THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

OF

C. WRIGHT MILLS
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By

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A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Master of Arts

McMaster University

July 1978
MASTER OF ARTS (1978) (Sociology)
McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: The Political Sociology of C. Wright Mills

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NUMBER OF PAGES: vi, 386.
ABSTRACT

The main purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate that C. Wright Mills' sociological contributions are of wide-ranging scope and diversity. Despite many limitations of the model of sociology which Mills offered, it may be contended that he deserves a place in the history of modern sociology/radical sociology for his many substantive contributions. These contributions, centering around his Critique of the Parsonian grand sociology, Sociological methodology, Mass Society, Alienation, Political Sociology, New Leftism, and Democracy and Liberalism, constitute the main themes for analysis and assessment in the present dissertation. A champion of sociological radicalism, Mills represents an integrating link between classic sociology and modern sociology.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to many individuals, too numerous to mention, who helped me in one way or another in writing the present dissertation. I am grateful to Dr. Buddhadeva Bhattacharyya of Calcutta University for first encouraging me to work on Mills' major ideas of political sociology. My thanks are due to members of my thesis committee: Dr. Dusky Lee Smith, Dr. Wallace Clement and Dr. Carl Cuneo, whose stimulating guidance, insightful criticisms, constructive suggestions and continued encouragement provided me with a thoroughly enjoyable intellectual experience at McMaster. I am especially grateful to Dr. Dusky Lee Smith, my Supervisor, who was very kind to offer me the intellectual freedom I needed very badly in the pursuit of my studies and work. I am very much indebted to him for his careful editing and criticisms of the entire manuscript for both content and style. I express my sincere appreciation to Rick G. Guscott, Anupam Sen and Mohammad Shahidullah who were kind to read and react to many draft chapters of the work. Finally, I am grateful to my wife, Bula Bhadra. Without her unfailing patience, criticisms and encouragement this study would never have been completed.
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A NOTE ON MILLS' WRITINGS

The abbreviations used in the bracketed references to Mills' works in this dissertation are as follows:

SP---Sociology and Pragmatism
FMW--From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology
NMP--The New Men of Power
WC---White Collar
CSS--Character and Social Structure
PE---The Power Elite
CWT--The Causes of World War Three
SI---The Sociological Imagination
IM---Images of Man
LY---Listen, Yankee
TM---The Marxists
PPP--Power, Politics & People
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The Objective

The basic objective of this dissertation work is to attempt an interpretive exposition of some chosen aspects of Mills' political sociology. Nowadays Mills is generally acknowledged as one of the central figures of modern sociology, particularly as the father of radical sociology. Although, generally speaking, I share this view, I consider Mills mainly a political sociologist and, accordingly, intend to systematize and assess the leading aspects of his political sociology.

It is my conviction that Mills has appreciably contributed to the development of modern sociology. Specifically said, Mills' sociology marks, in view of its political implications, a significant break with the mainstream sociology which dominated the arena of sociological theory and research until the beginnings of the decade of the 1960s. It has contributed towards a restoration of the critical and oppositional stance which sociology lost in the 1950s. On the one hand, Mills' political sociology constitutes a radical critique of the corporate capitalist social structure of America and its institutional arrangements. On the other hand, it represents a distinct variety of political sociology including a model of man and society, a definition of socio-
logy, and a theoretical system of sociological concepts and ideas. In other words, there are two manifest concerns behind this theoretical endeavor of evaluating important political sociological contributions of Mills. These contributions can briefly be summed up in the form of two hypotheses.

In the first place, Mills' political sociology is a theoretically articulated critique of a capitalist social structure and its institutions. It is often assumed, not without reason, that sociology as a field of intellectual inquiry and academic exercise is a way of expressing socio-historical realities at a given point of time. Since it evolves within a matrix of operating sociohistorical forces it reveals, among other things, changing relations of man to man in society. As far as political sociology is concerned, it reveals the nature of this changing relations in political terms. Mills' political sociology, though rooted in diverse American, European and the British intellectual traditions, is embedded within the sociohistorical contexts of a society and, as such, it is an indicator of the dominant operating sociohistorical forces and their associated institutional-structural trends. That is to say, Mills' political sociology reflects some of the contradictions of corporate capitalism, analyses some of the crises points in corporate capitalist social structure, focuses on some of their consequences on the life fates of individuals, and sheds some new light on the ascendancy of the military-industrial state.

If, therefore, sociology is an indicator of sociohistorical forces and institutional trends encompassing man's life and
his social relations, it may be hypothesized, then, that Mills' political sociology highlights these aspects as basic concerns of reason and freedom for the establishment of an equilitarian society.

This leads, secondly, to the other facet of Mills' political sociology. The task of political sociology, as he says, is to deal with "private troubles and public issues." They provide the goals to which the concerns of political sociologists, democratically oriented to the values of reason and freedom, should be directed. If power elite, mass society and alienation—the critical concepts of Mills' sociological radicalism—are features of American society, they constitute merely an aspect of his political sociology. The other one is programmatic and reformist in nature and mission. It envisages the establishment of a democratic society in terms of a translation of the ideas and ideals of the classic liberal democratic tradition. In its turn, it sets out the task of political sociology as themes of private troubles and public issues. If, therefore, establishment of a democratic society depends upon the restoration of reason and freedom in human social affairs, it may be hypothesized, then, that the primary task of political sociology is to deal with, among other things, private troubles and public issues of men and women in society. It is in this that political sociology becomes a function of private troubles and public issues. This also distinguishes Mills' political sociology either from Marxist sociology or from the mainstream/functional political sociology.
Thus the present dissertation takes up and deals with analytically and critically the leading aspects of Mills' political sociology. The following are the leading aspects which I have chosen for specific analysis here: a comparison of Mills with Parsons, sociological methodology, mass society, alienation, political sociology, new Leftism, democracy and liberalism. As already indicated, the central theme of this theoretical work is Mills and his basic aspects of political sociology. In spite of this theoretical point of reference, an attempt has been made to discuss the issues in the comparative perspective, taking note of the works of other theorists who have advanced their ideas on the similar items. In this regard my purpose has been to indicate how far Mills' ideas are continuous with, or have departed from, those of others in the area concerned. In brief, the present dissertation work is predominantly a theoretical and evaluative study of Mills' contributions to the field of political sociology.

Contemporary Evaluations: A Review

As Andy Warhol facetiously remarked, "Every one in America will be famous for fifteen minutes." Mills had his hour, and it came none too soon. Had he lived, the remaining years of the sixties might have been painful. Young Leftists, unable to tolerate any political or intellectual leader for more than a few months, would surely have abandoned Mills. Yet this would not have troubled him nearly as much as their growing tolerance of
reason and democracy. There was finally no way for Mills to throw off what he poignantly called "'this moral anguish is crushing me.'" (Clecak, 1973: 71).

These concluding remarks bring an end to Clecak's portrayal of C. Wright Mills as a lone rebel with radical paradoxes and dilemmas of a new Left. To be fair, in this contemporary epoch of political isms the obverse of "radicalism" is not anything without paradoxes and dilemmas. Whether young Leftists are intolerant of reason and democracy is one question; and whether there really exists a way out of radical paradoxes yet another. The significant point is whether one confronts, to use Mills' words, "the question of political irresponsibility in our time or ... the cultural and political question of The Cheerful Robot" (PPP: 246).

In the hey-go-mad days of rabid anti-intellectualism in politics and grand theory and abstracted empiricism in sociology of the fifties Mills does, unlike most others, confront the question of political irresponsibility in the overdeveloped superstate of corporate capitalism. If "moral anguish" crushed him it was not entirely, I think, due to radical paradoxes and dilemmas in his Left radicalism; it was rather the verbalized expression of powerlessness of a conscientious man in a society defined only by situated contradictions of corporate motives through metaphors of liberal vocabulary.

If Mills was not sure of the answers to the questions he raised he was, however, able to demonstrate, living in the
academic dog days of mythologizing jargon, that there were "important tendencies for irresponsible thought and action within American social science" (Kaufman, 1960: 116). Not that irresponsible thought and action have now abated. The mainstream sociology has become "corporate sociology." Its basic concepts, problems, theories and orientations are now determined "at least in broad outline, by the needs of the corporate system of which it is a part" (Szymanski, 1970: 3). In the mass production of this corporate corpus, the University has now become what Miller called "part of the factory system of commercial America" (1962: 8). It has been asserted that Mills was "a complex man" with "a bundle of contradictions," "egomaniacal and brooding, hearty and homeless, driven by a demon of discontent and ambition" or simultaneously "sociable and aloof, democratic and snobbish, generous and close, humble and cocky, rationalistic and simplistic" (Swados, 1963: 36-37). But at the same time he remains a man, says Wakefield, "as great in generosity and kindness as in talent and dedication" and that he was "out of step with the time and society he lived in" (1962: 331). Indeed, there were contradictions in Mills. He was on the Left but not of the Left, a radical but a lone guerilla, and always a political man but never with any political affiliation. He believes that liberalism has become a political rhetoric and, hence, increasingly banal and meaningless to larger masses. Yet he did not lose faith in the classic values of liberalism. Rather he speaks of moral, political and
intellectual commitment to its basic values of reason, freedom and truth. He likened Marx's conception of the working class to a romantic illusion, "a labor metaphysic" without any politico-historical substance. But he still conceives man, more in Marx's terms, as the maker of his life fate. Mills saw intellectuals having become transformed into powerless technicians and salesmen in the "American Celebration." But he thinks that they could be "programatic in a politically realistic way." However, beneath all too apparent contradictions and subterranean truths lies the significance of his life as a political sociologist. He lived a full life, had his hour and died a revolutionary (cf. Landau, 1965: 46) though in terms of effort rather than of accomplishment in his own decade. And as Howe, earlier a friend and later a critic, puts it nicely: "Even his enemies paid him that tribute" (1966: 246).

My own work is an attempt to search an answer to this question: Why do even his enemies pay him that tribute?

In my own effort to undertake this present study I have been motivated by this question, and it is this which has prompted my investigation into the manifold aspects of Mills' political sociology. Even when he remains much criticized, attacked, despised, fabricated, misunderstood and accused of sociological heresy and paranoid romanticism, what then accounts for the resurgence of Millsian themes in contemporary sociological literature? Stated otherwise, how can he become a rich fount of unabated inspiration to the present generation
of radical sociologists? How could he become the founding father of "radical sociology" (Scimecca, 1976, 1977), the forerunner of a "new sociology" (Horowitz, 1965; Anderson, 1974), and also a mentor of a radicalized liberal political sociology? How did he remain the most widely read sociologist of international repute over the decade and a half following the Second World War (cf. Friedrichs, 1970: 68)? In brief, why is he regarded as a "titan" (cf. Martindale, 1975) of modern sociology?

Is it due to the fact that, as Horowitz notes, "the main drift of C. Wright Mills' work is linked to the practical importance of an ethically viable social science"? He thinks that "this is so because such a sociology confronts the facts with integrity by doing something about the facts" (Horowitz, 1969a: 20). Is it because, as Domhoff concludes, Mills' *The Power Elite*, as landmark of political sociology, "stands as tall in the light of recent events as it did in 1956 when it crashed in on the Great American Celebration with its detailed description and provocative indictment of the structure of power in modern society" (Domhoff, 1969: 278). In commenting on the sources of appeal and overall achievements of social criticism as contained in Mills' same classic, Gillam concludes by saying that in a time of disquieting consensus "it was altogether timely and prophetic, moreover, in its attack on the prevailing orthodoxy." Although it lapses into ambiguity and contradiction in its task of the new radical synthesis in the long run, he continues, "*The Power Elite*
at once announced and helped to inspire a revival of radical theory that would, over the next decade and a half, considerably influence the course of American social thought. This was no mean achievement" (Gillam, 1975: 479). Aptheker, a much known Marxist theorist, contends that Mills' critique "does represent very vigorous indictments of significant aspects of monopoly capitalism's institutions, does offer important contributions toward a really radical attack upon the social system itself" (1960: 87). Then, are Mills' contributions important in terms of "tactical programs"? Thus he estimates: "He does stand firm against McCarthyism and the New Conservatism; he does condemn militarism; and he does call for an end to the Cold War and its replacement by an era of active peaceful co-existence. For an American today these are decisive ideological and political virtues. They are epitomized in and fought for in the books of C. C. Wright Mills and this must determine their over-all political evaluation" (Aptheker, 1960: 87-88). Sigler finds out that Mills, as both a post-Marxian and a post-Weberian, was a champion of democracy which he wanted to preserve and refine; as a social theorist Mills was "the outstanding recent exponent of radical-reformist social science" (Sigler, 1966: 46). Should he then be recognized as the inspiring fount of radical sociology? Translating Mills' message into tasks of sociological commitment Szymanski defends: "The radical sociologist must serve as a constant social critic. He must
incorporate into his life work an incessant critique of the
dominant institutional structure to the extent that it
frustrates man's human and material needs and crushes man's
potentiality. The role of the radical sociologist must be
to relate people's personal troubles and day-to-day concerns
to the dynamics of social structures, thus translating them
into political issues" (1970: 9-10). In view of their stages
of economic development together with related issues, both
the postindustrial and the industrializing nations are now
exhibiting symptoms of structural strains. Translated into
the individual's problems, the structural strains become what
Mills calls personal troubles. If this be so, sociology then
takes on a humanistic and liberating role. This means that,
as Rex points out, "the whole humane purpose of sociology
is to take these 'private troubles' seriously by tracing
them to their roots, even if this means being criticised for
not dealing with immediate problems of suffering" (1974: x).
Is it true, therefore, that Mills' contributions lie in giving
a human content to sociology's themes? Or, finally, can
it be said that Mills' importance is because of his personal
thrusts of "a unified style of life, one that would bring
together thought and action, power and reflection, as few
intellectuals seemed to be capable of doing?" The scar
Mills left on the map of modern sociology, defeating his
premature death, continues to scintillate. He was an intellec-
tual maverick, a political radical neither deterred by os-
tracism and alienating hostility nor ever exalted by honorific status bestowals of any sort. A tough-minded rebel throughout his life, Mills never lost the muckracker's zeal to expose and blast the ideological superstructure of consensual sociology of neo-liberal myths and rationalizations.

Is this portrait a reason for which the posterity should remember Mills? Howe remembers Mills as a Promethean personality, "a man of great seriousness if only fragmentary achievement, a natural rebel at a time when most intellectuals were taking to cover, a kind and ambitious mind that had the courage to undertake too much .... Compared to shilly-shallying of his academic colleagues, this Mills seems a great giant. For it is true that some of them can point to work more neatly rounded and firmly structured than the achievement of Mills. What is the measure of their success against the tragic power of his failure" (1966: 252)? Despite ambiguities, oversimplifications or contradictions, Mills' contributions to sociology are well recognized. His legacy definitely stands above and transcends discoverable inadequacies in his sociology. In brief, Mills as a political sociologist gave, in the words of Spinard, "enough that was valuable to make us all, if we want to think and act intelligently and responsibly in the political world, somewhat Millsean" (1966: 57).

In a profound sense, truth always remains elusive indicating a perennial gap between search and success. From
this point of view, all the above-mentioned portrayals may be considered in fact a multitude of intellectual endeavors to approach Mills—the man and the sociologist—and to evaluate his contributions. In bringing all these perspectives together in review I do not intend to contest their validity, disprove them and then make my own revelations hitherto unknown. Instead, I intend to pursue, in my work, the issue even further, rather in a different way. Mills contributed in several ways. For example, he constructed his own radical sociology in course of his debates with grand theory and abstracted empiricism. He fought against anti-ideologists and gave a Leftist orientation to sociological studies. He deplored for the rise of the power elite, mass society or alienation. But, above all, he also envisioned a humanistic radical sociology, contributed to sociology of knowledge, and revised and/or stood for democracy and liberalism. These are leading aspects of Mills' sociology, and the avowed objective of this present study is to systematize and critically evaluate Mills' contributions to these themes of sociology, having considered him basically a political sociologist par excellence.2

I prefer to call Mills a political sociologist, specifically in the political sociological tradition of Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Max Weber (1964-1920) and definitely without ignoring the influences of others on him. The inseparability of the social and the political goes back to the days of Aristotle, the grandmaster of modern politics.
This tradition of intrinsic inseparability continued to flow more or less in a historical sequence only to be interrupted seriously by Machiavelli (1469-1527) who opted for Politik rather than Staatslehre and sharply distinguished between Realpolitik and Ecclesiastical politics. Whereas both Bodin (1530-1596) and Montesquieu (1689-1755) renewed the tradition, it suffered a halt again in Hegel (1776-1831), although his metaphysical idealism postulated eventual consummation of the civil society in the State. But it was Marx and Weber who struck the keynote of modern political sociology, restoring the lost linkage between the social values and social science regardless of contrary purposes in their respective minds. As Runciman suggests, speaking of the inseparability of the social and the political: "For Marx, social science and social values are mutually involved because all social thought is liable to be (in his sense of the term) 'ideological'; for Weber, they are involved because the social sciences must be 'value-relevant' although this does not prevent the conduct of an actual sociological investigation being 'value-free'" (1963: 53). In Mills this classic tradition flows, occupying a unique place between Marx's political tradition of sociology and Weber's sociological tradition of politics. Whether it is a theoretical position of precarious balance and stabilized uneasiness in Mills or how he moves back and forth in between them itself poses a different problem which still needs to be answered.
In the meanwhile what I call Mills' political sociology represents a fruitful intersection between the social and the political and thus makes strongly a valid plea to redirect sociological imagination--its theory, research and practice--to the accomplishment of politically defined goals. Put otherwise, the relevance of Mills lies in his efforts to revitalize sociology in political terms and also to unite politics and sociology into a common area of intellectual exploration by social scientists. From another perspective, the political significance of Mills' political sociology may be understood in the background of predominant social science exercises around the decade of the fifties in America. As one commentator describes the situation: "Sociologists are hot on the trail of new discoveries in American social mobility; political scientists are busily assuring us that the two-party system is an inevitable ingredient of American politics; economists are celebrating America's new affluence; socialism is treated as a dead dog, buried for all time (thank God) in an enormous Princeton study" (Martinson, 1960: 14). It was in this academic environment of pseudo-politics that Mills spoke of the role of sociology in political terms. However, for Mills, how does the political become the social? Let him speak for himself:

The shaping of the society we shall live in and the manner in which we shall live in it are increasingly political. And this society includes the realms of intellect and of personal morals. If we demand that these realms be geared to our activities which make a public difference, then
personal morals and political interests become closely related; any philosophy that is not a personal escape involves taking a political stand. If this is true, it places great responsibility upon our political thinking. Because of the expanded reach of politics, it is our own personal style of life and reflection we are thinking about when we think about politics (PPP: 299).

In this statement, which he made as far back as 1944, Mills comes very close to Weber who once made this remark: "All ultimate questions without exception are touched by political events, even if the latter appears to be superficial" (quoted in Mayer, 1956: 15). Mills was predominantly a sociologist by training as well as by profession. When he coined the term "sociological imagination" he admits that he did not intend "to suggest merely the academic discipline of 'sociology'" (SI: 19 footnote). Nevertheless he uses the term because, inter alia, he was primarily a sociologist. "Every cobbler thinks leather is the only thing, and for better or worse, I am a sociologist" (SI: 19 footnote). Despite his self designation as a sociologist, it is neither unwarranted nor unjustified to call him a political sociologist because of the obvious political meaningfulness in which Mills conceives the substance of his sociology. Stated otherwise, this is to suggest that Mills' sociology is predominantly political sociology which seeks to study social structural problems in terms of their political repercussions on the life fates of individuals. Needless also to suggest, his is a political sociology and as such it offers a political critique of advanced capitalist society.
There is another reason which supports my decision to treat Mills' sociology as political sociology. Whether regarded as a political intellectual, intellectually a political rebel, an ideologist, a politically-oriented sociological social psychologist, a sociologist or even a democrat, Mills was basically a political man, a homo politicus. Beneath all concerns of his sociological imagination or social science, this remains the all-pervasive fact of his life. Mannheim said in his Ideology and Utopia: "Whatever your interests, they are your interests as a political person, but the fact that you have this or that set of interests implies also that you must do this or that to realize them, and that you must know the specific position you occupy in the whole social process" (1936: 163). Mills' life concerns are a fulfillment of this Mannheimian dictum as Mills reverberated in later years of his life. Although Weber started with different premises, this is also Weber's position, and, like Weber's, Mills' political sociology is a sociology of a political man. He is indeed a political man by self affirmation, not by anybody's imputation. In commenting upon the criticisms made against his The Power Elite, which was in effect "a blow at the smooth certainties and agreeable formulas that now make up the content of liberalism," Mills makes no wriggling to point out:

Yes, I do feel that I stand, with most other people, outside the major history-making forces of my epoch, but at the same time I feel that I am among those who take the consequences of these forces. That is why I do not make a rigid distinction between "life and history," and that is one major reason why I am a political man.
No one is outside society; the question is where you stand within it (Mills, 1957: 30). As a political man, intellectually and morally tied to democratic values of truth, reason and freedom, Mills confronted "the greatest human default being commited by the privileged in our times" at the back of which lie what he calls private troubles and public issues. Mills' political awareness as a social being is reminiscent of Aristotle's prophetic utterance in *The Politics*, the magnum opus of modern political science: "The man who is isolated—who is unable to share the benefits of political association, or has no need to share because he is already self-sufficient—is no part of the polis, and must therefore be either a beast or a God" (Aristotle, 1968: 6). Throughout his life, Mills remained politically conscious, and the leading agency of his political socialization was, among others, the trouble-ridden years of the Second World War (cf. Gillam, 1966). While the issues of both national and international politics strongly influenced the development of Mills' political attitudes (cf. Gerth, 1962a, 1962b), it was, most importantly, the outbreak of World War II that threw him the challenge to think and act politically and to profess radically. Mills was awakened to the new realities of power and politics of the modern industrial society only in the forties although the fact remains unerringly evident that his subsequent years were marked by ever increasing political awareness in sociological vocation.

At this point I would like to point out that any
specific discussion on Mills' power elite has been excluded, somewhat deliberately, from the purview of the present work. In this two reasons are responsible for my decision. First, much work has already been done on this aspect of Mills' political sociology. It is also my impression that absence of any specific discussion on this aspect does not seriously affect my treatment of his other contributions especially because I have in fact taken due note of this concept throughout the work as and when necessary. Second, I am of the opinion that it is quite possible to approach Mills and evaluate his other contributions without necessarily concentrating on the theme of power elite. In fact, those who evaluate Mills' position or his political sociology in terms of power or power elite concepts tend to underemphasize his other aspects of political sociology. This is, however, not to suggest that discussion of power elite thesis is unnecessary in or irrelevant to my assessment of Mills' contributions. Neither is it to undermine or undervalue its importance in the study of his political sociology. What is suggested here is that, on the contrary, Mills can be credited for having enriched many other areas of sociology. In other words, Mills' contributions do not exhaust what he said about the rise of power elite in America. Even if it is assumed that he has overemphasized power aspects in sociology, I take the position that Mills, by his use of the concepts of power or power elite, contributed to the relative politicization of sociology. Also, he made appreciable use of power elite theory
as heuristic device in order to articulate his concerns for the decline of democracy and democratic institutions in America.

This aspect may be illustrated in some more detail. Theorists like Horowitz, Gillam and Cuzzort, to cite three among many others, think that Mills' sociology revolves around the dimension of power, and this explains both political significance and political orientations of his sociology. Horowitz argues, "In short, the settlement of the sociological question of how men interact, immediately and directly entails research into questions of superordination and subordination, elites and masses, rulers and ruled, in-groups and out-groups, and members and non-members .... The study of power is the beginning of the sociological wisdom--but the essence of that wisdom resides in men. Hence the existence of power is a less significant area of study than the human uses made of power. Men define power; they are not necessarily defined by it. This, at any rate, is the liberating task of the social sciences" (1969a: 9, II). In his unpublished Master's thesis, The Intellectual as Rebel: C. Wright Mills 1916-1946, Gillam seems to have emphasized the "power" aspect in the political orientations of Mills' sociology. As evident by the title of the thesis, Gillam purported to understand "the mind" of Mills as a "paradoxical individual," and so he was led "back to his formative years." In connection with Mills' criticism of Dewey on grounds of the latter's failure to "confront the
the problem of power" in modern industrial societies, Gillam points out that there are "two elements which would dominate the course of Mills' own intellectual odyssey--his sometimes agonizing efforts fully to know his every hidden value, and a concomitant obsession with the problem of power in modern society" (1966: 67). Elsewhere, in tracing the roots of Mills' radicalism, he makes this observation: "Mills, however, while he sometimes feared power and always viewed it with suspicion, was ultimately concerned with using it for his own purposes" (Gillam, 1966: 130). Cuzzort's evaluation is this: "Mills was concerned with one aspect of society which never loses its significance--the question of power. His work remains centered on power--the nature of power, the distribution of power, the uses and abuses of power, the power of organizations, the myths of power, the evolution of power, the irrationality of power, and the means of observing and comprehending power in the vastness of modern society" (1969: 134). Of these different perspectives, Horowitz appears to have correctly indicated the role of power in Mills' sociology. Gillam has overemphasized his case and this exaggerates, I think, Mills' concern for power. As far as Cuzzort is concerned, he undervalues the over-all political contexts behind Mills' apparent reliance on the concept of power or power elite as a heuristic device. Generally speaking, there is little doubt that the power dimension is an indispensable, if not integral, component of Mills' sociological system. But, to be sure, that is not all
that Mills' sociology stands for. What is postulated here and to be elaborated throughout this work is that the dimension of power additionally adds political character to Mills' leading sociological themes. In other words, the concept of power has added political dimension to his sociology. "But the truth", says Miliband, "it was not so much by power that Mills was haunted as by powerlessness" (1965: 81). In view of this, my position with regard to the role of power in Mills' sociology is this: on the one hand, it not only enhances the political character of sociological themes but also restores, to a great extent, the significance of power in sociological analysis which was lost typically in the decade of the fifties; on the other hand, Mills only employed the concept of power as a heuristic device in order for highlighting the low ebb of America's democratic institutions.

That Mills' use of the concept of power adds political dimension to his sociology may be illustrated from the fact of its importance right in the discipline of political science itself. From one point of view, all great political thinkers have been aware not only of the coercive aspects of power; "they have also taken cognizance of the possibility of using power as an instrument by means of which other values might be maximized, and the 'good life' brought into being" (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1961: xiii). In their book, *Power and Society*, Lasswell and Kaplan point out that "political science, as an empirical discipline, is the study of the shaping and sharing of power" (1961: xiv). Poulantzas, a
theorist in the Marxist tradition, recognizes that the problem of power is of "supreme importance for political theory" (1973: 99). In this regard, by introducing his concept of power or power elite into the arena of sociological debates, Mills has made noteworthy contribution towards the development of political sociology. From another point of view, the concept of power implies also a social process and, as such, its political aspect cannot be differentiated from its social aspect. To be specific, a political process is also a social process politically considered. Power is as much social as it is political. "The power process is not a distinct and separable part of the social process but only the political aspect of an interactive whole" (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1961: xvii). Viewed in this light, Mills' use of the concept serves an important purpose in studying the political and the social structures of American society. By its use, he exhibited the structural consequences, in sociological and social psychological terms and in his discussions of mass society and alienation especially, of power elite as an independent variable in all its major aspects. Looking sociologically at power, the central concept of politics, Mills suggests how the study of society and polity through the instrumentality of this concept could be made theoretically possible and practically relevant. But this is not to say that Mills' use of the concept is beyond controversial limits. What is significant is that it means a fruitful beginning, not at an interdisciplinary endeavor only, but in the study
of what I call political sociology. From this focal point, political sociology is concerned with "who the power holders are, how they deal with social issues, why they follow a particular course of action, what kinds of challenges exist to their prerogatives, and how conflicts, if they exist, are resolved. These are issues of great consequence to all our lives. Political sociology, therefore, is not esoteric field, of interest only to specialists, but should speak to all concerned with the structuring of power in our society" (Chasin and Chasin, 1974: 2). What is true, therefore, is that Mills' sociology does recognize both the social and the political aspects of the same social reality of every day life. In a similar way, Mills accepts that politics is intimately connected with power phenomena. Setting forth his position in unmistakably clear terms Mills goes on to say, "There are those, of course, who deny that politics has to do with a struggle for power but they are of no direct concern to politics as we know it or can imagine it" (PPP: 212). This should be taken as more than a mere statement of a sociologist about his political concern for the role of power in the study of social structure. From sociology's point of view, Mills' treatment of power has had a profound impact on the politicization of sociology and also the evolution of political sociology itself. As for Mills, he realized the political implications of "power" in sociological studies as early as 1942. But it is interesting to note that "neither Park Burgess' Introduction to the Science of Sociology, which
was the standard introductory text in the 1920's and 1930's, nor Ogburn and Nimkoff's Sociology, which was probably the most widely read text during the 1940's and 1950's, even list the term 'power' in their indexes" (Olsen, 1970: x).

The advent of Mills, coupled with a host of empirical research studies of power structures in communities and organizations, provided the much-needed impetus towards the development of political sociology in the decade of the 1960s.

Though power is the major avenue through which institutional structures of the political society may be studied, where does power come from? In this Mills followed the sociological tradition of Weber. If power is an important variable in the study of political sociology, it is the state, the political society, which becomes all the more important since the nature, character, scope and consequences of power depends on the diverse structural contexts and components of the political organization called 'State'. Mills' realization of the importance of the state as the highest political organization monopolizing all sources of legitimate violence, a conception that precisely reflects the impact of the Weberian heritage on him, is contained in the article, "A Marx for the Managers", written with Hans Gerth in 1942. In this article he carried out a searching criticism of James Burnham's The Managerial Revolution. In this book Burnham advances the thesis that a managerial society will supersede through war and revolution both capitalism and socialism be-
cause of increasing indispensability of the new managerial class as productive experts and administrative executives. In reviewing Burnham's thesis, Mills strongly contends that "the chances at political power for those filling technically indispensable roles is not a function of their technical roles but of their class position and political affiliations, whatever that may be" (PPP: 61). He, therefore, vehemently refutes Burnham's assumption that "the technical indispensability of certain functions in a social structure are taken ipso facto as a prospective claim for political power" (PPP: 57). Alternatively Mills suggested:

The question is: Where is the power? The answer is: It is the structure of domination, which is the state with its monopoly of physical force, and fused within it the industrialists and their agrarian colleagues (PPP: 60).

Though Mills stated this in the immediate context of the Nazi State, it is fascinating to note him saying that "the task of understanding what is happening in the world today involves a comprehension of such basic issues as the retention or abolition of private property, the structure of classes, possible political and social movements, and of war" (PPP: 68).

As a matter of fact, Mills' use of power to dissect the institutional structures of society is inextricably bound up with his notion of politics the meaning of which consists "in understanding authority," the legitimated power involving voluntary obedience of the ruled to the ruler. In their turn, both power and politics are facts of state. For Mills, it was the state in the industrial epoch of advanced capitalism.
To raise such a question as "where is the power" meant a real beginning in Mills' intellectual odyssey as a political sociologist. On the one hand, it signifies his realization of the essence of political process in power; on the other hand, it enabled him to locate the habitat of power in the state as the social structure of domination, just as Wber did when he spoke of "Politics as a vocation" in a speech at Munich University in 1918.

This brings us to the crucial question Mills raised in connection with the role of power in modern industrial society. He asked: "Whose power and for what ends" (CSS: 195)? The general problem of politics, in general of his political sociology, is then the explanation of varying distributions of power and obedience. But power is not, and cannot be, an end but simply a means and an avenue to discern historical changes overtaking self, society and polity in the wake of industrialization, bureaucratization and centralizing tendencies in modern times. As far as Mills is concerned, he was aware of the limits of power in any fruitful analysis of the structural problems of society. To quote Mills:

In reflecting upon the basic transformations of twentieth-century societies, we may first examine those institutional orders in which the distribution of power is most visible. We do not intend by this approach to imply that "power" is the highest value, for men in general or for us; it is simply expedient to approach modern social structures from this point of view, for it is from this vantage point that we may best hope to understand the ground swell of our age (CSS: 456).7
In terms of this it seems clear, as I understand, that Mills' evolution into a political sociologist does not coincide with his discovery of "the power elite" in the institutional-structural trends in American society. In fact those who exaggerate his uses of power concept really underemphasize other aspects of Mills' political sociology. As a matter of fact, these other aspects, which constitute the substance of the present work, are equally, if not more, important in any attempt to evaluate his over-all contributions. Repeatedly Mills points out that "the idea of power elite is of course an interpretation. It rests upon and it enables us to make sense of major institutional trends, the social similarities and psychological affinities of the men at the top. But the idea is also based upon what has been happening on the middle and lower levels of power .... " (PPP: 30). Yet from another point of view Mills' analysis of the power elite is a part of his political and intellectual concerns for what is spoiling American democracy. Elsewhere he specifically pointed out the following:

An attack on this power elite is also a fight for the democratic means of history-making. A fight for such means is necessary to any serious fight for peace; it is part of that fight (CWT: 121).

If, therefore, as Horowitz says, the study of power is the beginning of sociological wisdom, then, it may be argued, it is not definitely and ultimately the goal; neither is it an end to which efforts of sociology, political sociology or any other social science as such need be directed. From this
vantage point, Mills does not falter to proclaim that his basic point is always "the political role of social science--what that role may be, how it is enacted, and how effectively--this is relevant to the extent to which democracy prevails" (SI: 189). To put him more succinctly:

... it is precisely the job of liberal education, and the political role of social science, and its intellectual promise, to enable men to transcend .... fragmented and abstracted milieux: to become aware of historical structures and of their own place within them (SI: 189, footnote).

Coverage of the Work

As already indicated, in delineating the contours and the content of this political sociology I have chosen selectively some issues which I have deemed basically fundamental to Mills' sociological system. My decision, involving unavoidably some amount of personal preference and understanding, need not however be taken in absolute terms since, whatever the criteria for choosing one set of issues rather than another, Mills' ideas are so interrelated as to defy any systematic scheme of classification. This is to suggest that his sociological categories stand in complex relationship to each other, and that all of them occur in one form or another in the analysis of any specific aspect of his sociology. In view of this the broad purpose of this work has been to present his sociological system as a whole although this has been done in terms of focussing on individual issues.
In chapters 2, 3 and 6 I discuss different aspects of Mills' political sociology as such. In chapters 2 and 3 I discuss how his political sociology gathers its form and content in the context of its theoretical debates with grand theory and abstracted empiricism, which claimed legitimate authority to have the final say over the defining contours of all theory and research in sociology until the advent of Mills in the decade of the fifties when he firmly put forward an alternative conception, variously designated as "radical sociology", "new sociology", or "humanistic sociology". While these two chapters serve to outline Mills' contributions to various general aspects of sociology including its theoretical emphasis and research orientations, in chapter 6 I focus on the political aspects and the political goals of his sociology. It is essentially a problem centered sociology conceived in terms of a reaffirmation of faith in political liberalism. Though conceived immediately to highlight private troubles and public issues, Mills' political sociology envisages reconstruction of a democratic society through an appeal for restoration of reason and freedom for all in the society. In chapters 4 and 5, wherein I discuss Mills' assumptions about mass society and alienation, contain descriptions of how individuals fell into the grip of private troubles or public issues due to continuing disappearance of reason and freedom from the society. Mills' ideological orientations and political
inclinations, as manifest in the totality of his counter conception of sociology, have constituted the general themes of chapters 7 and 8. Mills was not only a sociological ideologist, and as sociological ideologist he was, in his own unique way, a champion of new Leftism. It is needless to say that his protest against Bell's thesis of the end of ideology has become the cornerstone of sociological radicalism of his later life. Whereas these aspects are the substance of chapter 7, the specific concern in chapter 8 has been to establish Mills as a liberal democrat. Since I suggest that Mills' brand of political sociology is essentially a liberal political sociology, I have found it necessary to catalogue the elements of democratic liberalism for which Mills stood for throughout his life. My own finding is that Mills' position is very much comparable to that of Mill, the best theoretical representative of liberal democracy. My conclusions, contained in chapter 9, consist of two parts. The first part presents a summary of findings as to my assessment of Mills' contributions. The other part focuses on the shortcomings of Mills' political sociology and suggests some measures by which its theoretical and methodological deficiencies can be remedied.

A Note on the Method and Limitations of the Work

In pursuing the present work I have relied on what Mills called "intellectual craftsmanship." Broadly speaking,
this concept of intellectual craftsmanship underlies my own research procedure, or "method" as it may be called. Put very briefly, it demands, among others, the following pre-requisites.¹⁰

Avoid any rigid set of procedures. Above all, seek to develop and to use the sociological imagination. Avoid the fetishism of method and technique. Urge the rehabilitation of the unpretentious intellectual craftsman, and try to become such a craftsman yourself. Let every man be his own methodologist; let every man be his own theorist; let theory and method ... become part of the practice of a craft (SI: 224).

In terms of these assumptions of intellectual craftsmanship, which have influenced my own methodological consciousness, I have tried to examine, analyse and systematize basic ideas or categories of Mills' political sociology. Mills' concept of intellectual craftsmanship is meaningful in the sense of a method of analysis the purpose of which is to explain something or to increase their understanding. While not all sociologists are methodologists (cf. Becker, 1970: 3), methods are undeniably essential in the pursuit of sociological knowledge. As Mills said, "Statements of method promise to guide us to better ways of studying something, often in fact of studying almost anything" (SI: 122). So far so good. In my own work, I have taken the point of view that method is a tool, a means of raising certain worthwhile issues and of explaining them in order to reach certain conclusions which might follow from the findings. The criteria for raising issues or the modes of answering and explaining them
differ from sociologist to sociologist. Nevertheless, this study has chosen some issues, having assumed that they present a theoretical system of interrelated ideas. The question of any rigid adherence to any specific scientific method has been avoided because of the fact that sociology is both "a humanistic and scientific discipline" (Zetterberg, 1965: 20). For me, method has to do, as Mills said, "with how to ask and answer questions with some assurance that the answers are more or less durable" (SI: 120). In my effort to avoid any rigid adherence to method, I have tried to be guided by what Mills calls the sociological imagination. Stated otherwise, the function of the sociological imagination; in addition it has been conceived as a guiding principle that gives order to theory, methodology and research process. In my work I have adhered to the following ground rules:

The sociological imagination demands variability in the research process. The processes by which sociology is done should not be made too rigorous; an open mind is required. What some regard as doctrinaire will be challenged by others and, therefore, methodological and theoretical principles must always be evaluated in terms of the sociological imagination (Denzin, 1973: 6).

As far as the theoretical perspective of this work is concerned, I have looked to and have utilized the sociology of knowledge tradition. It has been used as a frame of reference, as a kind of perspective or orientation in my examination and explanation of the issues concerned. Although
Manheim is generally associated with the development of the sociology of knowledge area, it has a rich but widely diversified origin.\textsuperscript{12} But, it must be noted, the scientific status of the sociology of knowledge is still a matter of debate in spite of the fact that there are many sociologists who are urging for its development and employment in the sociological analysis.\textsuperscript{13} Without entering into controversies as to this, i.e., the scientific status of the sociology of knowledge, let me state in broad terms in which I have used this as the theoretical point of research orientation. My own understanding is that, put in the words of Jarvie, "we do not acquire our knowledge, opinions and beliefs in a vacuum, but in a social and political atmosphere; that what we take to be true, and especially what we take to be obviously true, is conditioned by these social and political surroundings, and especially by our social and political interests" (1972: 131). To this assumption it must also be added that knowledge has its origin in the social and material bases the exploration of which falls within the tasks of the sociology of knowledge. Obviously this approach conceives the society as a dynamic concept and steers its way through conflicting viewpoints. As one contemporary sociologist states: "For its vitality as an intellectual exercise, the sociology of knowledge posits a society of diverse and diverging viewpoints, intellectually rent into ideological camps providing, on the one hand, justification for the maintenance of the status quo and propounding, on
the other hand, dreams and schemes of future utopias" (Shaskolsky, 1970: 6). While the truth or falsity, correctness or incorrectness, validity or invalidity of my findings is left to the readers, this study has in general attempted to pursue an objective and detached analysis. Regardless of whether or not this stand has succeeded. I have tried to follow what Hughes advised to all researchers: "I believe those sociologists who will contribute most to the fundamental, comparative and theoretical understanding of human society and of any of its problems are those deeply concerned with it as to need a desperate, almost fanatical detachment from which to see it in full perspective" (Hughes, 1971: 495).

Finally, few words need to be said with regard to some limitations of this work. The most important of all limitations that might be found inherent to this work is that it remains far from being a complete study by itself. The existing literature on Mills or concerning his life and works is terrifyingly vast and is continuously growing. In addition, Mills himself was also a voluminous writer. For obvious reasons, therefore, not all but only chosen few aspects that are politically and sociologically relevant have been selected for specific analysis in this study. Since dissertations for the Master's degree requirement are necessarily of narrow scope my work, being conceived as an attempt to present Mills' contributions as a theoretical system, appears somewhat ambitious. I have no hesitation to admit this al-
though I have continuously struggled with the constraint of time which deprived me of more concentration and further critical analysis in my work. I urge the readers to consider this work as a necessary preliminary study of Mills, and not a decisive one which I hope to undertake in the near future. Another limitation of this work relates to the source of data. In general, the data for this work have been mainly collected from library sources. These data constitute the published works of Mills, works published about him, and other works that have been found to have a bearing on Mills and his era or his contemporaries. But I have not been able, primarily because of monetary and time constraints, to consult and examine Mills' unpublished papers some of which have been retained by Mrs. Yaroslava Mills, while others are now lying with the University of Texas.

Since these papers are "primarily academic in nature and weighted toward the middle and later years of Mills' life" (Gillam, 1966: 152), I presume that they might have a bearing on my information of Mills' sources or views on sociological concepts. The readers are therefore forwarned of some inadequacies of this work although, I suppose, these unpublished works of Mills may not, unless otherwise shown, significantly change the main theoretical thrusts or arguments of his political sociology. The main reason for this assumption is that Mills' own published writings are clearly indicative of what he has to say, and that published works of others concerning his sociology are also clear in their respective interpretations.
or emphases. It is my feeling that I have covered, as much as I can, the substantive information contained in the available published sources. However, this should not be construed as a justification of my lapses which this work might suffer from.
Notes

1. A clear evidence of increasing sociological interest in Mills' work can be illustrated by drawing attention, besides existing voluminous literature, to the number of theses already done on different aspects of his sociology. See Gillam (1966), Cleere (1971), Warner (1972), Bray (1973), Kraetzer (1975), Berkowitz (1976).

2. It must be noted that most of the contemporary reviewers of Mills are in general agreement over this characterization. See, for example, Spinard (1966), Domhoff (1969), Bray (1973), etc.

3. My own impression is that Mills, in spite of his serious plea for incorporation of what he calls "plain marxism" into social science, is more Weberian than Marxian. In all his essential ideas, e.g., power, power elite, politics, state, stratification, society, bureaucracy or marxism, Mills is far more close(r" to Weber than to Marx. To start with, see Mills (FMW: 40-50; 1963); Sharp (1960), Zeitlin (1971), Kozyr-Kowalski (1968), Mayer (1975), Sigler (1966), Berkowitz (1976: 73-89).

4. However, this political evolution of Mills was not continuous but rather abrupt. See Scimecca (1977:12).

5. For example, see especially Domhoff and Ballard (1969), Crockett (1970), Gillam (1971), and Berkowitz (1976).

6. Italics added. Gillam quotes William Miller in order to point out that the theme of Mills' life was "the intellect as a source and engine of power .... (H)e was a self-conscious student of power, and of men of power, new or old; he worked on power as an intellectual category. And he was devoted to his intellectual work; one should never forget that. And yet he studied power with the hope and anticipation of getting to use it as he understood it ...." (See Gillam (1966: 68).

7. Italics added.


9. Towards the end of the decade of the 1950s, Davis called for an abandonment of "functional analysis" as a special method or body of theory, and argued that structural-
functional analysis was in effect synonymous with sociological analysis. "If the most frequent conceptions of functionalism make it, in effect, inclusive of sociological analysis but exclusive of reductionism and sheer description, then the scientific problems of functional analysis are the same as those of sociology in general" (Davis, 1959: 762). See also Warshay (1975: 85) who designates the period between 1950 and 1963 as "Theory-Method Era".

10. For an elaboration of other fundamentals of this concept, see Mills' essay "On Intellectual Craftsmanship" in his The Sociological Imagination.

11. For a discussion of the scope and usefulness of Mills' concept of the sociological imagination, see chapter 3.

12. See, for example, Curtis and Petras (1970); also Stark (1958).

13. For leading criticism of the sociology of knowledge, see Popper (1957, 1959, 1962, 1972). For a brief criticism of Popper and an argument for the relevance of the sociology of knowledge as a fruitful orientation in sociological research, see Sjoberg and Nett (1968: 39-59). They argue that if the assumption that knowledge is superior to ignorance is accepted, then the sociology of knowledge perspective "can be employed as a tool to further rationality as opposed to irrationality. Viewed as a methodological tool, the sociology of knowledge perspective not only prevents any lapse into an anti-scientific, historicist position but permits one to avoid, at least to a degree, becoming captive of one's own time and place" (Sjoberg and Nett, 1968: 11-12).

14. This information is provided by Gillam (1966: 152).
CHAPTER TWO

Parsons and Mills: A Comparison

Introduction

Throughout the decade of the 1950s the mainstream sociology, in its twin aspects of grand theory and abstracted empiricism, dominated the sociological scenario practically without any rival to challenge its hegemonic control. Both grand theory and abstracted empiricism constituted its life essence. It claimed legitimate authority to have the final say over the defining contours of all theory and research in sociology until especially when Mills firmly put forward an alternative conception, variously designated as "new sociology", "radical sociology" or "humanistic sociology." Against this backdrop my purpose in the two following chapters, 2 and 3, is to undertake an examination of Mills' critique of the Parsonian sociology and an assessment of his views on sociological methodology.

Why Parsons?

Of the numerous social scientists, both within and outside of America, Mills launched one of the earliest and probably the bitterest attack against Talcott Parsons, the high-priest of what has been generally known in sociology
as "functionalism", "structural-functional approach" or "grand theory" in Mills' derogatory labelling. To start with, the basic question, which remains to be answered is why Mills picked up Parsons, not, for example, Merton "whose disservice to sociology has been more insidious than that of Talcott Parsons because, free from the latter's monumental muddle-headedness, he was able to sterilize the subject matter without falling into absurdity" (Andreski, 1973: 56-57). Another related question is whether Mills' almost exclusive focus on The Social System (1951) has degenerated into an one-sided critique of Parsons. On both counts Mills' position, I think, seems justified in view of the theoretical and practical influence exerted by Parsons' conceptual and methodological position upon innumerable adherents of the structural functional approach.

Compared to The Structure of Social Action (1937), the major work of Parsons' first phase in the intellectual career when he formulated various elements of a much-publicized voluntaristic theory of action, the publication of The Social System in 1951 marks the beginning of the second phase, probably and significantly the last one, where Parsons shifted his focus to the analysis of large scale social systems and detailed elaboration and further sophistication of the categories of his action theory. Closely following its heels were his Toward a General Theory of Action (1951) and Working Papers in the Theory of Action (1953), both of which were
outputs of collaborative effort. An interesting point to be noted here is that the publication of Working Papers was welcomed by Lundberg (1956a), a rigorous follower of the positivist tradition of Dodd, as a new positive methodological development in sociology. However in all three very significant publications one can easily discover Parsons' effort to develop a general conceptual scheme in terms of a set of concepts and categories that would enable, while codifying the empirical data, sociology to benefit from a theoretical framework to be developed by other sociologists through careful but systematic use of Parsons and his other associates' endeavours to establish a sociological science. This is to say practically that, despite Parsons' diversified and wide ranging areas of interest, one can see without much effort certain persistent themes and problems in all his writings, including those not specifically mentioned. Mitchell, a rather sympathetic commentator on Parsons, affirms this:

Perhaps the most persistent and generally noted theme has been his lifetime dedication to theory and to the task of elaborating a "logically articulated conceptual scheme" .... which will allow social scientists, generally, a means of organizing their collective product and direct them into fruitful areas of research. This has been the explicit goal and strategy in each of his books (Mitchell, 1967: 4).

If this be so and is accepted, there remains little doubt as to Mills' propriety to choose specifically The Social System as the focal point of his critique. For instance, in the afore-mentioned book Parsons admittedly undertook an attempt
"to present a logically articulated conceptual scheme" (1964a: 536). In later years Parsons consistently pursued the theme, reiterating his position forcefully in 1959 when he said this: "As the sciences of behavior mature as sciences, they will not continue to be the province of a plurality of competing 'schools' of theoretical interpretation, but they will tend to converge on a logically integrated, but also highly differentiated, conceptual scheme" (quoted in Mitchell, 1967: 5). Related to Parsons' concern for a unified conceptual scheme, it is worthwhile to outline his methodological position, especially his views on the role of values in a science, which, I think, only paralleled abstracted empiricism in its high esteem for the method of physical sciences. In 1935 he stated his position clearly:

Like most Americans growing up in the social sciences since the War, my starting-point has been what may be broadly called the "positivistic" movement in those fields--the tendency to imitate the physical sciences and to make physical science the measuring-rod of all things .... The task of sociology, as of other social sciences, I consider to be strictly scientific --the attainment of systematic theoretical understanding of empirical fact .... I stand squarely on the platform of science (Parsons, 1935: 313-14, 316).

