

MASS MEDIA OWNERSHIP
AND IDEOLOGICAL REPRODUCTION

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MASS MEDIA OWNERSHIP
FOR THE PROCESS OF IDEOLOGICAL REPRODUCTION:
THE CANADIAN CASE

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ABSTRACT

The thesis addresses the problem of the relation between the ownership and control of mass media and the process of ideological reproduction with specific reference to the Canadian case. The instrumentalist response, which suggests that the dominant class controls the major ideological institutions and sets the parameters within which ideological discussion is confined, is contrasted with the structuralist response, which sees ideological reproduction as a process related to the social relations of production that characterize the media discourse in a social order where a particular class is hegemonic. The concrete case of Canadian mass media is examined, and it is suggested that neither position is fully adequate to account for the operation of the process here. Porter's (1965) and Clement's (1975) studies of the ownership structure are revised for 1978, and it is found that mass media ownership and control has become increasingly more highly concentrated within a few dominant complexes that are increasingly interrelated through reciprocal shareholdings, interlocking directorships, and joint publishing and broadcasting undertakings. Similar linkages between the dominant media capitalists are documented, which suggests that the dominant media capitalists can be considered homogeneous, and which in turn carries implications

for the ideological diversity of media products. Their precise role in the process of media production/ideological reproduction is considered through the analysis of responses to a questionnaire forwarded to publishers, managing editors, broadcasting station managers, and news directors associated with the media outlets controlled by the dominant complexes. The results indicate that those who hold important editorial positions within the major publishing and broadcasting outlets are substantially indistinguishable from the dominant media capitalists in terms of particular ascriptive characteristics (age, sex, region of birth, ethnic origin, class origin, etc.) and that therefore these individuals can be considered class agents for the dominant media capitalists. Finally, the role of the Canadian state within the broadcasting sector is considered through a discussion of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (C.B.C.) and through the analysis of the activities of the Canadian Radio-television Telecommunications Commission (C.R.T.C.). It is argued that both state agencies act to favour the position of the private mass media and hence the position of the dominant media capitalists. It is concluded that ownership and control of the major mass media outlets in Canada is exercised by a few dominant media capitalists who are homogeneous, who recruit appropriate class representatives to the critical media positions in order to insure their own class interests, who otherwise act as latent overseers or "night watchmen" vis-a-vis their private media operations, and whose position is

secured and perpetuated through the activities of the state. The significance of this "structure of dominance" for the process of ideological reproduction is said to ultimately require a test of the structuralist position, that is, the analysis of the social relations of mass media production in order to understand how the interests of the dominant class are preserved, and the circumstances under which their interests may be threatened. Consequently, it should be possible to integrate the two approaches in such a way as to render fully comprehensible the reproduction of the dominant ideology through the mass media.

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INTRODUCTION

The problem of the relationship between the dominant ideology and the dominant class has been fraught with much theoretical confusion and little empirical analysis. Marx's classic statement that "the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas" has produced various readings of the relationship that posit, at one extreme, full-fledged conspiracy, and at the other, total abstinence, on the part of the dominant class, from the process of ideological reproduction. The bottom line of the problem is this: in terms of understanding how it is that a particular, dominant, bourgeois ideology is reproduced, and the part played by a particular, dominant, bourgeois class in its reproduction, is it that bourgeois ideas are the product of a particular (bourgeois) class or of a particular (bourgeois) society? In other words, is it that bourgeois ideology is reproduced in the interests of the dominant class, or is it reproduced under the direction of the dominant class? Marx's statement is sufficiently ambiguous to leave the question open to factionalist interpretations: instrumentalists and structuralists are the chief protagonists in a competition fuelled by the sorry absence of a concise theory of ideology in Marx's analyses. The problem of the "relative independence" of the capitalist state thus extends to the problem of the "relative independence" of ideological reproduction, a

process carried out (largely) through the ideological institutions of the state.

The test of each formulation ultimately rests with the empirical analysis of these ideological institutions, their relation to the state and to the dominant class. One such institution, one that is critically and increasingly important within the operation of the state, is the object of this analysis: the mass media. To date there have been few attempts to locate this potent ideological vehicle within a broader frame: to articulate its position within, its relationship to, and its significance for, the larger social formation. There has been a consistent failure to understand the institution of mass media in terms of its social location, its place and its role within the hegemonic order. Given this directive, the substantive analysis of mass media comes to enclose these larger theoretical questions: its relation to the state, to the dominant class, its ideological function and its role in the legitimation process, as well as its role in a still larger process according to which existing relations of class and power are reproduced.

The Italian semiologist Umberto Eco has said that "the problem of communication is an ideological problem." (1972: 107) This point has been missed by many who would call themselves "communication theorists." In sociological terms, it is difficult to conceptualize mass media as a social institution without reference to the problem of ideology; mass media must be placed within a theorization of ideology and its practico-social operation.

There is, fundamentally, rather than simply including mass media within the ideological apparatuses of the state, a need to explain how ideology is reproduced in concrete practice through the media of (mass) social communication. This task is imperative in light of the relative exclusion of mass media as a critical point of analysis for recent treatises pertaining to the reproduction and legitimation of class relations, or more generally, to the distribution of power in late capitalist societies. While a plethora of studies have dedicated their detailed and rigorous attention to other ideological institutions, particularly systems of formalized education, few have applied the same analytical fervour to the study of mass communications. Education systems and mass media systems each make critical contributions to the process whereby consent for bourgeois hegemony is solicited and sustained. Organized consent accords to those with power the right, the legitimacy, to act on behalf of the relatively powerless. Consent management becomes, at various and particular historical moments, a fundamental requirement that is increasingly fulfilled within the pivotal realm of the mass media. Hall (1973: 35) suggests that mass media systems, more than other ideological institutions, come to mediate the public discourse between the rulers and the ruled, to set the stage for consent formation and management, and to orchestrate the field of conflict at the ideological level.

The mass media are indeed critical mechanisms for the operation of bourgeois ideological hegemony. It is here that the language of dominance finds its clearest expression. Sadly, at a point in time where the necessary phrases ("the national interest"

is again in vogue) are so regularly invoked, these articulations have yet to be fully documented for the Canadian case. This massive task will not be undertaken here, although reference will be made to those few who have pioneered (elsewhere, especially Britain) in this field.

There is initially, and at the very least, an urgent requirement for a model of the media-ideology relation that 1) incorporates a theorization of ideology and the course that ideological reproduction takes; 2) situates the institution of mass media within this operation; and 3) permits the analysis of ideological reproduction within the realm of mass media in relation to ideological forces operative within the society at large. Some steps in this direction are offered in the first chapter. It will be suggested that there are three fundamental analytical imperatives that impose themselves on those seeking to explore the media-ideology relation: firstly, ownership of the means of media production/ideological reproduction; secondly, the social relations or social practices of media production/ideological reproduction; and thirdly, the media commodity, i.e. ideological analysis of the message. This model takes its direction largely from Gramsci's concept of the state,¹ and his discussions of the operation of the hegemonic process. It attempts to incorporate the first element (the focus of analysis for those of the instrumentalist strain) and the second and third elements (the focus of analysis for those of the structuralist strain) into a working model that seeks to reconcile these two apparently mutually exclusive modes of theorization.²

Briefly stated, it is argued that the structuralists, through their analyses of the social relations and the product of media production, can explain much but not all of what takes place at the level of media production/ideological reproduction, that these analyses must be complemented with a consideration of the ownership element. Evidence related to the ownership structure of Canadian mass media strongly suggests that this element cannot be discarded in charting the operation of bourgeois ideology here. The significance of the ownership element (and, to some extent, its implications for the operation of the hegemonic process in Canada) is the principal concern of this thesis.

The analysis begins with a brief consideration of the historical forces that have shaped the present ownership structure of Canadian mass media, including the historical role of the state in the development of the publishing and broadcasting sectors of the mass media industry. The third chapter considers the particular varieties of ownership (public, private, foreign) that characterize this structure and identifies those corporate complexes that dominate the field.³ This serves as a prerequisite to the identification of the dominant media capitalists in Chapter 4, where their shared characteristics and their homogeneity is assessed through the analysis of formal and informal linkages between the dominant media capitalists and between the dominant media complexes. Chapter 5 considers further their precise role in the process of media production/ideological reproduction, while Chapter 6 considers the significance of state media (the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation) and state regulation through the Canadian Radio-television

Telecommunications Commission (C.R.T.C.). Finally, the utility of Gramsci's theorizations for understanding the operation of the hegemonic process vis-a-vis mass media in Canada is reviewed and re-evaluated in light of the data presented.

Notes

1. There is a necessary ambivalence with regard to the use of the term "the state" throughout the thesis. Gramsci's concept of the state includes both political society (essentially, public institutions) and civil society (private institutions); this is the sense in which the state needs to be understood at a theoretical level in order to fully comprehend its place within and its contribution to the hegemonic order. At the same time, however, it would be difficult, awkward, and above all inadequate to continually refer (for example) to the role of "political society" in the development of the broadcasting industry; for one reason, the bourgeois common-sensical or legal definition of the state refers solely to the governmental bodies and agencies of political society. For ease of discussion, this usage of the term must be retained, with, nevertheless, a clear recognition of its limited theoretical value. Chapter 6 illustrates this limitation with reference to the relation between public and private media, where it is seen that the two must be incorporated within Gramsci's more inclusive definition of the state.

2. The theoretical conflict between instrumentalists and structuralists has been most fully articulated in terms of theories of the state per se; however, the same conflict appears where ideology is theorized and based within Gramsci's frame. In Chapter 1 it will be seen that Gramsci's work has itself produced competing interpretations of the relation between mass media, ideology, the state, and the bourgeois class; a conflict also rooted in the distinctions between instrumentalism and structuralism.

3. It should probably be stressed at this point that the thesis deals primarily with the mass media in Canada (newspapers, radio, and television) and only peripherally with other media that are not circulated at a mass scale or with the same frequency or regularity of appearance and distribution. This is not, of course, to suggest that ideological reproduction is confined to these three media.

CHAPTER ONE

THE MEDIA-IDEOLOGY RELATION

The Problem of Ideology

Like many concepts regularly employed in social science, the term "ideology" has been so used and abused that its inclusion in any discussion immediately commands a semantic exercise. Indeed, Gramsci was compelled to suggest the need for a historical analysis of the connotative transitions that the term has undergone: from "science of ideas" to "analysis of the origin of ideas" to its present usage "system of ideas." (1971: 376) Gramsci also suggested the need to distinguish between the use of the term for analytical purposes and for polemical purposes. Ideologies that are "historically organic" and "necessary to a given structure," those which "organize human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle etc." are of the first order, while ideologies that are "arbitrary, rationalistic, or willed," those which "only create individual 'movements', polemics and so on" carry less import. (1971: 376-77) Historically organic ideologies, those that are embodied in politico-economic forces and institutions, those that have institutional support, etc., are for Gramsci, and for this thesis, of central significance.

Ideology, then, is a system of ideas essential to, and necessarily a feature of, a given social formation. It includes a conception of how the social world works, how it should work, and what the procedures are for social change. At its core lies a set of constructions and assumptions that direct the daily operation of social life: a "stock-of-knowledge" in the Schutzian sense or what Gramsci terms "common sense."¹ This set of assumptions is widely held and largely incoherent and uncritical. (see Gramsci, 1971: 323-26) It comprises a substratum of ideology and is both historically and culturally specific.²

Ideology is thus embodied in the major institutional structures (provides the *raison d'etre* for social institutions and explains their interrelation), in a set of commonly held assumptions that direct the daily operation of social life, and finally, in language: words, terms, and concepts used to describe social life, the tools of public discourse, are imputed with ideological significance, and reflect a particular construction of the social world. For Gramsci, language "is a totality of determined notions and concepts and not just of words grammatically devoid of content." (1971: 323) There is a "philosophy" contained in language, in "common sense", and in the ideological sphere of the social formation.

At the same time, there is a fluidity or elasticity characteristic of ideology that permits it to alter its premises without sacrificing its basic structure, to adapt and fluctuate in response to societal forces, to re-formulate its concepts and its

language, yet still remain true to its fundamental principles and tenets. While it is possible to see the recurrence, throughout stretches of historical time, of certain themes and concepts within a dominant ideology, it is difficult to state definitively its content, or to outline its limits, since ideologies are (necessarily) in a constant, ongoing state of flux. This is in fact part and parcel of their reproduction and renewal. The survival of a dominant ideology is highly contingent upon its capacity to change and expand in order to integrate new social developments, and especially, new developments in social conflict.

The ideology that is "dominant" in a given social formation is that which is correlated with the major economic and political forces, that which underlies and supports the major social institutions, whose principles and doctrines are embodied within the social order. To understand how the dominant ideology retains its dominance, it is necessary to consider the process through which it is reproduced, and to somehow theorize its practico-social operation and reproduction. Althusser, Gramsci, and Poulantzas are three key theorists who have provided some raw materials for this purpose; of the three, it will be seen that Gramsci's model is the most useful with which to proceed to the analysis of ideological reproduction in Canada.

Gramsci's theory of ideology is inextricably bound with his theory of the state. *The conception of the state is central to the theory of ideology in the same sense that the state itself

is central to ideological hegemony and the legitimization process. Indeed, the state is precisely the embodiment of legitimization, and it is the ultimate conciliator between labour and capital. The very position of the state endows it with a highly ideological nature. These are not new notions, nor should these be credited solely or entirely to Gramsci. What is unique in Gramsci's schema is his attempt to systematically articulate this link between ideology and the state into a relatively comprehensive exposition of the hegemonic process.

There is not, however, a concise theory of ideology per se in his writings; it must be extracted from the hundreds of pages of cryptic and restrained musings that comprise the prison notebooks. In fact the term "ideology" appears relatively infrequently and is often substituted with crude equivalents: "philosophies," "conceptions of the world," "systems of thought," etc. Several key concepts will assist in the reconstruction of Gramsci's model: "hegemony," the "relative independence" of the state, the "compromise equilibrium," and finally, "ideology" itself.

Despite Anderson's disclaimers,³ Gramsci was undoubtedly the first to fully develop the concept of "hegemony." "Hegemony" and "dominance" are qualitatively distinct forms of rule: it is possible for a class to be dominant without being hegemonic, since hegemony encompasses three modes of dominance: the economic, the political, and the ideological. It occurs where a dominant class is able to extend its sphere of power to all corners of

society; to enclose within its reign all economic, political, cultural, educational, religious, public and private aspects of social life, and to justify this reign through its control of the principal ideological institutions. Williams' definition, while it captures the essence of the concept, more correctly describes the specifically ideological aspects of hegemony:

... hegemony is an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and political principles, and all social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral connotations.

(1975: 287)

While this thesis deals primarily with the specifically ideological aspects of hegemony, it is vital to keep in mind that hegemony necessarily includes, indeed requires, economic and political dominance.⁴ Without ideological hegemony, the position of the bourgeois class is, however, seriously undermined, and may render it merely dominant. Indeed, the distinction that Gramsci draws between "hegemony" and "dominance" is fundamental to the dialecticism of his model. It was said that a class can be dominant without being hegemonic. It is also possible that the hegemony of a particular class will undergo periods of crisis that may, or may not, presage systemic collapse. The mode of hegemony can fluctuate between periods where the exercise of coercion outweighs the management of consent, and vice versa. Thus the distinction between "hegemonic" and "non-hegemonic" domination

calls for the periodization of the various "moments" of hegemony, and of phases within each identifiable moment.

The hegemonic process, then, is one in which a dominant class, which controls the economic and political institutions of a society, also possesses or claims privileged access to the major ideological institutions of that society. Gramsci's description of the hegemonic process precisely articulates, in a fuller sense, the following statement from Marx:

The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, ~~the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance.~~ The individuals composing the ruling class ... among other things rule as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch.

(1970: 64-65)

Nevertheless, Gramsci's discussion still leaves in doubt the precise relation between the dominant ideology and the dominant class, and consequently, has led to alternative interpretations of the role of the dominant class in the hegemonic process, and, more specifically, of its role in the process of ideological reproduction through the mass media.

The hegemony of the dominant class is legitimated and reinforced through the totality of forces represented by the state, through the convergence of public and private ideological forces.

The state is broadly conceived to include both "political society" (the armed forces, the judicial system, and other public institutions) and "civil society" (education, political parties, religion, and private institutions).⁵ Ideologically, these forces converge in the hegemonic process; a process that occurs principally, though not exclusively, through the institutions of civil society. The element of consent is a vital constituent of this process, without which the ruling class loses its hegemonic position and becomes merely dominant, relying primarily on coercion to enforce its rule. Consent is secured through various processes (legitimation) and mechanisms (the compromise equilibrium) that operate amidst the institutions of civil society. In Gramsci's words "the state is the complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules." (1971: 244) The state "educates" this consent (largely) through those private institutions that are "left to the private initiatives of the ruling class." (1971: 259)

In order for consent to be sustained, the state is required to present itself as a neutral and objective sphere that represents the general interest, which leads us to the "relatively independent" status of the state. The crucial question posed for a Marxist analysis of the state as a whole is how the state can operate as an instrument of class domination, vital to the reproduction of capitalist social relations, and at the same time maintain the appearance of independence vis-a-vis the dominant class. It would

be difficult to argue that the "independence" of the state is pure illusion. Rather, the state remains apart from the field of class relations to the extent that it has an independent form; a form that is real, a form that is structured, yet a form that simultaneously mystifies its true relation to private capital, and consequently the class interest that is expressed through the forms in which the state manifests itself. Gramsci's discussions of the state suggest that its structural boundaries cannot be concretely located within the larger social formation in such a way as to exclude the interests of the subordinate classes, that the state's substance is a gelatinous one, continually formulating and re-formulating its substance, continually sifting through the field of class conflict in the effort to stabilize class relations, while at the same time ensuring the hegemony of the bourgeois class. The following passage illustrates:

It is true that the State is seen as the organ of one particular group, destined to create favourable conditions for the latter's maximum expansion. But the development and expansion of the particular group are conceived of, and presented, as being the motor force of a universal expansion, of a development of all the 'national' energies. In other words, the dominant group is co-ordinated concretely with the general interests of the subordinate groups, and the life of the State is conceived of as a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria between the interests of the fundamental group and those of the subordinate groups - equilibria in which the interests of the dominant group prevail, but only up to a certain point, i.e. stopping short of narrowly corporate economic interest.

(1971: 182)

This is the essence of the "compromise equilibrium," for which the state acts as mediator. Crude instrumentalist notions would therefore appear to be inadequate to account for the complexities of the state-capital relation. Instead, the state is the mediator of class power, the arbiter of class interests, and the organizer of the field of class relations. In order for class power to be successfully mediated through the state, and therefore in order that the hegemony of the dominant class is secured without jeopardizing the cohesion of the social whole, the state must appear as "neutral" and "independent", and in the course of sustaining this appearance, as one means of sustaining this appearance, it must from time to time make certain concessions to the dominated classes. The latter must be made to feel that their interests are represented in the state; to use Gramsci's term, the subordinate classes must consent to bourgeois hegemony.

Some have suggested (see Hall et al, 1977) that this may be the reason that Gramsci felt Western liberal democracies were particularly suited to a hegemony maintained primarily through the mechanism of consent, as opposed to coercion, since such things as universal suffrage and parliamentary representation were thoroughly entrenched at the politico-ideological level. In Canada, not only is this maintained by means of notions of parliamentary democracy and representation, which are institutionalized both ideologically and structurally in Canadian political culture, but the appearance of neutrality and independence is also maintained by means of the "independent" or private mass media, so that the voices of the

"little man" might be heard above the madding crowd. At the same time, the state-funded Canadian Broadcasting Corporation maintains the appearance of independence from the state as a whole, and certainly from the interests of private capital (see Chapter 6).

The compromise equilibrium, then, is required to maintain the appearance of universality and independence. The concept also suggests the possibility of conflicts between state and capital⁶ in administering this compromise equilibrium; a possibility that is clearly manifest in the struggle characteristic of the development of the broadcasting industry in Canada (see Chapter 2). The compromise equilibrium is necessarily an unequal equilibrium that allows the hegemony of the bourgeois class to appear "fair" to the dominated classes. Because the state must administer this equilibrium, however unequal, it cannot be explained in toto as the instrument of a dominant class; instead it is relatively independent of this class. The state is the organizer of the equilibrium and the organizer of hegemony: it organizes the productive process, at the economic level, it organizes juridically, it organizes politically, and, through the mass media and education systems, it organizes ideologically.⁷ Increasingly, it comes to organize all aspects of public and private social life.

Finally, it is clear that Gramsci attributed a great deal of power to the press; in fact, at one point, bourgeois newspapers are characterized as "ideological mercenaries in the service of capital." This is further evidenced in his belief that his own journal, the Ordine Nuovo (New Order) could be instrumental in

the development of organic intellectuals among the industrial workers of Turin, and ultimately in the formation of a counter-hegemonic movement. It was Gramsci's hope that the Italian working class would develop a degree of homogeneity, self-consciousness, and organization sufficient to offset the ideological impact of bourgeois hegemony, and thus to engage in the "war of position," a term analogous to ideological warfare. For Gramsci, the war of position is the crucial battle, the necessary preliminary to the "war of movement," which itself entails direct frontal assaults on the state. It is at this point in his revolutionary model that Gramsci has been subject to charges of idealism and voluntarism. (see, for example, Genovese, 1967; and Kiernan, 1972) The charge of idealism is clearly unwarranted: Gramsci reiterates Marx's premise that ideas are themselves material forces, which become meaningful only when fused with objective economic conditions. Objective economic conditions merge with subjective consciousness to develop revolutionary possibilities; this in no way deviates from the classic Marxist model. Gramsci simply argues that a class must establish hegemony in ideological terms as a prerequisite to revolutionary change in politico-economic terms:

... mass ideological factors always lag behind mass economic phenomena, and ... therefore, at certain moments, the automatic thrust due to the economic factor is slowed down, obstructed or even momentarily broken by traditional ideological elements - hence there must be a conscious, planned struggle to ensure that the exigencies of the economic position of the masses, which may conflict with the traditional leadership's policies, are understood. An appropriate political initiative is always necessary to liberate

the economic thrust from the dead weight of traditional policies - i.e. to change the political direction of certain forces which have to be absorbed if a new, homogeneous politico-economic historical bloc, without internal contradictions, is to be successfully formed.

(1971: 168; emphasis added)

Thus the charge of voluntarism has some merit, in that Gramsci insists that superstructural factors must ~~not be left to develop spontaneously~~, but must be consciously and intentionally and actively directed towards the end of revolutionary systemic change. ^{on Economy - to shift Italy from development} This conviction arises out of his analysis of the economic conditions of pre-Fascist Italy, in which the revolutionary potential of the northern workers and southern peasants was thwarted by a lack of homogeneity, but more significantly by the powerful brunt of dominant ideological forces, which effectively curbed opportunities to articulate those contradictions that ensured their economic plight. It was the fragmentary and inconsistent nature of their world-view, i.e. their weak ideological position, which rendered the subordinate classes politically impotent:

This social stratum finds its limits, and the reasons for its ultimate weakness, in its territorial dispersal and in the 'non-homogeneity' which is intimately connected with this dispersal. This explains some of its other characteristics too: its volubility, the multiplicity of ideological systems it follows, even the bizarre nature of the ideologies it sometimes follows.

(1971: 213; emphasis added)

Thus homogeneity is a fundamental prerequisite to the emergence of a class-based, historically congealed ideological bloc.

Gramsci's conceptualization of ideology is implicit in all that has been discussed of the hegemonic process. It accords the same all-inclusive mass social nature to ideology that Althusser does with his "human secretion" statement.⁸ For Gramsci, ideology's most important function is to "cement" the entire social bloc; it operates like a sinewy paste that interweaves and adheres all social institutions and mediates all social processes. Like Althusser and Poulantzas, Gramsci locates ideology at all levels of the social formation, yet, unlike Poulantzas, ideology is inconceivable outside the field of class relations. For Gramsci, ideology is above all and first and foremost a class weapon. The dominant ideology is quite emphatically the ideology of the dominant class. This, of course, is the central problem, calling for the war of position as a means to the end of revolutionary change. ~~Where Althusser and Poulantzas claim that ideology transforms the real relations of men into imaginary relations,~~ Gramsci asserts that bourgeois ideology effectively renders the subordinate classes inarticulate, with fragmentary and contradictory world-views; a condition which, when coupled with a lack of homogeneity, leaves them ideologically weak and hence politically weak as well.

Althusser, Gramsci, and Poulantzas each provide a picture, included in their respective discourses on ideology, of the "ideal" moment in the operation of bourgeois ideology. In the case of Althusser and Poulantzas, the picture that is presented is a very functional and functionalist one: at the height of its success, if you will, bourgeois ideology functions to provide cohesion amidst all disparate elements of the capitalist social formation.

It also quite neatly inserts the individual into his role as the bearer of those social relations characteristic of this formation. It also legitimates these relations and ensures their ongoing reproduction. What is absent from the theories of Althusser and Poulantzas is a consideration of the possibility that bourgeois ideology might fail to adequately perform these functions, a situation leading to what Gramsci referred to as a "crisis of authority" or "crisis of legitimacy." In fact, a crucial indicator of the dynamism of Gramsci's theoretical model is his insistence that the extent to which the dominant ideology successfully cements the social bloc must never be assumed:

If the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e. is no longer 'leading' but only 'dominant,' exercising coercive force alone, this means precisely that the great masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to believe previously, etc. The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.

(1971: 275-76)

For Gramsci, the possibility of revolutionary systemic change becomes ripe during such a moment of crisis. However, whether this potentiality is actualized depends upon a number of conditions, including the degree of homogeneity of the dominated classes. It must of course, as discussed, be preceded by the war of position, i.e. ideological warfare, the battle of the subordinate classes for ideological hegemony.

The Social Location of Mass Media

The institution of mass media, then, functions as the principal carrier of bourgeois ideology. While other social institutions perform activities that are only secondarily of an ideological nature, mass media operate exclusively in the realm of bourgeois ideas. It is not simply the presentation of "news" or the interpretation of "events" that endows mass media with this ideological task. It is, more fundamentally, the very nature of mass communication that directs it necessarily towards ideological ends. The system of mass communications presents itself as the carrier of the social process, as the communications link between all sectors of the population, between all regions of the nation, between all levels of social life. It presents, reports, and reformulates the concrete experiences of bourgeois society in ideological form. More critically, it frames the concrete experiences of bourgeois life within a legitimate model of the "correct" social order. Its more difficult task is to report, interpret, and frame new events and new experiences, in an ongoing fashion, in such a way that new social phenomena can be incorporated within this assumptive frame.

The crucial questions become: how is it possible for the mass media to fulfill these requirements, how is ideology articulated through the mass media, and what are the final implications of the media-ideology relation? Finally, how is it possible to analytically "map" the reproduction of bourgeois

ideology through the media of mass communication? A thorough analysis of ideological reproduction vis-a-vis mass media must consider three basic elements of the media-ideology relation: firstly, ownership of the means of media production, including the hierarchical structure that determines the control of media enterprises; secondly, the social relations or social practices of media production, including the selection, classification, preparation, processing, organization, etc., of media material, the socialization of editors, producers, journalists, broadcasters, etc.; and thirdly, the product of media production, through the "ideological analysis of the message." The empirical investigation of these three components of the media-ideology relation must be grounded in an adequate theorization of this relation that is above all able to account for the significance of all three elements for the reproduction of bourgeois ideology through the mass media. At this point, then, it will be useful to briefly review the existing models.

The first of these is the traditional model rooted in mass society theory. Cohen and Young (1973) review the British literature and identify three variants of what is termed the "mass manipulative" model. In the case of the United States, the leftist variant is represented by C. Wright Mills (1956) and Herbert Marcuse (1964). Mills argued that "the media, as now organized and operated, are ... a major cause of the transformation of America into a mass society." (1956: 315) For Mills, the mass media created new forms of dependence and a condition of

vulnerability among the masses, especially a vulnerability to greater control by power-wielding elites. Peterson (1965: 23) terms this a "pseudo-environment" which provides the means for increased social control. The dependence of the individual is intensified by a lack of reciprocal, obligatory, moral attachment to others, incited by rapid industrial expansion and the presence of disparate value systems; this in turn forces the individual to rely more on extraneous media of communication than on primary group or interpersonal relations in developing a world-view. In this way the centralized authority of mass communication systems takes precedence over micro-social forces in defining and rationalizing the social world for the individual. Finally, the movement towards mass society creates the requisite conditions for totalitarianism by increasing the isolation of the individual, by instilling a singular and all-pervasive world-view in the interests of the elite or elites, and by monopolizing media channels and thereby effectively eliminating ideological alternatives.

The Marcusean model of social control closely follows that outlined by Mills and others, and is equally static and ahistorical. In essence, the mass society or mass manipulation model stresses the uni-directional flow of information. Inequality of access to the means of communication is identified as the central problematic, which obstructs the free flow of ideas and the representation of "public opinion." These ideals are basic tenets of the libertarian theory of the press (see Siebert et al,

1963), which are, therefore, seen to be violated in practice, since ideas flow freely from the elite or elites to the masses and not vice versa, and hence are not representative of the general population, the "public." Accordingly, there is a need to "democratize" the communications system such that libertarian ideals can be realized in practice. Thus the assumptive principles of this position are libertarian, while the proposals are reformist. Inequality of access to the means of communication is indeed problematic, yet "democratization" is not likely to take place in a society where democratic principles are restricted to electoral procedures. Moreover, this model postulates (at the very least, implies) a mass audience of vacant minds, eagerly absorbing, in a rambunctious fashion, the products of mass media in order to fill their "tabula rasa" heads. It suggests a large undifferentiated mass of media recipients in a polar relation to a few powerful media producers and therefore highly vulnerable. Simplistic elitist models of this type can shed little light on the media production/ideological reproduction process.

The centrist variant identified by Cohen and Young is represented in the North American literature by Wirth (1948), Warner (1962), and others, who have modified the essence of mass society theory in a more positive or optimistic light. The development of mass communications and the emergence of "mass society" are seen as required integrative forces, which provide social cohesion. The development of mass media is also said to allow for the "democratization of culture," permitting the

greater participation of subordinate social groups in the "common life" of society. Thus it assumes equality of access to the means of communication; an assumption that is simply refuted by empirical realities.

The rightist variant of the mass society model is held, in the North American case, by Blumer (1951), Van Den Haag (1957), Howe (1957), and others, who tend to decry the emergence of "mass society" and its cultural vulgarities. The works of these writers are tainted with romanticism and a nostalgic yen for "traditional values," a sense of community spirit, and a return to the stability of the extended family. As McQuail observes:

... the sociology of mass communications has not prospered under the shadow of mass society theory. Not only have inappropriate questions been fostered and alternative ones discouraged, but the very weight of intellectual and ideological force behind these theories has discouraged competitors, and forced opponents to appear in the light of apologists for an existing social order, for capitalism and commercial exploitation, for ugliness and incipient totalitarianism.

(1969: 35)

Porter's analysis (1965), for the Canadian case, deals with the structure of mass media and their ideological function, which is identified in terms similar to the centrist variant: "those activities concerned with providing social cohesion and the maintenance of the value system we shall here call the ideological function." (1965: 457) The mass media are seen to hold a position within a larger "ideological system" that includes educational institutions and organized religion. Porter identified

eleven major mass media complexes and argued that media owners establish general boundaries that are made known to editors, boundaries that tend to constrain the presentation of ideological themes. The long-term implications of this ownership structure for the "ideological system" and for the larger system which contains it, were explored to a rather limited extent.

Clement explores these implications more thoroughly in The Canadian Corporate Elite (1975: 270-343), where mass media are regarded as ideological vehicles controlled by a significant fraction of the Canadian capitalist class. The media control process is described as one in which the presentation of ideological notions vis-a-vis media products is circumscribed within certain "limits of tolerance" established by media owners. (1975: 282) Lewin's "gatekeeper" concept is utilized to describe not only the selection of news, but also the selection of people: key editorial personnel who share an ideological affinity with owners. Hence ideological power is ultimately located at the ownership level.

While the media production process and media products have remained relatively uncharted fields of investigation in Canada, there is a considerable amount of data regarding the ownership element. Porter first documented the pattern of ownership concentration for 1961, based largely on the Board of Broadcast Governors (B.B.G.) hearings of 1960, clearly demonstrating the many linkages between the "captains" of the media industry and other sectors of the corporate world, while Clement identified the group of dominant media entrepreneurs

as a vital segment of the Canadian capitalist class. The mass media industry in Canada has traditionally been dominated by a few families firmly established in the upper class, in the grand style of classical family capitalism. Of the seventeen conglomerates presently dominant in the industry (see Chapter 3), in at least ten cases control remains tightly concentrated within those few families who long ago established a tradition of media power in Canada. The Southam family's media empire, for example, was founded in 1877, the Hunters' in 1887, the Siftons' in 1889, and the Atkinsons' in 1899. This historical pattern of media control is so outstanding a feature of Canadian media history that it can scarcely be disregarded in any consideration of the operation of media production and ideological reproduction here.

Elements of the Relation: Ownership of the Means of Media Production

There are many reasons why the ownership element of the media-ideology relation requires analysis. A wealth of evidence suggests that the ownership and control of Canadian media by a historically entrenched segment of the capitalist class is not merely a coincidental empirical fact, certainly not one that can be discarded in charting the operation of bourgeois ideology in Canada.

In the first place, there is evidence to suggest that dominant media capitalists regard themselves as significant in this respect. As Porter points out (1965: 482), the pattern of

generational continuity that characterizes the media ownership structure suggests that Canada's media families see their newspapers, radio stations, television stations, etc., as enterprises which perform important public functions, and (for this and other reasons) are reluctant to let them pass out of family control. The extent to which these families take pride in their media properties has in fact been the subject of several biographical works; for example, Charles Bruce's News and the Southams (1968), in which the author writes:

The company (Southam Press Limited) (believes) in certain principles for any newspaper: accurate news content, fair editorial comment, availability of advertising space to any purchaser subject to considerations of truthfulness, decency, and the public interest. Each Southam newspaper (tries) to live up to the best traditions of newspaper publishing. So (does) the company - not by interference with the individual papers, but by establishing standards of personnel for each.

(1968: 373; emphasis added)

The interests of the Southams, the Bassetts, etc., in retaining control of their media properties is also evident in the fact that control of each dominant complex is typically based on majority shareholdings, and that control is in most cases directly exercised by family members. In those cases where shares are publicly offered, ownership has not been diluted as a result. The death of Donald Hunter in 1976, for example, signified the end of a ninety year tradition whereby John Bayne McLean and then the Hunter family exercised direct control of those media held through the largest (in terms of

total media outlets controlled) complex in Canada. Recent developments in the ownership structure of Canadian media add momentum to this trend (see Chapter 4). The trend towards media ownership concentration has accelerated very rapidly throughout the 1970s; the dominant complexes continue to increase their media properties and other capitalists increasingly acquire media interests.

Moreover, media capitalists in Canada are scarcely removed from the media production process. Media owners frequently act simultaneously in the position of publisher or station manager; there is a considerable degree of overlap between owners, managers, and editors (see Chapter 5). The Maclean-Hunter complex illustrates this well (see Chapter 3); its board is predominantly composed of individuals who also act as its major publishers and editors.

It is clear that the dominant media capitalists have long retained a pride, a central interest, and (often) a direct role in their Canadian media operations. It follows that it is in their interests to exercise discretion in selecting individuals to operate those media enterprises where owners are not directly active. Porter illustrates this point:

The ownership group in their selection of personnel to run their newspapers and periodicals (etc.) have to concern themselves not only with technical competence, but also with ideological acceptability, which means sharing the attitudes and values of the owners.

(1972: 154)

The passage pertaining to the Southam complex cited earlier also illustrates this point. The recruitment process is critical to the maintenance of ideological continuity throughout the individual publishing and broadcasting outlets. Media capitalists tend to select individuals who are ideologically acceptable in terms of their demonstrated loyalty to the owners' standards and values. Typically those appointed are individuals who have worked for the complex for a lengthy period, and throughout their career demonstrated their ability to function well within the limits of corporate standards and editorial policies. Their ideological acceptability can be assessed in terms of their past performance, their class position, their political affiliation, their attitudes and values, and their formal and informal interactions with the controlling group or family. Often editors and station managers are long-time associates, friends, or relatives of the controlling family.

To summarize, several factors point to the significance of the ownership element of the media-ideology relation: 1) the pattern of generational continuity in media ownership and control; 2) the tendency for control to remain concentrated, and based on majority shareholdings; 3) the accelerated rate of acquisition in recent periods; 4) the degree of replication between owners, editors, and station managers; 5) the nature of recruitment procedures for selecting editorial and managerial staff; and 6) the direct and indirect participation of media capitalists in the operation of their media outlets.

It is vital, therefore, that the ownership element be included in the analysis of the media-ideology relation. At the same time, those analyses that deal strictly with this element, and which attempt to account for ideological reproduction through the mass media strictly in terms of this element, suffer a number of serious limitations. Firstly, this framework is insufficient to explain the consistent and necessary reproduction of ideological themes that is inherent in the nature of media production, in light of the relatively inactive role of media capitalists. Secondly, it is unable to account for the reproduction of bourgeois ideological themes through those (albeit few) media outlets that are ultimately controlled by individuals and companies unrelated to the capitalist class, like, for example, small rural and weekly newspapers, television stations operated by middle class professional associations, and other lesser media enterprises. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, it is difficult within this framework to account for those media operated by the state (in this case, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's radio and television networks), unless one adheres to instrumentalist notions of the state and its operations, and these, it will be seen, hold little weight where the relation between dominant media capitalists and the Canadian state is concerned. There is, therefore, a definitive need to complement this analysis with a consideration of the two other elements of the media-ideology relation: the process and the product of media production.

Elements of the Relation: The Social Relations of Media
Production

Few studies have addressed the problem of the media production process to any extent. Warren Breed's early study of "Social Control in the Newsroom" (1955) is perhaps a classic in this field. On the basis of interviews with newspaper journalists, Breed identified an underlying structure of control which effectively diminishes the possibility of deviations from policy norms and editors' expectations. "Policy" was broadly defined as "the more or less consistent orientation shown by a paper, not only in its editorial but in its news columns as well, concerning selected issues and events." (1955: 327) Policy conformity was found to be maintained by six basic factors: 1) the use of formal authority and sanctions, with a tendency to assign controversial stories to "safe" reporters; 2) feelings of obligation and esteem towards superiors; 3) the journalists' personal desires for career advancement; 4) the lack of any alternative group allegiance to support deviance; 5) the gratifications of remaining in the in-group of the newsroom; and 6) news handled according to policy becomes a value in itself. Consequently, journalists new to the newspaper are "socialized" into policy norms in such a way that their personal and ethical values are typically compromised. The ultimate result, according to Breed, is to maintain existing power relations within the larger society since "policy usually protects property and class interests." (1955: 335) Breed's

conclusions are supported by the work of White (1950), Gieber (1956, 1964), and Blumler (1969).

It is significant that "obligation and esteem towards superiors" and more specifically, "knowledge of the characteristics, interests and affiliations of their executives" (1955: 335), was found to be the most influential variable. These findings are not incompatible with those who stress the key role of owners; Breed simply identifies a further level at which the control process filters through. In a sense this supports the "gatekeeper" position: it provides some further documentation of the consequences (ideological and other) of the selection of "ideologically acceptable" publishers and editors, publishers and editors whose "standards" are transmitted "down through the ranks," whose enforcement of "the rules of appropriate ideological discourse" is the pivotal point of conjuncture between those who own the means of media production (media capitalists) and the "true" producers (journalists, and presumably also, broadcasters or broadcast journalists). Thus ideological enforcement becomes diffused throughout the organization and instituted through a set of socialization procedures that become practice for all newspapers (and presumably for all media enterprises). The same problem, however, remains: while the gatekeeper position may explain how ideological discourse is confined (within the "boundaries" or "limits of tolerance" established by media capitalists) through the mass media, it does not explain how a particular, dominant, bourgeois

ideology is reproduced through the operations of the mass media.

In order to understand how ideology is reproduced, it is necessary to look beyond the problem of the ownership of the means of media production to that of the social relations or social practices and the product of media production. Is it ~~X~~ possible, given the size, complexity, and bureaucratization of contemporary media organizations, to fully guard the "boundaries" of ideological discourse? Or are there other operative forces which ensure that the "limits of tolerance" are not breached? While Breed has identified some of these forces, little attention has been directed towards the actual procedures used and the rule-sets followed during the production of media material. It is these that constitute the "social practices of media production." The study of the social practices of media production leads quite logically to the study of media products, in the sense that it becomes possible to identify the operative forces within the process of production, and, on this basis, to follow their "transfer" to the actual media material, the final product, or end result of the production process.

The work of Stuart Hall and others,⁹ for the British case, has laid some important groundwork for the analysis of these two elements of the media-ideology relation. Their analyses utilize elements of semiology, structuralism, linguistics, and, to some extent, cultural anthropology. The utility of the material is, however, hampered by its lack of a clear formulation or theorization of the media-ideology relation. Nevertheless, it

will be useful to briefly illustrate the approach, since it makes possible the (potential) integration of all three elements of the relation, thus paving the way for a comprehensive explanation of both how, and in whose interests, ideological reproduction takes place within the social orbit of mass communications.

For the purposes of illustrating the approach, and considering its potential integration into a viable model, the discussion will be limited to the production of news, primarily since this has been the major object of the studies. At the same time, it will be seen that it carries application for all forms of communicative material. In order to outline the substance of the position, it will be necessary to consider these concepts: "formal news values," "ideological news values," and "dominant or preferred readings." Because the analysis of process and product are interrelated, the discussion will need to be complemented with a consideration of the methodological principles of "structural analysis." The subsequent discussion of the product of media production will relate this to the possibilities for an ideological analysis of the message, through a comparison of traditional content analysis and structural analysis.

The process of selecting and producing material for presentation and the constitution of "news" is at the core of the analyses. News is regarded as fundamentally a product, the product of a social practice. News production is both a social practice and a particular type of commodity production, with attendant social relations of production. It entails the primary

manufacture of news and the secondary manufacture of ideology.¹⁰ It meets Althusser's criteria in that it consists of "the transformation of a determinate given raw material into a determinate product ... effected by a determinate human labour using determinate means of production." (Hall, 1972: 54) The social construction of news, like other types of ideological reproduction, is institutionalized within a set of distinct apparatuses, and the process whereby historical occurrences become transformed into news commodities takes place within a set of social practices; these practices consist of the types of work required to translate the new material of social life into the finished commodity as it appears in the newspaper or in the broadcast news programme. (Hall, 1972: 60) In essence, then, news production (and media production in general) easily qualifies as a particular type of commodity production: it includes and requires particular types of labour, instruments of production, etc., and it takes place according to a set of institutionalized procedures and practices. Most importantly, the production process requires the processing of a raw material (the "event" or "events" of everyday life) into a finished product (the news item).

It is during this process of transformation that the ideological ingredients are added. Indeed, the ideological blend occurs prior to the transformation, since the subject of the news item must first be selected: one must first decide what is "newsworthy," which of the available raw materials of everyday occurrences will be processed. For Hall, this is the

moment at which ideology first comes into play, for it is precisely in the course of deciding, from among the limitless number of potential news items, what shall constitute "news" for a given day, that those in a position to decide and determine the "news" must make at least implicit reference to some pre-formulated criteria of the significant. The decision is based on one's common stock-of-knowledge as to "what passes as news in our society;" it "rests on inferred knowledge about the audience, (and) inferred assumptions about society."¹¹ (Hall, 1973: 86) These informal "theories" function through a set of professional routines or practices that find their conclusion at the point where transformation is complete, that is, with the finished news commodity. "News values" thus refer to "those professional/operational practices which allow an editor ... to select, rank, classify, and contextualize the (item) within his stock-of-knowledge as to what constitutes the news." (Hall, 1972: 63)

Hence the wheels of ideological reproduction are set in motion at the very first stage of production. However, this ideological directive, this "inferred knowledge," operates as a guideline, or what Hall has referred to as an "ideological compass," throughout the production process. In other words, once the act of selection is complete, this "inferred knowledge" will continue to guide the preparation of the news item or news commodity. It will decide "what are the significant 'facts'" or "what is significant about this event" or "what needs to be known;" these decisions, in turn, will rest on one's sense of "what is already

known:"

'What is already known' is not a set of neutral facts. It is a set of common-sense constructions and ideological interpretations about the world, which holds society together at the level of everyday beliefs.

(Hall, 1972: 78)

There are two sets of news values that will be operative in the production process: "formal" news values and "ideological" news values. Hall describes their interaction in the following quotation, worth citing at length, since it highlights the relation between news values and the broader ideological themes of the social formation:

Formal news values belong to the world and discourse of the newspaper, to newsmen (sic) as a professional group, to the institutional apparatuses of newsmaking. Ideological news values belong to the realm of moral-political discourse in the society as such. Ideological themes will be inflected in different ways according to the particular construction which each newspaper selects. This inflection will, in turn, be governed by the newspaper's policy, political orientation, its presentational values, its tradition and self-image. But behind the particular inflections of a particular news 'angle' lie, not only the 'formal' values as to 'what passes as news in our society,' but the ideological themes of the society itself ... It is this double articulation - formal news values/ideological treatment - which binds the inner discourse of the newspaper to the ideological universe of the society. It is via this double articulation that the institutional world of the newspaper, whose manifest function is the profitable exchange of news values, is harnessed to the latent function of reproducing 'in dominance' the major ideological themes of society.

(Hall, 1972: 73-75; original emphasis)

What are the points of divergence or possibilities for diversity in the inflection of ideological themes? It would

seem that there are at least two points at which divergence can occur, or on which diversity will depend: 1) the extent to which variations in policy, orientation, presentational values, etc., will determine variations in the particular inflection that is favoured; and 2) the extent to which "news producers" subscribe to the dominant ideological themes, and incorporate within their world-views a particular interpretation of the social order that fits with the official interpretation. Hall's model does not assume that particular policies, presentational values, or ideological stances on the part of news producers will prevail. It leaves open the question of the likely consequences for ideological diversity, at least at this stage of the analysis. It seems probable that variation (1) will be significant where there are identifiably distinct differences between media outlets in terms of their orientation and tradition; for example, distinctions between "quality" and "tabloid" newspapers. The report of a sexual crime, for example, will no doubt mean presentational differences between the Toronto Globe & Mail and the Toronto Sun; it is likely that presentational values will affect, for each case, those aspects of the event that are deemed "significant" or "newsworthy," and this will no doubt be reflected in the focus, length, scope, and positioning of the news item; however, it is unlikely that distinctively opposing ideological themes will be invoked. This type of potential variation is therefore one that can only occur at a superficial level; it will not pose fundamental problems for the implied or recommended interpretation of the event.¹²

Variation (2), however, has this potential. If the news producer subscribes to a particular interpretation of the social order that contradicts or opposes the dominant one, there is, in this case, the potential for disruptive inflections. In the same vein, variation (1) is potentially disruptive if the newspaper's policy or orientation has been established in such a way that it opposes or counters the dominant ideological themes. Each becomes an empirical question. The most favourable conditions for the insured reproduction of the dominant interpretation would seem to require that, firstly, the newspapers operate according to policies, orientations, etc., that are favourable to the dominant ideological forces, and secondly, that news producers subscribe more or less faithfully to the dominant mode of ideological discourse. Since Hall would agree that bourgeois ideology is reproduced and renewed consistently and systematically and primarily through the productive mechanisms of the mass media, an immediate problem is posed: how do these conditions arise, and how are these conditions ensured? How is it that news producers "happen" to more or less consistently subscribe to the dominant interpretation, and how is it that "policy" and "orientation" are typically favourable to bourgeois ideological reproduction, and, by extension, to the interests of the bourgeois class? To respond adequately, the ownership element must be inserted: it becomes the task of those who own the means of media production to ensure that policy, orientation, and the ideological allegiances of news producers are favourable to bourgeois hegemony. To suggest or imply that their adherence to the dominant ideology

"coincidentally" meets with the owners' favour, is to allow the possibility that alternative or oppositional interpretations could be held, interpretations that could well conflict with the official one, and this, in turn, would presumably be reflected in the finished news commodity. Why does this not occur to any significant extent? Hall's implication needs clarification, especially in light of his discussions of the systematic invocation of "dominant" or "preferred readings."

To understand the contention that particular connotations are "dominant" or "preferred," it is first necessary to consider the distinctions between the denotative and connotative levels of signification. These concepts are rooted in the work of Roland Barthes and his identification of the different levels of signification within the communicative material or within the message.¹³ Signification is made possible through the use of a particular "code" or "codes." The code consists of a set of principles or rules which organize meaning within a particular construction. Codes are required for the selection and organization of the "signs" that comprise the message. The code is operative both in terms of the production of the message ("encoding") and in terms of its reception ("decoding"). In each instance a code or codes are required. Where a message is produced through the use of one code for a group that receives the message utilizing a different code, the message will be understood in an entirely different or "unintended" way. Eco (1972) refers to this as "aberrant decoding." In order to carry meaning, the message must be composed of signs that are

selected and organized on the basis of a code. This is best illustrated through a consideration of the two major types of codes, denotative and connotative, and their relation to the levels of signification.

Denotative codes are "precise, literal, unambiguous" (Hall, 1972: 64); the example frequently used to illustrate the distinction between denotative codes and the more complex connotative codes is that of the photographic image of a sweater. At one level, the sweater means/is/denotes a particular article of clothing that is readily distinguishable from other articles of clothing; it is not a coat, it is not a hat, etc. Connotative codes are less precise and less definitive: "sweater" may connote "keeping warm," "a warm garment," and by extension, "a cold day," "the arrival of winter," etc. Within particular contexts, it may connote "a casual style of dress" (within the specialized discourse of the fashion industry) or a "long autumn walk in the woods" (within the domain of romantic discourse). The particular connotation that is suggested, therefore, will depend upon the "context of meaning and association" within which the object is placed. (Hall, 1972: 64) Each particular domain of discourse can be regarded as a "subcode" that is utilized in the decoding process.

The sign must first denote before connotation can take place; it must be "denotatively signified," that is, the object must be denoted before connotations can add qualities and attributes to the denoted object. More critically, connotations refer objects to one's routinized knowledge of the social formation,

to a structure of ideas and valuations about the social world. (Hall, 1972: 65) The connotative level of signification is therefore the more critical one for ideological reproduction; it is this level that carries the greater ideological significance.

The denotative level of the sign is relatively "closed," its meaning is fixed, while the connotative level is open and polysemic. In Hall's words "all signs are potentially mappable into more than one connotative configuration." (1973: 13) What then is the relation between connotative codes, a necessary aspect of all communicative material, and ideological reproduction? Firstly, it should be stressed that the polysemic nature of connotative codes is not to be confused with pluralism:

Any society/culture tends, with varying degrees of closure, to impose its segmentations, its classifications, of the social and cultural and political world, upon its members. There remains a dominant cultural order, though it is neither univocal nor uncontested. This question of the 'structure of dominance' in a culture is an absolutely crucial point. We may say, then, that the different areas of social life appear to be mapped out into connotative domains of dominant or preferred meanings.

(Hall, 1973: 13; original emphasis)

The word/image "pig," for example, denotes a particular animal: a pig is a pig is a pig. At the connotative level, the word/image "pig" may signify "a useful animal that produces meat, bacon, etc." (the dominant or preferred connotation) or, alternatively, it may signify "police officer." Again, this will depend upon the context of association within which the message is contained, and the codes used to produce (encode) the message. Since the connotative codes utilized by the encoder are culture-

specific and based in the available domains of interpretation, rooted in a common stock-of-knowledge, it follows that, where the encoder subscribes to the dominant interpretation, a particular connotation will emerge as dominant or preferred. Hall describes the process and its implications for the analysis of the ideological component:

New, problematic, or troubling things and events, which breach our expectancies and run counter to our 'common-sense constructs,' to our 'taken-for-granted' knowledge of social structures, must be assigned to their connotational domains before they can be said to 'make sense:' and the most common way of 'mapping them' is to assign the new within some domain or other of the existing 'maps of problematic social reality.' We say dominant, not 'determined,' because it is always possible to order, classify, assign and decode an event within more than one 'mapping.' But we say 'dominant' because there exists a pattern of 'preferred readings,' and these mappings both have the institutional/political /ideological order imprinted in them, and have themselves become institutionalized.

(1973: 13-14; emphasis added)

If it is possible, as Hall suggests, to decode an event within more than one "mapping," is it not also possible to encode an event within more than one "mapping"? Are not both encoder and decoder limited in their possibilities by the same available range of domains of meaning or sets of connotative codes? How is the dominant reading sustained, and what are the conditions under which it is susceptible to defeat?

While these issues require greater clarification, it is clear that the basic concepts and principles of structural analysis provide the basis for a truly ideological investigation of media material that relates the ideological component of media messages

to ideological forces operative in the larger social formation. This is its singular most important contribution to the understanding of the media-ideology relation. What is even more critical, this approach makes it possible to analyze the operation of media production/ideological reproduction within the context of the ideological climate of the society at large; in other words, it makes possible (and requires) an analysis that is historically and culturally specific, thus true to Gramsci's proposals for a dialectical analysis of the political. It becomes possible, then, to relate ideological change, periods of crisis, moments at which social forces provoke a rupture within the consensus, etc., to their concrete expression within the media discourse.

Elements of the Relation: The Product of Media Production

The tools for such an analysis are to be found within the methodological procedures of "immanent structural analysis."¹⁴ While still at its early stages of development, this mode of analysis constitutes a radical departure from traditional content analyses of the Berelson genre. For our purposes here, it will be useful to briefly illustrate the distinctiveness of structural analysis and its utility for the empirical investigation of the third facet of the media-ideology relation: the media product.

It is vital to stress that the term "content analysis" refers to one specific method of analysis and not to any general attempt to analyze the content of communicative material. Structural

analysis is a second method, less well established, for the analysis of media products. Content analysis is the traditional method, which consists of first establishing specific categories of communication content and then documenting (where possible, and typically, quantitatively) the presence, absence, or recurrence (frequency) of these categories. Berelson defines it as "a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication." (1971: 18) It is concerned with the manifest content or the denotative level of the message. Classificatory units of analysis (the categories) are determined initially, in accordance with one's hypothesis. This construction of a system of categories is both a prerequisite and a limitation of the technique.

Phillip Stone develops a computerized mode of content analysis and defines it as "a research technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics within the text." (1966: 5) The quantitative nature of the data collection and its "objective and systematic" analysis through computerized means each render this methodology appropriate to legitimate scientific investigation (presumably). The words "objective," "systematic," and "quantitative" consistently recur in definitions of content analysis (see also Kaplan, 1943; Kaplan and Goldsen, 1949; Sargent and Saenger, 1947).

Berelson discusses three basic assumptions of content analysis (1971: 18-20): firstly, content analysis assumes that inferences about the relationship between intent and content or between content and effect can be validly made, or the actual

relationships established, yet in his words "most studies have been limited to inferences" (1971: 18); secondly, it assumes that the study of manifest content is meaningful: "the content analyst assumes that the 'meanings' which he ascribes to the content, by assigning it to certain categories, correspond to the 'meanings' intended by the communicator and/or understood by the audience. In other words, the assumption is that there is a common universe of discourse among the relevant parties" (1971: 19); thirdly, it assumes that the quantitative description of communication content is meaningful. The last assumption simply does not hold for the study of the ideological component of the media message. To count column inches or to calculate the average number of attributive adjectives per one hundred verbs in a text (see Berelson, 1971: 68 with reference to Boder's analysis) is to misconstrue and "systematically" miss the ideological message.

Nor would it appear that content analysis is in any way adaptable to this purpose. Unfortunately for the ideological analyst, ideology does not present itself in a quantitative, or quantifiable, form. Moreover, what further rules out content analysis for this purpose is its limited focus on the denotative aspect of the message, whereas ideology is to be located at the connotative level, a level that is by definition, excluded from the attention of content analysts. Its very methodology and its fundamental methodological assumptions preclude the possibilities for an "ideological reading;" note Berelson's admonitions: "by definition, content analysis calls for the

quantification of content elements" (1971: 135); "content analysis stands or falls by its categories" (1971: 147); and "by definition, content analysis must be objective." (1971: 171)

The quantitative/qualitative dichotomy is the critical distinction between content analysis and structural analysis.

In Burgelin's words:

Traditional analysis of the content is essentially quantitative. Whatever its ultimate aim, its purpose is to endeavour always to proceed by enumeration of the items ... On the contrary, structural analysis numbers only exceptionally ... Moreover, nothing indicates that what reappears most frequently might be most important or most significative, because a text is, evidently, a structured internal totality where the place of each element is more important than their number.

