KANT'S METAPHYSICAL DEDUCTION
'Peut-être l'immobilité des choses autour de nous leur est-elle imposée... par l'immobilité de notre pensée en face d'elles.'

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KANT'S METAPHYSICAL DEDUCTION

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SCOPE AND CONTENTS:

The thesis is, (a), that there is an important and coherently argued stage (designated 'the metaphysical deduction') in the Critique of Pure Reason which concerns certain features of the pure understanding, and (b), that this stage does not invoke Kant's doctrines of sensibility, nor does it require support from the arguments of the Transcendental Deduction. The thesis is argued in the attempt to reconstruct the essential framework of the metaphysical deduction.

An examination of the logical forms of judgments, a brief review of how these are conceived to relate to the pure concepts of the understanding, and an examination of the pure concepts themselves form the content of the first three Chapters. It is then argued that the pure concepts are unschematised, that is, have no sensible significance (Chapter Four). There follows a reconstruction of the argument of Kant's deduction of the pure concepts from the forms of judgments (Chapter Five). Finally, the idealist implications of the conclusions of the argument of the metaphysical deduction are exposed (Chapter Six).
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PREFACE

In referring to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, I adopt the convention of abbreviating the title to, simply, 'the Critique'. No other of Kant's Critiques is mentioned in the essay. When a page reference is required, I cite the appropriate page in the second edition of the Critique (for example, '(B100)'), except where the reference is to a passage in the first edition version of the Transcendental Deduction (in which case I write, for example, '(A120)'). Kemp Smith's translation of the Critique is used throughout.

Other works mentioned in the essay are referred to by author and title. Full description of these works is to be found in the bibliography on page 89, where they are listed in the order in which references are made. Only works referred to in the essay are included in the bibliography; works mentioned only in the Notes on the Text (pages 86-88) are fully described there.

I am grateful to Professor James Noxon, my supervisor, for his perspicuous criticisms and sympathetic admonishment. I owe thanks also to Professor A. Shalom for his persistent and resolute philosophical opposition.
The structure of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* makes it possible and, I believe, legitimate to dismantle and reconstruct individual sections of the work without thereby disturbing the total edifice. The present essay is an exercise in just such piecemeal philosophical engineering.

There are three basic stages on the way to Kant's account of the necessary and limiting features of experience which seem to me sufficiently coherent to allow of treating them independently. In the first stage, the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant presents the conditions which determine the nature of experience so far as concerns the sensible, spatio-temporal component of experience. In the second, which I designate, roughly, the metaphysical deduction (thus giving the title a larger scope than usually it has), there is an analogous presentation of the conditions which determine the nature of experience so far as concerns the conceptual and non-empirical component of experience. In the third stage, the Transcendental Deduction, the conceptual elements of experience, the pure concepts discovered in the second stage, are firmly anchored to experience as necessary features when it is shown that no experience would be possible without unity of consciousness, and unity of consciousness would not be possible without the employment of the pure concepts.

My essay concerns the second of these three stages.
Namely, I propose to explore Kant's metaphysical deduction (in the broad sense) in order to discover how the conceptual features of experience, the pure concepts, are supposed to arise, and to discover what they are, and what they entail. I see a need for such exploration. Contemporary commentators (for example, P.F. Strawson in *The Bounds of Sense*, and Graham Bird in *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*) invariably appear to underestimate the role of the metaphysical deduction, and are inclined to see the Transcendental Deduction as significantly more important. Other, older, commentators consciously or unconsciously seem to invest the metaphysical deduction with more force than it can possibly bear, and thus one often begins to detect what amounts to a radical assimilation of the metaphysical deduction to the Transcendental Deduction.

Jonathan Bennett, in his *Kant's Analytic*, seems to me to come closer to a correct view of the metaphysical deduction than his counterparts. He sees Kant as here laying down 'certain conditions which... must be satisfied if one is to use concepts' (ibid, p 71). But yet Bennett devotes much of his attention to rescuing the metaphysical deduction from 'slithering into triviality' (ibid, p 82), as if such fate was obviously in store for Kant's argument. He concludes his account of the metaphysical deduction with the hope that it has 'lifted from our shoulders the dead weight of the argument from the table of judgments' (ibid, p 83).

That justice has not been done to Kant's arguments is, to me, clear. The reconstructed argument which I propose to offer
is an attempt to claim redress for Kant: to show that the
metaphysical deduction is important and interesting, both as an
independent philosophical enterprise and as an essential stage
on the way to Kant's account of the structure of our experience.

I am not concerned that the argument which I intend to
trace out should reflect everything Kant does say; I am concerned
only that it should reflect everything Kant really needed to say
with respect to his main purpose. Thus I propose not to be
concerned with Kant's transcendental psychology. I see that Kant
often does argue as a transcendental psychologist, but I am not
convinced that this was required to establish his conclusions.
I think it true to say that Kant occasionally tries to embed
propositions concerning the necessary and limiting features of
experience in his reflections on our transcendental psychological
constitution. But one must question the legitimacy of this
enterprise: is it adequate to establish Kant's conclusions? Is
it essential to the argument? It is my belief that it is neither.

In the first place, it is not, I think, adequate to explain
the necessary and limiting features of experience in terms of the
structuring of the human psychological constitution. As Kant himself
observes in his Introduction to Logic,

'If we were to take our principles from psychology, that
is, from observations on our understanding, we should merely
see how thought takes place and how it is affected by the
manifold subjective hindrances and conditions; so that
this would lead only to knowledge of contingent laws.'

(ibid, p 4).
But here, however, Kant must be taken to refer to empirical psychology; and, of course, it is clear that an empirical investigation cannot yield necessary laws. Now transcendental psychology is not an empirical investigation, and for this reason it might be argued that it can invest the principles at which Kant is aiming with necessity. But we do not yet know what kind of investigation transcendental psychology is. As P.F. Strawson observes in The Bounds of Sense (p 15), Kant seems to have conceived transcendental psychology 'on a kind of strained analogy' with empirical psychology. The difficulty is that it is not at all clear just how it is that we are supposed to become aware of our transcendental psychological constitution. Manifestly we cannot simply make observations. Further, it follows from this, that when Kant informs us that, say, our transcendental synthesising activities provide this, or function like that, we seem to have no criteria by which to judge the correctness of his claims.

In the second place, to say that transcendental psychology is not adequate to the task for which it was intended, but that it is an essential and functioning element in Kant's argument, is to say, if I'm not mistaken, that Kant has failed to match his intention. If, on the other hand, Kant's conclusions concerning the necessary structure of experience can be argued independently of transcendental psychology, then the threat of failure is not so immediate.

It is my contention that there is a framework of arguments in the Critique, which, when stripped of references to transcendental
psychology, does constitute at least *prima facie* plausible grounds for Kant's conclusions. This essay is an attempt to expose such a framework.

I do not wish to appear too concerned with the weaknesses of transcendental psychology. My thesis is not that transcendental psychology fails to achieve what it was perhaps intended to achieve. I prefer to try and exhibit the strength of an alternative framework of arguments. If they are as strong as I imagine them to be it follows that transcendental psychology is redundant in the *Critique*, at least so far as I intend to take the argument. If they are not so strong, then, for the reasons I have already adduced, I do not think transcendental psychologising can rescue them. In neither case do I see the need to examine transcendental psychology at work.

Schopenhauer writes in the Appendix ('Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy') to The *World as Will and Representation*, Volume II, that 'the logical basis of [Kant's] whole philosophy [is] the Table of Judgments' (p 430). This seems to me to be correct; accordingly, I shall begin to trace out the framework of the argument with which I shall be concerned from Kant's Table of Judgments.

In detail, the essay is set out as follows. First, there is an examination of what Kant considers to be the elements of pure general logic as they are expressed in the Table of Judgments (Chapter One). Second, I give an account of what Kant briefly
asserts to be an important connection between general and transcendental logic (Chapter Two). Third, there is an examination of the elements of transcendental logic as they are expressed in the Table of Categories. It is clearly in the interests of a consistent development of the argument which I am pursuing that the categories should arise from the forms of judgments in the way which Kant alleges. Thus, it seems to me important to apply the general principle which is supposed to govern the link between categories and forms of judgments to each of the twelve correlates of the two Tables. This explains the considerable detail of Chapter Three. Fourth, I attempt an account of the Schematism. My justification here is that I consider it crucial for a clear understanding of what Kant is doing to distinguish forms of judgments from pure or 'unschematised' categories, and to distinguish both from schematised categories. Kant contends that the categories apply to, or are referred to the object-in-general, and since the Schematism concerns the application of the categories to objects, there ought to be some illumination of Kant's claim in closely examining the Schematism (Chapter Four). Fifth, I try to explicate the Metaphysical Deduction, which I take to be Kant's argument for the link between forms of judgments and categories (which is to be contrasted with the assertion which was examined in Chapter Two). This constitutes Chapter Five. Finally, Kant's use of the notion of the object-in-general (to which I pay considerable attention throughout the essay) entails certain interesting theses if the
full development of the argument is to be consistent. The most
general and most exciting of these is the thesis which, in part,
determines Kant's ultimate (transcendental) idealism: the thesis,
in epigrammatic form, which holds that 'concepts determine objects'.
In Chapter Six, I attempt a brief account of how this thesis is
entailed by the argument which I have tried to reconstruct in the
previous five chapters.

The appendix, on page 84, is a tabulation of the occurrences
of the expression 'object-in-general' and what I claim to be
cognate expressions. Three of the passages in which these
expressions occur and which were not mentioned in the text
(largely because they are taken from the Transcendental Deduction)
are quoted since, to some extent, they support the thesis which I
have argued.
At B78 in his *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant states that pure general logic 'deals with nothing but the mere form of thought'; it embraces 'the absolutely necessary rules of thought without which there can be no employment whatsoever of the understanding' (B76). Logic, then, thus conceived, is crucially central to the Kantian aim of exploring the nature and limits of the human understanding. The discipline is not to be thought as a result of certain well-established empirical facts about how human beings think and talk, such that logic does have application to thinking and talking. Rather, logic is to be thought as a presupposition of intelligible thought and discourse: it must have an application. We might say here, echoing Wittgenstein's remark in the *Tractatus* (5.431), that 'What makes logic a priori is the impossibility of illogical thought'.

But if there is a certain familiarity about Kant's conception of the foundation of logic, the description which he offers of the elements of general logic is frequently unfamiliar. Kant is inclined to work within the scholastic tradition so far as concerns logic, and, of course, since Frege and the *Principia Mathematica*, the logic of the schools and the logic of Aristotle have been regarded by most as more or less interesting relics. This is, I think, part of the reason why recent commentators have tended to dismiss Kant's account of general or formal logic as
quaintly historical, or, at worst, boring nonsense. But while the Table of Judgments, which purports to list exhaustively all the logical forms of thought (or judgments), is not without certain peculiarities, it is, at the same time, not entirely without interest. And since the pure concepts of the understanding are alleged to stand in some special relation to the logical forms of judgments, it is imprudently precipitate not to try thoroughly to understand what Kant is saying in the Table of Judgments.

The Table has four divisions, concerning, respectively, the quantities, qualities, relations and modalities of judgments. The first two divisions reflect the orthodox readings of the component propositions of the categorical syllogism. Thus, subject-predicate judgments or propositions have both a quantity, expressed by the syncategoremes 'all', 'some', etcetera, and a quality, that is, they are either affirmative or negative. But Kant, curiously, does not think that the universal-particular distinction under the division quantity, and the affirmative-negative distinction under the division quality are sufficient fully to describe any judgment of subject-predicate form under these two divisions. Under the first division, Kant wants to include with the universal and particular forms of judgments, a third form, namely the singular form. In a sense this addition has a point. But this point is not obviously relevant to what Kant purports to be doing in the Table of Judgments. He says that 'logicians are justified in saying that in the employment of judgments in syllogisms, singular judgments can be treated like
those that are universal' (B96). At the same time, he insists that general logic 'considers only the logical form in the relation of any knowledge to any other knowledge' (B79). On the grounds of this last remark there seems to be no good reason for distinguishing singular from universal forms of judgment, if, for logical purposes, the two forms each stand in exactly the same relations with other forms of judgments. There are, of course, important differences between universal and singular judgments with regard to their respective semantics and grammar, but on Kant's account of general logic, and given his agreement with the convention that, in a syllogism, singular judgments may be treated for logical purposes as universal, it is not at all clear why these differences should be marked out in the Table of Judgments. One suspects here that Kant perhaps is more concerned to produce a third quantity of judgments in order to conform to a preconceived architectonic.

