CONCEPTS OF DEITY: RĀMĀNUJA AND HARTSHORNE
THE CONCEPTS OF DEITY

OF

RĀMĀNUJA AND CHARLES HARTSHORNE COMPARED

By

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ABSTRACT

The objective of this study is to determine why it is that Rāmānuja, a twelfth century Indian philosopher, and Charles Hartshorne, a contemporary American philosopher, who have essentially the same concerns motivating their writing, i.e., that the prevailing philosophical concepts of deity are inconsistent with and not expressive of the idea of God held by religious men, and begin with the same religious affirmation that deus est caritas, finally arrive at ways of conceiving God that are very similar in the unique way they conceive the God-world relationship yet radically different with respect to the doctrine of substance. Rāmānuja finds such a doctrine to be a necessary part of a concept of deity that is consistent with the idea of God held by men who worship and Hartshorne considers it to be the greatest obstacle in formulating a consistent, coherent concept of a worship-eliciting being.

Our thesis is that it is primarily soteriological concerns that force Rāmānuja to retain the substance doctrine as part of his concept of deity and that, while this causes certain ambiguities and contradictions in his conception of the God-world relationship, nevertheless, these concerns are an integral part of religious man's understanding of the God he worships, at least as far as those of the Indian traditions are concerned.

The development of our thesis begins with a discussion of the
concepts of individuals in general in the thought of Rāmānuja and Hartshorne. Rāmānuja's reasons for believing a substance doctrine is a necessary part of any concept of individuals that gives an adequate explanation of experience and, therefore, of existence, is the subject matter of Chapter II. Hartshorne's alternate view, which does not include a substance doctrine but is able to account for all the aspects of experience that Rāmānuja believes make a substance doctrine necessary, is discussed in Chapter III. The conclusion drawn from these chapters is that Rāmānuja's inclusion of the substance doctrine does not involve him in any logical contradictions but, even on his own presuppositions, the ātman concept seems to be ambiguous, if not inconsistent at certain points. There is no reason, other than his concern with the nature of salvation, to cause him to say that consciousness is a quality of the individual ātman or self rather than accepting the Advaitan position, which maintains that all ideas of individuality are restrictions within the one, undivided, ultimate consciousness that is Brahman. Hartshorne appears to be correct in saying that a substance doctrine is superfluous to an adequate explanation of experience and thus of existence, but we find that the "nervous system" in his concept of an individual comes close to Rāmānuja's ātman principle at significant points.

In Chapters IV and V, we discuss the concepts of an individual in the thought of the two philosophers with reference to the divine individual. Again, we find basic agreement on many points. Both philosophers agree that the appropriate object of worship defines perfection and attribute deity with perfect being and perfect knowledge,
and with being infinite, in the sense of not being limited by any
other. However, because Rāmānuja insists that perfection, as the
being of all beings, the knowledge of all knowing, and therefore
infinite, must possess these qualities as eternally actual and
unchanging, his conception of Brahman poses three problems for religious
men: (1) because Brahman is eternally actual and unchanging, yet one
with all existence and all knowledge, Rāmānuja must insist that the
becoming, contingent aspect of existence is less than being, so what
is most real and significant to ordinary individuals has no positive
value to Brahman; (2) because Brahman is unaffected by the concrete,
particular acts and deeds of other individuals, the rites, rituals
and moral lives of religious men contribute nothing to the object of
worship; and (3) when deity is conceived as an unchanging absolute,
it contradicts all ideas that religious man has of God as entering into
dynamic, personal relationships with him, especially as loving the
concrete, particular individual that he is.

Rāmānuja could avoid these problems by allowing that Īśvara,
whose substance is one with the eternally unchanging Brahman, but
whose knowledge and mode of being changes with the everchanging world
that is his body, is the archetype of perfection rather than Brahman.
In fact, if he thought Īśvara to be the ideal individual, who in-
cludes all other individuals in his existence, and considered
Brahman to refer to the supreme form of the universal categories
abstracted from Īśvara's all-inclusive existence, his concept of
deity would be exactly the same as Hartshorne's. This is not open to
him, however, because of understanding of the nature of the religious quest, which we discuss in Chapter VI.

The religious quest, as Rāmānuja understands it, is the quest for salvation or the Good. The Good is the realization that the true nature of each individual self is non-different in its essential nature from the divine individual, that all individuals have Brahman as the ultimate ground and cause of their existence. Each individual experiences concrete particularity as restrictions within its essential quality, consciousness, but the true being (substance) of the individual transcends the limitations of time and space. To realize this is to be free of all imperfections, to experience bliss, to know the Good, Brahman. When one realizes that his being (substance) is an eternal unchanging quality of Brahman (the ultimate substance), something apart from the ever-changing, impermanent, phenomenal world (samsāra), he can joyfully appreciate its aesthetic value, but not until then.

In contrast to Rāmānuja's identification of the Good with being, and his idea that salvation lies in transcending the realm of becoming, Hartshorne considers the Good to be the creative increase of new and varied experiences, the expansion of awareness (consciousness) until it includes the concrete particularity of all experience, which is the nature of divine experience. The all-inclusive experience of God is always changing, always in the process of becoming; but once something becomes, it remains as a part of the divine life forevermore. On this view, salvation lies in ordinary individuals realizing that they add all the concrete particularity of their novel creative acts and the
moral quality of their life to the divine life. Nothing is done in vain for nothing is lost from the divine memory. Each creative act will be integrated into the divine unity and influence the lives of all future selves.

The Good, to Hartshorne, is to know and to love the whole of existence that is concrete and actual at any moment, but only God is capable of this. If the Good was realizable by all, as it is in Rāmānuja's conception of individuals, in Hartshorne's system all would be God and individual distinctions would be lost. Perfection is a logical impossibility for ordinary individuals as Hartshorne conceives them. The Indian traditions have always maintained that the true nature of every individual is perfection. But more importantly, from the point of view of the Indian traditions, is the fact that in Hartshorne's understanding of the nature of God and ordinary individuals, religious men are denied the hope of release from the wheel of saṃsāra, the realm of duḥkha, the pervasive suffering that impermanence inevitably carries with it. Hartshorne accepts the idea that tragedy is inextricably associated with existence. If religious man can accept this and continue to assert that deus est caritas, perhaps a substance doctrine is not essential to an adequate concept of deity.
This thesis is born out of a belief that there is much to be gained on the part of any religious man (meaning anyone involved in the search for Truth), if not all men, by entering into dialogue with men of religious convictions other than his own. Man's great urge to know what is true gives rise to the propensity to mistake some partial truth for Truth itself. But, the moment any man insists that he has grasped the whole Truth within his own finite conceptual system, whether theological or philosophical, he has lapsed into idolatry. The truly great spiritual seers of both East and West have tended to agree with the saying of Lao-tzu, "Those who know do not speak; those who speak do not know" (Tao Te Ching, Chapter 56). However, in spite of the ineffable nature of the Ultimate, these same sages have not despaired, each one has made his own attempt to express, to the best of his ability and in recognition of the limitations of language, what is ultimately inexpressible. By bringing these expressions together in dialogue one brings out the strengths and possible weaknesses of the individual expressions and begins to see more sides of the many faceted Being, the knowledge of whom religious man affirms to be the supreme goal and end of life.

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BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE FOR THE THESIS

Perhaps the area of greatest disagreement among the various expressions of religious truth centres in the question of the authenticity of the source of religious knowledge and whether or not such knowledge can or should be subjected to the bar of reason to have its authenticity judged. This, of course, raises the question of the proper relationship between reason and faith, between cogent, sophisticated, rational exposition of the nature of God, man and the universe, and the affirmations of faith based on simple, spontaneous, emotional responses to life that come out of the living experiences of the masses of religious men who worship.

The question of judging the authenticity of religious knowledge and its proper relationship to rational analysis is but one of the problems involved in bringing order and structure to religious assertions within one religious tradition and of the even greater problems associated with making general statements about "religious men" as a universal category. This problem is a basic concern of this thesis. The concept of deity developed by Charles Hartshorne is built around what he believes to be a basic affirmation of religious men in general, i.e., that *deus est caritas*, with which Rāmānuja agrees. Where these two philosophers disagree is on the question of whether personal immortality and justice necessarily follow from this basic
affirmation in the thinking of religious men.

Background to Râmânuja's Concept of Deity

The sixth and seventh centuries A.D. in India saw the rise of what has been referred to as "popular Hinduism".\(^1\) Buddhism, with its strong ascetic tendency, had been dominant in the preceding centuries in South India but was now beginning to decline. It had stripped away all the external trappings of devotional life and pursued a path of radical analysis of the nature of existence, devoid of piety and emotion. With this decline of Buddhist influence there was a revival of Brahmanism, the Vedic religion of the Aryans. But the revival also incorporated many elements that were indigenous to the Dravidians of pre-Aryan India. Two main sects, the Śaivite bhaktas (adīyārs) and Vaiṣṇavite devotees (āḻvārs), popularized and developed a religious movement that emphasized devotion (bhakti) as the supreme method for attaining knowledge of God. Free impassioned expression was given of the feelings the devotees felt toward Śiva and Viṣṇu. Some followers of Viṣṇu, we know from the Purānic literature, expressed "an intensely emotional religion which dwells on incidents connected with the life of the cowherd, Kṛṣṇa Gopāla, and is at times led into eroticism by dwelling on his sport with the herdswomen".\(^2\) The influence

\(^1\) S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1923, II, 449.

of these sects became pervasive. "Festivals and temple worship connected with Purānic Hinduism were spreading everywhere".  

In reaction to the austere asceticism of the Buddhists and the uncontrolled emotionalism of the sects, another group, called the Mīmāṃsakas, began to exaggerate the importance of performing the Vedic rites as the way of salvation. But this emphasis on purity of action, in accord with the Vedic prescriptions led to formalistic ritualism "devoid of spirit". This was the situation to which the Advaita Vedantin, Śaṅkara, addressed himself.

Śaṅkara appeared ... as an eager champion of the orthodox faith and a spiritual reformer. He tried to bring back the age from the brilliant luxury of the Purāṇas to the mystic truth of the Upaniṣads. The power of the faith to lead the soul to the higher life became for him the test of its strength. He felt impelled to attempt the spiritual direction of his age by formulating a philosophy and religion which could satisfy the ethical and spiritual needs of the people better than the systems of Buddhism, Mīmāṃsa and Bhakti. The theists were veiling the truth in a mist of sentiment.

Śaṅkara was not without sympathy for the passionate, feeling, emotional aspect of religious life. He composed many beautiful hymns to the gods of popular Hinduism -- Viṣṇu, Śiva, Śakti and Sūrya. Devotion to God, as expressed through worship, was not unimportant to him. An indication of this is the fact that he himself established ten religious orders during his lifetime. However, even though there is this evidence that Śaṅkara saw value in acts of devotion (bhakti)

3. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, II, 449.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
and the performance of vedic rituals (karma), he saw them only as preparatory measures for the attaining of mokṣa, union with Brahman, which is the only true salvation. On his view, they make no positive contribution to the attaining of the ultimate goal. When one is seeking the True, the only viable method is jñāna yoga, the way of knowledge. This is the way of dialectical, critical analysis of experience, led by the sacred truths of the Upaniṣads, that ends with the transcendence of all qualities and all sense of duality, i.e., the mystical insight that "aham brahma asmi" (Brh. Up. I:4:10). In other words, there is the realization that all thought of there being anything other than Brahman is ultimately less than true, so discursive thought itself is eventually transcended in intuition, pure thought. Brahman is what is and what is True. All qualities and things, whether sentient or insentient, are negative principles and add nothing to what is Real. Consequently, the phenomenal world (saguṇa) has no value except in so far as it is the means toward the self-realization of the self-sufficient, eternal, absolute Brahman (nirguṇa).

The relatively greater importance attributed to jñāna by Śaṅkara, in comparison to bhakti and karma, in order to counteract the undisciplined emotionalism of the bhaktas and the formal ritualism of the Mīmāṃsakas, led to a disparaging of the common popular religious life and practices in favour of a rigorous philosophical understanding of religious principles. While Śaṅkara was able to hold together erudite, dispassionate, philosophical enquiry and emotional response to a personal deity encountered in devout worship, "there was a tendency among some of his disciples to make religion more an affair of the head than of the
It was in response to this subordination and disparaging of common piety and devotion that Rāmānuja (c. 1027-1137) wrote his commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras* and other shorter treatises. Bharatan Kumarappa writes:

Rāmānuja's religion was Vaiṣṇavism. In essence it was the worship of a Personal God, conceived as Supreme Perfection characterized by love. It is in defence of this doctrine fundamental to his religion, but essentially impossible on the hypothesis of the prevalent advaitic philosophy, according to which pure thought alone was ultimately real and all else was Maya (illusion), that Rāmānuja's philosophy arises.

It was not Rāmānuja's intention to free religion, as expressed in the Purānic literature, by divorcing it from the order and discipline that reason requires, but rather to provide a rationally sound system of thought that would support and be consistent with the essential principles implicit in the affirmations of the bhaktas. In his *Śrībhāṣya*, after summing up the conception of Brahman as held by the Advaita Vedāntists, he puts forward the following reasons for its inadequacy: (a) their view is founded on fallacious reasoning, (b) the exponents lack "the special quality" that causes one "to be chosen by the Highest Puruṣa described in the Upaniṣads", (c) they "have not understood the ways of right logical reasoning" nor "the various

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7. Refer to bibliography for a list of his writings.
particular modes of procedure [regarding ritual]". 9 Therefore he suggests that their view should be "treated with disrespect by those who know the rightful nature of sentences in conformity with logic, [and] of the functions of all means of proof like Direct Perception and others". 10 Here we have an appeal for the bringing together of the claims and practices of men who worship and the logical consistency of reason.

To determine whether or not Rāmānuja's criticisms of the Advaita Vedānta's conception of Brahman are justified would involve a whole dissertation in itself. The reason for including what we have said so far regarding the developments in religious thought in South India prior to Rāmānuja's time is to provide a description of the context in which his thought developed and to indicate the underlying motivation for his writing. This motivation is central to the subject of this thesis, the comparison of Rāmānuja's concept of deity with that of Charles Hartshorne, because Hartshorne is also concerned with the discrepancy between dominant orthodox philosophical conceptions of deity and conceptions of deity held by men who worship. This concern is the major contributing factor in the conception of deity that Hartshorne develops.

Background to Hartshorne's Concept of Deity

Charles Hartshorne (1897- ) published his first book, The

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9. Raghunath D. Karmarkar (trans. and ed.), Śrībhāṣya of Rāmānuja (Poona: University of Poona, 1959), p.45. This translation of the Śrībhāṣya is the main one used in the thesis. The other is that of George Thibaut, The Vedānta-Sūtras, with the commentary by Rāmānuja (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1962), which is used where it affords greater clarity and readability, without sacrificing accuracy.

10. Ibid., p.45.
Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation, in 1934. In an appendix to the main text of this book, he makes the assertion that "theology is now passing through its profoundest revolution since the early centuries of the Christian Era". The revolution he has in mind is due to the challenges that modern scientific developments in the early part of the twentieth century were bringing to bear on the traditional beliefs and methods of medieval theology, with the consequence of making them less and less tenable for an increasing number of learned men. He describes these methods as being non-relative, non-quantitative and non-dimensional, and as being associated with the categories "absolute, immutable, timeless, ens a se, totum simul", which have been traditionally judged to be more exact and superior to the quantitative, relative concepts of "all-knowing, all controlling, at-all-times-existing, etc." Hartshorne does not share in this opinion, nor, he believes, can anyone else who understands modern logic. And, he writes, "I also entirely fail to find in them a plausible referent of religious experiences".

Hartshorne sees the conflict between modern science and traditional theological concepts as one of the chief reasons for the rise of humanistic thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In his second book, Beyond Humanism, he explicated the nihilistic dilemma that is implicit in humanism and begins to develop a concept of deity that he feels is consistent with modern scientific theory and,

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12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
at the same time, provides a reasonable basis for attributing ultimate meaning and value to every aspect of life, which, on his view, neither classical theology nor humanism affords. His point of beginning for such a concept of deity is not in science or in philosophy but in the simple affirmation of religious man that deus est caritas. The conception of deity that he begins to develop in this way in his second book is fully developed in his third book, Man's Vision of God, in the preface of which he says:

The ground ... for this book is the conviction that a magnificent intellectual content -- far surpassing that of such systems as Thomism, Spinozism, German idealism, positivism (old or new) -- is implicit in the religious faith most briefly expressed in the three words, God is love, which words I sincerely believe are contradicted as truly as they are embodied in the best known of the older theologies, as they certainly have been misunderstood by atheists and skeptics.

Neither Rāmānuja nor Hartshorne claims to be a great visionary himself or to be the vehicle for the revelation of any new religious truth. Rather they claim only to provide a rational, coherent, philosophical base for the affirmations of religious man in general. Hartshorne's main attack in his writings is against the concept of deity held by those he refers to as the "classical theologians". He argues that their insistence on a completely absolute, immutable, non-relative, non-contingent, simple concept of deity makes God an impersonal, irrelevant entity and causes contradictions and inconsistencies

16. Ibid., p.xv.
in what even they, let alone the ordinary man of faith, want to say about God, the world, and how the two are related. Hartshorne seeks to overcome these failings and states as his reason:

I am confident that the theistic question will be rationally settled when, if ever, it becomes really clear to educated persons what are the possible consistent meanings, if any, of "supreme being", "absolute", "perfect", "necessary being", and the like. 17

In developing this point, Hartshorne draws our attention to the fact that religious man has attributed to God such characteristics as knowledge, personality, will, love, etc., all of which are ordinarily associated with contingency, increase, change and dynamic response to something or someone other than the individual so characterized. However, the traditional understanding of the terms "necessary", "perfect", and "absolute", which the classical theologians and philosophers consider to be most appropriately attributed to deity, are in direct contradiction to these qualities. On Hartshorne's reading, such predicates seem to make God out to be static, unresponsive, cold and incapable of any sympathetic participation in the lives of his devotees. They seem to be more appropriate to the description of a supreme object than a supreme subject (i.e., a person), which religious men affirm God to be. To alleviate the contradiction, these philosophers and theologians affirm that the characteristics attributed to God by religious man can only be used analogically with reference to the Supreme Being. And, when pressed with the question of what in fact man can know about God, the reply is that we know nothing positive about him; we only know what he is not (the via

negativa method). To Hartshorne this is tantamount to saying that the knowledge religious man believes he has of God is really not different from that of the atheist. Consequently, in his book *Philosophers Speak of God*, he describes his task as an attempt to find "a logical structure in our thinking about deity that makes room for the ideas thus labelled", i.e. those that the ordinary religious man attributes to God. And, consistent with his understanding of his task, Hartshorne defines deity as "the supremely excellent and all-worshipful being"\(^{18}\) or "the uniquely good, admirable, great, worship-eliciting being".\(^{19}\)

Hartshorne claims that the idea of God "first reaches vivid consciousness in an emotional and practical, not in an explicitly logical or analytic, form", and he says this emotional, practical, pre-analytic concept of deity "is not particularly simple". But, as man began analyzing his understanding of deity, he chose the 'best' of the contrasting categorical characteristics and attributed these alone to God. It was this kind of analytic method that produced classical theism in the West and pantheism in the East.

Briefly stated, Hartshorne's motivation in developing his concept of deity is to provide a description of God that is rationally sound, i.e., free from contradictions and coherent, and, at the same time, consistent with and expressive of the idea of the God men worship. Because of this he begins with religious man's belief in a personal God who is supreme perfection and characterized primarily by love. This

19. Ibid., p.7.
is the same point of beginning taken by Rāmānuja. From this point of common beginning, under the discipline of rational inquiry, they both seek to understand the meaning of this religious affirmation about the nature of God in relation to the nature of experience in general. In doing this they hope to demonstrate the reasonableness of this basic religious belief and its significance for every aspect of human existence.

Rāmānuja, of course, does not share in Hartshorne's concern for the increasing irrelevance of traditional religious beliefs for men involved in the modern scientific world as one of the motivating factors in the formulation of his concept of deity, but they do have in common the broader concern that religion have relevance and meaning for life in general and the particular everyday activities of men in the world. Rāmānuja says of Śaṅkara's position: "Truly, if such were the purport of the Veda, what more would the Veda be than the idle talk of a person out of his mind!" Rāmānuja has a similar problem with the classical idea of God in general, especially as it is expressed in Thomas Aquinas' idea that God is unaffected by what men do, which Thomas illustrates by comparing God to a stone column and other individuals to an animal beside the column. Hartshorne asks: "Very well, which is superior, a self-moving organism, or a fixed inorganic aggregate of crystals? Which is God more like, a superstone or a superorganic individual?"

The Objective of the Thesis

With this background to the thought of Rāmānuja and Charles

Hartshorne, we can now state the purpose for this thesis. Our
objective is to determine why it is that these two philosophers, who
have essentially the same concerns motivating their writing and begin
with the same religious affirmation, finally arrive at conceptions of
God that are very similar in the unique way they conceive the God-world
relationship and yet radically different with respect to the doctrine
of substance. Rāmānuja finds such a doctrine to be necessary in a
conception of deity that is consistent with the idea of the God men
worship and Hartshorne sees it as the greatest obstacle in formulating
a consistent, coherent concept of a worship-eliciting deity. In fact,
Hartshorne believes it is the presuppositions associated with the
substance doctrine that cause Aquinas to conceive of God in a way that
makes the above illustration appropriate. This doctrine, on his view,
is the chief cause for the classical theists ending up with an idea of
God who is impersonal and irrelevant, and that involves numerous
contradictions and inconsistencies.

In general, Hartshorne sees the doctrine of substance as being
destructive of the whole idea of God as conceived by men who worship.22
In addition to this, he believes its adverse consequences go beyond the
theistic question to the ethical precepts that are founded in religious
man's concept of deity and results in the radical individualism that
pervades "our entire Western tradition" and threatens "our whole future".23
Specifically, he has in mind the admonition to love one's neighbour as

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22. Charles Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection (Lasalle, Illinois:
Open Court Publishing Co., 1961), pp.119-121. Hartshorne's objections
to the substance doctrine are elaborated on below, pp. 24-27.
23. Ibid.
oneself. He asks: "How can I love my neighbour 'as myself' if, whereas I am simply identical with myself as one and the same personal 'substance' or 'being' from birth to death and perhaps beyond, I am simply non-identical with my neighbour, a second being?"24

In this dissertation, we will argue that Rāmānuja's particular formulation of the substance doctrine goes a long way toward overcoming the problems Hartshorne raises with respect to this doctrine, but that his concept is rationally weakened by certain ambiguities in his understanding of the relationship between substances and their attributes. On the other hand, we will also argue that there are certain basic soteriological beliefs, held by religious men in general, that do not find their rightful place in Hartshorne's concept of deity because he rejects the idea of a perduring, unchanging substance. These beliefs, we will demonstrate, constitute important reasons for Rāmānuja's retention of the substance doctrine as part of his understanding of the nature of the Supreme Person who is characterized by love.

This fundamental difference between these two philosophers is a part of the ongoing struggle to formulate a concept of deity that is both rationally sound and consistent with the faith affirmed by religious man. But, before we elaborate further on the subject of our study, it is necessary to consider the viability of a comparison of concepts held by two individuals so remote from each other in time and from such different cultural backgrounds.

24. Ibid., p.16.
Justification for This Comparative Study

One of the perennial problems with comparative studies of religious doctrines and systems of thought is to establish a neutral ground or point of meeting from which one can decide, with some degree of objectivity, what the strengths and weaknesses of any religious proposition or set of propositions has. There is always the danger of using the presuppositions of one of the proponents in evaluating the other and thus invalidating the conclusions so determined. One possibility, of course, is to refrain from value judgments altogether, simply drawing out some of the possible implications of each position, and letting the reader make his own evaluation and conclusions. Another possibility is to judge the assertions of each of the proponents on the basis of his own presuppositions. In this thesis, we shall use both of these methods, but we can go even further than either or both of these allow. The reason for this is that Rāmānuja and Hartshorne have much in common in their understandings of the nature of deity, the Ultimate, basic principles about the nature of existence, epistemological theory, methodology, and, as we have already noted, in the motivation for their writing. It is the fact that these philosophers have these points of convergence in their thought that makes a comparative study of their writings a worthwhile endeavor.

Comparison of Methodologies

The methodologies used by Rāmānuja and Hartshorne in deriving their respective concepts of deity are not the same in all respects but their differences are not prohibitive of fruitful comparison. Rāmānuja's method is primarily that of expositing generally accepted
authoritative texts of the Brahmanical religion -- the Upanisads, the Bhagavad-Gītā and the Brahma Sūtras. In his commentaries on these texts, he first states the views of his opponents and then shows where these interpretations are weak or erroneous on the basis of logical coherence and consistence with common experience, rational principles and affirmations of other authoritative texts. After defeating the positions of his opponents to his own satisfaction, Rāmānuja goes on to state his own view and why he believes it is superior.

Hartshorne, too, establishes his position by demonstrating the weaknesses and inconsistencies of opposing views. However, he puts less emphasis on authoritative religious texts and makes greater use of formal logic than does Rāmānuja. Nevertheless, he accepts the essential affirmations of such texts as significant data for understanding the nature of God and is anxious to harmonize the ideas he derives from the application of reason to the broadest possible spectrum of human experience with these assertions.

In support of the method he uses, Hartshorne argues that if we are to arrive at a consistent and adequate conception of God we must first of all let religion assert what its claims are, and that this is profitable only when we avoid the mistake of supposing that these assertions can only be stated in the categories of some particular philosophical system. Further, because there are several such systems, he makes the following suggestion:

The only way to avoid such question-begging procedure and yet to furnish a philosophical scheme in terms of which the religious idea can be rationally formulated is to discover a logically complete classification of possible ideas about God, a non-controversial
statement of what the theistic controversy might conceivably be about.\textsuperscript{25}

In general, Hartshorne's method for deriving an adequate concept of deity is to begin with basic assumptions about the nature of God that are accepted by all men who are interested in theistic questions and who are willing to subject their ideas to rational scrutiny. Then, through dialectical reasoning, advance with them toward the most cogent answers. But, to achieve comprehensiveness, it is not sufficient to consider only the answers to a given question previously given and generally accepted. The accepted assumptions must be tested in relation to all the conceivable possibilities. This requires a drawing out of "a logically complete classification" of each of the accepted propositions about the nature of deity. The advantage of doing this can be seen in relation to Rāmānuja's method of establishing his concept of deity in dialogue with the views of his predecessors. Even if his position does prove to be superior to those given before, there may still be other possibilities not yet considered. In fact, as we shall see, Hartshorne's claim is that this is precisely Rāmānuja's failing with respect to the doctrine of substance.

To derive an adequate concept of deity then, according to Hartshorne, we must first listen to what religion asserts about God. Secondly, we must draw out a logically complete classification of the philosophical categories that could possibly express these assertions consistently and coherently, and with the greatest cogency establish their truth in the minds of reasonable men, as opposed to arbitrarily

\textsuperscript{25.} \textit{Man's Vision of God}, p.x. Rāmānuja also uses the dialectical method for testing propositions by drawing out the logical alternatives to determine their truth value. Refer \textit{Śrībhāṣṭa} I:4:22 for an example of this.
accepting the categories of some particular philosophical system. Once these two steps have been taken, the way he suggests for determining which of the possible alternatives is most adequate to explain the given data involves appeals to two types of non-controversial assumptions: (a) "self-evident formal structures of pure logic and mathematics" and (b) to the "data of experience so vivid that, however one interprets them, they are universally admitted to occur, such as 'pain', 'memory', 'purpose', 'hate'.26

Methodologically, Hartshorne's conception of deity is founded in what religious man says about the God he worships. He bases his arguments for his particular philosophical explanation of these assertions on what reason requires and what he considers to be a consistent, coherent explanation of experience in general. Rāmānuja's method is basically the same. The difference between the two philosophers at this point are primarily matters of emphasis. Rāmānuja's emphasis is on the teachings of scripture; Hartshorne's is on reason.

Comparison of Epistemologies

The epistemologies of both Rāmānuja and Hartshorne are syntheses of idealism and realism. They are idealistic in the sense that it is the subject that proves the existence of the object, but they are realistic in that the object is not dependent upon the subject for its existence. In fact, just the opposite is true. Neither philosopher finds it possible to conceive of pure consciousness. To be conscious, for both of them, always means to be conscious of something, and that something exists independent of any particular

26. Ibid., p.62.
subject. Rāmānuja says for any object to be proven to exist it must be the object of some conscious subject, viz., an object could possibly exist independent of any subject but its existence could not be proven. Hartshorne's position is that to be an object is to be the object of some subject but of no particular subject. 27

The list of inadequacies Rāmānuja finds in the thought of the Advaita Vedāntans illustrates that he is just as committed to achieving a concept of deity that is consistent with reason and experience as is Hartshorne. 28 Regarding the supremacy of reason he writes: "If logical reasoning refutes something known through some means of knowledge, that means of knowledge is no longer authoritative!" 29

Rāmānuja accepts both sense-perception (pratyākṣa) and inference (anumāna) as valid pramanās or instruments of knowledge, as does Hartshorne, but he also considers sacred scripture (śruti), the testimony (śabda) of those who possess the "higher knowledge", to be a self-validating, unique source of knowledge, where Hartshorne does not. While the Scriptures are subject to the bar of reason, in the sense that they cannot affirm contradictory propositions, Rāmānuja believes that the higher knowledge of the Supreme Being cannot be attained through logical reasoning or experience, whether ordinary or yogic. Scripture alone is the source of this knowledge. This difference between Hartshorne and Rāmānuja is exemplified in their different understandings of how the existence of God is to be established. While they both reject all

27. The significance of this difference between Rāmānuja and Hartshorne is discussed on pages 90-111.
28. Supra, pp.5-6.
29. Thibaut, p.74.
empirically founded arguments, Hartshorne seeks to establish it by
the ontological argument, and Rāmānuja contends it cannot be rationally
established but as revealed in the sacred texts. 30

Hartshorne believes the existence of God, because of his unique
nature, can be affirmed on the basis of what is conceivable, when we
extrapolate from ordinary experience. And what is the nature of
ordinary experience? Hartshorne says

... reflection upon experience, if sufficiently
attentive, careful and dispassionate, will
convince anyone (a) that an ultimate dualism
of mind and mere matter is an absurdity, and
(b) that a monism of mere matter is only the same
dualism in disguise, since no one can effectively
think that there is no such thing as thinking ...
while he perfectly well can think that there is
no such thing as mere matter, wholly devoid of
feeling or awareness. 31

In sum, Hartshorne's contention is that the subject-object relation
is really a feeling of feeling, rather than a sentient subject
perceiving insentient matter, which is the common understanding of
the nature of experience and is the view of Rāmānuja. Hartshorne
contends that as long as experience is the only means of knowledge
and all experience is characterized by feeling there is no basis for
talking about non-sentient matter. He admits that such things as
colours and other abstractions do not feel and that compound entities

30. Actually Hartshorne's attempt to establish the existence of
God is more complex than this. Even though he has given more attention
to the ontological argument than any other, in Creative Synthesis and
Philosophic Method, Chapter XIV, he gives a revised form of the ontological,
cosmological, and teleological arguments and adds "Three Normative
Arguments" -- epistemic or idealistic, moral and aesthetic. But, here
again, he concludes: "None of the six arguments is empirical, from mere
fact; all are arguments from the requirements of concepts, concepts so
general or abstract that they cannot be simply rejected, though they may,
of course, be left implicit while more special concepts are explicitly
employed" (p.294).

like stones and trees, which are groups of individuals, do not feel, but the atomic entities that make up stones and trees do. They are responsive to changes that take place in their environment (e.g. temperature and humidity), which is but another way of saying they have "feeling" for other feeling entities around them. Groups do not have feelings or experiences because "they are individuals only as particular collective termini for the perceptions and thoughts of individuals". He calls this theory on the nature of existence "psychicalism" and defines it as "the doctrine that everything concrete feels, with the understanding that nothing irreducibly collective is as such, concrete". So "feeling", on Hartshorne's view is a 'cosmic variable', meaning that it characterizes every existent thing. Now, says Hartshorne, "something must measure the difference between the new local variables and other variables, must indicate the extent of the likeness and difference involved. Only a more inclusive, ultimately a cosmic, variable can furnish such a measure". Then, as we observe the objects of our experience, the "most obvious feature of the scale [of concrete entities, individuals] is increasing complexity of spatio-temporal structure. But over at least a part of the scale there is also an increase in psychological complexity - complexity of feeling, volition, and thought". The nature of this increasing complexity is that of higher individuals containing less complex individuals and the most


33. Ibid.

34. Beyond Humanism, p.113.

35. Ibid., pp. 115-116.
complex of all is God, the universal individual who contains all other individuals as his body.

God, for Hartshorne is "the integrated sum of existence". So the question of God's existence is really the question: "Is there an inherent harmony, capable of logical expression, between the religious and the secular functions of the human mind, and the world as portrayed in these functions?"

Rāmānuja also speaks of Brahman as the Supreme Individual (Paramātman), the Self who has the world as his body, but he does not believe that the existence of such a being can be argued for by extrapolating from experience. He is not convinced, on the basis of experience, that there is sufficient evidence for reason to make the inference that there is one supreme creator and sustainer of the universe rather than many. His reason for speaking of the ultimate principle in personal terms is founded in scripture. Early in the Rg-Veda there is reference to the primordial Puruṣa, from whose body the world is created, and the Upanisads have many references to Brahman as pervading the world as the soul pervades the body. Rāmānuja's reason for emphasizing this aspect of the Vedic Tradition stems from the strong emphasis given to the personal nature of deity by the Āḻvārs, the Vaiṣṇavite sect, and the Bhakti Movement in general, in which he was involved.

Thus when comparing the theories of knowledge of Rāmānuja and Hartshorne, we find that they both believe a synthesis of idealism and

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37. Ibid., pp.78-79.
38. Śrībhāṣya, pp.209-213.
realism most adequately explains the nature of experience in general and both insist that whatever is said about God must not violate the principles of consistent, coherent rational analysis. But, when it comes to attaining positive knowledge of God, there is not complete agreement between them. Hartshorne is of the opinion that reason alone, building from the basic religious affirmation that deus est caritas and a rational explanation of experience in general, can derive an adequate concept of deity that warrants acceptance by all rational men. Rāmānuja, on the other hand, does not have such faith in the power of reason. He believes that reason must be informed by the revelations of scripture if any knowledge of God, including his existence, is to be had at all.

This greater dependence on scripture in Rāmānuja's thought, we believe, accounts for his giving greater consideration to the soteriological aspects of religion in deriving his concept of deity, than does Hartshorne, and finally makes his philosophical understanding of the nature of God the more consistent of the two with the affirmations of men who worship. Concern with salvation is a dominant motif in the idea of God as conceived by religious men in general, and it is intimately related to the idea that deus est caritas. Hartshorne does have what he considers to be a reasonable and meaningful understanding of salvation, and it plays a significant role in his overall scheme, but the kind of salvation it affords is radically different from that expressed in sacred scriptures in general.

Now, since Hartshorne does not profess to be expositing scriptures, we cannot fault him on these grounds. The question that concerns us is, are there certain reasonable concerns, on the part of religious man,
implicit in the soteriological concepts of his scriptures, that Hartshorne does not adequately consider in his concept of deity? We will argue that there are and that this is a weakness in his thought that is more adequately treated by Rāmānuja. Further, we will see that the inadequacy of Hartshorne's concept of deity at this point is directly related to his rejection of the doctrine of substance, so the difference between the two philosophers regarding the role of scripture in obtaining knowledge of God is integrally related to the subject of our thesis.

The brief description of the epistemological theories of Rāmānuja and Hartshorne that we have given here are grossly oversimplified, but it is hoped that they are sufficient to indicate to the reader that there is adequate basic agreement between the two philosophers to warrant bringing their thought into juxtaposition and to make a comparative study fruitful. Also, it is hoped that what we have said will give the reader an idea of how the differences in the knowledge theories of the two philosophers figure in the development of the thesis. This is all it is intended to do at this point. Aspects of their theories will be further developed throughout the thesis because of the real relationship between what is known and what exists in both systems of thought.

Procedure for Explicating the Thesis

To justify this comparative study of the concepts of deity held by Rāmānuja and Hartshorne, we have briefly outlined the common elements in the situations and concerns that motivate their writing, and we have indicated the significant points of convergence and divergence in their
methodologies and epistemologies. With these preliminary considerations before us, we now turn to a fuller statement of the thesis of our study and a brief description of how it will be developed. To do this we will elaborate on other points of convergence in the thought of the two philosophers that we have only mentioned so far, i.e., their ideas concerning the nature of existence in general and of deity, what is Ultimate.

In our discussion up to this point, we have noted that both Rāmānuja and Hartshorne want to derive a concept of deity that will be consistent with and give an adequate rational explanation of religious man's idea of God as being supreme perfection and essentially characterized by love. The particular issue that concerns us is why it is that Rāmānuja thinks it is necessary to have a doctrine of substance as part of such a concept of deity and Hartshorne takes the opposite view that the substance doctrine destroys religious man's idea of God. Our thesis is that it is primarily soteriological concerns that force Rāmānuja to retain the substance doctrine and that, while this causes certain ambiguities and contradictions in his conception of the God-world relation, nevertheless, these concerns are an integral part of religious man's understanding of the God he worships. Hartshorne's rejection of this doctrine prevents him from adequately dealing with the soteriological concerns and keeps him from fulfilling the objective he has set for himself.

In our comparison of the epistemological theories of our two philosophers we noted that they both propose a synthesis of idealism and realism as the most comprehensive and consistent rational explanation of experience in general. This synthesis, in both cases, implies that
all ideas of existence are founded in experience, because to say something exists is to say it is or is destined to become an object of some experience. Thus, to understand the nature of existence we must understand the nature of experience and an adequate explanation of experience must be accepted as an adequate explanation of existence, because existence apart from experience is meaningless.

All questions about the nature of existence, then, are inevitably questions about the nature of experience. So, the next logical question is, what is the nature of experience? This brings us to a second epistemological tenet that Rāmānuja and Hartshorne hold in common, i.e., that experience is always experience of something.39 And, because every experience is an experience of something, every experience has two aspects, a conscious self and what the self is conscious of. Up to this point, because of the idealistic tenets in their epistemologies, our two philosophers are in agreement on the way existence is to be explained. Where they disagree is in their understanding of the nature of the self and what the self is conscious of, i.e., the nature of an individual, since they both define an individual as the unity of the experiencer and the experienced.

Rāmānuja's conception of an individual (jīva) involves two aspects. First, there is the experiencing subject or self (ātman), a substance (dravya) that provides the substratum that is necessarily presupposed in any adequate explanation of experience and primarily characterized by consciousness (caitanya).40 To say the experiencing subject is a substance means that it is something that abides in itself

39. Supra, p.17.
40. Infra, pp.32-37.
The second aspect of an individual is what the self is conscious of and is able to control for its own benefit, its body (ṣarīra), which constitutes the mode and attributes of the self at any given time. The substantial self must always have some mode and attributes but the only particular attribute that is necessary at all times is consciousness. Thus, on Rāmānuja's view, an individual is the unity of a knowing subject and a body, i.e., what the subject knows and controls, in a substance-attribute relationship.

Hartshorne, too, conceives of an individual as being a unity with two aspects, an experiencer and what is experienced. However, on his view, the knowing subject is not some substance that has experiences as its mode and attributes. Rather, the experiencer is just the momentary synthesis of experience that will itself become an objectified part of what is synthesized by the succeeding momentary self in a sequence of such unified experiences. Therefore, when we refer to an individual as something continuing to exist over a period of time, according to Hartshorne, we have reference to a set of common characteristics abstracted from the series of momentary selves. He believes the "notion of substance that it is an identical entity containing successive accidental properties is an absurdity, a misleading way of describing an individual enduring through change. The successive states are not 'in' the identical entity but rather ... it

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41. Śrībhāṣya, p.169.
42. Ibid., p.161.
43. infra, pp.38-41.
This statement reveals that the idea of "substance" rejected by Hartshorne is essentially the same as that affirmed by Rāmānuja.

The substantial self, Ātman, is the self-individuating principle in Rāmānuja's conception of an individual that establishes an ultimate separate identity for each individual, both in relation to other individuals and the ultimate individual, Brahman. The counterpart to the Ātman principle in Hartshorne's thought is a set of generic characteristics abstracted from the accumulated experiences synthesized in a sequence of events that is the life of the individual. It is the unique set of experiences that are summed up in the life of an individual at any present moment that distinguishes him from other individuals.

Rāmānuja's reasons for believing a substance doctrine is a necessary part of any concept of an individual that gives an adequate explanation of experience constitutes the subject matter of Chapter II. Hartshorne's alternate view, which does not include a substance doctrine but is able to account for all the aspects of experience that Rāmānuja believes makes a substance doctrine necessary, is discussed in Chapter III. The conclusion of these chapters is that Hartshorne appears to be correct in saying that a substance doctrine is superfluous to an adequate explanation of experience, and thus of existence, but we find that the "nervous system" in his conception of an individual comes close to Rāmānuja's Ātman principle at significant points.

