AXIOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY:

NIETZSCHE AND KANT
AXIOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY: NIETZSCHE AND KANT

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Axiological Ontology: Nietzsche and Kant.

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XII, 403
Abstract

The central purpose of this dissertation is to examine the function and role of the concepts "subject" and "object" in the respective epistemologies of Nietzsche and Kant. Initially, it is tentatively assumed that both Nietzsche and Kant admit the primitive irreducibility of a subject-object dichotomy and acknowledge that the "subject" is somehow involved in what it means to be an object. What subject is involved and how it is involved in constituting objectivity makes it necessary to distinguish between two kinds of idealism (Chapter I).

Constructive idealism, a position held by Nietzsche and several British commentators of Kant's first Critique, contends that human needs, shaped by our psycho-physiological constitution, ground a subjective imposition of certain categories upon an objectively given chaos of sensation. Insofar as the empirical or psychological subject imposes such categories as permanence and causality on chaotic sensation, it is claimed that we can never know what exists apart from any and all psychological states (empirical reality) but only how things must look or appear to us.

The second idealistic position is entitled "axiological ontology". It holds, essentially, that we cannot know X (epistemology) unless X is (ontology) a certain way. Permanence and causality are determined to be precisely the way things must be if we are to be able to value them (axiology) appropriately insofar as they promote and maintain human subjects. Throughout the dissertation a case is made for synthesizing elements of Kant's ontology, which guarantees the objective validity or truth of the categories of permanence and causality, and the inroads which
Nietzsche has made in his understanding of how the empirical subject imposes values on such permanent and causally related objects.

Chapter II of the dissertation outlines Nietzsche's theoretical epistemology by conceptually translating the function and role of "Apollo" and "Dionysus" in The Birth of Tragedy. Nietzsche's epistemology attempts to explain in empirical terms, how and why permanence and causality are perceived, conceived, and valued by the human species. Through the prejudices of sense and reason or, what Nietzsche calls "sensual-spiritual appropriation", man alters his sensations so that they give the appearance or look of durability. Subsequently, permanence is conceived as a necessary and therefore valuable category.

Values, for Nietzsche, reflect the affects of the psycho-physiological subject. The affects dictate the subject's needs and objects are therefore valued according to the degree to which they fulfill this need. The appropriateness of values rests squarely on our knowing the objective determinations of both the subject and the object insofar as values are simply relative facts with the subject and object as the correlatives. Nietzsche argues that it is neither necessary nor possible for us to know the objective determinations of either the subject or the object (i.e., to make the looks-is distinction) because "truth" is determined pragmatically, as are all values, by what in fact works towards human promotion.

Chapter III of the dissertation takes the transcendental route to establish the legitimacy of the empirical "looks-is" distinction. First, it reviews constructive idealism by examining its principles collected from individual British commentators of Kant. Constructive idealism
fails as an interpretation of Kant and as an epistemological position in its own right (à la Nietzsche) because it fails to understand or to make the Kantian distinction between what is properly transcendental and what is properly empirical. Kant's transcendental apparatus, viz., transcendental subjectivity and the conditions which it imposes on our experience of empirical objects, is therefore outlined. Space and time as pure a priori forms of intuition and the categories as pure a priori concepts of the understanding establish empirical reality and thereby make it possible to distinguish (empirically) how the object appears from how the object is. This empirical distinction is contrasted with the transcendental distinctions which Kant makes between thing in itself and appearance and between transcendental and empirical subjectivity.

Kant's transcendental idealism establishes the truth or objective validity of permanence and causality and thereby allows the subjective imposition of value (axiological imposition) to proceed within more realistic parameters than afforded to it by Nietzsche. Our ability and our need to know the actual state of affairs of the empirical object, i.e., how the object is apart from any and all psychological states, makes it possible to value an object appropriately. It is only because we know the object as it is and not simply as it looks to me that it can have an appropriate value in the promotion of the human species.
To my wife, Joan

and to my sons,

Tristan and Demian
This would be man's fate if he were nothing but a knowing animal. The truth would drive him to despair and destruction: the truth that he is eternally condemned to untruth. But all that is appropriate for man is belief in attainable truth, in the illusion which draws near to man and inspires him with confidence. Does he not actually live by means of a continual process of deception? Does nature not conceal most things from him, even the nearest things—his own body, for example, of which he has only a deceptive "consciousness"? He is locked within this consciousness and nature threw away the key. Oh, the fatal curiosity of the philosopher, who longs, just once, to peer out and down through a crack in the chamber of consciousness.

F. Nietzsche.
"On the Pathos of Truth".
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Key to Abbreviations

Kant. All quotations from the Critique of Pure Reason are taken from Norman Kemp Smith's translation. All references are given with the usual "A" and "B" numbering, referring to the first (1781) and second (1787) editions, respectively. I have not found it necessary to give anything more than reference to B for passages common to both editions. Internal references are also given for the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic (as Prolegomena plus original section number) as well as Kant's Logic (as Logic plus page reference to the English translation). Please see the Bibliography for complete reference.

Nietzsche. As far as possible, I have attempted to give Nietzsche's own internal references for his published works, e.g., GM III, 2 refers to The Genealogy of Morals, third essay, second section. In this way, any available edition or translation of Nietzsche should suffice. I have followed Walter Kaufmann's technique in Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist of identifying the source of all cited passages, along with the passage, but I have taken the liberty of anglicizing his German short forms. Please see the Bibliography for complete reference.

BT The Birth of Tragedy (1872)
PT Philosophy and Truth (notebooks 1870's)
Use The Use and Abuse of History (1874)
Schop. Schopenhauer as Educator (1874)
HAH I and II Human, all-too-Human (1878-1880)
Dawn The Dawn (1881)
JW Joyful Wisdom (1882-1887)
Zar. Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883-1885)
BGE Beyond Good and Evil (1886)
GM On the Genealogy of Morals (1887)
Twilight of the Idols (1889)
Anti. The Antichrist (1895)
WTP Will to Power (notebooks 1880's)

Hume. Although references to Hume are restricted to Chapter II, section 10 (Nietzsche and Hume: An Excursus), references to Hume have been internalized to facilitate reading and to avoid the abuse of footnotes. References are to Hume's A Treatise on Human Nature, edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge (as T. plus page reference) and to Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge (as E. plus page reference). Please see the Bibliography for complete references.
Chapter I: Subject-Object.

1. The Subject-Object Dichotomy.

It is quite easy to believe that we are aware of ourselves as knowing subjects. It is also quite easy to believe that, at the same time, we are aware of objects in the world about us. We believe that we, as knowing subjects, are something substantially different from any known object although it is not as immediately obvious perhaps that this substantiality must be understood literally, for example, in the Cartesian sense. We might therefore assume, though only initially and deliberately naively, that the starting point for philosophy should rest on the assumption that there are such things as subjects that know such things as objects. It seems that this should be accepted as a brute fact. However, it is not as immediately obvious what the concepts "subject" and "object" contain nor what might make legitimate any initial distinction we feel inclined or even obliged to draw between them. To ground the distinction between the "subjective" and the "objective" seems therefore to be of more pressing philosophical interest and importance than any apparent readiness we might have to accept these concepts wholesale. This is particularly the case insofar as this dichotomy between the subject and the object is thought to set up a tension between what might be called various "subjective" and "objective" elements in the knowledge relation. The general framework of the knowledge relation, which establishes this bipolar tension between subjective and objective elements, is simply "I" (the subject) know "X" (the object) in which the verb "to know" fulfills the role of the Cartesian cogito. Thus, "I see the book", "Tom imagines an apple", "We smell the flower", are all statements which fall within the general
framework of the knowledge relation. It is therefore easy to see how this bipolar tension between what is "subjective" and what is "objective" might be thought to have its very genesis in an original and fundamental subject/object dichotomy understood simply as a philosophical given. However, if we are to assume that there is such a primitive and irreducible givenness to the most basic epistemological elements, namely the "subject" and the "object", then we might begin to philosophize by first soliciting support for the very awareness and acceptance we claim for this original tension. As evidence of this original tension, we could list other, less fundamental epistemological elements, but place them in such a way that they reflect the subject/object dichotomy. After all, it would be thought, on this model at least, that given the mutual exclusion and exhaustion of the original dichotomy, any and all epistemological elements must fall exclusively on one side or the other of this philosophical coin. Thus, if we assume 1) that knowledge is knowledge of an object by a subject and 2) the subject and the object cannot be reduced one to the other, then the following lists of epistemological elements could be offered.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>subject</th>
<th>original tension</th>
<th>object</th>
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<tr>
<td>mind-imposed</td>
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<td>activity</td>
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<td>form</td>
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="elements analyzed by reference to the subject"

="elements analyzed by reference to the object"
A simplistic distinction of the same kind has been drawn by David M. Johnson. Johnson offers what he calls a "...rough, intuitive distinction" between the form and the content of a perception. Our purpose is simply to offer a "rough, intuitive distinction" of the same variety only this time between subjective and objective elements in the knowledge relation in general. These particular elements have a long philosophical history but they have been deliberately weighted in favour of the more Kantian terminology. Kant's epistemology offers, at least a prima facie, dichotomy between such subjective and objective elements in experience. For instance, in the Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant states,

There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience. For how should our faculty of knowledge be awakened into action did not objects affecting our senses partly of themselves produce representations, partly arouse the activity of our understanding to compare these representations, and, by combining or separating them, work up the raw material of the sensible impressions into that knowledge of objects which is entitled experience (Emphasis mine.) Bl.

In this introductory paragraph, Kant has given support (though not yet any justification) for the initial "rough and intuitive" distinction between subjective and objective elements. Similarly, Nietzsche, though by no stretch of the imagination a traditional epistemologist, also gives support to this initial distinction. Nietzsche asks,

What are our experiences, then? Much more what we attribute to them than what they really are (Dawn, 119).

...we make up the major part of the experience and can scarcely be forced not to contemplate some event as its "inventors" (First emphasis mine.) BGE 192.

While Kant refers to the "subject" "working up" raw sense material "...into that knowledge of objects which is entitled experience" (Bl), Nietzsche
refers, in a remarkably similar vein, to the "subject" "making up" a major percentage of his experience. Both philosophers appear to be assuming that the subjective and objective elements in the knowledge relation, whatever they might eventually prove themselves to be, are not only separate and irreducible but, at the same time, are jointly necessary for any experience. The general task of this dissertation is to probe this bipolar tension which is "assumed" by these two philosophers, testing their similarities and dissimilarities in an attempt to put forward what might be called an amalgamated epistemological position, that is, an epistemological position which consolidates the strengths disclosed in the respective theories of knowledge offered by Kant and Nietzsche.

An immediate problem arises from such a simplistic bifurcation of knowledge into the exclusively subjective and objective elements which jointly constitute our experience or knowledge of objects. If, for example, we characterize "sensation" as basically equivalent to passivity or receptivity, as Kant does (B1), then it, at once, becomes necessary to provide some account of the causal interaction which must take place between the subject and whatever it is, some unknown X, which seems to be actively causing the sensations in us. Secondly, if this X, the unknown cause of our sensations, is thought to be something real, which can exist independently of the knowing subject, then sensation qua receptivity seems to entail the claim that there is an ontologically independent, external world but knowledge of this world is either problematic at best or impossible at worst. Sensation would be our only recourse to things in the world and although sensation would always be immediate, the cause of the sensation, viz., the object as it is independently of the knowing subject, could only be known mediately or indirectly. Given the problems of this particular epistemological scenario, it seems to
be impossible to hold a philosophical position that does not immediately feel
the pressure of the conflicting bipolar elements within it. This pressure
is the result of trying to determine exactly what the subjective and objective
contributions to experience are and once determined, to balance them. A
shift in position might be in order to find relief from this tension. How­
ever, we have made the initial assumption that there are both subjective and
objective elements in experience at least to some degree and, apart from the
question what the subject and object might actually be, they are nonetheless
irreducible one to the other. Therefore relief from this pressure cannot be
found in the extremes of materialism nor in absolute idealism. These philo­
sophical positions must be excluded because they remove the conflict between
the subjective and objective elements in the knowledge relation by simply
reducing one set of elements to the other without remainder. Since we have
initially assumed the primitive irreducibility of these elements, these two
particular routes are closed to us. Nevertheless, especially given the,
at least *prima facie* acceptance of this primitive irreducibility by both
Kant and Nietzsche, it is still imperative to determine to what extent the
formal aspect of knowledge actively depends on the subjective side of the
subject-object dichotomy and to what extent the material aspect of knowledge
passively depends on the objective side of the subject-object dichotomy. It
is necessary to pinpoint precisely to what extent this traditional bifurca­
tion which has been naively accepted is really necessary or arbitrary by
determining the exact parameters which the "subject" and "object" have, as
concepts, and thereby to determine the role each plays in the knowledge re­
lation as it is understood to function within the respective philosophies of
Kant and Nietzsche.
However, a critical examination of the conflict between the subjective and the objective elements in the "theoretical" philosophies of Kant and Nietzsche cannot proceed without first clearing a path through certain areas of potential misunderstanding nor without establishing a problem which is of mutual concern to the two philosophers which can serve as the basis or focal point for any comparison of their respective theoretical positions.

Areas of potential misunderstanding might arise simply because we are comparing the systematic, architectonic Kant with the asystematic, aphoristic Nietzsche who sees the will to a system as a blatant example of intellectual dishonesty (Cf. Twi Maxims, 26). Thus, any attempt to compare Kant and Nietzsche, especially on epistemological themes, may be condemned outright as the equivalent of committing a serious category mistake. In fact, the difficulty of making any comparison between these two figures becomes even more exaggerated when it is openly acknowledged that, for the most part, Kant's and Nietzsche's respective philosophical themes are as diverse as the form in which each has chosen to express himself. Perhaps it might even be argued that the very meanings which each of them ascribes to the philosophical enterprise as a whole are so radically and diametrically opposed to one another as to make any fruitful comparison absolutely impossible. Thus, in order to counter this last possible objection, one which, if taken seriously could dissuade any philosophical comparison, it is necessary to establish a philosophical problem which is both central and common to both philosophers. But this problem of shared concern has already been identified as the subject/object dichotomy particularly insofar as this dichotomy is thought to involve some active "production" of the object on the part of the subject. George J. Stack sets the problem in precisely these terms.
...Nietzsche's critique of knowledge and truth may be construed as a kind of hyperbolic Kantianism insofar as he emphasizes the creative, active, productive nature of knowledge and accepts, more or less, the notion that the world of phenomena is shaped by man's perceptual and conceptual capacities....

In this particular passage, Stack highlights the two principal areas of our investigation. First, Stack suggests that Nietzsche's theory of knowledge is indebted, if not to Kant, then at least to some species of Kantianism. This first principal area of investigation will therefore focus on two interdependent issues: 1) Nietzsche's understanding, or misunderstanding as the case may be, of Kant's philosophy in general and of the appearance/thing in itself distinction in particular. It will be demonstrated that Nietzsche rejected a particular conception of the thing in itself, viz., as a metaphysical reality which we could never know. However, it will be demonstrated that Nietzsche's own theory of knowledge will generate its own new conception of a thing in itself, viz., "becoming-in-itself" which shares all of the problems which he ascribed to the older and rejected Kantian conception.

Again Stack has put the problem facing Nietzsche quite succinctly.

Even if we granted to Nietzsche that there is only a fluctuating becoming, that actuality is radically impermanent, does this not mean that he, too, retains a "becoming-in-itself" that is subject to all the criticisms that he directed against Kant's thing-in-itself?

2) It is necessary to understand Nietzsche's evaluation of the appearance/thing in itself distinction and his understanding of the "...creative, active, productive nature of knowledge", to borrow Stack's phrase, especially as this affects the appearance/thing in itself distinction. Essentially, we must come to understand the intricate and complex process by which Nietzsche deems that the world of phenomena is shaped by "...man's perceptual and conceptual capacities", particularly insofar as these two modes of shaping the
phenomena result in a world which, at least, appears to be constituted by permanent objects. In Stack's words,

"Facts" and stable "objects" are construed by Nietzsche as fictions or simplifications that result both from our selective mode of perception and the projection of meaning "into the world".

Although Stack speaks quite generally about "...man's perceptual and conceptual capacities" or "...our selective mode of perception and the projection of meaning 'into the world'", our investigation of Nietzsche's theory of knowledge will look more closely at these "capacities" under the rubrics "prejudice of sense" and "prejudice of reason". It will be demonstrated that although what Nietzsche calls "the prejudice of reason" (Nietzsche's categories) is parasitic on the prejudice of sense, the basis for both of these prejudices must be seen to be the subjective imposition of value and meaning (axiological imposition). How Nietzsche distinguishes between the thing in itself and appearance will be deeply influenced by the consequences of his assessment of the roles of man's modes of perception and conception. In Stack's words,

That the "world" apprehended through perception is "structured" by our particular organs of sense and their specific modes of functioning is a 'world' for us does not undermine the "reality" of that perceptual realm.

The problem raised by Stack, to be answered both by Nietzsche as well as Kant, is clear: In what sense exactly is the object known by the subject? Simply put, does knowledge of an object by a subject by its very nature preclude the possibility of knowing empirical reality by reducing "reality" to the way empirical objects look or appear to be to us? Nietzsche attempts to resolve (perhaps "dissolve" would be a more accurate term) the problem of the "reality" of our perceptual realm by claiming that we should no longer draw the distinction between an unknowable reality such as Kant's thing in itself and a knowable appearance which we have of it. Nietzsche's argument rests on what he views
as the logical vacuity of Kant's distinction between the thing in itself and appearance and perhaps more importantly, on the perceived fact that the general acceptance of this distinction is both detrimental and demeaning to human life. In nuce, Nietzsche advocates the conflation of the "looks-is" or "appearance-reality" distinction. We should value appearance (semblance) as if it were reality (things in themselves) because, after all, that is all we as human beings are epistemologically entitled to. More to Nietzsche's point, and therefore well beyond the scope of any rigorous epistemological rejection of the distinction, is the overman's plaintive, existential cry:

    Behold, I teach you the overman. The overman is the meaning of the earth. Let your will say: the overman shall be the meaning of the earth! I beseech you, my brothers, remain faithful to the earth, and do not believe those who speak to you of otherworldly hopes! (Zar. p. 13).

One last passage from Stack will make clear the role which the Kantian philosophy will have in the resolution of this problem as to the ontological status of the "earth" to which we are to remain faithful.

The repeated notion that our perceptual awareness, our conceptual classifications and discriminations and our metaphorically encrusted language are fables, errors necessary for our survival, inevitable falsifications is often cited in studies of Nietzsche, but rarely challenged.

The central thrust of this dissertation is therefore to take-up Stack's challenge, not only by outlining the specifics involved in perceptual awareness and conceptual classification, but to argue, by way of the Kantian epistemology, that we do, in fact, know empirical reality precisely by means of perception and judgement. Kant's distinction between appearance and the thing in itself will therefore play a major role in meeting this challenge. However, this distinction, although it is more openly and directly addressed
in Nietzsche's works, must be given a secondary role to a more fundamental distinction which Kant makes (and which Nietzsche does not) which returns to our initial acceptance of a subject/object dichotomy. While Nietzsche argues that there can be no knowledge of an object (empirical reality) independently of the "psychological" subject, Kant's epistemology centers on the claim that there can be, and indeed must be, knowledge of an object (empirical reality) independently of the psychological or empirical subject but there can be no knowledge of an object independently of the transcendental subject. The distinction which Kant makes between the empirical and the transcendental subjects is the very foundation of his revolutionary transcendental idealism and will be outlined in Chapter III.

In spite of several areas of potential misunderstanding, it is not only possible but indeed quite necessary to demonstrate that what is of genuine philosophical importance in Nietzsche, viz., those notions for which Nietzsche is most famous ('God is dead', the overman, the eternal return of the same, the will to power), although they rest quite squarely on a weak and inadequate epistemological base, can be made more secure by placing them within a Kantian framework. There is no denying that the end result of this philosophical surgery would be an epistemic entity barely recognizable by its parents who would have bitterly opposed the surgery if they were given half a chance to complain. However, the off-spring does have two strengths in its favour. On the one hand, it has brought along with it the rudiments of Nietzsche's understanding of the subjective imposition of meaning and value on an objectively meaningless and valueless world (axiological imposition). Assuredly, it does not penetrate as deeply within the "new" epistemological position as it did in Nietzsche's own philosophy but it no
longer needs to. While Nietzsche's subjective imposition of values into the world penetrated to the very creation of permanent and causally related objects, the "new" epistemological position will establish the objective validity of permanence and causality by means of the Kantian categories. Hence, the epistemic entity which will arise out of this enterprise will be an "axiological ontology", i.e., an epistemology which will rest Nietzsche's subjective imposition of values on the basis of the Kantian ontology particularly as this offers a transcendental account which will establish the permanence and causal interdependence of empirically real objects in the external world.
2. Preliminary considerations.

Three preliminary considerations will help to clear the ground for this comparison. These considerations include 1) an examination of Nietzsche's attitude toward Kant and the Kantian enterprise, 2) an examination of Nietzsche's attitude toward the theory of knowledge as having central philosophical import, and 3) an examination of Nietzsche's belief that the theory of knowledge should not, indeed, cannot be divorced from human practical concerns.

Nietzsche's attitude toward Kant is inconsonant to say the least. The early Nietzsche, i.e., the Nietzsche of *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872), was quite enthusiastic about Kant. It has been documented by Kaufmann that during this early period of Nietzsche's creativity, Nietzsche considered Kant a possible theme for his doctoral dissertation. However, the least scurrilous remark the later Nietzsche made of Kant, whom he referred to as the "Chinese of Königsberg" (BGE 210), was to say that he displayed "...German profundity and curlícues..." (BGE 11). In more vitriolic moments however, Kant was either an "idiot", a "catastrophic spider" (Anti 11), or a "scarecrow" (WTP 127). Even if there is, at least, a prima facie case that Nietzsche's enthusiasm for Kant dissipated, it is still essential to emphasize with Wilcox that "...[Nietzsche's] own views, especially epistemological, are unintelligible apart from the problems Kant forced upon the nineteenth century". However, Wilcox and I differ primarily on the value of *The Birth of Tragedy* for an understanding of Nietzsche's mature epistemological position. Wilcox states that "...if one developed a theory of Nietzsche's mature epistemological views on that book, it would be wrong
Nietzsche himself says that the text of *The Birth of Tragedy* contains many Kantian "formulas" but lacks both Kant's "spirit and taste" (Attempt 6). It will be demonstrated that if we can view the text of *The Birth of Tragedy* not simply metaphorically or symbolically through the notions of "Apollo" and "Dionysus" (though this must also be done), but also conceptually by "cashing-in" the Apollinian and Dionysian symbols, then Wilcox's evaluation of the usefulness of *The Birth of Tragedy* as the foundation for a mature Nietzschean epistemology will prove both inaccurate and misguided.

Secondly, it must always be remembered that the vehemence with which the later Nietzsche attacks Kant does not preclude either the possibility or the fact that Nietzsche owes Kant a considerable philosophical debt, even if this debt is neither acknowledged nor entirely fruitful.

Until recently, Nietzsche has never been primarily characterized as an epistemologist. His more negative polemics against herd morality, Christianity, Platonism, as well as Kantianism, and his more positive, though aggressive, notions of the revaluation of all values, the overman, and the eternal return of the same, have usually been considered the central themes of Nietzsche scholarship. Even Kaufmann's well known text only touches upon Nietzsche's theory of knowledge. The reason why epistemology has not been of major concern in Nietzsche studies is quite understandable: Nietzsche himself did not see the theory of knowledge as the focal point of philosophy. Nietzsche says, quite explicitly, that "...the value of philosophy does not lie in the sphere of knowledge, but in that of life. The will to existence employs philosophy for the purposes of a higher form of existence" (PT 17). In fact, rather than granting epistemology the status of the focal point of
philosophy, Nietzsche was at great pains to point out that its value was quite the opposite.

Philosophy reduced to 'theory of knowledge'...a philosophy that never gets beyond the threshold and takes pains to deny itself the right to enter—that is philosophy in its last throes...(BGE 204).

Nietzsche saw the service of philosophy to lie primarily in "...a voluntary quest for even the most detested and notorious sides of existence" (WTP 1041). Epistemology, traditionally understood and practiced, denied itself the right to enter the 'most detested and notorious sides of existence'. Nietzsche's philosophy is therefore an attempt to 'cross the threshold' in at least one sense. Nietzsche replaces traditional epistemology with his own "perspective theory of affects".

In place of "epistemology", a perspective theory of affects (to which belongs a hierarchy of the affects; the affects transfigured; their superior order, their spirituality') WTP. 462.

Nietzsche's description of philosophy which has been reduced to the theory of knowledge, that is, a philosophy which "does not cross the threshold" (BGE 204) was directed specifically at the theoretical philosophy of Kant. The Kantian philosophy, which limited reason to make room for faith, was thought by Nietzsche to have made it epistemologically impossible to cross the threshold which separates us from "reality" or the "thing in itself". Although Nietzsche rejects traditional epistemology, Kant's in particular, accepting instead his own "perspective theory of affects", it is somewhat ironic that this historical and thematic confrontation will show 1) that the Kantian philosophy does, in fact, allow us to cross the threshold if by "crossing the threshold" we mean the rejection of the kind of idealism which
persists, prevents us from knowing things as they actually are, i.e., of knowing empirical reality which is understood to be things existing in space and time independently of the psychological subject and that can be known precisely as they are with their objective determinations. In other words, epistemologically speaking, "crossing the threshold" means that we may come to know empirical reality or objects of empirical knowledge and that these objects can be known precisely as they are and not just as they appear or look to be to a knowing subject.

Secondly, in a letter to Carl von Gersdorff, dated the end of August, 1866, Nietzsche offers his own three-point summation of The History of Materialism (1866) by Fr. A. Lange, whom Nietzsche considered "...an extremely enlightened Kantian and natural scientist". It is the first point of this summation which concerns us because it will be argued that Nietzsche never swayed from this particular brand of idealism and that this brand of idealism, and not Kant's transcendental idealism, is precisely the kind of idealism which prevents us from knowing empirical reality.

1. The world of the senses [die Sinnenwelt] is the product of our organization.

2. Our visible (physical) organs are, like all other parts of the phenomenal world [Erscheinungswelt], only images of an unknown object.

3. Our real organization is therefore as much unknown to us as real external things [wirklichen Aussendinge] are. We continually have before us nothing but the product of both.

Nietzsche's particular brand of idealism will entail as a major consequence that "...the sensible world does not exist in the form in which it presents itself to us...". The ground for this misrepresentation, which will result in a form of mis-representational realism, is ourselves understood
to be actively constructive, and therefore distortive, subjects. Even more
ironically perhaps, it will be shown that the "most detested and notorious sides
of existence" (WTP 1041) which Nietzsche's philosophy exposes, along with
his "perspective theory of affects" which he introduced as a substitute for
the Kantian epistemology, together, that constitute the very reason why
Nietzsche's own philosophy is unable to "cross the threshold": simply put, he too has denied himself the right to enter.

Last, but certainly not least, it is important for an understanding,
not only of Nietzsche's theory of knowledge but also of Nietzsche's
interpretation of Kant's theory of knowledge, to keep in mind the extent to
which Nietzsche's practical or pragmatic perspective alters the scope of
what might be considered purely theoretical problems. Kant's faculty psychology,
for example, defines the understanding (Verstand) and reason (Vernunft)
according to their respective functions. Nietzsche says that philosophy,
as it is defined by Kant, is nothing more than "...the science of the
limitations of reason!!" (WTP 488). "Limitations of reason" as opposed to
"limitations of the understanding" might well be a careless mistake on
Nietzsche's part but it also exposes Nietzsche's major criticism of Kant's
philosophy, viz., the separation of theory and practice. Kant points out
within the Transcendental Dialectic (B 350 ff.) that metaphysical errors
have their origin in the indiscriminate use of these two functions thereby
allowing the regulative ideas of reason to function as if they were also
constitutive of nature. But, according to Nietzsche, Kant's philosophy has
wrongly presupposed that epistemological problems can be regarded as merely
theoretical problems, indeed, must only be regarded as theoretical problems.
Thus, in Kant, any sensitivity towards, or concern for, practical existence, everyday affairs of life, or usefulness must be omitted from strictly epistemological considerations. The Nietzschean perspective however, either in doing philosophy generally or in interpreting Kant specifically, is always to subsume the theoretical to the practical (WTP 423, 458). It is therefore to be anticipated that Nietzsche will interpret the Critique of Pure Reason as if it were merely an extension of the Critique of Practical Reason, which is itself, in turn, merely an extension of Kant's unconscious needs, beliefs, and fears. In other words, lurking behind Kant's epistemological position, regardless of the logical tightness of the argument which produced it, Nietzsche will look for some pre-philosophical, pre-logical need, belief or fear. In this way, Nietzsche attempts to reduce the elements of Kant's constitutive theory of knowledge, such as synthetic a priori judgments, space and time as pure forms of intuition, and the pure concepts of the understanding or the categories, to regulative beliefs (but not truths) necessary for existence (BGE 11). These epistemological considerations of Kant were deemed to be equal in philosophical status, but more importantly, in existential value, to the postulates of practical reason. Thus God, freedom of the will, and the immortality of the soul, along with causality, permanence, substance, and space and time, i.e., the constitutive, epistemological elements of the first Critique, are thought, by Nietzsche, to be "inevitable", practical beliefs which have been found necessary for a particular mode of existence. Although perhaps not as simple as this, for the most part it will be argued that Nietzsche effectively reduces the theoretical to the practical and ultimately to the level of the human biological constitution in its daily concern for survival. Paralleling Kant's claim concerning transcendental
ideas (ideals) in the first Critique, Nietzsche argues that we have a natural inclination or propensity to overextend the scope of the so-called "theoretical" elements. However, it must be remembered that Nietzsche does not so much confuse the use of the regulative and constitutive in Kant as he does conjoin them. He does not say that this is what Kant ought to have done but insists that this is what Kant, in fact, did, in spite of his attempt to do the contrary (See BGE 4, 11). Thus, Nietzsche offers us a picture of the Kantian metaphysics interpreted as a metaphysics based on Kant's own inner psychology (WTP 424, 576, 579). Nietzsche therefore interprets Kant's famous dictum: "I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith" (Bxxx) as just one instance of Kant having to falsify "...things and thoughts at which he arrived in another way by imposing on them a false arrangement of deduction and dialectic. Thus Kant falsified in his 'morality' his inner psychological tendency..." (WTP 424. Emphasis mine.) Thus Nietzsche can refer to "...Kant and his 'backdoor philosophy' as I call it..." (Twi. Expeditions 16. See also Dawn, 1886 Preface III) because Kant's foreground philosophy is nothing more than "...a desire of the heart that has been filtered and made abstract—" (BGE 5); it is, in less lyrical terms, "...physiological demands for the preservation of a certain type of life" (BGE 3). However, it is not Kant's 'morality', or for that matter any philosopher's morality, understood in the narrow sense of a philosopher's explicitly stated ethics, that concerns Nietzsche. As we shall see, Nietzsche understands a philosopher's morality, which is a falsification of the philosopher's own "inner psychological tendencies", to be equivalent to those "articles of faith" (Dawn 90, 199; JW III, 110; BGE 223; WTP 530) which shape each and every thinker's
perspective. In a sense, having a morality is holding a particular, but necessary, perspective realizing that for Nietzsche, "...perspective [is] the basic condition of all life" (BGE Preface). Nietzsche will draw a very tight connection between the morality a philosopher holds to be true and the unconscious existential fears and needs which generate not only the morality but our belief in it as well. This generation takes place through a physiological-psychological mechanism which still needs to be sorted out. However, as a preliminary consideration, it must be remembered that Kant's theoretical philosophy, as it is to be found in the first Critique, is understood in Nietzsche's mind to be a paradigm for all and any theoretical philosophy. In the particular case of Kant's theoretical philosophy, it is thought by Nietzsche to be merely a grandiose product of Kant's unconscious existential fears and needs.

In the philosopher, conversely, there is nothing that is impersonal; and above all, his morality bears decided and decisive witness to who he is -- that is, in what order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand in relation to each other (BGE 6).

The 'theoretical' philosophy of Kant is therefore said to be the product of Kant's practical concerns originally derived, and ultimately reducible to, an unconscious psycho-physiological level or "cultural need".

Kant said (in the second Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason): "I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith. The dogmatism of metaphysics, that is, the preconception that it is possible to make headway in metaphysics without a previous criticism of reason, is the source of all that unbelief, always very dogmatic, which wars against morality."

Very significant! Kant was impelled by a cultural need!

A cultural need impels Kant; he wishes to preserve a domain from knowledge: that is where the roots of all that is highest and deepest lie, of art and of ethics--Schopenhauer (PT. 10-11).
Given these three preliminary considerations, it is safe to say that Nietzsche's "epistemology" is not surprisingly covert and that a considerable amount of effort must be made in order to distil it into a conceptual, "theoretical" position. From that vantage point, it will be possible to see how closely Nietzsche's form of idealism parallels the idealism of Kant. It will be a question of determining if and how we are subjectively held back from reality.
3. Two Kinds of Idealism.

The bipolar tension which results from the assumption of an original subject-object dichotomy may be explained in terms of two, radically distinct idealistic positions. This means, generally speaking, that there are two fundamentally different ways of idealistically interpreting the subject's relationship to the object which respects the irreducibility of the subject and object themselves. Thus, an analysis of these two forms of idealism will exclude the kind of idealism which Kant refers to as "intellectual" or "creative intuition" (intuitus originarius, B 72), in which the entire object is thought to be originally created in the very act of thinking about it. This position is excluded from discussion because it obviates the need for determining on which side, of the original bipolar tension, the elements which constitute the object fall. For on this idealistic view, there can be no affection on the part of the given insofar as there is simply nothing to be given in any genuine sense whether the given be thought to be an object in its own right or scattered, atomic elements of sensation out of which an object is constructed. For something to be given in a genuine sense, it must be given as intuitus derivativus, that is, given as an intuition which is "...dependent upon the existence of the object, and is therefore possible only if the subject's faculty of representation is affected by that object" (B 72). Creative intuition therefore removes the foundation for the original subject-object dichotomy which has been provisionally accepted with its resultant tension. Subsequently, creative intuition removes the foundation for the notions of meaning, significance, truth, evidence, objective validity, and correspondence which, it will be demonstrated, make philosophical sense only within a
framework which sees the subject and object as conceptually distinct, epistemological elements. Creative intuition is therefore dismissed essentially because it identifies epistemology and ontology, by accepting that the object is simply because it is known. Thus, absolute idealism, by inflating the subject to absolute dimensions, violates the independence of the object. Similarly, materialism, by collapsing the subject to objective, material elements violates the independence of the subject. The two idealisms to be considered both assume and respect the primitive irreducibility of the subject and object.

The first of these two idealistic positions to be considered seriously, insofar as it assumes the genuine givenness of both the subject and the object, may be called "constructive idealism." Constructive idealism is to be found, as we shall see, not only as a dominant element in Nietzsche's philosophy, but it is also found to be a very persistent, if not widely accepted, interpretation of Kant's transcendental idealism. This particular interpretation of Kant, to be outlined quite briefly below but in greater detail in Chapter III on Kant, is the dominant British interpretation of Kant, that has had its advocates from the early 1920's to the present day. Although there is no denying that differences of interpretation abound when discussing such British notables as Russell, Ewing, Broad, Paton, Kemp-Smith, Walsh, Strawson, Wilkerson, and Bennett, for the most part "constructive idealism" finds it safest haven within their ranks. In fact, it might be fairer to these gentlemen to say that "constructive idealism", as it is defined herein, has been itself constructed from elements of their respective philosophies.

The constructive idealist position accepts the givenness of some
independent, ontological element as an essential part of the knowledge relation. However, it understands this element to be the thing in itself and identifies it with reality. The thing in itself is therefore the real but unknowable source of our ever-changing, chaotic manifold of sensation which is, in itself, devoid of all form (permanence, order, unity, causality). The subject therefore does not materialize the object but, in some sense, he is thought to construct it or to manufacture it out of this raw sense data. On this model, what it means to be an object of empirical knowledge is therefore equivalent to being the product of a joint venture. The empirical object is the result of a mental process of constructing, according to rules, the chaotic mass of sense data which has been given to us from this "external", unknowable reality. Constructive idealism therefore demands that there must be a subjective act of imposing some specific form or rule upon the objectively given chaos of sensation. C.D. Broad's comments accurately reflect this particular element of constructive idealism as an interpretation of Kant.

Kant makes man a constructor, though not a creator of nature. We do not indeed create nature on his view; for our materials are crude sense-data and are due to things-in-themselves. But we certainly do construct it on Kant's view; for the sensa as they come to us are a mere chaotic mass, and every definite object of human knowledge--such as chairs, tables, atoms, etc.--has been made by selecting and combining sensa according to rules which are innate in our minds.19

According to Wilkerson, appearances, that is, the objects which we experience, are simply the joint product of 1) a disorganized jumble of experiences or sensations which are caused by things in themselves or reality and 2) the knowing subject. The knowing subject, it seems, has the option of either selecting20 sense impressions out of the manifold
at the level of sense-perception or of imposing categories of the understanding at the level of conception, or both in order to produce an empirical object. For according to constructive idealism, and in the words of Wilkerson, "...the senses only yield a feeble and muddy approximation to genuine knowledge...". "Sensibility produces a disorganized jumble of experiences, a 'manifold of intuitions'...".

Although constructive idealism claims that we do not create the ontological or given element (the thing in itself or reality) as creative intuition would have us believe, once we accept an element in our epistemology which is, in itself, a "mere chaotic mass", we are forced, it seems, to establish some mode of construction, or manufacturing on the part of the subject, in order to account for the fact that by merely opening our eyes, we are able to perceive such determinate objects as tables and chairs. It is necessary to give this chaotic mass of sensation some specific form in order to have such elements in our ontology as tables and chairs. This is accomplished supposedly by imposing some specific form upon formless sensation. This process is necessary because, quite understandably, to be confronted by a chaos of sensation rather than an orderly assortment of such things as tables and chairs, is not conducive to knowledge and, a fortiori, life. Thus, according to Broad and others we are thought to "make" or "construct" such objective things as tables and chairs through various subjective formalizing or uniting principles, viz., the categories, which are modes for collecting and collating sense data. As Wilkerson says,

...Kant apparently makes the Berkeleian claim that objects of experience or phenomena are merely collections of representations, collections of perceptions, the result of the joint constructive endeavors of sensibility and understanding. Space and time are 'in us', patterns according to which our minds construct a picture of external things, and they are in no sense external to or logically independent of ourselves. (Emphasis mine.)
While Broad understands what it means to be an object such as a chair or a table to be the result of a kind of logical construction, i.e., that a "chair" is nothing more than the number of actual and possible sense data which the mind has collected and collated and thereby thinks to be a chair, other constructive idealists, such as A.C. Ewing, have understood the construction of an object in a very physical way. This is deemed to be possible because space and time, conditions for something's being physical, are subjectively imposed. Ewing, for example, claims that we "...also determine outer sense by a synthesis which combines the manifold into physical objects in space." T.E. Wilkerson also understands the construction of the object of knowledge to be physical; "...objects must be spatial and temporal because our minds construct them so." J. Bennett adds "...that the over-all nature of our experience reflects the spatio-temporalizing, categorizing impact of the mind upon our data." Bennett, although he believes that Kant, at times, argues for such an imposition theory (while at other times, Kant is said to argue for a selection theory), finds great difficulty identifying precisely what it is that constitutes the non-mental component of the knowledge relation.

A major objection to the imposition theory is that it represents experience arising from a transaction between the human mind and ... what? Something non-empirical, anyway, since everything empirical arises from the transaction. Perhaps, then, it is a transaction between the human mind and things as they are in themselves!

It should be noted that according to C.D. Broad (and paralleled entirely by Nietzsche), it is not possible to be aware of these acts of construction because they take place, quite conveniently it seems, on a completely preconscious and therefore prereflective level. In fact, the act of
constructing is understood to be a necessary condition for consciousness of objects. However, because Kant divides the mind into two, quite distinct faculties, viz., sensibility and understanding, it is possible to compounding the complexity of the process which is thought to result in the production of the empirical object of experience.

Thus, constructive idealism, particularly as it stands as a possible interpretation of Kant's transcendental idealism, regards the empirical object of knowledge (or appearance) as the joint product of the thing in itself (reality) and the human mind. Since the human mind is "responsible" for space and time, as well as permanence and causality, i.e., for providing both the a priori forms of intuition as well as the categories of the understanding, it is possible to know a priori the form of all of our experiences. This is possible because, on this model, what we are experiencing when we have knowledge of empirical objects is the way reality must appear to us to be. Similarly, as the content of experience, viz., sensation, is thought to be at least, in part, dependent on the thing in itself (an unknown reality), then it is not possible to know a priori the content of any experience. Schematically, constructive idealism has the following format:
Metaphorically, constructive idealism claims that we "make" tables and chairs in much the same way that a baker makes a cake. We have available to us, all of the single ingredients (material content or sensation), though we do not know where the ingredients come from. The single ingredients need to be brought together or united by the baker (the transcendental unity of apperception) according to some recipe. The recipes are various formalizing or uniting principles (the categories and a priori forms of intuition), and serve as modes of reification,
i.e., modes for making non-things, things. All of the elements which are combined together in the prescribed manner produce something substantial and permanent, viz., an object. Other metaphors used in lieu of the recipe model include cheques, blue- or rose-coloured spectacles, and sausage machines.

In sum, constructive idealism assumes the following:

1) it is possible to know only the way the empirical object looks, seems, or appears to us.
2) the subjective mode of cognition modifies the way in which the object in reality (the thing in itself) appears to us.
3) it is possible to know a priori certain things about the way the empirical object looks because it must look some way in accordance with the subjective mode of cognition.
4) it is never possible to know reality.
5) the way the object is in reality (position 4) is not the same as the way the empirical object appears to us (position 1), insofar as the subjective mode of cognition, through constructing, distorts our view of reality.

These five defining characteristics of constructive idealism can also be found in Nietzsche's philosophy. Although it is not fair to Nietzsche to claim that he is, strictly speaking, a constructive idealist and nothing more, it is fair to Nietzsche to claim that he too shares most of the defining characteristics of the constructive idealists. Nietzsche claims, for example, that it "... is to be proven that all constructions of the world are anthropomorphic, indeed, if Kant is right, all sciences" (PT 32).

Here one may certainly admire man as a mighty genius of construction, who succeeds in piling up an infinitely complicated dome of concepts upon an unstable foundation, and, as it were, on running water (PT 85. Emphasis mine.).
Nietzsche is a constructive idealist at least insofar as he claims that the world about us, that is, the objects of our experience, have already been simplified by man. The human being has already participated in the construction of his world and what "reality" might be, that is, what anything we experience might be like apart from our knowing it—-that for Nietzsche was an unanswerable question.

...this simplified, thoroughly artificial, suitably constructed and suitably falsified world...(BGE 24).

As Nietzsche says, "We look at everything through the human head and cannot cut this head off; while the question remains, what would be left of the world if it had been cut off?" (HAH I, 9. See also Dawn 438, 444; WTP 517, 518, 550; JWV, 374).

The second idealistic interpretation of the knowledge relation which is to be considered may be called "axiological ontology". It accepts the genuine givenness of an ontological element but views this element as empirical reality rather than as an unknowable thing in itself. Thus axiological ontology accepts as a matter of fact that objects can and do exist, and can be known to exist, quite independently of the psychological subject. Subsequently, axiological ontology accepts the empirical reality of the objects which it is given to be a neutrally valued presentation of permanent and causally interrelated things, i.e., a confrontation with an empirical reality which includes such things as tables and chairs. Secondly, axiological imposition, i.e., the imposition of meaning and value by the subject, is understood to be the projection of meaning and value on something which can legitimately serve as a genuine
basis for such an imposition. It will be argued that this is possible and philosophically plausible only insofar as 1) axiological imposition can depend on an ontology of permanent and causally related things 2) that these things are empirical reality and not merely appearances of some unknown, transcendent reality such as the thing in itself, 3) that claims which are made concerning these empirical objects, that is, claims concerning their objective determinations, can be verified. In fact, these claims must be verifiable, at least in principle, otherwise it becomes impossible to make sense as to the meaning of such claims as "this X has value for me" or "this is a valuable X". In other words, axiological imposition makes philosophical sense only if it is true that there really are such things as tables and chairs, empirically speaking, and that these things can and do exist independently of the psychological subject. It is also necessary that we can come to know these things not merely as they look to be to us because of some psychological idiosyncrasy which we might have, but as they actually are, that is, to know their objective determinations. This means essentially that there must be a radical separation between claims about the way object X looks or appears to be (semblance) and claims about the way object X is (reality) because, it will be argued, without access to the way things are, there can be no truth understood to be the correspondence between a judgement and thing judged. Axiological ontology will therefore be demonstrated to rest on the acceptance of a particular interpretation of the ontology of Kant, once that ontology has been sorted out and removed from the inadequate interpretation of his British commentators, an interpretation which views Kant as the paradigm of constructive idealism.
However, it is only possible to justify the claim that we do have knowledge of real, permanent, and causally related objects in the external world (the necessary prerequisite for axiological imposition), if Kant's fundamental distinction, viz., the distinction between the empirical and the transcendental levels of thinking is brought into sharp focus. In fact, Kant is mistakenly thought to be a constructive idealist precisely because his British commentators have confused, and therefore have conflated, the empirical-transcendental distinction. Although this distinction will be fully analyzed in the chapter on Kant (III), simply put, by conflating the empirical and the transcendental distinction, these Kant commentators believe that the Kantian premise that we can only know appearances and never the thing in itself, forever dooms us into accepting the further premise that we only know appearances of reality and never reality itself. It will be demonstrated that there is another way to interpret Kant which lifts this doom by giving us access to empirical reality or, in Nietzschean terms, allows us to cross the threshold. However, access to this empirical reality is possible only by first establishing the necessity of the transcendental-empirical distinction and through it, by sorting out the thing in itself/appearance distinction which is the usual sore spot for both attacking as well as misunderstanding Kant's philosophy.

Metaphorically, axiological ontology is very much akin to the taking of a photograph. The photographer (the subject) must decide from among the things which are given to him, which things are to be centralized or made important, i.e., made meaningful or valuable. The photographer is not confronted with a chaos of sensation which, upon taking a photograph mysteriously becomes tables and chairs and decides which of these things is to be photographed (valued). However, there are two, quite distinct
levels to be isolated in this analysis: 1) the importance which the object has for this subject (axiological imposition), i.e., how do the object and the subject mutually affect one another? This is especially important because a "value" will be shown to be a special kind of relational fact which necessitates our knowing precisely the objective determinations of the two correlatives; 2) the objectivity of the object, i.e., how is it that we can be correct in thinking that there are permanent objects in the world, that there is change, or causal interaction? These "ontological" problems must be resolved before the imposition of value can be existentially plausible.

In sum, axiological ontology will be put forward as the most viable of the two idealistic interpretations of the knowledge relation because it has the strength of a more tenable, that is, a more "realistic", account of Kant's ontology and, at the same time, the original and valuable inroads which Nietzsche has made into axiology, i.e., the subjective imposition of value and meaning in the world. This is possible because what Nietzsche does in his philosophical enterprise falls entirely within the empirical framework in Kant's sense. In other words, there is no reason whatsoever why our valuation cannot penetrate to the very depths of thinghood as Nietzsche suggests as long as we are speaking about "thinghood" as a question of empirical objects. Driving axiological imposition to the deepest reaches of what it means to be an empirical object will still not interfere with Kant's transcendental idealism. Axiological ontology therefore is an attempt to weld together the great strengths of Nietzsche's axiological imposition and the Kantian ontology. In order to do this successfully however, it is necessary to distinguish (where Nietzsche himself does not)
between types of value by demonstrating that permanence and causality are not different from all other values by kind insofar as permanence and causality are logically necessary prerequisites for anything else to become of value for us. The position of axiological ontology will therefore be generated out of two, more or less, independent accounts. The first account (Chapter 2) will separate the genuine Nietzschean insights into axiology from the weaknesses inherent in his epistemological position while the second account (Chapter 3) will draw the transcendental-empirical distinction in Kant, establish the objective validity of permanence and causality as categories, and offer at least a more convincing account of the thing-in-itself/appearance distinction than the account witnessed by constructive idealism.
Chapter II: Nietzsche

1. The Birth of Tragedy.

In The Birth of Tragedy (1872), Nietzsche establishes a basic metaphysical structure which undergoes very little, if any, alteration over the seventeen years remaining in his creative life. Nietzsche describes this structure poetically through the metaphors of "Apollo" and "Dionysus". Although most of The Birth of Tragedy deals with art qua works of art, as expressions of the Apollinian and the Dionysian influence, the importance of the text, philosophically speaking, centres on Apollo and Dionysus as the basic constituents of Nietzsche's theory of knowledge.

It has already been stated that Nietzsche's epistemology will be rather difficult to descry. This will be particularly evident in The Birth of Tragedy in which Nietzsche, as philosopher-poet, uses artistic and poetic metaphors in lieu of crisp and precise, philosophical concepts. Undoubtedly, this is one reason why John Wilcox refuses to acknowledge the centrality of The Birth of Tragedy for any interpretation of Nietzsche's theory of knowledge. However, The Birth of Tragedy, once its metaphors have either been separated from or translated into concepts, can clearly be shown to be the crux of Nietzsche's epistemological thinking. This thinking rests entirely on a bipolar tension, a literal "tension" in The Birth of Tragedy, between subjective and objective elements in knowledge.

Though The Birth of Tragedy artistically expressed the interaction of two metaphors, viz., Apollo and Dionysus, any attempt to remain philosophically rigorous is doomed to failure from the outset, if an analysis of Nietzsche's epistemology is confined solely to these metaphors qua metaphors. Although there is little doubt that to remain within the confines of these poetic
metaphors is truer, both to Nietzsche's spirit and methodology, there comes a point when it is necessary to translate these metaphors into more recognizable and readily workable, philosophical concepts, that is, if Nietzsche is ever to be valued more widely as a genuine philosopher. In other words, by translating Nietzsche from poetic metaphors to philosophical concepts, it is possible to establish the claim that he is a genuine philosopher, addressing himself to legitimate philosophical issues, not just within the poetic and existential circles in which he is already a laudable figure, but within the analytic tradition as well. This would establish the sympathetic focus necessary to compare the respective epistemologies of Kant and Nietzsche. Nevertheless, before a more analytic exposition of the relationship between Apollo and Dionysus can be offered, an exposition that will also demonstrate Nietzsche's debt to Kant, it is first necessary to understand the relationship between Apollo and Dionysus simply within the context of The Birth of Tragedy as "...two interwoven artistic impulses..." (BT 12) that are "...mutually augmenting one another" (BT 4). This, more lyrical exposition, will attempt to keep the "spirit and flavour" of Nietzsche, as far as that is possible, because it is precisely the "spirit and flavour" of Nietzsche which we stand to lose when we "cash-in" his poetic metaphors (and quasi-metaphors) for philosophical concepts according to their specific function in Nietzsche's thought. The more analytic exposition of Apollo and Dionysus, to be offered in the subsequent section of this chapter, will focus attention primarily on how the concepts "Apollo" and "Dionysus" together serve as the foundation both for Nietzsche's theory of knowledge and for his understanding of the subjective imposition of values and meaning which is a major element within it.
Nietzsche, as a precursor of Freud, believes that man's dreams have the task of both compensating for, and justifying, our existence in the world.

Oh world of phantoms in which we live! Oh world so perverted, topsy-turvy, and empty, and yet dreamt of as full and up-right (Dawn 118. Cf. 119).

Our nightly dreams deliver us, it seems, from our human inadequacies by compensating for all of the negative aspects of existence which we confront throughout the day. By analogy however, mankind is itself thought to be the poetic or artistic expression of another artist. Dreaming mankind offers this "true author" justification and compensation for its existence.

...nor are we the true authors of this art world. On the contrary, we may assume that we are merely images and artistic projections for the true author, and that we have our highest dignity in our significance as works of art--...(BT. 5).

Nietzsche characterizes the original substratum, out of which all things must come as if from a dream, as a reality which is never at rest and never quiescent. Out of this underlying, divine, primal unity springs all individuation and multiplicity. However, man's vision of this reality or substratum does not necessarily coincide with the substratum itself. The substratum, as far as it can be "known", if, in fact, it can be "known" at all (a point yet to ponder), is neither placid, quiet, harmonious, nor restful. On the contrary, Nietzsche claims that it is full of conflict, cruelty, and suffering. Although this substratum or reality is described as the horror in nature or as tragedy at the heart of things, man's mythic vision of this substratum is a vision of a benevolent, perfect, and happy divinity. The reason why we are deceived into misperceiving this discrepancy lies at the very core of the Nietzschean theory of knowledge and
of his understanding of Kant's thought.

Nietzsche's "argument" in *The Birth of Tragedy* is that the underlying, divine ground or reality requires some form of compensation or justification for its existence just as man does with his visions and dreams. This compensatory justification, in Nietzsche's mind, is the origin of all forms of creativity, human or divine. The substratum itself has the inherent urge to create in order to justify its own existence and we, the result of its creative urge, share the inherent urge to create as well. Although dreams are said to be our vehicles of self-justification, these dreams must not be understood solely in the narrow sense of private images and thoughts passing through the mind of a sleeping person. Dreams and visions, or in more general Nietzschean terms, "artistic projections" (BT 5), must also be understood in the broader sense of public or shared images and thoughts passing through the minds of those who are legitimately awake. However, what is pivotal in Nietzsche's radical reinterpretation of the Greeks is the "tragic" characteristics which underlie all creativity and which necessitate the myth, dream, or "Apollinian illusions" which are said to justify our existence.

...without myth every culture loses the healthy natural power of its creativity: only a horizon defined by myths completes and unifies a whole cultural movement. Myth alone saves all the powers of the imagination and of the Apollinian dream from their aimless wanderings (BT. 23).

Nietzsche understands the making of myth or the fashioning of a vision, that is, "art", to have the expressed purpose of saving the Greeks from the horrors which they saw in nature.

...the highest and, indeed, the truly serious task of art—to save the eye from gazing into the horrors of night and to deliver the subject by the healing balm of illusion from the spasms of the agitations of the will--... (BT. 19).
Art was created by the Greeks in order that they should be able to endure life, i.e., in order that they should be able to live at all.

That life is really so tragic would least of all explain the origin of an art form--assuming that art is not merely imitation of the reality of nature but rather a metaphysical supplement placed beside it for its overcoming (BT. 24. Emphasis mine.)

Art complements nature, for with art alone lies the possibility of improving nature by alleviating the suffering that must necessarily come with it. We can accept this suffering and live with it only by means of art, that is, only by means of creating visions or horizons which neutralize the inherent suffering of existence. In metaphorical terms, the Greeks had to create light because of their dark visions.

When after a forceful attempt to gaze on the sun we turn away blinded, we see dark coloured spots before our eyes, as a cure, as it were. Conversely, the bright image projections of the Sophoclean hero--in short, the Apollinian aspect of the mask--are necessary effects of a glance into the inside and terrors of nature; as it were, luminous spots to cure eyes damaged by gruesome night (BT. 9. Emphasis mine.).

Nietzsche's radical reinterpretation of the Greeks centered on the claim that the Greeks were not, in fact, a serene and complacent people. They, more deeply than any other people, looked into the horrors of nature and, as a necessary result, created for themselves tragedy as an art form. Art was created by them in order that they might alleviate their "...glance into the inside and terrors of nature" (BT 9). Art allowed the Greeks to tolerate life; it allowed them to live and to prosper. Art was therefore not a mere diversion but rather "...the highest human task, the true metaphysical activity..." (BT. Preface to Wagner). It is "...the metaphysical intention of art to transfigure" (BT 24).
The true capacity of art is to take man beyond nature. In this way, art provides for man an "aesthetic existence". According to Nietzsche, man's existence should only be justified aesthetically, that is, through art. Art, understood generally as any form of creative compensation, should constitute the world's only justification; "...existence and world seem justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon" (BT 24); "...the existence of the world is justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon" (BT. Attempt. 5). The kind of justification which Nietzsche demands for existence and the world must be understood in contradistinction to the kind of justification which he emphatically rejects. It is the contrast between these two modes of justification which will later find its way in Nietzsche's writings as two different modes of imposing value and meaning on the world and it will constitute his strongest charge against Kant.

Nietzsche maintained that the "Christian" or "moral" justification of existence and the world implicitly denied the value of existence and the world on their own. Christianity, seen as a paradigm for any Platonic or "other-worldly" system of valuation, sought to obliterate or annihilate all earthly conflicts and inadequacies rather than overcome them. The value that the world has, on the "moral" model, is thought to be guaranteed only insofar as it is deemed to be a product of a perfect God. However, if God is perfect, the world must be less than perfect in comparison. Consequently, we should aspire to another higher, more valuable world and move away from this world which is necessarily incomplete, imperfect, less valuable. Nietzsche rejects this model of justification because it obviates the possibility for the world to justify its own existence and value. As long as we continue to accept an external justification for existence, then the
source of that justification will be deemed more real, true, and valuable at the expense of the value and reality of this world. On Nietzsche's "aesthetic" model, there is no longer any need to justify the good or evil, the happiness or the suffering of existence precisely because existence is neither good nor evil. "There are no moral phenomena at all, but only moral interpretations of phenomena--" (BGE 108). Nietzsche advocates that we accept this world and our existence within it, with all of its inadequacies, because, simply put, there is nothing else. But we can accept this world it seems only if we are able to compensate for these experienced inadequacies through art for "...art, and not morality, is presented as the truly metaphysical activity of man" (BT. Attempt. 5).

Although Nietzsche emphasizes the tragic characteristics of existence and the terrors of nature which can only be overcome through art, his attitude toward existence must certainly be seen to be anything but pessimistic, at least, in the Schopenhauerian sense. Nietzsche does not despair or acquiesce in the face of life's suffering. Rather, he views the tragic openly and honestly and prescribes, that in spite of the horrific vision, we should embrace all of existence in a Dionysian affirmation.

...my instinct went into the opposite direction from Schopenhauer's: toward a justification of life, even at its most terrible, ambiguous, and mendacious; for this I had the formula "Dionysian" (WTP 1005).

We are asked to affirm life, complete with its terrors and horrors. We must therefore not deny this life nor attempt to escape from it. In this sense, we must be positive in our valuation of existence, but this is possible only through art. Only through art can existence itself be trium-
phant. In fact, art is the creative antidote to the resignation and
denial of life which is the hallmark of pessimism. Nietzsche's philosophy
which arises from The Birth of Tragedy is therefore an attempt to replace
the pessimism which is the result of a moral justification of life, a
pessimism of weakness (which ultimately and inevitably degenerates into
nihilism), with an unique form of pessimism which is the result of an
aesthetic justification of life, a jubilant pessimism of strength through
art, an "...uncanny, unbounded Yes and Amen" (Zar. p. 165).

According to Nietzsche, art or beauty must be placed alongside the
horrific in order to veil it. Only man can see the horrific and there-
fore only man can create the beautiful; "...beauty triumphs over the
suffering inherent in life; pain is obliterated by lies from the features
of nature" (BT 16). These "features of nature" are very aptly described
by Nietzsche in a passage from Beyond Good and Evil (9).

Imagine a being like nature, wasteful beyond
measure, indifferent beyond measure, without
purposes and consideration, without mercy
and justice, fertile and desolate and uncertain
at the same time; imagine indifference itself as
a power--how could you live according to this
indifference? Living--is that not precisely
wanting to be other than this nature?

We see the tragic in nature and from this vision springs the beautiful
in order to sustain life. Beauty allows man to overcome or transform nature
by supplementing it, or by adding to it, rather than by denying, annihilating,
or attempting to escape from it. Art and beauty serve as counterpoints or
balances which coincide with our realization of the tragic. The dark and
the light must balance one another. In more familiar Nietzschean terms,
"...the continuous development of art is bound up with the Apollinian and
Dionysian duality..." (BT 1). Without the so-called "middle world of art",
that is, without Apollinian intervention, man cannot survive. Dionysus needs, indeed, it demands the "brotherly" (BT 21, 24) expression of Apollo; "...all this was again and again overcome by the Greeks with the aid of the Olympian middle world of art; or at any rate it was veiled and withdrawn from sight" (BT 3). Beauty and art are Apollinian. They are a remedy, a salvation, a "redemption" or "deliverance" (Zar. p. 137), an escape from the fear and anxiety which are part of the very fabric of existence. By creating an illusion, and by living within the horizon of this illusion, we sustain our existence inspite of the Dionysian darkness of reality. Art is the "healing balm" (BT 19) which reduces the suffering gained by our looking into the depths of nature. Art is therefore a necessary after-effect produced by our looking into the unbearable, "Dionysian abysses" (BT 14); "...it was only his Apollinian consciousness which, like a veil, hid this Dionysian world from his vision" (BT 2).
2. Apollo and Dionysus.

In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche can establish that art is the "...truly metaphysical activity of man" (BT. Attempt, 5) by understanding the term "art" in two ways. First, "art" is taken in a narrow sense to mean "works of art". Individual works of beauty such as sculpture and painting are said to be the result of personal glimpses into the ugliness of existence. However, "art" is also understood in a 'broader, profounder, and metaphysical sense' (BT 15), as a synonym for the creation of general meaning horizons which are imposed upon nature in order to overcome it. "Apollinian illusions" are simply the general meaning horizons within which we live. "Perhaps art is even a necessary correlative of, and supplement for science?" (BT 14). Science is just one of many different "horizons of meaning" within which we must live our lives. It is now possible to "cash-in" Nietzsche's poetic metaphors (and quasi-metaphors) for philosophical concepts because the specific functions of the "Apollinian" and the "Dionysian" as metaphors have been disclosed. However, Nietzsche himself provides the key for this "cashing-in" process in the 1886 Preface to *The Birth of Tragedy* (5) when he says that "...all of life is based on semblance, art, deception, points of view, and the necessity of perspectives and error" (Emphasis mine.), and again when he equates art with science, religion, and morality (BT 15; HAH I, 6, 15; JW II, 107; WTP 853). While on a strictly aesthetic level, "Apollo" represents the plastic images of sculpture and painting which artists create having viewed the tragic horrors of the Dionysian, on a metaphysical level, "Apollo" represents those structures or features (earlier identified as Apollinian illusions and later to be identified as Nietzschean categories) which everyone qua artist
must place beside nature in order to overcome it (BT 15, 24). "Art" is therefore understood to be a metaphysical supplement precisely because it is that which we must add over and above (meta) what there really is (physis). "Dionysus" is therefore the metaphor which Nietzsche uses to represent what there really is, viz., physis, nature, or reality. Dionysus represents the way things actually are, the actual state of affairs which, according to Nietzsche, is bottomless, an abyss.

By Nietzsche's own definition, a "metaphor" is "...a vicarious image that he actually beholds in place of a concept" (BT 8). Although Nietzsche himself argues in Truth and Lie in the Extra-moral Sense that all words are metaphors, it is possible to draw at least a provisional distinction within his metaphors which will enable us to sort them into three separate classes, viz., metaphors proper, quasi-metaphors, and concepts. The metaphors proper are the most lyrical and poetic symbols which Nietzsche uses in The Birth of Tragedy. They are more figurative than functional but functional nonetheless. All of the metaphors, quasi-metaphors, and concepts which Nietzsche uses, either to represent Apollo and Dionysus (or "Apollo" and "Dionysus" themselves) are terms which represent a particular function or thing. The concepts which Nietzsche uses are just metaphors which are more abstract and prosaic than other terms which he uses. Concepts offer either a more literal description of the function or thing which they represent or they already have a tradition within the history of philosophy as concepts. Quasi-metaphors, the "gray area" between metaphor and concept, contains terms with features which might well fall into either of the other two camps. If concepts are simply metaphors that are filtered and made abstract, then these provisional distinctions are simply means of
exposing degrees of abstraction for terms which are used to represent one specific function or thing. Within The Birth of Tragedy, the following terms are used to represent Apollo and Dionysus respectively:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Apollo</th>
<th>Metaphor</th>
<th>Quasi-Metaphor</th>
<th>Concept</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>art</td>
<td>illusion</td>
<td>appearance</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>vision</td>
<td>lie</td>
<td>phenomenon</td>
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<tr>
<td>veil</td>
<td>semblance</td>
<td>empirical reality</td>
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<tr>
<td>beauty</td>
<td>deception</td>
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<td>dream</td>
<td>delusion</td>
<td>measure</td>
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<td>maya</td>
<td>contrivance</td>
<td>stability</td>
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<td>redemption</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dionysus</th>
<th>Metaphor</th>
<th>Quasi-Metaphor</th>
<th>Concept</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>terror</td>
<td>heart of nature</td>
<td>the essence of things</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>horror</td>
<td>the contradictory</td>
<td>thing in itself</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suffering</td>
<td>primordial unity</td>
<td>reality-truth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abyss</td>
<td>excess</td>
<td>change</td>
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It must be remembered that in "An Attempt at a Self-Criticism", the 1886 Preface to The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche himself points out that the original text of 1872 is liberally dotted with "Kantian formulas". If a central formula can be disclosed within The Birth of Tragedy, it would be that Nietzsche's cosmos is such that "...the only truly real Dionysus" (BT 10) never stands alone; Apollo must always stand beside it in order to overcome it. Generally speaking then, Apollo is the world created by
man in his role of metaphysical artist. However, even a cursory applica-
tion of "Apollinian" to "Dionysian" concepts yields what, at first glance, is a Nietzschean interpretation of Kantian epistemology. Apollo is the appearance which veils the Dionysian thing in itself. However, Nietzsche views the Apollo/Dionysus bipolarity in another way. Although it is still necessary to argue for this particular interpretation, there is every indication in Nietzsche that Apollo represents "meaning", "value", "permanence", "causality-order" while Dionysus represents "chaos-becoming-flux", "valueless" and "meaningless" existence. Thus Nietzsche's basic formula in which Apollo is simply imposed upon Dionysus would entail that order is imposed upon chaos and permanence is imposed upon flux. Epistemologically speaking, we should come to see in due course that Apollinian illusions are just various modes for organizing the manifold, giving meaning and value to a meaningless and valueless existence, and, to anticipate Nietzsche, for "...stamping becoming with the character of being" (WTP 617), a formulation which becomes the very essence of the will to power in Nietzsche's philosophy. Epistemological formulations of this kind are central to Nietzsche's thought and are to be found passim in the majority of Nietzsche's published writings as well as his unpublished notebooks. The basic formula is that Apollo is imposed on Dionysus; order and permanence are imposed on chaos and flux; meaning and value are imposed upon an essentially meaningless and valueless existence.

The meaning and the value which man is said to create is meant to compensate for the presence of the terror and horror of the Dionysian abyss and to give man's existence its justification for "...the existence of the world is justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon" (BT. Attempt, 5; 24). Man creates a horizon of meaning and value around himself in order
to be able to live for "...only a horizon defined by myths completes and unifies a whole cultural movement" (BT 23). This horizon of meaning, however, will be shown to correspond to the categories of thought which are believed to be necessary for an accurate, i.e., truthful understanding of the way things actually are. However, Nietzsche questions the very truth of these categories and attempts to expose them as simply Apollinian illusions, i.e., illusions which masquerade as the truth. Apollinian illusions are nothing more than enduring categories, the use of which preserves the lives of would-be knowers of Dionysus, "...the terrifying and questionable character of existence" (WTP 853). While tragedy has its birth out of the spirit of music, it has its death out of the spirit of Socrates. "Socrates" symbolizes a would-be knower of the Dionysian. In his optimistic, rationalistic scienticism, Socrates alone assumes that he can penetrate to the very depths of the Dionysian abyss. Yet, for Nietzsche, in direct opposition to Socrates and his optimistic spirit, the very categories through which we come to understand our world are nothing more than illusions and lies; they are metaphysical supplements placed beside nature (reality, the Dionysian) in order to overcome it; "...beauty triumphs over the suffering inherent in life; pain is obliterated by lies from the features of nature" (BT 16). Man requires illusion.