The same suspicion arises in the case of Kant's second division, the qualities of judgments. There are, according to Kant, three qualities of judgments: affirmative, negative and infinite. The distinction between negative and infinite forms of judgment is exemplified in the difference between the judgment 'The soul is not mortal' (the negative form of judgment) and the judgment 'The soul is non-mortal' (the infinite form). The rationale for this distinction is obscure. There certainly appears to be a difference between the infinite form, that is, we might say, a negative judgment with quasi-affirmative form, and both genuinely negative
and genuinely affirmative forms of judgments. But is there a real
difference? To say 'x is F' is to say that x is not non-F; and
to say that x is not non-F amounts as much to the negation of 'x is
not F' as it amounts to the negation of 'x is non-F'. This is to
say that the affirmative judgment 'x is F' is the negation not only
of the negative 'x is not F' but also of the infinite 'x is non-F'.
There is really no interesting difference here concerning the logical
forms of the infinite and negative judgment; there is only a minor
and irrelevant difference of verbal expression.°

It has been suggested that Kant already had in mind the
correlate categories of the Table of Categories when he included
the singular and infinite forms of judgments in the earlier Table.°°
This would explain the fact that the presence of these two forms in
the Table of Judgments is not obviously justified. But one wants
to think that this view is not correct. It is part of my thesis
that there is a strict and argued progression from the logical
forms of judgments to the categories. The view that Kant already
had in mind the categories when he constructed the Table of
Judgments implies a serious deception in the way Kant has set out
his argument. This seems to me nonsense. Kant might well have
dispensed with the Table of Judgments altogether were this the case,
and simply asserted that there are twelve categories. But I shall
return to this point in due course (see Chapter Two, pp.28ff).

The third and fourth division of the Table of Judgments, the
relations and modalities of judgments, are perplexing, both with
respect to the status of the divisions themselves and with respect to the constituents of each. While it is clear that any one subject-predicate judgment can be described as having both a quantity and a quality, it is equally clear that in the division concerning the relations of judgments there are two forms of judgment which describe, not the internal structure of a subject-predicate judgment, but rather relations between at least two such judgments. These are the hypothetical and disjunctive forms of judgment. We seem now to be at a different level of analysis. We have moved from talk about judgments themselves to talk about the relations between judgments. Yet, curiously, Kant includes in this same division, the categorical form of judgment. Certainly, we might say, the categorical form of judgment does pick out some relation, but it is the relation between a subject term and a predicate term within a judgment, and not a relation between judgments themselves. One would feel more comfortable had this distinction been noted, though of course one must remember that the strict line between predicate and propositional logic was only clearly and conscientiously drawn after Kant.

There is a further point here. So far from being merely one form of judgment among others, one would prefer to think that the categorical form of judgment is fundamental to the concept itself of a judgment. As Schopenhauer remarks, 'the form of the categorical judgment is nothing but the form of judgment in general, in the strictest sense' (op cit, p457). The categorical form of
judgment is, one might say, a presupposition of making the kind of distinctions that Kant is after in the Table of Judgments. For example, to describe a judgment as universal or particular is to describe the nature of the (distributive) relation which holds between the subject and predicate terms of a categorical judgment.

Perhaps, again, it is a preconceived architectonics which moves Kant to include the categorical form of judgment in the third division together with the relations hypothetical and disjunctive. Yet there would be no cause for distress from the point of view of the architectonics if it were agreed that the categorical form ought not to appear under the division of relations. (I do not of course suggest that the categorical form be excluded entirely from the Table of Judgments. The categorical form of judgment is, I have said, intimately bound up with the very notion of a judgment, and thus it justifies its place in the Table. I simply mean to question Kant's including this form with the other relations of judgments.) There is a third relation between judgments which might well have been included here, particularly since it is Kant's stated aim to make the Table of Judgments exhaustive of all possible logical forms of judgments. I have in mind the conjunctive form of judgment. There is adequate evidence that the conjunctive form is important, I think, in that '&' is usually taken to be one of the four logical constants in modern logical systems. (Some qualification may be necessary here. While I do not think Kant had this in mind in neglecting to
include the conjunctive form in the Table of Judgments, it is of course possible to derive the conjunctive form from a combination of negation and the hypothetical, or negation and the disjunctive form, all of which are already included in the Table. But I shall say more about interderivable among the logical forms later (see pp. 22-3).

Kant's conception of the disjunctive form of judgment, the third member of the third division is in itself not unfamiliar (he means simply exclusive disjunction), but when it comes to the derivation of the category 'community' from this form, certain problems arise. I leave a full discussion of the disjunctive, and also the hypothetical, form until then (see pp. 38ff).

The fourth division of the Table of Judgments, concerning the modalities of judgments, raises again the problem of the status of divisions with respect to each other. As with the relational forms of judgments, when we talk about the modal forms of judgments we seem to be at a different level of analysis from mere description of the internal structure of a judgment. Kant is perhaps aware of this when he calls modality 'a peculiar function' which concerns 'only the value of the copula in relation to thought in general' (B100). This, of course, is not so much a criticism of Kant's wanting to include modality as a function in the Table of Judgments as just mild anxiety about the introduction of the term 'modality' (or 'relation') without any real explanation of how they relate to other distinctions to be found in the Table. One might be inclined
to think, for all Kant says, that quantity, quality, relation, and modality are co-ordinate distinctions. Manifestly this is not so: judgments can involve these forms in a variety of permutations. Kant does claim that the Table of Judgments is supposed only to 'specify the understanding completely and yield an exhaustive inventory of its powers' (B105). And if 'inventory' here is taken literally then Kant does no more than he intends. But it is important to consider the 'powers' of the understanding in so far as concerns the human capacity to combine the forms of judgments in certain ways. As Jonathan Bennett points out,

'The classificatory words in the table [of judgments] seem to offer no prospect of complex analysis such as might be possible in respect of "concept-employing performance" or "use of the understanding" or the like.' (op cit, p83).

There are however more important points to be made concerning the constituents of the modality division. The three kinds of modalities are alleged to be 'problematic', 'assertoric' and 'apodeictic'. Problematic judgments are those in which 'affirmation or negation is taken as merely possible' (B100); assertoric judgments are those in which 'affirmation or negation is viewed as real (true)' (loc cit); and apodeictic judgments are those in which affirmation or negation is viewed as necessary.

As I have already pointed out, Kant thinks that the modality of a judgment concerns 'the value of the copula in relation to thought in general'. What he has in mind here is, I think, obscure, and requires careful analysis. It may be
useful at this stage to look to the work of the medieval logicians in order at least to be familiar with explications of the problem at issue here which preceded Kant's. (It is doubtful that Kant would have paid very much attention to the work of the medieval logicians. Aristotle and Kant's compatriots Leibniz and Wolff seem to have provided most of the impetus in Kant's discussions of logic. Nevertheless it is interesting, and, I think, illuminating to see how close Kant is to the scholastic view of modality.)

William of Sherwood writes, in his *Introduction to Logic*, of modal propositions thus:

'It should be noted that the adverbial modes can occur in discourse in two ways - viz, by determining [sic] either the action itself of the verb or the inherence of the predicate in the subject. Take, for example, "Socrates is running contingently". Here the word "contingently" can determinate the action as such, in which case the sense is "Socrates's running is contingent" and the proposition is not modal. Or it can determinate the verb itself in respect of its inherence in or composition with the subject, in which case the sense is "the composition [sic] 'Socrates is running' is contingent." In this case the proposition is modal since the adverb determinates the action of the predicate in the subject.'

(p39).

I understand this passage to remark the difference between two kinds of propositions, thus:

(1) 'Anything red is coloured' is a necessary proposition, that is, a modal proposition.

(2) 'Something which is red is necessarily coloured' is not (on this account) a modal proposition.

What Kant has in mind when he talks about modal propositions, it seems to me, are type (1) propositions. The modal judgment concerns
the value of the copula, for Kant, and this seems to echo Sherwood's description of a modal proposition as one which concerns the nature of the inherence of the subject in the predicate, that is, the nature of the copulative link between the subject and predicate. (The qualification that the modal judgment concerns the value of the copula 'in relation to thought in general' is a puzzle. I cannot see that much depends on the qualification: in the first place 'thought in general' is not an expression which one encounters sufficiently often in Kant to think that it has some precise technical meaning; in the second place it is difficult to imagine what contrasts Kant has in mind here: what other relations does the 'value of the copula' stand in?)

It is important, as Bennett points out (op cit p78), that 'the problematic must be distinguished from the possible and the apodeictic from the necessary'. The reason for this is that Kant wants to link the categories 'possibility' and 'necessity' to the problematic and apodeictic forms of judgments respectively. If there is to be a significant derivation of these categories from the forms of judgment in question then clearly the problematic and apodeictic judgments cannot themselves employ the concepts 'possibility' and 'necessity'. In this case there would be no real explanation of the origin of the categories. However, on the account which I have just given, derived from William of Sherwood problematic and apodeictic judgments do not employ the concepts 'possibility' or 'necessity'. Thus, 'Anything red is coloured'
is an apodeictic judgment, although the word 'necessary' or a correlate is not employed in the judgment. The judgment 'Something which is red is necessarily coloured' is, on the above account, not a modal judgment, and therefore a fortiori not an apodeictic judgment, although it does employ the concept of necessity in the judgment.

If this is in any way a correct account of what Kant is doing, then we can say that what he is concerned with in the fourth division of the Table of Judgments are judgments which are necessary or possible judgments; these are to be distinguished sharply from judgments of necessity or judgments of possibility.

There are yet further problems to be dealt with before we can securely leave the fourth division of the Table. The third modality of judgments Kant alleges is the assertoric mode. There is, however, or so it seems to me, something odd about calling 'assertoricity' a mode. We might here look again to William of Sherwood for some illumination. Sherwood writes

>'An assertoric statement, then, is one that simply signifies the inheritance of the predicate in the subject — i.e., without determining how it inheres. A modal statement, on the other hand, is one that does determinate how the predicate inheres in the subject.'

(op cit, p40).

An assertoric judgment is not a modal judgment, according at least to Sherwood.

But of course there is much more to be said here. There is a reason for Kant's identifying the assertoric as a form of judgment, and this perhaps provides a clue as to why the assertoric
is, for Kant, a modality. The reason is, I think, parallel to that which Frege gave for distinguishing between propositions which are asserted and those which are merely entertained.* Kant writes

'*...the two judgments, the relation of which constitutes the hypothetical judgment, and likewise the judgments the reciprocal relation of which forms the disjunctive judgment (members of the division) are one and all problematic only. In the above example ["If there is a perfect justice the obstinately wicked will be punished"], the proposition "There is a perfect justice" is not stated assertorically, but is thought only as an optional judgment, which it is possible to assume; it is only the logical sequence which is assertoric.... The problematic proposition is therefore that which expresses only logical possibility.... The assertoric proposition deals with logical reality or truth.'

(8100-1).

We need the distinction between problematic and assertoric judgments in order to understand the relations between the component judgments in a complex proposition of either hypothetical or disjunctive form. Since we do appear to need this distinction, and since the problematic form is a modality, it does not seem unreasonable to include the assertoric form of judgment along with the forms which concern the modalities of judgments.

Yet this is still not quite right. Kant calls the assertoric form of judgment that in which 'affirmation or negation is viewed as real (true)'. And this expression is not as clear as it might be. Kant seems to be suggesting that besides the problematic form, which concerns the mode 'possibility,' and the apodeictic form, which concerns the mode 'necessity,' there is the assertoric form, which concerns the mode 'true.' But are truth (or falsity) modes?

Certainly no judgment may be both problematic and apodeictic at
the same time. But are the problematic and assertoric forms, or
the apodeictic and assertoric forms mutually exclusive, in so far
as it is correct to think of the assertoric form of judgment as
concerned with the mode 'true.' In an apodeictic judgment for
instance, 'affirmation or negation is viewed as necessary.' But
if they are viewed as necessary then it follows that the proposition
at issue is true. An affirmation or negation which is necessary
is an affirmation or negation which is true. Therefore it cannot
be the case that the modes 'true' (or 'false') sufficiently distinguish
assertoric judgments from either problematic or apodeictic judgments.
If this interpretation is the correct one, then either Kant's account
of the assertoric form of judgment is incomplete, or it is altogether
wrong.

