THE ROLE OF HOSTAGES IN ROMAN FOREIGN POLICY
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IN
ROMAN FOREIGN POLICY

By
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TITLE: The Role of Hostages in Roman Foreign Policy

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ABSTRACT

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The emphasis of this study is essentially twofold. The opening chapters deal with the gradual development of Roman hostage policy and attempt to explain the standard procedures which the Romans employed in exacting formal hostages. Chapters III-IX are concerned with specific hostages or groups of hostages taken by the Romans during the period of the Republic and early empire. These chapters are intended not only to illustrate the procedures described in Chapter II, but also to show how the Romans cultivated hostages both as intermediaries in the dissemination of Latin culture among conquered peoples, and as a means of fostering political disruption in the internal affairs of powerful donor states. A summary of the main points of each chapter follows.

INTRODUCTION: Formal hostages were rendered in conjunction with peace negotiations or offered as pledges of good faith, and they are to be distinguished from prisoners of war and persons otherwise seized. The official role of formal hostages was a curious blend of legal and
and moral obligation, typified in Livy's description of them as a pignus fidei. The similarities between the submission of hostages and the Roman civil law of pledge are noted, but it is concluded that the extra-legal element of fides was the most important aspect of the function of formal hostages.

CHAPTER I: The evidence suggests that prior to the beginning of the third century B.C. the use of formal hostages by the Romans was restricted almost exclusively to the procedures associated with deditio (unconditional surrender). It is argued that the Romans did not use hostages regularly in the negotiation and maintenance of formal peace treaties until Rome had become prominently involved in extra-Italian affairs. The standard use of hostages in peace treaties seems to have developed because of the general impracticality of ius fetiale outside of Italy. Thübler's theory that hostages rendered in conjunction with peace treaties served to guarantee only the submission of indemnity payments is rejected, and it is maintained that hostages acted as surety for all aspects of a treaty.

CHAPTER II: The procedures employed by the Romans in the selection, delivery, and confinement of hostages are discussed.

CHAPTER III: The use of hostages by both the Romans and the Carthaginians in the Spanish campaigns of the Second Punic War is discussed, and the tactical importance of the liberation by the Romans of the hostages held by the
Carthaginians at Saguntum and Nova Carthago is emphasized.

CHAPTER IV: This chapter attempts to demonstrate that the account of Polybius-Livy regarding the Carthaginian hostages exacted by Scipio Africanus after the battle of Zama is preferable to that of Appian. The problem of mutatio obsidum (periodic renewal of hostage personnel) is discussed, and it is tentatively suggested that the Romans may have employed decennial mutatio in the case of the Carthaginian hostages.

CHAPTER V: The career of Demetrius, the son of Philip V of Macedon, is examined in light of his experience as a hostage. The evidence suggests that the close association of Demetrius with influential Romans during his term as a hostage facilitated Flamininus' later attempt to foster political rivalry within the Antigonid court. Whether or not this specific strategy had been envisioned by Flamininus as early as 197 B.C., he was well aware that the cultivation of the Macedonian hostage could prove useful for the future. The apparent diplomatic clumsiness of Flamininus in openly encouraging his client to aspire to the Macedonian throne suggests that it was Rome's primary motive to keep Macedon weak by creating internal political strife rather than to establish Demetrius as a client-king.

CHAPTER VI: This chapter deals with the hostages submitted to the Romans by Nabis of Sparta in 195 B.C., and by the Aetolians following the defeat of Antiochus at
Thermopylae in 191. The meagre evidence concerning the Spartan hostages suggests that their liberation in 191 was closely connected with the political struggle between Rome and the Achaean League over the restoration of the Spartan nobles who had been exiled during the reigns of Cleomenes, Machanidas, and Nabis. The problem concerning the Aetolian hostages is primarily textual. Thübler's interpretation of Polybius 21.32.10 (Liv. 38.11.6) as evidence for mutatio obsidum is rejected.

CHAPTER VII: The careers of Antiochus IV Epiphanes and Demetrius I Soter are re-examined in light of their experiences as Roman hostages. Although Antiochus Epiphanes acted officially as a guarantee for his father's good faith and his compliance with the terms of Apamea, the Romans also considered him as a potential means of interfering in the affairs of his elder brother, Seleucus, who succeeded to the Syrian throne in 187. The mutatio of 176, which resulted in the submission of Demetrius, the son of Seleucus, as a hostage in place of Antiochus, is viewed as an attempt by Seleucus to eliminate the threat represented by his hostage brother. After Antiochus became king, his subsequent policy with regard to Rome was based upon his intimate knowledge of the Roman political esprit, gained during his years as a hostage. The subtle and serious challenge which he presented to Roman diplomatic strategy (particularly in the Egyptian campaigns of 170-168) may have prompted the Romans to groom
Demetrius as a possible means of eventually interfering in the succession of Antiochus' son. However, Antiochus' premature death caused the Senate to abandon this strategy, and they considered that the retention of Demetrius would be an effective check on the activity of the unstable regime of Epiphanes' young son and his regent. Although Demetrius' years as a hostage had undoubtedly given him a keen insight into Roman diplomatic tactics, they had also romanized him to such an extent that when he finally did become king he could not establish a cultural rapport with his people. This contributed considerably to the successful coup of Alexander Balas.

CHAPTER VIII: This chapter attempts to demonstrate how Caesar dealt with the numerous difficulties involved in exacting hostages from the Gauls. It is also suggested that Caesar occasionally reports the submission of hostages in order to convey the impression that his conquests were more thorough than they actually were.

CHAPTER IX: This chapter shows how the Romans periodically employed various Parthian hostages as rival claimants to the Arsacid throne in order to divert Parthia's attention from Armenia. For almost 75 years (20 B.C. - A.D. 54) this policy, however cumbersome it may have been, was the basis of Rome's success in maintaining her hold on the Armenian kingdom.
PREFACE

Relatively little has been written about the use of hostages in the ancient world. Although André Aymard clearly devoted extensive study to the subject and published a few papers pertaining to specific incidents involving hostages, his premature death in 1964 curtailed the full scale treatment which he felt to be so necessary. Prior to Aymard's investigations, the study of hostages in antiquity had been limited to two survey articles by A. Matthaei and C. Lécrivain, and incidental remarks in various books on ancient statecraft and diplomacy. No one since Aymard has considered the matter of hostages seriously. Dahlheim's recent studies have added nothing new about the role of hostages in Roman diplomacy, and his views generally follow the now standard and respected views of Täubler. Amit's recent article, "Hostages in Ancient Greece", is a useful consideration of some aspects of Greek hostage policy, but is by no means as comprehensive as the title implies. There is need for more study of the Greek hostages, and although the scope of this dissertation precludes extensive digression into that area, we shall occasionally mention incidents from Greek history which instructively illustrate, by analogy or divergency, the Roman practice. Finally, we may mention the unpublished
doctoral dissertation of B.J. Brungs, *Hostages Prisoner\nReprisals and Collective Penalties: The Development of the\nInternational Law of War with respect to Collective and\Vicarious Punishment*. Brungs is concerned chiefly with the\period since 1800 and while his discussion of the Greek and\Roman hostages is simply a catalogue of the more important\incidents involving hostages, his work does provide a\useful account of the role of hostages in medieval and modern\history.

Although hostages from all periods of Roman history\have been considered in the preparation of this study,\particular attention is devoted to the period of the Republic\and early empire. The evidence pertaining to Roman hostage\policy after the reign of Nero is remarkably meagre. The\only noteworthy official hostage taken by the Romans between\the accession of Vespasian and the death of Justinian is\Theodoric the Goth. Ironically, his experience as a hostage\at Constantinople may have contributed considerably to his\subsequent success as governor of Italy!

The completion of this dissertation marks the end of\four enjoyable years at McMaster University. During that\time, many friends have helped me by their advice and interest.\I should like to acknowledge particularly the assistance and\kindness of my supervisor, Professor E.T. Salmon, whose\enthusiasm for Roman History is wonderfully contagious. It\is a high honour to have studied under so distinguished a
scholar. I should also like to thank Professor J.A.S. Evans for his help and constant encouragement throughout my entire doctoral programme. The expert assistance of the interlibrary loan staff of Mills Memorial Library and the financial generosity of the Canada Council are also gratefully acknowledged. Finally, this dissertation owes both its conception and its completion to my wife, Barbara. It was her analysis of Caesar's *commentarii* which suggested the topic to me, and her patience and encouragement which expedited its completion. I dedicate the work to her as meagre token of my esteem.

McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario
May 1972
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations have been used in the footnotes and bibliography to refer to journals, standard reference works, etc. Other abbreviated titles may be easily identified by consulting the bibliography under the author's name. For abbreviations of ancient authors and titles, the usage of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 2nd ed. Oxford, 1970, pp. ix-xix, is followed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ANS-MN</td>
<td>The American Numismatic Society Museum Notes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Athen.</td>
<td>Athenaeum: Studii periodici di letteratura e storia dell'antichità.</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCH</td>
<td>Bulletin de correspondance hellénique.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAH</td>
<td>Cambridge Ancient History.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJ</td>
<td>Classical Journal.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Classical Philology.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CQ</td>
<td>Classical Quarterly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRAI</td>
<td>Comptes rendus de l'académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGH</td>
<td>C. Müller's Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGrH</td>
<td>F. Jacoby's Fragmenta der griechischen Historiker.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GGM</td>
<td>C. Müller's Geographici Graeci Minores.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gnomon</td>
<td>Gnomon: Kritische Zeitschrift für die gesamte klassische Altertumswissenschaft.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSCP</td>
<td>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hermes</td>
<td>Hermes: Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILS</td>
<td>H. Dessau's Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JEA</td>
<td>Journal of Egyptian Archaeology.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JHS</td>
<td>Journal of Hellenic Studies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRS</td>
<td>Journal of Roman Studies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klio</td>
<td>Klio: Beiträge zur alten Geschichte.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OGIS</td>
<td>W. Dittenberger's Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pallas</td>
<td>Pallas: Études sur l'antiquité.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philologus</td>
<td>Philologus: Zeitschrift für das klassische Altertum.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RE</td>
<td>Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll's Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft.</td>
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<tr>
<td>REA</td>
<td>Revue des études anciennes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>REG</td>
<td>Revue des études grecques.</td>
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RFIC
Rhein. Mus.
RIDA
RPh
TAPhA

Rivista di Filologia e di Istruzione Classica.
Rheinisches Museum.
Revue internationale des droits de l'antiquité.
Revue de philologie.
INTRODUCTION

Until as recently as the middle of the eighteenth century all civilized nations were familiar with the standard practice of demanding and rendering formal hostages in conjunction with treaties and agreements.\(^1\) The use of formal hostages did not originate with the Greeks or the Romans, or with any one state for that matter, but rather was simply a logical development which inevitably accompanied the expansion and sophistication of international relationships. As states began to conduct their foreign relations by means of treaties and alliances, they also sought a formal and regular method of guaranteeing these arrangements. The retention of prisoners of war or hostages otherwise seized was hardly a satisfactory method of confirming agreements.\(^2\) On the other hand, hostages submitted more or less voluntarily implied some degree of assent on the part of their donors to fulfill certain obligations, even though this assent may have often been the result of such dire circumstances as the threat of annihilation.

Despite the usual deficiencies in trustworthy source material, the account of Rome's gradual but unrelenting expansion beyond the bounds of Latium and Italy affords a unique opportunity to observe the evolving role of formal hostages in international diplomacy. The most crucial
evidence, as might be expected, pertains to the momentous half century following the end of the Hannibalic War. During this period the Romans began to discover that hostages, in addition to acting as security for the maintenance of specific treaties and alliances, also furnished a potentially effective means of increasing foreign clientelae. The romanization of foreign hostages became one of Rome's principal methods of exerting her influence in conquered territories without straining military resources. Badian is certainly correct in suggesting that the example of Demetrius, the son of Philip V, induced other eastern monarchs to send their heirs apparent to Rome, ut iam inde a puero assuesceret moribus Romanis hominibusque. We may strongly suspect that the official reasons for exacting hostages frequently became merely the formal means of providing the Romans with important and impressionable young clients from conquered and allied states. This practical exploitation of hostages is virtually unparalleled in Greek history, even in the period of Alexander's conquests.

We have employed the phrase "formal hostages" essentially to distinguish between hostages who were captured or otherwise seized, and those who were handed over in connection with an agreement or sent voluntarily to Rome by their fathers as a pledge of good faith. Although there is no corresponding term in the ancient sources, it is clear that the Romans made a similar distinction. During Camillus'
The Faliscans were so impressed by Camillus' behavior that they subsequently offered to surrender their city to him and to provide hostages of their own accord. Whatever the truth of this story, it clearly emphasizes the difference between formal hostages and those acquired by blatantly undiplomatic methods.

A number of other incidents also suggest that formal hostages were not normally obtained by seizure or other devious means. In Dionysius' account of the Cloelia legend, the Roman ambassadors and hostages seized by Tarquinius are described as Ἑὐστα for the return of the property which the Romans had taken from the deposed king.⁷ 'Ἑὐστα' was a technical legal term used to denote something which had been seized as surety or by way of reprisal.⁸ Although Cloelia and her companions had been submitted to Porsenna by the Romans as Ἐὔπολ,⁹ Dionysius correctly senses that this term is inapplicable to their seizure by Tarquinius.

Similarly, the Caesarian writer of the Bellum Africanum
accuses the Pompeians of seizing and enslaving the children of their opponents, obsidum nomine. The phrase obsidum nomine implicitly suggests that the persons seized were not official hostages because of the illicit manner in which they had been obtained.

Formal hostages were basically a form of pignus, and the sources frequently use this term to describe their function. However, Livy implies that the fundamental purpose of hostages was to act as a pignus fidei, which suggests that their function was essentially moral rather than legal in nature. The strong moral basis underlying the Roman concept of hostages is demonstrated by Cicero's use of the word obses. Very rarely does he use the word to denote actual persons. In most instances he equates obses not with material collateral, but rather with personal fama or dignitas. In his famous speech on behalf of Caelius, Cicero says that the res publica habet a M. Caelio...duas accusationes vel obsides periculi vel pignora voluntatis. Caelius' past performances furnish a trustworthy guarantee of his present innocence. Similarly, in contrasting himself with Caecilius, Cicero declares a nobis multos obsides habet populus Romanus quos ut incoluntis conservare, tueri, confirmare ac recuperare omni ratione erit dimicandum. The hostages to which Cicero refers are the honos and dignitas which he has won, but which can be preserved only by maintaining an unblemished reputation. The same moral
overtones are reflected in Cicero's remarks on Caesar's oration concerning the Catilinarian conspiracy: Habemus enim a Caesare...sententiam tamquam obsidem perpetuae in rempublicam voluntatis.\textsuperscript{18} A letter from Plancus to Cicero illustrates how this abstract concept of \textit{obses} relates to the role of individuals as hostages: Lepidus tamen, quod ego desiderabam, fecit ut Apellam ad me mitteret, quo obside fidei illius et societatis in re. p. administranda uteret.\textsuperscript{19} Apella, no doubt a Greek slave of Lepidus, is sent, not as a guarantee of physical security, but rather as a symbol of \textit{fides} and \textit{societas}.

The close relationship between \textit{obses} and \textit{fides} is also evident in international diplomacy, particularly in the role which hostages played in \textit{deditio}.\textsuperscript{20} Since \textit{dediticia} were technically deprived of all juridical status and entrusted their fate entirely in \textit{fidem populi Romani}, their hostages consequently did not serve as a legal guarantee, but rather as a surety for their donors' \textit{fides}. Similarly, unsolicited hostages sent to Rome by their fathers did not act as a pledge for any specific contract or agreement, but they did serve to confirm their donors' good faith. It is clear that even hostages rendered in connection with formal peace treaties were still closely associated with the extra-legal concept of \textit{fides}. Several years after the end of the Hannibalic War a Carthaginian embassy succeeded in gaining the restoration of certain hostages and were encouraged by
e Senate that the remaining hostages might eventually be
berated, *si in fide permanerent.* Livy's account of the
cape of Cloelia and the other maidens who had been rendered
hostages to Porsenna also emphasizes the connection between
*se* and *fides.* Even though the Romans insisted that the
stages had fled of their own accord, they nevertheless sent
deposition to bring them back in order to preserve Roman
*des.* Festus, the second century A.D. epitomator of
rrius Flaccus, even went so far as to suggest that *obsides*
rives from *obfides, qui ob fidem patriae praestandam dantur.*
spite Festus' shortcomings as an etymologist, his suggestion
rives to confirm the close relationship between hostages and
*des.*

Even though one must refrain from interpreting the
le of hostages too legalistically, it is clear that in
ctice, the submission of hostages had much in common with
a Roman law of pledge. *Pignora,* like the submission of
stages, involved the actual delivery by the debtor to the
ditor of the thing to be pledged. Normally such delivery
not transfer legal ownership to the creditor, but simply
veyed the right of retention until the outstanding debt had
satisfied. Although later legal theorists were unanimous
applying this principle to hostages, the Romans often
ned the obligation for which hostages were retained with
breat ambiguity. A pledge of good faith need not have
time limit, and although practical considerations often
determined the length of time which hostages were to serve, their liberation was far less contractual than the restoration of goods pledged in accordance with the law of *pignus*.\(^{25}\)

Under the law of *pignus* a creditor did not normally enjoy the privilege of even using the objects pledged as security. This principle may be the basis of Livy's remarks concerning the knights of Certina who were taken by Sempronius Gracchus in conjunction with the surrender of their town.\(^ {26}\) Livy maintains that even though the knights were not formally hostages because they were required to do military duty, nevertheless, they fulfilled the primary purpose of hostages, namely to act as a *pignus fidei*. Livy seems to suggest that normal hostages acted solely as a guarantee or pledge and were not technically required to serve any additional function.\(^ {27}\)

Finally, in the event that a debtor defaulted on his obligation, the objects pledged as *pignora* passed into the ownership of the creditor. In the case of hostages, it is clear that according to the strict law of nations a hostage could be put to death if his donor violated the agreement for which he had been rendered. However, as Grotius noted, such a penalty was not in accord with *ius naturale* unless there as a fault on the part of the hostage himself which merited such punishment.\(^ {28}\) Scipio's warning to Indibilis andandonius that he would take vengeance, *neque in obsides anxios, sed in ipsos, si defecerint*... indicates that the same conflict between *ius gentium* and *ius naturale* existed
or the Romans as well. However, the moral issue might be obscured by the fact that all citizens of a state which isolated a treaty with Rome could be considered juridically as hostes. Obsides hostium could be reckoned officially as aptivi, and consequently might be executed or sold into slavery.

The close relationship between obses and pignus is fundamental importance to understanding the true nature of formal hostages. It was the element of pledge which clearly differentiated the hostage from the captive.

Polybius and his exiled colleagues were not technically hostages, as so many modern commentators insist, since they did not act primarily as pledges for the behavior of persons left in Achaea, but rather were taken in order to eliminate the threat which they themselves represented to the pro-Roman action led by Callicrates. As we shall observe below, most of the formal hostages taken by the Romans were children from aristocratic families of the donor states. Polybius refers to pledges of this sort as πίστεις τῶν παρ’ ἔρωτας νομίζομένων τὰς ἐσχαρότατας.

Perhaps even more important than the function of acting as formal pledges, hostages symbolically represented the distinct subordination of one state to another. Livy tells us how Marcius Philippus, before acceding to meet with Rseus, demanded hostages from the Macedonian king, nec tam pignus fidei ... quam ut appareret sociis nequaquam ex
ignitata pari congregi regem cum legatis. Similarly, the frequent appearance of hostages in the triumphal processions of Roman generals symbolized their donors' obeisance to Roman arms. Even deditio and the attendant submission of hostages was not always the result of direct armed intimidation, but rather was often a means of formally acknowledging Roman overlordship. As might be expected, Roman tradition records very few instances of the unilateral submission of hostages by the Romans themselves. Caesar might well have boasted with even more justification than the Helvetii that the Romans a maioribus suis institutos esse uti obsides occipere, non dare, consuerint.

As the reader will notice, most of the following chapters deal with problems concerning specific hostages. Chapters I and II, in which we attempt to present a general account of Roman hostage policy, are basically a compendium of conclusions drawn from evidence assessed in the remaining even chapters. Though some may object that the opening chapters ought more properly to appear as the conclusion of this study, it is the author's opinion that the discussions concerning specific hostages will be better understood if the reader has first familiarized himself with the basic principles of Roman hostage policy.
Notes

1 The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (October 18, 1748), which ended the War of the Austrian Succession, is traditionally viewed as the last treaty which formally called for the delivery of hostages (English Historical Documents, Vol. X, ed. D.C. Douglas, London, 1957, p. 926, Article IX).

2 E. Täubler, Imperium Romanum, Berlin, 1913 (hereafter simply Täubler), pp. 399-401, is probably correct in suggesting that the most primitive form of hostage practice, from which all other forms ultimately derive, is simply the use of captives as a means of extorting cooperation from an adversary. This type of hostage is by no means absent from so-called civilized societies, nor is it ever likely to be, despite the idealistic convention approved by the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva in 1949 (Final Report of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Berne, 1950-51, Article XXXIV) which makes expressly illegal the seizure of civilian hostages or the use of prisoners of war as hostages.


4 Cf. A. Aymard, "Philippe de Macedoine otage à Thèbes", REA LVI (1954), 34-35: "Mais si des préoccupations de cet ordre s'aperçoivent parfois dans les agissements de Rome à l'égard de certaines dynasties hellénistiques, on en chercherait vainement la trace dans ceux d'un état grec de la période classique. Au IVe siècle, semble-t-il, c'était une façon encore inédite de concevoir et d'utiliser l'institution des otages." It is remarkable how infrequently the accounts of Alexander the Great record the submission of hostages (Arr. Anab. 1.27.4; 2.12.2; 6.14.3; Curtius 3.1.23; 4.8; 4.11; 6.5.21; 7.2.15; 8.5.1; 9.1.23; Diod. 17.73.6) and there is absolutely no indication that Alexander ever considered the possibility of educating hostages as part of his cultural policies in Asia. Although his father, Philip II, may have gained a thorough grounding in military tactics and acquired an appreciation of Hellenic culture while he was a hostage at Thebes, Aymard (p. 34) is probably correct in rejecting the possibility that there was any intention on the part of Epaminondas of cultivating the Macedonian prince as a Theban client.

5 On the derivation of oboes and διηρος, see below, p. 30, n. 8. Theopompus' remarks about hostages (Suda, s.v. 

"ομηρος) emphasize the formal nature of their function: διμηρητ
φιστ τοις ἀρχαῖως λέγεσθαι το ἀκολουθεῖν. τοὺς οὖν ἐπ'
ἀκολουθία τῶν ὁμολογομένων διδομένους ἐντεθέν ὀμήρους φασὶ
λέγεσθαι.

6 Liv. 5.27.5-6.

7 Dion. Hal. 5.33.4.

8 On ῥουσον, which usually denoted the seizure of
goods rather than persons, see R. Dareste, "Du droit de
représailles chez les Grecs", REG II (1899), 306f.

9 Dion. Hal. 5.31.4.

10 BAfr. 26.5. The Seduni and Veragri make similar
charges against Caesar's general, Galba: Accedebat quod
suos ab se liberos abstractos obsidum nomine dolebant (Caes.
BGall. 3.2.3). Needless to say, Caesar insists (3.3.1)
that the hostages had been handed over, not seized.

11 Compare the following similar situations with
slight variations in vocabulary: Caes. BGall. 5.5.4
(observum loco); BGiv. 1.74 (obsidum loco); Liv. 33.14.3;
36.11.11 (pro obsidibus); Zosimus 3.7.7; 6.12 (ἐν διμηρο
ταξι); Hdt. 7.222 (ἐν διμηρο λόγῳ). It may be noted
at this point that Demosthenes' description of ἄνδρολησία
(Κατ. Ἀριστοκ.23.82) makes absolutely no use of the word
διμήρος. The law of ἄνδρολησία was often applied when
someone had been killed in a foreign polis. It provided for
the legal kidnapping of up to three men from the polis of
the offender. These "hostages" were then held to ensure
that the murderer was either brought to trial where the
crime had been committed, or was extradited to the polis
of the victim. However, as Amit, RPC XVIII (1970), 131,
n. 1, maintains, these kidnapped persons cannot be considered
technically as διμήρος.

12 Liv. 2.13.9; 9.15.7; 21.21.11; 22.22.5; 24.1.8;
28.34.9; 36.40.4; 37.45.16; 40.47.10; 42.39.7; 43.10.3; Cic.
Cael. 78; Suet. Aug. 21.2; Mon Anc. 32.6; Amm. Marc. 17.12.
13; Frontin. Str. 1.5.6; Just. Epit. 7.2.3; Ovid Met. 8.48.
Pignus was one of the three methods in Roman civil law of
conveying "real" security for the performance of obligation.
The other methods were known as mancipatio cum fiducia, and
hypothesa. For further details, consult W.W. Buckland, A
Textbook of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian, 3rd. ed.,
13 Although Livy employs this phrase only twice (40.47.10; 42.39.7) to describe the function of hostages, the relationship between oves and fides is often emphasized in the sources (e.g. Liv. 2.13.9; 5.27.15; 10.11.13; 21.34.3; 32.2.3; 42.5.12; 43.21.2; 44.25.7; Cic. Fam. 10.17; Caes. BGall. 2.15.1; 4.22.2; 6.9.7; 7.2.2; 8.3.5). The Greek equivalent to pignus was ἐνεχυροῦ (on which, see Meier-Schoemann-Lipsius, Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren, Leipzig, 1905, p. 690), and although this term is occasionally used to describe the role of hostages (e.g. App. BCiv. 1.44; Mon. Anc. 32.6; Hesychius, s.v. ὀμηροτ; Photius, Bibl., s.v. ὀμηροῦς), a term more commonly employed by Greek authors is πιστίς (Polyb. 4.17.9; 8.36; 21.17.8; Dion. Hal. 1.59; 5.33.1; Strabo 7.1.4; Thuc. 3.90; Plut. Pyrrh. 31.2; Xen. Cyr. 4.2.7; Hell. 3.2.18). It is significant that πιστίς is also often employed as the Greek equivalent of fides (Polyb. 2.11.2; 2.11.5; 2.12.2; 3.15.5; 10.40.9; 18.38.5; 20.9.11; 20.9.12; App. BCiv. 1.59; Dion. Hal. 1.59; 2.55), which tends to strengthen the notion that the function of hostages was largely extra-legal. Cf. J. Fartsch, Griechisches Bürgschaftsrecht, vol. I, Leipzig, 1909, p. 40, who refers to the function of hostages as a guarantee outside the law.

14 The studies of Heinze (Hermes LXIV (1929), 140-166), Pignaniol (RIDA V (1950), 339-47), and Badian (FC, pp. 5-10) emphasize the religious and moral nature of fides.

15 Fam. 10.17.3; 15.4.10; De Imp. Cn. Pomp. 35; Phil. 1.31; 2.90; Att. 4.18.5.

16 Cael. 78.

17 Div. Caec. 72.

18 Cat. IV.3.

19 Fam. 10.17.3.

20 See below, pp. 16ff.

21 Liv. 32.2.3.

22 Liv. 2.13.9.
23 Festus, De verborum significatu quae supersunt cum Pauli Epitome, ed. W.M. Lindsay, Leipzig, 1913, p. 179, s.v. ob.

24 e.g. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis 3.11.55; Vattel, Ius Gentium 2.16.248.

25 See below, p. 51.

26 Liv. 40.47.10: ...equites, nec obsidium nomine--nam militare iussi sunt--, et tamen re ipsa ut pignus fidei essent.

27 Cf. Vattel, Ius Gentium 2.16.249. While we may be sure that the Romans frequently considered auxiliary troops furnished by allied states as virtual pledges of their kinsmen's good faith, it is clear that they were not considered technically as hostages. No ancient source refers to the Romans employing foreign soldiers as hostages, even in instances when it is clear that soldiers were, in fact, recruited as pledges for their donors' good behavior (e.g. Liv. 23.4; Dio Cass. 49.44). Arrian (Anab. 6.14.3) suggests that the Greeks may have also differentiated between formal hostages and soldiers who served as pledges of their kinsmen's good faith: ὃ δὲ χιλιός ἢ πῆς τοὺς κρατισμένοις τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ σώζει, εἴ μὲν βούλοιτο, ἀντὶ ὀμηρών καθέξεν, εἴ δὲ μὴ, εὐπρόσιτοι τοῖς... On Hannibal's use of soldiers as hostages, see below, p. 64.

28 Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis 3.20.53. It has been suggested by A. Matthaei, Philologus LXIV (1905), 244, and G. Lécuyer, Memoires de l'académie de Toulouse II (1916), 130, that hostages enjoyed a personal sacrosanctity not unlike that accorded to foreign ambassadors. The evidence for this belief is found in Dionysius (5.34.1), who refers to Porsenna's anger at the attempt of Tarquinius to seize the Roman hostages and ambassadors being brought to the Etruscan camp. Porsenna reviled this attempt as εἴς ἱερα σώματα προσέβεν τε καὶ ὀμηρών παρανομείν... No other ancient source suggests that hostages possessed a traditional sacrosanctity, and while there was undoubtedly a certain responsibility on the part of the recipient of hostages to preserve their well being as long as the agreement for which they had been rendered remained intact, it seems likely that Dionysius has erred in extending ius legationis to hostages.
29 Liv. 28.34.9. See below, p. 74.

30 It is evident that both the Greeks and the Romans attributed to formal hostages a status quite distinct from that of captivi (cf. n. 31 below). An inscription recording the alliance between Athens and Selymbria in 407 B.C. (Meiggs and Lewis, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions, Oxford, 1969, no. 87) contains a clause (lines 37ff.) which provides for the liberation of a certain Selymbrian from the status of hostage. Amit, RPIC XCVIII (1970), 131, maintains that this evidence suggests that formal hostages were bound to retain their status until they were officially released. The situation of Demetrius, the son of Seleucus IV, seems to be analogous. Following the death of Antiochus IV, Demetrius appealed to the Senate that he be allowed to return to Syria and take up the crown as rightful heir. When the Senate refused his petition, he subsequently made a second appeal (Polyb. 31.11.7) in which he did not solicit Roman approval for any attempt he might make to win the Seleucid throne, but sought only that he be absolved from his obligation as a hostage. See below, pp. 164ff.

31 Cf. Isaeus, On the Estate of Apollodorus 8, who tells us that when his grandfather had been taken as a prisoner of war, Apollodorus consented to act as a hostage for him until he could raise the necessary ransom money. The passage clearly emphasizes the distinct difference between the status of captives and that of hostages. A similar distinction is strongly implied in Indibilis' bitter complaint to Scipio (Polyb. 10.38) that the Carthaginians had treated his family ὡς ὄμηρων ἔχοντας δίδεσιν, ἀλλ' ἀλχιμαλώτων καὶ δούλων, ....

32 No ancient source refers to the Achaean exiles as hostages, and, as Walbank, Comment. on Polyb., vol. I, p. 3, notes, they were technically "foreign internees". In the first edition of his Philip V of Macedon (Cambridge, 1940), Walbank referred to the Achaeans as hostages. In a second edition of the book (Archon books, 1967) he corrected the epithet to "detainees". In a private communication, Walbank informed this author that he had been misled by the common use of the term hostage, and concurred that the Achaeans were quite clearly not in that category. The sources refer to them as οἱ κατηγμένοι (Polyb. 30.32.3) and οἱ ἀνασκημενοί (Polyb. 33.14). However, the nature of Polybius' personal detention at Rome seems to have been similar in many respects to that experienced by distinguished official hostages.
33 Polyb. 4.17.9.

34 Liv. 42.39.7.

35 See below, p. 44.

36 e.g. Liv. 22.20.11.

37 Prior to the difficult times of the later empire, the sources mention only three instances in which the Romans surrendered hostages: to Porsenna following the expulsion of Tarquinius; to the Samnites at Caudium (See below, pp. 21-22); to the Tigurini in 107 B.C. (Liv. Epit. 65; Oros. 5.14.24).

38 Caes. BGall. 1.14.7.
CHAPTER I

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ROMAN HOSTAGE POLICY

As with most aspects of early Roman history, the earliest incidents involving the use of formal hostages by the Romans are obscured in a wealth of legend and annalistic patriotism. According to Dionysius, Aeneas and Latinus concluded a treaty of alliance by exchanging hostages as pledges of mutual good faith. One version of the legend even held that Romulus and Remus were the sons of Aeneas and that they were the hostages delivered to Latinus when the treaty was made. Livy's account does not mention any hostages, but it does say that Latinus gave Aeneas his daughter in marriage, thus confirming the alliance by a private and domestic bond. Täubler refers to this marriage alliance as "eine Geiselheirat", and suggests that this mild form of hostage practice was perhaps "die Garantieform des ältesten Vertrags." The familiar story of the rape of the Sabine women may also be a popular distortion of this type of alliance.

The earliest regular use of official hostages by the Romans seems to have been in connection with the act of deditio. Livy reverently notes the antiquity of the role of hostages in deditio, and in fact, the apparent derivation
of *obses* from *obsideo* strongly suggests that the basic Roman concept of hostages developed directly from events associated with the capitulation of besieged cities.\(^8\) The earliest recorded example of hostages being rendered to the Romans in conjunction with *deditio* is the alleged surrender of some Volscian cities to the *consul*, Servilius, in the tumultuous period preceding the *Foedus Cassianum*.\(^9\) According to Dionysius, following the battle of Lake Regillus the Volsci continued to plan war against the Romans and Servilius was sent to curtail their hostile preparations before they had progressed too far. The Volsci had not expected Roman reaction to be so immediate, and Servilius' advance caused the elders of the threatened cities to surrender themselves to the Roman general, who demanded provisions and clothing for his army, and 300 hostages from the most prominent families.\(^10\)

Although the submission of hostages was probably not an invariable feature of *deditio*, the sources suggest that the omission of this obligation from the act of surrender was very infrequent.\(^11\) Livy views Scipio's decision not to demand hostages from Indibilis and Mandonius as a notable exception to standard practice.\(^12\) Q. Marcius Philippus, the consul of 169 B.C., after receiving the surrender of Agassae, was willing to leave the city without garrison and free from tribute as a means of winning support among the Macedonians. However, he was unwilling to absolve them from the necessity of submitting hostages.\(^13\) In many
cases it is apparent that the delivery of hostages was actually prerequisite to the acceptance of the surrender.\textsuperscript{14} This policy was intended to ensure that the capitulating state would carry out its intention to surrender however distasteful the subsequent orders of the Romans might be.\textsuperscript{15} This precaution was not always effective, however, as the events culminating in the Third Punic War dramatically illustrate. Carthage had offered to surrender at discretion and had submitted 300 hostages to the Roman consuls in Sicily. When it was later decreed that the site of Carthage had to be evacuated, the Carthaginians elected to abandon their hostages and defend their city.\textsuperscript{16}

The role of hostages taken in conjunction with \textit{deditio} did not end with the acceptance of the surrender. It is important to remember that \textit{deditio} was not technically a \textit{foedus}, as THuber maintained,\textsuperscript{17} but rather was a process by which a state was deprived of its very juridical existence and entrusted its continued physical survival \textit{in fidem populi Romani}.\textsuperscript{18} Hostages acted as a pledge for the good behavior of \textit{dediticii} until their nebulous status was terminated.\textsuperscript{19} As Mommsen long ago observed, Rome rarely left her defeated enemies in the condition of \textit{dediticii} for very long.\textsuperscript{20} The status of conquered peoples was usually resolved either by incorporating them into the Roman state,\textsuperscript{21} or by reconstituting them as independent allied communities.\textsuperscript{22} However, the sources give very little indication as to how such changes affected
the subsequent role of any hostages which may have been surrendered. In many cases hostages were probably released as soon as their donors ceased to be dediticii. Scipio Africanus restored the Spanish hostages which he captured at Nova Carthago in 209 on the condition that their donors become allies of Rome.\textsuperscript{23} Although these hostages had not been delivered to the Romans in connection with deditio, Scipio's action probably indicates that hostages were generally restored when dediticii were granted formal alliances or became amici. However, in cases of less trustworthy peoples, or those whose territory was strategic to Roman military objectives, hostages may have been frequently detained even after their donors had ceased to be dediticii.

Livy tells us that the Apulian Teates and the Canusini delivered hostages to the Romans in connection with their surrender in 318 B.C.\textsuperscript{24} In the following year the Teates applied for and obtained an alliance, neque ut aequo tamen foedere sed ut in dicione populi Romani essent.\textsuperscript{25} Some scholars have suggested that Livy has failed to realize that Teanum Apulum and Teate are one and the same,\textsuperscript{26} or that the deditio of the Teates is the product of annalistic patriotism.\textsuperscript{27} However, it is noteworthy that Livy does not state that the Canusini also applied for a treaty in 317. This suggests that the deditio of the Teates and the Canusini was an altogether separate occurrence from the subsequent petition for an alliance by the Teates.\textsuperscript{28} Even if this interpretation
of the evidence is correct, we cannot be sure that the Romans retained the Apulian hostages after the alliance had been concluded. However, since the Teates had been quite unreliable in the past, and they lived some distance from the City, the Romans probably considered it wise to retain the hostages at least until the new resolution in status had proven satisfactory.

A similar policy may have also been applied to the Lucanians in 298 B.C. The Lucani had entered into friendly relations with Rome in 326, but were shortly thereafter seduced from their loyalty by the Samnites. However, the Lucani later came to regret their cooperation with the Samnites, and in 298 sent ambassadors to Rome to make apologies for their past errors and to petition the senators ut et Lucanos in fidem accipiant et vim atque injuriam ab se Samnitiwm arceant. They declared their readiness to submit hostages as a pledge for their good behavior. Although the Senate, after brief deliberation, granted the Lucanians a treaty, it is clear that the preliminary petition of the Lucanian ambassadors had taken the form of deditio. We cannot be sure that the Romans accepted the offer of hostages, but in view of their previous experience with the Lucani, hostages certainly would have been in order. If they were delivered, it is likely that they were retained for some time after the granting of the foedus.

The policy of delaying the restoration of hostages as
a means of guaranteeing the continued loyalty of former 
dediticii also seems to have been employed by the Romans 
in Gaul. Whatever the technical nature of the agreements 
made by Caesar with the various Gallic tribes may have been, 
it is virtually certain that there was no wholesale 
restoration of hostages taken in conjunction with anterior 
deditiones.\textsuperscript{35} We learn from Cicero that the Helvetii were 
acknowledged as foederati by 56 B.C.,\textsuperscript{36} and yet it is likely 
that Caesar retained the hostages which he had taken from 
them in 58 until the fall of Noviodunum in 52. Similarly, 
the hostages surrendered by the Ubii in 55,\textsuperscript{37} were apparently 
still in Roman hands in 53\textsuperscript{38} even though the tribe seems to 
have been recognized as a friend of the Roman people. It is 
clear that the act of setting free a state which had surrendered 
did not, as Larsen rather carelessly states, "merely cancel 
the result of the deditio."\textsuperscript{39} Even though dediticii might 
regain their nominal sovereignty, their surrender created 
moral bonds with Rome which were not easily cast aside. 
Whether or not the so-called foedus iniquum was a distinct 
class of treaty,\textsuperscript{40} the retention of cives sociorum as hostages 
was an unmistakable indication of the inferiority of certain 
allies.\textsuperscript{41}

Prior to the end of the third century B.C. there is 
little evidence to suggest that hostages played a regular 
role in the negotiation and maintenance of peace treaties. 
Livy, in his insistence that the Roman defeat at Caudium
resulted not in a **foedus**, but rather in a **sponsio**, maintains that hostages were not required in the negotiation of treaties: Quid enim aut sponsoribus in foedere opus esset aut obsidibus, ubi precatione res transigitur...⁴² Livy's account of the rejected treaty and the reprisal against the Samnites smacks hard of annalistic invention, and most modern commentators, as well as many ancient authors, believe that the debacle at Caudium did indeed compel the Romans to conclude a **foedus**.⁴³ Livy's assertion regarding the role of the hostages thus becomes equally suspect. However, it was one thing for him to insist that no treaty was concluded, but it seems extremely unlikely that he would have attempted to support his contention with completely incorrect technical evidence concerning diplomatic procedure. Clearly the 600 hostages surrendered by the Romans were connected solely with the preliminary negotiations, and their primary purpose was to force the Senate to accept the terms which the Samnites had proposed.⁴⁴ There was no intention that they remain indefinitely in Samnite hands as a means of guaranteeing the terms of the treaty, and we may agree with E.T. Salmon that the Romans presumably recovered their hostages by ratifying the agreement.⁴⁵

Another strong indication that hostages were not regularly connected with the maintenance of peace treaties during the early stages of Rome's development is their distinct absence in the numerous **indutiae** which Rome concluded with many of her neighbors.⁴⁶ While **indutiae** were not
technically foedera, they could be, and sometimes were, concluded for periods as long as 100 years.\textsuperscript{47} The conditions generally associated with such armistices -- the furnishing of provisions and the payment of stipendia -- are specifically of the sort which makes the complete silence regarding hostages of capital importance. Moreover, Dionysius' account of Tarquinius' negotiations with the Sabines and the Tyrrhenians suggests that the submission of hostages was not a customary feature of indutiae.\textsuperscript{48} The Sabines concluded a six year truce with Rome, but the Tyrrhenians, who were presumably negotiating for a similar agreement, broke off talks and resumed the war when Tarquinius insisted on retaining some of their captives as hostages.