The explication of our thesis begins with a discussion of individuals, not only because an understanding of the nature of the experiencer is

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44. Creative Synthesis, p.20.
necessary to an understanding of existence and thus of the epistemological and metaphysical presuppositions in the thought of Rāmānuja and Hartshorne, but for two other important reasons as well. First, as we have mentioned already, both philosophers conceive of deity as being the supreme person or individual. In developing their concepts of deity they both apply the basic principles involved in their conceptions of ordinary individuals to the Supreme Person. In fact, because the God men worship is perfection, both Rāmānuja and Hartshorne believe that deity is the supreme form of what it is to be an individual, the archetype of all individuals. Also, there is the point that since ordinary individuals are all part of the body of deity in both systems of thought, an analysis of their concepts of deity cannot be separated from an analysis of the nature of ordinary individuals. So, in Chapters IV and V, we discuss the concepts of an individual, as held by Rāmānuja and Hartshorne, with reference to the divine individual, the great worship-eliciting being. Again, in these chapters, we find that there are some interesting points of agreement between the proponents. We have noted that they both consider God to have perfect, unqualified love as one of his characteristics. We will see that they agree that God has perfect existence and perfect knowledge and is therefore infinite. But, whereas Rāmānuja conceives of Brahman as being one with all-existence and all-knowledge as eternally actual and concrete, for Hartshorne they are abstractions from all that has become actual and will characterize what is to become actual. Rāmānuja's position on the being-becoming relationship, which is the essential issue behind all the differences discussed in these chapters, involves him in certain ambiguities and contradictions that Hartshorne is able to avoid.
The second important reason why we begin our study with a discussion of individuals stems from our thesis that the primary reason for Rāmānuja insisting on a substance doctrine as part of his conception of both ordinary individual and the divine individual is his understanding of the nature of salvation as held by men who worship. The way one conceives of ordinary individual and the divine individual determines to a large extent one's conception of the God-world relationship in general and the way one understands salvation in particular. Hartshorne avoids the contradictions and inconsistencies that weaken Rāmānuja's position, but the doctrine of salvation that results from his concept of deity is unacceptable to Rāmānuja, or, we believe, to religious men of the East in general. These matters will be our primary concern in our concluding chapter.
II

RĀMĀNUJA'S CONCEPT OF AN INDIVIDUAL

In our brief comparison of the epistemological theories of Rāmānuja and Hartshorne in the introduction, we noted that they both propose a synthesis of idealism and realism as the most comprehensive and consistent rational explanation of experience in general. Rāmānuja's position is that all knowledge is knowledge of what is real, meaning that all objects of thought have as their cause something that corresponds to those thought objects that is external to thought itself. Consciousness does not create its objects according to Rāmānuja, in fact, he contends that consciousness cannot know its own existence apart from the experience of something other than itself.\(^1\) This is the realistic side of his theory of knowledge. On the other hand, he is an idealist in that he also maintains that it is direct perception that proves the existence of the objects of thought.\(^2\) Therefore, to say something exists is to say that it is, was, or is capable of being an object of experience. And, when these two aspects of Rāmānuja's theory of knowledge are considered together, we can infer that, on his view, an adequate account of all the aspects of the various kinds of experience will yield true understanding of the nature of existence in general. Consequently, through a survey of his analysis of the nature of experience,

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1. Śrībhāṣṭa, p.143. These objects of thought can be objects in the external world, feelings within the body, memory objects, or dream objects. Refer below, pp. 33-35.
2. Ibid., pp.54-56.
we will discover the role the doctrine of substance plays in his
metaphysics and what aspects of experience he thinks makes it a
necessary part of a comprehensive explanation of existence.

Because he believes every experience is necessarily an experience
of something, Rāmānuja contends that every experience presupposes the
existence of two things, a conscious self (ātman) and what the self is
conscious of. These two separate though intimately related entities
constitute what Rāmānuja conceives to be an individual (jīva). In other
words, he defines an individual as the unity of an experiencer and the
experienced.

Rāmānuja's conception of an individual (jīva) involves two aspects.
First, there is the experiencing subject or self (ātman), a substance
(dravya) that provides the substratum that is necessarily presupposed
in any adequate explanation of experience and primarily characterized
by consciousness (caitanya). To say the experiencing subject is a
substance means that it is something that abides in itself (svanisthā);
something that is essentially unchanging and eternally actual (asti).
The second aspect of an individual is what the self is conscious of and
is able to control for its own benefit, its body (śarīra), which
constitutes the mode and attributes of the self at any given time. The
substantial self must always have some mode and attributes but the
only particular attribute that is necessary at all times is consciousness.
Thus, on Rāmānuja's view, an individual is the unity of a knowing

subject and a body, i.e., what the subject knows and controls, in a substance-attribute relationship. Now the question is, what is the relationship between these two aspects? To get an answer to this question we must understand the nature of the ātman.

Ātman, the Substratum of Consciousness

The first thing to be said about the ātman, as Rāmānuja conceives it, is that it is the knowing subject (jñātr) in all experiencing. It is the permanent substratum of all knowing and acting, and it has consciousness (anubhūti, avagati, jñāna, samvit)\(^7\) as its essential nature. Rāmānuja rejects the idea that consciousness and ātman are identically one and the same.\(^8\) The relationship between them is visistādvaita, qualified non-duality. Consciousness and ātman are different in the sense that they denote different things, but they are not really different because the ātman has consciousness as its essential attribute and consciousness never exists otherwise.

Rāmānuja takes this position vis-à-vis the monism of Śaṅkara, who holds that ātman and consciousness are identical. To show the superiority of his position he points to the way in which consciousness is experienced. If we ask the monist how we know consciousness exists?, his answer is that it is self-evident. And, to this Rāmānuja replies, "what is that self to whom it is proven?" Consciousness is always experienced as relating a self to some object or group of objects;

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7. Śrībhāsya, pp.61, 70. All these terms refer to the same attribute according to Rāmānuja.

8. "The Knower alone is referred to as witness both in the Vedas and in the world [and] not mere Jñāna". (Ibid., p.77.)
"how possibly can that 'Samvit' experience its own nature of its own accord?" This argument against Śaṅkara is important to our thesis because of Rāmānuja's insistence that it is the experience of something that proves its existence and Hartshorne's idea that experience and existence are one. With this understanding of the relationship between experience and existence, Rāmānuja must establish a continuous, unbroken experience of being a self in order to establish the existence of the substantial ātman. Before we enter into a critical analysis of his position on this matter we will state all the arguments he puts forward to support the positing of a substantial self, because they are interrelated.

As we reflect on the experience of consciousness, our first consideration is the fact that its essential nature is such that it is its

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9. Ibid., p.61. This point presupposes Rāmānuja's idea that it is the experience of something that proves its existence. From this point of view, if there is no experience of consciousness, how do we know it exists? The Advaitan response to this is that it is intuited in all experience. If it is necessary to posit an individual ātman as the substratum of consciousness to which the existence of consciousness is proven, then we must infer that this ātman itself is consciousness in order for it to experience consciousness. Ashutosh Bhattacharyya Shastri, in his Studies in Post-Śaṅkara Dialectics (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1936), p.43, makes this criticism of Rāmānuja: "If ... knowledge is not believed to be capable of revealing its own existence and if it is thought to be dependent on another distinct knowledge for the revelation of its existence, the consequence will be a vicious infinite series and so no knowledge would be possible."

The Advaitans maintain that the being of consciousness is logically prior to the experience of consciousness. Consciousness is intuitively experienced when it is relation to māyā. But māyā is, on the Advaitan's own view, false (nāsti) or impermanent. Therefore, Rāmānuja asks, how can we prove the existence of a permanent, continuous, unchanging consciousness if it is only experienced in what is impermanent, momentary and constantly changing. Is it not equally possible that the impermanent, momentary objects of consciousness give rise to the moments of subjective consciousness, as the Buddhists suggest? In fact, this Buddhist idea is close to Hartshorne's idea that the knowing subject is essentially "feeling of feeling", so we will return to this question at the end of this chapter.
presence that makes it possible for other things to become objects of thought, but it cannot stand as an object to itself. Consciousness is the subject of all experience and the object of none. Therefore, we can readily see that its existence is evident in every experience, because it is the necessary presupposition in all experience. This is why consciousness is said to be svayamprakāśa, "self-luminous". However, consciousness is not self-luminous to consciousness in general; it is self-luminous to a self, Ātman. Just from an analysis of our ordinary experience, Rāmānuja claims, we see that the nature of experience reveals not only the self-luminous nature of consciousness but also the Ātman whose essential attribute it is.

'Anubhūti' is well known to all as a special attribute of the Ātman, the experiencer, having the nature of conducting favourableness for practical usage with respect to its resort of something by its very existence ...; relating to an object and having Ātman as the Witness in the form 'I know the jar', 'I comprehend this object', 'I am conscious of the jar'.

In the above statement, Rāmānuja makes two points. First, if consciousness is a self-existent substance rather than a quality of Ātman, it would serve no practical purpose. There would just be experience with no moral or aesthetic value. It would be an end in itself and one experience would be as valuable as another, which is contrary to our actual experience. We think of our experiences as

10. However, Rāmānuja does allow that past modes of one's own consciousness are valid objects of knowledge and we can know the consciousness of others by inference from their words and acts. "And if the inferential knowledge from the experiences of others is not admitted, there would be the undesirable result viz., the whole practical usage in respect of words would be rooted out [of existence] on account of the absence of apprehension of the relation between words and their senses" (Śrībhāṣya, p.54).

11. Śrībhāṣya, p.61.
having varying degrees of significance and as conveying varying
degrees of enjoyment and pain. Consciousness alone does not make
such value judgments nor does it make aesthetic discriminations, so
there must be some substratum that unifies these qualities.

His second point is that we are directly aware of the substrate,
âtman, and the attribute of that substrate, consciousness, in such
ordinary experiences as are expressed in the form 'I know the jar',
when consciousness relates the âtman to a jar. If there was consciousness
alone, rather than the conscious âtman, there would simply be the
experience of the jar rather than the experience of being a self who
has knowledge of the jar. In other words, all consciousness is
experienced as being "centered" or as radiating from some point, which
is its substratum, as opposed to it being some pervasive, self-existent
awareness. This is why Rāmānuja contends that consciousness is always
the consciousness of some âtman, some "I", and insists that the "I" is
just as real in the experience of the jar as the jar itself. The âtman
is a sāksin or witness, by nature, and this witness is what is referred
to in the first person in the form "I know". This is the teaching of
the scriptures, as well as being implied in ordinary language. 12 The
idea of "I" is an integral part of all experience and not something that
comes from reflection on experience.

Rāmānuja illustrates this relationship between the âtman and
consciousness with several analogies and derives a second argument for
the non-identity of âtman and consciousness. Consciousness is to the
âtman as the flame of a lamp, together with its lustre, is to the lamp,

12. Śrībhāṣya, p.77.
and as the lustre of a jewel is to the jewel. In each case the substrate and its attribute can be separated in thought and referred to as though they were separate entities, but the attribute has no existence apart from its substance.

The attribute is dependent on the substrate, but this does not imply that the substrate is in turn dependent upon the attribute. They exist in what Hartshorne calls an asymmetrical relationship.

As in the case of a lamp

... the lustre is the quality of the lustrous substance, still it is but the lustrous substance, not a quality like whiteness etc. on account of its existing elsewhere also, other than its resort, and on account of its being possessed of dissimilarity from the other attributes whiteness and others, as it is possessed of [the quality] colour. And it is a lustrous substance itself owing to its being possessed of an illumining quality, and not another object. And being possessed of illumining nature is due to illumining its own nature and others. The practical usage, however, of it as quality is based upon its having that permanent resort and being subordinate to it [the lustrous object].

Logically we can distinguish between the flame as a lustrous substance and the light emitted from it. In this sense light is a quality of the luminous substance, but existentially the light is not something apart from the luminous substance. Consequently, light is a quality of a luminous substance but not in the way whiteness is a quality. Whiteness can be a quality of a number of different kinds of substrata but light only of a luminous substances, i.e., substances that illumine themselves and other objects. Because of this, light and luminous substance have the same referend, but luminous substance refers to the substratum of light plus other qualities, e.g., heat. In the same way, the terms consciousness and Ṙmāṇ refer to the same entity, but

13. Ibid., p.64.
\textit{ātman} refers to the substratum of consciousness plus many other qualities.

**The Ātman and Its Essential Nature Unchanging and Permanent**

Let us grant that Rāmānuja's arguments justify his idea of a self that unifies its essential attribute consciousness with the other qualities that make up a unified experience. Is it not possible that the experiencer of something like a jar is just as impermanent as the jar, the object of the experience, i.e., is it nothing more than the unity of the qualities of that experience? If it is, it is not a self-existent \textit{dravya} or substance but a complex of interrelated qualities and dependent upon them for its existence. Rāmānuja refutes this and describes the \textit{ātman} as being permanent, unchanging and eternal. He writes: "Further, 'being the Knower' does not involve modification, for 'being the Knower' is being the resort of the quality of knowledge. And the knowledge of this [Ātman] which is eternal, owing to its being the natural attribute is eternal".\footnote{Ibid., p.69.} Assuming that the \textit{ātman} is eternal and unchanging, consciousness, as an essential quality of the \textit{ātman}, must also be eternal and unchanging.

We will not take up Rāmānuja's arguments for the eternality of the \textit{ātman} at this point\footnote{This will be discussed in Chapter IV.} but let us consider his reasons for saying it is permanent and unchanging. Again he points to the nature of experience. It is common for us to speak of having experienced a given object on previous occasions. We have two or more different cognitions.
of an object and we are able to speak of it as being the 
same object because they are the cognitions of the same conscious 
subject. Likewise, we experience change in the contents of consciousness 
(cognitions), as when we say, "I know the Periodic Table"; then, later 
on, when that cognition is no longer present in consciousness, we 
say, "I knew the Periodic Table at one time", or "I, the knowing subject, 
no longer have knowledge of the Periodic Table". This awareness of 
sameness and change in the contents of consciousness is possible only 
because of the permanent, perduring subject (ātman). "For there is no 
possibility of recognition by somebody of something experienced by 
another". 17

Rāmānuja's distinction between consciousness (Saṃvid) and cognitions 
(Saṃvedana) must not be misconstrued as meaning they are two separate 
referends. The ātman, as knowing subject, remains constant through 
all its experiences. Cognitions are but different modes of 
consciousness, as it expands and contracts. P.N. Srinivasachari puts 
it this way:

16. Cognition, conation, and feeling are three functions of consciousness.
17. Śrībhāṣya, p.61. P.N. Srinivasachari makes the following statement 
regarding the necessity of a continuing self:

The postulation of a mental series without an 
enduring self behind it is self-contradictory.
Being is always presupposed in the process of 
becoming. The view that consciousness is momentary 
and perishing fails to explain the reality of the 
persistence of the self based upon personal identity.
The self is not a mere aggregate of the five skandhas, 
but is a permanent subject which makes possible the 
synthetic unity of different sensations. The sensa-
tionalistic view would lead to nihilism as is illus-
trated in the history of European thought in transition 
from Locke to Hume. Philosophy of Viśistādvaita, pp.10-11.
Jñāna is the determining quality of the ātman; but it is also substantive as it is subject to the changes of contraction and expansion ...

Jñāna is ever identical with itself though its manifestations are liable to change. It changes without losing its nature and remains the same entity. 18

To understand how this is possible, we must realize that for Rāmānuja the ātman is atomic. It is a non-extended point from which its attribute jñāna radiates. Potentially, the pervasiveness of consciousness is infinite, in that it is not essentially limited by anything other than itself (a matter to which we shall return). 19

Consciousness is always the same. All ideas of change are but changes in the mode of consciousness as it expands and contracts in correspondence with the objects of consciousness, causing it to manifest itself in different ways.

With respect to this image of the ātman reaching out via its consciousness, Rāmānuja speaks of it as "enjoyer" (bhoktr), i.e., as a passive receiver of the modifications which its consciousness undergoes. And, in relation to this, we begin to see the relationship that exists between the ātman and the body.

Rāmānuja says the ātman, "abiding in one part of the body, experiences pain abiding in the whole of the body". 20 The ātman is located in the heart and pervades the whole body by its quality consciousness working through the prānas, i.e. the vital breath and the five sense organs. Rāmānuja quotes the Brhadāranyaka Upanisad (II:1:18):

20. Śrībhāṣya, p.729.
"In this very way, he catching hold of these vital airs, moves about at will within his body". And what is a body? "Any substance which a sentient soul is capable of completely controlling and supporting for its own purposes, and which stands to the soul in an entirely subordinate relation, is the body of that soul".21

The physical body then, is a kind of vehicle (śarīra) for the ātman, which is sensitive to its body because it is by nature a conscious subject. Being embodied, in this way, the consciousness of the ātman takes the form of the body that contains it and experiences that body as being its own. Because of this, we can say that the body literally informs the soul’s consciousness. However, the consciousness is not limited to the body, it extends itself through the sense-organs to the outside world and becomes informed by the objects and effects of other consciousnesses it encounters there. Hence, it is the particular information of the consciousness of the ātman that constitutes its self-knowledge (thinking of the self as identical with the body) and its knowledge of the world, of which the body is the most

21. Thibaut, p.424. The significant point to be remembered regarding the relationship between the ātman and the other aspects of the jīva is that the ātman is of a different order. It is eternal, uncreated and essentially unchanging, whereas all the other aspects are temporarily created by Ṣiva out of prakṛti. As to the number and order of the categories into which the prakṛti aspect of the jīva is divided, as Rāmānuja conceived them, we need not be greatly concerned. Srinivasachari writes: "Viśistādvaīta defines the self negatively as the purusa different from the twenty-four categories of prakṛti". op. cit., p.285.

The main categories mentioned by Rāmānuja are prāṇa (vital breath), manas (mind), and the five indriyas (sense organs). He describes their functions in this way:

The work of the organs, inclusive of the manas, is to act as instruments of cognition and action, while the work of breath is to maintain the body and the organs. It is for this reason that the subsistence of the organs depends on breath, that the organs themselves are called prāṇas. Thibaut, p.577.
immediate part. In this way, Rāmānuja is able to speak of the individual (jīva) as changing, because the essential consciousness of the ātman does undergo real change in its mode of being (epistemic change), while the essential nature of the ātman, which is ontological, i.e., constitutes its being, remains constant. 22

Rāmānuja thus takes the relationship between consciousness and cognitions to be one of substance to attributes. But, so far, his description of an individual has only explained how a continuous, essentially unchanging consciousness can be proven to exist through a series of modes of consciousness. Rāmānuja's proposition requires more than this. Can one who says that the existence of something is proven by knowledge of it speak of something having unchanging, permanent being and, at the same time, admit that the knowledge that proves the existence of that being changes? There must be consciousness of something, viz., consciousness must be informed in some way at all times, to intuitively prove the permanent existence of consciousness itself. A cessation or lapse of consciousness would leave open the possibility that the conscious ātman is impermanent and that its existence is contingent upon the impermanent objects of its experience. Consequently, Rāmānuja's idea of a continuing self is contingent upon a continuing consciousness of something in all states of existence. And, he sees no reason for believing that this is not the case. The differences in experience between the various states of existence -- waking, dreaming, deep sleep, and turiya or release, are simply

22. F.K. Lazarus, in his book Rāmānuja and Bovne (Bombay: Chetana Ltd., 1962), p.231, makes the distinction this way: "The changeful character of finite knowledge is owing to its association with the body, while the capacity to know at all is associated only with selves".
differences in the degree to which consciousness is extended. It is not that consciousness is present in some of these states and absent in others. After all, in the state of being awake, all experience belongs to a knowing "I"; dreams are always the dreams of some knowing subject; and even in the state of deep sleep the self "shines forth only in the form 'I', because he illumining in respect of himself does shine forth as 'I' alone".23 This is evident from the fact that "the person risen from sleep reviews the thing experienced prior to the state of deep sleep in the form 'By me was done this', 'By me was this experienced', 'I myself spoke thus'".24 Furthermore, "that inmost Ātman shines forth as 'I' himself even in Salvation, on account of his illumining in respect of himself".25

The idea of a continuing conscious Ātman, at least at the common sense level of understanding, in the states of being awake and dreaming are not too difficult to accept, but when it comes to speaking of the Ātman as being conscious of something in deep sleep or "in Salvation",26 we are not as willing to accede to the possibility. Therefore, we must be more explicit about what is meant by "being conscious of something".

The most important point to be realized in this regard is that "being conscious of something" does not mean the same thing as "being conscious of an object". Rāmānuja says that consciousness in this latter sense is not eternal and the knowledge of this is derived from

23. Śrībhāsyā, p.77.
24. Ibid., p.76.
25. Ibid., p.78.
26. We will take up the meaning of this in Chapter VI.
"valid non-perception" (anupalabdhi).

... the knowledge from Direct perception proving its object, jar and others existing at the time of its own existence, is not seen to make one apprehend the existence [of the jar and others] at all times, the existence pertaining to the prior and posterior time of jar and others is not apprehended, and that non-apprehension is on account of the apprehension of the cognition circumscribed by time.27

The point of this being that if consciousness of objects is eternal, then the objects themselves must be eternal, since it is the direct perception of objects that proves their existence, i.e., to say an object 'exists' is to say it 'exists for consciousness'. Thus, in true idealistic form, Rāmānuja makes the existence of an object depend on the subject. But, at the same time, he maintains that there is no knowledge of consciousness apart from objects. "There cannot be for the matter of that, any 'samvit' not referring to any object, on account of (its) non-perception; for, the self-illumination of the 'samvit' has been justified by Perception itself (and) owing to its having the nature of illuminating the object itself".28 In brief, being conscious of objects or consciousness in the subject-object relationship is in constant flux, with the existence of objects and knowledge of consciousness being dependent upon each other. Added to this is the fact that consciousness of objects is non-existent in the states of deep sleep, intoxication, swoon, etc., because in these states we remember nothing as having been experienced and "the absence of remembrance as a rule establishes definitely the absence of experience".29 Further-

27. Śrībhāṣya, p. 56.
28. Ibid., p. 57.
29. Ibid. Rāmānuja does not take this to be an absolute rule, because there is the possibility of the loss of all impressions, as in the case of "the extinction of the body, which sets at naught all impressions" (loc. cit.).
more, this lack of remembrance during the state of deep sleep is not a matter of forgetting, because there is definite non-perception; "its establishment being done by the reflection itself in the form 'I did not know anything during this time' in the case of one risen from sleep".30

Consciousness in the mode of being conscious of external objects comes and goes, but consciousness qua consciousness is always present.

In the case of Jñāna existing even in deep sleep etc., there is the possibility of its manifestation in the waking state etc., and so, its being an attribute persisting in its nature is appropriate. Like the (virile) nature of man etc. - Just as the virile ingredient etc., the essential characteristic of a man, although existing in childhood, is unmanifest, and is manifested in youth, by this (one cannot say that) being possessed of the virility is only occasional in a man.31

Consciousness is always present, but it is manifested only in the waking state and in dreams, when it relates itself to object. We could say that in deep sleep consciousness is a potentiality, which it is, but it is more than that, because there is the unbroken, always actual consciousness of being an "I" (ātmānubhava). This "I-consciousness" is not a matter of the consciousness having the "I" as object but an awareness of being. P.N. Srinivasachari puts it this way:


30. Ibid., pp.57, 58.
31. Ibid., p.733.
is different from the knowing processes and is presupposed in the subject-object consciousness. 32

An indication of this "I-awareness" in deep sleep is found in the statement "I slept well", says Rāmānuja. When we reflect upon a period of deep sleep in this way, it appears that even during that time the "I" was aware of the pleasure of sleep. 33 It is in this sense of consciousness as self-awareness that the conscious subject, the ātman, is ever conscious of something. Consequently, this having been established, it cannot be maintained that to be a knower, a conscious subject, is to be something essentially changing. "For to be a knower is to be the substrate of the quality of knowledge, and as the knowing self is eternal, knowledge which is an essential quality of the self is also eternal." 34 Another way of stating what Rāmānuja believes he has established is to say that the ontological status of the ātman is always the same but it undergoes epistemic change.

The Ātman As Agent

Having established the permanence of the atomic ātman and of its unchanging essential attribute, consciousness, Rāmānuja proceeds to arguments that demonstrate that the ātman is also a doer, an agent (kartr), and not just a passive knower or enjoyer (bhoktr). This latter idea, that the ātman is by nature a bhoktr is derived from the fact that the conscious ātman must always be conscious of something in order to prove its continuous, permanent existence. Now the question is, where

32. Srinivasachari, p.289.
33. Śrībhāṣya, p.75. Rāmānuja appears to contradict this idea of consciousness continuing in deep sleep in IV:4:16 of the Śrībhāṣya where he states that the ātman is unconscious in the states of deep sleep and dying. We will take this matter up in Chapter VI when we discuss the characteristics of the released ātman.
34. Thibaut, p.63.
is the locus of responsibility for the particular cognitions that inform the consciousness of the ātman at any given time and constitute its self-understanding, and that give rise to the particular behaviour manifested by the ātman at any given time? Rāmānuja insists that this responsibility must ultimately rest within the sentient ātman itself. His insistence is based on three principles: the relevance of scripture to the ātman's self-understanding, the responsibility of the ātman for what it knows and does not know, and the responsibility of the ātman for its existential situation.

Let us take his arguments based on scriptural significance first. Does scripture have any relevance to the ātman? If it does, the injunctions to do certain acts imply that the ātman is an agent. Deny that the ātman is an agent and you make the scripture irrelevant. Scriptures (śāstras) prescribe actions for the one who is "desirous of heaven" and "the one desirous of liberation". The very word "śāstra" is derived from the root "śās", which means to command, to order, to direct. He writes: "the Śāstra is (so called) because of its Śāsana (ordering), and Śāsana is - directing (one) to act and the role of a director in the case of Śāstra is through producing knowledge".35 For instance, in the case of "the one desirous of liberation", he is directed to meditate on Brahmān. If this injunction is addressed to the non-sentient aspect of man rather than the sentient ātman, the śāstras are insignificant as far as the latter is concerned. "Therefore, it is only when the enjoyer, a sentient one, is the agent, that the Śāstra can have significance".36

35. Śrībhāṣya, p.736.
36. Ibid.
The matter of the ātman's responsibility for what it knows and does not know, the second principle Rāmānuja is concerned with, is related to the first. He reminds us that the scriptures say that "Knowledge performs the sacrifice, it performs all works" (Tait. Up. II:5).\(^{37}\) It is true that these acts are done by the body of the ātman, so with respect to the mechanics of the act, the ātman is not the agent. However, "knowledge" necessarily has the ātman as its substrate, so this verse must mean that the active will of the sentient ātman is ultimately the agent in the making of sacrifice and the performance of all works.

Furthermore, the conscious ātman is responsible for its knowledge because of the manner in which knowledge is received. For one thing, as mentioned above and as stated in scripture, the ātman moves about its own body through the prānas. This presumably requires an act of will on the part of the ātman, so the degree to which consciousness is extended at any time is self-determined. In other words, even though the consciousness does not create its objects, it determines what is to be accepted into consciousness. And, it determines the manner in which it receives impressions of objects external to it. Every cognition involves the discrimination of qualities and objects, of truth and falsity, or of some ethical or aesthetic value. So each cognition involves an act of judgment on the part of the conscious ātman.

If it is said that scripture does not direct the ātman to do but

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37. This same text says: "All the gods worship as the eldest the Brahman which is understanding", which implies that the Brahman is the agent in the sacrifice and works, rather than the ātman. Rāmānuja resolves this apparent problem through his antarpātīn doctrine, which we consider in Chapter IV.
to realize what is, i.e., to appropriate knowledge of its self, then
the act of appropriation is at least appropriate for the ātman. If no
act is required, it is what it now knows itself to be. This implies
that the ātman has no responsibility for its present knowledge, which
includes its present self-understanding. But, considering the way
knowledge is acquired and the fact that actions are not all shared
equally by all ātmans but are experienced as my acts and the acts of
others, both experiences involving a responsible, active knower, to
say that the ātman is not this active, knowing subject is to take it
out of the realm of knowledge altogether. Consequently, practical
reason requires that we acknowledge that the agent responsible for the
act of knowing is none other than the ātman.

The ātman is responsible not only for what it knows and does not
know, it is also responsible for its existential situation.38 This is
necessarily so, on the basis of practical reason, because if we attribute
all acts to the body, the guṇas, and insist that the ātman, as non-
agent, is something apart from and unrelated to the existential
situation upon which the body acts, then we must ask, what is the
situation of the ātman? The only situation that consciousness knows is
the one in which it performs the sacrifice and all other works. There-
fore, the ātman can only be the substrate of that active, knowing
subject whose situation is that upon which it acts through its body.

38. The particular existential situation in which the ātman is located
at any particular time is due to a number of factors other than its own
determining powers. In fact, the chief determining agent at any time
is Ṛśvara, who determines the level of existence in which the ātman is
embodied and to a large degree the kind of experience the ātman has. Even
the dreams he has are produced by Ṛśvara. However, Ṛśvara causes the
ātman's type of embodiment and experiences on the basis of the particular
karma of the individual and this is what makes him responsible for his
own situation. We will discuss this further in Chapter VI.
This point is extremely crucial with reference to the act of meditation in the final state (samādhi), which is the instrument of release (mukti), if it does not belong to the ātman. But it is just in this act that the ātman realizes its difference from prakṛti (which includes all aspects of the self other than the ātman). Therefore, this act cannot belong to anything other than the ātman itself.39 If the act does belong to something other than the ātman, then the experience of mukti will also belong to that something and not the ātman. This, according to Rāmānuja, would make all human activity essentially meaningless in any ultimate, significant sense. And, as already noted in our introductory remarks, one of the most important concerns motivating Rāmānuja's thought, which he shares with Hartshorne, is to work out a relationship between the eternal, universal, necessary aspect of existence (being) and the temporal, particular, contingent aspect (becoming) in such a way as to give ultimate significance to the latter.

We have presented Rāmānuja's arguments in support of the thesis that the ātman is a kartr very briefly because we are not concerned with the details or with the particular psycho-physical concepts used by him. Our only concern is with the kind of arguments he uses and the fundamental principles he is concerned with. All the arguments are basically in the form of: given a certain fundamental principle, practical reason requires that we affirm that ātman is an agent.

Before we move to Hartshorne, we must notice two more significant points about Rāmānuja's conception of the ātman as agent. The first is

39. Śrībhāṣya, II:3:34-38.
germane to our comparison of these two philosophers, because, whereas we find Hartshorne saying, "To exist is to act upon other existing things", making the activity of being in relatedness the necessary element of existence. Rāmānuja makes self-consciousness the necessary characteristic and says that activity affected by the ātman on and through its body is non-essential.

The ātman, although endowed with the sense-organs – vāk (Speech) etc., acts when he wishes, but does not act when he wishes not; just as a carpenter even when the tools, axe, etc., are near, acts or does not act according to his will.

The ātman is essentially a knowing subject and is always present to itself as a subject, as "I". Therefore the act of knowing, in the sense of conscious self-awareness, is essential to the ātman to prove its existence and the existence of consciousness itself. But, the existence of the jīva, as the unity of an experiencer, the conscious ātman, and what is experienced, the intuited substance, ātman, is not contingent upon it being actively related to anything external to itself, as Hartshorne affirms. His existence is independent of the external world. The import of this is that the being of the self is always actual, i.e., transcendental to temporality, and his activities are all temporal and particular. Even the activity of knowing, in the discursive, subject-object sense, is always temporal and particular; therefore they are dependent for their being upon their substratum, the ātman.

40. Creative Synthesis, p.113. The meaning of this statement will be explained in the next chapter where the implications of the difference between Rāmānuja and Hartshorne on this point will also be dealt with.  
41. Śrībhāṣṭra, p.740.
The second significant point we need to take note of concerning the ātman as an agent is that the decision to act in a given way is a free decision on the part of the ātman. Rāmānuja says the ātman acts "according to his will", and that this is allowed by the Lord (Īśvara). This is a significant point for our study because one of Hartshorne's major criticisms of classical theism is that it does not allow (with logical consistency) for real freedom. The reason it does not is that freedom is precluded by its understanding of divine omniscience. And, the logical consequence of this, Hartshorne maintains, is that ultimately meaningful (in the sense of "meaningful to God") moral acts are also precluded.

It is precisely in this context, i.e., of what morality requires, that Rāmānuja speaks of the kind of freedom the ātman has in his acting.

Those Kṣetra-Knowers again, with powers endowed by him, with sense-organs and body awarded by him, with him as their support, of their own accord, in conformity with their will, take to Karmans of the nature of merit and demerit. And then, having known (a person) performing a deed of the nature of merit and acting in accordance with his ordinance - (the Paramapuruṣa) makes him prosper in religious duty, material prosperity, love and salvation; he unites one transgressing (his) ordinance with their opposites.

Using Rāmānuja's analogy of the ātman as a carpenter, we can say that all the tools for any activity and the ability to act at all are supplied to the ātman (kṣetra-knower or "knower of the field") by Īśvara (Paramapuruṣa). Because of this, there is not even the possibility

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42. Hartshorne believes the doctrine of a substantial self-identical individual is one of the greatest deterrents to a logically consistent idea of freedom. This problem is discussed infra, pp. 240-242.
43. Śrībhīṣya, p. 643.
for acting apart from the Supreme Lord. In fact, Rāmānuja explicitly states that without the "permission of the Paramātman" the activity of the ātman is impossible. However, the ātman does have sufficient freedom in determining how he shall act on any given occasion to make him responsible for the consequences of his acts. And, it is on the basis of his acts that the karmāṇa of the individual is determined to be good or bad. Hence, it is the way the individual exercises his freedom that determines the kind of karmāṇa he has and Īśvara justly rewards each individual according to his karmāṇa without pity.
Without this freedom, all injunctions and prohibitions would be meaningless. Consequently, on the basis of what morality requires, Rāmānuja rejects the idea that all activity is totally determined by forces external to the ātman.

In the beginning of this chapter, we stated that Rāmānuja supports the classical substance-attribute dichotomy in his analysis of what constitutes an individual. We have seen how, in the case of an individual sentient being (jīva), the ātman is the substratum of his essential quality, consciousness (samvit), which is always actual, and of his non-essential quality, active agent (kartr), which is always potentially present but actual only when freely willed by the ātman. We have considered Rāmānuja's arguments as to why the ātman must be, along with his essential quality, permanent and unchanging. What changes is the mode of consciousness and the body, the second aspect of the jīva, in which the ātman abides. The body is non-essential to the being of the ātman, for he can exist in a bodiless state, but some body is

44. Ibid., p.741.
45. In the state of release (mokṣa) the ātman may be with or without a body by an act of will. Śrībhūṣaṇa, p.1049.
necessary for him to have particular objective experience and to actualize his potentially active nature. Furthermore, it is the previous acts of the Ātman that caused his present mode of being. This is what gives value to the contingent, becoming aspect of existence. Hence, for Rāmānuja, the becoming aspect of the jīva is dependent upon the being aspect, which is just the opposite of Hartshorne's conception of the individual, where the being aspect is dependent on the becoming.

**Hartshorne's Criticism of Rāmānuja's Concept of An Individual**

As we turn now to Hartshorne's critique of Rāmānuja's concept of an individual, the primary question before us is, is the doctrine of substance, the Ātman concept, necessary to a coherent, consistent explanation of those aspects of experience that Rāmānuja points to as evidence of the existence of a continuous, permanent, self-identical individual? From what has been said so far, we see that Hartshorne is partially right when he states that Rāmānuja contends "that it is the body, but not the soul, that is touched by infancy, youth, etc." For Rāmānuja, these are all modes of the body in which the soul abides. But Hartshorne is only partially correct, because he does not take note of Rāmānuja's idea that changes in the body carry with them changes in the mode of consciousness and consciousness itself. This being the case, Hartshorne's reply would be that the conscious Ātman is not then the substratum of experience but is an abstraction from particular conscious experiences. Hence, concerning the doctrine of the unchanging, permanent soul he writes:

This is an argument not from experience but from traditional dogma. No one experiences a soul that is mature when the body is infantile or adolescent! (And if the soul is neither mature nor immature, then it is abstract.) It is theory that is here trying to shape the evidence, not evidence that is shaping the theory.47

This statement is a direct contradiction of the way in which Rāmānuja tries to establish the existence of a permanent, unchanging soul. It is true that this doctrine came to him through the śāstras, but he believes it to be validated in all experience. Granted, there is no experience of a soul in the subject-object sense, but it is a necessary condition for any experience whatsoever, and it is therefore intuited in all experience.

Hartshorne's complaint with this positing of a conscious subject as a necessary substratum upon which objects act is that it is "uneconomical of principles". It is unnecessary to speak in terms of a conscious subject that is contemporary with objects that affect it with experiences. "The given things are not effects upon the experience, as a kind of stuff moulded by hidden influences; instead, the given things are the real things, and the effect is simply the experience itself, as experience of those very things."48 This statement implies one of the two ways in which Hartshorne believes the term "individual" can be used, i.e., that it refers to the momentary,

47. Ibid.

48. Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1970), p.106. Following Whitehead, Hartshorne is able to overcome Humean skepticism by rejecting the bifurcation of nature into nature as it is in itself and nature as it is experienced. Rāmānuja does not have this problem because of his common sense theory of knowledge.
concrete unity of experience that is expressed in the grammatical form "I know". In this sense an individual is an event and "by event we mean a minimal temporal unity, or cross section, so to speak, of some actual process, such as the process of experiencing in a certain human being". This way of defining an individual has greater conceptual adequacy than defining it in terms of "substance or enduring individual", not only because it is economical of principles but also because this is the only way in which the inexhaustible complexity and concrete particularity of each individual can be comprehended in thought. All ideas of substance and enduring individuals, like concepts of species and genus, are abstractions from the fluxing, concrete particularity of the sequence of events that reality is. Hartshorne also uses the term "individual" in this second sense, i.e., to refer to certain abstract characteristics that per- 49

dure through a sequence of events that are causally related. Such abstractions are convenient classifications for the ordering of human knowledge, with its human limitations, but, he says, we should not allow these limitations to determine what is real.

The Greeks considered concrete particulars to be incomprehensible and unintelligible, because of their variety and constantly changing character; so, as far as they were concerned, the only certain knowledge is knowledge of abstract forms, which remain constant amid all the flux. But they were not content to consider these as abstract forms and developed the doctrine of substance. This doctrine maintains that

49. Ibid., p.173.
50. Ibid., pp.173-174.
the abstract forms are what constitutes being, substance. They are what truly exists and everything else, i.e., things in the realm of becoming, is an attribute of substance and exists only insofar as it participates in the substantial categories of being.

Hartshorne says we must admit that, even in our own time, it is necessary for the scientist to use abstractions in order to organize data and make predictions about and explanations of the behaviour of the natural world. However, scientific achievement comes not from taking these abstractions as the ultimate reality but from taking the concrete seriously and being content with the uncertainty and inadequacy of abstractions, recognizing them as a necessary means for dealing with the concrete, which is the real, due to our human limitations. 51

Thus Hartshorne accuses substantialism of detracting from a serious consideration of the concrete particularity of existence and consequently from its significance. This charge is a serious one for Rāmānuja, if he is guilty (as Hartshorne thinks he is), because, as we noted earlier, he too wants to give significance to the particular acts and circumstances of existence in the world.

Hartshorne understands Rāmānuja's position to be that the "soul is above events, for it is a being, and they are merely becoming". Whereas, he says, "Actually, it is being that is given as a mere aspect of becoming". 52  However, inspite of the fact that Hartshorne judges


Rāmānuja to be in error at this point, he still feels justified in claiming him as a panentheist insofar as the soul, as he conceives it, is capable "of forming a constituent of a body, such as the body of God".  

He grasps the principle, with which all our knowledge agrees, that a body is not essentially a single mass of stuff forming a single substance with a soul but is a plurality of items (cells, molecules) subject to the supreme influence or rule of one individual, which is the soul.

In the above statement Hartshorne does take notice of Rāmānuja's idea that changes in the body carry with them changes in the mode of the ātman's consciousness. He points to this as being a significant difference between Rāmānuja's conception of the soul and that of Western substantialism because it provides for a definite, real relationship between the soul and the body. The soul is the ruler of the body. Now the question is, does the grasping of this principle save Rāmānuja from the consequence of making the becoming, contingent aspect of existence insignificant? Hartshorne says, no.

... this is only half of the truth, the other half being that the soul is ruler, not by virtue of a merely one-way influence between it and the ruled items, but by virtue of a mutual action and reaction in which the soul's influence upon any one item tends to be radically more decisive than that of this item alone upon the soul. There is a superiority of influence from the soul, but this is not a superiority in reference to zero, as though the items simply failed to influence the ruling item.

As Hartshorne understands Rāmānuja, he has not escaped the substantialist

53. Ibid., p.187.
54. Ibid., pp.187-188.
55. Ibid., p.188.
problem because he formulates the body-soul relationship in such a way that the soul affects the body and not *vice versa*. And, the consequence of this is that the body has no ultimate significance to the soul, which can exist without it (above, pp.37-45).

The critical question underlying this whole matter of the body-soul relationship is, of course, the question of the relationship between being and becoming. Hartshorne is correct in his understanding of Rāmānuja when he says Rāmānuja makes being primary and becoming dependent upon it, and, because of this, the becoming aspect of existence does not prove to be significant for being *qua* being. The essential being of the ātman is not affected by his contingent, ever-changing body. But, this does not imply that the body is non-significant, as far as Rāmānuja is concerned, because there is no pure, undifferentiated, distinctionless being. Being is always in some mode of being. Or, to put it another way, there is no substance without some qualities. A distinctionless object cannot be an object of knowledge and something unknown cannot be said to exist.

Therefore, because in the case of an object definitely particularized by some distinctive attribute or other, other distinctive attributes are ruled out, there cannot be the establishment of a distinctionless object anywhere. For, in the case of consciousness (*saññvit*) there is the nature of consciousness and self-illumining nature on account of the knower being apprehended as having the nature of illumining the object. And in the case of the deep-sleep-state, intoxication and swoon, the experience is definitely a particularized one ...

To bring out the full import of this statement, we need to draw together the major points we have discussed concerning Rāmānuja's concept of an

56. Šrībhāṣya, pp.45-46. Supra, pp.44-45.
individual. First, we have noted that the atman constitutes the being of the individual; it is the substance. This substance has as its essential quality, consciousness (samvit). Thirdly, consciousness is never pure-consciousness but always conscious of something. Points two and three refer to the essential, differentiating qualities of the substance of the individual, point one. This is the bearing of the above quotation. These three factors are the necessary conditions for an individual and they are the sufficient conditions. The presence or absence of a body does not determine the existence of an individual, but the presence or absence of differentiating qualities does. Therefore, the soul, with respect to the body, is self-sufficient in its existence. The significance of the body to the soul is not in its determining that the soul exists but how it exists.

As mentioned earlier (p.41), the differences in the various states of existence - waking, dreaming, deep sleep and release - are due to the degree to which the consciousness is extended. The consciousness is least extended in deep sleep and death, when there is only what we have called "I-consciousness". But for Rāmānuja, this is not the ideal state. In fact, in contrast to Śaṅkara, he does not consider it to be superior to waking and dreaming. The ideal state is that in which consciousness has infinite extension, i.e., awareness of all that is, omniscience. This condition of unrestricted consciousness is the nature of consciousness in mokṣa. In this state the atman enjoys as many bodies as it wills.

57. Supra, pp.32-33.
58. Supra, pp.41-45.
When the atman has attained moksa, the body is a source of enjoyment, even though it belongs to the realm of becoming and contingency, because the atman knows its being is not dependent upon any or no particular body and it has any body at its will. Secondly, even while confined to a particular body in this existence, the atman, who knows its true nature, knows that its being is not dependent upon the body, but this does not mean its body is insignificant. Rather, the body is a useful tool, given by God (Īśvara), necessary for it to actualize its potential as an agent, and this is not unimportant, as we have seen. Acting is necessary for the individual to fulfill the precepts of the Vedas. It is necessary to preserve the world order, through which the eternal dharma is revealed. Acting is necessary for the individual to work out his karma, which is justly his, and by the contemplation of which his true nature is realized. Lastly and most importantly, the body is significant because, even though the atman is self-sufficient concerning its existence, in relation to the body, it is not self-sufficient concerning the quality of its existence. So, for aesthetic reasons, the body is important. And, as we shall see, aesthetic values are ultimate as far as Hartshorne is concerned.