I am inclined to think Kant's account is just wrong here.
Assertion cannot, it seems to me, be regarded as a logical function,
which is of course what it must be, for Kant, in order that its place
in the Table of Judgments be justified. Certainly there is a
problem about how to understand hypothetical or disjunctive judgments
in this respect, and for this reason one ought to hesitate to dismiss
Kant's account, since it was primarily intended to deal with just
this problem. At the same time, as Wittgenstein points out in the
Tractatus, there are severe difficulties in the Fregean position
(which seems to me close enough to Kant's) when assertion is taken
to be a logical function. Wittgenstein's idea was that assertion
is already somehow involved in the very concept of a proposition.
But this of course is not a very satisfactory resolution of the real problem. There is still the difficulty of how to make sense of a hypothetical or disjunctive if the component propositions are all asserted. A way out here would be to think of a hypothetical as having a kind of non-analysable unity such that it could not be broken up into its constituent propositions and a logical connective. (This, obviously would be no way out for Wittgenstein, for whom such a reduction was essential, in the Tractatus.)

A more satisfactory way here would be to ascribe to assertion only a psychological, and not a logical function. (G.E.M. Anscombe, in An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, states, rather baldly, "Assertion" has only a psychological sense.' (pl16).) This might mean, for example, that certain forms of propositions, the hypothetical and disjunctive forms notably, somehow indicated that their component propositions should not be taken to be true, but that they should only be 'considered' or 'entertained'. All this would mean however that the assertoric form of judgment could not legitimately be included in the Table of Judgments, since it would not be a logical function. This, in turn, would mean that it would not be open to Kant to trace a category back to the assertoric form of judgment. As it happens this might not be an entirely disastrous state of affairs. I shall have something to say later about the category which Kant claims does arise from the assertoric form of judgment.

For Kant, 'the logical functions of judgments...specify
the understanding completely and yield an exhaustive inventory of its powers'. I have already suggested that there is some unclarity about how this is to be understood. Are we to suppose that the Table of Judgments comprises those and only those logical functions which are basic and non-derivable? (In the passage concerning the Table of Categories at B108 Kant alludes to concepts, the predicables, which, while still pure concepts, are derivable from the twelve pure concepts which he lists as 'predicaments'. Is there an equivalent in the Table of Judgments? Is it perhaps possible that some of the members of the Table of Judgments are themselves derivable from others in the Table?)

A logician, no doubt, would be distressed to discover that there were twelve basic logical functions or constants. The primary motive in recent logic has of course been to economise radically on the number of functions necessary in a workable and useful system. Thus, we find Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, making the claim that there is only one logical constant. Now while it would be pointless to criticise Kant for lack of economy in the Table of Judgments, since he had no intention of setting up an elegant and economical formal system, there is some force to the challenge that some of the logical forms are easily derivable from others in the Table. For example, with negation and, say conjunction (which I have suggested might legitimately have been included in the Table) the hypothetical and disjunctive forms are easily constructed. Negation and disjunction, or negation
and the hypothetical, similarly, might be used to derive other logical functions.

Of course such reduction of the Table of Judgments would not be without radical consequences. The Table of Categories, for example, might have to be reduced to correspond with those functions which remained. There is, moreover, the question whether interdefinability or interderivability among the logical functions really affects the point with which Kant is concerned, namely that the twelve forms of judgments are logical functions of the human understanding. Does it matter that negation and disjunction can do the same work as the hypothetical when combined in a certain way? This no more shows that the hypothetical is not a function of the human understanding than the fact that a hammer and chisel can do the same job as a plane would show that a plane was not part of the same toolbox to which the hammer and chisel belonged.
Kant calls his transcendental logic (the logic whose elements comprise the categories) 'a logic of truth' (B87). This is a clue to the relation between general and transcendental logic which should, I think, be taken seriously.

'What is truth?' asks Kant at B82. He goes on, 'The nominal definition of truth, that it is the agreement of knowledge with its object, is assumed as granted.' Clearly Kant espouses some form of correspondence theory of truth. The important question which immediately arises on adopting such a theory is of course whether there can ever be a general criterion for such truth. Kant explores this question thoroughly in his *Introduction to Logic.*

There seem to be two possible criteria of truth conceived as knowledge corresponding with its object: a universal material criterion, and a universal formal criterion. The former criterion, Kant argues, will not do; a universal material criterion of truth is indeed self-contradictory:

'For, being universal, it would necessarily abstract from all distinctions of objects, and yet being a material criterion, it must be concerned with just this distinction in order to be able to determine whether a cognition agrees with the very object to which it refers. And not merely with some object or other, which would really mean nothing. But material truth must consist in this agreement of a cognition with the definite object to which it refers. For a cognition which is true in reference to one object may be false in reference to other objects. It is therefore absurd to demand a
But, on the other hand, a universal formal criterion of truth looks more promising:

'for formal truth consists simply in the agreement of the cognition with itself when we abstract from all objects whatever and from every distinction of objects. And hence the universal formal criterion of truth is nothing but universal logical marks of agreement of cognitions with themselves, or, what is the same thing, with the general laws of the understanding and reason.

These formal universal criteria are certainly not sufficient for objective truth, but yet they are to be viewed as its conditio sine qua non.'

According to the Introduction to Logic, then, Kant believes that the only criterion of truth which is available to him is a universal formal criterion. The rules which constitute general or formal logic are such criteria, though they can only provide a necessary, and never a sufficient, condition for truth. The argument here is a fuller explication, it seems to me, of the passage at B83 in the Critique which leads Kant to conclude that 'A sufficient and at the same time general criterion of truth cannot possibly be given'.

However, such a conclusion seems to raise an acute difficulty. On the one hand Kant has insisted that truth is the agreement of knowledge with its object; and, on the other, he has argued that the only criterion of truth available is a criterion which provides only a necessary condition for truth. This is
unsatisfactory; moreover, Kant knows that it is unsatisfactory:

'for although our knowledge may be in complete accordance with logical demands, that is, may not contradict itself, it is still possible that it may be in contradiction with its object.'

(B84).

But now the claim that transcendental logic is 'a logic of truth' begins to look weak. In order for transcendental logic importantly to be a logic of truth, where truth is correspondence, it must concern, in some way, objects (for truth is agreement of knowledge with its object). Yet it cannot concern particular objects, as Kant makes quite clear in his argument in the Introduction to Logic against there being a universal material criterion of truth. Moreover, as a logic of truth, transcendental logic ought to conform to the claim Kant has made that we can only have available a necessary condition for truth. The only way out, it seems, would be to link transcendental logic with some quite special conception of an object (which is not a material particular), such that a conflict with the formal demands of logic alone renders truth impossible.

This, almost bizarre, solution is exactly the solution which Kant selects.

Transcendental logic is conceived as dealing with the elements of pure understanding and with the principles without which no object can be thought (see B125). In other words, transcendental logic concerns the rules of the understanding in so far as they concern objective experience. Transcendental logic,
Kant says

'...should contain solely the rules of the pure thought of an object, [and] would exclude only those modes of knowledge which have empirical content. It would also treat of the origin of the modes in which we know objects, in so far as that origin cannot be attributed to the objects.'

(B80)

The passage here is excitingly pregnant; indeed it is largely to determine the course of the argument with which we shall be concerned.

Now perhaps we can begin to see the force of the claim that transcendental logic is 'a logic of truth': it is a logic of truth, where truth is conceived as the agreement of knowledge with its object, exactly in the respect that transcendental logic contains the rules of 'the pure thought of an object'; thus, 'no knowledge can contradict it without at once losing all content, that is, all relation to any object, and therefore all truth' (B87).

But, of course, it is yet quite unclear exactly what is involved in this talk about the 'pure thought of an object', or in what it is elsewhere called, 'object-in-general' (see Appendix). At present it will be sufficient to know simply that transcendental logic concerns the pure thought of an object, or the object-in-general. Where general logic has been concerned with 'logical form in the relation of any knowledge to other knowledge' (B79), transcendental logic is to be concerned, in some manner, with the thought of an object. On this principle we can at least begin to explore the elements of this transcendental logic.
But before I pursue that investigation (in Chapter Three) it might be well to consider a different account of the relation between general and transcendental logic. Such an examination is timely, since I have already alluded to the view that is held by some commentators that Kant constructed the Table of Judgments always with an eye to the derivation of the categories, and the account I propose to consider takes this line.

In his Kant's Transcendental Logic, T.K. Swing talks about Kant's formal and material logics (which are alleged to correspond to Kant's terms 'general' and 'transcendental' logic). The Table of Judgments, Swing claims, is a list of the concepts of an entirely formal logic; the Table of Categories is a list of the concepts of a material logic, that is, a logic which has immediate application to experience. But Swing can find no significant relation between the two:

'If [the Table of Judgments] really is a formal table it can be of no use at all in the derivation of the categories because formal concepts can never be a guide in discovering material concepts. To derive the categories from the forms of judgments is to derive material terms from formal terms. This is as impossible as the effort to draw water from a dry well. If the Table of Judgments is a material table, it can indeed be used for the derivation of the categories. To derive the categories from the types of judgments is to derive material terms from material terms. There is nothing ingenious about this. It is as obvious as digging gold from a gold mine.' (op cit, p 30).

The view makes nonsense out of Kant. Happily, it is not, I think, a view which can boast either subtlety or plausibility. Swing's case is partly loaded by his taking the Table of Categories to be
a list of material concepts. This seems to me to mismanage the term 'material', and, moreover, to ignore a consistently Kantian technique. Are the categories really material concepts? Certainly they are concepts which, it will be argued, relate necessarily to experience, but that hardly renders them 'material'. They are in no sense 'empirical' concepts, as Kant is at pains to insist throughout the Critique, and could hardly be confused with what might, with more justification, be called material concepts, for example, 'book', 'flower' and so on. Moreover, from Kant's point of view, it might be more appropriate if the categories were to be called 'formal' and not material concepts: they do concern our experience, but not the content of experience, simply the form it must take.

If the case against there being any conceivable link between the Table of Judgments and the Table of Categories rests on Swing's somewhat naive account, I think we can perhaps safely ignore it. I turn now to an examination of the elements of the Table of Categories, and their relation to the forms of judgments, that is, to a detailed examination of the alleged links between general and transcendental logic.
In the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, Kant writes that

> the labours of the logicians lay at hand, though not yet quite free from defects, and with this help I was enabled to exhibit a complete table of the pure functions of the understanding which are, however, undetermined in regard to any object. I finally referred these functions of judging to objects in general, or rather to the condition of determining judgments as objectively valid, and so there arose the pure concepts of the understanding....

(p85)

If the argument which I am pursuing is to hang together, it seems to me important to see whether Kant is consistently applying this general principle in each case, and therefore to see whether the categories really 'arise from' the forms of judgment in the manner suggested.

Corresponding to the quantities of judgments listed in the first division of the Table of Judgments, the Table of Categories includes in its first division the concepts 'unity', 'plurality' and 'totality'. There was some question as to whether Kant was entitled to include the singular form of judgment with the other two quantities of judgments, since he seemed to agree with the convention that for the purposes of the syllogism and logical form singular judgments may be treated as universal judgments. There are obviously, as I have said, important semantical and grammatical differences between universal and singular forms of judgment; these differences are reflected in one respect in this first division of the Table of Categories. The related concepts are alleged to
be 'unity' and 'totality', and, of course, it makes a large difference whether we pick something out under the concept 'unity' or under the concept 'totality'. Independently of the issue of whether the categories really do arise from the forms of judgments, one is inclined to think that 'unity' in particular is an absolutely crucial concept for the purposes of making sense of one's experience. A radical suggestion here would be that one could not possibly employ any concept at all without having the concept 'unity' first: that is, one could not classify things as 'a this' or 'a that' unless one could make sense first of the idea of 'a' anything. If this is so, then one is happily prepared to ignore the, fairly limited, convention that singular judgments be treated for the purposes of a syllogism, and applaud Kant for recognising that the singular judgment at least has the force of giving rise to the concept of unity. This would be fine, although there is of course a lot more to say (for instance I don't want now to appear to suggest that the various forms of judgment be included in the Table of Judgments simply because the categories should be referred to them: this is the very reverse of what Kant is suggesting). But Kant is curiously refractory here. The category 'unity' Kant relates to universal judgments, and not to singular judgments; the category which is alleged to arise from singular judgments is 'totality'. This is just the reverse of what one would expect. Clearly singular judgments, for example, 'This brick is green' are more obviously related to the concept of
unity or oneness than they are to the concept of totality or allness. Perhaps the answer is that Kant has simply made an error in the correlations of the first division of the Table of Judgments with the corresponding division of the Table of Categories. They ought, perhaps rather to read:

- Universal form of judgment: 'Totality' or 'Allness'
- Particular form of judgment: 'Plurality' or 'Someness'
- Singular form of judgment: 'Unity' or 'Oneness'.

