

SOCIAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN ONTARIO:

ELECTORAL FORCES 1867 - 1977

By

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ABSTRACT

In the years since Confederation, Ontario seems to have undergone profound social change, yet it seems also to have experienced relatively little political change. This apparent paradox is the starting point of this thesis. The initial terms of reference thus centre on change processes, but considerable attention is devoted to continuity and to stability in both the social and political arenas.

Reduced to simplest terms, the aim of this work is to determine what the relationship has been between social change and political change in Ontario over the past century. Although it is recognized that a good deal more is involved, elections and electoral forces are chosen as gauges of the interplay of social and political change. The empirical analysis consists of detailed examination of election returns and of census data, employing techniques both elementary and moderately sophisticated. In addition to the specific findings, the data set generated for these purposes represents in itself a significant contribution to knowledge of Ontario politics.

As a complement to the statistical analysis, a wide-ranging review was conducted of Ontario history. Based on secondary sources, this review of social and political developments in the province not only provides a context for the statistical analysis, but also brings into consideration aspects of social, political and electoral continuity and change which do not lend themselves to statistical enquiry. A key element here is the province's enduring "progressive conservatism", which is examined and related to change processes.

The findings of this study may be arrayed along four dimensions. First, no startling or grand new interpretations of Ontario politics emerge. Secondly, a host of new facts and insights on particular aspects of Ontario politics and society. Thirdly, in a number of instances, the conventional wisdom of Ontario electoral history proves an either incomplete or inaccurate guide; this is particularly so with respect to commonly accepted interpretations of politics in the Nineteenth Century. Finally, a number of middle range hypotheses relating social and political change are tested in the context of Ontario history. The initially appealing notion of critical realignment, for example, is found to have at best limited applicability to Ontario. Some evidence is adduced in support of John Wilson's theory of political development, but important shortcomings emerge as well.

In the end, the rather simple-minded paradox posited at the outset is largely dispelled by a more thorough understanding of the complexities of the social change - political change relationship in Ontario. The following are the key elements of this fuller view of the relationship: no significant social change has failed to effect lasting, substantial political and electoral changes. Conversely, no important, enduring political or electoral changes have come about save in response to social change. This transformation of social change into change in the electoral and political realms has been uneven - and at less pronounced levels of change, uncertain - for a host of reasons; some of the changes in Ontario society have been more apparent than real, while others

have lacked political salience; not all political changes have been manifested electorally; the parties and their leaders perform a crucial transmission role, yet they also exert an important independent influence; the province's diversity and its constituent communities have also had a telling effect, as has its social and political conservatism.

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX

Ontario is aptly described by its motto "Qui incipit fidelis
sic permanet," faithful as it began, so it remains. Not only has the province always been in the forefront of loyalty to Britain, but it has also remained faithful to its own traditions and its established political forms. This reflects the general quiescence, the stability, continuity and conservatism characteristic of so much of Ontario's political life over the past century. Such lack of political change is, in and of itself, not particularly noteworthy. The interest arises, however, from the contrast it provides with the thoroughgoing transformation of Ontario's social structure since Confederation. Inasmuch as most schools of political analysis posit a direct, if complex, relationship between social and political change, the Ontario experience thus appears paradoxical. The paradox is heightened by the fact that Ontario politics have been conducted on a colorably democratic basis, thereby providing a seemingly ready mechanism for the translation of social change.

In attempting to explain this curious paradox, a larger goal, shedding light on the nature of Ontario politics, should also be served. This thesis examines the relationship between social change and political stability in Ontario with specific reference to provincial elections.

The Paradox: Central Themes

The paradox is important for it focuses our attention on the

interrelationship of society and politics. Essential to an understanding of Ontario's history is an appreciation of how its political processes have responded to social conditions and pressures. The paradox suggests that social and political change¹ do not seem to fit together in the ways we might expect. This is not to say that Ontario is in some way a 'deviant case' to be reconciled with a general model. The point is, rather, that if the relationship between two fundamental elements, Ontario's society and its political system, seems paradoxical, then we do not understand Ontario very well. The paradox leads us to ask why surface appearances are misleading, and it suggests possible lines of enquiry for reaching a better understanding of Ontario politics.

In particular, it raises questions as to the role of the general citizenry in Ontario political life, for it is here that the most far-reaching changes in social structure and attitude seem to have occurred. Clearly, the social characteristics and political activities of the mass public assume a central position in the investigation of the paradox. In addition, the political role of the general public is an extremely important normative question in its own right. Evaluation of the degree and nature of democracy in a polity must rate as one of the prime issues for political enquiry and, by any definition, democracy centres on public participation in politics. Accordingly,

¹ Throughout this thesis, the term "social change" will normally be given the widest possible meaning: thus, "social change" subsumes the notion of economic change.

In both normative and analytical terms, the mass public is crucial to an understanding of Ontario politics.

Mass political activity may assume a wide range of forms. In Ontario the most prominent and enduring form of mass political involvement has been through elections and the support of political parties. Although voting and elections are highly visible and are widely held to have great effect on the political decisions governing people's lives, this is no guarantee that electoral politics are necessarily the most effective means by which large numbers of people engage in political activity. Certainly other forms of activity such as strikes and pressure group agitation have occurred sporadically in Ontario, with varying degrees of success. Moreover, political involvement within limited community settings often has a more direct impact on people's day-to-day concerns than the political decisions, however reached, at either the federal or provincial level of government. Still, in its influence on province-wide politics, on the issues and processes affecting the overall direction and tenor of the province's affairs, electoral participation has been the most consistently important type of mass political involvement.

Thus, in narrowing our focus on the complex interplay of social and political change, emphasis on elections and electoral change seems a reasonable choice. Directing attention to this important form of mass political activity should help clarify the political role of the general population. In turn, examining this key facet of the paradox should improve our understanding of the Ontario political system.

Our analysis of the interaction of social and political change is by no means premised on the assumption that elections are the primary mechanism for government control by the populace, as portrayed in 'civics-text' mythology.

Accordingly, the aim of this thesis is as follows: to identify, in as systematic a fashion as possible, the major electoral changes and continuities in Ontario history, and to determine how these may have been related to the forces of social change, with particular reference to the general population. This will be done through statistical analyses of provincial voting returns and census data. A more impressionistic, but more wide-ranging enquiry will also be made into the social bases of the province and the power distributions, ideologies and processes which have constituted its politics. Here again the principal focus will be upon stability and change in the social and political order. Taken in tandem, these approaches partially offset each other's weaknesses. The insights gained from the one complement those derived from the other; together they should reveal a good deal about the role of elections in the broader questions of social-political change. In considering popular participation in or exclusion from the political mainstream, this may deepen our understanding of how the political impact of potentially disruptive social change is diffused.

Clearly, this thesis can provide only very partial answers to the large-scale questions posed about the relationship between social and political change. Indeed, it is premised on the view that only through detailed examination of specific episodes - in this case,

elections - can the basic relationship be brought into focus.²

The remainder of this introductory chapter sets out in a very general fashion the the themes of political continuity and social change in Ontario, together with some possible interpretations to account for their apparently incongruent relationship.

Political Continuity in Ontario

The paradox arises from the apparent failure of political change in Ontario to keep pace with social change, rather than from a total lack of political change. The specific political actors and the issues with which they have been engaged have of course changed, although one is often struck by the longevity of both the personnel and the issues of Ontario politics. As well, other much more significant changes are evident over the past century. One obvious change is the advent and continuing presence of a major third party - espousing an ideology considerably at variance with those of the older parties.

² Perhaps this is the time to make explicit that the principal theoretical concern - the relationship between social and political change - is secondary to the understanding of Ontario politics. Ontario is thus not a test case for more general propositions linking social to political change; instead, the more obvious arguments are used to generate insights into the Ontario experience. This represents something of an inversion of the conventional priorities of current political science: generalization ahead of specification of a relationship within a given system. This preference cannot be justified here; suffice it to say that the far-reaching implications inherent in the necessary assumptions of generalizability and comparability are not justifiable given present levels of knowledge.

Now although no presumption is made that what applies to Ontario may be generalized to other political systems, it is reasonable to hope that what is learned about Ontario may well be germane to other polities, particularly other Canadian provinces. Moreover, although the contribution which this work makes to the study of comparative politics is uncertain, the influence which the comparative politics literature has had on the approaches taken to social and political change in Ontario is profound. If the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan, for example, is not directly applicable to Ontario in its particulars, the general mode of analysis it promotes is singularly insightful. See particularly, Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in Lipset and Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspectives (New York, The Free Press, 1967), 1-64.

Another important change is the marked lessening of political pre-occupation with religion, though the changes may be less far-reaching than surface appearances would indicate. A third substantial political change involves the expansion of government activity; the rate of government spending and the number of civil servants required to administer the apparatus of the state have both grown astronomically.³ This expansion, most pronounced since the Second World War, mirrors the increasing tendency for the public to look to government for solutions to problems viewed as strictly private affairs in an earlier day. Yet the continuity in the underlying approach and philosophy of government, discussed below, undercuts a good deal of the potential significance of this heightened activity.

The importance of such political changes is clear, but the political continuities are at least as striking. Long periods of one-party dominance, reflecting general political quiescence and satisfaction have marked provincial history.⁴ Fundamental to the maintenance of this political continuity is the high priority which tradition and the preservation of community have always enjoyed in Ontario. Closely

³For data on government spending and size of the civil service from Confederation until the mid 1960's, see F.F. Schindefer, Responsible Government in Ontario (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), chapter I.

⁴Although the prime focus of this work is continuity and change at the provincial level, many of the conclusions reached and the explanations proffered apply with equal force to federal politics in Ontario. This is hardly surprising, since we are dealing with essentially the same political system, viewed from different perspectives.

tied in with the strength and influence of tradition and community has been the orientation to government characteristic of many Ontarians, both mass and elite, from Mowat's time down to the present day. Central to this orientation has been the pervasive view that the essential function of government is the orderly and honest management of the province's collective well-being, with a view to steady material and social progress. This progress, however, must be brought about while the prevailing social and political order is maintained essentially intact, with a minimum of interference in the position of the individual. This distinctive and pervasive outlook, aptly characterized as 'progressive conservatism', has been a constant factor in Ontario politics, even when it has been necessary for it to masquerade under different labels and rhetorics. This orientation to government has been closely related to the province's lack of political volatility, though neither is an adequate explanation for the other.

On several occasions, the pattern of politics as usual was disrupted by the emergence of forces dissatisfied with the existing political order. The Patrons of Industry in the 1890's, the Farmer-Labour government following the Great War, the rise of Mitch Hepburn during the Depression and the CCF upsurge during the Second World War stand out as the most volatile episodes of provincial history. Yet the most striking features of all but the last of these are their remarkably transient nature, the speed and thoroughness with which conventional politics reasserted its primacy, and the lack of

enduring effects. Moreover, their 'radicalism' and their objections to the status quo were not based on any fundamentally new proposals for the restructuring of political life. Instead, firmly grounded in the best traditions of Ontario conservatism, they were mildly reactionary throwbacks to what were seen as the abandoned principles of an earlier era.

Withal, cautious reform has been more characteristic of Ontario politics than hidebound reaction. As one historian has commented, "change comes most easily to Ontario if it is imperceptible, urged on by nudges and prods. Leading innovators perform best as reluctant dragons. If the sum total of reform in Ontario turns out to be unexpectedly large, it is possibly because the process has rarely halted."⁵

Social Change in Ontario

The contrast between the political and the social order is striking. Even the most cursory comparison of Ontario in the era of Confederation and in the present day reveals marked transformations.⁶ In 1867 Ontario was scarcely a generation removed from a backwoods pioneer society; it was an overwhelmingly rural and Anglo-Saxon province intensely colonial and parochial in outlook. Save in a most

⁵Desmond Morton, "Introduction: People and Politics of Ontario", in Donald C. MacDonald, ed., The Government and Politics of Ontario (Toronto: Macmillan, 1975), 6.

⁶The social changes mentioned in the following outline are essentially macro-level changes. Micro-level changes, such as in family structure, have been equally pronounced but less directly relevant to our enquiry.

rudimentary form, education was the preserve of the few and was a relatively insignificant factor in society. Conversely, the churches exerted tremendous influence on all aspects of life, not leastways in the generation of widespread religious strife and prejudice. Wheat was the prime crop in an economy dominated by unmechanized agriculture, with no semblance of heavy industry. What little manufacturing existed was carried out by skilled craftsmen in small workshops. Small towns held sway over the economic and social life of the immediately surrounding countryside; the population of Toronto, the province's principal city, had yet to reach 50,000. Communications were abominably slow, except along main routes which settlement beyond the fringes of the Precambrian Shield was all but nonexistent.

The Ontario of a century later is scarcely recognizable from this sketch. Although the bulk of the population is still located in the south, substantial cities and extensive extractive industries dot the province's north. The south has undergone profound change itself, and has become heavily urbanized and industrialized. The relationship of virtually all segments of the work force to the basic structure of the economy - the ownership, objectives and methods of production and distribution - has radically altered. The larger urban centres, replete with sprawling suburbs, exhibit a strongly cosmopolitan flavour, reflecting the leavening influence of hundreds of thousands of non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants. Toronto has developed into a powerful metropolitan force, embracing the entire province within its economic and

social hinterland. With tremendous improvements in transportation facilities and the development of electronic communications media, most small cities and towns, unable to compete with the metropolis, have declined into little more than regional service centres.

Not only is agriculture drastically reduced in economic and social significance, but its character has dramatically changed as well. Farming is now heavily mechanized and markedly diversified, so that dairy farmers, fruit growers, market gardeners, livestock producers and tobacco farmers find few interests in common. In addition, domestic markets have for the most part replaced the overseas markets on which the wheat economy was based.

A huge educational establishment subtly yet powerfully influences attitudes and outlooks. Religion has correspondingly become a much less potent force in shaping popular viewpoints, which have in the main lost their parochial tinge. And if present day Ontarians are perhaps no less subject to a colonial mentality than their forebears, the empire to which they orient themselves is no longer that of Britain, but of the United States.

Not the least significant aspect of these changes is the fact that the social processes by which the Ontario of Sandfield Macdonald has been transformed into Bill Davis' "Place to Stand" have often been quite uneven in tempo; they have characteristically taken a sharp spurt in a relatively short time span. By way of illustration, industrialization, potentially one of the most far-reaching of all

social changes, had barely begun in the 1870's, but had become a central fact of provincial life by the turn of the century. Similarly, the period following the Second World War witnessed profound changes in a very few years: a massive influx of European immigrants, widespread suburbanization, tremendous economic growth and diversification, and an unparalleled cultural and economic assimilation into the American way of life. All these changes have contributed to marked transformations in social attitudes. Inasmuch as the rate of change is often thought to have at least as important a political impact as its content, the largely undisturbed continuity in the province's politics appears all the more anomalous.

Possible Explanations

Recapitulating briefly, the central problem, or paradox, constituting this thesis is how to account for the coexistence of marked social change with equally pronounced political stability, constancy and conservatism. Like Sherlock Holmes' curious incident of the dog who did nothing in the night-time, the province's apparent lack of political response to social change suggests itself as a focus for enquiry. Several possible explanations might be offered as to why the province's politics have not seemed to change apace with its social structure. Each of these explanations may be correct in some degree.

In the first place, it may be that the changes outlined in the preceding section have been less salient than underlying social

continuities. Urbanization and industrialization, for example, may be less important for Ontario politics than might be thought if religion and ethnicity continue to constitute the politically relevant divisions. Similarly, if Canadian cities are less 'urban' in character than agglomerations of 'rural villages', as S.D. Clark suggests,⁷ a like conclusion would follow. Even if this interpretation is correct, though, it only serves to raise the further question of why subjective social changes have not kept pace with 'objective' social change. In turn this focuses attention on the key issue of distinguishing the changes in Ontario society which have signalled truly significant transformations of the social order from those which have essentially been surface modifications in social forms. Chapter II examines this problem in a theoretical vein and Chapter IV assesses the central social changes in Ontario history.

Alternatively, the overall judgement of political somnolence offered at the outset may be inaccurate, or at least overstated. One important source of inaccuracy might be the implicit emphasis on highly visible mass politics. The political dispositions and activities of the elite are, at a minimum, as important as those of the public. Thus to the extent that the masses are excluded from the political process, social changes below the elite level, profound as they might be, would be much more tenuously related to political

⁷S.D. Clark, The Developing Canadian Community, second edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 251.

change. In short, our concentration on elections may be misplaced.

The political skill exhibited by the province's elites presents another possibility for resolving the paradox. Ontario has been governed by some extraordinarily gifted political animals who have successfully assembled and maintained strikingly heterogeneous coalitions. Oliver Rowat is the archetypal case, but in their day James Whitney, Howard Ferguson and the seemingly endless parade of post-war Tory chieftains have all proven adept at maintaining control over the province's affairs. Still, not all politicians are blessed with the Rowat touch, nor can even the most adroit political management ensure success under all circumstances. One of the principal themes of the historical analysis of Chapter III is the responsiveness and the general quality of political leadership in Ontario.

Ontario's tremendous social and geographic diversity gives rise to the possibility that far-reaching political changes have indeed occurred, but within regionally or socially limited bounds, with the result that they are lost in any aggregate view of the province's history. This is not a very satisfactory explanation; it bespeaks a mechanistic view of the composition of Ontario society. Further, it raises the question of how far-reaching are political changes which only affect a few segments of society.

This interpretation gains plausibility when it is recast with an appreciation of the significance of community structures in Ontario society. In many ways Ontario is essentially an amalgam

of communities,⁸ and since they have intrinsic social importance, politics may well be played out within community boundaries. At a minimum this would remove potential political conflict from the provincial arena, thereby inhibiting political change. Depending on the political salience of community, moreover, it may be that substantial changes taking place at this level seem, from a province-wide perspective, less profound than they really are. Unfortunately, the statistical analysis is necessarily confined to social aggregates and geographic regions which do not always correspond to actual communities. The communitarian bases of Ontario society are briefly discussed in Chapter III.

Since the empirical focus of this thesis is the translation of social change into electoral change, it is important to recognize that this is by no means always a simple one-onto-one relationship. Depending on the nature and scope of the social change and the responsiveness, ideological context and formal structures of the electoral process, this relationship may assume a number of forms. Accordingly, it is possible that the paradox represents nothing more or less than our lack of understanding of the ways in which electoral processes stifle or promote political responses to social change. The electoral context for the social change - political change nexus is discussed in Chapter II, and is a central subject for investigation

⁸A more detailed formulation of the nature of 'communitarianism' within Ontario's value system must await Chapter III; for present purposes, it is sufficient to point out that we are referring to 'sociological' communities.

throughout the subsequent analysis.

At this juncture, a question must be raised which may add some needed perspective: paradoxical compared to what? Compared to what other political systems may Ontario be said to be lacking in political response to social change? Brief reflection suggests that much the same 'paradox' might be posed for several Canadian provinces and indeed the country as a whole. The Ontario experience might not seem so singular had we a fuller understanding, based on broad comparative analysis, of the social change - political change nexus. Clearly though, this would require an enormous undertaking, so that in restricting attention to Ontario the question must be recast into more feasible terms: what political changes might have been expected to result from the social changes Ontario has undergone?

Answering even this question presents formidable difficulties. The recent work of John Wilson sets out the framework for at least a partial response. Wilson considers that for polities with a "prior history of representative government"⁹, the progression from rural to advanced industrial society corresponds, indeed causes a specific, parallel progression in the values and structures of the political system. This linkage is particularly evident, so the theory holds, in the composition of the party system.

⁹John Wilson, 'The Canadian Political Cultures: Towards a Redefinition of the Nature of the Canadian Political System,' Canadian Journal of Political Science VII (September, 1974), 455, n32.

Politics in the preindustrial society, according to this schema, turn on religious and ethnic conflicts, and on the clash between rural and urban interests. The party system "is dominated by two great parties of the left and the right...while both of them may serve the interests of the owning class, one of them is likely to be a party of the aristocracy - or of the landed gentry, or, if one likes, simply an agricultural party - and the other is likely to be a party of the master manufacturers - a party of trade and commerce or, in a very narrow sense, a capitalist party."¹⁰ As society industrializes, the old party system proves inadequate for coping with the demands of the emerging wage-earning class, and thus comes under pressure to change. In the ensuing period of adjustment, "both of the older parties must adjust or face extinction."¹¹ Whether working class interests are accommodated by one or both old parties, as in the United States, or emerge in a party akin to the British Labour Party, which replaces the less flexible established party, the end result in the advanced industrial society is a two party system featuring polarization over issues of economic equality.¹² The three party system, in Wilson's view, "appears to be the typical condition of otherwise stable societies during the period of transition."¹³

¹⁰ Ibid., 451.

¹¹ Ibid., 453.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., 454.

Ontario, by virtue of its three party system, is classified as a transitional polity in an industrializing society,¹⁴ with the NDP attempting, in the best Labour Party tradition, to bring about the class polarization of industrial society. A rather disquieting problem in accepting this analysis for Ontario is the fact that Ontario has sported three substantial parties for over three decades, none of which seems particularly inclined to quit the scene. Indeed, Wilson has elsewhere observed that electoral competition in this province "has developed to a stage where any one of them might reasonably expect to take power at the next election".¹⁵ Wilson points out that the Canadian party system is little more than an artificial aggregation of ten provincial party systems;¹⁶ considering its size and diversity, a like argument could be mounted for Ontario. Eastern Ontario, Northern Ontario, the Southwestern Peninsula and the Golden Horseshoe may all represent, if not independent political systems, then subsystems at different stages of socio-economic (and thus, political) development. What thus appears in sum as a three party system may be more accurately interpreted as a series of two party

¹⁴ Ibid., 459, 471-4. In a rather curious inversion of the cause and effect relationship, Wilson infers the nature of a society from its party system.

¹⁵ John Wilson and David Hoffman, "Ontario: A Three Party System In Transition," in Martin Robin, ed., Canadian Provincial Politics: The Party Systems of the Ten Provinces (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 199.

¹⁶ Wilson, "Canadian Political Cultures," 449.

systems, with the Tories as the common denominator. In addition to a general transition in the social bases of political life from ethnicity and religion to class, Wilson's model would predict that the NDP would depose the Liberals in the most urbanized, industrial sections of the province, but fail to make inroads in the agricultural areas, where the hallmarks of industrial society are least in evidence.

As a preliminary observation before the data are brought to bear, Wilson's analysis of the electoral impact of industrialization sets out some fundamental truths, but it seriously neglects the strength of impediments to class politics. As well, it seems premised on the dubious assumption that a class-polarized society represents a final order of political development.

With the information at our disposal, we can offer only partial evaluations of these explanations, which are by no means mutually exclusive. That our ability to reach definitive answers is sharply circumscribed is by no means equivalent to saying that our analysis can offer no useful insights or interpretations on the interrelation of social and political change in Ontario.

Organization of the Thesis

This, briefly, is the structure of the thesis. Chapter II explores the general question of the interplay of social and political changes, and sets out some models and hypotheses linking social change to electoral change. Chapter III is an overview of key political processes and developments in Ontario history, with emphasis on the

electoral arena; this chapter is prefaced by a brief discussion of the roots and the nature of Ontario's peculiar strain of conservatism. Chapter IV is a thematic treatment of social change in this province, concentrating on urbanization, industrialization and on religious and ethnic division. These two chapters are more than background for subsequent statistical analyses; they represent important, albeit largely impressionistic, aspects of the investigation of the relationship of social change to political change. Some of the central methodological problems of our statistical analyses are discussed, but not resolved, in Chapter V. The statistical data analysis begins in Chapter VI with an exploration of regional electoral patterns and trends; from this basis, Chapter VII seeks to identify and analyse electoral change and stability throughout provincial history. Chapter VIII attempts, through multiple regression, to link levels of party support to social groups with a view to inferring the electoral implications of social change. The final chapter presents and interprets the conclusions reached in the preceding data analyses.

In an empirical work of this nature, an appendix presenting the actual data employed is often beneficial; however, this was not possible for it would have run to several hundred pages. Appendix A consists of a brief examination of franchise requirements and the size of the provincial electorate. Sources of data and operational definitions are presented in Appendix B. Appendix C contains material relating to the selection of variables for the regression analysis in Chapter VIII. Appendix D discusses some implications of a

fundamentally important decision regarding the computation of party vote shares. Appendix E consists of tables mentioned in the text but deemed of insufficient importance to warrant their inclusion in the main body of the thesis.

CHAPTER II SOCIAL CHANGE, POLITICAL CHANGE AND ELECTORAL CHANGE

Treatments of social change generally assume one of two formats. Some are abstract, general discussions of a theoretical bent; others are detailed descriptions of change in specific locales, of limited relevance to other settings. Rarely is any middle ground reached. Accordingly, despite the voluminous literature available, the following discussion seems necessary in order to clarify, in general meaning, the concepts of social change and political change as they have guided this work. The object is not to set forth a definitive treatise on social change and political change, but to highlight, if not resolve, some key theoretical issues. The specific Ontario referents are largely confined to the broad analysis of Chapter III and IV, and to later statistical analysis. This chapter examines the general nature of social change, its overall relation to political change, and the role of electoral factors in the relationship. Further proceeding from the general to the specific, several models for the electoral manifestation of social change are discussed, with particular reference to Ontario history. Finally, some low-level hypotheses regarding third parties are raised, and the specific aims of the statistical analysis are briefly set out.

Social Change

Social change stands out as one of the most persistent and central themes in the written record of Western thought. As Robert

Nisbet has shown, certain fundamental premises underpinning analysis of social change have not altered since the earliest Greek thinkers. The Greeks, taking as their cue the cycles of birth, development, decay and death evident all about them, interpreted all change - in plants, individual persons, and societies - in terms of organic, generative growth - phylis.¹ Subsequent social change theorists have largely accepted this metaphor of organic growth and with it the classical view of slow, gradual and continuous development. Yet, in direct contradiction to the implication of the growth metaphor, "there is no historical evidence that macro-changes in time are the cumulative results of small-scale, linear micro-changes."² Many of the often implicit assumptions contained in the change-as-growth view do not square with the historical record. The fundamentally important implication is that the primal ideas that 'all is change' and 'nature never makes leaps' are not accurate guides to the study of societies and the processes of change within them.

Change may be defined as 'a succession of differences in time within a persisting identity.' Social change is typically understood to mean "a change in social structure, e.g. the size of a society, the composition, or balance of its parts or the type of its

¹ Robert A. Nisbet, Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 22-3.

² Ibid., 288.

organization."³ Differential rates of natural increase, emigration and immigration, growth or decline of group cohesiveness, as well as interchanges among groups may all modify the composition of a society. Such 'objective' social change is only part of the story. A good deal more important than shifts in the proportionate size of religious groups are changes in the strength of religious feelings within the various groups and in the ways in which peoples' religious convictions shape their outlooks on the world and their behaviour. What counts, in other words, is not how the analyst views or categorizes a person or group, but how they view themselves and their social situation. Accordingly, one crucial element in social change is alteration in perception of the nature of society, or of one's position in it.

In his singularly perceptive discussion of social change, Nisbet puts forward as a fundamental premise the proposition that, contrary to the commonly proffered interpretation, all is not change.⁴ He insists that serious recognition of the forces of social fixity and persistence is an absolute precondition for an understanding of the mechanics of social change. This fixity stems from "the profound tendency of human behaviour to be adaptive, to become conventionalized, routinized, through the forces of habit and custom."⁵ Any

³Morris Ginsberg, "Social Change," in S.N. Eisenstadt, ed., Readings in Social Evolution and Development (Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1970), 37.

⁴Robert A. Nisbet, "Introduction: The Problem of Social Change," in Nisbet, ed., Social Change (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972), 6.

⁵Ibid., 35.

scientific investigation of social change must thus recognize "the sheer power of conservatism in social life: the power of custom, tradition, habit and mere inertia."⁶

Directly related to this is the obvious but often ignored point that "mere interaction, motion, mobility, and variety" do not necessarily imply change, for all are inseparable from social life within even the most conservative and stationary societies.⁷ The key to understanding social change thus hinges on the distinction between the incessant interactions and variations in any society, which do not disturb its structural form, and those changes which fundamentally alter components of society or their interrelationship.⁸ Only the latter ought to be regarded as true social change.

The myriad forms social change may assume militate against the formulation of all encompassing definitions or laws, and point up the necessity of analysing social change within the specific context in which it occurs. In concert with numerical shifts among the constituent groups in society, social change occurs in the minds of men as they adapt themselves, their ideas and their institutions to their human and material environment. Very often such adaptations are reactions to forces in essence external to the society. The realization of particular social changes in response to specified objective

⁶ Ibid., 6.

⁷ Ibid., 4.

⁸ Ibid., 1¹-5.

conditions, say the emergence of working class consciousness in the wake of industrialization, is highly problematic. This reflects both the strength of social fixity and the wide range of ideological predispositions which give meaning to social processes and structures.

The only 'hard' statistical data which we can bring to bear relate to the size of various social groups, as defined in the census categories. Even here, as will be discussed later, we are forced to infer changes rather than precisely measure them. A far more serious shortcoming is the all but total lack of data on the attitudinal elements of social change. These key issues are confronted in Chapters III and IV.

Political Change

Persistence - fixity - is as much a feature of politics as it is of other subsets of society. Accordingly, as with the larger society, so in the political realm the continual interchanges and readjustments of everyday life must be distinguished from fundamental shifts in the principles or processes of politics. Only the latter may be properly categorized as political change, but the distinction is not always easy to make.

In each political system only certain ideas, procedures and demands are acceptable and legitimate. Thus, changes in the fundamental make-up of the polity may be signalled by what might appear to be minor readjustments in types and aims of political activity. As C.H. Dodd suggests, "it is when new issues arise for political

consideration lying outside the range of what is currently thought to be properly political that political change can be said to occur."⁹

The source of these new ideas is social change. As people's views of society and their position in it change, so too do their needs and wants. Since their fulfillment often calls for resources held by others or for acquiescence by others in the pursuit of new goals, which could not be granted without material or symbolic loss, political responses are required. More specifically,

social processes of economic change and social mobilization disorient the norm structure of the previous stratification system, introducing new kinds of roles and valued goods. In large measure, the pre-existing norm structure contains referents neither for the appropriate form of a new distribution of valued goods, nor an appropriate means of agreeing on one. Therefore political activity - recourse to the generalized decision processes of the state - becomes a necessary substitute for customary agreement.¹⁰

Social change, through its disruptive effects on prevailing social norms and ideological outlooks, and through its creation of new valued goods and ends, brings to fruition the latent pressures for political change present in any political system. The existing political equilibrium shifts in order to cope with the new political demands occasioned by social change. Political change, in short, "is politics in a changing social or ideational context."¹¹

⁹C.H. Dodd, Political Change (Hull: University of Hull, 1973), 4.

¹⁰Jesse F. Marquette, "Social Change and Political Mobilization in the United States," American Political Science Review LXVIII (September, 1974), 1061.

¹¹Dodd, Political Change, 4.

The political change - social change nexus is by no means straightforward, and admits of no simple transformation formula. By way of illustration, although the foregoing discussion looks to social change as a source, or at least a catalyst of political change, the relationship is not unidirectional. Enormous social changes have been wrought by political means; the Russian and Chinese Revolutions are extreme, though instructive, cases. More significantly, social change, as distinct from social readjustment, need not bring forth corresponding political change. It is possible, if improbable, that the social processes involved will not impinge on the political realm, or that the ensuing political activity will transpire within the framework of the existing political system. As a general rule of thumb, however, it seems fair, if not particularly enlightening, to expect a rough correspondence between the magnitude of social change and the resultant degree of political change. Thus non-fundamental political readjustments will normally suffice to meet the political pressures thrown up by minor social variations.

One exceptionally important factor determining the nature of political response to social change is the society's ideological make-up. This ideological component is by no means static, for indeed social change is in the broadest sense primarily ideological change. Since it may assume such varied form, the manner in which ideology impinges upon the transformation of social change into political change depends heavily on the specifics of a given case.

It is for this reason the discussion of social and political change in Ontario in Chapters III and IV is prefaced by a brief excursus into the roots and nature of the province's singular variety of conservatism.

The Electoral Context

In moving to the electoral realm, we would do well to consider Giovanni Sartori's comment that

the importance of the notion of translation /of social cleavages into political divisions/ lies in the implication that translation calls for translators, thereby focusing attention on translation handling or mishandling... /We should like to know/ the extent to which conflicts and cleavages may either be channeled, deflected and repressed, or, vice versa, activated and reinforced precisely by the operations and operators of the political system.¹²

Sartori is primarily reminding us of the great extent to which elite activity restricts the transformation of broadly based social change into electoral change. Politics in Ontario have always taken place in part beyond the bounds of popular influence. In addition, as Murray Edelman has demonstrated, the popular mythology, widely shared by political scientists, which portrays government as principally reacting to social pressure, overlooks the profound influence it exerts in structuring and controlling the political attitudes of the masses.¹³ Still, it seems fair to say that the general populace

¹²Giovanni Sartori, "The Sociology of Parties: A Critical Review," in Party Systems, Party Organizations and the Politics of the New Masses (International Conference on Political Sociology, Berlin, 1968), 20.

¹³Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence (Chicago: Markham, 1971), ch. 3.

does play a central role in setting the parameters of political activity in Ontario. The most widely practiced and most effective form of mass political activity has been the support of political parties. Electoral support or non-support constitutes the prime method by which the great mass of Ontarians exert a measure of control over the parties, and thus over the conduct of politics generally.

Popular influence over parties and governments owes something to such democratic elements as may exist in the political culture. Rather more telling, however, is the ultimate and ever-present threat that a government may be removed from power unless its leaders pay heed to the needs and wants of the general public. This is not to imply that the political elite will actually acquiesce to public demands, nor that public opinion dictates government policy. Clearly, adroit politicians may respond to pressure by producing symbolically appealing but unsubstantial policy, by granting piecemeal concessions, or by deflecting popular interest into other channels. Yet, if the public may be manipulated, bought off, hoodwinked, or otherwise have its wishes evaded, it may not safely be ignored. In a very gross form, the mass public, or sections of it, transmits its views to the elite via its response to political parties. Imperfect as they may be, elections do represent an important, direct link between the citizenry at large and the overall conduct of politics.

By no means does it follow that elections and electoral change constitute the key link in the transformation of social change into political change in Ontario. Elite behaviour and accommodation

may be the central mechanism, with the electoral process being largely bypassed as little more than symbolic window dressing. Conversely, electoral change need not even signify either social change or political change, as we have been using the terms. Rather, it may simply be a change in the party balance, due to the popularity of a particular leader, or a decline in one party's organizational efficacy. Electoral change may merely reflect elite restructuring of party alternatives, which affects neither the distribution of political power, nor any fundamental political processes. Party alternatives and postures, in the main determined by the elite, are of inestimable significance in maintaining or disrupting electoral continuity. As Butler and Stokes write, "if the issues and leaders that evoked the [voting] pattern persist in future elections, the pattern will tend to persist. If they do not, it may prove highly transient."¹⁴

Nevertheless, electoral change, particularly of an enduring character, may well be a manifestation of important changes in the political ideologies of various groups, in the distribution of political power, or in the fundamental workings of key political processes. In short, political changes wrought by social change may take an electoral form. Party response to new political demands brought about by social change differentially affect interested social groups, generating new electoral cleavages. Electoral change

¹⁴David Butler and Donald E. Stokes, Political Change in Britain (New York: St. Martins, 1969), 7.

of greater or lesser degree ensue: from the disruptive force of the new demands and the new cleavages on party postures, on the salience and priority of political activity for social groups, and on the resultant party preferences.

Should the political responses to social change be manifested electorally, the electoral change is not a simple function of the extent and depth of social change. Depending on such key intervening variables as the political salience of the social change, the skill and flexibility of the elite and the strength and legitimacy of the forces pressing for change, the electoral as indeed the larger political impact of specific social changes could vary a good deal, in scope and in nature.

The notion of electoral change employed here comprises two key elements. The first centres on shifts or alterations in voting patterns, such as changes in the overall attractiveness of specific parties, in the depth of division within the electorate and in the social composition of each party's electoral following. Electoral change of this order is analysed in terms of electoral and census statistics.¹⁵ The other basic aspect of electoral change involves changes in party structure and in the party system: for example, the appearance of new parties or the demise of established parties, shifts in parties' ideologies or in the range of electorally salient

¹⁵As will be discussed more fully in later chapters, the nature of the data is such that change must usually be inferred rather than measured.

issues. These types of change are generally not accessible through statistical means, but they are the prime focus of attention in Chapters III and IV.

Alignment: The Durability and the Social Bases of Party Ties

Before directing attention to the impact of social change on partisan preferences, it is necessary to ascertain the strength and durability of party ties through Ontario history, together with the extent of changes at specific points in time. Since the personnel were mostly unfamiliar, and the scope of provincial politics uncertain, a few years may have been required for patterns of party allegiance to crystalize in Ontario. With this possible exception, the conventional wisdom holds that during the nineteenth century, and well into the present century, most regular voters were loyal to their party for prolonged periods. Politics, until the advent of electronic communications media, was a major form of entertainment. Matters of a political bent seem to have been more salient to a larger number of people, whose greater interest and involvement led to less maleable partisan positions. As one historian has put it, "most late nineteenth century Ontarians seem to have had a zest for politics which is often lacking amid the social distractions and entertainment media of modern life."¹⁶ Interpretations of this nature, based upon very limited impressionistic

¹⁶A. Margaret Evans, "Oliver Mowat and Ontario 1872-1896: A Study in Political Success," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1967, 491.

evidence, are called into question, on a most elementary level, by the fact that turnout, as demonstrated in Chapter VI, shows only a very slight, and not statistically significant, decline over long periods of time.

In any event, this putative party loyalty should not be equated with the American Voter concept of party identification.¹⁷ In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, long-lived partisan attachments ought to be viewed not as psychological identification, but as a rather less deterministic 'standing decision'. Surface stability in electoral choice may not reflect deep internalized commitments to parties so much as the absence of forces sufficiently potent to overcome simple political inertia. "There tends to be," according to V.O. Key, Jr., "a standing decision by the community although as a descriptive term "decision" has connotations of deliberate choice that are apt to be misleading. The "decision" may simply represent the balance between the opposing party groups each with striking powers of self-perpetuation."¹⁸

¹⁷ Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960, chapter 6.

¹⁸ V.O. Key, Jr. and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Choice: The Case of Indiana," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur Brodbeck, eds., American Voting Behavior (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), 286. On the highly uncertain nature of party identification in Canada, see Paul M. Sniderman, H.D. Forbes and Ian Melzer, "Party Loyalty and Electoral Volatility," Canadian Journal of Political Science VII (June, 1974), 268-88; Jane Jenson, "Party Loyalty in Canada: The Question of Party Identification," ibid., VIII (December, 1975), 543-53; idem, "Party Allegiance," ibid., IX (March, 1976), 27-48. The terms party/partisan loyalty, allegiance, attachment, commitment, affiliation and preference, will be used interchangeably to denote consistent voting for a party without implying 'party identification'.

Party attachments are often rooted in and reinforced by a person's social ties. Hence a good deal of the following discussion of electoral behaviour is cast in terms of social groups. Every person is in some measure unique, but many of the social pressures which shape his political views and party allegiance are shared with others of like mind and circumstance. Though it involves certain distortions and simplifications, an extremely useful way of conceptualizing the electorate is in terms of its constituent social groups. The term 'alignment' thus refers to the electoral disposition of these groups over a certain period of time (that is, it implies some measure of stability).

Recalling the earlier discussion of the nature of social change, one crucial problem in the social group approach, particularly acute in the analysis of aggregate data, is that nominal or objective groups are by no means of any political import. The essence of political groupism lies in shared experiences, outlooks and interests of a politically salient nature. The dangers inherent in facile categorization of identifiable social aggregates as political groups are evident in W.L. Morton's observation that although an exploited proletariat can be seen to exist in Canada in the middle decades of the last century, "no more than the respectable and well-to-do, did they think in terms of class and classes until the second generation of the Victorian Age, and then only some of them."¹⁹ "The trouble with

¹⁹W.L. Morton, "Victorian Canada," in Morton, ed., The Shield of Achilles: Aspects of Canada in the Victorian Age (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966), 328.

the effort to relate people's political behaviour to their group interests," as S.D. Clark has suggested, "is that it assumes a greater order in the structure of group relationships than in fact exists."²⁰

A further problem is determining the durability of group influences. Group voting and persisting party loyalty are logically distinct; a cohesive group could well switch its support to and fro among parties, but empirically this seems improbable. The authors of Voting present three conditions as underlying the persistence of electorally salient social cleavages:

- (1) initial social differentiation such that the consequences of political policy are materially or symbolically different for different groups;
- (2) conditions of transmittibility from generation to generation;
- (3) conditions of physical and social proximity providing for continued in-group contact in succeeding generations.²¹

These conditions seem necessary, but not sufficient. Continuation in the circumstances which originally elicited the differing political reactions, or a lack of new salient issues which might submerge the original socio-political cleavage under a new alignment, would contribute to the preservation of social groups' party attachments. In very general terms, these conditions have obtained for several identifiable groups in Ontario history over certain periods of time, as will be

²⁰ S.D. Clark, "Group Interests in Canadian Politics," in J.H. Aitchison, ed., The Political Process in Canada: Essays in Honour of R. MacGregor Dawson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 76.

²¹ Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 75.

discussed in subsequent chapters. Yet many groups have demonstrated little electoral cohesion, and others were located in different parties' electoral followings in various periods.

Dealignment

Should a stable voter coalition, or alignment, begin to drift apart, it is by no means assured that another alignment, marked by firm party loyalty, will arise in its stead. The process in which the political boundaries setting apart social groups dissipate without being replaced by durable new boundaries has been aptly styled 'dealignment'.²² Dealignment stems from a political crisis (intense mass response to certain issues), in which the principal conflicts cut across one another as well as across existing party lines.²³ Traditional party allegiances are thus disrupted, but the cross-cutting of the issues reduces the possibility of the voters switching and firmly adhering to the other party. A large segment of the electorate is confronted by conflicting issue positions and party programmes. In turn, the parties are torn between clear but constricting appeals to specific interests and wide-ranging but dangerously imprecise overtures to opposing interests. Electoral instability and confusion become the order of the day. The unusually large pool of unattached voters so created is susceptible, given suitable

²² Ronald Inglehart and Avram Hochstein, "Alignment and Dealignment of the Electorate in France and the United States," Comparative Political Studies IV (October, 1972), 345.

²³ ibid., 345-6.

leadership and appropriate ideological conditions, to the blandishments of a 'flash party'.²⁴

A dealignment seems to have occurred in Ontario during the early 1890's. Agrarian discontent and exceptionally virulent religious strife split assunder Grit and Tory ranks alike, while two new parties, the Patrons of Industry and the Protestant Protective Association, entered the lists for the 1894 election. Although between them they amassed a fifth of the votes cast, neither of these flash parties survived to contest the next election. A similar dealignment process may have occurred immediately after the First World War. Here the crisis turned on three basic themes: acute agrarian discontent, prohibition, and labour unrest. Again these issues cut across existing party lines, which had already been seriously disrupted by the formation of a coalition government in Ottawa. The third parties arising out of these conditions, the United Farmers of Ontario and the Independent Labour Party, survived slightly longer than their predecessors of the 1890's, but may be fairly labelled flash parties.

Secular Realignment

If new alignments do take the place of earlier alignments, the transition may be swift or slow. In the latter case, Key's model of 'secular realignment', which centres on gradual, long-term change processes, is suggestive. "The rise and fall of parties," Key wrote,

²⁴ Ibid., 343-6; on flash parties see Philip E. Converse and Georges Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," Public Opinion Quarterly XXVI (Spring, 1962), 1-23.

may to some degree be the consequence of trends that perhaps persist over decades and elections may mark only steps in a more or less continuous creation of new loyalties and decay of old. The slow rate at which that process may occur suggests the potency of the old symbols, old leaders, old parties. Only events with widespread and powerful impact or issues touching emotions produce abrupt changes. On the other hand, other processes operate inexorably, almost imperceptibly, election after election, to form new party alignments and to build new party groupings.²⁵

The model, accordingly, "is one of secular change (or many secular changes affecting particular categories within the population) upon which are superimposed episodic fluctuations attributable to transient circumstances."²⁶

In this schema, long term processes of social development directly underlie long term partisan reorientations: "the odds are that some objective change in the status of a group of persons is the condition most frequently associated with such long-term partisan shift":²⁷

a partisan shift even over a long term may mean that group ties remain as strong as ever but that the position of the group vis a vis a changing set of party alternatives dictates a transfer of partisan allegiance. Or a category of persons may acquire, through a change in the impact of public policy upon it or through a change in its position in the social structure, a greater and greater political relevance which reflects itself in a growing political solidarity.²⁸

Realignment should be distinguished from "shifts in the party balance" arising from "organic change in the party system", such as

²⁵ V.O. Key, Jr., "Secular Realignment and the Party System," Journal of Politics XXI (May, 1959), 198.

²⁶ ibid., 208.

²⁷ ibid., 204.

²⁸ ibid., 207.

demographic change and individual conversion.²⁹ (The latter, by definition idiosyncratic, clearly cannot be studied with aggregate data, or indeed by any systematic macro methods of analysis.) Shifts in the party balance wrought by demographic forces loom large in Ontario electoral history. Massive immigration and emigration stand out as potentially the most significant. However, save the conventional wisdom that grateful immigrants tend to support the party in power at the time of their arrival, the presumed attraction of the more stridently imperialist Tory party to British immigrants, and the suspicion that Ontario emigrants have come disproportionately from the most venturesome and least traditional elements of society, we have little a priori basis for predicting the electoral effects of migration.

Critical Realignment

For more rapid transformation of alignments, the most promising line of inquiry lies with the so-called 'critical realignment'. Though substantially embellished, this concept derives essentially from V.O. Key's 'critical election':

a category of elections in which voters are, at least from the impressionistic evidence, unusually deeply concerned, in which the extent of electoral involvement is relatively quite high, and in which the decisive results of the voting reveal a sharp alteration of the pre-existing cleavage within the electorate. Moreover, and this is perhaps the truly differentiating characteristic of this sort of election, the realignment made manifest in the voting in such elections seems to persist for several succeeding elections. All these characteristics

²⁹ James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1973), 6-9.

cumulate to the conception of an election type in which the depth and intensity of involvement are high, in which more or less profound readjustments occur in the relations of power within the community, and in which new and durable electoral groupings are formed.³⁰

The most thoroughgoing and insightful treatment of critical realignment is Walter Dean Burnham's Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics. In Burnham's view the critical realignment is a period marked by intensification of ideological polarization, in which issues tend to be "highly salient...often with strongly emotional and symbolic overtones;" as well, voter participation is abnormally high.³¹ Critical realignments find their roots in social change in tandem with inadequate political response:

they arise from emergent tensions in society, which, not adequately controlled by the organization or output of party politics as usual, escalate to a flash point.../they/ arise out of increasingly visible social maladjustments; these in turn are the product of dynamic transformations in a quite separately developing socioeconomic system. Such transformations entail the emergence of quite unevenly distributed social costs. Some sectors of society are injured or threatened with injury far more directly than others, and eventually the pressure upon them produces stress which makes them particularly available for political mobilization by third parties or for subsequent massive shifts from one major party's following to the other's.³²

Any political system can cope more effectively with slow rather than rapid social change. Hence, it is only natural for secular realignment to be associated with slow social change, whereas critical

³⁰V.O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," Journal of Politics XVII (February, 1955), 3.

³¹Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New York: Norton, 1970), 6-8.

³²Ibid., 10 and 135.

realignments would more likely accompany rapid social change. Yet more than simply the rate of change distinguishes secular from critical realignments. Both represent political manifestations of social change, but in the former, gradual long-term processes of social development and adjustment are reflected by equally slow political change. The societal transformations leading to a critical realignment need be no less leisurely; the crucial difference is that here the political system fails to respond at anything like the rate at which the society is changing. Secular realignment lacks the resistance to change, the build-up of discontent and tension culminating in rapid, far-reaching political restructuring which mark the critical realignment. Critical realignments, moreover, are not simply politics as usual played out at a faster tempo, but centre instead on deep-rooted, highly effective issues, oftentimes of a highly symbolic bent, which bear closely on the representativeness of the political system and admission to its decision-making processes.

A general reading of provincial history suggests that Ontario has not undergone critical realignments on the scale described by American writers - profound readjustments in the conduct of politics wrought by epoch-making crises.³³ It is nonetheless possible that within specific regional or group contexts, sharp and durable shifts in party attachments have taken place in Ontario. In province-wide terms, the election of 1945 (or perhaps more accurately, the closely

³³ Ibid., 181.

linked elections of 1943 and 1945), may be viewed as a critical realignment, in that it represented a political response to significant, fast-paced social change, and entailed a fairly drastic break with earlier patterns of party loyalty together with a congealing of patterns which have largely endured to the present day.

The processes at work in critical realignments have been likened to the changeover in scientific paradigms analysed by Thomas Kuhn:

there are historical periods of normal politics in which a certain belief system, a paradigm, dominates political activity. Politicians are not ideology-free, but rather ideology-biased toward the principles which comprise the paradigm. Political paradigm shifts occur when a new paradigm arises which in the judgement of the electorate, better accounts for phenomena which were considered anomalous to the preceding paradigm, and which succeeds in attracting adherents (voters) away from competing modes of political activity. This process culminates at a critical election; when it is completed, the political community then returns to a stable condition of normal politics, though now functioning under the beliefs and principles of the newly adopted paradigm.³⁴

This, to be sure, is a highly idealized view of political change; shifts in political paradigms certainly do not occur in so tidy a fashion. Moreover, two or more paradigms might well exist within a single political system, for example, a paradigm still ascendent in the rural areas may have been long since supplanted in the cities. Nevertheless, the basic idea has much to commend it in analysing how social change comes to effect political change in the electoral arena.

³⁴William L. Shade, Social Change and the Electoral Process (Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1973), 14.

Third Parties

Third parties may act as agents or indicators of the transformation of social change into political change, though, of course, far-reaching electoral changes may be wrought by social change without recourse to a third party.

Scenarios for the rise of third parties are many and varied. The pool of uncommitted or confused voters occasioned by a dealignment may give rise to a third party. As well, third parties oftentimes accompany critical realignment.³⁵ Indeed, strong third party activity serves to set off critical realignments from realignments of the secular variety, for the latter (long-term transformations of gradual social change into political readjustment) could account for the accretion of support to an established third party, but not for its sudden rise or initial consolidation.

Structurally, the introduction of a third party into a two party system is a singularly important change. As well, the very existence of a third party offers a potential focus for other deeper changes in electoral alignments, ideologies, power distributions and the like. Third parties often represent a response to political and (or) social changes not satisfactorily dealt with by the established parties.

³⁵ MacRae and Meldrum suggest that third parties have historically acted as "half-way houses" for voters transferring allegiance from one party to another in "critical periods", Duncan MacRae, Jr., and James A. Meldrum, "Critical Elections in Illinois, 1888-1958," American Political Science Review LIV (September, 1960), 669.

Maurice Pinard has developed a theory to account for the rise of third parties, a theory couched in essentially the same terms as the foregoing discussion of realignments. In that it explains third party upsurges as mobilizations of inadequately represented social groups, the theory is useful in locating third party activity within the framework of general processes of social and political change.

Pinard's theory is built on three closely intertwined elements: unresolved social strain, 'structural conduciveness' in the form of 'political nonrepresentation of social groups through the party system,'³⁶ and a dichotomy of third party types. One variety, labelled the 'protest movement', arises from the condition of one-party dominance in a system marked by social strain. Lacking a viable opposition party through which to rectify their discontent, political leaders and voters turn to a third party as the most promising political vehicle to depose the government or at least to force a change in policy. For such protest movements, simple political expediency plays a central role. In contrast, the second type, the 'radical movement', can arise in any system, including a strong two-party system. The key here is the presence of persons 'who feel their central ideology and long-term grievances cannot be accommodated through any of the existing parties...[which] are not only abandoned, they are positively rejected as unsuitable channels for

³⁶ Maurice Pinard, 'Third Parties in Canada Revisited: A Rejoinder and Elaboration of the Theory of One-Party Dominance,' Canadian Journal of Political Science VI (September, 1973), 442; see also his The Rise of a Third Party (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), ch. 2-4.

the expression of a rather precise set of concerns."³⁷ In the protest movement, "ideology will tend to be less encompassing, to call for less fundamental redefinitions of the social order; it will be less intensely adhered to by its followers and, indeed, it may not be shared at all by many of them. The end result is that ideology tends to play a lesser role in mobilizing support, while immediate, as opposed to long-term grievances play a determining role."³⁸ For radical movements, the opposite is true. A further, related difference is that "mass recruitment to a protest is more likely to be based on generalized beliefs of discontent than on a shared, articulated ideology. Moreover, recruitment is not necessarily limited to a particular social class. Conversely, in a radical movement...one is more likely to have been recruited on the basis of an ideology shared by members of a specific social class or communal group."³⁹

Four of Ontario's many minor parties have attained noteworthy electoral success in Ontario. Of these, only one has survived for any length of time. The remainder, the Patrons of Industry, the United Farmers of Ontario, and the 1919 model of the Independent Labour Party, all effectively departed the scene after only one or two elections. Pinard has classified the UFO as a radical movement,⁴⁰ although it

³⁷Pinard, "Third Parties," 442.

³⁸ibid., 442-3.

³⁹ibid.

⁴⁰ibid.

seems a borderline case, for it exhibits features of the protest movement, principally in its ideology, which was fundamentally reformist and conservative. Two studies found little support for the interpretation of the UFO as a protest movement arising through the mechanism of one-party dominance.⁴¹ Yet the party's disintegration within a very few years of its foundation upon the most socially self-conscious group in Ontario - the farm community - argues against its classification as radical. A similar argument holds for the Patrons, whose congruence with the UFO in support, programme, leadership, rhetoric and fate, is striking. Not only the Patrons and the United Farmers, but also Mitch Hepburn all seem to have attracted their most pronounced support in generally the same areas. It would scarcely be surprising if the statistical analysis indeed uncovers a common electoral basis, since each in its own way appealed to the same latent Grit strain of reactionary Ontario rural conservatism, premised on unyielding moral righteousness and a pronounced sentimentality for the old-fashioned values of the enterprising yeoman.⁴²

The CCF-NDP is very different from earlier third parties, even the ILP, which was less a party than a transient amalgam of

⁴¹ K. D. Wakefield, "Measuring One-Party Dominance: A Study of Maurice Pinard's Theory of Third Party Emergence with Reference to the Case of the United Farmers of Ontario in the Ontario General Election of 1919," unpublished M.A. thesis, Queen's University, 1972; Graham White, "One-Party Dominance and Third Parties: The Pinard Theory Reconsidered," Canadian Journal of Political Science VI (September, 1973), 415-9.

⁴² For a fascinating exposition of these values see the memoirs of former UFO premier Charles Drury, Farmer Premier (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966).

various shades of labour opinion. Offering far and away the most radical challenge to the existing order, particularly in its initial phases, the CCF-NDP's principal appeal (following the early demise of its farm wing) has been pitched towards the industrial workers of the cities and the North. The party differs from its predecessors in another significant respect, namely its longevity: it has been an important element on the provincial scene since its Second World War upsurge, never subsequently sinking below a sixth of the popular vote, and moreover, consistently attracting more attention than its numbers in the legislature would seem to warrant.

Ideological colourations aside, the addition of a permanent, or at least long-lived third-party like the NDP has important ramifications for a political system. These mostly flow out of the way in which a third party, as literally a third party, disrupts and complicates established party alternatives for voters and coalition builders alike. By way of illustration, the choice among three parties may pose a conundrum for the 'rational' voter whose favoured party stands, in his estimation, less chance of winning than his second favoured party. Furthermore, "people often understand themselves as much in terms of what they are not as in terms of what they are; and party identifications are sometimes influenced more by a negative reaction to what the other party represents to the voter than by a positive reaction to the party with which the voter identified."⁴³

⁴³ Charles Sellers, "The Equilibrium Cycle in Two Party Politics," Public Opinion Quarterly XXIX (Spring, 1965), 26-7, emphasis added.

For many voters, however, this 'identification by repulsion' mechanism will break down in the three party situation.

With three parties rather than two, the division between government and opposition is no longer collinear with the division between party ideologies. More specifically, one of the crucial questions in post-war Ontario politics is whether the primal electoral chasm lies between the Tories and the opposition parties or between the old line parties and the 'socialist hordes' of the CCF-NDP. Has the Ontario electorate, in short, been divided along structural or ideological lines?

The Analysis

The first task of our statistical analysis will be to identify electoral change, to discover which regions or sectors of the province were changing at particular points in time, and to determine whether the changes were drastic or marginal, transient or enduring. Closely tied in to this is the question of the strength and durability of party loyalty. We are concerned with the stability of parties' holds over their electorates, as well as how and when these have changed. Since these two concerns are so closely related, a good many of the empirical findings will relate to both. By way of illustration, a high correlation of party vote across time will be taken to mean lack of change in established voter loyalties, while low correlations will indicate absence of firm voter commitments, or their breakdown. Continuities and discontinuities from one election to the next will also

come into play in analysing broader electoral change.⁴⁴

Following this phase of the analysis, we will turn to the social correlates of political preference, and by extension to the social bases of electoral change and stability. Due to the nature of the data base and the techniques employed to analyse it, we will be able to offer lamentably few precise observations on the relationships between specific social groups and support for particular parties. To a certain extent, we will be able to comment on changes and trends in the overall group basis of party support - what was earlier labelled electoral alignment.

Next, these findings will be combined with the earlier material on electoral change, with a view to assessing the validity and the analytical utility of the models of political change discussed earlier in this chapter. An across-the-board drop in the strength of party attachments, combined with the appearance of flash parties (whose strength cuts across that of the established parties), will signal a dealignment. A steady decay in the strength of party loyalty across successive elections (though the relationship across adjacent pairs of elections may be quite strong), together with gradual increases or decreases in the strength and direction of group voting, would mark a secular realignment. A critical realignment would be denoted by sharp discontinuities across one or two pair of elections, preceded and followed by periods of strong, stable party

⁴⁴The rationale underlying these inferences is discussed in Chapter VII.

loyalty.⁴⁵ We would also expect to find sharp drops or reversals in the strength and direction of relationships between social groups and party strength accompanying a critical realignment.

The analysis will then shift to the question of whether certain social variables' impact on electoral results has increased or decreased. This investigation is directed towards an evaluation of the electoral import of very broad social change processes. Some of the central issues here are: (a) whether religious and (or) ethnic factors have given way to economic-class factors as prime determinants of voting behaviour; (b) the extent to which urbanization underlies specific electoral outcomes, as well as underlying broader processes of electoral change; (c) whether regional differences, once social composition has been taken into account, have increased or decreased in importance.

In that it is predicated on the weakness of the traditional opposition party, Pinard's one-party dominance model for the rise of a protest party predicts a positive relationship between the electoral strength of the third party and the previous strength of the dominant party. In addition, as a general protest movement, the third party will not have inordinate support from communal or class groups, and thus the relationship between its strength and socio-economic

⁴⁵A very similar operational definition of critical realignment is employed in Duncan MacRae Jr., and James A. Meldrum, "Factor Analysis of Aggregate Voting Statistics," in Mattei Dogan & Stein Rokkan, eds., Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1969), 491.

aggregates will be weak.

Conversely, if the new party is of the radical variety, there need be no situation of one-party dominance; since its support does not devolve from the weakness of the traditional opposition party, the relationship between the third party's support and the previous strength of the government party will be either negative or non-existent. In addition, the radical party is rooted in communal or class groups; this will be evidenced by a strong association between its level of support and certain socio-economic groups. Finally, to the extent that the radical party has mobilized previous non-voters, there will be a positive association between its level of support and increases in turnout.

Conclusion

The generalities constituting the greater part of this chapter may seem needlessly abstruse for an analytic excursion into Ontario's electoral history. They are necessary, however, to convey what is meant - and what is not meant - by the terms social change and political change as they are used in this thesis, and the general way they hang together. Moreover, the discussion of social change and political change avoided precise definitions, stressing instead the relativistic nature of these change processes, that is, the need for specific contexts to give meaning to these tremendously broad concepts. Still, one key point did emerge. Not only is social fixity logically prior to social change, but an appreciation of its pervasiveness and

resilience is absolutely essential to an understanding of the relationship between the social and political orders, with respect both to change and to lack of change. This is a particularly important insight for a study initially based on an apparent incongruity between social and political change. Finally, the lack of specificity, together with the innumerable qualifications and elaborations which might have been made, strongly suggest that a thorough treatment of Ontario's particular set of social changes and continuities, and associated political responses will be necessary before any statistical analysis is undertaken. In dealing with such complex phenomena, it may well be, as Sherlock Holmes was wont to say, "a capital mistake to theorise before one has data." The two following chapters thus set out, in a primarily non-statistical vein, the principal changes and continuities in Ontario politics and society.

CHAPTER III Political Change in Ontario

This chapter sketches the principal political changes and continuities in Ontario history. In no wise is it a comprehensive history; rather, it is a chronological treatment of political events and processes germane to the concerns set out in Chapter I. Although the influence of social change - or its absence - is apparent throughout, the specifics of social change in relation to politics are reserved for Chapter IV. In that the discussion of social change is thematically organized, there seemed no overriding reason to incorporate it into an already lengthy chapter.

The aim of this chapter is to identify and analyse changes and continuities in the political realm. A key theme is the role of electoral processes in the larger political context: have important political changes been manifested electorally, and conversely, have electoral changes reflected broader political changes? As key actors in the electoral sphere, political parties constitute a prime focus of the analysis.

The analysis is primarily based on a wide reading of the secondary literature on Ontario, but province-wide electoral data are also brought to bear. These voting statistics are employed in the assessment of the relation between social, electoral and political change. In addition, they are used to highlight important electoral episodes and periods in Ontario, as preliminary to the more detailed analyses of later chapters. Nothing more sophisticated than construction of time series of party vote shares is attempted, but even this simple technique is very useful in establishing general trends and patterns.

The material discussed in this chapter, be it particular voting statistics or impressionistic interpretation of the broad sweep of Ontario political history, has a two-fold purpose. First, it provides the context within which later analyses are set. The outlines, let alone the details of Ontario history, are not so well known that this background knowledge can be assumed. At least as important as this setting of the scene, however, is the contribution of this chapter and the succeeding one in coming to an understanding of social change and political change in this province. So many crucial aspects of this relationship lie well beyond the realm of election returns and census rolls that an impressionistic, imprecise discussion of the broad interplay of social and political processes is crucially important in its own right for the evaluation of the larger issues posed in Chapter I. To an extent, then, the analysis here is to be understood as a supplement or an alternative to the more systematic statistical investigations of later chapters, which are severely circumscribed by the availability of data and the techniques by which the data are analysed.

The chapter begins with a brief account of the roots and the nature of Ontario conservatism; an appreciation of the form and the influence of this conservatism is absolutely essential for an understanding of Ontario society and politics. Following this is an account of the political development of this province, with special emphasis upon political parties and elections in relation to the larger processes of political change and continuity.

Conservatism in Ontario

Agreement is widespread on the social and political conservatism of Ontarians. "In Ontario," writes one historian, "the conservative tide has always run strong and deep;"¹ yet that conservatism has not generally been hidebound or reactionary: "this land has been consistently characterized by inhabitants who have tended to be restrained, staid, who have combined a proper respect for property and tradition with a belief that progress, expansion and growth per se are fundamental virtues."²

The roots of Ontario's conservatism reach back to the arrival of the Loyalists. Subsequent mythology has made of these fugitives from the American overthrow of British rule something very different from what they actually were.³ In the first place, "the Loyalist party in the thirteen colonies was made up of all sorts and conditions of men but with rare exceptions only Loyalists of humble origins found their way to what became Upper Canada and later Ontario."⁴ Nor were all the Loyalists possessed of close ties to the motherland; Loyalists of German or Dutch

¹ Peter Oliver, "The Making of a Provincial Premier: Howard Ferguson and Ontario Politics, 1870-1923," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1969, v.

² John Warkentin, "Southern Ontario: A view from the West," Canadian Geographer X (1966), 161.

³ "It was not until the rising Canadian nationalism of the mid-nineteenth century that a Loyalist cult began to form." Gerald M. Craig, Upper Canada: The Formative Years 1784-1841 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963), 7.

⁴ J. J. Talman, "The United Empire Loyalists," in Profiles of a Province (Toronto: Ontario Historical Society, 1967), 4.

extraction and speech outnumbered those of English descent in the Bay of Quinte area and along the St. Lawrence.⁵ Moreover, it was not long before the Loyalists effectively ceased to exist as an identifiable group, in sociological fact if not in reified spirit. Intermarriage between Loyalist stock and later American immigrants attracted not so much by political conviviality as by free land⁶ "made the groups indistinguishable."⁷

The importance of the Loyalists for Canadian conservatism has been questioned on the grounds that pre-revolutionary Tories who became Loyalists shared with their Whig opponents "liberal (Lockean) assumptions about the nature of sovereignty, good government, the right of resistance, etc."⁸ This argument underestimates the profoundly re-socializing experience on the Loyalists of the Revolution and subsequent emigration. In any event, no doubt exists as to the conservatism of the 'Loyalist myth', which arose after the War of 1812 and came to exert such telling influence on the political outlook of Upper Canada and Ontario.⁹ Another important Loyalist legacy was the strength of

⁵Jacob Spelt, Urban Development in South Central Ontario (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972, first published 1955), 19.

⁶Fred Landcn, Western Ontario and the American Frontier (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967, first published 1941), 20.

⁷Talman, "United Empire Loyalists," 5.

⁸David V.J. Bell, "The Loyalist Tradition in Canada," Journal of Canadian Studies V (May, 1970), 22.

⁹Jo-Ann Fellows, "The Loyalist Myth in Canada," Canadian Historical Association, Historical Papers 1971, 105-7; see also Dennis Duffy, "The Mythology of Loyalism," Journal of Canadian Studies XII (Spring, 1977), 17-26.

community they provided for the emerging society: "because the Loyalists had been settled in groups largely according to their membership in Loyalist regiments (which in turn had often been raised from a particular area in one of the older colonies), these bloc settlements possessed from the outset a social cohesion that was normally lacking in frontier expansion."¹⁰

The Loyalists had infused into the fledgling Upper Canadian society the seeds of a profoundly anti-revolutionary mentality set off by a distinct partiality to traditional authority. Political factors which might have diluted this conservatism failed to materialize; the antipathy between the farmers and the commercial interests, the primary political conflict in early Upper Canada, was entirely lacking in ideological foundations. In Creighton's words, "merchants and farmers in Upper Canada did not differ profoundly in their view of society and its proper organization."¹¹

The creeping Americanism, which threatened a social and ideological transformation of the colony, was vanquished by the War of 1812, which "hardened dislike for American ideas and institutions into fierce hostility, and produced a kind of Messianic Toryism inflexible in its insistence upon unbending adherence to orthodox values."¹²

¹⁰ John S. Moir, The Church in the British Era: From the British Conquest to Confederation (Toronto: McGraw-Hill-Ryerson, 1972), 83.

¹¹ Donald Creighton, The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence, 1760-1850 (Toronto: Ryerson, 1937), 126.

¹² S.F. Wise, "Conservatism and Political Development: The Canadian Case" South Atlantic Quarterly LXIX (Spring, 1970), 235.

The primacy of conservatism was further enhanced by the massive influx of British immigrants following the end of the Napoleonic wars. The immigrants doubled the province's population between 1810 and 1825, and doubled it again by 1834. These immigrants' conservatism and deference to authority may have modified but certainly not wrought any fundamental changes in the rapidly coalescing pattern of Upper Canadian conservatism. The British immigrants who swelled the province's population in the 1820's and 1830's knew little of local politics, and may indeed have been "quite hospitable to the idea of moderate reform." However, the Family Compact and its supporters convinced the newly arrived that the Tory-Reform struggle reduced to support or rejection of the British connection. Thus, given the "strong anti-revolutionary tradition which so many of these immigrants brought with them,"¹³ it is hardly surprising that they tended to align themselves with the forces of conservatism.¹⁴

S.F. Wise has admirably summarized the Upper Canadian conservative tradition:

Two streams of conservatism met and blended in the two generations of Upper Canadian history before the Union. One was that brought by the Loyalist founders of the colony: an emotional compound of loyalty to King and Empire, antagonism to the United States, and an acute, if partisan, sense of recent history. To the conservatism of the emigre was joined another, more sophisticated viewpoint, first brought by Simcoe and his entourage, and crystallized in the Constitutional Act of 1791: the Toryism of late eighteenth century England. What Upper Canada received from this source was not merely the somewhat creaking

¹³S.D. Clark, Movements of Political Protest in Canada, 1640-1840 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), 484.

¹⁴Craig, Upper Canada, 232.

intellectual edifice of Blackstone and Warburton, but a conservatism freshly minted into a fighting creed through Edmund Burke's philippic against the French Revolution. The joining of two intensely counter-revolutionary outlooks in a colony as peculiarly situated as was Upper Canada had powerful consequences for the Canadian conservative tradition.¹⁵

Another historian adds that "biological conflict in Upper Canada was less a contest between 'conservative' and 'progressive' schools of thought than a struggle between warring conservative traditions."¹⁶ Extreme radicalism was discredited by the abortive 1837 uprising, and with the exception of the early Clear Critics, who rapidly lost control over mainstream reformism, the character of Ontario liberalism has been moderate rather than radical, marked by "social and economic orthodoxy."¹⁷ As George Ross, Liberal premier at the turn of the century, put it, "the Ontario Liberal is not a radical in the English sense of the term. He is a cross between the radical and the conservative."¹⁸

Religion and conservatism have been mutually reinforcing in Ontario, and, as W.L. Morton reminds us, in the nineteenth century "religion - not wealth, and not politics - was the chief concern, the main ideal occupation of Canadians."¹⁹

¹⁵S.F. Wise, "Upper Canada and the Conservative Tradition," in Profiles of a Province, 20.

¹⁶Graeme Patterson, "Whiggery, Nationality and the Upper Canadian Reform Tradition," Canadian Historical Review LVI (Spring, 1975), 44.

¹⁷Wise, "Upper Canada," 32.

¹⁸Quoted in Charles W. Humphries, "The Political Career of Sir James P. Whitney," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1956, 193.

¹⁹W.L. Morton, "Victorian Canada," in Morton, ed., The Shield of Achilles: Aspects of Canada in the Victorian Age (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart: 1968), 314; see also William E. de Villiers-Vestrali, "The History of Protestant Ontario in the Victorian Period," Queen's Quarterly LXXXIII (Spring, 1974), 47-70.

The conservatism of the Anglican Church was to be expected, given its status as a semi-established church. More telling is the conservative tenor of Ontario Methodism (by a good margin the most common religious persuasion in the province until into the present century). Early on, Methodism represented a radical alternative to the religious as well as the political establishment. The alignment of evangelical Methodism with the forces of political reform soon fell victim to the Methodists' striving to consolidate and protect their newly acquired privileges.²⁰ Throughout the nineteenth century,

the churches' social and organizational interests, and their espousal of orderly progress within a stable, God-fearing society,²¹ led organized religion to assume an increasingly conservative posture. The enormous political energies invested in Protestant Catholic strife also served to deflect attention from social and economic issues which might have more effectively challenged the prevailing political conservatism.

Applying the Hartzian 'fragment' approach to Canadian history, Gad Horowitz has argued that the massive influx of British immigrants prior to Confederation crucially affected the development of political ideology. These immigrants occasioned the 'congealment' of English Canadian society at a point in time when rudimentary socialist ideas,

²⁰S.D. Clark, The Developing Canadian Community, second edition (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1968), 136. John Moir states that the equation of religious reformism with political reformism in Upper Canada is a "generalization based on historical part-truths." "The Upper Canadian Religious Tradition," in Profiles of a Province, 190.

²¹See Lawrence Fallis, Jr., "The Idea of Progress in the Province of Canada: A Study in the History of Ideas," and Goldwin French, "The Evangelical Creed in Canada," in Norton, Shield of Achilles.

together with Tory paternalism, were leavening the Whiggism ascendant when American society congealed.²² Consequently, English Canada is a Liberal society with important 'Tory touches', which serve to differentiate it from the United States, where Locke reigns supreme. This Toryism is manifested in a greater tolerance for socialist ideas, and a much stronger predilection for state intervention in the economic sphere.²³

The British immigrants who flooded Upper Canada after the War of 1812 were important in the development of Canadian conservatism, according to S.F. Wise, not because they served to congeal the society but rather for the way they were able to preserve their particularisms. 'What seems to have happened as a result of the immigration experience was not the flowering of a fragment,' he writes, 'but the efflorescence of group myths.'²⁴ Moreover,

colonial conservatism did not act to break down such myths. Rather, in a variety of ways, it tended to sustain them. Since conservatives were disposed to think in terms of collectivities, not of individuals, their tendency was to identify individuals with reference to the groups to which they belonged. Conservatism, at least in Upper Canada, was a coalition both of interests and of particularisms, whether religious, ethnic or both. It made no high assimilative demands beyond its insistence upon adherence to vital survival values - loyalty, order, stability - values that coincided with the interests and outlooks of many of the groups and collectivities that made up colonial society.²⁵

²²Gad Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 3-51, esp. 14-5; although Horowitz refers to English Canada, his arguments are demonstrably more pertinent to Ontario than to other regions.

²³Ibid., 17.

²⁴S.F. Wise, "Liberal Consensus or Ideological Battleground: Some Reflections on the Hartz Thesis," Canadian Historical Association, Historical Papers, 1974, 11.

²⁵Ibid., 12.

This passage points up the fundamental importance in the development and maintenance of Ontario conservatism of the strength of community and communal values.²⁶ The roots of 'communitarianism' are found in ideology, culture and economics.

Ideologically, the fostering of communal values began with the Loyalists, who maintained the paramount values of a successful family or community life.²⁷ Both influential leaders, such as Archbishop Strachan and John Beverly Robinson, and the populace at large exhibited a "desire to build a political society with a clearer and firmer doctrine of the common good than that at the heart of the liberal democracy to the south."²⁸

As the experience of Ontario county well illustrates, cultural and religious factors strongly fostered the growth of community:

the immigrants who arrived after 1820 were almost all from the British Isles, but they were far from being a homogeneous group. Distinctive in religion, racial origin and social organization, each group on arriving strove to create the society of its choice in its new home. For this reason newcomers tended to settle near their national and religious compatriots when possible. As a result distinct communities were formed, such as the Pickering Quakers, the Catholic Irish and Scots in Nara and Rama and the Anglican Irish in Brock.²⁹

Patterns of settlement contributed to the strength of community as well:

²⁶For a discussion of the communal nature of Canadian Politics, see Wallace Gagne, "Technology and Canadian Politics," and Howard Aster, "Nationalism and Communitarianism," in Gagne, ed., Nationalism, Technology and the Future of Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976).

²⁷Fellows, "Loyalist Myth," 107.

²⁸George Grant, Technology and Empire: Perspectives on North America (Toronto: Anasi, 1969), 68.

