MUNICIPALITIES AND THE MEGA-EVENT
MUNICIPALITIES AND THE MEGA-EVENT: A COMPARATIVE URBAN ANALYSIS

By CAROL ANN PHILLIPS, B.J., M.A.

A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy

McMaster University © Copyright by Carol Ann Phillips, September 2012
ABSTRACT

Why do municipalities bid for mega-events? Simply bidding for these events, such as the Commonwealth Games, the Olympic Games or a World Expo, can run into the millions of dollars. The cost of hosting such a large-scale international event now runs into the billions of dollars. It would appear to be an economic risk, yet cities, and their respective countries, around the world continue to choose this public policy path. Using urban regime theory, and focusing on the work of Stone, Stoker and Mossberger, this research investigates the actors and their motivations surrounding the Commonwealth Games bids by Melbourne, Australia for 2006, Halifax, Nova Scotia for 2014, and Hamilton, Ontario for 1994, 2010 and 2014. Civic pride, economic development, tourism growth and infrastructure improvements are all motivating factors and a mega-event is seen as a short-cut to achieving these public policy goals. We conclude that strong cooperation between the public and private sectors is necessary, as well as comparable cooperation between the upper levels of government and the host city, for a seriously competitive bid in a Western democracy, and that the weaker the cooperation, the less resolve and likelihood there is to host an expensive event at any cost. This research not only furthers political science knowledge in the sports public policy field, but also confirms the use of urban regime theory as a useful framework in comparative urban analysis as it allows us to categorize actors and motivations as we compare across municipalities.
To my supervisor, Prof. Mark Sproule-Jones. To my supervisory committee, Prof. Barbara Carroll, Prof. Nancy Bouchier and Prof. Henry Jacek. To the political science graduate secretary, Manuela Dozzi. To the library research assistant who helped me find the City of Hamilton’s 1985 financial report. And to my family.

Thank you. And sorry for the delay.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1......................................................................................................................... 1  
Introduction: The Policy Problem ................................................................................. 1  
Sport and The State ........................................................................................................ 4  
Sport, the State and the “Mega-Event” ........................................................................ 6  
A Suggested Framework .............................................................................................. 10  
Comparative Urban Analysis ...................................................................................... 12  
Urban Regime Theory and the Mega-Event Strategy ................................................ 14  
Contribution .............................................................................................................. 15  
Summary .................................................................................................................... 16  

Chapter 2......................................................................................................................... 18  
Theories and Methodology ......................................................................................... 18  
Stone, On Pluralism ...................................................................................................... 23  
Stone, On Political Economy ...................................................................................... 26  
A Critique ................................................................................................................... 29  
Stone’s Response ........................................................................................................ 32  
The Theory, in Summary ........................................................................................... 33  
Methodology .............................................................................................................. 35  
The Commonwealth Games ....................................................................................... 40  
The Case Studies ........................................................................................................ 43  
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 50  

Chapter 3......................................................................................................................... 51  
Melbourne ................................................................................................................... 51  
Melbourne’s Commonwealth Games Bid ................................................................. 53  
Melbourne’s Make-up ................................................................................................. 56  
Federal Policy ............................................................................................................. 59  
The Bid ....................................................................................................................... 61  
Post-Games Financials ............................................................................................... 74  

Chapter 4......................................................................................................................... 76  
Halifax 2005 ............................................................................................................... 76  
Halifax’s 2014 Commonwealth Games Bid .............................................................. 78  
Halifax Regional Municipality ................................................................................... 80  
Federal Policy ............................................................................................................. 85  
The End of the Bid ....................................................................................................... 89  
The Problem with Halifax ......................................................................................... 98  

Chapter 5......................................................................................................................... 100  
Hamilton 1987, 2003, 2005 ...................................................................................... 100  
The City of Hamilton ................................................................................................. 101  
Federal Policy ........................................................................................................... 108  
Hamilton 1987 .......................................................................................................... 113  
The Bid ...................................................................................................................... 116  
Hamilton 2003 .......................................................................................................... 125  
The International Bid ............................................................................................... 126  
The End of the Bid ..................................................................................................... 141  
Hamilton 2005 .......................................................................................................... 142  
End of the Bid ............................................................................................................ 144  

Ph.D. Thesis – C. Phillips; McMaster University – Political Science
LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1 Board Members of Melbourne’s Domestic and International bids for the 2006 Commonwealth Games .............................................. 68

Table 4.1 Board Members of Halifax’s Domestic and International bids for the 2014 Commonwealth Games ............................................. 92

Table 5.1 Members of Hamilton’s Domestic Bid Committee for the 1994 Commonwealth Games .......................................................... 121

Table 5.2 Members of the Domestic and International bid committees for Hamilton 2010 ........................................................................ 135

Table 5.3 Advisory Committee Members of Hamilton’s Domestic bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games .............................................. 147

Table 6.1 Five case studies in comparison: Melbourne, Halifax and Hamilton ........ 156
# ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACGA</td>
<td>Australian Commonwealth Games Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIS</td>
<td>Australia Institute of Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMO</td>
<td>Association of Municipalities of Ontario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Canadian Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGA</td>
<td>Commonwealth Games Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGC</td>
<td>Commonwealth Games Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGF</td>
<td>Commonwealth Games Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Canadian Sport Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOBC</td>
<td>Hamilton Organizing Bid Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRM</td>
<td>Halifax Regional Municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMEC</td>
<td>Melbourne Major Events Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URT</td>
<td>Urban Regime Theory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1

Introduction: The Policy Problem

The City of Hamilton approved a Sport Tourism Action Plan in early 2005, with its primary goal to bring major sporting events and sport conferences to the mid-sized Canadian industrial city. A year later, a new city council reaffirmed its commitment to the plan, established a sport tourism advisory committee, and hired a Sport Tourism Coordinator. By 2008, the Tourism Hamilton website had a “sports planner” link on its home page as an introductory aid to sports organizers around the world. Such public policy decisions seem the natural progression of a city that had a history of striving to attract sporting events to this primarily industrial city. The apex of this policy occurred in 2003, when Hamilton hosted the World Cycling Championships and a PGA tournament, the Bell Canadian Open. During that year, it also spent a lot of energy in an unsuccessful bid to host the 2010 Commonwealth Games, losing to New Delhi in a controversial 46-22 vote by the Commonwealth Games Federation.

This was not the first time Hamilton had tried to host the Commonwealth Games. In 1987, it competed against six other Canadian cities for the right to be Canada’s official bid for the Games. It lost out to Victoria, B.C. that went on to host the 1994 Games. Hamilton spent $300,000CDN on that domestic bid. In 2003, the bid committee spent around $3 millionCDN on its international bid package, a cost shared by five partners, including three levels of government. Should its bid have actually been successful, the Games budget presented in the package had the cash-strapped municipality contributing $80 millionCDN to the sporting event, an extra-budgetary commitment coming at a time when it was already struggling to meet its current obligations. At the time of its 2003 bid, the municipality of Hamilton was running a projected $50-million-plus deficit.

Since that time, the city has unsuccessfully tried to win the domestic bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games (losing to Halifax, N.S. which then pulled out of its

* As a Hamilton magazine and newspaper reporter for more than 15 years over the course of these bids, much of the narrative used in this dissertation, as well as the policy problem posed, comes from my own observations during those years.
international bid at the last minute, citing cost concerns). In 2008, Hamilton became part of a greater Golden Horseshoe bid (the region surrounding the western tip of Lake Ontario, including Toronto and Niagara) for the Pan-American Games. This bid won the right to host those Games in 2015.

The situation of this mid-sized Canadian industrial town and its political decisions regarding sports hosting has led to the posing of this study’s main research question: Why do municipalities bid for the right to host such mega-sized sporting events? Huge infrastructure projects, such as new rail lines or highways, housing, competition venues, or the environmental clean-up of vast wastelands typically accompany the rights to host such an event and can take the price of hosting into the range of well more than a billion dollars. In a multi-sport festival, like the Olympic Games, the Commonwealth Games and the Pan-American Games, the events are held over a couple of weeks. During this period, the region must accommodate a few thousand athletes and officials in a separate and secured “village” while hosting several completely unrelated sporting competitions at the same time, in venues that may or may not have existed at the time of the bid. A grand opening and closing ceremony in a large stadium is generally expected. Despite the costs, cities are lining up to host and underwrite these celebrations. Beijing hosted the 2008 Summer Olympics after winning a vote over other major international centres such as Toronto, Paris, Istanbul and Osaka. Vancouver won the right to host the 2010 Winter Olympics over PyeongChang, Korea; Salzburg, Austria; Berne, Switzerland; Andorra la Vella, Andorra; Harbin, China; Jaca, Spain and Sarajevo, Yugoslavia. The long list of candidate cities for the 2016 Summer Olympics ranged from Baku, Azerbaijan to Chicago and Rio De Janiero. Rio won. For the 2014 Commonwealth Games bid competition, Glasgow won the decision over Abuja, Nigeria.

While the cost of hosting such events has reached the billion-dollar level, this is not the main point of this research. Rather, it is that the cost to simply bid for the right to host one of these events has also run into the millions of dollars, with absolutely no guarantee of success. Melbourne, Australia had a virtually uncontested bid in 1999 for the rights to host the 2006 Commonwealth Games. (Wellington, N.Z. and Johannesburg,
S.A. had also initially expressed interest before dropping out.) Still, it worked with a bid budget of $10 million AUS, funded by the Victoria state government (the final tally was closer to $6 million AUS). This money was used primarily for airfares and accommodations (Coorey and Hawes 1999). The bid document alone cost almost $500,000 AUS. The Melbourne bid was a determined one as the city was still nursing its wounds from losing out on the right to host the 1996 Olympics. Once the Commonwealth Games were hosted in March 2006, the final contribution of the Victoria State government to the entire production was $651.4 million AUS. It would seem on the surface to be expensive public policy. The question remains whether or not it is good public policy.

Why do municipalities (“the state” at the local level of governance) make expensive and risky bids for the right to hold such mega-sized events as the Commonwealth Games? There are some plausible explanations. The public could demand it, but it should be safe to say there has never been a grass-roots petition requesting its local government make such a bid (notwithstanding those official petitions set up by governments after the bid has been made in an attempt to show public support). There could be economic benefits to hosting the event, and this is certainly the prevailing wisdom in municipal government. Perceived economic benefits include increased tourism, the attraction of new business development, higher employment and a general revitalization of the local economy and infrastructure. However, economists are not as optimistic as local government bureaucrats about the benefits of sports events. Perhaps the reason for the bid is to improve the city’s infrastructure at a much faster rate and with considerably more resources from other levels of government than would otherwise be possible. There is empirical support for this reasoning. Some $500 million in funding suddenly became available to Hamilton from the provincial and federal governments for infrastructure improvements, with the hook that it must win its 2010 Games bid. The money was withdrawn once the bid failed. The bid could also be driven by the private sector. Or it could be driven by the personality of the current local council and its vision of how its city should be “world class”, home to a major stadium, a national sports mecca, and a major tourist destination. Is it simply ego-driven since these large-scale
events do bring a lot of prestige? Or perhaps a mayor and business friends who are simply sports fans are pushing the bid.

Answering each of these questions is a project unto itself. Ultimately, this research seeks to identify the actors who participate and the coalitions that form when a municipality decides to bid for what the academic literature refers to as a “mega-event”. The mega-event strategy has become a worldwide phenomenon, despite its dubious benefits and exorbitant costs. It is a gamble, using public funds and swallowing up the time of public servants. Who, in effect, drives the municipal bid for a mega-event and why?

This paper will examine the cases of three cities on two different continents. Hamilton, Ont., Halifax, N.S., and Melbourne, Australia all have long histories of bidding for large sporting events and, specifically, mega-events. The City of Hamilton, the host of the inaugural British Empire Games in 1930, unsuccessfully bid for the 1994 Commonwealth Games, the 2010 Commonwealth Games and the 2014 Commonwealth Games (never getting out of the domestic phase of the bid for the 1994 and 2014 Games). This was a period of approximately 16 years that saw a change in political leadership and a restructuring of its local governance structures, but the same public policy decision regarding bidding for such events. Melbourne, host of the 1956 Summer Olympics, unsuccessfully bid for the 1996 Summer Olympics before focusing its political energy on hosting the 2006 Commonwealth Games, which it accomplished. Halifax, host to numerous national and world championships, bid for the 1994 Commonwealth Games, the 2010 Games and the 2014 Games. The first two bids never won the domestic phase. Its effort to be the Canadian bid city for 2014 was successful, but the city and province pulled their support midway through the international phase.

Sport and The State

The role of the state in sport policy and the power relationships that have developed is an area that has been under-researched by political scientists (Houlihan 2005). There is the relationship between the state and the athlete – including the
provision of direct grants, building facilities in which to train and compete, and even the regulating of performance-enhancing drug use. The relationship between the state and the media in sport primarily features a discussion of the reliance on media to provide sport coverage that would help build national identity and national pride. The relationship between the state and corporate interests has become particularly relevant in this age of new public management as governments look for public-private partnerships through which to fund much of its relationship with the athlete and the taxpayer.

The state has become a central player in sport at all levels, whether it be the federal government paying monthly grants to elite athletes or the municipal government rationing out city-owned and maintained soccer fields and ice time. Johnson and Frey (1985) argue that the state and sport were no longer inseparable by the 1980s. The state funds high performance sport and recreational activities. It financially sponsors bids to host international events. It legislates performance-enhancing drug use. The very organizational structure of international sport is based on the nation-state, as athletes represent their countries, and international governing bodies (in particular the International Olympic Committee and the Commonwealth Games Association) have representative organizations in each country. Yet academic literature on the role of the state in sport can barely be found in the leading public administration journals or those dedicated to political science and policy analysis in general. Rather, discussion is typically found in sociological journals and those dedicated solely to the study of sport. As a political scientist, British scholar Barrie Houlihan wants the discussion to broaden and include issues such as the role of institutions, non-state actors, and decision-making power. Causal theories and micro-level frameworks are missing from the literature.

The overwhelming bulk of the literature that addresses power and structure in sport policy uses an elitist, Neo-Marxist or political economy approach. In essence, sport is a tool of government, which is in turn a tool of the capitalist forces. Countries and cities bid for the right to host large international events in order to build national pride, attract economic development and appease local capitalists, despite the social costs involved in such a venture. The media plays a large role in this policy area. It provides
the medium through which international competitions enter millions of homes around the world, spreading images of nation-state success and (arguably) Western values, in some cases. It provides the technology through which a nation-state can unite its population and tug on nationalistic feelings. These forces lead international sport into the role of providing a forum for diplomacy.

The state is central to sport. With issues such as commercialization, growing administrative hierarchies, litigation over equality of access, and the regulation of performance-enhancing drugs, governments have no choice but take a bigger interest in the policy field. Johnson and Frey establish a continuum of state involvement, from the old Soviet Union at one end, and its overt use of sport for propaganda purposes (which can certainly be seen in present-day China), to the United States at the other, with relatively free-market views on sport, although this is debatable. Their questions echo those of Houlihan almost 10 years later: What is the role of government in sport and can its action bring resolution? Canadian scholars MacIntosh, Bedecki and Franks (1987), whose 1987 work remains a pillar of research for Canadian and international sport scholars, had stated future research should include issues regarding nation-building, building expensive facilities, growing bureaucracies, values, and sport autonomy as government’s role increases. Almost 20 years later, things seemed to not have changed much. Houlihan continues to bemoan how sport remains on the “margins” of the study of public policy process, despite its growing relevancy in government departments such as health and economic development. Any sport policy studies have been lacking the use of political science frameworks and theories, and instead have been dominated by sociological, cultural and economic perspectives (Houlihan 2005, 164).

**Sport, the State and the “Mega-Event”**

The term “mega-event” originated in the late 1980s, although academic literature does not provide a standard definition of the term. Hall provides the most useful description of what is also referred to in the literature as a “hallmark event”: a major festival, exposition, cultural or sporting event that can be held either on a regular or one-off basis. Its primary function is “to provide the host city with high prominence in the
tourism marketplace for a short period of time” (Hall 2001, 169). For the purposes of this research, a mega-event is defined as an international event that attracts visitors from around the world and has the potential for high-profile international media coverage. World championships in relatively high-profile sports, and multi-sport festivals such as the Olympic Games and the Commonwealth Games would be examples. Outside of the sports world, World Fairs would also be an example.

When the academic literature has examined the mega-event, it has done so in the context of being an economic development strategy for the state. But it is not kind to the strategy. At best, it is seen as elitist (Whitson 2005, Hall 2001, Jones 2001, Burbank, Andranovich and Heying 2001, Whitson and Macintosh 1996). Political economic literature, such as that emerging using urban regime analysis, would argue it is an indication of the shared power between the state and the capitalists with the ultimate goal of economic gain over any social costs such as environmental degradation and loss of low-income housing (Burbank et al 2001, Schimmel 2001, Lenskyj 2002). At worst, mega-events are a capitalist tool meant to socialize the masses while putting money into the pockets of developers and commercial interests at the expense of the taxpayer and those on the low end of the socio-economic scale (Whitson 2005, Lenskyj 2002, Hall 2001, Burbank et al 2001, Schimmel 2001, Wamsley and Heine 1996).

Hosting mega-events can provide a city that lacks an international profile a “short-cut” to gaining global name recognition (Jones 2001) and an increased profile can lead to sustainable economic development and tourism stimulation. (Emery 2001, 99) This type of image-building is central in economies that have lost heavy industry and are now trying to reposition themselves as tourist destinations, or are trying positions themselves in the international competition for capital (Hall 2001). The general argument of the strategy is that governments – local, provincial/state and national – bid to host these expensive events as a means of increasing their international profile. This, in turn, leads to the development of a strong tourism sector, the attraction of business to the country/state/city, and the development of upgraded infrastructure. It is the result of globalization where nation-states have lost much of their relevance and the city has
become a player on the world stage, competing against other cities in order to attract the business of a multinational corporation. With the mobility of capital in this new global economy, local governments are forced to find entrepreneurial ways to achieve economic growth and keep the tax rate down (Hall 2001, Jones 2001, Burbank et al 2001, Whitelegg 2000, Whitson and Macintosh 1996). In the sport policy literature, not much time is given to exploring the context within which cities spend millions just for a shot at hosting a sporting event. Rather, much effort has been spent investigating, case by case, what the impact of hosting such an event has had on a community, whether economically or socially (Horne and Manzenreiter 2004, Higham 1999, Lenskyj 2002, Hall 2001, Hiller 2000, Jones 2000, Burbank et al 2001, Whitelegg 2000, Mules 1998, Whitson and Macintosh 1993).

Academic literature on “games hosting” gained momentum in the 1990s, perhaps in part caused by the commercial success of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics following which the number of cities interested in bidding for such events increased as did the amount spent on the bids. The cost of running such events also increased. Meanwhile, in the United States, a related trend set in the 1970s and 80s saw major league sports team owners threatening to leave their original communities if they didn’t get newer facilities (Riess 1998). As a result, there was much sports economics research done in the 1990s with regards to the actual benefits of sport to a community’s fiscal health, and economists were not enthusiastic about the results. As an example, in a review of the economic academic literature, Coates and Humphreys (2003, 1) concluded “economists have found no evidence of positive economic impact of professional sports teams and facilities on urban economies.” They direct us to Crompton (1995) who identified 11 common mistakes made by city bureaucrats when creating economic impact analyses regarding sport events and facilities. In particular, they often feel pressured to create a report that echoes the direction their bosses want to take. The end result “is to exaggerate economic impact so a study reports substantially higher numbers than are justified” (1995, 18).

Crompton conducted a 15-year literature review of his own in 2004, and concluded that there was no statistical relationship between sport facility construction and
economic development. Mules (1998) had done a similar review of the economic benefits from hosting sporting events in Australia. He concluded that economic impact statements had been flawed because they ignore the fact that the public funding of sports events is simply money being diverted from somewhere else in the budget, and should not be counted as new money being generated. One cause of concern, he noted, is the extraordinarily large sums of money paid for the “rights” to an international event, something which governments may want to avoid when choosing which events to host. In general, the conclusions on sport hosting do not bode well for the mega-event strategy. Gratton and Henry (2001) concluded, after editing a book of essays on the role of sport in economic regeneration, that there was inconclusive evidence of any economic benefits. Individual case studies have come to the same conclusions. Jones (2001) concluded the 1999 Rugby World Cup in Wales had dubious economic spin-offs and the bulk of the profits went to the governing body that owned the rights. Critics also argue that there are social costs that come with hosting a mega-event, including the displacement of low-income residents by high-priced condos, general congestion and pollution during the event (Jones 2001, 18). Hall has written that Sydney ignored environmental and planning safeguards and never conducted a social impact statement (2001, 171-176) in its 2000 Olympic bid. As well, Toronto’s 2008 Olympic bid is identified as having been a closed process during which no social or environmental assessments were conducted (Lenskyj 2002).

However, it should be noted that while the overwhelming academic argument seems to be that there are no economic benefits to be had, there remains some literature that believes mega-events are useful so long as the proper planning methods and preparations are undertaken. Mules (1998), for example, is not outright against hosting sporting events. He suggests a government choose them more intelligently, looking to fund more high participation-low infrastructure events where “rights” money doesn’t have to be paid to an event owner. Emery (2001) argues that cities could help themselves if they conducted feasibility or risk assessments (social and economic) when bidding for events, instead of diving in headfirst.
In the mega-event literature, not much reason is given for why cities don’t fully acknowledge there are limited benefits with the mega-event strategy and thus conduct themselves accordingly. If Crompton is correct, that local economic development officials interpret the numbers to suit political will, perhaps the next question should be: What or who is feeding this political will, if there are no guaranteed economic benefits?

A Suggested Framework

One theoretical framework that has come to prominence in the games-hosting literature is urban regime theory, in which informal yet enduring coalitions between the state and non-governmental partners increase the power of “social production”. That is, the power to get things done (Stone, 2005). Burbank et al (2001) use this framework in an attempt to answer the aforementioned questions as they pertain to the United States. They write: “Indeed, our thesis is that mega-events are quintessential growth regime endeavors and that the initiation of a mega-event strategy is largely inexplicable outside the context of regime politics” (p 28). They argue that regime theory provides a framework for urban politics and why certain things get done (and others don’t). They provide case studies of the Olympic Games in Los Angeles, Atlanta and Salt Lake City to indicate the presence of regime politics where urban centres are pursuing mega-event strategies.

Urban regime theorists see power as fragmented. The state provides legitimacy and policy-making authority while non-governmental actors provide whatever other resources are needed to get things done. When applied to economic development, it is usually argued that the private sector forms a coalition with the state to provide the capital necessary to generate jobs. However, Clarence Stone (2005), the scholar most credited with developing the urban regime theory over the past 20-plus years, clarifies for his critics that the theory is not only about public-private sector partnerships. Rather, it is about government and non-governmental actors working together to get things done, be it health-care initiatives, education policy or economic development.
Using this theory, Stone characterizes four urban regime types. The maintenance or caretaker regime focuses on routine service delivery and low taxes. The development regime would change land use rules to promote growth. A middle-class/progressive regime sees environmental protection, heritage preservations and affordable housing as key tenets. Lower-class opportunity expansion regimes focus on increased access to employment and ownership (Mossberger and Stoker 2001, 812). Stone writes:

The operating assumption of the regime paradigm is that the authority of a community’s official government is too weak to govern autonomously. As we have come to appreciate, a winning electoral coalition is not the same as a coalition capable of government. Consequently, a government coalition can be created only by putting together an informal structure that joins public and private resources and institutions. (1989, 148)

Development policies will differ according to the coalition (or regime) in charge. (Stone 1987)

Regime theory has come under attack in recent years. Some scholars argue that it is U.S.-centric and irrelevant within, as an example, the European urban context. It is criticized as overemphasizing the local authority without taking into consideration the national or international political economic contexts within which it operates. There are several ways to approach urban studies and the investigation of local economic development policies. The ultimate search for a theory of community power – who participates in decision-making, who benefits, who doesn’t, and why (Polsby 1963) – opens up the possibility of various perspectives. At the broader level, there are pluralist and elitist approaches, but both must take into account how national and international forces play on local politics. An institutionalist perspective is helpful because there are constraints put upon local officials, however, one would need to study how local officials maneuver within these constraints. A political economic approach seems quite relevant to discussions on economic development because the two major actors involved in its policy arena are the state and the private sector. Globalization theory is one such example. However, it must also leave some room for the discussion of agency, especially in the details of the policy chosen. Recent second-level approaches to the study of community
power have included the growth-machine thesis, an elitist concept emphasizing the role of business in driving development policy, the study of urban protest and social movements, and urban regime theory (Stoker 1998, Graham, Phillips and Maslove 1998). Work by Stoker and Mossberger (1994), and Dowding (2001) place urban regime theory within these contexts. Stoker and Mossberger, for example, see regime theory as dealing with the process of decision-making between government and non-government actors rather than strictly a debate between elitism and pluralism. Dowding, on the other hand, describes the theory as encompassing principles of both political economy and pluralism. He states that urban regime theory not only incorporates coalitions of elected officials and business people, but also partnerships with broader-based interest groups. This is “one of regime theory’s great strengths, allowing writers from different traditions and ideological persuasions to work within the same paradigm whilst stressing different aspects of it” (Dowding 2001, 8). Stone responds to his critics with an explanation of how the theory focuses on local agency within larger structural forces when studying decision-making: “what motivates actors at this level, what affects their ability to cooperate or puts them into conflict, the leverage they can gain in tackling problems, and in general what they make of the structural forces in which they are enmeshed” (Stone 2005, 324).

**Comparative Urban Analysis**

The challenge put forth in the current academic literature is to move urban analysis from its tendency to focus on the single case study, and on to more comparative research (Kantor and Savitch 2005, Sellers 2005, Pierre 2005, Denters and Mossberger 2006, Stoker and Mossberger 1994). Conversely, comparative work should now be conducted at the urban level, not merely at the nation-state level. Taking scale into account, and the impact of one level of government on the other, becomes complicated and problematic. However, Sellers writes that comparative urban politics comes with a new set of rewards, namely “the chance to elaborate new, multilevel forms of comparative analysis that can more effectively grasp the changing character of the nation-state and the democratic possibilities of contemporary societies” (2005, 420). He writes
that these types of comparative studies will effectively “nest” urban political analysis within regional, national and global levels of governance.

The problem, as argued by Kantor and Savitch, is that “contemporary scholars struggle to find an approach to the comparative study of cities, but often find this so challenging that little of it is done” (2005, 136). The main obstacle is the lack of a “commonly accepted general theory of urban politics and policy” with only “middle range” theories that do not easily transfer across national boundaries. Regime theory, they argue, falls under this category due to “differences in the composition and power of business interests in European cities” (p. 136). They have interpreted regime theory as giving private-sector interests a primary role in urban decision-making; something that they argue does not exist in Europe. Regimes are “simply” the “old-fashioned notion” of coalitions (p. 140).

Pierre’s (2005) assessment of urban regime theory is in agreement: it is under theorized and ethnocentric, very little comparative work has been done using the theory and it has, thus, run its course. A way out of this comparative conundrum, he writes, is to study phenomenon in terms of “urban governance”, focusing on institutions and actors. He acknowledges Stone’s response that urban regime theory is about governance, not just land-use practices. However, Pierre believes that comparative politics needs a broader definition of the regime.

Stone’s original theoretical writings in the 1980s were based on the Atlanta experience. Stoker and Mossberger (1994) suggested several years ago that it was time for regime theory to move beyond its American roots and become a framework used in comparative urban politics. Far from writing it off as a useless framework, they devised a new typology for urban regimes that they felt was more abstract than those offered by Stone, and thus better able to explain the cross-national variances in regimes (p. 200). Their new typology would seemingly make it easier to conduct comparative urban analysis. The “organic regime” seeks to sustain the status quo (much like Stone’s caretaker regime). “Instrumental regimes” are short term and project-oriented, similar to
Stone’s development regime in that it uses more traditional incentives for economic development. “Symbolic regimes” are much like Stone’s progressive regime, however a key component in this typology is the intent to change a city’s image or ideology (Stoker and Mossberger 1994, Mossberger and Stoker 2001) using symbols as a mobilization function. Stoker and Mossberger also suggest the role of auxiliary players is greatly enhanced outside of North America. They refer to a category of “technical or professional officials”, arguing, “Knowledge can join economic position as a key resource that gives groups privileged access to decision-making” (1994, 198).

Urban Regime Theory and the Mega-Event Strategy

Burbank et al (2001) use the aforementioned typology in their study of the mega-event strategy in the United States. In their Olympic case studies of Los Angeles, Atlanta and Salt Lake City, a two-fold model is put forth: the constraints of economic change coupled with federal policy change impacts the actions of city leaders. How city leaders choose to deal with these changes impacts local economic development strategy. In this way, the scholars incorporate the scale of decision-making, as well as the principle of local agency within larger structural forces. They use urban regime theory in an attempt to find who is driving the mega-event strategy in these three cities, arguing that this type of strategy is “largely inexplicable outside the context of regime politics” (2001, 28). They argue that regime theory emphasizes the local government’s power of social production, stating, “fundamentally, an urban regime is a mechanism for overcoming obstacles to exercising power at the local level” (2001, 24).

While Kantor and Savitch (1997, 2005) dismiss the theory as rehashing or rebranding the traditional coalition, those who apply the theory embrace the term. Regime theory is about building coalitions to get things done. Burbank et al argue that without these particular coalitions, no bid for a mega-event would ever occur. They use Stoker and Mossberger’s (1994) typology, believing the symbolic regime to be most useful for their purposes of studying the mega-event strategy. A symbolic regime is growth-oriented, but only under certain conditions; it perceives a need to change the city’s image; and it uses symbols to garner support (Burbank et al 2001, 210). It is more
inclusive, process-driven, transitional and dependent on external resources, such as grants, in order for goals to be met. Stoker and Mossberger explain: “Symbolic politics arises because of the need to appeal for support from the populace, higher levels of government, and/or national or multi-national business concerns” (1994, 210).

**Contribution**

The anecdotal evidence is surely unequivocal: cities around the world continue to bid for the right to host mega-events. It does not seem to matter what the economic standing is of the city or its country, nor the political or economic ideology. This, alone, should merit further academic discussion. The issue provides a ripe area to investigate scales of governance and their relationships, local agency within larger structural forces, and coalitions between governmental and non-governmental actors. It also provides an opportunity to compare urban centres across nation-state lines. And how do we identify the existence of a regime? Singular case studies have been the dominant method of research in urban analysis and in urban regime theory, using qualitative methods such as document reviews and in-depth interviews. Very little is comparative, certainly nothing approaching large-N studies. As a result, there is still much work to be done in this area. The relevant literature to date, especially urban regime theory, both describes and categorizes mega-event cases. What is lacking is a discussion of “why” – a critique voiced by Mossberger and Stoker (2001). If an urban regime tends to exist in municipalities that bid for mega-events, why do these regimes take on certain characteristics and how do they change over time? With so many single case studies having been done, and economic reviews showing little actual benefits, more multiple comparative case studies may help determine some of the common variables that lead to bidding for mega-events. Those variables may be city size, government characteristics, or the existence of universities or personality types. The small-N cross-national comparative research proposed by this paper, investigating such variables, will help fill a void and provide a stepping-stone to further work using larger and more random sampling.

Exploring the context within which the bid for a mega-event is launched allows for identifying economic, social and political conditions at the global, national and local
level that existed at the time. This takes up Sellers’ challenge of providing a multi-level account of an urban public policy. Also, by identifying local actors who are part of the bid process, we can examine (as Stone suggests throughout his writings) local agency within larger forces and the driving motivations.

Ultimately, this research answers the call for political scientists to begin the study of sport policy by using and developing theoretical frameworks. If the study of politics is, at its most base point, the study of power – who has it, who doesn’t – than the focus of this research should shed some light on that most basic of questions. Bidding for a mega-event is an expensive public policy decision in which public funds are diverted from other areas of government in order to pursue a strategy that could ultimately cost taxpayers at all levels of governance hundred of millions of dollars with questionable returns. Why do municipalities pursue this avenue despite the risks?

Summary

This has served as an introduction to the issues surrounding the question: Why do municipalities around the world bid for mega-events such as the Olympics, Commonwealth Games and Pan-American Games? The bids are expensive with no promise of success. Hosting a multi-sport games now costs more than a billion dollars with no promise of lasting economic success. Using Hamilton, Halifax and Melbourne, the ultimate aim is to identify the “players” involved in these bids and their motivations, using urban regime theory as the framework through which to view, analyze and compare the policy process. Chapter Two will explore further urban regime theory and its evolution primarily through the writings of Clarence Stone as it is his work which is by far the most cited when academics discuss URT and its use in political science. Following his reasoning through the years will allow the reader to see the theory’s early pluralist roots, how it came to be used (perhaps mistakenly) pre-dominantly in economic development policy studies as an elitist concept, and how it may be expanded to encompass other policy fields in the future. The chapter will lay out the challenges posed to urban regime theory, as well as the methodology and hypotheses to be used. In chapters three, four and five, the cases of Melbourne 1999, Halifax 2005 and Hamilton in
1987, 2003 and 2005 will be examined with a closer look at the political, economic and social contexts of each city during those times of their respective bids for the Commonwealth Games. These chapters will tell the stories of each bid, identifying the stakeholders, the participants in the bid process, and the timeline. From this, the research will be able to categorize and compare those involved in the bids in different times and in different parts of the world. Chapter Six is the conclusion, in which the hypotheses will be discussed. Ultimately, by identifying the individuals and groups involved in bidding for mega-events, and comparing them in three cities and two countries, the research hopes to lead to an open discussion of the public policy merits of bidding for mega-events and the underlying motivations, as well as further the academic discussion as to what constitutes an urban regime.
Chapter 2
Theories and Methodology

The question in urban politics at this stage has moved on from the question *Who Governs?* to one more interested in *how* they govern. The main theoretical approaches used in urban governance have been public choice theory, political economy and community power studies. At the extreme within the political economy perspective is neo-Marxism, which regime theorists argue is too deterministic as it doesn’t take into account agency. Community power studies can be broken into several subsets, most notably elitism and pluralism (Graham *et al.* 1998; Stoker 1998), the merits of which have been debated to great lengths over the decades. However, the one criticism against them both is that, while they endeavor to answer the *Who* part of governing, they fall short on the *How*. That is, if small groups of prominent individuals do have the greatest influence on a city’s agenda (elitism), exactly how do they exercise this power? And if power is diffused within a pluralist framework, how do tough decisions and priorities get made with general compliance from the community?

Arguably, it is public choice theory that best attempts to explain how people govern. In essence, political man is a rational being who pursues his or her own best interest. For a politician, that often means getting re-elected and all decisions made while governing will be an effort to succeed in that final goal. For an urban taxpayer and resident, pursuing rational self-interest presumably means choosing to live in an area where they can get the best services while paying the least amount of property tax and facing fewer user fees. As a logical result, public choice proponents should advocate for a fragmented local structure with many, smaller jurisdictions so that the urban consumer has greater opportunity to make a choice (Bish 2001, Graham *et al.* 1998, Tiebout 1956).