In the text of The Birth of Tragedy (18), Nietzsche describes three such 'planes of illusion'. First, there is the Socratic or Alexandrian culture which sees Socrates as the paradigm of the scientific man of knowledge. The Socratic man optimistically assumes that his knowledge can, and eventually will, penetrate to all eternal truths and will therefore eventually come to know everything.
To fathom the depths and to separate true knowledge from appearance and error, seemed to Socratic man, the noblest, even the only truly human vocation (BT 15).

Now we must not hide from ourselves what is concealed in the womb of this Socratic culture: optimism, with its delusion of limitless power (BT 18).

Secondly, there is the artistic or Hellenic culture which is "...ensnared by art's seductive veil of beauty" (BT 18). Thirdly, and lastly, there is a tragic or Buddhistic culture that derives its metaphysical comfort from the wisdom that "...beneath the flux of phenomena, eternal life flows on indestructibly" (BT 18). Nietzsche believed that modern European culture was dominated by the Socratic man of theoretical science. However, Nietzsche also believed that a culture based on this particular, Apollinian illusion ("...this sublime metaphysical illusion accompanies science" (BT 15); "...science, spurred by its powerful illusion" BT 15) was doomed to failure for two reasons. On the one hand, such a culture was destroying itself from within because it was beginning to fear the conclusions generated by its own scientific penetration. These conclusions were thought to undermine the very premise on which Socratic culture rests, viz., the "...faith in the explicability of nature and in knowledge as a panacea" (BT 17).

Basically, Nietzsche believed that science was demonstrating the inappropriateness of its own optimism by establishing the unknowability of nature's depths. The optimism of science and its claim to universal validity were being "...destroyed by the evidence of these limits..." (BT 17). On the other hand, this undermining of the fundamental premise of science, viz., the knowability of everything, eroded the very optimism which served as the driving force behind all scientific investigation. According to Nietzsche, it was Kant and Schopenhauer who delivered the fatal blow to the scientific
man by establishing the phenomenality of the world of the sciences. It was Kant's first Critique which, according to Nietzsche, destroyed "...scientific Socraticism's complacent delight in existence by establishing boundaries..." (BT 19). Nietzsche applauded Kant's efforts to transform Socratic culture to a culture of the tragic.

...great men, usually gifted, have contrived, with an incredible amount of thought, to make use of the paraphernalia of science itself, to point out the limits and relativity of knowledge generally, and thus to deny decisively the claim to science to universal validity and universal scope. And their demonstration diagnosed for the first time the illusory notion which pretends to be able to fathom the innermost essence of things with the aid of causality.... Kant showed that these [space, time, and causality] really served only to elevate the mere phenomena, the work of maya, to the position of the sole and highest reality as if it were the innermost and true essence of things, thus making impossible any knowledge of this essence (BT 18. Emphasis mine.).

According to Nietzsche, Kant and Schopenhauer inaugurated the replacement of the degenerating Socratic culture with the culture of the tragic. However, it is important to note that the "tragic" culture, ushered in by Kant and Schopenhauer to the detriment of the "Socratic" culture, is simply the replacement of one "plane of illusion" (BT 18) by another. Although Kant is partially responsible for transforming Socratic culture to a culture of the tragic, Nietzsche clearly distinguishes between the Buddhist and the Kantian kinds of illusion within the same plane. The Birth of Tragedy (18) has already demonstrated that, in Nietzsche's mind at least, "the innermost essence of things" or "the innermost and true essence of things" can never be known. On Nietzsche's interpretation of Kant, the unknowability of the true essence of things (the thing in itself) is thought to be a consequence of Kant's thesis that what we do "know" are
merely phenomena or appearances. Although we are said to "elevate" the mere phenomena to the position of "the sole and highest reality" (BT 18), it is, nevertheless, maya or illusion.

And we, completely wrapped up in this illusion, and composed of it, are compelled to consider this illusion as the truly non-existent--i.e., as a perpetual becoming in time, space, and causality--in other words, as empirical reality (BT 4).

In a Nachlass passage of the 1870's (PT 41), Nietzsche draws a distinction between an "actuality [which] exhibits nothing but illusion" and an "actuality exhibiting an appearance which is totally adequate to the truth". Although the passage is somewhat ambiguous, it seems that Nietzsche identifies Kant's "thing in itself" not only as a true essence which cannot be known, a premise which reduces "appearance" to illusion, but appearance or actuality is said to be nothing but an illusion. It is, simply put, non-being and there can never be a question as to the adequacy or inadequacy of the illusion. In other words, on Nietzsche's interpretation of the Kantian model, it is absolutely impossible to know how closely appearance corresponds to reality. Nietzsche is therefore decidedly sympathetic to the Buddhist model. On Nietzsche's account, the Buddhist's "true essence of things" which lies behind appearance or actuality can, in some relatively minor sense, be known. Actuality or appearance is said to exhibit an appearance which is "adequate" to the truth (Cf. PT 32, 39).

Against Kant, it must always be further objected that, even if we grant all of his propositions, it still remains entirely possible that the world is as it appears to be (PT 32). Nietzsche therefore understands the Kantian "thing in itself" to be actuality or reality which we cannot know. What we do know, viz., the phenomenal world or the world of appearances, is not even an adequate appearance of reality. Since, in Nietzschean terms, we do not know the truly
Dionysian but must have instead an Apollinian illusion whose adequacy to the truth can never become a question, then it may be said that Dionysus fulfills much of the role of Nietzsche's own interpretation of Kant's "thing in itself" while Apollo fulfills much of the role of Nietzsche's own interpretation of Kant's "appearance". Hence, it is said that we can never come to know the thing in itself, understood to be reality, for our knowing it, ex hypothesi, entails that it has become mere appearance for us. The "middle world of art" (BT 3) is always thought to stand between man and reality.6

Apollo may well be called "empirical reality" and indeed valued as "reality" yet, in actual fact, Apollo is illusion, "...the truly non-existent" (BT 4). On the other hand, "...the truly existent primal unity" (BT 4) is Dionysus. It too is reality but a reality that can never be known. It is precisely because the Dionysian reality can never be known and that we must, by necessity, have the Apollinian illusions in order to live, that Nietzsche "elevates" the Apollinian to the value of reality.

...the reality in which we live and have our being is also mere appearance, and that another, quite different reality lies beneath it (BT 1).

Apollo is said to be "reality" (BT 1, 4, 14) but it is clear that this Apollinian reality is not reality at all but an appearance of it. Nietzsche equates "this world" (BT 4) with "empirical existence" (BT 4), "everyday reality" (BT 4) and "empirical reality" (BT 4, 7). Since empirical reality is characterized by "time, space, and causality" (BT 4, 18), then all temporal, spatial, and causally related things are, as Apollinian projections, simply appearances and not reality. On the other hand, Nietzsche refers to "Dionysus" as "the heart chamber of the world will" (BT 21), "the insatiable will" (BT 18), "the uninhibited effulgence of the unconscious will"
(BT 21) but, more importantly, he identifies "the will itself" with "the inner essence" (BT 17). The Dionysian therefore has an "...eternal life beyond all phenomena" (BT 16); "...it is a sphere which is beyond and prior to all phenomena" (BT 6). The inner essence, the "heart of the world" (BT 21) simply is the "true reality" (BT 21), the "thing in itself" (See PT 83). Appearance, although equated with "empirical reality" is simply illusion and deception (See WTP 853). However, the world of which we are aware is precisely the world of Apollo. Apollo is that "middle world of art" (BT 3) which serves as an intermediary between man and the Dionysian. Apollo is visible and illuminated. Dionysus, on the other hand, is not visible or illuminated. It defines illumination (BT 15), in fact, it is that which could never be illuminated (BT 11) and therefore could never reach consciousness. Although The Birth of Tragedy claims that some tragic vision or insight into the Dionysian is possible (BT 15), Dionysus itself is unconscious (BT 21) or at least remains unconscious to us. However, if true knowledge is meant to be "...an insight into the horrible truth" (BT 7), then it must be remembered that the Apollinian and Dionysian must always remain balanced.

Of this foundation of all existence--the Dionysian basic ground of the world--not one whit more may enter the consciousness of the human individual than can be overcome again by this Apollinian power of transfiguration. Thus these two art drives must unfold their powers in a strict proportion, according to the law of eternal justice. (BT 25. Emphasis mine.)

Although Zarathustra speaks reverently of a man who "...unlike other men, conceives reality as it is" (EH IV, 5), and of a "...Dionysian affirmation of the world as it is" (WTP 1041), the rule stands unchanged: whatever of the Dionysian enters consciousness, must be covered over.
...it was only his Apollinian consciousness which, like a veil, hid this Dionysian world from his vision (BT 2).

...consciousness resolutely keeps the external world at a distance (BGE 34).

We live only by means of illusions; our consciousness skims over the surface. Much is hidden from our view (PT 18).

The Dionysian reality is an "unfathomable depth" (BT 19). As such, it remains "mysterious" (BT 1, 4, 17, 24), "concealed" (BT 9) and "hidden" (BT 4). However, what characteristic or characteristics must the Dionysian reality display, to necessitate its being covered over by an Apollinian illusion? The Birth of Tragedy claims that Dionysus is "immeasurable" (BT 20), an "absurdity" (BT 7), "incomprehensible" (BT 22), a "riddle" (BT Attempt 4). Dionysus is a reality which is "uncertain" (BT 11), "intangible" (BT 5), "inchoate" (BT 5), and 'aimless in its wanderings' (BT 23). More importantly, for an understanding of Nietzsche's epistemology at least, Dionysus is described as a "primeval chaos" (BT 12; WTP 508, 515), that is, as a reality in "process" (BT 21), in "continual transition" (WTP 521, 1049, 1050), in "flux" (WTP 520), a "motley and manifold world" (BT 14; Cf. PT 36, 47, 48). This description of a reality which is in flux can be traced from The Birth of Tragedy (1872) to Nachlass material of the late 1880's. It is described as the "tragic existence of Dionysus", the "eternally flowing" in The Birth of Tragedy (18); the "flux or continuum of sensation" or "chaos, which lacks order, arrangement, and form" in Joyful Wisdom (III, 109, 112); it is the "river of becoming" in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (p. 113); the "motley whirl of the senses" in Beyond Good and Evil (14) and "change, passing away, and becoming" in Twilight of the Idols (III, 2). Nietzsche believes that the manifold of sense, or what physically
corresponds to the Dionysian concepts, is chaotic and unorganized apart from any subjective or Apollinian additions. The manifold is change, process, Heraclitean flux. Nietzsche comes to this belief, which will be demonstrated to serve as the basis for the remainder of his epistemology, by assuming that there is no real or genuine permanence in the world. In other words, Nietzsche thinks that the senses are accurate only when they show change and passing away. He excludes the possibility that there really is something permanent in the world even though the senses happen to show at least as much relative permanence and stability (objects) as they do impermanence and instability. In this sense, Nietzsche seems to be driven, much as Plato is in the Theaetetus, to deny the possibility of either saying anything truthful concerning things or knowing how these things actually are in the world. This is thought to be the case because within the framework of the correspondence theory of truth, and the notion of "evidence" which will later be demonstrated to complement it, it is deemed, by Nietzsche, to be impossible to say anything which is true about things unless there are "things", that is, permanent entities or objects, there to be known. Hence, the existence and observation of change and process are believed to exclude the existence, though certainly neither the apparent observation of the permanent nor our thinking that there is a permanent. This is thought to be the case whether the permanent is understood externally in terms of the object (Vide Appendix X) or internally in terms of the ego (Vide Appendix XI). The absence of any permanence is sufficient, according to Nietzsche, to exclude the possibility of saying something, viz., a judgement, which is truthful. This is, in part, what Nietzsche means when he says that "We are altogether unable to think anything at all just as it is--" (WTP 436. Cf. PT 43). We cannot know,
therefore cannot think or judge, anything as it actually is because nothing "is" in a world of change and process. In substance, Nietzsche is attacking the knowledge relation: I (subject) know X (the object) because it presupposes two things (literally) which Nietzsche refuses to grant, viz., the actual rather than the apparent existence of a relatively permanent subject and a relatively permanent object. Nietzsche's major epistemological task is therefore to demonstrate why we think, indeed, must think that there is permanence, and why we have the apparent observation of a world of stable objects.

There is another characteristic of Dionysus which must also be overcome by the Apollinian. Not only is Dionysus a flux which must be reified and ordered by Apollo but Dionysus is "ambiguous" (WTP 1005) as well. Needless to say, if Dionysus is ambiguous, it is quite certain that Apollo is impowered to balance this ambiguity. Apollo is therefore described by Nietzsche as "...all that simplifies, distinguishes, makes strong, clear, unambiguous" (WTP 1050). Nietzsche's major point in The Birth of Tragedy is that Apollo "...makes life possible and worth living" (BT 1). Dionysus must therefore be a reality that has neither value nor meaning on its own so that Apollo makes life possible by the very introduction of meaning and value even though they are, at bottom, Apollinian illusions.

...there is only one world, and this is false, cruel, contradictory, seductive, without meaning--A world thus constituted is the real world. We have need of lies in order to conquer this reality, this "truth", that is, in order to live--that lies are necessary in order to live is itself part of the terrifying and questionable character of existence. WTP 853 (Emphasis mine).

It suffices that the more superficially and coarsely it is conceived, the more valuable, definite, beautiful, and significant the world appears. The deeper one looks, the more our valuations disappear--meaning-
lessness approaches! We have created the world that possesses values! (WTP 602. Emphasis mine).

We have seen that in itself, the Dionysian manifold has neither order, unity, nor permanence. It is also thought to be completely devoid of value and meaning for the "...value of the world lies in our interpretation" (WTP 616).

Our values are interpreted into things. Is there then any meaning in the in-itself?! Is meaning not necessarily relative meaning and perspective? All meaning is will to power (all relative meaning resolves itself into it). (WTP 590).

The following table establishes in outline Nietzsche's fundamental position regarding the defining characteristics of the manifold as it is in itself, i.e., apart from any subjective additions or tamperings. In itself, the Dionysian manifold has:

1. no permanence, i.e., always changes (WTP 616)
2. no order, arrangement, form (JW III, 109; WTP 569)
3. no similarity (WTP 569)
4. no units or unities (WTP 715)
5. neither purpose nor manageability (WTP 584)
6. no meaning (WTP 853)
7. no value (JW IV, 301; Zar. p. 113; WTP 708).

It is neither coincidental nor arbitrary for Nietzsche to understand the absence of permanence and order and the absence of meaning and value in the manifold to be members of the same conceptual family. This is due to the fact that the interdependent relationship which he believes to exist between permanence and order on the one hand and meaning and value on the other is the key to his entire epistemology. However, it is philosophically more advantageous to view the elements of Nietzsche's epistemology individual-
ly. This will enable us to see why Nietzsche understands what might be
called the categorical elements (permanence and order) and the axiological
elements (meaning and value) under one heading. Initially, we should
investigate, in general terms, why Nietzsche claims that although we both
observe permanence and think there is permanence behind observed change,
there is really only change and passing away. "The indestructible is
but your invention" (JW. Poem: To Goethe).

In sum, Apollo represents conscious order and the organization of
appearance which thereby introduces individuation, measure, and limit.
We do not, indeed, cannot know the "truly existent primal unity" (BT 4)
which lies behind the appearance which we do experience because human
existence is thought to be possible only insofar as we have already
transfigured our awareness of it. Man, it seems, may never come to know
'the general character of the world'.

The general character of the world...is to all eternity
chaos; not by the absence of necessity, but in the
sense of the absence of order, structure, form, beauty,
wisdom, and whatever else our aesthetic humanities are
called (JW III, 109. Emphasis mine.).

However, according to Nietzsche, the "world" cannot be devoid of order,
structure, form, and beauty for these are precisely the elements which con-
stitute a "world", "...for what you have called world, that shall be created
only by you" (Zar. p. 86. Emphasis mine.). The "world" is the Apollinian
horizon of meaning and value which, of necessity, veils the Dionysian. Man
must therefore overcome nature by reifying and ordering the chaos with which
he is confronted. To view nature directly, that is, to perceive or to know
nature directly, without recourse to art as a metaphysical supplement, is
deemed to be impossible because it would mean our inevitable destruction.
Art, in both the narrow and the broad sense, is that which gives "...the
greatest possible depth and meaning to life and actions..." (HAH I, 6), by making the Dionysian chaos "endurable" (HAH I, 151; JW II, 107). What appears to us in experience is durable because, according to Nietzsche, it has been made durable, lasting, permanent. Once the depth of the concept "art" has been realized, any attempt to understand the parameters of human existence and the richness of its meanings and values must first have to take into consideration that meaning and value are merely projections which we have imposed on nature. Value and meaning are therefore invented rather than discovered. Any system of valuation, that is, any horizon of meaning in which we live (religion, philosophy, morality, science) must be understood to be but a natural development of the original "artistic" man (BT 14; HAH I, 222; WTP 670).

Only man placed value in things to preserve himself----he alone created a meaning for things, a human meaning. Therefore he calls himself 'man' which means: the esteeemer (Zar. p. 59).

However, each individual artist is not free to impose his own limitations upon this substratum nor to select the elements from the actual nature of things which he wishes to know. Man's capacity for imposing and selecting is strictly limited, i.e., the categories through which he comes to understand and to perceive the world are strictly limited. The modes of perceiving, conceiving, and evaluating the world are established by what best preserves the species.
3. Prejudice of Sense.

The "prejudice of sense" is Nietzsche's way of reconciling two of his most fundamental assumptions. On the one hand, he assumes that the actual state of affairs as it exists independently of the knowing subject, i.e., independently of the psycho-physiological subject, is one in which permanence, among other things, has no real place. On the other hand, Nietzsche assumes that, even at the level of sense perception, we seem to be confronted by a world filled with permanent things. However, if perception, even apart from conception, gives us, at least, the semblance of permanence, then given the initial assumption that there simply is no genuine or real permanence, perception must, in some sense, be initially interpretive. The mode of perception itself must be partially responsible for our seeing "things". It is necessary for Nietzsche to concede that we perceive a world of at least relatively permanent things because he will later claim that it is the artificial durability of these perceived things which serves as the necessary foundation for subsequently 1) conceiving "thinghood" on a secondary, categorical level and 2) for giving "things" value and meaning on a tertiary, axiological level (HAH I, 151; JW II, 107). These two initial assumptions force Nietzsche to draw a distinction which, in effect, parallels the distinction he has already made between Apollo and Dionysus. "Dionysus" stands for the ontological world (actuality) which is thought to be in constant flux and change (becoming). "Apollo", on the other hand, stands for what we believe to be the ontological world or actuality which has some change but which is primarily an actuality constituted by relatively permanent things. In fact, any change which is observed is thought to be attributable only to some changing feature or state belonging to some permanent
thing. Nietzsche claims that it is only because we, at least, believe that we are living in a world of relatively permanent things that our lives can have any value or meaning. Nietzsche's theoretical-practical philosophy is therefore an attempt to explain both how and why our perception, conception, and evaluation of the actual state of affairs in the world (becoming) is mis-represented by us. In other words, although "becoming" is said to be the defining characteristic of the actual state of affairs in the world, as it exists independently of the knowing (psycho-physiological) subject, we perceive permanence, conceive permanence, and value permanence. Nietzsche attempts to explain at least the "how" of this mis-representation or distortion by taking the modes of perception, conception, and evaluation in turn and by exposing how our initial mis-representation at the level of sense perception (prejudice of sense) generates the further mis-representations and distortions which we encounter both at the level of conception (prejudice of reason) and at the level of evaluation (axiological imposition). Schematically, Nietzsche's programme is as follows:

Dionysus

= the actual state of affairs as it exists independently of the knowing subject, i.e., the psycho-physiological being.

= becoming (no permanence, no order, no similarity, no unity, no purpose, no meaning, no value)

Apollo

= the state of affairs which the psycho-physiological subject 1) perceives 2) conceives 3) values.

1) Prejudice of Sense = the unconscious process of "simplifying" the manifold of sense which results in our perceiving the semblance of permanent things
2) Prejudice of Reason = the imposition of certain endurable categories including thinghood, permanence, causality, upon what is perceived.

3) Axiological Imposition = the specific impositions of value on things and relations between them.

Nietzsche believes that there is a two-fold falsification of the actual state of affairs (becoming) which is the result of two separate, but not independent, prejudices. There is prejudice on the part of the senses (WTP 617) or sense prejudice (WTP 635) and prejudice on the part of the spirit (WTP 617) or psychological prejudice (WTP 635). By means of these two prejudices, Nietzsche attempts to account for the apparent fact that we see "things" which are, at least relatively permanent and not a manifold of chaotic sensations, i.e., a myriad of successive and passing sensations which, if they were to present themselves as atomic and dissimilar elements, would be an accurate reflection of their cause, viz, becoming. Throughout his account of these two prejudices, Nietzsche assumes that for something to be really permanent, change can neither be observed nor predicated of it.

Nietzsche accepts succession, change, process, and impermanence as accurate descriptions of the objective state of affairs existing independently of the subject.

With the highest respect, I except the name Heraclitus. When the rest of the philosophic fold rejected the testimony of the senses because they showed multiplicity and change, he rejected their testimony because they showed things as if they had permanence and unity. Heraclitus too did the senses an injustice. They lie neither in the way the Eleatics believed, nor as he believed—they do not lie at all.... Insofar as the senses show becoming, passing away, and change, they do not lie (Twi. Reason. 2).

What Nietzsche is claiming is that 1) what there is independently of the knowing subject (which, for Nietzsche is always man as a psycho-physical
entity), constantly changes. It is in a state of perpetual flux and
becoming. 2) Our sensations are also constantly changing insofar as they are
caused by what exists independently of the knowing subject and it is in
perpetual flux. Yet 3) we believe that we observe both change and permanent
things. On Nietzsche's model, although the change may accurately represent the
actual state of affairs (becoming), permanence is assuredly a misrepresentation.
If both what there is (becoming) and our sensations which are derived from it
are in a perpetual, Heraclitean flux, then it is necessary for Nietzsche to
account for, at least, the semblance of permanent things which we observe.\footnote{11}

By "prejudice of sense", Nietzsche understands an unconscious and
uncontrollable process which serves to simplify the multiplicity of sensation
which, in itself, i.e., before any subjective tampering, is both confusing and
chaotic. The prejudice of sense is the means by which this multiplicity of
sensation is rearranged, altered, and distorted so that we are not aware of a
myriad of dissimilar impressions because what is offered to consciousness are
either similar or identical impressions. Nietzsche thinks that the chaotic
material of the senses is "logized".

The material of the senses adapted by the understanding,
reduced to rough outlines, made similar, subsumed under
related matters. Thus the fuzziness and chaos of sense
impressions are, as it were, logized ... (WTP 569. Emphasis mine.)

The role of the prejudice of sense is "... to reduce confusing
multiplicity to a purposive and manageable schema..." (WTP 584), "... to
master the multiplicity of sensations..." (WTP 517) because there are "... no
facts, everything is in flux, incomprehensible, elusive ...") (WTP 604).
In Beyond Good and Evil (230), Nietzsche outlines the role of the spirit as
precisely "... the will from multiplicity to simplicity." The will is also
said "... to appropriate the foreign ... to assimilate the old to the new, to simplify the manifold, and to overlook and repulse whatever is totally contradictory." The "appropriation of the foreign" is precisely the means by which the spirit is said to simplify the manifold of sensation. This is certainly not a rare or even perverted or misdirected function of the spirit because Nietzsche makes it quite explicit that "... life itself is essentially appropriation..." (BGE 259) and that this appropriation includes the "... overpowering of what is alien and weaker". This is accomplished, he claims, through the "... imposition of one's own forms" (BGE 259. Emphasis mine). Although there is no form whatsoever in nature (see PT 40 and 43), Nietzsche claims that our "... eyes detain us at the forms" (PT 18). Sensory impressions which are both multiple and complex are unified and simplified first, at the level of images for the eye and secondly, at the level of language which uses universal concepts or general notions "constructed" from sensations. Nietzsche argues that the "... forms of the intellect have gradually arisen out of the matter" (PT 39) where "matter" is specifically thought to be sensation as well as memory (see PT 35). For Nietzsche, memory is an "... original property" (PT 35), i.e., each individual memory is thought to include the memory of all generations that preceded us. Thus thought "... provides us with the concept of a totally new form of reality: a reality constructed from sensations and memory" (PT 35). But even before thought, concepts, and language can come into play, "... sensation immediately projects forms, which in turn produce new sensations" (PT 26). It is clear then that on Nietzsche's model of perception, as well as his model of conception which is parasitic upon it, there is distortion of the original sensory impressions which results in an image or form which is, in no sense, equivalent to the truth.
Nature has cushioned man in sheer illusions: that is man's proper element. He sees forms and feels stimuli rather than truths (PT 57-58).

According to Nietzsche's account, there are actually no permanent objects to be perceived; there only seem to be permanent objects. Nietzsche makes it abundantly clear that on his thesis, there are, in actuality, no things (HAH I, 19; WTP 634); that things are fictions invented by us (WTP 634, 635); that there are no endurable things or equal things, i.e., no substances (JW 110); that we posit substance (WTP 531) and create things by making identical (WTP 521); that a thing is simply a belief or an "it is considered" (WTP 556); that a thing has no constitution in itself (WTP 559); that a thing is a belief in a fixed unity (WTP 538); that a thing is nothing more than the sum of effects which have remained constant and interpreted through causality (WTP 635); that the thing qua the sum of effects which have remained constant is only synthetically united by a concept (WTP 551, 635); that belief in things is presupposed by logic (WTP 516); and that thought first re-forms the world into things, i.e., into the self-identical (WTP 521, 574) because this is presupposed by knowledge. Nietzsche's rejection of the permanent and substantial is so complete, the actual state of affairs cannot even be described as composed of atoms because atoms too are constructed "things" (WTP 551, 635, 715. See also Appendices X, XV).

Nietzsche is quite explicit as to the means by which the prejudice of sense affords us the appearance of permanence. Sense impressions, which are successive and dissimilar are changed at the level of sense perception, into sense impressions which are still successive but which appear to be so similar as to seem to be identical. The change, from dissimilarity to such strict similarity that it borders on identity, reduces our capacity to perceive these
sensations as discrete and atomic. In our diminished capacity to perceive
these individual differences, we seem to be perceiving one thing over an extended
period of time. In other words, the effect of seeing over an extended period
of time, an innumerable number of successive X's (X, X₁, X², X³, X⁴) which
have been made so similar as to appear identical, would be the same as seeing,
over the same period of time, just one X which really was self-identical
and permanent. Thus Nietzsche understands a permanent object to be nothing
more than an ordered collection or collation of single elements which, on
their own, lack order, permanence, coherence, and interdependence. Naturally,
the human species, motivated by a desire for stability and ultimately, for a
need to survive, changes given elements in preconscious experience from
dissimilarity to similarity and thereby, gives consciousness the impression
(in both senses of the word) of a self-identical, permanent entity. The
succession of dissimilar states made similar or identical by the imagination
must appear to consciousness as "objects" which are actually permanent and
stable in and by themselves. It must be understood that in Nietzsche's sense,
to be an object or thing is to be permanent and vice versa and that the
expression "permanent object" is riddled with redundancy.

Since there are actually no permanent objects to be perceived, although
there seem to be permanent objects, it follows as a consequence of Nietzsche's
model of perception that there can be no truth in any claim which asserts
that there are permanent things in the world (e.g., "There are books on the
table.") nor can there be any truth to claims which predicate something about
such permanent objects (e.g., "The books on the table are red").) Nietzsche's
claim that there only "seem" to be or only "appear" to be permanent objects
in the world means essentially that what is judged about objects in the world in terms of correspondence would be reduced to the same level of semblance or appearance as the objects which are judged. Nietzsche would understand his model of perception to therefore constitute a total refutation of the correspondence theory of truth.

The habits of our senses have wrapped us up in a tissue of lying sensations which in turn lie at the base of all our judgments and our "knowledge" -- there are no means of exit or escape to the real world! We are like spiders in our own webs, and, whatever we may catch in them, it will only be something that our web is capable of catching (Dawn 117).

Colin Wilson has accurately said that, for Nietzsche, knowledge "...is in essence the schematization of chaos". We are not passively aware of objects which are already ordered or formed, i.e., which are already objects, because there is "an active determining" (WTP 552) or forming on the part of the knowing subject which manufactures or constructs the object. The formalizing or manufacturing element in perception (the subject, ego, soul, spirit, understanding) must therefore always be understood in terms of this activity.

The soul is selective and self-nourishing entity, perpetually extremely shrewd and creative (this creative force is usually overlooked! is conceived only as "passive") WTP 673.

There is an element in man, an "artistic power" (PT 18, 20, 39), "...a creative, form-giving, changeable force..." (BGE 230) that plays an active role in the very construction of objects of "knowledge". In man, the Apollinian and the Dionysian have come together.

In man creature and creator are united: in man there is material, fragment, excess, clay, dirt, nonsense, chaos; but in man there is also creator, form-giver, hammer hardness, spectator divinity and seventh day (BGE 225).
However, Nietzsche makes it clear, not only in *The Birth of Tragedy* (25) but also in *Beyond Good and Evil* (230), that Apollo and Dionysus are always found in strict proportion. "Dionysus", Nietzsche's metaphor for "truth", "reality", "becoming", or "the way the world is independently of the knowing subject", can never stand alone. Apollo must always balance Dionysus. "Apollo" is therefore Nietzsche's metaphor which represents the degree to which man must falsify and distort the truth of things, "...or to put it more clearly, to what degree one would require it [truth] to be thinned down, shrouded, sweetened, blunted, falsified" (BGE 39). Since life is essentially appropriation (BGE 259), then appropriation must take place, at least to some extent, or life itself will perish. Although Nietzsche’s philosophy is undoubtedly a forceful attempt to expose the "...will to mere appearance, to simplification, to masks, to cloaks, in short to the surface..." (BGE 230), it is, at the same time, an attempt to counter the will to mere appearance "...by that sublime inclination of the seeker after knowledge who insists on profundity, multiplicity, and thoroughness..." (BGE 230). However, there is, and there can be, no absolute knowledge of the truth of things, i.e., knowing Dionysus as it is apart from Apollo. Similarly, although honesty, strength, courage, health, and laughter are the virtues which Nietzsche ascribes to the man who "...slays dizziness at the edge of abysses: and where does man not stand at the edge of abysses? Is not seeing always -- seeing abysses?" (Zar. p. 157), these virtues must be, to some extent, permeated and impregnated by their very opposites. Insofar as Dionysus and Apollo must always be united in strict proportion, honesty and courage must always be balanced by a sufficient amount of dishonesty and cowardice to save the life of the individual who would seek to know the truth absolutely. The "real standard of value", what
Nietzsche calls a "Dionysian value standard" (WTP 1041), reflects this need for the union and strict proportion of Apollo and Dionysus. For Nietzsche, it must always be a question of how much a spirit dares, how much truth a spirit is able to endure (cf. BGE 39). The degree to which this is possible, is the degree to which a man is honest, courageous, strong, and healthy. It is also the degree to which a man acknowledges the truth and value of "becoming" even though it is unavoidably held back from him by his own mode of perception. This is the case because the union and strict proportion of Apollo and Dionysus excludes from the outset, any realization of the truth apart from falsification and lie or of reality apart from appearance, semblance, and illusion.

...the limiting horizon, a Yea and Amen to ignorance -- all of which is necessary in proportion to a spirit's power to appropriate... (BGE 230).

Given the union and strict proportion of Apollo and Dionysus, sense perception for Nietzsche can never be understood to be pure, immediate, or of things as they actually are. Perception is a dynamic grasping and forming of chaotic sensation. The "object" of perception is therefore known mediately or indirectly because the object itself is thought to be the product of sensations which have been actively formed, and thereby deformed, at the level of sense even prior to conceptualization. Mary Warnock\(^{14}\) echoes Nietzsche's position when she says that,

*It is an essential part of perception itself to construct objects in the world. One cannot, by the outmost refinements of abstraction, consider perception apart from this constructive power. Thus we end with a picture of perception as necessarily a mixture of receiving and interpreting stimuli, of passive experiencing and active constructing.*

According to Nietzsche, the world does not objectively exist as it appears
to us simply because it is not and cannot be accurately reflected in our subjective mode of apprehension either at the level of perception or conception. (See Dawn 539; JW III, 110; IV, 355; WTP 496, 853). It is therefore impossible to claim that our subjective mode of apprehension reflects the objective mode of being or objective state of affairs even when we are presented with change, passing away, and becoming.  

How far the moral sphere extends. -- As soon as we see a new image, we immediately construct it with the aid of all our previous experience, depending on the degree of our honesty and justice. All experiences are moral experiences, even in the realm of sense perception". (JW III, 114. See also JW II, 57; III, 110; BGE 24, 192; WTP 505, 506, 507, 515, 521, 532).

Prejudice of sense, which distorts the given insofar as it gives the appearance of connection and unity to what is, in actuality, disconnected and disunited, is therefore an "error". But, according to Nietzsche, this particular error is the precondition of all thought (WTP 544). It is possible for us to think "objects" and therefore to know objects because we have somehow had a part in manufacturing or constructing objects, or, at least, the semblance of them, by making the sense data appear to be equal or identical. In fact, Nietzsche refers to this phenomenon as the principle of identity which is ultimately responsible for our belief in permanent objects.

The principle of identity has behind it the "apparent fact" of things that are the same. A world in a state of becoming could not, in a strict sense, be 'comprehended' or 'known'; only to the extent that the 'comprehending' and 'knowing' intellect encounters a coarse, already-created world, fabricated out of mere appearances but become firm to the extent that this kind of appearance has preserved life--only to this extent is there anything like "knowledge", i.e., a measuring of earlier and later errors by one another (WTP 520).
Nietzsche therefore believes that "...the construction of identical cases, of the appearance of sameness, is more primitive than the knowledge of sameness" (WTP 544), that is, the prejudice of sense not only precedes the prejudice of reason, it is a necessary precondition for it.

'Reason', evolved on a sensualistic basis, on the prejudices of the senses, i.e., in the belief in the truth of the judgements of the senses' (WTP 581).

The principle of identity can become a logical principle of thought because the human mind is so constituted that it has first constructed identical cases, viz., objects, at the level of sense perception. Object X is self-identical only because its identity has been manufactured or constructed by the subject. According to Nietzsche, "...our eye finds it more comfortable to respond to a given stimulus by reproducing once more an image that it has produced many times before, instead of registering what is different and new in an impression..." (BGE 192).

The manufacturing or constructing of objects at the level of sense perception has already established the importance, if not the necessity, for permanence to be regarded as the most fundamental category of thought through which we understand and subsequently value our world. This is the case because the "forms of the intellect have very gradually arisen out of the matter" (PT. 39) of sensation and memory. It is precisely "...the sense activities that support reason..." (WTP 521). If the prejudices of reason (Nietzsche's categories of thought) parallel or reflect the prejudice of sense, it is only because "...reason goes through the same development of making similar and equal as the senses --" (WTP 515). The prejudice of sense produces the appearance of a permanent base upon which, Nietzsche will argue, the prejudice of reason, i.e., certain endurable categories, may be projected, posited, superimposed, stamped or otherwise
placed upon the world as it is perceived by us. The categories through which we think about objects must fit the objects perceived because categorical imposition is parasitic upon the prejudice of sense and its product, viz., perceived objects. Nietzsche therefore argues that we can perceive such things as tables and chairs or anything else as a "united" thing, only because the senses have initially imposed some form of unity upon an atomic, chaotic manifold of dissimilar sensations. In other words, for Nietzsche, objective permanence is observable because permanence, in some fashion, has been subjectively introduced into a changing manifold of sensation at the level of sense perception. We believe or judge (prejudice of reason) that there are permanent objects precisely because there seem to be permanent objects presented to the senses.

The judgement does not produce the appearance of an identical case. Rather it believes that it perceives one; it works under the presupposition that identical cases exist. Now, what is that function that must be much older and must have been at work much earlier, that makes cases identical and similar which are in themselves dissimilar? What is that second function, which on the basis of the first, etc. "Whatever arouses the same sensation is the same": but what is it that makes sensations the same, "accepts" them as the same? There could be no judgements at all if a kind of equalization were not practical within sensations...

It is important for Nietzsche to emphasize that we judge "something to be something" because Nietzsche claims that language, out of which our judgements are made, "...contains a hidden philosophical mythology" (HAH II, 11). The mythology which permeates our language, which has given us the grammatical framework of the subject - predicate distinction, is also a framework which reflects the "metaphysics of the people" (JW IV, 354). We have been easily "seduced" by our grammar because we believe that our subject - predicate
judgements correspond, in fact, to substances and their properties in the world. According to Nietzsche, the seduction was easy because we initially perceive a world of substances, i.e., of things, and subsequently accept as a matter of course that our thinking should reflect our particular mode of perception. "Thus there is in every judgement the avowal of having encountered an 'identical case'..." (WTP 532). Nietzsche outlines this epistemological process in the shift from the prejudice of sense to the prejudice of reason.
4. Prejudice of Reason

Nietzsche believes that there are two prejudices (Vorurteilen) or two forms of falsification which arise unconsciously and uncontrollably from man's most primordial fear, viz., the fear of existence itself (Furchtsamkeit).

Twofold falsification, on the part of the senses and of the spirit, to preserve a world of that which is, which abides, which is equivalent, etc. (WTP 617).

Together, these two prejudices constitute what Nietzsche calls "sensual-spiritual appropriation" (WTP 473), remembering that Nietzsche believes that "...life itself is essentially appropriation..." (BGE 259). Jointly, these two prejudices determine our "perspective kind of outlook" (WTP 473. See Appendix III) and, for Nietzsche, having a perspective kind of outlook "...is the basic condition of all life" (BGE. Preface). Thus, appropriating and having a perspective basically amount to the same thing: both are conditions for life and both determine how things appear to us. 17

Let at least this much be admitted: there would be no life at all if not on the basis of perspective estimates and appearance... (BGE 34).

Nietzsche claims that the "...perspective therefore decides the character of the 'appearance'! As if a world would remain over after one deducted the perspective!" WTP 567). "Perspective" is therefore a term which Nietzsche uses to cover both sensual and spiritual appropriation (WTP 473). Perspective entails, for Nietzsche, that both our perception and conception of appearances are altered: "...we also gain a valuation of not-knowing, of seeing things on a broad scale, of simplification and falsification, of perspectivity" (WTP 492).

At the level of sense, we make impressions similar or equal (WTP 501, 505, 506, 485, 499). Our sense impressions are always "assimilated and
equalized" (WTP 500. Cf. BGE 230). This "positing of equality" at the level of sensation is the basis for our subsequent thoughts and judgements about the world which we perceive. "The development of reason is adjustment, invention, with the aim of making similar, equal -- the same process that every sense impression goes through" (WTP 515). All thought, judgement, perception, considered as comparison, have as their precondition a "positing of equality" and earlier still, a "making equal" (WTP 501). It is not surprising therefore that Nietzsche would identify the will to equality with the will to power itself (WTP 511).

Equality and similarity.
1. The coarser organ sees much apparent equality;
2. the spirit wants equality, i.e., to subsume a sense impression into an existing series: in the same way that the body assimilates inorganic matter. Toward an understanding of logic: the will to equality is the will to power -- the belief that something is thus and thus (the essence of judgement) is the consequence of a will that as much as possible shall be equal. (WTP 511).

According to Nietzsche, the "...only way to subdue the manifold is by constructing classes..." (PT 47). Classes are constructed both at the level of perception as well as conception. Nietzsche does not think of this process of classification as knowledge or the acquisition of knowledge in the traditional sense because his understanding of "schematization" implies distortion. "Not to know but to schematize -- to impose upon chaos as much regularity and form as our practical needs require" (WTP 515. Cf. WTP 516, 479). Given the assumption that chaos has neither regularity nor form of its own, any imposition of regularity or form which we might wish to make could amount to nothing less than a distortion of the way things really are. However, whether the process is actually called "knowledge" (PT 51), "schematization" (WTP 515), "categorization" (PT 47. Cf. PT. 19, 51-52) or any one of a
number of things (See Appendix IV), the process is always described as essentially one of equalizing sense impressions and then arranging them into particular categories. 18 The general principle of equalization is that "...like recalls like and compares itself to it. That is what knowing consists in: the rapid classification of things that are similar to each other. Only like perceives like: a physiological process" (PT 45). Given Nietzsche's basic assumption, namely, that "...in fact nothing is equal to anything else" (HAH I, 19), it becomes necessary for the will to power to manifest itself in and through the will to equality, if and only if, knowledge is necessary.

The drive toward the formation of metaphors [the visual images which are the equalized intermediaries between the dissimilar chaos of sense impressions and concepts] is the fundamental human drive, which one for a single instance cannot dispense with in thought, for one would thereby dispense with man himself (PT 38-39).

Thus, the manifestation of the will to power as the will to equality, is not a perversion or distortion of the will to power but precisely a necessary and essential feature of it. 19 Nietzsche says quite explicitly that the process of equalization is a "primal procedure" (PT 48) which amounts to a "fundamental human drive" (PT 88). "The primal procedure is to seek out some likeness between one thing and another and to identify like with like" (PT 48-49).

All the knowledge which is of assistance to us involves the identification of things which are not the same, of things which are only similar (PT 51).

The will to equality is only one manifestation of the will to power (WTP 515). Nietzsche most often equates the powerful per se with the creative (e.g., WTP 1023), though the notion of the will to power obviously
means a great deal more to the scope of his philosophy than the mere display of physical strength or even mental strength. In the most general sense, Nietzsche understands the "supreme will to power" to be "the creation of the world" (BGE 9). By the term "world" Nietzsche understands the matrix of all meaning horizons which are precisely of account to man. (See also Appendix VIII). The complexity of the process by means of which the "world is created" is simplified by Nietzsche's principle that "To impose upon becoming the character of being -- that is the supreme will to power" (WTP 617). It is clear that the imposition of the character of being upon becoming is the imposition of the character of permanence and substantiality upon an impermanent flux of sensation. Broadly speaking then, the notion of the will to power must include within its purview both the prejudice of sense and the prejudice of reason insofar as they both participate in making horizons of meaning. It is therefore neither gratuitous nor misleading for Crane Brinton to translate the expression "der Wille zur Macht" as the "intellect to construct". Brinton, however, does not realize that the will to power "constructs" not only at the level of the intellect but well below it and that the construction below the level of the intellect is precisely what determines the construction at the level of the intellect or reason. Similarly, R. J. Hollingdale views Nietzsche's epistemology in terms of construction but is not particular precise as to its levels or its extent.

There are no certainties and no laws; knowledge of this world is full of problems, of any other world impossible. The apparently simplest things turn out on inspection to be enormously complex: this is the tendency of Nietzsche's thoughts on the nature of knowledge. And he insists above all that 'knowledge' is always 'interpretation', that a 'fact' is never something simply seen, it is a mental construct into which a very large number of habits and prejudices enter (Emphasis mine.).
While broadly speaking, the will to power includes the "twofold falsification on the part of the senses and of the spirit" (WTP 617), narrowly speaking, Nietzsche understands the will to power in terms of an axiological imposition, that is, the imposition by an individual subject of specific values upon a world which is already constituted by permanent objects, or, closer to Nietzsche's understanding of the case, the individual subject imposes specific values upon a world which he shares with other individuals insofar as they jointly perceive and think of this world in terms of permanent objects. Nietzsche makes it quite clear that the will to power is identified with both valuing and esteeming (Zar. pp. 113, 116; WTP 675) at this individual level as well as at a more general level. Willing per se, i.e., willing, though not necessarily within the parameters of the will to power, is also thought to be identical with esteeming and creating (Zar. p. 87). The "introduction of meaning" into the world (Sinn-hineinlegen) is also identified with valuing, esteeming, creating, and the expression "the will to power" (See Appendices III d; VI c). In fact, all meaning, for Nietzsche, must be related to the will to power (WTP 590).

Although it is possible to point out individuals who are historically pre-eminent in the creation of some specific human values, it is more to Nietzsche's point, in order to understand what he means by the prejudice of reason, to emphasize in what sense these specific values, as diversified and as individually unique, interesting, and important as they might be, all rest upon the same general conceptual framework. The conceptual foundation which is necessary for the imposition of specific values by individuals (axiological imposition) is itself, according to Nietzsche, already the result of some form of axiological interpretation based on
general, rather than specific and individual human needs. As individuals, this or that particular thing or set of things might prove itself to be valuable, but as a species, it already seems to be of general value to have a world of permanent and causally related "things" appear before consciousness which can become valuable. Since "things" can come before consciousness only in two quite distinct ways, viz., in perception or in conception, Nietzsche must distinguish between "thinghood" at the level of perception and "thinghood" at the level of conception. Perceptual thinghood, i.e., the observation or at least the appearance to consciousness, of individual things is accounted for, by Nietzsche, in terms of the prejudice of sense. Conceptual thinghood, i.e., the thought of things in general is accounted for, by Nietzsche, in terms of the prejudice of reason. However, we only perceive and conceive "thinghood" because "thinghood" is of value to us. Axiology therefore reaches to the very depths of perception and, with perception as its foundation, to the very depths of conception and thought.

At the level of conception, Nietzsche points to certain "articles of faith" (Glaubensartikel) which can be found behind the more obvious imposition of specific and individually relative values. In Joyful Wisdom (III, 110, Cf. Twi. III, 2), Nietzsche mentions four such "erroneous articles of faith":

1. that there are enduring things.
2. that there are equal things.
3. that there are things (substances, etc.).
4. that a thing is what it appears to be.

These four 'articles of faith' establish, not only the pre-eminence of "thinghood" as the main category by means of which we understand our world but, at the same time, they point to the prejudice of sense which
"assimilate and equalize" (WTP 500) sense impressions into the appearance of things. Hence, the world looks or appears to be constituted by permanent entities and, according to Nietzsche, we base our judgements on the way the world is squarely on the way the world looks to us. Of course, Nietzsche's whole epistemological thrust is to point out that the way the world looks to us as knowing subjects is radically opposed to the way the world is in and by itself. "That a thing is what it appears to be" (JW III, 10) is one of the fundamental, erroneous articles of faith.

Again, in Joyful Wisdom (III, 212), Nietzsche refers to these same erroneous "articles of faith" though he broadens their scope with the addition of causality.

We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we can live--by positing bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and content; without these articles of faith nobody now could endure life. But, that does not prove them. Life is no argument. The conditions of life might include error.

The articles of faith, which Nietzsche catalogues, can be reduced quite readily to two principal categories, viz., substance (permanence) and causality because the "creation of the world" is, generally speaking, equivalent to the modes by which we avail ourselves of permanent and causally related things. This is the case because permanence and causality are necessary preconditions for giving anything value and meaning. It could even be argued that Nietzsche regarded permanence alone as the most fundamental (and undoubtedly the most erroneous) article of faith insofar as causality can be understood only in terms of permanence. In other words, to think that X is the cause of Y, it is first necessary to think that X and Y are things. At any rate, according to Nietzsche, "...we have projected the conditions of our preservation as predicates of being in
general" (WTP 507. See also Appendix II), and the projection or imposition
of the concepts "substance" and "causality" at the level of reason, based on
a construction or equalization process at the level of sense, reflects this
general human need (WTP 259, 505, 515, 580, 715) and this general human
usefulness (WTP 507, 514, 568, 584).

- Ends and means
- Cause and effect
- Subject and object
- Acting and suffering
- Thing in itself and appearance

as interpretations (not as facts) and to what extent
perhaps necessary interpretations? (as required for
"preservation")--all in the
sense of a will to power
(WTP 589).

The capacity to promote life illustrates, as well as demonstrates,
for Nietzsche, the pragmatic truth, or existential necessity, of certain
categories. However, it does not demonstrate the truth of these categories.
Indeed, it obviates both the need as well as the possibility for
demonstrating the truth of these categories if this truth is understood
in the sense of some actual state of affairs being known to correspond to
some judgement. Nor does it demonstrate the necessity of these categories
if necessity is understood in the sense of "a priori", i.e., necessary
and strictly universal. It is not the case therefore, as Nietzsche's
whole philosophy is wont to point out, that these so-called "conditions of
life" might include error. They are erroneous by their very nature. Their
"truth" as articles of faith must therefore only be understood pragmatically
as eradicable conditions of life (WTP 514, 515, 535, 555). Their "necessity"
as articles of faith must therefore only be understood existentially as
irrefutable assumptions (WTP 535).

"Necessity is", according to Nietzsche, "not a fact but an interpre-
tation" (WTP 552). "Necessity" can therefore be applied to any category or
general system of value which has become indispensible, irrefutable, inevitable, and inescapable, though certainly not, at least not initially, in any logical sense. If substance and causality are thought to be categories which are logically irrefutable, i.e., a priori (as they are for Kant), then, Nietzsche argues, it is because they have first been established as necessary at the more fundamental level of irrefutable, existential beliefs.

Exactly the same thing could have happened with the categories of reason i.e., Kant's categories of the understanding: they could have prevailed after much groping and fumbling through their relative utility --there came a point when one collected them together, raised them to consciousness as a whole--and when one commanded them, i.e., when they had the effect of a command--From then on, they counted as a priori, as beyond experience, as irrefutable. And yet perhaps they represent nothing more than the expediency of a certain race and species--their utility alone is their 'truth'-- (WTP 514).

Nietzsche never claims nor argues that these inevitable categories are anything more than what he calls "provisional assumptions" (WTP 497). Although Nietzsche understands "necessity" as a way of interpreting features in the world and a fortiori a way of explaining those features logically, he also claims that interpretation or, more succinctly, the need man has to interpret, is itself necessary. In other words, "Perspectivism itself is necessary" (WTP 636), though "...for man, there are no eternal horizons or perspectives" (JW III, 143). Nietzsche thinks that it is necessary for us to interpret the world and therefore to make and to make use of certain categories. However, how we interpret, i.e., what categories we use to understand the world is always contingent upon what is believed to be the testimony of the senses which, in turn, is dependent upon the relative strengths and weaknesses of our existential fears and needs. In Nietzschean
terms: "Psychology of metaphysics: the influence of timidity"

Within Nietzsche's epistemological model, human physiology dictates what will be of value to us. The will to power manifests itself through our perspective valuations (see WTP 608), and these, in turn, can be reduced to purely "physiological valuations" (BGE 20).

Nietzsche thinks that all categories or general horizons of meaning, which include the Kantian categories of the understanding, are empirical and contingent regardless of their claim to apriority. The Kantian categories are therefore mistakenly thought to be a priori, i.e., necessary and strictly universal (B 4) simply because, for a time, they really are structures which are necessary for existence.

Nietzsche's answer to the question 'Why is it that we have "permanence" and "causality" as the two, most fundamental categories?' is two-fold: we have these particular categories 1) because of general human need and usefulness and 2) because this general need and usefulness at a physiological level has been translated through "sensual-spiritual appropriation" (WTP 473) to a conscious level. Epistemologically, Nietzsche argues that thinking is impossible without first having "things" to think about. It is therefore necessary, if we are going to make any judgements about objects, that there be "things" which are self-identical (WTP 574, 516). Hence, to be able to judge that "The book is red" or "The book is on the table" is to presume that there are such self-identical things as "books" and "tables" and that things can be predicated of them. In fact, Nietzsche claims that belief in subject-attribute and cause-effect is to be found in every judgement (WTP 550). Since the actual state of affairs
existing in the world independently of the knowing subject is deemed, by
Nietzsche, to be utterly chaotic and disunited, i.e., without "things", he
argues that we must first undertake a construction at the level of the senses
in order to obtain "things" which can subsequently serve as the basis for our
judgements about them. Prejudice of sense constructs (better "equalizes")
the chaotic manifold of sense impressions so that we become aware of, at
least, the semblance of "identical things". The semblance of permanent
objects at the level of sense then serves as the basis for implicitly
believing and explicitly judging through a general, conceptual framework
which regards "thinghood" as a necessary category.

The perspective of all organic functions, all the
strongest instincts of life: the force in all life
that wills error; error as the precondition even of
thought. Before there is 'thought' there must have
been 'invention' [Bevor 'gedacht' wird, muss schon
'gedichtet' worden sein.]; the construction of
identical cases, of the appearance of sameness, is
more primitive than the knowledge of sameness (WTP 544).

He knows in that he invents [dichet], and he invents in that
he knows (PT 19. Vide Appendix VI).

In sum, Nietzsche's argument is that we judge or think that there
are permanent entities in the world because there seem to be permanent
entities. The belief, thought, or judgement that there are permanent
entities is based directly on the way the world appears to the knowing
subject. Becoming ("change" on the ontological level) is falsified by
the senses to appear to consciousness as being ("permanence" on the
believed-to-be ontological level). It is therefore necessary within
Nietzsche's epistemological framework for an equalization or manufacturing
process at the level of sense to precede thought. "The habits of our senses
have wrapped us up in a tissue of lying sensations which in turn lie at the
base of all our judgements and our 'knowledge'--(Dawn 117. Emphasis mine.).

Subsequently, the semblance or appearance of being is categorized epistemologically under "predicates of being in general" (WTP 507), viz., unity, thinghood, permanence, substance.

...prejudice in favour of reason compels us to posit unity, identity, duration, substance, cause, materiality, being...
(Twi. Reason, 5).

What we make of their testimony [viz., the testimony of the senses], that alone introduces lies; for example, the lie of unity, the lie of thinghood, of substance, of permanence. "Reason" is the cause of our falsification of the testimony of the senses (Twi. Reason, 5).

These categories are necessary for life and a fortiori knowledge but they are not, in any genuinely ontological sense, features of the objective world, i.e., the empirical world as it exists independently of the knowing subject. The imposition of particular concepts on what is given in sensible intuition is possible, and the affinity between these concepts and intuition which we might have is existentially guaranteed, because these concepts rest, and have their very origin in, a pre-established framework. In other words, what we judge about things in the world and therefore what concepts we use to make our judgement, have, as their ground, things which are the product of the prejudice of sense.

John Wilcox suggests that, for Kant, concepts unify while for Nietzsche concepts falsify. 23 It must be pointed out however that it is only because our concepts reflect the way in which the senses have constructed the manifold into objects that concepts, through judgements, can be said to give us a false picture of reality. It is the equalization of sense impressions which Nietzsche believes to be primarily responsible for the falsification of the actual state of affairs in the world. Only subsequent to this sense
falsification, and dependent upon it, do concepts falsify. Nietzsche gives a very precise account of the role of concepts: they change multiplicity to simplicity, tie up and tame, appropriate the foreign, assimilate the new to the old, simplify the manifold, overlook the contradictory, retouch and falsify the whole (See BGE 230). In other words, "concepts" must parallel or reflect the function of the prejudice of sense.

It should be apparent that given these particular epistemological parameters, viz., sense and psychological prejudice, it is neither possible nor necessary for Nietzsche to get outside of the subject-object dichotomy in order to check the actual state of affairs existing in the world independently of the knowing subject. Nietzsche's epistemology might therefore be described as "misrepresentational realism" in which two intermediaries prevent us from securing accurate knowledge of the way things are. According to Nietzsche, "...the character of existence is to be misunderstood..." (WTP 853). Man, by his very nature, "...conceals reality from himself, he falsifies it..." (WTP 453. Emphasis mine.). Although some might argue that "...men, who are products of an exacting process of development would not be likely to survive if their minds were falsifying agents...",24 Nietzsche argues that the exact opposite is true. The 'exacting process of development' through which we have evolved has found it necessary for us to be such falsifying agents because, for Nietzsche, the bottom line is the survival of the human species. Both subjective modes for representing objects, viz., intuition and concepts, precisely insofar as they represent objects, must misrepresent reality. Since there must always be this human perspective, there must always be a misrepresentation of the Heraclitean flux which constitutes the actual state of affairs (empirical reality) as it exists
independently of the knowing subject, i.e., the psycho-physiological being known as "man".

The most extreme form of nihilism would be the view that every belief, every considering-something-true, is necessarily false because there simply is no true world. Thus: a perspectival appearance, whose origin lies in us (insofar as we continually need a narrower, abbreviated, simplified, world). -- That it is the measure of strength to what extent we can admit to ourselves without perishing, the merely apparent character, the necessity of lies (WTP 15).

The Nietzschean categories are therefore not understood to be true, in terms of correspondence, nor could they ever be so understood. They are not a priori (WTP 507, 513, 584, 862) because they have what Nietzsche calls a "sensual origin" (WTP 488) in the sense of "sensual-spiritual appropriation" (WTP 473). The categories of permanence and causality are discovered in the world because they are imposed by reason on products already sensibly determined. Thus, Nietzsche accepts that activities, at both the intuitive and the conceptual levels, strictly determine the ways in which the world of the senses (Sinnenwelt) becomes the product of our organization. Reality does not and cannot exist in the form in which it presents itself to us because we, as doubly active subjects, have to misrepresent it. There is in fact no empirical world of objects at all, for Nietzsche, apart from the subject insofar as there are no objects at all apart from our subjective modes of cognizing. "We can comprehend only a world that we ourselves have made" (WTP 495). Emphasis mine.)
5. Axiological Imposition.

It is essential for an understanding of Nietzsche's more popular and more positive philosophy to establish the central role which he affords to axiological imposition, that is, the subjective imposition of value and meaning on an objective, value-neutral world. All of the elements in Nietzsche's more positive philosophy, particularly "God is dead", the revaluation of all values, the will to power, the overman, and the eternal return of the same, can be demonstrated to be directly dependent, in some measure, upon Nietzsche's understanding of axiological imposition.

The conceptual journey from Nietzsche's pronouncement that "God is dead" (JW IV, 125) to the abysmal thought of the eternal return of the same announced to Zarathustra (Zar. p. 158) is really nothing more than a poetic illustration of the metamorphosis which Zarathustra outlines in his first speech as to how the spirit (i.e., life itself, Zar. p. 104) changes first into a camel, then into a lion, and lastly into a child (Zar. pp. 25-28).

In Joyful Wisdom (IV, 125), Nietzsche's madman searches the market place, in vain, looking for God. Amidst great laughter and shouting, the crowd which has gathered hears the horrible cry from the madman not only that 'God is dead', but that we have all taken part in His murder. This is said to be true even though we may not, as yet, have heard about our bloody deed. "God" serves as Nietzsche's symbol for all absolute, objective, and otherworldly values. Hence, the proclamation that 'God is dead' simply means for Nietzsche that belief in absolute, objective, and otherworldly values is being questioned and, as a result, faith in such values is dying. Even the nightwatchmen of Zarathustra are beginning to doubt God's existence (Zar. pp. 181-182). "God is dead" therefore, means that
belief in one particular horizon of meaning and value is beginning to collapse and fall.

One interpretation has collapsed [viz., the belief in God and an essential moral order]; but because it was the interpretation, it now seems as if there were no meaning at all in existence, as if everything were in vain (WTP 55).

With the removal of God, i.e., with the removal of the rigid and fixed belief in the truth of metaphysical and transcendent values, it is no longer possible, it seems, to distinguish "up" from "down". Our horizon is gone; we have unchained the earth from the sun which gave this earth its very sense of direction. The death of God is said to bring with it the appearance of an infinite nothing, an empty space, a colder and longer-lasting night. In less poetic terms, the death of God brings with it the despair of nihilism. Although we may not know it or even believe it, Nietzsche argues that we have begun to live as if absolute, objective, and other-worldly values were no longer of any value to us. They are no longer believed to be unquestionable, sacred, and the support for our morality (See Twi. Skirmishes of an Untimely Man, 5). Nietzsche believes that the initial historical result of the rejection of such values is philosophical nihilism. To accept that "...there are no eternal facts as there are likewise no absolute truths" (HAH I, 1) results initially in the belief that there are no values at all nor anything of value. Nihilism is therefore ushered in by Zarathustra's lion or "free spirit" who is able to create the freedom from the old values. However, the lion's role is fulfilled so that others might be free for the creation of new values (Zar. p. 63). In other words, Nietzsche, especially through the dramatis persona of Zarathustra, deliberately accelerated what he understood to be the natural
progression and extension of nihilism in Europe. The nihilistic position was deliberately ushered in by the lion so that some, more tenable or viable, position regarding values might be reached which lies beyond, even through, nihilism, and especially the despair which accompanies it. Since nihilism is essentially the philosophical position which holds that nothing whatsoever has any value or meaning, precisely because God, the giver of all value and meaning is now dead, Nietzsche could push nihilism to its extreme position by presuming that the actual state of affairs existing in the world (becoming), must be, in and of itself, completely and absolutely without intrinsic meaning and value (JW IV, 301; WTP 804). The death of God denied the earth any meaning or value which might be transferred or imposed by some transcendent being or metaphysical state of affairs (e.g., the Christian God, the Platonic Forms, or the Kantian thing in itself). Nietzsche also denied the earth any alternative to God, i.e., he denied the earth any intrinsic value of its own. Thus, Nietzsche could proclaim that whatever value and meaning we believe things to have in this world, it must therefore originate, and must always have originated, in some value-giving subject. The object itself, apart from any value-giving subject, simply has no value or meaning at all (WTP 442).

The conflict which arose between contradictory beliefs, namely, the belief in absolute, objective, and otherworldly values and the further belief that there is perhaps nothing at all of value sets the philosophical stage for Nietzsche's attempt to revalue all values. According to Nietzsche, it has become imperative to examine all of our values and truths in light of the fact that 'God is dead'.

...and regarding the sounding out of idols, this time they are not just idols of the age, but
eternal idols, which are here touched with a hammer as with a tuning fork: there are altogether no older, no more convinced, no more puffed-up idols --and none more hollow. That does not prevent them from being those in which people have the most faith...
(Twi. Preface).

The "revaluation of all values" is Nietzsche's attempt to become cognizant of the nature of our systems of value and what he believes to be their natural, and thereby their "down to earth", origin. The despair of the nihilists resulted from their discovery that the values which we had believed for so long to be true, in the sense that they were believed to be objective, absolute, eternal, God-given and otherworldly in origin, were, in fact, only imposed or projected into the world by man (See Appendices I, II, IV). However, these particular values not only had an earthly rather than an heavenly origin, an human rather than a divine origin, but the origin itself was the very opposite of the value thought to be so sacred.

It might even be possible that what constitutes the value of these good and revered things [viz., truth, the will to truth, selfless deeds, purity] is precisely that they are insidiously related, tied to, and involved with these wicked seemingly opposite things [viz., error, the will to deception, selfishness, and lust]--maybe even one with them in essence (BGE 2).

While the nihilist despairs in the knowledge that all values must be projected or imposed on things by man (WTP 785), Nietzsche rejoices in the newly established freedom which has been afforded to the future man, viz., the overman. "Never yet has there been an overman" (Zar. p. 93). The overman is now thought to be free to knowingly and willingly create values of his own.

Let your spirit and your virtue serve the sense of the earth, my brothers; and let the value of all things be posited newly by you. For that
shall you be fighters! For that you shall be creators (Zar. p. 77).

The 'no-saying' lion becomes the 'yes-saying' child by disclaiming the otherworldly and by proclaiming, as Zarathustra does, the meaning of this world. While belief in God or in otherworldly values entailed the denial of the meaning of the earth, the 'death of God' now avails man both the opportunity as well as the possibility (perhaps even the necessity) for giving the earth its own aesthetic, rather than moral, justification, that is, for giving the earth its justification from the human and earthly perspective rather than from the divine and otherworldly perspective which demeans the earth. "Life has come to an end where the 'Kingdom of God' begins" (Twi. Morality as Anti-nature, 5).

The concept of "God" was until now the greatest objection to existence. We deny God, we deny the responsibility in God: only thereby do we redeem the world (Twi. The Four Great Errors, 8).

Nietzsche rejects any otherworldly or moral justification of the world because any justification for the world which is thought to be derived from the "outside", i.e., external to and independent of man, demeans the earth and devalues human existence. Nietzsche rejects any otherworldly or moral justification of the world by pointing out, in no uncertain terms, that "morality" itself has a natural origin and that its truths are, in fact, errors, lies, and deceptions. However, these values had their utility—at least for a time.

All the values by means of which we have tried so far to render the world estimable for ourselves and which then proved inapplicable and therefore devalued the world—all these values are, psychologically speaking, the results of certain perspectives of utility, designed to maintain and increase human constructs of domination—and they have been falsely projected into the essence of things (WTP 12).
However, all values, regardless of their apparent origin, must be seen to have been interpreted into things (hineininterpretiert) by man. This means essentially that both moral as well as aesthetic justifications of the world have the same origin as well as the same function. Nietzsche therefore distinguishes between the two modes of justification by establishing which justification 1) is truer to the meaning of the earth, i.e., promotes rather than demotes the value of this world and 2) by establishing which justification promotes life better. He does not distinguish between the two modes of justification by establishing which is "truer" per se. It might very well be the case, and Nietzsche argues this case, that lies, deception, and error are necessary for existence. The Birth of Tragedy has already established the case that the aesthetic justification of life is Apollinian illusion.

That the value of the world lies in our interpretation (--that other interpretations than merely human ones are perhaps somewhere possible--); that previous interpretations have been perspective valuations by virtue of which we can survive in life, i.e., in the will to power...(WTP 616. Cf. Twi. Max. 18; WTP 590).

Although Nietzsche accelerated nihilism by accepting the position that things apart from man have no meaning or value, he was not of the opinion that, as a consequence of this view, nothing could have any value at all. Nietzsche himself advocated nihilism only to establish what he saw to be the real source of all values in the world, viz., man. "We have created the world that possesses values" (WTP 602). However, the subjective imposition of value on a value-neutral world is not an arbitrary or capricious process. If it were, Nietzsche would not be able to establish either the claim that all values are the creation of man and as such, can be read as
a 'sign language of his affects' (BGE 187. Cf. Twi. The "Improvers" of Mankind, 1), or the claim that there are, in fact, both life-affirming as well as life-denying values. The natural origin of all value systems or moralities, whether they are life-affirming or life-denying, lies in the will to power, der Wille zur Macht. Man, as an individual manifestation of the will to power, must come to see himself as the creator of his own values. However, only the overman in his perpetual overcoming of his own values, has the right to be called "man, the esteemer". He alone has sufficient courage, strength, health, and honesty to destroy old values in order to create new values which reflect his necessary existential needs. These values alone are thought to be true to the earth because the overman's values alone are an accurate reflection of man's Dionysian nature, that is, his instincts (see Twi. The Problem of Socrates, 12). We must "...translate man back into nature..." (BGE 230), to put him back in touch with his instincts. This task is accomplished by first denying "morality" with the lion's negative roar. But by denying morality, Nietzsche is only denying the belief that morality is founded on truth, particularly absolute truth, especially when it is believed to be otherworldly in origin. Morality of this kind is not based on truth but on error. (Cf. Dawn 103), and it "...besmirches this world" (Twi. Skirmishes of an Untimely Man, 34).

Morality is only an interpretation of certain phenomena, more precisely a misinterpretation (Twi. The "Improvers" of Mankind, 1).

By translating man back into nature, i.e., back into his instincts, the overman lends a positive voice to the meaning of the earth.

The [overman] is the meaning of the earth. Let your will say: The [overman] shall be the meaning of the earth! I entreat you, my brothers, remain true to the earth, and do not believe
those who speak to you of otherworldly hopes (Zar. p. 13).

It must be emphasized that when the overman, or Zarathustra as his herald and precursor, advocates that we be true to the meaning of the earth, he is not claiming that the earth has some meaning which is intrinsic to it.

Becoming is of equivalent value every moment; the sum of its values always remains the same; in other words, it has no value at all, for anything against which to measure it, and in relation to which the word "value" would have meaning, is lacking (WTP 708. Cf. 272).

The earth simply has no intrinsic meaning. In fact, not only does the earth have no meaning but neither does anything else for "...no morality has any value in itself..." (Twi. Skirmishes, 37). No moral valuation is inherently true, but, for Nietzsche, "...the value for life is ultimately decisive" (WTP 493). Life "...demands a Yes or No... about life and the value of life..." (BGE 205). To advocate therefore that we remain faithful to the meaning of the earth is to place before us an imperative: we must justify this existence ourselves because it is all there is!