(cited in de Camargo: 125;
original emphasis)

Structural analysis is not strictly based on fragmented components of the message; it regards the message as a structured whole. Its object is the connotative level of signification, wherein ideology is present; for this reason, it is better able to provide the base for the ideological analysis of the message. The method of "ideological reading," which emerges as the final stage of structural analysis (and, to date, the least developed stage) is concerned with the implicit or non-manifest organization of the message. The identification of the various levels of signification, the context of associations within which the message is situated, the possible range or horizon of meanings that are called upon for the purposes of decoding, the preferred reading that is invoked, are the critical tasks that lead to

the final stage of ideological analysis:

The analysis will be ideologically significant when the structures of signification depicted in the social communication can be linked with conflict processes inside society as a whole. This type of 'reading' should reveal the ideological systems in society, or the ideological forms which organize this society.

(de Camargo, 1972: 133)

The Process of Media Production/Ideological Reproduction

The attempt to integrate the three elements that have been identified into a working model that can be utilized to analyze concretely the process of media production/ideological reproduction is hindered by the problematic of the relation between the dominant ideology and the dominant class. The role of the dominant class vis-a-vis the ideological reproduction process needs to be made explicit in order that its role in the process of media production can be understood. In the final analysis, the problem is precisely that of the relation between the dominant class and the state. This problem has created a theoretical impasse at which instrumentalists and structuralists stand opposed. Similarly, these two theories, or better, theoretical adjuncts, are reflected in alternate interpretations of the relation between the dominant ideology and the dominant class, and in alternate readings of the concept of hegemony.

The first of these is the instrumentalist or "literal" reading of hegemony, which is expressed by Miliband, and which

reads the relation as one of direct control, by the dominant class, of the dominant ideological institutions:

Gramsci, it may be recalled, saw the establishment and perpetuation of ideological hegemony as primarily the task of the dominant classes and of the cultural institutions they controlled ... the 'engineering of consent' in capitalist society is still largely an unofficial private enterprise, in fact largely the business of private enterprise.

(1969: 165; emphasis added)

The literal reading of Gramsci's concept follows, of course, from a literal reading of Marx's statement cited earlier. With a strong implication for the role of the dominant class in media production, Miliband adds that:

... whatever else the immense output of the mass media is intended to achieve, it is also intended to help prevent the development of class consciousness in the working class, and to reduce as much as possible any hankering it might have for a radical alternative to capitalism. The ways in which this is attempted are endlessly different ... But the fact remains that 'the class which has the means of material production at its disposal' does have 'control at the same time of the means of mental production;' and that it does seek to use them for the weakening of opposition to the established order.

(1977: 50; emphasis added)

Sallach (1974) echoes this position with specific reference to mass media, reviews the salient literature, and concludes that there is substantial support for what is read as Gramsci's position that:

The dominant class uses its privileged access to ideological institutions to propagate values which reinforce its structural position. Such propagation involves not only the inculcation of its values and the censorship of heterodox views but also and especially the ability to define the parameters of legitimate discussion and debate over alternative beliefs, values, and world views. Actually, censorship and direct inculcation are extreme instances in the hegemonic process ... The most effective aspect of hegemony is found in the suppression of alternative views through the establishment of parameters which define what is legitimate, reasonable, sane, practical, good, true, and beautiful.

(1974: 41; original emphasis)

The instrumentalist reading, translated to the problem of media production/ideological reproduction, leads to a focus on the ownership element, and is reflected in the attempt to determine the mechanisms through which the "boundaries" (Porter, 1965) or "parameters" (Sallach, 1974) or "limits of tolerance" (Clement, 1975) are established and enforced. Ownership of the means of media production/ideological reproduction is therefore the major object of analysis.

The structuralist or "metaphorical" reading is reflected in Hall et al's assessment of Gramsci's politics, where it is concluded that "ideas are not expressive of classes, but comprise a field in which class conflict takes place in particular forms." (1977: 51) This is perhaps better termed the "structuralist appropriation" of Gramsci's concept of hegemony; it is signified in Poulantzas' statement that "the dominant ideology is not the ideology of the dominant class, but the ideology of a social whole in which a certain class is dominant" and in Mepham's premise that

... the bourgeois class is the producer of ideas only in the sense that sleep is the producer of dreams ... It is not the bourgeois class that produces ideas but bourgeois society.

(1974: 100; original emphasis)

Thus the social relations of media production become the major object of analysis. While the structuralist position is nowhere explicitly stated, it seems clear that the ownership element is dismissed as negligible in Hall's analyses, where the implication is that bourgeois ideology operates independently of the bourgeois class. It posits media capitalists in a state of total abstinence from the process of media production/ideological reproduction. This is highly problematic for the present analysis.

Nevertheless, it has been suggested that there are points of complementarity between the two levels of analysis. To illustrate this, it will be useful to first restate the weaknesses of the gatekeeper position. There are three major limitations to this position, which holds that those who own and control the means of media production establish the boundaries or parameters of ideological discourse primarily through the selection of ideologically acceptable editorial personnel and through other means of direct and indirect participation in the operation of media outlets. The first problem is that this undermines the weight of ideological enforcement; it does not, for example, explain the procedures through which bourgeois ideology is reproduced in concrete (media) practice, nor does it account for the necessary relation between social communication and ideological exchange. Secondly, it becomes difficult to account for those

lesser outlets that do not fall under the controlling wing of the dominant media capitalists, that fall outside their immediate jurisdiction. Thirdly, the gatekeeper position suffers for a theorization of state media. This is especially imperative for Canada since the C.B.C. functions as a major radio and television network. It will be seen that instrumentalist theories will not suffice to rectify this problem for the Canadian case. The fundamental problem is this: how does the ideological acceptability of pre-selected editorial personnel become translated into "appropriate" communicative material? Is it possible, realistically, that this appropriateness can be fully guarded?

Hall's analyses of the social relations of media production suggest that this supervision need not be fully implemented. It seems more likely that media production/ideological reproduction should be understood as a social process that operates over and above the particular actions of particular class agents. At the same time, it was suggested that, in order for media production to follow a course favourable to bourgeois hegemony, some "checks" are required. In other words, neither the analysis of the ownership of the means of media production nor of the social relations of media production is in itself fully capable of rendering understandable the reproduction of bourgeois ideology through the mass media. However, it is possible to interlock the strengths and weaknesses of each approach in such a way as to remedy their respective inadequacies.

This still leaves the problem of the relation between the dominant ideology and the dominant class unspecified. For the purposes of this analysis, it will be assumed that Hall's model of the reproduction of bourgeois ideology through the social relations of media production is essentially valid. It is not possible, within the limits of this thesis, to demonstrate this definitively, since the concern here rests more with the problem of in whose interests this reproduction takes place, and the mechanisms through which it is sustained.

It is assumed, then, that the process of ideological reproduction, as it takes place with the social orbit of mass media institutions, follows this "relatively independent" course. Indeed, Hall et al suggest that the "relatively independent" status of the mass media institution itself is significant for ideological reproduction and consent management:

If we consider the media in homologous terms (with the State), we can see that they, too, do some service to the maintenance of hegemony, precisely by providing a 'relatively independent' and neutral sphere. And when we ask what it is that, in its overall tendency, the media reproduces of the ideological field as a whole by its occupancy of this neutral sphere, we would argue that it is certainly not the giving of narrow party-advantage to this or that side: it is the whole neutral terrain of State power - the underlying idea of the general interest - which is the most significant part of the ideological field which the media reproduces. And this reproduction is accomplished, not in spite of its rules of objectivity (i.e. by 'covert or overt bias') but precisely by holding fast to the communicative forms of objectivity, neutrality, impartiality, and balance.

In other words, like the state as a whole, the institution of mass media presents itself as the representative of "the public interest" (in Gramsci's terms, "the 'national' energies;" in bourgeois ideological terms, "the public defender," "the fourth estate," etc.), while at the same time, like the state as a whole, mystifying the class interests that it represents. It will be seen that similar parallels can be made for the C.R.T.C. (see Chapter 6).

The problem of the "relative independence" of the capitalist state, and, by extension, of the "relative independence" of its ideological institutions, ultimately calls for the empirical analysis of concrete cases. Since, in the Canadian case, both public and private media institutions fall within the perimeters of Gramsci's "relatively independent" state, it follows that this same relation must also describe its component parts; in this case, the mass media of both political and civil society. At the same time, however, the capitalist class, where it is hegemonic as well as dominant, retains control of the means of ideological reproduction in order to insure (not ensure, since their interests can never be fully ensured) the representation of its interests. This is the case at least for the media institutions of civil society, the private media, which, unlike the institutions of political society, are, in Gramsci's words, "left to the private initiatives of the ruling class." (1971: 259)

To tie this concretely to the present analysis, it will be argued that media capitalists, those who own the means of media production, are therefore required to act purely as latent

overseers or, crudely, night watchmen vis-a-vis their private media operations.

It goes without saying that much of the argument must, at this stage, remain at the level of supposition. Utilizing Gramsci's model and (in part) its structuralist appropriations, it will be feasible here to simply determine the significance of public and private mass media ownership and control: the role of the media institutions of political society and the role of media capitalists within the media institutions of civil society.

The Significance of the Ownership Element

The purpose of this chapter has been to formulate the problematic within which the thesis proceeds, and to delineate the assumptions on which the analysis is based. Having outlined this grandiose analytical scheme, it can now be said that the present analysis is far less ambitious, excluding the major considerations that have been discussed. Nevertheless, particular Gramscian concepts, including the "compromise equilibrium," the "relative independence" of the state, the significance of "homogeneity," and the notion of the ideological convergence of public and private ideological forces, will be utilized and their application for the Canadian case considered. It will be demonstrated that 1) the ownership of the private mass media, that is, the media of civil society, is tightly concentrated within the hands of a relatively limited number of individuals

who are identified as dominant media capitalists; 2) that the dominant media capitalists exhibit particular characteristics that suggest their homogeneity; 3) that extensive intercorporate linkages between the dominant media complexes underline the ramifications of this homogeneity; 4) that the dominant media capitalists play a significant yet relatively inactive role in their private media operations; 5) that, while their ideological convergence with the private media cannot be empirically affirmed within the scope of this analysis, the media institutions of political society (in this case, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation radio and television networks) can be said to complement their private counterparts at the economic level; and 6) that this complementarity reflects the administration and implementation of a "compromise equilibrium" within which a further state institution, the Canadian Radio-television Telecommunications Commission (C.R.T.C.), plays a critical organizational role.

Since the ownership element of the media-ideology relation is the starting point of inquiry, it is inevitable that much of the analysis is rooted in a set of assumptions that must be considered fundamentally instrumentalist in nature. Alternatively, were the thesis to deal primarily with the social relations and product elements, its procedures would be considered fundamentally structuralist in nature. Yet the argument here has been precisely that the three levels of analysis need to be integrated into a model that recognizes the futility of these

rigid theoretical dichotomies, at least where the process of ideological reproduction is concerned, and that, while the analysis of social relations and product can disclose the practico-social operation of the process, the significance of the ownership element, or what Murdock and Golding (1973) term the political economy element, cannot be dismissed or undermined. To the contrary, it is indeed possible to identify a critical relation between the ownership and control of mass media and the process of media production/ideological reproduction. This is the most important task for the present analysis.

There is little space here to consider the organization of the media discourse, the institutionalized practices and procedures that shape the media production process and its ideological by-products. However, it has been suggested that in order for the social relations of media production to be organized in a manner that will make possible and allow for the continued reproduction of bourgeois ideology, (at least) two conditions must be met: firstly, that the tradition and orientation of media enterprises be established according to principles that are congruent with the requirements of bourgeois hegemony; and secondly, that media producers possess, and utilize through their professional practices, sets of assumptions, interpretations, etc., that are also congruent with the requirements of bourgeois hegemony. It has been further suggested that one means of understanding the significance of media ownership is to relate these conditions to the

activities of media owners; in other words, to consider that the establishment of favourable orientations and the recruitment of media producers with favourable ideological positions, are in fact two important responsibilities that media owners hold.

Inevitably, there are difficulties to be encountered in any attempt to identify the operation of these and other forms of "ideological control." While strictly "economic" control (control of the regular corporate activities that media enterprises share in common with all other capitalist enterprises) can be determined in a relatively simple methodological fashion (see Chapter 4), it cannot be equated or confused with ideological control; the latter cannot ever be assumed. At the same time, the ideological power of media capitalists can be legitimately asserted, since power is always potential power; that is, power is intrinsic to particular positions and individuals who hold such positions must therefore be said to have ideological power. The extent to which media owners exercise this (potential) power is a distinct question, a distinct empirical question (and one that is addressed in Chapter 5). Nevertheless, the very position of media capitalists does accord to them the prerogative to oversee, direct, or in whatever manner, take part in the media production process, and therefore this role needs explication.

It will first be useful to consider the development of the mass media in Canada, and to extract, wherever possible, historical instances that point to the significance of both media capitalists and the state for the emergence of the present

structure of the media industry. This constitutes the subject of the following chapter.

Notes

1. Gramsci's concept of "common sense" has a specific meaning and is not, of course, to be confused with its bourgeois usage, which is termed "good sense."

2. One example is that of driving along a street or highway. It is assumed that one is safe to drive along the right-hand side of the road, that others, driving in the opposite direction, will follow the same procedure, so that collision is avoided. This assumption, which is part of one's common stock-of-knowledge as to "how the social world works," need not be articulated at a conscious level each time one sets out to drive. It is "common sense." At the same time, it pertains to a particular society or societies (the same assumption would not hold in England, for example) at a particular point in historical time.

3. Anderson (1977: 15-18) traces the history of the term to the early writings of Plekhanov in 1883-84 and documents its development through to Lenin, at which point it first entered the realm of common parlance. On this basis, Anderson argues that Gramsci's creation of the concept as a theoretical unit is a "widespread illusion." Gramsci in fact acknowledges Lenin's popularization of the term in the Notebooks (1971: 357); however, Lenin's use of the term "hegemony" in a strictly political sense is scarcely comparable to Gramsci's development of the concept. The two are qualitatively different exercises.

4. Gramsci does make this clear; for example: "for though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity." (1971: 161; emphasis added) Boggs (1976), however (among others), misses this point, and instead defines hegemony solely in terms of its ideological aspects.

5. Anderson (1977) throws doubt on the relation between the state and civil society in Gramsci's writings. Based on a highly selective collection of passages from the Notebooks, he identifies three possible relations between the state and civil society: the state contrasted with civil society, the state encompassing civil society, and the state identical with civil society, and finally decides to perceive the state and civil

society in a relation of "binary opposition." (1977: 25) It is equally possible, however, to select passages which counter Anderson's claims: "But what does that signify if not that by 'State' should be understood not only the apparatus of government, but also the 'private' apparatus of 'hegemony' or civil society?" (1971: 261); "... one might say that State = political society + civil society" (1971: 263); "... the two forms in which the State presents itself in the language and culture of specific epochs, i.e. as civil society and as political society" (1971: 268). Through the extraction of specific passages at random, Anderson fails to position the discussions of the state, civil society, and political society within the exposition of the hegemonic process itself. He does acknowledge that coercion is the prerogative of political society, while the burden of consent rests with (largely) civil society. On this basis, one can only conclude that the two must logically converge to form the state.

6. This, incidentally, is a possibility that few theorists of the state are able to incorporate.

7. See also Stuart Hall et al (1976).

8. "Human societies secrete ideology as the very element and atmosphere indispensable to their historical respiration and life. So ideology is not an aberration or a contingent excrescence of history: it is a structure essential to the historical life of societies." (1969: 232)

9. Hall's work is representative of a relatively large corpus of literature associated with the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham. Much of this material appears in the Working Papers of the Centre, which are published irregularly and, unfortunately, only scarcely available in Canada.

10. Nevertheless, it is the sale of newspapers and not the sale of ideology that produces profit, at least in the short-term, monetary sense. While the ideological operation of newspapers is critical for the ideological level of the social formation, economic considerations will be "determining in the last instance." This point escapes Porter's attention: "the test case would be where capitalists continued to operate newspapers and broadcasting stations at a loss, subsidized from their other activities, to serve their ideological interest. I would think such a case difficult to find." (foreword to Clement, 1975: xiv) Nor is it likely to be found where news production and media production in general operate under the rules of the capitalist mode of production.

11. This recognition is obscured by the separation of "objective" news items and "subjective" editorial items; a consequence of the peculiar form that newspapers take, their structure and their informational divisions. It effectively adds to their ideological efficacy through insisting that news is fact while editorials are opinion, freely expressed in line with liberal ideals. The same is true for the production of television programmes. In Hall's words: "television meets the public requirement that it should not have opinions of its own, that it should not editorialize: while concealing the fact that, since it must constantly select material, edit, mount in sequence, omit, emphasize, link and associate, it cannot help but editorialize. And each single act of selection is saturated by social values and attitudes." (1971: 107; original emphasis)

12. News values, which dictate "what constitutes news in our society," not only reflect a particular adherence to the dominant idea system, but also reflect the associations and concrete allegiances of news producers. Put bluntly, news values also decide "who constitutes news in our society." News practices, like "freebie" journalism, provide added incentives. To take a recent case: the United Auto Workers international convention held in Los Angeles, California, U. S., May 1977 was covered by a single Canadian journalist, representing the Windsor Star. On the other hand, the preview of two new automobile models by Chrysler Corporation in San Diego, California, U. S., December 1977 drew more than a dozen Canadian journalists, including the publisher of the Guelph Mercury, three C.B.C. reporters, one Toronto Sun reporter, and other newspaper and broadcast journalists representing media outlets as far afield as Edmonton and Montreal. Chrysler Corporation paid flight and hotel expenses for all attending journalists (although some did not accept payment); the U.A.W. invited reporters, but did not offer to pay their expenses. The "Canadian content" of the union convention included the union president's attack on the economic policies of the Liberal party in Canada, a speech by the leader of the New Democratic Party in Canada, and an address by the president of the Canadian Labour Congress on the subject of "what labour will do after Trudeau's wage controls are lifted." In terms of the auto preview, neither of the two new models introduced were scheduled to be manufactured in Canada, nor were their parts. See Bannon (1978).

13. See especially the section entitled "Myth Today" in Barthes' Mythologies (1972: 109-59).

14. This term is used by Stuart Hall in "Deviance, Politics, and the Media" (1974: 261-305). For a useful, albeit brief, summary of the distinctions between structural analysis and traditional content analysis, see de Camargo (1972).

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL PATTERNS

It is not our task here to document in detail the full history of mass media in Canada. This discussion is therefore highly selective, while still attempting to include the major developments that have had consequences for the present structure of the mass media industry. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate some of the historical patterns of the state's role in these developments, as well as trends leading to the present configuration of mass media ownership, in order to shed light on those processes in which the state and media owners are key elements.¹

Colonial Origins

The early beginnings of the press in Canada were of a decidedly colonial character. Prior to 1800, there was little to constitute a viable indigenous industry. The seeds of a Canadian newspaper and magazine publishing industry were not only nurtured by, but in fact almost entirely dependent on, the state. Notions of press freedom were superseded by the pure and simple economics of operating a newspaper or magazine in a market characterized by a small, geographically dispersed population, a high illiteracy rate, and consequently, low levels

of circulation. The state more or less subsidized their operation through effectively providing the content of the early papers: policy statements, proclamations, orders, public announcements, legislative enactments, and so on, dominated the pages of the pioneer journals. (Kesterton, 1967: 6) Not surprisingly, criticisms of the colonial government were consistently absent:

Because the printer-editor needed government business, he carefully avoided comment on the conduct of those in authority ... he normally refrained from discussing contentious political issues.

(Kesterton, 1967: 9)

Also characteristic of this period was the (largely unfelt) absence of a Canadian literary community. In addition to those conditions afflicting newspaper publication, Canadian trade book publishers faced the difficulties imposed by a larger and more established American neighbour, the colonial and cultural ties with Britain, the anomalies of copyright legislation which essentially forced Canadian authors to publish outside their own market, readers' preferences for cheap American reprints, and finally, the promotion of agency books to the neglect of original Canadian publications. (Gundy, 1972: 4ff) Geographical imperatives fostered a north-south, rather than an east-west, flow of publications. These conditions persisted throughout the nineteenth century, with the result that the Canadian provinces were flooded with American trade books and periodicals. In 1883 Goldwin Smith lamented the state of the industry:

... how is literature, how is the high class book trade to flourish here, under the present conditions? A Canadian writer can have no copyright of any value on his own continent ... the Canadian book trade is cut off from its natural centres of distribution, to which it cannot resort without paying double duty. At the same time both writer and trade are exposed to the overwhelming influx of American reprints from (sic) English works, with which the Imperial Copyright forbids the colony to compete. The literary calling if it exists at all in this country must exist almost apart from any hope of remuneration.

(cited in Gundy, 1972: 10-11)

In terms of periodicals, it has been estimated that American magazines outsold British magazines at a ratio of one hundred to one. (Roper, 1965: 266) Sara Jeanette Duncan wrote in a 1886 issue of The Week that "the British magazines could not compete in numbers, liveliness, variety, and price with the Americans." (cited in Roper, 1965: 266) Neither could Canadian magazines.

The newspaper fared much better than Canadian trade books and periodicals. During the 1820s and 1830s in particular, it emerged as the primary vehicle of exchange and debate on public issues. Population increases and the growth of enterprises with advertising needs spawned a sizeable and truly "private" press that could more credibly claim freedom from state dependence and sponsorship. Nevertheless, the ties of newspaper owner-editors to the state were highly visible. George Monro Grant, referring to Joseph Howe's journalistic activities at the time, stated that "it was almost impossible to be an editor without being a politician also." (Kesterton, 1967: 15) Howe was one of many individuals who represented both the media and political fields:

others included Edward Whelan, James Haszard, Etienne Parent, Ludger Duvernay, Dr. Daniel Tracy, William Lyon Mackenzie, and Francis Hincks. (Kesterton, 1967: 15) It is not surprising, therefore that, especially during the 1840s and 1850s, newspapers functioned primarily as party organs, voicing the rhetoric of either the Reform or Tory positions.

Newspaper circulation rates increased substantially. Stage coaches in the 1830s, steamships in the 1840s, and railways in the 1850s facilitated the transmission of news and the distribution of newspapers. (Rutherford, 1978: 7) These developments, as well as the introduction of favourable postal rates for newspapers, further population increases resulting from large-scale immigration, and a steady improvement in the literacy rate, each contributed to the new circulation levels. It was not, however, until the middle of the nineteenth century that technological developments in newspaper production signalled the emergence of the daily newspaper which, only at this late point, began to take precedence over the weeklies.

The proliferation of daily newspapers during the 1870s (there were forty-eight dailies in Canada by 1873) was shortly followed by an ultimate decline in the total number of dailies, indicative of the emergent trend towards newspaper ownership concentration. The early newspapers had met with little competition. Until at least 1900, it was a simple matter to establish a newspaper: in 1869, for example, Hugh Graham and G. T. Lanigan initiated publication of the Montreal Star with a few hundred dollars and some old equipment. (Rutherford, 1978: 9)

This particular newspaper has survived to the present; an achievement that is quite rare. The majority of those newspapers launched between 1840 and 1870 suffered a very brief existence, cut short by aggressive competition and the rising costs of production. Only those with lengthy subscription lists and sufficient capital to offset the increasing expenditures could survive. The most secure publishers were those who were able to acquire other newspapers and magazines in addition to their core publication. A number of these publishers established during this period the roots of media empires that now dominate both the publishing and broadcasting sectors. In this way, the pattern of ownership concentration was firmly established at a very early historical moment.

Finally, it is worth noting the content and the ideological potency of the press in pre-1900 Canada. The first wave of newspapers served as a forum for state policies and provided a service to their largest group of readers, the British colonial elite, relating news of events in Britain and elsewhere (albeit typically six weeks late). The second significant wave of this period (1840 to the end of the century) featured newspapers that were operated with very definitive political and ideological purposes. In fact, a large number of owners established their newspapers precisely in order to propagate their own political views and/or counter the political impact of competing newspapers; profit-making was only a secondary motivation. John A. Macdonald, for example, distressed by the popularity of the Globe's criticisms of his government, financed

the establishment of the Mail in 1872. (Rutherford, 1978: 30) Perhaps ironically, the two newspapers eventually merged to form one of today's major Toronto dailies. The persuasive potential of newspapers as ideological vehicles was well recognized by the colonial owner-editors. Moreover, editors tended to occupy a unique position of power and a sphere of influence that often extended beyond their local community. One need only mention the names of George Brown and William Lyon Mackenzie to illustrate. Editors were regarded as central figures in the political arena (many of course were politicians) and accorded a degree of respect, trust, and credibility not often granted by readers of the 1970s.² These same editors indulged excessively and proudly in what Rutherford calls "opinionated journalism:"

The editors freely mixed news and views. Not for them the cult of objectivity that would rule (in theory) the reporting practices of the mass press. Editors, proud of their partisan loyalties, convinced of the righteousness of their causes, played favourites.

(1978: 20)

Needless to say, this stood in sharp contrast to the meek nature of the earlier journals, which were basically no more than government bulletins. The later papers had not even the pretense of neutrality. As Rutherford rather vividly expresses it:

... the editor in heat was a secular messiah bursting with a zeal to proselytize. His was the task eternal, to lead the people and the politicians in the ways of righteousness. He readily assumed the garb of infallibility to preach the one true gospel, whatever that might be ... on balance, the colonial editorial was a marvellous species of propaganda.

(1978: 22)

The strong voices of Joseph Howe (the Nova Scotian) in the Maritimes, Etienne Parent (Le Canadien) in Quebec, and George Brown (the Globe) in Ontario, were widely heard, and ensured that liberal doctrines would reign supreme on the ideological battlefield. It might appear that libertarian press theorists, while no doubt scorning the opinionated presentation of news items, would welcome and applaud this fervent clash of political ideas. However, one must distinguish (as Rutherford fails to do) between the expression of partisan viewpoints and the propagation of ideology. Throughout the newspapers of this period, one singular ideological theme was persistently clear: that economic development, within the parameters of entrepreneurial capitalism, was the key to Canada's progress. This suited well the interests of the newspaper editors who were, almost without exception, simultaneously newspaper owners, and whose political and entrepreneurial pursuits were considerably vigorous. Even Rutherford, a self-confessed liberal, admits that "overall, the colonial press had helped to make bourgeois ways, then better termed the Victorian ethos, a leading force." (1978: 33)

Early Consolidation and Centralization

The trend towards concentrated press ownership continued through the early 1900s, and was most strikingly evident during the period 1911 to 1921 (see Table 1). By 1930, ninety-nine publishers controlled 116 daily newspapers. (Kesterton, 1967: 76) It quickly became apparent that

... what was once a venture possible to a private individual with a few hundred dollars and a desire to express himself in print has become an undertaking appropriate only to the wealthy capitalist.

(Kesterton, 1967: 72)

For the year 1929, newspapers and periodicals generated \$50 million in advertising revenue alone, employed more than 35,000 people, and produced commodities valued at \$140 million. (Rutherford, 1978: 38) Publishing had indeed become "big business" and the exclusive realm of "big capitalists." At the same time, circulation levels set new records; in fact, daily newspaper circulation increased at a rate faster than that of the population: while newspaper sales rose by almost 700%, the population grew at a less than 400% rate. (Kesterton, 1967: 70) Nevertheless, while newspaper circulation steadily increased through the first half of the century, the number of daily newspapers steadily declined. Table 1 illustrates this trend. Local community newspapers were overwhelmed by the competition of the large metropolitan dailies and many consequently folded; others lost their stature and suffered circulation losses.

TABLE 1

Total Daily Newspapers,
Proportionate to Total Canadian
Circulation and Population,
1901-1941

	1901	1911	1921	1931	1941
Total daily newspapers	114	143	113	103	90
Total daily newspaper circulation	650,000*	1,324,909	1,609,317	2,119,908	2,378,657
Total population	5,371,315	7,206,643	8,787,949	10,376,786	11,506,655

* Kesterton's estimate

SOURCE: Compiled from McNaught (1940: 18) and Kesterton (1967: 65-73).

The only other newspapers of significance at this time were those operated by religious institutions, notably the Roman Catholic church in Quebec. Some important trade periodicals appeared, including Industrial Canada (1900), the organ of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, and those controlled by John Bayne McLean (later to form the basis of Maclean-Hunter's Business Publications Division). In addition, specialized journals addressed to particular audiences emerged. For the farmers, there was the Farmer's Sun in Ontario and the Grain Growers' Guide in the prairie provinces, as well as Le Bulletin de La Ferme and the Western Producer arising later in the 1920s. The financial press included the Monetary Times and the Financial Post in Toronto, and the Journal of Commerce and Financial Times in Montreal. (Rutherford, 1978: 43) Less significant were the literary and academic journals, i.e. Revue Canadienne, Canadian Monthly, the Queen's Quarterly, and University Magazine.

While trade periodicals demonstrated relative success, general interest consumer magazines suffered a tenuous existence that was to remain so, far into the twentieth century. Again, as in the case of trade book publishing, the primary factor was the aggressive competition of foreign, especially American, publications. Typically, those Canadian magazines that survived the onslaught of foreign competition were owned by newspapers like La Presse and the Vancouver Province. John Bayne McLean alone stood triumphant among the indigenous publishers through his establishment of the durable Maclean-Hunter offerings: Maclean's Magazine (1905), Canadian Homes & Gardens (1925),

Mayfair (1927), and Chatelaine (1928). (Rutherford, 1978: 48)

The first world war provided a period of some relief for both the magazine and trade book sectors of the publishing industry as "thousands of young Canadians went off to Europe, while those at home were eager to read about their exploits, and to confirm their belief in the wickedness of the enemy and the righteousness of the allied cause." (Gundy, 1972: 24) There were record sales of Canadian publications, yet, following the war, the industry returned to its usual precarious state.

The effects of post-war instability were also felt by newspaper publishers, who faced decreasing advertising revenues and increasing labour and newsprint costs. In the eight years between 1914 and 1922, more than forty dailies were forced to cease publication. (Rutherford, 1978: 51) The year 1914 seemed to herald a steady decline in the number of dailies; a decline that further contributed to the ongoing concentration of newspaper ownership, and to the rapid emergence of single-newspaper cities. It was at this point that the great "newspaper chains" began to assume a dominant position in the industry; for example, the Southam family properties, which, by the 1920s, included the Hamilton Spectator (1877), the Ottawa Citizen (1897), the Calgary Herald (1908), the Edmonton Journal (1912), the Winnipeg Tribune (1920), and the Vancouver Province (1923). The formation of the news co-operative Canadian Press (C.P.) in 1923 served to cement their oligarchic position in the Canadian newspaper market. This organization, which presently serves as the major news source for more than 75% of all dailies (Warnock,

1970: 122), was originally financed by the large newspaper publishers, who denied franchise rights to prospective newcomers "on the grounds that their competition would threaten the profits of existing newspapers."³ (Rutherford, 1978: 51) Concomitantly, the need to attract mass audiences led to a standardization of the content of newspapers and periodicals that was most effectively carried out by the large, dominant publishers. Thus, early in the 1920s, the dominant media owners made clear their intent to retain a firm grip on the media market in Canada; a conviction that remained intact when the lucrative potential of broadcasting became evident later in that same decade.

Radio and the Ownership Debate

The Southams, the Atkinsons, and the Eatons were among the first of Canada's dominant media capitalists to hop on the broadcasting bandwagon when radio was first introduced in 1919. Bell Canada (then Bell Telephone), Westinghouse, and the Canadian National Railway quickly followed suit. (Peers, 1969: 4-6) Within only two years, a total of fifty-five radio broadcasting licences had been issued. By the end of the 1930s, there were seventy-eight radio stations under private ownership and ten stations owned by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (C.B.C.). At the same time, there were more than one and a half million radio receivers operative in Canadian households. (Peers, 1969: 8) Clearly the new medium had taken hold.

From the beginning, the state played a decisive role in the development of the broadcasting industry. The federal state first assumed the authority to grant licences and assign wavelengths, in order to avoid technological chaos. In 1928 it instructed the Aird Commission:

... to consider the manner in which the available channels can be most effectively used in the interests of Canadian listeners and in the national interests of Canada ... and to make recommendations to the Government as to the future administration, management, control, and financing thereof.

(Canada, Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting, Report, 1929: 1; emphasis added)

The Commission applauded the efforts of private enterprise to provide quality entertainment, yet criticized the volume of advertising on the private stations. It also pointed to the fact that private enterprise could not accommodate the realities of Canadian geography: radio stations were concentrated in the rich urban markets, while rural Canada was virtually unserved by the new medium.⁴ Furthermore, the pursuit of profit left no place for the production of original Canadian programmes; radio station owners instead imported cheap foreign programming to fill air time, and this the Commission regarded as a threat to the national culture. The potentialities of broadcasting, it was felt, had not been realized. The Commission concluded that:

The interests of Canadian listeners and of the Canadian nation can be adequately served only by some form of public ownership, operation, and control behind which is the national power and prestige of the whole public of the Dominion of Canada.

(Canada, Royal Commission on
Radio Broadcasting, Report,
1929: 9)

Broadcasting must be operated according to the principles of "public service;" a conviction later echoed by Pierre Juneau through his oft-cited "air waves are public property" dictum. Briefly, the Commission recommended a public system with no private stations and programmes with only a limited "commercial content," in the form of indirect advertising (sponsored programmes without a direct sales message).

The Aird Report is a critical document in Canadian media history. It essentially set the tone for all subsequent debates regarding press freedom, the responsible use of broadcasting, the contribution of the mass media to "national identity," the role of the federal and provincial states in communications, and so on. Each of these questions continues to be hotly debated. The Commission's recognition of the ideological potential of radio was evident in phrases like "education in the broad sense," "fostering a national spirit and interpreting Canadian citizenship," and shaping the "minds of the young people to ideals and opinions that are ... Canadian." The report definitively refuted the assumption which until that time had prevailed: that the Canadian public was best served by

a number of stations competing with each other and sustained by advertising revenue. Most importantly, the report left no question that state intervention in the broadcasting industry was here to stay, in whatever form and to whatever extent, through its outright declaration of the fundamental incapacity of private enterprise to fully develop the new medium to the satisfaction of all parties. In this way, it sparked the vicious, ongoing debate concerning public versus private ownership of broadcasting enterprises.

The private side of the ownership debate was (and has traditionally been) spearheaded by the Canadian Association of Broadcasters (established in 1926) with the support of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association. C.A.B. members included those private broadcasters who also controlled daily newspapers.⁵ The public side of the debate was led by the Canadian Radio League, organized in 1930 for the specific purpose of lobbying for public broadcasting. It claimed the support of womens' and farmers' organizations and the trade union organizations.

The Aird Report was quickly overshadowed by the stock market collapse and the election of 1930; three years elapsed before legislation was introduced. This legislation was based on the recommendations of the 1932 Special Parliamentary Committee on Radio Broadcasting, established to "advise and recommend a complete technical scheme of radio broadcasting in Canada." (Hindley et al, 1977: 48) The Committee was much less liberal in its proposals: it eliminated the recommendation for state subsidies and, in sharp contrast to the Aird Commission, supported

private ownership of broadcasting enterprises which, it said, should, at the very least, co-exist with public enterprises.⁶ Its basic recommendations included the establishment of a three member commission responsible for the ownership and operation of radio stations, the expropriation of existing private stations, the issuance of licences, and the production of programmes. The broadcasting system was to be financed through advertising revenue and state-determined licence fees.

During the course of parliamentary debate regarding the proposed legislation that embodied the committee's recommendations, Prime Minister R. B. Bennett made a speech which, in the words of Hindley et al "summarizes the basic position of the federal government from 1932 to the present ... with regard to broadcasting in Canada." (1977: 48) The following excerpt (quoted in Hindley et al, 1977: 48-49; emphasis added), and worth quoting here at length, is indeed a powerful and telling statement of the state's position:

First of all, this country must be assured of complete control of broadcasting from Canadian sources, free from foreign interference or influence. Without such control radio broadcasting can never become a great agency for the communication of matters of national concern and for the diffusion of national thought and ideals, and without such control it can never be the agency by which national consciousness may be fostered and strengthened and national unity still further strengthened. It seems to me clear that in Canada the system we can most profitably employ is one which, in operation and control, responds most directly to the popular will and the national need ... Secondly, no other scheme than that of public ownership can ensure to the

people of this country, without regard to class or place, equal enjoyment of the benefits and pleasures of radio broadcasting. Private ownership must necessarily discriminate between densely and sparsely populated areas. This is not a correctable fault in private ownership; it is an inescapable and inherent demerit of that system ... The use of the air ... that lies over the soil or land of Canada is a natural resource over which we have complete jurisdiction under the recent decision of the Privy Council; I believe that there is no government in Canada that does not reflect the principle under which the Crown holds the natural resources in trust for all the people. In view of these circumstances and of the further fact that broadcasting is a science that is only yet in its infancy and about which we know little yet, I cannot think that any government would be warranted in leaving the air to private exploitation and not reserving it for the use of the people.

Bennett says it all.

The subsequent legislation established the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission (C.R.B.C.), empowered with the responsibilities of not only operating a broadcasting enterprise, but also regulating its private competitors. The C.R.B.C. was granted the very considerable power to determine the number, location, and wattage of stations required for the development of the industry; to recommend the issuance, suspension, or cancellation of private broadcasting licences; to allot channels to stations; to determine the proportion of time that any station could devote to national and local programming; to identify periods to be reserved for the presentation of national programmes; to determine the permissible amount, and the character of advertising; and finally, to supervise the development of private broadcast networks. (Peers, 1969: 105) Inadequacies in the legislation that created the C.R.B.C., among other factors, led

to its almost immediate failure. The problem was passed to a parliamentary committee in 1934, to a different parliamentary committee in 1936, and ultimately resulted in the new Broadcasting Act of 1936; the Act that created the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. This Act also granted very considerable power to the public corporation. Private networks could not be established without the express permission of, and only according to the regulations established by, the C.B.C. Section 22 of the Act provided that the Corporation could make regulations:

(a) to control the establishment and operation of chains or networks of stations in Canada; (b) to prescribe periods to be reserved periodically by any private station for the broadcasting of programmes of the Corporation; (c) to control the character of any and all programmes broadcast by Corporation or private stations; (d) to determine the proportion of time which may be devoted to advertising in any programmes broadcast by the stations of the Corporation; (e) to prescribe the proportion of time which may be devoted to political broadcasts by the stations of the Corporation and by private stations, and to assign such time on an equitable basis to all parties and rival candidates.

(reprinted in Canadian Radio and Television Annual 1950: 255)

The powers initially granted to the C.R.B.C. and this new Act added fuel to the public/private ownership controversy. When the C.B.C. finally began operations in 1936, it appeared that the state had at last "won out" over the interests of private capital. In 1938, when the C.B.C. announced its commitment to commercial broadcasting, the private broadcasters declared war. Through the editorial pages of their daily newspapers, a full-fledged attack on public ownership was launched.

And so the battle raged on. Successive federal governments deliberately maintained the co-existence of public and private stations, within and outside the C.B.C. network. However, the ownership debate was soon to enter its next stage with the introduction of a new broadcast medium.

Television and the Post-War Period

The emergence of television in the post-war period accelerated the ownership debate through its unquestioned significance as a new and powerful medium of mass communications. Private television broadcasting had been relatively well established in the United States by the late 1940s. Canadian broadcasters were eager to capitalize on the increased advertising budgets of the post-war economic boom, and so fought hard against the state's presence as both broadcaster and regulator of the mixed public and private system. The state won. Its first television policy announcement, released in 1949, declared that the C.B.C. Board of Governors would be responsible for the development of television. The Corporation was authorized to establish production centres in Montreal and Toronto. In the same year, the state established the Royal Commission on the National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (the Massey Commission).

The Massey Commission basically concurred with the principles established by the Aird Commission and (at least partially) embodied in the 1932 and 1936 broadcasting acts.

It endorsed the principle of a single national system incorporating public and private elements, and rejected the private broadcasters' arguments for a public/private division. The Commission's response to the private broadcasters is illustrative:

The principal grievance of the private broadcasters is based, it seems to us, on a false assumption that broadcasting in Canada is an industry. Broadcasting in Canada, in our view is a public service directed and controlled in the public interest by a body responsible to Parliament ... The only status of private broadcasters is as part of the national broadcasting system. They have no civil right to broadcast or any property rights in broadcasting ... The statement that the Board of Governors of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation is at once their judge and their business rival implies a view of the national system which has no foundation in law and which has never been accepted by parliamentary committees or by the general public.

(cited in Hindley et al, 1977: 51-52; emphasis added)

The Commission's important broadcasting recommendations included: 1) that the C.B.C. should retain control of the national broadcasting system; 2) that private radio or television networks should not be permitted; 3) that all private stations should be affiliated with the C.B.C. network; 4) that no private television stations should be licensed until the C.B.C. was able to provide programmes to those stations; and 5) that the C.B.C. should receive longer term funds, that annual revenue should equal one dollar per Canadian, and that revenue should consist of licence fees, commercial revenues, and state grants. Few of the Commission's recommendations were incorporated into the subsequent, relatively insignificant, amendment to the

Broadcasting Act.

The state's second television policy statement, issued in 1952, recommended that the C.B.C. expand its television service rapidly and authorized the establishment of C.B.C. stations in Vancouver, Winnipeg, Ottawa, and Halifax. (Hindley et al, 1977: 53) At the same time, it invited applications for the establishment of private stations, to operate as C.B.C. affiliates, in other cities. Meanwhile, the C.B.C. continued to encounter financial difficulties, still dependent on the state for insufficient annual grants, and burdened with the high initial costs of television broadcasting. These financial problems were aggravated by the abolition of the receiver set licence fees in 1953; licence fees were replaced with a 15% excise tax on receiver sets. Excise tax revenues were high, while the rate of television set acquisition for Canadian households was at its peak,⁷ yet dropped significantly at the point of market saturation which soon followed. The expansion of television was nothing short of phenomenal in the five years between 1952 and 1957; the two C.B.C. stations operative in 1952, which served 146,000 television sets, had increased to forty-two (C.B.C. and private) stations which served 2,750,000 television sets in 1957. (Crean, 1976: 39) At the same time, the C.B.C.'s budget had increased from \$1.4 million in 1934-35 to \$7.5 million in 1952 to \$91.5 million in 1959.

Throughout this period, anti-C.B.C. hostility within the private sector escalated, culminating in a series of complaints regarding the C.B.C.'s operations, and finally forcing the

establishment of another Royal Commission, chaired by Robert Fowler, in 1955. The public hearings of the Fowler Commission provided a Canada-wide open forum for the private broadcasters; this was perhaps the height of their campaign and the fiercest moment of the debate. Porter observes that:

Many of the newspaper publishers who also controlled broadcasting outlets used both media to solicit public support for private broadcasting. Ownership links between radio and television stations further facilitated the campaign ... In their trade association, the C.A.B., the owners of broadcasting outlets have acted with a uniformity that could scarcely be more complete if all the outlets were owned by the same person.

(1965: 468)

Like the earlier Massey Commission, the Fowler Commission rejected the position of the private broadcasters; there was little evidence to suggest that the C.B.C. Board of Governors had been unfair to the private sector either in terms of regulation or competition (a telling admission in itself; see Chapter 6). The Commission, however, in contrast to all previous state commissions and committees, agreed that the C.B.C. Board of Governors occupied conflicting roles as the regulator of all broadcasting licences and as directors of the C.B.C. itself, and therefore proposed a separate regulatory board, the Board of Broadcast Governors (B.B.G.). Nevertheless, the Commission foresaw potential conflict arising from such a division of responsibilities, and consequently, organized its proposals and recommendations with a view to minimizing possible conflict. However, the legislative changes that followed in 1958

disregarded these specific measures, with disastrous consequences. The Fowler Commission did not support the establishment of independent private television stations; private broadcasters had not indicated a willingness to finance indigenous Canadian programme production beyond the absolute minimum. A change of government delayed legislative action until 1958, at which time a new broadcasting act was introduced. The Act signified a victory for private capital: the establishment of a regulatory board separate from the C.B.C., the Board of Broadcast Governors. The Radio League (now the Canadian Broadcasting League) was resurrected in response. The final result was a tremendous amount of divisiveness within the industry that merely served to heighten the ownership dilemma.

The legislation had not specified clearly the jurisdictional distinctions or boundaries of authority held by the B.B.G. and the C.B.C., nor the procedures for the settlement of disagreements between the two bodies. Such conflicts were frequent, substantial, and extensive. B.B.G. orders were ignored or disputed by the C.B.C. and there was no avenue for resolution; the vagueness and ambiguities of the broadcasting act precluded the resolution of conflicts. The situation had serious implications for the development of television broadcasting; for example, the B.B.G.'s approval of the C.T.V. network did not consider the expansion of C.B.C. television service. The B.B.G. typically approved private stations in areas where the C.B.C. already operated or already had plans to operate. At the same time, the C.B.C.'s financial position was increasingly precarious. Excise

tax revenues declined after 1958 while the C.B.C.'s costs increased at a tremendous rate. The Corporation increasingly relied on state funds to absorb the increasing costs of operation. The 1958 Act required the C.B.C. to seek annual state grants for capital and operating expenses; this arrangement precluded revenue predictions and long-term planning. Moreover, most of the capital required for the development of the C.B.C.'s television service was provided in the form of state loans that had to be repaid with interest.

The Troika Committee was established in 1963 to review and attempt to resolve the B.B.G.-C.B.C. conflicts. The Committee included "the leading protagonists in the dispute:" the chairman of the Board of Broadcast Governors, the president of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, and the president of the Canadian Association of Broadcasters. (Hindley et al, 1977: 59) The Committee submitted joint and individual statements which indicated a failure to reach agreement regarding the C.B.C.'s mandate and its powers.

Within a short period of time, the Fowler Committee⁸ was established to, again, study the Canadian broadcasting industry. This Committee recommended the abolition of the two board system and the establishment of a singular regulatory agency empowered to licence all stations. It further stated that conflicts between the public and private sectors should ultimately be resolved in the interests of the C.B.C.: the public corporation would have final authority. Their report was followed by the 1966 White Paper on Broadcasting, which basically recommended that the

distinction between a regulatory board with general supervisory responsibilities, and the C.B.C. directors, with responsibilities for the Corporation's management, should be retained. It repeated the position that the public sector should have final power in the case of private/public conflicts, and agreed that the C.B.C. should receive state grants for five year periods.

It took one more parliamentary committee in 1967 and six months of intermittent parliamentary debate before the 1968 Broadcasting Act was passed. It was this Act that created the Canadian Radio-Television Commission, which replaced the B.B.G. and was granted the authority to regulate both sectors of the broadcasting industry. Reiterating the assertions of the Aird Report some forty years earlier, the Act still maintained that "broadcasting undertakings in Canada make use of radio frequencies that are public property."

The point is that state media and state regulation, while it claims a forty-two year history in Canada, has never existed in a peaceful co-relation with private media enterprises. To the contrary, the C.B.C. in particular and state intervention in general have been a constant source of state-capital conflict. Nor is there a resolution in sight: as recently as March 1978, there were rumoured plans to abolish the Corporation entirely.

At the end of the 1950s, the C.B.C. English and French networks were accessible to more than 90% of the population. (Hallman, 1977: 25) Independent private stations were licenced in 1960 and immediately based themselves in the large urban

centres. The following year saw the establishment of the private C.T.V. television network, the collective undertaking of several powerful media capitalists, which at the time linked eight television stations across Canada. Other significant media owners, dominant in publishing and radio broadcasting, quickly joined in the highly profitable television venture. By the middle of the 1960s, there were thirty-eight private stations and nine C.B.C.-owned stations. Television had become well integrated into both the web of media interests held by the dominant media corporations and the everyday ritualized practices of the Canadian population, enjoying a rate of consumption that exceeded that of both Britain and the United States.

Other Canadian media cannot boast such a glorious post-war record. Trade book publishing, for example, experienced a peak year in 1945 that was shortly followed by a period of recession lasting well into the 1950s. Book prices rose at levels of 15% to 20% annually; sales fell while production costs increased. (Gundy, 1972: 31) Again, original Canadian publishing was stifled and publishers' lists were drastically reduced. The post-war education boom offered new hope in the field of textbook and scholarly publishing, yet this particular market was quickly infiltrated by the powerful British and American houses which, by 1960, had more than 700 agencies and branches in Canada. Foreign competition still plagues this sector of the publishing industry.⁹

With the exception of the Maclean-Hunter durables, indigenous Canadian periodicals continued their tenuous existence. The specialized trade and business periodicals of the Southam and Maclean-Hunter complexes enjoyed a prosperity in the 1960s that is still in evidence. However, general interest consumer periodicals and cultural magazines have been far less secure. Again, foreign, particularly American, competition has proved to be formidable. Between 1920 and 1960, more than two hundred Canadian magazines were either discontinued or absorbed. At the end of this period, more than fifty U. S. mass market publications could each boast a Canadian circulation exceeding 20,000 (Porter, 1965: 465); a situation that prompted the establishment of the O'Leary Commission in 1960, to investigate the problems that confronted this sector of the publishing industry. The O'Leary Report had little impact: fifteen years later, in 1975, the fact remained that 83% of all publications sold in Canada were foreign publications. As Porter words it: "The consumption of American periodicals in Canada is an ideological counterpart of the external control of the economic system." (1965: 465)

Daily newspapers, of course, held their own, losing only an insignificant proportion of their advertising revenue to television. Circulation rates continued to increase during the post-war period: total daily circulation rose from 2,926,564 in 1946 to well over five million in 1976. (Canada Yearbook, 1976-77: 233-35) At the same time, the number of daily newspapers steadily declined, perpetuating the historical trend

towards ownership concentration; a process characteristic of the newspaper field since the early 1900s, spilling over into radio in the 1920s, and very rapidly accelerated in the 1960s and 1970s. This feature of Canadian media history is the subject of the third chapter.

Conclusions: Historical Ownership Patterns and the Historical Role of the State

It could be said that the history of broadcasting in Canada is a history of royal commissions and parliamentary committees. The fact that, in the space of only twenty-one years between 1929 and 1950, thirteen separate commissions and committees wrestled with the broadcasting question, suggests that the peculiar problems posed by the medium certainly perplexed the Canadian state.¹⁰ The Aird Commission first articulated, perhaps too clearly, the fundamental problem: that the nature of broadcasting, coupled with the peculiar features of Canadian geography and the distribution of the Canadian population, as well as the perceived "cultural threat" of a large and imposing U. S. neighbour, rendered private capital incapable of fully developing the medium to the satisfaction of all parties and in accordance with the fundamental needs of the state. Through the course of the ensuing debate regarding public versus private ownership of broadcasting enterprises, no clearer statements of the "relative independence" of the state could have been made.

On the one hand, representatives of the dominant class sought the realization of their entrepreneurial aspirations; broadcasting was (correctly) perceived as a venture that promised abundant financial rewards. On the other hand, representatives of the dominated classes, organized largely through the Radio League with its constituent labour support, sought the "socially responsible" development of the medium and cast the state in the role of cultural guardian. The state was thus called upon to organize a reconciliation of these contending visions, and this it did, yet ultimately, and expectedly, the conflict was "settled to the profit of the ruling class." It will be seen later that the state's establishment of the public broadcasting corporation satisfied each requirement to a large extent and that of the private broadcasters to the greatest extent. Moreover, the state saw to its own requirements and its own interests in the conflict. This it did largely through the provision of innumerable forums (that is, the endless chain of investigative bodies) for the expression of class interests, that left its ideological reputation as "independent" arbiter untarnished.

At the same time, it is clear that the concentration of media ownership, and the class-based nature of media ownership, each have deep historical roots. It would be naive to discount the importance of these two critical and traditional characteristics of Canadian mass media. Their significance for the present ownership structure must now be considered.

Notes

1. This chapter relies on the following basic sources: McNaught (1940), Shea (1963), Weir (1965), Kesterton (1967), Peers (1969), Hallman (1977), Hindley et al (1977), and Rutherford (1978).

2. Claude Ryan, the former Le Devoir editor, is a notable exception.

3. C.P. still acts to protect the position of the dominant media capitalists in the newspaper sector of the publishing industry. See Chapter 3.

4. It was some time before this situation was at all rectified. The title of Chevrier's article, "A Radio in Every Home!" (Canadian Radio and Television Annual: 1950) belies the realities of regional disparities in the provision of radio service and in the ownership of radio sets. Chevrier's own data illustrate this. While 45% of all Ontario households had radio sets in 1931, this was true for only 21% of all Maritime households and only 28% of those on the prairies and in Quebec. His table regarding the regional distribution of Canadian radio households is reprinted below.

	1931	1941	1949
Maritimes	5.8	8.1	8.1
Quebec	19.5	22.7	25.2
Ontario	47.3	37.9	36.0
Prairies	18.8	22.0	20.2
B. C.	8.6	9.3	10.5
Canada	100.0	100.0	100.0

5. The C.A.B. is still largely the preserve of the dominant media capitalists.

6. It is worth pointing out that the C.A.B.'s submission to the Committee, with the support of the Canadian Association of Advertising Agencies and the Association of Canadian Advertisers, effectively endorsed the principle of public broadcasting, yet suggested that the public system should operate "for the purpose of correcting the deficiencies of commercial broadcasting by

providing the programmes and the nation-wide distribution that commercial broadcasters could not." (Crean, 1976: 36) Their proposal called for a separation of the regulatory and broadcasting functions held by the C.R.B.C. In Crean's words: "the C.A.B. held that public broadcasting should complement their own." (1976: 36) Wittingly or unwittingly, the state ultimately granted their wish; see Chapter 6.

7. For the year 1953, Rutherford reports that, in the Toronto area alone, television sets were purchased at the rate of 30,000 per month. (1978: 77)

8. Robert Fowler, of the earlier Fowler Commission, also chaired this investigation.

9. At the present time, foreign presence in the book publishing sector is still highly visible. There are seventy-five Canadian publishing houses which have no foreign shareholders. However, there are sixty-five major foreign firms, and approximately 660 foreign publishers who have representatives stocking their publications in Canada, with some Canadian houses acting as their agents. The situation has resulted in a steady decline in the proportion of the market served by Canadian publishers: from 38% in 1966 to 24% in 1969 to only 17% in 1973. See Audley (1975).

10. The list includes, aside from the Aird and Massey Commissions, the Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting 1932; the Special Committee on the Operations of the (Canadian Radio Broadcasting) Commission under the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Act, 1932; the Special Committee on the Canadian Radio Commission 1936; the Standing Committee on Radio Broadcasting 1938; the Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting 1939; and six committees of the same (latter) title in 1942, 1943, 1944, 1946, 1947, and 1950.

CHAPTER THREE

THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE

The ownership structure of mass media in Canada is a peculiar blend of three elements. The state is important for its ownership of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation radio and television networks within the broadcasting sector. Through the Canadian Radio-television Telecommunications Commission, it is also important for its regulation of this sector. Canadian capitalists are important for their ownership of the other "mass" media: daily newspapers, radio stations, and television stations. U.S. capitalists are important for their ownership of magazines and trade books distributed in Canada, and for their intrusion into Canadian-owned media through wire services that serve Canadian daily newspapers, through the provision of television programmes to Canadian television stations, etc. Nevertheless, ownership of the truly mass media and the most important media is held by Canadians; a condition protected by various legislative measures of the Canadian state.

There is no question that ownership of the mass media has become very highly and very tightly concentrated. The fact that media ownership and media ownership concentration has preoccupied the endless chain of state commissions and state committees since the early days of the Aird Commission,

yields some indication. The forces of centralization set in motion early in Canadian media history have rapidly accelerated in the present period. The rate of acquisition and concentration is so overwhelming as to render ownership data obsolete prior to the completion of any analysis of the ownership structure.¹ The Report of the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media (1970), which analyzed the degree of media ownership concentration for 1970, is already a historical document. Clement's 1972 study (1975: 270-343), based largely on this Report, identified fifteen media complexes as dominant based on their total circulation. This decade has seen changes in this structure of a quantitative rather than a qualitative nature; changes that have not fundamentally altered the pattern of concentration, but which have resulted in a very large increase in the degree of concentration, in the number of media outlets and the total circulation controlled by each of the large complexes, and, perhaps most significantly, in the number of associations between the large complexes. The 1970s have been a period of extremely rapid (and extremely lucrative) growth for the traditional media barons, as mergers between complexes and the ongoing acquisition of media properties continues at an unceasingly constant pace. Four of those complexes dominant in 1972 have merged to form two very large complexes in which Power Corporation and Argus Corporation figure prominently. The extremely rapid development of cable television in recent years has enabled three broadcasting organizations to increase their audiences well beyond the one million mark and therefore claim dominant status: these are

Global Communications Limited, Multiple Access Limited, and the Rogers complex. Quebecor Incorporated has assumed a position of dominance in the Quebec publishing industry. Free Press Publications Limited (F. P.) has acquired the major media holdings of the McConnell family, which has greatly increased the circulation of the former and left the latter with minor interests in two cable television systems. With the singular exception of the McConnell family, which lost its dominant status through the sale of the Montreal Star and Weekend Magazine, those complexes identified as dominant in 1972 are now "more dominant" than ever. All have significantly increased the number of media outlets as well as the total circulation under their control.