Later, in 1959, the year which witnessed the publication of Mills' The Sociological Imagination, Parsons formally acknowledges that his position is grounded particularly upon Weber's views on the methodology of the social sciences and the sociology of religion. He accepted the Weberian distinction between value-relevance (Wertbeziehung) and value-freedom
(Wertfreiheit). In his article, "An Approach to the Sociology of Knowledge," he admits, in regard to the Weberian postulate of value relevance, that empirical generalizations about society, however validated, are never completely independent of the value perspective of the social scientist (Parsons, 1970: 291). As to the other postulate of value freedom he interprets the Weberian position in another article, "Evaluation and Objectivity in Social Science" (1964), by saying that "it is not advocacy that the social scientist abstain from all value commitments .... The point is rather than in his role as a scientist a particular subvalue system must be paramount for the investigator, one in which conceptual clarity, consistency and generality on the one hand, and empirical accuracy and verifiability on the other, are the valued outputs of the process of investigation" (Parsons, 1968: 86). While the question as to why and under what circumstances Weber made the dichotomy between Wertbeziehung and Wertfreiheit will be answered elsewhere, for the time being it seems legitimate, as did Mills in regard to abstracted empiricists, to ask how far the Parsonian sociology preserves its conformity to the ethical injunction of Weber. Parsons proposes to distinguish between science and ideology on the analytical level. As to Wertbeziehung, his own version of sociology reflects what he himself calls "particular ideology," the ideological orientation which influences the selection of some problem in preference to others for greater emphasis and which thus neglects or plays down others. This
preference in selectivity, as he argues, "shades off into distortion" (Parsons, 1970: 294). Interesting though, Parsons seems to have never addressed himself to the "particular ideological" character of his own brand of sociology. Remindful of the Millsian tradition, Zeitlin makes this query. To quote him:

Has he confronted himself and asked whether and in what degree his "scientific" statements are characterized by "selectivity" and even "distortion"; whether, and in what measure, he has been yielding concessions to outside orientations and interests? For if he has not asked himself these questions, he has failed to abide by the norms of "science" as vocation (Zeitlin, 1973: 60).

In respect of the other canon of Weber's dichotomy, one can raise similar issues. Does his own scientific sociology contain the professed "conceptual clarity, consistency and generality" or "empirical accuracy and verifiability" as he suggested those as defining marks of the sociologist in the role of a scientist? If not, as is truly the case, the cult of dualism between fact and value, or knowledge and interest, in the Parsonian sociology has been transformed into a sacred doctrine of scientific objectivism as the integral core of structural functional approach. To put my own criticism in the words of a contemporary sociologist who bears much Millsian tradition: "Their objectivism is gained at the cost of reifying scientific knowledge and, consequently, mystifying its politically intended character and historical relationship to the technological needs of capitalist production" (Horton, 1971: 178). There remains little doubt
as to why Mills' selection of Parsons, whose methodological position provided a strong support to the abstracted empiricists' scientism, is very much justified. Apart from Parsons' theoretical, conceptual and methodological position that Mills criticized in his claim for an alternative sociology, he had in fact another equally important reason. Parsons' theoretical sociology, despite its many limitations, coincided with the theoretical enterprise of American sociology itself. "Few matched his classificatory diligence, but many purveyed his sense. 'Structural' (or 'normative') functionalism, as it came to be called, was in the 1950s and the early 1960s virtually coextensive with theory among American sociologists" (Hawthorn, 1976: 214). To be sure, there are variations in theoretical adaptations of structural functional approach among Parsons' adherents within the camp of establishment sociology. Despite this fact, the singularity of Parsons' prominence lies in over-all acceptance of his systemic framework by innumerable sociologists, no matter whether they are his associates, colleagues or students. For example, the list of his adherents is quite long; among them are Marion J. Levy, Kingsley Davis, Robert K. Merton, Neil J. Smelser, Charles Dremmier, Bert F. Hoselitz, S. N. Eisenstadt, Winston White, Robert Bellah, Clifford Geertz, Albert Cohen, David Aberle, Bernard Berber, Renee Fox, William Mitchell, Gabriel E. Almond, David E. Apter, Karl Deutsch, and many others within sociology, anthropology and
political science. It is clear that even if Parsons lacks the theoretical profundity of Weber, the revolutionary charisma of Marx, the lucidity of Freud or the causticity of Veblen, he became the focal point of many sociologists, both his proponents and opponents. Indubitably Parsons is one of the very few sociologists who have deeply affected theoretical and methodological developments of modern sociology. "If ever a social theory seemed to grow only from purely technical considerations internal to social theory, as if born of an immaculate conception, it is the work of Talcott Parsons" (Gouldner, 1970: 169). All this, therefore, indicates why Mills, as did Gouldner later, focussed on Parsons, considering him the best representative of the establishment sociology.

Functions of Terminology

Next, the most fundamental aspect of Parsons' sociology is his literary style, as Mills rightly pointed out. Parsons has been, in his own words, an "incurable theoreist." Naturally the logical style of Parsons has raised more questions, pointing ultimately to the ideological intent beneath sociologically stated issues. Fletcher, though generally accepting the main themes of Mills' *The Sociological Imagination*, observes that "terminology is the most evident, but surely the most trivial ground on which Parsons can be criticised" (1960: 170). Martindale suggests that "Parsons
wrote as he did by choice, that he developed a style as he adapted to his purpose as was that of Mills to other objectives" (1975: 73). These two explanations are too simple and do not reveal subterranean truths underlying the Parsonian sociology. The question is one of lack of substantive issues in Parsons' sociology and of whether conceptualizing problems is by itself worthwhile without necessary reference to any description and explanation of concrete social events and human action. If the purpose of the definition of the concepts is to focus argument upon fact, to transform argument over terms into disagreements about fact, and thus to open arguments to further inquiry, as Mills pointed out, then Parsons' sociology is far beyond this, despite its charms of pretentious language and sophisticated dressing up of the subject matter almost to a mysterious level. Most often it is either a theoretical forest and "a jungle of fine distinctions and intertwining classifications" (Devereux, 1961: 2), or a kind of sociological sport in which "methodology exercises its perverse influence by disguising itself as a theory" (Louch, 1966: 11). Piercing through the subtleties and obscurities of Parsons' language, Mills revealed in his unique way the vacuity and relative barrenness of grand sociology (SI: 25-33). But Mills was by no means alone to point out this. To cite an example of how an outrageous vocabulary can clothe 'the essential barrenness of the theory', let me quote Louch who focuses his argument on Parsons'
article entitled "General Theory in Sociology" and published in R. K. Merton and others' *Sociology Today*.

... when the structure of the larger system is undergoing a relatively continuous process of change in the direction of increasing differentiation, the mechanisms involved in this change will, under certain circumstances, operate to dichotomize the population of units receiving the primary "real" output of the focal system of reference and to produce an orderly alternation of relative predominance of the two nearly equal parts (Parsons, 1960a: 22).

Louch translates, so to say, and then comments:

That is: given social change in a democratic society parties in power will tend to swing from liberal to conservative and back again. I do not know why such simpler formulations will not do in place of the bewildering complexity, unless it is that the terminological display clouds the paucity of information (Louch, 1966: 14).

In other words, theory lacks explanatory power, makes description unnecessarily complex and is applied to cases which are far from enlightening. Illustrating Parsons' "nebulous verbosity" and his slippage into "the realm of pure fancy completely out of touch with reality," Andreski goes on to say, referring to his recent publication, *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives* (1966), that "despite the author's good intentions, what he says is sadly lacking in clarity. Indeed he can make the simplest truth appear unfathomably obscure" (1973: 60). Lack of substantive content is one of the basic shortcomings which reduce the grand theoretical sociology into what Mills calls "an arid
game of concepts." Much of what remains is sociological commonplace. "In fact, many of the ideas of grand theorists, when translated, are more or less standard ones available in many text books" (SI: 29).

Black points to the same direction when he opines that "on the whole, it seems to me, the component concepts of Parsons' scheme are laymen's concepts in the thin disguise of a technical-sounding terminology" (1961: 279). The grandiose vocabulary, built upon endless elaborations of finer distinctions, innumerable empirical generalizations and other conceptual and theoretical exercises, speaks of emptiness, rather than organizing a systematic effort to describe and explain intelligibly human conduct and social issues. In a very profound sense, grand theoretical sociology is locked within itself. As Mills points out:

The basic cause of grand theory is the initial choice of a level of thinking so general that its practitioners cannot logically get down to observation. They never, as grand theorists, get down from the higher generalities to problems in their historical and structural contexts. This absence of a firm sense of genuine problems, in turn, makes for the unreality so noticeable in their pages (SI: 33).

Relative Insignificance of Grand Sociology: Issues of Politics

Legitimation, Order, Change and Conflict

While the role of terminology in Parsons' sociology is not so simple as to be explained away as a matter of
personal style or endeavor at theoretical abstraction to picture reality, its more serious limitation is due to his persistent insensitivity and apathy to concrete social and political issues. For him sociological theory is "that aspect of the theory of social systems which is concerned with the phenomena of the institutionalization of patterns of value-orientation in the social system, with the conditions of that institutionalization, and of changes in the patterns, with conditions of conformity with and deviance from a set of such patterns and with motivational processes in so far as they are involved in all of these" (Parsons, 1964a: 552). It is now quite well known that the Parsonian theoretical system is a consensual sociology that has become self-defeating in its extraordinary emphasis over the subjective and normative elements. His sociology raises debates and resolves issues within the broad-based framework of order, cooperation, consensus and agreement. Norms are adhered not because of sanctions but for reasons of 'moral obligation' that manifests 'the existence of a common system of ultimate-value attitudes'. Parsons' overemphasis on the problem of order (1964a: 36-37) has led Mills, as also many others including Lockwood and Gouldner, to observe: "The idea of the normative order that is set forth, and the way it is handled by grand theorists, leads us to assume that virtually all power is legitimated" (SI: 42). Stated otherwise, grand sociology provides legitimation to any social order in which harmony of interests is the natural feature of the society.
Similar to his overemphasis on the normative order is Parsons' assertion that the social equilibrium, the continuity and maintenance of social patterns, normative expectations or value systems, is not problematic. He assumes that "the maintenance of the complementarity of role-expectations, once established, is not problematical, in other words that the 'tendency' to maintain the interaction process is the first law of social process" (Parsons, 1964a: 204).

The position that social continuity, normative expectations or value systems do not require explanation is hardly tenable. They do not suddenly appear from vacuum. But, as is contended here, the dominant normative system, requiring internalization of values and norms for a stable order, may very well serve the interests of the powerful and the privileged, such as, for example, those of big corporate owners of America's mass society. Alternatively said, which is predominant cannot be decided "a priori" in accordance with certain principles of sociology. Mills elaborates: "We might well imagine a 'pure type' of society, a perfectly disciplined social structure, in which the dominated men, for a variety of reasons, cannot quit their prescribed roles, but nevertheless share none of the dominator's values, and thus in no way believe in the legitimacy of the order" (SI: 39). Parsons isolates values from social classes, interests and the state, inviting serious deficiencies which weaken the reliability of Parsons' sociology.
To maintain and transmit a value system, human beings are punched, bullied, sent to jail, thrown into concentration camps, cajoled, bribed, made into heroes, encouraged to read newspapers, stood up against a wall and shot, and sometimes even taught sociology. To speak of cultural inertia is to overlook the concrete interests and privileges that are served by indoctrination, education, and the entire complicated process of transmitting culture from one generation to the next (Moore, Jr., 1968: 486).

It is then quite understandable why Mills' reaction to Parsons' sociology is so much negative. Parsons' selective emphasis on the normative elements only matches his underemphasis of the conflictual elements within the society. Those elements making for instability and conflict tend to be ignored "as a general determinant of the dynamics of social systems" (Lockwood, 1956: 136). To be sure, Parsons of course refers to conflictual elements within the normative social system and does in detail deal with "sources of conflict, aggression, deviance, and with processes at both the psychological and social-systems levels for the handling of conflict, deviance, and general re-equilibriating tendencies" (Mitchell, 1967: 39). Going a step further, Merton contends that functionalism, far from being a conservative ideology, can very well be radical and critical when addressed to the malfunctioning of specific institutions that satisfy societal needs of all. In other words, functionalism may involve "no intrinsic ideological commitment" (Merton, 1957: 39). But as a matter of fact in their respective functional sociologies of Parsons, Merton and Davis, even when conflictual elements
are raised and problems of social change posed, the considera-
tion only proceeds along the Durkheimian "dysfunctional"
road. Deviance, tension or strains, though dysfunctional,
tend to become either institutionalized or resolved in such
a manner as to promote integration which is taken for granted
as the dominant equilibrating tendency inherent in the society.
This is what is called cybernetic functionalism wherein soci-
ety is conceived to be a self-regulating and equilibrating

For instance, in his article "Social Classes and
Class Conflict in the Light of Recent Sociological Theory"
(1949), Parsons thinks that "class conflict is endemic in
our modern industrial type of society" and that "class con-
flict certainly exists in the United States." But he does
not focus on the bases, structural and objective, of class
conflict and regards conflict as a failure of social control
and normative breakdown. It is basically a Durkheimian ap-
proach, confusing anomie with conflict. No wonder for him,
there is no "sharp and fundamental sociological distinction
between capitalist and all noncapitalist industrial type of
society," and capitalist and socialist industrialism can be
seen "as variants of a single fundamental type, not as dras-
tically distinct stages in a single process of dialectical
evolution" (Parsons, 1966: 333). Such a view not only under-
writes most basic differences between socialism and capital-
ism but is also either too conservative or too Messianic.
Practically it ignores "the experiential reality of industrial society. It fails to touch upon an entire vast realm of the industrial experience, horror. It fails to comprehend either the collective horror or the personal horrors which certain features of industrial society almost necessarily involve" (Foss, 1963: 125-26).

Let me look at the same facet of Parsons' consensual sociology. In his "Democracy and Social Structure in Pre-Nazi Germany" (1942), Parsons refers to the development of Germany under the aegis of "big business" and to many other concepts such as "propertyless industrial class," "a high concentration of executive authority and control of industrial property," the role of "feudal-militaristic" elements in the structure of the German state, "economic distinction," "class struggle," giving an idea that he was pursuing a Marxian analysis. Far from it; he rather employs Durkheim's anomie and Weber's rationalization as explanatory categories in tracing the development of German National Socialism. In the period of "rapid technological change, industrialization, urbanization, migration of population, occupational mobility, cultural, political and religious change" in Pre-Nazi Germany, the immediate result was, says Parsons like a loyal Durkheimian, "the widespread insecurity" involving "the well known consequences of anxiety, a good deal of free-floating aggression, a tendency to unstable emotionalism and susceptibility to emotionalized propaganda appeals and mobilization of affect
around various kinds of symbols" (1966: 117). With this Durkheimian approach to "the elements of malintegration, tension and strain in the social structure" of Germany, Parsons finds out through what Weber called the process of rationalization how Germany's cultural tradition was affected "in the form of secularization of religious values, emancipation from traditional patterns of morality .... and the general tendency of rational criticism to undermine traditional and conservative system of symbols" (1966: 118). As a result of both, the older conservative patterns were shaken in such a way that they particularly "in defining the role of the youth, of sex relationships, and of women could not serve as an adequate basis of institutional integration" (1966: 122). From this vantage point the critically important aspect of the National Socialist movement for Parsons lies "in the fact that it constitutes a mobilization of the extremely deep-seated romantic tendencies of German society in the service violently aggressive political movements, incorporating a 'fundamentalist' revolt against the whole tendency of rationalization in the Western world, and at the same time against its deepest institutionalized foundations" (1966: 123).

Similar analysis can be found also in his article on "Sociological Aspects of Fascist Movements" (Parsons, 1966: 124-41). As is therefore evident in the Parsonian analysis, anomie consequences of disorganizing processes of industrialism and urbanism, and negative impact of rationalization were
obstacles to the development of liberal democratic patterns and values within German capitalism. And, as Parsons makes clear, it had nothing to do with what Neumann called "totalitarian monopolistic capitalism." Stated otherwise, the differences between Parsons and Mills as to their respective political orientations came to the fore when the latter reviewed in 1942, the year which saw the appearance of Parsons' essays, Neumann's *Behemoth*, and regarded it "at once a definitive analysis of the German Reich and a basic contribution to the social sciences" (PPP: 170). The deficiencies in the Parsonian analysis are now clear. Parsons never gives attention to the factual support rendered by bankers and industrialists who were largely responsible for the accession of the Nazis to power. The monopoly form of German capitalism required the stabilizing support of a total political power, for the corporations could not flourish in capitalism without guarantees and subsidies from the state, the structure of legitimate coercion.

Parsons also ignores the fact that the working class was regimented and fragmented, that the trade unions were smashed and, finally, that the social democratic and communist parties were suppressed. Power was concentrated in four elite constituents, the Nazi party, the State bureaucracy, the armed forces and particularly the monopoly capitalists. The combination of these forces made the struggle against capitalism impossible. The espousal of these views made, among others, Mills not only a radical but also aware of ominous
future awaiting individuals in capitalist democracy.

The analysis of Behemoth casts light upon capitalism in democracies .... (I)f you read his book thoroughly, you see the harsh outlines of possible futures close around you .... (I)t sets our attitude toward given elements in other countries, sights the acts of our allegiance, places limits upon our political aspirations: helps to locate the enemy all over the world .... Behemoth is everywhere united (PPP: 177-78).

This explains, as Mills concluded, "Why one Behemoth is worth, to social science, twenty Social Systems" (SI: 47).

The deliberate emphasis on a normative social order in the grand theoretical sociology, as also in its different structural functional variants, has resulted in a double effect; on the one hand, it not only minimizes the role of conflict or antagonisms within society but also, on the other, makes any large scale structural change of the corporate capitalist society impossible. Take for instance, Parsons' views on social change and Bolshevism in The Social System. He stresses the need for adaptive social structures in terms of functional requirements of the social system, the re-emergence of conformity needs as associated with the old society, the mitigation of radicality of revolutionary process (Parsons, 1964a: 527). All revolutionary movements, because of their motivational ambivalence due to a fusion of "utopian" and "realistic" elements, have to come to terms with reality once they are all accomplished--in other words, the process of reequilibration of the society. Possibilities of large scale structural changes are therefore ruled out by
its own internal constraints such as supposed ideological and utopian limits of revolutionary movements, inevitable equilibrating tendencies toward adaptive structures and restoration of old cultural values, personality need dispositions, vested interests, complexity of social structures, tendentious socialization toward conformity, strains of industrialization that shift emphasis from the universalistic-ascriptive to the universalistic-achievement pattern, etc.

By employing what he calls universalistic-achievement pattern, he not only discusses American society but also goes on to say that industrialization would transform the USSR in the direction of the USA, involving changes towards "political democracy" (Parsons, 1964b: 397).

In other words, we might expect a new variant of political democracy out of a marriage between industrialization and Soviet socialism. This is to say, as does Swingehood, that "civilization has run to its close in American pluralistic democracy and that only modifications and 'improvements' can be expected in the pattern of social inequality during the coming centuries. Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia are merely episodes on the way to normal mode of a well-integrated and stable industrial capitalism" (1975: 211). The truth of the matter is that in the Parsonian sociology the emphasis has been carried to an utopistic level.

By no feat of the imagination, not even by the residual category of "dysfunction," can the integrated and equilibrated social system be made to produce serious and patterned conflicts in its structure .... The system theory of
society comes, by implication, dangerously close to the conspiracy-theory of history—which is not only the end of all sociology but also rather silly (Dahrendorf, 1958: 120-21).

Parsons' one-sided selective emphasis on and preference to normative elements, which as a matter of fact minimize structural causes of conflict, are linked to his relative insensitivity to political issues and, so to say, conservatism of open complacency. Mills rightly points out that in terms of systems sociology "the idea of conflict cannot effectively be formulated. Structural antagonisms, large-scale revolts, revolutions--they cannot be imagined .... Not only does the 'collective behavior' of terrorized masses and excited mobs, crowds and movements--with which our era is so filled--find no place in the normatively created social structures of grand theorists. But any systematic ideas of how history itself occurs, of its mechanics and processes, are unavailable to grand theory, and accordingly, Parsons believes, unavailable to social science" (SI: 42-43).6 If the thrust of sociological analysis is on normative order and socialization, regardless of the fact that it legitimates in effect the exploitative social structure of corporate capitalism, it remains to imagine how the understanding of American society in terms of universalistic-achievement pattern can be realistic "without mentioning the changes which its capitalistic institutions .... are undergoing" (Lockwood, 1956: 138). Mills poses the same questions as Lockwood did earlier:
It is, for example, difficult to imagine a more futile endeavor than analyzing American society in terms of 'the value-pattern' of 'universalistic-achievement' with no mention of the changing nature, meaning and forms of success characteristic of modern capitalism, or of the changing structure of capitalism itself; or, analyzing United States stratification in terms of 'the dominant value system' without taking into account the known statistics of life-chances based on levels of property and income (SI: 43).

Not that Parsons is unaware of social change. He does deal with them, their origins, their directions, scope and rates; however, not to highlight the problematic facets of capitalism but eventually to return, by means of his peripheral analysis, to "liberal democracy" within the doctrinaire sovereignty of corporate capitalism. Whatever the optimism cherished by the sociologists of structural functionalism about the 'new possibilities for accounting for change and conflict, not to mention stability and order'--through the developments in the theories of resources, generalized media interchange, the logic of value adding processes, cybernetic control or general action level analysis--, even the adherents of Parsons admit of his failure. Loubser, a former student claiming to stand in particularistic relationship to Parsons, admits that "the critics have a point to the extent that Parsons in spite of his astounding capacity for sustained abstract thinking, has slipped into misplaced concreteness himself, hence seemingly providing empirical conceptions of concrete reality as always relatively integrated and stable" (1976: 17). To be sure, it is not a mere slippage since
Parsons' theoretical sociology is manifestly on the side of liberal optimism for a consensual social order, considering conflicts only anomic dislocations of ephemeral duration. This apparent political bias is at the bottom of his persistent avoidance of stark realities of capitalist society, such as the scale of corporate concentration, massive alienation, potential class conflict, consequences of elite constellation, media manipulation of mass consciousness, problems of legitimation, decline of democracy, growth of weapons culture at home or underdevelopment and imperialism abroad, and so on. A glaring example of his analysis of power. He has less to say on the distribution of power, struggle for it or costs of authority. Economic and political aspects of power, which constitute the factual social order, remain largely unattended and are delivered "for safekeeping to the economist and political scientist" (Lockwood, 1956: 141). The same criticism holds good for Parsons' recent writings (cf. 1968: 223-63, 297-354; 1965: 199-225). As one contemporary sociologist points out:

The parallels which Parson is determined to pursue between the polity and the economy serve, in fact, to separate political and economic processes from one another. That economic and other "material" factors themselves play a key part in power deflation is ignored because Parsons is above all concerned to show how the polity and economy are "analytically" similar, not how they intertwine. Parsons' many discussions of the relationships between sociology and economics, including his and Smelser's Economy and Society, are all stated in terms of highly formal ..., categories, and rarely suggest any substantive generalizations linking the two (Giddens, 1968: 266).
Parsons, Mills and the Role of History

Another serious flaw in Parsons' grand theoretical sociology is its conspicuous disinterestedness for historical concerns. Whereas in Mills "history is the shank of social study", in Parsons' it is relegated to comparative insignificance. The historical dimension appears to impose barriers to the development of a science of sociology. In the process of sociology's emergence into 'the status of a mature science', Parsons contended in 1945, historical sociologies of Tylor, Morgan, Marx or Veblen scarcely have any significant place since their "ill advised" attempts have tried "to attain, at one stroke, a goal which can only be approached gradually by building the necessary factual foundations and analytical tools" (Parsons, 1966: 220). In 1950 he reiterated his stand: "If the prospects of sociological theory are good, so are, I am convinced, those of sociology as a science, but only if the scientifically fundamental work is done" (Parsons, 1966: 368).

Incidentally, a striking parallel can be found in Karl Popper's two books, The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945) and The Poverty of Historicism (1957), wherein he argues over the impossibility of historical prediction since the progress of history is conditionally dependent upon the progress of knowledge. If Parsons' deliberate attempt to divorce sociology from historical concerns marks a healthy
protest against unfounded theorizing, fruitless abstraction or mere historicism, it in turn invites immediate criticism by its naive avowal of abstract conceptualization at empirical levels in almost total seclusion of historical data. Lynd, whose impact on Mills remains evident, argued in 1939 that the place of historical analysis in social science is "basic and beyond question." To the extent "that it reveals man confronted by typical human dilemmas and finding serviceable paths through them, we may cautiously canvass past precedents as possible dress rehearsals for coping with the fumbling present; and, in so far as it represents irreparably spilled milk, we may learn from it how to avoid past errors" (Lynd, 1964: 129-30). Historical knowledge is neither luxury nor amusement of intellect at leisure time. History adds to widen the range of intellectual grasp over reason itself; to understand society is to understand history too because social structures exist only as historical structures.

"The main structural features of what society can be like in the next generation are already given by trends at work now. Humanity's freedom to maneuver lies within the framework created by its history" (Moore, Jr., 1958: 159). A system sociology can of course establish certain uniformities and recurrences regarding human behavior and action but there is no guarantee that "the laws it establishes will hold good beyond the historical period from which facts are drawn" (Collingwood, 1969: 17-18).

In sharp contrast to Parsons, Mills conceives socio-
logy and its significant problems within an awareness of historical social structures. For him, the task of the sociological imagination, lying at the very bottom of any sociological enterprise, is "to understand the larger historical scene in terms of its meaning for the inner life and the external career of a variety of individuals" (SI: 5). To Mills both man and society appear in their historical significance. On the one hand, says Mills, "we cannot adequately understand 'man' as an isolated biological creature, as a bundle of reflexes or a set of instincts, as an 'intelligible field' or a system in and of itself. Whatever else he may be, man is a social and an historical actor who must be understood, if at all, in close and intricate interplay with social and historical structures" (SI: 158). Elsewhere, "Man is a unique animal species in that he is also an historical development" (CSS: 480). On the other hand, he also conveys that "the image of any society is an historically specific image" (SI: 149). By the principle of historical specificity Mills means that "the problems we face are set by conflicting elements in a specifically capitalist social structure" (CSS: 384). Having conceived of man as an historical actor he espouses, in continuation of the classic tradition of sociology, the view that "all sociology worthy of the name is 'historical sociology'" (SI: 146). Rightly he asserts that no social science including sociology can transcend history. Social sciences themselves have originated in the processes
of transition of human societies from one historical stage to
another, from the rural communities in feudal era to urban
industrial societies in modern times. Many of the dominant
conceptions of modern sociology—Maine's status and contract,
Tonnies' community and society, Weber's status, class and
rationalization, Spencer's military and industrial societies,
Pareto's circulation of elites, Cooley's primary and second-
ary groups, Durkheim's mechanical and organic solidarity etc.
—are inextricably bound up with different phases of historic-
al transition of society. These ideas still orient the prac-
titioners of sociology to multifarious ways of looking at
society and its realities. As a matter of fact the classic
tradition is imbued with, says Mills, "a master view of the
structure of society in all its realms, the mechanics of
history in all their ramifications, and the roles of individ-
uals in a great variety of their psychological nuances" (IM: 3).

Sociology, when conceived within its historical di-
dimensions, becomes a humanistic endeavor. The consciousness,
embedded in the knowledge of the past societies, of ironic
and tragic aspects of history has a sobering impact upon
anybody's enthusiasm for abstract theorizing. The dialogue be-
tween sociology and history is needed for a variety of
reasons. First, the intercourse is needed for a knowledge
of the historical varieties of human society. "We need the
variety provided by history in order even to ask sociological
questions properly, much less to answer them" (SI: 146-47).
Second, whereas "a-historical studies usually tend to be
static or very short-term studies of limited milieux" (SI: 149), a historical knowledge of sociological concerns broaden the range of consciousness and interest of the sociologist. Third, knowledge of the historical dimensions of sociological concerns enable the sociologist to undertake comparative studies by means of which "we can become aware of the absence of certain historical phases from a society, which is often quite essential to understanding its contemporary shape" (SI: 157). Lastly, the knowledge of historical materials is also required to discern long run trends of society, involved in answering questions of "from what" and "to what". However it must be noted, as Mills warns, that the sociologist requires historical orientation in order to "study history rather than to retreat into it" (SI: 153). One should study history in order to get rid of it; otherwise historical explanations, being indirectly relevant, may well degenerate into conservative ideologies or, at best, sociological trivialities. In brief, Mills' sociological perspective is what follows in his own words:

The problems of our time—which now include the problem of man's very nature—cannot be stated adequately without consistent practice of the view that history is the shank of social study, and the recognition of the need to develop a further psychology of man that is sociologically grounded and historically relevant. Without use of history and without an historical sense of psychological matters, the social scientist cannot adequately state the kinds of problems that ought now to be the orienting points of his studies (SI: 143).

A contemporary parallel to Mills' perspective can be found
in Berger's invitation to a humanistic sociology:

While most sociologists, by temperament perhaps or by professional specialization, will be concerned mainly with contemporary events, disregard of the historical dimension is an offense not only against the classic Western ideal of the civilized man but against sociological reasoning itself—namely, that part of it that deals with the central phenomenon of predefinition. A humanistic understanding of sociology leads to an almost symbiotic relationship with history, if not to a self-conception of sociology as being itself a historical discipline (Berger, 1963: 168-69).

An Assessment: The Roots of Ideology in Parsons and his Sociology

Having surveyed the main theoretical divergences of their ideas, it remains to see how Parsons' sociology is a sociology of legitimation of, and status quo for, the corporate capitalist society of America. Stated otherwise, it remains to point out in Mills' terms how the system sociology serves the ideological needs of the corporate mass society. The leading question is: "Is grand theory merely a confused verbiage or is there, after all, also something there" (SI: 27)? His own answer is quite suggestive, providing the basis of radical criticism of structural functional sociologies. Mills' answer is:

Something is there, buried deep to be sure,
But still something is being said (SI: 27).

Although he modestly claims not to "judge the value of Parsons' work as a whole," Mills nevertheless points, among other things already indicated, to the legitimation
functions of the systemic categories of the Parsonian sociology. The Parsonian variety seeks basically to convert all institutional structures including their problems of change and order into what Mills calls "moral sphere" or, more specifically, "symbol sphere." Parsons' value orientations and normative structures are mainly "master" symbols of legitimation of a specific type of social order, namely, the corporate liberal society of America. "Such symbols, however, do not form some autonomous realm within a society; their social relevance lies in their use to justify or to oppose the arrangement of power and the positions within this arrangement of the powerful. Their psychological relevance lies in the fact that they become the basis for adherence to the structure of power or for opposing it" (SI: 37). If this is the truth, as Mills claims, Parsons' sociology has nonetheless important function of providing political and ideological support in order to legitimate stable forms of domination. To this extent his is a conservative sociology. It is, in Dahrendorf's phrase, "the conservatism of complacency". Considered yet from another point of view,

The great challenge of sociology and of social science is not the concern with social equilibrium or stability commonly expressed with a repressive conservatism by the entrenched. The challenge is not to provide intellectual instruments and perspectives to entrepreneurs and administrators in the hope that they will approximate the ideal of the philosopher-king or even the philosopher-actionist (Lee, 1973: 6).

That is to say, as does Lee, "man is not a tool; society is not a system." To dig up conservative roots of Parsons'
sociology is to find that these are deep lying. His conservative antecedents are linked to social disorganization and consequent demoralization caused by the Great Depression, and to the general crisis facing the middle class dominated societies. 8

The economic crisis born of the Depression had the shattering impact on the economy which failed, as a result, to hold together American society of the middle classes. For Parsons it was predictive of even greater social catastrophe. In search of a way out of this disorganization and demoralization he looked to individual moral commitment than to economic sources that would involve consideration of economic bases of the society or changes in the distribution of power and income. Thus Parsons' voluntaristic sociology, the work of the first phase of his career, postulated that commitment to moral values would ensure stability and promote social integration despite widespread deprivation for economic reasons. This was indeed the beginning of his conservative response to the structural problems of society. When the Depression gradually receded, war came to an end, stability was restored, and prosperity made its appearance slowly, American society was no longer in need of an exclusive focus or emphasis upon commitment to moral values as cementing forces of a harmonious society. Having been assured of relative stability of the society and "welfare state" developments, Parsons shifted his emphasis, in the second phase, to a conception of society
as a social system. He now elaborates "the complex variety of specific mechanisms that contribute directly to the internal stability of a society, which goes well beyond the mere affirmation of the importance of shared values as a source of societal stability" (Gouldner, 1970: 143). In the postwar period he replaces the voluntaristic individual commitment by a conception of "how the social system as such maintains its own coherence, fits individuals into its mechanisms and institutions, arranges and socializes them to provide what the system requires" (Gouldner, 1970: 143). This is indeed quite well in accord with the welfare state's need to assure its existence through an emphasis upon "the oversocialized conception of man" (cf. Wrong, 1961). Needless to mention, the so-called evolving welfare state is in fact a limited conception within the social structure of corporate capitalism. Any sociology which is consistent with the basic assumptions and fundamental requirements of welfare state is necessarily a corporate sociology, assuring the system equilibrium of the corporate social structure. This is why Szymanski states, following Mills, that the main function of Parsons' sociology is to provide a conservative definition of the society in order to legitimate its existing institutional structures of domination. "The function of legitimation is the production of a sophisticated definition of social reality that explains and justifies the existing social order and its dominant interests--it ex-
plains how well a society functions, how well the ongoing institutions are necessary, and how good the whole system is" (Szymanski, 1970:3). In the words of another radical theorist:

*Even though the functionalists may well be right that there are a set of "needs" that each society has to meet to get it on, they cannot "scientifically" demonstrate that American corporate capitalism is the necessary or inevitable or most rational way of meeting those "needs." As a matter of fact, the irrationality, inequality, and inefficiency of American capitalism in meeting the "functional requisite" of its population is support for the "stupidity of the body" corrective to establishment functionalism (Sternberg, 1977: 115).*

Tracing back again to its origins, Parsons' conservatism is also rooted in such factors as shook the confidence of and created anxieties in the middle class men of America. On the one hand, there was the impact of World War II which undermined the confidence of the middle class in any notion of uninterrupted and continuous progress; prior to this, the Bolshevik Revolution heightened the psychological anxiety in the Euro-American middle classes; the rise of fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany further aggravated bourgeois search for social peace in a stable political order; and, finally, the global economic crisis of the 1930s created, among others, acute status anxieties and economic insecurities for the middle class. Here too, Parsons' response was conservative because he sought remedy only in a stable political order whose economic foundations remained nonetheless as weak as ever. The growth of welfare state only strengthened his conservatism. On the other hand,
the rising popularity of the Marxist studies necessitated a thinking of possible theoretical and/or practical alternatives to the claim of Marxism as an adequate social theory (cf. Gouldner, 1970: 188). Parsons' grand scheme, reflected in the voluntaristic interpretation, served to expel, at least for some time to come, Marxism from the purview of sociological analysis.

From another point of view, that of his intellectual orientations, Parsons was more amenable to a number of conservative influences. Many of his sociological heroes are either conservatives or old liberals, or both. Marshall was a neo-classical economist and liberal; Pareto a conservative Italian economist and sociologist with old liberal tradition; Weber a German nationalist and sociologist with old liberal tradition; Durkheim a French liberal, nationalist and admittedly conservative; Hobbes an English conservative political thinker famous for absolutist theory of sovereignty and also political order. In this context it is of interest to note that "Parsons has never suggested that if he were to rewrite The Structure of Social Action Marx's name would be added, although he has expressly suggested that Freud would be added" (Mitchell, 1967: 177).

What is, therefore, the dominant political orientation to which Parsons and his sociology remain firmly tied? It is not at all difficult to find that beneath his conservatism, which only rivals that of Edmund Burke, there lies his political and moral commitment to liberalism. It is "the
ideology of John Locke and John Stuart Mill, the ideology
of political liberty and a free society" (Hacker, 1961: 291).
In terms of what Parsons has omitted from the scope of his
work, it is highly illuminating to note that he speaks less
for the workers, the middle classes or the elites than for
the aristocracy of leadership. Masses are politically un-
dependable though he never explains why some are prodemocratic
than others. Since he is more interested in leaders not in
the masses of workers, no matter whether they are of white-
or blue-collar variety, he has much less to say of the masses,
of the structural transformations toward a mass society, of
cheap materialism or of the lowering of mass public tastes.
Whereas Mills' target was elites of politics, business and
military, Parsons' suggestion is for an elite aristocracy.
In his article, "Social Strains in America" (1955), he wrote:

Under American conditions, a politically leading stratum must be made up of a combination of
business and nonbusiness elements. The role of
the economy in American society and of the
business element in it is such that political
leadership without prominent business participa-
tion is doomed to ineffectiveness and to the
perpetuation of dangerous internal conflict.
It is not possible to lead the American people
against the leaders of the business world. But
at the same time, so varied now are the nation-
al elements which make a legitimate claim to
be represented, the business element cannot
monopolize or dominate political leadership and
responsibility. Broadly, I think, a political
elite in the two main aspects of "politicians"
whose specialities consist in the management of
public opinion, and of "administrators" in both
civil and military services must be greatly
strengthened (Parsons, 1965: 247).

This being "the realistic need" of time, Parsons argues,
in his search for a way out of strains during McCarthyism, for a close alliance between "a specially political elite" and other "cultural elements", notably those in the Universities and Churches. Elsewhere, he seems to think that the institutionalized values and norms of the society motivate at least certain upper groups and intellectuals to promote the interests of the social system as a whole (cf. Parsons, 1960b: 120). Given the theoretical thrusts and political orientations of both Parsons and Mills, one can only guess how there could be a reconciliation between the two (cf. Fallding, 1961).

At least one third of Parsons' work are on political issues which cover a wide range of areas and topics. But "even when he embarks upon the study of an important political question, as he has done increasingly in the last few years, apparently in response to external pressures, his natural inclination is simply to restate, where possible according to his conceptual scheme, some conventional and generally accepted judgements upon the subject" (Bottomore, 1975: 35). However, it must also be noted that structural functional sociology also confronted forces and factors all of which converged in the 1950s toward a paradigmatic consolidation for the legitimation of the status quo. The smooth transition from a war time economy to the material reconstruction of Europe, the retooling demanded by the electronic age and reinforced by the demands of Korean war, the resistance of the East Europeans to the militant Soviet
marxism, the collapse of McCarthyism, the open-ended property, and the homilies of family, education, and Eisenhower—all these united "to underwrite an era of unparalleled conformity and commitment to the status quo (Friedrichs, 1970: 17). Put in political terms, consensual sociology, which has its locale in Parsons' grand theoretical construction, has become in effect "a metaphysical representation of the dominant ideological matrix. It rests on a principle of 'general interests' that every member of society is supposed to imbibe if he wishes to avoid the onus of being a deviant or an unconnected isolate" (Horowitz, 1968: 7). This only impels any one seriously concerned with the state of sociology in corporate capitalism to think that thanks are due to Mills for his prophetic words he said in 1959:

It must be evident that the particular view of society which it is possible to dig out of Parsons' texts is of rather direct ideological use; traditionally, such views have of course been associated with conservative styles of thinking. Grand theorists have not often descended into the political arena; certainly they have not often taken their problems to lie within the political contexts of modern society. But that of course does not exempt their work from ideological meaning .... The ideological meaning of grand theory tends strongly to legitimate stable forms of domination. Yet only if there should arise a much greater need for elaborate legitimations among conservative groups would grand theory have a chance to become politically relevant (SI: 48-49, footnote).9

To call Parsons an ideologist of conservatism or of conservative liberalism is therefore not a stretch of imagination. Although Mills seems to be entirely justified,
his criticism is not enough since it, adds Andreski, "does not do justice to the insidiousness of a doctrine capable of carrying its adherents far beyond ordinary and honest conservatism, which entails a loyalty to some definite order, accompanied by a deprecation of systems or theories opposed to it." The structural functionalism is what he calls "promiscuous crypto-conservatism." There is much to believe, in continuity with Mills, in what Andreski says of this ideological variant of sociological conservatism:

The ideology of structural-functionalism, in contrast, bestows its blessing on every system which exists, so long as it exists; which means that it throws its weight on the side of the powers that be, whoever, wherever and whenever they might be (Andreski, 1973: 146).
Notes


2. See also McKinney (1954).

3. See chapter 3, especially the section on "Values and Objectivity".

4. It seems difficult for me to see how Parsons' literary style, which is of course unique, could be separated from the way in which he makes theoretical abstractions. In any case, the effect often has been to mystify, rather than to clarify, issues which Parsons raises and deals with.

5. For this and various other criticisms, see Bottomore (1975: 29-43).

6. It must, however, be noted that Mills "did not consciously conceive of providing a category for conflict in the conventional theory" (Allen, 1975: 48).

7. For further analysis of Mills' views on the role of historical dimension in sociological studies, see chapter 3 wherein I discuss, in a separate section, his ideas of "Empiricism based on Social-Historical Structures."

8. I am indebted to Gouldner (1970: 141-48) for his excellent analysis of Parsons' conservative roots. I have more or less pursued my own analysis along Gouldner's suggestions. See also Strasser (1976: 122-48) for conservative sources of Parsons' sociology.

9. Italics added.
CHAPTER THREE
Sociological Methodology

Introduction

The model I have 'taken' is C. Wright Mills. I have rejected arse-licking empiricism and bland theory in favor of his 'new sociology'. Mills did create a new method, theory and subject area with each substantive work. I do not think that new sociology is, in fact, new. It seems to be a traditional sociology surfacing in yet another generation with its modernity coming as shock. Mills united his sorrow, anger, knowledge and dignity in his sociological imagination. He did his very best .... I have a wish for fellow researchers; make Mills your model (Fletcher, 1974: 197).

These inspiring words of Fletcher, a contemporary writer on sociological methodology, only remind us of Mills' frantic attempt at liberating sociology from the empiricists' narcissistic focus on scientistic methodology. In accomplishing this, as he did in The Sociological Imagination, Mills did not overstate his case; rather he was "putting a genuine point of view. His statement is vigorous but not sweeping, unreasonable or purely emotional" (Robb, 1968: 79). And in proposing a counter sociology within humanistic concerns and an alternative sociological methodology Mills, succeeding the generation of Karl Mannheim, Robert Lynd, Louis Wirth and Pitirim Sorokin, invited in turn fiercest opposition from those in the camp of establishment sociology. Among other things, the heat produced in retaliation, and reprisal as a result, of Mills' virulent but well timed and long overdue
attack against "abstracted empiricism" was responsible to a large extent, I think, for the over-all neglect of his basic contributions to the issues of sociology of knowledge, epistemology and methodology. For example, the publication of The Sociological Imagination, in which Mills furnished a forthright statement of his own "philosophical and metasociological position with respect to the goals and methods of the social sciences, especially that of sociology" (Winthrop, 1960: 300), was followed by a barrage of devastating criticism. Despite the fact that "there is no question of rejecting the sort of quantitative research Mills attacks", Selznick asserts that his criticism, couched in "polemical language" evoking the "thrill of revelation," has added intellectually "nothing new" (1959: 128). Feuer contends that "the 'vulgar empiricist', whom Mills and the Marxists scorn, has contributed much to the daily life-blood of science" (1959: 121). Most noteworthy criticism was however made by Shils, who nevertheless agrees with Mills' critique of ahistorical bias and bureaucratic tendencies in the current empirical research practices. The questions which Shils directed at Mills are the following:

Does he deny that sampling, standardization of interview questions, and the statistical processing of the data gathered by interviews can make our picture of at least certain sectors of reality more reliable—even if it cannot depict all of that reality which properly interests us? Does he really believe that nothing that has been learned or could be learned by systematic empirical research can ever enrich our self-awareness and give us a more differentiated picture of the society in which we live? And does he really believe—as he says he does—that the sins of systematic empirical research arise simply and exclusively from the self-denying
ordinances decreed by a false conception of science and by a desire to stay on the right side of the powerful (Shils, 1961: 607).

Despite these criticisms Mills never misses, I think, the mark or fails to indicate wherein lies the deficiencies of the dominant modes of empirical inquiry. Anyway, although his interests in "the improvement of social science methodology" and his "concomitant faith in the ability of the social sciences, through the experimental method, to approach reality" (Gillam, 1966: 62-63) are clearly indicative even of his early writings, it is not until recently, it should be noted, that there has been a revival of interest in the methodological issues raised by Mills. Many years have passed by since Mills expressed his doubts as to the absolutist claims of methodology based on the model and philosophy of natural sciences (cf. PPP: 453-468). But, looking at the current trends of empirical inquiry, the situation seems not to have changed much, and the mainstream currents of the discipline are "still the safe and shallow waters of academic empiricism" (Dreitzel, 1969: ix). The science-building weltanschauung of sociology is related to what Mills called "liberal practicality." In its older forms it emphasized "pathological" in sociology. For example, in 1943 Mills spoke out, in criticising the "typical perspectives and key concepts" underlying the ideology of several authors of social problems books, that "in seeing everything social as continuous process, changes in pace and revolutionary dislocations are missed or are taken as signs
of the 'pathological'" (PPP: 537). In its current form, "the new liberal practicality" has shifted its emphasis, turning from "pathological" aspects of society towards "fragmentary problems of scattered causation" as relevant to serving the purposes of the political, corporate and military orders of the society (SI: 92). As a whole, the focus on "social problems", not of course in Mills' sense but covering stray cat and dog topics like crime, delinquency, families and broken homes, alcoholism, suicide, ghetto conditions, race relations etc., continue to remain firmly linked to liberal practicality in the academic empiricism. Sternberg has shown that three leading sociological journals, American Journal of Sociology, American Sociological Review, and Social Problems, are "basically social problems journals" (1977: 99). Interestingly, most American sociologists scarcely think that social problems are "the result and reflection of the underlying problems of an increasingly vociferous American capitalist system." As he further makes it clear, "the general rule is that American sociologists, deep, deep in the hip pocket (ASS) of the ruling class in the United States, define 'social problems' as groups of people or conditions likely to pose a present or future threat to the current structure of vast social inequality in our country" (Sternberg, 1977: 109). Others find that what goes on within sociology or the social sciences as scientific study tanta-

mounts to "sorcery."² In view of such an image of the current
state of affairs in sociology and the social sciences, it is quite worthwhile to sum up Mills' contributions in regard to the important issues of sociological methodology, as he conceived of them. 3

Sociology of Knowledge and Epistemology

It is to be contended here that Mills' reaction to and critique of methodological positivism as contained in abstracted empiricism is less important than what he had to say on the substantive issues of the sociology of knowledge, epistemology and methodology. Before Mills subjected the epistemology based on the model of physical sciences to searching criticism, in America it was prominently Lynd (1964: 119-20), among others, who cautioned against the rising trend of empiricism. But, despite his reminder and admonition, American sociologists in the 1940s and 1950s remained enthralled by the method of physical sciences. The culmination of this empiricist tendency transforming science, in Mills' words, "less a creative ethos and a manner of orientation than a set of science machines," produced sharply an opposite reaction for him. In The Sociological Imagination Mills directly raised the question of the cultural and humanistic role of science. "The felt need to reappraise physical science reflects the need for a new common denominator. It is the human meaning and the social role of science, its military and commercial issue, its political significance that are undergoing confused reappraisal" (SI: 16). The truth of
the matter is, however, that Mills' own intellectual career as a sociologist began with his lasting interests in the substantive problems of sociological methodology—the sociology of knowledge, epistemology, and other methodological issues.

Since Mills' own position on these matters is largely connected with what emerged as Wissenssociologie in Germany in the 1920s it is necessary, in brief, to outline its intellectual postulates within the framework of which Mannheim, Mills' orienting point, conceived the sociology of knowledge. In his *Ideology and Utopia* Mannheim undertakes to show that the sociology of knowledge seeks to clarify how conditions of existence affects the historical genesis of ideas; to show how they constitute an essential part of the products of thought and how they are reflected in the content and form of thought. Since the approach to a problem, the levels of problem formulation, the stage of abstraction or the concreteness the researcher hopes to attain are all bound up with social existence, the sociology of knowledge seeks to obtain "systematic comprehension of the relationship between social existence and thought" (Mannheim, 1936: 309). In this relationship of epistemology to general social-intellectual situations of any given period 'truth' necessarily appears as social, and it undergoes a process of social conditioning over time, meaning thereby absence of any absolute truth or any static ideal of "eternal truth."
We see, therefore, not merely that the notion of knowledge in general is dependent upon the concretely prevailing form of knowledge and the modes of knowing expressed therein and accepted as ideal, but also that the concept of truth itself is dependent upon the already existing types of knowledge (Mannheim, 1936: 292).

The precondition to further goals of the sociology of knowledge consists in the acquisition of a detached perspective through which not only the outlines of the contrasting modes are discovered but through its validity as well is established. The procedure allowing this is "relational" in contrast to avoidance of what is called "relativism" by Mannheim. Relationalism lies "in the nature of certain assumptions that they cannot be formulated absolutely, but only in terms of the perspective of a given situation" (Mannheim, 1936: 283).

Mannheim's sociology of knowledge and epistemology has raised many questions which still await solution. Of them, the most serious, besides his ambiguities in the concept of relationalism, is the charge of relativism which his views invariably lead to. In order to overcome epistemological consequences, which characterized his earlier work, Mannheim was gradually led "to argue in terms of a pragmatic theory of adjustment to the specific requirements of particular historical situations and, later, to stress the position of the 'socially unattached intelligentsia'" (Phillips, 1974: 75). As will be seen, Mills' position reflects both the advantages and disadvantages of the Mannheimian position. This is however to indicate that Mannheim himself was not sure of any way out of relativism despite his gradual re-
liance on pragmatism and activism. He himself said: "Only a mode of thought, only a philosophy which is able to give a concrete answer to the question, 'What shall we do?' can put forward the claim to have overcome relativism" (Mannheim, 1959: 128-29). Despite all criticism that can be legitimately raised to assail Mannheim's position, it goes to his credit for indicating that knowledge has a social basis; in addition he has shown that, as Kecskemetic has said, "genuine knowledge of historical and social phenomena" (1959: 1) is possible. It now remains to see how profoundly Mills was influenced by Mannheim although the former tried to effect a communion between the latter's sociology of knowledge and epistemology with the pragmatism of Peirce and Dewey, and with the symbolic interactionism of Mead.

Combining the views of both Mannheim and Mead, Mills asserts that the sociology of knowledge is moving towards "a theory of mind and knowledge which takes as its data not an individual's performances or tests, but the entirety of intellectual history" (PPP: 470).

Drawing upon the theories and findings of all social science, sociology of knowledge is an attempted explanation of the phenomena of intellectual history. In its explanation of these materials it appeals to the data of social history. And in order to trace the mechanisms connective of mentality and society, the sociology of knowledge must be informed by a "psychology" that is socially, ethnologically, and historically relevant (PPP: 471).

