TRADE IN FEELINGS: SHAME IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN
TRADE IN FEELINGS: SHAME IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN

BY AILSA KAY, B.A. M.A.

A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Doctorate of Philosophy

McMaster University © Copyright Ailsa Kay, October 2012
Abstract

“Trade in Feelings: Shame in Eighteenth-Century Britain,” traces a genealogy of shame, a difficult feeling which is transformed and reworked in eighteenth-century narratives and which provides a ground for the self-reflective interiority required of commercial subjects. The stakes of this project are twofold. First, while cultural critics (e.g., Ahmed, Probyn, and Sedgwick) have recently theorized shame and suggested its potential for political activism, histories of this feeling have yet to be written. Reading narratives of shame in George Lillo’s *London Merchant* (1731), Eliza Haywood’s *The British Recluse* (1722), multiple editions of Defoe’s *Roxana* (1724, 1730, 1745[49]), Samuel Richardson’s *Clarissa* (1747-48), and Frances Burney’s *Evelina* (1778), this chronologically organized study supplies one part of such a history. As such, the analysis builds on and reframes Foucault’s historical narrative of the emergence of the modern disciplined and divided self-consciousness by focusing on the affects that produce and re-produce it, particularly the affect of shame. Second, while Michael McKeon has identified the formative force of questions of virtue and truth on the novel, this thesis suggests that these questions are critically condensed in narratives of shame. The dissertation argues that private shame and the psychological interiority of the eighteenth-century novel are mutually productive. Once a passion which could lead to vice and even murder, by the late eighteenth century shame becomes a feeling which is internalized, and which divides the self. Connected both to the question of truth and the question of virtue, as well as to the status of passion itself, shame informs our sense of emotions as interior, yet remains inextricable from questions of reputation, credit, and civility.
Acknowledgements

I thank my supervisor, Peter Walmsley, for insight and guidance, and my readers, Sarah Brophy and Eugenia Zuroski Jenkins, for thoughtful comments and suggestions.
# Table of Contents

Introduction: Making Shame in Eighteenth-Century Britain ................................................. 1

A Crisis in Feeling .................................................................................................................. 9

Why shame? ............................................................................................................................ 14

Genres of shame: from execution to embarrassment ............................................................. 23

Chapter 1: Accounting for Shame in The London Merchant ................................................. 35

Motivating Apprentices ....................................................................................................... 40

The Errant Apprentice .......................................................................................................... 51

The Ideal Apprentice ............................................................................................................. 58

Barnwell’s Shame .................................................................................................................. 65

Chapter 2: Novel Shame: The British Recluse and Roxana’s Alternate Ends ...................... 83

Mastery and Solitude: The British Recluse (1722) ............................................................. 86

The Fortunate Mistress ......................................................................................................... 103

Shameless and damned: The Fortunate Mistress in 1724 ................................................. 107

Roxana’s children: The Fortunate Mistress (1740) ........................................................... 127

Roxana’s punishment: The Unhappy Wife 1745(49) ......................................................... 140

Effects of Shame’s Reform .................................................................................................. 150
Chapter 3: "A Reformation so much wanted": Clarissa’s Glorious Shame

- Shame as glory’s antithesis
- Shame and the blush
- Clarissa’s Refusals
- “Reformation so much wanted”

Chapter 4: Evelina’s Embarrassment

- Embarrassment and How One Ought to Act
- The paradoxical blush and the picture of modesty
- Familiar yet Vulgar
- Shame’s Siblings

Conclusion: The Shame of Trade

Works Cited
List of Figures

Figure 1: Frontispiece, Universal Penmen.................................................................52
Declaration of Academic Achievement

The author of this thesis is the sole contributor.
Introduction: Making Shame in Eighteenth-Century Britain

In a 1723 addition to Remark C of An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue, Bernard Mandeville expresses shame’s pivotal importance to public virtue:

It is incredible how necessary an Ingredient Shame is to make us sociable; it is a Frailty in our Nature, all the World, whenever it affects them, submit to it with Regret, and would prevent it if they could; yet the Happiness of Conversation depends upon it, and no Society could be polish'd if the Generality of Mankind were not subject to it…. [T]he only Remedy prescrib'd, is a strict Observance of certain Rules to avoid those Things that might bring this troublesome Sense of Shame upon [a man]. But as to rid or cure him of it, the Politician would sooner take away his Life. (101–102)

For Mandeville, shame is precisely the point at which public virtue enters and alters the private individual. It is also a politician’s tool. While the individual may experience it as a discomfiting after-effect of his private vice, the politician knows that it is necessary for the government of society. Shame works to regulate (or, as Mandeville later clarifies, at least hide) the passions, particularly the passions of “Lust, Pride, and Selfishness” (102). At first glance, this idea of regulation seems to work by some combination of reason and passion, wherein the reasonable avoidance of shame keeps passion in check; that is, the individual rationally chooses to avoid situations that will cause him shame, and so curtails his pride, lust, and selfishness. But that is not quite the model that Mandeville deploys. Rather, for Mandeville, shame itself is also a passion: “[T]here is a reality in Shame, as it signifies a Passion that has its proper Symptoms, over-rules our Reason, and requires as much Labour and Self denial to be subdued as any of the rest” (98). So the regulation of
self is not, in fact, a matter of reasonable choice, but of the pressure of one passion counterpoised against the pressure of another.

Yet, defining shame as a passion has a serious implication for any model of either morality or governance, one implication that Mandeville gleefully exploits. That is, because shame is a passion, it is by definition not necessarily a source of virtue. Instead, shame “may be either Good or Bad according to the Actions perform’d from that Motive. Shame may hinder a Prostitute from yielding to a Man before Company, and the same Shame may cause a Bashful good natur’d Creature, that has been overcome by frailty, to make away with her Infant” (107). So while Mandeville sets up shame as a countervailing passion, necessary to the well-being of society and to the skillful politician, at the same time he asserts its dangerously anti-social potential to motivate violence, in this case a violence that might be considered the most “unnatural” of all—a mother’s murder of her child. Leaving aside for now the politics of gender embedded in his argument, I want to point out the instability of Mandeville’s shame. Shame can reform a person, or it can override judgment and lead to violence. Both of these potentials are possible. By contrast, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury considers shame a more stable and thus politically useful passion. A contemporary of Mandeville’s, Shaftesbury advocates for a particular kind of public shaming—public ridicule—which he considers “the only way to save mens [sic] sense” (14). He writes: "Good humour is not only the best security against [religious] Enthusiasm, but the best foundation of piety and true religion" (16). Importantly, for Shaftesbury, ridicule is an English method of governance, which he contrasts it to French intolerance of and torture of religious minorities (15).
Both Mandeville and Shaftesbury are more interested in the cause and effect of shame, and less interested in exploring the phenomenology of shame (what it “feels” like). By mid-century, though, language about feeling, and interest in feeling, begins to change. Adam Smith, in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759), describes what happens in the self-splitting act of shame which, in Smith’s theory, is cognate with acts of sympathy: "By sympathizing with the hatred and abhorrence which other men must entertain for him, [the violator] becomes in some measure the object of his own hatred and abhorrence" (98–99). The violator imagines himself in the place of the other, looking at him. This is the same concept of imagination central to Smith’s theory of “harmony” of feeling: the sufferer must moderate his feelings, or flatten them enough that the spectator can in some way “enter into” sympathy with the sufferer’s pain. In this case, though, the pain is itself the consequence of the act of sympathetic imagination. The violator suffers (becomes a sufferer) because he seems himself through the eyes of others. Smith’s description of the violator’s “agonies” is detailed and near biblical in tone:

He dares no longer look society in the face, but imagines himself as it were rejected, and thrown out from the affections of all mankind. He cannot hope for the consolation of sympathy in this his greatest and most dreadful distress.... Every thing seems hostile, and he would be glad to fly to some inhospitable desert... [but] The horror of solitude drives him back into society, and he comes again into the presence of mankind, astonished to appear before them, loaded with shame and distracted with fear, in order to supplicate some little protection from the countenance of those very judges, who he knows have already all unanimously condemned him. (99)

Smith’s configuration of shame and remorse is remarkable for its intensity, but also for its description of locative ambivalence as the violator flees first the “eyes” of society, and then his own solitude. What protection does he seek from the condemning countenances
of the judges? It seems that in this case the protection he seeks is, in fact, punishment administered in the court of law whose purpose is to manage and properly distribute the “resentment” of mankind. Only by externalizing judgment as punishment might the violator hope for this “most dreadful” sentiment to be eased. In a later section Smith intimates a possible end to this “most dreadful sentiment.” He writes, “[w]hen the insolence of [the violator’s] injustice is broken and humbled by the terror of his approaching punishment; when he ceases to be an object of fear, with the generous and humane he begins to be an object of pity. The thought of what he is about to suffer extinguishes their resentment for the suffering of others to which he has given occasion” (104). While Smith seems here to offer some hope for the remorseful and punished (but still tearless) violator, Smith in fact labels this pity a “weak and partial humanity,” an enervating response that justice, which protects the “general interest of society,” guards against. Nevertheless, the pity that he observes opens the door for the remorseful man to enjoy, even if only temporarily, the sympathy of “generous and humane” spectators.

This is the shift I wish to trace, from a shame that is passionate and violent to a shame deeply felt and sociable. Whereas Mandeville’s shame contains the potential for anti-social violence, Adam Smith’s carries with it the imagined and interpersonal effects of judgment, of pity, and of spectacle. By the end of the century, shame is firmly embedded in the British narrative of self-improvement and civility. In Samuel Richardson’s *Clarissa* (1747-48) and, later, in Frances Burney’s *Evelina* (1778) shame is no longer a volatile passion. It might be the affective first step necessary to repair and reform, or it might be the highly socially-sensitive embarrassment experienced by self-
conscious narrators such as *Evelina*. As an emotion integral to self-reflection and self-narration, late-eighteenth-century shame is both useful and good. It certainly does not leave murdered children in its wake. The story of shame which I offer is not, however, a straightforward teleology. Rather, it tracks the divergent ways in which eighteenth-century writers negotiate what Michael McKeon seminally identifies as epistemological and ethical crises, the questions of truth and questions of virtue which riddled and functionally reformed seventeenth- and eighteenth-century society and around which the novel cohered as genre. While each of the first three contemporaneous texts that I study are concerned with questions of virtue, each produce different shames in response. The beginning of a socializing, interpersonally affirming shame is evident in both George Lillo’s *London Merchant* (1731) and Eliza Haywood’s *The British Recluse* (1722), yet shame’s passionate volatility insistently structures Daniel Defoe’s *Roxana* (1724). In *Clarissa*, the tension between models of feeling and sociability are expressed in the unstable referents of glory and shame. In *Evelina* passionate shame intervenes in the protagonist’s self-making in the form of her embarrassingly passionate grandmother, Madame Duval. Passionate shame exists alongside internalized and sociable shame; sociable shame contains within it the residue of its volatile and passionate history. I suggest that shame, as the feeling most closely associated with the question of virtue—what one feels at the *loss* of virtue—is the affective expression of these crises.

In this way, my dissertation elaborates the affective history suggested by McKeon’s study of genre. As I will explicate more fully in a later part of this introduction, shame is also implicit in two other important histories of the novel: Ian Watt’s *The Rise of the*
Novel and Paul Hunter’s Before Novels. Beginning from these critics’ implicit recognitions that shame, in some sense, shapes the novel and its readers, my dissertation broadens the generic purview to a study of eighteenth-century narratives, shame, and subjectivity. How do popular stories, told as drama and as fiction, publicly reveal, represent, exploit or constitute “private” shame? How does shame configure the relations between private subjects, narrative, and sociability? Also at stake in this investigation is the historical question, how did shame, as one (perhaps exemplary) emotion, become understood as the subjective expressions of an internal self?

The purpose of this thesis, “Trade in Feelings: Shame in Eighteenth-Century Britain,” is thus to trace a genealogy that considers the consolidation of a dominant “good” version of shame as well as its more unsettled and ambiguous beginnings and residues. My project is genealogical in that it tries to “see” the development of shame by tracing its imbrication in genre, economies, and subjectification, but I will add to Foucault’s nexus of power, knowledge, and bodies a fourth term: “feeling.” Put differently, I examine the affective dimension (physiological and social) of the disciplined body. Foucault describes discipline as a capillary form of power, which he argues is invented in the eighteenth century and which operates “within the social body, rather than above it” (Power/Knowledge 39). Capillary power is “the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes, and everyday lives” (Power/Knowledge 39). Affect is one additional route “into” the body and its actions. Though we may be accustomed to viewing feelings as interior, arising spontaneously from within, before or
separate from cognition, I take as my critical premise, with other historians of emotion, that whatever their phenomenological effects in the body, feelings/emotions/passions are not purely physiological but are also cultural and therefore can be studied as historical objects.¹ Indeed, one goal of this project is to identify how emotion becomes the interior, biological, and non-cognitive object it now seems to be.

Three historians, Albert Hirschman, Daniel Gross, and Philip Fisher, locate this transformation in the Enlightenment period, linking it to the socio-political changes that altered individuals and society. For Albert Hirschman, it is after the seventeenth-century writing of Hobbes and Locke that the passion of avarice or cupidity became the more malleable and socialized “interest.” Asking how it is that avarice, or the drive for money, a passion seen in the medieval period as leading to vice, came to be an appropriate and even commendable passion in capitalism, Hirschman suggests that during the Renaissance thinkers were grappling with the realization that religious precepts were losing their hold on the imagination and no longer sufficed to restrain the passions. So, something else had to be conceived and the concept of “human nature” became the object of study. Reconfigured as interest, the previously dangerous avarice was seen as capable of reining in the more destructive passions such as lust and rage; a person will govern his anger or lust if it serves his self-interest to do so (13-19). Daniel Gross’s The Secret History of Emotion develops a similar timeline. Gross argues that during the English Civil

War, two opposite concepts of emotion were available: one, following Descartes, considered emotions as primarily personal, biological, expressive of a human nature, commonly shared; the other, drawing on Christian Aristotelian thought, conceived of emotions as “irreducibly social” (41). In this second view, “emotions are not essentially universal traits of our biology expressed by individuals, but are, rather, contested terms negotiated in a public sphere where power is distributed unequally” (110-111). He argues that after the seventeenth century, the Cartesian view won out and, as a result, “passions that were once overtly rhetorical, such as anger, pride and humility, now quietly gird the Western system of belief that emotion is hardwired to the human nature we share equally” (8). Finally, for Philip Fisher, feelings are “democratized” in the eighteenth century; in this period, the intolerant, “vehement passions” begin to give way to tolerant, middle-class, everyday “emotions” (45).² In mid-seventeenth-century economic descriptions of man, work “externalizes the self in a secular, middle class world just as the passions and those deeds set in motion by the passions had in a world of the spirit” (56). Such economic descriptions, Fisher argues, created a “private” experience separate from the public world, with feelings that could also be private. While these historians orient their analyses to different goals and disagree about the universal nature (or not) of feelings, they all seem to suggest that the passions are democratized, socialized, and interiorized at

² Emotions, Fisher says, "are categories for the absolute priority of the everyday world, as all middle-class categories are...They are the democratized, mixed conditions of an inner life that is, at the same time, tolerant of others and their quite different inner lives" (45). Passions, by contrast, are intolerant.
the very moment they become important to the constitution of the modern civic being in a commercial culture. ³

Following the trajectory set by these writers, “Trade in Feelings” examines how shame is reformed, reconstructed and traded to become the more manageable modern “feeling” or “emotion.” I make the argument that shame is ontologically altered in the eighteenth century, as the political structure and the private individual within it are likewise altered. To put this differently, shame becomes a facilitator and marker of the civilized self required by a commercial society which takes the private individual as its primary political and economic unit. Building on Hirschman and on Fisher, who understand the modernization of feeling as implicit in the reorganization of society to accommodate capitalism’s necessary and cultivated instability, I connect the invention of modern shame with the revision of the self as a self-contained yet economically dependent subject.

_A Crisis in Feeling_

By the early eighteenth century, the passions had become uncertain concepts. Concerns to describe passion and its potential permeate the century as authors struggle to define relations between people, and between person and thing, in the context of an

³ Thomas Dixon and William Reddy make similar arguments for the importance of the eighteenth century to the invention of emotion. Reading British and American theology from the mid-eighteenth to early-nineteenth centuries, Dixon offers what he calls a "story of the creation of the category of 'emotions'" in English-language texts (19). William Reddy considers the era of the French Revolution “an extraordinary moment in Western history” when, “for a few decades, emotions were deemed to be as important as reason in the foundation of states and the conduct of politics” (143).
increasingly commercial, mobile, and urban nation.\textsuperscript{4} The crisis of passion is visible in multiple cultural products—plays, novels, literary criticism, social philosophy—and is itself inextricable from anxieties about narrative’s influence. It is visible, for example, in Samuel Johnson’s anxiety about the effects of reading novels, and Shaftesbury’s earlier explication of the effect of romances. In \textit{Rambler No. 4}, Johnson imagines the corruptive danger of reading fictive lives: “If the power of example is so great, as to take possession of the memory by a kind of violence, and produce effects almost without the intervention of the will, care ought to be taken that .... the best examples only should be exhibited; and that which is likely to operate so strongly, should not be mischievous or uncertain in its effects” (\textit{The Rambler.} 27–28). In Johnson’s understanding, passions make the person permeable, susceptible to influence. Entering the mind through the passions, the powerful exemplar can circumvent the will.

Forty years earlier, Shaftesbury suggests that “The appearance of reality is necessary to make any passion agreeably represented: and to be able to move others, we must first be mov’d ourselves, or at least seem to be so, upon some probable grounds”\textsuperscript{(4)}. His qualifying phrase “or at least seem to be so” suggests that credible, if not genuine, representation of passion will do if the aim is to move passion in others. However, the very difference between credible and real passion is further obscured when he observes that “a very small foundation of any passion will serve us, not only to act it well, but even

to work ourselves into it beyond our own reach” (4). With the help of a “romance or novel,” he explains, any man might “feel the belle passion in good earnest” (4). Whereas Johnson suggests that the feeling of passion awakened by reading novels might so impress the reader that he will alter, Shaftesbury proposes that reading romances or novels creates a problem of confused self-knowledge; the reader does not really feel the passion, but works himself into believing that he feels it. Both Johnson’s and Shaftesbury’s explications of passionate transfer suggest their fear of a passionate crowd, the untramelling of not one reader’s passion, but thousands’. This is most clear in Shaftesbury’s essay, in which the mode by which passion is transferred from text to reader is similar to religious enthusiasm which moves from person to person, creating a “panic” (11). He theorizes that passion in a crowd is swiftly contagious, transmitted visually: “The fury flies from face to face: and the disease is no sooner seen than caught” (11). The language of contagion and disease is signal. Passion is not imitated but “caught.” The spectator cannot remain a spectator, cannot separate himself from the “panic,” because merely by seeing, he is part of it.

Shaftesbury’s anxious attention to panic and contagious fury is exemplary of the cultural concern with passion which Geoffrey Sill links to the endemic eighteenth-century crises in truth and virtue identified by Michael McKeon. As Sill says, the question of passion, “which resulted from the uncertainty of the age over the nature, function, and uses of mankind's irrational, individualistic self” both “raises and problematizes” questions of truth and virtue (8). In other words, feelings (of anxiety, loss, shame, or lust) alert a character or individual to the instability of truth or virtue. If, as Sill suggests,
novels propose a “cure” for the crisis of passion, culturally they form a flashpoint for concerns about the instability, and potential uncontrollability, of the crowd. This crowd, for Johnson and Shaftesbury, does not comprise men like themselves—educated and reasonable—but the passions of others, those commercial and literate subjects upon whose judgment, self-governance, and work the British nation is now economically dependent, those Johnson describes as “the young, the ignorant, and the idle.” *(The Rambler. 28).*

While Sill proposes the novel as cure for the passions, John Mullan argues that sentimental novels articulated passions, in this way transforming their contagious communicability into a language of sociability. His study of sentiment in Hume, Richardson, and Sterne presents the hypothesis that all three writers "discover in their writings a sociability which is dependent upon the communication of passions and sentiment" (Mullan 2). Novels and philosophy, Mullan suggests, were both "under pressure" to create new language and forms of sociability. The challenge was to understand how exchanges of private feeling could be more than private and personal: "How can a language of feeling explain social relations as such?" (16). Writers aimed not only to represent social relations, but also to produce society or, as Mullan puts it, "to make society on the page" (25). I would suggest this goal is shared by writers such as Shaftesbury and Johnson, but the terminology is revealing. Mullan focuses on "sentiment"—which is aligned with heightened sensitivity, sensations of love and pity, self-knowledge through emotional response, and the mid- to late-eighteenth century culture of sensibility—whereas “passion” evokes the earlier, but in the eighteenth-century
still operative, humoral body. If sentiments can be conduits to both the self and the social, a special alternate to rational knowing closely aligned with judgment, then passions, by contrast, operate biologically. Bodily, humoral passion is described, for example, by Thomas Wright (1601) who draws on Cicero to explain that “actions which are common between us and beasts, we call Passions….. They are called passions… because when these affections are stirring in our mindes, they alter the humours of our bodies, causing some passion or alteration in them” (13). Sensations of love and pity, so important to Samuel Richardson and Adam Smith, are not humoral, but exist, rather, in the heart and the imagination.

Nevertheless, as Gail Kern Paster points out, these sentimental passions still retain a residue of humoral passion. Kern Paster argues that the biological view of emotions stems from the humoral theory of medieval and early modern England which persists, still, in the metaphors we use to talk about feelings: “Humoral materialism lingers in our propensity to describe ourselves as—and … feel ourselves to be—‘filled’ with emotion” (7). Humoral physiology, she explains, ascribes to the workings of the internal organs an aspect of agency, purposiveness, and plenitude to which the subject's own will is often decidedly irrelevant” (10) and “body parts are even imbued with their own affective capacity” (11). Kern Paster reminds us that in the early modern period, humoralism was epistemologically pervasive, extending from the experience of what it meant to be “in” a

---

5 The comparison I am drawing is similar to that drawn by Fisher. As he puts it, feelings, passions, affections are not different words for same thing; rather each is a "legislative ordering" of the inner life (41). So, for example, the idea of the state of "feeling" is defined by "a distinction between the self and its states, even within the moment of emotion" (42) whereas the state of “passion” might be defined as the momentary annihilation of past, future, and others.
body to understandings of gender and class. Kern Paster complicates Mary Douglas's distinctions between physical and social by "theorizing connection between the history of the outer body... and that of the inner body" both of which are both physical and social. In this period, the physiopsychological was, at the same time, social. Or, stated differently, physiological theory affects “the subjective experience of being-in-the-body” (3).

Arguing for the importance of grappling with humoral theory in histories of the body and of shame, she argues that “[t]he permeability, volatility, and especially the insistent interiority of the humoral body helps to motivate and rationalize the changing thresholds of embarrassment and shame seen ... as punctuating the history of the social body” (16). By the eighteenth-century, humoral concepts of the body had mostly been discounted, but as Kern Paster insists, they remain embedded in the language of emotions. While I argue that passion is ontologically altered, reworked to become the more manageable, or democratic emotion, it nonetheless persists in eighteenth-century print and stage culture, retaining its dense semantic history, fluctuating between sentiment and appetite, self-interest and sociality, and adapting to new epistemologies and systems of value.

*Why shame?*

Not only did the eighteenth century generate the transformation of feeling, it also witnessed a change in sociability and selfhood. It saw the beginning of a new form of society based on the idea of social contract and grounded in theories of natural sympathy
and sociability. It was also the period that invented the modern psychological individual. Recent critical perspectives on shame seem inevitably to recall, and yoke, these big eighteenth-century inventions. For Silvan Tomkins, for example, shame lies at the root of the self as it founds, or grounds, the intersection of self and world. Tomkins configures shame as *the* affect of sociability, or as Sedgwick and Frank gloss his work, the “switch point” of the self that enables or disables interest in the world; shame makes both self-consciousness and world-consciousness possible and at the same time interdependent (Sedgwick and Frank 23). To summarize and simplify Tomkins’ theory, we are “invested” in a person, and when we feel that person turn away from us, refuse our interest, we feel shame (Tomkins 138). But that does not make us lose interest in that person, or in the world. Rather, “shame is characterized by its failure ever to renounce its object cathexis, its relation to the desire for pleasure as well as the need to avoid pain” (Sedgwick and Frank 23). In reaction to loss of interest, shame functions to make apparent to the perceiving self (or, in the language that Sedgwick and Frank prefer, the perceiving “system”) that it is distinct from the world in which it is invested (7). In this way, it individuates the self. But in its refusal to relinquish interest in the object, it stubbornly clings to the world.

---

6 Armstrong claims that “the history of the novel and the history of the modern subject are, quite literally, one and the same” (1). Following a post-structuralist approach, she considers the novel to be not the expression of individualism, but the producer of it.

7 The context of mid-twentieth-century technology is important to Sedgwick and Frank’s reading of Tomkins, and this is what they call the "cybernetic fold": the moment of both structuralism and systems theory, the moment between modernist and postmodernist ways of theorizing brain and mind. Similar to systems theory, Tomkins' theory of affects is an interleaving of the digital and the analogic (12).
In a move very similar to Foucault's opening salvo in *History of Sexuality*, Sedgwick and Frank begin their introduction to *Shame and Its Sisters* by enumerating all the assumptions of "Theory" which now feel like common sense, before revealing them to be digitally structured (i.e. on/off and binary) and repetitive. Rather than freeing thought from the "repressive hypothesis" that Foucault denatured, "Theory," they say, repeats the repressive hypothesis by equating poststructuralist (or deconstructive, or feminist) critique with subversion. The language has simply shifted from "liberation/repression" to "subversion/hegemony" (1-2). Furthermore, they speculate that "the phenomenon of shame" might provide a way to get around or "short-circuit" such repetitions of the repressive hypothesis (5). How might this work? First, shame is an apt affect-theory to perform this short-circuiting or targeted circumvention because it is the affect most precious to the repressive hypothesis. According to the repressive hypothesis, which Foucault describes in order to dismantle, sex is natural, free, and needs to be liberated; sex has been repressed for centuries and to set ourselves free, we need to free sex. On the contrary, Foucault asserts, "What is peculiar to modern societies, in fact, is not that they consigned sex to a shadow existence [as the repression hypothesis would have it], but that they dedicated themselves to speaking of it ad infinitum, while exploiting it as the secret" (Foucault 35). Foucault argues that the theory of repression was (and perhaps still is) indispensible because it diverts attention from the real workings of power (of biopower which works not by subjugation but by subjectification) and supports the illusion that the goal of political action ought to be liberation from oppression (7-12). In Foucault’s words, the theory of repression "made it possible to
invert the representation of the relationships of power to sexuality, causing the latter to appear, not in its essential and positive relation to power, but as being rooted in a specific and irreducible urgency which power tries as best it can to dominate; thus the idea of 'sex' makes it possible to evade what gives 'power' its power; it enables one to conceive power solely as law and taboo"(155). In other words, by erecting power “solely as law and taboo” the theory of repression stops us from recognizing the minute workings of power instantiated and reiterated in our every performance of legitimate and legitimizing selfhood.

Foucault’s *History of Sexuality* has thus been critically important not just for rethinking sex, but also for rethinking the constitution of power itself. Yet because Foucault does not interrogate the affective presumptions of the repressive hypothesis, his analysis of our attachment to it (and of biopower) is described solely in terms of the “pleasures” of power/knowledge. (In this respect, Foucault himself is caught in the incitement to discourse, sexualizing the structure of power he interrogates.) The question of affect’s role in subjectification is posed by Daniel Gross and Sara Ahmed. Unlike Sedgwick and Frank, whose concern is largely with affect as the dynamic by which the individual forms relations with its extra-individual social, Gross and Ahmed place affect firmly within the socio-physical, economic, political world. Their excavations of the received notion that emotion wells up from within, sometimes threatens the rational mind, yet is still an authentic expression of the true self participates in a growing body of work across disciplines—including cognitive science, anthropology, history, political science—and from different critical positions—feminist, queer, post-colonial.
Gross uses Aristotle’s treatment of shame as one of his first proofs that emotion is social and that any theories of emotion that focus on the mere physicality of shame (as he suggests cognitive science has a tendency to do) misses the most important quality of the feeling. He quotes Aristotle:

Since shame is imagination [phantasia] about a loss of reputation and for its own sake, not for its results, and since no one cares about reputation [in the abstract] but on account of those who hold an opinion of him, necessarily a person feels shame toward those whose opinion he takes account of....And [he] feels more shame at things done before these people’s eyes and in the open; hence, too the proverb ‘Shame is in the eyes.’ (Aristotle: 1384a22-36, quoted in Gross 41)

For Gross, shame’s dependence on the eyes means that the causes of shame are directly and necessarily related to a person’s position, and to his perception of that position in relation to others. In Aristotle’s first example, the master would not feel shame before a slave since “doing something dishonorable in front of someone without status carries no direct consequence” (41). Shame is not in the slave’s eyes. For this reason Gross concludes that shame is “irreducibly social” (41).

Not only is shame felt in the presence of others who possess some significant degree of status (and thus can only be felt socially), but shame is felt particularly where “social institutions are most dense” (Gross 42). In other words, the experience of shame depends on the complexity of a culture’s hierarchy or social division, and on the very value it accords “reputation” and its own rules. It further depends on one’s own awareness of and attachment to those normative values. In Aristotle’s example, one politician, Cydias, urged an assembly of Athenian citizens to right action by asking them to imagine that all Greeks were watching their vote. At issue was a “suspect debate about
land allotment” (Gross 61). And Aristotle is clear that Cydias asks them to imagine themselves surrounded by watchers as they voted, not that their compatriots would only hear about it after the fact. For Gross, this example makes it clear that the “eyes” need not be present or embodied in a person, but can rather assume the “body” of the imaginary social, the system of norms according to which a community operates. Cydias’s persuasion assumes that the citizens are sufficiently attached to the normative values that structure their society, and also have sufficient investment in their own reputations. In this way, too, and perhaps even more significantly than in Mandeville’s formulation, shame is irreducibly social.

Gross’s insights into shame may help qualify Tomkins’ and Sedgwick and Frank’s analysis. Like Tomkins, and like Sedgwick and Frank, Gross finds that shame and interest are intimates. But whereas Tomkins finds a general, unspecified interest in others at the root of shame (though his example of the original moment of interest is, of course, the mother), Gross suggests that interest is inevitably socially configured. Reading Tomkins through Gross’s lens on sociality would calibrate Tomkins’ conclusions in this way: not all others interest us to the same degree, therefore not all interests attach us to the world with the same force, and we do not feel the withdrawal of all interests as shame. But Gross’s explication of Cydias’s persuasion leaves unanswered what is, for me, a series of vital questions: What makes those politicians so attached to their reputations that even imagining the eyes of their compatriots might cause them to change their minds? What made the other option so shameful? What makes the social so strong? Or, stated otherwise, what makes the individual so invested in the admiration of specific and
admirable others that he would sacrifice material gain? These questions go beyond the scope of Gross’s work, but Sara Ahmed’s analysis of the relation of shame to love—who offers a critical race take on Tomkins’ theory of interest-shame, critically informed by Freudian psycho-analysis—provide one possible answer. For Ahmed, the crucial task of the activist and theorist is accounting for emotional investment in structures of oppression. Ahmed’s question, as she says, is not "What are emotions" but "What do emotions do?" (*The Cultural Politics of Emotion* 4).

It is a profound question. “What do emotions do?” prompts us to pay attention to social-political effects of emotion, and to the histories embedded in language that precipitate these effects. The question itself is premised on an understanding of emotions as speech acts: "emotions are performative and they involve speech acts which depend on past histories, at the same time as they generate effects" (Sara Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* 13). The idea that emotion is “performative” gives Ahmed’s model substantial explanatory power. The effectiveness of a performative depends entirely on situation, that is, on the place and time of the act, the speaker and the receiver of the act, the relation between them, and their social positions. An emotion will only function

---

8 Austin’s most famous example of performative is the legal pronouncement of marriage. “I now pronounce you man and wife,” uttered by an authorized person, in an authorized situation, *makes* two people married. Judith Butler profoundly elaborated Austin’s theory in her analysis of gender and sex. For Butler, gender is a performative, endlessly reiterated (Butler). Importantly, this is not a willed performative (as Austin’s is) but is rather embedded in the discourse that makes us intelligible and that we reiterate—always imprecisely and not consciously. Ahmed’s move toward affect relocates the performative, moving it from discourse to a situated embodiment. Emotions, as Ahmed understands them, form the embodied boundaries between out and in, between object and subject: "it is through emotions, or how we respond to objects and others, that surfaces or boundaries are made" (10). Hatred of a racialized other is a performative which makes that other, and which makes the subject which hates the other.
successfully as performative—will only be recognized, will only have effects—if it accedes to the norms of that community, if the emotion, in other words, is recognized within a community. Considering emotions as performatives means that an emotion’s meaning is created precisely in the juncture between language (what a performative has historically meant or effected), community, and subject.

Shame is one such performative. Explaining why shame is such a potent social regulator, Ahmed writes: "in order to avoid shame, subjects must enter the 'contract' of the social bond, by seeking to approximate a social ideal" (107). In a statement very like Tomkins' Ahmed insists that in showing shame, the subject comes closer to its community, "to that which I have been exposed as failing" (107) or, in Sedgewick and Frank’s terms, “shame is characterized by its failure ever to renounce its object cathexis" (23). But this is where Ahmed takes a turn. She observes that for the subject to re-enter that community, to again “interest” its object, shame must be seen as temporary; in other words, to be reintegrated, the subject must again commit to the community ideals and reject the shameful act or identity (107). Non-restorative shame would be complete and total exclusion from the community, where the subject repeatedly acknowledges the “ideal” of the ideal, but repeatedly fails. Such failure might be seen as a constant or perhaps constitutive failure, a failure beyond hope or repair. (We can imagine this as the position of the ashamed queer and see, in it, the radical importance of queer pride.) Ahmed traces this logic of “happy” assimilation to nineteenth-century utilitarian thinkers such as James Mill. In The Promise of Happiness Ahmed links the utilitarian promise of happiness to nineteenth-century imperialism, a mission which was, she argues,
"legitimated through the utilitarian injunction of maximizing happiness" (The Promise of Happiness 123). My dissertation adds to Ahmed’s analysis by extending her genealogy of happiness to the eighteenth century to show that the dynamic of happiness is not only, as she argues, integral to imperial governance, it is also deeply sedimented in modernity.

Shame’s often-theorized link to both sociability and selfhood makes it a valuable affect to study in the context of eighteenth century literature and culture; it is during the eighteenth century that the terms of the social bond and that ideal were first articulated in the language of feeling or, as Mullan argues, that philosophers and novelists (namely David Hume, Samuel Richardson, and Laurence Stern) tried to make the social contract an imaginable ideal, “to make society on the page” (25). The social contract, as Nancy Armstrong explicates, sought to explain social cohesion and articulate a different form of political power, one that depended on discourse rather than on violence, or threats of violence and which was rooted in the "individual” rather than the "group" (Armstrong) 35-36). Armstrong argues that the social contract produced a contradiction: though grounded in the idea of the individual, the social requires the repression of the individual. She argues, “Such a notion confined the possibilities for human identity between the poles of political subjection, on the one hand, and apolitical subjectivity on the other” (Armstrong 36). My dissertation suggests that the contradiction Armstrong defines feels

---

9 According to Armstrong, the rise of the novel depended on the contradiction inherent in the social contract. "The novel developed sophisticated strategies for transforming political information into any one of several recognizable psychological conditions, and it did so in a way that concealed the power exercised by discourse itself in carrying out this transformation on a mass scale" (36). So Richardson's Pamela, for example, folds the worrisome aspects of the social contract into a tense tale of sexual contract, whereby the servant-class infiltrates (pleasurably) the gentry.
like shame. Or, stated differently, the tension of the social contract works itself out in literary constructions of shame, the affective dimension of the self-division required by a social cohesion which requires, in the terms of twentieth-century theory, structures of power and oppression. The traces of this tension surface in current theories of shame and subjectivity such as those of Ahmed and Tomkins.

Ahmed, Gross, and Sedgwick and Frank recognize that in order to understand how power works, we need to deconstruct our own affective attachments (which are not necessarily loving or desirous) to those structures. This project contributes to the same goal by tracing part of the history of one of those affective attachments to, very broadly speaking, the commercial economy and the social contract such an economy requires. My goal is not to explicate what shame “is” ontologically, but to recover what it has been, what it has meant, what pasts it carries, that make it what it is, or means, or does in the present. This is a story about how shame has been instrumental in the formation of a (commercial) self that is gifted with a complex, hidden, true interiority while at the same time sensitively, sympathetically alive to the touch of others. This dissertation is, thus, not only a story of shame, but also of the modern, ashamed, inevitably divided social and private being.

**Genres of shame: from execution to embarrassment**

Michel Foucault has described the two complementary techniques of power that created this modern, divided subject as “discipline” and “bio-politics,” and he traces these techniques to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Discipline casts the body as machine, and it trains that machine-body for efficient participation in the economy
As a technique of power, discipline operates in schools, the family, and, as will be relevant for my Chapter 1, in apprenticeship. Discipline creates “docile” and useful bodies in part by means of coercion based on observation; that is, the subject is “seen” and learns to act as if constantly under observation and, thus, “normalization becomes one of the great instruments of power” (Foucault, *History of Sexuality* 139; *Discipline and Punish* 184). Or, re-stated in terms of my focus, execution becomes embarrassment. Bio-politics concerns the body as species, that is, “the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes” (*History of Sexuality* 139) and it is seen in novel eighteenth-century sciences of, for example, demographics and probability or, as Ian Baucom has so forcefully shown, the financial instrument of insurance which is itself based on calculations of probability (Baucom). My analysis builds on and reframes Foucault’s historical narrative of the emergence of this divided self-consciousness by focusing on the affects that produce and re-produce it, particularly the affect of shame.

Shame, as other critics have recognized, exists between the social and the private body.\(^{10}\) I recognize that by using private/social I risk skewing the usual binaries of private/public and individual/social; however, I do this deliberately so as to emphasize the bounding, closeting, interiorizing sense of privacy and the social, rather than public, world described in novels and enacted in plays. Critics of eighteenth-century British

---

\(^{10}\) I am thinking here particularly of Sara Ahmed and Elspeth Probyn. Ahmed writes: "Crucially, the individuation of shame -- the way it turns the self against and towards the self -- can be linked precisely to the inter-corporeality and sociality of shame experiences. (105) for Probyn, shame is bodily and social: “It is about bodies being close to one another and an acute sensitivity of one's sense of self” (34). Shame, as bodily affect, enables us to “feel” social relations.
literature have characterized the connection between the private, literature, and the social in different ways. For Ian Watt, the novel occurs at (or as) the nexus of social and private, both representing and mediating between the private and the social. Identifying that the novel’s preoccupation with private experience occurs simultaneously with two other shifts, the expansion of print culture and the urbanization of Britain, he highlights what he considers the paradoxes of these coincidences. First, depictions of privacy that trigger feelings of “identification” are facilitated by print, "the most impersonal, objective, and public of the media of communication" (214). Second, urbanization led to a literary form more interested in private than public life. Watt concludes that these two paradoxical "tendencies" make the novel "capable of a more thorough subversion of psychological and social reality than any previous [genre]" (214). So, the novel is not only a nexus, but a dynamic one, capable of exerting its own pressures on the reality it represents and mediates. For J. Paul Hunter, the novel’s novelty lies not in its focus on the private lives of ordinary people, but in making those lives public. It made what had been private self-reflection into public and commercial entertainment (with moral instruction). Tracing what came “before novels,” Hunter finds precursors of the novel in “autobiographic” practices of the early eighteenth century, which in turn developed from the Puritan accounting for the self (330). He claims that there were two stages in the cultural process that enabled both autobiography and novels: first, a “willingness to go public with the fruits of subjectivity”; second, a “dislodging of self-analysis and self-disclosure from the utilitarian theological ends that had originally sponsored it” (330). The development of the novel and the published autobiography from autobiographic processes such as the
seventeenth century diary, then, is not simply a change in topos—the life of an ordinary person rather than hero or saint—but the extent to which it is elaborated and, I suggest, the extent to which it both constructs and elaborates that life precisely as a “private” life.

Both Watt and Hunter focus on the question of genre as both reflective of and producer of an emergent middle class. Each also, though not explicitly, theorizes shame as a part of the imaginative engagement between audience and character. For both critics, the eighteenth-century novel does something to—represents or constructs or bridges or negotiates—the imperfect wall between private and social and both identify the importance of shame to that porous wall. To explain the novel’s focalizing attraction for the reader, Watt cites Bernard de Mandeville’s primary example of shame’s sociability. Mandeville describes a modest girl who, though she would blush in company at a bawdy conversation, can listen from behind the wall without feeling any shame at all. For Mandeville, this is decisive evidence that shame is social, rather than pure bodily affect, but Watt puts the example to different use. He compares the novel-reader to the modest girl behind the wall in order to suggest that the novel provided a similarly unabashed and protected experience: in privacy, the novel-reader can experience “private” events that might otherwise make her blush. Critically, this mode of unwitnessed access to private and shameful experience is, for Watt, one of the ways that the printed novel permits and enables identification.¹¹ According to Watt, this covert gaze gives the novel "more

¹¹ Deirdre Lynch questions Watts’ easy assumption of identificatory reading practices, noting that "identification" is a modern and historically specific term for understanding the relation between reader and character. Lynch, by contrast, attempts to reconstruct readers' "working epistemologies" (10) that permitted reading pleasure in novels that are not about psychological depth. While with Lynch I question the “identification” that Watt
absolute power over the reader's consciousness" (209). That the novel does so precisely by creating and then *obviating* shame is key. Though necessary to the excitement the novel offers, shame does not (or cannot) collapse the wall between text and reader. Readers are thus implicated in a kind of incomplete or arrested exchange of shame where the result is both identification and the intensification of self-scrutiny. And in this schema, it is as though identification is premised not solely on the elaboration of private experience but also on the affect of this elaboration: “absolute power” resides in private revelations that *might* cause shame, but do not because the reader’s face is safely hidden behind her book. And I cannot help but note that, as Sedgwick and Frank also observe, the attitude and posture of shame (head bent, eyes downward) is also the posture of reading (20).

Like Watt, Hunter locates shame at the point of differentiation between unpublished autobiographic practices and the novel, at precisely the moment when, as I have suggested above, elaborating the “private” becomes the topos of the novel. As he explains, “[r]evelations that would have caused profound embarrassment—even shame—a generation earlier began to find their way into print” and “always with a clear moral point” (316). Both Hunter and Watt place obviated shame *inside*, as it were, their configurations of the novel’s elaboration or construction of the “private” in relation to print culture and readership, yet neither exploits or interrogates this intimate point of connection. “Trade in Feelings” takes precisely this uncomfortable intimacy as its focus, assumes, I suggest that eighteenth-century literatures, particularly those featuring shame, begin to construct relations of sympathy, substitution, and feeling judgment that help create an effect of psychological depth.
emphasizing that the connection which Hunter and Watt find between shame and the novel is not arbitrary. Rather, it is a mechanism necessary to the consolidation of middle class norms and subjectivities. Indeed, as the reader experiences the identification that Watt identifies, and unprecedented access to shameful, private revelations that Hunter identifies, she also experiences the intensification of pro-social self-scrutiny and self-regulation. Shame is a “necessary ingredient” not only to the novel, but also to making a sociable commercial, middle-class subject.

Though most of my analysis concerns novels, I begin this chronologically organized study in Chapter 1 with a play dominated by shame and recuperated by good commercial values, George Lillo’s *The London Merchant* (1731). I move between genres for two reasons. First, during the early eighteenth century, before the Stage Licencing Act of 1737, plays were a more lucrative and more popular form of narrative than novels and they reached the same audience that novels did, or that critics like Johnson feared they might: the less educated, the young, servants and apprentices, women.\(^\text{12}\) Second, like Defoe and later novelists, Lillo dramatizes the life and shame of an ordinary British person. In this case, Lillo’s ordinary Briton is the very personification of McKeon’s categorical instability: a person-in-progress, the apprentice. Lillo’s play directly engages commercial pride, on the one hand, and status anxiety, on the other. Bourgeois values are nowhere more blatantly expressed than in George Lillo’s Thorowgood, the successful merchant of *The London Merchant* who tries, but ultimately fails, to direct his apprentice Barnwell toward the good life. Thorowgood is the epitome of bourgeois values. He

\(^{12}\) See (DeRitter 7)
propounds a view of time that can be “lost” (Lillo)1.1.66), of inheritance as the “fruits” of “industry” (1.1.110), and of value based on merit rather than birth (1.1.140-144). For Thorowgood, not only does business profit the private man, it also protects the nation. He observes that “honest merchants ... may sometimes contribute to the safety of their country as they do at all times to its happiness” (1.1.18-19). In Lillo’s tragedy, the merchant is the model British subject, and the subject on whom the nation now depends for happiness and for safety, replacing the soldier and the landowner both. However, this is an uncomfortable dependence. I argue that the apprentice becomes a focal point for the period’s concern with the accountability of a new class of people, and, at the same time, with the question of what motivates a person to labour industriously in a commercial economy. While handbooks for apprentices (such as Samuel Richardson’s *Vade Mecum*) idealize a proper—rather than too-passionately, self-interested or ambitious—apprentice who is industrious, loyal, and pecunious, Lillo’s play idealizes that ideal’s failure in the tragic hero, George Barnwell. Barnwell departs from the typical bad apprentice, a fairly common negative example of the period, who progresses steadily from one vice to another and dies on the gallows. I argue that by making shame Barnwell’s most persistent and repeated affect, Lillo insists on the relation between the ashamed and the community that Ahmed points to; shame recovers the individual for his community, and at the same time recovers the ideals shared by the community, thus reifying and reasserting the boundaries of that community. Moreover, Barnwell’s shame insists that Barnwell, or indeed any person, could have been different, and that he still is, in some sense, different than his actions. In this way, by suggesting a possibility that is not realized but persists in
the imagination, his shame insists on maintaining the positive ideal as a kind of potential. It insists that loyal industry is possible and achievable in this world. More broadly, it suggests that the world is always in progress and that, with industrious application, it can be reshaped. Shame in this affirmative form undergirds even a community which values instability and ambition as the commercial economy inevitably must.