That brings us to two somewhat similar frameworks that have fallen under both the political economic and the community studies umbrella. Growth machine theory is an elitist concept in which the property industry holds systemic power within local
government (Graham et al., 25; Stoker, 122). This coalition focuses on economic development and economic growth. It has, however, been criticized as having too narrow a focus on economic development to be useful in other policy sectors and it has been criticized as being only applicable to the United States (Dowding 2001, Graham et al. 1998, Stoker 1998).

Urban regime theory, on the other hand, has been argued to be somewhat of a hybrid. It combines several of the aforementioned frameworks – elitism, pluralism, political economy and perhaps even a bit of public choice theory (as it is argued that one joins a coalition and engages in cooperation because it is in their best interest). At the risk of being repetitive from the previous chapter, here is a more detailed look at what the scholars have to say on where it fits into the theoretical debate. The point is to set up a discussion of the use of urban regime theory as a framework, focusing on its development through the work of Clarence Stone, as any debate during the past 20 years surrounding URT has been primarily about his writings, and he has been its main academic defender. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, Stoker and Mossberger discuss where regime theory fits in the debate between elitists and pluralists.

Regime theory is concerned more with the process of government-interest-group mediation than with the wider relationship between government and its citizens. Pluralists and elite theorists assumed government sought to control the mass of the public. For pluralists control is perceived as legitimate because of the open access to government. For elite theorists control is exercised in a manipulative way by excluding certain interests and ideas. Regime theorists view power as structured to gain certain kinds of outcomes within particular fields of government endeavor. (1994, 198)

Dowding, meanwhile, explains how regime theory combines political economy and pluralism.

These coalitions are not simply coalitions of elected politicians in loose-knit party support, but coalitions of the elected, business and other pressure organizations, and may include important bureaucratic and professional groups. In recognizing the broader base of potential coalition partners it has expanded the range of possible coalitions to encompass regimes that are not bound together by growth issues. In this manner, it has taken on the mantle of the political economy approach but has encompassed certain aspects of pluralism. This bringing together of the
political economy paradigm and pluralism is one of regime theory’s great strengths, allowing writers from different traditions and ideological persuasions to work within the same paradigm whilst stressing different aspects of it. (2001, 8)

In this chapter, we will try to investigate just how Stone, in particular, has brought together the political economist and the pluralist. We begin with the pillar of Stone’s work in 1989: his book on Atlanta city politics, analyzing more than 40 years of urban governance dating from 1946, when a Georgia court gave blacks the right vote, to the late 1980s. His study is an historical case study focusing on the impact of the black vote on city politics and how city leaders responded, in particular Atlanta’s downtown business elite. Stone is curious as to how Atlanta overcame the debilitating issue of race to get on with the general business of running the city while other southern cities were dragged down by segregation and caught up in racial violence.

Stone’s observation is that the black community was incorporated into a governing coalition with the politicians and white business elite. This biracial coalition of the black middle class and the white business class still experienced conflict within the coalition as each side made compromises and sought its own advantages from membership. However, the relationship remained stable and cooperative – two characteristics of the coalition, or Stone’s “urban regime”, that will be discussed in more detail below.

Stone’s working definition of an urban regime is found early in the book:

. . . the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions. (1989, 6)

Stone is also very clear on the scale to which local government operates – acknowledging it is but one level of governance, constrained by the decisions of others (as some critics have argued), but requiring the agency necessary to make policy decisions at a local level. Local politics does matter. Urban regimes do shape policy. They are the funnel, or
rather the “mediating agents between the ill-defined pressures of an urban environment and the making of community policy” (p. 6).

Underlying his use of urban regime theory in this research is the difference he sees in the study of the political through a social control lens versus a social production lens. It is in this discussion where one sees how he positions URT within the grander theoretical debates. It is the difference between government and governance. In the tradition of both U.S. political economy and elite pluralism, Stone acknowledges that government authority is limited by such things as the constitution, political tradition at the nation-state level, and the autonomy of private business interests (p. 3). These constraints both directly and indirectly lead (as we will see in this paper’s own research) to the need for local government to promote economic development within its boundary. With that need, government, by and for the people, enters into a sphere dominated by private ownership and, thus, private interests.

It is at this point in his Atlanta study that Stone parts ways with the traditional, macro views of political economy and elite pluralism with his own rendition of where URT fits into the surrounding theoretical debates on urban governance. The traditional theories of elitism and pluralism, specifically, are too focused on social control and who governs whom. Stone argues the social control model is problematic (“not helpful”, p. 220) in its analysis because it fails to fully explain how these phantom groups govern and, in essence, keep the general public in compliance in what he sees as an “incohesive, loosely-drawn society.” (p. 227)

. . . the paradigmatic issue is not the cost of compliance, since comprehensive control is out of the question. In a fragmented world, the issue is how to bring about enough cooperation among disparate community elements to get things done – and to do so in the absence of an overarching command structure or a unifying system of thought. (p. 227)

Instead, he uses what he calls a social-production model: “the capacity to assemble and use needed resources for a policy initiative” (p. 227). In a fragmented community, power is taken by those who have the capacity, or rather the means and/or
resources, to get things done. That could mean money. It could mean legal authority. It could mean the appropriate education. Or it could mean someone without any of it, but with access to it all. Central, then, to urban regime theory (and this need for the capacity to act) is cooperation. Stone identifies three separate spheres: electoral, economic and civic. It is through the civic sector that relationships are built between the other two. Thus, civic cooperation is a pillar of any urban regime. In what form this cooperation takes place is dependent on the characteristics of both the electorate and the local business sector. Stone argues that while the three sectors work together, during research it is important to study them as separate entities in order to highlight their details and hopefully “facilitate cross-city comparisons” (p. 185).

Using urban regime theory as his framework, Stone ultimately welcomes scholars to continue the research, especially in a comparative fashion. As a first step, we can highlight his above definition of an urban regime and then compose a rough checklist of what one looks for when trying to identify a regime in a city.

A checklist would look something like this:

An urban regime is:
- informal
- a stable, core group of actors with access to institutional resources
- purposive
- empowering
- inclusive of all private interests, not just business (such as labour, party, non-profit and church), although business is central
- dynamic
- pragmatic

An urban regime is not:
- static
- representative of one mind or identical interests
- created or directed at will
A regime must have:
1. the capacity (institutional resources) to do something,
2. a set of actors to do it,
3. and a relationship that allows them to cooperate (p. 179)

Thus, the questions to ask when analyzing the possibility of a regime include:
1. Who makes up the governing coalition?
2. How is this coming together accomplished?
3. What are the consequences? (p. 6)

Stone, On Pluralism

The pillars on which Stone’s urban regime theory are loosely based on pluralism and more substantially on political economy. His writings that are separate from his Atlanta work more succinctly underline both the similarities and the differences between URT, as a mid-level theory, and the macro-level lenses of pluralism and political economy. Stone understands we live in a pluralist society, insofar as our communities and their residents can be further categorized into various groups each with its own level of resources or influence on decision-making (from relatively non-existent power to quite influential). But if a pluralist believes that power in community decision-making is relatively widely dispersed, and that a wealth of resources can be overcome as long as groups properly organize themselves, then Stone is very obviously an elite pluralist. He believes that sheer numbers of people simply cannot counteract sheer wealth when it comes to political influence. A pluralist society, he contends, lacks any decision-making capacity because the cost-of-compliance is almost impossibly high. If everybody stands on equal footing, logic dictates you will not be able to get everyone to agree. Those with power are those with resources. The types of resources necessary to wield power can vary. This is not news. While Stone does not want urban regime theory to be dismissed as elite pluralism (2005), this paper introduces Stone first as an elite pluralist to better illustrate the theoretical groundings of urban regime theory. Throughout Stone’s early
and later work, one sees his need to explain *how* community power is organized and put to use – how elite pluralism actually operates – and this becomes the essence of urban regime theory’s relevance to comparative urban studies.

Stone attempts to explain how systemic power works rather than allowing elitists and neo-Marxists to casually use the term as a given. In order to govern a pluralist society, one must have the capacity to act. Local government is given part of its capacity from the residents through an election. However, he also believes governments are dependent on the private sector for their resources, both intellectual and monetary, in order to get things accomplished. Here we see Stone’s inclination towards Lindblom-style elite pluralism where the business class holds a privileged position (and which we will later use to illustrate where URT fits into the political economy perspective). Stone puts the politician at the apex of a “triad” between government, private sector and the electorate. Ultimately, it is the rationality of the politician that balances the needs of both groups (a public choice argument). But specifically, it is the politician’s need to incorporate elite/business needs that leads to systemic power, which he also calls a “system of stratification.” He writes:

> public officials form their alliances, make their decisions and plan their futures in a context in which strategically important resources are hierarchically arranged . . . Systemic power therefore has to do with the impact of the larger socioeconomic system on the predispositions of public officials. (1980, 979)

Such socio-economic differences are economic power, associational power or social position. However, it is important to remember that the third member of that triad is the electorate, and this is where Stone parts ways with elitism. The politician has no power if he/she does not get re-elected and that fact will rein in any tendency to lean completely away from the public good. Stone does not believe that:

> there is a ruling class exercising general dominance. Instead, the systemic power argument holds that the nature of upper strata advantage and lower strata disadvantage varies with the dimension of stratification under consideration. (1980, 984)
Stone repeats this argument 25 years later, adamant that there is no permanent body of elites or actors making decisions on how to run government. Depending on the policy agenda, urban regime theory holds that certain groups and their resources will be mobilized given certain problems. Business interests may or may not be a required member (2005, 313).

How do politicians work with the “upper strata” but still keep the public interest in mind? Stone is interested, not so much with community power as with community decision-making.

From the “ruling class”, we go to the concept of coalitional power – “that process of working out arrangements between complementary domains. . .” (1988, 88) – as Stone revisits his misgivings about the cost of compliance in a pluralist society by discussing the use of agenda control, or “preemptive power”. While command power allows one actor to tell another what to do with limited resistance, in coalitional power the actors involved have a “mutual capacity to resist” (p. 88) and this can lead to instability. However, it is in its members' interest to cooperate with each other to keep the coalition together. Stone argues the community is much more complex than actor versus actor.

The basic relationship is one in which the power of one entity comes from the dependence of the other . . . The entities involved are a dependent public largely unorganized for specifically political purposes and an informal but organized structure concerned with setting policy. Since this informal structure is composed of multiple elements, it can be referred to as the policy coalition . . . The presence of such a structure confers advantages on those who are able to claim membership in it. (1988, 89)

Stone likens it to machine politics and its role as a broker whereby “the machine is able to set the terms on which transactions occur, making some kinds of transactions more likely and others less likely” (p. 89). It is a strategic role.

The weakness of the pluralist’s public authority comes from the complex community’s need for a policy-setting coalition. Stone reiterates this as a fundamental
difference between pluralism and urban regime theory – the concept that one-person-one-vote makes politics open and accessible and can overcome any disadvantages of wealth and social status (2005, 310). Instead, Stone argues that urban regime theory explains why politics is accessible mainly to those that meet certain criteria (2005, 311).

While the public may be able to mobilize itself against a particular issue enough to persuade or weaken a member/s of the coalition, the coalition itself is still needed to set policy. Hence “mounting opposition is not enough. One must be able to come up with an alternative coalition” (1988, 90). Stone’s 1988 discussion of the policy-setting coalition relates to preemptive power and how the ruling class might control the agenda. What does this mean for urban regime theory? It is from this focus on the coalition and its strategic role that the theoretical beliefs behind URT come – URT being the practical implementation phase of the theory of community power.

While there is a sense in which the policy-setting coalition is dependent on the public for compliance, the public is not an organized and unified entity. It cannot simply withhold compliance; it must be organized to do that. Generally, the policy-setting coalition can act as a unified entity: its members have an incentive to remain intact, and they control resources to work at it. The public lacks a comparable capacity for unified action. (1988, 91)

**Stone, On Political Economy**

Pluralists see society as divided into groups with power widely dispersed. They acknowledge that some groups have more resources than others, but that can be overcome by organizing properly. While people may be apathetic to much that happens in governance, they can be aggravated to the point of getting involved. There can be no doubt that URT is partly rooted in pluralism, and very deeply rooted in elite pluralism. Stone is clear that he believes the public sector very much needs the resources of the private sector in order to establish a capacity to act, and that provides another pillar under urban regime theory. Those who hold political or legal power in governance still need the economic power that the business class can bring in order to provide a thriving community. Stone categorizes pluralism as a political culture approach and places regime theory under political economy (Stone 1993). Pluralists believe the economy is just one
of several “discrete spheres of activity”; regime theory holds the middle ground between the pluralist view and that of the structuralist who argues that the mode of production dominates all spheres. Pluralists argue that the state is autonomous and the allocation of costs and benefits will be done evenly. Regime theory holds it will reflect the governing coalition. While pluralists believe government authority is enough to govern, regime theory argues it is not. While the two sides agree no one group can dominate power, regime theory holds that resources are important. In this discussion of power, Stone differentiates between “power over” and “power to” by introducing what he calls a “social production model of power” in which an electoral victory doesn’t bestow power, but rather that power is created through the cooperation of unequal partners (1993, 8).

Stone states regime theory is about the two-way relationship between politics and the economy, not the subordination of one to the other. Within a political economy context, regime theory assumes two things (and, thus, is only useful to a certain extent within a comparative framework): that society is open, free and democratic, and that its economy is mainly guided by privately controlled investment (1993, 2).

The relationship between urban regime theory and political economy is most obvious in his work on development policy. Stone’s work on urban regime theory has been most closely associated with urban development policy, perhaps unfairly due primarily to his role as editor of a collection of essays on urban development (Stone, 1987). It is in this writing that Stone clearly maps out the relationship between urban regime theory and political economy, and it is also in this work where he devises a casual typology of regime that has been quoted extensively in academic debate. This particular book sets out two goals:

1. to show that local politics does matter and is not simply shaped by external, structural forces but actually mediates how a community deals with such forces
2. To demonstrate that politics is shaped by a division of labour between the state and market (1987, 4)

While urban regime theory derives itself from political economy, Stone is very clear that he nonetheless has problems with the extreme structuralism of neo-Marxism -- much as he had trouble with the conclusions of elite pluralists (Stone 1993, 1987). By using such a general and abstract class-based criticism to explain everything, it ends up explaining nothing. In fact, Stone’s opinions about Marxism eventually answer the criticisms of academics who would argue that urban regime theory, itself, merely describes political arrangements and does not provide an analytical framework (a discussion in which we will participate later in this paper). Stone believes academics need to step back from such general theorizations and “focus on the historically specific, but without ignoring continuities in context” (1987, 14). While local officials do operate within a context they can’t control, they are “architects of their own responses” (1987,14). Stone uses urban development policy to illustrate exactly how urban regimes are created, how they operate, and why they are relevant. That critics later argue urban regime theory is irrelevant because it can only be used in this one public policy area; or that it cannot be used comparatively because U.S. –style urban development policy is so structurally different from other countries, seems to be merely arguing for the sake of argument. By 2005, Stone takes his detractors to task, explaining to them that development policy was merely a way to illustrate urban regimes at work. Regimes do not include just politicians and businessmen, he argues, and its policy goals can be something other than just land development (Stone 2005).

Specifically, Stone does not disagree with Paul Peterson that cities are mainly occupied with matters of economic growth (Stone 1987). However, case studies show that cities within the U.S. use different measures to achieve this growth, despite operating within the same structural context (1987, 269). It is this variation that he believes needs more study, using the urban regime framework. Researchers should consider such variables as risk, equality versus efficiency, costs (who bears them) and benefit allocation
when comparing economic growth measures used in different cities and this will tell you the character of the regime or “prevailing coalition” that is governing the community. If economic growth decisions are to be made, according to the community’s “collective good”, then who defines the “collective good”? Stone argues it is defined by the prevailing coalition (1987, 282). Categorizing styles of economic growth in the above manner allows the researcher to observe the weaknesses of the political arrangements, because who pays versus who benefits will illustrate who is truly running the show. We will return to this later in a discussion of the methodology.

Most important to remember is that the crux of his argument remains that a regime’s character shapes policy, no matter the policy sector (1987, 271 and 274). His examples of a corporate regime versus a caretaker regime or one that is progressive is merely meant to illustrate this point (they are a means to an end, not an end in itself). That these categories have been taken at face value, criticized for not being broad enough, and expanded in subsequent works by regime theorists, is academically curious. This researcher is not convinced Stone meant for that to happen.

Structural constraints, such as a global economic crisis or federal constitutional responsibilities, are mediated through local political arrangements. And who is party to these arrangements will have a great deal of say in how a community deals with the coming challenges. In a clear debate between structure and agency, urban regime theory falls squarely under the heading of “agency”. As Stone states time and time again: politics matters.

A Critique

If a regime’s character shapes policy, then what shapes the regime? Regime theory’s focus on the internal workings of a regime (agency), as opposed to the structures within which the regime operates, has opened it up to criticism regarding its usefulness as a theoretical framework. To the extreme of the criticism, Pierre (2005) denounces it as little more than a dependent variable where different contexts produce different types of
governance. Urban regimes are merely one style of American urban governance. Critics claim it cannot be used for cross-national comparison because it is so much based on the U.S. political context and argue the European context does not have such an independent local government nor such a dependence on private capital as does the U.S. (Pierre 2005, Kantor and Savitch 2005, Davies 2003, Ward 1996). In response, regime theorists have expanded and invented new descriptive categories of regimes that they feel are more inclusive of the European experience (such as Kantor and Savitch 1997, Mossberger and Stoker 2001, Dowding et al 1999, DiGaetano and Klemanski 1993). Ward argues that such a focus on grouping types of regime fails to develop causal forces, and while there may be a fair number of regime typologies developed, none of these studies explains why they form in such a manner (1996).

One criticism of urban regime theory fundamentals is its focus on agency at the expense of structure, also referred to as the context within which a regime operates (Bennett and Spirou 2006, Pierre 2005, Imbroscio 2003, Davies 2002 and 2003, Kantor and Savitch 1997, Sites, 1997, Peterson 1987, Ward 1996). Peterson (1981) took an economic deterministic view of local politics in that local politics was mainly irrelevant because city governments were compelled to pursue economic development policy. Stone’s regime theory work that showed differences in economic development strategies was meant to reply that local politics does matter. But Peterson (1987) responded that Stone’s conclusions on differing strategies within economic development did nothing to disprove Peterson’s basic contention that desire for economic growth drove local government public policy. It is age-old can’t-see-the-forest-for-the-trees argument.

Imbroscio’s (2003) “sympathetic” critique, which is oft quoted in regime theory discussions, replays this debate, but sides with Peterson that regime theory must admit economic development is central to the governance of a city. If local politics matters, Imbroscio says it is only in the policy implementation phase. He believes that regime theory must better take into account the economic constraints on a city’s authority. Regime theory may have better success, he writes, if it is able to illustrate that cities make irrational choices in the strategies they use to encourage economic growth. The reasons
for these irrational choices may then lie within the regime’s characteristics. While Davies (2002) is willing to concede that local agency matters, he wonders: “How much?” His misgivings about regime theory surround how economic forces affect local political institutions and the power relationships within them. He is not altogether ready to throw Marx out the window and thinks regime theory would be well served to reconsider the role of economic trends and their effects on local politics. Critics also take specific issue with regime theory’s consideration of the scale of governance. Ward (1996) in particular is concerned that the theory’s methodology is “bottom-up” in that it stops at city boundaries. He feels the theory would be better served with a “top-down” view in which higher-level authorities are incorporated.

Taken together, regime theory is considered “under-theorized” by its critics due mainly because it lacks an explanation of regime formation and change (Imbroscio 2003, Davies 2002, Ward 1996). It is hard to operationalize and therefore difficult to use on a comparative basis (Ward 1996). The research that comes out of regime theory, its critics contend, has been nothing more than empirical observation.

Even Mossberger and Stoker, a proponent of the usefulness of URT, acknowledge that urban regime theory is more of a model than a theory, in that it is not able to predict how regimes form or change over time. There are some challenges that must be addressed if using it in research: its dependence on case-study methodology can lead to parochialism, misclassification and concept stretching (2001, 814). It still needs a measurement of how much cooperation constitutes a regime. More research is needed regarding the context in which regimes form, are maintained and are changed. And while they expand the categories of regimes in an attempt to make them more relevant to the European experience, they acknowledge that more research needs to be done on why regimes take on certain characteristics.
Stone’s Response

By 2001, Stone realized he had a problem with his model and how it was shaping up in Atlanta. Post-Olympic Atlanta had new problems outside of economic development surrounding education and poverty. But his biracial coalition was slow to respond. The coalition worked quite well when the issue was city renewal – an issue of great importance to the business sector. Now, it seemed the regime was in decline. The model he comes up with to explain the rise and fall of a regime uses agenda-setting terminologies and is both circular and unhelpful. One can only surmise that this led the scholar to re-examine the theory, because his writings in this new decade seek more to directly answer critics and flesh out the theory.

Stone takes both Imbroscio and Peterson head-on. For Stone, it does not makes sense to dismiss the importance of local politics simply because the overriding concern might be economic development. “Life is in the details,” he writes. “And so is politics” (2004, 5). He takes issue with their description of economic development as a “unitary interest” because, as he has argued in earlier discussions on pluralism, no one is capable of defining the true unitary or public interest. Public interest is what the decision-makers say it is. For Stone, there are “competing purposes” in policymaking, and which ones are prioritized depends on who is making the decision. While there may be consensus at the broader level, that is different than having consensus “at the level of a concrete course of action.” (p. 3) Important to Stone’s discussion in this area is the concept of bounded rationality in relation to unitary interests, business interests or public interests. He suggests that the researcher must look at the motives for a coalition working together, because it may not be as simple as an individual seeking “selective incentives” or side-payments (2005, 313). Instead, there may be a larger purpose or agenda within which actors maybe willing to compromise on their smaller incentives.

Stone does not believe there can be any one grand theory of the larger economic order, and argues that urban regime theory was never sold as such (2004, 2005):
Instead, its limited scope provides a way of examining how large forces for change play out concretely across a range of localities . . . The analysis of urban regimes is appropriate, then, for helping to explain how communities respond to broad social and economic change. (2004, 7)

In the ongoing debate of structure versus agency, Stone argues that it is the agent that strengthens or modifies the structure, and that the agent must consider “more immediate and complex” factors than just “broad structural pressures” (2005, 323) when making policy decisions.

Urban regime analysis thus concerns how local agency fits into the play of larger forces. Local actors are shaped by and respond to large structures, but the appropriate lens for viewing this wider field is local agency – what motivates actors at this level, what affects their ability to cooperate or puts them into conflict, the leverage they can gain in tackling problems, and in general what they make of the structural forces in which they are enmeshed. (p. 324)

On the criticisms of the lack of a tight definition of an urban regime, and the result of researchers having stretched the concept beyond explanatory usefulness, Stone responds that the critics are asking the wrong questions when observing local governing arrangements. Instead, they should focus on questions regarding the character of the governing arrangements, how the actors are enabled to pursue a specific agenda, and what is shaping the strength and direction of their efforts (2004, 9). Stone believes studying micro-behavior in decision making, far from being localism, allows researchers to understand how actors with otherwise strong and differing ideologies on a grander scale, can often work together at the local policy-making level. Ask too much, and you lose focus. Ask too little and you miss the opportunity “to refine our understanding of how local communities are governed” (p. 17).

**The Theory, in Summary**

The research question that this paper seeks to answer is straightforward: Why do municipalities around the world bid for the right to host mega-events? The decision to pursue this policy course is made not only at the national level, but ultimately at the local
level in North America, South America, Europe, Asia and Africa. The paper seeks to
discover who is driving this policy agenda, what are the coalitions that develop, what
resources are sought in building this coalition, and what are the motivations. To get lost
in pursuits of grand theory is arguably unhelpful.

In an attempt to contribute to a more robust model of urban regime theory, this
paper starts with the policy output – that of bidding for a mega-event -- and works
outwards. By working in this direction, it is hoped we can peel back the layers of
structure, context and scale of decision-making to reveal the forces at work on local
governance. It is undeniable that this is a policy agenda being followed by many local
governments around the world.

Our three municipalities under study – Melbourne, Halifax and Hamilton – were
each municipalities that focused on economic development during the time of the bids.
Each municipality chose the mega-event strategy as a policy direction in its pursuit of
economic development. But there were also other policy goals, some intertwining with
economic development such as infrastructure improvements, facility development,
international profile and prestige. Do urban regimes exist in these cities? Is there a set of
informal arrangements made between Stone’s electoral, economic and civic
communities? And what are their characteristics? Do these characteristics lead to a mega-
event strategy? Our research in each case identifies the actors involved in the policy
decision-making and their motivations. This illustrates why a seemingly irrational
strategy, due to its high costs and high risks, is undertaken by certain local governments.

By engaging in this research, we are following Stone’s guidelines on what
questions should be asked when studying the existence and behavior of urban regimes.
As will become evident during a discussion of our research, power is needed to see a bid
through to its end – power is the capacity to assemble needed resources as per Stone.
Those resources include money, knowledge and political will. They are not mutually
exclusive. Any weakness in these three pillars of a regime – electoral, economic, and civic – can cause the bid effort to self-destruct, as we will see in the case of Halifax.

While urban regime theory is a disputed framework, this paper holds that the suggestions made by critics are useful in improving its use. The policy of bidding for mega-events is an extremely relevant way of illustrating just how matters of structure and context – from the global capitalist economy to the division of responsibilities between federal and state/provincial governments – impact the decision making of local actors in three separate localities. It will illuminate and compare the coalition building that takes place in three separate cities, located in two separate countries, but with similar policy agendas.

Methodology

The challenges in using urban regime theory have been laid out earlier in this chapter. A broader definition of a regime is needed in order to make the concept better transferable across nations. Yet, it must still be specific enough, and measurable, in order for a regime to be identified over merely a convenient coalition. The researcher is urged to take into account multiple levels of analysis, or scale, in the study of an urban regime insofar as local governance does not take place in a vacuum, but rather acts and reacts within its political, economic and cultural context. The researcher should also show that the economic policy decisions made were a direct result of the character of the regime and not simply economic determinism.

Currently, the main challenge for comparative urban researchers centres on the study of scale in local governance. Here, the scholars admit the challenge is problematic, particularly in research design. The researcher is urged to compare policy-making processes, institutional linkages from the neighborhood to the global, and the general characteristics of space. At the same time, she is also cautioned to be mindful of parochialism, to search for functional equivalents and consistent data when comparing, and the need for careful definitions of variables, which can be measured. There is
concern that most of the research into urban governance has been based on the single-case study, and not very comparative. All this is underlined by the acknowledgement that urban comparative research lacks general theory, instead offering middle-range theories that cannot be easily transferred across nations (Ward 1996, Davies 2003, Kantor and Savitch 2005, Sellers 2005, Pierre 2005, Denters and Mossberger 2006).

With these questions and challenges in mind, perhaps it is most helpful to return to the initial question and purpose of this research. Why do municipalities around the world bid for mega-events when the costs are high and there is no guarantee of success in winning a bid, nor of the multi-billion-dollar event itself garnering the benefits hoped for. Specifically, what is happening in these cities that this risky public policy is even an option? Who is making the decisions and what are the motivations? The financial and social repercussions of such a decision are staggering. As shown in the introductory chapter, lower-income residents are displaced, environmental impacts are harsh, and local governments are in danger of taking on huge debt-loads, which can impact the quality of life for all local residents for decades to come as property taxes suffer under the financial burdens. The underlying assumption of this comparative research is that cities pursuing this mega-event policy will have similar economic contexts and that their decision-makers will come from similar sectors with similar motivations.

Sartori’s 1991 article “Comparing and Miscomparing” may be 20 years old, but it is a sobering call for comparative researchers to clear the mind of academic noise and focus on the task at hand. That is: “Why compare?” He is disappointed in the field of comparative politics and feels it has lost its purpose, filled with “parochial yardsticks and hypotheses” (p. 244); single-case studies that may have comparative merit but are in no way actually comparative, and has become content at being used “for better understanding and explanation” (p. 244) rather than actually comparing what is the same and what is different: “. . . the question always is: comparable with respect to which properties or characteristics, and incomparable (i.e. too dissimilar) with respect to which other properties or characteristics” (p. 246)?
Specifically, he argues that classifications establish what is the same and what differs. The danger, of course, is that you could have so many classifications that each individual case becomes its own category. (As previously noted, this has been a criticism of urban regime theory, in that its researchers merely describe urban styles of decision-making by creating a new type of regime.) If you are trying to develop a general theory of governance, the more conditions that are necessary for a specific outcome, the less its applicability (p. 251). But this is not generally a bad thing, according to Sartori; rather it is simply par for the course in comparative social science. It is up to the researcher to decide how inclusive or discriminatory her classifications are and he suggests that a “ladder of abstraction” is absolutely necessary in that the characteristics of a concept are reduced in order to render it transferable across nations (p. 252).

Perhaps a brief review of how urban regime theory has been used in some of the more prominent case studies outside of the United States would be helpful. In summary, the international research has been qualitative and focused on the single-case study, using government documents, media reports and elite interviews to collect its “data”. Academics have taken up the challenge of trying to use URT in non-American settings, from Bristol to Berlin to Sydney. The published academic articles are anecdotal, telling stories of government decision-making and describing the people involved and the institutions and processes within which they make their decisions.

DiGaetano and Klemanski (1993) study Bristol and Birmingham with the expressed intent of developing a comparative framework and determining if URT can be used across nations. If identifiable structures of urban power exist across nations, they write, that could be the basis for comparative urban research and they conclude that different political economic contexts can be used to compare regime formations. DiGaetano and Klemanski argue that the differing relationship between the state and business in Great Britain (as compared to the U.S.) means a broader definition of regime is required, and they come up with four new classifications: market-led pro-growth,
government-led pro-growth, social reform, growth management (p. 59). The emphasis is on the arrangement of political power and how it affects economic development. However, the work does not provide clear criteria for identifying a regime.

Strom (1996) wishes to explore whether American political economic approaches, particularly urban regime theory, are applicable to the economic transformation occurring in Berlin. She concludes that URT should not be dismissed as inapplicable to European circumstances, arguing that URT should not be regarded as an American regime approach, but rather a regime approach that has been applied in America (p. 460). Regime theory, she argues, is still useful as a way to analyze the relationship between wielders of economic versus political power. Of noted interest in this research, is her use of Berlin’s bid for the 2000 Olympics as an example of a growth coalition beginning to develop (and of its shaky foundations as the bid was heavily criticized).

John and Cole (1998) apply URT to France and the United Kingdom by describing the cities of Leeds and Lille, concluding that the theory is relevant to the European experience in terms of analyzing business incentives, coalition formation, informal politics and political leadership. They list five “favourable conditions” to regime formation: local and integrated business interests (in which one can speak for many), a large metropolis, a tradition of local pragmatism and trust, and uniqueness to the city (p. 388).

Dowding et al (1999) focus on London with the purpose of applying URT to six boroughs to see if it is relevant. The research gives an anecdotal description of the six boroughs, concludes that Croydon has such a regime, and then lists those actors. The research provides a checklist of regime features that focuses on matters such as a distinctive and long-term policy agenda that is sustained by coalitions of actors that cross sectors and institutions, and which can survive personnel or leadership changes over time (p. 516).
McGuirk (2003) specifically attempted a multi-scalar study of Sydney, analyzing how all levels of government as well as social processes and political-economic relations intersected in local governance. He identified and listed coalition actors, concluding that one could not understand Sydney’s local governance:

without a multiscaled perspective that attends to: 1) the city’s changing position in a globalized economy, 2) the (uneven) mediation of that economy by policy strategies emerging from different tiers in the scalar organization of government, and 3) to the politics of how these strategies are played-out in the practice of urban governance. (p. 219)

While he focused on scale, his methods used were similar to other URT research: in-depth interviews, documents and media reports.

In more recent work, Holman (2007) wants to know why and how the private, public and volunteer sectors actually collaborate in regimes and she uses a development in Portsmouth – Gunwharf Quays – as the case study. Her working definition of a regime comes from Stone in 2006: “a set of arrangements or relationship (informal as well as formal) by which a community is governed” (p. 436) and she provides a 10-point list of characteristics that she believes describe a regime. Her conclusion is that the governance arrangements in Portsmouth satisfied regime requirements.

Tretter (2008) focuses on Glasgow with the purpose of using URT to analyze scale and local governance, illustrating how scales of authority can affect a coalition, and vice versa. His definition of an urban regime is derived from both Elkin and Stone and his thesis is that the European City of Culture Festival succeeded because it “fused multiple expectations of a coalition of diverse actors” (p. 88). Tretter defends his use of the single case study as one that may not produce generalizations, but that can demonstrate detail and show causal complexity.

In 2001, scholars Burbank, Andranovich and Heying published the book Olympic Dreams, asking, specifically: “Why do some cities use entrepreneurial, even speculative,
growth strategies while other cities seek growth with more modest techniques” (p. 20)? They used qualitative case-study analysis, looking at bids for the Olympic Games by Los Angeles, Atlanta and Salt Lake City. Their working thesis was “that mega-events are quintessential growth regime endeavors and that the initiation of a mega-event strategy is largely inexplicable outside the context of regime politics” (p. 29). They use a standard Stone definition of an urban regime and use documents, media reports, personal interviews and opinion poll data to answer the questions: How and why did the city seek to host mega-events? How were policy decisions made? What were the outcomes?

It is from the above-mentioned work that this piece of research begins.

**The Commonwealth Games**

The Commonwealth Games bids by Hamilton, Canada (for 1994, 2010 and 2014), Melbourne, Australia (2006), and the withdrawn Halifax, Nova Scotia bid (2014) will provide the case studies of municipalities using the mega-event strategy. The purpose of this research is to investigate the political coalitions that form around a city’s bid for a mega-event and the motivations behind these coalitions. It will compare and contrast the coalitions in the three municipalities existing in two different countries. It will also compare three separate bids made in Hamilton along a timeline of approximately 16 years in order to study regime change. That gives this research five observations of the phenomenon.

The research on each municipality will focus on the period around the time of the domestic and international bids—typically about seven years before the event is to take place. For Melbourne, this would be 1996-1999; for Halifax, 2005-2006; and for Hamilton: 1987, 2003 and 2005. (We focus on 2005 for Hamilton and Halifax, which is nine years before the 2014 Games because the domestic portion of the bid process takes place earlier than the international bidding competition). The economic, social and political contexts will come from government and industry reports and documents, newspapers, as well as academic articles.
The Commonwealth Games brings together athletes from 72 nations in the British Commonwealth for a period of 10-14 days every four years.* In Melbourne’s 2006 Games, for example, 4,500 athletes competed for medals in 14 sports. Some 1.5 million tickets were sold to various events and the estimated television audience was 1.5 billion (Insight Economics 2006, 115).

The Games, as an entity, are owned by the Commonwealth Games Federation (CGF) that, every four years, entrusts the Commonwealth Games Association (CGA) of the host country with organizing the event. The CGA establishes an organizing committee, which has legal status and is responsible for organizing and staging the Games. Funding comes by way of the sale of international broadcasting rights, corporate sponsorship, ticket sales, licensing and merchandising sales, and sizeable monetary contributions from local and central government.