In his first full-length article concerning the sociology of knowledge, "Language, Logic and Culture", Mills confronts "the relevant sociological materials, particularly as they
bear on the nature of mind and knowledge" (PPP: 423). Accordingly, he presents "certain coordinates for a sociological approach to reflection and knowledge, viewing conjointly sociality and mind, language and social habit, the noetic and the cultural" (PPP: 437). Broadly speaking, Mills sets himself to the task of constructing a theory of mind that conceives "social factors as intrinsic to mentality," of developing a concept of mind that incorporates "social processes as intrinsic to mental operations" and of developing "a clear and dynamic conception of the relations imputed between a thinker and his social context." Without such a thorough-going social theory of mind, the research in the sociology of knowledge may become, says Mills, "a set of mere historical enumerations and a calling of names" (PPP: 426). As is therefore evident, although Mills takes up the Mannheimian concern for social determination of ideas and mentality and directly stresses his conception of "a psychology which would be socially and historically relevant" (Mannheim, 1940: 15), he moves a step farther than Mannheim. He calls for "a more adequate psychological base than has been given ...." (PPP: 425) to the sociology of knowledge and, accordingly, proposes to deal with relevant "social psychological" categories. It is here that Mills utilizes the Meadian social psychological category of "the generalized other. For Mills, The generalized other is the internalized audience with which the thinker converses; a focalized and abstracted organization of attitudes of those implicated in the social field of behavior and experience. The structure and contents of selected
and subsequently selective social experiences imported into mind constitute the generalized other with which the thinker converses and which is socially limited and limiting.... Within the inner forum of reflection, the generalized other functions as a socially derived mechanism through which logical evaluation operates (PPP: 426-27, 429).

However, unlike Mead who holds that "the attitude of the generalized other is the attitude of the whole community" (1965: 218), Mills argues that the concept may stand for "selected societal segments" instead of incorporating "the whole society" (PPP: 427 footnote). He names these selected societal segments as "significant others", "authoritative others", and the "generalized other" (CSS: 95). In any event the generalized other is very much crucial:

One operates logically (applies standardized critiques) upon propositions and arguments (his own included) from the standpoint of a generalized other. It is from this socially constituted viewpoint that one approves or disapproves of given arguments as logical or illogical, valid or invalid. No individual can be logical unless there be agreement among the members of his universe of discourse as to the validity of some general conception of good reasoning (PPP: 427).

Thus understood, illogicality or immorality are both derivations from social norms. The social structure of mind, built upon social and psychological factors, influences "fixation, not only of the evaluative but also of the intellectual."

The generalized other is "the seat of a logical apparatus" (PPP: 431).

Like Mannheim, Mills is inevitably led to confront these following questions: How is the sociology of knowledge
related to epistemology and methodology? Does the sociology of knowledge have epistemological and/or methodological consequences? Finally, can epistemology and methodology be bracketed together? In answering these questions, Mills finds, on the one hand, "no fundamental disagreement between Dewey's and Mannheim's conceptions of the generic character and derivation of epistemological forms" (PPP: 456). On the other, he strongly supports Mannheim's claim that "new criteria for social science may emerge from the inquiries of the sociology of knowledge. It is entirely possible" (PPP: 461). However, in attempting to work out a synthesis between Mannheim's sociology of knowledge and Peirce and Dewey's scientific postulates of the verificatory model, Mills moves a step beyond them. For example, Mannheim has failed to avoid certain ambiguities and mislocations in his work because of his inability to understand that, in Mills' words, "in its 'epistemological function' the sociology of knowledge is specifically propaedeutic to the construction of sound methodology for the social sciences" (PPP: 464). In Dewey experimental activity is the core element in his descriptive account of the scientific method (inquiry qua inquiry). As a result, in Dewey's model "there is ever present the drive programmatically to derive from physical science and then apply to other domains a paradigm of inquiry. Such an epistemological program carries with its fulfillment the application of the experimental mode of action to society" (SP: 387). In contrast to this, the position of Mills, who intends to
Mills asserts the relevance of the sociology of knowledge for epistemology by questioning the negative proposition, advanced mainly by Hans Speier, Talcott Parsons, Robert MacIver, and R. K. Merton, that "sociological investigations of inquiries have no consequences for norms of 'truth and validity'" (PPP: 453). The matter is more complicated than this simplistic assertion and the relevant questions, which Mills raised, are as follows:

He who asserts the irrelevance of social conditions to the truthfulness of propositions ought to state the conditions upon which he conceives truthfulness actually to depend; he ought to specify exactly what it is in thinking that sociological factors cannot explain and upon which truth and validity do rest. Those who take the negative position must state what sort of things these criteria of truth and validity are, how they are derived, and how they function (PPP: 454).

Mills acknowledges that 'truth' and 'objectivity' are meaningful in terms of some accepted model of verification. But they have many 'criteria' and these, either the observational and verificatory models of truth and validity or their criteria, are not "transcendental." In terms of the Mannheimian language, there are no eternal truths. They vary in different
social groups in different historical periods. In their persistence and change these criteria are "legitimately open to social-historical relativization." The acceptance or rejection by a thinker of a particular verificatory model is a kind of "juncture" when, says Mills in conformity to his sociology of knowledge stance, "extralogical, possibly sociological, factors may enter and be of consequence to the validity of an elite's thinking" (PPP: 457). The reason is that many thinkers do not select their verificatory model "consciously" or "thoroughly", as did Peirce. In addition, the social position of a thinker, though not directly relevant to the truthfulness of propositions tested by the verificatory model, is of considerable importance. For example, it is by no means certain that all thinkers have employed what is currently called 'scientific' thought model. Mills specifically draws attention to two factors. First, the intellectual and scientific categories upon which the inquiry rests are related to "social situations, cultural determinants." What is taken as problematic and what concepts are available and used may be interlinked in certain inquiries" (PPP: 459). Mills' views are also reflected in his assessment of Marcel Granet's La Pensee Chinoise. Adopting what he calls "the sociologistic view of sociology is "with the 'parallelism' of ideas and social structures, the 'origin' of conceptions from societal forms and drifts" (PPP: 474). In Granet's treatment the sociology of knowledge was used "methodologically as an organon of historical reconstruction" (PPP: 476). Second,
empirical verification is not a "simple, and positivistic
mirror-like operation." Mills refers to "the social theory
of perception" according to which observational dimensions of
any verificatory model, that may be selected, are delimited
by "the selective language of its users." As he says, "A
specialized language constitutes a veritable a priori form of
perception and cognition, which are certainly relevant to the
results of inquiry .... Different technical elites possess
different perceptual capacities" (PPP: 459-60).

As a matter of fact, besides the concept of the gen-
eralized other, in Mills' formulations language is an addi-
tional social psychological mechanism which connects thinking
with societal patterns or reflection with sociality. The
importance which Mills attaches to the social psychological
role of language in its historical significance can be under-
stood clearly from his formulation of the concept of "socio-
tics." As Horowitz has stated, "BY designating his work as
'sociotics', Mills sought to encompass all sociological pheno-
mena involved in the function of language; the ways in which
language channelizes, limits, and elicits thought" (SP: 15).

Sociotics is at once a portion of theory of
language and a division of sociology of
language .... Within the sociology of know-
ledge, sociotics designates the attempt to
set forth linguistic mechanisms connective
of mentality and other cultural items
(PPP: 492).

Sociologically considered, language is the mechanism by
which persons "internalize roles and the attitudes of others"
From an individual's point of view, mind is "the interplay of the organism with social situations mediated by symbols" (PPP: 433). Thus from the sociology of knowledge point of view,

Our behavior and perception, our logic and thought, come within the control of a system of language. Along with language, we acquire a set of social norms and values. A vocabulary is not a mere string of words; immanent within it are societal textures--institutional and political coordinates. Back of a vocabulary lie sets of collective action (PPP: 433).

If this be so the thinking process of the individual is circumscribed by the audience to which he addresses through a common set of symbols characteristic of any language system. Because, argues Mills like a Median, "in order to communicate, to be understood, he must 'give' symbols such meanings that they call out same responses in his audience as they do in himself. The process of 'externalizing' his thought in language is thus, by virtue of the commonness essential to meaning, under the control of the audience" (PPP: 434-35).

The task of the sociology of knowledge consists in giving, among other things, "promise of explaining an area of lingual and social fact" (PPP: 450). Accordingly, Mills develops "an analytic model" for the explanation of motives based on "a sociological theory of language and a sociological psychology." This rests, argues Mills with the influence of Weber (1964a: 39) and Dewey (1970: 471) in the background, upon refutations of both Wundt and Freud. Motives are not expressions of "prior elements" in the individual as Wundt sees them. Rather they are "typical vocabularies having
ascertainable functions in delimited societal situations" (PPP: 439). Again, the problem of motivation is not one of "motive power" as Freud's biological metaphysic holds. On the contrary, it is a problem of "steered conduct" (CSS: 113). With such a viewpoint Mills discovers motives in socially situated actions. Although motives are "terms with which interpretation of conduct by social actors proceeds" or "accepted justifications for present, future, or past programs or acts" (PPP: 440, 443), they or their vocabularies are avenues of social control. They are not static but vary in content and character in relation to different societal situations and historical epochs. So it is possible to say "what is reason for one man is rationalization for another" (PPP: 448). This poses the problem of relativism. Mills suggests a way out by singling out, for the sociology of knowledge analysis, the accepted vocabulary of motives of the dominant group to which the individual is linked. On the one hand,

Determination of such groups, their location and character, would enable delimitation and methodological control of assignment of motives for specific acts (PPP: 448).

on the other, rather at a higher level,

What is needed is to take all (these) terminologies of motives and locate them as vocabularies of motive in historic epochs and specific situations (PPP: 452).

Finally, it remains to consider Mills' views on "theory", "method" and "verification" in empirical practices of sociology. In relation to these categories, as developed in The
Sociological Imagination (1959), Mills follows generally the classic tradition of sociology.

In Mills' sociological methodology of intellectual craftsmanship, neither theory nor method constitutes "autonomous" domain. Methods are "methods for some range of problems." Theories are "theories for some range of phenomena." Every working sociologist is "his own methodologist and his own theorist, which means only that he must be an intellectual craftsman" (SI: 121). According to Mills, the operating and practical postulates of a viable methodology, based on the classic tradition, are the following:

'Method' has to do, first of all, with how to ask and answer questions with some assurance that the answers are more or less durable. 'Theory' has to do, above all, with paying close attention to the words one is using, especially their degree of generality and their logical relations. The primary purpose of both is clarity of conception and economy of procedure, and most importantly just now, the release rather than the restriction of the sociological imagination (SI: 120).

There is no one grand model or one grand methodology of sociological work. "Social science of any kind is advanced by ideas; it is discipline only by fact." The relevance of either theory or method consists in their efficacy to illumine the concrete realities of social happenings; their uses are justified in terms of actual work only. Successful craftsmanship avoids "rigid set of procedure," "association and dissociation of concepts," and "fetishism of method and technique." The methodological sophistication and scientific
concerns over purity of the "empirical," "data," "validity" or "facts" may bring about mellower maturity of sociology but, when it becomes an ethos of epistemological enthusiasm, it may needlessly erode human passions or moral fibres of the sociologist in understanding the human significance of tormenting sociopolitical issues. Neither theory nor method is, says Mills, "part of the actual work of the social studies. In fact, both are often just opposite: they are statesmanlike withdrawals from the problems of social science" (SI: 122). However sophisticated the postulates of theories and methods are, the search for universal generalizations of cause-and-effect relationships always falls short of the desired perfection. The more rigorous the methodology becomes the more it defeats the purpose of research, that of providing "factual information, that is, empirical evidence in the form of quantitative estimates and/or qualitative experience which can be organized to relate values we hold, and to confirm or repudiate our beliefs about the functioning of society, institutions, and people" (Rein, 1976: 38). Finally, Mills also raises the question of verification. "For what level of verification ought workers in social science be willing to settle" (SI: 71)? Mills' answer avoids both the rigidity of epistemology and the empiricists' techno-mindedness to process every thing through "the fine mill of The Statistical Ritual." He does not emphasize "how to verify" at the cost of "what to verify." The Problem of verification is not set apart from the craftsman's moral consciousness and social responsibility.
Verification consists of rationally convincing others, as well as ourselves. But to do that we must follow the accepted rules, above all the rule that work be presented in such a way that is open at every step to the checking up by others. There is no One Way to do this; but it does always require a developed carefulness and attention to detail, a habit of being clear, a skeptical perusal of alleged facts, and a tireless curiosity about their possible meanings, their bearings on other facts and notions. It requires orderliness and system. In a word, it requires the firm and consistent practice of the ethics of scholarship. If that is not present, no technique, no method, will serve (SI: 126-27).

Having outlined Mills' sociology of knowledge and epistemology, it now seems evident that his views, like Mannheim's suffer from what has been called "relativism." The truth of the matter inherent in the positions of both Mannheim and Mills is that they were unable to provide satisfactory remedy for relativism, and this seriously affects the scientific validity of their formulations. A partial explanation consists in their rejection of the Marxian scientific method. In particular Mills' dominant orientations, sociological, political and philosophical, were after all on the side of liberalism which he still regarded viable as an adequate theory of society. The other part of the story is that the sociology of knowledge remains, more probably, built upon certain relativistic propositions. Whatever it is, Mills' sociological methodology has been validly characterized by Gillam (1966: 48), Phillips (1974: 71-72), and Scimecca (1977: 59) as relativistic. For instance, even the verificatory model of Peirce and Dewey cannot provide,
argues Mills, "absolute guaranty" for the truthfulness of the findings of the sociology of knowledge. However, he suggests that it is "the most probable we have at present" (PPP: 461). In addition he holds,

The assertions of the sociologist of knowledge escape the "absolutist's dilemma" because they can refer to a degree of truth and because they may include the conditions under which they are true .... Assertions can properly be stated as probabilities, as more or less true. And only in this way can we account for the fact that scientific inquiry is self correcting (PPP: 461).

This raises the question of inner contradictions or relativistic assertions. Phillips rightly points out:

.... either the relativist's own assertions are themselves relative, and, therefore, lacking truth value; or his argument is unconditionally true, and, consequently, relativism is self contradictory (1974: 72).

Language is relative because "semantical changes are surrogates and foci of cultural conflicts and group behavior" (PPP: 432). Motives are relative because "the motivational structures of individuals and the patterns of their purposes are relative to societal frames" (PPP: 448). Logic is relative because "criteria are themselves developing things" (PPP: 461). And so on. Despite such relativistic social analysis, there is no point, I think, to underrate the theoretical awareness Mills demonstrated in these matters. The problem of relativism vs. absolutism has yet to be solved. And until that is done, it should be clear that both Mannheim and Mills recognized "as most sociologists do not, the social nature of language, perception, concept-formation, verificatory models, truth and knowledge" (Phillips, 1974: 79).
Values and Objectivity

The still indecisive controversy as to whether or not values should play any significant part in the scientific enterprise arose with Weber who asserted in 1904 that "it can never be the task of an empirical science to provide binding norms and ideals from which directives for immediately practical activity can be derived .... An empirical science cannot tell any one what he should do--but rather what he can do--and under certain circumstances--what he wishes to do" (1964b: 52-54). But, at the same time, it must be specifically noted, he did not intend withdrawal of value judgements from "scientific discussion in general"; rather he enunciates his position by saying that "the capacity to distinguish between empirical knowledge and value-judgements, and the fulfillment of the scientific duty to see the factual truth as well as practical duty to stand up for our own ideals constitute the program to which we wish to adhere with ever increasing firmness" (Weber, 1964b: 58). Despite the myth of a value free science which American sociologists created in the period following the Second World War in order to seek legitimation for their rampant methodological empiricism and also to shun social responsibility, it is thus clear that Weber never understressed the value relevance of the subjective value judgements in sociology. However, it is very difficult to gainsay that he, by emphasizing a dichotomy between judgements of fact and judgements of value, became the ideological
fountain source of the weltanschauung of the current neopositivism in the social sciences. But even then, he dichotomized under certain constraining circumstances. He formulated the doctrine of ethical neutrality, together with its all-soul concern for judgements of fact, in order to maintain the cohesion and the autonomy of the University in general and the nascent social sciences in particular, to enhance the independence of sociology, to depoliticize the University and place it above controversies of politics, to restrain political passion, to provide 'a partial escape from the parochial prescriptions of the sociologist's local or native culture', and so on (cf. Gouldner, 1973: 3-26). When the doctrine was imported into America in the early thirties most sociologists forgot, in their quest to make sociology scientific and search for predictive sociological generalizations and laws, the specific constraining circumstances of its origin and also Weber's concern that "only a small portion of existing concrete reality is colored by our value-conditioned interest and it alone is significant to us (1964b: 76). The intensity of the rising currents of social scientists' enthusiasm is conceivable in terms of their general agreement that "research should be conducted objectively; researchers should proceed without value judgements or personal preferences concerning the utilization of knowledge" (Hinkle and Hinkle, 1968: 26). This position was most brilliantly reflected in Lundberg who, as faithful successor to the Comtean
vision of a unified positivistic science, advocated "bring-
ing societary phenomena within the framework of natural sciences" (1956b: 18). Needless to say, the myth of value free sociology in its pseudo-objectivity was born at almost total cost of Weber's other dictum, the value relevance of social phenomena. It came to mean not only "an utter detachement" incumbent on the social scientist but also involved practically his "renunciation of the role of the citizen" (Shils, 1965: 1434). Many sociological practitioners found it expedient "to become peddlars not of knowledge but of techniques" (Lee, 1951: 706). The doctrine of ethical neutrality, involving a loss of critical stance for sociology, is now an escape route for those "who live off sociology rather than for it, and who think of sociology as a way of getting ahead in the world by providing them with neutral techniques that may be sold on the open market to any buyer" (Gouldner, 1973: 12).

Of the sociologists in America it was Wirth and Lynd, most prominently among others, who developed the unmasking tradition of which Mills subsequently became the most notable protagonist. Wirth, writing in the Preface to Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia, has reminded that assertions in the social sciences, no matter however objective they may be, have "ramifications extending beyond the limits of science itself" and accordingly points out that truth itself, not being a simple correspondence between thought and existence, is "tinged with
the investigator's interest in his subject matter, his standpoint, his evaluations, in short the definition of his object of attention" (1936: xv, xviii). Lynd has advised sociologists to be more candid about their "motivations" and not to hide behind "the aloof 'spirit of science and scholarship'" (1964: 178). However, it must be noted that it was Mannheim who, by virtue of his sociology of knowledge, influenced Mills more than others. His awareness of the problem of values was quite noticeable as early as 1940:

"Questions of value should not be taken überhaupt. Located as snarls in social inquiry, questions of value become specific and genuine .... Not only the content of values in social inquiries should be detected, but how values creep in, and how, if at all, they condition the direction, completeness, and warrantability of the results of research (PPP: 466-67).

While the values are themselves the subject matter of valid sociological investigation, later in 1962 Mills categorically asserts that "no political philosopher can be detached; he can only pretend to be" (TM: 11-12). Political and moral judgements are at the very heart of the social scientist's intellectual orientation. Values arise from various possibilities and are involved in all stages of sociological studies. As Mills wrote: "Values are involved in the selection of the problems we study; values are also involved in certain of the key conceptions we use in our formulation of these problems, and values affect the course of their solution" (SI: 78). The fact that values are extrascientific or non-scientific and that they are elusive of
logical formulation does not free the social scientist from moral, political and intellectual implications underlying his methodological commitment to objective detachment. Science itself is, as Polyani says, "a system of beliefs to which we are committed" (1964: 171). In the scientific enterprise values do creep in and the fact remains that "we cannot escape from making judgements and the judgements that we make arise from the ethical preconceptions that we have soaked into our very view of life" (Robinson, 1964: 19). To avoid values and ostracize them from the analysis of social phenomena practically means mindless refusal of one's responsibility. This causes concern in view of the fact that in this ideological epoch and so called social science affluence, the problems of research as well as results of their findings will have political implications. In other words, the question of the scientific status of sociology is less important than "the social and political uses" of this soft science (cf. Horowitz, 1975: xiv). Thus,

Whether he wants it or not, or whether he is aware of it or not, anyone who spends his life studying society and publishing the results is acting morally and usually politically as well. The question is whether he faces this condition and makes up his own mind, or whether he conceals it from himself and from others and drifts morally (SI: 79).

The slogan of scientific objectivity and the neutralist posture of the sociologist are in effect indication of a fear of "any passionate commitment." The avid passion for the curious mannerism of noncommitment, as evident in the small scale
empiricists, is a diplomatic manoeuvre of putting their work outside the political contexts of their society. It is needless to add that the task of social theory "does require a continuous, critical, uncomplaisant, re-examination of premises and analyses," and is not limited to describing "the basic form and outline of society as it is" (Kolko, 1970: 133).

On the one hand, the scientific character of sociology and the nature of its data are not the same as those of natural sciences. As has already been pointed out, Mills was particularly aware of the "cultural and intellectual" contexts of social research and he emphasized the inappropriateness of the laboratory and experimental technique to the investigation of social phenomena. The truth of the matter is that the social sciences in general are not, keeping aside the paraphernalia of scientific methodology with its associated technician's attitude, "sciences characterized by their own laws, but a heterogeneous collection of inquiries strung together on the common theme of human action" (Louch, 1966: 236-37).

Mills' call for the acceptance of a legitimate role of values, on the other hand, can be justified yet from another point of view. The positivistic viewpoint, taken by itself, is inadequate because it is not yet complete. The conception of objectivity, founded on the so-called separation of facts from values, is more complex and intriguing than is supposed by the protagonists of positivist sociology. While, on the one hand, scientific canons of verity, precision and semantic neutrality are yet to be formulated to distinguish "is" from
"ought" of the situations, a science which proposes to establish factual truth by purely objective formal criteria is, on the other, likely to be a failure. "Any process of inquiry unguided by intellectual passions would inevitably spread into a desert of trivialities" (Polyani, 1964: 135). Again, while values are difficult to exclude from social analysis, it is also difficult to ensure objectivity in view of the fact that the researcher's orientations are invariably bound up with the evaluative elements of his culture and society. In a conception of sociology that centers around human concerns and that involves what Berger calls "an openness of mind and catholicity of vision" no amount of methodological technicalities of verification or validation can guarantee objectivity. The problem of objectivity becomes acute only when one blindly adheres to personal preferences and partial views in face of clear, logical, factual and irrefutable evidence to the contrary. Otherwise the claim of the social scientist that "he knows how to proceed impartially is an illusion" (Couch, 1960: 46). However, by this it is not intended to argue that the ideal is not worth pursuing; it is rather to suggest that values may not be simple personal predilections but it may be such conceptions as are built within the logical structure of the argument. For this values themselves are worthy of discussion. The researcher can attain objectivity "not by giving up his will to action and holding his evaluations in abeyance but in confronting and examining himself" (Mannheim, 1936: 47).
As for Mills,

So far as conceptions are concerned, the aim ought to be to use as many 'value-neutral' terms as possible and to become aware of and to make explicit the value implications that remain. So far as problems are concerned, the aim ought to be, again, to be clear about the values in terms of which they are selected, and then to avoid as best as one can evaluative bias in their solution, no matter where that solution takes one and no matter what its moral or political implications may be (SI: 78).

Put in the words of Gouldner, who carries distinct Millsian tradition in his sociology:

Objectivity thus means not being biased in favor of one's own side or against our adversaries, particularly in our cognitive work .... It means, in short, facing bad news and not exaggerating the good news (1976: 5).

It follows, therefore that the problem of objectivity can be overcome, at least to a large extent, by confronting, and not by denying, values and value judgements (cf. Werkmeister, 1959: 503; Myrdal, 1953: 242). Additionally, if the sociologist keeps problem consciousness upper-most in his mind, he can proceed objectively in his analysis, given the acknowledgement of value premises and value implications of his work. "For objectivity in the work of social science requires the continuous attempt to become explicitly aware of all that is involved in the enterprise; it requires wide and critical interchange of such attempts" (SI: 130). Thus understood, it remains to accept what Mills rightly puts forward:

There is no way in which any social scientist can avoid assuming choices of value and implying them in his work as a whole. Problems, like issues and troubles, concern threats to expected values, and cannot be clearly formulated without acknowledgement of those values (SI: 177).
Quantification and Sociology

Mills' emphasis on the historical dimensions of the problems of structural significance might suggest his hostility to quantifying trends in the current styles of empirical researches. However this is far from the actual truth. He only reacted to what usually passes on in the name of quantification, that is "the use of statistics to illustrate general points and the use of general points to illustrate statistics" (SI: 71). He was, quite rightly, apprehensive of surreptitious white-washing by quantification of the facts and issues of sociology. Rather than speak against the uses of quantification Mills has persuasively argued for proper utilization of statistics or mathematics in the illumination of the problem situations of the emergent mass society.

The specific methods—as distinct from the philosophy—of empiricism are clearly suitable and convenient for work on many problems, and I do not see how anyone could reasonably object to such use of them. We can of course, by suitable abstraction, be exact about anything. Nothing is inherently immune to measurement. If the problems upon which one is at work are readily amenable to statistical procedures, one should always try to use them (SI: 73).

His caution against the common tendency of the quantophrenic empiricists to blind people and explore only such data as are quantitatively manipulatable is therefore understandable. It also must be noted that it is as wrong to assume that no knowledge is possible without quantification as it is to
believe that amenability of the data to measurement necessarily coincides with the significance of the problem chosen for the study. Mills only calls for the use of quantification in honest and sensible manner. What he argues against is "the soul-destroying taboo against touching anything that cannot be quantified and a surreptitious reverence for every scribbling which looms like amthematics" (Andreski, 1973: 136).

No amount of high-level quantitative endeavor is able to abstract without involving the risk of distortion of facts or reality. In addition, while dangers are obvious in the badly collected data, quantitative data are scarcely available in cases where the government and other private agencies do not wish exposure of their lapses. Far more important limitation arises in view of the fact that "there is no ultimately self-validating mathematics or other logic that could take from man the necessity of choosing his axioms, selecting his logical models and accepting responsibility for the particular grammar he chooses to apply to the problem confronting him" (Friedrichs, 1970: 151). Given the advantages of quantification, Mills' position, I think, resembles that of Moore Jr. who says this: "We do know in a general way that we do not want our gains in logical rigor and ease of manipulation to be at the expense of too much historical content" (1958: 135).

Empiricism based on Social-Historical Structures

In conformity to his espousal of the need for the em-
phasis on the historical dimensions in sociological analysis, Mills advocates "a much broader style of empiricism" than is usually available within the methodological inhibitions of abstracted empiricism. For him, legitimate sociological analysis consists of comparative understanding of the social structures in their historical significance. The classic practitioners like Weber and Ostrgorski, Marx and Bryce, Michels, Simmels or Mannheim have well illustrated the fruitfulness of the macroscopical orientation to sociological analysis. In the words of Mills, "These men like to deal with total social structures in a comparative way; their scope is that of the world historian; they attempt to generalize types of historical phenomena, and in a systematic way, to connect the various institutional spheres of a society, and then relate them to prevailing types of men and women" (PPP: 554).

In terms of this broadbased empiricism, Mills urges the sociologists to undertake social analysis and pursue it in the classic way which involves

.... an abstraction from what may be observed in everyday milieux, but the direction of its abstraction is toward social and historical structures. It is on the level of historical reality --which is merely to say that it is in terms of specific social and historical structures that the classic problems of social science have been formulated, and in such terms solutions offered (SI: 124).

The productive sociological research lies between grand theory and abstracted empiricism, as Mills said, or between "Big Theory and Big Research", as Moore, Jr. (1958: 140) said. Mills is however not hostile to small scale researches
centering around problems of milieux though he would advise not to study "merely one small milieu after another."

I do not suppose that anyone has a right to object to detailed studies of minor problems. The narrowed focus they require might be part of an admirable quest for precision and certainty; it might also be part of a division of labor, of a specialization to which, again, no one ought to object (SI: 74).

Problem Consciousness as a Source of Sociological Craftsmanship

The loss of problem consciousness had its origin in a two-fold source: grand theory and abstracted empiricism, both of which neglected historical dimensions in sociological theory and research. As a result, working sociologists indubitably came to underrate historical dimensions that only can provide "a real sense of problems". In spite of many limitations of his work, it is to the historian that "we may turn in search for a different approach to the problems of human society .... The fruitful historical research generally begins with an awareness of some problem that is felt to be significant" (Moore, Jr. 1958: 141). At the same time the problem consciousness, an integral component of sociologists' humanistic concern, "is not merely a means of avoiding ideological biases but is, above all, an indispensable condition of progress in any discipline of human inquiry" (Dahrendorf, 1958: 124). As a matter of fact the loss of problem consciousness was ultimately due to an abandonment of the classic tradition of sociology. In urging the working sociologists
to keep "uppermost a full sense of the problem at hand" Mills calls for the reinstatement of this tradition.

To practice such a policy .... is to take up substantive problems on the historical level of reality; to state these problems in terms appropriate to them; and then, no matter how high the flight of theory, no matter how pains-taking the crawl among detail, in the end of each completed act of study, to state the solution in the macroscopic terms of the problem. The classic focus, in short, is on substantive problems (SI: 128).

But, inevitably, the question is: what is a significant or substantive problem? As for Mills, the problems are not immediately significant because of their practical, political, or moral meanings. "What we should mean in the first instance is that", says Mills, "they should have genuine relevance to our conception of a social structure and to what is happening within them" (SI: 73). And, then, the problems become significant in terms of their political consequences upon men in sociohistorical transformations of the society. Thus his sociology becomes a political sociology, and its problems are significant, morally and intellectually, in terms of threats to cherished values of truth, reason, and freedom--in brief, political ideals of liberalism. These values constitute "the necessary moral substance of all significant problems of social inquiry, as well as of all public issues and private troubles" (SI: 175). To elaborate the political overtones of Mills' sociology:

The very enterprise of social science, as it determines fact, takes on political meaning. In a world of widely communicated nonsense, any statement of fact is of political and
moral significance. All social scientists, by the fact of their existence, are involved in the struggle between enlightenment and obscurantism. In such a world as ours, to practice social sciences is, first of all, to practice the politics of truth (SI: 178).

The realization of this truth has its roots in the ideals of political liberalism and pragmatism rather than in the tenets of Marxism or dialectical materialism. Whatever it is, in envisioning political tasks of the sociologists, Mills does not intend "to save the world" although there is nothing wrong in it if it means "the avoidance of war and the re-arrangement of human affairs in accordance with the ideals of human freedom and reason" (SI: 193).

Critique of Modern Empiricism: The Radical Viewpoint

Ever since its birth, mainstream sociological theory and research has retained its one-sided unneutral function of legitimating the irrationality and immutability of the existing structure or institutional arrangements of the society. Among other things, its main function has been ideological, and its practitioners are "so intensively interest-bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine their sense of domination" (Mannheim, 1936: 40). In its triumphant march the mainstream sociology, both in its intellectual content and ideological-political character, has continued to maintain its historic alliance with capitalism. It is still, more than ever, "a moralizing sociology of milieux" (SI: 88).
It is not "a science: it is a way of doing ideology. And in a high-technology society, it is an ideological production of great practical and ideological utility to any ruling class" (Freiberg, 1973: 19-20). That the situation has changed little since Mills' time is evident from the remark made by Kon in 1974: "When studied from within, the crisis of sociology, I believe, appears as a crisis of the illusions of positivist science, empiricism and functionalism" (Kon, 1975: 58). It is therefore no wonder that Mills' critique, in spite of its limitations, towers over most subsequent criticisms made recently in the social sciences (cf. Shaw, 1975: x).

As early as 1944 Mills discovered the US intellectuals' failure to reinstate "pragmatism's emphasis upon the power of man's intelligence to control his destiny" (PPP: 292). They suffered what he calls "a failure of nerve." In the beginning of the mid-twentieth century Mills saw how the emergence of rational bureaucracies affected "the conditions of intellectual life." The intellectual, he writes,

...hopes for opportunities of research, travel, and foundation subsidies. Tacitly, by his silence, or explicitly in his work, the academic intellectual often sanctions illusions that uphold authority, rather than speak out against them. In his teaching, he may censor himself by carefully selecting safe problems in the name of pure science, or by selling such prestige as his scholarship may have for ends other than his own (WC: 152).

The development of rational bureaucracies accompanied what Mills called "the managerial demiurge." The bureaucratic-
managerial-technological society required a legitimating ideology and a set of intellectuals who could be hired in research cartels in order to turn out "elaborate studies and accurately timed releases, buttressing the interest, competing with other hatreds, turning pieties into theologies, passions into ideologies" (WC: 153). As a result they became technicians and joined "the expanding world of those who live off ideas, as administrator, idea-man, and good will technician" (WC: 156). To carry Mills' analysis a little further, his concept of "technicians" is comparable to Gramsci's concept of "functionaries". In the words of Gramsci, whom Mills labels as a plain marxist, "the intellectuals are the dominant group's 'deputies' exercising subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government" (1971: 12). The great increase in the number of intellectuals or technicians is itself an indication of their need for ideological justification of the power wielder's domination in the regime of corporate capitalism. To quote him again, "The democratic-bureaucratic system has given rise to a mass of functions which are not all justified by the social necessities of production, though they are justified by the political necessities of the dominant fundamental group" (Gramsci, 1971: 13). In this light there is little difficulty to note, as Mills has done, that the empiricist-technicians of modern sociology, though too alienated to identify themselves with private troubles and public issues of their time, are in historical continuity with their pre-
decessors in providing legitimating ideology for the corporate capitalist social structure of domination, alienation and manipulation. The producers of social scientific knowledge, no better than other workers, are engaged in "producing commodities for exchange" and they participate only in developing "an exchangeable account of society" (Horton, 1971: 175). In fact the present relationship of the functions of social scientific knowledge to the corporate-pluralist interests of the dominant class is quite indicative of certain patterns which, though more complex and intriguing than supposed, are as follows:

First, a noticeable trend consists in the emergence of the government as the predominant buyer of social scientific knowledge or, stated otherwise, of relevant information suited to its political purposes. Private agencies come next. As a result of both the number of sociologists receiving support from these is generally on the increase. Between 1966 and 1970 their number, who were receiving federal support, has gone up from 3,640 to 7,658 (Horowitz and Katz, 1975: 10). In this wider involvement with different policy making agencies of the government, the sociologists are more prone to accommodate government's priorities, and therefore its political interests rather than assume autonomy and responsibility.

... there is slender evidence that information bought and paid for is made the basis of policy in critical times. Indeed, there is just as much evidence for the conclusion that information is used when it suits policy-makers and discarded
when it does not "fit" political plans
(Horowitz, 1968: 272).

As for researches within the Universities there is little
or no scope for developing or undertaking critical studies of
colonialism, imperialism or class struggle given the struc-
ture of Graduate programs geared to standardized methodology
and research techniques.11 The chief obstacle is the feudal
structure of the University through which "a bankrupt
orthodoxy perpetuates its bankruptcy by forcing young scholars
to swear fealty to its certified ideological idols and techni-
ques" (cf. Horowitz, 1970: 8).

Second, it is the foundations and other corporate
bodies that are influencing the trends of sociological research.
Nearly one-half of all foundations grew up between 1950 and
1959 and nearly one-fourth between 1960 and 1969. The largest
12 of approximately 25,000 foundations in 1969 controlled
some $7.5 billion in assets or roughly 30 percent of the
resources of all the foundations put together. In 1970-71
foundation support for the social sciences rose to $77 million
or 38 percent of the total expenditure (Horowitz and Katz,
1975: 16-18). Whatever the philanthropic purposes they might
serve, the foundations have been increasingly caught in the
political crossfire since the 1960s. Attacks came from all
directions, from liberal to Marxist, but it was Mills who took
lead to focus on the ideological purposes which they served.
In 1944 he wrote: "Research in social science is increasingly
dependent upon funds from foundations, and foundations are
notably averse to scholars who develop unpopular theses, that
is, those placed in the category of 'unconstructive'" (PPP: 297). As a matter of fact, directions of foundation financed research have caused concerns for many (cf. Lundberg, 1968; Horowitz and Kalodney, 1969; Horowitz, 1969). Nielsen comments that "the large foundations— their theoretical usefulness as creative forces and as change agents notwithstanding—are in fact overwhelmingly passive, conservative, and anchored to the status quo" (1972: 406).

The third characteristic trend relates to increasing uses of sociology, as well as participation of more sociologists, in providing materials useful for military intelligence, strategic planning and psychological warfare. Of course, this trend is coincident with the rise of Cold War and world wide US military involvement since the World War II. Bowers reports that well over two hundred professional sociologists have contributed to this post-War use of sociology and that "this upward trend in the military use of sociology is here to stay" (1967: 267). Sometimes military spending for behavioral and social research has yielded many important and interesting results, causing thereby euphoria among the sociologists. For example, one of them remarks, "... the resources for the conduct of our foreign policy, and our social science as a whole, would be poorer if military agencies had not stepped in and provided funds and encouragement that were not forthcoming from civilian departments" (Davison, 1967: 396). What, however, causes concern is that the same money could have come from another department. The truth is that socio-
logy is also becoming a component of the military establishment of the corporate capitalist society (cf. Beals, 1969: 111-12). Take for instance, the ultimate purpose of Samuel Stouffer's *The American Soldier* (1949). In spite of its claim that the study was value free, it is not at all difficult to see that the military used "its findings as a kind of handbook to promote higher morale, defuse dissension, and generally increase the efficiency of battle units in the European campaign" (Sternberg, 1977: 107). A far more glaring example in point is project Camelot, an Army-supported behavioral research project with a four year budget of $6 million. On the one hand, its purpose is clearly political and practically conservative. Its purpose, however hidden behind the technical vocabulary, was not only to investigate political conditions of Latin American countries but also to obstruct any political changes therein. Clearly it was one of "counter-insurgency" nature. On the other hand, its problems were also methodologically pertinent. By confusing revolution and radical change with problems of social pathology, the Camelot sociologists revealed only their conservative ideological biases characteristic of the functionalists' concern to reduce every thing as issues of order, stability, pattern maintenance, conflict management, and so on. As a matter of fact the project, though cancelled in 1965, has brought to the fore serious issues like value of the value-neutrality ethic, ideological cohabitation between social
science and vested interests, and conservative roots of mainstream sociology and sociologists. It is evident that "the brutal fact of imperialism is incorporated into the intellectual structure of the project. The unquestioned and highly doubtful presuppositions of power politics in the Cold War era are built into the very system of research which is supposed to discover truth. One might ask whether such social science is exploring or fabricating the truth" (Ober and Corradi, 1966: 52). The project has demonstrated, more than revealing the naked face of conservative-ideological politics underlying the current trends of sociological empiricism, that long run interests of the sociologists do not lie with a sectarian politics but with "the broader concerns of mankind" (Sjoberg, 1967: 160).

Finally, in conformity to the increased demand for policy related social sciences, the various government, industrial and corporate agencies are showing greater interest in gathering raw quantitative data necessary to their policy planning and policy formulation. In this survey research is the most frequently used tool. That is to say, recent developments point toward a client-centered sociology (cf. Lazarsfeld et al., 1967: x-xi). Besides such corporations as General Motors, Ford Motor Company, General Electric etc., the government prefers, particularly in the studies of criminality, defense, foreign policy and urban studies, to appoint sociologists who can transform qualitative materials into quantitative terms. The policy makers' preference derives
from the fact that this enables them "to order and audit political options and the implications of their choices", as Horowitz and Katz say. The negative implication arising from the purposive emphasis on the quantitative aspects is that "social sciences move beyond their academic confines, and become very much a part of the larger social and economic system" (Horowitz and Katz, 1975: 46). The widespread uses of survey research conform to the general pattern of the domination of the quantitative trends in sociology. The survey research provides necessary data by which establishment sociologists, in the name of so-called meaningful integration of theory and research, build up, on the one hand, a comfortable sociology and aid, on the other, the administrative-bureaucratic apparatus in the preservation of the status quo. The rise of the trend is "almost entirely the result of its general 'practical' uses in the manipulation of consciousness, together with its suitability to the financial, ideological and career structures of the 'social sciences'" (Shaw, 1975: 41).

This review of the major trends of current empirical research styles in sociology attest only to Mills' premonition of how the politics of liberalism, both as ideology and rhetoric, is providing "the terms of all issues and conflicts" (PPP: 218). Elsewhere he says that, even if the moral content of liberalism is still abstractly stimulating,
... its sociological content is weak: its political means of action are unpromising, unconvincing, unimaginative. It has no theory of man in society, no theory of man as the maker of history. It has no political programme adequate to the moral ideals it professes .... It is much more useful as a defense of the status quo .... than as a creed for deliberate historical change (TM: 30).

In this context Mills' political sociology, in its dual aspect of criticism of the establishment trends and of an attempt at the reconstruction of the radical alternative, is singularly important in the history of sociological analysis. To conclude, therefore, in the words of a recent critic of mainstream sociology:

Given the persistence of the structural constraints inherent in the exercise of the procession, which are partly rooted in the academic structure generally, the chance of another Mills arising in sociology is about equal to the chance of a Fidel Castro emerging in the State Department. Unless this structure changes profoundly, it is safely predictable that the next generation of prominent sociologists will be just as bought as the present one is (Nicolaus, 1971: 51).
Notes

1. To cite an example, see the recent article of Phillips (1974), where he contrasts Mills' position with that of Mannheim and Merton. See also Kraetzer (1975).

2. For a contemporary but highly critical point of view assailing "pompous bluff and paucity of ideas" in the recent flood of publications, see Andreski (1973).


4. For a discussion of Mannheim's lapses into historicism see Wagner (1952).

5. Mills' contention has been supported by Meltzer who says of Mead: "He oversimplifies the concept by assuming, apparently, a single, universal generalized other for the members of each society--rather than a variety of generalized others (even for the same individuals), at different levels of generality" (1972: 20), as Mills suggested earlier.

6. Mills' failure to realize that Marxism provides an adequate basis of "science" or "scientific method" has resulted in serious consequences for his radical sociology. See chapter 9, which contains my criticisms of the drawbacks of radical sociology in general.

7. His arguments are more elaborate and articulate in Can Science Save Us. See Lundberg (1961), and also Bierstedt (1963) who carries the same tradition, more or less.

8. For interesting discussion on the nature of social science including sociology, see Winch (1965) and Ryan (1970).

9. Cf. Shils (1961). I have already quoted a section from Shils' review article in this connection. See pp. 79-80 of this chapter.
10. For Mills' views on the role of historical materials in sociological analysis, discussed in a comparison with Parsons' grand sociology, see chapter 2, especially pp. 61-67.

11. However, I take note of the fact that nowadays many American social scientists are undertaking serious studies in these areas.
CHAPTER FOUR

Mass Society

Introduction

Before I again return to Mills' political sociology, I propose to deal with, in the following two chapters, two important theoretical issues: mass society and alienation. In this regard, Mills' contributions may be summarized in two ways: 1) he developed a sociological framework within which a theory of mass society could be formulated; and in doing so, he connected the alienating features of modern man with the emergent society in America; and 2) his framework provides an important perspective that helps one to assess the structural changes of American society and its impact upon the psychology of individuals. While accomplishing both purposes, Mills' framework also creates a distinct tradition within American sociological analysis in that it marks a characteristic break with the aristocratic perspective of European mass theorists.

The Trends towards Mass Society

In 1930, when he published his *The Revolt of the Masses*, Gasset perceived the new trend and wrote: "... America is, in a fashion, the paradise of the masses" (1957: 116).
By the mid-twentieth century American society has moved, says Mills, "a considerable distance along the road to the mass society" (PPP:358). This movement is the noticeable development of far-reaching structural transformations that were taking place following the last World War. The gradual evolution of American society into a mass society, in one form or another, is linked with the changes, brought about by developments of technologies of production and destruction, in the institutional orders of the society. Massive technological developments in the society were accompanied by rapid industrialization, continuous urbanization, proliferation of opportunities for men and women with the broadening of the economic base, the expansion of decision-making spheres and at the same time centralization of its apparatus and, finally, bureaucratization of all spheres of life, social and individual. The impact of these changes is most visible in the realm of power which nowadays increasingly resides in the economic, political and military orders of the society. Using the concept of power as an 'expedient to approach modern social structures' and keeping in mind the institutional dominance of the economic, political and military orders, Mills advanced his thesis of the structural transformations and of how it has trichotomized American society into three distinct layers, ranked in terms of their accessibility to power. To quote Mills:

The top of modern American society is increasingly unified, and often seems willfully coordinated: at the top there has emerged an elite
of power. The middle levels are a drifting set of stalemated, balancing forces: the middle does not link the bottom with the top. The bottom of this society is politically fragmented, and even as a passive fact, increasingly powerless: at the bottom there is emerging a mass society (PE: 324).

The concept of the mass society, as Mills develops, is linked with the shift of power from the mass of people to those "political, economic and military circles which as an intricate set of overlapping cliques share decisions having at least national consequences. In so far national events are decided, the power elite are those who decide them" (PE: 18). Conversely, in the mass society the people have become powerless or have suffered powerlessness to the extent the power elite has become powerful. Together with the middle level of the society, characterized by the new bourgeoisie which is without any political direction, the men in the masses are now open to control and manipulation by the power elite. This approach to the problem of powerlessness of the masses in a society presided over by elites in power sharply differentiates Mills from Le Bon, Mill, Tocqueville, Burckhardt, Gasset and others, who viewed with concern the emergence of the masses as a new balancing force in the society. These theorists assume more or less that either the masses have acceded to power or their likely accession to power is a threat to society. The basic postulates behind this aristocratic-elitist conception is a supposed incompetence of the masses to decide their own destiny. In contrast, Mills'
viewpoint is just opposite. The dividing line is Mills' explicit commitment to democracy. For Mills, the mass society is indicative of a societal condition in which elite preeminence replaces or erodes the power of the masses to rule themselves by their own representatives. As he remarks, "In our time, the influence of publics or of masses within political life is in fact decreasing, and such influence as on occasion they do have tends, to an unknown but increasing degree, to be guided by the means of mass communication" (PPP: 35).

Mills differentiates between what he calls "community of publics" and "mass society." For sure, these phrases indicate only the extreme types. Neither of them is at any time an exact reflection of social reality in America. "Social reality is always some sort of mixture of the two" (PE: 302). Therefore, these two concepts of "community of publics" or "mass society" are mere theoretical constructs developed in order to picture, in relative terms, the social situation that could exist at a given period of time. In distinguishing publics from masses, Mills chooses to examine the role of the communications media in influencing and as control over man in the industrial-technological society. Apart from many other effects which it entails, the media revolution has structurally transformed the community of publics into a society of the masses along four dimensions. In a public,
(1) Virtually as many people express opinion as receive them. (2) Public communications are so organized that there is a chance immediately and effectively to answer back any opinion expressed in public. Opinion formed by such discussion (3) readily finds an outlet in effective action, even against—if necessary—the prevailing system of authority. And (4) authoritative institutions do not penetrate the public, which is thus more or less autonomous in its operations (PE: 303-04).

At the opposite extreme, in a mass

(1) Far fewer people express opinions than receive them; for the community of publics becomes an abstract collection of individuals who receive impressions from the mass media. (2) The communications that prevail are so organized that it is difficult or impossible for the individual to answer back immediately or with any effect. (3) The realization of opinion in action is controlled by authorities who organize and control the channels of such action. (4) The mass has no autonomy from institutions; on the contrary, agents of authorized institutions penetrate this mass, reducing any autonomy it may have in the formation of opinion by discussion (PE: 304).

Mills' description of both concepts proceeds along 'ideal-type' description. The dividing line, as already indicated, is set by the media. In addition, he draws heavily upon the image of a classic public as theorized by the eighteenth century political scientists. Somewhat ideally conceived, the public of classic democratic tradition is the source of legitimation and the center for exchange of rational opinion between persons tied to each other by harmony of mutual interests. "And, in so far as the public is frustrated in realizing its demands, its members may go beyond criticism of specific policies; they may question the very legitimations of legal authority" (PE: 299). Such a concept of public
is, as the basis of democratic community, now a 'fairy tale' and does not even present 'an approximate model of how the American system of power works.' However, one should not forget, as Mills reminds, that the idea of the mass society "involves more than mass communications. The idea implies that multitudes of people participate in various activities, but that they do so only formally and passively. Action and opinion are one again, and both are rigorously controlled by monopolized media" (PPP: 583). Mills never says that America is completely a mass society though there are others who called America a mass society. America has never been completely a community of publics either. Mills only discovered the structural trends towards mass society. In 1954 he says that the situation was "half-mass and half-public." He also comments that America has travelled "a considerable distance along the road to the mass society" (PPP: 358). The latter position found poignant affirmation in his The Power Elite published in 1956. Therein he says more affirmatively that "many aspects of the public life of our times are more the features of a mass society than of a community of publics" (PE: 304).

How has this situation come about? That is, how has this transition to the mass society occurred apart from the rise of the power elite at the top of the masses? What are the other structural trends? What is their impact upon the mass life of the individual? All these queries are at
the heart of Mills' thesis of the mass society and alienation. On the one hand, there is the decline of the individualism and a rise of irrationality in life (cf. PE: 301-02). What Mills argues is a part of the story of disillusionment of the old liberals with the modern forces of sociopolitical change. The idealization of the traditional community as the source of organic, natural and desirable interpersonal relationship and the celebration of the free individual at the same time constituted the theme of liberal optimism which the old liberal mass theorists thought to have broken down under the impact of modern conditions of society. This kind of sociological romanticism found its genesis in the well known themes of Tonnies, Simmel, or Sombart. Mills only subscribed to this romanticism. On the other hand, Mills has found in the mass society "a movement from widely scattered little powers to concentrated powers and the attempt at monopoly control from powerful centers, which, being partially hidden, are centers of manipulation as well as of authority" (PE: 304-05). The fact that media control aids in manipulation is not to ignore the role which communication technology plays in the biological evolution of man and in the development of social structure. Rather, "the development and maintenance of large social structure depends on a communication technology that permits communication through space and time in addition to face-to-face oral communication" (Parker, 1973: 619). Mills' apprehension is that mass society marks a transition towards a life of manipulation, a life guided and directed
by centralized points of control, which must be eliminated.
In this sense men are not moving towards but are drifting away from possibilities of any more freedom in the society. He only points to the danger inherent in the society of media sovereignty. To put it in the words of Fromm: "We are not on the way to greater individualism, but are becoming an increasingly manipulated mass civilization" (1968: 26). Needless to add, it is also Mills' message.