According to Nietzsche, all "...valuations are only consequences and narrow perspectives in the service of this one will: valuation itself is only this will to power" (WTP 675). Although Nietzsche offers his overwhelming approbation to the life-affirming values, that is, to the values of the earth, at the same time, he heaps umbrage and vilification on the life-denying values. This is possible not because he believes that certain values really are valuable in and of themselves. No values are naturally or intrinsically valuable because "...nature is always worthless..." (JW IV, 301), and "...the value of life cannot be estimated" (Twi. The Problem
Judgements, judgements of value, concerning life, for it or against it, can, in the end, never be true: they have value only as symptoms, they are worthy of consideration only as symptoms; in themselves such judgements are stupidities (Twi. The Problem of Socrates, 2).

A condemnation of life by the living remains in the end a mere symptom of a certain kind of life: the question whether it is justified or unjustified is not even raised thereby. One would require a position outside of life, and yet have to know it as well as one, as many, as all who have lived it, in order to be permitted even to touch the problem of the value of life: reasons enough to comprehend that this problem is for us an unapproachable problem (Twi. Morality as Anti-nature, 5).

If it is impossible to assess the value of life, is it therefore impossible to assess the values which are deemed either life-affirming or life-denying? Nietzsche's answer is that it is not impossible; in fact, such a revaluation of all values is necessary. However, before such an attempt to revalue all values can proceed, it is necessary to remember exactly what it is that posits values in the first place.

When we speak of values, we speak with the inspiration, with the way of looking at things, which is part of life: life itself forces us to posit values; life itself values through us when we posit values (Twi. Morality as Anti-nature, 2).

A change in attitude toward our values, that is, a revaluation of all values, is possible only if we fully understand the unconscious origin of the values which we already esteem as well as the process by means of which this or that particular thing becomes valuable for us. Although it is not clear from Nietzsche's writings whether or not man can, or even should, become free from those prejudices of sense and reason which prevent him from obtaining a direct and immediate access to the truth of things (viz., be-
coming in itself), it is clear from Nietzsche's writings that the man of the future will be the creator of his own values. The overman, Nietzsche claims, would be the man who could live in the realization that all of his values are self-imposed upon a value-neutral world and that these values are "true" to the meaning of the earth only in the sense that they are a direct expression of his instincts, drives, and their for and against. If "truth" is impossible per se because, ex hypothesi, the uttering of any statement entails falsification, then the overman's values will not be true. The overman's values will not be metaworldly and absolute because these values belonged to the man that the overman had to overcome. However, the overman's values will not be subjective in the sense that that should entail the arbitrariness of all values. It is not the case that the overman might esteem anything he desires insofar as "nothing is true, all is permitted" (Zar. p. 274). This position announces the initial despair and unrestrained enthusiasm which becomes possible once "truth" has been exposed as false. Values, regardless of their truth or falsity, are values precisely because they promote life. However, Nietzsche argues that values must be seen to reflect the unconscious affects and drives of the subject. Whether the values are ultimately life-affirming or life-denying, they all have the same natural origin in life itself. Therefore, strictly speaking, Nietzsche advocates only one set of values, namely, those values which more honestly reflect the "sense of the earth" (Zar. pp. 20, 32, 76-77), but they may very well include the other set of values which he desperately wishes to reject, namely, the Apollinian illusions. The value of a value, according to Nietzsche, can only lie in its promotion of life. Apollinian illusions, i.e., the lies which have,
until now, masqueraded as the truth, have made life possible by falsifying our encounter with the flux of becoming.

...everything of which we become conscious is arranged, simplified, schematized, interpreted through and through—(WTP 477).

In order for a particular species to maintain itself and increase its power, its conception of reality must comprehend enough of the calculable and constant for it to base a scheme of behaviour on it (WTP 480. Emphasis mine. Cf. WTP 476).

Given the truth of Nietzsche's general premise, viz., that the value of a value lies solely in its promotion of life, then Nietzsche must be arguing that, at least up to this time in human axiological history, lying has been more valuable than truth. This is the case presumably because lying (prejudice) is a precondition for what are thought to be truth statements about the way things are, viz., as permanent objects. The "will to truth" which lies at the basis of our truth statements is also deemed valuable because it too has been a precondition of human preservation. However, more importantly for Nietzsche, is his claim that it must become possible for some future man to live with the kinds of values which distort our view of reality (becoming in itself) either much less or not at all if that should prove itself an existential possibility. At least this future man will be honest and courageous enough (relatively speaking) to overcome our present need to impose the kinds of values which distort reality to the extent to which they do. Nietzsche realizes that this proposal necessitates a penetrating analysis into the subjective origin of our values because "...the interpreting intellect... operates... for the most part unconsciously to us..." (JW III, 127). The result of this penetrating analysis is that values must now be understood as facts relative to the conditions which
promote a certain species of life. The affects dictate the subject's needs and objects (and anything else) will be valued according to their usefulness in affirming, supporting, and fulfilling these specific needs.

Nietzsche's understanding of the revaluation of all values and axiological imposition does not advocate nor necessitate any wholesale rejection of specific values nor of esteeming in general. However, the revaluation of all values demands that all values be viewed and assessed in their newly exposed origin and role in supporting the human species. "Esteeming" is therefore the most indispensible function which man has even though it is understood primarily to be an unconscious esteeming in which life itself posits life-affirming and life-denying values through us or whether or not these values are based entirely or even partially on error. There simply is no valuing at all without esteeming so esteeming must be seen as something which is most valuable. "To esteem is to create [Schatzen ist Schaffen]: hear this, you creators! Esteeming itself is of all esteemed things the most estimable treasure. Through esteeming alone is there value: and without esteeming, the nut of existence would be hollow" (Zar. p. 59). If there is no value at all without esteeming, it seems logically amiss that Nietzsche would give value to esteeming itself. This may be perhaps an instance of either the reversal of cause and effect or even of imaginary causality which Nietzsche himself exposes in The Twilight of the Idols (The Four Great Errors, 1-8). Nietzsche's point is easy enough to understand: if X makes Y valuable then X itself must be valuable.

Remembering that Nietzsche takes "value" in a broad sense to include metaphysics, morality, religion, art, and science (WTP 244, 785, 804, 853),
i.e., any and all horizons of meaning and value, then it is necessary for Nietzsche to give an in-depth account of the process by means of which life itself structures or determines which values are to be valuable in the sense that they promote life though not independently of the fact that they may still demand that life-affirming values contain certain elements of untruth and error. "Thus: a perspectival appearance, whose origin lies in us (insofar as we continually need a narrower, abbreviated, simplified, world). -- That it is the measure of strength to what extent we can admit to ourselves without perishing, the merely apparent character, the necessity of lies" (WTP 15).

It is we, who think and feel, [Wir, die Denkend-Empfindenen] that actually and unceasingly make something which did not exist before: the whole eternally increasing world of valuations, colours, weights, perspectives, gradations, affirmations and negations.... Whatever has value in the present world, has not it in itself, by its nature—nature is always worthless:—but a value was once given to it, bestowed upon it and it was we who gave and bestowed! We only have created the world which is of any account to man! (JW IV, 301).

In the above passage, Nietzsche is claiming that we "...make something which did not exist before" whenever we give and bestow value (i.e., colour, weight, perspective, gradation, affirmation, negation) on worthless nature. Although nature is deemed to be worthless in and by itself, it seems that nature at least exists before the process of valuation. In this regard, Nietzsche stands committed to an irreducible subject-object dichotomy in which "worthless nature" serves as the primitive objective element. However, the depth of Nietzsche's understanding of axiological imposition is also evident in the above passage because although it is certain that nature exists prior to evaluation, it is not certain whether objects do. It is both possible and equally natural for Nietzsche to understand axiological
imposition as 1) the subjective imposition of values on nature, which is worthless and devoid of objects or as 2) the subjective imposition of values on objects within nature. The later, and narrower of the two definitions, seems to assume that axiological imposition requires as a precondition the existence of objects in nature prior to any evaluation of them. However, it is not incorrect from Nietzsche's perspective to claim that there simply are no objects at all before evaluation because even the objects themselves are the result of the axiological process. An object is brought out of a chaos of sensation (nature) through the very act of bestowing value. Thus, in the broadest sense, axiological imposition covers what has already been disclosed as the purview of the prejudices of sense and reason: "We can comprehend only a world that we ourselves have made" (WTP 495). In other words, Nietzsche extends the scope of axiological imposition, in its broadest sense, to include his most fundamental epistemological claim, namely, that we construct "things" out of a manifold of sensation. Nietzsche believes that axiological imposition extends to the prejudice of sense because what we are aware of in sensation is already understood to be the result of some form of subjective valuation. Sense perception is thoroughly impregnated and permeated with human values (Vide WTP 260, 505; JW III, 114).

In its narrowest sense, Nietzsche understands axiological imposition to be the specific imposition of values and meaning on a world which is already perceived and thought to be constituted by objects: "We have created the world that possesses values" (WTP 602). However, even within the narrower scope of axiological imposition, a second distinction can be made between two separate stages in the process of what Nietzsche calls "creating a world" that can be of account to man (JW IV, 301), that is, establish-
ing a world of objects valued in terms of man's needs. The creation of a world is not only the imposition of particular values reflecting individual human needs, it must also be understood to include the projection of a general horizon of meaning and value, which, by reflecting the needs of the human species as a whole, allows that species to find sufficient security and comfort for its continued existence. Hence, the imposition of general as well as specific values both rest on the usefulness of what is deemed to be valuable (WTP 507, 514, 568, 584). However, it must be emphasized that the value imposed on this or that particular thing because of its usefulness rests on the general and more fundamental value of "thinghood". In other words, "...our values are interpreted into things" (WTP 590) and can be interpreted into things only because "things" or "thinghood" is itself the product of sensual-conceptual activity which reflects human needs in general. Values can be interpreted into things only because "things" are themselves understood to be a major part of interpretation.

The origin of 'things' is wholly the work of that which imagines, thinks, wills, feels. The concept 'thing' itself just as much as all its qualities. (WTP 556).

Axiological imposition therefore has three definitions. In its broadest sense, axiological imposition is 1) equivalent to the prejudices of sense and reason. In its narrower sense, axiological imposition is 2) the imposition of value by a species to determine what, in general, is of use and 3) the imposition of value by an individual to determine what, in particular, is of use. Axiological imposition in the broadest sense, viz., as the equivalent of the prejudices of sense and reason has already been examined. It is therefore only necessary to examine, in turn, the two narrower senses of axiological imposition, viz., the values which reflect human need in general and the values which reflect individual needs.

It is no accident that Nietzsche refers to man as a "thinking-feeling being" (Wir, die Denkend-Empfindenen. JW IV, 301) or that the origin of things is the work of that "which imagines, thinks, wills, feels" (WTP 556), for we have already seen how man's psycho-physical makeup ("sensual-spiritual appropriation", WTP 473) creates, in this two-fold sense, the appropriate look of things from which "true", that is, useful and existentially necessary judgements concerning things can be made. These judgements are thought to be true, in the Nietzschean sense of "truth", because they yield pragmatic results. These judgements can be pragmatic because judgement X can come to correspond with object X. Even this correspondence is thought to be possible because object X seems to be a certain way to us and it is this semblance which grounds our judgement or gives it its truth value. According to Nietzsche, all of our judgements about things are based on the semblance of things or the appearance of things to the senses. The very essence of a judgement is precisely the belief that something is a such and such (WTP 511), i.e., a substance or a particular kind of thing. Substance and attribute are necessary categories (again understanding "necessary" in a Nietzschean sense) because they are necessary for the maintenance if not the promotion of a particular species, namely, the human being. We can explain our world through such categories as substance-attribute, because our world has been initially interpreted in terms of substance-attribute. In other words, while explanation is thought to take meaning out of things, it can only take out the meaning which interpretation has initially projected or injected into the phenomena (WTP 604). Interpretation is therefore the active creation of concepts and value while explanation or explication is merely conceptual translation which assumes concepts and values are gifts (WTP 605, 409. Cf. BGE 14).
According to Nietzsche, it is only possible to explain the meaning and value of X (where "X" represents some particular thing or concept) because we have initially been interpretive in giving X both its meaning as well as its value. Therefore, all of our interpretations, including the most fundamental interpretation that gives us the appearance of X as some thing which can be both meaningful and valuable, are basically "affective interpretations" (GM III, 12), that is, interpretations that are determined by, and subsequently reflect, the natural ranking and ordering of our instincts, drives, feelings, emotions, and passions. "Affects" represents the multiplicity behind the will to power which is responsible for all valuation, perspective, and interpretation.

All valuations are only consequences and narrow perspectives in the service of this one will: valuation itself is only this will to power (WTP 675). The will to power interprets...it defines limits, determines degrees, variations of power.... Equal in that — In fact, interpretation is itself a means of becoming master of something (WTP 643).

According to Nietzsche, man is "...composed of many souls" (BGE 19). By this, Nietzsche means that man is not a simple entity composed of a few basic elements (e.g., soul and body in the Cartesian sense). In Zarathustra ("On the Despisers of the Body", pp. 34-37), Nietzsche claims that the awakened ones admit that they are entirely body and that the "soul" is just something small and decidedly insignificant about the body. Zarathustra distinguishes between the body or self, which he calls "Great reason" and the soul (spirit, sense, consciousness, thought, and feeling) which he calls "little reason". Zarathustra's description of the body as "a war and a peace", "a herd and a shepherd", and "as a plurality with one sense" amounts to a description of the affects and how they rank themselves. Man is therefore understood to be an unconscious "battlefield within" (Zar. p. 37). On the
other hand, the soul or consciousness of man is thought to be a "mere instrument" or "toy" of the body. Although consciousness or the ego "says I" and believes itself to be the master and controller of the body, Nietzsche argues that it is the body alone that "does I", without any regard or recourse whatsoever to conscious thought. Body is "...the leading strings of the ego and the prompter of its concepts" (Zar. p. 35). In fact, Nietzsche claims that "...thought is one thing, deed is another. The wheel of causality does not roll between them" (Zar. p. 38), at least not in the direction in which we "think" it rolls. The body (the affects or the will to power) is the unconscious source and controller of everything which reaches the surface of consciousness in man.

As the art of birth deserves no consideration in the whole process and procedure of heredity, so "being conscious" is not in any decisive sense the opposite of what is instinctive: most of the conscious thinking of a philosopher is secretly guided and forced into certain channels by his instincts (BGE 3).

Our values, truths, and convictions are nothing more than "...a desire of the heart that has been filtered and made abstract..." (BGE 5), and then defended, post facto, by reason. Values, in short, are simply "...physiological demands, for the preservation of a definite species of life" (BGE 3. Cf. "Physiological valuations", BGE 20). Nietzsche therefore believes that our general horizons of meaning and value, that is, the modes by means of which we perceive, conceive, and value the world, are all strictly determined by our unconscious affects; "...it is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their For and Against" (WTP 481). Our mode of perception, the categories through which we understand our world, and the values which we impose upon the things which we perceive and conceive are strictly determined by our
affects. Thus our valuations, perspectives, and interpretations can serve as a "...sign language of the affects" (BGE 187), i.e., "...a symptom of certain physiological conditions, viz., our affects." (WTP 254).

One may not ask: "Who then interprets?" for the interpretation itself is a form of the will to power, exists (but not as a "being" but as a process, a becoming) as an affect (WTP 556).

Who interprets?—Our affects (WTP 254).

According to Nietzsche, man is "...composed of many souls" (BGE 19), that is, man is nothing more than an organic complex of emotions, drives, instincts, and feelings, in a word, "affects", which compete and rank themselves naturally according to human need. "Affection", from the Latin "affectus": disposition, signifies the passions which determine our propensities and capacities. The affects determine how we meet, indeed, must meet, our needs and existential fears. The affects establish how we will be disposed toward existence by constituting the human nature which will confront it. Thus, for Nietzsche, "...the values of a human being betray something of the structure of his soul and where it finds its conditions of life, its true need" (BGE 268. See also BGE 197, 198, 201, 256). The general apprehension which man has concerning existence, particularly the apprehension which results from the recognition of the complete and utter absence of intrinsic value and meaning in the world, establishes the ground from which general systems of value are created.

Existential apprehension or fear (Furchtsamkeit) is therefore understood to be the "mother of morality" (BGE 201).

Even apart from the value of such claims as "there is a categorical imperative in us," one can still always ask: What does such a claim tell us about the man who makes it? There are moralities which are meant to justify their creator before others. Other moralities are meant to calm him and lead him to be satisfied with himself. With yet others he wants to crucify himself and humiliate himself. With others he wants to wreak revenge, with others conceal himself, with others transfigure himself and place himself way up, at a distance (BGE 197).
Every morality, every system of value, and every value from within the system, must all be seen as derived from some particular perspective or point of view. All valuations are perspective valuations (See WTP 608); "...every centre of force — and not only man — construes all the rest of the world from its own viewpoint... (WTP 636). Valuation is therefore always from a definite perspective, viz., the preservation of an individual, a community, a race, a culture, a church, a faith (See WTP 259; BGE 186, 224). "The standpoint of 'value' is the standpoint of conditions of preservation and enhancement for complex forms of relative life-duration within the flux of becoming" (WTP 715). Nietzsche believes that human values do not have a transcendent origin because, for him, the bottom line on which all values rest must always be empirical and pragmatic: we have the values we have, as a matter of empirical fact, precisely because they are based on those conditions which are, at this time, at least, existentially necessary for human promotion and survival. As Nietzsche says,

To what extent even our intellect is a consequence of conditions of existence...we would not have it, if we did not need to have it (WTP 498. Cf. JW 99; HAH I, 608; WTP 611, 26, 204, 259).

Similarly, Nietzsche believes that our systems of evaluation, viz., metaphysics, religion, art, and science (WTP 244, 785, 804, 853), do not have a transcendent origin because, for him, the bottom line on which our systems of evaluation rest must always be empirical and pragmatic.

Only man placed value in things to preserve himself—he alone created a meaning for things, a human meaning. Therefore he calls himself "man" which means: the esteeemer (Zar. p. 59. See also HAH II, 21; GM II, 8).

Metaphysics, religion, art, and science are essentially products of prejudice, categorization, and evaluation. They are the general horizons of meaning within which we find a world that can be of account to man. "I
understand by 'morality' a system of evaluation that partially coincides with the conditions of a creature's life (WTP 256). A 'morality', such as religion or science, is therefore "...only [a] scheme of interpretation by which man can endure himself—" (WTP 270. See also BGE 256; Appendix V: Categories). The following table lists most of the synonyms which Nietzsche uses for "morality":

- a system of evaluation WTP 256
- scheme of interpretation WTP 270
- system of systematic falsification WTP 584
- aesthetic humanities JW III, 109
- perspektivischen Formen JW V, 374
- Vorhaltens-Vorschläge (councils of behaviour) BGE 198
- schemes of behaviour WTP 480
- Glaubensartikel (articles of faith) JW III, 110; Dawn 90, 199; BGE 223; WTP 540
- regulative articles of faith WTP 530
- erroneous fundamental conceptions HAH I, 16
- ruling idea WTP 862
- horizon drawn around oneself Use p. 7
- human idiosyncrasy (common or shared Furchtsamkeit) WTP 565
- "Apollo" or "art" as a metaphysical supplement GT 24.

In Dawn (104), Nietzsche informs us that all values and value systems are either adopted by us or created by us. The majority or "herd" constitute the masses who blindly accept value systems (ethics, art, philosophy, science, religion) and the values which are derived from them, as pre-given and as inherent in the very nature of things.

All actions may be referred back to valuations, and all valuations are either one's own or adopted, the latter being by far the more numerous. (Dawn 104).

The herd unquestioningly accepts these value systems as if they were absolute, objective, and divinely sanctioned frameworks. The herd is neither cognizant of its own needs nor of the genuine absence of intrinsic value in things but the herd's needs are satisfied unconsciously through these systems of value and consciously by their confirmed belief that these systems are, in fact, absolute and objective. On the other hand, the minority of "free spirits"
are those few creators who consciously and deliberately project their particular values upon the world and wherever the value systems make that projection impossible, then they are the few who have the strength, courage, and honesty to overthrow the old and to establish the new. These "free spirits" are cognizant both of their own individual needs and the genuine absence of intrinsic value in things apart from any subjective imposition which might prevent a less courageous man from directly fulfilling his needs.

A revaluation of new values is achieved only when there is a tension of new needs of men with new needs, who suffer from the old values without attaining this consciousness. (WTP 1008).

It is life itself, through the will to power, that compels us to accept or to reject certain systems of value. Systems of value are themselves nothing more than affective interpretations, that is, interpretations determined by the natural ranking of human needs and fears as they are manifested in, and translated through, the ordering and ranking of man's drives. Although Nietzsche claims that one system of value may be life-affirming and "Yes-saying" to life while another system of value (notably Platonism, Christianity, which is simply "Platonism for the people" (BGE Preface) and Kantianism, since Kant is only an "underhanded Christian" (TWI. Reason, 6) may be life-denying and "no-saying" to life, these designations are neither evaluative nor prescriptive but are simply descriptive expressions. Nietzsche vehemently rejects any standard of valuation which is thought to exist outside of nature. Nature itself has "...natural degrees and ranks" (WTP 37). Thus Nietzsche may claim that life-affirming values are more valuable than life-denying values but only in the sense that these values reflect a natural ranking of affects which, at this time and for this species or individual, best promotes preservation. And it would certainly be conceivable, on Nietzsche's model, for certain systems of value which may have
been indispensably valuable for some time, to cease in the promotion of life. Needless to say, these ancient values may still be revered and held as indispensable truths. Nietzsche's diatribe against "herd morality" and his injunction that all values should be re-evaluated are simply his measures for coming to assess the "truth", that is, the usefulness which these particular values have for promoting life. The "truth" of a particular system of value or interpretation can be nothing more than its usefulness for promoting life; "...forcing, adjusting, abbreviating, omitting, padding, inventing, falsifying, and whatever else is the essence of interpreting..." (GM I,151), may never, perhaps, be escapable.

Lastly, for Nietzsche, the acceptance of a pregiven system of value by the majority simply means that, for the most part, it is easier for man to believe that he has discovered pre-existent or pre-established values than it is for him to come to the fearful, dangerous, and life-threatening realization that he can, and should, invent his own values or, at the very least, test those values he has so easily accepted. As explanation has been seen to be parasitic on an initial interpretation, any values which are believed to have been discovered (gefunden), or have been found to have some external, transcendent or divine, source, must, at some previous time however remote from memory, have been invented (erfunden) and projected into the world (See Appendix II). Thus, the majority believe that they have been divinely handed, or have discovered, the values and value systems of Platonism, Christianity, and Kantianism, (all seen by Nietzsche to be basically "meta-worldly" values). Nietzsche attempts to remind the majority (through Zarathustra's pronouncement "God is dead!") that Plato, Christ and Kant are individual creators who have initially invented these particular values but that these values are still to be understood as values which have been existentially derived from their own individual needs and fears as they are ranked by their affects.
Before investigating the function of axiological imposition at the level of specific value imposition by individuals, it is necessary to look more closely at Nietzsche's rejection of "otherworldly" values, particularly as they were historically represented in the metaphysics of Plato, Christianity, and Kant. At the same time, Nietzsche's assessment of the Kantian "true world", viz, the concept of the thing in itself, can be made so that our final evaluation of Nietzsche's philosophy can be shown to have a concept of "becoming-in-itself" which has most of the damning features for which Nietzsche rejected, in part, Kant's view of "reality". It will be left to chapter III (on Kant) to argue that Nietzsche's view of the "thing in itself" was not particularly Kantian in flavour or spirit.
The Rise and Fall of the 'True World'.

Nietzsche, in a letter to Georg Brandes (October 20, 1888), said of his book *The Twilight of the Idols* that "This work is my philosophy in a nutshell--radical to a criminal extreme...". In the text of *The Twilight of the Idols* (Maxims, 44. Cf. Anti. 1), Nietzsche lends credence to his statement by offering what might be called the most encapsulating nutshell of his philosophy: "The formula for my happiness: a Yes, a No, a straight line, a goal". The goal is undoubtedly the overman for Nietzsche states "Not ' mankind' but overman is the goal" (WTP 1001). However, Nietzsche also claims, at least from the time of the writing of *Zarathustra*, that "Humanity still has no goal" (Zar. p. 60). Humanity, it seems, has no goal because, as Nietzsche states, "Never yet has there been an overman" (Zar. p. 93). But perhaps the overman is the kind of goal that, once reached, is immediately transcended and replaced by a higher overman or an over-overman. "Whoever reaches his ideal", says Nietzsche, "transcends it eo ipso" (BGE 73). This particular arrangement would entail that there can never be an overman per se but only a man who has the will and the capacity to overcome himself continuously. After all, man himself is described as an "on-the-way" (Zar. p. 14), an "overture" (Zar. p. 15). "Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman--a rope over an abyss" (Zar. p. 14). Man is therefore the straight line that is always on the way towards the goal of the overman.

The Yes in the formula for Nietzsche's happiness is the Yes to life; it is the sacred Yes to life voiced by the child or overman; it is the voice which speaks of the Dionysian or highest affirmation of life which, in an existentially exaggerated condition makes its debut in *Joyful Wisdom* (III, 109; IV, 341) as the eternal return of the same (Cf. WTP 237). However,
Nietzsche's great Yes to life must always be seen in sharp contrast to the historical, and, for the most part, metaphysical background of the No. Yet the "No" in Nietzsche's formula plays a dual role. On the one hand, the No represents the No-saying lion, that is, the negative, destructive aspect of the spirit or life, since that is what life essentially is (See Zar. p. 104). The Yes-saying child, who would create his own values, requires the No-saying lion who must first destroy the ancient values that stand above the child, perhaps so transcendent and otherworldly as to be out of the child's reach. "And whoever must be a creator in good and evil", says Zarathustra, "must first be an annihilator and break values" (Zar. p. 116). What the lion roars No to, that is, what values the lion must first break for the child, are precisely those values which were created by another kind of No-saying spirit, namely, the spirit that addresses life from a perspective of weakness and exhaustion.

I teach the No to all that makes weak--that exhausts. I teach the Yes to all that strengthens, that stores up strength, that justifies the feeling of strength (WTP 54).

Ironically perhaps, the philosophical notion of the "true world" arose from declining life while the "true world" declines in power and finally becomes a fable due to the efforts of ascending life. Such an ascending life is the overman, introduced by Nietzsche as "the meaning of the earth", as an antidote to the declining life which threatens to slacken the rope which leads to the overman. The overman is always seen to be the counter-balance to the otherworldly hopes and aspirations of those declining in spirit.

However, "Human existence is uncanny and still without meaning" (Zar. p. 20). Human existence is still precariously perched on the rope stretched over the abyss because man is in some stage of transition between two oppos-
ing kinds of values. One kind of value, the values of the earth, the Yes-
saying values would help to propel man towards the overman; the other kind
of value, the more prevalent, otherworldly values would transform man into
the blinking last man filled with contempt for the earth. The problem
is that man has not yet owned up to the overman as the goal, as the mean-
ing of the earth, as a "human meaning" (Zar. p. 76). But, at the same
time, man is no longer forcefully and blindly clinging to his faith in
"otherworldly hopes". Man must "...no longer...bury his head in the sand
of heavenly things, but bear it freely, an earthly head, which creates a
meaning for the earth" (Zar. p. 32). "How the 'True World' finally became
a Fable" is a six point outline of the history of the rise and fall of man's
otherworldly, afterworldly, and meta-physical values. However, the history
of the error is not yet complete. The process of fablization is still
underway. The "finality" of the history about which Nietzsche speaks
is best read as an indication of the joy and pride he felt for having played
his part in moving the "true world" towards the status of a fable. However,
the madman of Joyful Wisdom (III, 125) has warned us that "...deeds, though
done, still require time to be seen and heard". We must heed the madman's
words because the historical process of making the "true world" a fable is
nothing short of the deed that brought about the death of God. But like
the death of God, the shadows of otherworlds and afterworlds are still
being cast upon the earth while metaphysics still flourishes in the schools.

1. The true world--attainable for the sage,
the pious, the virtuous man....

For Plato, the true world is an ontological referent. It is the realm
of Being, of the Forms or Ideas which are really real while the particulars
in this realm of becoming are less real and only inferior or imperfect
copies of the Forms. Being is known by reason; becoming, following Parmenides, is simply what appears to the senses. Nietzsche believed that Plato's philosophy was the end result of a physiologically negative attitude 'towards life'. Plato, in common with Christianity and Kant, typifies those who are physiologically weak, dishonest, unhealthy, decadent, and symptomatic of declining life. All "sages" who distinguish this apparent world from that "true world" do so out of a declining life which wants to defame, slander, discredit, and make us suspicious of this world to the point of having us flee from it. Plato, by equating knowledge, reason, virtue, and happiness, sees the epitome of their highest fulfillment in the philosopher whose life is spent training for death and dying, i.e., for the separation of the soul and the body, for the separation of reason from the senses, passions, and instincts. Insofar as Nietzsche (often) regards the senses as the means to truth (Vide BGE 128, 134; Zar. p. 86; Twi. Reason, 1-3; WTP 461, 585a, 1011, 1046.) and the passions and instincts as the very root of life itself (Twi. Morality, 1), the hostility which is directed against both the senses and sensuality by Plato, as well as Christianity, only serves to demonstrate to what extent they typify a degeneration of life. The prejudice of metaphysics, typified by Platonism, is the belief in the otherworldly which is deemed to be the origin of our highest values (BGE 2). Hence Being, the divine, pure, and eternal, though untrue and purely invented by man, became the measure of reality (BGE 4).

2. The true world--unattainable for now, but promised for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man....

Nietzsche's diatribe against Plato could also be directed against Christianity because, in Nietzsche's mind, Christianity simply is "...Plato-
nis for the people" (BGE, Preface, 1). Of the three metamorphoses of the spirit, Christianity is represented by the camel, a beast of burden who bears much, who kneels down under the weight of his self-imposed burden in renunciation and reverence and who eventually races off into the desert to become the ascetic ideal. According to Nietzsche, Christians preach the lie of the afterworldly because of their suffering and weariness of life. Christians therefore live this wretched life, it seems, only in preparation for the heavenly world to come. Thus, Nietzsche argues that Christianity is a "...form of mortal enmity against reality, that has never yet been sur-
passed" (Anti. 27).

3. The true world--unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable; but the very thought of it--a consolation, an obligation, an imperative.

The true world is still understood to be an ontological referent. It serves as a consolation for Kant because, by limiting reason to make room for faith, he made the existence of God, the freedom of will, and the immortal soul immune to the attacks of religious skeptics. It is in this sense that Nietzsche regards Kant as an "...underhanded Christian" (Twi. Reason, 6). Kant's true world or realm of the noumenal also establishes our moral obligations and duties through the categorical imperative. Thus, Nietzsche says that Kant "...invented a reason expressly for those cases in which one would not need to bother about reason: namely when the needs of heart, when morality, when 'duty' speaks" (WTP 415). It was nothing more than a "...desire of the heart that had been filtered and made abstract" (BGE 5) that created, in Kant's "backdoor philosophy" (Twi, Skirmishes, 16) "...a realm of moral values, withdrawn from us, invisible, real" (WTP 415).

According to Nietzsche, the Kantian concept of the "thing in itself"
is the concept of an unconditioned thing (WTP 555) which has been invented by thought (WTP 574) for Kant's metaphysical comfort (WTP 15). Insofar as the thing-in-itself is, by definition, unconditioned, it is, at the same time, unknowable. This is the case, Nietzsche argues, because "knowing" itself entails placing ourselves in a conditional relation with something. In fact, a "thing" just is the sum of its conditioned relations, and apart from these relations, a "thing" does not, indeed, cannot exist. There simply cannot be a "thing-in-itself" because a thing cannot exist independently of the psycho-physiological subject that constitutes part of the relations which make a thing what it is.

The "thing-in-itself" nonsensical. If I remove all the relationships, all the "properties" [viz., feelings of subject, sensations (WTP 562)], all the "activities" of a thing, the thing does not remain over; because thingness has only been invented by us owing to the requirements of logic, thus with the aim of defining, communication (to bind together the multiplicity of relationships, properties, activities). (WTP 558. See also 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 559, 560, 562, 568, 569, 571, Appendix XIII: Thing in itself).

A "thing-in-itself" just as perverse as a "sense-in-itself", a "meaning-in-itself" ...

(WTP 556).

It is not only the case that the object of empirical knowledge must be understood in terms of the way we know it, that is, perceive and conceive, but there is, for Nietzsche, no object at all apart from our modes of perceiving and conceiving (Vide PT 32, 37, 40, 85; Dawn 483; JW I, 54; BGE 16; GM III, 12). However, although Nietzsche argues that the concept of the thing in itself is perverse, nonsensical, and "empty of meaning" (HAH I, 16), he does not dispute the logical possibility that there may very well be a
"metaphysical world" à la Kant's thing in itself. This world would have to stand in conditions independently of man and would therefore be both inaccessible and incomprehensible. At the same time, it could not be regarded as a metaphysical world composed of "things".

...a metaphysical world could exist; the absolute possibility of it can hardly be disputed...but one can do absolutely nothing with it... --For one could assert nothing whatever about it except that it was a being-other, an inaccessible, incomprehensible being-other... (HAH I, 9).

Nietzsche's point seems to be that we are strictly limited in our knowledge to the human perspective and although it is logically possible to posit a thing in itself, i.e., a reality which exists independently of the knowing subject, in Nietzsche's mind, this convention has nothing more than an empty theoretical sense. Indeed, practically speaking it is useless since we are limited to how the world appears to us and, more importantly, its conceptual presence is sufficient to cause us to slander this appearance even though it is all we can possibly have. 25

What things are is something that can only be established by a measuring subject placed alongside them. The properties of things considered in themselves are no concern of ours; we are concerned with them only to the extent that they affect us (PT 37. Cf. JW V, 354).

4. The true world--unattainable? At any rate, unattained, also unknown. Consequently, not consoling, redeeming, or obligating: how could something unknown obligate us?

The true world continues to be understood as an ontological referent but the dawn of positivism, the first step in the process of fablizing the true world, does not give this referent much credence. After all, if the real world is unattained so far, and therefore unknown, it can be of no genuine concern to us and certainly not the kind of entity one should use
to support the cases of such human enterprises as religion and ethics which, for the positivists, already seem to be shady enough in themselves. Nietzsche would applaud the positivists for their enquiring spirit and for their critical stand, a stand that accepts nothing except the facts. However, Nietzsche questions the legitimacy of positivism stopping at the facts, particularly since there are no facts at all on Nietzsche's account.

Against that positivism which stops before phenomena, saying "there are only facts," I should say: No, it is precisely facts that do not exist, only interpretation...

(WTP 481).

5. The "true world"--an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even obligating--an idea which has become useless and superfluous--consequently, a refuted idea: let us abolish it!

Finally, although the word must still be used with hesitancy, the "true world" is no longer understood to be an ontological referent; the lion or free spirit has begun to regard the "true world" as nothing more than an idea, a worthless and therefore refuted idea which has run its historical course. The "true world" has been reduced to a lingering "concept-mummy", to borrow Nietzsche's phrase (Tw, Reason, 1), that is, it is only an ontological reference for which there is simply no ontological referent, and, more importantly, no longer any belief or need to believe in such a referent. However, Nietzsche realized that among "...all the products of the human artistic sense, ideas are the most solid and lasting" (HAH II, 171). The shadow or idea of God may therefore linger in human caves for thousands of years following the death of God so His shadow remains to be vanquished (See JW III, 108). "God is dead" therefore means that belief in
one particular kind of value system or morality, viz., an "anti-natural morality--that is, almost every morality which has so far been taught, revered, and preached..." (Twi, Morality, 4), is beginning to collapse and fall. This means precisely that the "true world" of metaphysical and transcendent values has become a fable, i.e., a useless and therefore refutable error. However, there is still one stage remaining in the history of the error. What is it about the stage of the lion that necessitates the sixth and "final" stage of the overman? It is the fact that the lion ushers in a period of nihilism, a philosophical position which man must face yet move beyond.

6. The true world--we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one.

The No-saying lion becomes the Yes-saying child by disclaiming the "true world" and by proclaiming the meaning of the earth. Belief in a "true world" brings with it the denial of the meaning of the earth.

If one shifts the centre of gravity of life out of life into the "Beyond"--into nothingness--one has deprived life as such of its centre of gravity (Anti. 43).

However, inspite of the claim that the "true world" has finally become a fable and with it, the claim that the apparent world has also been abolished, what we do experience is, in some genuine sense, an apparent world. The world of our experience is apparent, not vis-à-vis a real or "true world" that is transcendent and meta-physical; it is apparent in the sense that man cannot "know" the actual state of affairs as it exists independently of the psychophysiological subject and his contribution to experience.

One of the six "erroneous articles of faith" which Nietzsche catalogues
in *Joyful Wisdom* (III, 110) is the belief that "a thing is as it appears to be". This not only implies that on Nietzsche's view a thing is not what it appears to be but it also entails that we can and do distinguish between how the thing appears to us on the one hand and how the thing is, in itself, on the other hand. Nietzsche criticizes the realists for unjustly believing that the world is as it appears to be, as if reality itself stood unveiled before them (*Vide* JW II, 57). The realists, it seems, have not realized to what extent man contributes to his experience of reality.

That mountain there!
That cloud there!
What is "real" in that?
Subtract the phantasm and every human contribution from it, my sober friends. If you can (JW II, 57. See also Dawn 119; BGE 192).

Given the truth of Nietzsche’s claim that man must contribute to his experience of reality such that he can no longer be aware of reality itself but only how this reality must appear to be to him, then there simply "...is no 'reality' for us..." (JW II, 57). The contributions which man "makes" to his experience are made from the perspective of being human with all of the perceptual and conceptual idiosyncrasies that that entails. "We cannot look around our corner" (JW V, 347), Nietzsche says. "We look at everything through the human head and cannot cut this head off; while the question remains, What would be left of the world if it had been cut off?" (HAH 9. See also Dawn 438, 444; WTP 517, 518, 550). We simply cannot have an experience, i.e., a view of reality, which is free from the human perspective because perspective itself is "...the basic condition of all life (BGE, Preface 1). There "...would be no life at all if not on the basis of perspec-
tive estimates and appearances…” (BGE 34. Emphasis mine.). "The perspective therefore decides the character of the 'appearance'" (WTP 567. Emphasis mine.). It is important to note that Nietzsche regards our perspectival estimates and appearances to be lies and untruths, in precisely the same sense in which the "true world" was a lie and untruth. However, Nietzsche distinguishes between these two kinds of "lie" by establishing which kind of lie is truer to the meaning of the earth, that is, which kind of lie promotes life better. It is quite unimportant (and within the Nietzschean framework quite impossible as well) to discover which of these two kinds of lie is true per se because the lie is necessary for life. The "...value for life is ultimately decisive" (WTP 493) because life itself "...demands a Yes or No...about life and the value of life... BGE 205). Even those who would say Yes to life require the lie.

We have need of lies in order to conquer this reality, this 'truth', that is, in order to live... (WTP 853).

Thus: a perspectival appearance, whose origin lies in us (insofar as we continually need a narrower, abbreviated, simplified, world).-- That it is the measure of strength to what extent we can admit to ourselves without perishing, the merely apparent character, the necessity of lies (WTP 15. Cf. WTP 586; BGE 39).

Danto claims that, for Nietzsche, there is "...no way the world is in contrast with our modes of interpreting it". However, Nietzsche's claim seems to be that there is no possibility open to us as human beings for distinguishing between the way the world is and the way the world appears to be to us because of our particular modes of interpretation and as a consequence, we should not contrast the way the world is with our modes of
interpreting it. There simply is no way around or outside of the human being. "Truth" is, in Nietzsche's words, "thoroughly anthropomorphic" (PT 85). Coming to know the "true-in-itself" or "reality-in-itself" is therefore thought to be nonsensical for precisely the same reason that knowing the thing in itself is thought to be nonsensical: "...absolute and unconditional knowledge is the desire to know without knowledge" (PT 40; Cf. BGE 16; GM III, 12). In other words, we simply cannot step outside of the human condition in order to perceive or to conceive of a reality existing independently of our modes of perceiving and conceiving.

Knowledge, understood to be something independent of man and his "organs" is impossible (Dawn 438).

It appears therefore that Nietzsche uses the term "apparent" (or "appearance") in at least two, quite distinct ways. On the one hand, it has as its antithesis "...the world invented by the lie" (WTP 461), that is, the "true world" which Nietzsche fablized. By positing a "true world", this world is designated and eventually denigrated in value to mere appearance. But Nietzsche rejects this particular evaluation: "Becoming is not a merely apparent state; perhaps the world of beings is mere appearance" (WTP 708). However, "appearance" has a second antithesis: the reality or the truth of things apart from the subject and his perspectives, viz., becoming-in-itself.

The antithesis of this phenomenal world is not the "true world", but the formless unformulable world of the chaos of sensations--another kind of phenomenal world, a kind "unknowable" for us... (WTP 569).

However, this second antithesis between appearance and reality, of the way things appear to us vis-à-vis how they are independently of our perspectives, runs the risk of slandering and downgrading the value of
appearance much as its transcendent, otherworldly predecessors did. To avoid this risk Nietzsche raises the axiological level of "appearance" to that of "reality" as if he were perhaps hoping that the ontological status would follow suit. "For 'appearance' in this case means reality once more..." (TwI, Reason, 6). However, the sixth and final stage in the history of the error is not to rename, revalue, and hopefully re-establish the reality or the truth of appearance but to abolish the apparent-true world distinction entirely. This means essentially that we should abolish the "true world" both as an ontological reference and referent, so, by the law of non-vacuous contrast, we should abolish the "apparent" world as well. If there is no "true world" in contradistinction to an apparent world, even if it is an appearance in every other sense of the word, then the distinction itself becomes vacuous. Nietzsche has conflated such distinctions before, for example, purpose and accident in nature (JW III, 109); material and immaterial (WTP 488); health and sick (WTP 812). However, by conflating the apparent-true world distinction, Nietzsche wants us to accept the position that what we experience is not appearance vis-à-vis truth but that there are only degrees of appearance.

Indeed, what forces us at all to suppose that there is an essential opposition of true and "false"? Is it not sufficient to assume degrees of apparentness and, as it were, lighter and darker shadows and shades of appearance—different "values", to use the language of painters. Why couldn't the world that concerns us be a fiction? (BGE 34).

"Degrees of appearance" is meant in Nietzsche's mind to replace the appearance-reality distinction. The innocence of becoming, which is said to characterize the overman, is an innocence in which man has overcome, that is, has gone beyond not only good and evil, but truth and lie, and appearance and reality as
It now becomes possible to distinguish three "true worlds" in Nietzsche's thought. First, there is the "true world" that has finally become a fable. There is no true world in this sense. Secondly, there is the "true world" which is the "chaos of sensations", the becoming-in-itself, the state of affairs as it exists independently of the human perspective. We cannot know a true world in this sense. It seems therefore that there can only be a true world in the sense that it is the world that man experiences from his human perspective—but that too, it seems, is a fable.

The world with which we are concerned is false, i.e., is not a fact but a fable and approximation... (WTP 616).

We have already witnessed Kant's role in the historical process, as Nietzsche understands it, as to how the "true world" finally becomes a fable. In the history of this particular error, Kant plays a major role insofar as he proposed a "true world" that was deemed to be "...unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable" but nevertheless a necessary fixture for a philosopher that unconsciously needed an unimpeachable authority for his morality, i.e., for the categorical imperative. Kant may therefore be taken as a representative of an individual creator of values within, what Nietzsche would call "herd morality", in order that we may determine in what sense Kant's particular philosophy is thought to be a typical display of "...German profundity and curlicues" (BGE 11). Nietzsche believes that the Kantian "curlicue" or architectonic reflects Kant's singular existential fear or apprehension concerning existence. In other words, Kant's encounter with existence or at least his approximation to existence, understood to be an existence which is really without any intrinsic and objectively grounded moral or religious values, was thought to have unconsciously manipulated Kant into the philosophical perspective which sought to limit reason to make room for faith and to establish a safe haven for moral and religious values.

Our empirical world would be determined by the instincts of self-preservation even as regards the limits of knowledge... (WTP 583).

Kant's philosophical standpoint, according to Nietzsche, has necessarily appropriated the ranking of Kant's most deep-seated existential fears and needs. Thus, Kant's abstract-theoretical questions only appear to receive, and to require, abstract-theoretical answers. "The utility of preservation—not some abstract-theoretical need not to be deceived—stands as the motive behind the development of the organs of knowledge—they develop in such a way that their
observations suffice for our preservation" (WTP 480). In *Beyond Good and Evil* ("On the Prejudice of Philosophers": BGE 1-23), Nietzsche remarks that Kant's question "How are synthetic a priori judgements possible?" must not be understood to be Kant's most fundamental question. According to Nietzsche, the most fundamental question, i.e., the question with the most philosophical import for an honest interpretation not only of the first *Critique* but of Kant himself is the question "What underlying cause made it imperative for Kant to believe in the necessity of synthetic a priori judgements?"

What Nietzsche is emphasizing is that philosophy must consider that within the very purview of philosophy itself, there are questions which are existentially weighted or loaded questions, that is, questions posed such that they cannot be answered without granting the particular answers which have already been unconsciously presupposed within the structure, not only of the question but, more importantly, within the questioner himself. Nietzsche wishes to extend the scope of philosophy and philosophical investigation to include depth psychology because psychology "...is the path to the fundamental problems" (BGE 23) insofar as it is a path to the affects which shape our systems of evaluation.

Every philosophy is a foreground philosophy—that is a hermit's judgment: 'There is something arbitrary in his [Kant's] stopping here to look back and look around, in his not digging deeper here but laying his spade aside, there is also something suspicious about it! Every philosophy also conceals a philosophy; every opinion is also a hideout, every word also a mask (BGE 289).

The philosopher is therefore "...to descend into the depths" in order to perform a "...proper physio-psychology" (BGE 23). "And he would go down, and above all, he would go 'inside!'" (BGE 26). As the philosopher descends into the depths of human unconsciousness, from the conscious foreground upon which our values surface, he enters into the abyss out of which these values arise. Nietzsche describes the "inner machinery" (Dawn 129) which he discloses in the
depths as a "subtle and complicated mechanism" (Dawn 22), a "...machine about which we know so little" (Dawn 86).

...our moral judgements and valuations are only images and fantasies concerning physiological processes unknown to us, a kind of habitual language to describe certain nervous irritations (Dawn 119).

As the philosopher qua psychologist enters into the human "labyrinth" (BGE 29, 214, 223, 289), the possibility arises that the ground or ultimate cause of our valuations may never be found. According to Nietzsche, the more common instincts of man, for example, "...remain absolutely unknown to him" (Dawn 119). Similarly, in Beyond Good and Evil (289), Nietzsche again questions the very possibility of disclosing the ultimate cause or final ground of our particular surface values; "...whether behind everyone of his [the philosopher's] caves there is not, must not be, another deeper cave...an abysmally deep ground behind every ground, under every attempt to furnish 'grounds'" (BGE 289). Not only is there a question as to the real possibility of eventually disclosing the ultimate cause or final ground of human valuation, but there is also perhaps the more important question as to whether or not the very attempt to make such a disclosure is meant to be epistemologically futile except for the dramatic consequences which are produced when it is realized that man's conscious life is quite insignificant and shallow in comparison with the depths of the unconscious affects.

Man, like every living being, thinks continually without knowing it; the thinking that rises to consciousness is only the smallest part of all this—the most superficial and worst part... (JW V, 354).

At any rate, Nietzsche's attempt to psychologize to the unconscious source of our values must always be seen to be a further occasion for translating theoretical questions concerning the truth and value of particular abstract claims into practical, concrete questions about the need and utility that such claims have for the human being when they are believed to be true.
That is to say 'truths' do not establish themselves by means of some logical proofs, but by means of their effects: proofs of strength. The true and the effective are taken to be identical... (PT 16-17).

It is not really essential for our purposes to distinguish between Nietzsche as a good philosopher or as a poor psychologist nor is it essential to correlate Kant's life-long virginity or penchant for mustard with his philosophical positions. However, there is a very legitimate sense in which Nietzsche can claim that the subject's affects colour his perception and evaluation of the world. Nietzsche makes this point quite clearly when he says that the "...perspective therefore decides the character of the appearance" (WTP 567. Emphasis mine). Axiological imposition, at the level of specific values imposed by an individual, may assume that we are confronted in our experience by objects because this is simply a matter of narrowing the scope of axiological imposition to one of its three possible functions within Nietzsche's thought. As we have seen already, it is only axiological imposition of value in its broadest and most penetrating sense, i.e., as the prejudices of sense and reason, that gives us a world of things formed from a worthless and chaotic nature. Axiological imposition, in this latter sense, serves as a precondition for axiological imposition in the narrower sense of subjectively imposing specific values on things. It is not a vicious circle into which Nietzsche has fallen; it is only an indication that there are at least two, distinct, forms of value imposition, viz., the general and the specific, although this distinction may not be made explicitly by Nietzsche himself. Specific imposition of value seems to presuppose the imposition of value at the general level, viz., the prejudices, on the assumption that there are things in the world to value. Thus axiological imposition at the level of specific values imposed by an individual may easily assume that we are confronted in our experience by objects. However certain
encounters with objects are particularly dramatic, assertive, and obvious and can therefore be used in an important way to highlight the impositional relationship which is said to exist between the subject and the object. This impositional relationship will expose the essential point that, for Nietzsche, a value is a fact which is relative to the affects of the subject on the one hand, and what amounts to the objective determinations of the object on the other.

The strength and force, or even the profound lack of strength and force of the subject's encounter with the object rests, it seems, squarely upon the bipolar tension which originally defined the knowledge relation. This bipolar tension is an epistemological tension because the subject and object are thought to be irreducible in this primitive relationship. However, this bipolar tension is also an axiological tension because the subject's needs and fears (affects) must be balanced against the usefulness, calculability, and manageability of the object, if the value which can and should be appropriately applied to this object is ever to be determined.

Hate, anger, fear, envy, love, jealousy, rage, any strong or violent emotion demands, at the outset, that we at least believe in the reality of the object which is thought to be the cause of our response. In other words, there is an immediate acceptance of the object as both there and real when it is believed to be the object of our hate, anger, etc.

Wrath, hatred, love, pity, desire, recognition, joy, pain: all these are names indicating extreme conditions; the milder and middle stages, and even more particularly the ever active lower stages, escape our attention, and yet it is they which weave the warp and woof of our character and destiny (Dawn 115).

The intense emotions, though certainly not in any sense the only emotions, help to point out that, for Nietzsche, "Believing is the primal beginning even in every sense impression..." (WTP 506). Nietzsche argues that every encounter
with an object (even the fact that the object itself is constructed out of sense impressions) must be seen to be thoroughly permeated and impregnated by some emotional colouration. This colouration must be understood to be the result of an axiological imposition on the part of the subject that is dependent upon what the object is perceived and believed to be as well as the value which that object has in terms of fulfilling an individual's particular teleology (needs, purposes, goals). One of the most constant and, indeed, one of the most successful themes in Nietzsche's epistemology is his view that philosophy must account for man's needs and emotions because they are responsible for "...colour[ing] the world of phenomena" (HAH I, 16); they "...decide the character of the 'appearance'" (WTP 567). All human sense perception is thought to be thoroughly impregnated with the values which are based on our individual human needs and emotions. We "weave", "mingle" (JW 57) and "poetize" (WTP 801) our affects into our sense perceptions. All of our experience is permeated with value judgements (WTP 260, 505).

...this world has gradually become so marvelously motley, terrible, full of meaning and of soul, it has acquired colour—but we were the colourists; the human intellect, on the basis of human needs, of human emotions [the affects], has caused this "phenomenon" to appear and has carried its erroneous fundamental conceptions into things (HAH I, 16).

An everyday example of our own design might clarify what Nietzsche understands to be the scope of axiological imposition of specific values. The example should illustrate not only the process of valuation by means of which the value itself is posited as a relative fact but also how the process itself establishes the emotional colouration of all experience.

One day, we observe what we believe to be a snake coiled in our garage. It is neither a value neutral experience nor an experience free of emotional colouration. Given Nietzsche's understanding of axiological imposition,
value and emotional colouration have a mutual entailment: you either have both together in an experience or you have no experience at all. The snake coiled in our garage, at least the snake which we believed we observed in the garage, evoked fear in us because the snake was believed to be dangerous, repugnant, or, at least, something to be avoided. We might subsequently observe that it was not a snake coiled up in the garage but simply a piece of old rope. Our fear is then replaced by a new feeling of warmth, security, comfort, and well-being. The values "dangerous", "repugnant", "to be avoided" are lifted from what we thought we perceived, namely, the snake, and are replaced by the simple value "harmless". This is done presumably because "danger" is a value which is inappropriately applied to a rope, at least, under these particular conditions. The initial response, and the value imposed because of it, were frankly inappropriate because what was thought to be a dangerous snake was, on closer examination, really nothing more than a harmless rope. Although it is not inappropriate to fear a dangerous snake, it is inappropriate to fear a harmless rope. What is illustrated by this example finds many instances in our everyday life, expressly whenever one thing is thought to be something else based upon a misperception or misconception of it. However, axiological imposition at the level of specific value does not presuppose the legitimacy of the looks—is distinction, even though it might appear from the example that it does. This is the case, for Nietzsche, because the broader scope of axiological imposition, which includes both the prejudice of sense and the prejudice of reason, has already rendered the looks—is distinction both impossible and unnecessary.

When one considers, on the one hand, the value of knowledge, and on the other hand, a beautiful illusion which has exactly the same value as an item of knowledge—provided only that it is an illusion in which one believes—,
then one realizes that life requires illusions, i.e., untruths which are taken to be truths. What life does require is belief in truth, but illusion is sufficient for this (PT 16-17).

In each of these experiential situations in which we initially misperceive and misjudge the nature of the object and subsequently, as a consequence of our misjudgements impose a particular, but inappropriate "value-feeling" [Wertgefühl] (BGE 4, 186, 211; WTP 804, 1011, 1021) upon it, there are three common elements. First, something is believed to be an object of veridical perception in each case. Nietzsche would claim that our believing X to be true and the truth of X are more often than not confused. "However difficult it is to believe that 2 times 2 is not 4; does that make it true?" (Letter to His Sister, 1865). Secondly, in each case, what is later believed to be the "actual object", is discovered not to be what it was initially believed to be. However, in each of these cases, what is later believed to be the "actual object" serves, not only as the original ground for error (because it was misperceived), but also serves as the subsequent ground for "truth" (because it is believed to be perceived correctly). Our belief, and subsequently the value we placed upon the object of our belief, changed from "It is a snake" → dangerous to "It is a rope → harmless. We assume, Nietzsche would add, that our belief changed because it was discovered that this belief, with its accompanying perception, did not genuinely correspond to what was later thought to be the actual state of affairs. Thus, the second common element in perceptual misjudgements, which result in inappropriate axiological impositions and their corrections, is that the "truth-value" of such judgements is ultimately dependent on what is believed, in the last analysis, to be the veridical perception of the object to which the judgement is referred. It might therefore seem to be imperative that we be able, both in actual practice as well as in theory, to ascertain this objective state of affairs and its determinations
if we are ever to come to know the "truth" about it and thereby whether our
evaluation of it is or is not appropriate. Fearing harmless ropes may not be
counter-productive to human survival but not fearing dangerous snakes certainly
is. To distinguish between what seems to be the case and what the case, in fact,
is might therefore be deemed to be absolutely essential for the very preservation
of human life for if we are unable to distinguish between how X looks and how X
is, we might never come to know that the snake is really a rope and would continue
to hold an erroneous belief and with it, an inappropriate value. However, for
Nietzsche, "knowing", i.e., believing that it is a rope in appearance, if not
in fact, cancels out our initial belief as well as our initial valuation and
replaces them, not with knowledge and truth, but with a new belief and a new
value which is appropriate if it actually satisfies our particular needs and
fears. In other words, the "truth-value" of a judgement is always a direct
reflection of its utility. Thus, "knowledge" and "truth" are valued not because,
as knowledge and truth they are useful; it is whatever is useful that becomes
knowledge and truth for us.

To be a "thing" or "object" in any sense of these words is, for Nietzsche,
to be entirely anthropomorphic. Therefore, strictly speaking, both the snake,
as well as the rope, as objects, are anthropomorphically coloured.

We produce beings as the bearers of properties and
abstractions as the causes of these properties.
That a unity, e.g., a tree, appears to us to be a
multiplicity of properties and relations is something
doubly anthropomorphic: in the first place, this
delimited unity, "tree", does not exist; it is arbitrary
to carve out a thing in this manner (according to the
eye, according to the form). Furthermore, each relation
is not the true, absolute relation, but is again
anthropomorphically coloured (PT 52).

If the truth of a judgement about an object requires our having or standing
in an "absolute relation" with the object, then Nietzsche argues that this
condition is impossible as a matter of fact. If the truth of a judgement about
an object requires our knowing the object as it exists absolutely, i.e., apart from our knowing it, then truth is impossible ex hypothesi. Perspective, as we have seen, denies the possibility of there being a thing-in-itself to know. Axiological imposition in its broadest sense simply means that there are, and can be, no things at all apart from some knowing-valuing subject. Therefore, regardless of the status which we might wish to impose upon a given snake, rope, or thing, they all amount to semblance, i.e., how things appear to man. It is not essential for Nietzsche to distinguish between degrees of semblance for he has, in essence, collapsed the framework within which the looks-is distinction functions. What we are aware of, regardless of what it is, is only semblance. If one semblance, when believed to be true, promotes life, then that serves as "reality". This is however no indication, and certainly no guarantee, that this semblance really is reality or that this belief is, in fact, truth. But for Nietzsche, "reality", and "truth" are only convenient terms by means of which epistemologists distinguish one semblance and erroneous belief measured by means of another; although they do not admit it. Existentially speaking, Nietzsche insists that we drop this "appearance-reality" or "looks-is" distinction entirely because it demeans and devalues "appearance". When appearance is the only reality man can have, it becomes time for "appearance' to become reality once more" (Twi. Reason, 6). "The true world—we have abolished it. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one" (Twi, "How the 'True World' finally became a Fable", 6).

The third common element in cases of misjudgement based on misperception establishes what is specifically and fundamentally a Nietzschean insight. For Nietzsche, every perception of an object is permeated with an emotional colouration which serves to point out the true nature of the bipolar tension between the
subject and object. In other words, for Nietzsche, the encounter with the
"snake-rope" immediately establishes that epistemological problems are not
simply problems involving neutral subjects perceiving neutral objects;
epistemological problems involve such encounters as a fearful man perceiving
a harmless snake. Regardless of the actual colouration of the object, the
colouration itself must always be seen to be part of the axiological element,
i.e., as something imposed on the object by the subject. However, the colouration
is itself something which is ultimately dependent for its appropriateness on
the object being perceived regardless of the fact that the object being perceived is,
at bottom, a second-order appearance. Nietzsche's point is that evaluation requires
a reciprocal relation. The value which is imposed on the object must reflect more
than just my subjective dispositions and affects though they must assuredly be
taken into account. The value which is subjectively imposed upon the object
exposes a relational fact, viz., that the object, even if it is illusory in
substance, must fulfil a certain subjective need.

The way our streets are paved, good air in our
room, food—we grasp their value; we have taken
all the necessities of existence seriously... (WTP 1016).

...there is nothing which is good, beautiful, sublime, or
evil in itself [i.e., nothing is valuable in itself]; but
rather that there are conditions of soul which lead us to
attribute such qualities to things outside ourselves and
in us (Dawn 210).

Although Nietzsche infrequently exclaims that the instinct of preservation
is not the cardinal drive (WTP 650); that "...self-preservation is only one of
the indirect and most frequent results..." (BGE 13) of the cardinal drive; that
"...preservation [is] only a consequence of discharge of strength" (WTP 650),
he most frequently proclaims that all valuation is to be understood precisely in
terms of preservation. "In valuations are expressed conditions of preservation
and growth" (WTP 507). Interpretation, perspective, Apollinian illusions, the
will to power—all seem to be in the service of life's promotion.

...the quantum of illusion might be of a higher rank on account of its value for our preservation (WTP 583).

Let at least this much be admitted: there would be no life at all if not on the basis of perspective estimates and appearances... (BGE 34. Emphasis mine.).

Nietzsche often refers to this emotional colouration of our perception of possible objects of experience as if it were a priori (JW III, 114; WTP 260). "It cannot be doubted that all sense perceptions are permeated with value judgements..." (WTP 505. Emphasis mine.). Nietzsche seems to indicate that it is possible to know prior to experience that in any perception of an object, there will be an emotional colouration pervading the subject-object dichotomy, though what the emotion will be can only be determined by an actual empirical observation.

If you could only perceive, even once, to what extent your volition dominates your sight (Dawn 539).

Your physical exhaustion will lend the things pale colours whilst your feverishness will turn them into monsters (Dawn 539).

In this sense, Nietzsche understands emotional colouration or axiological imposition to be part of the form our experience must take. In the natural setting of the subject-object dichotomy, there cannot be a perception of an object without the subject having an accompanying disposition and the object being coloured by it; "...even in the 'simplest' processes of sensation the affects dominate..." (BGE 192).

Perhaps Nietzsche's most acute philosophical problem is that he often appears to forget the scope which he has afforded to the prejudice of sense whenever he draws specific attention to the second level of prejudice, viz., the prejudice of reason. In Twilight of the Idols (III, 2), Nietzsche claims that the senses "...do not lie at all". Nietzsche is claiming, or so it seems, that at the level of sensation alone, no lies have been introduced. Thus "...insofar as the senses show becoming, passing away, and change, they do not lie at all" (Twi III, 2). In the same passage, Nietzsche makes it quite clear that lies are introduced only at the level of reason (concepts, knowledge, judgement, thought, language, categorization).

What we make of their [the sense's] testimony, that alone introduces lies; for example, the lie of unity, the lie of thinghood, of substance, of permanence. 'Reason' is the cause of the falsification of the testimony of the senses (Twi III, 2)

...prejudice in favour of reason compels us to posit unity, identity, duration, substance, cause, materiality, being... (Twi III, 5).

Nietzsche appears to be contrasting the way things "are" or, at least, appear or seem to be to the senses and the way in which we think or interpret things to be. This distinction is drawn because reason, by its very nature, is believed to falsify or prejudice the testimony of the senses. It seems, given this particular characteristic of reason, that we are "...unable to think anything at all exactly as it is" (WTP 436. Emphasis mine.). However, this claim does not appear to exclude the possibility that we can at least perceive things exactly as they are and that this perception would be of change, becoming, and passing away. Perhaps what Nietzsche is claiming
might best be stated as a counterfactual conditional: if it were possible to have the testimony of the senses alone, we would 1) be able to perceive the actual or objective state of affairs in the world and 2) that this perception would be a perception of "becoming". It is not the case that, on the strength of our perception, true judgements about such states of affairs might be made because statement uttering, by its very nature affiliated with reason, must also result in falsification. The use of concepts and language falsifies the truth of things so if there is "truth" in any Nietzschean sense, it will not be judgemental or propositional in form. However, there is every indication that the testimony of the senses, in and by itself, amounts to a kind of primitive truth for Nietzsche that is falsified only when it becomes tainted by reason. Thus we find Nietzsche claiming that "...all credibility, all good conscience, all evidence of truth come only from the senses" (BGE 134. Emphasis mine. See also BGE 123; Zar. p. 86; Twi III, 1, 2, 3; WTP. 461, 585a, 1011, 1046). When Nietzsche claims that the senses do not lie at all when they show becoming, passing away, and change, he is undoubtedly suggesting that the testimony of the senses is an accurate reflection of the actual state of affairs in the world as it must exist independently of the psycho-physiological subject. In other words, the senses are thought to put us directly in touch with the Dionysian world of "becoming" that is devoid of permanence, order, similarity, and unity, not to mention purpose, meaning, and value. Nietzsche offers the following three point summation of the characteristics of "becoming":

1. Becoming does not aim at a final state, does not flow into "being".
2. Becoming is not a merely apparent state; perhaps the world of beings is mere appearance.
3. Becoming is of equivalent value every moment; the sum of its values always remains the same;
in other words, it has no value at all, for anything against which to measure it, and in relation to which the word "value" would have meaning, is lacking (WTP 708. Cf. 272).

However, it should already be apparent that the prejudice of sense, even apart from what Nietzsche has identified as the falsifying prejudice of reason, negates the possibility for our determining the actual state of affairs in the world by means of the senses alone. The prejudice of sense "pre-judges" our appearance of the world just as much as the prejudice of reason. In fact, although Nietzsche claims that the testimony of the senses is only falsified by reason (Twi III, 2), it has been demonstrated that the prejudice of reason, i.e., the Nietzschean categories, are themselves entirely dependent on the prejudice of sense. The senses, according to Nietzsche, do not give us a clear and undistorted access to any reality, becoming or otherwise.

...it seems to me that "the correct perception"--which would mean "the adequate expression of an object in the subject"--is a contradictory impossibility (PT 86).

...this appreciation of things we call sensation--but it is all an error per se (Dawn 117).

...our senses learn only late, and never learn entirely, to be subtle, faithful, and cautious organs of cognition (BGE 192).

The manifold of sense or becoming is the raw material or content out of which the object is constructed or formed first at the level of sensation and only subsequently at the level of reason. The possibility does not even exist for us, within the framework of Nietzsche's epistemology, to be immediately or directly aware of the actual state of affairs in the world. "Becoming" must therefore be one of two things: it is either an appearance which, in Nietzsche's mind, most closely approximates reality (i.e., what
"things" are like apart from the knowing subject) or becoming is an unknowable "thing-in-itself". If we take the former position to be Nietzsche's, namely, that becoming is a higher-order appearance, then the question still remains as to the nature of reality apart from the knowing and falsifying subject. If we take the later position to be Nietzsche's, "becoming" would be this unknowable reality, and thereby assumes the role of the proverbial "thing-in-itself", the concept of which Nietzsche vehemently opposes. Thus, to reiterate Stack's comment,

Even if we grant to Nietzsche that there is only a fluctuating becoming, that actuality is radically impermanent, does this not mean that he, too, retains a "becoming-in-itself" that is subject to all the criticisms that he directed against Kant's thing-in-itself?

Nietzsche's theory of knowledge therefore rests on the strength or weakness of these two positions:
1) man cannot make any claims about the actual state of affairs as it exists independently of the knowing subject with all of his idiosyncracies because such a claim would amount to nonsense. Knowing demands reference to the relationship between knower and known.
2) Any claim which man makes, because it must make reference, implicitly or explicitly, to the knowing subject, must also take into account that this relationship distorts, falsifies, or misrepresents the actual state of affairs.

Thus, given that these two positions are the very backbone of Nietzsche's theory of knowledge, that very theory of knowledge gives birth to an epistemological mutation of the "thing in itself", viz., "becoming in itself". At least, for Nietzsche, his becoming-in-itself, is a "down to earth" reality that we can never know.
The antithesis of this phenomenal world is not "the true world", but the formless unformulable world of the chaos of sensations--another kind of phenomenal world, a kind "unknowable" for us ... (WTP 569)

Nietzsche's "perspective theory of affects" replaced traditional epistemology (WTP 462) on the grounds that traditional epistemology, particularly of the Kantian variety, did not allow us "to cross the threshold" (BGE 204). Yet Nietzsche's philosophy is a kind of idealism which prevents us from knowing things as they really are, i.e., of knowing empirical reality which is understood to be things existing independently of the psycho-physiological subject. If "crossing the threshold" means that we may come to know empirical reality or objects of empirical knowledge precisely as they are and not just as they look to be or appear to be, then Nietzsche's epistemology has deliberately closed that door.

One day the wanderer slammed a door behind himself, stopped in his tracks, and wept. Then he said: "This penchant and passion for what is true, real, non-apparent [Un-Scheinbaren], certain--how it aggravates me (JW IV, 309).