Yet even this emendation encounters some resistance. In a typical architectonic gesture Kant claims that the third category in each division arises from some kind of combination of the first two (B110). If this is really so, then there is some sense to the original order of the first division of the Table of Categories. 'Totality' does seem to express the combination of 'unity' and 'plurality': that is, totality is simply unified plurality. But if the order of the first division is reversed to correspond more realistically to the related forms of judgment, it is more difficult to see how the concepts of totality and plurality could yield the concept of unity.

Since the point of Kant's wanting the third category in each division to be formed from the combination of the first two in the same division is quite obscure, and certainly is not a functioning element of the main argument, and since nothing much hangs, in general, upon this sort of manoeuvre's being possible (pace Hegel), and finally since this very same difficulty arises
with respect to the correlation within the other divisions of the Table of Categories, it seems to me prudent to ignore Kant's contention here, and to make the best possible sense of the correlations that is available to us.

There is a certain amount of discomfort here, since it was argued in Chapter One that perhaps Kant had not given adequate grounds for including the singular form of judgment in the first Table: one certainly does not want surreptitously, or worse, illegitimately to welcome back the singular form of judgment. But since the singular form of judgment does more obviously give rise to the concept of unity than any other form in the Table of Judgments, one perhaps ought to reconsider whether the arguments used to exclude the singular form are really watertight. One point at which leaks might well appear is via the notion of logical form. It is a difficult term, and one which is certainly vulnerable to several interpretations. Perhaps it is sufficient to say here that the interpretation which Kant gives to the term is such that reference to the convention that logicians have indulged in treating judgments of singular form as having universal form is of no consequence (as Kant clearly thought it was, given his arguments at B96). This either suggests that the convention is lacking in some respect, or it suggests that Kant worked with a concept of logical form, which, while it is never explained, seems to involve semantical considerations. It would certainly be interesting to pursue that.
The second division of the Table of Categories suggests correlations between the affirmative form of judgment and the concept of reality, between the negative form and the concept of 'negation', and between the infinite form and the concept of limitation. This last correlation is, I think, best ignored. The Table of Categories could well do without the concept of limitation, whatever it is. There are two reasons which might be advanced in support here: first, there is the difficulty which I have already discussed in Chapter One of ascribing to the infinite form of judgment a function which is not performed by the straightforward negative; and second, even though it may be that Kant is looking to the Table of Categories and the concept of limitation when he includes the infinite form of judgment in the first table, there is still not the faintest justification for relating the two, since such relation would depend on there being a clear and unambiguous sense which attached to the concept. And Kant says nothing at all about the nature of the concept of limitation, except that it is to be seen as a combination of the concepts of reality and negation (and it is just impossible to guess his meaning here). Since I have already ventured to suggest that this particular architectonic fantasy of the third category of any division arising from the first two in the same division is better ignored, it seems to me that there are sufficient grounds for neglecting a lengthy speculation about Kant's essential point. It looks like nonsense.
The concepts of reality and negation arise respectively from the affirmative and negative forms of judgments. There is some sense to this. When we make an affirmative judgment about an object, we seem to be saying something about the world, or reality. 'Objects are impenetrable' is an affirmative form judgment which says something about how things are in the world. A negative form judgment about an object again seems to say something about how things are not in the world. There is some discomfort here at the opposition between the concepts 'reality' and 'negation'.

It is certainly right to say that the ability to make negative judgments presupposes the concept of negation; that is to say that the concept of negation does not arise specifically when a negative judgment is referred to objects. But then, clearly, this is not the sense of 'negation' which Kant is after here; rather it is the logicians' sense. Kant means, I think, the concept which is opposed to the concept of reality, whatever it might be. Presumably the reason for using the term 'negation' here is that there is really no obvious candidate to contrast with the concept of reality. 'Non-reality', I suppose would, as a matter of clarity, be the most appropriate, but even then there is something a little odd in saying that negative judgments about objects are really saying something about 'non-reality'. What Kant intends here is not, however, totally obscure, and it just so happens that we do not have a well-established use of any particular term to express what it is that he does intend. 'Negation'
would do as well as any other, just so long as it is borne in mind that Kant does not mean it in its logical sense."

Kant says little enough about the relations between the third divisions of his two Tables. Presumably, he considered that the categories in question so obviously arose from the corresponding forms of judgment that any explanation would be otiose. He does, of course, have a lot to say about the concepts of the third division in his chapter on the principles related to them, that is in his discussion of the analogies of experience but it should not, at this stage, be necessary to look to that for possible illumination.

The substance accident model is, it seems to me, precisely what Kant contends that it is: namely it is an objectification of the subject-predicate logico-grammatical model. There are all kinds of subject-predicate form judgments which could not be said to give rise to the concept of substance (and accident). For example, the judgment 'Integrity is a virtue'. But there are none which obviously could be said to concern the 'pure thought of an object' or apply to 'the object-in-general'. One cannot plausibly take the judgment 'Integrity is a virtue' to be such a judgment, in any way which could suggest that integrity is substance and virtue its accident. One ought not to rest much weight on this observation however since we have yet to get clear precisely about the nature of the object-in-general.

Is it possible, similarly, to conceive the concepts of
cause and effect as an objectification of the hypothetical form of judgment? The same difficulty arises here as a result of the vagueness of Kant's remarks about transcendental logic concerning 'the pure thought of an object', or about the categories arising from the forms of judgment referred to the object in general. One might take him to mean that the categories arise from forms of judgments about objects (although this does not seem to me at all what Kant has in mind). If this were the case, then it would be a gross distortion to say that any hypothetical judgment about objects expressed some causal relation. For example, the proposition 'If an object is red then it is coloured', or the proposition 'If object a is to the left of object b, then object b is to the right of object a' both might be taken to be about objects in some sense, yet neither proposition of course expresses a causal relation.* Neither could thus be said to 'give rise' to the concept of cause.

The answer, I think, is that, whether or not we take a proposition to be 'about' objects in this absurdly vague sense, if any hypothetical proposition can be translated in terms of a relation which hold between constituent propositions, then it would not be, for Kant, the kind of judgment which could be said to give rise to the concept of cause. Thus, 'If an object is red then it is coloured' can naturally be translated into an expression of logical relation between two propositions, namely 'x is red' and 'x is coloured'. Similarly, 'If object a is to the left of object
b, then object b is to the right of object a' is easily translatable in terms of a logical relation between two propositions 'a is to the left of b' and 'b is to the right of a'. A hypothetical which we take to express a causal relation does not, of course, say that there is a causal relation between propositions: that would be nonsense. It says that there is a causal relation between objects (or events, perhaps): for example, billiard ball a's striking billiard ball b stands in some causal relation to billiard ball b's moving.* The argument that the categories 'cause' and 'effect' arise from the hypothetical form of judgment which concerns 'objects', with a little re-organisation, seems to me to be adequate here.

The third member of the third division of the Table of Categories is variously designated 'community', 'reciprocity' or 'mutual causation' (I take it that the expression 'mutual causation' adequately renders Kant's remark at B112 that, under this concept 'one thing is not subordinated as effect to another, as cause of its existence, but, simultaneously and reciprocally, is coordinated with it, as cause of the determination of the other'.) This concept is alleged to arise from the disjunctive form of judgment. As I have already briefly pointed out, Kant understands disjunction in its exclusive sense: that is, 'p or q' means 'either p or q, but not both'. Curiously, Kant wants to add that, whichever disjunct does obtain, the whole judgment expresses all possibilities in, to use an anachronistic phrase,
logical space. The disjunctive judgment is supposed to exhaust all possibilities in logical space and to show that the relation between the disjuncts is one of mutual exclusion. Thus, Kant says:

'There is, therefore, in a disjunctive judgment, a certain community of the known constituents, such that they mutually exclude each other, and yet thereby determine in their totality the true knowledge.'

(B99; translator's italics).

Kant must, I think, mean by 'true knowledge', 'knowledge of all possible states of affairs', rather than 'knowledge of all actual states of affairs'. The disjunctive judgment (if true) determines knowledge in the sense that what is the case must be a state of affairs expressed by one of the disjuncts, but it does not, of course, say which disjunct this is. Knowledge here is that (p or q or r...) is the case, and not that p is the case, or q is the case, or r is the case, and so on.

Kant himself admits that

'in the case of one category, namely that of "community" ...
... its accordance with the form of a disjunctive judgment - the form which corresponds to it in the table of logical functions - is not as evident as in the case of the others'

(B111-2)

The use of the term 'community' itself is an odd one. Admittedly, for Kant, the disjunctive judgment specifies a totality of possibilities, but it is hardly a totality of community. This would surely find better expression in the conjunctive form of judgment, '(p and q and r...)', which I have already suggested might appropriately have been included in the Table of Judgments.
We seem rather to have a totalit_ of exclusion, if that expression makes any sense: that is, each of the disjuncts excludes the possibility of any other disjunct's being the case; if one disjunct is the case, then every other is not the case.

It seems to me that the best that can be done with this refractory passage is to indulge a certain freedom of exposition afforded by the use of what are, allegedly, synonyms of 'community', namely 'reciprocity' or 'mutual causation'. In any disjunctive judgment, Kant says, 'if one member is posited all the rest are excluded, and conversely' (B112): which is to say that the disjuncts reciprocally determine each other. Bearing in mind that the categories are supposed to concern the thought of an object, whatever that means, we might say that, if we imagine a 'whole made up of things',

'one thing is not subordinated to another as cause of its existence, but, simultaneously and reciprocally, is coordinated with it, as cause of the determination of the other (as, for instance, in a body the parts of which reciprocally attract and repel each other)' (B112).

I would guess that this remark means something like this: where, in the case where C brings about E, we have a simple causal relation characteristically expressed in a hypothetical form judgment, in the case where C brings about E simultaneously with E's bringing about C, we have a relation of mutual causation, or reciprocity, characteristically expressed in terms of a disjunctive form of judgment.
Even if this is what Kant had in mind, it is still grossly unclear what kind of concrete situation would require the use of this category of mutual causation, and still more unclear why the disjunctive judgment would be an appropriate expression of such a situation. The obvious way of expressing a relation of mutual causation would be in terms of a conjunction of hypothetical judgments: 'if C then E, and if E then C'. But a conjunction of hypotheticals is by no means (truth-functionally) equivalent to the exclusive disjunction 'p or q'. Compare the truth-tables which can be constructed in each case:

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
(p \Rightarrow q) \& (q \Rightarrow p) & p \& q \\
T T T & T \\
T F F & F \\
F T T & T \\
F F T & F \\
\end{array}
\]

Indeed, truth-functionally the conjunction of hypotheticals is equivalent precisely to the negation of the exclusive disjunction. Schopenhauer has expressed the discomfort one feels here quiteforcibly in his criticisms of Kant's arguments. He writes:

'The deduction of the category of community or reciprocal effect from [the disjunctive form of judgment] is a really glaring example of the acts of violence on truth which Kant ventures to commit.... I also positively assert that the concept of reciprocal effect cannot be illustrated by a single example. All that we should like to pass off as such is either a state of rest, to which the concept of causality, having significance only in regard to changes, finds no application whatever; or it is an alternating succession of states of the same name that condition one another, for the explanation of which simple causality is quite sufficient.'

(\textit{op cit}, p459).
The only remaining aid to the discovery of what Kant could possibly be talking about here is the third analogy of experience, the principle which attaches to the category of community. But the third analogy is itself just notoriously obscure. One cannot help but feel that it might be better simply to leave further investigation of the concept of community, particularly when even the most liberal exposition of its possible meaning seems to reveal no crucial importance in our having such a concept, so far as the need to structure our experience in certain ways is concerned.

In the fourth division of the Table of Categories, 'Of modality', there is an immediate, striking peculiarity. Kant derives not three concepts from the three forms of judgments in the fourth division of the Table of Judgments, but six. From the problematic form of judgment, Kant alleges, there arise the concepts of possibility and impossibility; from the assertoric form the concepts of existence and non-existence; and from the apodictic form the concepts of necessity and contingency.