²⁹Leo A. Johnson, A History of the County of Ontario 1615-1875 (Whitby: Corporation of the County of Ontario, 1973), 72.

the struggle to clear the forest left profound marks of the social, political and economic organization of the pioneer community. Gradually these attitudes and institutions, isolated from the other centres by distance and poor communications, developed into a community in which the local inhabitants based an intense pride and identity which prevailed for generations.³⁰

In addition, because the Precambrian Shield imposed a rigid boundary on the spread of agriculture, the limits of possible settlement were reached early in the province's development. Thus no pervasive individualist agrarian myth arose to accompany a constantly expanding frontier, as was the case in the United States.³¹

Long after the original reasons for establishing strong communities faded, the communities themselves persisted, having taken on a powerful life of their own. Thus communitarianism was not dissipated by the remarkably high rates of transiency which marked the nineteenth century.³²

Now the essence of traditional conservatism is the assertion of "the right of the community to restrain freedom in the name of the

³⁰ ibid., 53.

³¹ H.V. Nelles, The Politics of Development: Forests, Mines and Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1849-1941 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1974), 42.

³² David Gagan and Herbert Mays studied population movements in Toronto Gore Township of Peel County, a typical rural township, from 1840 to 1880, and concluded that if it accurately reflected the whole society, "it would seem that one of the most pervasive and persistent characteristics of nineteenth century Ontario was the relentless movement of people in and out of the society at every stage in its development." "Historical Demography and Canadian Social History: Families and Land in Peel County Ontario," Canadian Historical Review, LIV (March, 1973), 38; for further evidence on the extent of mobility, see David Gagan, "Geographical and Social Mobility in Nineteenth Century Ontario: A Microstudy," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology XIII (May 1976), 152-64.

common good."³³ It is through the oft-noted organic-collective view of social life characteristic of English Canada that communitarianism contributes to the persistence of conservatism. The prime imperative in a value system centred in communal principles is the preservation of the community against changes threatening its cohesion and vitality. At the same time, however, changes promoting the well-being of the community, or the collectivities of which it is composed, will be welcomed, communitarianism thus by no means precludes progress, but rather channels it along collectivist lines.

No better illustration of the influence of these collectivist modes of thought could be offered than the administration headed by the greatest of all Ontario Liberals, Sir Oliver Mowat. As a longtime comrade-in-arms noted, Mowat "was not a radical, nor a Liberal, nor even a Whig. He was a Tory in social instinct and in political practice and outlook."³⁴ During Mowat's term, the Ontario 'Liberals'

saw no contradiction in defending the authority of the state in the collective interest. It is significant too, that the Liberal government of Ontario at this time championed provincial rather than individual rights ...And it is the measure of the conservative impact upon reform thinking that these same Liberals mounted a popular and successful campaign to expand the unimpaired jurisdiction of the provincial government over property and civil rights without first establishing constraints on the use of that power.³⁵

Still, the weight of collectivism and the communitarianism which

³³George Grant, Lament for a Nation (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965), 64.

³⁴Sir John Willison, Reminiscences: Political and Personal (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1919), 101.

³⁵Nelles, Politics of Development, 41-2.

spawned and nurtured it must not be overemphasized. Individualism has been a powerful element in all stages of provincial history. Moreover, one historian has written that "Judging from the Ontario experience the Tory tradition has been weak at precisely that point where its apologetic sense its contemporary relevance. Historically it has not been able to bring a broader range of community values to bear upon the industrial process than has Liberalism."³⁶ Though it is difficult to set out with precision the parameters of Ontario conservatism, particularly with respect to government activism, it is nonetheless clear that Ontario has been, and continues to be, a conservative, moderately collectivist-oriented society, whose politics both reflect and promote this conservatism.

Politics in the Union Period (1841-1867)

In the wake of the Rebellion of 1837³⁷ and the advent of Responsible Government, the commercial-bureaucratic alliance controlling the Canadian state became more responsive to local grievances, but its fundamentally conservative outlook was unaltered, as was its entrenched position of power.

Still, political changes were underway, led by Toronto's rise to metropolitan status. Located at the overlap of the hinterlands of Montreal and New York, Toronto was able to utilize its strategic location with respect to the American canal system to mount an economic base for securing

³⁶ Ibid., 493, n3.

³⁷ The Rebellion is more fully discussed in Chapter IV.

its independence from Montreal.³⁸ Although its independent base was not firmly solidified until the growth of an extensive railway network in the 1880's, Toronto's commercial elite was becoming ever more potent in the province's economic sphere, and thereby cementing its political power.³⁹

The vehicle for the exercise of this power was the Liberal (Reform) party. Once the moderate reformers, the "respectable professional and property-owning classes" had found satisfaction in the achievement of responsible government, the "real radicals"⁴⁰ - the Clear Grits of Southwestern Ontario, "the voice... of agrarian democracy"⁴¹ - were shunted aside, never again to exert significant influence.

The principal split in the Reform party, along East-West lines, on the surface reflected the mutual distaste of the radical Grits and the moderates, who were predominantly from east of Toronto. A more fundamental cause was the conflict between the traditional commercial domination of Montreal and the insurgent metropolitanism of Toronto.

Grittism may have begun as a political expression of the frontier, but early on it joined forces with the commercial interests of Toronto -

³⁸ Spelt, Urban Development, 85.

³⁹ See Douglas McCalla, "The Commercial Politics of the Toronto Board of Trade, 1850-1860," Canadian Historical Review L (March, 1969), 51-67.

⁴⁰ Frank H. Underhill, "Some Reflections of the Liberal Tradition in Canada," Canadian Historical Association Report, 1946, 36.

⁴¹ George Brown, "The Grit Party and the Great Reform Convention of 1859," Canadian Historical Review XVI (September, 1935), 301.

symbolized by the intellectual hegemony of the Toronto Globe.⁴² The success of the Grit 'party' thus owes more to its emergence as "the champion of the special attitudes of Canada West"⁴³ than to the triumph of a certain philosophy of democratic government. If the party's prevailing imagery and rhetoric "might be that of an agricultural society, its leadership would come largely from town-dwellers, commercial and professional men, and well-to-do farmers with close ties to the urban world of business."⁴⁴

As the Reform party coalesced during the late Union years into a solid Western bloc directed from Toronto, it came also to resemble a conventional British liberal party, with precious little room for propertyless workmen.⁴⁵

Politics in the Union period were overlain with an increasingly bitter language cleavage centring on highly emotional, symbolic issues, such as the 'rep by pop' controversy. The endless manoeuvring to concoct alliances between factions from both language groups served to dampen the salience of the reform-conservative struggle, already more than a little blurred in the Rebellion's aftermath. Withal, a fundamental

⁴²J.M.S. Careless, "The Toronto Globe and Agrarian Radicalism, 1850-1867", ibid. XXIX (March, 1948), 38-63; interestingly, Careless writes that "one need not look for any inevitable conflict between urban and agrarian interests in Canada West during this stage of transition from the frontier era. Instead, dividing lines between town and country were somewhat blurred", 42.

⁴³Paul G. Cornell, "The Genesis of Ontario Politics in the Province of Canada (1838-1871)", in Profiles of a Province, 67.

⁴⁴Careless, "The Toronto Globe", 42.

⁴⁵Ibid., 62.

transformation in the alignment of political groups occurred in 1854, brought on by the exigencies of crisis-coalition politics, the rise of the Clear Grits and the decline of the most hidebound Tories.⁴⁶ The coalescence of the Liberal-Conservative party effected a left-right polarization, splitting the ranks of the moderate (Hincksite) Reformers.⁴⁷ The alignment of political forces into two fairly distinct groups did not mean that the left did continuing, remorseless battle with the right, for the polarization was not intense:

Although the considerable readjustments of 1854 relegated political rivalry to duels between right and left, yet there is much in the Liberal-Conservative administrations of 1854-62 that smacks of political moderate government... One seeks in vain to find any dynamic matter of principle that distinguished the enactments or administration of the J. Sandfield Macdonald /Reform/ governments of 1862-4 from the Liberal-Conservative governments that preceded and succeeded them... the party rivalry between right and left did not represent any deep and fundamental divisions among Canadians.⁴⁸

The Mowat Era

In the province's first election, in 1867, Sandfield Macdonald's coalitionist ministry was victorious, despite the traditional Reform leanings of Canada West and the Reformers' better organization at the

⁴⁶Paul G. Cornell, The Alignment of Political Groups in Canada 1841-1867 (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1962), 61. Since writings on popular support of parties and factions are sparse, it is difficult to determine the extent to which this realignment reflected popular sentiment or simply the pressures and opportunities of legislative politics; impressionistically, the latter was likely of more predominant influence.

⁴⁷Cornell, Alignment, 64.

⁴⁸Ibid., 83.

local level,⁴⁹ This outcome was attributable to an unusual confluence of events, not likely to be repeated. The framers of the British North America Act had envisioned a minor role for the provincial legislature,⁵⁰ whose work promised to "partake more of the character of a county council than of a parliament";⁵¹ most experienced Canada West politicians thus elected to contest federal constituencies.⁵² Whereas the disparate sections of the Reform party had never been as badly divided,⁵³ the coalition was in the admirable position of having neither a record to defend nor a programme to put forward, but patronage to distribute. Moreover, the coalitionists were able to manipulate the date and many of the conditions of the election to their advantage.⁵⁴ Finally, although each candidate was clearly identifiable as to his support or opposition of the coalition,⁵⁵ the political forces were not divided by any significant matters of principle.⁵⁶

⁴⁹Margaret Helen Small, "A Study of the Dominion and Provincial Election of 1867 in Ontario," unpublished M.A. thesis, Queen's University, 1968, 10.

⁵⁰R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada, fourth edition, revised by Norman Ward (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 30-1.

⁵¹W. S. Wallace, "Political History, 1867-1912," in Canada and Its Provinces XVII (Ontario), Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty eds., (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1914), 105-7.

⁵²Cornell, "Genesis," 71.

⁵³Small: "Dominion and Provincial Election," 148.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, chapter 2.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 93.

⁵⁶Alexander Fraser, A History of Ontario: Its Resources and Development (Toronto: The Canadian History Co., 1907), 433-4.

The 1867 federal election in Ontario has been cited as a "critical" election in Key's sense. John A. Macdonald's campaign on the importance of maintaining the coalition which had brought about Confederation is said to have broken the Reformers' hold on the province, establishing a pattern of electoral alignment which persisted into the first decade of the present century.⁵⁷ Such was not the case provincially, for although it soon became apparent that party-free politics would not obtain in Ontario, the lines along which parties were to develop took longer to solidify.

The Macdonald administration failed to produce a coherent programme or sense of party solidarity. In contrast, the opposition Liberals put forward a clear set of principles, established a cohesive, disciplined party,⁵⁸ and accordingly, carried the 1871 election. Shortly thereafter, the enigmatic Edward Blake resigned the Grit leadership to pursue a federal career; in his stead, Oliver Mowat was persuaded to assume the premiership.

The Data and the Tables

Before embarking on a discussion of electoral trends and patterns of Oliver Mowat's Ontario, a brief introduction is required to the data

⁵⁷D. G. S. Kerr, "Ghosts of the Grandfathers: Voting Stability in Ontario Federal Elections, 1867-1917," paper presented at the Mathematics-Social Sciences Board Conference on Quantitative Studies of Popular Voting Behavior, Cornell University, June, 1973, 10.

⁵⁸According to Cornell, they did so by "actively advocating many of the old Clear Grit principles - an extended franchise, cheaper and simpler legal procedures, amelioration of the condition of debtors, and strict legislative control of appropriations," "Genesis," 71.

employed, and the form in which they are presented and analysed. The data are aggregate voting statistics, compiled from official returns, of party vote shares and turnout for each constituency at each provincial election.⁵⁹ The analysis is based upon simple descriptive measures, such as the arithmetic mean, which, though elementary, provide important insights into the province's electoral history. The discussion in this chapter rests entirely upon province-wide patterns; later chapters examine trends according to more restricted criteria, such as region or rural-urban composition. The material presented in this chapter is important not only as a prelude to the more analytical investigations of later chapters, but also for the basic information it conveys about the electoral divisions in this province and how they have changed over the past century.

Table III-1 presents party vote shares (weighted mean)⁶⁰ as a proportion of votes cast, the percentage of the registered electorate which voted, and the number of seats won by each party. This table closely resembles a similar table assembled by Wilson and Hoffman.⁶¹ A few entries for earlier years vary

⁵⁹For a detailed discussion of the sources and nature of these data, see Appendix B.

⁶⁰The weighted mean was employed rather than the unweighted mean in order that the vote shares not be affected by the size (population) of riding. In most cases, the weighted and unweighted means were within one or two tenths of a percentage point of one another; in very few cases do they differ by as much as a full percentage point.

⁶¹John Wilson and David Hoffman, "Ontario: A Three Party System in Transition," in Martin Robin, ed., Canadian Provincial Politics (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 204-5.

TABLE III-1

PARTY VOTE SHARES, TURNOUT AND SEATS WON BY PARTY

ENTIRE PROVINCE

Election	Vote Shares				Seats						
	Lib	Con	Third	Turnout	Lib	Con	Third	Acc	M		
1867	49	49		74	39	43		6	82		
1871	51	47		63	43	39		14	82		
1875	49	48		67	49	36		9	88		
1879	49	48		64	58	29		2	88		
1883	48	47		67	49	38		5	88		
1886	48	47		68	58	32		5	90		
1890	49	46		64	55	35		4	91		
1894	41	36	15	4	46	30	17	1	94		
1898	48	47		75	51	43		2	94		
1902	48	50		73	50	48		1	98		
1905	45	53		71	28	69			98		
1908	40	55		72	19	86		6	106		
1911	39	55		56	22	83		17	106		
1914	38	54		5	25	84		4	111		
1919	25	34	24	10	27	25	45	13	3	111	
1923	21	50	22	5	56	14	75	17	4	2	111
1926	22	56		11	64	21	74		16	3	112
1929	32	57		5	57	13	92		6	8	112
1934	50	40		7	73	20	17		1		90
1937	51	40		5	71	66	23				90
1943	31	36		32	58	16	38		34		90
1945	30	44		22	71	14	66		8		90
1948	30	41		27	67	14	53		21		90
1951	32	48		19	65	8	79		2		90
1955	33	49		17	61	11	84		3		98
1959	37	46		17	59	22	71		5		98
1963	35	48		16	63	24	77		7		108
1967	32	42		26	66	28	69		20		117
1971	28	45		27	73	20	78		19		117
1975	34	36		29	67	36	51		38		125
1977	32	40		28	65	34	58		33		125

Acc - Acclamations

Entries under third party:

1894 Patrons of Industry; Protestant Protective Association

1914 Prohibitionist

1919 - 1923 United Farmers of Ontario; Independent Labour Party

1926 - 1929 Progressives

1934 to date Co-operative Commonwealth Federation/ New Democratic Party

by one or two percentage points from Wilson and Hoffman's figures, presumably because of different designations of candidates' affiliations, but there are no substantial discrepancies.

Table III-2 and its graphical representation, Figure III-1, recast the voting data, rendering party vote shares as a percentage of the eligible electorate, rather than of votes cast, so as to give a clearer indication of the important influence of turnout.⁶² Since the figures in this table are computed only for those ridings in which a party actually fielded a candidate who was not acclaimed, the percentage may be substantially higher than it would have been if the percentages were calculated on the global basis used in Table III-1. This is particularly true of third parties which left many ridings uncontested. By way of illustration, in 1894, Patrons of Industry garnered 29 per cent of the vote⁶³ in the 44 ridings in which they had candidates; across the entire province, however, their share was 15 per cent.⁶⁴ If a party failed to nominate in more than two contested ridings, the number of candidates it did present is shown. The columns on the extreme right side of the table indicates the number of contested ridings (N), and of acclamations (A), for each election. The "third" column

⁶²The turnout figures are slightly lower - by approximately .3 to .5 of a percentage point - than those given in the official returns because the latter include spoiled or rejected ballots, which are excluded from our computation of turnout.

⁶³To minimize use of the cumbersome phrase "of the eligible electorate", the technically incorrect phrase "of the vote" will be understood to have the former's meaning.

⁶⁴Clearly, this procedure introduces some distortion; however, since the number of candidates presented is readily apparent, this is less of a distortion than the calculation of a party's vote share on the basis of all ridings.

PARTY VOTE SHARES AND TURNOUT

ENTIRE PROVINCE




TABLE III-2

PARTY VOTE SHARES AND TURNOUT

ENTIRE PROVINCE

Year	LIBERAL		CONSERVATIVE		THIRD		TURNOUT Mean	N
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N		
1867	36.1		36.9				73.8	76
1871	32.1		30.4				63.0	67
1875	33.5		33.0				67.4	79
1879	32.4		30.9				63.5	85
1883	33.8		33.1				67.3	82
1886	33.5		33.0				68.1	82
1890	33.4		30.7				64.4	83
1894	32.9	80	32.0	71	29.0	44	69.2	93
1898	36.8		36.3				75.3	91
1902	35.5		36.4				72.6	96
1905	32.1		38.3				71.3	97
1908	31.4	90	39.5				71.6	96
1911	26.7	78	32.5				56.3	85
1914	30.7	86	35.6				67.6	102
1919	26.1	68	24.3	97	31.4	74	72.5	103
1923	14.7	74	26.9	96	20.2	74	55.7	104
1926	24.4	71	36.4		34.7	22	63.7	109
1929	22.3	85	32.3		29.3	13	57.0	104
1934	37.7		29.2		10.8	37	73.3	90
1937	36.1		28.1		8.0	39	70.5	90
1943	18.9		20.7		19.0	86	57.8	90
1945	22.6		31.4		15.9		71.4	90
1948	20.0		27.7		19.0	81	67.1	90
1951	20.4		31.3		13.5	77	64.7	90
1955	20.5		29.4		11.5	81	60.6	98
1959	21.6		27.2		11.1	81	59.1	98
1963	22.5		30.4		10.6	97	63.0	108
1967	20.8		27.8		17.0		65.7	117
1971	20.3		32.5		19.8		73.1	117
1975	23.3		24.3		19.4		67.3	125
1977	20.6		25.9		18.3		65.3	125

Entries under "Third" column: 1894 Patrons of Industry
 1919 - 1929 United Farmers of Ontario
 1934 - 1975 Cooperative Commonwealth
 Federation; New Democratic Party

The N in the extreme right hand column indicates the number of contested ridings; N's associated with party vote shares indicate the number of ridings contested by the party; no entry in the party N column indicates that the party left no more than two ridings uncontested.

shows votes for the Patrons of Industry in 1894, for the United Farmers of Ontario in 1919, 1923, 1926 and 1929, and for the CCF-NDP in 1934 and subsequent elections. Extremely minor parties which fielded only a handful of candidates, such as the "Third" party, the Socialists, Prohibitionists and the pre-1919 Independent labourites (under any of their numerous labels) are excluded.

An Overview of the Mowat Years

Oliver Mowat was not only an exceptionally skilled politician, he was also essentially a conservative politician. He ensured that needed reforms were carried out gradually and within the established bounds of the social and political order, and never before the people were ready for them. The real radicals were the Conservative opposition, and indeed, "much of Mr. Mowat's influence and success as a Reformer and the leading spirit in a Reform Government was due to his conservatism."⁶⁵ One of Mowat's contemporaries observed that he drew on many of the same sources of support as did Macdonald's Federal Conservatives;⁶⁶ this would scarcely be surprising for both parties were in essence conservative, though leavened by moderate reformism and a strong disposition to foster steady growth and development.

It is easy to become caught up in the external appearances of

⁶⁵C.R.W. Biggar, Sir Oliver Mowat: A Biographical Sketch (Two volumes, Toronto: Warwick Brothers and Rutter, 1905), I, 218.

⁶⁶A.H.U. Colqhoun, quoted in A. Margaret Evans, "Oliver Mowat and Ontario 1872-1896: A Study in Political Success," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1967, 2.

the Liberal ascendancy. To contemporaries and historians alike, the latter third of the nineteenth century is indeed the Mowat era. The Liberal party, a formidably efficient political organization, built and maintained an impressively heterogeneous voter coalition around Mowat's adept blend of caution, progressiveness, fairness and patronage. In marked contrast, the Conservative party languished in the political doldrums. Handicapped by uninspired leaders who were constantly out-manoeuvred by the cagey Mowat, the party's organization was perennially in disarray.⁶⁷ Seemingly bereft of coherent policy which swung from one extreme to another, the party was simply out of tune with the tenor of the age. The Tories, consequently, lost repeatedly to Mowat, who seemed to know precisely what the province wanted and when.

Despite agreement among historians on these basic features of the Mowat years, a striking anomaly is apparent from even a cursory perusal of Tables III-1 and III-2. These tables reveal clearly the often devastating bias of the first-past-the-post electoral system. From 1875 until the turn of the century (save 1894), the barest of Liberal pluralities in the popular vote were transformed into comfortable majorities in the Legislature.⁶⁸ Thus, with the electoral system over-rewarding the Grits, the more salient distribution of seats has obscured the ex-

⁶⁷ See Charles W. Humphries, "The Political Career of Sir James P. Whitney," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1966, chapter 2.

⁶⁸ To an extent, this was abetted by the distribution of seats. Although Mowat may not be accused of gerrymandering seats at redistribution time, neither did he grant equitable representation to the urban areas. For example, although by 1901 the city of Toronto contained very nearly 10 per cent of the province's population, it accounted for a mere 4 of 98 members at Queen's Park.

treely narrow margin of votes by which the Liberals defeated the Conservatives. Indeed, combining the elections of 1875, 1879, 1883 and 1886, the Liberals outpolled the Conservatives by a scant 10,545 votes, out of approximately a million cast. The Tories, in short, were virtually as popular at the polls as the Grits. When consideration is taken of the Liberal edges in leadership, organization, and patronage, it becomes clear that their long hegemony was far less due to any great empathy with public feeling than to Tory inability to attract the few marginal voters who might easily have given them control of the province. Despite outward appearances, Ontario electoral politics in the previous century were competitive to an exceptional degree. From this perspective, much of the conventional wisdom regarding the Liberal electoral domination during the Howat years is clearly in error.

The numbers of seats carried by each party in nineteenth century elections are misleading in another respect, for they indicate more narrow legislative majorities than actually obtained. Early in the first parliament, the Coalitionist ministry won over nine members who had contested the 1867 election as Liberals. In subsequent years, the Liberal majority was usually augmented with by-election victories. By-elections were much more frequent in the nineteenth century, for invariably after each general election, several members would be unseated for fraudulent or illegal electoral practices.⁶⁹ During the Liberal

⁶⁹For confirmation of this point, see Roderick Lewis, comp., Centennial Edition of the Electoral Districts, Legislatures and Ministries of the Province of Ontario (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1968), *passim*.

tenure in office (1871-1905), the government took 23 seats from the Tories in by-elections, whereas on only 9 occasions were Conservatives victorious over Liberals in by-elections.⁷⁰

As is evident from the tables, the aggregate vote totals were extremely stable during the nineteenth century. This was not only true at the provincial level, but federally as well, as may be seen from Table III-3, which presents party vote shares, turnout and seats won in federal elections. Save the 1894 election, exceptional for its two strong third party movements, the overall levels of party support are remarkably stable: from 1871 to 1902, the Liberal share of the vote varied only from 32.1 per cent to 35.8 per cent, while the Tories' vote share remained in the 30.4 to 35.3 per cent range. This stability, however, is misleading, for it is in part an artifact of the aggregation process; the tabulation of vote shares according to region in Chapter VI demonstrates greater aggregate volatility than is apparent from a province-wide perspective. More significantly, perhaps, the stability in overall levels of support by no means implies continuity in the composition of parties' electorates. Indeed, the correlation analysis in Chapter VII strongly suggests that the nineteenth century was characterized by extremely low levels of continuity in party support - again in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom.

Turnout was not particularly high during the Mowat years, which raises some questions as to how much stronger political interest and

⁷⁰In the great majority of by-elections, the riding did not change hands.

TABLE III-3

PARTY VOTE, TURNOUT, SEATS WON BY PARTY IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS

(Vote as a proportion of votes cast)

Election	Liberal %	Conservative %	Third %	Turnout %	Liberal seats	Conserv seats	Third seats
1867	48	51		74	30	52	
1872	50	50		72	48	40	
1874	53	47		73	66	22	
1878	45	51		71	26	62	
1882	49	51		69	38	54	
1887	49	51		72	38	54	
1891	49	49		66	44	48	
1896	40	45	15	79	43	43	6
1900	50	50		77	36	56	
1904	50	50		73	38	48	
1908	47	51		70	37	48	1
1911	43	56		69	13	73	
1917*	34	62		79	8	74	
1921	30	39	28	63	21	37	24
1925	31	57	3	65	11	68	2
1926	39	54	4	64	26	53	2
1930	44	54	1	70	22	59	1
1935	43	35	22	74	56	25	1
1940	51	43	6	70	57	25	
1945	41	42	14	75	34	48	
1949	46	37	15	75	56	25	1
1953	47	40	11	67	51	33	1
1957	37	49	12	74	21	61	3
1958	33	56	11	80	15	67	3
1962	42	39	17	77	44	35	6
1963	45	35	16	77	52	27	6
1965	44	34	22	81	51	25	9
1968	47	32	21	80	64	17	6
1972	37	38	21	79	36	40	11
1974	45	35	19	74	55	25	8

* Coalitionist Government votes and seats listed under Conservative

Entries under third party: 1896 McCarthyites; Patrons of Industry
1921 - 1930 Progressives
1935 Reconstruction Party; CCF
1940 to date CCF-NDP

- Sources: votes and seats 1867 - 1968: J.M. Beck, Pendulum of Power (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1968), passim.
- eligible electors 1872-1891; 1900 House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1873 60
 1874 59
 1879 88
 1883 77
 1887 53b
 1891 27a
 1901 36
- eligible electors 1896 - 1917: M.C. Urquhart and K.A.H. Buckley, eds., Historical Statistics of Canada (Toronto: MacMillan, 1965), series W62 and W63 (figure for 1900 is incorrect).
- turnout 1921 - 1958: Howard A Scarrow, Canada Votes (New Orleans: Hauser, 1962), 238.
- turnout 1962 - 1968: Reports of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1962, 1963, 1965, 1968
- votes, turnout and seats 1972: Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1972
- votes, turnout and seats 1974: Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1974

involvement were in the nineteenth century, compared to that of the present day. From 1871 until 1894, turnout ranged between 63 and 69 per cent of the electorate. Between 1898 and 1908, that is in the dying days of the Liberal regime and the early years of the Tory dynasty, turnout was somewhat, though not spectacularly, higher, ranging between 71 and 75 per cent.

John Wilson, using aggregate data on voting shifts, has demonstrated that government defeats in Ontario have generally been a consequence of "a deliberate choice by an unusually large number of people"⁷¹. It has not been true, however, that government defeats have excited an abnormally high turnout rate. Such was the case at the turn of the century, but the mean turnout of the five government defeats (1905, 1919, 1923, 1934 and 1943) is 66.1 per cent of the electorate, compared with a mean of 66.4 per cent for twenty-four non-defeats.⁷²

During the Mowat years, or indeed throughout provincial history, turnout has been higher at federal elections in Ontario than at provincial campaigns; from 1867 to 1896, the mean turnout was 67.0 per cent provincially and 72.0 per cent federally. The most straight-forward interpretation of this differential is that provincial politics have simply not had the same salience and interest for Ontarians as politics at the senior level. A further explanation may lie in the fact that

⁷¹ John Wilson, "The Ontario Political Culture," in Donald C. MacDonald, ed., The Government and Politics of Ontario (Toronto: Macmillan, 1975), 217.

⁷² The ambiguous (low turnout) election of 1871, which led to a government defeat in the House, is excluded.

until the Dominion franchise reverted to the provincial franchise after 1896, the Ontario electorate was somewhat larger for provincial than federal elections; persons enfranchised provincially but without the federal vote (in the main the poorest segment of the populace) may well have had a higher rate of non-voting.

The Politics of Religion

The leitmotiv of Ontario politics during Mowat's tenure was religion. The basic Catholic-Protestant division was overlain with ethnic animosity, for most Catholics were Irish, though not all Irishmen were Catholic. To be sure, all was not harmony and good feeling among Protestant denominations, but the extreme hostility and bitterness generated by the Clergy Reserves and allied issues had dissipated. In addition, the reversion to the pre-Union provincial boundaries had effectively removed the language complication from religious controversy.

Although Catholics comprised only a sixth of the population, the numerical imbalance was obscured in emotional, symbolic clashes, particularly over government policy on separate schools. These conflicts were heightened by the popular perception of the 'solid Catholic vote' as Mowat's key to power, with the ominous implications that this must portend. The strident anti-Catholicism of George Brown had alienated many Catholics in the later Union years, but Mowat's unmistakable fairness returned a good many of them to the Reform cause. At least as important as Mowat's attractiveness, however, was Tory policy, which by stages

drove many long-time Conservative Catholics into the Grit camp.⁷³

Doubtless, the electoral impact of religious passions was not so strong as popular mythology, or party propaganda, would have it. Even the link between the Tory party and the Orange Order was probably substantially weaker than often believed, in part due to Grit influences in the local lodges,⁷⁴ and in part due to the nature of the organization. For its prime concern was not to combat Romish influences but to meet the symbolic and material needs of lower class Protestants, particularly those of Irish extraction.⁷⁵ Still, the oftentimes unsolicited and unwanted Orange pronouncements on behalf of the Tory party did much to identify it with the narrowly Protestant viewpoint.

Far more virulently anti-Catholic and nativist were the Equal Rights Association, a minor force in the 1890 election,⁷⁶ and the substantially stronger Protestant Protective Association. The P.P.A. nominated several candidates in the 1894 election, and endorsed a number

⁷³For an overview of the politics of religion in nineteenth century Ontario, see Evans "Oliver Mowat," and Franklin A. Walker, Catholic Education and Politics in Ontario (Toronto: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1964). These sources, like virtually all others on the topic, rely heavily on newspaper accounts, private papers and the like, and are therefore of very uncertain reliability in their conclusion as to religious influences in the mass public.

⁷⁴Hereward Senior, "Orangeism and Ontario Politics, 1872-1896," in Donald Swainson, ed., Oliver Mowat's Ontario (Toronto: Macmillan, 1972), 140-1.

⁷⁵Ibid., passim.

⁷⁶The E.R.A. ran only a handful of candidates under its own banner, usually with combined Conservative-Equal Rights affiliation; see J.R. Miller, "'Equal Rights for All': The E.R.A. and the Ontario Election of 1890," Ontario History LXV (December, 1973), 211-30.

of others who ran under Conservative-P.P.A., Patron-P.P.A., and even Liberal-P.P.A. banners.⁷⁷ No more than three straight P.P.A. standard-bearers were elected, though as many as a dozen others from the South-West, claimed or were attributed P.P.A. affiliation.⁷⁸ Withal, the P.P.A.'s showing was unimpressive, and the movement, wracked with bitter internecine dissension, effectively passed from the scene by 1897.

The demise of the P.P.A. was symptomatic of the marked lessened impact of sectarian strife on Ontario politics following the 1894 election. Standing as both cause and effect of this was a decline of the reversal in attitude of the Conservative party. Following a sharp rebuke by the Protestant electors of London, George Marter, the new Tory chieftain jettisoned the party's no Popery stance. James Whitney, who succeeded Marter in 1896, extended this policy and his overtures to the province's Catholics were well received.⁷⁹

The Farmer and the Workingman

The impact of industrialization and urbanization on Ontario's farm community and upon its class structure will be dealt with more extensively in the following chapter. For present purposes, only these groups' political activities will be highlighted.

⁷⁷Though Meredith, the Conservative leader, tried to dissociate the party from it, the P.P.A. was far more closely linked with the Tories than with the Liberals or the Patrons.

⁷⁸James T. Watt, "Anti-Catholicism in Ontario Politics: The Role of the Protestant Protective Association in the 1894 Election," Ontario History (March, 1967), 65-6.

⁷⁹Humphries, "Political Career," 149.

Although it bespeaks a dubious interpretation of history, the myth of the independent yeoman has always carried great weight among the Ontario farm populace.⁸⁰ In the Mowat years, this sharply constrained government activism in agricultural policy,⁸¹ and it also coloured the farmers' reaction to government.

The social disruptions engendered by the onset of industrialism combined with steadily declining prices to give rise to widespread agrarian discontent by the 1890's. Dissatisfaction crystallised around the "Patrons of Industry" movement, which by mid decade claimed an Ontario membership of 100,000. Originally concerned mainly with economics, particularly the iniquitous National Policy, the Patrons' ken soon encompassed broader social and political issues. Significantly, the order "represented not indigent agrarians on the verge of ruin, but small, reasonably affluent farmers fighting to continue a traditionally acceptable social structure."⁸² Like the United Farmers a generation later, they identified the key to their problems as the disproportionate influence wielded by urban interests in an unprincipled party system. Threats to the farmers' material well-being were thus closely bound up with symbolic concerns centring on the realization that their way of life and their social and political status were rapidly being undermined.

⁸⁰V.C. Fowke, "The Myth of the Self-sufficient Canadian Pioneer," Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada LVI (1962), 29.

⁸¹Such well-received departures as experimental farms, land drainage programmes, and the institution of the Agricultural College at Guelph indicated a certain leavening in the laissez-faire outlook.

⁸²S.E.D. Shortt, "Social Change and Political Crisis in Rural Ontario: The Patrons of Industry, 1889-1896," in Oliver Mowat's Ontario, 232.

Despite Mowat's essentially accurate remonstrance that the bulk of their political demands lay beyond provincial jurisdiction,⁸³ the Patrons entered some 49 candidates in the 1894 provincial election. They attracted 15 per cent of the popular vote, enough to elect seventeen of their number. In spite of P.P.A. attempts at infiltration, anti-Catholic nativism does not seem to have influenced greatly either the Patrons' policy or their support.⁸⁴ A preliminary analysis of the sources of Patron voting failed to turn up any consistent pattern "on the basis of traditional voting behaviour, religion or ethnic origins. The pattern most clearly discernible is geographic: the best agricultural areas in the province tended to show Patron strength.⁸⁵ Patron attempts to forge an alliance with labour foundered since, "despite similarities in outlook, labour and farmers held basically incompatible attitudes towards society." The Patrons' ideology gave pride of place to the small producer and limited government, in direct opposition to the positive role of the state advocated by organized labour.⁸⁶

The inexperienced, weakly led Patrons quickly fell in with Mowat, and the 1896 federal election, with its outright Liberal-Patron alliance and subsequent return to prosperity under Laurier, marked the

⁸³ Evans, "Oliver Mowat," 58, 62.

⁸⁴ Shortt argues that though both the Patrons and the P.P.A. counted their greatest strength in the West of the province, the latter were in large measure confined to the towns: "Social Change," 225.

⁸⁵ ibid.

⁸⁶ ibid., 229.

Patrons' end as an independent political force. The root causes of the Patron upsurge had by no means been assuaged: rather they had gone underground, to resurface a generation later in the United Farmers' movement.

Notwithstanding the occasional labour candidate and intermittent independent political activity, the bulk of the working class fell into line with the prevailing party system. Gradual but substantial widening of the franchise was partly responsible, as was political inexperience on the part of many labour leaders and acceptance of the familiar Liberal versus Conservative party configuration by the transplanted British artisans who figured prominently in Ontario organized labour.⁸⁷ Most important of all, though, were the positive benefits and rewards which the parties had to distribute. "Rational political consciousness" won out over class consciousness among the vulnerable working classes and their fragile organizations.⁸⁸ Furthermore, to workers and bosses alike, class interests lacked the salience of religion and ethnicity:

the hold of the Grit and Tory labour friend over the newly enfranchised artisan was guaranteed by ties of ethnic, religious, and social affinity. Working men were the active constituents of numerous voluntary organizations led by middle-class civic leaders in Toronto, Hamilton and other centres. The artisans frequently used their ethnic community with political leaders to advance their interests...when the factory system suddenly sprang into existence in Ontario in the 1880's and 1890's, when the bond of sympathy and intimate personal ties between capitalist

⁸⁷ Martin Robin, 'The Working Class and the Transition to Capitalist Democracy in Canada,' Dalhousie Review XLVII (August, 1967), 335.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 326-7.

and worker in the small firm gave way to the impersonality of the large establishment, when protective labour societies expanded rapidly, working men still shared a cultural, religious and political sympathy and identification with their social and political superiors.⁸⁹

Mowat's progressive Factory Act, together with other pro-labour policies, stood in stark contrast to apparent Tory disinterest,⁹⁰ and brought to the Reform party the solid support of labour.⁹¹ After Mowat's departure, though, this support began to fall away as it became increasingly clear that Whitney's Conservatives were much more attuned to the problems of an urban, industrialized province than the ossifying Grit party with its dated, rural viewpoint. One element in this shift was the more pronounced sympathy in the Grit camp for prohibition, which by the 1890's was taking on a distinctly anti-working class colouration.⁹²

The Decline of the Liberal Party

Following Mowat's departure for Laurier's 'cabinet of all talents', the Ontario Liberal party entered into a steady decline and

⁸⁹Ibid., 328-9.

⁹⁰Bernard Ostry, "Conservatives, Liberals and Labour in the 1880's," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science (May, 1961), 151-4. Michael Bliss contends that Ostry misread the Conservatives' pre-labour Trade Union Act of 1889; see his "Dyspepsia of the Mind": The Macmillan, ed., Canadian Business History: Selected Studies, 1497-1971 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972), 181, n21.

⁹¹Data on urban and rural voting, discussed in the following chapter, indicate that the conventional wisdom as regards Mowat's working class following is at best over-stated.

⁹²Graeme Decarie, "Something Old, Something New...Aspects of Prohibitionism in Ontario in the 1890's," in Oliver Mowat's Ontario, 163.

a doomed rearguard action against the resurgent Tories. Marginally outpolled by the Conservatives in 1898 and 1902, the Liberals clung to power with precarious legislative majorities, but it was becoming increasingly clear that they had lost touch with public opinion, and had only shopworn policies to offer. The Grits, too long at the helm and too wedded to the rural Ontario of the past, seemed unable to adapt to the ever expanding urbanization and industrialization about them.⁹³ Nor could they rely upon inspired leadership to pilot them through the political shoals. Mowat, for example, had brilliantly finessed the temperance question, drawing support from both sides,⁹⁴ but Ross' vacillation excited nothing but opposition.⁹⁵

The Tories, by contrast, were closely attuned to the province's social and political aspirations. In the early campaigns of the Mowat era, the chief Conservative complaint had been the Reformers' profligate handling of the provincial accounts, compared with the thrift characterizing the good old days of Sandfield Macdonald's administration. In the course of Meredith's tenure, however, the Tories became less concerned with fiscal retrenchment, taking on the trappings of British-style Tory democracy, while the Reform party "petrified into a complete Toryism,

⁹³ Charles W. Humphries, "The Sources of Ontario 'Progressive Conservatism' 1900-1914," Historical Papers Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical Association, Ottawa, 1967, 119.

⁹⁴ Willison, Reminiscences, 95.

⁹⁵ Humphries, "Political Career," 320.

despite its name.⁹⁶ Building upon the party's urban bailiwicks, Whitney's conciliatory, yet firm, leadership effectively removed religious strife from the political agenda, and established the Tories in the public mind as the true representatives of both the middle and working class. In addition, the Conservative organization, if poorly funded, was diligent, efficient and confident.

The Grits gave every indication of a party too long in office. Where once Mowat had drawn considerable support from those accustomed to voting Conservative federally, the Liberals of Ross' day were unable even to maintain good relations with their federal counterparts.⁹⁷ Party organization had deteriorated markedly, and by way of compensation, had come to an unhealthy reliance on questionable, if not outright corrupt, electoral practices. Such episodes as the notorious 'Gamey affair',⁹⁸ cost the party a good deal of its support among the staunchly righteous farmers who had been the party's backbone in days past. The Grits, in short, were a political force on the wane; by the turn of the century a Conservative triumph was inevitable.

The Tory Ascendancy, Phase One: 1905-1930

The Tory vanquish of the faltering Grit machine in 1905 stands out clearly as the great watershed of provincial politics. Not only was

⁹⁶ J.E. Middleton and Fred Landon, The Province of Ontario: A History 1615-1927 (Toronto: Dominion Publishing, 1927) I, 407.

⁹⁷ Humphries, "Political Career," 321.

⁹⁸ *idem*, "The Gamey Affair," Ontario History LX (June, 1967), 101-9.

it the beginning of the Tory stranglehold on Queen's Park, but it marked the establishment of a political agenda in which industrial development and the betterment of an urban society held pride of place. Religion, the great recurring issue of the Mowat years, was never far below the surface of political life, and came virulently to the fore on more than one occasion, but it was only one of several politically salient issues.

Whitney is a prize specimen of that illusive Canadian breed, the red Tory; his operating principle was "social justice to prevent social chaos".⁹⁹ Still, his reformist zeal had clear limits, and in addition, many of the men he gathered about him were traditional conservatives, keen on orderly administration but dubious about government activism. Ontario Hydro, showpiece of 'progressive' Conservatism, clearly illustrates the curious blend of populist government activism in the marketplace and attention to special private interests which characterized the Tories' response to the needs generated by the province's social and economic modernization. Though it necessitated state ownership "from the outset, the crusade for public power was a businessman's movement".¹⁰⁰ The struggle for public ownership lay primarily between the great commercial interests of Toronto and the small manufacturers of the western peninsula hungry for cheap power. Under the

⁹⁹Quoted in Humphries, "Political Career," 428.

¹⁰⁰H.V. Nelles, The Politics of Development: Forests, Mines and Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1849-1941 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1974), 304.

inspired leadership of Adam Beck, the latter effectively mobilized the populace against the private power barons. Ontario's middle classes and manufacturers could promote government ownership as a safeguard against the giant corporations precisely because, unlike in the United States, the threat from the left was negligible; labour was inarticulate and fragmented.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, Hydro did represent an important departure, and if their motives were mixed, the Conservatives were clearly amenable to using the state in the service of industrialization and urban interests.

During his nine years in power, Whitney assembled an impressively diverse coalition of supporters. This success was rooted in his consummate political skill, which combined high-principled firmness with a fine sense of pragmatic politics. He was, in addition, blessed with a singularly ineffective opposition. A moribund organization and uninspired leadership hamstrung the Grits, who remained tied to the interests of the countryside and of the business community. The progressive, urban-oriented liberalism promoted by N.W. Rowell, Liberal leader after 1911, failed to alter the situation appreciably. Under Rowell, the Liberals adopted a reformist platform,¹⁰² but they lacked credibility as a vanguard of social reform, save in their 'abolish the bar', crusade - scarcely the reform most sought after by the urban working classes.

¹⁰¹ ibid., 253-4.

¹⁰² Margaret Prang, N.W. Rowell, Ontario Nationalist (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 100-2.

In the four elections held from 1905 until the outbreak of the First World War, the Conservatives' margin of victory over the Grits was very substantial: while the Tories attracted an average of 54 per cent of the votes cast in these years, the Liberal share declined to less than 40 per cent. The differential in terms of share of the eligible electorate was less spectacular, 38.9 per cent versus 30.2 per cent, but this fails to take into account the fact that the Liberals were unable to nominate in over a score of ridings by 1911 and 1914.

Not until 1911 did the Liberals' share of the electorate fall substantially below the level it had been in the nineteenth century (in 1898 and 1902, it had been higher than in earlier elections due to the higher turnout). However, the extent of the Conservatives' electoral supremacy over the Grits is demonstrated in the rural areas, in which the Tory vote share was 3 or 4 per cent higher from 1905 to 1914 than it had been in the nineteenth century, whereas the Liberal share was 1 or 2 percentage points lower. The resulting Conservative lead in votes was translated into a tremendous bulge in the number of seats in the legislature.

Still, in view of the Tories' inability to fill the gap left by Whitney's death, shortly after the 1914 election, it is possible that the Liberals might have offered the Conservatives real competition had not the Great War intervened. The War had a pronounced short-term influence on Ontario politics, electoral and non-electoral, yet in the longer run, its political impact was surprisingly small. Indeed, few episodes in provincial history more tellingly illustrate the ability

of the political order to survive social change unscathed than the First World War.

The social impact of the war was profound.¹⁰³ Industry made tremendous strides in productivity and scale. Women joined the labour force in large numbers, and, more significantly, entered into the mainstream of social life to an unprecedented degree.¹⁰⁴ An entire generation of Canadians shared the searing experience of war and bitter post-war disillusionment. Fundamental divisions in Canadian society - French versus English, capital versus labour, city versus countryside - were laid bare as never before. Attitudinally, Canadians were irrevocably altered. For some, direct participation in warfare forced a reappraisal and rejection of traditional beliefs and values. For others at home, the economic and emotional mobilization for war highlighted new social questions and drastically remolded pre-war outlooks, not least with respect to the proper role of government. These attitudinal changes were clearly in train before the war, but it hastened them by starkly focusing attention on the contradictions and shortcomings of pre-war society.

Yet these landmark social changes wrought few lasting changes in Ontario's political order. The province found itself governed by a

¹⁰³For an overview of the social and economic impact of the war, see Robert Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), chap. 12, 13, 15; and Barbara M. Wilson, ed., Ontario and the First World War, 1914-1918 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977).

¹⁰⁴Ceta Rankhalawansingh, "Women During the Great War," in Janice Acton, Penny Goldsmith and Bonnie Shepherd, eds., Women at Work: Ontario 1850-1930 (Toronto: Canadian Women's Educational Press, 1974), 261-307.

farmer-labour coalition immediately after the war, but within a very few years the Conservatives re-established their hegemony, with precious few changes in programme or style. Prohibition, symbol of social reformist zeal, raised to statutory force by war-time conditions, survived barely longer than the UFO-ILP administration. The unprecedented state involvement in social and economic life occasioned by war-time mobilization and post-war reconstruction was of far greater moment at the federal level than in the provinces. Finally, the war brought about intense, short-lived grievances but no enduring changes in the political aspirations of labour and agriculture; both the United Farmers of Ontario and the Independent Labour Party faded into oblivion with untoward haste.

The war was a key catalyst in the election of a farm-labour government in 1919, though paradoxically the UFO's success must be understood as a defensive reaction to the social changes fostered by the war rather than as an expression of the new social order. W.L. Morton has written that the war 'blew up the old party structure in Canada'¹⁰⁵. Nowhere was this clearer than in the Ontario Liberal party, which split asunder over conscription and prohibition. Together with long-standing disappointment with Laurier's tariff policy,¹⁰⁶ this meant that the farm community was far less wedded to the Grit party as the traditional embodiment of Ontario agrarianism than in 1894, the

¹⁰⁵W.L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950), 59.

¹⁰⁶E.C. Drury, Farmer Premier (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966), 53.

year of the Patron upsurge.

If the Liberals were beset by fatal divisions, the Conservatives were saddled with an "astonishingly inept"¹⁰⁷ leader, William H. Hearst, who progressively eroded the coalition of diverse interests so painstakingly assembled by Whitney. He brought in prohibition, thereby splitting the party and alienating the urban wets, without attracting commensurate dry support. Similarly, the vacillating manner in which he enfranchised women minimized the potential political dividends,¹⁰⁸ and his uncertain attempts at framing social reforms "excit[ed] the resentment of traditional Tories without winning the trust of the working classes".¹⁰⁹

The Liberals' debilitated state and the Tories' endless gaffes facilitated but did not cause the rise of the UFO. More fundamentally, "the farmers were caught up in a growing tide of moral indignation, the conviction that the old parties were corrupt and had sold their souls to the protected interests, that only they, coming from the clean and pure soil of the countryside, could provide clean people's government."¹¹⁰ Precipitating the farmers' mobilization for political action

¹⁰⁷ Peter Oliver, "Sir William Hearst and the Collapse of the Ontario Conservative Party," Canadian Historical Review LIII (March, 1972), 23.

¹⁰⁸ Brian D. Tennyson, "Premier Hearst, the War and Votes for Women," Ontario History LVII (September, 1965), 115-23.

¹⁰⁹ Oliver, "Sir William Hearst," 38.

¹¹⁰ Brian D. Tennyson, "The Ontario General Election of 1919: The Beginnings of Agrarian Revolt," Journal of Canadian Studies IV (February, 1969), 29.

was the Dominion government's renegeing on its commitment to exempt their sons from military service.

The extraordinary circumstances of the First World War also had a pronounced, if temporary, impact upon Ontario workingmen, engendering among them an unprecedented solidarity founded upon a deep sense of injustice over governmental direction of war-time society and post-war reconstruction. Unions enjoyed skyrocketing membership and their attention was fixed upon the political realm as never before.¹¹¹ The political arm of labour was the Independent Labour Party, organized in 1917.

The ILP was a "quite conservative party"¹¹² which shared a number of common objectives with the UFO; early on friendly relations were established between the two movements, and they contested the election in concert. As became evident during their term in office, however, the farmers and the workers held oftentimes diametrically opposed views of politics and society. The ideological and political antagonism between the ILP and the UFO was not the only fatal flaw in the coalition government. As well, a serious rift developed between the Drury government and the doctrinaire agrarians of the UFO organization.¹¹³

Even the hard-core UFOers were generally not prepared to

¹¹¹ Martin Robin, Radical Politics and Canadian Labour (Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, 1968), 119.

¹¹² John David Hoffman, "Farmer-Labour Government in Ontario, 1919-1923," unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Toronto, 1959, 41.

¹¹³ Idem, "Intra-Party Democracy: A Case Study," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science XXVIII (May, 1961), 223-35.

propose the far-reaching measures requisite to fundamental change in the farmer's social and economic position.¹¹⁴ In this they only reflected the inclination of the Ontario farm community; they recognized that many things were not as they should be, but they shied away from the radical departures which might effect the desired changes. The UFO's essential conservatism, clothed as it might be in radical rhetoric, would sanction tinkering but not transformation.

Within these limits the UFO-ILP administration did enact some substantial reforms. Yet, as the social disruptions of the immediate post-war years gave way to the 'normalcy' and prosperity of the twenties, the Conservatives came to reflect the province's reviving complacent conservatism more faithfully than the farm government. Once returned to power in 1923, Howard Ferguson, the Tory leader, in line with prevailing currents of opinion, "defined for his party an image and a program that swung it to a place further to the right on the political spectrum than Ontario Conservatism had occupied for many a long year."¹¹⁵ This conservatism, together with careful fence-mending, secured for the Tories an impressive urban-rural power base.

The elections of the 1920's were marked by extraordinarily high Tory vote shares and unusually low turnout; doubtless the two are linked in part. The Liberal record was even more dismal than it had

¹¹⁴Jim Anderson et al., A Political History of Agrarian Organizations in Ontario 1914-1940 (Chase Press, 1974), 21.

¹¹⁵Peter Oliver, 'The Making of a Provincial Premier: Howard Ferguson and Ontario Politics, 1870-1923,' unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1969, 177.

been prior to the war, for they were in effect competing with the UFO, or at least the remnants of it, for the farm vote.-- Symptomatic of the Liberals' straightened condition were the aggregate electoral shifts from 1919 to 1923: whereas the Tories increased their share of the electorate slightly in 1923 (which, given the sharp drop in turnout, amounted to a very substantial gain), the Liberal share fell to barely half of what it had been in 1919. Support for the UFO, or more properly the "Progressive Party," in the later part of the decade remained at a high level in the limited number of seats it contested, almost all of which were in Western Ontario.

Adroit political management, good times and an absence of intractable, disruptive demands all conspired to make the 1920's perhaps the most politically somnolent era in provincial history. The enfeebled condition of the opposition stood as both cause and effect of the Conservative ascendancy. The UFO was but a shadow of its earlier self by 1926, when it fielded only 22 candidates, of whom 16 were elected. As for the Liberals, that they continued to hammer away at the demon rum testified more to their political catalepsy than to the issue's salience. Indeed, by the election of 1929, the Liberal party had degenerated into "not much more than a rural Protestant splinter group, narrowly based on a dozen predominantly dry ridings, its policies bankrupt, its leadership pathetically weak."¹¹⁶

¹¹⁶ Neil McKenty, Mitch Hepburn (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967), 31.

Turbulent Interlude: 1930-1945

The factors shaping Ontario between 1930 and 1945 may be succinctly described: depression and war. The Great Depression was far more than abnormally hard times; it was more "a state of mind, a loss of faith in stability and security."¹¹⁷ If the Depression itself brought surprisingly few political changes to Ontario, it did set in motion processes which, coupled with the social changes brought about by the war, thoroughly reshaped Ontario politics.

The decade of the 1930s was thus an era of transition... It was a period of turbulence and confusion. Traditional values were challenged and new concepts of society were formulated. The progress of industrialization had been going on for decades but in the 1930s the depression suddenly faced Canadians with this new reality.¹¹⁸

Thus, for a time in the early thirties, the rising star in the Ontario political firmament seems to be the fledgling Cooperative Commonwealth Federation. Organized in 1932 around the neo-Fabian League for Social Reform, assorted farm groups and the remnants of various splinter parties of a radical or labour bent, the CCF brought together most of mainstream Canadian radicalism, which had acquired new intensity and respectability by the social, economic and psychological dislocations of the Depression. Indeed, the CCF won the temporary imprimatur of the aging but symbolically important, and essentially conservative

¹¹⁷ H. Blair Neatby, The Politics of Chaos: Canada in the Thirties (Toronto: Macmillan, 1972), 22; for an overview of the social and political ramifications of the depression, see Ch. 2, 3 and 11 and Michiel Horn, "The Great Depression: Past and Present," Journal of Canadian Studies XI (February, 1976), 41-50.

¹¹⁸ Neatby, Politics of Chaos, 188.

UFO - a powerful indicator of the extent of the social disruptions wrought by the Depression. Still, this infatuation could not be expected to last: the CCF's ideas and approaches were simply too foreign to the Ontario farm community. Furthermore, the Liberal leader, Mitch Hepburn, came increasingly to embody the political traditions of rural Ontario: high-principled rhetoric arising out of agrarian conservatism.

Hepburn, an electrifying stump orator, was at root a political opportunist, whose adroit melding of reform and retrenchment struck a responsive chord in many voters. His appeal was by no means limited to the countryside: he had a pro-labour reputation and in a widely-quoted remark, he had declared, "I swing far to the left where some Liberals will not follow me."¹¹⁹ By contrast, the poorly organized CCF, beset by fierce internecine strife, could only attract lukewarm acceptance from the important labour bodies.¹²⁰ On all fronts, the solemn, unsettling CCF was simply no match for the ebullient Hepburn.

Hepburn's populism, widespread social and economic distress and the seeming unresponsiveness of the Conservative administration¹²¹ combined to give the Liberals a near-sweep in the 1934 election. Attracting fifty per cent of the votes cast overall, the Grits fared exceptionally well on the 'back concessions', Hepburn's special focus, but they also made important inroads

¹¹⁹Quoted in McKenty, Mitch Hepburn, 106.

¹²⁰Gerald L. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973), ch. 4-6.

¹²¹See Patricia V. Schulz, The East York Workers' Association: A Response to the Great Depression (Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1975).

in Tory Toronto and other urban centres. The Conservative share of the votes cast fell a catastrophic 17 percentage points and the party failed to elect a member west of Toronto and only 17 all told. The CCF garnered 7 per cent of all votes cast, and 11 per cent in the 37 predominantly urban seats in which they nominated; they carried but one seat, in downtown Hamilton. This election was also marked by an unusually high rate of voter participation, better than 73 per cent. The 1930's have been described as a "pre-eminently political decade", in which politics assumed new urgency and new salience;¹²² the high turnouts in 1934 and 1937 support this interpretation.

The 1937 election repeated the Liberals' triumph of 1934, with only minor aggregate voting shifts: a slight decline in turnout and in CCF support and a very small increase in the Liberals' share of votes cast. The correlation analysis of Chapter VII suggests important discontinuities in this pattern of surface stability. Perhaps more significant, however, Hepburn's personality cult and his disdain for organization meant that the Liberal party's successes in 1934 and 1937 were only temporary respites as it "failed to become a political force independent of his personal magnetism."¹²³

The vitriolic 1936 East Hastings by-election demonstrated that, should both parties champion religious causes, the potential for serious

¹²² Neathy, Politics of Chaos, 49.

¹²³ Dennis H. Wrong, "Ontario Elections, 1934-1955: A Preliminary Survey of Voting," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science XXIII (August, 1957), 406.

cleavage remained. Still, given the vociferous demands of the Catholic Taxpayers' Association, and the vigorous response it engendered from the Orange Order and others, the most notable aspect of religious strife in the 1930's was its lack of electoral impact. Other social issues and economic problems pressed more urgently for political response. As Depression gave way to War, it became increasingly clear that the Liberals, with their fundamental rural orientation, had little to offer a province shot through with new problems and prospects. Hepburn's lip-service to traditional virtues in place of new policy directions was unacceptable to an ever-growing proportion of the electorate.

Meantime, Ontarians were coming to look favourably upon the CCF, which, following the crucial York South by-election, was transformed almost overnight from political curiosity to mainstream party.¹²⁴ Gerald Caplan has admirably summarized the factors underlying the rise of the Ontario CCF:

a number of variables - all a function of the war - ...intervened to translate discontent and anxiety into temporary support for the CCF. These included the demand for a better post-war world in which the causes leading to wars would be removed, the realization that national planning was practical and efficient, the new role of the Soviet Union, and the rapid growth of urbanization and trade-unionism as a by-product of a booming war economy.

Following hard on the heels of the Depression, the pressures of wartime reinforced in Canadians a skepticism about existing values and conventions, and helped to shake people's minds out of their traditional grooves...as these new stirrings began to take shape - vaguely and rarely articulated, no doubt, but yet real and profound - the politicians and businessmen who had dominated Canada during the Depression fell

¹²⁴ J.L. Granatstein, "The York South By-election of February 9, 1942: A Turning Point in Canadian Politics," Canadian Historical Review XLVII (June, 1967), 142-58.

increasingly into public disrepute...nor can the importance of organized labour to the rise of the CCF be exaggerated.¹²⁵

Province-wide, the votes in the 1943 election were all but evenly split among the Liberals, Conservatives, and the CCF; although the Liberals lost more heavily in total vote, undoubtedly many former Conservatives went over to the CCF as well. In part due to inadequate provisions for armed forces voting, turnout fell to pre-Depression levels.

The CCF became the official opposition to a minority Conservative government, yet its success carried with it the seeds of destruction. Large segments of its support were "superficial and devoid of conviction and commitment."¹²⁶ The party was further handicapped with a rudimentary, poorly funded organization, and was beset by internal squabbles. In addition, the CCF programme wrought a leftward shift in Ontario politics. Both old parties strove mightily to demonstrate that their policies were as socially advanced as those espoused by the CCF, without involving the evils of CCF 'state socialism'. In 1945, the CCF came close to maintaining the number of voters it had attracted in 1943, but in concert with a very substantial rise in turnout, an increase in the Conservative vote share relegated the CCF to a poor third.

One segment of the electorate in which the CCF fared particularly well was the armed forces. Since the service vote was not separately tabulated in 1943, we cannot judge whether this represents an improvement or a loss of support. As Table III-4 makes clear, the overall level of

¹²⁵ Caplan, Dilemma, 88-90.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 110.

TABLE III-4

PARTY VOTE SHARES AMONG ARMED FORCES VOTERS 1945

	Liberal	Conservative	CCF
Entire province	28.0	35.4	33.6
Urban	26.2	35.4	35.3
Mixed	29.6	34.8	34.1
Rural	30.6	39.0	27.8
Eastern Ontario	33.1	40.2	23.0
Lake Ontario	28.2	46.7	24.6
Georgian Bay	26.3	41.0	32.1
Golden Horseshoe	27.6	32.1	37.1
Western Ontario	35.8	34.3	29.1
Toronto	21.0	36.5	37.5
Northern Ontario	27.2	24.5	43.8

CCF support was only marginally below the Conservative level, and substantially above the Liberal share. The CCF did especially well among servicemen from Northern Ontario; the Tories most pronounced service support was in Lake Ontario ridings; the most noteworthy aspect of the Liberals' electoral attractiveness was the party's poor showing among armed forces voters from Toronto. More significant than these findings which are clearly in line with expectations, is a relatively high CCF share of the service vote in rural ridings - 27.8 per cent, compared with the 13.5 per cent of the rural civilian electorate which opted for the CCF. This success doubtless reflects the importance of the war-time experience in fostering acceptance of the new society envisioned by the CCF.

The Depression and the War provided the social potential for radical political departures in Ontario. The Depression had raised doubts about the existing social order, and the attitudinal shifts fomented by the war culminated in the vista of a new, irrevocably different society. Yet the extent to which these social upheavals resulted not in radical political innovation, but rather in a reliance on traditional principles is a telling measure of the strength of Ontario conservatism. Depression-ridden Ontario sought political solace in the rhetoric and retrenchment of Mitch Hepburn, rejecting the sweeping reformulations of the CCF. Conversely, though, the limits of the conservative response were clearly exposed.

Although Hepburn's government largely failed to respond to them, new political forces did emerge out of the economic and social uncertainties of the Depression.

Ontario's wartime experience built upon these inchoate social forces and brought them to political fruition. The war presented a fundamentally different vantage point on social problems and their political solutions. In particular, the contrast with the pre-war social and economic situation emphasized the potential and minimized the fears of strong government activism. Thus, one of the war's political legacies was the triumph of 'progressive' conservatism over the populist, 'independent yeoman' strain of slightly reactionary conservatism epitomized by Hepburn.

The province had changed substantially, in social composition, outlooks and expectations, from what it had been before the war, and the Conservatives moved to meet the new social and political demands. That they have governed the province ever since testifies to their success in responding to new social conditions. However, the persisting attraction of the CCF-NDP for a substantial minority suggests important limits, both to the Tories' capabilities and to the strength of traditional politics. Although its ideology has never been extreme, the CCF-NDP has nevertheless represented a clear alternative to the Conservatives, forcing important changes upon them. Indeed, a principal theme of post-war Ontario politics has been the progress of the Conservatives' attempts at resolving the tension between their traditional approach and ideology and the political demands unleashed by new social forces.

The Tory Ascendancy, Phase Two: Post-War Ontario

Since 1943, the Conservative party has remained the government of Ontario through a happy combination of good management and good luck. The Tories' stranglehold on Queen's Park stems from a wide range of factors: prosperity; leadership well suited to the times and successfully regenerated; a divided and often dispirited opposition; rural overrepresentation in the Legislature and the first-past-the-post electoral system. The Conservatives have been "zealous imitators of the Oliver Mowat style of cautious but incessant reforms."¹²⁷

Central to their longevity has been their remarkable and broadly appealing ability to mix the traditional and familiar with new, forward-looking policies and approaches. This formula, which has included a profound transformation of the party itself, has enabled the Conservatives to diffuse many of the potential political implications of post-war social change. In the electoral realm, the clearest indication of the Tories' wide-ranging appeal is the fact that in no identifiable group or region have they fared poorly. To be sure, they attract more support from certain sections of the electorate than from others, but unlike the Liberals and NDP, they have enjoyed strong support throughout the electorate.

By no means, though, has the Tory government coped successfully with all the political problems and demands arising out of changes in social structure and attitude, nor has it always been the willing

¹²⁷ Desmond Morton, "Ontario 1975: Reflections on the Tory Decline", Canadian Forum, April-May, 1975, 8.

vehicle for innovation. Though a good many Tories would not applaud it - or perhaps even recognize it -

Ontario has in the period 1954-74 passed through a revolution. Socially, the province has moved very substantially towards state socialism, and away from the concept of local autonomy and the significance of private property to a confiscatory form of planning... A strong centralized bureaucracy has emerged. Local government has been significantly weakened in the guise of reform. Policy is dominated by technocrats, so that an allegedly private enterprise conservative government has moved significantly to statist, socialist and directive economic, social and political systems.¹²⁸

Drew, Frost, Robarts and Davis

For all his stuffy waspishness, 'Colonel' George Drew recognized that the Depression and the War had altered people's expectations of life and of government. His administration moved 'with reasonable dispatch to implement many of the famous 22 points'¹²⁹ from the 1943 election manifesto. In doing so, Drew earned a reputation as an able and progressive administrator. Far-reaching social welfare measures were alien to Drew's philosophy and to large segments of the electorate; instead, the Conservatives concentrated on providing the social overhead capital and the guidance necessary to promote industrial expansion.

Drew's haughty, righteous style endeared him to many, but alienated others. Together with strong labour support for the CCF, these pockets of unpopularity caused the Tories to slip marginally in

¹²⁸ Norman Pearson, "Regional Government and Development," in Donald C. MacDonald, ed., Government and Politics of Ontario (Toronto: Macmillan, 1975), 171-2.

¹²⁹ Jonathan Manthorpe, The Power and the Tories: Ontario Politics 1943 to the Present, (Toronto: MacMillan, 1974), 36.

the 1948 election. More significantly, though, Drew suffered personal defeat at the hands of a teetotaling CCFer and elected to run for the federal Conservative leadership. Tom Kennedy took his place on a caretaker basis, and in 1949 the party settled on Leslie Frost as the new leader.

Frost's political skills were prodigious. Despite clear evidence of corruption among senior ministers, he fashioned repeated lopsided electoral victories. Moreover, he bequeathed his successors a superbly efficient party machine. Frost built the facilities necessary for unprecedented growth and prosperity, but never lost touch with the aspirations and outlooks of his power-base in rural and small-town Ontario.

'The 1950's were, on the whole, a peaceful and prosperous time for Canada. Their great enemy, Canadians agreed, lay abroad, and few issues divided them passionately at home.'¹³⁰ Frost's governments, like the society they oversaw, were inward looking; they suited the times well and engendered remarkably little serious political opposition, either from the organized parties or from the province's various social and interest groups. The Liberal party was disorganized, disheartened, and largely ineffective; the CCF attracted only a faithful hard core of voters, elected few members and increasingly turned to a morbid introspection as its proposed solutions seemed largely

¹³⁰ Leo Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed: A Study of Change in the CCF, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), 85.

irrelevant to a complacent, satisfied electorate.¹³¹

"The overriding concern of the Frost administration was to create the conditions of economic growth."¹³² The 'state as builder' approach, begun under Drew, intensified in the early 1950's into a massive social capital building boom - highways, schools, hospitals, low income housing, homes for the aged, and the like.¹³³ As it became apparent that physical structures were not by themselves sufficient to deal with the changes and needs of post-war Ontario society, the foundations of the government's social policy shifted. From about 1957, the extent and quality of social services rose abruptly; expenditures increased markedly on unemployment insurance, hospitalization, vocational training, child welfare, recreation, and education.¹³⁴

Like the other Tory chieftains, Frost recognized the time to step down, and in 1961, John Robarts ascended to the leadership. Robarts and the talented bureaucrats he assembled were adept at maximizing political credit for the most reluctant decisions. Yet, suffused as it was with a shrewd, pragmatic political calculus, the Robarts 'team' did expand the reach and quality of social policy far beyond anything Drew or Frost might have imagined. If, as the medicare

¹³¹ Ibid., 85-137.

¹³² D.R. Richmond, Ontario: A Society in Transition (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1972), 66-7.

¹³³ Vernon Lang, The Service State Emerges in Ontario (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1974), 19.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 28.

episode illustrated, progress was often reluctant, initiated only when public pressure could no longer be denied, still, progress was made. (Medicare also revealed the Tories' feet of clay, demonstrating that they were not immune to serious blunders; their bureaucratic fumbling in implementing medicare was "awe-inspiring",¹³⁵ and hardly in the best traditions of 'managerial Conservatism'.)

The later years of Robarts' decade in office witnessed the "full flowering of Ontario as a service state".¹³⁶ This involved not only a greater emphasis on social welfare measures, but as well, unprecedented attempts to shape economic growth.¹³⁷ A related process of signal political significance was the Conservative party's metamorphosis in the 1960's from its basically rural character into a fundamentally urban orientation.¹³⁸ The contrast in style between Frost and Robarts made this shift evident, but substantial policy changes were undertaken as well, symbolized by capital construction grants for Toronto's subway, an anathema to rural conservatives of the Frost mold. The transition, however, was not entirely smooth. Traditional Tory voters in the countryside, still over-represented in the

¹³⁵Peter Oliver, "Ontario", in John T. Saywell, ed., The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1969 (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1970), 84.

¹³⁶Lang, Service State, 49.

¹³⁷D.R. Richmond, The Economic Transformation of Ontario: 1945-1973, (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1974), 21.

¹³⁸Ron Haggart, "How the Tories Hold Power in Ontario", Saturday Night, (January, 1972), 30.

legislature, were dismayed by the government's preoccupation with urban matters while policies such as rural school consolidation, regional government and farm subsidy programmes¹³⁹ engendered open hostility. That the electoral ramifications of this discontent were so minor testifies more to the Grits' incompetence, the NDP's irrelevance and the strength of Conservative traditions and organization than to any positive policy overtures to rural voters.¹⁴⁰

Notwithstanding its brilliantly orchestrated triumph in the 1971 election under the new leader, William Davis, the Conservative party threatened to fall victim to the tension between the forces of social change and the conservatism characteristic of its electorate. Whereas large segments of the Conservatives' power base remain rural, the government's perspective is fundamentally urban. Moreover, even in the cities (particularly in the context of the economic uncertainties of the 1970's), the Tories' electoral following was at least as conservative as it was progressive; much of the most vociferous criticism of the current provincial administration is not directed at its conservatism, but at its reforms in education, municipal

¹³⁹ Fred F. Schindeler, "Ontario", in John T. Saywell, ed., The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1966, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), 97.

¹⁴⁰ For a review of farm policies during the Robarts years, see Ontario Department of Agriculture and Food, Ontario Agriculture in the Sixties, (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1970); although agricultural policy was not entirely stagnant, it lacked the imagination and freshness of other policy fields.

government, urban transit and land-use planning".¹⁴¹ Even before the debacle of the 1975 election, the party was reaffirming its conservative credentials, but as two successive minority outcomes suggest, an appealing blend of progressive and conservative postures is difficult to achieve in economically troubled times.

Electoral Patterns

In considering the electoral patterns of the post-war years, it is well to be aware of the particularly devastating impact of the electoral system. Although votes for opposition parties always exceeded, often by a substantial margin, those attracted by the Conservative government, the fact that they were split granted the Tories comfortable, sometimes overwhelming majorities in the legislature. As in so many other respects, the 1975 election marked the end of this pattern.

The size of the parties' electorates remained remarkably stable during these years. In eight successive elections, beginning in 1945, the Tory vote share varied between 27.2 per cent and 32.5 per cent, while the Liberal range was even more restricted: 20.0 per cent to 22.5 per cent. The CCF-NDP's vote share was higher (and based on a fuller complement of candidates) towards the beginning and end of the period, but between 1951 and 1963 it too stayed within a limited range, 10.6 to 13.5 per cent. The regional tabulations, discussed in Chapter

¹⁴¹Desmond Morton, "Introduction: People and Politics of Ontario" in MacDonald, Government and Politics, 13.

VI, show that although the ranges may have been slightly wider within specific regional contexts, the size of party electorates is stable throughout the province. The correlational analysis of Chapter VII suggests that, unlike in the nineteenth century, this surface stability was symptomatic of great continuity in the strength of party ties.

The 1975 election signified, if not a clear end to this electoral stability, at least a marked aberration from it. The Tories' vote share fell better than eight points to 24.3 per cent. At the same time, despite picking up seats, neither the Liberals nor the NDP increased their vote share substantially; the Liberal share did rise to a post-war high of 23.3 per cent, but the NDP share actually declined marginally. The results of the 1977 election suggest something of a return to previous patterns, though with the Tories held to 25.9 per cent, the return is clearly incomplete.

Save in 1945 and 1971, turnout was not high, and indeed in the elections of the fifties, it was particularly low - doubtless a reflection of the politically somnolent character of those years. More important than these relatively minor variations (the entire post-war range was 59.1 to 73.1 per cent) was the wide, persisting discrepancy between turnout levels in federal and provincial elections. The mean turnout in Ontario from 1943 to 1975 was 65.0 per cent provincially, as compared with 76.3 per cent federally. Wilson and Hoffman suggest this differential is central to the weakness of the Ontario Liberal party. Utilizing aggregate electoral returns and individual survey data, they show that in the 1960's a disproportionate number of federal Liberals,

particularly in the urban centres, failed to exercise their franchise, thereby seriously hampering the party's electoral fortunes.¹⁴² Without comparable constituency-level federal data, it is difficult to evaluate this hypothesis for more recent voting, but in an overall sense, the 1971 election calls it seriously into question. Turnout in that election was very high by post-war standards, but the Liberal vote share remained virtually unchanged over 1967.¹⁴³

The Liberal Doldrums

In view of the factors working against them, what is significant about the Ontario Liberals is not their lack of success, but the degree of success they have enjoyed.

The Liberals have been undergoing a more or less permanent leadership crisis since 1942. The nine men who have led the party since then have largely been unable to inspire or discipline their followers. As well, the secondary leaders in the Legislature have been a singularly factious lot, unable to mold their highly individualistic approaches into a cohesive party stand. In consequence, the numerically inferior CCF/NDP has often provided - and been seen to provide - more effective opposition to the ruling Tories.

¹⁴² John Wilson and David Hoffman, "The Liberal Party in Contemporary Ontario Politics," Canadian Journal of Political Science III (June, 1970), 181-5.

¹⁴³ For a review of pertinent research, and data supporting the Wilson-Hoffman interpretation, see Toivo Miljan and Bruce Macnaughton, "Federal-Provincial Party Support: The Case of the Waterloo Ridings," paper presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, 1975.

Many of the provincial Liberals' woes are directly attributable to the success of the federal wing of the party, and to the distant relationship between the two. The federal party's indifference to the fate of its provincial counterpart stemmed less from the legacy of the Hepburn-King feud than from the simple fact that it found itself perfectly capable of winning elections without a strong provincial presence in Ontario. The contrast between federal strength and provincial weakness fed upon itself, as talented, ambitious Ontario Liberals gravitated to the federal arena, leaving the provincial party bereft of top-notch personnel. The abstention of federal Liberal voters in provincial elections, mentioned earlier, is in part a result of this organizational weakness.

Closely bound together with the efficacy of party organization is the question of how much voter loyalty derives from strictly party factors and how much from the candidate's or member's personal attractiveness. Bringing data on incumbency to bear on the analysis permits a preliminary investigation of these topics. Table III-5 presents tabulations of party vote shares according to success in the preceding election and the absence or presence of an incumbent candidate. As a glance at the N's on the right side of the table indicates, some of the entries are calculated on very few cases, and must be interpreted with caution.

The impact of incumbency on voting¹⁴⁴ is discussed at this

¹⁴⁴The effects of incumbency are defined simply as the difference between the vote share in ridings with incumbents and vote share in ridings without incumbents.