The Dominant Media Complexes

The present study considers seventeen media complexes which dominate the publishing and broadcasting sectors of the mass media industry in Canada. "Dominance" has been defined according to the total circulation of all media outlets controlled by each of the seventeen complexes.² Separate criteria have been used for the two sectors, for the simple reason that the circulation of a daily newspaper does not compare quantitatively with the circulation of a television station.³ The Toronto Star, for example, the most widely circulated daily newspaper in Canada, has a daily average circulation of 632,468; a figure easily exceeded by most television stations that serve urban centres.

Hence a complex is here defined as dominant where the total circulation of its publishing outlets exceeds 500,000 or where the total circulation of its broadcasting outlets exceeds one million. Table 2 provides these figures for each complex. No circulation data are available for three of the four television stations controlled by the Irving complex in New Brunswick; their circulation would undoubtedly place the Irving broadcasting interests above the one million mark, and, for this reason, the Irving organization is included as a dominant complex. The total circulation of a complex should be considered in conjunction with the total number of media outlets controlled by that complex. Table 2 includes these data and Table 3 provides a breakdown of the type and number of outlets for each complex. Multiple Access Limited, for example, claims a total circulation of 5.2 million for its two radio stations and two television stations, whereas the Maclean-Hunter complex controls a total of 149 media outlets in Canada that exceeds this amount by only 601,061. Indeed, in terms of total number of media outlets, Maclean-Hunter is the largest complex while Multiple Access ranks last with Global Communications Limited.

The dominance of the seventeen complexes can be expressed in several ways. While each complex is dominant in the sense that each commands a significant proportion of the total circulation of all mass media in Canada, there are important differences in the way that this dominance manifests itself. Some have attained dominance in a particular sector of the media industry, i.e. daily newspapers or trade periodicals, while others, most notably the

TABLE 2

Total Circulation Controlled By the Dominant Media Complexes*

	<u>Publishing</u>		<u>Broadcasting</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	#	<u>Circ'n</u>	#	<u>Circ'n</u>	#	<u>Circ'n</u>
Armadale	2	115,280	9	1,329,800	11	1,445,080
Baton	10	274,700	11	5,207,700	21	5,482,400
CHUM	-	-	30	6,009,800	30	6,009,800
Free Press	14	3,074,589	-	-	14	3,074,589
Global	-	-	6	4,826,000	6	4,826,000
Irving	5	125,259	9	830,700	14	955,959
Maclean-Hunter	106	3,565,761	12	2,185,400	118	5,751,161
Moffat	-	-	14	3,033,700	14	3,033,700
Mult. Access	-	-	5	5,150,100	5	5,150,100
Power	13	673,149	35	5,581,300	48	5,581,300
Quebecor	17	532,983	-	-	17	532,983
Rogers	-	-	5	1,899,700	5	1,899,700
Southam	104	7,722,943	35	8,869,700	139	16,592,643
Standard	-	-	24	5,605,000	24	5,605,000
Thomson	49	570,158	-	-	49	570,158
Torstar	19	7,290,272	-	-	19	7,290,272
Western	-	-	19	4,049,900	19	4,049,900

* excludes cable systems and media-related interests

TABLE 3

Total Media Outlets Controlled By the Dominant Media Complexes

Type of Outlet	Armada	Baton	CHUM	Free Press	Global	Irving	Maclean-Hunter	Moffat	Multiple Access
Newspapers (Daily)	2			10		5			
Newspapers (Weekly)		10		2			1		
Periodicals (Mass)				2			6		
Periodicals (Trade)							99		
Radio Stns (AM,FM)	4	5	11			1	6	8	3
TV Stns (Originating)	3	3	7		1	4	1	1	2
TV Stns (Rebroadcast)	2	3	12		5	4	5	5	
Cable TV Systems				1			15	2	
Media-Related		7	7				16	5	1
TOTAL	11	28	37	15	6	14	149	21	6

TABLE 3 (Continued)

Type of Outlet	Power	Quebecor	Rogers	Southam	Standard	Thomson	Torstar	Western	TOTAL
Newspapers (Daily)	5	2		16		35	1		76
Newspapers (Weekly)	8	14		3		14	13		65
Periodicals (Mass)		1		3			5		17
Periodicals (Trade)				82					181
Radio Stns (AM,FM)	16		5	12	15			7	93
TV Stns (Originating)	6			9	5			3	45
TV Stns (Rebroadcast)	13			14	4			9	76
Cable TV Systems			4	6	3	2			33
Media-Related			1	3	9		3	2	54
TOTAL	48	17	10	148	36	51	22	21	640

Irving complex, dominate a particular region. Others, like Multiple Access in Montreal, control outlets located in those centres where the population of Canada is highly concentrated. The dominance of all the complexes, with the singular exception of the Thomson complex, is underlined by their control of those media that dominate the largest population centres: Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver are at the core of their activities in most cases. On the other hand, hinterland areas are not at all free of the dominants. In the province of Saskatchewan, for example, Armadale and Thomson control all the daily newspapers; Armadale, Baton, and Moffat together control more than 50% of the radio circulation; Armadale commands the largest television audience in Regina, while Baton also beats out the C.B.C. in Saskatoon. New Brunswick, of course, provides the best example of provincial media domination by a single complex: the Irving organization controls virtually every English-language daily newspaper, a major radio station in Saint John, and seven of the fifteen television stations throughout the province. The Quebec media market is saturated with newspapers, radio and television stations controlled by the Power complex, while Quebecor is also significant for its control of weekly newspapers, periodicals, and two widely circulated tabloids in Montreal and Quebec City. Other complexes, like Rogers and Torstar, cannot claim provincial domination, yet each control important outlets in Ontario, and further, each have proposed plans to expand their operations at a national level. These plans will no doubt materialize in the near future. Thus, while some complexes credit their privileged

position to provincial or regional media domination and others to multi-media control that is widely dispersed at the national level, all of the complexes control a total circulation that far exceeds that of other complexes in Canada.

There is no significant "middle range" of companies between the dominants and individual media owners. Only two companies, Q Broadcasting Limited, and Radio I.W.C. Limited, anywhere approximate the circulation totals enjoyed by the dominant complexes. The former company, with a total circulation of 614,500, is somewhat significant in the Vancouver area through its control of two radio stations in that city, a radio and a television station in Prince George, and a radio station in Mackenzie; yet it is easily overpowered by the CHUM interests (CFUN-AM Vancouver), the F. P. interests (the Vancouver Sun, the Victoria Daily Times, the Victoria Daily Colonist), the Moffat interests (CKLG-AM and CKLG-FM Vancouver), the Southam interests (the Vancouver Province, CKFW-AM Vancouver, CKWX-AM Vancouver, CKFX-SW Vancouver, CJVI-AM Victoria, CHEK-TV Victoria, CHAN-TV Vancouver, etc.), and the Western interests (CKNW-AM Vancouver, CFMI-FM Vancouver, etc.). Radio I.W.C. Limited (formerly I.W.C. Communications Limited) until recently controlled the Global television network in Ontario, in addition to several radio stations and cable television systems in the province. The sale of the network and the cable systems leaves this company with three radio stations that have a total circulation of 677,100: CFGM-AM Richmond Hill (334,000), CHOK-AM Sarnia (71,400), and CILQ-FM Toronto (271,700). The fact that two of the stations

access the Toronto market accounts for its high circulation; however, the Toronto radio market is overwhelmingly dominated by stations that command the largest radio audiences in Canada. CFRB-AM, controlled by the Standard complex, has an average 1.5 million listeners weekly, the most powerful radio station in Canada. The core stations of the CHUM complex, CHUM-AM and CHUM-FM, together reach a weekly audience of 1.8 million people in the Toronto area, while the Rogers-controlled CFTR-AM and CHFI-FM have a total audience of 1.7 million listeners. Beside these giants, the I.W.C. stations are humble indeed. In sum, there are no media companies in Canada that compare well either in size, circulation, or diversification, with the dominant complexes, nor do any operate on a truly national scale, as is the case for twelve of the seventeen dominant complexes.

There are traditional "media families", however, also to be found among the small groups; for example, the Allen family, which controls two radio stations in Brampton, Ontario, and a number of media-related interests, and the Rawlinson family of Saskatchewan, which controls three radio stations, a television station, and a cable television system in that province. Others, perhaps resolved to their subordinate position in the media market, have invested in their larger "competitors:" Canadian Cablesystems, for example, holds a 6% interest in Bushnell Communications (controlled 66% by the Standard complex); while Cablecasting Limited holds a 33% interest in a Maclean-Hunter subsidiary, in addition to its relations with the Rogers complex.

In sum, the gap is wide in terms of the "structure of dominance" that characterizes the mass media industry. Where a particular media outlet can claim "independent ownership," that is, control by an individual or company with no other media properties, the outlet in question is typically located in a small urban or rural area, with low circulation.

The degree of ownership concentration is further illustrated by the proportion of the Canadian media market now controlled by the dominant complexes. Appendix 1 provides ownership and circulation for the 117 daily newspapers in Canada, on a provincial basis, while Table 4 summarizes the data for each complex that is engaged in daily newspaper publishing and compares this with their share of the daily newspaper market for 1970. The Southam, F. P., and Thomson complexes remain dominant in the field. In 1958, these three complexes controlled a combined daily newspaper circulation of 950,000 which represented approximately 25% of the total daily newspaper circulation in Canada. (Porter, 1965: 463) By 1970, their combined circulation had increased to 2,221,000 and the proportion to 47%. (Canada, Special Senate Committee on Mass Media, Report, II: 60) In 1978, their current combined daily newspaper circulation stands at 2,891,185 and accounts for 54% of the total daily newspaper circulation in Canada, more than double the 1958 figure. The Toronto Star, the core publication of the Torstar complex, itself accounts for an additional 12%, so that four complexes are responsible for 66% of the total daily newspaper circulation in Canada. Table 4 indicates that eight dominant complexes (those that publish

TABLE 4

Daily Newspaper Circulation Controlled
by the Dominant Media Complexes
1970 & 1978

<u>Complex</u>	<u># Daily Newspapers</u>		<u>Total Daily Newspaper Circ'n</u>		<u>% of Total Canadian Circ'n</u>	
	1970	1978	1970	1978	1970	1978
Southam	11	16	849,364	1,217,117	18.0	22.9
Free Press	8	10	855,170	1,174,439	18.2	22.1
Torstar	2	1	395,210	632,468	8.4	11.9
Thomson	30	35	400,615	499,629	8.5	9.4
Power	4	5	319,770	443,105	6.8	8.3
Quebecor	2	2	60,045	233,164	1.3	4.4
Irving	5	5	104,442	125,259	2.2	2.4
Armadales	2	2	115,785	115,280	2.5	2.2
TOTAL	64	76	3,100,401	4,440,461	65.8%	83.6%
TOTAL CANADA	116	117	4,710,865	5,312,499	100.0%	100.0%

SOURCE: (1970 data) Canada, Special Senate Committee
on Mass Media, Report, 1970, II: 58, 60.

daily newspapers) have increased their total dailies from sixty-four in 1970 to seventy-six in 1978 and their share of the total circulation from 65.8% in 1970 to 83.6% in 1978. Provincial proportions are even more striking, ranging from 28% in Nova Scotia (a relatively "dominant-free" province) to 94% in Alberta and Manitoba to 100% in Saskatchewan. In seven of the ten provinces, the dominants control more than 80% of all daily newspaper circulation. As Appendix 1 indicates, the "independent" dailies are each located in small population centres with relatively low circulations. The only notable exception is the Toronto Sun (established in 1971), which claims twenty per cent of Toronto's total daily newspaper circulation.

There are approximately 276 consumer magazines in Canada that range from general editorial (approximately 51) to specialized trade publications (approximately 225).⁴ Very few could be said to have a mass circulation; indeed, no more than fifteen to twenty have a circulation greater than 100,000. Table 5 presents ownership and circulation data for the ten leading consumer magazines. Two of the dominant complexes, Maclean-Hunter and Torstar, control five of the top ten and four of the five leading mass market magazines in Canada. Maclean-Hunter and Southam together control 181 trade periodicals with a combined circulation of 1.9 million or more than 80% of the total 225 trade periodicals. Moreover, all four of the major national roto publications are controlled by three of the dominant complexes: Canadian Homes (Torstar, monthly circulation 2,023,968), The Canadian Magazine (Torstar, weekly circulation 2,023,968), Perspectives (Power, weekly circulation

TABLE 5

Ownership and Circulation
of the Ten Leading
Consumer Magazines

Magazine	Circulation	Ownership
1. Reader's Digest	1,566,030	U.S.
2. Homemaker's/ Madame au Foyer	1,500,000	TORSTAR
3. Chatelaine	1,262,234	MACLEAN-HUNTER
4. Maclean's/ L'Actualite	917,499	MACLEAN-HUNTER
5. Quest	701,025	TORSTAR
6. Legion Magazine	434,969	Canvet Publications
7. United Church Observer	311,801	United Church of Canada
8. Time	300,654	U.S.
9. Toronto Calendar	205,840	Calendar Magazines
10. Miss Chatelaine	173,787	MACLEAN-HUNTER

SOURCE: Circulation data are taken from Canadian Advertising Rates & Data, March 1978. Figures represent average total paid circulation and include both English- and French-language editions where applicable. Note that the three Torstar publications are each controlled circulation magazines.

837,004), and Weekend Magazine (F. P., weekly circulation 1,735,331). These publications together reach 61% of all Canadian households and 74% of all centres with a population greater than 100,000. (Media Digest, 1977: 39)

Broadcasting stations in Canada, especially television stations, are also predominantly controlled by the large complexes. Appendices 2 and 3 provide ownership and circulation data for radio and television respectively. There are 178 AM and sixty-one FM radio stations with a circulation greater than 25,000 for a total of 239 major radio stations in Canada. The dominant complexes control a total of eighty radio stations (fifty-five AM and twenty-five FM) or 33% of these. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation owns fifty-one (thirty-nine AM and twelve FM) of its 129 affiliated radio stations in Canada. Slightly more than half of these stations (twenty-seven) have a circulation greater than 25,000, so that the C.B.C. owns 11% of the major radio stations. It is important to note that the C.B.C. is less significant as the owner of broadcasting stations than as the producer of network programming: only twenty-nine of the 115 originating television stations in Canada (25%) are actually owned by the Corporation, while 52% of the C.B.C. television affiliates are privately-owned, many by the dominant complexes. Thus both the C.B.C. radio and television networks are predominantly composed of private stations.⁵ In contrast, the Global television network in Ontario owns and operates all of its affiliated stations, which have a total circulation of 4.8 million throughout the province. At the national level, the C.T.V. television network

(the major network competitor of the C.B.C.) has twenty-one affiliated stations across Canada, fifteen of which are controlled by the dominant complexes. Of the total eighty-six private television stations in Canada, forty-six or 53% are controlled by the dominant complexes.

The dominant complexes also hold a privileged position in other sectors of the media industry, including cable television, television programme production, film production, and various media-related interests. Maclean-Hunter Cable TV Limited, which operates the complex's cable television systems, is the fourth largest cable company in Canada with more than 250,000 subscribers. The cable companies associated with the Rogers and Moffat complexes hold sixth and seventh position respectively.⁶ The Baton complex controls the third largest television programme production centre in North America.

While the seventeen dominant complexes hold extensive interests in all media and in various media-related concerns, it is significant that their holdings are greatest in those media which have the highest consumption rates and are thus distinctively "mass" in nature: daily newspapers, radio, and television. Perhaps more significant is the fact that their holdings tend to include outlets which cannot compare either in size, circulation, or in some cases prestige, to those owned by their subordinates in the media field (for example, the Toronto Globe & Mail, CFTO-TV Toronto, CFRB-AM Toronto, La Presse in Montreal, the Ottawa Journal, the Vancouver Sun, etc., etc.). Perhaps even more significant is the fact that their media properties operate

primarily in the major urban centres, and several are circulated at the national level (for example, Maclean's, the Financial Post, the C.T.V. television network, the roto magazines, etc.).

The following discussion of the dominant media complexes will serve to illustrate further their position within the Canadian media market, and to lay some preliminary foundations for the identification of dominant media capitalists in Chapter 4.

(i) The Armadale Complex

Sir Clifford Sifton initiated this complex in 1889 through his purchase of the Winnipeg Free Press. The Sifton family acquired the Regina Leader-Post, the Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, the Saskatchewan Farmer, and CKCK-AM Regina in 1928. In 1940, CFRC-AM Winnipeg, CKRM-AM Regina, and a one-third interest in All Canada Radio were added to the family's media properties. The following year the Siftons purchased a 50% interest in CKOC-AM Hamilton, and in 1947, a substantial interest in Quality Records Limited. CKRM was sold in 1950. Three years later Clifford Jr. and Victor divided their media interests, and in 1954, Clifford Jr. added CKCK-TV Regina to the Armadale complex. The Saskatchewan Farmer ceased publication in 1958, and in 1965, the interest in All Canada Radio was sold. Toronto Life magazine was acquired in 1967, and in the following year, a 25% interest in CFJR-AM Brockville, Ontario. The complex underwent a re-organization in 1970 that placed the broadcasting outlets

under the operation of Armadale Communications Limited and the publishing interests primarily under Armadale Publishers Limited. (Canada, Special Senate Committee on Mass Media, Report, II: 99-100) At the present time, the family's media properties include the Regina Leader-Post, the Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, and several radio and television stations variously located in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario. Michael Sifton, grandson of Sir Clifford, now carries on the three-generation of media control.

(ii) The Baton Complex

Baton Broadcasting Incorporated functions as the principal operating company for the interests of the Bassett and Eaton families. (Presumably, "Baton" was coined as a merger of the two surnames). The Bassett family, like the Siftons, also represents three generations of media control. The elder John Bassett published the Montreal Gazette, at the time considered a "highbrow morning newspaper that championed a business-minded conservatism." (Rutherford, 1978: 50) The Bassett men have never been particularly subtle about their political leanings. John White Hughes Bassett, son of John Sr. and chairman of Baton Broadcasting Incorporated, once unabashedly indicated his attitude toward media ownership concentration:

My ambitions are boundless. I'm only bound by two things. Money and the C.R.T.C. If I had unlimited wealth and the C.R.T.C. would let me have all the electronic media I wanted, I'd be a real pig. I like it. And if you're in business, you want more, you want to be a pig.

(cited in Zwelling, 1972: 116)

The Baton holdings extend through weekly newspapers to radio and television stations to television programme production. The wholly-owned Glen Warren Productions Limited, with branches in Chicago and Detroit, is the third largest television centre in North America, producing a substantial volume of programming for the large U. S. networks.⁷ More recently, the complex has acquired interests in several film production companies. Douglas Graeme and John F. Bassett, grandsons of the Montreal publisher, are each active in these diversified operations; the former as vice-president of Baton Broadcasting. The Eaton family is represented on the board by Fredrik Stefan Eaton.

John Bassett's "boundless ambitions" have recently led him to seek control of another dominant complex, Multiple Access Limited. The acquisition currently awaits C.R.T.C. approval, which, if granted, would increase the total circulation of the Baton complex from 5.5 to 10.6 million and place three of the largest television stations in Canada as well as the C.T.V. network under Bassett's control. The proposal was reportedly inspired by his "love of broadcasting and a desire to do his bit to help the cause celebre of national unity." (Laws, 1978)

(iii) The CHUM Complex

CHUM is a Toronto-based media complex controlled by

Allan Waters, who holds more than 80% of the voting shares. It was incorporated in 1944 as York Broadcasters Limited and operated CHUM-AM in Toronto. In 1962 "Radio CHUM 1050" acquired an interest in CKPT-AM Peterborough, and in the following year opened CHUM-FM in Toronto. In 1965 the company acquired a 50% interest in CJCH-AM Halifax and a one-third interest in CKVR-TV Barrie, Ontario. In 1967 the company gained control of CFRA-AM and CFMO-FM in Ottawa and for the first time offered its shares publicly. In 1968 the company acquired effective control of CKVR-TV Barrie and in the following year changed its name to CHUM Limited. In 1970 it acquired the remaining 50% of CJCH-AM Halifax and shortly thereafter several other radio and television stations in the Maritime provinces. In 1975 CHUM Limited received the C.R.T.C.'s approval to establish FM radio stations in those cities where it already operated AM stations. The complex now holds direct controlling interests in eleven radio stations and nineteen television stations that stretch from Halifax to Vancouver; its total audience has increased from 1.2 million in 1970 to over six million in 1978.⁸ (Canada, Special Senate Committee on Mass Media, Report, II: 80) CHUM is also engaged in film production, popular music production, and record distribution. Its interests extend outside the media field to alarms systems, marketing research, and events management.

(iv) Free Press Publications

The F. P. complex arose largely as a result of conflicts

between the sons of Sir Clifford Sifton. In 1953 Victor Sifton merged his share of the family's media interests with the media holdings of Max Bell to form F. P. Publications in 1959. Two years later Victor Sifton died, leaving Bell to direct the media operations. In 1963 the purchase of the Vancouver Sun placed the organization in a partnership with the Southam complex through Pacific Press Limited. Undoubtedly its most significant acquisition was the Toronto Globe & Mail in 1965, which increased its total daily circulation to more than 780,000. (Kesterton, 1967: 78) Its more recent purchase of the Montreal Star and Weekend Magazine is certainly not without significance; it can now claim control of nine major metropolitan daily newspapers, in addition to its two weeklies, two periodicals, and its minor interests in two cable television systems. The McConnell family of Montreal continues its association with this complex through Starlaw Investments Limited, which holds 25% of the shares of Free Press Publications Limited, the main operating company. The remaining shares are primarily held by the estates of Victor Sifton and Max Bell, for which R. Howard Webster and Richard Sankey Malone act as trustees. Each man holds additional shares on his own behalf. R. Howard Webster assumed control of the Toronto Globe & Mail in 1955 and is now chairman of that company and of F. P. itself. Brigadier Richard Sankey Malone is president of F. P., president and publisher of the Winnipeg Free Press, chairman of Sun Publishing Company Limited, and director of several other newspapers, including the Toronto Globe & Mail. Other F. P. directors

include Donald C. McGavin (also a director of the Toronto Globe & Mail) and James Stuart Keate, publisher of the Vancouver Sun and director of Sun Publishing Company Limited.

(v) Global Communications Limited

Global Communications Limited operates the Global television network in Ontario, which owns all six of its affiliated stations and has a total circulation of 4,826,000. As discussed earlier, the network was originally controlled by I.W.C. Communications Limited, which at the time held substantial interests in radio stations and cable television systems. In 1977 control of the network passed to Global Ventures Western Limited, which is effectively controlled by Paul Morton. Maclean-Hunter initially held a substantial interest in the network (36%) as did Odeon Theatres (Canada) Limited (28%). According to the most recent Bureau of Broadcast Measurement survey results,⁹ Global stations are watched an average of 3.8 hours per week by Ontario residents. This may well increase in future, given the network's recent acquisition of the exclusive Canadian rights to the popular Norman Lear programmes of the United States.

(vi) The Irving Complex

The Irving complex continues to enjoy a near-monopoly ownership of New Brunswick media that includes all five English-

language daily newspapers in the province, a Saint John radio station, and seven of the fifteen television stations throughout the province, including the C.B.C. affiliates in Saint John, Moncton, and Campbellton. The only alternatives to Irving media are the French-language daily newspaper L'Evangeline in Moncton, the C.B.C. French-language television station in Moncton, three television stations controlled by the CHUM complex, and a few independent radio stations. In total, fourteen of the twenty-eight media outlets in the province form part of the Irving conglomerate, now controlled by K. C. Irving's three sons James, Arthur, and John. As K. C. explained to former New Brunswick premier Louis Robichaud: "We're just a couple of Kent County boys trying to do the best for the province." (cited in Belliveau, 1972: 29) What was good for the province turned out to be not so bad for K. C. either: his personal fortune has been estimated at more than \$600 million. (Belliveau, 1972: 30)

K. C. Irving first entered the media field in 1944 when the two Saint John daily newspapers, the Telegraph-Journal and the Evening Times-Globe, were purchased. In 1948 the two Moncton dailies were added to his media properties. In 1968 the Irvings acquired a substantial interest in the Fredericton Gleaner, which by 1971 had increased to 100%. (Canada, Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration, Study #16, 1977: 19) In that year Irving was charged under the Combines Investigation Act in New Brunswick provincial court with regard to the newspaper monopoly, and ultimately acquitted when the case finally reached the Supreme Court of Canada. In 1972, before the trial began, John Irving

announced a corporate re-organization that reduced his father's personal shareholdings to a 20% interest in New Brunswick Publishing Limited. John received Moncton Publishing Company Limited (the Moncton Times and the Moncton Transcript) and University Press of New Brunswick Limited (the Gleaner and the monthly magazine Atlantic Advocate), while James and Arthur assumed control of New Brunswick Publishing Company Limited which in turn controls New Brunswick Broadcasting Company Limited. Nevertheless, it would be naive to suggest that K. C. is no longer a key force.

(vii) Maclean-Hunter

Fragments of Maclean-Hunter history were indicated in the previous chapter. John Bayne McLean's early publishing successes led, as early as 1895, to the establishment of branch offices in London, England, and U. S. subsidiaries in 1927. (McLean altered the spelling of his surname a number of times through the year, finally settling on the present spelling of Maclean). The company had established sturdy roots in the Canadian publishing industry by the early 1900s. Periodical publishing was the major activity throughout the first half of the twentieth century; in the period 1920 to 1949, seventeen new Canadian publications were started or acquired and two were merged or sold. Between 1950 and 1964, thirty new Canadian publications were added, while five were discontinued, merged, or sold. Shares were first offered to the public in 1965, and

in the following year, Maclean-Hunter entered the broadcasting sector through its acquisition of CKEY-AM Toronto plus Calgary's CFCN-AM, CJAM-FM, and CFCN-TV with its rebroadcast stations in Lethbridge, Banff, and other Alberta communities. The following year led the complex into the cable television sector: it acquired systems throughout Ontario and established Maclean-Hunter Cable TV Limited to operate them. Three years passed before the complex ventured out again, yet the time lapse was more than compensated for by the volume of acquisitions. The Co-operative Book Centre of Canada Limited was purchased in 1970. The year 1971 marked the entry into the business forms industry as three such corporations entered the complex. In 1972, with the Davey Report safely shelved away, it was time to accumulate additional radio and cable television interests, in order to complement the eight publications that had been acquired and the twenty-five new publications that had been introduced. By the end of 1973, Maclean-Hunter had attained the status of a veritable empire: it had acquired all the shares of the Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, the book publishing house; a 36% interest in the new Global television network; a 100% interest in the Metro News group of companies; and a controlling interest in KEG Productions Limited. The introduction to the complex's thirty-three page 1974 Annual Report acknowledged the trend:

Maclean-Hunter has diversified so much during the past fifteen years that a simple explanation of what we do is no longer possible ... we have broadened to the point that we now call ourselves a communications company.

The 1975 and 1976 Reports together listed a total of thirty-two new "profit centres" that included several new publications, a radio station, and a cable television system. In contrast, only six properties (five trade periodicals and an unprofitable 50% interest in an Orillia radio station) were discontinued. (1975: 2-3; 1976: 3)

In terms of total Canadian media outlets controlled, Maclean-Hunter is the largest of the seventeen complexes with 149 outlets under its wing (Southam follows with 148). Donald Hunter's retirement in 1976 marked the end of a ninety-year tradition whereby Colonel McLean and then the Hunter family had exercised a direct and immediate control of their interests in Canadian mass media. His death in the same year passed control to Donald Campbell, a long-time associate who had assumed the position of chairman. Through a somewhat complex arrangement, the Hunter shares were re-distributed among Campbell and several other directors. An anonymous shareholder, through a Wood Gundy account, obtained 33.8% of the 3.4 million shares.¹⁰ Nevertheless, it appears that control remains with the members of the board,¹¹ who include Lloyd M. Hodgkinson, vice-president of the magazine division and publisher of Maclean's; Doris H. Anderson, editor for nineteen years of Chatelaine; Paul Septimus Deacon, editor and publisher of the Financial Post; Peter C. Newman, editor of Maclean's; and Floyd Sherman Chalmers, who was for seventeen years Financial Post editor.

(viii) The Moffat Complex

Moffat Communications Limited has a much shorter history. Established in 1954, it operates radio stations in Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, Moose Jaw, and Winnipeg, as well as the Winnipeg C.T.V. affiliate and two cable systems in Manitoba, for a total circulation of 3,033,700. Through a subsidiary, the company also offers wholesale vacation tours. Effective control is exercised by Randall Moffat through his ownership of 47% of the voting shares. In 1977 Moffat attempted to acquire all the shares of CKOY Limited, which operates AM and FM stations in Ottawa, yet it did not receive C.R.T.C. approval for the purchase. This year Moffat announced its plans to acquire other unspecified media properties in the eastern provinces. (Keddy, 1978)

(ix) Multiple Access Limited

At the present time, Multiple Access Limited controls CFCF-AM, CFCF-TV, and a short wave station in Montreal, in addition to its controlling interest in CITY-TV Toronto,¹² for a total circulation of 5,150,100. It also owns 100% of Champlain Productions Limited, which produces television programmes primarily for the C.T.V. television network, in which it also holds a 16% interest, second only to that of the Baton complex. It is also in partnership with the Maclean-Hunter complex through Paul Mulvihill Limited, a broadcast sales company. Multiple Access

Limited is controlled by the Bronfman family through Mainvest Communications Limited.

(x) The Power Complex

While Power Corporation is not typically regarded as a media company, its extensive media holdings easily qualify it as the core of a dominant media complex. Figure 1 plots the ownership linkages between Power Corporation and a total of forty-eight media outlets in Quebec, not to mention the ownership linkages with the Standard media complex. Paul Desmarais, Jacques Francoeur, and Claude Pratte are the key figures in the Power media organization, while Peter D. Curry, Arthur Deane Nesbitt, and Wilbrod Bherer also play significant roles. Through Gelco Enterprises Limited, Desmarais acquired Trans-Canada Corporation Fund in 1965 which in turn owned Le Petit Journal; this was Desmarais' introduction to the media field. (Canada, Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration, Study # 10, 1976: 37ff) Trans-Canada Corporation Fund sold Le Petit Journal in 1966 and in 1967 it re-appeared in the T.C.C.F. portfolio under the guise of Trans-Canada Newspapers Limited/Les Journeaux Trans-Canada Limitee. Trans-Canada Newspapers Limited acquired three additional daily newspapers: Le Nouvelliste (Trois-Rivieres), La Tribune (Sherbrooke), La Voix de l'Est (Granby), as well as several weeklies. In a separate transaction, T.C.C.F. purchased 100% of La Presse, the major daily newspaper in Quebec and the largest French-language daily newspaper in North

FIGURE 1: THE POWER MEDIA COMPLEX




FIGURE 1 (Continued)

—————→ indicates effective control

-----→ indicates interest does not constitute effective control

* Power Corporation also holds 100% of the non-voting shares of Gesca and 53% of the non-voting shares of Argus Corporation.

SOURCE: Compiled from C.R.T.C. unpublished records, with modifications based on Intercompany Ownership 1975, Volume I, Chart 19 and Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration Study #10 (August 1976), Table III: 46.

America, with a 1978 circulation of 219,850. Following the initial acquisition of T.C.C.F., Power Corporation held its interests in the newspapers through a \$17.8 million income debenture of the newly created Gesca Limitee and in radio and television through its 100% control of CKAC Limitee and 50% ownership of Telemedia (Quebec) Limitee (now Telemedia Communications Limitee), which in turn owned a number of radio and television stations. Power Corporation acquired the remaining 50% of Telemedia in 1968. In 1969, immediately prior to the Davey Committee investigations into media ownership concentration, Power orchestrated a deal whereby its broadcasting interests were no longer directly held. CKAC and Telemedia were sold to Philippe de Gaspé Beaubien in return for a \$7.25 million general mortgage bond that in 1975 was converted to a \$8.8 million income debenture. Power Corporation still retains final control. In 1973 Jacques Francoeur sold his shares in Trans-Canada Newspapers Limited, yet received the weekly newspapers. Gesca Limitee retained the four daily newspapers and acquired Montreal-Matin, a daily newspaper which had been the organ of the Union Nationale. In the same year, Desmarais announced plans to acquire Le Soleil of Quebec City. The proposal was strongly opposed by the Federation Professionnelle des Journalistes du Quebec, the Conseil de Presse, several editors including Claude Ryan of Le Devoir, three major unions, and others, on the grounds that it would "threaten freedom of the press." (Canada, Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration, Study #10, 1976: 39) Desmarais agreed to delay the purchase until after a provincial

election in the autumn of 1973. In 1974 Le Soleil was sold to Jacques Francoeur.

It is important to note that Telemedia was itself a dominant media complex in its own right prior to its acquisition by Power Corporation. Through Claude Pratte, Power is also linked with Tele-Capital Limited, which controls a radio station in Montreal, two radio stations and two television stations in Quebec City, for a combined circulation of 2.2 million. The total circulation of all forty-eight media outlets associated with Power Corporation is 6.3 million. All of these outlets operate in the province of Quebec.

(xi) The Quebecor Complex

Quebecor Incorporated, a newly dominant complex, is the child of the aggressive Pierre Peladeau, who holds 73% of the voting shares. In the space of only twelve years, Quebecor has emerged as one of the largest publishers of French-language newspapers in Canada, almost challenging Power's print holdings in Quebec. Peladeau began by successfully reviving the popularity of the tabloid in the middle of the 1960s with his Le Journal de Montreal and Le Journal de Quebec; both dailies have experienced steadily increasing levels of circulation, culminating in an astonishing 6.7% and 21.1% respective increase between 1976 and 1977. In 1977 alone, Peladeau established a book publishing house, concretized interests in film production, purchased a Toronto-based printing operation, and launched a new daily

newspaper in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U. S. Each of these ventures added to an already substantial list of holdings based in Quebec, that includes English- and French-language periodicals, the two daily newspapers, a plethora of regional weeklies, a publication distribution firm, and four major printing plants. It appears that Quebecor's future plans should not be taken lightly: "We expect in future to broaden our horizons and expand the activities in which we have experience throughout the entire North American market." (Quebecor Incorporated, Annual Report, 1977: 2)


(xii) The Rogers Complex

Edward S. Rogers Family Holdings Limited is the parent corporation for a group of private companies controlled by that family and linked with the Grahams (see Figure 2). The primary interests are in five radio stations with a total circulation of 1,899,700 and four cable television systems in Ontario. The cable interests include substantial investments in the two largest cable companies in Canada, Canadian Cablesystems Limited and Premier Cablevision Limited. The Rogers family interests also extend beyond the media field to real estate and television set rentals.

(xiii) The Southam Complex

The Southam complex is beyond doubt the champion of

FIGURE 2: THE ROGERS COMPLEX



129

—————> indicates effective control - - - - -> indicates interest
 does not constitute effective control - . - . - . - . - . - .> indicates joint ownership

SOURCE: Based on Intercompany Ownership 1975, Volume II, Part I: 96-97.

media ownership concentration in Canada. William Southam's purchase of the Hamilton Spectator in 1877 set the precedent for a steady stream of newspaper acquisitions including the Ottawa Citizen (1897), the Calgary Herald (1908), the Edmonton Journal (1912), the Winnipeg Tribune (1920), the Vancouver Province (1923), the Medicine Hat News (1948), and the North Bay Nugget (1956). The weekly Bow Island Graphic and Hugh C. MacLean Publications, which later became Southam Business Publications Limited, were acquired in 1960. Later newspaper acquisitions included the Financial Times of Canada (1961), the Montreal Gazette (1969), the Owen Sound Sun-Times (1969), the Prince George Citizen (1969), the Brantford Expositor (1971), the Windsor Star (1971), and the Sault Star (1975). In 1965 a partnership was formed with the Torstar complex through Southstar Publishers Limited, which publishes the weekly magazine The Canadian. Southam also acquired a 48% interest in the Kitchener-Waterloo Record (1953) and a 49% interest in the Brandon Sun (1967). National Business Publications Limited was acquired in 1970. Seccombe House Limited, Canadian Mailings Limited, and Daily Commercial News Limited were purchased in 1971 and C. O. Nickle Publications Company Limited in 1972. Les Publications Eclair Limitee, which publishes TV Hebdo, was acquired in 1973. In 1974 Southam purchased Canadian Publishers Company Limited and in 1976 entered into a partnership with Beaubien and Telemedia in order to publish TV Guide.

Currently, the Southam family holds the largest (in terms of circulation, which stands at 16.6 million) and most

diversified interests in media and media-related fields of all seventeen complexes, including daily newspapers, weekly newspapers, consumer and trade periodicals, radio stations, television stations, and cable television systems. No medium has been left untouched by Southam control. The combined circulation of its daily newspapers totals 1,217,117 and accounts for 23% of the total daily newspaper circulation in Canada. Through All Canada Radio-TV Limited, Southam acts as a media sales representative for ninety broadcasting stations across Canada. The complex also owns 100% of Quality Records Limited and 60% of Robert Lawrence Productions Limited, which is engaged in television and film production. Control of the complex continues to be exercised by Southam family members, who occupy eight positions on the board of Southam Press Limited and three positions on the board of Selkirk Holdings Limited.

(xiv) The Standard Complex

Standard Broadcasting Corporation Limited was incorporated in 1925 as the Standard Radio Manufacturing Corporation and in 1929 the name was changed to Rogers-Majestic Corporation Limited. In 1941 the name was again changed to Standard Radio Limited. Argus Corporation first acquired its interest in the complex in 1946, at which time three Argus directors joined the board and were later accompanied by A. B. Matthews and E. W. Bickle in the early 1950s.¹³ The powerful radio station CFRB-AM Toronto, was, and is, at the

core of Standard's media operations. In 1960 CJAD-AM . Montreal, Radio Time Sales (Quebec) Limited, and Radio Time Sales (Ontario) Limited were acquired, and the latter company was later incorporated into Standard Broadcast Sales Limited. FM stations for CFRB Toronto and CJAD Montreal were launched in 1961 and 1962 respectively. In 1963 the company first engaged in the supply of background music services. In 1966 Canadian Standard Broadcast Sales was incorporated in New York as the U. S. counterpart to Standard Broadcast Sales. In the same year Standard Broadcast Productions was created to produce and distribute syndicated Canadian programme material for radio stations. This company subsequently created Standard Broadcast News Limited, which provides news reports to subscribing stations across Canada. Standard Sound Systems was later formed as a wholly-owned subsidiary to operate the background music services in Toronto and Montreal. The Toronto operation was sold in 1968 with the acquisition of the Muzak franchise for Montreal, Quebec City, and the Maritime provinces. In the same year the corporate name was changed to Standard Broadcasting Corporation Limited, its present title. (Canada, Special Senate Committee on Mass Media, Report, 1970, II: 106-07)

While the Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration (the Bryce Commission) would have us lament Standard's frustrated acquisition attempts over the years,¹⁴ there is little need to empathize with the complex's position. The C.R.T.C. was more than kind when, in 1975, it approved Standard's acquisition of Bushnell Communications Limited, then a dominant complex in its

own right, through the purchase of 52% of the common voting shares. Standard's share in Bushnell has since increased to 66%. (Standard Broadcasting Corporation Limited, Annual Report, 1976-77: 12) As a result of the initial take-over, Standard's media properties increased to include seventeen radio stations, six television stations, three cable television systems, and a substantial number of media-related interests. Total circulation presently stands at 5,605,000. Argus Corporation now holds more than 48% of the common voting shares, and continues to exercise effective control of the complex. Six Argus directors sit on the eleven-member board of the main operating company.¹⁵

(xv) The Thomson Complex

Lord Thomson was of course a true pioneer of media ownership concentration, who constructed an international media empire that remains powerful to this day. The Canadian operations date back to 1932, when Northern Broadcasting and Publishing Limited was first incorporated. The Timmins Press, founded by Lord Thomson in 1934, was acquired by Northern in 1939. Thomson Publishing Company was incorporated in 1944 to acquire the Sarnia Observer, the Welland-Port Colbourne Evening Tribune, the Woodstock Daily Sentinel-Review, and the Galt Evening Reporter. Thomson Publishing subsequently acquired the Northern Daily News of Kirkland Lake, Ontario. In 1947 Northern sold its broadcasting outlets and acquired the Guelph Daily Mercury and the Chatham Daily News; in the same year, it was amalgamated with Thomson

Publishing to form Thomson Company Limited, which in 1958 became Thomson Newspapers Limited. Shares were first offered to the public in 1965, yet following the sales, approximately 80% of the common voting shares were still held through holding companies or through Thomson family trusts. In 1967 the company acquired Brush-Moore Newspapers through its U. S. subsidiary, Thomson Newspapers Incorporated. The Peterborough Examiner was purchased from the Davies family in 1968, and later the St. John's Telegram and the Corner Brook Western Star from the Herder family of Newfoundland. (Canada, Special Senate Committee on Mass Media, Report, 1970, II: 110-11) In 1970 the C.R.T.C. approved the transfer of the broadcasting properties to Bushnell Communications Limited (later, as discussed, to become the properties of the Standard complex). Throughout the 1970s, the Thomson complex has continued to pursue its policy to acquire small newspapers that serve small urban and rural centres. Kenneth Thomson controls the Canadian media properties, which include thirty-five daily newspapers and fourteen weekly newspapers with a total circulation of 570,158. Through Kentholm Holdings Limited, the Thomson complex also retains its interests in two Ontario cable television systems.

(xvi) The Torstar Complex

The Torstar complex also represents a firmly established tradition of media control in Canada. Toronto Star Limited was founded in 1892 as the Star Printing and Publishing Company

Limited. Joseph E. Atkinson acquired control of the company in the early 1900s and retained control until his death in 1948. The Atkinson family retains control of the complex: Ruth Hindmarsh, Joseph Atkinson's daughter, and Catherine Atkinson Crang represent the family's interests as directors of the newly formed parent company, Torstar Corporation Limited. Beland Honderich, president and publisher of the Toronto Star, is also a leading force. The Toronto daily newspaper is the largest in Canada with a daily average circulation that has increased from 387,418 in 1970 to 632,468 in 1978. (Canada, Special Senate Committee on Mass Media, Report, 1970, II: 113) At one time Toronto Star Limited was engaged in a partnership with the Thomson complex for the purpose of publishing four weekly newspapers in the Toronto area. In the early 1970s, the two complexes divided these interests and each acquired full control. Torstar currently publishes thirteen weekly newspapers in the Toronto area with a total circulation of 408,843. It also publishes four mass market consumer magazines with a circulation of approximately 2.5 million.¹⁶ Its partnership with the Southam complex was noted earlier. It also owns 80% of Nielsen-Ferns Incorporated, which produces films and television programmes, and 53% of Harlequin Enterprises Limited, which publishes romantic fiction and educational materials. Through a share purchase agreement, Torstar's interest in Harlequin will increase to a minimum 67% by 1981. Torstar also holds 33% of the voting shares of the dominant Western complex; on several occasions it has indicated its interest in acquiring control of

Western.¹⁷

(xvii) The Western Complex

Western Broadcasting Corporation Limited was created as a public company in 1965. It has undergone tremendous expansion in the interim years, and currently has interests in seven radio stations and six television stations primarily located in the western provinces. It is also engaged in broadcast sales, music recording, and television programme production. Through British Columbia Television Broadcasting Limited, Western is in partnership with the Southam complex to operate several major television stations in British Columbia. While Torstar holds 33% of its voting shares, Western in turn holds 18% of Torstar Corporation and 18% of Harlequin Enterprises. Frank Griffiths, Walter S. Owen, and William J. Hughes are the three major shareholders of Western Broadcasting Corporation Limited; their total shares (48%) are controlled by Griffiths through a voting trust agreement. Western recently applied to the C.R.T.C. for approval to merge with Premier Cablevision Limited, the second largest cable television company in Canada, promising in return to establish a \$1 million television development fund to finance new Canadian programmes. It currently holds 26% of Premier. The total circulation of the Western complex is presently 4,049,900.

Conclusions: The Structure of Dominance

For their study of media ownership patterns in Britain, Murdock and Golding (1973) identified three dimensions of concentration that constitute three interrelated processes: integration (horizontal and vertical), diversification, and internationalization. Horizontal integration entails expansion and consolidation within a particular sector of media production in order "to maximize the economies of scale and shared resources," (1973: 213), while vertical integration takes place where a corporation expands its operations to include all stages of the production process, from the provision of raw materials to the organization of distribution and retail operations. "This considerably reduces the company's vulnerability to fluctuations in the supply and cost of essential materials and services and enables it to regulate and rationalize production more precisely and to increase its control over the market." (1973: 214) In the Canadian case, the process of horizontal integration is evident in all sectors and most fully developed within the newspaper publishing sector, taking root during the early 1900s and allowing those companies that acquired chains of dailies to partake in vertical integration later with the acquisition of printing companies, graphic ink manufacturing plants, distribution firms, etc. The relatively young Quebecor complex took this same path during the 1960s. The major consequence of these processes is a consolidation of the control, within each media sector, of a few large media corporations.

Diversification, which spreads this control across media sectors, is practically imperative for media companies in Canada, particularly for those engaged in periodical publishing. Maclean-Hunter is probably the most striking example of a company that diversified at a tremendous rate through the course of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Southam complex underwent diversification at a much earlier stage: by the early 1920s, the Southams held interests in "blast furnaces in Hamilton, steamers on the Lakes, corner lots in Montreal, milk and ice companies and department stores, gold mines and oil holes. Always with a view to swelling the surplus account of the family company." (Bruce, 1968: 183) Murdock and Golding note that "diversification enables companies to hedge their bets and to cushion the effects of recession in a particular sector." (1973: 219) For Maclean-Hunter, it has meant that their mass market consumer magazines have weathered the economic storms that have forced small independent magazine publishers into the fiscal grave. Their other media operations have acted as insurance against the precarious conditions that have historically confronted this sector. Diversification carries the additional advantage that a company can capitalize on the success of a product in one sector through the promotion and/or sale of "spin-offs" in other sectors. This is more characteristic of the industry in Britain than is the case for Canada (see Murdock and Golding, 1973: 220). It means, for example, that full page advertisements introducing new books published by the Macmillan Company of Canada appear regularly in the pages of Maclean-Hunter

magazines.

Internationalization bears the advantages of diversification on a grand scale, through its insurance against the economic pressures of the domestic market. This has been true for Maclean-Hunter, and for the seven other complexes that are multi-national in scope. Indeed, the process of horizontal integration (which, once fully developed, invites internationalization) has been underway for so long in Canada that the market for daily newspaper acquisitions is now virtually exhausted. This has forced the Southam complex to seek dailies elsewhere, and thus to enter, for the first time, the internationalization stage.¹⁸

Profitability further lubricates the process of concentration and centralization. The detailed documentations of the 1970 Davey Committee leave no doubt that mass media in Canada are not only "big business" but "good business," indeed, exceptionally good business. In part this has attracted and encouraged the entrance of dominant non-media companies, like Argus Corporation,¹⁹ into the media sector of the economy, and thus further increased the extensive degree of interrelation between media and non-media sectors.²⁰ In 1965, for example, before-tax profits on equity in the daily newspaper sector equalled 30.5%, compared to 18.0% for the manufacturing industry and approximately 15.0% for most other industries. (Canada, Special Senate Committee on Mass Media, Report, 1970, II: 248) For companies that publish newspapers with circulations that exceed 100,000 (that is, all of the eight dominant complexes that publish dailies), the rate is considerably higher, reaching,

in 1967, 57.2%. The Davey Committee attributed their high profit rate to three factors:

First, newspapers in large metropolitan centres generally tend to be very profitable. Second, the large groups tend to purchase the more profitable newspaper companies. Third, many of the cost economies achieved through group ownership have been used to increase profits rather than to reduce advertising and subscription rates.

(1970, II: 242)

It was concluded that "the profit rates for daily newspapers indicate that monopoly power is being used, intentionally or unintentionally, to generate very high profits." (1970, II: 248)

The profitability of broadcasting enterprises also favours the dominant complexes, since "profitability of broadcasting in Canada is, as a general rule, a direct function of size: the larger the station, the higher the rates of profitability, whichever profit measure is used." (1970, II: 354)

There are other forces which ensure that the dominant media complexes remain locked in at the top of the ownership structure. The Canadian Press (C. P.) wire service has fulfilled this task for the dominants since its formation in 1923. The dominant media complexes are a leading force within the wire service, which itself is essential for all Canadian newspapers, in that it supplies most Canadian and international news for dailies in the most economically feasible fashion. Without C. P. membership, attempts to establish new independent newspapers are futile from the start. The clause of C. P.'s charter pertaining

to new memberships reads as follows:

Membership in the Canadian Press shall be open to the widest extent compatible with the expectation of an applicant being able to establish a newspaper as a self-sustaining business enterprise. No application shall be granted except under conditions which give reasonable assurance that the newspaper can be permanently established.

(cited in McNaught, 1940: 59)

New membership applications require the approval of a two-thirds majority of the board members present, and a majority of the full board. Even if the application is granted, the new member, if it operates in a place where there is an existing C. P. member, is required to pay an entrance fee equal to three times the annual assessment and district fixed charges. McNaught describes the C. P. board's intimidating powers:

... it is important to note the wide powers which have been conferred upon this organization. Its charter guarantees it against interference from any outside source, other than the courts of law, in the conduct of its affairs. It imposes its own conditions for admission to membership, and it can withhold membership on grounds of which its present members (the dominants) are the sole judges. The opinion of its membership as to 'reasonable assurance that the newspaper can be permanently established' determines whether a new paper shall or shall not be granted the membership which is practically essential to its existence.

(1940: 61; parenthetical
note added)

To conclude, ownership and control of the major mass media outlets in Canada is tightly concentrated within a relatively few powerful conglomerates that have historically

dominated, and that increasingly dominate, all sectors of the industry. There is nothing to suggest that their phenomenal rate of growth during recent periods is likely to subside. Indeed, it seems more probable, given the relatively stable and profitable nature of mass media enterprises (especially broadcasting undertakings), even during periods of general economic instability, that their rate of growth, and hence their span of control, will continue to accelerate. The dominant media complexes have established themselves at the upper reaches of what is both an economically lucrative capitalist enterprise and an ideologically lucrative social institution, complete with built-in and consciously co-ordinated mechanisms that ensure their continued ascendancy.

Appendix 4 provides a detailed listing of the media outlets controlled by each of the seventeen dominants. Together these complexes control a total Canadian circulation of more than seventy-eight million, a circulation based primarily on daily newspapers, radio, and television: the three media that obtain the largest audiences and the greatest consumption time, and the three media that are most significant for the process of ideological reproduction as it takes place in this particular social realm. Some indications of the control of the complexes have been suggested briefly. This question now requires further investigation.

Notes

1. All ownership data included in this chapter and throughout the thesis reflect the ownership structure as at March 1978. See the postscript to this thesis for an update to September 1978. Other than the now obsolete Report of the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media (the Davey Report), there are unfortunately no basic reference sources that draw together ownership data for Canadian media. It is, therefore, necessary to gather this data from a wide range of materials. The principal data sources utilized here are as follows: C.R.T.C. master ownership and amendment listings, C.R.T.C. unpublished records provided by the Ownership Review Division of the C.R.T.C., the Commission's annual reports, corporation annual reports, CALURA reports, Financial Post special reports and general issues (including Survey of Industrials), trade periodical accounts, financial press items, etc. Two U. S. sources include some Canadian data: Working Press of the Nation (4 volumes), Burlington, Iowa, National Research Bureau, 1975; and Television Factbook (especially for cable ownership), Washington, D. C., Television Digest Incorporated, 1978 edition.

2. There are several possible criteria of dominance which might be utilized, such as total assets, total circulation, and number of media outlets controlled. The use of the latter criterion blurs the distinction in the size, circulation, and type of media outlets operating in Canada. The use of "total assets" as a criterion misses the point that the media industry is engaged not only in the circulation of commodities but also in the circulation of ideology. It is therefore more important to consider the proportions of the Canadian population subject to the ideological outpourings of media products. Hence "total circulation" has been selected as the best criterion.

3. In part this problem is posed by the different measurements of circulation that are applied to each sector. Daily newspaper circulation figures represent daily average circulation (total paid excluding bulk) for primary readers only. Circulation figures for the broadcasting industry, on the other hand, represent weekly reach (see Appendix 2 for a precise definition) for what effectively includes both primary and secondary listeners/viewers.

4. These estimates are based on a calculation of the number of publications listed in the "consumer magazine" section of Canadian Advertising Rates & Data, March 1978. Thus the figures are imprecise; presumably, some magazines could have been excluded, while others may have been questionably classified by C.A.R.D. editors.

5. This is a critically important point that is addressed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

6. This was calculated according to data provided in Television Factbook (1978: 1044-48).

7. It is interesting to note that Glen Warren Productions Limited at one time owned 50% of Rogers Cable TV Limited. See the Report of the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media (1970, II: 99-100).

8. Actually, CHUM's total audience is now closer to eight million with the acquisition of CITY-TV Toronto in July 1978.

9. All circulation data included throughout the thesis are based on these results, which reflect the period spring 1978. See Appendices 2 and 3 where the precise dates for radio and television are specified.

10. See Appendix 5 where Maclean-Hunter's revised share structure is presented.

11. "During 1976, the company has undergone a shift of control from Mr. Donald F. Hunter and his family to the Maclean-Hunter Limited board of directors." So says the complex's 1975 Annual Report (1975: 1), which is not, of course, to suggest that the rhetoric contained in corporation annual reports is a good source of data regarding "control." The transfer of control to the directors is, however, also suggested in a Globe & Mail article (24 March 1976). See the share structure, Appendix 5.

12. See Note 8.

13. Interestingly enough, Argus' investment in Standard was listed in its annual reports under "other securities having a quoted market value" until 1960. The study undertaken for the Bryce Commission (1975: 74) states that: "It was not until 1975 that it became known that the original position had been taken in 1946 and 1947, that the major portion of its holding was acquired at that time and that additional purchases had been made in 1952, by which time Argus owned substantially its present (1975) position."

14. These include Standard's attempt to acquire the Toronto Globe & Mail (1952), the Toronto Star (1954), a licence for a Toronto television station (1938, 1945, 1959), CHML-AM and CKDS-FM Hamilton (1970) (poor timing on Standard's part), and CKOY Limited Ottawa (1972).

15. The six Argus directors include, based on Standard's Annual Report (1976-77): Alex E. Barron, George Montegu Black III, Alex D. Hamilton, A. Bruce Matthews, Hollis T. McCurdy, and Maxwell C. G. Meighen. John Angus McDougald, who died in 1977, is also listed.

16. The figure is an estimate since no data are available for The City magazine. Homemaker's has a circulation of 1,232,000; Madame au Foyer, the French edition, 268,000; and Quest 701,025.

17. Most recently in Amanda Bennett (9 February 1978): "If the opportunity arose 'we'd be very interested' in acquiring more shares of Western Broadcasting Company Limited of Vancouver, Mr. (William) Dimma said."

18. Southam announced that it is "actively seeking investment prospects outside Canada for the first time" (Content #86, 1978: 4) at its 1978 annual meeting, which shortly followed the release of its Annual Report; a Report that, paradoxically, featured on its cover a photograph of a hand-stitched Canadian flag.

19. The Argus study cited earlier (1975: 73) describes the corporation's motivation as follows: "the principals (Argus) envisaged assembling a broad communications network that would participate in post-war economic growth. Investigations had indicated that the growth potential of the communications industry satisfied their investment goals and the company (Standard), whose main asset was Toronto's foremost radio station, CFRB, appeared to be an excellent base on which to build."

20. The extent of this interrelation is analyzed in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER FOUR

DOMINANT MEDIA CAPITALISTS

Dominant media capitalists are defined as those who exercise control of the dominant media complexes and who therefore are in a position to (directly or indirectly) determine or otherwise affect the presentation of ideological themes through the mass media in Canada. This position of ideological power in turn has consequences for all of the Canadian social formation. It will first be necessary to discuss the question of control and its location within each of the complexes, in order to identify those media capitalists that are dominant, their shared characteristics, and their homogeneity. It will then be necessary, in the following chapter, to consider their precise role in the process of media production/ideological reproduction.

The Problem of Control and the Identification of Dominant Media Capitalists

There are a number of difficulties to be encountered in defining, identifying, and documenting the exercise of "control." The first problem is that of elucidating the concept of "control" itself. Few theorists have dealt sufficiently with this critical task. It may be useful in this regard to distinguish between qualitative and quantitative

measurements of "control." Is "control" a position or a function? In other words, is control inherent and/or restricted to specific positions within the hierarchical structure of a corporation, or is it possible that the control function may be assumed by any one individual or individuals at varying positions in this structure? What is the significance of interpersonal relations in determining the "real" locus of control? At the qualitative level, these are merely a few of the questions that arise. Perhaps the most vital consideration is the qualitative definition of "control" itself. Burnham (1941) is one of the few managerial theorists who has distinguished between types of control, that is, his distinction between control over access to the instruments of production and control over preferential treatment in the distribution of the products of production. For Burnham it is the separation of these two elements of the control function (as he defines it) that is most significant in terms of "managerial power." Control over access to the instruments of production, which, according to Burnham, is increasingly removed from owners and increasingly accorded to production managers, is the more crucial type of control.