A city is awarded the right to host a Commonwealth Games seven years before it is scheduled to take place, with the CGF’s General Assembly voting for the winner at its annual meeting after a competitive campaign between interested cities. Each country’s CGA can have up to three representatives at the assembly, but there is only one vote per association. A city must win the majority of votes before it is declared host. Thus, if there is no majority on the first ballot, the city with the least number of votes is dropped and voting takes place again. This goes on until the majority has voted in favour of one city. Hamilton lost this vote in October 2003 to New Delhi, India. Melbourne was acclaimed as the 2006 host as no other county put up an opposing bid. It still, however, ran a bid campaign.

The bid process for this type of Games (whether acclaimed or voted in) entails a municipality first competing to win the right to become the official bid of its country. Interested cities officially apply to their national CGA. The initial proposal includes how

---

* The most complete and up-to-date information on the Commonwealth Games Federation, its member countries and how it conducts its votes can be found at its website: www.thecgf.com
the city would host certain events (the existing facilities versus those that have to be built) and how they would accommodate the athletes, media, volunteers as well as the hordes of tourists. The board of the CGA votes on which city should go forward to the international bidding process. As the official representative, that city receives funding commitments and support from all corners – from the prime minister to its ambassadors abroad – in order to convince members of the federation that it is the best choice to host the event. Hamilton, as an example, was Canada’s official bid city for the 2010 Games. However, the Canadian CGA chose Halifax to officially bid for the following 2014 Games, over interests from Hamilton, Ottawa, and York Region. Halifax was bidding internationally against Glasgow and Abuja, Nigeria.

Making an official bid is an involved process that takes a great deal of time and money. In general, a city sets up an official bid corporation that is responsible for all the details of the process, from researching all the technical details to publishing the bid document to greeting CGF site inspectors to hosting hospitality suites at various events. In this bid corporation you will find a board of directors, officers of the corporation and committee co-chairs.

At least six months prior to the vote, an official bid document must be submitted to the federation office, with copies sent to the executive board and all CGAs. The document should be in the form of a printed booklet laying out how the event will be run and containing answers to a questionnaire. It is signed by the president and secretary-general of the CGA, endorsed by the chair or senior official of the bid committee, and must include written support from all levels of government including the host city. The document must include charges for lodging of athletes and team officials as well as lay out the plans for things such as transportation, medical services, security, technology and media, sports program and venues, finances and marketing. Delegates from the CGF executive board visit each bid city for a site inspection. They evaluate the bid and release a report to the General Assembly. At the General Assembly meeting, bid cities organize
receptions and hospitality suites complete with displays, exhibitions and entertainment. Just before the final vote, a delegation from each city gives a 30-minute presentation.

The Case Studies

Melbourne is the lone successful bid, having hosted the 2006 Commonwealth Games. Hamilton failed to win the domestic portion of the bid competition for both the 1994 and 2014 Commonwealth Games, however it was Canada’s official bid city for the 2010 Games, eventually losing to New Delhi. Halifax is included in the study because of a twist in its policy decision-making surrounding the Commonwealth Games. In 2005, it won the domestic bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games over several other Canadian cities, including Hamilton, but as its committee developed a bid package for the international competition, the Province of Nova Scotia and the City of Halifax suddenly withdrew support citing financial concerns, and the bid collapsed.

Canada and Australia are geographically vast countries and highly developed Western democracies based on the Westminster model of government where local municipalities exercise varying degrees of autonomy within the taxation and governance restraints imposed from higher levels of government. Canada and Australia are federal systems in which areas of autonomy are constitutionally divided between national and regional levels of government (states in Australia, provinces in Canada). Economically, Hamilton and Melbourne are historical and modern-day industrial centres in their respective countries. Melbourne is Victoria’s state capital and its region is the industrial and urban centre of the state. Hamilton is a steel town, historically, although that has been in decline for decades. It plays a secondary role in the province of Ontario, where the capital and financial centre is Toronto, 45 minutes down the highway, and the nation’s capital is Ottawa, about 5 hours away. Halifax is the financial centre of Canada’s Atlantic Region and the provincial capital. All are port cities, Hamilton on Lake Ontario, Melbourne on the Yarra River and Victoria harbour, and Halifax on the Atlantic Ocean. Each has an international airport and is home to major universities with all those inherent research and knowledge resources available.
Anecdotally, the three cities share a municipal inferiority complex of varying degrees. Melbourne tends to find itself in competition with cities such as Brisbane and Sydney, to whom it lost the Australian bid competition for the 2000 Olympic Games. Hamilton has always operated in the shadow of the much larger and higher profile Toronto. Not large enough or with high enough stature to make a bid for the Olympic Games, it was always a site for secondary competition in the official, unsuccessful Toronto bids. As for Halifax, it could be argued that the Atlantic provinces have long complained about the excesses of Central and Western Canada and that it was time the East Coast received funding support for sporting infrastructure and to build its international reputation as a destination for tourism and investment.

The three cities also have a history of sports interest as well as the desire to bid for the right to host sporting events. Melbourne hosted the 1956 Olympics, lost its bid to host the 1996 Olympics to Atlanta and, as mentioned previously, lost in its domestic bid to represent Australia at the international bidding stage for the 2000 Olympics. However, it has become known as Australia’s events capital (Phillips 2007, 29), annually hosting such large sporting events as the Australian Open tennis championship and a Formula One Grand Prix.

Hamilton has a long list of bids, some successful, some not. It is the founding host of the 1930 Empire Games (the former name of the Commonwealth Games). It tried to win the nomination as Canada’s official bid city for the 1994 Games (as did Halifax), but lost to Victoria that eventually won the right to host the event. Nonetheless, its resume includes hosting 2003 world road cycling, 1996 world curling, world junior hockey, hockey’s Canada Cup, the International Children’s Games, and the Grey Cup, Canada’s professional football championship. The fact that Hamilton was not successful in its bid to host the 1994 or 2010 Commonwealth Games is irrelevant for the purposes of this paper. Instead, the research seeks to discover the reasons why a municipality would take the risk of officially applying to host a mega-event in the first place. In fact, continuing to
invest in the bidding process despite previous disappointment makes the case all the more compelling to this issue.

Halifax has also previously bid to host the Commonwealth Games, most recently in 2002 and back in 1987 (losing out to Victoria and Hamilton respectively in the domestic bid phase). It has hosted several high profile sporting events, including the 1990 world figure skating championships, 2003 world junior hockey championships, and 2008 world hockey championships.

This research asks one primary question. Why do municipalities around the world bid for the right to host mega-events despite the fact that the cost to simply bid for these rights can run into the millions; the cost to run these events in the billions, and the promise of economic success absolutely not guaranteed? It uses urban regime theory as its framework for analysis for two reasons:

1. URT is a proven lens through which to illustrate and explain the coalitions that form around a bid, incorporating both the pluralistic and political economic angles.
2. It has been used in research similar to this dissertation and we can thus further enhance the theory as we attempt to duplicate the methods that have been used in previous research and thus reinforce its applicability.

This paper will use Stone’s definitions and description as its working definition of identifying a regime: a regime is an informal yet stable group of core actors with access to political and financial resources. It has a clear, pragmatic purpose and its existence provides an empowerment to accomplish tasks that otherwise would be overwhelming. The group includes all private interests, not just business although business is central. In following his suggestions, we will ask the following questions: Who makes up the governing coalition? How is this coming together accomplished? What are the consequences (1987, 6)?
As discussed in Chapter 1, this paper also uses Mossberger and Stoker’s (2001, 194) definition of a symbolic regime where the intent of the policy is to change a city’s image or ideology using symbols to mobilize the public. They also introduce the term “auxiliary player” whose role they feel is very relevant in regime theory outside of North America especially in terms of individuals with technical or professional expertise. They bring knowledge to the group as a businessman may bring wealth.

It is important to note at this point, that the international URT case-study research to date analyzes different policies in one city in order to identify and classify the existence of a regime. The aim of this research, however, is to focus on one policy over time and in three different geographic locations, to see if similar regimes form. Focusing on one policy outcome, can a regime be identified in the three different cities? Will those regimes have similar members or will they be different, despite having the same policy goal?

This is a qualitative study. Archival and publicly available documents have served as a foundation, figuring prominently in identifying policy decision-making actors. Information gained from these documents, such as government records and reports at the local, provincial and national levels; bid committee records, and media stories, serve as background research to provide points of debate, context and a timeline in the anecdotal portion of the dissertation. Some one-on-one interviews were conducted via e-mail, telephone, or in person. These were elite interviews comprising mainly people who are in public service either as bureaucrats or elected officials, as well as high-profile people in the business and sports professions all of whom are well experienced in being interviewed. Primarily, they were involved with their respective city’s bid(s) for the Commonwealth Games.

Going through the bid documents, the research identifies the board of directors on each of the bid committees, categorizes them as politician, bureaucrat, businessperson, or auxiliary member. After identifying the major players and setting the timeline of the bid
through the bid documents and media stories, interviews will help supplement the research into motivations for bidding as well as possibly identify other behind-the-scenes local actors in the bid. Municipal documents will also aid in following a timeline and identifying points of debate. Staff reports such as cost/benefit analyses, recommendations and conclusions about the impact of the Games will provide further context.

Of course, there are always limitations with this type of research. With interviews, you are always relying on someone’s memory. Their memory may be faulty. They may be misleading. It will be important to focus people on their feelings before the bid occurred, not on its known results. Therefore, it is necessary to obtain as much information as possible from documents and written materials from the relevant time period with only supplementary information coming from interviews.

This research paper also acknowledges there are limitations with a small-N case study approach. Most notably, Landman argues that selection bias occurs in the researcher’s choosing of countries “because they exhibit only the outcome the comparativist seeks to explain” (2000, 45). Selecting on the dependent variable, thus, “can lead either to an overestimation of effects that do not exist, or to an underestimation of effects that do exist” (p. 45). While we agree with Landman that by comparing few countries we cannot draw strong inferences, we also draw attention to his point that, nonetheless, small –size case studies are intensive and good for theory generation (p. 52). Tretter defends his own use of the case study as it allows him to provide detail in description and explanation, better demonstrating the role of politics (2008, 88). Denters and Mossberger add that the “focused comparisons” of small-N research allow for in-depth analysis of the effects of variables (2006, 561). They suggest a most-similar-systems approach in order to filter out the challenges of having too many variables as well as increasing the number of observations within the individual cases, such as different points in time. Their caveat is the tendency to select cases on the dependent variable, and this paper concedes that is the choice that has been made as we are studying only cities, which have bid on the Commonwealth Games, and asking how they got to
that point. While this research may not be able to provide causal explanations, it will hopefully, in the words of Denters and Mossberger: “highlight nuances” and “may lead to some new insights” (p. 563).

This paper aims to expand on regime theory and its application by Burbank *et al.*, to use the framework on a cross-national basis and to measure the presence of certain actors in a municipality that pursues a mega-event strategy.

With this in mind, this paper presents several hypotheses:

*Hypothesis #1: Auxiliary players, specifically in the form of sport-knowledge groups, are prevalent in an urban regime that pursues a mega-event strategy. Therefore, an existing strong sport-knowledge infrastructure will lead to a municipality pursuing a mega-event strategy.*

Using regime theory as a framework, as suggested by Burbank *et al.*, there is one overriding question. Given the various regime typologies, is there one specific component that edges a coalition toward pursuing a mega-event strategy over other growth strategies of economic development? This paper argues that the technical and professional resources of the auxiliary players play a large role in defining a regime and explaining its actions. Expanding on Burbank, Andranovich and Heying (2001), not only does a coalition of government and business interests need to exist, fashioning themselves as a symbolic regime, but the technical and professional know-how of people in the sports community must also be present. Thus, it is the specific character of the auxiliary players (as defined by Stoker and Mossberger) that drives a city to bid for a multi-sport event. A city that pursues a mega-event strategy should have a strong local base of sport knowledge, specifically from a university as well as individuals and non-governmental organizations with experience in multi-level sport competitions. Also, as these are symbolic regimes, another group within the auxiliary-player category will be the local media. It is the institution most capable of manipulating symbols in order to rally public support, instill a sense of civic pride, and provide a sense of pluralistic
legitimacy to a public policy process that is otherwise elitist, exclusionary and somewhat unaccountable. These actors should show up in the bid committee.

Hypothesis #2: Similar actors in the regime, across nation-states, will lead to similar development strategies.

If, as Stone suggests, urban regimes vary according to the development strategies they take, then we should see similar actors in the regimes of all three cities as they have all taken on the same strategy. In Hamilton, where municipal elections would have taken place between the three bids, we should still see similar actors over this time period.

Hypothesis #3: De-industrialized economies lead to the pursuit of symbolic strategies such as the hosting of a mega-event. And as there are similar stressful economic conditions in municipalities bidding for mega-events, there should also be similar political conditions.

The literature, to date, suggests cities that have lost heavy industry try to re-brand themselves and quickly heighten their international profile by hosting a mega-event. This paper seeks to provide a multi-level account of an urban public policy, studying the governmental and socio-economic contexts within which these bids were made. It is expected the research will find similar economic, social and political conditions existing in each of the case studies during the course of their bids.

Hypothesis #4: The pursuit of a mega-event leads to the inclusion of non-local actors in an urban regime.

The mega-event is an international spectacle hosted at the local level. Due to its nature, the majority of members on a bid committee will be non-local actors, especially multi-level governance agencies and non-local business organizations. They are needed to bridge the gap between the local and the global. This should highlight urban regime theory’s basic tenet – building coalitions that give local government the “power to”
accomplish something rather than just the “power over” its citizens. It is a prime public policy example of multi-scale governance. However, it also brings up questions of accountability.

**Hypothesis #5: Policy learning leads to the pursuit of the mega-event strategy.**

Symbolic urban regimes that specifically pursue the mega-event strategy are a clear illustration of “policy transfer” at work. Its members will have spent time studying, traveling or communicating with urban regimes in other cities and other countries. However, the symbolic regime will have formed before policy transfer occurs.

**Conclusion**

The literature has posed several challenges to the use of urban regime theory. This paper aims to study the mega-event strategy in various municipalities with the goal of taking up some of these challenges. The hypotheses are straightforward, in and of themselves. It is the fact that they seek cross-national generalizations about urban policies that give them relevancy to the field of local governance. By grouping the local actors which form the coalition, and identifying their motivations in each city, this paper seeks to answer the question: Why are different municipalities, in different countries, with different governance structures using the same economic development strategy? Undoubtedly, there is international policy learning and policy transfer at practice. But who is doing the learning and why? Are similar stakeholder groups in each case pushing forward with a mega-event bid? How do the regimes (or coalitions) change depending on the governance structures? Far from past its due date, the use of urban regime analysis, with its look at both structures and agency, and with a demonstrated relevancy to local economic development, seems to provide a solid foundation on which to build.
Chapter 3
Melbourne

We begin our case studies by reminding ourselves of the research question: Why do municipalities around the world bid for the right to host mega-events? Specifically, we wish to study whether or not regime politics enters into the public policy decision-making, as is suggested by much of the mega-event literature. And if regime theory does apply, what type of regime is identified in each of the municipalities. Who are the participants and how do they vary in each case?

Stone’s urban regime theory, as discussed in Chapter 2, acknowledges that government authority is limited by such things as: the constitution, political tradition, and the autonomy of private business interests. These constraints, he argues, lead to the need for local government to promote economic development in order to increase tax revenues and fund those services it must provide as well as those that improve the community. Economic development is a sphere dominated by private interests. Stone employs what he calls a “social production” model in order to explain what happens once local government has entered into this sphere. His model focuses on the capacity to get things done, and the assembling of required resources (and actors) to achieve that end. Resources could include money, legal authority or intellect/know-how. As stated in Chapter 2, cooperation is, thus, a central component to URT. Stone identifies three spheres in a community: electoral (political), economic, and civic. Civic cooperation is what bonds the other two together. Important to our comparative research is to identify in what form this cooperation takes place and which characteristics of both the electoral and business sector may lead to this form. Stone suggests these three spheres be studied separately in order to facilitate cross-city comparisons.

Melbourne, Australia is our first case study. It successfully bid for the 2006 Commonwealth Games, an example of a mega-event as defined in the opening chapter. Melbourne has a long history of hosting large sporting events, including the 1956 Summer Olympic Games, and had an unsuccessful bid to host the 1996 Summer
Olympics. Melbourne is a municipality and the capital of Victoria State. As such, it fits within our purpose of examining local government public policy and the pressures that exist, within and without the local level of governance that would cause its leaders to choose to bid for such an expensive event. However, the institutional differences between an Australian city, particularly one in the state of Victoria during the 1990s, and a Canadian municipality, lead to interesting contrasts in local governance in the two countries despite both having similar federal and provincial/state government set-ups with like constitutions. The institutional differences on that grander scale have had a major impact on who becomes involved in such a major local public policy decision. What we find in Melbourne is an informal coalition between private and public partners – a component of regime theory -- encouraged by a long-time partnership between two very powerful and enigmatic men at a state (and even national) level, not at a local level – although in Victoria, the state is “local”. Their decisions take place in a city, state and country that has a very long record of sports-friendly public policy.

In this chapter we will focus on Melbourne during the 1990s, a period that is defined by the Victorian premiership of Jeff Kennett and his public policy actions that included drastic public sector cutbacks, forced municipal amalgamations, and the sell-off of public utilities, while building grand infrastructure projects. This chapter will first lay out the context within which Melbourne’s bid for the Commonwealth Games was made. This context includes the various public policy actions of Kennett throughout his seven years in power as well as the geographical, economic and most importantly the political atmosphere within which Melbourne existed. We should take careful note at this point that we are focusing on the decisions of the state leader, and not that of the municipality. Local government in Australia is notoriously weak, compared to that in North America. Melbourne during the 1990s, in particular, existed as a municipality in name only. Restructuring by the Kennett government meant that the premier dismissed local council and for three years, ending in 1996, appointed a three-person commission to run the city. Right away, this places Melbourne in a different category as the other cities in our study. While Melbourne returned to governance by democracy as the bid began, its council was certainly not about to challenge the authority of Kennett, given that he would not hesitate
to disband them again. At the time of the bid, Melbourne lived under the shadow of its state government (Economou 2011).

The chapter will continue with a storyline of the bid, followed by a discussion of who the main actors were during this time and what were their motivations. Through this discussion we should be able to discern whether or not the Melbourne situation fits into Stone’s criteria as an urban regime.

**Melbourne’s Commonwealth Games Bid**

In 1989, Melbourne lost its bid to host the 1996 Olympic Games. This is significant because the commissioner of that bid, businessman Ron Walker, recalled many years later how they had been out-campaigned by Atlanta and how he vowed that would not happen to him again (Johnson 1999). As a direct result of losing those Olympics, the Victoria State’s Labour government of the day created the Melbourne Major Events Committee (MMEC) in 1991 and Walker was named its chair. Its mission was, and continues to be to this day, to attract international cultural and sporting events to the city. MMEC is event-hosting policy institutionalized.

Walker was a powerful businessman with interests in property development, a prominent Liberal Party member and had been the Lord Mayor of Melbourne from 1974 to 1976. When the Liberal Party came to power with a coalition government (aligned with the National Party) in 1992, Walker and his friend, the new Premier Jeff Kennett (1992-99), embarked on a public policy exercise of attracting large sporting and cultural events to Melbourne and building the grandiose facilities that would accompany those events.*

* * *

In January 1996, Kennett announced that Victoria would bid to host the 2006 Commonwealth Games in the state capital of Melbourne. At the announcement, he estimated that the domestic bid alone would cost about $1 million AUS. The Games would bring a net deficit of $72 million AUS, according to Kennett, but boost the economy by $200 million AUS (Brady 1996).

Kennett, leader of the Liberal-led coalition government, had been premier since 1992. He was a neo-liberal, heavily influenced by the New Public Management policies of Great Britain in the 1980s (although NPM had its groundings in nearby New Zealand), and his first few years were served in office against the backdrop of a global recession, high unemployment, a stagnating economy and a large state debt. His immediate public policy goals when coming into power were to decrease that debt, curtail union power and cut the public sector. His policies focused on economic reform – specifically bringing down the state debt by downsizing the public sector more than 80,000 workers (including teachers and hospital workers) and selling-off state-owned energy corporations – using the assets to pay off the debt. He brought in a $100 flat property tax which he put against the debt, cut the number of local government areas (municipalities) by more than half through amalgamations, and forced their councils to contract out 50 per cent of their expenditures. The efforts brought his government enviable budget surpluses through his years in power. The economic statement for 1996, as an example, showed a surplus of $6 billion AUS, thanks mainly to asset sales and public-sector downsizing. This money, again, was mainly used to pay down the debt.

Kennett had served in public life since becoming opposition leader in 1982. He was known for shameless self-promotion, his authoritarian nature of leadership (also described as “bullying”) and having established in both the state and the country somewhat of a “personality cult” (Economou 2006, 364). Over the years, he was criticized for not caring about the environment, for disregarding the social impacts of gambling, and for not spending enough of the surplus on social welfare. His government was able to impose such drastic and controversial economic reform because it dominated both the state legislative council (77 per cent of the seats during his first term) and the
legislative assembly (66 per cent of the seats). Despite the controversies, when Kennett called a snap state election in the spring of 1996 (in order to take advantage of any momentum created by John Howard and the federal Liberal Party’s national victory in March), he again won a resounding Coalition victory with the National Party.

This heralded the second phase of his tenure, with the economy now in recovery. Not only was governing about privatization and rationalization of government services, but also about public building projects with the help of the private sector – a new toll-based freeway system, the redevelopment of the waterfront, new museums and entertainment complexes. The second half of his tenure as premier, in particular, was highlighted by efforts to shift Victoria’s economy away from one that was dependent on state-run corporations, manufacturing and industry. Instead, he wanted to expand into non-industrial ventures such as entertainment, gambling, sports, major events and tourism – all with the help of the private sector.

This public policy path had actually begun in 1993, when he had overseen the building of the controversial Crown Casino during his first term. Though the contract had been approved by the previous Labour Government, it was controversial not only because of its social impacts in a state that was considered socially conservative, but also due to Kennett’s personal connections with the owners. Those owners included Walker and his business partner -- motor racing promoter Lloyd Williams -- and Australia’s wealthiest media magnate and gambling enthusiast Kerry Packer (Political Chronicles 1996). Also in 1993, Kennett, Walker (as chair of MMEC) and Williams went after the Australian Grand Prix Formula One car-racing event, which had been hosted annually by Adelaide. Kennett had been called “ruthless” in the process of snatching it away from Adelaide and bringing it to Melbourne (Political Chronicles 1996). The first race was to take place in March 1996 on a controversial street circuit in city green space, Albert Park.

Kennett was also building infrastructure. In July 1995 the details of Kennett’s $1.7 billion transit plan became public. Melbourne’s three major freeways and bridge
would be linked. A private consortium called Transurban, which would also operate it and charge tolls, would conduct the “City Link” project.

And so, with this backdrop, a nine-member Commonwealth Games domestic bid committee was formed and announced on January 22, 1996. The news release came out of the premier’s office: the bid committee was co-chaired by Walker, officially as the chair of the MMEC, and Kevan Gosper, the City of Melbourne’s state-appointed chief commissioner. Gosper was also a member of the International Olympic Committee executive and part of the Olympic organizing committee for Sydney at that time. The other members of the domestic bid were: former Liberal prime minister Malcolm Fraser, Olympic gold medallist Debbie Flintoff-King, “corporate experts” Peter Bartels, John Gough and David Jones, senior public servant Elizabeth Proust, and sports administrators Geoff Henke and Max Roger. The MMEC was to provide the administrative infrastructure necessary to formulate the domestic bid.

At the start, Melbourne was up against bids from Perth, Adelaide, Sydney, Brisbane, Darwin and Canberra. Official bids had until June 30, 1996 to submit their proposals. The Australia Commonwealth Games Association (ACGA) had an 11-member panel poised to endorse one city in mid-October of that year. The winning domestic bid would then have three years to lobby Commonwealth Games delegates. The final decision as to which country, and which city, would host the 2006 Commonwealth Games, would be made in 1999.

**Melbourne’s Make-up**

Melbourne sits on the banks of the Yarra River that flows into the Indian Ocean and hosts an international airport, major container port, rail network, and several universities. It is also the site of several high profile sporting events including the Australian Open tennis championship, Formula One Grand Prix racing, and Australian Rules football. In 1999, its bid year, Metropolitan Melbourne had a population of roughly 3.4 million over 8,800 square kilometers. The actual City of Melbourne had a population of just 47,509 over 36.1 square kilometers, but it was (and remains) just one of 31 Local
Government Areas (the Australian term for municipality) that make up Metropolitan Melbourne. The metropolitan area is the state capital of Victoria. It remains the state’s manufacturing, wholesale and retail centre. However, there is no “metropolitan” government for the greater Melbourne area and its 31 local governments. All such “regional” responsibilities which would entail economies-of-scale cost-sharing amongst the small LGAs are carried out by the state government: public transport, police, main roads and traffic control, primary school education and major infrastructure upkeep.

Politically, the City of Melbourne itself is a small entity with just seven councillors, a lord mayor and deputy lord mayor with a chief executive leading the city administration. However, the city was in a state of democratic flux at the time of the 1996 announcement that it would be the centre of a Victoria bid. It was governed by three state-appointed commissioners from 1993 to 1996, at the height of Kennett’s local government reforms and the suspension of local democracy. Its chief commissioner, Gosper, was part of Melbourne’s domestic bid. It would not go back to a democratically elected council until later that year.

The fact that the Commonwealth Games bid came directly from the state, therefore, and not the City of Melbourne, speaks strongly to the weak role of local government in Australia and the turmoil Victorian municipalities faced in the 1990s as reforms were imposed upon them. As Sancton writes, “The main institutions of urban government in Australia are the state governments and their associated public authorities” (Sancton 2000a, 85). That has been the historical relationship between the state and local government, where local government “remains a creature of the states, bound by state prescriptions” (Munro 1997, 77).

Local governments in Australia are not protected by the federal constitution. Instead, they are entities of the state and, theoretically, exist at the whim of the state. The Australian Constitution is a written document that spells out 40 specific areas of federal responsibility and prohibits state parliaments from certain areas. However, if it is not specified in sections 51 and 52 of the Constitution, then it is an area of state responsibility.
as long as a state’s actions do not conflict with federal law. And so local government councils, which operate under their respective state’s local government act, collect property taxes and receive government grants and user fees. They make bylaws concerning local roads, parks and sports fields, garbage maintenance, libraries, domestic animals and street signage (Australian Parliamentary Education Office). Meanwhile, it is the state that looks after such big-ticket items such as transportation, health, police services, utilities, education and housing.

Local government areas in Australia had neither the political nor economic power to spearhead an international bid for such a large infrastructure-oriented project as the Commonwealth Games. In the years prior to 1999, their main sources of revenue were restricted to the property tax and government grants. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1999, as an example, the City of Melbourne had revenues of just $173 million AUS and expenditures of $183.5 million AUS. In comparison, that year, the 31 local government areas that make up the Melbourne “statistical division”, collected a combined $2.08 billion AUS in revenues and spent a combined $2.06 billion AUS (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2000a).

During the 1990s the relationship between state and local government had become even more domineering, particularly in Victoria. Kennett and his NPM-influenced policy decisions forced amalgamations – from 210 to 78 municipalities within a 15-month period. Staff, buildings and services were cut, local asset sales were forced, councils dismissed and replaced by state-appointed commissioners. It has been described as the “kneecapping of local government in Victoria” (Munro 1997, 79). Melbourne was caught up in these reforms. Indeed, the city was just coming out of a three-year period of being run by state-appointed commissioners when Kennett announced it would be bidding for the Commonwealth Games. While a newly elected council and lord mayor took office in 1996, one local planning expert described council’s power as “negligible” as they were under the constant threat of dismissal. Local media were said to be afraid of criticizing the government. And, of most importance to the bid, local government found “major development sites such as docklands and the casino being quarantined from its
political interference” (Munro 1997, 80). This shows a pattern of behavior by Kennett. Once his government (with a dominating majority coalition in the legislature) had lured away the Grand Prix from Adelaide in 1993, it ensured the controversial event would take place in the green space of Albert Park in the City of Port Philip (part of Melbourne region) by passing the Australian Grand Prix Act of 1994. The act exempted the event from the Environment Protection Act (1970), the Planning and Environment Act (1987) and the Environment Effects Act (1978). It also removed the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over any matters relating to the event, and would not allow compensation claims (Hoye, Nicholson and Houlihan 2010, 147).

**Federal Policy**

By the time Melbourne threw in its bid to host the 2006 Commonwealth Games, federal sport policy in Australia had become increasingly focused on elite athlete performance and international sports success. In 1993, Sydney had won the rights to host the 2000 Olympic Games. This was to be a crowning achievement for the country, in which Australia’s sport elite development policy would reach an apex. Once Sydney won its bid, a federally funded elite athlete development program (the Gold Medal Plan) threw $418 million AUS at the effort to ensure the country showed well on the podium (Houlihan and Green 2005, 34).

Federal government involvement in sport dates back to the 1970s. But it was in 1981 that the Australian Institute of Sport was established, to which Houlihan and Green refer as a “defining moment” in Australian sport (2005, 31). Australia had not won any gold medals at the 1976 Olympics and only five medals in total. The exponential improvement of Australian athletes at the Olympics can be traced back to the establishment of the AIS. The Australian Sports Commission was established in 1985, and by 1989 the two entities were merged to serve as the national sports administration and advisory agency, essentially the country’s administrative centre for its elite sport policy. Its roles and responsibilities were laid out in the Australian Sports Commission Act 1989, primarily to improve performance and participation by Australians. There is
one function stated that has relevance to this research: that the ASC also encourage private sector contributions to sport development.

In 1997, a national participation framework, *Active Australia*, was released with a focus on increasing mass participation in sport and recreation. It is in this document that we see the role of the states. The report included statements from each state as to how it intends to operate within the framework. For Victoria, as an example, that included the building or improving of sports or recreational facilities (Australian Sports Commission 1997). In October 1997, the federal government released its report, *Rethinking the funding of community sporting and recreational facilities: A Sporting Chance*. It concluded that the federal government should be more involved in assisting stakeholders with the improvement of facilities (Australia 1997). That meant setting standards for facilities, identifying need and coordinating planning, establishing a framework to encourage private-sector investment, and performing an ongoing audit of existing facilities. The monetary recommendation was $50 million AUS per year over five years to support these actions.

From this very brief synopsis of the federal role in sports policy, we see that the Commonwealth was very much focused on developing the individual elite athlete with the goal of improved international success, with some minor focus on the health/economic benefits of individual Australians. Since the 1980s, it had been aggressively pursuing high medal totals specifically at the Olympic Games and by 1993 had a hard-and-fast goal: to put on the best-ever Summer Olympics in the year 2000 in Sydney, and to ensure that during those Games, Australia establishes itself as a world sports power. The policy was meant to allow government to take a direct hand in the building of Australia as a world power, as a way of instilling pride in the country and its institutions. Hence, the 1992 “Maintain the Momentum” speech by the Hon. Ros Kelly, Minister for the Arts, Sport, the Environment and Territories, given while unveiling the government’s sports policy and funding for the next four years (just prior to the awarding of the 2000 Olympics to Australia):
The simple point is that there have been Australians and Australian teams, sometimes playing Australian sports, for longer than there has been an Australia, in which Australians have felt pride. Pride in marking ourselves as a distinct culture, different from and sometimes measurably better than, other cultures. If we could beat England at cricket, it was evident that our society was healthier, wealthier, and more democratic than theirs. Until the last 10 or 15 years, Australians have expected our society to produce great individuals and teams as a natural result of the way we are organized – as a healthier, wealthier and more democratic society. (Kelly 1992)

The minister then went on to announce another $236 million AUS to be spent on Australian sport over the next four years ostensibly as a way to ensure the country continued to produce those great individuals and teams. Through these years, the federal focus was on the country as a whole, and not necessarily on where this sport development should take place. It was up to the individual states and their cities to make sure they got a piece of that funding.

The Bid

We have now briefly reviewed the federal sports policy heading into the time of the Melbourne bid, and the federal government’s role and motivations in sport: primarily to develop elite athletes for the world stage and to a smaller extent to increase mass participation in sport and recreation across the country. The roles and motivations change at the state level. The January 22, 1996 news release from the premier’s office, for example, not only announced the members of its domestic bid committee, it also stated the government’s main selling point for wanting to host the Commonwealth Games. It read:

The potential economic impact of staging the 2006 Commonwealth Games is enormous with the preliminary estimates suggesting a boost to the economy of up to $200 million, with competitors and visitors totaling as many as 70 thousand (sic).

Kennett told reporters at the official announcement, that the state would spend $147.5 million AUS in operating costs and $63 million AUS in capital costs, while the games would earn approximately $138 million AUS. That would lead to a deficit of $71.18
million AUS, if 16 sports were included in the competition. Government revenues would cover the shortfall. Despite the costs, Kennett said Victoria would gain “ten-fold” the exposure and economic activity. The opposition Labour Party agreed, as did the opinion page of the daily newspaper of record, *The Age* (*The Age*, 1996a).

In July, Victoria unveiled a $135 million AUS bid, of which the state would contribute $65 million AUS and the rest would come from the private sector. * At the same time, opinion page editors at *The Age* repeated their support for the bid not only for Kennett’s economic reasons but also for the following: “It is another chance to show the rest of Australia and the Commonwealth, that our reputation as a sports city is deserved . . . The world loves a sporting contest, and the prowess of our athletes is a true part of our common wealth” (*The Age*, 1996b).

In August, the Victoria government signed a contract with the ACGA to underwrite the Games. At this point, Perth and Adelaide withdrew from the domestic contest because they refused to sign a similar contract. On August 12, *The Age* reported a secret agreement that would see the state making an opening payment of $20 million AUS to the ACGA, followed up with 20 per cent of the gross revenue from ticket sales, marketing and sponsorship. The premier’s office denied this. (A copy of the contract turned down by Perth was later tabled in the Western Australian Parliament.)

While Kennett had estimated the Games would cost the state $135 million overall, *The Age* went on to report that month that Melbourne Major Events had estimated it would cost $146 million plus another $50 million in capital upgrades from the state. At this stage, Melbourne was in direct competition with Brisbane. Walker made claims in the media that Brisbane had actually offered the ACGA more money, but that he was under “strict orders” from Kennett to keep the Melbourne budget “tight” (Farouque 1996). On Oct. 18, 1996, Melbourne won the domestic bid process and was named as Australia’s official bid city. The shadow minister for sport and recreation, John

*Unless otherwise cited, information used for Chapter 3’s narrative of Melbourne’s bid is sourced from newspaper coverage for the period January 23, 1996 to March 10, 2007, primarily from *The Age*. A full list can be found in Appendix 2.*
Pandazopoulos (and a member of the opposition) threw support behind the bid and its added benefits to the state: “continued state-of-the-art sporting facilities which can then attract other events themselves” (Costa 1996).