Does this elucidation of Rāmānuja's idea of how the body is

60. All the characteristics of the released soul will be discussed in Chapter VI.
61. Supra, pp.45-52.
62. It is essential that we understand that "knowledge" of one's true nature in Indian thought is more than intellectual assent. It is primarily intuitive insight.
63. Infra, pp.249-255.
related to the soul controvert Hartshorne's objection to his particular form of substantialism on the basis of it detracting from the significance of the becoming, contingent aspect of existence? Perhaps it does. The answer depends on the criterion that is used to determine significance. We will compare the criteria used by the two philosophers after we have a better grasp of Hartshorne's concept of an individual. At the present, there remains the question of whether the substance-attribute dichotomy that Rāmānuja uses to maintain his idea of an essentially unchanging Ātman that receives aesthetic value from an ever changing world involves him in contradiction?

Focusing the Main Issues

Does the substance-attribute dichotomy involve Rāmānuja in contradiction? On his view, a physical organism has two aspects — an Ātman or soul that is substance (dravya), and therefore eternally actual, permanent and unchanging, and a body that is temporal, impermanent, everchanging and expresses the mode and attributes of the Ātman. The essential characteristic of the Ātman is consciousness. It is also the enjoyer or witness in all individual experiences and the responsible agent in all individual activities. There is a one way dependence between these two aspects. The modes and attributes depend on the essential, substantial self, but not vice versa, even though substance must manifest itself in some mode and attributes in order to prove its existence to itself and others, because the substance is the cause of the being of the attributes. It is this need for the Ātman to manifest itself in particular forms and qualities that gives significance to the modes of the Ātman; and, in the case of the divine
individual, gives significance to the world for deity.

Now the question is, what is the relationship between these two aspects? Rāmānuja contends that the ātman of the īva or individual knows its body and controls it through its essential characteristic, consciousness. Consciousness is informed by the body and through the body it knows and acts upon the external world. The "information" of consciousness qualifies it in various ways and is the source of its cognitions, but consciousness itself, he insists, remains essentially unchanged, just as clay can take the forms of cups, vases, plates, figurines, etc. and still be essentially the same substance, clay.

Does this mean that clay exists apart from all particular forms? No, says Rāmānuja, it always has some form. Then is it not the case that "clay" is an abstraction from the particular clay objects? And, in the same way, is "consciousness" not an abstraction from particular conscious experiences? Again Rāmānuja's reply is negative. Consciousness is the cause of particular experiences, particular experiences cannot cause consciousness, so it is logically prior. Furthermore, consciousness is experienced as actual in all experience. It is continuous and permanent, whereas all particular cognitions are impermanent, momentary and everchanging. How does he know consciousness is permanent, continuous and essentially unchanging? His evidence is found in the experience of memory, recognition and, above all, in the ever present consciousness of being an "I", a self. If the idea of a continuous consciousness is an abstraction, in the sense of being a generic quality abstracted from different momentary conscious entities, rather than being the experience of a continuous concrete, actual conscious self, he does not see how these experiences would be
possible. In other words, his argument is that we do not experience a plurality of consciousnesses related to each other as having a common abstract quality, we experience a unified consciousness that illumines the concrete reality of the knower and the known.

Is there a contradiction in Rāmānuja's thought because he speaks of a continuous, concrete, actual conscious self and, at the same time, insists that its experience of change in the body and the world it is conscious of is real? If the change is real, it would seem that an individual who is conscious of it must also undergo real change and therefore be different. Rāmānuja's answer, of course, is that the changes are experienced as different modes of the same consciousness. Just as a round lump of clay can become a cube of clay and be the same actual clay substance with a different mode, there is no contradiction involved in saying that the same concrete consciousness continues as actual through different modes of its existence.

We are left with one more point that is related to the Advaitan criticism of Rāmānuja (refer p.33, n.9). Rāmānuja's arguments for the unity and continuity of consciousness seem to provide a convincing explanation of experience. But there is a problem with his saying that consciousness is a quality of the self rather than the idea of self being a quality of consciousness, which is what the Advaitans affirm. He speaks of the experience of everything else as being in knowledge because of the way it qualifies consciousness, but when he comes to the experience of being a self he reverses the relationship and says that consciousness qualifies the ātman and is therefore dependent upon it. The purported justification for this is that the experience of being a self is intuitive, as opposed to discursive, knowledge. To
establish his point, he claims it is necessary to posit the existence of the ātman as that to which the existence of consciousness is proven. Presumably the intuition belongs to the ātman. But, since there is no knowledge apart from consciousness, the ātman cannot intuit its own existence unless it is consciousness, so they are not different. To say that the existence of consciousness is proven to the ātman implies that there is a prior level of consciousness possessed by the ātman that witnesses it existence. Then there has to be another prior to it to witness its existence ad infinitum. This is the infinite regress that Shastri says Rāmānuja involves himself in when he makes consciousness a quality of ātman rather than seeing them as being one and the same. If existence is proven in experience, as he maintains it is, then consciousness must be logically prior to even the idea of being a self.

As to the ātman being the substratum that provides the unity of enjoyment, witnessing, and action, along with consciousness, Rāmānuja himself says that consciousness has the functions of cognition, conation and feeling, and he admits that the individual ātman is the source of activity, whereas the actual activity is performed by the body. Therefore, even on his own view, there seems to be no reason why consciousness does not have all the characteristics necessary to explain experience, without the added substratum. This means that ātman and consciousness are one and the same.

Rāmānuja's attempt to establish the primacy of the being of the individual ātman to consciousness is motivated by his religious beliefs, especially regarding the nature of salvation. Once it is accepted that consciousness and ātman are the same, ātman ceases to be an individuating
principle at the ultimate level of experience. The Advaitans maintain that consciousness is individualized in particular experiences, but in itself, it is universal. This being the case, the idea of being a self becomes a quality of consciousness, a particular form of universal consciousness, an ahamkāra, and Ātman becomes one with Brahman. In brief, Rāmānuja wants to establish an eternal, actual, permanent, unchanging, individuating principle. We shall see why later in the thesis.
HARTSHORNE'S CONCEPT OF AN INDIVIDUAL

Hartshorne's chief criticism of Rāmānuja's concept of an individual is that his positing a substantial, essentially unchanging, permanent self or soul that controls its body for its own use but is not itself affected by the body implies that the body is of no significance to the soul. This question of the significance of the body to the soul or essential self is important to our thesis because both Rāmānuja and Hartshorne consider the world to be the body of God, the divine individual. Consequently, the kind of significance the body has for the ordinary individual is the kind of significance the world has for God. If the soul is unaffected by the body, God is unaffected by the world. And, if the world makes no positive contribution to God, the ultimate being, it has no ultimate value or purpose for its existence.

Our elucidation of Rāmānuja's concept of an individual seems to controvert Hartshorne's interpretation of Rāmānuja's idea of the body-soul relationship because, on his view, the body does have aesthetic value for the ātman. However, he is able to attribute this value to the body for the soul only because of his substance-attribute dichotomy. If substance is something that is essentially unchanging and eternally actual, how can the ātman, if it is substantial, receive anything from the body? If it receives aesthetic value there is some
increase, which involves change.

To illustrate the fact that the body influences the soul as well as the soul the body, Hartshorne uses the following example. He says, "A man can rule his dog without being simply uninfluenced by him. Merely to perceive what the dog is doing is to receive optical sensory influence from the dog".\(^1\) It is this aspect of experience that Hartshorne contends Rāmānuja does not account for. But, as we have tried to demonstrate, Rāmānuja is quite in agreement with Hartshorne on this point and says that the individual perceiving the dog is different from what he would be if he were not. His mode of being would be different but not his being, which is in no way affected by his perception of the dog. His being is primary and necessary to his perception of the dog; whereas, the perception of the dog is contingent to his being. With certain qualifications, Hartshorne agrees with this. The experience of the dog is not necessary, but some experience is. Without some experience, there is no being, so being is dependent upon the continuation of experience. And, as we have seen, Rāmānuja seems to concur. If he does, our question and Hartshorne's is: why does he continue to talk about substance and substrata? What exists is some experience. The epistemic-ontological dichotomy is unnecessary, because there is no distinction between what an individual is and what he knows. When we refer to an individual as something continuing to exist over a period of time, we have reference to a set of common characteristics that are abstracted from a series of momentary selves that are no more nor no less than everchanging, momentary syntheses of experiences or events. Hartshorne

\(^1\) Philosophers Speak of God, p.188.
believes the "notion of substance that it is an identical entity containing successive accidental properties is an absurdity, a misleading way of describing an individual enduring through change. The successive states are not 'in' the identical entity but rather ... it is in them". ² This statement, as we have noted already, reveals that the idea of "substance" rejected by Hartshorne is essentially the same as that affirmed by Rāmānuja.

Unlike Rāmānuja, who maintains that there is the constant, unbroken, intuitive experience of being a self, Hartshorne insists that there is only objective consciousness or that there is no consciousness apart from being conscious of some other, which is what we call experience. Therefore, reality is a relationship between a subject and an object. The object in this relationship is contingent upon an experiencing subject for its existence, as Rāmānuja says, but the subject is also contingent. It is contingent upon there being some experience. The man does not necessarily perceive the dog in order to establish his existence, but he must experience something. The more inclusive term Hartshorne prefers here is "feeling", and he says zero in "feeling" is equal to zero in existence. ³ Thus the only necessary existent is some experience, and all experience is characterized by becoming, not being, as Rāmānuja himself says about objective consciousness (supra, p.43).

If Hartshorne can provide a conception of an individual which gives a coherent, adequate explanation of the nature of experience of

all types, which is the goal of both philosophers, without a continuing, conscious substance, then perhaps he is right in saying that Rāmānuja is allowing a theory from traditional dogma to shape the evidence, and that this results in his being "uneconomical of principles". To see if this is so, we will have to turn to Rāmānuja's arguments for a continuing, actual ātman and see if Hartshorne can adequately explain the characteristics of experience, which Rāmānuja believes point to the ātman, within his conceptual system.

Hartshorne's Doctrine of No-Soul

The nature of experience, as Rāmānuja understands it, is such that it contains three elements -- the substratum of the experiencer, i.e., the ātman, the consciousness of that substratum, and the thing experienced. Hartshorne rejects the first element as being superfluous and combines the second and the third into a unitary sequence of experiences in which the second continually becomes the third. As mentioned earlier (supra, p.54), he contends that experience is not something that a conscious subject has as the effects of certain causal objects external and simultaneously existent with it;

... instead, the given things are the real things, and the effect is simply the experience itself, as experience of those very things ... Givenness is a genuine relation, and it requires two terms. So does the causal relation. The experience of 0 is conditioned by 0 as antecedently there. And 0 itself is thus given.5

In this statement we see that, according to Hartshorne, experience

4. Supra, pp. 53-54.
does involve an experiencer and something experienced. We have the
two factors -- the experience of $0$ and the experienced $0$. But
take note, "$0$ as antecedently there." The $0$ that was antecedently
there becomes the experience of $0$. They are different and they are the
same, because the latter contains the former. Further, the experience
of $0$, "the given", is the locus of reality; it is not an attribute
of some substance. Hartshorne follows A.N. Whitehead in this
metaphysical conception of reality.

Whitehead's proposal here is that we take
human experience causally to 'inherit'
directly from our experiences, inheriting
in each case implying temporal 'following'
rather than sheer 'accompanying'. Thus
the general principle of causality is all we
need. And since individual genetic identity
is explicable as a distinctive special case
of the way in which concrete actualities
are caused by, follow, and include others,
sharing abstract factors in common, the
concept 'substance' is shown to be no
absolute addition.

The locus of reality is a continuing process divided into
discrete moments, "concrete actualities", with a maximal length of
about one-tenth of a second. Each of these moments constitutes
an event, and the succession of such events, asymmetrically related,
such that the present moment contains the preceding moment and that
moment the one before it ad infinitum, constitutes an event-sequence.
Such an event-sequence is what Hartshorne means by an individual.

When we refer to an individual in the ordinary sense of the
word, we are referring to certain common characteristics shared by a
sequence of discrete moments, which, Hartshorne allows, for convenience

7. Ibid., p.175.
sake and because of the limitations of human comprehension, is quite acceptable. However, he contends, and we agree, these factors should not influence our understanding of the nature of reality. The best explanation for the experienced commonality is not on the basis of continuing substance but on the basis of cause and effect.

The present event, "now", as a cross section of some actual process, has a particular, determinate structure in terms of forms and qualities. As this moment in the event-sequence causes its successor, it produces effects consistent with itself. The effect will be different from the cause in some ways, otherwise they would be indistinguishable, and they will be the same in other ways. They are the same because the effect "inherits" certain structures and qualities from its cause. Part of this inheritance is what Hartshorne refers to as "individual genetic identity", which is "a distinctive special case of the way in which concrete actualities are caused" (supra). It is special because of the degree of similarity over an extended period of time, which is, in turn, partially due to the level of abstraction involved. Our ordinary reference to an individual has reference to these abstract, inherited characteristics, but reality is much greater than these abstractions. And, it is this greater that Rāmānuja's substantialism does not take full account of when he takes the ātman (substance) as satya (true, real, actual) because it is continuous and essentially unchanging, and takes the infinite number of particular, contingent details of events to be simply momentary, changing, dependent modes of being, with no significance in themselves. On the other hand, when reality is defined in terms of events, because they include every aspect of experience, down to the minutest detail,
even though everything is momentary, in the concrete sense, nothing is insignificant, because every particle of an event is a cause of some effect in the subsequent event as its inheritor.

In light of this difference between Rāmānuja and Hartshorne regarding the locus of reality, we can see more clearly why Hartshorne accuses Rāmānuja of sharing in the classical bias against becoming in favour of being.\textsuperscript{8} The significance of the contingent, becoming aspects of existence have \textit{subordinate} significance for Rāmānuja, and for Hartshorne, every aspect of existence has \textit{coordinate} significance for every other aspect. Consequently, regarding the question of which system of thought attributes the greatest importance to the concrete particulars of the world, the answer seems to be that of Hartshorne. However, we need to note that here we are considering significance from the point of view of having the power to be the cause of subsequent effects. And, since the locus of reality, on Hartshorne's view, is the sequence of causes and effects, every detail of the concrete particularity of an individual at one moment is a constitutive cause of the reality of the individual in the succeeding moment. Later, in Chapter VI, we will return to the question of significance, as we compare value theories.

The real individual for Hartshorne is a sequence of discrete events related to each other according to the principle of cause and effect, but this is not a mechanical, materialistic process. It is a sequence of \textit{experiences}; this relates to the second important point we have before us, i.e., the relationship between being and knowing.

\textsuperscript{8} \textit{Philosophers Speak of God}, p.187.
We have quoted Rāmānuja (supra, p.58) as categorically stating that something must be known in order to affirm its existence. As he says, to exist is to have distinctive attributes, because "there cannot be the establishment of a distinctionless object anywhere". Consciousness of something is necessary to prove the existence of the Ātman to itself, and we have seen how Rāmānuja establishes the continuous presence of active consciousness (supra, pp.37-45). The crux of the matter rests on the validity of the statement, "in the case of the deep-sleep-state, intoxication and swoon, the experience is definitely a particularized one". This is, of course, an intuitive self-awareness, which Rāmānuja claims to be present in every other awareness or experience.

Hartshorne agrees with Rāmānuja's maxim that existence is contingent on experience. He writes, "With Peirce, and all the idealists, if not all metaphysicians, I submit that we must start with experience or knowledge, and in terms of it define 'reality'". And what is the nature of experience? First, "an experience is always 'of' something, and this relation is essential", which is precisely what Rāmānuja says about experience. Where the two philosophers differ is on the nature of the "something" experienced. Rāmānuja takes the realistic position that in the case of subject-object experiences (the Ātman related to something external to itself), which include waking and dream experiences, things are experienced as they are, i.e., every experience is a true experience. And, in the case of deep-sleep, etc., there is the continuous experience of being

9. Creative Synthesis, p.170. Also, ibid., p.102, Hartshorne says, "to be is to be experienced", and p.6, "apart from experience the idea of reality is empty".
10. Ibid., p.167.
a self, "I-awareness". This is the Atman being "in itself", which to Hartshorne is meaningless.

It is meaningless to ask what a singular is 'in itself', if this is taken to mean, 'supposing it were alone in existence'. It would then have no character whatever, extension or any other. To be is to be in relation; to be a subject or experience is to have other subjects as objects, forming a world system of such objects.\textsuperscript{11}

To understand the full import of this difference we must bring together all the points we have made about Hartshorne's idea of an individual so far. First, an individual is not a conscious substance whose mode of existence during a particular experience is the effect of certain external causes. The causes of experience are themselves experiences as the "given things", and these are "the real things". The effect or the subject of experience is "simply the experience itself, as experience of those very things" (p.69 above). The subject of an experience is a momentary event that has as its object antecedent experiences (events) which are inherited from the preceding moment and synthesized into a new unified experience. The subject is this unified experience and nothing more. This is why Hartshorne says "to be is to be in relation", meaning to be an experience in relation to other experiences. And, since an experience and an event have the same referent, an individual is a sequence of experiences.

The Experience of Continuity and Change

We need to elaborate more fully on the asymmetrical relationship between the subject as present experience and the object as past

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p.114.
subjective experiences. One of Rāmānuja's arguments for a continuing substratum is the experience of having experienced a given object on previous occasions. He contends that this is due to the fact that the two cognitions belong to the same conscious subject. Similarly, there is the experience of having known something in the past and no longer being able to remember it. This can only be explained, he believes, on the basis of a change in the contents of a continuous, conscious subject. Hartshorne, on the other hand, claims that by conceiving of an individual as a sequence of momentary subjects, related in such a way that the present subject inherits the experiences of the immediately preceding moment, he has adequately accounted for the undeniable human experience that Rāmānuja has reference to, the experience that has led so many thinkers to posit a perduring, substantial self.

In Rāmānuja's system, we have a plurality of ātmans, as well as prakṛti (matter), so space can be defined in terms of external relations among substances. But, whereas space is due to substantial divisions, time is due to adjectival divisions, i.e. changes in the mode of a continuing substance. In Hartshorne's system, we have plurality in time as well as space. The difference is that space is symmetrical relatedness and time is asymmetrical relatedness.

The distinctive character of time consists ... in this, that the earlier members of an event-sequence contains only a more or less indefinite specification of their successors, while the successors are essentially successors of the very members they succeed. Asymmetrical dependence, or (the same) asymmetrical independence, this is the temporal order.12

12. Ibid., p.179.
There is continuity through time, says Hartshorne, but not on the basis of a continuing subject. There is a new subject every moment. The experience of continuity is the present subject experiencing in memory the actual experiences of its predecessors in the event-sequence of which it is the latest occurrence.

Thinking back now to the example of the adult who has developed through infancy and adolescence, we see that, whereas for Rāmānuja these are different modes of one conscious subject, for Hartshorne the individual is, at the time of his infancy, the particular experiences of infancy and potentially the experiences of adolescence and adulthood. Then, when the event-sequence, which is the actual and potential existence of this individual, actualizes some of his potential in adolescence, the actual experience of his childhood are not lost, they are present in the memory of the adolescent and form a real part of what he concretely is at this stage of his existence. His childhood experiences are and always will be his experiences, as far as memory allows, and no one elses. The same will be true of the adolescent experiences, when the individual becomes an adult. In this way, the experiences Rāmānuja sees as indicating a continuous, conscious subject are accounted for in a different way.

Why is it common for us to speak of having experienced a given object of a previous occasion? The reason is that the subject now experiencing a particular object $A^2$ as an abstracted part of the "now".

13. The present potential that an individual has for future experiences is always vague and indeterminate. The vagueness increases in direct proportion to the increase in time before actualization. As Hartshorne says: "the past but not the future is in principle (apart from human limitations) knowable in detail". *Creative Synthesis*, p.179.
event, which is the actuality of the individual, has as another
abstracted part, at this same time, in memory, another experience in
which the same group of individuating, generic characteristics appeared
as $A^1$, and because of this coincidence, the assertion of sameness is
made. But, and this is the important point, the subject experiencing
$A^2$ is different from the subject experiencing $A^1$. The experience that
contained $A^1$ was independent of $A^2$, but the experience that now contains
$A^2$ also contains $A^1$ as an integral part.

The Identification of Consciousness and Particular Cognitions

Rāmānuja is not unaware of the theory of knowledge that
identifies particular cognitions with consciousness, with which
Hartshorne's position has some affinities, but he does not see it as a
viable explanation of experience. The Buddhists had put forward such
a theory long before his time and he addresses himself to it in the
Śrībhāṣya (II:2:17-30). Working on the assumption that consciousness
is eternal, Rāmānuja draws the logical conclusion that, if this theory
is true, since it is direct perception of particular objects that
proves their existence, then particular cognitions of objects and
\textit{ergo} the objects themselves would be eternal. But this is contrary
to the nature of experience. When we perceive particular objects,
like jars, etc., and in so perceiving them prove their existence, we do
not perceive "the existence pertaining to the prior and posterior time
of jar and others" (\textit{supra}, p.43). And, since non-perception equals
non-proof of existence, these objects and cognitions of them cannot
be eternal. Cognitions are always circumscribed by time. In fact,
time is known by the rising and passing of cognitions in consciousness.
The Buddhists, of course, were not all in complete agreement on the relationship between consciousness, cognitions and objects of consciousness. The majority did agree on the rejection of the ātman doctrine and on the impermanence of cognitions and their objects. They took different positions on the question of consciousness itself being momentary. This question of the eternality of consciousness need not concern us at this point. This matter will be dealt with later. For the present, we want to determine the validity of Rāmānuja's opposition to what Hartshorne is proposing above. Therefore, our question is, how are we to explain the fact that past experiences continue into the present in such a way as to give rise to the ideas of change and time if reality consists of a sequence of momentary events? A prerequisite to answering this question, in view of Rāmānuja's objections, is to consider the possibility of substituting Hartshorne's concept "particular experience" for Rāmānuja's "particular cognition".

The first consideration along this line is the distinction Rāmānuja makes between cognition and the thing cognized. This does not prevent the transposition because he maintains that perception is always true to its object, but we must extend cognition from the experience of a jar, etc., to the whole complex of cognized things and their relations that make up a unified, momentary experience, which for Hartshorne is the subject now, at this present moment. The reason for this is that objects are always experienced as parts of events or as being in space. And what is space? "Space ... is the symmetrical aspect of dynamic relatedness, the aspect of mutuality, whether mutuality of dependence or ... of independence. Space is how we have 'neighbours'". 14

14. Ibid.
Perhaps this can be made clearer with the following diagram:

As we have noted, an event is a "minimal temporal unit, or cross section ..., of some actual process, such as the process of experiencing in a certain human being" (supra, p. 55). Relating this to the diagram, it has reference to any one point, A, B, or C, etc. Now, when this cross-section is extended to cut across the processes of experiencing of a "society" of individuals, co-existent at any given moment, we have the configuration of space at the present. This is the actual state of existence now. In this present moment, each of the subjects is externally or symmetrically related to the others, so they are independent of each other, but they are not self-existent substances. As subjective experiences, they are dependent effects of their past experiences, i.e., their objective causes, part of which is
the immediate past experiences of their neighbours, to whom they are asymmetrically and, therefore, dependently related. This is a very brief statement of a very complex matter, but hopefully, it is sufficient to make it apparent that space as experienced and space as it presently is are not the same. Space as experienced is always past because it is not immediate to experience but mediate. Obviously, this has great significance for the question of the relationship between being and knowing. But before we draw any conclusion in this regard, we must continue to bring Rāmānuja's "cognitions" and Hartshorne's "experience" into a common framework.

In opposition to Rāmānuja's idea of a continuing, conscious subject, whose experiences are but modal changes, Hartshorne holds that the subject of experience is nothing more than a new synthesis of the previous moments in the event-sequence that is his individuality. In other words, stated more positively, the new subject is a new synthesis of previous experiences and in this sense it is more, but there is no substance of which these experiences are modal qualities. Experiences are what is and they are of three types: memory, imagination and perception.

Let us look at this more specifically, taking subject C in the diagram as our example. C, at the "present" moment is the synthesis of (1) all past, objectified moments in his event-sequence, in so far as he is able adequately to retain these in memory, and (2) images of anticipated, future experiences or images in dreams or fantasy constructed by the mind from memory of past experiences. Both of these aspects of experience are represented in the diagram by point "c" on
the line of immediate past moments. They are within the "body" of the subject and are experienced as "physical realities". "Every experience, there is reason to think", says Hartshorne, "is in its way and degree revelatory of the public physical world." There is no radical difference between an experience of something external to the body and a dream experience within the body. Both involve sensory stimulation. "No experience could simply generate its own content." Consequently, with reference to dream experiences, he makes the following comment:

All experience can, and I hold should, be taken as response to physical realities actually given in the experience. The physical real may be within the body more than outside it, but what of that? The supposition that what is inside the human skin is therefore non-physical (inextended) is one of the unconscious absurdities that sophisticated people easily fall into.

Memory and dream experiences are both experiences of "physical realities actually given". They involve extension, i.e., they are experiences of "being in relation to something", and their cognitive status is that they are no less real than experiences of entities external to the body.

To understand why Hartshorne attributes the same objective, cognitive status to dream and memory objects as he does to externally

15. Ibid., pp.75-77.
16. Ibid., p.77.
17. Ibid., p.79. Rāmānuja also considers dream cognitions to be real. He says the objects of dream cognitions are false but not the experience. "There is seen, verily, the stultification of them [objects] alone [and] not of the knowledge. For there does not arise in the case of any one of the apprehension 'the knowledge experienced by me at the time of the dream, does not exist here' (SriNāma, p.55). The reason Hartshorne can say this will become clear as we proceed.
perceived objects, we must realize that for him "cognition is only a way of using the felt qualities of things, taking them merely as signs of identities and differences which are structural rather than qualitative", as in the case of value judgments. In other words, just as there is no substantial, continuing subject that undergoes qualitative modal change on the subjective side of experience, there is only the experience of qualities on the objective side, and not of a substance or matter with qualities. All cognition is made up of a variety of interrelated "felt qualities".

In order to deal effectively and meaningfully with our experiences, we organize them by grouping the felt qualities into language categories with varying degrees of abstraction. Part of this is the association of certain generic characteristics continuing through time, by which we identify individuals (supra, pp.70-72). This is temporal extension, which is itself a felt quality, i.e., change. But there is also spatial extension which involves experiences of two kinds. First, there is extension in experiences of entities outside the body.

Given many entities, perceived en masse

19. Ibid., p.76. Earlier (p.71) we spoke of forms and qualities, which is not inappropriate from a common-sense point of view, but in reality, according to Hartshorne, forms are but one type of "felt qualities".

20. Rāmānuja says the cognitions of dream experiences are real and the objects are false, because the qualities cognized are caused by Īśvara, in concert with the karman of the individual who experiences them, rather than being objects in the external world or "public space", with prakṛti or matter as their material cause. Hartshorne does not make this distinction because he rejects the substance-attribute dichotomy in objects as well as subjects. Qualities, according to him are all we ever experience.

21. This is not a completely arbitrary enterprise because causes tend to give rise to effects consistent with themselves, with varying degrees of conformity. Definite characteristics are carried over from one moment to another. They are not "mind creations".
rather than individually, each entity
of course in a slightly different place,
the mass of entities will appear as
extended. This is the only way in which
we can physically perceive singular
entities.\textsuperscript{22}

There is the experience of a mass of felt qualities and out of this
some are grouped together as constituting particular entities.

Other felt qualities of the experience are the relationships among
these entities. This experience of felt qualities external to the
body is physical perception, i.e., what the experiencer receives
through the senses. Referring back to the diagram, it has reference
to "d" on the line of immediate past moments. The differences
between experiences of "c", memory and dream experiences within the
body, and "d", perception of what is external to the body, are not
differences in kind but in qualities. The experience of a particular
object in memory that was previously experienced in the public,
physical world has many of the same qualities but others are lost
because the human mind cannot grasp them in memory. Nevertheless,
the only difference is in the presence or absence of qualities.

Time is experienced in memory as a plurality of subjects in
an event-sequence. Public, physical space is experienced in per-
ception as a plurality of entities in relation to each other and
external to the self. These are two ways in which extension is
experienced. There is a third.

The other meaning cannot be exhibited to
physical perception, but only to self-
awareness, analogically applied to other
creatures. Even a true singular, e.g., my
present self or experience, is extended.
It is not confined to a point, it is not
ubiquitous, nor is it nowhere. There only

\textsuperscript{22.} \textit{Creative Synthesis}, p.113.
remains that it is in a region, that it is extended, but as one, not as many. Since no such unity is datum of sight, hearing, or touch, we can have no sensory image of this mode of extension. But we are aware of our experiences as by no means punctiform, but rather with internal heres and theres and elsewhere, with betweens and next to's, and so forth. How could it be otherwise, since we directly respond to bodily processes whose parts are in different places, and since our experience directly controls or influences these bodily processes? A thing is where it acts and is acted upon!23

The third way extension is experienced also involves a plurality of entities in relation to each other. But this time it is not an experience of relations among other entities but of being these relations. This is self-awareness. This is the experience of being an organism, a body, "which is simply a system of individuals of lower type than the one whose body it is".24

As in the case of public, physical space, the body is made up of a society of entities - cells, molecules, etc. - that interact with each other. These entities, again, as with public, physical space, are experienced as being in different places in their relationships with each other. Therefore, the quality of extension accompanies the other experienced qualities of these entities. The difference between extension as a quality of one's own body and extension as a quality of public, physical space is that the self, whose body the entities compose, is aware of their extended interactions by containing them. These relational qualities are experienced directly as opposed to receiving them indirectly through the senses.

23. Ibid., p.114.
24. Beyond Humanism, p.171.
Because of this, what happens to the cells is happening to the self. And, when this idea is linked with the idea that "a thing is where it acts and is acted upon", we can define the body of an individual as a region of space in which there is a unified, direct awareness of actions and reactions among a mass of individual entities.

These two forms of spatial extension, we have now briefly outlined, are related to two kinds of individuals, which Hartshorne refers to as "physical" and "psychical". Physical individuals are entities made up of groups of felt qualities in spatio-temporal relations with other groups. They can be outside or inside the skin, i.e., in public, physical space or in imagination or dream ("c" or "d"). They are "made one individual, one unit of reality, by virtue of some purpose of the observer in carving out that much of his environment and treating it as a single object of thought and behaviour". 25 Physical individuals are not self-determined entities; they are determined by the perceiving subject who abstracts them from the mass of felt qualities he perceives at any given moment, according to the purposes he projects for the future of his event-sequence. Psychical individuals, on the other hand, are the perceivers. They have their own unity and their own purposes. In a very real sense they are their own unity and purposes, among other things. "Psychical individuals are self-individuated; they actively distinguish themselves from their environment." 26

A physical individual is an extracted part of a system of

26. Ibid.
interacting entities. A psychical individual is a system of interacting entities with self-awareness, and it is a single unit of action. It has a purposing mind or will according to which it exerts force upon its bodily parts and through them upon the external world. With reference to the human organism, Hartshorne says, "when he thinks or wills, it is not one or any number of his cells that thinks his thoughts or wills his purposes, but himself as an irreducible unit, as much a unit as any cell or any atom or any electron".27

The reason for this unity of awareness, volition, and action is that a psychical individual is more than the sum of its parts. It is a "unitary organism" composed of many interrelated parts, like a physical individual, but it is more than that because it has one "dominant member, which is the synthetic act, or rather act-sequence, in the vertebrate case corresponding roughly to, or deriving its data from the nervous system".28 Therefore, the experience of self-awareness is a momentary experience "as a synthesis of events which have just occurred in various parts of the organism, especially the cortical parts of it."29 But, this does not mean that the nervous system is some kind of continuous substance that is the subject of these experiences. The nervous system is the integration of many experiences (felt qualities) within the body into one unified experience which is the momentary subject at the present time.30

Now, referring back to "C" in the diagram, "c" and "d" represent

27. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p.200.
all the physical individuals experienced by "C" at the present moment. "C" is a psychical individual, the synthesis of all these experiences of physical individuals. "C" is a concrete, particular, unified experience, the full actuality of an individual "now". And, with this explication of a "particular experience" before us, we are finally ready to consider the possibility of substituting it for a "particular cognition" in Rāmānuja's conceptual framework.

Rāmānuja speaks of the ātman's essential quality, consciousness, as moving throughout the body and from the body, through the senses to the external world. A particular cognition (e.g., of a jar) is the particular way the consciousness is informed by its encounter with some part of the body or some object in the external world. Now, if we take all the particular cognitions of an individual, i.e., all that he is "conscious of", at a present moment of his existence, we have the parallel to Hartshorne's psychical individual. A particular set of cognitions in any given moment in Rāmānuja's system is parallel to the experience of a psychical individual in Hartshorne's.

The reason for bringing these two concepts into juxtaposition is to consider Rāmānuja's objection to the idea that particular cognitions continue to exist through time, which is essentially what Hartshorne contends (supra, p. 77). This is important to Hartshorne because it is this condition that gives rise to the idea of a continuing self.

Both philosophers agree that direct perception of objects proves their existence. And, from this, Rāmānuja concludes that continuity of cognition would imply the continuity of the object cognized, which is contrary to experience. All particular cognitions of objects are
experienced as being circumscribed by time - a time prior to and a time after cognition. Indeed, time is known by the rising and passing of particular cognitions.

In dealing with this objection, Hartshorne can accept Rāmānuja's conclusion that continued cognition of an object implies continued existence if cognition proves the existence of its object. However, he does not agree that this is contrary to experience. If there is no continuity of particular cognitions, how can we say we remember particular things?

A particular cognition (in the sense of everything cognized "now") is composed of a multitude of felt qualities in the immediate past moment. A particular physical object, e.g., a jar, is a group of these qualities abstracted by the perceiver. So, its actuality is the experience of these qualities, not something external to the perceiver. The experience (subject) is always "present"; the experienced is always past. As Hartshorne says, "the events perceived, at least if outside our bodies, are in the past quite as truly as what we remember".31 Consequently, any particular object of experience consists of those qualities grasped by the perceiver. In moments subsequent to the initial experience of some object, some qualities will be lost, due to weakness of memory, but insofar as the object is adequately remembered, its modal state of being actual does not change

31. Creative Synthesis, p.75. Here Hartshorne is taking into consideration the physical conditions of experiencing - the speed of light and sound. Rāmānuja's audio-visual theory is that consciousness extends through the sense-organs out into the external world. Hartshorne's position is the usual western theory that the stimuli comes to the appropriate sense-organ of the body. This accounts for the differences in their definitions of "body".
from the first moment it was objectified in experience. 32

What about the experience of time through the "passing" of things and events, pointed to by Rāmānuja? Obviously he is not just referring to the fact that memory fails and we forget certain aspects of our experiences. If he is, time would be very erratic. Rather, he is referring to modal changes in consciousness, motion. Hartshorne's reply to this question is that the experience of time is not due to "passing", in the sense of something being lost, but to increase (supra, p.76). "Succession ... is essentially cumulative". 33 The present contains the past as actual and fully determinate, but the past contains the present as potential and indeterminate. "Time is 'objective modality' ...; it unites determinate, actual, past reality with indeterminate, potential future reality". 34

What this means with respect to the experience of a particular object in the past is that during some previous event in the event-sequence of an individual certain qualities are abstracted by the subject of that event to form a physical individual out of his experience of the external world. Then, during a subsequent event in the same event-sequence, another subject abstracts the same qualities from his experience of these qualities in memory. This, of course, is recognition. The first experience is known to be "past" because the

32. Ibid., p.184. Error equals the inadequacy of all other perceptions in relation to divine perception. Only divine memory perfectly preserves the actuality of all its experiences. Humans lose much more than they retain or pass on.
33. Ibid., p.15.
34. Philosophers Speak of God, p.11.
second could, if memory and perception were adequate, carry with it all the actual qualities of that first event, of which the object was a part, plus a multitude of new qualities, the full actuality of which could not in principle have been known by the subject of that first event. Hence, there is a qualitative difference between "past" and "present". Not that the present has different qualities but more.

Has Hartshorne successfully met Rāmānuja's objection to the continuity of particular past cognitions into the present? If his objection were directed against the idea of qualities in the past being experienced in the present it would be unfounded, because that, after all, is the nature of memory. As it is, however, there is no reason why he should not accept the continuity of qualities because his own idea of the way recognition takes place is very similar to what we have just described.35 Obviously Rāmānuja has something else in mind when he raises the objection.

The Relation of 'What Is Known' to 'What Exists'

Rāmānuja can agree with the idea that the qualities of a particular cognition continue to exist through time, but he does not agree that existence is made up of sequences of syntheses of qualities. Qualities are always attributes of some substance and substance always exists with some qualities. Every sentient and non-sentient individual is

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35. Rāmānuja distinguishes between non-determinate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka) perception. Against the idea of the apprehension of pure, unqualified consciousness, he insists that all apprehension by consciousness involves some distinction. "All apprehension is, indeed, produced in the form 'This [is] thus' on account of the impossibility of apprehending anything whatsoever without the specific configuration such as triangular form, dravya, etc.; therefore the Indeterminate [direct perception] is the first apprehension of a body among homogeneous objects; the second and subsequent apprehension of the object are called the Determinate [direct perception]" (Śrībhāṣya, p.47.).
composed of substance, which constitutes its being, and attributes, which constitute its mode of being. Sentient individuals have consciousness as an essential quality, and because of this their mode of being is qualified by their own qualities and the qualities of other substances they are conscious of. Even if we grant that all beings are sentient to some degree, Rāmānuja still distinguishes between the qualities of a substantial being (an object) and qualities of consciousness. Both are real qualities, but they relate to a substratum differently. In the case of dreams, for instance, the qualities experienced are real but dream objects are false. 36

When Rāmānuja speaks of cognition as always being circumscribed by time, he has specific reference to cognition of objects. We do retain the experience of certain particular qualities of an object in memory over a period of time, but the experience of qualities and the qualities themselves are two different things. If a jar is perceived directly in one moment and the jar is removed from perception in the next, the continued experience of the affected qualities of the previous moment is not the same as the actual experience of the jar. Even if memory was capable of retaining all the experienced qualities of the jar, the substance of the jar is removed and therefore the reality of the jar as an object of experience. The jar may continue to exist somewhere else, but it is no longer actual for the perceiver.

At this point we must clarify Hartshorne's idea of the relationship between thought and existence, because it has great significance for his understanding of the relationship between the divine individual

36. Supra, p. 82, n.20.
and all other individuals who make up his body. What we have been saying about his understanding of this relationship up to now moves very strongly in the direction of idealism, in which the subject determines the existence of the object, and Hartshorne does not want to accept this aspect of this theory of reality. His aim is to work out a synthesis of idealism and realism. Consequently, to bring the positive aspects of realism into his theory of knowledge, he asserts that facts exist and "by submitting to their influence upon us we know these facts correctly. We are moulded to the things, not the things to us (apart from fiction)." Here we have a statement that is very close to Rāmānuja's idea of consciousness being informed by the object known. However, unlike Rāmānuja, Hartshorne, under the influence of Einstein's theory of relativity, believes that knowledge of something is not simultaneous with the present existence of the object known (refer diagram p.79). Hence, when we speak of the actual existence of something, we mean its existence for the subject, because this is the only meaningful existence one can talk about. "The strictly simultaneous is the last thing we have to worry about, for by the time we could think about it it must already have become past. We deal with the future by interpreting the past, the absolutely present being for our knowledge the same as the nearest part of the future." Experiential meaning is of ultimate significance to Hartshorne. When he says "something exists", he means it exists as something

meaningful in the experience of some subject. On his view,

... there can be no experiential meaning
to a distinction between what is experienced
and what is simply not experienced, but only
to the distinction between what is experienced
by a given individual or species of individual
and what is not so experienced; and this
distinction has a meaning because the ways
in which one experience of an individual
involve an infinite range of values in principle,
but a finite range in fact.39

This is but another way of saying that everything that exists is or
is destined to become the object of some experience. Only what is
experienced is conceivable and meaningful but, and this is important,
what is conceivable and meaningful is not mind-determined, it is given
in experience. Realism demands "that relation to a particular
subject knowing an entity is extrinsic to that entity" and "that
relation to subjectivity in general is not thus extrinsic".40

However, Hartshorne continues: "that an entity could be precisely
itself were it unknown to S1, or were it unknown to S2, or to any
other subject you choose to point out, does not imply it could be
itself were it unknown to anyone, were it simply unknown."41

This synthesis of idealism and realism is not really different
from Rāmānuja's idea that to say something exists is to say it exists
for some consciousness (idealism) and that the conscious subject is

39. Beyond Humanism, pp.121-122. In The Logic of Perfection, he equates
"zero of mind" with "zero of reality" (p.123). Refer also, Creative
Synthesis, pp.159-167. In a personal letter to me on this matter,
Hartshorne writes: "I hold the experiential, not the empirical, theory of
meaning. Only experience of some conceivable sort can give statements meaning".


41. Ibid., p.71. The fact that simultaneously existing entities are
unknowable to each other in the present causes Hartshorne to qualify the
equation of what exists with what is known by saying that what exists
equals what is known or is destined to be known (Ibid., p.70.)
"moulded" by the object (realism). Also, we find the two philosophers in agreement on the idea that experienced qualities of objects continue in memory. Again, as we have found all along, their basic disagreement is on the doctrine of substance. Rāmānuja says we experience objects as passing because their substance and qualities enter our experience and pass out of it. Hartshorne's position is that we never experience substances with qualities external to us, i.e., the presence of another co-present with us, we only have the experience of their immediate past, and this is an internal relationship, not external.

John Wild's Criticism of Hartshorne's View

For our purposes, it is of interest, at this point, to consider at some length a dialogue between Hartshorne and John Wild in The Review of Metaphysics. It begins with Wild's review of The Divine Relativity, in which Wild challenges Hartshorne's conception of the knower-known relationship from a substantialist point of view that is essentially the same as that of Rāmānuja. In this review, Wild agrees with Hartshorne's realistic dictum that "knowledge adds something real to the knowing agent, nothing whatsoever to the object known"; but he says Hartshorne's rejection of the doctrine of substance, which a realistic analysis of experience presupposes, "leads him to the ambiguous and misleading theory that a subject 'includes' its relation ..., and that the relation also 'includes' its term". In

43. Ibid., p.69.
opposition to Hartshorne's theory, Wild affirms that relation "is always a reference to something really distinct, either to a really distinct part of one substance, or to the part or attribute of another substance". Here we have a statement to which Rāmānuja's position gives wholehearted support.

To support his statement, Wild puts forward the following argument:

It is true that the whole of my substantial being 'includes' each of my parts, and each relation of one part to another part. But one part does not 'include' its relation to another part, and certainly this relation does not include the other part. Mr. Hartshorne's head is no doubt related to his neck. He 'includes' both these parts and their relations. But his head does not 'include' its relation to his neck, -- nor does his relation to the great nebula in Andromeda make him 'include' the nebula. If this were so, an entity would include everything and exclude nothing. Such an entity could have no relations, for the very nature of relation involves a real otherness, or lack of inclusion between the related entities.