Thus, it seems that Rome's official policy regarding hostages during the period in which she competed for ascendency in Italy was restricted almost exclusively to the procedures connected with deditio. The relationship between hostages and foedera appears to have been unofficial and variable. Even when Rome began to become involved in affairs outside Italy, the role of hostages in armistices and peace treaties remained quite undefined. There is absolutely no mention of hostages in connection with the treaty concluded by the Romans with Hiero of Syracuse in 263 B.C., even though indemnity payments were submitted by the Sicilian king until 248.\textsuperscript{49}

Following the Roman victory over the Carthaginians in
241, the Carthaginian government instructed Hamilcar to negotiate a peace on the best terms he could secure from the Roman consul, C. Lutatius Catulus. Polybius gives the main clauses of the peace terms offered to the Carthaginians, but makes no mention of hostages.\textsuperscript{50} However, Zonaras states that after the Carthaginians had rendered money, grain and hostages to Catulus, they were granted an armistice so that they might send envoys to Rome.\textsuperscript{51} The procedure adopted by Catulus seems to have been quite similar to that imposed upon the Romans at Caudium, where the Samnites had been unable to conclude a treaty without senatorial approval and proper fateful solemnization. In view of the fact that Hamilcar had been granted full authority to negotiate the peace terms without reference back to his home government,\textsuperscript{52} it is likely that any hostages which he may have submitted to Catulus came from his camp at Eryx. These hostages probably would have been held only until the treaty clauses were finalized and ratified. Whether or not hostages were demanded for the subsequent maintenance of the treaty cannot be determined, but there is nothing in the sources to suggest that they were.\textsuperscript{53}

The difficulties which the Romans encountered in attempting to apply the fateful law outside Italy prompted the Senate to look for more practical means to conduct foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{54} The submission of hostages, unlike \textit{ius fetiale}, was universally understood and could be effectively applied to all nations with which Rome negotiated peace.
treaties. The foedera which Rome concluded with Philip V of Macedon, Nabis, Antiochus III, and with the Carthaginians after Zama, show that by the beginning of the second century B.C. the use of formal hostages had become a regular and relatively standardized feature of Roman diplomacy. In each of these instances, hostages were surrendered to the Romans in conjunction with an armistice during which ambassadors were sent to Rome to seek Senate ratification of terms which had been offered by the Roman commander in the field.\(^{55}\)

Although these hostages served both to guarantee the security of the Roman army during the period of the armistice, and to expedite the negotiations in Rome, they, unlike the hostages of Caudium, were also formally connected with the final treaty itself, once it had been ratified.

The exact nature of the role of hostages in the maintenance of peace treaties is not completely clear. Thûbler insisted that hostages taken in conjunction with peace treaties were not intended to strengthen the bonds of societas or amicitia, but rather served only to guarantee that indemnity payments were completed within a specific time limit.\(^{56}\) Admittedly, the conclusion of a peace treaty did not necessarily create an alliance, or even a relationship of amicitia.\(^{57}\) Moreover, it is clear that even though many treaties were theoretically concluded in aeternum, the Romans cannot have expected hostages to be delivered in perpetuity.\(^{58}\) Some practical criteria must have determined the length of
time for which hostages were required, and the sources often suggest a close connection between indemnity payments and the delivery of hostages. However, there is no indication in any of the above mentioned treaties that hostages were to act solely as surety for the completion of indemnity payments. Polybius' account of the terms offered to Antiochus III explicitly indicates that the hostages were to act as security for all the conditions of the treaty. Similarly, the hostages taken from Nabis were intended to ensure that all of Flamininus' stipulations were observed. Some treaties which provided for the submission of hostages did not even involve indemnity payments. Thus, even though the schedule established for the submission of indemnity payments may have often acted as a practical guideline for determining the length of time hostages were required, it seems reasonable to conclude that during their detention hostages were considered as pledges for all aspects of a treaty. If societas or amicitia was established by such a treaty, the hostages served to confirm that relationship as well. This was particularly true in the case of royal hostages. Even though the son of Antiochus III may have acted as a guarantee for the specific conditions set out in the treaty of Apamea, his retention by the Romans was intended primarily to ensure the future cooperation of the Seleucid monarch. Undoubtedly similar considerations influenced the Romans to request the inclusion of Armenas, the son of Nabis, and Demetrius, the son
of Philip V, among the hostages demanded from Sparta and Macedon. Moreover, a number of eastern monarchs found it expedient to send members of their families to Rome as unsolicited hostages. Although these hostages did not act as security for specific peace terms, most of them were intended, at least officially, to strengthen their fathers' relations with Rome. 64

In addition to the hostages taken in conjunction with dedita, armistices, peace treaties and alliances, it is clear that Rome could exact hostages at any time from subject and allied states as a means of ensuring continued loyalty or of checking seditious activity. 65 During the Second Punic War a number of Italian towns whose loyalty to the Romans was suspect were requested to submit hostages. Only Thurii, Tarentum, 66 and Arretium 67 are specifically mentioned by Livy, but Frontinus' reference to the revolt of certain Italian cities which had given hostages to Rome suggests that the number may have been considerably higher. 68 During the war with Perseus, the Penestae, who had remained loyal to Rome, were requested to give hostages as evidence of their continued good faith. 69 The Aetolians, whose complicity with Perseus was well known, were also required to submit hostages, though the Roman ambassador departed without securing them. 70 Hostages of this sort were not rendered in conjunction with any specific agreement, but it seems likely that they were considered officially as guarantees
for the maintenance of their donors' alliances with Rome.
Notes

1 Dion. Hal. 1.59. Since the exchange of hostages was a clear indication of the equality of the respective donors, Roman tradition records very few instances of hostage exchange involving the Romans (Dio Cass. 72.15; Zos. 5.36; Amm. Marc. 25.7; Procop. Goth. 2.5.7). However, such exchanges are quite frequently noted as common practice among other peoples (e.g. Cass. EGall. 1.9.4; 2.1; 3.23; 6.2.2; Liv. 44.23.2; Polyb. 29.3.4; App. BCiv. 1.38).

2 Dion. Hal. 1.73.

3 Liv. 1.1.9.

4 Tübler, pp. 335-338, provides several additional examples of "Geiselfrauen", most of which derive from legend and mythology (Ovid Her. 2.33; Met. 8.48; Sen. Phaed. 89). However, a number of historical examples may also be noted: Dio Cass. 49.44 (Iotapec, daughter of Artavasdes, betrothed to Alexander Helios); Dion. 25.12 (see below, p. 64, and n. 6); Liv. 24.41.7 (see below, p. 76, n. 7); Sen. Controv. 6.5 (daughter of Cotys betrothed to Iphocrates).

5 Cf. Plut. Rom. 16: o(e) δὲ Σαβίνοι ... δρώντες αὐτὸς ἐνδεδεμένους μεγάλοις ὁμηρεύμασι καὶ δεδίτεσε περὶ τῶν θυγητέων, ... As E.T. Salmon, OCD 2, s.v. "Sabini", has pointed out, although the tale of the Sabine women is clearly fictitious, stories associating the Sabines with primitive Rome are not entirely untrustworthy. Moreover, archaeology has dramatically shown that the amalgamation of the Sabines and the Romans was not the result of conquest, but rather a gradual synoicism of the two peoples (cf. E. Gjerstad, Facts and Legends of Early Rome, Lund, 1962, pp. 43ff.).


7 Liv. 28.34.7: Mos vetustus erat Romanis, cum quo nec foedere nec aequis legibus iungeretur amicitia, non prius imperio in eum tamquam pacatum uti quam omnia divina humanoque
dedisset, obsides accepti, arma adempta, praesidia urbibus imposita furent.

8 On the connection between *obses* and *obsideo*, see A. Matthaei, *Philologus* LXIV (1905), 227. The word "hostage" itself, according to Webster’s etymology, is apparently a merging of two Latin words, *hospes* and *obses*. If this derivation is correct, it would seem that the formation of the English word has been influenced by the actual policy which the Romans adopted regarding the treatment of formal hostages (See below, pp. 44 ff.). *Festus'* erroneous derivation of *obsides* from *obfides* (See above, p. 6) is the result of a fanciful attempt to associate *obses* with the actual role which formal hostages fulfilled. There is no apparent connection between *obses* and the Greek word, *δύναμις*, which the lexicographers Photius and Hesychius suggest to be a combination of *ὁμίω* (together) and *ἀπομικτεῖν* (to set in order; to regulate). Whether or not this derivation is correct (cf. W. Freidlitz, *Etymологisches Wörterbuch der griechischen Sprache*, Gottingen, 1892, s.v. *δύναμις*), it does at least reflect the role which hostages played in the conclusion of formal agreements.

9 Dionysius' account (6.25; 6.30) of the surrender of Cora and Pometia is preferable to the muddled version of Livy (2.16; 2.22). In any case, Alfoldi, *Early Rome and the Latins*, Ann Arbor, 1963, p. 370, is probably correct in maintaining that Roman successes in Volscian territory between 495 and 491 B.C. were probably invented to mitigate the effect of the subsequent discomfort caused by the Volsci under Coriolanus.

10 Dion. Hal. 6.25.3; Liv. 2.22.2. The Volscian hostages were subsequently executed because of the failure of their donors to keep the peace (Dion. Hal. 6.30; Liv. 2.16.7).

11 There are, of course, numerous instances of *deditio* in which the sources contain no reference to hostages. However, as Livy 28.34.7 (quoted above, n. 7) indicates, the submission of hostages was such an integral part of the surrender process that we may assume that they were often delivered even in cases where they are not specifically mentioned (cf. p. 202, n. 2). However, the Romans may not have always insisted that hostages be submitted by states which offered to surrender in order to gain Roman protection. No hostages are mentioned in connection with the surrender of the Campani (Liv. 7.31), the Fabraterni and the Lucani (Liv. 8.19.1), all of whom
sought Roman protection against the incursions of the Samnites. Similarly, the Saguntines and the Uticenses surrendered as a means of gaining protection against the Carthaginians, and neither city may have submitted hostages to the Romans.

Hostages are specifically mentioned in the following instances of deditio: Liv. 2.22 (= Dion. Hal. 6.25); 9.16.1; 9.20.4; 10.11.13; 21.61.7; 22.20.11; 23.41.6; 29.3.5; 38.28.6; 40.28.6; 40.34.12; 40.47.10; 41.11.9; 44.7.5; Caes. BGall. 1.28.2; 2.3.2; 2.13.1; 2.15.1; 2.34; 3.3.1; 3.23.1; 3.27.1; 4.16.5; 4.21.5; 4.22.2; 5.20.3; 5.22.4; 6.3.2; 6.6.3; 7.11.2; 7.90.2; 8.3.5; 8.20.2; 8.23.2; 8.27.1; 8.31.4; App. Hisp. 41; 48; 50; 72; 73; 77; 79; Ill. 13; 21; 28; Pun. 76; Polyb. 3.40.7; 33.10.12; 36.4.6; Cic. De Imp. Cn. Pomp. 35; Sall. Jug. 54.6; Diod. 33.16; Tac. Agr. 20.

12 Liv. 28.34.9. See below, p. 73.

13 Liv. 44.7.5. Cf. Liv. 45.27.2 for the defection of Agassae to Perseus and its consequent destruction by Q. Maximus.

14 Cic. De Imp. Cn. Pomp. 35 illustrates this point particularly well: idem Cretensibus, cum ad eum usque in Pamphyliam legatos deprecatorisque misisset, spem deditionis non ademit obsidesque imperavit. For other probable examples, see Liv. 9.20.4; 22.20.11; 23.41.6; 38.28.6; 40.28.6; 41.11.9; Caes. B GAll. 1.28.2; 2.13.1; 3.1.4; 4.21.5; 4.22.2; 6.9.6; 7.11.2; 8.3.5; 8.20; 8.31.4. Dahlheim, Entwicklung, p. 9, is led by these many examples to suggest that the submission of hostages was not, strictly speaking, part of the act of deditio itself, but rather was a "Vorbedingung ... rechtlich und zeitlich vor dem Deditionsabschluss liegen...." However, it is clear that hostages were frequently delivered even after the conclusion of the surrender (See below, p. 42). Admittedly, it is likely that in most cases at least a promise to submit hostages was elicited before the surrender was accepted.

15 The psychological effectiveness of this policy is reflected in Livy's description (24.1.8) of the attitude of the Locrians after many of their citizens had fallen into the hands of Hamilcar: velut obsidibus datis pigneratos haberent animos ... haud dubio in speciem consensu fit ad Poenos deditio.

16 Polyb. 36.3-7; App. Pun. 76. On the fate of these and other hostages submitted by dediticii who subsequently refused to carry out their surrender, see below, p. 60, n. 70.
17 Tübner, p. 20ff. Cf. Dahlheim, Entwicklung, p. 20, and Heuss, Grundlagen, p. 66, for opposing view. Liv. 28.34.7 (quoted above, n. 7) implicitly distinguishes *foedera* from *dedito*.

18 States which petitioned Rome to accept their surrender usually did so in the hope of avoiding the terrors of the more rigorous form of capture, *expugnatione*, and while the acceptance of the surrender did not guarantee that the conquered people and their property would be spared, it was traditionally incumbent upon the victors to act with leniency towards *dediticia*.

19 See above, p. 5.


22 In most cases the restoration of *iura legesque* was dependent upon some positive demonstration of good faith by the *dediticia*. For example, Caesar restored independent political status to the Atrebates (BGall. 7.76) as a reward for the faithful service which Commius had rendered him in Britain.

23 Polyb. 10.18.5; 10.34.6-35.7; 10.38.4. See below, p. 72.

24 Liv. 9.20.4.

25 Liv. 9.20.8.


27 Dahlheim, Entwicklung, p. 66, n. 54.

28 This interpretation is accepted by Sherwin-White, RC, p. 114f. and Badian, EC, p. 28, even though these two scholars differ in their views on the exact nature of the alliance concluded between Rome and the Teutes.
29 Liv. 8.37.3.

30 Liv. 8.25.3.

31 Liv. 8.27.10.

32 Liv. 10.11.13.

33 Sherwin-White, RC, pp. 114–115, describes the negotiations with the Lucani as the clearest example of the so-called foedus iniquum, "the bilateral compact between Rome and a state which has made an act of deditio...".

34 An inscription preserving the epitaph of Lucius Scipio Barbatus (ILLS 1), the consul of 298, mentions hostages taken from the Lucanians. Livy is quite unaware of Barbatus' activity in southern Italy, and it is apparent, as E.T. Salmon (Samnium, p. 260) has observed, that he knows only of Scipio's later uneventful campaign in Etruria (10.25.11). The hostages secured by Barbatus were taken sometime after the treaty mentioned by Liv. 10.11.13, and Salmon is likely correct in suggesting that the hostages were taken from a pro-Samnite faction of the Lucani who were attempting to scuttle the alliance recently concluded with Rome.

35 See below, p. 188, and n. 14.

36 Cic. Balb. 32.

37 Caes. BGall. 4.16.5.

38 Caes. BGall. 6.9.6.

39 J.A.O. Larsen, "Was Greece Free between 196 and 146?", CP XXX (1935), 196.

40 On the problem of the foedus iniquum, see Sherwin-White, RC, pp. 113f. and Badian, RC, p. 28.

41 See below, p. 27.

42 Liv. 9.5.3.

44 Liv. 9.5.5: et propter necessarium foederis dilationem etiam sescenti equites imperati, qui capite luerent, si pacto non staretur.

45 Salmon, Samnium, p. 228. Livy's account of the rescue of the hostages (9.15.7) can safely be rejected. Cf. Schmidt, Staatsvertr., p. 30: "Angezichts der hohen Zahl der Geiseln ist ein Bruch des Vertrags in der Tat unwahrscheinlich."

46 e.g. Liv. 1.15.5; 2.54.1; 4.30.2; 4.35.2; 5.32.5; 7.20.8; 7.22.5; 8.2.4; 8.37.2; 9.20; 9.37.12; 9.41.5; 9.41.7; 9.43.6; 9.43.21; 10.5.12; 10.37.5; 10.46.12; Dion. Hal. 3.57.1; 8.68.3; 9.36; 9.59.4; 9.71.

47 Sherwin-White, RC, p. 116, while acknowledging the difference between indutiae and foedera, implies that the Romans, in dealing with the Etruscan states, often employed indutiae virtually in lieu of formal treaties. Täubler, p. 30, notes that in early Roman history, indutiae often acted as final treaties ("Endverträge").

48 Dion. Hal. 3.57.

49 Polyb. 1.16.9; Diod. 23.4.1; Oros. 4.7.3; Zonar. 8.16; Eutrop. 2.19.

50 Polyb. 1.62-63; cf. 3.27. No hostages are mentioned in the accounts of Appian (Sic. 2) or Crocius (4.11.1).

51 Zonar. 8.17.

52 Polyb. 1.62.3.

53 A. Matthaei, Philologus LXIV (1905), 225, insists that hostages must have been submitted. For the opposite view, see Schmidt, Staatsvertr., p. 179. The instructions dispatched by the Senate to Finnes regarding a delay in the submission of indemnity payments (Liv. 22.33.5) suggest that no hostages had been taken by the Romans in conjunction with
the treaties granted to the Illyrians in 228 and 219. Pinnes was advised that he would have to submit hostages if he wished to defer the submission of indemnity payments. This implies that no hostages had been taken in connection with the earlier arrangements.

54 Cf. L. Matthaei, CC I (1907), 201: "When Rome tried to force this system (i.e. ius fetiale) on extra-Italian nations, the attempt was a failure."

55 The hostages submitted by the Aetolians in 189 may not have been delivered until after the treaty had been ratified at Rome (see below, p. 146, n. 20). Not all peace agreements were preceded by lengthy preliminary armistices or referral of ambassadors to Rome. Often capitulation was followed by terms of peace in the form of a pactio granted by the Roman general, and hostages were frequently exacted as a means of ensuring future good behavior. This procedure was commonly employed by the Romans in regulating relations with tribal states in Spain (e.g. App. Hisp. 52; 54) and Germany (e.g. Dio Cass. 54.20). In reality, there was usually very little difference between this procedure and outright deditio, and occasionally commanders made the submission of hostages prerequisite to even the negotiation of peace (e.g. Dio Cass. fr. 89.1; cf. Caes. BGall. 1.14.6).


57 Following the ratification of the treaty with Philip V, Cn. Cornelius advised the Macedonian king (Polyb. 18.48.4) to negotiate a formal alliance with Rome. This may suggest that the hostages rendered in connection with the peace treaty had no official function in the subsequent alliance.

58 Aymard, in his discussion of the Carthaginian hostages (Pallas I (1953), 55), entertains the theory of such a possibility: "Les préliminaires contenaient bien d'autres engagements à échéance variée, dont certains valaient en principe pour l'éternité: pourquoi n'aurient-ils pas juridiquement bénéficié eux aussi de la même garantie (i.e. the hostages)"

59 See below, p. 61, n. 76.
Polyb. 21.17: πίστιν δὲ τοῦτων.

Liv. 34.35.11: obsides, ea ita futura, daret....

e.g. Joseph. AJ 18.96 (See below, p. 223.). In the period of the later empire hostages were frequently taken from barbarian tribes in conjunction with agreements pertaining to frontier defence. However, the Romans were often required to provide handsome annual subsidies to these tribes in order to retain their loyalty. The most famous arrangement of this sort was made by Leo, who provided a large sum of money to the Gothic leaders Walamir, Widemir, and Theodemir, and received in return as a hostage, Theoderic, the son of Theodemir. For other similar arrangements, cf. Men. Prot. FGH IV, fr. 33; Priscus FGH IV, fr. 21.

See below, p. 151.

Some monarchs, in the guise of courting Roman friendship, dispatched hostages to Rome primarily as a means of ridding themselves of potential rivals. Cf. Liv. 42.19.3 (Ariarathes of Cappadocia; cf. Dio. 31.19.7); Liv. 45.44 (Prusias of Bithynia; cf. App. Mith. 4.7); Tac. Ann. 2.1 (Phraates IV; see below, pp. 217ff.); Joseph. AJ 20.37 (Izates); Tac. Ann. 13.9 (Vologeses). In some cases the Romans openly suggested that the submission of hostages might serve to strengthen bonds of friendship (e.g. Tac. Ann. 13.9: Vologeses...datisque obsidibus solitam prioribus reverentiam in populum Romanum continuaret.).

Cf. Xen. An. 3.2.24, who refers to hostages of this sort as δύνατον τοῦ ἀδόλως. Athens occasionally demanded hostages from members of the Delian league in order to curb treasonous activity (e.g. Thuc. 1.56; 1.115.2-4).

Liv. 25.7.11; 25.15.7. After Hannibal's initial victories in the north of Italy, the Romans took measures to block the possible entry of reinforcements from the south by sending garrisons to Tarentum and other suitable locations (Polyb. 3.75.4). Hostages may have been taken from Tarentum and Thurii at this time, especially if the number of soldiers to be garrisoned there was comparatively small (cf. Frontin. Str. 2.11.1; App. Ill. 23). However, if Tarentum was among the towns which revolted after the Roman defeat at Cannae (Polyb. 3.118; Liv. 22.61.12), the Romans seem to have recovered it shortly thereafter, and it was probably at that time that hostages were taken. Even though Thurii, whose hostages were closely associated with those of Tarentum, is
not mentioned among the rebels of 216, it is likely that Rome, in view of the unstable situation, would have exacted hostages to ensure the town's continued loyalty.

67 Liv. 27.24.1. When news was brought to Rome in the spring of 208 that Arretium was the center of a potential revolt in Etruria, Tubulus, the pro-praetor, was instructed to exact hostages from the leading senators of the town. After seven senators escaped with their families during the night, Tubulus took 120 hostages from the remaining senators and handed them over to Terentius Varro for removal to Rome. The Arretines' generous support of Scipio's campaign in 205 (Liv. 28.45) may have been prompted by concern for the safety of these hostages.

68 Frontin. Str. 1.8.6.

69 Liv. 43.21.2.

70 Polyb. 28.4; cf. Liv. 43.17.6.
CHAPTER II

OBSIDIBUS IMPERATIS

Roman policy governing the actual selection and delivery of hostages was highly adaptable, and varied as the requirements of each particular situation demanded. In most cases the victorious general probably issued explicit instructions concerning the number, age, rank, and sometimes even sex of the hostages to be submitted.\(^1\) Frequently he appended to these instructions names of specific individuals who were to be handed over.\(^2\) The remaining hostages were then either selected by the general himself,\(^3\) or chosen by the donor states, subject, of course, to final Roman approval.\(^4\)

Most of the formal hostages taken by the Romans were children belonging to aristocratic families of the donor states.\(^5\) In the case of monarchies, it was the regular practice to select one of the sons of the king,\(^6\) as well as the sons of high ranking court officials.\(^7\) Extremely young children were not usually required to serve as hostages, although Demetrius, the son of Philip V, was only about ten years old at the time he was brought to Rome.\(^8\) The youngest hostages acceptable under the terms of the treaties granted to the Carthaginians, the Aetolians, and Antiochus III ranged

-38-
from 12 - 18 years of age. However, the maximum age allowable in the terms of these treaties ranges from 30 to a surprisingly high 45 years of age. These regulations suggest that the Romans determined the age stipulations for hostages with two basic objectives in mind. Younger hostages — i.e. those in their teens or slightly younger — were extremely susceptible to cultural indoctrination and could be groomed as future "friends and clients". However, hostages also had to be selected with a view to guaranteeing their donors' cooperation and good faith, and since kings and influential statesmen will have frequently been between 45 and 65 years of age, it is reasonable to assume that their sons were often in their early twenties, if not considerably older. Although men of this age were frequently influential politicians themselves, the Romans rarely seem to have selected formal hostages with a view to removing prominent or even potentially dangerous leaders from positions of authority. On the contrary, hostages were taken as a means of controlling such men. The Romans were well aware that the removal of one group of leaders as hostages might only result in its replacement by another group equally hostile, for whom the detention of the first group meant little or nothing. The clause in the treaty granted to the Aetolians which excluded magistrates from being selected as hostages was probably applied regularly by the Romans in exacting formal hostages.
Although hostages were usually male, there is substantial evidence that female hostages were occasionally employed as well. Daughters of prominent statesmen or kings often played important roles in the political aspirations of their fathers and consequently could be effective pledges for their donors' cooperation and loyalty. However unhistorical the legend of Cloelia may be, the incident does suggest that mixed groups of hostages were not unusual. Women from Albanian and Iberian tribes were among the hostages led in Pompey's triumphal procession in 62 B.C. Tacitus tells us that the loyalty of many of the Germanic tribes was more effectively guaranteed by requiring them to submit high born maidens as hostages. Augustus discovered that some of these tribes absolutely ignored pledges secured by male hostages, and consequently he resorted to what Suetonius calls a novum genus obsidum, namely women. Obviously Suetonius cannot mean that no one before Augustus had employed women as hostages. Aymard interpreted the phrase novum genus obsidum to mean that Augustus had not personally resorted to demanding female hostages prior to his confrontations with the Germans. This may, in fact, be the correct interpretation, but the context of Suetonius' remarks suggests that the novelty of Augustus' action may have been in the fact that he exacted only female hostages in dealing with some German tribes. In any case, Augustus' policy furnishes a good illustration of how the selection of
hostages was adapted to meet specific situations.\textsuperscript{20}

The number of hostages requested from individual states was also frequently dependent upon political considerations. In dealing with monarchies, the Romans usually considered a few key hostages as sufficient guarantee for the king's future good behavior. Antiochus III was required to submit 20 hostages,\textsuperscript{21} Nabis only 5, while the later treaty between Gizeric and Valentinian was secured with a single hostage, a son of the Vandal king.\textsuperscript{22} Obviously a far greater number of hostages was required to guarantee agreements made with states which were governed by tribal councils or annually elected magistrates. During the fifty year period following the end of the Hannibalic War the number of hostages exacted from the Carthaginians by the Romans was probably at least 500.\textsuperscript{23} Caesar tells us of the difficulties which he encountered in assessing the factional divergencies among the numerous Gallic peoples,\textsuperscript{24} and it is likely that he seldom took less than 100 hostages from tribes which submitted to him. In the case of the populous and influential Bellovaci, he demanded 600 hostages.\textsuperscript{25}

Political considerations were not always the most important factor determining the number of hostages required. The Cephallenian cities, Same, Pale and Kronioi were requested to submit 20 hostages each in conjunction with their surrender to Marcus Fulvius.\textsuperscript{26} The number is large in proportion to the size of the communities, but Livy's account
suggests that the consul's demand was probably influenced by the strategic location of the towns. Subject and allied states which had revolted from Rome and were subsequently compelled to abandon their efforts were frequently required to submit large numbers of hostages as a form of penalty.  

As we have observed above, in many instances of deditio the Romans required that hostages be delivered before the actual acceptance of the surrender. However, when specific hostages were requested, or when it was necessary to collect hostages from various and distant locales, immediate delivery was not always possible. During his first invasion of Britain, Caesar accepted hostages from some of the coastal tribes, and received promises that other hostages who had to be fetched from a distance would be sent as soon as possible. In 149 the Senate granted the Carthaginians thirty days in which to deliver 300 hostages to the consuls in Sicily. Hostages demanded in conjunction with peace treaties were usually delivered to the Roman commander in the field at the commencement of the armistice, before envoys were allowed to depart for Rome. However, if the terms of the ratified treaty required that hostages be periodically exchanged or replaced, it was normally the responsibility of the donor state to transport the new hostages to Rome.

Although the Romans exacted a great number of hostages from territories outside Italy, relatively few of these
hostages were ever brought to Rome, and in fact, most of them were rarely transported very far from their own homelands. The numerous hostages submitted by Spanish, Gallic and German tribes were taken primarily as a means of facilitating military operations, and consequently they were generally retained among the baggage trains of the legions or held in central garrison towns which were in close communication with the armies.\textsuperscript{33} Caesar also resorted to entrusting some hostages to the most faithful of his Gallic allies.\textsuperscript{34} We have no record of any Spanish, Gallic, or German hostages ever being sent to Italy, although Caesar did take some prominent Gauls, together with their retainers, with him on his campaigns during the civil wars.\textsuperscript{35}

The majority of non-Italian hostages who were brought to Rome were either rendered in conjunction with major peace treaties involving indemnity payments, or were voluntarily submitted as pledges of good faith by kings seeking to gain Roman approval and friendship. With the exception of the hostages submitted by the Carthaginians, virtually all of the hostages who were sent to Italy came from the East.\textsuperscript{36} Aside from the obvious fact that a greater number of important peace treaties and alliances were concluded by Rome with eastern states, the Romans also saw that the detention of Greek hostages in Italy might provide them with better opportunities for eventually establishing pro-Roman factions and client kings in states where campaigns of Romanization
could make very little headway against the venerable Hellenic mode de vie. Hostages from the West could be, and were, Romanized in their own territories.\textsuperscript{37} It was quite a different matter with hostages from the East.

The accommodations provided for hostages during their detention depended not only upon their rank, but also upon the circumstances of their submission. Hostages rendered voluntarily as a sign of good will could obviously be given much more freedom than those detained for reasons of military exigency. Moreover, hostages detained far from their homelands generally required less constant surveillance than those held in or near their own territories. Many of the Gallic hostages surrendered to Caesar must have been kept under strict garrison supervision.\textsuperscript{38} In areas which were sufficiently pacified it may have been common practice to place hostages in \textit{ludi litterarii} especially set up to instruct them in Latin and other aspects of Roman culture.\textsuperscript{39}

Of the hostages sent to Italy, probably only the important royal hostages and their companions were actually kept at Rome. Although most hostages were probably brought initially to the City and frequently marched in the triumphal procession of the general who had been victorious over their fathers,\textsuperscript{40} many were shortly thereafter transferred to nearby towns.\textsuperscript{41} Since hostages sent to Italy were often accompanied by many slaves and attendants,\textsuperscript{42} the Romans clearly considered it advisable to break up large groups of hostages into smaller
lots in order to reduce the danger of escape or revolt. Moreover, the activities of the hostages could be more easily observed within the confines of the small neighboring towns than would be possible in the busy and populous capital.

Security measures for hostages held in Italy were generally quite lenient. In most cases the praetor probably issued specific regulations governing the movement and activity of hostages. The precautions taken in the case of Darius Altinius, though not a hostage, were probably typical of those frequently applied to hostages. Darius was detained at Cales, in libera custodia, where he was permitted to go free during the day, though observed by guards, while at night he was kept in his house and closely watched. During the revolt of the Carthaginian slaves at Setia in 198 B.C. the praetor at Rome sent instructions to the Latin towns in which the Carthaginian hostages were kept, directing them to restrict the hostages to their homes and to allow them no opportunity to come out into public places. The relative leniency of these restrictions suggests that under normal conditions the hostages enjoyed much the same freedoms as were permitted to Darius. Even during the Hanniballic War hostages from Thurii and Tarentum, whose complicity with the Carthaginians had long been suspected, were detained under only casual guard in the Atrium Libertatis.

The important royal hostages, who resided in Rome during their terms of detention, were granted considerable
personal liberty and often became prominent figures in the social life of the City. We are told that Antiochus, the son of Antiochus III, was well received by the Roman nobility, ut pro rege non pro obside, 50 and according to Asconius, a house was built for him at public expense. 51 During his stay in Rome Antiochus took a keen interest in Roman politics, religion, military tactics, and gladiatorial events. 52 His nephew, Demetrius, the son of Seleucus IV, was also on close terms with many of the Roman aristocracy, claiming that the senators were like fathers to him and their sons like brothers. 53 Demetrius, the son of Philip V, developed close ties with the circle of Titus Flamininus which ultimately led to the ruin of the Macedonian royal house. 54 From the imperial period there are a few scandalous references in Suetonius and Juvenal which indicate that hostages often enjoyed the company of the very highest classes in Rome. 55 Royal hostages of somewhat younger age were often educated with children from the Roman nobility. Suetonius tells us that Augustus educated children of defeated kings in the company of his own children, and it is possible that several of the hostage sons of Phraates IV may have become thoroughly Romanized in this manner. 56

The only serious restriction on the activity of the royal hostages must have been with regard to their freedom of movement. However, if the case of the Seleucid prince, Demetrius, is at all typical, royal hostages seem to have
been allowed fairly liberal travel privileges. We are told that Demetrius was accustomed to go boar hunting near Circeii, and when he finally did make his escape from Rome, no one even thought to look for him until four days later. What the official restrictions on the movement of hostages may have been we do not know. Cuntz argued that Polybius, though not a hostage, was probably restricted to Latium during his internment. This view has been justifiably questioned by Walbank and others who suggest that Polybius made visits not only to Spain, Gaul and Africa before his official release, but also several visits to Epizephyrian Locri. However, on most of these journeys Polybius was accompanied by his friend and patron, Scipio Aemilianus, whose family reputation was undoubtedly considered sufficient security for Polybius' good behavior. On the whole, it seems likely that some travel restrictions such as Cuntz suggested for Polybius must have been applicable to the royal hostages as well. In any case, there was a fundamental obligation on the part of all hostages to remain with those to whom they had been delivered. Hostages who attempted to escape and were recaptured could be considered captivi, and thus be liable to the death penalty.

Although we must unfortunately assume that the Romans executed more hostages than the sources suggest, it nevertheless appears that this ultimate sanction was applied very infrequently. Not even the potentially dangerous revolt
of Nabis in 193, nor the violation of the armistice by the Carthaginians in 203 seems to have resulted in the execution of any hostages. The Romans knew from experience that such extreme measures might cause the bereaved donor to become even more rebellious. For the most part, the real threat that hostages might be permanently enslaved was usually sufficient to guarantee the good behavior of donor states. However, in the event of rebellion, it was common practice for the Romans simply to demand additional hostages.

Despite the apparent reluctance of the Romans to execute hostages even when their donors had seriously violated the agreement for which they had been rendered, it is likely that the Romans occasionally threatened hostages with death or torture as a means of extorting cooperation from their errant kinsmen. When the Cephalenian Sameans changed their minds about surrendering their city to the Romans, the consul sent some of the hostages whom they had submitted up to the base of the walls to create anxiety for their parents and fellow citizens. Livy does not say what was done with the hostages, but in any case, the city refused to surrender. After four months of siege it was captured and its inhabitants were sold as slaves. If the hostages were not killed at the outset of the rebellion, they most certainly will have been sold along with the rest of their kinsmen. However, in contrast, it is noteworthy that the 300 hostages surrendered by the Carthaginians in 149 were not exploited
by the Romans during the siege of the African city, nor did they suffer punishment as a result of their fathers' decision to oppose the Romans.\textsuperscript{70}

Barring serious violation of the agreement for which they had been submitted, most hostages could reasonably expect that they would eventually be liberated.\textsuperscript{71} However, Roman policy regarding the restoration of hostages was dependent upon a number of factors, and was not always as contractual as Tübler suggests. As we have observed above,\textsuperscript{72} hostages taken in conjunction with deditio were generally retained at least until the status of their donors had been resolved. Dediticii whose new status was determined almost simultaneously with their surrender may have often regained their hostages immediately. However, dediticii could have no legal claims upon the Romans, and it is clear that there cannot have been any contractual basis to the submission of hostages in deditio.\textsuperscript{73}

With regard to hostages taken in conjunction with more formal agreements, only the treaty granted to the Aetolians in 189 specifically mentions how long hostages were to be submitted. Polybius tells us that the Aetolians were to furnish indemnity payments and hostages for a six year period.\textsuperscript{74} Tübler, depending heavily on this single piece of evidence, maintained that hostages taken in conjunction with peace treaties were intended to guarantee only the submission of indemnity payments and that
consequently there was a strict temporal correlation between these payments and the term for which hostages were required. Although we have taken exception to Täubler's restrictive view of the role of hostages in peace treaties, his formula for the restoration of such hostages may have been generally applicable to all but the most important royal hostages. However, indemnity payments were often spread over very long periods, and if hostages were to be furnished for the full term of the payments, some method of periodically exchanging hostage personnel will have been necessary. The treaty of Apamea provided for mutatio obsidum every three years. The Carthaginian hostages submitted after Zama must have also been occasionally exchanged. In some cases the schedule of exchanges may not have been fixed, but rather left to periodic negotiation between the donors and Rome.

Although the Romans may have employed mutatio with some consideration for the hostages themselves, the main reasons for its use were much more utilitarian. If hostages were to be submitted for an extended period, mutatio helped to ensure that Rome would always possess hostages relevant to the internal political situation in the donor states. This was probably the Romans' primary consideration in applying the procedure to the Seleucid hostages. However, the most important advantage to be gained through the periodic exchange of hostages was the substantial increase in the number of young and impressionable hostages who would spend
several years in Italy and become acquainted with many aspects of Roman culture. Whether or not these hostages became fully Romanized during their residence in Italy, the Romans no doubt hoped that once they had been returned to their homelands they might some day furnish the nuclei for vigorous pro-Roman political factions. 80

The restoration of hostage princes, regardless of whether they had been submitted in conjunction with formal peace treaties or not, was rarely effected in accordance with a pre-arranged schedule. Demetrius, the son of Philip V, after spending more than six years at Rome, was sent home as a means of encouraging his father to assist the Romans in their march through Macedonia and Thrace in pursuit of Antiochus. Even though Tübeler may be correct in maintaining that other Macedonian hostages were retained at Rome while Philip still owed indemnity payments, 81 the liberation of Demetrius clearly demonstrates that the Romans considered the cooperation of the Macedonian king far more important than the payment of a few hundred talents. Antiochus Epiphanes was specifically excluded from the groups of Syrian hostages involved in the triennial mutationes, and his eventual release, almost fifteen years after his arrival in Rome, was part of a political offensive designed to curtail the anti-Roman activities of his brother, Seleucus. 82 Demetrius, the son of Seleucus, was detained as a hostage long beyond the death of his father and would have remained
in Rome even longer but for his escape with the assistance of Polybius, whose account makes it clear that the Romans had no justifiable grounds for continuing to hold the Seleucid prince.\(^3\) It is evident that the restoration of hostage princes was almost invariably prompted by immediate political considerations, and there is no evidence to suggest that the Romans ever felt themselves legally or morally bound to liberate hostages simply because the cause for which they had been delivered had ceased to exist or had become irrelevant.
Notes

1 e.g. Polyb. 15.18.8 = Liv. 30.37.6; Polyb. 18.39.5 = Liv. 33.13.13; Polyb. 21.17.8 = Liv. 37.45.16; Liv. 34.35.11; Caes. BGall. 5.4.2. In some cases specific instructions regarding the selection of hostages were dispatched from Rome (Liv. 38.11.7; Joseph. AJ 18.96).

2 Polyb. 15.18.8 (διμήρους δούνατ... ους έν προγράμη των νέων ὀ στρατηγώς); Polyb. 21.17.8 (διμήρους ε'κοσι δούνατ... τούς παραγραφεῖν τας); Caes. BGall. 5.4.2 (quos nominatim evocaverat). In some cases the selection of hostages was facilitated through information provided by a Romanizing faction in the donor state (e.g. Lyciscos in Aetolia - Polyb. 28.4.7), or by a pro-Roman neighbour who was well acquainted with the political situation in the donor state (e.g. Masinissa - see below, pp. 98-99).

3 e.g. Liv. 38.11.6; App. Pun. 54; Ill. 21.

4 In some cases the responsibility for selecting hostages was left entirely to the donor state. L. Marcius Censorinus, the consul of 149, commended the Carthaginians on their careful selection of the 300 hostages delivered to the Romans in Sicily (App. Pun. 80). We have no details as to how these 300 hostages were selected, but Pufendorf, de jure nat. 8.2.6, maintained that when the recipient party did not demand specific hostages, the safest way to avoid complaints from one's own people was to resort to lot.

5 e.g. Polyb. 8.36; 28.4.7; Liv. 2.22.2; 27.24.1; 32.26.5; 34.35.11; App. Pun. 76; Ill. 25; 28; Caes. BGall. 3.2.5; 5.4; 5.27.4; Dion. Hal. 5.32.3; Dio Cass. 37.2.

6 It has generally been considered (e.g. E.R. Bevan, The House of Seleucus, London, 1927, vol. II, p. 124; H. Volkmann, Klio XIX (1925), 376) that it was standard Roman policy to refrain from selecting as hostages the eldest sons of defeated monarchs, and indeed, the examples of Demetrius, the son of Philip V, Antiochus Epiphanes, and Dareios, the son of Artabanus III, support this observation. Although the Romans may have claimed that this policy was intended to avoid unnecessary disruption in the succession to the donors' thrones, they probably considered that potential rivals to the heirs apparent furnished a more effective guarantee of not only the donors' cooperation, but that of the successors as well. The struggle between
Demetrius and Perseus shows how this policy facilitated the Senate's aim of keeping Macedon weak and in a chaotic state. Similarly, it was the Romans' sinister intention that Antiochus act as a surety for the cooperation of both his father and his elder brother (see below, pp. 151-153).

Although it is rarely emphasized, the selection of the hostages who were to accompany hostage princes to Rome was extremely important, as a fragment of Menander the Protector (FGH IV, fr. 33) illustrates: εἰ γε τῶν παρὰ Σκύθων ἀρχόντων λήγοντας τοὺς παιδίας, οἵ τε εἰκός, θυσευμένου τοῦ Χαγάνου τὰ ξυντεθεῖσά παρώσαιται, οὐ διαπερρήσειν τῶν ἀμφεφύρτων τοὺς πατέρας. In like fashion, Flamininus undoubtedly hoped that the fathers of the hostages who accompanied Demetrius to Rome might eventually be induced to oppose Philip's anti-Roman activities (see below, p. 120).

See below, p. 126, n. 2. The detention of Antiochus Epiphanes for over ten years after his father's death may have been caused in part by the fact that Seleucus IV did not have a son old enough to be taken as a hostage (see below, p. 174, n. 21).

The age stipulations in the three treaties were as follows: Carthaginians: 14-30 (Polyb. 15.18.8); Aetolians: 12-40 (Polyb. 21.32.10); Syrians: 18-45 (Polyb. 21.42.22).

Cf. Perseus' remarks concerning the release of Demetrius (Liv. 40.5.12): ...obses Romae fuit, corpus nobis reddiderunt Romani, animum ipsi habent.

For example, Antiochus III was about 50 years of age at the time of his defeat at Magnesia. It is entirely likely that some of his key advisors were as old as 60-65 years of age, and sons of these men could easily have been 40-45 years old at the time. Although these hostages were probably requested by name (Polyb. 21.17.8), the Syrians were required to send new hostages to Rome every three years. Since most of these replacements were likely to come from the same political circles as the original hostages, the age specifications set out in the treaty were geared for that eventuality.

The sources record very few instances in which the Romans took prominent leaders of a state as hostages (e.g. Caes. BGall. 2.13; Zosimus 3.7.7).
Polyb. 21.32.10. Cf. Diod. 20.99.3 for a similar clause in the treaty (304 B.C.) between Demetrios I and the Rhodians.

It is noteworthy that the taking of wives as hostages is not attested as a Roman practice. It does, however, seem to have been quite commonly employed by the Carthaginians (e.g. Polyb. 1.68.3; 10.35.1; 10.35.6).

App. Mith. 103.

Tac. Germ. 8.5.


According to Duris of Samos (Ath. 605E; Diod. 20.104) the Spartan king Cleonymus, was traditionally the first to take women as hostages.