In January 1997, the board of directors for the international bid was announced – eight men and zero women. The eight-member board included four representatives from the ACGA. The Victoria government appointed the other four positions: Walker as chairman, Gosper as deputy chairman, Don Argus (the CEO of the National Australian Bank) and Frank King from the state’s treasury department. Campbell Rose, head of MMEC for two years, was named the international bid’s CEO (ACGA 1997). The bid campaign budget was reported at $9 million AUS and by July, Walker and Rose had reportedly visited 40 Commonwealth countries with 30 more on the schedule by the end of the year. During July, some 19 members of the International Commonwealth Games Association were hosted by Walker, Kennett and Rose (a former Olympic yachtsman). It was at a banquet during this visit that former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, a member of the bid committee during the domestic phase, was seated next to South African Sports Minister Steve Tshwete. It had been reported that Johannesburg, S. Africa was to also bid for the 2006 Games. However, it was reported years later that Fraser used this time over dinner to convince Tshwete (an old acquaintance) to withdraw the country’s interest in hosting the Games, thereby eliminating its main competitor.

Wellington, New Zealand was now the only other competing bid, although it had not officially entered the competition, and it accused Walker of “bullying” them to drop out. Walker accused them of being “greedy” (Hawes 1997). Wellington’s bid was in trouble by November and in January 1999, it accused delegates of asking for bribes. They withdrew their interest in bidding by February, leaving Melbourne as the only city vying to host the 2006 Commonwealth Games. At this point, Walker announced that all of Melbourne’s facilities would be built and paid for by the end of the next year. He estimated the Games would attract over 50,000 overseas guests and generate an economic benefit of $500 million AUS.
In April 1999, Melbourne won the right to host the 2006 Games and they took place successfully. But they were hosted in 2006 without Kennett at the helm. When the premier called an election in August 1999, with the vote to be held in September, the timing was hailed as a “masterstroke” (Woodward and Costar 2000, 125). Not only was the campaign to be a short 25 days, it would be held in conjunction with the opening of the Citylink freeway during its toll-free period, and alongside the Australian football finals. Meanwhile, the opposition Labour Party was struggling under a new little-known leader Steve Bracks. The election, however, led to the defeat of Kennett and the first minority government in 50 years, led by Bracks.

Despite the wealth of development that took place through his tenure and the positive financial results, Kennett had been seen as favoring Metropolitan Melbourne over the rural areas. Rural Victoria had been hit hard by his restructuring of municipalities, and the cutting of the public sector, which had led to the loss of thousands of jobs upon which rural residents relied. They did not take kindly to the closing of schools and hospitals and the loss of rail service, all while Melbourne was building freeways and stadia. Ultimately, Kennett was seen as arrogant. It may have been Kennett’s public policy vision. But it would be Bracks who would preside over the 2006 Commonwealth Games.

The question as it pertains to this research is whether or not Kennett’s chosen policy path was a result of regime politics, or otherwise. If it is regime politics, what is the character of the regime? Taking our cue from Stone in Chapter 2, we ask several questions: Who makes up the governing coalition? How is this coming together accomplished? What are the consequences? This paper also uses Stoker and Mossberger’s definitions of regimes (1994) as they seek to expand the usefulness of URT into cross-national comparative purposes, and not just an American-based theory. For them, it is clear that private-public partnerships exist throughout all advanced capitalist societies (1994, 197) But there must be more present in a regime than just the two traditional URT categories of actors – elected officials and business interests – in order for a government to increase its capacity to act, and to understand why a regime has made
its policy choices over others. Stoker and Mossberger therefore introduce two other categories of actors: the community and labour organizers, and technical or professional officials (p. 198). They also identify five elements of regime building: purpose, motivation, sense of common purpose, quality of coalition, and the relationship with the wider political environment. This last element takes into account the various levels of government within which a regime must operate and studies how it manages that relationship. We will now attempt to apply these questions to Melbourne in order to gain a more clear understanding of why it bid for the 2006 Commonwealth Games and how it relates to regime theory.

1. Who was involved in the bid?

   This research uses the actors involved in the bid as a tangible way of identifying who held positions of power or influence during the time under scrutiny – to whom did Kennett and Walker trust in the implementation of their policy? Logic would dictate they chose like-minded people who saw similar benefits in the building of sports infrastructure and the hosting of mega-events. In Melbourne, the initial announcement of the bid came from the premier’s office in January 1996 and Kennett became the point person in the media. When the domestic bid was launched that summer, Rose and Walker, CEO and chairman respectively of the MMEC, began to take over as the spokespeople for the bid. As stated earlier, the domestic bid committee was co-chaired by Walker and Gosper. Committee members were former prime minister Fraser, Olympic track champion Debbie Flintoff-King, corporate leaders Peter Bartels, John Gough and David Jones, public servant Elizabeth Proust and sports administrators Geoff Henke and Max Roger.

   First, let us take a closer look at the biographies of these people. Walker was a former Lord Mayor of Melbourne, head of the failed Olympic bid in the late 1980s, Casino owner and Grand Prix organizer. Gosper was not only a member of the IOC executive and the founding chair of the Australia Institute of Sport, but he had just finished his tenure as Chief Commissioner of the City of Melbourne, appointed by Kennett in 1993 when the premier had dissolved Melbourne’s city council and used the
constitutional powers of the state to suspend local democracy and take over the city’s governance. Fraser, as prime minister, had vociferously championed the anti-apartheid forces in Africa and along the way had developed many positive relationships in southern Africa, south and southeast Asia. He would be a valuable commodity in persuading Commonwealth members to favour Melbourne should it win the domestic bid. Flintoff-King was the obligatory Olympic hero in the mix, having won the 1988 gold medal in the women’s 400-metre hurdles by a leaning torso. Proust, at the time, was the most senior public servant in Victoria, serving as secretary of the Victorian Department of the Premier and Cabinet. She had served as the CEO of the City of Melbourne in 1990. Bartels, Gough and Jones were part of Melbourne’s corporate elite. Bartels was CEO of Coles Myer Ltd., Australia’s No. 2 company in profits according to Forbes Magazine, at the time of the bid. At one point, he had also been CEO and managing director of Fosters Brewing Co. Before joining the business elite, Bartels was an elite cyclist, and a Commonwealth Games gold medallist. Gough was part of Melbourne’s establishment and a former chairman of ANZ Bank. Jones was chairman of lottery and gaming company Tattersalls and a prominent member of the prestigious Melbourne Cricket Club, of which the Melbourne Cricket Grounds would be the main stadium for the Games. He would go on to be named the club’s vice-president in 1997 and then president from 2003-07 notably holding that post during the actual 2006 Commonwealth Games. Max Roger, a sports consultant, had been the chief executive of Melbourne’s failed bid for the 1996 Olympic Games.

The bid committee changed once Melbourne began campaigning internationally for the 2006 Games. The Victorian government (Kennett) appointed Walker and Gosper as the chair and deputy chair, respectively, of the new committee. It also added Don Argus, CEO of the National Australia Bank and a large financial backer of the Liberal Party during the 1996 federal election, and Frank King from the Treasury Department. The ACGA appointed four representatives to the committee: its president Ray Godkin, secretary-treasurer Arthur Tunstall, president of the Victoria Division Sam Coffa, and general manager Perry Crosswhite. The two groups then appointed Rose as the CEO of the committee.
2. What were their motivations?

The motivations in Melbourne for hosting the Commonwealth Games mirror those first discussed in the opening chapter: building a national and local identity, bringing economic benefits, growing the tourism industry, increasing international exposure, building new facilities and infrastructure. When Kennett first announced their intention to bid for the games, he stated specifically that he believed Victoria would gain exposure and that the economic benefit would be $200 million with 70,000 visitors. The city newspaper editorial got behind the bid immediately, stating Melbourne had a “proud tradition” as a sporting city and this would be a chance to show its reputation as a sporting city was deserved. The government opposition supported the bid, stating it would boost Melbourne’s international profile and help build state-of-the-art facilities. Throughout the bid, we see indications of a symbolic regime at work – the use of symbols to invoke an identity and instill pride, a policy to refocus its economic development goals. We draw upon Mossberger and Stoker’s definition of symbolic regimes whereupon the key component in this typology is the intent to change a city’s image or ideology (2001, 1994) using symbols as a mobilization function.

The economic impact from the Games varied with nearly every speech or interview given by Kennett and Walker. By February 1999, Walker had increased the perceived economic benefits to $500 million, but with 50,000 overseas guests. The indirect benefits, he stated in April 1999, included an increase to the state GDP of $550 million and to the national GDP of $780 million. By October 1999, Walker had increased the economic benefits to $600 million. Both men also repeated the benefits of continuing a sporting legacy, promoting Melbourne around the world, building new facilities and infrastructure.
### Table 3.1

**Board Members of Melbourne’s Domestic and International bids for the 2006 Commonwealth Games**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>OCCUPATIONS</th>
<th>ACTOR-TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(DOMESTIC BID)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ron Walker</td>
<td>Property developer, Crown Casino owner, former treasurer for national Liberal Party, Grand Prix organizer, head of previous Melbourne Olympics bid, chair of MMEC, former Lord Mayor of Melbourne, friend of Jeff Kennett</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kevan Gosper</td>
<td>IOC member, inaugural AIS chair, vice-president for Sydney’s 2000 Olympic organizing committee, 1954 Commonwealth Games champion 440-yard dash, Chief Commissioner of Melbourne, former board member of Crown Casino Ltd.</td>
<td>Technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malcolm Fraser</td>
<td>Former Australian Prime Minister (Liberal), champion of anti-apartheid forces in South Africa during height of political struggles</td>
<td>Technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debbie Flintoff-King</td>
<td>Olympic 400m hurdles champion, 1988</td>
<td>Technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elizabeth Proust</td>
<td>Victoria’s most senior public servant (Secretary, Victoria Dept. of the Premier and Cabinet), former City of Melbourne CEO, would later join Australia &amp; New Zealand Banking Group</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Bartels</td>
<td>CEO, Coles Myer Ltd. (Australia’s No. 2 company in profits according to Forbes magazine that year), former CEO of Foster’s Brewing Co., Commonwealth Games cycling champion</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Gough</td>
<td>Former chair of ANZ Bank, considered part of Melbourne’s corporate establishment</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Jones</td>
<td>Chair of lottery and gaming company Tattersalls, prominent member of Melbourne Cricket Club (vice-president in 1997, president 2003-07)</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max Roger</td>
<td>Sports consultant, CEO of failed Melbourne bid for the 1996 Olympic Games</td>
<td>Technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campbell Rose</td>
<td>Sports administrator, CEO MMEC 1995-97, Olympic yachtsman 1988</td>
<td>Technical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Was the bid for the 2006 Commonwealth Games the result of regime politics?

Stone describes a regime as an informal, yet stable group of core actors with access to political and financial resources. This appears to describe the relationship of the two men driving the Commonwealth Games bid in the 1990s. Kennett and Walker epitomize Stone’s electoral and economic worlds meeting in the civic arena. Kennett was premier of the state with an overwhelming governing majority in parliament and huge personal popularity with the electorate. The constitutional powers that the state had over the municipalities, and Kennett’s policy choice to use them to suit his will by forcing amalgamations and suspending councils, demonstrates his “access” to political resources. He was also willing to use the formidable financial resources of the state to fund the bid. Walker, as the private-sector pillar in this bid, was a longtime friend, business partner and political ally. He also had access to considerable personal financial resources and appears to have used them to fund his own campaigning for the Games, at one point telling the media that he had visited every country in the Commonwealth on his own dime. Both men had considerable political access to the federal level of government and as well as access to Australia’s international sporting elite.
Stone describes this core group of actors as having a clear, pragmatic purpose and its existence provides an empowerment to accomplish tasks that otherwise would be overwhelming. Kennett and Walker certainly had a clear and pragmatic purpose in the public policy choices made during the 1990s, culminating in the Commonwealth Games bid. It was a clear public policy choice to go after tourism and entertainment-based development once Victoria had recovered economically. The building of the Crown Casino in 1993, awarded and overseen by the government, was conducted and operated by Walker and his partners in property development. In that same year, Kennett, Walker and Williams (the race promoter who was also a business partner in the casino) conducted a secretive and controversial campaign to steal the Australian Grand Prix Formula One car-racing event away from Adelaide. These two accomplishments, specifically, would seem to be unattainable without these particular people in partnership. Many sports and cultural facilities were built during Kennett’s tenure. The Commonwealth Games bid becomes the most formidable example of a seemingly overwhelming policy task that is accomplished due to the character of the group as well as the considerable power wielded by it.

But do all these public policy choices during Kennett’s two terms in office demonstrate the work of regime politics? The first challenge to these arguments is that the contract to build the Crown Casino was made by the previous Labour Government (which was not included in the “core group” of people running the bid). While Walker and his partners were involved in the casino development at that point, Kennett was merely leader of the opposition and not in a preferred position of power with the ability to make policy decisions. The second challenge to the argument is that the bid for the Commonwealth Games roots itself in the MMEC, an office that was created (and thus also the policy of) the previous Labour Government. The MMEC was created by Labour after its failed bid for the 1996 Olympic Games. While Walker is the constant in this scenario, as chair of the Olympic bid and the resulting MMEC, the actual policy choice of bidding for major events in Melbourne does not begin with Kennett. The fact that Sydney, Australia won the right to host the 2000 Olympic Games with a bid in the early-
90s, demonstrates that the mega-event policy choice was prevalent elsewhere in the nation-state (and not unique to Melbourne) and supported by the Australian government.

Stone also gives somewhat of a checklist as to what a regime is not. It is not static, representative of one mind or identical interests, created or directed at will, nor ideological. The Melbourne bid for the 2006 Commonwealth Games appears to be driven by a partnership, or coalition of identical interests: those of Kennett and Walker. These men appear at this point in time of Melbourne’s political history to have consumed all the power. Kennett’s overriding authority in all matters regarding Melbourne, his authoritarian manner of governing and his dismissal of any dissenting opinion surely means that this particular bid had nothing to do with ongoing regime politics. Kennett and Walker had the same mindset. They were longtime friends, business partners and political allies who happened to monopolize political and financial power in Melbourne during the 1990s. For these men, hosting a Commonwealth Games had as much to do with ego and leaving a legacy as it did with economic development. Mega-event policy was not new in the State of Victoria or Melbourne, or in Australia. The knowledge infrastructure for such policy was already set when these men reached their apex. They simply provided the political and financial will to put that infrastructure to good use.

Those who have a problem with regime theory could easily argue at this point that there does not seem to be any supporting evidence to suggest Melbourne’s bid for the 2006 Commonwealth Games was driven by an urban regime as per the traditional definition. In fact, this bid was not driven by a municipality at all. The constitutional structure of Australia and Victoria meant that any public policy of this magnitude could only come from the state. This bid stems from a lingering state policy of a previous government that established a corporation (the MMEC) to keep an eye on such opportunities. But it was nurtured by a longtime friendship between a powerful premier and a powerful businessman, both who loved bringing large events to Melbourne.

However, it is important to be reminded, as stated in Chapter 2, that Stone emphatically believes his critics ask the wrong questions when studying local governing
arrangements. They should be focusing on the character of the arrangements, how the actors are enabled to pursue a specific agenda and what shapes the strength and direction of their efforts (Stone 2004, 9). While the decision to bid for the Commonwealth Games was not made by a municipality, per se, the local governing arrangements in mid-1990s Melbourne were such that the state government was local government in Melbourne.

It is also important to re-visit Stoker and Mossberger’s categories of actors in a regime. Not only do you need political and economic resources, but also auxiliary players, or “technical or professional officials”. These were certainly present in Melbourne’s bid and in the city, especially with the presence of the MMEC and the annual sporting events that were already taking place in the city. If one is to take anything from the bid group as they tried to win the domestic bid for the Games, is that it was dominated by several of the nation’s corporate, government and sporting heavyweights. While we use Stoker and Mossberger’s typology of regime actors, it is noteworthy that in several instances there is crossover between the categories: a former sportsman has held powerful positions in both business and/or government. Specifically, several of these heavyweights had similar characteristics – they were related in some way to the sporting world.

We should not misinterpret the characteristics of those on the committee. It is only logical that people with a sports background would be chosen. However, what is interesting is the position of power that people with sporting interests have reached, outside the sports world. Melbourne, in fact, shows an ongoing pattern of its sports and business nomenclature being intertwined where business people have strong ties to sports and vice versa, whether through participation as an athlete or through administration. This could indicate the presence of Stone’s regime. While the individual actors involved in the bid weren’t necessarily the same actors involved in previous sports-related public policy in Melbourne and Australia, it could indicate an almost systemic relationship between sporting elites, business elites and government. In his study of Atlanta, Stone never claimed that the exact same actors held power through those 40 years. Rather, he argued at the time that the black community in general was incorporated into a governing
coalition with politicians and white business elite. It can be argued that Melbourne’s sporting elite has, similarly, been incorporated into a governing coalition with politicians and business elite. In fact, quite often the sporting elite has also become part of the business elite. Again, this paper quotes Stone: “The analysis of urban regimes is appropriate, then, for helping to explain how communities respond to broad social and economic change.” (2004, 7) With the apparent systemic integration of sport and business people in Melbourne, it seems inevitable that this particular characteristic would impact how the community responded to social and economic change – by focusing on sports-related economic development. The decision to focus economic development efforts on sporting events and mega-events thus becomes more rational when looking at the actors involved in governing the municipal region.

As for the character of the regime, we look to Stoker and Mossberger’s (1994) five elements of regime building: purpose, motivation, sense of common purpose, quality of coalition, and the relationship with the wider political environment. The actions and stated motivations behind bidding for the Commonwealth Games strongly suggest a symbolic regime (revitalization) in Melbourne. Using Stoker and Mossberger’s descriptives, Melbourne displays a “shared outlook” (p. 204) of its community as both a sports and business power centre in the country, and that it should predominate over all other municipalities in Australia (hence, the “stealing” of the Grand Prix from Adelaide, and its leaders’ derision of other competing cities during the domestic phase of the bid). Leaders use “symbols of growth and competition” (p. 205) to sustain the coalition and its sense of purpose, as well as to mobilize positive attitudes towards the hosting of sports events. Sports, business and government elites appear to “enjoy a political communion” (p. 206) in which they share interests and seek to maintain existing order. While this research identifies Melbourne has having a symbolic regime, as per Stoker and Mossberger’s typology – revitalization goals, use of symbols and images to invoke civic pride, dependent on non-local actors to achieve goals -- we should also acknowledge that the characteristics are not an exclusive list.
Any particular regime is unlikely to conform exactly to the list of characteristics that have been identified. Individual regimes may fall predominantly, but not exclusively within one classification or another. Regimes are also dynamic, and may move from one type to another as circumstances change. For example, a symbolic regime based upon image building and revitalization may move toward an instrumental type if economic conditions stabilize. (p. 208)

This only makes sense for a symbolic regime, whose logical conclusion is to have succeeded in changing the image of a city and must now evolve into some other type of regime, such as instrumental, which is more project-oriented and seeking tangible results.

**Post-Games Financials**

Melbourne is the only case in this research where we can compare the actual costs of the Games against what was promised during the early phases of the bid. Ultimately, the 2006 Games cost $1.055 billion AUS with the Victorian State government contributing approximately $651 million, or about 60.4 per cent. (*Melbourne Financial Overview 2006*) The Commonwealth Government (federal) contributed about $216 million, a large bulk of it in the form of security-in-kind. The City of Melbourne contributed $29.6 million (*Melbourne 2006*).

These costs were well worth it, according to Walker and all government reports and audits released in the months after the Games. The official *Report to The Office of Commonwealth Games Coordination* in October 2006 (Insight Economics 2006, 115) announced its official numbers of 1.5 million tickets sold, 57,010 international visitors and 60,125 interstate visitors attracted, and a 1.5 billion television audience. In economic impacts, it reported Gross State Product was higher by $1.6 billion AUS than “business-as-usual” over a 20-year period. Victorian consumption was $1.3 billion AUS higher.

To appreciate the ongoing importance that Australian government places on sport, one need only to briefly read the Rudd government’s 2008 report, *Australian Sport: emerging challenges, new directions*. Its opening sentence states:
Australia has long overachieved and out-performed our competitors on the sporting stage, but that stage is becoming increasingly crowded and competitive. (p. 1)

Two years after hosting the 2006 Commonwealth Games, the federal government believed it needed to reform how it develops elite athletes and encourages mass participation, in order to keep pace with the world. To underscore how important sports is to Australia, the report continues:

Sport is integral to Australia’s way of life, our view of ourselves and how we are viewed by the rest of the world. (p. 2)
Chapter 4
Halifax 2005

Halifax is the ideal setting for the 2014 Commonwealth Games. A jewel of a city, perched on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean – we are the gateway to Canada and North America. Halifax is a historic port city that has blossomed into a forward-looking city of the future – a place where creativity, ambition and ingenuity thrive in the midst of a caring, welcoming community. The Commonwealth Games are a timeless event showcasing everything that is good and hopeful about humanity and the future and Halifax is the perfect host.

-- Taken from Halifax 2014 Candidate City, Frequently Asked Questions, “Why should Halifax be chosen to host the 2014 Commonwealth Games?”, May 16, 2006

As in the previous chapter, we should remind ourselves of the original research question: Why do municipalities bid for mega-events? In Melbourne, we see a pattern of public policy geared towards mega-events, tourism and sports dating back many years, before Premier Jeff Kennett took power. However, Kennett pursues this public policy to the fullest while he also implements a neo-conservative fiscal policy statewide.

The Melbourne bid for the 2006 Commonwealth Games comes during the 1990s, a time of fiscal restraint and local government upheaval in Victoria. It is led by two very powerful men – Kennett, politically, and Ron Walker, financially. However, the state and Melbourne also have a longstanding plethora of professional and technical people from which to draw for support. These people have strong ties to business, sport and politics. Melbourne’s motivations focus on international prestige, local pride and economic development.

But does this constitute a regime within Stone’s frame of reference? We have determined in the previous chapter that it does constitute a regime and the characteristics of the ruling elite very likely influence the shape of economic development, as per Stone’s argument, although this cannot be stated point blank. Ultimately, the Melbourne
bid was deemed successful. It hosted the 2006 Commonwealth Games without a glitch, although it did end up costing taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars.

In this chapter, we turn our attention to Halifax, which was very much unsuccessful in its 2005 bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games. Referred to as Halifax Regional Municipality (HRM), the city is a growing population of 372,679 in 2006, strewn over 5,490.90 square kilometers. That makes it a mid-sized city by Canadian standards, certainly outside the country’s top-10 in terms of population. But it is the provincial capital and the largest population centre in both Nova Scotia, with 39.5 per cent of the entire province, and Atlantic Canada (Statistics Canada 2007a). HRM’s urban centre fronts Halifax Harbour on the Atlantic Ocean, one of the largest natural harbours in the world. Due to its geographical location, its major employers at the time included the Department of National Defence and the Port of Halifax. The three levels of government were also major employers, and it continues to host six universities (more than 40,000 students). The rural outreaches of the large municipality, however, continued to rely heavily on the resource industry, in particular agriculture, forestry, mining and the fisheries. The city also had a history of hosting and bidding for major sporting events. In 1987, it lost the domestic bid to represent Canada in the international bidding process for the 1994 Commonwealth Games. Victoria, B.C. went on to host the competition. In 2002, it again lost the domestic bid to Hamilton. But Hamilton would go on to lose the international campaign for the 2010 Commonwealth Games to New Delhi. In 1990, Halifax hosted the World Figure Skating Championships, in 1995 it served as the backdrop for the G7 Summit, and throughout the decade hosted the Canadian university basketball championships. Major events in the previous 10 years included the world junior hockey championships (2003), Canadian men’s curling championship (2003), and the women’s world hockey championship (2004). Halifax was also slated to host the world lacrosse championships (2007), the world men’s hockey championship (2008), and the 2011 Canada Winter Games.

Again, we remind ourselves of Stone’s urban regime theory in which local governments find themselves trying to attract business and promote economic
development in order to increase tax revenues and meet increasing demands from its electorate. His “social production” model focuses on the capacity to get things done. Economic development is a sphere dominated by private interests and Stone argues that in order for local governments to be successful in expanding and improving their economies, they need to develop partnerships with private interests in order to assemble the required resources. These resources include financial, legal or technical know-how. Cooperation between these actors with the necessary resources, coupled with the political power of the local government, is central to URT in that they provide that capacity. The characteristics of the actors should also help explain the direction of economic development efforts. This chapter will focus on Halifax as a second case study, to identify what form of cooperation took place in this mid-sized East Coast municipality at the beginning of the millennium. We begin with a brief summary of the overall bid – its rise and fall – before discussing the political and economic context within which Halifax made its decision to bid for the mega-event. At that point, we can look more closely at the bid, specifically the actors involved and their motivations, in order to determine if Halifax shows any similarities to the Melbourne case study, and whether or not its bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games was the result of regime politics.

**Halifax’s 2014 Commonwealth Games Bid**

The Halifax bid ended in so much disarray, that it’s perhaps best to first tell the short story. Halifax competed against Hamilton, Ottawa, York Region and Calgary to be Canada’s choice to bid internationally for the 2014 Commonwealth Games against Glasgow, Scotland and Abuja, Nigeria. Previously, Halifax had lost its domestic bid in 2002 to host the 2010 Commonwealth Games. Canada’s official bid that year, would be awarded to Hamilton, Ontario, which will be discussed shortly as our third case study. Two years later, Halifax Mayor Peter Kelly and Nova Scotia Premier John Hamm officially signed a Letter of Intent to bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games at a media event in the mayor’s office. At the time, the Halifax bid proposal suggested the cost of hosting the Games was approximately $785 million CDN*. But competing municipalities such as York Region were on the public record as expecting it to be at least $1 billion.

---

* All dollar amounts in chapters 4 and 5 are in Canadian funds.
Halifax won the domestic bid, much to the shock of the other cities, especially Hamilton that claimed it had been secretly promised the bid due to its 2003 loss to New Delhi.*

However, several months into the process, both municipal and provincial politicians expressed surprise and outrage as its own bid committee prepared an official international bid that they claimed was overly secretive and well more expensive than the provincial and municipal governments had ever approved. The original estimate for hosting the Games had now doubled to $1.7 billion thanks mainly to the expensive construction and upgrade of venues. The international bid committee went back and trimmed the budget to $1.3 billion. The bid committee’s eight-member executive committee comprised Joan Duncan and Thomas Jones representing Commonwealth Games Canada (CGC), Halifax CEO Dan English, Deputy Minister Robert Fowler from the premier’s office as well as treasury and policy board, Ken Bagnell from Canadian Sport Centre Atlantic (as the sport representative), ex-officios Scott Logan, CEO of the bid, Eric Savard, the CGC bid director, and the bid committee’s chair Fred MacGillivray, a high-profile businessman and president of Trade Centre Limited which managed the city’s major event facilities.

Despite the fact that $9 million of public money had already been spent on the bid, and that there was not enough time for another Canadian city to prepare a replacement bid, both the Halifax government and the provincial government backed out of their funding agreements. The bid was withdrawn just weeks before it was to be officially submitted to the international Commonwealth Games Federation on May 9, 2007. The federal government had committed $400 million to the overall budget, $165 million was to (hopefully) come from revenues and commercial sponsors, and the province and municipality were ready to put in a combined $550 million. However, that left a funding gap of $485 million. Amidst a flurry of activity in the first three months of 2007, a consultant’s report on the budget, conducted for the province and municipality,

* Much of the narrative for the Halifax bid comes from newspaper articles published during the time of the bid, a list of which can be found in Appendix 2. As well, the Halifax Regional Municipality website has kept a comprehensive online archive of the bid’s documents, which can be found at www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives
found several risks and weaknesses in the capital plan. While the bid committee asked for more time to crunch numbers, the mayor was on the phone to federal representatives, including the regional minister Peter McKay (who was from Nova Scotia) seeking extra monies as the bid deadline approached. The federal government failed to come up with an increased commitment and the province and municipality did not feel there was enough time to give due diligence to a new budget. Despite the fact that $9 million of public money had already been spent on the bid, and that there was not enough time for another Canadian city to prepare a replacement bid, both the Halifax government and the provincial government backed out of their funding agreements. The bid was withdrawn just weeks before it was to be officially submitted to the international Commonwealth Games Federation (CGF) on May 9, 2007. Glasgow went on to win the right to host the event.

**Halifax Regional Municipality**

Unlike its Australian counterpart, Halifax and the province of Nova Scotia were not in a state of political and economic turbulence in the years immediately leading up to its bid. Those times of upheaval had already taken place 10 years earlier during a time of federal and provincial cutbacks that ultimately led to the amalgamation of four municipalities – Halifax, Dartmouth, Bedford and Halifax County. In Canada, like Australia, municipalities have no protection under the constitution. Rather, the provinces have direct control over them – they can create them, redesign them as they see fit, or completely nullify their corporate existence. So in 1996, as a way of dealing with increasing costs and federal cuts, Liberal Premier John Savage forced the amalgamation of the above-mentioned municipalities. Urban cores merged with suburban neighbourhoods, villages, farmland and wilderness (Poel 2000, 32). HRM became a vast landmass, larger than the province of Prince Edward Island. It was argued that amalgamation would not only save money, but also eliminate squabbling over items such as waste disposal and what had become cutthroat competition for economic development investment specifically between Halifax and Dartmouth. It was a typical policy choice of the Liberals during that period where larger was considered better: local hospital boards were consolidated into regional boards, as were school boards. Savage was trying to pull
a province, used to doing politics in an antiquated manner, into the new millennium. He took a stand against patronage (which seemed endemic throughout the province) and emphasized codes of conduct, conflict of interest rules and greater transparency in government business (Clancy, Bickerton and Haddow 2000, 228). By the time he left office after four years, a $600 million provincial deficit had been turned into a balanced budget and he had introduced legislation that would make it illegal to incur a deficit of more than one per cent of projected revenues – a shortfall would become the first charge on the future year’s accounts (p. 239). Savage opened up the province to new, controversial, sources of revenue: public-private partnerships, licensed casinos, and harmonizing the provincial sales tax with the federal sales tax. The federal government had offered millions of dollars to the province as an incentive to harmonize taxes and that money helped in its deficit reduction. Savage was in power during a time of severe spending cuts by the federal government, which sought to eliminate its own deficit spending and did so, in part, by downloading more of the financial burden on provinces. Provinces dealt with this shift by downloading more of the financial burden on municipalities. And it was believed that one way to help municipalities cope with the added burden, and find cost efficiencies, was to amalgamate smaller towns into larger ones.

We should quickly note that academic literature since then is in agreement that savings from amalgamation were minimal to non-existent, although the economic development competition and waste disposal disagreement was solved (Sancton 2000a). HRM was still dealing with the aftershocks of the 1990s as Conservative Premier Hamm (in 1999) and Mayor Kelly (in 2000) took the reins, in particular the rural-urban divide that had occurred within the electorate as a result of the amalgamation, the fiscal stresses that came with the provincial downloading of services to the municipality, and the loss of 8,000 government jobs in the mid-1990s when the federal government was looking for ways to cut the deficit. HRM was also trying to stem the tide of young people leaving the city and the Atlantic Region in search of better employment, which partly led to a policy goal of attracting more immigrants to the area. The downloading or exchange of services that occurred as a result of amalgamations continued to impact municipalities financially.
An example of this in Halifax is the exchange of responsibility for policing and roads to the municipalities in exchange for uploading welfare costs to the province. While it was generally considered a better deal to let the larger level of government deal with social services, the new HRM encompassed such a vast rural area as well as its urban centre, that policing and road costs were also substantial. Any net gain urban Halifax would have enjoyed from the uploading of welfare costs were nullified by increased road and policing costs needed to service such a large area. This was the landscape when Premier Hamm and Mayor Kelly each came to power.

Both the federal government and the Nova Scotia government had successfully eliminated its deficit spending during the years leading up to the bid, and the country as a whole appeared to have escaped the 2001 recession. However, Nova Scotia’s economy was described as “sluggish” as it trailed the rest of Canada in growth in personal income and domestic provincial product (Finbow 2010, 264). Offshore energy revenues that were hoped to be the region’s financial saviour were now stagnant and the province was in the middle of negotiations with the federal government over equalization payment claw backs due to increased resource revenues. Two things limited Hamm’s power during his years in office. For most of those years, he led only a minority government, which meant he had to tread lightly in terms of his policy decisions. And he was limited by the Expenditure Control Act that did not allow deficit spending. As an example of his careful policy making in the face of a left-leaning NDP opposition, his government agreed to roll back its planned tax cuts in 2004, but there was very little new spending. User fees were increased and education funding continued to be low as post-secondary tuition fees continued to be some of the highest in Canada (p. 262).

* * *

HRM is responsible for many more local services compared to the City of Melbourne in our previous case study. While the constitutional divide of responsibilities is similar in Canada and Australia – where the provinces are recognized in the federal constitution and municipalities are not; and where municipalities are under the jurisdiction of the provinces – Canadian municipal governments in practice have much
more financial responsibility over and accountability for what happens within their geographical jurisdiction. Some of the main local responsibilities in Halifax include police, fire and emergency services (its largest expenditure at $109 million or almost one-fifth of the budget); local public transportation, libraries, water and sewers, waste management, public works, and most important for this research -- planning and development. Decisions on how to spend municipal revenues (which come primarily from property tax plus provincial grants and user fees) are made by a 23-member elected municipal council and a mayor elected at-large. A chief administrative officer heads city staff and provides council advice on its policymaking. In 2005, at the time of the domestic bid, Halifax council managed a budget of $587.8 million (HRM 2005a).

In the new millennium, Halifax was most definitely trying to change its image (Black 2008, Finbow 2009) as opportunities in biotechnology, offshore energy and information technology emerged. It was trying to portray itself as a hip, “Smart City” developing a knowledge economy that would keep young people in the province and attract skilled immigrants. Economic strategies emphasized investing in “social and cultural infrastructure”, creating an attractive business climate (financially), and building HRM as a “brand” in which HRM was seen “as a beautiful, immensely livable place that teems with history and creativity” in order to attract business investment. The municipality aimed to increase its international profile and become “the envy of the world” (HRM 2005b). Bidding for international sporting events was seen as a vital step in this process, and the bid served as a high-profile example of this strategy. As Kelly stated in the 2005 HRM Annual Report:

Hosting the Games would showcase our region internationally and leave a legacy that would last for generations in our municipality, our province and throughout the entire Atlantic Region.

***

On July 5, 2005, Halifax regional council met in its committee of the whole to discuss a staff recommendation that the city bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games. The
report was submitted by the region’s CEO, Dan English and cited nine “potential benefits” of hosting the event: international recognition and prestige, joining a group of Canadian cities which have hosted major international games, facilities and financial legacies, leadership and volunteer opportunities for Nova Scotia residents, infrastructure improvements, access to federal funds for infrastructure improvements, promotion of physical activity throughout province, attracting tourism through “international branding” for the province as well as “hundreds of hours of free international television and media coverage”, and substantial economic impacts (including 7,000 new jobs in person-years and $450 million in increased activity). For these lofty policy goals, council was asked for $5,000 needed to submit the domestic bid proposal, which would be split once the provincial government came on board (HRM 2005c). One week later, Kelly and Hamm officially signed a letter of intent to bid for the Games.