Wild argues that the relational structure of the knowing act is a definite whole made up of distinctly different elements -- the known object, accidents of this object, the knowing subject, and accidents of this subject, some of which have a definite likeness to the accidents of the object because of its relation to them. Or, in Rāmānuja's terms, there is the substantial object, with its qualities, the substantial subject, Ātman, with its essential quality, consciousness, which is qualified by the qualities of the object as effects of causes and therefore non-different. Where both Rāmānuja and Wild

44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
differ from Hartshorne is that they maintain that the subject and its accidents are exclusive of the object and its accidents. Where he seems to say that the former includes the latter, they contend that the whole is not related to its parts but is constituted by them. To use the above example, the whole man, Hartshorne includes a particular head and a particular neck, but the head is not related to the neck by including it within itself. Nor is the whole man related to his neck, it is one of his constituent parts. Again, in Rāmānuja's terms, in knowing his neck, it is not the whole man in relation to it because it is a part of what a whole man is. Rather, it is his conscious ātman, a part of the whole, knowing the neck, another part of the whole. Neck and ātman are two parts of one body, exclusive of each other.

In his reply to his critic, Hartshorne rejects the idea that the whole is just the sum of its related parts and their relations, but he concurs with the rejection of the idea that "the whole is something completely organic 'working on all its parts to integrate them into something distinct'". This would lead to a denial of freedom to the individual parts, a consequence Hartshorne especially does not want to accept when his concept of an individual is transferred to the divine individual. Rather, he proposes a third view.

A third view is that in certain cases the whole (or perhaps better, the inclusive reality) is not just the parts, but is something, W, inclusive of the parts, one while they are many: and yet this W does not 'work on the parts' or enter into their being at all ... the parts are not related at all ... to the whole. Only the whole

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is really related -- as different in certain respects, the same in others -- to the parts. 47

Does this mean that the whole can change without some change in at least some of its parts? It does, in the sense that it is replaced by a new whole in the next moment and the previous whole becomes a part of the new synthesis. As Hartshorne goes on to say:

The whole, then does not 'integrate the parts into something distinct', if that means that it changes the parts into more or less new entities, or into itself, the whole; rather, the whole is itself something distinct from the parts, but including them, and therefore has no need to alter the latter to transform them into something distinct from themselves. The whole produces itself or comes into being as a free act of synthesis, using the parts as data ... for its prehensions. 48

Here we are reminded of Rāmānuja's idea of the way in which particular, contingent entities come into existence, i.e., the essential, unchanging primal substances are brought together to form some object to fulfill some purpose, but the essential nature of the elements do not change in this transaction. 49 The difference is that in Rāmānuja's system there is a purposing agent who is but a part of the whole. As we shall see, Rāmānuja considers this activity to cause real change in the whole, but the change is nothing more than the sum of the changes in the relations among the parts. This is also the position Wild is arguing for. Hartshorne, on the other hand, holds that the whole is a purposing agent (supra, p.86) who is different from the parts and acting on them, and at the same time, including them within himself.

47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., pp.52-53.
49. Discussed in Chapter IV, p.159.
He admits that this conception of the whole, W, may seem to imply "that W itself becomes one of the items, along with X, Y, Z, so that we need a new whole, W1 to contain W and the part. But this is invalid. W is self-related to every one of the parts, and thus the inclusive unity is already provided for". 50 This brings us back to Hartshorne's concept of self-awareness, partially developed above (pp. 84ff), but before we can draw all these ideas together we must elaborate further on the manner in which the whole is distinct from the parts and yet includes them.

In reply to John Wild's criticism of his apparent idealism, Hartshorne admits the absurdity of his position if it is construed to mean that the knower is related to the known by including its existence within his experience.

For one thing, it makes the knower include the known, from which it follows (he says) that the thing known is 'only' a state of the knower -- against the realism of common experience which holds that things known are 'both independent of and external to us, not merely our own constitutive states. 51

However, Hartshorne contends that this contravention of realism is not present in his theory when it is correctly understood.

For on my theory, being a constituent of the knower is not a real relation, hence cannot infringe upon the independence of the object. To call the latter a 'state' of the subject is not a real description of the object at all, but only of the subject. It merely says over again, and backwards, that the subject has the object. 52

51. Ibid., p. 54.
52. Ibid. Hartshorne discusses this relationship in detail in Chapter X of Creative Synthesis.
When we speak about the existence of objects, we are saying something about the experience of those objects as constitutive of ourselves. In other words, we are speaking about our existence. We are saying nothing about the existence of the objects themselves, though that is implied in that they are causes of our experience. They are external to the subject and "antecedently there" as the causes of the experience of them (supra, p.69). Objects are independent of the subject and external to it; but Hartshorne insists, "independence-of" does not entail "external to". The former is necessary for individual freedom, the latter can be overcome with perfect knowing.

One of the absurdities Wild believes Hartshorne's theory implies is that a person saying he knows Africa would mean he includes Africa within himself. Hartshorne agrees that this is absurd. Common sense seems to dictate that when we know Africa we know it as being outside us. But, he goes on to say,

... both 'know' and 'outside' are not simple absolute terms subject to no degree of relativity. Man knows always imperfectly, and that means that what he 'knows', in one sense, he does not know, in another sense. But if we knew simpliciter, without qualification, what is to prove that the 'externality' of the known would not also be banished?53

An object is external to the subject in direct proportion to the lack of knowledge the subject has of it. The knower of Africa knows it to be external to himself because he knows there is a great deal more to that continent than what his knowledge contains. However, he does contain part of Africa, when "part" is taken to mean something that contributes "directly to the value of a single entity, the 'whole'.

53. Ibid., p.55. Also refer The Divine Relativity, p.111.
But the contributing entities need not be internal to the whole in the sense of spatially smaller and included parts. This form of part-whole distinction is vitally important, because it is the means by which Hartshorne establishes the independence of the object from the subject, of the individual monads that make up a "dominant monad". We have said that an individual, as conceived by Hartshorne, is the self-awareness of being a synthesis of all the experiences within the skin of a body at any given moment (supra, p.84).

My feeling at a given moment is one, that of my cells is many. The diverse cellular feelings become data for the unitary human feeling, and this feeling is the momentary 'whole' summing up the antecedent states of 'the parts' and subsequently reacting upon later states of these parts. Thus the many-one action is turned into a one-many action. Not the whole as collection of parts, but the one actuality which is my feeling now, and which reflects the actuality previously constituting my body, acts upon the many actualities which subsequently compose that body.

It seems that John Wild is right when he says that the essential nature of relational structure consists of something related "to something really distinct (another part or another whole) which is precisely not 'included' in itself". The whole individual present now, in a quantitative sense, does require $W^1$ to include $W$, the synthesis of $X, Y, Z$, and the subsequent moments of these parts $X^1, Y^1, Z^1$. Otherwise, we must admit that the "whole-self" is less than the sum of the parts.

54. Logic of Perfection, p.195.
55. Ibid., p.200.
making up the body at any given time. And indeed, this does seem to be the import of what Hartshorne is saying, because the synthesis which is the self-awareness of the individual at any moment is not of all the actual entities making up the body but the awareness of these entities in the nervous system. He writes: "We ... feel chiefly our bodies, and through these, other things. Just this indirectness of feeling, mediated by entities of lesser power and complexity than oneself, is what is meant by having a body."58

Is this idea of the nervous system knowing the lesser entities within the body significantly different from Rāmānuja's idea of the Ātman knowing the body by moving through the prānas and through the organs of the body knowing the external world? One reason for Hartshorne's rejection of Rāmānuja's dichotomy of a substantially different body and soul, experienced and experiencer (śārīra-śārīri), and his opting for experience alone as the locus of reality, comes down to his inability to consider the experienced as a separate reality because its co-presence is not knowable (what is known is the experience of them) and therefore not meaningful. On the other hand, he must affirm that objects external to the experiencer do exist, because a denial of such would end in pure subjective idealism. Thus, the present, as a synthesis of antecedent parts, is not co-terminus with all that exists in the body because simultaneity is known only

57. This point becomes more obvious when we refer to the diagram on page 79 and take D as representing the nervous system of the present, momentary synthesis of experiences that is the self-aware individual. F should be taken to represent the body of the individual. D is constituted of the previous experiences internal to the nervous system, d, and e, the experiences that constituted the body in the previous moment. But, the "whole-self" now actualized is not just D but DE.

58. Logic of Perfection, p. 196.
in the past, not the present. 59 A possible exception to this is the perfect knowledge of God, the implications of which we will turn to in Chapter VI.

If this distinction between the momentary, unified experience that is co-terminus with the nervous system of a complex organism and the simultaneously actual body is valid, Hartshorne's concept of an individual begins to look very much like Rāmānuja's Ārīra-Ārīri doctrine, i.e., the idea of a body and a self that abides in the body or a body-soul doctrine. The apparent differences are that the soul counterpart in Hartshorne's concept, rather than being something essentially unchanging, permanent and independent of the body, is said to be constantly changing, as it synthesizes the experiences that make up its body and what the body experiences in the external world, impermanent, because it is a new synthesis each moment, and dependent on the body, because it is asymmetrically related to it. We will take a careful look at these differences after we learn the nature of the synthesizing agent in Hartshorne's concept of an individual.

The Synthesizing Agent

There is more to Hartshorne's rejection of Rāmānuja's doctrine of soul as a distinct substance apart from other parts of the body than the impossibility of relations between contemporaries. Hartshorne rejects the doctrine of substance per se and we know now the alternative he proposes. Both he and Rāmānuja agree that all knowledge is knowledge of the real and both agree that an object's existence is proved by direct perception or experience. For Hartshorne, this is the case

59. Ibid., p.228f.
because the experience of an object is the real -- "the given things are the real things", and what is given is experience (supra, p.69).

For Rāmānuja direct perception proves the existence of an object because every cause produces an effect consistent with itself.

There is equality of nature between an effect and a cause, in that sense that those essential characteristics by which the causal substance distinguishes itself from other things persist in its effects also ...60

The cause and effect relation consists of one substance affecting another substance with characteristics consistent with or true to its own essential nature. Or, to use Hartshorne's term, the subject is "moulded" by the object, when cause and effect have reference to knowledge of something, only Hartshorne would not use the term "substance". How then, asks Rāmānuja, do effects differ from their causes, if they are not in different substances? And Hartshorne's reply is that they are different because the effect is a new synthesis of the causes it synthesizes. "'The many become one and are increased by one', a new inclusive unity is born; and this unity forms an item in a new many."61 The experiences of the immediate past moment cause the subject of the present moment because it is just the synthesis of these experiences. There are new relationships among the past experiences, but the experiences remain the same. These new relationships constitute the new subject and a new self-awareness. In other words, as we have already indicated (supra, p.86), the nervous system or "mind" is not some continuing substance affected by other substances making up the rest of the body, it is a synthesis of experiences which

60. Thibaut, p.146.
61. Creative Synthesis, p.16.
Qualities Are Psychical and Creative

Now the question is, how can such a synthesis take place without a synthesizer, a continuous, conscious Atman, which Rāmānuja believes to be presupposed in all experience? The answer to this lies in Hartshorne’s understanding of the nature of a "quality". In his system the synthesizer is the momentary subject who has self-awareness of being the mass of qualities (experiences) synthesized at any given moment. The significant point being that these experienced qualities are not configurations of consciousness, as Rāmānuja says they are, they are conscious, "feeling".

Mind is the "stuff" that constitutes the essential nature of all entities. Why? Because "any quality, to be known, must become a quality of experience in some form, sensory or affective, mind as such cannot be a mere species of quality; rather, it is the universal correlate of quality, and of quantity as well". 62 This does not mean that mind is a substance that has qualities as attributes. Qualities are themselves psychic, dynamic relationships and essentially creative in nature. This is why Hartshorne refers to them as "feelings" and says: "The feeling tone of a color is not ... some thing over and above the color; it is just the color itself seen in its intelligible essence." 63

Whereas Rāmānuja thinks of creativity as a voluntary act of the substantial Atman who has consciousness and activity as characteristics, Hartshorne thinks of creativity as being an essential characteristic.

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63. Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation, p.98.
of all existence. It is what existence is. "To be is to create".64 Knowing is but one form of acting. So the subject is a mass of dynamic qualities that evolve new qualities by interacting with each other. Certainly each subsequent subject is a new subject, because of increase, but it is also the same subject and in this sense continuous. This is why Rāmānuja thinks of consciousness as being "centered". It is when we think of an individual in relation to other individuals, but other individuals are only known, and therefore meaningfully exist, as they are "included" in the synthesizing subject. Each self-aware individual is really a universe in himself, indirectly affected by others.

Syntheses of experience are the synthesizing agents

However, even if we grant that experienced qualities are dynamic and creative in themselves, rather than inert qualities of some vital substance, this does not provide an explanation for the synthesis taking place. The synthesis that is the subject now (let us be clear that we are referring to psychical individuals and not physical individuals, which are synthesized out of experienced external data by psychical individuals65) is not just a haphazard collection of experiences. The synthesis is a thinking, purposing unit (supra, p.86). An adequate explanation of this seems to require the positing of some agent who experiences the many and synthesizes them into one experience. Such an agent would have to exist prior to the synthesis rather than being created by it. Furthermore, if purposing

65. Supra, pp. 85-86.
is to be meaningful, the individual must transcend the mere sum of experiences in some way in order to determine which of the possibilities of a given moment will be actualized in the subsequent moment. 66

Ramanauja provides for this by making consciousness and "doer" characteristics of the ātman and attributing it with the power to transcend particular cognitions and acts and pass judgment upon them.

It is in the realization of this transcendence that the ātman realizes his freedom in relation to any and all particular experience.

In his descriptions of the synthesizing process, Hartshorne frequently uses terminology that implies a synthesizing agent. For instance:

In every moment each of us accomplishes a remarkable creative act. What do we create? Our own experience at that moment. But, you may say, this experience is not of our own making, since it is produced in us by various causes. But, please note, there are many causes, not one. This is enough to show that the causes alone cannot fully determine the result. For the experience is one, not many. What causal law could prescribe in advance just how the many factors are to fuse together into a new single entity, an experience?67

Following this he writes:


Experience puts together its data; these remain several, but the experience in and by which they are put together is one. Each synthesis is a single reality, not reducible to interrelated parts. It is a "whole of parts", yet it is more than that phrase clearly states: the safest language is to call it a synthesis, or an inclusive reality. But the including reality is as much a unitary entity as is any one of the included items.68

Thus, "The many become one and are increased by one?"69

The causes of a particular unified experience do not fully determine the experience. The full particularity of an experience is not predictable. This is the import of the statement that no "causal law could prescribe in advance just how the many factors are to fuse together into a new single entity". On the other hand, the resultant synthesis is not a matter of pure chance because the experience "puts together its data". It is the synthesizer. A single experience brings the multitude of experiences together. This experience is an "inclusive reality". But how can this be, when that experience is not present until the unity takes place? It seems more accurate to say that the unified experience is the result of the coming together of experiences (data) rather than the cause.

The resolution of this apparent problem lies in understanding the nature of the pervasive self-awareness of the psychical individual, which Hartshorne also refers to as the "dominant monad" and "group mind", who thinks and wills as an irreducible unit.70 This is the

68. Ibid., p.3.
69. Ibid., p.16.
70. Reality As Social Process, p.59. Also, supra, p.86.
self-awareness of being all the experiences unified "now". This unified experience was not present prior to the coming together of these experiences, because to do so it would have to be something entirely different from those experiences. No, the organizing agent of this unified experience was in part the subject of the previous moment in the event-sequence, where, as an antecedent condition, it limits the possibilities for the subsequent synthesis in relation to its prehension of it in its subjective aim. But, Hartshorne insists, it "only limits the possibilities to a more or less narrow range", not in a fully determinate way. 71

The definiteness is new; not implied by the antecedent or "external" situation; but there it now is. Since the determinateness has come about, it is in that sense an act. But it is an act of no agent unless one internal to the entity, i.e., the entity itself regarded as acting or free. 72

Once the subject is fully determined it is not free to be anything other than what it is, i.e., the experiences it has synthesized. Its freedom lies in the range of possible experiences it can partially cause to be actualized, as the subsequent subject in its event-sequence, out of the determinate experiences present to it, which were also the results of free decisions. "We cannot simply experience our present free experience - of what? There must be some content. In memory and social experience, each with its own freedom, belonging to other times or other individuals". 73


72. Ibid.

The way in which a subject constituted of experience organizes other experiences can be made more explicit by referring again to our diagram (supra, p. 79). C is the present momentary event in the event sequence that is the life of an individual, who is identified by certain abstract, generic characteristics that perdure from event to event. The content of the unitary experience that C is consists of c, experiences of the body cells, memory, abstract ideas, thought images, etc., and d, experiences of entities external to c in the immediate past moment, received through the senses and unknown at that time. C cannot change this data, it is determinate and remains unchanged and actual as long as memory allows. What C can do however, according to Hartshorne, and this is the locus of freedom, is to prehend the possible ways in which this data can be synthesized into a new unity in the subsequent moment and act upon it in such a way as to cause a particular actual synthesis out of the prevailing possibilities. When this new synthesis does become actual, it ceases to be subjective and becomes objective, a past event ("Any actual occurrence, once it occurs, immediately acquires the status of being past" 74) constituting part of the object content of the experience of the new subject, C1, the subsequent moment of the same event-sequence. There is a new subject each moment, containing the preceding subjects in his event-sequence as objects of the experience he presently is. "Each experience is thus a free act, in its final unity a 'self-created' actuality, enriching the sum of actualities by one new member." 75

74. Reality As Social Process, p. 73.
Why is there a new subject each moment? Because the event-sequence is increased by one. But, this new subject is not completely de novo. It contains all the preceding subjects of the event-sequence and was in fact partially created by the immediately preceding subject, who was in turn partially created by the one preceding him back to the time this event-sequence became a self-conscious individual.

This is why Hartshorne says:

> Of course from birth to death I am I and not any other human person ... This means (for one thing), that the series of experiences of which I have intimate memory contains no members of the series of which you have (or a lion has) intimate memory; and for another thing, that the series of states which are referred to as the history of a certain human organism or body, called mine, contain no members belonging also to the series referred to as the history of someone else's body, or a tree or a lion ... Genetic 'identity', simply as fact, is not in dispute, only its analysis or logical structure. 76

What for Hartshorne is a new subject, Rāmānuja considers to be an increase in the qualities of consciousness. What Rāmānuja refers to as the substantial ātman, with the essential characteristic consciousness, the subject of every experience, Hartshorne believes to be the subject of the preceding moment, continuing into the present moment as part of the new subject. And, since the inclusion of subjects in their successors continues on back to the beginning of the event-sequence, part of the subject now has been present and actual from the beginning, because once something becomes actual and determinate it always is,

76. Ibid., p.183.
according to Hartshorne. 77 The difference between past and present is that something past is part of a more inclusive whole, i.e., what is present, which nothing possesses as part. 78 Consequently, it is misleading to speak of "momentary subjects" in Hartshorne's system. It is true that there is a new subject each moment, but once they are actual they continue as long as memory allows. They have what Whitehead referred to as "objective immortality". 79

This description of the synthesizing agent reveals that the apparent differences between his concept of an individual and that of Rāmānuja may not be as radical as one might think. We suggested above (p.102) that the nervous system of an individual, as conceived by Hartshorne, is in some respects analogous to the ātman in Ramanuja's thought. One apparent difference is that the ātman is essentially unchanging and the nervous system is constantly changing from moment to moment. But note the nature of the change. The nervous system, which like everything else is essentially mind, changes from moment to moment because in each moment there is a new synthesis of experiences, new qualities of mind. However, a large part of the new synthesis is made up of qualities of mind actualized in the distant past and will continue to be actualized and unchanged in subsequent syntheses for an indefinite period in the future. So, a significant portion of the nervous system does remain unchanged and the essential nature "mind" is continually and actually present. The basic difference then is that

77. Ibid., p.184. Also refer "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply", p.56.
78. The Divine Relativity, p.69.
Rāmānuja thinks of a continuous consciousness that takes on new qualities and that this is the cause of the idea of change, whereas Hartshorne believes the idea of change is derived from the addition of new mind qualities to other mind qualities that perdure from moment to moment.

The second apparent difference between the ātman and the nervous system is that the former is permanent and the latter is impermanent. However, the points we have just made to show that the changes in the nervous system from moment to moment are not radical indicate that the nervous system is impermanent from the point of view of continuous increase but, because each synthesis, once actualized, continues to be actual, the nervous system is fairly permanent. Now, the question is, how permanent?

At the beginning of this chapter we were concerned with the question of the significance of the body for the soul in Rāmānuja's system of thought. His position is that the ātman is dependent on the body for its mode of existence but that the permanence of the ātman is such that it can exist in itself apart from the body, which Hartshorne rejects (supra, p. 74). His view is that the nervous system, which we are taking to be co-terminus with the idea of being a self, comes into existence with the body because it is the synthesis of the body experiences. Thus, the absolute permanence that Rāmānuja attributes to the ātman is contingent upon the validity of the proposition that the ātman has "being in itself", based on the experience of continuous consciousness of being a self. So, the import of our question about the degree of permanence possessed by the nervous system, as conceived by Hartshorne, is whether or not it is of the kind
that would permit it to continue to exist apart from the other aspects of the complex organism?

I - Consciousness

This brings us to the last major issue that we must address ourselves to before concluding this chapter, i.e., the experience of "I-consciousness". This is the atman's experience "in itself" that Hartshorne believes to be meaningless. According to him, an individual is a system of temporal and spatial subject-object relations. An absence of such relations equals an absence of existence - "to be is to be in relation" (supra, p.74). This spatio-temporal unity manifests itself in the self-awareness of being a particular group of these relations, i.e., of being a body or organism. Each self-aware individual is "the momentary 'whole' summing up the antecedent states of the parts" (supra, p.100), and the event-sequence of these momentary wholes.

It is interesting to note that Hartshorne believes this conception of an individual is analogous to the idea of a "stream of consciousness". This is the "I" in the "I know" that Rāmānuja refers to. Rāmānuja claims that this conscious "I" continues to exist in deep-sleep, apart from subject-object relations, and that this is proof of the continuous existence of the atman as the substratum of all particular cognitions. Hartshorne, on the other hand, thinks it is quite possible that self-awareness is absent in deep-sleep and that indeed the individual as a dominant monad does cease to exist. 

80. Logic of Perfection, p.201.
81. Ibid., p.201.
Numerical identity seems not to admit gradations ... This makes light of and in effect denies the monstrous breaks and shifts in our self-identity -- complete breaks, apparently, in deep sleep, enormous shifts from virtually mindless infancy (or existence in the womb) to adult consciousness, from sanity to delirium or virtually-mindless intoxication, etc. 82

Gradations of I-consciousness Rāmānuja allows, but not complete breaks. From his point of view there are two questions for Hartshorne: first, why is there the remembrance of experiences prior to sleep, and second, why is there the feeling of having slept well if the individual ceases to exist? To which Hartshorne replies, "It may be said that when we lose consciousness we do not in fact cease to exist, since our bodily reality persists". 83 In other words, the awareness of being the unity of all cellular interaction of the body ceases but not all the activity. The individual cellular components of the body continue independently as individual event-sequences, but there is no dominant event-sequence that synthesizes them into a unity. The awareness of being the unity of body experiences ceases, so the 'whole' body, as a psychical individual ceases to exist. There is but a mass of psychical individuals making up a physical individual, analogous to a stone or a tree.

If this is an accurate description of the state of an individual in deep sleep, presumably the way one explains the remembrance of experiences prior to sleep is with the idea that the brain cells that carry on the function of remembering past events do so by passing

82. Ibid., p.120.
their data from moment to moment, synthesis to synthesis, without any increase during the period of deep-sleep. Otherwise, all past experiences would be lost. Likewise, one must assume that the nervous system, characterized by qualities that make it possible for it to become the dominant member of the body (supra, p.86), continued to perpetuate its existence, in a sequence of momentary cause and effect relationships, without receiving any new experience external to itself, i.e., it operates as a closed system. Each moment of the system's existence during deep-sleep must find itself internally related as subject to its previous moment as object. In this state, nothing is lost and nothing is added, so there is no sense of time. This we can assume is the way the nervous system continues its existence. It is not a dominant monad during this period, but it is continuously present to be stimulated by the other cells of the body, which means to begin receiving experiences external to its internal event-sequence or, as we say, 'to be awakened'. When this happens it becomes the dominant monad once again. The consciousness that comes with awakening is a new consciousness, but it is also the same consciousness. The essential nature of what consciousness is is always present and actual.

As to the experience of having slept well, this can be explained by the fact that the awakened self, or synthesis of experiences that follow the period of deep-sleep, has as part of the new unity the experience of cells that remember relaxed states of momentary existence.

84. Hartshorne believes an "entity could have one parent or source in time", Creative Synthesis, p.218.
Conclusion

In this chapter, we have seen how Hartshorne provides an alternate conception of the nature of an individual that gives a coherent, consistent account of all the aspects of experience that Rāmānuja points to as evidence of a continuing, permanent, essentially unchanging substance, the Ātman, without recourse to a substance doctrine. Our analysis has revealed that the nervous system of a complex organism, as described by Hartshorne, seems to perform the same basic functions of unifying knowledge, volition and feeling that Rāmānuja ascribes to the Ātman. Further, we have tried to show, by extending Hartshorne's principles, that Rāmānuja's idea of the continuation of "I-consciousness" in deep-sleep, which is the experience of the Ātman being in itself, has its parallel implicit in Hartshorne's scheme if we can conceive of the qualities that define a momentary event of the nervous system's existence in the state of deep-sleep as perpetuating their existence through a sequence of momentary cause and effect relationships.

Now, because the individual, momentary events in the event-sequence, which is the existence of the nervous system, are, like everything else, basically psychic or mind in nature, we can say it is essentially consciousness, just as the Ātman is, as described by Rāmānuja. And, because each momentary synthesis, once actualized, ideally remains actual, the qualities of the nervous system are continuous, i.e., continuous from the time of their actualization. Some of these qualities have their beginning in the moment of conception in the womb of the individual's mother, when the nervous system began to develop.
By extending Hartshorne's principles, we have found that there is a sense in which the nervous system of a complex organism is by nature a continuous consciousness. It is continuous but not unchanging or permanently the same. In fact, each momentary, unified, conscious event is different because it is a new synthesis. Some of these events are unified conscious experiences that synthesize all the qualities of experience that made up the body of the organism the previous moment and those that the body cells had synthesized from their contact with the external world. Other events in the life of the system, i.e., when it is in deep-sleep, will include only the defining qualities of the system being in itself. This latter set of qualities will be a necessary part of every experience. The degree to which the essentially conscious nervous system is extended at any moment, we must assume, is determined by the "will" of the preceding synthesis in the event-sequence. The maximum to which each conscious event can be extended is determined by the kind of organism to which the nervous system belongs. In biological terms, this would refer to its genetic composition. In terms of Rāmānuja's thought, and Indian philosophy in general, it would refer to the individual's kārmaṇa. This parallel presupposes the term "individual" is being used in the ordinary sense of a continuing self, which Hartshorne says is an abstraction. However, even when "individual" is used to refer to event, as Hartshorne prefers, the particular content of each particular synthesis in the event-sequence will also be determined to a large degree by the kārmaṇa that the individual has accrued up to that particular moment, i.e., what was selected to be synthesized in each preceding moment.
We have extended Hartshorne's principles considerably in order to bring out the possible parallel functions between the nervous system in Hartshorne's scheme and the ātman in Rāmānuja's. One obvious objection to what we have inferred is that it implies a continuing self or substratum of experience and that is precisely what Hartshorne denies. From the beginning of our comparison of the two concepts of individuals we have said that the essential difference between the views of Rāmānuja and Hartshorne is that Rāmānuja speaks of a continuous, unchanging, permanent substance that has as its modes and attributes various changing qualities and degrees of extension, whereas Hartshorne does not allow this substance-attribute distinction. His position is that all ideas of a continuing self are derived by abstracting certain common features from a sequence of momentary events or selves. Thus, when we say that in the passing of an individual from the awakened-state to the state of deep-sleep there is the continuity of the defining qualities of the nervous system and that these are present in all experience, on his view, what we mean is that certain abstract qualities continue to be present in a sequence of events.

It is not our intention to minimize this fundamental difference between the two conceptions but we want to see where the real issue lies. For this reason, we should not be misled by the term "abstract", as used by Hartshorne. The abstract characteristics he has reference to are not abstracted from many disconnected entities or events that exist independently of each other. They are indeed abstracted from many events but the many exist as actual in the present singular, latest synthesis that sums up all that preceded it like a series of concentric circles. They are abstract in the sense that no set of
these qualities embraces the full actuality of the concrete, novel, present synthesis, which, on Hartshorne's view, must be the point of reference when we speak of the reality of an individual, if we are to give adequate significance to the full particularity of every moment in the process that is the full reality of life. Nevertheless, these "abstract" qualities are continuous, actual parts of each new synthesis. And, these abstract qualities have the same function as the substantial ātman in Rāmānuja's concept of an individual.

A further objection that can be raised is that these abstract qualities do not function like the substantial ātman in Rāmānuja's system because they do not have other qualities as modes and attributes as the conscious ātman does. They are but parts of each new synthesis and the reality of the individual is defined in terms of the whole, not selected parts. There is continuous consciousness, but each moment there is a new unified consciousness or mind, because the qualities and mind are not different. This point is extremely important because it means the karman or previous acts in the event-sequence that is the continuing existence of the individual constitute its defining characteristics. In other words, karman is the individuating principle. Take away the qualities and you take away everything that the individual is. And, since all the qualities are contingent, the existence of the individual is contingent. This has profound implications when Hartshorne's principles of individuality are applied to the divine individual, and for the manner in which salvation is conceived by him.

In Rāmānuja's concept, the ātman is the individuating principle. As we noted at the end of the preceding chapter, his desire to establish the existence of a permanent, unchanging, eternal ātman is motivated by
his belief that individuality is eternally retained in mokṣa, that the relationship between the worshipper and the one worshipped is real and not the result of ignorance (avidya). To establish the eternal existence of a self, once one accepts that experience proves existence, there must be a continuous consciousness of some aspect of the self that is eternal, unchanging and permanent.

Finally, then, there are the related questions we raised at the end of Chapter II. What is the relationship between the continuing and the changing elements of experience and does Rāmānuja's formulating this relationship in terms of the substance-attribute dichotomy involve him in a contradiction? The answer to the latter question is no, at least no more than does Hartshorne's idea that some qualities continue to exist as actual throughout the event-sequence that is the life of an individual. The differences between the two philosophers centres in their conceptions of the relationship between being and becoming, and, particularly, which of these has priority over the other.

Rāmānuja takes the continuing qualities of experience to be indicative of a substance that is eternal, unchanging and permanent. This is the being of the individual. The momentary, changing, impermanent attributes, which Hartshorne refers to as becoming, are, on Rāmānuja's view, dependent upon the substantial self for their existence. They provide enjoyment for the atman, a means for the expression of its will, and a way for it to attain salvation, unity with Brahman. They have no existence or value in themselves. Being is logically prior to becoming.

Hartshorne takes the momentary event that is a synthesis of all present experience and all past experience as primary, and because it is
constantly changing, he considers existence to be primarily characterized by becoming. Being is derived from the becoming sequence by abstracting certain continuing qualities. And, since these abstract qualities have no existence apart from the becoming process, they are dependent upon it and priority must go to becoming. Existence is becoming and, as we shall see (Chapter VI), the aesthetic increase from moment to moment is an end in itself. The experiencer of each moment is a synthesis of qualities within the becoming process and becomes a part of a new whole in the next moment. The value of the experiencer is in its being a part of the aesthetic value of the new and subsequent totalities that constitute the living experience of the divine individual.
IV

RÂMÂNUJA'S CONCEPT OF THE GOD MEN WORSHIP

In Chapter II, we considered Râmânuja's arguments in support of his thesis that the Ātman, as the continuing, essentially unchanging self or soul, is a necessary presupposition in all experience, i.e., that a complete, coherent explanation of the nature of experience requires the positing of a conscious substratum. Then in Chapter III, we saw how Hartshorne offers an alternate conception of an individual that explains the various aspects of experience, pointed to by Râmânuja, without a continuing, conscious substratum. He does this by conceiving of an individual as a momentary event that is a synthesis of experience, essentially psychic in nature, that contains as a part of itself the actuality of all previous synthesized experiences in an event-sequence that is the continuing existence of an individual.

The basic description that each of these philosophers gives of an individual is considered by them to be applicable to the divine individual. Râmânuja considers Brahman to be the continuous, essentially unchanging soul of his body, the phenomenal world, and Hartshorne thinks of God as being the sum total of all experience, in all time and all space, with the abstract essence of all experience constituting the soul or generic essence of God, i.e., the individual characteristics of God.

Hartshorne defines God as "the supremely excellent and all-
worshipful being"¹ or "the uniquely good, admirable, great worship­eliciting being"² which is a more elaborate way of saying that God is what men worship. And, as we noted in our introductory comments, Rāmānuja also believes that any adequate definition of deity must find its basic presuppositions in the idea of God held by men who worship (supra, pp. 2-6). The significance of this definition in Hartshorne's conception of deity cannot be over-estimated. Many of the arguments he makes against classical theism come down to the question of what kind of God do men in fact worship? For instance, with respect to the polar opposites unity and variety, he sets out three possibilities: God equals complete unity, God equals complete variety, and God equals unity-in-variety or variety-in-unity. Then he raises this question: "Which kind of God is most worshipful?" His answer is: "The good as we know it is unity-in-variety, or variety-in-unity; if the variety overbalances, we have chaos or discord; if the unity, we have monotony and triviality".³ There is the possibility of good and bad on both sides of these categorical polarities, so "the supreme excellence must somehow be able to integrate all the complexity there is into itself as one spiritual whole".⁴ Hartshorne's dipolar concept of deity does this by bringing the polar categories together in the one entity and giving equal emphasis to both sides. The ensuing contradictions are avoided by positing a concrete and an abstract aspect to every individual, including the divine.

2. Ibid., p.7. 
3. Ibid., p.3. 
4. Ibid., p.4.
The God men worship is perfection. On this Rāmānuja and Hartshorne agree. For Hartshorne this means that he is categorically ultimate and unchanging in such qualities as righteousness, wisdom and power, and that his existence is infinite. Again, Rāmānuja agrees. However, when we come to Hartshorne's idea that the divine is categorically superior and capable of unlimited increase by continually excelling himself in such qualities as happiness, beauty and richness of experience, it is here that the two philosophers have their differences. For Rāmānuja, Brahman is supreme happiness and beauty because he is supreme bliss and the aesthetic ultimate. These characteristics of Brahman are also eternally actual and unchanging. He writes, "the modifications of the nature of Brahman, as in the case of earth and gold is not at all admitted by us, on account of the Śruti (passages) pointed out to (Brahman) not undergoing any modification and being free from all blemishes". This affirmation involves Rāmānuja in the same problems we noted with respect to his conception of ordinary individuals, when he tries to attribute reality to the changing aspect of existence and, at the same time, claims that a conscious self knowing these changes remains itself unchanged. Our task is to discover those elements in his understanding of the nature of perfection that induce him to rule all change out of the divine individual.

Rāmānuja's Idea of Perfection

Both Rāmānuja and Hartshorne describe an individual as having two

5. Śrībhūṣya, p.581.
aspects. For Rāmānuja these two aspects are an eternal self or soul (ātman), whose essential nature is consciousness (caitanya), and a temporal, contingent aspect, the body, in which the ātman abides.

In the case of ordinary individuals, e.g., a man, the body is defined as any "substance which a sentient soul is capable of completely controlling and supporting for its own purposes, and which stands to the soul in an entirely subordinate relation" (supra, p.40). This substance, making up the body of all ordinary individuals, comes under the general category of prakṛti or acit, non-sentient matter.

The divine individual, Īśvara, has two aspects also. There is the eternal, absolute aspect, the divine Soul or Self (Paramātman or Brahman), whose essential attributes are existence, knowledge, infinite, goodness, and blissful (satyam, jñānam, anantam, amalatva, and ānandamaya), and the temporal, contingent aspect, the body of Īśvara, in which the Brahman abides. The body of Īśvara is made up of the conscious jīvas (cit) and the non-sentient prakṛti (acit). Rāmānuja takes this to be the teaching of the Gītā and the revealed scriptures.

Elsewhere the śruti asserts that, in whatever

6. Rāmānuja uses many of the traditional appellations for the divine individual -- Indra, Īśvara, Kṛṣṇa, Hara, Hari, Nārāyaṇa, etc. He also uses superlative type names, the two most prominent ones being Puruṣottama or Highest Person and Paramātman or Highest Self. However, even though the names are many, they all have Brahman as their ultimate referend.

There is really no name that specifically refers to Brahman and his body as a unit; but, strange as it may seem, there is really no name that does not, because they are non-different. Hopefully, this will be more intelligible by the end of the chapter.

There are other names like Brahmā and Hiranyagarbha, "who represents the soul in its aggregate form" (Thibaut, p.500), but these gods are instruments through whom Brahman creates.

condition cit and acit or Subject and Object exist, their existence depends on God, because they constitute his body and are internally ruled by him, and that God is their Ātman. 8

There are three tattvas or ultimately real principles: 1) Brahman, the Ultimate Being and soul of the cosmos; 2) cit, all sentient individuals or jīvas; and 3) acit, non-sentient matter. These three principles are substantially different from each other and together make up the totality of existence. They are different yet non-different. Their relationship is viśistādvaita, qualified non-dual, because cit and acit exist only as modal qualities of Brahman. They relate to Brahman in the same way as the quality consciousness relates to the Ātman. Ātman is the necessary substrate for consciousness, but the qualities of consciousness are not the qualities of the Ātman. They are the effects of its involvement with prakṛti. In this same manner, Brahman is the cause of all existence, knowledge, finitude, morality and bliss. How he is the cause of these will be dealt with in this order, the first three in this chapter and the latter two in Chapter VI.

Brahman As "Existence"

In opposition to the Advaita of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja maintains that all three tattvas have real existence, but they are not all real in the same sense. The reality of the Brahman's existence is unique in two ways. First, Brahman's existence is the cause of every other existent thing, sentient and non-sentient. His existence is unique as cause, but it is non-different insofar as cause and effect must correspond.

But it is a rule that as a cause we must assume only what corresponds to the effect! -- Just so; and what corresponds to the total aggregate of effects is the highest Person... who has minds and matter in their subtle state for his body.  

Prior to the creation (srsti) of the world, there is complete undifferentiated unity of existence. In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (VI:2:1), there is the statement which says: "In the beginning, my dear, this world was just Being (sat), one only, without a second." Rāmānuja takes this to imply "that the nature of Brahman only is the one Reality and everything over and above that is false." But this does not mean that cit and acit are non-existent or essentially illusory. It means that the sentient and non-sentient aspects of existence in the causal, pre-creation state (pralaya) have no individuating characteristics and exist solely as undifferentiated modes of Brahman. In this state their form is "so extremely subtle that it hardly deserves to be called something separate from Brahman, of which it constitutes the body." This statement is indicative of a tension that exists in Rāmānuja's thought that defies clearcut logical distinctions. He wants to say that in the pralaya state "Brahman" denotes and connotes everything that exists, because nothing can be differentiated from it, in order to affirm that Brahman is the being of all other beings. Yet, on the other hand, he does not want

10. Śrībhāṣya, p.221. "False" here translates the Sanskrit term "mithya", meaning something unreal or having only apparent reality, untrue or vain.
to establish the complete identity of Brahman with cit and acit because that would imply that their imperfection belong to Brahman.

His position, briefly stated, is that the essential qualities of cit and acit are qualities of Brahman, but they are not all the qualities that Brahman possesses. So, Brahman is, at the same time, essentially the same as and essentially different from cit and acit. Similarly, the being of Brahman is the same as that of cit and acit because he is the cause of their being, but it is different because their being is a quality of his being. Rāmānuja finds his authority for this conception of the Brahman-world relationship in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (III:7:3-22).

He who dwells in the earth, yet is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who controls the earth from within, he is your self, the inner controller [antaryamin], the immortal (Brh. Up. III:7:3).

Creation is initiated by the thought, purpose and free choice of Brahman.

Brahman modifies itself with the world as its body in the order of dissolution, having first reflected -- May I, Brahman having the Darkness [undifferentiated cit and acit] reduced to that state as the body, have the body of worldly existence mixed with sentient and non-sentient objects with name and form distinguished as before ...12

Thus Brahman is the One from which the many evolves because prior to creation there is nothing distinguishable from him. With creation differentiation takes place and all the categories (nāma-rūpa) of existence are formed. However, it is important that this not be construed as meaning the One becomes the many. Creation means that what was undifferentiated, formless and nameless, has become differentiated,

12. Śribhāṣya, p.546.
informed and nameable. Individuals are denotable apart from Brahman. Brahman, "the highest Person", as the Ātman of the world, is substantially and essentially different from cit and acit, but Brahman, as the cause of all else, is not. Just how he is the cause of all else is a matter we will deal with later (infra, pp.134-139).

Brahman is unique in essence, in the manner of his being, in that his existence alone is absolutely unconditioned in any way. The jīvas, as we noted earlier, are not subject to non-existence. They exist eternally and cannot not exist. And, the jīvas eternally have consciousness (jñāna) as their essential characteristic. In these respects, their existence is unconditioned, and because of this they are satya, real and true, i.e., that they are and what they are is eternally the same and unchanging. But, the mode of the individual jīva's existence is subject to change insofar as his consciousness is modified by his contact with prakṛti, due to his kārmaṇa. Consequently, the jīva's existence is not absolutely unconditioned.

The jīvas are satya and Brahman is satyasya satyam, the True of the true or the Really Real.

In the case of the Jīvas, contraction and expansion of knowledge in conformity with Kārmaṇa, do exist. In the case of the highest Puruṣa, however, who is with all sins destroyed, those two do not exist. Therefore, this one is Satya, even beyond them.13

In other words, the existence, essential nature and mode of existence of Brahman are all necessary, in the sense that they could not be otherwise. He is eternally unchanging in that he is, what he is and how he is. Other things are true and real insofar as they correspond to him as their cause, i.e. insofar as they are one with his essence.

13. Ibid., p.822.
and qualities of his being.

When we turn now to the third tattva, prakṛti, we come to the important distinction between "being" and "non-being". We find that whereas Rāmānuja attributes "being" to Brahman and the jīvas, he considers prakṛti to be "non-being". It is important that we consider carefully the distinction he makes between these, because what is "non-being" for Rāmānuja is "becoming" for Hartshorne and the locus of reality.