Tacitus (Germ. 20.11) notes that another peculiarity among some German tribes was the unusually close bond between uncles and nephews. He says that some tribes regarded this blood tie as even closer than that between father and son, and consequently in taking hostages made it the basis of their demands. Although the sources have preserved no examples of this phenomenon being exploited by the Romans, it is clear that they were well acquainted with it (cf. Caes. BGall. 5.27).

Polyb. 21.42.22. Even considering the triennial mutations which were to be applied in the case of the Seleucid hostages, only about 75 hostages would have been required during the twelve year period of the indemnity payments (See below, p. 172, n. 6).


See below, pp. 92 ff.

Caes. BGall. 6.11.2.
25 Caes. BGall. 2.15.1. Cf. Caes. BGall. 5.4.1 (200 hostages from Indutio Marus); 6.4.4 (100 hostages from the Senones); 7.11.2 (600 hostages from Vellaunodunum); 7.90.1 (magnus numerum obsidum from the Arverni).

26 Liv. 38.28.9.

27 e.g. Liv. 21.61.7 (dies paucos pluribus quam ante obsidibus imperatis Ilergetes...); 41.17.3 (230 hostages taken from rebel Sardinian tribes); Caes. BGall. 4.36.2 (numerus obsidum quem ante imperavit duplicavit...) App. I11. 28 (700 hostages exacted from rebel Dalmatians); Hisp. 41 (Cato demands additional hostages from rebel tribes in Spain).

28 See above, p. 18.

29 Caes. BGall. 4.27.6.

30 App. Pun. 76.

31 The hostages rendered by the Aetolians in 189 (See below, p. 146, n. 20) may be an exception to this generally standard practice. In some cases the donor was assured that his hostages would be restored if the negotiations in Rome failed to produce a treaty (Polyb. 18.39.6 = Liv. 33.13.15; cf. App. Hisp. 49-50).

32 Polyb. 21.32.11; 21.42.14.

33 Caes. BGall. 5.47.2; 7.55.2.

34 e.g. Caes. BGall. 6.4.4.

35 Caes. BCiv. 1.39.2; 1.51.1; 1.51.6; 3.22; 3.59.

As DeWitt has noted ("The Peaceful Conquest of Gaul", Classical Essays presented to James A. Kleist, St. Louis, 1946, p. 26) Caesar's foresight helped to ensure the good behavior of the Gallic tribes and at the same time kept potential trouble makers away from home and out of mischief. However, it is clear that Caesar's Gallic friends were not official hostages, whatever purpose they may have fulfilled de facto.
36 Not all hostages taken from eastern states were brought to Italy. As in the West, those taken for temporary military security were probably retained in the vicinity of their homelands (e.g. Liv. 43.21.3).

37 Suet. Calig. 45. Plutarch (Sert. 14) describes how Sertorius collected the sons of Spanish nobles at Osca where he set over them teachers of Greek and Roman learning and assured the fathers of the youths that he was grooming them for a role in state administration. Although these boys were not official hostages, Plutarch notes that in reality they acted as such (... ἐργὼ μὲν ἐξωμηνεύσατο, λόγῳ δὲ ἐπαίδευεν ...). DeWitt, "Peaceful Conquest", p. 24, suggests that Caesar facilitated the later Romanization of Gaul by acquainting the more important hostages in his possession with aspects of Roman culture.

38 Caes. BGall. 5.47.2; 6.4.4.

39 Suet. Calig. 45.

40 Liv. 34.52.9; App. Mith. 103; 117.

41 Although some of the Carthaginian hostages taken at the conclusion of the Second Punic War may have remained in Rome (Liv. 32.26.17), the majority of them were distributed among a number of Latin towns. Those towns specifically mentioned in the sources are Fregellae (Nep. Hann. 7.2), Norba (Liv. 32.2.4), Signia (Liv. 32.2.4), Ferentinum (Liv. 32.2.4), Setia (Liv. 32.26.4), and Cerceii (Liv. 32.26.7-8). Zonaras (9.30) tells us that the hostages surrendered by the Carthaginians in 149 B.C. were detainted in various parts of Italy.

42 The 100 Carthaginian hostages brought to Italy in 201 B.C. may have involved a party of several thousand persons (Liv. 32.26.5: Cum iis, ut principum liberis, magna vis servorum erat.).

43 Despite the fact that the Carthaginian hostages were distributed among half a dozen or more Latin towns, those billeted at Setia were later suspected of involvement in a serious revolt of Carthaginian slaves (Liv. 32.26; see below, p. 106, n. 53). Zosimus (4.26) relates how Julius exacted hostages from the Scythians and distributed them in various cities, ἕως τε μὴ βαρβάρων νεολαίαν, εἰς πλῆθος συνελεγμένην τοσοῦτον, εὖρυχωρίαν ἔχειν τοῦ νεότερίζειν....
As E.T. Salmon, Samnium, p. 315, has noted, it is unlikely that any of the Latin communities would have been eager to accept the responsibility of hosting state hostages. It may have been Norba's failure to provide suitable accommodations for the Carthaginian hostages billeted there which prompted the Carthaginian government to request (Liv. 32.2.4) the transfer of some of its hostages from Norba to Signia and Ferentium.

Liv. 32.26.

Liv. 24.45.8. For the term libera custodia, cf. Liv. 39.14.9; Vell. Pat. 1.11; Sall. Cat. 47.3.

Liv. 32.26.

Zonaras (9.30) describes the detention of the 300 Carthaginian hostages taken in 149 as ἐν φροντίς δόζῳ.

Liv. 25.7.11: Custodiebantur in atrio Libertatis minore cura, quia nec ipsis nec civitatibus eorum fallere Romanos expediebat.

Liv. 42.6.9.

Asc. Pis. 52. Cf. Liv. 42.19.6 regarding the house built for the son of Ariarathes IV. Normally the Romans were probably not financially responsible for the accommodation of formal hostages (Cf. Vattel, Ius Gentium 2.16.251).

See below, p. 173, n. 12.

Polyb. 31.2.5. See below, p. 166.

See below, pp. 117ff.

Suet. Calig. 36; Juven. Sat. 2.166.


Polyb. 31.14.3.
58 Polyb. 31.15.6. On the details of Demetrius' escape, see below, p. 184, n. 100.


60 Walbank, Comment. on Polyb., vol. I, p. 4; 393; vol. II, p. 331.

61 These restrictions probably did not apply, or at least were certainly less stringent in the case of princes sent to Rome voluntarily by their fathers.

62 This principle is clearly demonstrated in Livy's version of the Cloelia legend. When Porsenna heard of the escape of the hostage maidens he declared that he would regard the treaty broken if Cloelia was not returned. The Romans felt themselves religiously bound to restore the hostages to Porsenna in order to preserve their own fides (Liv. 2.13.9).

63 The execution of the hostages from Tarentum and Thurii (Liv. 25.7.14) is the only recorded instance of the Romans inflicting the death penalty on hostages who attempted to escape custody. However, Pausanias (7.10.3f.) notes the execution of some of the Achaean internees who attempted unsuccessfully to escape.

64 The sources record only two incidents in which the Romans are said to have executed official hostages. The historicity of one of these incidents (Liv. 2.16.7 = Dion. Hal. 6.30 – the execution of the 300 Volscian hostages) is doubtful (See above, p. 30, n. 9), and in the other, the above mentioned execution of the hostages from Tarentum and Thurii, the hostages were punished for attempting to escape. Sertorius is said to have executed some of the Spanish youths whom he was "educating" at Osca (See above, n. 37), but these cannot be considered official hostages. The paucity of references to the execution of hostages in part reflects the moral discomfort which the Romans sensed concerning the harsh principle of collective guilt which made innocent hostages punishable for the transgressions of their donors. However, it is clear that Roman sources will not have been inclined to mention the execution of hostages by the Romans, and in several cases (Liv. 2.22.5; Caes. B.Gall. 1.31f.) the practice is ascribed to Rome's enemies in order to enhance Roman clementia (See below, p. 207, n. 53).
65 See below, p. 94.

66 The execution of the hostages from Tarentum and Thurii is said by Livy (25.8.1) to have roused the Tarentines to open revolt.

67 See above, n. 27.

68 Liv. 38.28.9. Aeneas Tacticus (10.23) has specific advice for towns which have rendered hostages and which plan to revolt. He says that the kinsmen of those who have been given as hostages must be taken away from the town if possible, or at least kept under close surveillance, since their emotional attachment to the hostages might cause them to betray the town, especially if they should see their kin brought up to the walls and threatened with death or torture.

69 Cf. Caes. BGall. 3.16, and p. 190.

70 Polyb. 36.5.9 tells us that the hostages were taken to Rome and kept in custody on board ship. According to Zonaras (9.30) they spent the rest of their days in honorable confinement in various parts of Italy. The sources give absolutely no indication of what fate befell the hostages submitted by the following rebellious dediticii: Boii (Polyb. 3.40.7); Numantines (Diod. 33.16); Spaniards (App. Hisp. 41); Seduni and Veragri (Caes. BGall. 3.1.4); Morini (Caes. BGall. 4.22.2); Metuli (App. III. 21); Sabiri (Men. Prot. FGH IV, fr. 42).

71 Some of the Parthian hostages, who by their own preference probably would have remained in Rome permanently, were sent back to their homeland at a very old age in order to contest the throne with anti-Roman rivals (See below, p. 222 ff.). However, it is apparent that some hostages actually did remain in Rome permanently. A law of Commodus (Marc. Dig. 49.14.31) concerning testamentary rights suggests that hostages, perhaps after long residence in Rome, could acquire certain citizen rights, if not even full citizenship. We do not know whether Artavasdes and Ariobarzanes, the sons of the Ariobarzanes sent out from Rome by Augustus in 20 B.C. to become king of Media Atropatene (Res Gest. 33) were officially hostages or not, but it is clear that the latter spent his entire life in Rome, was enrolled in the tribus Fabia, and took the Julian nomen. See below, p. 230, n.19.

72 See above, p. 18-22.
73 The Carthaginians in 149 bemoan the fact that their 300 hostages were not rendered ἐπὶ συνετὴν βεβαίαν.

74 Polyb. 21.32.10.

75 See above, p. 35, n. 56.

76 In addition to the evidence concerning the Aetolian hostages, Liv. 32.2.1f. indicates a close relationship between the indemnity payments and the hostages submitted by the Carthaginians. Polyb. 21.42.14 suggests that the delivery of the Syrian hostages was closely connected with the schedule of indemnity payments imposed upon the Seleucid king. However, it is noteworthy that the restoration of the hostages submitted by Nabis seems to have been entirely unconnected with the indemnity payments owed by the Spartan king. Whether those payments ceased with Nabis' death in 192, or were continued to their scheduled completion in 188, it is difficult to make any connection between them and the liberation of the hostages in 191. Admittedly, Armenas, the son of Nabis, was not set free with the other hostages, but his retention by the Romans does not seem to have had anything to do with outstanding indemnity payments. Not even Taubler suggests that it was. See below, p. 137.

77 Polyb. 21.42.22; Liv. 38.38.15; App. Syr. 39. Polyb. 33.10.12 notes a regular mutatio of the hostages rendered by the Ligurians to the Massaliots έμηρα ... διδόναι κατά τινας τακτοὺς χρόνους ...).

78 See below, pp. 90ff.

79 Suet. Aug. 21 says that Augustus granted to some of the German tribes the privilege, quotiens vellent obsides recipiendi. It is difficult to believe, as a literal reading of Suetonius suggests, that Augustus allowed the Germans to reclaim their hostages whenever they wished. Aymard, JRS LI (1961), 140, interprets Suetonius to mean that Augustus allowed the Germans to exchange their hostages whenever they wished. This may be the correct interpretation, but unrestricted mutatio could prove just as ludicrous as unconditional restoration. Possibly all Suetonius means is that the Germans were allowed to apply for the restoration of their hostages as frequently as they liked, but without any guarantee that their requests would be granted.

80 See below, p. 101.
81 Thübler, p. 39, n. 5. See below, pp. 112-113.

82 See below, p. 174, n. 21.

83 Polyb. 31.11.11.
CHAPTER III
SPANISH HOSTAGES DURING THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

During the Spanish campaigns of the Second Punic War both the Carthaginians and the Romans frequently took hostages from many of the native tribes as a means of securing their fidelity. Although the evidence is quite incomplete, a general description of the role which these hostages played in the war can be attempted.\(^1\) Extreme caution must be exercised in assessing the Carthaginian policy regarding hostages since it must be remembered that our sources are exclusively Roman,\(^2\) and therefore may be not only biased, but also likely to attribute inapplicable Roman practices to the Carthaginians.

In 237 B.C. Hamilcar Barca sailed to Gades in hopes of revitalizing Carthaginian influence in the Iberian peninsula. During his nine years as strategos in Spain he reconquered much of the southern and eastern areas of the country and brought many tribes under his control, some by force of arms, others by persuasion.\(^3\) A similar policy seems to have been followed by his son-in-law and successor, Hasdrubal.\(^4\) Although there is no specific mention of Spanish hostages being taken by either Hamilcar or Hasdrubal,\(^5\) it is likely that both generals took hostages from some of
the tribes which they brought under Carthaginian hegemony. Hasdrubal's marriage to the daughter of an Iberian prince would seem to be a classic example of Täubler's "Geiselheirat" principle.\footnote{6}

Beginning with Hannibal we have definite evidence of Spaniards being taken as hostages by the Carthaginians. In the period before he left for Italy, Hannibal was extremely busy pacifying areas south of the Ebro which had not yet recognized Carthaginian overlordship.\footnote{7} Plutarch's account of the siege of Salmantica, generally dated to about 220 B.C., records a demand by Hannibal for money and hostages,\footnote{8} and although neither request was fulfilled on this occasion, the incident suggests that the submission of hostages was probably a standard feature of Hannibal's policy in dealing with the native peoples. However, he also seems to have frequently recruited native soldiers with a view to securing their kinsmen's cooperation.\footnote{9} Among his preparations prior to leaving for Italy Hannibal sent some Spanish troops to Africa and brought some African soldiers to Spain, ἐνδεσμεύων τὴν ἑκατέρων πίστιν εἰς ἄλληλους διὰ τοιαῦτης οἰκονομίας.\footnote{10} That πίστιν (pignus) is used here in the sense of hostage is made clear by Hannibal's additional instructions that 4000 Metagonian footsoldiers be sent to Carthage, ὀμηρείας ἔχοντας καὶ βοηθείας ὑμα τάξιν.\footnote{11} Polybius tells us that the troops which crossed to Africa were supplied by the Thersitae, the Mastiani, the Iberian Cretes, the Olcades,
and the Baleares. All of these tribes, with the exception of the Baleares, who were probably mercenaries, seem to have been ones which had not succumbed to the Carthaginians peacefully. Hannibal could not leave Spain with the uncertainty that many of the native tribes, and especially those named above, might revolt very soon after his departure. However, the troops which he requisitioned would act as a guarantee for the good behavior of their tribes, and by sending them to Africa, they could not directly endanger his own operations.

Polybius relates that when Hannibal was starting on his march to Italy, ὃςας πόλεσιν ἥπιστησε τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, ἔλαβε παρὰ τούτων ὀμηρὰ τοὺς νιέες τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων ἀνδρῶν ὅσα πάντας εἰς ζακανέαν ἀπέθετο πόλιν ... Although we cannot identify definitely the tribes to which this statement refers, it would seem particularly applicable to the Carpetani, who had been subdued by Hannibal in 220. In 218 they had unsuccessfully opposed Hannibal's efforts to recruit troops in their territory, and in the same year, when Hannibal was on the point of crossing the Pyrenees, they refused to advance. He dismissed them along with 4000 others, quos et ipse gravari militia senserat. Hannibal's willingness to dismiss these soldiers suggests that he may have had other guarantees of their respective tribes' fidelity. If we are correct in suggesting that the hostages mentioned by Polybius came from the Carpetani, probably the
Oretani, and other tribes which lived in the area between the Tagus and Anus rivers, this might explain why they were delivered to Saguntum rather than to Nova Carthago, which was considerably further from their territory. Hannibal had probably received the hostages while en route to the Ebro and had placed them in the stronghold nearest at hand, Saguntum. However, a second possibility is that the hostages to which Polybius refers came from those tribes north of the Ebro which Hannibal attacked on his way to the Pyrenees. The Bargusii are specifically described as a tribe which Hannibal distrusted. However, both Polybius' and Livy's accounts of the betrayal of the hostages at Saguntum into Roman hands in 217 strongly suggest that the hostages came from tribes south of the Ebro. Moreover, it seems quite certain that Hannibal was content to take only several hundred cavalry from the Ilergetes as a guarantee of their good faith. The chieftain of the Ilergetes, Indibilis, had apparently convinced Hannibal that he intended to support the Carthaginians since we do not hear of any of his family, or that of his brother, Mandonius, being kept as hostages until 211. If Hannibal did take any hostages from tribes north of the Ebro, it is likely that he would have entrusted them to Hanno, the officer left in charge of that area, rather than dispatch them to Saguntum.

When Gnaeus Scipio, the uncle of Scipio Africanus,
arrived in Spain in 218, his first objective was to establish firm Roman control over the area north of the Ebro. Starting from Emporiae, he worked his way to the Ebro and, according to Polybius, reduced by siege those towns which refused his overtures, and bestowed rewards on those which cooperated with him. Livy does not mention the necessity of taking some towns by force, but rather suggests that it was simply a matter of "renewing former treaties of friendship and negotiating others." Polybius' account is probably to be preferred, and Livy is either attempting to minimize Carthaginian influence north of the Ebro, or does not realize its extent. Perhaps some of the towns which Gnaeus was forced to reduce had maintained their allegiance to Carthage because of hostages taken from them by Hannibal.

The decisive battle for control of the territory north of the Ebro was fought near Tarraco. The Carthaginians were soundly defeated, and Hanno himself was captured, along with Indibilis, the chief of the Ilergetes. Hasdrubal, who had been left in charge of the defence of Spain by his brother, arrived too late to aid Hanno, but he did succeed in inflicting a serious defeat on the Roman fleet before retreating across the Ebro. According to Livy, Hasdrubal recrossed the Ebro shortly thereafter and incited the Ilergetes to revolt. Scipio advanced to quell the uprising and Hasdrubal once more retreated south of the Ebro. Most scholars agree that this second encounter is merely a
doublet of the first, and certainly Polybius' account of the same events tends to confirm this view. However, in the doublet passage Livy does note that the Ilergetes had given hostages to Scipio, no doubt after the defeat of Hanno and Indibilis. The mention of Scipio's request for additional hostages after the second encounter, while it illustrates the likelihood of Livy's duplication of events, suggests that the first submission of hostages is historical. We would expect to find among the hostages rendered by the Ilergetes dependents of their chieftain, Indibilis, who had himself been captured by the Romans. However, this does not appear to have been the case, since the descriptions of Scipio Africanus' liberation in 209 of the hostages held by the Carthaginians at Nova Carthago give no indication that dependents of Indibilis had been in Roman hands on an earlier occasion. Roman authors would not likely have missed the opportunity of mentioning something like that. It is more probable that Indibilis' family managed to escape across the Ebro after the defeat of Hanno and took refuge with Hasdrubal. If so, they became virtual hostages of the Carthaginians, and this may explain Indibilis' readiness to revolt against the Romans the following year.

The Ilergetes are the only tribe north of the Ebro which is specifically named as having given hostages to the Romans. However, even though Livy's claim that 120 tribes submitted hostages to Gnaeus Scipio is probably an exaggeration,
it is likely that most of the towns which Scipio had been forced to reduce by siege were required to render hostages. A few towns south of the Ebro which were looking for an opportunity to rid themselves of Carthaginian domination may have sent hostages to Scipio as an indication of their willingness to cooperate with the Romans, but certainly there was no full-scale submission of hostages from distant parts of Spain, as Livy suggests.

In 217 Publius Scipio, the father of Scipio Africanus, joined his brother, and the Romans pushed their offensive across the Ebro. Their operations brought them close to Saguntum. Abilyx, an Iberian noble, thinking that the prospects of a Roman victory were rising, sought to ingratiate himself with the Scipios by offering to betray into Roman hands the Spanish hostages which the Carthaginians held at Saguntum. Livy implies that it had been the Romans' intention to liberate these hostages from the very beginning of the campaign, since id unum pignus inclinatos ad Romanam societatem omnium Hispaniae populorum animos morabatur, ne sanguine liberum suorum culpa defectionis lueretur. However, Polybius informs us that hostages from only a few of the most untrustworthy tribes were detained at Saguntum. Some scholars have rejected this whole incident as a doublet of the liberation of the hostages at Nova Carthago in 209 by Scipio Africanus. Although the importance which Livy attributes to the Saguntine incident may have been influenced
by the later events at Nova Carthago, it is likely that
the Romans would have attempted to exploit the propaganda
value of hostages held by the enemy whenever possible.
Even though hostages from relatively few tribes were kept
at Saguntum, their liberation could have influenced tribes
far beyond the circle of the immediate donors. It has been
objected that the freeing of these hostages does not seem
to have had the results which Livy implies were automatically
forthcoming, since the Romans are still found in winter
quarters north of the Ebro at the year's end. 39 However,
as Scullard has noted, it was not as if the Romans had won
Saguntum itself, and since neither the Carthaginians nor the
Romans were prepared for a decisive offensive, it was
reasonable that the Romans winter in safe territory, north
of the Ebro. 40 In any case, the fact that the Romans
wintered north of the Ebro does not imply that their strategy
in freeing the hostages was not successful. If anything,
Livy probably exaggerates the results: Itaque ingenti
consensu defectionem omnes spectare; armaque extemplo mota
forent, ni hiemps...intervenisset. 41

For the years between 217 and the capture of Nova
Carthago in 209 we have no specific information on Spanish
hostages held either by the Romans or the Carthaginians.
Livy frequently gives the impression that Roman successes
were causing "nearly all the Spanish tribes to come over to
the Roman side." 42 Despite Livy's exaggeration, certainly
some of the tribes which joined the Romans must have submitted hostages. Perhaps the 300 Spaniards of noble birth sent to Italy in 213 ad sollicitandos populares qui inter auxilia Hannibalis erant were hostages taken from tribes which had recently been won over from the Carthaginians. In any case, whatever number of hostages may have been taken by the Romans during these years, it is clear that the double defeat inflicted on the Scipios in 211 caused most of the Spaniards south of the Ebro to abandon the Roman alliance.

After Scipio Africanus arrived in Spain in 210, intent on avenging the defeats of his father and uncle, his first offensive thrust was a daring attack on Nova Carthago. One of the most important aspects of this campaign was the capture of the Spanish hostages held there by the Carthaginians. There is some question as to the number of these hostages. Polybius says that there were more than 300. Livy also mentions the number 300, but is clearly unsure about its validity and says that another source which he consulted gave the number of hostages as 3724. Even though hostages were kept by the Carthaginians at various other centres, such as Saguntum, it is difficult to believe that as few as 300 hostages were detained at Nova Carthago. Perhaps 300 was the number of the most important hostages, since Livy does state that the hostages held at Nova Carthago included those omnium nobilium regum populorumque.
The wives and daughters of Indibilis and Mandonius, the wife and sons of Edeco, prince of the Edetani, and the daughter of a Celtiberian noble are specifically mentioned as being among the hostages. The Carthaginians seem to have selected their hostages very skilfully, from families of chieftains who controlled either directly or indirectly large territories. Indibilis was not only king of the Ilergetes, but also influential among the Suessetani, the Lacetani and some of the Celtiberians, and others whom we cannot specify. Edeco's boast that Scipio's acceptance of him as a friend and ally would induce many tribes south of the Ebro to embrace the Roman cause suggests that he too enjoyed wide influence.

The Spanish hostages were warmly received by Scipio and told that they would be restored to their homes if their kinsmen were willing to become allies of Rome. Some of the hostages were handed over to envoys who had already come to Nova Carthago, but the majority of them seem to have been restored to their donors at Tarraco, where Scipio had summoned all the allies, new and old, to meet. Although the sources have romantically embellished the accounts of Scipio's treatment of these hostages with such episodes as the plea of Mandonius' wife, and the restoration of the Celtiberian maiden, Scullard is probably correct in maintaining that these incidents nevertheless reflect the true nature of Scipio's policy regarding the treatment of
hostages and prisoners. 62

The results of Scipio's policy cannot be fully determined. Polybius does state that many tribes south of the Ebro, encouraged by the example of Edeco, allied themselves with Rome. 63 However, it is noteworthy that Indibilis and Mandonius, who had received their wives and daughters back from Scipio at Tarraco, were among the first to revolt in 206 when it was falsely rumored that Scipio had fallen ill and was near death. 64 This rebellion was soon quelled and Mandonius was sent to beg Scipio's clemency. Scipio accepted their surrender, but did not demand that they either submit hostages or give up their arms. 65 This apparent leniency has puzzled many historians, including Livy himself, who notes that Scipio's action did not conform to the traditional Roman practice regarding dediticii. 66 Scullard states that Scipio did not exact hostages from Mandonius and Indibilis because "he had taken hostages from Indibilis before, but this had not stopped the revolt of the Spaniard, and there was no guarantee that more hostages would restrain him in the future." 67 However, the revolt might never have occurred if Scipio had retained Indibilis' children as hostages. They seem to have been very effective hostages in the hands of the Carthaginians. Indibilis had shown no intention of coming over to the Roman side until his wife and children were in Scipio's hands. In view of the manner in which the Carthaginians had taken his
family as hostages, there was no reason why he should not have been inclined to desert the Carthaginians much sooner, unless the hostages were, in fact, very effective guarantees of his fidelity. Scipio should have had every reason to suspect Indibilis' sincerity in view of his revolt in 217, and his failure to retain the Ilergetan children as hostages was likely prompted by his desire to achieve maximum propaganda value from the hostages liberated at Nova Carthago. De Sanctis sought to minimize the seriousness of the revolt of 206 specifically because Scipio did not exact any hostages. However, in view of the fact that this revolt arose during a very serious mutiny in Scipio's own army, de Sanctis can hardly be correct.

The key to understanding Scipio's action is found in the remarks which Livy attributes to the Roman commander in accepting the surrender of the Spanish rebels: *se libera arma relinquere, solutos animos -- neque (se) in obsides innoxios sed in ipsos, si defecerint, saevitum*....

Nothing less than the very lives of Indibilis and Mandonius themselves would be sufficient guarantee of their fidelity. Any violation of their agreement with Scipio would result, not in vengeance upon hostages, but rather in a virtual death sentence upon themselves. They were now, in a sense, hostages for their own good behavior. What appears to have been leniency on the part of Scipio was, in reality, the utmost of severity. Indibilis and Mandonius did not
understand, however, that Scipio's declaration would remain in effect even after his departure. Soon after Scipio had left for Italy, the two Spaniards revolted again.\textsuperscript{72} The uprising was put down by Lentulus and Manlius Acidinus. Indibilis died in the fighting, but Mandonius was surrendered by his own troops to the Romans for execution.\textsuperscript{73} Since the two brothers could no longer be held responsible for the future good behavior of the defeated rebels, the Romans took hostages from about 30 tribes.\textsuperscript{74}

The Spanish hostages taken by Rome during the war with Carthage were exacted for reasons of military exigency — to ensure that the donor tribes did not side with the Carthaginians or that troops which they may have supplied did not desert at a critical moment. Long range guarantees were not a primary consideration, as they most certainly were in the case of the Greek, Syrian and Carthaginian hostages. Very few, if any, of the Spanish hostages were ever sent to Rome. The majority of them were probably kept at Tarraco and consequently there cannot have been, at this early date, much opportunity for attempting to Romanize them. Nevertheless, these hostages did become the personal \textit{clientes} of the generals to whom they had been surrendered, and as such, they represented the first step in the irresistible spread of Roman culture over the Iberian peninsula.
Notes


2 We do not discount here, of course, the fact that Polybius and others had access to Carthaginian sources such as Sosylus and Chaeræas. See K.J. Beloch, "Polybios Quellen im Dritten Buche", Hermes L (1915), 357–72.

3 Polyb. 2.1.5f. Detailed information concerning Hamilcar's activity is almost non-existent. Diodorus (25.10.1) records a victory over the Tartessians and some unidentifiable Iberians and Celts.

4 Polyb. 2.36.2; Liv. 21.2; App. Hisp. 6.

5 As Walbank, Comment. on Polyb., vol. I, p. 151, notes, the pro-Baronc source employed by Polybius stresses the peaceful expansion of Carthaginian influence under Hamilcar and Hasdrubal.

6 Diod. 25.12. See above, p. 16.

7 Following the example of his brother-in-law, Hannibal married the daughter of a prominent man from Castulo, in part at least, hoping to ensure the fidelity of tribes in that area. Liv. 24.41.7 notes the strong connection between
Castulo and the Carthaginians: Castulo, urbs Hispaniae valida ac nobilis et adeo coniuncta societate Poenis ut uxor inde Hannibali esset...  


9 See above, p. 13, n. 27.

10 Polyb. 3.33.8; cf. Liv. 21.21.11 (mutuis pignoribus).

11 Polyb. 3.33.13.


13 The Thersitae are otherwise unknown, and Meyer, Kl. Schr., vol. II, Halle a.S., 1924, p. 402, may be correct in suggesting that Polybius means the Tartessians or the Turdetani. The Tartessians had been defeated by Hamilcar Barca soon after his arrival in Spain in 237 (see above, n. 3). The Mastiani may have come from the same general area as the Tartessians (Walbank, Comment. on Polyb., vol. I, p. 347). The Oretes were probably the same as the Orissi, who were responsible for the death of Hamilcar Barca and whom Hasdrubal subdued (Diod. 25.12). In 218, the Oretes, in association with the Carpetani, had seized the officials whom Hannibal had sent out to oversee the recruitment of troops in their area (Liv. 21.11.12). The Olcades had recently been defeated by Hannibal himself (Polyb. 3.13.5; Liv. 21.5).

14 Polyb. 3.98.1.

15 Polyb. 3.14.9; Liv. 21.5.6-17.

16 See above, n. 13.

17 Liv. 21.23.6; Frontin. Str. 2.7.7.

18 Cf. Schulten, p. 71: "los rehenes de los Cartaginenses fuesen transportados a Sagunto en lugar de Cartagena, se explica por la facilidad con que podian ser
vigilados en la ciudadela de Sagunto."

19 Polyb. 3.35.2 names the Ilergetes, the Bargusii, the Aerenosii, and the Andosini. Cf. Liv. 21.23.2.

20 Polyb. 3.35.4: μάλιστα γὰρ τούτοις ἡμῖν διὲ τὴν πρὸς Ἰσραήλ τῶν ἐνόοιαν. Cf. Polyb. 3.98.1, quoted above, p. 65.

21 Abilyx persuades Bostar, the Carthaginian left in charge of Saguntum, that the hostages should be released as a goodwill measure, ἐπειδὴ διαβεβήματι Ἰσραήλ τῶν ποταμῶν, φύνετη δύνασθαι Καρχηδονίους φόβῳ συνέχειν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰσραήλ. Cf. Liv. 22.22.10: metum continuasse ad eam diem Hispanorum animos, quia procul Romani abessent.

22 Polyb. 3.33.15; Liv. 21.22.3. The point at which Polybius and Livy mention the several hundred cavalry makes it possible that they were mercenaries, hired before Hannibal had subdued their tribesmen (so Meltzer, Gesch. der Karth., II, p. 448). However, Walbank, Comment. on Polyb., vol. I, p. 364, thinks it more likely that this cavalry was enrolled later, after the reduction of the Ilergetes in 218.

23 See below, n. 49.

24 Polyb. 3.76.2.

25 Liv. 21.60.

26 Polyb. 3.76.6-7. Liv. 21.60.7 does not mention Indibilis by name, but clearly includes him in the phrase aliquot principibus.

27 Polyb. 3.76.8-13; Liv. 21.61.1-4.

28 Liv. 21.61.5-11.


30 Liv. 21.61.7.
31 See below, pp. 71f.

32 Liv. 22.21. We do not know the details of Indibilis' release, but Münzer, RE IX, col. 1326, is probably correct in suggesting that the Romans freed him "weil sie ihn auf ihre Seite zu ziehen hofften." However, there seems to be no basis to Münzer's rejection of the revolt of 217 as unhistorical.

33 Liv. 22.20.10-11. See below, n. 35.

34 Liv. 22.21.7 mentions hostages submitted by some Celtiberian tribes.

35 Liv. 22.20.10-11: Inde flexa retro classis reditumque in citeriora provinciae, quo omnium populorum, qui (cias) Hiberum incolunt, multorum et ultimae Hispаниие legati concurrent; sed qui vere dicionis imperique Romani facti sunt obsidibus datis, populi amplius fuere centum viginti.

36 Liv. 22.22.5.

37 Polyb. 3.98. See above, p. 65.

38 e.g. J. Frantz, Kriege, p. 20; K.J. Beloch, Hermes L (1915), 361; de Sanctis, Storia III.2, p. 244. For the opposing view see Scullard, Scip. (1970), p. 252, n. 28.

39 e.g. Frantz, Kriege, p. 20. Cf. Liv. 23.28.


41 Liv. 22.22.21.

42 Liv. 23.27.9; 23.29.16 (216 B.C.); 23.49.14 (215 B.C.); 24.42.1 (213 B.C.).


44 For an analysis of the strategy, chronology, etc. of this campaign, see Scullard, Scip. (1970), pp. 39-57.
45 Polyb. 10.18.3. Scullard, Scip. (1970), p. 64 accepts the figure 300.

46 Liv. 26.49. Livy's source for this number was probably the annalist, Valerius Antias.

47 Liv. 26.42.3 probably exaggerates in claiming that all of the Spanish hostages held by the Carthaginians were detained at Nova Carthago. However, cf. Appian, Hisp. 19: ... αἰχμαλώτων καὶ ὀμήρων τῶν ἐξ ὅλης Ἰβηρίας....

48 Liv. 26.43.3.

49 The families of Indibilis and Mandonius had been taken hostage by the Carthaginians shortly after the defeats of the Scipios in 211. According to Polybius (9.11), Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, attempted to extract a large sum of money from Indibilis and when he refused to pay, Hasdrubal brought a false accusation against him and compelled him to give his daughters as hostages. Polybius (10.35.6) later informs us that the wife of Indibilis, as well as the wife and daughters of Mandonius were also taken as hostages at this time. There is a curious ambiguity or error in Scullard's account (Scip. (1970), p. 69) which suggests that the hostages and money were requested from Indibilis and Mandonius by the Carthaginians after the liberation of the hostages at Nova Carthago by Scipio in 209. However, it is clear that this incident, which marked the beginning of Indibilis' falling out with the Carthaginians, occurred in 211.

50 Polyb. 10.34.2; Liv. 27.17.2.

51 Polyb. 10.19.3; Liv. 26.50.1-12.

52 Liv. 25.34.6.

53 Liv. 28.24.4.

54 Liv. 29.1.25.

55 Liv. 29.3.5.

56 Polyb. 10.34.6-35.3.
Polyb. 10.18.5. Liv. 21.49 does not mention this stipulation, but it is clear from Scipio's negotiations with Indibilis and Edeco that this was his policy regarding these hostages.

Liv. 26.49.10.

Liv. 26.51.10.

Polyb. 10.18.7ff.

Polyb. 10.19.3ff.

Scullard, Scip. (1970), p. 64. In contrast, the Carthaginians are occasionally stated to have treated their hostages no differently than if they were prisoners (Polyb. 10.18.7; 10.38.2; Liv. 26.49.8).

Polyb. 10.53.3.

Liv. 28.24ff.

Liv. 28.34.9.

Liv. 28.34.7: Mos vetustus erat Romanis, cum quo nec foedere nec aequis legibus iungeretur amicitia, non prius imperio in eum tamquam pacatum uti quam omnia divine humanaque dedidisset, obsides accepti, arma adempta, praesidia urbis imposita forent. Scullard, Scip. (1930), p. 155, n. 2, misinterprets Livy's statement to mean that the Romans did not impose the conditions associated with deditio on conquered people with whom a treaty or amicitia had previously been established. "There was no need for Scipio to apply the traditional Roman procedure in this case, since friendly relations had previously existed between the Romans and Indibilis." However, Livy is merely saying that when the Romans did not terminate hostilities by means of a foedus or amicitia, they applied the procedures of deditio. Deditio, as the case of the Carthaginians in 149 demonstrates, was not restricted to only those states with whom Rome had had no previous formal relations.

Scullard, Scip. (1970), p. 104. Scullard fails to view the children of Indibilis in their proper perspective. Technically they were not formal hostages of the Romans, but
rather captivi. Indibilis, so far as we know, had never formally rendered hostages to Scipio Africanus.

68 See above, n. 49.

69 Polyb. 10.37.8 and Liv. 27.17.12 strongly suggest that the hostages were the only deterrent preventing Indibilis from deserting to the Romans much earlier.

70 de Sanctis, Storia III.2, p. 503.

71 Liv. 28.34.9.

72 Liv. 29.1.19ff.

73 Liv. 29.3.4; App. Hisp. 38.

74 Liv. 29.3.5.
CHAPTER IV
THE CARTHAGINIAN HOSTAGES

A number of scholars have briefly considered the
details pertaining to the Carthaginian hostages rendered to
the Romans at the conclusion of the Second Punic War.¹ Two
basic weaknesses are found in most of these earlier studies.
First, there has been a tendency to explain the procedures
applied to the Carthaginian hostages by drawing analogies
which are not completely appropriate from other instances in
which hostages were rendered to the Romans. Secondly, most
discussions have concentrated on the peace negotiations
which followed the battle of Zama, and have overlooked the
importance of those which followed the defeat and capture
of Syphax in 203, a full year before Scipio's final victory.

After the rout and burning of the combined camps of
Hmasdrubal and Syphax by Scipio's forces in the spring of
203,² Hasdrubal hastened to Carthage, ne quid per metum ex
recenti clade mollius consuleretur.³ Polybius, followed by
Livy, relates that three proposals were discussed by the
Carthaginian senate: to recall Hannibal from Italy; to
send an embassy to Scipio inquiring about peace terms; to
replace the losses which they had sustained and urge Syphax
not to abandon his efforts in the struggle.⁴ Livy says

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that the last proposal was adopted, *quia Hasdrubal praesens Barcinaeque omnes factionis bellum malebant...* 5 Even after a second defeat at the hands of Scipio, 6 the war party continued to direct Carthaginian policy:

*Rara mentio est pacis, frequentior legatorum ad Hannibalem arcessendum mittendorum; pars maxima classem, quae ad commenatus excipiendo parata erat, mittere iubent ad opprimendum stationem navium ad Uticam incaute agentem; forsitan etiam navalia castra relicta cum levi praesidio oppressuros. In hoc consilium maxime inclinant; ....* 7

However, the minimal success of the Carthaginian attack on the Roman naval station at Utica did not offset the anxiety caused by the defeat and capture of Syphax near Cirta:

*.... post famam capti Syphacis in quo plus prope quam in Hasdrubale atque exercitu suo spei reposuerant perculsi, iam nullo auctore belli ultra audito oratores ad pacem petendum mittunt triginta seniorum principes; ....* 8

The war party had been ostensibly discredited and Hannibal was saddled with the blame for causing the war. Livy's description of the embassy sent to Scipio gives the impression that it was composed entirely of members from the anti-war party. However, it appears that the Barcids had decided to cooperate, at least nominally, with the decision to seek peace terms, in order that they might gain time — *dum Hannibal in Africam traiceret, ....* 9

We need not concern ourselves with the details of the terms offered by Scipio to the Carthaginians. 10 Although Livy, who has the fullest account of the negotiations, makes
no distinction between the terms which were to apply strictly to the armistice and those which were to be incorporated into the peace treaty, he does note that Scipio specifically informed the Carthaginians that they would have to negotiate a formal armistice with him if they wished to send envoys to Rome.\textsuperscript{11} Appian mentions that Scipio requested and received supplies for his army from the Carthaginians before he allowed them to send envoys to Rome.\textsuperscript{12} However, neither Livy nor Appian gives any indication that hostages were also taken at this time. Polybius' account of the truce in Book XIV has not come down to us, though it is clear from the beginning of Book XV that an armistice and preliminary treaty had been negotiated. However, in a speech attributed to Scipio in the later meeting between Scipio and Hannibal, Polybius gives some of the conditions which had been set out by Scipio in the earlier negotiations: "When your countrymen were beaten and begged for peace we framed a treaty in writing in which it was stipulated ... that the Carthaginians should pay us 5000 talents and give hostages for the performance of the conditions."\textsuperscript{13} There is no reason to reject Polybius' statement concerning the hostages, and it is likely that they were rendered at the commencement of the armistice in 203.

Polybius and Appian both state that the preliminary treaty of Scipio was ratified at Rome.\textsuperscript{14} Only Livy maintains that the Carthaginian application for peace was rebuffed.\textsuperscript{15}
Most scholars have rejected Livy's statement as annalistic invention created in order to absolve the Senate from the embarrassment of having seriously misjudged Carthaginian motives.\textsuperscript{16} It had become clear to the Romans, a little too late, that an influential faction of the Carthaginian senate had cooperated in the peace overtures merely to temporize until Hannibal could return to Africa. Even before the Carthaginians had received word of the ratification of the treaty, they violated the armistice by attacking a Roman supply fleet which had been forced by storms to land in territory near Carthage.\textsuperscript{17} It is evident from the sources that the Barcid politicians, playing on the deprivation which Scipio's demand for provisions had forced upon the Carthaginian populace,\textsuperscript{18} encouraged the attack and the subsequent reopening of hostilities.\textsuperscript{19}

The violation of the armistice no doubt meant that the Carthaginian hostages held by Scipio were retained, and the Romans would have been within their rights to exact vengeance upon them. However, as we shall suggest below,\textsuperscript{20} the hostages appear to have suffered no harm from the Romans, except for the possible discomfort of having to live at Norba. We may add one further point about these hostages at this juncture. It is probable that the majority of them came from the party which opposed the policies of the Barcid faction and which had taken the lead in the recent peace negotiations. It is unlikely that many, if any
at all, came from the war party, which seems to have had no intention of keeping the armistice or the peace. It may seem an inconceivable blunder on the part of the Romans not to have insisted upon hostages from the Barcids, but apparently they were more concerned to secure guarantees from the party which they hoped would assume the direction of Carthaginian politics after the war.\textsuperscript{21} Livy's attempt to disguise Roman embarrassment resulting from the peace overtures of the Carthaginians by denying that the treaty was ever ratified shows that the Romans may well have underestimated the strength of the war party, despite its recent setbacks.