The second objection to Nietzsche's philosophy is to point out (though in greater detail in Chapter III) that it is as incorrect for Nietzsche to claim that the senses lie or deceive us as it is for him to claim that the senses tell us the truth. Essentially, the senses cannot lie because they are incapable of telling the truth. It is only possible for the senses to report the "look" of things which we experience (what Nietzsche claims) and the look of things, although ultimately serving in our explanation of the way things are, is not itself sufficient for determining truth or falsity (also what Nietzsche claims). Our senses do not tell us, for example, that the pencil submerged in a glass of water is bent. Our senses report only
that it looks bent. Reason therefore does not correct the "deceptive"

testimony of the senses but it interprets the look derived from the senses

by determining the way the object must actually be if it is to be capable

of presenting itself to the senses as it does. In other words, based on

our sensual evidence (the way the pencil looks) we might judge that the

pencil is bent. This would be an erroneous inference from the look of the

pencil and therefore a false judgement. Further evidence, this time the

look of the pencil outside of the water, subsequently serves as the basis

for the renewed claim that the pencil must really be straight. Thus,

reason does not correct deceptive testimony of the senses because there is

no deceptive testimony to correct. Rather, reason corrects itself. The

sense evidence remains the same and it is reason's task to provide some

account which can adequately explain why it is that things look one way

rather than another. Nietzsche argued that if reason were believed to

correct the senses, the senses would be seen to be our deceptive organs

for knowledge and reason alone would become the sole arbiter of truth and

reality.

The senses deceive, reason corrects the errors;

consequently, one concluded, reason is the road
to the constant; the least sensual ideas must be
the closest to the "true world".—It is from the
senses that most misfortunes come—they are de-
ceivers, deluders, destroyers (WTP 585a).

Only if it is the case that the pencil is, in fact, straight, can we

explain why it must look bent in the water. Therefore the senses are a

neutral and not a prejudiced witness to the material which constitutes both

that which is to be explained and perhaps paradoxically, evidence for ac-
cepting one explanatory account over another. Evidence and the grounds for
determining truth and falsehood will also be examined in Chapter III.
Lastly, if we accept as fact the truth of Nietzsche's claim that we do impose values and meaning on things, it must be argued against Nietzsche, that the values and meaning imposed are, in some significant sense, contingent upon the objective or ontological character of the given, not just as it seems to be, which is all that Nietzsche's view allows, but as it is, which is precisely what Nietzsche's view disallows. In other words, if our values are going to be appropriate to our needs and purposes, it is essential that we know the actual ontological character of the given; it is therefore insufficient for us merely to believe in some semblance of reality. It is therefore necessary to consider Nietzsche's assessment of this contingency between the appropriateness of our values and the apparent ontological character of the "objectively" given.

If, in fact, we do impose values upon things and these things are really meant to be valuable, that is, if value really is a relative fact, insofar as it reflects the relation between the object and its objective determinations, and the subject with his needs and purposes, then it seems, at least prima facie, that there must be some truly objective state of affairs. In other words, if object X only seems to be an object and only seems to have the objective determinations which it has, then it becomes difficult to understand how object X can have anything but the semblance of value. Object X can only, at best, seem to be valuable; it cannot, in any genuine sense, really be valuable. This discrepancy, if it can be called that, did not seem to bother Nietzsche in the least. In fact, he did not even regard it as a problem. However, it does seem to be the case that finding things which really can and do fulfill human needs cannot be grounded on an epistemology which, at best, establishes only the semblance or appearance of objectivity. Only when the objective state of affairs is such that
it can have and, more importantly, can be known to have, demonstrative regularity, is it even imaginable that it can be considered sufficiently dependable and manageable to be esteemed in terms of human need and purpose, in short, in terms of human preservation. Nietzsche, of course, would agree but he argues that dependability and manageability are first imposed on the world and for this reason only they are readily expected to conform to our needs. It makes better sense, I think, to give the objective state of affairs some genuine dependability and manageability. This could be provided by demonstrating the objective validity, in the Kantian sense, of the categories of permanence and causality.

By offering two disparate accounts to establish the permanence of objects within different levels of human experience, Nietzsche attempts to close the gap between the objective absence of things on the one hand, and the subjective imposition of value and meaning on "things" on the other hand. Order and permanence are "constructed" by us through an unconscious process of equalization which establishes the necessary perceptual base without which the conscious categorical imposition of "order" and "permanence" would lack convincingly understandable parameters. In other words, "order" and "permanence" would not become enduring and irrefutable categories in a world that presented itself to the senses as chaotic flux. "Order" and "permanence", that is, the categories of "causality" and "substance" are themselves necessary prerequisites for axiological imposition (only in its narrowest scope), according to which certain "things" or "processes" are deemed to be valuable. Nietzsche stressed the point that things can be meaningful and valuable for us only if they are first simplified (BGE 24, 230; WTP 477, 503, 517, 521, 556, 568, 580, 1050) and thereby made calculable (WTP 480, 516, 521, 584, 624) and manageable (WTP 584.
See also "formulatable" at WTP 516, 624). However, it is not sufficient that the world only appear to have, or only seem to have, permanent and causally related entities in order for it, not only to be believed capable, but for it actually to be capable, of supporting meaningful and valuable human enterprise. There must, in fact, be some legitimate reason for believing, and/or being able to rely on our belief, that there are permanent entities in the world and that, inspite of our observation of "change, becoming, and passing away", change must itself be interpreted as a changing state of some permanent substance. Nietzsche grounds our belief in permanence in the fact that there seem to be such entities as permanent objects in the world. The transition, however, from the way things look to the way things are thought to be is already understood by Nietzsche to involve the prejudice of sense. He therefore claims that even the look of things must not be considered a sufficient ground, in itself, for establishing the truth of any claim or for justifying any belief concerning how things actually are. His major point perhaps is that this is not, in the least, existentially important yet he himself tries, in vain, to get an epistemological access to the truth. Nietzsche's epistemological schema, as we have seen, makes it both impossible as well as unnecessary (it seems) to draw the distinction between how X looks and how X is. However, our inability to draw this distinction legitimately makes it just as impossible (and perhaps just as unnecessary) to establish when X looks valuable and when it really is valuable. However, Nietzsche argues that "morality is a sign language of the affects" (BGE 187). This means essentially that we should be able to take our values, our "good and evil" and read backwards to the underlying order and ranking of our drives and their For and Against. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra ("On the Thousand and
One Goals", pp. 58-60), Nietzsche also claims that we should be able to
work in the reverse direction, i.e., from need to value.

Verily, my brother, once you have recognized
the need and land and sky and neighbour of a
people, you may also guess the law of their
overcomings ["the tablet of their overcomings
= the voice of their will to power"], and why
they climb to their hope on this ladder (Zar.
p. 58).

Not only should we be able to read our needs from our values but we
ought to be able to do the reverse, viz., disclose what our values should
be because we are cognizant of our needs. Unless we can be certain that X
really is valuable or X really is a need, we do not seem to have a genuine
basis for preserving the human species which, for Nietzsche, is certainly
close to being the bottom line of his epistemology. Nietzsche's thesis
is that by means of particular value systems or "articles of faith", we
arrange for ourselves a world which can be of account to man by 1) equaliz-
ing 2) categorizing, and 3) axiologically imposing those values which, for
a time, have proven themselves to be necessary for our preservation. Al-
though Nietzsche quite expressly states that "...to demand that our human
interpretations and values should be universal and perhaps constitutive
values is one of the hereditary madnesses of human pride" (WTP 565), there
appear to be values which are dominant and, in all likelihood, have always
and will always prevail. This appears to be the case inspite of the fact
that people "...must not esteem as the neighbour esteems" (Zar. p. 58),
"...if they want to preserve themselves" (Zar. p. 58). It seems however
that even Nietzsche thought that these values, namely, permanence and
causality, dominated our value systems simply because they were the most
valued products of our prejudices. The Appendices, for the most part, are
an attempt to expose the fact that Nietzsche realized that permanence and
causality had a central role in our axiological imposition. However, in opposition to Nietzsche, it should be argued that permanence and causality are valuable for human survival, and can remain valuable, only if they are not simply products of sensible organization but somehow legitimately part of our understanding. Permanence and causality must not be considered simply as the way things look to us (though this is true), nor simply how it is that we judge about things (though this is also true), but legitimately part of our understanding of how objects of experience must be if we are ever to have experience of them, i.e., to know them as objects of human experience.

It seems evident, if only by the frequency of use (as demonstrated in the Appendices), that Nietzsche realized that permanence and causality were not values of the same kind, status, or degree as other values. This is due to the fact that all other values depend on permanence and causality for their value. In other words, axiological imposition in the narrow sense presupposes the availability of objects and that means that it presupposes the priority of the values of permanence and causality which constitute objectivity. It has already been demonstrated that the concept of causality is itself dependent upon the concept of permanence. However, within Nietzsche's epistemological model, one value or set of values can differ from another value or set of values only by degree, that is, only in terms of its ultimate usefulness. Nietzsche was certainly unwilling to accept "permanence" and "causality" as more valuable than other values strictly because they were different in kind. It was only in a pragmatic sense that Nietzsche even felt obliged to accept permanence and causality as "necessary interpretations" (WTP 589), that is, as dominant matters of fact. Nietzsche did not see that permanence and causality are transcendental
conditions for understanding our world and for this reason can ground axiological imposition in the narrow sense, namely, as the subjective imposition of specific values on "things". Thus, Nietzsche had to push axiological imposition to the level of sensation and reason in order to provide himself with a suitable foundation for imposing values on "things".

Nietzsche's world is therefore a world which only appears or seems to be permanent and causally related to some subject and this is an insufficient ground for establishing, even in a pragmatic sense, that something really has value for human preservation. Nietzsche's world is a world which is only believed, in fact, wrongly believed to be constituted by permanent and causally related entities. It matters little if the thought is wrongly believed by one subject or by the whole human species for such a world must be deemed miraculous if it can, in fact, support any human existence at all.

The human species can survive only if we can correctly claim that this or that thing actually fulfills or satisfies a particular human need. If it only seems to satisfy this need, then its potential towards survival must be severely questioned. In order for Nietzsche's reversed, pragmatic account to acquire philosophical plausibility, it would be necessary to assume that there is an extremely close affinity between the way things seem to be and are thought to be on the one hand, and the way things are on the other hand. This close affinity must, in fact, amount to nothing short of an actual correspondence which would reinstate the very looks-is distinction that Nietzsche tried to remove. However, although Nietzsche accepts the affinity between the way things seem to be and the way things are thought to be (insofar as prejudice of sense is what predisposes us for certain prejudices of reason or Nietzschean categories), it is precisely the affinity between these two modes and the way things are which he vehemently
denies and takes considerable pains to attack. There simply is no correspond-
ence between how things seem to be and how things are thought to be on the one hand, and how things are on the other. Yet the value X has for me can be successfully established only on the legitimacy of the dis-
tinction between how X is and how X seems to be and our subsequent ability to judge how X is in relation to ourselves as subjects who are in need of X's particular qualities. It therefore becomes necessary to find an epistemological position which will afford us the legitimacy of the looks-is distinction, that is, will enable us to distinguish between our subjective experience and the experience of an object with its objective determina-
tions. For if we deny the correspondence between how X is and how X is judged or thought to be, we deny ourselves the sole condition which would guarantee that the narrow account of axiological imposition have plausibility. It would guarantee us the capacity to make true judgements about the kinds of things in the empirical world which are of actual value to man. In fact, the pragmatic account which Nietzsche offers is epistemologically acceptable only if we accept, in its entirety, his ontological premises, which means essentially that human survival can, is, and must base itself pragmatically on the mere semblance of permanent and causally related beings. However, it will be demonstrated in Chapter III on Kant, that you cannot know X (epistemology) unless X is (ontology) a certain way. And insofar as the value of X as an object is parasitic on knowing it, then it will be further argued that you cannot value X (axiology) appropriately unless X is (ontology) a certain way. This will give rise to the amalgamated epistemological posi-
tion of "axiological ontology".

In sum, although Nietzsche thinks, as we have seen, that the theoretical is always an element of the practical, he has failed to realize that it is
only insofar as permanence and causality **really** hold of objects of experience, i.e., objects in the empirical world, that they can in any legitimate sense promote, or even, support life. It is therefore necessary to give permanence and causality objective validation. Without the category of causality, for example, we might observe an event but never be in a position to know exactly what determinate event has taken place. Without the category of substance, for example, we would not even be in a position to know that we had observed any event let alone be in a position to determine which particular event it was. **In nuce**, Nietzsche has failed to realize that without presupposing the permanent, succession ("becoming, passing away, and change"), which Nietzsche himself wants us to take to be the observable empirical state of affairs (Twi III, 2), would be impossible to recognize.

If it is, in fact, impossible to recognize a determinate event, it must also be impossible to establish any valuable changes. Of course, Nietzsche is correct to say that we do perceive change, becoming, and passing away but he is incorrect in his analysis of why change is believed to be a changing feature of some permanent substance. It is necessary therefore to counter Nietzsche's position, a position which accepts change at the expense of genuine permanence, by demonstrating 1) that permanence or, at least relative permanence, is an objective fact of perception and 2) that the correctness of our observation of permanence is transcendentally guaranteed only insofar as we are correct in thinking that the permanent is a substance, i.e., "...the permanent [which] is the object itself..." (B 277) and 3) that "...everything...which changes or can change belongs only to the way in which substance or substances exist, and therefore to their determinations" (B 277). It must be demonstrated that it is only insofar as there is permanence, i.e., substance, that it is possible for us to observe and to recog-
nize change.

Lastly, the narrow function of axiological imposition may be taken from Nietzsche's epistemology and placed within a Kantian context. It will, of course, no longer be "Nietzschean" in any sense of the word but it will be a valuable addition to an amalgamated epistemological position notwithstanding.
There is, at least, a prima facie case that Nietzsche finds his philosophical precursor not in Kant but in Hume. A. Danto, for example, says "Even though there are very few references to Hume in his writings, he may very well, for all I know, have derived his views from Hume". If any case can be made for Nietzsche deriving his views from Hume, then it would seem to be most evident concerning our beliefs in external objects and causality. Nietzsche and Hume both accept, as an initial assumption, that our sense impressions are atomic, momentary, and constantly successive but, at the same time, they both argue that we always seem to interpret the world in terms of permanent things which are causally related. Although they come to the same conclusion from precisely the same starting point, Hume's position is essentially the inverse of Nietzsche's.

First, Hume denied that the senses alone could be in any way responsible for our belief that objects are continuous, that is, permanent or enduring over some time, because our sense impressions are always discrete and discontinuous. Nor, Hume argues, can reason be the cause for our belief in continuous objects (i.e., objects as opposed to discrete and discontinuous sense impressions) because only philosophers and not the vulgar believe there to be a double existence. In other words, it is only the philosopher who draws the distinction between internal perception which is discrete and discontinuous and the external cause of perception which is believed to be a permanent object. Hume therefore lights upon the imagination as the source of our belief in the existence of permanent objects (see T. 193). However, while the imagination is essentially creative for Hume, it is creative only in the sense that it can "transpose and change its ideas" (T. 10). Thus,
the imagination is only at liberty to alter the order or the form of the original impressions of the senses; it is not, however, able to alter the original impressions themselves as they present themselves to us. Believing that there are permanent objects in the external world is therefore not equivalent to creating them *ex nihilo* but it is akin to constructing them out of sense data according to certain subjective principles found in human imagination. Hume draws a distinction between two independent functions of the imagination. On the one hand, there is imagination (I) which works upon our ideas by transposing and changing them according to principles which are capricious, "...changeable, weak, and irregular" (T. 9, 85, 225; E. 19, 47), and therefore contingent. On the other hand, the imagination (II) also works according to principles which are "...permanent, irresistible, and universal" and therefore necessary.

Secondly, according to Hume, the imagination (II) changes sense impressions which are similar into sense impressions which are identical. It is the imagination which makes us see these impressions, not as similar, but as identical impressions. Thus, we perceive one, permanent object rather than a myriad of discrete, discontinuous, and dissimilar impressions. "The smooth passage of the imagination along the ideas of the resembling perceptions makes us ascribe to them a perfect identity" (T. 205. Cf. T. 208).

Up to this point, there are many similarities between Nietzsche and Hume. However, Nietzsche would argue that these "permanent, irresistible, and universal" principles are necessary only insofar as they have become the foundation for action and *a fortiori* for our knowledge of life. Hume, on the other hand, argues the reverse position, *viz.*, that these principles are necessary because they give us knowledge of life which is true and *a fortiori* stands as the foundation for action (E 55, 108; T 225). According to Hume, permanent things are neither illusions nor appearances. Nor are
causal relations ultimately erroneous beliefs either because they are erroneously connected in the imagination or not grounded in reality.

Hume points out that the "...memory, the senses, and the understanding are ... founded on the imagination, or the vivacity of our ideas" (T 265).

It is the imagination which affords us our belief in the permanence of the external world and in the causal relations within it.

When the mind, therefore, passes from the idea or impression of one object to the idea or belief of another, it is not determined by reason, but by certain principles, which associate together the ideas of these objects, and unite them in the imagination (T 92).

While the "contingent" imagination (I) fancifully makes complex ideas from simple impressions, the "necessary" imagination (II) is a direct and fundamental tool for establishing the justification for our belief in specific relations among ideas. Hume has realized that these relations cannot be epistemologically justified on pragmatic grounds for the mere fact that something is necessary for survival (as Nietzsche points out) does not make it true. Hume argues rather that any epistemological procedure which allows us to know that one object follows upon another object must be a justified procedure precisely because it allows us to have a certain kind of knowledge which, as a consequence, allows us to be pragmatic. Only causation or causal inference, for example, can establish the connection between one object and another; it is "...the only one, on which we can found a just inference from one object to another" (T 89, 73-74). Hume argues that this connection cannot be established by demonstrative reasoning because proofs of reason can establish only necessary connections between relations of ideas and cannot concern themselves with matters of fact. At the same time, if it is necessary to go beyond both the senses and memory in order to establish a causal relation, neither the senses nor memory will suffice.
Hence, a "mixture" of impressions and ideas, mixed by necessary principles of the imagination, establish justified causal inference, i.e., custom, to which Hume accords "weight and authority" equal to demonstrative reasoning (E 41, 26; T 82, 83, 89). Knowledge is therefore justified for Hume only by means of epistemological and not pragmatic criteria. Survival is possible only because it can itself be based (i.e., presupposes) knowledge of causal relations and permanent things. At best, survival can serve only as a test for knowledge and never as a criterion for justification of it. (See Appendix VI).
CHAPTER III: Kant

1. Kant's Problematic: Constructive Idealism.

In the Introductory chapter on the "Subject-Object", it was suggested that Kant refers to the subject "working up" raw sense material "...into that knowledge of objects which is entitled experience" (B 1). In the second chapter on "Nietzsche", we have seen precisely how the subject makes up the major percentage of his experience (See Dawn 119; BGE 192), in terms of the prejudices of sense and reason.

In the Introductory chapter, it was also deemed possible to compare the relative epistemological positions of Nietzsche and Kant because it was tentatively assumed that they both held the view that there is a primitive and irreducible subject-object dichotomy but a dichotomy in which there is some active "production" of the object on the part of the subject. George J. Stack set this shared problematic before us.

...Nietzsche's critique of knowledge and truth may be construed as a kind of hyperbolic Kantianism insofar as he emphasizes the creative, active, productive nature of knowledge and accepts, more or less, the notion that the world of phenomena is shaped by man's perceptual and conceptual capacities....

We have seen, however, that for Nietzsche at least, what Stack calls "man's perceptual and conceptual capacities" amount to nothing more than an empirical analysis of man's psycho-physiological constitution which, through our "sensual-spiritual appropriation", determines how man perceives and conceives his world. Perhaps Stack calls Nietzsche's position an "hyperbolic Kantianism" because Kant's First Critique is also concerned with man's "perceptual and conceptual capacities". After all, it might be argued, the Aesthetic outlines the necessary conditions for observation
or perception while the Analytic outlines the necessary conditions for judgement. It seems to be quite possible, therefore, that Kant's Critique will present us with an epistemology grounded in man's psycho-physiological constitution. In point of fact, several British commentators of Kant's philosophy, which have been assembled under the rubric "constructive idealists", have reduced Kant's transcendental idealism to an empirical investigation of man's psycho-physiological constitution. Given the fact that Nietzsche's epistemology is also a form of constructive idealism, if we set out the constructive idealist position and show how it fails both as an interpretation of Kant and as a viable epistemology in its own right, then the arguments against constructive idealism will serve, at the same time, as arguments against Nietzsche's brand of idealism.

This chapter on "Kant" will therefore proceed by first outlining the constructive idealist interpretation of the Critique. The subsequent sections of the chapter will then offer a more plausible interpretation of Kant by analyzing precisely what Kant means by his more important terms (e.g., appearance, thing in itself, transcendental object, transcendental subject) but with constant reference to Kant's transcendental-empirical distinction. This is necessary because the problems generated by the constructive idealist position are generated because they have either not made Kant's transcendental-empirical distinction or they have, at least, failed to understand it. As a result, as we shall see, two of the key tenets of constructive idealism ensue. First, constructive idealism reduces Kant's transcendental apparatus to the level of the empirical investigation of man's psycho-physiological
constitution (a la Nietzsche). It will therefore become necessary in the subsequent sections of this chapter to demonstrate precisely how, and to what extent, Kant's transcendental apparatus, particularly space and time as pure a priori forms of intuition and the categories as pure a priori concepts of the understanding, not only differs from the empirical, psycho-physiological subject but how it, in fact, grounds all of its activities. Secondly, constructive idealism argues that we are subjectively held back from reality because the way we are as psycho-physiological beings distorts our cognitive, i.e., our perceptual and conceptual apprehension of reality. Thus, according to constructive idealism, we do not, indeed, cannot know how things are (empirically) but only how things must look or appear to us. We have already witnessed this very position in Nietzsche's philosophy. To this extent, at least, Nietzsche holds a basic tenet of constructive idealism. But insofar as constructive idealism itself is a product of Kantian interpretation, it is to be expected that this tenet finds itself expressed in Kantian terms. Thus, according to the constructive idealist interpretation of Kant, we must interpret Kant's principle that we can only know appearances and never things in themselves as the principle that we can only know the appearance of reality and never reality itself. Although Kant holds the first formulation of this principle, in fact, it is the central thesis of transcendental idealism, Kant would reject the second formulation as either equivalent to the first or entailed by it. Once constructive idealism has been outlined, it will therefore be necessary to re-erect the transcendental apparatus which Kant provided to put to rest such theories as constructive idealism.
In Kant's analysis of what it means to be an object of knowledge, as well as in the analyses of permanence and causality which he offers in the Analogies, Kant does not set as part of his philosophical task either to discover how the human mind is constituted or how it came to be so constituted. That the mind happens to be constituted in a particular way is an empirical and therefore contingent fact which would say nothing about things which holds of them by necessity. In order for Kant to determine what holds of things by necessity, he must demonstrate which things are necessary if certain distinctions which we make as a matter of course are to be made legitimately. Many of these distinctions are accepted as brute fact, e.g., that there are permanent objects with objective features which actually pertain to them, that change is observable, that events can readily be distinguished from non-events, that the semblance of a thing can be distinguished from how the thing actually is, that the subject can be distinguished from the object. These distinctions are thought to be so basic and so central to the philosophical enterprise as the investigation of things in general, that any empirical investigation, such as Nietzsche's, which would seek to discover, as a matter of fact, how the human being is constituted and how, on the basis of that psychological and physiological constitution, man relates to objects in the world, would necessarily have to presuppose them. Kant, on the other hand, is seeking the transcendental ground for such empirical knowledge. In other words, Kant is seeking particular conditions that must be presupposed in order for us to obtain any empirical knowledge of objects. Nietzsche, on the other hand, sought, at best, the empirical ground for empirical knowledge and believed that he
had reason to reduce any transcendental enquiry to the level of the empirical. While Kant's arguments are transcendental and therefore based on conditions necessary for experience, Nietzsche's arguments are firmly within the empirical framework and therefore depend on how the mind, as a matter of fact, is constituted. Kant argues from the possibility of certain types of knowledge (including the empirical) to the way the world must be, that is, to its ontology. According to Kant, to demonstrate that something is a necessary condition or a necessary presupposition either of empirical knowledge or of observation in general requires a "transcendental proof". Such a proof, Kant says, "...proceeds by showing that experience itself, and therefore the object of experience would be impossible without a connection of this kind" (B 811). D.P. Dryer refers to Kant's transcendental condition as a "metaphysical presupposition" of empirical knowledge. Such a metaphysical presupposition demonstrates that "...there are some empirical judgements which would not be known to be true unless certain metaphysical principles are true".²

On the other hand, Nietzsche argues from the structure of the human mind as a product of mental evolution or from the structure of language as a product of verbal evolution to the way we happen to experience things as a matter of course in order to survive.³ However, since both the structure of the human mind and the structure of language are matters of empirical fact, they must ultimately rest on the transcendental framework which Kant's transcendental arguments make legitimate. It is therefore only necessary to turn to the transcendental arguments which Kant offers in the First and Second Analogies in order to realize how Kant's transcendental turn establishes the necessity of such things as a perma-
nent substratum and causality without, at the same time, forsaking objective validity and without reducing it, as Nietzsche does, to the level of a necessary psychological error. In other words, Kant's argument in the First Analogy is sufficient to demonstrate conclusively that Nietzsche cannot legitimately hold a philosophical position which advocates the existence of change to the absolute exclusion of permanence. It demonstrates that Nietzsche, in spite of his Heraclitean leanings, is philosophically obliged to posit the objective existence of permanence at the same time that he accepts change as an observable empirical fact. Insofar as Nietzsche does, in fact, accept "change, becoming, passing away" (Twi III, 2) as objective features of the world, he is at the same time, forced to acknowledge the objective existence of the permanent. Permanence must be conceptually presupposed in order for us to account for our thinking correctly that we have, in fact, observed any change whatsoever. However, to understand "permanence" as a conceptual presupposition is not to reduce permanence to a merely subjective interpretation as if permanence only exists in our heads. Kant's argument in the First Analogy demonstrates the objective validity of the conceptual presupposition of permanence by grounding the presupposition within the very possibility of our knowledge of change. Thus, to say, as Kant does, that we must "presuppose" permanence is not to downgrade the permanent to the level of illusion. Walsh, for example, has a tendency to downgrade permanence in this manner simply because Kant claims that it is a presupposition. Walsh says that "In the Analogy, however, the permanent is only presupposed. The argument is that we have to interpret what goes on in the world on the basis of the principles that all change
is transformation...". However, according to Kant, to presuppose a permanent substratum simply means that in order for us to be correct in thinking that we have observed change, there must actually be a permanent substratum or object and the change observed must be interpreted as a change in some determination or feature of that object. "Permanence is...a necessary condition under which alone appearances are determinable as things or objects in a possible experience" (B 232). For Kant, permanence is "...simply the mode in which we represent to ourselves the existence of things in the appearance" (B 229). The mistake which Nietzsche, among others, makes by understanding change and permanence to be mutually exclusive rather than mutually inclusive notions has been succinctly assessed by Dryer. Dryer says that

Far from disproving continuance, changes can be ascribed only to what continues to exist. Those who feel that changes in things disprove their continuance are presuming that to ascribe continuance to a thing is tantamount to asserting that it remains unchanging. This presumption is erroneous.

As erroneous as this presumption might be, several notable British commentators of Kant's philosophy interpret Kant's philosophical position as if he were coming to grips with the object, permanence, and causality in much the same way that Nietzsche did. I have labelled this particular interpretation of Kant's transcendental idealism, "constructive idealism". It should be remembered, however, that no single commentator holds all of the elements found in constructive idealism (although Weldon and Wilkerson come remarkably close). In fact, constructive idealism itself is a philosophical construction; it has been amalgamated by collecting various tenets expressed by a range of British commentators. For this reason, I have not
isolated any single commentator such as Wilkerson or Weldon, or for that matter Strawson or Broad, nor shall I develop or outline their respective positions in turn. Instead, I shall set out the parameters which define the constructive idealist interpretation of Kant and cite individual commentators who best represent the individual elements within the broader scope of the interpretation. It must also be pointed out that there is a very close parallel between constructive idealism as it is to be voiced (in chorus) by the British commentators of Kant and Nietzsche's epistemological view based as it is on man's psycho-physiological constitution and the prejudices of sense and reason which it generates.

Essentially, constructive idealism is the view that the world of the senses is a product of our subjective organization, empirically understood. In other words, the subject, due to its psycho-physiological constitution is actively constructive and therefore distortive of the way in which reality appears to us. Thus, constructive idealism claims that "...the sensible world does not exist in the form in which it presents itself to us"⁶ and that the ground for this misrepresentation of the real is due to ourselves and to the kind of psycho-physiological beings we are. Constructive idealism assumes the following five points:

1) it is possible to know only the way the empirical object looks, seems, or appears to us.

2) The subjective mode of cognition, based on the subject's psycho-physiological constitution, modifies the way in which the empirical object appears to us.

3) it is possible to know a priori certain things about the way the empirical object looks because it must look some way in accordance
with the subjective mode of cognition (based as it is on our psycho-
physiological constitution.

4) it is never possible to get outside of our psycho-physiological
constitution therefore it is never possible to know reality.

5) the way things are in reality, i.e., the thing apart from any and
all psychological states, is not the same as the way in which the
empirical object appears to us because our subjective mode of cogni-
tion, through constructing the object, distorts our view of reality.

In sum, we only know the appearance of reality and never reality itself
because we subjectively distort or misrepresent what is real in the very
act of coming to know it.

Constructive idealism interpretors of Kant's philosophy, understood
in terms of logical, but especially physical, construction of the empiri-
cal object, undoubtedly find their source in a misunderstanding of Kant's
Copernican Revolution and subsequently a conflation of the transcendental-
empirical distinction. Kant's transcendental turn, in fact, is the
revolutionary claim that objects must be thought to conform to our know-
ledge and not our knowledge to objects. Kant's claim is interpreted along
constructive idealist lines insofar as it is thought to reject the notion
that knowledge is merely our passive awareness of objects and, at the
same time, insists that there is some kind of raw material which is
given by the senses and upon which the mind must work. Felix Grayeff,
for example, describes the problem in terms which are true to the spirit
as well as to the language of Kant but his position stands in need of
considerable qualification. Grayeff understands Kant's transcendental
turn to mean that we should "...construe the human mind as creative, not
However, once the unformed manifold of sense is understood to be a chaotic matter, a "mere chaotic mass" to borrow C.D. Broad's phrase or "a disorganized jumble of experience" to use Wilkerson's phrase, then the parameters which constitute constructive idealism have been set.

According to constructive idealism, the mind does not materialize the empirical object but it does construct it. To "construct" the empirical object is interpreted variously in terms of "transformation", "transformation of the real", "imposition of false form", and "construction proper.

Constructive idealist interpretators of Kant all share what Melnick calls "...a noxious, distorting form of idealism."

The contribution of certain elements on the part of the subject interpreted transcendentally means that these elements in their very concept make reference to a subject. This is not to be confused with a subject contributing elements in an empirical sense that would mean the subject making things up (inventing things) rather than basing his judgments on experience. This latter would indeed be a noxious, distorting form of idealism.

The various modes of "constructing" the empirical object, i.e., the various "noxious" modes of making things up or inventing things, are understood to rest on the mind's ability to construct things in the world 1) out of a mere chaotic mass of sensations 2) but according to prescribed rules that we share insofar as we are all thought to be basically the same type of psycho-physiological entity. Hence, according to the constructive idealist view, there are empirical objects which we can come to know but transcendentally it must be understood that objects are merely construc-
lations which the subject produces out of raw sense data. As C.D. Broad says,

Kant makes man a constructor, though not a creator of nature. We do not indeed create nature on his view; for our materials are crude sense-data and are due to things-in-themselves. But we certainly do construction on Kant's view; for the sensa as they come to us are a mere chaotic mass, and every definite object of human knowledge—such as chairs, tables, atoms, etc.—has been made by selecting and combining sensa according to rules which are innate in our minds.

Wilkerson voices this same "constructive" interpretation. According to Wilkerson, transcendental idealism is simply the construction of the world according to our innate mental patterns.

According to transcendental idealism the general properties of the world around us are strictly not properties of objects but rather properties of ourselves, patterns according to which our minds construct the world. The world must be spatial and temporal because our minds construct our experience spatially and temporally (Emphasis mine).

The constructive idealist position seems to gain its momentum, if not its prima facie plausibility, when it is believed that nature is, in itself, chaotic and unordered apart from the psychological subject and that it must therefore be reified and structured by the human mind according to some innate rules or "patterns". Hence, the way empirical objects must appear to us will be determined solely in terms of our empirical knowledge of the manner in which we universally apply the same "necessary" rules, insofar as we all share a basic psychological and physiological system. The application of these rules or patterns therefore explains why things must appear the way they do because they are thought to be imposed upon a world which does not have them. Kant is thought to define both the object, perma-
nence, and causality in terms of these innate rules or patterns which reflect the structuring of our psycho-physiological constitution. T.D. Weldon\textsuperscript{17} and P.F. Strawson\textsuperscript{18} voice this view.

The crucial question which inevitably arises is 'Do I find these (or any other) patterns in nature, or do I just make them up, retain them if and for so long as they are useful, and discard or modify them when they fail to do the job for which I invented them?' Kant is manifestly saying the former, though with an important addition. His answer is 'You do find them; but you find them because your constitution (or central nervous system) brings it about that they really are there (Emphasis mine.).

It is a commonplace of casual, and of scientific, observation, that the character of our experience, the way things appear to us, is partly determined by our human constitution, by the nature of our sense organs and nervous system (Emphasis mine.).

Perhaps Weldon's sausage and sausage machine analogy best epitomizes the constructive idealist interpretation of Kant. Although his analogy is crude, Weldon does reduce Kant's transcendental apparatus to the level of empirical psychology. Weldon claims, for example, that "'Form of sensibility' then stands for a piece of psychological apparatus which ensures that most if not all of our awareness of what goes on in the world is spatial" (Emphasis mine.).\textsuperscript{19} Given this basic understanding of Kant, viz., that the transcendental apparatus employed by the transcendental subject is ultimately reducible to the empirical subject and its psycho-physiological constitution, then Weldon's sausage and sausage machine analogy seem entirely plausible. According to Weldon's analogy, we cannot be aware of the raw material which goes into our mental sausage machines but we can know many things a priori about the products because we know about the machinery which manufactures, constructs, or transforms
those products. It is as if Weldon were saying that we know empirical objects must be spatio-temporal for the same reason that we know our sausages will be long and thin and in sausage casings. Although Paton does not explicitly mention Weldon's sausage machine analogy, he does manage to parallel Weldon's account of it with an account of his own, viz., the blue spectacle account. Although H.W. Cassirer rejects Paton's view as implausible, he does acknowledge that Paton may quite accurately ascribe the position to Kant.

It is a simple step from the sausage machine analogy and the view which supports it, viz., that the transcendental apparatus of Kant is psycho-physiological in nature, to an understanding of how such exponents of constructive idealism explain such Kantian terms as "necessity" and "objective validity". If we know, for example, the capacities afforded to our mental machinery, then we must know a priori the possibilities afforded to any and all epistemological products which arise or could arise through this machinery. In other words, we know that "...objects must be spatial and temporal because our minds construct them so" (Emphasis mine.).

W.H. Walsh ties the human constitution and nervous system to our innate rule-making system when he suggests that Kant comes close to his empiricist predecessors, who also present 'things' as 'collections of ideas' .... Kant himself would claim, rightly, to have introduced a very important amendment into the theory by insisting that the collecting be governed by a priori rules.

Walsh feels that an advance has been made in philosophy over Berkeley because Berkeley collected ideas according to arbitrary rules. Berkeley might therefore be called an "empirical phenomenalist". Kant, however,
at least according to Walsh, has subjective a priori rules which are
deemed to be necessary because they are based on our mental constitu-
tion. Kant is therefore not to be understood as an ordinary empirical
phenomenalist who thinks the object of knowledge to be nothing more
than the collection and collation of sense data united according to
contingent laws of association. Rather, Kant is seen to be a
transcendental phenomenalist because he thinks that the object of
knowledge is nothing more than a collection and collation of sensa
collected according to necessary rules of construction based innately
on the a priori framework of the human mind. Thus we find Wilkerson
claiming that "Transcendental idealism is essentially a mixture of
certain rationalist doctrines and Berkelian idealism, expressed in an
elaborate psychological vocabulary". Kant's particular brand of
phenomenalism is thought to differ from Berkeley's because Kant's
rules for collecting sensa are thought to be necessary and not contingent.
Hence, we can know a priori what the form of an object must be. Kant is
supposed to parallel Berkelian phenomenalism insofar as both are thought
to accept the claim that "knowledge through perception of things exist-
ing independently of perception, as they are in themselves, is impos-
sible". 

On any standard two sets of objects constitutes
an absurd philosophical extravagance. But worse
is still to come, for according to Kant there
are strictly no things as they appear indepen-
dent of our perceptions of them.

... Kant apparently makes the Berkelian claim
that objects of experience or phenomena are
merely collections of representations, collec-
tions of perceptions, the result of the joint
constructive endeavors of sensibility and under-
standing.
Since constructive idealism views Kant as a kind of phenomenalist along Berkelian lines, then it is necessary for them to argue the further position that Kant is only justified when he speaks about objects as they appear, since their appearance depends upon our psychological states, but we may not talk about things as they actually are, that is, things apart from our psychological states. What exists apart from any and all psychological states they view as the thing in itself and a reality which we can never know. This reading of Kant's position effectively reduces appearance (Erscheinung) to illusion (Schein). We shall argue that Kant defines "appearance" or the empirical object as empirical reality by which he means that it exists with its objective determinations absolutely independently of any and all psychological states. The constructive idealists have failed to pay heed to Kant's advice which he gives in the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection, i.e., to take into "...account the transcendental place of these concepts (whether the object is to be reckoned among appearances or things in themselves..." (B 327). Yet the most frequently made error in interpreting Kant, from the constructive idealist perspective, rests precisely in conflating the transcendental-empirical distinction. Once this is done, Kant's transcendental claim that we only know appearances and not the thing in itself becomes the mistaken Kantian claim that we know only appearances of reality (how X looks) and never reality itself (how X is). Kant distinguishes between the transcendental and empirical, and between the psychological and non-psychological, precisely to avoid this sort of confusion. Kant's empirical distinction between the look or appearance of something and the way it actually is (empirical reality)
serves to consolidate his ontological position. In spite of this, the constructive idealists contend that no knowledge can be had of reality but only of appearances. In other words, they take Kant's position to be that we only know the appearance of reality and never reality itself. This view is explicitly stated by Paton, Ewing, Kemp Smith, and Strawson. What is entailed by this view, is that we know only the appearance of reality and not reality itself because man and his psycho-physiological apparatus for knowing reality gets in the way. Thus, the constructive idealist interpreters of Kant also take us to the threshold but do not allow us to enter. We can no longer know things as they actually are apart from our psychological states because our mental constitution has somehow altered, transformed, or distorted our view of reality. As Ingarden says,

Unavoidable employment of the forms of intuition and categories in knowledge imposes a false form on things, i.e., gives to a certain extent a false picture of them, although we can never evaluate the extent of the counterfeit.

Paton also claims, for Kant, that "...knowledge of ultimate reality is unattainable by man" precisely because man himself is in the way. Man, in fact, is understood to see reality, but only in a distorted fashion, because he must view it through category-coloured glasses. Paton, Ewing, Russell, and Wilkerson voice this thesis. As Ewing says,

...when we use blue spectacles we can tell a priori that everything we see will look blue. This account of the a priori carries with it the implication that we can have a priori knowledge only of appearances and not of reality, just as from the premise that I wear blue spectacles I could infer not that all the physical objects I see really will be blue, but that they will look blue to me.
A possible clue to an understanding of the interpretation that Kant claims that we can only know appearances of reality but never reality itself might come from Kant's definition of sensation as "... the effect of an object upon the capacity for obtaining representations" (B 54). The problem to be worked out in order to understand the nature of appearance is to determine what the object is that affects our capacity for obtaining representations. J. Bennett asks the same question.

A major objection to the imposition theory is that it represents experience arising from a transaction between the human mind and ... what? Something non-empirical, anyway, since everything empirical arises from the transaction between the human mind and things as they are in themselves!

Constructive idealists believe that the manifold of sense, which is nothing more than "sensa" or "sense impressions" said to be caused by things in themselves, becomes appearance when in conjunction with a mind. This view obliquely suggests that appearances for Kant have a status both epistemologically and ontologically akin to secondary qualities for Locke, viz., as powers or potentialities which things have to affect us in some way but which are "actualized" only by being presented to a mind. This reduces appearances per se all to the level of appearance determined qualities such as red and sour. C.D. Broad, in the same way, refers to Kant's position as one of "agnostic realism". He believes that Kant's view is that we cannot know "physical objects" or the transcendental object X but only its appearances or looks which are "private, subjective, and fleeting". As Broad says,

...the concept of a physical object is the concept of something utterly different in kind from the sense-data which we take to be appearances of it to us. For they are private, subjective, and fleeting, and are possible objects of direct ac-
quaintance to the person whose sense-data they are. But it is something public, neutral, and persistent, which presents various appearances but cannot be an object of direct acquaintance to anyone at any time. No property of it can be intuited by anyone at any time. Kant therefore describes it [the physical object] as 'an object which cannot itself be intuited by us and which may therefore be named the non-empirical, i.e. transcendental, object, x' (p. 137, A 109).

Broad and Paton have failed to understand the scope of the empirical-transcendental distinction for Kant and, as a result, their analyses of the Kantian enterprise as it deals with our ability to know reality is grossly off the mark. While Broad and Paton at least attempt to juggle the transcendental object and appearances into a compatible though unintelligible scheme, Kemp Smith pronounces the whole notion of the transcendental object to be pre-critical thereby obviating the need for intelligibility.

In sum, once appearances are thought to be the joint product of the thing in itself and the human mind and the thing in itself is understood to be reality, it is unavoidable not to claim that we can only know appearances of reality and never reality itself. Yet Kant explicitly rejects this kind of interpretation.

When I say that intuition of outer objects in space and time, as well as the mind's intuition of itself, represent both in the manner in which the senses are affected, that is to say, in the way in which these present themselves, this is not talking as if these objects were a mere illusion. For when objects are regarded as presenting themselves, they together with the properties we ascribe to them are regarded as something really given... Hence I am not saying that bodies merely seem to be outside me, or that my soul only seems to be given in my self-consciousness. It would be my own fault, if out of that which I ought to reckon as appearance, I made mere illusion. That does not follow as a consequence of our principle.
of the ideality of all our sensible intuitions --quite the contrary. It is only if we ascribe objective reality to these forms of representation, that it becomes impossible for us to prevent everything being thereby transformed into mere illusion (B 69-70).

Lastly, the constructive idealist interpreters of Kant, as well as Nietzsche, believe that "causality" can be discovered in nature only because our minds have put it there, i.e., have first invented it. In fact, it is quite true that Kant says (A 125) that there is causal order in our experience because we put it there and that the order and regularity in appearances, which we entitle "nature", is introduced by the knowing subject. In many places (A 114, 125, 196, B 127, 164), Kant does seem to parallel Nietzsche's pronouncement that 'we have a logical world because we have made it logical' (WTP 521) especially when he claims that "We could never find them [order and regularity] in appearances, had not we ourselves, or the nature of our mind, originally set them there" (A 125). Causal laws, for example, are thought to express necessity because causal order is deemed to be mentally imposed on experience by the understanding. The known world must appear to be the way it appears because causality is a mental concatenation. Bennett, for example, claims, for Kant, that,

...if the known world is causally ordered because order is imposed on experience by the understanding, it follows that causal laws express "necessity" in the sense that they speak not just of what does happen but of what is transcendentally made to happen, in the known world.

According to Bennett, nature must depict a specific form of causal order because causality has been "...stamped upon the phenomenal world by the human mind" (Emphasis mine.). Kant however is quite explicit in
the *Critique* in speaking against just such an interpretation. According to Kant, the principle of causality,

...which expresses the necessity of an event under a presupposed condition, would be false if it rested only on an arbitrary subjective necessity, implanted in us, of connecting certain empirical representations according to the rule of causal relation. I would not then be able to say that the effect is connected with the cause in the object, that is to say, necessarily, but only that I am so constituted that I cannot think this representation otherwise than as thus connected (B 168. Emphasis mine.)

Constructive idealism, it seems, has failed to realize that the very basis upon which Kant's *Critique* rests, is the transcendental distinction which Kant makes between "appearance" and "the thing in itself". This distinction is brought sharply to the fore in the Transcendental Aesthetic in which Kant sets out the necessary conditions for observation, viz., space and time as pure a priori forms of intuition. At the same time, the Aesthetic will distinguish between the transcendental subject that imposes certain conditions, such as space and time, upon experience and the empirical or psychological subject and its states. The Aesthetic will thereby be the first acknowledgement that we can know empirical reality, i.e., things apart from any and all psychological states, but that empirical reality is only the reality of "appearance", (not the appearance of reality) i.e., that it is nothing apart from the transcendental subject and the conditions which it imposes upon experience.

Although the central focus of this chapter on "Kant" is to draw the empirical distinction between the way things are and the way things appear to be and therefore to examine the correspondence theory of truth which serves as the necessary backdrop against which all empirical claims are
made, these empirical undertakings rest squarely on the objective validity or truth of space and time as pure a priori forms of intuition and the categories as pure a priori concepts of the understanding. In other words, before the correspondence theory of truth can be made legitimate as a means by which to determine how something is as opposed to how something appears to be, it is first necessary to outline the transcendental conditions or truths which make empirical truth itself possible.

All of our knowledge falls within the bounds of possible experience, and just in this universal relation to possible experience consists the transcendental truth which precedes all empirical truth and makes it possible (B 185. Emphasis mine. See also B 269.).

What the Critique of Pure Reason provides in order to ground (indirectly) the correspondence theory of truth, i.e., what establishes empirical truth, is what Kant calls the "logic of truth" (B 87). The logic of truth, that is, the logic of transcendental truth which precedes empirical truth, is precisely the establishing of those conditions which are necessary for any judgement whatsoever (analytic or synthetic, a priori or a posteriori) to be true or false.

For no knowledge can contradict it [a logic of truth] without at once losing all content, that is, all relation to any object, and therefore all truth (B 87).

In the Aesthetic, Kant outlines the necessary conditions for the observation of an object.
2. Space and Time.

Although it is perhaps neither fair nor possible to isolate one part of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and to claim for it that it is the most significant or, at least, the most central part, such a claim might be made on behalf of the Transcendental Aesthetic, particularly the Metaphysical Expositions of the concepts of space and time. As evidence for what otherwise is simply a bald assertion, one might state that several of Kant's most fundamental distinctions are to be found in the Aesthetic and a misreading or misunderstanding of them, and thereby their value in Kant's transcendental turn, would give the remainder of the Critique a jaundiced purview at best. The key distinction Kant makes in the Aesthetic is the distinction between the transcendentally ideal and the empirically real which will manifest itself in the further distinction between the thing in itself and appearance, and in the distinction between the psychological and the non-psychological. It is therefore imperative to outline the arguments which Kant offers to show how space and time are subjective and how the subjectivity of space and time as pure a priori forms of intuition determines the conditions which are necessary for the observation of objects.

Kant's first argument in the "Metaphysical Exposition of Space" is to demonstrate that our awareness of space is not the awareness of an empirical concept and is therefore not derived from space understood to be something objective. "Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experiences" (B 38). If space were something objective, that is, something that could exist entirely apart from consciousness, i.e., as a thing in itself, then any knowledge which we would have of it would have to
be empirical and therefore derived from experience itself. It would therefore be impossible to know a priori about the nature of space if space were thought to be something that could exist entirely apart from consciousness. In fact, the only way we could come to know anything at all about space would be in the same way in which we learn about all things for which we have an empirical concept, namely, by abstracting from our experiences. If space were objective, then our concept of it would have to be empirical. However, Kant argues that in order for us to have an empirical concept of a thing, it is first necessary to have some experience of it (insofar as an "empirical concept" is a concept derived from previous experience. See B 64). But having an experience or making an observation always requires having sensations, and this itself presupposes space.

For in order that certain sensations be referred to something outside me (that is, to something in another region of space from that in which I find myself), and similarly in order that I may be able to represent them as outside and alongside one another, and accordingly as not only different but as in different places, the representation of space must be presupposed (B 38).

In other words, in order for us to draw a distinction between a sensation and what it is a sensation of, namely, something that is different from myself, it is first necessary to be able to distinguish the region of space which I occupy from the region of space to which I refer the source of my sensation. In order for me to have experiences or to make observations, I must be able to distinguish between myself and something else from which I am deriving my experiences. But in order for me to distinguish myself from what it is that I am observing, that is, to distinguish the observer from the thing observed, I must first have the representation of space ("...the representation of space must be presupposed". B 38).
Any distinction between the observer as subject and what is observed as object presupposes the availability of spatial distinctions and therefore of space itself. Thus space cannot be an empirical concept nor anything objective. Space is a necessary condition for being able to distinguish between the observer and the observed. As Dryer says, 41

...we cannot be immediately aware of things different from ourselves without being aware of them about us.

Although Kant defines "sensation" as the "...effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by it..." (B 34), sensation itself is not the subject nor the object; it is simply a mental state of the subject which cannot be referred to the object which affects us without the representation of space. Secondly, space is a necessary condition for being able to distinguish between one thing and another. In other words, I can distinguish between one thing and another only if I first represent them as occupying two different regions of space. Since we derive empirical concepts by noting the features which a plurality of things have in common and since we represent things as different things only in terms of their occupying different regions of space, then space itself cannot be an empirical concept. Our ability to obtain any empirical concept whatsoever presupposes space. As Dryer says, 42

What Kant points out is that since it is a condition of empirical intuition, it cannot be derived from it, hence it cannot be an empirical concept.

Kant's second argument in the "Metaphysical Exposition of Space" is an argument which states that space must be independent of the objects in space because it is conceivable that there be space without there being any objects in it. Thus, since space is not reducible to properties or relations of
things in space, then our representation of space must be a priori. Space is "...not as a determination dependent upon them" [i.e., appearances] (B 39), rather it is the condition of the very possibility of appearances or things in space. In other words, Kant argues that space is logically independent of things in space but things in space are not, at the same time, logically independent of space itself. While space is thought to be independent of the things which occupy it, the very being of these things depends upon their being in space. Space can therefore not be reduced to the things which occupy it, thus making space an a priori representation.

However, space is not itself something which can exist utterly apart from human subjectivity (although this term needs to be sharply and critically defined). But if space could exist as something apart from human subjectivity, whatever it is, and therefore exist as a thing in itself, then our conception of space would have to be empirical and it would therefore be necessary to observe space before we could ascertain anything at all about its nature. Kant has demonstrated this to be false on the grounds that we do know about the nature of space a priori, i.e., without any recourse to experience whatsoever.

In the third argument of the "Metaphysical Exposition of Space", Kant argues that space is not a "...general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition" (B 39). Once Kant has shown that space is not a thing in itself, for if it were it would be empirical, then it follows that space must be something subjective. Kant argues that space cannot be a concept because concepts can have multiple instances while "...we can represent to ourselves only one space; and if we speak of diverse spaces, we mean thereby only parts of one and the same unique space" (B 39).
Secondly, we cannot derive the concept of space from thinking of a collection of different spaces because space itself is a precondition for differentiating spaces. It is only possible to differentiate one space from another by conceiving of them as parts of one and the same space. "Space is essentially one; the manifold in it, and therefore the general concept of spaces, depends solely on limitations" (B 39).

In the fourth and last argument in the "Metaphysical Exposition of Space", Kant argues that any general concept is regarded as having an infinite number of instances falling under it but space is thought to have an infinite number of parts within it. It is the very nature of space to have an infinite number of parts within it.

In the "Conclusions from the above Concepts" (B 42) of space, Kant states that space "...does not represent any property of things in themselves, nor does it represent them in their relation to one another" (B 42). This conclusion follows from the argument which demonstrates that space is not something known empirically or derived from any empirical knowledge. If our knowledge of space is not derived empirically, then our knowledge does not depend upon the existence of things which present themselves to us through sensation. Space is therefore neither a thing in itself, the property of a thing in itself, or a relation among things in themselves.

In spite of Kant's arguments, some commentators, such as Kemp Smith, argue that Kant has demonstrated that space and time are pure a priori forms of intuition but, at the same time, space and time may also be intrinsic properties of things in themselves. Kant however rejects the very possibility of things in themselves being either spatial or temporal. Kant argues that space cannot exist independently of human subjectivity, that is, that space cannot be either a thing in itself
or an intrinsic property of a thing in itself. If space were a thing in itself, that is, something independent of human subjectivity, then the only mode of knowledge we would have of it would be by way of empirical intuition. But in order for something to be an object, it must be thought to be something which is distinct from the subject and that is possible only on the a priori condition that it exist in space. In other words, an object is an object only insofar as it can be distinguished from some subject. Since space is a condition of anything being an object, it cannot itself be an object.

Secondly, Kant concludes that space "...is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer sense" (B 42. Emphasis mine.). It is possible for space to be either the form or the matter of all appearances but Kant has demonstrated that it cannot be the matter, i.e., sensation, because space is the very precondition for having any observations whatsoever. Space is the "...subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is possible for us" (B 42). Space is a condition which the subject imposes on sensibility, that is, subjects can observe things only insofar as they refer sensations to various regions of space. In order for there to be any observation, the distinction has to be made between the subject and the object and this can be established only by means of space. Space is therefore a condition imposed by the subject on observation itself, i.e., on what it takes to observe anything. It is not therefore something which the subject imposes on particular sensations or even on the sensations themselves; it is imposed on sensibility in general (transcendentally understood). Sensations, as strictly mental states, cannot have spatial properties. While a sensation of red, for example, is a mental state, a
region of space can be represented as red. In other words, the content of a sensation (e.g., red) can be referred to a region of space. As Dryer says,

In observing a state of our own consciousness, we find no shape, size or position to it. All objects which we observe are either states of our own consciousness or objects about us. Kant speaks of inner sense as that by which we are aware of the former and of outer sense as that by which we are aware of the latter.

Kant concludes that space is nothing more than a formal thing which functions only insofar as it has some content or matter (sensations). By means of space we refer what is presented in sensation to some region of space. Apart from this formal function, space is absolutely nothing at all.

It is, therefore, solely from the human standpoint that we can speak of space, of extended things, etc. If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can have outer intuition, namely, liability to be affected by objects, the representation of space stands for nothing whatsoever (B 42).

Space is therefore a pure function and apart from that function it is absolutely nothing. Space is simply a subjective condition or capacity for referring sensations to regions of space different from that in which the subject finds himself.

This predicate [e.g., spatial, extended] can be ascribed to things only insofar as they appear to us, that is, only to objects of sensibility (B 43. Emphasis mine.).

Although it is only possible to ascribe such predicates as "spatial" or "extended" to objects of the senses, i.e., to appearances, these objects really are extended and spatial. It is not the case that they only appear to be, that is, only seem to be or only look to be extended
and spatial. The distinction which we make between ourselves and things outside ourselves can only be made in terms of space. Apart from space, there is no way whatsoever for making this distinction. Similarly, the distinction between one thing and another can only be made in terms of space. Dryer says, 45

We cannot be aware of any things about us without observing them alongside one another and with parts apart from one another. Indeed, we cannot observe any things distinct from ourselves without being aware of them as external to ourselves and as occupying different positions from one another. The constant form of this receptivity, which we term sensibility, is a necessary condition of all the relations in which objects can be intuited as outside us... (B 43).

Kant argues that space is real in the sense that it is definitely a feature of the things which present themselves to us, viz., appearances. However, if we try to go further than that and claim that space is a feature of things quite apart from human sensibility, then we are making a claim which is not only unsupported but, for Kant, quite fallacious as well. If space really were a feature of things apart from us, then our knowledge of it would be only empirical. But Kant has already demonstrated in the Metaphysical Exposition that space "...is a necessary a priori representation which underlies all outer intuitions" (B 38).

At the same time, however, Kant claims that space is transcendently ideal. In other words, space is a condition of the very being of the thing (viz., the appearance) which presents itself to us. However, this condition is subjective only in the sense that it is the necessary subjective condition for referring sensations to regions of space different from that in which the subject finds himself. Space has empirical reality insofar
as the things which present themselves to us really are extended.

Extention, although it really does belong to the objects which present themselves to us, is not objective in the sense that it is and could remain a property of things completely independently of the transcendental subject. In fact, if we subtract from the empirical object all the properties which are due to the transcendental subject, the thing (appearance) would be nothing at all.

With the sole exception of space there is no subjective representation, referring to something outer, which could be entitled [at once] objective [and] a priori (B 44).

To claim that space has empirical reality, on the other hand, is simply to claim that all of these things (appearances) are completely independent of the psychological states of human beings. In other words, the extension of any object which presents itself to my senses is in no way dependent upon my particular psychological states. Space, and things in space, are not in any sense dependent upon my psychological states. The empirical reality of space, in Kantian terms, means essentially that things really do occupy space even in those places and times within cosmic history when there were no psychological beings around to perceive them. However, Kant's point concerning the empirical reality of space must never be divorced from the transcendental ideality of space. Kant was perhaps not as clear on this particular distinction as he might have been, especially given its importance for his whole project but, nonetheless, such phrases as it is "...solely from the human standpoint that we can speak of space, of extended things, etc." (B 42) have an immediate tendency to make us believe that, for Kant, space is subjective simply in the sense of its
being a psychological state of some subject and therefore reduces all things which occupy space to the same psychological status which Berkeley affords them. However, Kant affords empirical reality to space precisely to distinguish space, and the objects which occupy it, from psychological states such as sensations. In other words, because space is not a psychological state, the existence of spatial things, i.e., empirical objects, is not dependent upon any psychological state. However, this is not to go so far as to claim that space itself is therefore something which can exist as a thing in itself. While space is dependent upon the transcendental subject, it is not dependent on any psychological subject.

Space is not subjective in the sense that it is simply a psychological state. In that sense, space is not subjective in the same way that sensations are subjective. This does not mean, however, that space is not subjective. It only means that it is not subjective in the same sense that sensations are subjective. This is undoubtedly the main reason why Kant spends so much time and effort in the Metaphysical Exposition of Space contrasting space with the subjectivity implicit in such sensations as taste and colour.

Although Kant introduces space as "a property of our mind" (B 37), it is not the case that space is therefore reduced to something on a par with sensation which is also thought to be a property of our minds, i.e., some psychological state. Throughout the "Metaphysical Exposition of this Concept", viz., space, Kant takes great pains to differentiate between the subjectivity afforded to psychological states such as sensations and the subjectivity he affords to space. Taste and colour, for example "...belong merely to the subjective constitution of our manner of sensibility..." (B 44) and as such, they are"...accidentally added by the particular
constitution of the sense organs" (A 29). However, Kant states explicitly that space must be considered "...without regard to the constitution of our sensibility" (B 44), i.e., without regard to the particular, and perhaps idiosyncratic, constitution of the psycho-physiological human being. Notwithstanding, Kant's statement that space is simply a "property of our minds" is itself almost sufficient to lead us to believe that space, and the fact that things appear to us to be in space, is simply the result of the particular constitution of the human nervous system.\footnote{46}

What, then, are space and time? Are they real existences? Are they only determinations or relations of things, yet such as would belong to things even if they were not intuited? Or are space and time such that they belong only to the form of intuition, and therefore to the subjective constitution of our mind, apart from which they could not be ascribed to anything whatsoever? (B 37-38).

By drawing the distinction between the empirical reality and the transcendental ideality of space, Kant also draws the distinction between the empirical or psychological subject and the transcendental subject, that is, the subject that imposes certain conditions for a possible experience. These distinctions immediately put Kant's transcendental idealism in a separate camp from Berkelian idealism because Berkeley analyzes what it means to be an empirical object in terms of psychological states, without remainder. Berkeley analyzes what it means to be an object entirely in terms of our psychological states, viz., sensation. Kant, on the other hand, does not analyze either space or objects in space in terms of our psychological states. In fact, Kant takes considerable pains to point out that neither space nor objects in space are dependent upon any psychological states whatsoever. It becomes necessary for Berkeley to bring God into the
philosophical picture in order for the object to exist apart from my personal psychological states. In other words, if the object is not actually being observed by me then it is either a possible psychological state (phenomenalism) or in God's mind as one of His psychological states. In nuce, Berkeley simply did not make Kant's transcendental turn which explains the ontological status of things without reference to psychological states. Neither space nor objects in space are, for Kant, reducible to, nor analyzed by reference to, psychological states, whether actual, possible, or in God's mind. Thus Kant was not, in any sense of the word, a phenomenalist. Both the transcendental subject and the psychological subject are subjective in the sense that they are both part of the "human standpoint" (B 42). But it is only if we take away the subjective conditions of sensibility that things in space and time disappear. On the other hand, if we take away all psychological states as well as all beings that have such psychological states, then Kant argues, everything would remain precisely as it was before. It is only within the framework of space and time that the distinction between the psychological and the non-psychological can be made. Whatever is non-psychological, for example, those empirical objects which I observe in space, are precisely those things which do not depend on my psychological states at all for their being or for their objective determinations, and are therefore empirically real. The objects which I observe are empirically real insofar as they are independent of any and all psychological states. However, this does not mean that they would exist independently of space and time, i.e., independently of the conditions imposed by transcendental subjectivity. The vital distinction which Kant makes is the distinction between what it
means to exist apart from psychological or empirical states and what it means to exist apart from space and time understood to be conditions of transcendental subjectivity. Empirical reality is simply the claim that something, be it space, time, or something in space and time, are independent of any and all psychological states whatsoever. It is with this distinction in mind that Kant charges Berkeley with reducing everything to the status of an illusion (B 70-71, B 274-275). What Berkeley claims is that objects in space are either reducible to psychological states or at least so intimately connected to psychological states that their analysis is possible only in terms of them. Kant's transcendental turn denies this possibility. Kant distinguishes transcendental subjectivity from empirical or psychological subjectivity.

Strictly speaking, therefore, these other representations [viz., sensations] have no ideality, although they agree with the representation of space in this respect, that they belong merely to the subjective constitution of our manner of sensibility, for instance, of sight, hearing, touch, as in the case of the sensations of colour, sounds, and heat, which, since they are mere sensations and not intuitions, do not of themselves yield knowledge of any object, least of all any a priori knowledge (B 44).

Intuitions are representations of things which are other than psychological states. Sensations, on the other hand, are nothing but psychological states. As Bird says, 48 Kant

...distinguishes between appearance and sensation as early as B34.... For what Kant means by 'appearance' certainly does not exclude physical objects.Appearances are frequently called 'objects' by him (B 34, A 109).

Whatever is regarded as subjective simply in terms of its being a
psychological state, as are sensations, cannot be regarded as the property of any thing but only as an affect in the subject which may differ from subject to subject. On the other hand, whatever is ideal, as is space, is, in fact, a property of the thing observed. Space is subjective only in the sense that it is necessary to be able to differentiate the subject from what is an object. This subjective condition must be the same for each and every subject, otherwise there could not even be a subject. Sensations are private and can vary with people such that a rose may affect one subject quite differently than another. Space is transcendentally subjective in the a priori sense of being a condition for all subjects even observing such things as roses.

For these [such properties as colour, taste] cannot rightly be regarded as properties of things, but only as changes in the subject, changes which may, indeed, be different for different men. In such examples as these, that which originally is itself only appearance, for instance, a rose, is being treated by the empirical understanding as a thing-in-itself, which, nevertheless, in respect of its colour, can appear differently to every observer (B 45).

Empirically, but never transcendentally, Kant says that we treat such properties as the colour of a rose or the taste of a wine as properties which really belong to the thing itself and thereby, empirically speaking, we treat appearances as things in themselves (Vide also B 62, 69). In other words, empirically speaking, we regard such properties as colour and taste as if they were not relative to our psycho-physiological constitution. Although colour is a relational property, and therefore nothing at all independently of our psychological states, we usually regard such properties as such as if they really belong to the thing itself. Space, on
the other hand, is always relative not to the psychological or empirical subject, but to the transcendental subject.

The transcendental concept of appearances in space, on the other hand, is a critical reminder that nothing intuited in space is a thing-in-itself, that space is not a form inhering in things-in-themselves as their intrinsic property, that things-in-themselves are quite unknown to us, and that what we call outer objects are nothing but mere representations of our sensibility, the form of which is space (B 45).

Kant defines "the thing in itself" as the correlative to "appearance" insofar as an appearance is what presents itself to the senses, i.e., what is presented to human sensibility. The thing in itself is what does not present itself to the senses and is therefore beyond the scope of human sensibility. Similarly, what presents itself to the senses, viz., appearance, presents itself by way of receptivity ("...the receptivity of the senses [is] its capacity to be affected by objects..." B 42), so it is correlative to some activity, viz., the thing in itself, as the cause of the appearance.

Unless, therefore, we are to move constantly in a circle, the word appearance must be recognized as already indicating a relation to something, the immediate representation of which is, indeed, sensible, but which, even apart from the constitution of our sensibility (upon which the form of our intuition is grounded), must be something in itself, that is, an object independent of sensibility (A 252).

The concept of "appearance" is therefore developed in contradistinction to the concept of the "thing in itself". In other words, it is only possible to say that something is an appearance, that is, has properties (space and time) that are dependent upon a transcendental subject only in
contradistinction to a thing in itself which only has intrinsic properties and is thereby independent of the transcendental subject. Kant's distinction between the thing in itself and appearance will be further developed below.

For the most part, Kant's treatment of the 'Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Time' (B 46-48) is roughly parallel to his treatment of space. Thus Kant argues that time "...is not an empirical concept that has been derived from any experience" (B 46). If time were a thing in itself then our knowledge of time would have to be ascertained empirically. If time were a thing in itself, that is, something existing independently of human consciousness, then its nature would be something that could only be ascertained either by observing time itself or things in time. Kant argues that this could not, in fact, be the case for if our concept of time were an empirical concept, it would have to be derived from observation of a plurality of instances of time. Kant however demonstrates that we can represent to ourselves a number of things as existing at one and the same time, i.e., simultaneously, or at different times, only by presupposing time. Thus the concept of time cannot be derived from observing things existing at different times, or even at the same time, only insofar as they are already thought to be parts of one and the same time. In order to have a diversity of temporal things, it is first necessary to have the notion that all of these things are within one time.

Only on the presupposition of time can we represent to ourselves a number of things as existing at one and the same time (simultaneously) or at different times (successively) B 45.

The second argument in the Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of
Time states that time cannot be analyzed simply in terms of things in time because it is conceivable that there be time without that time being occupied by things in time. If time were analyzable simply in terms of things in time, then it would be impossible to conceive of time independently of those very things. Since it is logically possible to conceive of time without things in time, then if follows that time cannot be understood simply by reference to things in time. "We cannot, in respect of appearances in general, remove time itself, though we can quite well think time as void of appearances. Time is, therefore, given a priori" (B 46).

Kant also demonstrates that time is not a concept but an intuition, that is, that time is not a general representation (as all concepts are) but a direct representation of a particular (as all intuitions are). Time cannot be a general concept because our representation of time is of a singular thing"...and the representation which can be given only through a single object is intuition" (B 47).

Lastly, Kant argues that time is a particular or single object which can be represented only by limitation, that is, the concept of the totality of space cannot be formed by the simple addition of times. In other words, the concept of time is not derived by adding up all of the particular times because particular times exist only as limitations of time itself. Consequently, time is not the sum total of all times. "The original representation, time, must therefore be given as unlimited" (B 48).

The Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Time...explains the possibility of that body of a priori synthetic knowledge which is exhibited in the general doctrine of motion..." (B 49). Kant defines "motion" as
essentially the concept of being at different places at different times. But something can be at different times only insofar as it is at one time after or following another time and this is possible only within time itself in which the different times are thought to be parts of one all-encompassing time. The concept of motion therefore presupposes being at different places at different times and it is only insofar as a thing can occupy different times, with successively different attributes, that the concept of alteration can be rendered intelligible and known a priori.