Events Halifax, a division of Trade Centre Ltd. (TCL), spearheaded the domestic bid. TCL was, and continues to be, a provincial Crown corporation that acts as a hub for attracting major business, cultural and sporting events to Halifax and Nova Scotia. One needs only to read the Chairman’s Message in its 2005/06 annual report, the year of the bid, to understand its mission: “A few decades ago, people weren’t even thinking about events-hosting as an industry or as an economic generator for Nova Scotians. But in its two decades of existence, Trade Centre Limited has built events-hosting into big-business” (McInness 2006, 2). TCL, with six divisions at the time that included the convention center and the World Trade Centre, had facilitated the hosting of 673 events that year, attracting an estimated 874,000 visitors. Halifax, as mentioned previously, was no stranger to hosting major events.

Bidding for the Commonwealth Games had been under consideration by Events Halifax since around 1999 and despite losing the domestic bid to Hamilton in 2002, it never left the discussion table (Logan 2010). The prime motivation at the time had been the lack of sporting facilities in Halifax – most of the existing sports facilities had been built in 1969 for the Canada Games. Expanding and improving sports facilities, with the help of outside funds from the federal government, was seen as a way of building
community as well as getting children to be more physically active. Businessman Fred MacGillivray, who started off in the grocery industry, was the CEO of TCL and had been since 1994. He was very involved in the failed 2002 domestic bid, and he headed the 2005 domestic bid and subsequent international bid. Kelly was head of municipal council during both bids, and Hamm led the province during both domestic bids (although he retired as the international bid began, and Rodney MacDonald took over as premier). MacGillivray, Kelly and MacDonald, who was the provincial amateur sports minister at that time, led the delegation that represented Halifax during the domestic bid announcement in Toronto on December 15. The premier and the mayor issued a joint press release/op-ed article a month later that outlined their motivations:

1. *Raising the city's international profile*: “For Nova Scotia and for Halifax Regional Municipality (HRM), the 2014 Commonwealth Games represent an opportunity to showcase our people, our history, and our accomplishments to the world.”

2. *Leaving a legacy*: “Indeed, if these Games are awarded to Canada with HRM as host city, the event will leave a legacy that would pay dividends to the municipality, the province, the region, and the nation for generations to come.”

3. *Instilling pride*: “(Polling support from the people) indicates a deep confidence in our community’s collective ability to stage large events that are successful from a financial, organizational and legacy perspective” (Hamm and Kelly 2006).

**Federal Policy**

Houlihan and Green (2005) trace the beginning of federal sports policy in Canada back to 1961 with Bill C-131 Fitness and Amateur Sport Act, and summarizes that the policy window appeared, firstly, with a concern for the Canadian fitness level, but also due to a national concern over the poor results from international sports events – primarily ice hockey. That Canadian hand-wringing and subsequent centralized elite sport policy predates Australia’s by almost 20 years is somewhat ironic, given that Canada now looks to the Australian model in how to develop world-class athletes and a culture of winning. Sport policy at the elite level in Canada has become increasingly
centralized in the hands of the federal government, while the policy areas of health and recreation (which are more relevant to mass participation) are largely under the jurisdiction of the provinces and even the municipalities (who run public health departments and build/maintain arenas and sports fields).

Sport Canada, currently located in the Canadian Heritage Ministry, is the federal department responsible for elite athlete development. Over the five decades of its existence, elite sport policy in Canada has been underpinned by the federal government’s need to instill national unity in a geographically dispersed country with vast regional differences, most obvious being the ongoing separatist threat from Quebec over the years. Success on the international stage, from a policy angle, should lead to national pride and national unity.

There was a flurry of policy-making and legislative activity early in the 21st century in Canada, during the years immediately leading up to the Halifax bid, as the federal government sought to update and clarify its role in sport:

- Bill C-54: An Act to Promote Physical Activity and Sport (2002, now C-12)
- The Canadian Sport Policy (2002)
- Canadian Policy on Doping in Sport (2000)

While much of the background to these policies and legislation took place in the 1990s, there was a strong catalyst for change building across the country late in the year 2000. Canada had not performed well at that year’s Summer Olympics in Sydney, Australia. The country had won 14 medals (three gold, three silver, eight bronze), compared to 22 at the Atlanta Olympics in 1996 and 18 at the Barcelona Olympics in 1992. The high-profile complaints began in Sydney from some of the country’s own top athletes whose main concern expressed to the nation’s media was a lack of government funding to their sports (Houlihan and Green 2005, 47-50).
Sport Canada, meanwhile, had been looking to update the Fitness and Amateur Sport Act of 1961. The effort began with what is generally known as the Mills Report of 1998: a sub-committee study of sport, which looked at everything from infrastructure to the economics of sport. This led, by the beginning of the new century, to a huge pan-Canadian consultative process including six regional conferences, roundtables with stakeholders and discussions with provincial and territorial ministers responsible for sport to devise an updated policy. In 2002, at the time of the new Canadian Sport Policy (CSP) being released, Sport Canada had a budget of about $95 million and a mission which included “strengthening the unique contribution that sport makes to Canadian identity, culture and society.” That mission statement can still be found on the home page of its website.

The CSP stated four goals: enhanced participation, enhanced excellence, enhanced capacity and enhanced interaction. It is Goal #3 which is most relevant to this research, as it states that building capacity in the sport system should include developing a long-term strategy to Games hosting in order to “maximize their contribution to sport and community objectives” (Canadian Heritage 2002, 18). The CSP also provides us a useful breakdown of the roles and jurisdictions of each level of government, which tends to pre-occupy much of Canada federal government: the federal government essentially supports the high-performance athletes and their coaches and support system, as well as supports the hosting of national and international sports events; the provincial government supports participation, volunteerism, and the athletic development of the “next generation of high-performance athletes”; municipal and community administrations support community-based participation through programming, and the building, maintaining and upgrading of sports and recreation facilities as well as hosting sports events (Canadian Heritage 2002, 15). The CSP led to Bill C-12 that stated the minister’s role included the coordination of federal initiatives such as the hosting of major sports events.

Most relevant to this dissertation is the federal hosting policy, which showcases the coordination needed between the three levels of government, and the interdependent policy goals of each level. This policy was being discussed and updated as Hamilton was
bidding for the 2010 Commonwealth Games and Halifax was in between its domestic bids. In 2003, a working group was established to develop an updated hosting strategy. While the Federal Hosting Policy was originated in 1989 and updated in 1996 and 2000, the federal government now felt the bidding process had become too fragmented. There were too many regional disparities as to who got what, with the Western provinces benefiting heavily (1988 Winter Olympics to Calgary, AB; 1994 Commonwealth Games to Victoria, B.C.; 1999 Pan-American Games to Winnipeg, MB; 2010 Winter Olympics to Vancouver although Vancouver had yet to be awarded those games). Also, ad hoc local municipality bidding decisions were putting funding pressure on federal and provincial governments outside of their annual budgets, and often lacked input from national sports organizations before cities submitted international bids for events (Canadian Heritage 2003a).

The federal government wanted the process cleaned up. The working group that was appointed included Eric Savard, who was at the time the director-general of the upcoming world youth track and field championships in Quebec and who would eventually sit on the Halifax bid committee. It also included MacGillivray as an industry representative. As the group acknowledged the lack of consistency in determining economic benefits, the legacy benefits from these events were now gaining in importance, as the group concluded that hosting major sports events “provide the greatest impact in terms of capacity building” in terms of sports infrastructure, sport development and grass roots participation. Thus, it recommended that a fixed portion of both levels of government funding towards operating expenses be set aside as a legacy fund in any bid. It had previously ranged from 5 per cent to 15 per cent (Canadian Heritage 2003a, 6).

Most relevant to Halifax was this working group’s recommendation that Canada host two major multi-sport international events every 10 years, and that – due to regional disparities in infrastructure -- support be provided to enable Atlantic Canada to be able to bid for a major international multi-sport or large single sport event within the next decade. Just two years later, Halifax would win the domestic bid over Hamilton in a controversial decision to represent Canada in the international 2014 Commonwealth Games bidding process. But there was a glitch in the plans: Vancouver had won its bid.
to host the 2010 Winter Olympics and was experiencing cost overruns due in large part to hyper-inflated housing and construction costs. Also, the federal government changed during the Halifax bid as Stephen Harper and his Conservative Party ousted the Liberals in 2006. Harper was known for feeling municipal issues should be left to the provinces (Finbow 2009). The Halifax bid committee would find Harper’s government reluctant to commit any more than the original $400 million to its endeavour while the federal government was under pressure to ensure the high-profile Olympic Games went off without embarrassment to the country.

**The End of the Bid**

What happened next in the Halifax bid’s chronology of events, and why it happened, is now the subject of many an investigative newspaper article, audit reports and even a couple academic papers. By the end of 2006, the international bid committee was accused of being too secretive, even to city councillors, and rumours of a ballooning budget swirled. On January 29, 2007 the three levels of government (referred to as “funding partners”) received a proposed budget that put the cost of the Games at approximately $1.37 billion in 2007 dollars -- $1.6 billion with inflation (Montgomerie 2007). This was more than twice the cost ($785 million with inflation) that had been estimated during the domestic bid. There was a flurry of activity in the early weeks of 2007 as the funding partners crunched numbers and sent the budget to its consultants. This included high-level informal discussions between the new Premier MacDonald and Prime Minister Stephen Harper, as well as more than one conference call between Kelly, provincial Minister of Health Promotion and Protection Barry Barnet, and federal ministers MacKay and Helena Guergis (secretary of state for sport). With the province and the municipality committed to putting in a combined $550 million, and the federal government in for only $400 million, there was still a funding shortfall of approximately $485 million. The consultant’s report determined that the business case for the Games was too weak:

> Providing the funding required to close the funding gap and submit the bid based on the proposed budget would have compromised the fiscal position and exposed the Province to undue financial risk. For example, the
Province would have had to also guarantee (at least at 50 per cent) any Games deficits and/or cost overruns. (Montgomerie 2007)

On March 7, 2007, Nova Scotia cabinet withdrew its support for the bid and city council, upon hearing the news just prior to a council meeting, also withdrew its support. Ultimately, neither the province nor the municipality had the political will to see this expensive public policy choice through to the end. The cost estimates were too great and deemed too risky for the two levels of government that were legally obliged to meet balanced budgets. Municipal council felt the bid committee was too secretive with the budget numbers and coy about the bid, despite the fact both the bid and the Games would be funded primarily with public funds. Federal government financial support seemed stuck at $400 million.

In general, it must be noted that even though the preliminary findings from these reports identified the potential of significant financial risk, the decision to withdraw was made primarily because it did not appear as though there was a sound business case for the three funding partners to proceed with submitting a bid, based on the proposed total budget. (English 2007)

The budget for the international bid had been originally pegged at just over $14 million, with the province and federal government each contributing $3.5 million, the municipality $3 million, plus corporate donations. In the end, some $9 million was spent, to chase a public policy goal -- all funded with tax dollars as very little had been raised from the private sector.

The question for this research remains whether or not Halifax’s chosen policy path of bidding for a mega-event in order to achieve other economic and social policy goals was the result of regime politics. If it was regime politics, what was the character of the regime? We ask the three questions taken from Stone in Chapter 2: Who makes up the governing coalition? How is this coming together accomplished? What are the consequences? As in the previous chapter, we also rely on Stoker and Mossberger’s definitions of various regime-types in order to gain a better understanding of who has power in local government and how this power shapes public policy choices.
1. Who was involved in the bid?

As discussed in the previous chapter, this research uses the actors involved in the bid as a way to identify who held positions of power or influence during the time under scrutiny. Halifax had previously bid domestically for the 1994 Games (in 1987) and the 2010 Games (in 2002), losing both. So it had a policy history of bidding for this event that pre-dates the mayor, the premier and even MacGillivray. By the 2005 bid for the 2014 Games, it had already hosted several international sporting events. It also already had in place infrastructure for bidding on events and hosting them in the form of Events Halifax and Trade Centre Ltd. The impetus for bidding for the Games in 2002 and 2005 came from Events Halifax, in which MacGillivray and Logan were involved. At that time, MacGillivray was a former grocery businessman and president of TCL (much like Melbourne’s Ron Walker, only without the personal wealth or political connections), and Logan was a provincial civil servant and Events Halifax board member. So the idea to bid for the Commonwealth Games generated from a group of people working for a Crown Corporation. The main spokespeople for the 2005 domestic bid and 2006 international bid were primarily MacGillivray and Logan. Mayor Kelly was also often quoted in the media. While he did not have a seat on the international bid committee (as English and Anstey were the city’s representatives), the fact that Kelly was sought after for comments on bid issues, his involvement in negotiations with the federal government in trying to get added funds and the substantially greater financial contributions of the municipality, shows a difference in the role of HRM during its bid, versus the City of Melbourne during the Australian bid. The Canadian municipality, which played a central role in economic development, also played a much more central role in what happens during the bid phase.

The domestic bid committee in 2005 included: MacGillivray, Logan, a former elite canoeist and sports administrator who now worked in the provincial government, most recently to this point as the assistant deputy minister of health promotion; the municipality’s CAO Dan English who was representing the mayor and the city’s interests, his deputy CAO Wayne Anstey, Ken Bagnell from the Canadian Sport Centre
Atlantic which supports high performance athletes (through, in part, government funding); Jamie Ferguson from Sport Nova Scotia, a government-funded umbrella organization for provincial sports organizations which promotes health and personal development through participation; city councillor Lloyd Johnson who was also a member of the First Nations (in Canada, it has become routine to ensure a First Nations representative is included in bidding), Duff Montgomerie from the premier’s office, and Howard Windsor, deputy minister of the premier’s office and head public servant.

The international bid committee did not change significantly from these actors. Windsor left the committee at the end of 2006 when the province appointed him to take over the troubled Halifax School Board. He was replaced by Rob Fowler. In its international phase, the bid committee added six members from the CGC, plus one as an ex-officio member. There were also two “observers” – one from the federal economic development agency Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency, and one from Sport Canada. Two corporate representatives had yet to be appointed to the board when the bid folded. And that is particularly noteworthy of this group of committee members. There were no clear representatives of the private sector in any decision-making or steering capacity. Both committees were heavily weighted towards the public sector, complemented by technical/professional actors who also have strong ties to the government. While MacGillivray had a private business background, he did not bring any added capacity to the bid.

Table 4.1
Board Members of Halifax’s Domestic and International bids for the 2014 Commonwealth Games

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>OCCUPATIONS</th>
<th>ACTOR-TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>former grocery-store executive, founder of a local minor hockey league</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan English</td>
<td>HRM CAO, representing mayor</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wayne Anstey</td>
<td>HRM Deputy CAO</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ken Bagnall</td>
<td>President, Canadian Sport Centre Atlantic</td>
<td>Technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Role</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamie Ferguson</td>
<td>Sport Nova Scotia, previously Tennis Canada for Atlantic Region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lloyd Johnson</td>
<td>Councillor, Millbrook First Nations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duff Montgomerie</td>
<td>Director of Community relations for premier’s office (during international phase will be moved to assistant deputy minister of health promotion to take over from Logan)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howard Windsor</td>
<td>Deputy Minister to premier’s office, head public servant, leaves international bid committee in Feb. 2007 to take position as one-man school board at troubled Halifax School Board</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott Logan</td>
<td>Assistant Deputy Minister for Health Promotion, Member of Events Halifax board, former CEO of Sports Nova Scotia, elite athlete (canoeing), coach and sports administrator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(INTERNATIONAL BID) *indicates executive committee member</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MacGillivray* (Chair), Logan* (ex-officio as CEO) Anstey, English*, Bagnall*, Ferguson, Johnson, Montgomerie, Windsor (later replaced by Robert Fowler)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Fowler*</td>
<td>Replaced Windsor (above), Deputy minister health promotion, premier’s office and treasury &amp; policy board</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trevino Betty</td>
<td>CGF athlete representative, track and field</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Andrew Pipe</td>
<td>CGC President</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suzanne Coffey</td>
<td>Former CGC board member</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claude Bennett</td>
<td>CGC past-president</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joan Duncan*</td>
<td>CGC former president</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Jones*</td>
<td>CGC CEO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ex-officio members)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric Savard*</td>
<td>CGC bid director</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Observers)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catherine Blewett</td>
<td>Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* indicates executive committee member
2. What were their motivations?

There were two major motivations for Halifax and Nova Scotia to bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games: the promise of economic benefits whether through increased business investment or tourism dollars, and building of international-standard sports facilities using non-local funds. There were also underlying themes in the motivations that have been discussed earlier in the chapter: international and national prestige and local pride. When HRM council first received a report on bidding domestically, the economic impact was estimated at 7,000 new jobs in person-years and a $450 million increase in economic activity. Upon winning the domestic bid, the mayor told the media that there was a projected economic spin-off of $2 billion and that it would “generate jobs and it will help unify Atlantic Canada” (Christie 2005). That number was used again in a 2006 Frequently Asked Questions public document, and repeated in February 2007 (Moreira 2007) as the bid is coming under closer scrutiny and criticism. At the same time that Kelly was celebrating the domestic win with reporters, MacGillivray was also saying that he hoped a new stadium would attract a CFL team, something that he and TCL had been pursuing for several years. He also invoked feelings of competitiveness and pride in stating: “The country can look at Halifax and say ‘They figured it out.’ Our Nova Scotia government gave us the resources and said, ‘Let’s go for it’” (Christie 2005). Knowing how the whole thing turned out, one can only view these comments with cocked eyebrow. In the end, Kelly would make a complete reversal and say that the Games would have left a “heavy burden of debt” (Tutton 2007).

Throughout the bid, we see some indication of a symbolic regime whereupon the key component is the intent to change a city’s image (Stoker and Mossberger 1994, Mossberger and Stoker 2001) using symbols as a mobilization function. The successful Games domestic bid was used to invoke pride locally as the Halifax committee defeated other Canadian cities for the right to bid internationally, and then focused on taking on international competitors. Stated benefits of hosting a Games included “world-class”
facilities. There was an economic strategy in place to re-brand the city and the province in order to attract business investment and retain its youth population as well as attract skilled immigrants and the Commonwealth Games was seen as part of that strategy. The motivations for municipal government actors were literally written in black and white right from the beginning, as we saw in English’s July 2005 report to council, discussed earlier in the chapter. They range from international and national prestige to infrastructure improvements and economic development. He referred to it in the report as a “once in a lifetime opportunity” (HRM 2005c). He repeated these benefits in May 2006 when council was being approached to approve the international bid budget and its initial $1.5 million contribution (of a total $3 million). That report also stated the benefits even if the bid were ultimately unsuccessful, including marketing exposure, facility conditions updates that could be used at a later date, and local economic spin-offs from bid monies being spent locally (HRM 2006).

It is also the working assumption for this dissertation that Halifax was and continues to be the economic and urban centre for Nova Scotia. Therefore, the motivations of local government actors should mirror those of provincial government actors as an economically healthy Halifax with a vibrant tourism industry can only benefit the rest of the province. Nova Scotia stood to gain as a province from the heavy marketing, and sports infrastructure would have benefited athletes of the entire province as they would not have had to travel to distant parts of the country in order to access world-class facilities for training. This relationship could be seen in the joint press release issued by Kelly and Hamm, mentioned earlier, in which they listed increasing the city’s international profile, leaving a sports legacy (which would aid in health promotion – a provincial aim -- as well as elite development) and instilling pride, as reasons to bid for the Games. As well, bid CEO Logan, a provincial civil servant, told the media that the province had a balanced budget for five years in a row and that the Games would “advertise this economic regeneration to the world” (Moreira 2007).

MacGillivray and TCL had a history of courting sporting events to the city as well as a highly publicized attempt to gain a CFL team. It was his job and it was in his interests that Halifax continue to attract major events. He showcased his role and that of
TCL as playing a central part of HRM’s economic generation, while also invoking local pride and competitiveness, in comments printed in the TCL annual report:

We must keep our eyes on the horizon because our industry is evolving. North American cities see the economic potential of events hosting. TCL’s activities generated $165.8 million in user expenditures and spin-off impacts this year. Our national competitors want a slice of that business and they’re aggressively pursuing it, with state-of-the-art facilities and bold marketing campaigns. Our partners affirm that we’re industry leaders but they also tell us that to host the biggest international conferences and world-class events we need to increase our capabilities. (MacGillivray 2006, 3)

A year after the bid collapses, an investigative report said that TCL organizations received $155,987.74 from the Games bid (Bousquet 2008).

Was the bid for the 2006 Commonwealth Games the result of regime politics?

This research operates under the assumption that the stakes are so high in mega-event bids that only those with true influence and power, or their representatives, are entrusted with spots on the bid committee. Whether or not one can describe the group that formed for this bid committee as representing an informal yet stable group of actors, as per Stone, is dependent on your definition of those two terms. The most apparent thing in reviewing the list of actors involved in this bid is its clear lack of private-sector involvement. If it was a governing coalition of any sort, it was a coalition of political actors, certainly stable but hardly informal as there were formal structures set in place in Canadian governance that would precipitate the involvement of all three levels of government in economic development policy, especially with regards to Atlantic Canada with its dependence on various transfer payments from the federal government, most importantly equalization payments and employment insurance benefits in the resource industry. The core group may also include technical/professional individuals but for the most part (except for CGC representatives who are required on an international bid) they represented organizations that were also heavily dependent on government funding and their very existence tied to the sport industry. The actors had access to political resources but could only access a finite amount of financial resources due to various constraints – a
federal government only willing to put in $400 million presumably due to cost overruns in Vancouver, a provincial government legally obligated to balance its annual budget, a municipal government that had limited means of raising funds before taking on huge debt. It appears this group had no access to private capital or resources. And that leads us to Stone’s next set of criteria, regarding actors in a regime having a clear, pragmatic purpose that together empowers them to accomplish tasks that otherwise would be overwhelming.

If we continue with the assumption that this group of actors is a “regime”, we see they certainly had a clear, pragmatic purpose: to set Halifax on the world stage as a top place to do business, with a wonderful quality of life. The economic strategy and talking points were consistent and the Commonwealth Games were seen as a major stepping-stone to accomplishing these goals. However, the fact that the bid not only failed, but imploded due to a lack of political will clearly shows this group was not empowered to see this task through.

Mossberger and Stoker identify key properties of a regime. It should include “partners drawn from government and nongovernmental sources, requiring but not limited to business participation” (2001, 829). They argue that while the composition of regimes should vary based on institutional resources available, “governing coalitions that are specifically regimes will include participants from business”. There were no private sector members on either the domestic or international bid committees. While McGillivray was once a member of the corporate grocery industry, he had been an employee of TCL since 1994 and did not appear to have the depth of personal resources as his Melbourne counterpart, Ron Walker. While there had been media reports of certain businessmen on board with the bid, they were more in line with the local businessman who rented furniture to the bid committee office, or who simply signed a petition to support the bid. While $639,000 was raised in corporate donations for the domestic bid, only $508,184 had been raised for the international bid out of a budgeted $3.2 million by the time the bid had collapsed (Deloitte 2007). Most tellingly, even by the time the international bid was unraveling, the committee had not yet named its two
corporate representatives to the board. Power doesn’t seem fragmented in HRM (as suggested by Stone), rather it was held by government. Unfortunately, that power was not enough to give it the “capacity to act” – to get things done, to make a forceful and concerted effort to bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games. Minority governments, an upcoming election, a change in federal government, forced balanced budgets; a divided local electorate (rural vs. urban) and lack of private sector funding all contributed to the fall of the bid. Therefore, this dissertation concludes that while Halifax certainly had a stable governing coalition, it was in no way a regime as defined by urban regime theory.

The Problem with Halifax

Sports legacy had become an important facet of national and international events hosting by the time Halifax bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games. Atlantic Canada had an identified sports infrastructure deficit that this bid was meant to rectify. Yet, that deficit turned out to be its demise. Because the municipality had very few venues from which to build upon for its bid, the capital costs were larger than what was usually incurred (Wildsmith and Bradfield 2007). The bid had a Capital Plan Budget of $571 million in 2007 dollars which was estimated could balloon to approximately $747 million taking into account inflation and construction cost overruns. The government funding partners’ consultant also assessed the investment risk for the $121 million Commonwealth Park Stadium, which committee members hoped would later be used for a CFL team, and for the $159 million Multiplex to be used for aquatics and badminton. In both cases, the consultant found the post-Games business plan to be non-existent. The plan for the $63 million Athletes Village was that a property developer would incur the $212 million in construction costs and then sell off the units post-Games. The $63 million was only for expropriation, site preparation and servicing. However, no property developer had been found and there was a risk the funding partners would have to take financial responsibility for the entire project (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2007, 11-13). The consultants gave four options. One was to continue on as planned, two options required whittling down the budget but would take more time and were not guaranteed to come up with a Winnable scenario, and the final option was to withdraw. On March 6, 2007, Dale
MacLennan, the senior director finance, administration and government relations for the bid, issued a briefing note to the funding partners in defence of the budget process:

The infrastructure deficit in Nova Scotia and Halifax is significant and the Games role in addressing this has always been a compelling part of the rationale behind the bid. Previous Games and even competitor’s bids do not require the remediation of such an infrastructure gap as part of their bids. If addressing this gap is a significant part of the reason for bidding at all, it should not be surprising that this very same element is behind the primary difference in cost estimates for the Halifax 2014 bid and previous Canadian Games. (Halifax 2014 2007)

A capital budget and sports infrastructure is all about property development. Theoretically, property developers should have been heavily involved in this bid process, especially by urban regime theory standards. It appears they were not. The downfall of the Halifax bid was due to the strongest reason it gave to win the domestic bid in the first place – a sports infrastructure deficit in Atlantic Canada. That politicians did not have the resources to muscle this through, and that the private sector played no major role in this public policy choice leaves this dissertation to conclude that there was no existing regime in Halifax despite it having bid for a mega-event. So the theory that mega-event public policy can only be explained through a symbolic regime type is incorrect. However, perhaps the lack of an urban regime prevented it from seeing the public policy through to its conclusion.
Chapter 5
Hamilton 1987, 2003, 2005

A Hamilton bid generally begins with the assertion that it hosted the first-ever British Empire Games in 1930 (as the Commonwealth Games were called back then) -- a competition founded by M.M. Robinson, who was at that time the publisher of the city’s daily newspaper, The Hamilton Spectator. Thus, each bid builds on the theme of bringing the Games back to where it all started.

The city made official bids for the Games three times between 1987 and 2005 – once winning the domestic competition only to lose the international bidding war in 2003 to New Delhi. The city had three different mayors for each bid. The short version of those three unsuccessful bids for the Commonwealth Games goes something like this: In 1987, Hamilton spent $300,000* on a bid against other Canadian cities to become the Canadian Commonwealth Federation’s (as it was called back then) official bid city in the international competition. It lost to Victoria, B.C., which went on to win the international bid and host the 1994 Games. Hamilton officials cried foul, charged the CCF with creating secret backroom deals and making decisions based on regional bias, not merit. They demanded a federal inquiry, and one took place. But the decision remained the same.

In 2002, Hamilton spent $466,600 (Hamilton 2005e) and won the domestic competition, then spent around $3 million in 2003 to bid against New Delhi for the right to host the 2010 Commonwealth Games. It lost to the Indian capital. Hamilton officials cried foul, charged the Commonwealth Games Federation with regional bias and corruption, and the Indian delegation with bribery. They demanded an inquiry. The decision remained the same. In 2005, Hamilton spent $425,000 on the domestic bid (Hamilton 2006b). It lost to Halifax. Hamilton officials cried foul, charged the CCF with regional bias and backroom deals and demanded an inquiry – claiming they were

* All funds in Chapter 5 are in Canadian dollars.
originally told they would be the official bid city before the competition was suddenly opened up. The decision remained the same.*

The City of Hamilton

The following section of this dissertation will paint a picture of Hamilton as a historically industrial city going through economic change as its heavy industry base erodes and it looks for ways to diversify. Three case studies over a 20-year period allow us to follow, not only the emergence of an urban regime, and its debatable decline, but also the financial challenges, economic and structural changes in an industrial city. During this time, this mid-sized Canadian city endured structural changes as the province amalgamated surrounding communities with the urban core known as the City of Hamilton. The municipality's relationship with the province was a constant storyline during this period as it was the provincial government that imposed this structural change as well as contributed to the changing financial obligations of the city. Throughout it all, however, the role of the city and its governance structure (council and administrative staff) remained central in the public policy decision-making, quite unlike our first case in Melbourne.

Hamilton, Ontario has historically been anchored by the steel industry. With a 1986 Census population of approximately 308,000 over 35,000 acres, it was, and continues to be a port city with a working harbour situated at the western tip of Lake Ontario and along the Niagara Peninsula. It is a mid-sized city by Canadian standards, but it lies in the middle of the densely populated and heavily industrialized Golden Horseshoe, less than an hour’s drive from Toronto (1986 Census population 2.2 million and growing) in one direction, and less than an hour’s drive from the U.S. border in the other direction. The city is geographically split by the Niagara Escarpment. Industry, commerce and older residential units are situated below “the Mountain” while residential expansion has taken place on “the Mountain”. At the time of the first bid, Hamilton was surrounded by five smaller towns and townships -- Stoney Creek, Glanbrook, Ancaster,

* The narrative for the Hamilton bids in 1987, 2003 and 2005 come from personal interviews as well as newspaper articles, primarily The Hamilton Spectator, dated from January 1985 to April 2006. A full list of interviews can be found in Appendix 1 and newspaper articles in Appendix 2.
Dundas and Flamborough. Some were a mix of urban-rural, others were primarily rural communities. All six made up the Region of Hamilton-Wentworth. Hamilton was the urban centre of this larger community, with a city council comprising a mayor and two representatives from each of eight wards. The chief administrative officer was head of the city bureaucracy. Each of the surrounding municipalities had its own elected mayor and council, but the region also had its own separately elected chairman and 27 regional councillors (the mayors plus town/city representatives, with Hamilton having the greatest representation). It was a governance structure forced upon the towns by the province in 1974 as a means of cost-sharing specific services such as public transit, waste management and policing (we have previously discussed the relationship between Canadian provinces and their municipalities). Within this political arrangement, responsibilities for providing certain services were divvied up between the region and its municipalities to the point, sometimes, of confusion. As an example, while policing was a regional responsibility, the local municipality ran fire protection. The local municipality conducted waste collection, but it was disposed of in the regional dump. A resident’s property tax bill thus included a local municipality tax, a regional tax, and an education tax. The City of Hamilton’s 1985 operating expenditures – the year Morrow announced the city would bid for the Commonwealth Games – totaled $123,275,953 (in 1985 CDN dollars). Its capital outlay was $32.7 million (Hamilton 1986). Economic development was a regional responsibility, but planning and development also shows up as expenditure in the city budget. It is important to delineate the difference between the two levels of government because the 1987 Hamilton bid for the 1994 Commonwealth Games was conducted solely on behalf of the city. The region was not involved in the domestic bid.

In 1985, the two steel companies in town were still the major employers. Stelco employed 13,000 while Dofasco employed 11,500. At the time, they were the No. 1 and 2 steel producers in Canada. Eight of the city’s top-10 employers were in manufacturing -- Stelco, Dofasco, Westinghouse Canada, Firestone Canada, Camco, JI Case, Dominion Glass Co., National Steel Car. McMaster University, at No. 3, and Bell Canada at No. 8, were the only two non-industrial major employers (Hamilton 1986). Still, the annual
financial report acknowledged that Hamilton’s economy “has been shifting from that of primarily an industrial and manufacturing city to one that is more service oriented” (p. 18). By 1987, Firestone was shut down by its U.S. parent despite federal and provincial enticements and some 1,300 jobs lost (White 1991) and by 2011, several more of those companies were no longer in town. Hamilton’s downtown revitalization efforts, which had begun in 1967, reflected this change with the building of a downtown shopping mall, the Hamilton Place theatre and the Hamilton Art Gallery in the core. In 1981, the Hamilton Convention Centre was built for $16.7 million. And in 1985, the downtown Sheraton Hotel was built as well as the heralded $41.3 million Copps Coliseum – constructed with the primary purpose of attracting an NHL team to the city. In December 1985, the city would christen the new facility by hosting the world junior hockey championships. The downtown Gore Park had been “redeveloped” (although many felt it had actually been destroyed when its century-old trees were felled and replaced by saplings), and a new $33 million waterfront recreational park was next on the list. The city and the region appeared to be in good financial shape and there was construction going on, especially in the entertainment and hospitality sector. Deficit spending is not allowed by Ontario municipalities, thus, the City of Hamilton had a $3 million surplus heading into 1985, on the strength of revenues collected mainly from property taxes (58.9 per cent), but also user fees, fines, licenses and permits (Hamilton 1986). The provincial economy, it should be noted, was also in seemingly good shape and certainly doing better than most other provinces, showing economic growth despite welfare rolls and homeless rates increasing.

Fifteen years passed before Hamilton’s next bid, and by 2002, the City of Hamilton as a legal entity was different than the one that bid for the Games in 1987. The Fewer Municipal Politicians Act had amalgamated the old city with its five surrounding suburban and rural towns and townships. The new City of Hamilton took effect Jan. 1, 2001 and with it, the population grew to 490,268 over 1,117.11 square kilometers (Statistics Canada 2002) to make it the fourth largest city in Ontario. Hamilton-Wentworth Region was abolished. The new city council now comprised eight councillors from the “old” City of Hamilton, and seven councillors total from the outer
five former municipalities (although the ward boundaries are not exact). The acrimonious amalgamation was forced by the province, and gave “urban” Hamilton the bulk of power on council. The only mitigating factor was that the new mayor-at-large was Bob Wade, the former mayor of the now-defunct Ancaster.

Hamilton was still predominantly a manufacturing town, and a steel maker, but Hamilton Health Sciences Corp. (an amalgamation of the city’s hospitals) and the City of Hamilton had now replaced Stelco and Dofasco as the top two employers (Hamilton 2004a). McMaster University continued in its role not only as a major employer with a student population of more than 20,000, but also a leader in many fields of research, including sports science. Downtown and waterfront revitalization, and brownfield development, were still points of concern for council, and Copps Coliseum – now almost 20 years old – still had not attracted an NHL team and was considered outdated.

Economic development continued to play a central role in council activities -- $31.9 million was allocated to planning and development in 2002 and $30.2 million in 2003 (Hamilton 2003a, 2004b). One has to remember that Canadian cities were (and continue to be) so dependent on property taxes for their revenues, that they had to find ways to grow these revenues without continually putting stresses on the residential tax base. Increasing the commercial and industrial tax base was imperative to meet costs and improve the quality of life for citizens.

In 1988, federal and provincial transfer payments accounted for 23 cents of every dollar of municipal revenue. In 2003, it accounted for just 16 cents of every municipal dollar and left cities trying to make up the shortfall by trying to find new sources of revenue. While this was going on, municipalities were investing a greater share in their infrastructure – 56 per cent, compared to the federal (21 per cent) and provincial (23 per cent) governments (Statistics Canada 2004). By the early 21st century, Canadian municipalities were organizing themselves to have a greater voice in Ottawa, and a greater share of revenues.
Quality of life was still relatively high in Canadian cities, but there were some troubling signs: an increase in poverty and homelessness during the 1990s, deteriorating infrastructure, shortages of social housing, underinvestment in education, and urban sprawl making public transit more expensive (Brunet-Jailly, Magnusson 2008, 87). A TD Bank report was also critical of the fiscal set-up, which saw cities rely on property tax for 50 per cent of revenues amidst services being downloaded by the provinces. It argued cities should be given authority to levy their own taxes, and that other levels of government should make room for them to do so, in order for overall taxes to remain the same. By 2003, cities appeared to be high on the Liberal federal policy agenda. The term “infrastructure deficit” became well worn. The Canadian Taxpayers Federation argued that gas taxes weren’t being funneled back into road improvements. Ottawa collected $4.7 billion in gas taxes, but gave just $118 million back to the provinces for highway and road development (Brunet-Jailly, Magnusson 2009, 87).