We may now consider the negotiations which followed Scipio's final victory over the Carthaginians at Zama.\textsuperscript{22} Polybius and Livy report that 100 hostages between the ages of 14 and 30 were demanded by Scipio.\textsuperscript{23} However, neither author states specifically that these hostages were to be delivered immediately as a means of guaranteeing the armistice and the terms of the preliminary treaty. Appian, on the other hand, reports that Scipio demanded 150 hostages immediately, and indicates that they were to be a guarantee for the maintenance of the armistice alone: ἀνοχὰς δὲ ἂν ἐθέλητε λαβεῖν ἔστε πρεσβεύσατε ἐς Ἰάµην, ὅσωστε μὲν ἡμᾶς αὐτίκα ὑμηρὰ πεντηκόντα καὶ ἐκατόν παιδῶν, οὐς ἣν αὐτὸς ἐπιλέξωμαι ... καὶ ἱερομένων τῶν σπονδῶν ἀπολήψασθε τὰ ὑμηρὰ.\textsuperscript{24} If, as Appian states, the Carthaginian hostages
were to be returned when the peace had been ratified, it is remarkable that he fails to mention that new hostages were to be rendered as part of the treaty.\textsuperscript{25} T"ubler attempted to account for this surprising omission by suggesting that a negative adverb had dropped out of Appian's text, which would thus have read καὶ οὐ γενομένων τῶν σπονδῶν ἀπολήγοντες τὰ δημοκρατεία.\textsuperscript{26} He notes that such a promise was made to Philip in 197,\textsuperscript{27} and another apparent example of this procedure is found in Spain in 150, when Marcellus returned hostages to the Celtiberians when their ambassadors failed to secure peace terms from the Senate.\textsuperscript{28} T"ubler's suggestion, though tempting at first glance, has not been accepted by most scholars. Appian's text is palaeographically sound, and, as Walbank notes, the situation in Carthage in 202 was not exactly parallel to that in Macedon in 197, since Philip had not yet been defeated.\textsuperscript{29} However, those who accept Appian's statement as it stands must answer the obvious question of what would have happened to the hostages if the peace had not been ratified? One infers from Appian that they would have been retained, and indeed, Aymard does not discount the possibility that Rome would have acted in such a fashion: "Restituer les otages si les négociations échouaient, comme l'a pensé E. T"ubler, eût été rétablir au profit des Carthaginois, la situation antérieure à l'armistice. Si les opérations militaires reprenaient, la restitution des otages privait Rome d'un inélégant, mais
utile moyen de pression." The Samnites had presented the Romans with similar alternatives regarding their 600 hostages following the ambush at Caudium. Nevertheless, it is difficult to concur with Aymard that 150 hostages were returned when the peace was ratified, and almost immediately thereafter, 100, "sans doute en partie les mêmes", were requested in accordance with the terms of the treaty. The fact that neither Polybius nor Livy associates the 100 hostages specifically with the conditions of the armistice does not militate against the likelihood that they were, in fact, rendered before the Carthaginian ambassadors left for Rome. Even though Livy includes a specific stipulation with which the Carthaginians had to comply before an armistice was granted, this does not necessarily mean that the hostages, because they are not mentioned in this stipulation, were not rendered at the commencement of the armistice. Polybius does not distinguish any of the conditions, including the one specified by Livy, as prerequisite for the granting of an armistice, and yet it is clear in both authors that certain of the conditions were to be fulfilled before ambassadors departed for Rome. No one will deny, for example, that the request for provisions for the army was expected to be fulfilled immediately. It therefore remains entirely possible, and indeed likely, that the 100 hostages mentioned by Polybius and Livy were to be rendered at the time of the armistice.

There is still, however, the difficulty regarding the
number of hostages rendered. At the beginning of 199, a Carthaginian embassy delivering the annual tribute payment to Rome requested the return of their hostages: *Petentibus deinde, ut, si iam videretur senatui, obsides sibi redderentur, centum redditi obsides; de ceteris, si in fide permanerent, spes facta.*\(^{34}\) The obvious implication of this statement is that because 100 hostages were restored to the Carthaginians, more than 100 must have originally been taken, or so it would seem. However, long ago, Nissen, drawing attention to the treaty which Rome made with Antiochus III, suggested that the Romans allowed the Carthaginians to exchange their hostages periodically, replacing the old ones with new recruits.\(^{35}\) Clearly if the Carthaginians had been expected to furnish hostages for the full fifty years during which indemnity payments were due, some sort of exchange policy would have been necessary. The hint that Carthaginian hostages were periodically exchanged is found in the request of Masgaba, a son of Masinissa, that the Romans demand Hanno, the son of Hamilcar, in place of another hostage whose name has not been preserved in Livy's text.\(^{36}\) Consequently, the restitution of 100 Carthaginian hostages in 199 and again in 181\(^{37}\) has been viewed by most scholars as evidence of *mutatio obsidum.*

However, it was noted, and thought strange, that in both these cases Livy employs the verb *reddere* to describe the transaction. Strictly speaking, *reddere* in no way implies an exchange, but merely outright restitution.\(^{38}\) Nevertheless,
as Aymard remarks, "depuis longtemps, et avec raison, les critiques s'accordent à reconnaître que, dans tous ces passages, l'emploi du verbe reddere par Tite-Live néglige un des deux actes de l'opération véritable et, par conséquent, induit en erreur: il ne pouvait s'agir, ni en 198 ni en 181, de restitutions; on se borna à procéder à des échanges, 100 nouveaux otages venus de Carthage remplaçant chaque fois en Italie 100 anciens otages libérés." Thus, according to Nissen, Aymard, and others, the Carthaginians brought 100 new hostages to Rome in 199 and exchanged them for the 100 which Polybius and Livy state had been rendered in accordance with the treaty of 201. De ceteris, in their view, would refer to the 100 new hostages.

Täubler, while he subscribed to the principle of triennial exchange, noted a distinct flaw in the suggestion of Nissen. Since the Carthaginian ambassadors requested that the hostages designated as ceteri be moved from Norba to more comfortable accommodations, it is likely that these hostages had not just arrived in Italy, but had been in Roman hands for some time. Täubler concluded that Appian's figure of 150 hostages was to be preferred to the 100 of Polybius and Livy. This being the case, he maintained that the mutatio applied to only two-thirds of the original hostages: "die dreijährige Auswechselung sich nicht, wie bei den Geiseln des Antiochos, auf alle, sondern auf je zwei Drittel erstreckte." According to Täubler's explanation, de ceteris
would refer to the 50 hostages who were not involved in the exchange. This solution is not convincing. Moreover, Aymard raised a serious objection to Täubler's suggestion of a triennial exchange schedule: "Comme les années 201, 198 et 181 ne peuvent marquer les étapes d'un même cycle à la fois simple et régulier, l'hypothèse d'un rythme quelconque fixé par le traité ou par un usage solidement établi paraît inadmissible...."42 Aymard does not preclude the likelihood that mutatio was employed in the case of the Carthaginian hostages, but maintains that if it was, it was done irregularly.43

There is, however, another serious difficulty with Täubler's hypothesis. Triennial exchange of hostages, however appealing it may have been to the Carthaginians, would have been somewhat impractical from the Roman point of view. If 100 hostages were to be exchanged every three years, the number required by 181 would have been in the neighborhood of 700. If Carthage was obligated to submit hostages for the full fifty years of the indemnity payments, as Täubler maintained, the total number of hostages required would have been about 1700! Even though one of Rome's primary objectives in employing mutatio was to augment the number of her potential clients, the number of hostages required under Täubler's plan seems too high. The analogy drawn by scholars from the treaty with Antiochus is not completely appropriate. In the Syrian treaty only 20 hostages were to be exchanged every
three years. In fact, really only 19 hostages were involved, since Antiochus' son was to be excluded from the exchanges. Since it is probable that the Syrians were required to furnish hostages for only twelve years (the length of time for which indemnity payments were due), 57 hostages would have been involved in the exchanges, a completely reasonable and practical number. 44

We can draw two fairly safe conclusions from the above discussion. If the Carthaginian hostages were periodically exchanged, the incidence of these exchanges was probably quite infrequent, and determined primarily by the ageing or ill health of the hostages. Secondly, if such an exchange took place in 199, the only likely basis for it will have been a political consideration on the part of the Romans. However, our sources give us no reasons to suspect that an exchange would have been considered necessary by Rome at that time. The Carthaginians had recently acted in good faith regarding the activity of their renegade general, Hamilcar, who had been stirring up Gallic tribes in the vicinity of Placentia and Cremona. 45 They declared him an outlaw and confiscated his property. 46 In addition, they sent 200,000 modii of wheat to Rome and a like amount to the army in Macedon.

If the return of the 100 hostages in 199 was not part of an exchange, and if we prefer Polybius—Livy to Appian regarding the number of hostages originally submitted in 201,
which hostages are designated by *de ceteris*? Scholars have overlooked that a number of Carthaginian hostages had been delivered to the Romans after the defeat and capture of Syphax in 203. We have maintained that these hostages had neither been returned nor executed following the violation of the armistice by the Carthaginians. It is likely that these hostages, or a portion of them, were returned in 199. We have suggested that most of them were dependents of men who opposed the Barcid faction. The defeat at Zama had dealt a severe blow to the reputation and power of the Barcids, and although it is true that Hannibal remained in command of an army, he does not seem to have taken any part in politics immediately after the war, and was largely employed in repairing devastations caused by the Roman invasion. Politically, the anti-Barcid faction had gained by the defeat of Hannibal, and for four or five years at least, held unchallenged sway at Carthage. The Romans may have anticipated and encouraged such a development, and if so, it is likely that the hostages which they took after Zama were also mostly from that party. It would have been no longer necessary to detain all of the hostages taken earlier, and in the guise of benevolence, the Romans could have returned some, or all, of them as a means of encouraging the anti-Barcids to continue their cooperation with Rome. *De ceteris* would thus refer to those hostages taken after Zama, and any hostages which may have remained from those taken in
The question is, were these among the hostages who were returned in 181, and was mutatio employed in that year?

If the hostages returned in 181 had been originally submitted in 203 and/or 201, they would have been between 34 and 51 years of age at the time of their restoration. While we have pointed out the improbability of triennial exchanges as far as the Carthaginian hostages were concerned, it is even more unlikely that the Romans would have retained hostages who had become much older than the maximum age stipulated in the treaty. Since a hostage was normally effective only as long as his father was politically influential, it is unlikely, except under special circumstances, that Rome would have kept a hostage who was 40 years of age or older. Furthermore, a hostage of this age, if he had been favorably receptive to Roman influences, would have been much more valuable restored to his homeland than retained in Roman hands. It is almost certain, therefore, that the Carthaginian hostages who were in Italy in 199 had been sent home before 181. The encouragement which the Carthaginian ambassadors had received in 199 implied a much earlier possibility for the restoration of their "other" hostages than 18 years later.

There is no indication in the sources for the return of any Carthaginian hostages between 199 and 181. However, there is one small hint, a bit of scurrilous gossip which Cato dredged up in 184 to secure the banishment of Lucius Flamininus from the Senate. Cato is said to have reproached
Lucius regarding Philippus, *Poenum, carum ac nobile scortum*, ab Roma in Galliam provinciam spe ingentium donorum perductum.\(^{54}\) Lucius had served as proconsul in Gaul in 191. It is unlikely that Philippus was a hostage himself, but there is nothing against his having belonged to the entourage of one of the hostages. It is conceivable that Carthaginian hostages were in Rome in 191, having been assembled there from the Latin towns in which they resided to be sent back to Carthage. An exchange of hostages could have taken place at this time. The Romans had sent three commissioners to Carthage early in 191, primarily to solicit grain for the army in Greece.\(^{55}\) However, they may have had the additional task of overseeing the selection of new hostages who were to be sent to Rome. Shortly thereafter, a Carthaginian embassy came to Rome, promising to send wheat and barley, and more importantly, offering to pay in one lump sum the remaining indemnity payments.\(^{56}\) The fact that these ambassadors were in Rome in connection with indemnity payments increases the possibility that some transaction regarding the hostages also took place at this time. The hostages taken in 203 and/or 201 would have been between 25 and 41 years of age, with the majority of them likely under 30. This would have been an ideal time for *mutatio obsidum*. Information as to which families should submit the new hostages was readily available, since Roman embassies had been to Carthage in 195,\(^{57}\) 193,\(^{58}\) and 191, and in addition, Masinissa provided a ready source of information
concerning Carthaginian internal politics. In some cases, the new hostages probably would have come from the same families which had rendered the earlier hostages.\textsuperscript{59}

We may now turn to 181, when we are specifically told that 100 Carthaginian hostages were restored: \textit{Carthaginiensibus eodem anno centum obsides redditi, \ldots}.\textsuperscript{60} We have already given reason to believe that Livy's use of \textit{reddere} in the passage concerning 199 did not involve the exchange of any hostages. However, this does not preclude the possibility of an exchange in 181, since all Livy is saying in both instances is that 100 hostages were returned, which is perfectly true. If hostages were exchanged in 181, he may simply not have known it. In fact, if hostages were exchanged at all during the whole fifty year period of the indemnity payments, Livy does not give us much indication that he knew anything about it except for the oblique reference to Hanno in 168.\textsuperscript{61} If hostages were exchanged in 191 because of their age, it is clear that the same consideration will have arisen in 181. What little we know about the political situation in Carthage between 191 and 181 shows that it had changed little from the previous decade. The death of Hannibal in 183 removed anxiety that he might return to Carthage and revitalize the remnants of his old party. The quarrel of the Carthaginians with Masinissa over territorial rights continued to engage both parties to the extent which the Romans approved. Thus, if an exchange of hostages did
take place in 181, it would seem that the age factor was again the prime concern of the Romans.

It is tempting to suggest that the Romans may have tentatively scheduled exchanges for the Carthaginian hostages every ten years. This would not only have taken care of the problem created by the ageing of personnel, but also would have provided a sufficient term in which to Romanize the most promising of the hostages.⁶² If decennial mutatio was employed by the Romans, 171 would have been the date of the next regular exchange. A Carthaginian embassy was in Rome at that time, probably in connection with the continuing feud over boundaries with Masinissa.⁶³ Gulussa, a son of Masinissa, was also at Rome and apparently succeeded in stirring up suspicion among the senators concerning the preparation of a Carthaginian fleet. A frustrating lacuna occurs in Livy's text right at the point where appears to have related what happened concerning the Carthaginians. Neither Appian nor the Periocha summary supplies the missing details. However, the sources, perhaps in anticipation of the 150's, clearly indicate that the friction between Carthage and Numidia was growing in the late 170's.⁶⁴ The party of Hamilcar, surnamed the Samnite, and Carthalo seems to have become more active in their opposition to the Numidian king. This would explain why Masgaba, another son of Masinissa, requested in 168 that the Romans demand Hanno, the son of Hamilcar, as a hostage in place of another
hostage whose name is not known.\footnote{65} This unnamed hostage must have come from a family which belonged to one of the parties which were not as vigorously opposed to Masinissa as the party of Hamilcar.\footnote{66} We cannot determine definitely when the unknown hostage had been delivered to the Romans, but probability favours a date about 171. We can eliminate other possibilities more or less easily. If he had been among the original hostages taken in 201, he would have been at least 47 years old in 168. It is unlikely that the Romans would have kept him so long. A date in the 190's appears equally unlikely for the same reason. Although it is possible that he had come to Italy in 181, it is improbable that the Romans would have kept a hostage even as long as thirteen years, except in unusual circumstances. Moreover, since it is unlikely that the unnamed hostage was the only Carthaginian hostage still in Roman hands in 168, it is safe to assume that not all of them would have been taken at the youngest possible age stipulated by the treaty. In 168 the youngest possible age of hostages taken in 181 would have been 27 years. It therefore seems likely that a group of hostages had been sent to Rome after 181, and 171 seems as likely a date as any. Presumably Masgaba named a specific hostage whom he wished to be replaced by Hanno. This would indicate that the unnamed hostage was not due to be released as part of a general pre-arranged \textit{mutatio}, and therefore he had probably arrived in Italy relatively recently.
Unfortunately Livy's text breaks off after 167, and our only knowledge of the late 160's as far as Carthage is concerned is a brief note of Polybius which mentions the awarding of the Emporia to Masinissa. There is some question about the date of the events which this passage describes, but 161 is the date approved by most scholars. Although Polybius mentions nothing about hostages, it is at least likely that there was a Carthaginian embassy at Rome in this year, and a mutatio obsidum could have taken place. In 152/51, when the last indemnity payment stipulated in the treaty of 201 was delivered, the hostages, who could not have been rendered much earlier than 161, were presumably restored. Aymard, in questioning Tübler's assertion that hostages were intended solely as a guarantee for the financial clauses of a treaty, suggests that since certain clauses of the treaty of 201 were valid for eternity, "éut-il été contraire aux engagements pris par Rome en 201 qu'elle retint des otages carthaginois en Italie après 152?" In principle Aymard may be correct, but practically speaking, it is unlikely that the Romans detained the Carthaginian hostages beyond the completion of the indemnity payments. In 149, when the Carthaginians were requested to submit 300 hostages in conjunction with their surrender in fidem populi Romani, there were probably no longer any hostages connected with the treaty of 201 in Roman hands. Appian's description of the departure of the 300 hostages for Sicily
is somewhat over dramatized and may be largely fabricated, but the fact that there is no mention of Carthaginian hostages already in Roman hands, a sympathy gaining device which could not have been missed, suggests that there were none at this time.\textsuperscript{71}

The ascendancy of the anti-Barcid politicians at Carthage in the years after Zama depended heavily on their cultivation of Roman approval. It is important to remember that even though the Carthaginians were continuously frustrated in their relationship with Masinissa, there seems to have been no serious question of their adherence to the treaty with Rome. This may have been facilitated in part by the regular return of hostages who, if not completely romanized, had at least become more sympathetic towards Rome. Many of these men, with friends among the Roman senators, undoubtedly became politically active in Carthage after their restoration.
Notes


3 Liv. 30.7.3.

4 Polyb. 14.6.10ff.; Liv. 30.7.6f.

5 Liv. 30.7.7. Walbank, Comment. on Polyb. vol. II, p. 431, notes that Livy's statement regarding the ascendancy of the war party "is perhaps an annalistic addition, but more probably a Polybian detail omitted by the excerptor."


8 Liv. 30.16.2-3.


11 Liv. 30.16.15 says that the Carthaginians sent one delegation to Scipio to conclude the armistice and another to Rome to ask for peace. Walbank, Comment. on Polyb. vol. II, p. 434, has noted the improbability of this procedure: "One must assume that the lost part of Polybius' Book XIV contained an account of how these envoys proceeded first to Scipio's camp at Tunis, and then to Rome."

13 Polyb. 15.8.7. Walbank, Comment. on Polyb. vol. II, p. 453, notes the differences between Polybius and Livy, including the mention of hostages, but does not pursue this aspect further.

14 Polyb. 15.4.8; App. Pun. 32.

15 Liv. 30.21-23.


17 Polyb. 15.1; Liv. 30.24; App. Pun. 34. A recently discovered papyrus (P. Ryl. III, 1937, pp. 114 ff., no. 491) contains a brief account of what is generally agreed to be the truce of 203. The fragment does not mention the Carthaginian attack on the Roman supply convoy. Hoffmann, Hermes LXXVI (1941), 270-82, believes that this account is preferable to that of Polybius and that the attack on the convoy should be rejected as pro-Roman distortion. His thesis has not been generally accepted. Cf. Scullard, Scip. (1970), p. 270, n. 103 for further discussion and bibliography.

18 Diod. 27.11.

19 Liv. 30.24.11 says that some of the Carthaginian senators pleaded that the sanctity of the armistice be respected, but popular demands carried the day and Hasdrubal was sent with 50 ships to capture whatever of the convoy he could find and tow it back to Carthage. When the Romans sent ambassadors to demand reparations for this violation of the armistice, they were roughly treated, and had it not been for the intervention of several members of the peace party, they might not have escaped the angry mob at Carthage. Moreover, on their way back to Scipio's camp they were attacked by Hasdrubal's fleet, and Livy (30.25.5) does not discount the possibility that this attack may have been ordered by the Carthaginian government.

20 See below, p. 94.

21 Cf. Liv. 33.45.6: Adversae Hannibali factionis homines principibus Romanis, hospitibus quisque suis, identidem scribant nuntios litterasque ab Hannibale ad Antiochum missas, .... Although the date of the events
which this passage describes is 195, the political alignments in Carthage are equally applicable to 201.

22 Polyb. 15.18.8; Liv. 30.37.6. We need not become involved here in the question of whether the sources have furnished the terms of the preliminary treaty set out by Scipio, or those of the treaty formally ratified by the Senate. It is enough to note, for our purposes, that the Senate ratified the peace on the terms which Scipio had offered, without amendment (Liv. 30.43.10; App. Pun. 65). It becomes largely academic whether Polybius consulted the final treaty, or actually knew of the terms offered in the preliminary draft of the treaty.

23 Polyb. 15.18.8; Liv. 30.37.6.

24 App. Pun. 54.

25 Aymard, Pallas I (1953), 48, recognizes this difficulty, and suggests two possibilities, neither of which is very convincing. No one can disprove, to be sure, that Appian may have merely neglected to mention the new hostages required by the treaty. Aymard also suggests the possibility that "à ce moment, Scipion n'aperçut pas leur nécessité pour garantir le traité. Peut-être ne l'a-t-il aperçue que plus tard; peut-être aussi l'ordre d'en exiger lui est-il venu du Sénat, ...." It is unlikely that Scipio, after his experience in the treaty negotiations of 203, would have felt that hostages were unnecessary to guarantee the treaty. Nor is it likely that the Senate added a completely new clause regarding hostages, since we are told that the treaty was ratified exactly as it had been set out by Scipio (see above, n. 23).

Doubts about Appian's account of the armistice are increased by his assertion that Scipio demanded 1000 talents to provision and pay his army (cf. Polyb. 15.18.6; Liv. 30.37.5). It has frequently been noted that 1000 talents was far in excess of the amount needed to pay the stipendium of Scipio's army for the duration of the armistice. It is generally considered that about 150 talents would have been sufficient to cover this expense. Täubler, p. 69, suggested that Appian had lumped together the amounts required for the stipendium and the first indemnity payment. However, since the annual payments were only 200 talents, an excessive amount (i.e. 800 talents) still would have remained to pay the army during the armistice. De Sanctis, Storia III.2, p. 618, unwilling to indulge in mathematical gymnastics to salvage Appian, thought it best to conclude that Appian had simply made an error.
Täubler, p. 40, n. 1. As Walbank, Comment. on Polyb. vol. II, p. 470, notes, the adverb μὴ would be grammatically preferable.

Polyb. 18.39.6.


Walbank, Comment. on Polyb. vol. II, p. 470.

Aymard, Pallas I (1953), 47.

See above, p. 22.

Aymard, p. 50.

Liv. 30.37.6: *indutias ita daturum, si per priores indutias naves onerariae captae quaeque fuissent in navibus restituerentur; aliter nec indutias nec spem pacis ullam esse.*

Liv. 32.2.3.

Nissen, Commentatio, p. 10. For the treaty with Antiochus, see Polyb. 21.42.22 and Liv. 38.38.15.

Liv. 45.14.5. See below, p. 98f.

Liv. 40.34.14.

Cf. Suet. Aug. 21, and p. 61, n. 79 above.

Aymard, p. 52. It is somewhat ironic that Aymard in correcting a typographical error in Täubler (p. 196, read 199 for 190 in lines 10 and 31) proceeds to cite an incorrect date in its place. The embassy of which Livy speaks in 32.2.3 came to Rome at the beginning of 199, not 198.

Liv. 32.2.4. For a list of the towns in which the Carthaginian hostages were kept, see above, p. 57, n. 41.

Täubler, p. 196. It is possible, though unlikely, that the 100 hostages who were restored to the Carthaginians had been billeted at Norba and suggested to their envoys that they request new locations for the replacement hostages.
42 Aymard, p. 53. Despite Aymard's error in placing the first restoration of hostages in 198 rather than 199, his criticism remains valid.

43 See above, p. 50.

44 In actuality, probably 76 Syrian hostages were held by the Romans between 189 and 173. See below, p. 172, n. 6.

45 Liv. 31.10. At 31.21.18 Livy says that Hamilcar was killed in the battle between Furius and the Gauls. However, at 32.30.12 he reports Hamilcar's death in the fight against Cornelius at the River Mincius. A third conflicting report is added at 33.23.5, where Hamilcar is said to have been led in the triumph of Cornelius.

46 Liv. 31.19.1.

47 See above, pp. 85f.

48 The number of hostages submitted in 203 is unknown, but it may have been 100, 150 (perhaps the source of Appian's error), or even more.

49 Aur. Vic. Prob. 37.2.3.

50 Cf. n. 21 above.

51 That is, of course, assuming that the hostages submitted in 203 had been subject to the same age restrictions as were applied to those taken in 201 (i.e. 14-30 years of age).

52 e.g. Antiochus Epiphanes (see below, pp. 150 ff.). Some of the Parthian hostages were detained in Rome for most of their lives (see below, pp. 210 ff.).

53 The only information concerning the Carthaginian hostages during this period is found in Livy's description (32.26) of the slave revolt which started at Setia and spread to some of the neighboring towns. The hostages were suspected of being involved in the uprising: In timore civitas fuit obsides captivosque Poenorum ea moliri. It is difficult to
suggest why the hostages would have taken part in such an incident, and many scholars (e.g. Aymard, p. 54; Nissen, Krit. Untersuch., p. 138; Kahrstedt, Gesch. der Karth., p. 590, n. 2) have doubted the historicity of their connection with it. Certainly, the statement of the Periocha does not seem likely: coniuratio servorum facta de solvendis Carthaginiensium obsidibus oppressa est. It appears that the revolt was not limited just to the towns in which the hostages resided. Norba is mentioned as a centre in which the slaves were encouraged to revolt, and yet it is likely that hostages were no longer kept there (Liv. 32.2). However, some of the slaves involved in the uprising may have belonged to households of some of the hostages, and it was natural that suspicion should fall upon the hostages themselves as instigators of the revolt. Livy never says that the hostages were directly involved themselves, and Zonaras (9.16.6) may have correctly identified the instigating source of the revolt as the Carthaginian element among the Gauls (See above, n. 45).

54 Liv. 39.42.8; Plut. Flam. 18. Whether or not the charge was true does not affect the statement as evidence for the presence of Carthaginians at Rome in 191.

55 Liv. 36.3.1.
56 Liv. 36.4.5.
57 Liv. 33.47.
58 Liv. 34.62.16.

59 Although Hannibal had enjoyed a brief, but effective return to politics in 195, anti-Barcid propaganda succeeded in driving him to the court of Antiochus. After 195 political alignments in Carthage began to change slightly. Appian (Pun. 68) tells us that there were three distinct factions. The remains of Hannibal's party, which looked to the people for its support, was led by Hamilcar the Samnite and Carthalo. The party which had opposed the Barcids during the war seems to have split, with a romanizing section led by Hanno the Great, and a wing which favoured cooperation with Masinissa, led by Hannibal the starling. These two latter groups controlled Carthaginian politics for most of the 190's, and it was from these groups that the new hostages were likely selected.
60 Liv. 40.34.14.

61 See below, p. 98.

62 This would not preclude the possibility, of course, that Rome might have made changes within a ten year period if political circumstances in Carthage changed drastically. It is also likely that hostages who died while in Italy were replaced immediately (cf. Polyb. 21.32.11).

63 Liv. 43.3.5.

64 Liv. 41.22; 42.23-24. P.G. Walsh, JRS LV (1965), 149-60, may be correct in suggesting that Livy's description of Masinissa's operations in 172 may be an anticipation of the developments in the 150's.

65 Liv. 45.14.5.

66 For the hostility between Hamilcar and Masinissa, see App. Pun. 70, and CAH VIII, p. 474.

67 Polyb. 31.21.

68 e.g. Badian, FC, p. 129, and note N, p. 295.

69 Aymard, pp. 55-56.

70 Polyb. 36.3-4; App. Pun. 76. Not much can be said about these 300 hostages. It is probable that most of them came from families who belonged to the romanizing wing of the old anti-Barcid faction (see above, n. 59). This party seems to have cooperated with the remnants of Hannibal's supporters in the unsuccessful war against Masinissa in 152/51, but abandoned them (App. Pun. 74) when it became apparent that Rome had resolved upon another war with Carthage. We can deduce from Polyb. 38.8.4 and App. Pun. 131 that the leaders of the Hannibalic party had not given up hostages from their families. The 300 hostages were taken to Rome and kept in custody on board ship (Polyb. 36.5.9). They later were dispatched to various parts of Italy, where they spent the rest of their lives in honorable confinement (Zonar. 9.30).

71 App. Pun. 79.
CHAPTER V

DEMETRIUS, SON OF PHILIP V

In June of 197, Philip V of Macedon was defeated among the hills of Cynoscephalae by Flamininus and his Greek allies. Shortly thereafter, at Gonnum, Philip agreed to accept the conditions offered to him the previous year at Nicaea, and consented to submit all other details regarding the peace to the judgement of the Senate. He agreed to surrender his son, Demetrius, and certain of the youth's friends as hostages, and pay 200 talents. A four month truce was granted by Flamininus in order that ambassadors might be sent to Rome, and Philip was assured that his hostages and money would be returned if the treaty was not ratified by the Senate. Plutarch's account of the negotiations indicates that Flamininus dispatched the hostages to Rome immediately, even before the treaty had been formally ratified. We have no details about Demetrius' stay in Rome as a hostage, except for the fact that he and Armenas, the son of Nabis, were among the hostages who appeared in Flamininus' spectacular triumph in 194. However, he spent six formative years at Rome, during which time he was befriended by many influential Romans and become familiar with Roman life and customs.

We cannot be sure to what extent Philip's cooperation
with the Romans between 197 and 191 was due to the fact that Demetrius was a Roman hostage. What is evident, however, is that the Romans themselves did not feel that this was a sufficient guarantee that Philip would not side with Antiochus. Cn. Cornelius, one of the ten commissioners sent to assist Flamininus in the application of the peace terms, advised Philip to send ambassadors to Rome and seek a formal alliance in order to dispel the Senate's suspicions about his intentions. It is not so difficult now to set out reasons why Philip's decision to cooperate with the Romans rather than with Antiochus was the correct one. However, at the time, the issue may not have seemed so clear cut, to either Philip or the Romans. We should not dismiss offhand the possibility that Philip seriously considered an alliance with Antiochus. Even though he followed Cornelius' advice, and made some sort of pact with Rome, his sympathies and intentions remained distressingly ambiguous. He did contribute 1500 troops to the operations against Nabis, but this move was prompted more by his desire to avenge Nabis' faithlessness at Argos than from any sense of loyalty towards the Romans.

In the summer of 194 Antiochus advanced into Thrace as far west as Aenus and Maronea, and made overtures to the Byzantines and the Danubian Celts. This development prompted Philip to send an embassy to Rome. In hopes of retaining Philip's loyalty, the Senate promised the return
of his son and the cancellation of the remainder of his indemnity payments. It is tempting to suggest that this promise influenced Philip's decision the following year to reject the attempt of the Aetolians to seduce him from his alliance with Rome. The Aetolians were successful, however, in inciting Nabis to revolt, and in the spring of 192 Roman envoys visited various Greek allies whom they feared the Aetolians had influenced into considering a move towards Antiochus. Livy tells us that at Demetrias many of the chief men had become alienated from the Romans, quia, cum reddi obsidem filium Philippo adlatum esset stipendiumque impositum remitti, inter cetera vana adlatum erat Demetriadem quoque ei reddituros Romanos esse. These rumors may have originated from the embassy which Philip sent to Rome in 194, but their association by Livy with the Roman attempt to counteract Aetolian propaganda shows that they were still current and probably among Philip's considerations in rejecting the Aetolian advances.

We need not trace in detail Philip's role in the war against Antiochus in Greece. Clearly there was still considerable uneasiness among the Romans as to his intentions. The fact that Hannibal could suggest that an attempt be made to invite the Macedonian king to join the anti-Roman coalition is indicative of the non-committal position Philip had adopted. Until January 191 he waited to see what would develop, not only between Rome and Antiochus, but also with regard to the
concessions promised to him by the Romans.\textsuperscript{15} According to Livy, Philip was finally spurred to active support of Rome because of Philip of Megalopolis' unwitting blunder in burying the dead of Cynoscephalae.\textsuperscript{16} The Macedonian king came to an agreement with Baebius by which he was to keep any territory he might win from the Aetolians and their allies.\textsuperscript{17} His conquests during the war in Greece, limited as they were, caused great apprehension among both the Greeks and the Romans and hastened the Roman decision to negotiate an armistice with the Aetolians.\textsuperscript{18} In short, Philip's support of Rome was prompted more by the prospects of territorial gains which he might make at the expense of the Aetolians than by his hopes for Demetrius' restoration.

In the winter of 191/190 Philip sent an embassy to Rome to congratulate the Senate on the victory at Thermopylae. The Senate, in recognition of Philip's services in the war, released Demetrius, and promised Philip that he would be relieved of some of the indemnity payments if he continued to be faithful.\textsuperscript{19} There is some doubt whether the other Macedonian hostages were also restored at this time. Only Polybius mentions their liberation. However, he does not refer to it in his account of the above mentioned embassy, but rather, later, in a resumé of a letter allegedly sent by the Scipios to King Prusias.\textsuperscript{20} This letter suggests that Demetrius, the other Macedonian hostages, and the outstanding indemnity payments were all remitted at the same time. This
clearly contradicts Polybius' own account of Demetrius' restoration.\textsuperscript{21} Täubler maintained that because the indemnity payments were not cancelled until the summer of 190, not all of the Macedonian hostages could have been released with Demetrius in 191.\textsuperscript{22} Even if Täubler's arguments regarding the connection between hostages and indemnity payments cannot be rigidly maintained,\textsuperscript{23} it is strange that Polybius does not mention the restoration of the Macedonian hostages at the time of Demetrius' release, but does indicate that the Spartan hostages were returned at this same time. It would appear that the letter to Prusias was simply a general statement of Roman policy and was not concerned to present exact chronological relationships. The remarks about the hostages need not be interpreted to mean that Demetrius and the other Macedonian hostages were restored simultaneously. Moreover, even if the remainder of the Macedonian hostages were retained until Scipio and the Roman forces had crossed through Macedonia and Thrace, their restoration will have been delayed only about eight months.

The time chosen to restore Demetrius was critical. Antiochus had been chased back into Asia, but the prospects of pursuing him would entail a march through the tricky defiles of Macedonia and Thrace. The Romans had to be absolutely sure of Philip's loyalty. Their promise to restore his son and remit some of the indemnity payments had been in the air for better than three years, and since
Philip had been intentionally limited in the number of gains that he was permitted to make at the expense of the Aetolians, the Romans realized that they would have to make some placating concession. Thus, in order that Roman promises not appear hollow, they returned Demetrius, but tantalizingly delayed the remission of indemnity payments. Demetrius was only sixteen years old at the time of his restoration, and the Romans cannot seriously have expected that he might persuade his father to cooperate with them. However, they had high hopes for the future: Obsidem enim se animum eius habere, etsi corpus patri reddiderit, ....

In the period following the war against Antiochus, Philip directed his efforts to the reorganization and consolidation of the territories which he had acquired during the war. His activities raised objections from the Thessalians, Perrhaebians, Athamanes, and Pergamenes, who sent ambassadors in 186/185 to lay complaints against him before the Senate. The Senate dispatched a commission to Greece which heard arguments from all the parties concerned and then decreed that Philip's garrisons should be withdrawn from the cities under discussion and that his kingdom should be reduced to the ancient boundaries of Macedonia. Despite the commission's decree, Philip continued to hold many of the cities in question, most notably Aenus and Maronea. In 184 another commission was sent to see that Philip withdrew his garrisons from the Thracian cities. In a fit of anger,
Philip engineered a massacre at Maronea and continued to maintain his troops in both Maronea and Aenus. His relations with Rome were rapidly deteriorating and he feared that war was imminent, as he confidentially admitted to his chief advisors, Apelles and Philocles. He needed more time to make defensive preparations. To this end, he decided to send Demetrius to Rome to placate the Senate and convince them that no remedial action on their part was required. He was confident that the favour which Demetrius had won while a hostage in Rome would stand him in good stead. In the winter of 183, Demetrius, then 24 years of age, arrived in Rome, accompanied by Apelles and Philocles. At the same time, many other embassies were arriving from Greece to lodge complaints against his father.

With the arrival of Demetrius in Rome begins the final sordid chapter in the reign of Philip V, a period in which the Antigonid house was plagued with family intrigue, accusation and counter-accusation, culminating in the political assassination of Demetrius himself. Although our sources have comparatively much to say about the intrigue surrounding Demetrius, they are heavily tainted with rumor and bias, and it is almost impossible to sift out the true facts. Demetrius is portrayed, almost without exception, as simple, ingenuous, and even to a degree, incapable. However, most modern commentators have come to recognize that he was by no means unaware of what was going on and was not a completely
innocent victim of Roman and Macedonian cunning.

Polybius tells us that it took three days to hear all the charges submitted by the various Greek embassies. It is not surprising that Demetrius should have been uncertain about how to respond to such a barrage. The Senate itself was perplexed about the procedure which should be followed. Livy gives the impression that the Senate expected Demetrius to reply to the charges immediately, but when they saw that he could give no intelligent information on any of the points, they asked him whether he had any written instructions from his father. Polybius, on the other hand, suggests that the Senate recognized the extreme difficulty which anyone would have had in replying ad libitum to so many accusations, and it did not even expect Demetrius to do so. Moreover, the senators were more interested in hearing what Philip himself felt about these matters, and consequently they asked Demetrius immediately whether he had any notes from his father. That Demetrius should have a memorandum outlining a point by point rebuttal of the accusations suggests that Philip had been informed well in advance about the charges he would be required to meet. Whether or not this was so, the Romans were probably aware long before his arrival that Demetrius would be his father's representative, and they could plan their strategy accordingly.

Since Demetrius had been sent to Rome specifically because of his influence with prominent senators, and obviously
not because of any particular oratorical or diplomatic skill, it cannot have surprised Philip that the Senate's subsequent decision in his favour was attributed to the high regard in which it held the Macedonian prince.\textsuperscript{36} However, what particularly distressed him was the extent to which the Romans publicized this fact and the consequent effects which this success had upon Demetrius. Rome clearly wished to enhance Demetrius' reputation among the Macedonian people, but to what end was the question which plagued Philip and Perseus. Did the Romans merely wish to build up an influential pro-Roman party in Macedon, or were their motives more extreme -- to establish Demetrius as heir to the throne ahead of Perseus, or even supplant Philip immediately with Demetrius? Polybius mentions that Flamininus, "by inviting Demetrius' confidences and eliciting his secrets, contributed much to the dissension within the Macedonian royal house, and τὸν τε γὰρ νεανίσκον ἐνυχαγώγησεν, ὡς αὐτίνα μάλα συγκατασκευάσοντων αὐτῷ Ἡρωϊδων τὴν βασιλείαν.\textsuperscript{37} Ἐνυχαγώγησεν may imply that the phrase which follows, ὡς... τὴν βασιλείαν, was not true, and in any case, it is extremely unlikely that the Romans ever had any intention of physically intervening in order to interfere in the Macedonian succession. Even so, as Edson remarks, "there cannot be the slightest doubt that Flamininus in (even) making such a suggestion was guilty of an absolutely unwarranted interference into the private dynastic affairs of an independent and technically friendly
state."^{38}

When Demetrius returned to Macedon he was accorded a warm welcome by the people, who were much relieved by the removal of the prospect of war with Rome. Livy remarks that Demetrius' success had established him in the people's eyes as a potential successor to his father's throne.^{39} Although Polybius does not mention this, he does describe Perseus' anxiety at the possibility, to which popular rumor could have contributed in no small way.^{40} Roman propaganda had been fast and effective! About this same time, Philip received a letter from Flamininus urging him to send Demetrius back to Rome with as many of his most serviceable friends as possible.^{41} Understandably, this letter enraged Philip and Perseus, and if it was Flamininus' hope to establish Demetrius on the Macedonian throne, it is difficult to believe that he would have been so tactless as to have deliberately imperilled the life of his client. And yet, this is exactly what he had done: ταύτας γὰρ ταῖς ἀφορμαῖς χρησάμενος ὁ Περσεύς μετ' ὀλίγου ἔπεισε τὸν πατέρα συγκαταθέσθαι τῷ Δημητρίου ἐκανάτῳ.^{42}

Despite the tendency of the sources to whitewash the character of Demetrius, it is clear that he was actively involved in political scheming no less than his brother. He seems to have had a considerable following, and Livy says Philip was displeased that there should virtually be a second court while he lived.^{43} Indeed, some of Demetrius' supporters
were numbered among the friends of Philip himself. It is tempting to suggest that some of the young men who had been hostages with Demetrius in Rome had succeeded in persuading their fathers that cooperation with the Romans was the best policy. It was undoubtedly Demetrius' supporters who churned up the issue of Perseus' questionable birth among the Macedonian populace.

Rome's involvement in this internal political struggle remained more or less veiled, but nevertheless very real. A commission led by Q. Marcius Philippus arrived in Macedon in the spring of 183 to oversee Philip's evacuation of the Thracian coastal cities. But much more provocative than their official mission was the rapport and extensive consultation between the commissioners and Demetrius. We do not know the essence of these consultations, but Philip and Perseus could only suspect the worst. Philip continued to conceal his displeasure at the activity of Demetrius, and "obeyed the Romans in everything in order to give them no reason for immediately declaring war." However, in founding a new city which he named Perseis, he indicated very clearly his feelings towards his eldest son. Perseus himself actively opposed the ambitions of his brother. He attempted to bribe the friends of Demetrius, and later, when the tide seemed to be turning against Demetrius, he succeeded in persuading some of them to change their colors. He fostered Philip's fervent anti-Roman feelings by continually
emphasizing Demetrius' Roman associations. Admittedly, much of what he said was true, but in order to reinforce his allegations, Perseus baited Demetrius during casual conversations into defending Roman customs and manners. It is possible that he even went so far as to suggest to Philip that there was a conspiracy afoot to dethrone him in favour of Demetrius. According to Polybius, shortly before Philip executed a group of Macedonian nobles, including Admetus, Pyrrhicus, and his own foster-brother, Samus. We are not told why they were executed, but Polybius' passage connects the incident with the struggle between Perseus and Demetrius. In addition, Philip gave orders that the sons and daughters of the executed men be sought out and imprisoned. It is possible that some of these children may have served as hostages with Demetrius, and were thought particularly dangerous by Philip because of their close connections with influential Romans. However, it is important to note that the sources do not give any impression that it was Rome's objective to depose Philip. All suspicion, both that of the Macedonian populace, and of Philip and Perseus themselves, indicated that it was Rome's desire that Demetrius should replace Perseus as heir to the throne. If there was a conspiracy at this time, it was probably of Demetrius' own making, or a fabrication of Perseus intended to arouse Philip's suspicions further.