Here I may add that the concept of alteration [that is, of a combination of contradictorily opposed predicates in one and the same object, for instance, the being and the not-being of one and the same thing in one and the same place. B 48], and with it the concept of motion, as alteration of place, is possible only through and in the representation of time... (B 48).

Kant has demonstrated that time is not a thing in itself because any object can only be known empirically, that is, by means of observation. In other words, if time were an object which could exist independently of us, our knowledge of it could only be derived if time presented itself to us as objects do, in empirical intuition. Since we know certain things to be true about time a priori, then time cannot be an independent object. Similarly, if time were a feature or a relational property of things in themselves, "...it could not precede the objects as their condition, and be known and intuited a priori by means of synthetic propositions" (B 49). We cannot know a priori what things will be like if time exists as an object quite independent of transcendental subjectivity. But space and time are necessary conditions for the very being of the things which present themselves to us in empirical intuition (appearances). Time is therefore
neither a feature of things nor a relation among things but, nevertheless, it is something that is required in order for any thing to present itself to us. Time therefore must precede the thing as its condition; "...time is nothing but the subjective condition under which alone intuition can take place in us" (B 49). Since the analysis of time does not presuppose the existence or observation of temporal things, "...this form of inner intuition can be represented [logically, though not temporally] prior to the objects, and therefore a priori" (B 49).

Kant concludes that time "...is nothing but the form of inner sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state" (B 49). All psychological states have, as their characteristic, that they only have temporal properties. Time is the form of inner sense while space and time together constitute the form of all outer sense. In fact, Kant states quite explicitly that time "...cannot be a determination of our appearances; it has to do neither with shape nor position, but with the relation of representations in our inner state" (B 49-50). This means essentially that all outer appearances, that is, things in space or empirical objects, are temporal or have temporal properties only "mediately" or indirectly. This will have serious repercussions for Kant's analyses of permanence and causality in the First and Second Analogies respectively. To say that all outer appearances are temporal only indirectly is to draw attention to the claim that everything we experience is, in fact, a representation.

But since all representations, whether they have for their objects outer things or not, belong, in themselves, as determinations of the mind, to our inner state... (B 50).

Insofar as all representations are "determinations of the mind", that is, belong as elements in our inner sense, they are simply psychological
states. But as elements of inner sense, all representations must be under the form of time; "...since this inner state stands under the formal condition of inner intuition, and so belongs to time..." (B 50). However, my awareness of an empirical object, that is, my awareness of what is presented to me in empirical intuition, represents something spatial and therefore not an element of "inner sense". Insofar as representations are determinations of the mind, they are "inner" and therefore non-spatial. However, although my representation of the empirical object is temporal and not spatial (being an element of inner sense), the empirical object is spatial. Yet, because I must represent the empirical object to myself and all of my representations are temporal, the empirical object must participate in the temporality of my representation of it, even though its participation is secondhand. As Kant says, time

...is the immediate condition of all inner appearances (of our souls), and thereby the mediate condition of outer appearances (B 50).

Although time is nothing more than "...the relation of representations in our inner state" (B 50) but because all representations, "...must all, as modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense" (A 99), they must also be temporal.

But since all representations, whether they have for their objects outer things or not, belong, in themselves, as determinations of the mind, to our inner state; and since this inner state stands under the formal condition of inner intuition, and so belongs to time, time is an a priori condition of all appearance whatsoever. It is the immediate condition of inner appearances (of our souls), and thereby the mediate condition of outer appearances (B 50).

As a consequence of Kant's conclusion, viz., that all appearances,
both inner as well as outer, are in time, it also follows that all objects of the senses "...stand in time-relations" (B 51). This fact makes it possible for time to serve as the "transcendental schema" which solves Kant's problem of demonstrating "...how pure concepts [the categories] can be applicable to appearances" (B 177).  

Thus an application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental determination of time, which, as the schema of the concepts of understanding, mediates the subsumption of the appearances under the category (B 178).

Kant argues that time is not a condition of "things in general" (B 51), that is, things, whether or not they present themselves to our senses. Time is a condition only of things that can present themselves to the senses, viz., appearances. "It [time] has objective validity only in respect of appearances, these being things which we take as objects of our senses" (B 51).  

Since the only way we have of immediately representing a particular being is by means of the senses, then no object can ever be given to us which does not conform to the condition of time, the form of sensibility. Thus all appearances or empirical objects which present themselves to the senses are, in fact, in time. Time therefore has empirical reality.

What we are maintaining is, therefore the empirical reality of time, that is, its objective validity in respect of all objects which allow of ever being given to our senses. And since our intuition is always sensible, no object can ever be given to us in experience which does not conform to the condition of time (B 52).

Although time is a property which empirical objects really have, time is also transcendently ideal. In other words, time is nothing more than a condition for the very being of the objects which we observe. The
ideality of time means that time is transcendentally and therefore subjectively constitutive of anything which presents itself to us in empirical intuition. Time is a property which something has only insofar as it stands in relation to the transcendental subject and apart from this relation, it is nothing at all. However, Kant warns us again that although time is transcendentally ideal and therefore a certain form of subjectivity, it is not the form of empirical subjectivity which makes something a psychological state. Kant's term "subjective", ambiguously enough, is used to cover both kinds of subjectivity even though they could not be more unlike one another. A property such as redness, for example, is a psychological state insofar as it is a sensation. To be "red" is to be in a state in which something looks red to normal observers under normal conditions. (Cf. the section below on the 'looks-is' distinction). Time, however, is subjective without, at the same time, being psychological. It is therefore subjective in the transcendental sense.

This ideality, like that of space, must not, however, be illustrated by false analogies with sensation, because it is then assumed that the appearance, in which the sensible predicates inhere, itself has objective reality (B 53).

The very distinction between the psychological and the non-psychological occurs within the framework of space and time and therefore space and time themselves cannot be psychological even though they are subjective in character. "Time is therefore a purely subjective condition of our (human) intuition (which is always sensible, that is, so far as we are affected by objects), and in itself, apart from the subject, is nothing" (B 51). Time is transcendentally subjective insofar as this subjectivity constitutes the
very nature of certain things which are objective. In other words, the
transcendental subjectivity of space and time constitutes the very nature of
what presents itself to us in empirical intuition which is non-psychological
and hence different from the subject. The transcendental subject is what
makes the empirical object different from the empirical subject because the
subjective (transcendental) makes the object (empirical) different from the
psychological subject (empirical). In other words, transcendental
subjectivity is the very basis for drawing the distinction between the
subject and the object, i.e., between what is and what is not just a
psychological state. In Kantian terms, transcendental subjectivity is the
precondition for distinguishing the empirical object from the empirical
subject.

Kant also argues that the ideality which he affords to both space and
time is not to be construed as the kind of idealism "...which teaches that
the reality of outer objects does not allow of strict proof" (B 55). In
the Refutation of Idealism (B 274), Kant defines "idealism" as "...the
theory which declares the existence of objects in space outside us either
to be merely doubtful and indemonstrable or to be false and impossible"
(B 274). Kant declares the former kind of idealism "problematic" and
attributes it to Descartes, while the latter is declared to be "dogmatic"
and is attributed to Berkeley. The idealist, it seems, is faced with too
possibilities: either something comes within human consciousness or it does
not. If it comes within human consciousness then it is immediately deemed
to be psychological and therefore nothing more than a constituent of inner
sense. This, Kant claims, was Berkeley's route toward dogmatic idealism
which claims (according to Kant, at least) that empirical objects in space
are both false and impossible (see B 70-71; B 274-275). If, on the other hand, something does not come within human consciousness and, as a result, is thought to be something beyond and apart from human subjectivity, it must be unknown. This, Kant claims, was Descartes' route toward problematic idealism which claims that empirical objects in space are reduced in status to the dubious at best or the indemonstrable at worst. (See B 274-275; A 367-369). The Kantian doctrine of the ideality of space and time, together with the Refutation of Idealism, rejects both brands of idealism as well as their initial, and Kant believes, erroneous starting point, viz., that although the reality of outer objects is not given, the reality of the object of inner sense is (that is, "the reality of myself and my state") (B 55). Kant's position is precisely the inverse of this position, viz., that the reality of the self is not in any way really given because what is given of the self is only its psychological states. The self per se is never given, only its psychological states are. Thus Kant argues, in the Refutation of Idealism, that the outer object (by which he means the object given in empirical intuition, that is, the object in space outside us) is immediately given. While idealists claim that we are in intimate and immediate contact with ourselves but the outer object is difficult to know, Kant reveres the position and claims that we are immediately aware of the outer object but we are only given the psychological states of ourselves and not the self per se. In fact, Kant's argument in the Refutation of Idealism solves problematic idealism by demonstrating that inner experience and knowledge of the self qua appearance is possible only when we assume the objective validity of outer experience.
The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me (B 275. All in italics in the original.).

Kant argues that the idealists have failed to recognize that the reality of the outer object, as well as the reality of myself as inner object, must always be understood as appearance only, but appearance, Kant claims, "...always has two sides, the one by which the object is viewed in and by itself (without regard to the mode of intuiting it--its nature therefore remaining always problematic), the other by which the form of the intuition of this object is taken into account" (B 55). We can think of the self as presenting itself as appearance because it presents itself in ways which mean that it could not be the self as it is in itself, viz., spatially or temporally, insofar as space and time are transcendentally subjective. Thus the self can be regarded both as thing-in-itself and as appearance (Cf. Bxxviii). Similarly, the external object, i.e., the object in the transcendental sense, can be understood only as X = the unknown which may present itself but about which no knowledge can be acquired as to what it may be in itself. We do know that it presents itself, however, because we have sensations and insofar as it is the ground of our sensations, it has reality.

This form [viz., space and time] is not to be looked for in the object in itself, but in the subject to which the object appears; nevertheless, it belongs really and necessarily to the appearance of this object (B 55).

It is necessary to determine precisely what an appearance is, for Kant, in contradistinction to the thing in itself and the transcendental object.
3. Appearance, Thing in itself, Transcendental Object.

According to Kant, the object in relation to human subjectivity, is entitled the "appearance". "The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is entitled appearance" (B 34). An appearance is therefore what is represented in empirical intuition. The appearance is that which presents itself to us by modifying our state of consciousness via sensation. The appearance may therefore be referred to simply as that X that we are immediately related to in empirical intuition in general because the appearance is an undetermined object. It is undetermined precisely because no properties or features, that is, no specific content has yet been ascribed to it. An appearance remains undetermined or unspecified until a judgement is made. An appearance is therefore an empirical object in general and has as its correlate, empirical intuition. However, once an undetermined object has been thought through the categories of the understanding, i.e., once properties or features have been ascribed to the appearance via judgement, then, Kant says, the appearance is designated by the term "phenomenon". "Appearances, so far as they are thought as objects according to the unity of the categories are called phenomena" (A 249). Phenomena are therefore determined appearances and what determines the appearance are the categories of the understanding.

In a very important passage in the Aesthetic (B 62), Kant draws a distinction within our ordinary spatio-temporal or empirical framework between the way the thing is (which he refers to as the thing in itself, empirically understood), and the way the thing might present itself to someone, or appear to someone, from "...a particular standpoint or to a peculiarity of structure in this or that sense" (B 62). For example,
from a particular standpoint, a stick may look or appear bent or to a peculiarity of structure in some sense, e.g., colour blindness, something might look or appear green when, in fact, it is red. Within this empirical framework, it is possible to draw the distinction between the way something is and the way something looks or appears to be, i.e., between those properties which something actually has and those properties which depend upon a particular external condition or a personal idiosyncracy in this or that sense organ. However, this is not the most vital distinction which Kant makes in this Aesthetic passage.

But this distinction is merely empirical. If, as generally happens, we stop short at this point, and do not proceed, as we ought, to treat the empirical intuition as itself mere appearance, in which nothing that belongs to a thing-in-itself can be found, our transcendental distinction is lost (B 62).

Kant warns us, in the above passage, that the appearance-reality distinction must only be regarded as an empirical distinction. Whatever is a mere appearance in the empirical sense is something which is entirely dependent upon some peculiarity of our subjective psychological or physiological constitution. Therefore, an appearance in the empirical sense does not have any status whatsoever apart from such psychological states. Therefore, an empirical appearance depends for its existence on a given psychological state while apart from that state it is nothing whatsoever. However, an appearance at the transcendental level depends upon the subjective constitution of sensibility itself. It does not depend, however, on any particular psychological state. Therefore, any commentator who regards Kant as a phenomenalist, and thereby reduces the empirical object qua appearance to psychological states, has simply
conflated Kant's transcendental-empirical distinction and, as a result, views transcendental "appearance" in the way Kant reserves for empirical "appearance".

We can determine, empirically, how a thing really is as opposed to how it merely appears to be to us. This means essentially that we can draw a distinction between how the thing is relative to our psychological and physiological constitution and how the thing is apart from that constitution. Empirical reality, for Kant, just is the object apart from any and all psychological states. Thus, according to Kant, to speak about "reality" is simply to speak about things, that is, ordinary, empirical objects as they are apart from our psychological states. This notion of "reality" is central to Kant's thesis. In fact, although Kant refers to the thing in itself as "real" ("the thing-in-itself as indeed real per se, but as not known by us". B xx.), it is real only in a derivative sense, that is, only insofar as the thing in itself is thought to be the correlate of sensibility (B 45) and therefore the ground or cause of sensation in general, can it be called real. This is the case because it is sensation alone which can properly be called the "real".

It is sensation, therefore, that indicates a reality in space or time, according as it is related to the one or to the other mode of sensible intuition. (Once sensation is given—if referred to an object in general, though not as determining that object, it is entitled perception...). (A 374. Cf. B 217).

Kant calls sensation the real in empirical intuition, "the real in appearance (realitas phaenomenon) (B 320). Sensation or the material element in empirical knowledge demonstrates that there must be something apart from our sensations (as psychological states) which cause them. As Dryer says,
Far from holding that our senses give us no knowledge of any thing that is real, Kant points out that it is only by our senses that we can secure such knowledge (Emphasis mine.).

Since "reality" is first and foremost defined in terms of sensation, then it is only in a secondary sense that the cause of sensation can be treated as something real. "For everything is real which stands in connection with a perception in accordance with the laws of empirical advance" (B 521). Kant even argues that inhabitants on the moon would be considered real if they were to stand in such an empirical connection (See B 521). However, since the thing in itself is thought to be the cause of sensation in general, we must extend to it the claim that it is real. This transcendental claim of Kant's, viz., that the thing in itself is the cause of sensation in general must not, however, be conflated to any empirical claim as to what real thing is the cause of this or that particular sensation because on this empirical level, the cause of any and all specific sensations must be some empirically real object.

According to Kant, all of the properties which an object of possible experience has, transcendentally understood, are contributed by the subject with one vital exception. Sensation, the matter of perception (B 209) cannot be known a priori. Kant argues, therefore, that the cause of sensation in general, is the thing in itself.

That in the appearance which corresponds to sensation I term its matter; but that which so determines the manifold of appearance that it allows of being ordered in certain relations, I term the form of appearance (B 34. See also B 323.).

Kant defines the 'thing-in-itself' as that thing which is constituted by its internal or intrinsic properites alone and therefore contrasts it...
with appearances which are constituted entirely by their relational properties insofar as an appearance simply has no intrinsic properties whatsoever. Kant says of the thing in itself,

According to mere concepts the inner is the substratum of all relational or outer determinations. If, therefore, I abstract, from all conditions of intuition and confine myself to the concept of a thing in general, I can abstract from all outer relation, and there must still be left a concept of something which signifies no relation, but inner determinations only (B 339).

An appearance has no intrinsic properties whatsoever insofar as all of its properties, with the exception of sensation, are dependent upon its relation to human subjectivity and the transcendental conditions it imposes on experience. Therefore an appearance has only relational properties and apart from those properties, it would be nothing at all.

It is quite otherwise with a substantia phaenomenon in space; its inner determinations are nothing but relations, and it itself is entirely made up of mere relations (B 321).

Corporeal things are never anything save relations only... (B 339).

All that we know in matter is merely relations... (B 341).

Kant is, therefore, claiming that the thing in itself "...cannot be known through mere relations" (B 67), that is, the thing in itself cannot have only relational properties. But, Kant continues, "...since outer sense gives us nothing but mere relations" (B 67. Emphasis mine. Compare mere appearances.), it follows that the inner or intrinsic properties of the thing in itself are never given and therefore are never known. We know, however, that the thing in itself and the appearance are not one
Since, however, in the relation of the given object to the subject, such properties depend upon the mode of intuition of the subject, this object as appearance is to be distinguished from itself as object in itself (B 69).

Kant often speaks about the thing in itself and appearance as if they were simply two different ways of understanding one and the same object. In the Preface to the Second Edition, Kant says, for example, "...that the object is to be taken in a twofold sense, namely as appearance and as thing-in-itself..." (B xxvii). It seems that the thing in itself and appearance are one and the same thing but viewed in two distinct ways. To view the object under the conditions imposed by transcendental subjectivity is to view the object as an appearance. However, to view the object quite apart from these same transcendental conditions is to understand the object as a thing in itself.54

...we can therefore have no knowledge of any object as thing-in-itself, but only insofar as it is an object of sensible intuition, that is, an appearance (B xxvi).

Now let us suppose that the distinction, which our Critique has shown to be necessary, between things as objects of experience and those same things as things in themselves, had not been made (B xxvii. Emphasis mine.).

The thing in itself is the concept of a thing which is constituted by its intrinsic properties (defining an "intrinsic property" as any non-relational property). Kant has demonstrated in the Aesthetic, however, that spatiality is an essential property of things which present themselves to us in empirical intuition. Spatiality is also thought to be an essential property of things which present themselves to us insofar as all
other properties which a thing has are dependent upon the thing's spatiality (e.g., place, shape, contact, motion, forces of attraction and repulsion, impenetrability. Vide B 321, 330, 339). Since space qua outer sense gives nothing but mere relations (B 67), it follows that empirical objects cannot be things-in-themselves. An appearance or an empirical object has only relational properties and therefore has no intrinsic properties whatsoever.

Now a thing-in-itself cannot be known through mere relations; and we may therefore conclude that since outer sense gives us nothing but mere relations, this sense can contain in its representation only the relation of an object to the subject, and not the inner properties of the object in itself (B 67).

In the Aesthetic, Kant has demonstrated that space and time are subjective conditions of whatever presents itself to us in empirical intuition. An empirical object is an appearance because all of its properties, with the exception of its specific material content, viz., sensation, depend upon its relation to the transcendental subject. If the relation of the appearance to the transcendental subject is removed, the appearance simply vanishes. However, if we remove from the appearance what is dependent upon any and all psychological states, the appearance remains intake. This is possible because Kant distinguishes his transcendental form of idealism from so-called "empirical idealism".

By transcendental idealism I mean the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all, representations only, not things in themselves, and that time and space are therefore only sensible forms of our intuition, not determinations given as existing by themselves, nor conditions of objects viewed as things in themselves (A 369).

Empirical idealism, and phenomenalism as its most popular form, ana-
lyzes the empirical object solely in terms of our psychological states and claims that, apart from these psychological states, the object is nothing at all. Empirical realism, on the other hand, a philosophical position Kant holds not only to be compatible with transcendental idealism but, in fact, to be grounded in it and guaranteed by it, is the position which claims that the empirical object is real insofar as it can exist quite apart from any and all psychological states, but that it would be nothing at all apart from our subjective constitution, transcendently understood.

Kant does claim, as we have already seen, that there is something quite apart from human sensibility in general which we can never know. Kant says that the thing in itself is the "true correlate of sensibility" (B 45) and that the word "appearance" itself already indicates a relation to something (See A 252, B xxvii). Our knowledge of this particular thing would have to depend on our representing it but that is impossible because as soon as we represent anything, we contribute spatio-temporal properties to it. Therefore, the only element in an appearance which cannot be derived from or reduced to the subject is sensation. Although my cup is a mere appearance, it has something in itself which is not subjectively contributed, viz., sensation: the matter "...in the appearance which corresponds to sensation" (B 34. See also B 118, 207, 286, 322). The cup qua appearance is just a representation. The features of the cup qua appearance which have been subjectively contributed (transcendently speaking) include the cup's spatio-temporality, the fact that it is thought to be an object, that it is thought to be a permanent substratum which may have changing features. These, however,
are all formal features which are to be found for any and all objects of a possible experience. Yet the matter of the experience, that is, the sensation, is due to something quite apart from the subject.

Kant argues that the source of the matter which is given in empirical intuition, transcendentally understood, is not from the subject on the grounds that the subject is entirely passive in its sensibility. "The capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is entitled sensibility" (B 33. See also B 43, 43, 74, 93, 129.). Therefore if sensation does not arise from human consciousness, that is, does not have its origin in human subjectivity, then it must be contributed by something other than, and apart from, human consciousness. Kant speaks repeatedly about "spontaneity", "the spontaneity of thought" (B 93), and "the understanding as an activity" which are always found in contradistinction to human sensibility as a receptivity. However, Kant argues that the understanding is "spontaneous in the production of concepts" (B 74), "the mind's power of producing representations from itself" (B 75), and the "ground of the threefold synthesis found in all knowledge" (A 97. See also. B 130, 132, 151, 158N, 430.). The understanding is not active in the production of sensation or the matter of knowledge. It is a thought which J.S. Beck in his letters to Kant called "...a naked piece of nonsense!" Although Kant muses that passive sensibility and the active understanding may "...perhaps spring from a common, but to us unknown, root" (B 29), Kant's essential point is missed if we dwell on this passage, as intriguing as it might be. Kant does not merely accept as a brute fact that there is passivity and activity and thereby
claim, dogmatically, that 'never the twain shall meet'. Rather, Kant argues that these two faculties must, in fact, be logically distinguished from one another (See Logic, pp. 37-40). His argument rests on the fact that there is, and can be, no a priori knowledge of sensation (apart from such formal or a priori considerations as that it must have both intensive and extensive magnitudes). There is no a priori knowledge of what falls properly and exclusively on the side of receptivity or the matter of knowledge. In other words, we cannot anticipate in any way what will be the matter or sensation within a given empirical intuition. We cannot anticipate what sorts of things we are going to encounter in empirical intuition, even though we know formally, i.e., a priori, that whatever it is, it must be spatio-temporal, have an intensive and extensive magnitude, and conform to the categories of the understanding. "Receptivity" is therefore defined as whatever is known a posteriori, while "activity" or "spontaneity", on the other hand, is defined as whatever is known a priori (See Logic, p. 40). If we know something a priori, it is because it is an element which originated within consciousness and is therefore antecedent to other elements which come within consciousness, viz., sensation. "Since, then, the receptivity of the subject, its capacity to be affected by objects, must necessarily precede all intuitions of these objects, it can readily be understood how the form of all appearances can be given prior to all actual perceptions, and so can exist in the mind a priori... (B 42). Only what is a priori within the mind, viz., the form of our experiences, can be known before hand. The material element in knowledge, viz., sensation, is a posteriori, therefore does not have its origin in us. It has its
source in something utterly distinct from consciousness. One thing is clear, Kant says that the thing in itself is the cause of appearances (B 344, 522). What this amounts to essentially will have to wait upon an analysis of the transcendental object since Kant assigns to it the role of causing or grounding appearances.

Kant's view of the transcendental object and its relation to appearance, the thing in itself, and the transcendental subject is not immediately clear nor obvious. However, there is no reason to assume that the notion of the "transcendental object" and its usage within the First Critique is therefore unintelligible, incompatible with other elements, or even a "precritical relic" to be discarded as Kemp Smith would have us believe.56

According to Kant, the transcendental object is the concept of an object in general. It is therefore a pure concept, i.e., a non-empirical and therefore a priori concept, that cannot be intuited (See A 109; B 522). The transcendental object is the concept of something in general = X that lacks any intuitive content. The transcendental object is thought to be that something which is distinct from any and all of our representations yet it is also thought to be that thing which accounts for these representations and their unity, that is, "...that unity which must be met with in any manifold" (A 109). The transcendental object is that object to which our representations, either our intuitions, or our concepts, or both taken together, refer. Kant therefore refers to the transcendental object as "...the object of a sensible intuition in general" (A 253). The transcendental object is thought to be the correlate of sensible intuition because sensible intuition is viewed as a receptivity (B 522). It is therefore necessary to posit
something which grounds what it is that presents itself to us in experience. In other words, although the transcendental object itself never presents itself to us in experience, it is posited as that to which we may attribute our having sensations insofar as we are entirely passive in empirical intuition. The transcendental object is therefore thought to be the purely intelligible cause of appearances in general (B 522, 344; A 109, 250). Kant, it seems, sometimes speaks more loosely of the transcendental object as the cause of appearances (B 344, 522, 567; A 372, 393) and sometimes, more strictly, of the transcendental object as the ground of appearances (B 333; A 379, 641). This seems to be problematic within the Critique because it appears, at least prima facie, that Kant is positing a form of "noumenal causality". In other words, the Critique itself argues that causality functions legitimately as a category only for objects of possible experience. Insofar as the transcendental object can never be experienced (because no intuition of it is possible), then the category of causality cannot be applied to it. As Kant says,

"...the concepts of reality, substance, causality, nay even that of necessity in existence, lose all meaning, and are empty titles for [possible] concepts, themselves entirely without content, when we thus venture with them outside the field of the senses (B 707)."

For all categories through which we can attempt to form a concept of such an object allow only of empirical employment, and have no meaning whatsoever when not applied to objects of possible experience, that is, to the world of sense (B 724).

However, Kant does not say that we know the transcendental object as the schematized cause of appearances. Whenever Kant refers to the
transcendental object as the cause of appearance, he is using "cause" in its preschematized employment, therefore as "ground to consequent" and he is claiming not that we know this but that we think this to be the case. Knowledge requires schematized categories and empirical intuition; thinking requires only the preschematized categories because these are nothing more than forms of thought (See. Bxxvi, 146, 157-8, 165, 195).

The transcendental object, as the concept of an object in general, is not one of the items represented in consciousness nor is it simply the totality of all of our representations. The transcendental object is "...the completely indeterminate thought of something in general" (A 253). However, it should be remembered that Kant defined "appearance" as the "...undetermined object of an empirical intuition..." (B 34). Kant parallels his definitions of "appearance" and "transcendental object" insofar as both are defined in terms of a form of "indeterminateness" or emptiness. An appearance is determined by being thought through the categories of the understanding. The transcendental object is undetermined insofar as it is nothing more than a bare (empty) formal structure which is simply the correlate of the categories as transcendental conditions. However, the transcendental condition is determined, that is, gets specified or obtains its content, from the particular thing to which it is applied. In other words, the transcendental object is determined by empirical intuition; "...it is not in itself an object of knowledge but only the representation of appearances under the concept of an object in general--a concept which is determinable through the manifold of these appearances" (A 251). In the formal,
but empty judgement, "This X is Y", "X" is the transcendental object because "X" stands for or represents the object which has not yet been determined. In other words, the transcendental object is simply a bare formal structure of the object in general or what Bird calls "...an empty conceptual repository, or abbreviation".58

All our representations are, it is true, referred by the understanding to some object; and since appearances are nothing but representations, the understanding refers them to something, as the object of sensible intuition. But this something, thus conceived, is only the transcendental object, and by that is meant a something = X, of which we know, and with the present constitution of our understanding can know, nothing whatsoever, but which, as the correlate of the unity of apperception, can serve only for the unity of the manifold in sensible intuition. By means of this unity the understanding combines the manifold into the concept of an object. This transcendental object cannot be separated from the sensible data, for nothing is then left through which it might be thought. Consequently, it is not in itself an object of knowledge, but only the representation of appearances under the concept of an object in general—a concept which is determinable through the manifold of these appearances. (A 250)

However, there is an ever-present danger in conflating Kant's transcendental-empirical distinction. If, for example, I am having a specific empirical intuition of something red and rectangular, then I can determine that its cause (not its ground) is a particular book. The red book is not the transcendental object nor is it the appearance of the transcendental object, if this is taken to mean that the transcendental object exists behind the look of the book causing it to appear the way it does. To think in this fashion is to conflate the transcendental-empirical distinction. To determine the cause of any empirical intuition is to work within the empirical framework. However, to deter-
mine the ground of passive sensibility in general, realizing that it is impossible to have empirical intuition in general, is to work within a transcendental framework. The transcendental object = X is the bare formal structure which gives the transcendental conditions for being an object in general. In the formal judgement, "This X is Y", "X" stands for those conditions and therefore stands for any and all objects of a possible experience. This is why Kant claims that there is only one X, that is, that there is only one transcendental object (A 253). When the concept of the object in general has been determined, because it has been specified by empirical content, then I might judge that "This book is red". The "book", however, is an empirical object, not a transcendental object because we have shifted immediately to the empirical framework whenever some specifying or determining element of empirical intuition has been added. By failing to heed Kant's distinction, searches abound for the ever-illusive, transcendental object which is thought to be the reality hidden behind the empirical object. It is imperative for an understanding of Kant, to keep the empirical-transcendental distinction ever before the mind.

We can indeed admit that something, which may be (in the transcendental sense) outside us, is the cause of our outer intuitions, but this is not the object of which we are thinking in the representations of matter and of corporeal things; for these are merely appearances... (A 372).

Insofar as the transcendental object is an abstract entity, and not an empirical entity that can be met with in our experience, it can be thought neither as a quantity, a reality, nor a substance (B 344, 707) "...because these concepts always require sensible forms in which they
determine an object" (B 345). Thus, according to Kant, there are three types of "emptiness" that can be sorted out in analyzing the notion of an object of possible experience: 1) if we are speaking merely of the form an object must have (viz., the pure a priori forms of intuition, i.e., space and time, and the categories), but the form is empty of all specifying empirical content, then we are speaking transcendentally about the **transcendental object** $= X$; 2) if we are speaking about the object of a possible experience in terms of the forms of space and time (without the categories) plus empirical content, then we are speaking transcendentally about appearances; 3) if we are speaking about the object but entirely divorced from the forms of intuition and judgment, i.e., the object independently of all transcendental conditions, then we are speaking about the **thing in itself**.

Kant also claims that the transcendental object is correlative to the transcendental subject, i.e., that it is the "...correlate of the transcendental unity of apperception" (A 250-251). It is the transcendental subject that both observes and judges thereby introducing space and time and the categories as transcendental conditions correlative to the transcendental object. The conditions which determine the possibility of experience establish the notion of the transcendental subject at the same time. It remains to investigate the transcendental subject in more detail. However, there remains one further set of distinctions which properly belong in this section, viz., phenomenon and noumenon so for the sake of completion, we shall attempt to come to grips with them before proceeding to transcendental subjectivity in the following section.

Although there are passages in the *Critique* in which Kant seems to
equate the noumenon with the thing in itself (B 312, 315, 343. See also Prolegomena § 33, 57, 59. Cf. A 253.) and to equate the noumenon with the transcendental object (B 344, 345), it is possible to define the noumenon independently of the thing in itself and the transcendental object and therefore to leave this controversial equation to the host of papers on this specific issue.  

Kant defines the concept of the noumenon only in a negative way. "The concept of a noumenon is thus a merely limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment" (B 310-311). The noumenon in its negative employment prevents empirical intuition from being extended to the thing in itself by limiting objective validity to empirical knowledge alone (See B 310). However, although the concept of the noumenon is negatively characterized as not the object of sensible intuition, it is further characterized as the object of non-sensible intuition. It is quite possible that there is an intuition which is non-sensible and if so, its object would be the noumenon. Thus Kant further defines the noumenon as "...the problematic concept of an object for a quite different intuition and a quite different understanding from ours..." (B 344). The concept of the noumenon therefore unfolds because it is entailed by the limitation of our sensibility. The object of sensible intuition is "phenomenon" and we are limited, in a positive sense, to knowledge of objects of empirical intuition.

The stage is now sufficiently set to investigate precisely what Kant understands by "transcendental subjectivity". Kant's key transcendental concepts must be understood before his empirical framework, and
with it the empirical distinction between "looks" and "is", can be outlined and used in an attempt to curb the pretensions of constructive idealism. Secondly, although Kant develops the notion of the transcendental unity of apperception at the same time that he develops the categories, I have separated these two problems and will deal with them one at a time beginning with the transcendental subject.
4. Transcendental Subjectivity.

Although it serves Kant's thesis best to define his key concepts in the context of their use within the *Critique*, and even though this is done throughout the chapter on Kant for all key concepts, including the transcendental subject, it is necessary, at this point, to distinguish the transcendental subject from the empirical or psychological subject and its states. This is necessary because it is the transcendental subject alone that as an activity or spontaneity *grounds* not only space and time (the Aesthetic) but the categories as well (A 401) and therefore serves as the very ground for all objectivity (A 106). For this reason, Kant claims that the transcendental subject may rightly be called the highest point [der höchste Punkt] upon which the whole of the transcendental philosophy rests.

The synthetic unity of apperception is therefore that highest point, which we must ascribe all employment of the understanding, even the whole of logic, and conformably therewith, transcendental philosophy (B 134N).

It is necessary to distinguish the transcendental subject from the empirical or psychological subject and its states because the "looks-is" distinction, which Nietzsche abandoned, rests on our ability to distinguish, within the framework of empirical reality, what exists independently of any and all psychological states. Nevertheless, empirical reality, and our ability to know objects with their *objective* determinations, is grounded in transcendental subjectivity and the conditions which it imposes on objects of possible experience.

Kant claims that the transcendental subject or the transcendental
ego is not a concept (B 404), not an intuition (A 382), nor a representation (B 132. Kant does refer to the "I think" as a "...merely intellectual representation of the spontaneity of a thinking subject". B 278.). The "I think", that is, the transcendental unity of apperception is a logical, as opposed to a psychological, subject (A 350, 355) and is therefore strictly formal and a priori in nature. In other words, the "I think", which must be able to accompany all of our representations, i.e., intuitions as well as concepts (B 132), is "...the mere form of consciousness, which can accompany the two kinds of representations..." (A 382). According to Kant, the "I think" or transcendental subject "...contains the form of each and every judgement of the understanding and accompanies all categories as their vehicle..." (B 406). The transcendental subject is therefore the ground for the categories and therefore for objectivity as well.

Apperception is itself the ground of the possibility of the categories... (A 401)
...a ground without which it would be impossible to think any object for our intuitions... (A 106).

However, as a form of consciousness and therefore as a formal element in knowledge, the transcendental subject must not be confused with something personal. In this sense, Kant says that there cannot be a plurality of transcendental subjects, though assuredly there is a veritable plethora of personal or psychological subjects. Kant claims that there is only one transcendental subject because, as a logical subject, it has the same status for all consciousness of objects. As Kant says, it "...cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects, and consequently signifies a logically simple subject..." (B 407). As the form of consciousness in
general (Cf. the concept of an object in general), the "I think" of the transcendental unity of apperception is one and the same in all consciousness (B 132). The transcendental unity of apperception is a logically necessary unity and numerical identity of consciousness. It is a necessary logical requirement for the possibility of experience and therefore for the possibility of knowing empirical objects.

We are conscious a priori of the complete identity of the self in respect of all representations which can ever belong to our knowledge, as being a necessary condition for the possibility of all representations (A 116).

The transcendental unity of apperception means that I am conscious of judging, that is, I am conscious of how what I am judging about is connected together. For example, in the judgement, "This book is red", I am aware of the concepts "book" and "red"; I am aware of what they are about, and I am aware of how they are thought to be connected together. In other words, judgement, following the categories which are forms of thought, brings things to subjective unity of apperception. I am conscious simply how "red" is thought to pertain as a feature or property of this "book". Thus, in the subjective unity of apperception (which Kant identifies with the empirical unity of consciousness. See B 140), I am aware of how concepts are related in a judgement. However, in the objective unity of apperception (which Kant identifies with the transcendental unity of apperception. See B 139), I am aware of how "red" and "book" are connected together in the object.

However, Kant's distinctions between subjective and objective unity of consciousness expose a need for another distinction. Kant also dis-
tinges between the analytic unity of consciousness and the synthetic unity of consciousness, making the latter serve as a necessary precondition for the former. Kant describes the analytic unity of consciousness as that unity which belongs to any general concept (e.g. red or book) in which we think what is common to a number of particular instances.

Analytic unity of consciousness belongs to every general concept, as such. When, for instance, I think red in general, I thereby represent to myself a property which (as characteristic) may be found in something, or can be combined in other representations (B 133N).

However, Kant argues, that unless these individual cases or instances of the concept come together or are united in one and the same consciousness, then it would be impossible to form any general concept (empirical concept) whatsoever. In Kantian terms, the synthetic unity of consciousness must precede the analytic unity. Only by means of a presupposed possible synthetic unity can I represent to myself the analytic unity. A representation which is to be thought as common to different representations is regarded as belonging to such as have, in addition to it, also something different. Consequently, it must previously be thought in synthetic unity with other (though, it may be, only possible) representations, before I can think in it the analytic unity of consciousness which makes it a conceptus communis (B 133N).

Similarly, the only justification which I have for ascribing all of the various representations I have to me is if they are all combined, conjoined, held together, or synthesized by one and the same consciousness. Only insofar as I can conjoin all of my representations in one and the same consciousness, can I think of myself as identical.

Only insofar, therefore, as I can unite a manifold of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible for me to represent to myself the
identity of the consciousness in [i.e., throughout] these representations (B 133).

Kant further distinguishes between the self as knower (viz., the transcendental unity of apperception which is a necessary condition for knowledge) and the self as known (viz., empirical subjectivity) (See B 155). The transcendental subject is the self as knower, as the "vehicle of all concepts" (B 379), and therefore it is not itself something which is observable or could ever be made an object of empirical knowledge. In fact, Kant makes explicit reference to a "perpetual circle" which is generated by trying to know the transcendental subject: we cannot know the transcendental subject as an object of thought because, as the very subject which is necessary for thinking, it is presupposed by all knowledge (Vide B 404. Cf. B 422).

The transcendental subject must therefore be distinguished from "...the inner and sensible intuition of our mind (as object of consciousness) which is represented as being determined by the succession of different states in time..." (B 520). The empirical subject is simply the "object of inner sense" (B 400) and as such represents the shifting content or material of our sensations and thoughts. The transcendental subject, on the other hand, is formal, not material. As Kant says, it is

...a bare consciousness which accompanies all concepts. Through this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of the thoughts = X (B 404).

However, empirical consciousness or empirical apperception cannot give us this identity of consciousness for, although it accompanies dif-
ferent representations which we have, it is "...in itself diverse" (B 133). Empirical apperception means that I am conscious of perceiving (intuiting or conceiving) something. Pure apperception, on the other hand, is to be conscious of consciousness in general. "Any judgement is therefore a consciousness of consciousness". The continuing, self-identical subject is a necessary condition for empirical knowledge because without such synthetic unity of consciousness, i.e., without the synthesizing of the manifold of intuition in one and the same consciousness, there could be no experience of objects.

The abiding and unchanging 'I' (pure apperception) forms the correlate of all our representations insofar as it is to be at all possible that we should become conscious of them (A 123).

According to Kant, empirical consciousness is simply our inner sense (A 107). The subjective unity of consciousness or empirical consciousness (B 140) is simply "...a determination of inner sense--through which the manifold of intuition for such [objective] combination is empirically given" (B 139). Empirical consciousness is therefore equivalent to our personal, individual, psychological egos, and that, according to Kant, amounts to nothing more than our own individual and personal psychological states--states which are constantly changing.

Consciousness of self according to the determinations of our state in inner perception is merely empirical, and always changing. No fixed and abiding self can present itself in this flux of inner appearances. Such consciousness is usually named inner sense, or empirical apperception (A 107).

Since time alone is the a priori form for inner sense, "...everything
that is in inner sense, is in constant flux" (B 291). In other words, as
a determination of inner sense, everything found in empirical conscious-
ness is in flux. "For space alone is determined as permanent, while time,
and therefore everything that is in inner sense, is in constant flux"
(B 291). Thus no fixed and abiding self ("perfectly identical and simple")
can be found, as Hume demonstrated, simply by looking within empirical
consciousness.

Hume's skepticism regarding self-identity is countered by Kant on
two fronts. First, Kant distinguishes between the psychological-empirical
ego that is in constant flux and the transcendental unity of apperception
which is a "...pure original unchangeable consciousness" (A 107). Hume
looked for, and failed to find, a perfectly identical and simple subject,
because he was looking for it in the flux of inner sense. Secondly, in
the Refutation of Idealism (B 274-279), Kant outlines a proof for the
relative permanence of the psychological-empirical ego. "The mere, but
empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the
existence of objects in space outside me" (B 275. All in italics in the
original.).

Briefly, because the Refutation of Idealism will be taken up again
within the chapter, Kant argues that "...the consciousness of my existence
is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other
things outside me" (B 276). It is precisely because inner sense is in
a state of constant flux, ergo Hume's problem, that Kant had to establish
the permanence of the empirical ego by means of outer experience. Since
there is not, and cannot be, an intuition of the permanent within inner
sense, "...it therefore follows that inner experience is itself possible
only mediately, and only through outer experience" (B 277). The analysis of the First and Second Analogies will demonstrate the objective validity of the general principle that experience is possible only by means of the representation of a "necessary connection of perceptions" (B 218). Since our perceptions themselves lack a necessary order, or, in Kant's words, since "...perceptions come together only in an accidental order" (B 219), it is the mind that must possess a rule for connecting perceptions, that is, a rule which "determines an object through perceptions" (B 218).

The principle of the First Analogy is the 'Principle of Permanence in Substance': "All appearances contain the permanent (substance) as the object itself, and the transitory as its mere determination, that is, as a way in which the object exists" (A 182). Kant's proof in the First Analogy therefore establishes what will become a necessary premise in the Refutation of Idealism, viz., that "Without the permanent there is therefore no time-relation" (B 226).

Even in the Aesthetic (B 68), Kant argues that if the diverse elements that are found in the subject were all due to the activity of the subject, then our knowledge of the self would be entirely intelligible and non-sensible. However, Kant says, "In man, this consciousness demands inner perception of the manifold which is antecedently given in the subject, and the mode in which this manifold is given in the mind must, as non-spontaneous, be entitled sensibility" (B 68). The activity of the mind is therefore not known immediately but mediately by affecting itself through sensibility. Kant extends this point further in the Refutation of Idealism by determining how we determine ourselves in time, i.e., by showing that we know our empirical self mediately while we know empirical objects immediately.
Empirical consciousness, i.e., the inner and sensible intuition of our mind, is an appearance (in the transcendental sense). We only know ourselves through our psychological states, that is, we only know ourselves from what it is that presents itself to us. Only the psychological states of the empirical ego are immediately given. The transcendental subject, on the other hand, though the most necessary element in the Critique, is an unknown being (B 520). We cannot know ourselves as we are as things in themselves because we know psychological states temporally and Kant has demonstrated that time can never be a feature of things in themselves. We therefore know ourselves only as we are qua appearances.

Before the "empirical object" can be properly defined, there are two remaining pieces of Kant's transcendental apparatus which must be outlined. First, it is necessary to investigate the categories insofar as they constitute further transcendental conditions for something to be an object of possible experience, that is, an empirical object. Developed with the categories will be Kant's understanding of how the objective validity or truth of the categories precedes empirical truth (correspondence) and makes it possible. Further into the chapter, objective validity will be contradistinguished from subjective validity within the context of determining how empirical claims can be justified.

Secondly, Kant's analyses of permanence or a permanent substratum and causality, as the two pre-eminent "Nietzschean" categories, will be outlined. The analysis of the First and Second Analogies will demonstrate how Kant transcendentally guarantees the objective validity or truth of permanence and causality as features of empirical reality. Once the complete transcendental apparatus has been set up, it will become possible to outline the empirical "looks-is" distinction.
5. Truth, Objective Validity, and the Categories.

Although there is a sense in which Kant argues that the answer to the "famed of old" question "What is truth?" is the "...nominal definition...that it is the agreement of knowledge with its object" (B 82), or simply correspondence, it is necessary to understand why Kant believes that the general acceptance of this criterion is tantamount to 'milking a he-goat and using a sieve as a container'. In other words, it is necessary to determine how Kant justifies the correspondence theory of truth for empirical claims. Kant is attempting to determine the "logic of truth" (B 87), that is, to determine what conditions are necessary for any proposition to have a truth-value. In other words, Kant wants to determine what must be true for any proposition to be either true or false. Insofar as judgements alone can have a truth-value, Kant's question becomes a question of determining what the conditions must be for making judgements. To determine the logic of truth is precisely to determine the transcendental truth which, Kant says, must precede all empirical truth as its condition (B 185, 269, 521).

Kant argues that it is necessary for a "logic of truth" (B 87) to have both concepts and intuitions. It is necessary to have concepts because they allow us to make general references and to subsume particulars or individuals (book or cup) or features of particulars or individuals (red or white) under a unity insofar as "...every concept must be thought of as a representation which is contained in an infinite number of different possible representations (as their common character), and which therefore contains these under itself" (B 40). However, having concepts or even their connection in judgements alone is insufficient for determining empirical truth. It is also necessary that what is connected in thought, that is, in the judgement, is
also connected in the object. It is therefore necessary for there to be a concept of an object in general and this is provided by the Kantian categories. However, a logic of truth also demands, besides a mode of uniting, a mode of individuating. Intuitions are precisely the way individuals or things give themselves insofar as an intuition is an immediate representation of an individual (B 33, 337). Hence, a logic of truth brings together individuals given in empirical intuition and concepts. The only way a concept can be applied to any thing is by means of a judgement. The judgement is, according to Kant, the only way we can go beyond our representations. The judgement, "The book is red" is not sufficient in itself for determining the truth about some object. The concepts "book" and "red" are general representations which have no particular content without explicit reference to some empirical intuition. But the observation or empirical intuition of something that looks red and looks book-like is also insufficient for determining truth. It is necessary to make a judgement about some particular object given in empirical intuition before the conditions for determining truth can be met. Although Kant refers to intuitions and concepts as "two kinds of knowledge" (B 318) or as two different modes of knowledge (B 33), it is perhaps best to emphasize that intuitions, that have their origin in passive sensibility, and concepts, that have their origin in active understanding, represent two cognitive faculties which are logically distinct.

All our cognitions, viewed in this respect, are either intuitions or concepts. The former have their source in sensibility—the faculty of intuitions; the latter in the understanding—the faculty of concepts. This is the logical distinction between the understanding and sensibility... (Logic, p. 40).

However, although intuitions and concepts are necessarily logically
distinct and it is true that "...things can have a twofold relation to our faculty of knowledge" (B 318), Kant's point is that these two distinct faculties "...can supply objectively valid judgements of things only in conjunction with each other..." (B 327). Insofar as an objectively valid judgement requires the conjunction of both generally formal and specifically material elements, Kant argues that a general criterion of truth is impossible.

Basically, Kant argues that the criterion of truth is conceived too broadly if it is thought to be correspondence, that is, the agreement of knowledge with its object, especially if it is thought to be "...the general and sure criterion of the truth of any and every knowledge" (B 82. Emphasis mine.). Kant argues that this sweeping and all-inclusive claim fails to make vital distinctions and, as a result, overextends itself. First, if correspondence is thought to be the sole criterion for every truth, then it has failed to distinguish between the formal and the material elements which are jointly necessary for knowing any empirical state of affairs. As Kant says,

...a general criterion of truth must be such as would be valid in each and every instance of knowledge, however their objects may vary. It is obvious however that such a criterion [being general] cannot take account of the [varying] content of knowledge (relation to its [specific] object). But since truth concerns this very content, it is quite impossible, and indeed absurd, to ask for a general test of the truth of such content. A sufficient and at the same time general criterion of truth cannot possibly be given (B 83).

According to Kant, there is, and there can be, no sufficient as well as general criterion for determining the truth of empirical claims because a general criterion must be able to account for not only the specific content of the judgement but the general form of the judgement as well. Kant argues
that insofar as the empirical content of a synthetic a posteriori judgement
is always specific, it cannot ever come to meet a general criterion which
might be found for the form of judgement which is general. In other words,
although there might be a criterion to determine the truth of the general
form of a judgement such as "This X is Y", the same criterion would be too
general and therefore ineffective to determine the truth of the specific
empirical content of the judgement in the same form, e.g., "This book(X)
is red(Y)" or "This cup(X) is white(Y)". Kant therefore finds it necessary
to distinguish between the formal and the material criteria for truth.

In order to work out the necessary conditions for the objective validity
of a judgement, insofar as the objective validity of a judgement is a neces­
sary condition for determining the truth or falsity of the judgement, it is
first necessary for Kant to establish the formal requirements for a logic
of truth.

Kant claims, first of all, that there are some purely logical criteria
of truth which all judgements must meet. In other words, a judgement must
meet the general and formal laws of the understanding and reason (B 86).
"For before the question whether the cognition agrees with the object,
must come the question whether it agrees with itself (as to form). And
this is the business of logic" (Logic, p. 57). The laws of identity, non­
contradiction, and the principle of sufficient reason, for example, serve
merely as negative criteria for determining truth by determining the
logical form of judgements for "What contradicts these rules is false"
(B 84), though, more accurately, Kant should claim that judgements that
do not meet even the formal criteria of logic are simply non-starters insofar
as they do not meet the minimum requirement for determining their truth or
falsity.
Secondly, in order to determine whether or not an empirical judgement is true (e.g., "The book is red"), we must presuppose that what is being referred to by the subject in the judgement (the book) has the property ascribed to it by the predicate in the judgement (red). According to Kant, there are only three possible relations of thought in judgements. There is 1) the simple relation of the predicate to the subject in which two concepts are considered in their relation (e.g., "The book is red"). Judgements may also presuppose two other, more complex relations of thought in which 2) two judgements or several judgements are connected as the ground to its consequent (e.g., "If it rains, then the grass will get wet") or 3) "...of the divided knowledge and of the members of the division, taken together, to each one" (B 98) (e.g., "Either it will rain or I will read a red book"). According to Kant's "Logical Table of Judgements" (Prolegomena, § 20. B 95), thought in a judgement is related either 1) categorically, 2) hypothetically, 3) or disjunctively. These forms of judgement were Kant's clue for determining the categories of relation (B 106): 1) inherence and subsistence (substantia et accidentes), 2) causality and dependence (cause and effect), and 3) community (reciprocity between agent and patient) respectively. As occasions for pure concepts of the understanding, the judgements of inherence and subsistence, and causality and dependence will each determine a universal principle of the science of nature (Prolegomena, § 20). An analysis of the First and Second Analogies (offered below) will determine why 1) substance must be presupposed to be a permanent substratum if we are ever to be correct in the determination of temporal relations (First Analogy) and why 2) causality must be presupposed if we are ever to be correct in thinking that we are observing objective
succession, that is, some determinate event (Second Analogy). To say that permanence and causality must be presupposed in order to be correct in thinking that some particular experience is true, is simply to claim, in Kantian terms, that permanence and causality are objectively valid and true.

According to Kant, it is the objective validity of the categories or the pure concepts of the understanding which serve as the necessary condition for the objective validity of empirical judgements. Insofar as the categories are the conditions of the possibility of experience in general, the categories are also the conditions for the possibility of the objects of experience (vide B 197). "Through them [the concepts of the understanding] alone is knowledge and the determination of an object possible" (B 367. Vide also B 305, B 125). The categories are both objectively valid and true because they provide the necessary precondition for the possibility of experience (Vide B 126).

All the manifold, therefore, so far as it is given in a single empirical intuition, is determined in respect of one of the logical functions of judgement, and is thereby brought into one consciousness. Now the categories are just these functions of judgement, insofar as they are employed in determination of the manifold of a given intuition (B 143).

The categories provide the various but necessary ways of explicating the bare framework or form of what it is that we mean by "an object of knowledge". The categories work by determining how objects of knowledge must be (a priori) conceived or thought (versus known) if empirical knowledge is to be got of them. Thus the categories set up as it were the necessary judgemental framework for obtaining empirical knowledge of objects. "We cannot think an object", Kant claims, "save through categories;
we cannot know an object so thought save through intuitions corresponding to these concepts" (B 165). The categories "...contain the pure a priori conditions of a possible experience and of an empirical object" (A 96).

If we can prove that by their means [the categories] alone an object can be thought, this will be a sufficient deduction of them, and will justify their objective validity (A 96-97).

Hence, Kant will argue, it is only through the categories that we can know a priori that any object of possible experience must be permanent (a substance that persists with states that change) and causally interrelated with other objects. An object of possible experience is thought through the relational category of Inherence and Subsistence (substantia et accidens. B 106.) as something (subject) to which other things (predicates) pertain. This example shows quite clearly how Kant saw the logical function of the understanding in judgements as providing the clue for discovering the concepts of the understanding. According to Kant, without the categories of the understanding, it would be impossible for us to determine what the objective features of the world are. The categories are therefore the ways in which we conceptually organize (not physically construct) our world, indeed, the ways in which we must conceptually organize our world, that is, the ways in which we must think about the world if we are to have empirical knowledge of it.

The objective validity of the categories as a priori concepts rests, therefore, on the fact that, so far as the form of thought is concerned, through them alone does experience become possible. They relate of necessity and a priori to objects of experience, for the reason that only by means of them can any object whatsoever of experience be thought (B 126. Emphasis mine.).

Obviously, the categories are a different sort of concept than empirical
concepts. Empirical concepts could have instances but a priori concepts are what enable other concepts to be brought under other concepts and hence to be judged. There are, for example, no empirical substances as such. There can be no individual empirical instances of any transcendental concept because no specific individual can answer to a general concept. This is precisely why Kant claims that the categories are purely formal concepts. They are merely general ways of thinking about objects insofar as the particular object can come under other concepts and hence they enable the object to be brought to judgement. The transcendental framework which the categories provide is therefore a necessary precondition for knowledge of objects of possible experience. It is impossible to ask if this transcendental framework is true, if truth is understood empirically to mean the correspondence between a judgement and some object of empirical reality because "object", "empirical reality", "judgements", "correspondence", and "empirical truths" make sense philosophically only within the framework which the categories alone can provide and transcendently guarantee. It is therefore impossible to ask of this transcendental framework, which is necessary for determining empirical truth, if it is itself true in the same way that things within the empirical framework are known to be true. In other words, the categories of substance and causality are not true simply because they correspond to objective features in the world in the same way that the judgement "The book is red" is true because there is a red book. There is, in fact, no correspondence at all between the categories and objective features in the world because the categories are simply the way in which features in the world must be represented by us.
In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant determined that space and time, as pure a priori forms of intuition, are therefore a priori conditions for objects presenting themselves in empirical intuition. In other words, Kant had to explain in the Aesthetic, the truth of geometric propositions. If they were known by empirical intuition, then geometric propositions would not be necessary truths but only contingent matters of fact. If they were known through concepts, the propositions would be analytic. Geometric propositions are known to be true, Kant argues, by means of an a priori intuition. But if they are known by means of an a priori intuition, how would that guarantee that what is true of the object in a priori intuition is also true of some object in the world? What is it that guarantees that what is thought to be true of geometry must necessarily be true of things in the world? Kant's answer in the Aesthetic is that they can be true only if their a priori condition is also the condition of things that are in the world. However, this could be the case only if the things that are in the world are appearances, the form of which is an a priori intuition. In other words, since they both have the same condition, viz., space as a pure apriori form of intuition, then what holds true of geometric propositions must also hold true of things in the world qua appearances.

Kant faces a much different and perhaps more difficult problem in the Analytic in demonstrating how the categories relate to things in the world because the categories are not conditions for any thing presenting itself to us, as are space and time. This, in fact, constitutes the very difficulty which faces Kant, viz., proving that the categories do relate to things in the world, i.e., are objectively valid. But how do we know
that what is present in empirical intuition does conform to the categories? We know that what is present in empirical intuition must conform to the conditions of space and time because otherwise, it could not be presented at all. Since spatial and temporal conditions do not entail that whatever is spatio-temporal must also be causal or substantial, then why must an object that is presenting itself to us be causal or substantial?

Kant's Transcendental Deduction in the Analytic is a justification for the application of the a priori concepts or categories to objects. The categories represent various concepts of an object, for unless we have a concept of an object in general, it is impossible to have knowledge of any object. However, how must the object be conceived so that knowledge of it is possible? Although making judgements is a necessary condition for obtaining knowledge of objects, by itself, making judgements is not a sufficient condition. The categories serve as concepts of an object in general, i.e., as the various ways of conceptually explicating the object. If we take, for our example, the judgement, "The book is red", we see that "book" and "red" are empirical concepts which we derive by abstracting features common to many books and many red things respectively. However, we do not, at the same time, observe which things are objects and which other things are simply features, properties, states, or determinations of objects. In other words, it is not by means of observation or intuition that we understand that the book is the object and red is a feature pertaining to the object. This specific judgement ("The book is red") follows the general formal pattern "This X is Y". Because the concept of an "object" means, in part, that which has predicates ascribed to it, the object is therefore the subjective element in the proposition which cannot
itself be made a predicate. To say "This book is red" means that we are thinking that the subject X (book) has feature Y (red) pertaining to it. Once the pure concept or category of Inherence and Subsistence has been schematized, i.e., once temporal criteria for its application have been added to it, an object of possible experience is thought to be something (substance) to which other things (properties) pertain. The Categories are therefore the conditions for recognizing how diverse things are united. In the judgement, "The book is red", we are uniting and separating at one and the same time. We are separating by keeping distinct what it means to be a book and what it means to be red. We are uniting by connecting together in the judgement that red is a feature which pertains to the book. The application of the categories therefore demands as its precondition, a systematic unity within consciousness. A unified consciousness is a necessary condition for having both the unity as well as the diversity held together in a judgement. To be able to distinguish one thing from another is the role of the analytic unity of consciousness insofar as the elements are distinguished one from another (as "book" is from "red") within one consciousness. However, the analytic unity of consciousness presupposes the synthetic unity of consciousness which recognizes that diverse things are united. The recognition of this combination or uniting of concepts only occurs in a judgement. The synthetic unity of consciousness is therefore to be conscious of how concepts are connected together by means of other concepts. Concepts are united or brought together in a judgement through the categories by bringing them to the transcendental unity of apperception. In sum, the conditions for the unity of consciousness are also the conditions of experience, viz., the
categories.

Only insofar, therefore, as I can unite a manifold of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible for me to represent to myself the identity of the consciousness in [i.e. throughout] these representations. In other words, the analytic unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of a certain synthetic unity (B 133).

However, if we consider the ordinary contents of any mind, we find, as Hume did, that they are always changing. "For space alone is determined as permanent, while time, and therefore everything that is in inner sense, is in constant flux" (B 291); "No fixed and abiding self can be present itself in this flux of inner appearances. Such consciousness is usually named inner sense, or empirical apperception" (A 107). But if inner sense is in constant flux, what sense can be given to Kant's claim that a number of things (a manifold or diversity) are present to one consciousness? What could this one consciousness be if its ingredients or contents are constantly changing? Given the fact that inner sense is in constant flux, then Kant is quite correct to say that what "...has necessarily to be represented as numerically identical cannot be thought as such through empirical data" (A 107). Kant must determine how a number of things (e.g., book and red) can be present in one and the same consciousness because empirical knowledge is possible only if we bring a number of things into one consciousness. In other words, the question, 'How is knowledge of empirical objects possible?' is dependent on the answer to the question, 'How can a number of things be present in one consciousness?'.

If we suppose, for example, that something is moving, what we are given in empirical intuition is a sequence of observations, one after another. But how could a sequence of observations, one after another, yield
any knowledge that something is moving? After all, by the time we have the second observation, the first observation is gone as will be the second on observing the third and so on. The observations precede one another in our mind. Knowledge that something is moving is possible only if we have a succession of observations that are retained in our mind. We must then think that what presents itself at each time is one and the same thing or that the observations are observations of different stages in the progression of this one object. Neither observation itself nor the simple retention of what is observed make us think that something is moving; it is given only conceptually. Conceptually, we interpret what is given in a series of observations as, for example, one and the same object being at different places at different times. But this can only be done by an act of judgement.

The way in which concepts are joined together in an act of judgement is the way in which the act of judging is distinguished from what it is that is being judged. It is only in the act of judging that the subject qua judger distinguishes itself from what it is that is being judged qua object. In a judgement, we are not only conscious of judging but we are also conscious of the way in which what we are judging about is connected. The transcendental unity of apperception is nothing other than being conscious of judging of connecting concepts (the categories) and also being conscious of how what we are judging about is connected together. An act of judging is therefore always an act of self-consciousness (apperception) because we are conscious of consciousness, i.e., how concepts are connected and how what is thought in those concepts is connected together. For example, when I judge "This cup is white", what I
am thinking about, under the concepts of "cup" and "white", is how these features (not concepts) are connected together in the object. I am conscious of how the features thought under these concepts are connected together in the object by thinking that what is thought about in the concept of "white" is thought to pertain to or to be some feature of what is thought about in the concept of "cup". Whenever we make a judgement therefore, we must necessarily bring things to a subjective unity of apperception, insofar as we are conscious of how the concepts are connected together, but also to an objective unity of consciousness insofar as we are aware of how the things are connected together that our concepts are about. In other words, subjective unity of apperception means that we are conscious of some other elements in consciousness and how these elements are connected together. But if I look, for example, at my cup and I think that the cup is white, I am bringing "cup" and "white" to a synthetic unity of apperception by thinking that in one act of awareness, I find these elements connected together. However, to be conscious of how these elements are connected together in an object is the objective unity of apperception. The subject distinguishes itself from what is not a subject by bringing what is given in empirical intuition under the forms of judgement and thereby to the transcendental unity of apperception. This means essentially, for Kant, that the subject and the object are co-constituted. In other words, something comes to be an object for me, strictly speaking, only at the level of judgement whereby I distinguish myself as judger from what it is that I am judging about qua object. Thus subjectivity and objectivity are correlative. It is only in the act of judging that I can distinguish myself qua subject from what is not myself,
viz., the object. When I judge "The cup is white", I am not merely saying that there is a connection in consciousness of the concepts "cup" and "white" (though this subjective unity is present), but that they are connected in a certain way in the object, that is, that the feature of whiteness pertains to the thing, viz., the cup. It is thereby only by the objective unity of apperception (i.e., consciousness of how things are connected together in the object) that we can relate all of the diverse elements together into one single consciousness.

Although Kant finds the clue for the categories in our forms of judgement, he must still show that there really are empirical objects with properties pertaining to them, that is, he must show that the categories have application in our experience. Kant does not find the objective validity or truth of the categories by comparing concepts nor by recourse to experience. Kant's answer is not that we simply have to think about things in terms of cause and substance because even if this were true, it would not follow that anything must really be causal or substantial. Kant finds the objective validity or truth of the categories by demonstrating that only by means of the categories alone is knowledge of empirical objects possible. In other words, Kant argues that things being causal or substantial is a necessary condition of empirical knowledge. They are conditions of knowing the time determinations of any thing which presents itself to us. To make any claim whatsoever about the temporal features of things (e.g., something endures, two objects co-exist, one observation succeeds another), Kant argues that this particular kind of knowledge would be impossible unless the categories apply.

If we return to the judgement "The book is red", it can be seen that
what is being referred to by the subject is thought to have the property ascribed to it by the predicate. The form of the judgement constitutes the framework necessary for establishing the truth of the judgement, i.e., whether or not the judgement corresponds to reality. The judgement, "The book is red" can be thought to be objectively valid only because of the categories which "...are concepts of an object in general, by means of which the intuition of an object is regarded as determined in respect of one of the logical functions of judgement" (B 128).

Although Kant claims that the judgement, "The book is red" is objectively valid, it has not yet been determined to be either true or false. The objective validity of the judgement is merely a precondition for determining the truth or falsity of an empirical judgement precisely because it establishes within the judgement what are thought to be the objective determinations of the object. However, transcendentally speaking, the categories are both objectively valid and true because they are the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience in general and, as we have seen, because they are also the conditions for the possibility of the objects of experience, they must, of necessity, hold true of all objects of possible experience. Kant therefore distinguishes between transcendental objective validity which the categories have (the "necessary application to the objects of experience" B 195), and empirical objective validity which empirical claims have when they are thought to reflect in the judgement what is present in some objective state of affairs. The transcendental truth of the categories precedes all empirical truth and makes it possible (vide B 185; B 269; A 126). What must still be determined before the correspondence theory of truth can be justified for
for empirical truths is to draw Kant's distinction between subjectively and objectively valid judgements insofar as Kant claims that only objectively valid judgements may have a truth-value. Secondly, it is necessary to introduce the material element which completes the picture for determining if any given empirical proposition is true.

However, before subjective validity is contradistinguished from objective validity, the schematized application of the categories of permanence (substance) and causality, as they are established in the principles of the first two of Kant's three Analogies of Experience should be outlined. Then it will be possible to sum up, in a sense, the transcendental apparatus Kant has provided by examining the various nuances afforded to the concept of an "empirical object". Once this is completed, the empirical programme may legitimately begin which includes, in part, the subjective-objective validity distinction and the "looks-is" distinction.
5. The First and Second Analogies.

In the second edition of the *Critique*, Kant posits as the principle of the analogies in general that "Experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions" (B 218). The first edition of the *Critique* states, for the same principle, that "All appearances are, as regards their existence, subject *a priori* to rules determining their relation to one another in one time" (A 177). The necessary connection of perceptions makes experience possible through the analogies by determining, i.e., by giving the rules by means of which we must interpret our representations in terms of the possibility of three temporal modes or relations (B 67, B 219). In other words, Kant establishes what the conditions must be for being able to determine objective duration, succession, and coexistence. This is necessary because "In experience, however, perceptions come together only in accidental order, so that no necessity determining their connection is or can be revealed in the perceptions themselves" (B 219). The question of establishing the objective validity of the principles derived from each of the three analogies is understood to be the question of determining what the necessary conditions must be if we are to have experience of each of these three temporal modes. In other words, the principles of the individual analogies are established as objectively valid principles because each one, in turn, is demonstrated to be indispensible for a particular knowledge which we have of empirical objects. Each of the three temporal modes will generate a rule by means of which all appearances can be determined in one time since "Time has only one dimension; different times are not simultaneous but successive" (B 47). Insofar as time has but one dimension, viz., succession, yet
there are three temporal modes, it follows that the three temporal modes can be analyzed in terms of succession. Duration or lasting is that which is simultaneous with what is successive. Coexistence is the negation of succession. Succession itself is really the basic temporal relation insofar as "...the parts of time are always successive" (B 50). All times are either earlier or later than others. This means essentially that no two times can be simultaneous. Kant's general problem in the Analogies is to establish "empirical time-determinations" (B 220) using the analogies themselves as rules under which all empirical time-determinations must stand within a universal time-determination.

What is to be demonstrated by the First Analogy, Kant says, is that "All appearances contain the permanent (substance) as the object itself, and the transitory as its mere determination, that is, as a way in which the object exists" (B 224. The thesis to be established by the First Analogy in A reads: "In all change of appearances substance is permanent; its quantum in nature is neither increased nor diminished". A 182). Briefly stated, Kant argues that time alone is the substratum, that is, "...the permanent form of inner intuition" (B 224). However, time itself cannot serve as the basis for objectivity nor, subsequently, as the basis for determining objective succession (an event) from subjective succession (the thesis of the Second Analogy) simply because time itself cannot be perceived (B 219, 225). It is therefore necessary to find a substratum within appearance which can represent time in general. Thus "Permanence, as the abiding correlate of all existence of appearances, of all change and of all concomitance, expresses time in general" (B 226). Without permanence, it would be impossible to establish change. Already in the
Transcendental Exposition of time, Kant has argued that change is possible only if it is "...through and in the representation of time" (B 48). Kant defines "change" or "alteration" as "...a combination of contradictorily opposed predicates in one and the same object" (B 48). It is the task of the First Analogy to demonstrate that permanence is a necessary condition for determining what can be thought to be "one and the same object" and, at the same time, to demonstrate that "...only the accidents change" (B 227). "All that alters persists, and only its state changes" (B 230).

