POLITICAL CAREERS IN THE CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS

ARE POLITICIANS RATIONAL ACTORS? POLITICAL CAREERS IN THE CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS

By

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ABSTRACT

Conventional analysis suggests that the Canadian House of Commons suffers from a lack of experienced parliamentarians. This thesis attempts to provide an analysis of political careers in Canada, and suggests that not all careers are of such a short duration. An initial analysis of Canadian political careers found some evidence to support the argument that there is little opportunity for advancement within Parliament, and that this affects the choices individuals make about staying in political life. Politicians who made it to cabinet have had longer careers than MPs who spent their entire career as a private member.

An analysis of exit patterns of politicians however, found that advancement within Parliament is not the only inducement for a long political career. MPs, both cabinet ministers and backbenchers, who leave parliament by choice tend to leave after a career that is much longer than that of members who leave through electoral defeat. This indicates that a number of MPs are not making decisions to leave office, based on their inability to receive quick promotions to positions of authority (namely cabinet or positions of authority within their parties).

The thesis concludes by suggesting that the rational choice model has helped our understanding of political careers, but does not offer an encompassing explanation. It is suggested that future work in this field should examine the role that institutions (Parliament and parties) play in structuring MPs views about the attractions of pursuing a career in the Canadian House of Commons.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

> Beware the election orator who requests your suffrage armed only with the slogan that he is "a businessman not a politician", that he is a "patriot not a partisan". If he has no knowledge of governmental activities, as they touch every class and every individual in the nation, let him stay at home. He may be of some use to his own business, he is useless to yours ... The position of MP has ceased to be an honourary one, it is a workers job.[1]

Charles (Chubby) Power made this case for a more politically experienced member of parliament in 1957. Power believed that by 1957 the House of Commons had "metamorphosed" from a part-time meeting place for businessmen into an institution demanding the full time attention of those chosen to sit in it. Power felt that previous Parliaments were top heavy with MPs who entered politics after establishing a career elsewhere and who saw elected office more as an honour or place to make business contacts than a place to conduct the nations business. He believed that MPs' who had fewer outside interests could more fully devote themselves to the task of representation. Further, more experienced politicians would be more adept at the political process and as such be better equipped to handle the job of representation.

There is another side to the issue of career length of

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[1] C.G. Power, "Career Politicians: The Changing Role of the M.P.", Queen's Quarterly, 63,4, (Winter 1957).

elected officials. Critics point out two possible dangers in long political careers. First, they suggest that a legislature risks ossification without a continual influx of 'new blood'. Second, "there is a large school of thought that regards power as corrupting and thus favours the regular displacement of the reputedly powerful".[2] Certainly these risks might exist were an electoral system to be structured in such a manner as to consistently favour incumbents over challengers. Some observers of the United States Congress consider this to be a very real problem.

Given the high turnover rate of Canadian politicians, few in Canada perceive present careers to be dangerously long. In fact, like Chubby Power, most observers of Canadian politics suggest that the Canadian parliament suffers from a shortage of experienced politicians. They believe that the House of Commons as an institution is weaker because of this. Far from becoming ossified, it is widely suggested that the Canadian House is unstable and dominated by a minority of elected officials with greater experience than most other members.[3]

This thesis examines political careers in the Canadian House of Commons. It attempts to understand why careers in the

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[2] J.A.A. Lovink "Is Canadian Politics Too Competitive?", Canadian Journal of Political Science, VI,3, (September 1973) p. 348. Lovink suggests that the American executive, elected for a limited term, is the "practical extreme" of this school of thought.

[3] See for example C.E.S. Franks, The Parliament of Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987). chapters four and twelve.

Canadian House are of a relatively short term nature. Studies of Canadian political careers to date have been largely atheoretical, and have focused upon the impact of short careers and not their causes. This thesis will draw heavily upon work undertaken in the United States on careers to develop a theoretical framework that attempts to explain why Canadian politicians do not serve longer terms. The framework, based on rational choice theory, sees politicians making strategic career calculations based upon the opportunity that elected office provides for realizing political ambition. In the course of this exploration, attention will also be drawn to those features of the political career in Canada that do not yield readily to the hypothesis generated by this framework.

However, it must first be established that short political careers in Canada are indeed a problem, that the problem is a serious one, and that parliament is typified by short term members. As well, a working definition of a political career must also be suggested.

Political Careers in Canada

Norman Ward suggested that MPs lack experience on two fronts. First, they have very little pre-parliamentary experience. Few MPs have served political apprenticeships at the local or provincial level. As a result rookie MPs come to Ottawa with naive expectations of elected life and are subject to influence from those members with longer careers and the

party which helped to get them elected. Second, once elected, Members tend to have brief careers. Ward found that "most members of parliament, far from being legislators who enact laws with the competence born of experience, are mere transients."[4]

John Porter also noted the absence of long political careers in Canada despite a system of government that should be well suited for long careers with members working their way up the parliamentary ladder. Individuals would start at the party level, work their way through the party ranks to a seat in the Commons and eventually through hard work would gain influence and status within their party and "become front bench material, alternating between government and opposition".[5] Yet as Porter notes, this type of political career has been all but absent from Canadian politics. Not only are political careers in general of a short term nature but, according to Porter, cabinet ministers are often recruited from outside the ranks of parliament and see political office as a short term break from a longer career outside of politics. As well, long term one party dominance has meant a minimum of alternation between government and opposition.

> Without these [model] elements in the political career it is unlikely that the political system becomes sufficiently differentiated to be a system of social power strong enough to make claims on behalf of the total society. Where the political career is unstable and taken up for an

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[4] Norman Ward, The Canadian House of Commons: Representation, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950). pp.135-138.

[5] John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965). p. 405.

> interstitial period only, during a career devoted to something else, the political system will probably be strong in administration and weak in creativity.[6]

Porter therefore saw the negative fallout of a lack of career politicians as twofold. First, he felt that short political careers weakened the ability of parliament to perform its representational function. Second, he believed that it creates a legislature that is unable to produce imaginative and innovative policies.

Lovink also sees the short Canadian political career as a potential problem. It is Lovink's view that in the highly competitive arena of Canadian politics few 'safe seats' - those seats which a party wins repeatedly despite the candidate they run or the opposition they face - are to be found. As a result, Canada has an exceptionally high electoral turnover rate. Accepting the conventional wisdom that it takes new members three to four years to become familiar with the workings of the House, Lovink concludes that "reducing the turnover rate among MPs and raising their average political experience...might do wonders for the effectiveness of Parliament as policy critic and administrative overseer, two functions it now performs least well."[7] According to Lovink the absence of safe seats has led to a large cadre of MPs who are inexperienced and more concerned with reelection than they are with overseeing government.

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[6] Ibid. p.406.

[7] Lovink, "Is Canadian Politics Too Competitive?" p.377.

Such concern has been echoed more recently by C.E.S. Franks who characterizes the typical Canadian MP as "an amateur politician, for whom election to parliament is a short term interlude in a career outside of politics."[8] Franks also suggests that the lack of previous elected experience of members accentuates this problem. V.S. Harder states that the most astounding feature of elected experience of members of parliament is "the overwhelming lack of any".[9] Individuals go to parliament with little knowledge of what elected life is about. Members of parliament therefore, often arrive in Ottawa with little political knowledge and do not stay long enough to gain experience in legislative affairs.

Franks maintains that because "competent experienced personnel is the backbone of any organization" this type of career pattern in Canada is cause for some concern. For one thing, it makes the House of Commons a poor training and recruitment stage for future political leaders (both prime ministers and cabinet ministers). Second, it is difficult for inexperienced members of the opposition to adequately perform their watchdog function over the executive. As Franks points out, in Canada there is a consolidation of experience at the highest level of Canadian office. Canadian prime ministers tend

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[8] C.E.S. Franks, The Parliament of Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987) p. 72.

[9] V.P. Harder, "Career Patterns and Political Parties", Jean-Pierre Gaboury and Ross Harvey ed. The Canadian House of Commons Observed: The Parliamentary Internship Papers, (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1979) pp.327-345.

to have a high degree of parliamentary - and governing - experience. In fact, "four prime ministers have governed Canada for 60 per cent of our history."[10] Franks contends that in Canada, "a strong solidly entrenched prime minister faces an insecure and transient House of Commons."[11]

Ward, Porter, Lovink and Franks therefore all detail the problems caused by short political careers in Canada. In summary these can be classified as weak representation, poor training for leadership positions, a reduced capacity to perform the overseeing function of parliament, a weakened ability potential for innovation, and an inability to hold its own with other structures of government. All of these authors correctly suggest that longer political careers would at least begin to offset these problems and produce a stronger more capable parliament.

While it may be true that short careers are detrimental to parliament, it has yet to be demonstrated systematically that Canada in fact suffers from short careers. Part of the reason this has yet to be demonstrated lies in the data base used for analysis by Porter et. al. Porter, for example, concentrates his analysis on members of the political elite, most notably the cabinet, and does not closely examine all members of the House of Commons. Franks relies heavily on both Porter and Ward's analysis, which while thorough, is dated. Lovink, whose main

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[10] Franks, The Parliament of Canada, p.23.

[11] Ibid. p. 24.

focus of analysis is the level of competition in Canada's political system concentrates on MPs who have been defeated in elections and not on those who have been more successful. As a result, Lovink can tell us how many members have had brief political careers but not how many members have had long careers and who the members with long careers are.

Finally, none of the authors to date have defined what a political career actually is. While describing MPs as amateurs, Franks fails to define what a 'professional' or 'career' politician is. Other analysts of Canadians politics talk of political careers without specifically describing what a 'career' in politics is.[12] The terms 'amateur', 'professional' and 'career' when used in the context of political office holders can therefore be confusing. A search for a definition therefore must begin outside the Canadian experience.

In his study of British MPs Anthony King defined career politicians not by whether or not politics provided them with their primary source of income but by their psychological commitment to public office. What matters to King is not the profession of politics - that is making a living from politics - but rather an MP's "attitude to what he regards as his

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[12] See for example Allan Kornberg and William Mishler Influence in Parliament: Canada, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1976). See also Roger Gibbins and Doreen Barrie, "Parliamentary Careers in the Canadian Federal State", Canadian Journal of Political Science, XXII,1, March 1989, pp.137-145.

principle occupation in life."[13] For King then, an increase in the number of political careerists means an increase in the number of people who are entering (or initially attempting to enter) politics at a younger age, staying in office longer and, while in office, treating it as a way of life.[14]

In Britain the job of MP remains part-time. This is not the case in Canada.[15] Therefore while King needs to look further to find how committed members are to their political career in Britain this is perhaps more readily apparent in Canada. By seeking office individuals are deciding to leave their other career(s) behind and treat politics as a way of life. These decisions may change as individuals spend more time as members but the initial decision demonstrates a commitment to political life.

This thesis will consider any individual who has been elected to the House of Commons to have had a political career,

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[13] Anthony King, "The Rise of the Career Politician and its Consequences", British Journal of Political Science, II (1981) p.250.

[14] Ibid. p.249.

[15] The job of MP in Canada has not always been full time. Only since 1957 have MPs spent most of their time as politicians, either in longer House sessions or in their ridings. Previous MP's served more or less on a part-time basis, and cabinet ministers were the only full time politicians. [These time demands were reflected in members salaries, as the pay for MPs was quite low until the mid-1960's.] Yet as Chubby Power alludes the time an MP spent on his or her political job had more to do with what was expected of an MP and the expected utility of office rather than a conscious rejection of political office as a full time job. See C.G. Power, A Party Politician: The Memoirs of Chubby Power, Norman Ward ed. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1966).

no matter how brief that career may have been. Just as it has been suggested by some that all politicians have political ambition (by virtue of seeking elected office); all politicians likewise have political careers (by virtue of holding office, however long). As there are degrees of ambition, so too are there differing lengths of political careers.[16] The term 'political amateur' holds negative connotations, implying that an individual is a poor politician simply by having limited elected experience, and will therefore not be used in this thesis. Likewise, the use of the term 'professional politician' will be avoided, as it suggests a full-time or part-time distinction that does not appreciate the changing demands of the Canadian politician before and after 1957.

For the purposes of this thesis therefore, careerism will refer to two aspects of political life. First is the length of a member's career in parliament. A possible method of measuring career length would be to use the pension plan for members of parliament as a guidepost. To qualify for a pension, a member must have sat for six years and won a minimum of two elections.

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[16] As will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, studies of political ambition have been most prominent in the United States. Among those who suggest that all politicians are by definition ambitious are; Joseph Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics Political Careers in the United States, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), Gary Copeland, "Choosing to Run: Why House Members Seek Election to the Senate", Legislative Studies Quarterly, XIV,4, (November 1989) pp. 549-565., and David Rohde, "Risk Bearing and Progressive Ambition: The Case of Members of the United States House Of Representatives" American Journal of Political Science, 23,1, (February 1979) pp.1-26.

Full pension is received at fifteen years of service.[17] Using the pension qualifications as a guide would give three possible categories for political careers. Any member who does not qualify for pension would be considered to have had a 'short' career, former members with full pension would have had a 'long' career and members in between would have had a 'medium' career. While this would be a beneficial method to use, there is one problem. Pensions for members are recent developments, and using this as a measure over time may not be an accurate tool. Therefore, where possible, career length will be a continuous measure of years of service, and not as a categorized measure.

The second measure of political career will refer to the amount of pre-parliamentary experience, in particular provincial and municipal office, that a member may or may not have when entering parliament. This measure of prior political experience will use only prior elected experience, and not prior involvement in the service of political parties or appointed positions.[18] Therefore members of parliament will not be referred to as either 'amateurs' or 'professionals'. Rather, analysis of career length and prior experience will use years of

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[17] See Appendix A for a complete breakdown of the pension plan for members of parliament.

[18] It is true that holding a party position or a government appointed position increases the level of ones political experience. However, in measuring the length of political careers in the House of Commons, the length of legislative, elected, experience is the focal point of this thesis. Therefore only elected experience is included in the measure of prior experience.

service and prior elected involvement to measure the longevity or brevity of political careers.

Are Canadian Political Careers Short?

When academics or politicians refer to the short term nature of political careers in Canada they are often referring to careers in a comparative sense. That is, Canadian political careers are short compared to U.S. congressional careers, British political careers, and Australian national careers for example. Tables 1.1.A to 1.1.C detail career lengths of Canadian, British, Australian and American national office holders.

In comparison to Britain, Australia and the United States, Canadian political careers are much shorter. The average federal career in Australia and the United States lasts over ten years, as do the careers of over half of British MPs. In Canada, half of MPs have held office for less than five years.[19]

As can be seen from Table 1.1.C the number of U.S. representatives staying in office for less than six years increased between the 1965-73 and 1975-83 periods. However, over half of those elected to Congress stay for at least eight years and over 25 per cent stay for over fourteen years.

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[19] See Franks, The Parliament of Canada or Thomas Casstevens and William A. Denham III, "Turnover and Tenure in the Canadian House of Commons, 1867-1968", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 3,4,(December 1970), pp.655-661.

TABLE 1.1.A

YEARS OF SERVICE: CANADIAN AND BRITISH MPS': 1961,1971,1981

Yrs of Experience	Percentage of MP's Canada	Britain
0 - 4	53	23
5 - 9	24	22
10 - 14	14	18
15 - 19	6	17
20 - 24	2	9
25 - 29	1	7
over 30	-	4

Source: C.E.S. Franks, The Parliament of Canada, p.24.[20]

TABLE 1.2.B

YEARS OF SERVICE: AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH MPS': 1949-1979

Yrs of Experience	Percentage of Members Senators	Representatives
6 or under	27	47
7 - 12	34	17
13 - 18	27	17
19 - 24	6	15
25 and over	6	4
Average Years of Service	10.8	9.8

Source: Joan Rydon, A Federal Legislature: The Australian Commonwealth Parliament 1901-1980, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1986).

TABLE 1.3.C

YEARS OF SERVICE: U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES: 1957-1981

Years of Experience	1965-1973	1975-1983
2-6	42.4	47.2
8-12	25.6	23.2
14-18	15.7	15.7
Over 20	16.3	13.8

Source: Joseph Cooper and William West, "Voluntary Retirement, Incumbency and The Modern House", Political Science Quarterly, 96,2, (Summer 1981) pp.279-300.

[20] Franks states that there are no differences in career lengths between the decades under study.