Why should Kant list the concepts here paired in opposites? Why here and not in the other divisions? The most he is entitled to claim, it seems to me, is that, from the three forms of judgments there arise the concepts of possibility, existence and necessity. These concepts, when negated, give rise respectively to the concepts of impossibility, non-existence and contingency. In this sense it might be more appropriate to
describe these latter concepts as 'predicables': that is, still pure concepts, but those which are easily derivable from the basic categories, the 'predicaments', which do legitimately appear in the Table of Categories. The issue here is not, I think, particularly important, although Kant's procedural inconsistency is puzzling.

It is not entirely clear how the derivation of the three concepts 'possibility', 'existence' and 'necessity' from the corresponding forms of judgments is achieved. I suppose that Kant's idea here is that, since, in, for example, the apodeictic judgment affirmation or negation is viewed as necessary, when the apodeictic form of judgment concerns objects, the necessity of the affirmation or the negation is reflected in the necessity of the existence of the objects in question. The clue to this interpretation is Kant's remark at BII where he says that 'necessity is just the existence given through possibility itself'. (Here Kant is trying to show, what I have already suggested is pointless, that the third category in each division arises from some combination of the first two.) Whatever this remark can mean, it seems to imply that we are to understand 'possibility' and 'necessity' to be somehow related to the concept of existence. Thus, Kant might be taken to mean, not simply 'possibility', but rather 'possible existence', and similarly 'necessary existence.'

Further support for this interpretation is to be found
in Kant's wanting to relate the assertoric form of judgment to the concept of existence. Thus, the modality division of the Table of Categories is concerned with modes of existence: possible existence, actual existence and necessary existence, while the corresponding division of the Table of Judgments is concerned with the logical modes. One can see some sense to this when one remembers that the categories are supposed to concern, in some way, objects: thus, judgments can be formally described in terms of the logical modes, but things are to be described in terms of their mode of existence.

The major question here seems to settle on the second concept of this division, namely, existence, just as in the first Table, the major question concerned the assertoric form of judgment.

I have already voiced some suspicion about taking the assertoric form to be a logical function. If this suspicion has any ground at all then already the corresponding category is rendered insecure. But there is a further reason for thinking that the concept of existence has no place in the Table of Categories. Kant already has the concept of reality (from the affirmative form of judgment). Is there any need for the concept of existence as well? Is there any important difference here between 'reality' and 'existence'?

It has been suggested that the reason behind the distinction between the two concepts is tied closely to the Kantian dichotomy
of phenomena and noumena." That is, presumably, we talk about a noumenal reality in contrast with a phenomenal existence. This is, I think, a wholly untenable view. The categories, of course, as Kant continually insists, are not to be employed with respect to noumena. Whatever 'reality' and 'existence' mean for Kant, it is clear that, since the employment of the categories is only possible when the categories are schematised, that is when they have a sensible component, they must at least mean 'reality in time (and space)' and 'existence in time (and space)' respectively. Noumena are not in time, and therefore cannot be described either as real or existent.

Moreover, just because reality and existence as categories both require schemata if they are significantly to be employed, it follows that it is not open to Kant to draw out a difference, as some philosophers have done, between existence as familiar, spatio-temporal, non-abstract and non-fictitious being, and reality as either abstract or fictitious being.

It seems to me that these worries, coupled with the suspicion that the assertoric form of judgment is not a logical function, are sufficient to suspend the category of existence from the Table of Categories, at least until some clear reason can be advanced for its inclusion. If it is suspended, does it then affect anything I have so far said? I think not. It is still possible to conceive the other two concepts of the fourth division to mean, as I have suggested they mean, 'possible existence' and
'necessary existence'. The problemmatic and apodeictic forms of judgment are those in which, respectively, affirmation or negation are regarded as possible or necessary. But the category which arises from the affirmative form of judgment is 'reality' (as 'non-reality' or 'negation' arises from the negative form). If it is correct to see no difference between Kant's conception of reality and his conception of existence, then it is possible to think that the categories which arise from the problematic and apodeictic judgments are 'possible existence (or reality)' and 'necessary existence (or reality)'.

I have suggested that three categories are only questionably to be included in the Table of Categories. In so far as Kant claims to have identified the twelve fundamental categories of the human understanding, that is, to have exhausted the possible functions of the human understanding, what does my disagreement here amount to?

The answer is, I think, that it does not amount to much. For Kant the categories arise from the logical forms of judgment. If it can be shown that the three categories which give rise to anxiety here either do not arise from the logical forms of judgment, or the related forms of judgment are either incoherently explicited or not logical forms, then it follows that, on Kant's own terms, the categories in question here are really not categories. If it is maintained that they are nevertheless categories then arguments must be adduced to show that categories can arise, and
can be discovered, in a manner which is different from that which Kant suggests. In that case one ceases to explore the arguments of the Critique.
In my account of one link which was claimed to hold together general and transcendental logic (in Chapter Two), I left open the question of what was entailed by saying that the categories were referred to, or applied to the pure thought of an object, or the object-in-general. The difficulty which I now propose to discuss is that, if it has already been established that the categories have application to objects, in some sense of that word, then the Schematism appears to be unnecessary, since the Schematism purports to establish just that the categories do have application to objects of our experience. The Metaphysical Deduction concludes that 'there arise precisely the same number of pure concepts which apply a priori to objects of intuition in general as...there have been found to be logical functions in all possible judgments' (B105). Are we to understand this conclusion to render the Schematism redundant?

The answer here clearly must be that the Schematism is not redundant: that whatever the Schematism does show, this is different from the claim that pure concepts apply (a priori) to the object-in-general, or, what I will argue is the same thing, objects of intuition in general. In fact, the Schematism, as I understand, argues that we can employ the schematised categories with respect to particular objects of our experience. What I think is required in order to distinguish the aim of the Schematism
from the conclusion allegedly established by the metaphysical
deduction, is an explication of the Schematism which pays
particular attention to drawing clearly what I believe to be
crucial differences between pure or 'unschematised' categories,*
schematised categories, and forms of judgment. Only when
these differences are clearly formulated is it, I think, permissible
to attempt an account of the passage in the Critique which is
generally called the Metaphysical Deduction. Hence I continue
to postpone the attempt to give an adequate account of the
passage which constitutes the essence of the argument which I am
concerned to reconstruct.

There are at least three accounts of the relations between
forms of judgments, unschematised categories and schematised
categories. The first is to be found in Graham Bird's Kant's
Theory of Knowledge. Bird argues (on p 106) that a schematised
category contains both a 'sensible' and an 'intelligible' component.
An unschematised category contains only the 'intelligible'
component. The particularity of the object to which a schematised
category can refer is a function of the sensible component, that
is, the component which invests the category with spatio-temporal
significance, via the schema. But, Bird writes,

'Since the "intelligible" component is derived from the
  logical classification of judgment forms, the pure
categories might, but the schematised categories could
not, be said to be identical with forms of judgments' (op cit p106).

Thus, a difference is made out between the unschematised and
the schematised categories; but the unschematised category is alleged to be identical with the form of judgment to which it corresponds.

The second account argues that the unschematised category is different from the form of judgment in that, implicit in the idea of an unschematised category is that it, in some sense, concerns objects, where the forms of judgment do not necessarily concern objects. But the schematised category is alleged simply to amount to a full sketch of how the categories concern objects. Thus, it is argued, all categories are in fact schematised, but this is simply not revealed by Kant until the chapter on the Schematism.*

The third account, which I want to argue is the correct account, claims that the form of judgment gives rise to the unschematised pure category when applied to objects-in-general. An unschematised category, with the addition of a schema, then, and only then, can refer to particular objects presented in our experience, that is, objects which are to be found at particular points in space and time. I want to maintain that the spatio-temporal nature of our experience is not invoked in the derivation of the categories from the forms of judgment; when the spatio-temporal nature of our experience is invoked, that is, when the categories are schematised, only then is it legitimate to say that the (schematised) categories are genuinely employable within experience. The unschematised or pure categories I shall argue are
not to be employed within our experience. This, I shall maintain, must be the case exactly because the categories have arisen only from Kant's investigation of one component of experience, namely, the understanding, and, as pure categories, are not also a function of Kant's account of sensibility as stated in the Transcendental Aesthetic.

In order to adjudicate between these three accounts, I propose to adopt the following procedure: first, I shall try to show why Kant thinks there is a need for the Schematism, and what in general terms it is; second, I shall attempt to be more precise about the exact nature of the Schematism; and third, I shall try to draw out the conclusions from the Schematism as I see it in order to get clear about the difference between an unschematised and a schematised category.

One of the crucial difficulties which follows on the claim that there are pure, non-empirical concepts is that of showing how such concepts could have application to experience. This difficulty was, before Kant, generally ignored by philosophers like Descartes and Leibniz, who thought there were pure, a priori concepts, or, on the other hand, not seen to be a difficulty by the empiricist philosophers like Locke, Berkeley and Hume, who argued there were no such concepts. Kant was under no illusion about the obstacles which confronted the claim that there were pure, a priori and non-empirical concepts.

It was in order to solve just this set of problems that
the Schematism was required. The categories, which Kant had argued in the Transcendental Deduction that we must employ, manifestly had to have application to experience if this were true. The Schematism was designed to capture, on the one hand, the pure a priori nature of the categories, and on the other, to capture the empirical nature of the sensible elements of experience.

I have already ventured to suggest that Kant can be, and indeed is, better understood without reference to his doctrines of transcendental psychology. The schematism is, importantly, equivocal with respect to transcendental psychology, and commentators have frequently explained it in these terms. But must it be understood in this way? The equivocal nature of the Schematism is described accurately by H.J. Paton in his Kant's Metaphysic of Experience:

'The main burden of [Kant's] doctrine is that the transcendental schema is a product of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination; but the account given of the schema in general suggests that the transcendental schema might be a rule of the transcendental synthesis; and the transcendental schema is even described in one place as if it were the transcendental synthesis itself.'


Yet despite the manifest ambiguity here, Paton continues,

'In spite of these difficulties I have little doubt that the transcendental schema is best regarded as a product of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination.'

(loc cit).

Unlike Paton, I have serious doubts as to whether this could intelligibly be the case. In so far as I can understand what 'a
product of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination' could be, I think it is not what Kant could seriously have entertained as being the transcendental schema. If I am wrong to think this, then it seems to me that Kant would have failed in the endeavour for which the Schematism was intended.

I understand a schema which is the product of the transcendental synthesis of imagination to be, roughly, some kind of image. Thus, it is alleged, Kant draws together a pure concept with that to which it applies via a third thing, namely an image, which image determines the correctness or incorrectness of the application of the concept.

There is a major difficulty here. I am supposed to recognise an object under a certain concept via an image appropriate to that concept. But how do I recognise that the image which I have is just that image appropriate to that concept? What would count as a criterion here? The problem of how one recognises that an object falls under a certain concept is simply reduplicated in this image theory in that one must now also recognise that the image is correctly or incorrectly associated with the concept. Further, how do I recognise that what falls under the concept corresponds to the right degree (and what could that mean?) with the image I have which is associated with the concept in question? I can be mistaken both in that I can misapply a concept, and in that I can have mislearnt the concept. How are these mistakes to be recognised as mistakes if my application of a concept is via an
image which is, presumably, private to me?

The Schematism, it seems to me, would be quite useless if Kant meant by 'schema' some image which was mysteriously supplied us. Yet there is strong evidence that this is just what Kant meant. He writes, for instance,

'This representation of a universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept I entitle the schema of this concept'

(B179-80).

It may be that there is some escape from what certainly appears to be a clearly incriminating remark such as this in the notion of a 'universal procedure of the imagination', but it seems unlikely in that Kant quite happily talks of images for concepts here.

What is so curious about this kind of view is that, as Bennett points out (op cit p144), Kant has already recognised its incipient defects. At B171 the distinction was made between understanding as the faculty of rules (that is, the faculty which enables us to compare and relate concepts), and judgment as the faculty of subsuming things under rules (that is, the faculty of concept application), and with respect to the latter faculty Kant writes that

'If it sought to give general instructions how we are to subsume under these rules, that is, to distinguish whether something does or does not come under them...that could only be by means of another rule. This, in turn, for the very reason that it is a rule, demands guidance from judgment.'

(B172).

There is, according to Kant, something utterly vicious about trying
to provide general guidance in applying concepts. Indeed Kant's objection here is precisely the objection, couched in general terms, which I made to an account of the schema as image. Just as much as we need guidance from a judgment in applying a concept to an object, so we need guidance from a judgment in recognising that an image is appropriate to the concept in question, or in recognising that an image sufficiently corresponds with the object before us. If the schema is an image, inevitably we become enmeshed in an infinite regression of rules which require guidance from judgments. And of course this is quite unsatisfactory.