The central question of the First Analogy is therefore a question as to the relationship between "permanence" and "change". Kant wants to know what has to be presupposed in order to think correctly that a change has been observed. However, by asking this question, Kant is not arguing that the concept "change" analytically demands reference to the concept "permanence". His point is not that what "duration" and "permanence" mean cannot be understood apart from what "succession" and "substance" mean. Kant's point in asking this question is that we cannot come to know or to be correct in thinking that we are observing change apart from duration and his philosophical task in the First Analogy is therefore to determine the objective validity of permanence, that is, of what endures, by demonstrating that permanence must first be presupposed in order for us to be correct in thinking that we have, in fact, observed a change, i.e., an event ("That something happens, i.e., that something, or some state which did not previously exist, comes to be...". B 236).

In order for us to be correct in thinking that we are observing a change, an event, or something's coming to be, it is first necessary to be presented with at least two observations. However, it is not sufficient for these
two observations to be just any two observations, e.g., the observation of a yellow banana and the observation of the front of a house, for if we are to establish that substance lasts or is permanent and that it is only the states, determinations, or features of substance which change, then the two observations which are required can neither be qualitatively the same observations nor can they be radically different observations. Two qualitatively identical observations, e.g., two observations of a yellow banana, can be thought to be numerically distinct only if they were observations at different times. However, having two qualitatively identical observations would be insufficient for determining that something is permanent or that something has endured because there has been no change in any feature of the banana. Similarly, and more obviously, two radically different observations are also insufficient for determining change. It is not possible to argue, for example, from the two observations of a yellow banana and a front of a house that some event has been observed because, Kant argues, an alteration or change must always be understood as "...a combination of contradictorily opposed predicates in one and the same object" (B 48. Emphasis mine.). Only states, determinations, or features of things and never things themselves can be incompatible. Insofar as it is not incompatible for a yellow banana and a front of a house to exist at the same time, we do not have the conditions necessary to determine if an event has occurred. It is necessary for the representations to be of incompatible features or determination of one and the same object in order for Kant to establish that these features must be thought to exist at different times if they are going to be thought to be features of one and the same thing. "Only in time can two contradictorily opposed predicates meet in one and
the same object, namely, one after the other" (B 48). However, something having the feature "blue" and the same thing having the feature "broken" would also be insufficient for determining that "substance is permanent" (B 224) because these observations are insufficient to how that something has come into existence, e.g., that the feature of being blue has come into existence or that the state of being broken has come into existence. If we are going to be able to claim that either the feature of being blue or the state of being broken (or both) have come into existence, then a necessary premise is that the feature or state under consideration replace a contiguous feature or state of not being blue (so that the change was a change from not blue to blue) or of not being broken (so that the change was a change from not being broken to being broken).

Kant's argument is that the two observations must present states of affairs which are incompatible with one another, that is, cannot exist at the same time as features of one and the same object. For example, at time $T_1$, we have the observation A which is the observation of the front of a house with a window (W). Subsequently, at time $T_2$, we have observation B which is the observation of the front of a house without a window (not-W). We are not entitled to say, in this instance, that we have two observations of one and the same house or that it is the same house in both observations except for the fact that, at one time, it had a window and, at another time, it did not. We cannot make this claim because this is precisely what is in question and what it is that Kant is attempting to prove by establishing what must initially be presupposed in order for us to be correct in thinking that this is, in fact, the same house which we have successively observed, i.e., have observed on at least two different oc-
casions, and that what we have observed has been a change in some feature or determination of one and the same house. Therefore, having two successive observations is sufficient only if they can be interpreted as representing two incompatible features or states of affairs such that nothing can have both feature F and feature not-F (where F is understood to be the same type of feature) at the same time. In the present case, we have two observations and the state of affairs W and the state of affairs not-W are incompatible. It is only if we are correct in thinking that it is one and the same thing which has these incompatible features and it follows that as incompatible features they cannot both be observed at the same time, that we have the right to conclude that something must have endured between the two observations and that what changed was a state or feature of that thing.

We would be correct in thinking that we have observed a change, an event, a happening, a coming into being, (though without the Second Analogy, we do not as yet know which determinate event has occurred), only if we
are correct in thinking that something has lasted between the time of our observations and that it underwent a change in state. "All that alters persists, and only its state changes" (B 230). What has lasted is permanent and is what Kant means (analytically) by the term "substance" (B 227) for in "...all change of appearances substance is permanent..." (B 224).

Although we know from the First Analogy what must be presupposed in order to think correctly that we have observed a change or an event, it is still insufficient for us to know what determinate event has taken place. Kant defines an "event" as a coming into existence of a state of affairs which did not previously exist. "That something happens, [means] that something, or some state which did not previously exist, comes to be... (B 236). Hence, the Second Analogy presupposes the results of the First Analogy insofar as it presupposes, first of all, when it is correct to think that some event has been observed.

The preceding principle [viz., the First Analogy] has shown that all appearances of succession in time are one and all only alterations, that is, a successive being and not-being of the determinations of substance which abides... (B 232).

If we return to the two observations which we had in the example of the house, these observations must be such that the state of affairs represented in the first observation is incompatible with the state of affairs represented in the second observation. Presupposing the First Analogy, it is possible to know that some event has taken place only if we are correct in thinking that the state of affairs "having a window" (W) and the state of affairs "not having a window" (not-W) are incompatible features of one and the same house. "I perceive that appearances follow one another, that is, that there is a state of things at one time the
opposite of which was in the preceding time" (B 233). As "opposite" or incompatible features of one and the same thing, these features cannot be thought to exist at the same time. Only if the observations are interpreted as a change in state of something which has lasted between the two observations is it possible to think of them as incompatible features. "All that alters persists, and only its state changes" (B 230). The First Analogy is therefore sufficient for establishing that some event has occurred but it is not sufficient for establishing which determinate event it was. The order of observation, that is, the subjective order of observation, is not sufficient to determine the order of events, that is, the objective order of occurrence. "In other words, the objective relation of appearances that follow upon one another is not to be determined through mere perception" (B 234). We do not know by the subjective order of our observations which determinate event we have observed nor do we know that we are actually observing an event. There is therefore a distinction to be drawn between the conditions which must be presupposed before we can be correct in thinking 1) that some determinate event has occurred (which will be referred to as the "soft proof") and 2) that we are presently observing an event (which will be referred to as the "hard proof").

In the Aesthetic, Kant argues that the moments of time are successive, that is, that the "...parts of time are always successive" (B 50). Time itself therefore does not last nor do its parts coexist. But although no moment of time endures, Kant has demonstrated in the First Analogy that things in time can endure and what endures is substance. However, whatever presents itself can present itself within the unity of time in
one of three possible modes: duration, succession, and coexistence. It is, however, only things in time which can endure in time, be successive in time, or coexist in time.

Insofar as time is the form of inner sense and since all of our representations, whether inner or outer, are determinations of the mind, it necessarily follows that time is the a priori condition of all appearances. As Kant says,

...all appearances whatsoever, that is, all objects of the senses, are in time, and necessarily stand in time-relations (B 51).

Kant's problem in the Second Analogy, a problem which, in fact, extends back to the First Analogy insofar as it is the object qua substance which alters, is precisely linked to the fact that our apprehension of the manifold of representations is always successive. This is problematic because, as Kant illustrates with his examples of observing parts of a house and observing a ship going downstream, no object is really represented. In other words, representations, which Kant defines as "...inner determinations of our mind in this or that relation of time" (B 242) must be distinguished from what it is that they refer to, namely, appearances. On the subjective side, we have our representations of apprehension which are always successive yet we contradistinguish them from appearance, that is, some object distinct from our representations.

How, then, does it come about that we posit an object for these representations, and so, in addition to their subjective reality, as modifications, ascribe to them some mysterious kind of objective reality (B 242).

Kant argues that we can distinguish between representations and the object which they represent only if there is a necessary rule by means of
which the manifold is connected in a certain way. Thus, the object can be redefined (better, defined more sharply) as "...that in the appearance which contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension" (B 236). It is only by means of these a priori rules for time determination that we can distinguish one set of apprehensions from another. The rules determine the necessary conditions for observing an object qua permanent substance (the First Analogy) and an event determined by the causal relationship (the Second Analogy). In a hypothetical argument in the Second Analogy, Kant states that if there were no causality to determine the order of succession in the apprehension of the manifold, then there would be no relation to objects at all but only "...a play of representations" (B 239); "...a merely subjective play of my fancy" (B 247). Causality is therefore the necessary condition for being able to distinguish the objective from the subjective succession of appearances.

We have successive observations of the various sides of a house as we walk around it and, similarly, we have successive observations of a boat as it moves downstream. But in both cases, "I am conscious only that my imagination sets the one state before and the other after, not that the one state precedes the other in the object" (B 233. Emphasis mine.). With just the results of the First Analogy, it remains open to us which of two possible determinate events can be known to have occurred: 1) the event AB: the window has been broken (W→not-W) or 2) the event BA: the window has been repaired (not-W→W). In either case, the observations which we had would be insufficient in themselves to determine which of these two events occurred. There is no means for moving directly from the subjective order of our observations to the
objective temporal relation which is thought to exist between the house at one time having feature W and the same house at another time (which may or may not be contiguous with it) having the incompatible feature not-W. There is insufficient information in the observations themselves, that is, in the subjective order of the observations, to be able to determine what the objective time relation must be if we are to be correct in thinking which of these two possible events took place. Simply by having the observation B (showing feature not-W) after having had observation A (showing feature W), it does not follow that we would be correct in thinking that what is represented in these observations occurred in the same order as the observations or that one state existed as a consequence of the other. The example of the two explosions used by Broad and Dryer, among others, adequately demonstrates that it does not follow that we would be correct in thinking that what is subjectively represented in successive observations actually occurred in the same order as the representations. In the example of the two explosions, we are asked to imagine ourselves at some point which is within audible range of the sound of two separate explosions. These explosions are said to occur in the order explosion A at $T_1$ and then explosion B at $T_2$. However, our position is such that by being closer to the site of event B, we hear the explosion B first followed by the explosion A. In this case, the subjective order of succession, that is, the order in which the events were represented by us, is "observation B-observation A" which would lead us to believe that the objective succession of the events was BA when it is known to be the reverse of this, viz., AB. It is quite easy to imagine an extension of this example. The observer might change his position relative to the place
of the two explosions such that the objective order of events (which is known to be AB) is subjectively represented by us either simultaneously (because the explosions are heard at the same time) or as AB. It is precisely because there are three possible ways of interpreting the objective temporal order of these two events (used only as an illustration for the need to be able to interpret the temporal order within a single event) based on our subjective apprehension that Kant finds it necessary to demonstrate in the Second Analogy how the objective temporal relation of an event can be determined. Kant's claim is that it is possible to distinguish objective succession (succession in the object) from subjective succession (how the subject represents the object) only by presupposing causality which thereby determines the temporal order of an event.

Kant does not argue that the proposition "Every effect must have a cause" is true. This is clearly an analytic proposition and it is therefore known to be true a priori simply by examining the concepts in the judgement. Nor does Kant argue that the proposition "Every event must have a cause" is true because to be an "event" means "to have a cause". "Every event must have a cause" is a synthetic a priori proposition. Insofar as it is a priori, it is strictly universal and necessary and insofar as it is synthetic, the predicate cannot be contained in the subject. Because this proposition is synthetic, it cannot be verified simply by examining the concepts within it and because it is a priori, it cannot be verified by direct recourse to experience as a posteriori propositions can. The only means available to Kant by which to verify this, and any other synthetic a priori proposition that serves as a metaphysical principle, is to show that the principle is a necessary condition for empirical know-
ledge. In other words, unless the principle is demonstrated to be objectively valid, then experience itself would be impossible. Thus Kant's proof in the Second Analogy is a transcendental argument because it shows that without causality as a necessary condition, empirical knowledge of a determinate event would be impossible.

...for instance, we derived the principle that everything which happens has a cause, from the condition under which alone a concept of happening in general is objectively possible--namely, by showing that the determination of an event in time, and therefore the event as belonging to experience, would be impossible save as standing under such a dynamical rule. This is the sole possible ground of proof; for the event, in being represented, has objective validity, that is, truth, only insofar as an object is determined for the concept by means of the law of causality" (B 816).

Kant's argument in the Second Analogy is therefore a transcendental argument. Kant demonstrates that unless causality is objectively valid, it would be impossible to distinguish between objective and subjective succession. In other words, unless causality were presupposed we would not be able to distinguish an event (a ship going downstream) from a non-event (viewing the various sides of a house successively). Although, as far as our subjective apprehension of the manifold in both cases is the same, Kant states that no one will grant that the observation of a house qua object is the observation of an event.

...the apprehension of the manifold in the appearance of a house which stands before me is successive. The question then arises, whether the manifold of the house is also in itself successive. This, however, is what no one will grant (B 235).

Kant's Second Analogy is a transcendental proof which demonstrates that you cannot know of an event unless it has, in fact, a cause. Kant's First Analogy is a transcendental proof which demonstrates that you cannot
know change or alteration unless there is, in fact, something (viz., substance) which is permanent. Transcendental proofs take the form that you cannot know X (epistemology) unless X is (ontology) a certain way. For the proof of the Second Analogy, Kant says,

...we never, even in experience, ascribe succession (that is, the happening of some event which previously did not exist) to the object, and so distinguish it from subjective sequence in our apprehension, except when there is an underlying rule which compels us to observe this order of perceptions rather than any other; nay, that this compulsion is really what first makes possible the representation of a succession in the object (B 241-242).

It is possible, though perhaps not necessary, to draw a distinction between a "soft" and a "hard" proof in the Second Analogy because it is possible to state different conditions for 1) determining that some determinate event has occurred (the soft proof) and for 2) determining that some determinate event is presently occurring and is being observed (the hard proof).

In order for us to think correctly that a determinate event has taken place (the soft proof), for example, that the window in the house has been broken, it is necessary to presuppose that there must have been a condition C at the time of A such that, if we have condition C at the time of A, then B must follow A of necessity. The principle of causality which Kant formulates in the Second Analogy does not tell us what the condition or conditions must be which exist at the time of A but only that there must be a condition and that it must be sufficient to determine that B follow A by necessity. What the actual condition or conditions are can only be determined empirically. It must also be emphasized that the Second Analogy does not tell us that the observation of B must follow the obser-
vation of A but only that B must follow A if a condition at A is the cause of B's coming into existence. A distinction must be made, Kant says, between our subjective representations and what they objectively represent. Our subjective apprehension of an event, that is, the order in which we observe the event must always be seen to be parasitic on the causal order of the event. In other words, it is the objective succession of appearances determined by the causal relation which establishes the subjective succession of our apprehensions. The example of the two explosions is a case in point. Even though the objective succession is A-B, it is possible, by altering our position relative to the two explosions, to have subjective apprehensions A-B, or AB simultaneously, or even B-A, the very reverse of the actual or objective state of affairs. Kant's primary claim therefore is that causal order determines objective irreversibility and it is this objective causal order which will determine the subjective order of our apprehension. It is only insofar as we can determine the causal order of an event that it is possible to determine its temporal order by knowing the preconditions for determining what new state of affairs came into existence.

...we must derive the subjective succession of apprehension from the objective succession of appearances. Otherwise the order of apprehension is entirely undetermined, and does not distinguish one appearance from another. Since the subjective succession by itself is altogether arbitrary, it does not prove anything as to the manner in which the manifold is connected in the object (B 238).

If the causal order has been determined to be AB, then the temporal order is that A must have preceded B and, as a consequence, their objective order is irreversible. In other words, B follows A according to the rule: If
Condition C is present at $T_1$ at the time of A, then B will follow A. This means that for us to think correctly that the event which occurred was the breaking of the window and not that the window had been repaired, then we must suppose that there was some condition at the time of A when we observed the house with the window (state of affairs "W") which was sufficient to make B, the house without the window (state of affairs "not-W") follow A by necessity. There must be causes in the world if we are to be able to make distinctions between subjective and objective temporal order and to make these distinctions legitimately.

When, therefore, I perceive that something happens, this representation first of all contains [the consciousness] that there is something preceding, because only by reference to what precedes does the appearance acquire its time-relation, namely, that of existing after a preceding time in which it itself was not. But it can acquire this determinate position in this relation of time only insofar as something is presupposed in the preceding state upon which it follows invariably, that is, in accordance with a rule (B 243).

Determinate Event I: to know that the window has been broken.
Given: \( \{ \begin{align*} \text{Feature } W & \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Feature not-} W \\ \text{that some event has occurred (First Analogy)} \end{align*} \)

Must Presuppose: Condition C existed at the time of A (if A is contiguous with B) or, because it is not known whether A and B are contiguous observations, that Condition C existed at some time prior to B and was contiguous with it.

In Order to Know: That the event is AB

Because: Condition C at A \((T_1)\) or before B determines the objective temporal order

\[
\begin{align*}
A & \rightarrow B \\
T_1 & \rightarrow T_2
\end{align*}
\]

If we are to think correctly that the determinate event which took place was the breaking of the window \((AB)\), then we must presuppose that there was some condition C which existed prior to B and was contiguous with it in virtue of which B followed. Condition C (the cause) determines the objective temporal order. However, although we know that A preceded B if the event which occurred was the breaking of the window, we do not know that the condition C existed at the time of A because we would have no way of establishing if A and B were contiguous. The cause of B has to be something which is, at least, contiguous with it. In many instances, if not most instances, all of which are determined empirically and not transcendentally, the objective temporal order and the subjective temporal order will be the same. In other words, our subjective apprehension will be the same as the succession in the object. Kant's own example of the ship going downstream is a case in point. However, the example of the two explosions demonstrates that this is not always true. However, the rule on which the principle of causality rests also works in reverse order on these two incompatible observations because it only provides the formal framework for being able to determine objective time relations. It does not create
the order itself (as Nietzsche among others is inclined to believe). Causality is simply the mode of thought which is necessary for interpreting the intuitional content if we are to be correct in thinking that some determinate event has occurred. Causality, as a pure unschematized category, tells us that we must think something to be the consequence of something else.

If I omit from the concept of cause the time in which something follows upon something else in conformity with a rule, I should find in the pure category nothing further than that there is something from which we can conclude [infer] to the existence of something else (B 301).

The transcendental schema (B 177) is a representation which serves as a mediating factor between objects in the world and the pure concepts of the understanding making the categories applicable to appearances. As a pure a priori form of intuition, time can serve as this mediating factor insofar as it is the element held in common by both the categories (being a priori) and appearances (being an object of direct awareness). The transcendental schema allows us to think of objects in regards to time thus a schematized category becomes a concept of time relations. Since all appearances are in time, once the categories are schematized, i.e., temporally determined, they must apply to all possible appearances.

The schema of cause, and of the causality of a thing in general, is the real upon which, whenever posited, something else always follows. It consists, therefore, in the succession of the manifold, insofar as that succession is subject to a rule (B 183).

Concretely, we can apply this rule to our observation of the house. We would be correct in thinking that the window had been repaired (not-\( W \rightarrow W \); \( B \rightarrow A \)) and not broken (\( W \rightarrow \text{not-}W \); \( A \rightarrow B \)),
regardless of the subjective order of our observations, if we were correct in thinking that some condition C existed at the time of B or some time prior to A and contiguous with it which was sufficient to determine that A would follow B. In this case, we would be correct in thinking that A was prior to B even though the subjective order of our observations might be remembered to have been AB.

Determinate Event II: to know that the window has been repaired.

Given: \( \{ A \} \) and \( \{ B \} \)

- Feature W
- Feature not-W

that some event has occurred (First Analogy)

Must Presuppose: Condition C existed at the time of B (if B is contiguous with A) or, because it is unknown whether B and A are contiguous observations, that condition C existed at some time prior to A and was contiguous with it.

In Order to Know: that the event was BA

Because: Condition C at B (\( T_1 \)) or before A determines the objective temporal order

\[
\begin{align*}
B & \rightarrow A \\
T_1 & \rightarrow T_2
\end{align*}
\]

It is necessary to argue that Kant distinguishes between the conditions which must be presupposed in order to be correct in thinking 1) that an
event of a particular kind has occurred (outlined above in the "soft" proof) and 2) that we are presently observing an event (the "hard" proof). Kant says in the proof of the Second Analogy, "But, as I note, in an appearance which contains a happening...B can be apprehended only as following upon A...(B 237. Emphasis mine. See also B 245: "That something happens" and B 246: "Knowledge of an event, of something as actually happening"). The example of the house which we have been using is sufficient to demonstrate what the preconditions must be for knowing that a determinate event has occurred but knowing that an event has occurred is not the same (and therefore does not have the same preconditions) as knowing that we are observing that event. Knowing that the window has been broken is not the same as knowing that we are observing the window breaking. Although the example of the house could be salvaged to demonstrate this distinction, it is perhaps better to use the example of an event which Kant offers, viz., of the ship going downstream. Kant undoubtedly uses this example because, as far as events go, it is not imaginatively complex (the fault of the house example) and secondly, because motion, for Kant, is the paradigm for all change.

Although, in the example of the house, we have two incompatible observations, we do not know anything at all about the time or times intervening between these observations. "I could not then assert that two states follow upon one another in the [field of] appearance, but only that one apprehension follows upon the other" (B 240). In other words, although the observations are successive (which they must be if there are, in fact, two of them), we do not know that they are contiguous with each other. If, for example, the observations were an hour apart, we would know that some event
occurred but we could not say with necessity that the cause of the broken window (Condition C) existed at the time of A. All that we could say is that the condition must have existed at some time and therefore any time within that hour period as long as it preceded B. We cannot, of course, say that it occurred immediately prior to B because we have no way of knowing when B occurred. It may have occurred at any time within that one hour time period. Hence, our two incompatible observations are sufficient for determining that some event occurred but nothing else. They do not tell us that we have been observing an event. It seems obvious that one precondition for observing an event is that we cannot divert our attention from those observations which would tell us about the event.

If we have only the two observations of the ship (II), viz., A at $T_1$ and D at $T_4$, but had intervening observations at $T_2$ and $T_3$, then the intervening time between $T_1$ and $T_4$ is necessarily filled with observations of things other than the ship. This rather obviously precludes our being able to know that we are observing an event. However, when we are just
observing the ship going downstream (I) and nothing else, we are having a series of successive observations. However, these observations are of a particular kind which puts emphasis on the serial aspect of the succession, and how it is to be interpreted, especially insofar as all of our apprehension is successive.

If, then, my perception is to contain knowledge of an event, of something as actually happening, it must be an empirical judgment in which we think the sequence as determined... (B 246. Emphasis mine.).

The serial aspect of the successive observations of the ship going downstream (I) is such that the observations are of states of affairs in the object which are contiguous with each other. They are known to be contiguous states of affairs only if it is logically impossible for there to be some intervening state of affairs existing in the object between the times of the two other states of affairs (e.g., some state or states of affairs existing between A and B): "...that upon one state in a given moment an opposite state may follow in the next moment..." (B 252) is what Kant means by contiguity. In other words, the state of affairs A at T₁ is supplanted by the state of affairs B at T₂. There are no intervening determinations in the object. There can be no other state of affairs between A and B and therefore, it is correct to say that A and B are contiguous and that the objective temporal order of AB is T₁ and T₂ and there is no intervening time or times between T₁ and T₂. Because one state of affairs can supplant another state of affairs in the same object only in contiguous times, Kant precludes the possibility of there being an empty time or gap between either the observations AB or the states AB in the
object. Because A and B are known to be both contiguous and incompatible states of affairs, we have sufficient information not only to know that an event has occurred but that 1) we have observed an event and 2) that there must be a Condition C at A which made B follow by necessity, i.e., in conformity with a rule. Condition C must exist at A because only A is contiguous with B. In the example of the ship going downstream, it is possible to order the series of contiguous objective determinations because it is known a priori that the cause must precede any change in state in the object. The cause, though contiguous with the effect may also be contemporaneous with it. Thus, B and C or C and D can be known as both contiguous and incompatible states of affairs which would necessitate some Condition C at B (the effect of some condition at A), as well as at C and at D and so on until the ship is downstream. In other words, the cause and the effect are, in this instance, simultaneous and in the laws of nature, cause and effect are often found to be simultaneous. "The great majority of efficient natural causes are simultaneous with their effects..." (B 248). The cause may be at one time, over some time, or over the complete time of the effect as it is in Kant's examples of the stove heating the room or the iron ball indenting a cushion. However, Kant's point is that although the cause may work over the same period of time as the effect, the principle of contiguity must always be understood to be the only means for distinguishing the cause from the effect.

The principle of the causal connection among appearances is limited in our formula to their serial succession, whereas it applies also to their coexistence, when cause and effect are simultaneous....Here [the example of a room heated by a stove] there is no serial succession in time between cause and effect. They are simultaneous, and yet the law is valid (B 247).
But in the moment in which the effect first comes to be, it is invariably simultaneous with the causality of the cause. If the cause should have ceased to exist a moment before, the effect would never have come to be (B 248).

Though the "causality of the cause" must be simultaneous with the effect, Kant insists that this be understood in terms of a lapse of time as opposed to an order of time. Although there might be no lapse of time, there must be an order of time and it is in this sense that we "...distinguish the two through the time-relation of their dynamical connection" (B 248).

According to Kant, any causal rule which is based on empirical generalization such that "A is to be considered the cause of B if B is seen to follow A", could only determine probable temporal order and never what Kant calls "...a necessity of synthetic unity" (B 234). "Since the universality and necessity of the rule would not be grounded a priori, but only on induction, they would be merely fictitious and without genuinely universal validity" (B 241. See also B 794.). Induction, based on empirical generalization, is not capable of accounting for the necessity of causal connection. Secondly, the causal rule based on empirical generalization already assumes what Kant establishes in the Second Analogy, i.e., that any explanation available for dismissing certain forms of strictly subjective succession, e.g., having successive observations of the front, side, and back of a house as an instance of a non-event, must already assume that an event not only is to be distinguished from, but can be distinguished from, a non-event. In other words, it must assume that subjective succession not only is, but can be, distinguished from objective succession. However, these distinctions are possible, Kant argues, only if it is presupposed
that events are caused and that this presupposition is objectively valid. Therefore, rather than being able to discover the cause for some objective succession AB, through repeated observations, the succession AB can be correctly thought to be an instance of objective succession or an event and not simply a subjective succession, only if it is thought to be caused. Hume attempted to find a theory of causality after finding objective succession when, in fact, causality has to be presupposed in order for Hume to be able to discover that there is a difference between objective and subjective succession. Kant's point is that you cannot even know that you are witnessing (or have witnessed) an event unless it were true that it were caused. There is however one sense in which the cause which determines the temporal order of an event is empirically determined. Although the Second Analogy demonstrates that the proposition "Every event must have a cause" is known to be true a priori (though not by analysis), all that is known a priori is that there must be a cause if we are to be correct in thinking that we have observed a determinate event. It does not tell us a priori, nor could it ever tell us a priori, what the specific cause for any particular event might be.

That sunlight should melt wax and yet also harden clay, no understanding, he pointed out, can discover from the concepts which we previously possessed of these things, much less infer them according to a law. Only experience is able to teach us such a law. If, therefore, wax, which was formerly hard, melts, I can know a priori that something must have preceded...upon which the melting has followed according to a fixed law, although a priori, independently of experience, I could not determine, in any specific manner, either the cause from the effect, or the effect from the cause (B 794).
Subjective time order, i.e., the order in which we observe things, does not determine nor does it always reflect the objective time order. It can therefore never serve as a guarantee for it. It cannot serve as a guarantee because our "...apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive, and is therefore always changing" (B 225, 233, 234). However, Kant is not claiming that it is a brute fact that all of our apprehension of the manifold of appearances is successive and therefore always changing. Kant argues that it is true a priori that various things are successive to inner sense because the a priori form of intuition which constitutes inner sense and, in that regard, distinguishes it from outer sense, is time. Various times are always successive, i.e., one time must always be either before or after another time in one, all-encompassing time which is infinite in magnitude and, in which, other times exist as parts. That our inner sense and therefore our apprehension is always successive plays a key role in the problem which faces Kant in the Second Analogy, namely, our ability to determine the objective features of experience. We cannot know from inner sense alone, that is, just from the nature and order of our representations, what the objective temporal order is because our subjective apprehension is successive (e.g., viewing the sides of the house or viewing the ship going downstream).

While our apprehension of the manifold is always successive, we believe that we can distinguish events from non-events and this means that inspite of the mode of our subjective apprehension, we think that some things which we observe in the world coexist and that some things in the world exist successively and that this objective succession is the hallmark of an event. We view the sides of a house successively but normally would
not think that our successive observations of the sides of the house means that the sides of the house must be viewed in that order. We normally think that the sides of the house coexist even though we have observed them successively. The argument which makes legitimate our ability to distinguish subjective from objective succession and the ordering of the objective succession is to be found in the Second Analogy. How we know that they, in fact, that is, objectively, exist at the same time regardless of our subjective representations is precisely what Kant determines in the Third Analogy (B 256-262): "All substances, insofar as they can be perceived to coexist in space, are in thoroughgoing reciprocity". The Third Analogy is therefore a synthesis of the first two Analogies. We can only determine the temporal coexistence of two events or of two objects by determining their causal action upon me. The First Analogy only demonstrates that any coming into being or passing away must be the coming into being or passing away of a determination or feature of a permanent substance. The Second Analogy only demonstrates that all objective successions are events determined by a cause. The principle of causality, viz., that "All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect" (B 232) is necessary for distinguishing subjective from objective succession and therefore for determining the objective temporal order of an event.

The transcendental apparatus which Kant outlines in the Aesthetic and Analytic may be summarized under the rubric "the empirical object". This necessitates a brief review of the various levels of Kant's thought at which it is possible to speak of the object (representation, intuition, concept, judgement). Similarly, the review will also draw attention to the
role of threefold synthesis and how it does not make Kant a phenomenalist. Once this review draws Kant's transcendental apparatus together, and thus to a close, the empirical investigation proper may begin, starting with an outline of subjectively valid judgements and the need for significant judgements before empirical truth can be determined.
In the words of the modern commentator of Kant's First Critique, Arthur Melnick, "Being composed of objects does not describe a feature of how the world is in itself; it is a description of the world only in relation to a judging subject". According to Melnick, "objects" are part of Kant's ontology and "Having a certain ontology is itself not something derived from the world; rather it is something contributed to experience. To have an ontology is to think of or relate to experience as consisting of objects". According to Melnick, objects are a necessary constituent of the Kantian ontology because they explain why it is that things look the way they do. In other words, objects constitute the cornerstone of the Kantian ontology (though undoubtedly this cornerstone is laid by the transcendental subject) because objects provide the framework for our explanation as to why we have the kinds of experience which we do have. However, although the Kantian ontology is exceedingly complex, it is still best to assume that Kant's general thesis is best served if we assumed from the outset that Kant tried to be consistent and to avoid contradiction in developing his ontology within the Critique, rather than accepting something akin to Kemp Smith's "patchwork theory", even in its tempered and modified form. The patchwork model alleges that Kant fitted anachronistic and therefore contradictory pieces together in order to complete the First Critique without any apparent regards to their contradictory natures. But before we ask about the nature of the empirical object for Kant, we might ask what seems to be a perennial philosophical question, viz., "What exactly is consciousness aware of?" Is it really possible to be aware of anything
except the brute facts that we are conscious and that we know ourselves and the contents of consciousness immediately and unambiguously? It seems to be obvious that a simple distinction can be drawn between the subject or psychological (consciousness and its contents) and the object or non-psychological (whatever is other than consciousness and its contents) and, at the same time, we deem it rather obvious that the former is readily known by us while the status of the latter, at best, is problematic, if it exists at all. It seems that the very mode in which the history of philosophy since Descartes has posed this particular question has itself been responsible for precipitating countless debates over realism, representational realism, idealism, and phenomenalism. Kant refers to this problem as a "scandal to philosophy".

...it still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the existence of things outside us (from which we derive the whole material of knowledge, even for our inner sense) must be accepted merely on faith... (B XXXIXN).

The problem arises, in part, because the kind of answer that could possibly satisfy the requirements set out (tacitly) within the question has been strictly determined, not only by the very parameters of the question itself, but also by the presupposition of certain truths about the nature of space, time, and consciousness. In other words, whenever a question is set out in terms of the "contents" of consciousness, then the answer must be, in some sense, that it is in consciousness, although not spatially, and therefore, by necessity, it is in consciousness, it is thought that the content of consciousness must be thoroughly subjective or psychologically or at least reducible to something subjectively tinged. Thus the
contents of consciousness which are known immediately are opposed to things
that are thought to be outside (spatially) consciousness, and therefore
something apart or independent of the mind. If the philosophy were
realistic enough to believe (as Kant says, on faith) that there was
something real out there as it were, then the problems arise: What is
it and what is it like apart from my knowing it? Hence, we establish
a subjective inside and an epistemological gap is created between this
inside and the objective outside which it wants to know. The history of
modern philosophy records myriad attempts to bridge this epistemological
gap already assuming that we do not know objective things in the external
world (i.e., the "reality of outer objects" B 55) but know only various and
sundry subjective impressions, ideas copied from these impressions and/or
sensations caused by such objects. The movement back to an objective,
external world becomes, in Kant's analysis, either problematic or dog­
matic (B 274). Kant's transcendental idealism, however, is an attempt
to overcome this problem, this scandal of philosophy, or in Nietzschean
terms, it is an attempt to find a means for crossing the threshold which
gives us knowledge of empirical objects as they actually exist apart from
any and all psychological states of consciousness. Kant's philosophy,
in spite of what many British commentators have claimed, is an attempt
to get us away from the view that we are forever locked into a subjective­
ly, i.e., psychologically, distortive view of empirical reality and that
we may never know empirical reality itself but only the way it appears
to us because we have the psychological and physiological constitutions
that we have.

However, Kant's distinction not withstandng, there is a pervading
ambiguity in the First Critique which, as we saw, has been, the occasion for several British commentators of Kant, most notably Strawson and Wilkerson, to reduce Kant's transcendental idealism to the level of the merely psychological and ultimately to a brand of phenomenalism not far removed, if removed at all, from that of Berkeley. Such commentators take Kant's major contribution to the analysis of what it means to be an object of knowledge or an empirical object to be the threefold synthesis by means of the imagination. Granted that the Transcendental Deduction in A is replete with psychological terminology, it must be remembered that the process which Kant outlines in the Deduction falls within "...the transcendental faculty of imagination" (A 102).

Although it cannot be denied that this threefold synthesis is deeply involved in Kant's understanding of what it means to be an object of knowledge, especially insofar as an "object" is defined by Kant as "...that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united" (B 137), it is still not necessary for the object to be interpreted as nothing more than a collection of its appearances or for Kant to be labelled, as he often is, a phenomenalist. It is therefore necessary to understand in what sense or senses, the object of knowledge is, for Kant, the result of some subjective unifying process, viz., the formal unity of consciousness, and to determine whether and how far this process is simply psychological.

However, it is not always immediately obvious what Kant means by the term "object", even though few terms could be more frequently used in the Critique or important than the term "object". Nevertheless, it is essential to pinpoint precisely what Kant does mean by this term.
within a variety of contexts, few of which are the same, although all
seem to be compatible overall. Most generally, Kant defines an "object"
as any representation we might have.

Everything, every representation even, insofar as we are conscious of it, may be entitled ob-
ject. But it is a question for deeper enquiry what the word 'object' ought to signify in
respect of appearances when these are viewed not insofar as they stand for an object. The
appearances, insofar as they are objects of consciousness simply in virtue of being
representations, are not in any way distinct from their apprehension... (B 235).

Kant distinguishes between representations which are in us from
what they are representations of. "We have representations in us, and
can become conscious of them" (B 242). Insofar as a representation is a
relation of subject and object with consciousness (See B 376), it is
possible to say that we are aware of objects, or cognizant of objects,
both at the level of intuition and at the level of conception. Since
Kant defines "sensation" as a "...perception which relates solely to
the subject as the modification of its state..." (B 376), sensation is
not an objective perception, that is, it has not yet established a rela-
tion between the subject and some object. "The effect of an object upon
the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by it, is
sensation" (B 34). Objects are only represented at the levels of intui-
tion and conception therefore sensation precedes the representation of any
object.

Kant claims that empirical intuition, i.e., that "...intuition which
is in relation to the object through sensation" (B 34), is a way of re-
presenting an individual thing that depends upon the fact that we are
affected in a certain way, viz., by having sensations. Hence, by "empirical intuition", Kant seems to mean our ordinary, empirical or sensory perception (observation) in which things present themselves to us spatio-temporally. Intuition "...relates immediately to the object and is single" (B 377); it is a representation of an individual.

Kant also claims that "Objects are given to us by means of sensibility and it alone yields us intuitions..." (B 33). Kant refers to the objects given in empirical intuition as "outer intuitions" (B 391) insofar as the intuition is both spatial and temporal. Thus, when Kant refers to an object given in empirical intuition, he refers to it as if it were synonymous with the perception of empirical objects (e.g., books and cups), which are given to us immediately and directly. Intuition is "...an immediate representation of an object..." (B 41). Intuition is the kind of representation which is always singular, that is, is always of an individual, hence things are given in intuition (B 33); things are given in observation (B 147). Without the understanding or any conceptual employment, there seem to be objects or things available to empirical intuition. As Kant says, "...that representation which can be prior to all thought is called intuition" (B 132, 67). "Appearances can certainly be given to intuition independently of the understanding" (B 132).

For Kant, it is therefore possible to speak about objects at the level of empirical intuition because intuition is always immediate and singular. As Dryer says, 73
What we are conscious of by intuition we can only regard as just 'this', and thus as individual. Yet this does not prevent us from finding some diversity in what we are immediately aware of.

The Aesthetic has already established that the most fundamental way of individuating something is space. Any thing in space might properly be called an object. For example, the cup on the desk, the desk itself, or even the handle on the side of the cup may be called "objects". Space therefore presents us with a unity but a unity within which there is a diversity of elements. Thus, the desk top can be viewed as an object even though it is literally covered with several other objects in their own right. Although what is contained in some region of space may be diverse (e.g., the top of the desk), the region of space itself provides this diversity with unity thereby allowing us to refer to it as one thing. We may therefore differentiate things existing in space simply by making reference to the fact that they occupy different regions of space but, at the same time, we may unify things into one object (e.g., the desk top) simply by establishing the fact that they are all within one space. As Dryer says,

...an intuition of an individual man discloses a variety of features of him. The diversity of which one is conscious by intuition is a diversity within it. (Emphasis mine.).

Kant claims that "...every intuition contains a manifold" (A 99) or variety and he refers to the manifold of sense or the variety of sensations as both indeterminate and formless. There are several passages (A 165, 201; B 195, 247) in which the manifold of sense, apart from our subjective organization or formalization (whatever that amounts to) ap-
pears to be understood as a vast amorphous confusion of sense data. Dryer paraphrases Kant's claim that "every intuition contains a manifold by saying that "when one observes an object, one is aware of a variety of different features of it at once". If, for example, I look at the tea cup on my desk, I am aware successively of the curve in the handle, then how the line on the handle enters into the intricate pattern on the side of the cup. Even to trace this pattern requires that I be aware successively of a variety of colours and shapes which occupy different spatial regions of the cup. If my gaze is extended to cover the whole working surface of my desk, I am successively aware first of a red pen beside a piece of writing paper and then successively of other objects. We think that we can observe a myriad of things or just one thing with a myriad of features and that we can shift our observation successively to the various aspects of the thing or things insofar as they are spatially separated.

However, Kant also refers to the "object" at the level of conception. A concept refers "...to it [the object] mediately by means of a feature which several things may have in common" (B 377). The fact that we have concepts, for example, "the cup", presupposes our ability to differentiate one cup from another yet, at the same time, to unify them by thinking what feature they must all have in common as cups. In order to apply concepts in judgements, it is first necessary to individuate things by means of empirical intuition in order to know what it is to which we are referring. Yet, according to Dryer, concepts differ from intuitions in terms of the way in which they make us conscious of this diversity. Dryer says,
By a general concept we are also conscious of what is diverse. However, a general concept differs from an intuition in the way in which we are conscious of diversity by means of it.

Whenever we form a general or empirical concept, what we are doing essentially is distinguishing between individual things and individual features (a diversity) and uniting together those features which they have in common.

At the last level of cognition, viz., whenever we form a judgement, we must distinguish what applies or pertains to something, viz., the feature or property (e.g., red), from that to which it applies or pertains, viz., the substance (e.g., the book). The judgement, "The book is red", distinguishes "book" and "red" yet, at the same time, unites them by thinking that these two elements are combined in the object. Although we can and do speak of objects at the level of empirical intuition, according to Kant, it is only by means of judgements that we can properly distinguish what is a feature of a thing (red) from the thing itself (book). This is the case because it is only possible to think of the object as having a feature pertaining to it via the pure concepts of the understanding or the categories. Thus, Kant must establish that the categories are the concepts of an object in general.

To say that the object is "...that in which the various matters of a given intuition are united" (B 137) [Objekt aber ist das, in dessen Begriff das Mannigfaltige einer gegebenen Anschauung vereinigt ist] means for Kant that an object of knowledge must be understood, and therefore analyzed, in terms of the way in which a given manifold of intuition or the variety within observation is combined together by us in a judgement. However,
combining what is given in intuition in a judgement already presupposes the combination of the manifold by the threefold synthesis. Kant claims, in fact, that "...an object is no more than that something, the concept of which expresses such a necessity of synthesis" (A 106. Emphasis mine.). Kant's argument is that the combination or connection of sensa via the apprehension of intuition (A 99), the reproduction in imagination (A 100), and the recognition in a concept (A 103) are necessary conditions for knowledge.

...receptivity can make knowledge possible only when combined with spontaneity. Now this spontaneity is the ground of a threefold synthesis which must necessarily be found in all knowledge; namely, the apprehension of representations as modifications of the mind in intuition, their reproduction in imagination, and their recognition in a concept (A 99).

Kant argues that "...our apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive and is therefore always changing" (B 225, 234). We must unite the variety given in observation or the manifold of sense which is given in empirical intuition under one concept. For example, as we walk around the house, we observe successively, the front, the side, the back, the other side, and lastly the front again. Although it is not necessarily the case that we can never observe all of the sides of the house simultaneously, whenever we do observe them successively, (undoubtedly the majority of the time without the advantage of sophisticated electronics), it is always possible to ask whether or not what we have subsequently observed to be successive objectively or actually exists successively or simultaneously. In other words, although we observe
the different sides of the house successively as we walk around the house, we think that the sides of the house, in fact, objectively exist at the same time as various sides or features of one and the same house. However, the simple movement of walking around a house confronts us with many observable manifolds. We can see many similar, as well as dissimilar features which belong to the house and yet we believe that these features all belong to one and the same thing, viz., a house. It will be remembered that Nietzsche questioned the philosophical legitimacy, (though not the existential practice) of our thinking that the house, or anything else, was really either a "one" or "the same". In other words, Nietzsche argued that we were not philosophically justified in thinking that either similar or dissimilar features, whether they had been observed successively or simultaneously, could be subsumed under a conceptual unity, especially if we also believed that in spite of the changes and diversities which we observed, we were always correct in thinking that we had observed one and the same thing. According to Kant, the threefold synthesis is a "subjective" unifying process which serves as a necessary precondition for knowledge of empirical objects as one and the same. As Kant says,

---the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations. It is only when we have thus produced synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition that we are in a position to say that we know the object (A 105. Emphasis mine.).

Thus, we apprehend the features of the house successively, recollect them as we move from feature to feature, and recognize them by applying various empirical concepts to the features and subsuming all of them under
one concept, viz., "house". It is therefore not surprising that Kant gives the imagination, particularly in the first edition of the Critique, an important, if not, an indispensible role in obtaining knowledge of empirical objects. Kant understands the imagination to be "...a blind but indispensible power of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious" (B 103). Kant uses the imagination in its transcendental or productive capacity as a necessary liaison between the extremes of passive sensibility and active understanding (A 124). Kant says that what...

...is first given to us is appearance. When combined with consciousness, it is called perception.... Now, since every appearance contains a manifold, and since different perceptions therefore occur in the mind separately and singly, a combination of them, such as they cannot have in sense itself, is demanded. There must therefore exist in us an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold. To this faculty I give the title, imagination (A 120).

To view successively the various sides of a house, Kant argues that it is first necessary to apprehend each side in space, i.e., to apprehend the representations 'as modifications of the mind in intuition'. Secondly, we must be able to reproduce what is apprehended in imagination, that is, to reproduce each side in memory. Thus, in order to be able to say that X, Y, and Z are features belonging to one and the same house, X, Y, and Z must be observed or apprehended but X must be retained and therefore reproduced in imagination when apprehending Y, and X and Y together must be reproduced in imagination when apprehending Z, otherwise it would not be possible to say that all three of these features belong to one thing.
If we were not conscious that what we think is the same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be useless. For it would in its present state be a new representation which would not in any way belong to the act whereby it was to be gradually generated. The manifold of the representation would never, therefore, form a whole, since it would lack that unity which only consciousness can impart to it (A 103).

Thirdly, we must recognize each of these observed and reproduced features as subsumable under a concept according to a rule. We must recognize what is apprehended and reproduced in a concept.

The word 'concept' might of itself suggest this remark. For this unitary consciousness is what combines the manifold, successively intuited, and thereupon also reproduced, into one representation (A 103).

For example, the concept "house" has, what Kant calls, the "unity of rule" (A 105) insofar as a manifold which is given in empirical intuition is united by thinking it through some concept. A concept, such as "house", can serve as a rule only insofar as "...it represents in any given appearance, the necessary reproduction of their manifold, and thereby the synthetic unity of consciousness of them" (A 106). Thus, the unity of the object is, at the same time, the formal unity of consciousness.

Dryer contends that if there were a being who had sensations but no imagination with which to synthesize or unite them, then although the being would be conscious, he would not, indeed could not, be conscious of objects. This means essentially that without some initial apprehension, reproduction, and recognition on the part of the productive imagination, the various features presented to consciousness via sensation, could not be "united" into either intuitive or conceptual repre-
sentations which alone are representations of objects.

When Kant defines the "object" as "...that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united" (B 137), he is speaking in general terms of what is necessary for something to be an object of empirical knowledge. In this sense, he is not referring to any empirical object specifically (e.g., this red book) but is speaking transcendentally about what it means to be an object of empirical knowledge in general. Kant must therefore address himself to the necessary conditions for something being an object of possible experience. What it means to be an object of empirical knowledge in general includes within its framework 1) what it means to be an object of empirical intuition. Its analysis proceeds by establishing the necessary conditions for the observation of things, viz., space and time. What it means to be an object of empirical knowledge in general also includes within its framework 2) what it means to be an object which can be conceived and subsequently brought under the forms of judgement. Its analysis proceeds by establishing the necessary conditions for thinking about things, viz., the pure concepts of the understanding or the categories which are developed by Kant in the Analytic. However, looking at the question of the empirical object from a different perspective, it might be argued that Kant establishes that there are fundamentally three conditions in which we think something (A) to be one the same thing even though, when we observe A, we are confronted with a manifold or a variety in intuition. These conditions cover the range of diversity which the manifold may have, viz., similarity, dissimilarity, and contrary features. However, each
of these three conditions already assumes the threefold synthesis as a precondition of judgement and the fact that things may be spatially individuated at the level of empirical intuition.

1. We observe features X, Y, Z at the same time and think, inspite of their dissimilarities, that they are various features of one and the same thing (A). In other words, we subsume all of these features under one concept and thereby think that they all belong to one thing (A). For example, we observe a window, door, and wall at the same time and think, inspite of their dissimilarities, that they are various features of one and the same house. In other words, we subsume all of these features under one concept and thereby think that they all belong to one thing, viz., the house.

2. We observe features X, Y, Z successively but think that X, Y, Z all exist simultaneously as features of one and the same thing (A). For example, we observe successively the front, side, and back of a house as we walk around it but think that the front, side, and back of the house all exist at the same time as various features of one and the same house.

3. We observe features X, Y, Z at one time and features not-X, Y, Z at another time and think, inspite of the replacement of one feature with its contrary, that we are observing one and the same thing (A) which has undergone a change. For example, we observe a window (X), a door, and a wall at one time and a broken window (not-X), a door, and a wall at another time and think, inspite of the fact that the window which was once in good repair and is now broken, that we are
observing one and the same house that has undergone a change, viz.,
having its window broken.

In sum, we believe that we are correct in thinking that we are observing one and the same thing (A) under the following conditions:

1. observing a manifold (features X, Y, Z) at one time.
2. observing a manifold (features X, Y, Z) successively.
3. observing a manifold (features X, Y, Z) at one time and a manifold (features not-X, Y, Z) at another time.

Although the first position can be established by Kant primarily in his discussion of the Transcendental Deduction in A with his analysis of the threefold synthesis, his justification cannot be divorced either from the justification of the categories themselves or from his analysis of space and time. Already in the Aesthetic, as we have seen, Kant has established that space is a necessary (though perhaps not a sufficient) condition for distinguishing one object from another and all objects from the subject doing the observing.

For in order that certain sensations be referred to something outside me (that is, to something in another region of space from that in which I find myself), and similarly in order that I may be able to represent them as outside and alongside one another, and accordingly as not only different but as in different places, the representation of space must be presupposed (B 38. Vide also B 319-320.).

The second and third positions were given their justification in the First and Second Analogies respectively. However, even though Kant argues that the threefold synthesis is a necessary feature for being correct in thinking that we are observing one and the same thing, even the simplest observation of a manifold having features X, Y, and Z at one
time causes problems beyond the range of the synthesis of the manifold and it is necessary for Kant to introduce the principles of the Three Analogies in order to determine the "...necessary connection of perceptions" (B 218).

In experience, however, perceptions come together only in accidental order, so that no necessity determining their connection is or can be revealed in the perceptions themselves (B 219).

Kant's argument in the Analogies demonstrated how duration, succession, and co-existence, which are necessary conditions for being correct in thinking that features which are being observed exist over a period of time, successively, or at the same time, can only be determined through the objective validation of permanent or enduring substance (First Analogy), cause and succeeding effect (Second Analogy), and the community of things which co-exist (Third Analogy). As Kant says, "...I have to show what sort of a connection in time belongs to the manifold in the appearances themselves" (B 255. Emphasis mine.).

According to Kant, the things which we observe in empirical intuition and the things about which we think are "appearances", that is, empirical objects existing, as Kant says, "outside us". However, Kant also states that to speak about objects existing "outside us" is fraught with ambiguity. There is a sense in which the empirical object is, indeed, outside us yet, in another sense, this very same object is not outside us nor could it be. The ambiguity which lies behind these seemingly contradictory claims rests squarely on Kant's most important and most fundamental distinction, viz., the distinction between what is transcendentally ideal and what is
The expression 'outside us' is thus unavoidably ambiguous in meaning, sometimes signifying what as thing-in-itself exists apart from us, and sometimes what belongs solely to outer appearance. In order, therefore, to make this concept, in the latter sense—the sense in which the psychological question as to the reality of our outer intuition has to be understood—quite unambiguous, we shall distinguish empirically external objects from those which may be said to be external in the transcendental sense, by explicitly entitling the former 'things which are to be found in space' (A 373).

It is therefore necessary for Kant to determine precisely to what extent empirical objects depend upon human subjectivity, that is, the transcendental apparatus which alone establishes and guarantees the empirical reality of objects existing outside of us in space and time. However, to speak about this transcendental apparatus or human subjectivity is not, at the same time, to reduce the status of empirical objects or appearances to psychological states. Kant does not argue that human knowledge, precisely because it is human knowledge is both theoretically, if only by definition, and practically, if only psychologically and physiologically, confined to the way things appear to us as if we were condemned by our very biological natures into knowing how things look but never how things are. Although Kant states quite explicitly that "...appearance can only be nothing by itself, outside our mode of representation" (A 252), the subjectivity of appearances must, at the same time, be such as to allow us to distinguish empirically between appearance and reality yet establish transcendentally the very conditions for the being of empirical reality in the first place. In other words, the
transcendental conditions which Kant outlines in the Critique for obtaining knowledge of empirical objects do not reduce the empirical object to a mental product of a logical or imagined synthesis of sense data. For Kant, an empirical object is real precisely insofar as it is something which exists independently of any and all psychological states. Kant does not reduce the empirical object (appearance) to a collection of all actual and possible sensa. For example, according to Kant, a house qua empirical reality, is a physical object which exists in space and time. Neither the empirical object nor, for that matter, space and time themselves, are psychological states. The house is empirically real insofar as it exists in space and time quite apart from any psychological states whatsoever. However, the house, though empirically real, is also, transcendentally speaking, an appearance because, as the Aesthetic has shown, space and time are nothing at all apart from the transcendental subject. However, if the transcendental-empirical distinction which Kant makes is conflated, then Kant's philosophical position simply degenerates or collapses into a form of Berkelian phenomenalism. Wilkerson, among other constructive idealists, assumes that Kant's position is one of phenomenalism. 78

Kant wants to be a phenomenalist, to reduce objects of experience to collections of actual and possible perceptions....

Yet, for Kant, a house is in no way reducible to its looks as phenomenalism believes and is therefore not merely a collection of sense data. For Kant, the concept "house" is a representation. The mind does not think certain sensa to be a house but thinks certain representations to be referred to a house as something actually existing in the world "outside
us", i.e., in space and time (Vide A 373) with objective determinations. In other words, the house is not a collection of sense data but that to which certain sense data are referred. Secondly, Kant makes the important empirical distinction between the way something looks and the way something is (a distinction which was found to be impossible in Nietzsche's epistemology even though, as we have seen, Nietzsche fought to abandon the distinction entirely). However, it is necessary, if empirical truth is to be established, not only to be able to distinguish between the look of X and the way X is but also to be able to know objectively how X is. Empirical truth, understood to be the correspondence between the judgement and X as it is (qua empirical reality) is grounded only on the possibilities of 1) judging about X and 2) being able to observe X's objective determinations.

It is quite true that Kant tells us that it is our representation which makes the object possible. This is, in fact, exactly what he means by the 'Copernican Revolution' in philosophy: "Either the object alone must make the representation possible, or the representation alone must make the object possible" (B 125). However, for Kant to claim that our representations make the object possible is in no sense and, quite literally by no stretch of the imagination, to claim that the subject "constructs" the object. Yet, as we have seen, several British commentators of Kant think this is precisely what Kant believed.

Prichard's view was that Kant envisaged a literal construction of the world of the same kind as the literal construction of a geometrical figure on a piece of paper. (Emphasis mine.)
Yet Kant states quite explicitly that,

"...representation in itself does not produce its object insofar as existence is concerned, for we are not here speaking of causality by means of the will. Nonetheless, the representation is a priori determinant of the object, if it be the case that only through the representation is it possible to know anything as an object (B 125).

To say that the "...representation makes the object possible" means, according to Kant, that the very notion of an empirical object can only be understood in terms of the subjective mechanism which grounds objectivity itself, viz., sensibility and understanding and the conditions for their empirical employment. In other words, according to Kant, what it means to be an object of knowledge must be analyzed in terms of certain transcendental features of the knowing subject. We do not thereby construct the empirical object in some causal way, either in terms of intellectual intuition or constructive idealism; rather, we must conceptually unpack what it means to be an object of knowledge in terms of how the subject observes or intuits (the Aesthetic) and how the subject thinks, i.e., joins or unites representations in judgements (the Analytic). Melnick makes this point quite succinctly. 80

Kant is saying that certain basic aspects of our experience make sense only in reference to a subject (most startlingly, the very notion of an object), but, properly understood, the independence from the subject required for something to be an object (independence in the empirical sense that our judgements must conform to how things are) is not thereby contradicted.

The empirical object, for Kant, is that which can present itself and
by presenting itself, it is that about which true judgements can be made. This means essentially that the concept "object" must be analyzed entirely in terms of the knowing subject, i.e., the transcendental subject, because the subject alone has intuitions in which objects are presented and about which the subject alone judges as to what objectively pertains to the object observed. After this subjective analysis at the transcendental level, the concept of an "empirical object" can have no remainder.

To cite Melnick, 81

The notion of an object for Kant is, we may say, primarily and essentially an epistemic notion. By this I mean that the question of how we can judge about what is given is identical to the question of how what is given can be an object for us.

Part of the concept of an object of possible experience is that the object be capable of undergoing change, that it be able to act upon me and other objects, and that it exists over a period of time. The object of knowledge in general is therefore the empty form of any object of possible experience. Insofar as the object of knowledge is purely formal, it does not, indeed, cannot have any empirical content and this effectively precludes it from being any individual or particular object, i.e., an empirical object such as a house, a red book, or a white cup. Hence, the distinction which Kant makes between the object of knowledge in general and a particular object both assumes and rests on the distinction between a transcendental notion of an object (in general) and an empirical notion of an object (in particular). The categories or the pure concepts of the understanding are the forms of the object of know-
ledge insofar as the categories are the concepts of the object in general. Thus Kant defines the "categories" as,

...concepts of an object in general, by means of which the intuition of an object is regarded as determined in respect of one of the logical functions of judgement (B 128).

As we have seen, in order to know the house as an empirical object, it is first necessary to synthesize what is apprehended by the senses together in one and the same consciousness. In other words, we must first apprehend the various parts of the house. We must also reproduce what was apprehended in memory, i.e., remember the parts of the house as we perceived them. Lastly (logically, not temporally since there is no reason to believe that the threefold synthesis cannot take place more or less simultaneously), we must think that what is being observed pertains to one and the same object, that is, recognize it as falling under one concept. However, to think that something pertains to something else as features of it is to invoke the category of substance. It is therefore only by means of the category of substance that I can refer to these various elements of the house as all pertaining to one and the same subject. Intuition alone does not give us anything but isolated facts; it does not, in the strictest sense, give us the house. The idea that all of these isolated and diverse facts pertain to one and the same thing, viz., a house, must therefore come from the mind alone. In other words, unity in the object comes only from the mind. However, in order to give unity to the object, by conceiving or thinking that the diversity given in empirical intuition belongs together to one and the same object, I must first presuppose that one and the same consciousness perceived the
manifold and thereby thought them to belong to one and the same house. The various features all become contents of one consciousness, that is, the unity of consciousness comes only when the mind refers what is given in empirical intuition to one and the same object. Insofar as an object can become an object for me only by means of the categories, then the categories, i.e., the conditions of experience, must also be the conditions for the unity of consciousness. I think of the front, sides, and back as all pertaining to the house, so I know that the observations of the front, sides, and back were my observations by thinking that what I observed pertained to one and the same object.

The transition to what falls legitimately within the empirical framework, specifically the "looks-is" distinction and the correspondence theory of truth, is not a simple one. It is first necessary to distinguish between objectively valid judgements (judgements of experience) and subjectively valid judgements (judgements of perception) and to demonstrate how the former are a necessary precondition of empirical truth. Only by means of objectively valid judgements is it possible to distinguish the subject from the object and thereby to refute the problematic and dogmatic idealists. Once the objective-subjective validity of judgements has been determined, and by means of it bona fide empirical claims can be made, it becomes possible to distinguish (empirically) between the appearance or look of X and how X is.
8. Subjective Validity and Significance

Kant argues that the correspondence theory of truth, that is, correspondence between knowledge and its object, cannot be the general and sure criterion of every kind of knowledge because it fails to make the vital distinction between empirical and what Kant calls "transcendental" knowledge. Correspondence is a necessary condition for establishing the truth of all empirical judgements, i.e., synthetic a posteriori judgements. However, Kant sets up a transcendental apparatus without which there could be no possibility of truth in any judgement whatsoever regardless of type. In other words, transcendental knowledge must be true if analytic, synthetic a posteriori, and synthetic a priori propositions are ever to have some truth-value. How these three types of propositions come to be verified is a question that presupposes the transcendental apparatus which makes every proposition objectively valid and therefore capable of being either true or false.

Kant argues that the form of empirical propositions must make reference to certain transcendental conditions, viz., the pure concepts of the understanding or categories which set out the necessary conditions for determining the truth of synthetic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, as well as analytic a priori propositions.

The agreement of knowledge with its object or correspondence is a sufficient condition for determining the truth of the specific content or matter of an empirical judgement or a judgement which is in some relation to an empirical object. For example, we can say that the matter or content of the judgement "The book is red" is true, if "redness" and "book", are connected in the object in the same way that the concepts which represent them are connected together in the judgement. If they are so connected, then it ought to be possible to have an empirical intuition (to make an observation) of a red book. This means
essentially that if the particular empirical proposition is true, then there ought to be evidence for it, viz., the givenness of some object in empirical intuition. Hence, correspondence is a necessary condition for determining the truth of all empirical judgements while finding evidence for the empirical judgement serves as a test for its truth.

However, before any empirical judgement can be established to be either true or false, it must be, according to Kant, an objectively valid judgement. In other words, before we can determine the truth of the judgement: "The book is red", the form of the judgement must be set up in such a way that the concepts combined in the judgement must be thought to reflect objective determinations in the object and not simply the connection of representations in one consciousness. This means essentially that a precondition for determining the truth of empirical judgements is the establishment of those very conditions which make knowledge of empirical objects possible by providing the necessary judgemental framework within which knowledge about objects is possible. These conditions which make experience possible, Kant calls the formal conditions of truth generally (B 236). Kant has argued that these conditions (the categories) must be formally valid of judgements regardless of their specific content. In other words, Kant has argued that these conditions must be formally valid of all judgements quite independently of the objects which are to be brought to judgement under those forms. Kant therefore understands the form of the judgement to be absolutely independent of the intuitional or empirical content which is thought to fall under it.

Since the formal conditions for the objective validity of judgements have been outlined, (viz., the categories) it is now possible to distinguish between judgements which are objectively valid, i.e., capable of verification, and judgements which are only subjectively valid, i.e., incapable of verification, and to point out how the distinction between subjective and objective validity
might reflect Kant’s empirical distinction between how X looks and how X is.

For Kant, judgements which are subjectively valid are judgements which only reflect the representations in one consciousness. Such judgements cannot therefore make any claim beyond the subject and its subjective experience to objects and their objective determinations. Judgements which are subjectively valid are, in fact, judgements only because they are semantically meaningful propositions but they do not come under the kind of intuition and judgement which together establish the strict parameters which are necessary for being able to determine objective truth and falsity. Knowledge, for Kant, strictly speaking, requires both intuitions and concepts. An "intuition" is an objective perception immediately relating the subject to an object which is always single (B 376). A "concept", on the other hand, is an objective perception relating the subject mediately or indirectly to the object by means of a feature which several things may have in common (B 376). However, either the passive intake of experience without judgement (the blind look of things) nor the active thinking of concepts without application to experience (empty concepts) can be considered knowledge in Kant’s strict sense. Kant, however, does understand both intuition and conception to be "knowledge" (cognitio) in a looser sense because, in both intuition and conception, there is a representation with consciousness or objective perception (perceptio), i.e., consciousness of some object. In other words, both intuition and conception taken separately are understood to establish a subject-object relation. Kant, it seems, has two points to make by stressing the stricter definition of "knowledge" which demands both intuition and conception. On the other hand, by defining both "intuition" and "conception" as objective perception, Kant excludes sensation from the parameters of the subject-object relation. In other words, for Kant, sensation is a perception, i.e., a representation with consciousness, which relates solely to the subject as a modification of its state (B 377). Thus, sensation is simply the "...effect of
an object upon the faculty of representation so far as we are affected by" (B 34) and therefore sensations do not, in themselves, yield us any knowledge of objects (B 49). Sensations do not tell us about the properties of objects but only about changes in the subject (B 45). On the other hand, Kant stresses the stricter definition of "knowledge" which demands both intuitions and concepts because, as we have seen only in the act of judging what is given to me in empirical intuition can I be self-conscious. In other words, according to Kant, I can only bring the subject-object relationship to consciousness and thereby differentiate myself as a knowing subject from objects only in the act of bringing what is given in empirical intuition under the forms of judgement. Neither judging, independently of intuitions, nor intuitions, independently of judging, is sufficient for apperception. I can only be aware of myself as a subject and I can only be aware of objects as objects, if I refer what I think through concepts to what is given in experience. This is one reason why Kant draws a distinction between subjectively and objectively valid judgements for it is only objectively valid judgements that make reference to objects and thereby secure the transcendental unity of apperception, that is, make self-consciousness possible. Secondly, Kant's distinction between objectively and subjectively valid judgements has a bearing on his Reputation of Idealism precisely because it is only by means of objectively valid judgements that I can be aware of myself as a subject vis-a-vis objects in the world.

From the Transcendental Deduction in the Analytic, we know that we can distinguish the judger qua subject from what is judged about qua object. From the Aesthetic, we know that we can distinguish the psychological (the subject) from the non-psychological (the object). But since time is the mode of inner sense and is therefore in constant flux, the only way that we can place the representations in our mind into temporal order and thereby, to determine ourselves in time, is by
locating what is permanent, viz., substance, outside of our mind. What we are aware of in empirical intuition must therefore be, for the most part at least, empirical reality. What we know immediately, Kant argues, are real things, i.e., empirical objects existing outside us in space. Once again Kant distinguishes between psychological and non-psychological states by reintroducing the spatial framework.

According to Kant, the Refutation of Idealism stands as the "...only possible proof of the objective reality of outer intuitions" (B x1), and, at the same time, the only demonstration that the knower himself is permanent and determined in time because this cannot be determined simply by means of introspection. In order to determine myself in time, it is necessary to know which state of consciousness occurs after which. It is possible to determine, Kant argues, that this state of consciousness follows that state of consciousness only when we know how these states of consciousness relate to outer, not inner, events.

I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All determination of time presupposes something permanent in perception. This permanent cannot, however, be something in me, since it is only through this permanent that my existence in time can itself be determined. Thus perception of this permanent is possible only through a thing outside me and through the mere representation of a thing outside me; and consequently the determination of my experience in time is possible only through the existence of actual things which I perceive outside me (B 275).

What we are aware of in empirical intuition is something permanent apart from our own states of consciousness. We are not aware merely of some representation especially not a permanent representation. Kant argues that we are aware of something, i.e., we represent something which is permanent and this is the empirical object in the external world. It is not the case that we could be merely aware of a representation of something inside ourselves because this is precisely what is in question for Kant, i.e., whether or not there is something in us which is permanent or lasts. If there were something permanent
in me or something which lasts in me, there would be no difficulty in demonstrating that my existence is determined in time which presupposes something permanent in perception. Hence, the Refutation of Idealism can solve Hume's problem of locating a self which is perfectly identical and simple even though 

"...everything that is in inner sense, is in constant flux" (B 291), only by recourse to real objects in the external world existing independently of the subject's psychological states.