GRAPH A: AVERAGE AGE OF ENTRY OF MPs BY PARLIAMENTARY FRESHMAN CLASS; 1867-1984

FIGURE 1.1



N.B.: MPs are grouped by the first Parliament they entered. Parliament One on the graph represents all individuals who entered the House of Commons for the first time in 1867, Canada's first Parliament. Parliament Two on the graph represents all MPs who first entered the House in 1872. Likewise, Parliament Thirty-Three represents those MPs who won office for the first time in the 1984 General Election, the 33rd Parliament.

GRAPH B: AVERAGE LENGTH OF POLITICAL CAREER BY PARLIAMENTARY FRESHMAN CLASS; 1867-1974

FIGURE 1.2



N.B.: MPs are grouped by the first Parliament they entered. Parliament One on the graph therefore, represents all individuals who entered the House of Commons for the first time in 1867, Canada's first Parliament. Parliament Two on the graph represents all MPs who first entered the House in 1872. Likewise, Parliament Thirty represents those MPs who won office for the first time in the 1974 General Election, the 30th Parliament.

Glasner and Grofman state that the average length of service for House members and senators seeking re-election between 1953 and 1983 was 10.7 years and 10.1 years respectively.[21]

Within Canada, however, short political careers are not a recent phenomenon. As the above scatterplots demonstrate, the relatively short political career in Canada has been a fairly stable phenomenon.[22] By contrast, the average entry age of politicians has followed an almost curvilinear relationship over time, peaking in 1925. The average MP of today has a career which, in terms of length and age of entry is not terribly dissimilar to careers in Canada's first Parliament. What changes have occurred in political careers have taken place during Parliament's middle years.

Figure 1.1 shows that the average entry age for first-time MPs in 1984 is only two years younger than that of the first Parliament. In fact the rookie classes from 1872 to 1896 look remarkably similar to the Parliaments of 1962 to 1984. The increase in ages entered is most marked during the period 1917 to 1949. In fact during this time no entry class had an average

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[21] Amihai Glasner and Bernard Grofman, "Two Plus Two Plus Two Equals Six: Tenure in Office of Senators and Representatives, 1953-1983" Legislative Studies Quarterly, XII, 4, (November 1987), p. 555-563. In both cases the probability of re-election was quite high; over 90% for representatives and over 75% for senators.

[22] Source for both scatterplots: Data collected by Dr. Doreen Barrie and Dr. Roger Gibbins. The data was collected through SSHRCC Grant # 410 - 84 - 1055.

entry age of under 45 years.[23] The elections during this period enveloped the First World War, the Depression, and the Second World War. It is possible that the many possible politicians of younger ages were preoccupied with other activities during this period.

Figure 1.2 shows the average length of tenure for parliamentarians by rookie class. There is no real change from 1867 to 1972. The standard deviation for years served is quite high and in 1874 actually exceeds the mean years served. This wide dispersion indicates that most parliamentary careers are either much briefer or longer than the average. Average years of service are not presented for entry classes 1979, 1980 and 1984 since data are incomplete. As these data were collected in 1985 the average years of service for these classes would appear to be naturally low.

Not surprisingly three of the longest serving entry classes coincided with the return of MacKenzie King and the beginning of over twenty years of uninterrupted Liberal party rule. It was during this time that King (and St-Laurent after him) enjoyed majority governments. As a result parliaments lasted longer (often the full five years) and the length of tenure increased

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[23] The standard deviations for entry age do not change significantly over time, although the deviations are highest for the period between 1940 to 1965, indicating that during this time MP's may have been entering at younger and older ages and less so around the average. No standard deviation is lower than 8.3 (1984 freshmen class) or higher than 11.2 (1963 class). See Appendix B for a complete list of the average ages of entry, length of career, and their respective standard deviations for each Parliamentary freshmen class.

accordingly.

As has been outlined above it is the length of these political careers, and the experience of MPs that hold implications for governance. It was suggested earlier that it takes three to four years to become familiar and competent functioning as a member of parliament. If this is true, then in Canada many members are leaving parliament just as they reach a level of minimal proficiency.[24] Compounding this problem is the lack of prior elected experience Members bring with them to the House of Commons. Between 1867 and 1984 close to 60 per cent of all MPs had no previous elected experience, either provincially or municipally. Therefore individuals are not coming to the House with previous legislative or elected experience, which might help to offset their lack of familiarity with parliamentary life in Ottawa.

This brief description of careers in Canada confirms the earlier, sometimes impressionistic, analysis offered by Ward, Porter, Lovink and Franks. What, then, are the reasons for the present career pattern in Canada? Lovink has suggested that the relative absence of 'safe seats' is a primary factor influencing career length.[25] Franks suggests that the strength of party in determining election outcomes is partially to blame but fails to justify his assertion. Franks also points to the high number of

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[24] J.A.A. Lovink, "Is Canadian Politics Too Competitive?"

[25] J.A.A. Lovink, "Is Canadian Politics Too Competitive?"

voluntary exits from parliament, suggesting that those deciding not to run again account for a significant proportion of the high turnover rate.[26]

Certainly there is some validity to these arguments. Canadian politics is highly competitive, and political parties, through their control of the recruitment process, do affect the type of candidate chosen to run for office. Voluntary exits are also a factor. Of the 713 MPs who left office between 1965 and 1988, 305 were voluntary exits. Yet it is far from clear how much of the short nature of Canadian political careers can be explained by these arguments. How strongly is an individual's career tied to the fortunes of his or her political party? Who is leaving voluntarily and do these persons differ from those defeated? Is electoral defeat responsible for short political careers or are most members deciding to leave politics soon after entering parliament? If voluntary vacancies account for more short careers than electoral defeat then perhaps greater attention should be paid to making elected office a more attractive career. To date there has not been a theoretically

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[26] Certainly the strength of party discipline and party control over the recruitment of candidates does influence both who is chosen to run and the attitudes of those who are elected. For an excellent analysis of the strength of party see Paul G.Thomas, "Parliamentary Reform Through Political Parties", in John C. Courtney ed. The Canadian House of Commons: Essays in the Honour of Norman Ward, (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1985). pp.43-68. There has been far less analysis of voluntary exits from Parliament. Those that do exist (Ward, Franks) makes only passing reference to dissatisfaction with elected life or frustrated ambition and instead concentrates on those MPs who received patronage postings after serving in the House.

driven attempt to understand why Canadian political office is characterized by short term inexperienced members. This thesis will attempt to provide such an analysis.

Rational Choice: A Framework for Understanding Political Careers

In the social sciences, theories compete to provide satisfactory explanations for the behaviour of individuals and groups. In political science, rational choice theory has become one of the dominant frameworks used to explain and understand political life, particularly with regard to the study of political careers.[27] Followers of rational choice theory examine the courses of action people select as the most efficient means to a preconceived end.[28] Rational choice "tells us what we ought to do in order to achieve our aims as well as possible."[29] In this regard, rational choice is not so much concerned with end products - or in rational choice terms, outcomes - as it is with the actions or events required to bring about desired results. Rational choice construes "political

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[27] This is not to suggest that the rational choice paradigm dominates the study of politics (it does however dominate the study of political careers). Marxist, Neo-Marxist, Structuralist and Institutional approaches all provide problematics for political decision-making. As well there are vastly divergent interpretations of the rational choice paradigm.

[28] Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1989). p.22.

[29] Jon Elster, ed. Rational Choice, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell ltd. 1986) p.1. See also Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Studies in the Limitations of Rationality, (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1989) chapter one.

processes as a series of choices undertaken by self-interested actors."[30] Within this paradigm, Gramm and Shepsle argue that individuals or groups of individuals have the ability to change structures to achieve a given objective. Actors have the ability to fashion outcomes by reorganizing institutions and removing the obstacles to efficient exchange.[31]

Yet despite the concern displayed by rational choice theorists with efficient exchange and individual autonomy, the paradigm is far from oblivious to the constraints actors face when making self-interested choices. In fact, at the heart of much of this paradigm is the study of how individuals make choices within the context of existing structures. Margaret Levi suggests that the approach neither ignores external constraints nor presumes that each actor has the ability to choose his or her own course of action free from any external structures. Structures, she states, "are a collection of social relations, institutions, extant organizations, and rules of the game which are an integral part of the rational choice analysis."[32] Rational choice is an approach to politics and decision making

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[30] Michael Atkinson and Robert Nigol "Selecting Policy Instruments: Neo-Institutional and Rational Choice Interpretations of Automobile Insurance in Ontario", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 22,1, (March 1989) p.107.

[31] Gerald Gramm and Kenneth Shepsle "The Emergence of Legislative Institutions: Standing Committees in the House and Senate, 1810-1825", Legislative Studies Quarterly,14,1, (February 1989), p.40.

[32] Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988) p.203.

which "treats actors as the central players on a historical stage replete with already existing structures and institutions."[33]

In the context of research on political careers, rational choice theorists make two important assumptions. First, political actors are not viewed as individuals who view their role in public life as part of a larger community commitment to public service. Rather, these actors are rational egoists who are choosing paths to some individually based outcome. Political office is treated as a means by which actors achieve a personal career goal (such as career satisfaction) rather than as a role through which they pursue policy,or other political, objectives. The study of careers becomes the study of strategic choices.

Second, political actors who are pursuing careers are constrained primarily by the structure of career opportunities that confronts them. The opportunity structure consists of a set of institutionally determined incentives and rules which shape career choices. Joseph Schlesinger claims that political institutions structure political ambition by creating a framework of opportunities.[34] The number of offices available to serve in , the competition for these offices, the cost (both personal and financial) of seeking office, and the opportunity the office holds for possible future advancement - both higher office and positions of power within the office held - all

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[33] Ibid.

[34] Joseph Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, p.2.

comprise the opportunity structure of elected office.

The rational choice paradigm places rational egoists in an institutionally centred opportunity structure. That is, individuals follow a particular path to a particular career goal - of their own choosing - through an opportunity structure which constrains and influences the choices that they make. The rational choice model takes a legislative structure, and the career incentives that it offers, and examines it at a micro level, namely how that structure affects the rational career choices and goals of politicians.

The thesis will explore the potential of a rational choice framework for an understanding of the relative absence of political careers in Canada. At the same time the thesis will not ignore the possibility that features of the political career in Canada do not conform to the rational choice model. While this thesis will not provide an answer to those questions left unresolved by the rational choice hypothesis, it will be suggested that a fuller understanding of political careerism in Canada may be found in an analysis which provides a different interpretation of institutional forces shaping and funnelling career paths. This different interpretation has been described by Donald Matthews as a 'neo-institutional approach' to career studies.[35]

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[35] Donald Matthews, "Political Recruitment and Political Careers", Legislative Studies Quarterly, IX,4, (November 1984), pp.552-592.

Briefly stated, the neo-institutional perspective suggests that institutions condition outcomes and choices by defining the norms and objectives of the individual within the institution. "An institutional perspective regards enduring institutional structures as the building blocks of social and political life. The preferences, capabilities and basic self-identities of individuals are structured by the institutional structures."[36] Actor's beliefs and preferences are defined by institutions. New institutionalists do not dispute that rational actors make choices based upon personal preferences. They suggest however, that these preferences "develop in politics, as in the rest of life, through a combination of education, indoctrination and experience."[37] The neo-institutional paradigm describes individuals not as uniquely developed independent thinkers but rather sees "human beings and their values as products of a larger institutional framework."[38]

Individuals then, are viewed as a part of a larger, complex web of institutions and structures. The more involved individuals are with any given structure, the more they are likely to view themselves as part of that structure and not as

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[36] Stephen Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," Comparative Political Studies, 21,1, (April 1988) p.67.

[37] James March and Johan Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," American Political Science Review,78,(1984)p.739. See also, James March and Johan Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics. (New York: The Free Press, 1989).

[38] Atkinson and Nigol, "Selecting Policy Instruments" p.114.

individuals simply using the structure to fulfil personal desires. Such a view suggests that altering institutional arrangements may not be the relatively easy task that Gramm, Shepsle and other rational choice proponents make it out to be. As Krasner observes, "the more [an] individual's basic self-definitions are determined by a given institutional structure the more difficult it will be for that individual to change."[39] This identification with institutions is what Krasner refers to as "the vertical depth" of institutions.

A second tenet of new institutionalism is its concern with the interaction and complexity of institutions, or as Krasner refers to them, the "horizontal linkages or breadth of institutions."[40] The institutions of the state do not have the freedom to act independently of one another. The constraints of one structure are often interconnected with other institutions.[41] Institutionalists would suggest that rational choice, in its analysis of political careers, is weakened by isolating the constraints of the opportunity structure to the

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[39] Stephen Krasner, "Sovereignty" p.74 For an excellent discussion of rational choice theory and institutions see Robert Grafstein, "The Problem of Institutional Constraint," The Journal of Politics, 50, (1988) pp. 577-597.

[40] Ibid. p.75.

[41] See Theda Skocpal, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research", in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpal, eds. Bringing the State Back In. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). pp.3-44. Skocpal uses Krasner's example of U.S. Congressional influence, both formal and informal, as affecting the President's ability to develop foreign policy, to illustrate her argument.

legislature and its immediate environment. This isolation may not pose a problem in instances where linkages between institutions are tenuous. Where there is a close integration of institutions however, the ability to overcome or ignore the constraints of one body may be greatly influenced by the constraints of a second.

The thesis will concentrate on the potential of the rational choice approach but will conclude by suggesting that an examination of political careers from a neo-institutional framework may provide answers to questions left unresolved by the more traditional rational choice theory.

THE DATA

This thesis will use three sources of information in its consideration of Canadian political careers. First, it will examine the research already undertaken on political careers. There will be two parts to this source. To begin, there will be an examination of the work done in the United States, most of it heavily influenced by the rational choice school. This research will be reviewed to demonstrate what rational choice theory offers in its examination of political careers. The second section of this review will draw upon research done on Canadian political careers, in order to provide a basis for understanding the opportunity structure of Canadian political office.

The second source of information to be used in this thesis is a data set on Canadian political careers collected by Doreen

Barrie and Roger Gibbins of the University of Calgary. The data set includes information on the 3,803 people who served in the House of Commons or the Senate between 1867 and 1984 inclusive. The information was collected from The Canadian Directory of Parliament and The Canadian Parliamentary Guide.

The final source to be used is a data set of Parliamentary exits, both voluntary retirements and electoral defeats, gathered specifically for the purposes of this thesis. Information was gathered on a random sample of 207 MPs who left Parliament between 1965 and 1989 [Members who were defeated in or retired before the 1965 General Election were not included].[42] Data sources were The Parliamentary Guide, Canadian General Election Results, Journals of Parliament, Who's Who in Canada, and Canada News Facts. While no systematic interviews were conducted with sitting Members to collect data for statistical analysis, one sitting member (Mr. John Bosley) and three former members (The Hon. Roland Michener, Mr. Michael Cassidy, and Mr. John Reid) were interviewed and provided invaluable background information on the nature of elected life.

Organization

Chapter two reviews the literature on career studies in the United States. It begins by examining Schlesinger's Ambition and

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[42] In order to select the random sample, all former members of parliament between 1965 and present were assigned numbers based on the date of their exit from office. Computer generated random numbers were used to determine the sample set.

Politics, which first introduced the importance of opportunity structure and its effects on career choices, and continue with a review of more recent U.S. studies, all of which have been informed by Schlesinger's work. A second section of this chapter provides a review of career studies in Canada beyond the review provided earlier in this chapter. It will be argued that by contrast, Canadian career studies have been atheoretical and have yet to sufficiently address the causes of the short Canadian political career.

Chapter three begins by identifying in full the opportunity structure of Canadian political office. The opportunity structure of political office can be defined in two parts. First it is a set of institutional arrangements which establishes the parameters both for getting elected and for achieving positions of meaningful leadership within elected office. This includes those aspects of political office that help to determine the length and success of political careers and the level of political experience that individuals bring with them to a given office. This would therefore include: the number of leadership positions available and the prerequisites for attaining these positions; the ease or difficulty in getting elected and re-elected; and the attractiveness of other political careers that may be available. The opportunity structure of office however is not limited solely to direct structures of office. Other aspects of political life influence the career decisions of individuals and must also be considered part of the opportunity

structure. While harder to define than institutional arrangements this second part of the opportunity structure includes the risk of leaving one office to run for another, the perceived cost of waiting in office in the hopes of promotion (i.e. selection to the cabinet in Canada or election as a Committee Chair in the United States) and the risk of running for re-election and losing. The opportunity structure of political office therefore is case dependent. Rational choice theorists believe that political actors make strategic decisions about their careers based on the structure of opportunities that face them. Some opportunity structures may be more welcoming than others. The aspects of political office in Canada that help to determine the length and success of political careers are structured and hierarchial and therefore may be less welcoming to political neophytes.