MEAN PARTY VOTE SHARE ACCORDING TO PARTY'S SUCCESS IN
PREVIOUS ELECTION AND PRESENCE OF INCUMBENT

Year	Liberal		Conser.		Third		N's					
	I	NI	I	NI	I	NI	1	2	3	4	5	6
	1	2	3	4	5	6						
1871	34	25	31	30			29	5	27	5		
1875	37	31	36	32			34	7	19	15		
1879	35	36	30	32			35	14	24	8		
1883	36	28	34	32			51	3	18	7		
1886	37	34	35	32			35	13	19	10		
1890	36	35	32	30			47	5	23	5		
1894	35	37	33	35			44	10	14	10		
1898	39	40	39	41			37	10	21	5		
1902	39	31	38	38			43	13	30	7		
1905	37	37	39	35			35	16	41	4		
1908	37	34	38	32			15	9	57	8		
1911	39	32	34	33			12	5	49	12		
1914	41	39	38	33			14	4	55	14		
1919	31	30	28	26			20	7	31	10		
1923	23	23	32	26	28	23	22	2	18	6	39	5
1926	29	23	37	39			4	6	55	20		
1929	33	28	33	33			18	4	56	11		
1934	44	41	30	26			11	3	58	12		
1937	39	30	33	34			58	13	14	3		
1943	21	19	28	25			51	16	15	8		
1945	32	26	37	32	21	17	13	3	36	2	32	2
1948	29	24	30	27	26	31	11	3	56	10	7	1
1951	30	31	37	36	22	18	13	1	45	8	20	1
1955	30		33	29	28		7		74	14	2	
1959	35		31	28	25		11		74	10	3	
1963	30	19	35	30	26	18	24	2	51	25	5	1
1967	32	23	32	28	31		14	8	70	16	5	
1971	32	18	39	34	31	30	24	4	52	16	19	2
1975	34	24	30	24	34	26	18	3	57	27	16	4
1977	34	26	33	30	29	27	29	6	46	5	37	1

I - Incumbent ran
 NI - Incumbent did not run
 Blanks indicate empty cells

The first line of the table shows that in 1871, the Liberal vote share in the 29 ridings which they had carried in 1867 and in which the incumbent ran was 34 per cent; in the five ridings which they had won in 1867, but in which they were without incumbent candidates, their share was 25 per cent.

junction because it is far and away most pronounced for the Liberals generally, and since the Second World War in particular. Both the Liberals and the Conservatives have generally fared better in ridings in which their sitting member ran again rather than giving way to a new candidate. This is hardly surprising, but what is of interest is that the relationship is significantly stronger for the Grits than for the Tories.¹⁴⁵ Not enough CCF-NDP sitting members have retired to permit any realistic appraisal of incumbency effects. Since World War Two, the Liberals have typically fared poorly in ridings which they carried in the previous election, but in which the sitting member did not run for re-election. Between 1963 and 1977, the differential varied between 7 and 14 per cent. The most notable illustration of this process occurred in Grey South in 1967. Farquhar Oliver, who had held the seat continuously since 1926 (for the UFO for the first few years), stepped down and his replacement attracted only slightly better than half the votes of the victorious Conservative.

In addition to its oftentimes suspect leadership and its organizational shortcomings, the Liberal party has frequently encountered difficulty staking out an effective and distinctive programme. It is nonetheless possible to discern in Liberal policy a consistent ideological concern with traditional Liberal individualism. Former leader Robert Nixon once defined his party's philosophy in the following terms: "the essence of liberalism is the perpetual pressing forward to a

¹⁴⁵Probability less than .07 by the Mann-Whitney test, two-tailed.

freer society where individuals can develop to their full potential, a continual removing of barriers blocking the avenues of individual progress. The reason for this passion is the realization that the best society can be achieved only through the individual efforts of all our people."¹⁴⁶ Linked to this has been a strain of nineteenth century Griftism running intermittently through Liberal policy, surfacing most recently during the 1975 and 1977 campaigns in which the party stressed local control of policy, a return to traditional educational philosophy and financial retrenchment.

Standing as both cause and effect to the Liberals' weakly articulated ideology has been their lack of electoral foundation in any particular economic group. The party has drawn disproportionate support from Roman Catholics and persons of non-British origin, but, in marked contrast to the NDP and the Conservatives, it has no clear relationship with specific economic groups.¹⁴⁷ This has thus far been an asset, but could well develop into a serious handicap should the much heralded socio-economic polarization of Ontario politics come to pass.

The CCF-NDP

The story of the CCF-NDP during the Tory years turns on three closely related themes: the leavening of recurring electoral

¹⁴⁶ Robert F. Nixon, "A New Direction for Ontario" in R. F. Nixon, ed., The Guelph Papers, (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1970), 3.

¹⁴⁷ Wilson and Hoffman, "Ontario," 218.

disappointments with 'moral victories', gradual electoral growth and consolidation and progressive ideological domestication.

In part because it was psychologically unprepared for continuing prosperity following the war, the CCF had to struggle merely to survive the 1950's. In the prevailing complacent conservatism of the Frost years, a good deal of the anti-government sentiment aroused by the CCF ended up in the more acceptable Liberal camp come election time.¹⁴⁸

The transformation of the CCF into the NDP between 1958 and 1961 was designed to extend and consolidate support from organized labour, but it entailed other, more far-reaching changes as well. "If the CCF grew naturally from the grass roots, the party which succeeded it was grown artificially, from the top down"¹⁴⁹ just like the Liberals and the Conservatives. The CCF had been a movement; the NDP was a party.¹⁵⁰ This dichotomy turns on more than simply organizational differences; it also involves a fundamental trade-off between ideological purity and electoral success. This has been an omnipresent conundrum for the CCF-NDP, resulting in occasional concessions to electoral considerations. Of late, the NDP has sought a more broadly based programme, encompassing both conventional economic-class concerns and what may be called 'quality of life' issues. As one

¹⁴⁸ Zakuta, Protest Movement, 114.

¹⁴⁹ Walter D. Young, The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF 1932-1961, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 133.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., ch. 1.

prominent party spokesman put it, these issues "cut across the traditional ideologies....it's a pragmatic style of socialism for the NDP to show that it cares about the survival of small communities or the problems of farmers, or to identify with the citizens of all classes fighting the Pickering Airport".¹⁵¹

Throughout the post-war period, the party's electoral following has been heavily concentrated in the large urban centres, particularly Toronto and Hamilton, and in the North. The importance of the party's union ties is evident in its greater attractiveness among skilled than unskilled workers, and in its electoral success among (non-agricultural) primary workers.¹⁵² The 1967 election marked a turning point for the NDP: its overall vote share increased dramatically, but more significantly, its 'natural constituency', the working class vote, seems to have fallen in behind the party more strongly than ever before.¹⁵³ Subsequent elections have confirmed this change, and, as well, the NDP has made substantial gains in several important ethnic communities.

The Tory Ascendancy: An Evaluation

The obvious fact that Ontario has been governed by the same party for thirty-six years, years of pronounced social changes,

¹⁵¹ Michael Cassidy, "The Resurgence of the NDP in Ontario", Canadian Forum, (February, 1974), 8, emphasis added.

¹⁵² David M. Cameron, "An Electoral Analysis of Democratic Socialism in Ontario: CCF-NDP Voting Patterns 1934-1963", (M. Phil. thesis, University of Toronto, 1965), 25-43.

¹⁵³ Wilson and Hoffman, "Ontario", 234-5.

obscures many important political changes. One change, which is especially easy to overlook, pertains to the policy priorities and ideological approach of the governing party itself. Yet, despite changes in the Conservative party, and the political system it directs, important elements of Ontario politics - particularly in ideological setting - have remained the same. F.F. Schindeler has admirably captured the political tension between old approaches and values and new demands:

In Ontario, classical liberal shibboleths still command apparent, if not actual, acceptance. Thus, the Government - wanting to maintain a facade of limited government and yet compelled to intervene in more and more areas of public concern in order to survive - has resorted to extra-departmental agencies as a compromise solution to their dilemma. This expediency salves their own liberal consciences and also meets the demands of the organized pressure groups who want the kind of control over their operations that can be achieved only through public authority but who nonetheless fear direct government supervision of their activities - no doubt because they too were nurtured on the principles of laissez-faire liberalism. It seems the province suffers from philosophic schizophrenia: compelled to preach old-fashioned liberalism but forced to practice /sic/ something quite different.¹⁵⁴

For a third of a century, skilled treatment by the Ontario Conservatives has kept the schizophrenia under control; however, there are limits to the effectiveness of any therapy which confronts symptoms rather than underlying causes.

In coming to an understanding of the success of the Conservative party in this century, a distinction set forth by the British political sociologist J.P. Nettl is instructive. To a certain extent,

¹⁵⁴ Fred Schindeler, "Responsible Government in Ontario: Will Government be up to the task?", in The Guelph Papers, 137-8.

he observes, political parties do serve as interest articulators and aggregators, as the conventional wisdom would have it. In many cases, however, they are more significant for their role as authority legitimators.¹⁵⁵

With the progressive institutionalization of cleavage structures into parties and party systems, Nettl suggests, representatives of various interests come more and more to avoid the formal political processes, in particular elections and legislators. This is due to the much greater effectiveness with which they can pursue their goals through direct contact with government decision-makers, rather than through cumbersome, inefficient political parties.¹⁵⁶ This process has a tendency to feed upon itself: the more parties are confined to authority legitimation as interest articulation flows through the more effective channel of informal political activity, the less attractive they become to potential interests, save perhaps those lacking in political resources.¹⁵⁷

Nettl further suggests that in certain party systems, one perennially successful party comes to assume the lion's share of authority legitimation, while the other party, typically out of power, is forced to find its raison d'etre in interest articulation. His description of this process at work in British and American politics

¹⁵⁵ J.P. Nettl, Political Mobilization (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), 163-4.

¹⁵⁶ ibid., 169-72.

¹⁵⁷ ibid., 170.

rings a familiar note for students of Ontario politics:

The British Conservative Party and the American Democratic Party - apart from the stable locational 'fixes' for individuals - are essentially the governing parties. The British Labour Party and the American Republican Party are essentially the reform parties, required to redress any 'excess' of time and exhaustion on the part of the governing party. Thus British Labour and American Republicans would only win in elections when fairly clear evidence of internal exhaustion (or corruption in American terminology) is provided by the governing party, as well as an inability to produce and cope with needed reforms. The point about this pattern however is not that it represents a popular bias for or choice of conservatism against change, but that it implies judgements on the capacity of the ruling party to achieve the minimum required for satisfactory government. It is for this reason that British Labour as well as the American Republicans have won elections in the last thirty years only whenever they have been able to present themselves as vigorous, competent and 'honest' as against the governing party's tiredness, incompetence and corruption. To repeat; the issue is not between policies so much as between the capacity of a particular elite, any disillusion with which can only be expressed by electing the other.

The rhythm such a pattern establishes is one of built-in advantage for the governing party, interrupted periodically by a brief change - long enough merely to enable the governing party to reconstruct itself at leadership and performance level.¹⁵⁸

The Ontario Conservatives clearly fit the description of governing party; in turn, both the Liberals and the NDP represent a range of specific interests, but neither is possessed of a credible, authority-legitimizing elite.

¹⁵⁸ J.P. Nettl, "Are Two-Party Systems Symmetrical?" Parliamentary Affairs XIX (1967), 221.

Conclusion

By way of investigating long term increases or declines in the level of party vote shares, Table III-6 presents a test for trend over the entire span of provincial history and for certain shorter time periods.¹⁵⁹ Both the Liberal and Conservative vote shares experienced a statistically significant decline over the course of the past century, but the level of Tory support seems less inclined towards significant trends within more restricted periods. The Liberal trend is significantly up for the years 1867-1902, and significantly down since the turn of the century. None of the other coefficients attain conventional levels of statistical significance. Of course the definition of the time periods has a bearing on these results. By way of illustration, had the post-World War Two era been divided into two periods, 1943-1955 and 1959-1975, doubtless the CCF-NDP trend would have been down in the former and up in the latter. Perhaps the most substantively interesting finding is the lack of significant trend in the level of turnout, both in overall terms and for the shorter periods selected for analysis. This casts serious doubt on the view of political activity as more central to people's

¹⁵⁹The test for trend employed here is Kendall's Tau, a non-parametric statistic, requiring ordinal level of measurement or better. On the use of Tau as a test for trend, see W.J. Conover, Practical Nonparametric Statistics (Toronto: Wiley, 1971), 249-53. The fact that the party vote shares are calculated on the basis of eligible electorate rather than on the basis of votes cast renders the trends susceptible to the influence of turnout. For example, had the trend for 1867-1902 been tested with share of votes cast, the Liberal coefficient would have been $-.60$ and the Conservative $-.29$.

TABLE III-6
 TEST FOR TREND (KENDALL'S TAU)
 PARTY VOTE SHARES AND TURNOUT
 ENTIRE PROVINCE

	1867-1975	1867-1902	1905-1975	1943-1975
Liberal	-.49***	.51**	-.40***	.25
Conservative	-.32***	.18	-.12	.09
CCF/NDP				.02
Turnout	-.12	.31	-.08	.20

* p < .10
 ** p < .05
 *** p < .01

lives in the days before the advent of electronic communications.

No further summary of the foregoing material will be attempted, but some general conclusions may be ventured. First, it is clear that Ontario has experienced far-reaching, profound political changes; conversely, significant periods of political stability as well as striking continuities are also evident. One of these continuities is the influence on Ontario politics of the conservative cast of mind, though change may be discerned here as well as in the rise of "progressive conservatism".

As expected, the relation of political change to electoral change is variable. Some important elements of political change, for example the transformation in the Conservative party since World War Two, do not seem to have occasioned marked electoral change. Other far-reaching political changes, such as the substantial change in the political agenda and political values around the turn of the century and during the Second World War, have clearly been manifested in the electoral arena. It does seem that each important electoral change came about as part of a more broadly based political change. Elections in this province clearly reflect political change, consolidate it and channel it. Electoral processes, in short, have indeed been of central importance to the fundamental changes and continuities of Ontario politics. The place of social change in all this is the subject of the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV SOCIAL CHANGE IN ONTARIO

Political change and electoral change as well as the interplay between them were examined in the preceding chapter. This chapter extends that analysis by explicitly relating, on a large scale, episodes and processes of social change to the political realm, and especially to the electoral arena. As in chapter III, some statistical data are brought to bear, relating to the province's social composition and to its voting proclivities. Due to the broad scope of the topics under investigation, and also the limitations on the availability of data, the analysis is primarily impressionistic. The findings and interpretations are important not solely as context for subsequent statistical analysis, but also in their own right, as judgements on the relationship of social and political change.

In examining the specifics of social and political change, one point stands out clearly: epoch-making crises simply have not been the stuff of Ontario politics. The sources of contemporary European politics have been provocatively analysed in terms of the alliances and cleavages generated by critical historical junctures, but this approach has sharp limits for the study of Ontario politics. Key dramatis personae, such as the landed gentry or the established church, are either altogether absent or radically altered from the European norm; further, Ontario has not experienced the social or political convulsions which have so influenced political development in Europe.¹ The most

¹ Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in Lipset and Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives (New York, The Free Press, 1967), 1-64.

prominent contender, the still-born Rebellion of 1837, did eliminate some possible lines of evolution, but it blurred as many distinctions as it crystallized. Serious strain and conflict in this province have mostly been short-lived and have uniformly failed to bring about intense crises capable of fundamentally restructuring politics or intruding directly into the political consciousness of later generations in the manner of the French Revolution or the American Civil War.

If social developments in Ontario have not, as a rule, brought on political traumas, they have nonetheless had a profound impact on politics. Though important short-term influences may be discerned, by and large the political (and electoral) ramifications of social change have emerged over relatively long periods of time. Thus this chapter is organized thematically as well as chronologically. The first section deals with the social pressures leading to the Rebellion of 1837, and its political legacy. Other principal analytical foci are immigration and demographic change, industrialization, urbanization, prohibition, and shifts in the ethnic and religious composition of Ontario and in related social and political attitudes. The hiving off of these processes into separate sections is by no means to deny that they overlap at many junctures, for indeed they cannot be fully understood save in relation to one another.

The Rebellion of 1837 and its Legacy

Though some participants may have had political ideals in the back of their minds, the fundamental and proximate causes of the 1837

uprising were economic.² The antipathy between the small Upper Canadian rural proprietors and the local seconds of the Montreal merchants reduced to one root cause: "The whole capital equipment of this pioneer agricultural community was in the hands of the commercial class."³ From the very beginning, moreover, the farmers had been heavily dependent on the commercial state to market their wares and to provide certain necessities. The upshot was that the administration of the province was firmly in the grasp of a small group of like-minded middle class merchants and professionals - the notorious and much misunderstood Family Compact.⁴

The outcome of the conflict between the countryside and the middle class bureaucrats in the towns who controlled the state was never in much doubt. Short of a popular rebellion, the well-ensconced elites held all the trumps, and when an ephemeral uprising did materialize, its direction was so inept as to guarantee its unpopularity. Indeed, it served to enhance the legitimacy of the regime by driving the bulk of the loyal populace, along with a goodly proportion of the reform element, into the government camp.⁵ The cause of the commercial middle

²Donald Creighton, "The Economic Background of the Rebellions of 1837," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science III (August, 1937), 322-34.

³Donald Creighton, The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence, 1760-1850 (Toronto: Ryerson, 1937), 125-6.

⁴See Robert E. Saunders, "What Was the Family Compact", Ontario History XLIX (December, 1957), 165-78.

⁵Gerald M. Craig, Upper Canada: The Formative Years 1784-1841 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963), 248.

classes of the rising towns was greatly aided by the absence of a traditional landed gentry. In Europe the political power of the great landowners had been of utmost significance for the relationship between the rural masses and the urban, middle-class interests, and thus in determining the ultimate form of political development.⁶ The Upper Canadian farmers could call on no such powerful ally against the well positioned commercial government apparatus. "Throughout rural Upper Canada class distinctions tended to disappear,"⁷ and if it was something less than an egalitarian paradise, certainly nothing remotely approximating a landed aristocracy ever emerged. Attempts to establish a squirearchy resulted mainly in encouraging land speculation.

Nor could the farmers, whose own cohesiveness was hampered by abysmally bad communications facilities, look to an emerging urban proletariat as a possible ally, for none existed.⁸ The urban centres were still small, while manufacturing was little more than "a village

⁶ See Barrington Moore Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston, Beacon Press, 1966).

⁷ S.D. Clark, The Developing Canadian Community, second edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 71; for a contradictory viewpoint, see Michael Cross, "The Age of Gentility: The Development of an Aristocracy in the Ottawa Valley", Canadian Historical Association Historical Papers (1967), 105-117.

⁸ That working class support could have been a valuable asset to the farmers, had a sizeable working class existed, is suggested by the fact that of the 885 persons arrested during the Rebellion of 1837, more were labourers (workmen or artisans) - 429 - than 'yeomen' - 396. Cited in Charles Lipton, The Trade Union Movement in Canada 1827-1959 (Montreal: Canadian Social Publication, 1967), 15.

handicraft in small workshops."⁹

The extremist, rebel faction was utterly quashed, its defeat assured by a lack of natural allies, and, among its potential supporters, by "political convictions, religious affiliations, loyalties and sentiments - the whole intellectual and emotional heritage of a people."¹⁰ Still, the Rebellion stands out as far and away the most serious political upheaval in Ontario history. For this reason, perhaps, a tendency has developed "to attach fundamental importance to the Rebellion and the Union as rejections of the colonial past, when they ought more accurately to be described as events which eliminated certain alternative lines of development, reform as well as conservative, implicit in the early circumstances of the colony".¹¹

The reform alternative suffered a good deal more damage than the conservative. Extreme radical American-style democracy was forever vanquished. The moderate reformers did regroup under the Union, but they were unable to regain their former cohesiveness and distinctiveness.¹² In that it was "premature", in terms of nascent class politics, and thus such an abject failure, the rebellion of 1837

⁹Jacob Spelt, Urban Development in South Central Ontario (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972, first published 1955), 74.

¹⁰Creighton, Commercial Empire, 316.

¹¹S.F. Wise, "Upper Canada and the Conservative Tradition", in E. Firth, ed., Profiles of a Province (Toronto: Ontario Historical Society, 1967), 21.

¹²Creighton, Commercial Empire, 338; see also J.M.S. Careless, The Union of the Canadas: The Growth of Canadian Institutions 1841-1857 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967).

discredited broadly based class movements. From an obverse point of view, it did render the commercial-bureaucratic alliance controlling the state more responsive. Thus the attainment of responsible government was not so much a triumph of democratic-reform modes of thought as a safeguard insuring the continuance of the fundamentally conservative mold of government. As S.D. Clark observed, 'what has been thought of in Canada as an orderly process of adopting political institutions to changing circumstances has actually represented an effort to hold in check the kind of democratic forces which were growing up from within the Canadian community.'¹³

Table IV-1 considers the political legacy of the rebellion in a much more restricted fashion. Party vote shares are tabulated for 'loyal' ridings and for 'disloyal' ridings,¹⁴ so as to gauge the electoral residue of 1837, and to trace the 'rebel' political tradition in Ontario voting. This measurement of loyalty is crude in the extreme; moreover, a host of factors could be identified which would diminish the strength of any rebel tradition. Hence the results which emerge from this analysis - against considerable odds, so to speak - are particularly intriguing.

To judge by party labels and party origins, as well as political mythology, the Liberals could reasonably be expected to be more popular

¹³S.D. Clark, The Developing Canadian Community, second edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 208.

¹⁴For the nature and source of this distinction, see Appendix B. Ridings uninhabited in 1837 are excluded.

MEAN PARTY VOTE ACCORDING TO LOYALTY IN 1837

Election	Liberal		Conservative		Third Party				N	
	Loyal	Disloyal	Loyal	Disloyal	Loyal	Disloyal			L	D
1867	34.5	37.3	37.8	36.7					38	31
1871	31.0	33.1	30.6	29.0					33	27
1875	32.3	35.2	33.6	33.1					39	29
1879	29.9	35.4	30.3	31.9					41	32
1883	33.1	35.6	33.4	33.4					42	30
1886	32.9	35.8	32.3	32.8					40	31
1890	32.5	36.4	29.8	32.5					39	30
1894	32.8	37.1	31.4	36.2	27.9	21	28.5	14	45	32
1898	35.1	40.4	35.8	38.3					44	32
1902	35.5	37.5	35.8	37.6					45	32
1905	32.3	37.0	38.7	40.1					45	32
1908	29.7	36.3	37.1	39.2					43	31
1911	28.1	33.6	34.0	36.4					39	26
1914	31.5	35.0	35.6	39.5					47	33
1919	27.2	28.1	26.6	26.1	32.2	12	35.7	26	46	33
1923	15.8	19.9	29.2	29.8	22.1	30	24.2	26	41	32
1926	23.6	32.1	38.1	35.2	36.2	7	40.4	6	55	30
1929	21.1	27.0	32.4	33.6	25.6	3	24.0	5	55	28
1934	36.1	39.6	28.9	30.2	12.0	20	9.3	12	48	22
1937	36.3	38.6	27.5	28.9	8.1	23	7.0	10	48	22
1943	18.1	20.0	22.1	22.0	16.0		17.4		48	22
1945	22.2	24.1	32.9	32.9	14.0		13.7		48	22
1948	20.2	22.9	29.8	27.0	17.7		17.0		48	22
1951	20.6	23.3	33.2	31.2	12.1	40	12.8		48	22
1955	20.4	22.9	30.2	30.8	10.9	38	10.3		52	25
1959	22.1	22.3	28.3	29.2	10.0	41	9.6		52	25
1963	22.0	23.5	30.7	32.2	10.3	55	9.2	22	60	27
1967	20.7	21.6	28.0	28.1	15.5		16.7		61	33
1971	20.4	21.8	32.0	33.3	19.1		18.9		61	33
1975	22.5	24.8	24.3	23.8	18.9		19.2		54	48
1977	19.7	21.5	25.7	25.3	18.0		17.8		54	48

The Conservatives ran virtually complete slates of candidates (no more than 3 below the N's in the final columns) in each election, save 1894, in which they presented 38 in Loyal ridings and 22 in disloyal ridings. The Liberals presented complete slates except in the following elections (number of candidates in loyal and disloyal ridings): 1894 (37,28); 1914 (41,26); 1919 (32,19); 1923 (36,20); 1926 (38,18); 1929 (46,25). The number of third party candidates is shown if it is less than a full slate.

in ridings with disloyal traditions than in loyal ridings. Following the same criteria, the Conservatives might be expected to fare better in loyal areas than in disloyal.

The latter prediction was not at all fulfilled; the Conservatives frequently proved to have slightly stronger electoral support in disloyal areas than in the ridings which had remained loyal. Overall, no consistent pattern emerges from the data on Conservative voting according to loyalty in 1837. Conversely, at each and every election since Confederation, the Grits have attracted a higher proportion of the electorate in disloyal ridings than in loyal ridings. To be sure, the difference has often been slight, particularly in recent years; in earlier times, though, the margin occasionally exceeded 5 or 6 per cent. Significantly, this differential was most pronounced and most consistent not in the years closest to the Rebellion itself, but rather during the years of the darkest Grit fortunes - 1905 to 1929. This suggests a potent 'rebel' tradition among those bedrock Liberals who remained faithful to the party over these years. On a larger scale, these findings might be interpreted as demonstrating a certain narrow, backwards-looking appeal on the Liberals' part, at least by comparison with the ruling Tories' all-encompassing popularity.

At the risk of reading too much into Table IV-1, it seems a telling indication of the Patrons' of Industry 'radicalism' that they fared virtually no better in disloyal ridings than in loyal ridings. As for the UFO, the distribution of their electoral support was

somewhat more in keeping with their heritage as Ontario rural radicals, for they were slightly stronger, in terms of votes attracted and candidates fielded, in disloyal ridings. It should come as no surprise that the loyal-disloyal dichotomy has made no discernible difference in CCF-NDP electoral support, which is rooted in very different traditions and issues.

Demographic Change and Immigration

Immigration, by shifting the social composition of Ontario society, and by increasing the province's population, has been of signal importance in bringing about certain social changes.¹⁵ At the same time, though, immigration (taken in tandem with its obverse, emigration) has contributed significantly to maintaining the social order, and it has powerfully reinforced Ontario's conservative tendencies.

Table IV-2 presents some basic demographic data on Ontario, culled in the main from the decennial census. As the figures in the table demonstrate, in the years prior to Confederation, the province experienced a truly remarkable population growth, due in large measure to a massive influx of British immigrants. Contrary to what might have been expected, however, these newcomers were anything but a force for progress and change, bringing new ideas and social organizations with them. Rather, people who immigrated to the colonies were not those who in the old

¹⁵Internal migration doubtless has important social and political implications. Save the special case of migration from countryside to city, however, it has not been possible to deal with internal migration.

Population of Ontario 1810 - 1971

Year	Population (thousands)	Percent increase over decade	Percent foreign born	Percent born in other provinces	Percent Ontario-born living in other provinces
1810	75				
1824	150	100			
1833	295	97			
1842	487	65			
1851	952	95			
1861	1,396	47			
1871	1,620	16	27	3	1
1881	1,926	19	22	3	3
1891	2,114	10	19	3	6
1901	2,182	3	15	3	8
1911	2,527	16	20	3	14
1921	2,933	16	22	4	14
1931	3,431	17	23	4	12
1941	3,787	10	19	6	10
1951	4,597	21	19	9	9
1961	6,236	36	22	9	8
1971	7,703	24	22	10	7

Empty cells indicate data not available

Sources: population 1810 R.L. Gentilecore, "Settlement", in Gentilecore ed., Ontario (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 28.
 1824-1961 Population Statistics Ontario, 1969 (Toronto: Queen's Printer, Department of Treasury and Economics, 1969), table I.
 1971 Census of Canada 1971, Catalogue 92-716, 14-4

foreign born, born in other provinces, Ontario born living in other provinces

1871-1951 calculated from Kenneth Buckley, "Historical Estimates of Internal Migration in Canada," CPSA Conference on Statistics, 1960, E.F. Beach and J.C. Weldon, eds., (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), table 9.
 1961 calculated from Census of Canada 1961, Catalogue 92-547, 49-2.
 1971 calculated from Census of Canada 1971, Catalogue 92-727, 34-1.

world were making a successful adjustment to the demands of the new industrialism and agricultural revolution. Rather they were the people who, caught up in these changes, were desperately trying to hold on to what they had. Emigration appeared to offer a means of preserving the past and escaping the demands of the future.¹⁶

In the first decades after Confederation, the proportion of Ontario residents born in other provinces was very low, as was the proportion of Ontario-born residents in other parts of Canada. This suggests that, in terms of population movement, and by implication, of social influence, Ontario had relatively little interaction with the other provinces, particularly in contrast to the large population flow, and with its social and cultural influence, from the British Isles.

The overall growth of population remained quite steady from 1861 to 1941, but the net population figures conceal important counter-trends of immigration and emigration. Throughout this period, the proportion of Ontarians born outside Canada hovered around twenty per cent. The important point about the substantial numbers of immigrants is that they were overwhelmingly British in origin.¹⁷ The British influence was thus continuously reinforced, while the socially leavening effect of non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants was minimal. On the emigration side of the ledger, substantial numbers of native Ontarians left the province; from 1891 onwards, approximately a tenth of those born in Ontario

¹⁶S.D. Clark, Movements of Political Protest in Canada 1640-1850 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), 484.

¹⁷In 1895, 87 per cent of the immigrants to Ontario were from the British Isles (70 per cent from England); A. Margaret Evans, "Oliver Mowat and Ontario 1872-1896; A Study in Political Success," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1967, 481.

resided in other provinces. Moreover, although reliable figures are not available, it is likely that at least an equal number found their way to the United States.¹⁸ These migrants, it seems safe to say, were disproportionately drawn from the most venturesome and enterprising and least traditional elements of the populace. Certainly the Ontarians who left for Manitoba in the years immediately after Confederation

¹⁸ Many migrated to industrialized states, but equal numbers apparently went to the Canadian and American wests in the last century; Charles M. Studness, "Economic Opportunity and the Westward Migration of Canadians in the Late Nineteenth Century," Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science XXX (November, 1964), 570. Estimates vary considerably as to the precise numbers involved: employing Canadian census data, Taylor made the following estimation for the net migration of Ontario born to the United States:

1881 - 1891	-20,700
1891 - 1901	-50,300
1901 - 1911	+44,300
1911 - 1921	-97,400
1921 - 1931	-148,000
1931 - 1941	-31,800

Taylor believes that, for a variety of reasons, these figures, particularly for the earlier decades, are serious underestimates. Iain C. Taylor, "Components of Population Change, Ontario 1850-1940," unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Toronto, 1967, table 2-7, p. 53. Some forty years earlier, G.E. Jackson used American census data to formulate the following estimates of the movement of Canadian born citizens to the United States:

1850 - 1860	135,000
1860 - 1870	305,000
1870 - 1880	325,000
1880 - 1890	410,000
1890 - 1900	380,000
1900 - 1910	225,000
1910 - 1920	110,000

Although he provides no regional or provincial breakdowns, Jackson did find English Canadians far more likely to emigrate than their French speaking counterparts. G.E. Taylor, "Emigration of Canadians to the United States," in W.P.M. Kennedy, ed., Social And Economic Conditions in the Dominion of Canada: The Annals (May, 1923), table II, p. 28.

were mainly well-to-do and industrious rather than impoverished or desperate.¹⁹ That these people elected to quit the province rather than rebel against its oftentimes stultifying conservatism only served to remove potential sources of change to the established order.

Since the Second World War, Ontario has experienced more rapid expansion of population than at any time since Confederation. The primal force underlying demographic change in these years has been the impact of immigration. To take an extreme but singularly important illustration, some sixty per cent of the substantial population growth in the Toronto-Hamilton area for the decade 1961-1971 was accounted for by international immigration.²⁰ Not only have immigrants come in tremendous numbers, but an altogether unprecedented proportion of them have come from continental Europe, and from other non-Anglo-Saxon parts of the world.²¹ Important as these immigrants have been in altering the province's social and cultural composition and the attitudes of native Ontarians, their impact in terms of overall social change, and hence of political change, has been less than it might

¹⁹J.J. Talman, "Migration from Ontario to Manitoba in 1871," Ontario History XLIII (January, 1951), 38-9.

²⁰Ontario Ministry of Treasury, Economics, and Intergovernmental Affairs, Ontario's Changing Population, Vol 1: Patterns and Trends Factors of Change 1941-1971 (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1976), 42.

²¹In the period, 1946-1961, thirty four per cent of the nearly 1.1 million immigrants to Ontario were British, and another six per cent were American: Ontario Department of Treasury and Economics, Population Statistics, Ontario 1969 (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1969), table 47: since 1961, the source of immigration has further shifted away from Britain and the United States.

have been, for two reasons. First, comparatively few of the post-war British immigrants were from lower or working class backgrounds; this, combined with the "much more proletarian"²² character of European immigrants, "reinforced the association between ethnic origin and social status that was already characteristic of the Canadian population".²³ Secondly, "instead of influencing the form and function of Canadian society, immigrants have been obliged to alter their behaviour, as have native-born Canadians, in response to social changes resulting from industrialization".²⁴

Religion and Ethnicity

Two fundamental changes have occurred over the past century in the social characteristics of religious and ethnic groups. One is readily documented: the shift in the relative sizes of the various groups. The other change is all but impossible to discuss in other than impressionistic terms: the decline in the salience of ethnic and religious ties and attitudes. Unfortunately, in both social and political impact, the latter looms somewhat larger.

Religion and ethnic origin must be dealt with in concert, for

²²Anthony H. Richmond, Post-War Immigrants in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), 106.

²³Ibid., 125.

²⁴Frank E. Jones, "Some Social Consequences of Immigration for Canada", Proceedings of World Population Conference (New York: United Nations, 1967), IV, 207. Since Ontario has consistently received just over half of all post-war immigration, the equation of Ontario with Canada seems justified for purposes of this observation.

they have been inextricably bound together in shaping social attitudes. In mid-nineteenth century Hamilton, for example, "Irish Catholicism, rather than Catholicism itself, proved the major [social and economic] handicap".²⁵ It is not possible, from the published census material, to distinguish with any consistency among the various combinations of religious and ethnic groups, save English and French speaking Catholics.²⁶ Thus in interpreting the data in Tables IV-3 and IV-4 on the religious and ethnic composition of Ontario since 1871, the complex interplay of the two must be kept in mind.

Table IV-3, which shows the national origins of Ontarians, clearly illustrates the numerical preponderance of persons with Anglo-Saxon background throughout provincial history. What the table cannot show, but which may be safely inferred, is the overwhelming influence of persons of British stock. Although the proportion of Ontarians claiming Irish or Scots descent has declined steadily since 1871, the percentage listing English origin actually increased as late as 1921. This doubtless reflects the disproportionate numbers of immigrants to Ontario from England rather than from elsewhere in the British Isles;

²⁵Michael B. Katz, The People of Hamilton, Canada West: Family and Class in a Mid-Nineteenth Century City (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), 68.

²⁶C. Houston and W.J. Smyth claim to have distinguished between Protestant and Catholic Irishmen in 1871. Their estimation procedures (which rely heavily on an early ethnographic study), are not entirely convincing for 1871, and are simply untenable for later years. "The Orange Order in Nineteenth-Century Ontario: A Study in Institutional Cultural Transfer," University of Toronto, Department of Geography, Discussion Paper Series, 1977, 39.

TABLE IV-3

NATIONAL ORIGIN OF ONTARIANS 1871 - 1971 (PERCENTAGES)

Year	English	Irish	Scots	Welsh	French	German	Dutch	Italian	Scanda- navian	Russian	Polish	Indian (
1871	27	35	20		5	10	1					1
1881	23	33	20		5	10	1					1
1901*	31	29	19		7	10	1					1
1911	36	25	17		8	8	1	1		.5	.5	1
1921	41	21	16	.5	9	5	2	1	1	.5	.5	1
1931	39	19	17	.5	9	5	2	2	1	.5	1	1
1941	38	18	15	.5	10	4	2	2	1	.5	1	1
1951	36	16	14	1	10	5	2	2	1	2	2	1
1961	31	14	13	1	10	5	3	4	2	2	2	1
1971	59	a	a	a	10	6	3	6	1	2	2	1

* national origin not ascertained in the 1891 census
a included with English (separate breakdowns not given)

Source: Census of Canada, 1871, I, 280-1.
1881, I, 296-7.
1901, I, 406-10.
1911, II, 334-7.
1921, I, 452-3.
1931, II, 396-7.
1941, II, 404-5.
1951, I, 33-5.
1961, catalogue 99-516, table 2.
1971, catalogue 92-774 (SP-4), table 1.

Empty cells indicate less than .5

as well, it may indicate a loss of ethnic identity among second and third generation Scots and Irish. An important process not revealed in this table, which may have contributed to such a decline, was the lessening of geographical concentration of ethnic groups; by the turn of the century, the extremely uneven distribution which had characterized initial settlement had given way to a much more homogeneous geographical distribution.²⁷ At any rate, as Table IV-3 shows, only after the Second World War did Ontario cease to be overwhelmingly British, and feel the impact of substantial numbers of European immigrants. Also of interest in this table is the slow but steady rise in the Franco-Ontarian population from 1881 to 1941, and its subsequent levelling off at ten per cent of the provincial population. Finally, the decline in the proportion of persons with German origin from 1901 to 1941 indicates the growing Anglicization of this group, reinforced by a desire to play down nationality during or shortly after both World Wars, as evidenced by the significant declines in 1921 and 1941.

The most salient feature of Table IV-4, which portrays the religious affiliation of Ontarians, is the steady increase in the proportion of Roman Catholics. In 1871, Roman Catholics lagged substantially behind Anglicans, Methodists, and Presbyterians in terms of numerical strength; a century later, they are far and away the largest denomination in the province. While the proportion of Anglicans in Ontario has remained fairly steady (though a downward trend may be

²⁷J. Clarke and P.K. MacLeod, "Concentration of Scots in Southern Ontario 1851-1901," Canadian Cartographer XI (June, 1974), 107-13.

TABLE IV-4

RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF ONTARIO 1871 - 1971 (PERCENTAGES)

Year	Baptist	Roman Catholic	Anglican	Lutheran	Methodist United*	Presbyterian	Other
1871	5	17	21	2	29	22	4
1881	6	17	19	2	31	22	4
1891	5	17	18	2	31	22	4
1901	5	18	17	2	31	22	5
1911	5	19	19	3	27	21	6
1921	5	20	22	2	23	21	7
1931	5	22	22	3	28	13	7
1941	5	23	21	3	28	11	8
1951	5	25	20	3	29	10	9
1961	4	30	18	4	26	8	10
1971	4	33	16	4	21	7	15

* in 1924, most Methodists and some Presbyterians formed the United Church of Canada. Other schisms and unions occurred over the years but were of very minor significance in terms of province-wide denominational composition.

Source: 1871-1961: Census of Canada, 1961, catalogue 99-521, table 1.
1971: Census of Canada, 1971, catalogue 92-775 (SP-5), table 1.

discerned after 1931), both the Methodists and the Presbyterians, and their later progeny, the United Church, have experienced marked declines since the turn of the century. The various Baptist Churches have fallen slightly in terms of their proportion of the provincial population, while the Lutheran Churches have gained slightly. Numerically more significant has been the growth in 'other' denominations, which include persons of the Greek Catholic, Ukrainian Catholic and Jewish faiths, and those belonging to no religious group.

As symbolized in the lumping together in recent censuses of persons of Scots, Irish, and Welsh descent as "British", this dimension of ethnicity is of minimal social significance for present-day Ontario. In an earlier age, however, these distinctions were of fundamental social significance. That such ethnic affiliations were highly salient is not to imply that they necessarily led to social conflict, let alone political divisions. As well, antagonisms among religious denominations, far more important in structuring political life, were only loosely related to ethnic divisions. The massive Irish migrations of the 1840's, however, effected major changes in the social bases of political conflict. Prior to the famine migrations, Catholics and Protestants of Irish origin had maintained reasonably peaceful, if not overly amicable, relations. However, the poverty, disease, and ignorance of the predominantly Catholic migrants encouraged Irish Protestants to seek a method of distinguishing themselves from the newcomers, who were considered a

"disgrace to Irish men".²⁸ The Orange lodge became the vehicle for displaying these differences, and it is from this time that Orangeism and anti-Catholicism came to figure prominently in the politics of Canada West.

Confederation was not a 'critical juncture' in the social sense, but it did provide the opportunity for a fresh starting point in Ontario politics. The reversion to pre-Union boundaries within an expanded federation at a stroke removed from the Ontario political agenda the central problem of pre-Confederation politics, the French-English imbroglio. Further, the new federal division of powers, in which the provinces were clearly subordinate, siphoned off most of the key economic issues to the central level of government. In some quarters these factors were expected to result in a local legislature which was little more than a glorified non-partisan county council. The issues which emerged to thwart this expectation were linear descendants of pre-Confederation conflicts, and they tellingly reflect the primary bases of political division in Ontario at that time: religion and ethnicity.

That, in Victorian Canada, "religion - not wealth, and not politics - was the chief concern, the main ideal occupation of Canadians"²⁹ can scarcely be denied. However, the extent and the depth of

²⁸Kenneth Duncan, "Irish Famine Migration and the Social Structure of Canada West", Canadian Review of Anthropology and Sociology II (February, 1965), 7.

²⁹W.L. Morton, "Victorian Canada," in Morton, ed., The Shield of Achilles (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968), 314.

religious conflict, and its political ramifications are easily overstated, in part because of the inflammatory language characteristic of political rhetoric and newspaper commentary of the day. The Orange Lodge had close ties with the Conservative party, but it was by no means primarily a political organization, nor was its foremost social aim the combatting of Papist influence. Moreover, much of the sectarian violence in nineteenth century Toronto was ritualistic: indeed in comparative terms, ethno-religious strife was fairly mild and seems to have been largely played out through verbal abuse.³⁰ Moreover, class was closely intertwined with religion and ethnicity:

pure religious conflict quickly gave way to much more complex struggles with political, class, and economic motives underlying what superficially appeared to be clashes of religion... Many a riot described by the contemporary press in simple Orange-Catholic terms involved such non-religious matters as political rights, working conditions, wages, and even the partisan enforcement of the law. One can argue that the great number of Irish people...gave a nationalistic and religious dimension to conflicts that would have taken place anyway in a society becoming increasingly urban and on the threshold of industrialization.³¹

Withal, religion was undoubtedly of great social and political import in Ontario in the nineteenth century and later; so too was ethnicity. Their prominence must not, however, lead us to over-emphasize their influence. It is clear that religion became politically significant when the parties chose to make it so, for example,

³⁰Greg Kealey, "The Orange Order in Toronto: Religious Riot and the Working Class," in Greg Kealey and Peter Warrian, eds., Essays in Canadian Working Class History (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), 13-34. It may be worth recalling that in the most infamous violent episode in Victorian Ontario, the murder of the 'Black' Donnellys, virtually all the participants were Catholic.

³¹Duncan, "Famine Migration," 8.

in the 1880's and early 1890's, and in the East Hastings by-election in 1936, whereas it declined in salience when the parties did not emphasize it. To be sure, social pressures and social changes, including economic conditions, partially - but only partially - determined the parties' promotion of religion. The bilingual schools issue admirably illustrates the complex interaction of social forces and the role of the parties in downplaying or promoting ethnic and religious conflict.

Bilingual schools first emerged as a point of political contention in the 1880's, as an offshoot of the separate school controversy (this despite the fact that most French schools were within the public school system). As religious strife left the forefront of political activity in Ontario after the 1894 election, the furor over French language schools died down. In the meantime, however, heavy French Canadian immigration into the eastern counties and the new north effectively doubled the French speaking population of the province within thirty years. By 1910, Ontario's Orangemen had been alerted to the danger and were determined that this baneful influence be beaten back in order that the province's Anglo-Saxon character be maintained. In response, the Whitney administration adopted a hard line against the use of French in the schools. This never became more than a minor issue in Ontario; faced with outright hostility from the Irish clergy and indifference from other Catholics,³² the harried Franco-Ontarians

³²Marilyn Barber, "The Ontario Bilingual Schools Issue: Sources of Conflict," Canadian Historical Review XLVII (September, 1966), 230. See also Robert Choquette, Language and Religion: A History of English-French Conflict in Ontario (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1975), passim.

were virtually without allies, so that the Liberal party would not take up their cause. The 'resolution' of the issue in the 1920's, like the compromise over funding of separate schools in the same period, clearly marked a conscious decision on the part of the Conservative government to have done with the politics of language and religion.

It has become a commonplace to speak of the decline in the importance of religion in Canadian society.³³ The corollary of the lessened social significance of religious attitudes, brought on by urbanization and industrialization, is that religious conflict is much diminished in political import. Of course religious affiliation continues to be related to party choice,³⁴ but to a large extent this reflects ethnicity and the force of electoral inertia rather than the political salience of religion. Despite concerted attempts on both sides to politicize it, the government's policy on funding separate schools was a relatively minor issue in the 1971 election. Not only is religious discord much less in evidence than in an earlier day, but the religious conflicts which persist do not rate highly on the political agenda.

³³ See Stewart Crysedale, The Changing Church in Canada (Toronto: Board of Evangelism and Social Service, 1965), and Stewart Crysedale and Les Wheatcroft, "The Analysis of Religion," in Crysedale and Wheatcroft, eds., Religion in Canadian Society (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976).

³⁴ See, for example, Robert Drummond, "Voting Behavior: The Blueing of Ontario," in Donald C. MacDonald, ed., Government and Politics of Ontario (Toronto: Macmillan, 1975), 294-317; Lynn McDonald, "Religion and Voting: A Study of the 1968 Federal Election in Ontario," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology VI (August, 1969), 129-44.

Such does not seem to have been the case with ethnicity. Though religion oftentimes is an essential component of ethnic identity,³⁵ with the advent of substantial numbers of non-British immigrants, ethnicity seems more germane in terms of social divisions than religion. All the same, politics premised on ethnic conflict have failed to emerge on any large scale, even in the post-War period. This is partially due to the entrenched power positions of the British elite and partially to the loss of ethnic identity among second and third generation immigrants. Ethnic factors impinge on a wide range of political issues, even economic class issues, for ethnicity and class are closely bound together, but they have not, in their own right, structured Ontario politics.

Prohibition

The struggle for prohibition in Ontario marked far more than simply a long-running battle over the evils of the demon rum. The temperance movement reflected and gave political form to some signally important attitudinal shifts brought on by social change. The politics of prohibition thus represent one key aspect of the interaction of social change and the political realm. As well, the political significance of temperance agitation was far more substantial than might be surmised from the short span of time when alcohol was outlawed in this province.

³⁵David Millett, "Religion as a Source of Perpetuation of Ethnic Identity," in I. Davies and K. Herman, eds., Social Space: Canadian Perspectives (Toronto: New Press, 1971), 175.

The prohibition movement gained strength in Ontario during the last years of the nineteenth century, but did not reach its maximum political impact until the Great War. Temperance sentiment (which was rarely temperate, but usually favoured total prohibition) had been present in Ontario since shortly after the War of 1812. Its growth into a potent organized movement, supported by a broad segment of the populace, coincided with the expansion of industrialism. "Drinking," observes Peter Waite, "was no doubt a social evil long before the Canadian industrial revolution, but its seriousness began to be felt when it became an economic evil as well."³⁶ Probably of greater moment, though, were the threats, symbolized by the intemperate workingman, to the status and life-style of the newly established urban middle class.³⁷ Individual attitudes towards prohibition were only loosely related to church membership, but the movement was predominantly Protestant with nativist overtones.³⁸ Attitudinally, the prohibitionists exhibited a curious, singularly zealous blend of religion, middle-class social reformism, reactionary agrarianism and feminism.

Dissatisfied with the local option provisions of the Canada Temperance Act and the often poorly enforced provincial act, prohibitionists were granted a provincial plebiscite in 1894, which they

³⁶Peter Waite, "Sir Oliver Mowat's Canada: Reflections on an Un-Victorian Society," in Donald Swainson, ed., Oliver Mowat's Ontario (Toronto: Macmillan, 1972), 16.

³⁷Malcolm Graeme Decarie, "The Prohibition Movement in Ontario, 1894-1916," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Queen's University, 1972, 339-40.

³⁸Ibid., 24, 29-33, 339.

carried. Mowat, however, finessed the issue by promising stricter regulation and claiming that anything further would fall under federal jurisdiction.³⁹ The Dominion government's failure to act on the results of its 1898 plebiscite, or on the moderate reforms urged by an earlier Royal Commission helped shift the focus of prohibitionist activity back to the provincial arena. A second provincial plebiscite, in 1902, missed the requisite two-thirds majority by only a few hundred votes. "Great was the indignation of the temperance people at this result; within sight of their goal, they had been balked by the evasions of Ross; and in the elections of 1905 there is no doubt that many temperance men voted against Ross in sheer revenge."⁴⁰

The Tories may well have acquired some votes in this fashion, but until the second decade of the century prohibition was not transformed into a central political issue, chiefly because both parties assiduously, if ambiguously, cultivated support from friends and foes of the demon rum, all the while attempting to avoid politicizing the issue. Whitney continued Mowat's policy of stricter enforcement of existing legislation together with reduction in the number of liquor licences, but he steadfastly refused to enact more restrictive legislation, lest he alienate urban supporters. If these policies won the Tories few votes, neither did they cost them many, for the Grits did

³⁹Evans, "Oliver Mowat," 330-41.

⁴⁰W.S. Wallace, "Political History, 1867-1912," in Canada and its Provinces XVII (Ontario). Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty, eds., (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1914), 182.

not push the government on the issue, and, by virtue of their past record, were scarcely less appealing to avid prohibitionists.

This state of affairs ceased abruptly with the accession of N.W. Rowell to the Grit leadership shortly before the 1911 election. Rowell, a prominent prohibitionist, immediately set out to make temperance the key plank in the Liberal platform. The impact on the 1911 election was scant, but by 1914, prohibition ranked as a central issue of the day.⁴¹ The advent of war added significantly to the appeal of prohibitionist arguments: "war called for an exaltation of those same virtues which prohibition was supposed to achieve and it added to the contempt for self-indulgence and waste associated with alcohol. Moreover, war intensified the nativist element in prohibition."⁴² The new Tory leader W.H. Hearst was personally amenable to moderate prohibition, and he recognized the growing popularity of the movement, as witnessed by the consistently dry outcome of local referenda. Despite its pretense of non-partisanship, the Ontario temperance movement was closely associated with the Liberal party. Hence when Hearst brought in the Ontario Temperance Act in 1916, he gained little political credit, but seriously split his party.⁴³

⁴¹ Brian D. Tennyson, "Sir William Hearst and the Ontario Temperance Act," Ontario History LV (December, 1963), 234.

⁴² Decarie, "Prohibition Movement," 345.

⁴³ Peter Oliver, "Sir William Hearst and the Collapse of the Ontario Conservative Party," Canadian Historical Review LIII (March, 1972), 45.

One historian has argued that prohibition may have been one of the most discussed issues in the 1919 campaign, but it was "probably not a vital factor in the outcome" since for any party to actively oppose it would have been to court political suicide.⁴⁴ This view overlooks the extent to which the O.T.A. undermined the Tories' urban strength, without gaining them commensurate rural dry support. As well, the new ultra-wet Grit leader, Hartley Dewart, was hardly attractive to his party's rural stalwarts who were predominantly dry; conversely, the Liberals shattered all precedents with their capture of five of the eight seats in Toronto, in which city temperance zeal was a notably minority failing. (The Independent Labour Party pointedly avoided any pronouncements on the subject, lest this lead to a falling out with its fervently dry country ally, the United Farmers of Ontario.) Another factor of some importance was the scheduling of a plebiscite on the continuation of the O.T.A. on election day, which doubtless increased the turnout among the newly enfranchised female population, which had relatively weak attachments to the established parties.

Temperance ardour cooled somewhat in the years following the war while the province's thirst grew; further, even some prohibitionists were repelled by the government's excesses in running down those who had contravened the Act.⁴⁵ The Conservatives were coy in their public

⁴⁴Gerald A. Hallowell, Prohibition in Ontario, 1919-1923 (Toronto: Ontario Historical Society, 1972), 38.

⁴⁵Peter Oliver, "W.E. Raney and the Politics of "Uplift", Journal of Canadian Studies VI (February, 1971), 15.

pronouncements on prohibition in the 1923 election, but their opposition was only thinly veiled. The drastic reduction in the dry plurality at the referendum held in late 1924 further underlined prohibition's drop in political potency. Within a year a revamped Ontario Temperance Act set up government controlled distribution of alcohol. In the 1926 election, the government's liquor policy figured prominently,⁴⁶ in large measure due to the lack of other issues. The unmistakably wet Tories gained substantially in popular vote, thereby writing finis to prohibition as a mainstream political issue.

Yet the movement had a more lasting significance than the memory of a fleeting period when the province had been nominally dry. The prohibitionists' original concentration on one facet of social reform came to embrace a much wider spectrum of social welfare issues, in particular the poverty and vile working conditions which frequently led to drink. Many prohibitionist leaders thus began to take action against the evils of the existing social and economic order, and became committed to a whole range of 'social gospel' reform measures. The remarkable shift within the Methodist clergy from antagonism to support of the principles of organized labour is but one illustration.⁴⁷ In addition, as repeated prohibitionist majorities in plebiscites failed to bring success, a deep distrust of the political system and its parties set in: "in the disillusionment which accompanied... broken promises and

⁴⁶Hallowell, Prohibition, 156.

⁴⁷William H. Magney, "The Methodist Church and the National Gospel, 1884-1914," The Bulletin, 1968, 59.

worthless electoral victories⁷ many leading men must have been lost to the established parties, particularly the Liberal party. The established parties forfeited much of their leadership in social reform and lost an elite. They also brought thousands of Ontarians into political activity outside the parties through local option campaigns. There, skills were developed which could be turned against the old parties.⁴⁸ The agitation over prohibition both signalled and fostered new attitudes towards society, and it also marked a significant departure from the political forms favoured by the established parties.

Table IV-5 explores the nature and the distribution of prohibitionist support; data from the four prohibition plebiscites held between 1894 and 1924 are tabulated by region and by rural-urban composition.⁴⁹

The province-wide figures convey important insights into the prohibition conflict. The 'drys' held clear pluralities over their 'wet' opponents in 1894 and 1902, but support for prohibition reached its zenith in 1919, when drys outnumbered wets approximately two to one. By 1924, after seven years of prohibition, the dry vote was barely two per cent higher than that in favour of doing away with the Ontario Temperance Act.⁵⁰ Comparison of turnout rates in elections and

⁴⁸Decarie, "Prohibition Movement," 343.

⁴⁹On the sources of these data, and definitions of regions, see Appendix B. The few women who voted in the 1894 Referendum are excluded; only the first (on which the spread between wet and dry was widest) of the four questions in 1919 is included.

⁵⁰The 'wet' and 'dry' figures are not precisely comparable across plebiscites, since the wording of the questions differed.

TABLE IV-5

RESULTS OF PROHIBITION REFERENDA
BY REGION AND RURAL-URBAN COMPOSITION

	1894				1902			
	Dry	Wet	Turnout	N	Dry	Wet	Turnout	N
Entire Province	34.9	21.1	56.0	90	32.9	17.1	50.0	97
Eastern Ontario	30.8	22.6	53.4	14	29.0	20.6	49.6	14
Lake Ontario	35.5	18.3	53.8	16	36.1	13.1	49.2	16
Georgian Bay	36.3	18.1	54.4	13	36.0	12.4	48.4	13
Golden Horseshoe	38.3	22.0	60.3	11	34.3	18.7	53.0	11
Western Ontario	38.2	22.8	61.0	30	35.2	16.8	52.0	30
Toronto	26.4	21.2	47.6	3	31.3	25.6	56.9	6
Northern Ontario	25.1	16.6	41.7	3	16.6	11.7	28.3	7
Urban	31.7	22.4	54.1	6	29.0	27.0	56.0	10
Mixed	32.4	22.9	55.3	18	31.0	19.0	50.0	20
Rural	37.3	20.1	57.4	65	34.7	13.9	48.6	67
	1919			1924				
	Dry	Wet	Turnout	Dry	Wet	Turnout	N	
Entire Province	48.7	23.2	71.9	31.1	29.3	60.4	107	
Eastern Ontario	45.3	24.3	69.6	28.7	29.5	58.2	15	
Lake Ontario	57.6	15.4	73.0	42.1	22.8	64.9	16	
Georgian Bay	58.9	15.7	74.6	46.3	19.7	65.0	13	
Golden Horseshoe	50.2	25.4	75.6	31.3	30.9	62.2	13	
Western Ontario	56.1	21.6	77.7	37.5	27.6	65.1	30	
Toronto	36.0	27.9	63.9	21.6	33.8	55.4	8	
Northern Ontario	37.9	29.4	67.3	15.2	34.4	49.6	12	
Urban	37.3	29.4	66.7	21.2	34.3	55.5	16	
Mixed	50.5	23.8	74.2	32.1	31.2	63.3	34	
Rural	57.3	17.2	74.5	40.9	22.0	62.9	57	

prohibition plebiscites is instructive:⁵¹ the liquor plebiscite held in January 1894 drew only 56 per cent of the electorate, compared with 69 per cent who voted in the election held six months later; seventy per cent of those eligible cast ballots at the May 1902 election, but in December of that year only 50 per cent voted on the liquor question; a slightly larger proportion of the electorate (4 per cent) voted at the 1924 plebiscite than had voted in the election held a year and a half earlier, but this was also 6 per cent less than the turnout in 1926. Given the greater importance of elections, and the heightened public interest in them, this differential in turnout is not surprising, but it does have an important implication. In view of the moralistic fervour characteristic of proponents of prohibition, it seems unlikely that very many dries failed to vote; those who did not participate in liquor plebiscites may not have been rabid wets, but neither were they prohibitionists. Now the proportion of dries varied considerably more from region to region than the proportions of wets.⁵² Since this result cannot be explained on any a priori basis, it suggests that the pro-temperance forces received a near maximum of their potential support, which would be subject to regional variation, whereas the poorly organized anti-prohibitionists mobilized their partisans haphazardly and ineffectively, thereby generating a more

⁵¹ Turnout in 1919 was, of course, the same for the election and the plebiscite.

⁵² The ranges for dry voting, within the seven regions, were 10.4, 19.5, 21.6 and 31.7 for the four referenda; the corresponding wet ranges were 6.2, 13.9, 14.0 and 14.7.

consistent vote across the province. The implication is that although they won clear victories in the voting, prohibitionists constituted little more than a third of the (male) Ontario populace in 1894 and 1902.⁵³

As the table makes clear, both region and rural-urban character were related to the plebiscite results, but the degree of urbanization had a particularly strong relationship to temperance voting. On each occasion, the wets were strongest in the cities and weakest in the country, while the reverse held true of dry support. In 1919, the rural areas went dry by a margin of 40 per cent, but in the cities the margin was only 8 per cent. Five years later, the countryside was still dry, by 19 per cent, but the urban centres voted wet by 13 per cent.

To an extent, the regional patterns reflect the rural-urban split over prohibition but regional factors are also at work. One clearly important feature of the table is the consistent ordering of regions in terms of the differential between dry and wet sentiment. On each occasion the Georgian Bay and Lake Ontario regions were the most pronounced areas of dry strength; Western Ontario was somewhat less ardent in its support for prohibition, but it was consistently ahead of the other regions. Next in terms of temperance voting was

⁵³It was widely believed that women were far more avid in their support for temperance than men. The results of the 1894 vote confirm this view; although only 35.7 per cent of eligible women voted, they were in favour of prohibition by a margin of better than six to one.

the Golden Horseshoe, with Eastern Ontario consistently less amenable to prohibition by several percentage points. The relatively low level of prohibitionist sentiment in Eastern Ontario was due to the large number of French-Canadians,⁵⁴ who were not the least enthused about prohibition. Weakest in their opposition to the demon rum were Toronto and Northern Ontario. The frontier character of the North as well as its high proportion of French Canadians and others of non-Anglo Saxon origin were key factors in the weakness of temperance zeal there. This ranking scarcely varied over three decades, suggesting the tenacity with which prohibitionist values were held among certain segments of the population. It also suggests important attitudinal continuities underlying the host of social and political changes which characterized the years 1894-1924.

Table IV-6 presents the simple correlation of party vote shares with the strength of wet and dry opinion in the various plebiscites for the years 1890-1905 and 1914-1923. In the first period, Liberal, Conservative and Patron voting was positively associated with dry strength, but virtually unrelated to wet strength. Since no party wished to align itself publicly with the wets, and since the dries were far better organized, and more cohesive, this is not surprising.

⁵⁴Outside of Toronto and Hamilton, the ridings most strongly and most consistently opposed to prohibition were Prescott, Russell, Ottawa East, Waterloo North, Windsor, Essex North, Sturgeon Falls, Sudbury, Cochrane and Nipissing. With the exception of Waterloo North, each of these ridings had large concentrations of French-Canadians. In 1911, slightly more than 75 per cent of the residents of Waterloo North were of German origin, far and away the largest concentration in the province.

TABLE IV-6

CORRELATION OF PARTY VOTE SHARES WITH PROHIBITIONIST SENTIMENT

	Dry		
	Liberal	Conservative	Third
1890	.19	.27	
1894	.19	.32	.30
1898	.27	.11	
1902	.48	.17	
1905	.41	.52	
1914	.51	.61	
1919	.07	.44	.38
1923	.17	.44	.55
	Wet		
	Liberal	Conservative	Third
1890	.10	.04	
1894	.12	.06	-.10
1898	.07	.13	
1902	-.06	-.11	
1905	.02	.13	
1914	-.33	-.54	
1919	.00	-.46	-.39
1923	-.18	-.42	-.49

As temperance agitation grew, both parties found their 1914 vote positively associated with dry strength and negatively associated with wet strength (the higher turnout in the dry, rural areas doubtless enhanced these relationships). In 1919, however, the Grims' close alliance with the prohibitionist forces was shattered; surprisingly perhaps, their vote in that year was all but unrelated to temperance sentiments. The strength of both the Tories and the UFO was positively, if moderately, related to support for the temperance cause (correlations of .44 and .38) and moderately associated with wet support in a negative manner (correlations of -.46 and -.39).

Urbanization

Urbanization and industrialization typically occur together, each fostering the other. Yet the social processes involved and their political ramifications are quite separate. The fundamental issues arising from industrial growth centre on economic inequality, exploitation and the requirements of work. Urbanization brings about a radically new environment and way of life (oftentimes accentuated by the values and lifestyles associated with industrialization) perhaps best categorized by Tonnies' gemeinschaft-gesellschaft distinction.⁵⁵

The process of urbanization raises a host of social and political problems indigenous to built-up areas, but the conflict between the

⁵⁵ for a discussion of the utility of Tonnies' distinction for contemporary social science, see W.G. Runciman, Social Science and Political Theory, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 151-5.

cities and the countryside over social and political hegemony looms equally large in potential political import. From the rural point of view, the rise of the cities may pose a serious threat to the moral well-being of society, while the rural influence may be seen by urban interests as retarding proper growth and development. This is certainly true of Ontario.

Table IV-7 presents data on the percentage of Ontarians residing in rural and urban places since 1851. The growth of the urban segment of the population is continuous, but two periods stand out with particularly high rates of urbanization: 1871-1911, the years of initial industrialization, and, to a lesser extent, 1941-1961, another period of rapid industrialization. Not only has the population of the rural areas declined relatively, but in some cases the decline was absolute. Yet the bald statistics of the table cannot convey the qualitative aspects of urbanization: in recent decades lifestyles and attitudes throughout the province's rural areas and villages have become so closely akin to those characteristic of the large cities as to call the very notion of a rural-urban distinction into question.⁵⁶

The political impact of the new city-dwellers was, until well into the present century, less pronounced than the weight of numbers might suggest. Some harboured illusions about returning to the farm, and so maintained their rural cast of mind; others were too impoverished

⁵⁶Kenneth Westhues and Peter R. Sinclair, Village in Crisis (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), 110-12.

TABLE IV-7

RURAL - URBAN COMPOSITION OF ONTARIO 1851 - 1971

Year	Percentages	
	Rural	Urban
1851	86	14
1861	81	19
1871	78	22
1881	70	30
1891	61	39
1901	57	43
1911	47	53
1921	42	58
1931	39	61
1941	38	62
1951*	29	71
1961	21	79
1971	18	82

* Prior to 1951 the census definition of "urban" included all incorporated places; in 1951 it was changed to include all built-up places of 1,000 or more persons. Since unincorporated suburbs, the principal areas affected by the change, were not extensive until after the Second World War, this definitional change results in only minor distortions in the comparability of pre- and post-1951 figures. Under the old definition, the 1951 and 1961 rural figures would have been 40 per cent and 42 per cent respectively.

Source: 1851-1951: calculated from Jacob Spelt, Urban Development in South-Central Ontario (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972, first published 1955), 180, table XIII.
 1961: Census of Canada, 1961, catalogue 92-536, 12-2.
 1971: Census of Canada, 1971, catalogue 92-709, 10-2.

to organize effectively,⁵⁷ while those in the new middle classes viewed the urban masses more as threats than as potential allies. In short, no community of interest or viewpoint united the disparate elements of the urban population; the statistical category did not correspond to sociological reality. Not so the rural population; indeed, the most obvious initial political outgrowth of urbanization was the farmers' opposition to it.

By the 1880's, the burgeoning urban centres had replaced foreign trade as the principal source of farm income, and the varied needs of the urban markets encouraged far-reaching diversification of Ontario agriculture. This in turn led to increased mechanization, as the chronic shortage of seasonal labour was intensified by heightened manpower requirements.⁵⁸ Thus the demand for farm implements, together with the improved productivity accompanying the new forms of husbandry, fostered industrial expansion and urbanization.⁵⁹ The farmer, in short, was being inextricably bound into the urban-industrial economy, becoming heavily dependent on the cities both for markets and supplies. This ever deepening interrelationship between the farmer and the forces of the urban market economy brought about what had been described as "the breakdown of the traditional rural life based on a large degree

⁵⁷Greg Kealey, Working Class Toronto At the Turn of the Century (Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1973).

⁵⁸D.A. Lawr, "The Development of Ontario Farming 1870-1914, Patterns of Growth and Change," Ontario History XLIV (December, 1972), 244.

⁵⁹Spelt, Urban Development, 155.

of local independence and self-sufficiency." In addition, "the spread from the cities of their modern technology and standards of living, homogenized rural living."⁶⁰ More alarming still was rural depopulation. Profound disquiet was felt at seeming government indifference to the massive shift of population from the country to the towns and cities. Every rural area of the province, save the newly opened north, had been undergoing population decline since the 1880's.⁶¹ This migration was deplored on social as well as on economic grounds. Socially, the loss of good rural folk, and especially the young, symbolized the breakdown of rural values, and the loss of the countryside's social and political guidance of the province's affairs. The farmers were convinced of the moral superiority of their lifestyle over that found in the decadent cities. In addition, the farmers' increasing economic interdependence with the cities forced them to turn their organizational efforts away from traditional goals of improved production processes, to concentrate instead on the system of distribution,⁶² which in turn raised fundamental political issues.

In the 1890's the political manifestation of agrarian discontent was the Patrons of Industry movement. In the wake of the Great War, the same social processes - though substantially advanced and

⁶⁰W.R. Young, "Conscription, Rural Depopulation and the Farmers of Ontario, 1917-19," Canadian Historical Review LIII (September, 1972), 290.

⁶¹Ibid., appendices A and B.

⁶²Marion Jean McLeod, "Agriculture and Politics in Ontario Since 1867," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1961, 125.

thus more potent - gave rise to the United Farmers of Ontario. . . Neither of these rural reactions to urbanization had any strong, enduring impact on the political landscape, and the cities continued to grow in size and in political import. Not until the upsurge of the CCF in the 1940's, however, did the cities come to adopt anything resembling a distinctively urban political viewpoint.

In the post-war years, the CCF-NDP has continued to champion the interest of the urban working classes, and additional aspects of urbanization have powerfully intruded upon the political agendas of all parties. Growth rates for the province's cities and towns have varied greatly, so that, as is the case for the province generally, the social and political issues raised by increased population relate far more to uneven distribution than to total volume.⁶³ Although few rural areas have actually lost population, throughout the province the non-farm component has grown as the farm component declined, leading to mutual antagonism rooted in both lifestyle and economics.⁶⁴ Issues such as the disposal of urban waste in rural sites, and the disappearance of farm land have pitted the cities directly against rural interests.

In municipalities with extensive suburban development in areas which not so long ago were rural or semi-rural, population increases engendered serious social and political problems, placing tremendous

⁶³Ontario's Changing Population, I, 77.

⁶⁴Ibid., 26-30.

pressure on outmoded forms of local government. As well, smaller rural municipalities have been unable to provide an adequate range of services. Regional government was a logical administrative response to these problems, but it entailed sweeping, oftentimes unpalatable political changes unforeseen by many participants, let alone the general public.

Rural-Urban Electoral Patterns

In sum, urbanization has wrought many crucial political changes, only some of which are discernible in rural-urban voting patterns. Still, as the data in Table IV-8 illustrate, an examination of party vote shares, as tabulated by rural and urban ridings, is an enlightening exercise. These data suggest that a crucial factor underlying a good deal of the variation in regional voting patterns is the area's rural or urban character.

Table IV-8 sets out party vote and turnout according to rural-urban composition. Urban ridings were defined as those with at least 75 per cent of the population living in urban areas; rural ridings were those with a like proportion resident in rural areas.⁶⁵ Ridings falling between these cut-off points were designated as mixed. Since party vote and turnout in these ridings almost invariably fell between the levels in the rural and the urban ridings, they were excluded

⁶⁵These definitions are admittedly arbitrary; for a somewhat similar classification system, see Laurence S. Grossman, "'Safe' Seats: The Rural Urban Pattern in Ontario," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science XXX (August, 1963), 367-71.

PARTY VOTE SHAPES AND TURNOUT

ACCORDING TO RURAL-URBAN COMPOSITION OF RIDING

Year	LIBERAL		CONSERVATIVE		THIRD		TURNOUT		N	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
1867	25.5	38.2	27.5	37.9			54.1	76.2	8	59
1871	27.5	30.1	26.7	29.9			54.2	62.3	7	55
1875	26.1	33.2	27.8	32.7			58.2	68.4	7	60
1879	23.7	33.9	27.2	31.5			53.2	65.4	7	62
1883	24.2	35.1	25.4	34.9			53.8	70.1	6	61
1886	21.7	35.3	33.9	33.5			68.1	69.4	6	61
1890	28.6	34.7	27.8	32.1			64.9	66.5	5	62
1894	31.1	32.6	35.8	30.6		29.7	67.5	69.4	10	65
1898	33.5	35.4	37.2	34.6			70.9	75.8	10	61
1902	28.5	33.6	35.6	33.1			69.0	73.6	10	65
1905	28.1	30.7	39.8	34.3			68.8	71.3	10	63
1908	19.8	32.9	35.4	37.8			61.7	71.5	12	57
1911	12.1	31.0	28.9	34.0			44.4	64.1	9	53
1914	25.8	32.2	31.6	36.0			59.2	68.4	15	58
1917	25.1	27.4	23.9	28.9		34.7	64.3	74.2	15	54
1923	9.1	19.6	25.3	30.2		24.6	36.7	62.3	15	56
1926	16.0	32.3	40.8	32.3		35.4	61.1	68.1	30	47
1929	13.3	29.5	29.2	34.8		28.0	43.2	69.4	28	45
1934	29.9	42.9	27.8	30.9	12.5		68.5	75.7	25	26
1937	30.6	40.6	25.8	32.2	9.9		66.1	74.3	25	26
1943	12.6	24.0	20.1	24.1	19.4	13.6	53.2	60.3	27	25
1945	16.1	27.8	30.1	35.2	18.1	9.9	68.3	73.3	27	25
1948	14.3	28.4	25.7	32.7	23.0	9.9	65.2	69.2	27	24
1951	15.5	27.8	27.7	38.9	16.6	7.1	60.9	71.1	27	24
1955	18.9	27.0	25.1	37.2	14.3	7.4	55.9	69.3	40	26
1959	19.1	26.7	22.8	35.8	14.1	8.9	55.0	67.2	44	26
1963	20.8	27.2	26.8	35.8	12.6	6.1	60.7	67.9	54	26
1967	19.8	25.1	25.4	33.3	19.5	8.8	64.8	67.4	66	27
1971	19.2	24.7	31.8	33.3	21.1	14.8	72.4	73.1	66	27
1975	21.5	28.6	22.9	28.6	21.0	13.6	65.9	70.9	72	19
1977	18.3	26.0	24.5	29.7	20.2	13.4	63.8	69.1	72	19

The Conservatives fielded virtually complete slates of candidates (no more than three less than the N's in the final columns) in each election, save 1894, when they nominated in 48 rural ridings. The Liberals presented complete slates except in the following elections (number of candidates in urban and rural ridings): 1894 (10,57); 1914 (11,53); 1919 (12,34); 1923 (14,33); 1926 (19,29); and 1929 (24,36). The Petrons had 35 rural candidates. The UFO had 50,49,17 and 11 candidates in rural ridings in the four elections beginning in 1919. There were 17 urban CCF candidates in 1934 and 19 in 1937; in rural seats the number of CCF-NDP candidates for the elections from 1948 to 1963 were 17,14,17,13 and 18.

from the table.

The most striking finding to emerge from the table relates to turnout. At each election since Confederation, turnout has been higher in rural ridings than in urban, often by a substantial margin. Rural turnout has always been greater than 60 per cent, whereas in the cities, it has been below that level on twelve occasions, and in three elections, it fell to less than 50 per cent. In addition, rural ridings have experienced far less volatility in turnout. On only four occasions has turnout in the rural ridings risen or fallen by as much as ten per cent from one election to the next; in the urban areas, differences of 15 per cent or higher have occurred eight times.

A suspicion that the low turnout in urban areas was often primarily a reflection of low voter participation in Toronto was not supported. Turnout in Ottawa, Kingston, London, Hamilton and Windsor has been every bit as low as in Toronto throughout provincial history. In addition, low turnout is characteristic not only of urban areas but also of suburban areas; as Table IV-9 demonstrates, since World War I, the rate of turnout has been very similar in the city of Toronto and in its suburbs (prior to the First World War, the 'suburban' ridings still had substantial rural components).⁶⁶

⁶⁶Close inspection of returns from particularly well-to-do sections of Don Mills and York Mills ridings reveal a substantially higher rate of turnout than throughout the suburban areas generally. Similarly, the well-heeled Forest Hill and Rosedale districts (included in "city") record far higher turnout levels than the downtown areas to which they are linked by the so-called 'strip' ridings.

TABLE IV-9
 TURNOUT IN TORONTO 1919 - 1975

Year	City	Suburbs
1919	57	63
1923	32	33
1926	61	59
1929	40	42
1934	65	67
1937	63	67
1943	53	51
1945	68	67
1948	66	66
1951	60	61
1955	56	54
1959	53	51
1963	61	59
1967	63	66
1971	69	74
1975	64	67
1977	63	64

"City" is defined by Region 19, Tier 1, and "suburbs" are defined by Regions 20 and 21, Tier 1 (Appendix B).