The following quotation from P.N. Srinivasachari's Philosophy of Viśistādvaita sums up very nicely Rāmānuja's understanding of the nature of prakṛti.

Prakṛti is subject to the law of pariñama and evolves into the ever-changing phenomenal universe. Matter is not merely what is, but what becomes, and is a series of particular perishing presentations. It is perpetually fleeting flux without any stability. Each object is fugitive, passes over into different states, and each later state is out of connection with the earlier.14

Because of its everchanging nature, when prakṛti is considered by itself, Rāmānuja claims it is appropriate to refer to it as "non-being".

The non-sentient thing ... is definitely fit to be denoted by the word 'Nāsti' [is not] on account of its becoming otherwise every moment ... For, the object fit to be denoted by the word 'Asti' [is], is devoid of beginning, middle and end, [and] being possessed of uniform nature, always on account of its not deserving the idea [viz.] 'Nāsti' [is not].15

Following this statement, Rāmānuja goes on to say that consciousness (jñāna) alone is (asti), and he seems to follow the idealists in defining being in terms of what is known or definable, but this is not

the case. Brahman and the īivas are asti because they are the continuous, essentially unchanging substrata of all experience. Being is defined in terms of jñāna not because the knower establishes the existence of the known but because consciousness is the only aspect of experience that is continuous and not subject to perishing.\textsuperscript{16}

Prakṛti, on the other hand, is nasti, because that aspect of experience that is differentiated by prakṛti is of a perishable nature, i.e., it has contingent existence. It always exists in some form, but it does not have a continuous essential nature to give it being, as is the case with the sentient aspect of existence.

Rāmānuja attributes being to what is experienced as continuous and non-perishing, as is the case with consciousness (jñāna), and to what is logically required as a substratum for this consciousness, the ātman, based on the nature of experience. Prakṛti is experienced as being in constant flux, because it continually undergoes changes in its essential nature, so he attributes it with non-being. However, even though it is non-being, it is not unreal (mithyā). Rāmānuja clearly states that with regard to "the non-sentient thing, the words 'Nāsti' and 'Asatya' are not used as referring to unsubstantial nature and false nature, but as referring to perishability".\textsuperscript{17}

The reality of prakṛti is important to Rāmānuja because what is at stake is the reality of the physical world, the establishment of which is as important to him as it is to Hartshorne. As we noted in

\textsuperscript{16} This point has significance in relation to the Advaitan criticism of Rāmānuja's idea that consciousness is a quality of the ātman rather than the self-consciousness being a notion within universal consciousness (supra, p.\textsuperscript{.}). We will discuss the importance of this with respect to the divine individual in Chapter VI.

\textsuperscript{17} Śrībhāṣya, p.161.
the first chapter, the primary motivation for Rāmānuja's philosophy is to prove that a system of thought that takes the world to be real is more consistent with the nature of experience and the religion of the Vedas than the māyāvāda of Śāmkara, which considers the world to be ultimately illusory in nature. If the material world is unreal, he concludes, so are the Vedas, the religious acts prescribed by them, moral behaviour and the attaining of salvation (supra, pp.46-49).

Śāmkara maintains that all difference, i.e., everything other than pure-consciousness -- jars, pieces of cloth, and any other object of consciousness, is ultimately unreal because it does not persist. On the basis of this, he contends that the whole physical world is in the final analysis, illusory (māyā) and false (mithyā). This is erroneous, says Rāmānuja, and the source of the error is that Śāmkara does not distinguish between non-persistence in the sense of false perception being replaced by true perception, as in the case of a rope being seen as a snake in one moment and having that perception contradicted by the perception of the rope as rope in the next, and non-persistence in the sense of the perception of a whole jar in one moment and a broken jar in the succeeding moment. In the first instance, one perception is sublated by another through contradiction. The sublated object is unreal and false. But, the perception of the whole jar in one moment and not in the next does not make it unreal because no contradiction is involved and because the existence of an object is proved by perception and is therefore real.18 Unreality is founded in false judgment. When the rope is judged to be rope and not

18. Ibid., pp.52-53.
a snake, what is false is sublated by what is real. When, on the
other hand, a whole jar becomes a broken jar, the becoming of one as
the effect of the other as cause is not false, it is a real becoming
because of a real perishing and no contradiction is involved.

There is still one more important aspect of the nature of
prakrti that deserves a fuller explanation, and that is the question of
what it means to say that prakrti is subject to perishing. In the above
quotation from Srinivasachari, he states that prakrti "is not merely
what is, but what becomes, and is a series of particular perishing
presentations". This is another way of saying that "the words
'Nästi' and 'Asatya' are not used as referring to unsubstantial nature
and false nature, but as referring to perishability". The import of
both statements is that prakrti has eternal substantial existence, i.e.,
that it is is not subject to non-existence, even though what it is and
how it is are constantly changing. Thus we see that "reality" and
"being" are not the same. "Reality" refers to thatness and "being"
to whatness.

Rāmānuja affirms the continuous substantial existence of
prakrti because its denial implies that the objective, physical world
is created out of nothing, which he finds untenable. Every aspect of
the physical world must have a real cause in order to be a real effect.
Prakrti is the real material cause of every material object that is
present to the conscious subject. Even though our experience of
material objects is that they are constantly changing, i.e., that what
objects of experience are is dynamic, there must be an underlying
substance that is continuous in their existence. Without the continuous,
real substance, real change is not possible, because there would only be
different, unrelated forms and qualities. If the material cause of the broken jar was not present in the preceding whole jar the idea of change from wholeness to brokenness would be meaningless. Rāmānuja

... affirms the truth that the cause was pre-existent and non-existent, and that the effect brings out the continuity, and does not betray any self-contradiction. What is non-existent cannot become the existent and what exists cannot be unreal. A substance enters into different states in succession. What passes away is the substance in its previous state or avasthā and what comes into being is the same substance in its subsequent state as effect.19

Being alone does not constitute the whole of reality. The impermanent, constantly changing, phenomenal world is not being, but it is real. Hence, being and becoming together make up the totality of existence. Now the question is, how are they related? And, the answer is, in essence, as soul to body.

How the Three Tattvas Are Related

The three tattvas are all real and substantially different from each other, but they are not unrelated as an aggregate of disparate parts. In the preceding chapter, we noted that the ātman is externally related to prākṛti, i.e., the consciousness of the ātman is informed by objects composed of prākṛti but prākṛti never exists within consciousness. Because these two aspects of existence are externally related, a third term is required to relate them to each other if the relationship is to be purposeful, as opposed to accidental, viz., if the term "universe" is to have any meaning. Brahman is this third term.

He has cit and acit as modes or attributes of his existence and he is

their common substratum. The principle by which they are related to Brahman Rāmānuja refers to as sāmānādhi-karanya or case-co-ordination, meaning, "the abiding of several things in a common substrate".\(^\text{20}\)

That all experience involves difference is one of Rāmānuja's basic tenets. And differences are of three types. They may be between different substances, between a substance and its qualities, or between the different qualities of one substance. Case co-ordination has to do with the way in which a number of different qualities exist in a common substratum, with the recognition that these qualities may themselves be substances. For instance, a shepherd is qualified by the staff he carries and a dancer by the bracelets she wears, but staffs and bracelets are substances with qualities of their own apart from shepherds and dancers.\(^\text{21}\)

Another basic tenet of Rāmānuja's is that every substance has some qualities and every quality is a quality of some substance. They can be separated in thought and are apprehended as being absolutely different, but they cannot be separated in actuality. Substances relate to qualities in two ways -- essentially and accidentally. A quality is essentially related to a substance when the substance cannot exist without it and accidentally when it can. In other words, some qualities have a necessary relationship to a particular substance and others a contingent relationship. When the relationship is necessary, the absence of the quality equals an absence of the


\(^{21}\) Śrībhāṣya, pp.48, 49, 169. "For as genus (jāti) and quality (guna), so substances (dṛṣṭavya) also may occupy the position of determining attributes (viśegana), in so far merely as they constitute the body of something else" (ibid, p.135).
substance. On the other hand, when the relationship is contingent, the existence of the substance is not affected by the presence or absence of the quality.

Relating the second of these two principles, i.e., that every substance has some qualities, to Brahman, Rāmānuja contends that the Highest Person is not pure, undifferentiated consciousness but is the ultimate substance who is "possessed of a host of auspicious qualities, unlimited, unsurpassed and innumerable". These innumerable auspicious qualities abide in Brahman, without contradiction, according to the principle of sāmānādhikaraṇya. In fact, because Brahman is the ultimate cause of all that is, all qualities have him as their ultimate substratum. But, not all qualities relate to the same aspect of Brahman. The essential nature of Brahman, the Ātman of the world, the satyasya satyam, is composed of only necessary qualities because it is essentially unchanging perfection, as discussed above (p.123). In this respect, Brahman is unique and different from everything else. We have listed these essential characteristics as existence, truth, knowledge, etc. Now we must add to these qualities cit and acit, which are equally necessary qualities, having Brahman as their substratum, even though they are substances in themselves. They qualify Brahman in the same way as the staff qualifies the shepherd. In other words, the "whatness" of the jīvas and prakṛti are part of the "whatness" of Brahman. With reference to the famous phrase from the Chāndogya Upanisad (IV:8:7), tat tvam āsi, "That thou art", Rāmānuja says:

22. Ibid., p.3.
The case-co-ordination in passages like 'That thou art' does not aim at the oneness of the distinctionless thing, on account of the words 'Tat' and 'Tvam' denoting Brahman with qualifying attributes. The word 'Tat' indeed, touches upon the Brahman-omniscient, with thoughts fulfilled, the cause of the world...

And the word 'Tvam' having the case-co-ordination with 'Tat' propounds Brahman having for its body the Jīva [the individual Soul] particularized by the 'Acit', on account of the case-co-ordination referring to one thing remaining in two modes. 23

Thus cit and acit are absolute, unchanging modes of the essential aspect of Brahman, despite the fact that they have substantial reality in themselves. They are modes of Brahman because they are non-different from him. The jiivas are non-different, even though they are asti, i.e., they have a continuous, unchanging essential nature of their own, because their being (sat) is not different from Brahman who is satyasya satyam. Their unity is in their identity, with primacy going to Brahman. Hence, the category jīva denotes a real individual apart from Brahman, when differentiation takes place in srsti, but, at the same time, it also connotes Brahman, because what it is is essentially non-different from him. Likewise, prakṛti is real in itself, but it is not distinguishable from Brahman. It has no being of its own, it is nāsti, because it has no continuing essence. Whatever prakṛti is at any time, it is that because it is a mode of Brahman and nothing else. In other words, what it is in essence is a mode of Brahman.

The Highest Person is unique in that his essence and existence are one. He is unchanging perfection. In pralaya, when Brahman is in the causal state and contains all actuality within himself, he is

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23. Ibid., p.163.
all that exists, and since he is absolute and unchanging, everything that actually exists has necessary existence; there is no contingency. There is Brahman alone, without a second, viz., there is being alone, without becoming. The realm of becoming originates with creation or srsti.

When the period of a great pralaya draws to a close, the divine supreme Person, remembering the constitution of the world previous to the pralaya, and forming the volition 'May I become manifold', separates into its constituent elements the whole mass of enjoying souls and objects of enjoyment which, during the pralaya state, has been merged in him so as to possess a separate existence (not actual but) potential only, and then emits the entire world just as it had been before.24

This brings us back to the idea that "creation means that what was undifferentiated, formless and nameless, has become differentiated, informed and nameable", (supra, p.127). From the intervening discussion of the nature of the three tattvas, the basic elements of existence, and their relations to each other, we conclude that, for Rāmānuja, the realm of contingent becoming is the realm of names and forms, the particular modes of existence that evolve out of the coming together of cit and acit. Just how the Highest Person relates to these particular names and forms, in determining what they are at any particular time, will be discussed in Chapter VI, when we consider Brahman as the cause of morality. For the present, what we hope to have achieved is a description of the way Rāmānuja understands Brahman to be the being and reality (satyam) of every aspect of existence. To bring this into focus, we need only ask the question of whether the Highest Person undergoes real change? The answer to which is both yes and no,

depending upon the aspect of the divine in question. No, if the question has reference to the essential nature of Brahman, the Ātman of the universe, because this aspect of the ultimate is absolute and eternally the same. On the other hand, the answer is yes, if the question has reference to the all-inclusive aspect of Brahman, having cit and acit as his body. In the latter sense he is the subject and object of all change, being not only relative but what Hartshorne refers to as "surrelative". Putting the two aspects together we can say that being exists within becoming but being is primary, because without being, becoming is non-existent and meaningless.

... God, the Supreme Person, is modified by all existent beings and things which modify him by constituting the body of which He is the Ātman. From this point of view all words express God. So, by applying the grammatical rule of sāmanādhikaranya or functional co-ordination, God, is said to be the quintessence of all entities. All these entities with their peculiar individuality and characteristics have originated from God, are sesas of God and depend on God inasmuch as they constitute his body, and God himself is modified by all these entities of which He is the Ātman.²⁵

Brahman Is "Consciousness"

Brahman is the primordial substance, the being (sat) whose body is the causal state is the potentiality of all existent subjects and objects — past, present and future. When Brahman wills to create the world, he moves from the causal to the effectual state and the non-different, self-differentiating subjects (cit) and the non-sentient, undifferentiated matter (acit) are differentiated into an infinite number of actual, distinctive, determinate subjects and objects. It is because of this cause-effect relationship between Brahman and the

world that he is *satyasya satyam*, the Really Real or True of the true.

Rāmānuja's understanding of Brahman as the *satyam* of the world implies, among other things, that he is the unity of all that exists, but not simply as their aggregate; though he is that in his all-inclusive aspect. Paramātman, Brahman as the soul of the universe, is also the unity of all other beings because he is that in relation to which "being" is defined, i.e., he is the exemplar of true being. But Rāmānuja's idea is more profound than either of these. Paramātman is the Being of all other beings, he is the Real of all that is real and he is the True of all that is true. There is no being, reality or truth apart from him, just as there are no qualities apart from substances. However, an essential requirement for Brahman being these things is his having *jñāna* or consciousness as one of his essential attributes.

Brahman could be the unity of all existent entities if he were merely a pervasive, homogeneous, non-sentient substance with other substances as attributes, but that he is and what he is depends upon his having *jñāna* as an essential attribute. Apart from *jñāna*, existence, and more especially continuous existence, is meaningless. Brahman must have consciousness, in the sense of self-awareness, if his reality, being and true nature are to be self-proven, aside from being the "quintessence of all entities". Brahman not only is but knows what he is, and what he knows himself to be is all that exists.

This aspect of the Brahman-world relationship will be more clearly understood by referring back to the ātman-world relationship discussed in the previous chapters. We noted that on Rāmānuja's view, an individual's body is made up of many parts -- the five elements, the five sense-organs, mind and the vital breath, but the aggregate of these
parts alone does not make a body. They become a body when they are
governed by a unifying principle, the \textit{Atman}, whose body they compose,
and the agency by which the \textit{Atman} governs his body is through his
essential attribute, \textit{jñāna}. In this same way, the infinite number of
\textit{jīvas} and the multitude of particular things \textit{prakṛti} continually
evolves into do not make a world. They need a controlling principle,
and this is what \textit{Brahman} is. Furthermore, the agency by which he
controls the world is his essential attribute, \textit{jñāna}. Consequently,
when Rāmānuja says \textit{Brahman} and the world are one, he is not simply
referring to the all-inclusive aspect of \textit{Brahman}, i.e., his body,
because that would leave the question of how the body and soul are
related. Rather, he is referring to \textit{Brahman} as the soul of the world,
\textit{Paramātman}. "And this identity is caused by the invariable association
on account of its being the \textit{Atman} in the form of the inner controller,
and not caused by the identity of objects in respect of the less
extensive and more extensive."\textsuperscript{26} Commenting on a phrase from the
\textit{Viṣṇu Purāṇa}, Rāmānuja writes:

\begin{quote}
Therefore, you alone are the one Reality on
account of your being the \textit{Atman} of all ... \\
Because the entire world is your embodied form
on account of its being pervaded as the \textit{Atman}
by you constituted of \textit{Jñāna}, therefore, those
that are bereft of the association with the
means of realization of your being the \textit{Atman}
[of that], see by mis-apprehension in the form
-- this is merely the form of gods and men etc. ... \textsuperscript{27}
\end{quote}

From our discussion of Rāmānuja's theory of knowledge in chapter
one, we know that all experience is experience of the real. Then, in

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Śrīla Pippali}, p.110. \\
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{ibid.}, p.115.
chapter two, we learned that the way a jīva experiences is by the expansion of his consciousness and having it informed by prakṛti constituted objects. Thus, consciousness is always qualified by real objects. In fact, it is their being objects for consciousness that proves the reality of their existence. Add to these points what we have said in this chapter about the jīvas and prakṛti being non-different from Brahman because what they are is determined by him as the cosmological principle and we begin to see why it is said, in the above quotation, that Brahman alone is "the one Reality".

However, before the full meaning of this statement is clear, we must remind the reader of two other important concepts. First, Rāmānuja uses the term jñāna to refer to consciousness as always being conscious of something, i.e., consciousness with contents (pure-consciousness is never experienced and is therefore non-existent). So jñāna can be translated as "consciousness" or "knowledge" because it always has as its contents, knowledge of something. Secondly, jñāna is not self-existent. It exists only as an attribute of some ātman, having as its function the relating of the ātman, its substratum, to the known.

Now, since Brahman, as the cosmological principle, is one with the forms of "the entire world" and has jñāna as an essential attribute, the content of his consciousness, his knowledge, can be nothing other than the forms that Brahman is. And since consciousness proves the reality of what exists, what is real and what Brahman knows are non-different. Consequently, Brahman's self-awareness is what

28. Ibid., p.61. Also, supra, pp.31-32, 121f.
29. Supra, p.34.
jnāna is, and jñāna equals omniscience when it refers to Brahman. To state the idea in another way, we can say that jñāna reveals satyam as the real. Without consciousness there is no reality, not even for Brahman. This is why it is said, with reference to Brahman, "you alone are the one Reality on account of your being the Ātman of all", and further, this supreme Ātman is "constituted of Jñāna".

Now we are ready to return to the idea that Brahman as Jñāna is the "inner controller" of the world, the explanation of which is implicit in the last lines of the above quotation. The knowledge that Brahman has is distinguished from that of the jīvas in that it is always uncontracted. "The word 'Jñāna' speaks of having the nature of Jñāna alone, always uncontracted. By that are excluded the released souls on account of [their] Jñāna [being] occasionally contracted".30 Rāmānuja means by this that the consciousness of the jīvas is not always fully extended so as to be coterminus with reality, as is the case with the Jñāna of Brahman. Brahman knows the infinite number of attributes by which things are qualified by being them, i.e., his knowledge is intuitive and therefore immediate. It is different with the jīvas.

In the case of the individual soul, whose essentially intelligizing nature is obscured by karman, such intuitive knowledge arises only through the mediation of the sense-organs; in the case of the highest Self, on the other hand, it springs from its own nature.31 In the contracted state, whether due to karman in samsāra or an act of will in mokṣa, the knowledge of the jīvas is mediate and of particular

30. Śrībhāsya, p.198.
things, "gods and men etc." This knowledge is real and true, because experience proves its object's existence, but it is only partial and does not determine what reality is. What reality is, is determined by the Jnāna of Brahman. Therefore, what the jīvas know is determined by Brahman; and, because they can know nothing other than Brahman, he is said to be their "inner controller" and the Jnāna of all jnāna. Thus it can be seen that even when moksa is achieved and the jīva fully realizes his essential nature of infinite consciousness, what he knows, his jnāna, is non-different from the Jnāna of Brahman. The jīva becomes Brahmanlike and not Brahman. They are eternally distinct entities. Whereas the jīva comes to know the Real, what Brahman knows and the Real are one.

Where the texts speak of the soul's becoming equal to, or having equal attributes with, Brahman, the meaning is that the nature of the individual soul -- which is a mere mode of Brahman -- is equal to that of Brahman, i.e. that on putting off its body it becomes equal to Brahman in purity. The text declaring that the soul 'attains all its desires together with Brahman' intimates that the soul, together with Brahman of which it is a mode, is conscious of the attributes of Brahman.32

Brahman As "Infinity"

This brings us to anantatva or infinity, the third and last of the essential attributes of Brahman to be considered in this chapter. It is a quality of Brahman, not shared by the other two tattvas, and as such, qualifies the other two essential attributes already discussed. Its meaning becomes clear when we see it as being implicit in these other attributes. If Brahman is all that exists (satyam)

32. ibid., p.759.
and knows all that exists (past, present and future) through his self-awareness, it is obvious that nothing exists beyond him and there is no knowledge outside his knowing (jñāna). We might say that ananta refers to Brahman as "wholeness", meaning he is one with everything that exists throughout all time and all space. For this reason, the term can be translated by "endless", "boundless", "unlimited", and "eternal", as well as "infinite". However, it is extremely important to note that the use of any of these terms must be in a qualitative sense and not quantitative, like infinite number, time or space.

In our discussion of Brahman as satyam and jñānam, we said that these attributes refer to him as the soul of the world, Paramātman, and not to his all-inclusive aspect. He is not satyam because he is the aggregate of all existent qualities and entities, nor is he jñānam because he is the sum total of all knowledge. He has these attributes as a result of being the cause of everything else and the ultimate meaning of all knowledge. He is the one in relation to whom existence is determined and the one to whom all words refer. This is the reason Paramātman is ananta, i.e., he is not limited or qualified by any other, because he is the cause of all possible and actual qualities and entities.

Rāmānuja says, "The word 'Ananta' speaks of the nature as bereft of limitations of the things in respect of space and time".\(^{33}\) In this respect, the Paramātman is different from the other tattvas. Prakṛti is potentially the matter of a multitude of forms, but the

\[^{33}\text{Śrīmad Bhāgavatam, p.19.}\]
particular form in which it is actualized at any given time and place is constantly changing and is contingent upon factors external to itself. The jīvas too, embodied in prakṛti, are subject to modifications in their mode of existence according to the Laws of Karman. They are potentially unlimited consciousness, but their actual mode of existence varies from time to time and place to place, again contingent upon causes external to themselves. Both cit and acit are involved in space and time because they have potentiality as well as actuality and because they are subject to causes external to themselves. In other words, they have limited existence; they are not ananta. They are manifestations of parts of existence and not what existence is, as is the case with Brahman. Brahman is not subject to space-time, because he is the eternal actuality of all existence. He is not subject to external causes, because he is the uncaused cause of all else.

Insofar as he transcends space, time and causality, Brahman is different from and excludes the particular forms of cit and acit; but, at the same time, he is not different from them, for he is their causal substratum. Briefly, he is in all time and space but he is not time and space. These are external to him. As we noted earlier, cit and acit have substantial existence apart from the Highest Person. Consequently, in the quantitative sense, Brahman is substantially limited, but Rāmānuja's use of the term ananta permits substantial limitation because he uses it in a qualitative sense. In fact, he believes a meaningful use of the term requires it. To be substantially limited means to be determinate, and this Brahman is. To be indeterminate is to be non-existent. Rāmānuja states the matter this way:
If the principle of difference is not admitted, indeed, everything would be absurd on account of the absence of discrimination ... The well-known nature of endlessness (in Brahman) is due to its being divested of limitation in time and space, only. If it were divested of limitation also in reality, such a thing imitating the hare-horn would not be found.\(^{34}\)

Thus, to say that Brahman is \textit{ananta}, meaning that he is what existence is, does not mean that he is the aggregate of all existent qualities and entities, nor does it mean that he is some indeterminate, empty generalization abstracted from all particular existing things, i.e., that he is devoid of limiting, determinate qualities that are uniquely his. According to Rāmānuja, the \textit{Brhadāranyaka Upanisad} uses the \textit{via negativa} in its description of Brahman not to deny that he has determinate qualities but to affirm that the Highest Person is one with all qualities and existent things. To indicate this it denies that he is like any particular \textit{part} of existence. To know Brahman one must intuitively grasp the \textit{whole} existence in a single experience, transcending the contingencies of time and space. Such was the experience of Arjuna, as recorded in the \textit{Bhagavad-Gītā}, which Rāmānuja paraphrases as follows:

\begin{quote}
Arjuna -- who by divine Grace had been granted supernatural vision -- beheld the entire universe with all its various subdivisions, crowded by the various kinds of classes of experiencing beings -- gods, men, animals, immovables etc. of all sorts and forms -- and by places, objects and means of experiences ... and consisting of puruṣa and prakṛti, this entire universe was concentrated in one single point of God's body.\(^{35}\)
\end{quote}

Brahman has determinate form or substantial limitation, but this

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{l}
\textbf{34.} \textit{Ibid.}, p.608. \\
\textbf{35.} Van Buitenen, p.128.
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
does not make him finite, because his determinations are the eternal actualization of all possible and actual existence that evolves through time and space. He is like a transcendent, ideal universe concentrated in one eternal moment. This is why Srinivasachari says, "The negative method of neti, neti does not deny the finite, but denies the finitude of the infinite". Interpreting the statement that Brahman is neti, neti, Rāmānuja writes:

This is the sense -- what Brahman is pronounced in -- Not thus, not thus -- Beyond that, beyond this, -- there is indeed no object beyond. There is nothing which is by nature and by virtue of qualities, superior to Brahman, Satyasya Satyam is the name.

Brahman, as the soul of the universe, is infinite and superior to all and every other being, because he is the Really real and the True of the true. But again, we must repeat, he is not ananta in the sense of being the aggregate of all existence, i.e., not infinite in the quantitative sense. It is true that he is one with the world quantitatively in that the world is his body but a body is determined by its soul and not vice versa. The world is his body because he is within it as its inner ruler (antaryāmin), determining its reality, giving it purpose, by being the ideal in which everything else realizes its true nature. The world is not identical with Brahman, because it is subject to time and space, and more importantly, it is afflicted with evil and suffering, whereas the Highest Person is one "in whom all the blemishes are by nature expelled". But before we deal with

36. Srinivasachari, p.117. Neti = "not this".
38. Ibid., p.3.
this latter point, we turn now to Hartshorne's criticisms of Brahman as satyam, jñānam, and anantam.

Hartshorne's Criticisms of Rāmānuja's Concept of Perfection

The first problem Hartshorne has with Rāmānuja's description of Brahman as Perfection is the idea that the "highest self undergoes a change, as a given world is brought into being, but the self, 'is in no way touched' by such changes". He asks: "But how does Brahman undergo a change without being touched by it ...?" He is aware of the fact that Rāmānuja's answer to this question "is that the highest is 'the ruling principle, and hence the self' of the changes; as ruler and self, Brahman is free from change, possessing the change only in his body". But Hartshorne is not satisfied with this answer, because "the distinction leads only to further difficulties, for Brahman, as the being of unlimited intelligence, knows of any change within his world body ... and the change must then itself become a possession of his conscious self". At least, as Hartshorne understands the nature of a superior individual, these changes should become part of his consciousness. Rāmānuja disallows this in his idea of perfection because its admission would mean that Brahman is subject to change and something changing, according to his categories, is nāsti, non-being. Hence, the consequences of allowing change in the essential self of the

40. Ibid.
Highest Person is nihilism, which Rāmānuja would not risk. Hartshorne of course, believes it is possible to affirm that God changes from moment to moment without this result. His concept of an individual, explained in the preceding chapter, is part of his answer to this problem.

Rāmānuja, like the classical theologians of the West, identifies Paramātman, the soul of the universe and the self-identity of Brahman, with being and insists that it is absolute, immutable, non-relative, non-contingent, and eternally actual, whereas the becoming aspect of existence is understood to constitute the body of Brahman. He asserts the primacy of being over becoming because things involved in the process of becoming have existence only insofar as they are modes of Being. Hartshorne argues that all who insist on conceiving the Divine as being exclusive of all change make it impersonal and irrelevant to the concerns of men and inevitably have contradictions and inconsistencies in what they want to say about it and the way it is related to the world. Is this true of Rāmānuja? Or, is there something unique about his conception of deity that helps him avoid the contradictions and inconsistencies of classical theism, assuming that such is the case?

If one applies only one column of the ultimate categories to God, Hartshorne says "it is at best problematic whether the superior pole retains its meaning under such treatment; whether 'unity', for

41. P.N. Srinivasachari's statement, quoted above, p.130, has reference to this problem in relation to the Buddhist idea of momentariness. In Chapter III, we saw how Hartshorne avoids the nihilistic tendency that Buddhism is accused of having implicit in its metaphysical systems with his assertion that reality, once fully actualized, continues to exist as an actual part of subsequent events in an event-sequence.
example, means anything, save as either a member or an integration of plurality; whether 'being' can conceivably be more or less than a factor in becoming of experience and its objects, from which we must have abstracted it", and he goes on. He suggests that the solution to the problems involved in bringing the polar categories together in one entity is to give equal emphasis to both poles and avoid the ensuing contradictions by positing two main aspects in the "essence of the supreme being". Then, he says, we must "strictly negate of both aspects ... any nonsupreme form of either pole, any mediocre or merely ordinary unity or complexity, activity or passivity, self-sufficiency or dependence". Mediocrity is very definitely a part of God as the all-inclusive reality, but these are the "accidents" of God's being, not his essence. Hartshorne writes: "God will, like other individuals, but as a supreme case or supercase, have an individual essence, and he will have accidents as well, so that what is 'in him' need not, for all that, be in his essence". And he defines "essence" as "the individual in abstraction from all in him that is accidental, or without which he would still be himself". The essence of God, which is his individuality, is the subject of all change, an affirmation that is at the heart of Rāmānuja's concept of deity also. He is that necessary subject who must exist without beginning or end in order for change to be a meaningful idea. We cannot speak of change

at all unless there is something that changes. Again, this is a proposition that is in complete agreement with Rāmānuja's thought. In fact, he says essentially this same thing contra the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness.

Rāmānuja can give unqualified assent to almost everything we have said here about the two aspects of deity as he considers the divine individual, Īśvara, the object of worshipping man's devotion, to have a soul, the Paramātman or Brahman, and a body, the world. One set of polar categories -- being, permanence, immutability, absoluteness, necessity, eternality, universality -- will apply to the divine soul, and the other polar set -- becoming, impermanence, mutability, relativity, contingency, temporalness, particularity -- will apply to the body. The differences between the two philosophers is basically the same as those of the preceding chapter. Just as Rāmānuja posits a soul, essentially characterized by consciousness as the substratum of all experiences, he posits Brahman, essentially characterized by Jñāna, as the unity of all existence and knowledge. Hartshorne, on the other hand, takes "soul" to mean the abstract essence of a sequence of experiences and considers the universal categories (Jñāna) to be the abstract essence of all knowledge. This abstract essence of all knowledge or experience is what, on Hartshorne's view, Rāmānuja should refer to as Brahman. He finds the idea of a substantial substratum to be superfluous to an adequate conception of the divine individual as well as ordinary individuals. We can bring out the implication of

45. Charles Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God (Harden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1964), p.251. This whole chapter deals with the necessity of there being something unlimited in order for change to be known.
46. Śrībhāṣṭa, p.671.
this basic difference for a concept of deity by returning to the
question Hartshorne raises for Rāmānuja, i.e., how does Brahman, as
the inner ruling principle, know all change and yet remain
essentially unchanging?

Briefly, the answer to the above question is that Brahman is the cause of which everything else is an effect. This is why it is said that in the beginning there was one only without a second and out of this one the plurality of things came. And, this is why everything is non-different from Brahman and to know Brahman is to know the whole universe. We have discussed this at some length above. To illustrate the idea that effects are not really different from their cause, Rāmānuja borrows an example from the Chāndogya
Upaniṣad (VI:1:1), "As by one clod of clay there is known everything that is made of clay". The meaning of this, says Rāmānuja, is that "jars, pots, and the like, which are fashioned out of one piece of clay, are known through the cognition of that clay, since their substance is not different from it".47 This is fairly straightforward, if you know the essence of the substance clay, you know the substance of everything made of clay. It is the essential nature of things that is continuous and unchanging and this is the nature of being. The multitude of concrete particulars in particular manifestations of clay objects are constantly perishing, according to Rāmānuja, and are therefore nāsti. Particulars have being only by participation in the eternal categories of the ultimate principle, Brahman. Therefore, he concludes that the changing aspect of experience, becoming, is dependent upon being, which is primary. But, essence plus accidents

47. Thibaut, p.454.
is greater than mere essence alone. By knowing the essence of clay, we do not know all there is to know about every particular thing that is made of clay. Likewise, even if Brahman, through the facility of consciousness, eternally knows the essential, unchanging categories of existence, he does not know all the concrete particularity of existence, his body, without undergoing some change.

Rāmānuja's understanding of perfection appears to be a prime example of what Hartshorne describes as the method used by the Greek philosophers, and followed by the classical theologians, in their derivation of the nature of God. They set up the polar contrast of the ultimate categories: one-many, permanence-change, being-becoming, necessity-contingency, actual-potential, the self-sufficient or non-relative - the dependent or relative. Then they decided which of the two columns seemed most admirable and attributed it to God, the other they attributed to the world. The same basic method, he believes, was followed in the East but with a different result, especially in the pantheism of Śaṅkara.

The difference between the two is that theism admits the reality of plurality, potentiality, becoming -- as a secondary form of existence 'outside' God, in no way constitutive of his reality; whereas pantheism, properly so called, supposes that, although God includes all within himself, still, since he cannot be really complex, or mutable, such categories can only express human ignorance or illusion.48

When this method is followed, says Hartshorne, there are two possibilities: "either there is something outside of deity, so that the total real is deity-and-something else, a whole of which deity is
merely one constituent; or else the allegedly inferior pole of each categorical contrast is an illusory conception. Classical theism took the first of these alternatives, according to Hartshorne, and eastern pantheism the second. Rāmānuja's position is closest to the first, but, as we have seen, there is nothing outside of deity as he conceives it. However, deity, as the all-inclusive individual, is not Brahman but Īśvara. It is misleading to say that Brahman is one with all existence unless we are prepared to deny the reality of all the contingent, changing particularity that is part of our experience. Brahman, as the unchanging Absolute, is not quantitatively one with it. He may have as a quality of his unchanging knowledge the categories "jar" and "clay", but not the mass of particular qualities that make up a particular experience of a clay jar. It is Īśvara, God as inclusive of the changing as well as the unchanging, who has all these particular qualities as part of his knowledge. Consequently, Īśvara, as containing both aspects, is the truly unsurpassable individual and not Brahman. Therefore, on Hartshorne's view at least, Īśvara should be considered perfection rather than Brahman and this would explain why it is that Īśvara is the object of man's worship and not Brahman.

If Īśvara is Perfection, i.e. what men worship, then he includes both columns of the ultimate polar categories. Both are applicable to God in a univocal sense, because all words will have God as their ultimate referent even though they apply to different aspects of his existence. However, if we make this shift in Rāmānuja's thought, the result would be that perfection would no longer be à lareally the

49. Ibid.
same, permanent and unchanging. And, if we go further with Hartshorne and say that Brahman is but a name for the abstract characteristics of Īśvara's all-inclusive, concrete, particular, moment to moment experience, this would mean that being is dependent on becoming. Rāmānuja will not allow this because, on his view, the becoming aspect of existence is impermanent and therefore nāsti (non-being).

We discussed this question of primacy between being and becoming in the previous chapter, beginning with Hartshorne's illustration of the interaction that takes place as a man rules his dog. At that time we noted that Rāmānuja allows that the epistemic mode of being of the individual perceiving the dog would be different from his mode of being if he were not, but his actual being would not be dependent upon that perception. His mode of existence at the time he perceives the dog is partially determined by that perception, but not his existence. He must be conscious of something in order to prove his existence but not of anything in particular. In fact, what is truly primary is the ātman, the existence of which is proven in the continuous, unbroken experience of being a self.

Now, in this chapter, we have learned that, according to Rāmānuja, Brahman does not experience anything other than its self; because like the ātman, it has independent existence in itself. Furthermore, it does not even undergo epistemic change, as the ātman does, because in the experience of itself, while it does not experience all qualities, Brahman experiences all auspicious qualities. What Brahman is and that it knows are eternally unchanging because it is satyasvabhāva satyam, that is Real and what is True. So, we raise the
question, **what are the implications of this for the status of the contingent, everchanging, becoming aspects of experience that must be unknown to the unchanging, absolute Brahman, because it knows all things according to their essence only? Are they real or unreal?** Rāmānuja replies: they are real ([supra, pp.130-134](#)), because direct perception proves the existence of its object. But to whom are they real. They are not constitutive of the eternal Jñāna but, nevertheless, they are known to Brahman insofar as they are known by the jīvas, who are but modes of Brahman, their inner ruler. We must not forget the crucial point that the jīvas and prakṛti are not different from Brahman.

The ruling element of the world, i.e., the Lord, finally, who has the sentient and the non-sentient beings for his modes, undergoes a change in so far as he is, at alternating periods, embodied in all those beings in their alternating states. The two modes, and he to whom the modes belong, thus undergo a common change in so far as in the case of all of them the causal condition passes over into a different condition.

The relationship between Jñāna and knowledge of things and qualities in the realm of becoming must be seen in the order of cause and effect dependence, cause in the sense of necessary condition or ground. This is implicit in the entire description of Rāmānuja's concept of deity given above, but we will attempt to delineate this order more succinctly by turning again to the relationship between the consciousness of a jīva and its being qualified by some particular object like a dog or jar. The ātman of the jīva has consciousness as an essential attribute, and, as such, is eternally the same. In the

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50. Thibaut, p.342.
experience of knowing a dog on a particular occasion, the consciousness is qualified by that knowledge, but the Ātman, whose quality it is, does not change. This is because consciousness exists for and external to the Ātman, not within it. What the Ātman is it eternally is, even though it undergoes modal change. And, as we have said, because it is essentially unchanging, it is asti or being and primary to all knowing. So the jīva has two aspects, the Ātman, characterized by being, and modes of consciousness (jñāna), characterized by becoming, with primacy going to being.

When we come to the Jñāna of Brahman, we move back another step in the order of dependence. The knowledge of particular things, dogs, jars, etc., is dependent upon consciousness. Consciousness is in turn dependent upon Ātman, as its substance, for no quality exists apart from substance. Ātman is a self-existent substance, but its meaning, what it is, and its existence are derived from Brahman, since it is by nature an essential quality of the Highest Person and a mode of its Jñāna. Thus all existence and all knowledge have Brahman as their ultimate cause and meaning. Furthermore, since Brahman is essentially unchanging, its essential qualities, Jñāna, of which Ātman is a mode, are also unchanging. Brahman, as the Ātman of the world, is characterized by being only and excludes all becoming.

Now, the particular mode in which the Ātman exists, its Jñāna, is subject to the conditions of time and space; it is limited. It is only a partial manifestation of Jñāna because of particularization, which is by nature exclusive. The mode of the Brahman's existence, its Jñāna, on the other hand, is unlimited, eternally actualized, being the essential nature of all existent things and qualities. Hence,
the Jñāna of Brahman and the jñāna of the jīva are at once the same
and different. It is qualitatively the same because it is at no
time or place more than a particular manifestation of the eternal
qualities of Jñāna. It is, however, quantitatively different because
these concrete, particular manifestations are external to Brahman,
called into existence at the time of srst (creation).

Following his statement that all clay objects are known by
knowing their essence, Rāmānuja says particular objects are created
out of the essential forms and substance, which are one with Brahman
as the cause of all things, to fulfill specific purposes, but they
are not different from their causes. For example, there is the desire
to draw water in a pitcher. To fulfill this desire, clay material
is moulded to a particular configuration and the name "pitcher" is
applied to the effect, i.e., "to the end that certain activities may
be accomplished, the substance clay receives a new configuration and
a new name". But, the clay alone is satyam, because it alone
remains constant. "A substance enters into different states, what
originates is the substance in its subsequent states". In other
words, the particular, contingent aspects of experience are states
in which eternal substances exist and are dependent upon the substance
they manifest. The substance, however, can manifest itself in any of
the number of different forms it potentially is and is dependent upon
none in particular. They need only manifest themselves in some
way to some one.

With this in mind, we can see how the Highest Person relates

51. Ibid., p.453.
52. Ibid., p.456.
to particularity. Brahman, the primordial substance with his essential modes, *cit* and *acit*, was in the beginning one without a second. These modes are but part of the eternal *Jñāna* by which Brahman is self-differentiated in the same way the *jīva* is self-differentiated by self-awareness. Therefore the qualities of *Jñāna* are necessary qualities of existence. The contingent qualities of existence came into being when this primordial being desired to become many. This does not mean that something new came into existence *ex nihilo*; "plurality results from a substance giving up the state of oneness, and oneness from the giving up of plurality". Nor does it mean that the necessary qualities of Brahman become contingent and subject to change. The primordial substance remains eternally the same. Brahman thought: "Let me make the aggregate of non-sentient things ... to possess various names and forms, by entering into them by means of the *jīva* which is of the nature of my Self". So, says Ramanuja: "The possession of names and forms must thus be understood to be effected by the *jīva* entering into matter as its Self". That is to say, Brahman, through the instrumentality of the *jīvas*, brings forth the particular, contingent aspects of existence by applying names and forms to *prakṛti*. Hence, the *jñāna* of the *jīva* is particularized but it is nothing in addition to the *Jñāna* of the Paramātmā. This is why we say *jñāna* is partial and *Jñāna* is wholeness.

**Focusing the Issues**

Implicit in the above summary paragraph we find the basic problems

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inherent in Rāmānuja's idea of perfection, especially when it is associated with the God men worship. On his view, perfection is the Being of all beings, the Knowledge of all knowing, and infinite, because there is no being or knowledge that does not have Brahman as its ultimate cause or substratum. When this description of perfection is conjoined with the idea that Brahman as perfection is eternally actual, unchanging, permanent and characterized by all auspicious qualities, it becomes obvious that Brahman's existence and knowledge is eternally complete, not subject to increase or decrease, so there is nothing that the world can contribute to it. The creation of the phenomenal world is but the movement of cit and acit from their subtle to their gross forms, of the one becoming many, of wholeness becoming partiality, which raises the question of all things being compossible, to be dealt with in the next chapter.

Secondly, if Brahman is unaffected by the particular acts and deeds of men who worship through the rites and rituals prescribed in the Vedas and by living moral lives all the activities of worshipping men are in vain. Brahman is like the stone column to which Aquinas likened the Christian God and there is nothing that man can do that has any significance for this ultimate perfection or that is even known by it for that matter. Brahman, so conceived, is really no different from the cold, impersonal entity that Rāmānuja accuses Śaṅkara of making it into.