It will be suggested in chapter three that ambitious politicians who desire a policy making role see cabinet membership as the only real avenue for satisfying this desire. Getting into the cabinet should be a goal for most politicians. Therefore the opportunity structure for Canadian politicians includes the availability of cabinet positions and the criteria for selection to cabinet. It will be also suggested in chapter three that individuals rely heavily upon the party hierarchy both for positions of importance within parliament and for help with re-election. Therefore the opportunity structure for Canadian politicians includes their willingness to work within

a leader dominated party structure. Finally, unlike the United States, the holding of a sub-national office has not been generally viewed in Canada as a good-starting block for individuals seeking a federal career. Therefore the opportunity structure for Canadian politicians includes the separation of federal and provincial political careers.

Do cabinet ministers have longer political careers than backbenchers and is the limited availability of cabinet positions deterring some backbenchers from continuing their career in politics? Also, how heavily do individuals have to rely on their political party for re-election? Why are there so few politicians in Ottawa with provincial experience? Is this latter fact true across all provinces or do some regions of the country send more provincial legislators to Ottawa than others, and if so are there structural reasons for this? All of these questions will be addressed in chapter three - using the data set collected by Gibbins and Barrie - in an effort to see how dramatically the opportunity structure affects careerism in Canada.

Chapter four examines an area of the Canadian political career relatively ignored by academics, the exit from political life. If, as rational choice theorists maintain, the opportunity structure is discouraging of political careers then there should be a large number of persons leaving office voluntarily after recalculating their opportunities for advancement. As well, among those who leave office voluntarily there should be

differences between those who leave satisfied with their political career and those who leave dissatisfied. Using the data set of 207 randomly selected former MPs, this chapter investigates the effects of the opportunity structure on those leaving office.

Chapter five will evaluate the rational choice hypothesis of political careers in the Canadian context. Drawing upon the conclusions of chapters three and four it will suggest that many political careers in Canada are in fact the products of rational calculations. However it will also suggest that the opportunity structure and strategic actor arguments of the rational choice school fail to account for much of the variation in political careers in Canada. This chapter concludes by positing that these latter political careers may be best accounted for within a framework that sees institutions as more than opportunity structures for rational egoists.

CHAPTER TWO:

RATIONAL CHOICE AND THE STUDY OF POLITICAL CAREERS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter has three purposes. First, it sets forth rational choice theory as it applies to the study of political careers. It will demonstrate how rational choice theorists view politicians as rational actors making strategic choices about having a political career based on the structure of opportunities of elected office. The second purpose of this chapter is to review careers studies in the United States. This review concentrates on, but is not limited to, the work of Joseph Schlesinger, Gordon Black, Gary Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, Peverill Squire, and Joseph Cooper and William West, all of whom have made important contributions to the field of career studies in the United States.

The third purpose of this chapter is to provide a review of career studies in Canada beyond the examination presented in the first chapter. Notable among these studies is the work of Norman Ward, Donald Smiley, William Irvine, C.E.S. Franks, and Roger Gibbins and Doreen Barrie. This chapter concludes by suggesting that in order to apply a rational choice framework to political careers in Canada the opportunity structure of Canadian federal office must first be delineated.

ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS: A RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE

The previous chapter suggested that the application of rational choice theory to the study of political careers has been most prominent in the United States. It was also suggested that the use of rational choice provided a micro-level, or individual centred, analysis of career choices. Proponents of rational choice theory suggest that although actors have the ability to reorganize institutions to maximize efficient exchange, significant weight should be given to the study of how individuals act and choose within a framework of existing structures. While acknowledging the constraints imposed by institutions these theorists nonetheless consider individuals, and not the constraining structures, to be the central actors.

Rational choice has been used effectively to explain why politicians act the way they do once elected to office. Riker states that even given structural constraints (in his example, single member districts and minimum winning coalitions), individuals have the ability to fashion outcomes in their own favour, in this case through strategic voting.[1] Riker is not alone in using rational choice arguments to study and explain legislative behaviour.

Weingast suggests that there are long term benefits for all members of the U.S. congress if they universally support each

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[1] William Riker, Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice, (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company,1982).

others proposed local projects.[2] In doing so legislators are encouraged by the existing incentive system to propose local projects whose benefits outweigh the costs borne by the community in question [they may not outweigh the total cost of the project, which is dispersed across the entire population, hence the incentive for each legislator to propose their own project]. In order to discourage groups of legislators from forming minimum winning coalitions that would limit the number of projects passed - and therefore maximize benefits to themselves - additional constraints on choice, either formal or informal, are required. In the case of the U.S. Senate, rules were introduced whereby a senator, in trying "to remove a [local] project by floor amendment" will instead have their own local project removed from an omnibus Bill.[3]

Rational actors therefore are constrained by structures from completely maximizing benefits to themselves or their districts.[4] The element of choice remains, but it is constrained by legislative rules. It would be in the best

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[2] Barry Weingast, "A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms", American Journal of Political Science, 23, 2, (May 1979) pp.245-261.

[3] Ibid. p.253. The obvious result of this Senate rule is the encouragement of log-rolling, thereby contributing to the problem of local projects being passed unchallenged.

[4] The maximum benefit, impossible to achieve,would be for an individual Senator to have his or her local project be the only one approved. This would disperse the financial cost across the nation while the Senator's district would not be subsidizing others local projects. Being a part of a minimum winning coalition would be the closest any Senator could come to completely maximizing benefits.

interests of all members to have someone else's project killed, thereby decreasing costs. Yet the structure prevents this from occurring. While it is the institution constraining the choices of individuals, the members nonetheless remain the central actors on the stage. For rational choice theorists, external structures (including institutions) shape and influence decisions but they do not produce outcomes. Outcomes are produced by individual choice.

In Weingast's study, the opportunity structure for political behaviour is the formal and informal rules within which individual actors decide how to maximize their own benefits. A similar framework within the rational choice school has been established for studies of political career choice. The opportunity structure of political office is a set of institutional incentives and rules which establishes the parameters of getting elected and achieving positions of power within elected office. Strategic actors make career choices based on the opportunity structure of office. It is the aggregated decisions of many strategic actors, namely those holding or seeking political office, that influences how political career patterns will eventually look. These actors determine career patterns by making self-interested strategic choices based upon the opportunity for maximizing personal benefits within the existing structure.

Jon Elster offers two reasons for examining opportunity structures. First, even if assumptions are made about human

desires (for example, all politicians have ambition) opportunity structures are more easily observed and quantified than personal beliefs or societal norms. Second, individuals or groups have the ability to alter opportunities and doing so is easier than altering desires. Elster also states that altering opportunities will have subsequent effects on individual desires or preferences. That is, persons may alter their desire to achieve certain outcomes based upon how difficult or easily the opportunity structure allows that outcome to be attained. It is these subsequent effects, that is how actors within a given structure of opportunities, that are important in studies of political careers.[5]

The work of Joseph Schlesinger, particularly Ambition and Politics, presaged the development of rational choice theory as it applies to career studies in the United States. Schlesinger's work easily fits within the rational choice paradigm as his study of political ambition in United States introduced the notion of an opportunity structure of elected office.[6] His analysis of how politicians approach office and their ability to work within, and if necessary change, the opportunity structure illustrates his compatibility with the rational choice school.

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[5] Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.18

[6] Joseph Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966). see also, Joseph Schlesinger, "Political Careers and Party Leadership" in Lewis Endinger ed. Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967). pp.266-293.

Schlesinger argues that political ambition is structured by the framework of opportunities created by political institutions. He suggests that the "constitution states the outlets for political ambitions and how they are to be achieved."[7] The constitution does this by outlining political offices, the requirements necessary to run for office and the powers and responsibilities that each office holds. Individuals make choices about political careers based upon the office they are seeking and the opportunity structure they must face to attain that office. Schlesinger also suggests that individuals have the capability of altering institutional arrangements when they "do not reflect the distribution of political influence within" society.[8] Presumably the newly created institutional arrangements would alter the considerations of and choices made by actors. In this regard, individuals are not bound by an intransigent opportunity structure.

James Burns argues that despite the importance of ambition in dictating the choices one makes about pursuing a political career, office holders and seekers are "cognitive, fact-gathering, calculating creatures who link their goals - and even subordinate them - to the reality of the structures of political opportunity around them."[9] Burns further suggests that whatever

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[7] Ibid. p. 3.

[8] Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, p.2.

[9] James MacGregor Burns, Leadership, (New York: Harper and Row, 1978) p.119.

the "intensity of their ambition, [actors] will calculate their chances [for political office] in terms of possible access points and advancement channels."[10] Likewise the best way to understand why individuals make the choices they do is to examine their actions within an opportunity structure and not to attempt to quantify what their personal preferences may or may not be.

What unites rational choice studies of political careers is their focus on how and why political actors make strategic choices within a given opportunity structure. Even given the claims of Schlesinger and others about the ability of strategic actors to alter institutional arrangements to favour more efficient or beneficial outcomes, the history of political careers shows that this happens rarely. As will be demonstrated, these studies make certain assumptions about individual desires -such as politicians are rational egoists with at least a minimum level of office ambition - and then examine the actions taken to fulfil these desires within the opportunity structure of elected office.

RATIONAL CHOICE AND U.S. CAREER STUDIES

If the rationale for using the rational choice framework for a study of Canadian political careers is the success its usage has received in the United States then a review of relevant U.S. studies is in order. In this review attention

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[10] Ibid. p.120.

will be paid to those aspects of the opportunity structure in the United States which have been successfully used to explain careerism and that can be adapted and applied to the Canadian experience. Given the different systems of government of the two countries, the opportunity structure of Canada will not mirror the structure of opportunities found in the United States. There are, however, many features found in the U.S. opportunity structure that have applicability for the study of careerism in Canada. Among the features are those that are tied to the structure of elected office itself, such as the resources a legislature provides its members and the opportunity for advancement within the legislature, be it through seniority, caucus election or selection by the party leadership. Other features include the external influences of the opportunity structure, such as the risk of giving up one office to run for a higher office. These features and their applicability for a Canadian study will be highlighted in the following pages.

Schlesinger's central thesis is that legislators use various levels of elected office as part of a larger career framework. Any given elected office then is not necessarily the final objective or 'end' for the office holder (although it may well be). The purpose of Schlesinger's work is to examine the consequences of political ambition, showing why politicians act in the manner they do, how policy ambitions can be related to the office ambitions of an individual, and how office ambitions (desires) are a more telling indicator of behaviour in office

than personal ambition. Specifically, he suggests "that the constituency to which [a] legislator is responding is not always the one from which he has been elected, and that it is more important what office a politician is ultimately seeking than how the politician got the job they presently hold." For a rational actor, the "problem consists, first, in defining his office goals and, secondly, in relating his current activities to them".[11]

Schlesinger describes three types of political ambition; progressive ambition, where a politician "aspires to attain an office more important than the one he now seeks or is holding"; static ambition, where a politician "seeks to make a long run career out of a particular office"; and discrete ambition, where a politician wishes to serve for a specified term and then voluntarily retire from that office.[12] An office holder's ambitions will dictate how they will act in the office they presently hold. As well, the ultimate office a politician seeks to achieve will structure what type of political apprenticeship they will undertake.

From within this framework Schlesinger draws specific conclusions about political ambition in the United States. He draws a path from state to national office, with state office being the starting base for many political careers. The type of state office held depends upon the state itself - a politician

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[11] Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, pp.4-7.

[12] Ibid. p.10.

will more likely be drawn to the state office with the highest overlap with national riding boundaries - but also and just as importantly, the type of state office held will depend upon the office ultimately sought. Schlesinger found that the "goal" office has a "manifest institutional relationship" with the offices held along the career path.[13] For example, if an individual is ultimately seeking the Presidency, he or she will seek the state office with similar leadership properties, in this case Governor.

If as Schlesinger contends, the opportunity structure of political office influences the career decisions of politicians, then Gordon Black is certainly correct in submitting "that other structural variables exert a similar systematic effect on these calculations."[14] Using municipal office in the San Francisco Bay Area as a case study, Black examines how structural incentives in the political system influence "the type of person who emerges as a candidate."[15]

Black finds that structural factors do in fact affect political ambition, particularly regarding the size of the office and the competitiveness of the constituency. First, politicians seeking office (either for the first time or for re-election) in large cities, where the office presumably holds

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[13] Ibid. p.195-196.

[14] Gordon Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of Structural Incentives", American Political Science Review, LXVI (1972). p.145.

[15] Ibid. p. 158.

more power, showed a much greater concern over winning than their counterparts in smaller communities where the office holds less prestige. For politicians in larger communities, the desire to achieve office was much greater. Second, council members who seemed confident of re-election also demonstrated a stronger desire to seek higher office in the future. Politicians involved in a tight race for re-election, where victory was not a certainty, had no immediate desire to look beyond the office they presently held.

Black suggests further that these are only two of a number of possible factors structuring the ambitions of strategic actors. He suggests that the "structural characteristics of [political] systems can shape both the risks that politicians face and the investments that are required to reach political office."[16] As such the opportunity structure of political office acts as a barrier that ambitious politicians must overcome, and in this manner "allows some types of individuals up through the system".[17] Others may be diverted to less risky directions where they have calculated their opportunities for success to be much greater. For example, ambitious local politicians may defer higher office aspirations until such time as they have secured their local base. If their present district is highly competitive, they will be less likely to seek higher office, as the costs of spending time organizing a bigger

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[16] Ibid. p. 157.

[17] Ibid. p. 158.

campaign are too great.

Jacobson and Kernell move beyond Schlesinger and Black and suggest that structural variables include factors not directly related to the political office sought or held, such as the economic environment, party and Presidential popularity. In Jacobson and Kernell's study of the effects of incumbency, they suggest that this 'external' part of the opportunity structure is more important for challengers than it is for incumbents. They suggest that electors make voting decisions based more upon the quality of the candidates running than on the basis of the state of the economy at voting time. Incumbents in the United States often have such a large electoral advantage because they face weak challengers. "Quality Candidates" - challengers who have a high name recognition in their district, often previous political experience, and the ability to raise sufficient election funds - do better against incumbents than lower profile challengers to office. Given their assumption that candidates and not policies influence voting decisions, Jacobson and Kernell suggest that in studying voting behaviour the important factors to watch are those that influence rational actors' decisions to run for office and not the policies they espouse.[18]

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[18] Gary Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). The study by Jacobson and Kernell owes much to the work of Edward Tufte who first examined the relationship between economic indicators, presidential popularity and midterm electoral results. See Edward Tufte, Political Control of the Economy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

In an analysis of midterm congressional elections Jacobson and Kernell suggest that quality challengers to incumbents make their final, public decisions about running in a fall campaign as early as spring of election year.[19] These challengers make their formal decisions to run based upon economic conditions (are times good or not?) and the President's popularity. For example, if in the spring of a midterm election year the unemployment rate is high and the Republican President is unpopular, a quality Democrat would be most likely to challenge a Republican incumbent. Indirectly, voters are responding to early year economic conditions and Presidential performance.

Factors such as the economic environment and the President's popularity influence the choices potential candidates make about seeking office. These types of calculations are considered external influences. They are not part of the direct opportunity structure as Schlesinger would define it - that is a structure of office set out by the constitution - but are a part of the external conditions that shape career choices, and are a fundamental part of the overall opportunity structure.[20]

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[19] Private decisions to run, and the building of an election organization for the campaign take place much earlier.

[20] The work of Jacobson and Kernell is the subject of considerable debate. In a response to Jacobson and Kernell, Richard Born discounts the impact of candidate quality in influencing voters decisions. He suggests that the more immediate economic concerns and presidential popularity have a more direct influence on "midterm vote fluctuation." However, he does not discount the influence of early signals in swaying politician's decisions, he only minimizes their impact at the polls. Richard Born, "Strategic

Bruce Robeck has studied the factors that influence state office holders when making decisions about running for federal seats. His findings are consistent with the view that state politicians tend to make calculated decisions about when to move to the national level, and that these calculations are based on the both the direct opportunity structure suggested by Schlesinger and the broader opportunity structure laid out by Jacobson and Kernell. For example, the location of the state and federal seat plays an integral role in shaping career choice. When sub-national legislators run for congress, "they are more likely to seek a nomination in an open seat" in an electorally competitive district, than to face an opposition incumbent in a weaker district.[21]

Further, state politicians "from more professional bodies are more likely than those from less professional legislatures to be nominated and to win the general election in open-seat races."[22] It is suggested by Robeck that professional state legislatures offer members more opportunity for state wide exposure and

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Politicians and Unresponsive Voters", American Political Science Review, 80,2, (June 1986), pp.599-612. See also Clyde Wilcox, "The Timing of Strategic Decisions: Candidacy Decisions in 1982 and 1984," Legislative Studies Quarterly, XII, (November, 1987) pp.565-571.