Chapter 2, “Novel Selves,” examines Eliza Haywood’s *The British Recluse* (1722) and follows Daniel Defoe’s *Roxana* (1724) through two later editions (1740 and 1745)[49]. If shame becomes a topos at the point that the novel becomes a genre, then the differences between these fictions—their radically different sites and uses of shame—suggest that at the very foundation of the novel lies a contest between the shamed and the shameless. In Haywood’s romance, the two women who are shamed—as it turns out by the same man—find friendship and peace by sharing their stories of humiliated love. Shame in this way is sociable. However, the women’s sociality is not based solely in identification—as Belinda would have it—but equally in a desire to be entertained. I suggest that in modeling an alternate sociality based in confession and exposure, *The British Recluse* foregrounds the uncomfortable affective premise of much novelistic narrative: its mechanism of hiding/exposing passions makes the reader curious about the prospect of humiliation. Shame structures Defoe’s *Roxana* differently. Not only distinct from other passions, shame is the pivot, or the point of connection and differentiation, between the present narrator-Roxana, and the self that she describes in the past tense. The structure of repentance requires this separation of selves, and also requires narration as analysis: telling the story to identify errors. In this structure, the narrator traces the steps
in her moral decline, and readers follow, knowing that it will end in redemption because the story is framed by the present narrator’s repentance. But while shameful acts generate much of the plot’s excitement and momentum—Roxana’s loss of virtue, her lies and disguises in pursuit of wealth—the most shameful action in the text, the murder of Susan, threatens to undermine the structure of this novel and of repentance itself because the event of the murder is not rendered within the chronology of the text. In Defoe’s *Roxana*, shame works both passionately and narratively as mechanism for self-invention, perhaps suggesting the violent, anti-social tendencies of some autobiographical accounts of self. In the later editions of Roxana, shame’s violent potential is reformed as it becomes a feeling that engenders pity or compassion within a moral framework. These later editions attempt to stabilize shame, to assert its virtuous potential for pro-social self-scrutiny, as they simultaneously conform to new generic expectations of the novel of formal unity and character coherence. Indeed, they cover over shame’s volatility to create the unified, coherent, self-monitoring interiority associated with the novel.

Chapter 3, “‘A Reformation so much wanted’: Clarissa’s Glorious Shame,” examines the effect of shame’s reformation. With its echoes of both romance and Puritan accounts of the self, and as a novel that must, as Samuel Johnson famously insisted, be read “for the sentiment” ((Boswell 137); Boswell in (Mullan 57), *Clarissa* (1747-48) is an experiment in shame and sociability which yields a desired pro-social stabilization of shame and, as such, provides a spectacular lens on two questions: first, how the self and emotion became “expressive”; and, second, how shame contributes to the development of a subjectivity defined by psychological interiority. *Clarissa* is structured by seemingly
opposite feelings, shame and glory, both of which are inhabited in turn by Clarissa and Lovelace. Shame’s connection to glory suggests the persistence of an older model of power and regulation that underlies and complicates the sympathy that Adam Smith and Richardson imagine. In this chapter, I argue that by providing a technology of self that relies on and narrativizes shame, *Clarissa* endeavours to resolve the problematic corruption of moral sentiments by wrongly-directed sympathy. Not only does shame work in *Clarissa*, as it did in *Roxana*, as an affective pivot which rationalizes the total revelation of self, but it does so by maligning or disgracing the ‘bad’ shame, that shame which is too closely associated with rank and ambition and which was, in *Roxana*, volatile and violent. Clarissa’s glorious shame stands in contrast to that aristocratic shame expressed by her family and Lovelace. She produces a shamed but authoritative self.

Thirty years later, another female protagonist, Evelina, blushes constantly, her embarrassment signaling a refined sensibility and differentiating her from those who claim greatest proximity, her family. Like the ideal apprentice, she is trained in the business of sociability, but this time, it is the sociability of womanhood. Chapter 4, “*Evelina*’s Embarrassment,” considers Frances Burney’s *Evelina* (1778) as the first novel of embarrassment. *Evelina* suggests the ways in which shame (as a modern emotion, now, rather than passion) entrenches a model of fully social shame. Here, I borrow from Philip Fisher’s differentiation between passion and emotion. For Fisher, whereas the passions are immediately public the emotions are “under control” (58). As he explains, after the eighteenth century, “we have … a privatization of feeling made possible by an impassive exterior that only 'displays' emotion when we choose to do so” (58-59). This means that
feelings can be selectively shared, or they can be held private. In such a culture, any vehement, public passion suggests that the individual does not possess the self-knowledge required to be civil. Evelina’s embarrassment, by contrast, signals her deep civility. Evelina is embarrassed by her maternal grandmother, Madame Duval, and by the Branghtons. She's embarrassed by her grandmother's impoliteness, her coarse intrusion into Evelina's trip to London with the Mirvans, and then her even more presumptuous intrusion into the Mirvans' home. Madame Duval's lack of sensibility to the Mirvans’ dislike of her, and indeed her imperviousness to Captain Mirvan’s outright ridicule, contribute to Evelina’s unease. Likewise, the Branghtons are constantly discomfiting. Their home is uncomfortably small and the family's desire to tell each others' secrets signals their awkward, embarrassing lack of "discretion." In Evelina, perhaps for the first time, social embarrassment rather than private shame becomes central to the character and the story, determining relations between characters and emplotting a humorous tension, aligning shame with new models of sociability, moving it from tragedy to comedy. To be “insensible,” as the Branghtons are to the gloomy Macartney, is to be embarrassing. Shame enforces sociability; it is, in some sense, sensibility’s ugly sister. And in this instance, I think, calling it sorority is accurate. The novel uses shame to divide sensible family against insensible, using shame as both signifier and enforcer of polite culture while recognizing the genealogical familiarity of the ashamed and the shameless.

While explicitly focused on the changing aspect of shame, these chapters also open questions of genre, gender, and class. How does the self-division required of the ideal apprentice and by shame become a mechanism for manufacturing not only the
interiority conceived in novels like *Clarissa* and *Evelina*, but also of the social contract which requires a self-regulating, pro-social subjectivity? How do eighteenth-century revisions of shame inform our sense of emotions as interior, and of novels as the genre which provide us access to that interior, private landscape of self, particularly of the feminine self? How do anxieties about passions become anxieties about credit just as credit moves from an aristocratic model of self and reputation to an economy built on the trust and the signatures of businessmen? How does the shame elemental to the formation of feminine virtue become elided with the insecurity and lack of knowledge associated with a whole class of people in the process of becoming polite?
Chapter 1: Accounting for Shame in *The London Merchant*

*I would not have you only learn the method of merchandise and practice it hereafter merely as a means of getting wealth. ... see how it promotes humanity as it has opened and yet keeps up an intercourse between nations far remote from one another in situation, customs, and religion, promoting arts, industry, peace, and plenty, by mutual benefits diffusing mutual love from pole to pole. (Lillo, 3.1.1-10)*

In the opening scene of George Lillo’s *The London Merchant; or, The History of George Barnwell* (1731), the merchant Thorowgood explains to his apprentice, Trueman, that “honest merchants, as such, may sometimes contribute to the safety of their country as they do at all times to its happiness” (1.1.18–19). He later observes that the people’s love is the queen's "richest exchequer" and the people's happiness "her greatest glory" (1.1.56-57). Here, at the beginning of the play, sovereign and merchant are joined in pursuit of happiness and love for all. Merchants contribute to the people’s happiness, which becomes, by virtue of sovereign possession or metonymic displacement, her very own glory. Later, Thorowgood advises Trueman to study the “method of merchandise” not only so that he may accumulate wealth, but also because it “promotes humanity” and “diffuse[s] mutual love from pole to pole” (3.1.10). The merchant’s dispensation of affect here reaches well beyond national borders, as commerce “keeps up an intercourse between nations far remote from one another in situation, customs, and religion, promoting arts, industry, peace and plenty” (3.1.6-9). Trade and the “method of
merchandise” itself form the basis of a love independent of patriotism, familiarity, or indeed any identity—a love which, in Thorowgood’s logic, replaces the method of war.\(^\text{13}\)

Thorowgood offers a more idealistic vision of what motivates trade than that offered by Dudley North in ‘Discourse of Coyned Money’ (1691): “The main spur to Trade, or rather to Industry and Ingenuity, is the exorbitant Appetites of Men, which they will take pains to gratifie, and so be disposed to work, when nothing else will incline them to it; for did Men content themselves with bare Necessaries, we should have a poor World” (17). In North’s view, “exorbitant Appetites” motivate men to work. In Thorowgood’s, however, any reference to “exorbitant Appetites” in relation to the work of commerce has vanished. He tutors Trueman that commerce is not only “a means of getting wealth” (3.1.3), but his speech implies that both getting wealth and multiplying happiness are disinterested motivations. Thorowgood is here speaking directly against the stereotype of the grasping, avaricious merchant, a staple figure of ridicule in Restoration theatre. According to John Loftis, merchants were satirized because of their perceived political threat to the landed interests and because of their association with avarice. In Aristotelian theory of comedy, vice deserves only ridicule (77). Working within this definition, by ennobling the merchant and his apprentice, Lillo’s play participates in a Whiggish defence of the merchant and of commerce against both political and moral

\(^\text{13}\) Thorowgood here concurs with Pope who in *Windsor Forest*, his celebration of the end of the War of Spanish Succession, declaims, “Oh stretch thy Reign, fair Peace! from Shore to Shore./ Till Conquest cease, and Slav’ry be no more” (403–406). Pope and Thorowgood are similarly optimistic and false; the treaty that England signed at the end of the War of Spanish Succession won England a thirty-year monopoly on importing slaves to Spanish colonies. Neither recognizes that commerce itself may enact violence, or that peace may require continued vigilance.
charges. That is, the play asserts that commerce itself is patriotic and good, and merchants are not figures of vice but of virtue.

Thorowgood’s speech on love also calls on, though less explicitly, another discourse or cultural expectation: that of the industrious apprentice. Thorowgood offers his advice to his apprentice Trueman, who has come to him with his account books industriously prepared and ready for review. Trueman is the good apprentice, the model from which Barnwell deviates. Thorowgood’s speech to Trueman is delivered over the material proof of the merchant’s virtue, and the good apprentice’s industriousness: the account books. While industry was appreciated generally as a Protestant virtue, the apprentice particularly acquires the burden of industry in the first half of the eighteenth century as Hogarth makes explicit in his prints of industrious Francis and idle Tom (1747). (Indeed, Trueman evokes this commonplace when he calls “business” “the youth’s best preservative from ill, as idleness his worst of snares” (2.1.122-4).) Apprentices perhaps more than any other category of person ought to be industrious. Their parents have paid for them to learn a trade by practicing it and, as the manuals repeatedly express, their masters own their every hour. However, as texts such as Richardson’s Vade Mecum (1734) identify, apprentices were commonly viewed as trouble-making, erratic, and undependable. They are a chaotic element in the City and in the new commercial economy, which the conduct manuals attempt to correct. Apprentices were in this way as much figures of the failure of an ideal as they were figures of the ideal itself. The apprentice, I suggest, becomes a focal point for the period’s concern with
motivation, particularly with the question of what motivates a person to work (and work well, industriously, loyally) for another’s profit.\textsuperscript{14}

Albert O. Hirschman asks how the vice of avarice came to be reconfigured as “interest,” a motivating virtue in a capitalist economy. This chapter asks a similar question of ambition, examining its configuration as self-improvement in conduct manuals for apprentices and in literary and artistic representations of apprentices, focusing particularly on George Lillo’s \textit{The London Merchant}. In the first section of this chapter, I contextualize Lillo’s apprentice-hero by examining the manuals intended for apprentices, both conduct manuals and manuals providing instruction in writing and bookkeeping. The apprentice himself is a form of commodity; his family or friends have paid his master to train him. However, the manuals do not present him this way. Unsurprisingly, these manuals train the apprentice in the discipline of self-improvement while, at the same time, inculcating the value of the hierarchical, master-servant relation and warning against unseemly ambition. They sustain this paradox while consistently linking the labour of writing and bookkeeping to the glory of the nation. In their inscription and reinscription of foreign luxury items, all available for purchase, these manuals perpetuate the national fantasy of prosperity at a time when the nation was, materially, not prospering. In fact, Britain was in debt to its merchants.\textsuperscript{15} Manuals for

\textsuperscript{14} Lucinda Cole argues that the play offered “different structures of identification.... and that these structures were at least partially provided by the discourse of apprenticeship proper” (58).

\textsuperscript{15} The Bank of England began when King William went to the London merchants for a loan of 1, 200,000 pounds sterling in 1694. To raise the funds, the merchants used “a new
merchant apprentices helped manufacture the faith in the commercial system that is necessary for a paper-based economy to continue to grow. They promised that the apprentice can, if he learns the method, manipulate value. In this way, the manuals both secure the apprentice in his place and destabilize that place by referring to the necessity of improvement, of constant striving and learning in a modern, changing society.

To manage this progressive narrative of self-improvement, the manuals prescribe a carefully managed ambition, a “good” ambition which is never named. While Barnwell’s initial cautions to himself, and later his self-recriminations, accord with the dictates of the conduct manuals, in the end Barnwell is not ambitious enough. Neither reason, nor his ambition to be a good apprentice, nor commerce’s universalizing love, can guard against his self-interested love for Millwood. The play’s participation in Britain’s developing bourgeois ideology has been ably analyzed by Lisa Freeman and Peter Hynes. What interests me, though, is the reformulation, or relocation, of the passions involved in commerce, particularly love, ambition, and shame. I want to understand not what commerce’s affects hide, but what they effect. I want to understand why, in what can be understood as the first bourgeois tragedy, it is not the merchant who falls, but his apprentice who is, even before he steps on stage, ashamed.

A final concern of the chapter is with the relationship between genre and feeling. While The London Merchant defends commerce and the virtues of its practitioners, it also

body called the Bank of England” (Nicholson, 6). The merchants formed a share-holding association, with the money loaned “secured against the anticipated revenue of new excise taxes which were to provide the funds to repay the interest on the money loaned to the King” (6). As Nicholson observes, London merchants directly contributed to the maintenance of the nation, and to the wars the king chose to fight.
mitigates against potential discomfort by reiterating familiar morals and feelings: inculcating the value of fidelity to the master, warning of the danger of unreasonable lust, and transposing one of commerce’s necessary vices—ambition—onto the whore. Millwood embodies an ambition that cannot be satisfied, that is, in Lucy’s words, “insatiate” (3.2.73, 864). Millwood is never ashamed and goes to her death without repenting of a single act. In the end, it seems, one is either ambitious or ashamed. Fear and pity are the affects classically necessary to tragedy, and certainly they are at work in The London Merchant. However, in the reinvention of the maligned Cit as the honest, benevolent merchant Thorowgood, and the ennobling (toward death) of his wayward apprentice Barnwell, Lillo’s London Merchant reworks familiar tragic feelings and comfortable morality. In this popular and commercially successful drama, the most repeatedly expressed feeling is shame, and it is necessary to the pity generated. Barnwell’s shame is most potent, though, in its insistence that Barnwell, and the world, could have been different, that he still is, in some sense, different than his actions. In this way, by suggesting a possibility that is not realized but persists in the imagination, his shame insists on the positive ideal. His shame suggests that the ideal is always, potentially, present and graspable.

Motivating Apprentices

In 1738, engraver George Bickham instructed his readers in the correct shape of letters for the purpose of business. In The United Pen-Men (1738), he provided this example of Bills of Parcels, by writing Master N. Dove: “The Hon’ble Lady Ashley Bought of Simon Pindar” (among other items) “36 China plates for 6 pounds 12 shillings,
Fine Chints 6 pieces for 19 pounds, 1 shilling, and 30 India fans for three pounds 15 shillings” (116). The riches of empire would flow through the tutored hand of this English apprentice. As he copied the sample, mastering both script and form, he could imagine these commodities, some of which he may never have held or touched, or even seen. He could imagine himself, too, in relation to them: the thirty-six china plates worth three years’ wages; the tea from India compared to the small beer he preferred. He may have little knowledge of either China or India, except what he may have gleaned from reports of trade published by the shipping company. He may never have read a book other than the Bible and Pilgrim’s Progress. He knows he is English because he lives in England and would fight for his king, if there were a war and if the army were to feed and clothe him. What motivates such a young man to open a penmanship manual in the first place, or to improve his skills?

Lillo’s Barnwell emerges from and within the same context as did Bickham’s imaginary apprentice: the proliferation of manufactured and imported objects, the commercialization of professional skills and knowledge, a soldering of literacy to both national might and individual freedom, an incommensurate mingling and differentiating of people in rapidly swelling cities and on newly built roads, a growing national debt, ongoing and expensive wars that strained finances and credibility while increasing the nation’s economic dependence on merchants. Not only would trade bring money, and banish need, it would end war and structure new, peaceful exchange with other nations. Trade offered a new kind of order characterized by mobility and liberty, powerful

---

metaphors for a nation which had survived civil war and forty years without a monarch, and whose territory, having expanded to include colonies on the other side of the Atlantic, was no longer comprehensible as native soil. However, for commerce’s beneficent potential to be realized, for trade to “promote humanity” and dispense “mutual love” (Lillo, 3.1.5-10, 861) to bring peace and prosperity to the nation, commerce required the faith and the labour of thousands. For this imperial prosperity-generating project to function, people like Trueman, Barnwell, and Bickham’s imaginary apprentice would need to believe in it, and commit their labour to it.

It is for this reason perhaps not too surprising that the industry and loyalty of apprentices was deemed a matter of national importance. Richardson is explicit about the relation between apprentices and the national well-being. Addressing his Vade Mecum (1734) to the "Class of Young men who are about being apprenticed out to Trades and Business," he justifies the need of the book first by pointing to the "general Complaint" from Masters about the "present Depravity" of their apprentices and second by asserting that depravity’s threat to Britain. He locates the value of the work— he calls it “industrious Labour”—of the potentially depraved young men: "Since it is from this Source that the most numerous and most useful Members of the Commonwealth are derived; on whose industrious Labour the Welfare of the Whole almost intirely [sic] depends" (v–vi). Richardson’s emphasis on the nation’s dependence on apprentice’s industry is significant. The good of an apprentice’s industry is a common good and by extension their depravity is a common detriment.
While Richardson writes in the context of the “present depravity” of apprentices, George Bickham idealizes apprentices and their labour, but the context is the same: the importance of an apprentice’s labour to Britain. The frontispiece of Bickham’s colossal *The Universal Penman* shows a “representative” at work (See Figure 1).¹⁷

![Frontispiece, Universal Penman](image)

Figure 2: Frontispiece, Universal Penman

¹⁷Unlike the copybooks from which it draws its examples, *The Universal Penman* is not made for the ordinary learner of writing—usually youths. It is a massive object issued to subscribers in fifty-two installments over eight years, from 1733-1741, 213 pages all engraved, many illustrated.
The poem says it all:

Preferring None where Numbers have a Claim,
This Emblem Sketch declares the Author’s Aim:
A representative of Skill refin’d,
Where all the Penman’s Qualities are join’d;
Where Use and ornament Unite in One,
To Serve or grace the Counter or the Throne:
Art Still improving from plain Nature’s Source;
With Judgment, Freedom; and with Freedom, Force. (The Universal Penman np)

The “representative” is an illustration by Hubert-Francois Gravelot, a French artist who made his reputation in England as a book illustrator. Gravelot’s young writer is fashioned after his own allegory of “study.” In Iconologie par figures Gravelot explains how to read his allegory: the young man’s attitude demonstrates the required seriousness, and the candle, the wakefulness necessary to study (Gravelot). The representative young writer is of course remarkably similar to the allegory and that similarity is loaded: Gravelot and Bickham together insist that the mechanical act of writing belongs properly to the realm of art, science, and literature. The youth is studying, not imitating or copying. He is doing intellectual, not mechanical labour. There are two sides to this assertion. First, it raises the merchant apprentice’s labour above that of other apprentices, valuing it more highly.

Second, it asserts that intellectual labour is still labour. Even if the apprentice does not look as though he is toiling—he is sitting at a desk, not using his physical strength—he is nonetheless working. Both sides of the story are important to understanding the position of the merchant apprentice in British society at this time, as intellectual labour becomes more economically vital to the nation, and as it facilitates an individual’s accumulation of wealth and status. Similarly, Bickham’s later extract of 40 folio copper-plates from The
Universal Penman, called The United Penmen, dedicated to “The Merchants and Tradesmen of Great Britain” insists that, “Writing and Accounts, no Less than Trade & Commerce, are become the Glory of Great-Britain.” Again, Bickham refuses the hierarchizing of trade over accounts, of exchange over the representation of exchange. He insists on the empirical necessity and the imperial reach of writing—that writing is necessary to knowing the empire, to tracking its value, and to managing the distance of it, bringing all desirable things within the compass (or at least the imagination) of the literate. As Ian Baucom argues, not only did credit invent a new kind of "social personality" it also, "enshrined the imagination as a new force at the heart of economic, political, and social life" (66). Borrowing from Pocock, he calls this a program of reification which, in Pocock’s words, "produced a discourse devoted, above all, to training society's members to credit the existence of the abstract, imaginary, speculative values and things that had come to dominate social life" (67). When Bickham insists that writing and accounts are what the nation’s material wealth is built on, that these, too, are work of the most important kind, he both takes for granted and assists the program of reification required by a commercial economy built on bills of credit.\(^{18}\)

Referring to Gregory King's statistical estimate of 1688, published in 1696, John Loftis observes that the increase in foreign trade at the end of seventeenth century was mostly due to "the very rapid expansion of the re-export trade (especially the transshipment of colonial goods).... Trade increased much more than industry, partly

---

\(^{18}\) Peter Earle characterizes the London apprentices and businessmen as “a highly literate class.” Before entering apprenticeship, these youths would have attended either grammar school or vocational school, followed usually by a year at a writing school in London (89).
because England was increasingly acting as intermediary between the American colonies and European and Asiatic markets” (7). More people, in other words, were making their money from work that was not “industry” and that therefore might be considered precisely not industrious. Making money from trading things rather than making things redefined work and industriousness. Though the apprentice does not appear to be working, he is in fact doing work that is crucially important to the economy and which require new skills: literacy and numeracy, and handwriting.

After 1714, at the end of an expensive war, the government started collecting excise taxes, indirect taxes on consumption, and by 1720 excise taxes together with custom paid on imports made up a larger percentage of government revenues than land tax (Spurr 25). The manuals directly reflect and result from Britain’s transition from a land-based economy (and system of taxation) to a commercial economy reliant on re-export trade. This system requires a veritable fleet of merchant apprentices and bank clerks trained in writing and accounting. Adding to this particular human resource pressure, this is also the age of credit in Britain. Britain’s commercial system, built almost entirely of paper, depended on the rapid expansion of literacy and writing skills, along with a confidence in the commercial enterprise of the nation. As one of the writing masters included in Bickham’s *Universal Penman* writes, “The Merit of the Merchant is above that of all other Subjects; For while he is untouched in his Credit his Hand-writing is more portable Coin for the Service of his Fellow Citizens and his Word the Gold of Ophir to the

19 Nicholson notes that as a result of the London merchants’ loan to the king (which established the Bank of England), and the others that followed, “the practice and recording of payment and exchange through various kinds of paper document developed exponentially” (6).
Country wherein he resides” (*The Universal Penman* 3). During this period of expanding empire, when Britain was taking its place as a commercial superpower, its national economy was almost completely powered by paper—handwritten and signed promissory notes—rather than by metal coin. Linda Colley argues that Britain’s reliance on credit contributed significantly to its political stability and this, in turn, to its wealth. She explains it this way: "All credit systems rely on confidence, confidence that interest payments will be made at the correct level and at the correct time, and confidence that debts will ultimately be repaid" (67). As Colley sees it, creditors and debtors both required peace; civil unrest, rebellion, or invasion would jeopardize the precarious system of credit. I would suggest that anxiety about these potential threats surfaces in texts about apprentices whose trustworthiness, industry, and loyalty were necessary to the functioning of this paper economy. Literally, or at least metonymically, in this period merchants and their apprentices hold the credit of the nation in their hands. The figure of the industrious apprentice is located at the unstable point of change, from industry to trade, and from metal to paper.\(^2\) He is located, that is, exactly at the point at which economy moves from trade in valuable, material, weighted material to trade in representation of value.

The industrious apprentice is thus the very embodiment of what Michael McKeon calls “the crisis of status inconsistency” (390). McKeon defines this crisis as "a divergence of power, wealth, and status widespread and persistent enough to resist the

\(^2\) Credit was an important part of British economy early on because the Mint couldn't produce sufficient silver or copper coin. So shopkeepers, for example, purchased much of their merchandise on credit (Colley 67).
methods by which stable societies traditionally have accommodated the instances of non-correspondence that occasionally must arise” (390). Indeed, though he does not emphasize it, McKeon’s analysis of the early novel’s negotiation of status inconsistency depends on the figure of the apprentice. Three of his four examples are stories of apprentices who are either industrious or idle, virtuous or vicious. “The Story of Roger Holland, Martyr” from Foxe’s *Acts and Monuments* McKeon reads as tale of an “idle and licentious” apprentice whose conversion to Protestantism enables him to later prosper as a merchant tailor (394). Henry Neville's story of apprentice George Pine, as McKeon tells it, is the story of "an industrious city apprentice who happens to stumble into a travel narrative" and thereafter populates a desert island to become the (good) sovereign of this new society. McKeon’s third apprentice story is an example of a conservative attempt to undermine the progressive plot. This one, a history in "pseudo-autobiographical form" by Charles Davenant, tells the story of an apprentice whose vice, in McKeon's words, “is not idleness but too much industry” (395). Whereas the first two progressive plots work to explain and “overcome” the crisis of status inconsistency, the conservative plot critically undoes the ideal of industrious virtue by showing it to be nothing more than “hypocritical opportunism” (395). For the purpose of my analysis, the most important aspect of these examples is the apparent equation of industry and its merited (or hypocritical) gains with the figure of the apprentice.

Lucinda Cole argues that *The London Merchant’s* success "may be ascribed to its treatment of the apprentice as an emblematic figure who, because he was not yet associated with a given socio-economic group, was able to serve for a segment of the
population as a model of the collective itself" (35). London apprentices were from a range of classes; many of their fathers were wealthier merchant and tradesman. Robert Malcolmson explains that because masters are paid for the apprentice, labouring families often could not afford to put their boys in certain expensive trades where premiums were 10 to 20 pounds: "The more desireable the trade, the higher the entrance premium" (64). As a result children apprenticed to masters outside their own family formed a minority of all trade apprentices. More commonly, the children of industrial workers would learn the trade (e.g. weaving) from the parent (64). An apprentice to a London merchant, by contrast, entered his period of indenture from a state of relative comfort, expecting to return to that state of relative comfort once his bonds were paid and he was free to set himself up in business for himself. Peter Earle shows that many (or even most) London apprentices "were at least of the same social standing as their masters and many came from families of distinctly higher status" (100). In his words, "[t]he sons of gentlemen thus permeated the London business world fairly thoroughly,” and they especially gravitated to “profitable occupations” such as overseas trade and finance (87).

The apprentice’s relative lack of necessity is an important backdrop to the question of his industry. Poverty was regularly viewed as the great motivator to industry; what else

---

21 Indeed, many apprenticeships stipulated what wealth the father must own. According to the 1707 *Jus imperij & servitutis*, "No Merchant, Mercer, Draper, Goldsmith, Ironmonger, Embroiderer or Clothier, dwelling in a corporate Town, may take any Apprentice, except the Apprentice or Father have Freehold Lands to the value of 40£ per Annum, &c but if such Master live in a Market Town, not corporate, his Apprentice, or his Friends, must have 3£ per Annum in Freehold" (*Jus imperij & servitutis* 114–115). The preface claims this text is first attempt to make available to both masters and servants the rights and duties of the institution of apprenticeship but much of it is written in Latin, and thus presumably only sensible to lawyers.
but survival could motivate men to work for the benefit of society? This logic leads an anonymous author in 1701 to declare that "the faithful diligence of honest and ingenious Poverty is really the richest Treasure, and safest BANK OF CREDIT in any Nation" *(Reflections Upon the Moral State of the Nation, quoted in Malcolmson 13).* Robert Moss in 1708 argued that "there could be no Government without Subordination.... And God's provident Care is very remarkable in making the Rich and Poor thus mutually needful and helpful to each other; that so they might be link'd together by the strongest Ties of Interest, and Both sufficiently encourag'd to act agreeably to the Station in which God hath placed them" *(Providential Disposition of Men in Malcolmson 15).* However, if apprentices are not poor, what motivates their industrious application to their Master and by extension to the nation? Precisely because they were not (necessarily) poor, the apprentice challenged both the divinely sanctioned class hierarchy, embodying the crisis of status inconsistency, and the new commercial economy that required his devoted labour.

Writing manuals and conduct manuals for apprentices participated in creating the British national identity as a commercial one, as they materially facilitated Britain’s credit system by training men in the skills required for a paper economy. Richardson and Bickham, while touting the value of commerce and the skills it requires, nevertheless suggest commerce’s vulnerability, which is that people with wealth (either landed gentry or merchants) depend on the loyalty and skilled labour of those who serve them. What could motivate a person to work well, to be industrious, to be a good and honest participant in a commercial economy, to work for another’s profit? The question of
motivation underlies Lillo’s play, conduct manuals, and instruction manuals as well as economic thinking. And it finds its potent realization in the figure of the apprentice.

**The Errant Apprentice**

*The London Merchant* makes central and sympathetic the errant apprentice, the industrious apprentice’s bad twin, popularized in literature, art, and pamphlets. Lillo famously defends his choice of protagonist with the economic argument that tragedy “is more truly august in proportion to the extent of its influence and the numbers that are properly affected by it” (15–16). Barnwell was one of the hero-types that proliferated at this time, and the apprentice was a category of person that, in the common view, needed to be “influenced” and positively “affected.” While I have suggested that the apprentice becomes a subject because he focalizes the problem of motivation and industry, Jones de Ritter argues that such a group of literate but "economically marginalized" people could have caused a fear of a collective (5). He has good reason for this analysis. Apprentices particularly were viewed as a collective, lionized in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in pamphlets such as *The honour of London apprentices: exemplified, in a briefe historical narration* (1647). This text traces the importance of apprentices to historic English events, beginning with the holy war under Godfrey of Boulogne. The writer suggests that there is, among apprentices, an "Exemplary practice" which "might worthily bee wished that it weare in some record drawne into custom in all christian societies, that is the unanimous correspondency that is among that innumerable company” (np). As he expands on this, he points to "a kinde of a supernatural Sympathy a generall Union which knits their hearts in a bond of fraternal affection under the common [word illegible] of
London Prentices or prentices of London" (np). To support his statement, he points to where "reall or suposed wrong, or vyolence be offered to any one, the rest (though not otherwise) knowing him to be a prentice, doe immediately (and commonly without examination of the quarell) ingage themselves in the rescue, afrighting the advarsary with this terrible sentence, Knock him down he wrongs a prentice" (np) The apprentices were, in other words, already viewed as a “collective,” even a model collective, a kind of miniature society that demonstrated the truth that social bonds are based in feelings of sympathy. The potential threat that such a collective, which responds to “real or supposed wrong, or vyolence” with immediate violence, could pose to order is clear: apprentices put the claims of their own collective above the claims and laws of state, city, or guild.

According to Peter Linebaugh, many of the London hanged were members of the "making class": 40% of those hanged from 1703-1772 were apprenticed to a trade and affected by the emerging market economy when protections on food and wages were removed (H. Burke 349). What is more, the number of actual “errant” apprentices likely far exceeded the numbers that were arrested or publicly judged. According to Earle, since prosecution was expensive, as was the loss of a worker, many more apprentices confessed than were hanged. These youths were forced to confess and “such confessions could then be used to recover losses from the apprentice’s parents or friends and held in reserve as a guarantee of the apprentice’s future good behaviour” (Earle 104).\footnote{Another method of discipline was to report the problem apprentice to the City Chamberlain who, at worst, would have the young man whipped or sent to Bridewell for a period of days (Earle 104).} It seems that apprentices at both individual and collective level were viewed as chaotic and potentially
threatening to the social order. There is a problem, in other words, with his motivation: apprentices refused to be uniformly industrious.

Concern with apprentices’ obligations seems to become amplified precisely as the guilds themselves are losing strength. The reasons for this lie partly in the changing structure of cities, particularly the City of London, and partly in the change in relevance of livery companies. While the basic rules that governed apprenticeship were outlined in The Statute of Artificers (1562), the regulation and enforcement of contracts lay with the guilds of incorporated towns and cities. Masters were required to register apprenticeship contracts with their guilds and this "record would then provide the basis for an apprentice to become a freeman or citizen of the town after completing his term" (Wallis 4).

Citizenship was the primary advantage of apprenticeship, and indeed apprenticeship was the most common means by which citizenship and the “freedom of towns” was obtained in the seventeenth century. Until the eighteenth century, “becoming a freeman brought significant benefits—settlement and its associated right to poor relief, and the right to work at a trade in the town or city” (Wallis 9). Yet, as Earle notes, in early eighteenth-century London, more and more trade was being done outside the incorporated City, so these benefits were less dependent on the completion of apprenticeship. This change is reflected in the fact that in London in the 1690’s, less than 50% of apprentices completed their apprenticeship (Wallis 11).

The publication of manuals such Richardson’s Vade Mecum thus coincide with the decline of the power of guilds and livery companies. They also mark the increase in the population of young apprentices in London. Peter Earle argues that apprentices formed “a
large group in London society” in the second half of the seventeenth century (104), estimating that in the City, “they might form as much as 10 per cent of the population of a parish” (104). Apprentices were, in other words, a noticeable demographic in London. Earle notes that since apprentices were all young and male, “they could make their presence felt in a number of ways from simple youthful high spirits, such as playing football in the streets, to drunken disorder, riot, and even the occasional intervention in politics” (104). The fact that apprenticeship is so historically tied to citizenship underscores the apprentice’s figural import: the apprentice is the nascent citizen who must work (industriously) for the right to participate in the commercial economy. When these nascent citizens appear to be enjoying too much leisure time in public places, and when the institutions that are supposed to hold them in check appear to hold less sway, the visible effect is one of a City disordered.

Representations of the errant apprentice take different forms in the early part of the century. The most lasting are perhaps Hogarth’s 1747 prints which illustrate the lives of an idle and an industrious apprentice. The idle apprentice, Tom, strays from his loom to gamble, goes with a whore who turns him in, and is finally executed for murder at Tyburn. Tom’s story has most in common with Barnwell’s but there are other ways, too, for apprentices to go wrong. In The Reformer (1701), Edward Ward describes the “beau prentice” as a character of vice who represents a range of cultural anxieties related to money and status. The beau prentice is a "Half-Man, Half-Boy" who has "more Money in his Pocket than he hath Sense to Guide"(30). Not only is he inadequately mature for the money he carries, he also "ape[s] a Gentleman” and "Mimick[s] the Air and Mein of a
Beau" (30) to the detriment of his father's finances. The prentice spends "in his Extravagancies" the money that "should Set him up, when his Seven Years Bonds are Cancel'd" (30). The author compares him to "an Hypocritical Whore" and notes that the "Jilts and the Sharpers...send him often Home with his Pockets Empty, and his Codpiece full" (32). He is tricked so that he will "not only Lavish his own Money, but Borrow his Master's from the Till" (32). The beau apprentice is similarly excoriated in A View of the Town (1731) in which one older merchant asks:

> If Shame, as well as Virtue had not forsaken us, would Will. Maggot, the Cheesemonger's Prentice at next Door, ever think of pulling off his Apron, and whipping on a Sword and Toupee, as soon as the Clock Strikes Eight; if he did but consider how well they agree with his Trade, and how much better it would become him, to enquire into the Price of salt Butter and Bacon, than to be listning[sic] at a Playhouse, or staring at an Opera. (A View of the Town: Or, Memoirs of London In Which Is Contained a Diverting Account of the Humours, Follies, Vices, and What Not? of That Famous Metropolis: ... 28)

Earle gives one historical example of an errant beau apprentice from the Mayor's Court Interrogatories (1678). This young man, son of a Gentleman and apprenticed to a merchant, "frequently came home drunk every night and put the house into disorder." He also repeatedly forgot to deliver letters to the Post Office and, most offensively, "kept a wench in Covent Garden whom he once pawned for 22 shillings when he was losing at a game of hazard" (Earle 103). This example highlights a feature of the London apprentice which eighteenth-century critics tended not to note. They were likely to be of a relatively cultured upbringing, sons of gentlemen or from wealthy families. Indeed, the apprentice’s status might be at the root of some of the friction between older merchants and their young apprentices.
Fundamentally, the beau apprentice is bad because he uses money badly, and in this way disrupts both status and credit systems. He spends money on his appearance—to pretend he is of higher status, or to express his higher status. He loses money and steals money and in this way devalues his credit as a businessman. In some sense though, the deviant apprentice does no differently with his money than a genteel merchant or trader does. That is, he spends on his appearance to manufacture the look of success and risks in gambling what others would risk on speculations such as the South Sea Company, or on a business venture. He understands too well, perhaps, the volatile potential of a credit-based economy while underestimating its circumscribing rules. Ward’s beau-prentice runs into debt and finally "being cast off by all, scorned by his Cronies, and neglected by his Friends, either the Gallows has him, the Sea, or else some Foreign Plantation, where he hath leisure Time to bemoan his Follies and Inadvertencies, where 'tis best to leave him" (32). Other bad apprentices are too ambitious or too quick to succeed. A View of the Town provides a description of a linen draper's apprentice who keeps "a Brace of Geldings at a Livery Stable in Finsbury" (20) before describing apprentices generally: "Having served their Times (as they call it) after this manner, you may imagine how carefully they manage after they set up. In the first Year they marry a Wife, in the second they have a Country House, in the third they get a Coach, which is generally succeeded by a Statute of Bankruptcy in the fourth" (20). This writer is offended at apprentices’ too-quick rise to fortune, too-quick claim to the trappings of a bourgeois life and, like Ward, he doubts their financial management skills.
A common theme in these complaints is the fear that apprentices behave in ways inappropriate to their station; that they will fail to be industrious. These young men are in the City to work. Their place is behind the “Counter” not at the theatre or the gaming table. However, the figure of the errant apprentice not only expresses the precariousness of the old class system, which drew recognizable lines between “Court” and “Counter,” it also expresses the vulnerability of the new commercial economy. That is to say, apprentices are participants in a commercial economy which is redefining work itself at the same time as the structures that organized citizenship and labour are themselves changing. Merchant apprentices do not learn the mysteries of a physical trade such as making candles or printing books. Rather, they learn and practice the mysteries of trade’s alternate sense: of exchange. Their industry is less obviously industrious, but equally if not more economically necessary. The bills of exchange which they write form the epistemic and material foundation of emergent capitalism. As Baucom identifies, bills of credit “circulated on and extended a double economy: an economy of monetary value and an economy of trust whose foundation was the credibility, the character, the trustworthiness of the person signing the bill over and the value of the trust that person had placed in the previous holder. To accept a multiply circulated bill of exchange was not only to accept a form of paper money but to express trust in one's own ability to read character and trust in the capacity of one's fellow citizens to do likewise” (64). Apprentices tutored in reading, writing, and trust are thus critical to the market of emergent capitalism. This also makes them a pressure point of that system since the market itself relies on imagination and ambition. It convinces subjects to "exchange
ownership of themselves and their fates for the speculative riches they hope will accompany their investments" (64). At the same time that emergent capitalism requires the apprentice to imagine riches for himself, the guilds and livery companies that used to regulate the competition are becoming more like clubs than regulatory bodies. If their primary concern was to control "opportunistic behaviour" that might otherwise destroy the institution (Epstein in Wallis 28), they were apparently failing.

The Ideal Apprentice

Richardson (wrongly) calls his Vade Mecum (1734) the first of its kind. In fact, it draws heavily from Caleb Trenchfield’s A cap of gray hairs for a green head, first published in 1671 (the fifth edition published in 1710) which is probably the first such published advice to an apprentice. Trenchfield’s text is written as a father’s advice to his son and covers not only the period of apprenticeship, but a whole life of work and family economy, concluding with funeral preparations. Both Richardson and Trenchfield envision an ideal apprentice who cares for his reputation and his master’s, and who is motivated by a promise of future well-being; Richardson, for example, cautions his readers that young apprentices need to behave well at this stage because the "Whole of their future Good generally depends" on it (vi). Neither frames his advice in terms of ambition, a vice not yet reformed into the capital virtue of the working person, yet both negotiate the question of ambition and motivation as they provide their readers with reasons to work well for another’s profit. Both writers, that is, negotiate the potentially contradictory motivations of ambition and submission.
While Richardson and Trenchfield similarly configure the master-apprentice relationship in terms of ownership, the differences between the two manuals are notable, and reflect socio-political changes between 1671 and 1734 as traditional status hierarchies become less stable. Caleb Trenchfield frames the virtue of industry as an animal obedience which is of value to the master. He advises an "industrious Officiousness" to do what others "intimate that they have a mind to" because "we set an estimate on him, as exceeding our expectation, who by his readiness, as it were, anticipates our Commands" (38). He compares this to the admiration we have "when Dogs or Horses show their ready motion at our Whistle or Chirrup" (39). Similarly, in support of keeping the Master's secrets, he provides two exemplars: "some Slaves, who have endure the extreamest Tortures, rather than discover their Masters secrets" and also of a woman who "hang'd her self with her own Garter at the back of the Chair she sat in" (28) rather than betray Nero. In Trenchfield’s advice, the ideal apprentice should be like the most obedient animal, or a willingly self-sacrificing slave. In no way does he resemble the master which Trenchfield prepares him to become. In this way, Trenchfield places the apprentice’s relation to master in the natural order of things. The master owns the apprentice by right of human and male superiority. Such metaphors not only assert the master’s right to “own” the apprentice, they also neatly submerge the progress of the apprentice toward mastery, a progress that itself in some measure undoes the principle of stable order. In other words, the text both insists that apprenticeship, like youth, is a stage in a natural progression toward becoming master while at the same time asserting that the apprentice is fundamentally different from and inferior to his master.
Richardson’s description of the master-apprenticeship relationship maintains an emphasis on rightful ownership, but reconfigures it by turning Trenchfield’s advice into quasi-legal rules. His book, Richardson claims, contains “useful Comments and Observations on the Covenants entered into between Master and Servant by way of Indenture; wherein that wise Obligation is considered Article by Article” (11). The emphasis is on contractual obligation, rather than divinely ordained or naturally ordered obligation. For example, the apprentice is not allowed to “commit fornication” or to marry (13). This was always part of the terms of apprenticeship, but Richardson’s justification is illuminating. Marriage is forbidden until the end of the period of indenture (usually seven years), he explains, because "tho' a lawful Engagement, in a Person who is his own Master and has a Right to dispose of himself, is often of very fatal Consequence to a young Man, who is an Apprentice" (14). The apprentice has no “Right to dispose of himself” because he does not belong to himself; he belongs, contractually, to his master until his term is complete. Richardson understands time as the master’s property: "Time is the same thing as Money and to squander away that, is consequently the same as to rob him [i.e. the Master] of so much Money" (28). The apprentice is no longer an animal or slave, but neither is he his own property; an apprentice is, by definition, not his own master.

Obedience is less easily stipulated in Richardson’s model of contractual obligation. Within such a model of rights and obligations, what motivates the apprentice to be obedient? That is, what motivates him not only to obey orders, but to *be* obedient, to perform obedience not only in the strict sense of the word, but with its accumulated
values of loyalty and dedication? Richardson appeals to emotional self-interest: "an Impatience under Command, and habitual Negligence of his Master's Interests … will make him uneasy in his Service, and, very probably, so grow upon him, as to render him forgetful of his own. A Temper of Slight and Disrespect will replace of that amiable one of Love and Submission; this will im bitter his Pleasures, and make his Time Service to a Master he does not love, appear tedious and irksome" (43). The story Richardson offers is one of love and affective servitude; both are necessary not only to the Master, but to the apprentice's own happiness. The apprentice serves obediently simply because it feels better.