If control is defined qualitatively in terms of the capacity or authority to recruit personnel at a particular level, as in Niosi's case for example (1977), one must decide at which level this type of control is most important: do the shareholders "control" because they elect the board of directors, do the directors "control" because they recruit

the upper levels of management, or do the managers "control" because they hire production supervisors and all other workers? If control is qualitatively defined in terms of the capacity or authority to make and/or implement decisions affecting the corporation's overall activities, one must decide what types of decisions and what types of activities are most crucial. Decisions affecting the everyday productive activities of the corporation with short-term implications are distinct from those which concern such matters as growth objectives, dividend payout ratios, supply and distribution arrangements, financing contracts, and so on, and which carry with them long-term implications. This then forces a distinction between "immediate" and "ultimate" control. It is probable that these kinds of problems would become quite cumbersome to one undertaking a qualitative analysis of corporate control.

At the quantitative level, it is necessary first and foremost to arrive at a working definition of effective control within a corporation, and to outline the parameters within which a quantitative analysis of control should operate. The most workable definition of "effective control" is probably that provided by the Gray Report (1972: 369), which is one of the few definitions that allows for variability in control structures. This factor is one that Berle and Means (1932), Larner (1970), and Niosi (1977) entirely ignore. (Berle and Means used an arbitrary minimum of 20%, Larner 10%, Niosi 5%). According to the Gray Report's definition, effective control of a corporation can be exercised in any of the following ways:

1) traditionally, through the ownership of 50% or more of the voting shares; 2) through a minority holding of the voting shares, where the remainder of the shares are widely dispersed; 3) through the ownership of corporate debentures; 4) through purchase or supply contracts; 5) through licensing arrangements and franchises; 6) through management contracts or other informal agreements; 7) through voting trusts, shareholder agreements, and other contractual arrangements; and 8) through any combination of the above.

While unquestionably it would be much "tidier," methodologically, to be able to apply a singular criterion consistently to all corporations in identifying control, this is not as realistically possible as it may be desirable. In fact, it could be argued that the use of variable criteria is an important step in the de-mystification of present complex forms of private ownership and control. To illustrate this point, one might imagine the difficulties that Berle and Means (1968), Larner (1970), and others would encounter in identifying effective control of the seventeen dominant complexes. The case demonstrates clearly the inadequacies of those analyses which rely solely on arbitrary minimums of voting share concentrations. Eight of the complexes are directly controlled through a majority holding of voting shares, five are controlled through voting trust agreements, three are controlled through a minority holding of voting shares where ownership of the remainder is widely dispersed, and in one case, control is exercised through both majority shareholdings and corporate debentures. Therefore,

Berle and Means, for example, would be able to definitively classify the type of control for less than half of the corporations; the remainder would be subject to cautionary statements regarding the tenuous nature of their conclusions.

Thus it is possible, for each of the seventeen dominant media complexes, to identify those individuals who qualify as dominant shareholders and who therefore exercise effective control based on share ownership, voting trust agreements, etc. It is also vital that one include directors who do not qualify as dominant shareholders, in addition to those dominant shareholders that do serve as directors. While several managerialists have made the attempt, it is difficult to argue against the position of control occupied by directors. In Porter's view, directors, individually and collectively, represent "formidable power." (1965: 253) The board of directors not only makes decisions regarding the recruitment and performance of management, but it also determines the context within which decisions are made at the management level. Thus its control extends to all levels of ownership and management within the corporation. In a similar vein, Clement regards the board of directors as a synthesis of ownership and management in that directors are elected by shareholders and in turn recruit management, thus acting as a mediator between major shareholders and senior executives. (1975: 21) Furthermore, the phenomenon of collegiality is most clearly manifest in activities which transpire at the level of directors:

... the collective power of the board is often greater than the individual power of an executive. Studies that do not include directors among the elite miss this important collective aspect of power.

(1977: 347)

At the same time, however, studies that include only directors exclude a small yet important segment of dominant shareholders who do not serve as directors. Inevitably, the extent of overlap between the group of major shareholders and the group of directors is very considerable. Nevertheless, those admittedly few cases which fail to adhere to this tendency can be crucial in terms of understanding and locating power. Witness the extreme case of New Brunswick Publishing Company Limited, a private corporation in which 997 of the 1,000 shares are held by K. C. Irving and his sons Arthur and James. No Irving sits on the board; the three directors (E. Kenneth Logan, Tom Crowther, and Ralph Costello) each hold one token share in compliance with provincial laws. Yet there can be no question that the Irving family exercises effective control of its publishing interests in New Brunswick, the majority of which are subsumed under the ownership of this company. One need only cite the account provided by Hunt and Campbell (1973), in which the extent of the family's control of its newspapers is well documented. It seems also that one would be hard put to find a New Brunswick resident unaware of the Irving presence in that province's newspaper publishing industry: in New Brunswick, newspaper publishing means Irving.

The point is that control need not be the exclusive domain of directors as such; it extends in very crucial ways beyond the four walls of the board room, to those individuals who exercise a very powerful form of control from the "sidelines," yet still basing their position of control on ownership rights. Irving is only one example of this critical form of control. Hence a thorough definition of control must include: firstly, dominant shareholders (identified according to the criteria listed) and secondly, directors. This procedure forms the basis for the identification of the dominant media capitalists.

In a recent article, Niosi (1977) questions the validity of including all directors, pointing out a need to distinguish dominant capitalists from their financial and legal advisors. These distinctions are difficult to draw and are susceptible to innumerable methodological errors.¹ The difficulties are underlined by the fact that, in the Canadian case at least, media capitalists and capitalists in general are predominantly educated in the "advisory" fields, i.e. finance, law, and engineering. Indeed, Porter and Clement each calculated (for 1951 and 1972 respectively) that more than 55% of the economic elite were trained in these fields.² It seems unlikely that "true capitalists" would allow themselves to be overrun in this manner by their "mere consultants," particularly in light of those cases where one director equals one vote. In terms of media capitalists, the case of Edward Rogers illustrates the problem well. Rogers graduated from Osgoode Hall Law School in 1961 and was called to the bar in 1962. However, in 1960, prior to his graduation

from law school, Rogers purchased his first media property, CHFI-FM Toronto; it was shortly to form the basis for the Rogers complex, over which Rogers personally exercises control. At no time has he engaged in the practice of law, nor can he be considered a mere legal advisor to the Rogers complex!

Moreover, given the homogeneity of media capitalists,³ their ongoing associations in both formal and informal contexts, and the collegial nature of directorial control, it is naive to suggest that "consultants" would be denied a voice in issues not directly related to their "specialized interests." Indeed, Niosi commits a serious error in overlooking the significance of collegiality both inside and outside the board room. In other words, the whole is clearly greater than the sum of its parts. This is not to suggest that each director holds equal weight by virtue of his position on the board; to the contrary, the power of each director is relative and the specific interests of directors may differ substantially. Clement illustrates this point:

Obviously, the persons in the board room have differing degrees of power. The president and vice-presidents will be principally concerned with operations, while the chairman's orientation will be toward general policy and external corporate relations. Some outside directors may represent specific financial ties or relations with the state, others may have particular legal skills, and some will be simply token representatives to give the corporation legitimacy. There will be internal hierarchies built around particular offices, committees, and large stock ownership. It is not possible to determine a priori which of these are the most powerful.

While the relative power of directors is a factor to be borne in mind, it should not therefore lead one to re-define the locus of control, or to subsequently reduce the number of individuals deemed to occupy positions of control.

A final problem is the need to identify the locus of control within a complex of related corporations. The existence of large conglomerates characterized by complex configurations of ownership renders more difficult the control identification process. This certainly applies to the dominant media complexes. Baldwin's recent article (1977) suggests three possible routes. Firstly, one could identify control at the level of individual media outlets and consider dominant all directors of the companies which stand in a direct ownership relation to these outlets. Baldwin admits that this method could become "rather cumbersome." (1977: 12n) This admission is a malapropism to top all malapropisms: there are well over three hundred subsidiary companies that would meet this criterion! The Maclean-Hunter complex alone boasts more than forty-seven subsidiaries and affiliates. For the Southam and Thomson complexes the total is much higher. The second alternative is to select the parent corporation to represent the complex, while as a third option Baldwin suggests selecting companies which have a controlling interest in the parent, although not necessarily operating directly in the media sector: the example of Nordex Limited is cited.

Baldwin selects the second alternative for what she admits are unconvincing reasons: because (according to Baldwin) Clement chose this route,⁴ because the Davey Committee did too,

and because more data were available for this level. The apparent popularity of a criterion hardly justifies its use. In any case, the selection of the parent corporation poses several problems. Firstly, it is difficult in many cases to identify which company is actually the parent; Baldwin illustrates this well in her mistaken identification of Gesca Limitee as the parent for the Power complex. Secondly, the boundaries between companies which can be said to operate primarily in the media sector and those which operate primarily in other sectors, are often unclear; hence some companies identified as "parent in the media sector" are either not in the media sector at all or their activities are not confined to the media sector. Baldwin, for example, selects Armadale Company Limited to represent the Armadale complex, which is neither the parent, nor is it a media company: Armadale Company controls Jonquil Limited and Armadale Enterprises Limited. Armadale Enterprises in turn controls Phoenix Leasing Limited, Toronto Airways Limited, and H. A. McLean Chevrolet Oldsmobile Limited, a car dealership contributed to the family's holdings by Heather Ann McLean Sifton, Michael Sifton's wife, whose father presumably willed it to her. Armadale Enterprises does, however, also control the two main operating companies: Armadale Publishers Limited and Armadale Communications Limited. Armadale Company, Baldwin's selection, is therefore twice removed from the two companies which actually operate the family's media holdings. Moreover, for the purpose of identifying the locus of control within this complex, it matters little which company

is selected, since in all four cases the dominant shareholders and directors are the same people: Michael Sifton is clearly the leading force, followed by Harold Crittenden and T. A. Cookson.

This raises the third problem with Baldwin's criterion. A company that appears to be the "parent in the media sector" may function merely as a holding company that exists only on paper, as in the case of Telegram Corporation, which Baldwin identifies as the "parent company in the media sector" for the Baton complex. Prior to the death of the Toronto Telegram in 1971, Telegram Corporation functioned as the parent company for Telegram Publishing (representing the daily newspaper), Inland Publishing (representing the weeklies), and Baton Broadcasting (representing the radio and television interests). It now functions as a mere holding company for Baton Broadcasting, which publishes the annual report. Like Mainvest Communications Limited of the Bronfman family complex (Multiple Access), Telegram Corporation is essentially the corporate title for a trust fund: 99.95% of the shares are held in trust for the sons of John Bassett Sr. and John David Eaton, while the trustee, Allan Leslie Beattie, is a director of Baton Broadcasting, the main operating company. There may be a few pieces of old stationery with the Telegram Corporation letterhead lying around Baton's offices, but the company is far removed from the daily concrete operations of the Bassett-Eaton media outlets. It would therefore be a serious error to select the shareholders and directors of Telegram Corporation to represent the Baton complex, either in 1972 or in 1978. Telegram Corporation basically "died" along

with the newspaper itself. Clearly, the correct choice is Baton Broadcasting Incorporated, since it is the main operating company for the Bassett-Eaton holdings. The same holds true in the case of the Armadale complex, where Baldwin incorrectly selects Armadale Company to represent the group. The same problem occurs in the case of the McConnell family properties, yet because this complex is no longer dominant, the question has become a non-issue.⁶

The final problem, then, with selecting the parent company in the media sector is that it is frequently far removed from the operations and interests of individual media outlets, which are, in the final analysis, the source of media production and the source of ideological propagation. Companies outside the media sector with controlling interests in the parent (Baldwin's third option) are generally even further removed from that process which is after all the major subject of concern. For our purposes here at least, the important question is that of ideological power and its location. It seems more likely to be located at the level where decisions regarding media operations are carried out, not where the concerns include car dealerships, leasing operations, etc. For these reasons, the main operating company for each complex has been selected to represent it for the purpose of identifying dominant shareholders and directors, that is, the company which most closely represents a direct relation to the majority or all of the media outlets controlled by a complex. The use of this criterion may require the exclusion of some outlets, yet, given other ownership relations and

directorship interlocks, the problem loses its significance.

Finally, it is important to realize that corporations are no more than legal structures in which capital is pooled and through which capital is accumulated; it is not corporations per se that exercise power, but people, particularly those people whose capital is represented in a corporation. People (individually or collectively) make decisions, select personnel, etc., not corporations as such. While the composition of the board of directors may differ somewhat from one company to another within a complex, those whose capital and therefore those whose interests are represented in the complex remain the same. For thirteen of the seventeen dominant media complexes, the same people are dominant shareholders in both the parent company and in the main operating company, while in the four other cases the parent company is the same as the main operating company. Thus the question of "immediate" versus "ultimate" control becomes largely a non-issue.

Table 6 lists the main operating company for each dominant media complex, as well as the number and proportion of individual media outlets in direct relation to the operating company for each case. It can be seen that it is not possible in every case to identify a single company as the main operating company. The Power and Irving complexes pose special problems. Baldwin's treatment of the former (1977a: 10-14) is problematic for several reasons. Gesca Limitee is not the parent company in the media sector, nor was it in 1972. The true parent in the media sector, based on share ownership, is Prades Incorporated,

TABLE 6

Main Operating Companies of the Dominant Media Complexes

Complex	Complex Holdings (Total Outlets)	Main Operating Company(s)	Total Outlets Operated By M.O.C.	M.O.C. Outlets as a % of All Complex Holdings
Armada	11	Armada Communications Armada Publishers	3 8	100.0
Baton	28	Baton Broadcasting Inc.	28	100.0
CHUM	37	CHUM Limited	37	100.0
Free Press	15	FP Publications Limited	15	100.0
Global	6	Global Communications	6	100.0
Irving	14	N.B. Broadcasting Ltd. N.B. Publishing Limited	9* 2	78.6
Maclean-Hunter	149	Maclean-Hunter Limited	133**	89.3
Moffat	21	Moffat Communications	21	100.0
Mult. Access	6	Multiple Access Ltd.	6	100.0
Power	48	Power Corporation Telemedia Communications	34*** 13	97.9
Quebecor	17	Quebecor Incorporated	17	100.0
Rogers	10	Rogers Telecommunications	10	100.0
Southam	148	Southam Press Limited	148	100.0
Standard	36	Standard Broadcasting	36	100.0
Thomson	51	Thomson Newspapers Ltd.	49****	96.1%

TABLE 6 (Continued)

Complex	Complex Holdings (Total Outlets)	Main Operating Company(s)	Total Outlets Operated By M.O.C.	M.O.C. Outlets as a % of All Complex Holdings
Torstar	22	Torstar Corporation	22	100.0
Western	21	Western Broadcasting	21	100.0
TOTAL	640		618	96.6%

* excludes 3 outlets operated by Moncton Publishing
and University Press of New Brunswick Limited

** excludes Macmillan and 15 outlets operated by
Maclean-Hunter Cable TV Limited

*** excludes 1 outlet (CKTS-AM Sherbrooke) owned
directly by Philippe de Gaspé Beaubien

**** excludes 2 cable television systems operated by
Classic Communications Limited

which operates two radio stations and thirteen television stations in Quebec. Baldwin ended her search at Nordex Limited, failing to recognize that Nordex is itself owned by Prades, which in turn is controlled by Claude Pratte and Paul Desmarais. The relationship between these individuals and Power Corporation need not be reiterated here. (Incidentally, this case illustrates the need to investigate the share structure of shareholders, that is, to follow the chain of ownership as far as possible to its limit). However, Power Corporation exercises effective control of Gesca through its ownership of a debenture valued at approximately \$23.8 million, as Figure 1 illustrates. Because Power Corporation does not operate in the media sector (although this is open to dispute), the selection based on Baldwin's criterion would be Prades Incorporated.

Nevertheless, the selection of either Gesca or Prades misconstrues the actual operation of the total media properties associated with the Power complex. As discussed in Chapter 3, Power Corporation formerly held a direct majority interest in the publishing and broadcasting companies with which it is now indirectly associated. Prior to the Davey Committee investigations, these interests were converted to debenture relationships with Gesca (holding the major publishing interests) and Beaudem Limitee⁶ (holding the major broadcasting interests). Power retains control, as discussed. The selection of Gesca as the main operating company would account for only a portion of the Power complex holdings, while the selection of Prades would account for only fifteen of the total forty-eight media outlets

under the control of this complex. Telemedia operates thirteen of the broadcasting interests; its dominant shareholder, Philippe de Gaspé Beaubien, also directly owns a radio station in Sherbrooke through Beaudem Limitee. Beaubien is president of Telemedia, a dominant complex in its own right, and appears to be the prime mediator between Power Corporation and those broadcasting interests which fall under Power's control. Hence Telemedia is selected as a main operating company to represent the Power complex. However, this represents only thirteen out of forty-eight or 27.1% of all Power media holdings. Because the remaining companies (Prades, Gesca, Les Journeaux Trans-Canada, and Tele-Capital) each bear a close relation to Power Corporation, because of the complementary directorship interlocks, because of evidence which suggests the prominent role of Power directors in some individual media outlets, and because of Power Corporation's ownership relations with the Standard complex, Power Corporation itself is also selected to represent the complex. The selection of Power Corporation and Telemedia Communications Limitee as the two main operating companies to represent the Power complex accounts for forty-seven out of forty-eight or 97.9% of all holdings effectively controlled by the complex as a whole.

The Irving complex is also a difficult case; a difficulty that is further complicated by the paucity of data regarding both the media and non-media corporations that are associated with the Irving family. It is known that K. C. Irving and his three sons hold controlling interests in each of the four media

companies associated with the complex: New Brunswick Publishing Company Limited, New Brunswick Broadcasting Company Limited, Moncton Publishing Company Limited, and University Press of New Brunswick Limited. The latter two companies account for only three of the total fourteen Irving media properties, while New Brunswick Publishing operates three daily newspapers and controls New Brunswick Broadcasting, which in turn operates the broadcasting outlets. These two companies therefore account for eleven out of fourteen or 78.6% of all Irving media properties. The three directors are the same for both companies; no data are available regarding the directors of Moncton Publishing or University Press of New Brunswick. Hence the four dominant shareholders, K. C. Irving and his three sons, and the three directors, Logan, Crowther, and Costello, are selected to represent the Irving media complex.

The selection of the main operating company for the rest of the dominant complexes is much less complicated, as Table 6 indicates.

Dominant Media Capitalists: Formal and Informal Linkages

Dominant media capitalists therefore consist of those individuals who are dominant shareholders and/or directors of the principal operating companies associated with the seventeen dominant complexes. Appendix 5 details the share structure and the composition of the board of directors for each of the seventeen complexes. There are a total of forty individuals who meet

the criteria of "dominant shareholder," that is, who, through either of the particular means outlined earlier, exercise effective control of the main operating company for their complex. Of these, twenty-eight also serve as directors on the board of the main operating company. When combined with directors who do not qualify as dominant shareholders (115),⁷ this makes for a total of 155 individuals who can be considered dominant media capitalists. This figure counts only once one person who is a director of the main operating companies of two complexes: Arthur Deane Nesbitt is a director of both Power Corporation and CHUM Limited. Biographical data have been located for 127 individuals or 82% of the total, while directorship data only have been located for 152 individuals or 98% of the group.⁸

While the composition of the group has altered somewhat since 1972, given the mergers that have taken place and the complexes that have emerged as dominant in the interim, the characteristics of the group have remained constant. The class position of dominant media capitalists is scarcely disputable; indeed, it has become redundant to discuss their class position, given their control of the dominant media complexes, and the fact that five of the complexes (Multiple Access, Power, Irving, Standard, and Thomson) are themselves controlled by corporations dominant in the larger economic system. From a Gramscian perspective, the more interesting question is the extent to which dominant media capitalists can be said to constitute a homogeneous group.

Tests to determine the homogeneity of dominant media capitalists and the integration of the dominant media complexes, for the purposes of this analysis, were based on a distinction between several types of linkages between the dominant media capitalists and between the dominant media complexes. These include formal and informal linkages between the dominant media capitalists, direct and indirect inter-complex directorship linkages, and direct and indirect inter-complex ownership linkages.

Informal linkages are represented by such indices as private school attendance, university attendance, common memberships in exclusive men's clubs and prestigious sporting associations, and class position. Commonalities in private school attendance and university attendance reflect homogeneity of background as well as class position. The tendency for dominant media capitalists to hold memberships in exclusive men's clubs illustrates a type of linkage that occurs within an informal context; yet it is significant in that club membership provides an exclusive meeting place for the dominant media capitalists, in which informal relationships are formed and maintained. Sporting associations also provide a milieu within which dominant media capitalists can interact at the informal level. Each of these commonalities has been well documented by Porter (1965) and Clement (1975). In this regard it can simply be noted that data collected for the present analysis confirm the conclusions reached in each case regarding these characteristics.

Of the 127 individuals for whom adequate biographical data

were available, sixty-one persons or 48.0% reaped the benefits associated with a private school education. As with Clement's group, Upper Canada College is the most commonly attended private school. Twelve persons attended this prestigious institution, six attended the University of Toronto schools, and six attended Trinity College School in Port Hope. Attendance at Lower Canada College and at Ridley College in St. Catharines was also significant. In terms of post-secondary education, 106 persons or 83.5% attended university and forty-one of these or 32.3% attended either the University of Toronto or McGill University. Other universities with significant attendance include the University of Western Ontario (7), Harvard (6), and Queen's (6). Seventy persons or 55.1% are members of one or more of the six national exclusive men's clubs (Toronto, York, National, Mount Royal, St. James, Rideau). The Toronto Club is the most popular with twenty-five dominant media capitalists active as members. The Canadian Club includes among its members sixteen dominant media capitalists, the Royal Canadian Yacht Club nine, and Lyford Cay, located in Nassau, includes six dominant media capitalists.

Other data confirm various elements of Clement's analysis. Slightly less than two-thirds (62.2%) were born in central Canada, fifty-seven in Ontario and twenty-two in Quebec. Twenty-four persons were born in one of the western provinces, ten in the Maritime provinces, five in the United Kingdom, five in continental Europe, and four in the United States. In terms of ethnic origin, it comes as no surprise

that only thirteen persons could be identified as of other than British origin.⁹ In terms of religious affiliations, Anglicans are again over-represented, constituting 26.8% of the group. Twelve persons identified Catholicism for their religion, while only five are Jewish. Only twenty-nine persons indicated their political affiliation in the biographical material, perhaps due to a consciousness of their sensitive position as members of a "free press." Of these, fifteen identified themselves as Liberals and thirteen as Progressive Conservatives. One U. S. resident, Pierre Rinfret of the Quebecor complex is listed as a Republican, and has held several important positions within the U. S. state, including his position as a Nixon advisor in 1968.

The predominantly male media capitalists have evidently not been inspired to appoint even token women to their boards. Torstar, however, has two women directors from the Atkinson family, Ruth Atkinson Hindmarsh and Catherine Atkinson Crang, who joined the board in 1976. Doris Anderson served for nineteen years as editor of Chatelaine and has been a director of Maclean-Hunter since 1972 when Maclean-Hunter's prominent editors were each called to the board. Margaret Letitia Hamilton was recently appointed a director of Thomson Newspapers Limited, following a twenty-nine year record of employment with the Thomson complex. Donna Pryor sits on the board of Moffat Communications Limited with her husband who is the second largest shareholder of that company through Jasman Property Enterprises.

Of the entire group of 155 dominant media capitalists, there are thus five women representing only 3.2% of the total.

In addition to informal linkages based on shared personal traits, there are an extensive number of formal linkages between the dominant media capitalists that serve also to indirectly link the dominant media complexes. Formal linkages consist of interlocks which occur within the context of formal business relationships. This type of linkage is exemplified through common directorships on the boards of non-media corporations. In this case, two or more dominant media capitalists together engage in decision-making activities unrelated to their individual media interests. It will be remembered that directorship data have been collected for 152 individuals or 98% of the total group, so that conclusions pertaining to all linkages other than informal linkages refer to all but three of the dominant media capitalists for whom no directorship data were available. Those media capitalists associated with the Global and Armadale complexes are not interlocked with the 113 corporations identified as dominant by Clement for 1972. However, the remainder are interlocked with fifty-eight of the 113 dominant economic corporations. On twenty-two of the fifty-eight dominant boards where dominant media capitalists sit, media capitalists representing competing complexes serve together, including four of the five dominant Canadian banks. In total, sixty-seven media capitalists or 44.1% and fifteen of the seventeen complexes are interlocked with fifty-eight of the 113 dominant economic (non-media) corporations. Six dominant

media capitalists representing four distinct complexes sit together on the board of the Royal Bank, five representing four complexes are directors of the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, three representing three complexes are directors of the Bank of Montreal, and four representing four complexes are directors of the Toronto-Dominion Bank. Table 7 indicates the extent to which each complex is interlocked with the 113 dominant economic corporations according to their sectors of activity. The dominant media complexes are very extensively interlocked with corporations dominant in the finance sector: thirteen of the seventeen complexes hold a total of seventy-eight directorship interlocks. Nine of the seventeen complexes are interlocked with dominant economic corporations that operate in the resource sector, the second most important sector for the dominant complexes. Two Southam directors, J. Norman Hyland and Gordon Southam, are on the board of MacMillan Bloedel, while Kenneth Thomson and John Tory of the Thomson complex sit with John Robarts of the Power complex on the board of Abitibi Paper. Another Southam director, Adam Hartley Zimmerman, is a director of B. C. Forest Products, while John McCutcheon of Multiple Access is a director of Weldwood of Canada. Peter Curry of Power and Donald McGavin of F. P. are directors of INCO Limited, while Zimmerman of Southam and Arthur Little of Maclean-Hunter are directors of Noranda Mines. In total, the dominant media capitalists hold 149 interlocks with the 113 dominant non-media corporations.

TABLE 7

Interlocks With the Dominant Non-Media
Corporations of 1972 (By Complex)

Complex	Finance	Trade	Utilities	Resource	Industrial	Total
Power	28	-	5	10	3	46
Standard	12	7	1	4	5	29
Thomson	14	1	2	2	2	21
Southam	6	-	1	4	-	11
Maclean-Hunter	5	1	2	1	1	10
Torstar	2	1	-	-	2	5
Mult. Access	2	-	-	2	1	5
Baton	1	3	-	-	1	5
Irving	-	4	-	-	-	4
CHUM	2	-	1	1	-	4
Rogers	2	-	-	1	-	3
Western	2	-	-	-	-	2
Free Press	-	-	-	1	1	2
Moffat	1	-	-	-	-	1
Quebecor	1	-	-	-	-	1
Armada	-	-	-	-	-	0
Global	-	-	-	-	-	0
TOTAL	78	17	12	26	16	149

Table 8 indicates the total number of non-media directorships (including the dominant economic corporations) held by the dominant media capitalists, while Table 9 summarizes this data on a per complex basis. The dominant media capitalists hold a total of 711 directorships on the boards of non-dominant economic corporations, which, when added to their dominant economic directorships, makes for a total of 860 non-media directorships held by the total group; the average number of non-media directorships per person is 5.7. There are fifty-eight dominant economic corporations and ninety-six non-dominant economic corporations on which more than one media capitalist serves as a director, for a total of 154 non-media corporations. Eighty-nine persons or 58.6% have at least one non-media directorship in common with some other media capitalist(s). Of these, sixty-seven or 44.1% of the group share a directorship with a competing media capitalist. There are also sixty-seven persons or 44.1% who have two or more directorships in common with other media capitalists. Tables 10 and 11 summarize these data for the number of directorships held in common with other media capitalists in general and the number of directorships held in common with competing media capitalists. Of the 152 dominant media capitalists for whom directorship data was available, then, forty have no non-media directorships (26.3%), twenty-three have non-media directorships on boards where no other media capitalists sit (15.1%), twenty-two have non-media directorships in common with representatives of their own or the same complex (14.5%), and the remaining sixty-seven persons have non-media directorships in

TABLE 8

Non-Media Directorships Held
by the Dominant Media Capitalists

# of Non-Media Directorships	# of Persons	% of Group	Total Non-Media Directorships
51	1	.66	51
35	1	.66	35
31	1	.66	31
23	2	1.32	46
22	1	.66	22
21	-	-	-
20	2	1.32	40
19	-	-	-
18	2	1.32	36
17	2	1.32	34
16	-	-	-
15	3	1.97	45
14	3	1.97	42
13	1	.66	13
12	4	2.63	48
11	3	1.97	33
10	4	2.63	40
9	6	3.95	54
8	8	5.26	64
7	10	6.58	70
6	3	1.97	18
5	6	3.95	30
4	8	5.26	32
3	12	7.89	36
2	11	7.24	22
1	18	11.84	18
0	40	26.32	-
TOTAL	152	100.01%	860

TABLE 9

Non-Media Directorships
By Complex

Complex	Total	Average # Per Person*
Power	230	12.8
Standard	86	8.6
Western	42	8.4
Thomson	101	8.4
Quebecor	52	6.5
Mult. Access	66	6.0
Moffat	36	4.5
Southam	69	4.1
CHUM	26	3.7
Baton	39	3.5
Free Press	30	3.3
Maclean-Hunter	45	3.0
Torstar	25	2.5
Armada	7	2.3
Rogers	2	2.0
Irving	12	1.7
Global	-	-
TOTAL	868**	4.8

* excludes "no data" category

** greater than Table 8 because of Nesbitt

TABLE 10

Non-Media Directorships Held
in Common With Other Media Capitalists

# of Non-Media Directorships	# of Persons	% of Group	Total Non-Media Directorships
16	1	.66	16
15	-	-	-
14	1	.66	14
13	1	.66	13
12	2	1.32	24
11	1	.66	11
10	-	-	-
9	4	2.63	36
8	5	3.29	40
7	3	1.97	21
6	8	5.26	48
5	6	3.95	30
4	5	3.29	20
3	11	7.24	33
2	19	12.50	38
1	22	14.47	22
0	63	41.45	-
TOTAL	152	100.01%	366

TABLE 11

Non-Media Directorships Held
in Common With "Competing" Media Capitalists

# of Non-Media Directorships	# of Persons	% of Group	Total Non-Media Directorships
9	1	.66	9
8	3	1.97	24
7	2	1.32	14
6	7	4.61	42
5	2	1.32	10
4	10	6.58	40
3	10	6.58	30
2	15	9.87	30
1	17	11.18	17
0	85	55.92	-
TOTAL	152	100.01%	216

common with media capitalists representing other complexes (44.1%). Of these sixty-seven persons, fifty or 32.9% of the total group have at least two non-media directorships in common with one or more competing media capitalists.

It is significant that this type of linkage is exhibited by fourteen of the seventeen complexes. Allan Waters of CHUM Limited is a director of the Canada Development Corporation with Louis Desmarais and Philippe de Gaspé Beaubien of the Power complex. George Gardiner of F. P. and P. Wilbrod Gauthier of Quebecor are directors of Dominion Lime. Other links between F. P. and Quebecor are provided by the father and son team of Lorne C. Webster and R. Howard Webster, who serve together on the boards of Imperial Trust, Canadian Fur Investments, Quebecair and the Windsor Hotel. Joseph Sedgwick of F. P. joins them on the board of Imperial Trust, while Donald McGavin of F. P. joins Rupert Carleton of Multiple Access on the board of Panarctic Oils. John Hewson Coleman of Thomson and Frederick Newton Hughes of Moffat are each directors of Siebens Oil & Gas. The board of Great West Life Assurance includes three Power directors as well as Coleman of Thomson and J. Blair MacAulay of Moffat. Several linkages occur in this manner between the Power complex and the Bronfmans' Multiple Access, including that which places Paul Desmarais on the board of Seagram Company. Paul Desmarais also sits on the board of Imperial Life with two other individuals who are dominant shareholders in their complexes: Kenneth R. Thomson of the Thomson complex and Walter Owen of Western. Owen is also on the board of Canada Security Assurance with George L. Crawford of

the Southam complex. And so on. Figure 3 illustrates the inter-complex linkages which arise as a result of all common non-media directorships held by representatives of competing media complexes. Inevitably, the type of interrelationship signified by this linkage leads to extensive formal and informal interchange between the dominant media capitalists.

Furthermore, various types of direct inter-complex linkages were identified in the present analysis, most of which have developed relatively recently.¹⁰ These linkages, which occur at the individual and complex levels, take the form of both ownership and directorship interlocks. Direct inter-complex linkages are distinct from indirect inter-complex linkages in that the former represent direct, formal relationships between dominant media capitalists and between the dominant media complexes, whereas the latter represent relationships in which a non-media corporation provides the intermediary linkage between dominant media capitalists and their media operations. A direct inter-complex linkage can be said to exist under any of the following conditions: 1) where two dominant media complexes participate in the ownership of a particular media outlet or media subsidiary; 2) where a dominant media complex holds a proportion of either voting or non-voting shares in a media outlet or subsidiary effectively controlled by a competing dominant media complex; 3) where a dominant media complex subsidiary holds a proportion of either voting or non-voting shares in a company associated with a competing dominant media complex; 4) where a dominant media capitalist holds a proportion of either voting or non-voting

FIGURE 3: INDIRECT INTER-COMPLEX LINKAGES

ARM	ARM																
BAT		BAT															
CHU			CHU														
FP		1		FP													
GLO					GLO												
IRV						IRV											
M-H		4	1				M-H										
MOF		3						MOF									
MA		4	2	1			2	2	MA								
POW			2	4			10	9	12	POW							
QUE				7				1	4		QUE						
ROG										3		ROG					
SOU							5		3	9	2		SOU				
STA			1				5		3	26	4	1	4	STA			
THO			2	1			3	2	2	19		1	2	5	THO		
TOR		1					2						1	1	1	TOR	
WES							1			1			1	4	2		WES
TOT		13	8	14	14	14	33	17	35	95	18	5	27	54	40	6	9

shares in a company associated with a competing dominant media complex; and 5) where directorship interlocks are associated with any of the above. Figure 4 documents the extensive inter-complex network that arises as a result of all direct linkages between the dominant media complexes.

Appendix 6 provides the share structure of the CTV television network, the major private television network in Canada. It also identifies the directors of CTV and their affiliations with the dominant media complexes. CTV provides a critical link between those complexes that control the dominant television stations in Canada (fifteen of the twenty-one CTV affiliates are controlled by nine dominant complexes). Some of the most powerful media capitalists are directors on the board of CTV, including John W. H. Bassett, chairman and president of Baton Broadcasting Incorporated; Donald G. Campbell, chairman and president of Maclean-Hunter; Keith Campbell, vice-president of Maclean-Hunter; Harold Crittenden, vice-president of Armadale Communications; John O. McCutcheon, president of Multiple Access Limited; J. Ronald Mitchell, president of Moffat Communications; and Allan Waters, president of CHUM Limited. Of the twelve votes exercised by all CTV directors, nine are voted by individuals who in turn exercise effective control of a dominant complex. Moreover, nine of the seventeen complexes are linked through mutual shareholdings in CTV. Armadale and Multiple Access are the only two complexes that list their shares under the name of the parent corporation; the rest are held through subsidiary companies. Other than the one hundred

FIGURE 4: DIRECT INTER-COMPLEX LINKAGES

ARM	ARM																
BAT	3	BAT															
CHU	3	3	CHU														
FP	1			FP													
GLO					GLO												
IRV						IRV											
M-H	3	4	4				M-H										
MOF	2	4	4				4	MOF									
MA	2	3	4				5	2	MA								
POW			3				5	2	1	POW							
QUE				1							QUE						
ROG			2									ROG					
SOU	3	3	5	7			5	3	3	1			SOU				
STA	2	4	5				5	2	3	2		2	5	STA			
THO		1	1				4	1	1			1	2		THO		
TOR				1									2			TOR	
WES	2	3	5				4	3	2	2		1	5	3		3	WES
TOT	21	28	39	10	-	-	43	27	26	16	1	6	44	33	11	6	33

common shares required for voting privileges, each of the nine complexes holds a significant proportion of the non-voting Class "A" and Class "B" shares of CTV. Baton leads with 100% of the Class "A" and 17.8% of the Class "B" shares, Multiple Access holds 16.4% of the Class "B" shares, Standard 10.1%, Moffat 8.3%, Maclean-Hunter 7.2%, and Armadale 3.4%. In addition, Southam and Western share in the ownership of British Columbia Television Broadcasting, which in turn holds 8.3% of of CTV's Class "B" shares. CHUM holds 4.3% through CJCH Limited and a further 4.3% through Moncton Broadcasting Limited. While the Baton complex is the leading force behind the CTV network, the composition of the board of directors and the related share structure leave no doubt that the eight other complexes have substantial commitments to this powerful network as well.

Of special interest are those dominant media capitalists who serve simultaneously on the boards of competing media complexes and thus provide direct inter-complex directorship linkages. Arthur Deane Nesbitt is a director of Power Corporation and of CHUM Limited. John A. Tory is president of Thomson Corporation Limited and Thomson Equitable Corporation Limited; director of Thomson British Holdings Limited, Thomson Newspapers Incorporated (U. S.), Thomson Newspapers Limited (Canada), and The Thomson Organization Limited (U. K.), in addition to his directorships on the boards of Rogers Radio Broadcasting Limited and Rogers Cable Communications Limited. George R. Gardiner is a director of both F. P. Publications Limited and Harlequin Enterprises Limited, which is controlled by the Torstar complex.

Peter Curry of Power is also president of the Southam-controlled Greater Winnipeg Cablevision. Donald J. McDonald of Moffat is a director of the Baton subsidiary C. F. Haughton Limited. Until 1976, Lawrence M. Nichols was vice-president of Baton Broadcasting and at the same time president of Bushnell Communications, effectively controlled by the Standard complex.

The Southam complex alone is engaged in joint ventures with at least four other complexes. Through Pacific Press Limited, which publishes two of the largest daily newspapers in Canada, the Vancouver Sun and the Vancouver Province, it is linked with F. P. Publications Limited. Gordon Fisher and J. Norman Hyland represent Southam while Richard Sankey Malone and James Stuart Keate represent F. P. on the board. Keate is also publisher and editor of the Vancouver Sun, while Paddy Sherman, a Southam Press executive officer and Province editor during the period 1965 to 1972, is now publisher of that newspaper. Southam's relationship with Western through B. C. Television Broadcasting was noted earlier. Southam continues its relationship with Torstar through Southstar Publishing Limited, which publishes the weekly magazine The Canadian and the monthly Canadian Homes. It is also linked with Torstar through Informart, which markets access to data terminals. Southam is also a partner with Maclean-Hunter through Trans-Canada Expositions Limited, which produces trade shows and exhibitions, and with the Power complex through TV Guide Limited/Limitee.

Master FM Limited links through ownership three dominant complexes (CHUM, Rogers, and Standard) as well as the C.B.C.

Through Talcorp Associates, the parent corporation of the Thomson complex holds 39% of the voting shares of a Baton subsidiary. F. P. Publications holds 123,768 Class "A" non-voting shares in Selkirk Holdings Limited, which is associated with the Southam complex. Edward S. Rogers Family Holdings Limited, the parent company of the Rogers complex, is the fifth largest shareholder of Standard Broadcasting, holding 112,590 common voting shares. Major Market Broadcasters links CHUM with Moffat through mutual ownership. The total number of inter-complex linkages that occur in this manner are too great to list here. In most cases, the ownership interlocks are complemented by associated directorship interlocks, for a total of 344 direct inter-complex linkages that have been located.¹¹ Figure 5 adds these linkages to the indirect inter-complex linkages in order to illustrate the network of interrelationships that results.

Three complexes - Armadale, Global, and Irving - are not well integrated into this web of dominance. In part this can be accounted for by the relatively small number of individuals representing each of these complexes, therefore providing fewer opportunities for interlocking with the other dominants. Unlike the other dominants, these three complexes have not pursued active media acquisition programmes in recent years. Armadale and Irving in particular, while still occupying a position of dominance, have remained relatively dormant in the field throughout the 1970s. Global Communications is the youngest (established in 1974) and the smallest complex in

FIGURE 5: TOTAL INTER-COMPLEX LINKAGES

ARM	ARM																
BAT	3	BAT															
CHU	3	3	CHU														
FP	1	1		FP													
GLO					GLO												
IRV						IRV											
M-H	3	8	5				M-H										
MOF	2	7	4				4	MOF									
MA	2	7	6	1			7	4	MA								
POW			5	4			15	11	13	POW							
QUE				8				1	4		QUE						
ROG			2							3		ROG					
SOU	3	3	5	7			10	3	6	10	2		SOU				
STA	2	4	6				10	2	6	28	4	3	9	STA			
THO		1	3	1			7	3	3	19		2	4	5	THO		
TOR		1		1			2						3	1	1	TOR	
WES	2	3	5				5	3	2	3		1	6	7	2	3	WES
TOT	21	41	47	24			76	44	61	121	19	11	71	87	51	12	42

terms of its total outlets. Until I.W.C. sold Global in 1977, the I.W.C. complex was itself dominant and was relatively well integrated with the other dominants. I.W.C. directors like Richard Ivey and Lloyd Stevens provided many direct and indirect linkages with other complexes. There is a lack of adequate data regarding Global's present owners, Paul Morton and his Global Ventures Western Limited; it may well be that Global will become integrated in the future, either through its directors or through absorption by another complex.

Conclusions: The Homogeneity of Dominant Media Capitalists

The dominant media capitalists are first and foremost capitalists, who "happen" to be intricately related to the rest of the corporate world. The fact that these particular capitalists also "happen" to control economic enterprises that function as powerful ideological instruments, places them in a special position, a position that accords to them ideological power. The data presented here lend support to the suggestion that the dominant media capitalists are homogeneous, based on the indicators that have been employed: class position, private school attendance, university attendance, club membership, common directorships on non-media corporations, and other direct and indirect linkages that draw these individuals together in formal and informal, business and social, contexts. Within these contexts, formal and informal relationships are established and sustained; relationships that are strengthened by traits held in common.

This is not to suggest that dominant media capitalists are therefore together engaged in conspiratorial plots to prohibit the expression of alternative ideologies. Homogeneity and conviviality are entirely different concepts. Homogeneity per se cannot be measured; however, it is clear that the conditions for and the indicators of homogeneity are more than abundant for the group of dominant media capitalists. It is also quite clear that these individuals do not in any way represent a cross-section of the population, nor, given their position within the capitalist class, is it in their interests to propagate alternative ideological notions that contradict the fundamental tenets of bourgeois ideology. The very location of media capitalists within an economic system guided by these bourgeois tenets presupposes a very specific ideological stance. The homogeneity of media capitalists underlines the probability that internal ideological discrepancies - are insignificant, that competition at any level is improbable, and unlikely to be reflected in their media products. In particular, the network of direct inter-complex linkages suggests that there is now even less genuine competition than if one considers only the dominance of the seventeen complexes.

This chapter has identified those individuals who exercise control of the dominant media complexes and who therefore are in a position to exercise ideological power of the sort that may have far-reaching implications for the population as a whole. The extent to which dominant media capitalists utilize this

power in such a way as to sustain or otherwise affect the ideological climate, is the subject of the following chapter.

Notes

1. In order to make his case, Niosi defines the "principal occupation" of a director according to the first position listed in the Financial Post Directory of Directors. This is not a reliable indicator: for example, it reduces John Robarts to a "legal advisor" (1977: 504) and W. Earle McLaughlin is relegated to the position of "financial consultant" (1977: 403). It is doubtful that Mr. McLaughlin would take kindly to this demotion.
2. See Porter's Table XXVII: "Career Patterns of the Economic Elite" (1965: 275) and Clement's Table 19 (1975: 174).
3. The homogeneity of the dominant media capitalists remains to be demonstrated later in the chapter.
4. See Clement's response (1977b: 205-14) to Baldwin, where his use of "main operating company" as the criterion is stressed.
5. Baldwin selects Commercial Trust (1977a: 15), which did not directly control all of the family's media interests (Starlaw Investments Limited still controls the cable interests), nor can it truly be said to operate in the media sector. Montreal Star Limited was the main operating company.
6. Baldwin incorrectly states that Telemedia is now called Beaudem Limitee (1977a: 13). In reality, Beaudem was set up by Beaubien and Roch Demers in 1975 as a holding company for Telemedia.
7. Some of these directors, of course, are significant yet "non-dominant" shareholders.
8. Major biographical data sources include: Canadian Who's Who (various years), Who's Who in Canada (various years), Biographies Canadiennes Francaises (various years), Macmillan Dictionary of Canadian Biography 1963, National Reference Book (various years), Encyclopedia Canadiana, Who's Who in Canadian Jewry 1965, various regional Who's Who editions, Canadian Radio & Television Annual 1950, Metropolitan Toronto Public Library Biographical Scrapbooks (microfilm), corporation annual reports, newspaper and periodical articles, etc.

9. The ethnic origin of dominant media capitalists is presented further in Chapter 5. Seven individuals were classified as "French" in that each met at least three of the following criteria: 1) membership in French-speaking clubs; 2) if listed in Biographies Canadiennes Francaises; 3) attendance at French-speaking universities or classical colleges; 4) if Catholicism was identified for religious affiliation; 5) if born in Quebec or traditionally French settlements outside Quebec; 6) father's birthplace, if available. Five individuals were identified as Jewish and one as Italian.

10. Murdock and Golding (1973: 221) note, but fail to document, a similar trend among the large British media corporations: "In addition to consolidating and extending their control within and across the various media sectors, the big companies are also becoming increasingly intermeshed through joint investments, reciprocal shareholdings, and interlocking directorships. The pattern is immensely complex ..."

11. This should be considered a conservative figure, since the writer does not claim to have located all existing linkages.

"An evaluation of the dangers to society inherent in press ownership and control is beyond the scope of this report. However, the power of the press must be exercised by someone."

(Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration, Study #10, "Power Corporation of Canada Limited": 40)

CHAPTER FIVE

THE ROLE OF DOMINANT MEDIA CAPITALISTS

The purpose of this chapter is to determine, as much as it is empirically possible within the scope of this thesis, the role of the dominant media capitalists in the media production process. It will be argued that their role is threefold. Firstly, there are those who act directly in the position of publisher, editor, station manager, etc., and thus not only own the means of ideological reproduction through the mass media, but also supervise the operation of the process within their media operations. Secondly, the dominant media capitalists who do not serve in these positions select "representatives" or "agents," that is, class agents, who will fulfill the necessary tasks in their absence, who meet the requirement that the dominant interpretation of the social order is that which directs the production of media material and the communication of developments taking place within bourgeois society. Thirdly, where neither of these conditions exist, or where either process falters, the dominant media capitalists are required to directly intervene in the production process in order to re-establish the "social control" of their key media producers, or, in extreme cases, to replace the "disruptive" individuals.

Owners and Managers

Porter pointed out that "the structure of the ownership and control of the mass media is not so simple that there is one well-defined group of owners and another well-defined group of 'professional' operators called publishers and editors." (1965: 484-85) This has traditionally been, and is still, the case. In Chapter 2 it was seen that, throughout the early press periods, those who owned newspapers were also those who held the position of publisher and/or editor. Owners, publishers, and editors were the same people. With the emergence of complex, hierarchically structured newspaper and media organizations that replaced the early simplistic operations, one might expect that a process of skill differentiation, the compartmentalization of media production tasks, etc., would lead to a less definitive relation between owners and publishers/managers, yet this has not taken place to the degree that one would presume. Indeed, the overlap between the group of media owners and the group of media "managers" is, in light of this, still relatively considerable.

In order to determine the degree of replication between the two positions, media "owners" will include the pre-defined set of dominant media capitalists, while media "managers" will include those who hold senior positions within publishing (publishers, managing editors, or their equivalents) and broadcasting (station managers or their equivalents) enterprises controlled by the dominant media complexes.¹ Firstly, it will be useful to consider those dominant media capitalists or media owners who

have, in the past, held senior management positions within publishing and broadcasting organizations. To this end, the biographies and career patterns of the dominant media capitalists need some discussion, since not all of the dominant media capitalists have followed career paths within media organizations. Table 12 indicates that, in fact, more than half (59.1%) have been primarily engaged in other fields, including law, medicine, and politics, while 43.3% are or were primarily active in non-media sectors of the economic system. A minority of fifty-two individuals (40.9%) have had their major careers within media companies, and of these, five individuals held positions throughout their careers that were not journalistically-oriented, that is, these individuals held either accounting or engineering positions within media companies. In other words, of the 127 individuals, only forty-seven or 37.0% have had their main careers as journalists, editors, publishers, etc., within media companies.

Of these forty-seven individuals, forty-one persons have at some time held managerial posts within a media enterprise; twenty-one have served as newspaper or magazine publishers (16.5% of the total), thirteen have been station managers or held other senior managerial positions within broadcasting organizations, while seven others have been senior editors. Moreover, one dominant media capitalist (G. Hamilton Southam), whose main career has been within the civil service, did nevertheless at one time act as editorial writer for the Ottawa Citizen, one of the newspapers owned by his family. Thus, in total, forty-two

TABLE 12

Dominant Media Capitalists: Career Patterns

Main Career Field	N	%
Media	52	40.9
Economic	55	43.3
Law	13	10.2
Political	4	3.1
Academic	1	-
Bureaucratic	1	-
Medical	1	-
Total	127	100.0

persons or approximately one-third (33.1%) of the complete group of dominant media capitalists have held managerial or editorial positions, and this is true for 87.2% of those whose main career has been within the (print or broadcast) journalism field.

However, it is somewhat misleading to gauge the overlap in this way, since not all of those who have held managerial or editorial positions were at the same time dominant media capitalists. The forty-two persons presumably include those who acquired the status of dominant media capitalist by virtue of their position as managers or editors, while others, like G. Hamilton Southam, acted as editors or managers for media outlets controlled by their families. Nevertheless, those who attained their present position through their managerial or editorial experience often did so as a result of their close associations with their predecessors, i.e. with those who were at the time (and in some cases, remain) dominant media capitalists. For example, Beland Honderich, chairman of Torstar Corporation and publisher of the Toronto Star, first joined the newspaper in 1943. Harkness (1963) relates how, throughout his various editorial positions, Honderich worked under the close supervision and strong influence of Joseph E. Atkinson himself, a formidable symbol of an earlier era of dominant media capitalists. Beland Honderich and others, it is important to note, continued to hold important managerial positions following their appointment to the board of directors

of their respective complexes. Ross Munro, for example, first joined Southam News Services in 1948, became assistant publisher of the Vancouver Province in 1951, subsequently its editor in 1955, publisher of the Winnipeg Tribune in 1959, and publisher of The Canadian Magazine in 1965. His appointment to the board of Southam Press Limited in 1968 occurred in the same year that he became publisher of the Edmonton Journal, and later (1976) publisher of the Montreal Gazette, the position he continues to hold at the present time.

Of course, the best indication is a consideration of those media capitalists who now serve in managerial positions, regardless of their past experiences. At the present time, twenty-nine of the dominant media capitalists (22.8%) hold a total of sixty senior management positions within their media enterprises; either on daily newspapers, magazines, or broadcasting stations, and typically as publishers and station managers. This is significant when one considers the potential number of positions that might be held by the dominant media capitalists. It is unlikely that key positions on weekly newspapers, FM radio stations, or trade periodicals, would attract the dominant media capitalists, since all of the complexes that include these outlets in every case also control their more significant corollaries: daily newspapers, AM radio stations, and mass market periodicals. Therefore, if only daily newspapers, AM radio stations, television stations, and mass market magazines, are considered for all the complexes, a possible

(approximate) 193 positions are most likely to be occupied by the dominant media capitalists, and, as noted, sixty of these are indeed occupied, or 31%.² Significantly, this figure excludes those dominant media capitalists whose kin occupy key positions; for example, Richard Cook Malone, the son of Richard Sankey Malone, who has been publisher of the Winnipeg Free Press since 1974. Of the twenty-nine media capitalists who simultaneously hold managerial positions, seventeen hold more than one such position; for example, Jacques Francoeur is publisher of the daily Le Soleil and the weeklies Dimanche Dernier Heure and Dimanche Matin, while Pierre Peladeau is the publisher of his two daily tabloids, and Ralph Costello of the Irving complex is publisher of the two Saint John newspapers.

Indeed, the position of daily newspaper publisher seems the most attractive to the dominant media capitalists, and it is perhaps one of the more important positions that might be held, since daily newspapers, more than other mass media, are those most fully and explicitly devoted to ideological propagation. It is striking that dominant media capitalists hold the position of publisher on six of the ten largest daily newspapers in Canada (in order of size: Beland Honderich, Toronto Star; Richard Sankey Malone, Toronto Globe & Mail; James Stuart Keate, Vancouver Sun; Pierre Peladeau, Le Journal de Montreal; Jacques Francoeur, Le Soleil; Frank Gustave Swanson, Calgary Herald), while, as noted, the son of a dominant media capitalist is publisher of the Winnipeg Free

Press.³

Thus, while the extent of overlap between the group of media owners and the group of media "managers" is suggestive, all factors considered, this role seems less significant than the task of recruitment, the more critical and undoubtedly more practical role, in light of the position of the dominant media capitalists.

Owners, Managers, and Editors

Of the three roles that dominant media capitalists may be called upon to play, the role of selecting individuals to operate their media outlets is probably the most important, and at the same time the least active, requiring little time and effort on their part, and freeing them to participate in their other media and non-media concerns. The importance attributed to this role probably differs from complex to complex, depending upon the history and tradition of the complex, and also upon the nature of its holdings. Presumably, those primarily engaged in newspaper and other publishing activities will be more concerned to select the "right people."⁴ This is true for the Southam complex (recall Bruce's passage cited in Chapter 1) and for the Irving complex, as K. C. Irving himself made clear in his statements to the Davey Committee:

I believe that the newspaper business and newspapers, if well run, are good business. So I am interested in them from that standpoint, and, too, seeing that good people are in charge.

(Hunt and Campbell, 1973: 50;
emphasis added)

In most cases, it would seem that once the act of selection is complete, there is little need for further activity on the part of the owner(s). Indeed, it is precisely this cautious selection process that enables individual newspapers and other individual media outlets to appear "independent" and "free." As a former member of the Davey Committee bluntly explains:

By hiring 'pawns' ... the owner puts himself in a position in which he never has to actually exercise his power. His choice of top pawn or pawns ensures that things will work to his entire satisfaction. He can then testify publicly, or even before committees of Parliament, that he has never interfered with the operation or editorial policies of his newspapers. He can even appear mystified to explain, under questioning, just why he ever bothered to buy up newspapers. He really cannot explain why he is in the business.

(cited in Hunt and Campbell, 1973: -
179)

For this reason, independence testimonies are easily made by, for example, the Southam complex:

The Southam company picks its local publisher and tells him to run the show. As far as editorial and news treatment go, its action as a company stops there. The publisher picks his staff and takes responsibility for how the show is run; for what his paper says. Under this practice the company's one recourse in the event of some persistently flagrant editorial campaign would be to fire the publisher. It has never had occasion to do so.

(Bruce, 1968: 404)

This is less a testimony to the "non-interference" of Southam Press than it is to the selective recruitment of Southam publishers. The probability that Southam would dismiss a publisher or find it necessary to otherwise interfere is indeed slim. This complex, perhaps more so than others, has traditionally retained the key position of newspaper publisher for its family members or close associates. Robert W. Southam held, successively, the positions of managing editor, assistant publisher, and publisher of the Ottawa Citizen during the period 1946 to 1977. G. Hamilton Southam, as discussed, served for a time within the editorial department of the same newspaper, while Gordon T. Southam also held positions at the Ottawa Citizen and later at the Vancouver Province. Wilson J. H. Southam did so at the Hamilton Spectator, while St. Clair Balfour, related to the family through his mother, was publisher of this newspaper from 1951 to 1954, following twenty years in various editorial positions there. Present Southam publishers have, in most cases, served for lengthy periods under family members; William Newbigging, for example, recently appointed Ottawa Citizen publisher, was Robert Southam's assistant for a period of six years prior to his appointment.⁵

Harkness' biography of Joseph E. Atkinson (1963) suggests that the same has historically been true for the Torstar complex. Joseph T. Clark, who was editorial writer or editor for a period of fifty years until his death in 1937, is described as "a gentle, kindly man with a soft pen, Joseph Clark came close to being Mr. Atkinson's conception of the ideal editorial writer."

(1963: 46-47) George Maitland, who succeeded Clark as editor-in-chief of the Toronto Star (1937-1954), "worked as closely with Mr. Atkinson as any man for more than forty years." (1963: 78) Beland Honderich succeeded Maitland as editor-in-chief, while Joseph E. Atkinson's son, Joseph S. Atkinson, assumed the position of publisher in 1958.