[21] Bruce Robeck, "State Legislator Candidacies for the U.S. House: Prospects for Success", Legislative Studies Quarterly, VII, 4, (November 1982) pp.507-514.

[22] Ibid. p.513. Robeck defines professionalism in legislators as a composite measure including pay, number of sitting days, and both personal and committee staff sizes. Each measure was standardized and those with the highest composite scores were considered "professional."

publicity than smaller, less professional assemblies. Ironically, Robeck found that legislators from less professional state legislatures had better success rates than their counterparts when challenging congressional incumbents at the nomination stage but were less successful getting elected to federal office.[23]

What eventually occurs is a self perpetuating scenario. Politicians with federal aspirations will be drawn toward a state
legislature as a political base if it has the right prerequisites, namely if it is a professional body. When the opportunity presents itself they will attempt to move to the federal level. Their electoral chances will be good, due at least partially to a reputation built serving in the 'professional' state capitol. Yet for these individuals state service was never intended to be a full political career but something more akin to an entry level position.

In a study of state legislature's, Peverill Squire found that a legislator's salary and the possibilities for advancement were the crucial factors explaining membership stability in legislatures. These two factors were part of the opportunity structure of keeping politicians at the state level or encouraging them to move on, either to national office or out of

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[23] As well, as Robeck admits, the number of lawmakers from less professional bodies in his sample (the 396 state legislators who sought federal office between 1974-1980) is so small (12) that making generalizations from the data is risky at best.

political life. State legislatures which offered high pay but limited prospects for advancement to the federal level had stable, long term membership. Squire defined these as 'career legislatures.' Legislatures which offered lower pay and benefits but which had high prospects for internal advancement were categorized as "springboard" legislatures. These legislatures had a high turnover rate with many lawmakers leaving them to run for national office.[24] Finally, legislatures where pay is low and prospects for advancement are also low were coined "dead end" legislatures. These dead end assemblies had the highest turnover rates. Dead end legislatures also attracted membership from all age groups, indicating no common career structure. By contrast, both "career" and "springboard" legislatures tended to attract younger first term Members. Young members of "springboard" legislatures left for national office after a brief stay at the state level.[25]

Squire suggests that analyzing the opportunity structure of legislatures holds benefits beyond explanations of career stability. Specifically, "the way in which a legislature distributes power internally may be related to its career

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[24] Only one legislature, California's, in Squire's study offered high pay and high prospects for advancement. Squire defined the California legislature as a "springboard assembly."

[25] Peverill Squire, "Career Opportunities and Membership Stability in Legislatures", Legislative Studies Quarterly, XIII, 4, (February 1988), pp.507-512. See also Peverill Squire, "Challengers In U.S. Senate Elections", Legislative Studies Quarterly, XIV, 4, (November 1989) pp.531-547.

opportunity structure."[26] Legislatures that provide full and satisfactory political careers for their members can rely on a seniority system which rewards legislative veterans. Other, more unstable legislatures may be structured in such a way as to reward aggressive power brokers who view a particular office as a stepping stone in a longer career.[27]

Squire also speculates that career opportunity structures may influence the behaviour of legislators toward outside groups. Members of career legislatures may strive for independence from the legislature and therefore forge strong ties with their district in an attempt to ensure re-election. Springboard legislatures will likely hold members whose greatest interest is the office beyond. Theses legislators will, as Schlesinger speculated, develop ties to interests which can help them in their future career. Dead end legislators, on the other hand, will lack the policy expertise to effectively compete with the executive for power.

In a subsequent analysis, Squire shows how the internal organization of state assemblies promotes particular types of political careers. The internal structure becomes part of the opportunity structure of a future, higher office. Squire

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[26] Ibid. p.77.

[27] Squire states that "Power in dead end bodies may be held by a small coterie who provide continuity in an otherwise unstable organization" (p.77). Elite control is seen as a product of a dead end legislature. These legislatures may be "dominated by the executive because they have no source of subject expertise themselves".

hypothesizes that a legislature's structure will reflect the career needs of its members. He also finds, however, that once established, a particular organizational structure "tends to endure." [28] Squire established that the differing structures of the New York, Connecticut and California assemblies produced different types of political careers.

In the New York State House of Representatives, a high salary and stable orderly ascension to powerful internal and party positions combined with relatively weak external advancement opportunities promote a legislative membership of veteran state politicians. In California, members services are equally as attractive as New York's but internal positions are available for younger aggressive junior members. California also offers more external senior positions for state representatives to attempt to win.[29] By contrast, the Connecticut State assembly members are paid as part-time lawmakers despite a work session only slightly less time

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[28] Peverill Squire, " Member Career Opportunities and the Internal Organization of Legislatures", Journal of Politics, 50,3 (August 1988). p.726-744. While this analysis tends to give greater weight to institutions shaping careers than Squire's earlier analysis, he does not discount the strength of members changing the internal structure of their Assemblies. He does, however, suggest that a legislature attracts members whose interests best match the opportunities presented by the legislative structure. See also Douglas Chaffey and Malcolm Jewell, "Selection and Tenure of State Legislative Party Leaders", The Journal of Politics, 34,4 (1972) pp.1278-1286.

[29] While New York and California have a similar number of federal offices, the California Senate has more seats and a longer term of office making it more attractive. New York State Senators serve two year terms, the same length as a state Representative.

intensive as New York's. As well, there is a dearth of higher electoral offices to run for and there is no seniority system to reward service within the legislature.

As a result, the New York legislature attracts members whose career orientation is to serve at the state level. The California state legislature is used by most of its members as a springboard to higher office. The Connecticut House has a high turnover with few members seeking external advancement. Squire notes that the opportunity structure of each legislature draws to it individuals whose career goals are compatible with the Assembly. Squire's interpretation is the "the existing structure attracts individuals whose career goals are consistent with it and therefore are unlikely to change it."[30] In this manner the status quo of the assembly and its' opportunity structure is maintained.

At the heart of Squire's work therefore, lies the importance of the resources and hierarchy of a legislature in attracting and keeping individual members. Legislative stability can be best accomplished by providing members with a good salary and accessible yet orderly opportunities for promotion. If high turnover is to be avoided, members must be well paid and, just as importantly, feel that promotions both exist and exist based on some form of seniority or merit.

Applied to the Canadian context, Squire's analysis suggests that the House of Commons must hold qualities similar to those

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[30] Ibid. p.742.

of career legislatures if a high turnover rate is to be avoided. Members of the Canadian House of Commons are less likely to view national service as a career if opportunities for promotion are not based on merit or hard work but rather on other less tangible factors. As well, applying the work of Squire to the Canadian experience suggests that the structure of advancement in the House of Commons, and the high rate of turnover, provides the makings of a "dead end" legislature. This will especially be the case if the executive, which is the policy making branch of parliament, is compromised of politicians with greater legislative experience than the opposition and government backbenches hold.

Once in the House of Representatives the next step for rational actors with progressive ambition is either the Senate or a Governor's office. Gary Copeland investigated the strategic calculations of House Representatives who were seeking election to the Senate. He found that the number of senate challenges from representatives are few. Those representatives who do seek a senate seat "run from established positions of electoral and financial strength" and "prefer to seek an open seat or to challenge an underfinanced incumbent".[31]

His analysis draws heavily upon the rational choice

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[31] Gary Copeland, "Choosing to Run: Why House Members Seek Election to the Senate", Legislative Studies Quarterly, XIV, 4, (November 1989) pp. 549-565.

approach in that he sees "the process of decision making as fluid and individualistic."[32] He suggests that politicians hoping to move from the House to Senate are influenced by the opportunity structure but at the same time have the ability to act so as to promote opportunity for themselves. He states that many of the institutional incentives that exist for House members can be exploited or manipulated to maximize actor's chances of senate success.[33] For example, House members will make policy decisions with an eye to attracting a larger constituency than just their House district, such as initiating state wide projects. Representatives can also help to promote their chances of reaching the Senate by using their present position not so much as a lawmaker concerned with particular policies but rather as a means of solidifying a personal support base and an avenue to raise the funds necessary for a senatorial bid.

The implications of Copeland's work for the study of career choice in Canada is not as readily evident as Squire's, but is nonetheless present. Do MPs, in attempting to make cabinet, reach for a constituency beyond the geographic one that elected them to office? Instead of raising funds and building up a base of support for a campaign, Canadian federal office holders may try to establish a reputation as an expert in a particular

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[32] Ibid. p. 562.

[33] Ibid. p. 563. See also Paul Brace, "Progressive Ambition in the House: A Probabilistic Approach", Journal of Politics, 46, (November 1984) pp.556-571.

policy field, or as a spokesperson for a group of individuals beyond the members own constituency (for example as a spokesperson for the francophone community) as a means of aiding their own prospects for advancement. If the Canadian opportunity structure is such that this is not possible, or will not bring the expected rewards, then members might be easily discouraged from moving beyond the duties expected of them as a representative of a particular geographic region.

David Rohde's study of progressive ambition among U.S. House representatives who served between 1954-1974 is an attempt to predict what type of Members would seek higher office. Rohde's analysis adds to Schlesinger and Black's work by suggesting that the only types of political ambition that representatives initially bring with them to office are discrete and progressive. Static ambition, he suggests, "is a behaviour pattern manifested by a member because of the risks of the particular opportunity structure he finds himself in, and his unwillingness to bear the risks."[34] Thus the greater the risks involved in seeking higher office the greater the chance that a politician's progressive ambition will become static.

Rohde's argues that House members are rational actors who make decisions about running for higher office based upon the utility - length of term and authority - of the higher office and the risks involved in seeking an advanced position.

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[34] David Rohde, " Risk-Bearing and Progressive Ambition: The Case of the United States House of Representatives", American Journal of Political Science, 23,1, (February 1979) pp. 1-26.

Specifically, congresspersons are more likely to run for a higher office that has a longer term (for example, the Senate or a governorship with a four year term) than an office with a two year term, as some state governors serve. As well, members of congress try to advance when the odds of winning are greatest and the risks are least, such as when the seat in question has no incumbent and the physical overlap between office held and office sought is high.[35] Finally, Rohde found that the desire to hold onto a congressional seat increased with length of service at the congressional level. Most senior congress members were unwilling to give up their positions of seniority for higher office, even if the chances of winning that seat were high and it provided a longer term.

Rohde's analysis and the assumptions he brings into his analysis - namely that politicians are all rational actors who enter office with progressive ambition - highlights some important aspects of political careerism that can be used in our study of careers in Canada. Members of parliament who continually seek re-election are, by definition, risk takers. Members of parliament cannot run for higher office. Instead, they must seek re-election in their existing seat with no assurance that of a cabinet position if they successfully defend

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[35] Rohde also introduces the notion that some congresspersons are greater risk takers than others. Those members of congress who were elected to the House by beating an incumbent or winning in a district that has historically voted for the opposite party were defined as risk takers. These members showed greater willingness to challenge incumbent Senators and Governors.

their constituency. Given that, the rewards for provincial MLAs who seek higher, federal, office may be minimal compared to the risks. Unlike the United States, seeking a higher office in Canada's parliamentary system does not bring with it a longer term. Further, like senior members of Congress who decide not to run for the Senate, experienced provincial MLAs may not wish to give up a secure sub-national seat to run for a national seat with no guarantee of winning, and no assurance of a senior position at the national level. Our study of Canadian careers, and in particular the effects of Canada's federal system on political careers, must consider these factors.

The final stage in a political career is the exit from office. The most obvious manner of exit is electoral defeat. The second way of leaving is the voluntary exit. In the United States, where the election rate for incumbents in national office is over 90 per cent, voluntary retirement has become the largest cause of turnover. It is with this second path, voluntary exits, that the opportunity structure of office may affect the calculations of rational actors by making the risks of achieving office greater than the rewards for staying on in office.

Cooper and West suggest that the mid-1970 changes in institutional incentives for achieving positions of power within the U.S. House of Representatives has had a concomitant effect

on the length of political careers. [36] Specifically, elimination of seniority as the guiding principle for selection of committee and sub-committee chairs - and its replacement with chairpersons elected from the majority party caucus - has decreased the value, in terms of power, of a longer political career. As a result, politicians have had to rethink their career plans. Previously, House members with ten to fourteen years of service would be ranking committee members and, depending upon their party, have a good opportunity to become a committee chair. As such, they would be reluctant to retire from the House at that stage in their career. John Hibbing quotes one former senior member of congress as saying "I sat through an awful lot of crap in order to get my sub-committee chairmanship. Once I had it, I wasn't about to give it up by not seeking re-election."[37]

The changes in the manner in which congressional leaders are chosen (the 1970s democratization process) are changes in the opportunity structure of congressional office. As Squire argues, the manner in which a legislature allows its' members access to positions of power will affect career patterns in the legislature. In the case of the U.S. House of Representatives,

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[36] Joseph Cooper and William West, "Voluntary Retirement, Incumbency and the Modern House", Political Science Quarterly, 96,2, (Summer 1981) pp.279 - 301.

[37] John Hibbing, "Voluntary Retirement from the U.S. House: The Costs of Congressional Service", Legislative Studies Quarterly, VII,1, (February 1982) p.69. See also John Hibbing, "Voluntary Retirement from the U.S. House: Who Quits?", American Journal of Political Science, 26, 3, (August 1982) pp.467-484.

this has meant that more junior members are acquiring positions of authority earlier in their careers, and the prestige of being a senior statesman has begun to tarnish. Cooper and West suggest that this has been accentuated by a continual decline in the strength of political parties in the United States. The result of both these changes, they argue, has been a continual increase in the number of voluntary retirees who have a great deal of legislative experience. They suggest that if this trend continues a new type of individual will be attracted to serve in congressional office, one "more attuned to the benefit-cost ratio" of the new opportunity structure.[38]

If the elimination of the seniority system in the United States has had such a dramatic effect on congressional careers, how does the absence of a seniority system affect careers in Canada? As the following chapter delineates, promotion up the party ranks and selection to cabinet is not based on seniority, but on a number of other variables. Rational actors may get discouraged of waiting in office - and continually risking electoral defeat - for a promotion to a leadership position that may never materialize. At some point in time this discouragement could cause them to leave office voluntarily. Does Canada suffer from an abundance of voluntary retirees because within our opportunity structure, length of service counts for so little? The absence of a system of promotion

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[38] Cooper and West, p.299. See also Stephen M. Frantzich, "De-Recruitment: The Other Side of the Congressional Equation", Western Political Quarterly, 31, (March 1978) pp.105-126.

based on seniority is part of the opportunity structure of Canadian national office both within the context of a cabinet career - or lack thereof - and the importance of political parties in offering promotion and positions of leadership to its members.

In sum, rational choice, when applied to the study of political careers, sees actors making strategic decisions about entering, advancing in, and in some cases leaving, political office. The common thread throughout these studies of U.S. political careers presented above has been that despite the constraining structures inherent in every political office, all have placed politicians at centre stage. The attributes and applications of the rational choice paradigm to the study of political careers are threefold.

First, it provides a focal point for an examination of political careers, namely the ambition, desires and rational decision-making processes of political office holders and seekers. Second, it places legislative structures within a micro-level framework. That is, it answers the question 'how do opportunity structures affect the career goals of politicians?' Third, it provides a method of characterizing and evaluating legislatures. It provides a reference point to help answer questions of 'do legislatures provide opportunities and more importantly, how do these opportunity structures affect the

legislature in its capacity to govern?'

The work of Schlesinger, Black and Jacobson and Kernell concentrate on the first two of these factors. The larger significance of their work lies in the implications of political ambition theory for questions of social choice. As Black states, "the study of political ambition can generally benefit from an approach that assumes that politicians attempt to behave in a rational manner in seeking their political ambitions."[39] This is the substance of rational choice theory and political careers. For example, Schlesinger, Black and others suggest that the politician's immediate environment - the opportunity structure -is more influential in shaping political careers and career choices than the politicians former environment - specifically family background and socio-economic status. The immediate structural environment within which decisions are made and the constraints imposed by that environment are more important than social background characteristics in influencing strategic career choices.[40]

The third attribute of rational choice theory as applied to

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[39] Black, "Political Ambition", p.158.