Trenchfield relies on natural order to justify the apprentice’s necessary obedience. Richardson offers happiness and love as motivation. However, for both there is another motivator and that is self-interest. While maligning a selfish self-interest, an undesirable trait that is more likely to lead to vice than virtue, the manuals also describe a different interest, one expressed as a concern for future self. Future happiness realized on earth and in business—rather than after death in heaven—provides a secular motivation for good behaviour. Obedience, loyalty, and industry will secure the virtuous apprentice his place in a commercial world. The message is clear: Sacrifice present self-interest so that the future-self’s interest may be satisfied. Potentially threatening ambition is in this way smoothed into a positive and commercially valuable self-interest.

Self-interest is problematic and must be curtailed if the apprentice is going to serve his master loyally and submissively. If the apprentice engages in independent trade, the master, as Richardson details, may "be robbed of the Profits of his Business" (15). Either
the apprentice could take the business's profits to himself (clandestinely) or he could present a competition to the Master's business, using what he has learned from the Master to make his own money. This kind of trading on his own, he asserts, "beget[s]... Self-Love and Self-Interest" (16). Richardson does not name this error “ambition,” but he suggests its hazard in terms that recall it—self-love and self-interest—and he here articulates the very real threat that an ambitious apprentice posed both to the individual master and to the system of livery companies that regulated trade. An entrepreneurial apprentice could present serious competition to his master while evading the guild rules governing the right to trade.23

To control this difficult “self-love,” both authors call on apprentices to orient themselves to the future, and to privilege their future selves over present. In a metaphor that both feminizes the apprentices and recalls Locke's metaphor for the mind, Trenchfield cautions, "Be sure therefore to go into the World like a Sheet of clean Paper, where no Blurs or Scribblings are to be discern'd; but let your Reputation be like that Virgin Purity, not stain'd with anything which may render you suspected to the time to come." Locke’s sheet of clean paper, the mind before it is written over with sensory experience and education, is here refigured as an ideal not of mind but of reputation. The metaphor moves from what cannot be seen (the mind), to what is visible, social, and

---

23 Earle’s study shows that Richardson’s injunction to be well-founded, and he identifies that some trade was with the master's permission. "Merchants' apprentices, for instance, normally took some of their own capital when they were sent abroad, 1000£ being typical for a young factor in the Levant trade" (99).
sometimes punishingly historical: reputation.  

Reputation is inevitably connected to the minds and memories of others, to one’s behaviour as it is seen, interpreted and remembered by others. Though reputation ought to be in Trenchfield’s view one’s most protected possession, in fact by definition it can never be entirely self-possessed.

Proper future-orientation is necessary to the story of commercial success, and critical to controlling the highly suspect motivation of self-interest. We see this clearly in Richardson’s advice. He counsels that the apprentice should "principally" pursue his interest, yet not so much as to "shew" that he is "sordidly attached to it" (38). This middle line is important as it will "ingage you many Friends, who, as they grow up with you into Life and Business, may be of very great Service to you" (38). Putting another before yourself is good because it will be of use or "service" to you in the future. The future self is more important than any potential present gain and investing in that future self inhibits the selfishness of present-tense self-interest. The stakes for Richardson extend beyond the individual apprentice. He advises this "benevolent Disposition" as helpful not only to an individual's reputation, but also to the reputation of “Tradesmen or Men of Business generally, who are too generally maligned as selfish” (38). Both authors ask their readers to speculate on future selves, to submit now in the expectation that such investment will be repaid in the future.

The ideal apprentice is necessarily self-divided as he continually judges his own acts in terms of how they will add to his future good. However, he is also self-divided in a

---

Trenchfield’s metaphor is particularly apt for those merchant apprentices struggling to learn the art of penmanship to produce exact and legible bills, for to blur or scribble here could interrupt or break the accurate exchange of value. Here, writing is not only reputation, but monetary credit.
second sense: "No one can well have a worse Character than he that deserves the name of an Eye-Servant; that is, such a one as no longer heeds his business, than while he is under his Master's Eye or Observation" (Richardson 29). The best apprentices internalize the master’s eye by behaving always as if observed. Lucinda Cole suggests that eye-service in this text and other manuals “appears as a means of identification with the master, an imaginary relationship pressed into the service of a presumably self-regulating work-time” (69). This is a radical transposition of Christian judgment onto a worldly hierarchy wherein the master replaces, in some sense, the all-seeing Divine. It also makes explicit how that judgment works. Unlike God, the master is not actually all-seeing, so in his absence, the apprentice must assume the master’s gaze; he must see himself as his master would see him. This is an early example of the self-division Foucault identifies as necessary to the “capillary” workings of power he associates with disciplines involved in education and training. The apprentice will be obedient to a master once he imagines himself both as master and as apprentice. Not only does he love his master, he can in some sense “be” his master. The best apprentice can regard himself from the position of the master; he will regulate his own activity. In return, he gains the love of his master. This ideally self-regarding servant is apparent in Lillo’s Barnwell, and it is precisely this capacity to see himself through his master’s eyes that prepares him to be the ashamed subject that he is from the beginning of the play. Self-divided, capable of seeing himself through the judging eyes of his superior, the good apprentice is not only disciplined, he is ready-made for shame.
Conduct manuals defuse the threat that, without poverty, there are few motivations to industry. They do so first by framing the apprentice-master relationship in terms of love, and second by refiguring ambition in terms of self-improvement, a future orientation that hinges on reputation. The purview of self-improvement is thus limited to the terrain of morality—to duty, obligation, and the common good—improving the self not to “be” the master, but to better serve the master and one’s own future self. The manuals’ emphasis on love and self-improvement thus purportedly resolves the tension created when one man labours for the profit of another.

_**Barnwell’s Shame**_

Lillo’s tragedy dramatizes the errant apprentice’s well-known route to the gallows with the stated didactic purpose of “correcting [those passions] as are criminal either in their nature or through their excess.” As with Hogarth’s prints, the play’s didacticism rests in a fear of negative consequence; the apprentice who errs will be hanged in the end. But this old-fashioned method of fire-and-brimstone persuasion is complicated by the feelings the play elaborates, suggesting that Lillo, like other writers of the early century, is grappling with questions fundamental to commercial society: questions of motivation and passion.

Peter Hynes notes the "destructiveness" of passion as it is represented in the play, observing that, in a universe reliant on contract, "[p]ossibly the most frightening aspect of passion is that it cannot be satisfied. Trade can be content with mutual benefit and mutual agreement, but desire has no economy" (np) He makes the related point that "Millwood's lust for money is quite different from the detached attitude of Thorowgood" (n.p.). Hynes
points to the contrast between the vice of avarice and the virtue of interest--that is, of self-interest which is presumed to be of "mutual" benefit. Hirschman explains that the term "interest" at first did not have the more narrow connotation of economic gain that it does now; rather, "it comprised the totality of human aspirations, but denoted an element of reflection and calculation with respect to the manner in which these aspirations were to be pursued" (32). Put another way, it carried the shadows of two vices, both avarice and ambition, though Hirschman concentrates only on the first. While in the seventeenth century, avarice was still viewed as a vice, "the foulest of them all," "once money-making wore the label of 'interests' and re-entered in this disguise the competition with the other passions, it was suddenly acclaimed and even given the task of holding back those passions that had long been thought to be much less reprehensible " (41-2). Yet while lust and avarice are both perhaps as “insatiate as the grave” (Lillo 3.2.74), as Lucy describes Millwood’s avarice, not all passions are destructive in The London Merchant. To the contrary, love and shame are both at least potentially good passions with the potential to motivate. These good feelings are as important, in Lillo’s play, as the passions that ultimately lead to Barnwell’s end, first because they suggest, powerfully, how things might have been, and second because they offer a different way of judging Barnwell’s acts.

In Lillo’s version of Barnwell’s fate, the feelings that motivate actions are more important than the actions themselves. The effect of increased value for motivation is evident if we compare Lillo’s drama to the ostensible source of the story, “An excellent ballad of George Barnwel an apprentice of London” (1661). The basic plotline is the
same. As the ballad’s subtitle states, it tells the story of Barnwel “who was undone by a strumpet, who having thrice robbed his master, and murdered his uncle in Ludlow.” In the ballad, we are given no account of what motivates Barnwel to be “undone by a strumpet,” to rob his master, or to murder his uncle. We understand that he is driven by lust for Millwood, but beyond this singular passion, which is always a risk, we learn nothing except that, as Lucy suggests in Lillo’s version, "one vice as naturally begets another, as a father a son" (2.2. 187-88). Rather, in the ballad, money is more important than feeling; every deed is reckoned in numbers. Barnwel goes to Millwood's house with “a hundred pound and one” under his arm, as he has been out all day collecting money owed his master. After she cries, he stays for supper "and for the same paid presently, in money twice three pound” (An Excellent Ballad of George Barnwel np). The next time he sees her, she is in bed, and she claims she owes ten pounds to a "cruel wretch" so Barnwel gives her the money: "Ten pounds, nor ten times ten, shall make my love decay." After this, he says, he gave her money many times, "all of which I did purloyn:/ And thus I did pass on, until my master then,/ Did call to have his reckoning in, cast up amongst his men." He was out, he says, "two hundred pound that day." Barnwel ambushes his uncle, and after he "beat his brains out of his head" he took "fourscore pound in ready coyn, out of his Purse” (np). If feeling is largely unmentioned in this early version, money—cash, not credit—is key. The ballad demonstrates numerically the extreme to which Barnwel is driven by his love for Millwood and itemizes Millwood’s unquenchable avarice.

Shame, while repeatedly named in the play, is never mentioned in the ballad. In this earlier version, instead of being captured and imprisoned immediately, Barnwel goes to
sea “straightway.” There, “fear and dread and conscience upon him still doth stay.”

Affected by these difficult feelings, Barnwel writes a letter to the Mayor of London
"Wherein his own and Sara's faults he did at large recite." As a result, Millwood is
apprehended and sent to Ludlow where she was "judg'd condemned for murder
incontinent" and Barnwell is hanged "in chains" in Polonia (np). Shame is never named as
a motivating feeling. Rather, “fear and dread” motivate confession and differentiate
Barnwel from the unrepentant Millwood.

By contrast, in Lillo’s version of the apprentice’s downfall, shame permeates the
story. It precedes even Barnwell’s own appearance on stage. Millwood describes meeting
him: “He blushed and, bowing very low, answered, ‘George Barnwell’” (1.2.66). Before
we meet him, and before he has done anything wrong, the blush has already defined him.
In Millwood’s description, the blush comes even before his name. Generally associated
with feminine modesty, the blush signifies both innocence and its potential to be
disrupted. For Millwood, it is a sign that Barnwell will be easily duped; he is not only
sexually inexperienced but he is untutored in deviance. It is also a shame before shame.
That is, it is a reaction to a potential but as yet unrealized shame which identifies that the
blusher is in agreement with the moral rules dictating what counts as shameful. From the
beginning, Barnwell is a self-divided by shame. That is to say, he is precisely not an Eye-
Servant (as Richardson terms it). Rather, he sees himself always from the perspective of

---

25 In fact, whether the blush can actually be a reliable marker of feminine modesty was
debated throughout the eighteenth-century. My introductory quote from Mandeville
indicates only one early example of this debate. I examine this debate in more detail in
my discussions of Clarissa and Evelina, both of whom blush in meaningful and not
always modest fashion.
one who sees him. Not only does outside/inside perspective determine his behaviour, it dictates his senses and sensation. It makes him feel.  

Unsurprisingly, then, Barnwell’s shame increases with every misstep and in every scene of the play. He is ashamed when he gives in to his lust, when he steals from his master (motivated by love), when he kills his uncle (again motivated by love for Millwood). In prison, he expresses remorse and by the time he hangs, he has been forgiven and symbolically reabsorbed by the community which judged him guilty and from which he felt himself rejected. He is a different kind of errant apprentice; Barnwell errs, but he feels his wrong as shame. This feeling assures Lillo’s audience that the labour of commerce occurs within a moral framework, that its participants are moral actors. What keeps the apprentice in his place, what motivates his industrious labour for his master’s profit, is not a threatening ambition to “be” the master, but love for his master and need to belong to the community that upholds this system of labour. This is what Barnwell’s shame insists. 

That is not all his shame performs, however. The self-divisive capacity of shame also complements and supports the future-orientation necessary to the self-improvement narrative by iterating an attachment to his ideal self. In this way, shame itself is a betrayal; it betrays its social promise to keep the passions in check. Barnwell repeatedly 

26 Philip Fisher suggests that shame poses a "limit" to the extrasocial passions. He calls shame an "aftermath state" suggesting that it "rebuilds the reality of other persons, not by means of reasoned reflection, but through the agency of a successor passion" (65). Shame occurs after an outburst—of anger, for example—in the moment of a return to awareness of others. It is thus a (feeling) attempt to repair reciprocity that is lost in moments of vehement passion. Such a shame Fisher calls democratic "because it acknowledges the very reciprocity that had been suspended" (69).
expresses and elaborates what shame feels like. Indeed, there is more description of how
shame feels than how love feels, though love (or, later, lust) is named as the instigator of
all chaos and crime. Yet, shame fails as a countervailing passion; it fails to arrest his self-
interested love for Millwood and it fails to guide his reason. It fails, even, to hold him to
the rules of apprenticeship. In response to Millwood’s first question of love and offer of
supper, he responds precisely as an apprentice tutored by Cap of grey hairs ought to. He
expresses that his ”youth and circumstances” make thoughts of love ”improper” (1.2.125-
126) and he cannot stay for supper for ”duty to my master calls me hence” (1.2.162). Of
course, these initial refusals are easily overcome, and over their first meal together
Barnwell and Millwood debate the value of a hypothetical future. Barnwell answers her
seductive ploys with an economic metaphor that hinges on a future: “To ease our present
anguish by plunging into guilt is to buy a moment’s pleasure with an age of pain”
(1.2.235-6). The tutored apprentice has an idea of himself in the future, and is invested in
that idea. Enclosing his economic ambition in Christian teleology, he believes that
granting himself happiness now will not increase the store of future happiness, but
diminish it because heaven ”requires us to govern our passions” (241). And later, still
clinging to his potential happy future, he says ”Yet for a moment’s guilty pleasure shall I
lose my innocence, my peace of mind, and hopes of solid happiness” (1.2.250-253).
Millwood calls these ”chimeras” (1.2.254), and the choice of word is instructive.
Johnson’s Dictionary defines chimera as ”[a] vain and wild fancy, as remote from reality
as the existence of the poetical chimera, a monster feigned to have the head of a lion, the
belly of a goat, and the tail of a dragon.” In other words, Millwood calls his optimistic
future unrealistic—belonging to poetry or myth rather than real life—and monstrous. In response to the optimism which attaches him to the work he does and to his place in the commercial economy, she offers a pessimism based in her view of reality.

Nevertheless, Barnwell is properly future-oriented. He is attached to the happy, guiltless future that he sees as his potential. He is attached enough that he is able at least at first to resist her. He uses a different metaphor of business, still future-oriented, when he decides to follow her, by imagining himself as the merchant-venturer who risks, but who risks in hope of happy returns, not in the belief that return is impossible, and tainted:

> Reluctant thus, the merchant quits his ease  
> And trusts to rocks and sands and stormy seas,  
> In hopes some unknown golden coast to find,  
> Commits himself, though doubtful, to the wind,  
> Longs much for joys to come, yet mourns those left behind. (1.2.257-262)

The merchant-explorer "trusts" and "hopes" and "though doubtful" he "longs much for joys to come." Barnwell speaks the language of risk and hopeful reward. In this final speech of the first act, Barnwell’s words also recall the storm and shipwreck which appear in the Puritan tradition as the moment of spiritual reckoning, turning this narrative of reckoning into its precise opposite; the moment at which the soul turns away from God, rather than toward.

This image is immediately followed, in the next act, by the metaphorical voyage’s conclusion. The scene opens with Barnwell alone at Thorowgood’s. He feels deserted, and familiar things have become "strange.” He has become the merchant who risked and found himself on an unknown coast, but it is not golden. The future he now imagines is
different; it has become the future he feared in his first replies to Millwood. In this future, the self is divided, but not as it was before, hopefully regarding its future potential or happily inhabiting the gaze of the master. Rather, claiming he cannot look his friend and his master "in the face" (2.1.7), Barnwell articulates the fault line of the (shamefully) divided self: "Though hypocrisy may awhile conceal my guilt, at length it will be known, and public shame and ruin must ensue" (2.1.8-9). Shame and hypocrisy are here paired, as Barnwell expresses the impossibility of concealment. Successful hypocrisy, another form of self-division, is not possible for Barnwell because he feels shame, a feeling that exposes the self precisely as it seeks to conceal it; the face blushes as it seeks to avoid the faces of others. Barnwell’s speech is to the audience, in whom he confides before Trueman enters. Even when addressed by Trueman, Barnwell speaks to the audience in asides rather than to his friend: "By my face he will discover all I would conceal"(2.1.32).

Fittingly in a drama so animated by love and shame, the shame that reveals Barnwell’s guilt also preserves him from punishment. Thorowgood calls Barnwell's act—staying out all night—"a fault" but he does not chide him for it because he sees the shame in his face: "That modest blush, the confusion so visible in your face, speak grief and shame. When we have offended Heaven, it requires no more, and shall man, who needs himself to be forgiven, be harder to appease" (2.1.148-152). "Though I had rather die than speak my shame, though racks could not have forced the guilty secret from my breast, your kindness has", exclaims Barnwell (2.1.157-159). Thorowgood forecloses on the possibility of confession with his sympathy, and after this exchange, Barnwell declares he is saved "from destruction" (2.1.197). He is not, of course, because even
bourgeois tragedy is relentless, but he expresses here the hope of love; that it will serve to regulate unruly passions, to foster peace, “from pole to pole” (3.2.10) In Mazella's analysis, by halting his confession Thorowgood’s pity gets in the way of Barnwell's actual recovery and "becomes at least partly responsible for the crimes that follow” (802). In this way, Lillo’s play acknowledges the double-sidedness or the hazard of pity: that it can be improperly bestowed. The pitier can be fooled.

A similar wariness of pity or sympathy, particularly where it concerns criminals, is echoed in other writing of the period. In An enquiry into the causes of the late increase of robbers (1751), Henry Fielding, for example, worries about pity’s chaotic effect on justice: “The Day appointed by Law for the Thief's Shame is the Day of his Glory in his own Opinion. His procession to Tyburn, and his last Moments there, are all triumphant; attended with the Compassion of the meek and tender-hearted, and with the Applause, Admiration, and Envy of all the bold and hardened” (92). The play’s sentimentality, as Mazella suggests, is not a whole-hearted endorsement of pity, but participates in the period’s other discourse on compassion, that it can disrupt right judgment. While this is accurate, I wish to point to the relation between the feelings performed in this scene. There is not only kindness, pity, and love—all those benevolent or “moral” feelings as Adam Smith will later call them—but also shame. Barnwell’s shame, his most identifying and prominent feeling, here betrays him. While he insists that he “had rather die than speak [his] shame,” his shame gives him away and it does so precisely because he is the ideal apprentice; he is the doubled-self that Richardson imagines as the opposite to the Eye-Servant. He might have made a mistake, but because he loves his master, and sees
himself from the position of his master, he experiences shame. His shame iterates the values of the system which he transgressed, but which he nevertheless recognizes as valuable. He is preserved from punishment not only by Thorowgood’s pity, but by his own visible identification with the system that judges him. Barnwell’s self-judgment, which is repeatedly expressed as shame, effectively repositions Thorowgood’s pity as rightly placed.

In contrast to Thorowgood’s rightly placed pity for Barnwell is Barnwell’s feeling for Millwood which he expresses variously as “compassion” or “love.” When Lucy and Millwood arrive at Thorowgood’s, infiltrating a place of honest business, they recount a story of hardship to generate Barnwell’s pity. It works. He gives them “a bag of gold” [stage direction]—stolen from his master. He articulates his logic as a choice: "whether it is right to let her suffer for my faults or, by this small addition to my guilt, prevent the ill effects of what is past" (2.2.183-4). After he gives Millwood money, he laments:

Were my resolutions founded on reason and sincerely made, why then has Heaven suffered me to fall? I sought not the occasion and, if my heart deceives me not, compassion and generosity were my motives. Is virtue inconsistent with itself, or are vice and virtue only empty names? ... All is confusion, horror, and remorse. I find I am lost, cast down from all my late erected hopes and plunged again in guilt, yet scarce know how or why. (2.2.200-209)

Barnwell is wrong about Millwood, and wrong about his love, of course. He expresses confusion along with remorse; he recognizes his wrong, but is unable to right it. The play here articulates a common idea, that youth are susceptible and easily misled or confused. On the other hand, youth are also the objects of a pedagogy; they are meant to learn. Barnwell has not yet learned to read people correctly, or to detect a lie. He believes a woman whom he ought to suspect. By insisting on compassion as that which motivates
his crime, he aligns himself with the merchant creed of benevolence and love for all ("from pole to pole"), and the Christian ethos of compassion. However, he has not followed the right method to get there. Immediately following Barnwell's statement of feeling, the next scene (and act) begins with Thorowgood's advice to Trueman on the merchant’s method which will lead to love for all: "Method in business is the surest guide. He who neglects it frequently stumbles and always wanders perplexed, uncertain, and in danger" (3.1.35-37). In words that echo biblical warnings, Thorowgood directly replies to Barnwell's confusion with the clarification of method, as he asks for Barnwell's accounts. Following the right method will ensure that love is rightly motivated and bestowed only on deserving objects.

In the ballad, Barnwel’s thefts are only discovered when the master reviews his accounts. In the play, by contrast, Barnwell specifically does not leave his wrong to be discovered in the reckoning of balances. Before he leaves Thorowgood’s house and employ, Barnwell writes a letter to explain his absence. In that letter, he explains that he writes rather than leaving his theft to be discovered in his account books:

[T]he reason of my withdrawing is my having embezzled part of the cash with which I was entrusted…. Though this might have been known by examining my accounts, yet to prevent that unnecessary trouble and to cut off all fruitless expectations of my return I have left this from the lost George Barnwell. (3.1.67-74)

As he expresses it, his motivation for writing is not self-interested. He generously wishes only “to prevent that unnecessary trouble.” Again, we see Barnwell’s attempt to adhere to merchant morality. We see, also, Lillo’s effort to remove the narrative of the errant apprentice from the system that requires his labour. The system is honest and it works; it is the apprentice who makes mistakes.
Mary Poovey observes that double-entry account books were graphical demonstrations of virtue necessary to the construction of the merchant as the ideal moral citizen (xvii). In this system, truth is visually displayed in the balance sheet and the “doubled” order of the books themselves where each credit can be checked against its debit, and also against the two other, supporting documents, the journal and the memorandum. The system not only "proclaimed the creditworthiness of the individual merchant” it also “displayed the credibility of merchants as a group”(xvii). The doubling of double entry is meant to guard against inaccuracy, and also against theft, embezzling, double-dealing of any kind. While the “flaw” derives from classical tragedy, the “error” is part of the language of bookkeeping. The system of double-entry is predicated on the idea that errors are easy to make, and therefore the credit/debit system, which requires a doubled glance, is created to reduce the chances of error, or, at least, to make the error visible and thus corrigible. As Poovey notes, "Implicitly...double-entry bookkeeping was both a system of writing and a mode of government, for if merchants were to benefit from the aura of credibility cast by the rectitude of the formal system, they had to obey the system's rules” (xvii).

27 Bookkeeping, Poovey argues, did not simply record in order to track and measure profits and losses. Rather "as a system of writing" the system exceeded these goals. One social effect was to "proclaim the honesty of merchants as a group" and one epistemological effect was "to make the formal precision of the double-entry system, which drew on the rule-bound system of arithmetic seem to guarantee the accuracy of the details it recorded" (30). She suggests that "the rhetorical apology for merchants" is implicit in the system's precision and seeming accuracy and that this same precision-accuracy crux "constituted a site" where a key question, not yet formulated as problem, was first posed: "how to conceptualize the relation between the particular (quantifiable) details one could observe in the world and the general theories one could advance to explain them" (30).
Account books—those visual and rhetorical displays of a merchant’s credit-worthiness of merchant credibility—enter into Lillo’s play only twice, both times in Act 3, Scene 1. The first is Trueman’s presentation of his accounts which triggers Thorowgood’s speech on the peace-spreading value of commerce and the second when Trueman reads the letter that Barnwell has left instead of letting the book speak for him. By confessing his wrong in a letter, rather than leaving it to be discovered in the account book, or trying to cover it over, Barnwell shows his respect for, and belief in, the regulatory function of the system of credit; he knows that the system will catch him out, and so he pre-empts this discovery. Though removed from the play’s plot, the account book nevertheless serves as an object reminder that at stake here is not only a singular apprentice’s misdemeanours, but the entire system of credit (credit-worthiness and credibility) upon which British commerce was based.

The threat of an errant apprentice is both activated and limited by the play’s emphasis on this individual apprentice’s singular disregard for his own reputation. Significantly, this emphasis on Barnwell’s individual failure in reputation simultaneously dismisses the discourse of necessity as generating good motivation. Reading the letter, Trueman surmises that Barnwell must have been driven by "necessity," that word so important to the early eighteenth century and so central to early tracts on what motivates the poor to work (3.1.95). In Trueman’s mind, necessity is not what motivates Barnwell to work, but it could be what provokes him to criminality; indeed, it could be the only reason for an otherwise good man to betray his master. Here, Trueman calls on another discourse of necessity, justifying Barnwell’s acts by suggesting that vice motivated by
necessity is exempt from moral reckoning. As I will argue in Chapter 2, Daniel Defoe’s unrepentant Roxana justifies her early sexual exchanges in the same way; she only feels shame when she becomes financially self-sufficient. For Trueman, as for Roxana, necessity justifies acting in self-interest. In this way, Trueman both rationalizes Barnwell’s crime (in error, as it turns out) and challenges the discourse that necessity drives industry. Necessity is a present-tense motivation and thus less useful for a credit economy driven largely by speculation, by the expectation of return on investment. Barnwell has acted to preserve his present self, but he has done so at the expense of his future self, as Trueman clarifies. Barnwell's reputation is finished, and so therefore is his potential as merchant since "few men recover reputation lost, a merchant never" (2.1.97). While we may sympathize with Barnwell, and understand his acts as errors in judgment, or as necessary in some way to his survival, the effect of the act is incontrovertible. As Richardson and Trenchfield warn, reputation bridges present and future; the acts one commits now will be remembered by others.

Trueman links his observation about reputation to an inference about Barnwell's present feelings, supposing Barnwell will never "be brought to look his injured master in the face" (2.1.100). If Barnwell’s reputation—that is, his picture of himself as others regard him now and in the future— is lost so his self-regard must also be lost. Shame and reputation, or self-regard and social opinion, are so closely linked in the apprentice as to be inseparable. In the narrative of industry, the imperative of future potential has replaced
the imperative of present necessity just as the play’s feeling has replaced the ballad’s money.

While shame and ambition fail to make Barnwell the model apprentice, they are both necessary to provoking the right sentiment in the audience and to making Barnwell a hero rather than a villain. To Millwood, after murdering his uncle, Barnwell pleads, "Oh hide me from myself, if it be possible." And he refers to "that inmate, that impartial judge, will try, convict, and sentence me for murder and execute me with never-ending torments" (4.1.24-26). The internal judge, which Millwood names as "what's less than a shadow, your conscience" is here more present than Heaven's judgment. Shame and judgment are connected internally in "conscience." In this way, the burden of moral judgment is removed from the audience and from justice; since he has judged himself, the world need not judge him.

In jail, Barnwell asks Thorowgood for forgiveness and then describes for Thorowgood the feelings, and alteration in feelings, that bible-reading has effected in him: “I hope in doubt, and trembling I rejoice. I feel my grief increase even as my fears give way. Joy and gratitude now supply more tears than horror and anguish of despair before" (5.2.26-30). Thorowgood calls these "genuine signs of true repentance" (5.2.31). In this scene, repentance is staged in Barnwell’s act of reading and his posture of submission; it is also described in language. It is not enough that the actor display feelings, but he must also explain the feelings that give rise to them. The tears are not from horror, but from joy and gratitude. The doubt persists, but so does hope. Belief in God makes him happy, even
as he judges himself. His shame is dissipated by his repentance. There is no room, here, for the audience to misinterpret or to occupy a position other than that of the sympathetic spectator. Like Thorowgood, the audience can recognize Barnwell’s acts as wrong, but they are relieved of the responsibility of punishing him.  

Public feeling however, is still important to the conclusion of the play. Millwood’s servant Blunt describes the public judgment of Millwood and Barnwell. Everyone present at the execution, he says, "with sympathizing sorrow wept for wretched youth" while Millwood "insisted upon her innocence and made an artful and a bold defense" (5.1.22-25). In this scene, Blunt, Thorowgood, and Lucy are already in a room in a prison. Each is on his or her way to visit the prisoners. Thorowgood generalizes from Barnwell's example: "With pity and compassion let us judge him. Great were his faults, but strong was the temptation. Let his ruin learn us diffidence, humanity, and circumspection. For we who wonder at his fate, perhaps had we like him been tried, like him we had fallen too" (5.1.53-59). Thorowgood here articulates a view of morality similar to the one that Barnwell expressed at his moment of crisis: perhaps virtue and vice are circumstantial. He advises a version of sympathy grounded in knowing (i.e. knowing a person’s history of trials and temptations) and expressed in feeling.

In Lillo’s tragedy, then, neither shame nor the promise of a happy future is strong enough to make Barnwell loyally and perfectly industrious. Neither provides sufficient

---

28 As Mazella reads the final hanging scene, "a theological, essentially communal notion of sin and retributive punishment is confronted by a juridical, essentially individualist practice of correction" (796). In Cole’s reading, "Barnwell's agonizing remorse provides further testimony to the power of the male-male affective relations that, by his actions, Barnwell seems to disregard" (70).
motivation to put work and master above his love for Millwood. At the beginning, at least for Barnwell himself, his love aligns with the merchant creed; his mistake is singular and not a rebellion. This turns, however, in the moment before murder. Before he kills his uncle, Barnwell cries: "hence remorse and every thought that's good: The storm that lust began must end in blood" (3.3.40-41). Remorse is named at the moment it flees. Simultaneously, whereas Barnwell had previously attributed his wrongs to love and compassion, he here concedes that his criminal act was motivated by lust. The play stages this confession as an unveiling of the true passion, which he'd previously hidden or misnamed as love, and we are meant to believe that this naming is accurate whereas the others were wrong.

Two cultural expectations lend this panicky redefinition of feeling the aura of truth: the youth of the apprentice (whose judgment is not fully formed) and the pure self-interest of the whore. Importantly, the invocation of lust also suggests that the battle has, all along, been between passion and reason. It thus simplifies the terms. This simplification, with its reliance on cultural types, makes it possible to believe that things could have turned out otherwise. It substantiates the view proffered earlier by Barnwell, and that finds itself reiterated by Maria, Thorowgood, and even Millwood: that vice and virtue are largely circumstantial, that even the most moral of merchants could make a mistake. This contingency keeps Barnwell’s alternate, possible future alive as potential. His life could have been different, if only Millwood had never happened. The industrious apprentice, motivated equally by love of master and by desire to be a master, fervently future-oriented, hovers unrealized over the scene of Barnwell’s violent insight. In this way his
shame insists on the potentiality of the ideal. It insists that loyal industry is possible and achievable in this world. More broadly, it suggests that the world is always in progress and that, with industrious application, it can be reshaped.
Chapter 2: Novel Shame: The British Recluse and Roxana’s Alternate Ends

In Eliza Haywood’s amatory fiction, characters can be ruined by passion, as Amena, in *Love in Excess*, is ruined by her love for d’Elmont; or they can be saved by it, as d’Elmont is by his love for Melliora. In words that presage David Hume’s description of passion, Frankville declines to fight his friend for seducing his sister because Frankville has the “too great a share of good sense not to know that, that passion [i.e. love] is not to be circumscribed; and being not only, not subservient, but absolutely controller of the will, it would be meer madness, as well as ill nature, to say a person was blame-worthy for what was unavoidable” (185). Once this passion is experienced, it reverses the primacy of reason (“it would be meer madness”), replacing judgment with feeling. Passion may be unruly, but in Haywood’s *Love in Excess*, it is the source of reasonable sociality. Like the feelings which unite the community at the end of the *London Merchant*, passion is the uncontrollable aspect of personhood which forms the basis for compassion.\(^{29}\) By contrast, the passions that preoccupy Daniel Defoe are various, ungovernable, and never good. During his time on the island Robinson Crusoe is beset by “nearly every passion known to man” (Sill 93-94). Moll Flanders is undone by vanity (21) and thrives by taking advantage of others’ passions, for example, a “Fop…blinded by his Appetites” (178) or “a little innocent Child, dress’d fine by the vanity of the Mother” (5). Roxana, as she regularly reminds us, is driven to vice by just

\(^{29}\) David Oakleaf observes that Haywood’s use of “we”—eg. “we know too, that we both do, and leave undone many other things, which we ought not”(186)—constructs or assumes a complicit reader who understands (and is forgiving of) passion’s ungovernable demands.
two passions: vanity and avarice. Passions do not lead to compassion, in Defoe’s histories, but to loss or vice.

The differences between Defoe’s and Haywood’s models of passion suggest generic distinctions. A preoccupation with the travails of love defines Haywood’s work as romance, while concern with the moral effects of disordered passion places Defoe’s novel in the trajectory of conversion narratives or spiritual autobiography. Despite these differences in feeling and form, critics have persuasively described Defoe’s *The Fortunate Mistress* as a reply to fictions like Haywood’s, observing that it borrows much from the disgraced genre it critiques. John Richetti, for example, describes *Roxana* as “a 'secret history' of low doings in high life” (192). Similarly, William Warner reads *Roxana* as an explicit formal revision of “fictions of amatory intrigue” in which the reflective voice serves to “prevent the reader from becoming absorbed in mere entertainment” (151). Given these formal or generic affinities, it may not be surprising that Haywood’s and Defoe’s texts were in conversation, in one instance at least quite materially: the 1740 edition of *Roxana* contains a good sixty pages of Haywood’s *The British Recluse* immodestly sandwiched between Roxana’s final arrival in Holland and an entirely rewritten ending.

I begin my analysis of novelistic shame with Eliza Haywood’s *The British Recluse* (1722) and Daniel Defoe’s *The Fortunate Mistress... Being the person known by the name of the Lady Roxana*, first in its original form (1724) and then in two of its after-lives: the editions of 1740 and 1745(49). The material pressing together of the two earlier narratives provides a bibliographic pretext for examining this Haywood fiction in
particular. I do not suggest that Elizabeth Applebee, the publisher of the 1740 amalgam, discerned a hidden consonance between Cleomira and Roxana. But The British Recluse does provide an illuminating contrast to Defoe’s The Fortunate Mistress, and I am not the first to notice the stories’ similarities; Paula Backscheider, for example, identifies that both books warn girls against an “unsuitable match” (185). More than sharing a common didactic purpose, however, these two very different stories, one multiply retold, engage the problem of shame, and in doing so reveal shame as it is remade and as it begins to assert its formal hold on narratives of self.

In Haywood’s romance, shame performs two seemingly disparate functions. First, as it did in Lillo’s play, it forms and models a sociability; however, the sociability Haywood offers is more limited, even confined. Whereas the final scene of The London Merchant sees Barnwell before a pitying, and thus sympathetic crowd of onlookers—and the crowd of the theatre—Haywood creates a sociability of two: the ashamed interlocutors who share their stories with each other and in this way with the reader. Haywood imagines a secular, redemptive shame, a shame that can form the basis for compassion and which may enable (or model) identificatory reading. Second, Haywood makes explicit, even thematizes, what Lillo does not suggest; that there is pleasure in shame and in its close cousin, humiliation. Next, I will turn to the 1740 and 1745(49) editions of The Fortunate Mistress to show how shame, once an unruly passion which could lead to murder, in later editions took on some of the characteristics of the shame of The British Recluse, particularly its capacity to enable sociality. I argue that in this affective transformation, Roxana becomes a (more) modern novel, and Roxana a suitable
object of feeling. A secondary line of argument concerns the relationship that the different texts construct between reader and character. I suggest that the reforming of shame, with its elaborated scenes of humiliation, enables an affective shift from evaluative to identificatory reading practices.

**Mastery and Solitude: The British Recluse (1722)**

As Backscheider suggests, *The British Recluse* works through the consequences of believing too readily in professions of love, a trope which surfaces in many of Haywood’s fictions. But in this romance, perhaps more than her others, the affective consequences of such misplaced belief are exhausted, hounded to a single and seemingly inevitable end: seclusion. For both heroines of this novel, “too easily giving Credit to what [they] hear” (1) leads to their withdrawal from society. At the opening of *The British Recluse*, we are introduced to Belinda, whose curiosity about a reclusive woman in the same house provokes her to seek out the woman’s company wishing only, as she says, “to mingle my Tears with hers” (6). Belinda and the reclusive Cleomira mingle not only tears, but stories, as each takes a turn recounting the passions and problems that “too easily giving Credit” caused them. Cleomira, the recluse of the title, recounts how the false Lysander seduced her, impregnated her, then abandoned and scorned her until she was made so miserable by her passion that she tried to poison herself. In exchange for Cleomira’s confession, Belinda relates how her unwary passion for a charming newcomer, Courtal, nearly occasioned the death of her fiancé, Worthy. As Belinda nears the end of her story, Cleomira realizes that Belinda’s Courtal is, in fact, her very own Lysander.
Rebecca Bocchicchio calls *The British Recluse* “the story of a painful self-making, of two women who experience the worst of the public world and make the decision to retreat into a semi-utopic sisterhood” (103). For Juliette Merritt, Cleomira’s prolific responses to Lysander’s rejection signal a transition “from spectacle to writing subject” (83).\(^{30}\) Both critics rightly emphasize discursive self-making as one of the thematic engagements of the text, but Bocchicchio’s description evokes also the second result of discourse: that is, the women’s story-telling is not only a self-making, but also social-forming act. After sharing their histories—and discovering how intimately connected those histories are—the two women form a friendship and retreat from the world together. Like d’Elmont and Frankville, who learn compassion, Belinda and Cleomira find in each other a perfect sympathy. But there is a difference: Unlike d’Elmont and Frankville, the women’s sympathy is based *less* in their common experience of love, than in their experience of the shame and guilt occasioned by believing they were loved. That is to say, as the preface informs us, their stories are not ultimately about love, but abandonment. Love may precipitate their first confusion, their disorder, and their ecstasy, but abandonment forms the basis of the self-narrating act and of their friendship. In *The British Recluse*, a shared experience of shame, not love, enables both compassion and self-making. By following Cleomira’s progress from desirous to abandoned woman, I hope to show that for Haywood, as for Bernard Mandeville, shame is decidedly not a

---

\(^{30}\) *The British Recluse* has received less critical attention than other Haywood amatory fictions of the same period such as *Love in Excess* and *Fantomina*. Bocchicchio’s and Merritt’s chapters are, so far, the only sustained analyses of the novel. Merritt locates Cleomira’s lament in the tradition of “abandonment literature,” a discourse she traces from Ovid through the *Lettres Portugese* and which she considers to be “the ally of women in its capacity to expose the power and deceitful ways of the libertine” (87).
moral affect, but a social one. That is, it is not an indicator of virtue. However, whereas for Mandeville shame demonstrates an awareness of social expectations and judgment (and for this reason is indispensable to the politician), for Haywood shame occurs in relation to a more intimate social world. It marks the awareness of one’s dependence on the object of love. In this way, Haywood approaches Sedgwick and Frank who argue that “shame is characterized by its failure ever to renounce its object cathexis” (23).

Cleomira’s shame begins the moment Lysander first speaks to her: “Surprise, and Joy, and Hope, and Fear, and Shame, at once assaulted me,” Cleomira claims (17). From this point forward in Cleomira and Lysander’s developing intimacy, shame and desire are paired, one the shadow of the other. Shame comes last in this list of affects and the others seem to rush toward and collapse into it. After a prolonged textual seduction, Cleomira finally meets Lysander face to face in Haywood’s inevitable garden:

> [W]hen I came near enough to see him, no Confusion sure was ever equal to mine:----The reflection that this was but the third Time I had seen him, ----but the second in which I had an opportunity to speak to him;----the Condescentions [sic] of my Letters;----and that which I now gave of meeting him, came all at once into my Head, and I was ready to sink with Shame. (33)

In Bocchicchio’s analysis, shame is Cleomira’s recognition of her “enmeshment in the paradoxes of early eighteenth-century womanhood,” a thoroughly social affective response to the ideological paradigm that “marks ‘female’ as insatiably desiring, and ‘feminine’ as the complete absence of desire” (111). Clearly, Cleomira’s shame is socially implicated, and it is reasonable to argue that hovering behind her words are the scrutinizing imaginary eyes of the community whose impossible rules her desire has
transgressed. What presses here most explicitly, however, is not so much the fact that she desires (definitionally but improperly), but that she has revealed that desire. Having not yet mastered the division of sensation and expression, Cleomira has put herself at terrible disadvantage. Her writing has given too much away. Against the narrator’s opening caution against “too easily giving Credit to what we hear” (1), Cleomira has given too much credit to her own sensation. She is ashamed because her declarations of passion have revealed her love before she is assured that her love is returned.31

The second scene in Cleomira’s progress heightens her initial shame of exposure when she reveals physically what she has already granted in words. After a period of chaste daily encounters with Lysander, she finally “cou’d not resist” (38). Her surrender is short—only one paragraph—its brevity signaled in advance: “one Night:---Oh! Ever be accurst that Night,---that Hour, ----that damned undoing Minute” (37-38). One “undoing minute” is all the time given to gratification. And once that minute is over, after “his glowing Touch [had] dissolv'd” her soul, after “guilty Transport pass'd,” she is overcome by other passions: “[A] thousand Apprehensions all at once invaded me! Remorse and Shame supply'd the Place of Exstasy!----Tears fill'd my Eyes,----cold Tremblings seiz'd my Limbs,----and my Breast heav'd no more with Joy, but Horror!” 38). Despite the sensation rendered in this description—the cold trembling, the heaving breast—the shame is not the symptom of a physical transgression. Rather, shame comes with the awareness

31 Compare this to Amena’s shame in Love in Excess. Haywood relates Amena’s reaction to d’Elmont’s obvious lack of love for her: “The formality of [his] compliment touched her to the quick, and the thought of what she was like to suffer on his account, filled her with so just an anger” (61). This is the loss of interest that Tomkins describes as triggering shame. Haywood does not describe it as shame, but a sensitivity, a pain (“touched her to the quick”) followed by anger.
that she expressed her desire, and that this exposure that has made her more than ever contingent on Lysander’s interest.

Michael McKeon argues that the discourse of female “chastity” is not a side-effect of patriarchy, but rather central to the ethical and epistemological crises that define the period: “In associating female virtue with chastity, the eighteenth century is commonly thought to mark a low point of careless patriarchal cynicism. But it may be more accurate to see that association in the context of patrilineal honor, a critique in which women, besieged by discredited aristocratic honor, come to embody the locus and refuge of honorable virtue” (*The Origins of the English Novel*, 158). By arguing that Cleomira’s shame has less to do with the loss of her chastity (sign of internalized virtue), and more to do with the vulnerability of her self-exposure and abandonment, I suggest that her shame is fundamentally “aristocratic”; that is, it is a response to a breach in her inherited honour rather than to the loss of an internalized virtue for which chastity is the physical sign. And yet, because the pivotal event is precisely that “damn’d undoing Minute,” the climax of a narrative of seduction which is simultaneously the beginning of a narrative of abandonment, the novel enables the transposition of shame from reputation to the quasi-physical status of chastity.

Cleomira’s dependence on Lysander’s love becomes clear later when, reassured by his professions of love, her shame seems to melt in a hazy, hopeful blur of future-perfect: “it was some Weeks before all his Wit, his Tenderness, and seeming Truth, cou’d make me hope I had not done a Deed, I shou’d, all my Life, have Occasion to repent” (39).
Shame remains a negative possibility contained in its past tense and nearly effaced by hope for its opposite. She experiences shame only when her belief in his love falters. Once he reassures her, shame disappears. Love replaces it with hope. Sadly for Cleomira, the negative potential of her past deed is soon realized, substantiated by Lysander’s abandonment of her. The third scene of shame’s progress reveals Cleomira’s recognition of her abandonment. When the time between Lysander’s visits begins to lengthen and more than a week goes by without her seeing him, Cleomira says, “the Mist, my good Opinion of him had cast before my Eyes, began to wear off, and Reason, unobscured by Passion, shew’d me how truly wretched I had made myself.... Penetration was but the Mirror which shew’d me my Deformity, but cou’d direct me to no Means which cou’d restore those Beauties, which Guilt and Shame had utterly defac’d” (40-41). This third naming of shame amplifies the previous two. First, Cleomira registers shame and guilt as having “defac’d” her; the affective results of her textual and physical self-revelations have deformed her in her own eyes. She experiences the shame of abandonment, the shame which is in some sense the “proof” that she is dependent on an other who is not dependent on her, one who not only substantiates her shame but forces her gaze back on herself: she looks in a mirror, not at Lysander. Cleomira is now ashamed of her shame. Second, this last scene of shame is significant because it signals the split that moves the narrative from seduction to lament.