The higher level and greater stability of turnout in rural Ontario may owe something to the mobility of city-dwellers compared to the social cohesion and stability characteristic of rural areas. These factors perhaps contribute to greater involvement in political affairs in the countryside (often for their entertainment value) and also to the maintenance of interest through greater familiarity with political figures and party organizers.

Over the past few elections, turnout in the cities has not been so volatile as in the past, and its level has been closer to that experienced in the rural areas, though an urban-rural differential is still present.

In the (relatively few) urban ridings, the Conservatives held a slight edge in vote share over the Liberals during the nineteenth century. From the turn of the century until the Depression this margin was far more substantial, often 10 per cent or better. In both 1934 and 1937, the Liberals outpolled the Conservatives in the urban areas, but not by the same extent as in the countryside. With the rise of the urban-oriented CCF in 1943, the Tory lead in the cities and towns declined somewhat, but, with the division in opposition forces, it remained large enough to win them a handsome majority of the urban seats in the post-War era: from 1943 to 1971 the Tories won 205 urban seats, the CCF-NDP 75 and the Liberals 63 (see Table IV-10). In overall terms, the Liberals and the CCF-NDP have been closely matched as to urban voting strength: from 1943 until 1948, the CCF was substantially more popular in the cities than the Grits:

between 1955 and 1963 the reverse was true, and since 1967, the parties' vote shares have been of very similar magnitudes. These figures, however, mask an important difference: the Liberals invariably attract a lower share of the vote in Toronto than in other urban centres while the CCF-NDP usually fares better in Toronto than in the rest of the province's urban ridings. In recent elections, these differentials have become exceedingly slight.

In the province's rural areas, the Liberals enjoyed a very narrow margin over the Conservatives until 1905. Though the Grit vote share never exceeded that of the Tories by more than 2.4 per cent, this nonetheless provided the Liberals with great numbers of seats, far more than were needed to overcome their disadvantage in the cities. The Conservative victory in 1905 was largely made possible by the turnabout in rural voting patterns: the slim Grit leads of the nineteenth century were reversed into a Conservative plurality larger than the Liberals had ever mounted, so that the Tories carried the lion's share of the rural seats. The Conservatives did exceptionally well in the urban centres in 1905, but without their dramatic successes in the countryside, they simply could not have carried the election.

Though it is true that the Conservatives outpolled the Liberals by a comfortable margin from 1905 on, as the table demonstrates, the Tories increased their vote share only slightly. Perhaps more significantly, the Liberals' vote share in the rural ridings declined somewhat, but remained close to the range it had occupied in the nineteenth century: from 1871 to 1902 the range was 30.1 to 35.4

per cent, and from 1905 to 1929 (with the exception of 1919 and 1923 when the UFO cut severely into the Liberals' agrarian support) it was 29.5 to 32.9.⁶⁷ This stands in marked contrast to the substantial decline in Liberal vote share in the urban centres.

From their initial victory until 1934, the Conservatives consistently bested the Liberals in both votes and seats, though their margins of victory were not so impressive as in the urban centres. In 1934 and 1937, Hepburn won overwhelming victories in the countryside, but these successes did not carry over into the war-time elections. Despite a precipitous drop, the Liberals held their own with the Conservatives in 1943 (in votes if not in seats), but fell several percentage points behind the Tories in 1945 and 1948. This margin widened to 10 percentage points in 1951 and remained at this level until 1975. Throughout the post-war period, the overall attractiveness of both the Liberals and the Conservatives in the countryside was relatively stable; the ranges of their vote shares were 3.7 and 6.2 percentage points (until 1975, when the Conservative vote share fell well below earlier levels). This greater (aggregate) stability in the rural ridings, together with the much stronger presence of the CCF-NDP in the urban centres has meant that the rural seats have generally been much safer than urban seats, and kinder to the

⁶⁷ If these vote shares are adjusted for turnout, the differential is somewhat increased, but the party's share of the total electorate is at least as valid an indicator of the underlying processes as the share of the votes cast.

incumbent members as well.⁶⁸ As for the CCF-NDP, save perhaps its initial success in 1943, it has never fared particularly well in rural ridings. In view of its unmistakably urban membership and ideology, this is hardly surprising. Throughout the 1950's, the party failed to nominate in substantial numbers of rural seats. In 1971 the NDP experienced a quantum leap in rural support, to nearly 15 per cent of the electorate.

As Table IV-10 illustrates, the electoral system has a tendency to magnify differences in popular vote into more substantial (and more visible) advantage in representation in the legislature. Thus in the Mowat years, the Conservatives' legislative contingent was more urban than their electoral support warranted. Conversely, elected Liberal members have been, throughout provincial history, proportionately more rural than the party's vote. In the dark days since 1905, this has engendered a politically debilitating vicious circle: despite progressive urbanization, the Liberals' members have been largely rural in orientation, in turn reinforcing the urban electorate's reluctance to consider the party as a genuine alternative. To an extent the party has broken out of this bind, though in 1977 only one Liberal was returned from Toronto. The CCF-NDP has had to contend with a similar problem. Since the party has only carried one rural riding in Southern Ontario - and not many more mixed ridings - the party's elected representatives have been severely

⁶⁸Grossman, "Safe Seats," 371.

TABLE IV-10

SEATS WON BY PARTY ACCORDING TO TYPE OF RIDING

Election	Urban			Mixed			Rural			Rural-North			Mixed-North		
	L	C	T	L	C	T	L	C	T	L	C	T	L	C	T
1867	2	6		4	6		33	30			1				
1871	3	5		5	5		35	28			1				
1875	2	6		10	4		36	27		1					
1879	2	6		9	5		46	18		1					
1883	2	6		9	6		37	26		1					
1886	3	6		10	6		42	21		2					
1890	3	6		12	5		38	24		2	1				
1894	5	6		10	6	2	29	17	15	2	1				
1898	3	8		11	8		35	26		3					
1902	1	10		6	13		39	23		3	2		1		
1905	3	8		6	16		18	41		2	3				1
1908	1	14		5	20		13	44			5				3
1911		15		5	20		16	41		1	4				3
1914	4	15		6	20		13	42		2	4				3
1919	7	8		10	3	12	7	10	33	3	3				1
1923	2	17		4	21	4	4	32	13	3	2				3
1926	1	29		4	23	1	17	13	13	1	4				5
1929		30		6	21		8	32			5				5
1934	12	11	1	28	3		20	3		3			7		1
1937	15	10		26	6		17	6		3			6		1
1943	1	10	14	6	15	10	8	13	1	1		2			7
1945	3	22		2	27	2	6	16		1	1	1	2		5
1948	4	7	14	2	27	3	6	15			2	1	2	2	3
1951	3	23		3	28	1	2	19			3			6	1
1955	3	34	3	4	24		4	19			3			4	
1959	13	26	5	4	20		4	19			3		1	3	
1963	12	35	7	3	21		6	17		2	1		1	3	
1967	15	36	15	4	13	1	6	17		1	2	1	2	1	3
1971	9	42	15	3	15		6	17			2	2	2	2	2
1975	16	26	30	12	12	2	6	10			1	2	2	2	4
1977	14	29	29	12	14		6	10			1	2	2	4	2

hampered in their attempts to establish themselves as sympathetic to, and knowledgeable of, rural interests. This has contributed to the party's dismal showing outside the cities and towns.⁶⁹

Industrialization

Shortly after Confederation, thoroughgoing industrialization began in Ontario, and by the Great War, the mainspring of the province's economy was no longer agriculture, but industry. In the process a sizeable urban work force was created. Since then, the extent and the nature of industrial production, and with them, occupational structure, have changed substantially. Though less of a 'critical juncture' than in Europe, where it marked a dramatic break with a centuries-old socio-economic structure, industrialization and its attendant social changes, contained the potential of important political developments. Only in part has this potential been realized.

These political changes stem from the fact that the political priorities and programmes suited to an agrarian society are simply not relevant to the problems of an industrial society. As Frank E. Myers has put it: "the logic of industrialization is to create different value orientations among different social classes."⁷⁰ Several features of industrialization promote political change: gross

⁶⁹The CCF-NDP has won its share of the handful of rural ridings in Northern Ontario, but these ridings are very different from rural ridings in the province's south. "Rural", in the North is not synonymous with "agriculture".

⁷⁰Frank E. Myers, "Social Class and Political Change in Western Industrial Systems," Comparative Political Studies II (April, 1970), 394.

economic inequality and exploitation, rendered visible by a new stratification system premised on income and occupational prestige; the large numbers of workers relying on forces and persons beyond their control for even the opportunity of earning a living; horrendous working and living conditions in impersonal factories and wretched slums; and trade union organization and repression. In Karl Deutsch's more general terms, the "social mobilization" associated with industrialization "brings about a change in the quality of politics by changing the range of human needs that impinge upon the political process."⁷¹

Yet electoral change is not automatically wrought by the advent of industrialization and related processes of social mobilization. Although political parties are usually seen as the reflections of social divisions, they themselves exert a powerful influence on the politicization of cleavages and issues. This is especially true for the emergence of class politics in an industrializing society:

large collectivities become class structured only if they are class persuaded. The most likely and apt "persuader" is the party (or the union) playing on the class appeal resource. In any case, ideological persuasion requires a powerfully organized network of communications...whenever the class appeal outweighs the religious appeal; this is not because class is an "objective reality"; rather, this is because the ideology of class wins the "belief battle", in conjunction with the prevalence of a new organizer, the mass party, over the former organizer, the church.⁷²

⁷¹ Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review LV (September, 1961), 497.

⁷² Giovanni Sartori, "The Sociology of Parties: A Critical Review," in Orto Stammer, ed., Party Systems, Party Organizations and the Politics of the New Masses (International Conference on Political Sociology, Berlin, 1960), 16 and 18; on parties as independent variables vis a vis social processes, see Richard Rose and Derek Urwin, "Social Cohesion, Political Parties and Strains in Regimes," Comparative Political Studies II (October, 1969), 7-10.

Moreover, the emergence of class politics in the electoral arena by no means entails a working class party after the fashion of the British Labour Party. Accommodation of working class demands by one of the existing parties is a distinct possibility.⁷³ In large measure, this depends on the amicability and flexibility of the existing parties, together with the rate, extent and militancy of working class mobilization.

Over the past few decades, Canada's record of labour unrest ranks among the highest in Western industrial societies,⁷⁴ but the political manifestations of this economic conflict have been relatively mild.

Early Stirrings

Some of the pre-conditions of industrialization and class politics were coming into place during the Union period. Among these was the development of a "capitalistic labour market", an essential prerequisite to extensive capitalistic expansion. The crucial element in this process was the arrival of great hordes of Irish peasants in the 1840's, who, unlike earlier immigrants, preferred wage employment to the prospect of becoming an independent farmer. In addition,

⁷³ John Wilson, "The Canadian Political Cultures: Towards a Redefinition of the Nature of the Canadian Political System," Canadian Journal of Political Science vii (September, 1974), 453.

⁷⁴ Stuart Jamieson, Times of Trouble: Labour Unrest and Industrial Conflict in Canada, 1900-1966 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), 9.

restrictive land policies had fostered a landless labourer class.⁷⁵ An industrial proletariat was slow in emerging, however, because industrial activity was still restricted in scope. The continuing primacy of commercial forces little interested in industrial endeavours meant that manufacturing in Ontario, in the years from 1850 to 1880, "preserved by and large many of its characteristics from the preceding period",⁷⁶ most notably the small size of the establishments.

As early as the 1820's and 1830's rudimentary trade unions were appearing, but in the typical pattern of nascent unionism, organization was largely limited to skilled craftsmen. For a good many years, indeed until well into the present century, small craft unions remained the norm. One labour historian has recently written that a "conscious working class movement" had been brought into existence in Central Canada by the decade of Confederation.⁷⁷ This movement, however, was almost exclusively confined to skilled and semi-skilled craftsmen. Furthermore, as the rise of the industrial system endangered the status of these skilled artisans, their unions exhibited not

⁷⁵H.C. Pentland, "The Development of a Capitalistic Labour Market in Canada", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science XXV (November, 1959), 464, 473; Gary Teeple, "Land, Labour and Capital in pre-Confederation Canada," in Teeple, ed., Capitalism and The National Question in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1972), 59-62.

⁷⁶Spelt, Urban Development, 124.

⁷⁷Steven Langdon, "The Emergence of the Canadian Working Class Movement, 1845-1875," (part 2), Journal of Canadian Studies VII (August, 1973), 8.

solidarity but rather hostility towards the unskilled factory hands threatening their jobs.⁷⁸ Prior to the 1880's, in short, nothing approximating a large cohesive proletariat existed in Ontario. Working class activity was largely insignificant, and what did occur was as much in defence of the status quo as in opposition to it. Professor Wilson remarks, in such a pre-industrial society, there are no hints that 'political life turns upon questions of economic equality. Nor should there be, because the circumstances of pre-industrial and even beginning industrial society are not such as to raise these issues."⁷⁹

Industrial society was not long in coming. The small workshops run by skilled artisans scattered throughout the province gave way, during the 1880's and 1890's, to large impersonal factories, which primarily employed unskilled labour.⁸⁰ Peter Waite has suggested that 'many of the characteristic features of an industrial society came into existence, one might almost say, at one great bound, in the decade of the 1880's.'⁸¹

Under the benevolent tariff protection of the National Policy,

⁷⁸ ibid., 22.

⁷⁹ Wilson, "Canadian Political Cultures," 454.

⁸⁰ Spelt, Urban Development, 166-75; see also E. J. Chambers and G. Bertram, "The Localization of Manufacturing Activity in Central Canada, 1870-1890," CPSA Conference on Statistics, 1964, Papers on Regional Statistical Studies (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), 225-58.

⁸¹ Waite, "Sir Oliver Mowat's Canada," 14.

railways served as the catalyst in Ontario's industrial growth. As yet unsoftened by consolidation or abandonment of overextended lines, the railways reached the zenith of their influence in the years immediately preceding the Great War. This influence was most notable in the concentration of manufacturing in the larger urban centres, and the concomitant decline of smaller towns and villages. Exigencies of railway transport stood both as cause and effect to the economies of scale and the proximity to markets which encouraged the growth of large factories in the cities.⁸²

With the advent of the new industrial order "the old graduated range of social orders in the towns, from unskilled labourers through artisans and shopkeepers to gentlemen, became much more plainly polarized into two main class groups representing either numbers or power".⁸³ Though it is easy to reify the often ill-defined social and economic antagonisms of the day into a clear-cut class struggle, the nascent middle and working classes frequently did find their interests or values at odds. "Most of Ontario's middle class," one historian has remarked, "was newly risen to its position in the political and social life of the province. It feared the challenge represented by a class so alien

⁸² Warren R. Bland, *The Changing Location of Metal-Fabricating and Clothing Industries in Southern Ontario, 1881-1932*, Ontario Geography (1975), 34-57.

⁸³ J.M.S. Careless, "Some Aspects of Urbanization in Nineteenth Century Ontario," in F.H. Armstrong, H.A. Stevenson, J.D. Wilson, eds., Aspects of Nineteenth Century Ontario: Essays Presented to James J. Talbot (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 75.

to it."⁸⁴ This challenge was more imagined than real, for despite, or perhaps partly because of, the horrendous working conditions and less than munificent wages which characterized the great factories, very little in the way of a cohesive, self-conscious working class emerged prior to the war.

Religious and ethnic ties frequently overrode class considerations, as did the rural background and modes of thought of many workers. As well, the tariff played an important, if indirect, part in restraining the development of the Canadian working class. By "exercising a continuous downward pressure on the Canadian standard of living, [the tariff] leads to continuous emigration from Canada and thus a continuous depletion of the natural increase in the Canadian labour force."⁸⁵ This loss of established native workers, coupled with the influx of unskilled immigrants and farm labourers willing to accept lower wages and poorer working conditions, seriously eroded the strength and cohesion of working class organizations.

Many of the most prominent labour organizations in late nineteenth century Ontario, such as the Knights of Labour, were American unions. These 'internationals' provided important support for economically weak Canadian labour, and found particularly warm welcome from

⁸⁴ Decarie, "Prohibition Movement," 340.

⁸⁵ J.H. Dales, The Protective Tariff in Canada's Economic Development (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), 119.

the workers in the burgeoning American branch plants.⁸⁶ However, they distorted the evolution of the Canadian labour movement. The American Federation of Labour craft unionism discouraged independent political action and fostered a tamer 'business unionism' than might otherwise have developed, particularly in Ontario. In addition, the carry-over of American jurisdictional boundaries between unions, which were often inappropriate in Canada, contributed to the chronic disunity of Canadian labour.

The political impact of the working class was sharply restricted because organized labour, which retained much of its earlier craft union flavour, was concentrated among the better-paid workers in a limited range of industries. Furthermore, its effectiveness in extending its constituency, as in developing political power, was severely undercut by incessant factionalism and regionalism.⁸⁷

The Primacy of Commercial Capitalism

Despite the growth of industrialism, control of the state apparatus remained basically with the mercantile class; fusion of commercial and industrial capitalism did not occur in Canada to the extent

⁸⁶ See Robert H. Babcock, Gompers in Canada: A Study in American Continentalism Before the First World War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), especially chapter 13; for the later period see John Crispo, International Unionism: A Study in Canadian American Relations (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1967).

⁸⁷ Martin Robin, Radical Politics and Canadian Labour (Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, 1968), 117.

it did in the United States.⁸⁸ Confederation to an extent, and the National Policy par excellence, were policies designed to consolidate mercantile rather than industrial capitalism. The tariff, keystone of the National Policy, 'was not needed to protect existing industry, which was small and highly competitive with imports...the purpose of the tariff was not to 'protect' existing industry but to expand the scale of the economy by attracting capitalists and blocking the out-flow of population."⁸⁹

Strong antagonism occasionally surfaced between the merchants and the industrialists, but very often their interests coincided, as indeed did their identities. Still, commercial capitalism was clearly dominant, even during Ontario's industrialization. To an extent, therefore, it may be true that the industrial working class had to enter the political arena "on the terms and conditions set by the on-going struggle between the petit bourgeois and [mercantile] capitalists classes,"⁹⁰ thereby dampening working class cohesion and

⁸⁸This thesis is most fully developed in R.T. Naylor, "The Rise and Fall of the Third Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence," in Teeple, Capitalism, 1-41. In more recent writings, Naylor has backtracked slightly from this extreme view. On the controversy of mercantile versus industrial capitalism in Canada, see Steve McBride, "Setting Naylor Straight," Canadian Dimension, (June, 1974), H.C. Pentland, "Marx and the Canadian Question," Canadian Forum (January, 1974), Wallace Clement, The Canadian Corporate Elite (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), chapter 2.

⁸⁹Naylor, "Rise and Fall," 19.

⁹⁰Leo A. Johnson, "The Development of Class in Canada in the Twentieth Century," in Teeple, Capitalism, 147.

consciousness. By the same token, however, workers perhaps faced far less intransigent opposition from the less well entrenched industrial entrepreneurs than was the case in the United States. If the merchants had little use for, and even less in common with, the emerging industrial proletariat, neither had they particularly strong reason to oppose their demands.

A less problematical implication of the primacy of mercantile capitalism lies in the character of the middle classes. As the work of Harold Innis made clear, the origins of the Canadian state lay in the exploitation of staples by large capital-intensive monopolies or oligopolies. Geography and economics, which favoured individual enterprise and limited political interference in the conduct of economic, social and religious affairs over a large part of the continent, favoured on this part of the continent large-scale bureaucratic forms of organization dependent on widespread intervention by the state.⁹¹ Capitalism, accordingly, came late to Canada, and was 'much more fully-grown, typified by the large-scale economic organization dependent upon outside capital and management and technical skill.'⁹² The upshot has been that 'the Canadian middle class has grown up very largely within a bureaucratic structure of power - economic, political, ecclesiastical.'⁹³ The bureaucratization of the middle class, nowhere

⁹¹ Clark, The Developing Canadian Community, 94.

⁹² Ibid., 249.

⁹³ Ibid., 234.

Industrialization relates to the organization and efficacy of the working classes.

After the virtual collapse of labour's political arm, following the rout of the ILP in 1923, the political impact of the working class fell off precipitously until the Depression. Prosperity doubtless contributed to the decline in working class activism, but so too did the failure of the self-satisfied international craft unions to adapt to new forms of industrialization. As mass production and assembly lines came to the fore, the established labour organizations 'wanted nothing else but to maintain their status and be left alone;'⁹⁵ their attitude towards the growing numbers of unskilled workers was one of disdain. In the Depression the Workers' Unity League and the industrial unions of the CIO organized the unskilled workers, thus indirectly laying the political groundwork for the rise of the CCF during the Second World War.

The relationship of the CCF-NDP to organized labour and the concentration of its electoral support among the urban working class were briefly sketched in the previous chapter. The important point for present purposes is not the substantial support the party has enjoyed in its natural constituency, but rather its failure to attract anything like a majority electoral following among either skilled or unskilled workers. To be sure, what success it has

⁹⁵Irving Martin Abella, Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour: The CIO, the Communist Party and the Canadian Congress of Labour, 1935-1956 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 2.

attained stems from its working class support, and the political position of the working class has been most stridently put forward by the CCF-NDP. Yet the scope and nature of industrial production has continued to change, so that workers' political outlooks and the policy of the CCF-NDP, as well as the reaction to that policy on the part of the general public and the other parties, have been forced to change again. An idea of the shifts in the province's industrial structure and the resultant social changes may be gleaned from Tables IV-11 and IV-12 which present data on the occupational composition of the Ontario labour force.

Though comparable data are only available for 1911 and subsequent census years, important changes stand out clearly. Perhaps the foremost change evident from Table IV-11, which presents the overall composition of the labour force, is the decline of agriculture. By 1971, barely 5 per cent of the Ontario labour force was engaged in agricultural pursuits, down from 29 per cent in 1911. Since the Second World War, the number of persons employed in agriculture has declined both relatively and absolutely, as has agriculture's contribution to Gross Provincial Product, though improvements in productivity have partly counterbalanced the decline in labour force.⁹⁶ Other occupational categories have also declined in numerical importance since the war, though not so precipitously as agriculture; these include

⁹⁶ For data on trends in the agricultural sector, see Ontario Ministry of Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs, Ontario Statistical Review, 1973, 32, 48-9, 59.

TABLE IV-11

OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION OF ONTARIO LABOUR FORCE
1911 - 1971 (PERCENTAGES)

Year	M&P	Prof.	Cler.	Agric.	O. P.	Manu.	Cons.	Trans.	C&F	Serv.	P.Serv.	Lab.	Other
1911	4	4	4	29	3	16	4	5	5	7	7	11	
1921	7	5	8	25	2	14	5	6	6	7	5	10	
1931	6	6	8	21	2	14	5	6	6	9	7	10	
1941 ^a	5	6	9	17	3	19	4	6	6	9	8	6	
1951	7	7	12	10	2	20	5	7	7	9	6	6	1
1961	7	9	14	7	2	17	5	6	7	11	8	5	2
1971	5	15	19	5	1	17	7	4	10	11	b	6	2

Key: M&P Managers and Proprietors Prof. Professional Cler. Clerical
 Agric. Agriculture O.P. Other Primary Manu. Manufacturing
 Cons. Construction Trans. Transportation and communications
 C&F Commerce and Finance serv. Service P.Serv. Personal service
 Lab. Labourer

a - excludes armed forces

b - some categories were defined differently in 1961 and 1971; labourers and persons in personal service occupations were distributed through other categories

Source: 1911-1961: Census of Canada, 1961, catalogue 94-501, table 3; earlier data grouped according to 1961 categories
 1971: Census of Canada, 1971, catalogue 94-717, table 2.

Empty cells indicate less than 1

manufacturing, transportation and communications, primary and unskilled labouring occupations. In their stead, professional, clerical, commerce and finance (essentially sales) and service occupation have increased in importance. Though it is not evident in the tables, while white-collar middle class occupations have become more significant numerically, their internal composition has also changed. Specifically, independent businessmen and other self-employed members of the middle class - the classic 'petite bourgeoisie' - have undergone a drastic decline in numbers and in social and political influence.⁹⁷ The overall trend is clear: away from manual, blue-collar occupations in manufacturing towards white-collar administrative positions and sales and service industries. High growth rates in all sectors of the economy have disguised this shift towards tertiary, service industries and the increasing proportion of white collar occupations in the labour force.⁹⁸ The transformation in the scale and direction of Ontario's economy has been of kind as much as of degree; going "far beyond increases in population and gross product. It reaches deep into basic values, lifestyles, social composition and attitudes."⁹⁹

The political upshot of these changes accompanying the shift into advanced industrial society is crucially important. To the extent

⁹⁷Johnson, "Development of Class," 151-3.

⁹⁸For a more detailed analysis of trends in the composition of the Ontario labour force, see Shirley P. Green, Occupational Trends in Ontario 1931-1961 (Toronto: Ontario Department of Labour, 1967).

⁹⁹B.R. Richmond, The Economic Transformation of Ontario, 1945-1973 (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1974), 1.

that economic or class interests structure political life (which depends on a host of social and political factors), the size, power and viewpoint of the white-collar work force will seriously complicate the translation of economic issues into clearly defined political camps. Even in the initial stages of industrialization, the middle class played a key role in muting 'classic' working class politics; this influence has been greatly heightened in the wake of the latest stages of industrial development.

The transition to this new occupational structure has by no means been uniform, nor has it eliminated the inequalities at the heart of class politics. The rise in the general level of income and well-being has not been accompanied by any substantial redistribution of wealth and income.¹⁰⁰ In geographical terms, Eastern and Northern Ontario, and a number of smaller regions have been largely by-passed in the overall growth and prosperity.¹⁰¹ One increasingly important source of economic inequality is the position of women in the economy. Table IV-12 contains data on the proportion of women in various occupational categories. In marked contrast to the other tables discussed in this chapter, the most notable pattern here is lack of change. The proportion of women in the non-agricultural labour force increased substantially between 1951 and 1971, but before that it

¹⁰⁰ D.R. Richmond, Ontario: A Society in Transition (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1972), 58.

¹⁰¹ R.H. Frank, "The Distribution of Personal Income in Ontario and the Ten Economic Regions", Ontario Economic Review IV (Oct.-Nov., 1966), 3-9.

WOMEN IN THE ONTARIO LABOUR FORCE 1911 - 1971
(Percentage of selected categories*)

Year	Total	Total non-A	M&P	Prof.	Cler.	Man.	C&F	Serv.	P.Serv.
1911	19	26	4	46	40	26	25	67	69
1921	20	26	5	53	46	23	26	59	70
1931	22	28	5	46	49	17	24	61	69
1941a	26	31	7	42	52	18	31	62	70
1951	26	28	8	38	59	17	36	44	61
1961	32	33	10	40	64	16	38	50	66
1971	36	37	16	51	70	14	32	47	b

Total non-A - women as a percentage of the non-agricultural labour force

* - in the primary, construction and labourer categories, the number of women has always been infinitesimal; in the agricultural and transportation categories, the proportion of women is well below ten percent for all years

Key and source: see previous table

underwent virtually no change. The figure for 1921, however, is somewhat misleading. During the Great War, the proportion of women in all occupations, but especially in manufacturing, was higher than it had been in 1911. By 1921, a great many women who entered the labour force during war time had voluntarily given up their jobs or were displaced by returned soldiers.¹⁰² Somewhat unexpectedly, the proportion of women in manufacturing has steadily declined since 1911, as has the percentage in service occupations. On the other hand, women have steadily become more important in clerical occupations and, to a lesser extent, in sales positions. The high figure for female participation in professional occupations is largely accounted for by the overwhelming female dominance of teaching and nursing; higher status professionals resembled the managerial and proprietor category in the proportion of females. Changes have occurred since 1951, and these are reflected in the higher proportion of women in managerial and proprietor occupations and in higher status professional occupations though these remain largely male preserves.¹⁰³

Industrialization has indeed wrought profound changes in social structure and in underlying attitudes. Politically, the effects of these changes are evident in the prominence of issues

¹⁰²According to Ceta Ramkhalawansingh, the decade 1901-1911 experienced a great increase in the proportion of women in the labour force; "Women During the Great War," in Janice Acton, Penny Goldsmith and Bonnie Shepherd, eds., Women at Work: Ontario 1850-1930 (Toronto: Canadian Womens' Educational Press, 1974), 263.

¹⁰³Green, Occupational Trends, 16.

arising from industrialism. Yet it is clear from the foregoing discussion that the sine qua non for the political realization of the social conflicts inherent in early and in advanced industrialization is an effective vehicle for political organization. The Ontario experience demonstrates that such vehicles, be they trade unions or political parties, face serious problems not only in overcoming the political weight of social conflicts unrelated to industrialization, particularly ethnicity and religion, but also in coming to grips with the political implications of the continual changes in the nature of industrial society.

Conclusion

Overall, the record and impact of social change in Ontario over the past century have been mixed. At one extreme, few, if any, changes took place so rapidly, so precipitously as to occasion social strain sufficiently serious to fundamentally restructure the society in a relatively short period. Still, a good many changes were rapid enough and profound enough to mount significant challenges to the existing social order, and over the long run, to irrevocably alter that order. The spurts of industrialization prior to and during the Great War, and during and after World War Two are obvious examples, but by no means the only ones. At the other extreme, and in a sense perhaps more significantly, change has been an ever-present element in Ontario society since Confederation and before; gradual though it may often have been, it has nonetheless been constant. Urbanization,

attitudes towards the role of the state in the economy, and the social importance of religion, to cite only a few examples, all represent areas of more or less continuous change, though to be sure, the rates of change have sometimes accelerated and sometimes slowed.

The depth and the extent of change must not, however, obscure the strength of the impediments to change - social fixity - as well as those elements in the society which have remained largely unaltered for long periods. The enduring legacy of the 1837 Rebellions stands as a striking symbol of such powerful continuities, as does the persistence of rural outlooks and lifestyles.

Politically, the ramifications of the changes and the stability are evident. The decline of religion as a political issue parallels its general reduction in social impact, and the growth of the CCF-NDP and class-oriented politics are clear responses to social change processes. Yet the political realm also gives evidence of fixity; the painfully slow development and as yet limited success of the CCF-NDP demonstrate the strength of traditional social and political outlooks. In sum, important social changes have eventually wrought important changes in the political arena; conversely, significant political changes seem ultimately attributable to the march of social change. The translation of social change into political change, however, has not normally been direct or anything like instantaneous.

CHAPTER V: SOME CONSIDERATIONS OF EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY

This chapter is not intended to be a thorough survey of empirical methodology, nor does it deal comprehensively with even the subset of topics which are included in the discussion. Instead, it highlights certain key methodological issues relevant to our data analysis. Many of the problems encountered in data analysis are insoluble. Nevertheless, they must be confronted, in order that we have as clear an understanding as possible of the limitations to our analysis.

The first topic explored is the use of aggregate data in social science, and specifically in our study. Following this is a brief discussion of a technique which permits the "retrieval" of unknown cell values in contingency tables from known marginal totals. Some of the more important issues related to multiple regression analysis are then briefly discussed. A number of secondary considerations relating to empirical methodology are raised as they occur in the chapters concerned with specific issues, rather than in the more general setting of this chapter.

Problems of Aggregate Data

Virtually all of the data employed in this work are aggregate—election returns and census statistics, organized on the basis of provincial constituencies.¹ Individual level data, providing information on individual voters, would have been superior for many of our purposes,² but for most of

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1. For a description of the data, their sources and the methods used to compile them, see Appendix B.
 2. For an interesting debate on the inherent 'superiority' of individual micro level data, over aggregate, macro level data, in an economic setting, see Yehuda Grunfeld and Zvi Griliches, "Is Aggregation Necessarily Bad?" Review of Economics and Statistics XLIII (February, 1960), 1-13 and Guy H. Orcutt,

the period under study, such data do not exist. On the other hand, inasmuch as sampling is not required, and actual voting decisions, rather than declared voting intentions or recollections, form the basis of enquiry, aggregate statistics possess some advantages over individual survey data. Unfortunately, the same may not be said for even the most carefully conducted censuses. Censuses are, after all, surveys, albeit aimed at reaching a population rather than only a sample drawn from it (and seldom eliciting attitudinal information). As surveys, censuses are subject to bias should certain types of persons be systematically excluded, and more significantly, they are also subject to biases inherent in interview situations.³ Recent Canadian censuses have undoubtedly reduced these problems to tolerable levels, but they may be serious in earlier censuses. Moreover, for our purposes, even the most recent censuses have serious 'measurement error'.⁴

Nonetheless, the most serious difficulty in the analysis of aggregate data arises from the grouping together of individuals and their traits into single summary measures. On the one hand, important variations may be lost in the aggregation process. With a unit as large as a constituency, this is inevitably a major problem; moreover, short of employing smaller units,

Harold W. Watts and John B. Edwards "Data Aggregation and Information Loss" American Economic Review LVII (September, 1968), 773-87. The latter presents strong arguments against employing aggregate data for studying micro level phenomena. A thoughtful paper on aggregate data analysis in political research is Erwin K. Scheuch, "Cross-National Comparisons Using Aggregate Data: Some Substantive and Methodological Problems" in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 151-168.

3. For a good overview of the shortcomings of survey analysis, see Derek Phillips, Knowledge From What? Theories and Methods of Social Research (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971).
4. Although this measurement error is multi-faceted, for our purposes, its most important source is the lack of correspondence between census definitions and our conceptual definitions.

no amount of methodological sophistication can overcome the problem.

Conversely, it is possible that aggregate data, simply by virtue of their aggregation, may lead researchers to misleading results concerning the strength and form of the relationships among variables.

W.S. Robinson, in his discussion of the 'ecological fallacy', some years ago demonstrated this process, and argued that, in consequence, aggregate data simply could not be employed in the study of individuals.⁵ A recent enquiry which analysed Robinson's own data, suggested that he was heavy in condemning ecological data⁶ out of hand, and that more serious problems arise from the use of improperly specified models.⁷ Model specification will be discussed below in the context of multiple regression.

For some purposes, we wish to employ aggregate data to describe a ~~characteristic~~ of a unit rather than as a measure of the proportion of persons in the unit possessing a certain characteristic. By way of illustration we may want to consider ridings as rural or urban, represented by a Liberal or a Conservative, and so on. This use of ecological data as 'context' variables avoids many of the problems usually encountered with aggregate data, particularly those relating to legitimate inferences concerning relationships among variables.⁸ Unfortunately, many types of aggregate data are not amenable for use as contextual variables, and their use as such is only a means of disguising rather than overcoming problems.

5. W.S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behaviour of Individuals", American Sociological Review XV (June, 1950), 351-7.
6. Although perissas might disapprove, the terms "aggregate data" and "ecological data" will be used synonymously.
7. Eric A. Hanushek, John E. Jackson and John F. Kain, "Model Specification, Use of Aggregate Data and the Ecological Correlation Fallacy", Political Methodology II (Winter, 1974), 89-107.
8. On the context variables, see Austin Ranney "The Utility and Limitations of Aggregate Data in the Study of Electoral Behaviour", in Ranney, ed., Essays in the Behavioral Study of Politics (Urbana Illinois, University of Illinois Press, 1962), 99-101.

For example, unless we have sound theoretical or empirical reasons for expecting differences in areas of greater than thirty percent Catholic population, compared with ridings with less than thirty percent, then dichotomizing the ridings in this fashion is not a valid use of the contextual variable approach.

A related problem stems from the social significance of contextual variables; for social reasons which need not detain us here, it is reasonable to expect that the numbers of a certain group, say Catholics, voting for a party in various ridings might be a function of two distinct factors. The first is simply the proportion of Catholics in each riding: the second (contextual) factor is the 'Catholicness' of each riding, for it may be that the higher the concentration of Catholics, the greater will be their electoral cohesion (in areas sparsely populated with Catholics, 40 percent of them might vote for a certain party, while in ridings with high concentrations of Catholics, 70 percent might vote for that party). The problem arises insofar as although these factors are clearly distinct at the individual level, they are indistinguishable at the aggregate level. As will shortly become evident, such interaction effects are the most serious stumbling blocks in the analysis of "ecological" data.

Before dealing with the ecological fallacy, it is important to note a problem inherent in aggregate voting data, even when only simple descriptive statistics are employed. When we consider electoral results arrayed in a time series, with a view to discovering and analysing change processes, it is all too easy to make what has been called the "assumption of minimal change", which entails assuming only that change visible as net change in aggregate data.⁹ This is a special, but extremely important case of the

9. Philip E. Converse, "The Problem of Party Distance in Models of Voting Change", In M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler, eds., The Electoral Process (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1966), 177.

masking of change problem. As is so often the case with ecological data, this problem may be observed but not resolved. However, the use of one simple device can remove some of the worst potential misinterpretations. This is the use of party vote relative to the eligible electorate rather than relative to actual votes cast. Since non-voting often figures prominently in electoral change, such a procedure automatically includes this very important information, without altering the ratios among party vote percentages.¹⁰ Our analysis exclusively employs party vote percentages calculated on the basis of all eligible electors.¹¹

Finally, one important effect of aggregation is the inflation of the correlation coefficient. Goodness of fit measures may be higher for data organized into groups than for individual level data.¹²

The simple product-moment correlation coefficient, employed extensively in our analysis, indicates the strength of the assumed linear relationship.¹³ (The regression equations convey information on the partial effects of various independent variables upon the dependent variable.) Since Robinson's article appeared in 1950, analysts have recognized that drawing individual level relationships from correlation of aggregate data is hazardous. Less common has been the realization that the lack of necessary correspondence between individual and aggregate correlation has two sources. The first is homogeneous, or perhaps better, non-random grouping of individuals on the

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10. By way of illustration, in the 1975 provincial election, the Liberal party's share of the votes cast rose approximately six percentage points; however, turnout dropped sharply from 1971 to 1975, so that in terms of the total electorate, the party's attractiveness increased only slightly.
 11. For a brief exploration of the effects of this decision, see Appendix D.
 12. See Jan Kmenta, Elements of Econometrics (New York: MacMillan, 1971), 327-8; and Michael T. Hannan, Aggregation and Disaggregation in Sociology (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1971), ch. 3.
 13. Visual inspection of scatter plots ensured that, at least for bivariate cases, curvilinear relationships were not wrongly assumed to be linear.

independent variable. Since people do not settle in geographic districts in a random fashion, this is an omnipresent problem for ecological correlation, though its severity may vary widely. A much more serious problem is that introduced by "aggregation bias", which arises when "the relation between two individual variables is systematically different in different units of aggregation."¹⁴ Recalling the earlier example, what this means is that if the proportion of Catholics voting for a party varies according to the density of Catholics in the riding (or according to some other variable), then aggregation bias is present. Another form of aggregation bias is likely of very limited relevance to our interest in voting analysis: if persons group themselves homogeneously into geographical units on the dependent variable, "the condition of identical relations within tracts will not be met".¹⁵ With electoral choice as our dependent variable, it seems reasonable to make the following assumption, which will preclude concern over this second type of aggregation bias: "individuals have been grouped in such a way that their scores on the dependent variable are unrelated to the aggregation in which they fall, except indirectly through the scores in the independent variable".¹⁶

14. John L. Hammond, "Two Sources of Error in Ecological Correlations", American Sociological Review XXXVIII (December, 1973), 765; the term "aggregation bias" will be used in this restricted sense; some authors seem to include non-random grouping on the independent variable in their use of the term.

15. Ibid., 771.

16. W. Phillips Shively, "'Ecological' Inference: The Use of Aggregate Data to Study Individuals", American Political Science Review LXXIX (December, 1969), 1186.

'Ecological' Regression

A mathematical trick gives simple regression analysis some very useful interpretative possibilities in conjunction with 'two-way' tables. "Ecological" regression was developed by Leo Goodman as an alternative to ecological correlation,¹⁷ and has been extended and refined by Gudmund Iversen.¹⁸ Phillips Shively and Terrence Jones have also discussed the technique with particular reference to voting analysis.¹⁹ It is a purely descriptive use of regression analysis; no statistical or theoretical model underlies it. Thus we need not be concerned with the usual stochastic assumptions accompanying regression analysis when it is employed in statistical inference.

We will not present a full mathematical exposition of the retrieval technique; however, the following discussion raises most of the key points underlying it. Table V-1 is a two-by-two joint probability table in which P and C denote the attributes "Party" and "Geographic region", both of which are composed of two exhaustive and mutually exclusive events. For the former, the events are "Liberal" (L) and "Conservative" (C), and the latter is made up of "Rural" (R) and "Urban" (U).

Table V-1 Joint Probabilities of Party and Region

G \ P	L	C	p(G)
R	P_{11}	P_{12}	$p(R) = p_{1.}$
U	P_{21}	P_{22}	$p(U) = p_{2.}$
p(P)	$p(L) = p_{.1}$	$p(C) = p_{.2}$	

17. Leo A. Goodman, "Some Alternatives to Ecological Correlations", American Journal of Sociology LXIV (May, 1959), 610-25.

18. Gudmund Iversen, "Recovering Individual Data in the Presence of Group and Individual Effects", Ibid., LXXIX (October, 1973), 420-34.

The cell entries are joint probabilities, and the marginal probabilities are defined as

$$p(L) = p_{11} + p_{21} = p_{.1}$$

$$p(C) = p_{12} + p_{22} = p_{.2}$$

$$p(R) = p_{11} + p_{12} = p_1.$$

$$p(U) = p_{21} + p_{22} = p_2.$$

The joint probabilities sum to unity. From the values shown in the cells, we can easily derive conditional probabilities, by using the basic relationship between joint, marginal and conditional probabilities for two events, A and B :

$$(1) \quad p(A|B) = \frac{p(A \cap B)}{p(B)}$$

where $p(B)$ is non-zero, and $p(A|B)$ denotes the probability of the occurrence of A, given (conditional upon) the occurrence of B; $p(A \cap B)$ denotes the probability of the joint occurrence of A and B, and $p(B)$ denotes the marginal (unconditional) probability of the occurrence of B. Thus, for example, the conditional probability that a person will vote Liberal, given that he lives in a rural area, is given by

$$(2) \quad p(L|R) = \frac{p(L \cap R)}{p(R)} = \frac{p_{11}}{p_{11} + p_{12}} = r_{11},$$

and similarly,

$$(3) \quad p(C|R) = \frac{p(C \cap R)}{p(R)} = \frac{p_{12}}{p_{11} + p_{12}} = r_{12}.$$

19. Shively, "'Ecological' Inference", and Terrence Jones, "Ecological Inference and Electoral Analysis", Journal of Interdisciplinary History II (Summer, 1972), 249-62.

The conditional probabilities, r_{11} and r_{12} , sum to unity. For an urban elector, we obtain

$$(4) \quad p(L|U) = \frac{p(L \cap U)}{p(U)} = \frac{P_{21}}{P_{21} + P_{22}} = r_{21},$$

and

$$(5) \quad p(C|U) = \frac{p(C \cap U)}{p(U)} = \frac{P_{22}}{P_{21} + P_{22}} = r_{22};$$

and r_{21} and r_{22} also sum to unity. Employing the two constraints, $r_{11} + r_{12} = 1$ and $r_{21} + r_{22} = 1$, we derive Table V-2, which follows Iversen.²⁰

Table V-2 Conditional Probabilities of Party and Region

P \ G		Conditional Probabilities		Marginal Probabilities
		L	C	
Conditional Probabilities	R	r_{11}	$1 - r_{11}$	$P_{1.}$
	U	r_{21}	$1 - r_{21}$	$P_{2.} = 1 - P_{1.}$
Marginal Probabilities		$P_{.1}$	$P_{.2} = 1 - P_{.1}$	

The key point in applying ordinary least squares in this context is the recognition that the cell entries, which are conditional probabilities, are linked to the column and row totals, which are marginal probabilities, through equation (1). Hence, because the event "being a Liberal" can be

20. Iversen, "Recovering Individual Data", 421-3.

partitioned into the elements "living in rural area" and "living in an urban area", we can write

$$L = (L \cap R) \cup (L \cap U) .$$

Then, drawing upon an axiom of probability theory, pertaining to the union of mutually exclusive event, we may write

$$p(L) = p(L \cap R) + p(L \cap U) .$$

Employing the definition of conditional probability this becomes

$$p(L) = p(L|R)p(R) + p(L|U)p(U) .$$

Substituting the entries from the preceding table, we have

$$p(L) = r_{11} (p_{1.}) + r_{21} (p_{2.}) .$$

Replacing $p_{2.}$ with $1 - p_{1.}$ from the preceding table, our basic equation becomes

$$(6) \quad p_{.1} = r_{11} p_{1.} + r_{21} (1 - p_{1.}) .$$

The discussion thus far has been couched in terms of probabilities. To develop an operational scheme for retrieving cell entries in Table V-2 (only r_{11} and r_{21} values are needed for, once these are known, the constraints automatically yield r_{12} and r_{22}), equation (6) must be reformulated to show an error term e (the subscript j denotes the observation number).

$$(7) \quad p_{.1j} = r_{11} p_{1.j} + r_{21} (1 - p_{1.j}) + e_j \quad (j = 1, \dots, n).$$

The presence of the error term reflects the fact that unless one has knowledge that the two variables (political affiliation and place of

residence) are statistically independent, it is not possible to infer, without error, either conditional or joint probabilities simply from marginal probabilities.

We have n observations (tables for n constituencies) on the values $p_{.1}$ and $p_{1.}$, with these two variables now reviewed as relative frequencies rather than as probabilities. At this stage, we have the framework for a regression problem, with $p_{.1}$ as the regressand, and a single regressor, $p_{1.}$. By grouping terms, (7) becomes

$$(8) \quad p_{.1j} = r_{21} + (r_{11} - r_{21}) p_{1.j} + e_j .$$

The problem is thus one of fitting a simple regression equation. The ordinary least squares value of the intercept (denoted by a) and of the slope (b), can be used to obtain a value for r_{21} and r_{11} . The value obtained for r_{21} is denoted by a , and for $r_{11} - r_{21}$ by b . Accordingly, we obtain a value for r_{11} as $b + a$. Because no stochastic regression model is applied (or needed), the coefficients are not to be viewed as estimates of population parameters.

If we substitute past voting (Liberal and Conservative) for geographic region, then "ecological regression" of aggregate voting returns (the marginal values), can provide estimates of the percentages of voters who remained faithful to a party across elections, and of those who strayed from the fold.²¹ Moreover, the technique is valid not only for two by two situations in which both pairs of proportions sum to unity, but also for more complex situations,²² permitting the inclusion of third party voters

21. See Shively, "'Ecological' Inference", 1187-90 for a common sense explanation of this result.

22. This is done by conceptualizing an $n \times n$ table of religion and vote as a series of 2×2 tables of the form Catholic - not Catholic versus Liberal - not Anglican versus Liberal - not Liberal, and so on.

and abstentions, and the use of sets of societal variables, such as our six religious variables. In such situations, $(a + b)$ would give the proportion of Liberals who stayed loyal to the party and $(1 - (a + b))$ would be the proportion of Liberals who left their party for the Conservatives, the NDP, Independents and so on, plus those Liberals who failed to vote at the second election.

The technique, however, is not without shortcomings. The principal defect is the need to assume, in order that aggregation bias not be present, that the values of r_{11} and r_{21} do not vary systematically across the n tables.²³ If aggregation bias is at work, the ecological regression estimates may fall outside the expected 0 to 1 range. We may thus discover that 112 percent of Election I Liberals stayed with their party at Election II - an unacceptable result, even allowing for exceptionally strong party identification, and the odd stuffed ballot box!

Iversen has extended the simple model discussed above to include different forms of what he terms "group effects",²⁴ which we have been referring to as "aggregation bias". Unfortunately, each of his extensions requires additional information beyond that contained in the marginal

23. If we consider that the "true" values of the cell entries are not constant from constituency to constituency, we might formulate a "random coefficient regression model" wherein the coefficients of a population regression function contain a systematic component and a stochastic component: it is the former at which statistical estimation would be aimed. Any gain from this type of statistical model building would not seem to warrant its application in the current context. Relatively complicated estimation methods are entailed - specifically a multi-stage application of generalized least squares (Aitken estimation). The application of such methods is intended to yield estimators which, on well-defined statistical criteria, are preferable to the results of applying ordinary least squares. However, it seems likely that any such gains will be nullified by mis-specification of the statistical model in our context. The most obvious form of this mis-specification lies in our omission of explanatory variables for which data are not available. Consequently, it seems desirable not to attempt to extract too much from our data retrieval method, and to avoid the obfuscation which might result from application of elaborate statistical methods to an inappropriate situation.

24. Iversen, "Recovering Individual Data", 426.

distributions, such as the cell entries for one riding.²⁵ It is also possible to force the estimates into the zero to unity range through mathematical techniques such as quadratic programming,²⁶ or by recasting the basic model.²⁷ These approaches only serve to disguise the fundamental problem of aggregation error bias.²⁸

Concerning the possibility that ordinary least squares may yield r_{11} and r_{21} values lying outside the zero to unity range, Kousser asserts that in practice "one is likely to obtain such estimates whenever a group overwhelmingly supports or opposes a candidate or referendum proposal". He suggests that estimates within about 10 percent of the logical limits, which are corroborated by impressionistic evidence, may be the product of random errors in "sampling";²⁹ he recommends accepting such inadmissible results as evidence of extreme electoral cohesion within a group. Not much experience has accumulated with this technique, so that such suggestions are difficult to evaluate. The only use of the technique with Canadian data is a preliminary report on aggregate voting behaviour in Newfoundland; the problem would seem to be present there although it is not explicitly discussed.³⁰

Two approaches have been suggested to circumvent aggregation bias in ecological regression: multiple regression and categorical separation, that is the calculation of separate regression estimates. For example, if we believe that Catholic voting varies according to rural-urban composition, we might run separate regression estimates equations for rural ridings, for mixed ridings and for urban ridings. This approach retains the simple regression format and thus permits the estimation of

25. Ibid., 427-9.

26. Ibid., 426.

27. The technique of "ridge regression" has been applied to the retrieval problem but it does not guarantee results in the 0 to 1 range, and requires an arbitrary setting of an "adjustment parameter". For a general ridge regression approach to the problem, see W.L. Miller, "Measures of Electoral Change Using Aggregate Data", Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, CXXXV (1972); for a fuller application, see Ivor Crewe and Clive Payne, "Another Game with Nature: An Ecological Regression Model of the British Two-Party Vote Ratio in 1970", British Journal of Political Science VI (January, 1976), 43-81.
28. Shively has developed some elegant procedures and proofs for reducing bias and determining its direction, "'Ecological' Inference", 1190-6; as Lichtman points out, however, these techniques are of little use in practical cases, for they require the unrealistic assumption to that all variation in the dependent variable is a function of a single independent variable plus an error term, Allan J. Lichtman, "Correlation, Regression and the Ecological Fallacy", Journal of Interdisciplinary History IV (Winter, 1974), 421.
29. J. Morgan Kousser, "Ecological Regression and the Analysis of Past Politics", Ibid., IV (Fall, 1974), 252. Iversen agrees that "sampling variation can give rise to illogical estimates but that good theoretical-substantive reasons for accepting them should be present, "Recovering Individual Data", 426.
30. Mark W. Graesser and Michael Wallack, "Voting Change in Newfoundland: A preliminary Analysis", paper presented to annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Montreal, 1973; Phillips Shively, "Party Identification, Party Choice, and Voting Stability: The Weimar Case", American Political Science Review LXVI (December, 1972), 1203-25, employs "multiple ecological regression" (?), which he does not explain and in which he has only two intervally scaled and two dummy independent variables. Moreover, it is clear from his figure 1, which presents his principle findings, that a few of his party loyalty percentages exceed 100, and a good many more fall in the high 90's. He does not, however, confront this problem. A somewhat different use of ecological regression is Joel D. Barkan and James E. Bruno "Locating the Voter: Mathematical Models and the Analysis of Aggregate Data for Political Campaigns", Western Political Quarterly XXVI (December, 1974), 710-30.

group voting percentages, which multiple regression does not. Conversely, however, the procedure of categorical separation - in effect controlling on third variables - requires a substantial number of cases, which may not be available. Similarly, controlling on more than one variable at a time, though highly desirable, is rendered well nigh impossible. (On the basis of his experiences, Jones suggests 30 cases as an ideal minimum in order to generate "reasonably reliable simple regression estimates".³¹ This is, of course, purely intuition, with no mathematical or statistical basis.) In addition, if the suspect third variable is continuous, there may be no self-evident divisions between categories, so that selection of cut-off points may become an exercise in 'data-dredging'.

Multiple Regression

Multiple regression remains imperfectly understood in the context of much social science research. This section considers, in a highly condensed fashion, a few crucial aspects of regression analysis as they relate to our use of it. The object is not the explication of multiple regression, but the demonstration of an awareness of the technique's possibilities and of the problems involved in bringing regression analysis to bear on our data set.

Multiple regression is a statistical technique for ascertaining the joint contribution to the variation in a dependent variable (the regressand) of several 'explanatory' variables (the regressors). The partial regression coefficients are the b_j ($j = 1, \dots, k$) in the multiple regression equation (9), where i denotes the i th observation in our sample of size n .

31. E. Terrence Jones, "Using Ecological Inference", Journal of Interdisciplinary History IV (Spring, 1974), 595.

$$(9) \quad Y_i = a + b_1 X_{1i} + b_2 X_{2i} + \dots + b_k X_{ki} + e_i \quad (i = 1, \dots, n).$$

Each partial slope (b_j) shows the change in the independent variable (Y) for a unit change in one of the independent variables, if the other ($k - 1$) independent variables are assumed constant (a is the intercept and e is the least squares error term).³² Thus, if we believe that a seemingly "strong" relationship between Conservative voting and a single explanatory variable, concentration of Anglicans, is misleading, and that Conservative voting actually depends on income level, degree of urbanization (both of which may be highly correlated with proportion of Anglicans), and proportion of Anglicans, we may calculate a multiple regression equation including all three as independent variables, along with any other variable we believe may contribute to the "explanation" of Conservative voting.

The success of the regression equation in accounting for variation in the dependent variable can be measured by the standard error of estimate, or by R^2 , the "coefficient of determination" (the square of the multiple correlation coefficient), which must lie within the range 0 to 1. Since the addition of new variables to the regression equation cannot decrease the value of R^2 , our analysis also employs the "corrected coefficient of determination", \bar{R}^2 , which takes into account the degrees of freedom lost when new variables are entered into the equation. In principle, \bar{R}^2 may assume negative values, and $R^2 \geq \bar{R}^2$.³³

32. More precisely, the slope shows the change in the estimated ("computed") value of the dependent variable. That is, the fitted equation is represented by $\hat{Y}_i = a + b_1 X_{1i} + b_2 X_{2i} + \dots + b_n X_{ni}$, and the observed values of the dependent variable are partitioned according to $Y_i = \hat{Y}_i + e_i$.

33. On \bar{R}^2 , see Kmenta, Elements, 364-6. If $k - 2$ regressors are included, the inclusion of another regressor (the k -1st) will increase \bar{R}^2 if and only if its t -score exceeds unity in absolute value.

Multiple regression may be used as a purely descriptive technique.³⁴ In this case, regression may be viewed as an extension of the simple arithmetic mean. The mean minimizes the sum of squared deviations from a point, whereas the ordinary least squares (OLS) criteria, which underlie the most common regression techniques, minimize the sum of squared deviations from a line in the case of one independent variable, and from a plane (or hyperplane) in the case of two or more regressors.³⁵ When regression analysis is employed in this a manner, it is unnecessary to distinguish sample and population, and hence no assumptions about probability distributions are needed. An application of descriptive regression analysis was discussed in our earlier treatment of 'ecological regression'.

Regression may also be used in the context of a statistical model, to make inferences from samples to populations. In that case, t-scores or F-scores may be employed to determine the statistical significance of R^2 , of individual regression coefficients, or of groups of regression coefficients.³⁶ Here the absolutely fundamental distinction between a population and a sample drawn from it, leads to the fundamental distinction between the 'population regression function' (PRF) and its sample analogue, the

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34. Ernest H. Oksanen and Bryon G. Spencer, "Some Aspects of Model Estimation in the Social Sciences", unpublished manuscript, McMaster University, 1976, 2.
35. It is worth pointing out that there is nothing sacrosanct or magical about the least squares criterion; other criteria are possible, and no less legitimate. Ordinary least squares does, however, incorporate some desirable optimality properties. Specifically, OLS estimates are, under certain conditions concerning the error term, "best linear unbiased estimates" (BLUE); *ibid.*, 7-8.
36. For example, although each of several ethnicity variables may not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, it is possible that, taken together, the ethnicity variables are highly significant. On the various significance tests for regression equations, see Kmenta, Elements, 366-74.

ordinary least squares equation, which is used to estimate the PRF. At this point, it is important to be clear that, although our data set contains all Ontario ridings, for inferential purposes it is viewed as a sample. When we wish to test hypotheses concerning the population, even aside from measurement error, "what is intended to be an exhaustive sample, such as a census ... would remain a sample in the sense that it turns up values which are, in part, the result of the operation of random factors which could, in principle, have produced another set of observed values".³⁷ In inferring characteristics of a postulated PRF through multiple regression, certain assumptions must be satisfied before probabilistic models may be validly applied. These assumptions all involve the stochastic (i.e random) error term.³⁸

The first assumption is that there exists a probability distribution of the error term for each value of the independent variables. It is sometimes assumed that the independent variables are non-stochastic, that is that their values are fixed in (conceptually) repeated sampling. This assumption is generally not warranted save in controlled experimental situations; however, certain key OLS optimality properties remain even if the independent variables are random, provided that, inter alia, the error term is not correlated with any of the independent variables.³⁹ Second is the assumption of a zero mean (expected value) for each of the n error terms.

37. Oksanen and Spencer, "Aspects", 8; for a more extended, common sense treatment of this point, see W.C. Hood, "A Note on Tests of Significance of the Coefficients of the Independent Variables in Statistical Cost Equations", Royal Commission on Transportation (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1962), III, 185-91.

38. Oksanen and Spencer, "Aspects", 6-8; Kmenta, Elements, 201-5.

39. Oksanen and Spencer, "Aspects", 6.

Next, we assume that each error term has a finite variance common to each of the n error distributions; this is the assumption of homoskedastic error. Finally, the assumption of "non-autocorrelation in the disturbances" requires that the values of the error term are not pairwise correlated. (In the event that normality is also posited - see below - this assumption becomes equivalent to the assumption of pairwise independence.)

These assumptions are almost never fulfilled in actual practice. For our data set, the assumption least subject to violation is the final one; 'serial correlation', as it is also called, is often a serious problem in time series data,⁴⁰ but is not likely present to any serious degree in our data. Violation of the assumption of uncorrelatedness between the error term and any independent variable would also occur should the dependent variable have a feedback effect upon any of the independent variables; it is improbable that this would occur when vote is the dependent variable and the independent variables entail relatively fixed social characteristics. It has been suggested that, for economic data, the assumption of homoskedacity is more likely to be violated for individual units than for aggregates,⁴¹ but our data harbour potentially serious violations of this assumption.

Two other problems, which do not involve violations of these assumptions, should be noted: specification error and multicollinearity. Specification error may assume several forms.⁴² A common form relates to

40. Ibid., 13-14; Kmenta, Elements, 269-71.

41. Ibid., 249.

42. Ibid., 392.

the incorrect mathematical form of the regression equation, for example postulating a linear PRF when the true PRF is curvilinear.⁴³ Other common specification errors are the inclusion of irrelevant variables, and its perhaps more serious obverse, exclusion of relevant variables. Such errors may lead to bias in the estimated coefficients, including bias which does not disappear even as the sample size grows indefinitely, as in the case of unwarranted exclusion of independent variables. The incorporation of excessive independent variables may reduce the efficiency (which we can roughly translate as "precision") of the ordinary least squares slope parameter estimates. Although the inclusion of irrelevant variables reduces efficiency, it might not produce the same interpretative difficulties as does exclusion of relevant variables. The latter is an omnipresent problem, for there are always systematic (i.e. non-random) variables which are believed to affect the relationship and for which data are unavailable. In our study this is particularly true. Unless an excluded variable is uncorrelated with the variables in the regression equation, which is highly unlikely, given the prevalence of at least some intercorrelations among independent variables, the ordinary least squares estimators will be biased.⁴⁴ Particularly in light of the confounding effects of intercorrelation among regressors (multicollinearity), it has been suggested that variables which are not statistically significant ought to be retained in the equation "provided there are good theoretical reasons for including them".⁴⁵

43. Linear regression is no more inherently "correct" than curvilinear regression; however, the problems of linear regression are sufficiently complex that no curvilinear regression was attempted.

44. Kmenta, Elements, 392-4; Oksanen and Spencer, "Aspects", 20.

45. Ibid., 21.

In order to understand the connection between simple (one independent variable) regression (10), and multiple regression (11), we have constructed an example in which the latter entails only two independent variables. For simplicity, all variables are assumed to be measured in terms of deviations from their sample means, thus permitting us to dispense with the intercept in our discussion. In (10) the term u_i denotes the ordinary least squares residual.

$$(10) \quad y_i = b_1 x_{1i} + u_i$$

$$(11) \quad y_i = a_1 x_{1i} + a_2 x_{2i} + e_i$$

The ordinary least squares coefficient of x_1 in (10) is given by

$$(12) \quad b_1 = \frac{\sum_i^n y_i x_{1i}}{\sum_i^n x_{1i}^2}$$

Upon replacement of y_i in (12) with the right side of (11),

b_1 becomes

$$b_1 = \frac{\sum_i^n (a_1 x_{1i} + a_2 x_{2i} + e_i) x_{1i}}{\sum_i^n x_{1i}^2}$$

$$= a_1 + a_2 \frac{\sum_i^n x_{2i} x_{1i}}{\sum_i^n x_{1i}^2} + \frac{\sum_i^n e_i x_{1i}}{\sum_i^n x_{1i}^2}$$

It is a property of ordinary least squares (in no way connected with any probabilistic assumptions) that the sample covariance of the residual term with each regressor is zero. Hence $\sum_i^n e_i x_{1i}$ is zero, and our expression becomes

$$b_1 = a_1 + a_2 \frac{\sum_i^n x_{2i} x_{1i}}{\sum_i^n x_{1i}^2}$$

Now examination of the term $\sum_i^n x_{2i} x_{1i} / \sum_i^n x_{1i}^2$ shows it to be the ordinary least squares slope coefficient from a so-called "auxiliary" regression entailing X_2 as the dependent variable and X_1 as the independent variable. If we denote this coefficient by c , we obtain (13), which displays the simple least squares slope coefficient associated with X_1 in terms of (i) its multiple regression "counterpart" (a_1), (ii) the multiple regression ordinary least squares coefficient of the other independent variable (a_2), and (iii) the auxiliary coefficient (c).

$$(13) \quad b_1 = a_1 + a_2 c$$

From (13) we see immediately that should c be zero, that is if X_1 and X_2 are not correlated (no multicollinearity between our independent variables), then the simple and multiple regression coefficients of X_1 coincide. A similar expression could be derived to relate b_2 in $y_i = b_2 x_{2i} + u_i$ to a_1 and a_2 in (11). One important implication of (13) is that even though b_1 may be zero (no simple correlation between Y and X_1), the partial

ordinary least squares coefficient (a_1) relating Y and X_1 could be non-zero. Clearly, too, the signs of b_1 and a_1 need not coincide.

The discussion has been conducted entirely in the context of a descriptive use of regression analysis. We now specify a PRF which contains both X_1 and X_2 , as in (14), where α , β_1 and β_2 denote population parameters and where the expectations operator (E) denotes the (population) mean value of Y for specified (X_{1i}, X_{2i}) , with the latter pair of values assumed to be fixed in repeated sampling.⁴⁶

$$(14) \quad E(Y_i) = \alpha + \beta_1 X_{1i} + \beta_2 X_{2i} \quad (i = 1, \dots, n)$$

The unobservable true error (C_i) connects the observed value of Y with its mean:

$$(15) \quad Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 X_{1i} + \beta_2 X_{2i} + C_i$$

We now assume that a researcher has mistakenly specified a PRF containing X_1 , but not X_2 , with b_1 presented as the estimator of β_1 . If, in repeated sampling, the mean of b_1 were given by β_1 , then b_1 would be an unbiased estimator of β_1 . In deriving $E(b_1)$, we again begin with (10), but we now replace y_i with (15). Upon summing this expression over the sample and dividing by the sample size (n), we obtain

46. The values (X_{11}, \dots, X_{1n}) and (X_{21}, \dots, X_{2n}) , and their deviations from sample mean $(\bar{x}_{11}, \dots, \bar{x}_{1n})$ and $(\bar{x}_{21}, \dots, \bar{x}_{2n})$ are viewed as fixed in repeated sampling here only to facilitate our use of the E -operator. If X_1 and X_2 were allowed to be random instead, but independent of the true error, then our result concerning the presence of bias would continue to hold.

$$(16) \quad y_i = \beta_1 x_{1i} + \beta_2 x_{2i} + \epsilon_i - \bar{\epsilon},$$

where lower case letters denote deviations from sample means (e.g. $y_i = Y_i - \bar{Y}$), and where $\bar{\epsilon}$ denotes the sample mean of n observable true errors. Substituting the last expression for y_i into (12), we obtain

$$(17) \quad b_1 = \beta_1 + \beta_2 c + \frac{\sum_i^n (\epsilon_i - \bar{\epsilon}) x_{1i}}{\sum_i^n x_{1i}^2}$$

The formation of expectations then yields⁴⁷

$$(18) \quad E(b_1) = \beta_1 + \beta_2 c$$

47. Note that $\sum_i^n \epsilon_i x_i$ does not vanish; ϵ_i is the true error and not the ordinary least squares residual. However, since $x_{1i} / \sum_i^n x_{1i}^2$ is a constant vis à vis the E-operator, the expectation for the last term in the expression is zero. To see this, let $w_{1i} = x_{1i} / \sum_i^n x_{1i}^2$, noting that w_i is fixed in repeated sampling since it depends only upon the values of the regressors. Then

$$\frac{\sum_i^n (\epsilon_i - \bar{\epsilon}) x_{1i}}{\sum_i^n x_{1i}^2} = \sum_i^n (\epsilon_i - \bar{\epsilon}) w_{1i} = \sum_i^n \epsilon_i w_{1i}$$

since $-\bar{\epsilon} \sum_i^n w_{1i} = 0$ ($\sum_i^n w_{1i}$ because $\sum_i^n x_{1i} = 0$ - the sum of deviations about a sample mean is necessarily zero). Then, upon forming expectations, we have $E\left[\sum_i^n \epsilon_i w_{1i}\right] = \sum_i^n E(\epsilon_i w_{1i})$, using the proposition that the expectation of a sum of random variables equals the sum of the expectations. In turn, $E[\epsilon_i w_{1i}] = w_{1i} E(\epsilon_i)$ because w_{1i} are fixed in repeated sampling and hence are treated as constants vis à vis the expected value operator. Finally, $E(\epsilon_i) = 0$ for $i = (1, \dots, n)$. Consequently the last term in (17) vanishes.

Equation (18) clearly shows that if $c = 0$, that is if no multicollinearity exists between the two independent variables, then the simple ordinary least squares slope coefficient will yield an unbiased estimator of its PRF counterpart. Alternatively, if $\beta_2 = 0$, then, regardless of the degree of multicollinearity, b_1 would be an unbiased estimator (this, however, is the case in which X_2 does not belong in the PRF in the first place).

An important implication of this exercise is that the simple, or zero-order correlation coefficient is a special case of the excluded variable problem. Due to all the relevant but excluded variables, this is almost invariably a very poorly specified model. Hence, although the simple correlation may be of considerable interest in a purely descriptive usage, it is, statistically, of dubious value in a great many instances.

Multicollinearity is almost invariably present to some extent in any social science data set, so that the "multicollinearity problem" is not one of kind but of degree.⁴⁸ Since multicollinearity is present when an independent variable is correlated with a linear combination of other independent variables, a high degree of multicollinearity "does not generally imply that the correlation between any two explanatory variables must be particularly high".⁴⁹

Multicollinearity basically means that the data set contains less information than the number of variables would lead one to expect.⁵⁰

48. Kmenta, Elements, 380.

49. Ibid., 389.

50. Donald E. Farrar and Robert R. Glauber, "Multicollinearity in Regression Analysis: The Problem Revisited", Review of Economics and Statistics LXIX (February, 1967), 95.

Thus the key to overcoming multicollinearity is more, rather than less, information.⁵¹ In practice, however, this is very difficult, so that although the problem is easily detected, it is "nearly intractable".⁵² Although multicollinearity does not violate the stochastic assumptions underlying multiple regression, and hence does not affect the optimality properties of ordinary least squares estimators, the implication of its presence "is to increase the true standard errors of the parameter estimators. The estimated standard errors of the regression coefficients will 'blow up' to some degree (and, concomitantly, t-scores will decrease)".⁵³ The analyst must be careful in drawing inferences about regression analyses beset by this problem: "a high degree of multicollinearity is simply a feature of the sample that contributes to the unreliability of the estimated coefficients, but has no relevance for the conclusions drawn as a result of this unreliability".⁵⁴ In other words, it is illogical to argue that but for the high degree of multicollinearity, the coefficients would have been more highly significant; this may be suspected, but not demonstrated.

51. Ibid.

52. Oksanen and Spencer, "Aspects", 19; see also Farrar and Glauber, "Multicollinearity", and Richard C. Rockwell, "Assessment of Multicollinearity: The Haitovsky Test of the Determinant", Sociological Methods and Research III (February, 1975), 308-20.

53. Oksanen and Spencer, "Aspects", 19. The distinction between "true" and "estimated" standard errors can be shown as follows. The true variance of b_j in repeated sampling is given by $\sigma_{b_j}^2 = \sigma_{\epsilon}^2 m^{jj}$ where σ_{ϵ}^2 is the (constant) variance of the error in an equation such as (14), and where m^{jj} is the j th element along the main diagonal of the inverse of $(X'X)$ the $(k+1)(k+1)$ product-moment matrix. The true standard error is σ_{b_j} , the square root of the variance. The estimated standard error requires replacement of σ_{ϵ}^2 with $(\sum_{i=1}^n e_i^2)/n - k - 1$ for the residual variance of the ordinary least squares equation, adjusted for the loss of $k+1$ degrees of freedom in the estimation process.

54. Kmenta, Elements, 391.

A more subtle problem arising from a high degree of multicollinearity is the substantial bias that may be implanted toward incorrect model specification: "attempts to apply regression techniques to highly multicollinear independent variables generally result in parameter estimators that are markedly sensitive to changes in model specification and to sample coverage".⁵⁵

The final aspect of regression analysis to be touched upon in this brief review is the use of binary or "dummy" variables. These are used to bring dichotomous qualitative data, such as region or incumbency, into the regression equation, and their coefficients are interpreted in the same fashion as those of ordinary variables.⁵⁶ For example, ridings in which the incumbent was standing for re-election would be assigned a value of one for the dummy variable, while a value of zero would be assigned to ridings without incumbent candidates. A more complex variable, such as region, may be incorporated into the analysis through a set of dummy variables: for the seven region system employed in our analysis,

55. Farrar and Glauber, "Multicollinearity", 93. For a substantive interpretation of multicollinearity problems, including illustrations of how very slight changes in correlations among independent variables may affect the magnitude and statistical significance of regression coefficients, see Robert A. Gordon, "Issues in Multiple Regression", American Journal of Sociology LXXIII (January, 1968), 592-616.
56. The coding of dummies in terms of (0,1) is arbitrary. Since OLS coefficients are invariant up to linear transformation of variables, precisely the same information would be obtained were the coding done with any pair of real numbers, for example (-7.6, 55.1). For use of dummy variables in regression analysis of aggregate electoral data, see Gerald H. Kramer, "Short-Term Fluctuations in US voting Behavior, 1896-1964", American Political Science Review LXV (March, 1971), 131-43; and Donald E. Blake, "The Measurement of Regionalism in Canadian Voting Patterns", Canadian Journal of Political Science V (March, 1972), 55-81.

seven dummies would be used. In each case the dummy has value unity for each riding in that region and zero for ridings not in that region. Whenever one or more sets of dummy variables are employed, one dummy must be (arbitrarily) deleted from each set, if the general intercept is retained. This does not entail any loss of information, and is a requirement of the algebra of ordinary least squares, which precludes incorporation of any variable which is a perfect linear combination of others. An alternative to deleting one dummy from each set is the deletion of the general intercept term. Although the approaches are mathematically equivalent, it might be argued that deletion of the intercept permits a more straight-forward interpretation of the coefficients, although this is only a matter of taste. If the intercept is retained, each coefficient of a remaining dummy must be interpreted as the differential effect of that dummy as compared with the deleted dummy. For instance, if there is only a single set of dummies, for six regions with one region's dummy deleted, the coefficient of each remaining dummy represents the ceteris paribus effect upon the dependent variable of an observation being located in the specified region minus the effect of being in the region denoted by the deleted dummy.⁵⁷

57. Oksanen and Spencer, "Aspects", 9.

CHAPTER VI REGIONAL ELECTORAL PATTERNS AND TRENDS

This chapter is primarily given over to examination of regional patterns and trends in Ontario's electoral history. The emphasis is not upon the determination of how region, as abstracted from social composition, affects levels of party support. The multiple regression analysis of Chapter VIII considers this issue. Instead, the aim is to set out broad similarities and differences in voting patterns across the various regions. Although no hard data on the social characteristics of the regions are brought to bear, the influence of social factors and social change on electoral patterns is a key focus of the analysis. This chapter thus extends and refines the analysis of province-wide electoral patterns and trends, in Chapter III. As in the earlier discussion, only simple descriptive statistics, measuring the means and dispersion of party vote shares are employed.

As a preliminary to the explicit investigation of regional patterns, data are presented on the dispersion of party vote shares and turnout across the entire province. Following this, a series of tables outlines the means of party vote shares for all provincial elections for seven regions of the province; the dispersion of party support within regions is also discussed briefly. Finally, trends in party vote shares are tested within regional contexts.

Dispersion of Party Vote

We wish to know the extent of riding by riding variation in the level of party vote; that is, did a party obtain approximately the same

share of the vote in all ridings, or did it fare much better in some ridings than others? To this end, the coefficient of variability was selected as a measure of dispersion in party vote shares. This descriptive statistic is simply the standard deviation divided by the mean; it is more directly comparable across samples than the standard deviation which measures dispersion about a given mean.¹

The coefficients of variability presented in Table VI-1 are computed for the unweighted means of party vote and turnout. This may seem paradoxical since the analysis of vote shares is based on weighted means. In determining party vote shares, what was wanted was a measure of the votes received by a party as a proportion of the entire electorate, regardless of how they were distributed in large or small ridings, so that the weighted mean seemed appropriate. For purposes of analysing dispersion, however, it was felt that all ridings should be treated equally, as distinct units, and for this the unweighted mean was deemed more appropriate.

In examining the data on vote dispersion, it must be recognized that no intrinsic importance attaches to any given coefficient of variability, as it does to the mean of party vote shares. Individual entries only take on meaning by comparison with other entries, either for the same party at other elections, or for other parties at the same election.