Alternatively, where the dominant media capitalists are perhaps less confident in their selection, it may also be necessary to (implicitly or explicitly) establish particular guidelines either in terms of general publishing philosophy, specific editorial policies, or with regard to the support of particular political parties. With reference to other complexes, Honderich has suggested that:

Since the opinions and interests of the chain owners are well known to the local editors, the independence the latter enjoy is subject to certain mutually understood inhibitions.

(cited in McDayter and Elman,
1971: 44)

It is clear that the control process is much more implicit and impalpable than sheer conspiracy theory would suggest, that is, that the establishment of parameters or limits of tolerance need not be expressly articulated. McNaught refers to an earlier period:

... in the final analysis the editor must usually keep his professional activities from crossing those bounds beyond which any considerable mass of public disfavour (and hence declining circulation) is risked. Moreover, because the publisher is a business man operating a business of his own and

possessing a business man's sympathies and affiliations, he is inclined, in practically all cases, to show a certain favouritism towards business interests. This is so well understood by the editors that it scarcely needs to be laid down in explicit terms. It has become part of newspaper tradition.

(1940: 28-29; emphasis added)

On the other hand, there is good reason to suspect that in some cases it is indeed made explicit. A recent study (1977) of the internal organization of La Presse, the core newspaper of the Power complex and the site of heated labour-management tensions regarding (among other issues) owner influence and intervention, is revealing in this respect. Acknowledging that "through (the) selection of managers at the supervisory level, the choice of editorial writers and journalists, monetary and intangible rewards, biased guidelines and direct intervention, owners can considerably influence the handling of news," (1977: 5) the authors found that La Presse editorial staff are explicitly instructed to adhere to the newspaper's ideological orientation:

Editorial writers are compelled to adhere to the ideological orientation of La Presse. The management of the union informed us, with a touch of bitterness, that for editorial positions the News Department promotes only candidates acceptable to it and by the same token certain journalists are cast aside because of their separatist or socialist leanings or because they could not adhere to the newspaper's ideological orientation.

(1977: 66)

This ideological orientation has itself been explicitly formulated, in terms clearly favourable to the interests of the key La Presse owner, Paul Desmarais:

La Presse believes in the free enterprise system as it is practiced and evolves in the world, but endorses moderate systematic intervention by the State. La Presse closely monitors any trend that could induce governments to exceed the limits of healthy intervention.

(1977: 26-27)

Desmarais has also fulfilled the critical role of selection, like in 1972 when,

... following certain difficulties in the field of labour relations and the resignation of some top managers, Mr. Desmarais had an opportunity to appoint a new President and Editor (Roger Lemelin) who shared his system of values and the premises on which he based his decisions.

(1977: 85)

Whether the loyalty of managers and editors to bourgeois values is implicitly or explicitly obtained, it is, in both cases, difficult to empirically document the process without, at the least, a thorough, long-term investigation of the internal organizational dynamics of each media enterprise. Needless to say, this well exceeds the scope of our considerations here. Rather, the present analysis considers the specific and key role of selection and recruitment, and its implications in terms of those who hold the positions of publisher, editor, station manager, news director, etc. To this end, structured questionnaires were forwarded to all individuals who hold these

particular positions at each of the publishing and broadcasting outlets controlled by the dominant complexes: specifically, the daily and weekly newspapers, the radio stations, and the television stations. A total of 513⁶ questionnaires were mailed, of which there were 174 usable responses or 33.9%.

While the response rate is undesirably low, the respondents are nevertheless representative of the total group in terms of type of position held, sector of activity, and location or region of operation.⁷ Moreover, this response rate compares very favourably with that obtained in a similar study conducted by the Canadian Institute of Public Affairs in 1938. For that particular study, questionnaires were forwarded to managing editors at each of the (then) 103 daily newspapers in Canada, and the managing editors were asked to distribute the questionnaires to those responsible for the selection and editing of foreign news. Twenty-one of the daily newspapers or 20.4% returned thirty-three completed questionnaires. Despite the poor response rate, this sample was also representative, at least in terms of region.⁸

It became apparent, in the early stages of the present analysis, that there was a need to distinguish between the group of "managers" (publishers, managing editors, broadcasting station managers, and their equivalents) and the group of "editors" (news editors, news directors, programme directors, and their equivalents). The distinctions between the two groups are evidenced in the tables that follow. At the same time, in most

cases, the distinction between publishing and broadcasting personnel was retained. Consequently, of the total group of 174 respondents, fifty persons were classified as "publishing-managers" (publishers, managing editors, and editors-in-chief), fifty-one persons were classified as "publishing-editors" (largely news editors), twenty-six persons were classified as "broadcasting-managers" (station managers), and forty-seven were classified as "broadcasting-editors" (news and/or programme directors). It should be borne in mind that the distinctions are not precise, since the classifications were based on the respondent's identification of his "official title."

The responses were analyzed in terms of four general categories of data or general areas to which the questions pertained: 1) recruitment patterns for each group, including relations between owners, managers, and editors (as defined here for comparative purposes); 2) the "sphere of influence," including subjective perceptions of "direct" and "ultimate" responsibility for the final media product, the extent of editorial policy input for each group, the frequency of consultation with others regarding news and editorial items; 3) the ascriptive characteristics of each group, including age, sex, region of birth, ethnic origin, and class origin; and 4) attitude measures.⁹

The first and second categories or areas of inquiry did not yield unexpected results. Table 13 indicates that, expectedly, the managers have served with their respective companies for lengthier periods of time and have occupied

TABLE 13

Managers and Editors:
Recruitment Patterns

	<u>Mean Years Present Company</u>	<u>Mean Years Present Pos.</u>	<u>Mean Difference</u>
<u>Publishing:</u>			
Managers (N = 50)	15.3	6.0	9.3
Editors (N = 49)	8.7	3.5	5.2
<u>Broadcasting:</u>			
Managers (N = 26)	17.3	6.9	10.4
Editors (N = 46)	6.4	3.5	2.9
<u>Total Editorial Group: (N = 171*)</u>	11.0	4.6	6.4

* excludes 3 unusable

their present positions for longer periods than have the editors in both the publishing and broadcasting cases. Managers also spend a greater amount of time in the employ of the company prior to their recruitment to a managerial position; many, presumably, first acting as editors for the company. Of the four groups, broadcasting-editors or news directors have spent the least time in the employ of the owning company and required the least amount of time to attain their position. The fact that this is less true for publishing-editors suggests that the position of newspaper editor is seen as one which requires greater experience and/or entails greater responsibilities.

Respondents were also asked to identify the nature of their relationship with both the owner and the publisher/manager. The results are presented in Table 14. The three managers who responded "I am the owner or one of the owners" are listed as "same." Since dominant media capitalists are excluded from this analysis, these individuals are presumably minority shareholders in their individual media outlets.¹⁰ In the same vein, it is important to keep in mind that the category "managers" is not restricted to those whose official title is "publisher" or "station manager," so that, for this reason, not all managers responded "same." Significantly, the lengthiest relationships are those between owners and managers, where professional relationships average 14.2 years, while professional and social relationships average exactly sixteen years. Editors are least likely to formulate such durable relations; indeed, only 8.5%

TABLE 14

Owner-Manager-Editor Relationships

Relationship With Owner:	Managers (N = 72)*			Editors (N = 94)*		
	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Mean Duration (Yrs.)</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Mean Duration (Yrs.)</u>
Same	3	4.2		0	-	
Professional and Social	12	16.7	16.0	8	8.5	3.3
Professional Only	39	54.2	14.2	43	45.7	10.8
Infrequent Professional Contacts	18	25.0		43	45.7	
Total	72	100.1%		94	99.9%	
Relationship With Pub/Mgr:						
Same	25	34.7		0	-	
Professional and Social	9	12.5	11.6	18	19.1	3.2
Professional Only	28	38.9	9.5	60	63.8	6.0
Infrequent Professional Contacts	3	4.2		11	11.7	
Pub/Mgr is Also Owner	7	9.7		5	5.3	
Total	72	100.0%		94	99.9%	

* excludes 4 unusable responses within each group

have a relationship with the owner(s) that extends beyond the purely professional, and even these are comparatively brief (3.3 years). Editors are more likely to identify a purely professional relationship with owners and with managers.

Those perceived as most directly responsible for the final media product were overwhelmingly the news editors and news directors in the publishing and broadcasting fields respectively. A full 71.8% of the total editorial group, 74.3% of the publishing group and 68.5% of the broadcasting group, agreed that this was the case. There was considerably less concurrence with regard to "ultimate responsibility," however. For those within the publishing sector, nine managers and eleven editors or 19.8% of the publishing group regarded owners as ultimately responsible, while twenty-nine managers and twenty-six editors or 54.5% of the group held publishers to be ultimately responsible. A further 15.8% (nine managers and seven editors) held editors ultimately responsible, while the remainder entered more than one response. Tables 15 and 16 summarize the results. Interestingly, within the broadcasting sector, twenty-three broadcasting-editors (that is, news directors) viewed themselves as ultimately responsible, while only three of their superiors (the managers) agreed. Instead, eleven of the twenty-six broadcasting-managers saw their position as one of ultimate responsibility, while eight other managers considered the owners to be finally responsible. This is not to suggest that there are serious role conflicts within this sector (!);

TABLE 15

Managers and Editors:
Subjective Perceptions of
"Direct Responsibility"*

	<u>Publishing</u>		<u>Broadcasting</u>	
	<u>Managers</u> (N = 45)	<u>Editors</u> (N = 50)	<u>Managers</u> (N = 23)	<u>Editors</u> (N = 46)
Owner	-	-	-	-
Publisher/ Stn Manager	11.1	4.0	13.0	-
News Editor/ News Director	71.1	86.0	78.3	69.6
News Reporters/ Broadcasters	17.8	12.0	4.3	30.4
Other	-	-	4.3	-
Total**	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%

* see Question #15 of the questionnaire,
Appendix 7

** excludes 10 unusable responses

TABLE 16

Managers and Editors:
Subjective Perceptions of
"Ultimate Responsibility"*

	<u>Publishing</u>		<u>Broadcasting</u>	
	<u>Managers</u> (N = 47)	<u>Editors</u> (N = 45)	<u>Managers</u> (N = 24)	<u>Editors</u> (N = 42)
Owner	19.1	24.4	33.3	14.3
Publisher/ Stn Manager	61.7	57.8	45.8	26.2
News Editor/ News Director	19.1	15.6	12.5	54.8
News Reporters/ Broadcasters	-	2.2	8.3	4.8
Other	-	-	-	-
Total**	99.9%	100.0%	99.9%	100.1%

* see Question #16 of the questionnaire,
Appendix 7

** excludes 16 unusable responses

it is clear that the term is sufficiently ambiguous to evoke conflicting responses, which merely points to the fundamental methodological limitations that riddle this question.

In terms of editorial policy input, the largest proportion of all four groups defined their role in the formulation of editorial policy as "very substantial:" 63.3% of the publishing-managers, 46.0% of the publishing-editors, 47.4% of the broadcasting-managers, and 59.0% of the broadcasting-editors. Fourteen of the seventy-three broadcasting respondents specified that their station does not editorialize. Again, however, there are connotational ambiguities regarding the term "editorial policy" itself, yet few sufficiently clear alternatives exist.

Tables 17 and 18 present the results for Questions #17 and #18 of the questionnaire. Respondents were asked to indicate the frequency with which others, at various levels, were consulted during the course of their selection and/or preparation of news and editorial items. Not surprisingly, consultation with owners is relatively rare; the greatest frequency of consultation with owners is found for broadcasting-managers where it is still below the "rare" level. Again there are distinctions between the publishing and broadcasting sectors. The publishing figures suggest, and reflect, a greater degree of co-ordination between the particular hierarchical levels in the news production process; a process in which publishers are important forces. Within the broadcasting sector, on the other

TABLE 17

Frequency* of Consultation With Others:
News Items

	<u>PUBLISHING</u>		<u>BROADCASTING</u>	
	MGRS	EDS	MGRS	EDS
Owner(s)	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.2
Publisher/Manager	2.4	2.5	1.8	1.9
Peers at same outlet	3.4	3.6	2.7	2.6
Colleagues at other outlets	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.6
Staff or subordinates	3.8	3.7	3.5	3.7

TABLE 18

Frequency* of Consultation With Others:
Editorial Items

Owner(s)	1.3	1.4	1.9	1.1
Publisher/Manager	2.5	2.5	3.0	2.0
Peers at same outlet	2.9	3.3	2.8	2.4
Colleagues at other outlets	1.8	1.6	1.7	1.7
Staff or subordinates	3.5	3.4	2.9	3.3

* 1.0 = minimum frequency (never)

4.0 = maximum frequency (frequently)

hand, station managers are rarely consulted regarding news production, yet are called upon significantly where editorial matters are concerned. In all cases, respondents indicated a considerable degree of consultation with staff or subordinates.

The data considered thus far neither provide a clear indication nor a definitive refutation of the processes earlier discussed. The ambiguity of particular terms and the inevitable limitations of mailed, structured questionnaires are but symptomatic of the basic problem: the "implicit" nature of the selection process does not lend itself well to empirical verification. Alternatively, however, it is possible to consider and examine the process in a post facto sense; that is, through a consideration of the particular characteristics of those who have, in effect, passed the test of acceptability. In other words, the ascriptive characteristics of managers and editors and some measurements of their ideological affinity with the dominant media capitalists may shed more light on the selection process than a review of their subjective perceptions of the organization and process of media production.

Porter, for example, collected data for a small group of publishers and editors who were not major shareholders in their respective media organizations. It was found that most were university graduates, predominantly middle in class origin and exclusively British in ethnic origin. (1965: 486) For this analysis, questions pertaining to educational level, ethnic origin, and class origin were included within the questionnaire, so that more or less complete data are available for the total

editorial group (all managers and editors). In most cases, similar data for the dominant media capitalists are available for comparative purposes.¹¹

Where the group of owners (the dominant media capitalists) is compared with the group of managers-editors in terms of age, sex, education level, region of birth, ethnic origin, and class origin/position, then, it is readily apparent that there are extensive similarities between those individuals who hold these three uppermost positions within the media enterprises controlled by the dominant complexes. Indeed, mean age is the singular characteristic that distinguishes owners, managers, and editors. While for all managers and editors the mean age is 38.4 years, for the dominant media capitalists it is 58.4 years (see Table 19). The eldest of the editorial group are the broadcasting-managers at 44.2 years, while the lowest mean age is that for the broadcasting-editors (33.7 years), which would seem to be consistent with their relatively short periods of service.

In all other respects, the set of owners and the set of managers-editors are not substantially distinguishable. Like the dominant media capitalists, the managers and editors are almost exclusively male. Of the total 174 individuals, a mere seven or 4% are women, and, significantly, six of the seven women are editors, while one woman is editor-in-chief of a daily newspaper.. All seven women hold at least undergraduate degrees, which is presumably to their competitive advantage, in light of their highly educated colleagues. Table 20 indicates that more than 80% of all groups except broadcasting-editors have attended

TABLE 19

Owners, Managers, and Editors:
Mean Age

	<u>N</u>	<u>Mean Age</u>
Owners	127	58.4
Managers (Publishing)	50	42.0
Managers (Broadcasting)	25*	44.2
Editors (Publishing)	51	36.3
Editors (Broadcasting)	47	33.7
All Managers and Editors	173*	38.4

* excludes one where date of birth
was not stated

TABLE 20

Owners, Managers, and Editors:
University Attendance

	<u>N</u>	<u>% Attended University</u>
Owners	127	83.5
Managers (Publishing)	50	88.0
Managers (Broadcasting)	26	88.5
Editors (Publishing)	51	82.4
Editors (Broadcasting)	47	70.2
All Managers and Editors	174	81.6

university, yet in their case, the proportion (70.2%) is still high relative to the general population. The rate for all managers and editors (81.6%) is only slightly less than that for the dominant media capitalists, where 83.5% attended.

The same parallels arise in terms of region of birth and ethnic origin. Tables 21 and 22 provide comparative data with respect to these two characteristics. While seventy-nine of the dominant media capitalists (62.2%) were born within the central provinces, Ontario and Quebec, this is also true for eighty-three persons or 47.7% of all managers and editors, and for more than half (51.3%) of the managers. It is particularly significant when one considers that, while the dominant media capitalists are largely based in Toronto and Montreal, the managers and editors are regionally dispersed and represent newspapers and broadcasting stations that operate in all areas across Canada. The consequences for the representation of regional interests vis-a-vis their newspapers and broadcast programmes would, however, need to be concretely assessed, yet the implications are suggestive. Similarly, one might question the priorities likely to be attributed to nationalist interests, since almost one-fourth of the managers-editors are not Canadian-born: twenty-two originate from the British Isles, eight originate from the United States, and four were born elsewhere. Relatedly, more than two-thirds (66.7%) of the managers-editors identified "British Isles" for their ethnic origin compared with 89.8% for the dominant media capitalists and 44.7% for the 1971 population.

TABLE 21

Owners, Managers, and Editors:
Region of Birth

	Owners (N = 127)	Managers (N = 76)	Editors (N = 98)	All Managers and Editors (N = 174)
West	18.9%	17.1%	22.4%	20.1%
Ontario	44.9	42.1	32.7	36.8
Quebec	17.3	9.2	12.2	10.9
East	7.9	3.9	9.2	6.9
Total Canada	89.0%	77.6%	79.6%	78.7%*
British Isles	3.9	14.5	11.2	12.6
United States	3.1	2.6	6.1	4.6
Other	3.9	3.9	1.0	2.3
Not Stated	-	1.3	2.0	1.7
TOTAL	99.9%	99.9%	99.9%	99.9%

* includes 7 where region was not specified

TABLE 22

Owners, Managers, and Editors:
Ethnic Origin

	Owners* (N = 127)	Managers (N = 76)	Editors (N = 98)	All Managers and Editors (N = 174)
British Isles	89.8%	69.7%	64.3%	66.7%
French	5.5	9.2	11.2	10.3
"Canadian"	-	6.6	6.1	6.3
"U.S."	-	1.3	3.1	2.3
Other	4.7	7.9	9.2	8.6**
Not Stated/Double Entry	-	5.3	6.1	5.7
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%

* Determinations of ethnic origin differ for the group of owners (see Chapter 5, note 9) and the group of managers/editors (see Question #3, Appendix 7).

** This figure includes 5 "other, not specified."

(see also Clement, 1975, Table 43: 334). The low "French" representation within all groups reflects the increasing degree of Anglo dominance within the Quebec media industry and the relatively few francophones that represent the Power and Quebecor complexes. Their representation is, however, somewhat higher (11.2%) within the group of editors than it is within the group of managers (9.2%), and considerably higher than it is within the group of owners (5.5%).

The class composition of the total editorial group is striking indeed.¹² Table 23 indicates that 25% are of capitalist class origin, while 39% are of upper middle class origin, and 27% are of middle class origin. A mere sixteen individuals (10%) are of working class origin, and, of these, no more than five hold managerial positions. This points to the distinction between managers and editors in this respect: 75% of the managers in both the publishing and broadcasting sectors are of either capitalist or upper middle class origin, while this is the case for 54% of the editors in both groups. The assets associated with roots at the top of the class ladder seem more important in terms of publishers and managing editors, where a total 80% originate, compared with 66% in the case of broadcasting station managers. Thus, of the 167 persons whose class origin could be determined, 105 persons or 63% have either capitalist or upper middle class roots. It seems improbable that their over-representation amidst those who hold critical editorial positions within the dominant media complexes is simply circumstantial. It seems equally improbable, particularly in

TABLE 23

Managers and Editors: Class Origin

<u>Class Origin*</u>	<u>Publishing</u>		<u>Broadcasting</u>		All Managers & Editors (N = 167)**
	<u>Managers</u> (N = 49)	<u>Editors</u> (N = 48)	<u>Managers</u> (N = 26)	<u>Editors</u> (N = 44)	
Capitalist	27%	19%	31%	25%	25%
Upper Middle	53	44	35	20	39
Middle	16	23	23	45	27
Working	4	14	12	9	10
Total	100%	100%	101%	99%	101%

* see Note 12

** excludes 7 indeterminate

light of their other shared characteristics, that their interests would seriously contradict those of the dominant media capitalists.

The final area of analysis sought to yield specific indications of their interests and, importantly, the compatibility of their interests with those of the dominant media capitalists. Table 24 summarizes the responses to the final questionnaire item, where the managers and editors were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with each of the statements listed. (The respondents were offered the options "agree strongly," "agree somewhat," etc., yet these variations are not indicated; see Question #20, Appendix 7.)¹³

Firstly, it is interesting that almost all of the respondents indicated very definitive opinions with respect to each of the questions, even where the statement did not directly relate to their own experience, their own position, or their own sector of activity (for example, the responses of the publishing-managers and -editors to the second and third statements regarding the C.B.C. and the C.R.T.C.). Very few of the total sample had no opinion or did not respond (note the "N" figures in Table 24), while one broadcasting-manager omitted the entire item. Indeed, in the vast majority of cases, the respondents in all categories indicated either strong agreement or strong disagreement with each statement. This was especially true for the fourth statement regarding state regulation of the publishing industry, where all except

TABLE 24

Managers and Editors: Attitude Measures

Statement		Publishing		Broadcasting	
		Mgrs	Eds	Mgrs	Eds
"Concentration of media ownership is not in the public interest."	(N)*	(49)	(50)	(25)	(45)
	Agree (%)	49	52	40	58
	Disagree (%)	51	48	60	42
"The C.B.C. should not be allowed to compete with the private media for advertising revenue."	(N)*	(50)	(50)	(25)	(47)
	Agree (%)	42	44	64	55
	Disagree (%)	58	56	36	45
"The C.R.T.C.'s Canadian content regulations should be abolished."	(N)*	(50)	(51)	(25)	(47)
	Agree (%)	56	35	48	53
	Disagree (%)	44	65	52	47
"State regulation of the broadcasting industry should be extended to the publishing industry."	(N)*	(50)	(51)	(25)	(45)
	Agree (%)	0	2	28	40
	Disagree (%)	100	98	72	60
"State regulation in general tends to impede the development of the free enterprise system in Canada."	(N)*	(50)	(51)	(25)	(47)
	Agree (%)	76	67	80	81
	Disagree (%)	24	33	20	19

* N excludes not stated and unusable

three of the publishing-managers strongly disagreed. These clearly formulated and vehement attitudes, which themselves reflect more general ideological sentiments (sentiments not at all in conflict with the basic themes of bourgeois ideology), inevitably find expression through their editorial statements, and through the ideological tone that underlies their "objective" news and other programme items.

Several writers (e.g. McNaught, 1940) have suggested that the interests of publishers and managers differ substantially from those of "the real producers" (represented, in this case, by the editors), and this is to some extent reflected in the responses to this particular item. Editors, for example, were more likely to agree that "concentration of media ownership is not in the public interest." In fact, a majority of the editors (52% of the publishing-editors and 58% of the broadcasting-editors), agreed with the statement, while the majority of managers (51% of the publishing-managers and 60% of the broadcasting-managers) disagreed. The responses of all categories of respondents are most remarkable when one considers that the entire sample consists of those associated with the "villains" of ownership concentration: the dominant media complexes.

Similar differences between managers and editors are evident for the broadcasting group with respect to the second and third statements. Broadcasting-managers were exceptionally consistent in their agreement (most agreed strongly) with the second statement, yet surprisingly less so in terms of the third statement regarding the abolition of the C.R.T.C.'s

Canadian content regulations. Each factor (the C.B.C.'s competition for television advertising revenue and the content regulations), however, directly affects what are presumably among their principal concerns: the financial-administrative aspects of their operations, so that one might expect strong agreement that each of these economically detrimental factors should be eliminated. The broadcasting-editors, on the other hand, are less concerned with the C.B.C.'s competition,¹⁴ and considerably more concerned than their managers with the Canadian content regulations, probably since the news and programme directors are regularly (indeed, daily) faced with the constraints imposed by the regulations on their programming schedules, and thus more acutely aware of the additional time and monies that have been required since the regulations were instituted. Of the total sample, publishing-editors were those most fully in favour of the content regulations (65%), yet, as their responses to the fourth and fifth statements demonstrate, this is by no means indicative of a "pro-state regulation" or "anti-laissez-faire" attitude on their part.

The responses to these latter statements suggest a complete lack of ambiguity, doubt, indecisiveness, etc., regarding the general question of state regulation. The unanimous agreement of publishers and the near-unanimous agreement (98%) of editors that the publishing industry should be free of state regulation, is not necessarily related to their loyalty to a particular newspaper or complex, yet it surely reflects loyalty to the interests of the industry as a whole, and could be extended to

the general laissez-faire sentiments embodied in the institutions that comprise the "free press."¹⁵

The broadcasting respondents, lacking these strong and historically rooted sentiments, and instead more accustomed to the imposition of the state within their own sector, were less hostile to the suggestion that their publishing counterparts be subjected to similar scrutinies. At the same time, however, this group emerged as the most anti-state regulation in general, with no significant difference between the responses of managers (80% agreed that state regulation is generally obstructive to Canada's free enterprise system) and editors (81% agreed), while the publishing respondents, not surprisingly, still included a large anti-state regulation/pro-laissez-faire component (71% of all managers and editors within the publishing sector).

Despite the minor discrepancies between the various categories of respondents and their differing responses to each statement, and regardless of the justification that one uses to account for their responses, one thing is clear: the expressed attitudes of the entire group of managers and editors are fully compatible with the interests and sentiments of the owners, that is, the dominant media capitalists. The extent to which these attitudes become articulated in their newspapers and broadcast programmes is less significant a consideration than the very fact that their responses can be seen to reflect a particular ideological stance that blends well with the dominant ideological themes of the larger society. This in turn meets the needs of

the dominant media capitalists (and, for that matter, all capitalists) in a more than satisfactory way.

The Limits of Tolerance

In addition to the critical role of selection, the dominant media capitalists can be required to take direct action where their interests are threatened. A recent case within the Irving complex will suffice to illustrate. The Fredericton Gleaner's managing editor resigned in May 1977, following a series of disputes regarding news content. In August of the same year, ten newsroom journalists and editors were simultaneously fired, presumably for their "activist" inclinations (see Labonte, 1978). At the same, Tom Crowther himself, a dominant media capitalist and thirty-one year Irving associate, was installed in the position of Gleaner publisher. At the time Russell Hunt commented that the incident would have repercussions through the Irving newspapers, and would intimidate other journalists who might criticize management policies: "It certainly is the Irving style. And that style is to give the feeling that there's power there. Then you don't have to use it very often." (cited in Content, January 1978: 3)

In cases like that of the Irving complex, the sheer awareness of a powerful media capitalist may intimidate editors and station managers in such a way as to predispose the treatment of news events or to otherwise effect a particular ideological

shade. Traditionally, the Irving newspapers have subdued or excluded stories regarding Irving media and non-media corporations. This is less the result of direct intervention than the "understood" practice of Irving journalists. Hunt and Campbell (1973) detail several incidents. A consultant's report, which accused the Irving pulp mill of dumping twenty-seven million gallons of waste daily into the Saint John harbour, was "buried" in the inside pages of the Irving newspapers. In 1970 an underground Maritime newspaper reported that the chairman of the New Brunswick Water Authority, a state organization responsible for the enforcement of the province's anti-pollution laws, had been simultaneously executive secretary of the New Brunswick Forest Products Association, the organization of pulp and paper companies (the province's largest water polluters) that was established to represent the industry in relations with the provincial state. The Davey Committee referred to the story as "an astonishing scoop" that should have been "joyously trumpeted" by the local newspapers, yet the Irving newspapers simply reported the new appointment, failing to connect it with the pulp and paper association. These same Irving newspapers, however, did react vehemently to the Davey Committee's Report: "Front page editorials attacked it as biased, inaccurate, possessed of 'sickening weaknesses,' and an affront to public credibility." (Hunt and Campbell, 1973: 179) The same Irving newspapers were uniformly hostile in their response to a Committee member's suggestion that:

It is not primarily the balance sheet that concerns these financial-industrial tycoons ... It is not the prestige of being owners and publishers of newspapers. It is not the earnest desire to lead, editorially, public thought toward progressive social reform and higher human purpose. The primary purpose is none of these. The primary purpose is to grasp power and more power. They want the power to choose and appoint publishers and editors who share their philosophy, or who will at least operate the newspapers in strict accordance with their philosophy.

(cited in Hunt and Campbell,
1973: 179)

The La Presse study cited earlier noted the operation of a similar "understood" practice at that newspaper, a practice related to the variables found significant in Breed's studies: "'Self-censorship' is a term used by (La Presse) journalists, referring to their decision to write articles that meet the perceived or stated expectations of management, with the aim of protecting their privileged status within the organization." (1977: 80) Hence the ideological allegiances of newspaper journalists can be secured through, and tied to, internal reward systems that favour those who meet management standards, which in turn are directly or indirectly established at the ownership level.

There are other cases which point to the direct (editorial and other) intervention on the part of dominant media capitalists. Kesterton (1967: 254-55) relates how the owners of Le Soleil (prior to Jacques Francoeur) once issued a directive to their editors to "play down criticisms of the established order." In 1976, James Stuart Keate, a dominant media capitalist and publisher of the Vancouver Sun, demoted his senior editor,

presumably because the editor's nascent anti-Liberal views contradicted the Sun's solid Liberal position (see Krangle and Moody, 1976). Few of these incidents have been documented. Provided that media capitalists have carefully selected the "right" editors, there is little need for direct intervention of this type.

Conclusions: The Significance of Private Ownership

Isolated instances of direct intervention on the part of dominant media capitalists are of little consequence for the process of concern here. The most significant role for the dominant media capitalists is that of selection, which, once carried out, allows for the appearance of independence and "non-intervention" to be sustained. The operation of the selection process does not, however, lend itself to empirical demonstration. Rather, this analysis has considered those who presently occupy important positions within the dominant media complexes, that is, those who act as the representatives for the dominant media capitalists, and found these individuals to be substantially indistinguishable in terms of particular ascriptive characteristics that render them, presumably, suitable to their assigned tasks. At the same time, it was seen that the dominant media capitalists continue to fulfill these tasks themselves (primarily in the roles of publisher and station manager), to such an extent that there remains a relatively considerable overlap between owners, managers, and editors.

Therefore it is not possible to regard each as distinct groups.

To conclude, the role of dominant media capitalists within the media institutions of civil society is significant yet largely inactive, requiring them to act simply as latent overseers or night watchmen, while still retaining control of the major Canadian media institutions in order to insure the representation of their interests. Their actions may be said to take three forms. Firstly, a sizeable proportion of the most important managerial positions within the major media enterprises are held directly by some dominant media capitalists. Secondly, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the dominant media capitalists are also important for their selective designation of individuals to hold these important positions. The extensive similarities between the group of owners and the group of managers and editors, the expressed attitudes of the latter group, and the expressed statements of the dominant media capitalists regarding the importance of "seeing that good people are in charge," all bear witness to the concrete operation of the selection process. Thirdly, at particular moments where the process falters, their night watchmen duties can be directly carried out, through the replacement or demotion of those who have veered from the intended and expected course, through the affirmation or re-affirmation of the parameters within which managers and editors are expected to operate, and through other direct and indirect means.

It is important to add, however, that this last and direct role of the dominant media capitalists will be executed only rarely, and will not necessarily be entirely successful. In light of the complex bureaucratic organization of mass media enterprises, and the sometimes significant resistance that can be aroused within the associations of journalists and other media producers (recall the hostility towards Desmarais expressed by the Quebec journalists' unions, discussed earlier), it would be unrealistic to expect that the owners' direct interventions would be either repeatedly evident or consistently effective. Such speculations are best left to the conspiracy theorists. This type of control, then, is neither definitive nor totally assured; yet the implications for the availability of ideological alternatives vis-a-vis their media products are clear.

Notes

1. "Enterprises controlled by the dominant media complexes" includes, in this case, daily newspapers, mass market magazines, radio stations, and television stations, and excludes television networks, other media, and media-related interests (for example, presidents of programme production companies, book publishing houses, newsstand distribution firms, etc.). For some of the dominant media capitalists, managerial positions presently held were listed in their biographical data, along with those held in the past. These were verified according to the key positions listed in Canadian Advertising Rates & Data, (March 1978) for all daily newspapers, mass market magazines, radio and television stations in Canada. Corporation annual reports often list key executives of subsidiary companies; where the subsidiary in question could be directly identified with a particular media outlet, and where the data did not conflict with that in C.A.R.D., this was also utilized as a source. The "Omnium Gatherum" column of various (1978) Content issues was also useful.

2. See Note 1. For this reason and others (especially the variations in managerial structures across different types and sizes of media outlets), the figure is necessarily an imprecise estimate of the overlap.

3. It is worth noting that all but one of these dailies, the Toronto Sun, are controlled by the dominant complexes.

4. The Thomson complex would appear to be a notable exception. Lord Thomson often declared that his interests in newspaper publishing (and in his other media as well) were strictly economic, that individual Thomson newspapers were free of intervention from above. Needless to say, however, Thomson's proclamations do not constitute solid evidence of editorial autonomy. Yet it is significant that the family's economic interests have been little cause for concern: Thomson's \$47 million net profit for fiscal 1977 represented a 16% increase over 1976 and is typical of the complex's annual haul (see Zwicker, 1978: 6-7). Were this rate to drop substantially, one might expect Thomson representatives to investigate more than the financial statements of their newspapers. This was in fact suggested in a letter from one Thomson managing editor (the letter accompanied his response to the questionnaire study discussed later): "It

might help to put some of the attached replies into context if I tell you that this newspaper is owned by the Thomson company. I have only ever met two executives of the company. The (name of newspaper) makes a tidy sum of money for Thomson; thus, corporate intrusion into editorial policy and other aspects of newspaper operation is nil. Were we to start losing money, company execs (and there are specialists for every facet of newspaper administration) might visit us more often." The second parenthetical note was in the original.

5. Southam's annual reports include biographical profiles of their key publishers. Newbigging's appointment culminated his more than twenty years with the complex. Paddy Sherman followed a similar route: he joined the Vancouver Province in 1952, became editor in 1965, and publisher in 1972. John D. Muir joined the Hamilton Spectator as retail advertising manager in 1952, was appointed advertising sales manager in 1954, business manager in 1959, assistant publisher in 1970, and finally publisher of the newspaper in 1971. E. H. Wheatley started with the Calgary Herald as early as 1945, transferred to the Toronto office of Southam Newspapers in 1950, returned to the Herald as national advertising manager in 1958, became the Edmonton Journal's advertising director in 1960, its marketing director in 1968, its assistant publisher in 1970, publisher of the Brantford Expositor in 1971, publisher of the Windsor Star in 1976, and most recently, publisher of the Winnipeg Tribune. Clearly, those publishers not related to the family through blood or marriage are carefully weaned in the ways of the Southams prior to their rise to the position of publisher.

6. This figure excludes two questionnaires forwarded to Le Nouveau Samedi and returned marked "moved, address unknown."

7. See Appendix 7 for a discussion of the procedures used in the questionnaire study and for a comparison of the respondents with the remainder of the sample.

8. The C.I.P.A. study is discussed in McNaught (1940; 237-46).

9. Refer to the questionnaire, which is presented in Appendix 7.

10. While the questionnaires were anonymous, it was possible in many cases to identify the respondent, based on the data provided (especially where directorships were listed for Question #9) and on the return postmark. One of the three managers holds shares in a Multiple Access subsidiary (CITY-TV Toronto), while the other two could not be definitively identified.

11. It is important to point out, however, that while it was possible to compare the owners with the managers-editors in terms of age, sex, education level, region of birth, ethnic origin, etc., it was nevertheless necessary to utilize different data sources. Those for the dominant media capitalists (the owners) are listed in Chapter 4, Note 8. Managers and editors, however, are less likely to be "enshrined" in Who's Who books; all references to the characteristics of this group are based on the questionnaire responses. This point is particularly important in terms of the ethnic origin comparisons. For the same reason, it was not possible to make comparisons in terms of class origin. See Note 12.

12. Determinations of class origin were based on the responses to Question #5 which asked "What was your father's occupation? Was he ever a company official?" (see Appendix 7). Since the purpose of this aspect of the analysis was to identify potential similarities between owners, managers, and editors, and not to consider their social mobility, it was not deemed useful, nor was it possible, to make comparisons in this regard, in that adequately comparable data were not available. For the editorial group, then, "capitalist class" includes those who stated that their father was a corporate official; "upper middle" includes professional and managerial occupations; "middle" includes salesmen, technicians, salaried bureaucrats, and farmers. (See also Clement, 1977a, Appendix XVI: 356-57, for a discussion of this and alternate methods). It was not possible to distinguish between "old" and "new" middle class, since the independent versus salaried status of the father could not be ascertained. The remainder (sixteen) were considered working class. In seven cases class origin could not be determined.

13. Since the analysis of the questionnaire responses was undertaken manually, it was not feasible to attempt to correlate variables other than those of "sector of activity" and "type of position held" with the responses to the attitude items.

14. At the present time, the C.B.C. "competes" with private broadcasting stations in the television advertising market only. In Chapter 6 it will be seen that this competition is, at best, illusory.

15. A number of respondents added comments to the effect that "state regulation of the publishing industry would ultimately mean control over content;" the possibility was variously described as "dangerous" and "totalitarian."

CHAPTER SIX

THE ROLE OF THE STATE


Thus far the discussion has centred on the private media institutions of civil society and their ownership and control. Since the major concern rests with the ownership of mass media, it is now necessary to consider that type of ownership which co-exists with private ownership; that is, public or state ownership of mass media, the media institutions of political society. While some provincial states are significant for their role in educational broadcasting,¹ the central embodiment of state ownership, in the Canadian case, is the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (C.B.C.). The investigation of the C.B.C.'s contribution to ideological reproduction must include a discussion of its cohort in the broadcasting sector, the Canadian Radio-television Telecommunications Commission (C.R.T.C.).² These two state organizations must in turn be understood within a theorization of the state as a whole.

The State as Broadcaster: The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation

Two Gramscian concepts are critical to the understanding of the state's role through the C.B.C. and the C.R.T.C.:

"ideological convergence" and the "compromise equilibrium." If

one accepts that reading of Gramsci which suggests that the state incorporates political society and civil society, then the C.B.C. and the C.R.T.C. operate within the realm of the former, while the private mass media operate within the realm of the latter. Together the two unite in the constitution of Gramsci's "state." As ideological forces representative of each realm within Gramsci's state, it follows that the C.B.C., a public institution of political society, and the private mass media, private institutions of civil society, converge in terms of their contribution to the ideological operations of the larger state.³ Diagrammatically, the relation is as follows:



This convergence of public and private media has several dimensions. At the level of structure, public and private media (that is, the C.B.C. and private broadcasting enterprises) are juxtaposed in a lateral relation that defines their social location within the ideological mechanisms of the state. Within this schema, it follows that each tends towards the same ideological ends, in support of the state's organization and maintenance of bourgeois hegemony. This of course would

have to be demonstrated through extensive comparative analysis (that is, ideological analysis) of the programme content of C.B.C. and non-C.B.C. broadcasting enterprises. Thus the extent to which the C.B.C. complements the operations of the private broadcasting media, in a strictly ideological sense, is yet to be demonstrated, and cannot be demonstrated within the scope of this thesis. It can, however, be argued that, at the level of operations, the activities of the C.B.C. tend to complement rather than conflict with the operations of private broadcasting enterprises in Canada. Finally, it can be argued that the C.B.C. operates in such a way as to preserve the legitimacy of private broadcasters, or more precisely, the private capital represented in the broadcasting sector of the media industry.

The traditional conflict between the C.B.C. and private broadcasting interests (discussed in Chapter 2) deceptively suggests a competitive relation between more or less equal participants in broadcasting undertakings. There is also a tendency to overlook the C.B.C.'s position as the owner of broadcasting outlets vis-a-vis the dominant media complexes. It was suggested earlier that the C.B.C. is more significant for its role as the producer of network programming than for its role as the owner of broadcasting stations. While no comparative data are available regarding the output of private radio and television programme production companies (most of which are controlled by the dominant complexes, i.e., Glen Warren Productions Limited, Champlain Productions Limited, etc.), it

is evident that the C.B.C. is a major, if not the major, producer of indigenous Canadian programming. At the same time, it is relatively minor as the owner of broadcasting stations. While it is futile and theoretically careless to contrast C.B.C.-owned stations with those owned by the dominant complexes,⁴ some figures can be provided to indicate the extent to which private broadcasting enterprises definitively dominate the ownership structure, based on both total outlets and total circulation. Historically, the number of privately-owned broadcasting stations has far exceeded the number of stations owned by the Corporation. As late as 1940, the C.B.C. still owned only ten radio stations or 9% of the ninety-four licenced radio stations in Canada. (McNaught, 1940: 249) By 1950, the C.B.C. owned nineteen or 13% of the total 150 radio stations. (Canadian Radio & Television Annual, 1950: 31) At the present time, C.B.C.-owned stations account for only 11% of all major⁵ radio stations and only 25% of the total television stations in Canada. These same stations contribute to 19.6% of the total Canadian radio and television circulation, while private broadcasting stations contribute 80.4%, 52.3% of which is claimed by the dominant complexes. Of course when the total circulation of the third major mass medium, daily newspapers, is included, the C.B.C.'s position in the mass media market is further reduced.

Thus, while the co-existence of private capital and state capital presents the appearance of competition between the private and state sectors of the broadcasting industry, in reality the two converge at the ideological level and are more than compatible at the economic level. Indeed, it could be argued that public and private broadcasting enterprises exist in a symbiotic relation, at least at the economic level. There are several facets of the C.B.C.'s operations and activities which serve the interests of private broadcasters, particularly those of the dominant media capitalists. The first and perhaps most obvious way in which this occurs is through the C.B.C.'s establishment of broadcasting stations in the hinterland areas; that is, in those regions where it is plainly not profitable for private media capitalists to operate. At the same time, it would be difficult for the state to lay claim to a truly "national broadcasting system" that serviced only the lucrative urban markets of Ontario and Quebec. It will be recalled that the Aird Commission's early recognition of the inadequacies of free enterprise in this regard in fact spawned the emergence of the public system. However, even the C.B.C., with its guaranteed annual access to increasingly large amounts of capital, has encountered innumerable difficulties in providing service to the hinterland areas. Radio service in the north was not introduced until 1958 (C.B.C. Annual Report, 1976-77: 11), twenty-two years after the C.B.C. first began operations, and thirty-nine years after radio was introduced in the rest of Canada. Radio

programming centres are presently located at Inuvik, Yellowknife, Whitehorse, and Frobisher Bay, and there is a C.B.C.-owned radio station at Churchill. In addition, a daily service is broadcast directly from Montreal via short-wave. The C.B.C.'s Northern Television Service (N.T.S.) first entailed taped programmes in 1967 (fifteen years after television was introduced in the rest of Canada) and later live satellite transmission in 1973. Nevertheless, N.T.S. has no production staff or equipment of its own; programming is supplied primarily by the national network. It was not until 1974 that the C.B.C. initiated its "Accelerated Coverage Plan," which seeks to extend radio and television coverage to previously unserved communities in Canada with a population of 500 or more. (C.B.C. Annual Report, 1976-77: 23)

In a similar vein, it is the C.B.C.'s practice to provide regional programming and to (increasingly) originate production in regional centres, such as Moncton, thereby drawing attention away from the concentration of the dominants in the metropolitan areas. Some provinces, such as Newfoundland, however, still have good reason to protest the paucity of alternatives to C.B.C. programming that originates in Toronto or Montreal. For the private broadcasting stations, these two cities (plus, to some extent, Vancouver) are the major sites of programme production.

Thirdly, the C.B.C. has traditionally assumed the burden of indigenous Canadian programme production, since this is clearly not economically feasible for private media capitalists. In 1972, for example, the C.B.C. spent \$144 million or 68% of its total

expenditures on programme production, while the entire private sector spent \$87 million or 41%. (Crean, 1976: 47) This same year the CTV network, C.B.C.'s major network competitor, spent \$11.4 million for Canadian programme production, a comparatively paudry sum. (Hallman, 1977: 61) Indeed, the C.B.C. clearly surpasses all private networks in terms of the volume of Canadian programmes produced. During the 1976-77 period, the network produced 4,257 hours of English-language television programming and 2,876 hours of French-language television programming for a total of 7,133 hours that year.⁶ The CTV network, on the other hand, regularly produces an average 2,000 hours of Canadian programming per year or 28% of the C.B.C.'s total Canadian programme output. In fact, CTV produces considerably less than its much smaller French-language network competitor, T.V.A., which yearly produces an average 3,900 hours of indigenous programming. The Global television network, which operates strictly in Ontario, produces approximately 1,140 hours yearly. (Hallman, 1977: 61-62)

The CTV network in particular, which, as discussed, represents a consortium of the dominant media complexes, has consistently resisted pressures to increase the meagre amount of original Canadian programming broadcast by its affiliated stations. As Crean observes:

Notwithstanding elaborate promises made at the time of its application for a licence, CTV never became anything like 'a co-operative of Canadian production.' Very quickly it settled into a pattern of importing most of its important shows and all of its featured movies, filling the time remaining with cheap and easy local productions, public and children's programmes, game shows, and bland variety concoctions like 'The Pig and Whistle.'

(1976: 46)

The same of course applies to non-dominant broadcasting outlets, which are scarcely in a position to finance the production of quality Canadian programming. The situation leads Crean to conclude that:

The conflict between public and private sectors has in reality been the struggle of national broadcasting against U. S. broadcasting; and the aim of private broadcasting to separate itself from the public system, and, as much as possible, from government control, has been like a declaration of its independence from national obligations within the Canadian system.

(1976: 47)

Given the nature of their position within the larger economic system, the hostility of those dominant in the private broadcasting sector towards nationalist sentiments is readily comprehensible.

The same factors that discourage the production of original or indigenous Canadian programming⁷ also discourage the production of in-depth news and public affairs programming. CTV's average weekly production of sixty-five programming hours includes only twelve hours of news and public affairs programming or 18% of its total programme schedule. (Hallman, 1977: 61) In contrast, the C.B.C.'s average weekly production of eighty-one (English-language television) programming hours includes thirty-eight hours that are dedicated to "information and orientation" or 47% of its total English-language television programme schedule. (C.B.C. Annual Report, 1976-77: 13) Tables 25 and 26 indicate the ratio of news and public affairs programmes to the more cheaply produced music

TABLE 25

C.B.C. Radio Programme Content 1977*

Type of Programming	% of Total Programme Schedule			
	<u>ENG AM</u>	<u>FR AM</u>	<u>ENG FM</u>	<u>FR FM</u>
News & News-related	66.3	57.9	31.7	25.9
Music (general)	13.3	40.6	4.5	4.8
Music (traditional & special interest)	20.4	1.5	63.8**	69.3***
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

* indicates "one representative winter week"

** 54.2% classical music

*** 60.1% classical music

SOURCE: C.B.C. Annual Report, 1976-77:
15-18, with calculations.

TABLE 26

C.B.C. Television Programme
Content 1976-77*

Type of Programming**	% of Total Programme Schedule	
	<u>ENG TV</u>	<u>FR TV</u>
"Information & Orientation"	47.6	34.5
"Light Entertainment"	35.2	47.8
"Arts, Letters, & Sciences"	2.3	2.8
"Sports & Outdoors"	14.9	14.9
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%

* represents the period 1 April 1976 to 31 March 1977

** C.R.T.C. categories

SOURCE: C.B.C. Annual Report, 1976-77:
13-14, with calculations.

and general entertainment programmes for the C.B.C.'s most recent programme periods. The ratio for AM radio in particular is considerably overwhelming.

In the same light, it is not in the interests (economic or otherwise) of private media capitalists to finance the production of unconventional or "radical" programmes potentially threatening to the existing order. This is largely a consequence of the nature of their position, and also their greater dependence on advertising revenue.

Mass programming, like mass production, works on the basis of a hypothetical average - the typical taste rather than a cross section of specific tastes. The commercial imperative disregards diversity and celebrates the middle-of-the-road, standardizing forms and simplifying content. Programmes designed to entertain as many people as possible have to be simple, conventional, and non-topical, rather than demanding, experimental, or provocative. The decisive factor is not what will please people the most, but what will irritate them the least.

(Crean, 1976: 44)

It is sometimes argued that the C.B.C., in light of its lesser dependence on advertising revenue, is therefore better able to supply a "radical" programming alternative to the mediocrity of the private media. This would also call for a comparative analysis of their respective programming materials, in addition to a concise operational definition of "radical."

Finally, the co-existence of public and private broadcasting enterprises presents the appearance of competition on a pure economic scale, in terms of advertising revenue, whereas in reality the C.B.C.'s share of the total advertising revenue has steadily

decreased to the point where it is now relatively insignificant. In 1960 the Corporation claimed only 3.7% of the total radio advertising revenue, which declined to 1.8% in 1968, and to nil in April 1975 when it discontinued commercial radio advertising entirely. The peak period of the C.B.C.'s share in the total television advertising revenue was 1960, just prior to the establishment of the CTV network. At this time it claimed 51.9% of the total, which decreased rapidly to 28.5% in 1962 and 23.9% in 1968. (Canada, Special Senate Committee on Mass Media, Report, 1970, II: 527) On the other hand, the state has become increasingly important as the major funding source. In 1965 the state provided \$100.1 million or 80.6% of the C.B.C.'s total expenses, increasing to \$170.5 million or 86.8% of the total expenses for 1969, and further to \$415.9 million or 87.4% in 1977.⁸ Advertising revenue in 1977 contributed to less than 16% of the C.B.C.'s total revenue of \$514.7 million. (C.B.C. Annual Report, 1976-77: 36) Thus the presentation of the C.B.C. as a "competitor" in the advertising market is highly deceptive. At the same time, the C.B.C.'s principal dependence on state capital, and its lesser dependence on advertising revenue, makes more credible the semblance of competition at the ideological level.

A broadcasting system based strictly on private ownership, then, would place rather severe restrictions on the type, quantity, and quality of programming provided. As the Aird Commission stressed, private enterprise simply does not lend itself well to the requirements of broadcasting. It is intrinsically poorly

suited to meet the demands of the broadcasting field; demands that, in Canada at least, are aggravated by regional, demographic, and linguistic imperatives. (It is not coincidental that the "national" CTV network operates only in those regions where the population is predominantly English-speaking). If it is possible to conceive of the development of Canadian broadcasting without the C.B.C. or an alternative state enterprise, it is evident that the critical contradiction between the private interests of private media capitalists and the "public interest" (so frequently defined by state commissions and others as the need for a "national broadcasting system" providing a sense of "national unity," "cultural identify," etc.) would have become, at a very early state, quite quickly and quite readily apparent. In this light, it will be seen that Gramsci's concept of the "compromise equilibrium" serves well. The establishment of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in 1936 may well have been one of the most important legitimation measures implemented by the Canadian state. It served to legitimate the activities of private media capitalists, to protect their long-term interests, and in fact to complement their operations by filling in those "gaps" (the hinterland areas, indigenous Canadian programme production, news and public affairs programme production, etc.) where private enterprise cannot lucratively function. Through the C.B.C., the state has effectively underwritten for private media capitalists the more prohibitive costs entailed in operating a broadcasting enterprise in Canada. In other words, the C.B.C. begins where private capital leaves off, yet primarily in terms of programming,

not ownership.

The State as Regulator: The Canadian Radio-television
Telecommunications Commission

Further light can be shed on the relation between the C.B.C. and private capital through a consideration of its offspring in the area of regulation: the Canadian Radio-television Telecommunications Commission (C.R.T.C.). The C.R.T.C. is empowered with the legal authority to supervise and regulate the broadcasting industry in Canada. An important component of this directive is the Commission's responsibility for both private and public broadcasting enterprises operating in Canada. Indeed, the Commission acts as the self-proclaimed monitor of the corporate activities of media owners, through its important and primary licensing function. The C.R.T.C. not only regulates the broadcasting sector, determining who shall control broadcasting stations and cable television systems in Canada, but it also therefore determines, more critically, who shall have access to what is a major ideological force in Canadian society. The C.B.C. of course performs a much more blatant ideological role. Both the C.B.C. and the C.R.T.C. place themselves, as agents of the state, in a direct and effectively daily relation with private capital, however that relation might be characterized. In theory, private capital is subordinate to the C.R.T.C., to the extent that dominant media capitalists are subject to its regulations; for example, their establishment of new broadcasting operations as

well as their acquisition of existing companies are each subject to the approval of the Commission. It will be seen that the appearance of regulation, presented by the C.R.T.C., and the appearance of competition, presented by the C.B.C., each have a utility for the maintenance of the hegemonic order, and for the maintenance of the appearance of the state in general as the representative of the interests of all classes.

More critically, the C.R.T.C. acts as a liason between the interests of private capital and the interests of the state; it places each in a direct relation to the other. How then can one characterize this relation? Firstly, it is important to note that the Commission is fundamentally a juridical agency: its basic function is to enforce adherence to the principles and legal imperatives of the 1968 Broadcasting Act. It is therefore, in some sense, the quasi-official "court" for the broadcasting industry. Thus it performs a juridical function in addition to its supervisory and regulatory functions. It bears a direct relation, indeed a subordinate relation, to the legislative branch of the state. The Commission was established through the 1968 Broadcasting Act and its authority is restricted to the specific provisions of that Act, as several legal battles between the Commission and private broadcasters have stressed. At the same time, it was established as an "independent authority," so that one might perceive it as a "relatively independent" state apparatus. To the extent that the Commission acts essentially as a juridical agency, enforcing (principally among the private media) the statutes contained within the Broadcasting Act, one

school of thought would suggest that it functions, in conjunction with other juridical agencies, as a mere instrument of class domination, that the law favours (necessarily) bourgeois economic relations, and upholds the interests of the bourgeois class.

However, it was argued earlier (see Chapter 1) that crude instrumentalist notions are inadequate to account for the complexities of the state-capital relation. The concrete activities of the state in general and the C.R.T.C. in particular cannot be sufficiently explained as a consequence of the direct subordination of the state to private capital. This conception is far too tidy, to withstand the test of empirical investigation, as the following analysis of the C.R.T.C.'s activities demonstrates. Rather, the state is considered the mediator of class power, the arbiter of class interests, and the organizer of the field of class relations; in Gramsci's words, it is the "organizer of hegemony." It was also suggested earlier that, in the Canadian case, consent management is considerably more effective and more easily enforced, than is coercion, since notions of democratic parliamentary representation are institutionalized both structurally and ideologically within the political culture, and since the private mass media provide the appearance of independence. Moreover, the state-funded C.B.C. maintains the appearance of independence from the state as a whole, and certainly from the interests of private capital. For pragmatic purposes, it is important that the C.B.C., as a media operation, as a member of the "free press," etc., maintain this appearance of independence from both the state and private capital. The public media must serve the

interests of "the public" and provide the broadcasting alternative to the private mass media, which from time to time are subject to suspicion in light of their greater dependence on advertising revenue. Overall, the development of institutionalized democratic political representation, of the "independent" mass media as the "voice of public opinion," of the juridical equality of all citizens in the juridical realm, and of labour concessions in the economic realm, each assisted in the ideological creation of the independent, representative state. In order to sustain this creation, there is a continual need to maintain the compromise equilibrium:

Undoubtedly the fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed ... but there is also no doubt that such sacrifices and such a compromise cannot touch the essential.

(Gramsci, 1971: 161)

To compress the process within the context of C.R.T.C. operations, one can see that all applicants to the Commission are regarded as individual citizens, irregardless of their affiliation with either a powerful economic enterprise or a community association composed of middle class professionals. The Commission expresses well the rhetoric of its parent structure, the state as a whole, as the embodiment of "the public interest" and the representative of "the will of the people" in assuring that the broadcasting industry, because of its "special significance" (its ideological potency) is developed in such a way as to best

serve "the public interest." The activities of the C.R.T.C. are thus legitimated, and secure the consent of the masses. Provided that the C.R.T.C. is able to justify its actions in terms of "the public interest," its legitimacy is sustained. It is argued here that, to the contrary, the C.R.T.C.'s actions can only be explained in terms of "the private interest" of private capital; specifically, the interests of the dominant media capitalists. It will be seen that the C.R.T.C. functions to not only maintain the existing pattern of media control in Canada, but to justify this control structure by 1) establishing and implementing policy according to its perception of "the public interest" and 2) by drawing attention away from the question of media ownership concentration and towards other issues less threatening to the interests of private capital. Before proceeding to demonstrate the way in which the C.R.T.C. functions to maintain the "structure of dominance" characteristic of the broadcasting industry and the media industry as a whole, it will be useful to review the development of the Commission itself.