From this scene onward, Cleomira expresses the passions of the abandoned woman and the narrative proceeds from one humiliation to another. She rages, weeps, begs, scolds, and hopes but, above all, continues to love while despising herself for loving. “All
Passions, but Hatred, took their Turn to persecute me,” she says (42). To Lysander, she writes with aggrieved, aggressive sarcasm: “Pardon me, if convuls’d and torn with Pangs too dreadful for Expression, the Anguish of my Soul, in spite of me, breaks forth into Complainings” (44). She sets a spy on him to find out whose company he keeps when he is not with her. Upon learning that he spends his time with a “notoriously Imprudent… Shameless” woman, Cleomira faces him with “all that my Rage and Jealousy suggested” (46). Her tones of lament and accusation heighten in response to his prolonged absence. When she is forced to retreat to the country, her pregnancy now obvious and still no letter from Lysander forthcoming, she threatens suicide: “Yes, forgotten and abandon’d as I am, when I am dead, my Ghost will be before you [Lysander] ever” (50). Cleomira’s lament, excessive, humiliating and long—thirty-three pages of her sixty-page narrative—attests not only to shame’s intimate relation to love but also to shame’s role in signifying or expressing passion. Both aspects of shame are important to the feminine sociality that concludes the sharing of stories in this work.

Cleomira describes her love this way: after a letter from Lysander to tell her of his upcoming marriage, she tells Belinda: “one wou'd think that such an Eclaircissement was enough to have cur’d me of all Passions, but Disdain and Hate. Nothing sure was ever so insulting, so impudent, so barbarous.” (63) And yet, “I still lov'd him with such an Adoration, that I cou'd not bring myself to think that any Thing he cou'd do was wrong, and began indeed to lay the Blame of my Misfortune on my own Want of Merit to engage the Continuance of his Affection, rather than on any Vice in him” (63). Choosing “to lay the blame of [her] Misfortune on [her] own Want of Merit,” Cleomira joins with
Lysander in her own rejection. Believing that the withdrawal of his love is deserved, she sees herself from what she imagines is his position, and condemns herself. With this act of imagination—seeing herself through the eyes of a condemning other—Cleomira exemplifies the same definition of shame that we have seen already in Barnwell: a self divided, both condemning and condemned. Like Barnwell, Cleomira is also an early expression of, or precursor to, the nineteenth-century disciplined subject which Foucault historicizes. Not a creation of panopticon, but of the generic conventions of romance, Cleomira demonstrates that the affective mechanism for this self-splitting pre-exists the structures that instantiated or institutionalized it.

Shame is not only the result of unreturned love, though. As the three scenes above show, it is also the result of Cleomira’s tragic inability to distinguish between passion and its expression—either hers or his. That is to say, she too readily gives “credit” not only to his words, but to her feelings. She articulates her passions as she senses them—first in writing and then physically (and then again and again in writing when he abandons her)—rather than separating sensation from expression. She is ashamed not only because her love is not returned, but because she has signified her love too easily. And this shame, the shame of signifying too much, accelerates as her lament builds. Ashamed of what she’s given away, she nevertheless keeps pleading with him, accusing him, and confessing her utter dependence on his love. Over and over again, she lays herself bare. Reading Cleomira's multiple responses to Lysander's rejection, Juliette Merritt argues that Cleomira is “defined by all she has lost” (83) and suggests that her lament signals a transition “from spectacle to writing subject” (83). Certainly, Cleomira writes and insists
on the validity of her perspective; she insists, in a way, on her right to write. As articulate and insistent as Cleomira’s version of the truth is, though, and as much her accusations draw attention to Lysander’s deceit, the female writing subject that emerges in her lament is a difficult one, as Merritt also notes.\footnote{Merritt makes the important point that for Haywood, "social agency does not necessarily follow from achieving a 'voice'" (92), and she observes that Cleomira's language fails to satisfy or change Lysander, and it does not, either, satisfy Cleomira's "need for self expression" (92). Rather, Merritt suggests that in *The British Recluse*, Haywood offers an alternate, new basis of female agency, beginning with “Resentment” which finally permits Reason to gain "a Conquest over all the Softness which has hitherto betray'd me to Contempt" (in Merrit 92).} While insisting that Lysander pay attention to her, give her credit, return her interest, Cleomira does not become a writing subject capable of influencing events or people—that is, her writing has no performative power—but a subject defined and circumscribed by its own performance, a subject bound by shame. She is not, however, entirely bound, for the lament is analeptically contained by the telling as she reveals her past to the understanding and interested listener, Belinda. There is a life beyond shame, for this heroine. By the time they meet, Cleomira has chosen life over love, freed finally, she says, by resentment and reason. Freed, she insists, and yet she relives every humiliating detail in conversation. And with this narrative device, the lament contained within the developing friendship of these two women, it is possible to see shame’s capacity to facilitate sympathetic sociability. In this way, shame is a kind of crucible, ultimately intensifying, purifying, reforming passion into middle-class sociability.
Similar to Cleomira’s first encounter with Lysander, Belinda’s first meeting with Courtal fills her with “Shame, Remorse, Confusion, and Despair” (80). And, also like Cleomira, her revelation of passion in writing is followed by its physical expression. Belinda and Courtal’s scene of ecstasy occurs not in a night garden, but in “the thickest and most obscure Part of the Wood,” where Belinda ponders their similarity to “the first happy Pair” who “while bless’d with Innocence... knew not Shame, nor Fear” (93). Their Edenic love scene is interrupted not by a serpent but by Worthly, who appears suddenly, sword at the ready. Belinda claims that had she not been immobilized by “Shame and Horror” she would have “certainly run between their Swords, and receiv’d those Wounds each design’d for the other” (94). Ironically, though the women are more interested in the similarities in their stories, Belinda has more in common with Lysander than with Cleomira in that she, too, has abandoned one who loves her, separating passion from expression.

Like Lysander, Belinda dissembles and sometimes, shame comes to her aid. For example, when Belinda’s fiancé, Worthly, describes Courtal, shame stops her from confessing to her fiancé that she’d already fallen in love with this charming newcomer. “A thousand Times,” she says, “I was about to lay open all the Weakness of my Soul... but Shame as often depriv’d me of the Power” (80). Shame leads her to self-protective

33 But, unlike Cleomira, Belinda is more cautious. When Belinda’s fiancé, Worthly, describes Courtal, shame stops her from confessing to her fiancé that she’d already fallen in love with this charming newcomer. “A thousand Times,” she says, “I was about to lay open all the Weakness of my Soul... but Shame as often depriv’d me of the Power” (80).

34 Haywood’s allusion to original sin cannily relocates and interrogates biblical shame; the illicit lovers are shamed not because, after eating the fruit of knowledge, they see themselves as naked, but because they are seen. The act is not shameful; being caught in the act is.
duplicity, just as it leads her into the woods to evade the swords of her dueling lovers. Significantly, Belinda’s shame is in both of these instances not a response to exposing her love to Courtal, but to being exposed before Worthly: “But what was my Confusion,---my Distraction, to find myself thus expos’d! and to the Man from whom of all the World I had most desir’d my Weakness shou’d be concealed” (94). Unlike Cleomira, Belinda does distinguish between passion and its expression as she tries to hide her “weakness” from her fiancé. This becomes most clear when she learns that Courtal has killed Worthly: “Though I had all the real Concern imaginable, and Grief for Worthly’s Death, and the Cause of it, yet, I confess, I could not hear that Courtal was out of Danger without a secret Joy, which was but too guilty. I dissembled it, however” (98). Unlike Cleomira, Belinda dissembles rather than exposing her passions. Also unlike Cleomira, Belinda is not subjected in the same way to Courtal’s abandonment. He leaves, yes, but to save his own life after the duel with Worthly. She pursues him, not from the position of one abandoned, and not with lament, but physically. She goes to London, hoping to find him. At the theatre, she learns of Courtal’s perfidy second-hand, through the gossip of women, which saves her from Cleomira’s fate.

Despite these clear differences in the heroines’ experiences of passion and shame, Belinda’s narrative nonetheless works to justify Cleomira’s lament by showing Cleomira that she is not alone. She is not the only woman to have exposed herself to a Lysander, not the only one taken in by his professions of love. In this way and after the fact, Belinda wrests the authority of signification, the mastery of passion, from Lysander/ Courtal, and simultaneously, by listening, she returns to Cleomira the interest that Lysander refused
her. The two narrators expose their past disgraces, and in doing so they also expose Lysander. They articulate their distance from their past selves and form a new, feminine sociality. Significantly, their shared shame, the shame of being unloved, is the ground of their sociality. As the narrator of The British Recluse expresses it, “Their common Misfortunes were a Theme not to be exhausted and they still found something for which to condole each other. In this melancholy Entertainment did they pass some Days” (113). The conclusion of the novel insists that this sociality of the abandoned is sufficient; in a house “about seventy Miles distant from London” their lives continue “in a perfect Tranquility, happy in the real Friendship of each other” (114). In this way, Belinda and Cleomira provide each other a feminine sociality unavailable to the male errant apprentice whose shame makes him a sympathetic figure, but ultimately leaves him alone on the gallows, any potential for sociability foreshortened by the justice which executes him, excising him (and the wrong he represents) from the community.

The sociability of the ashamed women suggests shame’s relation to self-consciousness and recalls Silvan Tomkins’ explication of interest and shame as opposite ends of the same pole. In Tomkins’ affect theory, shame is the affective response to the perception of one’s dependence on the other’s love and results from the withdrawal of interest. The echo of theories across the centuries does not suggest to me that shame is consistent and ahistorical, but rather that the framework of the self and the social that vivifies Haywood’s fiction operates in twentieth-century psychology. That is, we see in Haywood an early indication of the importance of shame to the construction of a loving or compassionate self. Or, from a Foucaultian perspective, we see in the women’s acts of
confession the “excavation” of self which is part of what Foucault calls the microphysics of power, that is, a power which is not deployed uni-directionally, from king to subject, but which disciplines and trains subjects in self-scrutiny and self-regulation (*History of Sexuality* 59). Thus we see in Haywood’s text, the beginning of that literature which, in Foucault’s words, is "ordered according to the infinite task of extracting from the depths of oneself, in between the words, a truth which the very form of the confession holds out like a shimmering mirage" (59). For Tomkins shame is not a moral affect, nor does it result from the perceived failure to achieve an “ideal,” but from the perceived withdrawal of the other’s interest. When interest is withdrawn, shame makes apparent to the perceiving self that it is distinct from that world in which it’s interested. In this way, it individuates the self. But the individuated self still does not turn away from the other who has withdrawn; rather, it clings to the (idea of the) other. Cleomira, like Tomkins’ shamed self, keeps reaching for the one who has turned away—keeps reaching, in other words, for love and for reintegration in the social, persists in trying to be “seen” or recognized, remains “interested” in the world. Simultaneously, Cleomira’s story shows that if the other refuses to return one’s interest, then the repeated act of reaching and of being rejected comes to register as a performance of self-humiliation, of the present self’s rejection of the past-self, the one who made the mistake. The narration of this humiliation is what binds the two women in their “real Friendship.”

As I am arguing in this chapter, novelistic shame produces a pro-social, self-regulating middle-class subjectivity. The successful and happy pro-social, self-regulated subjectivity suggested by the conclusion’s optimistic vision of feminine sociality,
however, is complicated and extended in Haywood’s text. It is complicated by Cleomira’s “suppos’d” death. Although after her failed suicide Cleomira decides that “I will live, and Love alone shall die” (73), the life she has chosen remains a social death. “I cou’d not endure,” she says, “to appear publickly in the World again; and as Lysander believ’d me dead, I was willing every Body else shou’d do so too” (73). Choosing a “solitary Life” (113) rather than sociability suggests that her shame has no conclusion; or, rather, that the choice is between shame and exile, a life where one’s “interest” can be returned only by one other, and that other must also be ashamed. This is, in other words, a very circumscribed sociability, one grounded in being excluded from a broader sociability. It is a sociability that is still, shamefully, hidden. The second complicating context is the fascination of reading about shame itself. That is, while Belinda and Cleomira offer a model of circumscribed sympathetic companionship, their stories also “entertain.” Ros Ballaster observes that “The telling of a story of seduction is also a mode of seduction” (Ballaster) 24); amatory fiction depicts seduction while at the same time stimulating the physical pleasure of arousal in the reader. But in this particular Haywood novel, where shame so thoroughly invades ecstasy, the arousal is likewise shifted. We see this in the narrators’ responses to each other; the two shamed women may console each other, but they also enjoy listening to each other’s humiliations.

The narrator prompts us to be suspicious of idealizing sympathetic listening in the first pages of the novel, as the two women justify—to each other, but also to the reader—what provokes them to narrate their histories. When she meets Belinda, Cleomira invokes the sympathy that Belinda earlier claimed drove her to seek the recluse’s company: “if, as
you confess, you really know the Power of Love, your own Heart will make you comprehend what 'twas mine felt, much more than any Words cou'd do” (20). As in *Love in Excess*, Cleomira names love as the affect that enables compassion, granting it a power over language. Love, “more than words,” will enable comprehension. Cleomira here reiterates the reason Belinda herself gave for seeking the recluse’s acquaintance: for sympathy. But this claim, that sympathy drives Belinda’s desire to hear Cleomira’s “secret history,” is already somewhat suspect. When Belinda first learns of the mysterious Recluse, the narrator informs us that “it fail’d not to excite her Curiosity to a Desire of knowing as much as she cou'd of this adventure” (4). Curiosity comes first, in other words; a desire for knowledge, rather than for compassionate understanding, makes Belinda wish to discover the secretive recluse. Belinda’s explicit acknowledgement of her curiosity extends the story I am telling about the emergence of a productive version of middle-class novelistic shame in that it links an affective shift toward sympathy with an epistemic shift; compassion follows the pleasurable search and discovery of shame.

While Cleomira articulates and embodies Haywood’s metaphysic—love will lead to compassion—curiosity remains the presupposition on which their sympathetic communication rests. The desire to know—or, at least, to know what happens next—remains the unacknowledged stimulus to narrative, and points to the power of shaming knowledge. Manufacturing that curiosity is what Haywood does best, exploiting the links, as Barbara Benedict says, between “the desire to find something out, curiosity, and the desire to be aroused” (Benedict 194). In *The British Recluse*, however, that desire to be aroused is not associated only with the passion of love, but also and predominantly with
the passion of shame. The sympathetic listener’s desire, like the reader’s, is not only to be sexually aroused but to feel the pangs and pleasures of humiliation; we identify with the intensification and self-scrutiny. As the narrator tells us, “Their common Misfortunes were a Theme not to be exhausted and they still found something for which to condole each other. In this melancholy Entertainment did they pass some Days” (113). So, if telling stories about one’s own shame and humiliation can provide the basis of a sympathetic sociality—as Haywood, I think, suggests they can—they do so by arousing pleasure. Whereas Tomkins identifies that in shame the self simultaneously recognizes its boundaries and its dependence on the other, Haywood identifies the pleasure of invoking that experience. That is, whereas Tomkins focuses on the experience of shame, as the self finds itself alone, and potentially unloved, as it reaches for the other which has turned away, Haywood offers the same experience at a second remove, telling the story of two women telling their stories of shame. In this way, Haywood insists on the discursive ground of shame, self, and sociability.

As with any amatory fiction, the crisis at the heart of The British Recluse is affective. Haywood’s fictions glory in, and glorify, the struggle to master passion. Significantly, though, mastery is different from control or the “cure” that Sill identifies as so central to the eighteenth-century novel. While Cleomira repeatedly expresses the wish for “Reason” to control this passion for Lysander, the crisis the text engages is quite different: not extirpation of passionate sensation, but the right interpretation of it; not the obliteration of love, but the selection of the right object of love. What Cleomira seeks, in fact, is to become expert in passion’s sensations, while controlling and correctly
interpreting its signs. Mastery of passion is the lesson that Haywood’s text offers. Though Haywood’s didacticism has often been dismissed, most quotably by George Whicher who calls her novels “less successful illustrations of fiction made didactic, than of didacticism dissolved and quite forgot in fictions” (Merritt 77), not only does didacticism remain central to *The British Recluse*, it is critiqued and thematized as the novel works through the various potentials of shame.  

Readings like Whicher’s assume that Haywood’s didactic aim is the cultivation of morality or the post-aristocratic “virtue” when, in fact, her texts offer excellent educations in passion. *The British Recluse*’s lesson— the danger of “too easily giving Credit to what we hear” (1)—is not a moral lesson, but a lesson in passion and interpreting passion. It is a lesson, in other words, in middle-class feeling. The text prepares its readers for participation in a society which depends on recognizing and controlling emotion as expressions of internal self.

Arguably, this lesson is undone by the book’s conclusion in female friendship. While the story tells the importance of mastering passion, of hiding rather than exposing feeling, the heroines’ bond is itself based in exposure; Cleomira and Belinda tell each other their secrets—and the narrator tells us. Potentially, the women’s happy friendship presents an alternate sociality to the one that has excluded and punished them, a sociality based in frank exposure and confession, rather than in carefully, protectively managed feelings. On this reading, then, *The British Recluse* participates in the project evident in *Love in Excess*, constructing a reader who will read tales of shame with compassion,

---

35 Warner similarly argues "Haywood gives a special privilege to love over every other social value, and subordinates traditional claims to improve the reader to the relatively new one of offering diversion and entertainment" (112).
rather than with moral judgment. But such optimistic reading is troubled, first, by Haywood’s insistence that the women’s friendship has no place in the world, and therefore cannot ever be public or the basis of a broader, public sociality and, second, by the recognition that a sociality based in shame can be activated (like novel-reading?) by the less-than-sympathetic appetite for humiliation. The women’s sociality is not based solely in identification—as Belinda would have it—but equally in a desire to be entertained by another’s humiliation. In modeling an alternate sociality based in confession and exposure, *The British Recluse* foregrounds the uncomfortable affective premise of much novelistic narrative: its mechanism of hiding/exposing passions makes the reader curious for humiliation. The pro-social and self-regulated subject idealized (or required) by the social contract, in this novel in fact consolidates relations of inequality; it loves its humiliation.

*The Fortunate Mistress*

Daniel Defoe’s *The Fortunate Mistress* offers a different picture of shame, and how it is told. Unlike Cleomira’s, Roxana’s shame has nothing to do with love. The passions that undo the fortunate mistress are not the result of her undue valuing of the lover’s interest, or for “giving Credit too easily.” Rather, she is undone by valuing her own interest too highly; the two passions that compel Roxana to (shameful) crime, and that propel much of the (shameless) narrative, are vanity and avarice. In this way, Defoe’s *The Fortunate Mistress* highlights and inverts the “aristocratic” shame of exposure that I have suggested Haywood personalizes and privatizes. Though shame fails to lead to Roxana’s reform, it is central to the narrative, demonstrating not only shame’s importance to the
autobiographical structure, but also the volatility of the model of the passions upon which such autobiography depends.

Roxana’s shame is remarkable for its absence from the text, an absence that has fuelled critical debates for decades. Roxana’s apparent lack of shame and her ultimate failure to repent has been called both “the book’s undoing” (Starr 165) and a focal shift that “deepens the complexity of the art [of the novel]” (Sim 175). By its very absence, it seems, shame is central to the mistress’s story. Critical responses tend to divide on the question of Roxana’s repentance. In the first, the narrator’s repentance is hypocritical or incomplete and thus undermines the narrative.36 In the second, the narrator’s apparent failure of feeling, along with the abrupt conclusion, is the book’s achievement.37 Either way, the question of the character’s repentance is regularly paired with the question of the narrative’s success or cohesion, with whether story itself is saved or damned, an association most explicit in George Starr’s reading that “that the technical difficulty of making an unregenerate malefactor her own critic is the book’s undoing” (165, my

36 Paula Barksheider, for example, suggests, "Not only did Roxana not offer correctives, but it failed to attract imitators or even numerous readers" (213).
37 Most recent criticism tends toward this view. For example, Alison Conway asserts that in Roxana, Defoe offers a conversion narrative that does not resolve in a clear "theological or moral abstraction" but insists, instead, "on the gendered and embodied status of the individual" (230). Geoffrey Sill argues that in the unrepentant and unpunished Roxana Defoe evinces his skepticism that any cure of the passions is possible. John Richetti claims that Roxana’s internal guilt “is nothing less than a presentation of the form of an eighteenth-century individualist consciousness as it converts… truth into power” (231). Sandra Sherman considers Roxana a speculative text embedded in the marketplace, and Roxana’s fear of ruin reflective of “an inability to escape the logic of narrative” (167). Similarly, Poovey argues that by creating an intermittently remorseful character whom readers may or may not trust Defoe designed “an exercise in the social process of evaluation that made the credit economy work” (Genres of the Credit Economy 120).
emphasis). Applying an eighteenth-century moral/sexual vocabulary to the narrative’s structure, Starr makes the book itself a heroine whose virtue is “undone,” compromised by the author’s vanity or ambition. Roxana’s vices and fortunes become Roxana’s.

While problematically sexualized, Starr’s homologizing of character and book turns out to be, in some sense, historically justified. For, in the end, near the close of the century, Roxana and Roxana were both reformed when later publishers of the novel, who also identified Roxana’s lack of repentance as a problem, resolved it by simply writing it in:

- In 1740, Roxana confesses to her son and daughter that she is indeed their mother, recounting an edited version of her history to her son before burning all Amy’s letters and any papers that might give away the truth. Having made peace with two of her children, she dies “in Charity with all the World” (Defoe, *The fortunate mistress* 442)

- In the 1745(49) revision (and all later editions based on it), in elaboration of the “calamity” suggested in 1724, Roxana loses her wealth, her fine clothes, and her reputation and is finally imprisoned for an unpaid debt. While in jail she “[gives] her mind wholly up to devotion” and dies (Defoe, *The life and adventures of Roxana the fortunate mistress or most unhappy wife. Containing, the vast variety of fortunes that attended her ... with several curious reflections, and entertaining particulars.* 431).
In 1775, Roxana dies “truly a penitent” in the arms of her new love, Mr. Worthy (Defoe, *The history of Mademoiselle de Beleau; or, the new Roxana, the fortunate mistress* 273). As John Mullan argues, multiple later editions of *The Fortunate Mistress* reveal changing reader expectations about novels, changes which Mullan connects to the developing culture of feeling in Britain. The original *Roxana*, Mullan observes, leaves readers with the sense “that penitence might merely be a 'Consequence' of 'Misery' rather than a proper growth of conscience” (*Roxana* xi). And this doubt or skepticism is precisely what later editions attempted to eliminate or reconcile “by showing Roxana truly and finally transformed” (*Roxana* xi).

Not only do all later editions conclude with repentance and death, but they all negotiate, though each one differently, the most morally problematic and narratively unresolved event: Amy’s likely murder of Susan, Roxana’s daughter. In the 1740 edition, we never find out what happened, but Roxana seems to be satisfied that Amy did not murder her, as she reinstates Amy as her serving maid and confidante. In the 1745 edition, and those based on it, Susan is not murdered but re-appears in Holland. In the 1775 edition Roxana leaves her children in Amy’s safe care, maintaining occasional contact with them during her years of adventure. The adjustments later publishers make to the conclusion and to Susan’s story suggest to Mullan that later readers expected moral certainty and were troubled by the (inconclusive) murder of Susan—perhaps in ways that readers in 1724 were not. While I agree that later editions were less likely to offend either

---

38 I do not analyze the 1775 text in this chapter, but the revised ending shows the remaking of shame that the dissertation tracks.
aesthetic or moral judgment, I want to uncover the affective shifts required to produce such a refined sense of moral/aesthetic offence. What changed in British literate culture to make this apparently popular unregenerate narrator, and her inconclusive narrative, increasingly reprehensible? By tracking one passion which I consider necessary to each edition of the text, I hope to show how a passion becomes a feeling: how shame, like the story and the character, is reformed and in this way put to the service of building sympathy. Put differently, I hope to show that shame, Mandeville’s volatile “necessary Ingredient,” (101) had to be reformed in order to facilitate and privilege the mode of relating to narrative that we now take for granted: identification. Also, I build upon the observation articulated in relation to Haywood’s *The British Recluse*, that such identification, which also forms the basis of sympathetic sociability, is itself bound up with relations of shame and humiliation—bound up, that is, in consolidating relations of inequality.

**Shameless and damned: The Fortunate Mistress in 1724**

In this section, I will begin by examining the relation between Roxana’s explicitly motivating passions, vanity and avarice, and the passion that, unnamed, propels the latter half of the plot to show: that when Roxana becomes motivated less by avarice and vanity and more by that which she calls either “guilt” or “shame,” that change in motivation is directly related to a change in her status—from worker to capitalist. Her shame is in this way fundamentally a “capitalist” shame; that is, it is bound to her own Credit. The second half of plot is driven by Roxana’s fear of judgment, both divine and human. I next propose that, while startlingly similar to Cleomira’s, Roxana’s shame is revealed to be not
only “social” (that is, related to her reputation or public “Credit” rather than to her virtuous chastity) but also dangerous in its sociality. In *Roxana*, it becomes clear that Credit is just another kind of honour. As McKeon notes, Defoe “recognized that the modern world of exchange value was ruled by, in his phrase, 'the Power of Imagination.' And he perceived that in some mysterious sense, capitalist credit was only a secularization of aristocratic honour” (*Theory of the Novel* 392). In this way, Defoe upends the social basis of shame and morality tentatively articulated by Haywood, and evinces his skepticism of shame’s utility for what Mandeville calls “the Happiness of Conversation” (101–102).

Vanity and avarice move Defoe’s heroine—quite literally, as they send her from one country to another—and the narrative for the first half of the novel. Looking back on her history, and in this way bringing herself to strict account in good Puritan practice, Roxana provides this teleological explication: “as Necessity first debauch’d me, and Poverty made me a Whore at the Beginning; so excess of Avarice for getting Money, and excess of Vanity, continued me in the Crime... These were my traits, these the Chains by which the Devil had me bound; and by which I was indeed, too fast held for any Reasoning that I was then Mistress of, to deliver me from” (Defoe, *The Fortunate Mistress*). 39 Shame does not feature in this teleology, even though, as I will argue, after this reflective turning point, it does replace avarice and vanity to move both plot and character. Unnamed, shame exists in tension with these two driving passions.

---

39 All references are to the 1724 text: *The fortunate mistress: or, a history of the life and vast variety of fortunes of Mademoiselle de Beleau, afterwards call'd the Countess de ...* London, 1724.
As Roxana describes her passions, they seem to be almost intelligent, independent agents which move and effect changes. Hers is a humoral body. Gail Kern Paster reminds us "the language of the humoral body constructs a bodily self-experience that is often tumultuous and dramatic even when the function is normal. Humoral physiology ascribes to the workings of the internal organs an aspect of agency, purposiveness, and plenitude to which the subject's own will is often decidedly irrelevant" (10). Roxana’s passionate agents are thus similar to that expressed by Thomas Hobbes for whom passions are the primary and necessary causes of motion, in both the personal and in the social: “Life itself is but Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor without Fear, no more than without Sense” (39). Samuel Johnson’s 1755 dictionary offers seven different definitions of passion, the first two of which define it in terms of movement and both of which appear to be at play in Roxana’s assessment of her life. First, passion is “any effect caused by external agency.” The quotation from John Locke illustrates the materiality of this meaning: “A body at rest affords us no idea of any active power to move, and when, set in motion, it is rather a passion than an action in it.” The second definition more nearly defines the passion that concerned moralists: “Violent commotion of the mind.” Significantly, quotations that illustrate this definition are largely drawn from verse—four from Shakespeare, two from Milton, one from Dryden—suggesting the intimate relation between imaginative literature and feeling. The final illustrative quotation comes again, from Locke: “All the art of rhetorick, besides order and perspicuity, only moves the passions, and thereby misleads the judgment” (A Dictionary of the English Language np). Roxana’s passions are both “effect[s] caused by external agency” in that she sees them as
the Devil’s chains and “violent commotion[s] of the mind” which “continue” her in crime. They not only mislead her judgment, but they steadfastly and actively resist it.

Even in this rare moment of reflection, Roxana asserts that her “Reasoning” is insufficient to loosen the “Chains by which the Devil” binds her. This opposition of reason to passion expresses one common early-eighteenth century view. Drawing on the classical view of the passions, moralists such as Isaac Watts (a contemporary of Defoe’s) believed that “ungoverned passions took their power from the sensory appetite, which was in rebellion against the rational will as a consequence of the fall and which was a symptom, therefore, of original sin” (Dixon 87). In this view, passion and “rational will” exist in fractious hierarchy, with the rational will holding tenuous power over sensory appetite, the inevitable and fleshly consequence of Eve’s originary curiosity (a view utterly unlike the happy, Edenic shamelessness evoked by Belinda). Roxana’s pessimistic assessment of her reason participates in the period’s debate on human nature and the problem of governance—that is, how to govern a self so easily moved by passions, and how to govern a social body after what McKeon calls the “devolution of absolutism” (The Secret History of Domesticity 3). In other words, any question of human nature was also, at the same time, a question of sociality. The necessary interdependence of these questions is clear in Isaac Watts’ The doctrine of the passions explained and improved (first published in 1729 as part of Discourses of the Love of God). Watts, like Hobbes, does not consider the passions to be in themselves wrong, if “put under due Government” (vii). However, for Watts, only governance makes the passions safe. “Ungoverned Passions break all the Bonds of human Society and Peace, and would change the Tribes
of Mankind into brutal Herds, or make the World a mere Wilderness of Savages. Passion unbridled would violate all the sacred Ties of Religion, and raise the Sons of Men in Arms against their Creator. Where Passion runs riot, there are none of the Rights of God or Man Secure from its Insolences” (viii). For Watts, living as member of society, rather than a herd, requires the regulation of these “mingled Powers of Flesh and Spirit” (vi). Regulating passion, he clarifies, will “tend to make our Neighbours happy as ourselves” (ix). We get a sense for the import of self-governance from the tenor of Watts’ words. The spectre of human violence hovers over the potential of the social contract, over a society no longer bound by an absolute faith or an absolutist monarchy.

Roxana’s passions seem, as Watts fears, to “run riot.” Though Roxana claims that her reason has no power over her passions, the view that reason ought to be able to hold the passions in check is one response to the question: might the passions be reformed? But it was an answer regularly and increasingly challenged as early-eighteenth-century thinkers from Bacon to Mandeville observed that reason alone was not up to the job. Francis Bacon, for example, commends poets and historians for their more accurate understanding of human nature; that is, for knowing how “to set affection against affection and to master one by another” (259). For Bacon this valuable insight into human nature is of use in resolving both “moral and civil matters.” He states, “as in the government of states it is sometimes necessary to bridle one faction with another, so it is in the government within” (260). What Bacon proposes here is a model of countervailing passions. In this model, the battle is no longer between vice and virtue, warring over the soul of man, or of rational mind trying to govern unruly sensual appetites; rather, it is a
fight between one passion and another. When Roxana claims that reason cannot
overpower avarice and vanity, she articulates a flaw in the model of human nature that
proposes that rational governance can, in fact, restrain these particular passions. But
Defoe does not provide her with another model. At least on first appearance, as far as the
narrator is able to reflect on her past or contemplate on her future, it seems that no
countervailing passion is set in motion to “bridle” the passions that have made her a
“fortunate mistress.” And, in this way Defoe seems to suggest, at least implicitly, the flaw
in the model of countervailing passion: that is, any passion can lead to vice.

Rational reflection on the passions has no effect on the passions themselves; as
Roxana observes, “it made no Impression upon me of that Kind which might be expected
from a Reflection of so important a Nature” (249). In some sense, then, Roxana contains a
built-in skepticism about the form of the autobiographical conversion narrative; that is, it
is skeptical that the self-narrating subject can successfully disentangle herself from her
passions and find salvation by simply calling herself to account. 40 Indeed Geoffrey Sill
argues that in Roxana Defoe evinces his skepticism that a cure for the passions is even
possible. 41 Similarly, Conway views Roxana's struggle and failure to “repent” in the
Protestant way as signal of a “larger epistemological concern” (221) which highlights the

40 I use the term autobiography anachronistically and broadly to refer to acts of self-
narration, whether fictional or diaristic. Paul Hunter uses the term similarly to refer to
published works of non-fiction in which “lives” of ordinary people, not saints, are used
for moral instruction. I expand it to encompass fiction to reflect the oft-noted blurred line
between fiction and fact in narratives of the period; Roxana was published as a “history,”
not a novel.
41 On Sill’s reading, the conclusion of Roxana suggests that there is neither cure nor
salvation: “The natural consequence of a life spent in the pursuit of a chimera is neither a
sentence at law, nor a religious penance, either of which would bring the work a sense of
closure, but an affliction of the spirit that has no cure” (128).
anxiety that salvation can ever be easy or complete. And yet, something does change. Though the character remains unmoved by reflection or, in her metaphor, not “impressed” by it, avarice and vanity are, in fact, displaced as the agents that move the narrative and the character. Significantly, this happens not because she repents, but because these passions have reached their apogee. The passions are halted by two, perhaps related events: first, the mobile, working mistress has become a capitalist; and, second, the daughter surfaces to threaten the perpetually self-transforming Roxana with self-identity. That is, the daughter threatens to expose Roxana as a mother turned “a” Roxana, and to anchor or stabilize her in that conflicted identity.

Roxana’s reflection on the Devil’s chains comes in response to her question “What am I a Whore for now?” (246). And it comes with her recognition that she has become financially self-sufficient; her money is producing enough money to sustain her and, indeed, to remove the force of her old passions. As she acknowledges,

But this was all over now; Avarice cou'd have no Pretence; I was out of the reach of all that fate could be suppos'd to do to reduce me; now I was so far from Poor, or the Danger of it, that I had fifty Thousand Pounds in my Pocket at least; nay, I had the Income of fifty Thousand Pounds; for I had 2500 £ a year coming in, upon very good land-Security, besides 3 or 4000 £ in Money which I kept by me for ordinary Occasions (248).

Thanks to Sir Robert Clayton, the fortunate mistress is now living on the interest of her investments: vanity and avarice have been transformed into successful capitalist accumulation. 42 While she observes, with some perplexity, that “Avarice could have no

42 Christopher Gabbard argues against this idea of Roxana as “successful” capitalist investor noting that it is Sir Robert's investment of her money that makes her rich and it is therefore "not accurate to assert that Roxana's turning to him to manage her finances somehow signifies that she herself has mastered finance"(245). I do not suggest that her “success” makes her a kind of capitalist exemplar but that it enables her not to “work” for
Pretence,” her actions suggest that it continues to exert its hold. After first meeting Clayton, Roxana avers that “Sir Robert knew nothing of my Design; that I aim’d at being a kept Mistress, and to have a handsome Maintenance; and that I was still for getting Money, and laying it up too, as much as he cou'd desire me, only by a worse Way” (207). The conflict between what she observes ought to be the case—“that Avarice could have no Pretence”—and what is actually the case—that she continues to be motivated by money—follows from her question: “What am I a Whore for now?”

Conway finds an illuminating parallel between Roxana’s soul-searching question and Nell Gwyn’s comparison of her own acts to that of the king’s other whore, the Catholic Louise de Keroualle: “If she be a lady of such quality, why has she become a whore? She ought to die of shame. As for me, it is my profession. I don’t pretend I’m anything else” (Conway 220). In other words, for Nell Gwyn, the aristocrat who whores for “social and political advancement alone” ought to be ashamed, whereas the worker, the woman who whores to make a living, has no need to feel shame. Finances define the scope of this shame, as they define Roxana’s credit. Though avarice should not exert its hold on her, it does, and recognizing that there’s no longer a reason for her to be a whore, Roxana simultaneously recognizes that she, like the Catholic whore, “ought to die of shame.”

Her money. Also, in response to Gabbard, I would suggest that indeed Clayton himself was an ambiguous, rather than exemplary, figure for Defoe. John Robert Moore identifies that Clayton was one of the judges in 1703 who sentenced Defoe to the pillory, and notes that Defoe had “impaled [Clayton] with one of his fiercest satires,” his *Hymn to the Pillory* (45).
In this way, Roxana’s terror of divine judgment is connected with her financial success. Roxana iterates this connection soon after her marriage to the Dutch Merchant. After she and her husband establish a way to keep her money separate from his, Roxana feels glad that she would not subject him to “the Blast of a just Providence for mingling my cursed ill-gotten Wealth with his honest Estate,” a worry brought on, she says, by the “Reflections which … came into my Thoughts, of the Justice of Heaven, which I had reason to expect would sometime or other still fall upon me or my Effects, for the dreadful Life I had lived” (320). As when she first asks, “What am I a Whore for now?” her reflections and her terror of justice arise from money. They stem from her awareness that her passions made her fortune; she now lives on the interest gained on the money she first earned illicitly. In this way, the terror of justice seems an integral or inevitable part of her capitalist success. Or, as John Richetti astutely summarizes it, “The world of legal status and secure wealth ... is maintained in tension with guilt and remorse” (228). The threat of judgment and Roxana’s fear that it could, at any point, fall on her or her “Effects” drives the second half of the story. Meanwhile, the passions that had driven her lose their grip on the plot which is now propelled by “terror” and “guilt.” After she becomes a capitalist, the question becomes: When and how will she be judged? Like the errant apprentices fearfully imagined by the instruction manuals; Roxana is too ambitious.

---

43 Similarly, Stuart Sim argues that the “calamities” the narrator refers to at the end of the novel are evidence that this judgment indeed comes to pass in the end. She falls upon worldly disaster, rather than receiving grace, the proof of which would have been in her continuing financial success (162).
44 I am not the first to read this part of the story as a tale of shame. William Godwin wrote “The terror of a guilty mind, haunted with mysterious fears of retribution, has seldom been more powerfully delineated” (qtd in Owens and Furbank 302).
She has overcome her status to become the master of her own time, body, and wealth. And so she fears the judgment that normally falls on the ambitious apprentice; she will be punished for the success which derives from her manipulation of a system that would ordinarily compel her subjection. She knows that if her life follows the trajectory of the errant apprentice, she will lose her money and her status.

However, throughout the text, there are two judgments at work, divine and human. Roxana herself contrasts these two forms of judgment. Justifying her decision not to reveal to Susan that she is, in fact, the Roxana that Susan once served as maid, she explains that “Parents always find it, that their own Children are a Restraint to them in their worst Courses, when the Sence of a Superiour Power has not the same Influence: *But of that hereafter*” (252). Divine judgment inspires terror, but the judging eyes of a child inspire what she later names either guilt or shame. And this affect is far more unstable than terror, as suggested by the ominously italicized “*But of that hereafter.*”

After Roxana realizes that Susan is her daughter, the possibility of human judgment presses threateningly close and reveals the danger of shame that is so intimately social. While shame and guilt drive the second half of the narrative, these passions are rarely named, but when they are, murder follows closely. The first time she names guilt, for example, occurs after she has scolded Amy for even imagining she might murder Susan. Roxana admits that ”the Notion of being discovered, carried with it so many frightful Ideas, and hurry'd my Thoughts so much, that I was scarce myself, any more than Amy, so dreadful a thing is a Load of Guilt upon the Mind” (337). Roxana’s guilt for past crimes is in this way connected to the possibility of Susan’s murder. So dreadful is
Roxana’s guilt, and so afraid is she of being discovered by her daughter, that she nearly contemplates it—or so her comparison with Amy implies. The potential for murder is later clarified, this time after naming shame.

Sent into a terrible “disorder” (368) for fear her husband was about to discover her secret identity, that she had indeed been a mistress and a roxana, she pauses in her crying to reflect on shame: “How just it is, that Sin and Shame follow one-another so constantly at the Heels, that they are not like Attendants only, but like Cause and Consequence, necessarily connected one with another; that the Crime going before, the Scandal is certain to follow; and that ’tis not in the Power of humane Nature to conceal the first, or avoid the last” (367). Shame in this passage is not so much a “feeling” as a response to public exposure, whether threatened or actual. The “consequence” of crime is a social effect—a scandal, a public disclosure. In Roxana’s imagination, the causal connection between wrongdoing and public exposure is inevitable. Every sin will inevitably be witnessed, and not only by God, but also by the community that judges. In this way, Roxana’s shame closely resembles Cleomira’s. As with Cleomira, shame really is “in” the eyes. Both experience the shame of exposure. But the differences are crucial. In Roxana’s case, the social is broader. Certainly, she fears the shame of being exposed before her husband, but she also fears a more general public disgrace. “Scandal” suggests that what is at stake here is her public reputation, her “Credit.” Her shame has little, if anything, to do with self-regard; it lies virtually entirely in the eyes of others. Her credit is no different, in this case, than the aristocratic credit that Haywood invokes (“too easily giving credit”); associated with credibility and truth, it is of material value. Roxana,
unlike Cleomira, long ago mastered the difference between passion and its signification. But to be discovered to have mastered them, to be exposed as a person fully capable of manipulating passion, is a broader and more consequential exposure. It reveals Roxana’s “credit” to be false, and her motivation to be the anti-social one of self-interest. Shame is then associated with murder when Amy upbraids her mistress for not allowing her to kill the persistent daughter. As in the first instance, Roxana responds that she “was not for killing the Girl yet “(368). When either guilt or shame is named as Roxana’s passion, murder is named as Amy’s act. For these two inextricable characters, shame is a dangerous passion. And yet, significantly, while Roxana claims that shame is the consequence of sin, when Susan is murdered, this causal link is broken. And with this event—that might be understood in this way to substitute consequentially for shame—the narrative structure falls apart, as does the first-person subject. The narrative repeats the gesture of shame by concealing the worst crime. The murder remains untold.

In contrast to Haywood’s narrative, which only looks back, we learn of the murder proleptically and repeatedly, as we see in the two conversations between mistress and maid quoted above. In the final conversation with Amy on the topic, Roxana reflects, “I know not what secret Impulse prevail’d over my Thoughts, against it, I cou’d not do it, for fear the wicked Jade shou’d make her away, which my very Soul abhorr’d the Thoughts of: which, however, Amy found Means to bring to pass afterwards; as I may in time relate more particularly” (italics original 373). But despite the promise to relate the facts “in time… more particularly,” the murder is never explained or detailed. Rather, the shameful secret is hidden by the text. Amy’s singular crime seems to throw the fortunate
mistress, and the autobiographical structure, into disarray, de-structuring the text by prolepsis and audible silence and, signally, by displacing the act onto the not-autobiographical subject; the murder is not committed by the fortunate mistress, after all, but by her maid.\textsuperscript{45} Indeed, the murder itself is never narrated. In a tale that provides such detailed accounts of the vicissitudes of the narrator’s soul and her repeated struggles with the Devil, this most shameful event remains remarkably untold, the hole in the story. This remarkable omission suggests that shame is not, here, as Tomkins formulates it the recognition of the boundaries of a self which is dependent on the love of another. Nor is it, as it is for Haywood, a confession or narration that founds compassionate community. Rather shame defies both self-knowledge and narration.

Roxana cannot tell what she does not know; she can only tell what she believes. The family, who had seen Amy collect Susan by coach, “believe’d Amy had carry’d [Susan] to pay her a Sum of Money, and that somebody had watch’d her after her having receiv’d it, and had Robb’d and Murther’d her” (402 my emphasis). Likewise, Roxana believes—but in her own version of the facts. “I believe’d nothing of that Part; but I believe’d as it was, That whatever was done, Amy had done it; and that, \textit{in short}, Amy had made her away, and I believe’d it the more, because Amy came no more near me, but

\textsuperscript{45} By reading Amy as prosthetically connected to Roxana, I am following in the steps of critics such as John Richetti, William Warner, and Sandra Sherman. Ricchetti considers Amy not only a kind of alter-ego to Roxana, but as “the classless naturalism that Roxana needs in order to survive” (203). Warner reads Amy as Roxana’s double, noticing that “doubling the central character blurs the moral responsibility of social exchange: it makes every social posture and emotional state seem arbitrary and reversible, and by loosening the force of social convention, it opens the plot to more options and enhanced mobility” (168). Sherman argues that both Amy and Roxana "affiliate to a matrix of expectations in which identity can be displaced, dispersed, disowned" (165).
confirm’d her Guilt by her Absence” (402). This is as close as the story comes to disclosing what happened: a series of belief statements, where the narrator’s belief is pressed into something near truth. But it is truth by omission: Amy’s guilt (and the murder itself) is only “confirm’d… by her Absence.”

Even when Amy returns to her, the narrator does not divulge how or whether Amy accounts for the daughter’s disappearance. Knowledge collapses into belief and the self-narrating subject surrenders to imagination. In this way, the unknowable and untellable event of Susan’s murder interferes with the Puritan ideal of a fully disclosed life; Roxana cannot bring herself to the “strict account” stipulated by Josiah Woodward because she never learns what Amy has done and what she, Roxana, is thus (however indirectly) responsible for. Roxana’s inability to know what happened signals the limit not only of her own account of self, but of the form of any autobiographical narrative; the individual can only tell her life as far as she witnesses it. By implication, then, she can only bring herself to strict account by treating her life as if it were singular, floating free of the acts of others. But Roxana’s life is clearly not singular as Amy effectively extends the mistress’s reach.