[40] See also Galen Irwin, Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie. "Social Background vs. Motivational Determinants of Legislative Careers in the Netherlands", Legislative Studies Quarterly, IV,3, (August 1979) pp.447 - 465. Irwin et al. argue that social background is an important factor in the recruitment of politicians but decisions to maintain a political career are influenced by political ambition and motivation. See also, Irwin et al. "Predicting Parliamentary Careers: A Quantitative Index Generated and Tested with Dutch Data", European Journal of Political Research, 9, (1981) pp.201 - 208).

political careers, its use in characterizing and evaluating legislatures, is best exemplified in the work of Squire and Cooper and West. For example, some legislatures may have high turnover rates and an unstable membership because the opportunity structure of office is, in Squire's terms, "dead end".[41] "Career" legislatures, on the other hand, have institutional incentives which attract and hold members for longer periods of time by providing an outlet for individual egoist's political ambition, namely positions of prestige and authority.

The studies of careers in the United States presented above have helped to direct our attention to aspects of Canadian political careers that a rational choice study must consider. The importance of the risk factor emphasized by Rohde may help to explain the bifurcated character of federal and provincial careers in Canada. Members of provincial assemblies may not be willing to risk giving up their seat for a higher (national) one with no immediate rewards in sight. Copeland's exploration of the constituency an individual responds to in order to assist their chances of promotion may help us understand the difficulties faced by backbenchers trying to reach cabinet. Hard work in the House of Commons might not be enough for those seeking a seat at the cabinet table. Yet if there is no outside constituency available for members to build up a reputation as

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[41] See also Wayne Francis and John Baker, "Why Do U.S. State Legislators Vacate Their Seats?" Legislative Studies Quarterly, XI,1, (February 1986) pp.119-126.

a spokesperson for, then these members may become frustrated with the opportunity structure and look for a career elsewhere. Finally, Squire's emphasis on the resources and salaries of a legislative body hold significant implications for the study of careers in Canada. Is Canada's parliament, executive dominated and replete with short term careerists, a "dead end" legislature? Examining the opportunities, or lack of opportunities, for internal advancement will help to provide a focus for our examination of political careers in Canada. As well, it will allow us to more properly evaluate the Canadian House of Commons and identify those obstacles to a more stable membership in the House.

Yet a study of Canadian political careers cannot depend solely on comparative analysis in order to establish the opportunity structure of its own careers. The differing institutional arrangements between Canada and the United States demands that the opportunity structure of Canadian office be unique. The following review of Canadian studies of political careers will help us to establish that unique structure of opportunities.

CANADIAN CAREER STUDIES

One of the earliest studies of political careers in Canada was undertaken by Norman Ward.[42] Ward states that MPs who

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[42] For an excellent overview of studies of Canada's Parliament see Michael Atkinson and Paul Thomas, "Studying the Canadian Parliament", in Michael Stein, ed. Aspects of Canadian Political

"spend only one or two terms in Ottawa" constitute a clear majority of Members. [43] He points to the high turnover rate of MPs as the greatest cause of the short Canadian political career but offers no substantial explanation of why the turnover rate is so high. And while the turnover rate has in fact declined over the time period of his study (from 48.7% in 1872 to 38.3% in 1945) he largely attributes this drop to the number of opportunities individuals have to seek political office. Specifically, he suggests that the decrease in patronage appointments and the decline in corrupt electoral practices has brought with them fewer by-elections and end of term resignations.

Despite this reduction in available offices, Ward described as "disturbing" the absence of experienced MPs. He suggests that this has helped political parties and party leaders to maintain control over their caucus, producing a "dead end" legislative environment.

> Since one of the qualifications for leadership is long service in the party interest, the inexperience and general ignorance of party affairs of so many members must greatly facilitate their acquiescence in the leadership of their seniors...[The] techniques of managing the party group both in the caucus and in Parliament can be learned only by experience, so that the comparatively few experienced members have a great tactical advantage over their more transient colleagues.

Science, Forthcoming.

[43] Norman Ward, The House of Commons: Representation. 2nd Edition, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963) p. 139.

Donald Smiley's analysis of political careers concentrates not on the length of careers but rather on the absence of federal-provincial cross over amongst politicians and in particular, cabinet ministers.[44] He found that of the 186 provincial cabinet ministers in 1974, only 5 had ever held national office. Among modern federal cabinets, provincial experience was just as rare. From Diefenbaker through Clark, no cabinet had more than three ministers with provincial experience. As a result, Smiley states that so far "as federal-provincial relations is concerned, ministers deal with one another in the absence of either personal experience or personal ambition related to the other order of government."[45]

In a more recent study Gibbins and Barrie also found that "provincial legislative experience among national politicians has been the exception rather than the rule."[46] They did find however that federal cabinet ministers are more likely to have provincial executive experience than non-cabinet MPs. Provincial executive experience does not, however, serve as an automatic stepping stone to the federal cabinet. Of provincial cabinet ministers who went on to a seat in the House of Commons,

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[44] Donald Smiley, Canada in Question: Federalism in the Eighties, 3rd. edition (Toronto: McGraw Hill Ryerson ltd. 1980). Chapter 5.

[45] Ibid. p. 137.

[46] Roger Gibbins and Doreen Barrie, "Parliamentary Careers in The Canadian Federal State", Canadian Journal of Political Science, XXII,1,(March 1989) pp.137-145. See also Doreen Barrie, "Political Recruitment in Federal States: Career Paths in Canada and Australia", Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Calgary, 1988.

less than one in five made it to the federal executive. Like Smiley, Gibbins and Barrie are more concerned with the potential ramifications of an abundance of federal cabinet ministers with no provincial experience than they are with its causes. They raise the question of whether or not this lack of provincial experience at the national level has made the federal government less sensitive to regional concerns and needs. They suggest that the eventual fallout of these separate career paths may well be a national parliament with decreased representational authority.

Gibbins and Barrie also examine the lack of a provincial national career ladder outside of cabinet ranks. Of all MPs from 1867 to 1984, they found that only 14 per cent had provincial political experience. They demonstrate that the number of MPs coming to Ottawa from provincial legislatures has decreased over time, and was most common during the first forty years of Confederation. They suggest that this lack of a provincial experience at the federal level is only marginally related to party. No real difference existed between the two major parties, and among the ranks of third parties in the Canadian House of Commons, only slightly more provincial experience could be found.[47]

They do however maintain that the impact of region on federal-provincial careers is significant. Atlantic Canadian MPs are more likely than their Western or Central Canadian

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[47] Ibid. pp.142-144.

colleagues to move to Ottawa from a provincial capital. Between 1908 and 1950, "approximately 38% of Maritime MPs compared to 20% of Western Canadian MPs had prior political experience."[48] Again the trend has been toward a decrease in the number of national politicians with provincial experience, and this has held true for all regions. Finally, the provinces with the fewest MPs with provincial experience, throughout Confederation, have been Ontario and Quebec.

There are two substantial features of Canadian political careers. As was pointed out in the first chapter and more briefly above, Canadian political careers are short. Second, according to Smiley, Gibbins and Barrie, these careers tend to be limited to one level of office only. Yet these studies offer no explanation of the cause of short and unilevel political careers. While Gibbins and Barrie refer to the American career ladder in establishing their argument, they make no attempt to propose an opportunity structure of Canadian office which would explain the relative absence of a provincial rung. Few studies have addressed the underlying reasons behind Canada's short political career, and these have done so only in an indirect manner.

William Irvine found that compounding the problem of few safe seats - the subject of Lovink's study mentioned earlier - was the reactive absence of a personal vote for local members.

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[48] Ibid. p.143. The figures cited here include municipal experience as well as provincial experience.

Irvine also suggests that any strength or following a local candidate has built up can be more than offset by any national swing based upon the popularity, or loss in popularity, of the candidate's party or leader. Poor local service might hurt a politician's reputation and diminish his or her potential for re-election but strong local service is no guarantee of electoral success.[49]

Neither Irvine nor Lovink's studies were influenced by the rational choice tradition. Both focus not on the individual career choices of politicians but rather on the effects of party on electoral competition. For Lovink, the central issue was how, if at all, political parties react through policy initiatives to the highly competitive Canadian political arena.[50] Irvine's study demonstrates the importance of party and party leader in shaping political careers. While he does examine the 'micro-politics of getting elected', that is the strength of the individual candidate, he does not do it from the perspective of career choice. Rather Irvine's analysis suggests that MPs toil under the burden of constituency service, trying to establish a secure personal following, unaware of its minor effects on electoral security.

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[49] William Irvine, "Does the Candidate Make a Difference: The Macro-Politics and Micro-Politics of Getting Elected", Canadian Journal of Political Science, XV,4, (December 1982). pp.759-782.

[50] Lovink suggests that this competition has a limited affect on party policy. In fact he proposes that if anything, a larger cadre of electorally secure MPs might feel more comfortable in introducing innovative policy options than MPs who constantly fear electoral defeat.

More recently, C.E.S. Franks has suggested that, after the lack of safe seats, the greatest contributing factor to the absence of a political career is the high number of voluntary exits from politics. He also suggests that close to one third (30%) of MPs who leave office eventually receive some form of patronage reward.[51] The large number of patronage positions available eases the departure of MPs from parliament. Ward suggests that the rewards for leaving political office, that is, a patronage posting, are not reserved for senior members. Historically, MPs have not had to serve a long career in the House of Commons before being appointed to the Senate, the Bench, or other government posting. In fact, Ward puts forth that patronage has often been used for expediency, perhaps to open up an opposition seat so the government might elect one of its own members. Franks suggests that many MPs are independently wealthy and do not need their parliamentary income to survive and as a result can easily move back into their pre-political life if elected office is found to be dissatisfying.[52] Those that are not so well off can hope to receive a patronage position as well as look forward to a "generous pension plan."[53]

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[51] C.E.S. Franks, The Parliament of Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988). pp.72-79.

[52] Ward, The Canadian House of Commons: Representation, pp.137-142.

[53] Ibid. p.77. While Franks suggests that the number of Agencies, Boards and Commissions available for patronage postings is high, many of these bodies do not provide full-time employment for Directors. As such, MPs who leave office cannot look to these bodies as their sole source of income.

It would appear then that the cause of the short Canadian parliamentary career is a combination of highly competitive seats and the ease with which MPs can step out of office of their own volition. The opportunity structure for exiting political office therefore seems more welcoming than the path for entering political life. It almost appears that there is more incentive to leave office than to stay. Yet this argument made by Ward and Franks rests upon the assumption that the majority of voluntary exits are made by political 'transients'. As will be shown in Chapter Four, while there is some validity to their case, voluntary retirement is not the cause of short political careers. In fact, of those who leave voluntarily, most serve longer terms in office than the average MP.

Like Ward, Porter et. al. Franks is more concerned with the fallout of the political career than the reasons for the prevailing pattern. The high number of appointments given to former members indicates that "the future prospects for many MPs depend upon how well they please and serve their party rather than how they serve the House or their constituents."[54] For Franks, Ward and others, eliminating the desire of MPs to leave office, and reducing their dependency on the party apparatus, would go a long way toward increasing the length of political careers and strengthening the role of Parliament.

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[54] Ibid. p.78.

THE NEED FOR A CANADIAN OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE

In sum, studies of Canadian political careers are few. Those studies that do exist are often part of a larger study, and only look at careers as a method of analyzing party strength or the policy process. As such, they cannot be faulted for failing to examine the roots of political careerism in Canada. They never set out to do so. It does however, highlight the need for such a study.

The first chapter established that Canadian political careers are short term breaks from a life outside of politics. It also suggested that Parliament would benefit from having more experienced longer serving members. The review of Canadian studies presented immediately above suggested that we lack a systematic attempt to understand why political careers in Canada tend to be short and why politicians come to the House of Commons with little prior political experience.

Studies in the United States have benefitted from the employment of a theory, rational choice, which sees political careers as the result of strategic choices being made by rational egoists within an opportunity structure of elected office. Some of these studies have placed greater emphasis on the constraints of the opportunity structure than others. All studies, however, treat politicians as the central players, and the opportunity structure as the stage on which they act out

their career ambitions.[55]

In order to employ a rational choice framework for the study of Canadian political careers, the opportunity structure of political office must first be established. That is, the steps and obstacles to achieving a successful political career - politicians realizing their progressive ambition - must be delineated. The following chapter will propose the opportunity structure of Canadian political office. It will be argued that the three most important facets of this structure are membership or not in the cabinet, the degree of party service, and the relative balance of provincial versus federal service. Once established, this opportunity structure will provide the focal point for the study of political careers in Canada. It will be then possible to evaluate how the opportunity structure affects the career choices of politicians.

If the opportunity structure acts as a filter, there will be two kinds of political careers. The first will be those who have not been able to use the opportunity structure and thus have had shorter careers. These people presumably will leave political life early to pursue another career. The second group will be those who have used the opportunity structure and have satisfied their political ambition and presumably enjoy longer political careers.

A second possibility is that career patterns will not be

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[55] See Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). Appendix.

split in such a dichotomous manner. In this instance there will be four possible types of political careers. Some members will find the obstacles too great and leave political life early. Others will make it through the opportunity structure and enjoy a long and successful political career. Still others will enjoy long careers despite never reaching the pinnacle of Canadian politics, the cabinet, or serving in various party positions. A fourth and final group may achieve progressive ambition early and find it not to their liking. This type of actor will leave office early, despite their initial success.

The first scenario is easily explained within the rational choice paradigm. Rational egoists make strategic choices about entering, staying in and/or leaving political life based upon their ability to satisfy career goals. The second possibility, that a sizable cadre of politicians remain in political life despite failure to satisfy initial career goals suggests that some aspects of Canadian political careers are left unexplained by the rational choice paradigm. It will be demonstrated in the next two chapters that while the opportunity structure model offers the best understanding of Canadian political careers to date, not all careers can be explained through the rational choice framework.

CHAPTER THREE

THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE OF PARLIAMENT AND POLITICAL CAREERS

INTRODUCTION

The preceding chapter reviewed studies of political careers in the United States and suggested that these studies have benefitted from the employment of a rational choice framework. This framework requires viewing political office as a series of opportunity structures that strategic actors either work within or manipulate to satisfy political ambition. The chapter further suggested that in Canada have been few and look at careers as a means of analyzing other aspects of Canadian political life. This chapter examines Canadian political careers directly within the rational choice paradigm. The analysis must begin, however, by establishing the opportunity structure of Canadian political office. Once established the hypothesis that the opportunity structure is responsible for the pattern of political careerism found in Canada can be at least partially tested.

The chapter is broken into two main sections. The first section establishes the opportunity structure of Canadian political office. The first chapter outlined the opportunity structure of office as both the institutional arrangements establishing the parameters of election and advancement, and the non-institutional influences on career choice, such as the

perceived risks in running for reelection and the opportunity costs of bypassing alternative careers. There are three significant features of the Canadian opportunity structure. First is the cabinet which can be described as the apex of a political career. The second feature is the strength of political parties both in terms of recruitment to the political process and in advancement within Parliament. The final feature of the opportunity structure is the separation of political careers federally and provincially. The second section of the chapter will test the hypothesis based on the rational choice model. It will do so by drawing upon both existing research and by using the data set collected by Roger Gibbins and Doreen Barrie. The analysis will show that the opportunity structure of political office does affect the political career in Canada by discouraging individuals with previous political experience from entering Parliament and by discouraging most MPs' from serving a long political career.

THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE OF THE CANADIAN PARLIAMENT

CABINET: THE APEX OF A FEDERAL CAREER

Within the Westminster model of government, the executive, or cabinet, is the law and policy-making branch of parliament and acts as a linkage between the House of Commons and the government. It is this branch which holds the most authority

and controls the parliamentary agenda.[1] In Bagehot's terms cabinet is the belt buckle "which fastens the legislative part of the state to the executive part of the state."[2] While the rise of executive federalism and the expanding role of government has increased the complexity of the relationship the analogy is no less true today than it was in the mid-nineteenth century. And while part of belt buckle that binds the legislature to the executive, the federal cabinet is also the pinnacle of a political career.

For members of parliament with progressive ambition, the objective of a federal career is to serve in the cabinet. While MPs who see their role solely as constituency oriented may not actively seek a cabinet post, those members who desire a strong policy role see cabinet as the only viable means of achieving it. David Rohde and other U.S. analysts have argued that all politicians enter office with progressive ambition and that static ambition is a product of an unwelcoming opportunity structure. Studies of Canadian politicians indicate that most

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[1] Robert Jackson and Michael Atkinson, The Canadian Legislative System, 2nd Rev ed. (Toronto: Gage Publishing, 1980) chapter four.