In the spring of 182 the hostility between Perseus and
Demetrius became openly violent. At the tournament associated with the annual festival of the purification of the Macedonian army, the royal princes competed with each other as if it were a real battle: *nec praeter ferrum quicquam defuit ad iustam belli speciem*. Later, Perseus refused to join his brother in the revelries which followed the ceremony. At this feast, one of Perseus' men was caught eavesdropping and was severely beaten up. When Demetrius, who knew nothing of this incident, suggested that the party move to Perseus' quarters, those who had maltreated Perseus' spy concealed daggers beneath their tunics. This was reported to Perseus, who consequently refused entrance to his brother, and on the next day accused him before Philip of attempting to assassinate him. This incident, which has all the elements of a Plautine comedy, prompted Philip to call a meeting with his two sons. Livy gives three speeches, one for each participant, and while most scholars recognize that they are largely Livy's own compositions, they may contain a basis of fact, and they do provide important contrasting opinions about the role of the Romans in this lurid bit of politics.

Philip opens with a didactic speech praising the virtues of brotherhood, and reprimands Demetrius and Perseus for their violation of that sacred bond. He cites examples of *sociabilis consortio*: the pairs of Lacedaemonian kings, Attalus and Eumenes, Titus and Lucius Quintius, Publius and Lucius Scipio. Are we to doubt that Livy's sense of rhetoric
has taken hold? Perseus' speech is concerned mainly with his accusation stemming from the tournament. However, he does make some allegations concerning the Romans. He says that they wish his death because he deplores the wrongs which Philip has suffered at their hands. He mentions the presence of a large number of Macedonian nobles, qui in Romanis spem omnem dignitatis et fortunae posuerunt et in eo qui omnia apud Romanos potest.57 He re-emphasizes the fact that it is Demetrius who safeguards Philip from the attack of Roman arms, and Flamininus is said to have replaced Philip as magister Demetrii. The letter urging Philip to send more Macedonians to Rome is also mentioned. Although Perseus' remarks contained much exaggeration,58 there was no denying the reality of Roman involvement. Nor did Demetrius make any attempt to deny it. He rather weakly places the blame for his Roman connections right at Philip's feet: Ego nec obses Romanis ut traderer nec ut legatus mitterer Romam petii. A te missus ire non recusavi.59 He responds to Perseus' accusations regarding his designs on the throne by posing several awkward rhetorical questions:

Nam si et in Romanis tantum momenti credebam esse ut quem vellent imponerent Macedoniae regem, et meae tantum apud eos gratiae confidebam, quid opus parricidio fuit? An ut cruentum diadema fraterna caede gererem? Ut illis ipsis, apud quos aut vera aut certa simulata probitate partam gratiam habeo, si quam forte habeo, execrabilis et invisus essem? Nisi T. Quinctium credis, cuius nutu et consiliis me nunc arguis regi, cum et ipse tali pietate vivat cum fratre, mihi fraternalae caedis fuisset auctorem.60
The implications which Philip and Perseus would be likely to draw from such questions could hardly have been pleasing to the Romans, and especially Flamininus. In fact, they may have been asking some of the same questions themselves!

The meeting of Philip, Perseus, and Demetrius broke up without anything definite being resolved. Shortly thereafter, Philip sent Apelles and Philocles to Rome, not on an official mission, but rather to investigate the nature of the connections between Demetrius and Flamininus. They returned after several months with evidence supporting serious charges. Their chief exhibit was a letter allegedly sent by Flamininus to Demetrius: *Deprecatio in litteris erat si quid adulescens cupiditate regni prolapsus secum egisset: nihil eum adversus suorum quemquam facturum neque eum se esse qui ullius impii consilii auctor futurus videri possit.*

The authenticity of this letter has bedevilled both ancient and modern historians. If it was genuine, it is clear that Flamininus had not been pleased with the course of action which Demetrius had been pursuing of late. We have already noted the possibility that Demetrius may have been behind a conspiracy to dethrone Philip, without the knowledge or approval of the Romans. However, even earlier, on the occasion of his return from Rome in 183, we learn that success had made Demetrius *haud dubie inflator.* His confidence may have caused him to become more aggressive than the Romans approved. To be sure, they hoped that
Demetrius would become a source of contention within the Macedonian royal house and perhaps even eventually succeed to the throne. What distressed them most was the extent to which he had implicated them in what was officially an internal matter and technically none of their business. The whole affair had caused Rome considerable embarrassment. Thus, it is entirely conceivable that Flamininus may have written to Demetrius warning him not to become too ambitious in his designs on the Macedonian throne. The question is, how did this letter get into the hands of Philip's spies? The Romans must have known why Apelles and Philocles had come to Rome. So far as we know, they did not even have an official mission to disguise their real one. Clearly, the Romans could have arranged for them to take back whatever information they wanted. Walbank wonders "why Flamininus should send a letter virtually admitting his guilt." Surely Flamininus' implication in the intrigue surrounding Demetrius had been so well advertised that his primary concern was to dissociate himself from the nasty directions it was beginning to take. About the same time as Apelles and Philocles were in Rome, Demetrius began to refrain from all reference to or contact with the Romans. Livy attributes this to Demetrius' fear of Philip. It may also reflect the deterioration in relations between the Romans and their client.

In the winter of 181 Perseus again accused Demetrius before his father. The cumulative evidence against him was
overwhelming, and Philip finally agreed to his assassination. Livy says that no sentence was openly pronounced, **ne poena eius consilia adversus Romanos nudaret**. A public condemnation and execution would have been embarrassing for both Philip and the Romans. The Romans could not have remained unmoved by such an official condemnation of their policy, nor could Philip have afforded to risk the chance of open hostilities with them on that account. A quiet, mysterious assassination was much more diplomatic, and as far as we know, there was not a single official objection on the part of the Romans.

Walbank sums up the career of Demetrius very succinctly: "Vain and ambitious, he had lent himself to clumsy manoeuvring by Flamininus and his circle and had himself to thank for his untimely end." Flamininus had pushed too hard and too fast, and when his plans misfired, he showed no hesitancy in abandoning his client. The apparent diplomatic clumsiness of Flamininus in openly encouraging Demetrius to aspire to the Macedonian throne suggests that it was the Romans' primary motive to keep Macedon weak by creating internal political chaos rather than to establish Demetrius as a client-king. However, they did not come out of this sordid affair unscathed. There can be no doubt that the antipathy which Perseus continued to have for the Romans was, in large part, the result of their association with his hostage brother.
Notes

1 For the negotiations at Nicaea in 198, see Polyb. 18.1-10; Liv. 32.32-38; Plut. Flam. 5.6; App. Mac. 8; Zonar. 9.16.4; Just. Epit. 30.3.8. As a result of these complicated, and in part secret, negotiations, Flamininus acceded to Philip's request for a truce in which to send an embassy to Rome regarding a possible settlement. The truce was to be two months in duration, and it was further stipulated that the king's garrisons should be immediately withdrawn from Phocis and Locris. Long ago, Täubler, Imp. Rom., p. 41, noticed the absence of any mention of hostages or war indemnity in connection with this truce: "Die Geld- und Geiselforderung ist in dem Vertragsvorschlag bei Polybios nicht genannt .... Das Fehlen der Verpflegungskosten und der Geiseln hängt andererseits wohl auch mit dem Fehlen der Ersatzbestimmung in dem Vertragsvorschlag zusammen." In his characteristically cautious manner, Täubler did not pursue the matter further. However, two possibilities may be suggested. If hostages were taken by Flamininus we would expect to find this condition set out with the other stipulation governing the truce (i.e. the withdrawal from Phocis and Locris). Conceivably Polybius could be referring to the submission of hostages, among other measures, when he says (18.10.5) διεστάξατο δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἵδρυμαν υφοκειμένως, ἕνα κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον μηδέν εἰς αὐτοῦς ἀποκειμένη γίνεται κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ὑπὸ Μακεδόνων.

In any case, if hostages were taken, it is entirely possible that they were restored to Philip when the peace talks failed at Rome. However, it seems more likely that no hostages were taken. The two month truce, as Badian in the preliminary publication of his 1970 University of Cincinnati Semple Lectures, Titus Quinctius Flamininus, Philhellenism and Realpolitik, p. 41, has noted, was an extraordinarily short time for embassies to be sent to Rome, do their business, and return. "It is clear that prolonged negotiations in Rome were not anticipated." It has long been suspected, even from ancient times, that Flamininus' motive for granting Philip this truce was merely to guarantee himself the credit for finishing the war if his command were not renewed. The shortness of the truce suggests that Flamininus was confident that his command would be renewed and the war could then be continued. This probably accounts for his failure to exact hostages or indemnity payments. If, by chance, the peace had been ratified at Rome, the details pertaining to hostages and indemnity payments could have been determined by the Senate, since Philip had agreed to abide by whatever conditions of peace the Senate imposed (Liv. 32.36.4).

2 Polyb. 18.39.5-6; Liv. 33.13.14-15; App. Mac. 9; Plut. Arat. 54.5; Zonar. 9.16. Demetrius seems to have been
about ten years old in 197, since Livy (40.6.4), in describing the purification ceremony of the Macedonian army (Mar./Apr. 182), tells us that Perseus was in his thirtieth year and that Demetrius was five years his younger, which would place his birth about 206. One of Demetrius' fellow hostages may have been Herodorus, whom Livy (40.23.4) describes as princeps amicorum Demetrii, and who was later tortured to death by Philip for his suspected complicity in the alleged conspiracy of Flamininus and Demetrius. For the identification of other possible hostages, see below, p. 120.

3 Plut. Flam. 9: ... Δημήτριον δομησόντα λαβὼν εἰς Ῥώμην ἀπέστειλεν, ἄριστα τῷ κατηχομένῳ καὶ προδρόμῳ τῷ μέλλον. It may have been more standard practice for hostages to be retained by the commander in the field until the peace terms had actually been ratified. See below, p. 150.

4 Liv. 34.52.9.

5 Plut. Flam. 9 (quoted above, n. 3) implies that Flamininus recognized the possibilities for extending Roman influence in Macedon through the cultivation of Demetrius. Perseus later complained (Liv. 40.5.12) that though the Romans had given back Demetrius' body, they had kept his soul. Cf. Liv. 39.47.10.

6 Polyb. 18.48.4; Liv. 33.35.1-7.


8 Liv. 39.28.6 records Philip's claim that Antiochus offered him 3000 talents, 40 ships, and all the Greek cities he had formerly possessed, for his alliance. Holleaux, CAH VIII, p. 212, n. 1, rejects the passage as annalistic fabrication. Walbank, Philip V, p. 198, n. 4, shrewdly remarks, "falsehood it may be, but Philip's own."

9 Liv. 34.26.10.

10 App. Syr. 6.

11 Diod. 28.15. Livy makes no mention of this embassy, but the apprehension of the Magnesians expressed in 35.31.5 (see below, n. 13) may stem from it.
12 Liv. 35.12.10-14.

13 Liv. 35.31.5. Philip, in fact, did eventually recover the city. See Liv. 39.23.11f. and Walbank, Philip V, p. 195, n. 5.

14 Liv. 36.7.17-20; App. Syr. 14. Livy's account of the embassy sent to Rome by Philip (36.4.1ff.) with an offer to supply men, money and provisions is rejected by Walbank, Philip V, p. 200, n. 3, and with good reason, since it would have been exactly this sort of demonstration of good faith which the Romans were seeking from Philip at that time.

15 Liv. 36.8.6: qui ad id tempus fortunam esset habiturus in consilio, .... Cf. App. Syr. 16.

16 Liv. 36.8.6.

17 Liv. 39.23.10.

18 Liv. 36.34.10; Plut. Flam. 15.4. See below, p.141.

19 Polyb. 21.3; Liv. 36.35.13; App. Syr. 20; Mac. 9; Diod. 28.15.1; Plut. Flam. 14.3.

20 Polyb. 21.11.9: ...φίλημπιν μὲν καταπολεμήσαντες καὶ συγκελάδαντες εἰς ὅμηρα καὶ φόρους, βραχεῖαν ἀυτοῦ νῦν λαθόντες ἀπόδειξιν εὐθείας ἀποκαθιστάνει μὲν αὐτῷ τὸν μισθὸν καὶ τοὺς ἀπ’ αὐτῶν συνομορεύοντας νεκροσκούς, ἀπολευκάνει δὲ τῶν φόρων, .... Livy's account of the letter to Prusias (37.25.8-13) mentions the return of Demetrius, but not the other hostages.

21 i.e. Polyb. 21.3. Appian's narrative, like that of Polybius, contains two contradictory versions of Demetrius' restoration. In Mac. 9 he states that Demetrius was released and the indemnity payments remitted in return for Philip's assistance in the Roman advance to the Hellespont in 190 B.C. However, Syr. 20 records Demetrius' release following the battle of Thermopylae.

22 Täubler, p. 39, n. 5.

23 See above, p. 61, n. 76.
It is not likely that this was sufficient incentive in itself to secure Philip's cooperation for the expedition to Asia (cf. Walbank, Philip V, p. 210: "...the Senate's promise to remit his tribute was a sufficient deterrent against a break with Rome."). It is clear that the Romans were uneasy about Philip, and on the eve of their departure for Asia, Scipio sent Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus to Pella to ascertain his attitude and intentions (Liv. 37.7.11). Gracchus found everything in readiness for the Roman expedition -- supplies laid in, bridges built, and roads constructed. The march through Macedonia and Thrace occurred without incident, and we are told that Philip was rewarded by the remission of his indemnity payments (App. Syr. 23). However, when the Roman forces returned from Asia in the autumn of 188 they suffered severe attacks at the hands of four Thracian tribes, and Livy (38.40-41) says that it was generally believed that this did not happen without treachery on the part of Philip. If there is any truth to these suspicions, Philip's earlier cooperation with the Romans may be viewed in a different light. The tribute owed by Philip in 190 was probably not more than 200 talents (Walbank, Philip V, p. 211, n. 5). The preparations which Philip made to facilitate the Roman expedition might in themselves have cost almost that much. Perhaps this assistance was rendered in the hope that the Romans would suffer a reverse in Asia.

Liv. 39.47.10. Cf. 40.5.12.


Liv. 39.33.4.

Polyb. 22.14.7.

Polyb. 22.14.9-11; 23.1.5; Liv. 39.35.2; App. Mag. 9; Just. Epit. 32.2.3. Livy's phrasing is curious and unparalleled in the other sources: "...quod Romae obses specimen indolis regiae dedisset, aliquid momenti factum." Clearly Livy is giving the Roman opinion of Demetrius rather than Philip's. It was his kingly qualities which the Romans attempted to exploit, much to Philip's distress.

P.V.M. Benecke, CAH VIII, p. 254, and R.S. Conway, Bull. Ryl. Lib. X (1926), 309-339, suggest that the sources for this and other parts of Philip's reign were based on tragedies or historical novels which were written about the
ruin of the Macedonian royal house. This theory has been rejected, probably correctly, by Walbank, JHS LVIII (1938), 55-68, and C.F. Edson, HSCP XLVI (1935), 191-202. Walbank concludes that Polybius saw in Philip a prime example supporting his beliefs regarding the role of Tyche. See for example, Polyb. 23.10. Edson, whose treatment of the career of Demetrius is the soundest to date, emphasizes the unreliability of the sources.

31 Polyb. 23.1.9.
32 Polyb. 23.2.1.
33 Liv. 39.47.2-4.
34 Polyb. 23.2.
35 This is suggested by Walbank, Philip V, p. 239, n. 2.
36 Polyb. 23.2.10; Liv. 39.47.10.
37 Polyb. 23.3.8.
38 Edson, p. 193. The suggestion of Benecke, CAH VIII, pp. 252f., that Philocles, and not the Romans, may have been responsible for creating the rumors about Demetrius' hopes of succeeding his father, has been rejected, probably correctly, by Meloni, Perseo, p. 30, n. 3.
40 Polyb. 23.7.2-7.
41 Polyb. 23.3.8. Flamininus may have included among Demetrius' "most serviceable friends" some of the hostages who had accompanied him to Rome in 197.
42 Polyb. 23.3.9.
43 Liv. 39.53.7.
44 Liv. 40.5.3-4.
45 Liv. 39.53.3. Perseus himself later suggests (Liv. 40.9.2) that the rumors about his birth may have been true.

46 Liv. 39.53.11.

47 Liv. 39.53.11.

48 Liv. 39.53.14-16.

49 Polyb. 23.7.7; Liv. 40.3.7.

50 Liv. 40.5.5.

51 Liv. 40.5.7.

52 Polyb. 23.10.9. Cf. Liv. 40.3.7. Walbank, Philip V, pp. 244-45, rejects Niese’s identification of the executed men with the five counsellors executed about 205 (Diod. 28.2), and suggests rather that they were involved in some sort of plot to replace Philip with Demetrius.

53 e.g. Polyb. 23.7.6; Liv. 39.53.2; 39.53.6; 40.5.2.

54 Perseus’ speech (Liv. 40.9.5; 40.10.8) is the only source which alludes directly to the possibility that Demetrius may have been plotting against his father.

55 Liv. 40.6.6.

56 Liv. 40.8-16. Philip’s speech, at least, has its basis in Polyb. 23.11.

57 Liv. 40.10.8.

58 e.g., the statement that Demetrius omnia apud Romanos potest (40.10.8).

59 Liv. 40.15.6.

60 Liv. 40.12.15-18.
Liv. 40.20.3f. Livy adds that although Philip sent these envoys as neutral, being neither disposed towards Demetrius or Perseus, they later turned out to be agents of Perseus. Walbank, *Philip V*, p. 247, n. 4, dismisses this statement as part of the pro-Demetrian source used by Polybius in his account of Demetrius' death.

Liv. 40.23.8.

Livy flatly states (40.23.7) that the letter was a forgery, but as Walbank, *Philip V*, p. 251, notes, Apelles' subsequent flight to Italy in order to avoid the wrath of Philip makes this extremely unlikely. Nevertheless, Walbank has difficulty accepting the letter as it stands, and suggests that the contents must have been "couched in much more guarded terms than our source suggests." This is hedging the issue. Edson, p. 200, on the other hand, claims that "this is exactly the sort of letter which might be expected under the circumstances, in view of the previous relations between Flamininus and Demetrius."

See above, p. 120.


Cf. the remarks of Meloni, *Perseo*, p. 52.


Liv. 40.20.6.

Liv. 40.24.1–2.

Liv. 40.24.2.

CHAPTER VI
THE SPARTAN AND AETOLIAN HOSTAGES

A. The Spartan Hostages

The meagre evidence concerning the hostages rendered to the Romans by Nabis in the summer of 195 B.C. may be summarized as follows: In accordance with the peace terms set out by Flamininus, Nabis agreed to submit five hostages, quos imperatori Romano placuisset, et filium in iis suum, et talenta centum argenti in praesenti et quinquaginta talenta in singulos annos per annos octo.¹ The hostages appeared in Flamininus' triumph in 194.² In the spring of the following year, the Aetolians persuaded Nabis to revolt against Rome, and he promptly sent agents to stir up seditions in the maritime towns which he had lost in 195. Livy tells us that he even put to death prominent men who stubbornly adhered to the Roman alliance.³ However, the sources do not in any way suggest that the Spartan hostages were punished because of Nabis' hostile action. Nothing further is known about the hostages until the winter of 191 B.C., more than a year after Nabis' death, when a Spartan embassy came to Rome to request the liberation of their hostages and the restoration of the maritime towns.⁴ The Senate left these matters unresolved, but very shortly thereafter it restored the hostages, with
the exception of Armenas, the son of the dead tyrant, who subsequently fell ill and died in Italy.\textsuperscript{5} Unfortunately, this evidence is hardly sufficient to indicate the role which the Spartan hostages played in the political manoeuvring which arose from Rome’s relations with Sparta and the Achaean league following the murder of Nabis.\textsuperscript{6} That they did play a role, however, cannot be doubted.

Philopoemen’s masterful coup of incorporating Sparta into the Achaean league in the autumn of 192 must have momentarily stunned the Romans, and especially Flamininus, who had employed all his diplomatic talents in an effort to block such a development.\textsuperscript{7} However, the death of Nabis and the intervention of Philopoemen had produced new factional strife at Sparta which might provide him with the means of refurbishing Roman dignitas, as well as his own. In 192 there were essentially three different factions involved in the Spartan turmoil. In addition to the supporters of the late tyrant and the exiled victims of the tyrants,\textsuperscript{8} there was a pro-Achaean group, represented by Timolaus, which Philopoemen had established in power.\textsuperscript{9} Most, if not all of the Spartan hostages undoubtedly belonged to families which had supported Nabis. The aims of these factions were irreconcilably divergent and precluded any realistic coalitions. Although the exiles and the tyrant’s party vehemently opposed the incorporation of Sparta into the Achaean league, they confronted one another on the insoluble
problem of the restoration of the exiles' property and political rights. Rome was caught on the horns of this same dilemma since she had clients in both parties. The party of Timolaus, though it appears to have been opposed to the restoration of the exiles, was directly dependent upon Achaea for its political existence.

Flamininus' attempt in the spring of 191 to re-establish the tyrant's party in control of the local government of Sparta was frustrated by the daring intervention of Philopoemen, who, as a private citizen, prevented Diophanes and Flamininus from entering Sparta to resolve a factional crisis which had erupted between the tyrant's party and the pro-Achaean party of Timolaus. Philopoemen himself restored order in Sparta, and succeeded in preserving the ascendancy of the pro-Achaean faction.

There was, however, another issue which the Romans could attempt to exploit, and that was the cause of the exiles who had been expelled by the Spartan tyrants. Many from this group had appealed to Flamininus in 195 in the hope of regaining their lost positions and property, but much to Nabis' surprise, nothing had been said about their restoration in the treaty granted him by Rome. During Nabis' reign Rome had been content to ignore the plight of the exiles, but now, with the tyrant dead and a pro-Achaean party in control of Sparta, the cause of the exiles might provide profitable propaganda. In the autumn of 191 Flamininus went to the
Achaean synodos at Aegium and advanced the proposition that the Spartan exiles be restored. It met with violent opposition from Philopoemen, who if he did not desire to reserve for himself the credit of restoring the exiles, at least wished to prevent the Romans from gaining this political advantage.\textsuperscript{13}

Shortly after the confrontation between Flamininus and Philopoemen at Aegium it appears that the pro-Roman tyrant's party managed to seize control of Sparta. We may deduce this from the fact that the Spartan embassy which came to Rome in the winter of 191 requested the liberation of their hostages and the restoration of the maritime towns which Nabis had lost as a result of the war in 195.\textsuperscript{14} As Errington has pointed out, neither the embassy itself, nor the requests which it tendered, could have been condoned by a pro-Achaean government.\textsuperscript{15} The Senate's reply to the Spartan envoys was extremely non-committal. They were informed that a commission would be sent to Greece to deal with the question of the maritime towns, and that further deliberation was required regarding the hostages. As if to give the reason why these matters were still undecided, the Senate concluded by asking the Spartans why the old exiles had not yet been restored now that Sparta was free.

Soon after the return of the Spartan embassy, the hostages, with the exception of Armenas, were released.\textsuperscript{16} Why now did the Romans consent to their liberation? Aymard remarks of this measure, "il gaspillait une monnaie d'échange
qu'il eût facile d'utiliser des négociations avec les Spartiates.¹⁷ He admits the potential usefulness of the hostages in the negotiations for the restoration of the exiles, but discounts the possibility that their liberation may have been directly connected with that problem. Admittedly, none of the tyrant's party, and especially those who held expropriated lands, would have relished the return of the exiles, but some may have been willing to acquiesce in order to gain the restoration of the hostages and to secure continued Roman support in face of Sparta's ever-perilous relationship with the Achaeans. This might explain why Armenas was not restored with the other hostages. His kinsmen probably belonged to that part of the tyrant's party which was most adamantly opposed to any reconciliation with the exiles, and consequently the Romans decided to retain him.¹⁸

Whether or not the Senate broached the matter of the exiles again in connection with the return of the hostages, it is apparent that the tyrant's party, or at least a dominant section of it, remained hostilely opposed to any restoration of exiles. The Senate does not seem to have pressed the matter further, as is dramatically demonstrated by the apathetic view which it took of the circumstances surrounding the attack of the Spartans on the exiles at Las in the autumn of 189.¹⁹
B. The Aetolian Hostages

In conjunction with the treaty granted to the Aetolians in 189 B.C., the Romans demanded forty hostages, μή νεωτέρους ἕτων δώδεκα μηδὲ πρεσβυτέρους τετταράκοντα, εἰς ἔτη ἕξ, οὐς ἂν Ἁρματοι προκρίνωσιν, χωρὶς στρατηγοῦ καὶ ὑπάρχου καὶ δημοσίου γραμματέως καὶ τῶν ὁμηρικῶν ἐν Ῥώμῃ, καὶ τὰ δήμα καθιστάτωσαν εἰς "Ῥώμην" ἔὰν δὲ τις ἀποθάνη τῶν ὁμήρων, ἄλλον ἀντικαθιστάτωσαν. 20 The clause which excludes the submission of persons who had served previously as hostages in Rome suggests that sometime prior to 189 the Aetolians had rendered hostages to the Romans. However, no ancient source specifically mentions Aetolian hostages prior to 189, and Täubler suggested that the restriction regarding the hostages may have been connected with the procedures relating to mutatio obsidum. 21 Since forty hostages were handed over to the consul in 189, Täubler maintained that the instructions regarding the delivery of hostages to Rome must have applied to hostages who were to be submitted by the Aetolians at some later date. According to Täubler, the hostages rendered in 189 would have been subsequently restored, but excluded from groups of hostages submitted in later exchanges. This interpretation creates more difficulties than it solves. 22 In the first place, it presumes a monumental blunder on the part of Polybius, whose account gives absolutely no indication that mutatio was to be employed. 23 Moreover, since hostages were to be furnished for only six years, it is unlikely that
more than one exchange, if even that, would have been scheduled. Consequently, there would have been no need to prohibit hostages from serving a second term. It therefore seems likely that the restriction regarding former hostages refers to persons submitted prior to 189. The instructions relating to the delivery of hostages to Rome probably refer to the very hostages which the Aetolians had rendered to the consul in 189. It seems likely that the hostages had been delivered to the consul for his approval, following which the Aetolians were held responsible for transporting them to Italy.

Even though the sources do not mention the submission of hostages by the Aetolians prior to 189, there are several possible occasions when this may have occurred. The defeat of Antiochus in the spring of 191 at Thermopylae and his retreat into Asia left the Aetolians in difficult straits. After the Romans captured Heraclea, Phaeneas, the Aetolian strategos, sent ambassadors to Acilius Glabrio to discuss peace terms. Glabrio granted a ten day truce and instructed Valerius Flaccus to accompany the Aetolians to Hypata to continue the negotiations. Flaccus advised the Aetolians to surrender unconditionally: *haec una via omnibus ad salutem visa est*. Phaeneas appeared at the head of an embassy before Glabrio and declared *Aetolos se suaque fidei populi Romani permitsere*. When Glabrio requested the surrender of Dicaearchus, Menestas and Amynander, Phaeneas
objection. They did not intend to deliver themselves into slavery, but rather had entrusted themselves to the good faith of the Roman people. 29 Thereupon followed the famous scene in which Glabrio commanded that chains be brought out in order to impress upon the Aetolians the real meaning of deditio in fidem populi Romani. Phaeneas and his companions acknowledged that they would have to do what was commanded, but requested that another ten day truce be granted so that the matter could be decided by the full assembly of the Aetolians. 30 During the truce, Phaeneas consulted with the apokletoi, who reluctantly admitted the necessity of complying with the consul's orders. 31 However, the Aetolian assembly was outraged at the humiliation which their leaders had suffered at the hands of Glabrio, and Nicander's timely arrival from Asia, with promises of support from Antiochus, induced them to refuse the terms and continue the war. 32

Although it is clear that the Aetolians had not understood the real meaning of deditio, it seems likely that Flaccus, who had advised them to surrender unconditionally, would have informed them of the necessity to submit hostages in conjunction with their surrender. This much, at least, the Aetolians may have understood. If hostages were rendered by Phaeneas and his supporters, the failure of the peace talks need not have jeopardized their lives, since Glabrio may have hoped that his retention of them might induce Phaeneas to be cooperative in the future. However, for the
moment, Nicander and the radicals had persuaded the Aetolians to resume the struggle against Rome.

During August and September of 191 the Romans besieged the Aetolians at Naupactus. The siege would have carried on much longer had not Flamininus, concerned about the activities of Philip of Macedon, convinced Glabrio to grant an armistice to the Aetolians, in diem certam, qua legatio renuntiari ab Roma posset. Hostages may have been demanded in conjunction with this armistice.

The Aetolian ambassadors had little success at Rome. The Senate offered two harsh alternatives: vel senatui liberum arbitrium de se permetterent, vel mille talentum darent eosdemque amicos atque inimicos haberent. When the Aetolians tried to determine what they might expect by surrendering unconditionally, no positive reply was given, and they were ordered to leave the City immediately. If hostages had been rendered at the commencement of the armistice, they may have been released at this time, or they may have been among the 43 Aetolians who were sent to Rome by Glabrio and detained in the Lautumiae.

There is one other possible occasion prior to 189 when the Aetolians may have surrendered hostages to the Romans. The arrival of the Scipios in Greece, Lucius as consul and Publius as his legate, resulted in further negotiations with the Aetolians. However, they were confronted with the same alternatives as they had received.
at Rome -- that they either submit their case unconditionally to the arbitrament of Rome, or pay 1000 talents and make an offensive-defensive alliance with her. The Aetolians' reaction was the same as it had been at Rome and the offer was refused by the full consilium of the league. However, through the efforts of Echedemus, the Athenian mediator, and Publius Scipio, the Aetolians obtained a six-months truce in order that envoys might be sent to Rome. Hostages would have been appropriate at this time. However, the subsequent treatment of the ambassadors in Rome, and the harsh declaration expelling them from the City shows that the Romans had decided to shelve the Aetolian problem until they had finished with Antiochus in Asia. They obviously had no intention of granting peace to the Aetolians at this time and thus probably no hostages had been taken. The six-months truce ensured that the Aetolians would not hamper their operations against Antiochus.

It is perhaps most likely that the Aetolian hostages taken by the Romans before 189 were submitted at Naupactus in late 191. It is impossible to suggest when they may have been restored, though the clause in the treaty of 189 which excluded them from serving as hostages again indicates that they had been liberated. But why were these hostages deemed ineligible for a second term? Possibly the restriction was simply in accordance with a general Roman policy which sought to acquaint as many non-Italian hostages as possible
with aspects of Latin culture. However, the reason for the restriction may have been political. We have suggested that the former Aetolian hostages may have come from the party of Phaeneas. From 198 until the final truce the Romans had directed their efforts for a settlement to negotiations with that party. This policy had not been very successful, since the party of Thoas and Damocritus had been extremely influential among the people, and it was in the full assembly of the Aetolians that matters of peace and war were decided. Therefore the Romans were determined to secure hostages from the dominant party, and in order to ensure this, they instructed their consul to avoid selecting those hostages who had served before. It is noteworthy that the Romans had no unusual difficulties with the Aetolians during the six year period which their hostages were to serve, despite the fact that the radical party continued to dominate Aetolian politics. We do not know anything about the Aetolian hostages during their detention in Italy. It is possible that some of them graced the triumph of M. Fulvius in 187.
Notes

1 Liv. 34.35. Armenas, the son of Nabis, was probably about 12-18 years of age in 195, since Livy (35.36) tells us that during the chaos which followed Nabis' murder in 192 some of the Spartans brought forth as a figurehead ruler, Laconicus, eius stirpis erat puer admodum, eductus cum liberis tyranni. It may also be noted that Armenas was not the only son of Nabis (Liv. 32.38.3).

2 Liv. 34.52.9.

3 Liv. 35.13.1.


5 Polyb. 21.3.4.

6 The most recent analysis of this difficult and tortuous subject has been that of R.M. Errington, Philopoemen, Oxford, 1969. Somewhat older, but still extremely useful is André Aymard's Les premiers rapports de Rome et de la confédération achaïenne, Bordeaux, 1938 (hereafter simply Aymard, Premiers rapports).

7 For an excellent assessment of Flamininus' objectives and methods, see Errington, pp. 97-110, especially p. 98 and p. 106, n. 1.

8 The sources do not generally distinguish between the victims of Nabis, Machanidas, and Cleomenes. See for example Liv. 34.26.13.

9 Plut. Phil. 15.2-4.

10 Liv. 34.26.12.


12 Liv. 34.36.2.

13 Liv. 36.35.7; Plut. Phil. 17.4. Philopoemen's claim to have been ab initio exulum causae amicus (Liv. 38. 31.1) is, as Errington, p. 141, has recognized, patently untrue.
14 Polyb. 21.1.

15 Errington, p. 133. The Senate's reference to "old exiles" ἄρχαῖοι φυγάδες (Polyb. 21.1.4) also suggests that a new group of exiles (i.e. Timolaus and his party) had been created by the recent coup. Walbank, Philip V, p. 208, does not acknowledge any change in the local government at Sparta at this time. However, it seems certain that the pro-Achaean party would not have violated the convention of the Achaean foedus which prohibited an individual member of the league from making independent representations before the Senate (Paus. 7.9.4; cf. Errington, pp. 282-83). Moreover, the Spartan attack on the exiles at Las in the autumn of 189 and Philopoemen's subsequent intervention make it clear that the supporters of Nabis must have been ascendant in Sparta.

16 Polyb. 21.3.4.

17 Aymard, Premiers rapports, p. 369 and n. 7. For the relationship between these hostages and the indemnity payments owed by Nabis, see above, p. 61, n. 76.

18 A number of other reasons for Armenas' continued detention may be suggested. Aymard, Premiers rapports, p. 369, maintains that the Romans may have seen in Armenas, "sans doute un candidat possible à la tyrannie." However, Armenas should have been no more a threat to establish a tyranny than the other sons of Nabis (see above, n. 1) who were presumably still in Sparta. Perhaps Armenas did not wish to return to Sparta in view of the very unstable conditions there. Although Polybius (21.3.4) does not suggest that Armenas had already contracted his fatal illness at the time of the hostages' restoration, it is possible that his health was not sufficiently good to allow him to make the return journey.

19 Liv. 38.30.6-9; 38.32.9. Errington, p. 140, suggests that this attack was against the party of Timolaus, rather than against the old exiles, and certainly if he is correct this would explain why the Roman government was not extremely concerned. However, the circumstances suggest that the attack was made against a much broader group than just the party of Timolaus. Livy (38.30.6) says of the threatened exiles, ...magna pars in maritimis Laconicae orae castellis quae omnis adempta erat habitabant. That is, the exiles were not only at Las and the other maritime towns, but elsewhere as well (magna pars does not include all). This description
better fits the condition of the "old exiles". Moreover, the fact that the "old exiles" are found prominently in the army of Philopoemen at Compasion (Liv. 39.36.14-16) suggests that they had been among the exiles who appealed to Achaea following the attack on Las.

20 Polyb. 21.32.10. Livy's account (38.11.6) does not mention the term for which hostages were to be furnished (six years), nor that the Aetolians would be responsible for replacing any hostages who died while in Roman hands. Livy also omits the troublesome regulation regarding the delivery of hostages to Rome. However, the accounts of both Livy and Polybius suggest that the Aetolian hostages were not delivered until the treaty had actually been ratified at Rome. Although Fulvius had requested the immediate submission of 200 talents in the preliminary terms of the treaty (Polyb. 21.30.2 = Liv. 38.9.9) he made no mention of hostages, and it does not appear that the Aetolians handed over either money or hostages prior to the return of their ambassadors from Rome. The instructions in the senatus consultum regarding the financial settlement (Polyb. 21.32.8 = Liv. 38.11.8) also suggest that none of the consul's stipulations had been fulfilled at the commencement of the armistice. This procedure would appear to be an exception to the usual Roman practice. Cf. p. 42 above.

21 Täubler, p. 71. On mutatio obsidum, see above, p. 50.

22 Täubler does not attempt to argue that the absence of the article τοῦ in the clause regarding the exclusion of magistrates from serving as hostages indicates that the restriction did not apply strictly to 189. Diodorus (20.99.3) records a similar restriction observed by Demetrius in taking hostages from the Rhodians, but it is certain that the measure had nothing to do with mutatio. The same restriction was probably applied to most prospective donors. Since hostages were intended to guarantee the behavior of the men governing the donor state, the exaction of executive magistrates as hostages would only result in the election of alternates whose loyalty to Rome might not be guaranteed by the fact that their predecessors were hostages in Rome.

23 Polybius' account of the treaty with Antiochus III (21.42.22) shows that he was well acquainted with the procedure of mutatio.

24 The hostages submitted by Antiochus III were to be exchanged every three years (Polyb. 21.42.22). Täubler does
not state what he believes would have been the frequency of exchange in the case of the Aetolian hostages.

25 Cf. Liv. 38.11.6: *obsides quadraginta arbitratu consulis Romanis dato*...

26 Polyb. 20.9; cf. Liv. 36.27. During the 190's two factions dominated Aetolian politics. The radicals, led by Damocritus and Thoas, were vehemently anti-Roman, while the moderates, led by Phaeneas, though also anti-Roman, sought to rid Greece of the Romans by more diplomatic means. Polybius' description (18.48) of the Aetolian synodos at Thermus in 197 illustrates well the difference between these two parties: "Cornelius, the Roman ambassador, begged the Aetolians, who were unhappy about the arrangements with Philip, to maintain their good disposition towards the Romans. Many rose to answer, of whom some expressed dissatisfaction with the Romans in moderate and decorous language...while others delivered violent invectives, asserting that the Romans would never have set foot in Greece or conquered Philip had it not been for them." Both Phaeneas and Thoas agreed that Antiochus should be summoned to Greece, but the moderates intended that he should arbitrate in the difficulties between Aetolia and Rome, while the radicals desired his help in expelling the Romans from Greece (Liv. 35.45).

Hoffmann, RE XIX.2, col. 1564, suggests that Phaeneas' election as strategos for 192/91 was probably the result of the failure of the radicals at Sparta and Chalcis (Liv. 35.37f.). Even so, Thoas was obviously still very influential in the assembly. He had departed only a few days before the fall of Heraclea, accompanied by Nicander, to seek aid from Antiochus and to persuade the king to bring his forces back to Greece. The combination of the fall of Heraclea, the absence of several key leaders of the radical party, plus the important fact that Damocritus and others had been captured by the Romans at Heraclea (Liv. 36.24.12), increased Phaeneas' influence temporarily. However, the decision of the Aetolian assembly after the return of Nicander to continue the war shows that the radical party was still very strong.

27 Liv. 36.27.7.

28 Liv. 36.28.2.

29 Liv. 36.28.4.

30 Liv. 36.28.7.
31 Liv. 36.28.9.

32 Liv. 36.29.3. On the political outlook of Nicander, see above, note 26.

33 Liv. 36.34f.

34 Liv. 36.35.6.

35 Liv. 37.1.5.

36 Liv. 37.3.8: ...principes Aetolorum tres et quadragesimae, inter quos Damocritus et frater eius erant, ab duabus cohortibus missis a M. Acilio Romam deducti et in Lautumias coniecti sunt. Damocritus had been captured at Heraclea (Liv. 36.24.12), and very likely others of the 43 had been taken at that time as well. 36 of these captives marched in Glabrio's triumph in late 190 (Liv. 37.46). If hostages were included among this group, it is possible that they had been relegated to the status of captivi because of the failure of the peace talks. Their return may have been effected at the conclusion of the treaty in 189.

37 Polyb. 21.4f. Liv. 37.6.6f.

38 Liv. 37.49.8.

39 Polyb. 21.32.10: τῶν ὕμηρευκτῶν ἐν Ῥώμῃ. An alternative reading, τῶν ὑμηρευόντων, preserved in Ms. 0 (Monacensis 185), although accepted as correct by Casaubon, does not seem likely in view of Liv. 38.11.7 (quis qui ante obses fuit).