However, it is only by means of objectively valid judgements that reference can be made to real objects in space. Subjectively valid judgements lack this capacity. Kant's distinction between subjectively and objectively valid judgements rests on the distinction between the subject and its psychological states and the object and its objective determinations. Subjective validity or subjectively valid claims are claims that concern the state of the subject at some given time and are therefore limited to subjective experience. For example, I might claim that "The book looks red" or "The wine tastes sour". These claims are based on intuitions which, as intuitions alone (how things look prior to and therefore independently of judgement), are neither true nor false. However, as belief claims, they must take the form of judgements. Although they are in judgemental form, they are still not making either explicit or implicit reference to an object. Thus, subjectively valid judgements, which are judgements limited to my subjective psychological states do not establish, nor do they have the capacity to establish, what must hold good or be true for everyone, i.e., be inter-subjectively valid. Each of these subjective claims ("The book looks red"; "The wine tastes sour") reflects just my present state of sensation, i.e., how things look to me, and therefore they hold good only for me. Insofar as they are in the form of judgements, it is possible to say, in a sense too narrow to matter, that these claims can be true or false. However, their truth or falsity is strictly limited to one particular subject. "Tasting sour", (though not
"being sour") is not and cannot be an objective determination of the wine. 
"Looking red" (though not "being red") is not and cannot be an objective determination of the book. In order to determine objective truth or falsity, it is first necessary to make some claim which goes beyond the connection of representations in one consciousness to a claim which takes the form of a judgement which links some predicate to some subject in the same way in which determinations are supposed to be connected in the object. In subjectively valid judgements (or "judgements of perception", as Kant refers to them in the Prolegomena, § 18-20), the claims show only a logical connection between any two sensations or states of the subject. Judgements of perception express only a relation between two given sensations to one and the same subject. For example, "something looks book-like" and "something looks red" are connected together in one consciousness to yield the subjectively valid claim "The book looks red". No objective characterization is made in a judgement of perception; it is merely a reflection of how things look to me and therefore only reflects my own subjective experience. However, the judgements "The book is red" and "The wine is sour" are what Kant calls "objectively valid judgements" precisely because they assert that the features "red" and "sour" (the predicates of the judgements) are thought to pertain objectively to the book and the wine, respectively (the subjects of the judgements). The objectivity of these claims does not lie in their analyticity, for it is not the case that the concept "red" has been determined to pertain to the concept "book" or that the concept "sour" has been determined to pertain to the concept "wine". Nor does the objective validity of these claims lie in the fact that the judgement turns out to be true for it is only because the judge-
ments are objectively valid that they can be true or false. Objectively valid judgements are thought to describe actual states of affairs because as judgements they reflect how determinations or features are to be connected in the object. In other words, objectively valid judgements are judgements about how X is in itself, i.e., in empirical reality, as an object of possible empirical knowledge. The subject-predicate connection in an objectively valid judgement is thought to reflect an actual connection between an object and its objective determinations and thereby asserts that that determination really, i.e., objectively, belongs to the object regardless of how someone might perceive it. Subjectively valid judgements can only state how X looks to some subject.

An external mark or an external touchstone of truth is the comparison of our own judgement with those of others, because what is subjective will not dwell in all others alike; thus semblance may be cleared up by comparison (Logic, p. 62).

...what I know, I hold to be apodeictically certain, i.e., to be universally and objectively certain (valid for all), supposing even that the object to which this certain holding-to-be-true relates were a mere empirical truth (Logic, p. 73).

With one important exception, mentioned already in the analysis of Kant's Aesthetic but to be spelled out in detail below (viz., dispositional characterizations of objects), Kant argues that the properties which are judged to pertain to the empirical object qua substance are judged to pertain to it quite independently of the subject's psychological states. Dispositional characterizations of the object, e.g., red, sour, are the only legitimate way in which the object, at least some properties of the object, can be considered a joint product of the object and the subject's psychological idiosyncrasies. It is not however what Kant takes "appear-
ances" to mean, at least in its transcendental employment. Kant's conceptual analysis of what it means to be an object of knowledge (appearance) is not to be confused with a strictly psychological characterization of the object as would be found if Kant's major problem in the Critique were "What must an object look like?". The "look" of something can only be conceptually unpacked by reference to a subject and his particular psychological states. The way something looks, but not, in the same sense, the way something is, cannot be determined a priori to be an objective feature of any object of experience, possible or actual, nor can the "look" of something be an objective determination of it in the same strict sense which makes Kant exclude red and sour. We can never know a priori how something must look. Secondly, that something looks red, for example, in no way entails that it is, in actual fact, red or that redness is a property which the empirical object has objectively, i.e. independently of any psychological states. That something looks red is already to presuppose two particular relations. First, it presupposes a reference to the way we perceive and therefore the empirical conditions necessary for perception, viz., space and time. Secondly, to be able to distinguish between the way something looks and the way something is, is already to presupposed certain ontological implications by making reference to something which has properties held independently of the psychological subject which can be objectively determined. In other words, it presupposes Kant's distinction between what is transcendentally ideal and what is empirically real. The object's empirical reality allows it to exist apart from any and all psychological states but its transcendental ideality dictates that this empirical reality be seen as an appearance.
If we are viewing a tower, it may look round and small at a distance but look large and square at closer quarters. Obviously, the tower cannot be both X and not-X (large and small/square and round), at the same time, unless there are two towers or one tower has undergone a change, but there can be no denying that the tower can appear to have both sets of features, even though they are quite contradictory. Naive realism, which asserts that the tower and all of its features are really "out there" and, more importantly, are always exactly as they appear to be, cannot give an adequate account of how the tower, which really is large and square sometimes appears to be small and round. What must be taken into account is the fact that it is possible to distinguish empirically between how things look to us because of our particular psychological makeup and how things actually are in their objective determinations, that is, apart from this psychological makeup. The object or the actual state of affairs can only be determined by discovering, by empirical means, what possible explanation covers the manifold of experiences which we have of objects. For example, in order to explain how it is that the tower can appear to us as something which is both large/square and small/round, it is necessary for the tower to really be large and square because only something that is large and square could look small and round at a distance. Hence, the tower's actually being large and square ontologically grounds the explanation. We might, at times, speak about the primacy of some appearance simply because, under normal conditions to normal observers, the tower will appear large and square. In other words, in this particular instance, and perhaps in most instances (though surely not in all), one appearance or look of the thing actually coincides with the way the thing is. However, the
thing is not the totality of its looks. It is not simply the collection of its actual or possible sensa. In Kantian terms, intuitions (the way X looks) are by themselves incomplete so the object cannot be defined simply in terms of them. It is also necessary to think that there is something (viz., an appearance) to which the intuitions or the looks are referred, that this something has properties which objectively pertain to it, and that we can come to know these properties. Whatever properties an empirical object has objectively, therefore independently of all psychological states, can be determined with certainty. Kant says that it is possible to determine whether something merely looks or appears red or square or whether it really is red or square. However, the distinction which Kant makes between the look or the appearance of the thing and the way the thing is is expressly qualified to be an empirical distinction between appearance (the look) and empirical reality (the way the thing is) (B 62). This empirical distinction will be spelled out in greater detail below. However, the empirical distinction between appearance and reality is not to be confused with the transcendental distinction between appearance and the thing in itself.

What is left to be considered in this section is the material element which is necessary in order to verify empirical propositions. Without the presentation of an object in empirical intuition, that is, without something giving itself empirically in observation, validity must remain formal and therefore limit itself to purely logical or analytic truth. In other words, without appeal or reference to some ontologically independent element of sensible intuition, validity must remain confined within the formal elements of logic. Insofar as formal validity is, according to Kant, independent of truth, at least, independent of truth as it is concerned with
objects of possible experience, it is necessary to make a distinction between formal logic and formal validity which are "...abstracted from all content of intellectual knowledge" (B 38) and transcendental logic and objective validity which must have "...some reference to objects and therefore some meaning" (B 185). Meaning or conceptualization, for Kant, is quite possible without any regard or reference to content but in order for this meaning or conceptualization to become significant, i.e., to be knowledge of objects of a possible experience, it must make reference to something objective.

If knowledge is to have objective reality, that is, to relate to an object, and is to acquire meaning and significance in respect to it, the object must be capable of being in some manner given (B 194. Emphasis mine.).

Every concept requires...the possibility of an object being given to which it refers. Without this it has no sense, and is completely devoid of content...(B 298. Emphasis mine.).

Though meaning is obviously internal to the concepts in a judgement, the significance of the judgement points to something external to those concepts and to the judgement itself insofar as significant judgements, i.e., judgements which are objectively valid, make reference to some object. Thought, which manifests itself in judgements, as with formal logic, is concerned only with concepts and their analyses. Knowledge, on the other hand, grounds those concepts by accepting empirical intuition as an independent, ontological given. Thinking "X" and knowing "X" must therefore be different (B 145) because knowing "X" demands that we have an intui-
tion of X as something which is logically independent of any judgement which we might make about it. What transforms thought into knowledge
therefore is the availability of some empirical intuition of X which corresponds to what we judge about it. It is the independence of what is given in empirical intuition, namely, the empirical object, which affords us the means for distinguishing between those judgements which are merely subjectively valid and judgements which are objectively valid. Truth, as well as falsehood, about objects of experience is possible only if we make objectively valid judgements, i.e., judgements which are significant because they make reference to empirical objects. It is therefore a necessary, though not in itself a sufficient condition, for determining the truth of an empirical judgement that the judgement is significant. A significant judgement is a judgement which is meant to reflect an objective state of affairs. Thus, "The cat is on the mat" can be called a significant judgement. It is significant because it is meant to reflect an objective state of affairs in which there is a cat actually sitting on a mat. Hence, for a meaningful, significant judgement about X to be true, it must be thought to reflect how X actually is. Three points must be noticed, however. First, the judgement "The cat is on the mat" would not be true if the judgement merely described how the cat looked to me. Secondly, the judgement, "The cat is on the mat" cannot be determined to be true if the most that can be determined, and all that can be consulted for evidence, is how the cat appears or looks to me. Thirdly, we must therefore have recourse to the actual, i.e., to the objective state of affairs, if we are ever to be able to determine which significant judgements are also truthful judgements. To use Kantian language, objective validity (significance) is a necessary condition for determining both truth and falsity. The judgement "The cat is on the mat" is significant or objectively valid but it is the cat's
actually being on the mat which determines whether or not the significant
determination is true or false. Thus, since significance is a necessary
condition for being able to determine the truth or falsity of a judgement,
it can thereby not be concerned simply with how concepts and judgements
relate to each other because even analyses of this sort are divorced from
truth about empirical objects and are therefore empty (B 87). Objective
validity or significance is concerned rather with how concepts in a judg­
ment connect with one another and how that connection holds of objects
in the world (B 126, 128, 148).

Analytic judgements are not directly concerned with any actual state
of affairs in the world. They are concerned rather with the question of
how the contents of certain concepts relate to one another. An analytic
judgement such as "All bachelors are married men", which is, at the same
time, meaningful and false is determined to be false not because it has
been found not to correspond with reality, but because the judgement is
self-contradictory. The truth or falsity of analytic judgements is always
internal to the judgement itself. As with subjectively valid judgements,
there is no need for analytic judgements to go to the object and there is
no attempt or possibility open to amplify our knowledge. In this sense,
analytic judgements might be thought to be insignificant insofar as a
significant judgement is not only meant to reflect an objective state of
affairs but, at the same time, the truth of the judgement can only be veri­
fied by recourse to that objective state of affairs. In other words, what
makes the judgement "All bachelors are unmarried men" insignificant is not
the fact that worldly counterparts cannot be found to verify the judgement,
even though it is obvious that there are such worldly counterparts, nor that it is not objectively valid because it is. What makes the judgement analytic and therefore insignificant is that the mode of verification is simply a check to see if the negation of the judgement itself generates a self-contradiction. There is therefore no need to see if there are, in fact, unmarried bachelors really existing in the world in order to demonstrate the truth or falsity of the judgement because analytic judgements are not verified by recourse to experience. A significant judgement is therefore any judgement which is both objectively valid and verified by recourse to experience or to the possibility of experience.

It is also necessary, though still not a sufficient, condition for determining the truth or falsity of a judgement that the judgement is meaningful. "The cat is on the mat" is meaningful insofar as it makes grammatical sense. A judgement is thought to be meaningful therefore if the words which make up the judgement conform to a set of endemic rules of language. The meaningfulness of a proposition is therefore something internal to the proposition itself.

The truth or falsity of a synthetic a posteriori judgement is a function which is, in an important sense, epistemologically independent of the meaning which the concepts have in the judgement. Judgements which are both meaningful and significant must therefore always be synthetic and ampliative of our knowledge of experience. Synthetic a posteriori judgements are significant not just because they are objectively valid nor because they are both meaningful and their negation is not self-contradictory but because it is both necessary and possible to verify whether or not these propositions, in fact,
accurately reflect an objective state of affairs only by going to the state of affairs itself. In order for synthetic a posteriori judgements to be verified, the reference which confirms their truth or falsity must be given as an ontologically independent object with its own objective determinations. The following list sets out the possible kinds of judgements according to their meaning, significance, truth, and mode of verification.

1. "All bachelors are unmarried men."
   - analytic a priori
   - meaningful
   - insignificant
   - true
   - verified by conceptual analysis

2. "All bachelors are married men."
   - analytic a priori
   - meaningful
   - insignificant
   - false
   - verified by conceptual analysis

3. "Bachelors married all men are." (Any verbal imbroglio.)
   - neither analytic nor synthetic
   - neither a priori nor a posteriori
   - meaningless
   - neither significant nor insignificant
   - neither true nor false
   - neither verifiable nor unverifiable (a non-starter)

   - synthetic a posteriori
   - meaningful
   - insignificant
   - (subjectively) true
   - verified by recourse to subjective experience
5. "The book is red."

   synthetic a posteriori
   meaningful
   significant
   true (the objective state of affairs is a red book)
   verified by recourse to experience


   synthetic a posteriori
   meaningful
   significant
   false (the objective state of affairs is a blue book)
   verified by recourse to experience

7. "All events have a cause."

   synthetic a priori
   meaningful
   significant
   true (the objective state of affairs, viz., an event, could not be observed unless it were true that it was caused)
   verified by recourse to the very possibility of experience

Kant draws the distinction between formal and transcendental logic, and with it the distinction between formal and objective validity, because he argues that from the concept of X alone, it is impossible to know if some X exists which corresponds to the concept of it. "Existence" is not a determining category or part of the essence of X and therefore it cannot serve as a predicate adding to our knowledge of some X. Kant's familiar refutation of the ontological argument demonstrates that "In the mere concept of a thing no mark of its existence is to be found" (B 272), and subsequently, "...the observation which supplies the content to the concept is the sole mark of existence" (B 273). For example, as far as the concept
"unicorn" is concerned, I do not seem to be able to disclose anything by means of the concept alone except the implicit meanings which the concept "unicorn" has, not with regard to its actual or even possible being, but only with regard to its meaning, that is, what an analysis of the concept "unicorn" contains that is common to all entities subsumable under the same concept, viz., white, horse-like, one-horned. I cannot say, however, that because the concept "unicorn" has the meaning "mythological creature" rather than "biological creature" that the unicorn must necessarily be but a figment of my imagination and that it cannot possibly exist somewhere undetected because, as Kant has shown, from the concept alone it is impossible to determine if any unicorn exists which corresponds to the concept. In other words, the question must always be asked as to how thought, specifically, how a judgement, is related to an object, i.e., to something empirically real. A unicorn is therefore thought to be an imaginary, i.e., an unreal creature, simply because no evidence, that is, no observation or empirical intuition of a unicorn has availed itself to establish its reality among other biological creatures in the world. However, to discover an existing unicorn is not to add to the concept of unicorn the meaning of being real because a unicorn can be thought to be imaginary or real only by making reference to the possibility of observing it. "Existence" is simply not part of the meaning of the concept "unicorn" for existence must always be derived or determined from the given or from intuitional content. It therefore cannot be found as part of the definition of X that some particular X exists. If a concept gives us what it means essentially to be an X, then Kant is arguing that existence is not
a part of the essence of anything. We cannot tell from the concept of X alone that existence pertains to X and is inseparable from X as we can and must do about X's genuine essences. The existence of anything, that is, an empirical instantiation of any concept lies in its being given to us and this givenness, or lack of it, is the sole arbiter of the ontological status which something has. To separate and to categorize different modes of givenness must therefore be equivalent to establishing the diversity which exists among different kinds of experiences. Experiences are determined to be of a particular kind only because we have recourse to the ontological status of the object thought to be the object of this or that particular experience, all within our empirical framework.
Chapter IV: Conclusion

The fundamental tenet of axiological ontology, as an amalgamation of elements from the philosophies of Nietzsche and Kant, is that the particular values which the empirical or psycho-physiological subject can impose or project on an empirical object, insofar as that object can really be thought to serve in some genuine capacity to promote the existence of that subject, must ultimately be seen to be subservient to 1) the transcendental constitution of the subject and to 2) the ontology which that transcendental subject entails and 3) to the legitimacy which is transcendentally guaranteed to the empirical "looks-is" distinction. In other words, it is necessary to transcendentally establish an ontology (such as Kant's) before the practical value of some particular "object" for some particular "subject" can be determined.

Nietzsche argues that values are a kind of relational fact and therefore determined by relating the objective determinations or features of both the subject and object as relata. However, if object X, whatever it is, is really to be of any value either to the human species in general or to some human being in particular, then its value must lie, and be determined by, the relationship which can be known (not simply believed to) exist between the empirical or psycho-physiological subject and the empirical object and their respective objective determinations. Only if the empirical subject can be known to be a certain way, that is, as having certain needs, dispositions, capacities, qualities, characteristics, and necessities (the range of "affects" which have already been outlined by Nietzsche), can it really be understood that some object X, in fact, might really prove to be valuable for the subject. But this, in turn,
means that only if the empirical object can, in fact, be known to be a certain way, that is, as actually having certain objective features or properties or having the capacity to change these properties, that it can really be afforded any genuine value for the subject. It is therefore imperative that a necessary precondition for the subjective imposition of value (axiology) at the level of empirical objects and subjects, is to establish an ontology such as Kant's which not only lends this axiology its working parameters and limitations but, at the same time, that it grounds this empirical framework, it thereby becomes immune to charges and attacks against it from that very framework. In other words, the empirical framework which includes the "looks-is" distinction necessary for Nietzsche's axiological imposition, is philosophically possible because that framework is grounded within Kant's transcendental apparatus. Any attempt to refute the transcendental apparatus from the standpoint of the empirical (e.g., by conflating the transcendental-empirical distinction or by attempting to reduce the transcendental subject and the conditions it imposes upon experience to the level of the empirical, psycho-physiological subject and its idiosyncracies) presupposes the legitimacy of the framework itself. By means of his transcendental apparatus, viz., space and time as pure a priori forms of intuition and the categories as pure concepts of the understanding, Kant has established the necessary, foundational ontology for axiological imposition. Kant's ontology guarantees that there is, in fact, an external world in which empirical objects, both permanent and causally inter-related, really exist with objective determinations quite independently of any and all psychological states. Therefore, by resting axiological imposition or
subjective value positing firmly on Kant's ontology, it effectively precludes the need for Nietzsche to establish that such values as "permanence" and "causality" must be understood simply as values among other values that have been imposed upon a world which does not actually have them. In other words, the Kantian ontology precludes permanence and causality from having only the semblance or appearance of truth and, at the same time, re-establishes the "looks-is" or (empirical) reality-appearance distinction which is a necessary prerequisite for establishing the relational facticity of values which stand between subjects and objects.

Although it is true that both Nietzsche and Kant regard permanence and causality as features of the world which are dependent on the "subject", Nietzsche understands this dependence in terms of "sensual-spiritual appropriation" at the level of the psycho-physiological subject. However, as deeply as Nietzsche penetrated into the abyss of man as an empirical subject, he can never refute Kant's transcendental thesis. Kant's transcendental subject and the conditions which it imposes on experience must be presupposed (even by Nietzsche) by all empirical endeavours. As we have seen, any kind of experience which Nietzsche himself would accept or reject as "veridical" or as "valuable" rests entirely on the objective validity or truth of both space and time and the categories.

Essentially then, Kant's ontology still allows us to understand permanence and causality as necessary values but it appreciates their value by regarding them from a higher, i.e., transcendental, point of view. The remainder of Nietzsche's axiological imposition, that is, of
the specific imposition of values by individuals, can be grounded by
placing it firmly and squarely upon the Kantian ontology. It is there-
fore necessary only to demonstrate how the "looks-is" distinction can
be made so that the objective determinations of the subject and object
can be established, in order to provide the more adequate basis for
arguing, as Nietzsche does, that values are relational facts. It must
be remembered however that the removal and subsequent imposition of
Nietzsche's axiological imposition from its basis in the prejudices of
sense and reason, effectively precludes that the finished product is
justifiably designated as "Nietzsche's philosophy". However, it is
argued that the amalgamation of Nietzsche's axiological imposition to
Kant's ontology will provide an account that has the shared strengths,
if no longer the shared characters, of both Nietzsche and Kant.

The "looks-is" distinction is a distinction within the empirical
framework. It is a distinction which must be made in order to be able
to determine what is empirically real within the empirical framework
which Kant has already established by means of the transcendental apparatus
of the Aesthetic and the Analytic and which Nietzsche requires to ground
his axiological imposition.

It is often claimed that consciousness is transparent, i.e., that
everything within consciousness is exactly as it appears and appears
exactly as it is. Hume claims, for example, that,

...since all actions and sensations of the mind are
known to us by consciousness, they must necessarily
appear in every particular what they are, and be what
they appear. Everything that enters the mind, being
in reality as the perception, 'tis impossible any
thing shou'd to feel appear different. This were
to suppose, that even where we are most intimately
conscious, we might be mistaken.
Berkeley also claims that things in consciousness are exactly as they appear: "Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered only as so many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing in them which is not perceived." Hume and Berkeley are claiming that consciousness is the sole realm in which the look of X (how X looks) and the being of X (how X is) are one and the same and that, on the strength of this identity, it is impossible for us to be mistaken about anything in consciousness. However, although it cannot be argued that the immediate data of consciousness are, in fact, free of error, it is also the case that there is nothing in the immediate data of consciousness that is true either. In other words, it is impossible to be either correct or incorrect about what presents itself immediately to consciousness because consciousness is the realm in which the distinction between how X looks to me and how X is in itself (the "looks-is" distinction) has not yet been made. The immediate data of consciousness are neither fallible nor infallible because it is first necessary to make a judgement about how things are and not just how things look to me before such terms as "error" and "truth" make any philosophical sense. Although it is true to say that sensations or what is immediately present to consciousness are the bottom line or raw material of knowledge, they are ontologically neutral descriptions of subjective experience and must therefore not be thought to be sufficient evidence in themselves for making ontological claims about the objective thing which is experienced. The distinction between "looks" and "is" is therefore an empirical distinction which cannot be made at the level of consciousness alone. Kant is very careful to distinguish the empirical from the transcendental employment of the term
"appearance". Empirically, appearance is to be distinguished from reality; transcendentally, appearance is to be distinguished from its correlative, the thing in itself.

In such examples as these [viz., sensations of colour, sounds, and heat], that which originally is itself only appearance, for instance, a rose, is being treated by the empirical understanding as a thing in itself, which nevertheless, in respect of its colour, can appear differently to every observer. The transcendental concept of appearances in space, on the other hand, is a critical reminder that nothing intuited in space is a thing in itself... (B45).

We commonly distinguish in appearances that which is essentially inherent in their intuition and holds for sense in all human beings, from that which belongs to their intuition accidentally only, and is valid not in relation to sensibility in general but only in relation to a particular standpoint or to a peculiarity of structure in this or that sense. The former kind of knowledge is then declared to represent the object in itself [i.e., the empirical object, appearance, or phenomenon] the latter its appearance only. But this distinction is merely empirical (B62. Emphasis mine. See Also A 376, 396; B 69, 350).

According to Kant, only those things which are a certain way, can look or appear to be in some other way. We can ask of something which is red, for example, whether or not it is red or if it only looks red to us. However, to ask if something is red is to ask about an object's objective determinations while to ask if something looks red is simply to ask about my subjective experience.

However, Kant claims that there are certain properties, such as "red" and "sour", which are not, strictly speaking, objective determinations of things. In other words, although "red" and "sour" can be established (by empirical means) to be properties which belong to objects, "red" and "sour" must always be understood to be dispositional characterizations of objects and therefore ultimately dependent on the psycho-physiological
subject. To say, for instance, that a particular book is red or a particular wine is sour ultimately means that some things in the world are structured in such a way as to appear red or sour to most people under standard conditions given a shared psycho-physical structure. Similarly, all of the so-called secondary qualities of Locke are appearance-characterized qualities which must ultimately be analyzed according to the way they appear to us. According to Kant, to speak of the book as a red book or to speak of the wine as a sour wine is to claim nothing more than that there are some things that are predisposed to affect our senses generally in a certain way. However, strictly speaking, "red" and "sour" are not objective determinations of the object but it is important that they stand as exceptions to the objectivity of properties because, as exceptions, they serve to point out that we can, in fact, know properties of objects which are properties independently of the subject's "...particular standpoint or to a peculiarity of structure in this or that sense" (B 62), i.e., independently of the psychological subject and his states. However, although all appearance-determined qualities such as "red" and "sour" must ultimately be analyzed in terms of the subject's mode of sensory perception and therefore fall entirely within the empirical conditions which frame it, Kant argues that such properties are not to be thought of as subjective illusions. The book can be determined to be red just as the wine can be determined, by empirical means, to be sour.

The taste of a wine does not belong to the objective determinations of the wine, not even if by the wine as an object we mean the wine as appearance, but to the special constitution of sense in the subject that tastes it. Colours are not properties of the bodies to the intuition of which they are attached, but only
modifications of the sense of sight, which is affected
in a certain manner by light (A 28. See also B 70 FN).

There is therefore a crucial distinction to be made between the way
things look and the way things are. When we speak about the way things look,
we are speaking about our immediate perception, i.e., how things look (in
the narrow sense), smell, taste, sound, and feel to us. However, being
aware of the look of the thing is not to be equated with our judging
by the look of the thing that it is a thing of some particular sort
which has certain determinate properties. This identification implies
the addition of some belief component, that is, the subsuming of the
thing under some empirical concepts and then connecting these concepts
together in some judgement so that the connection of the concepts in the
judgement is meant to reflect the connection of feature to substance in
the object. Thus "The book is red" or "The grass is green" are examples
of judgements made on the basis that the book and the grass (understood
neutrally as equivalent to what I am immediately aware of in my experience)
look a certain way to me. Our experience, which in this case is the look
of the thing initiates empirical knowledge insofar as the look of things
is where we must begin in order to be able to account for our experience.
Ultimately we must always return to the look of things because that is
precisely what our ontology must explain. To say that the look of
things must be explained by our ontology is to say that we must explain
the look of things by making reference to the way things are.

To have an experience is simply to have an immediate perception.
This experience can be broken down into simpler terms by making reference
to "sensa" or "sense data". They are the best mode of describing the
look of things in the ontologically neutral terms which a description
of experience in its purest sense demands. Sense data are therefore
descriptive of our subjective experience *qua* experience. It is pre-
cisely because sense data are ontologically neutral descriptions of
subjective experience *qua* experience that we are able to describe any
experience, regardless of its ontological mode, in precisely the
same way. In other words, it is possible, as we shall see, to describe
the experience of a snake, for example, in terms of sense data and this
description would remain unchanged *qua* description whether the experience
was a veridical perception, an illusion, a hallucination, or a hologram.
The ontological neutrality of experience which is described by sense
data is the basis for all of our beliefs about things in the world.
It is precisely for this reason that Nietzsche could rest his axio-
logical imposition on the prejudice of sense. We conceive and value a
world of "beings" because that is how things look to us. However,
although it is true to say that all of our beliefs about things in the
world rest on this kind of ontologically neutral experience, the experi-
ence itself is neither a belief nor a knowledge claim. Insofar as be-
liefs are at least implicitly judgements, then all of our judgements
about the way things are in the world are based on the ontologically
neutral way the world looks or appears to be. It is, however, the
logical gap between the way things look and the way things are which
concerns us because the gap itself is a necessary condition for
establishing the truth of empirical claims about objects.

Immediate perception or how a thing looks is neither veridical nor
non-veridical. Only mediate perceptions which involve as a minimum, an
implicit belief and as a maximum, an explicit judgement about how things
are have the capacity to be true or false. In an implicit belief, we mediate the look of things by suggesting that, on the basis of the look, something seems to be the case. In an explicit judgement, we mediate the look of things by claiming that, on the basis of the look, something is the case. A billboard, for example, may look green. On the basis of this look, I may suggest that the billboard at least seems to be green thereby introducing a belief component into the look which has no belief component at all. I suggest that the billboard seems to be green because I believe that I have some evidence for this belief. In this particular case, the evidence for my belief that the billboard is green is the fact that the billboard looks green to me. It is at this point that Nietzsche argues that we regard the look or appearance of thinghood at the level of sense as sufficient evidence for the belief (prejudice of reason) that there are, in fact, things. However, as far as the billboard is concerned, I might go further and feel that the evidence of how it looks or appears to me is strong enough to make the explicit knowledge claim "The billboard is green." An explicit knowledge claim or a judgement about an object goes beyond either the ontologically neutral look of the object to me or the guarded belief that, on the basis of the look, some thing seems to be a certain way. It cannot be argued that I am in error about the way the object looks to me but, at the same time, I cannot argue that I am not in error about the way the object looks to me. The look of the object is neither true nor false and therefore the object itself cannot yet be said to be valuable or worthless. The look of the object is all that we are aware of (not know), not the object itself. The only thing which can be true or false is an explicit judgement about the way the object is and
this is a necessary precondition for establishing the value of the object as a relational fact. When I claim, for example, that "The billboard is green", I am going beyond the mere look of the billboard to me. I am claiming that green is a property which actually pertains to the billboard as an objective feature of it. If and only if "green" is an objective determination of the billboard is the judgement "The billboard is green" true. However, even though the billboard looks green to me, I might discover (by means of another look) that the billboard is composed of several thousand alternately placed blue and yellow dots. Hence, the judgement "The billboard is green" would be false although the billboard would continue to look green to me. If, for some reason, it was necessary to avoid green billboards, it would not be of much benefit not to be able to distinguish the fact that the billboard may look green, and may even seem to be green, but is not in fact green. The legitimacy of the "looks-is" distinction is a necessary condition of axiological imposition. If I cannot distinguish between the look of X (regardless of what X is) and how X is in itself apart from the psychological subject and his states then relational facts cannot be anything more than the illusion of relational facts (since the relata remain an enigma).

As we have seen, the look of the billboard, because it contains in itself no belief component, is neither true nor false. However, although it is not possible to speak about the truth or falsity of immediate perceptions, such as the look of the billboard, without first making an explicit judgement which mediates the perception, this does not mean that it is impossible to have an empirical intuition or to observe an object without the necessity of making an explicit judgement about it. At the
level of appearance or looks, it is, at least, logically possible to speak of perception or empirical intuition as devoid and independent of all and any conceptualization.

That representation which can be given prior to all thought is entitled intuition (B 132).

For appearances can certainly be given in intuition independently of functions of the understanding (B 122).

Objects may, therefore, appear to us without these being under the necessity of being related to the functions of the understanding (B 122).

In every cognition there is to be distinguished matter, i.e., the object, the form, i.e. the manner how we cognize the object. For example, when a savage sees a house in the distance, the use of which he does not know, he has the same object before him as another who knows it as a dwelling furnished for men. But as to form, this cognition of one and the same object is different in both. In the one it is mere intuition, in the other intuition and concept at the same time (Logic, p. 38).

Although experientially it is perhaps difficult, if not impossible, for us to avoid the immediate introduction of an epistemic or belief component into our immediate perception, Kant argues that intuition and conception are logically distinct.

Since we have constantly to make use of inference, and so end by becoming completely accustomed to it, we no longer take notice of this distinction [between what is immediately known and what is merely inferred], and frequently, as in the so-called deceptions of the senses, treat as being immediately perceived what has really only been inferred (B 360).

It is only because there is a genuine distinction and independence of function between immediate and mediate perception in Kant that it is possible for him to claim that a representation of the senses (immediate perception or empirical intuition), insofar as it contains no belief component or judgement (mediate perception or concepts) is absolutely
For truth or illusion is not in the object, insofar as it is intuited, but in the judgement about it, insofar as it is thought. It is therefore correct to say that the senses do not err—not because they always judge rightly but because they do not judge at all. Truth and error, therefore, and consequently also illusion as leading to error, are only to be found in the judgement, i.e., only in the relation of the object to our understanding (B 350).

According to Kant, judgement is a necessary condition for establishing truth and error (See Logic, p. 59). Without judgement, truth and error have no place to work. Judgement alone introduces the possibility of both error and truth. It is therefore illegitimate and inappropriate to place truth and falsity in the realm of immediate perception because it is concerned only with the way things look to me and not with the way things are. "In a representation of the senses—as containing no judgement whatsoever—there is no error" (B 350). To make a judgement, according to Kant, is to relate the object to our understanding (B 350). To make a judgement about some object is to relate the concept of some object to some other concept in our understanding such that what is represented by the concepts in the judgement, and the way in which the concepts are related in the judgement, are thought to correspond to or to reflect the object and its objective determinations. Therefore, before it can be determined whether or not a given perception is veridical, it is necessary to form a belief or judgement which establishes the relation between what is given in the empirical intuition, viz., the look of the thing and the way the thing, in fact, is. "Judgement is therefore the mediate knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a representation of it" (B 93).

Immediate perception, before it can be considered veridical, must involve a judgement, i.e., it must become mediate perception. Before it
can be determined whether or not an immediate perception (the way X looks) is veridical, it is necessary to relate how X looks to how X is. This does not mean, as we have seen, that it is impossible to intuit or observe without making judgements about them. It does mean however that we cannot say that what we intuit is the way it looks (i.e., is a veridical perception) without making a judgement. In order for truth to serve as the foundation for knowledge, insofar as knowledge is the collection, collation, and integration of individual truths about individual things, it is necessary for these truths to be established as intersubjectively valid judgements. One or even one thousand individuals "looking" at an object prior to the making of any claim about it, does not meet the conditions necessary for intersubjective validity. Although the look of the object is the ground for truth, it is not truth itself.

An external mark or an external touchstone of truth is the comparison of our own judgement with those of others, because what is subjective will not dwell in all others alike; thus semblance may be cleared up by comparison (Logic, p. 62).

Kant assumes throughout the Critique that the only way to establish the truth of an empirical claim (synthetic a posteriori judgements) is to be correct in thinking, and therefore in judging, that what is presenting itself in empirical intuition is accurately reflected in the judgement made about it. In other words, Kant assumes that correspondence defines empirical truth (B 82, 197, 236, 670) and that empirical claims are easily verified by recourse to the correspondence theory of truth (A8; B 792). We have already seen however how Kant grounds empirical truth in transcendental truth (B 185, 269, 521). Insofar as Nietzsche understands the look of things to be initially prejudiced and in error and therefore not neutral in truth-value,
he sets the stage for the "falsity" of all subsequent judgements concerning "things" since they not only are about the so-called "objects" of sense but are in fact parasitic upon them. Intuition and conception are not independent in function for Nietzsche as they are for Kant. Truth and error cannot be found in the locus of the object itself but only in a judgement made about the object as it actually is thought to be. Empirical truth is therefore a matter of correspondence. Correspondence is simply a matter of determining whether or not what is said of X ("The stick is bent") is, in fact, the way X is (the actual stick). However, this is possible only if we can, in fact, discover the object's objective determinations. Thus truth cannot lie in X alone, nor in the look of X to us. Truth must lie in the judgement which corresponds to its object. Empirical truth therefore lies precisely in the correspondence between X and the judgement about X. The correspondence theory of truth therefore rests on the availability of our being able to give substance to claims by finding the substance (evidence or thing) about which the claim is made.

However, it seems that the only way in which something can be thought to be "evidence" for some claim is if the "givenness of the object" is understood to entail the ontological independence of the object from the psychological subject and with it the independence from the subject of the empirical object's determinations. In other words, "evidence" as a philosophical notion requires as a necessary backdrop the correspondence theory of truth. Without evidence, truth, understood to be the relation of correspondence between the object of judgement and the object in the world becomes something which is impossible to verify outside the scope of analytic propositions. Any question about X's actual state of affairs is
a question whose answer is not to be found included within the concept of X. If evidence is that which verifies or falsifies, validates or invalidates judgements about X and X is not an ontologically independent object with knowable objective determinations, then there can be no possibility at all of disclosing whether or not the description of X which is given in our judgement about it, is accurate or not and therefore whether or not X is of any real value to us. It is not sufficient for the objective determinations just to look a certain way or even to be thought a certain way; they must really be known to belong to the object. Evidence is therefore concerned only with the truth or falsity of synthetic a posteriori or empirical judgements.

However, within the empirical framework itself, there are several kinds of experiences possible, each experience having its own defining characteristics. Any experience which the empirical subject has must be discerned as to what kind of experience it is before it can be properly evaluated. The task of discerning what kind of experience we are having is the work of the subject but it cannot proceed with this task without direct recourse to ontologically independent things which center themselves in our experience. In other words, the subject can discriminate among his various experiences only if he has recourse to something beyond his subjective experience, viz., the object. It is the object of the experience which determines the kind of experience we are having. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the object as such and our experience of it. To speak of experiences of the object as opposed to the object itself is precisely to divorce our subjective experiences from the objects we are experiencing.

To put it briefly, all experiences which go beyond the subject and his internal psychological states must be experiences of objects. This
means essentially that experiences themselves are separated, categorized, or distinguished one from the other according to the kinds of object which affect consciousness or if there is an object affecting consciousness at all. For if we concern ourselves solely with experience qua experience, i.e., with the look of things or immediate perception, then all objects of experience must be treated in exactly the same way, viz., as being ontologically neutral. As John Pennycuick says,

It is possible that a person should have exactly the same experience as he would expect to have if he saw a real oasis, yet no oasis be there. Nor, of course, is it only oases to which this applies, for it applies to any item whatever in our physical environment that we care to choose.

C. D. Broad also establishes the fact that, as far as our subjective experiences are concerned, experiences of real objects are the same as experiences of dream objects.

The quasi-sensory content of dreams is exactly the same as the sensory content of ordinary waking perceptions. One's dreams are certainly experiences of colour, sound, tactual qualities, temperature, and kinaesthetic and somatic feelings, just as our waking perceptions are. But the resemblance goes much deeper than that.

All of our subjective experiences (and the values we give to these experiences) are differentiated in terms of the kind of object not only thought to be given to us in the experience but also to the kind of object actually given to us in the experience. The object presented to us in experience appears to be the same kind of object regardless of the kind of experience it is. Thus the grounds for determining the kind of experience we are having cannot lie entirely within the subjective side of experience which can only tell us that something looks a certain way nor within the judgement itself which has no specific content and is therefore empty.
It must lie with the judgement and the object together. It is impossible to determine the truth or falsity of a judgement concerning the content of our subjective experience without recourse to the empirical object which not only exists independently of the subject's psychological states but has determinations which are objective, i.e., that really pertain to it.

It is necessary to examine our subjective experience by stating in judgemental form what is thought to be given in the experience and then to determine which empirical givens are, in fact, genuinely given. This is possible only by recourse to something which is not itself a psychological state but necessarily something other than or apart from psychological states, viz., the empirical object.

If I have an experience of a coiled snake in my garage, then I must separate or categorize this experience in terms of the kind of object which confronts me. This necessitates not only the making of a judgement about the object given in the experience but also the ability and the availability of a possible examination of the truth of the judgement. No doubt, I am confronted by or having an experience of some "thing". However, if I judge "I experience a snake", the experience of the snake qua experience is ontologically neutral. To judge "I experience a snake" is not to go outside of an account of the experience itself to an object. In order to know what kind of experience it is, it is necessary to determine what kind of object or indeed, if any object is really presented in the experience about which we have judged. This means that the object element pointed to in the experience can never remain ontologically neutral.

Three factors can be found in each kind of experience, e.g., veridical perception, illusory perception, hallucination, or hologram, which establishes
it to be the kind of experience it is.

1) an experience of veridical perception requires:
   a) that we experience an appearance of a rope.
   b) that we judge "There is a rope" or "I see a rope".
   c) that there be, in fact, a rope.

2) an experience of illusory perception or misperception requires:
   a) that we experience an appearance of a snake.
   b) that we judge "There is a snake" or "I see a snake".
   c) that there be, in fact, a rope.

3) an experience of hallucination requires:
   a) that we experience an appearance of a rope.
   b) that we judge "There is a rope" or "I see a rope".
   c) that there be, in fact, no rope.

4) an experience of a hologram requires:
   a) that we experience an appearance of a rope.
   b) that we judge "There is a rope" or "I see a rope".
   c) that there be, in fact, no rope.

The first factor in each case is the same, viz., that we experience the appearance or look of something. This is a guarantee only that the experience in itself tells us nothing about the ontological status of the object presented to us and that it is only by referring to the object by means of the judgement that we can categorize the experience. The second factor in each case is a judgement which indicates that we think we are having such a veridical perception. It is only the third factor, namely, the presence or non-presence of the empirical object which determines the truth or falsity of the judgement and thereby what values can appropriately be attached to the object.

There can be no knowledge of empirical objects or appropriate evaluation of them without the availability of these three factors: 1) the experience (which is ontologically neutral), 2) the judgement about the object
of experience (which serves to characterize the kind of object we think we are experiencing) and, 3) the object itself which not only determines the truth or falsity of the judgement by giving the ontological status when it gives itself but thereby provides the basis for appropriate evaluation. Experience is the focal point of philosophy because there cannot be any other starting point but strictly speaking no experience is true or false. Only our judgements about the kind of experience it is thought to be can be true or false and this is the case only insofar as they are verified or falsified by testing the correspondence between the judgement and the object of judgement. We always look at the object in experience with something in mind, namely, the question: what kind of an object is given to me? In other words, we look at the object in order to substantiate a claim made about the object which defines the kind of experience we are having. A veridical perception is not simply a higher form of semblance; it is rather the complete removal of semblance and it is only upon the removal of this semblance and the transcendental guarantee of the empirical "looks - is" distinction that the appropriate and life-affirming values of Nietzsche can be established. Axiological ontology therefore contains the strengths of both Nietzsche and Kant by squarely placing the subjective imposition of values which Nietzsche describes on the transcendental foundation of the Kantian ontology.
Footnotes

Chapter I: Subject-Object.


2. Although Nietzsche claims that it "...is not...the antithesis of subject and object which concerns me here: I leave this differentiation to the epistemologists..." (JW, IV, 354), he nevertheless uses many traditional epistemological concepts including terms borrowed from Kant's philosophy.

3. There is a third route which is also closed to us although it accepts the irreducibility of an original subject/object dichotomy. This route would take the form of a hypothetical position which we might call "pure empiricism". It would assume that the subjective element in the knowledge relation was a pure tabula rasa. Hence, the form of the object of which we are aware could be entirely accounted for in terms of passively accepted content. In this sense, there would be no need for a pure empiricist to account for any active formation of the object, i.e., no Kantian "working up" or Nietzschean "making up" experience or, at least, a major part of it. However, this "pure empiricism" route must assume that what we are immediately aware of in the world is not an inchoate, gelatinous manifold of sensation but already a world of preformed objects. In other words, on this model, what we know would be understood to be precisely equivalent to what there is to be known for it assumes that there is no possibility that we can have a sense impression of X when the object doing the impressing (remembering that on this model, we are entirely passive) is something other than X or even unlike X in appearance. If we know object X, it is only because object X has impressed itself upon us. Thus, it is assumed, that things are as they appear to be and appear exactly as they are. This latter assumption will be shown to be false.

Secondly, pure empiricism of this variety is deemed to be a hypothetical position because there is no empiricist in the western tradition to whom this could refer. Carvaka in the eastern tradition accepts perception as the only valid means of knowledge and assumes the most naive form of realism. See A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy, edited by S. Radhakrishnan and C.A. Moore (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 227-249. All western empiricists (e.g., Locke) have laws of association or rules of combination by which the raw material of sense is arranged or ordered. "Even if reality 'is wholly material' and all things are 'made up of matter' the carving-up of the all-inclusive pie into particular things is, and cannot but be, the work of the mind." Nicholas Rescher, Conceptual Idealism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), p. 113.

4. George J. Stack, "Nietzsche and Lange", The Modern Schoolman, LVII (1980), p. 142. Compare Stack's similar comments in another article. "...Nietzsche's critical theory of knowledge is derived from Kant in the sense that Nietzsche also insists upon the spontaneous, creative, pro-


7. Stack, "Review of Grimm", ibid., p. 252. According to Stack, Nietzsche's position is one in which appearances are thought to be "adequate approximations to the external world". In other words, although we are limited to the way reality appears to us to be, because of our modes of cognition, the appearances at least approximate reality adequately enough to be able to make judgements with some accuracy. Although it will be shown that Nietzsche is somewhat sympathetic to this view (a view he regards to be Buddhist), Nietzsche rejects the correspondence framework which supports it.


12. Throughout the text, I shall be following Kaufmann's rendering of "Apollinisch" as "Apollinian". See Kaufmann's translation of BT, Translator's Introduction 3, FN9.

13. Vide Wilcox, op. cit. It is the first serious attempt in English to come to grips with Nietzsche's theory of knowledge. Although Jean Grenier's text: Le Problème de la Vérité dans la philosophie de Nietzsche (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966), by title, at least, has claim for this distinction, the text itself is traditional in nature.


There is little doubt that Nietzsche was strongly influenced by the
Neo-Kantian spirit of Lange. Jörg Salaquarda, "Nietzsche und Lange",
Nietzsche-Studien, VII (1978), p. 253 states that "Nietzsche blieb
bei allen Veränderungen und Neuansätzen in wichtigen Punkten seines
Denkens und überhaupt seines Verständnisses des Philosophierens an
Lange orientiert". George J. Stack, "Nietzsche and Lange", The Modern
Schoolman, LVII (1980), 137-149 exposes seven "important points" in
which Lange's influence can be found in Nietzsche's writings.
1) Projection of ideals following aesthetic principles. These poetic
ideals (Begriffsdichtungen) heighten the quality of life.
2) Both Nietzsche and Lange understand "actuality" to be in perpetual
flux. Stack allows that this particular idea may well have had
its inception with Heraclitus. See Jackson P. Hershbell, "Nietzsche
and Heraclitus", Nietzsche-Studien, VIII (1979), 17-38.
3) Actuality is unknowable and hidden
4) All that we can ever know is a system of appearances.
5) The sense organs function by abstraction.
6) There is no identity nor equality in actuality.
7) Nietzsche accepted Lange's psychological interpretation of Kant's
theory of knowledge. This last point is important because Nietzsche,
following Lange's interpretation, never understood Kant's distinction
between the psychological and transcendental subjects.

17. This definition is from Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's
Several of Nietzsche's attacks on 'idealism' are attacks on ideals,
i.e., unattainable goals (see, for example, WTP 16). Nietzsche does
offer a reductio ad absurdum argument against subjective idealism: the
external world cannot be the work of our organs because, if this were
the case, our bodies, and subsequently our organs would be the work of
our organs (BGE 14. Cf. Briefe, op. cit., I, p. 83). There is a
considerable ambiguity shown towards idealism at JW V, 372.

18. Paul Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology, trans. by
says that, for Husserl, the "...ontological question is the epistemo-
logical question". This appears to be a prima facie claim that transcen-
dental phenomenology is creative idealism, a claim which Husserl vehement-
ly denies (E. Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology,
Marvin Farber, Phenomenology and Existence: Toward a Philosophy within
the artificiality of his starting point, namely, in the ego cogito alone.
Farber's criticism unfairly makes Husserl's position too one-sided by
understanding Husserl's ego cogito as one of Cartesian isolation.
Husserl's position is philosophically more mature than Descartes's.
He realizes that the ego cogito cannot be sharply divorced from the
cogitationes because consciousness is always consciousness of something.
The phenomenological reduction or epoche does not deny the existence of
the real world and, in this sense, Ricoeur's equating the epistemologi-
cal and ontological questions does not entail that consciousness creates
real objects in the world. The epoche actually serves to translate questions which were formerly questions about the being of objects into questions concerning the meaning of the being of objects for consciousness which obviously demands reference to the knowing subject. The transcendental turn in Husserlian phenomenology is therefore essentially Kantian because it holds that what it means to be an object of knowledge can only be understood if it is analyzed in terms of the subject's mode of cognizing. This means essentially that the concept of the object of knowledge and not the object of knowledge itself is subjectively dependent. Neither Kant nor Husserl equate this kind of subjective analysis with subjective idealism (Compare Arthur Melnick, Kant's Analogies of Experience (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 144-151). Husserl, "Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy", trans. Ted E. Klein, Jr. and William E. Pohl, Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, V (1974), p. 24 says explicitly that phenomenology attempts to underline "...the relationships between cognized being and cognizing consciousness". D. Sinha, Studies in Phenomenology (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 120 also says, quite rightly, that "One could speak of metaphysics within the framework of phenomenology only so far as that concerns the foundation not of being but of knowing."


21. Cf. William Barrett, What is Existentialism? (New York: Grove Press, 1965), p. 169: "The mind, in short, imposes its own patterns upon phenomena, which must conform to these patterns if they are to be admitted to consciousness at all." Bennett, op. cit., p. 54 adds that Kant "...sometimes suggests that these inevitable features of our experience are imposed upon it by the mind--conformity to the categories being the work of the understanding, and spatio-temporality being imposed by the sensibility."

22. T.E. Wilkerson, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: A Commentary for Students (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), p. 182. Wilkerson has seriously misunderstood Kant's position when he claims for Kant that "the senses only yield a feeble and muddy approximation to genuine knowledge". Kant would claim that the senses yield no knowledge whatsoever, whether it be muddy, obscure or confused perception. Leibniz had "...the assumption that we intuit things as they really are, although in confused representations" (B 323. See also B 320, 326-7). Kant's thesis is not Leibnizean. He does not claim that the senses give confused ideas of things in themselves while concepts give clear and distinct ideas. Kant breaks from this Leibnizean position by claiming that the senses alone, i.e., the senses without concepts, are blind and therefore offer no knowledge whatsoever. See however B 377.
29. Cf. D.P. Dryer, *Kant's Solution for Verification of Metaphysics* (London: George, Allen and Unwin, 1966), p. 251: "Kant therefore urges that if a being had sensations but no imagination, it would have some conscious life but no consciousness of objects. Such a being would have a stream of consciousness but would not even be conscious of it." Wilkerson, *op.cit.*, p. 66 adds: "...Kant appears to suggest that self-consciousness, the necessary unity of apperception, consists in an awareness of the mysterious noumenal synthesizing work of the mind which is prior to and responsible for our experience". Ewing, *op.cit.*, p. 92 says that "...apart from a synthesis employing the categories there would be left not even a sense-data but only a form-less unrelated manifold, nothing of which we could conceivably be conscious at all".
Chapter II: Nietzsche.


2. References to the "Apollinian" metaphors, quasi-metaphors, and concepts are given below in order:

**Metaphors**

**art:**
- ("art") BT 7, 10, 24, Attempt 5.
- ("the complement and consummation of existence") BT 3
- ("a saving sorceress, expert at healing") BT 7
- ("in the metaphysical, broadest, and profoundest sense")
- ("the net of art") BT 15
- ("artistic projections") BT 5
- ("the Olympian middle world of art") BT 3
- ("religion and science") BT 15

**vision:**
- ("redeeming vision") BT 4
- ("the rapturous vision") BT 4
- ("blissfully serious visions") BT 24
- ("the Apollinian world of images") BT 8
- ("merely images") BT 5, 21
- ("a bright image") BT 9
- ("the bright image projections of the Sophoclean hero") BT 9
- ("artistic projections") BT 5
- ("the Apollinian projection") BT 24
- ("the visible world of mere appearance") BT 24
- ("a visible intermediary world") BT 24
- ("all-illuminated total visibility") BT 24

**veil:**
- ("veil") BT 2, 3, 21, 24
- ("the veil of maya") BT 1, 2
- ("the veils of illusion") BT 7
- ("the veil of beauty") BT 18, 25

**beauty:**
- ("beauty") BT 16
- ("the sphere of beauty") BT 3
- ("Apollinian world of beauty") BT 4
- ("the veil of beauty") BT 18, 25
- ("the beauty of mere appearance") BT 3, 25

**dream:**
- ("dream") BT 4
- ("the beautiful illusion of the dream worlds") BT 1
- ("the Apollinian state of dreams") BT 8
- ("the Apollinian dream world") BT 8
- ("the Apollinian dream") BT 24
- ("the radiant dream-birth of the Olympians") BT 3

**maya:**
- ("maya") BT 1
- ("the work of maya") BT 18
- ("the veil of maya") BT 1, 2
redemption: BT 4, 8, 12, 16, 21

Quasi-metaphors

illusion: ("illusion") BT 4, 16, 21
("the beautiful illusion of the dream worlds") BT 1
("the beautiful illusion of the inner world of fantasy") BT 1
("beautiful illusion") BT 1
("a profound illusion") BT 15
("a new transforming illusion") BT 25
("the pleasurable illusion") BT 4
("the most forceful and pleasurable illusions") BT 3
("this sublime metaphysical illusion") BT 15
("illusion spread over things") BT 18
("healing balm of blissful illusion") BT 21
("Apollinian illusion") BT 3, 21, 24
("the healing balm of illusion") BT 19
("the veils of illusion") BT 7

lie: BT 8, 16
error: Attempt 5
semblance: Attempt 5
deception: BT 21, Attempt 5
delusion: Attempt 5
contrivance: Attempt 5
interpretation: Attempt 5
perspective: Attempt 5
points of view: Attempt 5

Concepts

appearance: ("mere appearance") BT 1, 4, 8, 12, 24
("the beauty of mere appearance") BT 3, 25
("changing appearances") BT 7
("the world of appearance") BT 24
("the whole world of appearances") BT 8, 15
("the visible world of mere appearance") BT 25
See also BT 5, 8, 9, 21; Attempt 5

phenomenon: ("the mere phenomenon") BT 18
("the entire world of phenomena") BT 22
("the whole world of phenomena") BT 25
("the eternity of the phenomenon") BT 16
("phenomenon") BT 4, 6, 16, 17, 21

Nietzsche cites a passage from Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Representation (see BT 16) in which Schopenhauer equates "this actual world", "the world of particulars", "nature", and "the phenomenal world".

reality: Although "Apollo" is said to be "reality" (BT 1, 8, 14), Nietzsche makes it quite clear that it is the reality of "the truly non-existent" (BT 4), i.e., not reality at all but only an appearance of it. In fact, Nietzsche equates...
Apollo, understood as "the sole and highest reality" (BT 18) with "maya" and "mere phenomenon" (BT 18).

individuation (includes "measure" and "stability"):
"the apotheosis of the principium individuationis"
BT 4, 16, 21
"the individual" BT 4
"Apollo, the god of individuation" BT 9
"Apollo, the god of just boundaries" BT 9
"drawing boundaries" BT 9
"measure" BT 4, 9
"Apollinian precision and lucidity" BT 9
"the stamp of the eternal" BT 23
"the eternity of the phenomenon" BT 16

Miscellaneous Apollinian symbols include:

myth BT 9, 15, 21, 22, 23
mask BT 9, 10
magic BT 21, 25
mirror BT 3
cure BT 9

luminous spots BT 9
metaphysical comfort BT 7, 8, 17, 18; Attempt 7
metaphysical supplement BT 24

3. References to the "Dionysian" metaphors, quasi-metaphors, and concepts are given below in order:

Metaphors

terror:
("the terror and horror of existence") BT 3
("the most terrible things") BT 12
("terrible destructiveness") BT 7
("the horrible truth") BT 7
("the horror or absurdity of existence") BT 7
("the horrible") BT 7
("the horrors of night") BT 19
("cruelty of nature") BT 7
("gruesome nights") BT 9
("an abysmal and terrifying view of the world") BT 3
("the terrible seriousness of true nature") BT 19
("the inside and terrors of nature") BT 9
("the hard, gruesome, evil, problematic aspect of existence")
BT, Attempt 1
("everything underlying existence that is frightful, evil, a riddle, destructive, fatal") BT, Attempt 4

suffering:
("the suffering inherent in life") BT 16
("primordial suffering of the world") BT 21
("the hidden substratum of suffering") BT 4
("the misfortune in the nature of things") BT 9
"eternally suffering and contradictory") 4
"primordial pain") BT 5, 6
"the bliss born of pain") BT 4, 5
"this excess of life, suffering, and pleasure) BT 20
"the distress of fullness and overfullness and from the
affliction of the contradictions compressed in his
soul") BT, Attempt 5

abyss:  ("the abyss") BT 9, 15, 23, 24
("a dark abyss") BT 17
("the deepest abyss") BT 13
("deepest abysses of being") BT 15
("the innermost abyss of things") BT 21
("the Dionysian abysses") BT 14
("an abysmal and terrifying view of the world") BT 3
("chasm") BT 2, 8
("depth(s)") BT 11, 15
("mystic depths") BT 17
("background") BT 11
("mysterious background") BT 24
("unfathomable depths") BT 19

Important references to "abyss" and "unfathomable" outside The Birth of Tragedy
include the following:  HAH II, 138; JW II, 80; III, 109; V, 322; V, 347;

Quasi-metaphors
heart of nature:  ("the innermost heart of nature") BT 4
("the innermost ground of the world") BT 2
("the mysterious ground of our being") BT 4
("the foundation of all existence") BT 25
("the Dionysian basic ground of the world") BT 25
("the innermost and true essence of things") BT 18
("the innermost essence of things") BT 18
("the innermost heart of things") BT 16
("the inside and terrors of nature") BT 9
("the heart of the world" = "true reality") BT 21

the contradictory:  ("the primordial contradiction that is concealed
in things") BT 9
("the contradiction at the heart of the world") BT 9
("primordial contradiction") BT 5, 6
("eternally suffering and contradictory") BT 4
("contradiction") BT 4, 5
("the contradictions compressed in his soul") BT,
Attempt 5

primordial unity:  ("the primordial unity") BT 1
("mysterious primordial unity") BT 1
("the truly existent primal unity") BT 4
("the primordially One") BT 22
("the primal unity") BT 4, 5, 6
"the oneness of everything existent") BT 10
"primal being") BT 8
"primordial beauty itself") BT 17

excess:  
(Dionysian flood and excess") BT 21
"this fantastic excess of life") BT 3
"this excess of life, suffering, and pleasure") BT 20
"the eternal joy of existence") BT 17
"the infinite primal joy in existence") BT 17
"the exuberant fertility of the universal will") BT 17
"so full, so green, so amply alive, immeasurable and full of yearning") BT 20
"a glorious, intrinsically healthy, primordial power") BT 23
"in glorious health, profundity, and Dionysian strength") BT 24
"the titanic powers of nature") BT 3
"the artistic power of all nature") BT 1
"by well-being, by overflowing health, by the fullness of existence") BT, Attempt 1
"joy, strength, overflowing health, overgreat fullness") BT, Attempt 4
"the distress of fullness and overfullness") BT, Attempt 5

Concepts
the essence of things:  
"the essence of things") BT 7
"the inner essence") BT 17
"essence") BT 18
"the innermost and true essence of things") BT 18
"the innermost essence of things") BT 18
"the core of being") BT 21
"the eternal core of things") BT 8
"the bottom of things") BT 7
"the basis of things") BT 5
"the essence of nature") BT 2
"the heart of nature") BT 19
"the very heart of nature") BT 4
"the nature of things") BT 15

thing in itself:  
"thing in itself") BT 21
"thing in itself") BT 8. In this passage, Nietzsche identifies the "thing in itself" with the "eternal core of things" and opposes both of these notions with "appearance". Nietzsche cites a passage from Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Representation (see BT 16) in which Schopenhauer equates the "thing in itself" with "the will itself".

reality/truth:  
"the reality of nature") BT 24
"the world of reality") BT 7
"Dionysian reality") BT 7
"reality") BT 1
"the womb of the true and only reality") BT 22
Nietzsche cites a passage from Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation* (see BT 16) in which Schopenhauer equates the "inner being of the world", "the inmost kernel", and "the heart of things".

4. "We far too readily confuse Kant's "thing-in-itself" with the Buddhist's "true essence of things". On the one hand, actuality exhibits nothing but illusion; on the other, it exhibits an appearance which is totally adequate to the truth. Illusion as non-being is confused with the appearance of beings" (BT 41).

5. It is only possible on Nietzsche's understanding of Kant to ask the question whether or not the way things are is equivalent to the way things look or appear to be. On Nietzsche's model, he is saying that things in themselves might very well be the same as appearances in appearance. On Kant's scheme, appearances and things in themselves are never the same. For example, a thing in itself can never appear; it is never in space and time. Nietzsche does not realize that the looks/is distinction is an empirical distinction and can therefore be solved simply by using empirical criteria. The thing in itself/appearance distinction, which is not the looks/is distinction and is therefore not an empirical distinction, cannot be resolved simply by empirical means. The appearance/thing in itself distinction is a transcendental distinction which makes the looks/is distinction, within the empirical, understandable.

6. While on the level of the Dionysian substratum, we are mere illusions, we change this "reality" by making it fuller, richer for life, by creating new visions. Everything then, except for the substratum, is illusory. For "...the only truly real Dionysus appears in a variety of forms..." (BT 10). Individuals emerge out of a real substratum. Then illusions emerge from individuals in order to keep them in existence. But should illusions be down-graded, even to the point of calling them "illusions" or "mere appearances" when the fact of the matter is, they are indispensable for our existence? Nietzsche establishes a framework within *The Birth of Tragedy* which retains the appearance/reality distinction at least epistemologically speaking. However, paradoxically it seems, Nietzsche's philosophy in nuce is a vociferous dismissal of the metaphysical "otherworldly" precisely because it downgrades this world even
if it is essentially appearance.

7. What happens if the balance between the Apollinian and the Dionysian is destroyed? Nietzsche says: "If but for an instant he could escape from the prison walls of his faith, his 'self-consciousness' would be immediately destroyed." (PT 86). Thus "...the world of which we become conscious is only a surface and sign-world, a world that is made common [verallmeinert] and meaner [vergemeinert] (JW V, 354). Vide PT 18, 19, 51-52; JW III, 127; BGE 3, 230; WTP 477, 514.

8. Compare the following:
   "confusing multiplicity" (WTP 584)
   "confusing multiplicities" (WTP 715)
   "incomprehensible, elusive flux" (WTP 604)
   "the terrible and questionable character of existence" (WTP 853)
   "the formless, unformulable world of the chaos of sensations" (WTP 569)
   "medly of sensations" (WTP 552)
   "fuzziness and chaos of sense impressions" (WTP 569)
   "chaos of sensations" (WTP 569)
   "material of the senses" (WTP 569)
See also WTP 616, 708, 711, 809. The point is clear. The manifold for Nietzsche is utterly chaotic. Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), I, p. 15 comments: "Alles Sein ist für Nietzsche ein Werden."

9. "We are not able to think things as they are because we are not permitted to think them [at all]" PT. 43.

To know something as it "actually is" is, for Nietzsche, an impossibility. It essentially amounts to knowing the Dionysian without an Apollinian illusion or knowing the manifold qua manifold, i.e., the manifold without any subjective tampering. On Nietzsche's understanding of Kant, it is knowing the thing in itself (See Appendix XIII).

10. It is debatable whether or not Nietzsche's point is that the flux of Dionysus has no meaning whatsoever unless we put it there or if the flux of Dionysus has so much meaning that the problem we face in existence is trying to sort them out or find some order within their natural disorder. Both interpretations find textual support. Nietzsche claims, in support of the latter interpretation: "Insofar as the word 'knowledge' has no meaning, the world is knowable; but it is interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings.--'Perspectivism'" (WTP 481. See also GM III, 12). Further support for this position would be Nietzsche's many references to the "excess" of Dionysus in The Birth of Tragedy and Nietzsche's fundamental assumption that life itself has no purpose or teleology whatsoever (see WTP 595). However, in support of the former interpretation, viz., that nature (reality, Dionysus, flux) has no meaning in itself, let alone a myriad of meanings, is the
fact that Nietzsche himself speaks of "introducing a meaning..." "...assuming there is no meaning yet" (WTP 605). Nietzsche does not make reference to finding or to sorting out the myriad of meanings found in nature. Rather, he draws the sharpest of distinctions between finding (finden) order and inventing (erfinden) it. He builds on this distinction when he separates "interpretation" (the introduction of meaning) from "explanation" (in which meaning is already thought to be present) (WTP 604). Of course, on both models, the "...world may have infinite interpretations" (JW IV, 374. See also WTP 481) but it would be more characteristic of Nietzsche to have him advocate the "creation" rather than the "sorting out" of values. Lastly, Nietzsche wanted to accelerate the advancement of nihilism in his time. "Nihilism" meant the absolute worthlessness and meaninglessness of the world (See WTP 617, 83, 84, 85). The lion that roars "No" must precede the child who creates "Yes". In other words, we must be free from before we can be free for values. See Zar. p. 63.

11. What Nietzsche may have "borrowed" from the Heraclitean philosophy has been outlined by Jackson P. Hershbell, "Nietzsche and Heraclitus", Nietzsche-Studien, VIII (1979), 17-38. The most valuable points of similarity include: the affirmation of becoming or flux; the affirmation of an underlying unity inspite of perpetual change (logos and "the will to power"); affirmation of war, opposition, and strife ("man's self-overcoming"); the denial of being; the general denial of real opposition and the specific denial of the opposition between what is apparent and what is true. Lastly, the notion of the eternal return is said to have its Nietzschean inspiration in Heraclitus.

12. It is important to remember that Nietzsche describes Dionysus as the "contradictory" when trying to understand what Nietzsche means by the spirit's role of "overlooking and repulsing whatever is totally contradictory" (BGE 230).


15. Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India: Three Phases of Buddhist Philosophy (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1973), p. 109. Although Conze is referring specifically to an epistemological problem within Theravada Buddhism, he is accurately representing the epistemological problem faced by Nietzsche. "Suppose you see an orange in front of you. In terms of the 'elements' this experience presupposes at least three factors--a sight-object, the sensitivity of a sight-organ, and an act of sight-consciousness. The 'orange' as a datum of experience, as the sight-object which is seen, should not be mistaken for the objective fact 'orange', as it is 'out there', for the simple reason that the objective fact, when presented to the mind, is
modified by two additional factors, having undergone the effect of the organ and the act of consciousness. No one can possibly know what really goes on if the contribution of the other two elements is subtracted. No one can get at the object as it is by itself, but only at the 'orange' as modified and falsified by subjective processes. To those whose minds are intent on reality itself, this discovery cannot easily be neglected". (Emphasis mine.)

16. Modern psychologists such as Robert Thomson, *Psychology of Thinking* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1964), p. 65 are inclined to accept Nietzsche's pre-conceptual simplification. Thomson argues that the concept "flower", for example, "...indicates both the configuration that we are seeing, smelling, and touching, and also relates this present impression to an indefinite class of similar ones in the past. Thus to identify what we perceive as 'flowers' is partly being able to use a particular word. But it is primarily the making of a consistent response to a particular group of stimuli. Even if we had no words we could still learn to respond differently to a bowl of flowers and to a rattlesnake."

17. It is important to point out that Nietzsche uses the term "appearance" to mean "illusion" or "the semblance of reality". "Appearance", for Nietzsche, is the very antithesis of reality which, for him, cannot be known. There is always some illusion or appearance mixed with it. The following passages have been selected because they substantiate this claim:

The world seems [erscheint] logical to us because we have made it logical (WTP 521).

The coarser organ sees much apparent [scheinbar] equality... (WTP 511).

Our inner world, too, "appearance" [Erscheinung]! (WTP 476).

Our needs have made our senses so precise that the "same apparent world" [die "gleiche Erscheinswelt"] always reappears and has thus acquired the semblance of reality [Anschein der Wirklichkeit]. (WTP 521. Cf. WTP 524, 545).

18. According to Nietzsche, the "...initial power [i.e., the power of metaphor formation which is the fundamental drive in man] produces an equation between things that are unequal, and is thus an operation of the imagination. The existence of concepts, forms, etc. is based upon this" (PT 94). Similarly, "...a word becomes a concept insofar as it simultaneously has to fit countless more or less similar cases--which means, purely and simply, cases which are never equal and thus altogether unequal. Every concept arises from the equalization of unequal things" (PT 83).
19. It is not entirely fair to Nietzsche to identify the will to equality with the will to power in every sense of the term "equality". First, Nietzsche did not use the expression "will to power" until *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (p. 58), while his notion of the process of equalization fills his notebooks of a decade earlier. Kaufmann has dated the Nachlass passage (WTP 515) which establishes the identity of the will to power and the will to equality as 1885-86, that is, at the time of Zarathustra. Perhaps the claim that the will to equality is a distortion or perversion of the will to power finds its best support from the perspective of Zarathustra. In that text, Nietzsche argues against the will to equality when it is understood to be the will's ill will against itself. Through the spirit of revenge, the will equates the past with the future. On the grounds that the will is helpless (powerless) to retrieve the past or to relive it, insofar as the will is unable to will backwards, the past and everything within it is deemed to be without value. However, since the future and even the present will eventually become the past, they too must be deemed to be without value. Nietzsche argues against the will to equality in this regard precisely because the future hope rests on the coming of the overman. In order for the overman to be able to present the meaning of the earth, it is necessary to save the future by redeeming the past. Ergo the necessity arises for the eternal return of the same. Nietzsche's rejection of "making things equal" at the level of morality (e.g., democracy, the values of the herd, the last man), should not therefore be understood as a blanket rejection of equality in all its forms. The moral claim for equal is truly a distortion of the will to power. "For men are not equal: thus speaks justice" (Zar. p. 126). Epistemologically, the will to equality remains a "primordial procedure" (PT. 48).