[2] David E. Smith, " The Federal Cabinet in Canadian Politics", in Michael Whittington and Glen Williams ed. Canadian Politics in The 1990's, 3rd Rev ed. (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1990) chapter 18. For a more detailed account of the role and powers of the cabinet in Canadian politics see Thomas Hockin ed. Apex of Power: The Prime Minister and Political Leadership in Canada, (Toronto: Prentice Hall, 1971). For an examination of executive-legislative linkages within a comparative framework see Anthony King, "Modes of Executive-Legislative Relations: Great Britain, France and West Germany", Legislative Studies Quarterly,1,1, (February 1976) p.11-36.

legislators either see themselves as policy makers or seek a role in the policy making process.[3] It is known is that of all MPs asked to serve in cabinet, few have turned down the opportunity. A key feature of the opportunity structure is the limited number of alternatives to service in the cabinet for members of parliament seeking a policy role. Getting into cabinet therefore, becomes a priority for these members. Both House and Senate members are eligible for cabinet service, however, the more common path to cabinet is through membership in the House of Commons.

Once elected to the House of Commons there are a number of avenues open for strategic politicians to follow in order to increase their chances of reaching cabinet. These avenues are also part of the opportunity structure. Opposition members can use their shadow cabinet or critic positions to build up expertise in a policy field and hopefully name recognition. If their party forms the government, the knowledge and credibility these members have developed may increase their chances of being chosen by the prime minister to sit in cabinet. A recent example of this type of strategy was Perrin Beatty's use of his Revenue Canada critic role, and chairmanship of a party task force on

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[3] See for example, Allan Kornberg, Canadian Legislative Behaviour: A Study of the 25th Parliament, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), Chapter four. As Michael Atkinson points out, desires for a policy making role may depend on the nature of the legislative environment. See Michael Atkinson, "Comparing Legislatures: The Policy Role of Backbenchers in Ontario and Nova Scotia", Canadian Journal of Political Science, XIII,1, (March 1980) pp.55-74.

Revenue Canada, while in opposition. Mr. Beatty's work in opposition, particularly between 1980-1984, gained him a reputation as an expert in the field of taxation. When the Conservative Party won office in 1984 Mr. Beatty was named Minister of Revenue. [4]

Members of the governing party often work their way into cabinet by first apprenticing as committee chairs or vice-chairs, or parliamentary secretaries. Atkinson and Nossal argue that between 1968 and 1979 leaders of Legislative Committees were very successful in moving on to both parliamentary secretary and cabinet positions. Pierre Trudeau's two-year maximum service rule for parliamentary secretaries was designed in part to allow backbench members the opportunity of proving themselves worthy of a cabinet portfolio.[5] Bright team players - and more recently those who offer constructive policy criticism through the parliamentary structure - may be rewarded by being chosen to serve in cabinet.[6]

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[4] Not all opposition members hold critic positions. And while being a member of the shadow cabinet might increase an MP's profile, the MP does not receive extra pay or staff resources as a result of this position. Therefore opposition MPs not in the shadow cabinet do have the opportunity to become experts in a policy field. There is no institutional block to this avenue.

[5] Michael Atkinson and Kim Richard Nossal, "Executive Power and Committee Autonomy in the Canadian House of Commons: Leadership Selection", Canadian Journal of Political Science, XIII,2, (June 1980) p.287-308.

[6] The tendency to reward team players may be decreasing. Two former Chairpersons first elected in 1984, William Wynegard and Mary Collins, whose committees produced reports somewhat critical of existing government policy, were among those appointed to the cabinet after the 1988 general election. For the purposes of this

Yet only a fraction of elected members will ever serve in cabinet. Despite the comparatively large size of the Canadian cabinet (in comparison to both Britain and the United States) historically only ten to fifteen percent of MPs are in the cabinet at any one time. Between 1867 and 1984, there have been 3,337 MPs in Canada. Of these, 406, or 12.2 per cent have been cabinet ministers. Therefore, building up expertise in opposition or apprenticing at junior leadership positions on the government side of the House is not a guarantee of eventual cabinet selection. Compounding this problem, prime ministers make choices about who will serve in cabinet based upon a number of considerations, including competence, loyalty, region, ethnicity and ideology. Questions of regionalism and ethnicity are beyond a Member's control. As Walter Baker suggested to his fellow MPs, "if you work hard, take chances, stay out of trouble and get lucky, you might end up a cabinet minister."[7] As well, it has not been uncommon for prime ministers to look outside of parliament for cabinet ministers. Public figures who have not had an elected political career have been recruited to run for the House and then been automatically placed in cabinet. Simply put, the odds are against a member of parliament making it into cabinet.

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thesis the terms private member and backbencher will include all MPs who are not in cabinet and are not Party Leaders or House leaders or whips.

[7] Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 9 July,1981. p.11377. (Walter Baker).

Given the opportunity structure imposed by the requirements of cabinet government, the following hypothesis can be set forth. The objective for members of parliament with progressive or perhaps even static ambition is service in the cabinet. The opportunity to become a cabinet minister is limited. Once in cabinet however, MPs will have realized their ambition and as a result should have a relatively satisfying political career. This job satisfaction should encourage ministers to maintain their career in politics longer than ordinary MPs. Therefore, whether or not an MP serves in cabinet should be a significant factor in determining the length of a political career.

POLITICAL PARTIES: THE CONTROLLERS OF POLITICAL SUCCESS

Since the 1960s, the House of Commons has provided individuals with the physical opportunity to make political office a professional, full-time position. In terms of salary, staff services and standard of living, since the 1960's the House of Commons has allowed MPs to treat their political office as a full-time career.[8] In the early 1960s two Members shared both an office and a secretary. The secretary was available only when the House was in session. By 1976, MPs were in their own office directing a four person staff. Three staff members were in Ottawa and a fourth was in the constituency operating

[8] The term modern Parliament will refer to Parliaments since 1957, where sessions became longer and services to Members and the House began to expand. Although most services did not begin to fully develop until well into the 1960s, the foundations for the changes were laid during the Diefenbaker Governments.

the federally financed constituency office, also a product of the new, busier Parliament.[9] By 1989, each MP had an annual global staffing allowance of over $120,000 to allot - within some constraints (for example, there are maximum salary levels) - at their discretion. As well, the Parliamentary Library and each caucus provides research facilities and services for Private Members.[10] In terms of financial incentives, both salaries and pensions have come to reflect the full-time demands on an MP's time. Until the 1960 s an MP was dependent upon an outside source of income to support his or her career in Ottawa. Today this is no longer necessary or in fact encouraged. In 1988 the base salary for an MP was $77,700 with additional indemnities for MPs with leadership positions (for example cabinet ministers, the Speaker, parliamentary secretaries and whips). Over one quarter of all MPs receive some additional legislative salary.[11] As mentioned earlier, members with at least six years service now have a pension plan. The attractions for a career in Parliament, therefore, have improved dramatically in the past 25 to 30 years.[12]

However despite the improved facilities and services

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[9] Alistair Fraser, "Legislators and Their Staffs", in Harold Clarke et al. ed. Parliament, Policy and Representation, (Toronto: Methuen, 1980). p.230-240.

[10] Robert Fleming, ed. Canadian Legislatures 1988/87, (Ottawa: Ampersand Communications ltd. 1988).

[11] Ibid. p.98.

[12] See Appendix A for a breakdown of members salaries and their pension entitlements.

available to all members of the House, political advancement is still controlled by party. Members who seek legislative advancement must do so within the structure of party discipline. Who runs for office and how far they advance within the House is determined to a large extent by the party hierarchy. As Paul Thomas puts it:

> The [institutional] arrangements within the Canadian cabinet-parliamentary system elevates parties over individual members... Ambitious [MPs] get ahead by acquiring a party label through a nomination, seeking election largely on the basis of the party's and leader's appeal, and striving to advance through the ranks of the parliamentary party.[13]

Political parties in Canada are an integral part of the legislative opportunity structure. This is true for both government and opposition members. For the governing party, access to cabinet and many, although not all, leadership positions are controlled by the prime minister. In order to satisfy more of its members, the governing party could create and distribute more positions of leadership. Doing this would open up the opportunity structure, allowing more members to satisfy their progressive ambition and possibly lengthen their political careers. However, as Franks argues, Canada's parliamentary system requires a strong government party,

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[13] Paul G. Thomas, "Parliamentary Reform Through Political Parties" in John C. Courtney ed. The Canadian House of Commons: Essays in the Honour of Norman Ward, (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1985).

dominated by the prime minister and cabinet.[14] As such, there are significant obstacles in the way of decentralizing leadership positions.

For members of the opposition, there are few positions available that offer additional power, prestige or salary. Party created positions such as regional chairpersons and critics, often carry with them added responsibility but few rewards. As a result, opposition members, like government backbenchers, must tie their political fortunes to their party, and work within the party system in the hopes of achieving a leadership position.

In sum, every MP, receives financial incentives - by way of salary and benefits - and staff resources that are sizable enough to make a political career a viable option. Political parties however, dominate the opportunity for satisfactory political careers in two ways. First, the local riding association plays a large role in the nomination of party candidates. Second, the party label and the party leader help decide the electoral fate of individual party candidates. If fortunate enough to get elected, positions of leadership in parliament do not automatically come with the job. Political

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[14] C.E.S. Franks, The Parliament of Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987) p.38. see also James Gillies and Jean Pigott "Participation in the Legislative Process", Canadian Public Administration,25, (1982). For the argument that this structure is in fact opening up and Committees are more autonomous see A. Paul Pross "Parliamentary Influence and the Diffusion of Power," Canadian Journal of Political Science,XVIII,2, (June 1985) pp.235-266.

parties, therefore, dominate both who gets elected and the internal opportunity structure, that is, who gets positions of authority and prestige. For members elected to the governing party it is conceivable that more leadership positions could be created and dispersed. To a limited extent, this has already happened. However, the logic and structure of Canada's executive centred parliament dictates that cabinet will remain the dominant holder of power. Members of the opposition who seek a political career must be satisfied with positions of little prestige and smaller renumeration.

Therefore an analysis of the Canadian opportunity structure should expect to find political careers tied to party fortunes. The dependence of Members on their party and leader for electoral victory should have an effect on the length of political careers in the House. Specifically, the length of political career a rational actor has should be a function of which political party they represent. Liberal MPs, members of Canada's most successful political party, should have longer political careers than other politicians.

OTTAWA OR THE PROVINCES? DECIDING ON ONE POLITICAL CAREER

The two features of the Canadian opportunity structure presented above lie in direct contrast to the United States career structure. The third and final preeminent feature of the Canadian political career structure, the level of prior political experience new members bring with them to the House, also differs from the United States experience. Schlesinger

outlined a clear ladder to national office in the United States, from the municipality to the state capital to Washington. By contrast, V.P. Harder has suggested that in Canada the most significant aspect of previous political experience among MPs "is the overwhelming lack of any."[15]

Smiley suggests that the institutional framework of Canada's federal state "clearly works toward the mutual independence of federal and provincial parties."[16] The authority to determine electoral boundaries, the timing of elections and the selection of who is eligible to vote rests with each separate jurisdiction. Unlike the United States, there is little overlap between national and sub-national elections. Canadians vote for only one jurisdiction at a time. Further, Harold Clarke et al. suggest that most Canadians are capable of distinguishing between federal and provincial areas of jurisdiction. Clarke and others infer that decisions made by the electorate about which party to support federally are arrived at by a different criteria than that used to assess

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[15] V.P. Harder, " Career Patterns and Political Parties and the National and Sub-National Levels in the United States and Canada," in Jean-Pierre Gaboury and James Ross Hurley, ed., The Canadian House of Commons Observed: The Parliamentary Internship Papers, (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press 1979). pp.327-346.

[16] Donald Smiley, Canada in Question: Federalism in the Eighties, 3rd edition (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980) p.123. The determination of the franchise is now subject to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, perhaps signalling the end to provincial autonomy in this field.

provincial parties.[17]

All of this has helped to establish a bifurcated opportunity structure of political careers. Federal politicians who do have previous political experience overwhelmingly gain this experience at the municipal and not the provincial level. As a result new recruits tend to be relatively inexperienced in legislative politics. The national parliament does not have access to a pool of politicians who have honed their legislative skills at the provincial level. One of the biggest influences in the opportunity structure of political careers therefore should be the nature of Canadian federalism.

In sum, the three most influential features of the Canadian opportunity structure are cabinet, party, and the federal system. Given these features, it can be argued that rational egoists, no matter how strong their ambition, when seeking a political career, must: (a) decide between a federal or provincial legislative career; (b) tie their electoral fortunes to a party and leader; and (c) overcome discouraging odds in order to achieve a position of leadership within the parliamentary system. The next section of this chapter looks at each of these features and argues that the data supports the supposition that the Canadian opportunity structure is indeed discouraging of long serving and fully apprenticed political

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[17] Harold Clarke et al., Political Choice in Canada, (abridged ed.) (Toronto: Mcgraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980). pp.60-63.

careerists.

CABINET AND NON-CABINET CAREERS

It was suggested earlier that service in cabinet is the objective for MPs with progressive ambition and a desire for a role in the policy making process of elected office. It was suggested that a key feature of the structure of opportunities for strategic actors is that the positions which offer policy roles are limited primarily to the cabinet. This section makes two arguments. First, it will be demonstrated that the probabilities of getting into cabinet have increased only marginally over time. The opportunity structure remains discouraging for parliamentarians who are seeking a cabinet career. Secondly, it will be argued that at least in terms of length, the political career of a cabinet minister is quite different than that of a private member. By inference this indicates that those fortunate enough to make it into the cabinet have a more satisfying political career than private members.

GETTING INTO CABINET: OVERCOMING THE ODDS

Within the Westminster model of government, cabinet ministers are parliamentarians. While the best worn path to the cabinet table lies through the House, elected members do not hold a monopoly on access to cabinet. It is not uncommon for senators to be cabinet ministers. Senator cabinet ministers are

often appointed to fill regional vacancies, when the governing party has been "shut out" of a province or region. Joe Clark turned to the Senate to give Quebec greater cabinet representation in 1979, as did Pierre Trudeau for Western representation when the 1980-84 Liberal Government failed to win a seat west of Winnipeg.[18] Yet each senate cabinet appointee takes away an opportunity for a government MP to sit in cabinet. Proportionately, the opportunity to serve in cabinet is not significantly greater for elected MPs than it is for appointed senators.

Between Confederation and 1984, 711 people have served in the Canadian Senate. Of these, 245 have also spent part of their federal political career in the House of Commons, leaving 466 senators whose previous elected experience has either been local, provincial or nonexistent. Of this remaining group, 34 or 7.3 per cent have served in the federal cabinet. This represents only a minor proportion - 7.7 per cent - of all cabinet ministers since 1867. However, compared to the opportunity structure of cabinet that faces MPs, the number of cabinet ministers drawn from the Senate takes on new significance. Simply put, 12.2 per cent of MPs make it into cabinet, compared to 7.3 per cent of senators. Overall, a member of the House has a 40 per cent better chance of becoming a cabinet minister than a senator does. However, when compared

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[18] Richard Van Loon and Michael Whittington, The Canadian Political System: Environment, Structure and Process, (Toronto: McGraw Hill Ryerson, 1987) chapter 14.

only to his or her House of Commons peers, the chances for a cabinet position are only five per cent greater among MPs than they are among senators. Further, members of the Senate do not have to fight for re-election, therefore the risk factor (of losing office) for senators is negligible compared to that of their House counterparts.[19]

While the number of senators in the cabinet has remained fairly stable since the turn of the century, the number of MPs in the cabinet has increased. Table 3.1 below compares the number of cabinet ministers to the size of the House of Commons for thirteen Parliaments. The ratio in the right hand column shows the number of seats in the House of Commons for every cabinet position available. Only those cases where the ratio change is one or greater are included.[20]

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[19] The number of Senators in the cabinet is not time bound. The use of the Senate as a pool of potential cabinet ministers was only slightly higher in earlier Parliaments than in later ones. The first Canadian cabinet had five Senators in it, but since the Laurier Governments, it has been rare that any cabinet has had more than two or three Senators. Pierre Trudeau's last cabinet had three Senators. It is interesting to note that two Prime Ministers, Sir John Abbott and Sir MacKenzie Bowell, presided over the Government from the Senate. See Malcolm Punnett, The Prime Minister in Canadian Government and Politics, (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1977). See also Bruce Hutchinson, Eighteen Men: The Prime Ministers of Canada, (Toronto: Doubleday, 1985).

[20] As the Government Leader in the Senate is automatically a member of the cabinet one cabinet seat was dropped from the total before the ratio was calculated. While most cabinets have contained more than one senator this has been done by prime ministerial choice, not necessity. As such only one cabinet seat was not counted in the ratio. The cabinet size shown is the size of the first cabinet in each Government.