These stresses were showing up in Hamilton’s budget. By 2003, residential tax assessment accounted for 59 per cent of revenues compared to 41 per cent non-residential. In 2002, the City of Hamilton collected revenues of $967.1 million, including taxation ($501.1 million), government grants ($215.3 million) and user fees ($188.4 million). Its expenditures totaled $926.2 million, of which its biggest expenditure was $237.6 million to social and family services – a downloaded responsibility from the provincial government (Hamilton 2003a).

To help mitigate this problem, the city sought to diversify its economy and bring in new investment as a means of increasing the commercial tax base. In May 2002, council approved an economic development strategy that identified six “clusters” of development: advanced manufacturing, airport land development, agriculture, biotechnology, film and information/communications technology. Its goal was to create a diversified economic base with globally competitive wealth creating companies (Hamilton 2002b). Council was still trying to grow its tourism industry. It hoped to encourage hotel development by passing a by-law that would defer development charges
for hotel construction. But more importantly, the city created a new tourism department in 2002 and hired David Adames as its director. He would have to hit the ground running as the domestic bid had just got off the ground and he would be part of the initial organizational meetings. Also, Hamilton was hosting the Bell Canadian Open (a PGA Tour event) and the World Cycling Championships 2003.

McMaster had become a major partner with the city in economic development. It contributed to the city’s skilled labour supply, bringing in research partnerships and improving the quality of life. It was building an Innovation Park on 37 acres of brownfield in support research and commercialization in advanced materials and manufacturing, nanotechnology and biotechnology. (Hamilton 2005b) The strategy recognized the decline in the North American auto industry and its negative impact (along with a stronger Canadian dollar) on the steel industry. During this period, Stelco had emerged from bankruptcy protection and would be facing changes in its existing operations. Also, Dofasco had been the target of a takeover.

The financial challenges facing Hamilton in 2004 and 2005 were similar to those during the previous bid in 2003. Hamilton, as well as cities across the province, was overly dependent on the property tax to fund its responsibilities, especially the increasing costs of health and social services that had been downloaded onto the municipalities and the aging infrastructure. The Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) began a campaign in late 2005 to pressure the provincial government into shrinking what it called the $3 billion provincial-municipal fiscal gap:

Ontario is the only province in Canada where municipal property taxes are used to subsidize provincial health and social services programs, like welfare and employment services, disability benefits, drug benefits, social housing, child care, homes for the aged, public health and ambulance services. (AMO 2005)

The AMO argued that Ontario’s municipalities spent more than $8 billion a year on provincial health and social services programs, or about one-third of their total operating expenditures. This was being played out in Hamilton’s 2005 budget
where total expenditures reached $976 million. Social and family services cost the city $255.1 million and social housing $53.4 million, or almost one-third of expenditures (Hamilton 2006a).

The new City of Hamilton had its second-ever municipal election in the fall of 2003, electing Stoney Creek councillor Larry DiIanni, who was the mayor-elect at the time the city lost its 2003 international bid. Council numbers remained the same, as did the representation of urban wards versus the suburban wards. The estimated population for the city was 513,000 in 2004, continuing the pattern of growth and ranking Hamilton as the fourth largest in Ontario (Hamilton 2005c, 3).

Manufacturing was in decline in the city, and by 2006 the occupational group of processing, manufacturing and utilities accounted for just 7 per cent of the labour force, or 19,175 (Hamilton 2005c, 16; Statistics Canada 2007b). In the meantime, the city was trying to find ways of generating greater income without increasing the property tax. Thus, came the need for a focus on economic development.

By the 2005 bid, tourism had emerged as its own economic development “cluster”. A Statistics Canada report found that for every tourism dollar spent, government raised 29.1 cents. By 2006, the feds were raising 13.6 cents, the provinces 13.9 cents and the municipal governments 1.6 cents per dollar spent. Those revenues came mainly from sales tax for the senior levels of government. (Statistics Canada 2007c) In January 2005, city council approved the Hamilton Sport Tourism Action Plan. The council report, prepared by Adames, called sport tourism “one of the fastest growing segments of the tourism industry” (Hamilton 2005d). The plan would require an annual operating budget of $300,000 to $400,000 of which the city would pick up $150,000 and the private sector would make up the difference. The intent was to build sport capacity, use sport events for economic and social gain, raise the city’s profile, engage residents and support economic development. The Commonwealth Games bid fit this strategy, and
council approved Adames’ recommendation that he and Tourism Hamilton lead the city’s bid team (Hamilton 2005d). This is a clearly demonstrated and stated connection between the city’s public policy decisions, sport and economic development.

Federal Policy

The previous chapter on Halifax briefly discusses the history of federal sport policy in Canada. By the 1980s, whether it be the Liberals or Progressive Conservatives in power, elite sport development had become concentrated under the federal government. There were two main goals that underlie this interest: national pride and national unity (Houlihan 2005; Macintosh, Bedecki and Franks 1987). The two were not mutually exclusive, and the success of Canada’s elite athletes on the world stage was seen as a way to bring a heavily regionalized country together. With Calgary scheduled to host the 1988 Winter Olympics, the federal government introduced the Best Ever program in 1982 – a $25 million investment in 10 winter sports with a goal of Canadian athletes producing the country’s best-ever results. In 1984, that program was extended to the Summer Olympics (Houlihan and Green 2005, 41-43).

Sports infrastructure investment had also taken a central role in the 20 years or so leading up to the 1987 domestic bid competition for the 1994 Commonwealth Games. Capital costs for the 1967 Pan-American Games in Winnipeg were $5.3 million, the 1976 Montreal Olympics had capital costs of $805.5 million and the 1978 Commonwealth Games in Edmonton spent $36 million (Macintosh, Bedecki and Franks 1987, 137-8). This led to an increase in demand for large sports facilities, primarily by Canadian urban centres that had not yet benefited from the cash outlay. At the same time, government members were beginning to question exactly what value it was getting from the huge expenditures. New facilities did not appear to be improving either high-performance development or mass participation. Plus, the infrastructure came with high maintenance and operational costs post-event. This scenario led to the development of a sport hosting policy in 1983. Specifically, the policy called for closer scrutiny of the benefits of any
major investments. Federal contributions would take into account how the events would develop high performance athletes. And the federal government would only contribute to capital costs for international multi-sport events – single-sport events would only be eligible for operating costs (Macintosh, Bedecki and Franks 1987, 138). There were a couple of motivations for the federal government to get involved in the funding of sport infrastructure – both symbolic and tangible. The buildings could be used as a symbol of what the federal government was doing for the taxpayer (during a time of animosity towards the central government from the provinces), and the construction would generate profits in the private sector and temporary local employment (p. 177).

For Hamilton, the pattern of federal sports infrastructure investment was undeniable. Ontario was not getting its fair share. Within the previous 10 years, Canada had hosted three major international multi-sport events (the 1976 Montreal Olympics, the 1978 Commonwealth Games in Edmonton, the 1980 World University Games in Edmonton) and was preparing to host the 1988 Calgary Olympics. All the money and benefits that come with hosting had gone either to the West or to Quebec. The bid committee issued an introductory newsletter for its campaign, and its content focused on the inequalities in investment. The committee calculated that the federal government had spent $205.5 million since the 1967 Pan-American Games (and this did not include the upcoming Calgary Olympics). It claimed 19.4 per cent had gone to Western provinces, 11.3 per cent to the Atlantic provinces, and a whopping 66.8 per cent to Quebec. Just 2.5 per cent of the funding had gone to Ontario, the most populous province in the country, amounting to approximately 57 cents per person (Hamilton Organizing Bid Committee 1987b). The federal government had put $50 million in infrastructure investment up for grabs for the Canadian city that won the rights to host the 1994 Commonwealth Games, and all competing bid cities wanted it: “When you put up a lottery prize of $50 million – that’s an awfully attractive lottery when there are only nine players in the game,” said Mike Brow, parks and leisure director for Richmond, B.C. *(Hamilton Spectator* 1987d) It shouldn’t be surprising to see the regional disparities in federal funding. Canada was a country divided, continually fighting a battle with Quebec separatists or Western animosity towards Central Canada. That so much money would be invested in major
sports infrastructure that the government believed would be a national symbol should not be surprising given the previously stated federal government motivations.

Fifteen years later, while Hamilton was just getting its domestic bid together for the 2010 Games, a new Canadian sport policy was about to be revealed and new legislation introduced – the result of two years of stakeholder conferences in the various regions, roundtables and discussions with provincial and territorial ministers. Those consultations were the result of more than a decade of soul searching and hand wringing over disappointing international results, primarily at the Olympics. This all came to a head after the Sydney Olympics.

There had been some upheaval in the Canadian system during the 1990s. Not only was there a long period of self-reflection due to the positive drug test of Ben Johnson during the 1988 Seoul Olympics and the resulting Dubin Inquiry in 1990 which concluded that federal policy was too focused on winning, but a new federal Liberal government headed by Jean Chretien was now in deficit-slashing mode following a tough recession to open the decade. The federal government won a narrow victory in the 1995 Quebec referendum and the economy was weak. Sport policy was certainly not a priority, and from 1990-91 to 1996-97, the Sport Canada budget was cut 17 per cent to $52 million in 1998-99. There was no more fitness and health ministry, rather Sport Canada was put under Canadian Heritage (Houlihan and Green 2005). There was a huge amount of criticism after a poor showing at the Sydney Olympics – an outcry led by the athletes themselves because they felt sport was being underfunded. But things were looking up for sport in Canada as the new millennium began. Vancouver was about to be named host of the 2010 Winter Olympics and the federal government was now spending. By the time of the Hamilton bid in 2002, Sport Canada’s budget had increased to $95 million and a new sport policy had been developed (as has been discussed in detail in our previous chapter on Halifax). Most importantly for Hamilton, a local member of parliament, Sheila Copps, was the Minister of Canadian Heritage.
Copps was not only a longtime Hamilton politician on both the provincial and national stage, she was a Liberal heavyweight and a local booster. Her mother sat on city council, and her father was a beloved mayor of Hamilton in the 1970s – the namesake of the Copps Coliseum. With the new sports policy came the updating of Bill C-54 (now C-12) that emphasized participation, physical activity, and alternative dispute resolution for athletes, and a new hosting policy. It specifically gave the minister a mandate to coordinate federal activities with regards to the hosting of major sporting events. We will quickly note here, that while Copps was never a member of Hamilton’s domestic or international bid committees, she was a large presence in any discussions.

As noted in the previous chapter, the goals for the 2002 Canadian Sport Policy were enhanced participation, enhanced excellence, enhanced capacity, and enhanced interaction (amongst stakeholders). It called for more private funding of sport, the development of a volunteer base and strong salaried leadership, and it discussed specifically the need for an updated hosting policy:

Canada’s fragmented approach to hosting sport events has created tremendous pressure on public and private funding sources, prevented the coordination of public funding for such events, and resulted in regional disparities in terms of the significant benefits hosting brings to a community. (Canadian Heritage 2002, 11)

That call for a more strategic approach would lead to a 2003 working group to be formed on developing a new hosting policy. While it would not impact Hamilton in its 2010 bid, it would play a role in the later bid for 2014. While the hosting policy had been updated in 2000, the feeling was that there were regional disparities in which cities were benefiting from hosting (too many were being awarded to the Western provinces) and ad hoc municipal decisions to bid were putting too much pressure on federal and provincial coffers outside of their annual budgets.

Still, the federal government and Copps wholeheartedly supported the Hamilton bid, and announced in a Canadian Heritage July 24, 2003 press release that it would
provide $1.4 million in direct funding for the international bid, and another $250 million should Hamilton win the right to host the 2010 Commonwealth Games. It established a 2010 Bid Secretariat within the department (as was standard) to assist bid organizers as the primary contact for any federal business. The Hamilton bid was consistent with federal policy, according to the Canadian Heritage press release, because it would – among other things – improve access to facilities and programming, develop the volunteer sector and provide a meaningful legacy (Canadian Heritage 2003b).

By the 2005 federal budget, federal funding of Sport Canada had increased to $140 million, although much of it was earmarked specifically to get results in Vancouver. Most relevant to Hamilton, however, was the work that was being done to update the federal hosting policy. A new hosting policy was supposed to clean up the process and give municipalities clear rules and goals when bidding for sporting events. The working group was appointed in 2003 to make recommendations. It included Eric Savard, who at the time was the director-general of the upcoming world youth track and field championships in Quebec but who would become the CGC bid director for the 2014 Commonwealth Games domestic bid competition, (and later sit on the Halifax bid committee). It also included Fred MacGillivray, chair of the Halifax bids in 2002 and 2005. The working group acknowledged a lack of consistency in determining economic benefits and directed the focus onto the importance of legacy and sports infrastructure as a benefit. It recommended a fixed portion of government funding towards operating expenses be set aside as a legacy fund. It recommended that Canada host two major multi-sport international events every 10 years and that the focus should be on getting such an event held in Atlantic Canada within the next decade (Canadian Heritage 2003a). In 2004, 14 federal-provincial/territorial governments adopted the Strategic Framework and it formed the basis for a new hosting policy (which would be released in 2008, long after the 2005 bids, without the specific goals for Atlantic Canada). None of this seemed to be an issue until Hamilton lost the domestic bid to Halifax in 2005. In its attack on the CGC and the process, Hamilton committee members mentioned specifically Savard and the working group that had recommended Atlantic Canada be awarded a major sports event.
During this time it should also be noted that there was a change in federal leadership at both the ministry level and the government level. Paul Martin was now prime minister and Copps was his rival. She was removed from her post as Canadian Heritage minister, in late 2003. It meant Hamilton would have no strong advocate for its bid at the senior levels of decision-making and we are left to surmise whether it would have made a difference at any point during the bid process, especially at the early point of 2005 where Sport Canada told the CGC the domestic bid process needed to be opened up to cities other than Hamilton.

**Hamilton 1987**

In January 1985, Hamilton Mayor Bob Morrow held a press conference to announce that he wanted to put together a bid for the 1994 Commonwealth Games. He’d gotten the idea from Jack Pelech, a lawyer by trade, but best known as chairman of the Canada Games Council (which ran the Canada Games multi-sporting event) and a big booster of amateur sport. Hamilton had just lost a domestic bid for the 1991 Pan-American Games in which it had spent a meager $10,000. Morrow promised this next bid would be more extravagant. He wanted Pelech involved as well as marketing experts (Davie 1985).

Morrow, mayor since 1982, was always looking for ways to showcase the steel town internationally. The Pan-Am Bid and Commonwealth Games bid were just two examples. The city was also bidding to host the World Basketball Championships during this period. Morrow believed these events would bring tourists and investment to the city, known best internationally for its steel companies and nationally for its professional football team, the Hamilton Tiger-Cats. But even that franchise was struggling financially and Morrow was also working behind the scenes to keep the Ticats alive and in the city. In the meantime, Copps Coliseum, a 17,500-seat arena was being built in the downtown core. The hope was that it would lure an NHL team to the city. Morrow believed that sports played a central role in building community and raising the profile of a city (Morrow 2010). Despite the grander scale, he believed the city could handle a
Commonwealth Games. In fact, it had all the things he was looking for to grow Hamilton – the promise of sports legacy projects on sites already available, improving transportation networks and mobilizing the community in a volunteer force. The city’s own university, McMaster, was on board as were nearby communities such as St. Catharines (which could host rowing). The Golden Horseshoe, an area that runs from Toronto (pop. 2.2 million at the time) around the tip of Lake Ontario to Niagara Falls, had the population size necessary to support such an event. And it could only help the city’s new hospitality industry that was being created at that time with new hotels, banquet centres and entertainment facilities going up.

The city also had a sports knowledge infrastructure that included many athletes dating back to the 1930s and the first Empire Games, and staff at McMaster University, which had a strong sports program and sports-related academic program. Morrow could draw from this resource. Specifically, there was Pelech with his longtime experience on national sport committees; Dr. Mary Keyes from McMaster who was a professor of kinesiology and director of the physical education and athletics department; and Dr. Gene Sutton, a national gymnastics coach at the time who would go on to become an international judge and a Canadian Olympic Committee member. It was an informal collective decision-making group at this point, primarily due to the fact that it was a domestic bid during the 1980s, a time when mega-event bids were still modest. Formal committees and incorporated bid groups normally occurred during the international bid phase. Morrow was fully involved with the decision-making and keeping city council informed and involved. A city council subcommittee, chaired by councillor Tom Murray, for example, was in charge of developing a display that traveled to Scotland for the 1986 Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh. Keyes, Pelech, high-level government consultant Dan Pugliese and HECFI boss Brian Conacher were also key contributors (Morrow 2010).

During those Games, in July 1986, Morrow went to Hamilton, Scotland with his executive assistant Dennis Carson, marathon runner Jim Lupton and their wives. It was the site of the rowing competition for the Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh. They
were manning that display showcasing their city. Morrow also hosted a breakfast for executives of the Commonwealth Games Association of Canada. On this same trip, Morrow would stop in Barcelona to hear the results of the city’s bid for the World Basketball Championships (it was unsuccessful), and also in Italy for twinning ceremonies with the city Racalmuto.

As 1987 began, the Hamilton bid co-chairman, Pelech, said $125,000 was earmarked for the bid and the campaign heated up, with the official bid due to be submitted by May 20 and the announcement of Canada’s bid city scheduled for November 20. By April, Pelech had invited 35 members of the local business community to the boardroom of the local daily newspaper, *The Hamilton Spectator*, to pledge their financial support. The bid book was a $95 million package with $51 million in capital costs, calling for a new velodrome ($18.6 million), track and field facility ($4.75 million) and a major aquatic facility ($16.5 million). Pelech’s plan was that the federal and provincial governments would each chip in $32.1 million, the XV Commonwealth Games Foundation another $21 million, and the city just $12 million. After this meeting, the corporate community committed to raising $5 million (*Hamilton Spectator* 1987b). The federal government had actually pledged $50 million towards hosting the Games and Ontario had pledged to match the feds up to one-third of the overall budget. Pelech, a very high profile and well-connected lawyer in the city with Liberal connections, said Hamilton would be willing to accept its share of the one-third split and would launch a fundraising campaign should it win domestically (*Hamilton Spectator* 1987a). In comparison, the City of Ottawa stated it believed hosting the Games would cost $142 million -- $84 million in capital costs and $58 million in operating costs.

On May 21, the bid book was presented to council in chambers, and in a ceremony at the Hamilton Convention Centre. Pelech said it was important to establish Hamilton as a “sports mecca” in order to restore the city’s profile and its commitment to international and national events. Morrow added that local business, education facilities and media would be called upon to secure the bid (*Krewen* 1987). The schedule was set: an evaluation tour by the Canadian CGA in July with the final presentations and decision
on who would be the domestic candidate on November 20. Eight other cities were also in the running: Edmonton, Halifax, London, Ottawa, Richmond, Thunder Bay, Victoria and Windsor. The selected Canadian city would make an international bid to the Commonwealth Games Federation (CGF) for the rights to host the 1994 Commonwealth Games. The CGF would make its decision the following year at the 1988 Winter Olympics in Calgary. Cardiff, Wales was the only known international bid competitor for the Games.

The Bid

A two-man review committee, both from out west, visited the city. The tour included a public rally in the downtown core’s Gore Park during lunchtime featuring many former elite athletes from the city and the lure of free hot dogs and Pepsi. Not as many people showed up as hoped, although it was reported 2,000 hot dogs were consumed (McGuinness 1987). By mid-October, a theme song had been released, titled “Share the Vision”, which cost $9,000 for the rights through November and which they planned to play in a Montreal hospitality suite in the lead-up to the vote. Pelech announced the domestic bid would end up costing $300,000, including donations in-kind from local companies. The only other city to spend more on its bid was Victoria, at $350,000. On November 7, the final presentations were given in Montreal, a half-hour presentation coupled with a half-hour question-and-answer session. Hamilton’s bid costs were broken down in *The Hamilton Spectator*:

- $50,000 to cover Montreal presentation expenses
- $25,000 on consultant for a feasibility study
- $100,000 for design and printing of bid book, design of logo
- $30,000 more on consultants, travel costs to present bid book, receptions and rallies
- $9,000 theme song
- plus services donated (1987c)
Hamilton sent a 14-member delegation for the presentations and hosted a hospitality suite in the living room of the mayor’s suite, decorated with posters from the presentation. A table served as a bar tended by HECFI boss Conacher and there were baskets of munchies around the room (Ottawa, by way of comparison, was serving roast beef and Caesar salad). The affair was described as low-key and invitation-only. (Coutts 1987)

In the end, a nine-person selection committee took two hours to decide that Victoria would go forward as the domestic bid. Victoria had a $100,000 slide presentation; its bid was put together by the business community (the mayor was the only politician), and they estimated the Games would cost $93 million.

We have determined in our previous case studies whether or not regime politics was involved in the policy decision to bid for the Commonwealth Games. In the case of Melbourne, the pre-dominance of sports-minded people in the corporate and political sectors, and their inclusion in decision-making positions during the bid is one major indicator that there was a regime at work. In the case of Halifax, however, the lack of corporate representation on the domestic and international bid committees, leads us to conclude regime politics were not at play as Stone clearly states that there must be public-private cooperation in order to be classified as an urban regime. We now ask those same questions of Hamilton’s unsuccessful domestic bid for the 1994 Commonwealth Games: was Hamilton’s chosen policy path of bidding for a mega-event in order to achieve other economic and social policy goals the result of regime politics? If so, what was the character of the regime? We ask the three questions taken from Stone in Chapter 2: Who makes up the governing coalition? How is this coming together accomplished? What are the consequences.? We will again apply Stoker and Mossberger’s definitions of regime-types in order to gain a better understanding of who had power in local government and how this power shapes public policy choices.

1. Who was involved in the bid?
Morrow and Pelech led the Hamilton bid. Not only were they both named the co-chairs of the domestic bid committee, but they were also the originators and spokesmen for the bid. And while the committee has been described as an informal group, given that it was just the domestic phase of the bid, it was Morrow, Pelech and McMaster’s Dr. Keyes that made the final decisions. Here we see a clear triumvirate of public-sector resources, private-sector resources and knowledge resources.

Morrow had been leading the city in a charge to expand its economic base and clean up its image as a dirty industrial town – it would be a theme of his 18 years as mayor. He had already tried a bid for the Pan-American Games and was in the middle of putting together a bid for the World Basketball Championships. Morrow held the local political power, and his central role in this bid again highlights the differences in city autonomy in Canada versus Australia. Of all the mayors discussed in this research, he played the most hands-on role in the municipal bid. City council, it also appears, was also kept very up-to-date and involved with bid committee decisions, for example the sub-committee formed to create a Hamilton presentation for the 1986 Commonwealth Games.

Pelech was a lawyer by trade and well known for his unrelenting support for amateur sport in Canada, having been a founding member of the Canada Games. He was also extremely well connected politically at higher levels of government as well as locally. His influence with the Hamilton business community is undeniable and can be illustrated by his meeting with 35 business leaders in the community to gain their pledged support for the bid – coming away with initial pledges of $5 million before the domestic bid was even won. As well, while the domestic bid campaign came in at an estimated cost of $300,000, almost one-third of that total came from donations in-kind from the private sector.

Hamilton also uses the technical and professional resources of McMaster University, one of the country’s larger post-secondary institutions that includes a prestigious medical school and a kinesiology/physical education department as well as a
strong sports culture. It also had strong ties to the business community. In 1987, it was highly respected sports administrator Dr. Keyes who represented the university on the bid committee.

Reg Wheeler, who at the time of the bid was between stints as a councillor, was well connected in the sports world as chairman of the CFL’s hall of fame. Conacher was a former Toronto Maple Leaf player who had just been hired by the city to manage the newly amalgamated HECFI facilities – Hamilton Place, the Hamilton Convention Centre and Copps Coliseum. It was the building of Copps that precipitated this merging of city properties, and Conacher’s primary mandate was to secure an NHL franchise for the city. Dan Pugliese, a sports administrator from the University of Waterloo, was very well connected at the federal government level, having been a high-level consultant in the organization of elite sport institutions during the 1970s, not coincidentally at the time that powerful Hamilton Liberal member of parliament John Munro was the minister of fitness and health. Pelech brought Pugliese, who had once played basketball for McMaster, into the Hamilton fold. The mayor’s assistant, Dennis Carson, rounded out the bid committee.

2. What were their motivations?

One need only remember the quote from a Richmond, B.C. organizer to understand the basic motivation for many of the bid cities – a $50 million federal contribution to infrastructure. The Ontario government had sweetened the pot for its bid cities, by pledging to match that. “Prestige, dollars and jobs” were on the line (McGuinness 1987). At the federal level, we see a government trying to improve Canada’s international performances and build infrastructure as an attempt at instilling national pride and unity during a continuing time of regional animosity, not the least of which was Quebec separatism. The province had taken a relatively quiet role in this bid process, perhaps because several of its cities were bidding and it did not want to be seen as having a favourite.
For Hamilton, the motivations were numerous. There were sports legacy projects for sites already available, the community would be mobilized in one giant volunteer force, transportation infrastructure would be updated and the new hospitality industry that was being created would thrive. The mayor believed the Commonwealth Games would play an integral role in “making a great city”: “We were on the cusp of a new adventure, growth from Toronto, and sport can play a part in that” (Morrow 2010). By May 1987, the economic impact was being estimated at $200 million.

McMaster University stood to benefit greatly, primarily as the site of the athletes village ($800,000 in renovations), the host of indoor cycling (with a brand new $18.6 million velodrome), badminton and judo, and also as a training facility for several sports. Its national and international exposure would increase exponentially. Pelech, for his part, wanted the city returned to its former glory as a “sports mecca” that had hosted the original Commonwealth Games and had contributed many athletes over the years to the country’s national teams, in order to “restore the city’s profile and commitment to national and international events.” A newspaper ad from the organizing committee spelled it out for residents: a chance to see the best athletes in the world compete, advance goodwill and amateur sport, three new facilities would be built, 1,100 man-years in jobs would be created and $160 million in spending. (Hamilton Organizing Bid Committee 1987a) An editorial in the local newspaper drew on city pride and the competitive nature between cities: “the comeback which Hamilton has made to regain a place among Canada’s leading cities isn’t likely to go unnoticed.” (Hamilton Spectator 1987c) The city’s ongoing downtown rejuvenation and industrial growth, it continued, was “a story that deserves international exposure and recognition.”
Table 5.1
Members of Hamilton’s Domestic Bid Committee for the 1994 Commonwealth Games*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>OCCUPATIONS</th>
<th>ACTOR-TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bob Morrow</td>
<td>Hamilton mayor since 1982 and alderman before that. Former school teacher. Accomplished organist.</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Mary Keyes</td>
<td>McMaster University faculty in kinesiology department. 1981-87 Director of the School of Physical Education and Athletics.</td>
<td>Community/technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Conacher</td>
<td>Manager, Hamilton Entertainment and Convention Facilities Inc. Former Toronto Maple Leaf player.</td>
<td>Technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reg Wheeler</td>
<td>Longtime Hamilton councillor and regional councillor. Former Hamilton football player and competitive rower. Chair of the CFL’s Hall of Fame board of directors.</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan Pugliese</td>
<td>Sports administrator and consultant out of University of Waterloo, best known for federal recommendations regarding the organization of elite sport institutions during 1970s. Former McMaster basketball player.</td>
<td>Technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denis Carson</td>
<td>Assistant to the mayor.</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Gene Sutton</td>
<td>National gymnastics coach, high school teacher.</td>
<td>Technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carol Pugliese</td>
<td>Wife of Dan Pugliese</td>
<td>Technical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Information gathered from interviews and newspaper articles.
Now we must determine whether or not the bid for the 1994 Commonwealth Games was the result of regime politics. This dissertation has described a regime as an informal, yet stable group of core actors with access to political and financial resources. This appears to describe the relationship between Morrow, Pelech and Keyes in Hamilton’s bid for the 1994 Games, the key players in the bid. The mayor, himself, describes it as an “informal” group, and each comes from a separate sphere of influence, each with its own set of resources. The role and power of a mayor is central to Canadian municipal politics. He is the primary figurehead of the city and has the ear of business people, and while he holds only one vote on council (in the event of a tiebreak), he holds tremendous sway. In this particular case, city council appears on-board at this early stage. Pelech represents the private sector. While a lawyer by trade, he is well connected politically at higher levels and is held in high regard with the most influential in the business community. This is evident when he invites 35 business people to *The Hamilton Spectator* boardroom to discuss fundraising, comes away with initial pledges of $5 million to help host the Games (against the estimated city cost of $12 million) plus donations in-kind to the domestic bid campaign. Dr. Keyes was a respected member of McMaster faculty, a stakeholder that not only had much to gain from hosting the Games, but also brought with it considerable technical knowledge as well as financial and political resources (and available land) as the city’s one major university.

This core group of actors should have a clear, pragmatic purpose and its existence should provide an empowerment to accomplish tasks that otherwise would be overwhelming. This Hamilton group had one purpose – to establish Hamilton as one of the major cities of Canada, to improve its quality of life and make it a leader in sport and business. The Commonwealth Games was seen as a means to that end. In its recent history, the city had bid for the Pan-American Games and the world basketball championships (unsuccessfully) and was set to host the World Junior Hockey Championships in 1985-86 and the World Judo Championships in 1989. It had built a multi-million-dollar arena with the expressed reason of attracting an NHL team. It seemed to have the resources necessary to pull this off – political will on the part of the
Ph.D. Thesis – C. Phillips; McMaster University – Political Science

mayor and council, technical knowledge available through the university and former athletes, and the financial resources that were able to be mobilized by people such as Pelech from well-off sports-minded business people that were Hamilton supporters (among others, Ron Joyce, co-founder of Tim Horton, who was willing to finance an NHL team for the city, and Ron Foxcroft, owner of Fluke Transport, a part-time international basketball referee, and a big sports booster in town).

But does the existence of these core people constitute a regime? The group assembled for the Hamilton bid in 1987 show signs of being a regime – the mayor (a bid co-chair) represented the public sector, and Pelech (a bid co-chair) came from the private sector, which is a fundamental pre-requisite as discussed in the previous chapter. Both had access to substantial political and financial resources and the city was flush with knowledge resources in regards to sports. Many of the heavy-hitters in Hamilton’s business community had sports ties and one of the city’s major employers – McMaster – was a very sports-minded university with an eye to national and international prestige.

Using our rough checklist from Stone for determining the existence of regime, we conclude that this group of core actors was: informal, with access to institutional resources, purposive, empowering, inclusive of all private interests (not just corporate), dynamic and pragmatic. As per Stone’s definition, this regime had the capacity (institutional resources) to lead a bid and host a mega-event, it had a set of actors willing to do just that, and a relationship between them that allowed them to cooperate. However, prior to Morrow’s mayoralty, there was not a major push to host sporting events. There was a brief unsuccessful attempt to bid for the Pan-Ams in the 1970s and early 1980s (the second time under Morrow), and the city did host the inaugural Commonwealth Games (the British Empire Games) in 1930. Perhaps this was a regime in its infancy stage, as the historical record will show that the city was just entering into a phase where it bid quite consistently for high-profile sporting events, including two more attempts at the Commonwealth Games (our next two case studies).
We now look into the character of the Hamilton 1987 regime to determine if its actors were pre-disposed to using the mega-event as an economic development tool over other means, as Stoker and Mossberger state that “regime theory holds substantial promise for understanding the variety of responses to urban change” (1994, 196). Stoker and Mossberger describe a symbolic regime as attempting:

to change fundamentally a city’s ideology or image. Their purpose is transition. . . . Economic growth exists not as a goal in itself, but as an activity that must conform to the regime’s broader values about what the city is or should be. The urban revitalization regime purports to change the city’s image in order to attract investment and/or middle-income or high-income residents. (1994, 201)

With this definition, it appears as though there was a symbolic regime in Hamilton during this period, as the “common denominator” amongst all actors was the desire to change the city’s image from a dirty industrial town into a thriving metropolis. Stoker and Mossberger divide a symbolic regime into two sub-categories: the revitalization regime and the progressive regime. The Hamilton 1987 group seems to be a revitalization regime as that was the main theme of any efforts during that period – downtown revitalization, waterfront revitalization, economic revitalization. It was “attempting to ‘revitalize’ their fortunes with a change in image as well as in circumstance” (1994, 200). Symbols were used to rally positive attitudes towards the bid, whether it was the call for more federal investment in infrastructure in Ontario because it had not been given its fair share (a symbol of not being treated fairly), or the recollection of how hosting the 1930 Games “made Hamilton a centre of world focus” (Hamilton Organizing Bid Committee 1987a), which invoked historical pride and a symbol that the city could be world-class. The inherent competitiveness of bidding against other cities for a mega-event also instills a sense of pride and us-against-them mentality in any city. The core group of actors in Hamilton 1987 shared an “inclusive” characteristic in its relationship with the environment, as Stoker and Mossberger write it is very important that “wide public participation” (p. 207) and enthusiasm be harnessed in order to be successful and put on a good face. Hamilton was also dependent on non-local sources for its success (two high levels of government and the CGA of Canada).
**Hamilton 2003**

Manchester, England was hosting the 2002 Commonwealth Games and *Hamilton Spectator* reporter John Kernaghan went out a year earlier to do a story. As Hamilton had hosted the very first British Empire Games, he thought it would be interesting to see how Hamilton was regarded overseas (Kernaghan 2009). There was only one mention at Commonwealth House that Hamilton had hosted the inaugural Games in 1930. So he wrote a column about how, perhaps, it was time for the city to host another one. His publisher, Jagoda Pike, read the story and hadn’t realized the huge part the newspaper’s then-publisher M.M. Robinson had played in bringing the first-ever Games to the city.

Meanwhile, in the winter months of 2002, Cecelia Carter-Smith, a former international track athlete and a big supporter of local sports in Hamilton (and friend of Pelech), heard about the Queen of England’s baton relay for the upcoming Games and saw that Hamilton was not on the route. Carter-Smith was also a high school teacher who happened to have taught then-Canadian Heritage Minister Sheila Copps. Carter-Smith mentioned this omission to Copps, who got on the phone to put Hamilton on the route. The pageantry of the relay that March – which stopped briefly at Ivor Wynne Stadium for a ceremony and then at a reception at Hamilton Place -- seemed to inspire some key actors in the city. *Hamilton Spectator* editor-in-chief Dana Robbins played up the newspaper’s role in the inaugural Games in his address to the crowd. Mayor Bob Wade announced he had directed two staff members to look at the possibility of hosting the Games. Pelech said publicly he would be willing to help. M.M. Robinson’s elderly daughter encouraged the city to bid for the Games in her remarks (Kernaghan 2002a).