Other Factors

The Bureaucratic Character:  In his Economy and Society (1922)

Weber wrote:

The United States still bears the character of a polity which, at least in the technical sense, is not fully bureaucratized. But the greater the zones of friction with the outside and the more urgent the needs of administrative unity at home become, the more this character is inevitably and gradually giving way formally to the bureaucratic structure. Moreover, the partly unbureaucratic form of the state structure of the United States is materially balanced by the more strictly bureaucratic structures of those formations which, in truth, dominate politically, namely, the parties under the leadership of professionals or experts in organization and election tactics (1968: 211).

Mills, the faithful carrier of the sociological heritage of Weber, also found that "the United States has never and does not now have a genuine civil service, in the fundamental sense of a reliable civil service career, or of an independent bureaucracy effectively above political party pressure" (PE: 239). As far back as 1942, Mills said, in virtual agree-
ment with this master theorist of bureaucracy, that "the historical drift may be seen as a bureaucratization of industrial societies, irrespective of their constitutional government" (PPP: 53). He also notes that "all modern states are bureaucratic" and that "bureaucracies do not operate without definite social settings" (PPP: 65).

With Weber as the dominant influence upon him therefore, it was not difficult for Mills to discover bureaucratic tendencies of the modern industrial societies. In other words, bureaucratization added mass character to the industrial-technological societies of today. Although the development of a money economy is not decisive for the existence of a bureaucracy, it flourishes along with bureaucracy. It is a "presupposition of bureaucracy" (Weber, 1968: 204). Mills found its corroboration in his own society. "In three or four generations the United States has passed from a loose scatter of enterprisers to an increasingly bureaucratic coordination of specialized occupational structures. Its economy has become a bureaucratic cage" (WC: 58). Bureaucratic centralization has pervaded almost all aspects of mass man's life and all the sectors of his society. In the present era, the mass society is characteristic of, to borrow a phrase of Whyte's "a generation of bureaucrats." The corporation manifests the generation's values. All are in a frantic race to respond to standardized future which it portends. Whether he is corporation-bound, a lawyer or a scientist, his occupation is "subject to the same centralization, the same trend
to group work and to bureaucratization .... Whatever their many differences, in one great respect they are all of a piece: more than any generation in memory, theirs will be a generation of bureaucrats" (Whyte, Jr., 1956: 64).

(1) The Managerial Demiurge: An important aspect of the emergent mass society, as Mills refers to in one way or another, is that it has increasingly become, following World War II, a "managerial society." Managerial development is a new phenomenon of the modern America's mass society. The managerial demiurge, as Mills termed it, is largely a result of bureaucratization. "As the means of administration are enlarged and centralized, there are more managers in every sphere of modern society, and the managerial type of man becomes more important in the total social structure" (WC: 77). Both types of managers--the business and industrial--set the pace and tone of corporate life for the mass. Managers are the high priests and they possess social mana. The managerial bureaucrats have exiled the old captains of industry and business into oblivion. They have thus become "the economic elite of the new society; they are the men who have the most of whatever there is to have; the men in charge of things and of other men, who make the large-scale plans. They are the high bosses, the big money, the great say-so" (WC: 100).

The managerial demiurge is conspicuous in terms of three distinct tendencies that it seems to have. First, it is manifest in the increasing trend of rationalization, the core and the essence of bureaucratization. Stated simply,
rationalization decreases the chance of the individual, however placed in the stratification structure or in the occupational hierarchy, to get a view of the whole, of the totality of any reality. The managers, the business men, the corporation executives, the clerks, the salesmen, the store-keepers or the foremen—all are now subject to the sovereign rule of rationalization. The second consequence of the rising tide of managerialism is that, in its progress, "the capitalist spirit itself has been bureaucratized and the enterprise fetishized" (WC: 107). Bureaucratization, in the last place, gives way to manipulation, the secretive exercise of power. The mass man's powerlessness has increased to the extent to which manipulation has grown anonymous and all embracing. The shift from the exercise of authority to one of manipulation is the hallmark of the new society of the masses, including the new bourgeoisie.

(2) The Profession and Education: The increased bureaucratization of the world of professions is another mark of this society. The managerial demíurge works to build up "ingenious bureaucracies of intellectual skills" (WC: 115) practically in all types of professions. The impact of bureaucratization is such that "the rationality itself had been expropriated from the individual and been located, as a new form of brain power, in the ingenious bureaucracy itself" (WC: 112). More and more professionals now respond to and operate as part of the managerial demíurge.

Again, Mills refers not only to "mass-production
methods of instruction" (WC: 129) but also to a kind of "bureaucratic ethos" which underlies education in the mass society. American educational system is based upon the organizational and hierarchical pattern of the corporate society. It functions only as a response to and in the satisfaction of the needs of a technocratic culture. "It is a product both of certain unique conditions of mass education and higher education's servicing role vis-a-vis the bureaucratically organized political and economic sectors" (Vaughan, 1973: 232). The knowledge has thus become both bureaucratized and a commodity. It is giving rise to what Mills calls a "new academic practicality" (cf. WC: 134).

Its practitioners readily assume "the political perspective of their bureaucratic clients and chieftains" and serve only "to increase the efficiency and reputation--and to that extent, the prevalence--of bureaucratic forms of domination in modern society" (SI: 101). Professors become "more directly an appendage of the larger managerial demiuurge" (WC: 133) as more and more foundation money is poured to encourage large-scale bureaucratic research into small-scale issues. The more the members of the academic community act as part of the corporate establishment and pursue goals bureaucratically set out, the more they become apolitical, detached from larger structural issues of long run consequence. The more they professionalize this apolitical ideology of the managerial society, the more they endanger their ability to grasp the other side of the political reality. Given such a situa-
tion, American social science presents a dismal picture. "Research for bureaucratic ends serves to make authority more effective and more efficient by providing information of use to authoritative planners" (SI: 117). 3

It is worthwhile to note that before the mass society began to make its appearance, it was considered a major avenue to social equality and political freedom, but "not the big avenue of economic advancement for the masses of populace" (WC: 266). The purpose of education was the creation of 'good citizen' in a 'democratic republic.' In the new industrial-mass society the meaning of education has shifted "from status and political spheres to economic and occupational areas" (WC: 266). It has increasingly become "a mark of status, and has already become a necessary prerequisite for higher social ranking" (Rodnick, 1972: 50). Because it is the decider of the individual's occupational fate in a competitive mobile society, educational system is oriented to providing "'the successful man' in a 'society of specialists with secure jobs'" (WC: 266). Of many other consequences that it has produced, education on a mass scale has also been "one of the major social mechanisms of the rise of the new middle-class occupations, for these occupations require those skills that have been provided by the educational system" (WC: 266). For wage workers, mass education probably provides the only channel along which their offspring can improve their status, although in the long run they usually end up at the bottom of the white collar job hierarchy. Whether
for wage workers or for salaried employees, it must not be presumed that the prospect offered by mass education is of limitless success. Often the supply exceeds the demand and this results in alienating frustration for those who find themselves outside the opportunities. As Mills says, "Among those who are not allowed to use the educated skills they have acquired, boredom increases, hope for success collapses into disappointment, and the sacrifices that don't pay off lead to disillusionment" (WC: 272).

(3) The Decline of Voluntary Associations: Another important consequence of the bureaucratization of the predominant economic, political and military structures of the US society has been the lowering of the effective use of all "smaller voluntary associations operating between the state and the economy on the one hand, and the family on the other" (PPP: 360). The decline of the primary, traditional or voluntary relations and, therefore, also of primary groups is historically associated with the theory of the mass society. Maine, the celebrated English sociologist of law, traced the development of progressive societies in terms of a passage from status to contract. This movement involved a decline of social groups and the family and an accompanying emergence of legally autonomous individual (cf. Maine, 1861). The German sociologist, Tonnies, who introduced the much publicized dichotomy between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft in 1887, traced the rise of more impersonal, atomistic and mechanical relations as features of the new society, Gesellschaft.
which grew out of the ruins of new commercialism and industrial capitalism. In America Colley anticipated the rise of the mass society because of the continuous eclipse of primary groups from social life. Park, who also perceived the same trend, distinguished masses from publics as far back as 1904.  

It was, however, Blumer, a student of Park, who extended and systematized the idea of "mass" (cf. Blumer, 1955: 370). Mills looked at the decline of voluntary associations from the political context which is, in its turn, a consequence of centralization and bureaucratization of the dominant institutional structures of the society. He clearly points out: "Voluntary associations, open to individuals and small groups and connecting them with centers of power, no longer are dominant features of the social structure of the United States" (CWT: 33). It is this political perspective that differentiates Mills from other mass theorists who associate the decline more with the rise of industrialism and commercialism. Voluntary associations are gradually transformed into mass organizations and the more they become so, the more they lose the grip over individuals. The result is three-fold: first, the individual is detached from his moorings in the voluntary association in which he can either reach 'reasonable opinions' or utilize its agency to undertake 'reasonable activities;' second, he becomes vulnerable to mobilization. With the media techniques they become open to manipulation. As the parties become larger, the individual's role disappears
sector of the economy in 1969. Moreover, that figure is a substantial advance over a dozen years ago and is actually 1.35 times higher than it was in 1955, when only half were on the top 500 payrolls" (1970: 38). A typical but representative example of the late 1970's corporations is General Motors

.... with its 750,000 employees, its 1.3 million shareholders in more than eighty countries, its plants in twenty-four different countries and its varied production which includes autos, refrigerators, electric stoves, locomotives, jet engines, earth-moving equipment and missile guidance systems. In 1969 General Motors had a net profit (after taxes) of over $2 billion, which was greater than the general revenues of forty-eight states, while its sales of $21 billion were greater than the Gross National Product of all but nine foreign countries (Rodnick, 1972: 97-98).

The following two Tables provide a picture of corporate concentration in American economy.

| Table A |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Share of Assets Held by the Largest US Manufacturing Corporations, 1950 to 1972 (percentages) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>100 largest</th>
<th>200 largest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>53.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>60.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Clement (1977: 139).
Table B

US Manufacturing Corporations
with Assets over $1 billion,
1960 to 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1973</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of all mfg. corps</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of profits of all mfg. corps</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Clement (1977: 140).

(2) The Thesis of the Managerial Revolution and Mills: An important aspect, which needs to be mentioned, relates to the so-called separation of ownership from the control of corporations. The question is: Who controls the corporations?

In the early thirties, Berle and Means suggested that control had passed to the top managers who did not own the corporations. They assert that recent changes, brought about by distribution of stock of the corporation among a wider segment of people and by concomitant legal measures, have affected radically the character of the corporations. It represents a qualitative break with the older forms in so far as the question of control is concerned. The separation of ownership from control has thus necessitated a 'neutral technocracy' that would supposedly promote the well being of all sections of the people and balance their interests against each other. To quote them: "It is conceivable--indeed it seems almost
inevitable if the corporate system is to survive—that the 'control' of the great corporations should develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity" (Berle and Means, 1933: 356). The idea of neutral technocracy found its authentic articulation in J. Burnham's *The Managerial Revolution* (1941). Therein he asserts that the present capitalist institutions and beliefs are undergoing a rapid transformation. The forces that are at the back of contemporary societal events have ruled out both socialism and capitalism as any adequate basis of social reorganization. Rationalization process has meant increasing indispensability of 'production experts' and 'administrative executives.' Therefore, "within the new social structure a different social group or class—the managers—will be the dominant or ruling class" (Burnham, 1966: 74). Stated very simply, present social trends are towards a managerial society. Berle further developed the ideas in his other works, *The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution* (1954) and *Power Without Property* (1959).7

Mills' response to this thesis of managerial revolution, formulated in the larger contexts of political power and social stratification, was contained in the article, "A Marx for the Managers," written with his teacher Hans Gerth and published in 1942. Later, he elaborated his position
and never lost sight of it. Subsequently this article has become a substantive basis of a radical critique of the corporate-mass society. The postulates of the managerial revolution, as theorized by Burnham, "unduly short-cut the road from technical indispensability to a grab and hold of power. The short-cut establishes too automatic an agreement between the social-economic order and political movements" (PPP: 57-58). The fundamental error consists in the recognition of technical indispensability of a class as superior claim to political power. Burnham was incorrect in assuming that in Germany the new middle class--the managers--had become new rulers. The group of big industrialists and Junkers never lost their power; German capitalism produced for the state rather than for the open market; and so the political power was a monopoly of the German state; the fact that the middle class enjoyed more opportunities on a wider social scale did not mean that it rose to power; "On the contrary, the Nazi war economy has violated all material election promises to the middle class. The middle class was politically important in the ascent of the Nazi party to power, but it is a power which they do not share" (PPP: 59). Burnham confounds 'the regulatory power of the state with ownership.' The fact is that the state control does not dislocate ownership but rather guarantees security against such dislocation. Burnham's definition of property as actual disposition perpetuates the notion of private property. No American heiress loses ownership of
machines and offices which her late father's 'production engineers and executives efficiently and faithfully run' for her. In the sphere of politics, "managers do not significantly differ from owners in their beliefs and loyalties" (PPP: 64). At the same time, experts seldom make decisions and the top knock off "the 'managers' before they get to be the depository of decisional power" (PPP: 67). In this he blasts the myth of the managerial revolution and, so to say, of the idea of soulful corporations. "Modern revolutions are not watched by masses as they occur within the palace of elites. Revolutions are less dependent upon the managerial personnel and their myths than upon those who bring to focus and legitimate the revolutionary activity of struggling classes" (PPP: 71). Later, Mills argues in specific terms: "While owner and manager are no longer the same person, the manager has not expropriated the owner, nor has the power of the propertied enterprise over workers and market declined. Power has not been spilt from property; rather the power of property is more concentrated than is its ownership" (WC: 101). What has happened in fact is, as Mills calls it, "the managerial re-organization" of the propertied class whose powers and privileges are integral components of the institution of private ownership (cf. PE: 147). As one industrial sociologist says:

As C. Wright Mills has shown, the managers under any regime whatsoever are never anything but executive agents. They are never in a position, publicly or institutionally, to assert themselves against their masters. Conversely, the masters become totally powerless without the complex (and secretly all powerful) managerial cadre (Ellul, 1965: 256).
The institution of private ownership is now "depersonalized, intermediate and concealed" (WC: 101). The owners do not run the corporation or the enterprise. Owners are only people "who legally claim a share of profits and expect that those who operate the enterprise will act for their best interests" (WC: 100 footnote). Managers only have such 'operating control' over the enterprise as is necessary to run it. The top man in the bureaucratized big business is, says Mills,

"... a powerful member of the propertied class. He derives his right to act from the institution of property; he does act in so far as he possibly can in a manner he believes is to the interests of the private-property system; he does feel in unity, politically and status-wise as well as economically, with his class and its source of wealth (WC: 102).

The divorce of control from ownership of property changes "the personnel, the apparatus, and the property status of the more immediate wielders" (WC: 102) of power, but it does not diminish, rather increases, the power of property. Therefore, as Mills argues, "if the powerful officials of U.S. corporations do not act as old fashioned owners within the plants and do not derive their power from personal ownership, their power is nevertheless contingent upon their power of property" (WC: 102). The managers are the managers of private properties.

It is frequently asserted that stockholders are the owners of corporations, involving a disposal of ownership over wider sections of people. But this proposition has little validity in point of stockholder's control over the corporations.
If it is true that there are individual stockholders, then it is also true that almost half of the stockholding are owned by corporate entities (cf. Hacker, 1970: 41). Menshikov reports that

... in 1953, the richest families owned 77.5 percent of all stocks in individual possession, 76 per cent of the bonds of companies and 100 per cent of the bonds of states and municipalities .... While in 1929 one per cent of the U.S. population owned 65.6 per cent of the individually owned corporate capital, in 1953 this share increased to 76 per cent (1973: 73-74).

This is the reason why Mills is led to conclude that "the managers are agents of big property owners and not of small ones. Managers of corporations are the agents of those owners who own the concentrated most; they derive such power as they have from the organizations which are based upon property as a going system" (WC: 103).

The stark reality is that neither the salaries nor business nor stock options have essentially altered the distributions of stock ownership in favor of the top executives so that they will be in a position to control the corporations in the near future. Menshikov reports, on the basis of data for over 100 of the biggest US corporations, that "in the last ten years there has not been a single case of any of the hired executives advancing to the ranks of their leading stockholders" (1973: 111). Although it is true, as Mills thinks, that managers seldom personally own the property they manage, it should not be assumed that managers are in general divorced from ownership. "Quite to the contrary," hold Baran and Sweezy,
"managers are among the biggest owners; and because of the strategic positions they occupy, they function as the protectors and spokesmen for all large-scale property. Far from being a separate class, they constitute in reality the leading echelon of the property-owning class" (1972a: 167). Mills had no doubt that managers, especially those at the top, 'definitely form a segment of the small, much-propertied circle'. However, they do not constitute a separate class since the "top level managers .... are socially and politically in tune with other large property holders. Their image of ascent involves moving further into the big propertied circles" (WC: 104). In The Power Elite Mills reaffirmed the idea that "the chief executives and the very rich are not two distinct and clearly segregated groups. They are both very much mixed up in the corporate world of property and privilege .... (PE: 119). It must be pointed out, however, that the advancement of the top executives to the ranks of the very rich does not mean their ultimate absorption into the owning class. Rather they remain in subordinate position. Mills' failure has been made up by Menshikov who suggests the following:

Whatever corporate 'privilege and prerogative' this top group enjoys, however broad its power over the working masses and also the small and middle businessmen, it is not the owner and it is not the one which in the final count wields power. Managers come and go, but the power of the finance-capitalists, based on their wealth and ramified control system, remains so far (1973: 132).
In the light of foregoing analysis, it seems that the theory of the managerial revolution—the myth of a ruling class of managers—is in reality an apology for the institution of private property and ownership. What Mills said in 1942 seems to be valid even today: "If the present ruling owners fall, so may their managers" (PPP: 71).

The Cultural Character

Whereas McLuhan notes the impact of media revolution by saying that in the modern society "the medium is the message," Mills realizes its importance through its capacity to transform the community of publics into a society of the masses. By observing that medium is the message, McLuhan merely says that "the personal and social consequences of any medium—that is, of any extension of ourselves—result from the new scale that is introduced into our affairs by each extension of ourselves or by any new technology" (1965: 7). For Mills, the media are a basic feature of America's industrial-technological society and they have added the mass character to it. The pervasiveness of the mass media in American society can hardly be overemphasized. "Americans are media freaks. They read 60 million newspapers per day, have nearly 300 million radios in cars and homes, and spend more than 360 million hours per day in front of their television sets. Including film, book and stereos, total media consumption per person averages some 50 hours per week, exceeding every other activity but sleeping"
(Glessing and White, 1973: v). In other words, the media consumption in America has already reached a height quite unknown to any earlier period. At the same time, as Mills argues, "the media, as now organized and operated, are even more than a major cause of the transformation of America into a mass society" (PE: 315). While Blumer in his analysis of mass behavior perceived the tendency of the media to detach the individual from his links with primary group and local community, Mills was more pointed, along with other critics of mass culture, in his attack on the negative consequences that jeopardize modern man's life in the urban-industrial society of the masses. Like Macdonald, Howe, Van den Haag, to mention the prominent few, Mills sharply criticized the role of the media in massifying American society.8 To illustrate his basic stand on the cultural role of the media in America:

The contents of the mass media are now a sort of common denominator of American experience, feeling, belief and aspiration. They extend across the diversified material and social environments, and, reaching lower into the age hierarchy, are received long before the age of consent, without explicit awareness. Contents of the mass media seep into our images of self, becoming that which is taken for granted, so imperceptibly and so surely that to modify them drastically, over a generation or two, would be to change profoundly modern man's experience and character (WC: 334).

For him, the individuals are passive consumers of standardized media content in the media markets of the mass society; they are at the receiving end; they are imprisoned within a 'pseudo-environment' full of stereotypes and standardized
images of imitation. In reviewing the media effects, Klapper notes that "persuasive mass communication functions far more frequently as an agent of reinforcement than as an agent of change" (1965: 15). In this light, Mills argues, not without reason, that the prime function of the media is to foster "a sort of psychological illiteracy" among the mass consumers of this media-dominated society. This reminds us of McLuhan who said: "Mental breakdown of varying degrees is the very common result of uprooting and inundation with new information and endless new pattern of information" (1965: 16). Let me indicate some of the functions of media in the mass society.

First, "the media not only give us information; they guide our very experiences. Our standards of credulity, our standards of reality, tend to be set by these media rather than by our own fragmentary experience" (PE: 311). Even when the individual attempts to define the meaning of the message of the media, he is seldom successful because of the stereotypes already organized by the mass media in his structure of attitudes and beliefs. Second, the individual's passivity and his construction of the pseudo-world is furthered by the consensual, homogeneous and standardized themes that the media purvey. As the media are now organized, the individual cannot play 'one medium off against another' because there is no genuine competition between them. For, "The more genuine competition there is among the media, the more resistance the individual might be able to command" (PE: 313). But this does not usually happen, given the economic nature of the
corporation-dominated capitalist society. The media operate on the basis of corporate profitability encompassing the broadest audience. "Profitability may depend on reaching a national audience; if so, then sympathetic treatment of the American Negro's struggle for equality--for instance--is uneconomical. This is not because the television networks are anti-Negro. If they have been unable to find sponsorship for popular Negro entertainers, it is because advertisers are afraid of alienating too many white viewers" (Bensman and Rosenberg, 1963: 361). Speaking of the TV in particular, Lazarsfeld admits, though 'facetiously', that "the networks continue their bad programs because this makes for larger audiences and therefore more profit from advertising" (1971: viii). Third, the mass media have become the chief source of mass man's identity, aspirations and self-image. As Mills puts it, "(1) the media tell the man in the mass who he is--they give him identity; (2) they tell him what he wants to be--they give him aspirations; (3) they tell him how to get that way--they give him technique and (4) they tell him how to feel that he is that way even when he is not--they give him escape" (PE: 314). In other words, the media provide him with a sophisticated frame of self-reference, which is, more often than not, a source of perverted way of looking at the sociopolitical reality. In the last place, the mass media, the TV being the most important of them, "often encroach upon the small-scale discussion, and destroy
the chance for the reasonable and leisurely and human inter-
change of opinion" (PE: 314). The media have produced a new
human type, the mass-produced hermit captivated in a world
within the four walls of his room.9

The mass media are the purveyors of a vulgarized
universe; they do not focus on individual's sources of private
tension and anxieties; they do not provide clues to wider
contexts of reality and connect them with his experiences.
"They do not connect the information they provide on public
issues with the troubles felt by the individual. They do not
increase rational insight into tensions, either those in the
individual or those of the society which are reflected in the
individual" (PE: 315). Rather they are a bunch of diver-
sionary techniques which corrode his chance to understand his
self and its meaning or the world he lives in.

The Metropolitan and Industrial Character

Lastly, as Mills points out in the tradition of
Simmel in particular, the rise of the metropolis is an im-
portant master trend making for a mass society (cf. PPP: 364-
65). For Simmel, the advent of metropolis, as the locale of
modern urban civilization of innumerable masses, is one of
the great transformations the origins of which are rooted in
'the large developmental tendencies of social life as such.'
It has simultaneously given rise to opposing trends which
engulf modern man. On the one hand, metropolis has given
the individual 'a heightened awareness and a predominance of intelligence', 'punctuality', 'calculability', 'exactness', a 'money economy', 'the highest division of labor' and a system of mass production for the anonymous market. Yet, on the other hand, Simmel discovers the progressive fragmentation of man in the metropolitan civilization in which he has become encapsulated. Thus he could write, "The deepest problems of modern life derive from the claim of the individual to preserve the autonomy and individuality of his existence in the face of overwhelming social forces, of historical heritage, of external culture, and of the technique of life" (Simmel, 1964: 409). In 1938 Wirth, a prominent representative of the Chicago school of American sociology, added the urban dimension to the sociological theory of mass society. He reminds us, as Mills did later, that "the masses of men in the city are subject to manipulation by symbols and stereotypes managed by individuals working from afar or operating invisibly behind the scenes through their control of the instruments of communication" (Wirth, 1938: 23).

As mass theorist, Mills also discovers, reminding us of Tonnies and Simmel in the earlier and Wirth in the latter times, that "the growth of this metropolitan society has segregated men and women into narrowed routines and milieux, and it has done so with the constant loss of community structure" (PPP: 365). The metropolitan society has split the individual from easily identifiable groups in which he had his identity. It is a society of strangers, only linked to
each other by a huge network of impersonal and formal media of communications. Here persons know each other only in a "segmental manner." The members of a metropolitan society of masses know one another only fractionally" (PPP: 365). The metropolitan man is "a temporary focus of heterogeneous circles of causal acquaintances, rather than a fixed center of a few well-know groups (WC: 252). Primary personal relations evaporate and causal contacts, at the impersonal level, gain supremacy in the metropolitan life. It is a society in which "the humanist reality of others does not, cannot, come through" (PPP: 365).

The metropolis is also an industrial society. Raymond Aron defines industrial society as a society in which ".... large scale industry .... is the characteristic form of production" (1967: 73). Aron's definition has two key features: first, it involves separation of the enterprise from the family; and second, it also means a new form of the division of labor which not only involves ".... the division which has existed in every society between the various sectors of the economy, peasants, merchants and craftsman, but a technological division of labor within the firm which is one of the characteristics of modern industrial society" (Aron, 1967: 73). In both senses, American society is an industrial society which, in course of large scale production, turns into a society of the masses. For Mills, America is becoming a mass society, among other reasons, by forces of
"structural industrialization." Whatever the criteria of an industrial society, which are yet to be sorted out, America is the top industrial society in terms of developments in both science and technology, and mass production and mass marketing. Industrial Revolution has led to mass production of things and services through "special type of factory production in which the principles of power, accuracy, economy, system continuity, speed and repetition are realized" (Martin-dale, 1960: 3-4). It has transferred the skill from the artisan to the machines. In the assembly line production man and machine are fused into one continuous operation. The principle of maximum production by the minimum number of men is the essence of mass production in the mass society. Thus "the immense productivity of mass production technique and the increased application of technological rationality are first open secrets of modern occupational change: fewer men turn out more things in less time" (WC: 66). The idea of mass production as an ongoing preoccupation involves mass consumption, mass distribution and mass market in the society. All are interconnected, which in the process becomes a 'network of enterprises and occupations' with the middle classes in the middle and the masses at the bottom of the mass society. The underlying principles rest on the operations of a market economy. To quote Mills:

Goods produced in the factory are transported to urban centers of consumption; there they pile up, and are unpiled into the market radius of the city. Without mass production, commodities cannot be accumulated to fill great stores.
Without big cities there are no markets large enough and concentrated enough to support such stores. Without a transportation net, the goods cannot be picked up at scattered points and placed in the middle of the urban mass. Each of these is a center of the modern web-work of business and society (WC: 162-63).

As for the individual as worker in the industrial-metropolitan society, Mills creates no vagueness to point out the following:

.... in modern industrial society the mass of men are, and must be, dependent workers. This paramount fact of dependent, collective work is firmly anchored in large-scale technology; it finds a parallel and a further anchorage in an extremely narrow distribution of property (PPP: 180).

The rise of industrialism and urbanism has led to the disintegration of the family and no longer is it an economic unit in the society of the masses. If its decline is one aspect, its separation from the sphere of work is then another. The process of the division of labor has acted as the major catalyst towards this end (cf. WC: 237-38). In addition, Mills refers to religion as 'part of the false consciousness of the world and of the self' among the cheerful robots of the mass society (cf. CWT: 148). For them religion has become 'the religion of good cheer and glad tidings' or 'a respectable distraction from the sourness of life.' The decline of religion is a mark of the new society of the masses. To quote him:

As a mass medium, religion has become a religiously ineffective part of the show that fills up certain time slots in the weekly routines of the cheerful robots. As an in-
stitution that is part of a political society, religion has become a well-adapted rear guard. Rather than denounce evil, rather than confront agony, the minister goes his amiable way, bringing glad tidings into each and every home (CWT: 152-53).

An Assessment

The main thrust of the foregoing analysis has been to highlight the differential aspects of emergent mass social order in American society in so far as they were evident in Mills' writings. Put otherwise, his formulations provide, from a theoretical point of view, "a diagnosis of certain underlying tendencies in the modern world, as well as a set of criteria for measuring the extent of these tendencies in specific cases" (Kornhauser, 1968: 14).

This is of course not to overlook various other assessments of the mass society theory. Bell, Shils, Rose, Parsons, Bramson, Bauer and Bauer, Gans and many others have squarely challenged the basic assumptions of the theory. Shils hails the mass society as a new social order in which the individual has for the first time experienced "a greater sense of attachment to the society as a whole, and of affinity with his fellows" and in which "large aggregations of human beings living over an extensive territory have been able to enter into relatively free and uncoerced association" (1974: 229). In the mass society man experiences, evidently in contrast to Mills' assumptions, a new height of freedom
and individuality. To quote him:

The personal dispositions, those qualities of rationality and impulsiveness, amiability and surliness, kindliness and harshness, loving-ness and hatefulness, are the constitution of the individual. Felt by himself, acknowledged by himself, coped with by himself, they are formed into his individuality. The perception and appreciation of individuality in others moves in unison with its development in the self (Shils, 1963: 40).

As conceivable, Mills' theory is diametrically opposite to one suggested by Shils. Both are 'ideal-type' descriptions in respect of the major features of the mass society. It is interesting to note in this connection that most of "the critics of the critics" of mass society, such as Bell, Shils, or Bauer and Bauer, have not referred to Mills except indirectly. The criticisms they have made largely apply to European theorists like Gasset, Marcel, Lederer or to those who are European immigrants to America or Britain, such as Arendt, Mannheim, Fromm and Marcuse. As a result, their criticisms suffer from a two-fold drawback. On the one hand, these critics have much in mind the European postulates of mass society or alienation. On the other hand, they criticize most of which represent the aristocratic critique of the mass society; to be sure, Fromm or Marcuse, along with Mills, do not present such a view. On both counts their criticisms have limited validity and scope in so far as Mills was concerned. For all of them, Mills, Fromm or Marcuse, the primary data in analysing the nature of post-Second World War American society are based on American, and surely not European,
experiences of life and society. Since the main purpose here is to focus on Mills in particular, the essential points of criticism against the mass society theory can be briefly and selectively touched upon in as much as they apply directly or indirectly to Mills' theory.

First, Bell has said that the theory of mass society is "at heart a defense of an aristocratic cultural tradition—a tradition that does carry with it an important but neglected conception of liberty—and a doubt that the large mass of mankind can ever become truly educated or acquire an appreciation of culture. Thus, the theory often becomes a conservative defense of privilege" (1967: 28). Applied this to Mills' theory, Bell's criticism seems to have zero validity. In his theory Mills does not talk of "mindless masses," as the aristocratic representatives of the mass society theory do, but of the "powerless masses" who have become targets of manipulation from centralized points of control, no matter whether specifically by the power elite or by any other persons in the seat of power in the corporate capitalist society. If his theory is any defense, it is the defense of democratic tradition discovered in the loss of reason and freedom in the contemporary American society.

Secondly, Shils says, though not directly referring to Mills:

The critical interpretation of mass culture rests on a distinct image of modern man, of society, and of man in past ages. This image has little factual basis. It is a product of disappointed political prejudices, value as-

True, there are elements of romanticism in Mills' theory of mass society. He resents for the decline of 'the Renaissance man' or of the 'traditional' and 'primary' social relationships. But, if Shils' critique could at all be applied to Mills' theory, it is still hard to sustain in terms of the basic spirit behind Mills' major assumptions. If Mills' theory is a product of disappointment or resentment against American society, Shils' own theory, as of Bell's too, is simply an apology of the established regime. Far from being a product of 'disappointed political prejudices, value aspirations for an unrealizable ideal or resentment against American society', Mills' theory is directly an outcome of political mindedness, of democratic aspirations and of an assessment of America's ills for the construction of a society founded on democratic values of reason and freedom. At least, Shils' image of modern man in the new social order of the mass society is as romantic as that of Mills' image of alienated man. If Mills is accused of pessimism, Shils then portrays an equally opposite, more optimistic than real, image of modern man. Bramson echoes Shils. Looking at the theory of the mass society in the contexts of developments in the media research in America, he suggests that the shift in the analysis of the mass society is, among others, "symptomatic of the disillusionment of many American sociologists with the
panaceas of socialism, which previously had provided a tacit ideological justification for dealing with larger social issues" (Bramson, 1967: 97). But, to be sure, Mills' disillusionment with socialism matches equally with his disillusionment with liberalism. What Mills detested in the mass character of the industrial-urban or corporate-capitalist society, not the industrial society or the processes of industrialization and urbanization thereof.

Thirdly, in a widely read and much quoted article, "America, 'Mass Society' and Mass Media," Bauer and Bauer made three specific criticisms against mass theorists. They also, like others, did not mention Mills in their critique. But these criticisms may very well be applied to Mills' theory. First, they suspect that "the elements of elitism extend very deeply into the thinking and feeling of the theorists of mass society" (Bauer and Bauer, 1960: 59). Second, the theorists are intellectuals in whom "social pessimism is more often and more readily approved than is social optimism" (Bauer and Bauer, 1960: 59). Third, mass theorists are opposed to the Protestant ethic and they fail to recognize "the fact that in America Protestantism is a rural phenomenon" (Bauer and Bauer, 1960: 62). Their image of American society is an outdated model of describing the present realities; the onset of automation has reversed the trend of progressive alienation of the worker from his work; this has caused 'a characteristic confusion between reality and values'; the mass theorists are disturbed by 'the egalitarianism of modern
By and large, the theory of mass society is a theory of social control from above even though it is premised on the necessity for making concessions to mass taste in order that the masses be controlled most effectively. ... While the critics of mass society (or at least some of them) exhibit a romantic populist trend when talking about "folk societies," they are strongly anti-populist with respect to modern society (something of an anomaly in view of their generally liberal political orientation) (Bauer and Bauer, 1960: 64).

Parsons and White endorse the views of Bauer and Bauer. They also agree on the point that the findings of the mass theorists reflect not only "a serious paucity of adequate research findings .... but also an even greater lack of theoretical analysis" (Parsons and White, 1960c: 67). Bauer and Bauer have drawn profusely, although at times to their advantage, upon Ernest Van den Haag, Leo Lowenthal, T. W. Adorno, Bernard Rosenberg, T. S. Eliot, Q. D. Leavis, Dwight Macdonald, Irving Howe, Clement Greenberg and a host of others. In developing a generalized model of mass society, they have underrated the differences in moral, scientific or political attitudes which exist in fact between different mass theorists. Although the conclusions of most of the major theorists point to the same direction and tend to be alike, there is no denying the fact that considerable antinomies exist between them. As Coser has justifiably remarked, Bauer and Bauer have thrown all the mass theorists, especially the
critics of mass culture, "in one bag" (1960: 79). In the same way it is difficult to sustain the argument that Mills' theory is characterized by elitism as such. On the contrary, he viewed with concern the growing political apathy and powerlessness in face of manipulative tendencies in the mass society. Mills found that the decline of primary publics could only end up in the emergence of the mass society and that, given the tendency, it is a serious set back for American democracy. An elitist is no supporter of democracy. There is scarcely any indication in Mills' assumptions of mass society that he preaches a control of the masses from the above.

These critics aver that mass societies destroy the "public," i.e., those meaningful intermediary groups which mediate between the primary family unit and the nation-state. The claim that by dissolving those proximate units which cushion and envelop the individual and hence make possible a meaningful participation in public affairs, mass society destroys the very possibility of a democratic, pluralistic polity. This, in essence, is the point of view of, among others, C. Wright Mills, Seymour Lipset, Philip Selznick; that is, of some of the major contemporary critics of mass society. How do they fit into Bauers elitist amalgam (Coser, 1960: 80)?

By the same token, it may be counter-argued that the mass theorists including Mills are no more intellectual than those who criticise them. Again, it is also difficult to trace out in Mills any lack of enthusiasm for the revival of Protestant spirit as the core of work ethic. Rather, the whole import of Mills' views on work alienation is pervaded by a humanist concern to instill the spirit of the Protestant ethic in the workers.
The advent of automation, the second Industrial Revolution as John Diebold has called it, now marks the latest stage of the production technology. By substituting machines in place of men as controllers of production operations, automation is now introducing most fundamental changes in the nature of man and machine relations. But, to be sure, there is no fool proof guarantee that automation will always provide immunity against alienation from all types of work. The introduction of automated techniques has not always in fact produced similar immunity from alienation in the office as it does more in the work places of factory. In addition there are others who express concern, at this given stage of technology's development, over the shape which automation will take on in the approaching future.

Bauer and Bauer are on a very strong ground in respect of the empirical evidence concerning the effects of exposure to media of mass communications. In America early researches in this field contributed much to the development of the mass society theory. Naturally the theory becomes vulnerable to severe scrutiny in so far as media research points to the contrary. It bases are shaken to the extent that its theoretical postulates are based upon the "wrong" assumptions as to the role of the media. As far as the media impact on the outcomes of the political campaigns is concerned, it seems that mostly they are ineffective in causing substantial changes in the attitudes of the people in general. Weiss reports that "few people appear to be converted merely through
exposure to formal political communications. The available evidence suggests that the preponderance of total media effects is contributed by the reinforcement of substantiation of vote decisions brought about by other factors, such as habitual patterns of voting or social and personal influences" (1969: 176).

In whatever way one may look at the role of the media, it is redundant to add that they have come to stay, rather quite firmly, in human societies. Evidently, they have good as well as bad, positive and negative, effects, and the concern of the mass theorists is with the latter. There is no evidence to show that the mass theorists are ignorant of the positive impact of the mass media. It is, therefore futile for any one to single out the chosen set of data in order to back up one's position and then criticize the adversaries, often underestimating and even concealing the ill effects of the media. The main question, as Weiss poses it, is this; "What role can the media play in developing public taste for a culturally more varied range of programs and more serious or demanding offerings" (1969: 110)? In Mills' terms, the media should also be a political forum disseminating clashes of opinion and stimulating public interest in politics. The fact that empirical evidence concerning media runs counter to many of the basic postulates of the mass society theory has got to be accepted with careful reservations. On the one hand, it has not yet been possible to develop any satisfactory or
theoretically derived schema to categorize the effects of the media. Despite unprecedented spurt in the media research, it has not been successful to provide worthwhile scientific generalizations since "there are a sizable number of differences between the different media and some of these may operate to increase and others to decrease the effects studied. At the same time, the studies have frequently been done under somewhat artificial conditions so that they have likewise not been too useful for practical application under naturalistic conditions" (Hovland, 1972: 530). On the other hand, most "critics" of the critics of mass society are more or less silent on the specific question of the monopoly control by corporate interests over different media. The irresistible urge on the part of the media controllers to reinforce the existent social trends and stabilize the Establishment defined status quo and political attitudes has been a natural corollary of the capitalist transformation of the society.

The news media operate to continually underscore the legitimacy of business and government, to enhance their perpetuation in the name of order and stability, and to romanticize their agents with publicity and sometimes affectionate attention .... In American society where the news media are controlled, almost monopolized by persons of wealth, power and high political office, most persons are imprisoned in a network of myths and lies, in an environment where the media have become a mass means for pacification (Ehrlich, 1974: 32-33, 41).

Finally, contrary to the assumptions of Mills, Rose has claimed that, among others, the institution of the family and the voluntary associations have acquired special signifi-
cance in the mass society. Of the family, he says: "For many adults in our society, the nuclear family provides the only regular source of companionship, the only safeguard against loneliness. It provides partial compensation for the mass society" (Rose, 1967: 202). With regard to the voluntary associations he thinks that they enable individuals to counteract 'the feelings' generated by the mass society. Like Shils or Bells and many others, Rose draws attention to a vast increase in the number of voluntary associations, clubs, societies and other organizations. Despite the rosy picture Rose has provided, there are subtle truths behind the pluralistic universe in the American social structure. Despite its role as an emotional center, it may be said that "in American society the institutional significance of the family has been eroded especially fast. Its socializing functions have been undermined not by political institutions or the ideological jealousy of the authorities, but by the growing belief that the experience of one generation is irrelevant for the next" (Hollander, 1973: 264). Keniston, in a study of alienation of the American youth, remarks that "the middle-class American family is extreme in its smallness, its isolation from the mainstreams of public life and its intense specialization" (1965: 273). Similarly, pluralism has been a familiar model of society to many theorists beginning with Madison and Tocqueville, apart from its modern apologists. But the question remains the same: How far does
this model fit the facts of, and work in, the corporative society of America? Hacker provides an answer:

.... when the General Electric, the American Telephone and Telegraph, and Standard Oil of New Jersey enter the pluralist arena, we have elephants dancing among the chickens. For corporate institutions are not voluntary associations of individuals but rather associations of assets, and no theory yet propounded has declared that machines are entitled to a voice in the democratic process (1970: 42-43).

The efficacy of voluntary associations suffers a serious erosion in a community that is molded mostly by the corporate-normative institutions in the capitalist society. The alienation of the individual from the community is anything but natural likelihood since in the capitalist society "the institutions determining the role structure, the power structure, and the physical structure of a community operate apart from the needs of individuals" (Gintis, 1972: 282). It is to these aspects, along with others, of alienation that I now return in the next chapter.
Notes

1. See, for example, Wirth (1948) and Martindale (1960).


3. See also Whyte, Jr. (1956: 219). Mills' criticism on the point and my own review of the current trends in sociological research have already been discussed in Chapter 3, especially at pp. 112-120.

4. This information is provided by Walter (1964: 399).

5. Arendt (1951) has illustrated this.

6. In the period, 1955-1970, "the proportion of workers in manufacturing and mining in the United States employed by the top five hundred rose from 44.5 per cent to 72 per cent" (Clement, 1977: 138).

7. For a modern version of managerialism emphasizing "wide ranging scope of responsibility" of the "soulful corporations", see Kaysen (1957).

8. For a collection of critiques of mass media and mass culture, see Rosenberg and White (1957).


10. Shepard suggests that "the thesis that automation reverses the historical trend toward increased alienation from work among factory workers appears to be supported" (1971: 117).

11. See, for example, Killingsworth (1970: 341-42).

CHAPTER FIVE

Alienation

Introduction

Both in the history of sociological thinking and in the present day studies of human relations, the concept of alienation, originating notably in the works of classic sociologists such as Tonnies, Marx, Durkheim, Weber and Simmel, has travelled a long way to become the master concept of sociology. It has emerged "as the inclusive category which points to our personal and social frustrations, to our sense of collapse and doom and to the critical nature of the human situation at this juncture in history" (Murchland, 1971: 4). Whereas the classic masters were preoccupied in one way or another with the alienating themes of the individual in the urban-industrial society, the concept received dramatic formulation and amazing authenticity in the hands of the different mass theorists.\(^1\) The massive literature on the mass society became the breeding ground of phenomena associated with the concept of alienation, although it may very well be doubted how far the basic assumptions of the mass society theory are central to the understanding of the concept in its later manifestation in the contemporary societies.\(^2\) However, looking at its genesis from the historical perspective, the concept of mass turned out to be of
central importance to the phenomenon of alienation. Mills elaborated the theme and extended its differential dimensions against the back-drop of mass societal developments that were taking place amid forces of structural transformations in American society. In the model he built for the study of social structure and personality, alienation became its chief social psychological issue. In other words, he started with the assumption that "problems of the nature of human nature are realised most urgently when the life-routines of a society are disturbed, when men are alienated from their social roles in such a way as to open themselves up for new insight" (CSS: xiii). At bottom, the problem of alienation is a matter of individual experience; outside, it is a question of relationship between him and the historical social structure he lives in. That is why Mills proposes that "the structural and historical features of modern society must be connected with the most intimate features of man's self" (CSS: xix) -- the theme of Mills' sociological social psychology. The problem of alienation, for him, is a problem of both personality and social structure. Mass society provided the framework of modern social structure; and within this framework, the psychological theme of modern man is alienation. Put in a single sentence: the structural shifts in social existence of life have been accompanied by experiences of alienation for man. This was the basic point of Mills' stand when he reviewed Charles Mirris' book, Paths of Life: Preface to a World
Religion. The basic issue of this book is one of 'estrangement, of self alienation'. Alternatively he proposed that

... the problem of estrangement arises from an urbanized, pecuniary, and minutely divisioned society and that the ground problem cannot be solved by moral consideration of personal ways of life .... That self-estrangement arises from a social-historical condition has been demonstrated by such men as Marx, Simmel and Fromm. In order to transform the conditions of estrangement (.... or to remake the self), we must be dominantly Promethean .... (PPP: 161-62).

The developments that were taking place in the capitalist orders of America's social structures, especially following the Second World War, revealed, for Mills, the obstacles in the way of the individual's capacity to live rationally with freedom. Rationality and freedom are values, the heritage of the Enlightenment, that are needed to establish a democratic or free society which "entails the social possibility and the psychological capacity of men to make rational political choices" (Mills and Slater, 1945b: 315). The problem of alienation is a problem embedded in the capitalist social institutions, and Mills speaks for an acceptance of 'a socialist view of human nature' to counter the facts of changed structural contexts of the society. Although early enthusiasm of Mills for this socialist image of man evaporates in his later writings, he, nevertheless, points out in 1945 how this could enable men to solve the problem of alienation:

It will recognize the collective conditions of work which exist under capitalism and which will continue to exist in any modern industrial society. It will see in immense detail how the institutions of such collective work, pegged upon bureaucratized private property, make for the alienation of man from one of his key chances
to contact reality creatively. It will see that the chances of individual men rationally to work out their life plans are increasingly expropriated by the spread and clutch of corporate institutions (Mills and Slater, 1945b: 315).

At the beginning of the mid-twentieth century Mills discovers the social psychology of the little man in the emergent mass society since the problems now confront him 'border on the psychiatric'. "In so far as universals can be found in life and character in America, they are due less to any common tutelage of the soil than to the levelling influences of urban civilization, and above all, to the standardization of the big technology and of the media of mass communication" (WC: xiv). In the new pattern there is no "moral sanctifying of the means of success; one is merely prodded to become an instrument of success, to acquire tactics and not virtues; money success is assumed to be an obviously good thing for which no sacrifice is too great" (WC: 265). Though Mills says this in his characterization of the new middle class man, it also holds good for the wage workers who are not far behind in their run for monetary success. Aware of the built-in constraints of mobility in the corporate society, "the wage-worker comes to limit his aspirations, and to make them more specific: to get more money for this job, to have the union change this detail or that condition, to change shifts next week" (WC: 278). Mills continued to refer to the theme of alienation in many of his other writings at various points of time. But the theme drew most of his attention in White
Collar (1951), The Power Elite (1956) and The Sociological Imagination (1959). In The Power Elite he elaborates the alienating experiences of the mass man in the following terms:

.... He is not truly aware of his own daily experience and of its actual standards: he drifts, he fulfills habits, his behavior a result of a planless mixture of the confused standards and the uncriticized expectations that he has taken over from others whom he no longer really knows or trusts, if indeed he ever really did. He takes things for granted, he makes the best of them, he tries to look ahead .... but he does not seriously ask, What do I want? How can I get it? .... He loses independence, and more importantly, he loses the desire to be independent: in fact, he does not have the hold of the idea of being an independent individual with his own mind and his own worked-out way of life .... Such order and movement as his life possesses is in conformity with external routines; otherwise his day-to-day experience is a vague chaos .... He does not formulate his desires; they are insinuated into him. And, in the mass, he loses the self-confidence of the human being--if indeed he has ever had it. For life in a society of masses implants insecurity and further impotence; it makes men uneasy and vaguely anxious; it isolates the individual from the solid group; it destroys firm group standards. Acting without goals, the man in the mass just feels pointless (PE: 322-23).

In The Sociological Imagination, Mills comes finally to attach central importance to alienation as did Karl Marx in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Contrary to Becker's remark that "Mills himself was led to neglect the idea of alienation" (1965: 122), it appears that Mills realized, no less than Marx, the magnitude of increasing alienation in man's life. It is alienation that has turned him into a cheerful and willing robot and yet lifeless.
The advent of the alienated man and all the themes which lie behind his advent now affect the whole of our serious intellectual life and cause our immediate intellectual malaise. It is a major theme of the human condition in the contemporary epoch and of all studies worthy of the name. I know of no idea, no theme, no problem, that is so deep in the classic tradition--and so much involved in the possible default of contemporary social science (SI: 171).

The cult of the present is the theme of alienation and the quest of the individual is to search out a breakthrough and transcend powerlessness, fragmentation or manipulation. Alienation stands for detachment of the individual from the social and historical setting of his life, from his value commitments and from his commitments to life. The ascendancy of the cheerful robot is the ascendancy of the alienated man in the mass social order. On the one hand, the individual has become "always somebody's man, the corporation's, the government's, the army's; and he is seen as the man who does not rise .... He is more often pitiful than tragic, as he is seen collectively, fighting impersonal inflation, living out in slow misery his yearning for the quick American climb. He is pushed by forces beyond his control, pulled into movements he does not understand; he gets into situations in which his is the most helpless position" (WC: xii). On the other hand, the society has emerged as "a great salesroom, an enormous file, an incorporated brain, a new universe of management and manipulation" (WC: xv). Against the back-drop, let me illustrate different aspects of alienation to which Mills referred.
Rationalization and Bureaucratization

A basic aspect of Mills' theory of alienation traces its genesis in rationalizing and bureaucratizing tendencies inherent in the large-scale organizations that now make the corporate mass society of America. Foreboding this ominous trend, Weber states that "the fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the 'disenchantment of the world'" (1968: 155).