But there is a serious consequence which follows on dismissing the claim that there can be any general guidance in the application of concepts. Was not the Schematism supposed to provide exactly such guidance?

Happily, there is an escape for Kant. The Schematism, he reminds us, is not intended as a general guide in the application of all concepts; it purports to offer a guide in the application of the pure concepts alone. While the problem of giving some plausible explanation of how we in general go about applying empirical concepts remains, just because we are pursuing a transcendental inquiry it is possible, according to Kant, to

'formulate by means of universal but sufficient marks the conditions under which objects can be given in harmony with these [pure] concepts'

(B174).

The task, then, of the Schematism is to sketch out the
'universal and sufficient marks', that is, the schemata, which will reveal how it is possible for the pure concepts, when schematised, to apply to objects of our experience.

"How, then, is the subsumption of intuitions, the application of category to appearances, possible?" Kant asks at B177.

If an object is to be subsumed under a concept, the representation of that object must in some way be homogeneous with the concept, according to Kant. This homogeneity, he argues, is provided by the schema: the schema is on the one hand homogeneous with the concept, and on the other, with the object.

There is a crucial passage in the chapter on Schematism which reveals the germ of this homogeneity. Since this passage is generally regarded as fiercely resistant to intelligible exposition, I propose to attempt a closely explicative paraphrase.

The passage reads (and I letter the component sentences for convenience),

'[a] Time, as the formal condition of the manifold of inner sense, and therefore of all representations, contains an a priori manifold in pure intuition. [b] Now a transcendental determination of time is so far homogeneous with the category, which constitutes its unity, in that it is universal and rests upon an a priori rule. [c] But, on the other hand, it is so far homogeneous with appearance in that time is contained in every empirical representation of the manifold.'

(B177-8)

The first sentence, [a], I take to recall what has already been established in the Transcendental Aesthetic: namely, that all
representations are subject to the formal condition of sensibility, Time. (When Kant means by 'time' the a priori condition of sensibility, I adopt a convention of writing 'Time' with a capital 't'; when he means time in general, or particular points in time, or just the concept of time, I write 'time' with a lower case 't'.)

The point here is further elucidated in the remark that Time 'contains an a priori manifold in pure intuition'. This is to say that Time, as a formal condition of sensibility, determines that any sensible intuition should have, a priori, a certain kind of manifold, that is, I suggest, a certain type of structure. By this I understand that any sensible intuition must have a possible 'time-structure', a structure which is demanded by the requirement that sensible intuitions conform to the a priori conditions of sensibility, which, in any particular intuition would be given certain dimensions in terms of 'time series', 'time content', 'time order' and 'scope of time' (Kant uses these expressions at B184).

The second sentence, [b], is one half of the key to the required homogeneity between category and object, or appearance, in that it specifies the homogeneity of the category with the transcendental determination of time, the schema. It is determined a priori, according to the Transcendental Aesthetic, that sensible intuitions have what I am calling a 'time-structure'. But the categories, too, are determined a priori, although by the formal conditions of understanding, and not of sensibility. Thus the transcendental determination of time, the schema, and the category
are homogeneous to the extent that they have the same status as functions of a priori conditions of our experience.

(There is a curious remark which occurs in sentence [b]: Kant says that the category constitutes the unity of the transcendental determination of time. I am neither confident about what this might mean, nor able to see that it is of much consequence. The grammatical structure of [b] shows that the unity of the transcendental determination of time which is constituted by the category could not be the ground of the homogeneity of the transcendental determination of time and the category; the ground of the homogeneity is expressed in the clause following 'in that'. What, I think, Kant might mean here is that because it is the function of the category to provide unity to representations, and because a transcendental determination of time determines something, namely representations, so the category indirectly unifies, or, better, fully delimits the scope of, the transcendental determination of time.)

The third sentence of this passage, [c], concerns the other half of the key to the homogeneity of category and object, in that it specifies the homogeneity of the transcendental determination of time with a particular (empirical) object of experience. The transcendental determination of time and any empirical representation are homogeneous to the extent that the empirical representation is a representation which, because it is empirical, conforms to the formal condition of sensible experience, namely Time, and thus it is temporal.
This, it seems to me, is the account which Kant wants to offer of the schema. It looks less exciting than one might have expected. The question which ought now to be asked is whether the homogeneity of the schema, or transcendental determination of time, and the category, on the one hand, and the schema and the object of experience, or appearance, on the other, are sufficient to do the work which Kant requires of the schemata.

It is difficult to know what would constitute an answer to this question. It is clear enough that the homogeneity of the schema and category in terms of their common status as functions of the a priori conditions of our experience is simply a reflection of the characteristic model which is adopted in the Critique, where the formal conditions of sensibility and the formal conditions of the understanding work cooperatively to provide an intelligible structure within our experience. The homogeneity of the schema and appearance similarly reflects another characteristically Kantian model, namely the form-content model. If \( x \) is determined by the formal condition of Time, then it follows a fortiori that \( x \) must occur at a particular time. The formal and a priori condition of Time does not of course itself determine at which particular time an appearance will occur (the reason for \( x \)'s occurring at time \( t_1 \) rather than at time \( t_2 \) is to be sought within the phenomenal world, and not in the formal conditions for such a world). But it follows from that which it does determine that an appearance must occur at a particular time: nothing can occur as a representation
which conforms to the formal condition of Time without occurring at some particular time.

There are important conclusions, for my purposes, which Kant draws from his account of the schema. It has been proved, he claims, that

'pure a priori concepts, in addition to the function of understanding expressed in the category, must contain a priori certain formal conditions of sensibility, namely those of inner sense. These conditions of sensibility constitute the universal condition under which alone the category can be applied to any object.'

(B179)

The addition is, of course, the schema. The category with such an addition is a 'schematised' category. The 'unschematised' category has only what Kant calls here a 'function of the understanding', that is, the power to unify representations, and, unlike the schematised category, cannot be applied to objects of experience.

It is essential to follow through this distinction between schematised and unschematised categories. The motive behind this attempt to explicate the Schematism was that it might help to make clear the nature of a pure, unschematised category, and to what such a category could apply. We know now that a schematised category relates to particular objects of experience, and thus that 'the [schematised] categories have no other possible employment than the empirical' (B185). But it is important to note that the pure, unschematised category is not, for this reason, without any further interest: the pure category
retains, as Kant says, 'a function of the understanding'. We ought not, of course, to think that this means that the pure category therefore can be employed within experience: it cannot, precisely because experience is the result of the necessary cooperation between understanding and sensibility. Nevertheless it is necessary to explore this notion of a 'function of the understanding' in order to see just what status the pure category does have for Kant.

Only the schematised categories have 'significance', according to Kant at B185. But yet, he maintains, this is not to say that pure categories are meaningless concepts, for

\[ 'there does certainly remain in the pure concepts of the understanding, even after the elimination of every sensible condition, a meaning; but it is purely logical, signifying the bare unity of representations' \]  

(B186).

Kant appears to want to make out a difference between 'significance' and 'meaning'. I suggest that the distinction amounts to the difference between a concept which has both sense and reference (significance), and a concept which has only sense (meaning). The schematised category has both a sense and refers to a particular object or appearance; the unschematised category has a sense, but refers to no particular object. The sense which the unschematised category has is just that which 'signifies the bare unity of representations'.

It is necessary now to look back to the three accounts of the possible relations between forms of judgments, unschematised
and schematised categories to which I referred at the beginning of this chapter, in order to see which, if any, is correct, and why.

It has been shown that the schematised categories are concepts which can refer only to objects which are elements in a specifically temporal experience; moreover, they can so refer only because it is a priori certain that our experience is temporal (according to the doctrines of the Transcendental Aesthetic). The schemata are thus functions of the temporality of our experience. Just for this reason, it seems to me that the second account, which sees the Schematism as revealing something about the pure categories which was in fact already implicit in them, is mistaken. The pure categories arise from the logical forms of judgments we make. But that we make judgments of certain logical types in no sense determines that the categories which arise from them must have a temporal component, the schemata. One might say here that it would be possible to derive pure categories from the forms of judgments employed by non-human intelligences whose experience was not spatio-temporal, and in this sense there would clearly be no reason to think that these pure categories had any spatial, or temporal component. The only reason that schematised categories are possible for human beings is precisely that it is a priori certain, if the Transcendental Aesthetic is correct, that our experience is spatio-temporal.

There is, I think, adequate confirmation of this point.
in a remark of Kant's in the Pragmepena to Any Future Metaphysics.
The logical forms of judgment were, Kant says, referred to the object-in-general,

'and so there arose the pure concepts of the understanding, concerning which I could make certain that this and this exact number only constitute our whole cognition of things from pure understanding.' (op cit., p.85, my italics).

There is no reference here to our cognition of things from the point of view of sensibility, and clearly there would have to be if the categories were regarded by Kant as essentially having a temporal component, whose nature was made clear only in the Schematism.

The point here, I think, reflects the general claim I have already made concerning the stages of the argument of the Critique. In the argument which I am calling the metaphysical deduction Kant is pushing to the limit his exploration of the formal structure of the understanding. Previously, in the Transcendental Aesthetic, he thoroughly explored the formal structure of sensibility.

The account of the relations between forms of judgments, unschematised categories and schematised categories which is to be found in Bird (op cit., p.106) is, I think, more telling, though I am not at all happy about the identification of forms of judgments with unschematised categories.

The force of this latter identification rests on the same 'clue' which, as we shall see in the following chapter, Kant uses in his Metaphysical Deduction: namely, that judgments and concepts have identical functions in that both unify representations.
To do justice to Bird, he does not ultimately claim that it is correct to think of the forms of judgment as identical with schematised categories: he merely considers this a possible interpretation. Thus, he writes

"Kant has, therefore, some ground for saying that pure categories, divorced from any sensible reference, are mere logical forms. But the sense in which this is true is compatible with the claim that a given judgment form does not always express a claim of the appropriate categorial type."

(\textit{op cit, p106}).

However, I do not fully understand the rationale which Bird offers here. I want to put it this way. In the first place, if the logical forms of judgments and the unschematised categories are identical, then for what reason did Kant move, not from the Table of Judgments directly to the Transcendental Deduction and the Schematism, but rather from the Table of Judgments to the Table of Categories, via the Metaphysical Deduction, and only then to the Transcendental Deduction and Schematism?

The answer is that there is absolutely no reason to suppose that forms of judgments are essentially connected with, as Kant puts it, our cognition of things. Clearly not all judgments concern our cognition of things. Those which do give rise to the categories. (This, presumably, is the point which Bird makes in saying that 'a given judgment form does not always express a claim of the appropriate categorial type'.) Thus, if the forms of judgments which do concern our cognition of things, that is which apply to objects-in-general are those and only those which give
rise to the pure categories, then it follows that the forms of judgment generally are not identical with the pure categories.

It might be prudent to summarise the claims I have made here. I began by expressing some anxiety about the problematic remark that pure categories apply to the object-in-general, or to the pure thought of an object. In order better to understand this, the Schematism was examined with the aim of elucidating the idea of a schematised category, and therefore the idea of an unschematised category. What has emerged is a clear distinction between forms of judgments, unschematised categories, and schematised categories. This clear, it is only now permissible to go on to consider the Metaphysical Deduction, the essence of the argument with which I am concerned. Manifestly confusion would abound if it were not clear what the Metaphysical Deduction purported to deduce, namely, the pure categories.
What is generally known as Kant's Metaphysical Deduction of the pure categories appears in the chapter entitled 'The Clue to the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of the Understanding.' The core of the Deduction is, I think, to be found in two passages: 'The Logical Employment of the Understanding' from B92 to B94, and 'The Pure Concepts of the Understanding' from B102 to B106.

The Metaphysical Deduction is certainly one of the most obscure parts of the Critique, but in many ways it is also the most fruitful. Although it is not always clear just what Kant is arguing, there are several acute insights into the nature of judgments, the nature of concepts, and the intimate relation between making judgments and having concepts.

What, then, is to be made of the Deduction? The only occasion on which Kant uses the expression 'metaphysical deduction' is at B159, where he writes

>'In the metaphysical deduction the a priori origin of the categories has been proved through their complete agreement with the general logical functions of thought.'

(B159).

However, as Bird points out in his brief consideration of the Metaphysical Deduction,

>'...it would be just as natural to think that this elusive property [a priority] is ascribed to categories on the basis of arguments in the Transcendental Deduction.'

(op cit, p 84).