It was suggested in Chapter 2 that the 1929 Aird Report essentially set the tone for what emerged as a prolonged debate concerning state versus private ownership of broadcasting enterprises in Canada. In light of the classical debate, it was suggested that the public media, while serving the long-term interests of private media capitalists, have never existed in a peaceful co-relation with private media enterprises. To the contrary, the C.B.C. in particular and state intervention in

general have been a continual source of state-capital conflict. It is clear that the nature of broadcasting posed special problems for the administration of the compromise equilibrium: broadcasting presented itself as a new industry, and as a new profit-making venture, that could not be reduced to the simple production of commodities. It was evident, from the very beginning, that the operation of the new medium would require special concessions on the part of private capital, that new appearances must be constructed through the mechanisms of the state, in order to appease and sustain the consent of the masses. (Recall Bennett's statements cited in Chapter 2).

The C.R.T.C., then, is the latest in a series of efforts to in some sense reconcile the traditional conflict regarding the ownership and regulation of broadcasting enterprises in Canada. The 1968 Broadcasting Act stressed that the Commission was to function as a "single independent public authority" responsible for the "regulation and supervision of the Canadian broadcasting system." The appearance of independence was not entirely well orchestrated: the Commission was not granted the authority to revoke or suspend a licence issued to the C.B.C. However, the appearance of the C.R.T.C.'s regulatory authority was maintained: the Corporation must follow the same application procedures as private broadcasting enterprises; new, renewal, and other types of applications can be subject to a public hearing; it must consult with the Commission on conditions of licence, and, in cases of disagreement, the issue must be referred to the Minister of Communications. In other words, the special status accorded to

the C.B.C., to all appearances, pertains only to its assurance that its applications will never be denied by the Commission; an assurance that is granted in other ways to private broadcasters.

The Commission was empowered, by the 1968 Act, with the authority to "prescribe classes of broadcasting licences, to establish regulations applicable to all licence holders relating to various specified matters (i.e. programme standards, allocation of broadcasting time, operation of broadcasting networks, and other related matters) and to revoke licences." It may also, under the licensing provisions of the Act, "establish conditions of operation related to the circumstances of the licensee." (C.R.T.C. Annual Report, 1968-69: 2-3) Virtually all corporate activity in the broadcasting sector is subject to C.R.T.C. approval: the establishment of new broadcasting operations; licence renewals for existing outlets; the take-over of existing outlets either by other broadcasters or those outside the media field; the establishment of broadcasting networks; changes in the conditions of licence, such as transmitting frequency allocations, transmission tower locations, service area extensions, etc.; and finally, any and all changes in the share structure of existing outlets, even where such share transfers do not entail a change in the effective control of the enterprise. In 1976 the Commission's authority was extended to include the telecommunications industry; it assumed the responsibilities in this area previously held by the Canadian Transport Commission. For our purposes here, the important consideration is that the Commission is officially

empowered to deny applications submitted by the dominant media complexes, that it could potentially alter, in a substantial way, the control structure of the broadcasting sector and thus structure of dominance that characterizes the media industry as a whole.

Finally, it is important to point out that the Commission's jurisdiction extends only to the broadcasting sector of the media industry. The Canadian publishing industry was operating according to the libertarian "press freedom" model long before broadcasting was introduced in the early 1920s. "Freedom of the press" is of course an important component of the "free man in a free market" mentality; it would do far too much ideological damage to grant the C.R.T.C. or any other state agent the authority to regulate and supervise the newspaper and periodical publishing industry. One can of course suggest, within the consensual parameters, the establishment of such things as a "Press Ownership Review Board;" however, the Davey Committee's recommendation has never been implemented, nor have the infrequent actions of the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission been effective in limiting further concentration.⁹ Because print and electronic media ownership are so closely interrelated in Canada, a genuine effort to restrict the degree of concentration would require legal jurisdiction over both sectors of the media industry. The C.R.T.C. claims jurisdiction over only one of these sectors; however, it is authorized to reject applications for broadcasting licences submitted by media owners with substantial print holdings. Its official policy states that: "the ownership and

control of broadcasting undertakings should be separate from the ownership and control of newspapers except in special circumstances." (C.R.T.C. Annual Report, 1974-75: 16) In reality, it has always been the case, since broadcasting was first introduced, that ownership in two sectors has never been separate. As discussed in Chapter 2, the very first broadcasting licences were issued in many cases to those corporations already dominant in the publishing industry (for example, the Southam, Atkinson, and Eaton families). This continued to be the case in 1968 when the Commission was first established, and it continues to be the case today, as six of the dominant complexes control media properties in both sectors of the industry. The relation between C.R.T.C. policy and C.R.T.C. practice must now be given greater attention.

(i) C.R.T.C. Policy

It is argued that there is a fundamental contradictory relation between policy and practice in terms of the activities of the C.R.T.C. There is a common-sensical notion (highly functional for bourgeois ideology) that no state enterprise can be expected to follow policy to the rule or in any consistent sense, that there will inevitably be some discrepancy between official rhetoric and concrete practice. However, in the case of the C.R.T.C.'s ownership policy, the concrete day-to-day activities of the Commission not only fail to strictly follow its policy pronouncements, but actually contravene this policy. This will be demonstrated in

the analysis that follows. It will first be necessary to consider the position of the Commission on media ownership concentration, and the means through which it maintains the appearance of neutrality and of public representation.

There are three basic elements of the ownership question that are addressed by the Commission: local or community ownership, foreign ownership, and concentrated indigenous ownership.¹⁰ It is a policy of the Commission that radio stations, television stations, and cable television systems should be locally owned, or at least that there should be local participation in the ownership of the outlet. It will be seen that, rather than rejecting an application by (for example) a Toronto-based dominant complex for a new licence in Tuktoyaktuk, the Commission tends rather to grant the application to the complex, and to impose as a condition of licence that a local resident must serve on the board of the operating company in question, in order to represent "the interests of the community." With respect to foreign ownership, it is a responsibility of the Commission to enforce the 20% limit on foreign ownership in any broadcasting undertaking; indeed, during the first few years of its operation, the Commission was consumed by the task of weeding out foreign investors in the broadcasting industry.

It is the policy regarding concentrated indigenous ownership that is of crucial concern here. The position of the Commission pertaining to ownership that crosses the boundaries between publishing and broadcasting has already been noted. More importantly perhaps, the Commission has also denounced cross-media

ownership within the broadcasting sector. It has stated on innumerable occasions that: "except in special circumstances, television undertakings should be independent of cable television undertakings, both as regards ownership and control and as regards substantial shareholdings." (C.R.T.C. Annual Report, 1968-69: 18-19) Similar proclamations have been published regarding the simultaneous ownership of radio and television, radio and cable, and of course newspapers and any form of broadcasting endeavour. The Commission has made clear its preference for the independent ownership of each medium, for an ownership structure in which the control of each individual medium is held in separate, distinguishable hands. At the same time, on at least one occasion, the Commission has at least tacitly recognized the futility of this task, yet not for the correct reasons. It has defined the need for a "compromise equilibrium" in the following manner:

... the whole area of concentration of ownership is a complex problem made more difficult by the distribution of the population of Canada. The Commission realizes that the development of communication in Canada may sometimes require the participation of large entities. The dilemma, therefore, is to reconcile the conflicting desires to restrict concentration of ownership on the one hand and allow the participation of large entities on the other.

(C.R.T.C. Annual Report, 1968-69: 18)

The above statement was published in the first year of the Commission's operation. In the ten years since, the Commission has indeed effected a compromise, yet not in the sense that it was initially perceived by the Commission. In effect, the C.R.T.C.

has done little "restricting" and very much "allowing." What has been maintained as a result of the Commission's activities is a compromise of a different sort, whereby concessions have been granted to small independent broadcasters in the interests of the state, while licences have been granted to the dominant media capitalists in the interests of "the public." The ultimate effect has been to maintain a compromise equilibrium, in the true sense that Gramsci used that term, in that broadcasting has particularly taxed the need for the state to present itself as universal, to construct the appearance of neutrality, and to preserve the ideological benefits of a system of "public representation."

(ii) C.R.T.C. Practice

The present study is an analysis of all applications submitted to the C.R.T.C. during the following terms: 1 April 1970 to 31 March 1971, 1 April 1972 to 31 March 1973, 1 April 1974 to 31 March 1975, and 1 April 1976 to 31 March 1977.¹¹ Approval and denial rates were calculated for four categories of applicants: dominant media complexes primarily engaged in electronic media ownership ("D.P.E." complexes), dominant media complexes primarily engaged in print media ownership ("D.P.P." complexes), non-dominant media enterprises (including individual private broadcasters), and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.¹² Approval and denial rates for each type of applicant were further subdivided according to the type of application. Five such classifications are distinguished

by the C.R.T.C.: 1) applications for licences to carry on new broadcasting undertakings ("new" applications); 2) applications to renew existing broadcasting licences ("renewal" applications); 3) applications for permission to transfer shares in a broadcasting enterprise ("securities" applications); 4) applications to amend the conditions of an existing licence ("amendment" applications); and 5) applications to establish broadcasting networks (radio or television) between existing stations either under common or separate ownership ("network" applications).

For the purpose of investigating the Commission's decisions vis-a-vis its ownership policies, new, renewal, and securities applications are of particular interest. Amendment applications have also been included in the analysis; while these applications typically concern such matters as changing antenna sites, rate increases for cable firms, changes in channel distribution for cable firms, transmitting frequency allocations, etc., there have been cases which indicate that this type of application also merits consideration.¹³ Moreover, applications to increase the transmitting power of a radio or television station, which also fall into this category, effectively extend the service area of an applicant, and thereby increase the proportion of the population accessible by the particular station. Network applications are comparatively infrequent; in most cases, a network application is submitted to the Commission for approval of the establishment of a temporary network, often in order to broadcast a particular sports event.

Table 27 summarizes the results of all applications submitted during the four terms for each category of applicant. What is initially striking is the considerably high approval rate for all applications in general: only 215 (7.3%) of the 2,937 applications filed by non-C.B.C. applicants in all four terms were denied the Commission's approval, while 92.7% were approved, and 94.0% of all applications, including the C.B.C.'s, were approved. In sum, a total of 3,339 of the 3,554 applications submitted by all applicants in all four terms were approved.

Dominant media complexes fared well in all terms except the 1970-71 period, where "only" 88.2% of their applications were approved; a figure significantly lower than their average approval rate of 94.8%. It was only during this period that their approval rate was lower than that for non-dominants. While the proportion of non-dominant applications has steadily increased since 1970-71 (from 52.0% of all applications in that term to 62.7% in 1972-73 to 71.9% in 1974-75 to 70.3% in 1976-77), the non-dominant approval rate has been consistently lower than the average for all non-C.B.C. applicants, as Table 28 indicates. Only during the 1970-71 period did their approval rate exceed that for the dominant complexes, and here only by 1.4%. The proportion of dominant applications remained relatively constant throughout all four terms (representing an average 18.3% of all applications, the greatest deviation occurring during 1970-71 when the proportion was 20.8%); yet their approval rate suffered only during 1970-71, the only period in which it dropped below 96.0%.

TABLE 27

Summary of C.R.T.C. Application Results,
All Terms

Term	Type of Applicant	Approved (N)	Approved (%)	Denied (N)	Denied (%)	Total (N)	Total (%)
1970-71	DPE	121	89.0	15	11.0	136	100.0
	DPP	36	85.7	6	14.3	42	100.0
	SUBTOTAL	157	88.2	21	11.8	178	100.0
	NON-DOM	398	89.6	46	10.4	444	100.0
	CBC	232	100.0	0	0	232	100.0
	ALL PRIVATE*	787	89.4	67	10.6	622	100.0
1972-73	DPE	106	98.1	2	1.9	108	100.0
	DPP	59	95.2	3	4.8	62	100.0
	SUBTOTAL	165	97.1	5	2.9	170	100.0
	NON-DOM	555	92.2	47	7.8	602	100.0
	CBC	188	100.0	0	0	188	100.0
	ALL PRIVATE*	720	93.3	52	6.7	772	100.0
1974-75	DPE	89	98.9	1	1.1	90	100.0
	DPP	36	97.3	1	2.7	37	100.0
	SUBTOTAL	125	98.4	2	1.6	127	100.0
	NON-DOM	446	89.0	55	11.0	501	100.0
	CBC	69	100.0	0	0	69	100.0
	ALL PRIVATE*	571	90.9	57	9.1	628	100.0
1976-77	DPE	118	95.9	5	4.1	123	100.0
	DPP	60	96.8	2	3.2	62	100.0
	SUBTOTAL	178	96.2	7	3.8	185	100.0
	NON-DOM	707	95.5	33	4.5	740	100.0
	CBC	128	100.0	0	0	128	100.0
	ALL PRIVATE*	885	95.7	40	4.3	925	100.0

TABLE 27 (Continued)

Term	Type of Applicant	Approved		Denied		Total	
		(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)
ALL TERMS	DPE	424	94.9	23	5.1	447	100.0
	DPP	192	94.6	11	5.4	203	100.0
	SUBTOTAL	616	94.8	34	5.2	650	100.0
	NON-DOM	2106	92.1	181	7.9	2287	100.0
	CBC	617	100.0	0	0	617	100.0
	ALL PRIVATE*	2722	92.7	215	7.3	2937	100.0
	TOTAL	3339	94.0%	215	6.0%	3554	100.0%

* see Notes to Tables 27-32

TABLE 28

Summary of Approval Rates
for Non-C.B.C. Applicants

<u>Term</u>	<u>Non-Dominants</u>	<u>Dominants</u>	<u>All Non-C.B.C.</u>
1970-71	89.6%	88.2%	89.4%
1972-73	92.2	97.1	93.3
1974-75	89.0	98.4	90.9
1976-77	95.5	96.2	95.7
ALL TERMS	92.1%	94.8%	92.7%

In general, the 1970-71 period was relatively unfavourable for the dominant complexes, with twenty-one out of 178 applications denied by the Commission. It was at this particular time that the Davey Committee placed the question of ownership concentration in the realm of public discussion. The 1970-71 Annual Report of the C.R.T.C. states that: "Ownership of broadcasting undertakings and the economic situation of broadcasting have been special concerns of the C.R.T.C. in the past year." (1970-71: 5) This is reflected in the number of securities applications filed during that term, and in the lower approval rate for dominant applications in general and for new and securities applications in particular. The 1970-71 period is evidently deviant in each of these respects. The number of securities applications filed by all non-C.B.C. applicants (105) is almost twice the average for all other periods (fifty-four). Expressed in proportionate terms, 12.3% of all applications filed during the 1970-71 period were securities applications, compared to 6.7% in 1972-73, 7.5% in 1974-75, and 4.5% in 1976-77. Of the 105 total securities applications filed during 1970-71, sixty-two or 59.0% were filed by the dominant complexes, and of these, forty-three or 69.4% were approved.

For our purposes here, it is particularly important to compare the various approval rates for renewal, new, and securities applications. The treatment of renewal applications provides an indication of the Commission's efforts to alter the existing "structure of dominance" that characterizes the broadcasting industry. One might expect that, especially during

1970-71, renewal applications submitted by the dominant complexes would be subject to closer scrutiny and, at least in some cases, denied. To the contrary, all seventy-two renewal applications submitted by the dominants were approved; not a single application was denied. The fact is that on only three singular occasions during all four terms did the Commission deny a renewal application submitted by any category of applicant: a non-dominant applicant in 1973, a non-dominant applicant in 1976, and an application by the Armadale complex in 1977. In 1976 the decision regarding a non-dominant renewal application was deferred and later approved. In all other cases, renewal applications received the Commission's immediate approval.

Table 29 compares the approval rates for new applications filed by non-C.B.C. applicants for 1970-71 and for all other terms. Like securities applications, the results of applications for new broadcasting licences reflect the results of attempts by the dominants to increase their media properties in Canada. Again there is a clear distinction between the results for 1970-71 and those for all other terms. In the former period, the overall approval rate for new applications was 64.2%, compared to 71.7% for all other terms, whereas the dominant approval rate increased from 55.6% in 1970-71 to 77.3% in the three later terms. D.P.P. complexes, with a single application denied in 1970-71, received approval for ten out of sixteen new applications submitted during the three later terms. Less significant was the increase for non-dominants: from 65.1% in 1970-71 to 70.3% in the three later terms. Expressed in a different manner, one out of every twelve

TABLE 29

Summary of Results For
"New" Applications Only

Term	Type of Applicant	Approved (N)	Approved (%)	Denied (N)	Denied (%)	Total (N)	Total (%)
1970-71	DPE	5	62.5	3	37.5	8	100.0
	DPP	0	0	1	100.0	1	100.0
	SUBTOTAL	5	55.6	4	44.4	9	100.0
	NON-DOM	56	65.1	30	34.9	86	100.0
	ALL PRIVATE*	61	64.2	34	35.8	95	100.0
ALL OTHER TERMS	DPE	24	85.7	4	14.3	28	100.0
	DPP	10	62.5	6	37.5	16	100.0
	SUBTOTAL	34	77.3	10	22.7	44	100.0
	NON-DOM	239	70.3	101	29.7	340	100.0
	ALL PRIVATE*	273	71.1	111	28.9	384	100.0

new private broadcasting licences issued during 1970-71 was granted to a dominant media complex; one out of three during 1972-73; one out of eleven during 1974-75; and one out of eight during 1976-77. Of the 334 new licences issued during all four terms, thirty-nine licences or one in eight were issued to a dominant media complex.

Table 30 provides similar data for securities applications. It can be seen that approval rates for securities applications by both dominants and non-dominants were considerably lower in 1970-71 than the overall rate for all other terms; a difference of 16.4%. Further, there is a clear distinction between the approval rates for D.P.E. complexes and D.P.P. complexes in all four terms. Also worthy of note is the difference in the number of securities applications submitted by the dominants: a total of sixty-two were filed during the 1970-71 term alone, while only twenty-two were submitted during the three later terms. At the same time, forty-three or 69.4% of the sixty-two dominant applications were approved, while nineteen or 30.6% were denied. D.P.P. complexes submitted only eighteen securities applications during all four terms, eleven of which were approved.

Several preliminary conclusions can be drawn on the basis of this analysis: 1) that all applications to the C.R.T.C. experience a high approval rate (94.0%); 2) that the approval rate for dominant media complexes is generally higher than that for non-dominants; 3) that the 1970-71 term, the period of the Davey Committee investigations into media ownership concentration, was deviant in terms of a) the number of securities applications

TABLE 30

Summary of Results For
"Securities" Applications Only

Term	Type of Applicant	Approved (N)	Approved (%)	Denied (N)	Denied (%)	Total (N)	Total (%)
1970-71	DPE	33	70.2	14	29.8	47	100.0
	DPP	10	66.7	5	33.3	15	100.0
	SUBTOTAL	43	69.4	19	30.6	62	100.0
	NON-DOM	37	86.0	6	14.0	43	100.0
	ALL PRIVATE*	80	76.2	25	23.8	105	100.0
ALL OTHER TERMS	DPE	17	89.5	2	10.5	19	100.0
	DPP	1	33.3	2	66.7	3	100.0
	SUBTOTAL	18	81.8	4	18.2	22	100.0
	NON-DOM	133	94.3	8	5.7	141	100.0
	ALL PRIVATE*	151	92.6	12	7.4	163	100.0

filed with the Commission, particularly by the dominants, and b) the lower approval rate for dominant applications in general and for new and securities applications in particular; 4) that applications to renew licences are only very rarely denied; and 5) that the results of new and securities applications have been generally favourable for the dominant media complexes, with the exception of the 1970-71 term.

It becomes necessary, then, to inquire further into the reasons for the high approval rate experienced by the dominant complexes. One should not be led to conclude that the C.R.T.C. is engaged in a conspiratorial plot to maintain the advantages enjoyed by the dominants. Rather, the Commission operates under a number of restrictions built into the Broadcasting Act which limit to some extent its power to alter the control structure of the broadcasting industry. There are also a number of self-imposed restrictions which severely prohibit the Commission's effects, and still others entirely beyond the C.R.T.C.'s control. One important problem results from the fact that applications by dominant complexes are commonly filed under the name of the operating subsidiary for the outlet in question. In cases where the share structure of the applicant is taken into account, this factor is therefore typically dealt with only at the subsidiary level. Consequently, decisions rendered in these instances fail to appreciate the total ownership complex of which the media operation may represent only a minor part. For example, in approving the purchase of CKCV (Quebec) Limitee by Philippe de Gaspé Beaubien, the Commission noted that Beaubien already controlled several AM

and FM radio stations in Quebec, as well as a radio broadcasting network. No reason for the approval was indicated in the published results of the application; the Commission required only that Beaubien increase his staff.¹⁴ The Commission failed to note the relation between Beaubien's Telemedia (Quebec) Limitee, whereby, as discussed, Telemedia is ultimately controlled by Power Corporation through the ownership of corporate debentures. This limitation is thus to some extent intrinsic to the nature of application procedures.

In addition to a general paucity of concern for the ownership configuration to which the outlet relates, there is also little consideration given to the size of the outlet. More or less equal weight appears to be given to outlets of radically different size and circulation. In a similar vein, little consideration is given to the location of an outlet, other than in terms of discussing antenna sites, etc. Only infrequently does the Commission consider the size and nature of the market in which the outlet operates, and then typically only in terms of the availability of C.B.C. or CTV network service in the area.

The Commission tends to place a high priority on the extension of both public and private network service, which also indirectly results in further ownership concentration, through the extension of the coverage area of stations controlled by the dominant complexes. In 1974, in an effort to improve the availability of the C.B.C. regional service in the French language, the Commission granted nine rebroadcast licences to CHAU-TV, a C.B.C. affiliate in Carleton, Quebec, effectively controlled (84%)

by the Power complex through Television de la Baie des Chaleurs Incorporated. In the same year, rebroadcast licences were issued to several CTV affiliates, each controlled by a dominant complex. The extension of ownership concentration in this manner appears inevitable, given that more than 50% of the C.B.C. television affiliates are privately-owned, in many cases by the dominant media complexes. The CTV network, as discussed, is a consortium of the dominants; hence all licences granted in the name of CTV network extension effectively increase their span of control.

Furthermore, licences are frequently granted to the dominants in return for programming commitments; commitments that are more readily fulfilled, given the financial resources of the larger complexes. Thus the application by the (then non-dominant) I.W.C. Communications Limited to acquire control of Bushnell Communications Limited was rejected, due to the somewhat tenuous financial position of the former.¹⁵ The Commission later approved the purchase of Bushnell by the Standard complex, in return for a commitment on the part of Standard that it would finance the expansion of the news and public affairs service of CJOH-TV Ottawa.¹⁶ The C.R.T.C. decision added a total of twenty-five broadcasting stations to Standard's holdings, which already included several major radio stations in Toronto and Montreal. Moreover, it placed five Montreal radio stations under the control of one owner. As a condition of the approval, the Commission required only that Standard cause Bushnell to divest itself of its interests in two cable television systems. A group of minority

shareholders representing Bushnell subsequently took legal action to appeal the condition imposed by the C.R.T.C. Because the licences of the two cable companies were not due for renewal, the court found that the C.R.T.C. had no authority to impose, in advance of any application for renewal, a restriction on the licensee's right to renewal that had not previously existed. The court ordered the Commission to re-consider the application, and as a result, the Commission issued a further decision which re-affirmed its approval of the acquisition, yet omitted the condition. (C.R.T.C. Annual Report, 1975-76: 22-23)

In a similar vein, it is the Commission's practice to consider an existing licensee's renewal application before accepting other applications for the same licence; this offers some explanation for the extremely high approval rate experienced by all renewal applicants. On one occasion, this practice was challenged: in 1976 the C.R.T.C. was ordered by a federal court to hear the application of Capital Cable Co-operative Limited before renewing the licence of the existing licensee, Victoria Cablevision Limited (affiliates with the F. P. complex). The Commission successfully appealed the order in a higher court; it is still not required to hear competing applications. (C.R.T.C. Annual Report, 1975-76: 23-24) This practice serves to further restrict access by non-dominants to the broadcasting market, particularly those lucrative urban markets where the traditional power of the established complexes is perpetuated through the mere formality of a renewal application..

In addition, the Commission's preference for local participation in the ownership of a broadcasting station is in no way disadvantageous to the national and multi-national dominant complexes. Provided that a dominant complex agrees to include a local resident on the board of the operating company for the station, applications for new licences are not likely to be impeded by this particular policy.

In some cases, no justification is offered for decisions regarding new and securities applications. The Commission may merely state that it is "in the public interest to approve this application."¹⁷ In 1970 the Standard complex was denied the Commission's approval to acquire two radio stations, reportedly because of the Commission's concern regarding media ownership concentration.¹⁸ On the very same day, the Commission announced its approval of the Baton complex's acquisition of two radio stations, with no mention of ownership and no reason for the approval indicated.¹⁹ This provides a minimal indication of the C.R.T.C.'s general lack of consistency in the treatment of applications by the dominant media complexes. Also in 1970, the dominant CHUM complex was granted the Commission's approval to acquire all the shares of Ralph Shelnigrove Television Limited because "CHUM Limited already holds a two-thirds interest."²⁰ At the same time, Selkirk Holdings Limited (associated with the Southam complex) was not allowed to increase its interest in Ottawa Cablevision Limited, since, according to the Commission, this was "not in the public interest."²¹ Finally, the dominant complexes have benefited considerably from the foreign ownership

limitation enforced by the C.R.T.C., in that many successfully applied to buy out those interests held by foreign corporations.

Tables 31 and 32 summarize the reasons indicated by the Commission for its decisions regarding new and securities applications by the dominant media complexes. It can be seen that ownership concentration was cited in the decisions more frequently in the 1970-71 period than is the case for the three later terms. In addition, the Commission's inconsistency in the treatment of applications to establish new stations and acquire existing stations is clearly evident.

TABLE 31

Reasons Indicated For Decisions Regarding
 "New" Applications By the Dominant Complexes,
 All Terms

<u>Approvals</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Denials</u>
a) No reason indicated	16	6	a) Competing with non-dominants, no reason indicated
b) CTV network service extension	7	3	b) No reason indicated
c) CBC network service extension	5	3	c) Would result in duplication of service
d) Unserved area	4	1	d) Competing with non-dominants, local ownership preferred
e) Competing with non-dominants, no reason indicated	3	1	e) "Not in the public interest"
f) Service improvement/financial resources	2		
g) Foreign ownership	1		
h) "In the public interest"	1		
Total new licences issued	39	14	Total new applications denied
Identified as part of dominant complex/mention of ownership concentration	2	0	Identified as part of dominant complex/mention of ownership concentration

TABLE 32

Reasons Indicated For Decisions Regarding
"Securities" Applications By the Dominant Complexes,
1970-71 & All Other Terms

<u>Approvals</u>	<u>1970-71</u>	<u>All Other Terms</u>	<u>1970-71</u>	<u>All Other Terms</u>	<u>Denials</u>
a) No reason indicated	16	3	14	2	a) Would increase concentration
b) Would result in some local participation	11		4		b) Local ownership preferred
c) Foreign ownership	6	1		2	c) Disposal/proposed owner outside the media field
d) Programming commitments/service improvement	4	9			d) "Not in the public interest"
e) Disposal/would reduce concentration	4	1	1		
f) "In the public interest"	1				
g) Both "b" and "d"		4			
h) Both "c" and "d"	1				
Total approvals	43	18	19	4	Total denials
Identified as part of dominant complex/mention of ownership concentration	33	10	15	2	Identified as part of dominant complex/mention of ownership concentration

Conclusions: The Significance of "Public" Ownership

The Aird Commission had first set the stage for the historical conflict between the state and private capital vis-a-vis broadcasting, as well as for the administration of a compromise equilibrium that was to characterize the development of the broadcasting industry in Canada, and which continues to operate, although it could be argued, less successfully than at earlier points in time. The historical struggle between private broadcasters and the state can be viewed as a struggle between the short- and long-term interests of private capital, with private broadcasters arguing for the former and the state seeking the latter, that is, the preservation of its appearance of independence and, ultimately, the preservation of the legitimacy of capitalist social relations. The establishment of a system in which private capital and state capital co-exist while at the same time presenting the appearance of conflict and competition, is highly functional for this social order; in reality, the two converge at the ideological level and complement each other at the economic level. Indeed, the relation between public and private media can be regarded not simply as complementary, but in fact symbiotic, in the sense that, in both economic and ideological terms, the two are mutually interdependent. The C.R.T.C., as a regulatory force, ensures the reproduction of a structure in which dominant media capitalists reign supreme.

At the core of state-capital conflict vis-a-vis broadcasting is the contradictory nature of the state itself. On the one hand, the state expresses the interests of the dominant class and provides the mechanisms through which hegemony is sustained. At the same time, in order to ensure that hegemony is sustained, the state is required to present itself in an independent form, representing "the public interest" or the interests of all classes. The principal means of reconciling this contradiction is that of the compromise equilibrium, in which both the C.B.C. and the C.R.T.C. are vital state assets.

The C.R.T.C. operates in such a way as to maintain a control structure favourable to the dominant media complexes, which in turn are controlled by a group that forms an important segment of the capitalist class. It is evident that, while the dominant complexes have from time to time received unfavourable treatment by the Commission, in the long run their interests have been well served, and these complexes have retained their dominant status with the aid of the Commission. In other words, in the ten years of its operation, the C.R.T.C. has not substantially altered the structure of dominance that characterizes the broadcasting sector of the mass media industry.

At the same time, the Commission has constructed and maintained the appearance of neutrality and independence, the appearance of close supervision and regulation in the public interest, in several ways. Firstly, the Commission has

established policies which present it as a neutral agent, concerned for the interests of all classes, representing "the people" in safeguarding the development of the Canadian broadcasting system. Secondly, it has administered a compromise equilibrium, a nevertheless unequal equilibrium, according to which certain concessions are granted, such as comparable approval rates for small media companies where the size and circulation of the broadcasting outlets is not at all comparable to those controlled by the dominants, local residents serving as directors for the dominants, etc., all of which still preserve the traditional structure of dominance. Thirdly, it has assisted in the ideological work undertaken by the Davey Committee to appease a concern regarding this structure of dominance. In the period since the activities of the Davey Committee, it has carried on this task largely by disregarding the issue of ownership concentration and instead directing priorities towards such issues as programming improvements, network service extensions, and of course, its consistently vague notion of community interest.

Like the C.B.C., the C.R.T.C. contributes to the ideological presentation of the state as a neutral and objective sphere. It sustains the interests of the dominant class and simultaneously sustains legitimacy and consent. It is in this sense that the C.B.C. and the C.R.T.C., as particular agents of the state, perform their roles in the organization of hegemony. Finally, it is crucial to stress that it is the

preservation of the state's appearance as a neutral power, and not the "bias" of the compromise equilibrium, that achieves this ultimate effect. Through their structure, through their official rhetoric, and occasionally through their operations, the C.B.C., the C.R.T.C., and their parent structure represent the interests of a particular class as the interests of all classes. It is in this fashion that an important ideological task is carried out.

Notes

1. The three major educational broadcasting organizations operated by provincial states include: 1) the Ontario Educational Communications Authority (O.E.C.A.), established as a Crown corporation in 1970 to serve all levels of education in Ontario; 2) the Quebec Broadcasting Bureau (Radio-Quebec), established in 1969; and 3) the Alberta Educational Communications Corporation (ACCESS), established in 1973. See Hallman (1977: 62-68).

2. In January 1976 the responsibilities of the Canadian Radio-Television Commission (C.R.T.C.) were extended to include the telecommunications industry; consequently, it became the "Canadian Radio-television Telecommunications Commission" (C.R.T.C.).

3. Recall that "the larger state" refers to the Gramscian concept, incorporating civil society and political society. It is within the latter that the bourgeois or legally defined "state" is to be found. At the same time, Milner, for example, notes that: "It is difficult to see how one can reconcile a functional description of state activities with a legal definition of the state ... The nurse in both the public and private hospital, the teacher in public and private school, the bureaucrat in a reformist trade union and his counterpart in the Ministry of Labour, the broadcaster with the C.B.C. and with CTV, the social worker employed by the state and the one working for a private agency, the city policeman and the 'rent-a-cop' - all serve the state." (1978: 67; emphasis added)

4. Curiously enough, Baldwin (1977a) attempts to do this. She does not, however, indicate the source of her data for C.B.C.-owned stations (included in Table 3: 9), which conflicts somewhat with the circulation data presented here. Her Table 3 is also misconstrued to the extent that there is a duplication (not identified by Baldwin) in the circulation of C.B.C. affiliates and the figures for those dominant complexes that own C.B.C. affiliated stations.

5. "Major" refers to those radio stations with circulations that exceed 25,000 (see Chapter 3).

6. These figures exclude local station productions.

7. Indeed, the cost factor is stunningly prohibitive; for example, Crean points out (1976: 49) that the U. S.-produced "All in the Family" cost the C.B.C. \$2,000 per week in 1975 and reaped \$24,000 in weekly advertising revenue. On the other hand, the Canadian- (C.B.C.-) produced "The Beachcombers" cost \$65,000 per week to produce and generated the same amount of advertising revenue.

8. Figures represent the year ended 31 March in each case, based on Canada, Special Senate Committee on Mass Media, Report, II, Table "E": 534, Table "H": 537-38, and C.B.C. Annual Report 1976-77, with calculations.

9. In 1960, for example, the R.T.P.C. investigated the arrangement whereby the Southam-owned Vancouver Province became part of Pacific Press Limited in association with the Vancouver Sun, at that time owned by the Cromie family. Its report found no unacceptable monopoly situation in Vancouver but recommended that no further change of ownership take place without court approval. In 1963 Donald Cromie sold the Sun to Free Press Publications Limited to bring that complex and the Southam complex into a publishing partnership. While the anti-combines section of the federal justice department took note of the change, no report was made of the sale, nor was further action recommended. (Kesterton, 1967: 78) In 1963 the R.T.P.C. investigated the Thomson complex's control of both the Fort William Times-Journal and the Port Arthur News-Chronicle. Its report concluded that "no detriment to the public had resulted," pointing out that in 1963 the Thomson complex controlled "only" 6.95% of the total daily newspaper circulation in Canada. The report was finally issued in May 1965, at which time total Thomson circulation had increased to 311,500 and accounted for 7.22% of the total Canadian circulation. See Kesterton (1967: 79-80).

10. At the time of this writing, the C.R.T.C. has announced a new ownership policy. Details of the policy statement are not yet available.

11. See the "Notes to Tables 27-32" at the end of this chapter. The Commission often grants licences for a three-year period; thus alternating terms were selected for study to avoid excessive duplication in terms of renewal applications, etc.

12. "Dominant media complexes" refers to those complexes that were dominant during each of the periods studied. I.W.C. Communications Limited, for example, became dominant in April 1974 and recently lost its dominant status. In general, those complexes dominant at 1 April 1970 remained so throughout each of the four terms.

Because applications to the C.R.T.C. are rarely filed under the name of the parent or main operating company of a dominant complex, i.e. "Southam Press Limited," it was necessary to cross-reference the application data contained in the Commission's annual reports with ownership data identifying the subsidiaries as well as the individuals associated with each of the dominant complexes.

13. For example, the political autobiography of Judy LaMarsh (1968) relates an incident in which an amendment application by an individual associated with the CHUM complex was granted, largely as a result of direct political intervention.

14. See Decision #74-425, C.R.T.C. Annual Report (1974-75: 197).

15. See Decision #74-58, C.R.T.C. Annual Report (1973-74: 176-77)..

16. See Decision #75-78, C.R.T.C. Annual Report (1974-75: 264-65).

17. See, for example, Decision #70-289, C.R.T.C. Annual Report (1970-71: 238-39), in which Maclean-Hunter acquires a cable television system.

18. See Decision #70-311, C.R.T.C. Annual Report (1970-71: 247).

19. See C.R.T.C. Annual Report (1970-71: 248). Both decisions were announced on 17 December 1970.

20. See Decision #70-326, C.R.T.C. Annual Report (1970-71: 253).

21. See Decision #70-338, C.R.T.C. Annual Report (1970-71: 257).

Notes to Tables 27-32

1. ALL PRIVATE*: C.B.C. applications are excluded in the calculation of the overall approval rates for Table 27.

2. Free Press, Irving, Maclean-Hunter, Quebecor, Southam, Thomson and Torstar were classified as D.P.P. complexes, since circulations for their respective publishing interests have traditionally exceeded those for the broadcasting holdings. Southam's broadcasting circulation, however, has recently increased to the point where it now exceeds the complex's total publishing circulation (see Table 2). The McConnell family complex was considered D.P.P. for the period of its dominance, while I.W.C. was classified as D.P.E. The remaining complexes were all classified as D.P.E.

3. "Deferred" decisions were disregarded, since most were later reconsidered during the same term. There were only eleven decisions deferred in all four terms.

4. "Approved in part" decisions were rendered primarily in the case of amendment applications and frequently referred to a problem with the distribution of a particular channel by a cable firm, or in other cases, with reference to rate increases for cable companies. Thus all "approved in part" decisions were classified as "approved."

5. Securities applications by dominant media complexes were in some cases listed in the name of the outlet(s) to be acquired. For example, a radio station would apply for permission to transfer its shares from its existing shareholders to individuals or companies associated with a dominant complex. In these cases, the complex was regarded as the true applicant and the application was considered a D.P.P. or D.P.E. securities application.

6. British Columbia TV Broadcasting Limited and Okanagan Valley TV Limited, in which Western (D.P.E.) and Southam (D.P.P.) are partners, were each classified as D.P.E. applicants, since Western holds a slightly higher proportion of the voting shares in B.C. TV (50.3%) and in Okanagan (34.0% to Southam's 30.0%).

7. In one case (Wawa Cablevision Limited) a revoked licence was classified as "renewal-denied." It was the only instance in which the Commission revoked a licence prior to the renewal date.

CONCLUSION

Originally, the problem of the relationship between the dominant ideology and the dominant class was posed, and the particular "schools of response" identified and briefly discussed. Needless to say, there is little here that can be offered in the way of resolution; however, this fundamental problem underlies all that has been discussed with regard to the operation of the process of media production/ideological reproduction, and, critically, its relation to the state and to the dominant class. It has been suggested that, therefore, the problem of the "relative independence" of the capitalist state extends to the problem of the "relative independence" of the process of ideological reproduction, and that, for each, the final test must rest with the empirical analysis of concrete cases. The present analysis considered one particular social realm within which ideological reproduction takes its course, within the context of the Canadian social formation. It was seen that the Canadian case presents the added problem of the relation between the media institutions of civil society and those of political society; in this regard, it was argued that Gramsci's conceptualization of the state and his theorization of the operation of the hegemonic process does indeed prove useful to the understanding of its concrete implementation

here.

Several conclusions emerge from the analysis of the ownership element of the media-ideology relation. Firstly, the media institutions of civil society, the private media, are predominantly owned and controlled by a relatively limited number of dominant media capitalists who have solidly established themselves at the upper levels of a "structure of dominance" that characterizes both the publishing and broadcasting sectors of the mass media field. Their control of the major media institutions is manifest in the seventeen media complexes that dominate this structure. At the same time, their position is insured through various mechanisms, including the operations of the Canadian Radio-television Telecommunications Commission, which organizes the structure of dominance to their continued advantage.

Secondly, not only is the ownership and control of the private mass media concentrated within the hands of a relatively few, but the dominant media capitalists also exhibit a suggestive degree of homogeneity. Homogeneity has been assessed in terms of their class position, private school attendance, university attendance, club memberships, common directorships on non-media corporations, direct inter-complex linkages, and several other indices. In each instance, the dominant media capitalists were found to exhibit a relatively extensive number of commonalities in these areas, as well as a substantial number of direct and indirect interrelationships. In particular, the relatively recent phenomenon of direct inter-complex linkages, which interrelate the dominant media complexes and the dominant media

capitalists, suggests that the possibilities for genuine competition, either at the economic or at the ideological level, are seriously undermined, considerably more so than if one considers only the dominance of the seventeen complexes.

Thirdly, it has been argued that the critical role of dominant media capitalists vis-a-vis their private media enterprises is that of selection; the selection of individuals who effectively act as class agents for the ownership group, and who share with this group particular ascriptive traits that render them substantially indistinguishable and thus appropriate representatives of the dominant media capitalists. Consequently, there is little need for the media owners to intervene or otherwise take direct action to insure that their interests are represented. At the same time, it was seen that dominant media capitalists often retain key managerial and editorial positions for themselves or their close kin and associates, thus able to more directly supervise their media operations.

Finally, it was argued that the media institutions of political society, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation radio and television networks, serve to complement the operations of their private "competitors" within civil society. While the convergence of public and private media at the economic level is strongly suggested, their convergence at the ideological level needs to be empirically determined. Were this to be documented, it would lend considerable credence to Gramsci's conceptualization of the state as a whole.

The structure that discloses itself, based on this analysis and the implications of its results, corresponds closely with that suggested by Gramsci's concept of the state. The usage of the term here has been restricted to its legal definition, which has made possible the discussion of the state as a separate unit of analysis, enclosed within a distinct division of the whole thesis. Yet what is clear at this point is that a meaningful concept of the state must trespass the boundaries of traditional definitions in order to include all institutions, regardless of their public or private status, that take part in the organization and management of consent; the consent that must be sustained if bourgeois hegemony is to continue unchallenged. Gramsci indicates this theoretical requirement very concisely in the following crucial passage:

In my opinion, the most reasonable and concrete thing that can be said about the ethical State, the cultural State, is this: every State is ethical in as much as one of its most important functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level (or type) which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes. The school as a positive educative function, and the courts as a repressive and negative educative function, are the most important State activities in this sense: but, in reality, a multitude of other so-called private initiatives and activities tend to the same end - initiatives and activities which form the apparatus of the political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes.

This means that, in our own case, there is little need to fret about public/private distinctions, that the private mass media and the public mass media both contribute equally to the "educative functions" of the state. Where the distinction becomes significant, in the Canadian case, is in terms of the control of the private mass media by owners, managers, and editors, who all act as agents for the dominant class and who operate in such a way as to guard the interests of this class. On those occasions where these interests seem threatened, the dominant media capitalists, by virtue of their very position vis-a-vis the media production process, are able to rectify potential disruptions and redirect the process to better suit their needs.

This, however, is rarely required. Rather, the dominant media capitalists do no more than oversee, in their capacity as night watchmen, the process of media production; their actions are called for only where the ideological direction of their mass media operations takes an overtly harmful course, where the legitimacy of bourgeois rule seems likely to suffer at the hands of their media producers. Their night watchman position parallels that of the state's night watchman duties, required where class hostilities exceed the desired levels, signifying the kind of "legitimacy crisis" that predates a full-fledged assault on the foundations of bourgeois hegemony itself.

To attribute to the dominant media capitalists the capacity to avert such crises or to fully obstruct their development, or to fully supervise all aspects of the process of media production/ideological reproduction and thus recognize the moments of its breakdown, is probably to grant them too much credit. Nevertheless, these capacities, part and parcel of their position as owners of the means of media production, constitute their ideological power, and that power must not be underestimated or theoretically discarded, as the structuralists would too quickly do.

The resiliency of bourgeois hegemony, and its support from the media institutions of both political society and civil society, will be most completely comprehensible when the implications of the media control structure, and the role of media capitalists, can be related to the characteristics of the process of media production itself, the limitations inherent in the media discourse as it is organized within the existing social order. These are evident, for example, in the presentation of "events" as dehistoricized and unrelated to conflict processes or other processes that operate in the social world. "News," then, consists of an enumerated list of "incidents" that are accorded significance, and hence air time and column space, not because of their importance for or their relation to basic social developments, but because of their perceived "relevance," their novelty, their "human interest," and so on. These kinds of limitations need to be traced to their source: the practices and procedures of media

production that characterize its internal organization, that is, the social relations of media production.

The analysis of "the social construction of news" and the social construction of all media material, should provide greater substantiation for the proposals advanced here with respect to the ownership element of the media-ideology relation. It might indicate, for example, that the traditions, orientations, and policies of mass media enterprises do indeed restrict the expression of particular themes, the interpretation of social events, and the contexts within which events are presented and "intended" to be understood. It might also indicate that the characteristics and interests of top media producers that have been identified do indeed become translated to the production process, and are manifest in the sets of assumptions that direct this process.

A fruitful analysis of the social relations of media production would therefore take as its central object the very process of production: the raw materials of media production (selected and rejected news and other items), the instruments of media production, the labour required to produce the media commodity, and, not least of all, the set of institutionalized practices and procedures that link each of these components in order to produce the final media product. It would require extended and extensive in-house observation of what takes place inside newsrooms and programme production studios, complemented by interviews with media producers at all levels. In the

Canadian case, the Canadian Press (C.P.) and other wire services would also need to be investigated, since C. P. alone supplies more than 75% of all that constitutes "news" in Canada. What individual news editors and news directors accept and reject of what is received from C. P., could provide the basis for the identification of "formal news values." The selection of news items could, then, be a starting point for the inquiry. La Presse, for example, publishes a mere average 150,000 words daily of the approximately 365,000 words received each day from wire services and the 100,000 words of staff-written articles. (Canada, Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration, Study #23, 1977: 51) Undoubtedly, the criteria used to siphon through such a mass of "raw materials" draw upon the media producers' formal news values and their stock-of-knowledge regarding what is significant or "newsworthy." One could begin, then, to identify the "double articulation" that Hall refers to (see Chapter 1); that is, the interaction between formal news values and the "ideological values," as it were, of the larger social world.

The analysis of the media production process from start to finish must logically conclude with an equally extensive investigation of its end result: the media product. Very little work has been undertaken in this area in Canada; there has been an astonishing lack of content analyses in any form for any of the mass media. For the reasons outlined in

the first chapter, this would best be rectified through a structural analysis that utilizes semiological principles to disclose and document the ideological component of media messages: the denotative and connotative levels of signification, the "preferred readings" that are invoked, and so on. Armed with the methodological assets of the structural approach, the documented ideological ingredients of Canadian media messages could be related to their roots within the production process, and, most importantly, to ideological forces operative in Canadian society as a whole.¹

In this way, it should be possible to integrate the three levels of analysis (ownership, social relations, and product) that have been identified. Each of these aspects of the media-ideology relation and the interrelation between them would form the object of a comprehensive analysis that must above all be historically specific. The latter is a methodological imperative imposed by the nature of bourgeois ideology and its legitimating tasks: bourgeois ideology survives, provided that it is able to integrate ongoing developments and conflicts in bourgeois society into its justificatory frame. While bourgeois ideology is consistent in terms of the class interests it represents, it is at the same time required to continually re-formulate and adapt itself in order to accommodate the continual procession of potentially threatening events. Gramsci's model of the practico-social operation of bourgeois ideology suggests that it is not necessarily capable of fulfilling this task, particularly at those historical moments

where certain developments inevitably pose themselves as problematic.

On a larger scale, the empirical task of unravelling the web of articulations wherein bourgeois ideology appears (education systems, organized religion, political parties, other state institutions, and the sphere of production itself), must take place within a viable theorization of ideology that locates its necessary relation to the state and to the dominant class. With this in view, it is clear that much work remains to be done.

Notes

1. The analysis of the social relations and product of media production, as proposed here, is planned for the writer's Ph.D. project.

APPENDIX 1

DAILY NEWSPAPER OWNERSHIP & CIRCULATION
BY PROVINCE

NOTE: Circulation data are taken from Canadian Advertising Rates & Data, March 1978, and represent daily average circulation (total paid excluding bulk) for each newspaper. Ownership listings are in block type for those dailies controlled by the dominant complexes. The Daily Racing Form and one foreign-language daily are excluded. "NA" indicates no circulation data available.

BRITISH COLUMBIA

<u>Newspaper</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>Ownership</u>	
Cranbrook Daily Townsman	4,403	Sterling Newspapers	
Alaska Highway News	2,810	Sterling Newspapers	
Kamloops Daily Sentinel	8,640	THOMSON	
Kelowna Daily Courier	12,083	THOMSON	
Kimberley Daily Bulletin	2,345	Sterling Newspapers	
Nanaimo Free Press	9,500	THOMSON	
Nelson Daily News	8,386	Sterling Newspapers	297
New Westminster Columbian	26,785	The Columbian Co.	
Penticton Herald	7,339	THOMSON	
Port Alberni Valley Times	7,253	Sterling Newspapers	
Prince George Citizen	20,142	SOUTHAM	
Prince Rupert Daily News	3,611	Sterling Newspapers	
Terrace Herald	NA	Sterling Newspapers	
Trail Times	5,881	Sterling Newspapers	
Vancouver Sun	232,505	FP PUBLICATIONS	
Vancouver Province	128,924	FP & SOUTHAM	
Vernon Daily News	7,466	THOMSON	
Victoria Colonist (morn))	67,753	FP PUBLICATIONS	
Victoria Times (eve))		FP PUBLICATIONS	

TOTAL B.C. CIRCULATION: 555,826

TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 494,352

% D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 88.9%

ALBERTA

<u>Newspaper</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
Calgary Albertan	41,844	FP PUBLICATIONS
Calgary Herald	130,959	SOUTHAM
Edmonton Journal	183,713	SOUTHAM
Fort McMurray Today	4,129	Fort McMurray Today
Grande Prairie Daily Herald-Tribune	6,740	Bowes Publishers
Lethbridge Herald	25,795	FP PUBLICATIONS
Medicine Hat News	11,796	SOUTHAM
Red Deer Advocate	15,609	Red Deer Advocate
<u>TOTAL ALBERTA CIRCULATION:</u>	420,585	
<u>TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION:</u>	394,107	

% D.M.C. CIRCULATION:

93.7%

SASKATCHEWAN

Newspaper

Circulation

Ownership

Moose Jaw Times-Herald

9,075

THOMSON

Prince Albert Herald

8,645

THOMSON

Regina Leader-Post

66,251

ARMADALE

Saskatoon Star-Phoenix

49,029

ARMADALE

TOTAL SASK. CIRCULATION:

133,000

TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION:

133,000

% D.M.C. CIRCULATION:

100.0%

MANITOBA

<u>Newspaper</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
Brandon Sun	16,170	SOUTHAM
Dauphin Daily Bulletin	NA	Daily Bulletin
Flin Flon Reminder	3,800	Reminder Publications
Portage La Prairie Daily Graphic	3,865	Vopni Press Limited
Roblin News	3,024	Hal-Man Publications
Swan River Report	1,200	Swan River Report
Thompson Citizen	4,305	Precambrian Press
Winnipeg Free Press	143,643	FP PUBLICATIONS
Winnipeg Tribune	96,623	SOUTHAM
<u>TOTAL MAN. CIRCULATION:</u>	272,630	
<u>TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION:</u>	256,436	
<u>% D.M.C. CIRCULATION:</u>	94.1%	

ONTARIO

<u>Newspaper</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
Barrie Examiner	10,590	THOMSON
Belleville Intelligencer	16,827	THOMSON
Brampton Daily Times	8,054	THOMSON
Brantford Expositor	29,385	SOUTHAM
Brockville Recorder & Times	13,175	The Recorder & Times
Cambridge Daily Reporter	13,341	THOMSON
Chatham Daily News	12,489	THOMSON
Cobourg Daily Star	4,543	Daily Star
Cornwall Standard-Freeholder	15,642	THOMSON
Fort Frances Daily Bulletin	NA	Fort Frances Times
Guelph Mercury	16,149	THOMSON
Hamilton Spectator	138,350	SOUTHAM
Kenora Miner & News	4,135	Kenora Miner & News
Kingston Whig-Standard	34,863	The Kingston Whig- Standard Co.
Kirkland Lake Northern Daily News	5,820	THOMSON
Kitchener-Waterloo Record	65,689	SOUTHAM
Lindsay Post	4,891	Wilson & Wilson Ltd.
London Free Press	128,542	London Free Press Printing Co. Ltd.

Niagara Falls Review	20,591	THOMSON
North Bay Nugget	23,222	SOUTHAM
Orillia Packet & Times	8,437	SOUTHAM
Oshawa Times	23,864	THOMSON
Ottawa Citizen	127,176	SOUTHAM
Le Droit (Fr-lang)	45,325	Le Droit Limitee
Ottawa Journal	80,791	FP PUBLICATIONS
Owen Sound Sun-Times	19,340	SOUTHAM
Pembroke Observer	7,284	THOMSON
Peterborough Examiner	24,017	THOMSON
Port Hope Guide	3,190	Guide Publishing
St. Catharines Standard	41,854	The St. Catharines Standard Ltd.
St. Thomas Times-Journal	11,191	THOMSON
Sarnia Observer	20,147	THOMSON
Sault Ste. Marie Star	23,863	SOUTHAM
Simcoe Reformer	9,388	Pearce Publishing
Sioux Lookout Daily Bulletin	NA	Daily Bulletin
Stratford Beacon-Herald	11,674	The Beacon-Herald
Sudbury Star	31,481	THOMSON
Thunder Bay Times-News (morn)	7,917	THOMSON
Thunder Bay Chronicle-Journal (eve)	24,117	THOMSON
Timmins Press	11,891	THOMSON
Toronto Globe & Mail	263,353	FP PUBLICATIONS

Toronto Star	632,468
Toronto Sun	224,529
Welland-Port Colborne Tribune	18,588
Windsor Star	87,085
Woodstock Sentinel Review	8,990

TORSTAR
The Toronto Sun
THOMSON
SOUTHAM
THOMSON

TOTAL ONTARIO CIRCULATION: 2,334,258

TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 1,808,149

% D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 77.5%

QUEBEC

<u>Newspaper</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
Le Quotidien (Chicoutimi)	21,166	Le Quotidien
La Voix de L'Est (Granby)	9,635	POWER
Le Devoir (Montreal)	35,625	Le Devoir
Montreal Gazette (Eng-lang)	114,500	SOUTHAM
Le Journal de Montreal	174,352	QUEBECOR
Montreal-Matin	127,831	POWER

La Presse (Montreal)	219,850
Montreal Star (Eng-lang)	189,831
Le Journal de Quebec	58,812
Le Soleil (Quebec City)	145,109
Sherbrooke Record (Eng-lang)	6,672

La Tribune (Sherbrooke)	38,733
Le Nouvelliste (Trois-Rivieres)	47,056

<u>TOTAL QUEBEC CIRCULATION:</u>	1,189,172
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<u>TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION:</u>	980,600
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<u>% D.M.C. CIRCULATION:</u>	82.5%
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POWER
FP PUBLICATIONS
QUEBECOR
Le Soleil Limitee
Townships Communica- tions
POWER
POWER

304

NEW BRUNSWICK

Newspaper

Circulation

Ownership

Fredericton Gleaner	20,768	IRVING
L'Evangeline (Moncton, Fr-lang)	15,417	L'Imprimerie Acadienne
Moncton Times (morn)	18,339	IRVING
Moncton Transcript (eve)	23,664	IRVING

Saint John Telegraph-Journal)		
(morn))		
	62,488	IRVING
Saint John Times-Globe (eve))		

<u>TOTAL N.B. CIRCULATION:</u>	140,676
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<u>TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION:</u>	125,259
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<u>% D.M.C. CIRCULATION:</u>	89.0%
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NOVA SCOTIA

<u>Newspaper</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
Amherst Daily News	3,099	Cumberland Publishing
Halifax Chronicle-Herald (morn)	71,247	The Halifax Herald
Halifax Mail-Star (eve)	52,057	The Halifax Herald
New Glasgow Evening News	11,245	THOMSON
Cape Breton Post	29,316	THOMSON
Truro Daily News	8,394	THOMSON
<u>TOTAL N.S. CIRCULATION:</u>	175,358	

TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 48,955

% D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 27.9%

PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND

<u>Newspaper</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
Charlottetown Guardian (morn)	16,725	THOMSON
Charlottetown Patriot (eve)	5,181	THOMSON
Summerside Journal-Pioneer	10,834	Sterling Newspapers
<u>TOTAL P.E.I. CIRCULATION:</u>	32,740	
<u>TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION:</u>	21,906	
<u>% D.M.C. CIRCULATION:</u>	66.9%	

NEWFOUNDLAND

Newspaper

Circulation

Ownership

Corner Brook Western Star

8,522

THOMSON

St. John's Daily News

9,661

The Daily News Limited

St. John's Telegram

40,071

THOMSON

TOTAL NFLD. CIRCULATION:

58,254

TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION:

48,593

% D.M.C. CIRCULATION:

83.4%

APPENDIX 2

AM & FM RADIO OWNERSHIP & CIRCULATION BY PROVINCE

NOTE: Circulation data are based on unpublished Bureau of Broadcast Measurement (B.B.M.) survey results for spring 1978. B.B.M. data were collected during the periods 6 March to 19 March and 3 April to 9 April 1978. Figures included here represent "weekly reach" for the full coverage area of each radio station, i.e. the total number of listeners reached by the station during the course of the average week of the survey. Stations with less than 25,000 circulation are excluded. Ownership listings are in block type for those stations controlled by the dominant complexes.