The mistress, through Amy, murders her daughter to avoid the disclosure that the she is, or was, a Roxana. In other words, the most shameful act, the one too shameful to be disclosed or known, is committed to avoid the shame that Roxana calls sin’s consequence. Shame, it seems, is dangerously recursive. Rather than leading to reformation, shame leads Roxana (via Amy) into worse crime. Shame does not reform Roxana, or reproduce her as a middle-class, self-regulated subject. It does not act, as a
countervailing passion, to restrain the vanity and avarice which drove her and the narrative; it does not compel her to face the judgment of God and repent, as the conversion narrative requires. Rather, it breaks narrative causality. It spins outward to violent and unpredictable effect.46

Let me return, now, to Mandeville’s example of the unmarried “good-natur'd Creature,” who gives birth to a child and then, overcome by “Frailty” (74), kills it. For Mandeville, the point of this story was to illustrate that, contrary to popular belief, modesty is not a virtue; rather, “it is built upon Shame, a Passion in our Nature, and it may be either good or bad.” The similarity between Mandeville’s good-natured creature and Defoe’s unfortunate mistress is clear: each mother is threatened by the disclosure of her sins which the child either holds or embodies. The differences, too, are obvious. Mandeville’s child is illegitimate, proof of the mother’s loss of virtue; Defoe’s is the legitimate, abandoned child of a mother whose “crimes” have nothing to do with the child’s conception. Also, Mandeville’s murder is committed by the mother, Defoe’s by the mother’s out-of-control proxy, Amy. Yet, both stories express the danger of passionate shame; in each case, shame results in the murder of a child.

What Mandeville makes explicit is that in the early eighteenth century shame could be understood, and its effects debated, as a passion. Though necessary for sociality, as

46 It might be argued that my logic here leaps over the more direct motivations for Susan’s murder; that is, that Amy is motivated, rather, by the desire to protect her mistress’s reputation, her wealth, and her marriage to the Dutch Merchant. While the text supports this interpretation, I want to suggest that the model of the passions in operation at the time compels an alternate reading as, indeed, do the passages quoted above which cast shame/guilt in causal relation with murder.
Mandeville himself asserts, shame cannot always be trusted to result in good acts. Rather, it is an unruly passion which can lead recursively to crime, producing more shame, leading to more secrets, maybe more vice, in potentially endless antisocial reiteration. Importantly, what makes shame so volatile is not its physicality, its symptomatic “reality” as Mandeville describes it, but the fact that it is constituted in social relations. Shame, he asserts, is “a sorrowful Reflexion on our own Unworthiness, proceeding from an Apprehension that others either do, or might, if they knew all, deservedly despise us” (64). For Mandeville, as for Aristotle, shame is a self-splitting passion—“a reflexion on our own Unworthiness”—which depends on imagining ourselves through the eyes of others.

This alerts us to a constitutive, structural aspect of shame as it emerged in the early part of the period: in its use of imagination and deployment of judgment it is surprisingly like the affective exchange that Haywood terms compassion. That is, where compassion uses the imagination to propel the self into an other’s experience of “love in excess,” provoking a warm or charitable affective judgment of that other’s potentially shameful acts, shame uses the imagination to propel the self into the place of a condemning other, provoking an uncomfortable judgment of the self. Viewed this way, shame is the mirror image of compassion or, in vocabulary more appropriate to Defoe, of pity. It is not coincidental, then, that Roxana calls on pity as the appropriate response to her narrative. Justifying the inclusion of so much (salacious) detail in her history, Roxana makes her plea to an imagined evaluator; she’s not trying to justify herself, she asserts, rather she only hopes to “move the Pity, even of those who abhor the Crime” (73). She wants, in
other words, not to offer reasons, but to activate a passion. Two things are important here. First, the text positions the reader as moral arbiter. Second, that arbitrating reader is urged to make a judgment based not in reason, but in the one specific passion that could soften the judgment: pity. Equipped with the facts of the fortunate mistress’s life, and stimulated by these facts to “pity,” readers whose hearts are not as hardened as the protagonist’s can reach their own conclusion about the likelihood of her spiritual salvation.  

This begins to seem remarkably like the compassion that Haywood imagines for her characters, except for one important difference: it is not based on having felt similar passions, or committed similar “crimes.” It is not, therefore, compassion—a feeling with—but the feeling part of judgment: abhorring the sin, the reader might still feel pity for the sinner.

Taking seriously the narrator’s request that we judge with pity, means that the assumed relation of reader to character is not an identificatory one. Nor is it the passively impressionable reader that Samuel Johnson later frets uneducated readers might be. The self-division that we see in Barnwell is evident in Roxana, and here she seems to call on

---

47 In Genres of the Credit Economy, Mary Poovey similarly suggests that Roxana demands that readers apply their judgment to character, arguing that Roxana offers a “primer” in evaluating face value, linking the cultivation of judgment to the credit economy (113). Didactic positioning then becomes not “here is an example for you to imitate or not” but “here is an example for you to trust or not,” putting the reader in position of creditor, rather than imagining an identificatory relationship with main character. I propose (with Starr and Hunter) that this relation of reader to text is not a modern invention, but a redeployment of that relation presumed by spiritual autobiography.

48 Johnson worries about the corruptive danger of fiction that depicts ordinary combinations of vice and virtue and advises that “If the power of example is so great, as to take possession of the memory by a kind of violence, and produce effects almost without the intervention of the will, care ought to be taken that .... the best examples only should be exhibited; and that which is likely to operate so strongly, should not be mischievous or uncertain in its effects” (S. Johnson, The Rambler. ?)
the pity that Barnwell’s shame successfully evokes. *Roxana*’s reader is constructed within the text as the eyes, the community of watchers, which are necessary for a shame that is, in Daniel Gross’s words, “irreducibly social” (41). Shame takes place not within the narrator, or even within the self that she used to be, but it nevertheless structures the narrative and constructs the relation of reader to text. And this suggests another key difference between *The British Recluse* and *The Fortunate Mistress*. Cleomira and Belinda model compassionate communication based in their shared experience of shame, and in this way might be understood to model identificatory reading, albeit an uneasy one, driven by curiosity for humiliation. No such compassion is modeled or expected in *The Fortunate Mistress*. Rather, like the crowd at the execution of Barnwell, the choice is between unfeeling judgment or feeling judgment.

From its first words, *The Fortunate Mistress* is framed by shame. In the preface to the 1724 edition, the anonymous Writer relates that “The scene is laid so near the Place where the Main Part of it was transacted, that it was necessary to conceal Names and Persons; lest what cannot be yet entirely forgot in that Part of the Town, shou’d be remember’d “ (np). This rationale for excluding names stages the text as interactive, that is, as based in the world, and as having an effect in the world. And its primary (fictional) effect is its potential to shame. Names are hidden not to protect the (multiply named) fortunate mistress, but rather to protect the reputations of anyone who may have had commerce with her, whether they are represented in the text (Brewer, Jeweller, Prince, Merchant, Quaker), or if they’re merely associated somehow with the disgraced narrator by virtue of living “in that Part of the Town.” And so it is that before even encountering
the mistress herself, the reader is asked to consider the potentially volatile affective effect of the story. The hiding of names frames the relation between text and world as a potentially shaming one and the story (with its names suggestively concealed), as deliciously shameless. 49

By the end of the story, however, the Relator has disappeared, leaving Roxana’s narrative, as Mary Poovey observes, without formal “mediation” (Genres of the Credit Economy 114). The suggestive shame which frames the opening of the text remains in question. The Fortunate Mistress is not structured to build identifications between reader and character, but to work through possible relations between the shamer and the ashamed. Roxana’s shame, her reflection on her own unworthiness, does not lead in the Protestant way to reform. It leads, instead, to a violence that cannot be contained within the structure of repentance, and for which she cannot be pitied, but for which she might be judged. The difference between the ashamed and those who witness shame is steadfastly maintained. Where the jilted Cleomira and Belinda find in each other a single person to return their interest and, in this limited way, re-enter the social, Roxana is abandoned, or so we might believe, by God and potentially condemned by every reader who judges her.

Here, after some few Years of flourishing, and outwardly happy Circumstances, I fell into a dreadful Course of Calamities, and Amy also; the very Reverse of our former Good Days; the Blast of Heaven seem’d to follow the Injury done the poor

49 In his introduction to the 2008 edition, Mullan observes the generic debt of hiding names: "From 'secret histories' Defoe has learnt that reticence about names mimics the shamefulfulness of the actions in his 'history.' People do things to which they dare not admit” (xx).
Girl, by us both; and I was brought so low again, that my Repentance seem’d to be only the Consequence of my Misery, as my Misery was of my Crime. (407)

The paradox is, of course, fairly obvious. Readers do not abandon The Fortunate Mistress. Her history is reprinted and rewritten and rediscovered for centuries.

In The British Recluse (1722) and The Fortunate Mistress (1724), I suggest, we see two experiments in passion, both of which test (and stipulate) different ways that readers might engage imaginatively with the passions and their consequences. Learning from example, ought the reader govern or master passion? Ought the reader judge or identify with the example given? It is significant that, in both Haywood’s and Defoe’s texts as in Mandeville’s examples, the shame in question belongs to women, and it is sexual. But as I hope to have shown, shame and sex do not exist in perfect correspondence in these texts. That is, neither Cleomira, nor Roxana, feel shame as a result of having sex, or “losing their virtue” as it was euphemized. Rather the shame arises from exposure or impending exposure. Its status as passion blurs into its status as event. As I have suggested above, thinking about shame this way supports, and perhaps refocuses, McKeon’s insight into the links between aristocratic, patrilineal honour, and the establishment of chastity as sign of feminine virtue. In Roxana’s case, there is no chastity to be sacrificed and sex is entirely disconnected from passionate love. Her appetites are not sexual, as she repeatedly reminds us. She is motivated by avarice and vanity, both self-interested passions. So, while she fears being exposed as a “whore” this exposure does not reveal that she is sexually voracious, but quite the opposite, that she is as calculating a libertine as Lysander. For Roxana, the character, the shame resides entirely in loss of public
reputation. Yet the pleasure of the text resides in the character’s explicitly “shameful” sexual behavior, and in the threat (and promise) that hangs over the second half of the story, that she will be punished.

Roxana’s children: The Fortunate Mistress (1740)

The 1740 edition of The Fortunate Mistress printed by Elizabeth Applebee breaks before the famously unsatisfying “Course of Calamities” to let Roxana introduce a new character, Belinda:

…I appeared there with all the Splendor and Equipage suitable to our new Prospect, as I have already observed, where we lived many years in flourishing Circumstances, ’till a Lady, whom my Husband took into the House, as a Companion to me, had created some Differences between us, the Consequence of which will be related hereafter; in the mean Time, the following History of this Lady, I believe, will not be disagreeable to the Reader; and as she was allied to some of the noblest Families in England, makes it necessary to call her only Belinda (299-300).

The 59-page excerpt from The British Recluse that follows this abrupt turn is Applebee’s first textual “borrowing”; the edition also contains one verse from the poem The pleasures of a single life, or, the miseries of matrimony (1702) and multiple excerpts from William de Britaine’s Human prudence: or, the art by which a man may raise himself and

---

50 All references are to The fortunate mistress; or, a history of the life and vast variety of fortunes of Mademoiselle de Beleau, afterwards call’d the Countess de Wintselsheim, in Germany. Being the person known by the name of the Lady Roxana. London. E. Applebee. (1740). The Applebee edition was one of two versions of The Fortunate Mistress published in 1740. The second, printed by G. Buckeridge, is almost identical to the 1724 edition except that it omits the Preface. Elizabeth Applebee was the wife of John Applebee, in whose Applebee’s Journal Defoe’s works had earlier appeared and who had published an edition of Defoe’s Colonel Jack (Mullan 333). Neither Applebee appears to have previously published Haywood’s work.
his fortune to grandeur (1680). In addition to these three textual inclusions, the ending itself is rewritten and the fates of Roxana and several other key characters entirely, newly imagined. The 1740 book, published under the same title as the original 1724 edition, is a composite text barely held together by the fortunate mistress’s narratorial “I” who, like the book itself, is significantly altered and reformed.

In the 1740 addition, the emphasis is decidedly on reconciliation with family. The new frontispiece shows Roxana and the frock-coated Dutch Merchant welcoming a new child into the family and legitimacy. In the new, extended ending, Roxana meets two children from her first family, a son and daughter, both of whom are now adult and fully realized characters; they each have short pieces of dialogue and share their lives with her. The son she had with the French prince also reappears; they converse, and she feels a mother’s love for him. Most importantly, Susan is apparently not murdered, though the evidence of her survival in this edition remains as markedly untold as her murder in the first. The shame and guilt that in 1724 led to murder seem simply to evanesce without either confession or punishment. The “true” identity she finally reveals to her English son and daughter is not the multiple identities of the title page; she is simply and singularly “mother.” Instead of confessing the truth of her history and various titles to her children, she burns all remaining traces of her “wicked Course of Life” (441). Shame in 1740 is

\[51\] Robert J. Griffin, citing Spiro Peterson’s unpublished dissertation, asserts that the book contains "almost verbatim reproduction of the published rules governing Quaker courtship and marriage" (Griffin 398). Griffin does not identify the Quaker publication to which he refers and Humane Prudence, first published in 1680, is the only source I could locate that contains these exact passages. Given how often de Britaine’s manual was republished, it must have been popular; the 1729 text, to which I refer, was the twelfth and apparently final edition.
neither cured nor reformed; rather, its murderous proclivities are retroactively snipped in order to permit the resolution of the family. And this is informative; the 1740 edition does not solve the problem of shame, but the texts that it borrows and the silences it enforces reveal a model of feeling under conflicting pressures. It reveals, also, what is at stake in this reform. I will first discuss the revision to the story, and the silences that revision exerts, before turning to the three intertexts.

The fact that Applebee’s ending was not picked up in later editions suggests that it was not considered particularly artful or even right. Later publishers and editors sought to solve Roxana’s problems in other ways, rather than adopt what was available from the 1740 edition. For a revision so concerned with the (re)constitution of the family and the hopeful affirmation of Roxana’s motherhood, there remain some remarkable omissions significant to this edition’s renovation of narrative, character, and affect. First, the supplied ending, while it (barely) eliminates shame’s violence, manages to dodge the question that I have been suggesting drives the second half of the narrative: when and how will the fortunate mistress be judged? In fact, the question of either divine or human judgment becomes unnecessary to the plot. Also missing from Applebee’s conclusion is the resolution of the daughter’s story and the threat that, in the first edition, Susan poses to the narrator’s identity. Finally, while the 1740 edition works toward the fulfillment of the narrative’s promise by ensuring that the narrator does reform, the affective component of this reform—the feeling of shame we might expect to enable “sincere” repentance—is missing. In what follows, I examine these significant occlusions—of judgment, threat, and shame—to argue, first, that they are significantly interdependent and, second, that
their absence demonstrates the friction between an older and increasingly inadequate model of passion and newer models of feeling required for moral-aesthetic unity. In effect, this revision moderates and relocates the shame earlier deployed as an effect of capitalist guilt and fear of ruined credit. It puts shame in its place, so to speak, by disconnecting it from murder.

Unlike the fortunate mistress of 1724, the Roxana of this version does not fear divine judgment for her role in Susan’s possible murder. After receiving the message that Amy “cannot be at Peace in her Mind, nor die in Quiet,” without seeing her mistress to communicate something “of great moment” (361), Roxana interprets her servant’s disquiet as certain sign that she has, indeed, murdered the daughter. This belief throws Roxana into a state similar to the one we have seen before, when she feared the blast of heaven. But, in this instance, divine judgment plays no part: “I rav’d, tore my Hair, and cry’d bitterly; nay, to such a Degree of Fury did my Passion hurry me, that had Amy been there, I should certainly have killed her with my own Hand directly, let the Consequence have been what it would” (362). Passion still causes murderous thoughts, but this time the object is Amy.

While it is true that Susan, in this version, is not actually murdered (thus making the question of judgment beside the point), Roxana’s lack of fear precedes her later realization that Susan lives. While the reduction of the fear of God might be read as symptomatic of a general cultural shift toward secularity or, at least, away from the Puritan theology which elaborated human damnation, I suggest that Roxana’s seeming immunity to the fear so vital to the first edition suggests not merely a shift in theology
but, rather, a shift in thinking about the nature of judgment and the individual. Amy, in this moment, is no longer Roxana’s “double” but her own separate and willful agent, leaving Roxana the victim rather than the accomplice in violence. In this new passage, unlike the last time she feared what Amy had done, Roxana is certain of her position; that is, she is not responsible. She exculpates herself from any role in the girl’s possible murder, and in so doing, places herself in position of both judge and executioner, regardless of “Consequence.” Indeed, she no longer fears divine judgment because her perspective is that she has done nothing wrong. The auto-biographical self is in this way more self-contained in 1740; Roxana is both singular (not Amy’s double) and her fate is determined by her acts, rather than by God. Her self-containment is signaled by her refusal of responsibility. This refusal of responsibility is particularly significant if we recall Warner’s reading of Roxana’s and Amy’s doubling: “doubling the central character blurs the moral responsibility of social exchange: it makes every social posture and emotional state seem arbitrary and reversible, and by loosening the force of social convention, it opens the plot to more options and enhanced mobility” (168). In effect, by separating Amy from Roxana, and by refusing to admit the fear of God as motivating factor, the 1740 edition closes what the 1724 edition had left open. It affirms the moral responsibility of the singular individual; it asserts that emotional states are neither arbitrary, nor reversible, but consequential. It makes Roxana less mobile, her reach less murderously extended. It unifies her and, in doing so, it works toward a more unified narrative.
But, as though this removal of responsibility was still insufficient, the new ending doubly repairs it by implying that the daughter was not murdered at all. When Amy arrives in person, unannounced, there’s no mention of what had so aggravated her. Instead, the subject of the daughter’s murder is smoothly elided, dispensed with in a single sentence: “I ordered that Amy should again Officiate and attend me as my waiting Woman, and by that Means had the Opportunity of some Discourse with her, in which she gave me so much Satisfaction, that I was almost reconciled to her, and continued her in her Place” (377). For some reason, though Susan lives, Roxana no longer fears her judgment either. The question of judgment which, in the first instance, is replaced by asserting the singularity of Amy and Roxana, in this second instance, is not replaced but simply forgotten. The daughter lives, but she exerts no pressure on the narrative, and presents no threat to the narrator’s new identity. Susan is mentioned twice more, but in neither case does Roxana perceive her as potentially dangerous or shameful. The first reference veers very close to accusation. The Quaker writes Roxana with an important question. It turns out, the Quaker’s son has fallen in love with a girl who apparently “hath no Mother living, and without that Mother's Consent, she cannot marry among our Friends” (383, emphasis in original). That girl, as the Quaker reveals, is Susan’s sister. And so the Quaker puts the question to Roxana, asking bluntly, as Roxana reports, “Whether the Girl be my own child, or not; she being the Sister of the other Girl, whom the Quaker used to call my Troublesome Visitor; who had positively asserted I was---. That she had many corroborating Circumstances to induce her to believe that I was the
real Mother of them both” (304, emphasis in original).52 The revised Roxana expresses no shame or guilt in response to the Quaker’s new knowledge, and the newly reintegrated Amy does not threaten murder. Rather, the Quaker’s son and Roxana’s youngest daughter are married, and thanks to the helpful intervention of Amy the problem is neatly and dispassionately solved.

Near the close of the story, immediately before Roxana reveals the truth to her son, Susan is mentioned for the last time. The passage is remarkable for its occlusions:

I therefore proceeded to the main Design of making myself known to my Son and this one Daughter; I had not yet received any farther Account, what became of my other Daughter (who had formerly been so troublesome to me) since the Account which Amy had given me of her, the last Time of her coming to Holland; so that I believed what Amy had said became of her, to be Truth” (439).

At the end of the book, Roxana believes Amy, but her readers remain in the dark; the account Amy provides Roxana is never given. Susan’s survival is as unverifiable as her murder, and yet Roxana never again fears Susan’s judgment, or the shame that might result.

In both these later mentions of Susan, the daughter is avowed and disavowed. Roxana is allowed to keep her identity secret from the Quaker, while at the same time the Quaker’s insight is allowed to stand. Similarly, Susan’s survival exists as a possibility, rather than fact—a story, rather than a witnessed truth. In this doubled avowal-disavowal, the daughter who, in the first edition, seemed to present the judgment Roxana most feared, is here denied that position; she may live, but she may not judge. Both the

52 Mullan claims that in the 1740 edition, Susan is not murdered but marries the Quaker’s son. However, this passage and the following show that the Quaker’s son marries Roxana’s other daughter.
daughter’s judgment and divine judgment are disarmed in the revision. The blast of heaven which closes the first edition does not follow Roxana in 1740.

The unification of character and narrative in the 1740 *The Fortunate Mistress* is contingent, it seems, on the careful excision of judgment and shame. So, while the 1724 ending suggested the improbability that Roxana’s passions could be cured, and Roxana saved, the 1740 ending asserts that salvation is possible: Roxana dies “in Charity with all the World” (441) after retiring from the world to devote herself to solitary contemplation and reuniting with her children. By ensuring that Roxana is saved, not only from the blast of heaven, but from the judgment of her children and of her readers, the 1740 edition eliminates the skepticism that Geoffrey Sill identifies as key to understanding Defoe’s conclusion. In Applebee’s edition, the passions are cured by “retirement” and self-reflection or, at least, this is what the first excerpt from *Humane Prudence* suggests. Once judgment and threat are removed from the text, the narrator arrives at her reformation by her self, through a process of recognition and awareness. In this way, her reform may seem more sincere; she regrets her past sins not because she’s afraid of judgment, but because, looking back, she sees she has done wrong and desires reconciliation with those who might judge: her children and God. Both the novel and the character achieve a measure of unity not required in 1724, but expected in 1740. However, the textual inclusions complicate this story.

No doubt, Applebee’s decision to incorporate pieces of text from *The British Recluse*, *Humane Prudence* (de Britaine 1680), and *The Pleasures of a Single Life* (Ward 1702) was largely a commercial one; Applebee published her edition of the text serially,
so the three inclusions both increased her page count and stretched out the story thus, presumably, increasing her profit. That said, however, these three very different intertexts seem to comment on each other, amplifying the problems of judgment and responsibility while, at the same time, undoing the unity the narrative seemed to aspire to. The excerpt from *The British Recluse* ends with Cleomira’s attempt to kill herself. Cleomira admits to Belinda (who reports to Roxana), “I drank [the poison] without the least Alarm, or any of those Apprehensions which so terrify the Minds of most People at the Approach of Death; so much had Despair hardned [sic] my Heart, and stupefied my Reason” (359). Readers are left to guess how the recluse survived her own suicide, and Roxana never fulfills her promise that she will explain how Belinda contributed to her marital problems. But the partial inclusion of Cleomira’s story does serve a purpose; it foregrounds the possibility that reclusion from the world is, in itself, a kind of redemption, a possibility that Roxana later realizes when she parrots William de Britaine’s *Humane Prudence*.

Back in London, and content that two children of her first marriage are well, but without having revealed her relationship to them, Roxana “retires” to a cottage to read and write in solitude, providing the first interjection of de Britaine’s text. The excerpt, comprising the first seven pages of Section XXVI, “Of the Grotto, or Retired Life,” is disconcertingly apposite. Alone in her cottage the narrator Roxana/de Britaine declares “Here, I can enjoy myself in the greatest Tranquility and Repose, without Fear, Envy or desiring any Thing” (410). The narrator lives without desire, and in this way, she claims, “I am delivered from the Tumults of the World, free from the Drudgery of Business, which makes us troublesome to others, and unquiet ourselves, for the end of one Appetite
or Design, is the beginning of another” (411). Solitude, and a life of “Humane prudence,” spells the end of the passions that drove the Mistress into both fortune and vice. Here, in a grotto “safe, though Narrow” (411), she finds the end of avarice and vanity. Solitude relieves her of both because without an audience these passions have no hold. She separates herself from the world of commerce which made her what she was and in so doing, she finds not redemption per se, but the peace of the innocent, as though simply by withdrawing, she wipes the slate clean. In surprisingly tidy intertextual echo, she becomes another “British Recluse.”

Unlike the recluse, though, Roxana does not hide from the world out of a feeling of shame but to seek a kind of truth and coherence with herself. She achieves this feeling of truth and coherence not, as the trajectory of spiritual autobiography might suggest, by repenting, but by committing herself to a present apart from the world, which she now sees as false. As she observes, still borrowing from Humane Prudence, “All the Exterior Lustre of the World, which charms the Eyes of Men, is but a painted Cloud, a Dial which we then look on, when the Sun of Honour reflects upon it; or like an Act in a Comedy, which presently has its Exit.” Everything of the past was false anyway, just a “Comedy” from which she can simply “exit.” The insertion of de Britaine’s text in this way dissolves the passions that directed the narrative, indeed threatens to dissolve the narrative itself. Shame is excised, but so is its narratological potential for a story built as a confession.

Before Roxana returns to the resolution of her story, though, a second textual intrusion follows, the fifth verse of The Pleasures of the Single Life. Again, the words at first appear apposite for the travelling mistress:
Thus would I range the World from Pole to Pole;
To increase my Knowledge and delight my Soul:
Travel all Nations, and inform my Sense;
With Ease and Safety at a small Expence. (416)

Indeed, it is hard not to read the poem as satire, and its double-entendres as playful engagement with Roxana’s sexual travels. For Roxana surely did, more than most, go “from Pole to Pole” and “inform [her] Sense.” I doubt this is what the publisher intended, but it’s hard to know how to read this cheeky intruder. Originally written, according to its full title, in response to “the many divorces lately granted by Parliament,” the poem is a misogynist diatribe, in which the narrator gives thanks to “the Powr’s that rid me of my Wife” (The pleasures of a single life, or, the miseries of matrimony. Occasionally writ upon the many divorces lately granted by Parliament. 11) and bids farewell to “Woman, thou worst of all Church-Plagues… Bad at the Best, but at the worst a Hell.” Woman, for this poet, is only ever the “Apple-Eating Tray'triss, who began/ The Wrath of Heav'n, and Miseries of Man;/ And ha'st with never-failing diligence,/ Improv'd the Curse to humane Race e'er since“ (11). In other words, she is “a” Roxana: a woman with desires. What is more, this praise to divorce presents an implicit argument against marriage and the sentimentalizing of family; in other words, it speaks directly against the very values the new ending adopts. In this way, the insertion of The Pleasures of the Single Life exposes both the text’s and the mistress’s incoherencies. More than this, though, the contradictory textual inclusions affirm that the 1740 edition reveals a genre in flux. Neither the book nor the “novel” is yet the unified object that it was increasingly expected to be.
Applebee’s attempts to unify the character and narrative end in accomplishing the opposite: they make the narrative impossible. This is most obvious in the forced reconciliation between Roxana and her remaining two children (Susan’s siblings) that concludes the book. These two children are, finally, her last possible judges. But the story precludes their judgment, and in doing so, the narrative self-destructs. Though she finally confesses to her son that she is his mother, and even provides him, as she says, “an Account as I thought proper of my past Life,” Roxana divulges nothing she might be ashamed of. In other words, she does not provide the details that have occupied the text that we have read. She never divulges to him the identities that she was so concerned to hide from Susan in 1724 and which are listed, still, on the 1740 title page. Indeed the possibility of narrative closure is destroyed when she burns the evidence rather than disclose her past to her newfound children: “While he [i.e. the son] was busy with his Sister, I looked over all my Papers, and burnt all Amy’s Letters to me, and the Copies of mine to her, with all other Writings that could give the least Intimation of my former Gallantry, and wicked Course of Life, that they might not bring anything to light” (440-441). Rather than confessing to her remaining children, Roxana omits some facts. Rather than submitting to their judgment, she burns the evidence. What is more, as in the first edition, the Relator of the Preface never reappears to supply the mechanism by which the past is brought into the present and united in the body of the present-tense narrator. There remains no “pretext” for the text we read. Roxana’s last act, burning the traces of her history, resists or undermines the text’s attempts at unity. Family love and the narrator’s salvation are both built on shaky foundations, that is, on the narrator’s lies. Shame may
not lead to murder, but neither does it lead to self-knowledge, the first requirement for Protestant conversion. Shame, in 1740, leads not to moral judgment, but to diversion from judgment. It leads to the destruction of the evidence, in order to escape judgment.

Shame does not work as a countervailing passion to counter the more dangerous passions of avarice and vanity; rather these passions are overcome simply by removing what generates them—that is, the gaze of “the world.” Without that gaze, shame is likewise rendered impotent. Having burned all traces of her past shamelessness, Roxana seems to emerge fully “mother” to her remaining children. To reconcile with family seems to require the elision of both shame and history, but the textual inclusions that attempt to cover over the hole that’s left reveal a different kind of unraveling; a suicide hangs in the air incomplete, and a diatribe against marriage and women intervenes in the narrator’s bucolic solitude. Shame is stymied; it remains in the text without effect. However, by avoiding the question of judgment—burning the evidence rather than bringing it to light, denying the murder without assuring Susan’s survival—the 1740 edition in fact amplifies the problem. It amplifies, that is, the difficulty of reforming shame within a model of feeling that recognizes that passion’s unruliness is inherent within sociality. Further, the incoherencies and unravellings of the 1740 edition suggest that moral/aesthetic evaluation and shame exist in dynamic tension. As my chapters on Clarissa and Evelina will explore, the moral-aesthetic requirement for unity so important to the later eighteenth-century thinkers requires not only the reformation, but the complete restructuring of shame.
Roxana’s punishment: The Unhappy Wife 1745(49)

The re-titled The Life and Adventures of Roxana, the Fortunate Mistress or Most Unhappy Wife printed by C. Whitefield is probably the most consequential later edition of Defoe’s work. Most later-century adaptations were based on this 1745 text; according to P.N. Furbank and W.R. Owens’ bibliographic research, the editions of 1749, 1750, 1755, 1765, 1774 were reproduced, with varying degrees of accuracy, on the 1745 edition. Indeed the 1745 continuation was still taken to be the authoritative one nearly a hundred years later.\footnote{Hazlitt the Younger's 1840 edition includes the continuation which he identifies as that printed in 1745. As it turns out, Hazlitt’s attribution was not quite accurate. Though the continuation he included did indeed originate in the 1745 text, it also contained changes that appeared in the 1755 edition. The two continuations were merged and again altered in the 1765 Cooke edition, which is the one Hazlitt actually used for his edition. See Owens and Furbank, “The ‘Lost’ Continuation of Defoe’s Roxana.”} The 1745 text is also important for my purpose because of its timing. The Life and Adventures of Roxana is published just as the culture of feeling is starting to take hold in Britain, and it is roughly contemporaneous with Richardson’s Clarissa. By 1745, shame is definitively reformed. No longer an unruly passion, shame is instead an affective pivot between the narrated self and the present narrator. In this way, shame enables narrative closure and the unification of subjectivity, a shift signaled by the title which puts the narrator’s most shameful identity first: The Life and Adventures of Roxana, the book is now titled. In 1745 The Fortunate Mistress has become Roxana and her fate is sealed; she might be the Fortunate Mistress but she is also a Most Unhappy Wife.\footnote{This is not the first edition to put the name Roxana in the place of privilege; the 1742 republication of Defoe’s text by H. Slater and F. Noble was titled Roxana: or, the fortunate mistress.} This change of fate is accompanied by two shifts: the first is epistemological, as the narrative
turns from belief and hearsay to juridical fact; and the second is affective, from externalized passion to internalized feeling.

In the 1745 edition, the final two paragraphs of the original text are omitted so that, without reference to either good fortune or “Calamity,” the text slides smoothly from Roxana’s final instruction to the Quaker about Amy—’she should come away to me, upon this condition nevertheless, that she gave full Satisfaction to my Friend the Quaker, that she had not murdered my Child” (353)—straight into a new account of the voyage to Holland. This voyage not only includes a bit of tourism in England but also the introduction of a new character, Roxana’s son Thomas (Susan’s brother), who becomes the Dutch Merchant’s servant. In Holland, Roxana receives a letter from the Quaker who has learned from Amy that she did not murder Susan; rather, this Roxana has had her servant arrested for debts. The Quaker frees Susan from jail and, soon after, Susan finds her way to the Quaker’s house. There she finds a letter from her mother to the Quaker. Immediately, Susan sets out for Holland, eager for the reunion with Roxana so long withheld. Susan surprises Roxana at home in her parlor, and after scuffling with the newly-arrived Amy, Susan finds the Dutch Merchant and confesses her story to him. After being so exposed, all Roxana’s fears come true. The Merchant condemns her for being the Lady Roxana of Pall Mall, and, more importantly, for being a bad mother. He then punishes her by removing first his love, then his money. He leaves her nothing in his will, even though, as she reminds him, much of their shared wealth was originally hers.

55 Page references are to the 1749 republication of the 1745 text, _The life and adventures of Roxana the fortunate mistress or most unhappy wife. Containing, the vast variety of fortunes that attended her ... with several curious reflections, and entertaining particulars._ London: C. Whitefield. 1749.
After her husband dies, the unhappy wife tries to make the most of what she’s left—that is, her clothes—but she loses her entire fortune when the ship she’d invested in sinks. She ends her life in debtor’s prison, and her new maid Isabel concludes the story, telling us that her mistress “gave her Mind wholly up to Devotion” (431) but died “with meer Grief” and was buried in a Lutheran church yard.

The two shifts, epistemological and affective, are interdependent. This becomes evident when we compare the 1724 version of Roxana’s last days in England to that offered by the 1745 edition. Rather than simply offering a continuation that rids the story of murder, the 1745 text also excises most (though not all) references to the crime from the 1724 text. This has a double effect. First, Whitefield’s careful excisions prepare the way for Susan’s reappearance by diminishing the likelihood of her murder. Second, they diminish the force and consequence of passion. One editorial cut removes Roxana’s belief in the murder from the problematic place it had before occupied as substitution for certain knowledge. The 1724 text pitted Roxana’s belief in Amy’s guilt against the Spittlefield family’s belief that “Some Body” had murdered her, part of which is cited above: “I believ’d nothing of that Part; but I believ’d as it was, That whatever was done, Amy had done it; and that, in short, Amy had made her away, and I believ’d it the more, because Amy came no more near me, but confirm’d her Guilt by her Absence” (1724: 402).\(^{56}\) This passage is omitted from the 1745 text allowing the belief that “Some Body” (not Amy) might have killed the girl to stand as a possibility, but Roxana’s belief does not enter the

\(^{56}\) Another damning suggestion also omitted: "[Susan] wou’d, in all Probability, have trac’d me out at last, if Amy had not by the Violence of her Passion, and by a Way which I had no Knowledge of, and indeed abhor’d, put a Stop to her; of which I cannot enter into the Particulars here" (1724: 405).
picture. The autobiographer’s belief, in other words, is not permitted to substitute for knowledge as it had been, disconcertingly, in 1724. A second omission demonstrates the deflation of passion. Roxana’s murderous impulse toward Amy is also excised: “I believe, if I cou'd have seen her, I shou'd certainly have sent her to Newgate, or to a worse Place, upon Suspicion; indeed, I think I cou'd have kill'd her with my own Hands” (1724: 401). Not only do these editorial choices smooth the way for Susan and Amy’s reappearances in Holland, they also effectively alter the affective landscape of Roxana’s final days in England. Roxana is less guilty in 1745, less terrified, and less hateful; in short, she is less passionate. Her terror-inspired or guilt-inspired belief does not overwhelm the authority of the text, as it does in the earlier version.

This is not to say that Roxana does not experience shame in the 1745 text. Rather, instead of simply eliding the shame as the Applebee version did, this edition foregrounds it and it does so by recalling and containing the murder that did not happen. Reassuring her new Dutch husband that she could not want anything “except the Continuance of his Life and Love,” Roxana immediately asserts, in almost theatrical aside and signaled by parentheses “(tho the very Thing he had mentioned [ie more money and prestige], join'd with the Death of my Daughter, would have been much more to my satisfaction)” (382). This is an astonishing change of heart. While Defoe’s fortunate mistress could only speak of the murder in terms that, simultaneously, declared her soul’s abhorrence of it, the unhappy wife imagines it as a desirable outcome. But this is not the only important shift signaled in the aside. Here, we are presented with self who is divided not because she battles temptation or the Devil, but because she says one thing while thinking another.
Though the multiply disguised mistress has, necessarily, lied to every one of her lovers, this is the first time we are witness to the interior monologue that registers both her awareness of her duplicity, and the more despicable truth that any feeling she may have for her husband is trumped by avarice, vanity and shame; she would prefer more money and prestige and the death of her daughter. Here, for the first time, we witness Roxana in the act of disguise. What she disguises is both her lack of love and the deathly propulsion of her passions. She has both too little, and too much passion. Roxana’s duplicity is entered into the narrative as revealing who she “really” is; she really is a hard-hearted liar.

The outward-spinning, violent effects of shame are here contained within the character, articulated by her newly found interior voice. In this way, shame is internalized. What is more, by showing it as “internal,” that is, rendered by the parenthetical aside as the expression of one of Roxana’s real feelings, shame is also connected to the construction of character. Exposed as a liar, Roxana’s character becomes more accessible to the reader than it is to her husband; it’s not that we know her shame (in this moment she has none) but we know exactly how shameful she really is. I do not mean to suggest the divided self is an Enlightenment invention—we need only remember Hamlet to recall the importance of the revealing (and guilty) aside—but I do claim that Roxana’s sly admission performs an important substitution, one upon which the character’s later repentance is based. By substituting an internal/exposed wish for violence for the external/untold violence, the text prepares the reader for a resolution that will be both internal and articulated. That is, we expect for the character to become coherent, for her duplicity to be resolved into unity; we expect her heart to soften.
The heart is more important in 1740, not only for its changeability but for its relation to identity and truth and compassionate identification with others. In 1724 Roxana laments the hole in her heart caused by reflection on her past: “and now indeed, and not till now, those Reflections began to prey upon my Comforts, and lessen the Sweets of my other Enjoyments: They might be said to have gnaw'd a Hole in my Heart before; but now they made a Hole quite thro' it” (325, 1724). But in 1745, others “see” that hole as is manifested in her lack of feeling. And that hole, or that lack of feeling, is her most shameful secret, and the one most unbearable to her husband. Roxana’s self-exposure to readers is soon followed by that scene of exposure and judgment that Defoe’s 1724 edition works so hard to avoid: Susan reveals everything she knows to the Dutch merchant. Upon hearing Susan’s story, the horrified husband condemns his wife with the words “I find you have been an abandon'd Wretch, and had nothing to recommend you, but a Sum of Money, and a fair Countenance, join'd to a false unrelenting Heart” (386).

This scene of exposure becomes a virtual trial, as first Susan, then Amy, then Thomas are called upon to recount what they know. Each one, by turn, provides new facts to oppose Roxana’s lies, which she desperately continues to insist are true: “Neither can I say that I have either heard or known any Thing of my Children” she replies to her husband’s accusation, “excepting that I heard they were all taken care of; and this was the very Reason I would not marry you… for these Children lay at my Heart, and as I did not

57 Roxana’s heart here comes closer to what Mullan identifies as the organ so necessary to sentimental fiction: To reproduce the sentiments in language, the mid-century novel of sentiment, “relies on the image of the heart as the source of writing itself. The organ whose urgings were traditionally associated with romantic delusions has become a guarantee of truthfulness” (63).
want Money, my Inclination was to come to England, and not to entail five children upon you the Day of Marriage” (387). The husband interrupts her to argue that, on the contrary, “Your whole Scheme has been to conceal yourself from them as much as possible, and even when you were found out, deny’d yourself, as witness the Case of your Daughter here” (387). The daughter is here entered as witness and proof—as fact, in other words, to counter Roxana’s lies. One by one, her identities collapse, each one dispassionately disproven in this family court.

“Pray, Mrs. Amy,” says the Dutch Merchant, “give me your Judgment in this Case” (388). Whereas in the 1724 text, two judgments, divine and human, are feared and ultimately curtailed, in 1745 judgment is literalized. Moral judgment is separated from pity and yoked to fact in a scene that mimics legal justice. At stake in this trial is the truth not only of what Roxana has done, but of what she is: “an abandon’d Wretch.” And for this, she is made to pay. She is punished with shame; that is, she is made to feel shame by being abandoned not only by God, as her husband’s epithet implies, but by being abandoned by those most proximate. When she asks her husband to return, he refuses, and tells her to go ahead and sleep with “Lord ****” if his bed is empty (397). These words leave Roxana with a “Heart full of Malice, Grief, Shame, and Revenge” (397). In a phrase that echoes Haywood’s swarming of passions—recall the “Surprise, and Joy, and Hope, and Fear, and Shame” which assaulted Cleomira (17)—shame here mingles with its threatening consequences of malice and revenge. But no revenge occurs. Instead, there is only more shame. Her husband marries off her two children, giving them both substantial fortunes. Amy is kicked out after dallying with a male servant. In a final
insult, her husband rewrites his will, leaving Roxana 500 pounds per year. Roxana is shocked to learn that upon marriage, all her property had become his and so, though she has gained a title, she has lost her worth: “As he had now all my Substance in his Power,” she writes, “I was in a very poor State for a Countess” (410). And when she asks for a codicil to be added, granting her some bit of mercy, he responds by doing the opposite, by enlarging the scope of his pitilessness, writing it into his estate. The added codicil stipulates that should an heir give Roxana even the least bit of assistance, that person would thereby forfeit his inheritance. No mercy, no charity, and no pity will be granted the lying Roxana in this edition.

Roxana is made to be ashamed. Shame is her punishment not for being avaricious or vain, nor for being a whore, but rather for keeping secrets. She could not, she said, “persuade him to forgive me the denying of my Daughter, and acting the Part of Roxana, because I had always kept those two Things an inviolable Secret from him” (411). Roxana is punished for being incoherent, a mistress of multiple identities, and, in this way, paradoxically, she is forced into the coherence signaled by the presumptuous single name of the title; she is forced to be Roxana. In other words, the coherence of character—and of the narrative—is achieved by punishing the character’s incoherence. In effect, the 1745 text reveals how necessary an ingredient shame is not only to middle class sociability (as Mandeville would have it), but to the construction of a coherent subject. Shame, no longer chaotic and potentially murderous, becomes the affect most necessary for the coherence of both the autobiographical subject and for the novel.
This inevitable conclusion is realized at the end of the story when Roxana finally articulates her shame in relation not to others, but to God. “And upon Consideration, I found myself in a worse Condition than I thought, for I had nothing to recommend [sic] me to Heaven, either in Works or Thoughts; had even banished from my Mind all the Cardinal and Moral Virtues, and had much more Reason to hide myself from the Sight of God, if possible, than I had to leave the Hague, that I might not be known of my Fellow Creatures” (430). In this statement, of course, the unhappy wife aligns her shame with Original Shame. She finds shame before God, and at the same time recognizes herself, as she says, “in a worse Condition than [she’d] thought.” Shame returns her to God, and enables self-knowledge. What does the difference between 1724 and 1745 tell us about shame? First, in 1745, shame becomes “good.” Shame is no longer destructively recursive; it does not lead to more shameful acts, but to sincere penitence and, I would suggest, reader-satisfaction. Shame is harnessed in the 1745 text and its socializing power affirmed. In the revised text, shame is not a passion that might become unruly; rather, shame brings the now bearably sinful narrator back into the compass of readers’ pity. It does so, though, by degrading the character. Roxana suffers, suffers, suffers. This breakdown, however, is, in its own way, pleasurable, and facilitates an identification not permitted by the first edition. By depriving her of pity within the text, that is, the narrative paradoxically enables pity as a possible affective response from the reader. Now that the character has been deprived completely of any power to wound, now that she has been brought so low, has been so deprived of love, and so scorned, she may indeed warrant a
reader’s pity, or even compassion. But this is only possible once the too-shameful act is erased, shame’s murderous propensity curtailed.

Second, shame is affirmed as the affect that serves as the pivot and connection between past sinful self, and the present repentant narrator. It enables the coherent self, and the coherent novel. In 1745, the unhappy wife’s statement of shame enables a narrative closure which the 1724 edition refused. And for this reason, it is significant that the 1749 version appears without the preface that, in the original edition, situated the fortunate mistress’s salacious history in relation to its potential to shame others. Without a preface, the revised text cannot locate the narrator’s history in relation to an extra-textual community. Now, shame can exist only within the narrative itself, expressed by the narrator as a feeling which compels her to tell her tale. The novel closes as the narrator faces her history and her death. After recounting her shameful past, she ends her history with an acknowledgement of both guilt and authorship:

It is in this wretched State, that I shall close my History, being certain, without some very unforeseen Accident, I shall never go out of it till I am carried to my Grave, for which may much offended God prepare me as soon as possible. (431)

The unclearly referential “it” blurs what it is that she shall never go out of: this wretched State, or her “History.” And this blurring is strangely apt. For the autobiographical form to work, it seems, the narrator has to put herself in the pillory, hang a sign around her own neck to identify that she, too, sides with the shamers now.