Karl Mannheim advanced Weber's thesis in his classic Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction wherein he introduced the dichotomy between 'functional rationality' and 'substantive rationality'. Modern industrial societies bear the mark of functional rationalization, and increasing industrialization stands for increased functional rationalization (cf. Mannheim, 1940: 55). With the ascendant trend of functional rationalization in the industrial society, man gradually loses what Mannheim calls 'self-rationalization' which implies his capacity to exercise systematic control over his impulses and accordingly plan his action towards the goal he has in mind. This leads to alienation. As he says,

The average person surrenders part of his own cultural individuality with every new act of integration into a functionally rationalized complex of activities. He becomes increasingly accustomed to being led by others and gradually gives up his own interpretation of events for those which others give him. When the rationalized mechanism of social life collapses in times of crisis, the individual cannot repair it by his own insight. Instead his own impotence reduces him to a state of terrified helplessness (Mannheim, 1940: 59).
Mills combined points of view provided by both Weber and Mannheim and applied the paradigm of 'bureaucratic rationality' to the changed structural contexts of America's industrial society. In doing this he proceeded social psychologically to reveal the differential dimensions of alienation, as are experienced by the mass man. Like these classic masters, he argues that the modern society is no longer characterized by an identification of rationality with reason. In the industrial society, increased rationality does not provide the condition of increased freedom and this is due to the decline of both Marxism and Liberalism. The triumph of science and of its rationality does not mean that man now lives "reasonably and without myth, fraud, and superstition" (SI: 168). The man in the industrial-technological society suffers from what may be called technological malaise. When technique, remarks Ellul, "Enters into every area of life, including the human, it ceases to be external to man and becomes his very substance. It is no longer face to face with man but is integrated with him, and it progressively absorbs him" (1965: 6). Rationally organized arrangements, far from being a means of increased freedom for the individual, are "a means of tyranny and manipulation, a means of expropriating the very chance to reason, the very capacity to act as a free man" (SI: 169). Technological development is no longer an embodiment of reason in history or society. Instead of working toward human liberation, technological rationality works toward human alienation.
The rational organization is .... an alienating organization: the guiding principles of conduct and reflection, and in due course of emotion as well, are not seated in the individual conscience of the Reformation man, or in the independent reason of the Cartesian man. The guiding principles, in fact, are alien to and in contradiction with all that has been historically understood as individuality (SI: 170).

Mills' cry is, therefore, for the loss of individuality— the free man of the Renaissance or the Enlightenment ideal. The alienated man, who has now flourished, is the antithesis of the Western image of man. And the society in which this alienated man, 'the cheerful robot', has flourished is the antithesis of free society, a symptom of the decline of democracy in America. This signifies, for Mills, the decline of the values of reason and freedom. The advent of the alienated man is thus a problem of a loss of reason and freedom in the society and, in this sense, alienation is the trouble of the contemporary individual. In other words, "put as a trouble of the individual--of the terms and values of which he is uneasily unaware--it is the trouble called 'alienation'" (SI: 172). By the same token, alienation is a public issue, an issue of democratic society, as fact and as aspiration (cf. SI: 172).

It is interesting to note that the same conclusion was reached by Fromm. Fromm has found that "the rationality of the system of production, in its technical aspects, is accompanied by the irrationality of our system of production in its social aspects" (1965: 138). Though man has built his world, factorics, cars and clothes, he has become "estranged from the product of his own hands, he is not really the master any
more of the world he has built" (Fromm, 1965: 138). Marcuse, a Freudian like Fromm, also looks at the problem of alienation from the point of view of irrationality of the capitalist system of production. Though the techniques of industrialization are ultimately political techniques, it is to be noted that "as such, they prejudge the possibilities of Reason and Freedom" (Marcuse, 1966: 18). The truth is that "the core of Marcuse's work is a critique of technologial rationality--that is, an evaluation of its present impact on individuals and society and an analysis of its interconnected positive and negative features" (Leiss, 1971: 399). In his own analysis of commodity fetishism Marx has shown, quite decisively, how the market mechanism within the capitalist society turns not only the products of human labor but also human beings into commodities. ".... the existence of things qua commodities, and the value-relation between the products of labor which stamps them as commodities, have absolutely no connection with their physical properties and with the material relations arising therefrom. There it is a definite social relation between men that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things" (Marx, 1970: 72). In his own analysis of alienation Mills, like Fromm, pursues Marx's basic assertion that in capitalism every thing including man is turned into a marketable commodity. This could be illustrated by Mills' reference to American society as The Great Salesroom or The Enormous File.
The Individual in the Great Salesroom: Whether one is really a salesman or not, says Mills, "the salesman's world has now become everybody's world, and, in some part, everybody has become a salesman" (WC: 161). The mass character of this salesman's society has all the qualities of impersonal bureaucratic and commercial relationships that permeate its length and breadth. Salesmanship is almost an independent force that keeps the mass consumption society in its highest gear of production. The centralized control separates him from the product of labor or the processes of the creation of the product. Describing the alienation of the individual salesman, Mills says:

As the organization of the market becomes tighter, the salesman loses autonomy. He sells the goods of others, and has nothing to do with the pricing. He is alienated from the price fixing and product selection. Finally, the last autonomous feature of selling, the art of persuasion and the sales personality involved, becomes expropriated from the individual salesman. Such has been the general tendency and drift, in the store as well as on the road (WC: 181).

The salesgirl shares, probably more, the alienating experiences of her male counterpart. There is seldom any area of her personality that remains immune from adroit management required of successful salesmanship. The result of this is self-alienation. "In the normal course of her work, because her personality becomes the instrument of an alien purpose, the salesgirl becomes self-alienated" (WC: 184). The centralization of salesmanship in the new society has given rise to the personality traits and develop ruthless techniques for sharpening them. The production of "high powered sales personal-
"ity," to borrow a phrase of Mills', is only an aspect of commodity production in the capitalist-mass society of America. The new socioeconomic role that the individual occupies in this personality market gives rise to what Mills calls "marketing mentality" (WC: 182). This reminds us of Fromm's concept of "marketing orientation." "His sense of value depends on his success: on whether he can sell himself favorably, whether he can make more of himself than he started out with, whether he is a success" (Fromm, 1955: 129). Mills' analysis reaches the same conclusion, revealing the same self-alienated image of the individual. On the one side, the sales personality is a symbol for success since it has become "a dominating type, a pervasive model of imitation for masses of people, in and out of selling" (WC: 187). On the other, the personality market which has resulted from the conversion of society into the great salesroom shows how unmistakable signs of "all pervasive distrust and self-alienation so characteristic of metropolitan people" (WC: 187-88). In this epoch of unabated rationalization and bureaucratization, manifest in the managerial demijuge, the individual in the office is a minute part of the gigantic apparatus. This has paved the way for increased alienation from fragmentation of tasks, from expropriation of a total view of the operative process, from loss of solidarity of primary contacts and from negative satisfaction in work. They constitute, in his words, "the model of the future" (WC: 212).
Alienation of the Intellectual: Mills' continued interest in the alienation of the intellectuals, while adding a new dimension to the contemporary theme, could be considered a part of the general tradition in the intellectual mood of the Western world. Attesting to this, Hofstadter writes: "A self-conscious concern with alienation, far from being peculiar to American intellectuals in our time, has been a major theme in the life of the intellectual communities of the Western world for almost two centuries" (1963: 398).

Amid a general acquiscent mood of the intellectuals toward cultural adaptation and conformity following the turmoil-ridden years of Second World War, Mills was one of the few, prominently with Howe and Mailer, who raised the voice of protest. In 1944 he said:

We continue to know more and more about modern society, but we find the centers of political initiative less and less accessible. This generates a personal malady that is particularly acute in the intellectual who has labored under the illusion that his thinking makes a difference. In the world of today the more his knowledge of affairs grows, the less effective the impact of his thinking seems to become. Since he grows more frustrated as his knowledge increases, it seems that knowledge leads to powerlessness (PPP: 293).

In 1959 he articulated the problem in terms of its relations to capitalist social institutions. "In capitalist societies over the last two centuries, all that has happened to work in general—in a word, alienation—is now rapidly happening to cultural, scientific, and artistic endeavor" (PPP: 226).

Elsewhere he urged the intellectuals to "confront capitalism
as one type of political economy .... (CWT: 142).

The estrangement of the intellectual is not a simple retreat from reason or due to a lack of radical movements and decline of "marxism as a packaged intellectual option."

In the corporate economy, there are "others"--capitalists--who "own and operate the mass media" and stand between the intellectuals and publics (cf. PPP: 226). They own the cultural means of production, as they own the other means of production. At the same time, many of the intellectuals are salaried employees in institutions directly or indirectly controlled by corporate owners. Thus the intellectual has become a hired man of an industry or corporate business and the fact remains that, as Mills remarks, "when a man sells the lies of others he is also selling himself. To sell himself is to turn himself into a commodity. A commodity does not control the market; its nominal worth is determined by what the market will offer" (WC: 153). And one can anticipate how much this mass market can offer the intellectuals in the long run. The reason is not difficult to understand, for ultimately in this society "science-technology, far from being a negative force for critical assessment of events and governmental policies, has been a positive instrument in assessing the positive role of corporations and government to influence events in the directions favorable to the interests of the marketeers" (Smith, 1973: 166). It is in this light that the shifts in the attitudes of contemporary intellectuals
towards America may be understood. In viewing this in terms of "from what to what" Mills explains the nature of the shifts:

From a political and critical orientation toward life and letters to a more literary and less politically critical view. Or: generally to a shrinking deference to the status quo; often to a soft and anxious compliance, and always a synthetic, feeble search to justify this intellectual conduct, without searching for alternatives, and sometimes without even political good sense (1952: 446).

However, Mills' attitude to alienation is not merely negative. For most intellectuals it provides an escape route from facts of defeat and powerlessness. "It is a lament and a form of collapse into self-indulgence. It is a personal excuse for lack of political will. It is a fashionable way of being overwhelmed" (WC: 159-60). But alienation is not a cul-de-sac in which the intellectuals are predestined to live in a state of continued passivity. Mills explicitly asserts that "there is no reason to make a political fetish out of it" (PPP: 301). Elsewhere he says in no dubious terms:

So long as they are intellectuals, they must reason and investigate and, with their passion to know, they must confront the situations of all men everywhere. That he expects this of himself is the mark of the intellectual as a type of social and moral creature. That he is alienated is another way of saying that he is capable of transcending drift, that he is capable of being man on his own (CWT: 125).

It is not an assertion of negativism towards responsibility, but a positive stance, as also a way, to transcend negativism and fulfil responsibility. It is not a resentment for exclusion of intellectuals from places of power and recognition
but an exhortation to all those concerned in affairs of the society. It is not, finally, an expression of defeatism, but a realization that "the capacity to formulate radical views and higher standards is an advantage which the alienation that individual enjoy and suffer makes available to them" (CWT: 140).

Work, Private Property and the Division of Labor

Although John Stuart Mill anticipated very well workers' alienation, it was in Marx that the theory reached its climax.\(^{11}\) In course of time it became the root of modern interest in the alienation of labor. It may be added, not without reason, that it provides for many including Mills the basis of an adequate social psychological framework within which alienation of the worker could be fruitfully explained. Mills' analysis of the workers' alienation is supportive, at least in broad terms, of Marx's thesis. It also fills in the gap left behind by Marx, for changes in the conditions of labor in the advanced industrial societies have necessitated a fresh reappraisal of the problem. Mills' thesis in this respect is based upon cues from Weber, and therefore, Weber's influence upon Mills may be looked upon, among others, as a reason of his deviation from Marx.\(^{12}\) The psychical exploitations, of which Marx was quite aware, are not, as Mills argues, "rooted in capitalism alone and as such. They are also coming about in non-capitalist and post-capitalist societies. They
are not necessarily rooted either in the private ownership or in the state ownership of the means of production; they may be rooted in the facts of mass industrialization itself" (TM: lll). The fact that alienation is not a problem of any capitalist society, as Mills argued, has now found corroboration by many.13 The question, as Mills raises, is that "the attitude of men towards the work they do, in capitalist and in non-capitalist societies, is very much an empirical question, and one to which we do not have adequate answers" (TM: lll).

(1) Mills' Model of Craftsmanship and Alienation: It is worthwhile to note how Mills proceeds to highlight the social psychology of alienation that engulfs both the salaried employees and the wage workers in America's industrial-mass society based upon concrete foundations of corporate capitalism. In this society the meaning of work no longer corresponds either to the secularized gospel of work as compulsion or to the humanist view of it as craftsmanship. The historical work ethic does not provide the motive force for work. For almost everyone "work has a generally unpleasant quality .... For the white-collar masses, as for wage earners generally, work seems to serve neither God nor whatever they may experience as divine in themselves. In them there is no taut will-to-work, and few positive gratifications from their daily round" (WC: 219). Elsewhere, he asserts, echoing Marx, "Underneath virtually all experience of work today, there is a
fatalistic feeling that work per se is unpleasant" (WC: 229).

Marx has provided in the 1844 Manuscripts a model of "man in industrial society," not merely "a philosopher's projection of his ways of feeling on to a model of an industrial worker" (cf. Clayre, 1974: 58). In the like manner, Mills has constructed a model of craftsmanship that portrays man's social role as a worker in the industrial society. The features of his model may briefly be stated here as follows:

There is no ulterior motive in work other than the product being made and the processes of its creation. The details of daily work are meaningful because they are not detached in the worker's mind from the product of the work. The worker is free to control his working action. The craftsman is thus able to learn from his work; and to use and develop his capacities and skills in its prosecution. There is no split of work and play, or work and culture. The craftsman's way of livelihood determines and infuses his entire mode of life (WC: 220).

In fact, Mills' conception of work as craftsmanship is an amalgam of diverse intellectual traditions. He draws upon the works of Tolstoy, Carlyle, Ruskin and Morris, on the one hand, and of Marx and Engels on the other; and both groups, in their turn, drew their inspiration from the Renaissance tradition of work. Most of them harbor in their mind an image of work that is supposed to have been better in the past days--say, in the early origins of civilization, in the culture of primitive peoples, in the medieval period or in the pre-industrial craftsmanship and agricultural labor. In constructing his model of craftsmanship Mills has also an image of work "as it should be," which he compared with work "as it is" in
the contemporary conditions of industrialization. The question which remains to be answered is that how far these theorists are justified, in the words of Clayre, "in believing that there was any past age in which ordinary experience of most men at work was dramatically more happy and satisfying than that of men at work in their own time" (1974: 86).

(2) The Private Property: In this regard, Mills finds, like Marx, capitalism as a breeding ground of alienation for both white- and blue-collar workers. Mills points out in no less clear terms that "the objective alienation of man from the product and the process of work is entailed by the legal framework of modern capitalism and the modern division of labor" (WC: 225). Elsewhere, he reiterates the theme by saying that "the alienation of the individual from the product and the process of his work came about, in the first instance, as a result of the drift of modern capitalism" (WC: 233). Work is no longer self-creativity, as Marx thinks; it has been trivialized into what Mills calls 'marketable activity' in which worker's personality or his personal traits become part of the means of production. In other words, man "instrumentalizes and externalizes intimate features of his person and disposition (WC: 225). In so far as capitalism is concerned, if the institution of private property is one reason, the division of labor is then another. The structural transformation of the rural world of small entrepreneurs into an urban society of dependent employees has given rise to the institution of "property conditions of alienation from product and processes
psychologically detached from him, and this detachment cuts the nerve of meaning which work might otherwise gain from its technical processes .... As tool becomes machine, man is estranged from the intellectual potentialities and aspects of work; and each individual is routinized in the name of increased and cheaper per unit productivity (WC: 225-26).

But as essential difference between Marx and Mills may be noted at this point of discussion. For Marx, the capitalist market turns everything into commodities, not only the products which acquire exchange value and are sold as commodities but also the producers, the makers themselves. In contrast to this, for Mills, it is not so much the capitalist market as it is the bureaucratized enterprise which is at the back of expropriation of rationality, resulting thereby in alienation. In the Weberian tradition, he postulates that "not the market as such but centralized administrative decisions determine when men work and how fast" (WC: 226). At the same time he also sounds very much alike when Mills says that "the enterprise is an impersonal and alien Name, and the more that is placed in it, the less is placed in man" (WC: 226). The harder the worker works in the bureaucratized enterprise, whether in the office or in the factory, the more he builds up that which dominates his work 'as an alien force, the commodity'. In the manner characteristic of Mannheim, Mills thus comes to conceive of alienation:

The expropriation which modern work organization has carried through (thus) goes far beyond the expropriation of ownership; rationality itself has been expropriated from work and any total
view and understanding of its process. No longer free to plan his work, much less to modify the plan to which he is subordinated; the individual is to a great extent managed and manipulated in his work (WC: 226).

(4) **Other Factors:** Apart from the alienating grounds of private property, the division of labor and the rational bureaucracy, Mills points to three other sources of workers' alienation. He advances, following Weber, that "under modern conditions, the direct technical processes of work have been declining in meaning for the mass of employees, but other features of work--income, power, status--have come to the fore" (WC: 230). First, since the work is a source of income and therefore of security, economic motives operating in the background are its firm rationale. In his the 1844 Manuscripts Marx reminded: "The power to confuse and invert all human and natural qualities, to bring about fraternization of incompatibles, the divine power of money, resides in its character as the alienated and self-alienating species life of man. It is the alienated power of humanity" (1961: 166). For Mills too, money-mindedness in the consumption-orientated society is a new variable of meaninglessness in work. "The division of labor and the routinization of many job areas are reducing work to a commodity, of which money has become the only common denominator .... The sharp focus upon money is part and parcel of the lack of intrinsic meaning that work has come to have" (WC: 230). Second, the meaninglessness in work is correlated to status yearning which, in their turn, depend more or less upon the money the worker is able to earn. The
growth of this development. Its main empirical bases stem from the studies carried out between 1927 and 1939 at the Hawthorne Plant of the Western Electric Company near Chicago.

Mills reacted quite violently to this approach, particularly as developed by Mayo, Roethlisberger, Dickson and others. The new approach, he points out, is an ideologically motivated political formula that attempts to psychologize the problems of industrial relations in the private interests of the growing big business. Put otherwise, the studies of human relations may be considered "part of the attempt to work up new symbols of justification, part of the effort to sophisticate business rhetoric and business outlook" (Mills, 1948a: 202). In White Collar he was more pointed in his criticism. "The need to develop new justifications, and the fact that increased power has not yet been publicly justified, give rise to a groping for more telling symbols of justification among the more sophisticated business spokesmen, who have felt themselves to be a small island in a politically hostile sea of propertyless employees" (WC: 234). Later, Mills called the approach an example of "new illiberal practicality" (SI: 92).

In speaking of the 'adaptive society' as the ideal of the present or future society, Mayo suggests that "in a modern and industrial society ultimate decisions, if they are to be reasonable and progressive, must vest in groups that possess both technical and social understanding" (1975: xlviii). Naturally he assumes that "modern civilization is greatly in need of a new type of administrator who can, metaphorically
speaking, stand outside the situation he is studying" and that, therefore, "the outstanding need of the modern world is the need for investigation and study of organization and the principles of intelligent administration" (Mayo, 1975: 109, 129). In this form of managerialism the management is to understand "the feelings and sentiments of the bottom" and, then, to decide on transferring, upgrading, downgrading, promoting, demoting, placing and selecting the workers in accordance with "the social values" that are conceivably made of the managerial wisdom (cf. Roethlisberger, 1959: 192-93). Trade unions do not appear as competing centers of loyalty for the workers. The same is also true of 'status' and particularly 'power' factors within the work organizations. The fact of the matter is that any reference to power--political and economic conflict of interests--is often dissolved into the problem of securing collaboration from the workers.

As Mills has clearly indicated, the managerial attempt to boost up workers' morale is linked with the plain fact that the workers are alienated in one form or another. The hierarchical nature of the social structure of industrial workplaces and the routinized character of job commitments, under mechanized division of labor, demand that the workers be in managerial terms. Stated otherwise, "morale in a modern American factory has to do with the cheerful obedience on the part of the worker, resulting in efficient prosecution of the work at hand, as judged by management" (SI: 93). Under-
standably, such a morale approximates neither to that of the Adam Smith-Jeffersonian unalienated man nor to that of Marx's unalienated species being. Mills calls such a worker 'cheerful robot'--the image of alienated man in Mills' political sociology. (His powerlessness, a product of alienation, follows from his work roles in the authoritarian structure of modern industry.) "The morale projected by the 'human relations' experts is the morale of men who are alienated but who have conformed to managed or conventional expectations of 'morale'" (SI: 94).

Management's effort to create job enthusiasm reflects lack of workers' spontaneity for job commitments which are more often than not routinized tasks in the mechanized and rationalized work situations of mass production. This amounts to, as Mills reminds us of Marx's statement, attempts to conquer work alienation within the bounds of alienation. Power is not a negligible aspect in the work organizations and any sociology of firms "must inquire into the relations between strategy, balance and the politics of the firm" (Touraine, 1971: 147). Mills' emphasis on the power dimension is in conformity to his discovery of structural trends in the society. The question of 'morale' is not separate from but related to 'power' in the work milieus. Both provide clues to the etiological background of work alienation. To sum up in the words of Mills:
The theoretical problem of industrial sociology, as it comes to an intellectual and political climax in the conception of morale, is a problem of exploring the several types of alienation and morale which we come upon as we consider systematically the structure of power and its meanings for the individual lives of workmen. It requires us to examine the extent to which psychological shifts have accompanied structural shifts; and in each case, why. In such directions lies the promise of a social science of modern man's working life (SI: 95 footnote).

Leisure, Consumption and Alienation

Referring to the alienation of the individual worker due to ascendant trends of rationalization, Mills says: "Alienated from production, from work, he is also alienated from consumption, from genuine leisure" (SI: 170). In his The Theory of the Leisure Class Veblen traced how the rise of the leisure class in America is linked with individual ownership and the division of labor and how the feature of leisure-class life is expressed in "the conventional mark of superior pecuniary achievement and the conventional index of reputability" through a "conspicuous exemption from all useful employment" (cf. 1965: 86-87). Mills went further than his sociological mentor, Veblen. If alienation from labor is one characteristic of life of the industrial man, then alienation from leisure, also consumption, is no less important as a distinguishing mark of contemporary mass living. Leisure ethic now runs through the consciousness of modern man. The theme of leisure activity has turned into an important aspect of mass society (cf. Touraine, 1971: 193).
The mass consumption society travels towards, to borrow a phrase from Touraine, "leisure civilization." For Mills, as for many others, the trend is the same.

As people have more time on their hands, most of it is taken away from them by the debilitating quality of their work, by the pace of their everyday routine, and by the ever-present media of mass distraction.... (A)s work declines in meaning and gives no inner direction or center, leisure becomes the end of life itself, and the leisure ethic swallows up all values, including those of work (PPP: 349).

When work loses its significance or fails to infuse the craftsman's mode of living, it becomes "a sacrifice of time, necessary to building a life outside of it" (WC: 228). Genuine leisure releases, says Mills, "our attention so that we come to know better our true selves and our capacities for creative experience. Beyond animal rest, which is both necessary and for many today quite difficult to get, genuine leisure allows and encourages our development of greater and truer individuality. Leisure ought to be what work ought to be, and what neither of them usually is: a sphere of independent action" (PPP: 350). Viewed in this light, modern worker rarely discovers a genuine leisure which he can utilize privately 'to discover, create and reinforce' his own individuality. As Lasch says, "the work ethic has given way to a 'fun morality', the spirit of calculation to concern with personal well-being and psychic health" (1977: 14).

The ideology of alienated work automatically generates the ideology of alienated leisure. In the mass produc-
tion society leisure activities derive importance from the innumerable ways that are available for consumption, and the process of consumption is no less alienating than that of production. The American worker, Bell remarks, has not been tamed by the discipline of the machine but by the "consumption society" (1967: 254). Consumption in America's mass society means "the satisfaction of artificially stimulated phantasies, a phantasy performance alienated from our concrete, real selves" (Fromm, 1955: 122). The increased availability of leisure time for man is a mark of this technological society. In America the week's average working hours has declined from 70.6 in 1850 to 40.8 in 1950, in addition to a week-end of two complete days (cf. Friedmann, 1961: 105). At the same time leisure activities have multiplied, but the result has been alienation in one form or another. The work ethic is replaced by the leisure ethic, and the split between work and leisure becomes so absolute that "now work itself is judged in terms of leisure values. The sphere of leisure provides the standards by which work is judged; it lends to work such meanings as work has" (WC: 236). Alt has rightly noted that the development of consumerism, accelerated by rise in wages and greater labor, has plagued the working population and has caused erosion of the work ethic. Consumerism is 'a major mechanism for shaping consciousness and reproducing capitalist hegemony'. In his words:

Concerned primarily with the immediate gratifications of familial intimacy and consumerism, they come to tolerate the exploitative labor
and even political authoritarianism so long as the system sustains a rising standard of living. Given its centrality in the reproduction of the economy the culture of daily existence, and political legitimation consumerism has become the major form of domination and reification (Alt, 1976: 55).

When the leisure ethic is stretched over to most spheres of conscious and conspicuous enjoyment, the worker experiences a dysjunction between his work and the rest of his life. The cycle of work gives rise to one image of self—the everyday image based on work. The leisure ethic generates another image of self—the holiday image of self based on leisure. The split within the self produces tensions that usually remain suppressed but which find occasional outbursts especially in the week-end when they steam off along the erotic roads of frenzied enjoyment. Thus, exposure to mass leisure activities, an incidence of commercialization of leisure and culture, does not accelerate but retard the creative life of the working masses.

So work is an unsatisfactory means to ulterior ends lying somewhere in the sphere of leisure. The necessity to work and the alienation from it make up its grind, and the more grind there is, the more need to find relief in the jumpy or dreary models available in modern leisure .... To modern man leisure is the way to spend money, work is the way to make it. When the two compete, leisure wins hands down (WC: 237-38).

Alienation from Status

Mills enriched the sociology of alienation by introducing into it the psychological dimension of status striving.
Following World War II, when the American era of fabled plenty and mass merchandisers made its appearance, the rising standard of living accompanied the growth of a generation of status seekers. As Mills has noted, the preoccupation of Americans with more and more status is a feature of "overdeveloped" society with its production techniques and mass consumption outlets. The overdeveloped society is one in which "the means of livelihood are so great that life is dominated by the struggle for status, based on the acquisition and maintenance of commodities" (PPP: 150). The frantic search for new roads for higher status and its symbols surrounds the new little men more than others in this production-consumption society of the masses. By the mid-fifties America came to be marked, so to say, as society crowded by status seekers--"the people who are continually straining to surround themselves with visible evidence of superior rank they are claiming" (Packard, 1960: 7). For Mills, the distinguishing mark of alienation in this status society is manifest in what he calls "status panic" (cf. WC: 240). Mills has rightly noted that "the enjoyment of prestige is often disturbed and uneasy, that the bases of prestige, the expressions of prestige claims, and the ways these claims are honored, are now subject to a great strain, a strain which often puts men and women in a virtual status panic" (WC: 240). The theoretical postulates of status alienation have been neatly formulated by Packard:

A society that encourages status striving produces .... a good deal of bruising, disappointment and ugly feelings. If a society promotes
the idea that success is associated with upward mobility, those who can't seem to get anywhere are likely to be afflicted with the feeling that they are personal failures, even though the actual situation may be pretty much beyond their control or capacity to change (1960: 326).

The psychology of the middle class man is 'the psychology of status striving' and the phenomenon of status alienation is more a characteristic of the white collar rather than the blue collar workers. However, Mills adds that, in conformity to his thesis of 'blurring the class lines', dominant structural tendencies are leading to what he designates as "status proletarianization" (WC: 249) of the white collar strata. The traditional bases of prestige and, therefore, of status have become informal and fragile. It has meant that alienation from status, the result of morbid strivings for status, has found newer ways of expression.

First, minute gradations of rank and fragmentation of skills cause, because of continuous bureaucratization, the break up of the occupational bases of workers' prestige and, thus lead to status competition and estrangement (cf. WC: 254). Second, the breakdown of community relations and the growing economic insecurity make the prestige relations fleeting and transitory. Leisure activities tend to justify the individual's claims to higher status and, in turn, cause further status alienation. Finally, many individuals, mostly those in the white collar strata, often seek release from the long-run reality of rather fixed positions in life through efforts to
raise themselves, at least temporarily, to higher status. Status cycles provide people in a lower class a chance to act like persons on higher social levels and get away temporarily with it. "Urban masses look forward to vacations, not 'just for the change,' and not only for a 'rest from work'--the meaning behind such phrases is often a lift in successful status claims" (WC: 257).

Alienation from Politics

Alienation in America's mass society is not merely a characteristic of rationalization and bureaucratization processes, of work roles in the capitalist economy, of leisure and consumption, or of status strivings. It has penetrated into the arena of politics and, so argues Mills, political alienation is bound up with mass indifference to politics of this society. The mass man is neither radical nor conservative, neither liberal nor socialist. He is a stranger to politics, either a visionary or an inactionary. The questions of legitimacy of political decisions and institutions appear to have receded apparently behind mass man's estrangement from all concerns of his polity. Rosenberg points out, among other reasons: "In our complex urban mass society, individuals devote themselves to minute specialized tasks woven into the complex fabric of the economy. The great economic and power blocs, typified by giant corporations and unions, thrust the individual about with pressures too power-
ful to resist. As a consequence the individual is likely to feel overwhelmed and powerless" (1951: 9).

For Mills, political alienation meant indifference to or estrangement from "politics as a sphere of loyalties, demands, and hopes" (WC: 326). Whereas politically conscious person finds 'a political meaning' in his own insecurities and desires, and considers himself a demanding 'political force', one who is politically indifferent does not find such meanings in life. Mills defines the politically indifferent persons in the following manner:

The politically indifferent are detached from prevailing political symbols but have no new attachments to counter-symbols. Whatever insecurities and demands and hopes they may have are not focused politically, their personal desires and anxieties being segregated from political symbols and authorities. Neither objective evils nor internal stresses count politically in their consciousness .... To be politically indifferent is to see no political meaning in one's life or in the world in which one lives, to avoid any political disappointments or gratifications. So political symbols have lost their effectiveness as motives for action and as justifications for institutions (WC: 326-27).

When most are preoccupied in private pleasures that so-called Affluence has brought for them all, 'a revulsion from politics and the strain it induces' is anything but natural. Thus to the question, does the ordinary American feel a revulsion from politics? Birnbaum has the following answer which brings out the import of what Mills calls political alienation.

The most striking thing about the country that considers herself the world's most thorough-going democracy is the political passivity of
the populace, the absence of politics. I had the feeling of residing under an ancien régime, which though one without clerics, censors and magistrates to keep down opposition, because without opposition. Consent and affirmation fill the press, are found every other page of serious and scholarly journals, envelop classroom and fall instinctively from the ordinary mouths of ordinary men and women (1958: 43).

Political indifference, as Mills saw, manifests principally in two ways: political meaninglessness and political powerlessness. Both are interrelated since one entails the other. Political meaninglessness exists when the individual is unable or incapacitated to distinguish between alternative political choices because they have lost their meanings for him. Political powerlessness, on the other hand, implies precisely a lack of control over processes of political decision making. Like Fromm or Marcuse, Mills has discovered manipulation at the bottom of political powerlessness.

From the individual's standpoint, much that happens seems the result of manipulation, of management, of blind drift; authority is often not explicit; those with power often feel no need to make it explicit and to justify it. That is one reason why ordinary men, when they are in trouble or when they sense that they are up against issues, cannot get clear targets for thought and for action; they cannot determine what it is that imperils the values they vaguely discern as theirs (SI: 169-70).

Political powerlessness is indicative of a 'malaise' of America's mass social order. Very recently another commentator attests to this:

(Another) aspect of the malaise of American society in the 1960's and the early 1970's is a sense of powerlessness that permeates almost every major stratum and segment of society--
an indication of politics having become more subjective, and unconnected with the more clear-cut issue of measurable social-economic interest and privation.

.... Almost every major stratum of the population simultaneously attributes power and influence to some other group: the blacks to whites, militant feminists to men, the lower middle-class whites to the students and ghetto residents, the radical students to the Establishment, the middle classes to the manipulators of the mass media, the alienated intellectuals to the 'silent majority' (Hollander, 1973: 398-99).

When, therefore, Mills says that "political estrangement in America is widespread and decisive" (WC: 331), it is not difficult to comprehend how it makes sense in the current political realities of American society.

At the back of mass indifference to politics there lies the fact that, speaking historically, politics was never an autonomous region in the capitalist social structure of America. Stated otherwise, in the words of Weinstein, "Liberalism became the movement for state intervention to supervise corporate activity, rather than a movement for the removal of state control over private enterprise" (1972: 191). It thus explains that politics has always been anchored in the economic sphere and that, therefore, the economic rather than the political institutions have been the reigning aspects of the capitalist social structure of America. Mills has also rightly drawn attention to the role of the bi-party system and its working as a contributory cause of fostering political apathy among the masses of people. The traditional two-party system is responsible for the rise of 'opportunistic politics'. 
Neither party has any explicit or articulate view. Nor do they fundamentally differ in issues or making promises. Often it is, to borrow a phrase from Reagan, "a politics of silence, a campaign without issues" (1956: 355). For Mills, By virtue of their increased and centralized power, political institutions become more objectively important to the course of American history, but because of mass alienation, less and less of subjective interest to the population at large. On the one hand, politics is bureaucratized, and on the other, there is mass indifference. These are the decisive aspects of U.S. politics today (WC: 350).

The conditions of mass apathy towards politics have not abated but, on the contrary, they have shown symptoms of continuance as well as of increment, as Mills prophesied in 1951, Most recently, in 1976, Aberbach attests to this. His following observation further illumines what Mills said earlier:

The last decade has been marked by intense social stress, increased ideological polarization and a third-party revolt. Political disaffection has increased steadily as citizens have lost confidence in the personnel and operations of government. Accompanying this situation has been an erosion of party fidelity, in which some voters have drifted away from identification with the major parties and the influence of the parties on voting behavior has diminished .... We are now at juncture where political distrust is growing rapidly, accompanied by a rise in the percentage of the population which does not identify with either of the two major parties (Aberbach, 1976: 26).

Political Alienation from the Mass Media

The role of the mass media has acquired a new significance in so far as it has become a factor in causing
alienating experiences for the people in the society of the masses. "With the broadening of the base of politics within the context of a folk-lore of democratic decision-making, and with the increased means of mass persuasion that are available, the public of public opinion has become the object of intensive efforts to control, manage, manipulate, and increasingly intimidate" (PE: 310). Indeed, the role of the media as a causal factor of political alienation is a unique phenomenon of the large-scale industrial society of contemporary generation of the masses. They are now a new intermediary between the individual's material existence and the psychological awareness of this experience.

Between consciousness and existence stand communications, which influence such consciousness as men have of their existence. Men do 'enter into definite, necessary relations which are independent of their will', but communications enter to slant the meanings of these relations for those variously involved in them. The forms of political consciousness may, in the end, be relative to means of production, but, in the beginning, they are relative to the contents of the communication media (WC: 332-33).

These words sum up precisely the political significance of the media in the modern society; simultaneously it indicates how pervasive the one-dimensionality of the media could be when they are controlled by a single dominant group in the society. In assessing the scope of shared communication in the participation of the public concerns of a political community, Pool notes that "to play that game they must to some extent be informed. There must be a communication system that
tells the public about the state of the world and identifies the issues that must be resolved. Without shared information of those kinds, there would be only private experiences, not a public forum" (1973: 792). Considering this as a starting point, the role of the media in the mass society presents a dismal picture. In the United States the communications system is neither 'autonomous' nor independent; it reflects society selectively, reinforces a generalized version of reality and creates its own world (cf. WC: 334). Or, as Mar-cuse said: "If mass communications blend together harmoniously, and often unnoticeably art, politics, religion and philosophy with commercials, they bring these realms of culture to their common denominator--the commodity form" (1966: 57).

The political role of the media in the mass society could be better explained in terms of its content and accompanying message. They create, process, refine and transmit messages and information that give rise to a world of false consciousness and that never correspond to the actual life conditions of the individual. On the contrary, by using myths they explain, justify and at times glamorize the prevailing conditions of existence. In a nation that has "6,700 commercial radio stations, more than 700 commercial TV stations, 1,5000 daily newspapers, hundreds of periodicals, a film industry that produces a couple of hundred new features a year, and a billion-dollar private book-publishing industry" (Schiller, 1973: 19), it is amazing to note that
the world created by the mass media contains little political discussion. Despite this existence of enormous media pluralism, the multichannel ecommunication flow does not provide adequate political message or information in their media content. The controversial issues are eliminated in order to maximize the number of consumers and therefore the media exhibit manifest symptoms of ingrained institutional inability to highlight latent bases of social conflict. Freire notes that "the oppressors develop a series of methods precluding any presentation of the world as a problem and showing it rather as a fixed reality, as something given--something to which man, as mere spectators, must adapt" (1971: 135). As the present day cultural-informational apparatus of the mass media functions, they rarely highlight what Mills calls 'the deprivations and insecurities' arising from structural positions and historical changes. In terms of ideological politics, the mass media have become entertainment media in the leisure-oriented mass society.

.... the mass media do not display counter-loyalties and demands to the ruling loyalties and demands which they make banal. They are polite, disguising indifference as tolerance and broadmindedness; and they further buttress the disfavor in which those who are 'against things' are held. They trivialize issues into personal squabbles, rather than humanize them by asserting their meanings for you and for me. They formalize adherence to prevailing symbols by pious standardization of worn-out phrases, and when they are 'serious', they merely get detailed about more of the same, rather than give big close-ups of the human meanings of political events and decisions (WC: 335).
This brings us to the central aspect of political alienation—manipulation—by the mass media. In the same manner it is here that the question of ownership and management of the media networks assumes importance since it is the mainspring of manipulation of the masses. Manipulation is a technique of social control and an instrument of domination. It lacks public legitimation, and in this sense it is "the 'secret' exercise of power, unknown to those who are influenced" (PE: 316). In the mass society, divided into elites and masses, manipulation is a necessary instrument of control in the hands of those who have the power to exercise but not the legitimation to do so. The technology of mass media is made to respond to the needs of capitalist growth and the entire system of media production, distribution and consumption is geared to this. The primary role of the media is to instill and reinforce the capitalism's belief, though indubitably false, that material goods bring individual happiness and are path to personal salvation (cf. Gintis, 1972: 283). It is in this context that the question which Mills raises in regard to media's role becomes important: "... Why do mass communication agencies contain such persistently non-political or falsely political content" (WC: 339)? His answer is also too clear:

These agencies are of course owned and directed by a small group of people, to whose interest it is to present individual success stories and other divertissement rather than the facts of collective successes and tragedies (WC: 339).
The fact of the matter is that in America mass media have developed into a large-scale industry and operate according to commercialized norms of capitalist ownership. They are firmly tied to the corporate economy. The corporate structure that controls the media networks has now transcended the national boundaries (cf. Read, 1976: 3). It is widening the chasm between elites and masses in the developing nations. It is meddling with their internal affairs. It is manipulating the public opinion at the national and international level. Above all, it has become the purveyor of American mass standards and homogenizing influences. To state otherwise, the transnational flow of the American media of communication has established a process of socializing foreign media consumers into the corporate norms predetermined by media merchants and managers in the United States. "The international commerce in mass media, insofar as U.S. merchants are concerned, is dominated by a handful of organizations that also hold commanding positions in the American domestic market" (Read, 1976: 4). It is in this respect that Mills' apprehensions as to the role of the media in the mass society acquire validity:

The mass media hold a monopoly of the ideologically dead; they spin records of political emptiness. To banalize prevailing symbols and omit counter-symbols, but above all, to divert from the explicitly political, and by contrast with other interests to make 'politics' dull and threadbare--that is the political situation of the mass media, which reflect and reinforce the political situation of the nation (WC: 335-36).
If this is not true in toto one must not ignore, then, the point that, in the words of Read, "America's mass media merchants have become controversial both for what they say and for having their ability to say it" (1976: 179).

**Mills and Alienation: An Assessment**

With regard to alienation in America's mass society, Mills' depiction, without any doubt, conforms by and large to that of many other theorists, both Liberal and Marxist. The present debate no longer concerns its existence but rather centers around the extent to which it exists. The development of the vast literature of the sociology of alienation has proceeded generally alongside the tremendous growth of sociology in America, and much of the literature has developed on the basis of America social experience. On the one side, much of the theoretical development of alienation literature took place because American social scientists became involved in the debate about the validity of Marx's formulations of the concept and its applicability to the modern industrial-social situations. A glance over the contents of the leading journals of sociology and its allied social sciences especially from 1950 on will evidence the social scientists' enthusiasm for alienation studies. On the other side, the rapid development of the literature was only possible because the studies were largely fed by data from the American society especially following the World War II.
In this evolution of the sociology of alienation Mills' contribution, as has been illustrated throughout this present chapter, is scarcely insignificant. A modest estimate is provided by Horowitz in these words:

Once Marx opened (this) pandora's box of the social and cross-cultural locale of alienation, it was just a matter of time before others would see alienation of different social sectors from those Marx had dealt with. Thus, for example, in a modern view of bourgeois society, that held by C. Wright Mills, alienation comes to be understood as a lower middle class phenomenon, something that debases salesgirls, technicians, and even intellectuals in a similar way. In this Mills provided not only a bridge from one class to another, but even more importantly, a way of viewing alienation as a problem for all nonruling classes, not only the factory-anchored urban proletariat (1968: 105).

In spite of the charges against the concept of alienation that it is used to signify "the most banal of dyspepsias as well as the deepest of metaphysical fears" (Jay, 1973: xiii), that this all-inclusive term "denotes practically everything and connotes nothing" (Zordon, 1972: 20), that it is "an atrocious word" (Johnson, 1973: 3), and that "what it says can be better said without it" (Feuer, 1963: 145), social scientists have gone well with the alienation studies. 16

In this connection a brief comparison of Mills with Marx may be made since, as has been noted, both have attached central importance to the concept of alienation, though for different reasons and in different ways.

As a plain marxist, Mills accepts Marx's concept as "brilliant and illuminating" or as "a quick rationalist
conception." As has been noted, like Marx, he has also found origins of alienating causes in the core of capitalism. His discussion of work, private property, the division of labor or money bear much testimony to Marx's influence, as a classic sociologist, on Mills. Plasek has rightly said that the more Marxist approaches among contemporary sociological and empirical studies "include some of the works of C. Wright Mills" (1974: 320 footnote). However, in spite of Mills' marxist bias in his analysis of alienation, he was unable to accept capitalism as the fountain source of alienation in modern man's life. On the contrary, he says that "the variety and the causes of alienation go beyond Marx's cryptic and not too clear comments about it" (TM: 111). Although as a matter of fact Mills revealed at times more dimensions of alienation than Marx, it seems, on the basis of a vast array of Marxist literature on alienation, that he has underrated the all-round significance of the capitalist contexts of social and self-alienation. Mills' differences with Marx in respect of this theme may be illustrated in terms of his own intellectual orientations as well as institutional developments within American sociology itself. On the one hand, Mills was intellectually more predisposed to influences of Weber and Mannheim, especially in regard to the rise of bureaucratic rationality in course of industrializing processes of the society. In later days of his life he was disillusioned
with what he calls 'labor metaphysic'. In addition, Mills' acceptance of the intelligentsia in preference to the masses as the main agency of sociohistorical change has stood in his way of realizing the pervasiveness of alienation in a particular mode of production, that of capitalism. Rather than looking, therefore, from a Marxist standpoint, he approached the theme admittedly declaring to be a liberal democrat in the classic tradition. Herein lies the importance of difference arising out of his intellectual and political orientations. On the other hand, Mills' deviation from Marx can be understood as a function of dual set of facts. First, Mills' attitude to Marx is in part linked with Weber's, not Marx's, reception in the mainstreams of American sociology, although "the American response to Weber is considerably differentiated" (Horowitz, 1968: 189). It is needless to mention here that overwhelming impact of Weber's reception in American sociology is an important reason behind the critical attitude of mainstream sociologists such as Parsons and other members of his structural-functional school. In this sense, the firmament toward more Marxist approach in sociological themes is of fairly recent origin in American sociology. Second, Mills' approach to alienation is also a part of the tradition along which most of American studies of alienation have proceeded. Plasek has found that American studies estimate alienation as "one of the forms of consciousness found among those involved in social problems. Certain structural conditions and their interaction with
various beliefs may be found to produce alienation" (1974: 325). In contrast to this, Marxist studies treat consciousness of alienation as a function of capitalism, that is of a given set of socioeconomic conditions. While both approaches are helpful in revealing the multidimensionality of the alienation phenomena, the difference can hardly be underestimated.

In criticizing Marx, Mills states that his conception of alienation contains "mixed moral judgements." Into his conception, Marx has jammed, says Mills, "his highest and most noble image of man--and his fiercest indignation about the crippling of man by capitalism. And he has the strong tendency to impute in an optative way, these judgements to the psychological realities of the work men do and the life men lead. Often these are not the realities men experience" (TM: 111). Even if Mills' description of the sociopsychological faces of alienation in different sectors of social life is considered to be an improvement upon Marx's own, it can hardly be said that his own conception of the image of man "as an actor in historic crises, and of man as a whole entity" (CSS: xiii-iv) is empirically more valid. Mills' own conception is rather a standard image of man as a social creature in sociology. In spite of many inadequacies that it might have, Marx's theory no where misses the basic point of human exploitation. Just like Mills, Marx was not a 'Messiah' indeed. The plain fact is that both started with the background images of man in their respective minds and then subsequently followed different routes only to prove humanists at the end. In
regard to the elimination of alienation, Marx was positive in its transcendence with the disappearance of capitalism and establishment of a communist society. Communism, says Marx, "turns existing conditions into conditions of unity. The reality, which communism is creating, is precisely the true basis for rendering it impossible that anything should exist independently of individuals, insofar as reality is only a product of the preceding intercourse of individuals themselves" (1972: 157). Compared to this Marxist solution, Mills called for the restoration of 'free individuality' and for the restoration of 'reason' in human affairs. Put otherwise, Mills wished the return of men of the Renaissance tradition, that is, "men of substantive reason, whose independent reasoning would have structural consequences for their societies, its history, and thus for their own life fates" (SI: 174). In effect he wanted a revival of liberal democracy in its classic tradition. But this was, as it were, running against the tide of times. Had he lived beyond 1962, at least for some time, he would have seen, given the transformation of corporate-capitalist economy of America, that the prospect of restoration of reason and freedom in the liberal democratic tradition is a far fetched one. One cannot overcome alienation within the existent world of alienation. The beneficiaries of post-Worl War II prosperity are now involved in the paradox of alienation. The American social system is facing "onslaught from all sides and alienation has been the
harbinger of the depth of the crisis" (Mizruchi, 1973: 124). The problem of alienation is a problem of political economy, that of capitalism. The point is whether abolition of the capitalist mode of production should precede abolition of anti-people bureaucracies as the pre-condition for the onset of progressive disalienation. For the time being, one can agree with what Pappenheim says: "Capitalism can no longer play a positive role today. And a system geared to commodity production and based on competition cannot help man to contend with the forces of alienation" (1967: 31). In spite of his failure to realize this, it is heartening to learn from Mills, even when he is betrayed by the on-march of events and the run of times, the following:

'Man's chief danger' today lies in the unruly forces of contemporary society itself, with its alienating methods of production, its developing techniques of political domination, its international anarchy—in a word, its pervasive transformations of the very 'nature' of man and the conditions and aims of his life (SI: 13).
Notes

1. The list of mass theorists is long. However, for many parallels in respect of alienating tendencies in American social life, see Marcuse (1966), Fromm (1955, 1965) and Riesman (1973) in particular.

2. See Seeman (1967) and Lystadt (1972: 91, 102).


4. It is to be noted that Mills does not offer any precise definition of the concept of alienation. Rather he describes its differential aspects. Naturally, I have avoided attempting its conceptualization or specifying its indices.

5. For example see his articles (1) "Mass Society and Liberal Education" (1954) and (2) "The Big City: Private Troubles and Public Issues" (1959), both of which are contained in Power, Politics and People.

6. More or less in this way Israel calls this "a discrepancy theory of alienation" (1971: 203).

7. For an earlier but different version, see Andrew (1970).

8. It must, however, be noted that there is a basic difference between Mills and Marx in their respective analyses of alienation. Mills does not focus on alienation with any specific discussion of the forces and relations of production, as Marx did in his Capital.

9. Mills' views on how intellectuals have emerged as hired research technicians of the Establishment appear in Chapter 3, especially at pp. 112-114. See also pp. 133-35 of Chapter 4.

10. Italics added.


12. A comparison between two viewpoints of Marx and Mills has been attempted in the concluding section of this chapter.

13. For example, see Almasi (1965), Vranicki (1966), Schaff (1970) and also Novack (1973).
14. Briefly stated, Mills' thesis about the blurring of any worthwhile distinction between the white- and blue-collar workers is as follows: In the present capitalist society both the wage workers and the salaried employees are fast becoming dependent occupational category. "In terms of property, the white-collar people are not 'in between Capital and Labor'; they are exactly in the same property-class position as the wage workers" (WC: 71). For different evaluations of Mills' thesis, see Hamilton And Wright (1975: 21-22), Rainwater (1971: 207), Dahrendorf (1959: 55-56), Westley and Westley (1971: 54), Carchedi (1975a; 1975b; 1975c) and Johnson (1977).

15. To be noted is the fact that it was Fromm who popularized the concept of alienation as far back as 1941 when he published his Escape from Freedom. In 1961, he introduced Marx's Manuscripts to American readers through his publication of Marx's Concept of Man. The critical political mood then prevailing--the McCarthy period--is understandable in the fact that Marx's writings were published not in Marx's but in Fromm's name. The publications of Schacht (1970) and Israel (1971) attest to continued interest of the sociologists in the theme of alienation.

16. See, for example, Seeman (1975). A less useful but, on the whole, a readable summary of empirical studies on alienation can be found in Mouledoux and Mouledou (1975).

17. For example, Ollman and Meszaros, along with Fromm, Sweezy, Korsch, Novack, Mandel and others, have made abundantly clear the pervasiveness of alienation in capitalist society. See especially Meszaros (1970) and Ollman (1976).

18. In Chapter 7, I trace the origins of Mills' disillusionment with the Marxian thesis of the working class as a revolutionary change agent for social transformation.