Shortly after, Pike approached Wade about a partnership with the newspaper to put together a bid. She cited the opportunities for downtown and waterfront development as well as the intangibles, such as instilling unity in a newly amalgamated city and “a new aura of faith” (the reporter’s words) in Hamilton (Kernaghan 2002b). In June, city council approved a motion to put together a joint bid for the 2010 Games with Pike leading the business side of the partnership. It approved the expenditure of $300,000
from its tax stabilization reserves, and it agreed to send four city representatives to the Manchester Games in July as observers (Hamilton 2002b). In his report to council, city manager Bob Robertson stated the cost of hosting could be $400 million, although the assumption would be that the federal and provincial governments each contribute 35 per cent. He told council it would be an opportunity to share costs on building infrastructure, create thousands of full-time jobs and attract tourism (Kernaghan 2002c). Following council’s approval, Pike engaged the help of Pelech, Dr. Gene Sutton (a Hamilton teacher and a Canadian Olympic Association board member), and Carter-Smith to help get the bid off the ground. A meeting was called in the mayor’s office with some of the city’s key stakeholders: Wade and Pike, Sutton, Pelech, Carter-Smith, Robertson, city recreation director Bill Fenwick, new tourism director David Adames, and a McMaster representative (Kernaghan 2009; McMaster rep would have been either president Peter George or athletics director Therese Quigley). An eight-member team visited the Manchester Games in July on a “fact-finding mission”: Wade, Carter-Smith, Sutton, Pelech, Robertson, Greg Maychak from the city’s recreation department, Spectator circulation department manager Gary Myers who was representing Pike, and former elite track athlete Paula Schnurr.

Hamilton submitted a $381.5 million bid in the domestic phase of the competition, including a $75 million renovation of Ivor Wynne Stadium, an $8 million aquatics centre and a $31 million athletics stadium. The CGC accepted Hamilton’s bid over that of Halifax and the city had now won the right to compete internationally for the right to host the 2010 Commonwealth Games.

**The International Bid**

Hamilton’s international bid committee began its campaign in early 2003 with $1.4 million committed to its bid budget by the federal and provincial governments, the city, and the private sector. May 2003 was a busy month for the Hamilton bid committee with the bid book due to be presented in London, England on May 30. By the end of April, when the bid committee made a presentation to city council looking for an $80-million commitment, the overall budget for a Hamilton Commonwealth Games in 2010
had almost doubled to $715 million. This was due, according to committee members, to “past experiences” with mega-events in Edmonton, Victoria and Winnipeg where costs had always escalated. This new budget, however, included $340 million worth of new and upgraded facilities, the most expensive being a new $150 million, 27,000-seat Commonwealth Games stadium.

City council was told what the Games would bring: 6,000 athletes and officials for 15 sports, 250,000 visitors, 2,500 media, a television audience of one billion, $1.4 billion in economic activity ($800 million in Hamilton, alone), plus new facilities. McMaster University was slated to get a new aquatics centre, 7,000-seat stadium and multi-sports complex for its money. The bulk of the funding was expected to come from the federal and provincial governments ($250 million each), $86 million from sponsorships and ticket sales, $50 million from McMaster University – of which $20 million would be coming from additional student fees that had been approved in a student referendum plus the city’s contribution (Nolan 2003a; Hamilton 2003b; Hamilton 2003c). Council did not support the Games contribution unanimously (an 8-3 vote), and several councillors missed the final vote due to prior commitments. The next day, the Hamilton Chamber of Commerce went on the public record as supporting the Games and their costs, citing city pride, reputation and morale. But it would take the rest of the month before the committee got a firm funding commitment from the senior levels of government. Copps and Ontario Tourism Minister Brian Coburn finally announced at the Canadian Warplane Heritage Museum on May 26 they their respective governments (Liberal and Conservative) would each contribute $250 million should Hamilton win the Games. With the contributions now official, the bid committee and other Canadian representatives flew to London on May 29 for its official bid book presentation – a group including Olympic track medallist Bruny Surin from Montreal, and the federal Secretary of State for Sport (situated within Canadian Heritage) Paul DeVillers.

Hamilton was competing against New Delhi for the right to host the 2010 Games, and the Indian organizers had made it very clear throughout the process that Canada had
hosted the Commonwealth Games more than its fair share, and that it was only fair that India -- the largest country in the Commonwealth -- got its chance. Hamilton organizers fired back, usually through stories that ran in Pike's newspaper:

India and its bid city of New Delhi haven't exactly been covered in glory since Commonwealth Games bid books were tendered late last month. Hamilton's rival for the 2010 showcase has suffered a couple of embarrassments. (Kernaghan 2003a)

Kernaghan, who was the beat reporter following the bid, wrote about power failures and a doping scandal at the Asian Wrestling Championships in India, poor organization of the Afro-Asian Games that led them to be moved to another city, and a “deeply flawed bid book”. A month later, the CGF executive visited Hamilton, and the newspaper’s editorial stated: “Hamilton’s bid is well-thought out and comprehensive” (Prokaska 2003). We should quickly note here that it has become standard for local newspapers to write glowing editorials on their city when selection committees visit.

The fall of 2003 was taken up with finalizing the bid details. In September, all eyes were on the PGA Championship taking place at the Hamilton Golf & Country Club. And then they turned to the World Cycling Championships in October. Bid members knew these two events had to be successful in order for their own endeavor to carry momentum into November. The cycling championships, which had been pummeled with organizational and funding problems in its infancy stages (until businessman David Braley took over), and with resident complaints about road and business closures right up to race time, came off without a hitch and showcased the city on national and global television so well that there were no complaints by the end of the event. There was now momentum. Being awarded the 2010 Commonwealth Games in November was to be the jewel in the crown for these Hamilton boosters.

On November 8, the bid group and its entourage headed to Montego Bay for final presentations and the CGF vote. The group included Pike, Wade, George, Copps, and Olympic gold medallist Donovan Bailey. A public rally to be held the evening of the vote announcement was organized at Copps Coliseum (because organizers felt that
Hamilton Convention Centre was not big enough after the enthusiasm and buzz created by the World Cycling Championships. But the mood in the Jamaican air from voting delegates did not seem to favour Hamilton. India’s presentation promised accommodation spots for 20 people per national team up to seven days prior to the Games (which Kernaghan charged in his newspaper stories were more than needed and could be read as a promise to house friends and family) and $50 USD per day for any extra officials. Sports executive were offered free business-class flights to India (Kernaghan 2003b). The India pitch argued that Canada had already hosted the Commonwealth Games four times, and that India – the largest democracy in the Commonwealth – had never been awarded the Games. Some 3,500 people attended Copps Coliseum to hear the news: New Delhi had been awarded the 2010 Commonwealth Games. Hamilton, and its bid that cost $3 million to put together, had lost.

There had been some final few hours of lobbying, in which Canada first offered $3.8 million in financial incentives to the sports organizations of the 72 delegates. Then India offered $7.2 million in incentives -- $100,000 USD to each of the Olympic Committees of 72 member states. Whether that final financial push, or the compelling argument that India deserved the Games, swayed the final vote will never be proven. The Hamilton delegates charged India’s bid committee with buying votes, but the decision had been made.

We should now turn our attention to the make-up of Hamilton’s domestic and international bid committees to determine whether or not regime politics were a factor in this city’s public policy decision-making. In Hamilton 1987, we saw strong cooperation between the city (the mayor), the corporate sector (represented by lawyer Pelech) and the university. This dissertation concludes the 1987 group possessed the characteristics of Stone’s urban regime. However, its choice to use sports tourism and the hospitality industry as a tool for economic development was relatively new to the city, and this dissertation will also compare the three Hamilton bids to see if this coalition has been “enduring”.
As we did for the previous three case studies, we ask three main questions. Who makes up the governing coalition? How is this coming together accomplished? What are the consequences? If a regime does exist, what is its character and how has that impacted the choice of public policy? We will again apply Stoker and Mossberger’s definitions of regime-types in order to gain a better understanding of who has power in local government and how this power shapes public policy choices.

1. Who was involved in the bid?

This bid was unequivocally led by Pike, publisher of *The Hamilton Spectator*. By all accounts, she had read a story written by her own reporter on Hamilton’s history and her newspaper’s role surrounding the inaugural Commonwealth Games in 1930, and approached the mayor specifically about a public-private partnership in bidding for the 2010 Games. While Wade was the figurehead in the bid, council made all city decisions regarding its financial contribution and gave its political blessing. Wade was a member of the domestic and international bid committees, as was city manager Robertson and recreation director Fenwick, but it was Adames, the Tourism Hamilton executive director, who had a central role in all decision-making. He came into his role as the domestic bid was just developing, but was a key player in the international bid as a general manager of the bid corporation and representative of the city. He would keep Wade apprised of bid business.

McMaster University was also a major partner in the bid corporation, as evidenced by its financial contribution to both bids and its central role in hosting a Games – the site for several venues and athletes village. While the university president Peter George was the figurehead on the committee, the institution was also represented on the international bid committee by athletic department head Therese Quigley. Most importantly, George seconded Roger Trull, the university’s vice-president of advancement, to the bid corporation. Trull completed the triumvirate of city-corporate-university at the decision-making table.
By several accounts, it was Pike, Adames and Trull who made all the decisions regarding the bid, with Pike holding ultimate decision-making power. However, there were also several other key figures on these committees without whom the bid could not succeed. Pelech, Dr. Sutton and Carter-Smith were three very high-profile, well-respected individuals in the city who each possessed valuable resources to bring to the table, be it personal/political/corporate contacts as well as technical knowledge. These three individuals brought credibility to the bid – two of them directly involved with the 1987 bid (Pelech, Dr. Sutton) and Carter-Smith, a popular and well-connected sport-supporting citizen. Pelech, however, dropped off the committee during the international phase.

There are unverified accounts (Pelech was deceased at the time of this research) that he was discouraged at being kept out of the loop of primary decision-making. This also alienated several corporate players who were close to Pelech and viewed this as Pike trying to run the bid as “a one-woman show” (Anonymous Interview 2009).

While Pike was often described as heading up the corporate side of the bid, she also brought Robert Jones from Armour Steel Ltd. to the board. The international bid committee also had representatives from outside the city – a necessity once the bid won domestically. A federal representative, a provincial representative, and two members of the CGC joined the Hamilton bid for the international campaign.

There were also very powerful people behind the bid, and not necessarily mentioned on the committee lists, such as Copps. As a federal minister, she would not take a personal seat on the committees, but her opinion carried weight and her position as federal minister was considered a very strong asset to the bid. She would be kept updated on all matters. In one example, once McMaster had decided to pledge $50 million to the 2010 Games budget, President Peter George contacted Copps directly to let her know of the contribution. The federal government, to that point, had not yet finalized its own financial commitment.
Two high-profile businessmen in the city – Foxcroft and David Braley, both with very strong sports ties – were also kept in the loop of the bid committee. Foxcroft had offered to visit every Commonwealth country to lobby for Hamilton, on his own dime. His offer was never taken up. Braley was the owner of Orlick Industries – a politically well-connected, sports supporter and owner of a CFL team. He was called in to head up the world cycling championships to ensure they would be run successfully. Braley was asked to fundraise $300,000 for the bid campaign, which he did, and was named in the bid book as the co-chair of the fundraising committee.

2. What were their motivations?

Pike was not a Hamilton native, nor a resident of the city. She had been sent to the newspaper by Toronto head office and she lived in the Greater Toronto Area. Still, she invoked the symbol of city pride and wanting her paper to take a lead role, as it had done historically, in gaining this mega-event for the city: “We write a lot about local issues but this is one where we can act, a terrific opportunity we would bring back to the city” (Kernaghan 2002b). She said that the Commonwealth Games would bring the opportunity to develop the city core and the waterfront, but also bring unity to the amalgamated city and some “faith” to the city. She made her personal pitch to the domestic bid review committee in a Spectator editorial, calling the bid her “personal passion” in which she “tore a page out” of the newspaper’s and the city’s history by following in M.M. Robinson’s footsteps to kick start a bid. She wrote: “Bobby’s vision transformed this city, and the legacy of those Games continues to nurture it. . . . We have a new vision – one which we’re confident should have no less a positive impact than Bobby’s” (Pike 2002). She then proceeded to discuss the benefits: job creation, sport tourism, federal and provincial funding, new facilities.

Hamilton was in line to get $500 million in funding from senior levels should it win the Games. That’s money that would not have been offered otherwise. In its 2002 economic development review, four “major impacts and legacies” are mentioned:
development of sports locally (as well as provincially and nationally), construction and renovations of “world-class” facilities, a “renewed sense of community” and “civic engagement”, a chance to showcase city to the world and grow its tourism industry (Hamilton 2003d). Robertson listed the specific benefits for the City of Hamilton in a report to Council on April 30, 2003 as they were preparing to approve his recommendation that they contribute $80 million to the 2010 Commonwealth Games budget. It was a “special opportunity” that would leave $300 million in capital facilities, have an economic impact on Hamilton of more than $800 million and on Ontario of more than $1.4 billion, and leave a trained volunteer force of up to 15,000 people. Council was told Hamilton would have 2,500 international media at its doorstep and one billion television viewers watching events in the city for two weeks. His report mentioned “civic engagement and community pride”, “a renaissance for sport, health and wellness in Ontario, “global recognition”, and “opportunities for business promotion, economic development and urban regeneration” (Hamilton 2003b). Wade was an easy sell for Pike. A self-professed “sports nut”, he saw the bid and the hosting of the event as a way to change steel town’s image: “The overriding issue was that I was trying to change the profile of Hamilton from something that was very negative across the country to something that was very positive” (Wade 2010).

Not only did McMaster have three high-profile people working on the bid – its president, athletics director and the vice-president of advancement – but it was willing to contribute $50 million to the budget (although a full $20 million would be raised through increased student fees and much of the rest would come through further fundraising). Its motivations were, obviously, very high. The Hamilton bid promised to build a new aquatics centre, multisports complex and 7,000-seat stadium. McMaster would also host the $30.9-million athletes village, which it could later use as student residences.

The federal government stated its motivations very clearly in notes published on its news release announcing a $250 million commitment to the Games should they be held in Hamilton. The bid was “consistent” with the government’s “sport priorities”, including: enhancing sport development, improving access to facilities and programming,
providing opportunities for youth to gain international experience, developing a volunteer sector, contributing towards the Commonwealth sport movement, leaving a legacy. The fact that the Secretary of State for Sport was placed under Canadian Heritage is also very telling of the role the Canadian government believes sport plays in building national unity and pride. The Canadian Sport Policy (2002) opens with the following statement on the contribution of sport:

> Today, sport is widely accepted as a powerful contributor to social and personal development. Nevertheless, the magnitude of sport’s influence surprised many Canadians. To develop a comprehensive sport policy and to design action to make that policy effective, it must be clearly understood that sport’s impact and contribution encompasses social and personal development, health and well-being, culture, education, economic development and prosperity, tourism and entertainment. (Canadian Heritage 2002, 5)

The provincial government’s motivation to extend $250 million to the budget would have come not only from the promise of economic development and economic impact, but also as a way of getting good public relations for the tourism industry of Ontario, Hamilton and the Greater Toronto Area after the province was negatively impacted by the SARS outbreak of 2001. Ontario Tourism Minister Brian Coburn said it would put the city and the province on the “world stage” and boost tourism in the area. It was also a way of getting federal money siphoned back into the provincial sports system. Opposition Leader Dalton McGuinty supported the city hosting the Games, stating that Ontario needed a greater investment in its sports infrastructure.

Hamilton’s private sector supported the city’s bid for the Games. As one prominent businessman put it in an interview: “It’s in their best interests.” Benefits cited were improved infrastructure and the investment of senior levels of government, new facilities and the dollar being spent during the actual event. “The key to bringing major events is they are a tremendous help building infrastructure. The city would have great difficulty doing this on their own,” said one businessman. “If you can get $100 million spent in your backyard and you spend $25 million . . . You don’t look the gift horse in the mouth very often. It’s strictly economic value.” Even though the estimated budget had
escalated to $715 million, the head of the local chamber of commerce was quick to publicly support the international bid in the newspaper, citing city pride, boosting the city’s image, and building already-needed facilities with federal and provincial money that wouldn’t be available otherwise (Nolan 2003b).

Table 5.2

Members of the Domestic and International bid committees for Hamilton 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>OCCUPATIONS</th>
<th>ACTOR-TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(DOMESTIC BID)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jagoda Pike</td>
<td>Publisher, The Hamilton Spectator</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob Wade</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack Pelech</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>Community/business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Gene Sutton</td>
<td>Teacher, Canadian Olympic Committee board member, international gymnastics judge</td>
<td>Community/technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cecelia Carter-Smith</td>
<td>Retired teacher, former elite athlete</td>
<td>Community/technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter George</td>
<td>President, McMaster University</td>
<td>Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Therese Quigley</td>
<td>Director of Athletics, McMaster University</td>
<td>Community/technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob Robertson</td>
<td>City Manager</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Adames</td>
<td>City director of tourism</td>
<td>Government/technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Fenwick</td>
<td>City director of recreation</td>
<td>Government/technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maurice Graf</td>
<td>Architect</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(International bid Board of Directors)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jagoda Pike (president)</td>
<td>Publisher, The Hamilton Spectator, Senior VP – Regional Daily Newspapers, Torstar Corp.</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivan Chittenden (treasurer)</td>
<td>CGC Treasurer, Partner, Ernst &amp; Young</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Peter George</td>
<td>President and vice-chancellor, McMaster University</td>
<td>Community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Robert Jones
Director, Strategic Development, Armour Steel Ltd.

Judy Kent
Past president, Commonwealth Games Canada

Jean Lam
Asst. Deputy Minister, Ministry of tourism and Recreation, Province of Ontario

Karen O’Neill
CEO, Commonwealth Games Canada

Therese Quigley
Director of Athletics and Recreation, McMaster University

Robert Robertson (secretary)
City Manager, Hamilton

David Robinson
Executive, Bid Secretariat, Government of Canada

Cecelia Carter-Smith
Former international track athlete, teacher, coach, administrator

Robert E. Wade
Hamilton mayor

Officers of the Bid Corporation incl. Pike, Chittenden, Robertson, and the following:

David Adames, General Manager
Tourism Hamilton

Bill Fenwick, General Manager
Manager, Culture & Recreation, Hamilton

Roger Trull, General Manager
Seconded from McMaster University

* While the exact make-up of an official “domestic bid committee” is unclear in all Hamilton cases (as no documentation could be found), the names listed here are those either mentioned directly in newspaper articles as participating in the bid, or those names that come up in interviews. Participation in the domestic bid does not necessarily mean a central decision-making role. City staffers, for example, may have served an administrative support role during the domestic phase. The Hamilton Spectator, at one point, mentions there are 24 members of this domestic bid committee. Conversely, we have mentioned the officers of the bid corporation (who were not official members of the international bid “committee”) because interviews indicate that the ultimate decision-making power rested with Pike and two of her general managers (who were also referred to as vice-presidents), Adames and Trull. International bid committee members were taken from the official bid book.

Our research question asks: Why do municipalities around the world bid for the right to host mega-events despite the fact that the cost to simply bid for these rights runs into the millions with no promise of success? This dissertation uses urban regime theory to help answer this question as it allows us to focus on the coalitions that surround the bid. By studying the coalitions – the actors and motivations – it is hoped we can explain why cities make this public policy choice. But we cannot assume that all coalitions are
actual regimes. And so we must now consider: was the bid for the 2010 Commonwealth Games the result of regime politics?

We can describe the group of actors that formed around this bid as informal, as there are no institutional ties that bind them together. The newspaper, city hall and the university – the three main parties behind this bid -- are not beholden to each other officially, although they certainly rely on each other for their own well-being and the general well-being of the community. It is also a stable group of actors as city hall, as we see their roles and relationships continue from our previous case study in the 1980s, and the university remain pillars of the community and the holder of valuable resources in terms of economic development. While individual actors may vary in terms of the corporate sector, the strong industrial history of the city suggests that private business has long been a part of the unofficial (and informal) decision-making community. The city brings its political resources, and some financial resources to the table while the university brings its technical knowledge from its faculty and staff, and some access to both financial (not only monetary, but in the way of available land assets) and political resources (through its alumni and daily contacts). The corporate sector in town brings considerable financial resources and intangible powers. Most noticeably, The Hamilton Spectator is the only daily newspaper in town, and is the newspaper of record. While there are other media outlets, such as a television station and several radio stations and weekly papers, it has the power to control the news agenda in the city. Having its publisher head up the bid makes a huge symbolic statement that this is good for all parties. Not only were there corporate representatives on the committees, but also several prominent businessmen were kept in the loop of the decision-making, such as Foxcroft and Braley. The fundraising campaign to raise $300,000 for the bids was conducted by one of the most influential businessmen in the city, Braley, and raised more than expected. The Hamilton Chamber of Commerce supported the bid. The city council report from Robertson stated that several members of the private sector had already pledged “financial and human resource support” for the bid, including The Hamilton Spectator, Orlick Industries (Braley’s company), and Dofasco (Hamilton 2003b). Thus, all indications are that this bid was the result of public-private cooperation.
The “clear, pragmatic purpose” (as per Stone) of this group was to change the image of Hamilton from that of a dirty industrial town to a city that was “world class”, a great place to visit and to invest. This would come through downtown revitalization, brownfield development and waterfront regeneration – which were at the forefront of economic development plans. Bidding for the Commonwealth Games would be a short cut to these goals, and would attract money from senior levels of government. This group of actors wanted Hamilton to become a tourist destination. It wanted the city to have state-of-the-art sports and hospitality facilities. By 2003, it had hosted a myriad of sporting events, including: World Junior Hockey, the Canada Cup hockey tournament, the Canadian men’s curling championship, Canadian figure skating championships, International Children’s Games, PGA Golf, World Cycling Championships. It wanted to raise the profile of the city and take a spot among the top cities in the country. A task this great, and with so many pieces to the puzzle, could only be done with the cooperation of the major parties within the city – specifically with the political will of city council, the cooperation of the university with its considerable knowledge resources, and the financial support of the private sector. We have discussed in more detail above the resources that each of the actors brought to the table. They were considerable and surely, together, empowered and encouraged each other to continue on with large development projects.

Does the existence of this group of core actors constitute a regime? The checklist that we have derived from Stone’s writings shows us that this group has come together informally and the institutions represent stable actors at the decision-making table. There is public sector and private sector representation and each side has access to considerable economic and/or political resources. While the actors may have changed this core group had also been together over time – city, university and corporate – since at least 1987. The group also possesses a very clear purpose – city regeneration and revitalization through tourism and economic development. And so this dissertation concludes that the Hamilton bid for the 2010 Commonwealth Games shows the signs of being the result of regime politics.
At this point, we can begin to determine whether symbolic regime politics was at play, as per Stoker and Mossberger. One finds a symbolic regime in a city trying to change its image and direction – revitalizing its economy and quality of life in order to attract investment and middle- or high-income residents (1994, 199-201). This category of regime gets its name from the efforts of the regime to use symbols to convey ideas and mobilize the public into supporting the public policy:

By fostering positive attitudes about a city that has experienced serious erosion of its economic base, regimes aim to create a new image as a city that is rising from the ashes. This image change assists the city in attracting new investment or stemming or reversing the outflow of population. The regime in such a city may also attempt to define strategically what type of investment it wants to attract – what future role it envisions for the city. (p. 201)

This is clearly what was happening in Hamilton during the time of the bid. Actors spoke of turning the industrial city into a “world class” city, invoked the symbol of the sense of history with Hamilton having hosted the inaugural Games in 1930 and the pride that brought to the city, and often trotted out the gifted athletes that came from Hamilton – both new and old. Civic pride and unity was often a theme, as Pike implied with comments when the bid was first being considered: “We have a lot more to offer here than some people realize. We must go big and the city has the capacity to do that” (Kernaghan 2002b). Carter-Smith invoked the sense of politicians leaving their own historical mark on the city if they supported the bid by telling the newspaper: “It’s something historic they can say they supported 10 or 15 years down the line” (Kernaghan 2002c). She referred to Copps Coliseum as being hailed as the “best ever” boxing facility by the world boxing body, and invoked a sense of massing the troops when she stated in the paper that “we have 15,000 volunteers already”. There were several tangible benefits cited over the course of the dialogue, in particular the symbol – used once again – of southern Ontario not getting its fair share of sports infrastructure. The tangible benefits these actors envisioned also conveyed what direction they wanted economic development and revitalization to take: a burgeoning tourism industry, a sports development hub, a growing and vibrant university that would attract the best students and faculty. Many of
them had strong sporting ties. The prominent business people were established sports boosters. And they were well-connected with the governing Liberal party at the federal level. McMaster also had a vested interest in sports development as well as economic development as the Games would bring new infrastructure to campus, and make it a more attractive option for students.

In the Hamilton bid and actions/comments of the actors we see that the motivations are similar to what Stoker and Mossberger term “expressive politics”. While there are tangible results sought, and actors that are dependent on the economic health of the local community, the goals are not so narrow. Private sector members have a sense of corporate responsibility to their locality (The Hamilton Spectator) and it is good public relations for companies that may be downsizing or decreasing its investment in the community. Politicians are concerned with unemployment and economic decline in general. And there is both civic and personal pride in knowing you were associated with a prestigious city-building project (1994, 203). Winning the right to stage the Games is not an end in itself, it is a means to an end.

Stoker and Mossberger believe that a symbolic regime should form through “competitive agreement” in that the actors are “focused around a common concern but one where the various interests lack a deep, shared understanding”. They may be unequal partners or reluctant partners (1994, 207). One can argue that the overriding interests of a city council, versus that of a steel company or a university are very different. Each has a different set of priorities and a different set of stakeholders to which they are accountable. However, in the case of bidding for a mega-event, these institutions come together with a common goal: to improve the fortunes of the city. And these institutions have now been together over a period of time. They also argue that symbolic regimes have an “inclusive orientation” and are dependent on non-local actors for success. This is certainly the case in mega-event public policy, as senior levels of government as well as members of the sports event governing body are always incorporated into the decision-making circle. Money and political will are needed from the senior governments and the approval, technical knowledge (and usually political muscle) is needed from the sports body, in this
case Commonwealth Games Canada. It is therefore the conclusion of this dissertation that the Hamilton bid for the 2010 Commonwealth Games can be explained through the lens of symbolic regime politics and that the public policy decision to bid for the event was a rational decision given the actors involved and their motivations.

**The End of the Bid**

The real epitaph to the bid for the 2010 Commonwealth Games is the city’s following domestic bid for the rights to hold the 2014 Commonwealth Games. However, there were some important observations that occurred around the unsuccessful bid in 2003. Hamilton bid officials sincerely felt that India had bribed voting delegates with a last-minute offer of $100,000 per each of the 72 national Olympic associations. Hamilton committee members knew about the pro-India sentiment heading into the final presentations and there are several unconfirmed accounts that Copps suggested to Pike and mayor-elect Larry DiIanni that Hamilton immediately negotiate to host the 2014 Commonwealth Games should India win – in effect, allowing the Games Federation to award two Commonwealth Games at once. Several interviews indicate that Pike felt Hamilton’s bid was strong enough to win, and that a deal would not be necessary. There were also rumblings after the bid that the decision-makers – Pike, Adames and Trull – had been too exclusive a group and that more effort should have been made to bring in influential business members. According to several interviews, one sore point was the disappearance from the international bid committee of Pelech, once one of the most influential people in Canadian amateur sport, who reportedly resigned because he was being left out of the loop. This apparently also alienated some of his corporate friends.

Nonetheless, essentially the same group of people decided in 2005 that the city should regroup and make a pitch for the 2014 Games. The groundwork was in place – the bid book was still sound. But there were some changes in the actors. This time, the Mayor of Hamilton was DiIanni, a former school principal, Hamilton city councillor and councillor in the former Town of Stoney Creek. He had always been supportive of the bid. Carter-Smith, such an emotional and staunch supporter of Hamilton and the Commonwealth Games, was no longer involved due in large part to the disappointment
of 2003. Pelech, with his national sports connections, was now long out of the picture. Copps was no longer Heritage Minister, and she was no longer a favoured member of the Liberal Cabinet in Ottawa. As we will see in the next section, the city was approached by the CGC in late 2004 and asked to again submit a bid. They complied.

Hamilton 2005

Dilanni was Hamilton’s mayor-elect when the city lost its bid for the 2010 Commonwealth Games. At the time of the announcement in Jamaica, he was positioned to be the master of ceremonies at Copps Coliseum for the announcement – which he and everyone in the building thought would be Hamilton. He meant to lead the city victorious. Instead, he was the face of bad news. It left a bitter taste in his mouth, and he didn’t want any part of another Commonwealth Games bid. But then Dilanni, Adames and Trull were approached by board members of the CGC in the fall of 2004 and asked if Hamilton would bid for the 2014 Games. The board, according to city parties involved in the discussions, said it wanted to forego the domestic phase of the competition and confirm Hamilton as its bid city (Dilanni 2010). It should be noted that the CGC has never confirmed this, but The Hamilton Spectator reported seeing documents that confirmed this agreement (Buist 2005e). Sport Canada, reportedly, was uncomfortable with that decision, especially given its new hosting policy, and wanted a domestic competition. Sport Canada was under the Canadian Heritage ministry, but that ministry was no longer under the control of Copps.

Hamilton decided to go ahead with another bid, despite being told there would be a domestic competition. They felt they had the inside track and this was just a formality. An advisory committee was formed, comprising the same people that participated in the earlier bid – Pike, Adames, Trull, Dr. Sutton. New actors (though not their positions) were involved: Dilanni, the new mayor, and Glen Peace, the new city manager.

As the new bid took place after a municipal election, some members of city council were new, but in July 2005 it again authorized a bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games, including approval of a domestic bid budget up to $400,000, with $275,000 of
that coming from its unallocated capital levy reserve. Another $65,000 was slated to come from its portion of the budget surplus from the 2003 bid, with the rest expected from the private sector (Hamilton 2005e). More than 6,000 athletes and 2,500 international media, plus more than 1 billion in television audience were expected, council was told in a report by Adames. The council report listed the many benefits believed to be gained from hosting the event, including: global recognition, facility renewal including a new stadium, establishing the city as a sports hub and a tourism destination, civic engagement, funding from senior levels of government and the private sector otherwise not available. The economic impact for the city was estimated at $800 million and overall $1.4 billion. It was all much the same as 2003. The city had consulted with its “core partners” – The Hamilton Spectator and McMaster University – who were committed to launching a new bid. In October, 2005, city council endorsed the bid document (which was not released publicly) and approved funding of up to $100 million should Hamilton win the rights to the Games. It would also contribute $1 million to the international phase of the bid, coming from the Hamilton Future Fund (a fund generated by the selling off of hydro assets).

In November 2005, Hamilton found out it would be competing against Ottawa, York Region and Halifax. Pike presented an $834 million budget. Although the details were kept confidential at the time, this bid included a new $150 million stadium with track, a $36.5 million aquatics centre, a $28.5 million multi-use sportplex, a $38.4 million triple pad arena and a $27.2 million field hockey field with gymnasium. The committee had budgeted $100 million from the City of Hamilton, $292 million from the Province of Ontario and $292 million from the federal government, with McMaster University chipping in $25 million (Hamilton 2007). Ottawa’s proposed Games budget came in around $725 million, York Region was estimating costs around $1 billion, and Halifax presented a budget of $500 million (Buist 2005a). The details of the bids were to be kept confidential, on a directive from the CGC, because it said it did not want to give the international competition (Glasgow, Scotland and Abuja, Nigeria) a competitive edge. This attitude was to be a bone of contention later in the domestic phase and ultimately in the Halifax international bid. The bid review committee was set to visit the competing
cities in December. Hamilton got its turn December 10 with an eight-hour visit. There was a presentation of proposed new venues and a tour of existing facilities. Its closing event at the Sheraton Hotel in the downtown included fireworks seen from the top floor of the adjacent office building (Stelco Tower), and the presentation of replica medals from 1934, handed out by three local athletes who had competed in those games. The cities would make final presentations on December 14 in Montreal, and Canada’s official bid city would be announced on December 15.

End of the Bid

When the CGC named Halifax as its choice for Canada’s official bid city, Hamilton officials immediately turned on the selection committee and the CGC board, claiming it had been betrayed and that the Halifax bid was flawed. They felt the process was not transparent as each city’s bid details could not be made public until after the decision had been made. Adames told The Hamilton Spectator the city had been approached by CGC president Claude Bennett to stand as the bid city. The newspaper reported it had seen an internal CGC document confirming the board unanimously approved Hamilton as its choice. The city was so confident of this decision that it had already booked tickets to the Commonwealth Games international general assembly in Melbourne for 2005. But in June 2005 it received a letter stating it had been decided to hold an open bid competition. Sport Canada had told the CGC – and confirmed this to a Spectator reporter -- that it “strongly encourage” a domestic bid process (Buist 2005e).

DiIanni demanded a de-briefing meeting with CGC officials, and on Feb. 22, 2006 officials from both sides met. That spring, council called for an “independent, formal review of the domestic bid process” for the games and asked for a meeting with the Ontario Minister of Health Promotion. Nothing ever came of the protest.

The two previous Hamilton bids for the Commonwealth Games show signs of being a public policy choice resulting from regime politics. In both cases, there was cooperation in decision making and funding between city hall, the local corporate sector and the university. This didn’t change in 2005. We ask the same three questions as in the previous case studies: Who makes up the governing
coalition? How is this coming together accomplished? What are the consequences? We will then apply Stoker and Mossberger’s definition of a symbolic regime to see if the category fits the group of actors in order to understand how this public policy choice was made.

1. Who was involved in the bid?

Pike was again involved in the 2005 bid, which really was an extension of the previous bid in 2003. When the CGC president Claude Bennett came to Hamilton officials in late 2004, he approached Pike, DiIanni, Trull and Adames. We have established that Pike, Adames and Trull were the primary decision-makers in the earlier bid, representing the institutions of corporate, city hall and university. The only change in actor was DiIanni, who took over as mayor from Wade but still wholeheartedly supported a bid and again would have acted mainly as the figurehead, much of the city work fell to Adames. The city also had a new city manager and a new city council that was onside with the bid. Dr. Sutton still participated in the domestic bid. There were some actors missing, as previously discussed. Private sector members who had been supportive of the 2003 bid, such as Foxcroft and Braley, were still active in the city and supported another bid attempt.