I am inclined to agree with Bird here, to the extent that the
arguments of the Transcendental Deduction seem more obviously intended to prove that the categories are a priori, in that they purport to show that we must employ the categories since they are instrumental in providing unity of consciousness, which, it is claimed, is an essential feature of any experience at all. Yet, as we shall see, there is some sense in saying that the Metaphysical Deduction shows the origin of the categories to be a priori.

In a more general sense, what the Metaphysical Deduction achieves, it seems to me, is an impressively perceptive account of the nature of concepts, both empirical and non-empirical concepts. In this sense, what Kant is deducing is not so much that there are pure a priori concepts, but rather that, if there are, then they will have a certain nature. Pure concepts may be described in general terms, but we must wait until the Transcendental Deduction before it is established conclusively that the pure concepts are a priori just because we must employ them. This hypothetical conclusion of the Metaphysical Deduction, I think, accords well with the fact that the Deduction appears in a chapter which talks of a 'clue' to the discovery of the pure concepts. Since the Deduction rests on a clue, it would be vain to hope that it could establish a categorical conclusion like 'there are pure a priori concepts'.

In order to make clear exactly what it is I am claiming for the Metaphysical Deduction, it might be prudent to say more precisely how I am locating it with respect to the Transcendental
Deduction. The Transcendental Deduction argues that the pure concepts are a priori. But before that can be argued it must already have been established just what these concepts are, and what it is to use them, and this is what is established in the Metaphysical Deduction. Thus, the Metaphysical Deduction is a stage on the way to the Transcendental Deduction. It is not a stage which can be ignored, as some critics have wanted to suggest. Neither does it argue the same point as the Transcendental Deduction.

The 'clue' to the discovery of the pure concepts is that judgments and concepts express an identical function of the understanding: namely, they provide unity among representations. 'All judgments', Kant says

'are functions of unity among our representations; instead of an immediate representation, a higher representation which comprises the immediate representation and various others, is used in knowing the object, and thereby much possible knowledge is collected into one.'

(B93-4).

Every judgment, no matter what its particular form, collects or comprehends or unifies a set of representations. ('Representation' is, of course, the most general Kantian expression for what might otherwise be called 'mental content'. Kant says of representations that 'whether they have for their objects outer things or not, [they] belong, in themselves, as determinations of the mind, to our inner state' (B50.).) Thus, the singular judgment 'This nectarine is soft' draws together the various representations
which are appropriate to the concept 'nectarine', with the further representation, namely, the softness of the object, into some kind of cohesive whole.

A concept, similarly, it is argued, unifies representations. Indeed a concept is a concept 'solely in virtue of its comprehending other representations' (B94). This is to say, I think, that a concept just is that which brings together a diverse set of representations under itself: thus, in the judgment 'This nectarine is soft', as I have said, the concept 'nectarine' may involve several representations, a round shape, a yellowy red colour, the taste of peach and plum combined.

The point which is being made clearly here is that there is an intimate link between judgments and concepts in that they both express a single function of the understanding. Indeed it emerges here that a concept 'is the predicate of a possible judgment'. This is to say, I think, that where we find a concept employed (in a judgment), it is always possible to re-express that judgment by analysing the concept in question into another judgment. Thus, 'This nectarine is soft' might be analysed as 'x is a nectarine' and 'x is soft', where the concept 'nectarine' in the original judgment becomes the predicate of a further judgment.

The same point is made in more general terms at B92-3. First, Kant argues, 'besides intuition there is no other mode of knowledge except by means of concepts' (B92); from this it follows that 'the knowledge yielded by the understanding, or at least by the
human understanding, must therefore be by means of concepts' (B93).
But, Kant continues, 'the only use which the understanding can
make of these concepts is to judge by means of them' (B93). To
use concepts is to make judgments.

This is an extremely important insight on Kant's part.
Its familiarity is, I think, a mark of the respect with which
philosophers since Kant (particularly Wittgenstein) have regarded
it. Thus, one might consider it mere orthodoxy now to say, for
instance, that, if to use concepts is to make judgments, then it
follows that to have grasped a concept, to know what it means,
is to be able to make a certain kind of judgment. I can only
be said, for example, to have the concept 'fuschia', if generally
I can make judgments which correctly distinguish flowers which
are fuschias from flowers which are not. My knowing the meaning
of the word 'fuschia' is just my being able to recognise fuschias,
characteristically in judgments like 'This is a fuschia'.

One might pursue this point in all kinds of fruitful ways.
For example, one might bring its significance to bear on the
relation between having concepts and knowing a language, or on
what restrictions there are on the ability to acquire concepts.
Of immediate interest here, for us, is how the point reflects on
the possibility of concept-acquisition. If it is true that one
cannot be said to have a concept without one's being able to make
certain sorts of judgments, then it follows that, for instance, a
child could not acquire any concept without first knowing how to
make a judgment. Thus, if we restrict for the present the possibility of making judgments to certain specific forms of linguistic behaviour (although this restriction is not necessary in any obvious sense), then it follows that a child must know, say, how to make a judgment of the form 'This is an F' before he can really be said to be in a position to have acquired a concept. In this sense one might say that the judgment forms are a priori. Since they are, and since, for Kant, the categories arise from, or originate in the forms of judgments, one begins to see the force of saying that the a priori origin of the categories has been proved through their complete agreement with the logical functions of thought, that is, through their agreement with the forms of judgment.

It now becomes necessary to concentrate only on the pure concepts of the understanding, and not pursue the general remarks about concepts which apply as much to empirical as to non-empirical concepts. The Metaphysical Deduction is, of course, intended to deduce the pure concepts of the understanding.

Empirical concepts relate to items within our experience; because they are empirical there obviously can be no question of their not relating to our experience. But the same is not true of pure concepts. How do they acquire their significance with respect to experience? To some extent we have already explored this question in the previous chapter when it was noted that Kant insisted that pure categories, despite the absence of a sensible component, yet had a meaning. But there is more to say.
Empirical concepts clearly have an empirical content which gives them their significance. Pure concepts, Kant argues, have a 'transcendental content', and thus are not evacuated of all significance. This transcendental content is provided 'by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general' (B105). What does this mean?

Kant tells us at B93 that 'concepts are based on the spontaneity of thought'. If the manifold which lies before a concept is to be known

'the spontaneity of our thought requires that it be gone through in a certain way, taken up and connected. This act I name synthesis.'

(B102).

This is to say that if the content before a concept is to be known, if the concept is to mean anything to us, what is required is that imagination 'synthesises' the manifold in such a manner as to connect it, or give it a unity. With pure concepts, the content or manifold will be a 'manifold in intuition in general' (and it is important to note that Kant qualifies 'intuition' as 'in general', by which I take it he means any intuition, and not necessarily the particular sensible intuitions of human beings). The act of synthesis, this 'blind but indispensable function of the soul' as Kant calls it at B103, gives unity to the manifold in intuition in general. Thus, the pure concepts of the understanding immediately relate to the 'synthetic unity of a manifold in intuition in general'.
There are several points which arise here. In the first place we seem now to have two apparently correlate unities of manifolds or representations with which pure concepts are concerned. In Chapter Four it was argued that the function of a concept is to unify possible representations. We might call this the 'analytical unity' of a manifold of representations (as Kant apparently does in a, not quite clear, remark at B105), that is, a unity provided by the very nature of a concept. On the other hand, we now discover that there is also a synthetic unity among possible representations, that is, a unity provided by an act of synthesis in the imagination.

Clearly, for Kant, pure concepts concern both an analytic and a synthetic unity. The major question is whether both are required. I have already said that I find Kant's transcendental psychology a puzzle, and invariably unnecessary to his arguments. The idea of a synthesis in the imagination which lies behind the employment of the concepts with which we are concerned, is a further example of the redundancy of transcendental psychology.

Kant seems to be saying that a concept provides unity among representations (an analytical unity) on the one hand, and on the other he tries to reinforce the claim by suggesting that certain (transcendental) psychological activities lie behind our use of concepts. But if representations are given a unity simply by being brought under a concept, in that this, precisely, is what a concept provides, then is it really necessary to specify that
this same unity of representations is also a result of some act of the imagination? Kant clearly is trying to fill out the picture in his characteristically diligent manner, but it does not seem to me that the ornaments contribute anything to the skeletal structure we already have. If reference to these mysterious acts of the imagination is simply speculation, then it is, so far as I can see, of no philosophical importance. If Kant is making a philosophical point then we must ask for the criteria by which to judge its correctness or incorrectness, and we must ask how it is that Kant feels himself to be in the privileged position of discovering processes in the imagination which are alleged to be common to all concept-employing human beings. The 'explanation' of our use of concepts in terms of the processes which underlie that use looks more appropriate to the psychologists' experimental techniques, than to the philosopher; but yet, as Kant himself admits when he remarks, underhandedly, that we 'are scarcely ever conscious' of such processes (scarcely ever?), there seems to be no experimental data on which even a psychologist might work.

My point here is that, whether Kant is wrong or right about the synthetic processes involved in concept employment (and even this is to be generous to Kant since there can be no question of right or wrong where there are no criteria), the argument with which I am concerned can rely, for all purposes that I can see as relevant, on the idea that concepts, by their nature, provide an
analytical unity among representations.

It remains now to state the essence of the Metaphysical Deduction. Clearly, the kind of work which the concept does is precisely the same as that done by the judgment. The very same function of the understanding is involved here, namely that function which provides unity among representations. For this reason, since we already know the variety of ways in which this function is expressed in the logical forms of judgments, we have only to look to them to discover the pure concepts. The same functions of the understanding are expressed, in terms of judgments, in the Table of Judgments, and, in terms of concepts, in the Table of Categories. As Kant says

'In this manner there arise precisely the same number of pure concepts of the understanding which apply a priori to objects of intuition in general, as, in the preceding table, there have been found to be logical functions in all possible judgments. For these functions specify the understanding completely and yield an exhaustive inventory of its powers.'

(B105).

The domain and function of the pure concepts of the understanding is now clearer. But it is not finally clear. The problem remains of how to understand the claim that pure concepts 'apply a priori to objects of intuition in general'.

We have seen this claim expressed in a variety of ways (see the Appendix on p 84 for a full tabulation of the occurrence of this and cognate expressions). We are, however, at last in a position to reveal this claim in its true colours. In the attempt to reveal its meaning, the idealist implications of Kant's
account of the formal structuring of the human understanding will also become manifest.
CHAPTER SIX

Kant's (transcendental) idealism is to be understood in a variety of ways. One can, for instance, trace its development from the thesis that space and time are not independent of human sensibility, and that therefore experience of a spatio-temporal world is a function of our form of sensibility, and not of a spatio-temporal world which is independent of us. One can, on the other hand, trace the idealism from the thesis that experience of an objective world is a function of the use of certain kinds of concepts. These two ways, of course, must not be thought of as independent of each other. The one is determined by the doctrines of the Transcendental Aesthetic, and the other by the doctrines of what I have called the metaphysical deduction. Kant's idealism stems both from his account of the formal conditions of sensibility and from his account of the formal conditions of the understanding. The vast and unique consistency of the Critique of Pure Reason is a reflection of the fact that when Kant describes experience as the cooperation of sensibility and the understanding, the implications of his accounts of both sensibility and the understanding are thoroughly compatible.

I propose here to say a little about the idealist implications of Kant's account of the understanding so far as they are part of the metaphysical deduction. I am aware, however, that they are idealist implications only, and that they do not constitute
a full-blown idealist account of experience (precisely for the
reason that experience is to be seen as the cooperation of
sensibility and understanding).

It has been argued that the meaning which a pure category
retained, even after the elimination of all sensible features, that
is, when free of a schema, was that which 'signified the bare
unity of representations'. We have now to ask just what this
'bare unity of representations' amounts to.

There are two passages which reveal what Kant had in mind
here. The first occurs at A104 in the first version of the
Transcendental Deduction. Kant writes:

'...the object is viewed as that which prevents our
modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary,
and which determines them a priori in some definite
fashion. For in so far as they relate to an object
they must necessarily agree with one another, that is,
must possess that unity which constitutes the concept
of an object."

The second passage occurs at B137 in the second version of the
Transcendental Deduction:

'Understanding is, to use general terms, the faculty of
knowledge. This knowledge consists in the determinate
relation of given representations to an object; and an
object is that in the concept of which the manifold of
a given intuition is united.'