The unhappy wife, simultaneously embodying both shamed and shamer, publicizes her own misconduct by writing her history. She condemns herself both to the wretched state of shame and social abjection, and to being identical to the history she has written
and closed. With this intrusion into the text, closing it, the narrator becomes one with the narrated. Moreover, by internalizing the judgment that the novel itself has also internalized and literalized, by making herself the shamed narrator of shameful events, the narrator makes herself and her story an object of feeling, rather than an object of judgment. And yet, a reviewer in the *Monthly Review* (March 1775), writing a full fifty years after the publication of the first edition and on the occasion of the seventeenth, declared: “Few novels are better known than the story of the Lewd Roxana; which, we see, is ascribed to the famous De Foe” (Griffin 396).  

So perhaps moral judgment, along with the more chaotic, passionate version of shame, is too pleasurable to give up.

**Effects of Shame’s Reform**

As Geoffrey Sill shows, early novels offered case studies in how passion might be cured. Returning to the passage from *An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue*, we see that for Mandeville, shame might offer one such “cure” by countervailing the more damaging passions of lust, vanity, and avarice. Indeed, Mandeville even uses medical metaphors to describe how this might work: To avoid shame, “The only Remedy prescrib’d, is a strict Observance of certain Rules.” Shame in this sense is potentially curative, and unlike the other passions it certainly does not require cure, “as to rid or cure [a person] of shame, the Politician would sooner take away his Life” (101-102). The novels I have examined here show that shame *does not* deter the heroines from acting on their dominant passions. Though shame may occur to the heroines of these novels—it may be named, felt, feared and expressed—it fails to intercede. In the case of Cleomira, it

---

58 See Robert J. Griffin for a detailed bibliographic analysis.
comes too late; in the case of the 1724 Roxana, it effects vice rather than virtue. In the 1745/49 edition of *Roxana*, it comes only just in time to effect the narrator’s spiritual salvation, but not in time to alter her fate or her acts. Shame for the mid-century Roxana is first a punishment administered by her husband before she adopts and experiences the feeling as spur to repentance. Shame may promise to cure the passions, but in novels it constantly fails to deliver on its promise. It is possible this is a failing inherent to the structure of shame. Shame itself does not operate as a countervailing passion, rather *fear* of shame does. Shame itself is a feeling perpetually dislocated—either it is anticipated, or it persists as the stain of past acts whether that be exposure or wrong. In the case of Cleomira and Belinda, and of Roxana in 1745/49, it results in death—physical or social.

So what are these novels doing, in terms of offering cures for passion? They demonstrate that shame, and its close relation, humiliation, are the outcomes of expressing or acting on passion. By rehearsing that ungoverned or unmastered passion leads to shame, they repeat Roxana’s insistence that shame follows sin like cause and effect, while at the same time demonstrating that when it comes right down to it, shame is either an insufficient deterrent to other, stronger passions of the moment, or it carries its own disastrous and violent consequences. Shame may not cure, but in its later-century iteration it enables a particular form of narrative, the narrative of moral improvement as a narrative of divided self.

The reform of shame from the passion it is in Defoe’s 1724 *Roxana* to a feeling that might engender pity or compassion within a moral framework brings about a number of consequences for the novelistic structure of autobiography, for the subject of first-person
narrative, and for judgment. Once shame becomes a legitimate and productive feeling, it enables the structure of a “unified” autobiography that can be internally resolved. The narrative structure of autobiography requires a self-splitting, a present narrator and a past actor. Shame provides a resolution to this structure internal to the character. Feeling shame, a narrator can comment from the present on her past actions from the position of one who is now ashamed, but was not, then. Divine judgment and social judgment both are absorbed into the narration of self; the subject who narrates is already ashamed, already judged. In this way, shamer and the ashamed are joined in one body; the subject is split, and the narrative unified.

Shame itself in this way provides evidence of an improvement that has no other proof. The narrator may never demonstrate improved behavior (Roxana dies before she can), but only the capacity to recognize and condemn the error of her ways. Shame becomes itself a marker of an improved self, a subject who is not only self-knowing, not only able to see and judge “with reason” the errors of her ways, but able to feel the error of them. Mandeville claims that the blush is no evidence of virtue, but the 1745/49 edition of Roxana insists that shame is good evidence of reform, proof of a self who has acceded to the ideals and values of the social. This repetition of or submission to social values is required for the “sinner” to be reabsorbed into the social. On the one hand, this is an old story, not a modern one. But Defoe’s experimentation with Roxana’s violent shame and Haywood’s demonstration of the self-destructiveness of shame both demonstrate a Mandevillean skepticism of shame’s relation to virtue. This skepticism vanishes from the
1745 text, replaced not only by affective and moral certainty, but by epistemological certainty: we know Roxana’s heart, and we know the facts of her crimes.
Chapter 3: "A Reformation so much wanted": Clarissa’s Glorious Shame

After she is abducted, Clarissa accuses Lovelace: "You may glory in your fancied merits, in getting me away: but the cause of your glory, I tell you plainly is my shame" (Richardson, Clarissa 393; L98). Feelings are reversed after the rape, as Lovelace accuses, “My very crime is your glory” (909; L266); then despairs, “I have laid the foundations of her glory in my shame,” (916; L268); and complains, “What have I obtained but an increase of shame and confusion!—While her glory has been established by her sufferings!” (930; L275). This tidy chiasmus is Lovelace’s interpretation of the situation (and therefore suspect), but he is essentially right: his loss is her gain.

I want to comment on three remarkable aspects of this affective exchange. First, unlike the heroines of romance such as Eliza Haywood’s Melantha or Cleomira who carry the “blot” or “stain” of lost virtue, Richardson’s exemplary heroine refuses to experience her “ruin” as shameful. After her rape, and after initial expressions of grief, madness, or “irrational guilt” as Eagleton names it(Eagleton 69), the shame she had felt after being abducted is replaced by a determination not to be shamed. Clarissa repudiates the affect that others expect will motivate her either toward marriage or legal reparation; she refuses to cover the crime or her shame. Second, shame and glory are here rendered as opposite

59 Eagleton analyzes Clarissa’s question, “And who was most to blame, I pray? The brute, or the lady?” arguing that it must be seen as an expression of “the irrational guilt women commonly experience after such violations” (69).
ends of a single axis. As soon as Clarissa lets go of shame it automatically—or so it seems—spins to land on Lovelace, as glory reverts to her. In this contest, only one person can hold the glory and, of necessity, the one who does not hold it must be ashamed of having lost it. Both shame and glory seem, in this sense, to be intimates of power: shame at its loss, glory at its gain. The power Clarissa holds at this point in the story is a precarious one, and perhaps not rightly labeled as power except that this is how Lovelace experiences it. It is the “power” of not feeling—at least, not as she should feel. That is, Clarissa does not feel the love that Lovelace expects she will (and thereby prove his thesis that all women are corruptible). Nor does she feel shame at the loss of her virtue as an elopement plot might dictate. Whereas falling in love with Lovelace could only lead to heartbreak and shame, and whereas shame could only prove her assent to an incurious and unfeeling social judgment, Clarissa’s suffering can be powerful because it denies Lovelace power to affect her and proves her moral and affective superiority to a judging world. Her suffering strips him of the usual power of the libertine, the power to affect the passions while remaining, himself, unaffected.60

Lovelace equivocates. His shame either signals his sensible awareness of the terrible wrong he has done Clarissa, or it expresses the libertine’s shame of having failed to gain the victory over “the whole sex” that he’d predicted. Or, and this might be more accurate, each of his claims to shame carries within it both potential meanings. He is both

60 Haywood considers all men potential libertines, and all women passionately affected: “A woman, where she loves, has no Reserve; she profusely gives her all, has no Regard for any Thing, but obliging the Person she affects, and lavishes her whole soul. —But Man, more wisely, keeps a Part of his for other Views, he still has an Eye to Interest and Ambition” (Reflections on the Various Effects of Love 12).
ashamed of what he has done and ashamed that, having done it, he cannot claim it as victory. While such a double-sided feeling should be specific to the consistently duplicitous Lovelace, it is surprisingly not. Rather, this doubling lies at the very crux of shame/glory in the novel and is the third remarkable aspect of Lovelace and Clarissa’s exchange of feelings. Not only are the positions interchangeable (shamed for glorious) but each feeling carries within itself two potential meanings and causes. Shame can be experienced in relation to loss of reputation, or to having done wrong. Likewise, glory can express the victory of conquest, or the ascension of the pure-hearted. These feelings, in other words, move from reputation to ethics, from public to private, external to internal and vice versa. Clarissa’s shame in the first third of the novel is expressed in relation to the eyes of the world which she imagines, and feels to be, perpetually upon her. After Lovelace kidnaps her, she tells Anna, "I despise myself—and well I may: for could the giddiest and most inconsiderate girl in England have done worse than I shall appear to have done in the eye of the world" (382; L94). In her tightly wound “could… have done/shall appear to have done,” Clarissa refuses actual guilt while at the same time despising herself from the judging perspective of the world. She hates herself for making a mistake that the world will misinterpret. Clarissa, like Lovelace, equivocates between reputation and morality; her shame is a response both to loss of reputation (to having been seen to have done wrong), and to having disobeyed her parents (to having really done wrong in her own view). The word for each feeling does not change, but readers are expected to sift through the evidence and align their sympathy and their love correctly, that is with the first shamed, then rightly glorious Clarissa. They should feel nothing but
contempt for the incorrectly (and then at the last minute dubiously whole-heartedly) shamed Lovelace.

Famously, not all period readers condemned Lovelace but desired his reform and marriage, a response that distressed Richardson and motivated him to revise Lovelace in continued attempts to align readers’ feelings with, in this case, unsympathetic moral judgment. And recent critics such as Eagleton, William B. Warner, and Thomas Keymer have argued that the text’s multiple perspectives complicate Richardson’s stated didactic aims, one of which is to undo the romance of the reformable rake. That is, by providing readers access to the first-person psychology of each character, including the villain, readers are left to come to their own judgment of character; each perspective of reality is contested. For Warner, this is where the text gets away from the author’s attempt at control; for Keymer, it is evidence of Richardson’s “dynamic” didacticism. And yet, for all its multiplicity and dynamism, and for all Lovelace’s allure, there is still clearly a right and wrong kind of judgment, and a right and wrong way to arrive at that judgment. With Karen Valihora, I argue that *Clarissa* articulates a quite uncomplicated, if unrealized, ideal community where virtue is not a matter of social convention but of truth, and recognized with reference to absolute moral standards. (It is, in some sense, Lillo’s community of onlookers who pity and forgive Barnwell even though he is judged guilty by law.) In Valihora’s reading, "Richardson suggests at once that the idea of a moral

---

61 Warner argues that though the text’s form—letters from multiple perspectives—seems to solicit or invoke a reader’s independent judgment, Richardson’s interventions (post-script, indexes) point to his anxiety to control errant readings (129). Keymer argues that "In its very organisation the narrative is in conflict with itself, with results so discordant that at times one is driven to think not of competing versions of an identical reality, but of reality's displacement by the force of competing fictions" (Keymer 47).
community … is pure fiction, and that such fictions have a great deal to offer their communities through the ideal images they construct and the common focal points they offer” (176). Whereas Keymer argues that “the narrative is in conflict with itself,” to such a degree that it suggests “reality’s displacement” (47), Valihora suggests that the novel does offer one "preeminent" view that triumphs in the end, and that is Clarissa's. The community is not shattered; rather, "The image of an ideal community hovers beyond the reality of the community that drove" Clarissa to her death (177). I agree with Valihora’s analysis, and would emphasize that in such an ideal community not only is virtue rightly recognized, but vice condemned; not only are transgressors punished, as Richardson himself claims Lovelace is, they are also shamed. Shame is necessary to the image of an ideal community, and to the morality that triumphs in Richardson’s novel.

Andrew Miller presents shame as "a feature of mid-nineteenth-century moral perfectionism, responsive to those conditions in which one discovers who one is through the recognition of others"(163). The recognition he refers to is the "recognition of one's capacities in another, and the internalization of that other in oneself, now self-divided" (165). This is a shameful self-knowledge, based on comparison. Though his study is directed at literature written a full century after Richardson’s novels, he might well be writing of Clarissa when he suggests that shame "inclines us toward particular epistemological dispositions, pressing us to worry over our knowledge of others and theirs of us" (175). This "worry" over one’s own reception—how little control one has over it, how best to anticipate and attempt to control it by trying to know others, developing theories about how others think, feel, act—might well define the interiority
first fully articulated by Richardson’s self- and other-conscious heroine. This is not to suggest that Clarissa is the first protagonist to be concerned with her reputation. Haywood’s heroines were also alert to their own reception, and shame resulted from their untutored expressions of love—of loving without first establishing knowledge of the loved other. Also, this concern with reception aligns with the merchant’s concern with his credit, reputation, or “credibility.” As Thorowgood and Trueman, with the writers of apprentice manuals argue, merchants must guard their reputations to be successful and must also be skilled at interpreting the trustworthiness of others. In the linked markets of finance and reputation, credibility is pre-eminent. Richardson though, relocates this “worry”—and therefore the whole economy of feeling it organizes—to the private realm of subjectivity. Clarissa forms part of the developing epistemological disposition outlined by Miller, that is, the disposition of a subject prepared for shame, a subject in some sense predisposed to shame. Clarissa’s letters are preoccupied with what the world thinks of her, with what she thinks of herself, and with theories about how others, particularly Lovelace, think—how they rationalize, what they believe and what motivates them. Clarissa’s correspondents are similarly preoccupied, and in this way all writers in Richardson’s novel theorize from a place of potential (predisposed) shame.

In what follows, I investigate the relation of shame to the construction of sympathetic sociability as it is realized in Clarissa. I argue that while Richardson seeks to model sympathetic sociability and a moral judgment founded in sensibly realized virtue (as John Mullan argues), the pity he urges readers to feel for Clarissa is both balanced and disciplined by the contempt they ought to feel for Lovelace. In fact, the tragedy of
Clarissa, and perhaps the ideal of sympathetic sociability itself, relies on managing the shifting instability of shame and glory, two passions that seem by definition linked to the watching eyes of the world. This nexus of shame and glory is not evident in either Roxana or The British Recluse precisely because, as I’ve suggested above, only in Clarissa does shame become that predisposition necessary to the making of subjectivity in relation to others. By making shame debatable affects of both characters, and glory a contested goal, the novel reckons with the dubious ethicality of a community comprised of sympathetic spectators.

**Shame as glory’s antithesis**

Critics have long observed that Clarissa is nearly mathematically structured by antitheses; sincerity versus imitation (Lamb); true versus nominal reform (Martin); naïve exegete versus plotter (Castle). The doubled nature of both shame and glory is in this sense not surprising; what is surprising is their mobility. Neither belongs exclusively to either position. Both Lovelace and Clarissa experience public shame at the loss of reputation. Clarissa’s public glory is as much her legacy as her moral superiority; her status as pedagogical example relies on her testimonial vindication. In other words, shame and glory move from one side to the other of these structural divides as they also move between Lovelace and Clarissa. By calling on this antithetical pairing, Richardson suggests an economy of passions, wherein one does not countervail the other—shame does not govern a tendency to glory—but rather each exists as the necessary inverse of the other. Clarissa’s credit is Lovelace’s debit, and vice versa.
The antithetical pairing of shame and glory is an old one, evident even in such seemingly opposite thinkers as Thomas Hobbes and Isaac Watts. In Hobbes’ *Leviathan* (1660), the closeness of these two passions is suggested in the organization of the text—his paragraph on shame directly follows the paragraph on glory—and in their relation to the antithetical sensations of grief and joy. Shame for Hobbes is “Grief for the discovery of some defect of ability … or the passion that discovereth itself in blushing, and consisteth in the apprehension of something dishonourable; and in young men is a sign of the love of good reputation, and commendable: in old men it is a sign of the same; but because it comes too late, not commendable” (73). Hobbes here apparently revises Aristotle’s allocation of shame, described in the *Ethics*. Aristotle too asserts that shame is “appropriate not to every age, but only to youth” for, as he argues, “young people should be properly disposed to feel shame because they live by feeling and so make many errors, but are restrained by shame” (*Ethics* Book IV, Chapter 9; 79). By contrast, “no one would praise an older person for having a sense of shame, since we think that he should do nothing to feel shame for” (*Ethics* Book IV, Chapter 9; 79) Whereas for Aristotle, the difference between the young and the old is a difference in both feeling and the development of virtue, for Hobbes shame exists in relation to reputation and honour.62 It is entirely social, “a sign of the love of good reputation,” and its value, whether it is “commendable” or not, is related to one’s potential. If a young man feels shame, this is

---

62 In *The Art of Rhetoric*, Aristotle recognizes the connection between shame and reputation that Hobbes, too, identifies. Aristotle writes: “[S]ince shame is an imagination connected with disrepute, and felt for its own sake and not for its consequences, and none considers reputation except through those who confer it, one must needs feel shame before those whom one holds in regard” (*The Art of Rhetoric* V1; 159).
commendable because, presumably, he can begin to alter his actions accordingly. By contrast, there is no point to an older man’s shame because he should have changed already; his good reputation is already lost.

Glory, for Hobbes, is always experienced as joy, but there are three types of glory: glory, vainglory, and sudden glory. Glory is grounded in experience. It can be joyful and an expression of “confidence” (72). Vainglory, by contrast, is “grounded on the flattery of others, or only supposed by himself” and is called vain because whereas “a well-grounded confidence begetteth attempt… the supposing of power does not” (71). Vainglory, he says, is “most incident to young men, and nourished by the histories or fictions of gallant persons” (71). Shame and glory are both rendered as feelings of a public self, a self that has, or is expressed as, reputation.63 Furthermore, both glory and shame are relations of self to imagination; that is, both are self-reflective and seem to require a vantage on the self by which one judges or assesses the self. That vantage may be misleading, as in vainglory, or it may be rightly motivating, as is in commendable shame and glory. Like the right kind of shame, the “right” kind of glory leads to “attempt” or action. “Sudden glory” is an odd third term which helpfully elucidates glory’s uncomfortable intimacy with shame. Sudden glory, Hobbes explains, is realized in the “laughter at the defects of others,” and he calls this type of glory a “sign of pusillanimity” (73). It is the sign of a weaker man since “of great minds one of the proper works is to help and free others from

63 Daniel Gross attributes Hobbes’ careful differentiation of glories to Hobbes’ experience of the political and humanitarian implications of such passion, arguing that for Hobbes, vainglory "catalyzed the English Civil War" (80).
scorn” (73). In this case, one man’s sudden glory occurs precisely at the cost of another’s humiliation.

In *Discourses of the love of God* (1729), Watts similarly describes shame and glory in terms of grief and joy, pairing them more explicitly. Importantly, he considers both as sensations of *morality*: "As inward Sensations of Glory frequently attend moral Joy, so Shame is a frequent concomitant of this moral Sorrow, or it may be called one Species of it; for as all moral Sorrow arises from a Consciousness of having done some evil Action, so Shame arises from a Consciousness of having done an Action which is dishonourable, contrary to the Dignity of our Nature, or to our good Character in the Esteem of God or Men" (*Discourses of the love of God* 40). Similar to Hobbes, Watts identifies that shame is not in response to having done “evil,” but to having done something “dishonourable.” It is thus definitionally connected to the “esteem” of another, be that God or other men. In this way, feeling shame is always an act of self-splitting, of seeing oneself from outside the self, from the position of an observing God or human. By contrast, glory seems not to entail this self-splitting. It is simply an “inward sensation” that comes with “moral” joy.

Whereas Hobbes considers the human naturally and primarily motivated by self-interest—and in this way highly susceptible to the opinions of others—Watts offers a benevolent model: for Watts, human morality is sensible, experiential in that it is “felt” in joys and sorrows. Yet for both thinkers glory and shame are, if not opposite sensations, then at least tightly connected by their relevance to the sociability of the human. That is, whether the human is self-interested or benevolent, s/he is necessarily embedded in a community and this community’s judgment is sensibly felt in moments of shame and
glory. For Watts, this is of particular concern; as an Independent minister, his primary interest in the passions is in understanding how to “move” them to religious ends.

Adam Smith’s *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) refigures glory as “ambition and rank” and at the same time demotes shame’s role in the formation of sociability, putting Mandeville’s “necessary ingredient” of shame in its place. In Smith’s configuration, sympathy is the pre-eminent moral feeling—not shame. And yet, Smith offers at least three powerful examples explicating shame’s relation to sympathy. The final example is most striking, that of a man on the pillory. “A brave man is not rendered contemptible by being brought to the scaffold; he is, by being set in the pillory. His behaviour in the one situation may gain him universal esteem and admiration. No behaviour in the other can render him agreeable” (71). For Smith, the man on the pillory can do nothing, perform no gesture or emotion that will gain him the sympathy of the spectators. He is irretrievably contemptible. Whereas the man in the scaffold may receive sympathy—spectators will sympathize with his pain to the degree that he can

64 The first example is the man who, if he “shed one single tear upon the scaffold, he would disgrace himself” (60). We cannot feel sympathy for this man, Smith claims. “We cannot bring ourselves to feel for him what he feels for himself, and what, perhaps, we should feel for ourselves if in his situation: we, therefore, despise him; unjustly, perhaps, if any sentiment could be regarded as unjust, to which we are by nature irresistibly determined”(60). The second example is the poor man. For Smith, poverty is shameful not only because our suffering is evident and visible, but also because the “eyes of mankind” do not look on us with sympathy. The poor man is “ashamed of his poverty" (62) in part, and paradoxically, because he is not, in fact, seen. Smith elaborates, "[A]s obscurity covers us from the daylight of honour and approbation, to feel that we are taken no notice of, necessarily damps the most agreeable hope, and disappoints the most ardent desire, of human nature" (62). Shame in these examples seems to identify sympathy’s limit, or the point at which sympathy cease to function, the line it cannot cross.
withhold his tears—the man in the pillory will not. “There is no sympathy in the other [i.e. the pillory]; or, if there is any, it is not with his pain, which is a trifle, but with his consciousness of the want of sympathy with which this pain is attended” (71). Unlike the man on the scaffold, the pilloried man can do nothing to save himself from that absolute shame, the shame derived from knowing oneself alone. Here, shame seems to mark the boundary of self and other, it is the feeling that accompanies the separation of the self from its community. It is the feeling of total exclusion. Providing some small window of sympathy for the pilloried man, he continues: “It is with his shame, not with his sorrow” that we sympathize. “Those who pity him, blush and hang down their heads for him” (70). In other words, we sympathize with the condemned man’s recognition that he is utterly alone.

The contagion of shame is a new and different sympathy, not with the more social feelings of sorrow, pain, or joy, but with the abrupt boundaries of sympathy itself. Shame evokes sympathy because we can imagine the desolation of no sympathy. But for the ashamed man, unlike the suffering man, the sympathy does not help, does not alleviate the shame. Thinking about shame seems to turn sympathy back on itself, somehow: Imagining that the pilloried man imagines himself without sympathy, we sympathize. Thus, the sufferer "feels himself irrecoverably degraded by the punishment, though not by the crime." The final sentence of this chapter reads "Compared with the contempt of mankind, all other external evils are easily supported" (3.2.12). Shame is the worst of all to bear because sympathy, in this case, only makes the pillory worse, only enforces the essential loneliness of it rather than overcoming it. Feeling that others sympathize with
his shame amplifies, rather than diminishes, the shame of the pilloried man because it
offers no reprieve from contempt, and no sympathy for his suffering, but only affirms his
shameful loneliness. He is “irrecoverably degraded.” There is no covering over his
shame. He cannot recover from this sympathy. The gaze of the spectator is the
punishment. Smith’s examples of shame harness shame to its feeling opposites “the
admiration and respect we have for rank.” For Smith, shame must be bound to status and
esteem, because it is a feeling in response to how one’s suffering is seen. This is similar
to the distinction that Gross finds in Aristotle’s explication of shame; if shame is in the
eyes, as Aristotle says, then the causes of shame are related to a person’s position, and to
his perception of that position in relation to others. As Gross says, shame is “irreducibly
social” (41) and it depends on one’s own awareness of and attachment to normative
values. Gross does not identify any connection between shame and sympathy but Smith’s
explications suggest than shame is, in some sense, the unavoidable corollary of sympathy
or, more specifically, the sympathy for suffering or misery. When one’s suffering is seen,
one feels shame.

Clearly, Smith disagrees with Mandeville; shame cannot serve as the basis for
sociality; it is not that “necessary ingredient” (Mandeville 101). Yet, the feeling that
Mandeville asserts is both an astoundingly good tool for governing a people and a passion
that can lead to vice, is similarly, in Smith’s account, that which maintains the order of
society, but also a sign of society’s corruption. Smith agrees with Mandeville that shame
is not a virtue or, in Smith’s language, it is not a moral sentiment; rather, it is the feeling
that marks sympathy’s disgrace. That is, shame is the feeling associated with what Smith
considers “the most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments”: the admiration and respect we have for rank. This “natural” admiration which is itself the origin of rank can lead to disruption of social order and to injustice.

Of such mighty importance does it appear to be, in the imaginations of men, to stand in that situation which sets them most in the view of general sympathy and attention. And thus place... is the end of half the labours of human life; and is the cause of all the tumult and bustle, all the rapine and injustice, which avarice and ambition have introduced into this world. (69-70)

Though the "disposition to admire... the rich and the powerful" is necessary to "maintain the distinction of ranks and the order of society," it also corrupts. Smith identifies this as a paradox or insoluble dilemma of moral thinking:

That wealth and greatness are often regarded with respect and admiration which are due only to wisdom and virtue; and that the contempt, of which vice and folly are the only proper objects, is most often unjustly bestowed upon poverty and weakness, has been the complaint of moralists in all ages (72).

When esteem is lost, and is seen to have been lost, shame is felt. But the desire for esteem is itself corruptive. In other words, shame is itself shameful; it marks unjust judgment and unreasonable social distinctions. In Smith’s analysis, shame may be antithetically connected to glory, where glory is an effect of ambition, rank and status, but it is not in itself glorious. Rather, it serves as a feeling reminder of the corruptive potential of sympathy itself, that is, of sympathy wrongly or “unjustly” directed.

Two decades before Adam Smith wrote *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Richardson’s engagement with the difficult pairing of shame/glory suggested that his didactic project—the inculcation of Christian feelings by way of a secular and “diverting”
print genre—required him to work through, or rework, a model of the human where shame, not sympathy or pity, bonds the individual to his community. Richardson navigates a transition toward sympathetic sociability via the pairing of shame and glory. To generate “right” feelings and values, it seems, the novelist must not only cultivate sentiment and sympathy, but must also detach (and reconstruct) passions which seem uncomfortably dependent for their “rightness” upon the social, even aristocratic, imagination and judgment. Shame and glory are unreliable guides to morality, dependent as they are on the eyes of others, on reputation and honour, yet the plot depends on them for their causative power and, ultimately, Richardson requires them to motivate the “right” sentiment in readers.

*Shame and the blush*

John Mullan argues that in Richardson’s novels, virtue is realized in sensibility, and that sensibility is displayed in the “massively sensitized, feminine body” (61). Mullanvaluably recognizes that the heart, that organ “whose urgings were traditionally associated with romantic delusions,” in Richardson’s novels becomes “a guarantee of truthfulness” (63). Mullan’s analysis concerns the moral feelings of love and sympathy and for this reason he focuses on the heart, the traditional bodily location of such passions. However, turning away from sympathy and toward shame requires attention to a different organ, and the skin does not carry the same guarantee of truthfulness. The blush, shame’s bodily manifestation, is notoriously unreliable in the eighteenth century. John Locke uses shame as the example to prove his claim that while passions often cause “changes” in the body, they do not always do so. “Shame, which is an Uneasiness of the
Mind, upon the thought of having done something which is indecent, or will lessen the valued esteem which others have for us, has not always Blushing accompanying it” (172). Shame enters the lexicon of Clarissa under suspicion, as a kind of test-case in the debate on the truthfulness of the body’s expression of internal states as both Lovelace and Clarissa question what and how the blush signifies.

Lovelace parrots Mandeville’s suspicion of women’s blush: “The modestest women, Jack, must think, and think deeply sometimes—I wonder whether they ever blush at those things by themselves, at which they have so charming a knack of blushing in company—If not; and if blushing be a sign of grace or modesty, have not the sex as great a command over their blushes, as they are said to have over their tears?” (691-92; L 216). His stance is libertine—it reiterates his usual claim that women are corrupt and justifies his conquest of them—but it also engages a common question of the period: Does the body express passions automatically—and therefore reliably and truthfully—in response to an object or thought, or does the body calibrate the display of passion in response to a perceived spectator and/or social expectations? While we might expect such a question from Lovelace, it is more surprising when Clarissa, too, points to the instability of the blush’s referent, arguing that the blush is not necessarily a sign of guilt but can be a response to “injurious charge.” She asks whether Scipio “did not blush with indignation

---

65 A decade after Clarissa, Adam Smith will disarm Lovelace’s suspicion of social feelings by observing that the calibration of passion is actually integral to sympathy and, in this way, to both moral action and social concord, but in this moment, for Lovelace, the blush figures as a sign of women’s suspect “command” of passion. For Lovelace calibrating or commanding her blush makes it suspiciously like an artificial and manipulative act. For Smith, calibrating one’s joy or grief makes a person more likely to be granted sympathy.
when the charge was first communicated to him” (531; L157). This is not the commanded blush that Lovelace describes but it is similar in that the blush can occur or be suppressed in anticipation of how one will be judged by others; for this reason, it cannot possibly be an indication of one’s “real” feeling. Or, even if the feeling is real—Scipio’s response to the charge—the blush itself may be illegible. If the heart is a “guarantee of truthfulness,” the blush is a reminder of sentiment’s unreliability as a guide either to truth of self, or to moral truth. Visible on the skin in a way that the heart’s motions are not, the blush questions whether passions are identical with their outward, gestural signs. 66

In Mary Ann O’Farrell’s analysis of Austen’s novels, the blush operates as an important narrative device which makes visible the love that an Austen heroine feels, but which she is not allowed to show or voice with propriety. ”In its involuntariness, the incivility of the blush—as apparent sign of the body’s separable will and of the body's willful intrusion into social order—seems to exempt the blush from the limitations

66 The eighteenth-century distrust is different from current theories of shame’s physicality. For example, for Silvan Tomkins, Eve Kosovsky Sedgewick, Elspeth Probyn and Sara Ahmed, shame’s bodiliness is critical to the self-recognition or individuation that shame performs. In Ahmed’s words, “Shame involves the intensification not only of the bodily surface, but also of the subject’s relation to itself, or its sense of itself as self. In other words, the lived experience of being-itself depends on the intensification of the skin surface” (104). The apartness is felt and intensified when the self is the object of the gaze. "Crucially, the individuation of shame -- the way it turns the self against and towards the self -- can be linked precisely to the inter-corporeality and sociality of shame experiences” (105). These theorists do not question shame’s reality in relation to its dependence on social factors; rather, they insist that shame is a quintessentially social affect because it is experienced as reaction to a social, a response to the corporeal "gaze" of another which causes the self to turn against itself.
imposed on love in the system of manners” (15). While O’Farrell offers an apt evaluation of Austen’s blushes, the analysis is a marked misfit for Richardson, where the very innateness of the blush is repeatedly questioned. Katie Halsey identifies the blush with feminine modesty and asserts that “despite the evidence of contemporary physiologists (who saw anger and shame as the chief causes of blushing), novelists and poets continued to insist on the innate ‘modesty’ of the feminine blush” (227–228). However, I suggest that Richardson invokes a Mandevillian debate on the blush not to insist, ultimately, on the blush’s innate relation to modesty, but to emphasize the lapses in legibility; to emphasize, in other words, the problems of interpreting another’s feelings. Richardson’s engagement with questionable nature of the blush suggests that during this period, and in the novel, passion exists in a context and in disquieting, because uncertain and multiply signifying, relation to the social.

Similarly, shame, the passion most often associated with the blush, resides somewhere between the individual and the social. As Watts’ and Hobbes’ definitions both suggest, shame is intimately associated with the opinion of others, with reputation and honour. For this reason, in Richardson’s diorama of passions, it is necessarily suspect. Richardson’s critique of shame is tangible in the Harlowes’ invocation of it, most repetitive in Arabella’s stern, unforgiving letters to her sister: "Everybody, in short, is ashamed of you: but none more than Arabella Harlowe" (510; L147). By referring to herself in the third person, Arabella implicitly raises the sense of her own public reputation. Weeks later, when Clarissa is preparing for death, "But God give you true penitence, if you have it not already! And it will be true, if it be equal to the shame and
the sorrow you have given us all” (1160; L378). Arabella’s claim is reinforced by Uncle Antony who quotes from Ecclesiastes: "Keep a sure watch over a shameless daughter (yet no watch could hold you!), lest she make thee a laughing-stock to thine enemies (as you have made us all to this cursed Lovelace)” (1196; L406). Whether the Harlowes “really” feel shame is not the point. Because they claim it, their shame binds them to the community of watchers as it simultaneously excludes Clarissa from that same community. This is a perverse exercise of imaginative sympathy; they both claim to feel a shame that properly belongs to Clarissa, reveling in their borrowed abject shame while, simultaneously, deploying it as accusation. In this way, Arabella and Uncle Antony exemplify shame’s dangerous collusion with social judgment. Far from being a trustworthy guide to moral action, their projective shame justifies the worst action of all, the expulsion of Clarissa, the exemplary daughter, from the family’s love. Where shame is aligned with reputation and honour, it makes right action—in this case, compassion for the shamed—impossible.

In some sense, then, it seems that Richardson puts shame and sympathy in opposition; shame kills compassion as it excludes the shameful. Or, to put it differently, shame, an antiquated passion too closely associated with reputation and honour, cannot be the basis of a new social and moral order; all it can do is condemn those who offend an existing power structure. And indeed, this is the shame that Clarissa refuses.

**Clarissa’s Refusals**

Critics have tended to frame the reversal of power that happens after the rape in terms of refusal. Terry Eagleton calls Clarissa’s death her “absolute refusal of political
society” (76). Mary Patricia Martin describes Clarissa’s steadfast refusal of marriage as Richardson’s rejection of the conventional reform resolution. Karen Valihora understands it as Clarissa’s refusal of the distinction between private and public selves. Valihora’s argument is most pertinent to my own. She argues that in Clarissa’s refusal of the private/public divide, Richardson "discredits the 'eye of the world' as a standard of judgment" (165): "Her utter heedlessness of any public scandal after her 'ruin' is the most important of Clarissa's challenges to social decorum and convention" (168). Whereas Valihora is most interested in the question of how judgment is formed and itself “judged,” my own argument is concerned with the parameters of feeling associated with that judgment. That is, as Richardson discredits the “eye of the world” as a standard of judgment, so too does he disarm the shame associated with the world’s condemnation. And yet, for all that Clarissa is “heedless” of scandal, neither is she shameless. While she refuses the shame of reputation, the social shame that her family wrongly holds to, she nevertheless claims the other kind of shame, the “moral Sorrow,” as Watts would call it, which leads to Christian glory.

The evening after her kidnapping, Lovelace and Clarissa face each other, each contesting the other’s version of events. In the dialogue I cited at the beginning of this chapter, Lovelace declares “all the merit of having saved you from an odious compulsion shall be mine. I glory in it” (392; L98), but Clarissa questions the merit upon which his glory is based. “You may glory in your fancied merits, in getting me away: but the cause of your glory, I tell you plainly, is my shame.” While Lovelace claims a Hobbesian true glory, having heroically rescued the woman from her oppressors, Clarissa clearly
considers it vainglorious on his part; his merits are only “fancied.” But what shame does she claim for herself, that of public reputation or of private morality?

The shame that launches the novel and conditions the first third of it is clearly a social one. In her first letter to Anna, Clarissa fears for her reputation after her brother has just lost a duel with Lovelace. The duel is "so much the public talk" (53; L4), Clarissa writes. The duel—that out-moded, aristocratic contest of masculine honour—and the subsequent gossip about the duel, immediately casts the story as one of reputation and embeds it in the spectatorship that lends reputation its consequence. Society is here rendered as both powerful and talkative, or maybe powerful because talkative. Though the eye of the world is ever-watchful, it is the talk of the world that is most threatening and unpredictable. While the eye may notice and judge, the talk generates its own uncontrollable effects, as Clarissa notes soon after she is first confined by her own family:

I have no doubt that I am the talk, and perhaps the byword of all the county. If so, I am afraid I can now do nothing that will give me more disgrace than I have already so causelessly received by their indiscreet persecutions: and let me be whose I will, and do what I will, I shall never wipe off the stain my confinement and the rigorous usage I have received have fixed upon me; at least in my own opinion. (349; L85)

On the one hand, her claim that she can “now do nothing that will give [her] more disgrace” only foreshadows the tragedy to come, but her statement also draws attention to the fact that disgrace and “the stain” both exist in the gossip itself. She “receives” disgrace “causelessly.” She is disgraced not by her own deed, but by her punishment: gossip assumes or invents the reason for her confinement so that she is not only the subject of gossip, but condemned by it. She recognizes that her reputation is entirely out
of her hands, separate from her, and the absent babble is more powerful than her own actions. Do what she will, she will “never wipe off the stain,” she asserts. She then adds, “at least in my own opinion.” In this statement of opinion, she does not concur with the gossip’s judgment, but she acknowledges its power to stain, or to affix stain. There is no getting outside the world’s talk. And yet for all the power accorded to the gossiping public, readers are never privy to the talk, and it is not until the book is more than two thirds done that we have any glimpse of the gossipers. It is only after the rape, and upon Lovelace’s “unblushing” attendance at the ball, that “the world” makes its first appearance (1134; L367). This is an important coincidence of plot and talk, which I will return to in my discussion of Lovelace’s unrefromability, but for now I simply want to note that Clarissa characterizes public chatter as both powerful and generative and, as a corollary to this, she distances herself from the disgrace that it attributes; the “stain” is not necessarily “inside” the person but can be, rather, an effect of talk itself.

After she is lured through the garden gate, however, Clarissa’s disgrace is no longer an effect of gossip but her own. She has acquired the external viewpoint on herself which is advised in apprenticeship manuals: she is self-divided, both master and apprentice. In a letter to Anna, she narrates the events of her capture straightforwardly and chronologically until, reaching the moment that Lovelace thrusts her into his chariot, she writes,

Here I must suspend my relation for a while: for now I am come to this sad period of it, my indiscretion stares me in the face: and my shame and my grief give me a compunction that is more poignant, methinks, than if I had a dagger in my heart-- To have it to reflect, that I should so inconsiderately give in to an interview which, had I known either myself or him, or in the least considered the circumstances of
In this passage, Clarissa describes physical sense of shame and grief which seems unrelated to the eyes of the world, a product only of her own reflection on her own conduct, a reflection which, in this passage, renders her act as an externalized persona which “stares” her back. Clarissa is physically divided from her feelings of shame and grief and from her past act. The reflection, in other words, while it may provide an effect of interiority is represented as an encounter between internal and external. In this same letter, in words which I quoted at the beginning of the chapter, she expresses the shame of being seen to have done wrong: "I despise myself—and well I may: for could the giddiest and most inconsiderate girl in England have done worse than I shall appear to have done in the eye of the world?" (382; L94). Her shame, though now “felt” so keenly that it halts the narrative, triggering two pages of self-reflection and self-recrimination, is seemingly inextricably linked to the judgment of the social. “You don’t know, nor can you imagine, my dear, how I am mortified!—How much I am sunk in my own opinion!—I, that was proposed for an example, truly, to others” (382; L94). Her own opinion is that of the world which proposed her as “example.” And, of course, she remains an example, albeit in a transformed sense.

By the time she declares that the cause of Lovelace’s “glory” is her shame, her shame is itself ambiguous. That is, it is uncertainly moral—referring either to social judgment or moral judgment—and as a result it is an unreliable guide to the truth of Clarissa. Shame’s relation to epistemological certainty, which later editions of Roxana
insist on, is here undermined. Clarissa feels the shame of having committed an error—she went to the garden—and feels also mortification at the imagined social judgment which she has assumed as her own opinion. Importantly, though, what she will “appear to have done” is so much worse than what she did, actually, do. And so while her shame is a response to a very slight wrong actually committed, more an error in judgment than morality, it is also Scipio’s shame: a blush at an injurious charge which she does not merit.67 Because her shame remains ambiguously located—both public and private, concerning both social and self-judgment, between truth and gossip—her double-sided statement is accurate: She does not merit her shame anymore than Lovelace merits his glory. Yet, she feels it.

Much later, after the rape, when she is arrested coming out of church, Clarissa exclaims in answer to the officers’ accusations: "Action!... I have committed no bad action!" (1051; L333). This is surely true, and at this moment she states her position clearly. She has not, in this moment nor indeed in any other committed a “bad action.” The rape was not her “action” but Lovelace’s. Significantly, this scene is also the only one in which we see Clarissa outside the private space of garden, carriage, or room and in which she is seen by a public. While the sense of “world” is ever-present in this novel, it hardly presses. It never actively intervenes. And yet, every character assumes its force. In other words, while for Richardson’s project the coherence and preservation of an ideal of community is clearly important, it remains immaterial and imagined. And then, in this

---

67 Watts makes a similar observation, noting that shame can arise in response to accusation: "Let it be noted also, that if anything that is counted dishonourable among Men be charged upon us, or imputed to us, tho’ we are innocent, it excites Shame"(Discourses of the love of God 41).
scene, in a community of strangers, there are suddenly bodies, voices, and witnesses. While these churchgoers do not represent “the” world whose eye Clarissa has referenced since her first letter, they are nonetheless spectators to her humiliation. The churchgoers who witness her arrest cannot possibly know more than what is visible in this moment; they do not know her history; they do not know what happened to her in the room where Lovelace confined and raped her. Yet, as the crowd gathers “the people were most of them struck with compassion” and only “some few threw out vile and shocking reflections” (1052; L333). In her only moment of public exposure—arrested in front of a church no less—Clarissa publicly refuses to acknowledge the truth of the charges. She no longer hesitates, it seems, on that threshold, imagining how she might “appear” to the eye of the world, and then taking that imaginary stance as her own. Now, she is certain. In public, seeing and seen, she declares “I have committed no bad action.”

This is not what the scheming women who engineered Clarissa’s arrest expected. As Belford explains to Lovelace, the women “thought thou [i.e. Lovelace] wouldst not be displeased at anything she suffered, that could help to mortify her into a state of shame and disgrace; and bring her to comply with thy views” (1063; L333). The women’s plan does not work. Although Clarissa exclaims, as she throws herself into the officers’ carriage, “Carry me, carry me out of sight!—Cover me—Cover me up—for ever!” she later refuses to be mortified. After Belford has engineered her release and taken her to the home of the honest Mrs. Smith, Clarissa straightforwardly acknowledges that she had been in prison. Instead of seeking to be covered or covering over the disgrace of her
arrest, she does the opposite: she exposes herself. In Belford’s paraphrase of Clarissa’s words, "The disgrace she cannot hide from herself, as she says in her letter to Lady Betty, she is not solicitous to conceal from the world" (1073; L336). It is not so much that Clarissa refuses shame, rather that she refuses to be ashamed of her shame.

In a letter to Anna, after receiving the account of Lovelace at the ball, she articulates the difference between moral and social shames: "As to the world, and its censures, you know, my dear, that however desirous I always was of a fair fame, yet I never thought it right to give more than a second place to the world's opinion. The challenges made to Mr Lovelace by Miss D'Oily in public company are a fresh proof that I have lost my reputation and what advantage would it be to me, were it retrievable, and were I to live long, if I could not acquit myself to myself" (1139;L368). This is the second description of a public. In this case, the public is not a group of anonymous churchgoers, but rather the world that Clarissa belongs to and through whose watchful eye she has constantly seen and judged herself. The one “seen” in this instance is Lovelace, whom Anna describes as the "unblushing villain" (1134; L367). As in the first scene of witnessing, this public is likewise entered into the text only to be discounted. Not knowing her whole story, but only Lovelace’s version of it, Miss D’Oily and others are all too readily persuaded, and so if Clarissa has lost her reputation, “the world” has lost its authority. She does not call its judgment flawed, but puts it in “second place,” behind her own opinion of herself. Clarissa’s seclusion from the world is reminiscent of the isolated friendship which concludes The British Recluse; excluded from the world by their shame,
the women form a compassionate sociality of two. It is different, though, for while
Haywood’s text implicitly questions the logic and morality of their exclusion, seeking
compassion from its readers for the plight of the two ashamed women, Belinda and
Cleomira do not offer an alternate authority to the world’s. They accede to, and even
enjoy, their shame.