¹For a use of the coefficient of variability to analyse dispersion of aggregate voting, see Donald E. Blake, "The Measurement of Regionalism in Canadian Voting Patterns," Canadian Journal of Political Science V (March, 1972), 77-9.

TABLE VI-1
 COEFFICIENT OF VARIABILITY
 PARTY SHARES AND TURNOUT
 ENTIRE PROVINCE

Year	Liberal	Conservative	Third	Turnout
1867	.28	.20		.15
1871	.26	.27		.20
1875	.24	.19		.12
1879	.23	.20		.15
1883	.20	.20		.17
1886	.17	.19		.12
1890	.18	.18		.15
1894	.24	.25	.39	.13
1898	.22	.22		.13
1902	.20	.17		.15
1905	.29	.15		.18
1908	.29	.14		.16
1911	.36	.18		.22
1914	.26	.19		.14
1919	.36	.31	.25	.13
1923	.48	.24	.35	.20
1926	.43	.19	.35	.14
1929	.40	.15		.21
1934	.21	.19	.59	.07
1937	.19	.28	.63	.08
1943	.35	.36	.49	.12
1945	.33	.27	.52	.06
1948	.38	.21	.55	.08
1951	.34	.24	.59	.10
1955	.37	.25	.61	.14
1959	.33	.26	.58	.14
1963	.32	.25	.70	.09
1967	.34	.27	.57	.09
1971	.42	.30	.42	.06
1975	.33	.31	.43	.06
1977	.46	.32	.46	.08

The most salient feature of this table is that the range of the Conservative coefficient is generally lower as well as more narrow than that of the Liberals;² this pattern is repeated in all of the regions discussed later in this chapter. In terms of variation from riding to riding, therefore, the Tories have usually had a more consistent vote share. The CCF-NDP vote share is much more widely dispersed than that of the older parties, which, given the party's typically poor showing in rural areas compared with its relative success in urban centres, is not surprising.

For both the Liberals and the Conservatives, the elections in which their level of support was most consistent were those in which they reached the zenith of their popularity: 1934 and 1937 for the Grits, and 1905-1914 and 1926 and 1929 for the Tories. The coefficient of variability for the Liberal party was far higher than that of the Conservatives during the years 1905-1929, the period of the party's lowest electoral fortunes. Although it is not dictated by the mathematics of the situation, and indeed important exceptions are evident (such as the extremely wide dispersion of NDP voting in 1967, the year of its greatest improvement since 1943), it does seem that inconsistency (as denoted by a high coefficient of variability) and comparative weakness go hand in hand. Conversely, when a party receives relatively strong support, that support tends to be more evenly distributed.

²The mean of the Tory coefficients is .23, with a range of .14 to .36, whereas the Liberal range is .17 to .48 with a mean of .30.

Over the entire span of provincial history, the trend of both Liberal and Conservative dispersion, as measured by Kendall's tau, is positive: .36 for the Grits, .35 for the Tories.³ Party strength, in other words, has tended to become less consistent across time. The wider dispersion of party vote shares is a feature of this century,⁴ and has occurred in all regions. The explanation for this increasing dispersion in levels of party voting lies in social as well as political factors. Socially, although local and regional peculiarities may have declined in political significance, the social diversity of the province, in terms of ethnic, religious, and occupational makeup has brought about a broader spectrum of political problems and responses, which in turn accentuate the electoral differences among ridings. In terms of political structure, third parties have been powerful in some ridings but negligible in others, which would produce a further strong differential effect on the level of support elicited by all parties. An interesting counterpoint is the consistently negative correlation of time with the dispersion of turnout, for all periods of time and for all regions. Turnout has, in other words, become steadily more narrowly dispersed across ridings with the passage of time.

Regional Voting Patterns

This section analyses patterns of electoral change and

³Both correlations are statistically significant at $p < .01$. On the use of Kendall's tau as a test for trend, see Chapter III.

⁴Province wide, the correlations are 1867-1902: Liberal -.55 ($p < .01$) Conservative -.22 (n.s.); 1905-1975: Liberal .06 (n.s.) Conservative .53 ($p < .01$).

continuity from a regional perspective. The primary mode of analysis is the construction of time series of party vote shares for seven regions: Eastern Ontario, the Lake Ontario Region, the Georgian Bay Region, Western Ontario, the Golden Horseshoe, Toronto and Northern Ontario.⁵ As the data in the following tables make clear, region has been an important factor in Ontario's electoral history, with significant differences evident among regions on many occasions. Of at least equal import, however, has been the strength of province-wide electoral forces and patterns. For all regions, the nineteenth century was characterized by relatively competitive⁶ conditions between the Liberals and the Conservatives, which gave way around the turn of the century to a wide Tory margin over the Grits, which lasted until the Depression. In the two elections of the 1930's the Liberals enjoyed a tremendous upsurge in support in all regions, which quickly dissipated during World War Two; from then until 1975, the Liberal vote was consistently well below that of the Conservatives. Similarly, the CCF enjoyed substantial popular support in the 1940's which declined markedly in the 1950's, and has shown a general resurgence since the

⁵For the definition of these regions, and the rationale underlying them, see Appendix B.

⁶The use of the word "competitive" is imprecise. As David Elkins points out, the critical dimension of party competition is uncertainty prior to an election rather than margin of victory (or some kindred measure) calculated after the election. Since we have no way of determining this, however, we use the term competitive as a synonym for "close". For a full discussion of the problem, see Elkins, "Measurement of Party Competition", American Political Science Review LXVIII (June, 1974), 682-700.

mid 1960's. To be sure, regional variations may be discerned in all these trends, but the fundamental importance of province-wide forces must be borne in mind during discussion of regional patterns.

The aggregation of ridings into regions necessarily masks differences within regions. Some of the more important differences are pointed out in the ensuing discussion but in order to gain a fuller appreciation of the extent of subregional variation lost in the large regional groupings, table VI-2 reports party vote shares for twenty-three smaller regions for five selected elections, 1879, 1905, 1934, 1943, and 1941.⁷ The data in this table will not be discussed in detail; suffice it to say that the patterns which emerge are essentially the same as those evident in the seven larger regions, and further, they indicate that the use of the large regions does not seem to distort subregional differences unduly. The most noteworthy differences lost in the larger regions are between the city of Ottawa and the remainder of Eastern Ontario, and between the urban centres of London, Windsor and Kitchener-Waterloo and the balance of the Western Ontario region.

As with the impression of Liberal dominance in the nineteenth century, the conventional wisdom regarding areas of party support tends to over-state basic trends. Doubtless this is due to the influence on evaluations of the more readily perceived but often misleading distribution of seats. In terms of seats won (see Table VI-3), Western

⁷These regions are defined in Appendix B.

TABLE VI--2

MEAN PARTY VOTE AND TURNOUT ACCORDING TO THE 23 REGION SYSTEM, SELECTED ELECTIONS
(Party vote as a proportion of total electorate)

Region	1879				1905				1934				1943					1971				
	L	C	T	N	L	C	T	N	L	C	CC	T	L	C	CC	T	N	L	C	ND	T	N
1 Stormont-Russell	25	28	59	4	35	32	75	4	40	23		73	28	16	12	66	4	16	40	16	72	3
2 Ottawa	11	19	48	1	37	36	73	1	34	31	2	76	22	16	6	46	2	21	29	17	67	5
3 Renfrew-Lanark	29	35	70	5	21	37	58	5	41	34		75	22	30	8	60	4	23	39	11	73	4
4 Dundas-Leeds	31	35	66	5	29	38	67	4	38	38		76	21	33	4	58	2	14	47	11	72	2
5 Frontenac-Hastings	31	33	69	8	31	37	68	8	39	40		79	22	31	9	62	5	24	35	8	70	5
6 Durham-Victoria	33	32	69	8	30	40	70	8	40	35	4	79	23	30	11	64	4	18	36	22	76	4
7 Muskoka-Parry Sound	43	31	74	1	20	28	49	2	47	32		79	20	18	21	59	2	16	32	16	74	2
8 Simcoe-Bruce	33	31	68	9	32	37	72	11	46	32		78	22	23	14	59	6	24	36	14	74	5
9 Ontario-York	35	29	64	3	41	44	85	3	43	27	6	76	18	18	24	70	2	13	38	26	77	3
10 Peel-Halton	36	34	70	2	39	43	82	2	38	34	5	77	17	27	16	60	2	16	42	16	74	4
11 Hamilton	30	29	59	1	37	43	80	2	34	25	18	79	15	17	25	60	4	18	27	25	70	5
12 Wentworth-Welland	33	28	61	4	37	40	77	4	39	27	8	74	18	19	24	61	3	20	35	19	74	6
13 Brant-Elgin	38	34	72	7	42	41	83	7	44	31	2	77	26	19	13	58	4	23	35	18	76	4
14 Oxford-Huron	36	30	68	14	39	41	80	14	45	30	2	77	22	22	15	59	9	27	31	17	75	9
15 London	23	32	55	1	39	44	85	1	41	33		74	17	25	19	61	1	20	35	19	74	2
16 Kitchener-Waterloo	38	33	71	1	34	39	73	1	36	17	13	69	17	12	20	49	1	30	23	19	72	2
17 Lambton-Essex	32	31	63	6	39	40	79	6	42	27		73	25	24	10	59	5	32	25	14	71	6
18 Windsor	19	24	43	1	29	38	67	1	41	22	8	74	13	14	26	55	3	22	18	33	73	3
19 Toronto city	24	24	48	2	18	39	59	4	27	27	9	66	10	22	18	54	13	16	31	22	69	11
20 York West	32	31	63	1	22	39	61	1	27	25	12	65	9	19	23	52	2	22	29	22	73	9
21 York East	21	27	59	1	32	40	72	1	23	29	14	69	8	21	24	53	1	19	37	18	74	8
22 Algoma	35	30	65	1	23	27	50	5	42	27	5	76	20	10	34	66	7	16	30	29	75	10
23 Thunder Bay					22	25	47	2	51	28	1	79	18	14	37	69	4	15	31	29	75	5

Key L Liberal ND NDP
C Conservative T Turnout
CC CCF N Number of ridings

SEATS WON BY PARTY ACCORDING TO REGION

Election	East			Lake Ontario			Georgian Bay			Golden Horseshoe			West			Toronto			North		
	L	C	T	L	C	T	L	C	T	L	C	T	L	C	T	L	C	T	L	C	T
1867	5	11		5	11		8	5		15	12		1	3							
1871	3	13		7	9		7	4		21	6		2	1							
1875	5	10		8	7		8	2		21	9		2	2							
1879	5	10		9	6		9	1		25	5		2	2							
1883	3	9		5	10		9	1		23	7		1	3							
1886	10	4		5	11		9	1		24	6		3	2							
1890	8	6		3	8	4	5	2		24	6		3	2							
1894	7	5	3	5	7		9	3	7	19	7	3	1	5							
1898	7	3		7	9		6	5		20	7		3	4							
1902	7	3		7	9		7	4		17	13		1	5							
1905	6	9		5	11		5	3		10	20		2	6							
1908	4	11		1	15		3	3		9	21		10	10							
1911	3	12		1	15		3	3		11	19		10	10							
1914	5	10		3	13		3	1		13	17		12	12							
1919	5	8	7	5	6		5	2	4	5	2	19	5	6							
1922	4	9	1	3	13		1	8	4	2	18	8	3	6							
1926	4	12		3	8		4	4		8	13	6	12	13							
1929	4	14		2	4		2	4		5	21		18	18							
1934	3	14		2	11		2	5		25	21		9	9							
1937	3	5		5	6		6	1		23	17		7	8							
1942	5	7			9		4	3	1	6	9	8	7	7							
1945	5	7		1	9		2	1		4	19	2	14	14							
1949	4	11		2	6		4	4		6	5		3	3							
1953	4	10		2	9		2	3		6	20		15	18							
1957	4	12		2	12		4	2		4	15		13	15							
1961	4	12		2	12		4	2		6	17		15	18							
1965	4	12		2	12		4	2		6	17		15	18							
1969	4	12		2	12		4	2		6	17		15	18							
1973	4	12		2	12		4	2		6	17		15	18							
1977	4	12		2	12		4	2		6	17		15	18							
1981	4	12		2	12		4	2		6	17		15	18							
1985	4	12		2	12		4	2		6	17		15	18							
1989	4	12		2	12		4	2		6	17		15	18							
1993	4	12		2	12		4	2		6	17		15	18							
1997	4	12		2	12		4	2		6	17		15	18							
2001	4	12		2	12		4	2		6	17		15	18							
2005	4	12		2	12		4	2		6	17		15	18							
2009	4	12		2	12		4	2		6	17		15	18							
2013	4	12		2	12		4	2		6	17		15	18							
2017	4	12		2	12		4	2		6	17		15	18							
2021	4	12		2	12		4	2		6	17		15	18							

Ontario was indeed the Liberal bailiwick in the nineteenth century, while Eastern Ontario, and the Lake Ontario and Georgian Bay regions have been areas of great Conservative strength. Popular vote is rarely so unevenly split as are seats. Still, the size of the regions employed in the analysis is such as to mask some differences which would add credence to this view of regional powerbases. The Western Ontario region, by way of illustration, contains the city of London, a Tory stronghold. Yet even in this case, appearances can be deceiving, for although the Conservatives won London from 1867 to 1894, only in the first two elections did they enjoy substantial margins, despite the fact that the sitting member during the years 1878-1894 was the Conservative leader, W.R. Meredith.

The following tables, VI-4 to VI-10 together with their graphical representations, Figures VI-1 to VI-7 contain the data on which our brief review of voting within regional contexts is based. The emphasis, as in Chapter III, is on trends and patterns, rather than on specific elections, interesting as they may be. Moreover, due to the sheer volume of data, many points common to all regions, such as the tremendous rise in Liberal support in 1934, will not be mentioned within each regional context.

Eastern Ontario

Party vote shares and turnout for Eastern Ontario are presented in Table VI-4. This area has been consistently Conservative since Confederation. Until 1919, however, the Tory margin was rarely

overwhelming, usually of the order of two or three per cent, though in 1905 it did reach 8 per cent. The electoral system tended to over-compensate the Conservatives substantially in term of seats.

From 1923 until the present day, save the Hepburn elections and the 1943 campaign, the Tory margin over the Liberals has been extraordinarily high, a consistent 8 to 10 percentage points. This bulge has been further amplified in the number of seats each party has carried. The widening of the Conservative plurality is almost entirely due to a decline in Liberal strength, for the Conservative vote in Eastern Ontario has remained very steady.


Although Eastern Ontario was the UFO's weakest area outside of Toronto and the North, the regional variation in UFO vote shares was not great; the UFO attracted nearly 36 per cent of the eligible electorate in the 11 of 15 ridings it contested in Eastern Ontario. Aside from minor initial success in 1943, the CCF-NDP fared very poorly in this region until 1971, when it first attracted a significant proportion of the vote. Even in the 1970's, though, the party's vote has been heavily concentrated in Ottawa and Cornwall.

The Eastern Ontario region is an amalgam of three quite distinct entities. First is the extreme eastern tip of the province, the counties of Russell, Prescott and Glengarry, which are heavily French-speaking. Even at Confederation, these counties contained a strong French element, and the French presence expanded steadily over the following years so that today Prescott and Russell counties are over eighty per cent French in origin. Although pockets of Franco-Ontarians

TABLE VI-4
 PARTY VOTE SHARES AND TURNOUT
 EASTERN ONTARIO

Year	LIBERAL		CONSERVATIVE		THIRD		TURNOUT Mean	N
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N		
1867	34.6		39.1				74.8	15
1871	30.9		32.0				64.4	13
1875	31.4		37.8				68.8	14
1879	26.6		31.4				61.5	15
1883	29.5		32.6				65.4	15
1886	32.1		32.4				66.2	14
1890	32.3		29.0				60.5	13
1894	31.0	10	25.8	11	28.8	7	63.3	14
1898	32.7		34.3				71.2	13
1902	32.8		34.5				67.3	14
1905	30.0		38.3				65.5	14
1908	31.9		34.9				67.0	14
1911	27.0		32.2				59.5	10
1914	30.9		31.1				64.8	13
1919	27.1	10	25.5		35.6	11	69.6	15
1923	21.1	3	27.5		23.5	11	52.5	15
1926	26.6		35.6				65.4	16
1929	24.8		34.5				61.1	14
1934	38.0		31.1		3.1	1	74.7	12
1937	38.0		29.4		10.3		71.3	12
1943	23.1		22.2		10.7		53.3	12
1945	25.3		33.1		8.4		69.7	12
1948	21.7		32.4		7.4		62.6	12
1951	25.0		35.3		4.6	8	64.1	12
1955	23.3		33.8		3.0	5	58.8	13
1959	25.5		32.4		2.7	7	59.8	13
1963	24.0		34.5		2.7		62.4	13
1967	21.5		32.4		7.0		61.0	15
1971	19.7		34.9		15.7		70.4	15
1975	20.7		28.1		18.1		67.0	14
1977	20.1		28.5		15.3		64.2	14

FIGURE VI-1
 PARTY VOTE SHARES AND TURNOUT
 EASTERN ONTARIO



are found elsewhere in Eastern Ontario only here and in Ottawa and Cornwall do they form a significant proportion of the population. Possibly due to federal influence, these French-speaking ridings were strongly Liberal from the later stages of the nineteenth century until the Second World War. It is thus a telling indication of the Tories' wide ranging appeal that these ridings (with the exception of Ottawa East, and more recently, Cornwall) have been unshakeably Conservative since then.

The second component of the region comprises the counties of Lanark, Leeds, Grenville and Dundas, and the rural sections of what was formerly Carleton county. Both the farm areas and the small cities and towns such as Brockville, Prescott and Smiths Falls have staunch Loyalist roots and extremely long Tory traditions: Grenville has been Conservative continuously since 1875; Leeds shows only one Grit aberration since Confederation, while Lanark returned its last Liberal in 1894.

The third element of the larger region is the city of Ottawa, a city unique by virtue of the influence of the federal government (and a concomitant low level of industrialization). Until the 1920's, Ottawa's voting patterns were highly volatile; since then (with the exception of French-speaking Ottawa East), it has been consistently Conservative, though the NDP has made important gains in the 1970's.

The rate of turnout in Eastern Ontario has been quite unremarkable, save perhaps for a close correspondence to the provincial norm.

The dispersion of party vote and of turnout⁸ in this area has generally conformed to province-wide patterns,⁹ with two minor exceptions. First, compared with other regions, and in particular the neighbouring Lake Ontario area, the Conservative party's vote share has had an unusually wide dispersion.¹⁰ Secondly, during the Liberals' dark days from 1905 to 1929, their support was no more widely dispersed than the Tories' support in Eastern Ontario.

Lake Ontario

One politically salient feature of the Lake Ontario region, which does not emerge from its voting history as portrayed in Table VI-5, is that it has suffered a greater loss of representation through demographic change than any other region. At Confederation this area returned 20 per cent of the members, but by 1977 it accounted for only 7 per cent of provincial seats.

Until the watershed election of 1905, the Lake Ontario region was extremely competitive in both seats and votes. Since then, however,

⁸Tables containing the regional coefficients of variability were judged of secondary interest, and hence are located in Appendix E.

⁹Since individual regions tend to be more homogeneous than the province as a whole, it is often the case that most, or all, of the regional dispersions are less than the province-wide figure. Thus a region's vote dispersion may not be compared with the provincial 'norm' in the same way that vote shares may be compared (the weighted mean of the regional vote shares will precisely equal the province-wide vote share, but there is no analogous equivalence for dispersion). Dispersions may, however, be compared across regions, and regional patterns may be compared with province-wide patterns.

¹⁰From 1867 to 1898, and again from 1934 to 1975, the coefficient of variability only once fell below .20.


TABLE VI-5
 PARTY VOTE SHARES AND TURNOUT
 LAKE ONTARIO

Year	LIBERAL		CONSERVATIVE		THIRD		TURNOUT Mean	N
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N		
1867	29.2		37.8				67.7	14
1871	26.8		30.3				57.5	12
1875	34.7		32.2				67.2	16
1879	32.3		32.3				65.1	15
1883	35.6		36.9				72.7	16
1886	33.6		36.0				69.6	16
1890	33.9		32.0				65.4	15
1894	33.5	12	31.7		26.3	7	68.5	16
1898	36.1		38.6				77.2	16
1902	37.3		38.1				75.4	16
1905	30.4		38.5				69.0	16
1908	32.4		39.3				72.1	13
1911	29.9		37.8				68.2	9
1914	30.4	12	40.5				69.6	16
1919	32.6	7	28.8		37.2	3	71.1	13
1923	23.5	10	33.8		24.5	8	63.9	15
1926	36.9		36.1		40.1	1	69.8	12
1929	30.3		37.2		32.3	1	68.2	10
1934	39.1		37.5		8.1	2	78.7	9
1937	39.1		39.9		6.7	1	80.1	9
1943	22.7		30.8		10.1		63.6	9
1945	25.6		40.7		8.3		74.7	9
1948	24.5		34.2		10.4		68.7	9
1951	25.1		42.6		5.9	6	71.7	9
1955	21.7		38.2		4.9	5	64.4	9
1959	22.1		37.5		4.0		63.3	9
1963	25.4		37.8		5.1		67.7	9
1967	20.5		34.3		14.7		69.6	9
1971	21.0		35.4		14.9		72.7	9
1975	24.9		27.5		17.8		70.5	9
1977	24.4		29.7		14.0		68.2	9

FIGURE VI-2

PARTY VOTE SHARES AND TURNOUT

LAKE ONTARIO



the Conservatives have enjoyed very impressive margins over the Liberals, rarely less than seven percentage points and often more than 10 points, although in 1975, it dropped to a scant 2.6 per cent. Since their accession to power in 1905, the Tories' share of the electorate in this region, usually greater than 37 per cent, has typically been the highest in the province. This in turn is closely tied in with what has generally been the highest level of turnout. Since the Lake Ontario region has been the least competitive region in Ontario (from 1943 to 1971 the opposition carried only 2 of 81 seats), it stands in sharp contradiction to the frequently proffered notion that electoral competition breeds high turnout.

The explanation for the high turnout may instead rest upon the nature of the region. This is probably the most traditional and economically stagnant area of the province. Even the urban centres, Kingston, Belleville, Trenton, and the sometime NDP outpost, Peterborough, are strongly traditional. It thus may be that the nineteenth century view of party politics as a social exercise, a part of community life, persists more strongly in the Lake Ontario region than elsewhere in the province. Together with a related strength of long-established party ties, this may overcome the inevitability of the final outcome, thereby acting as a spur to turnout.

The NDP has made gains in this region over the past decade, but this is less attributable to a shift in traditional attitudes and loyalties than to the growing population of suburban offshoots of Oshawa and Toronto.

With very few exceptions, the dispersion of Liberal and Conservative voting in the Lake Ontario region has been unusually small.¹¹ The high degree of riding-by-riding consistency likely reflects the area's social and political homogeneity.

Georgian Bay

Much of the Georgian Bay district was at the frontier of settlement in 1867, but by the present century it had come to resemble the Lake Ontario region in terms of social stability, economic stagnation¹² and the strength of tradition. Its electoral history, which is presented in Table VI-6, is like that of the Lake Ontario area in that it was highly competitive between the Liberals and the Conservatives during the nineteenth century, and also in that 1905 marked the beginning of the Tory hegemony. The Conservative margins over the Liberals in the Georgian Bay region have not been so consistent nor so overwhelming as in the Lake Ontario district, though they often have reached 7 or 8 per cent, and occasionally 10 or 12 per cent.

The region's eastern and western sections have disparate electoral tendencies. The Grits have always been comparatively strong in Bruce and Grey counties, whereas the Tories have dominated Dufferin

¹¹The Liberal coefficient of variability has not been greater than .26 since 1919; between 1871 and 1919, the dispersion of Tory voting only once exceeded .20, and since then it has never been greater than .17.

¹²The farmland in Grey, Dufferin and Simcoe counties is generally much better than most of that in the Lake Ontario region, except for that in Prince Edward County; see W.G. Dean, Economic Atlas of Ontario (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), plate 59.

TABLE VI-6
 PARTY VOTE SHARES AND TURNOUT
 GEORGIAN BAY


Year	LIBERAL		CONSERVATIVE		THIRD		TURNOUT Mean	N
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N		
1867	39.4		41.9				81.4	5
1871	26.2		34.4				65.7	5
1875	29.1		30.1				64.1	11
1879	33.4		30.6				64.1	10
1883	31.5		34.0				63.9	10
1886	31.6		35.2				69.9	11
1890	31.4		30.4				62.6	13
1894	23.4		26.1	9	31.3		67.1	13
1898	31.9		34.0				67.6	12
1902	33.4		33.4				59.8	12
1905	29.1		35.4				64.8	13
1908	29.3		35.0				65.2	11
1911	28.6		33.1				61.8	11
1914	31.3		39.3				67.5	12
1919	32.9	5	31.4		40.5	10	74.9	12
1923	16.8	7	31.1		26.0	9	64.9	12
1926	30.3		32.4		36.6	5	68.7	10
1929	32.5		35.9		37.1	3	70.0	9
1934	45.7		31.9				77.6	8
1937	38.9		34.7		4.9	1	74.3	8
1943	21.0		21.9		15.9		58.8	8
1945	24.0		33.4		11.3		68.8	8
1948	27.9		29.1		11.6		70.1	8
1951	24.3		38.5		6.6		70.8	8
1955	29.6		36.7		5.6		71.1	8
1959	26.2		35.9		6.0	5	66.4	8
1963	25.5		36.2		4.9		65.9	8
1967	22.5		34.3		8.5		65.5	7
1971	22.1		35.4		14.2		73.7	7
1975	26.5		28.7		14.6		69.9	8
1977	24.2		28.9		15.2		68.4	8

FIGURE VI-3

PARTY VOTE SHARES AND TURNOUT

GEORGIAN BAY

Per Cent



and Simcoe counties as well as the sparsely populated Muskoka and Parry Sound districts.

In terms of both votes garnered and candidates fielded, the Georgian Bay region was the strongest area for the Patrons of Industry and for their latter-day counterparts, the UFO. Indeed, Grey and Bruce counties served as the last outpost of "Progressivism" (as the UFO came to be known) in the late 1920's and early 1930's.¹³

In 1943, the CCF came remarkably close to the Liberals and the Conservatives in this region; it even managed to take Parry Sound, the only rural riding in Southern Ontario the party has ever won. Afterwards, however, it faded to a poor third and then a very poor third in the 1940's and 1950's. Although the NDP remains well behind the Conservatives, it experienced strong upsurges in 1967 and 1971. As was the case for the two regions already discussed, the NDP's strength is disproportionately concentrated in the region's urban centres: Collingwood, Owen Sound, Orillia and Barrie.

Turnout in the Georgian Bay area fell slightly below the provincial norm from 1898 to 1908; from the 1919 election until the early 1960's, it had somewhat higher turnout levels than the rest of the province.

Since the turn of the century, the Conservative vote share has been more narrowly dispersed in this region than anywhere else in the

¹³See Jim Anderson, et al, A Political History of Agrarian Organizations in Ontario 1914-1940 with special reference to Grey and Bruce Counties, (n.p. Chase Press, 1974).

province. The substantially wider dispersion of Liberal voting reflects the difference in the party's strength in the region's eastern and western sections. The comparatively narrow dispersion of CCF-MDP vote shares is interesting because this is usually more characteristic of the party's urban powerbase than of a semi-rural area like the Georgian Bay region.

Golden Horseshoe

The "Golden Horseshoe" is clearly the most artificial region created for these analyses. In the nineteenth century this area, with the exception of the city of Hamilton, was predominantly rural with a sprinkling of medium size towns such as Oshawa and Welland. Not until well into the present century did the Golden Horseshoe become highly industrialized and urbanized, so that the geographic horseshoe indeed became a distinct region.

As the data in Table VI-7 illustrate, during the Mowat years, the region was clearly, if not overwhelmingly Liberal. The margin over the Tories was generally slightly wider in the Golden Horseshoe than in Western Ontario, the supposed heart of Gritism. Given the arbitrary demarcation between Western Ontario and the Golden Horseshoe in the nineteenth century, this is hardly an astonishing finding. Still, it is a significant illustration of Liberal strength that even the city of Hamilton was a safe Liberal seat in these years. A further indication of the strength of Liberalism in this region is the fact that in 1894 the Patrons put forward only one candidate and left ten ridings


TABLE VI-7
 PARTY VOTE SHARES AND TURNOUT
 GOLDEN HORSESHOE

Year	LIBERAL		CONSERVATIVE		THIRD		TURNOUT Mean	N
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N		
1867	40.5		34.8				75.4	10
1871	34.0		27.3				61.3	10
1875	36.3		32.2				66.6	9
1879	34.0		29.7				63.7	10
1883	33.8		31.6				68.7	9
1886	35.1		30.8				67.8	10
1890	35.7		34.5				70.2	10
1894	40.1		36.7		37.0	1	76.4	11
1898	40.3		40.2				80.5	11
1902	38.9		39.3				79.7	11
1905	36.4		42.4				80.7	11
1908	30.6		39.1				73.9	11
1911	30.5		36.2				67.6	10
1914	32.7	10	37.7				69.6	13
1919	25.9	10	25.3		28.8	8	74.8	13
1923	14.7	10	26.5		22.8	9	54.3	13
1926	23.5		38.9		36.4	4	64.7	14
1929	22.1		33.8		19.6	2	57.8	14
1934	38.2		27.4		11.3		73.7	11
1937	37.5		25.8		7.4		71.6	11
1943	16.6		19.2		23.4		60.0	11
1945	19.4		30.0		20.1		71.5	11
1948	18.1		25.6		24.5		68.3	11
1951	18.0		27.2		15.8		61.5	11
1955	17.9		25.4		11.2		56.5	13
1959	18.2		23.7		13.3		55.4	13
1963	19.8		28.3		12.3		60.6	13
1967	17.6		27.4		21.0		66.1	18
1971	17.3		35.6		20.5		73.5	18
1975	21.9		24.1		21.2		67.4	24
1977	20.6		24.2		19.0		65.3	24

PARTY VOTE SHARES AND TURNOUT

GOLDEN HORSESHOE

Per Cent



uncontested, whereas in Western Ontario they had standard-bearers in seventeen of thirty constituencies.

By the turn of the century, the Golden Horseshoe was well along the road to industrialization, and this was evident in its voting patterns. Whereas the Liberals and the Conservatives battled on fairly even terms in Western Ontario until the Depression, the Tories had drawn even by 1898 and 1902 in the Golden Horseshoe, and soon began to pull away in both seats and votes. The Hepburn interlude recalled earlier Grit triumphs in this region, but in 1943 the Liberal vote share fell to less than half of what it had been in 1934. The Liberals have yet to recover from this drop in strength, in part because of the strong CCF-NDP presence; the CCF-NDP outpolled the Liberals in the 1940's as well as in 1967 and 1971. The Conservatives' share of the post-war electorate has been relatively low, usually between 23 and 27 per cent, though the split in opposition votes has granted them a clear lead in the number of members elected.

The low Conservative level of support, typically 2 to 5 percentage points below the provincial mean, also reflects a generally low level of turnout in the Golden Horseshoe during the 1950's and early 1960's. In this respect the region is becoming much like Toronto, which has always experienced low turnout. Until 1923, the Golden Horseshoe consistently exhibited extremely high turnout; from then until 1948, a period roughly corresponding to the consolidation of urbanization and industrialization in this area, turnout remained very close to the provincial norm.

Two points relating to the dispersion of vote shares in the Golden Horseshoe are of interest. First, from Confederation until 1905, the Liberal level of support varied remarkably little from riding to riding; since then, there has been little to distinguish it from other regions. Secondly, for most elections, the dispersion of CCF-NDP voting has been relatively narrow.

Western Ontario


Table VI-8 presents the party vote shares and turnout for Western Ontario. As the conventional wisdom would have it, this area has indeed been the heartland of Ontario Liberalism. The Grits have consistently garnered more support, thereby carrying more seats, here than in any other region, with the exception of the Golden Horseshoe during the Mowat years.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Liberals held steady, if unspectacular leads over the Tories in popular vote. In terms of seats, however, rural over-representation and the bias of the single member plurality electoral system turned Western Ontario into a Grit bastion. From 1871 to 1898, the Liberals won 180 seats in this area, compared to only 53 for the Conservatives. Yet by 1905, the Liberals had lost their edge even in Western Ontario, although until the Depression the Grits and Tories were very evenly matched. Western Ontario still was far and away the strongest Liberal area in this period; indeed, it was the only region in which they were not hopelessly out-polled by the Conservatives. This concentration of Liberal strength,

TABLE VI-8
 PARTY VOTE SHARES AND TURNOUT
 WESTERN ONTARIO

Year	LIBERAL		CONSERVATIVE		THIRD		TURNOUT Mean	N
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N		
1867	38.7		37.1				76.8	27
1871	36.2		30.3				67.0	23
1875	35.0		33.4				68.9	25
1879	34.1		31.6				64.2	29
1883	34.8		32.2				67.0	27
1886	35.2		30.5				65.7	28
1890	35.1		30.6				66.0	28
1894	36.4		33.6	17	27.9	17	72.1	30
1898	39.8		34.6				77.8	30
1902	37.6		36.1				75.3	30
1905	38.3		40.7				79.8	30
1908	35.9		39.1				74.4	30
1911	32.9		35.7				70.0	29
1914	35.3		38.8				73.1	30
1919	23.9	19	24.0		41.1	27	77.3	30
1923	16.6	22	26.8		25.4	25	56.3	30
1926	31.9	16	34.8		38.7	3	65.9	27
1929	27.3		31.7		26.4	6	62.2	28
1934	42.9		28.1		9.5	7	75.2	23
1937	42.0		24.7		4.7	9	70.3	23
1943	21.2		20.5		16.6		58.1	23
1945	27.0		32.8		12.1		72.2	23
1948	26.1		27.8		14.8		66.1	23
1951	24.0		32.1		11.7	17	66.7	23
1955	25.8		31.3		10.0	17	65.1	24
1959	26.6		28.9		9.9	17	63.4	24
1963	26.8		32.4		7.6	18	65.3	24
1967	25.2		26.6		13.6		65.7	26
1971	26.3		28.3		19.5		74.5	26
1975	29.1		21.6		15.7		66.6	26
1977	28.0		21.7		14.2		64.0	26

WESTERN ONTARIO



such as it was, may have harmed the party, in that a highly disproportionate share of the party's seats and leaders came from a single region, for this bred a vicious circle in which the party remained confined to Western Ontario. (The other principal area of Liberal strength through the dark days from 1905 to 1934 was extreme Eastern Ontario, but the French speaking representatives from this much smaller area carried little weight in party councils.)¹⁴

Hepburn swept the area in the 1930's but the party's vote share fell precipitously in 1943. It is the measure of their overall weakness since the Second World War that although Western Ontario consistently ranked as the Liberals' strongest region, the Conservatives headed the polls there from 1943 to 1971. The Liberals did manage to keep within striking distance of the Tories, however, and in 1975 the latent Grittism of Western Ontario came to the surface, as the Liberals attracted substantially more votes than the Conservatives.

In order to ascertain something of the nature of Liberal voting in the Golden Horseshoe and in Western Ontario, Liberal support was tabulated according to loyalty in 1837. Table VI-9 summarizes the data. The entries simply indicate how much larger was the Liberal vote share in 'disloyal' ridings than in 'loyal' ridings.¹⁵ In the

¹⁴On the role of Franco-Ontarians in the Ontario Liberal party during this period see Peter Oliver, Public and Private Persons: The Ontario Political Culture 1914-1934 (Toronto: Clarke Irwin, 1975), 148-9, 152-3.

¹⁵On this distinction see Chapter IV, and Appendix B.

TABLE VI-9

IMPACT OF 1837 LOYALTY ON LIBERAL VOTING* IN
THE GOLDEN HORSESHOE AND WESTERN ONTARIO

	Golden Horseshoe	Western Ontario
1867 - 1905	1.5	2.7
1908 - 1937	6.2	.8
1943 - 1975	3.4	-.7
1867 - 1975	3.6	.9

* - Liberal vote share in disloyal ridings minus
Liberal vote share in loyal ridings

nineteenth century, the difference in Liberal support between loyal and disloyal ridings was slightly stronger in Western Ontario than in the Golden Horseshoe; this relationship has been sharply reversed since the turn of the century. Thus, as the Golden Horseshoe became urbanized and industrialized the importance of 'rebel' traditions to Liberal voting became greater, while such influence declined markedly in Western Ontario. More significantly, by this measure at least, neither Liberal strength in the Golden Horseshoe in the last century, nor Liberal support in Western Ontario in this century owe much, as might have been expected, to the legacy of Upper Canadian radicalism.

The rural Grit tradition of Western Ontario was doubtless a factor in rendering it fertile ground for the Patrons and the UFO. On the other hand, the CCF-NDP has never fared particularly well (or particularly poorly) in this region. However, the party's fortunes have by no means been uniform in Western Ontario. Industrialized, unionized cities like Brantford and Windsor, and to an extent such centres as Stratford and St. Thomas, have traditionally been favourable to the CCF-NDP, but it has yet to make any serious inroads in the region's rural areas. Nor has the party fared well in the city of London; save one by-election victory, the CCF-NDP has never carried a London seat.

As was the case in the Golden Horseshoe, turnout in Western Ontario was consistently high until 1923. Since then it has remained very close to the provincial norm. That turnout did not fall so markedly as in the Golden Horseshoe likely reflects the lesser impact of

Industrialization.

The pattern of dispersion in Liberal voting is very similar to that of the Golden Horseshoe. The Liberal vote share did not vary substantially from riding to riding in the nineteenth-century, but it did during the period 1911 to 1929. Following the Depression, Liberal support was somewhat more narrowly dispersed than during the dark days, and quite unexceptional by provincial standards. The dispersion of Conservative voting in Western Ontario diverges very little from overall provincial patterns, although in 1971 and 1975 it was wider than at any previous election.

Toronto


In contemplating Table VI-10, which contains the electoral data for Toronto (as defined by the present Metropolitan boundary), it is well to recognize that in the last century what is now suburban and even mid-town Toronto was farmland, interspersed with small villages. This is not to say that, as might be surmised, the aggregate figures, which portray Toronto as strongly competitive until 1894, simply reflect the cancelling of large Liberal majorities in East and West York, the rural seats, by the Conservative plurality in the city. East York did regularly give the Grit standard-bearer a comfortable majority, but West York was a very competitive seat, while the city proper usually went Tory by only slim margins. In the 1890's though, the image of 'Tory Toronto' became accurate, as the Grits fell hopelessly behind in the popular vote.

TABLE VI-10
 PARTY VOTE SHARES AND TURNOUT
 TORONTO

Year	LIBERAL		CONSERVATIVE		THIRD		TURNOUT Mean	N
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N		
1867	23.9		26.3				56.5	4
1871	27.6		23.0				50.6	4
1875	87.9		28.6				56.6	3
1879	26.4		25.8				52.3	4
1883	29.3		26.6		13.4	2	54.0	4
1886	20.2		38.1				75.9	3
1890	26.3		26.9				70.5	3
1894	29.0		33.9		20.9	1	68.3	6
1898	31.1		35.6				66.7	6
1902	28.1		34.8		2.4	4	65.6	6
1905	19.8		38.8		1.6	4	60.1	6
1908	12.3		32.0		5.4	4	52.1	6
1911	8.2		24.9		4.3	4	35.8	6
1914	23.7		31.4		1.3	4	55.4	7
1919	21.2		23.8		20.6	4	57.7	8
1923	3.9		24.0		4.6	4	32.4	8
1926	12.8		41.0				60.5	18
1929	12.0		27.9				40.4	18
1934	26.7		27.0		13.1	11	65.8	16
1937	26.5		26.6		10.4	14	64.6	16
1943	9.8		21.1		19.4		53.0	16
1945	11.9		31.9		20.0		68.9	16
1948	11.3		26.3		26.4		66.8	16
1951	12.5		27.9		18.4		60.4	16
1955	14.4		23.8		14.6		54.5	19
1959	15.9		21.7		13.4		51.7	19
1963	18.7		26.2		14.8		60.0	29
1967	18.9		24.3		21.2		64.6	28
1971	18.8		32.4		20.8		72.5	28
1975	20.3		23.5		21.1		65.8	29
1977	15.1		26.0		21.6		64.1	29

PARTY VOTE SHARES AND TURNOUT

TORONTO



Entries in the "third" column of Table VI-10 for the years 1879 to 1914 show the proportion of the Toronto electorate attracted by Socialist and Labour candidates (in no other region were they of anywhere near the same significance). That their votes are lumped together by no means implies that the various candidates at any given election had any connection; indeed, they were often bitterly opposed. The vast bulk of those votes at each election went to candidates describing themselves as Labour; self-styled Socialists typically fared very poorly. The data in this column for 1919 and 1923 show the size of the ILP electorate.

Since the turn of the century, Toronto has consistently been the most dismal territory for the Liberal party. Except in 1919 and in the Hepburn elections, no Liberal won a Toronto seat from 1905 until 1959. Concomitantly, the city has been a key stronghold for the CCF-NDP, though until recently, the party's support varied substantially from district to district. Only twice since its initial rise to prominence in 1943 has the CCF-NDP garnered fewer votes in Toronto than the Liberals.

In the elections since the Second World War - like those before it - the Tories have not attracted a particularly impressive proportion of the electorate in Toronto, but the split in opposition voting, coupled with low turnout, has until very recently given them a safe plurality and a rich harvest of seats. From 1905 until the 1975 debacle, they won 229 Toronto seats, compared to 40 each for the Liberals and the CCF-NDP; from 1945 to 1975, they won 113, the CCF-NDP 33 and the Liberals 20.

One of the most salient features of Toronto's electoral history has been its exceedingly low level of turnout; voter participation has been in the 50 to 60 per cent range almost as often as in the 60 to 70 per cent range, and on three occasions, it dipped far below 50 per cent. The high rate of abstention may be partly attributed to the Tories' lack of competition throughout most of this century, but this explanation cannot hold either for the nineteenth century, or for 1919, 1934 or 1937. The city's low rate of turnout is of course symptomatic of generally low turnout in urban areas, as discussed in Chapter IV. In the 1970's, turnout in Toronto has come very close to the provincial norm, and in 1971 its turnout was substantially higher than the previous highs, registered in the 1890's.

The only noteworthy features of voting and turnout dispersion for Toronto are the wide dispersion of Liberal support, particularly between 1905 and 1926, and the comparatively narrow dispersion of CCF-NDP vote shares.

Northern Ontario

Despite its enormous expanse, Northern Ontario possesses a certain organic unity, based on the economic pre-eminence of extractive industries and a common feeling of isolation and alienation from mainstream Ontario life.¹⁶ As Table VI-II demonstrates, in terms of

¹⁶See Morris Zaslow, "Does Northern Ontario Possess a Regional Identity?" Laurentian University Review V (August, 1973), 9-20, and Don Scott "Northern Alienation" in Donald C. MacDonald, ed., Government and Politics of Ontario (Toronto: Macmillan, 1975), 235-43. For the view that its subservience to the south fragments politics in the north, see G.R. Weller "Hinterland Politics: The Case of Northwestern Ontario", Canadian Journal of Political Science X (December, 1977), 727-754.

TABLE VI-11
 PARTY VOTE SHARES AND TURNOUT
 NORTHERN ONTARIO


Year	LIBERAL		CONSERVATIVE		THIRD		TURNOUT Mean	N
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N		
1867	14.7		40.9				55.7	1
1871*								
1875	27.6		15.2				42.8	1
1879	35.1		30.2				65.3	1
1883**	33.0		27.0					1
1886*								
1890	35.9		29.8				58.6	3
1894	29.1		24.5				53.6	3
1898	24.7		22.2				46.9	3
1902	25.3		23.6				49.7	7
1905	22.4		26.3				48.9	7
1908	21.5		31.4				53.8	11
1911	18.5	7	25.1				42.9	10
1914	22.6		27.1				53.5	11
1919	24.6		22.4		21.0	7	68.3	12
1923	18.9	10	22.5		19.1	6	55.0	11
1926	15.4		29.4		14.5	4	49.7	12
1929	21.9		35.3		37.0	1	62.2	11
1934	44.1		27.4		8.2	5	76.6	11
1937	36.5		27.1		7.0	5	72.4	11
1943	19.1		11.4		35.2		66.7	11
1945	22.2		19.7		28.1		75.1	11
1948	19.3		22.8		23.9		70.0	11
1951	22.6		27.9		16.0		67.5	11
1955	18.9		30.7		16.5		66.6	12
1959	24.1		27.5		15.6		67.4	12
1963	22.8		28.3		14.8		66.4	12
1967	20.6		28.1		22.6		71.6	14
1971	15.6		30.5		28.1		74.1	14
1975	17.9		22.8		27.9		68.8	15
1977	12.5		27.9		25.7		66.3	15

* Acclamation

** No data on registered voters; party vote estimated on the basis of sixty per cent turnout

PARTY VOTE SHARES AND TURNOUT

NORTHERN ONTARIO



aggregate voting shifts, Northern Ontario's electoral history displays somewhat more volatility than other regions. It is scarcely surprising that the electoral traditions which developed in the province's south should not become firmly entrenched here, for not only were historical, economic and environmental conditions substantially different, but a very large proportion of Northern Ontario's population had no roots or connections with the south.

Until 1885, Northern Ontario comprised only one riding. In concert with the extremely fluid, transient population in this largely uninhabited area, this made for extreme swings in the popular vote. From the 1890's to the First World War, as the North became populated, a fairly consistent, competitive pattern emerged (in popular vote, if not always in the distribution of seats). It is the measure both of the integration of the North into the province's social and political affairs, and the extent of the Tory attraction, that, as elsewhere in the province, 1905 marked the beginning of a solid Tory advantage over the Liberals.

The 1919 election began a period of great electoral instability in Northern Ontario. In the early 'twenties, the area's votes were fairly evenly split among the Tories, Grits, and the UFO-ILP (the alliance between the farmers and the workers was probably at its strongest here). Then, within a space of four elections, three parties carried off virtually clean sweeps. In 1926 and 1929, Northern Ontario voters were strongly attracted to the Conservatives, but during the Depression they rallied behind Hepburn's Liberals in greater

numbers than any other region except the Georgian Bay district. Finally, in 1943 Northern Ontario swung to the CCF far more strongly than any other region.

Although in 1943 the Tories suffered their most grievous popular vote losses in Northern Ontario, plummeting to 11.4 per cent of the electorate, over the following three elections they rebuilt their support to about thirty per cent, where it remained until 1975. After its initial successes, the CCF faded badly in the 1950's, but of late NDP support has approached its earlier level, so that Northern Ontario is once again the party's strongest region. This resurgence has been largely made at the Liberals' expense; the Liberal vote, until a mild recovery in the 1975 election, had been steadily declining since 1959.

Until 1929, turnout in Northern Ontario was very far below the provincial norm; only twice was it greater than 60 per cent, whereas it fell below 50 per cent on six occasions. Simple geographic and environmental factors, which rendered the act of voting far more difficult in Northern Ontario, doubtless had some influence on turnout. Since 1929, however, the rate of voter participation in Northern Ontario has uniformly been marginally higher than the provincial mean. This represents the area's growing integration into the overall pattern of Ontario politics.

As was generally the case throughout the province, the Liberal vote share has varied more across ridings than has that of the Tories, particularly from 1905 to 1929, and also since 1948. The dispersion of Conservative electoral support is much like that of the other regions,

particularly Toronto, the Golden Horseshoe and Western Ontario. By comparison with other regions, the CCF-NDP's vote share has been narrowly dispersed.

Trends Over Time

By and large the trends in party vote shares within regional contexts repeat the province-wide trends discussed in Chapter III. The data, presented in Table VI-12 are correlations (Kendall's tau) of party vote shares with time for the entire span of provincial history, as well as for the periods 1867-1902,¹⁷ 1905-1975 and 1943-1975.

Liberal support has declined significantly in each of the seven regions since Confederation, but for most regions, this overall trend masks an upward trend in the nineteenth century and a downward trend in the present century. Since 1943 the trend of Liberal support has been down in Eastern Ontario, but up in Western Ontario and Toronto;¹⁸ the correlations for the other regions are not significant.

Regional trends in Conservative voting have not been so consistent. Across all thirty elections, the trend is significantly up in the Lake Ontario district, significantly down in the Golden Horseshoe, Western Ontario, and Toronto, and not significant elsewhere.

¹⁷ If the 1867 election is excluded from the calculations, on the grounds that firm party lines had yet to be established, the trend for both Liberal and Conservative voting in all regions becomes more strongly positive, although the basic pattern - strong upwards Liberal trend, mixed Conservative trend - remains.

¹⁸ The upward trend in Toronto signals not so much recent Liberal strength there as the party's abysmal showings in the 1940's.

TEST FOR TREND (KENDALL'S TAU)

PARTY VOTE AND TURNOUT

	1867-1975	1867-1902	1905-1975	1943-1975
EASTERN ONTARIO				
Liberal	-.53***	.32*	-.53***	-.47**
Conservative	-.02	-.32*	.02	.11
CCF/NDP				.02
Turnout	-.13	-.04	-.02	.23
LAKE ONTARIO				
Liberal	-.39***	.46**	-.44***	-.12
Conservative	.17*	-.02	-.13	-.27
CCF/NDP				.18
Turnout	.09	.47**	-.04	.23
GEORGIAN BAY				
Liberal	-.34***	.00	-.33**	-.24
Conservative	-.01	-.27	-.11	.00
CCF/NDP				-.04
Turnout	.17*	.07	.17	.27
GOLDEN HORSESHOE				
Liberal	-.51***	.44**	-.43***	.21
Conservative	-.32***	.58***	-.44***	.14
CCF/NDP				-.11
Turnout	-.25**	.58***	-.31**	.18
WESTERN ONTARIO				
Liberal	-.36***	.36*	-.29**	.56**
Conservative	-.25**	.21	-.34**	-.11
CCF/NDP				-.04
Turnout	-.19*	.18	-.31**	.07
TORONTO				
Liberal	-.36***	.45**	.15	.85***
Conservative	-.25**	.64***	-.33**	-.05
CCF/NDP				.09
Turnout	.09	.61***	.34**	.34*
NORTHERN ONTARIO				
Liberal	-.33***	.05	-.22*	-.25
Conservative	.05	-.39*	.09	.41**
CCF/NDP				-.11
Turnout	.49***	-.24	.44***	.11

N=30

N=10

N=20

N=10

* p < .10
 ** p < .05
 *** p < .01

For the period 1867-1902, the trends are mixed: two significant positive correlations, two significant negative correlations, and three which are not significant. For the elections since 1905, all three significant correlations are negative, indicating a downward trend in Tory vote share. For the post-war era only one of the correlations reaches standard levels of significance: in Northern Ontario the level of Conservative support has increased significantly.

None of the tests for trend of CCF-NDP over the 10 elections beginning in 1943 are significant, though doubtless this conceals a downward trend from 1943 to the mid 1950's and an upward trend since then. Trends for turnout are mixed, both across regions and across time spans; individual entries in the table may be of interest, but no overall patterns are evident.

Conclusion

No purpose would be served by a recapitulation of specific findings raised in this chapter. What is of moment is that important regional variations emerged with respect to patterns and trends of party support, though virtually all major developments were province-wide in scope - which is not to say uniform. Many regional variations, such as the divergence in the electoral paths of Western Ontario and the Golden Horseshoe after the turn of the century, and the poor showing of the CCF-NDP in Eastern Ontario and elsewhere, are clearly rooted in the social make-up of the different regions and in the resultant differential impact of social change. Other regional variations,

particularly involving short or medium term electoral shifts may well be essentially reflections of social influences, but the influence of distinct regional political traditions cannot be ruled out. Moreover, even if most of the electoral differences across regions could be accounted for in terms of social composition, this does not mean that region is without intrinsic importance, for region has been and continues to be a salient reference point to voters and politicians alike. Region is important because people deem it thus, and as this chapter demonstrates, they have good reason for viewing it as a key element in Ontario electoral politics.

The regional similarities and differences outlined in this chapter are of interest in their own right, but as well, they must be borne in mind as background and context to the analyses carried out in the two following chapters.

CHAPTER VII ELECTORAL CHANGE

The data presented in Chapter VI identify, in a preliminary fashion, some major and minor electoral changes and periods of stability. This chapter extends the analysis through more precise, systematic identification of these changes.

None of the methods of analysing electoral change employed in this chapter possess great statistical sophistication. Some modes of analysis were precluded on technical grounds. More fundamentally, though, the lack of complexity derives from the basic goal of the analysis: the identification, description and evaluation of specific electoral changes rather than the formulation of abstract models of electoral change. In addition, the decision to remain 'close to the data' is premised on an appreciation of the shortcomings inherent in the data set and a consequent desire to avoid statistical or methodological complexity which might convey an air of precision and certainty unwarranted by the data.

The principal focus of the analysis, sought via 'ecological regression' and construction of matrices of correlation coefficients, is the strength and durability of party ties. The patterns uncovered are important in their own right, but they also have a bearing on the evaluation of several models of electoral change outlined in Chapter II. Following this, the focus of attention is turned towards the relationships among the various parties' supporters. These relationships are important for understanding the bases of political division within the electorate, and the occasions and manner in which these divisions have

changed. Finally, data are examined pertaining to the rise and the electoral consequences of third parties.

By no means are all of the interesting features of the data discussed in the text. Any number of intriguing or anomalous findings are simply ignored because they are at best only tangentially related to the analytical concerns of this chapter (in any event, a good many of them are all but inexplicable).

The Analysis of Electoral Change

The principal technical hindrance to some other promising modes of analysis is the lack of continuity in the unit of analysis, the constituency. In his excellent study, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics, Walter Dean Burnham employed a form of "discontinuity" analysis, fitting a regression equation to successive sets of ten contiguous elections, with dummy election-year variables set to 1 for the first five elections and to 0 for the last five. Systematic changes in residuals (as reflected in the "discontinuity coefficient") were taken as an indication that the period between the fifth and sixth elections marked a transition from one pattern of alignment to another.¹ Although this procedure generates precise statistics on the degree of change from one period to the next, it requires that the unit of analysis remain constant throughout the

¹Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970), 13-5. This technique is well suited to distinguishing between electoral periods, but is less appropriate for discerning other forms of change.

entire time span. The redistribution of ridings renders this technique impossible; although the effects of redistributions may be taken into account for any pair of elections (though less satisfactorily across increasing numbers of redistributions), it is not possible to do so consistently for series of elections.² MacRae and Meldrum's imaginative use of factor analysis in identifying electoral change cannot be used on our data since it is only applicable to two party systems, and requires a full complement of invariant cases over the full period of analysis.³ Finally, some noteworthy findings about electoral change in the United States were made possible through analysis of the unique data thrown up by the American electoral system - split-ticket voting, differences in party preference and turnout rates for various offices at state, national and local levels of government, and the like.⁴ The single vote given the Ontario elector necessarily precludes many revealing analytic techniques available to students of American politics.

Two basic methods are employed in the present analysis of

²Given the peculiarities of regression analysis, moreover, it would be extremely difficult to estimate the effects of differing numbers of cases due to acclamation, or the presence or absence of third party candidates.

³Duncan MacRae, Jr., and James A. Meldrum, "Factor Analysis of Aggregate Voting Statistics," in Mattei Dogan and Stein Rokkan, eds., Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969), 497-9.

⁴See for example, Walter Dean Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," American Political Science Review LIX (March, 1965), 7-28; Meldrum and MacRae, "Factor Analysis," and Gerald M. Pomper, Voters Choice: Varieties of American Electoral Behaviour (New York: Dodd Mead, 1975).

electoral change. First, correlation matrices are assembled relating each party's vote share to its own vote share and to that of other parties for earlier and later elections.⁵ Correlating a party's vote share across time is a means of monitoring changes in the strength and stability of the electorate's attachment to it. Correlating two parties' vote shares offers insights into the relationships between their electorates. The second general method of analysing change is the generation of time series of cross-sectional relationships. That is, relations between variables at different points in time are inspected for evidence of changes or continuities. In a way, this is a special case of the matrix approach.

The data set and the techniques employed to analyse it contain precious few explicit measures of electoral change. Instead, each mode of analysis infers change or continuity rather than measures it. The nature of the data necessitates that change, particularly change over the long term, be read into relationships. This involves a good deal of impressionistic comparison and assessment, rather than calculation of precise statistics of change; this does not mean, however, that the analysis is unsystematic. Moreover, many of the more important relationships are examined with more than one statistical approach, so as to reduce dependence on individual entries in tables or on single tables.

⁵All of the correlations and regression coefficients discussed in this chapter represent descriptive rather than inferential approaches. Hence, assumptions or decisions concerning distributions and significance levels are not appropriate.

To avoid endless repetition of this important caveat, let it be said here that the methodological and interpretive shortcomings arising from the fact that the analysis is an exercise in indirect inference of change rather than direct measurement are readily admitted. They must be kept constantly in mind, even if they are not often explicitly raised hereafter.

The Strength and Durability of Party Ties
as Estimated by 'Ecological Regression'

The first phase of our enquiry into the strength and durability of party attachments is built upon the retrieval from the marginals, via simple regression, of cell entries in a contingency table. As demonstrated in Chapter V, this ecological regression produces estimates of the proportion of a party's voters remaining loyal to it in the succeeding election. The technical derivation need not be repeated here; suffice it to say that given

X_1 = Percentage voting for Party A at election 1

Y_1 = Percentage voting for Party A at election 2

X_2 = Percentage voting for Party B at election 1

Y_2 = Percentage voting for Party B at election 2

and $X_1 + X_2 = Y_1 + Y_2 = 1$, then regressing X_1 upon Y_1 , and rendering it in the form $Y_1 = a_{yx} + b_{yx} X_1$, the proportion of X_1 which was also X_2 - that is, party loyalists - is given by $(a+b)$.

As noted earlier, the retrieval technique, which will be referred to as regression estimation, is premised on the assumption that the underlying relationship does not vary systematically from riding

to riding. One sure sign that such is not the case, that "aggregation bias" is present, is a result outside the 0 to 1 logical limits (although a logically possible result is no guarantee that aggregation bias is not at work). The three tables presenting the regression estimates, Tables VII-1, VII-2 and VII-3, contain relatively few inadmissible results. Seven per cent of the entries are greater than unity, with approximately two thirds of these falling in the 1.00 to 1.10 range. None of the entries is negative, and only one is improbably close to zero (Liberal in rural ridings for 1926: .09). This is encouraging since, a priori, we normally expect loyalty to party to be closer to unity than to zero. Similarly, we expect fairly high turnout among previous voters. In the three tables, rates of voting in a second election, having voted at a first, vary between .63 and 1.02, with most entries in the .80's and low .90's:

Other results accord less well with impressionistic expectations. The estimate of Liberal loyalty in 1894 is a case in point: given the strong showing of the Patrons of Industry, whose support, geographic and ideological, was closely related to Mowat Liberalism, it is inconceivable that the Liberals could maintain 94 per cent of their 1890 voters. (If only ridings contested by Patrons are included, the proportion falls to .82, but this too seems impossibly high.) By comparison, in 1919, a somewhat similar election, Liberal loyalty rates manifest the expected drop (to .49).

To judge by the regression estimates, party attachments have generally been quite strong throughout Ontario history, with

occasional important exceptions. Indeed, even aside from the logically inadmissible results, a good many of the entries in Tables VII-1 to VII-2 are improbably high, and this realization must condition our reliance on the technique and acceptance of specific conclusions.⁶ All the same, the object of the exercise was not to arrive at precise levels of voter loyalty to party, but to gauge its general levels, and to discern trends as well as periods of continuity and change. Hence, we are far more interested in the fact that entries for the 1920's and 1930's are considerably lower than for other periods than we are in their exact magnitude.

Table VII-1 presents the regression estimate for the province as a whole. They suggest that the establishment of strong party attachments took three or four elections. With members and even ministers switching parties, and the proper scope of provincial activity uncertain, it is hardly surprising that the bases of party support were extremely fluid. Table VII-1 indicates that Liberal loyalty was comparatively low in 1871 and 1875, and that Conservative loyalty was low until 1883. Mowat's Grits thus seem to have attracted a faithful following several years before the Tories. In turn this partially supports the conventional wisdom that the Conservatives' failure to unseat Mowat stemmed from a lack of consistency. (In interpreting the regression estimates,

⁶The computation of the estimates requires that a riding be contested by a party at both elections. The elimination of some ridings for this reason may in part account for the unpalatably high loyalty rates. This explanation, however, would hold only until 1929; since then all parties, save the CCF in the 1930's and 1950's, fielded virtually full slates of candidates.

REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF PARTY LOYALISTS

Year	Liberal	Conservative	Third	Turnout
1871	.53	.58		.76
1875	.49	.54		.76
1879	.83	.39		.82
1883	.74	.56		.88
1886	.68	.69		.80
1890	.79	.67		.90
1894	.94	.78		.81
1898	.72	.63		.95
1902	.68	.65		.93
1905	.97	.82		.97
1908	.84	.70		.89
1911	.98	.91		.96
1914	.75	.88		.91
1919	.49	.58		.88
1923	.54	.63	.52	.72
1926	.34	.48		.81
1929	.73	.34		.65
1934	.70	.65		.85
1937	.73	1.10	.43	.92
1943	.61	.64	.54	.77
1945	.98	1.03	.72	.85
1948	.95	.65	1.01	.90
1951	.81	1.14	.70	.90
1955	.88	.85	.90	.97
1959	.80	.92	.81	.93
1963	.79	.89	.92	.86
1967	.79	.80	1.02	.90
1971	.91	.94	.82	.90

it is well to remember that they do not take into account newly mobilized voters or switches from other parties.)

By the 1880's, strong party loyalties had become the order of the day. With ebbs and flows, the overall level of party loyalty seems to have remained high until the advent of the UFO in 1919. According to the evidence presented in this table, neither 1902 nor 1905 marked a clearly defined turning point in the strength of attachment to party as required in the critical realignment interpretation. The first decade of the century is a division of sorts: until then the Liberals were blessed with a higher, though more volatile, rate of party loyalty than the Conservatives. Since that time, however, the parties' positions have been reversed, with the Tories' electoral following the more faithful but more variable.

The rise and the presence of the UFO seems to have played havoc with established party loyalties, for the entries for the 1920's rank among the lowest in the table.

The Hepburn years and the 1940's, which encompassed the first two surges in CCF strength in 1943 and 1948, were marked by considerable variation in rates of party loyalty, particularly for the Tories. Again, neither the 1943 election nor that of 1945 stand out as a demarcation, as might be expected had they signalled a critical realignment; instead, the whole period is one of flux. (To be sure, the data in Table VII-1 are hardly conclusive on the occurrence of critical realignments, since, aside from doubts as to their validity, they do not speak to the behaviour of new voters and of voters changing parties.)

The view that the 1940's are more properly seen as a 'critical period' is lent credence by the generally high and consistent levels of party loyalty which characterize post-World War Two elections. One singular anomaly confounding analysis is the peculiar series of roller coaster ups and downs in Conservative loyalty from 1934 to 1955. Doubtless this is a reflection of election-specific factors, but it is particularly curious in contrast with the relative stability in Liberal loyalty for these years.

Table VII-2 and VII-3 employ the 'categorical separation' approach to examine party loyalty in Eastern and Western Ontario,⁷ and in urban, rural and mixed ridings. Some interesting differences appear in these tables, but by and large, and despite the odd glaring disparity, no dramatic, systematic variations appear between regions or among types of ridings.⁸

Table VII-2 contains evidence of substantial regional variations in strength of attachment to party, but only some of these are consistent or systematic. In particular, short term changes in party

⁷The "eastern" and "western" Ontario employed throughout this chapter are much larger than the similarly named regions in the previous chapter. For definitions of the larger ("Tier II") regions, see Appendix B.

⁸Methodologically, it is noteworthy that this 'categorical separation' technique increased the frequency of inadmissible results (i.e. scores greater than unity). This in turn tells us that whatever their substantive importance, regional and rural-urban factors were not the prime cause of the aggregation bias. Neither, to judge from a table not presented, is the partisan inclination of the riding; in this table, loyalty coefficients were computed according to the party winning the riding at the initial election, but as many inadmissible results were encountered in this as in other tables.

REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF PARTY LOYALISTS BY REGION

Year	East				West			
	Lib	Con	Third	Turnout	Lib	Con	Third	Turnout
1871	.44	.45		.72	.64	.67		.83
1875	.42	.54		.75	.49	.48		.78
1879	.75	.37		.81	.74	.30		.75
1883	.78	.40		.87	.60	.54		.85
1886	.65	.52		.75	.77	.91		.85
1890	.70	.71		.89	.94	.83		.96
1894	.63	.69		.82	1.16	.70		.79
1898	.80	.66		1.01	.64	.57		.84
1902	.62	.77		.94	.64	.55		.89
1905	.86	.81		.97	.83	.68		.92
1908	.60	.71		.88	.87	.85		.92
1911	.98	1.01		.97	.87	.81		.84
1914	.76	.95		.92	.84	.63		.88
1919	.71	.63		.77	.42	.86		.82
1923	.37	.45	.49	.62	.52	.67	.51	.81
1926		.43		.77		.51		.90
1929		.53		.93	.73	.55		.98
1934					.50	.71		.78
1937	.59	1.16		1.00	.65	1.12		.91
1943	.52	.77		.84	.70	.45		.70
1945	1.00	1.01	.72	.84	.95	.75	.65	.85
1948	.57	.52	.62	.90	1.08	.92	1.24	.91
1951	1.02	1.12	.82	.94	.76	.99	.63	.92
1955	.72	.89	.88	.88	.87	.80	.66	1.02
1959	.92	.86	.92	.94	.83	.95	.86	.89
1963	.72	.74	.90	.88	.86	.86	.71	.88
1967	.68	.68	2.44	.91	.89	.72	1.05	.93
1971	.64	.77	.91	.81	.96	1.03	.60	.91

TABLE VII-3

REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF PARTY LOYALISTS BY TYPE OF RIDING

Year	Lib	Urban			Lib	Mixed			Lib	Rural		
		Con	Third	Turn		Con	Third	Turn		Con	Third	Turn
1871									.54	.51		.84
1875									.46	.52		.74
1879									.82	.38		.79
1883									.71	.51		.86
1886									.68	.65		.76
1890									.81	.75		.93
1894									1.02	.73		.78
1898									.67	.65		.94
1902									.63	.63		.92
1905					.90	.65		.97	.92	.87		.97
1908					.97	.70		.92	.76	.72		.90
1911					1.05	.75		.87	.95	.96		.96
1914					.72	.74		.88	.82	.91		.92
1919						.25		.70	.40	.64		.87
1923					.61	.32		.72	.70	.98	.54	.78
1926					.42	.69		.94	.09	.61		.84
1929	.49	.44		.63	.62	.48		.77	.61	.64		.82
1934	.80	.61		.91	.51	.60		.82	.47	.80		.76
1937	.99	1.01		.83	.50	1.09		.93	.62	1.09		.93
1943	.48	.66	.63	.70	.47	.67	1.04	.75	.55	.62		.75
1945	.84	1.11	.71	.83	.89	1.04	.70	.77	1.03	.94	.74	.85
1948	.94	.60	1.27	.89	.76	.71	.88	.81	.91	.46	.74	1.02
1951	.82	1.19	.71	.78	.73	1.05	.70	.84	.71	1.07		.88
1955	.71	.60	.86	.87	.73	.77	.95	.89	1.00	.77		.98
1959	.77	.88	.85	.90	.67	.88	.71	.91	.89	.82		.92
1963	.78	.92	.99	.88	.81	.81	.76	.82	.78	.91		.88
1967	.71	.84	1.02	.89	.67	.69	1.57	.93	.87	.81		.94
1971	.82	1.10	.79	.92	1.00	1.15	.88	.84	.92	.92	.98	.85

loyalty vary markedly according to region, but seem mostly to be idiosyncratic responses to specific elections. As might be expected, the entries depicting Liberal loyalty have generally been higher, and subject to less pronounced short term change, in Western Ontario than in the east of the province. Conversely, the Tories have been favoured by slightly higher and more stable levels of loyalty in Eastern Ontario. It would also seem that the Liberals' ability to hold onto earlier supporters depends somewhat more on regional factors than has been the case for the Conservatives.⁹ None of these tendencies are particularly strong.

Regression estimates of party loyalty for urban, mixed and rural ridings are presented in Table VII-3. (Due to the small number of cases it was not possible to calculate loyalty for mixed ridings before 1905 or for urban ridings before 1929.) The table's most noteworthy feature is the overall lack of variation: not only are there few important systematic differences in party loyalty according to rural-urban composition, but there are few idiosyncratic, unsystematic differences either. This is particularly curious inasmuch as rural-urban character would seem, a priori, a much more politically salient feature than the rather gross regional division employed in the previous table.

The absence of variation is especially clear for the series

⁹On 18 of 26 occasions, the Tories' loyalty levels either both rose or both declined in Eastern and Western Ontario; this was true of the Liberal entries only 7 out of 23 times.

of ups and downs in loyalty to the Conservative party from 1934 to 1951; the consistency across the various types of ridings is quite remarkable. Similarly, for those years in which it is possible to make comparisons, neither the overall level of Tory loyalty, nor the direction of election-by-election change seem to vary much from one type of riding to the next. The Liberals' attractiveness for their supporters is somewhat less consistent across riding types, but does not have nearly the same variation as in the regional breakdown. The CCF-NDP's frequent failure to nominate in rural areas precludes this comparison, but differences and trends in loyalty to this party are much less pronounced between urban and mixed ridings than between ridings in the eastern and western sections of the province.

One of the analytical approaches carried out for this study, but not included was a measurement of continuity between adjacent elections in terms of the proportion of the variation in party vote shares statistically "explained", via multiple regression, by the results of the preceding election.¹⁰ The data are not presented in part due to space restrictions, and in part due to a want of insights or conclusions not attained elsewhere in this chapter. In the present context, however, it is of some interest that the general findings of this approach are quite similar to those arising from regression estimation: until the mid 1870's for the Liberals and the 1880's for the

¹⁰ Party vote was regressed upon the vote shares of all parties which contested the previous election, dummy variables denoting the victorious party and the presence or absence of an incumbent candidate. The results were expressed as \bar{R}^2 .

Conservatives, election-by-election continuity was extremely low; from 1919 to the 1940's, instability was endemic; and in the post-war elections, continuity has been the order of the day. This accord is of course no guarantee of anything, although it does serve to bolster our faith somewhat in the regression estimation technique.

The data and the observations presented in this section are subject to all the usual caveats on the use of aggregate data, plus a number of additional provisos regarding the validity of the procedure employed. Bearing these disclaimers in mind, the basic inference is that short-term party loyalty in Ontario has been generally strong from the 1880's until the present day, though not so strong as to preclude the occasional catastrophic drop in party attachments, as for example, during the 1920's.

The Strength and Durability of Party Ties as Indicated by Correlation Matrices

This section continues the investigation into the strength of party attachments, but employs a different approach. The data consist of matrices of correlation coefficients of party vote shares across time. The assumption on which the analysis proceeds is that a high correlation of a party's vote shares over two elections indicates stability in its electorate, whereas a low correlation indicates change. Since the data are aggregate, it is quite possible to imagine cases where precisely the opposite occurs. In strict logical terms, all we may infer from such correlations is the stability of the geographical distribution of a party's support. We make the assumption that if a

party did well in the same ridings and poorly in the same ridings for two elections, thus producing a high correlation, that the party attracted essentially the same voters at each contest. Although this need not necessarily follow, it does seem a reasonable approach, and from the results obtained from taking it, we have no grounds for believing that it is outrageously wrong. To be sure, it must be understood that the analysis is premised on a tenuous assumption, and evaluated accordingly.

Although it would have been technically possible to compute full matrices of coefficients, that is, each election correlated with each other election, this was not done. Our confidence that the procedure employed to overcome gaps occasioned by redistribution produces comparable and meaningful units of analysis wanes with longer time spans encompassing more than one redistribution. A compromise between attention to this problem and comprehensiveness of the matrices was struck at the admittedly arbitrary figure of eight elections. Correlations were computed with the eight preceding and following elections; this covered a period of approximately thirty years in either direction. As the data were examined, it became clear that analysis over a longer term would have yielded very little additional information, for in most matrices, the correlations had diminished to near zero in fewer than eight elections.

The data are contained in Tables VII-4 to VII-15. The first four present the province-wide correlation coefficients of Liberal, Conservative, UFO and CCF-NDP voting, and the balance are matrices of

Liberal and Conservative voting in Eastern and Western Ontario and in rural and urban ridings.

As a preliminary, two basic points should be made. First, the typical pattern is a moderate to high correlation of party vote shares at adjacent elections, with a marked drop in the strength of the correlation one election removed, and a more gradual decay in the strength of the relationship over longer time spans. Secondly, despite the emergence of some interesting variations from the matrices for different categories, most of the fundamental patterns are quite similar in all manner of ridings.

The Nineteenth Century

The intercorrelations of Liberal voting in the nineteenth century are not very strong, indicating substantially less stability in the Grit electorate during the Mowat years than surface appearances, or aggregate totals, would suggest. For the nineteenth century, the party's vote correlations are higher in Western Ontario, the Grit bailiwick, than in the east of the province.¹¹ This finding is hardly unexpected; what is perhaps most noteworthy about the Liberal

¹¹Precisely half of the 36 correlations involving the elections from 1867 to 1898 were .40 or greater in Western Ontario, whereas only a quarter of Eastern Ontario coefficients were of similar magnitude. Detailed presentation of the evidence that correlations were higher in one matrix than another would be tedious in the extreme and for this reason has not been included in the text, save occasional particularly illustrative highlights. Each statement based on the comparison of matrices rests upon close inspection of the matrices; conclusions regarding relative strengths of correlations probably err in the direction of minimizing differences rather than exaggerating them.