It seems to me quite clear that Kant thinks the concept of an
object to be that which, quite simply, comprehends in a unity
possible representations and thus prevents the haphazardness or
chaos of the undetermined input of our modes of knowledge (whatever
these modes happen to be).
What I want to suggest now is that it is exactly this
concept of an object as that which prevents chaos and arbitrariness
among representations produced by our modes of knowledge which
Kant has had in mind when he talked of the 'pure thought of an
object', and of 'the object-in-general'. 'Object-in-general'
just means the concept of an object. The concept of an object is
that which is constituted by a unity of representations. But since
it is the function of the pure concepts to provide an analytical
unity among representations, we can perhaps, at last, begin to
see what Kant meant when he talked about referring the forms of
judgment to the object-in-general in order to give rise to the
categories. The pure concepts, the categories provide just that
unity of representations which would constitute the concept of an
object, which I am claiming means the same as 'object-in-general'.

What reason is there to think that the identification of
the object-in-general with the concept of an object is correct?
There are at least two, it seems to me.

In the first place, it is clear that, for Kant, the object-
in-general is not a thing: it has no ontological status. This is
partly shown by the fact that a cognate expression is the 'pure
thought of an object', and clearly that is not a 'thing'. The
concept of an object, of course, is not a thing either (pace Frege):
it is, as all concepts are for Kant, a function. We could no more
imagine an encounter with an 'object-in-general' than we could
imagine an encounter with an apple-in-general. All that is going
on is that Kant is using a substantive expression to refer to the criterion for identifying anything as an object, namely that representations should have a unity, and, as Kant says, it is 'that unity which constitutes the concept of an object' (A104).

In the second place, there is a passage in the first edition version of the Transcendental Deduction which really makes clear what ought to have been made clear before, and which we are in the process of making clear now:

'Now we are in a position to determine more adequately our concept of an object in general. All representations have, as representations, their object, and can themselves in turn become objects of other representations. Appearances are the sole objects which can be given to us immediately, and that in them which relates immediately to the object is called intuition. But these appearances are not things in themselves; they are only representations, which in turn have their object - an object which cannot itself be intuited by us, and which may, therefore, be named the non-empirical, that is, transcendental object = x.

The pure concept of this transcendental object, which in reality, throughout all knowledge, is always one and the same, is what alone can confer upon all our empirical concepts in general relation to an object, that is, objective reality. This concept cannot contain any determinate intuition, and therefore refers only to that unity which must be met with in any manifold of knowledge which stands in relation to an object.'

(A108-9).

We can never, legitimately, go beyond our intuitions if we are to make any sense, therefore we cannot legitimately and significantly talk about the transcendental object, 'which cannot itself be intuited by us'. But we can talk about the concept of such an object because, although no intuitions are available, the concept has a significance in that it refers to 'that unity which must be
met with in any manifold of knowledge which stands in some relation to an object’. And, as we have seen, this unity is just exactly the concept of an object.

To put it differently: the passage aims to elucidate the concept of an object-in-general. The first step in the elucidation is to link the concept with the 'transcendental object = x'. The second step is to move quickly from talk of the transcendental object (which cannot be significant talk since the transcendental object 'cannot itself be intuited by us') to talk of the concept of such an object. To talk of the concept of such an object is significant just in so far as it refers to a unity of representations in any manifold. But it is precisely this unity of representations in any manifold which constitutes the concept of an object.

To understand the passage at A109 in the way I suggest, then, indicates just what sense there is to the identification of the object-in-general with the concept of an object. If the object-in-general, or what is the same thing, the concept of an object is simply a unity of representations, and if it is precisely the function of the pure concepts to provide unity among representations, then it follows that in supplying this unity then, by the very same stroke, the pure category 'creates', as it were, or provides us with the concept of an object. Naturally it follows that the pure concepts of the understanding 'apply a priori to objects of intuition in general':
they are what determine such objects in general in so far as they provide the unity which constitutes the concept of an object.

The point can be expressed in broader terms. Clearly, if objects just are certain unities among representations, then we must look to what provides such unity if we are to know objects at all. Since it is the function of the categories to supply this unity, it follows that the categories determine what are to be objects for human experience. They do not of course fully determine what are to be objects of human experience: as I have pointed out, we are dealing here only with the idealist implications of Kant's account of the structure of the understanding. A full-blown idealism would have to show that the representations which are unified by the categories are themselves conditioned, in so far as they are sensible intuitions, by the forms of our sensibility conceived as forms which reside a priori in us.

It seems to me that the argument of what I have called, broadly, the metaphysical deduction, has now been exhausted. There is confirmation, I think, that what has been argued is precisely no more than Kant himself thought he had argued in a passage, at the end of the argument I have been pursuing, in the chapter entitled 'Transition to a Transcendental Deduction'. The passage seems to allay the suspicion that I have perhaps illegitimately been employing remarks from the Transcendental Deduction in explicating what I have wanted to say is a section of the Critique which is independent of the Transcendental Deduction. The
Remarks may have been, as a matter of clarity, and for the purposes of my exposition, necessary, but this is not, I think to say that force of these remarks is not implicit in the argument which precedes them. (And certainly it would be foolhardy to think that what is clear for Kant is clear for anyone.) The passage reads,

'The question now arises whether a priori concepts do not also serve as antecedent conditions under which alone anything can be, if not intuited, yet thought as object in general. If that case all empirical knowledge of objects would conform to such concepts, because only by thus presupposing them is anything possible as object of experience. Now all experience does indeed contain, in addition to the intuition of the senses through which something is given, a concept of an object as being thereby given, that is to say as appearing. Concepts of objects in general thus underlie all empirical knowledge as its a priori conditions. The objective validity of the categories as a priori concepts rests, therefore, on the fact that, so far as the form of thought is concerned, through them alone does experience become possible. They relate of necessity and a priori to objects of experience, for the reason that only by means of them can any object whatsoever be thought.'

(B125-6).

Kant's task is, as yet incomplete. It remains for him to show that we must employ the categories, and not simply that, 'so far as the form of thought is concerned', they are objectively valid as a priori concepts. This task is completed in the Transcendental Deduction, I take it, where it is argued, broadly, that experience requires unity of consciousness and unity of consciousness depends on the (employment of) the categories.

Kant's task may be incomplete still; mine, I hope is completed.
Throughout the text, various remarks of Kant's have been taken to concern the object-in-general, which I have generally hyphenated to indicate that it is a technical expression. I find important references to the object-in-general and what I claim are cognates at the following points in the Critique:

'Object in general': B125, B146, B148, B158, A104, A108.

'Objects in general': B81, B88, A106, A111, A115; (see also Prolegomena, p85)

'Objects of intuition in general': B105, B150, B154.

'Pure thought of an object': B80.

Expressions which are obviously related here, namely 'manifold in intuition in general', and 'manifold of intuitions in general' appear, respectively at B105 and at B154.

Of particular interest among the occurrences of these expressions which I have not already quoted in context in the text, so far as concerns my thesis that the argument of the metaphysical deduction deals only with the structuring of the understanding, (and in which the formal conditions of sensibility are not invoked), are three passages from the Transcendental Deduction:

(a) 'To think an object and to know an object are thus by no means the same thing. Knowledge involves two factors: first, the concept, through which an object in general is thought (the category); and secondly, the intuition through which it is given. (B146; translator's italics);

(b) 'Space and time, as conditions under which alone objects
can possibly be given to us, are valid no further than for objects of the senses, and therefore only for experience. Beyond these limits they represent nothing; for they are only in the senses, and beyond them have no reality. The pure concepts of the understanding are free from this limitation, and extend to objects of intuition in general, be the intuition like or unlike ours....'

(B148);

(c) 'Apperception and its synthetic unity is, indeed, very far from being identical with inner sense. The former as the source of all combination, applies to the manifold of intuitions in general, and in the guise of the categories, prior to all sensible intuition, to objects in general.'

(B154; translator's italics).
NOTES ON THE TEXT

Page 1*: In referring to this second stage of the argument I designate it 'the metaphysical deduction', that is, with lower case initial letters. 'Metaphysical Deduction', with capital initial letters, refers to the arguments of the chapter entitled 'The Clue to the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of the Understanding' (B92 - 116). (See page 66 for a more specific identification of the passages which commentators generally hold to be the Metaphysical Deduction.)

Page 11*: A.O. Lovejoy has suggested that the oddness of Kant's introduction of the idea of the infinite judgment is a result of a shifting use of criteria. On the one hand Kant seems to be referring to the 'size of the genus within the denotative limits of which the subject is left by one of these "infinite judgments" (and there is no reason to suppose that it would be infinite)'. On the other hand, Kant seems to be referring to 'the fact that "infinite" predicates ascribe no positive quality, no definite connotation, to their subjects'. Lovejoy concludes that 'Kant has fallen into the exceedingly elementary error of confusing the basis of division which he should use for distinguishing species with that by which the genera are distinguished'. (See A.O. Lovejoy, 'Kant's Classification of the Forms of Judgment' included in the anthology Kant: Disputed Questions, edited by M.S. Gram (Quadrangle, Chicago, 1967), pp 277-8.)

Page 11**: The suggestion is made by T.K. Swing in Kant's Transcendental Logic (passim, but see especially p 30). A case against this interpretation is argued in my Chapter Two, pp 28-9.

Page 13*: The quality and modality of a judgment can also be expressed as functions of a categorical judgment. Thus 'quality' refers to the (affirmative or negative) nature of the copula in a categorical judgment; 'modality' refers to the modal nature of the copula in a categorical judgment. The hypothetical and disjunctive relations of judgments might be said to be relations between categorical forms of judgment.

Page 19*: Frege writes that 'we need a special sign to assert that something or other is true' (pp 156-7 in Translations
from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, by P.T. Geach and M. Black; see also pp 33-51 (41-2).

Thus, as Anscombe points out in An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 'for Frege, the assertion sign symbolises the difference between the thought of something's being the case and the judgment that it is the case - it can thus never occur in an if clause' (p 113).

Page 36 * : Kant writes at B183
'Reality in the pure concept of the understanding, is that which corresponds to a sensation in general; it is that, therefore, the concept of which in itself points to being (in time). Negation is that concept which represents not-being (in time).'

Page 37 * : It is more likely that these two propositions would now be taken to be 'about' language rather than 'about' anything else: that is, as analytic propositions they say something about the use of certain expressions.

Page 38 * : The necessity which Kant wants to retain in causal relationships is a necessity which determines the relations between appearances. He says 'In order that this relation be known as determined, the relation between the two states must be so thought that it is thereby determined as necessary which of them must be placed before and which of them after, and that they cannot be placed in the reverse relation' (B234).
This, I think, adequately forestalls the objection that the necessity in a causal relationship might, for Kant, be expressible in terms of a necessary connection between propositions. Clearly, however, the necessity Kant is here concerned with is a necessity in time, and could not therefore be taken to describe a relation between propositions.

Page 43 * : In the Table of Categories in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic the modalities are listed simply as 'possibility', 'existence' and 'necessity': there is no mention of 'impossibility', 'non-existence' or 'contingency'. (See Prolegomena, p60).

Page 45 * : In a discussion of this issue, Professor A. Shalom wrote:
'But one point seems clear: the assertion, by Kant himself, of noumena as distinct from phenomena, does not seem to allow for the simple equation between existence and reality.'
I use the expression 'unschematised category' and such use may appear to need justification, since it does not occur in the *Critique*, or at least in Kemp Smith's translation. There is a clear justification. In the first place, as I point out, Kant himself distinguishes a schematised category from a pure concept from which every sensible condition (i.e., the schema) has been eliminated. In the second place, there is a convention among contemporary commentators on Kant in which use is made of the locution 'unschematised category' (see Bird, *op cit*, passim, and Strawson, *op cit*, p 77).

This account was suggested to me, in discussion, by Professor A. Shalom.

This distinction perhaps sounds too sophisticated and post-Kantian. But Bird writes in a footnote to p122 of his *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, 'Anyone who prefers to see Frege, rather than Hegel or any nineteenth century Idealist as Kant's spiritual successor may legitimately point to a striking similarity between what Kant says at B140 and what Frege says at greater length of the distinction between sense and reference and associated idea. (Cf. *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, ed. Geach and Black, pp 59-60.)'

R.P. Wolff writes on this point: 'In fact, since we can never go beyond our representations, the source of their unity must be sought in the concept of an object = x, and not in the object itself. Thus, the organising and unifying principle of our representations in a mode of knowledge is the concept of an object = x.' (R.P. Wolff, 'A Reconstruction of the Argument of the Subjective Deduction' included in the anthology *Kant* edited by R.P. Wolff (Macmillan, London, 1968).)