Thirdly, as Hartshorne says, such conceptions of deity contradict not only what men who worship want to say about God but also what these philosophers themselves want to affirm about deity. This is born out in the contradiction between the above description of Brahman and the
notion that the world moves from the pralaya to the srsti state when Brahman reflects, "May I ... have the body of worldly existence mixed with sentient and non-sentient objects with name and form distinguished as before ..." \(^55\) This statement, if we are to take it literally, as Rāmānuja does, involves Brahman in an idea of time before the pralaya and a time after, which implies a consciousness of change in Brahman. Furthermore, when it is said that Brahman "emits the entire world just as it had been before", i.e. just as Brahman remembered "the constitution of the world previous to the pralaya" \(^56\) presumably it was a particular, imperfect kind of world that Brahman remembered and knew, including the particular karman of each jīva.

The three problems we have outlined above are greatly alleviated by Rāmānuja's idea that the concrete, particular acts and deeds of men are known by Īśvara as being particular expressions of the body of Brahman. Īśvara, the supreme individual, knows his essential self or soul to be Brahman and knows the concrete particularity of the world, his body, from moment to moment as well. Īśvara is the receiver of the devotion and worship of his devotees and responds to them in acts of love and grace. He is the one who appreciates the morally good life and gives the appropriate rewards. \(^57\) Consequently, Īśvara is the warm responsive deity to whom the acts and deeds of men are significant, not the absolute Brahman. And, it is more consistent to say that it is Īśvara, as the Supreme Lord who has the ability to reflect on the karman of individuals, who remembers the world before the pralaya and creates the new world accordingly. Our question is,

\(^55\) Supra, p.128.
\(^56\) Supra, p.138.
\(^57\) Supra, p.51.
therefore, why is it that Rāmānuja thinks of Brahman as perfection rather than Īśvara. If he would allow that Īśvara is perfection and that perfection as such has two aspects, the necessary and the contingent, his conception of deity would not be very different from Hartshorne's, as we will try to indicate at the end of the next chapter. In Chapter VI, we will find that it is Rāmānuja's understanding of the nature of salvation that prevents him from identifying Īśvara with perfection rather than Brahman.

To avoid a misunderstanding of Rāmānuja's thought at this point, we need to emphasize that Īśvara and Brahman do not refer to different beings but to the same being. Rāmānuja often uses the terms interchangeably. For the sake of clarity in focussing the differences between the concepts of deity of Rāmānuja and Hartshorne, we have chosen to use the term Brahman to refer to the eternally unchanging essence of deity, who has the world as its body, and Īśvara as referring to that same essential being as it knows the concrete particularity of the changing world. Change, however, as we have seen, on Rāmānuja's view, is due to restrictions within the Jñāna of Brahman, so Īśvara, as deity knowing the concrete particularity of the changing world, is not knowing something more than Brahman but knows it as being something less. It is this idea that becoming is something less than being that, from Hartshorne's point of view, gives rise to the three problems in Rāmānuja's thought we refer to above.
In describing the points of convergence in the thought of Rāmānuja and Hartshorne in the first chapter and in the beginning of the preceding chapter, we noted that both philosophers define God as a being who elicits and is worthy of the worship of men. Also, we observed that they agree that the reason God elicits and is worthy of worship is that he is perfection. For Rāmānuja, the object of worship is Īśvara, the Supreme Lord, or Paramāpuruṣa, the Supreme Individual, whose body is the world of sentient and non-sentient individuals. The reason Īśvara is worshipped is that his true self or soul is Brahman and Brahman is perfection. In other words, it is not the all-inclusive nature of deity that entitles him to the epithet perfection but his essential self, which is eternally unchanging and absolute, unaffected by the becoming, ever-changing particularity of the phenomenal world. This soul of Īśvara, Paramātman or Brahman, is perfection in the sense that it is the being of all existence or perfect existence, the knowledge of all knowing or perfect knowledge, and infinite, because there is no being or knowledge that does not have Brahman as its causal substratum.

Hartshorne, too, believes that God, as perfection, is perfect existence, perfect knowledge and infinite, with the latter meaning, as it does for Rāmānuja, not limited by any other. However, in significant ways, these divine attributes mean different things to Hartshorne than
they do to Rāmānuja; and these differences, he contends, avoid the
problems we found in Rāmānuja's conception of perfection.

_Hartshorne's Idea of Perfection_

God as Perfection, according to Hartshorne, has two aspects, one
congrue and the other abstract. As with all other individuals, the
congrue aspect of the Supreme Individual is characterized by becoming,
i.e., it is constantly changing, and the abstract aspect, being, is
dependent upon it, because it is but the sum total of the generic
congrue characteristics derived from it. Rāmānuja, and classical theism in
general, cannot accept such an idea of the divine individual because
to allow change in the essential nature of deity is to imply a previous
or subsequent imperfection. But, says Hartshorne, this is a problem
only when one insists that perfection is something absolute, with its
content actually fixed for all time. His own position is that "God is
perfect" means that "he has no possible rival (no equal or superior)
among individuals." With this dynamic idea of perfection, it is
possible to say categorically that God is eternally perfect and, at
the same time, allow for God to change by excelling his own perfection
from moment to moment, as he receives all that is new and particular
from moment to moment. "Through such self-excelsing the most excellent
being changes, not into a more excellent being, but into a more ex-
cellent state of the same being." God is "categorically superior" but

1. Śrībhūṣya, p. 546.
2. Philosophers Speak of God, p. 9
3. Ibid., p. 10.
always self-excelling in such things as happiness, beauty, and richness of experience. He is "categorically ultimate" or unchanging in such things as righteousness, wisdom and power. This being aspect of God, being the abstract, categorical description of the divine individual, is perfect and unchanging. The becoming aspect, being inclusive of all that exists at any given time, is also perfect, because there is nothing at any given moment that is equal or superior to it. In this way, Hartshorne claims to avoid the equation of imperfection with change, which equation prevents Rāmānuja from allowing change in deity.

God As "Existence"

Besides avoiding the problems related to ascribing change to deity, Hartshorne further claims to eliminate the contradictions involved in not allowing for change. God knowing this world, he says, must be different from the God he would be if he knew some other world. For to know this world in all its particular moments of existence, God must know the changes that take place within the time sequence of the world's events. And, since knowledge is an internal relationship, God knowing the world of this moment must have a different state of being than of the preceding moment and will be different again in the following moment. In other words, a God who truly knows the world in all its concrete particularity, as we assume an omniscient being or perfect knower would, would not be unchanging but rather subject to all the change that actually exists.

The question of the relationship between God and time is of primary importance to understanding the relationship between being and becoming.
propositions concerning matters of fact", i.e., if it is conceivable that God knows eternally what we know as taking place over a period of time, the priority of being over becoming can be consistently established. But, if God does know all that has being, all that truly is, such that he is pure actuality, incapable of diminishing or increasing in knowledge or state of being, then there is no significant meaning or purpose to what takes place in time. In this case, all that is real is equally necessary, all action or inaction in the finite realm is to no avail, and we have a pure determinism. "If a whole is necessary, all its parts or members must be. But if a whole is accidental, not-all its parts need be so." To Hartshorne, God is the contingent whole with a necessary part, which "part" is his individuality, his essence. He writes:

God is neither being as contrasted to becoming nor becoming as contrasted to being; but categorically supreme becoming in which there is a factor of categorically supreme being, as contrasted to inferior becoming, in which there is inferior being ... The divine becoming is more ultimate than the divine being only in the simple sense of being more inclusive, of being concrete while the other is abstract.  


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\begin{align*}
\text{p:} & \text{ God knows that the world exists.} \\
\text{q:} & \text{ The world exists} \\
\text{q*:} & \text{ q is contingent.} \\
\text{r:} & \text{ p entails q.} \\
\text{s:} & \text{ ((p entails q) and (q is contingent)) entails (p is contingent).} \\
\text{r,q*,s:} & \text{ Inference, modus ponens: p is contingent.} \\
\text{t:} & \text{ That which a contingent proposition affirms, and its contradictory denies, cannot be in something which is in all respects necessary. Therefore, since p is contingent, knowledge that the world exists cannot be in God, if God is an, in all respects, necessary being.}
\end{align*}
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5. Ibid., p.24.
As we have seen, Rāmānuja does not try to establish "a tenseless theory of propositions concerning matters of fact", rather his claim is that Brahman knows all things according to their essence, i.e., the essential qualities that make up particular, concrete "matters of fact." His example is that one who knows the essence of clay knows everything that is made of clay. Brahman knows concrete particulars through the instrumentality of jīvas. The problem we noted in relation to this is that the jīvas are externally related to Brahman as parts of its body, Brahman does not become or evolve into the jīvas, so, in fact, it does not know concrete particularity at all. It is the modes of Brahman, the jīvas, who have this knowledge and it is unified in the supreme jīva, Īśvara, the unity of Brahman and the ever-changing phenomenal world.

The crucial point to be grasped in relation to Brahman, as the soul of the universe, not including in itself the concrete particularity of the becoming, changing world is Rāmānuja's claim that the experience of this aspect of existence is the result of contracted consciousness. Brahman does not experience becoming and change because its unlimited or infinite consciousness is eternally qualified by the essential qualities of all existent things, both actual and potential. When consciousness is contracted to accomplish particular ends, some of the eternal, essential qualities are brought together to form concrete, particular

7. Supra, pp.147-148.
objects, "matters of fact." It is then that names and forms come into existence. These concrete, particular objects are what we experience as becoming and changing. Thus becoming is a restriction in the consciousness of being. Not the consciousness of the being of Brahman but of the atman.

Hartshorne does not agree that we experience becoming as the result of something being absent, the lack of "wholeness". Becoming is more than being, not less.

Temporality, even in the ordinary form is not to be stated as a partial abstraction from eternity -- eternity with something left out. No mere omission of anything will give becoming ... Becoming (on our view) is something positive and ultimate.

As Hartshorne understands becoming, it is known through the continuous change we observe in all our experiences, whereas any idea of being we have is derived by abstracting from this constant flux. We do not experience being, as such, or non-being. Rather, we experience a continuous process. Being and becoming are not two separate, substantial realities but a single reality composed of a sequence of experiences, causally related, in which being becomes and becoming is. Neither is more real than the other. We abstract common features from several moments of the living process and it becomes a category of knowledge, "being". But, even though it is an abstraction, it is still "real". The difference between the category and the numerous particular expressions of it is that: "Process is not the mere identities of 'being'; it

is the identities with the differences; or rather it is the diverse states with abstract aspects of identity". 10 Thus, in the act of abstracting essential characteristics from the experienced process that is life, a great deal is lost, i.e., "the differences". Therefore, he maintains the becoming rather than being is co-extensive with reality or existence. And, to repeat, becoming is more than being, not less.

On Hartshorne's view, a theory of reality like that of Rāmānuja's does not take the "differences" of experience seriously.

Because the concept of being is derived by abstracting essential qualities from the process of becoming, which is our living experience, and because the essence of God contains both poles of the abstract categories, God is coincident with being. As Hartshorne says:

In some sense, then, God must coincide with Being as such; for he cannot be without existence, and therefore equally existence cannot be without him, so that the very meaning of 'exist' must be theistic (or else theism is itself without cognitive meaning, as positivists say it is). 11

What is involved here is related to the above statement that categories like being are abstractions but are still "real". In other words, what do we mean when we say something exists? Above we said that becoming is co-extensive with existence. Are we to conclude with Heraclitus that the real is flux itself?

Hartshorne distinguishes three levels of existence:

That I shall (at least probably) exist tomorrow is one thing; that I shall exist hearing a blue jay call at noon is another. The latter is the

10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., p. 8.
more specific or concrete statement, and it is not entailed by the former ... Furthermore, the existence of 'human being' (the bare fact that there are such beings) is less concrete than the existence of you or of me. There are thus at least three levels of existence: the occurrence of certain actual states of individuals; the existence of certain individuals; the existence of certain kinds of individuals or of certain class-properties.

There is the existence of a particular entity in a given time and place. There is the existence of this particular entity through a series of times and places, identified as being the same entity by the continuation of certain characteristics abstracted from the particular occurrences. And, thirdly, there is the existence of these abstract characteristics from this particular entity and several others to form a property class. Would one deny that men exist, and are real, just because the concept must eventually relate to some particular man in a particular time and place?

What Hartshorne is saying is that one aspect of God is coincident with being, i.e., the two levels of existence which involve abstraction, and the second aspect of God, because it includes all the particularity that exists at any particular moment, is co-extensive with becoming or process. However, because being is an abstraction from becoming, becoming is the primary term. God is coincident with being, as Rāmānuja and the classical theologians correctly believe, but we need not conclude that it has priority over becoming, which is coincident with the other aspect of deity.

The difference between Hartshorne and Rāmānuja at this point

seems radical, to say the least, because they appear to take directly opposing positions. But, when Hartshorne's position is clarified, as it is in his reply to John Smith's review of his article in Tillich's *Festschrift*, their difference, while not overcome, is greatly lessened and their real point of disagreement is brought into sharper focus.

Hartshorne's uneasiness with Tillich's position centres in his belief that Tillich does not take process and relativity, i.e., the differences in particular, contingent experiences, seriously. To take this aspect of experience seriously, Hartshorne maintains that it must be seen as something real in addition to being and not as something less. He expresses this in the following quotation, alluded to by Smith:

... 'what becomes and what does not become', the referent of this entire phrase, does it become -- or not? This at least is clear: merely to say that something becomes and something does not ... leaves it open what status is assigned to the togetherness of the two. 13

Professor Smith's correct understanding of Hartshorne's point is evident in his response to this statement: "The answer to the question is, presumably, that the referent of the phrase in question becomes, with the result that process is inclusive of being and the converse does not hold." 14 And, he points to a critical aspect of Hartshorne's system when he raises the counter-question about "the referent of the conjunc-


tive phrase, the question, namely, 'is it or is it not?" Smith claims it is intelligible to speak of being without becoming but it is not intelligible to speak of becoming without being. This point is well taken, and, as we noted earlier, both Hartshorne and Rāmānuja insist that a doctrine of universal change makes change itself meaningless. Hartshorne affirms this again in his reply to Professor Smith.

I not only admit but insist, as the main point of my argument, that becoming can and does include things which do not become. An actual becoming is always composed of what, at least in that act of becoming, does not become...

What Smith does not see is why the togetherness of being and becoming cannot be in being rather than in process. Hartshorne's rejection of this proposition is based on his contention that philosophies of being "digest and denature the idea of becoming", whereas philosophies of becoming can include being, i.e., a continuous, unchanging aspect, without destroying its positive meaning. He sums up his argument in this way:

... unless the togetherness becomes, nothing becomes; since a single new constituent means a new totality, while a new totality does not require that every constituent be new. Thus process, as the becoming of new totalities, can include whatever there may be that is but does not become, while that which is, without becoming, can not include what becomes. Becoming or process is the inclusive category. The argument assumes that at least something does become, that process is not an illusion. On that assumption, process must be all inclusive.

15. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 95.
Following this statement, he goes on to say that the same is true of contingency as for becoming, i.e., the contingent aspect of existence must be greater than the necessary. The totality of the contingent and the non-contingent must itself be contingent, "for had the least item in the totality been otherwise the totality would have been otherwise ..., but there may yet be something in the contingent totality which could not have been otherwise, i.e., which is necessary."\(^{18}\)

There is nothing in these statements that Rāmānuja cannot accommodate within his concept of deity. Brahman (Paramātman), as being, is the eternal actualization of the essence of all existent things and qualities. Because of this, he is qualitatively unsurpassable and unchanging, but he is capable of real quantitative increase. His body expands from the subtle (causal) to the gross (effectual) state with the creation of each new world and a multitude of particularized things come into existence. These particularized entities are external to Paramātman, so the sum total of being plus becoming is greater than being. And, Rāmānuja can quite easily admit that the quantity of real, existent, particular things is contingent and that therefore the totality of particularized existence at any given time is contingent.

Hartshorne contends that if Brahman is "the being of unlimited intelligence, knows any change within his world body ..., the change must then itself become a possession of his conscious self".\(^{19}\) And, indeed it does, according to Rāmānuja. It becomes a part of the con-

\(^{18}\) Ibid.

\(^{19}\) Supra, p.139.
sciousness (jñāna) of the body of Brahman in its effectual state, but not part of his essential Jñāna.

Brahman knows himself as Jñāna and he also knows all existent particular contingent things through the instrumentality of the jñāna of the jīvas, within whom he abides as antaryāmin. The whole purpose of creation, as we shall discuss later,20 is to increase the knowledge of the jīvas until they realize their Brahmanlikeness. They never become one with Paramātman, because they are eternally external to him, so their increase is a definite, real increase in the all-inclusive aspect of Brahman.

Up to this point, Rāmānuja is in agreement with Hartshorne in saying that the totality of existence at any moment has two aspects, one changing and contingent, the other unchanging and necessary. But his understanding of the nature of the continuing, unchanging aspect of experience is different. On Hartshorne's view, a quality of experience continues to exist

... either because it has previously achieved its becoming, or because it is something wholly abstract, like the generic nature of becoming as such. The latter, of course, does not become. Not that it is real apart from all becoming. Nothing is, in any sense, except in conjunction with things that become, and this conjunction itself becomes in each new case.21

Rāmānuja cannot accept the first of these reasons because to do so would be to deny the reality of perishing which is experienced as an essential characteristic of all particular, contingent entities, which

Hartshorne does not admit. This brings us back to our discussion in Chapter III of Hartshorne's idea that the "existence" of something is not external to the experience of it, i.e., any "entity must be (or at least be destined to become) object for some subject or other." When we take this principle in conjunction with the idea that something continues to exist as long as it is retained in memory and apply them to the divine individual, who is by definition perfect in every way, we can only conclude that it is impossible that anything that has "achieved its becoming" should perish, cease to exist. According to Hartshorne, therefore, things do not cease to exist, it is just that ordinary memory fails and ordinary knowing is inadequate to grasp all that does exist.

Ordinary subjects, at least do not without qualification include the things they experience, but then they do not without qualification experience them. In memory I experience my past, but how inadequately, with what loss of vivid detail, accessible to introspection! ... the world we experience is much more complex than our experience of it. But again, we experience yet do not experience, this world. If there is an ineradicable paradox in this philosophy here it may be. But the defense is that divine experiences can fulfill the principle in question that they can adequately experience and hence adequately include their objects, and that even our experiences include in proportion as they adequately experience what they experience.

Divine knowledge is perfect knowledge, omniscience, so God knows all there is to know; and since the divine memory is also perfect (which omniscience also implies), his knowing never fails to retain all that

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is or was capable of being known. Consequently, divine knowledge is coterminus with all actual existence, past and present, and nothing perishes. In fact, existence, as Hartshorne understands it, can be defined as what God knows at any given moment. And, since God knows adequately all there is to be known, his knowledge is the truth about all existent things. Therefore, he is satyasya satyam, not because he excludes the limitations of time and space, change and becoming, but because he includes them with full adequacy. Here we have the real reason why Hartshorne cannot take seriously Rāmānuja's idea that the jñāna of the jīvas is possessed by Brahman. He knows the jīvas as external modes of his consciousness and what they know is in turn external to them. Rāmānuja states that the relation between the jīva and Brahman is that of "whole" and "part", analogous to "being of the form of the lustre and lustrous one, of the form of power and the powerful one, and being the body and the Ātman." Then he says, two sutras later: "Although the Jīvas are possessed of a uniform nature in being the portion of Brahman etc., there would not be commingling either of enjoyment, on account of their being mutually different, and being different for each body, owing to their being atomic." In other words, because the limited, the jīvas, are different from the unlimited, Brahman, and from each other, the experiences of individuals are not mixed up. Brahman does not have the experiences of the jīvas, except insofar as he has them as parts of his body. So, knowing is an external relation-

24. Śrībhāṣya, p.749.
25. Ibid., p.750.
ship in Rāmānuja's understanding of it, whereas for Hartshorne, it is internal, i.e., the knower includes the known.

God As "Knowledge"

We are now ready to continue our discussion of Hartshorne's theory of the relation between what exists and what is known, begun in Chapter III, and to determine some of its implications for the divine individual. In our discussion of this relationship, we concluded that the object of knowledge is the same as it existed independent of the event-sequence of the knower in the previous moment (assuming the subject adequately grasps all there is to be known about it), but it is not the same as the present existence of that object, because simultaneity is not knowable in the present. The object as known now is the subject's experience of the immediate past moment of that object's event-sequence. Regarding this point, we quoted Hartshorne as saying that his theory of the subject including the object says nothing about the object but is descriptive of the subject only. Further, when he speaks of the known being part of the knower, "part" should be taken to mean something that contributes "directly to the value of a single entity, 'the whole'", and not necessarily to something "internal to the whole." Consequently, with reference to a particular knower XY at $T_2$, knowing a particular object Y and therefore including it, we have an internal relation, meaning part of what XY is is the experience of Y. This is the actual existence of Y. But, at $T_1$, the preceding moment, when X and Y were co-present, they were externally related and Y, because unknown to X,

26. Sunya, pp. 96-100.
27. Sunya, pp. 96-100.
had no meaningful existence from the point of view of X. We begin to grasp what Hartshorne refers to as a possible "inerradical paradox" in his philosophy, when in the light of his definition of existence, we ask the question, what then is the status of Y prior to being known by X? Does it exist or not? The answer to this question is twofold. First there is the doctrine of panpsychicism or psychicalism. 28

For Hartshorne to say that the existence of the object is dependent on the subject partially commits him to an idealistic theory of reality, which, as we have already noted, he is willing to accept with qualifications. However, he does not consider idealism alone to give an adequate explanation of the nature of experience. He believes that many of the conflicts between the idealistic and realistic conceptions or reality stem from the confusion of two questions: first, the ontological question, "How fundamental and universal in reality is 'mind', 'soul', or 'experience'?"; second, the epistemological question, "When a given subject knows something, 'its object', does the former depend on the latter, or the latter on the former, or are the two mutually interdependent?" 29 He contends that the realists have accused the idealists of deriving their idealistic answer to the ontological question from an untenable answer to the epistemological question, and he thinks they are right. However, according to him, they are both wrong in not seeking the logical relations between the two questions. He believes the realist's epistemological position provides the most

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28. In Creative Synthesis (p.141), Hartshorne says he now prefers the term "psychicalism" to "panpsychicism".

cogent argument for an idealistic ontology and the result is psychicalism.

Hartshorne's argument in support of his synthesis begins with a definition of the word "subject", which is:

a. "anything that can be said to be aware of (know or feel or intuit) anything".
b. does not mean ego, soul, personality, or "spiritual substance".
c. "something that simpliciter or by definition is aware of something, something determinate or unequivocal. It is the subjective 'role' of an actual subject-object relation. Thus the state, not the substance, of experience (in its aspect of awareness of something) not the ego, is the subject".30

Following this definition of a "subject", as he uses the term, Hartshorne delineates four epistemological principles, operative in various philosophical positions. By proving these to be complementary to each other, rather than conflicting, Hartshorne makes his synthesis.

The principles are:

1. An "object", or that of which a particular subject is aware, in no degree depends upon that subject. Principle of Objective Independence.
2. A "subject", or whatever is aware of anything, always depends upon the entities of which it is aware, its objects. Principle of Subjective Dependence.
3. Any entity must be (or at least be destined to become) object of some subject or other. Principle of Universal Objectivity. "Idealism".
4. Any concrete entity is a subject, or set of subjects; hence, any other concrete entity of which a subject, S1, is aware, is another subject or subjects (S2; or S2, S3, etc.) Principle of Universal Subjectivity. "Panpsychism"31

The first two principles above constitute "realism" and are not

30. Ibid., pp.69-70.
31. Ibid., p.70.
in conflict with each other. In fact, they are complementary because
(1) provides the subject of (2) with an object. The object of (1)
remains independent and the subject of (2) can be dependent upon it
without any contradiction of the principle of either. Likewise,
principles (1) and (3) are compatible and can be united without
contradiction. The object of (1) can be an object under (3) without
any violation of the Objective Independence principle because a "relation
to a particular subject knowing an entity is extrinsic to that entity."32
And, since "idealism holds that entities need to be known, but that any
subject suitable for the function of knowing the given entity will
suffice", Hartshorne asks, "Why may we not regard X-is-known-by-someone-
or-other as a universal, and X-is-known-by-S1 as an individual case of
this universal?"33 In this way, the necessary requirement of some
suitable knower of X is provided and satisfies principle (3). This
last step is crucial to Hartshorne's argument and we shall return to it.

If we allow that (1) and (3) are compatible and agree that the
requirements of both principles are met, it is obvious that they are
both compatible with (2) because the "X-is-known-by-S1", which is the
individual case of the universal of (3), satisfies the requirements of
(2). So we move on to principle (4), psychicalism, where Hartshorne
reasons: "If what I know is another subject, it may still be true that
in this knowing I depend upon that other subject, while it does not
depend upon me."34 In other words, a subject can have another subject

32. Ibid., p.71.
33. Ibid., p.72.
34. Ibid., p.73.
as its object without that subject being influenced by it. Therefore, the subject, which is the object of the first subject, fulfills the role of principle (1) and the first subject fulfills the role of the subject in principle (2), making psychicalism completely realistic. Consequently, Hartshorne concludes, "the idealistic interpretation of reality as essentially relative to or consisting of mind, experience, awareness ... is entirely compatible with a realistic view of the independence of the particular object and the dependence of the particular subject, in each subject-object situation."\(^{35}\)

Having thus established an epistemology that is compatible with realism and idealism, Hartshorne sets out to show how his realistic thesis provides a cogent argument for an idealistic ontology. He begins by pointing out that every actual occurrence immediately acquires a past status and that past always means past in relation to some new present. And, he notes, there are two ways in which things can be considered as being past. One way is their being experienced in memory, i.e., the experience of some past experience in the event-sequence; the second is as cause is past to its effect. These two forms of pastness are not unrelated, for it is memory, as we have seen, that affords the experience of cause and effect. On the other hand, cause and effect relations are not purely mental, because these relations can be experiences shared by more than one mind,\(^{36}\) and because of the creative, unexpected aspect of experience.\(^{37}\) This being true then,

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35. Ibid.
36. Cf. discussion of "public, physical space", pp.76-79.
the present experience is as subject with past experience as its object, in this subject-object relation, the particularity of the past experience (the object) is intrinsic to the present experience (the subject), while the particularity of the present experience is extrinsic to that of the past. The two realistic theses are thus observed. But also, one may hold, the object is bound to be remembered by some future experience or other; and indeed, while no experience anticipates particular successors, experiences do, at least normally, involve a sense that they will be looked back upon by some sort of memory.38

Now we return to the problem mentioned earlier. It is raised again by the latter part of the above quotation, i.e., is the idea that an object is "bound to be remembered" by some subject sufficient to satisfy idealism? Hartshorne says, idealism has traditionally stressed the independence or "absoluteness" of the knower or subject and the dependence of the known or object. But, modern logic teaches us that the relativity of a subject is more important than absoluteness or independence, and a subject, "according to realism, is just such an intrinsically relative entity."39

If we object by saying that logically the effect is always relative to the cause, that the cause needs to be self-sufficient and absolute, and that the cause should explain the effect and not vice versa, making it impossible for idealism and realism to be compatible, Hartshorne replies that every cause is also an effect, that to know what it is to

38. Ibid., p. 70.
39. Ibid., p. 75.
be an effect something must also know what it is to be a cause. 40

Cause and effect are not separate entities but integrally related. Subjects or experiences are effects of things remembered or contained within them. But these things remembered and contained are also causes of other subjects and experiences. 41 So, both causes and effects are essentially subjects. Consequently, when the question of "how fundamental and universal in reality is 'mind', 'soul', or 'experience'?", the answer is that they are the basis "stuff" of everything that is.

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Present  Immediate  Past  Independent and Absolute
          Past

\[ S_3 \rightarrow S_2 \rightarrow S_1 \rightarrow 01 \]

Dependent and Relative

The relation runs in one direction only.
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The first part of our answer to the question of what the status of Y is before it is known by X is that Y is not yet objectified in the present moment when it is co-existent with X, it is itself the subject of some experience (whether a single subject, a psychical event, or a

40. Hartshorne rejects the definition of "cause" as a "set of conditions, from which only one outcome is possible, or from which, in principle or ideally, the outcome is wholly predictable", which is essentially what Rāmānuja means in saying that "as a cause we must assume only what corresponds to the effect" (above, p.127). Instead, he defines "cause" as "a state of affairs such that when granted something more or less like what happens subsequently was 'bound to happen', of (if you prefer) could safely have been predicted" (Logic of Perfection, p.163). The effect contains the cause as indeterminate because the relationship is asymmetrical rather than symmetrical (Creative Synthesis, pp.213-226).

41. Sures, op.78-87.
group of subjects, a physical event). So, in sum, we can say that to exist is to be the object of some experience or to be destined to be the object of some experience, because every "object is bound to be remembered by some future experience or other." 42

Now we come to the question of the adequacy of subjects to know their objects, i.e., the fact that ordinary subjects do not without qualification experience their objects. If what exists is only what is known or destined to be known there must be perfect knowledge because nothing exists outside of being known. This makes false or imperfect knowledge logically impossible even though it is an aspect of experience. "Experience has two at least verbally contrasting forms; these are, partially ignorant, unclear, uncertain, or 'fragmentary' experience, as opposed to wholly cognitive, clear, certain, and 'complete' experience." 43 In fact, since on Hartshorne's view the present moment of an event-sequence of any object is the sum total of all the events that have contributed to that sequence, to know an object completely one would have to know the entire sequence of events it summarizes. However, experience shows that this is something we are not capable of grasping in the consciousness of our own event-sequence, let alone that of objects external to us. How are we to account for this paradox? Or, to put the same question in another way, what is fallible, imperfect knowledge? The answer to the paradox, says Hartshorne, "is that divine experiences can adequately experience and hence adequately include their objects." 44 What is fallible, imperfect knowledge? It is the inadequacy

42. Supra, p.183.
43. Creative Synthesis, p.166.
44. Supra, p.176.
of ordinary knowing in comparison with divine knowing. Divine knowledge contains all there is to be known and therefore all that can meaningfully be said to exist. It is jñāna, of which our jñāna is but an imperfect part. From this it would seem to follow that, on Rāmānuja's definition of anantam, Hartshorne too could say that God is infinite, because he is wholeness, unlimited by any other, because he includes all existence, but he cannot without qualification, because at any present moment of his existence he does not know what co-exists with him, i.e., what is destined to be known.

God As "Infinity" and the Problem of Simultaneity

Our question is, does the divine individual really include all existence if there are existent entities co-present with him and unknown because of the impossibility of knowing simultaneously existing things? They exist because they are destined to be known, but can God know them and therefore include them? This Hartshorne admits is a difficult problem. It is difficult for at least two reasons. To allow that God does know contemporary happenings throughout the universe is tantamount to affirming absolute time and space in the face of relativity physics. Secondly, it involves a denial of freedom and independence to all other individuals. We will not deal with the first of these problems because it would take us beyond the scope of this thesis, but the second definitely concerns us.

In Chapter III we saw how Hartshorne, in reply to John Wild's criticism, establishes the independence and distinctiveness of individuals on the fact that co-present entities are not causally related. The
example used is the relation between the head and neck of an individual. The head-now does not include the neck, which is free and independent of it, because the head-now is related to the neck by including the past moment of the neck and not the neck-now. And, because the head cannot know and therefore include the neck with complete adequacy, the neck contains much more concrete data than the head knows of it, the neck is a separate independent entity. However, when we come now to the matter of divine knowing, we have a different situation, because we are dealing with perfect knowledge. As Hartshorne says: "Only in God is there adequate memory-inclusion. Only in God is the past unqualifiedly in the present".45 So, the distinctiveness of the known from the knower cannot be established on the basis of the more concrete and less concrete. The remaining possibility is that God does not know simultaneous events. But then says Hartshorne:

... I am not able to see clearly that it makes sense to say that contemporary events are unrelated. For they seem to have the relation of coexistence, or rather, of co-occurrence. If this is not a real relation in them, it must be a relation in some mind considering them, above all, God's. But then there is a problem of God as, in a certain phase, contemporary with us in a certain phase. So I suspect (not too happily) that one must admit real relations between contemporary happenings. The consequence, 'everything is related to and includes everything ...'46

If this is the consequence of admitting real relations between

46. Ibid.
contemporaries, how are we to distinguish God from the sum total of existent things or from any one of the parts? If Hartshorne accepts this consequence he ends up with the strict organicism he wants to avoid and the freedom of individual entities is lost, because the parts are not distinguishable from the whole. Furthermore, if everything includes everything and God is not distinguishable from the sum of the parts, God is related to nothing. As John Wild says: "Such an entity could have no relations, for the very nature of relations involves a real otherness, or lack of inclusion between the related entities."47

And, we have seen how the realistic aspect of Hartshorne epistemology causes him to agree with Wild on this point. In his system, "the deficient modes of awareness or inclusion serve to distinguish things through the endless variations in the items which are most vividly 'prehended'."48 Does this not imply that relations are ultimately illusory, because they are the result of ignorance and that when truth is known everything will be seen as being the same as everything else, an absolute monism? Rāmānuja does not have this problem because of the substantial difference between the three tattvas. Even if the jñāna of the jīvas becomes equal to the jñāna of Brahman, they only become like Brahman, not the same entity. Because entities are substantially different, relations between them are eternally possible even when their modes of existence are identical and their individual autonomy is preserved. Rāmānuja tries to establish his particular formulation of

the substance doctrine for this very reason. Individual autonomy is necessary for Rāmānuja's understanding of the nature of salvation.

In his most recent book, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, after discussing the questions of simultaneity and coexistence, Hartshorne concludes: "A thing coexists with whatever inherits from part of the same past and is destined to influence part of the same future." Coexistent entities are not known in the present. Then he says: "Since deity is not, at least in the same sense, localized spatially, the theistic account must somehow alter or complete the foregoing picture. But just how I find myself unable to understand." The problem remains for Hartshorne; but he rejects what he "not too happily" admitted in 1950, in his reply to John Wild, i.e., "real relations between contemporary happenings." He affirms that "the subject-object duality is ultimate ... and it involves a real and indeed temporal priority of the object in each case."

The rejection of the possibility of God knowing his coexistent contemporaries, with the consequences we have outlined above, and the acceptance of the ultimacy of subject-object duality, means that, on Hartshorne's view, the divine experiences, which constitute the existence of the divine individual, include all other experiences in the same way the nervous system of an ordinary individual, "especially the cortical parts of it", synthesizes into a unified momentary event the experiences of all the body cells in the preceding moment. In other words, each

50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Sura, p. 81.
moment in the life of the divine individual "is the momentary 'whole' summing up the antecedent states of 'the parts', all other individuals. Insofar as coexistent individuals exist external to the experience and knowledge of God, they are external to and independent of him. In this respect, Hartshorne's conception of the God-world relationship is similar to Rāmānuja's. Further, there is a parallel to Rāmānuja's idea that the jñāna of the jīvas implies the Jñāna of Brahman in Hartshorne's statement: "If the 'identity theory' of mind-body means only that the sensory qualities of experience apply to neural processes, as well as to sensory experiences, and that the latter logically entail the former, I incline to accept it."54

On Rāmānuja's understanding of the God-world relationship, the existence of Brahman contains all the actual and potential qualities of the existent world as eternally actual in his self, such that the divine experience (Jñāna) is wholeness and completeness, not subject to change or becoming. The experiences of all other individuals, on the other hand, are partial and incomplete and this is the cause of their experiencing becoming and change. The qualities that make up the partial, incomplete experiences of the jīvas are not different in kind from the qualities experienced by Brahman. In fact, the former are but concrete, particular modes of the latter.

Likewise, Hartshorne's understanding of the God-world relationship allows him to affirm that God's experience contains all the actual and

53. Supra, p.100.
potential qualities of existence, but not as eternally actual. On Hartshorne's scheme, God can only know as actual what in fact is actual in the existent world because he has no "self" that exists apart from the world. The qualities experienced by God as his existence are not only essentially the same or the same in kind as those of the world, they are identical. The change and becoming of the world is also the change and becoming of God. This becoming aspect of God is not less than being or wholeness, rather it is true wholeness because it contains not only what is the same and continuous from moment to moment but contains what is the same plus the multitude of differences that exist from moment to moment which Brahman must exclude in order to remain unchanging.

The identification of the existence of God with the actual world that is actually present as the object of an all-inclusive experience from moment to moment does not involve Hartshorne in the monistic problems pointed to earlier because the autonomy of the divine individual and of all other individuals is retained by the non-relatedness of the subjective poles of the individual event-sequences. God does not include the subjective aspect of coexistent individuals within his present knowledge and existence but they are destined to be known by him in the future moment, just as the experiences of the body cells of a human individual are destined to become his experiences.

Because the divine individual adequately knows all there is to be known, has perfect memory and everything that exists is part of his
body, nothing that has become actual, viz., objectified, is ever lost from his knowledge and, therefore, ever ceases to exist. Everything that becomes actual continues from that moment to be a part of each subsequent event in the sequence of events that is the divine life. In this sense, the being of God at any particular moment consists of all that is actual in the present unified experience that is the existence of God now, and that experience includes all that has become actual in the beginningless past. As Hartshorne says: "It seems that God must eternally have been and be aware of an infinite number of already actualized entities."

It is important to note that the being of God as we have described it above becomes a new being each moment. This is why Hartshorne says being becomes and becoming is. The being of God, as Hartshorne conceives deity, is subject to constant change, in the form of increased experience, as he receives the creative acts of his own subject pole and those of every other individual.

The idea that once something has become actual it continues as an unchanging part of the existence of God is one way in which Hartshorne establishes a continuing, unchanging aspect of experience that makes change and becoming meaningful. We will discuss the consequences of

55. Supra, p.176.

56. Creative Synthesis, p.65. Hartshorne goes on to say that the "problems which this suggests are baffling enough. But at any rate I see no good ground at all for supposing that, besides numbers or similarly abstract entities, including metaphysical categories, every quality of sensation or feeling that occurs in experience must have its eternal duplicate" (Ibid., pp. 65-66), which is, of course, Rāmānuja's position.

57. Supra, p.175.
such a conception of the God-world relationship for religious man in
the next chapter, but before we do that, we must give our attention to
the second way things that do not become are experienced, i.e.,
"because it is something wholly abstract, like the generic nature of
becoming as such." 58

God, the Ultimate Synthesis and Synthesizing Agent

Here we are dealing with Hartshorne's idea that being is abstracted
from the common features of existence in several moments of the living
process of an individual event sequence, which is characterized by
becoming, the primary characteristic of all experience. In other words,
we are still on the question of the primacy of becoming to being, but
in this context, the term "being" has the more classical meaning as
referring to the essence of something's existence, its defining
characteristics. 59

Rāmānuja, as we now know, believes being is prior to becoming
because the scriptures state that Brahman can exist without any phenom-
enal world, as he does in the pralaya state. And, experience itself
shows that the ātman can exist in itself without depending on the

58. Ibid.
59. In Chapter III (p.71), we outlined two ways in which Hartshorne
uses the term "individual", i.e. as a momentary event summing up all
previous moments in an event-sequence and as "referring to certain
common characteristics shared by a sequence of discrete moments." He
uses "being" in these two ways also. The two uses of these terms are
not different, because the latter is abstracted from the former and is
less inclusive. Rāmānuja uses different terms for the two ways Hartshorne
defines an individual -- jīva and ātman respectively -- and different
terms for the two ways Hartshorne uses the term "being" -- asti (real)
and satya (being) respectively.
body, as it does in deep sleep. Hartshorne, on the other hand, rejects
the idea of a substantial, self-existent, independent soul that
transcends time, having particular, accidental, contingent qualities as
dependent attributes, because such a conception of an individual makes
it logically impossible to attribute any ultimate significance to the
differences and uniqueness of particular experiences, as is evident
from the problems we found in Rāmānuja's thought in Chapter IV. It
subordinates the experiences of the phenomenal world to some "higher"
experience, making them ultimately valueless and results in a depre­
ciation of life in the world. As an alternative, he proposes a concep­
tion of individuality that makes the continuing aspect of existence,
being, dependent upon the momentary, becoming, contingent aspect, cons­
tituted of concrete particularity, which then takes on ultimate signif­
icance because it is the locus of reality. Being, as the essence of an
individual's existence, is dependent upon becoming because it is but
the generic characteristics of all the data in the individual event­
sequence. Becoming is the all-inclusive category, including being as
an abstracted part, so an individual has being as long as the becoming
aspect of his existence continues.

Because the existence of God at any present moment includes all
actual existent things as parts of a unified experience, the being of
God, as conceived by Hartshorne, must equal the abstracted common
features of all experiences presently synthesized as the existence of
God-now, which, we must remember, includes all past actual experiences
as they are perfectly retained in the divine memory, part of which
are his own subjective experiences and acts as an autonomous individual.
The result of this is that what God is now is dependent upon all previous experiences and acts, both his own and all other individuals, because, as the universal synthesizing subject, he is dependent upon them as objects of his experience, as realism requires. As Hartshorne declares, "my position is that the higher the being the more dependence of certain kinds will be appropriate for it." Thus God, the Highest Person, cannot be consistently conceived as independent and absolute. On Hartshorne's view, the "divine is to be conceived as relative beyond all other relative things, but this relativity itself must have an abstract character which is fixed or absolute."

The obvious question vis-à-vis a concept of God that makes him so completely contingent, dependent and relative is whether such a god would not be subject to non-existence, as are all other individual event-sequences. In our discussion of ordinary synthesizing agents in Chapter III, we saw how each new subject is created by the subject of the preceding synthesis and is therefore dependent upon it as well as other contingent experiences and these in turn upon contingent experiences as their causes, ad infinitum. Furthermore, in delineating the merits of process thinking over substance thinking in Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, Hartshorne says:

... we get rid of the suggestion that a single event is adjectival, an abstracted aspect of something more concrete. We also make explicit the profoundly important truth that genetic identity is a special strand of the causal order of the world, and rests on the same principle of

61. Ibid., p.128.
inheritance from the past as causality in general does ... We also take into proper account the truth that a first event in a series might have been the last, and then there would have been no sequence, no enduring individual, except an unfulfilled potentiality.

The first two of these statements apply to the divine individual as well as any other. Does the third also? In other words, if some event-sequences can come to an end, cannot all?

According to Hartshorne, to attribute contingent qualities to God does not leave him vulnerable and subject to the possibility of non-existence. The reason is

... whereas other beings are accidental products of becoming, we should think of God as qualifying becoming essentially, so that he is always certain to become, his life being a process inherent in all process, in process as such, or within which all process must occur, therefore beginningless (for his beginning would be a process independent of him and with himself as accidental product) and for the same reason endless.63

What Hartshorne is articulating here is just another way of stating the classical axiom that God is that 'being whose essence it is to exist'. He says much the same thing in a slightly different way when he writes, "God is thus the great 'I am', the one whose existence is the expression of his own power and none other, who self-exists -- rather than is caused, or happens, to exist -- and by whose power of existence all other things exist."64 To establish the necessary exis-

64. Ibid., p.8.
tence of such an individual, it is necessary to establish the existence of a perfect knower, whose existence includes all past and present experiences, and is therefore the potentiality of all future experiences as well, and who cannot possibly not exist. This, according to Hartshorne, is what the ontological argument seeks to do.