2. What were their motivations?

It is the assumption of this dissertation that the motivations of these actors had not changed substantially since the bid two years earlier. The report given to council in 2005 by Adames, outlining the benefits to the city, were almost verbatim from the previous bid in terms of new facilities ($340 million) and economic impact ($1.4 billion for Ontario including $800 million in Hamilton). Hamilton would become a sports hub and would gain financial investment from the senior levels of government that would otherwise not be available. There were
opportunities for jobs, tourism growth and for civic engagement through volunteerism (Hamilton 2005e). Adames told *The Hamilton Spectator* that plans in the bid would be “an outstanding transformation for the city” (Buist 2005b). McMaster University would receive several new facilities and the athletes’ village. But Trull also mentioned its intangible motivations upon losing the bid: “We wanted to help the image of Hamilton and some people will view us as having lost twice. But it takes a significant event like this to be the catalyst to transform the city and the image of the city” (Buist 2005e). Pike wanted to leave a legacy, and cited those benefits to the city: “Think of the areas of the city that will be absolutely transformed. Think of facilities for elite athletes, like a national aquatic centre and a new stadium. Think of all of the jewels of Hamilton and add a few more. We’ll be able to regenerate some of our brownfield sites as well” (Buist 2005d). John Dolbec remained the chief executive of the Hamilton Chamber of Commerce and was still supportive of the bid, telling *The Hamilton Spectator* after the loss that the city needed to keep looking for ways to bring new facilities and development to Hamilton (Buist 2005e). For the province, it remained a way to increase tourism to the area and there was still the promise of $1.4 billion in economic impact. For the federal government, its hosting policy wanted the country to host two major sporting events in a 10-year period, and Vancouver already had the 2010 Winter Olympics. Its motivations, as stated previously, were national unity and pride through the development of elite athletes for international success. Investing in sports infrastructure (legacy) was key as was developing sports capacity in the system and aiding the development of athletes from the grass roots on up. A 2004 evaluation of the hosting policy states that hosting sporting events is “expected to offer sport, economic, social and cultural benefits” (Canadian Heritage 2004).
Our research question asks: Why do municipalities around the world bid for the right to host mega-events despite the fact that the cost to simply bid for these rights runs into the millions with no promise of success? This dissertation has chosen to use urban regime theory in order to answer this question by highlighting the actors that participate in the choice of public policy choice and the motivations they bring to the decision-making table.

As the key decision-makers from 2003 are still present in the city and at the decision-making table for 2005, this dissertation must argue that the group representing the city, the corporate sector and the university are very much stable and again are an informal group as there are no official institutional ties that force them to work together. While certain individual actors have left the bid group, the core decision-makers are still present, and most importantly so are the institutions they represent. The city has once again put its financial resources behind the bid and demonstrated political will in wanting

Table 5.3
Advisory Committee Members of Hamilton’s Domestic bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>OCCUPATIONS</th>
<th>ACTOR-TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jagoda Pike</td>
<td>Publisher, The Hamilton Spectator</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Adames</td>
<td>Executive Director, Tourism Hamilton</td>
<td>Government/Technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger Trull</td>
<td>Vice-President, Advancement for McMaster University</td>
<td>Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larry DiIanni</td>
<td>Mayor, City of Hamilton</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Gene Sutton</td>
<td>High school teacher, Canadian Olympic Committee member</td>
<td>Technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glen Peace</td>
<td>City Manager, Hamilton</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* There would have been nine committee members, in total for Hamilton, but only these four are named definitively in interviews and newspaper articles. There are no official records. We know that Olympic swimmer Joanne Malar, from Hamilton, was in Montreal representing the city during the final presentations according to newspaper reports. Others on the committee would have been administrative helpers. The six above represent, to a greater or lesser degree, the actual decision-makers.
the Commonwealth Games and using it for economic regeneration. The university has dedicated its staff with considerable technical knowledge and some funds and contacts in the public and private sector to help bring the Games to the city. The corporate sector again appears supportive. The Hamilton Spectator, in particular, again spearheads the campaign and controls much of the public agenda as the city’s only major daily newspaper. Public-private cooperation is again a major component of this bid.

The clear purpose of this core group has not changed: to transform the city from a struggling industrial town to a vibrant community. Downtown revitalization, waterfront regeneration, and brownfield development continue to be mentioned as motivators from bringing the Commonwealth Games to the city. Hamilton stakeholders want businesses of certain “clusters” to establish themselves in the city in order to create new jobs and add to the commercial and industrial property tax base, taking pressure off existing taxpayers. They want the city’s tourism industry to thrive with Hamilton becoming a destination with its world-class sports and hospitality facilities. They want the only university in town to gain international prestige with its facilities in order to attract more students, prestigious faculty, and research money. They want the negative image of the city in which they live and raise families to change. They want better facilities for their families. City, corporate and university cannot accomplish its goals without each other, and the hosting of a mega-event, with all its logistical, financial and political issues, cannot be pulled off successfully without the cooperation of these three pillars in Hamilton. It is the conclusion of this dissertation, therefore, that regime politics do exist in Hamilton and have led to the public policy choice of bidding for a mega-event.

We will now apply Stoker and Mossberger’s categories of regimes in order to determine whether or not the decision to bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games was the result of a symbolic regime. It has been stated in early studies of mega-events and urban regime theory that the public policy choice to bid for a mega-event can only be explained through a symbolic regime. And this dissertation has shown that the two previous Hamilton bids appear to have those characteristics that would place it in that category.
This particular group of actors continues to use a vocabulary that is consistent with a symbolic regime.

Stoker and Mossberger state that the “common denominator” in symbolic regimes is a desire to change a city’s image or direction (1994, 199). We continue to see this in the dialogue of the actors involved, and in the official documents – words like *transform* and *regenerate* (Buist 2005d). Reports to city council on the benefits of hosting the Games consistently bring up the 1 billion world-wide television audience and 2,500 media. The Games brings the opportunity of “Global recognition” – a chance to sell the city and its image. It is also a chance for the historically industrial city to position itself as a sports hub and attract tourism (Hamilton 2005e). When the bid was lost, Hamilton’s economic development director told the newspaper: “But this isn’t going to stop anyone from working to improve Hamilton and Hamilton’s image” (Buist 2005e). This desire to change the city’s direction is evident in the economic development strategy for Hamilton, a 20-year “vision in which Hamilton will possess a diversified, sustainable economic base consisting of globally competitive, wealth creating companies that employ a highly skilled, well-educated labour force” (Hamilton 2005a). Downtown revitalization was a “top economic priority” for Mayor DiIanni in his submission to the Economic Development Review 2005 and economic progress in the city “has helped turn Hamilton’s image around, sparking significant economic development. Each investment reflects a strong confidence that is changing the face of our community, not only in our Downtown, but in all areas and sectors of our City” (Hamilton 2005b).

There continued to operate what Stoker and Mossberger term a revitalization regime in Hamilton, which used symbols to build support for their efforts and to convey their message. This may have come in the reminders of Hamilton’s historical place in the Commonwealth Games and in Canadian amateur sport, by putting that fact in every piece of bid documentation, having it appear almost constantly in newspaper articles, bringing out the city’s aged athletes from the 1930s to have them participate in the site selection committee’s visit, or having Pike and DiIanni wear authentic medallions from the 1930 Games. City pride was often invoked to rally the population. Adames said the city’s
presentation would highlight the strength of “our people, the strength of our overall bid plan and the fact that we’ve been through this before” (Buist 2005c).

Tangible results are not the only things sought by this group. Again, this is also indicative of what Stoker and Mossberger term “expressive politics”: “Politics and policy making are about saying as well as doing things. They are about communicating values, intentions and symbolic rewards” (1994, 203). They continue: “It may be important to individuals to live in a city that people can be proud of, that is “in the vanguard”, “world class” and outcompeting other localities” (p. 203). Perhaps that is they key point when other scholars state that mega-event politics cannot be explained other than through the existence of a symbolic regime. The actual bid for a mega-event is, in itself, a competition, pitting municipality against municipality. It is a competitive process in which one community tries to sell itself over another community: Why is my city better to hold these Games than yours. Factor in the time spent on the bid by high-profile bid committee members and the millions of dollars put behind the bid, alone, and the stakes become very high. This was certainly evident in Hamilton, with the effort and money put behind the bid and the animosity felt once the bid was lost. This dissertation, therefore, concludes that the Hamilton 2005 domestic bid is best explained by the continued presence of a symbolic regime in the city.

Hamilton’s Mega-Event Future

Five years down the road, Hamilton was no longer contemplating its own bid for a mega-event. Instead, it became part of a Greater Toronto Area bid for the 2015 Pan American Games – a bid that was successful and had Hamilton listed in the bid book as the site of its Commonwealth Games stadium where track events would be held. However, as we have seen in federal policy statements about the importance of legacy, the stadium was supposed to be big enough and in a location suitable to host a Canadian Football League team (the Hamilton Tiger-Cats) after the Games had finished in order to make the infrastructure investment financially viable. City council, however, saw it differently. It wanted a stadium built on its waterfront, to aid in waterfront regeneration and downtown revitalization. This was not the preferred site of the CFL or the Ticats due
to its tight location – not enough seating and problems with transportation. The debate set the city against the private sector – some of Hamilton’s most influential businessmen, Foxcroft, Braley and Ticat owner Bob Young, wanted the site moved to a location closer to the highway. Under deadline pressure from the Pan Am Games organizing committee, the compromise was to renovate and expand the existing Ivor Wynne Stadium. Whether or not this signifies the end of regime politics in Hamilton, or at least the end of an existing symbolic regime, is a question to be pursued in future research.
Chapter 6
Conclusion

Why do municipalities bid for the right to host mega-sized sporting events? As this research has shown, it is expensive and risky. Even a “successful” event will have cost taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars. In the cases of Melbourne 2006, Halifax 2014 and the Hamilton bids for 1994, 2010 and 2014, coalitions of citizens from various spheres of influence banded together in the effort to win the right to host the Commonwealth Games – one of these so-called mega-events. Our discussion has shown, in general, that the need and want of infrastructure investment, the desire to build the city’s image on the world stage and to diversify its economy are the three primary reasons that municipalities are willing to make this expensive public policy decision.

We have chosen to use urban regime theory as a framework within which to analyze this public policy choice. Firstly, it is a framework that has been used to study local government decision-making and operates on the assumption that local politics matters insomuch as decisions made at this level are influenced but not predetermined by outside forces such as higher levels of government and economic forces. Secondly, as in our earlier theory chapter, URT is shown to encompass many attributes of grander theoretical theory, from community power to political economy. URT allows us to analyze and categorize exactly who is banding together to make such impactful public policy decisions on the local scene as well as their motivations. It moves the debate onward from just who holds power over, to a discussion on how one gains power to accomplish a public policy goal. In the pre-eminent work on mega-events and local government policy, Burbank, Andranovich and Heying (2001) argue that the public policy decision to bid for a mega-event can only be understood within the typology of a “symbolic regime” – a sub-category of an urban regime coined by Stoker and Mossberger in which a regime is growth-oriented, striving to change a city’s image, and uses symbols to gain support. It is more of an inclusive regime as it depends greatly on external resources and therefore must incorporate actors from various levels of government, the private sphere and the knowledge or technical sphere.
However, Imbroscio (2003) has suggested that in order for URT to be a useful tool in public policy analysis, one must first show that the character of a regime impacted the public policy choice. Imbroscio believes that economic development is central to the governance of a city. If local politics does matter, it is in what strategies local leaders use to obtain that goal of economic development. For URT to become relevant, he believes one must show a public policy decision that would otherwise be considered irrational, become wholly rational due to the composition of the governing regime. In other words, with so many different strategies available to spur on economic development, why did the municipality choose the mega-event strategy?

In Chapter 1, we discuss the problems with adopting a mega-event strategy that make it appear to be an irrational public policy choice: bids, alone, cost millions of dollars with no guarantee of success; even a successful bid means taxpayers will be paying hundreds of millions of dollars to stage the event with no guarantee that it will ultimately attract economic investment; social costs include the displacement of low-income housing and environmental impacts; sport legacies such as stadia often become underutilized; long-term economic benefits are questionable at best.

In chapters 3, 4 and 5 we have told the stories of Melbourne, Halifax and Hamilton to examine why this seemingly irrational strategy was chosen as a public policy path. Were urban regimes present in these cases? If so, what were the characteristics and motivations of these regimes and its actors that spurred them on to bid for mega-events? We have concluded that urban regimes appear to have been present in Melbourne and in the three Hamilton cases, however, the lack of involvement from the private sector in the case of Halifax leads us to conclude it had the absence of a regime. To answer Imbroscio’s question, the characteristics of the actors within these existing regimes made it wholly rational for the mega-event strategy to be followed. Many of the actors had personal interests in sports and seeing it flourish in their municipalities. The mega-event strategy was sold as a shortcut to fixing the city’s image from a dying industrial town to a jewel in the nation’s crown – a city that would be showcased internationally and, in turn,
attract much-needed economic development, grow the tourism industry and gain impressive infrastructure for its taxpayers – all within a relatively short time frame. This made it a wholly rational investment choice in cities that already had a strong sports-knowledge base and were looking to quickly rejuvenate themselves.

In Melbourne we see the meeting of arguably the two most powerful men in the State of Victoria. Jeff Kennett was the premier of Victoria who ruled a majority government and ran the state with an almost authoritarian nature. His friend and business associate, Ron Walker, was one of the richest men in the country based on his businesses and property dealings. Here we had a meshing of the two spheres – public and private (or electoral and economic in Stone’s terminology) at the time of great economic and political turmoil within the state. Melbourne had a history of bidding for and hosting major sporting events. These men had a history of looking favourably toward sports. And the members of Melbourne’s bid committee paint a picture of just how sport is embedded in the city’s culture. Powerful and influential businessmen in the state also happen to have had very strong sport backgrounds, whether as athletes or as administrators. The long tradition in Melbourne of hosting large sports events, and the presence of sports-minded individuals within the business and political nomenclature lead us to conclude that there was a regime present in Melbourne whose actors had characteristics that would definitely lead them to use the mega-event strategy as a tool for economic development.

In Halifax, however, the research unearths a different story. The Halifax bid had little to no involvement from the private sector, and this may, ultimately, be the reason the bid imploded midway through its campaign. The idea to bid for the Commonwealth Games started with politicians. The CEO of a Crown Corporation led the bid. But the most telltale sign is the lack of business people on the bid committee, as well as the lack of private funding for the bid. Halifax may have had a history of bidding for sporting events. But while those involved with the bid had strong sport backgrounds, they all came from the public or not-for-profit sector. Cooperation between the public and private sectors, which is a pillar of Stone’s definition of an urban regime, was non-existent. So
while many of the motivations were the same, and the actors involved had connections to
sport, we must conclude that the Halifax bid was not the result of regime politics.

In Hamilton 1987, Mayor Bob Morrow was a city-booster (and brother of the
national women’s rowing coach) who believed that economic rejuvenation of his steel
city would come through changing its image as a dirty steel town into a sports tourism
and hospitality centre. Bidding for the Commonwealth Games was one of many projects
during his tenure that was meant to gain the city broader exposure and grow the
hospitality industry – including building a convention centre and an arena with the hopes
of luring an NHL team. He was joined by another longtime city booster – the well-
connected lawyer Jack Pelech who was well-known and well-liked among local
businessmen and (Liberal) politicians, and had served many years at a national level as
the chair of the Canada Games. We have determined an urban regime was present during
this bid whose ongoing goals were to change the city’s image, rejuvenate its downtown
core and make it one of the higher-profile cities in the country. The involvement and
interest of many of the city’s leaders in the sports field led to the using of sport to fulfill
this public policy goal.

Hamilton 2003 is a continuation of this regime, although Morrow and Pelech had
now been replaced by newspaper publisher Jagoda Pike and Mayor Bob Wade. Pike was
the driving force behind the bid, as reported by core respondents, for both personal and
professional reasons. She wanted to leave a mark on the city as had Spectator publisher
MM Robinson when he first established the British Empire Games in 1930, but also felt
there were many economic benefits to be had. Wade also saw the merits of making a bid,
economically and symbolically. Hamilton continued to bid for, and host, sporting events
through the 1990s, creating an influential knowledge base. The city still had strong
connections within the federal Liberal Party. The university was still interested in
boosting its own image through the sports industry. Prominent individuals in the city had
strong sports backgrounds.
Hamilton 2005 saw the same actors within its regime, although the mayor had again changed. But future research on this era and its public policy choices may unveil the beginnings of the decline of the regime. Local politicians no longer held influence in federal government and newer faces on city council, especially those from the amalgamated suburbs, meant many now questioned the high costs associated with a mega-event strategy, especially if it only benefited the city core. This dissertation has concluded the 2005 bid was the result of a regime because it incorporated both the economic and electoral spheres, as per Stone. However, the degree of cooperation from the economic sphere in the Hamilton 2005 case warrants further study. How much cooperation and how strong does it need to be between spheres in order for it to be considered a regime? Or does it need only exist?

Table 6.1

Five case studies in comparison: Melbourne, Halifax and Hamilton

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GREATER MELBOURNE</th>
<th>HALIFAX</th>
<th>HAMILTON 1987</th>
<th>HAMILTON 2003</th>
<th>HAMILTON 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>3,417,945</td>
<td>372,679</td>
<td>308,000</td>
<td>490,268</td>
<td>513,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bid Initiated by</td>
<td>State government</td>
<td>Provincial Crown corporation</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>Local business leader</td>
<td>Local business leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public policy history of bidding for sports events</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of bid</td>
<td>$9 million AUD</td>
<td>$9 million CAD</td>
<td>$300,000 (domestic bid only)</td>
<td>$3 million CAD</td>
<td>$400,000 CAD (domestic bid only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public funds available/used</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private funds available/used</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Bid Committee</td>
<td>Ron Walker, businessman, property developer, head of MMEC</td>
<td>Fred MacGillivray, CEO of Trade Centre Ltd.</td>
<td>Bob Morrow, mayor, with lawyer Jack Pelech</td>
<td>Jagoda Pike, publisher, The Hamilton Spectator</td>
<td>Jagoda Pike, publisher, The Hamilton Spectator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BID MEMBERS</td>
<td>Electoral sphere</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic sphere</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As previously stated, Burbank, Andranovich and Heying concluded that the pursuit of a mega-event strategy was “largely inexplicable outside of the context of regime politics” (2001, 28). Case studies in Melbourne and Hamilton show symbolic regimes may be present, due to the focus on economic rejuvenation and the stated need to change the city’s image both nationally and globally. Citizens in these cases tended to be “rallied to the cause” using symbols such as civic pride and an us-against-them dialogue. The Halifax case study, however, presents a problem. Halifax shows attributes of a symbolic regime, with emphasis on the symbolic part – a desire to change the city’s image, to place it on the world stage, to diversify its economy. However, we have raised serious doubts that an actual regime exists in the city due to its lack of private-sector cooperation during the bid, a necessary component in an urban regime. Instead, we see a bid very much driven by the government. Perhaps this lack of private-sector involvement led to the bid’s implosion as costs escalated and politicians got cold feet as they saw taxpayers footing most of the bill. Thus a symbolic regime is not necessary to make an
initial mega-event bid. However, perhaps it is necessary to make a serious bid (a
definition of “serious” thus being needed). How much policy transfer or policy learning
was present in Halifax is cause for further study as it would appear policy learning – from
previous municipal administrations as well as other municipalities – leads to the pursuit
of the strategy but the lack of a regime does not allow the city to see it through. It does
not have the capacity (the resources) to get things done.

This dissertation presented several hypotheses in Chapter 2 and we will now
discuss how they stand up over the course of the research:

_Hypothesis #1: Auxiliary players, specifically in the form of sport-knowledge groups, are
prevalent in an urban regime that pursues a mega-event strategy. Therefore, an existing
strong sport-knowledge infrastructure will lead to a municipality pursuing a mega-event
strategy._

Does the character of the auxiliary players in a regime influence the economic
development strategy of that municipality. This dissertation would conclude that it does.
Sport-knowledge infrastructure is definitely present in all three municipalities covered by
our case studies. Not only is Melbourne a national sport centre with Australian Rules
Football, its Cricket Club, the Australian Open and Grand Prix administrative expertise, it
also has national sport offices and an event planning centre with experience in bidding for
grand sporting events. Hamilton’s McMaster University is a major actor in the city’s
economic development, and its own sports administration knowledge, and sport
infrastructure play a central role in all three of Hamilton’s bids. Those bids ultimately
benefit the university in terms of improved sport infrastructure, student housing and a
raised profile. There are also several high-profile community members, federal
politicians and business people with ties to the sports world. In Halifax – the financial
and bureaucratic centre of Atlantic Canada – we see several regional sports centres or
offices. It has several universities with strong sport programs, and it has an event-
planning company with experience bidding for sporting events.
Hypothesis #2: Similar actors in the regime, across nation-states, will lead to similar development strategies.

In a previous chapter, we stated that Stone argues development strategies vary according to the character of the urban regimes that make the decisions. Therefore, we should see similar actors in the regimes of all three cities as they have all taken on the same development strategy. In the Melbourne bid, businessman Ron Walker was the clear leader, but one cannot talk about Walker without acknowledging that Premier Jeff Kennett was a close friend and had put Walker in that position of power. Anything Walker did, would have had the approval of Kennett – and Kennett held the purse strings for the Games. Walker held personal financial and political resources.

In Hamilton, in 2003 and 2005, newspaper publisher Jagoda Pike was the clear leader of the bid, though there was a triumvirate of power at the top, which included the university and the city. While Pike represents the private sector, she was not personally “wealthy” (was not a wealth-generating business owner) nor was she local as she lived in another community. She did, however, hold immense power over the city agenda as the publisher of the city’s only daily newspaper. The Hamilton bid in 2003, especially, also had a very powerful politician on its side in the form of Sheila Copps, a local MP and federal cabinet minister whose department held the purse strings to the Commonwealth Games. The 1987 Hamilton bid, only in its domestic phase, was run by the city’s mayor and a close confidante, Pelech, who possessed personal political and knowledge resources, as well as contacts in the business community. We see in these bids by Melbourne and Hamilton that powerful and highly influential politicians from a higher level of government were actors in the regime. We also see strong participation from the business sector, and notice that many of the higher profile business people in these cities also happen to have strong sports backgrounds. One noticeable difference between Melbourne and Hamilton is that the Canadian steel town was much more dependent on the knowledge (and political) resources of its one university – something that is not apparent in the Melbourne bid. This is an aspect that perhaps deserves further study.
Halifax, however, was run by leaders of government and sport agencies. There was no high-profile private sector involvement, save for MacGillivray, who did not have the same depth of wealth as Walker in Melbourne, nor public agenda control as Pike in Hamilton. No university had tied itself to the bid, and there was no highly influential politician that was ready to make the Games happen, no matter the cost.

Therefore, we see both Hamilton’s and Melbourne’s bids were directed by a purposeful member of the private sector, with very powerful political backing. The Halifax bid was not. Melbourne’s bid is striking because of the cross-over between other categories and the sports world. It had very powerful businessmen – including Walker and Kennett -- in its community who also held sports backgrounds either as athletes or administrators/board members. Hamilton was very reliant on its local knowledge base, especially that of the university which had a large vested interest in the development of sports infrastructure locally. Some of the more high-profile and well-connected local citizens, Cecelia Carter-Smith and Dr. Gene Sutton, had strong links to the sports world – Carter-Smith as an athlete and Sutton as a coach and administrator. Sutton was a constant through all three Hamilton bids. The city also possessed some prominent businessmen with ties to sports. Ron Foxcroft was a professional basketball referee and owner of both a transport company and a sporting goods manufacturing company. David Braley, owner of a manufacturing company, owned a professional football team and at the time of the 2003 bid, was overseeing the operations of the World Cycling Championships. Halifax, as already discussed, did not have private sector representation throughout the course of its bid and therefore was most likely not the result of regime politics. Its technical knowledge and resources came from either the government or government-funded sports agencies.

Therefore, this dissertation argues that similar actors in a regime across nation-states will lead to similar development strategies. These municipalities all had sports-related actors in a position of power and influence, helping to make the public policy decision to bid for a mega-event.
Hypothesis #3: De-industrialized economies lead to the pursuit of symbolic strategies such as the hosting of a mega-event. And as there are similar stressful economic conditions in municipalities bidding for mega-events, there should also be similar political conditions.

Literature, to date, suggests municipalities with a loss of heavy industry seek to re-brand themselves and gain an international profile in order to attract new investment. All three municipalities in our case studies show a desire to brand themselves internationally and diversify the economy. Melbourne and Victoria State in the 1990s were going through a recession that brought high unemployment and a stagnating economy. Premier Kennett brought in a right-wing agenda of public-sector cuts and privatization as he endeavored to steer the state’s economic dependence away from state-run corporations, manufacturing and industry and instead re-focus on entertainment, gambling, sports, major events and tourism. Hamilton was built on the steel industry but its slow decline was quickly speeding up and the city needed to find new job opportunities for its citizens. Throughout its three bids, the focus was to improve its international image and expand its economic development base from one of heavy industry dependent on steel. Expanding Hamilton’s tourism sector, especially its sports tourism niche, was one economic development goal and they believed a mega-event would improve the city’s international image and, thus, attract, other business investment. Halifax was never dependent on heavy industry. It was, however, dependent on the public sector for jobs while its rural outreaches were dependent on the resource sector. It sought to expand its economic base by creating job opportunities in bio-technology, offshore energy and information technology, as well as change its image to one of a hip, creative urbane centre, in order to keep its younger population from leaving. Therefore, this dissertation must conclude that de-industrialized economies – as well as economies in need of diversification – pursue such symbolic strategies as the mega-event strategy as a fast short-cut to re-branding themselves and attracting new investment.

Political conditions, however, are not always the same in our five case studies. In Melbourne, the bid was overseen by a high profile businessman who had been given carte-blanche from his personal friend, the premier of the state, to win the Games.
Premier Kennett had a ruling majority in the State of Victoria, and the state had very deep pockets. Municipalities in Australia are politically much weaker and without as large a budget as their Canadian counterparts. So this bid, in fact, came from the state level of government. In Hamilton, it is the opposite, where the province played a tertiary role in the bid while the municipality initiated the strategy and engaged the federal government for financial and political support. A city business woman in a decision-making partnership with the city and the university led the 2003 and 2005 bids. However, the federal government was also a major player once the international bid began, due in part to the Heritage Minister being from the city and from the fact it would become a major funder. In Halifax, the bid was a joint venture between the municipality and province, but there was a struggle to get the federal government on board wholeheartedly, perhaps due to the escalating costs of the bid plus a (fiscally) Conservative government now being in power. The bid was run by the public sector with little input from the private sector leading up to the bid’s demise. Therefore, we can conclude that de-industrialized economies can lead to the pursuit of a mega-event strategy. However, the political conditions within parliamentary democracies are not necessarily similar. Worthy of further study, however, is whether political conditions are similar within successful mega-event bids.

*Hypothesis #4: The pursuit of a mega-event leads to the inclusion of non-local actors in an urban regime.*

Non-local actors were certainly prevalent in the bid committees. The very nature of a mega-event bid necessitates the inclusion of people who have influence with national and provincial governments, businesses at all levels, including international business, and people with international sport connections. In the Canadian cities, Hamilton and Halifax, we see the inclusion of partners from all three levels of government as well as members of the national Commonwealth Games committee. Private-sector members and auxiliary members were all local. In Melbourne, four members of the Australian Commonwealth Games Association were brought in as well as one member of the private-sector – a national banker. These members provided expanded
resources in terms of money and expertise that gave the regime increasing capacity to get things done. What is interesting is the lack of a non-local private-sector person on Canadian bid committees. The private-sector member (a national bank CEO) brought into the Melbourne bid was chosen by the Victoria State government and was a Liberal Party supporter. This dissertation has speculated that the mega-event is an international spectacle hosted at the local level and that, due to its nature, the majority of members on a bid committee will be non-local actors, especially multi-level governance agencies and non-local business organizations. They are needed to bridge the gap between the local and the global. However, we have since found this not to be the case. The majority of non-local actors brought in are members of the national Commonwealth Games committee. This should not be a surprise as they are integral participants in the entire process without whose support a bid would be impossible. However, the lack of national-profile businessmen on the Canadian bids leads us to wonder if their presence would not have helped determine the ultimate success of winning a Games bid. This would be a question for further study.

*Hypothesis #5: Policy-learning leads to the pursuit of the mega-event strategy.*

This seems true as politicians and businessmen frequently use other cities as examples of why bidding for mega-events is good public policy. These cities and their regimes also learn from their own past experiences when conducting a bid. Melbourne had a history of bidding for sporting events, as did many Australian cities. Hamilton also had a long history of bidding for sporting events, as did Canada, and in the 2003 case, especially, drew on the Manchester Games in 2002 as a way of explaining how an old industrial city could benefit from such an event. Halifax also had a history of bidding for sport events. This dissertation concludes that while the process of “policy learning” is at work, the symbolic nature of the regime will have formed before policy transfer occurs directly influencing which policies the municipality pays attention to long enough to actual “learn”.
Caveats

Can we conclusively state that the mega-event strategy can only be explained through urban regime theory, and more specifically through the lens of symbolic regime politics as per Burbank, Andranovich and Heying? Of course not. The main caveat to this research is that it is a qualitative investigation rather than quantitative – and therefore hard to measure definitively the presence of a regime. We can only look for indicators, such as similar actors across time with characteristics conducive to mega-event public policy. But that does not make the research any less relevant as public policy decision making is very much about human nature and bounded rationality which would be difficult to measure quantitatively, and by no means exact. Qualitatively, we can look for trends and patterns that would allow us to guess the public policy choices by looking at the actors involved in city politics. There will also be naysayers who call any appearance of a “regime”, merely a convenient coalition. But our research shows a longstanding “coalition” – almost systemic – within Hamilton and Melbourne, where we have determined a regime possibly exists. One could also argue that the research has simply shown the need for private-sector support and not necessarily regime politics, but we must still answer why, with all the economic development strategies possible, does the mega-event strategy gain prominence in these communities.

One argument against the usefulness of regime theory is that it could not be used outside of the American context. However, this research has shown the theory to be extremely compatible to the Canadian and the Australian political context. But can this theory be used outside of Western-style democracies? That remains to be seen and further research in such countries may show similar motivations and actors. Whether that constitutes a regime is questionable. Further research may also want to focus on other economic development strategies and see if regime politics matters.

Contributions

Ultimately, this research answers the call of Houlihan who wants to see political science begin to study sport policy within its theoretical frameworks. We have furthered the research on the mega-event strategy as a public policy choice, we have furthered
research on urban regime theory using comparative analysis outside of the U.S., and we have furthered research examining local agency within larger forces (as Sellers would have us give a multi-level account of an urban public policy). By using an expensive and controversial public policy choice, and examining the decision-making process at various levels of governance, this research helps to shed light on the question: Who holds power? Ultimately, we have seen in our five cases that the role of the private sector is central to the successful pursuit of the mega-event strategy – ‘success’ defined as seeing the process through to completion, whether or not the bid is won. Political will must be present, and that ‘will’ appears most often to come from a concentration of power at the top – one driven politician be it a premier with a majority (Melbourne) which gives him tremendous access to both political and state economic resources, or at the least an agreeable mayor with an abundance of political capital (Hamilton) and allies with considerably more access to resources. That political will is strengthened by the support, and even the encouragement, of the private sector. This is Stone’s regime politics.

However, this research has also revealed a question that requires further study. To what degree does there need to be public-private cooperation in order to constitute a regime? Can there be such a thing as a weak regime, versus a strong regime? This is asked within the context of Melbourne in the 1990s – a strong regime – versus Hamilton over the years, in which we see what appears to be the rise and decline of a regime from the 1980s (strong) to the early 21st century (weakening).

Summary

Why do municipalities bid for mega-events such as the Commonwealth Games despite the fact that these bids are expensive and have no guarantee of success. Our research into five such cases prove the assertions of previous mega-event analysis that these cities – Melbourne, Hamilton and Halifax – are using the strategy as a quick fix to international prestige and recognition in order to kick-start an economic recovery, grow a tourism industry (thus bringing in outside dollars) and change its image. In all cases, but in Canada in particular, it is a means to attract infrastructure investment from the higher levels of government to cities that have long argued that their streets and neighbourhoods
are in decay and that new transportation networks are needed to support any economic development. The mega-event strategy thus becomes a wholly rational public policy choice because it is believed such events can have a high impact on these goals. Those in charge of the decision-making are drawn to sports-centred decisions because of their backgrounds, either a personal affinity for sport, a developed relationship with the sports sphere, or a business background dependent on sport.

Municipalities around the world continue to bid on mega-events, whether the Commonwealth Games, the Olympics, Pan-American Games, or the World Cup of Soccer. This trend continues despite an ongoing escalation of costs due in large part to the logistical demands of international sport organizations, but also international security fears. The bids pit Third World versus First World countries, western democracies versus autocracies. Examining why this public policy is so popular remains extremely relevant today. This dissertation is just one piece of the puzzle and researchers should now continue to investigate the conditions and motivations around the world – political, economic and historical -- to host what amounts to a very large and costly international celebration, in which sport provides the central entertainment.
References


Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2008. About Australia: 


Buist, Steve. 2005c. Hamilton makes its pitch; City will learn Thursday if it will vie for the Games. *Hamilton Spectator*. December 13.


Buist, Steve. 2005e. Jilted; Commonwealth Games Canada courted Hamilton a year ago.
It left the city at the altar yesterday. *Hamilton Spectator*. December 16.


Goad, Peter. 2007. Submission to the Select Committee on Public Land Development From Save Albert Park Inc. October 5.


Hall, C.M. 2001. Imaging, tourism and sports event fever: the Sydney Olympics and the


Hamilton. 2005e. Committee of the Whole Report. Subject: City of Hamilton Support for the 2014 Commonwealth Games Bid (PED05070). By Lee Ann Coveyduck and
David Adames. July 12.


Ph.D. Thesis – C. Phillips; McMaster University – Political Science

Coordination. October.


Kernaghan, John. 2002c. Taxpayers may be on hook over Games bid. *Hamilton*
Spectator. June 5.


McCloy, Cora. 2009. Canada Hosts the World: An Examination of the First Federal


Appendix 1
Interviews

MELBOURNE
Nick Economou, telephone interview, March 10, 2011, notes

HALIFAX
Peter Kelly, telephone interview, August 11, 2010, notes
Scott Logan, telephone interview, August 9, 2010, notes

HAMILTON
Anonymous, private sector, telephone interview, January 29, 2010, notes
Anonymous, private sector, telephone interview, November 17, 2009, notes
David Adames, telephone interview, June 24, 2009, notes
Cecelia Carter-Smith, personal interview, September 27, 2009, notes
Larry DiIanni, personal interview, June 24, 2010, tape recorded
John Kernaghan, personal interview, May 5, 2009, tape recorded
Greg Maychak, personal interview, July 17, 2009, tape recorded
Bob Morrow, personal interview, April 21, 2010, tape recorded
Greg Myers, personal interview, September 21, 2009, tape recorded
Roger Trull, personal interview, January 14, 2010, tape recorded
Bob Wade, telephone interview, September 16, 2010, notes
Appendix 2

Newspaper Articles

(in chronological order)

MELBOURNE


April 11, 2007.)


**HALIFAX**


**HAMILTON**


Melnbardis, Robert. 1987. We were shafted McCulloch charges. *Hamilton Spectator*. November 11.


*Hamilton Spectator*. Ottawa may withhold $50 million pledge: Jelinek. November 19.


Cox, Christine. 2003. Mac students to vote on plans for complex; Project for multi-sport


McLeod, Meredith. 2003. We’re a winning city; 2010 Games dream gets $500 million closer. *Hamilton Spectator*. May 27.


August 7.


Buist, Steve. “Now we sit tight till site visit; Cities vying to host Commonwealth Games must not contact Canadian bid review committee.” The Hamilton Spectator, 3 November 2005, sec. A, p. 5.