TABLE VII-4

CORRELATION OF PARTY VOTE SHARES

LIBERAL vs. LIBERAL

Year	1867	1871	1875	1879	1883	1886	1890	1894	1898	1902	1905	1908	1911	1914	1919	1923	1926	1929	1934	1937	1943	1945	1948	1951	1955	1959	1963	1967	1971	
867	-																													
871		.35																												
875			.43																											
879				.35																										
883				.19																										
886				.22																										
890				.38																										
894				.50																										
898				.57																										
902				.55																										
905				.63																										
908				.37																										
911				.70																										
914				.46																										
919				.36																										
923				.48																										
926				.59																										
929				.48																										
934				.61																										
937				.63																										
943				.51																										
945				.22																										
948				.42																										
951				.02																										
955				.19																										
959				.42																										
963				.02																										
967				.19																										
971				.42																										

TABLE VII-5
CORRELATION OF PARTY VOTE SHARES
CONSERVATIVE vs. CONSERVATIVE

Year	1867	1871	1875	1879	1883	1886	1890	1894	1898	1902	1905	1908	1911	1914	1919	1923	1926	1929	1934	1937	1943	1945	1948	1951	1955	1959	1963	1967	1971			
1867	-																															
1871		.43																														
1875			.22																													
1879			.33	.27																												
1883				.11	.07																											
1886				.01	.10	.18																										
1890				.29	.40	.29	.26																									
1894					.50	.43	.25	.16																								
1898						.47	.44	.34																								
1902							.47	.44	.34																							
1905								.57	.38	.39	.39	.19	.46	.03																		
1908									.57	.38	.39	.19	.46	.03																		
1911										.66	.22	.18	.32	.31	.14																	
1914											.71	.54	.61	.58	.13	.33																
1919												.61	.60	.45	-.06	.00	.27	-.15	.14													
1923													.74	.58	.25	.29	.26	.21	.38	.31												
1926														.68	.33	.44	.14	.23	.25	.27	.44											
1929															.40	.59	.25	.13	.50	.53	.57	.63										
1934																.50	.39	.37	.53	.44	.60	.53	.34									
1937																	.39	.01	.16	.22	.27	.44	.33	.46								
1943																						.64	.64	.33	.46							
1945																							.64	.46	.56	.41						
1948																							.69	.53	.47	.44						
1951																								.88	.73	.66	.64					
1955																									.83	.77	.71	.64				
1959																										.90	.79	.64				
1963																																
1967																																
1971																																

TABLE VII-6
CORRELATION OF PARTY VOTE SHARES

		UFO vs. UFO		
1919	1923	1926	1929	
-	.59	.64	-.20	1919
	-	.68	.25	1923
		-	.15	1926
			-	1929

1926 column based on 15 cases; 1929 column on 11

TABLE VII-7
CORRELATION OF PARTY VOTE SHARES

		CCF/NDP vs. CCF/NDP									
1934	1937	1943	1945	1948	1951	1955	1959	1963	1967	1971	
-	.52	.09	.30	.51	.44	.36	.50	.50	.10	.02	1934
	-	.21	.57	.66	.58	.50	.56	.56	.52	.45	1937
		-	.91	.70	.65	.71	.72	.69	.69	.70	1943
			-	.76	.71	.75	.80	.75	.74	.72	1945
				-	.93	.87	.84	.79	.81	.70	1948
					-	.90	.86	.79	.79	.69	1951
						-	.82	.78	.72	.67	1955
							-	.87	.78	.70	1959
								-	.85	.70	1963
									-	.81	1967
										-	1971

TABLE VII-9

CORRELATION OF PARTY VOTE SHARES

LIBERAL vs. LIBERAL

WESTERN ONTARIO

Year	1867	1871	1875	1879	1883	1886	1890	1894	1898	1902	1905	1908	1911	1914	1919	1923	1926	1929	1934	1937	1943	1945	1948	1951	1955	1959	1963	1967	1971
1867	-	.27	-.02	.11	.08	.41	.06	.03	-.09																				
1871		-	.36	.33	.30	.51	.34	.33	.09	-.12																			
1875			-	.45	.41	.49	.73	.32	.56	.18	.44																		
1879				-	.48	.36	.53	.38	.24	.21	.35	.29																	
1883					-	.63	.49	.53	.28	.20	.33	.27	.17																
1886						-	.77	.72	.59	.46	.65	.67	.23	.30															
1890							-	.70	.71	.50	.67	.60	.35	.39	.06														
1894								-	.66	.50	.71	.49	.12	.35	-.23	.07													
1898									-	.45	.68	.56	.23	.26	.35	.31	-.37												
1902										-	.68	.33	.17	.34	-.14	.20	-.01	-.00											
1905											-	.79	.58	.53	.05	.34	.20	.10	-.07										
1908												-	.69	.61	-.10	.30	.42	.05	-.15	.74									
1911													-	.72	.13	.24	.36	.20	.10	.24	.12								
1914														-	.39	.29	.14	.25	.50	.24	.49								
1919															-	.52	-.56	.24	-.26	-.07	-.19	-.11	-.13						
1923																-	-.17	.03	.09	.07	-.05	.03	.20						
1926																	-	.77	.12	-.26	-.19	-.41	-.55	-.22	-.22				
1929																		-	.21	.05	.04	-.02	-.04	.08	.16	.04			
1934																			-	.44	.52	.45	.56	.50	.54	.41	.29		
1937																				-	.66	.62	.44	.27	.28	.40	.41	.64	
1943																					-	.79	.80	.64	.47	.54	.44	.40	.33
1945																						-	.81	.61	.62	.63	.52	.45	.48
1948																							-	.83	.69	.68	.59	.46	.45
1951																								-	.62	.68	.44	.37	.28
1955																									-	.62	.68	.44	.37
1959																									-	.01	.59	.50	.46
1963																										-	.79	.69	.59
1967																										-	.81	.74	.74
1971																										-	.81	.74	.74

CORRELATION OF PARTY VOTE SHARES
 CONSERVATIVE vs. CONSERVATIVE
 EASTERN ONTARIO

	1871	1875	1879	1883	1886	1890	1894	1898	1902	1905	1908	1911	1914	1919	1923	1926	1929	1934	1937	1943	1945	1948	1951	1955	1959	1963	1967	1971	Year			
1867		.23	.00	-.14	.31	.24	-.11	-.18	.03																				1867			
1871			.48	.10	-.14	-.31	-.08	-.10	-.25	-.40																			1871			
1875				.09	-.26	-.09	-.05	.31	.21	.14	.15																		1875			
1879					.05	.19	.16	.19	.15	.51	.35	.34																	1879			
1883						.27	.25	.17	.21	.16	-.09	.11	.39																1883			
1886							.48	.44	.74	.50	.08	.19	.51	.44															1886			
1890									.34	.53	.41	.52	.59	.79	.52	.24													1890			
1894										.70	.48	.33	.65	.60	.64	.21													1894			
1898											.83	.51	.44	.78	.50	.02	.32	-.01											1898			
1902												.64	.64	.80	.71	.21	.27	.25	.15										1902			
1905													.67	.83	.55	-.04	-.30	.22	.08	.27									1905			
1908														.87	.77	.33	-.02	.30	.26	.56	.57								1908			
1911															.78	.77	.33	-.02	.30	.26	.56	.57							1911			
1914																.78	.50	.06	.41	.39	.53	.49	.71						1914			
1919																	.38	.30	.47	.28	.75	.86	.76	.64					1919			
1923																		.26	.24	.00	.57	.59	.49	.39	-.04				1923			
1926																			.13	.34	.87	.87	.49	.50	.38	.46			1926			
1929																				.43	.44	.51	.57	.40	.10	.10	.15		1929			
1934																					.51	.50	.65	.50	.18	.40	.30	.23	1934			
1937																						.90	.82	.80	.30	.45	.44	.36	.36	1937		
1943																							.86	.84	.14	.40	.36	.30	.34	1943		
1945																								.88	.47	.45	.42	.36	.39	.14	1945	
1948																										.47	.56	.50	.26	1948		
1951																										.83	.86	.75	.63	.41	1951	
1955																											.83	.86	.64	.43	1955	
1959																												.83	.86	.64	.43	1959
1963																													.67	.31	.19	1963
1967																														.49	.63	1967
1971																															.64	1971

TABLE VII-11

CORRELATION OF PARTY VOTE SHARES
 CONSERVATIVE vs. CONSERVATIVE
 WESTERN ONTARIO

Year	1867	1871	1875	1879	1883	1885	1890	1894	1898	1902	1905	1908	1911	1914	1919	1923	1926	1929	1934	1937	1943	1945	1948	1951	1955	1959	1963	1967	1971	Year
1867	-	.35	.01	.32	.32	.46	.30	.11	.53																					1867
1871		-	.22	.18	.14	.02	.04	.22	.25	.41																				1871
1875			-	-.03	.19	-.12	.15	-.06	.12	.10	.15																			1875
1879				-	.38	.51	.28	.26	.36	.48	.30	.28																		1879
1883					-	.78	.67	.24	.16	.09	-.02	-.08	-.07																	1883
1886						-	.68	.26	.36	.41	.03	-.10	-.16	.11																1886
1890							-	.46	.30	.21	.12	.06	-.20	.01	-.24															1890
1894								-	.42	.32	.36	.42	.09	-.01	-.29	.21														1894
1898									-	.49	.07	-.06	.09	-.29	.10	.37	.22													1898
1902										-	.61	.46	.52	.33	.07	.30	.36	.07												1902
1905											-	.72	.64	.14	-.18	.04	.31	-.03	.27											1905
1908												-	.67	.28	-.03	.17	.26	.09	.35	.08										1908
1911													-	.50	.28	.39	.24	.26	.44	.40										1911
1914														-	.46	.41	-.17	-.05	.07	.23	-.06	.12								1914
1919															-	.64	-.04	.52	.34	.76	.42	.47	.36							1919
1923																-	.25	.45	.27	.58	.24	.16	.10	.18						1923
1926																	-	.34	.11	.12	.27	-.27	-.36	-.39	-.47					1926
1929																		-	.67	.68	.04	.15	.11	.16	.12	.20				1929
1934																			-	.79	.40	.49	.41	.37	.30	.29	.47			1934
1937																				-	.38	.32	.33	.35	.39	.39	.44	-.04		1937
1943																					-	.67	.70	.63	.26	.44	.53	.48	.22	1943
1945																						-	.80	.71	.54	.53	.57	.29	.03	1945
1948																							-	.91	.74	.66	.63	.40	-.10	1948
1951																								-	.77	.66	.55	.28	-.05	1951
1955																									-	.90	.77	.58	.06	1955
1959																										-	.78	.70	.15	1959
1963																											-	.68	.39	1963
1967																												-	.72	1967
1971																													-	1971

CORRELATION OF PARTY VOTE SHARES

LIBERAL vs. LIBERAL

RURAL RIDINGS

Year	1867	1871	1875	1879	1883	1886	1890	1894	1898	1902	1905	1908	1911	1914	1919	1923	1926	1929	1934	1937	1943	1945	1948	1951	1955	1959	1963	1967	1971
1867	-	.30	.32	.26	.03	.26	.18	-.10	.14																				
1871		-	.23	.23	.13	.31	.25	-.05	-.03	.12																			
1875			-	.62	.43	.39	.52	.26	.06	.22	.30																		
1879				-	.55	.51	.56	.34	.24	.52	.50	.48																	
1883					-	.62	.41	.48	.22	.39	.33	.43	.31																
1886						-	.75	.67	.41	.67	.77	.57	.51	.63															
1890							-	.61	.47	.63	.71	.48	.39	.51	.06														
1894								-	.58	.54	.50	.56	.37	.44	-.29	.02													
1898									-	.53	.44	.57	.33	.37	-.28	-.32	.37												
1902										-	.74	.68	.57	.58	-.17	.04	.34	.16											
1905											-	.75	.77	.76	.06	.01	.34	.29	-.18										
1908												-	.87	.79	-.08	-.12	.40	.09	.05	.64									
1911													-	.83	.07	.02	.24	.23	-.30	.50	.30								
1914														-	.20	.27	.42	.19	.07	.72	.33	.49							
1919															-	.66	-.41	-.26	-.17	.15	.14	.26	.10						
1923																-	-.26	-.27	-.30	.08	.47	.40	.09	.28					
1926																	-	.50	.05	-.14	-.36	-.36	-.40	-.34	-.50				
1929																		-	.10	.24	-.21	-.06	.14	.17	.21	.31			
1934																			-	.44	.08	.13	.50	.32	.32	.22	.28		
1937																				-	.47	.54	.56	.36	.47	.57	.60	.63	
1943																					-	.86	.52	.66	.41	.58	.35	.27	.20
1945																						-	.61	.67	.52	.68	.39	.24	.32
1948																							-	.80	.83	.69	.45	.34	.46
1951																								-	.74	.70	.25	.05	.13
1955																									-	.86	.56	.35	.44
1959																										-	.71	.53	.42
1963																											-	.83	.70
1967																												-	.86
1971																													-

TABLE VII-13
CORRELATION OF PARTY VOTE SHARES
CONSERVATIVE vs. CONSERVATIVE
RURAL RIDINGS

	1867	1871	1875	1879	1883	1886	1890	1894	1898	1902	1905	1908	1911	1914	1919	1923	1926	1929	1934	1937	1943	1945	1948	1951	1955	1959	1963	1967	1971	
167	-																													
171	.30																													
175		.36																												
179			.05																											
183			.08	.17																										
186			.07	.01	.32																									
190				.14	.08	.38																								
194				.06	.06	.03	.38																							
198				.23	.23	.42	.09																							
202				.45	.45	.05	.38	.09																						
205				.46	.27	.63	.31	.47																						
208					.27	.31	.47	.47	.02																					
211					.27	.31	.47	.47	.02	.15																				
214					.27	.31	.47	.47	.02	.02	.15																			
219					.27	.31	.47	.47	.02	.01	.02	.15																		
223					.27	.31	.47	.47	.02	.01	.02	.15																		
225					.27	.31	.47	.47	.02	.01	.02	.15																		
229					.27	.31	.47	.47	.02	.01	.02	.15																		
234					.27	.31	.47	.47	.02	.01	.02	.15																		
237					.27	.31	.47	.47	.02	.01	.02	.15																		
243					.27	.31	.47	.47	.02	.01	.02	.15																		
245					.27	.31	.47	.47	.02	.01	.02	.15																		
248					.27	.31	.47	.47	.02	.01	.02	.15																		
251					.27	.31	.47	.47	.02	.01	.02	.15																		
255					.27	.31	.47	.47	.02	.01	.02	.15																		
259					.27	.31	.47	.47	.02	.01	.02	.15																		
263					.27	.31	.47	.47	.02	.01	.02	.15																		
267					.27	.31	.47	.47	.02	.01	.02	.15																		
271					.27	.31	.47	.47	.02	.01	.02	.15																		

correlations in the western region is not their slightly greater magnitude compared with those in the east, but their unexpectedly low level. Western Ontario may have been the Grit bastion in the Mowat years, but it was a bastion marked by considerable electoral instability.¹²

For nineteenth century Ontario Conservatism, electoral instability was endemic. In the section of the Tory matrix for the years 1867-1898, the highest correlation was .57 and most were below .30. Even correlations between adjacent elections were quite low. This pattern held, with only minor variation, for rural ridings and for constituencies in the province's east and west (see Tables VII-10, VII-11 and VII-14). To judge from this weakness, at each election the Tories' electorate was substantially different from that of the immediately preceding contest and bore even less similarity to those attracted at earlier elections.

The correlation matrices suggest that if the Grits held only a slight edge in the total vote, their electorate was more stable than that of the Tories by a wide margin. The long Liberal tenure in office thus seems more due to Tory inconsistency than to any natural affinity of Ontarians for the Mowat Liberals. Since the Tories came so close to victory each time with what would seem to be substantially different coalitions of voters, the startling implication is that the Conservatives rather than the Liberals held whatever 'natural' superiority'

¹² Only 7 of the 36 correlations are greater than .60; by way of comparison, 18 of a like number of correlations of Liberal voting in Western Ontario since 1943 have been .60 or better.

existed in the electorate, but rather than consolidating it, they continually managed to fritter it away.

The Patron upsurge in 1894 might well be expected to exacerbate the underlying instability in the parties' electorates. This is emphatically not the case. Other than the abnormally low 1890-1894 correlation of both Liberal and Conservative voting in Eastern Ontario, basic patterns are scarcely disrupted. Indeed, to look at the correlation matrices, one would never suspect significant third party activity in 1894. To a certain extent the lack of full slates of candidates, necessitating computation of the correlations on only those ridings in which a party fielded a candidate, may have somewhat biased the results in the direction of maintaining established relationships.¹³ The remarkable lack of effect of the Patron movement is emphasized by the havoc wreaked by the UFO a generation later on the strength of party attachments.

The Turn of the Century

The period around the turn of the century has been hypothesized as one of critical realignment, centred in the years between the elections of 1902 and 1905. Although some electoral changes around the turn of the century appear in the matrices, the sharp demarcations in

¹³As this qualification suggests, the strength of correlation coefficients must be viewed in light of the number of candidates involved; a high correlation of party voting computed on full slates of candidates should not be equated with a high correlation based on a full slate at one election and only a half-slate at the other (in which case only the ridings with candidates at both elections are brought into the analysis). The number of standard-bearers fielded by each party for the entire province, by region and type of riding, is given in the Tables in Chapter VI.

voting patterns denoting a critical realignment are largely missing.

In province-wide terms, the 1905 Tory victory and the voting shifts it entailed were not accompanied by any pronounced changes in the stability of the Liberal electorate, at least as far as can be determined from the data in Table VII-5.¹⁴ Similar conclusions about the absence of critical realignment may be drawn from the matrices of Liberal voting in Western Ontario and in rural ridings. In Eastern Ontario, 1902 was a dividing point of sorts: correlations of voting in 1902 and subsequent elections are clearly stronger than those for elections prior to 1902. However, this does not support the critical realignment model, for the requisite condition of abnormally low correlations between pre-1902 and post-1902 elections is not met.

For the Conservatives, the election of 1902 did mark a division, but not on the scale of a critical realignment. In general, correlations of Tory voting in the twentieth century are a good deal stronger than was the case for the nineteenth century, and the election of 1902 stands out as the turning point. The correlations of Tory vote shares in 1902 and subsequent elections are substantially higher than for earlier elections,¹⁵ suggesting that 1902 marked the establishment of a substantially more stable electorate than the

¹⁴The coefficients in the 1902 column and row are slightly higher than those for 1898, but the difference is not sufficient to attribute any fundamental importance to it.

¹⁵Although the correlations in the 1902, 1905, and 1908 columns are not substantially different from those in earlier columns, the correlation in the 1902, 1905, and 1908 rows are a good deal stronger than those for earlier rows.

Conservatives had previously enjoyed.

Comparison of Tables VII-10 and VII-11 indicates an important regional contrast: the pattern of the province-wide table is duplicated in the Western Ontario matrix, but not in the Eastern Ontario matrix. In the east, the higher correlations began in 1886. Another important difference is the abnormal strength of the correlations in both the columns and the rows for 1908, 1911 and 1914 in Eastern Ontario. This suggests great electoral continuity and stability in the Tories' traditional powerbase in the years leading up to and following the great Conservative victories under Whitney. In the Western peninsula, there is no hint of such continuity.

All told, the evidence tells clearly against the interpretation of the first few years of the century as a critical realignment, and is more consistent with a secular realignment model. To be sure, the magnitude of the aggregate voting shifts, and the data in the correlation matrices indicate that the elections of 1902 and 1905 represented the decisive culmination to the critical realignment process.

The UFO and the 1920's

The 1919 election and the three subsequent contests of the 1920's stand out in each matrix as the time of the most profound disruptions of established voting patterns. Especially after 1919, the UFO resembled the Liberals in ideology, personnel and geographic concentration of support. Thus it is not surprising that the presence of the UFO should so strongly disturb the continuity in Liberal electoral

support, as evidenced by the very low correlations of Grit voting in the 'twenties with earlier and later voting (indeed, not a few of the Liberal correlations for the period are actually negative). These low correlations are characteristic of all matrices.

The Conservative correlations did not generally fall so low as those for the Liberals. Still, in each matrix of Conservative correlations, the entries in the columns and rows of the four elections beginning in 1919 are substantially lower than those of earlier and later elections. Even the correlations between adjacent elections in the 1920's are exceptionally low.

In short, the presence of the UFO disrupted party attachments far more strongly - if only temporarily - than did the Patrons in the 1890's or the CCF in the 1940's. In one respect, the electoral impact of UFO presents a curious anomaly. Although it was in serious decline prior to the 1926 election, and all but irrelevant by 1929, the Liberal and Conservative correlations involving these two elections are not substantially higher than those for 1919 and 1923, years in which the UFO was an important electoral force.

On the surface, the 1920's resemble the years before the First World War. Both periods were characterized by devastating, broadly based Conservative victories over a weak, dispirited Liberal party. Yet the weakness of the correlations (not least those relating voting from 1905-1914 to 1919-1929 voting) suggests that the voter coalitions assembled by both the Tories and the Liberal rump were very much different from the parties' previous electorates. In electoral terms,

therefore, the view of the 1920's as a return to Tory normalcy is clearly a misconception.

Table VII-6 presents the matrix of UFO correlations. Most of the entries are computed on relatively few cases, since the UFO fielded very incomplete slates of candidates in 1926 and 1929. The data suggest that neither in its first years, when it contested a relatively full complement of seats, nor in later years, when it was reduced to a handful of Western Ontario seats, could the UFO call upon a particularly stable electorate. The correlation of UFO vote shares in 1919 and 1923 was surprisingly low, in view of the nature of UFO and the stability in its aggregate electorate over these two elections. For the province as a whole, the correlation is .59; for rural ridings, .61; for Eastern and Western Ontario, .43 and .60. These relatively low correlations support Pinard's classification of the UFO as a protest movement, with a somewhat unstable electoral following, rather than as a radical party, with a solid, consistent electoral base.

The Depression and The Second World War

The most intriguing feature of Ontario electoral behaviour during the Depression revolves around the relationship between Liberal voting in 1934 and in 1937. As the tables in Chapter III illustrate, Hepburn's aggregate attractiveness changed very little between these elections. Yet important undercurrents are concealed in this surface stability. The correlation of Liberal voting in 1934 and 1937 is surprisingly low: .65 province-wide, but only .38 in Eastern Ontario,

.44 in Western Ontario and .44 in rural ridings; in the cities, where the Liberal vote might be expected to be the least stable, on account of its earlier extraordinary weakness, the correlation was a quite respectable .74.¹⁶ This weak relationship does not obtain for Conservative voting: for all matrices, the 1934-1937 correlation is quite high, ranging from .79 to .90. An important element in Tory voting during the Depression and the Second World War is the re-emergence of links with traditional Conservative strength in Eastern Ontario, as contrasted with the weak relationship with past voting in Western Ontario. The mean of the nine correlation coefficients relating voting in 1908, 1911 and 1914 to vote shares in 1934, 1937, 1943 and 1945 is .64 for Eastern Ontario, but only .18 for the Western peninsula.

At first blush, the election pair of 1943-1945 seems a classic case of critical realignment. Massive voting shifts established a pattern essentially unaltered since, and were accompanied by the rise to major party status of a new party espousing an ideology markedly at variance with those championed by the old parties. In this general sense, it is legitimate to view the Second World War as a time of critical realignment in Ontario politics. The data in the correlation matrices, however, make it clear that the critical realignment notion is only partially applicable to the elections of 1943-1945.

¹⁶ Also, a marked difference is detectable in all tables in the strength of Liberal correlations with voting in 1908, 1911 and 1914: the correlations with 1934 voting are uniformly weak, whereas those with 1937 are consistently a good deal stronger; for the entire province, the correlations are .11, .14 and .18 for 1908 and .51, .43 and .53 for 1937.

Although the Liberals lost huge numbers of voters in 1943, the underlying distribution of Liberal strength and weakness changed remarkably little from the election of 1937: province-wide, the 1937-1943 correlation is .74, with somewhat lower entries in other matrices. Further, in each matrix, the coefficients in the 1937 row are virtually the same magnitude as those for 1943, 1945 and later elections. All told, 1937 marks at least as sharp a dividing line for Liberal voting as does 1943. More generally, despite occasional weak 1937-1943 correlations as well as some minor differences in the magnitude of the entries in the 1937 and 1943 rows, it is clear that the Second World War elections do not mark any important demarcation in the matrices of vote share correlations.¹⁷ Given the massive exchanges of electors which occurred among the parties, this underlying stability is very convincing evidence that the critical realignment interpretation simply will not wash for this phase of Ontario history.

One unexpected feature of the correlation matrices is that the statistical evidence points to a scaled down critical realignment in rural Ontario in 1948, when the impressionistic signs of any disruption are all but non-existent. A further curious feature of the pattern in 1948 is that only voting for the Conservatives was effected; patterns of CCF and Liberal voting changed nary a whit. In the urban

¹⁷This is even true for the fledgling CCF. Though the 1937-1943 correlation is only .21, the differences between 1943 and 1937 correlations with later CCF-NDF voting are relatively minor, particularly considering that the CCF fielded twice as many candidates in 1943 as in 1937.

areas, nothing whatsoever sets the 1948 election off from any other election after 1934, in terms of the correlation of Conservative vote shares, but for rural ridings, that year marks a sharp division.¹⁸ Tory vote shares in 1945 and 1948 are only weakly related in the countryside: the correlation is .32, as compared with .77 in the cities. More generally, correlations of rural voting in 1948 with earlier elections are extremely low, whereas they are quite high for elections after 1948 (the mean correlation with the eight preceding elections is .06; for the six subsequent elections it is .56). The weak relationship with pre-1948 voting holds for 1951 as well, and to a lesser extent, for 1955 and 1959. Substantial, systematic differences divide the columns and rows of 1945 and 1948 entries for Tory voting in rural areas, and the general weakness of the coefficients above and to the right of the 1945-1948 division (i.e. those relating pre-1948 voting to post-1948 voting) stands in sharp contrast to the stronger coefficients below and to the left (i.e. among pre-1948 elections and among post-1948 elections).

What would seem to be the most salient feature of the 1948 election, the resurgence of the CCF, was entirely confined to the cities and to Northern Ontario.¹⁹ Yet the clear indication from the

¹⁸The same result appears in the province-wide and Eastern and Western Ontario tables, in less pronounced form, indicating that the urban-rural contrast is the salient one. The Conservative matrix for mixed ridings (not presented) reveals, as is to be expected, an intermediate position between the rural and urban matrices.

¹⁹In the countryside the CCF vote remained virtually unchanged: 9.9 per cent of the eligible electorate in each contest (although they had 5 fewer candidates in 1948).

correlation matrices is that important and enduring electoral shifts occurred in the countryside rather than in the urban centres. At this juncture, no leastways satisfactory explanation for this curious phenomenon suggests itself.

The Post War Period

Save these inexplicable goings-on in 1948, the post-Depression sections of all matrices are characterized by the highest coefficients in provincial history. In contrast to the findings on the nineteenth century, these consistently strong relationships bear out the overall impression of electoral stability for all types and locations of ridings. As demonstrated in Chapter III, the parties' share of the electorate remained generally stable in the years following the Second World War; the high correlations suggest that, as well, the composition of the parties' electorates changed comparatively little.

Prior to 1943, the correlation coefficients for Liberal vote shares were generally stronger than the Tory correlations.²⁰ Since then, however, the two parties' correlations have been of roughly equal magnitude. Of somewhat greater moment, however, is the fact that the correlations of CCF-NDP vote shares are consistently stronger than those for either old party. Moreover, with the exceptions of 1934,

²⁰Prior to 1943, the Liberal correlations were higher than Conservative correlations for 11 of 19 adjacent election pairs, for 12 of 18 election pairs with one intervening election (e.g. 1867 and 1875), and for 12 of 17 election pairs with two intervening elections. Moreover, on those occasions when the Conservative correlations were higher than those of the Liberals, the margin was typically less than .10, whereas the Liberal correlations were often .20 or more higher than the Conservative coefficients.

and to a lesser extent 1937 (elections at which the CCF was still establishing itself, and fielded only partial slates), the relationship between CCF-NDP vote shares for any given pair of elections is consistently strong. Excluding the first two elections, the lowest entry in the entire matrix is .65. This exception to the usual pattern of drastically reduced correlations over time is all the more noteworthy because it holds true for all types and locations of ridings.²¹ This implies very strong continuity in the CCF-NDP's electorate, which has withstood the political and social changes of the post-war years remarkably well - substantially better, it would seem, than the Liberals or the Conservatives.

One exception to the general pattern of high post-war correlations may well prove of lasting significance. Unfortunately, even if we possessed the requisite data on the 1975 and 1977 elections, judgements would be premature. What is of interest, nonetheless, is the uncharacteristically low magnitude of Tory vote share in 1971 with previous voting, evident in all Conservative matrices. For the entire province, the correlation drops from .77 with 1967 vote share to .54 in 1963, .33 with 1959 and .29 or lower for the five earlier elections. By post-war standards, these are very weak correlations. No similar decline is noticeable in the level of the NDP or Liberal coefficients,

²¹The correlation matrices of CCF-NDP voting in Eastern and Western Ontario are not presented. Since the correlations in these matrices were uniformly high, there seemed to be no necessity of adding to the tabular overkill of this chapter.

save for the latter in Eastern Ontario. Together with the Tories' catastrophic decline in 1975 and their limited revival in 1977, the weakness of the link between 1971 Conservative voting and earlier voting suggests, albeit uncertainly, that major electoral shifts may currently be underway in Ontario.

Relations Between Party Electorates

This section examines the relationships between party electorates via correlation matrices of vote shares of different parties across time and at the same election. These matrices display a good deal less change than might have been expected, in part because of the overall weakness of the relationships.

Table VII-16 presents the correlation matrix of Liberal and Conservative vote shares for the entire province.²² The most notable feature of the table is the extremely low magnitude of the great majority of the entries.²³ Even the entries in the principal diagonal, which represent correlations of Liberal and Conservative vote shares at the same election, are quite low, as are correlations of adjacent elections. Only a handful of correlations exceed .50 and the strongest

²²The matrix is symmetrical because there is no necessary relationship between the correlation of election I Liberal voting with election II Conservative voting and election I Conservative voting with election II Liberal voting.

²³A number of fascinating clusters of high correlations may be discerned in this matrix, such as that relating Tory voting in 1905, 1908 and 1911 with Grit voting in 1902, 1905 and 1908 (mean .55). Unfortunately, any discussion of these clusters is little more than barefoot empiricism, for no solid, or even speculative interpretations for the existence of these clusters suggest themselves.

TABLE VII-16
CORRELATION OF PARTY VOTE SHARES
LIBERAL vs. CONSERVATIVE

Liberal

Year	1867	1871	1875	1879	1883	1886	1890	1894	1898	1902	1905	1908	1911	1914	1919	1923	1926	1929	1934	1937	1943	1945	1948	1951	1955	1959	1963	1967	1971	
1867	-.22	.08	.20	.15	.41	.20	.04	.62	-.05																					
1871	.09	.27	.16	.17	.19	-.05	.09	.24	-.02	-.06																				
1875	.19	.12	.16	-.02	-.04	-.08	-.20	.03	-.06	.05	-.15																			
1879	.17	.13	.29	.33	.19	-.03	.14	.14	-.08	.06	-.01	.05																		
1883	.00	.02	.27	.28	.58	.17	.15	.00	.02	-.01	-.12	.07	.03																	
1886	-.03	-.04	.16	.07	.12	.15	.05	-.17	-.15	-.15	-.22	-.03	-.05	-.22																
1890	.15	.03	.28	.25	.29	.36	.41	.27	.30	.31	.26	.17	.05	.00	-.09															
1894	.09	.32	.27	.34	.35	.12	.17	.45	.32	.03	.03	.03	.04	-.05	.07	-.10														
1898	.10	.13	-.04	-.01	.11	.05	.09	.12	.19	.17	.09	.02	.11	-.02	.11	.09	.12													
1902		.18	.25	.24	.11	.08	.06	.11	.16	.35	.28	.27	.27	.00	-.04	.01	.25													
1905			.25	.31	.19	.25	.25	.39	.40	.62	.50	.34	.36	.27	-.10	-.07	.29	.00												
1908				.48	.32	.20	.38	.42	.54	.52	.54	.41	.25	.06	.11	.48	.16	.09	.27											
1911				.46	.37	.17	.30	.29	.57	.54	.64	.52	.40	.19	.22	.63	.25	.09	.43	.27										
1914					.14	.07	.06	.25	.27	.15	.40	.30	.12	-.17	-.10	.45	.16	.50	.12	.03	-.01									
1919						-.40	-.33	-.19	-.09	-.11	.05	.17	.00	.05	.00	.33	.12	.19	-.11	-.01	.03	.06								
1923							-.12	-.09	-.05	-.21	.13	.08	-.11	-.04	.14	.40	.13	-.02	-.00	.11	.02	.16	.16							
1926								-.10		.02	.05	-.22	-.35	-.33	-.13	-.17	-.19	-.43	-.37	-.39	-.51	-.49	-.43	-.37	-.28					
1929										-.11	-.01	.06	.08	.02	.08	.22	.45	.42	.25	.17	.20	.19	.26	.31	.18	.10				
1934											-.11	-.07	-.01	-.21	-.43	-.17	.45	.18	.09	-.01	.07	.03	.10	.13	.10	.02	-.13			
1937												-.21	-.14	-.38	-.50	-.39	.40	.16	.15	-.12	.02	.01	.09	.13	.09	.00	-.13	-.23		
1943													.35	.05	-.31	.29	.16	.04	.00	.09	.09	.21	.08	.22	.07	-.02	.07	.14		
1945														.06	-.38	-.30	.44	.24	.02	.00	.08	.11	.21	.04	.20	.04	-.02	.07	.23	
1948															-.28	.01	.42	.24	.02	.00	.08	.11	.21	.04	.20	.04	-.02	.07	.23	
1951																-.10	.42	.23	.14	.12	.37	.36	.25	.19	.25	.17	.13	.14	.23	
1955																	.49	.31	.25	.27	.46	.44	.44	.32	.33	.25	.19	.20	.27	
1959																		.37	.42	.45	.36	.56	.54	.49	.44	.44	.37	.23	.21	
1963																			.42	.45	.38	.59	.50	.52	.47	.43	.28	.15	.14	
1967																				.36	.35	.48	.42	.43	.42	.44	.24	.05	.14	
1971																					.19	.46	.36	.27	.41	.35	.25	.08	-.10	
1973																						.18	.04	-.06	.15	.09	-.02	-.23	-.31	-.47

in the entire table is .64. The mean absolute value of the coefficients in the principal diagonal is only .29, and that of adjacent elections .23. With so many factors involved, correlations between party vote shares cannot be expected to be as strong as intra-party correlations. Between temporally proximate elections, however, moderately strong relationships might reasonably have been expected at least under conditions of relative stability. Moreover, the natural expectation would have been for negative relationships, whereas considerably more of the coefficients in Table VII-16 are positive than negative. This indicates that factors contributing to turnout levels exert an important common influence, an influence oftentimes stronger than party divisions.

Further to this, in tables not presented, correlations were assembled between turnout levels and party vote shares. In province-wide terms, the relationship of turnout to Liberal and Conservative voting was positive in every instance, and was usually fairly strong (Liberal mean .61, Conservative mean .59).²⁴ Turnout is only very weakly and inconsistently associated with CCF-NDP support (mean -.02).²⁵ Grit and Tory electoral fortunes thus seem to have been typically tied to general interest in politics, and hence to turnout rates, in broadly similar fashion. This in turn implies important similarities in these parties' electoral appeals and bases of support. By the same token,

²⁴A very few of the entries for subcategories of ridings (rural, Eastern Ontario, etc.) were negative, but all were very weak.

²⁵The correlation with Patron voting was .50; for the UFO it was .38 in 1919 and .67 in 1923.

TABLE VII-17

PEARSON CORRELATION OF PARTY VOTE

LIBERAL vs. CCF/NDP

Year	CCF/NDP										Year	
	1934	1937	1943	1945	1948	1951	1955	1959	1963	1967		1971
1914	-.04	-.10	-.33	-.33	-.31							1914
1919	.06	.08	.11	.07	.13	.22						1919
1923	-.06	.07	.03	-.01	-.06	.01	-.09					1923
1926	-.12	.08	-.35	-.41	-.50	-.33	-.33	-.28				1926
1929	-.13	-.15	-.27	-.34	-.41	-.40	-.32	-.28	-.22			1929
1934	-.73	-.41	-.07	-.27	-.41	-.40	-.23	-.24	-.34	-.34		1934
1937	-.38	-.69	-.22	-.45	-.51	-.46	-.41	-.39	-.44	-.44	-.33	1937
1943	-.33	-.47	-.31	-.48	-.64	-.58	-.47	-.47	-.56	-.55	-.43	1943
1945	-.46	-.49	-.30	-.47	-.62	-.55	-.40	-.43	-.57	-.54	-.42	1945
1948	-.42	-.39	-.29	-.48	-.57	-.53	-.45	-.42	-.51	-.48	-.43	1948
1951	-.34	-.38	-.24	-.43	-.55	-.56	-.46	-.43	-.51	-.50	-.39	1951
1955	-.17	-.44	-.29	-.48	-.51	-.47	-.54	-.45	-.53	-.47	-.36	1955
1959	-.37	-.56	-.15	-.36	-.46	-.44	-.41	-.39	-.45	-.44	-.23	1959
1963	-.01	-.40	-.14	-.28	-.32	-.31	-.37	-.29	-.44	-.41	-.32	1963
1967		-.42	-.21	-.33	-.32	-.27	-.33	-.32	-.41	-.52	-.38	1967
1971			-.29	-.37	-.40	-.33	-.42	-.26	-.33	-.44	-.49	1971

TABLE VII-18

PEARSON CORRELATION OF PARTY VOTE

CONSERVATIVE vs. CCF/NDP

Year	CCF/NDP										Year	
	1934	1937	1943	1945	1948	1951	1955	1959	1963	1967		1971
1914	-.15	-.24	-.42	-.48	-.22							1914
1919	-.58	-.09	-.32	-.26	-.23	-.20						1919
1923	-.01	-.41	-.41	-.33	-.40	-.40	-.19					1923
1926	.37	.23	-.07	.09	.29	.22	.06	-.10				1926
1929	.02	-.06	.01	-.06	-.20	-.20	.12	-.09	-.17			1929
1934	-.36	-.09	-.38	-.38	-.44	-.39	-.49	-.52	-.31	-.20		1934
1937	-.35	-.03	-.27	-.28	-.26	-.21	-.29	-.39	-.30	-.18	-.30	1937
1943	-.06	.16	-.62	-.56	-.37	-.31	-.44	-.48	-.41	-.44	-.53	1943
1945	-.03	.04	-.64	-.54	-.37	-.34	-.48	-.50	-.40	-.43	-.55	1945
1948	.07	.17	-.56	-.47	-.56	-.52	-.47	-.47	-.44	-.55	-.57	1948
1951	-.30	-.15	-.52	-.53	-.62	-.62	-.55	-.56	-.48	-.57	-.59	1951
1955	-.30	-.30	-.37	-.46	-.63	-.58	-.48	-.52	-.56	-.62	-.54	1955
1959	-.32	-.20	-.43	-.51	-.76	-.63	-.53	-.60	-.59	-.61	-.53	1959
1963	-.48	-.23	-.48	-.52	-.63	-.59	-.54	-.62	-.68	-.65	-.53	1963
1967		-.20	-.38	-.43	-.52	-.46	-.42	-.52	-.58	-.56	-.54	1967
1971			-.23	-.22	-.24	-.16	-.13	-.31	-.31	-.26	-.39	1971

a distinction is apparent between their electorates and the 'socialist hordes' of the CCF-NDP.

That Liberal and Conservative vote shares seem to be so weakly related suggests an intriguing but tenuous inference. Throughout provincial history, no clear or durable division seems to set apart Grit and Tory electorates. Doubtless each party could count on unwavering support from its own faithful, yet a large segment of the populace must have floated to and fro between the parties in order to account for the indistinct boundaries between the parties' electoral followings evident in Table VII-16. The relationship between the CCF-NDP and the old parties, examined in Tables VII-17 and VII-18, indicates that it is indeed possible to discern from our data set firm boundaries between party electorates, and by doing so, supports the interpretation of unstable, fluid electoral divisions between the Liberals and the Conservatives. In the matrices correlating vote shares of the CCF-NDP and the old parties, the coefficients are consistently negative and moderately strong near the principal diagonal, decaying somewhat over time. The mean correlation in the principal diagonal is $-.52$ for Liberal voting and $-.50$ for Conservative voting; for adjacent elections it is $-.42$ for the Liberals, $-.45$ for the Conservatives. (In general the correlation of CCF-NDP support with Liberal voting differs little from that with Tory voting.) The CCF-NDP electorate would thus seem to be clearly delineated from Grit and

Tory voters over the entire span of the party's existence.²⁶

Matrices of inter-party voting correlations might have been presented for Eastern and Western Ontario and for rural and urban ridings, but there did not seem to be sufficient justification, in terms of additional information and insights, for such a tabular population explosion. Each essentially repeated the basic pattern of weak Liberal-Conservative correlations and moderately strong negative CCF-NDP-Liberal and CCF-NDP-Conservative correlations.

The association of Patron of Industry voting in 1894 with Liberal, Conservative and UFO support is portrayed in Table VII-19. The relationship of Patron support with Grit and Tory voting is exceedingly weak: of 28 coefficients, only 7 are as high as $\pm .20$. This weak association with the older parties' electorates suggests that although, as discerned earlier, the Patron movement did not seriously disrupt established voting patterns, it certainly garnered support which cut across party lines. This in turn suggests that the dealignment concept, discussed in Chapter II, has at least limited validity for the 1894 election.

²⁶ Additional support for this proposition is found in tables (not presented) containing partial correlations of party vote shares controlling for turnout. The zero-order correlations of Liberal and Conservative voting are very often wildly different from the partials, whereas the partials of CCF-NDP and old party support differ only slightly in magnitude. This confirms the importance of turnout for the Liberal-Conservative relationship and its virtual irrelevance to the association of the CCF-NDP electorate and those of the Liberals and Conservatives. In addition, it enhances our confidence in the existence of a deep, enduring electoral gulf betwixt the CCF-NDP and the older parties, in contrast to the ill-defined boundary separating Liberal voters from Conservative voters.

TABLE VII-19

CORRELATION OF PATRON VOTING WITH LIBERAL
AND CONSERVATIVE VOTING

Year	Liberal	Conservative	UFO
1875	-.32	-.16	
1879	.13	.19	
1883	-.19	-.22	
1886	-.00	.18	
1890	-.22	-.06	
1894	.12	.16	
1898	-.28	.06	
1902	-.05	.18	
1905	-.02	.02	
1908	-.10	.20	
1911	.07	.09	
1914	-.21	.14	
1919	-.12	.13	.26
1923	.14	.27	.33

As is to be expected, the correlations between Patron and UFO voting are positive, but they are only slightly stronger than those with the old parties: .26 for 1919 and .33 for 1923.²⁷ Whatever their similarities in rhetoric, programme, and ultimate fate, the Patrons and the United Farmers mobilized substantially different electorates.²⁸

Table VII-20 presents the correlation of UFO voting in 1919 and 1923 with Liberal, Conservative and CCF support. Again, the vote share of the farmers' party is only weakly related to Grit and Tory voting, though the pattern is somewhat more complex than was the case with the Patrons. Despite apparently common roots in rural Ontario radicalism, and even common personnel, the United Farmers and the Hepburn Liberals had only very tenuous electoral links; the correlation of UFO support in 1919 and 1923 with Liberal strength in 1934 and 1937 ranged between .04 and .19. Although the relationship was still generally weak, Tory voting is somewhat more strongly associated with support for the UFO

²⁷Based on 34 and 33 cases. As the following table demonstrates, the relationship was slightly stronger in rural areas, but varied somewhat from 1919 to 1923 in Eastern and Western Ontario.

Correlation of Patron and UFO Vote Shares

	Rural (in 1919)	Eastern Ontario	Western Ontario
1919	.32 (25)	.42 (10)	.19 (22)
1923	.39 (26)	.17 (11)	.42 (22)

Figures in parentheses indicate number of ridings.

²⁸Since the movements arose a generation apart, this is obviously true in terms of the actual voters involved, but the low correlations suggest that it is true for the type of voter as well.

than is Liberal voting.²⁹ Far more interesting than this minor differential, though, is the relationship of 1919 and 1923 UFO strength with Tory and CCF voting in the 1940's. The moderately positive relationship of UFO and Tory voting, together with the moderate negative correlation of UFO and CCF vote shares, suggests that in the early 1940's, the Tories' success over the CCF owed something to a close association with traditional Ontario rural conservatism.³⁰

Third Parties

The preceding section demonstrated as clearly as is possible with aggregate data that the primal division in post-war Ontario electoral politics lies between the CCF-NDP and the old-line parties. This section will examine the rise of Ontario's third parties in light of the Pinard theory, and it will also explore the ways in which third parties affect established electoral patterns.

To review the discussion in Chapter II briefly, the Pinard theory explains the rise of third parties in terms of serious social strain and

²⁹This result is probably biased by the low number of Liberal candidates in 1919 and in the elections of the 1920's; however, it is not possible to say whether this has a positive or negative effect on the Liberal-UFO correlations. Had Grits contested every riding with a UFO standard bearer, they might have split the agrarian/anti-Tory vote, thus producing a more negative correlation; on the other hand, their vote might have varied together, in response to the same set of underlying factors. Suspicion lies in the former direction.

³⁰In the handful of comparable rural ridings, the correlation of UFO in 1919 and 1923 with CCF voting in 1943 and 1945 varied between -.61 and -.83 (N = 7).

TABLE VII-20

CORRELATION OF UFO VOTING WITH LIBERAL, CONSERVATIVE
AND THIRD PARTY VOTING

Year	UFO 1919			UFO 1923		
	Liberal	Conservative	Third	Liberal	Conservative	Third
1890	-.04	.14		.11	.22	
1894	-.11	.07	.26	.02	.13	.33
1898	-.04	.14		.09	.16	
1902	.04	.16		.05	.16	
1905	.13	.01		.01	.11	
1908	.18	.24		.10	.29	
1911	.13	.27		.10	.27	
1914	.18	.28		.28	.34	
1919	-.30	.39		-.30	.20	.59
1923	-.07	.31	.54	.11	.40	
1926	-.26	.01		.21	-.03	
1929	-.01	-.24		-.20	-.16	
1934	.09	.04		.04	.35	
1937	.19	.09		.15	.06	
1943	.10	.36	-.43	.30	.55	-.43
1945	.27	.36	-.42	.18	.54	-.31
1948	.16	.26	-.29	.39	.39	-.46
1951	.17	.21	-.07	.20	.37	-.21

structural conduciveness of the party system. Of the presence of strain in the Ontario social system at the time of the Patron upsurge in 1894, the rise of the UFO in 1919 and the emergence of the CCF during World War Two, the secondary literature leaves little doubt.³¹ The question of structural conduciveness, including the influence of one-party dominance, is less clear cut, as is the nature of the Patrons and the UFO.

By the time of the Patron upsurge, the Grits had governed the province for better than two decades. Though their margin of victory was typically very narrow, what count in establishing one-party dominance are not objective criteria, but subjective, perceptual criteria. As Duverger puts it, "a dominant party is that which public opinion

³¹On the Patrons, see S.E.D. Shortt, "Social Change and Political Crisis in Rural Ontario: The Patrons of Industry 1889-1896," in Donald Swainson, ed., Oliver Mowat's Ontario (Toronto: MacMillan, 1972), 211-35; Janet B. Kerr, "Sir Oliver Mowat and the Campaign of 1894," Ontario History LV (March, 1963), 1-13; Marion Jean MacLeod, "Agriculture and Politics in Ontario since 1867," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1961; Russell Hahn, Some Historical Perspectives on Canadian Agrarian Political Movements (Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1973); and John Smart, "Populist and Socialist Movements in Canada," in Robert Laxer, ed., (Canada) Ltd.: The Political Economy of Dependency (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973). On the UFO see Brian D. Tennyson, "The Ontario General Election of 1919: The Beginnings of Agrarian Revolt," Journal of Canadian Studies IV (February, 1969), W.R. Young, "Conscription, Rural Depopulation and the Farmers of Ontario 1917-19," Canadian Historical Review LIII (September, 1972), 289-320; Peter Oliver, "Sir William Hearst and the Collapse of the Ontario Conservative Party," ibid., (March, 1972), 21-50; R.W. Trowbridge, "War Time Rural Discontent and the Rise of the United Farmers of Ontario, 1914-1919," unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Waterloo, 1966. On the CCF see Gerald Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism: the CCF in Ontario (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973); Neil McKenty, Mitch Hepburn (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967); Leo Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed: A Study of Change in the CCF (Toronto: University of Toronto Press).

believes to be dominant."³² Thus the one-party dominance calculus seems at least plausible in the case of the Patrons. The movement is difficult to categorize as clearly protest or radical. On the one hand, the Patrons' rhetoric rejected the values and principles of both old parties, and one historian argues that they possessed a thorough-going, radical critique of emerging industrial society.³³ Conversely, though, the Patrons had been almost entirely re-absorbed into Mowat's Liberals by the election of 1898, and another historian has stated that, like their UFO successors, they "lacked a class analysis and did not differ much in their overall ideology from those whom they were opposing, though they were class movements if one looks at who participated in them."³⁴ In sum, the Patrons seem a borderline case. To the extent that they were a protest movement, arising through the one-party dominance mechanism, we can expect a positive relationship between Patron strength and Liberal strength at earlier elections; to the extent that the underlying dynamic is one of a class-based radical movement, a negative relationship will be expected.³⁵

³² Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, Third English edition, tr. by Barbara and Robert North (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 308. For a further explication of the concept of one-party dominance in a Canadian context, see Graham White, "One-Party Dominance and Third Parties: The Pinard Theory Reconsidered," Canadian Journal of Political Science VI (September, 1973), 399-401.

³³ Hahn, Some Historical Perspectives, *passim*.

³⁴ Smart, "Populist and Socialist Movements," 200.

³⁵ See Chapter II.

Essentially the same arguments apply to the UFO, which presents characteristics of both radical and protest movements. With respect to the pre-conditions of one-party dominance, the Conservatives enjoyed overwhelming victories prior to 1919, but were themselves in serious decline before the election.³⁶ In terms of the nature of the movement, although the UFO lasted longer than the Patrons, it too was ultimately absorbed into the Liberal party, and its ideology seems little more radical.

For both of these cases, the analysis is complicated by the fact that the opposition parties fielded incomplete slates of candidates, so that some contests were straight fights between the new party and one of the old parties, while others were three-cornered. The logic of the one-party dominance structural hypothesis is valid for all manner of ridings, but the class-radical party interpretation predicts a negative relationship between dominant party strength and third party strength only in two party contests; for three party fights, no logical prediction may be made. This indeterminacy stems from the fact that it is no longer true that all former opposition supporters have no alternative but to switch to the third party. The option of remaining with the opposition is still available. This implies that the size of the third party's electorate will be a function of two distinct proportions: the percentage of the dominant party's supporters deserting in favour of the new party and the percentage of the

³⁶For a summary of the political events leading up to the 1919 election see White "One-Party Dominance," 415-7.

opposition party's supporters migrating to the new party. Depending on the magnitude of these proportions (presumably determined largely by class factors), the overall relationship may be either positive or negative.³⁷

In ideology, organization and durability, the CCF was clearly a radical party. As such, the expectation is for a negative relationship between its strength and that of the previously dominant party. Interpretation of the CCF case is complicated by the conundrum of whether it "rose" in 1934, when its candidates attracted 7 per cent of the vote, or in 1943, in which year it attracted 32 per cent of the vote, with an all but complete slate of candidates. Although this is primarily a matter of definition, our view inclines toward the latter year. (The problem of differentiating two- and three-cornered fights does not arise inasmuch as virtually all CCF standard bearers faced both Grit and Tory opponents.)

Table VII-21 reports the pertinent data. Yet another interpretive difficulty emerges with the question of how legitimate, for our purposes of investigating the circumstances surrounding the rise of third parties, are correlations spanning three or four elections extending over a period of ten or more years. At a minimum, the greatest weight must be assigned to the immediately preceding elections, and findings from other, more remote elections, treated with

³⁷ibid., 417-8.

TABLE VII-21

CORRELATION OF THIRD PARTY VOTE SHARE WITH VOTE SHARE
OF DOMINANT PARTY AT PREVIOUS ELECTIONS

	One election previous	Two elections previous	Three elections previous
Patron 1894	1890	1886	1883
Conservative candidate	-.55	-.40	-.45
No Conservative candidate	.43	.31	.08
All ridings	-.22	-.00	-.19
UFO 1919	1914	1911	1908
Liberal candidate	.36	.27	.27
No Liberal candidate	-.30	-.06	.36
All ridings	.28	.27	.24
CCF 1934	1929	1926	1923
All ridings	.02	.37	-.01
CCF 1943	1937	1934	1929
All ridings	-.22	-.07	-.27

caution.³⁸

The most striking aspect of the data on the Patron upsurge in 1894 is the contrast between the ridings with Conservative candidates (i.e. three cornered fights) and those ridings in which a Patron faced only a candidate of the (dominant) Liberal party. The relationship was generally the same at all three elections, but the contrast was sharpest for the correlation of Patron voting with the results of the 1890 election. In three-way contests, the association was $-.55$, whereas in straight fights, it was $.43$. The latter correlation would indicate the operation of the one-party dominance mechanism; however, as the logic of the one-party dominance situation is intended to apply to all ridings, the negative relationship in the three-way contests renders their interpretation uncertain. Clearly, neither the class nor the structural hypothesis can adequately account for these findings.³⁹

The data on the rise of the UFO are less contradictory. The reversal of the sign of the correlation in ridings without Liberal candidates from $-.30$ in 1914 to $.36$ in 1908 is not necessarily a

³⁸ Interpretation of the results is also complicated somewhat by our decision to base percentages on the number of eligible voters rather than on votes cast. The major problem stemming from this decision relates to the Patrons in 1894; see note 39.

³⁹ The correlation of Patron voting with Liberal voting in 1890, 1886 and 1883 would have been $-.71$, $-.63$ and $-.36$ had we been working on the basis of votes cast, rather than on eligible electorate. This would of course suggest a class element in the rise of the Patrons. For the UFO and the CCF, the patterns of correlations are essentially the same, though the magnitude of the correlations may vary somewhat.

serious problem, since the theoretical status of earlier elections is somewhat unclear. Although the correlations are not strong, they do suggest that the underlying dynamic in the rise of the UFO was class. Since the class interpretation is indeterminate in the three party case, the positive correlations do not necessarily contradict this finding, though neither do they support it. If the support for the class interpretation is mixed, or perhaps weak, however, no support can be adduced for the structural, one-party dominance model.⁴⁰

In the 1934 election, the first contested by the CCF, the (outgoing) Conservative party was clearly the dominant party; but it is less certain that the CCF "rose" at this election, so that the correlations cannot be presumed to indicate one-party dominance or class as prime factors. Given the nature of the CCF, we should expect the latter, which would be indicated by a negative relationship, to be substantially more important. Such is not the case, though, as the correlations with 1929 and 1923 Tory voting are all but non-existent, .02 and -.01. The association with 1926 Conservative support is stronger but is, unexpectedly, positive: .37. It is therefore almost impossible to attribute any substantive meaning to these findings, at least in terms of the factors leading to the rise of the CCF in 1934.

For the election of 1943, for which it seems more proper to

⁴⁰A more detailed analysis, employing a modified version of party vote shares based on votes cast, found no support for the one-party dominance interpretation: White, "One-Party Dominance," 418-9.

speak of the "rise" of the CCF (although social strain was less pronounced), the findings are in the expected direction, but the relationships are quite weak. The correlations of CCF support in 1943 with Liberal voting in 1937, 1934 and 1929 are $-.22$, $-.07$ and $-.27$. That the data indicate a class basis for CCF success in 1943 rather than a one-party dominance origin is hardly startling, although it does bolster our faith in the analytical procedures somewhat.

Aside from these specific findings, two more general conclusions may be offered. First, correlational analysis of aggregate data is, at best, a highly imperfect technique for examining the conditions surrounding the rise of third parties, although it may provide some interesting insights. Secondly, the data raise the possibility that despite important similarities, the Patrons and the UFO achieved success in somewhat different ways: the Patrons arose in part through the mechanism of one-party dominance, whereas the UFO was more of a response to class factors.

Finally, Table VII-22 provides some limited evidence to support the notion that third party upsurges are tied in to the mobilization of previous non-voters. It presents the correlation of the increment in turnout across two successive elections with party vote shares at the second election. The association of changes in turnout with third party voting is positive, but so too are its associations with Liberal and Conservative vote shares, and all are of approximately the same magnitude. Patron voting correlates moderately, $.41$, with the changes in turnout from 1890 to 1894; however, the UFO correlation

TABLE VII-22

CORRELATION OF INCREMENT IN TURNOUT WITH PARTY VOTE SHARES

Year	Liberal	Conservative	Third
1871	.45	.56	
1875	.22	.09	
1879	.40	.45	
1883	.29	.52	
1886	.19	.23	
1890	.40	.28	
1894	-.02	.24	.41
1898	.36	.21	
1902	.25	.28	
1905	.67	.22	
1908	.24	.09	
1911	.48	.33	
1914	-.39	-.07	
1919	-.20	.33	.16
1923	.24	.40	.27
1926	.24	.28	.52
1929	.55	.38	
1934	-.37	-.11	-.05
1937	-.13	.45	.15
1943	.06	-.15	.54
1945	.08	.10	-.31
1948	-.17	-.11	.44
1951	.60	.52	-.48
1955	.50	.30	-.12
1959	.07	-.10	.10
1963	-.01	-.12	.00
1967	-.10	-.21	.49
1971	-.07	.07	-.01

reaches moderate strength only in 1926, when the party had been reduced to a marginal force. Aside from its first electoral venture in 1934, the CCF-NDP voting surges and declines have consistently been marked by moderately strong relationships with changes in turnout. The party experienced strong surges of support in 1943, 1948 and 1967; the correlations for these years are .54, .44 and .49. In the years of most pronounced CCF decline, 1945 and 1951, the correlations are -.31 and -.48.

The Impact of Third Parties on Established Electoral Patterns

The advent of third parties has had a demonstrable effect on established electoral patterns.⁴¹ Moreover, two separate phases are discernible, though not always in so clear cut a fashion as the basic division between the absence or presence of third parties. From 1943 on, the impact of third parties seems more pronounced than from 1919 to 1937. This suggests that the simple structural addition to the electoral calculus of a third party effected important changes, and further, that the presence of a strong, genuinely radical third party exerted a still more powerful influence. The impact of third parties is evident in any number of areas, but only three will be examined.⁴²

⁴¹We have, of course, no definitive evidence that the changes in 1919 and 1943 were occasioned by third parties. A misogynist, for example, might attribute the changes beginning in 1919 to the enfranchisement of women. The advent of third parties, however, does seem far and away the most plausible explanation.

⁴²Statements in this section are based not only on the summary tables presented in the text, but also on the more detailed tables (not presented) on which they are based.

First, Table VII-23 contains the mean correlations of Liberal and Conservative vote shares with turnout for the elections prior to 1919, for the years 1919-1937 (years of intermittent third party activity), and for the period since 1937. These data demonstrate clearly that the relationships are substantially stronger prior to 1919 than after. The UFO and the early CCF had a slightly greater impact on the Liberal correlations than did the CCF-NDP during and after World War Two; for the Tories, the opposite is true.

Secondly, as may be seen from the principal diagonal of Table VII-16, which shows the year by year correlation of Liberal and Conservative vote shares, the association was, save 1867, positive until well into the present century, though the strength of the relationship varied considerably. Table VII-24 presents the mean correlations for the province as a whole and for Eastern, Western and rural Ontario. It strongly suggests that the presence of third parties has had a decided impact on the relationship, although the CCF-NDP influence is no stronger than that of the UFO.

Finally, Table VII-25 reports the mean correlations of the increments in Liberal and Conservative vote shares for the periods in question. So long as Ontario enjoyed a two party system, Liberal and Conservative vote shares tended, in the short term, to increase or decrease in tandem, although a few of the correlations were negative. Since 1919, though, they have generally changed in opposite directions, with a distinction evident between the impact of the UFO and the early CCF, and the later CCF-NDP.

TABLE VII-23

MEAN CORRELATION OF LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE
VOTE SHARES WITH TURNOUT

Liberal

	Entire Province	East	West	Rural
1867 - 1914	.77	.79	.71	.76
1919 - 1937	.52	.25	.32	.17
1943 - 1975	.46	.38	.53	.51

Conservative

	Entire Province	East	West	Rural
1867 - 1914	.71	.65	.64	.71
1919 - 1937	.60	.39	.41	.40
1943 - 1975	.41	.32	.35	.13

TABLE VII-24

MEAN CORRELATION OF LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE VOTE SHARES

	Entire Province	East	West	Rural
1867 - 1914	.31	.23	.19	.28
1919 - 1937	.06	-.08	-.10	-.03
1943 - 1975	.10	-.03	-.05	-.22

TABLE VII-25

MEAN CORRELATION OF INCREMENTS OF LIBERAL AND
CONSERVATIVE VOTE SHARES

	Entire Province	East	West	Rural
1871 - 1914	.23	.23	.19	.23
1919 - 1937	.02	-.10	-.23	.08
1943 - 1971	-.35	-.30	-.23	-.37

Clearly, the additional alternative represented by a third party has disrupted established electoral patterns. Considerations of 'strategic' voting probably are important for only a small proportion of the electorate; far more important is the simple presence of three parties. This not only forces the voters to re-evaluate their party preference; it also poses a threat to the old parties and thereby forces them into policies and postures which will likely alienate some previous adherents, while attracting new supporters. In addition, the more clear cut an alternative the third party poses, the greater will be its impact.

Conclusion

As a preliminary to our concluding remarks in this chapter, a comment is in order on the utility of aggregate data analysis in shedding light on the issues examined in these pages. On the one hand, our ecological analysis perforce leaves many questions unanswered, and many inferences uncertain. Conversely, though, it has enabled us to reach some important conclusions, and it has also turned up some intriguing, if inexplicable, non-obvious findings (for example the curious relation between Liberal voting in 1934 and in 1937).

On the key question of long-term attachment to party, our data suggest an unexpectedly high level of electoral instability in nineteenth century Ontario, particularly among Conservative supporters, but pronounced among Grits as well. Our analysis also indicates that the most thoroughgoing disruption of established voting patterns

occurred not at the turn of the century, nor during World War Two, as had been expected, but during the 1920's, partly in response to the presence of the UFO, and partly in response to other factors (since by 1926 the UFO had become a marginal electoral force). From the 1930's until the 1970's, the data suggest, all parties enjoyed high rates of electoral stability, although there is some reason to suspect that established patterns of attachment to party may be breaking down.

Since social data were not incorporated into this chapter, little can be said about the validity of the dealignment and secular realignment models set out in Chapter II. Even before the social data are brought to bear, however, the evidence is unequivocal in its failure to sustain the critical realignment model. Save the singular and inexplicable exception of rural Tory voters in 1948, no critical realignments have occurred in Ontario. Interpretation of the 1905 Tory victory and the 1943 CCF upsurge, therefore, must be grounded in other explanatory schemas.

Of a wide range of findings about specific parties' electorates and the relations between and among them, likely the most important are, first, the convincing evidence of an enduring electoral gulf between the CCF-NDP and the old line parties (which in turn have important electoral affinities); secondly, the considerable evidence suggesting that, in terms of electoral impact, the simple structural fact of a third party's existence seems as important, if not more so, than its ideological-programmatic stance.

Finally, one important general conclusion is so obvious that we might easily overlook it in this review. Turnout, or perhaps more accurately, differential turnout rates, are of absolutely fundamental importance to all manner of electoral phenomena, and can scarcely be left out of any analysis or explanation of voting, party fortunes or electoral change in this province.

CHAPTER VIII THE SOCIAL BASES OF PARTY SUPPORT

This chapter reports and discusses multiple regression analysis of the electoral and the social data.¹ On one level, this multivariate investigation is aimed at the determination of the relative importance of various social groups and regions for the explanation of party voting. For reasons presently discussed, the regression analysis can take us only a limited distance towards this objective. At a more general level, however, the analysis should permit some broad judgements as to changes and continuities in the social bases of party support.

We may reasonably expect, by way of illustration, that the multiple regression analysis will indicate the overall importance of ethnic and religious factors in structuring electoral divisions in various periods of Ontario history. As well, the analysis should suggest the degree to which social class, operationalized in terms of occupational groupings, has replaced religion and ethnicity as bases of party voting, both generally and for particular parties.

The chapter begins with a brief discussion of how multiple regression analysis has been applied to our data set, and of the

¹The 'ecological regression' technique was applied to the census data so as to estimate the proportions of persons in various social groups voting for each party. Although the results for persons living in urban and rural areas were remarkably akin to those of Chapter IV, other results were extremely unstable and all too often outside the zero to unity logical limits. As well, the entries for 1967 and 1971 bore only incidental correspondence to the survey data presented in Robert Drummond, "Voting Behaviour: The Blueing of Ontario," in Donald C. MacDonald, ed., Government and Politics of Ontario (Toronto: MacMillan, 1975), 294-316. For these reasons, the ecological regression findings are neither presented nor discussed.

limitations of that analysis. Included under this rubric are a description of the methods by which variables were selected for inclusion in the regression equations, and some comments on the interpretation of regression coefficients.

Preliminary Observations

Equations were estimated for each party's vote share at each election from 1867 until 1971, some 71 equations all told. These equations are not presented, and are discussed only briefly, for three reasons. First, the high degree of multicollinearity (compounded by the aggregate nature of the data), together with the sensitivity of regression analysis to slight changes in the data set makes for unstable coefficients. It is simply too much to expect of the data and the regression technique to be able to attach a precise meaning to a specific coefficient. Indeed, the great majority of coefficients were extremely unstable, in sign as well as in magnitude, even in the short term. Attention is occasionally drawn to certain coefficients which did remain relatively stable over extended periods.² Secondly, even if we did have confidence in the precision of particular coefficients, for the vast majority of them, we have no a priori expectations, nor are we especially interested in the strength and signs of specific coefficients, for example, that relating concentration of Baptists

²The coefficients of Blake's regression equations, which cover a twelve year period and utilize similar data, demonstrate enviable stability, Donald E. Blake, "The Measurement of Regionalism in Canadian Voting Behaviour," Canadian Journal of Political Science, v (March, 1972), 73-4.

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²The coefficients of Blake's regression equations, which cover a twelve year period and utilize similar data, demonstrate enviable stability, Donald E. Blake, "The Measurement of Regionalism in Canadian Voting Behaviour," Canadian Journal of Political Science V (March, 1972), 73-4.

to Liberal vote share in 1886. Finally, the sheer mass of data involved all but precludes this line of enquiry.

As something of a compromise solution to these problems, regression equations are presented and discussed for party vote pooled across several elections. While not becoming engulfed in a morass of detail, this approach does permit analysis of large scale, enduring patterns of party support as well as the possibility of drawing attention to specific relationships.

A second phase of the multiple regression analysis is the attempt to gauge changes in the electoral importance of groups of variables, for instance of all available religious variables, rather than of individual variables. Here again the focus is upon broad, developmental patterns. As is true throughout this thesis, little data is presented directly measuring change of any sort, let alone the interplay of social and political change. As in previous chapters, we must infer rather than measure or observe change.

Although the sources and methods employed to assemble the data are fully discussed in Appendix B, a brief word may be in order on the social data analysed in this chapter. These data consist of proportions of the total population included in various ethnic, religious and occupational groups and in rural, urban or village settings. Data are taken from the following censuses: 1871, 1911, 1931, 1951 and 1971. Occupational data are scanty for 1911 and altogether lacking for 1931; as well, all data are missing from 20 urban ridings in 1931. The social data from each census are used to estimate equations for a

series of elections rather than simply for the election closest to the census; by way of illustration, data from the 1911 census are related to all elections from 1894 to 1923. Interpolation of census data for each election would have posed horrendous, often insoluble, technical problems, and would not have been obviously more accurate.

In mounting the analysis, one singularly thorny problem was the decision as to which of the social variables to incorporate into the regression equation. Here, multicollinearity and the excluded variable problem came into sharp conflict. Particularly since data on any number of salient variables were missing, we were loath to exclude further variables, for fear of exacerbating bias. Conversely, though, we wished to minimize multicollinearity and also to provide a reasonably parsimonious model; these considerations argued in favour of reducing the number of independent variables.

As a first step, several variables were deleted which were not deemed of intrinsic importance on the grounds that they accounted for only a small proportion of the population, usually in the order of one or two per cent. (The details as to inclusion or exclusion of specific variables have been consigned to Appendix C).

The next step in resolving this dilemma was the construction of correlation matrices of the variables which were candidates for inclusion. It became evident that the major problem was high inter-correlation among occupational and rural-urban variables, and in 1971, educational variables. By and large, the religion and origin variables were not highly correlated either with one another, or with other

variables; the German-Lutheran and Scots-Presbyterian correlations, which were typically about $\pm .80$, were the only ones greater than $\pm .60$.

The high correlations between occupational variables are essentially a reflection of the rural-urban dimension. This is clearly true in the case of the high negative association between farmers and (say) clerical workers. In addition, the size of the units (constituencies) necessarily entails high positive correlations between clerical, professional, skilled and unskilled workers, for all are concentrated in urban areas, but the ridings are generally too large to distinguish, for example, professional neighborhoods from the neighbourhoods where unskilled workers predominate.

The point is not that occupation is conceptually indistinguishable from size of place of residence, for this is clearly not the case. Rather, the peculiarities of our data set lead to their being inexorably bound together statistically, so that some method of maximizing the analytical utility of these variables was needed. Deletion of some variables was settled upon as a reasonable solution. It would, of course, have been possible to substitute factor scores for entire sets of inter-related variables, rather than deleting variables. This would not overcome the underlying problem, however, and was not done so as to keep interpretation as straightforward as possible.

In order to more fully understand the relationships among the highly intercorrelated variables, principal components analyses were performed on them. The other variables, such as those pertaining to religion and origin, were not included in these analyses, because they

were clearly analytically and statistically distinct from the cluster of urban and occupational variables. The results of the principal components analyses are presented in Appendix C, together with a discussion of the rationale for exclusion of variables.

In addition to the variables measuring religious, ethnic and occupational composition, a set of 7 regional dummy variables was incorporated into the regression equations, in order that the impact of regional factors be included. The 7 regions were the same as those employed in Chapter VI, and are defined in Appendix B. These regional dummies, it must be understood, represent far more than "pure" regionalism, for they stand as proxies for a host of social variables on which we have no data.

Also included in the regression analysis were dummy variables indicating the party which had carried the previous election and indicating the presence or absence of an incumbent candidate.³ These political variables were incorporated into the equations in recognition of the close interplay between social and political forces in electoral outcomes. Social factors do not influence electoral decisions in isolation from the political milieu; political traditions are often of signal importance. These dummy variables also act as proxies for a

³For those elections in which third parties held 3 seats or less, a seat held by the Liberal party was coded 1, and a seat held by the Conservative party was coded 0, with seats held by third parties coded in the same fashion as the opposition party. For elections in which a third party held more than 3 seats, two dummy variables were utilized, one indicating whether a Liberal held the seat, and one indicating whether a Conservative held the seat.

wide range of political variables for which we lack data. The incumbency dummy, for example, reflects not only the personal attractiveness of the incumbent, but as well, it is a reflection of local organizational factors. The political dummies are included so as to provide a more comprehensive model, both in theoretical and in statistical terms.

The basic model, then, is contained in the following regression equation:

$$Y = a_1E_1 + a_2E_2 + \dots + b_1O_1 + b_2O_2 + \dots + c_1U_1 + c_2U_2 + \dots + d_1R_1 + d_2R_2 + \dots + f_1P_1 + g_1I_1 + e$$

where Y is the vote share of a given party, E_j represents certain ethnic and religious variables, O_j represents certain occupational variables, U_j represents certain urban variables, R_j represents a series of regional dummy variables, and P_j and I_j are dummy variables standing for previous voting history and incumbency. The parameters of the relationship (the a 's, b 's, c 's, d 's, f 's and g 's) were estimated by the ordinary least squares method. The e is an error term representing unmeasured variables, whose effect is assumed to be random. This represents the fullest model; for some equations, not all variables are included on account of missing data. The addition of interaction terms, akin to those employed by Blake⁴ to determine whether relationships between social variables and vote share persist across regions, was contemplated, but rejected on the grounds that the analysis was already sufficiently complex.

⁴Blake, "Measurement," 61-2.

In interpreting the results of the multiple regression equations, the ceteris paribus condition is of absolutely fundamental importance. The relationship between an independent variable and the dependent variable, expressed in a regression coefficient, indicates the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable, with the impact of all other independent variables incorporated into the equation taken into account. The coefficient shows the change in the dependent variable which, ceteris paribus, is associated with a unit increase in the independent variable.⁵ By way of illustration, from Table VIII-1 (pooled vote, 1867-1894), other things remaining the same, an increase of one per cent in the proportion of the population adhering to the Anglican church would produce a decline in the level of Liberal support of .22 of a percentage point. The relative magnitudes of the coefficients, therefore, indicate the relative propensity of each group to support the party (this is, of course, in aggregate terms, and subject to the usual caveats about drawing inferences on individual behaviour). This is to be distinguished from groups' overall importance in a party's electorate; a small group may have a greater propensity to support a party than a much larger group, but account for only a small proportion of the party's total support.

⁵These coefficients are not converted into "standard units" in the form of "beta coefficients". Such conversion merely entails linear transformation of the original variables, and the ordinary least squares coefficients obtained from the regression based upon standardized data may be easily calculated from the regression results based upon the original data. It is not necessary to fit another regression equation. Furthermore, T -scores and R^2 values are unaffected by standardization.

The statistical significance of each coefficient has been determined, and arbitrary but fairly conventional levels of significance set. If a coefficient's probability of differing from zero is .10 or less, this is indicated.⁶ Non-significant coefficients are of course no less accurate, but the unacceptably high probability of their being the result of random factors renders them of limited analytical value. A fundamental distinction here lies between magnitude and significance of regression coefficients: although the two are frequently linked, it is quite possible to have a very small but nonetheless statistically significant coefficient.

Although we attach more substantive meaning to a significant coefficient than to a non-significant coefficient, we must be careful about disregarding the latter for two reasons. First, the decision as to what is significant is arbitrary: coefficients with a probability of .11 are shown in the tables as non-significant. For some purposes it would be preferable to indicate the precise level of significance for each coefficient, but this would render the tables completely incomprehensible. Secondly, multicollinearity may well be inflating the standard errors of the coefficients and thus reducing

⁶All tests of significance are two-tailed, that is without any prediction as to the direction of the relationship. For some instances, such as the association between Tory voting and urban population at the turn of the century, such predictions could have been made, and a one-tailed test employed. In most cases, however, no such prediction was possible, so that to avoid mixing one and two-tailed tests, only the latter were reported. In addition, since a two-tailed test may be converted into a one-tailed test by doubling the significance level, the former test seemed the better way of conveying information.

statistical significance and leading us to faulty conclusions.

Interpretation of the coefficients of the dummy variables is essentially the same as for other variables. For example, Liberal voting in 1867-94 was, ceteris paribus, increased by .02 of a percentage point in ridings previously held by Liberals. Conceptualizing the difference between a riding with and without an incumbent candidate is not difficult, but the same may not be said for the regional dummy variables. What are we to make of the fact of an increase in party vote from a riding's being in Northern Ontario as opposed to its not being in Northern Ontario? Interpretation of the coefficients of the regional dummies is therefore much more difficult; we may speak of the strength of a "regional effect", but we must be careful in describing and comparing such effects. Taking Liberal voting in Table VIII-1 as an illustration, we may legitimately conclude that the Eastern Ontario effect is stronger than the Lake Ontario effect, but we must be very careful in drawing any further inferences.⁷

Regression Analysis of Pooled Data

The following sections report and discuss regression analyses of data pooled across several elections. For example, Table VIII-1 presents one regression equation for Liberal voting and one for

⁷A more interesting comparison would entail attributing contributions of the various regressors to the variation in the dependent variable (vote share), in such a way that one could claim that a certain dummy explained a certain per cent of the variation. Unfortunately, unless all regressors are pairwise uncorrelated, this is not possible.