19. In this revival of Marxism in American sociology, Mills was, however, one of the leading sociologists. See Swingehood (1975: 2) and Friedrichs (1970: 259-60).
CHAPTER SIX

Political Sociology

Introduction: Towards the Radical Alternative

In offering a radical alternative to the academic model of establishment sociology, Mills sought to construct a conception of sociology in all its political, intellectual and moral implications relevant to the changed contexts of self and society since World War II. As early as 1942, when Mills reviewed W. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Hunt's The Social Life of a Modern Community, he came to realize the need for a basic reorientation of focus in the studies of sociological theory and research. Along with the various theoretical and methodological issues which he raised in the review, Mills directly pointed to a lack of "sociological imagination" (PPP: 50) in the work. Few years later, in 1953, Mills discovered how sociologists, in their search for generalized model, slipped into the grip of the methods of the physical sciences and essentially fetishized these techniques. At the same time his commitment to the basic tradition of sociology became increasingly evident, and he continued to speak of an imaginative sociology that would rest on both molecular terms and macroscopic concepts. Stressing the need for a "consciousness," he says that "the sociological enterprise requires macroscopic researchers to imagine more technically,
as well as with scope and insight; it requires technicians to go about their work with more imaginative concern for macroscopic meaning as well as with technical ingenuity" (PPP: 566). A year later, in 1954, Mills conceived sociology as a human enterprise. He intended sociology to be a "common denominator" and, accordingly, raised questions as to society, personality and history (cf. PPP: 572). For him these are the major themes, as also orienting points, of sociological analysis. Both theorists and research technicians of sociology, contends Mills,

"... are going to have to drop their trivialization of subject matter and their pretensions about method. Both are going to have to face up to the realities of our time. And both are going to have to acquire the humanist concern ... for excellence of clear and meaningful expression (PPP: 576).

At the bottom of Mills' humanistic concern there lie the agonizing experiences of the common man--the alienated man in the emergent mass society of postwar America. In the mid-fifties he notes the impact on mass man of the levelling influences of urban and industrial civilization, of the standardization of big technology and of the media of mass communication. It was a period "moral uneasiness" and of disintegration of "liberal values in the modern world." As he writes: "Internationally and domestically, the death of political ideas in the United States coincides with the general intellectual vacuum to underpin our malaise" (PPP: 188). Elsewhere, speaking in more explicit terms, he goes on to say in a clear Durkheimian language:
The moral uneasiness of our time—in politics and economics, in family life, educational institutions, and even in our churches—is due to this key fact: the older values and codes of uprightness no longer grip us, nor have they been replaced by new values and codes which would lend moral meaning and sanction to the life-routines we must now follow (PPP: 332).

Gradually the theme of "private uneasiness and public indifference" as also "the political default of cultural workmen" to recognize "imperilled values" came to occupy the focus of Mills' sociological imagination. From the point of view of a politically conceived sociology, "the unfulfilled promise of political thinking that is also culturally sensible stems from the failure to assert the values as well as the perils, and the relationship between them" (PPP: 387).

The task of his political sociology would then, predictably, be a study of troubles and issues in the context of the decline of liberal values of reason, freedom and truth—the watchwords of the Enlightenment. And the questions which such a sociology raises in fulfillment of these tasks are as follows:

(1) What is the structure of this particular society as a whole? What are its essential components, and how are they related to one another? How does it differ from other varieties of social order? Within it, what is the meaning of any particular feature for its continuance and for its change?

(2) Where does this society stand in human history? What are the mechanics by which it is changing? What is its place within and its meaning for the development of humanity as a whole? How does any particular feature we are examining affect, and how is it affected
by, the historical period in which it moves? And this period—what are its essential features? How does it differ from other periods? What are its characteristic ways of history making?

(3) What varieties of men and women now prevail in this society and in this period? And what varieties are coming to prevail? In what ways are they selected and formed, liberated and repressed, made sensitive and blunted? What kinds of 'human nature' are revealed in the conduct and character we observe in this society in this period? And what is the meaning for 'human nature' of each and every feature of the society we are examining (SI: 6-7).

These fundamental questions, underlying the territorial ambit of the Millsian sociology, are in effect an articulation of the sociological tasks which Mills conceived in 1954. In raising these questions as to the structure of society, the role of this specific society in this specific historical period, and the dominant personality types now prevailing at the helm of institutional arrangements, Mills has made an appreciable attempt in The Sociological Imagination (1959) to direct working sociologists' attention to such issues as would provide the goals and orientations for sociology itself. It has been rightly asserted that "unbiased answers to these questions would have radical implications." That is, an objective analysis in the direction that these questions point would undermine the established theories and unexamined assumptions on which corporate capitalism is based" (Szymanski, 1970: 7-8). Stated in critical words, the answers provide, on the one hand, a radical critique of the liberal mythology theorized in the rhetorics of the establish-


ment sociology, and on the other, outline a counter conception of sociology as a preferred alternative.

Let me illustrate this. From the point of view of its component social structures American society is undeniably a social structure of corporate capitalism in its form. The state exists to articulate the needs of corporate institutions and has been an ideological and legitimating apparatus to maintain the equilibrium of the liberal society and also to promote the goals of capitalism. Whereas corporations, the institutions of state apparatus, the military, the universities or the Church are the essential ingredients of the social structure of capitalist society in America, the primary functions of the family, the mass media or educational institutions have been positive expedients to socialize masses to the ideological consciousness of a liberal society. Next, American society stands, from the standpoint of history, at this historical moment for monopoly capitalism in all its global consequences for every nations, developed or developing. The internationalized capitalist system has been, among other things, an alliance of the ruling classes in both developed and developing nations. The "Free World" is not now conducive to reason and freedom, as Mills thought, but it is "always receptive to capitalism" (Gurley, 1970: 50). Again, there is little doubt that in the modern societies the dominant human type now prevailing is one of the bureaucrat. Its prominence has followed the historic development of capitalism in its organic-solidary relationship with the principle
of bureaucratic rationality. Historically, the marriage between capitalism and bureaucracy has been consequential not because of bureaucracy's inherent rationality and efficiency but because of its ability to organize the productive apparatus for accumulation and internationalization of capital (cf. Edwards, 1972: 119). The conception of sociology which Mills conceives in radical terms has to realize its potential through, on the one hand, what he calls "the sociological imagination," and through, on the other, its revitalization in terms of the political ideals of classic liberalism. While the sociological imagination constitutes the life-essence of this new sociology of radicalism, liberal ideals of reason and freedom give it necessary direction and orientation. Both are symbiotic aspects of one and same sociological enterprise.

**The Sociological Imagination:** What then is the concept of the sociological imagination? What does it stand for? How is the concept the life-essence of radical sociology? Mills' own answer is as follows:

The sociological imagination enables its possessor to understand the larger historical scene in terms of its meaning for the inner life and the external career of a variety of individuals. It enables him to take into account how individuals, in the welter of their daily experience, often become falsely conscious of their social positions. Within that welter, the framework of modern society is sought, and within that framework the psychologies of a variety of men and women are formulated. By such means the personal uneasiness of individuals is focused upon explicit troubles and the indifference of publics is transformed into involvement with public issues (SI: 5).
The concept of sociological imagination indicates, without doubt, the culmination of Mills' vision of ultimate moral, intellectual and political fulfillment of the promises of sociology. While the very formulation of the concept marks the acme of personal glory in the entire intellectual career of Mills as a sociologist, nothing less can be said of the relevance of the concept for the development of sociology itself. By adding sociological imagination to sociology, which suffered apoplexy in the locked-up iceberg of grand theory and abstracted empiricism, Mills infused necessary life-blood to the discipline; he revitalized the consciousness of sociology; he generated its radical spirit and instilled critical stance; he brought down sociology from the high paradise of system theory and system sanctioning research to the lower levels of systematic analysis of the experiential realities of mundane life. Seeking to place sociology in the apostolic tradition, by proposing to initiate the sociological endeavor at the grass root levels, Mills has constructed, as Horowitz says, a "man-sized sociology" which does not convert "men into data, and history into autobiography" (1969a: 2). If the social sciences are becoming the common denominator of this epoch the sociological imagination is also becoming, so argues Mills, the most desirable quality of mind required of both the masses and the social scientists. For the masses the sociological imagination is an aid to understanding the ongoing realities of historical and structural significance. For the sociologists,
it provides the most fruitful form of self-consciousness, self-awareness and intellectual sensibility with which to realize the cultural meaning of sociological substance. It lays down the procedural rules of work; it is also substantive in that it tells the sociologists where to focus and how to channel intellectual effort. Procedurally it equips the sociologist with

..... the capacity to shift from one perspective to another--from the political to the psychological; from examination of a single family to comparative assessment of the national budgets of the world; from the theological school to the military establishment; from considerations of an oil industry to studies of contemporary poetry. It is the capacity to range from the most impersonal and remote transformations to the most intimate features of the human self--and to see the relations between the two (SI: 7).

At the same time the concept is more than a procedural rule of sociology. From the substantive point of view it requires that

..... we seek a fully comparative understanding of the social structures that have appeared and do now exist in the world history. It requires that smaller-scale milieus be selected and studied in terms of large-scale historical structures (SI: 134).

In brief, the substantive focus is on the building up of a macrosociology, but not necessarily at the expense of a micro-sociological conception of reality. The sociological imagination provides realism and relevance to both theory and research; while it seeks a replacement of grand theory and abstracted empiricism, on its own part it does not seek to divorce either theory or research. On the contrary, it en-
riches theory by providing necessary nutriment; it guides research to more pertinent goals of reason and freedom for the masses of men and women. And above all, it is the most desirable quality of mind required for sociological work. However, as Mills points out, "it is not merely one quality of mind among the contemporary range of cultural sensibilities—it is the quality whose wider and more adroit use offers the promise that all such sensibilities—and in fact, human reason itself—will come to play a greater role in human affairs" (SI: 15). More concretely understood, the concept provides one with "adequate summations, cohesive statements, comprehensive orientations." The concept may be understood, as Shils elaborates, "as that body of categories, estimations, and preconditions which an experienced and realistic sociologist carries in the boundary area of the mind beyond the systematic articulations of research and theory" (1961: 616). Mills' conception of the sociological imagination closely parallels what Polyani calls "personal knowledge" signifying not only a fusion of the personal and the objective but also anchoring points of intellectual commitment. He shows that "into every act of knowing there enters a passionate contribution of the person knowing what is being known, and that this coefficient is no mere imperfection but a vital component of his knowledge" (Polyani, 1964: xiv). The phrase "sociological imagination" is not simply a catchword; an invitation to sociology and to practice it can be extended to someone
only when he manifests his willingness to grasp its meanings. It is a passionate appeal, perhaps more than that.

The Sociology of Political Liberalism: The other important aspect of Mills' radical sociology pertains to its educational and political role in the establishment of a democratic society. As a matter of fact he conceives the role of sociology in terms of its programmatic implications for a radical restructuring of the existing institutional arrangements along democratic lines. In his article entitled "Mass Society and Liberal Education" (1954), he specifically dealt with the role of liberal education in the context of postwar mass societal trends. Remindful of both Tocqueville and Mill, the most famous proponents of the Western democratic tradition, he placed his faith in liberal education as an integral condition for the establishment of a democratic society of self-conscious and knowledgeable publics (cf. PPP: 370-73). In The Sociological Imagination (1959) he proposes:

It is the political task of the social scientist --as of any liberal educator--continually to translate personal troubles into public issues, and public issues into the terms of their human meaning for a variety of individuals. It is his task to display in his work--and, as an educator, in his life as well--this kind of sociological imagination. And it is his purpose to cultivate such habits of mind among the men and women who are publicly exposed to him. To secure these ends is to secure reason and individuality, and to make these the predominant values of a democratic society (SI: 187-88).

In this way the political role of sociology becomes relevant to the extent it sustains democracy. Mills' radical sociology is therefore a political sociology based on the funda-
mental values of democratic liberalism. In trying to help build a democratic society Mills envisages what he calls "a liberating educational role" of sociology. "The educational and the political role of social science in a democracy is to help cultivate and sustain publics and individuals that are able to develop, to live with, and to act upon adequate definitions of personal and social realities" (SI: 192).

In other words, this assertion makes his political sociology essentially an updated version of liberal political sociology, notwithstanding all qualifications which Mills makes in regard to liberalism as ideology and rhetoric. Its radicalism in the form of a critical and oppositional stance plus a powerful plea to substitute the status quo by major institutional changes provides strength and legitimation to claims of this variant of sociology. But, to be sure, its radicalism falls short of revolutionism inherent in the Marxian alternative for the complete, rather than radical, restructuring of the society. This becomes evident when one takes note of his concluding remarks in The Sociological Imagination (1959):

What I am suggesting is that by addressing ourselves to issues and to troubles, and formulating them as problems of social science, we stand the best chance, I believe the only chance, to make reason democratically relevant to human affairs in a free society, and so realize the classic values that underlie the promise of our studies (SI: 194).

Sociology of Private Troubles and Public Issues

It is now clear from the preceding analysis that Mills'
political sociology centers around what he calls "the personal troubles of milieu" and "the public issues of social structure." Sociologically he refers to the structural problems facing the individual in the mass society; politically he relates these problems to the decline of the liberal values of reason and freedom. Political sociologically Mills proposes to formulate structural problems of both private and public nature in terms of values that are assumed to have been threatened by the rise of the power elite and consequent mass society. His political sociology is therefore as much a sociology of private troubles and public issues as it is a political area of social analysis for enthroning liberal ideals towards establishing a democratic society of free men and women. From this standpoint, in taking up the substantive problems at the contemporary historical level of corporate capitalist reality Mills argues, explicating the theoretical contours of his envisioned political sociology, that

..... the formulation of problems, then, should include explicit attention to a range of public issues and of personal troubles; and they should open up for inquiry the causal connections between milieux and social structure. In our formulation of problems we must make clear the values that are really threatened in the troubles and issues involved, who accept them as values, and by whom or by what they are threatened (ST: 130).

Closely related to this is his designation of the area as "a sort of public intelligence apparatus." Sociology is, said otherwise, a goal related enterprise. Primarily purposive, it is concerned with "public issues and private troubles and with structural trends of our time underlying them both"
While sociology can be directed at kings and citizens at the same time, sociologists are required, contends Mills, to attempt to uphold the liberal values. The dethronement of reason from public activity and mass societal captivity of individuals in the situations of unfreedom lead him not to think of the revolutionary or even radical role of the individual but to postulate that "it is a prime task of any social scientist to determine the limits of freedom and the limits of the role of reason in history" (SI: 184). This kind of elitist conferment of a superior role on the social scientist, rarely supported by any adequate theory of history-making of which Mills is so often vociferous, can however be explained in terms of his totalist and somewhat negativist assumption that mass man's revolutionary or radical role to enforce reason and freedom has been too jeopardized to become effective. While this is typically a dilemma of many classical democrats, such as Mosca, Mannheim or Mill, it can be said that such a conception constitutes a potential contradiction in Mills' postulated democratic sociology. Keeping this aside, let me return to his focus on troubles and issues as themes of his mainly reformist political sociology. The question is, what are these troubles and issues?

Private Troubles: For Mills, "it is the uneasiness itself that is the trouble; it is the indifference itself that is the issue. And it is this condition, of uneasiness and indifference, that is the signal feature of our modern period" (SI: 12).
The concept of trouble is a narrower one; it is the experience of one individual or an individual phenomenon. Troubles occur, says Mills,

.... within the character of the individual and within the range of his immediate relations with others; they have to do with his self and with those limited areas of social life of which he is directly and personally aware. Accordingly, the statement and resolution of troubles properly lie within the individual as a biographical entity and within the scope of his immediate milieu—the social setting that is directly open to his personal experience and to some extent his willful activity (SI: 8).

Troubles, occurring at the personal level, demand personal intervention. This is so in view of the fact that a person is the best judge of his interests; he knows more than anyone what to do when he himself is personally and directly aware of his troubles. If the person fails there are ways of assisting him, as is the case now after the rise of techniques of social casework. The suffering individual can overcome his troubles with the help of those concerned with his welfare. Experiences in modern industries and urban societies increasingly point to this direction. At the same time these may be approached rather sociologically. As Rex puts it, "A more sociological approach to 'troubles' is that which looks at the problem, not merely as one of personality disturbance, but as one in which the immediate structure of social relations around the individual has been fractured and needs repair, or, if we may put it that way, the replacement of a part" (1974: 209).
Public Issues: The distinction between troubles and issues is less real than apparent. The dichotomy which Mills draws between them is merely a ploy to invite attention to the same matters but at different levels. Public issues are personal troubles which take on wider social dimensions of affliction. For example, says Mills, "in modern society insecurity tends to be experienced not as a personal mishap or misfortune, nor as an irrevocable fate due to supernatural forces nor even to the natural forces. And men, full of the tension of insecure positions correctly blame social factors for personal defeat" (CSS: 462). The public issues require, for their resolution, social intervention at the public level. These larger issues, says Mills

... have to do with matters that transcend these local environments of the individual and the range of his inner life. They have to do with the organization of many such milieus into the institutions of an historical society as a whole, with the ways in which various milieux overlap and interpenetrate to form the larger structure of social and historical life. An issue is a public matter: some value cherished by publics is felt to be threatened .... (It is the very nature of an issue, unlike even widespread trouble, that it cannot very well be defined in terms of the immediate and everyday environments of ordinary man. An issue, in fact, often involves a crisis in institutional arrangements, and often too it involves what Marxists call 'contradictions' or 'antagonisms' (SI: 8-9).

The relevance of the twin aspects--troubles and issues--of his political sociology can be illustrated by concrete examples which Mills himself provides. In particular he names, among others, only four.
Unemployment: Referring to unemployment Mills asserts, quite rightly, that "when a handful of men do not have jobs, and do not seek work, we may look for the causes in their immediate situation and character. But when 12 million men are unemployed, then we cannot believe that all of them suddenly 'got lazy' and turned out to be 'no good'" (PPP: 331). In both cases

.... the very structure of opportunities has collapsed. Both are correct statements of the problem and the range of possible solutions require us to consider the economic and political institutions of the society, and not merely the personal situation and the character of a scatter of individuals" (SI: 9).

There is no doubt that the example which Mills cites to substantiate his case for a problem orientated political sociology is very important. By itself, unemployment is one of the few major structural public issues of American society. Despite fabulous achievements by American economy, the problem of unemployment, together with its attendant incidents, has continued to draw attention since the 1930s. "If there is any consistent pattern in the postwar era it is that the recoveries after the recessions tend to become ever more hesitant and to result in an even more incomplete employment of the labor force in proportion to the rise in output" (Myrdal, 1963: 3). Combining the data provided by Bertram Gross, Stanley Moses and Paul M. Sweezy, Anderson reports recently that "we may total some 14.2 million military-dependent employed with the 25.6 million real civilian unemployed to
obtain nearly 40 million persons out of a real labor force of 104 million who are either military-dependent or out of work" (1974: 220). There are other collateral issues which Mills has not dealt with but which are legitimately related to his example of unemployment. For instance, although in general more whites are unemployed than nonwhites, there is an evident tendency of growing unemployment among the latter group. The income gap between them is also growing. "While the Negro was earning $1 in 1949, his white counterpart earned $1.90; in 1959, every time the Negro earned $1.75 the white man earned $3.20" (Shriver, 1965: 157). In addition, the impact of automation affects more black workers than their white counterparts. In effect racism has become an ideological arsenal in respect of job opportunities. Another glaring aspect is overall poverty which stands directly face to face with "affluence" in the postwar American society. The attack on the so-called "magnificent abundance" was launched by many radicals in the early years of the 1960s. The other Americans, the invisible millions sunk into "huge, enormous, and intolerable fact of poverty in America", are "the victims of the very inventions and machines that have provided a higher living standard for the rest of the society. They are upside-down in the economy, and for them greater productivity often means worse jobs; agricultural advance becomes hunger" (Harrington, 1968a: 19). For many social scientists poverty was only an after thought (cf. Kolko, 1970: 130). The 1964 Report of the President's Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) put the figure at 35 million
and concluded that one-fifth of the US population was poor. Of the total, 22 percent were Negroes who comprised nearly 50 percent of the entire Negro population of the United States (cf. Seligman, 1972: 101). Despite problems involved in the computation of the exact number of the poor, especially in view of differences as to the changing nature of standard living or the base line of income level for families or unattached families, it may reasonably be said that "poverty is built into the system, that it is neither accidental nor individual, but is due to the way the social system is structured" (Henslin and Reynolds, 1973: 206). On the one hand, these problems are not a creation of the moral and educational lapses of the poor; rather they should be understood as result's of government's deliberate policy (cf. Birenbaum and Sagarin, 1972: 96). On the other hand, to solve them adequately is to change the social structure of capitalism whose major function is, ironically though, to maintain a massive permanent shortage of jobs. The truth of the matter is that capitalism actually benefits by its presence "since it is primarily by means of such high unemployment that wages are kept down" (Christoffel, 1970: 259).

War, Militarism and Multinational Corporate Capitalism

Mills' sociology calls for an abandonment of the politics of war in favor of "the politics of peace." Individually war is a problem of personal survival. Socially it is
a problem of the existence of **homo sapiens** and of human society. And

.... the structural issues of war have to do with its causes; with what types of men it throws up into command; with its effects upon economic and political, family and religious institutions, with the unorganized irresponsibility of a world of nation-states (SI: 9).

For Mills the questions of war and peace are now political and moral questions. He calls for the sociological imagination in this respect since it is also required "to stimulate the dialogues which will result in basic shifts from cold war strategies, from the politics of oversimplification, to an emphasis upon conflicts which threaten mankind" (Fox, 1965: 479). Mills' interest in and concern for issues of war are basically humanistic in nature, the very roots of which are interlinked with the political influences behind his intellectual formation. In 1936, when he was only twenty years of age, Mills found himself "at the watershed of events leading to WW II" (Gerth, 1962b: 2). The very year of 1936 witnessed a sequence of world-shaking events: Hitler's penetration into Rhineland, his defiance of the Versailles treaty, and his denunciation of the Locarno pact; the onset of Spanish civil war, the formation of Rome-Berlin Axis and Japan's participation in anti-committern treaty with Germany. The "newspaper headlines" created in him a consciousness that would later find expression in what he termed "the blind drift of history." For him, who did not take a "moral stand" at the
beginning, war years exercised deep-lying influences on his intellectual devotion to the study of blind drifts faced by powerless man within the historical social structure. The later years only attested to his growing aversion to war or any violence associated with it. In reviewing Neumann's Behemoth (1942) he states that any adequate explanation of Germany's imperialistic war would have to be explained by drawing attention to "the economic structure and its political apparatus that lead dynamically to war" (PPP: 173). In April 1945, few months before the Atomic Bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (6th and 9th of August, 1945 respectively) Mills pointed out the following which, inter alia, attested to his continuing concern for "war," "the integration of big business with the military elite," "universal military conscription" or "the drift toward a permanently militarized society":

The abolition of war and unemployment requires changes that neither monopoly business nor the Washington army is apparently willing to accept or permit. Both war and depression tend to bring these two elites together, and in war, or under warlike conditions, both gain in power and honor .... In modern industrial warfare, the men controlling organized violence need the men controlling industry, and both must have some arrangement with those in control of educational institutions and of labor (Mills, 1945a: 16-17).

In addition, he also noted the dangers in the over-all structural trends: "If those who monopolize the means of production and the means of military violence are unified, they will continually threaten any democratic control of the political..."
system" (Mills, 1945a: 17). His democratic concerns as to war, militarized capitalism, permanent militarization or military society continued to find expression in various forms in most of his writings (NMP: 4; CSS: 390; PE: 212). The most dramatic expression of Mills' anti-militarism, culminating so far, found its way in The Causes of World War Three (1958), published a year before The Sociological Imagination and, from the vantage point of world politics, Fidel Castro's takeover in Cuba. The Causes, centering around the contention that "war is not inevitable today" (CWT: 129), signified his continuing quest for stabilized global peace. While it shows manifestly Mills' humanist and pacifist concerns, it also captured the essential spirit of postwar years— that of the Cold War (1917/1945-1956/1962) which, though remaining "the most enigmatic and elusive international conflict of modern time" (Graebner, 1969: 123), involved in several ways the two superstates of the USA and the USSR in a politically bipolarized world: ideological disdain, political distrust, arms race, diplomatic outmaneuvering, espionage, psychological warfare, military alliances and so on (cf. Fleming, 1961; Horowitz, 1971; Alperovitz, 1965). The Causes establishes beyond doubt, I think, that Mills, the Texan Trotsky, was not intellectually a man of war but morally, politically and intellectually committed against war. The Causes volume is not flawless (cf. Wisley, 1959: 8-9; Aptheker, 1960: 46-88; Howe, 1959: 195; Warde, 1960: 90; Clecak, 1973: 66). Despite the
validity of many of the criticisms that may be levelled against Mills' theses in the book, his discussion of war and other ancillary matters is extremely important from the point of view of political sociology which, in its discussion of the problems of man and society, is being increasingly drawn into the arena of underdevelopment, militarism and imperialism. In this light let me illustrate some points of his fruitful suggestions.

(1) World War and Its Possibility: Mills says that "the ethos of war is now pervasive .... The drive toward war is massive, subtle, official and self-directed" (CWT: 2). Without entering the debate as to why world war has not broken out so far since 1958, it may be reasonably asserted that the danger of its occurrence "still exists, even though the present industrial and military weakness of China, and the detente between the USSR and the USA conceals the fact" (Rex, 1974: 217). In the present multipolar world regional conflicts, containing always potential of global war, are more probable. They more often either provoke new ones or revive old ones, rather than stabilize peace. The general tendency "in world affairs is not toward unity and great common endeavors. The old sources of conflict have not disappeared but new ones have emerged. A more stable world is not in sight. The statesmen will have to work hard in the years ahead to prevent chaos" (Laqueur, 1975: 18-19). Stated plainly, globali-
zation of the world has not assured global peace for the community of mankind. "The forces making for militarism, however, are increasing the opportunities for extinction, and within this milieu of increasing militarism lies the age-old scenario of human tragedy" (Rising, 1973: 110). It is therefore not a casual interest to note that "during 5,560 years of recorded human history there had been 14,531 wars, or 2.6135 a year, with only about 10 generations enjoying relatively undisturbed peace" (Grieves, 1977: 107). That there has not been a global war since 1945 "may be a matter for congratulations; but it does not dispose of all problems involved" (Modelski, 1972: 312). It does not evidence that post-war years are any more peaceful than those prior to 1945.

The Great Powers themselves may not have clashed, but they did collide indirectly in cases where third parties were in between. In view of this, Mills' passionate appeal to ban war and call for an adoption of the policy of "peaceful coexistence", first outlined by Khruschev in an address to the 20th Party Congress in February, 1956, is neither cheap journalism nor mere pamphleteering.4

(2) Continuing Arms Race: Related to the first point, Mills asserts, not without reason, that the existence of a bureaucratic state, and especially lethal machinery, is the first cause of the next world war. "Without them there could be no war .... The immediate cause of World War III is the preparation of it" (CWT: 46-47). Stated otherwise, despite the
Great Powers' tautologous assertion of the impossibility of total war, both are engaged in "arms race" and yet they "search for peace by warlike means" (CWT: 49). The existence of arms may not directly cause war but war, it may be reminded, is not fought without arms. The international political scenario has undergone many characteristic changes since Mills' death: the era of detente, strengthened by Brezhnev's policy, has replaced the Cold War; detente has relaxed tension and normalized the Great Powers' relations, thus accelerating agreements over disarmament, increased social, economic and cultural ties, settlement of territorial disputes, and so on; it has softened America's anti-communism since Russia no longer represents any demonic totalitarianism; and the world has seen the proliferation of new states freed from colonialism. But all these do not make the world any safer than before. The nuclear overhang continues to exist and the arms race continue to remain unabated. "Both parties accuse each other of waging Cold War policy to extend their spheres of influence, and of using their respective ideas of deterrence and prevention of war to justify the arms race and intensive preparations for war as well as to assert their preeminence within their own camp" (Lider, 1976: 369). Approximately nine-tenths of world's nuclear potency is still with the two superstates that have "tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, amounting, it is estimated, to the equivalent of over 10 tons of explosive power per inhabitant of the planet" (Wesson,
1977: 47). Side by side there has also been an upward trend in the development of tactical weaponry with increased offensive capability. Satellites, rockets, MIRVs (multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles), ABMs, ICBM, long-range bombers, scores of nuclear missile firing submarines, together with highly developed computers and sophisticated delivery systems and guidance mechanisms—are all pointer to the "mutual assured destruction" (MAD). The Soviet-American agreement of 1961 to work for "general disarmament, abolishing all military forces under the UN inspection," which still technically remains in force, and the signing in subsequent years of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Ban on the Employment of Weapons of Mass Destruction on Seabeds, the Ban on the Production and Stockpiling of Biological (Bacteriological) Agents and Toxins, or the Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) agreements may have helped both superstates in their management of the crisis; they may have reduced risk-taking in a dubious gamble of diplomacy. But the nightmarish potential of turning the world into a veritable inferno still exists. The much publicized agreements and treaties, though breakthroughs, "not only failed to reduce the nuclear overhang but also permitted, and perhaps even encouraged, an acceleration of the arms race" (Wesson, 1977: 56). The very presence of the unimaginably potent nuclear arsenals is an indication that the Great Powers have acquired more insecurity in lieu of desired security (cf. Carter, 1974). In all these Mills' concern to outlaw war is quite conceivable. There is
doubt that in the meantime "the proliferation of nuclear weapons threatens to sever the hair supporting the sword of Damocles above the arena of world politics" (Grieves, 1977: 128).

In this regard it will not be out of place to add a few words to what has generally been called "peripheral militarism." The phenomenon of peripheral militarism has been an aftermath of the dynamics of increased arms production, proliferating nuclearization and continuing transfer of weapons from major powers—the USA, the USSR, the UK and France—to the peripheral societies in the developing countries. The peripheral societies are increasingly becoming testing grounds for the use and further development of newer sophisticated weaponry. The development and maintenance of militarization in peripheral societies is a "necessary pre-condition for the prevalence and further penetration of the capitalist mode of production" (Albrecht et al., 1975: 206). The gravity of peripheral militarization can be assessed from the fact that, whereas the Third World in 1955 accounted for 5 percent of world military expenditure, in 1973 the figure rose to 14 percent of the total. In 1974, 60 percent of American major weapons went to peripheral societies whereas the corresponding figure was only 35 percent for the period between 1962-1968 (cf. Oberg, 1975: 215). Inherent in the arms race and peripheral militarization is what may be called "peripheral nuclearization." Strikingly parallel to arms race and nuclear
confrontation are stories of military competition between peripheral societies, Argentinian-Brizilian, Israeli-Egyptian or Indian-Pakistani, which can result in the outbreak of small-scale nuclear warfare without superpower participation (cf. Dunn, 1977).

(3) Increased Militarization of American Society: In view of advances in global militarism it is instructive to note that Mills' reference to American society, its "permanent war economy" and the imperialist designs of its military-corporate capitalism merits significant attention. Given the contemporary radical and Marxian analyses of American social structure, it seems that subsequent developments have in the main justified Mills' apprehensions. His reviews of Neumann's Behemoth (1942) and Brady's Business as a System of Power (1943), and his articles (1) "A Marx for the Managers" (1942) with Gerth, and (2) "The Conscription of America" (1945) contained his major ideas which in 1958 became firm principles of radical humanism in his Kantian quest for perpetual peace. In 1956 Mills warned about the structural trends of American society by saying that, behind increased personnel traffic between the military and corporate realms, the expansion of the military and the increased military budget, there lies "the great structural shift of modern American capitalism toward a permanent war economy" (PE: 215). Two years later he said:

.... military institutions and aims have come to shape much of the economic life of the United States, without which the war machine
could not exist .... Military men have entered political and diplomatic circles; they have gone into the higher echelons of the corporate economy; they have taken charge of scientific and technological endeavor; they have influenced higher educational institutions; they are operating a truly enormous public-relations and propaganda machinery (CWT: 54).

This characterization portrays the other face of what Galbraith has called The Affluent Society or The New Industrial State. The other face is the exact opposite of what President Johnson promised Americans on May 22, 1964: The Great Society. Mills spoke of the advent of the warlords and the ascendancy of the military. Whether or not in his tradition, others have pointed in other ways to the same developments. Cook designates America as "the Warfare State" and points illustratively to the magnitude of the "military-industrial self-interest that makes peace the antithesis of the new American way of life" (1962: 175). Aware of "the substantial militarization of American capitalism," Heilbroner predicts that this semi-militarized economy "will probably become even more so during the next decade" (1967: 104-05). The product of overdeveloped capitalism is pentagonism, as Bosch argues. For him, "the natural expression of a mass society in a system of free competition is pentagonism, not liberalism" (Bosch, 1968: 71). Nieburg saw it as "The Contract State."

The interaction between government and its contractors has brought a kind of back-handed national planning which tends to confuse the definition of legitimate defense needs, the requirements of economic health, and the manpower and educational needs of
the nation with demands for preservation of a subsidized and sheltered process of industrial and political empire-building. The public consensus for defense, space and science is distorted to serve the interests of the private contractors who penetrate government at all levels and inevitably interpret narrow special interests as those of the nation (Nieburg, 1970: 380).

While Lasswell conceptualized the notion of "the Garrison State" (1941: 1962) and Neumann (1942) saw in Hitler's Germany, Mills bore their influence in his conceptions of "permanent war economy," "permanently militarized society" etc. The theme reoccurs in Dibble's notion of "the Garrison Society" in which, among others, "the military penetrates into education, into research and scholarship, into labor unions, into the political decisions of Senators and Congressmen, and, most crucially, into business and the economy" (1968: 274). An essential feature of the garrison society is its possession of what Lapp calls "Weapons Culture" that has fastened "an insidious grip upon the entire nation" and that stands for "massive commitment to weapons development and deployment in time of peace" (1969: 18). For example, "in 1968 two-thirds of the total 28,000 million dollars allotted for scientific research were spent on military research" (Aboltin, 1972: 103).

It is also of interest to note how American militarism, while establishing a pentagonized-mass society at home, is exporting its weapons culture abroad. Corporations like Lockheed, Martin-Marietta or North American Aviation can
hardly survive without contracts from the DOD (cf. Lapp, 1969: 192-93, 197-200). That is to say, with Mills, the leading corporations "now profit from the preparation of war. Insofar as the business elite are aware of their profit interests-- and that is their responsible business-- they press for a continuation of their sources of profit, which often means a continuation of the preparation of war" (CWT: 57). While military assistance has always been a part of American overseas aid program, rising from approximately 26 percent in 1950 to 70 percent of the total aid in 1951-1954, arms sales are now increasingly occupying the most significant role in America's expanding military capitals. Arms sale has spiralled from $3.6 billion in fiscal 1973 to nearly $14 billion in 1975. This may be compared to the world arms trade which amounted to only $300 million in 1952, but which jumped to $5 billion in 1969 and nearly $18 billion in 1975 (cf. Wesson, 1977: 81-83). Business Week recently reported that "foreign countries have sustained the U.S. industry through the famine years. They ordered $9 billion worth of U.S. military hardware in fiscal 1976; the year before $12 billion in military deliveries went abroad" (January, 1977: 53).

(4) America and its Corporate Capitalist Imperialism: Following from the preceding analysis, it remains to focus on what Mills calls "capitalist imperialism" and its concomitant consequences. It is here that Mills' views remain typically open
to contradictions. For him, the prime cause of war is not capitalism or capitalist imperialism, but mainly militarism. He states that "to a considerable extent, militarism has become an end in itself and economic policy a means of it" (CWT: 57). This position reflects an acceptance of E. H. Carr's espoused epigram that "the principal cause of war is war itself." On the one hand, it is, among other reasons, because of his rejection of Marxism as an inadequate social theory.

In an interview with Victor Flores Olea, Enrique Gonzales Pedrero, Carlos Fuentes and James Gracia Terres in Mexico City on March 30, 1960, Mills said:

I don't believe that the prosperity of United States capitalism can be accounted for only by reference to a theory of imperialism ... As an economic fact, the adequate reasons for U.S. economic prosperity cannot be found in any theory of imperialism of which I know. It has many other sources, that may be one of them, but it is not the major one, in my opinion. The permanent war economy for example, is probably more important (Mills, 1961: 116).

As is probably evident, this position is an affirmation of what Mills had in mind when reviewing Neumann's Behemoth (1942) or writing on "The Conscription of America" (1945). His rejection of the Marxist-Leninist explanation has been coupled with his one-sided reliance on the power elite theory to explain theoretically disparate societies, e.g., America and Russia. As he states, "The categories of political, military, and economic elites are thus as important (or more so) to the analysis and understanding of our times as the mechanics of economic classes and other more impersonal forces
of history-making" (TM: 121). This is indeed an alternative point of view which he sought to apply "with appropriate modifications, to the understanding of Soviet types of society, to underdeveloped countries, as well as to advanced capitalist societies" (TM: 121). Therefore, in locating the causes of the obstacles to "development," which he identifies with "modernism" and "industrialization," Mills holds, among other things, that one of them "lies with the ruling groups of these countries" (Mills, 1961: 117). This theory, though not without explanatory relevance, is highly questionable in view of the current assertion by radicals and Marxists alike that underdevelopment is related to and a consequence of capitalist development in all its global ramifications (cf. Baran, 1957; Frank, 1967, 1970; Jalee, 1968; Magdoff, 1969; Rhodes, 1970; Weisskopf, 1972; Cohen, 1973; Amin, 1974; Helen, 1975).

By conceiving socialism as an alternative method of industrialization, Mills tends not only to confuse socialism with industrialization but also tends to ignore the point that "developing capitalism, and especially monopoly capitalism, has restrained the industrialization of the so-called undeveloped areas" (Aptheker, 1960: 76). Given the current evidence provided by Development sociologists, it is unlikely that both capitalist and socialist ways of industrialization—or two models of development, as Mills implies—could coexist; it is rather the former that obstructs any development of a society except what is needed to make it a periphery to its expanding
system. In the modern context capitalist imperialism "comprises a complex of private corporate policies, supplemented by induced governmental support, seeking to develop secure sources of raw materials and food, secure markets for manufactures, and secure outlets for both portfolio and direct capital investment" (Wolff, 1973: R341-1). Without an analysis of war and its causes within the context of capitalism, it makes little sense to say that "war, not Russia, is now the enemy" (CWT: 97). For, he does not get closer to realism to which capitalism is inevitably leading. "War is not a super-class phenomenon .... Preparations for war and the waging of war are integral parts of the politics of the class holding power and reflect the basic drives and aims of its social structure" (Warde, 1960: 87).

Whatever his contradictions, it must be noted that Mills was not unaware of the problems of capitalist imperialism or underdevelopment. Though lacking Marxian sophistication in his analysis of capitalist imperialism, Mills is quite aware of how "the backward region becomes a sphere for the investment of capital accumulated by the advanced nation" (CWT: 64). He thus calls for the abandonment of the doctrinaire idea of capitalism by America. Mills was also not altogether unaware of the international consequences of capitalism, which modern theorists of dependency so illustratively evidence. He said: "That the underdeveloped countries--containing two thirds of mankind--are still underdeveloped is a world historical default of Western capitalism" (CWT: 69).
The post-Millsian analyses of America's capitalist imperialism by radical and Marxist theorists have thrown new light on the continuing defaults of Western capitalism. Business Week reports that the US has an overseas investment of about $120 billion and that 30 percent of all corporate profits are made abroad (May 12, 1975: 72). It also reports that in 1974 Britain had about $35 billion, West Germany $13 billion, Switzerland $16 billion and Japan $12 billion in their respective foreign investments (July 14, 1975: 65). The following tables indicate some pertinent aspects of the US capitalist imperialism:

TABLE A


(Book value in billion US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or Region</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>6.69</td>
<td>24.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>11.18</td>
<td>22.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>8.32</td>
<td>14.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>5.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>3.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>3.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11.79</td>
<td>31.82</td>
<td>78.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A shows characteristically that the major area for US investment has shifted from Latin America in 1950 to Canada in 1960 and then to Europe in 1970. It is needless to point out that long-term effect of the foreign investment is "to expand and control U.S. foreign markets and hence to support the home country" (O'Connor, 1973: 152). Table B shows the increasing rate of returns from direct investment:

**TABLE B**

*Returns from direct investment*  
*(in billion dollars)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>US direct investments</th>
<th>Direct investment income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>2.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>7.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>9.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>10.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>4.87</td>
<td>9.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>7.46</td>
<td>17.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The most important aspect of internationalized capitalism is evident in the dominance of the US multinational corporations. Despite its positive assessments by many, emphasizing its
role in promoting "globalism," "peace and world order," "development/modernization" or in transferring entrepreneurial and managerial skills, or capital and industrial technology from the developed to the developing nations (cf. Rolfe, 1969; Quinn, 1969; Johnson, 1970; Stauffer, 1973), the advent of the multinationals is symptomatic of a totalitarian transformation of the world economy into an integrated global capitalist system (cf. Baran, 1957; Frank, 1967; Mandel, 1968; Emmanuel, 1972). Bukharin describes the process:

There grows the intertwining of 'national capitals'; there proceeds the 'internationalization' of capital. Capital flows into foreign factories and mines, plantations and railroads, steamship lines and banks; it grows in volume; it sends part of the surplus value 'home' where it may begin an independent movement; it accumulates the other part; it widens over and again the sphere of its application; it creates an ever thickening network of international interdependence .... (1975: 26).

The multinational corporations are now vanguards of totalitarian capitalism on a global scale; they are ominously indicative of a regime of satellite transnational managerial elites; they are neither a prologue to any new world of unity nor a major force of international integration. They are the means "to protect 'the free world' and to extend its boundaries wherever and whenever possible" (Baran and Sweezy, 1972b: 442). Their growth is "a process of centralizing and perfecting the process of capital accumulation" (Hymer, 1975: 49). They are out in the world to turn it into a
"global factory" with internationalization of finance capital and alienated labor in the background. On the one hand, whether or not production goals and techniques, investment policies, labor relations, profit allocation, purchasing, distribution and marketing policies are consistent with the local country's development, they are all decided from the standpoint of the profit goals of the multinational corporations (O'Connor, 1970: 46). Thus they offer little hope for, in the words of Barnet and Muller, "the problems of mass starvation, mass unemployment and gross inequality" and create additionally "social, ecological and psychological imbalance." They are an "institution of unique power" which has the potential for "colonizing the future" (Barnet and Muller, 1974: 363). On the other hand, by consolidating the ownership and control of global production and distribution in the hands of "an international entrepreneurial elite" they spell "the end of the political boundaries of capital" (Kimmel, 1975-76: 110). They are also potential precursors of a global mass society. Turning national societies into markets for mass consumption, many of them are increasingly becoming standardizers of mass consumer taste and culture.

Soft drinks, automobiles, transistor radios and blue jeans are the symbols of a more profound homogeneization of culture that is well under way and despite possible "nativistic" reversals, can only be stimulated by continued MNC consolidation (Wells, 1977: 53).
Of the world's 50 largest industrial corporations, the number of US based corporations was 24 in 1975 and 23 in 1976. In both years 8 companies were American out of top 12 in the list. The Fortune reports that "the U.S. is still the dominant country on the list, by far. American companies account for 57 percent of the total sales, 53 percent of the assets, 52 percent of the employees, and 68 percent of the net income" (August, 1975: 163). Although in recent years American companies are increasingly facing those of Japan, France, Germany and Britain for the hegemonic control over the global corporate business, their over-all performance statistics do not forecast their disappearance in the immediate future from the international market. Recently Fortune reported that

....their sales grew 40 percent, and their net profits 37 percent. As a result, the American companies loom larger than last time. They account for 56 percent of the total sales, 50 percent of the assets and 42 percent of the net income .... If National Iranian is set aside as a special case, the profits of the American companies look much heftier--two-thirds of the combined profits of the forty-nine non-Iranian companies on the list (August, 1977: 240).

The fact that global corporate investments are more guided by considerations of profit, on the one hand, and of acquiring a hold over such strategic materials--oil, iron, bauxite, chromium, copper, lead, manganese, tin, natural gas etc. (Barnet and Muller, 1974: 126-27)--, on the other, than by genuine motives of development and democracy is more evident. For instance, Business Week reports that
the US has a great deal at stake in Southern Africa which is one of the world's great storehouses of vital minerals and that the US companies have more than $1.5 billion in the racist country of South Africa alone (February 14, 1977: 64). It is reasonable to predict that Americanization of the host countries is likely to continue for many years to come in view of the different government maneuvering that is possible to protect the interests of American or America-based international corporations. "If means for bringing other countries into compliance with preferred American policies are desired, the American government does not have to look far to find them" (Waltz, 1972: 222). The US government may very well manipulate in favor of the multinationals through its control over such financial institutions as the Agency for International Development, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation, the Export-Import Bank etc. It can influence directly by making it difficult for an offending host country to receive foreign assistance from these financial institutions. The case of Chile, where Marxist Allende's election to the presidency in 1970 threatened corporate interests of the International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT), is a case in point. Finally, it can be said in summing up that "instability, dependence, 'over-kill' of incentives, the lack of linkages, etc. makes worldwide sourcing a doubtful tool in the longer term for solving the problems of the Third World,
despite some job creation and export earnings" (Adam, 1975: 102).

The Family and Marriage

Tonnies could well see that the ordinary human being, in the long run and for average of cases, "feels best and most cheerful if he is surrounded by his family and relatives. He is among his own ...." (1964: 43). Since the family is the most general expression of social reality, he necessarily assumes that "the study of home is the study of the Gemeinschaft, as the study of the organic cell is the study of life itself" (Tonnies, 1964: 53). What has happened in the course of its transformations throughout history is that many of its functions have been transferred to other institutions like the state, corporate bodies, welfare agencies, etc., and consequently the family has declined as a preservative influence in the industrial society. Referring to the family's role in the context of suicide Durkheim said: "For most of the time, at present, the family may be said to be reduced to the married couple alone, and we know that this union acts feebly against suicide" (1966: 377). Turning especially to the changes in the role of the family in the corporate capitalism one can observe that the familial institutions, conditioned apparently by urbanization, industrialization and bureaucratization, have become supportive institutions of capitalist society oriented to goals and interests of corporate owners.
Corporate capitalism is at the bottom of the formation of the economic and political macrostructure of the society and the psychological structure of mass attitudes, values and beliefs. Having transformed mainly into an instrumentality for maintaining and reproducing labor power (Morton, 1972: 121)--thus separating men from women in economic corporation, throwing the former into the wage labor market, subjecting women to inferior roles in the occupational hierarchy and degrading them into sexual objects, and also emphasizing oversocialization of the children--the family in the industrial-mass society becomes more repressive and less directive. The family's functions such as the sexual function, the reproduction function, the socialization function, the personality-forming function, the economic provider function, the consumptive function, the expressive or emotional function and status placement function together with transmission of ascribed elements of social position, property, power, culture and life styles are all fed into, convincingly argues Grønseth, "the overriding labor-producing function." In corporate capitalism these functions serve "to channel the labor force into work, class, economic, and power structures advantageous to the material well-being and compensatory, life-inimical, polluting achievement and thus in the long run really false interests of the upper classes and power elites" (Grønseth, 1973: 257). The power elite is thus emerging as a new exploit-er and expropriator of the labor-producing function of the family.
When it started, the family in America was for most people a place where they both lived and worked. American society was then, in Mills' words, "the world of small entrepreneur" which was at the same time "self balancing." Its economy was agricultural and predominantly based on family-owned and family-operated business enterprises. There was "a linkage of income, status, work, and property" (WC: 9).

The family had the basic productive function in that it was a productive unit in which domestic-familial functions were scarcely distinguishable from economic functions. The pattern ran its full circle until the industrial and technological changes gave way to capitalist transformation of the society resulting in what Mills calls "the transformation of property" with its concomitant "rural debacle." As the American farmer became both "the tool and the victim of the rise of American capitalism" so the American ideal of the family-sized farm became "more and more ideal and less and less a reality." The centralization of property signalled the end of the union of property and work, and it also severed the individual from independent means of livelihood.

Within a period of less than 100 years, following the gradual rise of the cities, national markets, transportation systems, mills, mines or factories, the basic productive function of the family was transferred to corporate industry and business, giving way to a sharp differentiation between economic/work roles and familial roles of American people. Whereas in 1882
approximately 72 percent of those gainfully employed were engaged in agriculture, in 1974 the percentages of self-employed men and women fell to 3.1 and 0.35 respectively. Between 1935 and 1975 the number of family farms also declined. While the average size of the American farm was 155 acres in 1935, in 1975 it rose to 385 acres, indicating centralization and consolidation. In 1974 only 4.1 percent of the farms received as much as 45 percent of total cash receipts for agricultural sales in America (cf. Fullerton, 1977: 10-11). In brief, the urban pattern replaced the rural one. In the process of the incorporation of industrial capitalism into corporate capitalism the family was turned into a corporative institution reflecting, among other things, mass man's frantic search for new corporate status and identity commensurate with the role demands of industrial-mass society. To quote Mills:

In identifying with a firm, the young executive can sometimes line up his career expectations with it, and so identify his future with that of the firm's. But lower down the ranks, the identification has more to do with security and prestige than with expectations of success. In either case, of course, such feelings can be exploited in the interests of business loyalties (WC: 244).

In other words, the rise of corporation men coincides with the rise of "the managerial demiurge," in Mills' words, or of "the organization society," in Whyte's appellation. Whereas for lower middle class men families are quite dependent on corporate business and industry, to many career men, on the
other hand, "the home is almost an adjunct to the job" (Cuber and Harroff, 1965: 117). When the dividing line between economic life and family life is indistinct or grows thinner, business crises become family crises and may turn out to be sources of private troubles as well as public issues. As Mills describes it, pointing out the plight of "the marginal victim" or "unpaid family workers":

Business competition and economic anxiety thus come out in family relations and in the iron discipline required to keep afloat. Since there is little or no outlet for feelings beyond the confines of the shop or farm, members of these families may grow greed for gain. The whole force of their nature is brought to bear upon trivial affairs which absorb their attention and shape their character. They come to exercise, as Balzac has said, 'the power of pettiness, the penetrating force of the grub that brings down the elm tree by tracing a ring under the bark' (WC: 30).

An example of the familial trouble or issue is divorce. As Mills refers to this:

Consider marriage. Inside a marriage a man and a woman may experience personal troubles, but when the divorce rate during the first four years of marriage is 250 out of every 1000 attempts, this is an indication of a structural issue having to do with the institutions of marriage and the family and other institutions that bear upon them.... In so far as the family as an institution turns women into darling little slaves and men into their chief providers and unweaned dependents, the problem of a satisfactory marriage remains incapable of purely private solution (SI: 9-10).