By contrast, by claiming shame rather than covering it over, Clarissa converts
shame to glory. That is, rather than keeping shame and glory at opposite ends of the same
axis, she refashions the relation. She makes it a trajectory rather than an opposition:
"There is a shame which bringeth sin, and there is a shame which bringeth glory and
grace" (L413; 1207). It is not so much that shame leads to redemption—as it does in the
Christian imaginary expressed here in Clarissa’s meditation on Job—but shame is itself
her redemption. In Clarissa’s chiasmus, her shame is her glory; she glories in her shame.
Clarissa knots shame to exposure, suffering, and transcendence in the act of narrative.
This represents a significant shift in novelistic shame. Shame itself has become a
(glorious) rationale for telling shameful secrets and in this way, because it is redemption,
shame redeems both the teller of private shames and the novel as the pre-eminent genre
for secret-telling and the re-creation of shame. Clarissa not only feels shame, she knows
herself in shame; she is predisposed to shame. In some sense, shame structures her
subjection. Using Tomkins’ theory of affect, we might say that shame has become
Clarissa’s organizing affect. Receiving all information in relation to shame results in the
distilling of perception and of the perceiving self; all is only potentially shameful—not
potentially amusing or potentially frightening.
In words that emphasize shame’s relation to truth-telling, Reverend Lewen urges Clarissa to testify against Lovelace. "I know, madam, that you have dignity enough to become the blushes of the most naked truth, when necessity, justice and honour exact it from you." (1251). Clarissa replies: "It is certain that creatures who cannot stand the shock of public shame should be doubly careful how they expose themselves to the danger of incurring private guilt, which may possibly bring them to it" (1253; L428). Here, “public shame” is precisely the shame of exposure that Defoe’s Roxana ran from and (likely) murdered to avoid; that is, the shame of exposure and condemnation. Clarissa contrasts it with “private guilt,” which seems to refer to a “bad action” which is “private” both because it is one’s own and because it is not exposed to public view. But her case, she says, is different because she made the mistake of consenting to Lovelace’s "clandestine meeting" (1253; L428). She committed not a “bad action,” but an action which would lead others to find her guilty. In a court, she suggests, any "pleas to [her] favour" would not be taken seriously, though they might well be with a "private and serious audience" (1253). As other critics have noted, the novel itself provides her with the “private and serious” audience that a courtroom would not.\footnote{My argument here is similar to Valihora’s who argues that Clarissa addresses not the real community, but a reader "capable, finally, of recognizing perfect virtue when she sees it" (179).} It does so because, unlike the two publics that have appeared in the novel—the churchgoers and “the world” at the ball—the public who reads her letters could know the “whole” story and, knowing the whole story, would judge her differently and with compassion. Her ideal audience, in other words, has access to her subjectivity or, at least, to her narrative of her subjectivity.
As she expresses to Anna, immediately after her first meeting with Lovelace in the garden, "there would hardly be a guilty person in the world, were each suspected or accused person to tell his or her own story, and be allowed any degree of credit" (172; L36). A reading public would allow her this “degree of credit,” becoming private audience to her shame (her private guilt and her rape) and to her glory (her acceptance of her shame and her endurance of humiliation). Clarissa’s shame is not passionate and violent, but deeply felt. Like the shame described by Adam Smith, it carries with it the imagined and interpersonal effects of judgement, of pity, and of spectacle, but for Clarissa, the sympathy she imagines from a reading public does not intensify her shame; it makes it valuable and, as such, assures her worth.

“Reformation so much wanted”

Lady Bradshaigh imagines another conclusion for Clarissa and Lovelace. She writes to Richardson, "I see her resentment over, her stifled love returning with double force; with the addition of an esteem for him, to which, from his former demerits, she was before a stranger" (Corr, IV, 205 in Warner 164). While readers such as Lady Bradshaigh voiced their desire for a happier end, Richardson denied it. Lovelace dies as the result of a duel, unreformed, unredeemed, and condemned—if not by God, then certainly by Richardson. Richardson refuses to grant the "Reformation so much wanted” by his readers because, he says (mirroring Clarissa’s logic), he “should be able to answer it to his own heart” (Postscript to the Third Edition 255).

To have a Lovelace for a series of years glory in his wickedness, and think that he had nothing to do, but as an act of grace and favour to hold out his hand to receive that of the best of women, whenever he pleased, and to have it thought, that
Marriage would be a sufficient amends for all his enormities to others, as well as to her; he [i.e. the author] could not bear that. Nor is Reformation, as [the author] has shewn in another piece, to be secured by a fine face; by a passion that has sense for its object; nor by the goodness of a Wife's heart, or even example, if the heart of the Husband be not graciously touched by the Divine Finger. (254)

The rape condemns Lovelace in Clarissa’s eyes and, indeed, in Richardson’s arguments. But what makes him irredeemable, finally, is his lack of shame; his heart is decidedly not “touched by the Divine Finger.” And Richardson emphasizes his lack of shame precisely to deprive him of sympathy.69

In the only social scene of the entire novel, Anna describes Lovelace at the ball as the "unblushing villain" (1134; L367). His refusal to hide from the world, a refusal to blush after having perpetrated such a wrong, is itself wrong. In this scene at the ball, Richardson emphasizes Lovelace’s impermeability to social judgment and ethics. Readers see Lovelace not only interacting with Anna, but interacting with her in a public setting, where they may be seen, and where Anna can record the reaction of the watching eyes. Anna’s encounter with Lovelace at the ball is designed to demonstrate not only Lovelace’s shameless villainy, but the community’s failure; the community watches, but it does not see. The effect of this is scene is complex. The public materializes and, in the same gesture, fails. Lovelace is confirmed to be heartless, worthy only of condemnation, at the same instant that the public is exposed as blind. Anna’s partial and private view is more reliable than the world’s.

69 Margaret Ann Doody situates novel in the trajectory of Restoration tragedies of rape wherein the “hero is defeated, remorse comes too late, and the woman is… the victor even in death” (109). Rape in these tragedies reveals the hero as utterly contemptible as it simultaneously shows the woman as morally triumphant and thus deserving of sympathy.
Lovelace’s incapacity for shame is observed not only by Anna, but also by Belford, by Clarissa and, most damningly, by Lovelace himself. Belford justifies his decision to show Clarissa Lovelace’s letters with the words, "Since thou [Lovelace] gloriest in thy pen, and in thy wickedness, and canst not be ashamed" (1174; L388). Clarissa reacts to those same letters, exclaiming, "To take crime to himself… without shame, oh what a hardened wretch is this man!" (1078; L339). And Lovelace crows, "what other people call blame; that I call praise: I ever did; and so I very early discharged shame, that cold-water damper to an enterprising spirit" (1024; L321). By painting Lovelace as so utterly untouched by either shame or the “Divine Finger,” Richardson wagers that readers will not sympathize with him, that readers will, rather, judge and condemn him. He does not feel, in other words, the “moral sorrow” described by Watts but only the shame which is described by Hobbes, the “sign of the love of a good reputation”—except, of course, that his “good” reputation is morally bankrupt. Richardson wagers, in other words, that the shameless man will not only fail to achieve “glory” but will engender no sympathy precisely because he sets himself apart from, and is untouched by, the community’s moral judgment. The ball scene emphasizes that not only that it is contemptible to feel no sympathy for Clarissa, but also that it is contemptible to feel sympathy for Lovelace. In fact, it shows not only bad moral judgment, but a kind of stupidity, a willingness to be duped.

Yet, Richardson offers two hypotheses for the attraction and hoped-for-resolution that his novel is trying to undo. Trying to understand why a rake like Lovelace attracts women’s attention and love, Anna offers this one: "But our sex are generally modest and
bashful themselves, and are too apt to consider that, which in the main is their principal
grace, as a defect: and finely do they judge, when they think of supplying that defect by
choosing a man who cannot be ashamed” (1136; L367). In Anna’s logic, the reason
women fall in love with the rake is not because they hope to reform him, necessarily, but
because shamelessness is a quality which they consider themselves to lack. Anna’s view
coincides with the eighteenth-century view of modesty as a feminine grace. But she
suggests that women (women unlike Clarissa, that is) mistake it for a feminine “defect.”
Her analysis is a mirror image to that which Lovelace offered much earlier. Lovelace
claims that rakes are, originally, bashful men. He himself, he writes, is "bashful still, with
regard to this lady!--bashful, yet know the sex so well!--But that indeed is the reason that
I know it so well--for, Jack, I have had abundant cause, when I have looked into myself,
by way of comparison with the other sex, to conclude that a bashful man has a good deal
of the soul of a woman; and so, like Tiresias, can tell what they think and what they drive
at, as well as themselves” (440-441; L115). Lovelace characteristically plays devil’s
advocate to the assumption that modesty is gendered. In so doing, he remakes modesty
itself as the position of most knowing, rather than most ignorant of the other sex. And
this, he says, is the reason that the most modest women, "that is to say, the slyest"
women, love an "impudent man" (441). Such love, he ventures, must be caused by a
"likeness in nature. And this made the poet say, that every woman is a rake in her heart"
(441). Richardson here offers two contrasting speculations on the attraction of the rake,
both grounded in qualities closely aligned with shame: modesty and bashfulness. That is,
while Anna characterizes the attraction in terms of a shamelessness that is “wanting” in a
woman, Lovelace characterizes it as a shamelessness that is hidden “in her heart.” Richardson works to make Lovelace an unsympathetic character, but here suggests this labour is bound to fail.

Richardson recuperates shame from itself. Or, more accurately, he disgraces one shame in order to recuperate another. Not only does shame work as an affective pivot which rationalizes the total revelation of self, but it does so by maligning or disgracing the ‘bad’ shame, that shame which is too closely associated with rank and ambition and which was, in *Roxana*, volatile and violent. Clarissa’s glorious shame stands in contrast to that shame associated with rank and ambition as expressed by her family (we are ashamed of you) and Lovelace (ashamed to lose his reputation as libertine). In other words, by demonstrating the falsity of other types of shame and at the same time by refusing to “cover” her shame with marriage, Clarissa’s shame is shown to be above suspicion. Clarissa can glory because she is right and her community is wrong. Clarissa refuses both legal solutions to her shame—marriage and a trial—and instead produces letters; in other words, she produces a shamed but authoritative self. Shame is a feeling under suspicion—the blush a signifier of passion as unstable referent and in this way a crisis in truth. Paradoxically, it is also a register of a type of internal truth of self which links feeling to virtue; that is, as Watts insists, shame is a “moral sorrow”; it is how we feel when we do wrong, when we are not virtuous. As Geoffrey Sill argues, the question of passion, “which resulted from the uncertainty of the age over the nature, function, and uses of mankind’s irrational, individualistic self" (7) both ”raises and problematises” questions of truth and virtue (8). The genre itself experiments with and re-imagine
passion as it becomes a “feeling” required for self-analysis and retrospection, the feeling most important to the construction of “novel selves” or autobiographies.\textsuperscript{70}

In other words, shame is a reformed passion, necessary for a modernity that is based on the fiction of the individual. As the feeling required for retrospection and self-division, the narrative techniques so important to first-person narratives, shame becomes itself a kind of enabling technology. It enables and upholds the construction of the modern individual who knows herself in shame (resolving the crisis of truth), and whose moral authority comes from shame (resolving the crisis of virtue). Nancy Armstrong makes the large claim that the power of modern, secular morality "comes from and authorizes those works of fiction where morality appears to emanate from the very core of an individual, as that individual confronts and opposes socially inculcated systems of value" (How Novels Think 27). This individual, as Armstrong characterizes her, personifies McKeon’s categorical instability. The “core” Armstrong alludes to is an abstraction, the invisible aspect of self which is, in these fictions, explicitly not socially constructed. My discussion of Clarissa builds on Armstrong’s insight to suggest that shame is critical to making of

\textsuperscript{70} D.A. Miller, writing on nineteenth-century novels, argues that "Perhaps the most fundamental value that the Novel, as a cultural institution, may be said to uphold is privacy, the determination of an integral, autonomous, "secret" self. Novel reading takes for granted the existence of a space in which the reading subject remains safe from the surveillance, suspicion, reading, and rape of others. Yet this privacy is always specified as the freedom to read about characters who oversee, suspect, read, and rape one another.... We enjoy our privacy of watching privacy being violated, in the act of watching that is already itself a violation of privacy. Our most intense identification with characters never blinds us to our ontological privilege over them: they will never be reading about us. It is built into the structure of the Novel that every reader must realize the definitive fantasy of the literal subject, who imagines himself free from the surveillance that he nonetheless sees operating everywhere around him" (162). In effect, novel reading is shameless, but it nevertheless depends on the interrupted transfer of shame.
that invisible “core” of self visible, or at least narratable. If the revelation of potentially “shameful” and “blush-inducing” secrets is part of what defines the novel, then *Clarissa*, in some way, *performs* the genre and makes a profound argument for its transmutation of shame. By narrating her shame Clarissa achieves glory. By narrating his lack of shame, Lovelace becomes desirable and his reform itself is therefore desirable or, in other words, “much wanted.” The full exposure (the shameless telling) new to and required of novels is justified; shame becomes a topos just as exposing one’s secrets becomes glorious.
Chapter 4: Evelina’s Embarrassment

Evelina makes her “entrance into the world” in a series of missteps, stutters, silences, and blushes. In response to men’s attention she “colour[s]” or listens “in silent embarrassment” (37). She feels “dreadfully abashed” (45), “ready to sink with shame and distress” (34, 54), “quite ashamed” (34), "too much ashamed” (37) and "ready to die with shame" (37) for her errors. She is also “ashamed of such a connection” to her cousins, the Branghtons (105), and feels “so much ashamed of [her] near relationship” to her grandmother, Madame Duval (96), that when these shameful familial connections are exposed she suffers “mortifying conjectures and apprehensions” and later declares “I thought I should have fainted; so great was my emotion, from shame, vexation, and a thousand other feelings, for which I have no expressions” (263). Shame, in all its gradations from abashed to mortified, colours Evelina’s many outings from her first ball to Bristol Hotwells where, strolling innocently along the footpath, she is recognized by her “blushing cheek” and “downcast eye” (362).

Evelina’s shame is different from that articulated by earlier century heroines. Unlike Clarissa’s shame, its domain is not morality but “the World” and its judgment. Unlike the passionate shame invoked by Haywood and Defoe, Evelina’s shame is not capable (however unreliably) of governing other passions. Rather, it governs behaviour. It governs, that is, the outward body—gesture, movement, expression, speech—and it does so by intensifying the sense of the community as persistent judging witness. Evelina’s
shames take place in a world of spectators and gossip, in this way much like Clarissa’s shame. Men watch Evelina—sometimes instead of watching the spectacle for which they have paid--and debate or extol her merits. She, too, watches, and in her letters exposes the vanity and foolishness of others. In this intensely spectatorial world, every act—regardless of its apparent relation to virtue or vice—is potentially shameful. Here is the affective dimension of what Foucault terms disciplinary, capillary power, “the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes, and everyday lives” (Foucault, *Power/Knowledge* 39). A laugh, a blush, the dropping of a name, a request to borrow a coach, a loud-mouthed relative, a dancing grandmother—all these apparently unthreatening acts and contacts can trigger shame. In *Evelina*, her first novel, Burney performs a remarkable innovation in feeling: shame becomes embarrassment.

Whereas modern embarrassment is commonly understood to be a gradation of shame, Johnson’s 1755 *Dictionary* defines embarrassment as “perplexity; entanglement.” It was a problem of understanding, as Johnson’s illustrative quotation shows: "Let your method be plain, that your hearers may run through it without embarrassment, and take a clear view of the whole." While for Johnson’s contemporaries embarrassment was a “perplexity,” a failure and a hindrance in clear knowing, in Burney’s *Evelina*, embarrassment is keenly felt. In this chapter, I read *Evelina* as a comedy of shame, as shame and perplexity become a new, hybrid feeling:

---

71 Embarrassment’s link to shame is clarified in the Oxford English Dictionary’s historical thesaurus which classes embarrassment as a “feeling of shame,” itself a sub-category of humility “the mind » emotion or feeling » humility » feeling of shame » [noun] » embarrassment” (*Oxford English Dictionary*)
embarrassment. I argue first of all that embarrassment, a secular and fully socialized shame, semantically linked to problems in knowing, facilitates the intensification of first-person narrative. Evelina’s embarrassment creates a character in the near-constant process of self-splitting. She perpetually imagines how others interpret her actions as she fails regularly to do as she “ought.” Embarrassment thus produces a private self who knows itself by seeing its difference from its public representation and, simultaneously, from what it ought in some ideal sense to be. However, in Burney’s comedy, the failure to achieve an ideal does not result in pain, exclusion, or suffering, nor is it the spur to reformation. Rather, Burney exploits the paradoxes and ironies of embarrassment in order to erect a private feminine self as the knowable secret. That is, although Evelina’s blushes are evidence of her modesty, they also (secretly) signal her erotic interest and provoke curiosity; she describes her feelings minutely, but her readers and her spectators know her better than she knows herself. Although she attributes her embarrassment to her ignorance of society’s rules (again we hear echoes of Mandeville’s observations on self-governance), the fact that she feels shame is also, in itself, an assertion that she knows better; she knows enough, that is, to know that she has done wrong. In the final irony of embarrassment, although Evelina explicitly feels shame for failing to be what she ought, she is already, in *her very embarrassment*, the ideal modest woman. Evelina’s shame is different than Clarissa’s—both generically and in relation to the realization of sociability. Whereas Richardson’s heroine makes shame her glory and then dies, Evelina’s modesty is never assaulted, and even before she is welcomed into a community, she embodies that community’s ideal femininity.
My second argument concerns Burney’s interrogation of this emerging middle class feminine ideal. I argue that *Evelina* explicitly engages the question of female modesty in relation to a culture of spectatorship. It does so by attending to embarrassment and its close relatives: ridicule, humiliation, and mocking laughter. Unlike the ideal modest woman, and unlike literary paragons of virtue such as Clarissa, Evelina *laughs*. It is no coincidence that Evelina’s first episode of social embarrassment is also her first, and punishably improper, laugh. When she laughs at the foppish (or feminized) Lovel’s pretentious statement of the injury she has done his pride, her laughter is simultaneously his humiliation and hers. He feels the sting of public ridicule, and she has committed a grievous social mistake. Though she laughs at his pretensions and artifice, laughter is, like the lack of embarrassment, a mark of the low. A sign of her natural good sense and morality, Evelina’s laugh exposes the artifice of polite society. At the same time, it exploits the vantage of the embarrassed narrator, a new and arguably gendered position. In this novel of manners, embarrassment separates the civil from the uncivil, the polite from the low. The improper are not embarrassed; rather, they are either humiliated or satirized (or both). They become the objects of laughter which, though it may be low, is also natural. The rude, often bodily, humiliations of the posturing Madame Duval and the pretentious Lovel form a comedic counterpoint to Evelina’s more delicate feelings. The Branghtons, Evelina’s perpetually squabbling, merchant-class near-relations in their steep and cramped home, are viciously satirized. Signally, though, the perspective from which this satire is offered is that of Evelina’s embarrassment: Evelina persistently exposes Madame Duval’s and the Branghtons’ ignorance and social misdemeanours as offenses to
her self-contained propriety. Evelina chafes with the shame of familial association, and her subjective observations render them ridiculous while asserting her difference from them, and implying her “belonging” to a better class. Evelina’s laughter suggests her natural preference for belonging over sympathy. Evelina can only be “tolerant” when her position is secured. In this late eighteenth-century text we see happily codified the relationship between shame and sympathy which in earlier texts were sources of tragedy. Not only does shame facilitate sympathy for the ashamed, feeling shame marks one as belonging to a community of other similarly self-divided and self-conscious, sympathetic individuals.

**Embarrassment and How One Ought to Act**

Critics have addressed the importance of embarrassment to Burney’s novels. Ruth Bernard Yeazell locates *Evelina* in a history of feminine modesty, a virtue often connected with shame or embarrassment, and she makes the point that "the fantasy that shapes *Evelina* is not merely that the young woman will be loved despite her perpetual embarrassments but that she will be loved because of them" (135). Margaret Ann Doody also notes that Burney is "one of the first writers to use 'embarrassed,' ‘embarrassing’ and 'embarrassment' in their modern, more psychological sense" (*Frances Burney* 60) arguing that "the narrative form of Evelina, with its combination of public scene and personal record, is especially well-suited to studies of embarrassment" (59). Emphasizing the more difficult implications of feminine embarrassment, as it is embedded in patriarchic modes of power, Barbara Zonitch claims “In all of her novels, Burney explores the links between physical abuse and embarrassment” (47). My reading of Evelina’s embarrassment builds
on these studies, but by focusing particularly on embarrassment as Burney’s innovation in feeling I hope to show the manner in which shame continues to shape the self-knowing narrator.

The modern OED suggests embarrassment’s status as feeling, while retaining its eighteenth-century connection to understanding: “Perplexity, sense of difficulty or hesitation with regard to judgment or action; constrained feeling or manner arising from bashfulness or timidity” (OED online). 72 The first recorded use of this new, affective meaning is from Edmund Burke in a 1774 speech: “If my real, unaffected embarrassment prevents me from expressing my gratitude to you as I ought” (OED online). Two elements of Burke’s use of the word illuminate its sense in Evelina. First, he calls his embarrassment “real, unaffected.” He emphasizes the feeling’s authenticity, as if there could be an “affected” embarrassment or as if his feeling is at risk of being interpreted as false. Evelina’s embarrassment, by contrast, is always genuine; indeed, as I will discuss in a later section of this chapter, it is the pre-eminent marker of Evelina’s “true” civility in contrast to the affectedly civil. Second, Burke’s embarrassment prevents what he “ought” to express. Embarrassment is, in this way, a feeling closely aligned with idealism; it gets in the way of achieving the ideal, and is itself the feeling of such failure.

Toward the end of the novel, Evelina expresses her embarrassment in similar terms: “Unused to the situations in which I find myself, and embarrassed by the slightest

72 Its closer connection to shame is expressed more clearly in the verb form. To embarrass: “To make (a person) feel awkward or ashamed, esp. by one's speech or actions; to cause (someone) embarrassment”(Oxford English Dictionary). Johnson’s 1755 dictionary defines it as “To distress; to entangle” and provides this illustrative quotation from The Spectator, “I saw my friend a little embarrassed, and turned away.”
difficulties, I seldom, till too late, discover how I ought to act” (334). In this somewhat belated articulation of self-understanding Evelina names embarrassment as the feeling of not knowing, or of knowing too late. The first volume establishes Evelina as the “embarrassed,” because constantly unknowing, narrator of her own progress. In Johnson’s illustrative quotation from Isaac Watts—"Let your method be plain, that your hearers may run through it without embarrassment, and take a clear view of the whole”--what is not understood is a lesson, or a sermon. What Evelina does not understand is “how to be” properly in the world. It is an ontological crisis which is at the same time a gap in knowing; that is, as she puts it, she knows “only too late.” New situations may cause the difficulties that embarrass and perplex, but only once she sees them from a position of improved knowledge can she identify her distance from the ideal, or from the “ought.”

In first-person narratives subtended by Protestant morality, such as Roxana and Clarissa, shame is the affective requirement that precedes sincere reform. (This formal requirement is what makes its apparent absence in Defoe’s Roxana so palpable, and its inclusion in later versions so reassuring. It is also the generic presumption underlying desires for Lovelace’s reform expressed by Richardson’s readers.) Evelina’s “reform” is a different operation. The ought, here, is neither religious nor strictly moral. It is, rather, entirely social. Her actions, gestures, behaviour are either appropriate or inappropriate as determined by “the world.” Shame is in the eyes, as it has been since Aristotle. But in

---

73 That said, it is perhaps a moral reform in the sense outlined by Karen Valihora in Austen’s Oughts, recognizing the eighteenth-century connection between morality and aesthetics.
*Evelina*, that relationship between spectator and spectacle is given particular force as Burney emphasizes Evelina’s entrance into a world of watchers. The connection between being seen and feeling shame is rendered in Evelina’s first blush. When Lord Orville asks her to dance, she "colour[s],” she explains to Villars, because she was “frightened at the thoughts of dancing before so many people, all strangers, and, which was worse, with a stranger” (32). Evelina panics and blushes at the thought of being seen. But, of course, a young lady’s entrance into the world entails exactly this: she will inevitably be seen in public by strangers because that is what coming out means. Susan Kubica Howard’s analysis is illuminating here. Howard characterizes Evelina’s trajectory as a progress from "naive spectator" to a more educated one, via first public then personal spectacles. She suggests that while the point of view is Evelina's, Burney trains the reader to "see how Evelina is viewed as she makes that entrance" (203). I would suggest that embarrassment aids this education in spectacle in that it is the feeling most associated with this doubled perspective. It is against this backdrop of “being seen” that Evelina experiences the escalation of mistakes which she describes to Mrs. Mirvan as “disasters” (37).

Evelina’s first two outings with the Mirvans initiate the marriage plot and establish Evelina as the unknowing and unknown outsider. Unlike Clarissa, who knows precisely the moral and social codes of her community, Evelina does not conform to social expectations because she does not yet know them. And, unlike Clarissa, who is the community’s exemplar, Evelina is a stranger. Through this lens of the outsider, we meet the hopelessly foppish Lovel, the good and polite suitor Lord Orville, and his competitor in love, the forward, questionably motivated Sir Clement Willoughby. Evelina is the
naïve narrator and, as Howard suggests, the naïve spectator. She doesn’t know the rules of the ball, and her suitors don’t know who she is. From this embarrassed perspective Evelina is witness to the manners of society and to her own acts within it. In the first brightly choreographed social scene, Burney locates Evelina’s embarrassment in her body as physical confusion and shame. As other dancers move in time to music, tracing known and predictable patterns, Evelina freezes, flees, hides, and sinks, physically manifesting her embarrassment as shame. When Orville tries to start a conversation with her Evelina is literally petrified by affect. She was, she says, "seized with such a panic, that I could hardly speak a word, and nothing but the shame of so soon changing my mind prevented my returning to my seat, and declining to dance at all" (32). Panicked, she is rendered speechless. In the effort to appear constant, she overdoes it. Trying to avoid the “shame” of not being what she ought, she is physically immobilized.

What begins as fear of being seen becomes a fear of being seen to fear doing wrong. As she remarks, “how will he be provoked… when he finds what a simple rustic he has honoured with his choice! One whose ignorance of the world makes her perpetually fear doing something wrong” (33). Moments later, upon learning that the dance is a difficult one, she breaks her immobility to flee the dance floor with Maria without telling Orville that she is doing so. She hides. Trying to avoid the shame of not knowing the dance, and feeling the shame of being both ignorant and afraid, she creates a new shame; by fleeing the dance floor, she has revealed herself to be exactly what she “ought not” be—inconstant, changeable, embarrassed and afraid. Recognizing that Orville has seen her, she feels "ready to sink with shame and distress" (34). This stock phrase, used at least
since Haywood’s fictions to describe heroines’ reactions to men, emphasizes an important aspect of shame.\textsuperscript{74} The narrator describes her desire to vanish from sight, since shame is in the eyes, after all. Evelina would rather sink than be exposed as embarrassed. But instead of sinking, or being immobilized, Evelina rises abruptly from her chair and again flees his gaze. Her feelings of shame manifest in confused behaviours and movement over which she apparently has no control.

The scene foregrounds movement and immobility; position and gesture; speaking and failing to speak. In so doing, it casts embarrassment as a kind of controlling passion. That is, it is still in some sense a “passion” as Mandeville identified it in the early part of the century. As Evelina writes to Villars, “You may easily imagine how much I was embarrassed. I made no answer, but hung my head, like a fool, and looked on my fan” (34). It is unclear and irrelevant whether the embarrassment she names is perplexity or shame. Her perplexity, manifested in her stuttering movement, exposes her. She hangs her head “like a fool,” she writes, but of course hanging the head is not generally a gesture of confusion but of shame. Evelina experiences (and acts) perplexity as shame, and shame is manifest as confusion. Before our eyes, as it were, Burney remakes embarrassment as shame and, in so doing, she recasts shame as an entirely social feeling, apparently separate from absolute or universal morality, which ties knowing to belonging. Evelina is not ashamed, after all, of having done any moral wrong but of being exposed as one who does not belong because she does not know how to behave. That said, morality and

---

\textsuperscript{74} When Cleomira meets Lysander in the garden she reflects that “the Condescentions [sic] of my Letters;----and that which I now gave of meeting him, came all at once into my Head, and I was ready to sink with Shame” (\textit{The British Recluse} 33).
manners are not easily separable. Patricia Spacks’ comment on Austen applies equally to
Burney: "Like the most serious eighteenth-century conduct-book writers, [Austen] assumes an identity between politeness and morality connected with the imperative of self-knowing" (529). Evelina’s embarrassment is not due to lack of self-knowledge but to gaps in social knowledge; she does not always know how to be polite. Though regularly impolite, there is no question of her virtue because she experiences her social errors as shameful, as mistakes in morality which are also problems of self-representation. She fears Orville will think her "superior" which shows both a (immoral) self-interest and lack of propriety. But her writing to Villars shows that there is no problem in her "self-knowledge"; though regularly unable to maintain perfect propriety, she both knows and feels where she has transgressed.

Unlike the perplexity exemplified by the Watts quotation in Johnson’s dictionary, Evelina’s confusion is affective. She feels perplexed about how to act in a world of watching strangers. She experiences embarrassment as a shame because her failure to do as she ought suggests a gap between what she does and who she believes she is in some essential or absolute sense. While Evelina draws attention throughout this scene to who she “is” in terms of her status, the shame that she expresses points to a split between the first, socially visible “being”—the ignorant “rustic”—and the being that she feels she could or should express, the person she really is. Evelina insists on her potential, yet publicly invisible self as the true one, separate from her status and also separate from her misbehaviour. Somewhat paradoxically, this secret self, expressed in her shame, belongs
seamlessly to the community, the “world” that she enters. Like Clarissa, Evelina’s “core” or “true” self is apparent in her shame. In this way, the extended emphasis on her shame, specifically her feeling of embarrassment, signals her value for the world of strangers in which she is still a stranger, unknowing and unknown.

Yeazell observes another gap in Evelina’s logic, arguing that what keeps Evelina safe while she is in that dangerous transitory stage between father’s house and husband’s, while she is "out" in the world, is precisely that she does not know her self; "she has internalized the prohibition against knowing her own desire--or at least against knowing it until her future husband 'speaks,' and thus speaks it for her"(126–7). Modesty, as Yeazell observes, is not-knowing. Epstein’s characterization of Evelina as “a storyteller with an ulterior motive” (99) is nonetheless worth keeping in mind. Epstein observes that as most of Evelina's letters are written to Mr. Villars who "represents the source of all permission"(99), Evelina "has no choice but to edit them carefully” (98). Yet, as her letters to Villars are also the only access readers have to Evelina, it is still fair to say that Burney casts her heroine as both not-knowing her own self, and not-knowing what she ought to be. In this way, Burney constructs a self invisible to the public, and indeed invisible to the narrating subject.

75 Patricia Spacks explains it this way: "Propriety conceals, but social convention maintains that it can also indirectly reveal the emotional integrity and sensitivity constituting the foundation of female virtue. By refusing to display her heart, a woman testifies her sense of its worth" (525). A Burney heroine "employs... all the forms of polite society... not as dissimulation, not as mere conformity, but as an expression of her native goodness. Virtue resides not in seclusion but in conventional good behaviour" (525).
Burney emphasizes this split between the invisible self and the publicly visible one by including talk about Evelina in Evelina’s own account of herself. At the first ball, Maria overhears Orville, Lovel and Willoughby speculating about Evelina’s “pretty modest” appearance and her apparently bad behaviour. Lovel attributes her behaviour to “ill-breeding” and Orville describes her as a “poor weak girl” but does not know whether she is “ignorant or mischievous” (39). Indignant and affronted, Lovel is happy to read her behaviour through the lens of status: “For a person who is nobody, to give herself such airs,” he vents. “For, my Lords, though I have made diligent enquiry—I cannot learn who she is” (39). Whereas for Lovel Evelina’s misbehaviour reveals who she really is—so ill-bred that she acts as though she is well-bred—to Orville and Willoughby, her behaviour reveals nothing about her; it only provokes curiosity. As Willoughby exclaims, “ill-bred?—I can never believe it. And she looks too sensible to be ignorant” (39). Evelina knows, as her readers do too, that she is neither ignorant nor ill-bred. Nor is she giving herself airs. In fact, the text insists that Evelina is exactly what she appears to be: pretty and modest. Her secret self, in other words, is nearly equivalent to what Orville and Willoughby see. It is nearly exactly what the world requires her to be, if she is to belong. That “nearly” is important. “She is the most beautiful creature I’ve ever seen in my life!” the hyperbolic Willoughby exclaims. And yet, she has acted in a manner inconsistent with her beauty; she has laughed inappropriately. When Lovel obsequiously interrupts her conversation with Orville, Evelina cracks up. Burney renders the laughter as an automatic response: “I could not help it” Evelina insists (36). Her laughter is as involuntary, it seems, as her blush.
In her preface, Burney describes her own character as a heroine “young, artless, and inexperienced… the offspring of Nature” (8). Evelina’s social mistakes signal her inexperience, and the involuntariness of her laughter and blushing might be read to signal that she is “the offspring of Nature.” Doody, for example, sees Evelina’s laughter as an example of her “too natural” response to society which, in the course of the novel, she learns if not to govern then at least to hide. “She must learn the artifice,” explains Doody, “which means she has to accept the masks that are imposed on women” (xxxii). Similarly, Judith Newton argues that Evelina acts as she does at the first ball "because she feels like it, because her natural self-consequence prompts her to act in direct contradiction to the rules of behavior which give men the authority to choose" (44). By contrast, Patricia Hamilton suggests, “Although Evelina's laughter may seem a natural response to his foppish appearance and affected behaviour, according to the rules of common civility, laughter is dangerous for either sex to indulge in publicly at someone else's expense” (428). Julia Epstein observes that Burney's refusal to dance with Lovel is "more than merely a comment on the social ineptitude of a country girl in the city.... Burney, too, is outraged that a woman should not be at liberty to turn down a man" (107). Furthermore, the apparent involuntariness of her laughter encodes it as “natural,” but of course the cause of this uncivil eruption, this disruption of politeness so valuable to society, is a generic laughingstock. Lovel is not only an exaggeration of society’s artifice, he is also, as fop, a stock object of ridicule in theatre since at least the Restoration.76 So, Evelina laughs as audiences have laughed for a century, instantiating herself as natural by

76 Laura Brown calls Lovel "a character directly derived from the fop of the Restoration comedy of manners" (381).
comparison to the laughably artificial. At the same time, though, she widens the scope of her ridicule to include the society that does not laugh at Lovel. She laughs, as she explains, not only at the foppish Lovel, but also at Orville’s “extreme surprise” (36). She laughs, that is to say, at the theatre she sees: a “genuinely” polite noble lord confronted by a caricature of himself.

Patricia Hamilton cites Hester Chapone’s *Letters on the Improvement of the Mind* (1773) to explain the social significance of Evelina’s laugh. In Chapone’s view, "It is so shocking an outrage against society to talk of, or laugh at any person in his own presence, that one would think it could only be committed by the vulgar" (in Hamilton 428). Judging by her laughter, “one would think” Evelina vulgar. However, Burney introduces the laughter from the position of Evelina’s embarrassment. “I interrupted him—I blush for my folly—with laughing,” she writes to Villars (36), before adding, “I could not help it.” In this way, shame pre-empts her laugh. It demonstrates her value for the society of strangers in which she is still a “stranger.” In other words, she might not yet govern her natural responses, but her embarrassment suggests that she knows she ought to—if she wants to belong, that is. Newton argues that Evelina "secures toleration" for her rebellious acts by feeling mortification every time she resists "restriction" (45). However, I would suggest that it accomplishes both less and more. Her embarrassment gives Evelina permission to laugh—a resistant affective response which, while involuntary and outrageous, is also generically legible. Her resistance to restriction is still narrowly circumscribed. It is hard to imagine, for example, that mortification would be enough to secure toleration for an outburst of anger. It also accomplishes more than toleration; I
suggest that her embarrassment secures Evelina interest and, eventually, love. That is, as shame facilitated pity, or even compassionate identification in earlier novels, embarrassment here not only excuses Evelina’s lapses in polite behavior, it makes her desirable. Shame’s affective work is expanded in this late-century novel as it ensures Evelina’s successful, and economically advantageous, entry into the community and simultaneously marks her “true” value.

*The paradoxical blush and the picture of modesty*

Claudia Johnson argues that the blushes of Burney’s heroines, Evelina's particularly, show that the heroines' “affective lives are perfectly calibrated to the social practices of their culture” (140). While I agree that Evelina’s blushes are socially “calibrated” for inclusion, the spectacle of her flushing complexion, and conversations between characters about her colour, participate in a long-running debate on the nature of women, and of feeling. As I suggested in my reading of *Clarissa*, the blush was a problematic sign in the eighteenth century, a reminder of sentiment’s unreliability and of woman’s potential for duplicity. Mandeville again provides the touchstone for this

77 Yeazell makes a similar point that "the fantasy that shapes *Evelina* is not merely that the young woman will be loved despite her perpetual embarrassments but that she will be loved because of them--that the more she blushes before the Other, the more she intensifies her beauty in his eyes. The very moments at which Evelina has felt herself to be most vulnerable prove to be the ones at which she has been covertly assuring her future safety" (135).

78 This is in marked contrast to theorist Elspeth Probyn’s recent reading of the blush. Probyn seems to take the blush at face value, as she claims that shame “reveals with precision our values, hopes, and aspirations, beyond the generalities of good manners and norms” (x).
debate. At the beginning of the century, he asked whether the “modest” woman’s blush could be trusted as a natural, bodily reaction to shame. Is it a natural shame at overhearing vulgar talk, or is it a reaction to being seen, and judged, as understanding that vulgar talk? His own answer to that question is that “Modesty of Women is the Result of Custom and Education.” Mandeville expands by way of the example of the “Vertuous young woman” who hears obscenity in two different situations, the first public and the second private. I referred to this passage in my introduction in reference to Watt’s argument about the novel and privacy. Here, I will quote it in full.

Then I say, that when obscene words are spoken in the presence of an unexperienc’d Virgin, she is afraid that some Body will reckon her to understand what they mean, and consequently that she understands this, and that, and several things which she desires to be thought ignorant of. The reflecting on this, and that Thoughts are forming to her Disadvantage, brings upon her that Passion which we call Shame….

To try the truth of this, let them talk as much Bawdy as they please in the Room next to the same Vertuous young Woman, where she is sure she is undiscover’d, and she will hear, if not hearken to it, without blushing at all, because then she looks upon her self as no Party concern’d. (The Fable of the Bees: Or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits 99)

The difference Mandeville makes is between witnessed and unwitnessed responses, expressing an anxiety around the “nature” of women that permeates eighteenth-century discourses on modesty and the blush. Lovelace similarly wonders whether “the

---

79 Yeazell observes that while modesty is vaunted as a natural feminine virtue, authors perpetually entreat readers to cultivate it, and she finds behind this opposition the older belief that women are naturally lustful. “[P]articularly when a woman's modesty is understood as a sexual virtue, the lingering fear that she has merely veiled over the original immodesty of her sex continues to trouble those who sing her praises--and to
modestest women … ever blush at those things by themselves, at which they have so charming a knack of blushing in company?” (Clarissa 691–92; L216). Burney makes the query itself questionable by putting it in the mouth of Lovel, the anti-Lovelace, too pretentious to be taken seriously, too ridiculous to be rakish.

At the theatre, after the performance of Love for Love, Lovel makes Evelina blush only to question her colour’s relation to natural modesty; he has “known so many different causes for a lady's colour, such as flushing--anger--mauvaise honte--and so forth that [he] never dare decide to which it may be owing” (88). This begins a debate about the nature of a woman’s blush which sees Orville and Mrs. Mirvan squaring off against Lovel, Sir Clement, and Captain Mirvan. Sir Clement argues that the “natural complexion has nothing to do with occasional sallies of the passions” (88), and the Captain notices that, in a passion, he will “have as fine a high colour as any painted Jezebel in this place” (88). For Lovel, Evelina’s physical show of shame is nothing more than an entertaining diversion; it happens as automatically as the sound that emerges from the mechanical pineapple and is equally meaningless. It is also always potentially false, as the Captain’s reference to “painted Jezebel[s]” infers. For Mrs. Mirvan and Lord Orville, by contrast, Evelina’s blush is a true indicator of her genuine modesty, and both try to save her from the ridicule to which her automatic blushing subjects her. Mrs. Mirvan interrupts Lovel’s logic by insisting that it does not apply to Evelina: "Miss Anville's colour, as you have trouble them most insistently... just when they most insist that she is modest by 'nature.'" (11).
successfully tried, may, you see, be heightened.” Orville argues that the difference between natural and artificial colour is “easily discerned” (88). None of the speakers’ arguments are, in themselves, novel, but their debate articulates a concern central to the text and to Evelina’s narrative position. That is, while the blush can be the outward expression of feminine modesty, it is not a reliable one. By extension, shame can either produce a socially legible self, or a “truly” modest woman but there is no certainty regarding their differentiation. Lovelace would still be concerned about the difference between real and performed modesty.

The discussion at Love for Love is the first time that Burney engages the problem of feminine modesty as spectacle. She addresses it again toward the end of the novel, this time even more pointedly casting modesty as maligned value and punishment. In Macartney’s poem, Evelina’s blush signifies her perfection as moral-aesthetic object: the beautiful and virtuous modest woman

See last advance, with bashful grace,
Downcast eye, and blushing cheek,
Timid air, and beauteous face,
Anville (370)

In this adoring verse Evelina’s propensity to blush is an indicator of her moral purity and her beauty. But in the mouths of the three strangers who arrest Evelina and her friends on the path to the baths, it becomes something else: "Yes ... tis certainly she! – mark but her blushing cheek!” Another joins in: “And then her eye – her downcast eye!” (362). The youths turn Macartney’s encomium into a taunt and as Susan Greenfield observes, their taunts lead directly to Evelina’s fall. That is, she trips. Greenfield writes, "Even when
Evelina seems most fair and angelic—most like prelapsarian Eve—she is, like Eve, only a short step from descent” (Monkeying 426).\textsuperscript{80} Howard observes, “It is interesting that Macartney’s verses, written out of gratitude, make a spectacle of Evelina, since the last person he would want to give pain to would be Evelina” (213). And yet, the pain associated with Evelina’s modesty suggests Burney’s critique of what Yeazell terms the “fiction of modesty.” The physical indicators of feminine modesty are integral to Evelina’s beauty and they set her apart from other women, but they also make her a target. Her modesty is not only an aspect of her perfection; it is also a vulnerability which these young men are happy to exploit for their own entertainment. These young men do not respect the feminine virtue. They mock it. However, in doing so they only voice more crudely what Orville has already suggested: feminine modesty is seductive. It is in some sense femininity’s highly valued commodity.

When Evelina tells Lord Orville that she will soon be leaving London, he responds with a flattering comment at which she is so embarrassed that she stops speaking and this "foolish embarrassment... was the cause of what followed" (79). What follows is an increased intimacy as Orville takes her hand saying "I do think that whoever has once seen Miss Anville, must receive an impression never to be forgotten" (79-80).

Embarrassment is the result of his attention, but it only causes him to increase the attention. To the sensitive Orville, Evelina’s embarrassed perplexity signals a seductive modesty; her embarrassment is erotic. While Evelina describes her first encounters with

\textsuperscript{80} Greenfield also usefully observes the echo here of Madame Duval’s earlier fall. In both cases, it is raining and gowns are dirtied and wet (426).
Orville as “mortifying” and “embarrassing,” knowing readers recognize these feelings as indicators of her desire, or perhaps more accurately, her desire to be loved by him.

This connection between shame and desire is different than the one that structures early-century novels, but it nevertheless relies on the generic conventions that earlier novels established. Haywood’s heroines are ashamed of exposing their passions rather than their ignorance but they, too, blush. And their suitors know what that blush means. To take just one example, in Haywood’s *The British Recluse*, Lysander tells Cleomira: "Blush not, fair Excellence.” But Cleomira’s eyes reveal the truth: "without doubt … he saw enough in my Eyes to make him know the Pleasure I took in hearing him speak, far exceeded my confusion at what he said" (*The British Recluse* 8). It is up to readers to make sense of her embarrassment by reading love into it. Evelina is not ashamed of feeling or exposing her love because she does not expose it as love. Rather, she is embarrassed of her stumbling, her blushing, her inarticulacy, her missteps before Lord Orville. The result, though, is the same as that designed by the writers of amatory fiction: the suitors read the stuttering and blushing as invitations to love.

To read Evelina’s embarrassment as erotically charged requires the code of feeling established in those earlier amatory fictions; we know better than Evelina because generic conventions encode shame and confusion as desire. Unlike Cleomira, we do not know just what Evelina’s eyes betray, but thanks to her literary precursors, we “see” what Evelina never says, that where Orville is concerned, she blushes and blunders because (secretly) she loves. While Evelina, as narrator, represents her blush as the outward symptom of her ignorance and confusion, embarrassment or shame, the story tells another
story. That is, it enables the dramatic irony necessary to the marriage plot; she can talk about being silenced by confusion, and she can manifest her shamed embarrassment bodily, but thanks to the established code of amatory fiction, we know that what she feels is desire.

To return to the conversation at *Love for Love*, it seems that while Orville and Mrs. Mirvan insist that Evelina’s blush be read as a true outward sign of her inner beauty, the romance plot requires that it be interpreted as the apparent *opposite* to the modesty it is supposed to signify. However, this is not the only narrative work that shame and its blushes perform. More than encoding desire, Evelina’s shame also mitigates against another *in*modesty, that is, the self-interest, or too-ready authority that the self-narrating heroine of her own romance must (immodestly) assume. Narrating from the position of embarrassment permits Evelina to recount stories that are only, ultimately, about how much she is admired, and how much she merits that admiration. It allows her to talk about herself unabashedly, volubly, and in highly flattering terms, and to be read by others.