Conservative voting for the period 1867-1894. The social data in these equations are taken from the 1871 census. Each non-acclaimed candidate's vote share at each election, together with the appropriate social data, constitutes a case (thus, if a riding did not undergo major redistribution, precisely the same values of the social variables would be employed each time the seat was contested). The rationale underlying the choice of periods (1867-94, 1894-1923, 1923-45, 1937-59, 1955-71) was not theoretical, but was largely dictated by the spacing of the censuses from which the social data were drawn. So as to gauge the influence of individual elections, dummy variables were added for each election, save one, which was arbitrarily deleted so as to avoid the 'dummy variable trap'.

To be sure, this pooling procedure has a certain artificiality about it, yet (aside from rendering great masses of data manageable) it gives us an opportunity to observe underlying patterns relatively free of idiosyncratic, election-specific influences. As a rule, the goodness of fit measures, R^2 and \bar{R}^2 , are lower for the pooled data than for individual elections. This is only to be expected, and what is of perhaps greatest interest is the generally narrow gap; in other words, given the time spans involved, the proportion of variation accounted for by the pooled equations are generally high, relative to the means of R^2 and \bar{R}^2 for the individual equations.

In overall terms, the regression equations, both pooled and individual, accounted for a respectable proportion of the variation, particularly when consideration is taken of the aggregate nature of

the data and the substantial number of unmeasured variables. The mean R^2 values for the individual Liberal, Conservative and CCF-NDP equations were: .64, .63 and .72 over the entire span of provincial history (values for the nineteenth century were approximately .10 lower than in the twentieth century). Though not so impressive as the R^2 values reported by Blake in his study of nation-wide electoral patterns from 1953 to 1965 (mean of .79 and .78 for Liberal and Conservative support)⁸, these are by no means disastrously low.

In the pooled equations, as is to be expected considering the substantially larger number of cases, several of the coefficients of the social variables exhibit greater statistical significance than in individual elections. On the other hand, the reverse situation obtained in at least a few instances.

1867-1894

The equations reported in Table VIII-1 are only moderately successful in accounting for the variation in Liberal and Conservative vote shares during the Mowat years. For Liberal voting, $R^2 = .57$, $\bar{R}^2 = .34$, while for the Tories, the values were .26 and .22; for the eight individual elections involved the mean R^2 and \bar{R}^2 were .58 and .49 for the Liberals and .41 and .29 for the Conservatives. That in as

⁸ Computed from Tables IV and V in Blake, "Measurement"; in his thesis, Blake applied a similar regression analysis to Quebec voting, but was able to account for only a small proportion of the variation in party support (R^2 values were often as low as .15). Donald Blake, "Regionalism in Canadian Voting Behaviour," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1972, chapter IV.

TABLE VIII-1

MULTIPLE REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF POOLED PARTY VOTE 1867 - 1894

Variable	Liberal	Conservative
Urban	-.04	-.06**
Village	-.03	-.02
Eastern Ontario	.30***	.31***
Lake Ontario	.28***	.31***
Georgian Bay	.24***	.28***
Golden Horseshoe	.29***	.30***
Western Ontario	.28***	.30***
Toronto	.26***	.26***
Northern Ontario	.13***	.18***
1867	.04***	.08***
1875	.02*	.02**
1879	.01	.01
1883	.02*	.03***
1886	.02*	.02*
1890	.02*	.01
1894	.02**	.02*
Anglican	-.22***	.12*
English Catholic	.03	-.04
Methodist	-.01	.03
Presbyterian	.18***	-.08
Baptist	.00	-.04
English	.17***	-.06
Irish	-.03	.01
Scot	-.04	.10
French	-.12***	-.12***
German	.11***	.04*
Labourer	-.02	-.18
Skilled worker	-.01	.17
Incumbent	.00	.00
Past winner	.02***	-.02***
R^2	.37	.26
$\frac{R^2}{R}$.34	.22
N	631	619

Social data taken from the 1871 census.

* $p < .10$
 ** $p < .05$
 *** $p < .01$

politically unturbulent a period as this (compared, for example, with the upheavals between 1894 and 1923), the pooled goodness of fit measures should be further below the norm of the individual equations than in any other period suggests a certain instability in the social bases of electoral choice. In addition, the generally low R^2 and \bar{R}^2 values, as well as the overall lack of significant association between the social variables and party vote shares,⁹ point to an overall weakness in the social bases of party choice.

Probably the most striking feature of Table VIII-1 is the consistent significance of the coefficients of the regional dummy variables for both parties. It is difficult to interpret individual coefficients; each region had approximately the same ceteris paribus effect on party voting, save Northern Ontario; the coefficients for this region, though highly significant, were substantially lower than for the other regions, doubtless reflecting the low turnout rates in the North during this period. In more general terms, however, the impact of region is unmistakable, though we cannot know whether the effect is intrinsically 'regional' in the sense of distinct attitudes and traditions, or whether it simply reflects the importance of unmeasured social variables.

The coefficients of the election-year dummies were generally weak but statistically significant, although attributing substantive meaning to them seems a pointless exercise (with the exception of those for

⁹In the individual equations, of 112 coefficients linking social variables to vote shares, only 13 of the Liberal coefficients and 11 of the Conservative coefficients were significant at .10 or better.

1867, which are stronger and more highly significant than any of the others, suggesting the degree to which the first Ontario election was unlike those to follow).

In terms of the variables relating to place of residence, only the Conservative coefficient of the proportion of persons living in urban areas is statistically significant. The somewhat surprising result that this coefficient is negative may partially reflect the lower urban turnout, yet the fact the Conservative coefficient is marginally stronger than the Liberal suggests that more than this is involved. This implies that the Tories' slight lead over the Grits in the cities and towns was to an important extent accounted for by the differing social composition of town and countryside in addition to intrinsic rural-urban factors. One possibility, though it is nothing more, is that the disproportionate number of Anglicans in the cities accounted for a major portion of this difference.¹⁰

Concentration of Presbyterians, Germans, and persons of English origin were positively associated with Liberal voting at statistically significant levels, while the relationships with Anglicans and French Canadians were negative. For Conservative voting, the significant coefficients were with concentration of Anglicans and Germans (positive) and French Canadians (negative).

¹⁰The correlation of concentration of Anglicans and the percentage of the population living in urban areas in 1871 was +.41; the proportion of Anglicans in Toronto, 36.4 per cent, was far in excess of the proportion in any other area (the next highest was the North; 23.6 per cent).

Whereas several of the ethnic and religious variables made significant contributions to the explanation of party vote shares, neither of the occupational variables were significantly related to either Liberal or Conservative voting; class does not seem to have been particularly salient in nineteenth century electoral politics in Ontario.¹¹

Though in occasional specific elections the presence of an incumbent candidate contributed significantly (if only slightly) to the explanation of party voting, in overall terms, this factor had virtually no impact. Small but highly significant relationships appeared between party vote shares and the outcome of the previous election. In that this variable was coded 1 for a Liberally held seat, and 0 for a Tory seat, it is hardly surprising that the coefficient was positive in the Liberal equation and negative in the Conservative equation.

1894-1923

Table VIII-2 reports the regression equation for data pooled over the period 1894-1923.¹² For these elections, the only occupational

¹¹ Although the myriad problems in doing so are admitted, occupation is understood as an indicator of class.

¹² No equation is reported for the Patrons of Industry, which contested only the 1894 election and presented only 44 candidates. Two equations were estimated for Patron voting, one with 1871 social data and one with 1911 social data. The results were horrendously contradictory. With the 1871 data, $R^2=.85$ ($\bar{R}^2=.71$), with the coefficients of all five regional dummies and 10 of the 15 social variables were highly significant; with 1911 data, $R^2=.44$ ($\bar{R}^2=-.01$), none of the regional dummies and only 2 of the social variables had significant coefficients. The only common significant coefficients were a strong negative village coefficient and a strong positive prohibition coefficient.

MULTIPLE REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF POOLED PARTY VOTE 1894 - 1923

Variable	Liberal	Conservative
Urban	.01	.01
Village	-.04	-.03
Eastern Ontario	.33***	.32***
Lake Ontario	.35***	.31***
Georgian Bay	.30***	.31***
Golden Horseshoe	.36***	.34***
Western Ontario	.34***	.32***
Toronto	.27***	.31***
Northern Ontario	.27***	.28***
1894	-.04***	-.04***
1902	-.01*	-.00
1905	-.04***	.02**
1908	-.04***	.01
1911	-.07***	-.02***
1914	-.04***	.00
1919	-.08***	-.10***
1923	-.16***	-.06***
Anglican	-.33***	-.13***
English Catholic	-.06	.01
Methodist	.05	.10***
Presbyterian	.15*	-.02
Baptist	.14**	-.00
English	.05	.01
Irish	-.07	.10***
Scots	-.04	.04
French	.03	-.11***
Wage	.00	-.00
Incumbent	.00	-.00
Past winner (L)	.07***	.00
(C)	.03***	.03***
R^2	.54	.48
$\frac{R^2}{R}$.52	.46
N	752	821

Social data taken from the 1911 census.

* $p < .10$
 ** $p < .05$
 *** $p < .01$

data available relate to the size of the wage-earning labour force. Data from prohibition plebiscites were available for only some of the elections, so that it was not possible to incorporate temperance sentiment into the larger equations. In individual equations, for both Grit and Tory voting, the coefficients of the prohibition variables (which measured strength of 'dry' support) were positive in each case save one, and were generally statistically significant. The lone negative coefficient, which did not reach conventional levels of significance, turns up in the Liberal equation for 1919; this seems reasonable, as the Liberals fought that election under the leadership of the unabashedly wet Hartley Dewart.

These equations account for substantially more of the variation in Liberal and Conservative vote shares than those of the previous period; the R^2 values are .54 and .48, with only marginally lower \bar{R}^2 's. Since the three party elections of the beginning and the end of the period were somewhat atypical, the equations were recalculated to include only the six elections between 1898 and 1914. These equations explained nearly the same proportions of the variation ($R^2 = .52, .42$), and the magnitudes of the coefficients, particularly the significant coefficients, were generally very similar and invariably had the same sign. The clear implication is that despite the different matters at issue and the very different structure of party competition, the elections of 1894, 1919 and 1923 fit well into the general patterns of social support for the parties. All the same, for both parties, the coefficients for the 1919 and 1923 elections (but not 1894) were

unusually strong, indicating important discontinuities.

Neither the proportion of the population living in villages nor that in urban centres was significantly associated with party voting, but all of the coefficients of the regional dummies were highly significant in both equations. The influence of region varied somewhat more in the explanation of Liberal voting than in Conservative voting. Although the Northern Ontario effect remained the weakest, it had very nearly reached the same magnitude as those of other regions. The other point of interest here is the clear evidence of the Grits' weakness in Toronto.

As in the earlier period, Liberal voting was negatively associated with the concentration of Anglicans and positively related to the presence of Presbyterians; similarly, the negative Conservative relationship with the proportion of French Canadians reappeared. These were the only instances of significant coefficients in both the 1867-94 and 1894-1923 equations. One variable, proportion of Anglicans, was positively associated with Tory voting in the earlier period, yet the relationship was negative from 1894 to 1923. The other statistically significant coefficients were all positive: Liberal-Baptist, Conservative-Methodist and Conservative-Irish. Not only were the coefficients of the size of the wage-earning labour force not significant, they were of virtually negligible size; in this they only repeated the

results of the election-by-election equations.¹³

The effect of incumbency on both Tory and Grit voting is all but nonexistent, but the dummy variables representing previous political leaning are clearly related to party voting.¹⁴ Two points of interest emerge from these political dummies. First, the effect of a Liberal 'presence' on Liberal voting is substantially stronger than the effect of Conservative success on Conservative voting. Secondly, the positive, significant coefficient in the Liberal equation of the dummy representing a Tory victory in the preceding election contrasts sharply with the small, non-significant effect on Tory voting of a Liberal presence.¹⁵ The full meaning of these findings is obscure, but one clear implication is that, ceteris paribus, voting for the Grits was far more subject to political traditions and to established partisan factors than was Tory support.

¹³ Only six of the 18 coefficients reached values greater than $\pm .01$; none of these were significant, and no clear pattern was evident. In a study of urban Ontario voting from 1908-1919, Michael Piva claims that "class was far more important in determining voting behaviour than ethnicity or religion", "Workers and Tories: The Collapse of the Conservative Party in Urban Ontario, 1908-1919," Urban History Review 3-76 (February, 1977), 33. As he employs only zero-order correlations, this conclusion is not convincing.

¹⁴ Although it was only necessary to include both a Liberal and a Conservative dummy for the 1898 and 1923 elections, in order to have a consistent, full set of variables, data from all elections were re-cast in this fashion.

¹⁵ The strong effects of the political dummies on Liberal support, and their weaker, inconsistent impact on Conservative voting are also evident in the individual equations.

1923-1945

Table VIII-3 presents the multiple regression equations for data pooled over the seven elections held between 1923 and 1945. Interpretation of these results must be tempered by the realization that they are based on a restricted sample: data from the 1931 census were not available for ridings in the city (proper) of Toronto, or in Hamilton, Windsor or Ottawa: some 20 seats all told. Despite this serious shortcoming, however, the results are sufficiently interesting to warrant our attention.

The R^2 and \bar{R}^2 values for these equations are higher than for the foregoing equations: for the Liberals, R^2 was .72, for the Conservatives, .59, for the CCF, .71, with \bar{R}^2 only slightly lower in each case (the values attained in individual equations were of similar magnitude).

As might be expected from the turbulent electoral history of this period, the coefficients of the election-year dummy variables are unusually strong and statistically significant. This is particularly true in the Liberal equation in which the triumphs of 1934 and 1937, and of the debacles of 1923 and 1943 are clearly evident (the Grit and Tory dummies are of course relative to 1926, and the CCF dummies relative to 1943).

Even with a goodly portion of the purely urban ridings missing, the influence of urban-rural factors is apparent. Both Liberal and Conservative vote shares were negatively associated with the proportion of persons resident in cities and towns, at significant levels,

TABLE VIII-3

MULTIPLE REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF POOLED PARTY VOTE 1923 - 1945

Variable	Liberal	Conservative	UFO	CCF
Urban	-.05**	-.04**	-.14**	.06*
Village	-.11**	.05	-.03	-.04
Eastern Ontario	.24***	.30***	.47***	.18***
Lake Ontario	.25***	.30***	.44***	.20***
Georgian Bay	.23***	.26***	.46***	.24***
Golden Horseshoe	.23***	.25***	.45***	.25***
Western Ontario	.24***	.26***	.47***	.21***
Toronto	.14***	.21***	.41***	.28***
Northern Ontario	.22***	.26***	.42***	.30***
1923	-.10***	-.03***	-.13***	a
1929	-.03**	.01	c	a
1934	.13***	-.04***	c	-.12***
1937	.08***	-.02**	c	-.16***
1943	-.10***	-.11**	c	b
1945	-.04***	-.02*	c	-.06***
Anglican	-.21***	.04	-.37**	.25**
English Catholic	.05	.03	-.06	-.01
United	.03	-.05	-.15	.12
Presbyterian	-.01	-.04	.04	.15
Baptist	.15	-.05	.28*	.06
English	.10	.13***	.14	-.21**
Irish	.06	.14***	.25**	-.22***
Scots	.18**	.02	.04	-.26**
French	.05	-.11***	-.09	.03
Incumbent	.00	-.00	-.03*	.00
Past winner (L)	.05***	.01	-.08***	-.02
(C)	.02*	.04***	-.05**	-.04**
R ²	.72	.59	.57	.71
R	.70	.57	.49	.67
N	458	529	147	185

Social data taken from the 1931 census.

* p < .10
 ** p < .05
 *** p < .01

a no CCF candidates in 1923 or 1929
 b 1943 dummy deleted in CCF equation
 c UFO equation calculated for 1919
 and 1923; 1919 dummy deleted

whereas the urban powerbase of the CCF shows through clearly in its significant positive coefficient. Since these equations lack occupational variables, it seems safe to assume that, even more than is usually the case, the "Urban" variable is measuring class/occupational factors as well as strictly urban factors.

The coefficients of all regional dummies are highly significant (the Toronto variable contains only a few cases). Save Toronto, the graveyard of Liberals, the impact of regional factors did not vary substantially for Grit voting. Again with the exception of a low Toronto effect, Tory support was only slightly more subject to differing regional influences, though all the same, the Conservatives' particular strength in Eastern Ontario and the Lake Ontario district is clearly demonstrated. The equations also illustrate the CCF's weakness in these same regions and in Western Ontario, as well as its great success in the North and (with caveats concerning missing data) in Toronto.

The social variables which turn out to be strongly and significantly related to party vote are precisely those which are strong and significant in the regression analyses of individual elections. Liberal support is negatively associated with the concentration of Anglicans but positively related to the proportion of Scots; Tory voting is positively associated with the presence of persons of English and Irish origin, but negatively related to the proportion of French Canadians; and CCF support is positively associated with the presence of Anglicans, but negatively associated with the concentration of

persons of English, Irish, and Scots origin.

A close examination of the individual equations suggests important changes in the bases of Liberal support in 1929. Prior to 1929 (i.e. 1919-1926), the regional dummies were generally not significant, but from 1929 on, they were all highly significant; before 1929, the United and Presbyterian coefficients were positive whereas in later elections they were negative; the Scots coefficients were positive until 1929, but negative afterwards.¹⁶ Without wishing to put too much store in these results, they do indicate that the demise of the UFO had important effects on the propensity of certain social groups to vote Liberal (there is no trace of a similar shift in the social basis of Conservative support).

Incumbency effects were virtually negligible for all parties but previous political leaning had its typically small but highly significant impact. For both the Grigs and the Tories, success in the preceding election was clearly and positively related to level of support. For both, the coefficients of the dummies indicating that the other had carried the riding at the last election were also positive (though only the Conservative dummy in the Liberal equation was significant). This recalls the affinity between the two old parties' electorates when compared to CCF-NDP supporters, which came out clearly in the preceding chapter, and it further suggests that the electoral division

¹⁶The pre-1929 and post-1926 coefficients are uniform as to sign, and except in the case of the Presbyterian coefficient, at least intermittently significant.

was only in part a reflection of the different social bases of party support.

1937-1959

The multiple regression equations for Liberal, Conservative and CCF voting over the years 1937-1959 are presented in Table VIII-4. These equations are based on a full complement of seats, and although data on ethnic origin are unavailable, data on several key occupational groupings are incorporated into the analysis.

As with the last set of pooled regression equations, these equations accounted for quite respectable proportions of the variation in levels of party support; \bar{R}^2 values were .63 and .73, which were only marginally below the means of the individual equations. In general, variables strongly and significantly related to party voting over the entire period were similarly related to party support in the election-by-election analysis.

The dummy variables denoting specific elections are all highly significant, and by comparison with other pooled equations, are relatively strong. The coefficients indicate election effects relative to 1943, and from this perspective hold few surprises. The Liberals, of course, fared very much better in 1937 than in 1943, and from 1945 to 1959 the effects of each election were very similar. The effect of specific election-year contexts on Tory voting was uniformly positive, and on CCF voting uniformly negative, reflecting these parties' low and high water marks in 1943.

TABLE VIII-4

MULTIPLE REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF POOLED PARTY VOTE 1937 - 1959

Variable	Liberal	Conservative	CCF/NDP
Urban	-.04***	-.04***	.04***
Eastern Ontario	.16***	.18***	.07***
Lake Ontario	.17***	.19***	.09***
Georgian Bay	.15***	.13***	.12***
Golden Horseshoe	.13***	.12***	.15***
Western Ontario	.16***	.14***	.10***
Toronto	.10***	.13***	.15***
Northern Ontario	.13***	.11***	.18**
1937	.18***	.08***	-.15***
1945	.06***	.08***	-.06***
1948	.06***	.05***	-.02**
1951	.06***	.10***	-.08***
1955	.06***	.07***	-.09***
1959	.07***	.06***	-.10***
Anglican	-.19***	.05	.15***
Catholic	.04	-.03	.10***
United	.05	.14***	.01
Presbyterian	.27***	.34***	.06
Baptist	.22***	.03	.10
Clerical	.03	.05	-.30***
Manufacturing	-.15**	-.30	.52***
Labourer	.41	.91***	-1.16***
Primary	-.05	.24	.47**
Incumbent	-.00	.00	.00
Past winner (L)	.07***	.01	-.04***
(C)	.02***	.05***	-.04***
R^2	.74	.65	.65
\bar{R}^2	.73	.63	.63
N	641	646	534

Social data taken from the 1951 census.

* p < .10
 ** p < .05
 *** p < .01

As in the equations for the immediately preceding period, Liberal and Conservative vote shares are negatively associated with the proportion of urban residents, while the CCF association is positive; each coefficient is highly significant. Since, unlike the previous equations, this analysis does incorporate occupational data, urban-rural factors, as distinct from occupational composition, would seem to have played an important role in party voting during the years 1937-59, far more so than in earlier periods.

The regional effects on party voting, as captured in the coefficients of the regional dummies, are substantially weaker than in the earlier pooled equations, but they are all highly significant.¹⁷ In addition, the coefficients are somewhat more widely dispersed than in the preceding pooled equations, suggesting that regional influences may have been particularly important in electoral outcomes in this era. The strongest regional effects on Liberal voting were in Eastern and Western Ontario and the Lake Ontario district, whereas the Toronto effect was much weaker; for the Tories, the Eastern Ontario and Lake Ontario effects were a good deal stronger than those for the other regions; and for the CCF, the Northern Ontario, Golden Horseshoe, and Toronto effects were strongest, with the Eastern Ontario and Lake Ontario effects the weakest. All these are in line with a priori

¹⁷One curious anomaly here is that for the election-by-election CCF equations, none of the coefficients of the regional dummies reached conventional levels of significance until 1959; the pattern of strong and weak coefficients is broadly similar to that in the pooled equation. Regional dummies for Liberal and Conservative voting were uniformly significant.

expectations and the findings of chapter VI, but these results are important since they demonstrate the importance of region once the other variables have been taken into account.

Religion was generally related to party voting in familiar ways. Liberal support was negatively associated with the concentration of Anglicans, and positively related to the proportion of Presbyterians and Baptists. These relationships are also found in the regression analyses of individual elections. One relationship not appearing in the pooled data is the positive relationship which emerged from the election-by-election analysis between level of Liberal support and the presence of Catholics (since origin data are missing, this is all Catholics rather than English Catholics as in other periods). Although the relationship reached statistical significance in four of eight elections, it was not particularly strong, with the coefficients never exceeding .15.

The proportions of United Church members and of Presbyterians were both positively and significantly related to Tory support, with the latter relationship much stronger than the former. CCF voting was positively related to the concentration of Anglicans and Catholics.

In terms of occupational variables, only the proportion of persons in manufacturing was significantly related (negatively) to Liberal voting, and only the concentration of labourers was (positively) associated with support for the Tories at conventional levels of significance. It is thus a telling indication of the nature of CCF support that it was strongly and significantly associated with all four

occupational variables, negatively with the clerical and labouring population and positively with the proportion of workers in manufacturing and primary industries.¹⁸ At first blush, the negative relationship with labourers seems peculiar for the CCF; a possible explanation lies in the strength of the party's ties with organized labour. Workers in secondary manufacturing and in primary industries would be far more likely to be organized than would labourers. A final point of interest with reference to what would seem to be the class basis of CCF support emerges from the election-by-election results: in the 1940's the coefficients of the occupational variables are markedly weaker and less significant than in the three elections of the 1950's. This suggests that during the Frost era, the party's electoral reverses coincided with an intensification of its class basis of support; in all likelihood, cause and effect were closely intertwined in this process.

Once again, incumbency was an all but negligible factor in accounting for party voting. Conversely, the previous political disposition of a riding has important effects on party vote shares; the overall pattern resembles that in the equations for the preceding period (1919-45). The level of Liberal support is positively and significantly associated with both dummy variables, though the coefficient of the Liberal dummy is much stronger. As in the earlier period, Tory voting was only

¹⁸ For a detailed exploration of the electoral dependence of the CCF on skilled manufacturing workers and on workers engaged in non-agricultural primary industries, see David M. Cameron, "An Electoral Analysis of Democratic Socialism in Ontario: CCF-NDP Voting Patterns 1934-1963," M.Phil. thesis, University of Toronto, 1965, 25-31.

significantly associated with a riding's being previously held by a Conservative. The greater impact of political factors on Liberal voting is thus repeated. The negative and highly significant coefficients of both dummies for CCF support again demonstrates the gulf between the CCF and the old parties.

1955-1971

Table VIII-5 reports the results of the regression analysis of data pooled over the five elections from 1955 to 1971 (due to a massive redistribution in 1974, it was not possible to extend the analysis to the elections of 1975 and 1977). The social data, taken from the 1971 census, incorporate a wider range of variables than in any other set of equations. Although the proportion of the variation explained in the election-by-election analysis was very similar for all parties (mean R^2 ranged only between .70 and .73), the pooled equation of CCF-NDP support accounted for substantially more of the variation than was the case in the Liberal or Conservative equations (respective R^2 values: .73, .59 and .62). The signs and the magnitude of the coefficients in the pooled equations largely resemble those of the individual equations; however, the coefficients in the pooled equations are generally more significant than in the individual equations. An illustration of this difference, which is far more pronounced in these equations than for other periods, is the Presbyterian coefficient of Conservative support: in the pooled equation, the coefficient, +.37, is significant at better than the .01 level, whereas none of the individual

MULTIPLE REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF POOLED PARTY VOTE 1955 - 1971

Variable	Liberal	Conservative	CCF/NDP
Urban	-.04*	.00	.04*
Eastern Ontario	.11	.29***	-.15**
Lake Ontario	.15*	.25***	-.15**
Georgian Bay	.13*	.24***	-.14*
Golden Horseshoe	.11	.24***	-.13*
Western Ontario	.13*	.23***	-.14*
Toronto	.11	.25***	-.09
Northern Ontario	.10	.27***	-.08
1955	-.01	.02**	.00
1963	-.01	.04***	-.01
1967	-.02***	.01	.06***
1971	-.03***	.05***	.09***
Anglican	-.37***	.24**	-.04
English Catholic	.30***	.08	-.03
Presbyterian	.38***	.37***	-.09
United	.01	.31***	-.09
Baptist	.35**	.17	-.10
English	-.11	-.19**	.20***
French	-.09	-.05	.18*
German	.13	.04	-.05
Italian	.33***	-.07	-.09
Born in Ontario	.25**	.20*	-.14
Born in Canada	.10	-.16	.06
Immigration A	.01	.19	.28*
High School	.49	-.41	.26
Family income	-.04*	-.00	.00
Clerical	-.25	-.06	-.10
Manufacturing	-1.01***	-.41**	1.38***
Primary	-.85**	-.20	.84**
Incumbent	-.01*	.01***	-.00
Past winner (L)	.09***	-.01	-.08***
(C)	.01	.06***	-.08***
R ²	.59	.62	.73
R ²	.57	.60	.71
N	536	538	493

Social data taken from the 1971 census.

* p < .10

** p < .05

*** p < .01

coefficients reached the .10 level, though all were positive (mean +.31).

The coefficients of the dummy variables representing the influence of specific elections, which are to be interpreted relative to the 1959 effect, do not reveal anything particularly new or noteworthy. The most salient feature of these results is the markedly improved fortunes of the NDP in 1967 and 1971 (but not in 1963).

Liberal voting over the five elections was negatively related to degree of urbanization, CCF-NDP support was positively related to it, and for Tory voting, the relationship is non-existent. This is clearly in line with a priori expectations, and with earlier findings except in the case of Tory support, which was previously related to degree of urbanization in a negative fashion. Although the evidence from the election-by-election result equations is less clear cut, the implication is of a shift in the Conservatives' electoral base away from its somewhat rural character to the point where, ceteris paribus, the Tories' electoral attractiveness depends not at all on rural-urban factors.

The coefficients of the regional dummy variables are generally lower, less dispersed and less statistically significant than in earlier pooled equations. Together with the fact that the coefficients in the individual equations are substantially less significant than in the pooled equations,¹⁹ this suggests that region may have become

¹⁹In the CCF-NDP equations, 3 dummies were statistically significant in 1967; no other regional dummies were significant. For Tory support, all regional dummies were significant in 1955, 1959 and 1963, but only 3 in 1967 and none in 1971.

considerably less important in influencing electoral support in recent years. Substantively the most interesting features of these findings are the relatively weak Eastern Ontario effect on Liberal support, and the similarly weak Western Ontario effect on Conservative voting. The negative coefficients in the CCF-NDP equation are of no intrinsic importance; more interesting is the fact that for the 1937-1959 pooled data, the Golden Horseshoe effect was of a similar magnitude as those of Toronto and Northern Ontario, the CCF powerbases, whereas in this equation, the Golden Horseshoe effect is more akin to those of the weaker CCF-NDP areas.

The relationship of the religious groups to party voting points up an important difference between the electoral bases of the old parties and the CCF-NDP. The widespread acceptance of the view that the impact of religion on Ontario politics is greatly diminished from what it had once been gives cause for hesitation in inferring too much from these results. Nevertheless, seven of the ten relationships between concentration of religious groups and Grit and Tory voting were moderately strong and highly significant, whereas none of the five coefficients relating religion to CCF-NDP support were strong or statistically significant.

Of the strong, significant relationships, only one is negative, the perennial association of Liberal voting and the presence of Anglicans. The positive relationships are: Liberal with English Catholics, Presbyterians and Baptists, and Conservatives with Anglicans, Presbyterians and United Church members. Most of these relationships also

emerged from the previous pooled equations.

No overall pattern emerges from the coefficients of origin and birthplace variables, though some of the individual results are intriguing. Whereas we might well have expected Tory and Grit voting to be positively associated with the proportion of the population born in Ontario, Liberal voting to be positively related to the concentration of Italians and, perhaps, CCF-NDP voting to be similarly related to the presence of pre-World War II immigrants, it comes as a surprise that Tory support is negatively related to concentration of persons of British origin and that CCF-NDP vote is positively related to this variable and also to the proportion of French-Canadians.

The coefficients of the only educational variable are fairly strong, but nowhere near statistical significance. The family income variable makes only an infinitesimal contribution to the explanation of Tory and CCF-NDP voting, but is positively, if weakly, related to the level of Liberal support, and is statistically significant.

The differences in occupational support for the parties which emerged in the pooled equations for 1937-1959, stand out even more clearly in the more recent period. All parties' support is negatively related to the proportion of the population engaged in clerical occupations, though none is statistically significant. CCF-NDP voting is very strongly and positively related to concentration of manufacturing workers, whereas the relationship with the level of Liberal support is strongly negative, and is negative but moderate with Conservative voting. A strong and statistically significant negative relationship

emerges between Liberal vote share and the proportion of primary workers. The relationship between primary workers and CCF-NDP support is strong, positive and statistically significant; this marks a shift from the previous period, which only becomes clear in the individual equations in 1967.

Save weak but significant incumbency effects for Grit and Tory voting, there are no surprises with respect to the political variables. For the Liberals and the Conservatives, the fact of previously having held a riding had a positive effect on party fortunes, whereas the effect of the other old party's having carried the riding is of little import. The level of CCF-NDP support was adversely affected by either a Grit or a Tory presence from the previous election. Once again, the sharp dividing line between the electorates of the old parties and of the CCF-NDP is evident.

General Findings

Several general observations may be made pertaining to the foregoing results. First, some specific relationships between party support and social groups emerge with great clarity and persistence across substantial time spans. Perhaps the most obvious of these is the negative association between Liberal voting and the concentration of Anglicans; this relationship was statistically significant in all five pooled equations, and in 16 of 37 individual equations. That this relationship should persist over such a long period and under such different circumstances (i.e. some equations without origin data, others

with little occupational data, and yet others with many urban ridings missing) strongly suggests that it is no mere artifact, but an important fact of Ontario electoral life.

If the Liberals have always fared poorly among Anglicans, their relationship with Presbyterians and Baptists has been more felicitous. In four of the five pooled equations, concentration of Presbyterians was positively associated with Liberal voting at significant levels, as was concentration of Baptists in three equations. It is tempting to read these results as confirmation of the continuing influence of the Grit heritage in the sectarian strife of pre-Confederation days. This interpretation, however, must needs be tempered with the realization that the leading non-conformist religious group, Methodism and its progeny, the United Church, was allied with the Conservative party, at least by our data: in three of the pooled equations, the coefficients were positive and significant. The other important correlate of Liberal voting, at least since 1931, is the negative association with degree of urbanization. This relationship was of course evident from the data presented in Chapter IV, but it is important to know that it persists even when many social variables, particularly those relating to occupation, are taken into account.

Aside from the aforementioned positive association with Methodism, support for the Conservative party was positively related to the proportion of Irishmen and negatively related to concentration

of French-Canadians.²⁰

One of the most intriguing non-findings is the lack of relationship between party voting and the proportion of English Catholics. In the pooled equations, the only statistically significant coefficients were for Liberal voting in 1971 and for CCF support in 1951; in the individual equations, the coefficients vary widely as to sign, strength and significance. Again we must be careful about inferring too much from such evidence; at a minimum, however, these findings raise important questions as to the electoral salience of Catholic-Protestant conflict in Ontario.

The CCF-NDP's shorter history renders generalization more difficult, but from both the pooled and the election-by-election equations, the positive association with degree of urbanization and with proportion of manufacturing and primary workers is evident. As this, together with the generally negative relationship between manufacturing workers and Liberal and Conservative support, shows, class elements have indeed become important for the fortunes of the various parties.²¹ At the same time, the evidence seems quite clear that religious and ethnic factors

²⁰The coefficients for French-Canadians were negative and significant in 1871, 1911 and 1931 (no origin variables were included in the 1951 equation). The Irish coefficients were significant in 1911 and 1931 (Irish origin was not ascertained in 1971, and thus was incorporated into only 3 of the pooled equations).

²¹As our occupational data prior to 1951 are spotty, the suggestion that class factors are more important now than in the past is tenuous. Still, from the data at hand, there is no suggestion whatsoever that occupation had any impact on voting between 1867 and 1923.

have by no means been displaced by class as key determinants of party support.

By far the most persistent relationships to emerge from these analyses is the strength and significance of regional effects on party voting. As pointed out above, the specific findings essentially duplicate those in Chapter VI, for example the strength of the Tories in Eastern Ontario and the Lake Ontario district, and the CCF-NDP's weakness there. Yet it is of fundamental importance to see that these effects are still present once important elements of the social composition of the regions are taken into account. Inasmuch as the regional dummy variables serve as proxies for unmeasured variables, we are not dealing with 'pure' regional effects, though these are doubtless at work. There are indications, albeit inconclusive, that region may be declining in electoral importance.

Finally, as to political factors, the idiosyncratic influence of the context of specific elections emerges clearly from the coefficients of the dummy variables. Aside from this, however, no overall patterns are apparent, save perhaps the crucially important fact that, despite the importance of elements unique to each election, significant communalities in the social bases of party support clearly emerge for each pooled equation - and often for even longer periods. Although the effects of incumbency are negligible over the time spans encompassed in the pooled equations, they are occasionally significant (if weak) for specific parties at particular elections. The findings with relation to the party dummies hold few surprises, but this was

not the primary reason for their inclusion. Rather they were designed to permit us to see the impact of social variables, shorn, as much as possible, of localized, short-term political factors.

Significance of Sets of Variables

The final set of tables examines not individual variables, but sets of variables. It is quite possible, particularly in view of the multicollinearity problem, that a number of variables are not individually related to party voting at a statistically significant level but, as a group, do make a significant contribution. By way of illustration, although none of the regional dummies was significantly related to NDP voting in 1963, taken as a lot, the probability that region was unrelated to NDP level of support was less than .03. The data are presented in Tables VIII-6, VIII-7 and VIII-8.²²

The entries in the tables are probability values obtained in the following manner. The error sum of squares and the degrees of freedom from each individual election were noted, and the equations recalculated with each set of variables deleted in turn (i.e. all regional dummies deleted, then re-incorporated into the equation with all religion variables deleted, and so on), and the error sum of squares and degrees of freedom noted. The F statistic was then computed from these

²²Entries for 1937 and 1943 were based on 1931 census data; entries for 1955 and 1959 were calculated with 1971 census data.

components, and the probability value obtained.²³ Thus the probability that the seven regional variables, taken together, were not associated with Liberal voting in 1867 was .03, while the probabilities for the religion variables, the origin variables and the occupation variables were all greater than .10.

The tables only indicate probabilities; the entries are not coefficients, and they have no relevance to 'strength' and 'direction' of the relationships, which in the context of such groups of variables are non-sensical notions. There are, of course, no entries for occupational variables between 1898 and 1937 and for origin variables between 1943 and 1951, due to missing data.

As it turns out, most of the entries in these tables might have been (roughly) predicted from the individual, election-by-election equations. Although little new information is brought forward in these tables, they are useful as summaries, particularly since the individual equations were not presented.²⁴

²³The actual formula is:

$$F = \frac{\frac{\text{increment in error SS}}{\text{increment in DF}}}{\frac{\text{original SS}}{\text{original DF}}}$$

where "original" refers to the equation with no variables deleted. The critical value of F is determined by (incremental, original) DF. On this procedure see Jan Kmenta, Elements of Econometrics (New York: Macmillan, 1971), 366-74.

²⁴For a somewhat similar use of the probabilities of groups of variables see, Frank T. Denton and Peter J. George, "An Exploratory Statistical Analysis of Some Socioeconomic Characteristics of Families in Hamilton, Ontario, 1871," Social History (April, 1970), 16-44.

PROBABILITY VALUES FOR F-TESTS ON GROUPS OF VARIABLES

LIBERAL VOTE SHARE

Election	Region	Religion	Origin	Occupation
1867	.030	-	-	-
1871	.020	-	-	-
1875	.001	-	.020	-
1879	-	-	.010	.030
1883	.005	.050	-	-
1886	-	-	.080	-
1890	.080	-	.010	.020
1894	.001	-	-	-
1898	.001	.050	.050	-
1902	.001	-	-	-
1905	.001	-	.100	-
1908	.001	-	-	-
1911	.005	-	-	-
1914	.001	.005	-	-
1919	.030	-	-	-
1923	.050	.090	.050	-
1926	-	-	-	-
1929	-	-	-	-
1934	.001	-	-	-
1937	.001	-	.050	-
1943	.020	.005	-	-
1945	.001	.020	-	-
1948	.003	.090	-	.060
1951	.020	-	-	-
1955	.100	-	-	-
1959	.050	.010	-	.100
1963	.080	.001	-	.010
1967	-	.002	.050	.001
1971	-	.100	.010	.010

The entries indicate the value of $P(F < F_c)$, where F_c is the value of the F-statistic calculated from our sample data as explained in the text. In some instances linear interpolation was employed in establishing the probability values. A dash indicates that the probability value exceeded .100; a blank indicates that the test was not calculated due to lack of data.

PROBABILITY VALUES FOR F-TESTS ON GROUPS OF VARIABLES

CONSERVATIVE VOTE SHARE

Election	Region	Religion	Origin	Occupation
1867	-	-	-	-
1871	-	-	-	-
1875	.003	-	-	.100
1879	-	-	-	-
1883	.001	-	.050	-
1886	-	.050	.040	.030
1890	.008	-	.080	-
1894	.003	-	-	-
1898	.001	-	.100	-
1902	.001	-	-	-
1905	.001	-	-	-
1908	.001	-	-	-
1911	.001	.003	-	-
1914	.001	-	.001	-
1919	.010	-	-	-
1923	.001	-	.001	-
1926	.003	-	-	-
1929	.001	-	-	-
1934	.005	-	-	-
1937	.020	-	.050	-
1943	.002	.001	-	-
1945	.003	.001	-	-
1948	.010	.020	-	-
1951	.010	.001	-	.100
1955	.001	.010	-	.100
1959	.001	.020	-	.003
1963	.100	-	-	.040
1967	.100	-	-	-
1971	.005	-	.050	-

The entries indicate the value of $p (F < F_c)$, where F_c is the value of the F-statistic calculated from our sample data as explained in the text. In some instances linear interpolation was employed in establishing the probability values. A dash indicates that the probability value exceeded .100; a blank indicates that the test was not calculated due to lack of data.

TABLE VIII-8
 PROBABILITY VALUES FOR F-TESTS ON GROUPS OF VARIABLES
 PATRON, UFO AND CCF/NDP VOTE SHARE

Election	Region	Religion	Origin	Occupation
1894	.001	.010	.001	.001
1919	-	-	-	
1923	.100	-	.020	
1943	.001	-		.080
1945	.003	.050		.050
1948	.005	-		.020
1951	.010	-		.001
1955	-	-	-	.090
1959	.100	-	-	.001
1963	.030	-	-	.001
1967	.005	-	-	.001
1971	-	-	-	.001

The entries indicate the value of $p(F < F_c)$, where F_c is the value of the F-statistic calculated from our sample data as explained in the text. In some instances linear interpolation was employed in establishing the probability values. A dash indicates that the test was not calculated due to lack of data.

As was evident from the earlier analyses, the regional variables have consistently been the most significant in explaining Liberal and Conservative vote. On only a handful of occasions have the regional dummies, as a set, not been significantly related to the level of each party's support. Indeed, for Tory voting, 1886 was the last election at which the relationship was not significant. For the past two decades, however, the significance of the association between Liberal vote share and region has been markedly less than in earlier eras, to the point that in 1967 and 1971, the relationship was not significant at the .10 level.

Until the 1940's, although they were not so consistently related to party voting as the regional dummies, the origin variables contributed significantly to the explanation of party voting far more often than did the religion variables. This is somewhat surprising in light of the widespread view of the historic importance of religion in Ontario politics. Indeed, for Conservative voting, at only 2 of the 20 elections before World War Two were the religion variables, taken together, significant; the record relating to Liberal support is scarcely more impressive: 4 of 20 elections. These findings are hardly conclusive evidence that national origin was a more important determinant of voting, ceteris paribus, than religion, but they are nonetheless suggestive.

Since the 1940's, the pattern has been reversed, as the religion variables seem more important: since 1943 in only 5 of 18 instances have the religion variables, as a group, not been significantly

associated with Liberal and Conservative voting (it may be of some moment that religion has not been significantly related to Tory voting since 1959).²⁵ The importance of religion in explaining Liberal and Conservative vote share in this period is somewhat unexpected; a priori expectations would have been for religion to be important in the nineteenth century, but for it to become progressively less important in more recent times. Our findings are precisely the reverse. A good many heroic inferential leaps are required from our results to the conclusion that religion has been a more important factor in recent Ontario electoral patterns than it was in the previous century and up until the Depression. Still, the quite unexpected importance of religion since the Second World War is clear, as is its even more surprising apparent unimportance in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century.

Between 1867 and 1894 the occupational variables contributed significantly to the explanation of both Liberal and Conservative voting in only two of eight elections apiece. Before leaping to any conclusions, however, we must realize that this is a more impressive record than that of the religion variables. After 1948, occupation attained statistical significance for Grit and Tory vote share at several elections, although it is curious that in 1943 and 1945, the initial years of the CCF upswing, occupation was not significantly related to either party's level of support. In sharp contrast,

²⁵ In 1948 and 1951, the absence of origin variables might be expected to enhance the contribution of the religious variables.

occupation has been significantly related to CCF-NDP vote at every election, whereas only on one occasion has either religion or origin been so related.

Conclusion

The results of this chapter are at once the most substantively important and the most difficult to interpret. Some of this difficulty arises from the sheer mass of data, but more serious in this respect are the oftentimes weak and inconsistent relationships between social groups and party voting. Such findings would not present such grave interpretative problems were it not for our suspicion that the inconsistency and weakness reflected the limitations of our data set and the crudity of our analytical techniques at least as much as they reflect the nature of the actual relationships.

Although the interpretive difficulties are obvious, we should not go too far in emphasizing them. The noticeable shifts in the social correlates of Liberal voting following the demise of the UFO indicate that the data can indeed be sensitive to social and political changes. That some social changes are manifested in the data is no guarantee, however, that all changes will be so reflected.

To be sure, some relationships demonstrated consistency and a modicum of strength over extended periods of time. Foremost among these was the consistent negative relationship between concentration of Anglicans and level of Liberal vote.

Time and again the influence of region on party voting is

strongly evident. Still, the generally similar magnitudes of the coefficients of the regional dummies, together with the logical limitations surrounding interpretation of such variables, make it difficult to attach more precise meaning to them. It is clear, however, even aside from the frequently noticeable impact of turnout - which of course is evident in other variables as well - that regional factors have been fundamentally important for understanding electoral processes in this province. The analysis proffered in Chapter VI demonstrated substantial variation in regional voting patterns, but the multiple regression analysis showed that even with important elements of the social composition abstracted, regional influences on level of party support remained important.

The analysis set out in this chapter can shed only so much light on the interplay of social and political change. Changes and continuities in specific relationships are interesting and important, but in many ways the data set is too static and the analysis too crude to permit investigation of some of the key issues we should like to pursue. Still, several important points do stand out. (These concluding remarks incorporate insights gleaned from the unreported election-by-election equations.)

First, as was the case with the purely political data examined in Chapter VII, there is absolutely no evidence to support the critical realignment interpretation of Ontario politics. The data offer no indication of sharp, massive, enduring shifts in the parties' attractiveness

to social groups as required in the critical realignment schema.²⁶ It might be surmised from consideration of Tables VIII-6 and VIII-7 that 1943 marked something of a critical realignment, in that religion emerged at this election as a far more significant explanation of party voting than it had been previously. From what we know of politics in this era, and from examination of the coefficients of variables in both the pooled and the individual equations, however, this interpretation is patently untenable. The rise, in 1943, of a strong third party rooted primarily in class might be viewed as, in Burnham's term, a protorealignment phenomenon, yet one of the most intriguing aspects of the CCF episode is the extent to which it failed to disrupt prevailing electoral patterns. This was evident in Chapter VII, and is also suggested in the multiple regression analysis; only after 1948, for example, did occupation become an important determinant of Liberal and Conservative voting.

The secular realignment model is more difficult to evaluate. The electoral shifts on which it is premised are gradual and may well be too incremental to be detected by our techniques; on the other hand, certain gradual change processes do emerge. The most substantial of these is the shift from the almost total lack of consistent significant social correlates of party voting in the Mowat years into the comparatively more widespread and enduring relationships between social groups

²⁶ Although this was not explicitly brought out, it will be recalled that the data on urban and rural voting, presented in Chapter IV, offer no indication whatsoever of sharp, enduring electoral shifts.

and party support of the twentieth century. A similar process in reverse has been the recent lessening impact of all manner of social groups on Tory support, indicative of their wide-ranging attraction. Other instances include the strengthening of the negative relationship between urban population and Liberal vote share following the turn of the century; the consolidation of the association between CCF/NDP support and manufacturing and primary workers; and the heightened significance of the negative relationship between concentration of manufacturing workers and Liberal and Conservative vote shares. Thus, some evidence of secular realignment has come to light; what we lack, though, are more precise indicators of how extensive such realignment processes have been and precisely which groups they have encompassed.

One aspect of Ontario electoral history which emerges from the analysis with unmistakable clarity is the importance of class in post-war politics. Given the limitations of our data set, we may not claim to have demonstrated that occupation was electorally unimportant prior to World War Two. However, considering that the class basis of the CCF remained relatively weak in 1943 and 1945, and that occupational groupings only became significantly associated with Grit and Tory voting in 1948 and subsequent elections, it is reasonable to infer that class was not a particularly salient feature of the electoral divisions between Liberals and Conservatives until the advent of the CCF. That class has developed into a key element in Ontario electoral life does not mean that it has displaced origin, religion and region as bases of party conflict. As the data in this chapter show, Liberal and Conservative

support are closely tied in with these factors, while they are distinguished from the NDP in terms of social class. Professor Wilson's model for the translation of a pre-industrial two party system into the two party system of the modern industrial society²⁷ is only in part applicable in Ontario. The apparent anomaly of the persistent three party system derives in large measure from the fact that class-structured politics have become central but hardly dominant in present day Ontario; religious, ethnic and other non-class bases of political division remain strong.²⁸

²⁷See Chapter I.

²⁸For a detailed survey analysis of the social correlates of Ontario voting in the late 1960's. see Drummond, "Blueing", and also his "Party Choice in a Canadian Province," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Northwestern University, 1975.

CHAPTER IX CONCLUSION

Summarizing and interpreting the vast range of material in this thesis is at once a simple exercise and an impossibly complex undertaking. The complexity is as obvious as the myriad numbers in the three score tables reporting the statistical findings. In a sense, though, the task is quite straightforward, as the principal conclusion is that the general explanations put forward in Chapter I seem largely accurate. Further, no startling new interpretations emerged from the analysis of either Ontario political history or the paradox posed at the outset.

Although we have no cause to reject or to alter fundamentally the views set out in Chapter I, their status has changed from speculation to credible interpretation backed by a substantial weight of evidence. In the process, they have been significantly refined and clarified, and although we remain a formidable distance from a complete understanding of social change and political change in this province, we have travelled a long way indeed.

Needless to say, the statistical data and the secondary literature available proved inadequate for full assessment of the rather grandiose theoretical issues raised in the opening chapter. Nonetheless, we did arrive at a number of important conclusions, some narrow in scope, others large-scale; some expected, others quite unexpected; some positive, others negative. Moreover, it seems clear that, even aside from their intrinsic merit and interest, elections do indeed provide a very useful analytical focus in the study of social and political change.

Before entering the realm of higher-order conclusions, we shall recapitulate some of the more important observations and specific findings to emerge from the impressionistic and statistical analyses.

It is perhaps the measure of the lack of systematic study of Ontario politics that in several key instances, evidence was brought forward either refuting or casting serious doubt on the 'conventional wisdom' of provincial history. Prime among these dubious interpretations is the view of the nineteenth century as the electoral preserve of Oliver Mowat's Grits, and characterized by unshakeable party loyalties and a tremendous fervour for politics. The reality is a good deal different. In the first place, the Liberal victories were built upon the slimmest possible margins in the popular vote. As well, to judge by the relatively low turnout rates, large sections of the general public were able to keep their enthusiasm for politics well in check. Finally - and with rather less certainty - evidence was presented that party attachments were distinctly fluid for great numbers of electors.

Clearly, one of the central reasons for some of the more misleading interpretations is the bias of the first-past-the-post electoral system. This bias is of course readily admitted, but nonetheless legislative seats are far more readily perceived than vote shares. Thus when distribution of seats is considered, Western Ontario and rural Ontario were indeed Liberal bastions prior to 1900, but in terms of votes garnered by parties, the political reality is very much different. Similar bald statements about the Tories' overwhelming

predominance among urban workers in the decades before and after the Great War, though based on important, genuine tendencies, are subject to serious inaccuracy.

Although we cannot marshal hard statistical evidence on this point, it seems probable that this hyperbole concerning the 'farm vote' and the 'working class vote' extends as well to historians' and contemporaries' evaluations of religious and ethnic 'bloc' vote - the "solid Catholic vote" - and the like. Doubtless, various groups did not favour all parties in equal measure, and indeed Chapter VIII provides evidence of the electoral proclivities of some important groups; however, the electoral cohesion of particular religious and ethnic groups seems to have been much over-estimated.

Accepted interpretations have been called into question in other episodes and aspects of provincial electoral history. The commonly held view of the 1920's as a return to the pre-War Tory dominance overlooks the significant rightward shift on the Conservatives' part as well as sharp discontinuities in their electoral base. Another case in point is the curiously weak electoral relationship between the Patrons of Industry, the United Farmers of Ontario and Hepburn Liberalism, despite strong affinities in their prescriptions for Ontario's social and political ills. Finally, although in an aggregate sense, the election of 1943 was marked by fundamentally important shifts in party support, the underlying continuities in party attachments are striking.

To be sure, in a good many instances, the conventional wisdom proved a reliable guide to Ontario's political and electoral history.

If the electoral system does accentuate tendencies, still the popular views as to bases of party strength were generally found to be accurate. By way of illustration, we could cite "Tory Toronto" from the turn of the century onward, the relative Liberal success in the Western peninsula over long periods of time, and the Conservatives' similar record in Eastern Ontario.

Other noteworthy findings were largely unrelated to generally accepted accounts of Ontario politics. Under this rubric, for example, are the importance for recent Liberal electoral fortunes of the personal followings of individual members and the long-standing relationship between Liberal strength and 'rebel' tradition of 1837. This last-mentioned tendency is only one of many relationships between the electoral sphere and the social order exhibiting extreme longevity. The consistently higher turnout rates in the rural areas as compared with urban turnout is another illustration, and the regression analysis in Chapter VIII revealed a number of enduring links between social groups and particular parties, of which the negative Liberal-Anglican association is the most prominent.

If important continuities and stable relationships emerged from the analysis, so too did substantial electoral changes. Many of these changes were associated with one form or other of third party activity. The very existence of a third party was shown to seriously disrupt established electoral patterns, and in particular the CCF/NDP seems to have fostered a deep and lasting gulf between parties unlike anything in the province's earlier electoral record. A further

important change has been the growth and consolidation of the CCF/NDP's base of support. By no means, however, have third parties acted as handmaidens of all significant electoral change. The watershed shift in the first decade of this century from Liberal hegemony to Conservative dominance was accomplished without benefit of third parties.

As a general conclusion, far-reaching social changes in Ontario have indeed effected large-scale political change, which in turn have been manifested in substantial electoral change. The process by which this transformation occurs, however, is somewhat indirect and gradual. The Tory vanquish of the Grits in 1905 was rooted in prominent, long-term social changes, prime among them industrialization and urbanization. The Liberal demise was the culmination of electoral developments evident at least as far back as 1898 and clearly took place in stages: the regions which had undergone the most extensive social changes were the first to be won over by the Tories. The 1943 CCF upsurge, like the election of 1905, marked an electoral culmination of long fomenting social and political changes.

Although the data set was not of sufficient richness to permit final judgements, little evidence was adduced for the complete critical realignment interpretation, though in a general sense, it seems to have some validity. The secular realignment model found some support, but could not adequately deal with the very substantial short-term voting shifts in 1905 and 1943. The Ontario experience thus contains elements of both critical and secular realignment.

One of the reasons why even major social changes took some time

to work their way through to the electoral arena, and why some less major social changes came only slightly to be electorally reflected lies in the crucial transmission role of political parties. Although the parties are anything but insulated from the social environment, they do act in considerable measure as independent politicizers or de-politicizers of particular social issues or concerns. A prime illustration is the crucial role of the parties in promoting or dampening religion as one of the central bases of political life. Similarly, the CCF-NDP owes its existence to the social processes of class division and yet in turn, the CCF-NDP itself has powerfully contributed to politicizing and institutionalizing economic class issues. Moreover, the political ways in which parties respond to social change are greatly conditioned by such independent factors as organizational structure and leadership style. (The quality of leadership emerged as a centrally important variable, yet if it could powerfully effect specific events and certain political responses to social change, ultimately even the most adroit (or most inept) leadership could only marginally alter the principal political thrust of major social change.)

Further to this, the analysis demonstrates that social changes may be weakly reflected in the electoral arena not for a want of political impact, but precisely because of their influence on the parties. The Conservative party since World War Two offers the most striking example of transformations within a party in response to social change; the changes in the Conservatives' outlook, style and programme resulted in only relatively minor electoral changes, but must rank as an

important political change. Other instances of social changes which took political form in the internal structure and policy direction of the parties did have electoral overtones, but the basic point remains: parties are central foci of the translation of social change into political change, and the political changes wrought within parties may reduce the pressure for electoral change. Changes restricted to parties are obviously important, but electoral changes are more readily perceived.

This discussion of the role of parties as filters and catalysts in the social change - political change - electoral change equation serves to direct our attention to some of the more general questions and interpretations posed in Chapter I. Although we did not find our emphasis on elections misplaced, it became clear that social change was not spontaneously transmuted into political change, but required institutional channels such as political parties, farm organizations and trade unions. Accordingly, such institutions have a good deal of leeway in deflecting, postponing - or focusing - social change as it impinged on the political world. From this point of view, the paradox, though by no means resolved, is less puzzling. In addition, of course, it became evident that important as elections and other forms of mass political activity have been, they hardly exhaust the range of political changes brought on by social change. This, too, serves to explain the paradox.

One absolutely fundamental consideration which likewise contributes to understanding the paradox is that, as suggested in Chapter

I, social change in Ontario has indeed been less sweeping than initial impressions or bare statistics would indicate. Forces of change have had to make their way through a dense overlay of existing attitudes and structures; the strength of social fixity is constantly apparent. Throughout the early and later stages of industrialization, class feelings have been closely intertwined with religious and ethnic factors, usually undermining but occasionally fostering class solidarity and the ensuing class political activity. Similarly, the social impact of urbanization, far-reaching as it has clearly been, has been diluted by the complex network of social relations and pressures which, together with the circumstances flowing from the urban experience, mold people's attitudes (and in turn their politics).

Thus, John Wilson's model of political change in Western industrial societies has a certain relevance for Ontario. Class has certainly become a central feature in the province's political life, but the residue of religion, of ethnicity and of a host of other factors has dampened both the social and the political salience of economic class. The bureaucratic, middle-class elements in Canadian society have hindered polarization along class lines; the three party system lives on in Ontario and the persistence of this 'transitional phase' bears witness to the complex interplay of social forces and political preferences.

Neither Ontario society nor its relation to the political arena can be explained in terms of such simple and apparently pre-eminent bases as industrialization or urbanization, for many other social forces are at work.

Throughout this work we have stressed that the influence of communities - regional, ethnic, religious and the like - is prominent among these other social forces. Unfortunately, our statistical analysis of these communities was severely circumscribed by the limitations of the data set. The closest approximation of community which we could adequately examine was the region. The principal finding with respect to region was that, despite strong common tendencies across regions, important, persistent regional variations emerged; in large measure, these variations were due to differences in social makeup (and thus the differential impact of social change), but even when attempts were made to abstract social composition, significant regional variation remained. Results of other analyses counsel caution in reifying the social and political cohesion of identifiable social groups, yet the importance of communities for understanding Ontario politics and society remains. By extension, the diversity of Ontario society has served to mute the transformation of social change into political change not only because of the intrinsic importance of communities, but also because of the different socio-political conditions and experiences of the various regions, which fashion their responses to change.

Linked to the social cross-pressures which impede the forces of social change, the sheer weight and persistence of social and political conservatism in Ontario have powerfully restrained potential social and political changes. This conservatism has not been so hidebound or reactionary as to prevent change, but its emphasis on orderly progress and traditional values has served to diffuse, at least, in part potential

changes in the social and political realm.

It is clear, by way of final summary, that no significant social change has failed to effect lasting, substantial political and electoral changes. Conversely, no important, enduring political or electoral changes have come about except in response to social change. This transformation of social change into political and electoral change has been uneven - and at less pronounced levels of change, uncertain - for a host of reasons: some of the changes in Ontario society have been more apparent than real, while others have lacked political salience; not all political changes have been electorally manifested; the parties and their leaders perform a crucial transmission role, yet they also exert an important independent influence; the province's diversity and its constituent communities have also had a telling effect, as has its social and political conservatism.

The political change - social change nexus in Ontario is now perhaps revealed as less paradoxical than complex. This overall conclusion, however, seems rather less important than the fuller understanding of Ontario's society and politics gleaned in the process of reaching it.

Appendix A - Franchise

With the obvious exception of the female population, the story of the franchise in Ontario is a singularly unspectacular one of fairly rapid extension toward near-universal manhood suffrage. Indeed, given the importance attached by students of comparative political development to the "crisis of participation",¹ it is extremely significant that "at no time was the extension of the franchise as such a major political issue in any part of Canada".² It was only a minor sidelight in the 1837 Rebellion, and if 'rep by pop' came to be the rallying cry of George Brown's Canada West Grits, this did not betray an egalitarian ethos so much as an expedient vehicle for delivering the province from the stifling grasp of the French-Canadians.

The Franchise in Upper Canada and Canada West was granted to adult male British subjects meeting fairly modest property or income requirements.³ Nevertheless, it has been estimated that, in 1851, 90 per cent of the lowest two-fifths of the work force in Hamilton failed

¹See, for example, Myron Weiner, "Political Participation: Crisis of the Political Process", in Leonard Binder, ed., Crisis and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 159-204.

²W.L. Morton, "The Extension of the Franchise in Canada: A Study in Democratic Nationalism", Canadian Historical Association Report, 1943, 73.

³For specifics, see John Garner, The Franchise and Politics in British North America 1755-1867 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), especially 82-3, 107.

to meet the economic qualifications for the franchise.⁴ Following an 1853 act which enfranchised a substantial proportion of tenants, approximately 13.9 per cent of Canada West's population was entitled to vote;⁵ this is a deceptively low figure, for it represented some 59.1 per cent of adult males.⁶

A confused legal situation at the time of the 1867 elections resulted in two sets of property requirements: in some areas, owners or occupiers of real property, valued at \$300 or \$30 per annum, in cities and towns, and \$200 or \$20 elsewhere; in other ridings, the qualifications were \$600 in cities, \$400 in towns, \$300 in incorporated villages, and \$200 in rural townships.⁷ The following two decades witnessed a good deal of change, including the introduction of the secret, numbered ballot in 1874; F.F. Schindeler has admirably summarized the highlights of franchise reform:

The first provincial statute governing the subject was the Election Act of 1868, which gave the vote to males who were at least twenty-one years of age and subjects of the Queen and who owned, rented, or occupied real property of the value of \$400 in cities, \$300 in towns, or \$200 in incorporated villages or townships. The latter qualification

⁴Michael B. Katz, "Social Structure in Hamilton, Ontario", in Stephen Thernstrom and Richard Bennett, eds., Nineteenth Century Cities: Essays in the New Urban History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 212.

⁵Garner, Franchise and Politics, 115.

⁶Calculated on the basis of age data by sex, Census of Canada, 1860-61, I, 520-3.

⁷For a full discussion, see D.G.G. Kerr, "The 1867 Elections in Ontario: The Rules of the Game", Canadian Historical Review, LI (December, 1970), 374-7; even Professor Kerr is unable to say how widely each franchise was employed (375).

was supplemented in 1874 with the provision that adult male British subjects with an income of at least \$400 per year from some trade, calling, office, or profession could also vote. By the same statute, "unenfranchised Indians" were allowed to vote, provided that they met the other qualifications set forth in the Act. Three years later, significant changes in the franchise were introduced: the vote was extended to farmers' sons and to unenfranchised Indians not living among Indians, subject to the same qualifications as other voters, and the income requirement was lowered from \$400 to \$250 per year.

A few minor changes were made during the following decades, but the next real landmark was the Manhood Suffrage Act passed in 1888. By this Act, the franchise was extended to all adult male British subjects, except unenfranchised Indians living on reservations.⁸

Also noteworthy in this period, symbolically if not substantively, was the abolition in 1885 of plural voting by non-resident property owners, thus establishing the 'one man - one vote' principle.⁹

After 1888, the only important unenfranchised groups in Ontario were Indians and women. Until 1908, unenfranchised Indians living off reservations were subject to property qualifications, and in 1954, all Indians were enfranchised.¹⁰ Women meeting the property qualifications had been granted the right to vote for school trustees as early as 1850; unmarried women with property were given the municipal franchise in 1884,¹¹ and 45,000 were added to the 521,000 males participating in the 1894 provincial referendum on prohibition.¹² It was not

⁸F.F. Schindeler, Responsible Government in Ontario (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 93; on the definition of "unenfranchised Indians", see ibid n. 52.

⁹A. Margaret Evans, "Oliver Mowat and Ontario 1872-1896: A Study in Political Success", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1967, 271.

¹⁰Schindeler, Responsible Government, 93-4.

¹¹Catherine Lyle Cleverdon, The Women Suffrage Movement in Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950), 22.

¹²Data from Ontario Sessional Papers XXVI, 1894, number 70.

until 1917, however, that women were, with one fell swoop, placed on an equal electoral footing with men.¹³ In typical Ontario fashion, the struggle for female suffrage was accomplished with little bitterness or rancour, and certainly did not come about through heavy pressure on the government.¹⁴ Greater conflict might have been expected inasmuch as the reversion in 1898 to the provincial franchise as the basis of the federal franchise had effectively channelled the woman suffrage struggle into the provincial arenas.¹⁵ The final franchise extension in Ontario, to persons between the ages of 18 and 21, was made by the Davis government shortly before the 1971 election.¹⁶

From a less legalistic point of view, Tables A-1 and A-2 offer some insight into the broadening of the franchise in Ontario. Table A-1 indicates the proportion of the province's population entitled to vote at each election. Although the percentages have been adjusted to take into account ridings won by acclamation (for which numbers of

¹³The footing was not precisely equal: "the women of the province did not achieve absolute voting equality with men until about 1935, mainly because of peculiarities in the law governing citizenship, which in some cases even made it necessary for women to obtain a judge's certificate to prove that they were citizens." Schindeler, Responsible Government, 94.

¹⁴Cleverdon, Women Suffrage, 19-45; also Brian D. Tennyson, "Premier Hearst, the War, and Votes for Women", Ontario History (September, 1965), 115-123.

¹⁵Norman Ward, The Canadian House of Commons: Representation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950), 232. The provincial franchise had been the federal franchise from 1867 to 1885.

¹⁶Statutes of Ontario 1971, c.98, Sched., par. 12; for an enumeration of those entitled to vote, see Revised Statutes of Ontario 1970, c.42, s. 9-11.

PROPORTION OF ONTARIO POPULATION ENFRANCHISED 1867 - 1971

Election	Proportion *	Acclamation/Total Ridings
1867	15.2	6/82
1871	15.0	15/82
1875	18.2	9/88
1879	21.3	2/88
1883	21.1	5/88
1886	24.4	5/90
1890	25.4	4/91
1894	25.3	-
1898	25.8	2/94
1902	27.5	1/98
1905	26.8	-
1908	27.2	6/106
1911	31.0	17/106
1914	28.5	4/111
1919	58.0	3/111
1923	57.9	2/111
1926	58.8	3/112
1929	57.9	8/112
1934	60.1	-
1937	51.2	-
1943	57.9	-
1945	61.7	-
1948	61.3	-
1951	59.8	-
1955	55.1	-
1959	53.5	-
1963	52.8	-
1967	51.4	-
1971	58.4	-

* - Adjusted to take acclamations into account

Sources of Population data :

Population Statistics, Ontario 1969 (Toronto, Queen's Printer,
Department of Treasury and Economics, 1969,
table 1)

Census of Canada:	1871	I , 86-145	1911	II,	42- 85
	1881	I , 160-196	1921	I,	588-601
	1891	I , 252-288	1931	I,	604-639
	1901	IV , 422-434	1971	Cat.,	92-775 (SP-5)

PROPORTION OF VOTING-AGE POPULATION ENFRANCHISED 1871 - 1971

Census Year	Election	Percentage of voting-age public enfranchised*
1871	1871	68.9
1881	1883	81.0
1891	1890	95.2
1901	1902	97.8
1911	1911	102.6
1921	1923	96.6
1931	1934	98.4
1941	1943	89.4
1951	1951	92.4
1961	1963	88.8
1971	1971	89.1

* - Prior to 1921 excludes females

In years other than census years, the voting-age public was estimated by pro-rating the census figure by the percentage change of the province's population from the census year to the election year as calculated from Population Statistics, Ontario 1969 (Toronto, Queen's Printer, Department of Treasury and Economics, 1969, Table 1).

For elections in which acclamations occurred, the voting-age public was adjusted to exclude the population in acclamation ridings; this was done by calculating the ratio of persons 21 and over to persons and applying this to the population in uncontested ridings.

In 1891, 1901, and 1911, the number of 20-year-olds was not given, so that voting-age public was calculated as all persons 19 and under, plus twenty per cent of persons 20-24 years of age.

Sources of age data : Census of Canada

1871	II, 59- 60	} also 1971, cat. 92-715, 7-5 and 7-6.
1881	II, 119	
1891, 1901, 1911	III, 4 (1941)	
1921	II, 48	
1931	III, 80	
1941	III, 32	
1951	II, A-5	
1961	92-543, 26-2	
1971	92-716, 14-4	

eligible voters are not usually available), this adjustment may have biased the results slightly for elections in which large numbers of acclamations occurred. The data presented in Table A-2 are rather more significant than those in Table A-1, though, because of the estimation procedures involved, they are also slightly more tenuous. This table indicates the percentage of persons of voting age (males only until 1923) who were eligible voters in the elections nearest the decennial census. As the embarrassing figure of 102.6 per cent for 1911 suggests, the data are not precise; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that any of the figures are off by more than a few percentage points.¹⁷

At any rate, the major implications are clear enough. Starting from a base of about two thirds of the adult male population, the franchise was extended through the 1870's to a point where four-fifths of adult males had the vote, and with the 1888 Manhood Suffrage Act, virtually all Ontario men had the vote. The decline in the percentage of voting age public enfranchised after the Second World War likely reflects the influx of non-British immigrants who may not vote until they become naturalized citizens; since most immigrants before this were

¹⁷ There are several identifiable sources of potential error for the 1911 figure which suggest that it is probably the least accurate: 1) the bias introduced by the 17 acclamations, most of which were in rural areas, which may have had different age structures from the cities and towns; in this regard, note the abnormality in Table A-1 of the 1911 figure; 2) the estimation of number of 20 year olds; in addition, the number of persons for whom age was not ascertained reached a peak in the 1911 census; 3) the 1911 election was held in December, while the census was taken in April (the province's total population grew by approximately 1.78 per cent from 1911 to 1912).

British subjects, they were entitled to vote after fulfilling a short residency requirement.¹⁸ The low figure for 1943 is the result of the failure of the Liberal government's system of proxy voting for soldiers overseas;¹⁹ with typical Tory administrative competence, a much more effective system was instituted for the 1945 election.

¹⁸ Unlike at the federal level, British subjects are still placed on an equal footing with Canadian citizens; both must fulfill a one year residence requirement before becoming entitled to vote, and of course must not be among those classes prohibited from voting, namely prisoners, mental patients, returning officers, and election clerks, and judges. Revised Statutes of Ontario c. 142; Statutes of Ontario 1971 c 100 and c 98, Sched., par.12; Statutes of Ontario 1974 c 140.

¹⁹ Gerald L. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism: The CCF in Ontario (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1973), 105.

Appendix B - Sources of Data

The problems inherent in aggregate data analysis, for example, the 'ecological fallacy' or the masking of important variation in the aggregation process, are well-known to anyone who has worked with ecological data. Aggregate election results do possess some advantages over survey data, primarily in the avoidance of sampling problems, and the oftentimes wide gap between reported attitudes and actual behaviour. However, their outstanding strong point is simply that they exist and represent the only data available for systematic long-term analysis of voting behaviour. Since the official election statistics for Ontario are remarkably complete, and present relatively few problems in compilation, the analysis of those data is surely a good deal better than guesswork and intuition. The first question to be dealt with, then, concerns the appropriate unit of analysis.

Ideally, the unit of analysis should be as small and as homogeneous as possible, so as to minimize the effects of the ecological fallacy, and to avoid masking important variations. In practical terms, however, the options are usually severely limited, so that available data are usually aggregated to much larger and more diverse units than one would prefer. Similarly, the opportunity rarely presents itself to put into practice Shively's admonition that individuals be grouped so that their score on the dependent variable is independent of the basis on which they were grouped.¹ More realistic is Eric Allardt's

¹Phillips Shively, "The Use of Aggregate Data to Study Individuals", American Political Science Review LXIII (December, 1969), 1186.

warning that if we attempt causal interpretations on the basis of ecological data, "it seems important to use data units which really correspond to areas that people are aware of and with which they identify themselves and others".²

At first blush, the township would seem the best unit of analysis for Ontario. Townships are the fundamental building blocks of the Ontario administrative structure; they generally have populations substantially less than 10,000, and are usually of high salience to their inhabitants; save those absorbed into cities, their boundaries have remained constant since before Confederation;³ they are the basic unit for most census reports, and for non-urban election returns. Against these powerful advantages are ranged disadvantages even more telling: some important census data are not available by township; most of Northern Ontario, although formally subdivided into townships, is grouped, in both census and election returns, under 'unorganized' in each county or electoral district; with a few exceptions, after 1871 the election results are not aggregated to township level, so that an astronomical number of calculations on individual poll returns would be required to organize the data; most significant of all, though, is the lack of any

²"Implications of Within-Nation Variations and Regional Imbalances for Cross-National Research", in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 340.

³Virtually all of Southern Ontario had been surveyed into townships by 1849, with many predating the War of 1812; see C.F.J. Whebell, "The Political-Territorial Structure" in G.L. Gentilecore, ed., Ontario (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), esp. 116. The move to regional government has fundamentally altered the boundaries and the function of the township.

corresponding unit for the urban areas: since the individual polls vary from one election to the next (and precise definition of poll locations prior to the 1960's is unavailable), the smallest possible continuous unit of analysis for the cities is the constituency. For these reasons, the constituency appears to be the best choice for a uniform, continuous unit of analysis. Individual ridings conceal myriad regional differences, and have ranged in size from a population of less than 4000 (Niagara 1867-74) to considerably in excess of two hundred thousand (suburban Toronto ridings in the 1950's and early 1960's); still, these are extremes, and if constituencies are not always units or communities in the sociological sense, many times they do possess such qualities. In sum, the riding would seem an acceptable, if well short of ideal, unit for the analysis we wish to make.

Political Data

The number of votes cast for each candidate has been taken from Frederick Lewis, compiler, Centennial Edition of a History of the Electoral Districts, Legislatures, and Ministries of the Province of Ontario 1867-1968,⁴ and, for the 1971, 1975 and 1977 elections, from the official returns;⁵ the votes cast for armed forces personnel in 1945 are taken from this source as well. Although the figures from the Lewis volume were not checked extensively against the official records, originally published as Sessional Papers of the Legislative Assembly, the checks which were

⁴Toronto, Queen's Printer, 1968.

⁵Ontario, Ontario Elections: Return from the Records (Toronto, Queen's Printer, 1972, 1976, 1977).

made revealed no discrepancies, other than a few obvious typographical errors.⁶

The Centennial History attaches party affiliations to the candidates, based primarily on the reports of the constituency returning officers. For elections up to and including that of 1886, Lewis' designation of the candidate's affiliations were checked against the elected members' own statements in the Parliamentary Companion, the results appearing in the Toronto Globe, and in scattered references in secondary sources.⁷ Only a handful of inconsistencies were encountered, which were resolved in favour of the Companion and the Globe. The 1867 election, conducted before the final solidification of party lines, presented

⁶One difference between the Centennial History and the official returns is that, particularly in the early years, the former omits candidates who attracted only a handful of votes (several, in fact, failed to receive a single vote).