The question of God's necessary existence is basically the question of the conceivability of an individual possessing categorial supremacy. In this chapter we have set forth Hartshorne's conception of such an individual. We have seen how God can be conceived as having perfect knowledge, which means to know all there is to be known, perfect existence, which means to include the existence of all other existent entities, and, because of the all-inclusive nature of these characteristics, infinite, meaning not limited by any other. To deny the conceivability of such an individual is tantamount to denying any significant meaning to the terms "universe" and "world" as well. 65

If we grant the conceivability of an individual with categorial supremacy as described by Hartshorne, then to say something exists logically implies that God exists and necessarily exists, because he is by definition the unified and unifying synthesis of that something. Consequently, the first step Hartshorne takes in establishing the necessary existence of his supremely relative god is to indicate that the all-inclusive, non-restrictive, existential statement that embraces all actual and possible experiences and excludes none, "something exists," is a priori true. 66 He does not consider the completely res-

66. Logic of Perfection, pp.156, 292-293. Also, Creative Synthesis, pp.159-163.
trictive statement "nothing exists" to be a real existential possibility because it is falsified by every experience and verifiable by none, since to verify it someone must exist. Partially restrictive statements are dependent upon some particular experience for their verification, but the statement "something exists" is verified in every experience and not conceivably falsifiable by any, so it is necessarily and a priori true. "A necessary proposition ... is one 'implied by any and every proposition'. It thus forms an aspect of the meaning of any statement you please." In other words, Hartshorne establishes the necessary existence of "something" on the same grounds as Rāmānuja establishes the continuous existence of the conscious Ātman; it is implied in all experience.

To say "something exists" is tantamount to saying "something is experienced", for both Rāmānuja and Hartshorne. So, if we ask the question: "Why does something exist?", continuing our concern with the problem of whether God, as Hartshorne conceives him, could cease to exist, we are really asking "Why is there experience?", which to Hartshorne is a meaningless question. Experience is the given. If we mean, is it possible for all experience to end?, which apparently is conceivable to Hartshorne, even though he thinks it is not very likely, this is a different matter. Hartshorne admits that if God "could exist without a world, it is illogical to say, 'Because there is a world God must exist'. In no case can a sheer necessity obtain because one

contingent alternative rather than another is realized." This simply points to something that both Hartshorne and Rāmānuja agree on, namely, that the question of God's existence cannot be answered on empirical grounds.

As further argumentation against the possibility of contingent proof for God's existence, he asks, who could know the non-existence of God? Certainly a divine mind could not experience its own non-existence, and if God, being that than which none greater can be conceived cannot know it, who can? Hence, if "the non-existence of God has no conceivable experiential meaning, in terms of divine or nondivine experience", it is necessary, he believes, to conclude that either "'conceivability' has no essential relation whatever to the testimony of possible experience, or the 'nonexistence of God' is inconceivable." The empirical questions raised by atheism and agnosticism are thus invalidated by the very nature of the subject matter.

Here is what Hartshorne believes Anselm discovered:

Assuming certain 'meaning postulates' ... concerning the import of 'God' and certain related terms, it follows that the existence of God is a logical or analytic truth. The meaning postulates can be rejected, but the position then is not atheism, as commonly understood (or agnosticism either) but positivism (as I shall use this label), the view that the divine existence is logically


impossible ... No question of contingent or empirical fact is at stake.\textsuperscript{70}

Hartshorne and the "positivists" agree that all empirically known existence is contingent. The question of God's existence is not empirical but logical. And, Hartshorne believes, once the question of God's existence is correctly formulated, the answer is logically necessary and undeniable, provided the idea of god has any meaning at all. The real issue in the ontological argument is not whether or not God exists, says Hartshorne. This question was clearly eliminated by Anselm. To have non-existence even as a possible alternative is not to be "unsurpassable," which is the unique characteristic of God as Anselm understood him, i.e., God is such that "none greater can be conceived."

If God has the mere possibility of non-existence he is subject to contingency, and to "exist contingently is to exist precariously, or by chance" which is imperfection, an attribute that is inappropriate for deity.

Perfection either could not possibly exist, or it exists necessarily. And the necessarily true is true. The existence of divine perfection is a question not of contingent fact, but of necessity, positive or negative. Logical analysis, not observation of nature, alone can settle it.\textsuperscript{71}

When dealing with the question of the existence of God, perfection, the question of empirical or contingent truth is inappropriate. Hartshorne says this is one proposition that cannot be proven contingently true or false, so the question is one of being necessarily true or necessarily false, which can only be decided on the basis of logic.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., p.34.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., p.31.
The argument is based on two concepts of modal logic, i.e., contingency and necessity. God is defined as being such that "none greater can be conceived." Hence, if X > Y because X is and Y is not, i.e., if it is better to be than not to be, it must be true that an unsurpassable being exists. Therefore God necessarily exists.

The questions that can be put to this postulate are: is it really expressive of faith?, is it free from ambiguity? and is it free from contradiction? In answer to the first question, Hartshorne says Anselm assumed that anyone but a fool would necessarily believe that God is greater than any other conceivable thing or he would not worship him. In other words, if God could conceivably not exist he would not be worthy of worship. So the question of what men worship is important and will be our main concern in the next chapter.

The other two questions get Anselm into difficulty, says Hartshorne, because of his classical concept of deity. Ambiguities and contradictions do arise with such a definition of deity. If we take any conceivable number we can think of a still greater number that is conceivable, and this could also be true of entities. "Greatest individual"

72. Anselm's Discovery, pp.25-26. Because the existence Hartshorne has reference to here must be the phenomenal world (since he does not recognize any other level of existence, e.g., an underlying substratum that is the causal ground of the phenomenal world) Indian philosophy and religion, in general, would not agree with this axiom. T.R.V. Murti, in an article entitled "The Individual in Indian Religious Thought," in Charles A. Moore (ed.), The Indian Mind (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967), pp.320-340, writes: "Buddhism and all the systems of Indian philosophy (excluding the Carvaka) show their keen spiritual insight in beginning with the truth of suffering (duhkha-satya). To all of them, not only the actual states of painful feeling, but phenomenal existence in its entirety (Samsara) is suffering" (p.322). The most fundamental motivating force in Indian thought has been to derive ways and means, as well as an understanding of the nature of existence, that affords freedom from the painful, phenomenal world. We will have more to say about this in Chapter VII.

like "greatest number" is an abstraction. Taking this in conjunction with the fact that "modern logical analysis shows that no existence can be necessary," it seems we must conclude with J.N. Findlay that:

"Concrete or actual existence cannot follow from a mere predicate or abstract definition. Hence divine perfection is impossible." Thus, Findlay's observations create a dilemma for theism when God is conceived in the classical form, because a "merely contingent being would not deserve worship, for we should be revering at most a big and wonderful accident; yet, on the other hand, that a mere abstraction like 'all-worshipful' could necessitate a concrete actuality is a logical absurdity." The only answer to this problem, Hartshorne submits, is to conclude with Leibniz "that 'greatest' must be taken to mean a purely qualitative, not a quantitative, maximum." Consequently to avoid Anselm's dilemma, neo-classical theism distinguishes between "no greater individual" and "no greater thing or entity." The latter characteristic, when applied to God, excludes all increase from deity in an abstract, absolute sense. And, the former means that God in the concrete particular sense is surpassable but only by himself, so he can include quantity as one of his qualities without its being the contradictory, ambiguous thing of classical theism, an absolute, actual, unsurpassable quantity. Then, to avoid the contradiction involved in

74. Ibid., p.37. This is Hartshorne's summary of Findlay's argument in Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre (eds.), New Essays in Philosophical Theology (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1955), pp.47-56, in which Findlay asserts that Anselm proved the impossibility of God's existence insofar as it is necessary.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid., p.27.

77. Ibid., pp.28-29.
bringing the necessary and contingent, the abstract and the concrete
together in a unified experience, Hartshorne insists that we must
distinguish between two forms of contingency: 1. where "both that and
how the predicate is actualized or concretized are accidental";
2. where "only the how is accidental, while the that is necessary."\(^{78}\)

All existing things, other than God, have accidental, contingent exis-
tence and actuality, i.e., their continuing spatial and temporal exis-
tence is dependent on external factors, as is all the particular,
actual occasions of their being. God, on the other hand, has necessary
existence and accidental, contingent actuality, i.e., his continuing
existence as being one with all space and time is absolute, unchanging
and independent of any and all external forces, while his particular,
actual manifestation at any given time is accidental and contingent
upon all the forces in actual existence at that particular time. This
'actual-existent' distinction avoids the contradictions associated with
classical theism and it is meaningful because it is applicable to all

\(^{78}\) Ibid., p.38. Another charge of contradiction and ambiguity that
is brought against the ontological argument by the positivists is that
it uses 'existence' as an a priori predicate when it can only be an
existential fact to be affirmed or denied (see article by J.J.C. Smart
in *New Essays*, pp.33-34). Hartshorne agrees that in general 'existence'
is not to be considered a 'real predicate'. However, "the existence
which in the sole case of God is taken as a predicate is not simply
existence in general, but a unique and superior form or manner of exis-
ting" (Ibid., p.33). God's existence is necessary existence without the
slightest possibility of non-existence; it is self-existence without
dependence on any other; it is existence according to essence. Even
though we cannot infer 'existence' or 'non-existence' from the modal
status of ordinary, contingent things, it is possible to infer from the
non-contingent nature of deity that it is "necessarily existent unless
impossible" (*Logic of Perfection*, p.57) because it is a logical truth
rather than empirical.
existent things.

The assertion that deity has necessary existence is a necessary proposition in that it "is one whose truth is included in that of any other proposition whatever". Divine existence includes the existence of all existent, actual entities and the knowledge of all knowing. Furthermore, it is the source of all creativity.

... objective necessity is merely what all possibilities have in common, their neutral element, which will be actualized 'no matter what' course the creative process may take. This neutral element is creativity in its essential or irreducible aspect, which is inseparable from the necessary aspect of deity.

Creativity is an abstract category, yet it is, at the same time, part of every concrete experience, because, like becoming, it characterizes all particular, concrete, actual entities. If it is conceivable that there is unity, order, purpose and meaning to existence as a whole, as religious man affirms there is and attributes to God, then God, as that than which nothing greater can be conceived, necessarily exists, with each momentary, all-inclusive, cosmic moment constituting the actual existence that includes all previous cosmic moments (all knowledge, existence and creative acts) and contains each future moment as indeterminate potentiality. As long as this 'whole' is not conceived as being eternally actual, complete and unchanging, no contradiction is involved in affirming God's necessary existence.

79. Ibid., p.41.
80. Ibid., p.43.
Hartshorne believes he has met the requirements of conceiving God in a way that is expressive of faith and free from contradiction and ambiguity. Still, when the questions: "Could God exist, is any idea of his nature intelligible?" are asked, he admits that the arguments for God's existence do not force affirmative answers. It is still possible to deny that the idea "God" has any rational meaning just as one can deny that the concepts "universe" or "all inclusive existence" are meaningful.

The final decision derives from the realization through reflective experience of the meanings in question, and of the impossibility of making skepticism in either direction a sincere philosophy. All men, it seems, must ultimately or at least obscurely feel the religious ideal as the referent of all comparisons between interests, presupposing an inclusive interest in interests which can only be God's and not any merely human interest.81

To deny the existence of God is to deny the unity of knowledge, an overarching order to existence, and any ultimate meaning and purpose to life. The moral consequences of which we will consider in the next chapter. Up to this point, we have seen how relativity theory seems to controvert the possibility of there being an all-inclusive experience, which in itself seems to deny a unity to knowledge, an overarching order, and therefore a single meaning and purpose to existence as a whole. This makes the developments in modern physics a matter of great concern for Hartshorne and causes him to say that God's way of knowing must be different from the way ordinary beings know. To

be required to admit that God must know and experience the world in some unique way is not a small matter for one who wants to derive all knowledge of God from rational analysis of and extrapolations from ordinary experience. Further, on his own admission, he has not conclusively demonstrated the existence of God. Nevertheless, his efforts are not in vain. He has at least proven that the question of God's existence is a "controversial" problem rather than one of empirical fact. And, once this is established, he believes it is a matter of the existence of God having any "experiential meaning." With reference to this, he contends that the experience of the mystics is compatible with his conception of deity.  

Rāmānuja, too, rejects all the empirical arguments for the existence of God and acknowledges that the world might be caused by many powers rather than an ultimate one. All arguments for the existence of Brahman fail, says Rāmānuja.

Brahman is not manifested by other means of proof; for Scripture says, 'His form is not to be seen, no one beholds him with the eye' (Ka. Up. II, 6,9); 'He is not apprehended by the eye nor by speech' (Nu. Up. III, 1,8).

Moreover, it is only in the state of perfect conciliation or endearment, i.e.

82. Anselm's Discovery, pp.64-65.

83. Śrīdhāsa, I:1:3. The entire commentary on this sutra is given to arguments that support the contention that the existence of Brahman is known through Scripture alone.
in meditation bearing the character of devotion, that an intuition of Brahman takes place, not in any other state. 84 Consequently "worship" and "what men worship" becomes the key to the concepts of deity of both Hartshorne and Rāmānuja. So, in the next chapter, we will turn our attention to the nature of the religious quest as understood by our two philosophers.

Conclusion

The question that led us into a discussion of the ontological argument was whether or not Hartshorne's giving primacy to becoming over being would have as its corollary the possibility of God's non-existence. In our discussion we have found that non-existence is not a possibility for God as long as he can be conceived as having categorial supremacy, especially perfect existence and perfect knowledge. In fact, if such an individual is conceivable, according to Hartshorne's logic, it has necessary existence. However, and this is important, "the 'necessity' of deity which follows from categorial supremacy refers to his existence as an individual and ceases to be a truism if it is construed to mean that everything in God's total reality is necessary." 85 God is the unique individual who is categorically supreme over every other individual at any given moment of his existence, because he contains every other individual; but God as the supreme actuality at one moment of his existence may be (and, indeed, Hartshorne thinks he must be) surpassed in some of his characteristics

84. Thibaut, p.617.
85. Philosophers Speak on God, p.?.
in the succeeding moment. Without this idea of the self-sur-passability of deity, Hartshorne finds it impossible to give any ultimate significance to the changing aspect of existence. Hartshorne agrees with the classical theologians in saying that the form or state of his existence cannot change. He writes: "to admit change in God need not mean renouncing his prerogative of existing necessarily." God's ability to adjust to all possible states means he cannot fail to exist.

Unless we understand the full meaning of Hartshorne's affirmation that it is the abstract essence of God (his individuating or generic characteristics) that has necessary existence and not his concrete actuality, the differences between his conception of deity and that of Rāmānuja will seem to be greater than they really are. We must remember that Hartshorne recognizes that a "mere abstraction" cannot necessitate a concrete actuality. And, it is true that the abstract essence of God cannot necessitate a particular concrete moment of his existence. But, because one of the abstract characteristics of deity is perfect existence, which means to exist without the possibility of non-existence, it is necessary that some concrete actuality will always exist, the sum total of which, at any given moment, is the concrete, all-inclusive actuality of deity at that moment. The abstract essence or being of deity is abstracted from and has its reality in that becoming whole. The abstract aspect of deity always exists

86. Supra, p.165.
within the concrete aspect; consequently, if the abstract exists necessarily, some concrete actuality necessarily exists as expressing the generic characteristics of deity. This is why Hartshorne says: "It seems that God must eternally have been and be aware of an infinite number of already actualized entities." Thus, the generic characteristics of deity, the essence of all existence (Brahman in Rāmānuja's system), are eternally actual in some particular form of existence. Just what particular form is contingent. "An actual becoming is always composed of what, at least in that act of becoming, does not become." Becoming is the primary category in relation to being because the togetherness of being and becoming must become or nothing becomes, "since a single new constituent means a new totality, while a new totality does not require that every constituent be new." Briefly, becoming includes being, either as what has already become actual, or as the abstract characteristics of becoming as such, plus becoming.

When we compare Hartshorne's conception of the being-becoming relationship, as it applies to the two aspects of deity, with that of Rāmānuja, we find that the crucial difference between them centres in the question of whether being is abstract or concrete. Rāmānuja's view is that being and Brahman are one and Brahman is absolute, unchanging, and eternally complete. There is no becoming in Brahman

88. Supra, p.192.
89. Supra, p.173.
90. Ibid.
because it is the eternal, concrete actualization of all the auspicious qualities that can be experienced. In other words, being is related to becoming by containing as actual the essence of all possible becomings. So, being is in all becoming as Rāmānuja views their relationship to each other, as well as for Hartshorne, but for Hartshorne it is not an eternally unchanging actuality.

As Hartshorne views the actuality of God from moment to moment, it is at once the same and different, unchanged in part, changed as a whole. The unchanged part, being, is, on the one hand, a set of abstract characteristic that apply to every moment of the divine life, i.e., they constitute the essence of all existence. On the other hand, they are eternally concrete and actual, since they must have been actualized in some form from the beginningless past, and once something becomes actual in the divine experience, it remains actual forever more as a cause in all future effects.

With the above points in mind, we can bring the real issue between Rāmānuja and Hartshorne into focus by a careful look at the following statement from The Divine Relativity:

The infinity of the absolute is the infinity of possibility. The absolute form is neutral to alternatives, therefore limited to none of them, but not because it has something lacking to any one of the alternatives. For since the abstract is in the concrete, any concrete case contains the entire unlimited form. The form is unlimited, not because it has all possible cases in actualized form, but because it has no actual case within it, being the common form of all actuality, and no actuality whatever.

91. Supra, p.197.

92. The Divine Relativity, p.144.
Let us consider this statement in conjunction with Hartshorne's psychicalist doctrine, namely, that all existence is feeling for feeling. This doctrine denies that there is a soul or self who has feeling and that there is matter to be felt. There is just feeling. If we substitute Rāmānuja's term "caitanya" or "consciousness" in the place of feeling, Rāmānuja is obviously opposed to the idea of a universal consciousness, since this is what he opposed in the Advaita Vendantists. However, in our conclusion to Chapter II, we saw that even on Rāmānuja's own theory of knowledge, it would be reasonable for him to accept the ultimacy of consciousness along with the Advaita Vendantists rather than make it a quality of ātman. We suggested that he does not do this and argues for real ultimate distinction between ātman and Brahman as ultimate principles because of his understanding of the nature of salvation. We will return to this in the next chapter, but for now, let us assume that he should accept the Advaitan view as far as the ultimate universality of consciousness is concerned, where would this put him in relation to Hartshorne?

We are using the term feeling in place of "absolute" in the above quote, because, as a cosmic variable, it is one of the absolute qualities (experience, love, creativity are others). With this in mind, we can say that feeling is a cosmic variable because it is implicit in all experience and as such is coincident with all actual and possible existence (since existence equals what is or is destined to be

experienced), and is therefore infinite. The Advaitan's response to this would be that consciousness is present in every experience as its necessary cause (meaning ground for its appearance) but the particular qualities of that experience, the experience of things and individuals, the subject-object relationship in general, are caused by māyā and have no ultimate reality. To avoid this ultimate negation of the phenomenal world, Rāmānuja insists that the qualities of the phenomenal world are ultimately qualities within the infinite consciousness of Brahman. However, as opposed to Hartshorne, Rāmānuja maintains that the qualities of the world, his body, do not become qualities of Brahman's consciousness, they are eternally actual to him. To avoid change in Brahman, which to him would imply a previous or subsequent imperfection, Rāmānuja insists on two principles: (1) Brahman eternally knows as actual the essence of all actual and possible existent particular things, and (2) to know the essence of something is to know all there is to be known about it. These principles issue in the three problems we noted at the end of Chapter IV.95

Hartshorne can say with Rāmānuja that feeling or consciousness is unlimited, infinite, but not "because it has all possible cases in actualized form, but because it has no actual case within it, being the common form of all actuality, and no actuality whatever" (above). In other words, universal feeling or consciousness is an abstraction and, as such, has no reality in itself, like every other abstract category. The reality of consciousness is the concrete, particular,

95. Supra, pp. 161-162.
unified experience of the present moment, summing up all the previous
syntheses of experience in the event-sequence, that is, the life of an
individual. Each moment in the divine life consists of a unity of
consciousness that draws together the objectified experience of God
in the preceding moment along with the experiences of all other
individuals. The universal consciousness that is the divine experience
at any present moment includes all that is actual, i.e., all the
variety of particular feelings experienced up to that moment and all
the possible feelings of the future, but only as possible, not as
actual or fully particularized.

God as perfect existence and perfect knower must include all
other existence, in all its concrete particularity, in his existence,
for that is the only meaningful locus of reality, and he must include
all there is to be known in his knowing. It is not sufficient to
simply know the essence of things because that means the rich novelty
of the feelings of particular moments is lost. This is the only
logically consistent way that perfection can be conceived, according
to Hartshorne. And, besides being logically consistent and coherent,
he believes, as we have had several occasions to note, it is a
concept of deity that is consistent with the idea of God as worshipped
by religious men. We will turn now for a closer look at this latter
claim.
VI

CONCLUSION: THE RELIGIOUS QUEST

The objective of this dissertation, as stated in the introduction,\(^1\) is to determine why it is that Rāmānuja and Hartshorne, who have essentially the same concerns motivating their writing (i.e., to arrive at a conception of deity that is rationally coherent, free of contradictions and, above all, consistent with the idea of God held by men who worship) and begin with the same religious affirmation (\textit{deus est caritas}), arrive at conceptions of God that are very similar in the way they conceive the God-world relationship (the world is the body of God) and yet radically different with respect to the doctrine of substance. In seeking an answer to this question, for reasons outlined in Chapter I,\(^2\) we started with an analysis of the conceptions of ordinary individuals in the thought of these two philosophers. The conclusion we arrived at with respect to Rāmānuja’s view on the nature of an individual was that while his particular formulation of the substance doctrine, which he considers to be essential to an adequate explanation of experience \textit{qua} experience, does not involve him in any logical contradiction, even on his own presuppositions, the \textit{atman} concept seems to be ambiguous, if not inconsistent at certain

points. This conclusion is based on the fact that if something must be known in order to prove its existence, the "self" must be consciousness or a quality of consciousness. Nothing prior to consciousness can be experienced and, therefore, meaningfully be said to exist. And, if the ātman and consciousness are one and non-different, the notion of "I", in the statement "I know the jar", could be a quality of consciousness (ahamkāra) just as well as the cognition of the jar. Also, the "I-awareness" that seems to perdure in deep-sleep could be a contingent restriction within universal consciousness. Just because it is experienced as being a continuous element in all experience up to now does not mean that it is essential to experience qua experience. There is no logical justification for Rāmānuja believing that knowledge of everything other than the self is a quality of consciousness and then inverting the relationship, making consciousness a quality of the ātman. If we are to accept the substance-attribute dichotomy, the Advaitan view that consciousness is ultimate seems to be the more reasonable proposition from the point of view of consistency.

Rāmānuja's rejection of the Advaitan proposition that consciousness is the ultimate reality is not primarily based on logical reasons but on the affirmations of religious men. First, it implies that consciousness is the essence of all things; and when this idea is taken in conjunction with Rāmānuja's epistemological premise that to know the essence of something is to know all there is to know, because the concrete particularity of becoming existence is but a restricted mode of its essence, something less rather than more, it follows that
knowledge of consciousness is knowledge of everything, omniscience, perfect knowledge. Further, knowledge of anything other than consciousness, even the idea of being a self, would be a restriction of consciousness and, therefore, less than perfection. Perfect knowledge would be consciousness knowing itself to be ultimate and free from all restriction, all qualities. The consequence of this is that if the idea of being a self, as a quality of consciousness, is a contingent restriction within consciousness and, therefore, less than perfection, the self must be ultimately unreal. This ultimate negation of the individual in Advaitan thought was unacceptable to Rāmānuja because, on his view, it made the relationship between the worshipper and the object of his worship ultimately unreal.

The second reason for Rāmānuja not being able to accept the proposition that consciousness is the ultimate principle is implicit in his question: "Resorting to what does it produce delusion?"3 In other words, if all is of one consciousness, what is affected by ignorance (avidyā) to give rise to multiplicity? It cannot be the individual jīva, "on account of the nature of the individual Soul being superimposed by Avidyā. Nor again, resorting to Brahman on account of its being opposed to Avidyā due to its having the form of self-illumining Jñāna."4 The very nature of Brahman is such that it cannot be overcome by ignorance. After all, it is the knowledge of Brahman (Jñāna) that destroys ignorance.

3. Śrībhāṣya, p.125.
4. Ibid.
The Highest Brahman is of the form of Jñāna; whatever is fit to be turned away by that [Jñāna] is of a false nature. If Ajñāna were to screen [Brahman] - who is competent in respect of driving that away?5

The import of this statement is that if Brahman is one with universal consciousness and is the one and only ultimate principle, everything else being illusory, and this ultimate principle can be overcome by ignorance, then salvation, freedom from ignorance, is impossible and what religious men hope for is vain. Rāmānuja avoids this problem in his own thought by making Brahman and ātman both ultimate individuating principles, with consciousness as an essential quality. This allows him to attribute all the imperfections of existence to the jīvas, whose consciousness can be affected by ignorance, and retain the perfection of Brahman, defining it as: "free from all evil, devoid of all imperfection, all knowing, all-powerful; that all its wishes and purposes realize themselves; that it is the cause of all bliss; that it enjoys bliss not to be surpassed."6

In arguing against the Advaitan position, Rāmānuja points to the nature of experience and concludes that an experience of unqualified consciousness is not to be had.7 Consciousness is always experienced as consciousness of something, and, above all, the consciousness of being a self. This is a fundamental point on which he and Hartshorne agree. Hartshorne, too, insists that experience is always an experi-

5. Ibid. Rāmānuja credits this statement to Natha Muni, one of his predecessors.
7. Supra, pp.32-33.
ence of something and the unity of experience at any moment is the experience of being a self. Their reasons for this affirmation are basically the same, i.e., the admission of pure, unqualified consciousness leads to a disparaging of the qualities that constitute the world of ordinary experience and the denial of any ultimate meaning and value to the deeds and quality of life of individuals, which are basic presuppositions in the worship of religious men. Both Rāmānuja and Hartshorne are critical of their predecessors for failing to do justice to this dimension of experience.

The qualities of ordinary experience are significant in Hartshorne's thought because he defines an individual as being the present sum total of experiences in a sequence of events, causally related, or as a group of continuing abstract qualities derived from such an event-sequence. So, on his view, an individual is not some substance that has experiences as qualities, he is a unity of experiences. Consciousness, or, to use his term, feeling, must be qualified in some way because it has no existence apart from particular experiences.

Rāmānuja also gives significance to the qualities of ordinary experience by asserting that consciousness must be qualified in some way at all times, if only to prove its existence. On his view, because consciousness is a quality of ātman, there is the continuous experience of being a self, so an individual can exist, and have its existence proven to itself, apart from any subject-object relationship. This

8. **Supra**, p.84.
9. **Supra**, pp.54-55.
seems to imply that the experienced qualities have less significance in Rāmānuja's thought than they do in Hartshorne's. However, in the conclusion to Chapter III, we tried to show that the "nervous system" in Hartshorne's idea of an individual performs the same basic functions as the ātman-consciousness relationship in Rāmānuja's scheme. The difference is that, in Rāmānuja's description of this relationship, the minimal experience is the ātman's intuition of itself; whereas, in Hartshorne's description of the nervous system, a minimal experience would be a present moment in the life of the nervous system subjectively experiencing the immediate past moment as object, with no new data being received external to the system as a whole. If this interpretation of Hartshorne is correct, we can conclude that it is just as possible for the nervous system to live within itself as an individual as it is for the ātman. But, neither Hartshorne nor Rāmānuja would say that this is the ideal form of existence. The ideal form of existence is exemplified, for both philosophers, in the divine individual, "the great worship-eliciting being", and, in each case, this involves being infinite, in the sense of not being limited by any other, which means to include all existence and all knowledge.

In Chapter IV, where we discussed Rāmānuja's conception of Brahman (perfection) as satyam, jñānam and anantam, we noted that both he and Hartshorne attribute these qualities to the ultimate principle. However, because Rāmānuja insists that perfection, as the being of all beings, the knowledge of all knowing, and therefore infinite, must possess these qualities as eternally actual and unchanging, his conception of Brahman poses three problems for religious men. First, in
order to assert that Brahman is eternally actual and unchanging, yet is one with all existence and all knowledge, Rāmānuja has to insist that the becoming, contingent aspect of existence is less than being, rather than more. Consequently, this aspect of existence, which is what is most real and significant to ordinary men, has no positive value to Brahman at all. The concrete, particularity of individual men and things are not known to Brahman, except according to their essence.

Secondly, because Brahman is unaffected by the particular acts and deeds of men, the worship of religious men, through rites and rituals prescribed in the Vedas and living moral lives, is all in vain as far as Brahman is concerned. So, all of Rāmānuja's attempts to controvert the Advaitan conception of Brahman to bring it in line with the conception of deity held by worshipping men seem to be destroyed by his inability to allow change in perfection.

The third problem related to Rāmānuja's conception of Brahman is that it does not allow him to say all that he wants to say about Brahman without involving him in contradiction. He speaks of Brahman deciding to create the gross world of concrete, particular things in conformity with the particular karman of the individual jīvas prior to pralaya, which implies some change in Brahman and knowledge of all particularity from one state of cosmic existence to another.

We have suggested that these three problems in Rāmānuja's thought could be overcome if he would allow that Īśvara, the Supreme Person who has Brahman as his soul and the world as his body, is the arche-
type of perfection rather than Brahman. Íśvara is the highest individual who knows the concrete particularity of the world of ordinary individuals and Rāmānuja appropriately attributes to him the role of suiting men with their just rewards and punishments. Therefore, Íśvara, and not Brahman, is the appropriate object of man's worship.

If Rāmānuja did allow that Íśvara is the idea individual because he receives with complete adequacy the experienced qualities of the phenomenal world as positive increase (and therefore to be characterized as becoming) and understood Brahman to be the abstract essence or being of Íśvara (and because abstract, less rather than more than Íśvara), his concept of deity would be almost exactly the same as that of Hartshorne, who conceives of deity as satyam, because he includes all that has become actual and will include all that becomes actual in the future, and jñānam, because he knows all there is to be known at any given moment, and will know all that becomes knowable, in all its concrete particularity, and is therefore infinite both quantitatively and qualitatively.

However, we have further suggested that Hartshorne's way of conceiving the ideal individual is not open to Rāmānuja because of his conception of salvation, the religious quest. To see why this is so we will have to consider the remaining two essential characteristics that Rāmānuja attributes to Brahman, mentioned in Chapter IV, i.e., amalatva (goodness) and ānandamaya (blissful). These two qualities are integrally related, as Rāmānuja conceives them, because to know the supreme good is to have supreme bliss.

The Nature of the Good

Rāmānuja's View of the Good

The religious quest, as Rāmānuja understands it, is the quest for salvation or the quest for the Good. This Good is the realization that the true nature of each individual self is non-different in its essential qualities from the divine individual.

The individual ātman is beginningless and endless; it is subject to God, of whom it is a śeṣā [one who exists for the purpose of the śeṣin]; it is a quantity of the category kṣatrajñā [subject of any subject-object relationship], distinguishable from and not circumscribable by the body. It cannot be called sat or asat, because it is neither cause nor effect. The ātman's conjunction with the conditions of effect and cause results not from its proper form, but from its concealment by ignorance of karman; kṣetra and kṣetrajñā conjoined may be called cause, but not the pure kṣetrajñā alone, because the condition of cause results from karman.\(^\text{11}\)

As we know from Chapter II, one of the essential qualities of the ātman is caitanya, consciousness, which makes it the substratum of all experiences. In its pure form the ātman has perfect knowledge, i.e., its jñāna is one in essence with the Jñāna of Brahman, and like Jñāna it is anantam, infinite in time and space. However, because of ignorance (avidyā), the ātman identifies itself with its body, composed of the elements of prakṛti, and the activities of that body. This union of the true self and the body (kṣetrajñā and kṣetra) is the cause of the particular, concrete, contingent entities of ordinary experience. The acts of the embodied ātman that produce these effects establishes its karman, merit or demerit, the results of which the ātman is responsible

\(^{11}\) Van Buitenen, p. 142.
for and it is justly required to bear their consequences. \(^{12}\) So, it is the ātman's involvement in the realm of cause and effect relationships that causes it to reap rewards and punishment, happiness and suffering. Consequently, on Rāmānuja's view, to suggest that the divine individual experiences contingent happiness and suffering is to suggest that he, too, is shrouded in ignorance and subject to karman, which is abhorrent to any religious man.

Because Brahman knows he is substantially different from prakṛti, the realm of contingency (nāsti), he cannot experience the happiness and suffering that is derived from it. It is not that Brahman does not know the existence of prakṛti. On the contrary, it is because he knows it as it is that he is unaffected by it. Salvation for the jīva lies in his, too, coming to the realization that all acts and the fruits of actions are performed by and are the results of prakṛti and not his own essential nature, which has the form of knowledge or consciousness. Thus, Rāmānuja writes, "When a person perceives that all different modes of existence of all beings depend on one principle, prakṛti, and not on the ātman, and that the varieties of new beings issuing from these beings again arise from prakṛti, then he will attain the ātman in its purest form." \(^{13}\) When the jīva realizes this true self, he realizes that, like Brahman, he too is substantially different from the contingencies of prakṛti. He realizes that he is an eternally unchanging ātman, one in essence with Brahman.

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12. Supra, pp.51-52.
The Released one experiences himself as not
separate from the Highest Brahman ... Therefore, he experiences himself as not divided,
only as -- I am Brahman. The reference to the
equality and the possession of the same qualities,
propounds the purity equal to that of Brahman by
the abandonment of the ordinary forms of gods,
etc., because the nature of the immost Ātman
who is, verily, the mode of Brahman is equal to it. 14

Rāmānuja gives the primary emphasis to unity and sees variety
as something that must be transcended. His reason for this is the same
as that which would be given by any school of Eastern thought, i.e.,
that it is the identification of oneself with and the love of or desire
(trṣna) for particular things in the realm of flux (or variety) that
is the cause of pain and suffering. On this view, even those events
that appear on the surface to be happy moments involve suffering
(duhkha), because the fact that they are not lasting makes them a
source of anxiety and frustration. As Krṣṇa tells Arjuna in the
Bhagavadgītā: "Of the non-existent [asat] there is no coming to be;
of the existent [sat] there is no ceasing to be." 15 Krṣṇa admonishes
Arjuna to seek the imperishable Ātman and know that as his true self,
because to know that is to know the Good.

Hartshorne’s View of the Good

The very positive attitude toward being, as compared to the
negative attitude toward becoming, that is expressed in Rāmānuja’s con-
ception of ideal or blissful existence destroys a great deal that is

14. Śrībhāṣya, p.1041.
15. S. Radhakrishnan (trans.). The Bhagavadgītā (London: George
integral to religious experience, as Hartshorne understands it. As is evident from the above, it includes one-sided emphasis on unity with a concomitant suppression of variety, which is destructive of the very nature of aesthetic appreciation, because, as he says: "Beauty in the emphatic sense is a balance of unity and variety."16 Also, it calls for a withdrawal from the concrete, particular, becoming aspect of existence because it involves the experiences of happiness and suffering, both of which are so much a part of the richness of human experience. Hartshorne can agree that God "enjoys bliss not to be surpassed,"17 but the cause of God's blissful experiences are always concrete, particular and changing. To consider the bliss of deity as being derived from his experience of his own nature is not the kind of God men worship, according to him.

For religion, as a concrete practical matter, as a way of life, has generally viewed God as having social relations with man, as sympathizing with him and gaining something through his achievements. God was interested in man, therefore could be 'pleased' or 'displeased', made more or less happy by man's success or failure, and could thus be 'served' by human efforts.18 God so conceived is far from Rāmānuja's idea of God as one who "is not bound to do anything, for there is no desire of his that is not fulfilled."19 Hartshorne's God is essentially 'creator' and is therefore bound to create. He must have some creation as the object of his experience, because the absence of experience equals the absence of

17. Supra, p.217.
existence. Consequently, God is dependent upon there being some other for his own existence. This necessity does not impinge upon the freedom or sovereignty of God, because "if God could not exist without some world or other, this would only imply that with his unsurpassable creativity he infallibly provides himself with a world." Indeed, if our suggestion that the nervous system, as described in Hartshorne's conception of an individual, continues as a closed system, during the state of deep-sleep, it would seem to be possible for God, as conceived by Hartshorne, to exist as a closed system, with each moment of his existence being the experience of the previous moment with no addition, i.e., each moment would have one "parent" as its cause. This would be parallel to Rāmānuja's idea of Brahman in the pralaya state.

Hartshorne believes God creates the world of other individuals not because of the necessity of experiencing some other but because "when God creates, he creates additional contents of his own awareness, enriches the panorama of existence as his to enjoy." The creative increase of new and varied experiences, the expansion of awareness until it is all-inclusive is the Good as Hartshorne understands it. Consistent with this idea of the motivation behind God's creative activity, he partially defines worship as a conscious effort to inte-

21. A Natural Theology, pp.84-85.
23. A Natural Theology, p.12.
grate "all one's thoughts and purposes, all valuations and meanings, all perceptions and conceptions ... Or, worship is individual wholeness flooded with consciousness." 24 To move in the direction of this ideal one must love all things, for love is "sympathetic participation" in the feelings of others. 25 So, on Hartshorne's view, love and worship are synonymous. God is the appropriate object of worship because he is the integration of all existence, true "wholeness". This is, according to Hartshorne, the import of the religious affirmation deus est caritas. God's nature defines what love is and it means completely, adequate "sympathetic participation" in the lives of all others. Only a being such as this is worthy of "unrestricted devotion" or worship. 26 Only such a conception of God, he believes, is consistent with the total commitment to God that all the great religions call for. As Hartshorne says:

The idea that worship is love with the whole of one's being is correlated, in many high religions, with the idea that what we thus wholly love is itself also love, the divine love for all creatures, and for God himself as including all ... It seems impossible to love an unloving being with all one's being. ... Only supreme love can be supremely lovable. 27

Hence, one of the important questions related to what men worship is: "were the early Christians right - is anyone right - from the

24. Ibid., pp.4-5.
26. Ibid., p.113.
27. A Natural Theology, p.12.
standpoint of secular philosophy, in believing that deus est caritas?"²⁸ Christianity has been traditionally caught in a dilemma in making this affirmation, according to Hartshorne, for logically it seems that "either divine power or divine goodness must be limited."²⁹ Philosophers and theologians, both East and West, have gone to great lengths to disassociate God from the evil and suffering of the world because it seems to contradict the idea of God, whose essence is love. On this point Hartshorne says of Rāmānuja: "Notable is the energy with which our author maintains the immunity of deity to all evil, including suffering."³⁰

The idea that deus est caritas is not foreign to Rāmānuja. As we mentioned in the introduction to our study, one of the motivating forces of Rāmānuja's writing is his feeling that Śaṅkara's conception of the ultimate made it into a "cold stone" and did not express the true nature of the supreme perfection, who is a personal God, characterized by love. In the Gītā, he says the jñānin, one who has the highest knowledge and therefore achieved the highest attainment, "loves God so dearly that God himself cannot express how much he loves Him, for his love is beyond quantity; and God loves the jñānin as dearly as the jñānin loves God."³¹ And yet, in his argument against those who say that if Brahman possesses a body he must experience happiness and misery, Rāmānuja compares Brahman (Paramātman) with an

²⁹. Ibid., p.xv.
³¹. Van Buitenen, p.104.
authoritarian ruler.

As in the world in the case of those who comply with the orders of the king, and those who transgress them, even though there is the association of happiness and misery due to favour and punishment by the king, there is not, by merely being possessed of a body, the undesirable contingency of being the enjoyer of happiness and misery due to the compliance with, and transgression of the orders, in the case of the ruling king also. 32

Now the question is, do these affirmations of God's love for the worshipper and of a supreme ruler not being affected by the happiness and misery of others involve Rāmānuja in the same dilemma Hartshorne attributes to classical Christian theism? The answer is no, and the reason is that what God loves in the worshipper is also unaffected by happiness and misery. Following the above quotation from the Gītā, Rāmānuja writes:

But the jñānīn is regarded by God as Himself, that means, God considers the maintenance of his own ātman to depend on his worshipper's ātman, for such a one approaches God as his highest attainable end because without God he would not be able to maintain His ātman; therefore God is not able to maintain His ātman without him and so he is His ātman. 33

What the creator loves in the creature is what is satyasya satyam, the True of the true and the Real of the real. Briefly, the purpose and value of contingent existence is not to add to what is but to realize what truly is. Brahman eternally has this Jñāna, because he is satyasya satyam. This is why he is not "bound to do anything." He

32. Śrībhāṣya, p.581.
33. Van Buitenen, p.104. God in this quote isĪśvara.
creates the numerous worlds in order to bring the infinite number of ātmanas to the realization of their oneness with him, i.e., that their true essence (satya) is non-different from his (satyasya satyam). Or, as Rāmānuja says, "He is active in order to save the world."\(^{34}\)

The Relation of the Religious Quest to Life in the World

Rāmānuja's View

Perhaps the strongest point in favour of Hartshorne's concept of deity, which is integrally related to his understanding of the nature of the religious quest, is that, considering the main objective of both himself and Rāmānuja, it affords ultimate significance to the concrete particularity of every experience, because every experience contributes its full quantitative and qualitative contents to the divine experience. Therefore, it is appropriate at this point to ask whether or not Rāmānuja has failed in his quest by not admitting Brahman to receive anything from the universe he creates?

One of the reasons Brahman creates the universe out of his subtle body is that it is the realm in which the jīvas work off their karman, which is the result of the ignorance that blinds them from knowing their true nature. Brahman gains nothing from their coming to realize their true nature because he eternally knows their reality and is

\(^{34}\) Ibid., p.71. Rāmānuja's thought is ambiguous, confusing and perhaps even contradictory at this point, because of his insistence that Brahman is unchanging and, at the same time, speaks of it as acting in the creation of the world and the saving of the ātman. We must attribute such acts to Īśvara and remember that Īśvara and Brahman are not different. Brahman is Īśvara's true self and it is only because of this that he is worthy of worship. When the jīvas realize that they are one with Brahman in essential nature and are free of the limitations of karman, no new knowledge is added to Brahman, because he eternally knows the attributes to their true essence. Īśvara knows them in their particular, restricted forms.
himself unaffected by *karma* or ignorance. Thus the concrete particularity of the world plays a significant temporal role in the attaining of the higher knowledge by the *jīvas* but it does nothing for Brahman. This means it has a subordinate functional role for the sentient aspect of the world but has no ultimate significance in itself.