22. Nietzsche is quite clear that the categories of thought, as well as the Kantian forms of intuition (space and time) have a psychological origin. "Space, time, and the feeling of causality appear to have been given along with the first sensation" (PT. 31). "Time in itself is nonsense; it exists only for a being capable of sensation. It is the same with space" (PT. 42). The fact that man perceives in Euclidean space is therefore reduced to a merely human idiosyncracy (See WTP 515). As a particular species of being, we "...have to believe in time, space, and motion..." (WTP 487). Our belief in "things" also has a psychological origin (See WTP 473). "The overwhelming human consensus regarding things proves the complete homogeneity of men's perceptual apparatus" (PT. 37). According to Nietzsche, every law of nature is ultimately anthropomorphic (See PT. 58, 87); man simply "...transports the order of which he is the physiological representative into his relations with other human beings and with things" (Twi. Four Great Errors, 2).


Charles Hanly, "Emotion, Anatomy, and the Synthetic A Priori", *Dialogue*, XIV (1975), 101-118 argues that emotion is a transformation of our perceptions of the world and that that transformation discloses some need we have to preserve mastery over the world. Although the paper is essentially a critique of Sartre's *Outline of a Theory of Emotions*, Hanly argues, in a Nietzschean way, that there is a species of the a priori which is due to the "contingent facts of the mechanics of the human sensory apparatus" (p. 117) and includes as his prime examples the structure of human emotions and space for Kant. Nietzsche allows emotion to penetrate to the very depths of perception so it is not difficult to understand that concepts have emotion as their basis. The tiny amount of emotion to which the "word" gives rise, as we contemplate similar images for which one word exists—this weak emotion is the common element, the basis of the concept. That weak sensations are regarded as alike, sensed as being the same, is the fundamental fact. (WTP 506).


Chapter III: Kant


3. For Kant, the a priori is built on a necessitarian and not a contingent foundation. Nicholas Rescher, Conceptual Idealism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973), p. xii thinks the basis for our de facto concepts is pragmatic in much the same manner as Nietzsche's line of argument. The major problem with an evolutionary account of knowledge is that evolution may just as easily have selected, reduced, falsified, or narrowed our view of the world (à la Nietzsche) than give us a more accurate and detailed account (à la Rescher). Evolution should therefore not be used to shore-up our epistemology.

4. W.H. Walsh, Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 193 (Emphasis Walsh's). The only alternative to transformation is substitution. It is not the succession of incompatible states of one and the same substance but the complete substitution of one "thing" for another. This is Nietzsche's view. Compare Ch. Perelman, An Historical Introduction to Philosophical Thinking (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 8: "...the idea of change does lead to the idea of permanence. Underlying the development of any particular thing (child--adult--old man) is a presupposition of its oneness. In spite of change, something remains constant. Belief in change is possible only if a certain permanence is granted. Without this permanence there would be substitution rather than change; one thing would replace another".


16. Wilkerson, op. cit., p. 36.
Graham Bird, Kant's Theory of Knowledge: An Outline of One Central Argument in the 'Critique of Pure Reason' (New York: Humanities Press, 1973), p. 3 says that "Prichard's main point is that Kant's term 'synthesis' refers to a construction of physical objects out of appearances, or sensations". Similarly, "...Kant speaks materially of the construction of the physical world itself, rather than formally of the construction of concepts applying to, or principles governing, such a world" (p. 8). Bird argues that Prichard's position is one in which we literally construct the world in the same way that we literally construct geometrical figures on a piece of paper. Bird shows that Kant explicitly restricts "construction" to mathematical contexts (See B 741, 867). Lastly, Prichard claims that the physical world is one of things in themselves. (See Bird, p. 3).


24. Walsh, op. cit., p. 91.

31. Roman Ingarden, "A priori Knowledge in Kant vs. A priori Knowledge in Husserl", Dialectic and Humanism, 1973, p. 6. H.J. Paton, Kant's Metaphysics of Experience (London: George, Allen and Unwin, 1968), I, 62 also claims, quite incorrectly, that the "...character of the human mind (with its human sensibility and understanding) determines (along with things-in-themselves) our common objective world. It determines in short how things-in-themselves must appear to us. For this reason the world we know is a world of appearance, a world of things as they appear, and must appear, to human minds, but not a world of these things as they are in themselves." Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), pp. 145-146 adds: "Factors that are peculiar to the realm of appearance have intervened to transform the real; and in consequence even completed knowledge of the phenomenal—if such can be conceived as possible—would not be equivalent to knowledge of things in themselves" (Emphasis mine.). A similar position is held by A.C. Ewing, A Short Commentary on Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 30: "This account of the a priori carries with it the implication that we can have knowledge only of appearances and not of reality, just as from the premise that I wear blue spectacles I could infer not that all the physical objects I see really will be blue, but that they will look blue to me."

Paton, op. cit., pp. 61 and 63 believes that things as they appear must be different from things-in-themselves because of our powers of knowing and that what we know is "...a world transformed by the necessary conditions and limitations of finite human experience". W.H. Walsh, Kant's Criticism of Experience, op. cit., p. 28 says that the "...reason why we cannot get at things in themselves in perception is, put crudely, that space and time are the forms of all our intuition, and thus as it were stand as a barrier between us and independent reality". A.W.J. Harper "On Metaphysics and Epistemology" Dialogue, XII (1973), pp. 334-335 adds: "A subjectivity of this kind [Kant's] gives no firm knowledge about objective reality, and the search for a satisfactory science of reality as such is not furthered to any great degree." Kemp Smith, op. cit., p. 146 claims: "Factors that are peculiar to the realm of appearance have intervened to transform the real; and in consequence even completed knowledge of the phenomenal—if such can be conceived as possible [undoubtedly referring to B 344] would not be equivalent to knowledge of things in themselves."


34. A.C. Ewing, op. cit., p. 30. See also pp. 30, 51 and Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity: A Commentary on the Transcendental Analytic of the 'Critique of Pure Reason' (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1973), pp. 92-93. Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (London: George, Allen and Unwin, 1974), p. 680 also uses the blue spectacle analogy. H.J. Paton (op. cit., I, 183. See also I, 166, 168FN, 168-169), imaginatively, though quite incorrectly, combines the blue spectacle analogy with Leibnizian monads. He says that "...it must be remembered that for Kant the conception of the monad has altered. His monads [unlike those of Leibniz] are not self-sufficient, and there is some sort of contact between the knower and the known. If the mind of man is a monad, it is not a windowless monad, but looks out through its windows at reality. Its windows, however, are not of transparent glass. As coloured glass imposes its colour on the objects seen, so the windows of our mind impose upon all objects sensed the forms of time and space, and it is only through these windows that we can be conscious even of ourselves.


37. Kemp Smith, op. cit., p. 204.


40. For further references to the "logic of truth", see H.J. Paton, Kant's Metaphysics of Experience (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970), I, p. 235; Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1973), p. 40 but especially to D.P. Dryer, Kant's Solution for Verification of Metaphysics (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966), pp. 75, 83-84. Dryer says, "...Kant calls Transcendental Logic a logic of truth. For it has to seek how thinking may be related to things so as to obtain knowledge of them. It must seek whether there are any necessary ways in which things must be conceived in order that they may become known." (p. 75). Dr. George J. Nathan, (in private conversations with me) understands the logic of truth to entail Kant's distinction between conception and intuition because truth, which can only be found in judgements, requires a means to both unite as well as to differentiate at every level, of cognition, viz., intuition (by space), conception, and judgement proper. With this acknowledgement, and Dr. Nathan's kind permission, I have adopted this position as well.


43. Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'* (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), p. 113 argues that space could be an inherent property of things in themselves even though it is a pure a priori form of intuition. "Kant recognizes only two alternatives, either space as objective is known a posteriori, or being an a priori representation it is subjective in origin. There exists a third alternative, namely, that though our intuition of space is subjective in origin, space is itself an inherent property of things in themselves." Kant's alternatives, viz., objective or subjective, are exhaustive and Kant demonstrates, against Kemp Smith, that if space is not objective, it cannot be an inherent property of things in themselves. A.C. Ewing, *A Short Commentary on Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 50 parrots Kemp Smith's error.


46. T.D. Weldon, *Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 170 reduces all of the subjective conditions for experience to the idiosyncrasies of our nervous sytems. "The crucial question which inevitably arises is 'Do I find these (or any other) patterns in nature, or do I just make them up, retain them if and for so long as they are useful, and discard or modify them when they fail to do the job for which I invented them?' Kant is manifestly saying the former, though with an important addition. His answer is 'You do find them; but you find them because your constitution (or central nervous system) brings it about that they really are there.'"

47. Notwithstanding, many British commentators of Kant, think that Kant is a phenomenalist of the Berkelian kind. P.F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*: An Essay on Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' (London: Methuen, 1978), p. 35 remarks that "...transcendental idealism which finally denies to the natural world any existence independent of our 'representations' or perceptions, an aspect to which I have already referred in remarking that Kant is closer to Berkeley than he acknowledges." T.E. Wilkerson, *Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'*: A Commentary for Students (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), p. 68 adds that, for Kant, "...there is the Berkeleian claim that objects of experience or phenomena are merely collections of perceptions, entirely dependent on perceivers."


49. Kant points out that the expression "outside us" is ambiguous because it has both an empirical as well as a transcendental usage. In its empirical usage, it means "things which are to be found in space"
while in its transcendental usage it means "thing-in-itself apart from us." See A 373.

50. The transcendental schema (B 177) is a representation which serves as a mediating factor between objects in the world and the pure concepts of the understanding or the categories. It is necessary to have such a mediating factor because we do not observe such categories as substance and causality in the world of experience yet the question remains: "...to show how pure concepts can be applicable to appearances" (B 178). Time serves as the transcendental schema or mediating factor because time, as a pure a priori Form of intuition, is an object of direct awareness yet not itself derived from experience. Time can therefore mediate between such "heterogeneous" elements as appearances and the categories because it is the common element in both. The transcendental schema allows us to think of objects in regards to time, that is, the pure categories are schematized by time and become concepts of time relations. Since all appearances are in time, once the categories are schematized or temporally determined, they must apply to all possible appearances. For instance, if something lasts or endures through time, then it must be thought through the schematized category of substance; the "...schema of substance is permanence of the real in time, that is, the representation of the real as a substrate of empirical determination of time in general, and so as abiding while all else changes" (B 183). Similarly, if something happens in time, then it must be thought through the schematized category of causality (Vide B 183). Since the transcendental schematism supplies the a priori rules which determine the relation of appearances to one another in one time (Vide B 174, A 177), then the schematism will establish the general principle of the analogies to be examined below.

51. Kant's definition of "appearances" as "objects of our senses" (B 51) may be misunderstood because there is nothing to prevent an object of the senses (therefore an appearance) from actually being a thing-in-itself. What Kant's arguments in the Aesthetic prove, however, is that what is an object of the senses is, in fact, an appearance, that is, it has properties which could not belong to the thing-in-itself. Thus, although Kant equates "appearances" with "objects of the senses", it must be remembered that he has excluded as a possibility that objects of the senses could be, in fact, things in themselves. Whatever presents itself to the senses must be an appearance which has properties which are not intrinsic, that is, which it could not possibly have apart from a subject. Even Kant's earlier definition of an "appearance" as the "undetermined object of an empirical intuition" (B 34) may be misunderstood because it does not directly leave out the possibility that the object of an empirical intuition is or is not a thing-in-itself. Kant's arguments show that the object of an empirical intuition could never be a thing-in-itself and must always be an appearance because certain properties which the object has, viz., its spatial and temporal properties, are subjective.

52. Kant is unquestionably ambiguous in his choice of terms in the Aesthetic. For example, he uses the term "subjectivity" to cover two, radically
distinct notions. It is only by differentiating these two notions immediately within the Aesthetic, viz., "subjectivity" as transcendental conditions and "subjectivity" as the psychological subject and its states, that the Critique itself becomes feasible and Kant's transcendental turn removes him from the charge of phenomenalism. I thank Dr. George J. Nathan for bringing this vitally important ambiguity, and the distinction it glosses, to my attention.


56. Kemp Smith, op. cit., p. 204.

57. Nicholas Rescher, "Noumenal Causality", Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress, edited by L.W. Beck (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972), pp. 462-470. Rescher explains noumenal causality by making a firm distinction between authentic causality, which follows the principle of causality among phenomena and generic grounding which Rescher claims is governed by the principle of sufficient reason. Rescher claims that the former is constitutive while the latter (a precategorical version of the former) is simply regulative.

58. Bird, op. cit., p. 79.

59. See, for example, Sadik J. Al-Azm, "Kant's Conception of the Noumenon", Dialogue, VI (1968), 516-520.

60. See Dryer, op. cit., p. 118.
61. Dryer, op. cit., p. 121.

62. Dryer, op. cit., pp. 183, 194 sets both the problem as well as Kant's solution to it quite succinctly. Dryer says that "...geometry gives us knowledge of things that we observe. Yet geometry does not explain why things that we observe must conform to the knowledge which it gives." As for Kant's solution, Dryer says, "Although judgements of geometry are verified by recourse to pure intuition of space, they hold of things that we observe about us, since we cannot observe things about us without observing them in space."

63. Dryer, op. cit., p. 86 argues convincingly that Kant views objective unity in terms of the connection of features in the object not as a simple connection of the contents of certain concepts.

64. In an earlier article, Richard S.G. Brown, "Nietzsche and Kant on Permanence", Man and World XIII (1980), pp. 39-52, I did not distinguish between the so-called soft and hard proofs and offered only the soft proof. On further reflection, it seems that only the hard proof belongs to Kant's Second Analogy.

65. D.P. Dryer, Kant's Solution for Verification in Metaphysics (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966), p. 425. Dryer outlines C.D. Broad's use of the example as an objection to Kant and refutes it. Broad however seems to think that Kant's problem was one of determining the objective order of two events. "We may now return to Kant's main argument... Since in our apprehension of an event B in time, the apprehension of B follows upon the apprehension of a previous event A, and we cannot reverse the order...". (Broad, cited in Dryer, ibid., p. 410 FN 1). Kant's problem in the Second Analogy was to determine the objective order of a single event.

66. "Creation", for Kant, means "coming to be out of nothing" (B 251), a state of affairs which cannot be an object of possible experience because it cannot be "...admitted as an event among appearances, since its mere possibility would destroy the unity of experience" (B 251). We cannot experience an absolute coming to be or passing away. Only the state of substance can come to be or pass away; substance itself is permanent.


68. Melnick, ibid., p. 141.

69. Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), pp. xix-xxv. The most serious usage of the patchwork model for an interpretation of the Critique occurs in Kemp Smith's analysis of the Transcendental Deduction in A (See pp. 202-284) in which Kemp Smith isolates pre-critical, early critical, critical, and even post-critical fragments. The result of this interpretative model is to reduce the Kantian notion of the
transcendental object to a pre-critical and therefore unimportant element in the Critique. This will be demonstrated to be incorrect.

70. Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity: A Commentary on the Transcendental Analytic of the 'Critique of Pure Reason' (Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1973), pp. 81-84 offers such a tempered and somewhat modified patchwork interpretation.


74. Dryer, ibid., p. 177.

75. Dryer, ibid., pp. 338-339.

76. Dryer, ibid., p. 176.

77. Dryer, ibid., p. 251. Wolff, op. cit., p. 76, following Kemp Smith (op. cit., pp. 251-252) argues that "...sheer consciousness itself, depends upon certain synthesizing activities of the mind. Consequently these activities must be preconscious...". According to Wolff, if consciousness depends on the threefold synthesis, then the process of synthesis must prece consciousness itself. Kant's analysis of the productive imagination is not however psychological (Compare Kant's footnote at A120). The productive imagination is a transcendental faculty and therefore Kant's analysis of the necessity of synthesis is to determine the logical priority of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition. It may well be that, as Kant claims, that we are "scarcely ever conscious" (B 103) of this imaginative process. Nonetheless, at least by abstraction, the process itself, and its three sub-divisions can be isolated. The same is also true of intuition and conception. It might be the case, as an empirical matter of fact, that they are always found together (Cf. B 350) but logically speaking they are quite distinct.

78. T.E. Wilkerson, Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason': A Commentary for Students (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), p. 94. H.A. Pritchard, see Kant's Theory of Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), pp. 231-235, equates appearances and sensations, and believes that physical objects can be reduced to sense data. Kant may be regarded as a "phenomenalist" only in his sense of the term "phenomena": "Appearances, so far as they are thought as objects according to the unity of categories, are called phaenomena" (B 305). All objects of empirical knowledge are therefore phenomena but they are also empirically real insofar as they can exist in space and time independently of the psychological subject and his states. Appearances (the undetermined objects of
empirical intuition) and phenomena (the determined appearances) are never independent of transcendental subjectivity which constitutes their very being.


81. Melnick, ibid., p. 43.

82. In the Logic (pp. 72-80), as well as in the Critique (B 848-850), Kant outlines the criteria for establishing in what ways a judgement may be held to be true. It requires, says Kant, more than simply objective grounds; there is also a need for a subjective element. For example, if a judgement is believed to be valid for everyone, it must have objective sufficiency. Holding a judgement to be true which is believed to be valid for everyone, Kant calls "conviction". However, if I alone hold some judgement to be true, even though there are objective grounds for doing so, Kant calls this mere "persuasion". "Persuasion" is an epistemological illusion because we are mistaking our subjective feeling for objective grounds. To "opine", says Kant, is to have a belief for which there is neither subjective nor objective sufficiency. To "believe" is to have before the mind a judgement which has subjective sufficiency (i.e., it is held to be true) but which lacks objective sufficiency (i.e., I have insufficient evidence for bringing conviction to others). "Knowledge" alone has both subjective and objective sufficient. Subjectively, I have conviction and so does everyone else thus, the judgement is "certain" because it claims intersubjective validity. Kant's point here is not that intersubjectivity is the criterion of truth for, at best, it can simply be a test for the truth of a proposition. If a proposition claims to be knowledge, then it must have objective sufficiency, that is, there must be grounds for establishing the truth of the judgement such that everyone who understood the grounds would also share your conviction which would result in intersubjective validity or certainty.

83. Neil Wilson, "The Two Main Problems of Philosophy", Dialogue, XII (1974), p. 213 offers the following definition: "By the 'transparency of consciousness' I mean this: If I am conscious of some thing, say a toothache, or the glare of the sun or snow, then I am conscious of being conscious of it." My claim is different but not incompatible with Wilson's. While Wilson uses "transparency" to mean that we are conscious of being conscious of X whenever we are conscious of X, I am claiming that "transparency" means that whenever we are
conscious of X, then X appears to consciousness exactly as it is and is exactly as it appears to be.


86. This is an important point for Kant. As W.H. Walsh rightly claims ("Kant", The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by P. Edwards (New York: Collier Macmillan, 1972), IV, p. 312): "An objective connection for Kant is a connection determined by a rule, and a rule is of its nature something that claims inter-subjectivity." Walsh is not abundantly clear on the distinction which Kant makes between objective and subjective judgements but Ken Dorter, "Epistemology and Ontology", Dialogue, XIII (1974), pp. 113-114 puts the intersubjectivity of claims in the correct Kantian framework by arguing that claims are true not because they are common, shared, or intersubjective but it is precisely only insofar as they are true, i.e., have objective validity that they can be shared.

87. George Gale, "Are Some Aesthetic Judgements Empirically True?", American Philosophical Quarterly, XII (1975), pp. 341-348 outlines the descriptive predicates used in the appraisal of wine and demonstrates the objectivity of taste.

88. Kant defines "intuition" as that mode of knowledge which "...relates immediately to the object and is single" (B 377). This definition is general enough to allow Kant to define three kinds of intuition: intellectual (B 72), pure (B 35), and empirical. Space and time are pure intuitions insofar as both are immediately given and single but space and time as such are really never given per se. In other words, we are aware of space and time only as they are given in empirical intuition. In this sense, pure intuition is a conceptual abstraction for "...if we abstract from these objects [viz., objects intuited as outside us], it is a pure intuition, and bears the name of space" (B 43). For the "looks-is" distinction, I am claiming that it is at least logically possible to distinguish the immediate from the mediate in perception, the immediate being the equivalent to Kant's empirical intuition. See Kant's Logic, p. 38.

89. See Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. Mary J. Gregor (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), pp. 21-30 in which Kant argues against three accusations against the senses: 1) that the senses cause disorder; 2) that the senses lay down the law to the understanding; 3) that the senses deceive us.
90. D.P. Dryer, *Kant's Solution for Verification in Metaphysics* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966), p. 87 says "A judgement is true only if it corresponds to that to which it refers. This Kant never questions." Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'* (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), pp. xxvii, 36-38 argues that Kant held a coherence theory of truth. Coherence may well have been a test for empirical truth. Kant says that "...everything is real that stands in connection with a perception in accordance with the laws of empirical advance" (B 521). In this way, we can know about inhabitants in the moon and the historical past. We know the past by means of a causal regression of possible observation which form a coherent system according to empirical laws (See B 273, 523, 860).

91. Aristotle was the first to state explicitly that it is a necessary condition of a thought's being true that it should be a combination of what is combined in reality. See *Metaphysics*: 1011b25-29, 1024b17ff, 1027b18-19; *Categories*: 2a4-10; *De Anima*: 430a26-30; *De Interpretatione*: 16a12-18.

92. What makes the content of the proposition "The book is red" true is that it is a fact. A fact however is ontologically neutral because the fact itself must be explained by our ontology. The ontology explains the way the world must actually be so that certain things will be factual. If we are correct about the way things are (ontology), it will explain the way things look. However, the ontological implications of facts are not readily apparent and a sharp distinction must be drawn between facts and the ontological elements which support them. Facts tell us what is true and are explanatory. To be genuinely explanatory, facts must be stated propositionally thereby meeting those semantic conditions which allow for the correct application of predicates to subjects. "The book is red", for example, is such a fact. That facts are epistemological in nature yet rest on ontological or objective states of affairs is best illustrated by an example such as the factual claim that "The average Canadian family has 2.3 children." There are no ".3" children in our ontology nor does the truth of the proposition stand on there being 2.3 children per household. However, the truth of the proposition does stand on something else which is part of our ontology, viz., the number of children there actually are divided by the number of households with children. True propositions must always be about something.


The Appendices.

The central thesis in the chapter on Nietzsche is the demonstration of the importance which Nietzsche places on permanence and causality. Nietzsche understands them to be the most fundamental values which can be imposed, posited, or projected by means of our sensual-spiritual appropriation, i.e., prejudices of sense and reason. References to these particular values have therefore been collected and collated in the following Appendices (especially from Nachlass material from the 1880's--WTP) in order to help substantiate and to emphasize the importance of these specific values in Nietzsche's philosophy. The Appendices therefore serve three interdependent functions: 1) they demonstrate the centrality of permanence and causality in Nietzsche's thought as well as their subsidiary concepts (ego, being, equality); 2) they outline the principles for the application of these values and give Nietzsche's own equations for such principles; 3) they give immediate reference to specific terms used by Nietzsche in a technical sense. Outside of this framework, I have included a selection of passages from the notebooks of the 1870's (Appendix XV) which give valuable reflection on the above material from an earlier perspective. Whenever necessary, reference to the German original has been included so that the English terms used can be seen to have the same German original.
Nietzsche equates "creative positing" (schöpferischen Setzen) with:

1) forming (Bilden), shaping (Gestalten), overcoming (Überwältigen), and willing (Wollen). 605
2) the essence of philosophy. 605
3) the introduction of meaning (Sinn hineinlegen). 605
4) active interpretation (Ausdeutung der Tat) as opposed to conceptual translation (begriiffliche Umdichtung). 605
5) molding facts (einformen). 605 ("There are no 'facts in themselves', for a sense (Sinn) must always be projected (hineinlegen) into them before they can be 'facts'. 556)

According to Nietzsche, we posit a general framework in which specific values and meanings can be posited. The general framework constitutes principles of reification, i.e., ways in which the chaos of the given manifold can be made permanent and manageable. Under each verb used by Nietzsche as synonyms for "positing", the same general framework of principles of reification can be found basically following the formula that "...the prejudice of reason forces us to posit [ansetzen] unity, identity, permanence, substance, cause, thinghood, being...". Twi, 'Reason in Phil.', 5.

a) general framework: "To impose (aufprägen) upon becoming the character of being -- that is the supreme will to power." 617

to posit (setzen) a crude world of stability. 715
things. 569
magnitudes by which we measure the world, viz., the unconditional, ends and means, things, substances, logical laws, numbers and forms. 574
fixed magnitudes. 666
a goal, 23
a why. 23
a meaning. (Sinn). 35
an ultimate meaning. (Sinn). 35
as realities all those hypostases: substance, attribute, object, subject, action... 516

to posit (ansetzen) the atom. 636
values. 390
our belief in the concept of substance as true a priori. 484
b) ego:

**to posit (setzen)**
- an interpreter behind the interpretation. 481
- the ego (through thought). 483
- ego (as primeval fact). 581
- soul (as primeval fact). 581
- spirit (as cause of coordination -- a certain unity in the group of things). 526
- a will. 35
- purposes (by the ego). 676
- activity (as activity of a subject). 531
- himself (as equal to other individuals). 784

**to posit (ansetzen)**
- a mass of psychological entities that are supposed to be causes. 135
- general purpose. 707
- that which acts. 521
- that towards which the act is directed. 521
- our belief in the concept of substance (as true a priori). 484
- consciousness (as aim and wherefore of life). 707
- consciousness (as standard and condition of life with supreme value). 707
- himself (as the meaning and measure of the value of things). 12

c) causality:

**to posit (setzen)**
- necessity of change. 1064
- belief (as the cause of mechanistic motion). 670
- "affects" as causes for our feelings. 670
- activity as activity of a subject. 531
- spirit as cause of coordination -- a certain unity in the grouping of things). 526
- capacity and capability of the intellect. 533
- a why. 23
- a will. 35
- a purpose. 35
- purposes (by the go). 676

**to posit (ansetzen)**
- that recurrence of changes. 545
- any organization in all events. 12
- any organization under all events. 12
- that which acts. 521
- that towards which the act is directed. 521
- a mass of psychological entities that are supposed to be causes. 135
consciousness as aim and wherefore of life. 707
general purpose. 707

d) equality:

to posit (gleichsetzen) as equal. 510
equality (as a precondition of thought, judgement, perception). 501

to posit (setzen) fixed magnitudes. 666
himself (as equal to other individuals). 784

to posit (ansetzen) that the limits of the logician are the limits of things. 535

e) goals:

to posit (setzen) goals. 605
goals for oneself. 23, 898
ends and means. 707
the happiness of repose (as a goal for the world). 464
the ideal. 304

to posit (ansetzen) goals for oneself. 358
the ideal. 17

f) specific values:

to posit (ansetzen) evil (posited either by an individual or by a culture). 1025
God (the antithesis of evil). 576
the good (as supreme desideratum). 351
the beautiful. 804
the ugly. 804
truth. 804
pleasure. 707.
pleasure/displeasure (as cardinal facts). 693
instinct of preservation (as cardinal drive). 650
the value of man (as moral value). 288
the moral value of depersonalization. 382
consciousness (as standard and condition of life with supreme value). 707
spirituality, morality, any particular of the sphere of consciousness (as the highest value). 707
degrees of reality. 586

to posit (setzen) power. 688
summation of displeasure and unlogic (which devalues the value of becoming). 708
g) miscellaneous:

art, politics, moral thought, logic are called "posittings of value" (Wertsetzungen), "creations of value" (Wertschöpfungen) BGE 211

value positing (wertsetzen). 14, 19, 707
value-positer (Wert-Ansetzer). 13

to posit (voranstellen) a crude unity. 704
to posit (zur Setzung) and arrange (zur Zurechtmachung) a world that shall be called true by us. 516

The 'conscious world' cannot serve as a starting point for values: need for an 'objective' positing of values [Wertsetzung].
Appendix II: project

("project" as the English translation of "projizieren").

a) permanence:

we project being = faith in ego-substance Twi reason 5
some value into the world (via categories: aim, unity, being) 12
the conditions of our preservation (as predicates of being in general) 507
the idea of spirit, reason, logic (into and behind things) 524
man's drive to truth, his "goal" qua a world that has being 552
qua a metaphysical world 552
qua a thing-in-itself 552
qua a world already in existence 552
the measure of value in general 204
our "outer world" 479

b) causality:

an effect from outside qua cause of what we are conscious of 479
a condition that accompanies an effect (as sufficient reason for event) 689
the inferred and imagined cause (of unconscious effect) 490
cause (out of ourselves in order to understand an event) 551
a law of causality (into every event, by us) 551

c) specific values:

experiences (to the sphere of "in-itself") 579
the victory of unnaturalness into the future as conclusion 204
pain, to a part of the body where it is not situated 479
pain, (intellectual and dependent upon the judgement "harmful") 490
sense perceptions (inside/outside?) 500

1. "Man projects his drive to truth, his 'goal' in a certain sense, outside himself as a world that has being, as a metaphysical world, as a 'thing-in-itself', as a world already in existence. His needs as creator invent the world upon which he works, anticipates it..." WTP 552. Nietzsche uses the concept "project" within the same framework as "posit" and the other axiological verbs, viz., to project being, substance, causality, and value-meaning.

2. Cf. "We must always project the world against the background of nothingness, and we ourselves are a human project within nothingness." William Barrett, What is Existentialism (New York: Grove Press, 1964), p. 187.

3. Cf. "We may say that our perceptual experience is a kind of 'projection' of events in our environmental world (external as well as internal)...". Herbert V. Guenther, Buddhist Philosophy: In Theory and Practice (Baltimore: Penguin, 1972), p. 127.
d) miscellaneous ("project" as the English translation):

(hineininterpretieren) the reality of things (after the model of the subject) into a medley of sensations. 552
(hineinlegen) a sense into facts to make them facts. 556
(hineinlegen) antithesis into things. 124
(einlegen) the categories "aim", "unity", "being" which put value into the world. 12
(verlegen) the feeling of a social order of rank into the universe. 579
(hineindichten) substance into things. 562
(hineindichten) force into things. 562
(hinausprojizieren) this pleasant feeling in us. 319
(hineinspiegeln) their own honourable stupidity and goodness. 320
(Sinn legen) meaning into history. 1011
(Einmischung) the concept of punishment is a projection into the physical and metaphysical world. 1021
(die Projektion) of the ideal into the antinatural, anti-actual, illogical. 341
(Dahinter-Gestecktes) the subject behind what there is. 481
Appendix III: perspective

a) kinds of perspective (e.g., moralistic perspective*):

- moralistic * 530
- psychological 569
- hedonistic 781
- dysdaemonistic 666
- necessary 636, 927
- definite 259
- corner 823, 444
- foreground 804

b) kinds of perspective (e.g., perspective* of interpretation):

- * of interpretation 678
- of utility 12
- of the foreground 804
- of what tends to preserve 789
- of evaluation 779, 780
- of moral problems 41
- of Darwinism 253
- of psychology 288
- of the theory of affects 462
- of consciousness 528, 636
- of outlook 473
- of extreme altruism 786

- * of a parte ad totum 707
- of utility 12
- of the audience 811
- of the critic 811
- of society 927
- of the metaphor of nourishment 71
- of growth 134
- of worship 177
- of blessedness 222
- of good conscience 253
- of personalization 339

In so far as the word "knowledge" has any meaning, the world is knowable; but it is interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings. -- "Perspectivism". 481; GM III, 12.

In place of "epistemology", a perspective theory of affects....462

It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their For and Against. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm. 481

In short, we also gain a valuation of not-knowing, of seeing things on a broad scale, of simplification and falsification, of perspectivity. 492

Insight: all evaluation is made from a definite perspective: that of the preservation of the individual, a community, a race, a state, a church, a faith, a culture. --Because we forget that valuation is always from a perspective.... 259
Our values are interpreted into things [hineininterpretiert]. Is there then any meaning [Sinn] in the in-itself?! Is meaning not necessarily relative meaning and perspective? All meaning is will to power (all relative meaning resolves itself into it). 590

...this necessary perspectivism by virtue of which every center of force--and not only man--construes all the rest of the world from its own viewpoint, i.e., measures, feels, forms, according to its own force--they forgot to include this perspective-setting force in "true being"--in school language: the subject. 636

...perspective, the basic condition of all life... . BGE preface; BGE 34; BT Attempt 5

The perspective therefore decides the character of the "appearance"! As if the world would remain over after one deducted the perspective! 567 (cf. 560, 636).

d) equations:

- value = a point of view = just a perspective 711
- perspective valuations = the will to power 608
- perspective valuations = interpretations 616; JW V, 374
- valuations = consequences and narrow perspectives 675
- perspectivism = only a complex form of specificity

e) miscellaneous:

- Perspectivism = only a complex form of specificity 636
- from perspective grounds of practicality and utility, we introduce units, "beings" 715
- beings are part of our perspective 517
- perspective illusion 518, cf. 636
- perspective point of view 678
- perspectives for all things 556
- our perspective "truths" which belong to us alone 565
- this perspective world 602
- perspective-setting force 636
- every centre of force adopts a perspective toward the entire remainder 567
- perspectival appearance 15, cf. 567
- [things are said to be] conditioned by perspective 272
- all that is expressed is a perspective 293
- each one [drive] has its perspective 481
- number qua perspective form 490
add (Hinzu-Erdichten) the subject behind what there is. 481
ascribe (zusprechen) reality to things in general. 487
adjust (zurechtmachen) states, so as to make them similar. 485
adjust (gleichmachen)\(^1\) sense impressions, so as to make them similar. 515
adapt (zurechtmachen) the material of the senses by the understanding. 526, 569
assume (annehmen) beings in order to think and infer. 517\(^2\)
arrange (zurechtmachen) everything of which we become conscious. 477
appearance is an arranged and simplified world. 568
a world that shall be called true by us. 516
by compulsion, a world for ourselves. 521
appropriate (aneignen) = the desire to overwhelm, form, shape, reform, assimilate. 656
the drive to appropriate and conquer = the drive to knowledge. 423
= making manageable. 423
the sensual-spiritual. 473
assimilate (einverleiben) = the desire to overwhelm, form, shape, reform, appropriate. 656
blow up (bauschen) our needs into cosmic and metaphysical values. 27
build (bauen) the existing world so that it appears durable. 1046
bluten (vercumpfen) = thin down, shroud, sweeten, falsify, transcendentalize, deify. BGE 39, 59; cf. JW IV, 326; Zar. 45
create (schaffen) concepts. 409
for themselves a right to affirm certain things as irrefutable. 251
similarity between different states. 485
reality, the concept "reality". 516
a world that is calculable, simplified, comprehensible. 521
the thing, the identical thing, the subject, attribute, activity, substance, form. 521
our apparent world. 569
thingness. 569
construct (Konstruktion) by the intellect, "affects" as the cause of our feelings. 670
construct (bilden) concepts, by compulsion. 521\(^3\)
construct (zurechtbilden) thought = the construction of identical cases. 544
condition (bedingen) sense impressions by the inner world. 479
subjectively condition the world. 583
conceal (verbergen) reality. 453
confuse (verwechseln) cause and effect. 44
construe (konstrulieren) the world in our image. 116

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\(^1\)Our making states and sense impressions similar or equal is what generates our notion of "subject".

\(^2\)The notion of "beings" is derived through imposing equality.

\(^3\)The notions of concept, law, species, form and purpose are derived through equalization.
comprehend (begreifen) only a world that we have made. 495, 520, 521
classify (aufreihen) phenomena into definite categories. 517
courses (vergröbern) our sense activities, by compulsion. 485, 515, 521.
conquer (überwältigen) the drive to appropriate and conquer. 423
calculate (rechnen) the world we create. 521, 569

establish (feststellen) = to come to know. 555
emphasize (unterstreichen) our sense activities. 485, 515, 521
elaborate (ausdichten) our sense activities. 485, 515, 521

falsify (falschen) reality. 453
    things and thoughts. 424
    our apparent world. 569
    = thin down, shroud, sweeten, blunten. BGE 59
fabricate (machen) subject, object, attribute. 549
fabricate (ziern) a true world from psychological needs. 12
filter (durchsieben) a desire of the heart and make it abstract. BGE 5
form (formen) = overwhelm, shape, reform, appropriate, assimilate. 656
give (unterschieben) a false reality to a fiction. 521

imagine (see Appendix VI)
impose (aufprägen) the character of being upon becoming. 617
impose (setzen) meaning. 556
impose (sich stellen) duties on himself. 872
infuse (legen) a transfiguration and fullness into things. 801
introduce (hineinlegen) durable, ultimate units. 715
    the postulates of logic into events. 521
import (hineinstecken) whatever man finds in things. 606
interpret (auslegen) everything of which we become conscious. 477
    our outer world by means of the schematism of things. 480

invent (erfinden) a world beyond. 12
    the abstractly perfect man. 430
    the ideal of man by Christianity. 252
    a reason. Invent = rationalization. 414
    the reality of things after the model of the subject. 555
    thingness. 561
    the ego, by thought. 574

invent (erdichten) a world where one is at home. 430
    a world, so this world can be slandered. 461
    a world, invented by a lie. 461
    the subject, behind what there is. 481
    categories. 513
    the world upon which he works. 552

invent (tingieren) thingness. 558
logicize (logisieren) the fuzziness and chaos of sense impressions. 569
our apparent world. 569
as a life expedient. 552

make (machen) concepts. 409
we can comprehend only a world that we ourselves have
made. 495, 520, 521
make similar (gleichsetzen) states that are not similar. 485, 515
make similar (ähnlich machen) the material of the senses. 569
make similar (zurechtmachen) states that are not similar. 485
measure (messen) the will to measure = to simplify. 1050

overwhelm (überwältigen) = form, shape, reform, appropriate. 656
organize (organisieren). 526

posit (see Appendix I)
project (see Appendix II)
perspective (see Appendix III)
postulate (ansetzen) the improvement of mankind. 393
poetize (dichten) about things. 801

read (hineinsehen) something else into the heart of things. 320
reform (umschaffen) the world of thought into things. 574
reduce (reducieren) the material of the senses to rough outlines. 569
rationalize (rationalisieren) as a life expedient. 552
= to invent a reason. 414.

shroud (verhüllen) = to thin down, sweeten, blunten, falsify. BGE 59
submit (einordnen) to rule and concept = Apollo. 1050
schematize (schematisieren) everything of which we become conscious. 477
our outer world. 480
via subject, object, attribute. 549
via regularity and form upon chaos. 515
sweeten (versüßen) = thin down, shroud, falsify, blunten. BGE 59
shape (formen) things according to our wish. 495
= to overwhelm, reform, appropriate. 656
subsume (subsumieren) material of the senses. 569
for the purpose of calculation. 515
super-add (hinzuerfinden) atoms as things. 551
a cause to events. 551
simplify (vereinfachen) everything of which we become conscious. 477
appearance is a simplified world. 568
our sense activities, by compulsion. 485, 515
= to make comprehensible. 521
synthesize (synthesieren) the ego. 371
values and goals. 23
things. 551, 524, 489
systematize (systematisieren) as a life expedient. 526, 552
unify (vereinigen) things. 551, 524, 489
Appendix V: categories

a) being in general: (principles of reification). The notion of "substance" is derived from "ego". 485, 488, 518, 524, 552, 635. See also the chapter on "Ego".

ego: 483, 574, 581, 635.
subject: 485, 518, 517, 550, 556, 589, 635.
substance: Twi. reason 2, 5; 484, 485, 513, 517, 531, 574, 624.
thing: Twi. reason 2, 5; JW III, 110; 479, 516, 521, 556, 569, 574, 624, 634, 635, 715.
being: Twi. reason 5; 128, 507, 513, 517, 552, 585a, 715, 1050.
object: 513, 589.
permanence: Twi, reason 2, 5; 715.
individuals: 520
unity: Twi, reason 2, 5; 12B, 561, 635.
atoms: 551, 624, 635, 636, 715.
unconditional: 574, 624.

b) causality:

thing [interpretation by causality] = sum of its effects (that remain constant) 635.

ego is primary therefore cause/effect related to ego is primary 550.

cause-effect: JW III, 121; 520, 550, 589, 635.

activity: 531, [activity = the separation of cause/effect] 635.
acting-suffering: 531, 635.
aim: 12B.
purpose: 35, 521, 676.
ends and means: 574, 589, 707.
motion: JW III, 121; 635.

conditions of causality, viz., space and time: JW V, 374; 487, 515, 520, 545, 578, 862, 1064.

C) principles derived from reification.

logical laws:

principle of identity: 516, 520, 530.
identical cases: Twi, reason 5; JW III, 121; 499, 501, 515, 521.
principle of non-contradiction: 530 (generated from one identical thing)
aids in forming identical things:

form: JW III, 109, 121; 521, 574
structure: JW III, 109
number: 574, 635
species: 521
concepts: 521

origin of the categories:

categories are not true [i.e., are not a priori] 507, 513, 584, 862

categories are empirical [i.e., have a sensual origin] 488

categories are invented 513, 574, 624

"...we have projected the conditions of our preservation as predicates of being in general." 507

therefore by need: 259, 505, 515, 516, 580, 715
by usefulness: 507, 514, 568, 584

e) "Die Moral" - synonyms for Nietzschean categories:

a system of evaluation 256
scheme of interpretation 270
system of systematic falsification 584
aesthetic humanities JW III, 109
perspektivischen Formen JW V, 374
Vorhaltens - Vorschläge (councils of behaviour) BGE 198
schemes of behaviour 480
Glaubensartikel (articles of faith) JW III, 110
recolative articles of faith 530
erroneous fundamental conceptions HAH I, 16
ruling idea 862
horizon drawn around oneself Use 7
human idiosyncrasy (common or shared Furchtsamkeit) 565
"Apollo" or "art" qua metaphysical supplement placed beside the given GT24
Appendix VI: imagine

dichten (to poetize) .......................... 544
erdichten (to invent freely) .................. BGE 192
cinbilden (to imagine) ......................... Twi. Imrovers, 1
zurechtendichten (to invent for a specific purpose) HAH I, preface
fingieren (to simulate; to feign) ................ HAH I, 19

a) permanence:

we imagine [fingieren] beings, unities, which do not exist HAH 19
we imagine truth, reality, substantiality in general 485
we imagine that our compulsion to make concepts and arrange
our world is connected with truth 521
world of the philosopher is imaginary because nothing is 570
everything simple is merely imaginary 536
the origin of things and its qualities is work of that which
imagines, thinks, wills, feels 556
imagine another world 579
imagine another life 141 (cf. 215)

b) causality:

the actual process of inner "perception", the causal connection
between thoughts, feelings, desires, between subject and
object (perhaps purely imaginary) 477
"I" causes "thought" has an imaginary origin 483
in concert with I (powerful drives seek compensation) by turning
inward 376
imagined cause is projected 490
the act is imagined (viz., thinking) = the spirit as that which
thinks as the subject-substratum for the act 477
the cause is imagined after the effect has taken place 479

c) equations:

to know = to believe = to fancy (einbilden) JW 354
to invent (erfinden) = to make up (erdichten) JBE 192
to experience (erleben) = to fancy (erdichten) Dawn 119
to imagine (zurechtendichten) = to counterfeit (zurechtfälschen) HAH I, preface
= to manufacture (künstlich erzwingen)

W. Kaufmann points out (WTP 544 FN) that "dichten" usually means "to write
poetry" but adds that Nietzsche "... also means to stress the quasi-poetic
function of the imagination."

1
Appendix VII: language

a) permanence:

Root idea of substance in language, not in beings outside us (WTP 562).

Linguistic means of expression are useless for expressing "becoming"; it accords with our inevitable need to preserve ourselves to posit a crude world of stability, of "things", etc. (WTP 715).

Linguistic legislation yields a regularly valid and obligatory designation of things (On Truth and Lie, p. 44).

Our senses and language seduce us. Subject, object, a doer added to the doing, the doing separated from that which it does: let us not forget that this is more semeitics [pathology concerned with symptoms] and nothing more (WTP 634).

"Seduction of grammar" = necessary condition for subject-object dichotomy (BGE 20, 227).

Language = the grammar of the subject-object dichotomy = metaphysics of the people (JW 354).

b) causality:

There are neither causes nor effects. Linguistically we do not know how to rid ourselves of them (WTP 551).

The concept "causa" is only a means of expression, nothing more; a means of description (WTP 645).

Our senses and language seduce us. Subject, object, a doer added to the doing, the doing separated from that which it does: let us not forget that this is more semeitics [pathology concerned with symptoms] and nothing real (WTP 634).

c) ego:

We think that there is a 'subject' because of the seduction of language and the fundamental errors of reason that are petrified in it. GM I, 13.

Thinking is an activity; activity needs an agent; therefore there is an ego which thinks = a grammatical habit (BGE 17).

1 Nietzsche's formation of the problem follows Theaetetus (152e, 157b, 183ab) and Cratylus (411bc). Knowledge has to do with Being, language has to do with knowledge, therefore language has to do with Being and language is really inadequate to describe Becoming. This means essentially that there can be no truth statements given a metaphysics of pure change. It also implies that because we have language, we do seem to have a metaphysics of permanence.
Will = a unit only as a word (BGE 19).
Ego = a play on words (Twi. Four Great Errors, 3).

And what ultimately do we know of ourselves? And how the spirit that leads us would like to be called? (It is a matter of names.) (BGE 277).

Our senses and language seduce us. Subject, object, a doer added to the doing, the doing separated from that which it does: let us not forget that this is mere semeitics [pathology concerned with symptoms] and nothing more (WTP 634).

d) principles:

Language contains a hidden philosophical mythology, which, however careful we may be, breaks out afresh at every moment (HAH II, Wander 11).

Moralities [Nietzschean categories] are also merely a sign language of the affects (BGE 187).

Morality is mere sign language, mere symptomatology (Twi, VII, 1).

My attempt to understand moral judgements as symptoms and sign language which betrays the processes of physiological prosperity or failure (WTP 258).

Only this conscious thinking takes the form of words, which is to say signs of communication... (JW 354).

Concepts and words are our inheritance from ages in which thinking was very modest and unclear (WTP 409).

Affinity of Greek, German, Indian languages = affinity of Greek, German, Indian philosophy (BGE 20).

All our words refer to fictions (WTP 676).

We think only in the form of languages (WTP 552).

Think only with available words (Dawn 257).

Even our thoughts we are unable to render completely in words (JW III, 244).

Concepts are possible only when there are words (WTP 506).

Words = sign for concepts = sign for recurring and associate groups of sensations (BGE 268).

See also Dawn 423; JW III, 58; GM I, 13; Zar. 84; BGE 16 FN, 24; Twi, Reason 5; WTP 228, 484.
Appendix VIII: world

"world"  1. the sum of appearances; the totality of both beings and meaning-horizons
2. a formal system constructed and governed on principles having a thoroughgoing interconnection

a) world qua real:

world set in a definite space WTP 1067

b) world qua ideal:

world = result of a mass of errors and fantasies HAH I, 16.
world = a work of art that gives birth to itself WTP 796.
["Art as the will to overcome becoming, as 'eternalization'..."
WTP 617; "Philosophy is the tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to the 'creation of the world'..."
BGE 9.]
*the world, apart from our condition of living in it, the world that we have not reduced to our being, our logic and psychological prejudices, does not exist as a world "in-itself"... WTP 568.

the existing world, upon which all earthly living things have worked so that it appears as it does (durable and changing slowly), we want to go on building--and not criticize it away as false! WTP 1046.
[appearance = an arranged and simplified world at which our practical instincts have been at work. WTP 568].

we have arranged for ourselves a world in which we can live--by the postulating of bodies, lines, surfaces, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and content: without these articles of faith no one could manage to live at present! JW III, 121.

c) creation of the world:

created by us Zar. 86
creates a fictitious world WTP 586
simplified, thoroughly artificial, suitably constructed and falsified world BGE 24.
we can comprehend only a world which we ourselves have made [by our "shaping will"] WTP 495.
world includes infinite interpretations JW V, 374.
Appendix IX: causality

cause/effect = conventional fictions BGE 21 [i.e., not explanations but interpretations]

cause/effect = useful unreality 711
cause/effect = perception of regular sequence in the intellect Dawn 121
cause/effect given by language [otherwise there is none] 551, 645, 631
cause/effect based on our perspectival form [how we experience time] JWV, 374

we project cause and sequence BGE 21
we super-add causality to events 551
causality = our inability to interpret events otherwise than as events caused by intentions 550

causality is a less fundamental perspective than space/time JW V, 374

everywhere 'being' is projected by thought, pushed underneath, as the cause
Twi. Reason, 5; 507, 585a, 552, 1050.

thing = a fixed unity 538
thing = a caused unity [to make the world calculable] 635
thing = interpretation unity by causality = sum of its effects (551) that remain constant (635)

we create things by making identical 521
we create things by making self-identical 574

we confuse cause and effect 42, 44, 334, 380

regularity and calculability [invariable order] are not necessary 552, 689
belief in causality not founded on regularity and invariable order 550
things do not behave regularly, according to a rule 551, 634

"The calculability of an event does not reside in the fact that a rule is adhered to, or that a necessity is obeyed, or that a law of causality has been projected by us into every event: it resides in the recurrence of 'identical cases'" WTP 551.

"...habit (not only that of the individual!) makes us expect that a certain often-observed occurrence will follow another: nothing more!" WTP 550
Appendix X: permanence

There are no durable ultimate units, no atoms, no monads: here, too, "beings" are only introduced by us (from perspective grounds of practicality and utility). 715.

Suppose all unity were unity only as organization? 561
All unity is unity only as organization and co-operation. 561. Cf. 585

we, as it were, attribute being. 552
"beings" are part of our perspective 517

to impose upon becoming the character of being--that is the supreme will to power. 617

...the will to truth is merely the desire for a world of the constant. 585a

Will to truth is making firm, a making true and durable, an abolition of the false character of things, a reinterpretation of it into beings. 'Truth' is therefore not something there, that might be found or discovered--but something that must be created and that gives a name to a process, or rather to a will to overcome that has in itself no end..it is a word for the will to power. 552

we posit stability, things, durable units. 715

Art as the will to overcome becoming, as 'eternalization', but shortsighted, depending on the perspective: repeating in miniature as it were the tendency of the whole. 617

...the artist's work...the symbol of the eternally constant HAH, I, 222.

Art embellishes life by concealing and transforming HAH, II, 174.

The concept of substance is a consequence of the concept of subject: not the reverse. 485

It is only after the model of the subject that we have invented the reality of things and projected them into the medley of sensations. 552

the essence of judgement = the will to power. 511

will to equality = the will to power. 511

The origin of "things" is wholly the work of that which imagines, thinks, wills, feels. The concept "thing" itself just as much as all its qualities. -- Even "the subject" is such a created entity, a "thing" like all the others: a simplification with the object of defining the force which posits, invents, thinks, as distinct from an individual positing, inventing, thinking as such. 556

We need "unities" in order to be able to reckon: does that not mean we must suppose that such unities exist. We have borrowed the concept of unity from our "ego" concept--our oldest article of faith. If we did not hold ourselves to be unities, we would never have formed the concept "thing". Now, somewhat late, we are firmly convinced that our conception of the ego does not guarantee any actual unity. 635. See also Twi. Reason. 5.
Appendix XI: ego

inner world is complex (523) and atomistic (478, 682)

something makes consciousness a unity (485, 518, 523, 529)
something makes consciousness a cause (529)

ego as a causal unity is a fiction (370, 480, 481, 485, 529, 552, G IV, 3).

ego as a causal unity is a "habitual and indispensible" fiction (483) which is posited by thought.

consciousness and ego = tools for something greater (676, JW V, 354).

conscious world of feelings, intentions, and valuations is small part of organism (707. See also JW IV, 333; 526, 474).

Who interprets? -- Our affects. 254
One may not ask: "Who then interprets?" for the interpretation itself is a form of the will to power, exists (but not as a "being" but as a process, a becoming) as an affect. 556

body am I entirely Zar. 34; JW V, 354; 526

If it is not the ego or subject (both posited) which posits, then there is an "element" or "fundamental activity" that posits (533, 569) and that gives meaning (HAH I, 215).

the intellect posits 553, 569

"thought" invents ego and reforms world 574
our shaping will 495
subject = a perspective-setting force 636
the inventive force that invented categories 513
something which makes identical, course, simple 521
thinning and reducing machine 1045 (See also 503, 517, 521).
understand "adopts" material of the senses 569
no subject but an action, a positing, creative 617

ego = a conceptual synthesis 371, 524
ego = a perspective illusion (i.e., an apparent unity that encloses everything like a horizon) 518

perspectivism demands that every center of force construes all the rest of the world from its own viewpoint 636.

If we did not hold ourselves to be unities, we could never have formed our concept "thing". 635
faith in ego-substance allows us to project "being". Twi Reason 5
faith in ego-substance = false substantialization of the ego 786
"ego" precedes being, substance, permanence 518, 485, 524, 552, 635, 488

The concept 'reality', 'being' is taken from our feeling of the 'subject'.
The subject': interpreted from within ourselves, so that the ego counts
as a substance, as a cause of all deeds, as a doer.
The logical-metaphysical postulates, the belief in substance, accident,
attribute, etc., derive their convincing force from our habit of regarding
all our deeds as consequences of our will--as that the ego, as substance,
does not vanish in the multiplicity of change. 488

The origin of "things" is wholly the work of that which imagines, thinks,
feels, wills. The concept "thing" itself just as much as all its qualities.--
Even "the subject" is such a created entity, a "thing" like all the others:
a simplification with the object of defining the force which posits, invents,
thinks, as distinct from an individual, positing, inventing, thinking as such.
556

We need "unities" in order to be able to reckon: that does not mean we must
suppose that such unities exist. We have borrowed the concept of unity from
our "ego" concept--our oldest article of faith. If we did not hold ourselves
to be unities, we would never have formed the concept "thing". Now somewhat
late, we are firmly convinced that our conception of the go does not guarantee
any actual unity. 635. See also Twi. Reason, 5.

there is no 'being' behind doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely
a fiction added to the deed--the deed is everything. GM I, 13.1

If I say "lightning flashes", I have posited the flash once as an activity
and a second time as a subject, and thus added to the event a being that is not
one with the event but is rather fixed, is, and does not "become". -- To re­
gard an event as an "effecting", and this as being, that is the double error,
or interpretation, of which we are guilty. 531 (See also 548)

...first an act is imagined which simply does not occur, "thinking", and
secondly a subject-substratum in which every act of thinking, and nothing else,
has its origin: that is to say, both the deed and the doer are fictions. 477

It thinks; but that this 'it' is precisely the famous old 'ego' is, to put it
mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an "immediate
certainty". BGE 16.1

1Compare: "Substance of a Spirit is that it acts, causes, wills, operates,
or if you please (to avoid the quibble that may be made on the word it) to
act, cause, will, operate". Berkeley's Philosophical Writings, edited by
If there "is only one being, the ego" and all other "being" is fashioned after its model -- if, finally, belief in the "ego" stands or falls with belief in logic, i.e., the metaphysical truth of the categories of reason; if, on the other hand, the ego proves to be something in the state of becoming: then --. 519. (See also 487, 550, 517, 518).

When one has grasped that the "subject" is not something that creates effects, but only a fiction, much follows. It is only after the model of the subject that we have invented the reality of things and projected them into the medley of sensations. 552

The concept of substance is a consequence of the concept of the subject: not the reverse. 485.
Appendix XII: necessity

we have an inevitable need to preserve ourselves therefore we must posit [setzen] a crude world of stability, of things, etc. 715

knowledge is possible only on the basis of belief in being. 518

perspectivism is necessary. 636

giving meaning to a world without meaning is necessary in order to live. 853

we must dream. JW I, 54

Necessity is not a fact but an interpretation. 552

Necessity = a useful unreality. 711, 521

there are no eternal horizons or perspectives. JW III, 143

But what after all are man's truths? -- They are his irrefutable errors. JW III, 265; 532.

And we are fundamentally inclined to claim that the falsest judgements (which include the synthetic judgements a priori) are the most indispensible for us; that without accepting the fictions of logic, without measuring reality against the purely invented world of the unconditional and self-identical, without a constant falsification of the world by means of numbers, man could not live--. BGE 4. (See also Dawn 90.)

The most strongly believed a priori "truths" are for me--provisional assumptions; e.g., the law of causality, a very well acquired habit of belief, so much a part of us that not to believe it would destroy the race. 497.

The new courage--no a priori truths (such truths were sought by those accustomed to faith!), but a free subordination to a ruling idea that has its time: e.g., time as a property of space, etc. 862

the unchanging elements in our supreme values, are judgements of our muscles. 314

"I" causes "thought" an habitual and indispensable fiction. 483

We have to believe in time, space, and motion. 487

rational thought is interpretation according to a scheme that we cannot throw off. 552

the fundamental false observation is that I believe it is I who do something, etc. 549

our inability to interpret events otherwise than as events caused by intentions. 550

from the fact that something ensues regularly and ensues calculably, it does not follow that it ensues necessarily. 552

The question is whether there could not be many other ways of creating such
an apparent world—and whether this creating, logicizing, adapting, falsifying
is not itself the best-guaranteed reality... 569

There exists neither "spirit", nor reason, nor thinking, nor consciousness,
nor soul, nor will, nor truth: all are fictions that are of no use. There
is no question of "subject and object", but of a particular species of
animal that can prosper only through a certain relative rightness; above
all, regularity of its perceptions (so that it can accumulate experience)—.
WTP 480.

In order for a particular species to maintain itself and increase its power,
its conception of reality must comprehend enough of the calculable and constant
for it to base a scheme of behaviour on it. 480

Ends and means
Cause and effect
Subject and object
Acting and suffering
Thing-in-itself and appearance

as interpretations (not as
facts) and to what extent
perhaps necessary
interpretations? (as
required for "preservation")
--all in a sense of a
will to power. 589
Appendix XIII: thing-in-itself

the distinction between appearance and world in itself is illegitimate (786, 3, 553, JW IV, 354) because causality is phenomenal and the thing-in-itself is noumenal (553).

the expression "thing-in-itself" is empty of meaning. HAH I, 16

if we cannot know the thing-in-itself then we do not know enough to distinguish thing-in-itself from phenomena. JW IV, 354.

the "unconditioned thing" is invented by thought. 574
the "unconditioned thing" is a derived metaphysical comfort. 15

thing-in-itself is an unconditioned thing (555) and as unconditioned, it is unknowable by definition in so far as "knowing" means "placing oneself in a conditional relation to something".

those who know existence completely might perish. BGE 39.
no organ for knowing "truth". JW IV, 354.

a man who, unlike other men, conceives reality as it is. EH IV, 5.
a Dionysian affirmation of the world as it is. 1041
the absolute nature of things = truth. 13
pure truth. Truth and Lie 45.

chaos and fuzziness of sense impressions = the really unknowable by us. 569
external things are not as they appear to us. Dawn 116
consciousness resolutely keeps the external world at a distance. BGE 34

The world with which we are concerned is false, i.e., is not a fact but a fable and approximation on the basis of a meagre sum of observations; it is "In flux" as something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood always changing but never getting near the truth: for--there is no 'truth'. 616

The "thing-in-itself" nonsensical. If I remove all the relationships, all the "properties", all the "activities" of a thing, the thing does not remain over; because thingness has only been invented by us owing to the requirements of logic, thus with the aim of defining, communication (to bind together the multiplicity of relationships, properties, activities). 558

object = \{ thing = thing-in-itself plus.
properties = feelings of subject, sensations
(yields the distinction thing-in-itself versus thing for us.) 562

Only after we have recognized everything as lies and appearance do we regain the right to this fairest of falsehood, virtue. 328
It will, for example, like the ascetics of Vedanta philosophy, downgrade physicality to an illusion. GM III, 12.

...as if the veil of maya has been torn aside and were now merely fluttering in tatters before the mysterious primordial unity. BT 1.

How far the perspective character of existence extends or indeed whether existence has any other character than this; whether existence without interpretation, without 'senses', does not become 'nonsense'... JW V, 374.

A 'thing-in-itself' just as perverse as a 'sense-in-itself', a 'meaning-in-itself'. There are no 'facts in themselves', for a sense must always be projected into them before there can be "facts". 556

Man and Things. -- Why does the man not see the things? He himself is in the way: he conceals the things. Dawn 438

It is true that there might be a metaphysical world; the absolute possibility of it is hardly to be disputed... HAH I, 9.

For nothing could be said of the metaphysical world but that it would be a difference condition, a condition inaccessible and incomprehensible to us. HAH I, 9.

When we talk about trees, colours, snow, and flowers, we believe we know something about the things themselves, and yet we only possess metaphors of the things, and these metaphors do not in the least correspond to the original essentials. Truth and Lie.

questions, what things"in-themselves" may be like, apart from our sense receptivity and the activity of our understanding, must be rebutted with the question: how could we know that things exist? "Thingness" was first created by us. The question is whether there could not be many other ways of creating such an apparent world--and whether this creating, logicizing, adapting, falsifying is not itself the best-guaranteed reality; in short, whether that which "posits things" is not the sole reality; and whether the "effect of the external world upon us" is not also only the result of such active subjects -- The other "entities" act upon us; our adapted apparent world is an adaptation and overpowering of their actions; a kind of defensive measure. The subject alone is demonstrable; hypothesis that only subjects exist--that "object" is only a kind of effect produced by a subject upon a subject--a modus of the subject. 569

Thought cannot be derived, any more than sensations can be; but that does not mean that its primordiality or "being-in-itself" has been proved! All that is established is that we cannot get beyond it, because we have nothing but thought and sensation. 574

1 Nietzsche thought highly of Kant's distinction between phenomena and the thing-in-itself in The Birth of Tragedy(21). At BT 18, Nietzsche lauds Kant for putting an end, once and for all, to the optimistic logicians, by showing that space, time, and causality "...served only to elevate the mere phenomenon, the work of maya...". The thing-in-itself then, in The Birth of Tragedy is nothing more than what "defies illumination" (BT 15). See also BT 4.
Appendix XIV: schema

Essential feature of thinking is to fit new material into old schemas = making new things equal WTP 499.

I maintain the phenomenality of the inner world, too: everything of which we become conscious is arranged, simplified, schematized, interpreted through and through. 477.

not to know but to schematize -- to impose upon chaos as much regularity and form as our needs require. 515

we interpret by means of \{the schematism of "things", etc. 479
the scheme of being 516

Apollo = a will to measure, to simplify, to subsume to a rule and concept. 1050

to subsume = to schematize. 515

We reduce to rough outlines 569
we reduce to purpositive and manageable schema 584

The fictitious world of subject, substance, 'reason', etc., is needed ----: there is in us a power to order, simplify, falsify, artificially distinguish. 'Truth' is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations: ---- to classify phenomena into definite categories. In this we start from a belief in the 'in-itself' of things (we take phenomena as real). 517
Appendix XV: miscellaneous material from the Early 1870 Notebooks

1. This proposition must be established: We live only by means of illusions; our consciousness skims over the surface. Much is hidden from our view. PT. 18

2. ...it is his [man's] nature to be so immersed in illusion (dream) and dependent upon the surface (eye). Is it surprising that, in the end, his truth drives return to his fundamental nature? PT. 44

3. Owing to the superficiality of our intellect we indeed live in an ongoing illusion, i.e., at every instance we need art in order to live. Our eyes detail us at the forms. PT. 18

4. ...sensation immediately projects forms, which in turn produce new sensations. PT. 26

5. Advanced physiology will declare that the artistic begins with the organic. PT. 18

6. Our understanding is a surface power; it is superficial. One also calls it 'subjective'. It understands things by means of concepts; i.e., our thinking is a process of categorizing and naming. Thus, thinking is something dependent upon human option and does not touch the thing in itself. PT. 19

7. Art depends on the inexactitude of sight. PT. 20

8. There exists within us a power which permits the major features of the mirror image to be perceived with greater intensity, and again there is a power which emphasizes rhythmic similarity beyond the actual inexactitude. This must be an artistic power, because it is creative. Its chief creative means are omitting, overlooking, and ignoring. PT. 20

9. Imagination consists in the quick observation of similarities. PT 23
   In order to think, one must already possess an imagination [Phantasie] that which one seeks, for only then can reflection judge it. PT. 23-24

10. Space, time, and the feeling of causality appear to have been given along with the first sensation. PT. 31

11. Time, space, and causality are only metaphors of knowledge, with which we explain things to ourselves. PT. 47

12. The perceived manifold already presupposes space and time, succession and coexistence. Temporal coexistence produces the sensation of space. PT. 43
13. The only way to subdue the manifold is by constructing classes, e.g., by calling a large number of ways of acting "bold". We explain them to ourselves when we bring them under the category "bold". All explaining and knowing is actually nothing but categorizing. PT. 47

14. Our sense perceptions are based, not upon unconscious inferences, but upon topes. The primal procedure is to seek out some likeness between one thing and another, to identify like with like. Memory lives by means of this activity and practices it continually. Confusion [of one thing with another] is the primal phenomenon. This presupposes the perception of shapes. The image in the eye sets the standard for our knowing, as rhythm does for our hearing. Using only the eye, we should never have arrived at the notion of time; using only the ear, we should never have arrived at the notion of space. The sensation of causality corresponds to the sense of touch. PT 48-49

15. We are acquainted with but one reality--the reality of thoughts. In what way? What if thought were the essence of things? What if memory and sensation were the matter of things? PT. 35

16. The forms of the intellect have very gradually arisen out of the matter [memory and sensation]. It is plausible in itself that these forms are strictly adequate to the truth. For where is an apparatus which could invent something new supposed to have come from? PT. 39

17. Thought provides us with the concept of a totally new form of reality: a reality constructed from sensations and memory. PT. 35

18. Sensation, reflex movements which occur very frequently and with the speed of lightning and which gradually become very familiar, produce the operation of inferring, i.e., of the sense of causality. Space and time depend on the sensation of causality. PT. 36

19. There is no form in nature.... PT. 40

20. Unconscious thinking must take place apart from concepts: it must therefore occur in perceptions. PT. 41

21. Like recalls like and compares itself to it. That is what knowing consists in: the rapid classification of things that are similar to each other. Only like perceives like: a physiological process. The perception of something new is also the same as memory. It is not thought piled upon thought. PT. 45

22. All the knowledge which is of assistance to us involves the identification of things which are not the same, of things which are only similar. PT. 51

23. The omitting of what is individual provides us with the concept, and with this our knowledge begins: in categorization, in the establishment of classes. But the essence of things does not correspond to this: it is a process of knowledge which does not touch upon the essence of things. PT. 51-52.
24. We produce beings as the bearers of properties and abstractions as the causes of these properties. That a unity, e.g., a tree, appears to us to be a multiplicity of properties and relations is something doubly anthropocentric: in the first place, this delimited unity, "tree", does not exist; it is arbitrary to carve out a thing in this manner (according to the eye, according to the form). Furthermore, each relation is not the true, absolute relation, but is again anthropocentrically coloured. PT. 52

25. We can say nothing about the thing in itself, for we have eliminated the standpoint of knowing, i.e., of measuring. PT. 37

26. What things are is something that can only be established by a measuring subject placed alongside them. The properties of things considered in themselves are no concern of ours; we are concerned with them only to the extent that they affect us. PT 37

27. Even the Kantian theory of knowledge was immediately employed by man for his own self-glorification: the world has its reality only in man. PT. 38

28. As soon as one wishes to know the thing in itself, it is precisely this world [which one comes to know]. Knowing is only possible as a process of mirroring and measuring oneself against one standard (sensation). We know what the world is: absolute and unconditional knowledge is the desire to know without knowledge. PT. 40
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