BRITISH COLUMBIA

<u>Station</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
CKVR Abbotsford	33,500	Fraser Valley Broadcasters
CHWK Chilliwack	42,200	Fraser Valley Broadcasters
CKEK Cranbrook & CFEK Fernie	36,000	E.K. Radio Limited
CFJC Kamloops	51,800	Twin Cities Radio Limited
CFFM-FM Kamloops	25,200	Twin Cities Radio Limited
CHNL Kamloops	48,300	N.L. Broadcasting
CKIQ Kelowna	57,300	Four Seasons Radio Limited
CKOV Kelowna	53,700	Okanagan Broadcasters
CKOK Penticton	35,300	Okanagan Radio Limited
CJCI Prince George	54,900	Prince George Broadcasting
CKPG Prince George	49,500	Q Broadcasting
CKXR Salmon Arm	33,600	Hall-Gray Broadcasting
CJAT Trail	25,600	Kootenay Broadcasting
CBU Vancouver	336,700	C.B.C.
CBU-FM Vancouver	77,300	C.B.C.
CFUN Vancouver	496,100	CHUM
CHQM Vancouver	290,500	Q Broadcasting
CHQM-FM Vancouver	171,100	Q Broadcasting
CJOR Vancouver	343,500	Jim Pattison Broadcasting
CKLG Vancouver	453,700	MOFFAT

CKLG-FM Vancouver	163,800
CKNW Vancouver	442,900
CFMI-FM Vancouver	199,300
CKWX Vancouver	303,000
CJIB Vernon	51,300
CFAX Victoria	92,400
CJVI Victoria	127,600
CKDA Victoria	119,000
CFMS-FM Victoria	<u>38,200</u>

<u>TOTAL:</u>	4,253,300
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<u>TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION:</u>	2,237,700
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<u>% D.M.C. CIRCULATION:</u>	52.6%
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MOFFAT
WESTERN
WESTERN
SOUTHAM
SOUTHAM
CFAX Radio 1070 Limited
SOUTHAM
Capital Broadcasting System
Capital Broadcasting System

ALBERTA

<u>Station</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
CBR Calgary	132,100	C.B.C.
CFAC Calgary	231,900	SOUTHAM
CFCN Calgary	259,200	MACLEAN-HUNTER
CJAY-FM Calgary	91,700	MACLEAN-HUNTER
CKXL Calgary	256,300	MOFFAT
CHFM-FM Calgary	59,500	MOFFAT
CHQR Calgary	168,200	WESTERN
CFCW Camrose	266,700	Camrose Broadcasting
CBX Edmonton	142,600	C.B.C.
CFRN Edmonton	252,800	Sunwapta Broadcasting
CFRN-FM Edmonton	96,100	Sunwapta Broadcasting
CHED Edmonton	477,900	MOFFAT
CHQT Edmonton	212,900	CHQT Broadcasting
CJCA Edmonton	278,500	SOUTHAM
CJCA-FM Edmonton	56,000	SOUTHAM
CKVA Edmonton	48,000	NA
CHEC Lethbridge	72,200	Southern Alberta Broad- casting
CJOC Lethbridge	86,100	SOUTHAM
CHAT Medicine Hat	51,100	Monarch Broadcasting

CKGY Red Deer	53,000
CKRD Red Deer	<u>66,600</u>

Park Country Broadcasting
Central Alberta Broadcasting
(1961)

TOTAL: 3,359,400

TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 1,965,300

% D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 58.5%

SASKATCHEWAN

<u>Station</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
CHAB Moose Jaw	179,200	MOFFAT
CKBI Prince Albert	81,300	Central Broadcasting Ltd. (Rawlinson family)
CBK Regina	129,900	C.B.C.
CFMQ-FM Regina	30,900	Buffalo Broadcasting Ltd.
CJME Regina	104,300	Midwest Broadcasters Ltd. (Rawlinson family)
CKCK Regina	312,300	ARMADALE
CKRM Regina	123,700	Buffalo Broadcasting Ltd.
CFQC Saskatoon	265,900	BATON

CJWW Saskatoon	64,500	Western World Communications Ltd.
CKOM Saskatoon	108,000	Saskatoon Community Broadcasting Ltd.
CKSW Swift Current & CJSN Shaunavon	<u>31,100</u>	Frontier City Broadcasting
<u>TOTAL:</u>	1,431,100	
<u>TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION:</u>	757,400	
<u>% D.M.C. CIRCULATION:</u>	52.9%	

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MANITOBA

<u>Station</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
CKX Brandon	58,000	Western Manitoba Broadcasters Ltd.
CKLQ Brandon	51,900	NA
CBW Winnipeg	164,300	C.B.C.
CBW-FM Winnipeg	25,000	C.B.C.
CFRW Winnipeg	175,400	CHUM
CHIQ-FM Winnipeg	74,500	CHUM
CJOB Winnipeg	392,500	WESTERN
CHMM-FM Winnipeg	81,600	WESTERN

CKRC Winnipeg	210,300	ARMADALE
CKY Winnipeg	288,500	MOFFAT
CITI-FM Winnipeg	42,700	MOFFAT

<u>TOTAL:</u>	1,564,700
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<u>TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION:</u>	1,265,500
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<u>% D.M.C. CIRCULATION:</u>	80.9%
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ONTARIO

<u>Station</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
CHOO Ajax	55,000	Community Communications
CHAY-FM Barrie	84,100	NA
CKBB Barrie	89,800	Four Seasons Radio Ltd.
CJBQ Belleville & CJNH Bancroft	118,900	Quinte Broadcasting Ltd.
CING-FM Burlington	51,700	Burlington Broadcasting
CFCO Chatham	121,800	MACLEAN-HUNTER
CKCB Collingwood	26,100	Barrie Broadcasting Ltd.
CHML Hamilton	328,200	WESTERN
CKDS-FM Hamilton	239,200	WESTERN
CJJD Hamilton	166,400	ROGERS

CKOC Hamilton	467,200
CKLC Kingston	101,200
CFLY-FM Kingston	43,900
CKWS Kingston	132,500
CFMK-FM Kingston	36,200
CJKL Kirkland Lake	27,300
CHYM Kitchener-Waterloo	125,800
CKGL-FM Kitchener-Waterloo	109,000
CKKW Kitchener-Waterloo	96,500
CFCA-FM Kitchener-Waterloo	128,200
CKLY Lindsay	45,500
CFPL London	246,700
CFPL-FM London	62,900
CJBK London	196,100
CKSL London	124,100
CJRN Niagara Falls	132,500
CFCH North Bay	85,400
CKAT-FM North Bay	34,400
CBO Ottawa-Hull	143,800
CBO-FM Ottawa-Hull	52,200
CBOF Ottawa-Hull (Fr-lang)	35,500
CFGO Ottawa-Hull	218,800
CFRA Ottawa-Hull	546,000
CFMO-FM Ottawa-Hull	184,700

ARMADALE
St. Lawrence Broadcasting
St. Lawrence Broadcasting
STANDARD
STANDARD
STANDARD
MACLEAN-HUNTER
MACLEAN-HUNTER
Central Ontario Television
Central Ontario Television
Greg-May Broadcasting
CFPL Broadcasting Ltd.
CFPL Broadcasting Ltd.
Middlesex Broadcasters
London Broadcasters Ltd.
Radio Niagara Limited
STANDARD
STANDARD
C.B.C.
C.B.C.
C.B.C.
BATON
CHUM
CHUM

CHEZ-FM Ottawa-Hull	127,500	NA
CJRC Ottawa-Hull	156,600	CJRC Radio Capitale Ltee.
CKCH Ottawa-Hull	93,800	POWER
CIMF-FM Ottawa-Hull	57,300	POWER
CKOY Ottawa-Hull	107,300	CKOY Limited
CKBY-FM Ottawa-Hull	222,900	CKOY Limited
CFOS Owen Sound	39,700	Grey & Bruce Broadcasting
CHOV Pembroke	38,400	Ottawa Valley Broadcasting
CHEX Peterborough	90,500	STANDARD
CFMP-FM Peterborough	25,000	STANDARD
CKPT Peterborough	59,700	CHUM
CHSC St. Catharines	110,200	Radio Station CHSC Ltd.
CHSC-FM St. Catharines	79,300	Radio Station CHSC Ltd.
CKTB St. Catharines	84,000	Niagara District Broad- casting Limited
CKTB-FM St. Catharines	37,300	Niagara District Broad- casting Limited
CHOK Sarnia	71,400	Radio IWC Limited
CFYN Sault Ste. Marie	48,800	NA
CKCY Sault Ste. Marie	72,200	Algonquin Radio-TV Ltd.
CHNR Simcoe	37,000	NA
CJET Smiths Falls	47,300	Rideau Broadcasting Ltd.
CFBR Sudbury	25,500	Sudbury Broadcasting Ltd.
CHNO Sudbury	117,900	Sudbury Broadcasting Ltd.
CKSO Sudbury	117,200	Cambrian Broadcasting Ltd.
CIGM-FM Sudbury	54,100	Cambrian Broadcasting Ltd.

CBQ Thunder Bay	62,800	C.B.C.
CFPA Thunder Bay	55,600	Ralph H. Parker Limited
CKPR Thunder Bay	97,700	H.F. Dougall Co. Limited
CKGB Timmins	56,900	STANDARD
CBL Toronto	647,500	C.B.C.
CBL-FM Toronto	196,600	C.B.C.
CFGM Toronto	334,000	Radio IWC Limited
CFNY-FM Toronto	74,300	All-Can Holdings Ltd.
CFRB Toronto	1,494,200	STANDARD
CKFM-FM Toronto	478,700	STANDARD
CFTR Toronto	1,182,300	ROGERS
CHFI-FM Toronto	503,900	ROGERS
CHUM Toronto	1,318,500	CHUM
CHUM-FM Toronto	523,500	CHUM
CILQ-FM Toronto	271,700	Radio IWC Limited
CJBC Toronto (Fr-lang)	38,900	C.B.C.
CJRT-FM Toronto	106,200	CJRT-FM Inc.
CKEY Toronto	718,900	MACLEAN-HUNTER
CKFH Toronto	438,200	BATON
CKO All News Radio	132,500	NA
CKO-TO Toronto	49,700	NA
CHOW Welland	64,500	Wellport Broadcasting Ltd.
CBE Windsor	50,700	C.B.C.
CKLW Windsor	241,500	BATON

CKLW-FM Windsor	43,100
CKWW Windsor	117,300
CJOM-FM Windsor	26,300
CKNX Wingham	128,100
CKNX-FM Wingham	<u>35,200</u>

<u>TOTAL:</u>	16,067,700
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<u>TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION:</u>	10,312,100
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<u>% D.M.C. CIRCULATION:</u>	64.2%
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QUEBEC

<u>Station</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
CKPB Bagotville	48,900	CKPB Radio
CBJ Chicoutimi	51,600	C.B.C.
CJMT Chicoutimi	85,800	CJMT Limitee
CHRD Drummondville	56,200	NA
CHLC Hauterive-Baie Comeau	45,600	Radio Cote-Nord Inc.
CKRS Jonquiere	119,700	Radio Saguenay Limitee

CBGA Matane & GBGN Ste. Anne Des Monts	60,700	C.B.C.
CHRM Matane	47,800	NA
CBF Montreal	675,000	C.B.C.
CBF-FM	168,000	C.B.C.
CBM Montreal (Eng-lang)	250,200	C.B.C.
CBM-FM Montreal (Eng-lang)	81,100	C.B.C.
CFCF Montreal (Eng-lang)	396,700	MULTIPLE ACCESS
CFQR-FM Montreal (Eng-lang)	487,400	MULTIPLE ACCESS
CFGL-FM Montreal	413,900	NA
CIEL-FM Montreal	148,900	NA
CJAD Montreal (Eng-lang)	556,500	STANDARD
CJFM-FM Montreal (Eng-lang)	211,500	STANDARD
CJMS Montreal	899,100	CJMS Radio Montreal Ltee
CKMF-FM Montreal	344,300	Supravox Corporation Ltd.
CKAC Montreal	1,113,400	POWER
CITE-FM Montreal	250,300	POWER
CKGM Montreal	698,800	Maisonneuve Broadcasting
CHOM-FM Montreal	385,400	Maisonneuve Broadcasting
CKLM Montreal	400,600	POWER
CKO-MO Montreal	61,200	NA
CKVL Montreal	564,000	NA
CKOI-FM Montreal	238,800	NA
CHNC New Carlisle	97,400	La Compagnie Gaspesienne De Radiodiffusion Ltee.

NEW BRUNSWICK

<u>Station</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
CFNB Fredericton	166,900	Radio Atlantic (1970) Ltd.
CIHI Fredericton	64,100	NA
CBA Moncton	43,600	C.B.C.
CKCW Moncton	149,500	CHUM
CFQM-FM Moncton	48,800	NA
CBD Saint John	34,200	C.B.C.
CFBC Saint John	145,900	Fundy Broadcasting
CFBC-FM Saint John	28,600	Fundy Broadcasting
CHSJ Saint John	95,700	IRVING
<u>TOTAL:</u>	777,300	
<u>TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION:</u>	245,200	
<u>% D.M.C. CIRCULATION:</u>	31.5%	

CBV Quebec City	152,700	C.B.C.
CBV-FM Quebec City	35,200	C.B.C.
CFLS Quebec City	222,800	NA
CHRC Quebec City	429,300	POWER
CHOI-FM Quebec City	202,800	POWER
CJRP Quebec City	302,500	CJRP Radio Provinciale
CKCV Quebec City	157,600	POWER
CKRL-FM Quebec City	29,100	Campus Laval FM Inc.
CJBR Rimouski	89,700	POWER
CJFP Riviere-du-Loup	69,100	Radio CJFP Ltee
CHRS St. Jean	73,000	NA
CKCN Sept-Iles	48,600	Radio Sept-Iles Inc.
CHLT Sherbrooke	141,000	POWER
CITE-FM Sherbrooke	102,100	POWER
CJRS Sherbrooke	87,400	CJRS Radio Sherbrooke Ltee
CKTS Sherbrooke	70,000	POWER
CHLN Trois-Rivieres	209,600	POWER
CJTR Trois-Rivieres	143,000	CJTR Radio Trois-Rivieres

TOTAL: 11,524,300

TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 5,851,200

% D.M.C. CIRCULATION:

NOVA SCOTIA

<u>Station</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
CBH Halifax	86,400	C.B.C.
CFDR Halifax	113,900	NA
CHNS Halifax	166,000	Maritime Broadcasting
CHFX-FM Halifax	97,400	Maritime Broadcasting
CJCH Halifax	214,500	CHUM
CBI Sydney	48,000	C.B.C.
CJCB Sydney	<u>127,100</u>	Celtic Investments Ltd.
<u>TOTAL:</u>	853,300	
<u>TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION:</u>	214,500	
<u>% D.M.C. CIRCULATION:</u>	25.1%	

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PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND

<u>Station</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
CFCY Charlottetown	201,800	Island Radio Broadcasting
CHTN Charlottetown	57,200	Northumberland Broadcasting

TOTAL: 259,000

TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION: -

% D.M.C. CIRCULATION: -

NEWFOUNDLAND

<u>Station</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
CKVO Clarenville	26,700	Colonial Broadcasting System Limited
CBY Corner Brook	28,300	C.B.C.
CIYQ Grand Falls	34,200	NA
CKIM Grand Falls	61,900	NA
CKCM Grand Falls	54,400	Colonial Broadcasting System Limited
CHCM Marystown	41,900	Colonial Broadcasting System Limited
CBN St. John's	84,800	C.B.C.
CHOZ-FM St. John's	31,300	Newfoundland Broadcasting

CJYQ St. John's

162,300

NA

VOCM St. John's

191,800

Colonial Broadcasting
System Limited

TOTAL:

717,600

TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION:

-

% D.M.C. CIRCULATION:

-

APPENDIX 3

TELEVISION OWNERSHIP & CIRCULATION BY PROVINCE

NOTE: Circulation data are based on unpublished B.B.M. survey results for spring 1978, collected during the periods 27 February to 12 March and 20 March to 26 March 1978. Circulation figures included here represent "weekly reach" for each television station, including rebroadcasters, for the full coverage area of a station. The B.B.M. defines "weekly reach" as the total number of different people viewing a station during the course of seven days. All data are for all persons aged two and over, and include both viewing via cable television and viewing directly off air. U.S. television stations that access the Canadian market are also included; circulation figures represent their weekly reach in Canada only. "AVH/Week" (Average Viewing Hours Per Week) refers to the average number of hours spent per week viewing a television station by each person reached by the station. Network affiliations are indicated for the Canadian stations. Ownership listings are in block type for those stations controlled by the dominant complexes.

BRITISH COLUMBIA

<u>Station</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>AVH/Week</u>	<u>Network Affil.</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
CJDC Dawson Creek	35,000	15.0	CBC	Radio Station CJDC Ltd.
CHBC Interior/Kelowna	336,000	7.8	CBC	SOUTHAM & WESTERN
CFJC Kamloops	129,000	7.1	CBC	Inland Broadcasters
CBUGT Fort Nelson	4,000	17.2	-	NA
CKPG Prince George	102,000	7.4	CBC	Q Broadcasting
CFTK Terrace	74,000	13.1	CBC	Skeena Broadcasters
CBUFT Vancouver	24,000	2.3	CBC(F)	C.B.C.
CBUT Vancouver	1,400,000	4.5	CBC	C.B.C.
CHAN Vancouver	1,862,000	6.0	CTV	SOUTHAM & WESTERN
CKVU Vancouver	976,000	3.0	-	NA
CHEK Victoria	891,000	3.1	CBC	SOUTHAM & WESTERN

TOTAL B.C. CIRCULATION:
(CANADIAN STATIONS): 5,833,000

TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 3,089,000

% D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 53.0%

KVOS Bellingham	1,100,000	4.2	-	U.S.
KING Seattle	1,079,000	3.5	-	U.S.
KIRO Seattle	971,000	3.1	-	U.S.
KOMO Seattle	1,114,000	3.4	-	U.S.
KSTW Tacoma	314,000	2.7	-	U.S.

ALBERTA

<u>Station</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>AVH/Week</u>	<u>Network Affil.</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
CBRT Calgary	522,000	4.0	CBC	C.B.C.
CFAC Calgary	639,000	5.2	-	SOUTHAM
CFCN Calgary	759,000	7.5	CTV	MACLEAN-HUNTER
CBXT Edmonton	763,000	5.3	CBC	C.B.C.
CBXFT Edmonton	40,000	2.2	CBC(F)	C.B.C.
CFRN Edmonton	963,000	8.2	CTV	Sunwapta Broadcasting
CITV Edmonton	697,000	6.8	-	Edmonton Video Ltd.
CJOC Lethbridge	134,000	6.2	-	SOUTHAN
CITL Lloydminster	41,000	7.0	-	NA
CKSA Lloydminster	96,000	11.0	-	Sask-Alta Broadcasters
CHAT Medicine Hat	56,000	8.0	CBC	Monarch Investments

CKRD Red Deer	<u>156,000</u>	6.3	CBC	CHCA TV Limited
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TOTAL ALBERTA CIRCULATION:
(CANADIAN STATIONS): 7,041,000

TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 1,532,000

% D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 21.8%

KFBB Great Falls	46,000	6.5	-	U.S.
KRTV Great Falls	42,000	5.4	-	U.S.
KHQ Spokane	625,000	3.3	-	U.S.
KREM Spokane	673,000	3.8	-	U.S.
KXLY Spokane	789,000	4.6	-	U.S.

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SASKATCHEWAN

<u>Station</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>AVH/Week</u>	<u>Network Affil.</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
CKBI Prince Albert	137,000	10.6	CBC	Central Broadcasting (Rawlinson family)
CBLFT Regina	15,000	1.7	CBC(F)	C.B.C.
CBKRT Regina	233,000	6.8	CBC	C.B.C.

CKCK Regina	340,000	17.0	CTV	ARMADALE
CBKST Saskatoon	228,000	6.8	CBC	C.B.C.
CFQC Saskatoon	343,000	15.5	CTV	BATON
CJFB Swift Current	48,000	9.4	CBC	Swift Current Telecasting Co.
CBTA Uranium City	INSIG	INSIG	--	NA
CICC Yorkton	97,000	10.0	-	Yorkton TV Limited
CKOS Yorkton	<u>188,000</u>	14.1	CBC	Yorkton TV Limited

TOTAL SASKATCHEWAN CIRCULATION: 1,629,000

TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 683,000

% D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 41.9%

329

MANITOBA

<u>Station</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>AVH/Week</u>	<u>Network Affil.</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
CKX Brandon	152,000	10.4	CBC	Western Manitoba Broadcasters Ltd.
CHGH Churchill	INSIG	INSIG	-	NA
CBWT Winnipeg	831,000	7.9	CBC	C.B.C.
CBWFT Winnipeg	45,000	2.5	CBC(F)	C.B.C.

CKY Winnipeg	884,000	8.0	CTV	MOFFAT
CKND Winnipeg	<u>688,000</u>	6.6	-	Canwest Broadcasting

TOTAL MANITOBA CIRCULATION
(CANADIAN STATIONS): 3,567,000

TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 884,000

% D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 24.8%

WDAZ Devils Lake	310,000	3.1	-	U.S.
KTHI Fargo	347,000	5.0	-	U.S.
KSJB Valley City	310,000	3.8	-	U.S.

330

ONTARIO

<u>Station</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>AVH/Week</u>	<u>Network Affil.</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
CKVR Barrie	895,000	3.5	CBC	CHUM
CKWS Kingston	399,000	4.4	CBC	STANDARD
CKCO Kitchener	1,931,000	4.9	CTV	Central Ontario TV
CFPL London	1,023,000	5.7	CBC	CFPL Broadcasting Ltd.

CKNY North Bay	110,000	8.5	-	Tel-Ad Co. Limited
CHNB North Bay	128,000	9.4	CBC	J. Conrad Lavigne Ltd.
CBOT Ottawa	792,000	4.0	CBC	C.B.C.
CBOFT Ottawa	282,000	8.2	CBC(F)	C.B.C.
CIYO Ottawa	17,000	1.8	-	NA
CJOH Ottawa	1,382,000	7.0	CTV	STANDARD
CHRO Pembroke	292,000	4.2	-	NA
CHEX Peterborough	573,000	3.8	CBC	STANDARD
CJIC Sault Ste. Marie	88,000	8.4	CBC	Huron Broadcasting
CKSO Sudbury	499,000	9.8	CTV	Cambrian Broadcasting
CKNC Sudbury	196,000	9.8	CBC	J. Conrad Lavigne Ltd.
CBFST Sturgeon Falls	35,000	4.4	-	NA
CBFOT Timmins	7,000	8.7	-	NA
CFCL Timmins	186,000	10.0	CBC	J. Conrad Lavigne Ltd.
CHFD Thunder Bay	123,000	6.5	-	Thunder Bay Electronics
CKPR Thunder Bay	135,000	8.0	CBC	Thunder Bay Electronics
CBLT Toronto	3,322,000	3.5	CBC	C.B.C.
CBLFT Toronto	138,000	2.9	CBC(F)	C.B.C.
CFTO Toronto	3,674,000	4.1	CTV	BATON
CHCH Toronto-Ham	3,710,000	3.6	-	SOUTHAM
CICO Toronto (TV Ontario)	1,144,000	2.0	OECA	provincial government
CITY Toronto	1,604,000	2.6	-	MULTIPLE ACCESS

CKGN Global (all Global stns)	4,826,000	3.8	GLOBAL	GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS
CBEFT Windsor	4,000	3.6	CBC(F)	C.B.C.
CBET Windsor	302,000	4.1	CBC	C.B.C.
CKNX Wingham	263,000	7.7	CBC	SOUTHAM

TOTAL ONTARIO CIRCULATION:
(CANADIAN STATIONS): 28,080,000

TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 17,326,000

% D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 61.7%

WIVB Buffalo	3,187,000	3.5	-	U.S.
WGR Buffalo	2,675,000	3.2	-	U.S.
WKBW Buffalo	3,354,000	4.6	-	U.S.
WUTV Buffalo	1,371,000	3.1	-	U.S.
WJBK Detroit	462,000	5.2	-	U.S.
WKBD Detroit	330,000	5.0	-	U.S.
WWJ Detroit	479,000	5.4	-	U.S.
WXYZ Detroit	513,000	6.8	-	U.S.
KDAL Duluth	102,000	5.8	-	U.S.
WICU Erie	287,000	3.5	-	U.S.

WJET Erie	175,000	3.7	-	U.S.
WSEE Erie	247,000	3.4	-	U.S.
WJRT Flint	60,000	5.8	-	U.S.
WNEM Flint	57,000	4.3	-	U.S.
WHEC Rochester	608,000	4.6	-	U.S.
WROC Rochester	572,000	3.3	-	U.S.
KBJR Superior	91,000	4.8	-	U.S.
WIXT Syracuse	55,000	3.9	-	U.S.
SWYR Syracuse	80,000	3.3	-	U.S.
WWUP Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan	88,000	6.1	-	U.S.
WWNY Watertown	278,000	7.6	-	U.S.

333

QUEBEC

<u>Station</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>AVH/Week</u>	<u>Network Affil.</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
CHAU Carleton	170,000	18.5	CBC(F)	POWER
CBFAT Chibougrou	10,000	7.6	CBC	NA
CBJET Chicoutimi	20,000	2.5	CBC	NA
CJPM Chicoutimi	380,000	11.8	-	Tele-Metropole Inc.
CKRS Jonquiere	257,000	14.4	CBC(F)	Radio Saguenay Ltee

CBGAT Matane	177,000	19.1	CBC(F)	C.B.C.
CBFT Montreal	2,733,000	7.8	CBC(F)	C.B.C.
CBMT Montreal	1,665,000	3.6	CBC	C.B.C.
CFCF Montreal	2,662,000	5.4	CTV	MULTIPLE ACCESS
CIVM Montreal	285,000	1.7	-	Quebec Broadcasting Bureau
CBVT Quebec City	810,000	7.9	-	POWER
CFCM Quebec City	923,000	13.6	-	POWER
CIVQ Quebec City	112,000	1.8	-	Quebec Broadcasting Bureau
CKMI Quebec City	261,000	2.6	CBC	POWER
CJBRT Rimouski	143,000	15.0	CBC(F)	POWER
CKRT Rivier Du Loup	161,000	16.5	CBC(F)	CKRT TV Limitee
CKRN Rouyn	160,000	19.9	CBC(F)	Northern Radio
CHLT Sherbrooke	787,000	8.4	-	POWER
CKSH Sherbrooke	550,000	6.5	CBC(F)	Television St. Francois
CHEM Trois Rivieres	225,000	9.7	-	POWER
CKTM Trois Rivieres	628,000	7.1	CBC(F)	Television St. Maurice

TOTAL QUEBEC CIRCULATION
(CANADIAN STATIONS): 13,119,000

TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 5,171,000

% D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 39.4%

WCAX Burlington	1,287,000	4.3	-	U.S.
WPTZ Plattsburg	1,117,000	3.5	-	U.S.
WMTW Polant Sprg.	548,000	3.7	-	U.S.

NEW BRUNSWICK

<u>Station</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>AVH/Week</u>	<u>Network Affil.</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
CHCR Campbellton	NA	NA	CBC	IRVING
CKCD Cambellton	NA	NA	-	CHUM
CBAFT Moncton	96,000	6.2	CBC(F)	C.B.C.
CHMT Moncton	NA	NA	CBC	IRVING
CKCW Moncton	743,000	12.1	CTV	CHUM
CHCN Newcastle	NA	NA	-	IRVING
CHSJ Saint John	735,000	8.8	CBC	IRVING
CKLT Saint John	NA	NA	-	CHUM
CKAM Upsalquitch	<u>INSIG</u>	INSIG	-	CHUM

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TOTAL NEW BRUNSWICK CIRCULATION: 1,574,000

TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 1,478,000

% D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 93.9%

NOVA SCOTIA

<u>Station</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>AVH/Week</u>	<u>Network Affil.</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
CBHT Halifax	485,000	7.5	CBC	C.B.C.
CBHFT Halifax	26,000	8.5	CBC(F)	C.B.C.
CJCH Halifax	531,000	14.1	CTV	CHUM
CJCB Sydney	236,000	18.1	CTV	CHUM
CBIT Sydney	<u>163,000</u>	8.0	CBC	C.B.C.

TOTAL NOVA SCOTIA CIRCULATION 1,441,000
(CANADIAN STATIONS):

TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 767,000

% D.M.C. CIRCULATION: 53.2%

WVII Bangor	457,000	6.9	-	U.S.
WLBZ Bangor	392,000	4.7	-	U.S.

PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND

<u>Station</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>AVH/Week</u>	<u>Network Affil.</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
CBCT Charlottetown	<u>137,000</u>	9.5	CBC	C.B.C.
<u>TOTAL P.E.I. CIRCULATION:</u>	137,000			
<u>TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION:</u>	-			
<u>% D.M.C. CIRCULATION:</u>	-			

NEWFOUNDLAND

<u>Station</u>	<u>Circulation</u>	<u>AVH/Week</u>	<u>Network Affil.</u>	<u>Ownership</u>
CBYT Corner Brook	86,000	14.6	CBC	C.B.C.
CJWN Corner Brook	63,000	16.6	CTV	Nfld. Broadcasting
CFLA Goose Bay	7,000	33.1	CBC	C.B.C.
CJCN Grand Falls	48,000	15.7	CTV	Nfld. Broadcasting
CBSET Sept-Iles	1,000	11.9	CBC	C.B.C.
CBNLT Labrador	25,000	24.5	CBC	C.B.C.

CBNT St. John's	386,000	11.4	CBC	C.B.C.
CJON St. John's	<u>438,000</u>	17.5	CTV	Nfld. Broadcasting

TOTAL NEWFOUNDLAND CIRCULATION: 1,054,000

TOTAL D.M.C. CIRCULATION: -

% D.M.C. CIRCULATION: -

APPENDIX 4

THE DOMINANT MEDIA COMPLEXES: CANADIAN MEDIA PROPERTIES

NOTE: Only effectively controlled media outlets operating in Canada are listed. In most cases, listings include both direct and indirect (i.e. through effectively controlled subsidiaries) interests. Percentage figures represent the percentage of shares which include voting rights. Interests held through non-voting shares are excluded. Circulation data are for March 1978 unless otherwise indicated. All listings reflect media properties held as of March 1978; see the "Postscript" for an update to September 1978.

ARMADALENEWSPAPERS (DAILY)

100%	REGINA LEADER-POST	66,251
100%	SASKATOON STAR-PHOENIX	49,029

TOTAL NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION: 115,280

RADIO

100%	CKCK REGINA	312,300
100%	CKRC WINNIPEG	210,300
100%	CKOC HAMILTON	467,200
28%	CFJR BROCKVILLE, ONT.	NA

TOTAL RADIO CIRCULATION: 989,800

TELEVISION

100%	CKCK-TV REGINA	340,000
	CKCK-TV-1 COLGATE	
	CKCK-TV-2 WILLOW BRANCH	
100%	CKMJ-TV MOOSE JAW	NA
100%	CKJM-TV MARQUIS, SASK.	NA

TOTAL TELEVISION CIRCULATION: 340,000

OTHER

8%	CTV TELEVISION NETWORK
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TOTAL CANADIAN CIRCULATION: 1,445,080

BATONNEWSPAPERS (WEEKLY)

100%	AJAX/WHITBY/PICKERING NEWS	
	ADVERTISER	19,500
100%	BRAMPTON GUARDIAN	20,000
100%	BURLINGTON POST	30,000
100%	ETOBICOKE GAZETTE	40,000
100%	MARKHAM ECONOMIST & SUN	17,100
100%	MISSISSAUGA NEWS	67,000
100%	NEWMARKET/AURORA ERA	12,300
100%	OAKVILLE BEAVER	20,500
100%	OSHAWA THIS WEEK	40,000
100%	STOUFFVILLE TRIBUNE	8,300

TOTAL NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION: 274,700

RADIO

100%	CKFH TORONTO	438,200
100%	CFGO OTTAWA	218,800
100%	CFQC SASKATOON	265,900
100%	CKLW WINDSOR	241,500
100%	CJOM-FM WINDSOR	26,300

TOTAL RADIO CIRCULATION: 1,190,700

TELEVISION

100%	CFTO-TV TORONTO	3,674,000
100%	CKBQ-TV MELFORT, SASK.	NA
100%	CFQC-TV SASKATOON	343,000
	CFQC-TV-1 STRANER	
	CFQC-TV-2 NORTH BATTLEFORD	
	CFQC-TV-3 RICHMOND LAKE	

TOTAL TELEVISION CIRC'N: 4,017,000

MEDIA-RELATED

100%	AGINCOURT PRODUCTIONS
100%	GLEN WARREN PRODUCTIONS
100%	THE 25TH FRAME FILM PRODUCTION COMPANY
100%	CLEO PRODUCTIONS
100%	VARIETY ARTISTS PRODUCTIONS
67%	SENECA PRODUCTIONS
60%	GROVE ENTERPRISES

BATON (Cont'd)

OTHER

18%

CTV TELEVISION NETWORK

TOTAL CANADIAN CIRCULATION: 5,482,400

CHUMRADIO

100%	CJCH HALIFAX	214,500
100%	C100-FM HALIFAX	NA
100%	CHUM TORONTO	1,318,500
100%	CHUM-FM TORONTO	523,500
100%	CFRA OTTAWA	546,000
100%	CFMO-FM OTTAWA	184,700
100%	CFRW WINNIPEG	175,400
100%	CHIQ-FM WINNIPEG	74,500
100%	CFUN VANCOUVER	496,100
80%	CKPT PETERBOROUGH	59,700
80%	CKQM-FM PETERBOROUGH	11,900

TOTAL RADIO CIRCULATION: 3,604,800

TELEVISION

100%	CKVR-TV BARRIE, ONT.	895,000
	CKVR-TV-1 PARRY SOUND	
	CKVR-TV-2 HUNTSVILLE	
	CKVR-TV-3 HALIBURTON	
100%	CJCB-TV SYDNEY, N.S.	236,000
	CJCB-TV-1 INVERNESS	
	CJCB-TV-2 ANTIGONISH	
	CJCB-TV-3 DINGWALL	
	CJCB-TV-4 NEW GLASGOW	
	CJCB-TV-5 BAY ST. LAWRENCE	
100%	CKCW-TV MONCTON/CHARLOTTETOWN	743,000
100%	CKCD-TV CAMPBELLTON, N.B.	NA
100%	CKAM-TV UPSALQUITCH, N.B.	NA
	CKAM-TV-1 NEWCASTLE	
100%	CKLT-TV SAINT JOHN	NA
51%	CJCH-TV HALIFAX	531,000
	CJCH-TV-1 CANNING	
	CJCH-TV-2 CALEDONIA	
	CJCH-TV-3 YARMOUTH	

TOTAL TELEVISION CIRC'N: 2,405,000

MEDIA-RELATED

100%	MUSIC BY MUZAK
100%	HUCHM PRODUCTIONS
100%	ASSOCIATED BROADCASTING CORPORATION
72%	SUMMERLEA MUSIC
72%	WINTERLEA MUSIC
72%	MUCH PRODUCTIONS

TOTAL CANADIAN CIRC'N: 6,009,800

FREE PRESSNEWSPAPERS (DAILY)

100%	TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL	263,353
100%	MONTREAL STAR	189,831
100%	OTTAWA JOURNAL	80,791
100%	WINNIPEG FREE PRESS	143,643
100%	CALGARY ALBERTAN	41,844
100%	LETHBRIDGE HERALD	25,795
100%	VICTORIA TIMES)	
100%	VICTORIA COLONIST)	67,753
87%	VANCOUVER SUN	232,505
50%	VANCOUVER PROVINCE	128,924

NEWSPAPERS (WEEKLY)

100%	FREE PRESS WEEKLY	NA
100%	WINNIPEG	NA
TOTAL NEWSPAPER CIRC'N:		1,174,439

PERIODICALS

100%	WEEKEND MAGAZINE	1,735,331
100%	REPORT ON FARMING	164,819
TOTAL PERIODICAL CIRC'N:		1,900,150

CABLE

23%	CALGARY (Community Antenna)	46,500 (4/1/77)
TOTAL CABLE SUBSCRIBERS:		46,500

TOTAL CANADIAN CIRCULATION: 3,074,589

GLOBALTELEVISION

100%

CKGN-TV PARIS, ONT.	4,826,000
CKGN-TV-1 WINDSOR	
CKGN-TV-2 BANCROFT	
CKGN-TV-6 OTTAWA	
CKGN-TV-22 UXBRIDGE	
CKGN-TV-29 SARNIA	

TOTAL TELEVISION CIRC'N:	4,826,000
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<u>TOTAL CANADIAN CIRCULATION:</u>	4,826,000
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IRVINGNEWSPAPERS (DAILY)

100%	SAINT JOHN TELEGRAPH-JOURNAL)	
	(Arthur and James))	
100%	SAINT JOHN EVENING TIMES-GLOBE)	62,488
	(Arthur and James))	
100%	MONCTON TIMES (John))	
100%	MONCTON TRANSCRIPT (John))	42,003
100%	FREDERICTON GLEANER (John)	20,768
	TOTAL DAILY NEWSPAPER CIRC'N:	125,259

RADIO

100%	CHSJ SAINT JOHN	95,700
	TOTAL RADIO CIRCULATION:	95,700

TELEVISION

100%	CHSJ-TV SAINT JOHN	735,000
	CHSJ-TV-1 BON ACCORD	
	CHSJ-TV-2 DOAKTOWN	
	CHSJ-TV-3 BOIESTOWN	
	CHSJ-TV-4 CHATHAM	
100%	CHMT-TV MONCTON	NA
100%	CHCR-TV CAMPBELLTON	NA
100%	CHCN-TV NEWCASTLE	NA
	TOTAL TELEVISION CIRCULATION:	735,000
	<u>TOTAL CANADIAN CIRCULATION:</u>	955,959

MACLEAN-HUNTERBOOK PUBLISHING

100% THE MACMILLAN COMPANY OF CANADA

NEWSPAPERS (WEEKLY)

100% FINANCIAL POST 161,789

PERIODICALS (MASS)

100%	L'ACTUALITE	242,010
100%	CANADA & THE WORLD	NA
100%	CHATELAINE (FR & ENG)	1,262,234
100%	FINANCIAL POST	190,233
100%	MACLEAN'S	675,849
100%	MISS CHATELAINE	173,787

TOTAL MASS PERIODICAL CIRC'N: 2,544,113

PERIODICALS (TRADE)

100%	L'ACHETEUR	NA
100%	AEROSPACE CANADA	6,991
100%	AUDIOSCENE CANADA	24,786
100%	AUDIO TRADE MERCHANDISING	5,712
100%	BATIMENT	4,801
100%	BENEFITS CANADA	11,685
100%	BRAND CANADA	NA
100%	BUILDING SUPPLY DEALER	6,992
100%	LE BUREAU	6,246
100%	BUS & TRUCK TRANSPORT	20,584
100%	CANADIAN ADVERTISING RATES & DATA	4,561
100%	CANADIAN AUTOMOTIVE TRADE	28,900
100%	CANADIAN AVIATION	20,505
100%	CANADIAN BUILDING	18,548
100%	CANADIAN CONTROLS & INSTRUMENTATION	11,503
100%	CANADIAN DATA SYSTEMS	15,067
100%	CANADIAN DRIVER	NA
100%	CANADIAN ELECTRONICS ENGINEERING	11,703
100%	CANADIAN GROCER	14,589
100%	CANADIAN HOTEL & RESTAURANT	23,191
100%	CANADIAN INTERIORS	6,353
100%	CANADIAN JEWELLER	4,603
100%	CANADIAN MACHINERY & METALWORKING	11,156
100%	CANADIAN PACKAGING	9,135
100%	CANADIAN PAINT & FINISHING	5,190
100%	CANADIAN PHOTOGRAPHY	8,038

MACLEAN-HUNTER (Cont'd)

100%	CANADIAN PREMIUMS & INCENTIVES	8,351
100%	CANADIAN PRINTER & PUBLISHER	6,672
100%	CANADIAN PULP & PAPER INDUSTRY	16,177
100%	CANADIAN RED BOOK	NA
100%	CANADIAN RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT	8,532
100%	CANADIAN SECRETARY	17,088
100%	CANADIAN SHIPPING & MARINE ENGINEERING	3,167
100%	CANADIAN TRAVEL COURIER	9,386
100%	CIVIC	14,088
100%	COSMETICS HANDBOOK	NA
100%	DESIGN ENGINEERING	13,293
100%	DRUG MERCHANDISING	7,011
100%	EDUCATIONAL DIGEST	19,949
100%	ELECTRICAL CONTRACTOR & MAINTENANCE SUPERVISOR	13,145
100%	L'EPICIER	7,756
100%	FLOOR COVERING NEWS	6,527
100%	FOOD IN CANADA	8,016
100%	FORECASTER	NA
100%	FORET ET PAPIER	4,148
100%	FROZEN FOODS/CANADA	18,855
100%	HARDWARE MERCHANDISING	10,076
100%	HEAVY CONSTRUCTION NEWS	20,118
100%	HOME GOODS RETAILING	9,633
100%	IDEAS	30,407
100%	IMPETUS	NA
100%	INDUSTRIAL LEASING	NA
100%	INVESTOR'S DIGEST OF CANADA	2,204
100%	MARKETING	7,685
100%	MATERIALS MANAGEMENT & DISTRIBUTION	10,497
100%	MEDICAL POST	28,444
100%	MEN'S WEAR OF CANADA	6,366
100%	MODERN FINISHING METHODS	NA
100%	MODERN POWER & ENGINEERING	12,610
100%	MODERN PURCHASING	15,500
100%	MONDAY REPORT ON RETAILERS	NA
100%	MUSIC MARKET CANADA	1,344
100%	OFFICE EQUIPMENT & METHODS	NA
100%	OIL WEEK	11,007
100%	OUTDOOR POWER PRODUCTS	NA
100%	LE PHARMACIEN	3,254
100%	PHOTO CANADA	28,047
100%	PLANT MANAGEMENT & ENGINEERING	16,073
100%	PRIORITIES FOR PROFIT	NA
100%	LE QUEBEC INDUSTRIEL	8,585

MACLEAN-HUNTER (Cont'd)

100%	QUINCAILLERIE-MATERIAUX	4,359
100%	REPORT ON CANADA	NA
100%	REVUE-MOTEUR	11,543
100%	SONO	NA
100%	SOURCES CANADA	NA
100%	SPORTING GOODS CANADA	9,118
100%	STYLE	11,723
100%	TRANSPORT COMMERCIAL	6,007
100%	TRAVEL COUNSELLOR	NA
	TOTAL TRADE CIRCULATION:	727,600

ANNUALS

100%	AUTOMOTIVE SERVICE DATA BOOK	32,563
100%	L'HOSPITALITE	7,053
100%	CANADIAN INDUSTRY SHOWS & EXHIBITIONS	6,306
100%	CANADIAN PHOTO ANNUAL	NA
100%	CANADIAN SNOWMOBILE TRADE-IN GUIDE	NA
100%	CANADIAN SPECIAL TRUCK EQUIPMENT MANUAL	9,695
100%	FINANCIAL POST DIRECTORY OF DIRECTORS	5,854
100%	FRASER'S CANADIAN TRADE DIRECTORY	9,987
100%	FRASER'S CONSTRUCTION & BUILDING DIRECTORY	11,123
100%	MATERIALS HANDLING HANDBOOK	10,497
100%	NATIONAL LIST OF ADVERTISERS	4,125
100%	REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT ANNUAL	10,039
100%	SHOPPING CENTRE DIRECTORY	NA
100%	SPEC INDEX INTERNATIONAL	NA
100%	SURVEY OF CONSUMER BUYING INTENTIONS	NA
100%	SURVEY OF ENERGY RESOURCES	NA
100%	SURVEY OF FUNDS	4,329
100%	SURVEY OF INDUSTRIALS	12,726
100%	SURVEY OF MARKETS	7,962
100%	SURVEY OF MINES	NA
	TOTAL ANNUALS CIRCULATION:	132,259

RADIO

100%	CKEY TORONTO	718,900
100%	CFCN CALGARY	259,200
100%	CJAY-FM CALGARY	91,700
100%	CFCO CHATHAM	121,800

MACLEAN-HUNTER (Cont'd)

100%	CHYM KITCHENER	125,800
100%	CKGL-FM KITCHENER	109,000
	TOTAL RADIO CIRCULATION:	1,426,400

TELEVISION

100%	CFCN-TV CALGARY	759,000
	CFCN-TV-1 DRUMHELLER	
	CFCN-TV-2 BANFF	
	CFCN-TV-3 BROOKS	
	CFCN-TV-4 BURMIS	
	CFCN-TV-5 LETHBRIDGE	
	TOTAL TELEVISION CIRCULATION:	759,000

CABLE SYSTEMS

75%	PETERBOROUGH, ONT.
62%	AJAX, ONT.
62%	COLLINGWOOD, ONT.
62%	GUELPH, ONT.
62%	HAMILTON, ONT.
62%	HUNTSVILLE, ONT.
62%	LONDON, ONT.
62%	MIDLAND, ONT.
62%	MISSISSAUGA, ONT.
62%	NORTH BAY, ONT.
62%	OWEN SOUND, ONT.
62%	ST. CATHARINES, ONT.
62%	SARNIA, ONT.
62%	THUNDER BAY, ONT.
62%	TORONTO, ONT.
	TOTAL CABLE SUBSCRIBERS (5/4/77): 255,425

MEDIA-RELATED

100%	MACLEAN-HUNTER FINE BOOKS (distribution)
100%	MACLEAN-HUNTER DISTRIBUTING
100%	METRO NEWS
100%	CO-OPERATIVE BOOK CENTRE OF CANADA
100%	COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS
100%	IDC PUBLISHING
50%	SELECTIVE PAPERBACKS
50%	COLONIAL DISTRIBUTORS
50%	KEG PRODUCTIONS (film)
50%	WILDLIFE FILM DISTRIBUTORS

MACLEAN-HUNTER (Cont'd)

50%	QUALITY SERVICE PROGRAMS
50%	SINNOTT NEWS COMPANY
50%	CANADIAN PROGRAMMING SERVICES
49%	PAUL MULVIHILL LIMITED (broadcast sales)
40%	STEPHENS & TOWNDROW (broadcast sales)

OTHER

7%	CTV TELEVISION NETWORK
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<u>TOTAL CANADIAN CIRCULATION:</u>	5,751,161
(excluding cable)	

MOFFATRADIO

100%	CHED EDMONTON	477,900
100%	CKLG VANCOUVER	453,700
100%	CKLG-FM VANCOUVER	163,800
100%	CKY WINNIPEG	288,500
100%	CITI-FM WINNIPEG	42,700
100%	CKXL CALGARY	256,300
100%	CHFM-FM CALGARY	287,600
100%	CHAB MOOSE JAW	179,200
TOTAL RADIO CIRCULATION:		2,149,700

TELEVISION

100%	CKY-TV WINNIPEG	884,000
	CKYF-TV* FLIN FLON	
	CKYA-TV* ARBORG	
	CKYS-TV* SNOW LAKE	
	CKYP-TV* THE PAS	
	CKYT-TV* THOMPSON	
TOTAL TELEVISION CIRCULATION:		884,000

CABLE SYSTEMS

80%	WINNIPEG (Winnipeg Videon)	102,500
80%	PINAWA (Winnipeg Videon)	591
TOTAL CABLE SUBSCRIBERS: (4/15/77):		103,091

MEDIA-RELATED

100%	EMM-CEE PRODUCTIONS	
100%	EMM PUBLISHING LIMITED	
100%	CEE PUBLISHING LIMITED	
100%	EMM-CEE SERVICES LIMITED	
63%	MEDIA TOURS LIMITED	
TOTAL CANADIAN CIRCULATION:		3,033,700
(excluding cable)		

* rebroadcast stations with different call signs

MULTIPLE ACCESSRADIO

100%	CFCF MONTREAL	396,700
100%	CFQR-FM MONTREAL	487,400
100%	CFCX-SW MONTREAL	NA

TOTAL RADIO CIRCULATION:	884,100
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TELEVISION

100%	CFCF-TV MONTREAL	2,662,000
45%	CITY-TV TORONTO	1,604,000

TOTAL TELEVISION CIRCULATION:	4,266,000
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MEDIA-RELATED

100%	CHAMPLAIN PRODUCTIONS LIMITED
40%	PAUL MULVIHILL LIMITED (Maclean-Hunter link)

<u>TOTAL CANADIAN CIRCULATION:</u>	5,150,100
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POWERNEWSPAPERS (DAILY)

100%	LA PRESSE (MONTREAL)	219,850
100%	MONTREAL-MATIN	127,831
100%	LE NOUVELLISTE (TROIS-RIVIERES)	47,056
100%	LA TRIBUNE (SHERBROOKE)	38,733
100%	LA VOIX DE L'EST (GRANBY)	9,635
TOTAL DAILY NEWSPAPER CIRC'N:		443,105

NEWSPAPERS (WEEKLY)

100%	DIMANCHE-MATIN	208,184
100%	DIMANCHE DERNIERE HEURE	21,860
100%	HEBDO L'AVENIR DE L'EST	NA
100%	HEBDO FLAMBEAU DE L'EST	NA
100%	HEBDO GUIDE DU NORD	NA
100%	HEBDO JOURNAL DE ROSEMONT	NA
100%	HEBDO NOUVELLES DE L'EST	NA
100%	HEBDO ST. LEONARD & NEW ROSEMONT	NA
TOTAL WEEKLY NEWSPAPER CIRC'N:		230,044

RADIO

100%	CKAC MONTREAL	1,113,400
100%	CKTS SHERBROOKE	70,000
100%	CHLT SHERBROOKE	141,000
100%	CITE-FM SHERBROOKE	102,100
100%	CHLN TROIS-RIVIERES	209,600
100%	CKCH HULL	93,800
100%	CIMF-FM HULL	57,300
100%	CJBR RIMOUSKI	89,700
100%	CJBR-FM RIMOUSKI	5,100
100%	CJBM CAUSAPSCAL	NA
99%	CHEF GRANBY	NA
96%	CKSM SHAWINIGAN	NA
59%	CKCV QUEBEC CITY	157,600
50%	CHRC QUEBEC CITY	429,300
50%	CHOI-FM QUEBEC CITY	202,800
50%	CKLM MONTREAL	400,600
TOTAL RADIO CIRCULATION:		3,072,300

POWER (Cont'd)TELEVISION

100%	CHLT-TV SHERBROOKE	787,000
100%	CJBR-TV RIMOUSKI, P.Q.	143,000
	CJBR-TV-1 EDMUNDSTON, N.B.	
100%	CHEM-TV TROIS-RIVIERES	225,000
84%	CHAU-TV CARLETON, P.Q.	170,000
	CHAU-TV-1 STE. MARGUERITE MARIE	
	CHAU-TV-2 ST. QUENTIN, N.B.	
	CHAU-TV-3 PORT DANIEL	
	CHAU-TV-4 CHANDLER	
	CHAU-TV-5 PERCE	
	CHAU-TV-6 GASPE	
	CHAU-TV-7 RIVIERE AU RENARD	
	CHAU-TV-8 CLAIRDORME	
	CHAU-TV-9 L'ANSE A VALLEAU	
	CHAU-TV-10 ST. MARTIN-DE-RESTIGOUCHE	
	CHAU-TV-11 KEDGWICK, N.B.	
	CHAU-TV-12 MURDOCHVILLE	
50%	CFCM-TV QUEBEC CITY	923,000
50%	CKMI-TV QUEBEC CITY	261,000
	TOTAL TELEVISION CIRCULATION:	2,509,000
	<u>TOTAL CANADIAN CIRCULATION:</u>	6,254,449

QUEBECORNEWSPAPERS (DAILY)

100%	LE JOURNAL DE MONTREAL	174,352
100%	LE JOURNAL DE QUEBEC	58,812
	TOTAL DAILY NEWSPAPER CIRC'N:	233,164

NEWSPAPERS (WEEKLY)

100%	ECHOS VEDETTES	139,866
100%	SUNDAY EXPRESS	46,109
100%	LE GRAND JOURNAL ILLUSTRE	NA
100%	PHOTO VEDETTES	NA
100%	LA COTE NORD	NA
100%	NOUVELLES ILLUSTREES	39,989
100%	LE JOURNAL DES VEDETTES	NA
100%	LE NOUVEAU SAMEDI	NA
100%	TELE-RADIOMONDE	NA
100%	LE NORDIC DE PORT CARTIER- SEPT-ILES	16,100
100%	L'ECHO (VAL D'OR)	12,986
100%	LE REVEIL DE LA BAIE	NA
100%	LE NORDIC DE BAIE COMEAU- HAUTERIVE	11,500
100%	LA FRONTIERE (ROUYN-NORANDA)	10,811
	TOTAL WEEKLY NEWSPAPER CIRC'N:	277,361

PERIODICALS

100%	MAGAZINE VIVRE	22,458
	TOTAL PERIODICAL CIRCULATION:	22,458
	<u>TOTAL CANADIAN CIRCULATION:</u>	532,983

ROGERSRADIO

100%	CFTR TORONTO	1,182,300
100%	CHFI-FM TORONTO	503,900
100%	CJJD HAMILTON	166,400
100%	CKJD SARNIA	47,100
100%	CHYR LEAMINGTON	NA

TOTAL RADIO CIRCULATION:	1,899,700
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CABLE SYSTEMS

100%	TORONTO (Co-axial Colourview)	74,000
100%	TORONTO (Rogers Cable TV)	87,000
100%	BRAMPTON (Bramalea Telecable)	24,000
100%	LEAMINGTON (Essex Cable TV)	2,500

TOTAL CABLE SUBSCRIBERS (6/6/77):	187,500
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MEDIA-RELATED

100%	G. N. MACKENZIE LIMITED (production)
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OTHER

26%	CANADIAN CABLESYSTEMS
21%	PREMIER CABLEVISION

TOTAL CANADIAN CIRCULATION:	1,899,700
(excluding cable)	

SOUTHAMNEWSPAPERS (DAILY)

100%	EDMONTON JOURNAL	183,713
100%	HAMILTON SPECTATOR	138,350
100%	CALGARY HERALD	130,959
100%	OTTAWA CITIZEN	127,176
100%	MONTREAL GAZETTE	114,500
100%	WINNIPEG TRIBUNE	96,623
100%	WINDSOR STAR	87,085
100%	BRANTFORD EXPOSITOR	29,385
100%	SAULT STE. MARIE STAR	23,863
100%	NORTH BAY NUGGET	23,222
100%	PRINCE GEORGE CITIZEN	20,142
100%	OWEN SOUND SUN-TIMES	19,340
100%	MEDICINE HAT NEWS	11,976
50%	VANCOUVER PROVINCE	128,924
49%	BRANDON SUN	16,170
48%	KITCHENER-WATERLOO RECORD	65,689

TOTAL DAILY NEWSPAPER CIRC'N: 1,217,117

NEWSPAPERS (WEEKLY)

100%	FINANCIAL TIMES OF CANADA	63,587
100%	BURLINGTON GAZETTE	31,500
100%	POINTE CLAIRE NEWS & CHRONICLE	18,400

TOTAL WEEKLY NEWSPAPER CIRC'N: 113,487

PERIODICALS (MASS)

50%	CANADIAN HOMES (monthly)	2,023,968
50%	THE CANADIAN (weekly)	2,023,968
35%	TV GUIDE	1,043,688
35%	TV HEBDO	293,724

TOTAL MASS PERIODICAL CIRC'N: 5,385,348

PERIODICALS (TRADE)

100%	ADMINISTRATIVE DIGEST	21,083
100%	ARCHITECTURE-CONCEPT	2,678
100%	BRITISH COLUMBIA LUMBERMAN	7,523
100%	CANADIAN ARCHITECT	7,487
100%	CANADIAN CHEMICAL PROCESSING	13,290
100%	CANADIAN CONSULTING ENGINEER	7,845
100%	CANADIAN DAIRY FARMER	NA
100%	CANADIAN DOCTOR	32,856

SOUTHAM (Cont'd)