40 See above, p. 50.

41 See above, note 26.

42 Dicaearchus, the brother of Thoas, was strategos in 187/6, while Thoas himself held the same post in 182/1 (G. Klaffenbach, Tabula Praetorum Aetolorum, IG IX I², Berlin, 1932, xlix-lxiii). Another prominent radical politician, Nicander (see above, n. 26), had become influential enough among the Romans to induce them to release Thoas in 186/5 (Polyb. 28.4.11). Whether or not hostages from his family were in Rome at that time cannot be determined.
43 Liv. 39.5.16.
CHAPTER VII
THE SELEUCID HOSTAGES

Following the defeat of Antiochus III at Magnesia in early 189, preliminary terms of peace were issued by Publius Scipio. The terms included a demand for twenty hostages to be designated by the Romans. Among the hostages requested was the second eldest surviving son of Antiochus, also named Antiochus, later to be known as Antiochus IV Epiphanes. When the hostages had been delivered to the Romans at Ephesus, Antiochus' ambassadors departed for Rome to seek Senate approval of the peace terms. Although Appian does state that both the Scipios and Antiochus sent messengers to Rome, it is possible that the hostages remained in Ephesus pending ratification of the treaty. This would not only have facilitated any changes which the Senate might prescribe regarding their number, age, and personnel, but would have also allowed for their immediate restoration in the unlikely event that the treaty was not ratified and the war was resumed. The Senate did, in fact, make some slight changes and additions to Scipio's terms, including several pertaining to the hostages. With the exception of Antiochus himself, the hostages were to be exchanged every three years. Furthermore, it seems to have been the Senate which specified
that the hostages submitted be between 18 and 45 years of age.⁷

Although Antiochus was among the first group of Syrian hostages delivered to Rome, his relationship to the rest of the hostages is not completely clear. Was he merely the most distinguished of the 20 hostages taken to guarantee the terms of Apamea, or was he taken specifically as a surety for his father's personal goodwill and loyalty? In the case of Demetrius Soter, Polybius explicitly states that he had been given as a hostage for his father's good faith.⁸ Moreover, Demetrius' complaint that he should not be required to act as a pledge for his uncle's good faith further demonstrates that Demetrius, at least in Polybius' mind, had no connection with the terms of Apamea.⁹ We do not hear that Antiochus made similar complaints about being retained at Rome after the death of his father and the succession of his brother, but this is not enough in itself to indicate that his detention was rigidly connected with the terms of the treaty. In any case, it is unlikely that any technical justification was necessary for the continued retention of a hostage.¹⁰

Antiochus was about 25 years of age when he arrived in Rome.¹¹ He was not as young and impressionable as many of the hostages which Rome took, and consequently there will have been little opportunity animum eius habere through Romanization.¹² However, we may be sure that the Romans did
their best to impress the Seleucid prince with their military strength and political acumen. He was well received by the Roman nobility, ut pro rege non pro obside,\textsuperscript{13} and according to Asconius, a house was constructed for him at public expense.\textsuperscript{14} His immediate patrons were probably from the Scipionic family, the architects of the treaty of Apamea. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, who seems to have been well acquainted with Syrian affairs, may have known Antiochus during his detention in Rome.\textsuperscript{15} L. Aemilius Paullus and L. Furius, who had pressed for a moderate settlement with Antiochus III,\textsuperscript{16} may have also been among those who befriended Antiochus in Rome. Justin mentions that Antiochus knew C. Popilius Laenas before their famous encounter in Egypt.\textsuperscript{17}

We do not know exactly how long Antiochus served as a hostage. Seleucus IV, sometime before his murder in 175, sent his own son, Demetrius, to Rome as a replacement for Antiochus.\textsuperscript{18} We know that Demetrius was born in 188/187,\textsuperscript{19} the very year of his father's succession to the throne, and whether or not he was the eldest son of Seleucus,\textsuperscript{20} it is clear that he could not have been sent as a hostage much before 180. Appian's extremely telescoped account gives the impression that Seleucus himself took the initiative in arranging the exchange of the royal hostages.\textsuperscript{21} He undoubtedly wished to deprive Rome of the potential means of interfering in the succession of his son, and at the same
time attempt to repair the seriously deteriorating relations between the Seleucid court and the Roman government. The Romans were no doubt aware of Seleucus' motives, and consequently they may have advised Antiochus to remain at Athens rather than return to Syria. If, as we have suggested above, there was a general mutatio of Syrian hostages in 176, it is certainly possible that Demetrius was also sent to Rome at that time.

Very soon after the liberation of Antiochus, Seleucus was murdered by his chief minister, Heliodorus. The assassination seems to have been entirely a palace plot by which Heliodorus hoped to gain the effective reins of power, either as regent of Seleucus' young son, or by assuming the diadem himself. The news of Seleucus' death was not unwelcome to Eumenes of Pergamum. He had attempted to win the friendship of the Syrian court after Magnesia, but Seleucus' policy had been consistently hostile towards Pergamum. Eumenes now viewed the situation in Syria as an opportunity to establish on the Seleucid throne a ruler who would be his ally. He approached Antiochus, then living in Athens, with an offer to assist in the overthrow of Heliodorus. It has occasionally been suggested that Eumenes took this action on a hint from Rome, or in the belief that the accession of Antiochus would be pleasing to the Romans. However, the Senate, in its desire to keep the Syrian government weak and disorganized, probably would have preferred the succession of
Seleucus' young son rather than Antiochus, whose ability they had been able to assess during the years he spent in Rome. Even if the real power was to be in the hands of Heliodorus, as murderer of Seleucus, his natural allies would have been the Romans, and it is likely that he would have cooperated with them as fully as possible.\textsuperscript{30} Certainly, when Antiochus did gain the throne, the Romans hoped that he would be well disposed towards his former hosts, but they may have viewed with some suspicion his close relationship with Eumenes.\textsuperscript{31}

We cannot become involved here in the difficult problems of chronology and numismatics connected with the accession of Antiochus.\textsuperscript{32} It is clear that even with the support of Eumenes, Antiochus did not gain the throne without difficulty.\textsuperscript{33} In addition to the opposition which he must have met from Heliodorus, there were also other factions which opposed his usurpation. We do not know what policy was adopted by the former supporters of Seleucus IV,\textsuperscript{34} but there was a faction in Coele-Syria which favoured the restoration of that area to Egypt. They knew that their chances of success would be severely diminished if Antiochus became king.\textsuperscript{35} The difficulties which Antiochus encountered in stabilizing his position may help to explain why it was not until 173 that he sent Apollonius to Rome with instructions to reaffirm the treaty which his father had had with the Romans.\textsuperscript{36} Apollonius also brought with him money for the
overdue indemnity payments. It has occasionally been assumed that these payments were in arrears because of the problems associated with Antiochus' accession. However, the default must have occurred during Seleucus' reign, since the payments had been scheduled to be completed in 176. Though further delay, to be sure, will have been caused by the turmoil following Seleucus' death, the Romans no doubt viewed Antiochus' payment in 173 as evidence of his good faith. The tribute was accepted, and the treaty with the Seleucids was renewed. Antiochus, as king, had begun his relationship with Rome on the right foot.

Antiochus' first concern after securing his throne was the threat from Egypt on Coele-Syria. Apollonius, on his return from an official mission to Alexandria, reported that Egypt's hostile intentions were very real. Antiochus began immediate "defensive" preparations, some of which technically contravened the terms of Apamea. However, during his years at Rome, Antiochus had seen that the Romans were becoming increasingly reluctant to become directly involved in eastern affairs, and that their control of developments in Greece and Asia Minor was effected largely through skillful political diplomacy, friendships, and intrigue. He was confident that he could rebuild Seleucid fortunes as long as he did not directly challenge Rome and maintained, at least officially, friendly relations with her. By following this policy, he felt certain that Rome would be
willing to overlook minor violations of the treaty of Apamea which his plans might necessitate.

There can be no doubt that Rome was aware of the volatile situation existing between Syria and Egypt, and she will have reacted with mixed feelings to the possibility of a war between the two. While such a war would help to ensure that neither Ptolemy nor Antiochus would become involved in any war in Macedon, there nevertheless will have been great apprehension about Seleucid expansion into Egypt and the possibility of the union of the two hellenistic kingdoms. In order to discourage such a development, the Senate dispatched an embassy to Alexandria, ad Ptolemaeum renovandae amicitiae causa. This should have been a clear indication to Antiochus that Rome would not allow him to incorporate Egypt into the Seleucid realm. Otto suggests that the Roman ambassadors proceeded from Alexandria to Syria where they received assurances from Antiochus that he would not lend support to Perseus. Whether or not the same embassy visited Alexandria and Antioch, it is clear that the missions to both kings were conducted at about the same time, and they demonstrate the delicate balance which Rome was trying to maintain in the late 170's.

In 171/170 Antiochus sent Meleager to Rome to complain about Egypt's menacing preparations. While Meleager was in Rome, hostilities actually erupted in Coele-Syria, and Antiochus moved swiftly, inflicting a defeat on the forces
led by the regents, Eulaeos and Lenaeus, near Mount Cassius. 48 There was no question that Egypt had declared war first and was technically the aggressor. 49 However, the Senate replied somewhat ambiguously to Meleager and his colleagues that it would instruct Q. Marcius Philippus, the consul, to write about the matter to Ptolemy. 50 No amount of ambiguity could disguise Antiochus' diplomatic triumph. He had managed to win tacit approval from the Romans for his defensive war! 51

Antiochus' victory at Mount Cassius and the capture of Pelusium, the gateway to Egypt, could be justifiably claimed as defensive measures. However, it is difficult to see how anyone could have construed his continuing advance into Egypt and the conquest of virtually all of Lower Egypt with the exception of Alexandria as defensive. Antiochus himself seems to have realized the diplomatic weakness of his position, and he quickly and skillfully devised a convenient excuse to justify his aggression. Sometime before the Syrian invasion, the advisors of Ptolemy Philometor, for reasons of which we cannot be sure, assented to the elevation of Philometor's younger brother, Physcon, to the position of co-monarch. 52 Shortly after invading Egypt, Antiochus came to some sort of agreement with Philometor which did not win the approval of a group of influential politicians in Alexandria led by Comanus. 53 These men, using Ptolemy Physcon as a figurehead, seem to have expelled Philometor from Alexandria, and he joined Antiochus at Memphis. 54 Antiochus
immediately declared that his campaign in Egypt had as its objective the restoration of the rightful king to the Egyptian throne. He proceeded to March on Alexandria.

In the meantime, though Rome was involved in the conflict with Perseus, she had not failed to keep an eye on what was happening in Egypt. As early as the summer of 169, Q. Marcius Philippus had suggested to the Rhodians that they attempt to mediate in the Syrian-Egyptian war. Somewhat later in the year the Rhodians did send an embassy under Praxton which met with Antiochus near Alexandria. Antiochus interrupted Praxton in the middle of his speech, saying that there was no need for prolonged talk: τὴν μὲν βασιλείαν εἶναι Πτολεμαίου τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου, πρὸς δὲ τοῦτον καὶ διαλέγοντας πάλαι καὶ φίλους ὑπάρχειν, καὶ θυν βουλομένων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει κατάγειν τοῦτον μὴ κωλύειν Ἀντίοχον. In Swain's view, Polybius believed that the Alexandrians were ready to take back Philometor and that Antiochus withdrew on those terms. However, as Livy observes, the subsequent reconciliation of the brothers Ptolemy was quite contrary to the hopes and expectations of Antiochus. The Alexandrians may have been willing to take back Philometor, but Antiochus no doubt insisted that he be recognized as sole king, a demand which would have been unacceptable to Physcon's supporters.

Antiochus was probably aware that the views expressed by Praxton represented Roman opinion, but Rhodes was not Rome, and it was clear that the rebuff of this embassy was
not at all the same thing as directly rejecting the demands of a Roman envoy. Nevertheless, many scholars believe that the unsuccessful mission of Titus Numisius should be placed at about the same time as the Rhodian embassy. It is argued that since Rome was still deeply involved with Perseus and could not afford to irritate Antiochus to the point that he might consider turning to the Macedonian king, Numisius' approach would have been very low key. This, combined with the fact that Numisius was not a man of high rank, may have encouraged Antiochus to reject courteously the suggestions of the Roman envoy, perhaps with the same sort of arguments which he had presented to the Rhodians. However, if the situation in Macedon had been the reason for Numisius to employ cautious diplomacy with Antiochus, it is somewhat surprising to find only shortly thereafter that the Senate responded to an appeal from Phryscos by dispatching C. Popilius Laenas, C. Decimi, and C. Hostilius with a much harsher proclamation. They were instructed to approach first Antiochus, and then Ptolemy, and announce that nisi absistatur bello, per utrum stetisset, eum non pro amico nec pro socio habituros esse. Admittedly, this harsher declaration could have resulted from Antiochus' disregard for the milder suggestions of Numisius, but certainly the situation in Macedon had not changed all that much. It is difficult to believe that Rome had been forced to tread lightly in the fall of 169, but could virtually order Antiochus out of Egypt.
by January 168. It may be preferable, as we shall suggest below, to place Numisius' mission after Antiochus' first withdrawal from Egypt.

Popilius and his colleagues left Rome almost immediately after the presentation of the Egyptian embassy, but before proceeding very far, they must have received the news that Antiochus had left Egypt. His sudden withdrawal has puzzled many historians. Otto suggested that it was because of the Jewish revolt led by Jason. Aside from the fact that this revolt probably took place during Antiochus' second Egyptian campaign, it still seems unlikely that a small rebellion by little more than 1000 men would have been sufficient to compel a king with as many as 50,000 troops to abandon a major campaign. In Swain's opinion, the chief reason for Antiochus' departure from Egypt was "his desire to get on with the great eastern adventure which he had long been planning." This motive seems no more likely than that suggested by Otto. Surely such plans could have been deferred for the brief time that the Alexandrians could have continued to sustain Antiochus' siege. Bevan is unwilling to indulge in hypothesis, and remarkably, Morkholm does not even consider the question. Porphyry states that Antiochus was defeated by Ptolemy and driven out of Egypt, but it is clear from Livy that this is merely an exaggerated account of Antiochus' failure to take Alexandria by storm. It seems entirely likely that Antiochus' sudden departure from Egypt may have
been prompted by the expectation, or even knowledge of the dispatch of a Roman embassy with an order from the Senate commanding the cessation of hostilities in Egypt.⁷³ He had been willing to sidestep the less official attempts of Rome's friends to persuade him to withdraw from Egypt, but he was entirely unwilling to confront a high Roman official armed with a Senate ultimatum. There are several indications that this may have been the case. Polybius tells us that after abandoning the siege of Alexandria, Antiochus sent Meleager, Sosiphanes and Heracleides to Rome with fifty talents to smooth things over with the Romans.⁷⁴ These envoys undoubtedly declared that Antiochus' reason for pursuing the Egyptian campaign had been merely to restore Philometor to his throne. A second indication that Antiochus had withdrawn because of Roman pressure may be seen in Perseus' renewed efforts to draw the Seleucid king over to the Macedonian camp. Perseus openly taunted Antiochus by reminding him that as victor of Egypt he was being barred from his prize of war.⁷⁵ However, Antiochus, as had consistently been his policy, ignored the overtures of Perseus.

Although Antiochus had withdrawn from Egypt as a matter of discretion, he was not entirely displeased with the situation he had left there. He held Pelusium, which would facilitate his return at any time he wished, and, moreover, his friend, Philometor, was entrenched in Memphis, as yet unrecognized by the court at Alexandria.⁷⁶ However,
the reconciliation of the brothers Ptolemy early in 168 changed the situation for Antiochus considerably. Not only did it remove his *honestam speciem* for re-entry into Egypt, but it might soon be possible that he would find himself in a position not unlike that which had faced him in 174. The Ptolemies, too, realized the implications of their reunion, and immediately dispatched an embassy to the Achaeans to ask for aid against an attack which they were sure must come. The Romans were also aware of the potentially explosive situation, and it may have been at this time that they dispatched Numisius in an attempt to bring about peace between Antiochus and the Ptolemies. However, Numisius got nowhere with Antiochus and returned to Rome.

It is not necessary to relate the details concerning Antiochus' second Egyptian invasion. The story of Popilius Laenas' famous circle in the sand is too well known to bear repeating. What is puzzling, however, is why Antiochus, with no justifiable excuse at hand, would risk a direct confrontation with the Romans if he had only recently withdrawn from Egypt precisely to avoid such an encounter. The only possible answer seems to be that the seriousness of the change brought about by the reconciliation of the Ptolemies induced Antiochus to gamble everything on the chance that the Romans would be too involved in Macedon to take any action with regard to Egypt. However, Pydna came too soon, and he had no choice but to withdraw when Popilius
presented him with the Senate's ultimatum. Polybius expresses the opinion that had Perseus not been defeated by the Romans when he was, Antiochus would never have obeyed the Roman order. However, in view of Antiochus' relationship with Rome, it seems unlikely that he would have openly and blatantly disobeyed a command of the Senate.

The Roman ultimatum and its novel presentation were extremely embarrassing to Antiochus. None the less, he withdrew from Egypt and Cyprus with scarcely any objection, and even sent an embassy to congratulate the Senate on the victory over Perseus. In keeping with his strict policy of outwardly maintaining friendly relations with the Romans, he instructed his ambassadors to announce to the Senate that omni victoria potiore pacem regi, senatui quae placuisset, visam, eumque haud secus quam deorum imperio legatorum Romanorum iussis paruisse. The Senate replied that Antiochus had done what was right and proper in obeying the envoys and that the Senate and Roman people were pleased.

Antiochus did not again attempt to challenge Rome's authority directly. However, the incident at Eleusis did not crush him to the extent which Otto suggests. The first invasion of Egypt had been very successful, especially from an economic point of view. We do not need to postulate a great eastern victory to account for the spectacular celebration at Daphne in 166. Considering Antiochus' love of pomp and ceremony, there is no reason to
reject Diodorus' statement that Antiochus desired to surpass the triumphal games celebrated by Aemilius Paullus at Amphipolis in 167. This is certainly not indicative of the man "broken by Eleusis." In fact, the celebrations at Daphne prompted the dispatch of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus to investigate the situation in Syria. Antiochus managed to convince the Roman that he held no hard feelings for the rebuff he had suffered in Egypt. Nevertheless, the Romans continued to harbour suspicions about Antiochus, partly because of the Egyptian campaigns, but probably more because of the frequent accusations laid by various embassies which connected Antiochus with the activities of Eumenes. According to Appian, the Senate rejoiced at the premature death of Antiochus in 164. He had presented a quiet, but very serious challenge to Rome's policy of keeping the East weak and disorganized. His intimate acquaintance with the Roman political esprit, gained during his years as a hostage, had made him all the more dangerous.

The chaotic situation in Syria following Antiochus' death was eminently consonant with Rome's eastern policy. Nominally the throne fell to Epiphanes' young son, Antiochus V Eupator, but there was some question as to who would act as regent, resulting in a brief struggle between Lysias and Philippus, a syntrophos of the late king. Furthermore, much of the actual power remained in the hands of Epiphanes' favourites, Heracleides of Miletus and his brother, Timarchus.
Another contender for the throne was, of course, Demetrius, the hostage in Rome, who made an appeal to the Senate that he be allowed to return to Syria and take up the crown as rightful heir. The Senate rejected his petition, apparently not because it was unjustified, but rather because "they were suspicious of a king in the prime of life like Demetrius and thought that the youth and incapacity of the boy who had succeeded to the throne would serve their purpose better." With this in mind, they sent an embassy to Syria with instructions to burn the decked warships, to hamstring the elephants, "and by every means to cripple the royal power." The violations of Apamea perpetrated by Antiochus IV could now be permanently rectified. Polybius notes that no opposition was expected, since τοῦ μὲν βασιλέως παιδὸς ὀντος, τῶν δὲ προεστώτων ἀσμενιζόντων ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ παραδεδοθέατ' τὰ πράγματα τῷ Δημητρίῳ μάλιστα γὰρ τούτο προσεόδοκαν. The implications of this statement are interesting. The expectation that Demetrius would assume the Seleucid throne, whatever his legal rights of succession were, must have been based on the belief that Rome would support his claim. We can never know for sure whether this may have been Rome's intention if Antiochus had lived longer and had been able to groom his son to carry on his policies, but it seems likely that the Romans may have been cultivating Demetrius for the purpose of eventually hampering the smooth succession of Antiochus' son. However, when Antiochus died before his son
was sufficiently competent to assume the reigns of government, the Romans saw that it would be more effective to retain Demetrius as a means of extorting cooperation from the unstable regime of Lysias and his associates. What they had not taken into consideration was the fact that there was a large section of the Syrian population which strongly opposed Roman interference. This was dramatically demonstrated by the assassination of one of the Roman ambassadors, Octavius, by a certain Leptines of Laodicea.\textsuperscript{95} Lysias quickly dispatched an embassy to Rome with instructions to assure the Senate that he and his friends had had nothing to do with the murder. The Senate, wishing to reserve the incident for possible use in the future, made no decision on the matter.\textsuperscript{96} The incident would provide one more guarantee of Lysias' cooperation.

The murder of Octavius prompted Demetrius to consider another appeal to the Senate. His friend, Polybius the historian, advised against making a second appearance before the Senate, and encouraged the young prince to take matters into his own hands.\textsuperscript{97} However, Demetrius was so convinced of his good rapport with the Roman nobility that he preferred to follow the suggestion of Apollonius, whom Polybius describes as "an unsuspecting character, and quite young."\textsuperscript{98} Demetrius' second appeal to the Senate was much the same as his first, except in one important respect. He did not solicit Roman approval for any attempt he might make to win the Seleucid throne, but sought only that he be released from his
obligation as hostage. The Senate rejected his request, since they no doubt suspected, and possibly even knew of the investigations which his supporters had been making with regard to the situation in Syria. For it was at about this same time that Demetrius learned from his foster-father, Diodorus, that conditions in Syria were ripe for his return. Diodorus was confident that the Romans would not lend any aid to Lysias in the event of a revolution, and moreover, he reported that there was extreme distrust between the Syrian populace and the regent's party. All Demetrius had to do was to appear in Syria!

In cooperation with a small body of close friends, including Polybius, the Syrian prince laid plans for an escape. The escape was carried out smoothly, and indeed, it was not until the fourth day after his departure that Demetrius was missed at all. On the fifth day after the escape, the Senate met to discuss the situation and decided that there was no point in pursuing Demetrius. However, they did appoint three commissioners, Tiberius Gracchus, Lucius Lentulus, and Servilius Glaucia, and instructed them to proceed to Asia, await the outcome of Demetrius' action, and then assess the sentiments of the neighboring kings towards the new developments.

Demetrius apparently had little difficulty in defeating Antiochus V and his regent, Lysias. However, his troubles were far from over. Diodorus Siculus notes that when it
became known that the Romans were ill disposed towards Demetrius, not only the neighboring kings, but even some of the satraps subject to him, regarded his kingship with scant respect. Timarchus, one of the former supporters of Antiochus IV, was not only aware that Demetrius had gained the throne without Rome's approval, but he was also confident that his own influence among certain of the Roman senators might win him support for his own claim to the throne. Whether or not Rome actually recognized Timarchus' claim, it is clear that she encouraged him to create further discord in Syria. It soon became equally clear that she had no intention of coming to his rescue when he was hard pressed by Demetrius. Rome also encouraged many of Demetrius' neighbors to spurn friendly relations with him. Ariarathes V of Cappadocia received the commendation of Gracchus and his colleagues because he rejected the offer of Demetrius' sister in marriage. The famous treaty between Rome and the Jews provides another example of the Senate's attempt to embarrass the Syrian king. Demetrius, for his part, energetically attempted to gain Roman friendship and recognition of himself as king of Syria. He sent envoys to Rome with the gift of a crown, and two special prisoners, Leptines, the murderer of Octavius, and Isocrates, one of Leptines' most fervent admirers. The Senate accepted the crown, but refused the prisoners in order that the murder might not be considered avenged. With regard to Demetrius
himself, the Romans replied that "he would meet with kindness from them if his conduct during his reign was satisfactory to the Senate."\textsuperscript{110} Diodorus Siculus remarks that the Senate's reply was σκολιάν καὶ δυσεύρετον,\textsuperscript{111} perhaps suggesting that official recognition was withheld from Demetrius pending further proof of his good faith.

It would be unwise to assume that the Romans had rebuffed the approaches of a potential client simply because he had contravened his obligations as a hostage. Demetrius, like Antiochus, realized the importance of cultivating Roman friendship, but he was also determined to restore the Seleucid kingdom to a semblance of the independent supremacy which it had enjoyed under his illustrious grandfather. His schemes for widening Seleucid influence caused great apprehension not only among the Romans, but also among his neighbors, particularly Ptolemy Philometor,\textsuperscript{112} Eumenes and Attalus of Pergamum,\textsuperscript{113} and Ariarathes of Cappadocia. There seems to have been some cooperation among these monarchs in the plot to replace Demetrius with the youth, Alexander (Balas), who was reputed to be a son of Antiochus Epiphanes.\textsuperscript{114} In the summer of 153, Heracleides, the crafty old associate of Epiphanes, accompanied Alexander and his sister, Laodice, to Rome. There he delivered a lengthy panegyric of Antiochus and reviled Demetrius, asserting that it was only just that the real children of Antiochus be allowed to regain the throne.\textsuperscript{115} Demetrius made one last attempt to win Roman
approval by sending his eldest son, Demetrius (Nicator), to Rome.\textsuperscript{116} The boy was only about eight years of age, and was obviously sent with the intention that he be kept as a hostage.\textsuperscript{117} However, the Romans did not retain him, either because they thought that by doing so they would tacitly recognize Demetrius' claim to the Seleucid throne, or because they did not feel that the boy would be sufficient guarantee for his father's good behavior. A majority of the Senate was persuaded by Heracleides to pass a consultum granting Alexander and Laodice permission to go home and regain their father's throne.\textsuperscript{118} Rome had passed another paper decree, and the eastern coalition had its rubber stamp of approval.

The situation for Demetrius was bleak. Not only was he surrounded on all sides, but he had even disenchanted most of his subjects. The years he had spent at Rome had been the most formative years of his life. He did not know his people, and in many respects he was probably more Roman than Greek. Antiochus Epiphanes had been popular with the Syrians and the prospect of being ruled by one of his sons made them eager to revolt.\textsuperscript{119} Demetrius died fighting bravely, the last of the Seleucid line who could have picked up some of the pieces from Magnesia.
Notes


2 Polyb. 21.17.8; Liv. 37.45.16; App. Syr. 38; Diod. 29.10; Eutrop. 4.3.

3 Antiochus III had three sons, Antiochus, Seleucus, and Antiochus. The elder Antiochus, proclaimed joint king with his father in 209, died in the summer of 193, leaving Seleucus as heir to the throne. App. Syr. 39 and the confused account of Zonaras (9.20) are the only sources which state specifically that Antiochus (IV) was taken as a hostage after Magnesia. However, the silence of Polybius is not sufficient to support the view of Mago, "Appunti di cronologia ellenistica", RPh XXV (1907), 576-578, that Antiochus was delivered to the Romans only after the conference at Apaneia in 188. As Mørkholm, p. 22, n. 3, remarks, "it is hard to imagine that the Romans should have spent more than a year waiting for the most important of the Syrian hostages, when they had reserved for themselves the right to nominate these."

4 Polyb. 21.17.11; Liv. 37.45.20; App. Syr. 39.

5 Livy's failure (37.59.5) to include Antiochus among the duces regii, praefecti, purpurati duo et triginta who
marched in Lucius Scipio's triumph in 189 suggests that Antiochus, at least, was not yet in Rome. According to the bungled account of Zonaras (9.20), Manlius, L. Scipio's successor in Asia, was not satisfied with the peace terms offered to Antiochus and made additional demands of the king, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ὁμήρους δοῦναι ἐκέλευσεν ἄλλους τε καὶ τὸν ὑπὸ Ἀντίοχον .... While it is clear from the final terms of the treaty (Polyb. 21.42.22) that no additional hostages were demanded, Zonaras' passage suggests that the hostages were still at Ephesus when Manlius arrived.

6 Polyb. 21.42.22; Liv. 38.38.15; App. Syr. 39. If Syrian hostages were to be furnished for as long as indemnity payments were submitted, three exchanges of hostages would have been scheduled in the twelve year period prescribed for the payments. Since Antiochus delivered 2500 talents to Manlius (Polyb. 21.40.8 = Liv. 38.38) just prior to the meeting at Apamea in the summer of 188, it is likely that the first annual payment of 1000 talents was not due until at least February 187. If this was the case, the annual payments would have been scheduled until 176. It thus seems likely that the three year terms of the hostages were reckoned from the time of the conference of Apamea (summer 188) rather than from early 189, when the first batch of hostages was actually delivered. If this is so, the mutationes obsidum would have taken place in 185, 182, and 179. The hostages delivered in 179 would have been released at the time of the last indemnity payments in 176. However, we know that some of these payments were not made on time, since an embassy sent by Antiochus IV delivered the overdue sum in 173 (Liv. 42.6.3). Presumably another group of hostages was submitted in 176 and released in 173 (Cf. the regulation applied to the deferment of indemnity payments by the Illyrians (Liv. 22.33.5): Ad Finnum quoque regem in Illyrios legati missi ad stipendium, culius dies exierat, poscendum aut, si diem proferri vellet, obsides accipiendos.). If no more hostages connected with the treaty of Apamea were delivered to Rome after 176, then 76 Syrian hostages, in addition to Antiochus IV and his nephew, Demetrius, would have been in Roman hands between 188 and 173.

7 Polyb. 21.42.22; Liv. 38.38.15. For a possible explanation of the broad age regulations applied to the Syrian hostages, see above, p. 39 and n. 11.

8 Polyb. 31.2.2.

9 Polyb. 31.2.2. Even though it is certain that
Demetrius was submitted as a hostage before the indemnity payments stipulated in the treaty of 188 were paid off, it is important to note that at the time of his arrival in Rome Demetrius did not conform to the age restrictions prescribed for the hostages in the terms of the treaty (Cf. below, n. 19).

10 See above, p. 51.


12 The sources do, however, provide glimpses of how Antiochus was influenced by various aspects of Roman culture. Polybius (26.1a; cf. Diod. 29.32; Liv. 41.20.1) describes how Antiochus, after he had become king, would often garb himself in the white toga of the candidate and go around the market place soliciting votes, "sometimes for the office of aedile and sometimes for that of tribune." Upon being elected he would sit upon the ivory curule chair and pronounce judgement on lawsuits presented before him. Historians have been puzzled by this behavior of Antiochus. Polybius considered it just one of the many incidents which earned Antiochus the epithet epimanes in place of epiphanes. Tarn, The Greeks in Bactria and India, Cambridge, 1951, p. 190, is inclined to dismiss the story as "just so much hellenistic gossip", while Mørkholm, p. 40, suggests that the king's conduct may have been a "serious attempt to reorganize the administration of Antioch by creating greater interest in public life and to instill in the minds of the citizens that kind of public spirit which he had seen in Rome." Whatever the historicity of this particular incident, there are other less controversial examples of Antiochus' adoption of Roman customs. He introduced gladiatorial shows in the Roman fashion at Antioch (Liv. 41.20.9-13), where he also built a temple to Jupiter Capitolinus. He may even have employed a Roman architect for this project as he did for the unfinished temple of Olympian Zeus at Athens (Vitr. De Arch. VII, praef. 15). Finally, he may have adopted certain Roman military practices, evidenced by the fact that the spectacular procession at Daphne in 166 was headed by a detachment of 5000 men armed in Roman fashion (Polyb. 30.25.3). These few vignettes show that Antiochus was well acquainted with Roman institutions and culture. However, they are not sufficient to support the claim of Reuter, Beiträge, p. 38-40, that Antiochus "seinen Staat nach dem römischen Muster zu reformieren bestrebt war."
Liv. 42.6.9.

Asc. Pis. 52.

See below, p. 185, n. 106.

Liv. 38.45.1ff.

Just. Epit. 34.3.2. Mørkholm, p. 94, n. 24, rejects Justin's statement as simply a sentimental addition to the popular story of Popilius' circle in the sand.

App. Syr. 45.

Polyb. 31.2.5 states that Demetrius was 23 years of age at the time of Antiochus' death in 164.

Mørkholm, pp. 42-50, argues convincingly that Demetrius was the eldest son of Seleucus IV. If he is correct in identifying the infant portrayed on a gold octodrachm from the mint of Antioch (cf. ANS MN XI (1964), 76) as Antiochus, son of Seleucus IV, there can be little doubt that Demetrius was the eldest son of the Syrian king. However, cf. Aymard, Historia II (1953), 49ff., who suggests that the "child of the coins" was a son of Antiochus IV.

App. Syr. 45; ... Ἀντιόχου δ᾽ ὑπερον τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως τελευταίον γένεται ἐξελυκός ὁ υἱὸς διὸδοχος καὶ τὸν ἁδρέδων δὲ Ἀντιοχον ἐξέλυσε τῆς ὑπὸ Ἐπιμεθείς ὁμήρειας, ἀντιδοὺς τὸν ἔως τοῦ πατέρα Δημητρίου. Mørkholm, p. 36, maintains that the Senate probably made the request for Demetrius. It is possible that the Romans had simply been waiting until one of Seleucus' sons was old enough to be taken as a hostage. Regardless of who engineered the exchange, the Romans hoped that the combination of Antiochus' release and the submission of the heir apparent as hostage in his place would prove a more effective curb on Seleucus' anti-Roman activities (see below, n. 22).

Perhaps the most provocative act undertaken by Seleucus was the marriage between his daughter and Perseus of Macedon in 177. Livy (42.12) states that the Seleucid king had definitely taken the initiative in promoting this marriage. Several scholars (e.g. Bevan, Seleucus, p. 124; Mørkholm, p. 34) have suggested that in naming his eldest
son Demetrius, Seleucus, from the very beginning of his reign, had sought to encourage friendly relations between Syria and Macedon. In 183 Flamininus was sent out to observe the situation in Bithynia and Syria (Polyb. 23.5.1), and although we do not know any details about his mission, it does indicate Roman concern. In 181–80, when war broke out between Pharnaces of Pontic Cappadocia and Eumenes, Prusias, and Ariarathes, all allies of Rome, Seleucus seemed about to intervene on the side of Pharnaces (Diod. 29.24), but on the point of crossing the Taurus, he reconsidered and adhered to the terms of Apamea. Also, sometime during this period Seleucus seems to have fallen behind in the delivery of indemnity payments (see above, n. 6).

23 Livy's epitomator (Per. 41) and Zonaras (9.21) both suggest that Antiochus was not released until Seleucus' death, and then, for the express purpose of assuming the Syrian throne. However, it is clear from an Athenian decree (see below, n. 28) that Antiochus spent some time in Greece prior to his accession.

24 See above, n. 6.


26 Polyb. 21.16.5.

27 See above, n. 22.

28 Most of the details concerning Antiochus' invasion of Syria come from an Athenian decree (OGIS 248) honoring the Attalids for their role in Antiochus' coup. The intermediary between Eumenes and Antiochus may have been the former's brother, Philetaerus, who also resided at Athens (OGIS 248, n. 4).

29 e.g. Bevan, CAH VIII, p. 497; Bouché-Leclercq, p. 242. See below, n. 31.

30 Cf. the somewhat analogous situation following the death of Antiochus IV (p. 165 below). Lysias, the regent of Antiochus V, fearing the return of Demetrius from Rome, attempted energetically to cultivate Roman friendship.
31 Rome's later distrust of Eumenes stemming from his relationship with Perseus is well known. However, the sources suggest that, at least among some senators, this distrust had arisen much earlier. In fact, Appian specifically states (Syr. 45) that Eumenes' motive for assisting Antiochus against Heliodorus was to gain an ally on whom he could count in face of growing Roman suspicion regarding himself: καὶ τὸν Ἀντιόχον ἐς αὐτὴν (τ. θ. ἄρχην) πατάγουσιν ἐπίταξεν ἕπειτα ἱματάρ. ἀπὸ γὰρ τινῶν προσκρομάτων ἤδη καὶ οἷς ΅παρικίο ὑπεξέλεγοντο. Niese, Geschichte, vol. III, p. 93, suspects that Appian's statement is in anticipation of the later falling out between Eumenes and Rome. However, there are other hints of latent hostility between Rome and the Pergamene king. Cato's famous remark regarding Eumenes, ἄλλα φύει τοῦτο τὸ ζώον δ' ἐβασιλευείς σαρκωφάγον ἐστὶν ... (Plut. Cat. Maior 8), may apply, as Scullard, Rom. Pol., p. 198, n. 2, notes, to 189 rather than 172. A certain amount of Roman coolness towards Eumenes can be seen in the war which Pergamum directed against Pharaphes in the late 180's (see above, n. 22). An investigating commission headed by Q. Marcius Philippus reported to the Senate that in all matters Eumenes was moderate and cooperative, while Pharaphes was rapacious and generally overbearing (Polyb. 24.1.3). The Senate, however, replied that it would send out legates again to inquire with more diligence into the dispute of the two kings. That this was taken as an insult by Eumenes is seen in the embassy which he sent to Rome after peace had been concluded with Pharaphes: οὗ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀτταλον ἐξελθόντας εἰς τὴν συγκλητὸν ταῦτα προς ἄρχοντας ἐπικράτησαν ὁ γὰρ πλείον ἐὰν ἄνευσαντο ... (Polyb. 24.5.7). When Pharaphes subsequently violated the peace, Eumenes mobilized his forces energetically, ... οὕτω δὲ βουλόμενος ἐνεχθεῖν τοῖς Ρωμαίοις οὗτοι δὲ πλεῖστος δυνατός ἐστι τὸν ἀναμαθήματο καὶ καταπόλεμειν (Polyb. 24.14.11). After the agreement between Eumenes and Antiochus IV was cemented, Rome's suspicion of the κοινοπράγματα of the two kings was frequently aroused (e.g. Polyb. 30.30.4–7; 31.1.6). For further discussion of Rome's growing distrust of Pergamum between 188 and the death of Antiochus IV, see McShane, The Foreign Policy of the Attalids of Pergamum, Urbana, 1964, pp. 148; 158; 172; 176.

32 Detailed discussions of Antiochus' accession may be found in Mørkholm, pp. 38–50; Zambelli, RFGC LXXXVIII (1960), 363–389; Aymard, Historia II (1953), 49–73; REA LVII (1955), 110–112.

33 It is possible that Antiochus had influential supporters in Syria among the families which had submitted
hostages to the Romans between 189 and 176.

34 Polyb. 31.13.2-3 states that Apollonius, a former supporter of Seleucus IV, retired to Miletus at the accession of Antiochus. Mørkholm, pp. 47-48, suggests that this Apollonius is to be identified with the ambassador sent to Rome in 173 by Antiochus, and that during the first years of the reign he belonged to a faction loyal to the young son of Seleucus IV who had been adopted by Antiochus and declared co-monarch. What the relationship of this faction had been with Heliodorus we cannot say.

35 Porphyry, FGrH II, no. 260, fr. 49: ...Antiochus Epiphanes cui primum ab his qui in Syria Ptolemaeo favebant, non dabatur honor regius. Syria is generally conceded to refer to Coele-Syria. See Jacoby, FGrH II, p. 882; Mørkholm, p. 47.

36 Liv. 42.6.8. The Romans had been concerned enough about the developments in Syria to send out a commission in 174 (Liv. 42.6.12) to observe the situation. However, they do not seem to have taken any official action.

37 e.g. Bevan, Seleucus, p. 133.

38 We cannot treat in detail the numerous problems connected with Antiochus' Egyptian campaigns. The careful study of Otto has become the basis of all modern inquiry into the subject, but as Skeat and Bell, JEA XXI (1935), 262, note, "the evidence is jejune, fragmentary, and often ambiguous; the writer who would construct a connected history out of this haphazard debris must too often be content to make bricks without straw."

39 II Macc. 4.21. We do not know whether Apollonius' mission to Egypt was before or after his visit to Rome in 173. Otto, p. 15, believes that Apollonius was Antiochus' official representative at the marriage of Ptolemy Philometor and his sister, Cleopatra II. However, a recently published papyrus (JEA XLV (1959), 52ff.) shows that this marriage occurred at least six months before the accession of Antiochus. The context of II Macc. only allows us to date the mission of Apollonius before the end of 172.

40 II Macc. 4.20 tells of new ships of war being built in the Phoenician docks, while I Macc. 1.17 mentions elephants and a large fleet employed in the Syrian invasion
of Egypt. Although this rearmament was expressly forbidden in the terms of Apamea, it is important to note that the treaty did allow the Seleucid king the right to wage defensive wars, provided he did not exercise sovereignty over the aggressors or take them into his alliance (Polyb. 21.42.25).

41 We may question, however, whether Rome had become as Machiavellian as Otto, throughout his work, suggests. Hof, Bijdrage, p. 104, is certainly correct in maintaining that Antiochus' stay in Rome influenced his later policy, but it is debatable whether the developments which influenced him were what Hof says they were: "A kind of intellectual revolution in which the spirit of Cato, the die-hard opponent of Greek culture, was being superseded by that of Scipio and his circle... It seems probable that in forming his later policy Antiochus relied upon the affection which he had experienced." If anything, the period after Magnesia saw an upsurge of Catanism, and Antiochus based his later policy not on any revival of Roman philhellenism, but rather on his awareness of Rome's increased isolationism.

42 Although it is nowhere stated in the sources, it is possible, as Otto, p. 33, suggests, that when Apollonius was in Rome in 173, he reported to the Senate on Egypt's hostile preparations against Coele-Syria and attempted to justify Antiochus' defensive measures.

43 Liv. 42.6.4.

44 Otto, p. 20, n. 2. The suggestion that Livy (42.26.7) "die Könige in umgekehrter Reihenfolge genannt," is unconvincing. For evidence of Perseus' negotiations with Antiochus at this time, see Polyb. 27.7.15. Polyænus' statement (Strat. 4.21) that Antiochus supplied the Romans with Indian elephants for the Macedonian war is probably untrustworthy (cf. Bevan, Seleucus, p. 134, n. 4), but it does tend to confirm that Antiochus had quite openly rebuffed Perseus' overtures.

45 See Otto, pp. 20 and 61ff.

46 Polyb. 27.19.

47 Polyb. 28.1.

Diod. 30.2; Polyb. 27.19. Cf. Liv. 42.29.5-7.

Polyb. 28.1.9.

To suggest, as Otto, pp. 37-38, does, that Rome instigated Egypt to attack Coele-Syria as a means of diverting both Egypt and Syria from any involvement in the Macedonian war seems unwarranted. Rome had made extensive diplomatic efforts to assess Antiochus' attitude and to guarantee his non-involvement in Macedon. She hardly needed to start a war which she might not be able to control.

The earliest document indicating the joint reign of the brothers Ptolemy is P. Byl. 583, which has been dated to 12 November 170 (T.C. Skeat, The Reigns of the Ptolemies, Munich, 1969, p. 33). The joint reign may have been inaugurated, as Skeat suggests, as a means of strengthening the government in face of the threatened Syrian invasion, or as a result of a political compromise between various factions in the Egyptian court.

Exactly when the agreement between Antiochus and Philometor was made is uncertain. Diodorus (30.18) and St. Jerome (FGH II, no. 260, fr. 49) suggest that Philometor was in Antiochus' camp at the time of the capture of Pelusium. Polybius (28.20.12) implies that the agreement was made much later, after the capture of Memphis. The exact chronology does not concern us here. However, for a clear statement of the problem, see Jouguet, RPh. LXIII (1937), 227f.

Polyb. 29.23.4 merely says that Physcon had been proclaimed king ὑπὸ τῶν Ὑπακόου. However, Swain, CP XXXIX (1944), 82, suggests that Physcon's supporters were Egyptian Greeks, including Comanus, who resented Philometor's alliance with Antiochus. Mørkholm, p. 80, believes that Philometor left Alexandria of his own free will. However, in view of the cause of the schism between the Ptolemies, and Antiochus' declaration to restore Philometor to his throne, it is perhaps more likely that Philometor had actually been forced to leave Alexandria.