⁷Canadian Parliamentary Companion, 1872, ed. Henry J. Morgan (Montreal: John Lovell, 1872); Canadian Parliamentary Companion and Annual Register 1878, ed. C.H. Mackintosh (Ottawa: Citizen Printing and Publishing, 1878), 210-45; Canadian Parliamentary Companion and Annual Register 1880, ed. C.H. Mackintosh (Ottawa: Citizen Printing and Publishing, 1880), 262-97; Canadian Parliamentary Companion 1885, ed. J.A. Gemmill (Ottawa: J. Durie and Sons, 1885), 190-223; Canadian Parliamentary Companion 1887, ed. J.A. Gemmill (Ottawa: J. Durie and Sons, 1887), 192-227; Toronto Globe, March 21-2, 1871, January 19, 1875, June 6, 1879, February 28, 1883, December 29, 1886; The Dominion Annual Review and Register, 1879, ed. H.J. Morgan (Ottawa: Maclean, Roger and Company, 1880), 159-63; The Dominion Annual Review and Register 1882, ed. H.J. Morgan (Toronto: Hunter, Rose and Company, 1883), 423-7; The Dominion Annual Review and Register, 1886, ed. H.J. Morgan (Montreal: Éusebe Sénécal et Fils, 1887), 308-72; W.S. Wallace, "Political History 1867-1912" in Canada and Its Provinces, ed. Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty (Toronto: Glasgow and Brook, 1914), XVII, 103-85; C.R.W. Siggart, Sir Oliver Mowat: A Biographical Sketch (Toronto: Warwick Brothers and Rutter, 1905); A Cyclopaedia of Canadian Biography, ed. George Maclean Rose (Toronto: Rose Publishing, 1886).

a few problems, particularly since the Parliamentary Companion for 1868 did not include biographical data on members of the Ontario Parliament. Thus, the main source used to check the data presented in the Centennial History was the Toronto Globe for August and September 1867 (the elections were held over a period of several weeks). George Brown and his staff certainly had little trouble in identifying candidates as opposition 'Reformers' or as 'Coalitionist' supporters of the Sandfield Macdonald government and, in the half dozen instances of disagreement, the Globe's designation was accepted over that in the Lewis volume.⁸

The election of 1894 was an unusually confused affair; not only were accusations and denials of alliances between the old parties and the new Patrons of Industry and Protestant Protective Association flying thick and fast, but a large number of candidates claimed or were attributed affiliation to more than one party. Candidates with dual affiliations were assigned a primary affiliation in accordance with the consensus of a number of sources, and designated as having a secondary loyalty.⁹

⁸M.H. Small checked the party affiliation of successful candidates in the pro-coalitionist Toronto Leader, finding few discrepancies from the Globe's categorization; M.H. Small, "A Study of the Dominion and Provincial Election of 1867 in Ontario", unpublished M.A. thesis, Queen's University, 1968.

⁹The following sources were used: Farmers' Sun, April 17, May 8, June 27, 1894; Canadian Parliamentary Companion 1897, ed. J.A. Gemmill (Ottawa: J. Durie and Sons, 1897), 233-63; L.A. Wood, A History of Farmers' Movements in Canada (Toronto: Ryerson, 1924), 139-40; S.E.D. Shortt, "Social Change and Political Crisis in Rural Ontario: The Patrons of Industry 1889-1896" in Donald Swainson, ed., Oliver Mowat's Ontario (Toronto: Macmillan, 1972), 221-6; James T. Watt, "Anti-Catholicism in Ontario Politics: The Role of the Protestant Protective Association in the 1894 Election", Ontario History LIX (March, 1967), 62-6.

The only other contest to present difficulties was that of 1919, in which affiliations of some candidates were uncertain. Several corrections in the assignments in the Centennial History were made according to the Parliamentary Guide, the Canadian Annual Review, and the Globe.¹⁰

Dual ridings have not been prominent in Ontario electoral history. The city of Ottawa returned two members from 1894 until 1908; from 1885 until 1894 Toronto returned three members (with the ingenious provision that each elector had only two votes, thereby ensuring that the Liberals, who otherwise would have been shut out, secured one Toronto member); from 1908 until 1925, the four city of Toronto districts returned a member from the 'A' seat and a member from 'B' seat, in separately conducted elections. In all of these cases the votes received by each party were divided by two; in a few cases, this results in something of a distortion for parties which ran only a single candidate; however, no superior method suggested itself.

The number of eligible voters was taken directly from the official election returns in the Sessional Papers.¹¹ Although the returns

¹⁰ Parliamentary Guide 1922, ed. E. J. Chambers (Ottawa: Mortimer Co., 1922), 305-39; Canadian Annual Review, ed. J. Castell Hopkins (Toronto: Annual Review Publishing, 1920), 661-5; Toronto Globe, October 14, 21, 1919.

¹¹ Specifically, Ontario Sessional Papers 1868-9, number 10; 1872, number 39; 1876, number 59; 1880, number 19; 1884, number 1; 1887, number 13; 1891, number 1; 1895, number 1; 1899, number 1; 1903, number 46; 1906, number 46; 1909, number 46; 1912, number 49; 1915, number 50; 1920, number 51; 1924, number 47; 1927, number 25; 1929, number 3; 1935, number 25; 1938, number 25; 1943, number 40; 1945, number 40; since 1945, election returns, though still officially designated as sessional papers, have been issued in the form of Return from the Records made by the Chief Electoral Officer.

are quite complete, a few figures were found to be incorrectly tallied, particularly on the summary sheets, so that any figures which looked improbable in light of the number of votes cast, or earlier and later numbers of eligible electors, were totalled anew from the individual poll returns. In some cases, the number of eligible voters had not been added although all the poll results were given; such cases were simply added. In other cases, estimates were required for a few polls (out of perhaps one hundred in a riding) which did not report eligible voters. In another nineteen instances, such estimation procedures were not possible, due to a large number of incomplete polls; for these ridings, the number of eligible voters was estimated by taking the mean of the figures for the previous and subsequent elections. Since the electorates were small and relatively stable in total, this is unlikely to have introduced any serious errors. In five cases of newly-settled, rapidly-growing areas, these procedures were not possible, and the number of eligible voters was coded as missing data.¹²

Data from the prohibition plebiscites were taken from the Sessional Papers and the Ontario Gazette.¹³

¹² These were Algona 1883, Algona East 1890, Algona West 1890, Muskoka 1886 and 1890.

¹³ Ontario Sessional Papers 1894, number 70; 1903, number 48; 1925, number 50; Ontario Gazette, December 6, 1919, 2932-3.

In 1902, the question posed was, "Are you in favour of bringing into force Part II of 'The Liquor Act', 1902?" (Statutes of Ontario 1902, c.33; Part II authorized prohibition if plebiscitary approval was obtained, as set out in Part 17).

The 1919 questions were: 1) "Are you in favour of the repeal of the Ontario Temperance Act?" (i.e. no prohibition); 4) "Are you in favour of the sale of spirituous and malt liquors through Government

It is impossible to determine how accurate these figures may be. It is improbable that more than an infinitesimal proportion of the figures are incorrect by virtue of clerical or printing errors.¹⁴ A far more serious problem involves the question of systematic corruption at election time, chiefly in the preparation of voters lists and sundry forms of ballot-stuffing. In the nineteenth century, standards of morality in the electoral arena were less stringent than today, so that irregularities resulting in controverted elections were fairly regular occurrences.¹⁵ The abuses of open balloting and secretive compilation of voters lists¹⁶ led to the introduction by the Mowat administration of more open procedures for assembling lists of electors, together with the secret, numbered ballot.¹⁷ Although the numbered

agencies and amendments to the Ontario Temperance Act to permit such sale?" Questions 2 and 3, not analysed here, asked about the sale of light beer in government outlets and in hotels. All four questions had to be answered or the ballot was voided.

The 1924 questions were 1) "Are you in favour of the continuance of the Ontario Temperance Act?"; 2) "Are you in favour of the sale as a beverage of beer and spiritous liquor in sealed packages under Government control?" Affirmative answers for these questions were taken as for and against prohibition respectively.

¹⁴After considerable checking, the only figure clearly in this category is the number of eligible voters for Algoma in 1879. According to the official returns, which are free from errors in extension, no less than 2007 of 2078 registered electors cast ballots in this enormous riding. The number of eligible voters was disregarded and coded as missing data.

¹⁵For a discussion of these problems at the federal level, see Norman Ward, The Canadian House of Commons: Representation, second edition, ch. XIV.

¹⁶See D.G.G. Kerr, "The Ontario Elections of 1867: Rules of the Game", Canadian Historical Review LI (December, 1970), 369-85.

¹⁷Statutes of Ontario, 1874, c. 5.

ballot left the possibility of identifying an individual's choice, this was judged a lesser evil than ballot-box stuffing which was rendered far more difficult. These measures reduced, but in all likelihood failed to eliminate fraudulent electoral practices. Electoral corruption apparently reached its zenith in the waning years of the Liberal regime at the turn of the century; in 1902, the Queen's Quarterly sadly observed that "Ontario, the intellectual and moral centre of Canada, has even acquired an undesirable notoriety for electioneering fraud".¹⁸ Whether electoral corruption was more pronounced under Ross than under Mowat or Whitney is a moot point, given our lack of systematic information. Accordingly, the possibility of systematic, widespread inaccuracies in the data as a result of illegal manipulation must be noted, for it cannot be resolved.

Redistributions

Redistributions, ever the bane of aggregate analysts, proved a serious, but not insurmountable, problem. A fundamental trade-off exists between the precise comparability of longitudinally-analysed ridings, and the number of continuous ridings available for such analysis. A compromise figure of twenty-five per cent was decided upon in order to minimize the number of ridings which would have to be excluded from the analysis because of boundary changes, while maintaining a reasonable level of temporal comparability among the ridings remaining

¹⁸ James Cappon, "The 'Machine' in Canadian Politics", Queen's Quarterly X (April, 1903), 500.

for analysis. In other words, a riding in which less than a quarter of the post-redistribution population had not been transferred from other ridings and no more than a quarter of the pre-redistribution population had been transferred to other ridings was considered to be the 'same' riding; a riding not meeting these criteria was considered as two distinct units, one terminating at the redistribution and one commencing with it. For the most part, these calculations were not difficult, since the organization of the census usually paralleled the official definition of the constituency closely; problems might have been encountered in the larger cities, had not it been obvious in almost all instances that the changes were either very minor else sweeping;¹⁹ the large tracts of unorganized or sparsely settled areas in Northern Ontario created a few difficulties, but nothing insurmountable.

Table B-1 shows the number of ridings considered to have changed or to have remained the same at each redistribution since Confederation.²⁰ As will be seen, the only sweeping redistrictings occurred in 1925, 1933, and 1966; the others made mostly minor changes, or else were confined to a certain locale (1894, Toronto and Hamilton;

¹⁹ The amalgamation of contiguous suburbs into the main city (for instance, Toronto Junction and North Toronto with Toronto, and Walkerville and Riverside in Windsor) caused some problems in actually determining constituency boundaries, as did shifting ward boundaries in Toronto and Ottawa; I wish to thank Michael Doucet and Glenn Wright for unearthing old ward maps of these cities for me.

²⁰ Statutes of Ontario 1874 c.2; 1885 c.2; 1894 c.2; 1902 c.4; 1908 c.2; 1914 c.4; 1926 c.2; 1933 c.56; 1954 c.84; 1963 c.125; 1966 c.137; the ridings were originally defined in the British North America Act, 1867, First Schedule.

TABLE B-1
EFFECTS OF REDISTRIBUTIONS ON CONTINUITY OF RIDINGS

Redistribution	Ridings Before	Ridings Terminated	Ridings Unchanged	Ridings Created	Ridings After
1874	82	8	74	14	88
1885	88	14	75	14	88 (2)*
1894	89** (2)	2	87	6	93 (1)
1902	93 (1)	3	90	7	97 (1)
1908	97 (1)	7	90	12	102 (4)
1914	102 (4)	12	90	17	107 (4)
1925	107 (4)	34	73	39	112
1933	112	52	60	30	90
1954	90	8	82	16	98
1963	98	6	92	16	108
1966	108	42	66	51	117

* - numbers in brackets indicate additional members returned from dual and triple seats, which are only counted once

** - riding of Nipissing created in 1889

1902, Northern Ontario; 1963, Toronto suburbs). In all, some 289 riding-units were defined according to the above criteria; sixteen of these existed in virtually the same form for two separate spans of time.

In order to alleviate the problem of biasing the results when a large number of the ridings had to be dropped from a facet of the analysis, such as correlating 1934 voting with 1929 voting, a series of artificial ridings was constructed. These artificial ridings are simply additions of the votes from two or more ridings into one or more ridings to which they correspond. This procedure was made possible by the unwillingness of those redrawing the electoral map to transcend county boundaries.²¹ By way of illustration, prior to 1966, Hastings County was divided into two ridings which were drastically altered into two new ridings, so that the total of the two new ridings exactly equalled the total of the two old ones; in 1966, Peel County, previously one riding, was split into two. In each of these cases, one artificial riding was constructed, providing a means of including Peel and Hastings counties in correlations across the 1966 redistribution. Most ridings so constructed, 82 in all, were precise splits or consolidations, though a few were not so neat, a few were quite large - four ridings consolidated into three - and, in a few cases involving Toronto ridings, it was not possible to construct artificial ridings, for they would have

²¹ For the rural areas of the south, it would have been possible to re-construct precisely ridings which were altered at redistributions using sub-township poll data. This was not done for two reasons: 1) it would have been enormously time-consuming; 2) no such counterpart was possible for the urban areas, due to a lack of knowledge about poll locations.

had to include virtually the entire city. Nevertheless, they do provide a reasonable method of including the entire province in analyses across redistributions, with fairly minimal conceptual damage to the unit of analysis.²² Whenever these artificial ridings are employed, this fact is noted in the analysis.

Finally, a highly impressionistic, but also quite intriguing indicator of an area's political disposition at the time of the 1837 uprising was incorporated into the data set. In his Movements of Political Protest in Canada 1640-1840, S.D. Clark quotes at length from a confidential memorandum prepared either by or for Governor Arthur about May, 1839. This document offered judgements as to the loyalty or disaffection among the populace of the various districts and counties of the colonies.²³ Following this appraisal, constituencies which were inhabited at the time were categorized as either loyal or disloyal. This approach to the legacy of political radicalism in Ontario was suggested by Paul Opferkurch who uncovered "a surprisingly close relationship... between the 'disloyal' and doubtful counties of 1839 and those which switched drastically to Diefenbaker in the 'electoral rebellion'

²²Until the 1966 redistribution, virtually all changes outside the urban centres were made within the confines of county boundaries. For example, most of the changes in 1933 were simply consolidations of two 'half-county' ridings into a single riding (Perth East and Perth West into Perth) or similar one-for-two consolidations (London North and London South into London). In 1966, however, many inter-county boundary shifts were introduced; this trend has accelerated with the 1975 redistribution.

²³S.D. Clark, Movements of Political Protest in Canada 1640-1840, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), 409-413.

of 1957 and 1958".²⁴

Social Data

The social data employed in this thesis have been taken entirely from the decennial Census of Canada, and all but the data from the last census were taken from published reports. The most serious shortcoming inherent in census data is simply that at best they contain only approximations of the data we should like to have. Even within the framework of the standard demographic questions which the census-takers did ask, large gaps abound. For example, it is not possible to sort out the Irish Catholics from the Irish Protestants, so that this important cleavage is largely masked by the census reports. The most significant gap, however, is the lack of occupational data from 1871 until 1951.²⁵

Another set of problems relates to the quality of the data itself. Although in recent years the census has been carried out with painstaking attention to detail and accuracy, such was not always the case. In the early years, by way of illustration, the definitions used changed frequently, and were oftentimes regrettably vague; N.B. Ryder has pointed out how shifting and uncertain conceptual as well as operational definitions have pervaded the Census' origin statistics, with the result that some figures, particularly for those not of French or

²⁴ Paul Raymond Opferkuch, "Southern Ontario Voting Patterns, 1945-1959", M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1963, 62.

²⁵ In the 1941 census, occupational data were published, but they were only broken down to rural and urban components for each county.

Anglo-Saxon origin, are highly unreliable.²⁶

The final set of problems with the census data relates to the difficulty in fitting the census units to our units of analysis, the constituency. Fortunately, since the census reports break down most of the variables we are interested in to the township and village level, the fit between the social and political data is in most cases exact. The major exceptions here are in the urban areas, prior to the introduction of tract data in 1951; as a result, most of the Toronto ridings are missing social data for the 1911 census, and all Toronto city ridings, plus those of Hamilton, Ottawa, and Windsor, are missing social data for 1931. The specifics of fitting social data to the political units are discussed under each census.

The censuses chosen as principal data sources are those of 1871, 1911, 1931, 1951, and 1971, with some additional data from the 1901 and 1961 censuses. Consideration of time and return on effort invested prohibited the use of each census. The importance of occupational data (only available in 1951, 1961, and 1971), along with their strategic location in terms of Ontario's post-war development, dictated the selection of the 1951 and 1971 censuses. From this decision, as well as from their proximity to crucial social and political processes (including key government turnovers in 1905 and 1934) flowed the choice of the 1911 and 1931 censuses. The other census, that of 1871, was a less ideal choice; the 1881 census would have been a better choice in

²⁶N.B. Ryder, "The Interpretation of Origin Statistics", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science XXI (November, 1955), 466-479.

temporal terms, but would have required far too much estimation and missing data for the crucial occupation variables, whereas the 1871 census presented few problems in this regard. Finally, since the only data which the 1891 census could have provided was on religion and place of residence, it was decided that the possible benefits would not be worth the effort expended. Instead, data were computed on size of place of residence from the 1901 census, which provided a precise comparison with 1911 not possible with 1891 data.

Due to the spacing of redistributions relative to the censuses, on several occasions social data were calculated for ridings both before and after redistributions; for example, 1971 census data have been calculated for 165 ridings; the 117 which existed at the time of the census, plus 48 which disappeared in either 1963 or 1966. Table B-2 gives the censuses used and the range, in terms of the years during which they existed, of the ridings for which data from particular censuses were calculated.

By way of explanation, the final line demonstrates that any riding which existed between 1962 and 1975 (at any time, not necessarily for the entire period) has data from the 1971 census calculated for it. For a riding which underwent redistributions too minor to necessitate its being considered a new riding, the census data were calculated on the basis of the riding boundaries set out in Table B-2, with 1874b signifying that ridings minimally changed in 1874 were calculated according to the pre-1874 boundaries, and 1966a that those so changed in 1966 were computed on the basis of post-1966 boundaries. For example, in

TABLE B-2
 BASES FOR CALCULATION OF CENSUS DATA

Census year	Data calculated for any riding existing between the years	Redistributions
1871	1867 - 1886	1874b, 1885b
1901	1894 - 1915	1908a
1911	1894 - 1915	1908a
1931	1924 - 1934	1925a, 1933a
1951	1950 - 1955	1954b
1961	1953 - 1967	1966a
1971	1962 - 1975	1966a

For explanation see text.

1966, the constituency of Sault Ste. Marie lost a small portion of its population (though this occupied well over ninety per cent of its area), and its 1971 census data was computed on the basis of the post-1966 boundaries.

The 1871 Census

Data on religion, ethnic origin, occupational class and place of residence were taken from the 1871 census.²⁷ The religious denominations selected were Baptist (including small numbers of "African Association", "Free Will", "Union", and "Tunker" Baptists),²⁸ Catholic, Church of England, Lutheran, Methodist (mainly Wesleyan and Episcopal, with some "Primitive", "New Connection", "British Episcopal", "Calvinistic", and "Bible Christians") and Presbyterian (including "Reformed" and "Evangelical Union"). National origin, traced through the father if the person had been born in North America, was broken down into the following categories: Dutch, English, French, German, Irish, Scots. In 1871, and in subsequent censuses up to that of 1951, Indians living on reservations, who were not granted the vote until 1954, were excluded from all compilations. This was a comparatively simple process, since Indian reservations were treated as separate units in the census reports. As in the case of religion, other origins (or denominations) were far too small to be included in the analysis. Size of place of

²⁷ Sources: Census of Canada, 1871, Religion: I, 86-145; Origin: I, 252-281; Occupation: II, 250-297; Size of Place of residence: I, 86-145.

²⁸ In this, as in subsequent cases, the smaller groups are included by the census under the more general category.

residence was determined as follows: incorporated places with a population larger than 2000 were considered urban, incorporated places with less than 2000 were designated villages, and the remainder, as rural. The dividing line between 'villages' and urban is clearly arbitrary, but no more so than any other line of demarcation; a more serious shortcoming is the reliance on incorporation to sort out rural from village; unincorporated places of any size (though few, if any, would have been larger than 1000) are not distinguished from the township in the census reports.

The final variable, occupational class, presents a good many conceptual and operational problems: even today it is very difficult, and some would say impossible, to construct a set of socio-economic classes from objective occupational data. The task is all the more problematical when applied to census records from a century ago: "occupational categories drawn from the twentieth century may not be particularly relevant to Upper Canada in the nineteenth century when the distinction between 'blue collar' and 'white collar', so critical today, was much less clear".²⁹ With these reservations in mind, a seven fold 'class' structure was developed: farmers, clerical and shopkeepers, skilled craftsmen, unskilled workmen, professionals and managers, primary workers, and labourers.³⁰ Labourers were established as a separate category from the unskilled workmen, since this occupation appears

²⁹Susan E. Houston, "Politics, Schools, and Social Change in Upper Canada", Canadian Historical Review LIII (September, 1972), 251.

30. The categories were defined as follows (occupations are as stated in the actual census returns; no definitions are given):

Farmers: farmers, various agricultural occupations

Clerical and shopkeepers: accountants, agents, auctioneers, book-sellers, commercial clerks, commercial travellers, court officers, express employees, grocers, hotel keepers, insurance employees, merchants, municipal employees, notaries, photographers, policemen, teachers*, bar keepers, musicians, ship chandlers

Skilled craftsmen: apprentices, bakers, barbers, blacksmiths, boom-keepers, bookbinders, box makers, bricklayers, brewers, broom-makers, builders, butchers, cabinet makers, carvers, carpenters and joiners, carriage makers, carders, chair makers, coopers, dressmakers, edge tool makers, furnace builders, gardeners, hatters, hosiers and glovers, india rubber operatives, safe makers, locksmiths, marble workers, mechanics, millers, nurserymen, packers, painters, pilots, plasterers, plumbers, potters, printers, riggers, saddlers, sailmakers, shipbuilders, shoemakers, steam engine builders, tailors, tanners, watchmakers, wheelrights, weavers, furriers, goldsmiths, confectioners, engineers and mechanics

Unskilled workers: boat and bargemen, cabinen and carters, foundrymen, hawkers and peddlars, hospital attendants, keepers and guards, messengers, quarrymen, sawyers, railway employees, (male) servants, stevedores, various industrial occupations

Professionals: advocates, artists, architects, bankers, brokers, chemists, christian brothers, civil engineers, clergymen, contractors, dentists, dealers and traders, veterinary surgeons, gas works engineers, gentlemen of private means, grain dealers, judges, land surveyors, militia officials, students, manufacturers, various professional occupations

Primary: fishermen, hunters, mariners, miners, lumbermen

Labourers: labourers

The following occupations were not included in any category:

laundresses, midwives, nuns, pensioners, seamstresses, female servants, various indefinite occupations

* - the 1871 census did not distinguish between male and female teachers; the 1881 census (II, 273-315) did, and the proportion of male to female teachers in 1881 was applied to the 1871 figures to obtain an estimate of male teachers.

This schema approximates, but does not duplicate, the categories developed to classify the occupations listed in Toronto's assessment rolls in Peter G. Goheen, Victorian Toronto 1850 to 1900: Pattern and Process of Growth (Chicago: University of Chicago, Department of Geography Research Paper number 127, 1970), appendix B. For a discussion of the

to have included both hired men on farms and urban workers. As much as possible, females were excluded from this categorization, for unlike the other variables it was possible to separate out largely female occupations, as well as unreasonable to presume that males and females formed fairly equal proportions of each category.

Since the 1871 census was organized on the basis of federal ridings, which were identical to provincial ridings until 1872, very few problems were encountered fitting the social data to the political units. For a few ridings which came into being at the 1874 redistribution, through splits in old seats, it was necessary to estimate the classes, since the occupational data was not given below the federal riding level. This was done by pro-rating the farm and primary classes according to the new ridings' proportions of rural population, the labourer class according to the proportions of total population, and three quarters of the remaining classes according to the proportions of urban population (on the premise that their constituent occupations were mainly, but not entirely, urban-oriented). For other ridings, created either in 1874 or 1885, it was possible to use the figures from the 1881 census, again based on federal ridings, because the federal ridings had been changed so as to closely resemble the provincial ridings.³¹ Finally, for one riding, Dufferin, which was assembled in

problems involved in developing an occupational classification in the context of the 1851 census for Hamilton, see Michael B. Katz, "Occupational Classification in History", Journal of Interdisciplinary History 111 (Summer, 1972), 63-88:

³¹ See Statutes of Canada 35 Victoria, c. 13.

1874 from parts of four federal ridings, no estimate was possible. Ridings created in 1885, 1889 (Nipissing), or 1894 (Toronto and Hamilton), were assigned religion and place of residence data from the 1891 census,³² and origin, which was not ascertained in 1891, from the 1881 census.³³

The 1901 Census

The only data taken from the 1901 census were on place of residence, following the same definition as in 1871.³⁴ Since this data was primarily aimed at comparison with 1911 figures, places incorporated between 1901 and 1911 were assigned a village (or urban) population in 1901 equal to that in 1911, with an appropriate reduction in the 1901 rural population, so as to minimize distortion due simply to incorporation. Similarly, places crossing the 2000 person threshold (all of which did so by narrow margins) were placed in the same category in 1911 as they had been in 1901. The Toronto ridings presented some problems, but reasonable estimates could be made from the federal riding figures.

The 1911 Census

The data employed from the 1911 census were: religion, national origin, size of place of residence, and number of salaried and

³²Census of Canada, 1891, I, 252-28; denominations the same as in 1871.

³³Census of Canada, 1881, I, 262-97; nationalities same as in 1871.

³⁴Census of Canada, 1901, IV, 423-34; these figures were based on the federal ridings created in 1903.

wage-earning employees.³⁵ The categories for religion and origin were the same as in 1871, except that the various fringe groups and sects were included under the principal denomination. Size of place of residence followed the same definition, subject to the qualifications described in the preceding paragraph. Data on salaried and wage employees, although a poor substitute for socio-economic class, were the only indicators available for industrialization. The figures for employees were given only for federal ridings; fortunately, however, the 1903 federal redistribution brought many federal ridings into exact equivalence with the provincial ridings, and others were made into close approximations.³⁶ For a few ridings, it was necessary to pro-rate four-fifths of the employees according to proportion of urban population. The Toronto ridings which existed until 1908 were handled in the same manner as in the 1901 census. The Toronto constituencies created in 1908 bore no resemblance to the federal ridings, so that it was not even possible to hazard guesses for them. The seats in Northern Ontario presented problems because a handful of the mining and railway camps mentioned in the census could not be located; more significantly, however, it was necessary to estimate roughly the allocation among ridings of persons living in unorganized territory according to the number of registered voters and the population density maps in the

³⁵ Compare Statutes of Ontario 57 Victoria c. 1 s. 1 with Statutes of Canada 3 Edward VII, c.60, schedule, s.54.

³⁶ Religion and residence: Census of Canada, 1911, II, table II; national origin: II, table VII; employees: III, table IX.

Economic Atlas of Ontario,³⁷

The 1931 Census

The 1931 census, as mentioned above, did not break down its reports below the city level (earlier censuses frequently gave data for wards), so that no data are available for Hamilton, Ottawa, Windsor, or Toronto city ridings. The municipality of York, contiguous with the city of Toronto, was divided into two equal parts, one of which was allocated to York West and one to York South ridings. Estimations similar to those made in 1911 were necessary for some northern ridings. The variables taken from the 1931 census were size of place of residence, ethnic origin, and religion,³⁸ using the same categories as in 1871 and 1911, save that, in 1923, almost all Methodists and some Presbyterians had joined to form the United Church.

The 1951 census was the first national census reporting information for 'tracts' in the larger cities; as a result, data were available for each riding, although some estimation procedures were required. Size of place of residence, religion, and occupation were culled from this census;³⁹ origin was not included because it was not broken down to the township and village level. Religion was categorized according

³⁷W.G. Dean, Economic Atlas of Ontario (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1969), plate 6.

³⁸Religion and residence: Census of Canada, 1951 II, 604-637; Origin: II, 396-431.

³⁹Religion and residence: I, Table 41; Occupation: IV, Tables 6, 9, 19; CT-5 (Ottawa); CT-6 (Toronto); CT-7 (Windsor).

to the same denominations as in 1931; for place of residence, the threshold separating 'village' to 'urban' was raised to 2,500 persons in order to take into account the changes which had occurred in Ontario society: as the cities of the province grew more and more 'urban', places of moderate population which had once been more urban than rural-village were finding themselves more closely akin to the smaller centres than the large cities.

Prior to 1951, the odd case had appeared, mainly in the Toronto area, in which what appeared from the census organization to be rural townships in fact had most of their population located in suburbs contiguous to large cities. By 1951, however, the growth of unincorporated suburbs was substantial, requiring that special attention be given to the townships surrounding urban centres. Accordingly, it was necessary to estimate the proportion of persons in such townships, particularly those adjacent to Windsor, London, Hamilton, and Ottawa, who were actually living in urban areas.

The occupational categories were as follows: farmers, other primary workers, Manufacturing and mechanical workers, Transportation and communications workers, sales workers ("commercial and financial" in census terms), professionals, service workers, clerical workers, construction workers, labourers, and proprietors and managers.⁴⁰

For the most part, the census tracts in the urban areas fitted the constituencies well, so that although some are not precise fits, no

⁴⁰ For a detailed breakdown of the specific occupations in each category, see Vol. IV, table 6.

glaring inconsistencies were encountered. For some reason, tract data were published for Windsor, Toronto, and Ottawa, but not for London or Hamilton; it was thus necessary to substitute data from the 1961 census for these cities.⁴¹ As was the case in 1911 and 1931, it was necessary to substitute the proper riding allocations for persons living in unorganized areas. Finally, the format in which the occupational data were published necessitated some rather convoluted calculations and some estimation. Full occupational data were published for the urban tracts, for rural and urban portions of counties and for all incorporated places. Thus, for ridings which were not identical with counties and which were not wholly urban, it was necessary to calculate the occupational categories for all incorporated places, and then add the rural component which had been pro-rated according to proportions of rural populations in each of a county's ridings. Since the great bulk of the rural labour force was agricultural, this process is unlikely to have introduced any serious distortions.

The 1961 Census

The only data taken from the 1961 census were size of place of residence.⁴² Following the reasoning outlined above, the line distinguishing urban from village was raised to 3,000, although to avoid

⁴¹ Cat 95-523, CT-8 (Hamilton), Cat 95-526, CT-11 (London). In 1961, construction workers were included with manufacturing workers, so that the figure for the latter group was pro-rated by the proportion of construction to manufacturing workers in Hamilton-Wentworth county (15%) and London-Middlesex county (22%) in 1951 to obtain an estimate of the number of construction workers.

⁴² Census of Canada, 1961, catalogue 92-527 (SP-3).

biasing the changes involved, places which because of slight changes in population or due to the change in definitions, would have been in different categories in 1951, 1961, or 1971 were assigned their 1961 status for both 1951 and 1971. Again, it was necessary to estimate the number of urbanites in townships adjacent to built-up areas.

The 1971 Census

The data set garnered from the 1971 census was far more complete than for any other year. Data were obtained on place of birth, period of immigration, ethnic origin, religion, language spoken at home, education, occupation, family income, and size of place of residence. In addition, the problems of fitting the census data to the ridings were all but eliminated. Both of these advances were made possible through the use of unpublished census data tapes, organized through York University's Institute for Behavioural Research Canadian Census Data Management System (CCDMS).⁴³ This system is based on the Census "Official List",⁴⁴ which divides the province into some 14,391 "enumeration areas" of approximately 500 persons each. These enumeration areas are aggregated on the standard township, village, etc. basis, but may be individually isolated if so desired. Accordingly, it was possible, using village, township and tract codes, and enumeration areas where need be, to match almost all provincial ridings precisely. The only problems encountered were the occasional enumeration area

⁴³ I wish to thank Jim Wirt of the ISR for extensive technical advice on the use of the system.

⁴⁴ Statistics Canada, 1971 Census Official List, series 1, part 1c.

bisected by a constituency, and some difficulty in assigning enumeration areas in the sparsely populated unorganized areas of Northern Ontario, due to vagaries of the guide maps. These problems were, however, very minimal in their net effect. A good many checks were made between the CCDMS output and the published census data to ensure that coding errors and the like had not crept in. Although it is never possible to be absolutely certain that the results are error-free, any surviving errors must be exceedingly small.

The categories of variables are as follows: place of birth: Ontario, in Canada outside Ontario, United Kingdom, other; period of immigration (for those born outside Canada): prior to 1946, 1946-55, since 1955; origin⁴⁵: British, French, German, Italian, Dutch; religion: the same as in 1951 and 1931; language most often spoken at home: French, English, Italian; education (highest level of schooling, including those currently in school): less than grade 5, grade 5-grade 8, grade 9-grade 10, grade 11-13 without any post-secondary education, grade 11-13 with post-secondary education, some university, university degree; occupation:⁴⁶ managerial and administrative, teaching, medical, social and religious, clerical, sales, service, farming, other primary, processing, machinery and fabricating, construction,

⁴⁵ Traced through the father, according to the question, "To what ethnic or cultural group did you or your ancestor (on the male side) belong on coming to this continent?" Census of Canada, 1971, catalogue 95-752 (CT-22B), explanation of terms.

⁴⁶ For a listing of the occupations falling under these categories, see Census of Canada, 1971, catalogue 12-536, "Occupational Classification Manual".

transportation, labourer and unclassified; income: average family income in dollars; size of place of residence: the same as in 1961.

Regions

Clearly, given Ontario's vastness and diversity, some system of regions had to be devised. However, it soon became apparent that any system would inevitably involve many arbitrary decisions. Whatever factors entered into the designation of specific regions, whether social, economic, geographical, or political, would inevitably raise inconsistencies. As one attempt to devise a set of regions for Canada at one point in time based solely on economic criteria established, "no one system of economic zoning would satisfactorily meet all requirements".⁴⁷ Sharply exacerbating these problems is the time factor: a system of regions which made sense on social and economic bases for the 1960's might be much less appropriate for turn of the century Ontario, and absurd for the years shortly after Confederation. Yet another complication was the need for each region to encompass a sufficient number of ridings so as to make analysis based on regions meaningful.

A partial solution to this last problem was the setting up of a three-tiered system of regions. In the first tier, some 23 regions were delineated: this minimized the possibility of glossing over important differences, but it left too many regions with only a handful

⁴⁷Pierre Camu, E.P. Weeks, Z.W. Sametz, Economic Geography of Canada with an Introduction to a 68-Region System (Toronto: Macmillan, 1964), 262.

of ridings. Thus, for most phases of the analysis, the twenty-three regions were combined into seven regions, a compromise between numbers and precision. Finally, for still other facets of the study, for which even the seven region system left too few cases in individual cells, the province was divided simply into East, West, and North, minus the large cities.

No defence of the criteria used to determine the regions will be presented, since virtually every decision might be found objectionable on some grounds, and since it is admitted that the regions ultimately are quite arbitrary in nature. Social, economic, and geographic factors all contributed to defining the region, though not in any systematic, precise fashion; political considerations were specifically excluded from the determination of the regions. Finally, the maintenance of the same regions over the entire time period covered in the thesis was deemed a lesser evil than the periodic shifting of boundaries with a resulting loss of comparability.

The regions used in this study, in terms of pre-regional government counties, are:⁴⁸

Tier I - 23 Region System (see Figure B-1)

1. Russell, Prescott, Stormont, and Glengarry counties

⁴⁸ Compare with Camu, Weeks, and Sametz, Economic Geography, ch.10; Lloyd G. Reeds, "Agricultural Regions of Southern Ontario", Economic Geography XXXV (July, 1959), 219-27; and the various official sets of regions set out in the Economic Atlas of Ontario, plate 103; the seven region system corresponds fairly closely with some of the latter, particularly the "economic regions of Ontario", ibid.

2. Ottawa city*
3. Renfrew, Lanark, and Carleton counties
4. Dundas, Grenville, and Leeds counties
5. Frontenac, Lennox and Addington, Hastings, and Prince Edward counties
6. Durham, Northumberland, Peterborough and Victoria counties and Haliburton district
7. Muskoka and Parry Sound districts and Nipissing district south of Lake Nipissing and the Mattawa River
8. Simcoe, Dufferin, Grey and Bruce counties
9. Ontario and York counties
10. Peel and Halton counties
11. Hamilton City
12. Wentworth, Lincoln, and Welland counties
13. Egin, Brant, Norfolk, and Haldimand counties
14. Huron, Wellington, Waterloo, Oxford, Perth, and Middlesex counties
15. London city
16. Kitchener and Waterloo cities
17. Lambton, Kent, and Essex counties
18. Windsor city
19. Toronto city proper (1960 boundaries)
20. Metropolitan Toronto east of Yonge Street, excluding city proper
21. Metropolitan Toronto west of Yonge Street, excluding city proper
22. Algoma, Sudbury, Cochrane, Manitoulin districts, Nipissing district north of Lake Nipissing and Mattawa River, and Patricia Portion of Kenora district east of $85^{\circ} 20'$.
23. Thunder Bay, Rainy River, and Kenora districts and Patricia Portion of Kenora district west of $85^{\circ} 20'$.

* - the regions are mutually exclusive, so that cities assigned separate regions are not included in the surrounding counties

Tier 2 - 7 Region System (see Figure B-2)


Eastern Ontario	regions 1 - 4 above
Lake Ontario	regions 5 - 6 above
Georgian Bay	regions 7 - 8 above
Golden Horseshoe	regions 9 - 12 above
Western Ontario	regions 13 - 18 above
Toronto	regions 19 - 21 above
Northern Ontario	regions 22 - 23 above

Tier 3 - 3 Region System (see Figure B-3)

Eastern Ontario:	area east of York and Simcoe counties and south of French River, Lake Nipissing, and Mattawa River, excluding Ottawa**
Western Ontario:	area west of Ontario county and Muskoka district, excluding Toronto, Hamilton, Kitchener-Waterloo, London, and Windsor**
Northern Ontario:	area north of French River, Lake Nipissing, and Mattawa River

** - the large cities are excluded in order to facilitate large-scale regional comparisons while minimizing the influence of these urban centres; since they were each allocated a first tier region, they could be added to their third tier region if need be.

Figure B-2
REGIONS OF ONTARIO (Tier 2)



Appendix C

This appendix provides the details and the rationale behind the selection of the variables selected for inclusion in the multiple regression analysis of Chapter VIII. It contains two sets of tables. The first set, Tables C-1 through C-5 present the simple correlation matrices of all eligible social variables taken from the 1871, 1911, 1931, 1951 and 1971 censuses. The second set reports the principal components analyses for selected variables in 1871, 1951 and 1971.

Table C-6 reports the principal components analysis of the occupational and rural-urban variables in 1871. Save village, primary workers and labourers, these variables were typically correlated with one another at $\pm .80$ or better. As might have been expected, with the exceptions just noted, all variables loaded very highly on the first factor ($\pm .90$ or higher). The second factor was basically a Labourer-Primary factor, and Village was by a wide margin the foremost element in the third factor. Village and Labourer were thus retained in the analysis; Primary was dropped in part because it constituted only .007 of the population, and was thus not of great substantive significance. From the first factor, both Urban and Skilled Worker were retained.¹ Lutheran and Dutch were, like Primary, dropped from the analysis, due to the small proportion of the population for which they accounted:

¹ For 1871, as for 1951 and 1971, various occupational variables were grouped together in different ways to form "middle" or "working" class categories. None of these (somewhat dubious) combinations, however, effectively eliminated the problem of high correlations among variables.

2.1 and 1.3 per cent.

Since the 1911 census contained only limited occupational data, and few high correlations among variables, no analysis was performed. Rural was deleted as being essentially the mirror image of Urban ($r = -.96$) and Dutch, Lutheran and Salaried workers were excluded because of their small contributions to the provincial population: 1.7, 2.8 and .7 per cent (the last mentioned was also correlated with Wage workers at $+.95$). The 1931 census contained no occupational data, so that the only variables deleted were Rural (correlated with Urban at $r = -.98$), Lutheran and Dutch (representing 3.6 and 2.1 per cent of the population).

Although the occupational variables drawn from the 1951 census were not as highly intercorrelated as those of 1871, it was necessary to delete some of them. The factor analysis is presented in Table C-7. As was the case in 1871, most of the variance was accounted for in the first factor, on which Clerical, Farmer, Urban and Rural loaded very highly ($\pm .88$ or better), Professional, Manufacturing and Village loaded highly ($\pm .72$ to $\pm .81$), while Labourer and Primary only loaded very weakly (.12 and $-.19$). Factors 2 and 3 were basically Labour and Primary factors, although other variables had moderately high loadings, particularly on factor 2. The variables chosen for inclusion in the analysis were Urban, Clerical, Manufacturing, Labourer and Primary. Village was not incorporated into the equation in part because of its high loading on the first factor ($-.81$), and in part because it was felt that by 1951 the substantive distinction between persons living

In villages and those living in rural areas had lessened appreciably. Proportion of Lutherans was again dropped due to its lack of numerical importance.

The 1971 census yielded a far wider range of data than earlier censuses, and accordingly the problems in deciding on inclusion of variables for the equations were more complex. The first variables to be eliminated were English language, French language and Italian language, since, despite representing very different proportions of the population² than the variables on origin - British, French and Italian - the correlations were very high (.88, .97 and .98). Dutch and Lutheran were deleted on account of their lack of numerical significance (2.7 and 3.5 per cent). Table C-8 reports the principal components analysis for the intercorrelated occupational, educational and rural-urban variables. Although the loadings are somewhat lower than in 1871 and 1951, the first factor accounts for almost half the variance in the 13 variables; the basic rural-urban dimension is still clearly of fundamental importance. The second factor was marked by high Manufacturing and Labour loadings, and moderately high loadings from other variables. Primary and High School had the highest loadings on both factor 3 and factor 4. In consequence, the variables retained were Clerical, Manufacturing, Primary, High School, Family Income and Urban.

A second set of 1971 census variables, all relating to

²Percentage of the population by origin in 1971, British 59.5, French 9.6, Italian 6.0; the corresponding language percentages were 85.1, 5.3, 3.2.

birthplace, were found to be highly intercorrelated, and were subjected to analysis. These were Born in Canada, Born in Ontario, Born in United Kingdom, Born other (outside Canada, except for United Kingdom), Immigration A (arrived prior to 1945), Immigration B (arrived between 1945 and 1960), Immigration C (arrived since 1960). The data are presented in Table C-9. Immigration B and Immigration C, Born in Ontario and Born other all loaded highly on the first factor; Immigration A and Born in UK had moderately high loadings on this factor, and born in Canada was all but unrelated to it. Factor 2 was essentially a Born in Canada factor, factor 3 a born in UK factor and factor 4 an Immigration A factor. From these seven variables, Immigration A, Born in Canada and Born in Ontario were selected for inclusion in the regression equations.

TABLE C-1

INTERCORRELATION OF 1871 CENSUS VARIABLES (N = 32)

Lab	Farm	Shop	Skil	Unsk	Prof	Prim	Bapt	Ecat	Ang	Luth	Meth	Pres	Eng	Fren	Ger	Ir	Scot	Rur	Vil	
Lab	-																			
Farm	-.35	-																		
Shop	.24	-.89	-																	
Skil	.29	-.92	-.90	-																
Unsk	.43	-.81	.61	.89	-															
Prof	.41	-.89	.91	.91	.82	-														
Prim	.59	.03	.09	.04	.28	.22	-													
Bapt	-.04	.03	-.08	-.01	-.09	-.06	-.09	-												
Ecat	-.02	-.28	.33	-.20	.21	.19	-.08	-.41	-											
Ang	.17	-.39	.45	.46	.49	.47	.06	-.31	.11	-										
Luth	-.11	-.05	-.08	-.03	-.07	-.04	-.05	.19	-.05	-.42	-									
Meth	-.04	.27	-.31	-.22	-.22	-.17	-.07	-.01	-.49	.08	-.32	-								
Pres	-.32	.23	-.23	-.21	-.16	-.25	-.10	-.18	-.05	-.20	.00	-.35	-							
Eng	.37	-.33	.24	.38	.34	.39	.06	.34	-.46	.30	-.31	.46	-.36	-						
Fren	.34	-.02	.08	.09	-.01	-.02	.35	-.16	.21	-.25	-.05	-.42	-.17	-.39	-					
Ger	-.02	-.02	-.16	-.07	-.16	-.11	-.10	.34	-.24	-.40	.78	.05	-.24	-.09	-.13	-				
Ir	-.27	.07	.05	-.03	.00	.01	-.17	-.54	.34	.56	-.30	.05	.01	-.26	-.15	-.49	-			
Scot	-.23	.18	-.17	-.16	-.11	-.22	-.03	.05	.13	-.37	-.05	-.40	.84	-.30	-.06	-.19	-.31	-		
Rur	-.17	.93	-.94	-.93	-.80	-.88	.06	.10	-.35	-.45	.03	.29	.20	-.23	-.01	.10	-.07	.18	-	
Vil	.04	.03	-.11	-.09	-.09	-.13	-.07	.02	.00	.01	.14	-.07	-.02	-.11	.00	.17	.02	.04	.01	
Urb	.16	-.89	.94	.92	.79	.83	-.04	-.09	.34	.42	-.06	-.26	-.19	-.25	-.00	-.14	.06	-.16	-.96	-.30

Lab - Labourer Farm - Farmer Shop - Shopkeeper Skil - Skilled Worker
 Unsk - Unskilled worker Prof - Professional Prim - Primary worker
 Bapt - Baptist Ecat - English Catholic Ang - Anglican Luth - Lutheran
 Meth - Methodist Pres - Presbyterian Eng - English Fren - French
 Ger - German Ir - Irish Scot - Scots Rur - Rural Vil - Village
 Urb - Urban

TABLE C-2

INTERCORRELATIONS OF 1911 CENSUS VARIABLES (N = 102)

	Rur	Vil	Urb	Sal	Wage	Ang	Bapt	Luth	Meth	Pres	Ecat	Dut	Eng	Fren	Ir	Ger	Scot
Rur	-																
Vil	.37	-															
Urb	-.96	-.61	-														
Sal	.09	-.11	-.05	-													
Wage	.04	-.13	.00	.95	-												
Ang	-.51	-.24	.50	.30	.27	-											
Bapt	.00	-.01	.00	.04	.04	.02	-										
Luth	-.08	.07	.04	.03	.06	-.31	-.15	-									
Meth	.43	.14	-.41	-.24	-.23	.07	.17	-.36	-								
Pres	.11	.34	-.19	-.15	-.17	-.01	-.17	-.01	-.13	-							
Ecat	-.30	-.17	.31	.20	.21	-.09	-.36	.54	-.57	-.07	-						
Dut	.26	.10	-.25	-.17	-.11	-.05	.05	-.16	.52	-.32	-.23	-					
Eng	-.23	-.10	.23	.18	.20	.52	.45	-.37	.55	-.09	-.50	.05	-				
Fren	.03	-.09	.00	-.08	-.09	-.40	-.23	-.06	-.53	-.34	.18	-.10	-.54	-			
Ir	.24	.15	-.24	-.22	-.28	.21	-.34	-.25	.28	.25	.09	.07	-.20	-.24	-		
Ger	.09	.05	-.09	.07	.09	-.33	.09	.74	-.08	-.06	.09	.02	-.19	-.20	-.28	-	
Scot	.06	.20	-.11	-.09	-.09	-.12	.05	-.05	-.21	.81	.03	-.23	-.14	-.22	-.03	-.07	-

Key: Rur - Rural Vil - Village Urb - Urban Sal - Salaried Workers
 Wage - Wage earning workers Ang - Anglican Bapt - Baptist
 Luth - Lutheran Meth - Methodist Pres - Presbyterian
 Ecat - English Catholic Dut - Dutch Eng - English Fren - French
 Ir - Irish Ger - German Scot - Scots

TABLE C-3

INTERCORRELATIONS OF 1931 CENSUS VARIABLES (N = 70)*

	Rur	Vil	Urb	Eng	Dut	Ger	Ir	Fren	Scot	Bapt	Ecat	Luth	Unit	Pres	Ang
Rur	-														
Vil	.65	-													
Urb	-.98	-.77	-												
Eng	-.23	-.03	.20	-											
Dut	.20	.07	-.18	.26	-										
Ger	-.04	.07	.02	-.23	-.13	-									
Ir	.34	.29	-.36	.05	.08	-.07	-								
Fren	.14	-.10	-.09	-.66	-.17	-.19	-.30	-							
Scot	.07	.41	-.17	.12	-.09	-.03	.29	-.31	-						
Bapt	-.06	.01	.05	.47	.17	.01	-.21	-.33	.20	-					
Ecat	-.25	-.37	.31	-.56	-.28	-.15	-.26	.19	-.24	-.29	-				
Luth	-.07	-.12	.09	-.44	-.28	.66	-.20	-.01	-.20	-.18	.44	-			
Unit	.42	.44	-.47	.60	.38	-.14	.56	-.59	.29	.19	-.60	-.39	-		
Pres	-.07	.38	-.04	.30	-.11	.10	.32	-.45	.72	.13	-.34	-.18	.28	-	
Ang	-.47	-.31	.47	.68	.14	-.31	.12	-.49	.08	.20	-.21	-.35	.17	.20	-

* - Rur-Vil, Rur-Urb and Vil-Urb based on 90 cases; all others based on 70 cases

Key: Rur - Rural Vil - Village Urb - Urban Eng - English Dut - Dutch
 Ger - German Ir - Irish Fren - French Scot - Scots Bapt - Baptist
 Ecat - English Catholic Luth - Lutheran Unit - United Church
 Pres - Presbyterian Ang - Anglican

TABLE C-4

INTERCORRELATIONS OF 1951 CENSUS VARIABLES (N = 90)

	Rur	Vil	Urb	Ang	Cath	Unit	Pres	Luth	Bapt	Pro	Cler	Farm	Man	Prim	Lab
Rur	-														
Vil	.67	-													
Urb	-.98	-.80	-												
Ang	-.44	-.42	.56	-											
Cath	-.02	-.07	.03	-.57	-										
Unit	.47	.39	-.48	.26	-.71	-									
Pres	.01	.32	-.09	.20	-.56	.36	-								
Luth	.10	.09	-.10	-.35	-.01	-.12	.02	-							
Bapt	.02	.04	-.03	.19	-.42	.23	.21	-.13	-						
Pro	-.66	-.45	.65	.51	-.11	-.20	.00	-.16	.01	-					
Cler	-.81	-.61	.81	.53	-.06	-.35	-.04	-.16	-.06	.77	-				
Farm	.77	.66	-.85	-.30	-.31	.53	.35	.06	.18	-.55	-.69	-			
Man	-.65	-.54	-.81	.28	-.07	-.37	.01	.06	.09	.26	.49	-.62	-		
Prim	.21	.11	-.19	-.28	.39	-.21	-.41	.21	-.24	-.20	-.24	-.15	-.15	-	
Lab	-.01	-.18	.05	-.24	.32	-.33	-.32	.11	-.26	-.22	-.06	-.28	.38	.19	-

Key: Rur - Rural Vil - Village Urb - Urban Ang - Anglican
 Cath - Catholic United - United Church Pres - Presbyterian
 Luth - Lutheran Bapt - Baptist Pro - Professional and Managerial
 Cler - Clerical and sales Farm - Farmer Man - Manufacturing
 Prim - Primary workers Lab - Labourer

TABLE C-5

INTERCORRELATIONS OF 1971 CENSUS VARIABLES (N = 117)

	Rur	Vil	Urb	Elem	High	Post	Pro	Cler	Man	Farm	Lab	Finc	Bont	Bcan	Buk	Both	ImA	ImB	ImC	Brit	Fr	Ger	Ital	Dut	Ang	Bapt	Luth	Pres	Unit	Engl	Fr1	Itl				
Rur	.77																																			
Vil	-.99	.85																																		
Urb	.35	.35	-.38																																	
Elem	-.13	-.69	-.19	-.51																																
High	-.55	-.46	-.57	-.75	.30																															
Post	-.25	-.40	-.51	-.69	.17	.95																														
Pro	-.76	-.62	-.76	-.42	.23	.83	.73																													
Cler	-.97	-.98	.08	.51	.01	-.52	-.64	-.23																												
Man	.31	.27	-.78	.23	-.03	-.39	-.39	-.60	-.01																											
Farm	-.44	-.58	.47	.21	.16	-.01	-.18	.31	.69	-.30																										
Lab	-.51	-.53	-.59	-.80	.17	.01	.76	.61	-.40	-.49	-.65																									
Finc	.74	.62	-.75	.02	.21	-.47	-.39	-.73	-.14	.67	-.56	-.40																								
Bont	-.27	-.31	-.29	-.31	-.18	.26	.37	.30	-.46	-.48	-.20	.33	-.32																							
Bcan	-.62	-.43	.61	-.53	.63	.67	.62	.69	.00	-.45	.43	.59	-.53	.01																						
Buk	-.55	-.45	.57	.27	-.33	.24	.14	.53	.37	-.41	.62	.15	-.89	-.06	.32																					
Both	-.50	-.42	.58	.07	.13	.33	.19	.48	.25	-.35	.50	.21	-.59	-.10	.48	.60																				
ImA	-.64	-.44	.63	-.13	.07	.44	.36	.58	.34	-.36	.65	.42	-.79	-.12	.62	.31	.62																			
ImB	-.62	-.48	.61	.17	-.27	.33	.23	.61	.30	-.46	.60	.22	-.91	-.01	.45	.95	.47	.76																		
ImC	.24	.27	-.25	-.41	.70	.19	.13	-.05	-.14	.32	-.13	.02	.46	-.35	.33	-.50	-.20	-.20	-.39																	
Brit	.17	.04	-.15	.16	-.42	-.29	-.15	-.28	-.30	-.06	-.42	-.13	.22	.48	-.51	-.32	-.36	-.51	-.34	-.55																
Fr	-.13	-.20	-.15	.01	.05	-.09	-.07	-.16	.17	.31	-.02	-.07	.25	-.25	-.12	-.15	-.18	-.06	-.16	.08	-.24															
Ger	-.49	-.38	.48	.35	-.40	-.04	-.13	.28	.49	-.39	.58	.04	-.60	-.05	.14	.80	.41	.60	.75	-.50	-.16	-.22														
Ital	.30	.23	-.32	-.22	.48	.05	-.16	-.25	.15	.62	-.05	-.07	.36	-.49	.13	-.25	-.02	-.12	-.27	.55	-.41	.14	-.41													
Dut	-.16	-.23	.16	-.59	.59	.49	.40	.34	-.18	-.20	.06	.39	-.04	.01	.66	-.16	.32	.15	-.02	.71	-.52	-.18	-.23	.28												
Ang	-.20	.02	-.13	.02	.33	-.09	-.16	-.17	.22	.39	.16	-.13	.23	-.45	.10	-.10	.16	.02	-.14	.39	-.39	.17	-.20	.42	.20											
Bapt	-.04	.09	.02	.09	-.07	-.08	-.03	-.05	.14	.02	.07	-.01	.02	-.02	-.13	.03	.01	.03	-.03	-.18	-.17	.76	-.04	-.13	-.27	-.05										
Luth	.13	.34	-.18	-.11	.51	.05	-.01	-.08	.14	.44	.11	-.10	.27	-.46	.31	-.22	-.04	.03	-.16	.65	-.52	.28	-.23	.47	.35	.33	.06									
Pres	-.58	-.36	-.69	-.16	.50	-.15	-.15	-.33	-.14	.59	-.28	-.25	.66	-.42	-.07	-.58	-.33	-.33	-.55	.85	-.42	.11	-.55	.65	.41	.36	-.09	.49								
Unit	-.19	.21	-.28	-.45	.67	.20	.13	-.06	-.05	.28	-.08	.11	.43	-.39	.27	-.43	-.04	-.09	-.39	.88	-.67	.29	-.46	.55	.51	.42	.12	.59	.77							
Engl	.07	-.31	-.05	.19	-.51	-.22	-.10	-.16	.36	-.11	-.42	-.08	.07	.48	-.45	-.25	-.34	-.47	-.24	-.66	.97	-.28	-.19	-.40	-.34	-.41	-.19	-.49	-.53	.36						
Fr1	-.45	-.33	.44	.41	-.44	-.06	-.13	.30	.44	-.37	.54	.01	-.70	-.07	.14	.82	.37	.58	.80	-.48	-.17	-.22	.98	-.38	-.24	-.18	-.07	-.23	-.52	-.48	-.20					
Itl	-.13	-.30	.17	.07	-.18	-.05	-.06	.20	.25	-.41	.34	.07	-.41	.22	.02	.40	.14	.30	.57	-.38	-.01	.11	.25	-.35	-.22	-.14	.16	-.27	-.51	-.20	-.30	.33				

Key: Rur - Rural Vil - Village Urb - Urban Elem - Elementary School
 High - High School Post - Post Secondary Education Pro - Professional
 Cler - Clerical Man - Manufacturing Farm - Farmer Lab - Labourer
 Finc - Family Income Bont - Born in Ontario Bcan - Born in Canada
 Buk - Born in UK Both - Born other ImA - Immigration A
 ImB - Immigration B ImC - Immigration C Brit - British Fr - French
 Ger - German Ital - Italian Dut - Dutch Ang - Anglican Bapt - Baptist
 Luth - Lutheran Pres - Presbyterian Unit - United Church
 Engl - English language Fr1 - French language Itl - Italian language
 Itl - Italian language

TABLE C-6

PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS FACTOR ANALYSIS OF OCCUPATIONAL AND
PLACE OF RESIDENCE VARIABLES, 1871 CENSUS

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Labourer	.37	.81	.10
Farmer	-.95	.09	-.12
Shopkeeper	.96	-.09	.00
Skilled worker	.97	-.07	.04
Unskilled worker	.90	.19	.01
Professional	.95	.10	-.02
Primary worker	.12	.90	-.15
Village	-.13	.05	.98
Urban	.95	-.22	-.16
Rural	-.96	.21	-.12
Explained variance	64.6	16.2	10.5
Cumulative variance explained	64.6	80.9	91.4

TABLE C-7

PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS FACTOR ANALYSIS OF OCCUPATIONAL AND
PLACE OF RESIDENCE VARIABLES, 1951 CENSUS

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Professional	.72	-.43	.26
Clerical	.88	-.25	.08
Farmer	-.88	-.30	-.24
Manufacturing	.72	.36	-.38
Labourer	.12	.85	-.28
Primary worker	-.19	.57	.78
Urban	.98	-.03	.00
Village	-.81	-.14	.04
Rural	-.95	.08	-.01
Explained variance	57.0	17.1	10.7
Cumulative explained variance	57.0	74.2	84.9

TABLE C-8

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PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS FACTOR ANALYSIS OF OCCUPATIONAL, INCOME,
EDUCATIONAL AND PLACE OF RESIDENCE VARIABLES, 1971 CENSUS

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
Professional	.82	-.46	-.01	-.20
Clerical	.89	.08	.09	-.22
Manufacturing	-.28	.86	.22	.11
Labourer	.23	.84	.28	.02
Farmer	-.70	-.35	.46	-.17
Primary	-.35	-.12	-.74	.47
Elementary	-.69	.50	-.17	-.35
High school	.28	.09	.67	.62
Post secondary	.88	-.37	.15	-.14
Family income	.83	-.30	-.10	.11
Urban	.87	.42	-.12	-.01
Village	-.76	-.40	.25	-.13
Rural	-.86	-.41	.08	.05
Explained variance	48.4	21.5	11.4	7.1
Cumulative explained variance	48.4	69.9	81.4	88.5

TABLE S-9

PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS FACTOR ANALYSIS OF IMMIGRATION AND PLACE
OF BIRTH VARIABLES, 1971 CENSUS

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
Immigration A	.72	-.21	.26	.60
Immigration B	.91	-.16	.06	-.10
Immigration C	.92	.04	-.29	-.20
Born in Canada	.02	.98	.14	.11
Born in UK	.63	-.06	.70	-.30
Born in Ontario	-.94	-.32	.08	.01
Born other	.93	-.03	-.37	.04
Explained variance	62.0	16.4	11.6	7.3
Cumulative explained variance	62.0	78.3	90.0	97.3

APPENDIX D

SOME EFFECTS OF PERCENTAGING VOTE SHARES ON THE BASIS OF ELIGIBLE ELECTORATE RATHER THAN ON THE BASIS OF VOTES CAST

Table D-1 examines some consequences of the decision to percentage party vote shares on the basis of eligible electors. It was argued in Chapter V that this procedure would produce less artificial results than the more common practice of calculating percentages in terms of votes cast. Although the table cannot confirm or deny this contention, since we do not know what "reality" is, it does indicate some outcomes of this approach. The table presents a time series of intra-year correlations of Liberal and Conservative vote shares, computed first on the basis of votes cast, then in terms of eligible electorate, and finally the partial correlation of Liberal and Conservative vote (calculated on eligible electors), controlling for turnout. The last figure is included in order to demonstrate the possibility and the effects of removing the influence of turnout from the relationship.

As may be seen from this table, the relationship between levels of party vote is often strongly influenced by the rate of turnout. This by no means implies that we should attempt to eliminate the impact of turnout, for this would be to ignore a key element of electoral phenomena; however, on occasion we may wish to evaluate party vote interrelationships independent of turnout level.

Three general observations may be made of the data reported

in Table D-1. First, the coefficients in the first and third columns are quite similar in magnitude and direction (on the handful of occasions of substantial divergence, the partial correlations are uniformly weaker); this is hardly surprising, for these are essentially different mathematical approaches to an underlying phenomenon. This finding confirms our contention that little is lost through neglecting the percentages calculated in terms of votes cast, for the device of partialling out the effects of turnout is readily available, and seems to produce similar results. Secondly, most of the coefficients in the first and third columns, that is with the effects of turnout excluded, are negative, which is only to be expected - indeed, in the pure two party case (i.e. with no independent candidates), the correlations must lie in the 0 to -1 range. This leads to the expectation that, even though it is no longer a mathematical certainty, the correlations incorporating turnout (column two) will also be negative. As it turns out, however, this is the case in only a handful of instances, indicating the extremely strong impact of turnout and abstention on the relationship. Comparison of the second and third columns would of course lead to a like conclusion. Thirdly, not only is the direction of the relationship typically reversed when the effect of turnout is included, but its strength is often dramatically altered. The impact of turnout varies a good deal, it would seem, since the magnitude of the coefficient when turnout is controlled bears little relationship to the coefficients which do control turnout. This impression, gained from "eye-balling" table D-1, was confirmed by plotting the values in

column two against those in column three; the values are entirely unrelated.¹ The basic point, then, is that turnout rates have a powerful, but variable, impact on the relationship between levels of party vote, and although we may wish to separate its effects out on occasion, we are probably obtaining a fuller, more realistic, though more complex, picture by explicitly including it in our analysis via the calculation of percentages on the basis of the eligible electorate.

¹One fascinating quirk did emerge from the scatterplot: although the overall relationship is all but non-existent ($r = -.08$, $N = 30$), when only third party elections are considered (1894, 1919, 1923, 1926, 1934-1975), a positive linear relationship did emerge ($r = .75$; $N = 16$); fascinating as this is, it is beyond the bounds of our enquiry.

TABLE D-1

ALTERNATE METHODS FOR CALCULATING THE CORRELATION BETWEEN
LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE PERCENTAGES OF THE VOTE

Year	Zero-order correlation based on votes cast	Zero-order correlation based on eligible electorate	Partial correlation controlling for turnout
1867	-.96	-.22	-.94
1871	-.86	-.27	-.74
1875	-.48	.17	-.21
1879	-.73	.33	-.29
1883	-.57	.58	-.40
1886	-.62	.15	-.51
1890	-.73	.41	-.49
1894	.00	.45	.12
1898	-.35	.19	-.29
1902	-.84	.35	-.99
1905	-.99	.50	-.98
1908	-.70	.54	-.52
1911	-.82	.52	-.82
1914	-.79	.12	-.61
1919	.02	.05	.03
1923	-.39	.14	-.16
1926	-.65	-.19	-.49
1929	-.53	.42	-.12
1934	-.27	.09	-.34
1937	-.52	-.12	-.52
1943	-.06	.09	.02
1945	-.04	.11	.03
1948	.16	.25	.21
1951	-.01	.32	-.16
1955	.01	.44	-.12
1959	-.14	.28	-.26
1963	-.31	.05	-.39
1967	-.21	-.10	-.21
1971	-.52	-.47	-.51
1975	-.24	-.09	-.25
1977	-.40	-.23	-.46

Appendix E

Tables of Regional Coefficients of Variability

COEFFICIENT OF VARIABILITY
 PARTY SHARES AND TURNOUT
 EASTERN ONTARIO

Year	Liberal	Conservative	Third	Turnout
1867	.25	.26		.14
1871	.22	.28		.21
1875	.23	.20		.13
1879	.38	.24		.17
1883	.30	.15		.12
1886	.24	.30		.14
1890	.18	.20		.16
1894	.23	.39	.40	.14
1898	.29	.21		.12
1902	.27	.17		.15
1905	.34	.19		.20
1908	.18	.17		.13
1911	.26	.21		.15
1914	.26	.29		.13
1919	.34	.36	.23	.08
1923	.19	.26	.28	.19
1926	.21	.27		.13
1929	.26	.12		.15
1934	.16	.25		.04
1937	.22	.42		.06
1943	.27	.45	.56	.17
1945	.26	.37	.71	.08
1948	.24	.21	.44	.12
1951	.26	.24	.55	.12
1955	.27	.22	.63	.17
1959	.26	.21	.40	.15
1963	.30	.19	.23	.12
1967	.23	.24	.89	.12
1971	.27	.28	.54	.08
1975	.30	.32	.41	.08
1977	.44	.32	.44	.10

TABLE E-2
 COEFFICIENT OF VARIABILITY
 PARTY SHARES AND TURNOUT
 LAKE ONTARIO

Year	Liberal	Conservative	Third	Turnout
1867	.54	.25		.20
1871	.47	.30		.35
1875	.25	.17		.12
1879	.16	.11		.09
1883	.21	.22		.20
1886	.16	.10		.09
1890	.13	.13		.11
1894	.18	.18	.38	.11
1898	.30	.12		.09
1902	.24	.10		.10
1905	.31	.15		.19
1908	.18	.09		.11
1911	.24	.09		.15
1914	.25	.11		.12
1919	.52	.35	.36	.27
1923	.26	.16	.28	.10
1926	.11	.13		.08
1929	.18	.08		.10
1934	.11	.10	.04	.04
1937	.10	.09		.04
1943	.11	.15	.43	.07
1945	.10	.08	.37	.06
1948	.14	.11	.43	.04
1951	.26	.14	.35	.05
1955	.15	.14	.46	.08
1959	.22	.15	.48	.10
1963	.21	.10	.52	.12
1967	.25	.17	.68	.08
1971	.26	.14	.68	.05
1975	.22	.15	.47	.04
1977	.45	.15	.52	.06

TABLE E-3
 COEFFICIENT OF VARIABILITY
 PARTY SHARES AND TURNOUT
 GEORGIAN BAY

Year	Liberal	Conservative	Third	Turnout
1867	.11	.05		.05
1871	.42	.15		.16
1875	.38	.27		.11
1879	.26	.11		.13
1883	.26	.26		.27
1886	.17	.11		.09
1890	.32	.21		.18
1894	.41	.30	.51	.21
1898	.19	.24		.18
1902	.21	.15		.21
1905	.31	.14		.18
1908	.28	.09		.15
1911	.40	.12		.21
1914	.23	.07		.11
1919	.14	.21	.17	.08
1923	.33	.17	.28	.09
1926	.18	.17		.07
1929	.16	.10		.07
1934	.06	.09		.03
1937	.07	.07		.04
1943	.28	.15	.28	.10
1945	.24	.18	.44	.08
1948	.29	.11	.49	.09
1951	.21	.09	.33	.08
1955	.34	.09	.43	.13
1959	.40	.11	.28	.12
1963	.34	.11	.34	.11
1967	.35	.15	.43	.11
1971	.35	.15	.27	.05
1975	.33	.09	.38	.05
1977	.47	.16	.43	.05

TABLE E-4
 COEFFICIENT OF VARIABILITY
 PARTY SHARES AND TURNOUT
 GOLDEN HORSESHOE

Year	Liberal	Conservative	Third	Turnout
1867	.12	.14		.10
1871	.15	.29		.14
1875	.06	.24		.14
1879	.09	.30		.16
1883	.13	.15		.07
1886	.12	.18		.10
1890	.10	.18		.13
1894	.09	.09		.08
1898	.08	.13		.06
1902	.09	.08		.05
1905	.07	.07		.04
1908	.27	.14		.08
1911	.26	.16		.16
1914	.20	.12		.11
1919	.43	.24	.46	.08
1923	.38	.24	.53	.21
1926	.47	.16		.10
1929	.43	.12		.18
1934	.15	.16	.91	.05
1937	.09	.23	.80	.05
1943	.13	.28	.23	.05
1945	.25	.17	.24	.04
1948	.31	.19	.24	.04
1951	.32	.13	.36	.10
1955	.24	.22	.45	.10
1959	.33	.25	.48	.08
1963	.31	.26	.55	.05
1967	.30	.25	.35	.06
1971	.26	.24	.28	.06
1975	.27	.27	.35	.07
1977	.37	.31	.43	.07

TABLE E-5
 COEFFICIENT OF VARIABILITY
 PARTY SHARES AND TURNOUT
 WESTERN ONTARIO

Year	Liberal	Conservative	Third	Turnout
1867	.15	.14		.10
1871	.14	.22		.10
1875	.16	.14		.09
1879	.20	.21		.16
1883	.11	.17		.11
1886	.14	.18		.14
1890	.15	.16		.13
1894	.15	.24	.30	.10
1898	.11	.27		.09
1902	.11	.14		.08
1905	.11	.07		.06
1908	.16	.09		.12
1911	.22	.13		.10
1914	.15	.14		.09
1919	.31	.28	.30	.04
1923	.48	.18	.26	.15
1926	.30	.15		.12
1929	.30	.17		.16
1934	.10	.17	.22	.06
1937	.09	.27	.58	.09
1943	.24	.33	.46	.09
1945	.17	.16	.47	.05
1948	.29	.21	.51	.08
1951	.26	.21	.62	.08
1955	.30	.21	.54	.13
1959	.22	.24	.66	.11
1963	.29	.23	.67	.09
1967	.32	.27	.53	.09
1971	.37	.33	.41	.05
1975	.25	.35	.47	.07
1977	.33	.35	.46	.09

TABLE E-6
 COEFFICIENT OF VARIABILITY
 PARTY SHARES AND TURNOUT
 TORONTO

Year	Liberal	Conservative	Third	Turnout
1867	.32	.12		.17
1871	.17	.34		.21
1875	.17	.02		.08
1879	.18	.12		.15
1883	.25	.20		.22
1886	.38	.37		.19
1890	.20	.15		.08
1894	.20	.13		.05
1898	.22	.09		.06
1902	.22	.10		.09
1905	.38	.02		.13
1908	.61	.12		.10
1911	.61	.13		.19
1914	.35	.15		.07
1919	.31	.34	.25	.13
1923	.32	.10	.36	.05
1926	.64	.12		.12
1929	.27	.09		.12
1934	.18	.10	.28	.04
1937	.26	.17	.56	.05
1943	.28	.22	.29	.07
1945	.21	.27	.30	.05
1948	.29	.15	.27	.05
1951	.23	.23	.31	.07
1955	.33	.13	.36	.07
1959	.24	.20	.38	.06
1963	.23	.25	.45	.06
1967	.30	.27	.36	.07
1971	.43	.27	.36	.05
1975	.25	.28	.35	.06
1977	.27	.33	.24	.05

TABLE E-7

COEFFICIENT OF VARIABILITY

PARTY SHARES AND TURNOUT

NORTHERN ONTARIO

Year	Liberal	Conservative	Third	Turnout
1867				
1871				
1875				
1879				
1883				
1886				
1890	.07	.41		.18
1894	.20	.17		.04
1898	.10	.04		.06
1902	.18	.19		.07
1905	.22	.10		.15
1908	.24	.17		.17
1911	.40	.17		.21
1914	.38	.25		.14
1919	.38	.31	.52	.06
1923	.43	.33	.51	.15
1926	.31	.16		.15
1929	.31	.12		.12
1934	.15	.16	.83	.05
1937	.09	.19	.44	.04
1943	.25	.36	.21	.06
1945	.20	.24	.18	.04
1948	.32	.19	.32	.08
1951	.20	.10	.40	.05
1955	.27	.17	.51	.06
1959	.27	.16	.31	.07
1963	.29	.14	.44	.04
1967	.41	.22	.26	.07
1971	.60	.32	.27	.04
1975	.48	.38	.56	.05
1977	.62	.35	.34	.07

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
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LEGEND

- TECK FORMATION
- BLANCHE RIVER FORMATION
- CHAPUT HUGHES FORMATION
- GOODFISH MEMBER
- GOLDTHORPE MEMBER
- GRENFELL FORMATION
- PERRON LAKE FORMATION

- LEBEL FORMATION
- KING KIRKLAND FORMATION
- KEARNS FORMATION
- VIRGINIATOWN MEMBER
- DOBIE MEMBER
- BEAR LAKE FORMATION
- BINNEY LAKE FORMATION
- McELROY FORMATION
- LARDER LAKE FORMATION

PROTEROZOIC

- OTHER UNITS**
- COBALT GROUP
 - INTRUSIVE ROCKS, LARGELY SYENITE
 - CARBONATE ROCK
 - UNNAMED TIMISKAMING CONGLOMERATE AND SANDSTONE
 - UNNAMED TIMISKAMING TRACHYTE, LEUCITITE
 - ABITIBI GROUP

ARCHEAN

ABBREVIATIONS

- CH--CHAPUT HUGHES
- KL--KIRKLAND LAKE
- KK--KING KIRKLAND
- DO--DOBIE
- LL--LARDER LAKE
- VT--VIRGINIATOWN
- KE--KEARNS
- KLF--KIRKLAND LAKE FAULT
- LLF--LARDER LAKE FAULT
- MCF--MURDOCK CREEK FAULT
- BRF--BLANCHE RIVER FAULT
- LoLF--LONG LAKE FAULT
- MICF--MILKY CREEK FAULT
- BF--BOSTON FAULT
- LNF--LINCOLN-NIPISSING FAULT
- ACF--AMIKOUGAMI CREEK FAULT
- BLS--BEAVER LAKE SYNCLINE

SYMBOLS

- Geologic contact
- Faults
- Facing direction
- Anticline
- Syncline
- Town
- Locality
- Highway
- Railroad

Scale on all maps: 1:29,400