100%	CANADIAN FARM EQUIPMENT DEALER	6,008
100%	CANADIAN FOOTWEAR JOURNAL	5,048
100%	CANADIAN FOREST INDUSTRIES	11,628
100%	CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT NEWS	33,008
100%	CANADIAN LIVESTOCK FARMER	NA
100%	CANADIAN MINING JOURNAL	8,300
100%	CANADIAN OFFICE PRODUCTS & STATIONERY	3,929
100%	CANADIAN PETROLEUM	10,054
100%	CANADIAN PLASTICS	8,041
100%	CANADIAN POOL & PATIO	15,000
100%	CANADIAN SALES MEETINGS & CONVENTIONS	8,975
100%	CANADIAN TRANSPORTATION & DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT	19,292
100%	CANADIAN TRAVEL NEWS	10,501
100%	CONSTRUCTION WEST	NA
100%	DAILY COMMERCIAL NEWS & CONSTRUCTION RECORD	7,896
100%	DAILY OIL BULLETIN	NA
100%	ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT NEWS	20,979
100%	ELECTRONICS & COMMUNICATIONS	12,618
100%	ENGINEERING & CONTRACT RECORD	21,437
100%	EQUIPMENT FINDER	NA
100%	EXECUTIVE	35,322
100%	FURNITURE & FURNISHINGS	9,983
100%	GENIE-CONSTRUCTION	6,415
100%	GIFTS & TABLEWARES	6,930
100%	GOOD FARMING	230,415
100%	GOVERNMENT & THE CONTRACTOR	NA
100%	HEALTH CARE DIGEST	14,427
100%	HEATING, PLUMBING & AIR CONDITIONING	12,523
100%	HOSPITAL ADMINISTRATION IN CANADA	12,530
100%	JOIE DE VIVRE	NA
100%	JOURNAL OF COMMERCE	13,720
100%	LABORATORY PRODUCT NEWS	NA
100%	LEATHER LIFE DAILY	NA
100%	MODERN MEDICINE OF CANADA	35,466
100%	MOTS CROISES	NA
100%	NATIONAL INTERIOR DESIGN DAILY	NA
100%	OPERATIONS FORESTIERES	4,314
100%	ORAL HEALTH	11,163
100%	POOLS, PARKS, & RINKS	4,326
100%	PROGRESS REPORT	NA
100%	PROMENADE	30,050
100%	PULP & PAPER CANADA	12,097
100%	SHOP	12,046

SOUTHAM (Cont'd)

100%	SHOWTIME	NA
100%	SOUTHAM BUILDING GUIDE	16,119
100%	TV TIMES	32,145
100%	WATER & POLLUTION CONTROL	8,942
100%	WESTERN BUSINESS & INDUSTRY	NA
	TOTAL TRADE CIRCULATION:	804,409

ANNUALS

100%	ADMINISTRATIVE REFERENCE GUIDE	NA
100%	ALMANACH MODERNE	155,838
100%	B. C. LUMBERMAN GREENBOOK	NA
100%	CANADIAN ARCHITECT YEARBOOK	NA
100%	CANADIAN FOREST INDUSTRIES DIRECTORY	NA
100%	CANADIAN HIGHWAY CARRIERS' GUIDE	NA
100%	CANADIAN MEDICAL DIRECTORY	NA
100%	CANADIAN MINING MANUAL	2,338
100%	CANADIAN OIL REGISTER	NA
100%	CANADIAN PLASTICS DIRECTORY & BUYERS' GUIDE	7,925
100%	CANADIAN PORTS & SEAWAY DIRECTORY	NA
100%	CANADIAN SHOEMAKING DIRECTORY & BUYERS' GUIDE	NA
100%	CHEMICAL BUYERS' GUIDE	9,472
100%	LA COLLECTION MINI POCHES	NA
100%	CONTRACT INTERIORS CATALOGUE	NA
100%	DENTAL GUIDE	NA
100%	DENTALOG	NA
100%	ELECTRONIC PROCUREMENT INDEX FOR CANADA	12,618
100%	GENIE-CONSTRUCTION ANNUAIRE	NA
100%	HEALTH CARE PRODUCTS & SUPPLIERS' DIRECTORY	NA
100%	HEATING, PLUMBING & AIR CONDITIONING BUYERS' GUIDE	12,196
100%	HOROSCOPE QUOTIDIEN	NA
100%	INDUSTRIAL LITERATURE REVIEW	NA
100%	PRODUCT BULLETIN DIRECTORY	NA
100%	WATER & POLLUTION CONTROL DIRECTORY	NA
100%	YARDSTICKS FOR COSTING	2,195
	TOTAL ANNUALS CIRCULATION:	202,582

SOUTHAM (Cont'd)RADIO

100%	CKWX VANCOUVER	303,000
100%	CJCA EDMONTON	278,500
100%	CJCA-FM EDMONTON	56,000
100%	CFAC CALGARY	231,900
100%	CKNX WINGHAM, ONT.	128,100
100%	CKNX-FM WINGHAM, ONT.	35,200
100%	CJVI VICTORIA	127,600
100%	CJOC LETHBRIDGE	86,100
100%	CKWX-SW VANCOUVER	NA
100%	CJPR BLAIRMORE	NA
100%	CFCP GRANDE PRAIRIE	NA
50%	CJIB VERNON, B.C.	51,300

TOTAL RADIO CIRCULATION:	1,297,700
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TELEVISION

100%	CHCH-TV HAMILTON	3,710,000
100%	CHEK-TV VICTORIA	891,000
100%	CFAC-TV CALGARY	639,000
	CFAC-TV-1 DRUMHELLER	
	CFAC-TV-2 BANFF	
100%	CHCT-TV CALGARY	NA
100%	CJLH-TV LETHBRIDGE	NA
50%	CJOC-TV LETHBRIDGE	134,000
	CJOC-TV-1 COLEMAN	
	CJOC-TV-2 BROOKS	
	CJOC-TV-3 BURMIS	
41%	CHAN-TV VANCOUVER	1,862,000
	CHAN-TV-1 CHILLIWACK	
	CHAN-TV-2 BOWEN ISLAND	
	CHAN-TV-3 SQUAMISH	
	CHAN-TV-4 COURTENAY	
	CHAN-TV-5 BRACKENDALE	
41%	CHBC-TV KELOWNA, B.C.	336,000
	CHBC-TV-1 PENTICTON	
	CHBC-TV-2 VERNON	
	CHBC-TV-3 OLIVER	
	CHBC-TV-4 SALMON ARM	
	CHBC-TV-5 ENDERLY	
	CHBC-TV-6 CELISTA	
	CHBC-TV-7 SKAHA LAKE	
	CHBC-TV-8 CANOE	
41%	CHKL-TV KELOWNA, B.C.	NA
	CHKL-TV-1 PENTICTON	
	CHKL-TV-2 VERNON	

SOUTHAM (Cont'd)

41%	CHKM-TV KAMLOOPS, B.C.	NA
	CHKM-TV-1 PRITCHARD	
41%	CITM-TV MOUNT TIMOTHY, B.C.	NA
	CITM-TV-1 WILLIAMS LAKE	
	CITM-TV-2 QUESNEL	
41%	CIFG-TV PRINCE GEORGE	NA
TOTAL TELEVISION CIRCULATION:		7,572,000

CABLE SYSTEMS

100%	OTTAWA (Ottawa Cablevision)	74,761 (4/30/77)
100%	PEMBROKE (Pembroke Cablevision)	7,609 (4/30/77)
97%	ARNPRIOR (Arnprior Cablevision)	1,121 (4/30/77)
50%	WINNIPEG (Greater Winnipeg Cablevision)	46,000 (3/31/77)
34%	HAZELDEAN, ONT.	NA
33%	SAULT STE. MARIE (Lake Superior Cablevision)	18,200 (3/31/77)
TOTAL CABLE SUBSCRIBERS:		147,601

MEDIA-RELATED

100%	ALL-CANADA RADIO-TV (media sales rep for 53 AM stations, 16 FM stations, and 21 TV stations across Canada)
100%	QUALITY RECORDS LIMITED
60%	ROBERT LAWRENCE PRODUCTIONS (TV & film)

OTHER

11%	CJCH-TV HALIFAX (CHUM link)
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TOTAL CANADIAN CIRCULATION:	16,592,643
(excluding cable)	

STANDARDRADIO

100%	CFRB TORONTO	1,494,200
100%	CKFM-FM TORONTO	478,700
100%	CFRX-SW TORONTO	NA
100%	CJAD MONTREAL	556,500
100%	CJFM-FM MONTREAL	211,500
66%	CKWS KINGSTON	132,500
66%	CFMK-FM KINGSTON	36,200
66%	CHEX PETERBOROUGH	90,500
66%	CFMP-FM PETERBOROUGH	25,000
66%	CFCH NORTH BAY	85,400
66%	CKAT-FM NORTH BAY	34,300
66%	CKGB TIMMINS	56,900
66%	CFTI-FM TIMMINS	5,400
66%	CJKL KIRKLAND LAKE	27,300
66%	CJTT NEW LISKEARD	16,600
TOTAL RADIO CIRCULATION:		3,251,000

TELEVISION

66%	CJOH-TV OTTAWA	1,382,000
	CJOH-TV-1 DESERONTO	
	CJOH-TV-2 CORNWALL	
66%	CHEX-TV PETERBOROUGH	573,000
	CHEX-TV-1 BANCROFT	
	CHEX-TV-2 MINDEN	
66%	CJSS-TV CORNWALL	NA
66%	CFCH-TV NORTH BAY	NA
66%	CKWS-TV KINGSTON	399,000
TOTAL TELEVISION CIRCULATION:		2,354,000

CABLE SYSTEMS

66%	AYLMER, P.Q. (Laurentian Cablevision)	19,000 (4/20/77)
66%	ROCKLAND, ONT. (Bushnell Comm'ns)	650 (5/4/77)
44%	OTTAWA (Skyline Cablevision)	77,000 (4/28/77)
TOTAL CABLE SUBSCRIBERS:		96,650

STANDARD (Cont'd)MEDIA-RELATED

100%	STANDARD BROADCAST SALES (media sales rep for 15 radio stations)
100%	CANADIAN STANDARD BROADCAST SALES (media sales rep for 64 radio & TV stations)
100%	CARLETON PRODUCTIONS
100%	CINE-TAPE ASSOCIATES
100%	VTR PRODUCTIONS (television programme production)
100%	INDEPENDENT COMMUNICATIONS SALES
100%	INTERMEDIA ELECTRONIC SERVICES (television programme production)
60%	INTERACT COMMUNICATIONS
25%	GRAPHIC FILMS

OTHER

8%	CTV TELEVISION NETWORK
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TOTAL CANADIAN CIRCULATION:
(excluding cable)

5,605,000

THOMSONNEWSPAPERS (DAILY)

100%	BARRIE EXAMINER	10,590
100%	BELLEVILLE INTELLIGENCER	16,827
100%	BRAMPTON DAILY TIMES	8,054
100%	CAMBRIDGE DAILY REPORTER	13,341
100%	CAPE BRETON POST	29,316
100%	CHARLOTTETOWN GUARDIAN (morn)	16,725
100%	CHARLOTTETOWN PATRIOT (eve)	5,181
100%	CHATHAM DAILY NEWS	12,489
100%	CORNER BROOK WESTERN STAR	8,522
100%	CORNWALL STANDARD-FREEHOLDER	15,642
100%	GUELPH MERCURY	16,149
100%	KAMLOOPS DAILY SENTINEL	8,640
100%	KELOWNA DAILY COURIER	12,083
100%	KIRKLAND LAKE NORTHERN DAILY NEWS	5,820
100%	MOOSE JAW TIMES-HERALD	9,075
100%	NANAIMO FREE PRESS	9,500
100%	NEW GLASGOW EVENING NEWS	11,245
100%	NIAGARA FALLS REVIEW	20,591
100%	ORILLIA PACKET & TIMES	8,437
100%	OSHAWA TIMES	23,864
100%	PEMBROKE OBSERVER	7,284
100%	PENTICTON HERALD	7,339
100%	PETERBOROUGH EXAMINER	24,017
100%	PRINCE ALBERT HERALD	8,645
100%	SARNIA OBSERVER	20,147
100%	ST. JOHN'S TELEGRAM	40,071
100%	ST. THOMAS TIMES-JOURNAL	11,191
100%	SUDBURY STAR	31,481
100%	THUNDER BAY TIMES-NEWS (morn)	7,917
100%	THUNDER BAY CHRONICLE-JOURNAL (eve)	24,117
100%	TIMMINS PRESS	11,891
100%	TRURO DAILY NEWS	8,394
100%	VERNON DAILY NEWS	7,466
100%	WELLAND-PORT COLBORNE TRIBUNE	18,588
100%	WOODSTOCK SENTINEL REVIEW	8,990

TOTAL DAILY NEWSPAPER CIRC'N:	499,629
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NEWSPAPERS (WEEKLY)

100%	BATHURST NORTHERN LIGHT	5,338
100%	COLLINGWOOD ENTERPRISE	4,902
100%	DUNNVILLE CHRONICLE	3,442
100%	ELLIOTT LAKE STANDARD	NA
100%	ESPANOLA STANDARD	NA
100%	GEORGETOWN HERALD	13,041
100%	HANOVER POST	3,908

THOMSON (Cont'd)

100%	LEAMINGTON POST	5,727
100%	MIDLAND FREE PRESS HERALD	6,041
100%	ORANGEVILLE BANNER	7,162
100%	PORT CREDIT WEEKLY	NA
100%	SWIFT CURRENT SUN	5,699
100%	TRENTONIAN	7,607
100%	YORKTON ENTERPRISE	7,662

TOTAL WEEKLY NEWSPAPER CIRC'N:	70,529
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CABLE SYSTEMS

50%	RICHMOND HILL (Classic Communications)	16,500 (2/14/74)
50%	BELLEVILLE (Cablevue Quinte Ltd.)	14,000 (11/30/ 74)

TOTAL CABLE SUBSCRIBERS:	30,500
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<u>TOTAL CANADIAN CIRCULATION:</u> (excluding cable)	570,158
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TORSTARBOOK PUBLISHING

53% HARLEQUIN ENTERPRISES

NEWSPAPERS (DAILY)

100% TORONTO STAR 632,468

NEWSPAPERS (WEEKLY)

100%	AURORA BANNER	10,543
100%	BOLTON ENTERPRISER	3,800
100%	ETOBICOKE ADVERTISER-GUARDIAN	30,000
100%	ETOBICOKE CONSUMER	39,000
100%	HALTON CONSUMER	16,000
100%	MISSISSAUGA TIMES	55,000
100%	NORTH YORK CONSUMER	89,000
100%	NORTH YORK MIRROR	47,000
100%	OAKVILLE JOURNAL RECORD	20,000
100%	RICHMOND HILL LIBERAL	13,500
100%	SCARBOROUGH CONSUMER	33,000
100%	SCARBOROUGH MIRROR	48,000
100%	WOODBIDGE & VAUGHAN NEWS	4,000

TOTAL WEEKLY NEWSPAPER CIRC'N: 408,843

PERIODICALS (MASS)

100%	HOMEMAKER'S	1,232,000
100%	MADAME AU FOYER	268,000
100%	QUEST	701,025
100%	THE CITY	NA
50%	CANADIAN HOMES (monthly)	2,023,968
50%	THE CANADIAN (weekly)	2,023,968

TOTAL PERIODICAL CIRCULATION: 6,248,961

MEDIA-RELATED

80%	NIELSEN-FERNS INC. (TV & film production)
50%	INFORMART (Southam link)

OTHER

33% WESTERN BROADCASTING CO. LTD.

TOTAL CANADIAN CIRCULATION: 7,290,272

WESTERNRADIO

100%	CKNW VANCOUVER	442,900
100%	CFMI-FM VANCOUVER	199,300
100%	CJOB WINNIPEG	392,500
100%	CHMM-FM WINNIPEG	81,600
100%	CHML HAMILTON	328,200
100%	CKDS-FM HAMILTON	239,200
100%	CHQR CALGARY	168,200
TOTAL RADIO CIRCULATION:		1,851,900

TELEVISION

50%	CHAN-TV VANCOUVER	1,862,000
	CHAN-TV-1 CHILLIWACK	
	CHAN-TV-2 BOWEN ISLAND	
	CHAN-TV-3 SQUAMISH	
	CHAN-TV-4 COURTENAY	
	CHAN-TV-5 BRACKENDALE	
50%	CHKM-TV KAMLOOPS, B.C.	NA
	CHKM-TV-1 PRITCHARD	
50%	CHKL-TV KELOWNA, B.C.	NA
	CHKL-TV-1 PENTICTON	
	CHKL-TV-2 VERNON	
50%	CHBC-TV KELOWNA, B.C.	336,000
	CHBC-TV-1 PENTICTON	
	CHBC-TV-2 VERNON	
	CHBC-TV-3 OLIVER	
	CHBC-TV-4 SALMON ARM	
	CHBC-TV-5 ENDERBY	
	CHBC-TV-6 CELISTA	
	CHBC-TV-7 SKAHA LAKE	
	CHBC-TV-8 CANOE	
50%	CITM-TV MOUNT TIMOTHY, B.C.	NA
	CITM-TV-1 WILLIAMS LAKE	
	CITM-TV-2 QUESNEL	
50%	CIFG-TV PRINCE GEORGE, B.C.	NA
TOTAL TELEVISION CIRCULATION:		2,198,000

MEDIA-RELATED

100%	WESTERN BROADCAST SALES
100%	WESTERN PRODUCTIONS LIMITED

WESTERN (Cont'd)OTHER

50%	B.C. T.V. BROADCASTING (Southam link)
26%	PREMIER CABLEVISION
18%	TORSTAR CORPORATION (Torstar link)
18%	HARLEQUIN ENTERPRISES (Torstar link)

<u>TOTAL CANADIAN CIRCULATION:</u>	4,049,900
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APPENDIX 5

THE DOMINANT MEDIA COMPLEXES: SHAREHOLDERS & DIRECTORS

NOTE: Compiled from C.R.T.C. published master ownership and amendment listings, C.R.T.C. unpublished records provided by Ownership Review Division, Intercompany Ownership 1975, corporation annual reports, Financial Post Survey of Industrials 1976, with revisions based on financial press items, etc. Share structure data reflect the period for which the most recent data are available; in most cases, 1975 or 1976. Asterisks (*) indicate those shares that include voting rights. Directors are taken from the Financial Post Directory of Directors 1977 unless otherwise indicated.

ARMADALE

1) ARMADALE COMMUNICATIONS LIMITED (private)

	<u>Common*</u>	<u>%</u>
Armadales Enterprises Ltd.	245,135	98.04
Harold A. Crittenden	4,864	1.92
T. A. Cookson	1	.01
James R. Grisenthwaite (deceased)	1	.01
Clifford Sifton (deceased)	1	.01
Michael C. Sifton	1	.01
TOTAL	<u>250,003</u>	<u>100.00%</u>

DIRECTORS (1976)

Clifford Sifton (deceased)
Michael C. Sifton
Harold A. Crittenden
James R. Grisenthwaite (deceased)
T. A. Cookson

2) ARMADALE PUBLISHERS LIMITED (private)

100% owned by Armadale Enterprises Limited

DIRECTORS

same

BATON

1) BATON BROADCASTING INCORPORATED

	<u>Common*</u>	<u>%</u>
Telegram Corporation Limited	3,560,400	51.60
Hewittdale Productions Limited	752,100	10.90
Foster William Hewitt	255,300	3.70
Monray & Company	131,100	1.90
Canada Trust	89,700	1.30
Front & Company	75,900	1.10
Canada Trust (account)	75,900	1.10
Ontario Hydro Pension Fund	69,000	1.00
Isabel Glenthorne Bassett	69,000	1.00
Others (less than 1% each)	1,821,600	26.40
	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL	6,900,000	100.00%

DIRECTORS

John White Hughes Bassett	Chairman and President
Gordon Vincent Ashworth	Vice-President
Douglas Graeme Bassett	Vice-President
Edward Joseph Delaney	Vice-President
Joseph John Garwood	Vice-President
Foster William Hewitt	Vice-President
Allan Leslie Beattie	
Charles Fowler William Burns	
Donald Hatch Davis	
Fredrik Stefan Eaton	
Edwin Allan Goodman	

BATON (Continued)

2) TELEGRAM CORPORATION LIMITED

	<u>Common*</u>	<u>%</u>
Allan Leslie Beattie, trustee for the sons of John W. H. Bassett and J. D. Eaton	23,996	99.954
A. H. Agnew	1	.004
Gordon Vincent Ashworth	1	.004
John F. Bassett	1	.004
John W. H. Bassett	1	.004
Allan Leslie Beattie	1	.004
Charles Fowler William Burns	1	.004
Charles L. Dubin	1	.004
J. E. Foy	1	.004
J. D. MacFarlane	1	.004
D. S. Perigoe	1	.004
G. D. Wotherspoon	1	.004
TOTAL	24,007	99.998%

3) HEWITTDALÉ PRODUCTIONS LIMITED (private)

	<u>Preferred</u>	<u>%</u>
Foster William Hewitt	998	99.80
F. W. A. Hewitt	1	.10
D. D. Hill	1	.10
TOTAL	1,000	100.00%

CHUM

1) CHUM LIMITED

	<u>Common*</u>	<u>%</u>
Allan Waters Limited (100% owned by Allan Waters)	884,111	80.34
Ralph Snelgrove Enterprises Ltd.	38,048	3.46
Imperial Life	14,700	1.34
Brant Investments Limited	11,000	1.00
Others (less than 1% each)	152,544	13.86
	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL	1,100,403	100.00%

DIRECTORS

Allan F. Waters	President
J. Wesley Armstrong	Vice-President
Alexander A. Forbes	Vice-President
Fred G. Sherratt	Vice-President
Ralph T. Snelgrove	Vice-President
Arthur Deane Nesbitt	
Robert M. Sutherland	

FREE PRESS

1) FREE PRESS PUBLICATIONS LIMITED (private)

	<u>% Voting**</u>
Starlaw Investments Limited	
(McConnell family)	25.00
Victor Sifton estate***	22.50
Bell Foundation (G. Max Bell)***	22.50
R. Howard Webster	22.50
Richard Sankey Malone	7.50
	<hr/>
TOTAL	100.00%

DIRECTORS

R. Howard Webster	Chairman
Richard Sankey Malone	President
H. Purdy Crawford	
David M. Ferguson	
George R. Gardiner	
James Stuart Keate	
Donald C. McGavin	
Derek A. Price	
Joseph Sedgwick	

** N figures are not available.

*** Webster and Malone are the trustees in each case.

GLOBAL

1) GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS LIMITED

Through a contractual re-financing arrangement, all voting rights are held by Global Ventures Western Limited which is effectively controlled by Paul Morton.

DIRECTORS

The Financial Post Directory of Directors 1977 edition indicates the composition of the board of directors prior to the change in ownership that took place during 1977. A revised list is not yet available.

IRVING

1) NEW BRUNSWICK PUBLISHING LIMITED (private)

	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Arthur L. Irving	399	39.90
James K. Irving	399	39.90
K. C. Irving (through Forest Mere Investments Limited)	199	19.90
E. Kenneth Logan	1	.10
Tom Crowther	1	.10
Ralph F. Costello	1	.10
TOTAL	1,000	100.00%

DIRECTORS (1976)

Ralph F. Costello	President
Tom Crowther	Vice-President
E. Kenneth Logan	

2) NEW BRUNSWICK BROADCASTING LIMITED (private)

	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
New Brunswick Publishing Limited	4,997	99.94
E. Kenneth Logan	1	.02
Tom Crowther	1	.02
Ralph F. Costello	1	.02
TOTAL	5,000	100.00%

DIRECTORS (1976)

same

MACLEAN-HUNTER

1) MACLEAN-HUNTER LIMITED

	<u>Class "A"*</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Class "B"*</u>	<u>%</u>
Wood Gundy (account))			1,158,030	
CFCN Communications)			1,400,798	
Toronto-Dominion Bank)			338,986	
Maclean-Hunter Cable TV)			306,114	
Maclean-Hunter directors)			209,897	
Donald G. Campbell)			10,273	
SUBTOTAL: MACLEAN-HUNTER HOLDINGS LIMITED			3,424,098	61.52
Hunco Limited (Hunter family)			600,002	10.78
Adams & Company	469,400	19.70		
Edward Nymark			200,000	3.59
M. J. Chalmers			191,200	3.44
Walgor Holdings Limited			189,000	3.40
Gilbert Securities Limited	114,400	4.70		
Montreal Trust	107,600	4.42		
Ravensbourne Investments			100,000	1.80
J. L. Craig			99,500	1.79
C.P.R. Pension Fund	90,000	3.70		
Moncus & Company	84,300	3.45		
C.G.E. Pension Fund	80,300	3.30		
Front & Company	80,000	3.25		
Suet Company	70,000	2.87		
Donald G. Campbell			62,275	1.12
George W. Gilmour			58,600	1.05
Lloyd M. Hodgkinson			58,110	1.04
Floyd Sherman Chalmers			57,800	1.02
National Trust	55,000	2.25		
Bansco & Company	40,420	1.66		
Western Assurance	37,000	1.52		
Gee & Company	34,500	1.42		

MACLEAN-HUNTER (Continued)

	<u>Class "A"*</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Class "B"*</u>	<u>%</u>
Canada Permanent Trust	33,800	1.37		
Monray & Company	33,762	1.35		
Gee & Company (account)	32,125	1.32		
Roytor & Company	30,000	1.23		
Vale & Company	26,600	1.01		
Others (less than 1% each)	1,014,802	41.49	525,406	9.46
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL	2,434,009	100.01%	5,565,991	100.01%

DIRECTORS

Donald G. Campbell	Chairman & President
Keith Campbell	Vice-President
Lorne R. Clark	Vice-President
George W. Gilmour	Vice-President
Lloyd M. Hodgkinson	Vice-President
Edward Nymark	Vice-President
Robert W. Robertson	Vice-President
Doris H. Anderson	
Paul Septimus Deacon	
Peter C. Newman	
Floyd Sherman Chalmers	
John M. Holton	
Arthur J. Little	
Frederick T. Metcalf	
Gordon P. Osler	

MOFFAT

1) MOFFAT COMMUNICATIONS LIMITED

	<u>Common*</u>	<u>%</u>
Randall Moffat	705,000	47.00
Fidelity Estates Limited	150,050	10.00
Jasman Property Enterprises Ltd.	150,050	10.00
J. Ronald Mitchell	66,825	4.46
Donald M. E. Hamilton	60,000	4.00
Monray & Company	45,500	3.03
Front & Company	40,100	2.67
Brant Investments Limited	25,000	1.66
Pitfield, Mackay, Ross	20,344	1.36
Woodmount Investments Limited	19,600	1.31
Richardson Securities Limited	19,125	1.27
Imperial Life	15,000	1.00
Roytor & Company	15,000	1.00
Others (less than 1% each)	167,406	12.00
TOTAL	1,500,000	100.00%

DIRECTORS

Randall L. Moffat	Chairman
J. Ronald Mitchell	President
Gary T. Brazzell	
Frederick Newton Hughes	
J. Blair MacAulay	
Donald J. McDonald	
Donna M. Pryor	
J. M. Pryor	
Bennet R. Wong	

MULTIPLE ACCESS

1) MULTIPLE ACCESS LIMITED

	<u>Common*</u>	<u>%</u>
Mainvest Communications Limited	624,128	25.93
Sunmont & Company	230,662	9.58
May Mikkila & Company	136,847	5.69
Manufacturers Life Insurance	83,300	3.46
Barlow & Company	77,000	3.20
Excelsior Life Insurance	74,900	3.11
Roytor & Company (account)	74,245	3.09
Torbay Company	49,300	2.05
Mermon & Company	42,150	1.75
Cains & Company	35,300	1.47
Wood Gundy Limited	33,900	1.41
Canada Permanent Trust (account)	31,200	1.30
Draper Dobie & Company	30,745	1.28
John O. McCutcheon	30,001	1.25
Allpak Products Limited	30,000	1.25
G. M. Deacon	29,808	1.24
P. H. Buckley	25,810	1.07
J. Zelikovitz	24,360	1.01
Others (less than 1% each)	742,961	30.87
TOTAL	2,406,617	100.01%

DIRECTORS

John O. McCutcheon	President
Charles R. Bronfman	
Rupert B. Carleton	
Sydney C. Cooper	
E. Leo Kolber	

MULTIPLE ACCESS (Continued)

D. K. Lowry
D. W. G. Martz
D. B. McCaskill
W. F. Mitchell
P. F. Vineberg
F. T. White

2) MAINVEST COMMUNICATIONS LIMITED (private)

	<u>Common*</u>	<u>%</u>
Charles R. Bronfman trust	600	42.86
A. M. Bronfman trust	400	28.57
P. B. Bronfman trust	400	28.57
	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL	1,400	100.00%

POWER (see Figure 1)

1) POWER CORPORATION OF CANADA LIMITED

53% owned by Paul Desmarais

DIRECTORS

Paul G. Desmarais	Chairman
Louis R. Desmarais	Deputy Chairman
Peter N. Thomson	Deputy Chairman
Peter D. Curry	President
Daniel Johnson	
Wilbrod Bherer	
Alfredo F. Campo	
William M. Fuller	
Pierre Genest	
Jean-Paul Gignac	
Robert H. Jones	
W. Earle McLaughlin	
Arthur Deane Nesbitt	
Paul Britton Paine	
Claude Pratte	
John P. Robarts	
Robert Carleton Scrivener	
William I. M. Turner Jr.	

2) TELEMEDIA COMMUNICATIONS LIMITEE (private)

	<u>N*</u>	<u>%</u>
Beaudem Limitee	170,495	99.997
Philippe de Gaspe Beaubien	1	.001
Andre Bureau	1	.001
Roch Demers	1	.001
Charles Leblanc	1	.001
S. Morrison	1	.001

POWER (Continued)

TOTAL	170,500	100.002%
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3) BEAUDEM LIMITEE (private)

	<u>Class "A"*</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Class "B"*</u>	<u>%</u>
Philippe de Gaspé Beaubien	64,992	99.992	22,500	69.23
Roch Demers			3,529	10.86
M. Dansereau			3,529	10.86
A. Lecompte			1,765	5.43
M. G. Scott			1,177	3.62
R. Beaulieu	1	.001		
Andre Bureau	1	.001		
Mrs. P. de Gaspé Beaubien	1	.001		
Ralph Barford	1	.001		
Charles Leblanc	1	.001		
G. C. Moussette	1	.001		
G. Normandin	1	.001		
S. Morrison	1	.001		
TOTAL	65,000	100.000%	32,500	100.00%

4) PRADES INCORPORATED (private)

	<u>Common*</u>	<u>%</u>
Paul G. Desmarais	500	50.00
Claude Pratte	499	49.90
J. G. Porteous	1	.10
TOTAL	1,000	100.00%

QUEBECOR

1) QUEBECOR INCORPORATED

	<u>Common*</u>	<u>%</u>
Les Placements Peladeau (100% owned by Pierre Peladeau)	1,599,472	72.75
Henri Duhamel Jr. Imprimerie Hebdo (100% owned by Pierre Peladeau)	23,128	1.05
Pierre Gauvreau	1,369	.06
Others (less than 1% each)	600	.03
	573,815	26.10
TOTAL	<u>2,198,484</u>	<u>100.00%</u>

DIRECTORS

Pierre Peladeau
Pierre Gauvreau
Robert G. Le Moyne
Roger Turgeon
Yves Moquin
Louis P. Beaubien
P. Wilbrod Gauthier
Pierre A. Rinfret
Lorne C. Webster

President
Vice-President

ROGERS (see Figure 2)

1) EDWARD S. ROGERS FAMILY HOLDINGS LIMITED (private)

	<u>Common*</u>	<u>Class "A"</u>	<u>Class "B"</u>	<u>Class "C"</u>
Rogers family trusts	1,125			
Edward S. Rogers			3,375	4,000
Mrs. Loretta A. Rogers		450		500
A. T. Graham trust		57		
TOTAL	<u>1,125</u>	<u>507</u>	<u>3,375</u>	<u>4,500</u>

2) ROGERS TELECOMMUNICATIONS LIMITED (private)

100% owned by Edward S. Rogers Family Holdings Limited

3) ROGERS RADIO BROADCASTING LIMITED (private)

	<u>Common*</u>	<u>Class "A"</u>	<u>% Class "A"</u>
Rogers Telecommunications Limited	200,000	16,832	33.55
National Trust (Management Share Purchase Plan)		10,600	21.13
K. J. Dancy		8,548	17.04
G. G. Ledingham		8,023	15.99
Stanfram Enterprises Limited		5,922	11.81
G. H. Grant		240	.48
TOTAL	<u>200,000</u>	<u>50,165</u>	<u>100.00%</u>

4) ROGERS CABLE COMMUNICATIONS LIMITED (private)

100% owned by Rogers Telecommunications Limited

SOUTHAM

1) SOUTHAM PRESS LIMITED

	<u>Common*</u>	<u>%</u>
Brant Investments Limited	818,360	6.60
Gilbert Securities Limited	697,687	5.63
Hasco Limited	280,000	2.26
Kenneth G. Southam estate	279,250	2.25
Wilson Mills Southam estate	258,488	2.08
Richard Southam estate	248,000	2.00
H. S. Southam estate	241,100	1.94
William W. Southam estate	226,000	1.82
Belvedere Securities Limited	181,800	1.47
Lake & Company	181,000	1.46
Janco Investments Limited	167,648	1.35
Martha F. Hallward	164,000	1.32
Chedoke Securities Limited	162,080	1.31
Gordon N. Fisher	160,000	1.29
Robco Investments Limited	160,000	1.29
Royal Trust (account)	160,000	1.29
Trilby Investments Limited	148,000	1.19
Longvale & Company	141,520	1.14
Sun Life Assurance	140,800	1.14
Gee & Company	140,420	1.13
Montreal Trust (account)	140,000	1.13
St. Clair Balfour	136,000	1.10
Others (less than 1% each)	7,168,120	57.81
TOTAL	12,400,273	100.00%

SOUTHAM (Continued)

TOTAL SOUTHAM HOLDINGS:	1,835,240	14.80
TOTAL FISHER HOLDINGS:	409,209	3.30
TOTAL BALFOUR HOLDINGS:	347,208	2.80
	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL SOUTHAM FAMILY HOLDINGS:	2,591,657	20.90%

DIRECTORS

St. Clair Balfour	Chairman
Gordon N. Fisher	President
Ross Munro	Vice-President
Robert W. Southam	Vice-President
Frank Gustave Swanson	Vice-President
A. Ronald Williams	Vice-President
G. P. Clarkson	
George L. Crawford	
Hugh G. Hallward	
J. Norman Hyland	
Aubrey Joel	
J. Jacques Pigott	
Gaston Pouliot	
G. Hamilton Southam	
Gordon T. Southam	
Wilson J. H. Southam	
Adam Hartley Zimmerman	

SOUTHAM (Continued)

2) SELKIRK HOLDINGS LIMITED

	<u>Class "A"</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Class "B"*</u>	<u>%</u>
Southam Press Limited	1,527,380	37.98	597	29.85
N. A. Botterill			200	10.00
P. L. P. Macdonnell			200	10.00
J. S. MacKay	131,664	3.27	200	10.00
R. A. McCreath			200	10.00
H. J. S. Pearson			200	10.00
Nathan Starr (in trust for Taylor, Pearson & Carson Ltd.)			200	10.00
Theatre Properties (Hamilton) Ltd.	300,000	7.46	100	5.00
Kenneth D. Soble estate (executors: Frances Soble & Canada Trust)	282,000	7.01	100	5.00
G. L. Crawford			1	.05
Gordon N. Fisher			1	.05
St. Clair Balfour			1	.05
Bantor Company	150,000	3.73		
Gilbert Securities Limited	138,400	3.44		
Free Press Publications Limited	123,768	3.08		
H. E. Pearson	104,602	2.60		
Pound & Company	100,000	2.49		
Grator & Company	60,000	1.49		
National Trust (account)	55,000	1.37		
Sun Life Assurance (account)	54,800	1.36		
R. S. Carson	47,000	1.17		
Eaton Retirement Annuity Plan	46,006	1.14		
Manufacturers Life Insurance	42,200	1.05		
Others (less than 1% each)	858,662	21.35		
TOTAL	4,021,482	99.99%	2,000	100.00%

STANDARD

1) STANDARD BROADCASTING CORPORATION LIMITED

	<u>Common*</u>	<u>%</u>
Argus Corporation	2,705,538	48.06
Brant Investments Limited	247,698	4.40
C.P.R. Pension Fund	163,256	2.90
Gee & Company	146,367	2.60
Edward S. Rogers Family Holdings Ltd.	112,590	2.00
Bansco & Company	106,961	1.90
Canada Permanent Trust	101,331	1.80
Canada Permanent Trust (account)	90,072	1.60
Mutual Life Assurance	73,184	1.30
North American Life	67,554	1.20
Montreal Trust (account)	61,925	1.10
E. R. Bradley	61,925	1.10
Others (less than 1% each)	1,691,099	30.04
TOTAL	5,629,500	100.00%

DIRECTORS

John Angus McDougald (deceased)	Chairman
Hollis T. McCurdy	President
Donald H. Hartford	Vice-President
Alex E. Barron	
G. Allan Burton	
Pierre P. Daigle	
A. D. Hamilton	
W. Leo Knowlton	
A. Bruce Matthews	
Lord McFadzean	
Maxwell C. G. Meighen	

THOMSON

1) THOMSON NEWSPAPERS LIMITED

70.5% owned by The Woodbridge Company Limited

DIRECTORS

Kenneth R. Thomson	Chairman & President
St. Clair Landerkin McCabe	Executive Vice-President
Margaret Letitia Hamilton	Senior Vice-President
J. J. Stephenson	Vice-President
Brian W. Slaight	
Sydney Frank Chapman	
John Hewson Coleman	
J. S. Dewar	
Walter E. Harris	
Douglas John Peacher	
David C. H. Stanley	
John A. Tory	

2) THE WOODBRIDGE COMPANY LIMITED (private)

	<u>Common*</u>	<u>Preferred</u>	<u>%</u>
The Thomson Corporation Limited	7,380		
L. R. Wice		4,400	34.92
M. M. Bilton estate		3,000	23.81
E. A. Thomson estate		2,800	22.22
G. S. Wice		1,200	9.52
G. A. Wice		1,200	9.52
TOTAL	<u>7,380</u>	<u>12,600</u>	<u>99.99%</u>

THOMSON (Continued)

3) THE THOMSON CORPORATION LIMITED (private)

	<u>Common*</u>	<u>Class "A"</u>	<u>Class "C"</u>	<u>Class "D"</u>
I. J. Brydson estate		249,082		
S. E. Brydson		2,146	3,075	673,425
Mrs. P. A. Campbell		60,399	4,476	43,395
L. C. Campbell		2,852	1,228	268,932
P. G. Campbell		3,152	1,504	329,376
S. E. Campbell		3,303	958	209,802
Kenneth R. Thomson	5,883	128,469	1,697	127,222
D. K. R. Thomson	65	500	3,000	671,235
L. L. Thomson	52	800		11,388
Trust Corporation of the Bahamas Limited			562	123,078
Kentholm Investments Limited				239,921
KRT Holdings Limited (100% owned by Kenneth Thomson)				953,477
PAC Holdings Limited				597,449
TOTAL	<u>6,000</u>	<u>450,703</u>	<u>16,500</u>	<u>4,248,700</u>

TORSTAR

1) TORSTAR CORPORATION LIMITED

Complete share data for the newly-formed Torstar Corporation Limited are not available. It is known, however, that the following hold substantial proportions of the Class "D" voting shares: Starson Holdings (York) Limited 28.1%, Western Broadcasting Limited 18.0%, Hindmarsh Holdings Limited 16.7%, Honderich Investments Limited 13.2%, and Thall Holdings Limited 13.2%.

DIRECTORS

Beland H. Honderich
William A. Dimma
Burnett M. Thall
Lionel C. Mohr
Martin W. Goodman
Richard A. N. Bonnycastle
William J. Campbell
Catherine Atkinson Crang
Walter L. Gordon
Harry A. Hindmarsh
Ruth Atkinson Hindmarsh
Alexander J. MacIntosh

Chairman & Publisher
President
Senior Vice-President
Vice-President
Editor-in-Chief

WESTERN

1). WESTERN BROADCASTING COMPANY LIMITED**

	<u>Class "A"</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Class "B"</u>	<u>%</u>
Doncaster Investments Limited) (Griffiths))	363,064	18.82	726,122	42.40
Atlin Investments Ltd. (Owen)) ***	361,353	18.73		
Portrush Investments Limited) (Hughes))	208,625	10.82		
Gilbert Securities Limited			320,300	18.70
C. P. R. Pension Fund			100,000	5.84
North American Life (account)	84,000	4.36		
Peter Paul Saunders	77,768	4.03		
North American Life			71,000	4.15
Investors Growth Fund of Canada			63,700	3.72
Sun Life Assurance (account)			59,000	3.44
Montreal Trust (account)			54,750	3.20
Theodore S. Soskin	54,101	2.80		
Derston Investment Corporation	50,000	2.59		
Longvale & Company			50,000	2.92
National Trust (account)			50,000	2.92
Investors Group			49,000	2.86
Prudential Insurance			45,000	2.63
National Trust (account)			40,000	2.34
Mutual Life Assurance	42,000	2.18	30,000	1.75
Others (less than 1% each)	687,874	35.66	53,853	3.14
TOTAL	1,928,785	99.99%	1,712,725	100.01%

** This reflects the share structure as at 31 December 1975. Torstar has since acquired 33% of Western's shares; however, it is not known which shares were acquired.

*** All of these shares (933,042 or 48.37%) are controlled by Griffiths through a voting trust agreement.

WESTERN (Continued)

DIRECTORS

Frank A. Griffiths
William J. Hughes
Walter S. Owen
Peter Paul Saunders
Theodore S. Soskin

President
Vice-President

APPENDIX 6

CTV TELEVISION NETWORK:
SHAREHOLDERS & DIRECTORS

CTV TELEVISION NETWORK

	<u>Common*</u>	<u>Class "A"</u>	<u>Class "B"</u>	<u>% "B"</u>
CFTO-TV (Baton)	100		132,249	17.80
Multiple Access Limited	100		121,617	16.36
Ottawa-Cornwall Broadcasting Limited (Standard)	100		74,710	10.05
Sunwapta Broadcasting Limited	100		66,126	8.90
MTV Limited (Moffat)	100		61,884	8.32
British Columbia TV Broadcasting Limited (Southam & Western)	100		61,849	8.32
CFCN Television Limited (Maclean-Hunter)	100		53,300	7.17
Central Ontario Television Ltd.	100		50,104	6.74
CJCH Ltd. (CHUM & Southam)	100		32,040	4.31
Moncton Broadcasting Ltd. (CHUM)	100		31,965	4.30
Newfoundland Broadcasting Ltd.	100		31,965	4.30
Armadale Communications Ltd.	100		25,572	3.44
Canet Holdings Ltd. (Baton)		78,280		
<hr/>				
TOTAL	1,200	78,280	743,381	100.01%

* 100 common shares = 1 vote

DIRECTORS (1976)

Murray H. Chercover

President

Donald W. Coyle

Vice-President

B. D. Alloway (Sunwapta)

John White Hughes Bassett (BATON)

Donald G. Campbell (MACLEAN-HUNTER)

Keith Campbell (MACLEAN-HUNTER)

Harold A. Crittenden (ARMADALE)

Stuart W. Griffiths (STANDARD)

C. Jamieson (Newfoundland Broadcasting)

J. O. McCutcheon (MULTIPLE ACCESS)

W. D. McGregor (Central Ontario Television)

J. Ronald Mitchell (MOFFAT)

J. R. Peters (SOUTHAM & WESTERN)

W. B. Plaunt (Cambrian Broadcasting)

Allan F. Waters (CHUM)

about important stories.

NEWS EDITOR: Top man on the news desk. In the absence of the managing editor, he will put out the paper. He is the one man who reads everything; stories from all department editors (except, possibly, sports) funnel through him, and he determines their relative importance and position in the paper. If a story does not satisfy him, he sends it back for revision. He orders and approves all headlines, personally draws up a dummy of the front page, and either dummies or direct the make-up of all other pages.

Names and addresses of the individuals occupying these positions were obtained largely from June and July (1978) issues of Canadian Advertising Rates & Data. Of the total 515 questionnaires mailed, less two returned "moved, address unknown" for a revised total of 513, there were 174 (33.9%) usable responses. In total, 310 publishing questionnaires were forwarded to 204 persons at daily newspapers and 106 persons at weekly newspapers, while the total 205 broadcasting questionnaires were forwarded to 149 persons at radio stations and 56 persons at television stations. Of the 310 publishing questionnaires, less the two returned for a revised total of 308, there were 101 usable responses or 32.8%. Of the 205 broadcasting questionnaires, there were 73 usable responses or 35.6%. Thus the response rate for each sector was more or less equivalent. (see Table 33).

Official titles varied, however, across media outlets so that in some cases the questionnaires were addressed to "editors," "associate editors," "executive editors," etc., where no "managing editor" and/or "news editor" could be identified. The same is true for the broadcasting sector where, as noted, some programme directors are responsible for both news production

and the production of all other broadcasting programmes. Within the publishing sector, questionnaires were mailed to 139 persons who would qualify as "managers" (see Chapter 5), and, of these, 50 usable responses (36.0%) were returned. Fifty-one of the remaining 169 publishing questionnaires (30.2%) were received from those who would qualify as "publishing-editors." Within the broadcasting sector, 26 of the 75 "broadcasting-managers" (34.7%) returned responses, and 47 of the 130 "broadcasting-editors" (36.2%). Hence the response rates are consistent across each of the categories utilized in Chapter 5 (see Table 34).

Otherwise, the representativeness of the sample could be checked only in terms of a limited number of items, since C.A.R.D. and other comparable sources provide little data regarding the managers and editors. Nevertheless, the sample was representative in terms of sector of activity, type of position held, and finally, region of operation, as Table 35 illustrates. The publishing and broadcasting questionnaires and the introductory letter are presented in the pages following the tables.

TABLE 33

Distribution of the Sample
by Sector of Activity

Questionnaires Mailed			Responses	
<u>Sector</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>% of Total Mailed (N=513)</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>% of Total Mailed (N=513)</u>
Publishing	308	60.0	101	32.8
Broadcasting	205	40.0	73	35.6

TABLE 34

Distribution of the Sample
by Type of Position Held

Questionnaires Mailed			Responses	
<u>Position</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>% of Total Mailed (N=513)</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>% of Total Mailed (N=513)</u>
Publishing:				
Managers	139	27.1	50	36.0
Editors	169	32.9	51	30.2
Broadcasting:				
Managers	75	14.6	26	34.7
Editors	130	25.3	47	36.2

TABLE 35

Distribution of the Sample
by Region of Operation

<u>Region</u>	Questionnaires Mailed		Responses		
	<u>N</u>	<u>% of Total Mailed</u> (N = 513)	<u>N</u>	<u>% of Total Responses</u> (N = 174)	<u>% of Total Mailed</u> (N = 513)
West	146	28.5	56	32.2	38.4
Ontario	231	45.0	77	44.3	33.3
Quebec	106	20.7	31	17.8	29.2
East	30	5.8	10	5.7	33.3



McMASTER UNIVERSITY

Department of Sociology

1280 Main Street West, Hamilton, Ontario, L8S 4M4
Telephone: 525-9140 Local 4481

August 15, 1978

Dear (name):

It seems safe to suggest that the public is largely unaware of the role and responsibility of senior personnel in newspaper and broadcast news production. I am conducting a study of this question and I am asking for your help in answering a few questions on the subject.

The enclosed questionnaire is being sent to a selected number of managing editors, news editors and news directors at newspapers and broadcasting stations across Canada. I would be grateful if you would take just five minutes to complete it and return it to me at your earliest convenience.

Your co-operation is crucial to a general understanding of the communication process in Canada. The questionnaire is anonymous; all responses will remain strictly confidential. A self-addressed envelope is enclosed for your convenience.

Thank you very much for your assistance.

Sincerely,

DC/bn
Encls.

Debra Clarke
Dept. of Sociology
McMaster University

PUBLISHING

1. Please indicate your year _____ and place _____ of birth.
2. Your sex? M () F ()
3. Your ethnic origin? British Isles () French () Other _____
4. Your level of education? _____
5. What was your father's occupation? _____
Was he ever a company official? yes () no ()
6. What is your official title? _____
7. How long have you held this position? _____ years
8. How long have you been employed with the company that owns your newspaper? _____ years
9. Have you at any time served in a directorship capacity on the board of a publishing or broadcasting company? yes () no ()
If yes, please state name of company(s) _____
and length of term(s) _____
10. Which of the following do you feel was most important in your recruitment to your present position?
 experience as a news reporter ()
 experience as a news editor ()
 general publishing or broadcasting experience ()
 past record with present newspaper ()
 past record with company that owns present newspaper ()
 other (please specify _____) ()
11. Which of the following specific qualities do you feel were most important in your recruitment to your present position? Please rank in order of importance (1=most important, 7=least important, etc.).
 _____ managerial potential
 _____ editorial or journalistic ability
 _____ ability to work well with superiors
 _____ ability to work well with peers
 _____ ability to work well with subordinates
 _____ loyalty to company
 _____ adherence to company policies and principles
 _____ other (please specify _____)
12. Which of the following most accurately describes your relationship with the owner(s)?
 I am the owner or one of the owners ()
 professional relationship lasting _____ years ()
 professional and social relationship lasting _____ years ()
 professional contacts are infrequent ()
13. Which of the following most accurately describes your relationship with the publisher?
 I am the publisher ()
 the publisher is also the owner ()
 professional relationship lasting _____ years ()
 professional and social relationship lasting _____ years ()
 professional contacts are infrequent ()

(continued ...)

14. Who would you say is most influential in the hiring of news reporters?
 the owner(s) ()
 the publisher ()
 the editor(s) ()
 the personnel manager ()
 other (please specify _____) ()
15. Who would you say is most directly responsible for what the reader finally reads?
 the owner(s) ()
 the publisher ()
 the editor(s) ()
 news reporters ()
 other (please specify _____) ()
16. Who would you say is ultimately responsible for the final product?
 the owner(s) ()
 the publisher ()
 the editor(s) ()
 news reporters ()
 other (please specify _____) ()
17. How frequently do you consult with each of the following in selecting news items for publication? (1=never, 2=rarely, 3=occasionally, 4=frequently)
 _____ the owner(s)
 _____ the publisher
 _____ peers on the same newspaper
 _____ colleagues on other newspapers
 _____ staff or subordinates
 _____ other (please specify _____)
18. How frequently do you consult with each of the following in preparing or selecting editorial items?
 _____ the owner(s)
 _____ the publisher
 _____ peers on the same newspaper
 _____ colleagues on other newspapers
 _____ staff or subordinates
 _____ other (please specify _____)
19. Which of the following best describes your role in the formulation of editorial policy?
 very substantial ()
 significant, in consultation with superiors ()
 significant, in consultation with peers and/or staff ()
 minimal ()
20. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements (1=strongly agree, 2=agree somewhat, 3=strongly disagree, 4=disagree somewhat):
 _____ Concentration of media ownership is not in the public interest.
 _____ The CBC should not be allowed to compete with the private media for advertising revenue.
 _____ The CRTC's Canadian content regulations should be abolished.
 _____ State regulation of the broadcasting industry should be extended to the publishing industry.
 _____ State regulation in general tends to impede the development of the free enterprise system in Canada.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR CO-OPERATION.

BROADCASTING

1. Please indicate your year _____ and place _____ of birth.
2. Your sex? M () F ()
3. Your ethnic origin? British Isles () French () Other _____
4. Your level of education? _____
5. What was your father's occupation? _____
Was he ever a company official? yes () no ()
6. What is your official title? _____
7. How long have you held this position? _____ years
8. How long have you been employed with the company that owns your broadcasting station? _____ years
9. Have you at any time served in a directorship capacity on the board of a broadcasting or publishing company? yes () no ()
If yes, please state name of company(s) _____
and length of term(s) _____
10. Which of the following do you feel was most important in your recruitment to your present position?
 experience as a news broadcaster or reporter ()
 experience as a news director or editor ()
 general broadcasting or publishing experience ()
 past record with present station ()
 past record with company that owns present station ()
 other (please specify _____) ()
11. Which of the following specific qualities do you feel were most important in your recruitment to your present position? Please rank in order of importance (1=most important, 7=least important, etc.).
 _____ managerial potential
 _____ editorial or journalistic ability
 _____ ability to work well with superiors
 _____ ability to work well with peers
 _____ ability to work well with subordinates
 _____ loyalty to company
 _____ adherence to company policies and principles
 _____ other (please specify _____)
12. Which of the following most accurately describes your relationship with the owner(s)?
 I am the owner or one of the owners ()
 professional relationship lasting _____ years ()
 professional and social relationship lasting _____ years ()
 professional contacts are infrequent ()
13. Which of the following most accurately describes your relationship with the station manager?
 I am the station manager ()
 the station manager is also the owner ()
 professional relationship lasting _____ years ()
 professional and social relationship lasting _____ years ()
 professional contacts are infrequent ()

(continued ...)

14. Who would you say is most influential in the hiring of news staff?
- the owner(s) ()
 the station manager ()
 the news or program director ()
 the personnel manager ()
 other (please specify _____) ()
15. Who would you say is most directly responsible for what the viewer/listener finally sees/hears?
- the owner(s) ()
 the station manager ()
 the news or program director ()
 news reporters or broadcasters ()
 other (please specify _____) ()
16. Who would you say is ultimately responsible for the final product?
- the owner(s) ()
 the station manager ()
 the news or program director ()
 news reporters or broadcasters ()
 other (please specify _____) ()
17. How frequently do you consult with each of the following in selecting news items for broadcast? (1=never, 2=rarely, 3=occasionally, 4=frequently)
- _____ the owner(s)
 _____ the station manager
 _____ peers at the same station
 _____ colleagues at other stations
 _____ staff or subordinates
 _____ other (please specify _____)
18. How frequently do you consult with each of the following in preparing or selecting editorial items?
- _____ the owner(s)
 _____ the station manager
 _____ peers at the same station
 _____ colleagues at other stations
 _____ staff or subordinates
 _____ other (please specify _____)
19. Which of the following best describes your role in the formulation of your station's editorial policy?
- very substantial ()
 significant, in consultation with superiors ()
 significant, in consultation with peers and/or staff ()
 minimal ()
20. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements (1=strongly agree, 2=agree somewhat, 3=strongly disagree, 4=disagree somewhat):
- _____ Concentration of media ownership is not in the public interest.
 _____ The CBC should not be allowed to compete with the private media for advertising revenue.
 _____ The CRTC's Canadian content regulations should be abolished.
 _____ State regulation of the broadcasting industry should be extended to the publishing industry.
 _____ State regulation in general tends to impede the development of the free enterprise system in Canada.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR CO-OPERATION.

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POSTSCRIPT:
Media Acquisitions by the
Dominant Complexes Since March 1978

Some indication of the tremendous growth rate of the dominant media complexes can be provided through a consideration of their acquisitions since March 1978. (Ownership data included in the thesis reflect the ownership structure at this time.) The following major acquisitions and/or changes have taken place throughout the mere six months between March and September 1978 (excludes the month of September itself):

APRIL 1978: Bassett seeks control (54%) of Multiple Access Limited, which, if approved, will increase the total circulation of the Baton complex from 5.5 to 10.6 million and place three key CTV stations (CFTO TORONTO, CFCF MONTREAL, CFQR SASKATOON) as well as two of the largest private television programme production companies (Glen Warren and Champlain Productions) under his control. The C.R.T.C. schedules a hearing for September 1978.

Through CKEY Limited, Maclean-Hunter purchases all the issued shares of CKOY-AM and CKBY-FM OTTAWA, formerly independent.

Rogers purchases an additional 24.2% of Canadian Cablesystems Limited (the largest cable television company in Canada), which increases its interest to 50%, thereby giving Rogers effective control (according to a preliminary C.R.T.C. ruling). C.R.T.C. approval is pending.

MAY 1978: Premier Cablevision Limited acquires 45% of Western Cablevision Limited.

Torstar initiates publication of a new closed circulation periodical, City Woman, with a total distribution of 200,000.

- JUNE 1978: Torstar increases its interest in Harlequin Enterprises Limited to 55.6%.
- JULY 1978: Western plans a merger with Premier Cablevision Limited, the second largest cable television company in Canada.
- Sun Publishing Limited merges with the Free Press complex. (F. P. formerly held 86.6% of Sun's Class "B" voting shares.)
- Standard offers to purchase the remaining shares of Bushnell Communications Limited.
- CHUM receives C.R.T.C. approval to acquire effective control of CITY-TV TORONTO, in return for its commitment to establish a \$1.75 million radio and television production facility that will provide programmes for CITY-TV, CKVR-TV BARRIE, and CHUM-AM & -FM TORONTO. CHUM now controls 11 radio stations and 20 television stations across Canada with a total circulation of 7.6 million.
- AUGUST 1978: Global acquires all the outstanding shares of Tee Vee Records Incorporated.
- Maclean-Hunter enters the daily newspaper sector through its acquisition of Sterling Newspapers Limited, which controls nine dailies, nine weeklies, and two semi-weekly newspapers in British Columbia (see Appendix 1). This, along with the CKOY and CKBY-FM acquisition, brings its total media outlets to 171 from 149 and its total circulation to 6.1 million. It also means that B.C.'s total daily newspaper circulation is now 100% controlled by four dominant complexes (Southam, F. P., Thomson, and Maclean-Hunter).