Polyb. 28.17; Diod. 31.1. Liv. 45.11.8 relates how Antiochus officially announced his honestam speciem (44.19.8) to all the states of Asia and Greece by sending out letters declaring his intent.
Polyb. 28.17. For the date of this incident, see Otto, p. 63. There is some question, even in the mind of Polybius, whether Philippus encouraged the Rhodians to mediate in the war between Syria and Egypt, or the one between Rome and Perseus. From Briscoe’s examination of the problem (JRS LIV (1964), 69-70) it seems clear that Philippus had the Syrian-Egyptian war in mind. Otto is probably correct in maintaining that Philippus saw in the Rhodians a means of expressing Roman concern to Antiochus regarding his activities without actually appearing to meddle officially in the situation.

Polyb. 28.23.

Swain, CP XXXIX (1944), 84-85.

Liv. 45.11.8.

Cf. Otto, p. 64, and note 56 above.

Polyb. 29.25.3, our only reference to the mission, does not allow a definite dating relative to the other events of this period. Otto, pp. 60-62, places Numius’ mission in late summer 169; Swain, p. 91, in November 169; Bevan, Seleucus, p. 141, before the reconciliation of the Ptolemies; Mørkholm, p. 34, in the autumn of 169. Only Volkmann, RE XXIII, col. 1709, entertains the possibility that Numius’ mission occurred after the reconciliation of the Ptolemies.

e.g. Otto, p. 63.

Liv. 44.19.14. Since Livy’s account clearly indicates that the reconciliation between the Ptolemies had not yet taken place, Otto, p. 60, maintains that the embassy dispatched by the Senate could not have been that headed by Popilius Laenas, but rather was the unsuccessful mission of Numius. Livy, according to Otto, has mixed up the famous mission of Popilius in 168 with that of Numius in 169. Otto refers us to Justin 34.2.8 which speaks of an appeal to the Senate by both Ptolemies which resulted in the dispatch of Popilius. However, a decisive criticism of this arrangement is, as Swain, p. 91, has shown, that it is difficult to believe that the Romans would have dispatched Popilius with an ultimatum ordering Antiochus to withdraw from Egypt when they knew that he had already departed! It seems preferable to follow Swain and Briscoe (p. 72) in
believing that Popilius was dispatched in January 168, before
the Senate had heard of Antiochus' withdrawal, but also
before the reconciliation of the Ptolemies.

64 Liv. 44.20.1.

65 Liv. 45.11. We do not hear specifically of the
news of Antiochus' departure reaching Popilius, but his
activity in Greece (Liv. 44.29; 45.10) indicates that he
did not go to Egypt until after the victory at Pydna.

66 Otto, pp. 66f.

67 II Macc. 5.1 clearly relates the revolt of Jason
to Antiochus' second Egyptian campaign. See Swain, p. 84.

68 Swain, p. 84.

69 Liv. 45.11.7 indicates that the Alexandrians were
in desperate straits not only during Antiochus' siege, but
for some time after his evacuation.

70 Bevan, Seleucus, p. 140: "The meaning of this
abrupt move (dependent upon the secret history of the times
or the impulses of a strange nature) is dark to us."

71 Porph. FGrH II, no. 260, frr. 49 and 50.

72 Liv. 45.11.1.

73 This depends, of course, on when Antiochus left
Egypt. If he withdrew as early as autumn 169 (as Mørkholm,
p. 86, suggests) our case is admittedly weaker, since we
would be forced to maintain that Antiochus evacuated Egypt
in anticipation of the success of the Egyptian embassy
described in Liv. 44.19.6. However, as Briscoe (p. 72) notes,
it is not necessary to consider October 169 as a terminus
ante quem for Antiochus' withdrawal, which may have occurred
as late as January 168. Consequently, he may have received
word of the dispatch of the Roman embassy before his departure.

74 Polyb. 28.22; cf. Diod. 31.27a.

75 Liv. 44.24.5: iam Antiochum victorem ab Aegypto,
praemio belli, arceri.

76 Liv. 45.11.1.

77 Polyb. 29.23ff.

78 Polyb. 29.25.3. Polybius' description of the debates in the Achaean assembly regarding whether or not aid should be sent to the Ptolemies strongly suggests that Numisius' mission had been recent and connected with the same crisis which now faced Egypt. If, as we have suggested, Antiochus had withdrawn from Egypt at the very news of the approach of a Roman embassy, it is difficult to believe that he could have rebuffed Numisius face to face only shortly before that. However, if Numisius' mission is placed just prior to the second Syrian invasion, it is easier to see how Antiochus was able to circumvent the Roman official. Since he had not yet invaded Egypt, there was little that Numisius could, or dared insist upon, especially in view of the fact that Rome was still embroiled with Perseus. He could only encourage Antiochus to make peace with the Ptolemies. The chronological difficulties seen by Briscoe (p. 72) and Bevan (Seleucus, p. 141) are more apparent than real, since it is very likely that word of Numisius' failure was received in Achaea before it was at Rome.

79 Polyb. 29.27; Liv. 45.12; Diod. 31.2; App. Syr. 66; Vell. Pat. 1.10; Justin. Epit. 34.3.1; Val. Max. 6.3.

80 Mørkholm, p. 89, believes that since Antiochus had been formally recognized by Philometor as his ally, the Syrian king would have had sufficient legal basis for his intervention in 168. However, it is doubtful that the Romans would have accepted such an argument.

81 Polyb. 29.27.13.

82 Liv. 45.13.1-3.

83 Liv. 45.13.2.

84 Otto, p. 81. Cf. Hof, Bijdrage, p. 105, who goes so far as to suggest that the Roman ultimatum was the cause of a mental shock from which Antiochus never recovered and thus accounts for his strange behavior.
85 Polyb. 30.26.9.


87 Diod. 31.16.2.

88 Polyb. 30.27; cf. Diod. 31.17. Polybius assures us that Antiochus' real feelings were exactly the opposite.

89 See above, n. 31.


91 Polyb. 31.2.

92 Polyb. 31.2.7.

93 Polyb. 31.2.11.

94 Polyb. 31.2.10.

95 Polyb. 32.3.3 states that upon the accession of Demetrius to the throne, Leptines begged the king not to punish the Laodiceans for the murder of Octavius. This suggests that Leptines' act had not been unanimously deplored. In fact, Bevan, *Seleucus*, p. 186, states that Leptines instantly became a popular hero because of the assassination.

96 Polyb. 31.11.2.

97 Polyb. 31.11.5.

98 Polyb. 31.11.7.

99 Polyb. 31.12.4.
Polyb. 31.12.7-15.12 provides an elaborate description of the escape plans. In addition to himself, Polybius names several supporters of Demetrius who were involved in the escape: Diodorus, the foster-father of Demetrius; Menylius of Abalanda, an ambassador of Ptolemy Philometor; Apollonius, a syntrophos of Demetrius; Meleager and Mnestheus, brothers of Apollonius. It has generally been assumed (e.g. Badian, FC, p. 108; Volkmann, Klio XIX (1925), 383-84) that Polybius did not act independently in his support of Demetrius, but that his patrons, the Aemilii, were also in favour of the escape. The indications that this may have been the case are not very strong. Polybius (31.2.6) suggests that the official policy to reject Demetrius' petition was not approved privately by many of the senators. This same discrepancy is evident in the attitude of certain senators regarding the plan to replace Demetrius on the Syrian throne with Alexander Balas. Polybius (33.18.10) refers to the group of senators which disapproved of the plot as ὁ μέτροις, but we get no further indication as to who these men were. The participation of Menylus, the agent of Philometor, in the escape plan may suggest the approval of Scipio Aemilianus, whose low view of Philometor's rival, Ptolemy Physcon, was well known (Ath. 12.549c; 550a; Plut. Mor. 201a).

If Polybius was merely doing what his patrons desired, he certainly gives no indication of this. He himself had arrived in Rome only very recently, and may have felt a certain sympathy for Demetrius, whose predicament was not unlike his own. By the time he wrote the account of the escape, perhaps some twenty years later, he had cultivated the patronage of the Aemilii to such an extent that he did not have to fear punishment, but this probably would not have been the case unless his patrons knew and approved of his action at the time. Although Volkmann's suggestion (p. 386) — "vielleicht hoffte das Scipionenhaus, aus einer neuen, durch seine Hilfe zur Macht gekommenen, syrischen Regierung irgendwelchen finanziellen oder politischen Nutzen zu ziehen, etwa in Form eines der Klientel oder dem Patronat sich nähernden Gastfreundschaftsverhältnisses."— cannot be substantiated, certainly the long period which Demetrius had spent in Rome might encourage the ὁ μέτροις to hope that he would prove to be a faithful and useful client. However, in the subsequent relationship between Demetrius and Rome, Rome was clearly unresponsive to any friendly advances made by the Syrian king. It does not seem likely, as Volkmann, p. 384, suggests, that a faction of the Senate favored Demetrius' escape only as a means of adding to the chaotic situation in Syria. If anything, Demetrius was likely to put an end to the disorder in Syria. We can only assume that if the Aemilii were connected with
Demetrius' escape, their motives are not able to be determined, or they failed of realization.

101 Polyb. 31.15.6.

102 Polyb. 31.15.10.


104 Diod. 31.27a.

105 Diod. 31.27a: δόμα περὶ αὐτοῦ θέσθαι τοιοῦτον. Τιμάρχης ἐνεμέν... (lac.) αὐτῶν βασιλέα εἴναι. Bevan, Seleucus, p. 194, n. 2, emends αὐτῶν to αὐτῷ, and translates, "as far as Rome was concerned, Timarchus was king."

106 Diod. 31.28; Polyb. 32.1. Once again, however, Rome's reluctance to stand by her friends can be seen in her reaction to Demetrius' support of Orophernes in toppling Ariarathes from his throne. The Senate decided that the kingdom should be divided between the two rivals (Polyb. 32.10; App. Syr. 47). Badian, FC, p. 108, n. 1, views this decision as another example of Rome's machinations aimed at keeping the East in a chaotic and weakened condition. The role of the commission headed by Gracchus is somewhat puzzling. Although it is apparent that the commissioners were responsible for encouraging the hostile reception which Demetrius received from Ariarathes, there is some evidence that Gracchus was personally well disposed towards the Seleucid king (Polyb. 31.33.4; cf. n. 108 below).

107 I Macc. 8.23. We need not become involved here with the problem of the validity of this treaty. See Täubler, pp. 239ff. According to I Macc. 8.31, Rome even undertook to write to Demetrius, ordering him to desist from attacking the Jews. However, Demetrius' subsequent invasion of Judaea (I Macc. 9.1 ff.) shows that the Romans had no intention of actually intervening.

108 We do not know whether Rome ever officially recognized his claim. Polybius, in describing Demetrius' efforts to win over Gracchus and his colleagues, says (31.33.3) ἐξεμεμεθέν χαίρειν τῶν προσαγορευόμενον. Badian, FC, p. 108, n. 1, is quite correct in asserting that if the text of Polybius is sound, αὐτῶν must refer to the envoys and not the Senate.
109 Polyb. 32.3.11; Diod. 31.29.

110 Polyb. 32.3.13.

111 Diod. 31.30.

112 Though Demetrius had attempted to befriend his cousin, Philometor, when the latter appealed to Rome in 163 (Diod. 31.18), he later incurred his distrust by seeking to gain control of Cyprus (Polyb. 33.5).

113 Eumenes probably could not forget whose son Demetrius was, and the hostile relations which had existed between Pergamum and Seleucus IV were resumed (Polyb. 32.12; Diod. 31.32a).

114 Diod. 31.32a has the fullest account of the initial stages of the plan to replace Demetrius with Alexander. For Philometor's involvement in the plot, see App. Syr. 67. Cf. Justin 35.1.9: igitur Alexander admirabili rerum veritate...totius ferme Orientis succinctus bellum Demetrio infert....

115 Polyb. 33.18.

116 Polyb. 33.18.5.

117 Willrich, RE IV, col. 2797.

118 Polyb. 33.18.12-13.

119 Diod. 31.32a; Just. Epit. 35.1.8. For the reverence with which Antiochus Epiphanes was remembered long after his death, see the evidence collected by Mørkholm, pp. 184-85.
CHAPTER VIII
HOSTAGES IN THE BELLUM GALlicum

Long ago, a German scholar with an unusually rich sense of humour somewhat facetiously remarked that "überhaupt müsste Caesar mehr Geiseln als Soldaten gehabt haben." ¹ The truth of the matter is that Caesar undoubtedly took even more hostages than he specifically mentions in his commentarii. Most of the hostages which the various Gallic tribes submitted to Caesar or his generals were rendered in conjunction with the surrender of these tribes in fidem populi Romani, and although Caesar occasionally records the submission of tribes without stating specifically that hostages had been given,² it is safe to assume that in most cases the delivery of hostages, or at least the promise of them, was a standard prerequisite to the granting of peace.³ However, because Gaul consisted of literally hundreds of tribes, there were serious difficulties, both logistical and political, connected with the taking of hostages. Caesar attempted to simplify these difficulties by establishing as favored clients certain tribes which either already exercised hegemony over their neighbours, or could be entrusted with such a hegemony.⁴ This policy may have eliminated the necessity of taking hostages from many of the smaller tribes.
For example, Caesar's relationship with the Aedui probably
ensured, without hostages, the good behavior of the Segusiavi,
Ambivareti, Aulerci Brannovices, Blannovii,⁵ Senones,⁶
Bituriges,⁷ Boii,⁸ and Ambarri.⁹ If it did become necessary
to take hostages from such client peoples, Caesar could, and
did, entrust the responsibility for these hostages to the
patron tribe.¹⁰ This policy not only freed Caesar from the
burden of caring for the hostages, but also placed an extra
bond on responsibility on Rome's more powerful Gallic allies.

Despite the special arrangements which Caesar made
for billeting some hostages, it is clear that he must have
held a considerable number which he did not wish to entrust
to Gallic clients. Most hostages, following their submission,
were temporarily detained for reasons of security and
convenience in the winter camps of the legions.¹¹ However,
it is obvious that the prolonged retention of hostages among
the baggage trains of the armies would have produced a
serious encumbrance, and Caesar seems to have designated
certain towns as central depots where hostages could be sent
for extended periods. The chief of these towns was the Aeduan
fortress, Noviodunum, in which were kept, according to Caesar,
omnis obsides Galliae.¹² While we cannot be sure that all
of Caesar's hostages were eventually delivered to Noviodunum,¹³
the widespread revolt following the capture of the town and
the recovery of the hostages by the Gauls in 52 strongly
suggests that a large number of hostages were kept there.¹⁴
Another town in which Caesar kept hostages was Samarobriva, in the territory of the Ambiani, but this seems to have been a much more temporary measure than the arrangement at Noviodunum.\footnote{15}

While it is admittedly dubious to insist that tribes refrained from hostilities simply because they had rendered hostages,\footnote{16} it is worthwhile to consider the instances in which tribes revolted despite the fact that they had given hostages to the Romans. In conjunction with the campaign of 57 B.C., Caesar dispatched Publius Crassus, son of the triumvir, to deal with the tribes in the northwest part of Gaul. Near the end of the campaigning season Crassus informed Caesar that he had been successful in bringing the Veneti, Venalli, Osismi, Coriosolites, Essuvii, Aulerci, and Redones under Roman control.\footnote{17} It is clear from the beginning of Book III of Caesar's narrative that at least the Veneti, Coriosolites and Essuvii had surrendered hostages to Crassus, and it is extremely likely that the other tribes had done so as well.\footnote{18} Shortly thereafter, the Veneti, exhibiting considerable audacity, seized Quintus Velanius and Titus Sillius, who had been sent by Crassus to obtain supplies, and held them in ransom for the return of their hostages. Spurred by the example of the Veneti, the Coriosolites and the Essuvii also detained Roman legates.\footnote{19} The three tribes quickly won the adherence of the neighboring tribes, and a joint embassy was sent to Crassus demanding the restoration
of the hostages for the return of the legates. Crassus informed Caesar of these developments, and a campaign was planned against the rebel tribes. Caesar gives strong reasons for undertaking the campaign:

\[
\text{iniuriae retentorum equitum Romanorum,}
\text{rebellio facta post deditionem, defectio}
\text{datis obsidibus, tot civitatum coniuratio,}
\text{in primis ne hac parte neglecta reliquae}
\text{nationes sibi idem licere arbitrarentur.}^{20}
\]

Titurius Sabinus was sent against the Venelli, Coriosolites, and Lexovii, while Caesar himself advanced against the Veneti, the instigators of the revolt. Following the defeat of the Veneti, Caesar, in order to demonstrate to the rest of Gaul the inviolable sanctity of ambassadors, commanded that the entire Senate of the Veneti be executed, and that the rest of the population be sold into slavery.\(^2\)\(^1\) Meanwhile, Sabinus was successful in bringing the other rebels to heel. There is no information regarding the fate of the hostages or the detained legates. The hostages of the Veneti may have been executed along with the rest of their kinsmen, or sold into slavery. If the hostages from the other tribes were not executed or sold into slavery, but still remained in Roman hands, they do not seem to have furnished any deterrent against a second attempted revolt by the Aremorican tribes in the winter of 54/3.\(^2\)\(^2\)

Another example illustrating the ineffectiveness of hostages may be seen in Sulpicius Galba's campaign into the territories of the Nantuates, Veragri, and Seduni in 57 B.C.\(^2\)\(^3\)
After Galba had won several victories and taken a number of enemy fortresses, all the tribes submitted hostages and concluded peace. Galba then dispatched two cohorts to winter quarters among the Nantuates, while he took the rest of his army to Octodurus, a town of the Veragri. Before the winter encampment at Octodurus had been properly entrenched, Galba discovered that the heights surrounding the town had been occupied by a large force of the Seduni and Veragri. Caesar tells us that Galba had not expected any resumption of hostilities specifically because hostages had been submitted to him by the threatening tribes. A war council was summoned and various strategies were discussed. Some advised defending the camp. Others suggested that they abandon the baggage and attempt to force their way out of camp. It is noteworthy that no mention is made of attempting to intimidate the rebels by threatening the lives of their hostages. The Romans managed to extricate themselves from their predicament, but we hear nothing of the fate of the hostages that had been submitted, nor that any additional hostages may have been demanded.

In preparation for his first invasion of Britain in 55 B.C., Caesar advanced into the land of the Morini, since it was from their territory that the channel crossing was least difficult. While he was waiting for the fleet to be assembled, a large section of the Morini sent envoys who apologized for their tribe's previous hostile action and
promised to obey Caesar's commands.\textsuperscript{26} The submission of the Morini was very timely, since Caesar did not wish to leave so formidable an enemy in his rear during the expedition to Britain.\textsuperscript{27} He demanded a large number of hostages, and probably entrusted them to Publius Sulpicius Rufus, who was left to hold the harbor until the fleet's return. However, the fact that the Romans held their kinsmen as hostages did not deter the Morini from attacking two Roman ships which had sailed off course during the return voyage from Britain.\textsuperscript{28} Although Labienus was dispatched on the following day to punish the rebels, we do not hear anything about the hostages which they had submitted. If they were not executed, they were probably taken to Samarobriva.\textsuperscript{29} Thereafter, they may have been moved to Noviodunum, or handed over to Commius when Caesar made the Atrebate prince suzerain over the Morini.\textsuperscript{30} In either case, it is likely that the Morini had recovered their hostages by the time of the general uprising in 52 B.C.\textsuperscript{31}

Before embarking on his second invasion of Britain, Caesar set out for the territory of the Treveri, who had refused to attend the annual councils of Gallic chieftains or submit to Roman authority.\textsuperscript{32} However, because of an internal power struggle between Indutiomarus and his son-in-law, Cingetorix, the Treveri were in no position to oppose the Romans, and Cingetorix came to Caesar and assured him that he would remain loyal. When Indutiomarus saw that more
and more of the Treveran leaders were going over to Caesar's camp, he too appeared before Caesar and claimed that he had not come earlier because he had been attempting to keep the tribe loyal to Rome. Caesar recognized the weakness of Indutiomarus' excuse, but to avoid wasting the whole summer among the Treveri, he ordered the Gallic leader to furnish 200 hostages, in eis filio propinquisque eius omnibus quos nominatim evocaverat. However, the retention of these hostages by the Romans seems to have been completely ineffective in curtailing Indutiomarus' hostile designs.

Shortly after Caesar had returned from Britain, Indutiomarus persuaded the Eburonians, Ambiorix and Catuvolcus, to attack the winter camp of Titurius Sabinus. Following the destruction of Sabinus' army, the camps of Quintus Cicero and Labienus were threatened, the latter by the forces of Indutiomarus himself. Indutiomarus succeeded in fanning the area of revolt wider and wider, and even made overtures to tribes across the Rhine. T. Rice Holmes claims that Caesar must have restored the hostages submitted by Indutiomarus shortly after his return from Britain. He draws this conclusion from Caesar's assertion that following the death of Indutiomarus, the Treveri conferred the leadership of the tribe on members of the dead rebel's family. If we may believe Caesar, all or most of these successors would have been among the hostages taken earlier. Furthermore, although Rice Holmes does not explicitly say so,
it seems unlikely that Indutiomarus would have dared to promote such open revolt if most of his relatives were in Caesar's hands. However, there is no evidence for the restoration of the Treveran hostages, and the situation facing the Romans in the fall of 54 B.C. makes the possibility of such a restoration quite unlikely. Caesar tells us that he had decided to return to the continent from Britain for the winter, propter repentinos Galliae motus. The Treveri are not specifically named, but it is likely that the hostility of Indutiomarus was among Caesar's considerations. Furthermore, the necessity of establishing the winter camps among a larger number of tribes than was defensively desirable cannot have been conducive to releasing the Treveran hostages. It seems likely, therefore, that Caesar has exaggerated in claiming that all of Indutiomarus' relatives had been taken hostage, and that in his haste to embark for Britain, he did not completely eliminate the power of the hostile faction.

Among the tribes which joined the revolt of Indutiomarus were the Senones and the Carnutes. Even after the death of Indutiomarus these two tribes continued to cooperate against the Romans until Caesar, by one of his characteristic lightning marches, succeeded in forcing them to seek peace terms. 100 hostages surrendered by the Senones were entrusted to the Aedui, who had assisted in the negotiations between the rebels and Caesar. Similarly, it
seems likely that the hostages submitted by the Carnutes were entrusted to the Remi, who had helped the Carnutes obtain peace terms. At the end of the campaigning season, Caesar held an inquest into the revolt of the two tribes, and Acco, the Senonian noble who had been the ringleader of the conspiracy, was executed. Several other leaders who had fled in fear of being brought to trial were outlawed. However, neither these measures, nor the fact that hostages had been taken, quelled the revolutionary aspirations of the Senones and Carnutes. Caesar speaks of secret meetings convened by Gallic leaders at secluded spots in the woods during the winter of 53/2. His description strongly suggests that the men involved in these meetings were not simply fugitive guerillas, but rather members of the Druid council of Gaul, which held its annual sessions in the territory of the Carnutes. In any case, the Carnutes were the first to declare that they were prepared to face any danger for the common cause, and undertook to strike the first blow against the Romans. Led by Conconnetodumnus and Gutuater, the Carnutes attacked Cenabum and killed the Romans who had settled there for commercial reasons. Spurred by this example, the Arverni raised the standard of revolt, and the Senones were among the first to join the forces of Vercingetorix.

Caesar, as we might expect, does not comment on why hostages were not effective in certain cases. Some tribes
were no doubt simply willing to abandon their hostages for the sake of the national cause. The declaration of the Carnutes, *se nullum periculum communis salutis causa recusare*,49 was probably not unique. However, no reader of Caesar can fail to observe that there is not one instance in the whole *Bellum Gallicum* of punishment being meted out to hostages by the Romans. In fact, we do not even hear of the Romans threatening the lives of hostages in order to intimidate the Gauls. This could, of course, be due to propaganda considerations -- i.e. Caesar's reluctance to include incidents in his account which might tarnish his reputation for clementia.50 However, the punishment of hostages does not seem to have been in keeping with Roman moral tradition,51 and in all of Roman history there are only a few instances of vengeance being exacted upon hostages by the Romans.52 Although we cannot state positively that Caesar did not execute or torture any Gallic hostages, his deliberate effort to emphasize how harshly hostages were treated by the Gauls and Germans suggests that, in general, he adhered to traditional Roman practice in this regard.53 Once Roman leniency towards hostages was known to the Gauls, the hostages submitted by them must have become somewhat less effective guarantees against revolt.54 In a few cases, Caesar attempted to alleviate this problem by insisting that hostages submitted be not simply dependents of the leading men of a tribe, but rather the leading men themselves.55
At the time of his second invasion of Britain, Caesar was well aware that regular hostages (i.e. children of leading men) were not sufficient to curb the hostile activities of the Gauls. He therefore ordered all but a few of the Gallic chieftains to accompany him to Britain, obsidum loco. However, it was often a difficult matter to select effective hostages, since, as Caesar himself tells us, there were rival factions, not only in every tribe in Gaul, atque in omnibus pagis partibusque sed paene in singulis domibus. The Romans could not hope to control a whole tribe effectively without gaining control over all of the factions within a tribe. New leaders might quickly replace those who had been taken hostage or who had become acquiescent because of hostages taken from their families. Caesar attempted to keep abreast of political alignments within tribes by holding annual councils of Gallic leaders, but even these meetings did not always provide him with sufficient information to choose more effective hostages. For example, although Caesar had taken hostages from the Carnutes, it is evident that many members of the tribe remained aggressively opposed to Roman domination. It would have been difficult, if not impossible, for Caesar to control by means of hostages all of the hostile elements within a tribe. Cononnetodumnus and Gutuater, the leaders of the attack on Cenabum in 52, may have been among those who had fled in fear of being brought to trial at Caesar's inquest held the previous fall.
at Durocortorum. If so, it is likely that they and their followers may have avoided contributing to the hostages which the Carnutes had been compelled to surrender to the Romans.

Another possibility which may account for the ineffectiveness of hostages in certain cases is connected with Caesar's policy of entrusting hostages to the care of his more trustworthy Gallic clients. The hostages of the Senones, who were among the first to join the revolt of Vercingetorix, had been handed over to the Aedui. This does not necessarily mean that the Aedui actually encouraged their clients to rebel, but it is possible that the Senones were less hesitant about joining Vercingetorix than they might have been if their hostages had been in the hands of Caesar himself. Similar circumstances may have affected the decision of the Carnutes and the Morini to revolt, though it cannot be definitely proven that hostages from these tribes had been consigned by Caesar to Gallic allies.

Although all of the above mentioned circumstances may have been factors in minimizing the effectiveness of hostages, Caesar has obscured what must be the chief reason for his difficulties with certain donor tribes. In his efforts to magnify the success and completeness of his conquests, Caesar sometimes gives the impression that a tribe had been completely conquered, when in reality only a portion of the tribe had been defeated and compelled to
render hostages. For example, the revolt led by Acco against the Roman protégé Cavarinus seems to have been centered around the chief city of the Senones, Agedincum. Caesar's advance, with its customary rapidity, was directed towards this center, and it is unlikely that he took time to bring the outlying towns of the Senones completely under his control. The 100 hostages received from the Senones were probably all from Agedincum and from the party of Acco. However, Caesar gives the impression that the entire territory of the Senones had been pacified. That this was not the case is clearly suggested by a number of facts. In the first place, Caesar's fear of restoring Cavarinus to the throne of the Senones, ne quis aut ex huius iracundia aut ex eo quod meruerat odio civitatis motus exsistat, implies that there was still strong anti-Roman feeling in the tribe. Moreover, the stationing of six legions at Agedincum for the winter of 53/2 shows not only the concern which Caesar had regarding the Senones, but also suggests that he did not have effective control over much of the rest of their territory. If he had exercised such control, we should expect him to have stationed some troops at Vellaunodunum, much nearer the territory of the Carnutes, who had recently been in revolt, and where trouble was likely to begin anew. In fact, Vellaunodunum was among the first towns which Caesar besieged in the campaign against Vercingetorix. When the town capitulated Caesar demanded 600 hostages, clear evidence
that his earlier victory over Acco had not resulted in the complete pacification of the Senones.\textsuperscript{68} Nor, in turn, did the fall of Vellaunodunum mean the end of Senonian resistance.\textsuperscript{69} Tribes frequently had to be conquered piecemeal, virtually town by town.\textsuperscript{70} Hostages might be effective in controlling the activity of individual towns, but even then, only as long as the families from which they were taken remained ascendant in their respective towns.

Caesar sometimes mentions the delivery of hostages, or the promise of them, as a means of masking his reluctance to pursue or undertake a difficult campaign. The surrender of hostages and the payment of an annual tribute by Cassivellaunus gives the impression that Britain had been brought under Roman hegemony and tends to disguise the relatively meagre extent of Caesar's penetration.\textsuperscript{71} Similarly, Caesar gives the impression that the mere report of his campaigns of 57 B.C. had induced tribes which dwelt across the Rhine to surrender and submit hostages.\textsuperscript{72} However, we learn later that the Ubii were the only Germans who surrendered hostages to Caesar, and their motive was not so much fear of Caesar as the desire to gain the Romans as allies against the Suebi.\textsuperscript{73}

Finally, we may note briefly how the subject of hostages is employed by Caesar as a dramatic device to embellish his narrative of the campaign against the Helvetii.\textsuperscript{74} Several times Caesar makes pointed reference to the defeat
which the Romans had suffered half a century earlier at the hands of the Tigurini, one of the four major tribes which made up the Helvetian people. 75 In the most dramatic of these references, Caesar describes a conference between himself and Divico, who had been the commander of the Tigurini in the defeat of the Romans in 107 B.C. 76 At Caesar's request for hostages, Divico haughtily replies *ita Helvetios a maioribus suis institutos esse uti obsides accipere, non dare, consuerint: eius rei populum Romanum esse testem.* 77 Divico's boast is clearly an exaggeration included by Caesar not only to poignantly remind his readers of a defeat which urgently needed vengeance, but also to make more spectacular the subsequent capitulation of the Helvetii and their submission of hostages. 78
Notes

1 M. Eichheim, Die Kämpfe der Helvetii und Sueben gegen J.C. Caesar, Munich, 1866, p. 113, n. 1.

2 e.g. the Ambiani (BGall. 2.15.2); the Nervii (2.28.2); the Atuatuci (2.31.2); the Aremorican tribes (2.34; however, cf. 3.8.2); the Sotiates (3.21.3; cf. 3.23.1). In some cases Caesar does not even record the submission of tribes which had clearly been pacified (e.g. 3.11.5).

3 See above, p. 18.

4 The chief of these influential clients were the Aedui and the Remi (6.12.7). For a detailed consideration of Caesar's relationship with the Aedui, see E. Thévenot, Les Éduens n'ont pas trahi, Vol. I, Collection Latomus, Brussels, 1960; M. Rambaud, L'art de la déformation historique dans les commentaires de César, Paris, 1966, pp. 312-324.

Caesar's description of the surrender of the Remi (2.3) in the spring of 57 B.C. gives the impression that they had been taken completely unawares by the Romans' sudden arrival (on celeritas as a theme of Caesar's propaganda, see Rambaud, pp. 251-254). However, they shrewdly masked their embarrassment and saw that by accepting Caesar's patronage they might be able to shake off the overlordship which their neighbors, the Suessiones, exercised over them (See below, n. 55). In order to guarantee the loyalty of the Remi, Caesar took as hostages the children of their leading men (2.5.1). We do not know how long these hostages were detained, but the Remi do not appear to have ever openly betrayed the Romans, and they were held as high in Caesar's favour as the Aedui.

5 BGall. 7.75.2.

6 BGall. 6.4.2; however, see below, p. 194.

7 BGall. 7.5.2.

8 BGall. 1.28.5.

9 BGall. 1.11.4.

10 Hostages submitted by the Senones (6.4.4) and possibly the Bellovacii (2.13) were entrusted to the Aedui.
Similarly, it seems likely that the hostages rendered by the Carnutes (6.4.5) and the Suessiones (2.12) were entrusted to the Remi.

11 For example, Crassus retained the hostages rendered by the Aremorican tribes (3.7-8) in his winter camp among the Andes.

12 BGaII. 7.55.2. From the wording of 7.63.3 (obsides quos Caesar apud eos deposuerat) it may be thought that Caesar had entrusted the hostages at Noviodunum directly to the care of the Aedui. However, it seems more likely that authority over the hostages was in the hands of the garrison stationed in the town (7.55.5). Cf. Dio Cass. 40.38.2.

13 Cf. Dio Cass. 40.38.2: ... ὁμήρους τε πολλοὺς. For Caesar's imprecise use of omnis, see Rambaud, pp. 182-186.

14 BGaII. 7.63.3: Nacti obsides quos Caesar apud eos deposuerat, horum supplicio dubitantis territant. Gelzer, Caesar, Politician and Statesman (trans. by P. Needham), Oxford, 1968, p. 160, states without comment that the Celtic hostages were held at Noviodunum. However, the presence of the Bellovaci, Ambiani, Nervii, Morini, Atrebates and Velocasses among the forces raised by the Gauls to relieve Alesia (7.75) suggests that the Belgic hostages may have also been kept at the town. See below, n. 16.

15 BGaII. 5.47.2. Samarobriva was maintained by Caesar as a winter headquarters in 54/53 (5.53). However, in the spring of 53 he moved his camp to Lutetia, and the hostages then in his possession were probably transferred to Noviodunum.

16 For the sake of convenience, we include a list (roughly chronological) of the tribes which are stated to have rendered hostages to Caesar and which apparently remained faithful to the Romans at least until the revolt of the Gauls at Noviodunum in 52 B.C. Those tribes which seem to have taken no part in the revolt of 52 are designated with an asterisk (*): Helvetii (1.28.2); Remi* (2.5.1); Suessiones* (2.12); Bellovaci (2.13); Nantuates* (3.16); Aquitani* — including the Sontiates, Tarbelli, Bigerriones, Ptiaini, Vocates, Tarusates, Elusates, Gates, Ausci, Garummi, Sibuzates and Cocosates (3.27); Nervii (6.3); Menapii* (6.5-6).

We may add to the above list those tribes which are
said to have submitted hostages after the revolt of 52 had been crushed: Arverni (7.90); Bituriges (8.3); Bellovaci (8.23); Aquitani (8.46); Atrebates (8.48).

17 BGall. 2.34.
18 BGall. 3.8.2.
19 BGall. 3.8.3.
20 BGall. 3.10.

21 BGall. 3.16.4. The weakness of Caesar's pretext for ordering the execution of the Veneti has often been noted (e.g. Gelzer, p. 126). Several times Caesar professes to have virtually exterminated a tribe, only to find that they later recover sufficiently to oppose him once again. The Veneti appear to have been among the contributors to the force raised by the Gauls to relieve Vercingetorix at Alesia (7.75.4). Similarly, the Nervii and the Atuatuci seem to have bounced back from utter annihilation to become formidable opponents of the Romans (Nervii: 2.28; cf. 5.38ff.; 5.56f.; 6.3; 7.75; Atuatuci: 2.33; cf. 5.38; 5.56; 6.2; 6.33).

22 BGall. 5.53. It is noteworthy that the revolt in the winter of 54/53 threatened the camp of Roscius, located in the territory of the Essuvii (5.24), one of the three principal rebels in the revolt of 56.

23 BGall. 3.1-6.
24 BGall. 3.1.4.
25 BGall. 3.3.1.

26 BGall. 4.22.1. The Morini, along with their neighbours, the Menapii, had been among the most persistent tribes which Caesar had encountered in Gaul. Cf. BGall. 3.28.

27 BGall. 4.22.2.
28 BGall. 4.37.
Caesar does provide a few bits of information concerning his relationship with the Treveri before the encounter with Indutiomarus. During the negotiations in 58 B.C. between Caesar and Ariovistus, delegations from the Aedui and the Treveri informed the Roman proconsul of further German threats on the Rhine frontier (1.37). We do not know whether the Treveri made any formal recognition of Roman authority at this time, but the half-hearted performance of their cavalry in the campaign against the Nervii in 57 B.C. (2.24) suggests that their support of Caesar against the Belgae had been rendered somewhat unwillingly. They would have undoubtedly been reluctant to fight against their clients, the Condresi and the Eburones (4.6.4; 6.5.4), who were among the Belgic rebels (2.4.10), although they may have hoped to break the hold which the Atuatuces seem to have held on the Eburones (5.27).

Throughout the Gallic campaigns, the Treveri continued to be a source of worry for Caesar. During the revolt of the Veneti he dispatched Labienus to the territory of the Treveri to keep an eye on the activity of the Germans, whom some of the Gauls were said to have summoned to their assistance (3.11). The German threat materialized the following year in the invasion of the Usipetes and Tencteri, and the Treveri may have been instrumental in encouraging the German migration. Caesar tells us (4.6) that a number of tribes had sent embassies to the Germans inviting them to go farther afield than the Rhineland, and promising to supply all their requirements. Caesar does not identify the tribes, but the presence of the Usipetes-Tencteri in the land of the Eburones and Condresi, clients of the Treveri, virtually confirms Treveran complicity with the Germans. Cf. 5.2.4 and 5.55 for additional evidence connecting the Treveri with the Germans. For further details on the Treveri, see E.M. Wightman, Roman Trier and the Treveri, London, 1970.
BGall. 5.55-56.


BGall. 6.2.1.

BGall. 5.22.4.

BGall. 5.24.

BGall. 5.56. In conjunction with his preparations for the campaign against the Belgae in 57 B.C. Caesar had established Cavarinus on the throne of the Senones in place of his brother, Moritasgus (5.54). The Senones assisted Caesar by reporting on the activity of the Belgae, on whose territory they bordered (2.2). However, three years later, a group of influential Senonian leaders, perhaps former supporters of Moritasgus, plotted to murder Cavarinus. Cavarinus got wind of the plot and fled to Caesar, who sent a deputation to the Senones to demand an explanation for their action. The revolutionaries, led by Acco, disregarded Caesar's demand, and sent envoys to Indutioramus.

The territory of the Carnutes was vital to Caesar's control of Gaul, not only in a geographical sense, but also for political reasons, since it was in their territory that the annual council of the Druid priests was held (6.13). At least part of the tribe had supported Caesar during the Belgic campaign in 57 when he established Tasgetius as king of their tribe (5.25). Although many members of the tribe disapproved of cooperation with the Romans (5.25.3), Tasgetius managed to remain in control for three years. However, in the winter of 54/53 he was murdered by members of the anti-Roman faction, and the Carnutes joined the revolt of Indutioramus.

BGall. 6.4.1.

BGall. 6.44.

BGall. 7.1.

See above, n. 42.
Certainly it cannot be said that Caesar attempts to give the impression that he never punished rebels with extreme severity (Cf. 1.28.2; 2.33.6; 3.16.4; 4.13-14; 6.4.3; 6.34.8; 7.28.4; 8.43.3; 8.44.1). However, in his concern to contrast Gallic-German barbarism with Roman refinement and his own clementia, Caesar was probably not conscious that his account conveys the distinct impression that the hostage policy of the Gauls and Germans was considerably more effective than his own. We need cite only the most prominent examples to illustrate this point (however, cf. also 1.9.4; 2.1.1; 3.23; 6.2; 7.4; 7.7; 7.64). Hostages seem to have been a key factor in Ariovistus' control over the Aedui and their allies. Diviciacus reports to Caesar (1.31f.) that Ariovistus had taken as hostages the children of every man of rank and threatened to inflict upon them all manner of torture if his will was not complied with immediately and in every detail. How effective this harsh policy had been is distinctly implied in Diviciacus' claim that of the whole Aeduan nation, he alone had been able to go to Rome and plead for assistance because he had not given his children to Ariovistus. Even so, Diviciacus was sure that if Ariovistus discovered that he had revealed to the Romans the circumstances of Aeduan subjection, all of the hostages in his hands would suffer the most inhuman punishments.

The Eburones, for reasons unknown to us, had been compelled to make tribute payments to the neighboring Atuatuci. To guarantee this payment, a number of hostages had been taken, among whom were the son and nephew of Ambiorix. Ambiorix states (5.27) that the hostages had been enslaved and kept in chains, perhaps as a threat of even worse punishment if the tribute payments were not submitted. It is apparent that the Eburones had been making these payments for some time (5.27.2).

Finally, as we have noted above (n. 14), the capture
of the hostages held by the Romans at Noviodunum gave the Gauls an effective means of exerting pressure on tribes which showed hesitation in joining the general uprising of 52 B.C. (7.63).

54 Although some tribes may have been induced to remain quiet by the prospect that their hostages could be detained for very long periods of time, some tribes, as we have observed above (p.189) even attempted to regain their hostages by seizing Roman legates as counter-hostages.

55 BGall. 2.13.1.
56 BGall. 5.5.4.
57 BGall. 6.11.2.
58 BGall. 5.25.3.
59 BGall. 6.44.
60 See above, n. 10.
61 See above, p. 188, and n. 10.
62 For detailed consideration of Caesar's "disjonction des faits," see Rambaud, especially, pp. 97ff.
63 BGall. 6.4.
64 BGall. 6.5.1: Hac parte Galliae pacata, ...
65 BGall. 6.5.2.
66 BGall. 6.44.
67 See above, p. 195.
68 BGall. 7.11.2.
69 BGall. 7.34; 7.58.
The case of the Bituriges, who possessed a number of towns and an extensive territory (8.2.2), may be cited as a typical example. The capture of Nufiodunum and the submission of hostages (7.12.4) did not mark the end of Biturigan resistance. Even the capitulation of Avaricum did not, as Caesar had hoped (7.13.3), secure the submission of the whole tribe.

BGall. 5.22.4.

BGall. 2.35: His rebus gestis, omni Gallia pacata, tanta huius belli ad barbaros opinio perlata est, uti ab eis nationibus quae trans Rhenum incolentur mitterentur legati ad Caesarem, qui se obsides daturas, imperata facturas policerentur.

BGall. 4.16.5. For discussion of Caesar's reluctance to move against the Suebi, see Rambaud, pp. 334f.

Caesar also includes dramatic details concerning Ariovistus' hostage policy in order to intensify his picture of the German as a cruel and barbaric tyrant. See above, n. 53.

BGall. 1.7.4; 1.12.4-7; 1.13-14.

BGall. 1.13-14. It is not impossible that Divico could have led the Tigurini in 107 and still have been sent as an ambassador in 58, but one suspects that Caesar may have included him in the episode merely to heighten the dramatic effect.

BGall. 1.14.7.