A certain amount of divorce is likely to occur since at times it provides "an escape valve for the tension which inevitably arises from the fact that two people must live together" (Goode, 1970: 81). Again, divorce is no longer treated as a
personal stigma and can be preferred as an alternative to a dead marriage. Sometimes its increased rate can be explained by such factors as liberalization of divorce laws, changes in the value system of the society, lessened emphasis on marital instability or availability of new alternatives. Despite all these countervailing factors, a continuous or sudden rise in divorce rate is a matter of public concern. When such is the case, there are other accompanying problems. As a matter of fact, the divorce rate in the US has doubled between 1965 and 1975. In 1974 there were 19.3 divorces for every 1,000 married women (cf. Fullerton, 1977: 421). Reiss reports that

\[ \ldots \text{in 1975 there were over a million of divorces among a total population of about 51 million married women or a rate of roughly 20 divorces for every 1,000 marriages in existence that year. This indicates that 2 in every 100 marriages ended in divorce in this particular year. If this divorce rate of 2 in 100 continues, then 45 percent of all married couples will eventually experience a divorce during their life times (1976: 306).} \]

To be sure, the effects of divorce are somewhat neutralized by remarriage since there is "no larger kin unit to absorb the children and no unit to prevent the spouses from re-entering the free marriage market" (Goode, 1970: 9). In 1973, 28 percent of all marriages were remarriages. Even then, it remains a question whether remarriages are in effect a real solution, especially in view of involvement of increasing number of children affected by divorce and its impact upon them. In fact their number has tripled since 1953 and,
until 1964, rose at a higher rate than that of divorce. In 1972 there were more than a million of children involved in divorce (cf. Reiss, 1976: 323).

Metropolis

It is instructive to note that sociology "was born in a world in ferment. The fermentation process was nurtured in the cities of the West" (Meadows and Mizruchi, 1976: 2). For classic sociologists too, the problems of the city were a central aspect of their sociology. To Tonnies, the city was typical of Gesellschaft in general, and metropolis a result of the synthesis of capital and city. Here, "money and capital are unlimited and almighty" and here people come "from all corners of the earth, being curious and hungry for money and pleasure" (Tonnies, 1964: 228). Weber regarded the city as "the seat of commerce and industry" (1961: 235), looking into its various economic and extra-economic facets and tracing its relationship to rational capitalism at various historical stages of evolution. But it was Simmel who brilliantly wrote on, in the words of Mills, "the big city from a humanist as well as a sociological point of view" (IM: 12). This classic concern on the problems of the city or metropolis is reflected quite strongly in Mills who, in his turn, took it up as both private trouble and public issue.

What should be done with this wonderful monstrosity? Break it all up into scattered units, combining residence and work? Refurbish it as
it stands? Or, after evacuation, dynamite it and build new cities according to new plans in new places. What would those plans be? And who is to decide and to accomplish whatever choice is made .... And insofar as the overdeveloped megalopis and the overdeveloped automobile are built-in features of the overdeveloped society, the problems of urban living will not be solved by personal ingenuity and private wealth (PPP: 395-97).

Despite many improvements in some directions, most of these problems are still responsible for what may be called "urban crisis" in America. To highlight some of the problems connected with urban crisis in America:

(1) **The Urban Apartheid**: Though Mills never refers to this important problem, there is no doubt that the most noticeable cause of urban crisis relates to continuous concentration of blacks in the major cities of America. In fact the racial schism is one of the biggest public issues of contemporary America (cf. Grodzins, 1973). Given the fact of urban concentration of the black population, it is likely that "the present trends may take the nation farther down the road toward a de facto 'apartheid society'" (Hauser, 1975: 14).

(2) **The Housing Crisis**: Although many years have passed by since America was urbanized, the problem of housing seems to have persisted without any remarkable sign of abatement for most of the urban dwellers, especially the poor and the blacks. Still there is no clear set of national housing policies. Whereas the Department of Housing and Development was initiated only in 1965, other public housing programs...
in such legislation as the Housing Act of 1943, the Housing Act of 1949 (Urban Renewal), the Demonstration Cities Act of 1966 (Model Cities Program) and the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 have had less appreciable effect on the urban housing blight. The victims are generally the poor or the blacks, while the affluent whites move to suburbs. At the present time 500,000 additional units of housing are required each year for the poor while the yearly construction averages about 30,000, leaving a net deficit of 470,000 units per year (cf. Butler, 1977: 138). The federal government has begun to approach the problem of housing on a national level but it is unlikely that the private housing industry, which has annual business close to $25 billion, employs over 5 million workers and creates a vast market, would risk investment for building construction for the poor. The profit motive remains the insurmountable barrier (cf. Turner, 1976: 218-19).

(3) America as "automobile" and "effluent" society: America can appropriately be called an automobile city. Most of the cities are now automobile cities though the poor, blacks, Chicanos, or Puerto Ricans have rarely any access to private cars. While a nationally coordinated network of transportation and construction of highways can be traced to the prosperity and growth of corporate capitalism, there has been few improvements in the direction of cheaper and speedy mass transit
systems. In 1970 there were 90 million automobiles as against 2.5 million of them in 1915. Around the 1970s the number of accidental deaths from automobiles rose to about 40,000 a year. The automobiles are also a source of urban air pollution which ranges between 25 and 50 percent a year depending upon the city involved. The automobiles are a great symbol of ecological abuse. However, the question of pollution, implying ecological crisis, has assumed greater dimension. Heilbroner goes so far as to predict, commenting on the special environment-destroying potential of newly developed science and technology, that the continued ecological decay, if not arrested ahead of time, may result in "the decline or even destruction of Western civilization, and of the hegemony of the scientific-technological view that has achieved so much and cost us so dearly" (1972: 69). Whatever the blessings of urban industrialism, negatively it creates environmental pollution by concentrating residues and wastes into an ever shrinking ecological space. It is thus no wonder that Marine characterizes America as "the effluent society."\(^7\)

Although current attempts to counter environmental hazards and ecosystemic disruption have continued to grow, in the meanwhile "the greatest polluters are the affluent, who generate the greatest economic demand (and hence stimulate industrial pollution), consume the most polluting goods, and dispose of a majority of nondegradable or nonrecyclable wastes" (Turner, 1976: 265-66). The emergent pattern resulting
from "the incest between the pollution control business and the industrial polluters" is increasingly leading to what Gellen has called "the making of a Pollution-Industrial complex." It is interesting to note that many of the pollution control agencies are subdivisions or subsidiaries of the largest corporations which are themselves polluters. Thus the capitalist motive remains the same: profit seeking rationality of exploitation and market economics, and oligopolistic corporate integration of polluters and controllers. Indeed this is a paradox of the suzerainty of capitalism of the few in the public society of liberalism. To sum up: A society whose principal ends and incentives are monetary and expansionist inevitably produces material and cultural impoverishment—in part precisely because of the abundance of profitable goods. To make an industry out of cleaning up the mess that industry itself makes is a logical extension of corporate capitalism (Gellen, 1973: 306-07).
Notes

1. An attempt to highlight Mills' contradiction arising out of his moral, intellectual and political faith in democracy, on the one hand, and his loss of faith in the masses as an instrument of radical social change, on the other, has been made in Chapters 7 and 8.

2. I agree with Bray that Mills "does not argue that we should spend our time as political sociologists concentrating on our personal troubles or worrying about them. Instead, he argues that we spend our time concentrating on the analysis of structural troubles and the turning of them into public issues" (1973: 44). Whereas Mills' thrust is to turn troubles into issues, not issues into troubles, it is interesting to note that Gouldner's reflexive sociology is somewhat closed because of its focus on personal troubles, and because of its failure to turn them into larger issues. Gouldner's "reflexive sociology," as contained in The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, achieves in the end "the opposite of what Wright Mills advocated at the beginning of the radical revival: instead of turning personal troubles into public issues, it turns public issues into personal troubles, by exhorting the sociologist to give his attention narcissistically to the problem of the relationship 'between being a sociologist and being a person' and to worry about his relation to his work .... They are a symptom of intellectual malaise, not a remedy" (Bottomore, 1971: 40).

3. I must point out that Mills' humanism has its roots, not in socialism or communism, but in democratic or political liberalism. See Chapter 8 or this work.


5. Italics added.

6. In a much powerful critique a recent observer contends that the policies of these institutions "are based on the acceptance and upholding of the existing international and national framework of the capitalist world .... there is a strong emphasis in the agencies' policies and demands on the principles of free enterprise, or reliance on market mechanisms, and on the respect of private property, domestic and especially foreign" (Hayter, 1971: 151-52).
7. For many faces of pollution, see Marine (1972).

8. An assessment of Mills' political sociology will be included in my general criticism of radical sociology contained in Chapter 9.
CHAPTER SEVEN

New Leftism

Introduction

As I have already pointed out, Mills was not only a sociological theorist but also a sociological ideologist. As a sociological ideologist, he was one of the leading theoretical architects of the movement known as New Leftism in sociology or political science. In the present chapter my purpose is, therefore, to focus on the nature of Mills' new leftism, and also to show that his protest against the Bell-Lipset thesis of the end of ideology has become the cornerstone of his sociological radicalism. While his theory is not without drawbacks, it has nevertheless pointed to the urgency and indispensability of structural changes in American social system.

Mills as an Ideologist: If Mills is a radical, his radicalism lies in making issues politically explicit, and as politically radical, he is also an ideologist. He knows that any "political reflection that is of possible public significance is ideological: in its terms, policies, institutions, men of power are criticized or approved" (PPP: 251).

The word 'ideology' was introduced on 23 May 1979 by the French theorist de Tracy in his newly conceived
"Science of ideas" (cf. Drucker, 1974: 3). Since then, the word 'ideology' has retained its political implications, and as such both 'politics' and 'ideology' go together. This is, however, not to suggest that the word 'ideology' has an all-accepted meaning. On the contrary, it has a wide range of meanings that has changed over the generations. In any case, ideology stands for a complex of ideas, and ideological postulates are politically formulated ideas. Put in the political contexts of American society, the concept of ideology as more or less an integrated body of political belief system implies three distinct but related categories, as suggested by Dolbeare and Dolbeare:

(1) The 'world view' or general perspective on how the American economic and political system works today, for whom and why; (2) the values that are central to the ideology and the goals that it holds out as most desirable for the United States; (3) the image of the process of social change to which it subscribes and the tactics that it deems appropriate in the light of its world view, values and goals, and image of change (1971: 7).

This definition also fits the facts of Mills' ideological politics. To call him an ideologue, as may be seen, is neither unwarranted nor unjustified. Mills' ideological orientations are a mark of his political understanding of the historical epoch when "our basic definitions of society and of self are being overtaken by new realities" (PPP: 236).

In the 1930s and 1940s radical movements in America had diversified origin in a broad spectrum of organizations and were based on contending interpretations of political ideologies. The national political scene included the
communists, the socialists, Trotskyists, other anti-Stalinists and trade union organizations like CI0 etc. In this forum of ideological clashes radicalism flourished through political debates between liberal and socialist intellectuals. By the mid-fifties the radical movements came to a halt the reasons for which are both complex and varied. In the beginning of the 1960s, Bell wrote: "Such calamities as the Moscow Trials, the Nazi-Soviet pact, the concentration camps, the suppression of the Hungarian workers, form one chain; such social changes as the modification of capitalism, the rise of the Welfare State, another. In philosophy, one can trace the decline of simplistic, rationalistic beliefs, and the emergence of new stoic-theological images of man, e.g. Freud, Tillich, Jaspers, etc. .... But out of all this history, one simple fact emerges: for the radical intelligentsia, the old ideologies have lost their "truth" and their power to persuade" (1967: 402). As a necessary result from this decline in ideological thinking, the radical tradition in America reached the point of exhaustion since the intellectuals in place of responding ideologically through divisive dogmas have now arrived at a rough consensus on political issues.

Thus one finds, at the end of the fifties, a disconcerting caesura. In the West, among the intellectuals, the old passions are spent. The new generation, with no meaningful memory of these old debates, and no secure tradition to build upon, finds itself seeking new purposes within a framework of political society that has rejected, intellectually speaking, the old apocalyptic and chiliastic visions (Bell, 1967: 404).
The first sociologist to note the end of ideology was, perhaps, Raymond Aron, writing in *The Opium of the Intellectuals* (1955). In America Lipset is the other sociologist who found closest agreement with Bell on the decline of political ideology. For him the decline of ideology in

"... Western political life reflects the fact that the fundamental political problems of the industrial revolution have been solved: the workers have achieved industrial and political citizenship; the conservatives have accepted the welfare state; and the democratic left has recognized that an increase in over-all state power carries with it more dangers to freedom than solutions for economic problems. This very triumph of the democratic social revolution in the West ends domestic politics for those intellectuals who must have ideologies or utopias to motivate them to political action (Lipset, 1963: 442-43)."

Lipset finds that at the back of this general tendency there lies "the shift away from ideology towards sociology. The very growth of sociology as an intellectual force outside the academy in many Western nations is a tribute, not primarily to the power of sociological analysis but to the loss of interest in political inquiry" (Lipset, 1963: 453).

**The Thesis of the End of Ideology and Mills**

Mills' response to this anti-ideological thesis was both instantaneous and violent. He summed up his own ideological position in "Letter to the New Left," published originally in the *British New Left Review*, September-October 1960, and this critique has become the "Das Capital of the present radicalism" (Berman, 1968: 136).
Mills defines the thesis as 'an intellectual celebration of apathy' and calls it 'a slogan of complacency.' He writes: "It is no exaggeration to say that since the end of World War II in Britain and the United States smug conservatives, tired liberals and disillusioned radicals have carried on a weary discourse in which issues are blurred and potential debate muted; the sickness of complacency has prevailed, the bi-partisan banality flourished" (PPP: 247). Bereft of liberalism as any political theory, the thesis is rather a liberal rhetoric to be used ultimately "as an uncriticized weapon with which to attack marxism." It is based upon "a disillusionment with any real commitment to socialism in any recognizable form" (PPP: 248). Along with their ideological hostility to Marxism or socialism, the end of ideologists, the self-selected intellectuals of affluent society, seek to discover rationale and then legitimate the corporate-liberal establishment. "The mixed economy plus the welfare state plus prosperity— that is the formula. US capitalism will continue to be workable; the welfare state will continue along the road to ever greater justice" (PPP: 248). Stated otherwise, the anti-ideological perspective is the ideology of corporate liberalism. It is 'a mechanical reaction', and not 'a creative response.' It is an escapade not an involvement, a release from concerns of public issues not a commitment to work out 'an explicit political philosophy.' It is an apotheosis of methodological scientism that stands for and, presumably, stands upon "a fetish of empiricism". At
one end, the Bell-Lipset thesis either ignores the problem of the historical agencies of change or identifies those with the existing social institutions. It is also a denial, at the other, of the human and political ideals. That is why the anti-ideologists fail to understand 'structural realities' of the present day social transformations. The end of ideology, self-managed as it is, is empty pragmatism, a fashion and, finally, a posture of what Marx calls false consciousness. Therefore, says Mills, "the end-of-ideology is of course itself an ideology--a fragmentary one, to be sure, and perhaps more a mood. The end-of-ideology is in reality the ideology of an ending: the ending of political reflection itself as a public fact. It is a weary know-it-all justification--by tone of voice rather than by explicit argument--of the cultural and political default of the NATO intellectuals" (PPP: 249).

Despite the amount of truth contained in the Bell-Lipset thesis, it seems that subsequent events--within and beyond America--and assessments have pointed to the contrary. In this light, Mills' critique, the product of the master ideologue, seems to have been established beyond any reasonable doubt. Bell has unduly emphasized radicalism to the extent it was developed in the 1930s. When Germany had Hitler and Third Reich, America produced Roosevelt and the New Deal. In the decade of the 1940s, radicalism had its roots in the economic depression that persistently grew since the beginning
of the last World War, although even then the assumption of affluence was widespread. By that time there was also a growing alignment between the private corporations and government which is marked by an increase in the military expenditure. Then came, in the 1950s, the sombre and tormented era of McCarthyism. Politically, during this era communist suppression reached its all-time peak level; in the realm of ideas, it was rabidly anti-intellectual; and socially, it was a period of what Hofstadter calls "status anxiety" due to rootlessness and heterogeneity in American ways of life. Despite all this, Bottomore says rightly, "it would be wrong to conclude, however, that the age was therefore 'unpolitical'; it was simply a time in which the political offensive was taken by thinkers and politicians of the right" (1968: 52 footnote). In fact there took place a revival of critical thought in the fifties, and in this revival one of the prominent figures was Mills. Instead of battle cries, founded on Marx or Mill, there were shifts in the bases of ideological conflict. To quote Young:

In the late 1950s, new issues to make an impact on our politics, the following of Ayn Rand became something of a cult, the works of C. Wright Mills progressively shifted in emphasis from sociology to ideology, and the radical right has grown apace. More important have been the growing critique of the basic assumptions of American foreign policy emanating from both right and left and the variable revolution in civil rights (1968: 204).²

The anti-ideological stance of the Bell-Lipset doctrine
is rather an ideological attempt to castigate those ideologies they disapprove of. It not only confuses the line between description and exhortation but also provides, in conformity to their anti-Marxist proclivity, a justifying and solidarizing ideology to the new class of managers to legitimate their status quo in a politically "managed economy." The slogan of the end of ideology functions selectively as an anti-ideological perspective on the surface but supports, as Mills rightly pointed out, consistently the ideological position of its proponents. Beneath the apparent differences of terminology that may be imagined, Lipset's "conservative socialism" has much common ideological alliance with the "managerial" "welfare" liberalism of Bell. This may be termed as the ideology of pluralistic liberalism suited to provide legitimation to the status quo of the bureaucratic Welfare State that has come into existence in what Eric Goldman calls the Crucial Decade following the World War II. The verity of Mills' fundamental assumptions is distinct in what Kleinberg has here to say:

At the least, both seem very serious about respecting the existing rules of the game of bargaining among organized collective interests, broadly within the established boundaries of modern corporate capitalism .... The overlapping of conservative-revisionist socialism and managerial-welfare liberalism expresses a peculiar ideological combination of equilitarianism as a political end and centralized bureaucratic organization as a technical means, mixing governmental acceptance of responsibility for the general welfare with sophisticated managerialism as a practical way of attaining it (1973: 13).
In a powerful critique of the Bell-Lipset thesis, Aiken confirms the same apprehensions of Mills. He asserts that the end of ideology is a liberal-pluralistic posture, a doctrine of mock pragmatism directed mainly at those political radicals who suggest a thorough-going social change. He says, therefore, that "what Bell appears to be calling for is, among other things an end to moral discourse and a beginning of consistent 'pragmatic discourse' in every sphere of political life" (Aiken, 1964: 36). At the same time, the thesis is a reflex-product of methodological scientism based on a facile interpretation of Weber and also on a typical ideological positivism. 3

Mills' reaction to the anti-ideological perspective takes further ideological posture when he identifies utopian vision with structural criticism of social institutions reminiscent of the Mannheimian tradition. Mills' ideological stand is quite implicit in what Mannheim says here:

The disappearance of utopia brings about a static state of affairs in which man himself becomes no more than a thing. We would be faced then with the greatest paradox imaginable, namely, that man, who has achieved the highest degree of rational mastery of existence, left without any ideals, becomes a mere creature of impulses. Thus, after a long tortuous, but heroic development, just at the highest stage of awareness, when history is ceasing to be blind fate, and is becoming more and more man's own creation, with the relinquishment of utopias, man would lose his will to shape history and therewith his ability to understand it (1936: 262-63).

As the master ideologue, Mills, the utopian intellectual hero in the Mannheimian tradition, conceives that the end of ideology would only result in shaping human history by default of
few powerful men in the society. It means acceptance prac-
tically of some kind of fatalism as the inevitable aftermath
of the blind drift of history-making through organized politi-
cal interests. However, Mills' ideological role is not,
as Feuer suggests, to provide a redefinition of what he calls,
'the Mosaic myth.' Feuer contends: "During the last decade,
ideologists beginning with C. Wright Mills have given a fresh
version to the Mosaic myth; they have perceived the intellec-
tuals as clearly called upon by history to make the revo-
lution, abetted by their allies located among the colored
races of Asia, Africa, and Latin America" (1975: 7). Feuer's
misjudgement of Mills' position becomes all the more open in
terms of his conclusion which flatly denies intellectuals
any potentials to be of any political use as seekers of
social change in required circumstances. To note this: "Then,
when intellectuals cease to be ideologists, that is, cease
to be 'intellectuals' and become instead scientists, scholars,
teachers, they will find a vocation more enduring than any
that myth can confer, more sincere because without self-
ilusion" (Feuer, 1975: 210). This amounts to a denial of
any 'right' of the intellectuals to conceive of social real-
ity that has now become increasingly political. Mills'
politics has beginnings in ideological commitment. For him,
"Indeed, the way to political reality is through ideological
analysis" (PPP: 175), as Neumann taught him by his analysis.
in the Nazi Behemoth. To be sure, ideology was not a myth for Mills, but for those who resist a reversal of capitalists' socialism. Neither was it based on any self-illusion. His ideological-utopianism is based upon "any criticism or proposal that transcends the up-close milieux of a scatter of individuals: the milieux which men and women can understand directly and which they can reasonably hope directly to change" (PPP: 254). Stating in unambiguous terms, Mills enunciates his ideological role: "If there is to be a politics of a New Left, what needs to be analysed is the structure of institutions, the foundation of policies. In this sense, both in its criticisms and in its proposals, our work is necessarily structural--and so, for us, just now--utopian" (PPP: 254). It is this ideological Weltanschauung of Mills that makes him react to the welfare-planning orientation of the New Deal liberalism implicit in the anti-ideological manifesto. Whatever the limitations in Mills position as a radical ideologue, there are many who openly sought identification with his sort of radicalism.4

Mills: The Ideologist as a New Left

As a political ideologue, Mills identifies logically, because of his radicalism, with the New Left. His ideological leftism is opposed to the imperialist militarism and the Rightist McCarthyism, both of which are responsible for the emergence and continuation of the garrison state in America.
At the theoretical level, his leftism is neither liberalism nor Marxism but rather a product of an assimilation of the human values of both. In brief, it is radical humanism. Mills' leftism seeks to connect "up cultural with political criticism, and both with demands and programmes. And it means all this inside every country of the world" (PPP: 253). To be of the Left politically means, for Mills, to know of impersonal forces at work within the society, to know how they lead to structural changes, to apprehend that these changes have not eliminated problems or issues, and finally, to conceive of historical agency of social structural change. What is, therefore, the theoretical content of Mills' radical Leftism? To Mills, it consists in

... structural criticism and reportage and theories of society, which at some point or another are focussed politically as demands and programmes. These criticisms, demands, theories, programmes are guided morally by the humanist and secular ideals of Western civilization--above all, reasons and freedom and justice (PPP: 253).

This enables him also to encounter the substantive problem of ideological politics in his political sociology. As he singles out:

Which brings us face to face with the most important issue of political reflection--and of political action--in our time: the problem of the historical agency of change, of the social and institutional means of structural change (PPP: 254).

Furthermore,

The seeming collapse of our historic agencies of change ought to be taken as a problem, an issue, a trouble--in fact, as the political problem which we must turn into issue and trouble (PPP: 255).
Indeed he tried to turn the structural issue and the individual problem into themes—and also problems—of his political sociology. It is here that Mills stands in sharpest contrast to the anti-ideological political sociology of Bell or Lipset. In both of them there is a conspicuous absence of any concern for historical function of ideological politics. Bell's depoliticized ideology of the "Affluent society," implicit in the exhaustion of ideology, found its logical extension in the ideology of technocratic elitism in his *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*. Very recently his thesis now, being in the nature of further dialectical improvement upon the preceding ones, researches out the cultural contradictions of capitalism. This time the problem—the cultural contradictions—has locus in the "post-modern" culture of postindustrial society itself. It is a 'dysfunctional conflict' between "functional rationality, technocratic decision making, and meritocratic rewards" on the one hand, and "apocalyptic moods and anti-rational modes of behavior," on the other. Put otherwise, "efficiency, least cost, maximization, optimization and functional rationality," characteristic principles of the "scientifically managed" industrial society, are now in direct conflict with the "anti-cognitive and anti-intellectual cultural trends" of the modernist culture (cf. Bell, 1976: 84). Therefore, on the one hand, "the theory of the end-of-ideology makes a full reversal to suggest, not the exhaustion of movements of ideological or cultural opposition in the developing postindustrial society, but their
expansion to cover the entire culture" (Kleinberg, 1973: 215). On the other hand, it consistently neglects the persistent increase of economic power and political influence of the privately managed corporations in the economy. Let me now turn to the point of view of Bendix and Lipset who also stand in sharp contrast to Mills' point of view. For Bendix and Lipset, "The task of political sociology is .... to analyze the status structure of a society in terms of the abstract or logical possibilities of decision-making and to compare these possibilities with actual decisions made" (1967: 23). Elsewhere they write, "Like political science, political sociology is concerned with the distribution and exercise of power in society. Unlike political science, it is not concerned with the institutional provisions for that distribution and exercise, **but takes these as given**" (Bendix and Lipset, 1967: 26). It is now probably evident how Mills' ideological position both as a political man and as a social scientist differs from that of Bell or Bendix and Lipset. While the anti-ideology of Bell is addressed to finding out and also lamenting over the cultural contradictions of capitalism, Bendix and Lipset's politics in political sociology is limited paralytically to the studies of voting behavior only in terms of documentary evidence, attitude and opinion research, psychological testing, content analysis or mathematical models. In neither is there any concern for the political and economic contradictions of the military-expansion...
sionist capitalism of America. Nor is there any concern, to repeat, for historical agency to restructure the institutional system. It is in this that Mills' Leftism consists, and this enables him progressively to look forward to changing the social order and formulating the problems of private and public life as themes of political sociology.

Naturally this leads Mills to search for ideological-political reasons for the absence of a "Left establishment anywhere that is truly international and insurgent--and at the same time, consequential" (PPP: 221). If there is any decline of ideological thinking following the last World War, Mills argues, unlike Bell and Lipset, that is due to the culmination of increasing disappearance of the Left from the arena of cultural and political activities in the world dominated by two super powers with nuclear war-heads in their possession. Mills' Leftism has roots, therefore, in this:

In both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., as the political order is enlarged and centralized, it becomes less political and more bureaucratic; less the locale of a struggle than an object to be managed. Within both, most men are objects of history, adapting to structural changes with which they have little or nothing to do (PPP: 227).

Here in this evaluation of the state of affairs in both the USA and the USSR, Mills comes closest to Marcuse, the other Marxist-minded theorist of the New Left movement.

.... the contradictions of corporate capitalism today are as serious as ever before, but we have immediately to add that today the resources of corporate capitalism are equally strong and they are daily strengthened by the cooperation, or shall I say, the collusion, between the United States and the Soviet Union. What we are faced with, and I think this is one of the old-fashioned
terms we should save and recapture, is a temporary stabilization of the capitalist system, a temporary stabilization, the task of the left is a task of enlightenment, a task of education, the task of developing a political consciousness (Marcuse, 1969: 470).

Like Marcuse, who believes that the task of the new Left is to 'prepare itself and others .... in thought and action, morally and politically,' Mills also rests his hope on this and, thus, in this vein suggests formation of a Left establishment that "creates and sustains a cultural and political climate, sets the key task, the suitable themes, and establishes the proper canons of value, taste, and reality" (PPP: 221). The existence of a strong Left establishment is, however, as important as an effective strategy—a lever of action to cope with the magnitude of structural changes in the contemporary society. And, here, in respect of the historical agency of social change Mills and Marcuse differ. Whereas Mills is on the side of Plato and Mill, Marcuse approximates to Marx. Basically anti-Marxist in this context, Mills' preference for a leftist approach to issues and problems and his choice of historical agency are at bottom yearnings of a liberal democrat for realization of the cherished values of human life. This differentiates Mills from Marcuse who specifically opts for "libertarian socialism which has always been the integral concept of socialism, but only too easily repressed and suppressed" (1969: 469). Mills and Marcuse are close to each other as new Lefts in general sense rather than as theorists.
At the outset, Mills' political evolution is marked by an extraordinary enthusiasm about the role of labor as the live agent of structural change. In the spring of 1943, when he confronted the labor problem for the first time, he took up the case for the coal miners against the mine owners and the Federal administration. Taking a brief on behalf of those who seek "a way out of the present political situation" and who "believe intelligently in democracy," Mills thought in terms of "the formation of an independent labor party," though he qualified it by saying that on the basis of the present labor union it would not come into being "at all in the foreseeable future" (1943: 697). In the same year, Mills writes, in a review of Brady's Business as a System of Power, that somehow labor "must become a militant political movement" (PPP: 76). In 1948 Mills' enthusiasm reached its peak. He writes: "Inside this country today, the labor leaders are the strategic actors: they lead the only organizations capable of stopping the main drift towards war and slump .... What the U.S. does, or fails to do, may be the key to what will happen in the world" (NMP: 3). By the middle of the 1950s Mills discovers that "the labor unions have become organizations that select and form leaders who, upon becoming successful, take their places alongside businessmen in and out of government and politicians in both major parties among the national power elite" (PPP: 97). In 1959 Mills' growing
pessimism ran its full circle and he became more disillusioned than not. In categorically open terms he declares: "I do not believe, for example, that it is only 'Labor' or 'The Working Class' that can transform American society and change its role in world affairs .... I .... do not believe in abstract social forces--such as The Working Class--as the universal historical agent" (PPP: 232). In the following year he reaffirms his belief by saying that he does not understand why some New Leftists still "cling so mightily to 'the working class' of the advanced capitalist societies as the historic agency, or even as the most important agency ...."

(PPP: 256). Such a labor metaphysic, so he thinks, is a 'legacy from Victorian marxism that is now quite unrealistic.' But it must be noted, with much caution, that Mills never rules out the potentiality of the labor to bring about structural change. As Mills clearly points out:

The social and historical conditions under which industrial workers tend to become a-class-for-themselves, and a decisive political force, must be fully and precisely elaborated. There have been, there are, there will be such conditions .... Of course we can't "write off the working class." But we must study all that, and freshly. Where labor exists as an agency, of course we must work with it, but we must not retreat it as The Necessary Lever .... (PPP: 256).

Closely linked to Mills' disillusionment with, if not rejection of, the working class are his views on the inability of the mass to act as the chief agency.6 Standing at the bottom of the mass society, now the mass is "politically fragmented, and even as a passive fact, increasingly power-
less" (PE: 324). At the same time, "The new middle class of white-collar employees is certainly not the political pivot of any balancing society. It is in no way politically unified. Its unions, such as they are, often serve merely to incorporate it as hanger-on of the labor interest" (PPP: 34). The incapacity of the mass or of the white-collar to act politically leads Mills to explore whether the cultural apparatus is a substitute for effecting sociocultural change. He finds out that in America, as also in other advanced industrial societies, the politics of culture and the culture of politics have coalesced in the overdeveloped capitalist-industrial economy of the garrison state. "... culture is part of an ascendant capitalist economy and this economy is now a condition of seemingly permanent war. Insofar as cultural activities are established, they are established commercially or militarily" (PPP: 417). So Mills rules out the possibility of this capitalistic cultural apparatus to act as the agency.

Whatever the amount of Mills' early optimism and subsequent pessimism about the role of the working class, his final dependency on the intelligentsia is neither sudden nor logically unconnected in point of his own political evolution. In 1944, Mills finds himself, on the one hand, a political intellectual and also discovers, on the other, how intellectuals are incapacitated to act politically and culturally in the pursuit of "a politics of truth in a democratically responsible society" (PPP: 304). In face of organized irresponsibility, endangering both freedom and security, and of expropriation of
the intellectual worker from the means of effective communication, Mills realizes "why it is in politics that intellectual solidarity and effort must be centered" (PPP: 299). In order to cope responsibly with the problems of his life experience, the intellectual needs to relate himself to the values of truth in political struggle. In White Collar he focuses on how a new kind of patronage system for free intellectuals has caused "a loss of political will and even of moral hope" (WC: 144). In 1955 Mills points out that "the intellectual ought to be the moral conscience of his society, at least with reference to the value of truth, for in the defining instance, that is his politics. And he ought also to be a man absorbed in the attempt to know what is real and what is unreal" (PPP: 611). In The Causes of the World War Three (1958) Mills now addresses "neither to power elites nor to people in general, but to those who are generally aware of what is going on" (CWT: 8). To break the political monopoly of the current powers as also to break their monopoly of ideas, Mills directly calls upon the intellectuals "to act at once politically and intellectually" (CWT: 137). He now makes it clear:

It is our first task as an intellectual community publicly to confront the new facts of history-making and so of political responsibility and irresponsibility (CWT: 139).

In the celebrated article, "The Decline of the Left," published in 1959, Mills states that "in our present situation of the impoverished mind and lack of political will, United
States intellectuals, it seems to me, have a unique opportunity to make a new beginning. If we want to, we can be independent craftsmen" (PPP: 231). As a master political ideologue and a left radical, he urges upon the intellectuals 'to offer alternative definition of reality.' In 1960, Mills' conviction in the role of the intelligentsia as the leading live agency of historical change becomes once more solidified. He writes in Listen, Yankee that the revolution in Cuba is "not a revolution made by labor unions or wage workers in the city, or by labor parties, or by anything like that" (LY: 46). The first moves were taken by young intellectuals joined by the students. The Cuban revolution "really began .... when a handful of these young intellectuals really got together with the peasants" (LY: 46). Since 1958, in Cuba "the peasants have remained decisive, now the wage workers have become very important too" (LY: 47). What is interesting to note is that, whereas these quotes evidence Mills' emphasis on the role of intellectuals as revolutionaries, he does not rule out altogether the role to be played by peasants and industrial workers. As he himself admits, Mills was uncertain, accelerated by experiences in America, Soviet Union, Hungary and elsewhere, about the role of the peasantry and the working class as to their revolutionary potential. This position differentiates Mills from Lenin, and the reason of this basic difference is that, like Lenin, Mills was never a revolutionary in the field of action. Of course he was aware of this limitation. But Mills reminds us
that they should not be "bypassed." Alternatively he said: "So far as structural change is concerned, these don't seem to be at once available and effective as our agency any more. I know this is a debatable point among us, and among many others as well; I am by no means certain about it" (PPP: 255).

In place of a cultural apparatus, Mills argued in 1960 for an alternative "cultural apparatus, the intellectuals--as a possible, immediate, radical agency of change" (PPP: 256).

An Assessment

By now it is probably evident that Mills' early optimism and later pessimism about the role of the working class matches his early negativism and later positivism about intelligentsia as an alternative agency. By the same token, it is also evident that, in spite of his predominant emphasis on the political role of the intelligentsia, Mills does neither underestimate nor rule out the potential ability of political parties, the peasants or the working class to initiate and effect historical change. However, in whatever way he might have justified his thesis, Mills has been subjected to searching criticism from all quarters, regardless of their political affiliation. There is no denying the fact that Mills' theory suffers from a Platonic variety of elitism and is, therefore, somewhat "closed," as I see it, in point of politics of democracy for all. Warde says that Mills, as a
new Left, mistakes 'the prologue for the play.' The typical failure of the new Left is that "they fail to grasp the unstable and transitory causes for the lethargy of the laboring masses or to foresee the emergence of new conditions which can transform the mood and movements of the labor into their opposite" (Warde, 1961: 71). Thus "the error of the New Left .... consists in identifying and confusing the betrayals of the labor bureaucracies with the disorientation these cause in the ranks. The setbacks due to faulty leadership are read as evidence of a congenial incapacity of the working class to fulfill its historical mission" (Warde, 1961: 71). Aptheker, another Marxist theorist, notes that one of his basic failures, among others, is that "Mills' analysis of the political situation within the United States leads him to rule out any significant mass democratic movement for real renovation and change ...." (1960: 80). Closely linked to this is his "impatience with the imperfections and failures of socialism. He tends to view socialism in exactly the same terms as capitalism--and capitalism at its best and most stable, as in Great Britain and the United States--forgetting the centuries of political instability, terror and civil war that marked the achievement of relative stabilization in the Anglo-American world" (Aptheker, 1960: 81).

From a Marxist point of view, as also viewed in the general context, it appears in the reappraisal of Mills' thesis that both Warde and Aptheker are correct by and large
in their respective assessment. But the point needed to be emphasized is that Mills' was not focusing on the role of intelligentsia as an agency of change from the Marxist point of view.\(^7\) He is not Marxist in the sense in which he has been criticized, although it is contestable whether Mills' thesis is basically compatible with the world realities of today. He rather conceives of Marxism in a "plain" way, his basic point being this:

Is there any doubt about this after Max Weber, Thorstein Veblen, Karl Mannheim--to mention only three? We do now have ways--better than Marx's alone--of studying and understanding man, society, and history, but the work of these three is quite unimaginable without his work (TM: 13).

Yet Mills believes that Marx's Marxism is as much a part of European culture as is Italian Renaissance architecture. In line with William Morris, Antonio Gramsci, Rosa Luxemberg, G. D. H. Cole, Georg Lukacs, Christopher Caldwell, Jean-Paul Sartre, John Strachey, Georges Sorel, Edward Thompson, Lezlo Kolakowski, William A. Morris, Paul Sweezy and Eric Fromm, Mills claims to be a plain marxist theoretically and intellectually in the classic tradition. How far Mills, as he claims, is a Marxist at least in comparison with some of those he mentioned remains a question which needs to be answered in the near future.\(^8\) For the time being, Mills points out that these plain marxists have stressed "the humanism of marxism, especially of the younger Marx, and the role of the super-structure in history; they have pointed out that to under-
emphasize the interplay of bases and superstructure in the making of history is to transform man into that abstraction for which Marx criticized Feuerbach" (TM: 97-98). More specifically, as also politically, Mills joined Weber in "rounding out" and revising Marxism. Neither to Weber nor to Mills was the state a product of class antagonism, a capitalist apparatus for human exploitation. Sounding like Weber, Mills believes that "class struggle in the marxist sense does not prevail" (TM: 126). In addition, "the dialectical method' is either a mess of platitudes, a way of double talk, a pretentious obscurantism--or all three" (TM: 128-29 footnote). Evaluating Marx's influence on him, Mills says: "We agree with Weber's evaluation of Marx's emphasis upon the economic order in the modern capitalist era: It is a heuristic choice which holds that the economic order is the most convenient way to an understanding of this specific social structure. So much is fruitful in the marxist perspective ...." (CSS: 384). It is in this plain marxist perspective that Mills looked at the problem of historical change, and this posture is thus different from the standpoint of Warde's and Aptheker's criticisms. However Mills goes beyond. He justifies, theoretically, the inadequacy of "the labor metaphysic."

Behind the labor metaphysic and the erroneous views of its supporting trends there are deficiencies in the marxist categories of stratification; ambiguities and misjudgements about the psychological and political consequences of the development of the economic base; errors concerning the supremacy of economic causes within the history of societies and the mentality of
classes; inadequacies of a rationalist psychological theory; a generally erroneous theory of power; an inadequate conception of the state (TM: 127).

It is this Mills' theoretical standpoint that confronts him to face the Marxist criticism of Warde and Aptheker, who seem to be on more solid grounds than Mills, and this renders his thesis more vulnerable than he probably thought. Since his Marxism amounts to some kind of "liberal Marxism," it is not unreasonable for Schneider to say that "instead of calling himself a 'plain marxist,' Mills should have said along with Marx and in the precise sense that Marx meant it: 'I, at least, am not a Marxist'" (1963: 556). Anyway, Mills' radicalism in his leftist posture of an ideologist includes three distinct components: (1) the acceptance of the "Weberian" marxism; (2) a "Veblenite" critique of American social institutions; and (3) a "Mannheimian" utopianism of the role of the intelligentsia. Precisely put, Mills as a Weberian marxist poses concerns of the Mannheimian intellectual through the Veblenite terms in the post-industrial and corporate-capitalist America. In fact Mills' thesis of the historical agency of change has its genesis in two sets of circumstances. In the first place, since liberalism, robbed of its classic role, has become merely the ideology of legitimation in a military-industrial complex and the decline of politics has coincided with the rise and consolidation of the power elite, Mills correctly thinks that the structural consequences of
capitalism are integrally connected with liberalism. He is largely backed by evidence to find out that, on the one hand, the labor leaders, once they are up in the public limelight, join the axis of the national power elite, and that the working class movement, on the other, is more a failure than success in promoting its supposed mission to initiate radical changes that are long overdue. Therefore, Mills is left with only one alternative, the intelligentsia. This reliance is not simply an outcome of but surely related to his independent radicalism that is embodied in his Leftism. Secondly, Mills' experience with the Hungarian revolution in 1956 and the Cuban revolution of 1958 in both of which the intelligentsia took a leading political role along with the workers and peasants led him to realize the intelligentsia's hidden potential as the probable, at the same time effective and powerful, prime mover of change. But it seems very difficult to buttress Mills' rationale for what may be called excessive optimism about the intelligentsia which is usually and historically constituted of the rank and file of the bourgeoisie. To make the point clear, Mills' preference for the intelligentsia, not as a substitute for the governing power elite, but as a prime mover of historical change and as participants in the joint cultural and political struggle thus automatically compels him, despite apparent truths of the apolitical mass, to underestimate the potential political power of the mass including the white collar workers. Thompson, a British
laborite, says in this context:

It is possible that when Wright Mills offers the intellectual 'as a possible, immediate, radical agency of change' he is thinking of them, not as the leading agents of revolution, but as the force which may precipitate a new consciousness and initiate much broader processes. In this case I am much closer to agreement with him .... since it seems to me to be a crucial role of socialist intellectuals to do exactly this; and this in fact is what is happening all around the world today. But while socialist intellectuals may 'trigger off' these processes, they will only defeat and isolate themselves if they assume the hubris of 'main agents,' since the kind of socialism we want is one which is impossible without the participation of the whole people at every level (Quoted in Warde, 1961: 76).

Regardless of the ambiguities in the concept of the whole people, the conclusion that Mills has underemphasized the role of the working class seems on all counts inescapable. However, one should not forget that Mills was one of the very few intellectuals who took up "the theme of the 'growing together' of union bureaucracies and the controlling institutions of capitalism" (Hyman, 1973: 20). Hyman has correctly evaluated him in this regard: "Mills was one of the few prominent academic writers on industrial relations to display a basic sympathy for the underlying orientations of the Marxist tradition. He was also very much in the minority in his sensitivity to the dialectic between trade unions and capitalist society" (1973: 21).

Mills' lack of emphasis on the potential political role of the mass has also invited charges of elitism in his call for intellectuals' participation in politics.¹⁰ Articulating the charge of elitism in Mills' radical Leftism,
Schneider has the following to say:

In sum, Mills offers us a view of society that is elitist in several senses. First, he views society as dominated by a power elite. Second, he calls upon an intellectual elite to influence the men of power. Third, he sees in the power elite not only a danger to mankind but, perhaps, the only opportunity to avoid catastrophe. For the power elite can really make and remake history as it chooses. In this respect, rule by the power elite, dangerous as it is, may be preferable to rule by non-rational masses, open to the influence of demagogues (1963: 562).

My own findings, however, point to the contrary. Schneider's assessment of his radical politics is largely based upon his misunderstanding of the spirit and tenor of the body politic of Mills' sociology. It certainly remains uncorroborated by greater weight of evidence, and at the same time, it misunderstands the over-all impact of Marx on Mills. It undervalues Mills' democratic aspirations. Lawrence Goldman has also indicated that Schneider's assertion is a "distortion of Mills' position." As a political sociologist Mills has justifiably depicted that the power elite, despite differences of opinion as to its magnitude and role or its internal cohesion, exists and rules in the monopoly capitalist social structure of America. What Mills means by saying that the power elite retains the opportunity to make and remake history is that it could have done so had it not been the case as it is in the present. He makes it abundantly clear, often repetitiously, that the power elite are "crackpot realists" only interested in continuing politics by other means. He does talk of
creating the Left establishment—international, insurgent and consequential in scope and effect—indeed independent of the power elite and suggests such an establishment as "creates and sustains a cultural and political climate, sets the key tasks, the suitable themes, and establishes the proper canons of value, taste and reality" (PPP: 221). In so far as the role of the mass is concerned, Goldman nicely estimates Mills' position in these words:

The mass could be transformed into a community of publics if they rejected the politics of drift and blind fate and tried to solve the basic political problems of their society. Mills did not regard this as a very likely possibility but he would not have emphasized the importance of reason in political affairs or insisted on the need to control the cultural apparatus if he did not believe that the creation of a community of publics was a vital task for the radical intellectual (1963: 342).

The Millsian political role of the intelligentsia emphasizes wholesale disaffection and radical dissent from politics of status quo as practised by the higher circles or politically immoral men of power. "He was not an elitist," concludes Goldman quite rightly, "but an intense democrat who believed in the egalitarian ideal, the continuity of publics. This ideal is the best hope for America, and Mills insisted that the radical intellectual must take the responsibility upon himself and point the way" (1963: 343). Whatever the continuities with or departures from the other members of the Left, Mills' work represents more than a mere rebellion against deceit and irresponsibility of the power elite. Even
if one finds disconcerting caesura in the anti-intellectualism of the 1950s or a lack of political issues at the presidential election of the 1960s, as Macdonald saw, Mills was consistently a Left in his political radicalism and in his commitment to the cause of democracy. As a successor to and a carrier of the values of the Enlightenment, Mills was one of the very few exceptions to the usual style of life manifest in most new Leftists in the fifties. "To take this seriously," says Berman, "is to admit that C. Wright Mills had some logic when he proposed the intellectual as the immediate and radical agency of change. It need not be reiterated that our cultural task is to make that kind of change unnecessary" (1968: 32).
Notes

1. See Chapter 1, pp. 29-30.

2. Italics added.

3. For an elaboration of this point see Rousseas and Farganis (1965).

4. For example, see Johnson (1966: 99). See also Scimecca (1977) and Szymanski (1970).

5. Italics added.

6. For details of the rise of the masses and the mass society, see Chapter 4 of this work.

7. Mills' differences with Marx on the theme of alienation have already been discussed in Chapter 5, especially at pp. 213-18. For an assessment, from a non-Marxist point of view, of Mills' theory of the intelligentsia as a change agent, see Bachrach (1967: 55-59).

8. As already been pointed out in Chapter 1, at pp. 13, 37 (note 3), Mills is Weberian rather than Marxian in all his essential ideas.

9. The term "liberal Marxism" may sound contradictory. Whatever it is, in using the term I have in mind the fact that Mills was, unlike many liberal sociologists of the Establishment, fully aware of the relevance in sociology of at least certain principles of Marxism as a social theory.

10. One critique of Mills' position, not covered in this work, can be found in Bachrach's The Theory of Democratic Elitism. Generally speaking he argues "that democratic elitism, as an empirical theory, is basically unsound; and that viewed normatively, it fails to meet the essential political needs of twentieth century man" (Bachrach, 1967: 9). Specifically in connexion with Mills, he puts forward that despite Mills' "aversion to 'men of power,' he could not bring himself to advocate the abolition of the power elite here and now" (Bachrach, 1967: 57).

11. For elements of Mills' commitment to democracy, see the next chapter, i.e., Chapter 8.
CHAPTER EIGHT

Democracy and Liberalism

Introduction

I have shown in different places of this work\(^1\) that many theorists found elements of elitism in Mills' political orientations or in his political sociology. While these theorists are not entirely without some points in favor of their accusation, it seems to me that Mills, despite his apparent elitist tendencies, was at bottom a democrat, rather a stubborn democrat. In this chapter, I specifically focus on this issue, pointing to the different elements of his commitment to democracy and liberalism.

The New Left as a Democrat

Beneath what appears to be contradictions in many of his political sociological formulations, not necessarily limited to the intelligentsia, the power elite, the mass society, the organized irresponsibility, the collapse of both liberalism and socialism and so on, there is an important truth in his life, i.e., Mills was a stubborn democrat. Behind all his sociological themes this democratic tradition is the most dominating fact. In actuality, Mills' lament for the collapse of both liberalism and socialism has its root in his unbounded faith in the heritage of the Enlighten-
ment and in a call for restoration of democracy in America.

Let me illustrate Mills' commitment to democracy in his own words:

We should take democracy seriously and literally. Insofar as we accept the democratic heritage--as not only our heritage but as of use and of value to the world tomorrow--we must realize that it has been a historically specific formation, brought about by a set of factors, a union of procedural devices and ideological claims quite specific to Western civilization; and that it is now in a perilous condition not only in the world but in the West itself, and especially in the United States of America (CWT: 140-41).

Elsewhere,

We are free men. Now we must take our heritage seriously. We must make clear the perils that threaten it. We must stop defending civil liberties long enough to use them. We must attempt to give content to our formal democracy by acting within it (PPP: 233).

Mills' commitment to democracy is unequivocal and total. It is spectacular in view of doubts about democracy of such classic sociological thinkers as Pareto, Mosca and Michels. But at the same time he also resembles Weber and Durkheim or Mill and Schumpeter in their commitment to the cause of democracy. For Mills, the Enlightenment is the main fount of liberalism and Marxism, and in both the values of reason and freedom coincide. In their turn they provide the content of Mills' democratic tradition. Freedom and reason, the predominant values of liberalism and Marxism, are not mutually exclusive because he believes, not without reason, that increased rationality is also a condition for increased freedom. On the one hand, liberalism recognizes freedom and reason as the
supreme facts of the individual being. On the other, Marxism gives central importance to man in the political making of history for himself. However, as it would follow, Mills, as a democrat, is a liberal in an ultimate choice between liberalism and Marxism. Mills is aware that neither Mill examined the kinds of political economy now arising in the world nor Marx analysed the kind of society now in formation in the socialist world. But, compared to the egalitarian classless social tradition of Marx, Mills is rather on the side of the representative democratic tradition of Mill. This becomes evident in spite of Mills' concern that the fundamental values of reason and freedom have become problematic as the ideological mark of "The Fourth Epoch" in the social contexts of post-industrial society. Put otherwise, Mills thinks "liberalism, as a set of ideals, is still viable, and even compelling to Western men" (PPP: 189).