TABLE 3.1
CABINET AND HOUSE SIZE 1867-1984

PARLIAMENT YEAR	CABINET SIZE	HOUSE SIZE	RATIO CABINET TO HOUSE
1867	14	181	1:12.9
1872	13	200	1:16.7
1878	14	205	1:15.7
1887	15	215	1:14.3
1891	17	213	1:13.3
1908	15	214	1:15.2
1911	18	221	1:13.0
1926	15	244	1:17.4
1930	19	244	1:13.6
1935	16	245	1:16.3
1940	18	245	1:14.4
1945	20	245	1:12.9
1963	26	265	1:10.6
1968	29	264	1: 9.4
1984	40	282	1: 7.2

Source: Canadian Parliamentary Guides :1867-1984.

The cabinet to House ratio has decreased over time to the point of being cut by more than half over the 112 year period from 1872 to 1984. This indicates that the opportunity for members to reach cabinet, from the standpoint of numbers alone, has increased.[21] There are two points to be noted here. First, the smaller cabinet to House ratio is a result of a cabinet that has grown faster than the House of Commons. The growth of the House has not kept pace with the growth of the cabinet.

Second, the most significant changes in cabinet size have tended to occur when a new prime minister has been elected. The

[21] Table 3.1 shows only the size of cabinet at the beginning of new Parliaments. The actual number of cabinet ministers for each entire Parliament will be greater as some ministers resign and are replaced in mid-term. As well, in earlier Parliaments it was common for some ministers to hold down more than one portfolio at the same time. As will be subsequently shown, however, the overall number of portfolios held by individual ministers is greater in later Parliaments than it is in earlier ones.

more dramatic changes in cabinet size have coincided with the elections of Brian Mulroney, Pierre Trudeau, Lester Pearson and Robert Borden, and with the return of Mackenzie King and John A. Macdonald to the Prime Minister's office after losing power. Beyond the power to choose who gets into cabinet then, the prime minister has historically played a role in shaping the opportunity structure by dictating how many people will sit in cabinet and by therefore altering the ratio of cabinet seats to House seats.

Yet while the cabinet to House ratio has opened up over time, the constraints on the possible selection of cabinet ministers have also increased. It was suggested earlier that for both opposition and government private members there are avenues available to increase their chances of sitting in cabinet. These avenues include being a member of the shadow cabinet, chairing party task forces, chairing legislative committees and serving as parliamentary secretaries. Each of these can be used by strategic actors to help increase the probability of being chosen by their party leader for cabinet duty.

Nonetheless, the opportunity structure to cabinet also has many impediments that can block the entrance of members who follow one of these avenues. First, as has been shown, the size of cabinet constrains the opportunity structure. Therefore building up expertise in opposition or junior leadership positions on the government side is no guarantee of eventual

cabinet selection. Compounding this problem, prime ministers make choices about who will serve in cabinet based upon a number of considerations, including competence, loyalty, region, ethnicity and ideology. None of these considerations are formal requirements but have been adopted by prime ministers for political reasons.[22] Questions of regionalism and ethnicity are beyond an actors control. For example, it would be rare for Prince Edward Island to have more than one representative in the cabinet at any one time. At the same time, New Brunswick may have anglophone and francophone representation in cabinet. It is conceivable that a highly competent MP from P.E.I will not be in cabinet, if a fellow Islander already is, while a less competent MP from New Brunswick will be in cabinet. Similarly, a number of competent southern Ontario MPs may be competing with each other for a limited number of cabinet spots while a lone government member from Prince Edward Island will have much easier access simply by virtue of informal regional representation requirements.

Finally, a further part of the opportunity structure of cabinet for elected members has been the tendency for prime ministers to occasionally look outside of parliament to recruit

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[22] Van Loon and Whittington, The Canadian Political System, pp.440-445. In a study of the provincial distribution of Cabinet Ministers between 1867-1965 Van Loon and Whittington demonstrate that the regional distribution of Cabinet seats has corresponded fairly equitably with the national population. Likewise, they suggest that the distribution of Cabinet seats between anglophone and francophone members has, when possible, roughly paralleled the national composition.

ministers. As Porter argues, between 1935 -1957, the Canadian cabinet was characterized "by the recruitment of political outsiders."[23] In particular, many of these outside cabinet recruits were brought in from senior positions in the federal civil service. As Franks points out, the predilection of prime ministers to go outside of parliament for cabinet ministers continued into the 1960s.[24] Among senior ministers in Pearson's cabinet who had bypassed any apprenticeship in the backbenches were Walter Gordon, Mitchell Sharp, Bud Drury, Maurice Lamontange and even Pearson himself.[25] While this trend has subsided, there still remains a tendency for prime ministers to sometimes overlook Parliament when looking for senior cabinet ministers. Marc Lalonde began his political career as a Minister's Assistant and moved on to become the Principal Secretary in the Prime Minister's Office. Upon his election to the House of Commons in 1972 he was immediately named the Minster of National Health and Welfare. More recently, Brian Mulroney brought home the Canadian Ambassador to France, Lucien Bouchard, and named him to the cabinet before he was a member of the House of Commons.[26]

In sum, despite its increasing size, the limits on access

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[23] John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965) p.407.

[24] Franks, The Parliament of Canada, p.25.

[25] John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, pp.408-409.

[26] Bouchard ran and was subsequently elected in a by-election immediately after joining the Cabinet.

to cabinet through the House of Commons are overwhelmingly evident. While serving in cabinet is the goal of progressively ambitious politicians, the opportunity structure prevents the majority of parliamentarians from ending up in the cabinet. The prime minister controls the size of the cabinet. Cabinet selections are often based on regional or ethnic considerations and personal loyalties and not on movement up a parliamentary career ladder. Finally, although this practice has diminished, prime ministers often look outside of the House of Commons (and the Senate) to fill cabinet vacancies. Parliament has not been the only training ground for cabinet service, as outsiders are sometimes placed in cabinet without any training in the backbenches.

STAYING IN PARLIAMENT: THE ADVANTAGES OF CABINET

Having assumed first, that cabinet is the primary objective for rationally ambitious politicians, and shown that the opportunity structure for entry into cabinet is discouraging for these office holders, the effect that cabinet service has on political careers can now be examined. If our assumption is correct it follows that cabinet members should have longer political careers than MPs who have never made it out of the backbenches. It is being assumed therefore that longevity in a political career is a measure of career satisfaction. Further, strategic politicians who wish to become cabinet ministers should be willing to serve for a long time in the backbenches

waiting for the opportunity structure of cabinet to favour them. For example, the competent but junior government member from Prince Edward Island or Newfoundland must be willing to sit and serve in a non-cabinet role - perhaps as a committee head or parliamentary secretary - until the minister from their province leaves cabinet. Likewise, an MP from southwestern Ontario must hope to both outlast most of his or her regional colleagues and at the same time prove their loyalty to the party and the party leader.

Therefore, it can be hypothesized that those politicians who are successful in making it into cabinet should have a longer (and by assumption more satisfying political career) than those members who fail to make it into the cabinet. It is true that some members may spend years in a position that they are dissatisfied with yet remain there in hopes of eventual promotion. Similarly, an incumbent politician may be completely satisfied with his or her political career and be defeated in an election, thereby ended a satisfying career. Years of service however, remains the best quantitative measure of satisfaction available. As well, the use of years of service allows any differences in political experience between cabinet ministers and private members to be noted. In particular, if as was suggested at the outset of the thesis, Canada's executive-centred parliament suffers from a lack of long term career politicians, who among this group dominates in terms of political experience, cabinet or non-cabinet MPs? Table 3.2

below illustrates the average length of political careers for Canadian MPs from 1867 to 1984. Members are separated into three groups, private members, MPs' who have served in cabinet, and prime ministers.

TABLE 3.2
AVERAGE CAREER LENGTH FOR MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT*

POSITION	PARLIAMENTARY CAREER LENGTH (IN YEARS)	LENGTH OF CAREER AS CABINET (PRIME) MINISTER
PRIVATE MEMBER	7.39	
CABINET MINISTER	12.39	4.92
PRIME MINISTER	22.00	6.89

*Each difference of means test was significant at the .01 level

At first blush it seems that Franks' assessment that "Canada is characterized by long-term prime ministers and short-term members" is indeed correct.[27] In terms of overall experience prime ministers have average political careers almost three times as long as private members and almost twice the length of the average cabinet minister. In terms of time spent as prime minister, as shown in the lower right corner of Table 3.2, Franks' contention could stand clarification. As leaders, Canada's prime ministers can be separated into three groups. Six prime ministers have led Canada for more than eight years each while seven prime ministers have ruled for approximately

[27] Franks, The Parliament of Canada, p.23.

two years or less.[28] The remaining five prime ministers served for between four and six years as the head of government. As Franks has argued, long serving prime ministers is a natural consequence of long periods of one party domination. Certainly, the average time spent as prime minister is almost equivalent to the average parliamentary career of a private member. Nonetheless, not all Canadian prime ministers have held the highest elected office for long periods of time.

While the political career of a cabinet minister is not as long as that of a prime minister's, it still exceeds that of a private member by some length, indicating a greater degree of career contentment among cabinet ministers. As Table 3.2 indicates, the parliamentary career of a cabinet minister is 75 per cent longer than the political career of a backbencher. In terms of length of service therefore, being in cabinet produces a more satisfying political career than serving as a backbencher.[29] If the average number of years served in cabinet is subtracted from the total parliamentary career of cabinet ministers, their term of office is remarkably similar to non-

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[28] Sir John Thompson was actually Prime Minister for 2 years and 2 months. Of the other six Prime Ministers in this latter group, three served as head of government for less than one year.

[29] A further indicator of a more enjoyable career might be to look at the number of voluntary retirements. Presumably those that enjoy their careers would be less likely to leave office of their own volition. Yet this is not a true indicator of career satisfaction. As chapter four will show, per capita, cabinet ministers are more likely to leave voluntarily than private members. Minister's however, step down after serving much longer careers that non-ministers.

cabinet ministers; 8.0 years to 7.39 years respectively. Being in the cabinet therefore increases the length of the average political career by more than four years, a period of time customarily associated with the length of a majority government.[30] Making it into cabinet therefore, makes for a very different, longer, political career.

While the average length of political careers for all parliamentarians has not changed significantly over time (as Graph 1.B in chapter one illustrates) the political careers of cabinet ministers have undergone change. In particular, parliaments from 1957 to the present have witnessed a different type of cabinet career. According to Smiley, pre-1975 parliaments were "composed of persons most of whom were provincial or regional bosses with bases of power independent of the prime minister."[31] Among the many duties of these ministers was the responsibility to act as brokers for regional demands. As David Smith argues, these earlier cabinet ministers did not act solely as regional brokers, at the expense of national interests. In fact, much of their importance was their ability to bring regional input into national policies thereby acting as an agent of national unity and not an exacerbating regional

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[30] While a number of ministers end their political career in cabinet, many begin -or spend the middle portion of- their careers in cabinet and end their careers on the backbenches. It would be incorrect therefore to suggest that all cabinet ministers have a political career similar to backbenchers and then have their career extended by joining cabinet.

[31] Donald Smiley, Canada in Question, p.134-135.

force.[32] Both Smiley and Smith suggest that since 1957 and the rising importance of executive federalism, the regionally based strong cabinet ministers have decreased in number. Herman Bakvis has suggested that the 'regional minister' has not disappeared since 1957 and was particularly evident between 1980-1984. However, Bakvis also suggests that today's regional minister has a "lower [national] profile and is more restricted geographically" than his or her earlier counterpart.[33]

If Smiley and Smith are correct and pre-1957 cabinets are characterized by regional ministers with responsibilities extending beyond their own portfolios, then a cabinet minister's success should depend less on what portfolio they hold and more on how they perform these broader responsibilities. As such it is suggested that early ministers will be more likely than later ministers to hold onto their original portfolio.[34] Further, given the long periods of one party dominance prior to 1957, it should be expected that once in power, earlier ministers should

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[32] David Smith, "Cabinet and Commons in the Era of James G. Gardiner" in John Courtney ed. The Canadian House of Commons, p.69-88.

[33] Herman Bakvis,"Regional Ministers, National Policies and the Administrative State in Canada: Regional Ministers in cabinet Decision-Making 1980-84," Canadian Journal of Political Science, XXI,3, (September 1988). pp.539-567.

[34] It should be acknowledged that an alternative explanation for the propensity of earlier cabinet ministers to stay in one portfolio for longer periods of time than their post 1957 counterparts lies in the Trudeau management ethos of governing and his rationalization of the cabinet system. Trudeau was much more willing than former Prime Ministers to rotate members of his Cabinet into different portfolios. See Bakvis, "Regional Ministers," pp. 548 - 550.

enjoy a longer cabinet career. The evidence, shown in Table 3.3, supports both suggestions. The pre-1957 cabinet minister held fewer portfolios for a longer period of time than a cabinet minister in the later Parliaments of 1957 to 1984.

This changing cabinet career has implications for the opportunity structure of political office. For the strategic politician, getting into a 'modern' cabinet will not depend so much on the ability to speak for one region of the country. In contrast to pre-1957 members of the executive, cabinet ministers from 1957 on have a cabinet career that is more than a full year shorter. Once an actor gets through the constraints of the opportunity structure and becomes a member of the executive, he or she is not certain that their cabinet career will extend beyond one term of office. The number of minority governments since 1957 has made the length, and re-election, of governments less certain than they perhaps were in the pre-1957 period. As well, cabinet ministers can always be demoted even if both they and their party wins re-election.[35]

TABLE 3.3
THE CHANGING CABINET CAREER

	1867-1953	1957-1984
Number of Years Served	5.28	4.07
Number of Portfolios Held	1.64	2.07

Each difference of means test was significant at the .01 level

[35] As will be shown in chapter four, many people who have served in the executive retire voluntarily after their cabinet career is over (either through demotion or defeat of their party).

In sum, the obstacles in the way of strategic politicians making it to cabinet are numerous. While the actual size of cabinet has increased, regional, ethnic and ideological factors dominate, albeit informally, the selection process.[36] Competence and apprenticeship help, but do not guarantee that government members will eventually be called to the executive. Those who never get to cabinet have a much shorter political career than those who are successful in breaking through the opportunity structure's barriers. However, in recent years even the structure of opportunities surrounding cabinet has become somewhat discouraging of political careers. Political careers are still longer for those in the cabinet, but the cabinet career itself has shortened. If this trend were to continue the costs involved for private members seeking cabinet positions - namely the risk of losing office during continual re-election bids - may exceed the value of the cabinet post once obtained. If the cabinet career continues to shorten, rational actors may be further discouraged from seeking cabinet or indeed re-election so actively.

DOMINATING THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE: POLITICAL PARTIES IN CANADA

While the political career of the rational politician who makes it into cabinet is considerably longer than the career of

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[36] Van Loon and Whittington, The Canadian Political System, pp. 440-445. A similar argument is made about Cabinet selection in the province of Ontario. Richard Loreto and Graham White, "The Premier and the Cabinet," in Graham White, ed. The Government and Politics of Ontario, 4th edition (Scarborough: Nelson Canada). 1990. pp. 81-83.

backbenchers, access to cabinet is controlled by the prime minister and, through him, by the party hierarchy. In Canada, political parties are central to the opportunity structure of political careers. Paul Thomas suggests that while in the United States "constitutional arrangements and related political practices create the incentive for the emergence of ... independent political careers... the arrangements within the Canadian cabinet-parliamentary system elevate parties over individual politicians."[37]

Yet if research on Canadian political careers is scarce, research on the effects of political parties on careers is even scarcer. As Atkinson and Thomas suggest, "if political parties are the key to understanding political careers in Canada, then students of parliament will have to become more familiar with an area of research in which they have so far expressed only passing interest."[38] This section argues that political parties are a integral component of the opportunity structure of Canadian political careers. In order to make this argument however, the parameters of what is meant by political party as it effects political careers must first be established. In Canada, national parties are multi-layered and affect political careers in a number of manners.

For our purposes, the effect of party on political career

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[37] Thomas, "Parliamentary Reform," p.43.

[38] Michael Atkinson and Paul Thomas, "Studying the Canadian Parliament," in Michael Stein, ed. Aspects of Canadian Political Science, forthcoming.

length can be broken down into three stages. The first stage is the nomination stage. Individuals seeking office are nominated at the local level. Party officials at this level are members of the local, not national party elite. Second, individuals who have received the nomination and are seeking election - and re-election - deal with a different set of party elites, the national office and the party leader. As will be argued, at this stage Canadian office seekers are often dependent upon the popularity of their party and leader for their electoral fortunes. Third, as elected representatives, party members receive promotions within their party ranks through the party leader and his or her advisors. These promotions are to positions such as parliamentary secretary, committee chairs and vice-chairs, shadow cabinet positions, and House leader and party whip. At each of these three stages, the structure of the party system affects the advancement of politicians to the House and once there, within the House. At the second stage, that is the influence of party on the re-election of members, there is evidence to suggest that the influence of the party system influences the length of political careers.