But there is yet another reason for Brahman creating the world, according to Rāmānuja. Creating the multitude of particular contingent things of the world is the sport, *līlā*, of Brahman.

The motive which prompts Brahman - all whose wishes are fulfilled and who is perfect in himself - to the creation of a world comprising all kinds of sentient and non-sentient beings dependent on his volition, is nothing else but sport, play. We see in ordinary life how some great king, ruling this earth with its seven dvipas, and possessing perfect strength, valour, and so on, has a game at balls, or the like, from no other motive than to amuse himself; hence there is no objection to the view that sport only is the motive prompting Brahman to the creation, sustentation, and destruction of this world which is easily fashioned by his mere will.35

On first encountering this idea that the concrete, particular entities of this world are but "toys" for divine amusement, the Western mind is repulsed at the thought of taking the things of this world so lightly. And, with reference to the question we are now concerned with, it seems that Rāmānuja's concept of deity makes life in this world less significant than even a humanist would allow. There is obviously more to the concept *līlā* than first meets the eye.

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35. Thibaut, p.447.
The first thing we must be reminded of is that Rāmānuja was part of the Bhakti Movement in India. In his commentary on the Gītā, he writes: "It is only through bhakti that God may be either known by śāstras, or experienced directly, or approached as he really is."\(^{36}\)

In other words, above all else, the one who seeks to know the Ultimate must be fully devoted to God and desire nothing else.\(^{37}\) Within the context of this movement it is no small matter for the devotee to be able to participate in the divine play, even if it had no ultimate, lasting significance.

To look upon the world as being the result of divine play would be a viable reason for its existence if life in the world were a matter of joyful amusement, fun and games, but it is not. There is the much larger question of theodicy that needs consideration in this context. The matter of justifying evil and suffering with the omnipotence and perfection of God is a serious one for every theist, and Rāmānuja has an explanation for why an imperfect creation does not contradict the idea of a perfect creator.

Rāmānuja claims on one hand that Brahman is the sole cause of the universe. Furthermore, he claims that Brahman is identical with the world because it is the body of the Supreme Person in the causal and the effected state. He admits that this world, the body of Brahman, is plagued with evil and suffering, and at the same time, he

\(^{36}\) Van Buitenen, p.132.

\(^{37}\) This is certainly in keeping with Hartshorne's definition of worship. Supra, p.227.
affirms that Brahman possesses only those qualities that are antagonistic to all evil. He believes there is no contradiction involved in these affirmations. According to Rāmānuja, the "identity rather proves for Brahman supreme lordly power, and thus adds to its excellence." He means by this that one who believes God is the cause of all existence is able to attribute greater power and excellence to him than one who tries to disassociate God from the world in order to remove him from any relationship with its imperfections.

To say that Brahman is the cause of an imperfect world does not trouble Rāmānuja because, on his conception of deity,

The imperfections adhering to the body do not affect Brahman, and the good qualities belonging to the Self do not extend to the body; in the same way as youth, childhood, and old age, which are attributes of embodied beings, such as gods or men, belong to the body only, not to the embodied Self; while knowledge, pleasure and so on belong to the conscious Self only, not to the body.

In other words, the presence of an imperfect clay jar does not necessitate the conclusion that the clay is imperfect. This way of circumventing the association of the essential aspect of deity with the imperfection of the world is open only to one who subscribes to a doctrine of substance. It is not open to Hartshorne.

Even though Rāmānuja has extricated the essential self of the world (Paramātman) from the problem of evil, he still has the problem of the identity of the imperfect world and the body of Brahman in the effected state. If Brahman, having the world of cit and acit as his

39. Ibid., p.422.
body, is the cause of all things, the logical conclusion would seem to be that Brahman is the cause of an imperfect world. Rāmānuja explains why this is not so.

The individual souls ..., which are under the influence of karman, are conscious of this world as different from Brahman, and, according to their individual karman, as either made up of pain or limited pleasure. But as this view depends altogether on karman, to him who has freed himself from Nescience in the form of karman, this same world itself as lying within the intuition of Brahman, together with its qualities and vibhūti, and hence as essentially blissful.40

The basic problem of human existence is ignorance, avidyā, according to Rāmānuja, and Eastern thought in general. Ignorance is looking upon the contingent, particular entities of the world, composed of prakṛti, as the real; whereas these are but partial expressions of the real. Brahman alone is the Real and the True, Satyasya Satyam. It is this partial knowledge of what is real that gives rise to perceptual and conceptual error. It is partial knowledge that gives rise to desires (trṣna) and activities that give rise to cause and effect chains of events that result in good and evil deeds, karman. And, it is karman that gives rise to pain and momentary pleasures that in themselves give rise to suffering. Consequently, the cause of the suffering that individuals endure is none other than the individuals themselves, not the essential nature of Brahman or even the world in itself, the body of Brahman. In fact,

... the world becomes an object of supreme love to him who recognizes it as having Brahman for its Self, and being a mere plaything of Brahman -- of Brahman, whose essential nature is supreme bliss.
and which is a treasure-house, as it were, of numberless auspicious qualities of supreme excellence. 41

Again, to repeat what we have already said above, to suggest that Brahman knows suffering is to imply that he does not know the Real and the True. One who knows this cannot suffer pain, anxiety and frustration, because he has all his desires fulfilled, blissful existence. This is not only true of Brahman but of the jīvanmukta, the released soul, also. As Rāmānuja says, "the Released one, ... having enjoyed the modified worlds that are the manifestations of the Lord, becomes gratified at his own will." 42 Why is this the case?

The Released one realizes the Highest Brahman with its manifestations, with all the modifications shaken away, of a uniformly auspicious nature opposed to everything fit to be abandoned, possessing an excessive bliss, and having all auspicious qualities. The worlds although within the modifications are fit for being enjoyed by the Released one, as they are included in the manifestations of that. 43

This quotation brings us to the significant point in Rāmānuja's understanding of the relationship between the religious quest and life in the world. It has reference to the final full release, which takes place after the death of the enlightened individual in this world. In that ultimate state, the jīva is free to create or move by mere thought or act of will. He can be with or without a body, according to his desires. Rāmānuja believes that sometimes "the souls using their own creative will-power themselves create their own worlds,

41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., p. 105.
43. Ibid.
which however are included within the sphere of sport of the highest
Person (so that the souls in enjoying them do not pass beyond the
intuition of Brahman).\footnote{Thibaut, p.764.} In other words, the concrete particularity
of things have their place and value even in eternity. This is
aesthetic value in that it does not determine \textit{that} the $j\tilde{i}va$ exists but
\textit{how} it exists.\footnote{Supra, pp.} It is not of ethical value, the ethical is trans-
cended, because all particularity is seen as but manifestations of
the Ultimate unity. However, even though these are conditions of the
final release, one who has knowledge of his true nature while still
embodied in this world has an analogous kind of freedom. This freedom
of self is achieved by dedicating all of one's activities and posses-
sions to God.

Rāmānuja's religion is not a religion of passive inaction. He
gained much of his teaching from the \textit{Bhagavad-Gītā}, and in the \textit{Gītā}
Krṣna tells Arjuna:

\begin{quote}
Do thou thy allotted work, for action is better
than inaction, even the maintenance of thy physical
life cannot be effected without action. Save work
done as an for a sacrifice this world is in bondage
to work. Therefore, O son of Kuntī (Arjuna), do thy
work as a sacrifice, becoming free from all attachment.\footnote{Radhakrishnan, \textit{The Bhagavadgītā}, p.135.}
\end{quote}

Commenting on this passage Rāmānuja writes: "Therefore one should be
active in order to acquire the means of performing sacrifices and not
for realizing a personal ambition."\footnote{Van Buitenen, p.69.} His point is that life is given

\begin{footnotes}
44. Thibaut, p.764.
45. Supra, pp.
47. Van Buitenen, p.69.
\end{footnotes}
with all its variety of names and forms as part of the cosmic play and its ultimate value is aesthetic in nature. This is realized by those who see the Whole, those who know Brahman. For them there is no suffering, rather, for them the world is a 'treasure-house of numberless auspicious qualities of supreme excellence', and it is for this reason that Rāmānuja can say that the identification of the world with the body of Brahman does not contradict its perfection but, instead, proves his 'supreme lordly power, and thus adds to its excellences'.

The next obvious question in relation to Rāmānuja's theodicy, is, if the Supreme Person is omnipotent, why does he allow the avidyā, ignorance, that results in kārman and the consequent suffering? To this question Rāmānuja provides us with no answer, but he is not alone in this. No Indian school of thought has found it possible to explain its cause. It just is. Radhakrishnan speaks of this in his introductory remarks to his Indian Philosophy:

If we ask the reason why there is avidyā, or māyā, bringing about a fall from vidyā or from being, the question cannot be answered. Philosophy as logic has here the negative function of exposing the inadequacy of all intellectual categories, pointing out how the objects of the world are relative to the mind that thinks them and possess no independent existence.48

Does the fact that the Supreme Person does not annihilate ignorance imply weakness in the Divine? According to Rāmānuja it does not, because, as we have said, his view is that the cause of evil and

suffering is not the result of being limited to a body (of having upādhis, limiting adjuncts), it is due to the action (karman) of the jīvas themselves. Īśvara is just, because he awards each individual what is due him. 49 P.N. Srinivasachari makes this point: "The view of Rāmānuja that Īśvara is the operative cause and the karman of each jīva the material cause of the diversities of moral experience, satisfies the needs of ethical transcendence and logical immanence."50

Furthermore, Rāmānuja contends that "the world is each time created to the end of the souls undergoing experiences retributive of their former deeds; otherwise the inequalities of the different parts of the creation would be inexplicable."51 In other words, the Law of Karma not only points to the justice of the God, it also explains the discrepancies and apparent injustices present within the world, giving them some meaning and purpose.

For still other reasons why Rāmānuja believes the ātman must be understood to be the cause of the wrongness of existence, we refer the reader back to Chapter II,52 where we described his arguments for conceiving the ātman as being characterized as kartr (agent), as well as jātṛ (knower), and bhoktr (enjoyer). Briefly, his point is that if the Supreme Person did not act toward the jīvas on the basis of

49. Supra, p.51.
51. Thibaut, p.392. T.R.V. Murti, in The Indian Mind (p.322), says: "What other more plausible explanation could we offer for the inequalities of beings that the doctrine of karma and rebirth, which is consistent with free will and the conservation of moral values?"
52. Supra, pp.55-52.
justice and gave them what they were undeserving of, he would deny
them of any meaningful role in the attaining of their salvation. And,
there is the further point that if salvation, the Good, was attained
purely by the will of Brahman, all scriptural injunctions, which are
a significant part of every religion, would be to no avail.

Hartshorne's View

In his understanding of the relation between the religious quest
and life in the world, Rāmānuja has provided for unity in variety
and thus overcomes the monotony and triviality which Hartshorne says
is the result of an over emphasis on unity and contrary to 'the good
as we know it'. On his view, the concrete, particular, contingent,
becoming aspect of existence has significance in relation to the
religious quest and the nature of the Good for two reasons. First,
it is important to the individual actor because the particular
configuration of life that he experiences now is the direct result of
his past acts and his acts now will determine his future experiences.
Also, the social situation of the present is the result of his karman
and that of other individuals like him, all of which points to the
justice of God. By doing what is right (dharma) each individual moves
that much closer to fulfilling life's goal and assists others in this
achievement. Consequently, the life one lives, in all its particularity,
is significant not because it contributes to the life of the Supreme
Person but because it leads to the realization of what is, the sub-
stantial aspect of deity. To realize this is to realize what is
lasting and of eternal value, to realize the God and experience bliss.
The second reason Rāmānuja believes life in the world is significant is that it is part of the divine play (līlā), because the variety of concrete, particular experiences add contingent qualities to the body of God, which is capable of change. They do not add to the substance of deity, Paramātman, because they are but modes of its existence, but they are enjoyed byĪśvara and for this reason they are not insignificant to Rāmānuja or to any man who worships in the Indian Tradition.

Hartshorne has the following to say about the first of the above reasons:

The notion of an all-arranging, chance-excluding Providence is doubly tragic; it is cruel, for it compels us to try to imagine that our worst tortures are deliberately contrived for our own or someone's good by an allegedly all-loving being, and it is dangerous, for it suggests that we need not use our own resources to avert evil where possible and to help others in danger and privation.53

Rāmānuja's justifying the evil and suffering of existence by invoking the Law of Karma is not acceptable to Hartshorne because it leads to their passive acceptance, with the excuse that those who suffer are but receiving their just reward for past deeds. It is a failure to take the problem of suffering seriously. Besides, he believes that even "God cannot undo or mitigate the past evil by punishing it."54 Once an evil act is done it becomes part of the sequence of events that is the cosmic process and will continue as a cause of all sub-

sequent effects. But this is exactly what the Law of *Karma* is all about. However, the believers in this doctrine maintain that it is possible to initiate counter *karmic* forces to overcome the effects of the evil deeds done in the past. Passive acceptance is not a necessary result of this principle by which the Hindu affirms his belief in a just universe. When Hartshorne says that God's concern must be "to work for an optimal future" rather than to punish past evil, he is stating what Rāmānuja means when he says that *Īsvara* "is active in order to save the world." So, on this point there is no real disagreement between our two philosophers.

There is an even more important reason why Hartshorne cannot accept the idea of an "all-arranging, chance-excluding Providence", which has reference to his understanding of the nature of individuals. He believes individuals cannot, absolutely speaking, be arranged, they must arrange themselves, evil or no evil. This is analytic -- 'individual' means this. And what is 'power' if exercised over nothing save the absolutely powerless (i.e. over nothing)?

To have all power is to have no power because to exist one must have some power, so if all power was in one individual, God, there would be no other individuals over whom he could exert his power. The omnipotence of God means that he has all the power that is necessary to retain the right balance of order and freedom. This is what links the omnipotence of God with his love. The fact of evil does not

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55. Ibid.
preclude one from saying that "God is love", for Hartshorne, because God’s love moves him to desire freedom for other individuals rather than to eliminate evil by fully determining what they can and cannot do. Therefore, even if God granted complete security from evil and suffering by completely controlling life in the world, it would not be the best possible world. On Hartshorne’s view, "freedom, chance and evil in general are inherent a priori in the mere idea of existence, construed as a multiplicity of creative processes." Consequently, he says: "Man needs to know that he is born to freedom, hence to tragedy, but also to opportunity." It is, then, on the basis of the freedom of individuals, required by the nature of God’s love, that Hartshorne explains the presence of evil in the world.

Rāmānuja can accept Hartshorne’s idea that it is the freedom of individuals that makes evil and suffering in the world possible. In fact, their theodicies are not very different at this point. Rāmānuja does not imply that God is the only individual who has power to act. As we have seen, he has reasons for insisting that the ātman is an agent (bhoktr). As he conceives deity, Īśvara is all-power in the sense that the acts of all other individuals are allowed by him, and Hartshorne seems to be saying much the same thing. Further, Rāmānuja agrees that if the lives of other individuals were completely contrived by God, life in the world would be denied any significant meaning.

59. Logic of Perfection, p.209.
60. Ibid., p.14.
61. Supra, pp.45-52.
62. Supra, pp.230-239.
Where Rāmānuja is completely at odds with Hartshorne is on the idea that tragedy is inevitable and that evil is inherent a priori in the idea of existence. This is too fatalistic for Rāmānuja and promises no hope for the attainment of bliss, ananda, promised by the God men worship, at least by Lord Viṣṇu, whom he worshipped. This brings us to the critical point of this chapter, which is to find out why Hartshorne's way of conceiving deity is not open to Rāmānuja, because of his conception of salvation, and of our whole study, which is to determine why it is that these two philosophers, who have so much in common, take different stands on the doctrine of substance.

Hartshorne's concepts of the divine individual and of ordinary individuals leads him to say:

The world is tragic because the creatures are partly free, within limits making their own choices. A multitude of partly free individuals are bound sometimes to clash, for their choices are made in comparative ignorance of each other, and are thus leaps in the dark, so far as effects upon others are concerned. Unless all were omniscient, this must be the case. But only deity can be omniscient. And if there were only the omniscient, what would the omniscient know, save its own knowing—of what? And upon what would its power be exercised? So it seems that deity needs a world. This world would be insignificant, if even conceivable, were the creatures wholly deprived of their own power, their own self-determination or freedom. There is a need for partly free and more or less ignorant beings, which must surely come now and then into conflict with one another.

With respect to this statement, it is interesting to note that one

63. Supra, p.221.
64. Supra, p.12.
of the ways Hartshorne believes conflicts and suffering can be greatly minimized is to get rid of "substance-thinking." Of all the destructive aspects of this doctrine that he points to, he thinks its association with "the dangerous 'individualism' of our Western world" is the most important. So, an important question for us is whether Rāmānuja's formulation of this doctrine has the same destructive effect of putting individuals in conflict with each other because --

If I am one with myself through time, just a single entity, then when I know myself this must be an absolutely different thing from knowing other substances. Knowing becomes either identity, I know myself because I am myself, or sheer non-identity, as when I know you. And so with loving, or taking an interest in, myself and others.

The answer to our question is that it does not, because, while there is the quantitative difference among individuals, which the substance doctrine affirms, qualitatively, all the ātmans are identical. Consequently, what the individual loves in himself he also loves in all others, just as Brahman loves in us what he loves in himself, and what he loves in us is all that is worthy of love, because it is all that is lasting. Our salvation lies in realizing Brahman, because when we do, we too know what is worthy of unqualified love and can love each other for what we truly are and what there is within us that is of true value. In short, Rāmānuja too can subscribe to the Great Commandment, "love thy neighbour as thyself."

This does not get at all the problems Hartshorne has in mind.

66. Logic of Perfection, p.121.
67. Ibid., pp.120-121.
There is also that characteristic of individualism that does not distinguish between 'this possible beauty of life ought to be actualized', and 'it ought to be actualized by and for me'. Hartshorne's own solution to this problem is to think in terms of event-pluralism, whereby the self of the present realizes the social nature of existence. The self of the present, that is, realizes that he is a temporal society, a synthesis of momentary selves. What he is now is the result of the activities of past momentary selves, both internal to his body and external, which were events in the event-sequence that is his individuality. Therefore, knowing that the present self will continue only as part of a new society, the succeeding self in the event-sequence, he acts not out of egoism but altruism, defined as "participating in the life of another so that his needs become yours." Thus, according to Hartshorne, "the right act is the one promising the more vivid as well as the more social enjoyment, not, however, necessarily to the agent, but to the ultimate referent of all really social motivation, the totality of members of the social community." Like Rāmānuja, Hartshorne believes the root of all evil is ignorance. "Absolute selfishness is nonsense;" he says, "and it is worth realizing that this is so."

The kind of selfish individualism Hartshorne is decrying here is rejected by Rāmānuja also. On his view, it stems from the Śaṅkara,

68. Ibid., p.256.
69. Han's Vision of God, p.149.
the ego-sense that results from the false identification of the self with prakrti, the material aspect of the embodied self. It is this false identification that results in partiality in action and narrowness of concern, it is not implicit in the substance doctrine. It is the identification of oneself with a particular, concrete name and form, and other individuals with other names and forms that leads to conflicts, evil and suffering. It is the belief that one can add significantly to what one is, or, indeed, to what someone else truly is, even God. The enlightened individual realizes that being cannot be created or destroyed, that he eternally possesses all that is truly worth having. When this is realized, he is freed from selfish goals and free to sacrifice all his activities and possessions to the universal Good.

One of the causes of conflicts and suffering within and among individuals, that Hartshorne points to, is the fact that while all things are possible, not all things are compossible. No individual can actualize all his possible particular desires at any one given moment, so he must choose, and this sometimes requires choosing one particular good over another equally good act. Further, the limitations of time and space, which characterize human existence, limit the possibilities that any finite individual can actualize in his three score and ten years, if he has that many. Also, because life is social in nature, there are bound to be divergent desires and conflicts over which of the multitude of possibilities open to any given society are to be actualized at any given time. Hence, the fact that all things are not compossible necessarily leads to conflicts within and among individuals.
And, in order to actualize some value at a particular time and place, an individual or group of individuals must renounce other possible values that might be actualized. Exclusion is the price of achieving any value. This is part of the tragic nature of ordinary, finite existence. It must be accepted as inevitable, because individuality requires a certain amount of conflict, at least as Hartshorne understands it. "For sympathy without antipathy would mean complete merging of selves, the destruction of individuality, just as antipathy without sympathy would mean the complete lack of influence or interaction among selves." 72

The inevitability of tragedy does not nullify God's omnipotence or the doctrine that deus est charitas on Hartshorne's view, because God's love requires that he grant freedom to the individuals who make up his body. From the freedom of ordinary individuals there inevitably follows evil. Why? Because ordinary individuals are ignorant. It is necessary that they be ignorant because it is their ignorance, their being defined by their limited knowledge and acts (karman) that establishes their individuality. Salvation, the experience of bliss and the fulfillment of the Good is impossible. The only way tragedy could be avoided, given the nature of individuals as Hartshorne conceives them, is for all ordinary individuals to become omniscient. And, if this were to happen, there would be no difference among individuals, there would be but one individual, God. Hartshorne's

72. Beyond Humanism, p.198.
thought leads to an Advaitan conclusion, i.e., there is one ultimate principle, all ideas of duality are the result of ignorance, there is only consciousness or feeling, leading to the conclusion that worship is grounded in ignorance.  

Rāmānuja agrees with the principle that all things are possible but not compossible, but this is not a source of tragedy for him for two reasons. First, what is most real and true, and therefore of ultimate, lasting value, the ātman that is one in essence with Brahman, though different in substance, is attainable by all, because it is the true nature of all and is indestructible. The fact of substantial difference, established in continuous awareness of being a self, guarantees that all individuals will not merge into one, even when all are omniscient. The particular, concrete, experiences of this world are significant for the attaining of the superior knowledge, but not in themselves. They are means to an end, not ends in themselves. By an individual doing what is possible for him to actualize at the level of existence he is at, determined by his karman, and looking upon that as his sacrifice to deity, he attains the ultimate goal, which involves true freedom in the absence of all suffering and evil.  

The second reason the problem of incompossibility does not carry the same consequences for Rāmānuja as it does for Hartshorne is that even though it is not possible to actualize all of one's desires at the same time, even in the state of release, this is not a source of tragedy because the individual realizes that he has an infinite time
to actualize an infinite variety of experiences. This brings us to a discussion of the doctrine of the immortality of the self, which Hartshorne associates with 'radical individualism'.

The immortality of individuals

Hartshorne finds the idea of an eternally existent self to be untenable. He asks:

How could any one of us have been the same individual at all times past, down to the present? Either he must have forgotten all but the most recent times or else he must be conscious of a personal continuity through the most radical cultural diversities, changes of beliefs, attitudes and events. But is it not precisely in our limitations that our personal identity consists?74

The possibility of remembering experienced events of previous existences is not foreign to Eastern thought. Such a claim is in fact made for Siddharta Gautama, the Buddha, on the night of his enlightenment.75 And, apparently there is no logical difficulty with such an idea, even on Hartshorne's concept of an individual, because he attributes this ability to the divine individual. But, on Rāmānuja's view, the acceptance of such a claim is not necessary, because one's true personal identity is not a remembered event-sequence, it is the self-conscious ātman. Consequently, it is Hartshorne's rejection of the substantial self that makes the idea of an eternally existent self untenable for the reason he gives.

Hartshorne's view is that "there was once no such individual as

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74. Logic of Perfection, p.246.
myself, even as something that was 'going to exist'. But centuries after my death, there will have been that very individual which I am. This is creation, with no corresponding decreation."76 This assertion is based on Hartshorne's contention that once something has become actual it eternally retains this status. Such a conception of eternal life is the only meaningful kind Hartshorne finds to be reasonable and indeed necessary to satisfy the aspirations of religious man. Death is not, on his view, the annihilation of what was but the termination of the possibility for future actualizations of syntheses of experiences by an event-sequence that is the life of a given individual. "The realized actuality of the beloved one lay in his or her thoughts, feelings, decisions, perceptions. These are evermore as real as when they occurred."77 Nevertheless, the unactualized potential of the individual remains frustrated forevermore.

Hartshorne finds belief in life after death to be a "genuine impossibility" but not an "absolute absurdity." It is impossible, he believes, again because of the nature of personal identity, "for if I am to be I, and not you and not the universe and not God, then I must be limited, a fragment of reality, not the whole."78 Rāmānuja does not say that the individual Ātman is God, but he does say the individual is like God in that he possesses all the qualities of God,

76. Logic of Perfection, p.250.
77. Ibid., p.251.
78. Ibid., p.253.
save three main attributes, and has all knowledge. Each individual self is a mode of God and complete in itself. The impression of being a part or fragment of the whole is the result of ignorance (avidyā).

True knowledge through "immediate presentation of the proper form of the ātman" is the proper end of every jīva.

By this knowledge one will perceive in one's own ātman the beings which one knows to exist in a plurality of forms. Then one perceives that all beings exist totally in God, for the ātman is equal to God's being when it is exempt from name-and-form: all ātmans, free from prakṛti, are equal to one another and to God.

Again, the retention of personal identity within qualitative unity is not a problem for Rāmānuja because of the doctrine of substance. This doctrine permits quantitative difference with qualitative unity, viz., an infinite number of individuals can retain self-identity, even though they have the same qualities, because they are self-conscious of the substratum of their experiences. Or, quite simply, they are conscious of being a continuous self, as described in Chapter II. Hartshorne says: "If our capacity to assimilate new future content and yet remain ourselves, as much united with our past selves as in contrast to them, is unlimited, then in that respect we are exactly as God is." And Rāmānuja says yes, this is true of the ātman free of ignorance.

Turning again to Hartshorne's view, if we ask how the realized actuality of an individual event-sequence is to be retained, he first

79. Śrībhāṣya, p.1058. The ātman has all the attributes of Brahman except the power to control the world of sentient and non-sentient things (ibid., p.1056), and it is dependent upon Brahman as the permanence of all its qualities (ibid., p.1057). Also, whereas the ātman is always capable of becoming involved with ignorance (avidyā), this is not true of Brahman (ibid., p.113).

80. Van Buitenen, p.94.

points to a number of ways in which a man's life can be extended beyond the day of his death, e.g., by his successors reading books he wrote, by having his deeds remembered, etc. This is what he refers to as "social immortality." It has some validity he acknowledges, but it has critical limitations. First, no other human being knows us sufficiently well enough to be able to preserve the full content of "our experiences, thoughts, intentions, decisions, emotions, and the like. Even while we live no one else quite sees the content of our own experience at this or that moment."82 Secondly, besides missing the full content of our experiences, quantitatively speaking, other humans also fall short of grasping the quality of our experiences.

"Thus the reality of one's life, as a stream of experiences, sensations, ideas, emotions, recollections, anticipations, decisions, indecisions, is a target at which the perception of others may be aimed but which they never literally reach."83 Consequently, if we are dependent on other human individuals to retain our actuality in memory, the result is futility. However, there is one individual, whose existence is affirmed by the theist, who does adequately know and remember the full complexity of our particular experiences both quantitatively and qualitatively, and that is the divine individual, says Hartshorne.

... our adequate immortality can only be God's omniscience of us. He to whom all hearts are open remains evermore open to any heart that ever has been apparent to Him. What we once were to Him, less than that we never can be, for otherwise He Himself as knowing us would lose something of

82. Ibid., p.252.
83. Ibid.
His own reality; and this loss of something that has been must be final, since, if deity cannot furnish the abiding reality of events, there is, as we have seen, no other way, intelligible to us at least, in which it can be furnished.  

The Supreme Person, as Rāmānuja conceives Īśvara, also knows and remembers completely the life of each individual, but not because he gains or loses anything by his knowledge or lack of knowledge of what there is to be known. His knowledge of them is directly related to their salvation and the principle of justice. He knows their particular deeds, which constitutes their karman, and on the basis of this knowledge awards them sense-organs and bodies befitting the particular karman that is theirs at the beginning of each new birth or when the period of a great pralaya draws to a close. Those who have acted in accordance with his ordinances he makes prosper in religious duty, material prosperity, love and salvation; and those who transgress his ordinances he unites with their opposites. Eternal life is thus not simply something that one hopes for, it is what justice demands.

Hartshorne disagrees with this. He believes that at the termination of the event-sequence that is our life, death says to us:

"More than you already have been you will not be. For instance, the virtues you have failed to acquire, you will now never acquire. It is too late. You had your chance." This may be thought to be expressed in the notion of the Last Judgment. Our lives will be definitely estimated, the account will be closed, nothing

84. Ibid., pp.252-252. Hartshorne's book, Beyond Humanism, has as its purpose the setting forth of arguments to show that belief in God, as he conceives him, is essential for sound moral living.
85. Supra, p.131-138.
86. Supra, p.51.
can be added or taken away. But this applies to punishments and rewards also. 87

This life brings its own rewards and punishments, on Hartshorne's view. There is no balancing of the scales in future life or lives by God or anyone else. The reward of a life well lived is that someone else will have a richer life because you lived, and it will forever contribute to God aesthetic experience of the whole. The highest attainment for man, man's salvation, according to Hartshorne, is in making the greatest contribution possible to the divine individual.

All of one's life can be a 'reasonable, holy, and living sacrifice' to deity, a sacrifice whose value depends on the quality of the life, and this depends on the depth of the devotion to all good things, to all life's possibilities, neither as mine nor as not mine but as belonging to God's creatures and thus to God. 88

The holiness of God, as conceived by Hartshorne, is not in his justice or mercy "but in the simple aim at the one primary good, which is that the creatures should enjoy rich harmonies of living, and pour this richness into the one ultimate receptacle of all achievement, the life of God." 89 Consequently, one serves God best not by conforming to ordinances, says Hartshorne, "But in that creativeness of new values together with respect for old ones by which man can most truly imitate the everlasting creator." 90 This is the goal of the religious quest as Hartshorne understands it. Man's salvation lies in his knowledge that all the goodness he strives for will be retained in the divine

87. Logic of Perfection, p.255.
88. Ibid., p.257.
89. Divine Relativity, p.128.
memory and not be destroyed.

Hartshorne makes a great deal of the idea that nothing is lost in defending his concept of immortality; but, as we discovered in Chapter V, even though nothing that becomes actual ever ceases to be actual, something does cease to be, i.e., the creative potentiality of all individual event-sequences other than the divine individual.91 This is part of the tragic nature of existence. The tragedy is lessened somewhat if one believes, as Hartshorne does, that every personality, other than the divine personality, has a limited number of possible variations, such that to continue forever would lead to "the monotony of insignificant variations on the theme of our personality,"92 but this would not be true of an individual as conceived by Rāmānuja.

Conclusion

On more than one occasion we have referred to the fact that the prime motivation for Rāmānuja's and Hartshorne's writing is to conceive of God in such a way as to give meaning and purpose to the particular acts of individuals and thus to life in the world. This relates, of course, to Hartshorne's concern that the Supreme Person incorporate both variety and unity within his existence. Part of the varied experiences of God, as Hartshorne conceives him, is his receiving of all the particular complexity of every particular event-sequence, which is the life of an individual, into his own being. This contribution to deity is received with complete adequacy because of the

91. Supra, p.196.
92. Logic of Perfection, p.261.
omniscience of God and is eternally retained because of the unfailing divine memory. Man's salvation lies in realizing that his life has such supreme importance to God, the all-inclusive individual, because to realize that one's life contributes to God is to realize that one's life, with all its complexity, affects the life of all future individuals, including the future selves of one's own event-sequence.

Rāmānuja attributes meaning and significance to the concrete, particular experiences of this finite world on the basis of their role of expressing the justice of the creator and in the attaining of the Good, the experience of bliss. Such experiences continue to have value beyond this function, however, because they will eternally be part of the divine sport, in which tragedy is unknown. Does this mean that Rāmānuja is guilty of what Śaṅkara believed the theists of his time were guilty of, i.e., "veiling the truth in a mist of sentiment?"93 If he is, we need to ask whether men are justified in their belief in ultimate justice and in their hope of Heaven? Hartshorne says the Christian affirmation that Jesus was God "ought to mean that God himself is one with us in our suffering, that divine love is not essentially benevolence -- eternal well-wishing -- but sympathy, taking into itself our every grief."94 We agree that this is what the Cross symbolizes in the Christian faith, but the Apostle Paul also says that "if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain and our faith is in vain" (I Cor. 15:14, RSV).

93. Supra, p.3.
Does this Pauline statement pose any particular problems for Hartshorne's concept of deity as it relates to the idea of salvation held by religious men? It does not, if it is given an existentialist interpretation, as does Schubert Ogden in his book *The Reality of God*,\(^95\) drawing heavily on the work of Rudolf Bultmann. In this book, Ogden maintains that in the scriptures of the Christian Church the doctrine of resurrection, like the doctrine of creation, has as its purpose the assertion of "the sole sovereignty of God as the ground and end of whatever is or is even possible, and denying, against all forms of metaphysical dualism, that there can be anything at all which is not subject to his sovereignty."\(^96\) Ogden insists that all the eschatological statements of the New Testament are mythical in nature, and, he goes on to say, "the only meaning of eschatological myths, as of all myths, is existential; that they are in all cases symbols of faith and, therefore, have no other intention than to illumine our life here and now in each present in face of the reality and promise of God."\(^97\) And what is the promise of God? Ogden writes: "By 'the promise of faith,' I understand the promise immediately implied in the witness of faith of Jesus Christ that we are all, each and every creature of us, embraced eternally by the boundless love of God."\(^98\) From this statement of his understanding of the promise of God,

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revealed in the resurrection myth, Ogden proceeds to describe how Hartshorne's conceiving of deity as the all-inclusive individual, who is adequately affected by and eternally preserves the complex detail of the particular acts and deeds of all other individuals within the divine life, gives coherent meaning to the Christian doctrine of the resurrection.

If Ogden's existentialistic, Hartshornian interpretation of the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of Christ is an accurate account of New Testament teaching, there is a radical difference between the Christian idea of salvation and that of religious men of the East in general. As we noted above (p.201, n72), Indian spirituality begins with "the truth of suffering (duhkha-satya)", viz., that the whole of phenomenal existence is characterized by suffering. So, in terms of Ogden's interpretation of the resurrection and Hartshorne's idea of the nature of salvation, what God would preserve and experience for eternity is what religious men of the East have sought freedom from. T.R.V. Murti, in describing this aspect of Indian thought, also has reference to modern existentialist thought. He says of them:

The existentialist philosophers of the present day pointedly bring out the predicament of man, his anxiety and deep distress, caused by the thought of the inevitability of passing away into nothingness. Many of their analyses and the phraseology used could be matched by passages from Buddhist and Hindu texts. What the existentialist philosophers fail to present, however, is a clear and sure way out of this anxiety and distress. Indian religious thought is most re-assuring in this respect. It definitely and most emphatically asserts that man can overcome his predicament and that he can attain freedom and the fullness of his being.99

It is true that Hartshorne's idea of the God-world relationship takes away the fear of "passing away into nothingness", because the self of each moment passes into the divine life, but the divine life is itself never free from suffering. God and all other individuals are eternally destined to suffer, because, on Hartshorne's view, the realm of impermanence (sāṁsāra) is all that exists, at least in the sense that the "first event in a series might have been the last, and then there would have been no sequence, no enduring individual, except an unfulfilled potentiality" (supra, p.196).

The manner in which Rāmānuja attributes significance to life in the world implies to Hartshorne an "all-arranging" Providence who completely contrives the lives of individuals in some deterministic way. It leads to the passive acceptance of suffering and "suggests that we need not use our own resources to avert evil where possible and to help others in danger and privation."¹⁰⁰ There is little doubt that Rāmānuja's theodicy and acceptance of the Law of Karma makes him one of those Hartshorne has in mind when he makes this statement. To him, this is a form of escapism, and he believes it is integrally related to the doctrine of substance, and with the emphasizing of being over becoming as well as identity over diversity. He suggests that this way of looking at life "arises from a certain despair of the values of concrete living which early civilization produced, especially in the Indian climate."¹⁰¹ Hartshorne is not the first to suggest that

¹⁰⁰. Supra, p.240.
¹⁰¹. Creative Synthesis, p.44.
the climate of India produced fatalism and quietism in the Indian character, but a noted authority on early life in the Indian subcontinent, A.L. Basham, questions the validity of this proposition. He writes:

The great achievements of ancient India and Ceylon -- the immense irrigation works and splendid temples, and the long campaigns of their armies -- do not suggest a devitalized people. If the climate had any effect on the Indian character it was, we believe, to develop a love of ease and comfort, an addiction to the simple pleasures and luxuries so freely given by Nature -- a tendency to which the impulse to self-denial and asceticism on the one hand, and occasional strenuous effort on the other, were natural reactions.102

Paul Younger makes essentially this same point in a recent publication in which he attempts to discover the roots of "the present Indian Religious Tradition."103 One of the main contributors to this tradition was the Indus Civilization. Its contribution, he says, "was a ritualistic recognition of the impermanent in life. In one form this was an acknowledgement of the feminine principle pervading the universe and an affirmation that the fertility of the earth is never a finished business, but the repeated emergence of life out of death."104 This is not an indication of despair but an appreciation for what is, for what is natural, and it allied itself with the second great contributing element, the Rig-Vedic Civilization. This society was ordered around a "hero" (rsi), whose main "purpose is always to catch a 'vision' (dhñ). This vision is in one sense a revelation of a shining

104. Ibid., p.11.
forth of the 'Power', but it is at the same time the grasp which the 'hero' makes of that divine manifestation."¹⁰⁵ This quest for vision is the same religious quest that Rāmānuja has reference to. It does not arise from despair but from a strong positive conviction that life in the world has some meaning and purpose. It is a belief that this meaning and purpose can be grasped by conforming to the rhythmic pattern of nature (ṛta), the cosmic order (dharma), because the permanent is present within the impermanent. Truth is not known by dreaming about what the world might be and setting about trying to fashion it according to that ideal with technocratic violence. In relation to this Murti writes of Indian thought:

It is common ground in Indian thought that the adoption of secular means and methods do not lead to freedom or salvation. It may be held that, if we could conquer Nature and fully exploit her resources, we might satisfy all our wants, and as soon as they arise. The modern man in the atomic age with his immense faith in technology is prone to think that the solution lies this way. But wants may still outstrip our ability to satisfy them; a leap-frog race may result.¹⁰⁶

All of man's creations are part of the impermanent flux. The True is what is, what lasts, and that alone is worthwhile. From the point of view of the Indian tradition one might say that the frantic activity of our technological society is a form of escapism, because we spend most of our time and resources in trying to make the world into what

¹⁰⁵. Ibid., p.15.
we want it to be, very little on trying to see it as it naturally is. (Though we are not suggesting that Hartshorne is guilty of this). Gandhi says: "To see the universal and all-pervading Spirit of Truth face to face one must be able to love the meanest of creatures as oneself." This does not imply a fatalistic resignation to pain, suffering, and deprivation. If it was, there would be no quest.

The admonition to become sensitive to all of life that one can grasp within the limitations of finite existence is not significantly different from Hartshorne's notion that the cause of evil is ignorance, in the sense of inadequate sensitivity to the needs, feelings, and aspirations of others because the imperfect mediation of our bodies limits our ability to communicate with them. God is the only one who has adequate sensitivity for all others. In fact, this, on Hartshorne's view is what perfect love means, sympathetic participation in the feelings of others. This love of God's is the ideal that every individual should seek to emulate. Yet, with his conception of individuals, it is inherently impossible, because complete sympathy 'would mean a complete merging of selves, the destruction of individuality'. This is not a problem for Rāmānuja, as we pointed out earlier, because of differentiation on the basis of substance. Rāmānuja's religion calls for active involvement in life to overcome the ignorance that besets oneself and all other selves, and

108. Beyond Humanism, p.197.
it is a religion of optimism because it holds forth the possibility of complete overcoming, bliss, which Hartshorne's does not. Furthermore, since ignorance is a basic cause of evil and suffering, and God grants such individuals the freedom to act on the basis of their ignorance, evil and suffering will eternally be a part of God's existence and of every other individual, this is fatalistic from Rāmānuja's point of view.

Related to the above differences between the two philosophers is the very "high" doctrine of ordinary individuals held by Rāmānuja. High in the sense that ordinary individuals are qualitatively one with Brahman, with the exceptions of his unique power to control (not in an absolute sense) the universe of sentient and non-sentient being, his being the source and sustainer of all qualities, and his inability to be affected by avidyā. Hartshorne, perhaps because of his Judaeo-Christian orientation, cannot allow this unity of God and other individuals. But how is Hartshorne to explain the stratification of beings from the simple molecule up to the all-inclusive, divine individual, which Rāmānuja does via the Law of Karma? What is the justification for some individuals being confined to very simple, bland kinds of existence of extremely short duration and others to a longer and much more complex and interesting existence? Of course we must recognize his point that all individuals have but momentary existences, when we realize the social nature of life. But then there is memory, some are afforded longer and richer memories than others and he thinks the longer and richer a memory is the better, so what
is the justification for this? The answer has two parts: First, each individual personality is unique, but its uniqueness can only manifest itself in a limited number of ways, so triviality and monotony result from a life extended beyond that period of time; second, the true value of any individual is not in what he does or accomplishes for himself but for the divine self who includes all other selves. And, since the highest value is aesthetic value and aesthetic value is grounded in variations, it is better to have an infinite variety of individuals of varying complexity than to have an infinite number of like individuals. This explanation is perhaps the most adequate that can be given, when the substance doctrine is rejected. But the substance doctrine, as Rāmānuja formulates it in conjunction with a dipolar concept of deity, can go beyond this and allow for an infinite increase of aesthetic value on the part of every individual.

This concludes our comparison of the dipolar concepts of deity of Rāmānuja and Hartshorne. The results of our study indicate that, with regard to concepts of individuals, Hartshorne is correct in his assertion that a doctrine of substance is superfluous to an adequate explanation of experience, and since both he and Rāmānuja consider what is experienced and what exists to be non-different, to an adequate metaphysical theory of existence. When it comes to conceiving a consistent, coherent description of the divine individual, Rāmānuja's conception of Brahman as an absolute, unchanging substance leads to inconsistent, ambiguous and contradictory statements about the rela-
 relationship between this ultimate principle and the world of impermanence. He would avoid these problems if he followed Hartshorne and thought of Īśvara as being the ultimate principle, the all-inclusive reality, and considered the characteristics he attributes to Brahman to be the abstract, generic characteristics of Īśvara's contingent, becoming body, the world. However, it is Rāmānuja's retention of the substance doctrine in his conceptions of ordinary individuals and the divine individual that permits him to develop a doctrine of salvation that is consistent with the hopes and aspirations of religious men, at least religious men of the East. It is possible that these hopes and aspirations are "veiling the truth in a mist of sentiment." Nevertheless, they are an integral part of the idea of God held by men who worship.
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