Both liberalism and democracy are reciprocally interlinked political and social phenomena. Whereas democracy is more often a form of government, it has roots in liberalism as a set of political ideas and ideals. Speaking historically, liberalism as a set of political and social orientations has sustained democracy as a form of government since the seventeenth century. However, it is unwise to make any rigid dichotomy between the two concepts of democracy and liberalism. In consonance with the tradition of the Renaissance and the Reformation, the most fundamental assumption of liberal-
ism consists in viewing man as autonomous individual or as the "masterless" man. Liberalism, therefore, attaches highest value to the moral worth and equality of human personality. Articulating in the Deweyan tradition of liberalism, Mills says that it looks at "man as the measure of all things: policies and events are good or bad in terms of their effect on men; institutions and societies are to be judged in terms of what they mean to and for the individual human being" (PPP: 190). In order to develop his dormant potentialities as fully as possible, liberalism is based ultimately upon the postulate that the individual is the essential criterion of all public policy and that he is the maker of his own life fate. In this autonomous conception of man, there are two essential ideals which constitute integral aspects of liberalism: freedom and reason. Freedom for the autonomous individual consists in the cherished fulfilment of his potentialities, and this can only occur through self-fulfilment. The faith on man's capacity to reason stresses his participation in decision-making. In brief, "Based upon a conception of individuality that emphasized the autonomy of individual will, the autonomy of human reason, and the essential goodness and perfectability of human nature, liberalism was the political expression of this individualistic Weltanschauung" (Hallowell, 1954: 70).

Mills' concept of man "as an actor in historic crises, and of man as a whole entity," though rooted in intellectually
diverse traditions of James, Mead, Freud and Marx, is not far removed from this classic liberal view of human nature. Based on this concept of man, Mills superimposes his 'sociological conception of fate.' Fate is not an universal constant in man's life; neither is it rooted in the nature of history nor in man's nature. It is intimately connected with the specific kind of social structure within which history-making decisions, affecting life fates of individuals, are made. This is to indicate that "the extent to which the mechanics of fate are the mechanics of history-making is itself a historical problem. How large the role of fate may be, in contrast with the role of explicit decision, depends first of all upon the scope and the concentration of the means of power that are available at any given time in any given society" (CWT: 12-13). Conceived in this way, Mills argues that modern social structures, especially those of the USA and the USSR, offer unique opportunities to shaping human fate and industry. The enormous enlargement and the decisive centralization of all means of power and decision that accompanied the rise of industrial societies have now become unique means of history-making. In the Eighteenth Brumaire, Marx writes: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but rather circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past" (1959: 320). Mills quotes Marx in order to emphasize the
circumstances when man is or is not the maker of his life fate and history. But it is extremely important to note that the underlined portions of Marx's statement are conspicuous by its absence in Mills' quote. This indicates that Mills, as a plain marxist, is averse to following the Marxian route of dialectical inevitability of historical materialism. For certain, he appears to have taken 'inevitability' and 'fatalism' synonymously, contrary to the intent of Marx or Engels. Considering this aspect, Aptheker was right to observe: "The inevitability of historical materialism is exactly the opposite of fatalism--and only its position is the opposite, by the way. The inevitability of historical materialism is the unfolding of human history not regardless of man's activity but rather because of that activity" (1960: 73-74). What appears apprently to be a misconception of or deviation from this interpretation of Marxism on Mills' part is in fact in conformity to his professed position as a "plain marxist."
Like Marx, Mills contends that 'men are free to make history'; but he immediatly adds, in the context of modern overdeveloped society, that "some men are now much freer than others to do so, for such freedom requires access to the means of decision and of power by which history can now be made" (CWT: 14). And in this, Mills was haunted by the vision of the historic capacity of man ingrained in a conception of the Enlightenment. To quote Mills:

The facts about the newer means of history-making are a signal that men are not necessarily in the grip of fate, that men can now make history (SI: 183).
In view of Mills' conception of man, as based upon the ideal of the Renaissance or the Enlightenment, it is difficult to sustain the argument that Mills is basically an elitist. On the other hand, Mills' theory of democracy is closely connected with and proceeds upon this basic assumption of free man. The essence of democracy consists in "the rehabilitation of political life, making politics again central to decision-making and responsible to broader publics." Mills defines democracy in the following way:

By democracy I mean a system of power in which those who are vitally affected by such decisions as are made--and as could be made but are not--have an effective voice in these decisions and defaults (CWT: 118).

Elsewhere,

In essence, democracy implies that those vitally affected by any decision men make have an effective voice in that decision. This, in turn, means that all power to make such decisions be publicly legitimated and that the makers of such decisions be held publicly accountable (SI: 188).

To define democracy seems to be a futile task since to date there is no all-accepted definition of this concept. Macpherson has rightly indicated that "democracy has become an ambiguous thing, with different meanings--even apparently opposite meanings--for different peoples" (1974: 2). There is no single definition that fulfills all criteria which are spoken of by different theorists of democracy. In other words, it is to say that, without attempting to discover its technical deficiencies, Mills' conceptualization of democracy includes three components: first, persons affected by
binding decisions of men in power in the government should have an effective voice, implying their 'consent' and voluntary 'participation' in the political process; second, power exercised by the government must be publicly legitimated, not necessarily implying in terms of mere constitutional validity; and thirdly, the decision makers must be accountable to the publics. This aspect indicates what is called the principle of public accountability, especially political accountability. However, there are certain apparent deficiencies in Mills' concept of democracy. For example, he does not specify the ambit of 'public legitimation'; he does not indicate how the policy makers could be made accountable to the public; he does not specifically say how the present acts of the government suffer from lack of legitimation; again it is not enough to say that democracy is a system of power since any system of government is always a system of power. In democracy, it is people's participation that counts most, and if so, then the question arises as to how to maximize their participation. To be sure, Mills was not concerned with problems of government or state as such. Naturally, his theoretical limitations are easily understandable because after all he was a sociologist. On the other hand, the point is whether or not Mills was a democrat, not as a theorist but as a believer. If this is taken as the starting point, it would seem that the corpus of his writings indicates that he was a stubborn democrat. As a democrat,
Mills is very close to John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), the best known political theorist on representative democracy. At home, he has some parallels to Schumpeter, among others. All of them—Mill, Schumpeter and Mills—believed in indirect, or representative, form of democracy. But, it must be noted here that Mills, like Mill, was not at all concerned as such to defend how far, to what extent and when the representative democracy is the most ideally suited form of government to best serve the needs of the people. Instead, Mills started with the primary acceptance of the superiority of representative political institutions. With Schumpeter, Mills regards that democracy is now a method, a kind of political institutional arrangement. In this context it is fruitful to remember Schumpeter's notion of democracy since it appears that Mills has also been influential in his formulations of democracy. Schumpeter says that "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (1962: 269).

His book, *Capitalism, Democracy and Socialism* was published in 1942. Here he formulated a catalogue of conditions for the successful functioning of democracy, and this catalogue has a striking parallel in Mills'. Against this backdrop, it seems worthwhile to discuss Mills, Schumpeter and Mill together, although my own interest centers around Mills' position only. Mills particularly mentions that "the poli-
tical structure of a modern democratic state .... requires at least .... six conditions" (CWT: 118).

Elements of Mills' Commitment to Democracy

(1) The Existence of a Community of Publics: The idea of a successful democracy presupposes the existence of a community of publics who form discussion circles. In its turn, it enables people to carry opinion form one to another and helps them participate in the struggle for power. In this sense, "Congress or Parliament, as an institution, crowns all the scattered publics." The existence of a community of publics is, therefore, integrally linked with the idea of public opinion as the ultimate source of all public legitimation. Speaking of the liberty of thought and expression for the individual, Mill once remarked: "If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind" (1951: 104). Mills' statement expresses a vigorous political individualism, the utility of man's freedom of expression of opinion in a democracy. In Mills it has a noteworthy reflection since he always considers that freedom of political expression of the individual in the form of public opinion provides an indispensable formal content to democracy. Therefore, as Mills says, the first condition for democracy "requires not only that such a public as is projected
by democratic theorists exist, but that it be the very forum within which a politics of real issue is enacted" (CWT: 118). Public opinion initiates the free ebb and flow of discussion. "The possibilities of answering back, of organizing autonomous organs of public opinion, of realizing opinion in action, are held to be established by democratic institutions" (PE: 298). What Mills says of the public opinion is supplemented by Schumpeter's observation made earlier: "effective competition for leadership requires a large measure of tolerance for difference of opinion" (1962: 295). As Mills understands, the essence of democracy's success consists in organizing an effective public opinion as the legitimating source of all exercise of power by the government.

(2) The Need for a Responsible Party System: For its successful operation, democracy requires the existence of "nationally responsible parties which debate openly and clearly the issues which the nation, and indeed the world, now so rigidly confronts" (CWT: 118). Mills' concern for an effective party system was reflected in his review of Wilfred E. Binkley's American Political Parties, published as far back as 1943. Therein he notes with characteristic seriousness that the political parties play important role in the making as well as democratizing the public decisions in a democracy. Parties decline with the number of compromises they make, and thus, "the idea of parties as representative of definite interests becomes a fiasco" (Quoted in Gillam, 1966: 97).
(3) The Indispensability of a Bureaucracy: Mill, Schumpeter and Mills—all of them particularly recognize the importance of a well trained, efficient and independent civil service as an indispensable component of democracy. Schumpeter pointed out, "... democratic government in modern industrial society must be able to command, for all purposes the sphere of public activity is to include—no matter whether this be much or little—the services of a well-trained bureaucracy of good standing and tradition, endowed with a strong sense of duty and a no less strong esprit de corps" (1962: 293). Echoing this tradition, Mills considers that the success of democracy "requires a senior civil service firmly linked to the world of knowledge and sensibility and composed of skilled men who, in their careers and in their aspirations, are truly independent of any private—that is to say, corporation—interests" (CWT: 118). Mills' emphasis on a public spirited and merit based civil service also reminds us of Mill who lent his support to the reform of the British civil service through competitive public examinations in 1854.

(4) The Requirement of an Independent Intelligentsia: To be successful, democracy "requires an intelligentsia, inside as well as outside the universities, who carry on the big discourse of the Western world, and whose work is relevant to and influential among parties and movements and publics. It requires, in brief, truly independent minds which are directly relevant to powerful decisions" (CWT: 118). It is now probably clear
that Mills' reliance on the intelligentsia as the prime mover of historical change does not indicate elitism in his aspirations as a democrat. He does never say that the intelligentsia is a substitute to take the place of the power elite in the administration of the government or public business. On the contrary, his reliance on the potential of the intelligentsia is a part of his intention, as a democrat, that they should play the prominent part in the forefront of national politics in view of the decline of the publics, the working class or the political parties. What Mills means, insofar as its role is concerned, is that the intelligentsia, being men of power by virtue of their knowledge, is better suited to taking the initiative in the interplay of diverse political forces in a democratic society. To be sure, he does not intend, as Plato does in The Republic, to stratify the intelligentsia as the political category of ruling class. Therefore Mills' emphasis on the role of the intelligentsia should be construed as part of his intellectual concern for the establishment of a viable democratic society. In this respect there is an excellent parallel between Mills and Mill. The latter's enthusiasm ran so high as to lead him to suggest even more than one vote to the educated intelligentsia. Though Mill recognizes equal voting for all, he pointed out this necessity of additional franchise in his Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform:

... if the most numerous class, which (saving honourable exceptions on one side, or disgraceful ones on the other) is the lowest in the educational scale, refuses to recognise a right
in the better educated, in virtue of their superior qualifications, to such plurality of votes as may prevent them from being always and hopelessly outvoted by the comparatively incapable, the numerical majority must submit to have the suffrage limited to such portion of their numbers, or to have such a distribution made of the constituencies, as may effect the necessary balance between numbers and education in another manner (Quoted in Robson, 1968: 226).

(5) The Need for an Impartial Media: Mills' fifth condition requires that "there be media of genuine communication which are open to such men and with the aid of which they can translate the private troubles of individuals into public issues, and public issues and events into their meanings for the private life" (CWT: 119). The unprecedented feats of science and technology have revolutionized the domain of mass communication and have lessened the distance between the people and government. In enlarging and broadening the forum of public discussion, it possesses the unique opportunity to multiply 'the scope and place of personal discussion,' to 'encourage competition of ideas,' to further 'the conventional dynamic of classic democracy,' and finally, to stimulate 'the growth of rational and free individuality.' Recognizing the importance of mass media, the quintessence of any democracy in large scale industrial societies, Mills goes on to say, "so long as the media are not entirely monopolized, the individual can play one medium off against another; he can compare them, and hence resist what any one of them puts out. The more genuine competition there is among the media, the more
resistance the individual might be able to command" (PE: 313).
In brief, mass media provide the necessary means of opinion
formation among the publics who, in their turn, make demo-
ocracy function.

(6) **Pluralism as a Requirement:** Lastly, "democracy certainly requires, as a fact of power, that there be free associa-
tions linking families and smaller communities and publics
on the one hand with the state, the military establishment,
the corporation on the other. Unless such associations exist,
there are no vehicles for reasoned opinion, no instruments
for the rational exertion of public will" (CWT: 119). Demo-
cracy in the sense of a balance of constitutionally demarcated
rights and obligations between government and citizens re-
quires the plurality of associations--trade unions, cultural
organizations, educational or vocational institutions, centers
of professional activities, etc. that operate at various social
levels and act as countervailing powers. In large scale in-
dustrial societies, the need for a variety of free associa-
tions is felt in terms of the bureaucratic tendencies that
are characteristic of such societies and also in terms of
their political role in opinion formation and channelizing
the political power and processes ultimately towards the
values of democracy. That Mills was aware of the role of
voluntary associations as a condition for the operation of
democracy is, therefore, needless to mention.
In this regard, it is also worthwhile to take notice of certain other prerequisites that are needed to make democracy viable in any society. Mills does not state them as in a catalogue, but those are emphasized in his writings here and there. Let me refer to some of them:

(7) The Role of Education: Mills mentions the role of liberal education in the formation of a politically conscious community of publics consisting of knowledgeable men. This provides the much-needed forum where they can participate in the political debates that are really open and free. It was Mill who took the lead in relentlessly emphasizing the role of education as the essential support of a stable and progressive society. In *Principles of Political Economy* Mill wrote: "The institutions for lectures and discussion, the collective deliberations on questions of common interest, the trades unions, the political agitation, all serve to awaken public spirit, to diffuse a variety of ideas among the mass, and to excite thought and reflection in the more intelligent" (1973: 262). Reminding Mill's *Inaugural Address* at St. Andrews University in 1967, Mills says, "Alongside skill and value we ought to put sensibility, which includes them both and more besides; it includes a sort of therapy in the ancient sense of clarifying one's knowledge of one's self, it includes the imparting of all those skills of controversy with oneself which we call thinking, and with others which we call debate" (PPP: 369). As far as the political task of
public education is concerned, it aids "to make the citizen more knowledgeable and thus better able to think and to judge of public affairs" (PE: 317). Mills thus elaborates:

In a community of publics the task of liberal education would be: to keep the public from being overwhelmed; to help produce the disciplined and informed mind that cannot be overwhelmed; to help develop the bold and sensible individual that cannot be sunk by the burdens of mass life (PE: 319).

In regard to the role of educational institutions in the popular participation in democracy, both Mill and Mills were influenced by Tocqueville's analysis of democracy in America.

(8) Moral Commitment as Prerequisite: Unlike Machiavelli, both Mill and Mills stood for a politics that is based upon morals. Both of them displayed the Platonic distaste for any differentiation of politics from morality. Mill viewed with concern, like Mills, that American social institutions, unless reformed, might prevent the intellectual and moral improvement of men. For Mill, the community, together with its institutions, customs and ways of life, must be permeated with morality. Pointing out the moralizing effects of state, Mill says in his On Liberty:

The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it; and a State which postpones the interests of their mental expansion and elevation to a little more of administrative skill, or of that semblance of it which practice gives, in the details of business; a State which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile
instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes—will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished (1951: 229).

About Mills, Horowitz writes, he "personally was a man with deep moral convictions; quite willing to stake his professional reputation on the line in defense of these convictions" (PPP: 14). And this personal morality in Mills also finds reflection in public concerns. Reverberating Mill, he says that "our moral level is now primarily a matter of corrupting society" (PPP: 331). Individuals are at present morally defenseless and politically indifferent. Mills thus views that a mere "call for 'administrative reorganization'" does not improve what he calls "a moral culture." Like Mill, he believes that there is "in a democracy no dilemma on this score, but a dialectic, in which the moral quality of both men and institutions can be progressively improved" (PPP: 337). In realization of the need for moral men and for moralizing institutions Mills says, rather in a more caustic terms that Mill:

Where there are moral men in immoral institutions, you seek to improve the institutions. When there are immoral men in moral institutions, you kick the rascals out. When you are confronted by immoral men in immoral institutions, you follow Jefferson's advice and revolt. If you are fortunate enough to encounter moral men in moral institutions, you seek to maintain them as a standard for other areas of your public life (PPP: 337).

In particular defense of democracy, Mills says in positive terms that "the moral quality of both men and institutions must be progressively improved" (PPP: 338).
Commitment to Truth: Mills is in favor of a politics of truth as the essence of all democracy. Here he also comes to Mill for whom the role of intellect is the consistent search for truth. In his Inaugural Address Mill says, "The most incessant occupation of the human intellect throughout life is the ascertainment of truth. We are always needing to know what is actually true about something or other" (Quoted in Robson, 1968: 154). This enables Mill to conceive of the realization of his utilitarian ideal, the greatest good of the greatest number, through continuous approximation to truth. Basically as a sociologist, orientated in the pragmatist tradition of Peirce and Dewey or in the sociology of knowledge tradition of Mannheim, Mills approaches truth "in terms of some accepted model or system of verification," which is not transcendental. On the one hand, Mills views that truthfulness of propositions may be tested by the verificatory model generalized by Peirce and Dewey. On the other, Mills learned from Mannheim that relativity of truth depends on "the structure of consciousness in its totality" within specific social-historical situations. Truth is therefore a probability. The quest for truth is a perennial intellectual concern for Mills. In the realm of politics, he carries this lesson of the sociology of knowledge further and links to the ends of his liberal democratic aspirations. In 1944 he opined that the political intellectual should pursue the "politics of truth in a democratically responsible society"
(PPP: 304). Fifteen years later, in 1959, he states categorically that "the politics of truth" is the only possible realistic politics open to the intellectuals.

(10) The Need for Representative Men: Mills, just as Weber or Mannheim or Mill, also displays his profound concern for what he calls lack of "Representative Men" in America. The problem is one of leadership. Stating his position on the type of public man who might be a popular representative, Mill said: "One who desires to be a legislator should rest on recommendations not addressing themselves to a class, but to feelings: and interests common to all classes: the simple as well as the learned should feel him to be their representative; otherwise his words and thoughts will do worse than even fall dead on their minds; will be apt to rouse in them a sentiment of opposition" (Quoted in Robson, 1968: 236). In brief, the free-floating representatives are the physicians of the body-politic and, as leaders, elevate the moral and intellectual standard of the citizenry, developing their active capacities and strengthening protection against tyranny and class welfare. In Mills this tradition continues. He also feels the need for a set of Representative Men "whose conduct and character are above the taint of the pecuniary morality, and who constitute models for American imitation and aspiration" (PPP: 337). For the quality and the maintenance of representative institutions, these Representative Men are the political leaders vested with the task of improving
moral and intellectual standards of people. They are to demand moral change by dramatizing moral issue of public affairs. In the light of the Watergate scandal that is yet to evaporate from the memory of the American public, Mills is not without reason when he laments that "we are today a leaderless democracy" (PPP: 337). "If public officials are to be morally responsible, there must also be a sense of morally political purpose. For in politics those who have no moral beliefs are likely to become the tools of those who do" (PPP: 336). It is in this sense that Mills' Representative Men are also moral men, that political intellectuals are moral men and that democracy is meaningless without moral ends. To sum up:

It is to create, to force, to make articulate such crises that Representative Men would find one major role in a democracy. Being men of conscience, they would stand up to corrupting institutions and thus become the pivots around which these institutions could be redirected. But they could not do that if they were not sustained by a morally oriented movement .... I do believe that the creation of such Representative Men should be a major aspiration of our collective political life. For only the presence of such men, and the moving conditions for their maximum influence, could change the sourness of the higher immorality into the everyday sweetness of a morally free society (PPP: 338).

Mill and Mills: Few Points of Contrast

The broad purpose behind this preceding comparison of Mills with Mill is that it illustrates how Mills, primarily a
sociologist, shared many of the fundamental democratic aspirations of Mill, the classic exponent of representative democracy. Both were afraid of moral, intellectual and, ultimately, political stagnation of representative democracy in their respective societies. However, it is now necessary to indicate certain discontinuities between the two. Quite understandably, since Mill is a political theorist, he is more comprehensive than Mills. Though both were radicals in their styles of thought and shared similar reformist zeal, Mills' realization of the political role of public opinion and of parties seems to place him in a unique position compared to that of Mill. Though none of them had any political affiliation, they differed much on these points. Mill values the worth of the freedom of expression or the liberty of political dissent for the citizen. But, unlike Bentham or Mills, he is sceptic about the public opinion. For Mill, the rule of public opinion virtually means the rule of the majority, and in the political circumstances of realistic politics, the majority is intolerant of any other opinion but its own. So he can write: "The majority have not yet learnt to feel the power of the government their power, or its opinions their opinions. When they do so, individual liberty will probably be as much exposed to invasion from the government, as it already is from public opinion." (Mill, 1951: 94). Therefore, Mill ultimately comes to realize that "in politics it is almost triviality to say that public opinion now rules the world" (1951: 165). Mills was not unaware of Mill's anxiety
about the tyranny of the majority. In addition, he also knew Mill's elevation of the selfless, public-minded, knowledgeable and conscientious few in the forefront of democratic politics against the obvious mediocrity of the majority. Mill points to them as "the tribunal of the specially instructed" or the "intellectual benefactors of humanity." This only parallels Mills' primacy attached to the intelligentsia. Despite all these and other similarities with Mill, Mills recognizes the indispensability of public opinion in the functioning of democracy, as evident, at least, by his lament for the transformation of the community of publics into a community of masses. However, both of them typically share what might be called some sort of political inability of the general mass to be the real rulers in the regime of democracy. But that Mills was in favor of restoring the public to the seat of legitimate power is much evident in his analysis of the decline of American democracy. Closely related to Mill's apprehension of the quality and role of public opinion was his negative opinion towards political party system. In fact Mill had no love for it. One immediate reason is that in his time political parties were looser bodies than what we find today. However, in spite of this, Mill always emphasized popular participation in the political processes of democracy. As Duncan remarks, "Mill, who certainly had little of Dahl's enthusiasm for party and in-
terest group competition, did believe strongly that continuous participation in political life, even by men who were initially selfish and short-sighted, would bring about greater agreement and close community ties than had previously existed" (1973: 271). Insofar as Mills is concerned, he repeatedly points out that political parties have much to do with functioning of democracy. Although he was critical of the parties as they worked in America, Mills strongly believed in the parties as leading agent and catalyst of political socialization for the people in general and also as mechanism that would shape decision-making at various policy levels of democratic government. At the level of social change, while Mill favored gradualism, Mills believed in radicalism and, therefore, wanted immediate restructuring of American society within the democratic framework. However, Mills was quite aware of the hindrances to the resurgence of democracy in America. As he reminded:

I do not believe that these six conditions can be brought about so long as the private corporation remains as dominant and as irresponsible as it is in national and international decisions; I do not believe that they can be brought about so long as the ascendancy of the military, in personnel and in ethos, is as dominant and as politically irresponsible as it is; and certainly they cannot be brought about without filling the political vacuum that is now the key fact of U.S. politics (CWT: 119-20).

An Assessment

Any conclusion of Mills' position as a democrat seems to be a negative one, no matter how authentic he was in his
democratic aspirations. In terms of realpolitik, Mills' democratic visions of American democracy remain an utopia far beyond immediate possibilities of any realization.

As a democrat he shares, as already noted, the values of classic socialism and liberalism, especially the latter. With Weber and Durkheim, on the side of sociology, and Mill and Schumpeter, on the side of political theory, Mills exhibits his manifest conviction in the basic superiority of the democratic ideal as the most utilitarian arrangement of power sharing between the rulers and the ruled. He is not a democrat in the sense of what he calls "liberal rhetoric." Speaking theoretically, he began his intellectual odyssey with virulent criticism of liberalism, especially that of pragmatist tradition of Peirce, James and Dewey. Approaching Peirce on a social psychological level, Mills criticized him on the ground that "he did not have a worked-out view of politics" (SP: 194-95). James, to whom Mills owes his humanism, moralism and the reverence for truth, was an apologist of war, a "conservative" and a protagonist of "laissez-faire." In estimating him, Mills was quick to point out that he was "at bottom conservative. In his pronouncements on morals, family life, and temperance this is true. In religion, the only thing not conservative about his view, the only thing original is his explanation, the grounds on which he justified theism. In political matters we have seen that his individualism was bound to place his weight with the regnant laissez-faire attitude. On economic and political questions he was usually in the classic liberal position" (SP: 273).
However, it was in criticism of Dewey's pluralistic relativism that Mills elaborated his concern for unequal power distribution in the modern industrial-democratic society. On the one hand, it is a kind of "politics of reform of situation." On the other, Dewey's biological model of action and reflection "serves to minimize the cleavage and power divisions within society." (SP: 382). Commenting on the limitations of pragmatism, Mills' first love according to Horowitz, he states that politically "pragmatism is less expediency than it is a kind of perennial mugwump confronted with rationalized social structures" (SP: 394). Elsewhere he repeats: "As a method, pragmatism is overstuffed with imprecise social value; as a social-political orientation, it undoubtedly has a tendency toward opportunism" (PPP: 167).

In his discussion of the prospects of a new individualism, Alexander makes a suggestive remark: "liberalism, if it is to pursue its historic ideals, must become radical" (1972: 111). By the late 1960s, like many, Mills fought to break with the liberal establishment; protested against the merger of political-corporate power system; attacked the manipulative system of pseudo-politics; bemoaned for growing political apathy of the intellectuals, the mass and the working class; and finally, sought a remedy in resuscitation of democratic reason and freedom for the modern man in the confines of the technological society. In trying to reinstate "the image of the self-cultivating man as the goal of the human
being," to overcome social, technological and bureaucratic rationality as "a means of tyranny and manipulation, a means of expropriating the very chance to reason, the very capacity to act as free man," to warn against the advancing menace of the soft cell of the managerial-technological-welfare and warfare society as successor to gospels of the New Deal, Mills indeed became a radical. Rather he became what may be called "the radical liberal." Or, in other words, he turned into "a democratic Left." This is the reason why he wrote on the decline of the Left and appealed to the democrats in the leftist tradition. Suggesting in broadest terms the objectives of a realistic politics of truth, Mills summarizes the tasks lying ahead of all:

In summary, what we must do is to define the reality of the human condition and to make our definitions public; to confront the new facts of history-making in our time, and their meanings for the problem of political responsibility; to release human imagination by transcending the mere exhortation of grand principle and opportunist reaction in order to explore all the alternatives now open to the human community (PPP: 235).

But, tragically though, it remains more an ideal, an utopian vision for changed self and society. Despite reformist postures and Leftist offensives, the triumphant march of corporate capitalism, the liberalized democracy and bureaucratized state apparatus has remained and has grown unhindered. Smith has said that "the collapse of liberalism might well lie in the future, but it is not the impending doom or the imminent inevitability of the near future" (1972: 88). In all
probability, it is more than a prophesy. The question, however, remains the same which Mills himself raised in 1942:

As government and business become increasingly interlocked, economic questions will more and more become: who is to staff the points of political decision in governmental hierarchies and pinnacles? The new questions of freedoms and securities must be put in the fore of these decisions ... for today "the political freedom of free enterprise" means the power of Corporations over and within the state (PPP: 186).

Considered in the Millsian terms, the political problem of unfreedom has become even more acute in the days subsequent to Mills' death in 1962. I have already drawn attention to the chain of developments in America. American society is now variously designated as "Warfare State" (Cook, 1972), "Pentagonized Society" (Bosch, 1968), "The Contract State" (Neiburg, 1970), "The Garrison Society" (Dibble, 1968), "Weapons Culture" (Lapp, 1969), etc. In fact, these developments are not so much a pointer to the crisis of democracy as it is to that of capitalism within which democracy has been dissolved or is, at least, in the process of dissolution. In a capitalist society where liberty is a function of the ownership and possession of property, the important question which Mills should have asked, is not "whether democracy will survive, but whether capitalist democracy will survive, for that is the system which is attacked" (Laski, 1933: 185). Mills, being on the side of Mill, failed to understand that liberal democracy, in changed circumstances of modern times, would have to be revised in order
to resolve its built-in contradiction, "the contradiction between equal freedom to realize one's human powers and freedom of unlimited appropriation of others' powers, or between the maximization of powers in the ethical sense and the maximization of powers in the descriptive market sense ...." (Macpherson, 1973: 23). How far, if at all, this contradiction can be resolved is one question. If resolved, whether it will remain "liberal" is another. But insofar as current developments within advanced capitalist societies including the US are concerned, they point unmistakably at least to one uniform pattern: ever increasing accumulation of private economic power and a concomitant rise of the state as a guardian and protector of the dominant economic interests. In a situation like this even the success of the reformist proposal for a participatory democracy involving "a down-grading or abandonment of market assumptions about the nature of man and society, a departure from the image of man as a maximizing consumer, and a great reduction of the present economic and social inequality" (Macpherson, 1977: 115), seems to be quite remote. For, the growing "unequal economic power, on the scale and of the kind encountered in advanced capitalist societies, inherently produces political inequality, on a more or less commensurate scale, whatever the constitution may say" (Miliband, 1976: 237). The prospect of democracy then recedes in face of mounting tensions between economic and political equality in the capitalist contexts of the
society. The democratic state fully emerges as a capitalist state with the function of sustaining and maintaining a class structure and relations of production suited to the predominance of private ownership of property and capitalistic competition. In the epoch of "late capitalism," to borrow Mandel's (1975) phrase, the state also becomes repressive, revealing the "seamy side of democracy" (cf. Wolfe, 1973). Whatever the other results that might follow, the people are increasingly separated from centers of democratic participation. In the crisis of capitalism, while the democratic form of the state is maintained, its democratic content suffers constant erosion. Commenting on the growing conflict between capitalism and democracy in America, Reich and Edwards go on to say the following:

The isolation of government from the electoral system, the capitalists' financial weight with both parties, and the sterility of the present two-party system have wrung from American government much of its democratic content. Many civil liberties and personal freedoms remain, but the basic elements of democratic government—consent of the governed and control of the government by popular majority—have been seriously eroded (1978: 53).

Against this backdrop of all these developments, what remains of American democracy or of Mills' vision for a democratic society based on values of classic liberalism? Insofar as Mills' position as a democrat is concerned, it seems that posterity would remember him ultimately as a humanist. His success lies in the rebirth and rejuvenation of democratic ideals of reason and freedom that now form the inexhaustible
fountain of radical protest. With full knowledge of the constraint of bureaucratized liberalism to contain and subvert "the humanistic tradition with greater and more streamlined ease" (Smith, 1972: 83), let us wait to see how soon Lasch proves right in what he says in conclusion of his own essay:

The post-industrial order, far from transcending the contradictions inherent in capitalism, embodies them in an acute form. Having outlasted its principal historical function— that of capital accumulation—the system of privately owned production for profit can only survive by devoting itself more and more to the production of waste. Yet the social effect of waste is to generate mounting political tensions. How these tensions will be resolved— whether in the long run they will furnish the basis of a socialism of abundance or whether efforts to resolve them will usher in a new age of barbarism— no one can say with any confidence. What can be said is that the post-industrial order is an inherently unstable form of society. There are good reasons to think that it may not even survive the twentieth century (1972: 47-48).
Notes

1. See Chapter 4, pp. 161-63; also Chapter 7, pp.

2. Although not directly relevant here, I agree with Macpherson who says that "it was the liberal state that was democratized, and in the process, democracy was liberalized" (1974: 5).

3. I have already made the point clear in Chapter 7 at pp. 296-98.

4. For further discussion on Mills' views about truth, its origin or nature, see Chapter 3, especially pp. 89-91, 96-97.

5. The epithet has been taken from Kaufman (1968).

6. See Harrington (1968b) for an assessment of American social developments from the viewpoint of the democratic Left.

7. For further discussion on these developments, see Chapter 6, pp. 265-67.
CHAPTER NINE

Conclusion

Having finished the main burden of the work, I now propose, in this concluding chapter, to accomplish two remaining tasks. First, I intend to summarize the main findings of this work, indicating also Mills' contribution to sociology in general. Second, I undertake a critical assessment of his radical political sociology, pointing out some of its major deficiencies.

Summary of the Findings

(A) The basic importance of Mills as a sociologist, it seems to me, lies in his over-all contributions to the different areas of modern sociology. As already pointed out in the first chapter, the importance of Mills as a sociologist or political sociologist does not consist solely in his thesis of the power elite. This is to say that his reliance on the concept of power or his use of the thesis of the power elite does not exhaust his other basic contributions to the different areas of sociology, although there is a distinct tendency among many sociologists to overstate Mills' position as a theorist of power or power elite. This becomes quite evident if one focuses, as I have done throughout this work, on his
contributions in other areas such as his critique of Parsons or abstracted empiricism, sociological methodology, mass society, alienation etc.

(B) In Chapter 2, I have shown that an important contribution of Mills' lies in his demonstrating how Parsons' sociology is a sociology of legitimation of, and status quo for, the corporate capitalist society of America. In this demonstration, Mills was one of the earliest and leading sociologists who broke with the mainstream currents in academic sociology. This has positively accelerated the rise of the opposing current, the radical point of view, in modern American sociology.

(C) Mills' methodological contributions, made out in Chapter 3, are quite unique. Many of the issues he dealt with are certainly not beyond controversy. But, in general, they attest to his methodological consciousness of the discipline and are significant in laying foundation for a humanistic sociology. Needless to mention, his discussion of the issues of sociology of knowledge, values and objectivity, quantification, role of historical dimension in sociology, and the role of problem consciousness is quite significant. In this connexion, it may also be added that his critique of modern empiricism has become theoretical basis of the radical, and sometimes Marxist, attack on the establishment sociological theory and research. Mills' concept of the sociological imagination and his research strategy of sociological craftsmanship have now become rules of methodological guidance for many of the recent socio-
Mills' theses of the power elite, the rise of the mass society, and the advent of alienation in modern industrial and social life of man are powerful weapons with which he launched his onslaught against corporate capitalist institutions of American society. There is no need to repeat the point that Mills' thesis of the power elite has been very much influential in stimulating, in modern sociology or political science, critical debates about the trends of power distribution in American society. Its importance is quite well known. Mills' theory of mass society (Chapter 4), as I have constructed it out of different elements in his writings, is no less important as a heuristic device for assessing the mass life of individuals in a society dominated by elites in power. While his theory of mass society is not necessarily scientific in view of its lack of coherent or logical postulates, it nevertheless provides a diagnosis of the emergent social order in America. In Mills' political sociology, the concepts of mass society and alienation appear as interrelated aspects of societal developments that have taken place since World War II. Insofar as the different aspects of alienation are concerned, as I discussed in Chapter 5, it is apparent that Mills is not a systematic theorist comparable to the position of Marx. Although he agreed with Marx on a number of aspects regarding the origin or nature of the problem of alienation, he differed fundamentally from Marx in not viewing alienation from the context of political economy. Since he was more Weberian, he
relied on other variables in addition to its capitalist contexts. Whatever it is, my own finding is that Mills attached, like Marx, central importance to the problem of alienation in modern industrial society. What is really significant in this connexion is that Mills revealed, unlike Marx, more dimensions of the problem of alienation.

(E) In Chapter 6, wherein I discuss the ingredients of Mills' political sociology, demonstrates that Mills is fundamentally a problem-centered sociologist. He conceives of his political sociology in terms of what he calls private troubles and public issues; at the same time, it is oriented to the goals of political liberalism, that is, attainment of reason and freedom for all. Here Mills' uniqueness, as a political sociologist, consists in three things: First, it is now widely acknowledged that sociological theory or research should be guided by what he termed as "the sociological imagination." My investigations have illustrated how this concept can be fruitful in sociological or social analysis. Second, Mills has tried, at least in his own way, to link sociology to political goals of liberalism. No matter whether one accepts a sociology based on political liberalism, it is clear that Mills fought and stood for it. In this he was quite open and explicit. Third, Mills' views on war, militarism, capitalist imperialism or private troubles and public issues in regard to marriage and the family or metropolis have largely stood the test of time. It is my impression that many of Mills' ideas are still valid and will continue to remain valid.
(F) An important characteristic of Mills' political sociology is that it is not only radical but also leftist in orientation; at the same time, although his is a liberal sociology, it is not simply based upon liberalism pure and simple. In Chapter 7 I have shown that Mills' political sociology, though based on premises of liberalism, is sharply different from other varieties of liberal political sociology in that Mills proposes leftism as a component of sociological tasks. In other words, he criticizes the existing corporate institutions, attacks their status quo and stands for immediate restructuring of the society within the framework of democratic values and ideals. His preference for the intelligentsia as an agency of radical historical change, which has invited charges of elitism, is not a sudden appearance. This is also true of his disillusionment with the working class. As a matter of fact, Mills' early optimism and later pessimism about the role of the working class matches his early negativism and later positivism about the intelligentsia as an alternative agency of change. My own findings indicate that Mills' disillusionment with the working class was due primarily to two reasons: first, Mills' orientations in pragmatism, liberalism and his acceptance of the Weberian evaluation of Marx are one important reason; second, he was rather a prisoner of circumstances in the sense that he saw how labor leaders or labor bureaucracy gradually become integrated with the national power elite. Similarly, it has been found that Mills' reliance on the intelligentsia is not a simple case of personal preference but
rather a consequence of a chain of events and a series of experiences. Therefore, charges of elitism against him can only be made with risks.

(G) I have shown, in Chapter 8, that Mills was at heart a liberal democrat who believed in its classic values. His faith in democracy is quite comparable to that of Mill, who is considered to be the best theorist on representative institutions. I called Mills "a stubborn democrat." My own enumeration of the different elements of his commitment to democracy makes this characterization all the more compelling. While this rules out charges of elitism against Mills, I have also found that his democratic visions of American society are likely to remain an utopia in view of subsequent developments there. Mills failed to realize that the crisis of democracy is a crisis of capitalism; he also failed to realize that growing economic inequality in capitalism cannot bring about political equality for all in the society. In general, it seems to me that Mills failed to appreciate the consequences of growing conflict between capitalism and democracy.

(H) A final point need to be added here. It is my impression, having done this work, that Mills' sociological contributions are of wide-ranging scope and diversity. In him, there flows a rich intellectual tradition; he is a carrier of several currents of sociological tradition. As I see, Mills is a link between classic sociology and modern sociology. In this sense his sociology represents an integrating point between classic sociology and modern sociology.
A Critique of Mills' Radical Political Sociology

The signal contribution of Mills, in contrast to the conservative and consensual Weltanschauung of the mainstream sociologists, consists in the fact that he provides a radical break which, in later years, became the fountain source of radical school of modern sociology. While this constitutes a noteworthy achievement of Mills and thus entitles him to a place in the history of modern sociology, it is also true at the same time that his political sociology suffers from serious theoretical and methodological deficiencies. Both liberals and Marxists have subjected Mills' political sociology to searching criticism. Let me illustrate this, while drawing my own conclusions.

Shils, a noted liberal sociologist, considers that Mills' scheme of sociology, centering around society, history and personality, leads to a kind of "hyper-political historicism." On the one hand he thinks that Mills' recommendation that sociologists help ordinary men to translate their 'private troubles' into public issues is reminiscent of the Marxian idea of 'false consciousness' and its transformation into 'class consciousness' through the adoption of the Marxian outlook" (Shils, 1961: 612 footnote). Whereas this statement reflects a liberal reaction to Marxism in general, he accuses Mills, on the other hand, of concentrating too much on power. Somewhat one-sidedly he remarks: "But in our present condition, where power is and the 'troubles' which occur in sub-
systems ('Milieux'? ) are functions of 'public' events, these lesser phenomena are not worth studying except as emanations of that all-creative essence: power" (Shils, 1961: 614). Aptheker, a Marxist theorist, accuses Mills of "moderation-ist-liberal" approach and of an exaggeration of "the universality of the defeat of reason in the social sciences" in America. Mills' limitations in the analysis of capitalist social structure and its accoutrements—depression, unemployment, war-making, male supremacy, inhabitable cities—are apparent because his "main point is not the substantive critique of the status quo; it is, rather, to insist upon the social roots of what appear to be and so often are labeled purely personal problems or difficulties" (Aptheker, 1960: 99). A more direct criticism has been made by Warde who contends that Mills' faith in the endurance of capitalist sovereignty, his underestimation of the role of labor and an acceptance of the predominant economic and political conditions of the past have debarred him to expect "countertendencies" and "fresh advances of the anticapitalist forces" in the capitalist economy of the US.

His thinking was a mass of contradictions. Repelled by the decay of liberalism and its apology for capitalist reaction and militarism, he nevertheless adhered to its fundamental pragmatic method of approach to the major social processes of our epoch. He was attracted by socialism but could not accept its scientific doctrine. He was a partisan of the Latin-American revolution who had no faith in a North American revolution. He opposed the autocracy of the Power Elite and aspired to a rebirth of
democracy in our country. But he despaired of the capacities of the working people to clear the way for its realization (Warde, 1962: 95).

The validity of this characterization of Mills' political orientation and his coioloogy derives from the fact that he either turned to classic masters who were old liberals or conservatives, or attempted to work out a theoretical synthesis between Weber, Marx and pragmatist liberalism. The result has not been satisfactory and the failure is especially visible in that he, despite his attempt to stretch democratic liberalism to its maximum point of radicalism, ends up eventually with political liberalism and envisages all radical changes within the liberal-capitalist order.² His simplistic adherence to "plain marxism" and antipathy for revolutionary role of the labor or the masses had its impact on the content of his political sociology. It is of no surprise that Mills' eclectic program fails to produce any "politically-credible synthesis" of Weber, Marx and pragmatism (cf. Binns, 1977: 141). At the same time the big range sociology, which follows from and is built upon Mills' conception of a problem-oriented political sociology, has come under severe attack:

.... much of the new sociology is over-ambitious, pretentious, even downright shoddy, sometimes journalistic in the worst sense and only held together by the distorted simplifications of the ideologically blinkered. The stakes are raised. The good is superb, the bad is appalling, the average is poor; it is easier to come to grief. The new sociologists have no conception of a utopia in which freedom, reason and responsibility are permanently secured for all men. They may bedazzle with striking phrases but they proclaim no eschatology (Bryant, 1976: 311).
My own findings indicate that this criticism is too much to be said of Mills or any other sociologists in the radical tradition. If it is at all applicable, in which case it tends almost to nullify the claim of the radicals to conceive of sociology anew and restructure society accordingly, the same also holds good for establishment-liberal brand, probably to a greater extent. The truth of the matter is that both establishment sociology and Mills' variant are committed, though in varying degrees in terms of their respective theoretical emphases and ideological orientations, to the reformist tradition. Mills' sociology takes the side of a new social order when it criticizes the existing societal status quo; it calls for, though in vague terms, basic structural changes; focuses often social psychologically rather than structurally on the major social problems; and, finally, develops a theoretical standpoint, as distinct from social pathology framework, in dealing with those problems. It also proposes to be "an action sociology," "a humanistic sociology" or even "a long range sociology." In spite of these plus points, whereby it gains advantages over mainstream sociology and draws popular support of the younger generation of sociologists, Mills' political sociology is likely to remain a perspective, a rising but not a dominating tendency, in sociological enterprise. Its thrust on the immediacy of action does not in fact radically alter the non-radical character of his sociology. Its so-publicized radicalism finds expression only in proposals of reformism, and that too within a
framework of, as I see it, "limited conflict" conception. In practical terms it advocates institutional-structural changes and speaks of, politically, individualistic rehabilitation of reason and freedom. Its programs are ad hoc and eclectic. It borrows from and is in turn strengthened by Marxism but it rarely rises above mere acceptance of certain Marxian humanist or social psychological fundamentals. One can also find in Mills' political sociology a conception that modern monopoly capitalism could be turned into a democratic ethic of equal opportunities for all in the United States. Compared to Marxism as a social theory, Mills' radical political sociology neither offers a science of society nor takes into account objective, structural and material forces determining the formation of the society or polity. At the same time a conception of sociology that is obligated to translate the personal troubles of the milieu into the public issues of social structure unnecessarily delimits the range of sociological imagination (cf. Shils, 1961: 619). It is not an objective analysis of social structure but results in an exhortation of, as I call it, a moralistic individualism. Its stress on the role of history does not fully conform to the way in which it analyses contemporary problems; the relevance of its idealized version of the role of reason and freedom to the current capitalist structural realities inside or outside of America is also questionable. Within such realities men are seldom free enough either to make their own history
or to establish the democratic regime of reason and freedom. Thus both mainstream and Mills' sociology can be seen as, in the words of Sklair, "sociological utopias fulfilling different but complementary functions."

Now 'Radical' sociology is best understood in terms of a relatively unrealizable utopia precisely because the social order towards which it points has no scientific basis as such. All talk about disalienating mankind, restoring human dignity, putting an end to inequalities and misery without reference to the particular forms of economic exploitation characteristic of societies in which labor and capital (private or state) are in antagonistic relations, is indeed more or less utopian. (Sklair, 1977: 64).

The radical sociology of Mills mistakes the contradictions of capitalism as mere reformable failings; for example, the advent of mass society and its accompanying consequences of alienation is apparently traced to the postwar changes in the institutional structures of the society, to the decline of reason, freedom and therefore democracy, and to urbanization, industrialization and bureaucratization. Rather than looking into the internal operations and contradictions of capitalism, Mills' political sociology locates mass society or alienation mainly at the "super"-structural levels. It sees power relations as the fountain of inequality but turns away from treating the state as a repressive institutional-administrative apparatus. It catalogues deleterious consequences of the rise of the mass consumption society but it does not take into account how production relations are manipulated and who manipulate them. It is afraid of bureaucratic tendencies
in the modern state but does not treat its growth as a component constituent of the capitalist state. It seeks to replace corporate capitalism but it does not seek socialism; it rests its hope on the goodwill of capitalism and the capitalists. As a matter of fact, Mills' sociology has not accomplished a theoretical integration of its basic, but divergent, postulates on the basis of which a systematic theory or science of society is possible. On this count its immediate problem is, I think, methodological. Its critique of formalistic methodological empiricism is both encouraging and time honored. Mills' methodological contributions are quite insightful and important. The point, however, is that its own critique of so-called scientism is self-defeating so long as it is not able to offer its own "science" of society. For this reason radical sociology, Mills' own variant included, has to develop at least a scientific framework by which to examine objective/material social realities of everyday human life outside the subjective experiences of individuals. Its avoidance of historical materialism has resulted in a virtual acceptance of historical idealism. As a consequence it has not only failed to recognize the historical specificity of capitalism and its mode of production but was also practically led to accept the rationality of capitalism and its relations of production as a necessary, or at least as an alternative, way of development of the productive forces of other societies. In this regard, therefore, the future prospect of radical
sociology, Mills' sociology included, will be conditional to the extent to which its principles rest upon a foundation of interrelated and consistent propositions about society. It will succeed to the extent to which it can claim to be a scientific, and not merely a critical, sociology. The defining characteristics of this science would have to be, I think, materialist, deductive and dialectical, rather than only idealist or historicist. Practically this means that the only kind of methodology available to radical sociology is Marxist methodology (cf. Sklair, 1977: 64).

The need for a reformulation of "science" in Marxist terms, and the development of a materialist epistemology are the problems which face intellectuals today, and if "radical sociology" is to confront these problems it must come down from the abstract pedestal of "critical theory" to the materialistic praxis demanded by real life (Pitch, 1974: 58).

Having said all these, the important question, which demands an answer, is this: What is, then, the future of Mills' political sociology or of radical sociology in general? To answer this obviously is a risky venture of prophesy-making. It may be suggested however that, despite its theoretical and methodological deficiencies, Mills' political sociology or radical sociology of more or less of the Millsian tradition will continue to grow in mass and attract attention as long as it capitalizes on the failings of corporate capitalism in America. As long as it takes on the role of the critic of corporate capitalist society and focuses mainly on its failings, such a sociology will have enough grist for its mill since
continuous production of such problems are a function of corporate capitalism. These problems are many, ranging from unemployment to militarism of the para state (cf. Kolko, 1976: 346; Melman, 1970: 226). To describe capitalist contradictions in terms of problems of fiscal crises:

In modern America individual well-being, class relationships, natural wealth and power are bound up in the agony of the cities, poverty and racism, profits of big and small business, inflation, unemployment, the balance-of-payments, problem, imperialism and war, and other crises that seem a permanent part of daily life. No one is exempt from the fiscal crisis and the underlying social crises, which it aggravates (O'Connor, 1973: 3).

If this is any description of the contemporary problems of American society, let me conclude by a recent radical response in the Millsian tradition:

Men suffer, we are saying, and the direction of the world opened up by capitalism and the Enlightenment is to ensure an increase in that suffering. But the suffering is not due simply to the wickedness of individuals. It is not even due to the evils of one system as against another. The fact is that, having escaped from the pre-capitalist, pre-industrial world, this is where we are (Rex, 1974: 222).
Notes

1. Although all the members of this school of radical sociology are not unanimous on the issues of their area, the scope of their sociology or the nature of methodology involved, it is suggested here that they draw their main inspiration from Mills. See Horowitz (1968: 203), Howard (1970: 7), Coalfax and Roach (1971: 18), Szymanski (1970) and Scimecca (1977).

2. In a sense, Mills was also conservative. However radical may be his sociology, the appeal of Mills "was not for the dismantlement of the American society but rather for its purification, for its return, not to the form and rhetoric, but to the reality of the principles which first animated and were the source of the original American vitality and strength" (Kraetzner, 1975: 249). See also Hofstadter (1955) who initially put forward this line of estimation.

3. For a similar criticism of radical sociology, see Deutsch (1970: 90-91).

4. My own impression about this is that Mills neglected to explore, somewhat because of his total rejection of abstracted empiricism, the possibilities of making sociology a scientific endeavor or of putting sociology on scientific foundations. Mills sharply distinguished sociology from physical science, stood for the primacy of the individual as opposed to team research, and was too concerned with all that passed on in the name of science. These are points, among others, which sustain the view that Mills rejected science. Thus, Willer says, "If Concept and Method are the fetishes of some, Science was the taboo of Mills" (1967: xviii-xix). However, I think that Willer has overstated his case because Mills was not completely against science or the use of scientific method. The point is that he had his own views.
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