BGall. 1.28.2. The Helvetii had been driven to undertake their migration because of pressure from Ariovistus and his Germans. From the description of Ariovistus' treatment of the Sequani and the Aedui, it seems extremely probable that he had demanded hostages from the Helvetii as well. In any case, Caesar mentions an exchange of hostages between the Sequani and the Helvetii (1.9.4; 1.19.1), and although this is admittedly not the same as the unilateral submission of hostages to a conqueror, it helps to demonstrate the rhetorical exaggeration of Divico's claim.
CHAPTER IX

THE ARSACID HOSTAGES

During the final years of the civil war between Octavian and Antony, a similar struggle was going on in Parthia between the rightful Arsacid ruler, Phraates IV, and a certain Tirdates. Before the end of 30 B.C. Phraates had succeeded in driving Tirdates into the Roman province of Syria where he sought asylum and requested aid against the Parthian king. Dio says that although Octavian allowed Tirdates to live in Syria, he did not promise him any assistance against Phraates, and chose rather to enter into friendly negotiations (φιλικῶς ἐκρημωτικῶς) with the Arsacid ruler. Dio then adds a statement which has long bedevilled historians: νῦν τε τινα Φραττου ἐν εὐεργεσίᾳ μέρει παρ’ αὐτοῦ λαβὼν ές τε τὴν Ἴρωμην ἀνήγαγε καὶ ἐν ὁμοίᾳ ἐποιήσατο. If αὐτοῦ refers to Tirdates, it is difficult to see how the Romans could have initiated friendly relations with Phraates, whether formal or not, by retaining one of his sons who had been delivered to them by the enemy of the king. If, on the other hand, αὐτοῦ refers to Phraates himself, Dio's account stands in serious contradiction to the narrative of Justin, according to which Tirdates seized the youngest son of the Parthian king during an
attempt to depose Phraates in 26/25 B.C. Justin states that when Phraates successfully counterattacked and regained the throne, Tiridates fled into Syria and delivered the king's son as a hostage to Augustus, who was then campaigning in Spain. There is a further discrepancy in the accounts of Justin and Dio regarding the eventual restoration of the royal hostage. According to Justin, immediately after Phraates had regained his throne, **legatos ad Caesarem mittit, servum suum Tiridaten et filium remitti sibi postulat**. 

**Caesar ... neque Tiridaten auxilia daturum ... et Phraati filium sine pretio remisit**. Dio says that Augustus refused to surrender Tiridates to Phraates, but sent back the king's son on the condition that the Parthians return the captives and standards taken in the disasters of Crassus and Antony. However, Phraates took no steps to fulfill these conditions until several years later (20 B.C.), when Augustus was in Syria. At that time, according to Dio, Phraates hastened to return the standards and captives, 

Although there is general agreement among most scholars that Tiridates made two attempts to depose Phraates IV, the first in 30 B.C. and the second in 26/25 B.C., attempts to sort out the circumstances surrounding the hostage son of Phraates from the accounts of Justin and Dio have not been very successful. W.W. Tarn, in perhaps the
most ingenious reconstruction of events, suggests that Tiridates, who was not of the Arsacid line, realized from his first confrontation with Phraates that only an Arsacid could successfully retain the Parthian throne. Accordingly, on his second attempt to depose Phraates he set up as joint king with himself a son of Phraates, quem negligentius custoditum rapuerat. When the coup collapsed, Tiridates once again fled into Syria and delivered the king's son as a hostage to the Romans. Tarn suggests that this hostage is to be identified with rex Phraetes regis Phratis filius, who Augustus says fled to him as a supplicant. Thus, Tarn accepts the date furnished by Justin for the kidnapping of the Parthian prince. However, as Schur notes, Justin has severely intermingled events from Tiridates' two encounters with Phraates. Although he clearly dates the seizure of Phraates' son to 26/25 B.C. by telling us that Augustus was in Spain, he attributes Tiridates' brief success to the disenchantment of the Parthian populace with Phraates, whose pride and cruelty had increased because of his victory over Antony.

There are several additional difficulties in Justin's account of the royal hostage. It is admitted, even by those scholars who prefer Justin to Dio, that it is extremely unlikely that Tiridates would have delivered Phraates' son all the way to Spain. Furthermore, Justin states that Augustus returned the Parthian hostage sine pretio. However,
in the very next sentence he says that when Augustus arrived in Syria in 20 B.C., *metum Phrahati incussit ne bellum Parthiae vellet inferre.* Itaque tota Parthia captivi ... signaque cum his militaria Augusto remissa.\(^\text{17}\) Justin has given no reason in his earlier narrative why Phraates should have feared an attack from Augustus. However, his phrasing seems very similar to that of Dio, who gives an entirely logical reason why the Parthian king would have been anxious about Augustus' presence in Syria.\(^\text{18}\) It is difficult to believe that the Romans would have returned Phraates' son with no strings attached, and yet several years later appear in Syria prepared to go to war over the return of the captives and standards.

Although the evidence does not allow a definite solution to the intriguing puzzle presented by Justin and Dio, a number of possibilities may be suggested. If Phraates IV rendered a son as hostage to the Romans in 30 B.C., we should expect that it would have been in connection with a more formal agreement than that suggested by Dio's φιλίας ἐχθριμάτωσ. Moreover, if a formal treaty had been concluded at that time, we may be sure that the restoration of the standards and captives held by the Parthians would have been one of the major clauses of the agreement. The fact that the hostage was returned to his father before the restoration of the standards and captives virtually eliminates the likelihood that any formal agreement had been arranged in 30.
However, it is equally unlikely that any sort of friendly relations could have been established between Rome and Parthia at that time if the Romans had been willing to retain a son of the Parthian king kidnapped by Tiridates. It thus appears that Justin has provided the correct date for the acquisition of the Parthian prince by the Romans.\textsuperscript{19} We may assume, as Ziegler suggests,\textsuperscript{20} that Rome had hoped to obtain the standards and the captives simply by establishing amicitia with the Parthian king, but when Phraates showed no intention of fulfilling Roman hopes, Tiridates was encouraged to make a second attempt to gain the Parthian throne. Tiridates can hardly have moved out of Syria without the knowledge or approval of the Romans. When the pretender was forced to flee back into Syria, he presented the Romans with an unexpected political weapon, the youngest son of Phraates IV. A Parthian embassy arrived in Rome shortly thereafter to request the surrender of Tiridates and the restoration of the king's son. The Romans granted the latter request on the condition that the standards and captives be returned. It is possible that the young Parthian hostage died while returning home,\textsuperscript{21} and Phraates, holding the Romans responsible for his death, took no steps to fulfill the conditions until Augustus appeared in Syria several years later.

It may seem somewhat surprising that the Romans would have released Phraates' son before the standards and captives had actually been restored. Perhaps they were somewhat
embarrassed at the manner in which they had acquired the royal hostage, and took the earliest opportunity to return him, at the same time hoping to gain some political advantage by their action. We may be sure that if Phraates' son had been a formal hostage, rendered in conjunction with an official treaty, he would not have been returned until the conditions of the treaty had been fully satisfied. The uneasiness which Rome may have felt regarding the seizure of Phraates' son might be reflected in Justin's insistence that the boy was returned sine pretio.

In 20 B.C. Augustus arrived in Syria as part of a combined operation with Tiberius, who had been instructed to set up Tigranes on the Armenian throne in place of his Arsacid supported brother, Artaxes. Phraates, uneasy at Augustus' proximity to the Euphrates, hastened to restore the standards and captives to the Romans and tacitly recognized their overlordship in Armenia. Although Augustus mentions only that the Parthians sought amicitia with the Roman people, it seems clear from other sources that an actual treaty was negotiated between Rome and Parthia at this time. Orosius specifically states that royal hostages were handed over to the Romans in connection with this treaty. Justin also says that Phraates submitted members of his family as hostages at the time when the standards and captives were restored. Suetonius mentions an offer of the Parthians to render hostages, but does not
say that they were actually submitted.\textsuperscript{27} We do know that Phraates sent four sons to the Romans as hostages, but the exact date and the attendant circumstances of this incident are not completely clear. Our most authoritative source, Augustus himself, does not give an exact indication of the date when Phraates' sons were delivered, but he does associate their submission with the Parthian king's application for Roman friendship.\textsuperscript{28} Orosius and Justin, as we have already noted, explicitly connect the submission of the royal hostages with the events of 20 B.C. Velleius Paterculus, although he attributes the delivery of the hostages to the awe in which Phraates held Tiberius, indicates that the incident took place during the operations of Tiberius and Augustus in 20.\textsuperscript{29} Eutropius also closely connects the submission of the hostages with the return of the standards and prisoners.\textsuperscript{30} Josephus, however, maintains that Phraates dispatched his four sons to the Romans in order to please his concubine, Thesmusa, who hoped to promote her own son, Phraataces, as heir to the Parthian throne.\textsuperscript{31} Thesmusa was an Italian slave girl presented to Phraates by Augustus,\textsuperscript{32} and it has usually been assumed that she was given to the king at the time of the restoration of the standards.\textsuperscript{33} Since it is clear that some time would have been required for her to bear the king a son and induce him to send away his four legitimate sons, Josephus' account suggests that the submission of the Parthian royal hostages occurred quite some time after 20 B.C.
Even if Thesmusa had been sent to Phraates before 20 B.C., which is quite possible since Augustus had been engaged in diplomatic negotiations with Phraates since 30 B.C., it is difficult to believe that there was an interval of eighteen years between the intrigue of the concubine and the actual succession of her son. Further evidence that Phraates' sons were delivered to the Romans sometime after 20 B.C. is usually seen in the account of Strabo, who notes that Phraates summoned the governor of Syria, M. Titius, and handed over his sons as hostages to him. Titius is known to have been governor of Syria between 12 and 8 B.C., and most scholars have followed the view of Mommsen that it was during this period that Phraates surrendered his sons. However, even though Strabo emphasizes that Phraates dispatched his sons to the Romans as a precaution against palace intrigue, it is important to note that he definitely associates the incident with the restoration of the standards and the cementing of friendship between Rome and Parthia. Finally, Tacitus concurs with Strabo regarding Phraates' real motives, but he states that the official reason for rendering the hostages was to confirm amicitia with Rome.

Since all of the sources, with the exception of Josephus, strongly suggest that Phraates surrendered his four sons to the Romans in connection with the agreement of 20 B.C., the date of Titius' Syrian command should be carefully reconsidered. This has, in fact, been done by
L.R. Taylor, who argues convincingly that Titius was governor of Syria twice — between 12 and 8 B.C., and earlier, between 20 and 17 B.C. If Taylor is correct, there is no difficulty in connecting Strabo's account with the events of 20 B.C. Phraates' decision to surrender the standards and captives to Augustus and to enter into friendly relations with Rome may not have been popular with a large sector of the Parthian populace, and although the delivery of the hostages would have been officially connected with the new agreement, Phraates' more immediate purpose may have been to lessen the possibility of treasonous plots against him. Josephus' account regarding the scheming of Thesmusa is probably the product of common gossip which arose at the time of the succession of her son to the Parthian throne in 2 B.C. It was certainly not the only gossip which was spread about the new king and his low born mother.

The Romans, and no doubt Phraates as well, were aware that the royal hostages provided Rome with a potentially effective means of interfering in the succession to the Arsacid throne. However, there is no evidence that Phraates during the rest of his reign gave the Romans any reason to foster internal discord in the Parthian royal house or that the Romans themselves took any steps in this direction. Following Phraates' death in 2 B.C., however, relations between Rome and Parthia became severely strained. Phraataces induced the Armenians to revolt against Artavasdes, whom the
Romans had established as their client king. Augustus dispatched the young and inexperienced Gaius Caesar in 1 B.C. to restore order in Armenia. When Phraataces heard of Gaius' expedition, he sent an embassy to Augustus to explain what had happened in Armenia and to demand the return of his half-brothers as a condition of accepting peace. Following an exchange of insulting letters between Augustus and Phraataces, the Parthian king met with Gaius Caesar on an island in the Euphrates and came to an agreement re-establishing the status quo: Phraataces recognized Roman overlordship in Armenia and withdrew his request for the restoration of the hostages. However, it is clear that he viewed these hostages as a threat to his own stability, and there can be no doubt that if he had succeeded in securing their release, they would have suffered the same fate as the brothers of Phraates IV when he ascended the Parthian throne. Phraataces was well aware that interference in Armenian affairs could be extremely dangerous with so many suitable rivals for his throne living in Rome, and when he failed to deprive Rome of this political weapon, he acquiesced.

Phraataces did not long survive his encounter with the Romans. We do not know the details of his downfall, which seems to have occurred about A.D. 4 or 5. Josephus merely says that he was caught up in a civil stasis and consequently lost control of the kingdom. Whether or not he subsequently fled to Augustus, as some scholars have
suggested, Rome does not appear to have played any part in his overthrow, since the Parthian elders offered the throne to Orodes (III) without any reference to the Senate or Augustus. In fact, the deposition of Phraataces may have been engineered by an anti-Roman faction among the Parthian nobility who not only resented the influence of the Italian born queen mother, but were also discontented with Phraataces' recent reconciliation with the Romans. In any case, Orodes was assassinated very shortly after his accession and a Parthian embassy came to Rome to request that one of the hostages be released and sent to assume the Parthian throne.

Vonones, the eldest son of Phraates IV, was chosen and dispatched to Parthia, much to the satisfaction of Augustus, who no doubt viewed this development as tangible confirmation of his earlier foresight.

Augustus had very little time to be pleased with the situation in Parthia. Vonones was soon driven out of the kingdom by another Arsacid rival, Artabanus. Tacitus gives a stirring description of the Parthians' contempt for their Roman cultivated and appointed monarch:

Accendebat discernantis et ipse diversus a maiorum institutis, raro venatu, segni aquorum cura; quoties per urbes incederet, lecticae gestamine fastuque erga patrias epulas... Sed prompti aditus, obvia comitas, ignotae Parthis virtutes, nova vitia; et quia ipsorum moribus aliena perinde odium pravis et honestis.

Vonones had spent more than a quarter of a century in Rome,
and it was unrealistic to hope that a romanized client could maintain control for very long in a kingdom which had itself been so little influenced by the effects of romanization. Vonones fled into Armenia and managed to gain the throne of that kingdom for a brief period. However, when Artabanus became threatening, Creticus Silanus, the governor of Syria, was instructed to summon Vonones from Armenia and keep him under surveillance. He was permitted to retain his wealth and royal title while living in Syria. Tacitus refers to his position as *quod ludibrium*, and although Vonones certainly did not have any real power, his maintenance in Syria as "king" represented a potential threat to Artabanus, who subsequently requested that the pretender not be kept in Syria, from where he could stir up discord among the Parthian chieftains by sending agents over the border. Vonones was removed to Pompeiopolis, a maritime town in Cilicia. The attempt to establish the romanized hostage on the Parthian throne had been an utter failure, but his retention in Syria was useful in securing recognition of Roman ascendancy in Armenia from Artabanus, who acquiesced in the coronation of Zeno-Artaxias. In Zeno, the Romans had made a good choice. For the seventeen years of his reign Roman security in Armenia was not seriously endangered, and relatively good relations existed between Artabanus and Rome. Soon after Zeno's death in A.D. 35, trouble again sprang up between Parthia and Rome. Artabanus moved in
quickly and installed his son on the Armenian throne.\textsuperscript{56} However, during the years in which he had consolidated his position in Parthia, Artabanus had disenchanted an influential group among the Parthian nobility. This faction sent an embassy to Tiberius requesting that he dispatch one of the Parthian hostages to be established as king in place of Artabanus. Tacitus says that the Parthian request was exactly what Tiberius had desired,\textsuperscript{57} and we may believe that he saw developments in Parthia as an opportunity to improve the recently deteriorated situation in Armenia. He chose Phraates, the only surviving son of Phraates IV, and dispatched him with the means for gaining his father's throne. Phraates must have been at least 60 years old at this time, if not older, and had spent over fifty years of his life in Rome. Tacitus notes that he attempted to recultivate the customs of his fatherland, but proved unequal to the task and died before reaching the Euphrates.\textsuperscript{58} Undaunted, Tiberius chose another candidate from among the hostages in Rome. This time he selected a younger man, Tiridates, a grandson of Phraates IV.\textsuperscript{59} The plans for establishing him on the Parthian throne also included the expulsion of Artabanus' son from Armenia.\textsuperscript{60} After Vitellius had succeeded in driving the Parthians from Armenia, he accompanied Tiridates to the banks of the Euphrates where they met the Parthians who had requested a replacement for Artabanus. Vitellius entrusted Tiridates to his supporters, ostentasse
Romana arma satis ratus, and withdrew into Syria. Tiridates was briefly successful in driving Artabanus from his throne, but the latter soon counterattacked and expelled his rival, with a few followers, back into Syria. However, the hostage had fulfilled his purpose. He had humiliated the king of kings, and Roman overlordship in Armenia had been re-established.

Following Artabanus' recovery of his kingdom, Tiberius instructed Vitellius to negotiate a treaty with the Parthian king. However, he warned his general to put faith in a treaty of friendship only if hostages, and especially the son of Artabanus should be given. The agreement was dramatically concluded in the middle of a bridge constructed over the Euphrates, and Artabanus handed over to Vitellius his son, Dareios, and perhaps other children of high ranking nobility. Dareios seems to have been the second eldest of the then surviving sons of the Parthian king and his submission as a hostage provided the Romans with an effective means of interfering in the succession to the Parthian throne. However, we do not hear of any political manoeuvring by the Romans involving the hostage or hostages surrendered by Artabanus, and indeed, our only reference to their stay in Rome is in connection with Dareios' participation in Caligula's wild scheme of bridging the waters between Futeoli and Bauli for a triumphal procession.

When Artabanus died in A.D. 39, civil war broke out
between Vardanes, the heir apparent, and his cousin, Gotarzes. The Romans employed this opportunity to restore their client Mithridates to the Armenian throne. They apparently saw no need to inject further complications into the Parthian dynastic struggle by promoting the claims of Darcios or one of the other hostages. However, after the death of Vardanes in A.D. 45, the rule of Gotarzes became intolerable to many of the Parthian nobility, and a secret petition was sent to Claudius requesting that Meherdates, the son of Vonones and grandson of Phraates IV, be set free to ascend the Parthian throne. Claudius, in contemplating the failures of Vonones and Tiridates, can hardly have been confident in the chances for Meherdates' success. Perhaps he did not consider it vital whether the hostage became king of Parthia or not so long as he deterred the Parthians from attempting to regain Armenia. In any case, Meherdates' invasion of Parthia was inept and uninspired. He was finally betrayed into Gotarzes' hands and suffered the indignity of having his ears cropped, thus making him permanently ineligible for the Parthian throne.

The ignominious failure of Meherdates marked the end of a long line of hostage rivals to the Arsacid throne. These hostages had furnished Rome with a relatively effective, if cumbersome, means of maintaining her ascendancy in Armenia. The threat presented by Vonones to Artabanus, however real it may have been, seems to have been sufficient
to induce the Parthian king to acquiesce in the coronation of Zeno, whose long reign in Armenia provided the security which Rome desired on her eastern frontier. Similarly, Tiridates' diversionary attempt to replace Artabanus in A.D. 35 had allowed the Romans to establish their client, Mithridates, on the Armenian throne. He held the kingdom until he was murdered in A.D. 51, and his murder appears to have been the result of internal plotting rather than Parthian intrigue. In other words, between 20 B.C. and A.D. 54, when Tiridates, the brother of Vologeses, succeeded in gaining the Armenian throne, the Parthians had managed to control Armenia probably less than half a dozen years. However, given the cultural and geographical circumstances of Armenia, the policy of attempting to control the territory by means of client kings was bound to be a difficult matter so long as Parthia remained outside the Roman hegemony. One solution, of course, would have been to establish client kings on the Parthian throne as well. In this regard, the attempted coups of the various hostage rivals were dismally unsuccessful. One suspects that Rome's primary purpose in supporting such endeavors had been entirely to divert Parthia's attention from Armenia. However, this was an impractical solution to an ever pressing problem. Rome could not always be sure of finding suitable rival claimants to the Arsacid throne, and moreover, the policy guaranteed no permanent stability in the area. For seventy-five years Armenia had
been a powder keg. Nero attempted a new solution by manoeuvring Tiridates into accepting the Armenian throne as a boon of the Roman emperor. This proved to be a satisfactory resolution of the Armenian tug of war until Trajan annexed the country in A.D. 114.
Notes

1 The chief ancient sources for the study of the Arsacid hostages are: Tac. Ann. 2.1-4; 2.58; 2.68; 6.31-37; 6.41-44; 11.10f.; 12.10-14; Dio Cass. 51.16-18; 54.8; 55.10; Joseph. Ant. 18.39-52; 18.96-105. On Josephus' reliability as a source for Parthian history, see E. Täubler, Die Parthenaussichten bei Josephus, Berlin, 1904. The most recent account of Parthian-Roman relations is to be found in K.H. Ziegler's Die Beziehungen zwischen Rom und dem Partherreich, Wiesbaden, 1964. Of somewhat less use is N.C. Debovis, A Political History of Parthia, Chicago, 1938. The numismatic evidence pertinent to the study of the Arsacid hostages may be consulted in R.H. McDowell, Coins from Seleucia on the Tigris, Ann Arbor, 1935, while V. Gardthausen's collection of the inscriptions is "Die Parthen in griechisch-römischen Inschriften", Festschrift für Theodor Nöldeke, Giesen, 1906, pp. 839-859, although quite old, is still the most convenient.

2 Dio Cass. 51.18. See W.W. Tarn, "Tiridates II and the young Phraates", Mélanges G. Glotz, Paris, 1932, pp. 831-837, who maintains that Tiridates was not an Arsacid. Dio's τινος Τερπιδάτου (51.18.2) and Justin's Tiriden quendam (42.5.6) would suggest that he was not of royal blood. Tarn's identification of Tiridates as Monaeses, the general of Phraates IV who fought against Antony in 36 B.C., is ingenious and quite convincing.

3 Dio Cass. 51.18.3.

4 Ziegler, pp. 45-46, is probably correct in maintaining that no formal treaty was concluded between Parthia and Rome at this time: "... ohne dass förmlicher Friedensvertrag zustände gekommen war, dem latenten Kriegszustand zwischen Rom und dem Partherreich praktisch ein Ende gemacht... die amicitia zwischen Römern und Parthern neu geknüpft war."

5 Just. Epit. 42.5.6.

6 Just. Epit. 42.5.8-9.

7 Dio Cass. 53.33.

8 Dio Cass. 54.8.1.
9 e.g. Ziegler, p. 46; Tarn, p. 832; Schur, RE XVIII, col. 1998. Justin records only the encounter of 267/25 B.C., and although Dio does not mention this revolt, except by implication (53.33), the obscure reference by Isidor of Charax (Müller, GGM I, p. 249) to an island in the Euphrates from which Tiridates, φυγὰς δὲ εἰς ἔδαφος, strongly indicates that Tiridates did make a second attempt to depose Phraates by invading from Syria. Moreover, the numismatic evidence (see Tarn, pp. 832-35; McDowell, p. 222) seems to indicate two periods when Phraates IV was briefly out of power.

10 Many sources indicate that however fickle the Parthian populace may have been towards one monarch or another, they were constant in their insistence that the ruler be from the Arsacid family. See Strabo XVI.748-49 (quoted below, n. 11); Joseph. Ant. 18.44; Tac. Ann. 6.31.

11 Just. Epit. 42.5.6. Justin mentions explicitly that Tiridates seized the youngest son of the Parthian king. It has usually been assumed (e.g. Tarn, p. 834; E.G. Hardy, The Monumentum Ancyranum, Oxford, 1923, p. 146), without substantial basis, that this son was the Phraates who was later sent to Rome as a hostage with his three brothers, and who was Tiberius’ candidate for the Parthian throne in A.D. 35. If this identification is correct, it is remarkable that there is no mention of his having been a hostage twice, or in the case of Tarn’s theory, that he had, in fact, been king of Parthia, if only briefly, long before Tiberius intended that he become king in A.D. 35. Moreover, if we may believe that Strabo (XVI.748, quoted below) has given the names of Phraates’ four sons in ascending order of age (Vonones, who appears last in Strabo’s list, is referred to as the eldest by Tac. Ann. 2.1), it would appear that Phraates was the second eldest of the four sons. If Tiridates seized a son of Phraates IV, as Justin states, he may very well have been the youngest son of the Parthian king, but it is unlikely that he was the Phraates who was sent as a hostage in 20 B.C. and who was Tiberius’ candidate for the Parthian throne in A.D. 35. Thus, Tarn’s identification of this hostage with the Phraates mentioned in Augustus’ Res Gestae (see below, n. 12) becomes virtually untenable unless Phraates IV had two sons named Phraates. This possibility has, in fact, been suggested by Gardthausen, "Inschriften", p. 842, who notes that a gravestone from Telmessus (OIG 4199) records the name Phraates and is dated to about 25 B.C. Gardthausen suggests that another son of Phraates IV, otherwise unknown, had been delivered to the Romans by Tiridates in 25 B.C. and was returned in 23 B.C., but en route died at Telmessus from the rigours of his
journey and was buried there. Two difficulties stand in the way of accepting Gardthausen's hypothesis. If the Phraetes of the gravestone had been a son of Phraetes IV, or possibly even a former king of Parthia, we should expect the epitaph to record such distinctions. Secondly, as Gardthausen himself admits, we cannot be sure that the name Phraetes was unique to the Parthian royal house. None the less, Gardthausen may have hit upon a possible solution. The son taken by Tigranes may have died before the four sons mentioned by Strabo were sent as hostages to the Romans. Tarn's theory might satisfactorily apply to this unknown son. Certainly Strabo's description of Phraetes' motives for sending his sons to Rome suggests that the king had been threatened by someone who had united himself with some Arsacid prince: τὰ τρόπαια ἔπεμψεν ὃ κατὰ Ῥωμαίων ἀνέστησαν Παρθανοῦ, καὶ καλέσας εἰς σύλλογον Τίττον τὸν ἐπιστατοῦντα τότε τῆς ἱμάτους, τέτταρας παιδὰς γυναικὸς ἑνεχείρισεν δύο ἀντιπάροις, Σεραπινᾶν καὶ Ῥωδάσπην καὶ Φράτην καὶ Βηθνήνην, καὶ γυναικὰς τρώγον τῷ καὶ νύεις τέτταρας, δεδείλτι τις στάσεις καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτεθεμένους αὐτῷ. ἦσε, πάντως, ἵππος θυσίων καθ' ἑαυτόν ἢ μὴ ὑπερρήθη τοῦ Ἀραβικοῦ γένους διὰ τὸ εἶναι σφόδρα φιλαράκας τοὺς Παρθανοὺς. Cf. above, p. 36, n. 64.

12 Res Gest. 32. The chief difficulty with Tarn's identification is that Phraetes, the son of Phraetes IV, is nowhere stated to have been king of Parthia (see above, n. 11). Most scholars (e.g. Ziegler, p. 56, n. 72) have maintained that the Phraetes referred to by Augustus is really the later Parthian king, Phraates, the son of Phraetes IV by the Italian slave girl, Thesmusa (see below, pp. 216ff.).


15 Just. Epit. 42.5.5.

16 Tarn, p. 831.

17 Just. Epit. 42.5.10-11.

18 Dio Cass. 54.8.1, quoted above, p. 211.
19 Dio's error regarding the date may not be simply the result of anticipating the incident. It is possible that he has confused the delivery of the son of Phraates IV to the Romans with the arrival of Ariobarzanes (the son of Artavasdes the Mede), who also came to the Romans with Tiridates (Dio Cass. 55.10a.5). Ariobarzanes is nowhere referred to as a hostage, but it seems clear that he did spend some time in Rome after his father had been established by the Romans on the throne of Armenia Minor, since Augustus himself implies (Res Gest. 33) that the Median prince was sent out from Rome to become king of his father's ancestral kingdom (Media Atropatene) in 20 B.C. In any case, it is clear that two sons of Ariobarzanes lived in Rome, perhaps as hostages. One of these sons, Ariobarzanes, spent his entire life in the City and took the Julian name (OGIS 381). The other son, Artavasdes, was sent from Rome to become king of Armenia when his father died in 1 B.C. (Res Gest. 27; Dio Cass. 55.10a.7). However, he too left a son in Rome, C. Julius C.f. Fab. Artabasdes, who, so far as we know, spent his entire 39 years as a resident of the City (OGIS 380).

20 Ziegler, p. 46.

21 This possibility has been discussed above, n. 11.

22 Dio Cass. 54.9.4; Tac. Ann. 2.3; Suet. Tib. 9; Vell. Pat. 2.94; Res Gest. 27. Tigranes, along with his parents and younger brother, Artavasdes, had been captured by Antony in his invasion of Armenia in 34 B.C. and sent to Alexandria in chains. Artaxes, the eldest son of the Armenian king, had managed to evade Antony and flee to Parthia where he later won support to regain his father's throne. Following the deaths of Antony and Cleopatra, Tigranes and Artavasdes were held by Octavian, who rejected the request of Artaxes that his younger brothers be restored (Dio Cass. 51.16.2). Although it is clear that Tigranes and Artavasdes were not official hostages, Octavian saw that they might be useful in his future plans for Armenia.

23 Res Gest. 29; Dio Cass. 54.8.1-2; Suet. Aug. 21.3; Tib. 9.1; Just. Epit. 42.5.11; Vell. Pat. 2.91.1; Oros. 6.21.29.

24 Oros. 6.21.29; Liv. Epit. 141; Vell. Pat. 2.100; Prop. 4.6.79. See also Ziegler, p. 48, and Schur RE XVIII, col. 2000.
25 Oros. 6.21.29: Parthi...signa, quae Crasso interfecto abstulerant, ad Caesarem remiserunt regiisque obsidibus traditis firmum foedus fidelis supplicatione meruerunt.

26 Just. Epit. 42.5.11-12.

27 Suet. Aug. 21.3.

28 Res Gest. 32: Ad me rex Parthorum Phraates Crodis filius filios suos nepotesque omnes misit in Italiam, non bello superatus, sed amicitiam nostram per liberorum suorum pignora petens.

29 Vell. Pat. 2.94.4.

30 Eutrop. Brev. 7.9.

31 Joseph. AJ 18.42.

32 Joseph. AJ 18.40 says that the girl was a gift of Julius Caesar, clearly a chronological impossibility.

33 e.g. T. Mommsen, Res Gestae Divi Augusti ex Monumentis Ancyranos et Apolloniensi, Berlin, 1883, pp. 141-142.

34 Strabo XVI.748, quoted above, n. 11.


37 Tac. Ann. 2.1: ..partemque prolis firmandae amicitiae miserat, haud perinde nostri metu quam fidel

38 L.R. Taylor, "M. Titius and the Syrian Command", JRS XXVI (1936), 161-173. We need not restate her arguments in detail here. Taylor suggests that when Augustus was preparing to set things in order in Syria and Armenia in 20
B.C. he required an experienced general to command the Syrian legions. Titius was especially suitable for the job since he had seen long service in the East and knew the Syrian legions well. The problem of iteratio, i.e. one man holding the same provincial command more than once, need not present any difficulty. The Tiburtine Elogium (ILS 918) preserves the record of an Augustan legate who held the Syrian command twice. Taylor argues convincingly that this legate was in fact M. Titius.

39 It is unlikely that Augustus actually made a formal request for hostages from Phraates, since it would have been normal procedure to demand only one of the donor king's sons. However, the fact that the hostages were submitted voluntarily does not change their official status. They still acted as pignora for the fides of the Parthian king.

40 Joseph. AJ 18.43.

41 Tac. Ann. 2.4; Dio Cass. 55.10.18; Vell. Pat. 2.100.1. For Artavasdes, see above, n. 19.

42 Tac. Ann. 2.4; Dio Cass. 55.10-18-19; Vell. Pat. 2.101.

43 Dio Cass. 55.10.20.

44 Dio Cass. 55.10a.4; Vell. Pat. 2.101.

45 Just. Epit. 42.5.1: ...patrem interficit; fratres quoque omnes xxx trucidat.

46 Joseph. AJ 18.43.

47 See above, n. 12.


49 Tac. Ann. 2.2: Magnificum id sibi credidit Caesar....


52 Joseph. AJ 18.50 states that Vonones never did actually become king of Armenia since his application to Tiberius for the throne was refused. However, Tacitus (Ann. 2.4) states that Vonones was received as king by the Armenians. Gwatkin, Cappadocia as a Roman Procuratorial Province, Columbia, 1930, p. 15, suggests that Rome may have been displeased with Vonones' interference in Armenia because he displaced Augustus' apointee, Tigranes, and thus instigated a civil war in the kingdom.

53 Tac. Ann. 2.58.

54 Tac. Ann. 2.56-58; Joseph. AJ 18.52 states that Artabanus gave the Armenian throne to his son, Orodes, immediately after Vonones had withdrawn into Syria. Tacitus' remark (Ann. 2.56), regem illa tempestate non habebant, amoto Vonone, has led most scholars to believe that Josephus' statement has been misplaced, and that it actually refers to A.D. 35, when Artabanus sent Orodes to seize Armenia. However, Tübler, Parthennachrichten, pp. 9-15, accepts Josephus' testimony on the basis of numismatic evidence. More recently, Kahrstedt, Artabanos, pp. 17-18, has voiced support for Tübler's observations. However, Josephus omits all mention of Zeno-Artaxias, and this might have been the cause of his pre-dating Orodes.

55 Tac. Ann. 2.56: is prima ab infantia instituta et cultum Armeniorum aemulatus, venatu, epulis et quae alia barbari celebrant, proceres plebeumque iuxta devinixerat. Compare the description of Vonones, p. 220 above.


57 Tac. Ann. 6.32: Cupitum id Tiberio:

58 Tac. Ann. 6.32.

59 It seems almost certain that Tiridates cannot have been among the original hostages submitted in 20 B.C., since Tacitus (Ann. 6.43) refers to the boy's puellitia, hardly characteristic of a man who would have been at least 55 years of age if he had come to Rome in 20 B.C. It seems, therefore, that he must have been born in Rome. Nor can we
be sure which of Phraates' four sons was his father. Vitellius advised the young hostage at the outset of his Parthian invasion to remember the qualities of his grandfather and of his foster-father, Caesar. Since Phraates' (the younger) death had occurred only several months before the dispatch of Tiridates himself, and Vonnones' death had been recent enough (Tac. Ann. 2.68) that it would not likely have been necessary for Caesar to act as a foster-father, it is probable that Tiridates was the son of Seradaspes or Rhodaspes, both of whom had died in Rome (ILS 842).

60 See Tac. Ann. 6.32-36 for the Armenian campaign.

61 Tac. Ann. 6.37. This would seem to be a clear indication that Rome's real interest in the expedition had been the Armenian situation.

62 Tac. Ann. 6.41-44.

63 Joseph. AJ 18.96; cf. 101.

64 Joseph. AJ 18.103 mentions only Dareios. Dio Cassius 59.17.5 refers to Dareios as only one of the Parthian hostages living in Rome in A.D. 39, but it is possible that the other hostages included those who still remained from the families of the sons and grandsons of Phraates IV. However, Dio later specifically states (59.27.3) that Vitellius took more than one son of Artabanus as hostages.

65 Kahrstedt, Artabanos, p. 22. Dareios seems to have been quite young at the time he was sent to Rome since Tacitus (Ann. 11.10) tells us that his elder brother, Vardanes, died intra primam iuventam.

66 Suet. Calig. 19; Dio Cass. 59.17.5.

67 For the oscillating fortunes of Vardanes and Gotarzes, see Kahrstedt, Artabanus, pp. 19ff. The main sources are Tac. Ann. 11.8-10; 12.10-14; Joseph. AJ 20.69-74.

68 Tac. Ann. 11.8; Dio Cass. 60.8.1.
69 Tac. Ann. 11.10; 12.10f. It is unlikely that Meherdates was among the hostages submitted by Phraates IV since Tacitus' description of him as iuvenis (Ann. 12.11) could hardly apply in A.D. 49 if the Parthian prince had been born in or before 20 B.C. However, Gotarzes' charge that Meherdates was non propinquum neque Arsacis de gente, sed alienigenam et Romanum (Ann. 12.14) suggests that Meherdates' birth should be placed no later than A.D. 6/7, when Augustus had dispatched his father, Vonones, to take over the Parthian throne.


71 Vologeses did dispatch some Arsacid rivals to Rome, ostensibly as hostages (Tac. Ann. 13.9), but we do not know anything about their subsequent activity, except for the fact that they may have provided Pliny with some geographical information about their homeland (NH 6.8.1).
CONCLUSION

Although the official role of formal hostages was to serve as a guarantee for the performance of obligation, or as a pledge of good faith, the Romans frequently attempted to cultivate impressionable young hostages as a means of strengthening political and cultural links between Rome and the donor states. However, the objectives of this policy, and the methods by which they were achieved were by no means the same in all instances. In the less civilized western half of the empire, hostages were exacted by the Romans primarily in order to facilitate military security. Nevertheless, it is also likely that these hostages often acted as important intermediaries for the transmission of Roman culture to their countrymen. Moreover, by acquainting youthful hostages with aspects of Latin culture, the Romans could be confident that the effects of romanization might continue for several generations. As DeWitt notes, "the men who were at the most impressionable age when Caesar was in Gaul would be in the prime of life when romanization underwent its second great period of positive stimulation, during the visit of Augustus between 16 and 13 B.C."¹

Unfortunately, the sources do not give much indication
of the methods and results of Roman hostage policy in the West, but it is apparent that Roman strategy with regard to hostages taken from eastern states was distinctly more political than cultural in emphasis. The romanization of eastern hostages as potential clients was undertaken not primarily as part of a general Kulturkampf, but rather as a possible means of interfering in the internal affairs of Rome's hellenistic rivals. In negotiating peace treaties with eastern monarchs, the Romans frequently demanded as hostages the second eldest sons of kings. This policy was applied, not in the interests of facilitating the smooth succession of the eldest sons of donor kings, but, on the contrary, because of the potential rivalry which could be generated between the heirs apparent and their younger brothers. It is perhaps questionable whether such ulterior motives were formulated in advance by the Romans in the case of Demetrius, the son of Philip V, since the Macedonian prince was only sixteen years of age at the time of his restoration in 191 B.C. However, they were clearly confident that Demetrius might prove useful in the future. Flamininus' apparent diplomatic clumsiness in fostering the heated rivalry between Perseus and Demetrius after the latter's successful mission to Rome in 183 leads one to believe that it was Rome's explicit intention to keep Macedon weak by stirring up internal discord within the Antigonid royal house. In the end, Flamininus' disruptive
tactics were frustrated by Demetrius' headstrong character and the steadfast refusal of Philip to be intimidated by his son's Roman patrons. Nevertheless, a new and devious use of hostage-clients had become dramatically apparent.

The example of the Macedonian hostage may have prompted Seleucus IV to offer his own son, Demetrius, as a hostage in place of his brother, Antiochus, who had been handed over to the Romans after the Seleucid defeat at Magnesia. However, by liberating Antiochus and taking care that he did not fall into his brother's hands, the Romans unleashed the very threat which Seleucus had hoped the hostage exchange would eliminate. We can never be sure whether it was Rome's ultimate intention that Antiochus supplant his brother as king, but when he actually did succeed in gaining the throne, the Romans continued to retain his nephew as a possible means of interfering in the succession of their former client's son. As it turned out, any plans which the Romans may have had of encouraging Demetrius to aspire to his uncle's throne were abruptly changed by the premature death of Antiochus. The perilous succession of Antiochus' youthful son was highly congenial with Rome's eastern policy, and the young king's regent, Lysias, was fully aware that the Romans continued to have in Demetrius a very real means of adding to the political turmoil in Syria.

Sons of monarchs were not the only hostages who
proved useful in Rome's political manoeuvring. Frequently hostage princes were accompanied to Rome by sons of high ranking court officials. These hostages not only served as an effective check on the activities of the royal advisors, but also furnished the potential nucleus for a vigorous and influential pro-Roman faction in the future. In some cases, the Romans sought to increase the number of these future clients by regulating the restoration of hostages through mutatio. By periodically exchanging hostage personnel the Romans were able to guarantee not only that they possessed hostages relevant to the current political situation in the donor states, but also that a considerably greater number of important young hostages became familiar with influential Romans and their way of life.

A number of eastern kings, in the guise of courting Roman favour, sent unsolicited hostages to Rome as a means of ridding themselves of potential rivals. Whether or not the Romans were always aware of such ulterior motives, they gladly acknowledged these token demonstrations of friendship and viewed the unexpected hostages as useful tools for future interference in the affairs of the donor states. The most noteworthy example of the effectiveness of this policy is furnished by the hostages submitted to Augustus by Phraates IV in 20 B.C. Several of these hostages and their dependents played important roles in Rome's struggle with Parthia over the control of Armenia for more than 50 years.
Even though hostages rendered to Rome by eastern monarchs often proved useful in fostering timely political disruption in the donor states, any hopes which the Romans may have had that these hostages might also subsequently become faithful and acquiescent client kings were generally unfulfilled. During their detention in Rome some hostages became so well acquainted with the Roman political esprit that they were later able to present a subtle and serious challenge to Roman diplomatic strategy. Antiochus knew how and to what extent he could ignore the terms of Apamea without incurring Roman censure, and moreover, he was acutely aware of the power of Syrian gold among certain influential senators. It is equally clear that Demetrius Soter, even though he never did succeed in winning Senate pardon for his escape and seizure of the Seleucid throne, understood the Romans and their tactics well. Ironically, his eventual downfall may have been due in large part to the fact that his years as a hostage had made him more Roman in spirit than Greek. However, the complete acculturation of hostages did not always work in Rome's favour. Although the various Parthian hostages sent out by Rome as rival claimants to the Arsacid throne were relatively successful in creating sufficient political turmoil to divert Parthia's attention from Armenia, the sources emphasize the utter inability of these hostage-clients to establish any cultural rapport with their former
countrymen. Rome's persistent willingness to support the claims of these rival Arsacids clearly indicates the essential role which hostages played in Rome's overall scheme of keeping the eastern powers weak and disorganized. It may be difficult to attribute success to such a negative policy, but there is no doubt that the Antigonid, Seleucid and Arsacid hostages provided Rome with effective and dispensable pawns of political disruption.
Notes

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I. Ancient Sources

It has not seemed necessary to list standard editions of texts. For the most part Oxford and Teubner texts have been employed. Citations from less familiar or fragmentary sources are accompanied by bibliographical details.

II. Modern Works

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