She writes of her own beauty and virtue by couching others’ adulation in her self-conscious discomfort. She does not say, “I am beautiful.” Rather, she says (though I paraphrase here), “That terribly impolite man called me beautiful. I was so embarrassed!” In other words, her “modesty” permits Evelina to be as utterly immodest a narrator as she pleases and, in fact, as the genre requires her to be. Shame gives her permission to quote the men who debate, extol, or question her modesty and authorizes her to be interested in herself, without expressing ambition or desire or pride. In this way, embarrassment, a new iteration of shame, civilizes the incivility of the female self-narrating subject. More than
securing toleration for bad behaviour, as Newton suggests her mortification does, Evelina’s embarrassment apologizes for, and permits, her shameless preoccupation with herself.\textsuperscript{81} In a way, it allows her to be precisely the person she feared Orville would believe her to be, a woman that is, “so much above [her]self” (34).

In other words, just as nesting a story of vice in the discourse of repentance permitted misbehaving heroines like Roxana to reveal the most shameful acts, embedding her modesty in embarrassed discomfort permits Evelina to reveal how good and deserving she is. The reversal implied in this comparison is instructive. The previously sinful female narrator is now fully reformed, and shame fully social. Evelina’s embarrassment is a feeling of heightened self-consciousness and self-interest, but it is a self-interest entirely invested in belonging, not to the society which she enters—a society that she reveals as both artificial and flawed—but to her “right” family—her father and Macartney—and an ideal community bonded by moral feelings of sympathy and love. Burney relies on readers’ informed literacy to "read into" Evelina’s shame and embarrassment, to feel, in other words, the heroine's precarious and vital attachment to the people whose approval and love she needs. Evelina may feel the shame of feeling abandoned by Orville or her proper family, and this shows her separation from that world. At the same time, she refuses to relinquish her desire to be loved and to belong. While the real risk of a woman’s unbelonging might be to her financial security, Evelina’s embarrassment insists that her interest is emotional. Or, rather, the novel suggests that both of these risks are

\footnotesize{Critics have addressed the parallels between Evelina’s “coming out” and Burney’s authorial position. Greenfield, for example, observes "Thus, novel, author, and heroine are in analogous positions as all are in the process of crossing the boundaries of private feminine space" (318)\textsuperscript{3}
equally real and codependent. Being unloved by her father and by Orville would leave Evelina substantially poorer, less secure, and still ashamed.

**Familiar yet Vulgar**

After Willoughby sees her with the Branghtons at Vauxhall, Evelina concludes her letter, "As to myself, I must acknowledge, nothing could be more disagreeable to me, than being seen by Sir Clement Willoughby with a party at once so vulgar in themselves, and so familiar to me" (231). In *Evelina*, embarrassment marks the difference between Evelina and her “vulgar” family, between civil and uncivil, polite and low. Evelina’s embarrassment to be seen with these “vulgar” familiars demonstrates that she is not like the Branghtons and Madame Duval. She chafes against the shame of familial association, and her subjective observations render them ridiculous, contemptible, deserving of our laughter. There is a regulatory effect here; who laughs at whom and when marks the boundaries of polite society. I agree with Howard, who remarks in a note on the footrace, "[P]erhaps embarrassment becomes a signifier of upper class standing, and the occasions upon which Evelina is made a spectacle give her the opportunity to show her embarrassment, thus proving her greater sensibility and innate nobility" (222). Even though to laugh at another is a sign of vulgarity, we laugh sympathetically with Evelina at her impolite and tasteless family who are never, themselves, embarrassed. The difference between the embarrassed and the unembarrassed is necessary to this novel of manners: one creates a sympathetic first-person narrator, modest and desirable who “belongs” to a community, the other a cartoonish object of ridicule, exposed, excluded, humiliated.
Yet, as Evelina herself notes, while her grandmother and cousins may be “so vulgar in themselves” they are also “so familiar.” The embarrassed and the humiliated are not strangers. They are hardly separable at all. Zonitch observes “manners are affiliated with forms of power; they are part of an elaborate code that upholds prevailing ideologies” (31) and she argues that “[I]n Burney's hands, the ‘novel of manners’ is in many ways a cultural articulation of this new bourgeois patriarchy” (31). While Zonitch suggests that Burney’s concern is with how women internalized the violence of a code of manners (15), I would emphasize that *Evelina* is an experiment in narrating the feelings (shame, but also laughter and love) associated with this shift toward reading behaviour as sign of value. Tracking who laughs at whom in Evelina reveals not only the regulation of behaviour as the necessary work of a society (newly) structured by manners more than hereditary privilege, but it also demonstrates the pressure that the urge to belong places on moral feelings. Evelina’s embarrassment is not only a matter of “not knowing” as I have suggested in the first part of this chapter, but also of “being unknown.” Shame is not only Evelina’s reaction to her own behaviour, but also to the conjoined problem of, on the one hand, her “lack” of family and, on the other, her too-present family. In this way it makes not only visible but visceral the precarity of her “natural” place in this world. If Evelina is “natural” in her lack of artifice and her modesty, as Burney is at pains to show in the first volume, she is also “naturally,” that is, genealogically, low as her invasive family reminds her so forcibly. (Of course, Evelina knows, as do her readers, that she is only half low. She is also the “natural” daughter of Sir John Belmont and in this way deserving of hereditary privilege, and inheritor of hereditary honour.) Though Evelina’s
embarrassment and laughter articulate her difference from her vulgar family, she
nevertheless belongs to them in a way that she does not, until the end of the third volume,
belong to any other natural family.

The importance of Evelina’s grandmother, Madame Duval, to Evelina’s “original”
embarrassment is established in the correspondence that opens the novel. In these letters
between Lady Howard and Evelina’s guardian, Mr. Villars, Evelina’s shameful genealogy
is revealed. At the same time, all shame is traced to Madame Duval, a woman of
decidedly low origins, once “a waiting-girl at a tavern” (14). After marrying below his
class, Evelina’s grandfather, Mr. Evelyn, left England for France, “followed by shame
and repentance; feelings which his heart was not framed to support,” and died two years
later, apparently of these insupportable feelings. Their daughter, too, dies in shame, and
again Madame Duval is the original cause. It is as a result of Madame Duval’s clumsy
attempts to manipulate her daughter into marriage and her subsequent “wrath and
violence” (15) that Miss Evelyn agreed to a private marriage to the known libertine, Sir
John Belmont. And it is then because of the “inexorable rancour of the Duvals” that Sir
John “infamously burnt the certificate of their marriage, and denied that they had ever
been united” (15). In other words, according to Mr Villars, Madame Duval’s inability to
govern her own rage is the reason that Evelina is not recognized by her father and, as a
result, the reason she enters the world as a young woman of “obscure birth” (8).

Madame Duval is embarrassing for a number of reasons: she speaks
ungrammatically; she insists she is polite but is viewed as “uneducated and unprincipled”
(13); she is old but dances and desires as if she were young.\(^{82}\) She is also too passionate (and too French). In one of the first scenes of Madame Duval’s passionate outbursts, when she demands that Evelina accompany her to the opera, we see not only her passion, but the reactions of those around her. Madame Duval’s face was “the colour of scarlet, and her eyes sparkled with fury” (95), but while Evelina feels "terror" at Madame Duval's passion, she is the only one frightened. Captain Mirvan addresses Madame Duval as “Mrs. Turkey Cock” and “Madam Fury,” raging that he is the only one allowed to be "in a passion in my house" (95). Willoughby, having witnessed this scene, says to Evelina, "For Heaven's sake dear Madame, compose yourself; surely the violence of such a wretch ought merely to move your contempt; she can have no right, I imagine, to lay her commands upon you" (96). The real threat Madame Duval poses lies not in her anger, but in her familiarity, as Willoughby’s words—“she can have no right, I imagine”—suggest. Madame Duval’s passion is no danger to herself, and it is only dangerous to Evelina in that it could, potentially, reveal her true genealogical shame.

The comedy in this scene is generated by the cartoonish passions of the Captain and “Madam Fury” in contrast to Evelina’s “terror.” The overblown anger of these two characters is “funny” (to apply Tom Branghton’s low and slang adjective) (188) because such passion is in its very vehemence both too public and entirely inconsequential, both impolite and unthreatening. In a similar vein, Kubica Howard argues that Madame Duval and Branghtons are spectacles not only because they behave badly but because "they are

\(^{82}\) Kristina Straub argues that in her characterization of Madame Duval, Burney makes it clear that "a refusal to obey the rules of female aging wins women nothing but additional humiliation"(30–31).
bad audiences: unkind, unjust, and prone to self-display" (206). Philip Fisher’s history of "vehement passions" provides a relevant distinction. Fisher argues that unlike feelings, affections, or emotions, vehement passions are characterized by "thoroughness," the experience of being an undivided, self-identical being. A state of passion, as a state that annihilates past and future and other people, may be considered a moment we are "in touch with the essence of our own being, or, just the opposite, outside ourselves" (61). As Fisher notes, vehe-mente means out of the mind. In passion, "the attention is to a single, all-absorbing, monarchical object"(63). The passions are always immediately public because not thought. Fisher argues that in the eighteenth century, with the shift from singular king to a political culture of citizens, the passions are “brought under control” and as a result “we have instead a privatization of feeling made possible by an impassive exterior that only 'displays' emotion when we choose to do so" (58-59). The privacy thus created "presupposed a control over the distribution of knowledge about oneself and one's inner states" (59); we can be selective about those with whom we share our feelings. This selective confession and reticence, Fisher says, "defines the citizen within the public realm in modernity" (59). In this culture of modern, privatized emotion, the passions are outmoded and they demonstrate not only a lack of control over the self, but also a disregard for the private self and the self-knowledge assumed to go with it.

In Madame Duval, Burney engages an earlier model of feeling in which untrammeled passion leads to vice and ends in shame (as it did, for example, in *Roxana*). Significantly, though, the tragedy that results from Madame Duval’s passion takes place outside of this story; Evelina’s mother dies, but that unhappy ending is mere antecedent.
In her introduction to the Penguin edition, Doody reminds us that “Evelina is actually a sequel” (vii). At age fifteen, Burney wrote, and then burned, the story of Evelina’s mother, Caroline. Burney destroyed the tragedy, and then created a comedy of out of its ashes, so to speak. In the story of Evelina, Madame Duval’s unseemly passion causes only laughter and social humiliation. Fisher observes, "The passions are humorless" (44). There can be no irony within a passion because irony requires a perspective on the self. Duval’s passion is funny because it is humourless. Her excessive passion leads to comedy rather than tragedy because Evelina, our narrator, is a creature of modern feeling, fully capable of irony, of knowing herself and the social in which she is vested in her moment of feeling. In this sense, what we see in the generational contrast between Evelina and her grandmother indexes a shift in cultural modes of feeling and modesty.

In Fisher’s formulation, the person in the moment of passion is incapable of seeing the other, and so cannot, by implication, engage sympathetically with the other. Indeed, this is true of Madame Duval, to Evelina’s relief, when Madame Duval realizes the trick that Captain Mirvan has played on her.

Almost instantly, the whole truth of the transaction seemed to rush upon her mind, and her wrath was inconceivably violent. She asked me a thousand questions in a breath, but, fortunately, was too vehement to attend to my embarrassment, which must, otherwise, have betrayed my knowledge of the deceit. (187)

Her choice of which story to tell registers more than generic preference. It also indicates that the moral imperative which drove Richardson to write Clarissa’s unhappy ending is not operative for Burney. By creating a happy ending for Evelina, in which she is reunited with her now repentant father, Burney effectively reformed the libertine, but in such a way that his reform is de-eroticized.
Duval’s seeming incapacity for sympathy, her inability to imagine herself in the place of another, makes her an unsympathetic contrast to Evelina whose modern, reflective emotion makes her capable of both shame and sympathy.

Madame Duval’s humiliation, recounted first by Evelina to Villars, then by Madame Duval to Evelina (which Evelina “endeavour[s] to write in [Duval’s] own words” [167]), then again by Madame Duval to the Branghtons, showcases not only humiliation but also laughter and its effects. Evelina does not *quite* laugh at her grandmother. "Though this narrative [i.e. Duval’s account of being robbed] *almost* compelled me to laugh" (168 my emphasis), Evelina states, she was too “irritated” with Captain Mirvan to do so. By contrast, when the Branghtons hear the story, they laugh uproariously. Young Branghton “burst into a loud laugh” and this is joined by the “convulsive tittering of the sisters” until the “violence of their mirth” silences Madame Duval (188-9).

By smothering her laughter, Evelina situates herself on the side of the polite while permitting her, at the same time, to offer descriptions that render the impolite as ridiculous or worthy only of “contempt,” as Willoughby suggests. This same almost-laughter occurs in two other moments of class differentiation. Arriving at the opera with her cousins, she says, "If I had not been too much chagrined to laugh, I should have been extremely diverted at their ignorance of whatever belongs to an opera" (99). Later, she does not, quite, laugh at Mr. Smith. "I could almost have laughed when I looked at Mr. Smith," out-classed by Willoughby, and later, she does not quite, again, "I saw Sir
Clement bite his lip; and, indeed, so did I mine" (227). Laughter situates Evelina, the narrator, between politeness and impoliteness; she knows enough to notice and find amusing the embarrassingly improper or artificial behavior of others, but unlike the most impolite Branghtons, she also knows enough to stifle that laughter to align with social expectations. Burney’s comedy, and Evelina’s perspective, legitimates the laughter of a reader who, by learning what is funny and when to laugh, also calibrates to the fine lines of politeness. But laughter can also both affirm and disturb status, and in this way comedy can critique the status quo. For example, Duval later embarrasses Sir Clement when she accuses him of planning the trick on her. "It was curious to observe the effect which his embarrassment, added to the freedom with which Madame Duval addressed him, had upon the rest of the company" (235). No longer awed or envious or inhibited by his status, they all relax. Mr. Smith returns to his "usual expression of satisfied conceit" and Tom Braghto "was again himself, rude and familiar" (235). Proper place and rank is overturned by ridicule, by exposing Willoughby as powerless against Madame Duval's "gross" speech. "Sir Clement could no longer endure being the object who excited them; and, having no answer ready for Madame Duval, he hastily stalked towards Mr. Smith and young Braghto, and sternly demanded what they laughed at?" He leaves soon after.

---

84 Newton argues that one of Evelina's successes is her mastery of the rules and successful rebuffing of Smith and Braghto. "Evelina's victory...is the working out of anger and of a desire for revenge, but of revenge in a sphere where revenge was safe, where it could even be approved of by those with real authority--and Burney's upper class readers were especially fond of her satires on the vulgarity of the trading orders" (47). In other words, the satire of trading orders is somewhat of a displacement--it substitutes for her anger with the patriarchal order, more generally, and "the economic contradiction between genteel men and women" (47).
but not before asking Evelina "who are these people? and how came you so strangely situated?" (237).

Evelina only actually laughs once in this novel and that at Lovel, the laugh that marks her social mistake and at the same time causes Lovel humiliation and resentment. For the rest of the novel, the laughter is left to others, as Burney foregrounds laughter’s association with shame and humiliation. While Doody argues that in Burney’s comedy none of the unsympathetic or scheming characters are punished for their bad behaviour, I would suggest they are; they are punished by laughter. After Captain Mirvan’s elaborately plotted escapade lands Madame Duval in a ditch, tied by the feet, her wig soaked and bedraggled, she claims, in words that echo Hester Chapone’s, "I declare I'd rather be done anything to than laughed at, for, to my mind, it's one or other the disagreeablest thing in the world" (172). Duval’s statement reverberates in Evelina’s comment which began this section: "As to myself, I must acknowledge, nothing could be more disagreeable to me, than being seen by Sir Clement Willoughby with a party at once so vulgar in themselves, and so familiar to me.” Just as being laughed at is a “disagreeable” to Madame Duval, so is “being seen” with her vulgar family to Evelina. Evelina shares with the humiliated Madame Duval the fear of being laughed at. This is the danger that Evelina faces upon her entrance into the world. Not only is being laughed at a “disagreeable” feeling, it is itself performative; scornful laughter makes the laughed-at laughable. It humiliates and condemns to contempt. Madame Duval’s

---

85 There is good reason for Julie Park to read Duval as abject, observing that “violent and unseemly images of feminine misconduct pollute [Burney’s] novels' surfaces …, thus producing not the material excess of ornament, but its corporeal face of abjection.” (Park 30)
assessment of being laughed at recalls, also, Adam Smith’s observation that “Compared with the contempt of mankind, all other external evils are easily supported” (3.12.12). The community’s condemnation, realized in *The London Merchant* as legal justice, and in *The British Recluse* as ostracism (or self-imposed seclusion), is here at the end of the century, in an increasingly self-regulating culture, apparently contained in laughter—a potent tactic of social exclusion, forcefully affective.

We do *not* laugh at Evelina, because she is a sympathetic heroine. However, she is sympathetic, in part, because she enters the world already embarrassed. In this way, via the mechanism of shame, Burney fulfills the promise of a productive shame that was evident at mid-century in the revisions of *Roxana*, and in *Clarissa*. That is, in *Evelina*, Burney blurs the separation between the ashamed protagonist and the readers who witness her shame, crafting a relation of compassionate identification rather than judgment. Evelina pre-empts laughter with her shame and by laughing—at herself and at others. Readers’ compassion is thus cultivated by creating an embarrassed and ironic heroine. While moral feelings are exemplified in Villars, Evelina, and Orville, they are to some extent undone, or at least *loosened*, by laughter—Evelina’s and ours. We never laugh at Villars or Orville, or at their displays of feeling, but we encounter the limits of sympathetic benevolence in Evelina’s “almost laughter”—laughing though she ought not.

Zonitch makes the point that “the violation of emotional boundaries, in effect a lack of sympathetic restraint, is one instrument of violence in a middle-class culture” (15) and argues that the Branghtons and Madame Duval “expose Evelina to emotional and psychic violence, to social embarrassment” (47). The Branghtons’ uproarious laughter at Madame
Duval when she most requires sympathy is surely one instance of the shaming violence that Zonitch describes (though this is not the example she uses); however, the fact that the laughers in this case are themselves laughable means that we need to be wary of assuming that their violence is taken seriously. By making shame humourous, Burney emphasizes both the necessity of embarrassment to social belonging—i.e. the not-embarrassed become the humiliated—while also making the point that Shaftesbury made at the beginning of the century, that ridicule is the best antidote to enthusiasm, or taking unserious things too seriously. For Shaftesbury, the only way to differentiate between the truly serious and the mere imposture is to apply the test of ridicule. If the subject can be ridiculed, then it is not serious. If the ridicule itself is ridiculous, then the subject is serious. To buttress this argument, he recalls "some wise nations" who used ridicule as punishment in those cases that "deserv'd only to be laugh'd at" (10). Significantly, Burney’s imagined community of the potentially ridiculous (and potential ridiculers) is different than Shaftesbury’s because she writes for an audience that includes women and non-aristocratic readers, but the high value she places on ridicule is similar. For Shaftesbury, the talent for ridicule is a British characteristic and value. "'Tis only in a free nation, such as ours, that imposture has no privilege" (7). Ridicule is necessary to liberty and "gravity is of the very essence of imposture" (8). This trait sharply differentiates the British from the French. For Burney, I suggest, laughter and ridicule are also yoked to liberty and to skepticism of gravity. No one’s social sins in this novel merit the shame of actual social exclusion—no one is imprisoned, loses their fortune, their virtue, their
reputation—but too-vehement feeling, or inept expression of feeling, is punished by laughter.

**Shame’s Siblings**

In a plot twist that recalls the coincidences of the romance or early novels, Evelina discovers that she has one sibling and one alternate. Her half-brother is Macartney, whom she originally meets as a penniless, melancholic Scot tormented both by his own memories and the Branghtons. Her alternate is Polly Green, the wash-woman’s daughter, the substitute who has occupied her place in Sir John’s affections and legal family.

Evelina’s engagement with these two characters offers a lens on the novel’s renovation of shame in relation to that pre-eminent eighteenth-century moral feeling, sympathy. These two characters, in love with each other, lie just outside the frame of Evelina’s narrative and both nearly fall off the edge of respectable gentility, rescued at the last moment by marriage and sympathy. Their love forms a shadow double to Evelina and Orville’s. Macartney duels and nearly kills Polly’s assumed father, Sir John Belmont, and the two lovers are thus separated by masculine violence and assertions of honour before being reunited. Polly and Macartney’s romance, determined by an aristocratic model of honour and violence, provides the opportunity for Evelina and Orville to demonstrate their moral superiority, and Sir John Belmont his complete reformation. Macartney and Polly Green’s shames—and they are shames, not embarrassments—are halted by the adroit dispensation of sympathy. At the same time, not to sympathize with the sensitive Macartney is offered as one more evidence of the Branghtons’ embarrassing lack of sympathy, another proof that they are not like Evelina, and not, therefore, true family.
Macartney is first cast as both a “man of feeling” and a figure of mystery, and Evelina his saviour. When Evelina first sees Macartney he is “in profound and melancholy meditation” (196) and she is curious about him. The young Branghtons describe him dismissively as “a poor Scotch poet” (196), “as proud as he is poor” (197), and they scoff at the poem they have found, which they immediately present her with. The Branghtons have no sympathy for Macartney’s misery or poverty, suspecting him only of taking advantage of them. “[Y]ou won’t find he will live without meat and drink: no, no, catch a Scotchman at that if you can! Why they only come here for what they can get” claims Tom Branghton. But Evelina immediately imagines that he has “misfortunes of no common nature” and, soon enough, Evelina leaps uncharacteristically into action, seizing the pistols she believes he is about to use to kill himself. Macartney at first seems simply another foil, demonstrating Evelina’s superiority to her family. “How much does my disgust for these people increase my pity for poor Mr. Macartney! … I am determined to take every opportunity in my power, to shew civility to this unhappy man, whose misfortunes, with this family, only render him an object of scorn” (215).

Macartney’s history—related in a letter to Evelina—tells the story of a romance with a young Englishwoman who had “but just quitted a convent” and a duel with her father, who turns out also to be his father. Macartney’s story has the shape of an old romance, particularly in its resolution in a duel. Believing he has killed his own father, and nearly committed incest with his sister, he laments being pursued by “Mis’ry, Shame, Remorse” (198). Macartney’s shame seems, likewise, the shame of early-century, aristocratic romance, an almost entirely different animal than Evelina’s embarrassments.
By including Macartney’s romance in Evelina’s story, Burney demonstrates the persistence and the sentimental attachment to stories of nobility, and to the vehement passions that they narrated. At a time when dueling is seen as a corrupt aristocratic behaviour (Zonitch 28), the inclusion of Macartney’s (nearly) tragic story in Evelina’s own emphasizes both Evelina’s separation from that earlier model of feeling, and at the same time her sympathy for it.\footnote{Zonitch notes that a growing middle-class readership was “concerned with replacing corrupt aristocratic values with a new middle-class creed, which included self-regulation and less-violent approaches to socialization” (28). Dueling, particularly, came under attack “because it symbolically recalled an aristocratic version of society in which privilege and inherited status were the dominant principles” (28).}

The one character in the novel at risk of a truly consequential shame is Polly Green, Sir John Belmont’s “fictitious daughter” (418), and Macartney’s beloved. Polly very nearly suffers the shame that Villars fears would be Evelina’s. After Villars learns that Belmont has raised another daughter, he writes,

> if any other Lady Belmont should be named, the birth of my Evelina will receive a stigma, against which, honour, truth, and innocence may appeal in vain! – a stigma, which will eternally blast the fair fame of her virtuous mother, and cast upon her blameless self the odium of a title, which not all her purity can rescue from established shame and dishonour (142-143).

Evelina doesn’t suffer this “odium of a title.” The “shame and disgrace” that Villars fears, and that subtends her entire entrance into the world, hovering over the plot as a highly visible secret, does not happen. And, remarkably, it does not happen to Polly Green, either. Rather, shame is shut out entirely. As Mrs. Selwyn tells it, she and Belmont agreed “that the most eligible scheme for all parties would be to have both the real and
the fictitious daughter married without delay” (418). Neither daughter would have to experience the shame of being nameless.

In a novel so apparently concerned with shame, shame has no bad consequence. Rather, the ashamed merit sympathy. The innovation Burney offers in Evelina is an embarrassed, self-narrating subject who also laughs. This is a critical loosening up, if not an undoing, of productive Protestant/capitalist shame and of the female narrator. Not coincidentally, it is also a movement from tragedy to comedy. Burney’s innovation is significant both in terms of a history of emotion and a history of the novel, but just as interesting to me is what is not new to Evelina; that is, shame persists at the core—and on the skin—of the self-narrating subject who is, not by coincidence, female. While on the face of it shame and embarrassment seem genderless—Barnwell, Lovelace, and Orville each experience one of these feelings and Edmund Burke supplies the embarrassment quoted in Johnson’s Dictionary—the embarrassed autobiographical subject is notably feminine. Embarrassment as an authoritative position recalls the long history of female shame which stretches from curious Eve’s expulsion from the garden, through the erotics of exposure in Haywood’s fictions, to the multiply revised and chastened Roxana, and onward to Clarissa’s Christian embrace of glorious shame. As eighteenth-century writers grappled with the contradiction inherent in the social contract—though grounded in idea of individual, the social requires the repression of the individual—they housed such questions in the self-conscious constructions of female narrators. In the autobiographical works discussed here, the feminine houses both the ideal of the perfectly social and private human, and the feeling of its failure.
Cultural theorist Sara Ahmed might be speaking from the position of Burney’s embarrassed heroine when she articulates the relation of shame to an ideal. Ahmed writes,

In shame, I am the object as well as the subject of the feeling. Such an argument crucially suggests that shame requires an identification with the other who, as witness, returns the subject to itself. The view of this other is the view that I have taken on in relation to myself. I see myself as if I were this other. My failure before this other hence is profoundly a failure of myself to myself. In shame, I expose to myself that I am a failure through the gaze of an ideal other. (*The Cultural Politics of Emotion* 106 italics original)

Ahmed elaborates on the "ideal" as a form empty of content. It does not have specific characteristics. Rather, it is given to the subject and "sticks subjects together" through love; she calls this ideal a "proximate 'we'
" (*The Cultural Politics of Emotion* 106). "If we feel shame, we feel shame because we have failed to approximate 'an ideal' that has been given to us through the practice of love. What is exposed in shame is the failure of love, as a failure that in turn exposes or shows our love" (106). The ideal self in Ahmed's formulation is "produced as a self that belongs to a community" and so, to feel shame seems always to involve or maybe invoke the community. This is why shame is such a potent regulator, and I quote here, as I did in the introduction, Ahmed’s important insight that "in order to avoid shame, subjects must enter the 'contract' of the social bond, by seeking to approximate a social ideal" (107).

Evelina’s embarrassment, and the erotics of that embarrassment, make sense within Ahmed’s formulation of shame. Love is part of shame, for Ahmed. And while the love that Ahmed refers to is not necessarily an erotic love, the comedy exploits such a potential, making the shame a response to a single, loved object (who is ideal) rather than to the community—a flawed and abstract concept—that produces the idealism.
Ultimately, the ideal that Evelina seeks to approximate is not Clarissa, not Roxana, but a reworking of these different emphases and potentials of shame. The ideal is not the modest woman, but an ironic version of her: a modest woman who laughs, an embarrassed narrator who writes her own success. The potentially volatile and anti-social passion of shame has been reworked as embarrassment, a fully social feeling which joins knowledge of social norms to feelings of potential exclusion. The novelistic shame of early novels, necessary to the self-divided narrator, to compassionate identification, to the unified narrative, is here fully expressed as a self-divided subject who can comment on, and laugh at, her own shame. A fully social shame, it turns out, is almost anti-social in its self-interest.
Conclusion: The Shame of Trade

Eighteenth-century drama and novels made the private lives and shames of ordinary people both instructive and entertaining. They trained their audiences not only in morality, but in the civil feelings necessary to a new, commercial economy. Characters from Barnwell to Evelina learn “the dangerous Consequence [of] too easily giving Credit to what we hear” (*British Recluse* 1), lose their reputations, and are excluded from the economies that structure truth and virtue. And, nearly alchemically, their shame at exclusion, or fear of potential exclusion, becomes the basis of stories that train audiences in feeling and in judgment. From *The London Merchant* to *Evelina*, shame becomes the articulate and deeply narrativized feeling that paradoxically unifies the self as it demonstrates the self-division and the cultivated judgment of feelings required for business, sociability, and civility.

In this thesis, I have argued that shame is the affective dimension of the discipline which Foucault seminally recognized in eighteenth-century schools and training manuals and in nineteenth-century prisons. It is the feeling associated with being watched, and with watching oneself from the position of the other. It is the feeling, that is, of self-division. The self-division required of the ideal apprentice becomes a mechanism for manufacturing the interiority conceived in novels, and at the same time it affirms the social contract. In eighteenth-century novels, shame becomes a feeling pivotal to self-knowledge; it differentiates between and connects the self who knows, and the self who is
known. The self-reflexive shame of *Clarissa* and the later versions of *Roxana* is the pivot between present and past self. As such, shame permits the narration of a continuous self who has been reformed. In so doing, shame enables a unified and coherent (though-self-divided) self-narrating subject; shame is fundamental, in other words, to erecting the sense of a “self” which is both reformed and reformable and continuous through time. This is the turn toward self-regulation identified by Foucault. Narratives offer the self as "reformable": a self, in other words, that can be refashioned while still asserting that it is internally continuous and coherent. In texts from *The London Merchant* to * Evelina*, shame is used to divide and revision the self.

Eighteenth-century revisions of shame inform our sense of emotions as interior. At the beginning of the century, shame is recognized as a “useful” passion, necessary to governing a people, but it is still a passion, and thus potentially volatile, unpredictable in its reach. At the time Mandeville, Haywood, and Defoe are writing, shame is the passion of a humoral body. As a passion, shame is associated with the organs and humours of the body, with the physiological interior of the embodied self. At the same time, shame exemplifies the unreliability of passion’s signs. The blush is the uncertain and unreliable sign of a woman’s modesty. As writers from Mandeville, to Richardson, and through to Burney debate, the blush might be the true and pre-cognitive response to feeling shame; it might also be a socialized (and thus cognitively controlled) expression of a shame which is not genuinely felt. Shame is thus connected, in multiple texts, both to the question of feminine truth and feminine virtue, and to the question of passion itself. Whereas the heart, as Mullan has shown, becomes the organ most associated with true and articulate
(if hidden) selves, the blushing skin problematizes the association of feeling with moral and epistemological certainty. Is the blush a reliable indicator of true feeling, or does it lie and manipulate? Likewise, is the apparently modest woman really virtuous?

In this way, anxieties about passions become anxieties about credit just as credit moves from an aristocratic model of self and reputation to an economy built on trust and promissory notes. Shame, so elemental to romances such as Haywood’s, where feminine virtue can be lost and replaced by a “blot” or “stain”; is refashioned as the glorious and moral reason for complete exposure. Whereas Belinda and Cleomira experience shame of exposure, Clarissa remakes shame for the purpose of exposure, to authorize the confession and exhaustive recounting of the mistakes that have led to her downfall. This division and “revisability” of self is necessary to the civil self. In Lillo’s tragedy, the idea of the flaw that leads to the downfall of the hero is revised in terms more pertinent to bookkeeping and to the construction of a civil and reformable self: the apprentice makes a mistake. Clarissa, likewise, makes a mistake. Evelina makes multiple mistakes, but they are all covered over and recovered by her embarrassment. These subjects who make mistakes feel shame. Their shame recovers them for the community, and at the same time their shames instantiate and affirm community values and boundaries. In each of these texts, most vividly in The London Merchant and in Clarissa, an ideal exerts its pressure, the sense of potential that could yet be realized. The assumption is that a self, like a text, can be revised. With this assumption comes the belief so fundamental to speculative economics: that the future will be different, better, happier, more prosperous.
In the repeatedly embarrassed protagonist Evelina, shame is elided with the insecurity and lack of knowledge associated with a whole class of people in the process of becoming polite. Evelina’s embarrassment is the shame of the bourgeois subject who knows—from manuals similar to that studied by apprentices, from novels, from watching others—the social norms of the new society enabled by categorical instability, and yet who also makes mistakes in performing to those norms. The bourgeois subject “knows” the norms, and knows that her continued success or status is intimately and uncomfortably dependent on meeting these norms, on performing and reiterating them. She also knows, as Evelina repeatedly shows, that the poorly or incompletely polite self revealed in mistakes can retain access to her privilege status by being embarrassed and, in this way, demonstrating her affective attachment to the norms she transgresses. In Evelina, shame becomes a facilitator and marker of the civilized self required by a commercial society which takes the private individual as its primary political and economic unit. Sympathy is one necessary characteristic of this civil self, and failure to be sympathetic, like failure to be ashamed, marks the bourgeois subject as outside the civil. In this way, the tension of the social contract works itself out in literary constructions of shame, the affective dimension of the self-division required by a power which works, in part, by disciplining bodies and those bodies, as this dissertation insists, are affective bodies. By the end of the eighteenth century reputation is more important than ever, shame is fully socialized, and training in civil feeling is an explicit topic of the novel.

The study of shame is also, as it turns out, the study of early capitalism. That is, it is inextricable from questions of reputation, credit, and civility. Britain’s increasingly
commercial economy required literacy—hundreds of apprentices to write thousands of notes of credit—and, with it, a sharp sensitivity to the perceptions of others because, as Lillo’s Truman observes, "few men recover reputation lost, a merchant never" (2.1.97). This investment in reputation recalls an older aristocratic model of public virtue, but during the eighteenth century, the aristocrat was regularly represented in novels as spectacularly beyond shame or, as Lovelace shows, concerned with a reputation disconnected from virtue. Reputation, so closely aligned with an aristocratic model of honour, and displaced early in the century onto the female body as feminine virtue, is also the ground of commercial subjectivity. In Paul Langford’s analysis, civil feelings are a kind of currency that enables upward mobility:

Gentility was the most prized possession of all in a society obsessed with the pursuit of property and wealth. It could be purchased, but only if the code of genteel conduct was sufficiently flexible to fit the diverse social and educational circumstances of the purchasers. The emphasis on feeling provided this flexibility and removed the sense of repressive social exclusiveness which marked a more aristocratic view of the world. (464)

While gentility is available for purchase and removes “repressive social exclusiveness,” Evelina shows that it nevertheless asserts its own boundaries. Shame is the feeling that marks both the loss of such reputation and the commensurate degeneration of social or monetary capital. And so it is that reputation, credit, honour, disgrace—all these apparently aristocratic, social or public expressions of worth—texture the period’s preoccupation with human nature and complicate Britain’s national narrative of civilized, commercial benevolence.
In closing, I return briefly to Britain’s ideal of commercial benevolence to examine one late-century political debate that challenged such an ideal: the attempted impeachment of Warren Hastings, first Governor General of India. This widely publicized debate invoked shame in order to sway political opinion and motivate political change. It was not successful; Hastings was not impeached. Nevertheless, the incursion of shame into Britain’s nationalist rhetoric of commercial pride and civility raises questions: What is shame called upon to do? What is shame’s function in a global economy built on uneven trade relations? Perhaps most critically, what does its failure to bring about political change tell us about shame’s limit and about the affective disposition of the British “imagined community” as it enters the nineteenth century? While these questions remain largely outside the scope of this dissertation, I want here to suggest their import and possible direction for future work.

Links between the British culture of sensibility and the expansion of Britain’s commercial power are well-established. For example, Maximillian E. Novak and Anne Mellor argue that by the end of the eighteenth century, sensibility was “invoked as the ideal moral antidote to an increasingly capitalistic culture” (14). Many scholars, including Langford, have identified the abolition movement’s use of the language of sentiment in anti-slavery pamphlets and speeches: “viewed against the sentimental background in which it belongs, abolition takes its place among the manifold expressions of the new sensibility, most of which can only be tangentially related to economic analysis” (516). The Hastings trial is often read as a spectacle of sympathy and sentiment. For example, writing on Edmund Burke’s impassioned speeches against William Hastings, Sara Suleri
evokes Adam Smith’s model of moral sentiments when she describes Burke’s rage as “the anguish of spectatorship” (46). Similarly, Siraj Ahmed argues that by “providing an exaggerated performance of how the sentimental character responds to imperial atrocities, Burke gave the British public a model of how it should act” (44).

For Burke, feeling was neither separate from nor a threat to justice, but necessary to it, as indeed it was necessary for the formation of community. And, undoubtedly, the expectation (or hope) that civilized British men and women would be sensibly affected by the suffering of non-white, non-British others grounds Burke’s challenge to parliament. I have suggested that shame is invoked in both these political moments but, in fact, it is only rarely named. Rather, horror, pity, and outrage are the primary feelings performed and named during Hastings’ trial. The managers of the trial (i.e. prosecuting MPs Burke, Charles James Fox and Richard Brinsley Sheridan) do not shame Hastings; rather, Sheridan makes him out to be an unnatural “monster” and cast the managers in the roles of defenders or avengers of his victims. Neither do the managers speak of being ashamed of the British East India Company’s acts, though Burke is more than once “ashamed to go on” when he details, minutely, the horrors of rape and torture. The word “disgrace,” however, hovers over the proceedings and this word alerts us to the affective regime governing Burke’s and Sheridan’s performances of feeling. Sheridan’s speech in

87 Nicole Reynolds cites Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, in which he calls for, in Reynolds' words, "an incorporation of sentiment into politics so that social and political institutions would be supported by the populace not only out of fear or private interest, but also through affectionate attachment"(159). Citing Burke's *Philosophical Enquiry* Elizabeth D. Samet explains that Burke believed the “primary function of words was to facilitate those affective connections that weave individuals into a community” (400) (400).
February of 1787 begins by calling on the House to “wipe off the disgrace that stood affixed to the British name in India, and to rescue the national character from lasting infamy” (5). As much as the trial is a spectacle of modern sympathy, I suggest, “disgrace” reminds us that it is also a drama that turns on the value of reputation, that social self so integral to aristocratic notions of honour and to the merchant’s credit. But reputation requires a defined public; it needs people to notice and respect a reputation, to agree on what good reputation comprises, to look with contempt or admiration. Burke encounters precisely this difficulty when he claims, "There are many things, undoubtedly, in crimes, which make them frightful and odious; but bribery, filthy hands, a chief governor of a great empire receiving bribes from poor, miserable, indigent people, this is what makes government itself base, contemptible, and odious in the eyes of mankind" (2). In order to make this statement affectively resonant, Burke imagines judgment “in the eyes of mankind.” Whose eyes does he imagine?

In her study of Australia’s sorry books, Sara Ahmed’s focus is the shame expressed by Australians in letters collected in “sorry books” requesting that the prime minister apologize for the nation’s history of violence against aboriginal Australians. She observes that much of the force of these letters is on moving from shame to pride. The Australian sorry books insist that the lack of shame is the source of shame; without an official apology the Australian subject says he cannot be proud of his nation. The sorry books’ insistence on shame evoke an ideal: "The witness who exposes the shame of the nation--and the shame of its refusal of shame--is here implicitly 'international civil society’" (111), writes Ahmed. The witness evoked by the sorry books is surely similar to the “eyes
of mankind” which Edmund Burke imagines to gaze in contempt upon the House of Lords. However, the difference between the national apology, analyzed by Ahmed, and the political shame invoked by Burke is instructive. Burke invokes a shaming gaze for the purpose of condemning one man, Hastings, for the crimes of a commercial nation. The sorry books invoke the witnessing and shaming gaze of international civil society in the act of collective apology for past actions. In this way, as Ahmed insists, the sorry books close the present off from the past; they insist the past is past. The condemnation of Hastings might have effected a similar closure, by locating wrong not in a past, but in a single person. Adam Smith considers contempt the worst of all to bear because it results in abject loneliness. Burke threatens the government of Britain, as representatives and moral guardians of the empire's reputation, with this abjection and loss of human dignity, but in order for this plea to work the "eyes" must mean something, must be the eyes of those whose love the members of parliament would hate to lose.

Of his attempt to impeach Warren Hastings for high crimes and misdemeanors in India, Edmund Burke writes, “Let my endeavours to save the Nation from that Shame and guilt be my monument: The only one I ever will have!” (In Samet 414. Burke to French Laurence, 28 July 1796, in Selected Letters, 397-98). It is an odd choice of monument, a memorial to endeavors which ultimately failed. Burke did not manage to “save the Nation from that Shame and guilt.” After a trial that dragged on for seven years, Hastings was finally acquitted. While on the one hand Burke attempts to evoke a sympathy for non-British, non-white people, and to model a feeling response to imperial violence, he also, on the other hand, refers precisely to a geographically bounded entity, the nation. His
affective goal is national: he seeks to protect the nation from a shame which it,
shamelessly, does not feel. Burke’s choice of monument is striking for another reason.
His words suggest that by firmly affixing legal guilt to one man, he could remove it from
the nation. In other words, his goal was to *extract* shame from the nation by persuading
the Lords to condemn one man and, in so doing, demonstrate that Britain, the nation, was
separate from those shameful acts. The eyes of mankind which he called upon in his
speeches is here implicitly imagined as *future* mankind. While still calling on the House’s
aristocratic notions of disgrace, Burke imagines his acts and the nation’s, from the
perspective of a potential, more enlightened, future community who will see, as he did,
that it is contemptible, shameful, and disgraceful not to feel sympathy, to be “uncivil.”
Like Burke himself, this unrealized future community is capable of judging rightly, of
seeing Hastings’ acts as morally wrong and the Lords’ refusal to condemn him as equally
morally wrong. In this way, just as Barnwell’s shame expresses a potential unrealized and
ideal commercial subject, and just as Clarissa imagines an ideal community of readers,
Burke imagines the eyes of posterity, in other words, of an ideally commercial civil
community not yet come.
Works Cited


---. *The Universal Penman, or, The Art of Writing Made Useful to the Gentleman and Scholar, as Well as the Man of Business : Exemplified in All the Useful, and Ornamental Branches of Modern Penmanship; with Some Necessary Observations on the Excellency of the Pen, and a Large Number of Select Sentences in Prose and Verse; .... London : Printed for, and Sold by the Author, at the Crown in James Street, Bunhill Fields,, 1741. ECCO. Web. 5 Oct 2012


Brown, Laura. “Shock Effect: Evelina’s Monkey and the Marriage Plot.”


_Philological Quarterly_ 73.3 (1994).


---. *The fortunate mistress; or, a history of the life and vast variety of fortunes of Mademoiselle de Beleau, afterwards call’d the Countess de Wintselsheim, in Germany. Being the person known by the name of the Lady Roxana,* ... London: printed by E. Applebee. And to be had of the news-carriers, 1740. *ECCO*. Web. 9 Oct. 2009.

---. *The history of Mademoiselle de Beleau; or, the new Roxana, the fortunate mistress: afterwards Countess of Wintselsheim. Published by Mr Daniel De Foe. And from papers found, since his decease, it appears was greatly altered by himself;* ... London: printed for the editor; and sold by F. Noble and T. Lowndes, 1775. *ECCO*. Web. 1 Jan. 2010.

---. *The life and adventures of Roxana the fortunate mistress or most unhappy wife. Containing, the vast variety of fortunes that attended her ... with several curious reflections, and entertaining particulars.* London: printed for C. Whitefield, 1749. *ECCO*. Web. 1 Jan. 2010.


Johnson, Samuel. *A Dictionary of the English Language: In Which the Words Are Deduced from Their Originals, and Illustrated in Their Different Significations by Examples from the Best Writers*. London: printed by W.


Reynolds, Nicole. “Phebe Gibbes, Edmund Burke, and the Trials of Empire.”


---. *The apprentice’s [v]ade mecum: or, [Y]oung man’s pocket-companion*. In three parts. [P]art I. Containing useful comments and observations on the conveants enter’d into between master and servant, by way of indenture; wherein that wise obligation is considered article by article. ..” 1734. *ECCO*. Web. 5 Oct. 2012.


Trenchfield, Caleb. *A cap of gray hairs for a green head or, the fathers counsel to his son, ... The fifth edition. With additions of precepts adapted to each chapter. By Caleb Trenchfield, ... 1710*. *ECCO*. Web. 5 Oct 2012.


Ward, Edward. *The pleasures of a single life, or, the miseries of matrimony.*


---. *The reformer. Exposing the vices of the age in several characters.* ... *To which is added, The rambling rakes: or, London libertines,* ... *Together with Three nights adventures: ... Also A step to the bath.* 1701. *ECCO.* Web. 5 Oct 2012


Watts, Isaac. *Discourses of the love of God and the use and abuse of the passions in religion, with a devout meditation suited to each discourse.* *To which is prefix’d, a plain and particular account of the natural passions, with rules for the government of them.* London: printed for J. Clark and R. Hett at the Bible and Crown in the Poultry ; E. Matthews at the Bible in Pater-Noster-Row ; and R. Ford at the Angel in the Poultry, 1729. *ECCO.* Web. 30 May 2010.

---. *The doctrine of the passions explained and improved. Or, a brief and comprehensive scheme of the natural affections of Mankind, Attempted in a plain and easy Method. With an Account of their Names, Nature,*
Appearances, Effects, and different Uses in human Life. To which are subjoined, moral and divine rules For the Regulation or Government of them. 5th ed. London: printed for J. Buckland and T. Longman, 1770.

ECCO. Web. 31 May 2010.