David Mayhew has suggested that in the United States Congress, both internal leadership positions and committee assignments are oriented towards facilitating the re-election of individual representatives. Congressmen attempt to sit on committees which can provide projects to their districts. As well, congressmen are free to vote against their party on

matters of local importance.[39] In this manner, politicians in the United States are able to combine their legislative functions with re-election strategy. This is not the case in Canada. Parliament is organized through the party structure and as a result the constraints on the opportunity structure that face Canadian politicians are to a large measure party induced. Leadership positions, both cabinet and non-cabinet, are not arranged in a fashion which can so easily facilitate the desires of individuals who wish longer careers.

The importance of party to the opportunity structure of federal office is apparent even before a political career begins. Individuals with political ambition are elected to office through a political party. As William Mishler argues, nominations for candidacies are "controlled almost entirely... by officials of the various party organizations." More often than not, actors wishing to obtain a party nomination must have a "record of demonstrated loyalty and service to the party."[40] Mishler further suggests that candidates chosen to run in a constituency where the party is electorally competitive will tend to have even stronger records of prior party service. Any

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[39] David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973). See also Christopher Deering, "The New Apprenticeship: Strategies of Effectiveness for New Members of The House," Paper presented to the 1984 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington D.C.

[40] William Mishler, "Nominating Attractive Candidates for Parliament: Recruitment to the Canadian House of Commons," Legislative Studies Quarterly, III,4, (November 1978), p.581-599.

rational actor beginning a political career therefore is immediately faced with the constraints of the party structure, albeit at the local level. As was presented in the first chapter, the average entry age for politicians in Canada has declined in recent years, and is approaching the entry ages of Canada's earliest Parliaments. This suggests that either strategic politicians are getting involved in party service at a younger age, or the weight placed on prior party service is becoming less important.

The effect of the nomination process on career length is perhaps so obvious that it is often overlooked. There is no career without a nomination. The person today who seeks a political career must be nominated by a local riding association and run under that party's banner. Few individuals are elected as independents. Those few that are elected without party labels have not had long political careers.[41] In essence therefore, the career length for MPs who have not gone through a party nomination process cannot be measured simply because too few of them exist.

For those who have received a party nomination, election - and for sitting MPs re-election - is heavily dependent upon party fortunes. This lies in contrast to the United States -

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[41] The last independent elected was Tony Roman from Markham, Ontario, in the 1984 General Election. Prior to that, Leonard Jones ran and won as an independent in Moncton in 1974. Neither man sought re-election after sitting for one term without a party affiliation. As well, the re-election chances for people who have either crossed the floor or left their party to sit as an independent are not good.

and to a lesser extent Britain - where Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina suggest that politicians have been able to cultivate a "personal vote" independent of party ties.[42] In large part this personal vote comes from the attentiveness of politicians to the needs and demands of his or her local district. In the United States a large part of this personal following is also derived from the willingness of office holders ignore party platforms (if and where they exist) and act according to the needs and desires of the constituents that elected them to office. This latter point is not as pronounced in Britain, although elected officials vote against the wishes of the party hierarchy more often in Westminster than they do on Parliament Hill.[43]

Unlike their U.S. counterparts, Canadian national office holders do not enjoy a personal vote. Instead, political security and political advancement are much more closely tied to the party hierarchy and party fortunes. Using election survey data, William Irvine has shown that the Canadian electorate ranks the quality of the local candidate third behind both party and party leader as the most important factors influencing

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[42] Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp.40-45. See also Bruce Cain, "Blessed Be the Tie that Unbinds: Constituency Work and the Vote Swing in Great Britain," Political Studies, XXXI (1983). pp.103-111.

[43] See for example, Philip Norton, "The Changing Face of the British House of Commons in the 1970's," Legislative Studies Quarterly, V,3 (August 1980). pp. 333-357. See also Philip Norton, The Commons in Perspective (Oxford: Martin Robertson) 1981. chapters 3 and 9.

voting decisions. Irvine's findings were consistent over the 1968, 1974 and 1979 elections.[44] And while members of parliament are expected to serve constituency and constituent needs, the work of these individuals at the local level brings little benefits on election day. As Irvine suggests, a Liberal MP between 1974-79 "by roughly tripling his [constituency] effort could add about two points to his popularity, and this could be entirely offset by a four point decline in his party's ratings." Conservative MPs' faced similar difficulties.[45]

It would seem reasonable to suggest therefore that the length of the Canadian political career would be heavily dependent upon political parties. In particular, MPs who represent successful political parties should, almost by definition, have the opportunity for a longer political career than members who represent less successful political parties. If, as Irvine suggests, individual political success is tied to party and leader, then Liberal MPs should be expected to have enjoyed longer political careers than non-Liberal MPs. Between 1867 and 1984 the Liberal party formed the government nineteen times compared to the Conservatives thirteen

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[44] William Irvine, "Does the Candidate Make a Difference? The Macro-Politics and Micro-Politics of Getting Elected," Canadian Journal of Political Science, XV,4, (December 1982) pp.755-783. While the results of the 1965 General Election Study rank local candidate over party and leader, Irvine suggests that this is an anomaly created by the questions asked in 1965 and not a swing in local candidates appeal over time.

[45] Ibid. p.772. Given the small caucus size, figures were not provided for New Democrats and Social Credit MPs.

governments. Of Canada's four longest serving Prime Ministers, three were Liberal party leaders. Members of the Liberal caucus therefore should expect to have political careers that are longer than the careers of Conservative MPs. Members of the House who are members of third parties should also expect to have political careers that are shorter than the careers of Liberal MPs. For these third party members, the opportunity structure of elected office should be discouraging of a longer political career. The parties these members depend on for electoral help have not traditionally enjoyed the widespread popular support afforded to the Liberal party.

The following model was created to measure the effect of political affiliation on career length.

$$YRS = a + B1(ENTAGE) + B2(PARTY) \qquad (1)$$

Where

YRS = Number of years served as an MP

ENTAGE = Age when first elected to the House of Commons

PARTY = A dummy variable with value 1 if MP is Liberal, 0 if otherwise. [46]

The indicator ENTAGE was included in the model in order to

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[46] MPs who first entered the House of Commons in 1984 were not included in the model.

control for the age of entry for political office holders.[47] It is expected that individuals who enter office at younger ages should have longer political careers than members who enter office later in life. Therefore it is expected that the indicator ENTAGE should have a negative value. That is, as entry age increases, career length should decrease. The results of the model are shown below.

TABLE 3.4
CAREER LENGTH: POLITICAL AFFILIATION AND AGE OF ENTRY, 1867-1980

	(2) (Coefficient)	(3) (T-ratio)	(4) (Std. Error)
ENTAGE	-.14	10.9	.01
PARTY	1.04	3.68	.25
R squared = 8.7	N = 2950		

Underlined values are significant at the .01 level.

In equation form the model looks as follows:

YRS = 15.26 - .14(ENTAGE) + 1.04(PARTY)

The low R squared, despite being statistically significant, indicates that age of entry and political affiliation explains only 8.7 per cent of the career length of political actors.

[47] As well, PARTY is a dummy variable and a second variable allowed multiple regression to be used. An analysis of variance was undertaken to measure the effects of political party on the career length of members, using the Liberal, Conservative, New Democratic and Social Credit parties. The results of this analysis are displayed in Appendix C.

Equation (2) shows the coefficient values of the model. As expected, the coefficient for age of entry has a negative value. Therefore, the model suggests that the older a politician is when he or she enters office, the shorter his or her political career will be. The coefficient for party, 1.04, indicates that Liberal MPs have political careers that are expected to last just over one year longer than non-Liberal members. For example, the model indicates that someone who enters Parliament at age 45 should expect to have a political career of 10.5 years if they are a Liberal MP and 9.46 years if they are not a Liberal MP, all other things being equal. The low standard error - shown in Equation (4) - for both ENTAGE and PARTY suggest that most cases in the analysis fall within a close range of the coefficient values. The suggestion therefore, that being a member of the Liberal party does increase the length of a political career, finds support from the results of the model. In other words, for strategic actors seeking a long political career, running and winning as a Liberal helps add at least some longevity to a career.[48]

Yet the results of the model do not hold strong substantive significance.[49] That is, while statistically significant, the difference in career length between Liberal and

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[48] This model was also tried using three separate time periods; 1867-1911, 1917-1953, and 1957-1980. In each instance the results were similar to those shown above.

[49] For a discussion of substantive significance see Christopher Achen, Interpreting and Using Regression, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications) 1982. pp.46-51.

non-Liberal members of parliament is less than a term of office. Being a member of a particular political party, the Liberal party, does not, by itself, increase the number of terms that an individual will serve in office. This suggests that part of the answer to how political parties affects career length may lies elsewhere.

Lovink, Franks and others suggest that the relative absence of safe seats in Canada has helped to produce a high turnover rate of MPs. Since 1957 the problem of turnover has been exacerbated by an increase in the number of elections within a shorter period of time. This problem is linked to the influence of party popularity on career length. Specifically, today's member of parliament must rely heavily on their party and leader and they must do so more often than their pre-1957 counterparts. Turnover and career length are affected by the number of elections that politicians must face. The more often an office holder faces the electorate, the greater the risk that office holder has in losing his/her position through defeat and not voluntary retirement. Clearly, the fewer elections and the longer the term of office the longer the political career. By extension, even if Members in the past thirty years have sat in more Parliaments they may have their career cut short simply by having to fight more elections.

Table 3.5 delimits the percentage of members who have been re-elected for a second through sixth term. Entry groups of politicians were broken into three chronological sets each

representing either ten or eleven elections (and ten or eleven freshmen groups).[50] Those who did not stay from one Parliament to the next include both those defeated in office and those who choose not to run.

TABLE 3.5

REELECTION RATE OF MPS

	Freshmen Group		
Re-elected for;	1867-1911	1917-1953	1957-1980
Second Term	56.1%	58.1%	65.4%
Third Term	33.6%	40.0%	49.2%
Fourth Term	19.4%	25.5%	37.0%
Fifth Term	11.2%	16.7%	26.2%
Sixth Term	7.7%	9.0%	15.0%

As is evident from the Table, members who have sought re-election have become more successful in later Parliaments than they have in earlier ones. Yet this has not produced a larger cadre of experienced parliamentarians. For concomitant with more successful politicians has been more elections. Canada's first eleven elections were held over a forty-one year period; the next eleven over a forty-two year period. The following eleven elections were held within twenty-seven years of each

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[50] The last column in Table 3.5 relies disproportionably on its earliest entry classes. For example those first elected in 1980 could not possibly be elected past a second term. Rookie classes were therefore only included in those subsequent terms that they were eligible for. As well, the Rookie cadre of MPs from 1984 were not included in this Table at all. As such the last group only contains the results from ten elections,not eleven.

other. Conceivably, a recent member of parliament can be more successful at the polls than an earlier MP and still serve less time in office. To choose an extreme example, an MP first elected in 1911 would only have to win re-election once (1917) to serve for ten years. A 1962 freshmen would have to be re-elected three times to serve for ten years.

The comparatively large number of minority governments in the past thirty three years has helped to shape political careers. Majority governments, and longer parliaments bring with them greater job security and more opportunity for newer members to become comfortable with their roles. It also allows members to spend more time on parliamentary functions and become more involved with committee work without the continual threat of elections. Many rookie members since 1957 have not had this opportunity.

The post 1957 MP with progressive ambition must be willing to spend a lot of time fighting elections. Yet, as mentioned earlier, they do not have the opportunity that their American counterparts do to facilitate their re-election through strategic uses of their legislative functions. The lack of this opportunity may be encouraging members to increase their ombudsman role as this at least provides a more visible presence in the community. Given the relative absence of safe seats in Canada, one might expect to see members of a minority parliament spending a large proportion of their time at home cultivating

a personal base of support.[51] There have been no studies undertaken to substantiate the supposition that members in minority governments try to develop more of a personal vote than MPs in majority governments. Yet even if this is the behaviourial pattern of members, a personal base of support has yet to develop en masse.

As well, the increasing number of minority governments may also have encouraged provincial MLAs in provinces with a two party system to remain in their respective legislatures. The rational provincial politician who seeks a long political career may be less tempted to advance to the national level if it means entering a less stable Assembly.

Yet the development of a stable third party and the decreasing length of parliamentary terms is not the only constraint that the party system places on progressively ambitious politicians. The limited number of positions of power outside the cabinet and the control that party leaders hold in determining who receives these positions also constrains the ambitions of MPs. Advancement within the House of Commons is done within a framework of the party system and there are few

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[51] For an examination of 'safe seats' in Canada see Lovink, "Is Canadian Politics Too Competitive?". There is no way of measuring the comparative amount of time Members spend in their ridings during minority and majority governments. All that is being suggested here is that Members of minority Parliaments will be more consistently concerned with re-election than Members of majority Parliaments and as a result may concentrate less on Parliament and more on their constituency.

rewards for individuals who choose not to play within these rules.

For opposition parties, positions of leadership include, whips (chief and deputy), House leader, and in some instances committee chairships and vice-chairships. Opposition parties also have their own shadow cabinets or policy critics. These opposition positions do not come with increased pay -as the other positions do - but being a critic does offer a member some opportunity for publicity. In serving in any of these positions strategic politicians will hope to increase their profile and their chances of eventually serving in the cabinet, once or if their party forms the government. As Thomas suggests, the dispersement of these positions rests with the party leader.[52]

The governing party has a greater number of leadership positions at their disposal, most of which hold more authority than positions at the opposition leaders disposal. These government positions include parliamentary secretary, Chief Government Whip and chairpersons and vice-chairpersons of Standing, and Legislative Committees. Government members try to use the experience gained in these positions to help increase their chances for eventual promotion to the cabinet. As Atkinson and Nossal suggest, most of these positions are controlled by the Prime Minister. Since 1968 however, there has been some autonomy in the committee system for committees to

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[52] Thomas, "Parliamentary Reform", p.57. While this holds true for both the Liberal and Conservative parties, the New Democratic caucus has traditionally elected its House Leader and Whip.

choose their own chairman and vice-chairman.[53] Choosing who will fill the remainder of these positions, however, clearly remains the prerogative of the prime minister and his advisors.

Does holding one of these positions make for a longer political career? These positions are not as powerful as cabinet spots, nor do they hold the prestige that a cabinet position does. However, the analysis of the effects of cabinet on career lengths should lead us to suspect that holding some of these non-cabinet positions, in particular opposition House leader, and the whips positions, might lead individuals to have longer political careers. As well, if the positions of parliamentary secretary and committee chair are used by some as a means of gaining legislative experience for future advancement, then holding one of these positions might lengthen a political career. Unfortunately, there has yet to be sufficient data collected in this area to make a proper judgement about the effect of non-cabinet leadership positions on career length in Canada. A fuller examination of the effect of the party system on career length must include an examination of the effects of these non-cabinet positions on career length to determine if holding such a position does increase the length of an individual's political career.

Some comparative analysis suggests that if caucus were given greater control over these non-cabinet leadership

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[53] Atkinson and Nossal, "Executive Autonomy" p. 288.

positions the length of political careers in Canada might be altered. In Australia for example, the power held by the Labour Party caucus in choosing their cabinet ministers has produced some significant results. Unlike other Australian political parties the Labour Party, upon forming the government, elects from its ranks the appropriate number of Members to fill the all cabinet positions. It is then the responsibility (prerogative) of the prime minister to assign the elected members to a portfolio. While the party caucus must consider regional ethnic and ideological factors in their selection process, with few exceptions potential ministers are expected to have served a healthy apprenticeship in the backbenches. In this fashion there exists an informal seniority system for cabinet ministers.[54] As a result Labour cabinet ministers have a longer than average political career since they must wait longer to get into cabinet.[55] Whether a similar situation would result if Canadian political parties were to follow suit is not known. While it would undoubtedly alter the centralization of power that presently exists within the offices of the prime minister and opposition party leaders, it may also create an informal

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[54] Joan Rydon, A Federal Legislature, chapter 4. Also interview with Helen Gloris Nelson, Professor University of Sydney, at McMaster University, Hamilton, November 23, 1989.

[55] It is interesting to note that this has caused a paucity of political apprenticeship at the state level among Labour Members. State Legislators with experience are reluctant to leave an established sub-national career to "start all over again" at the national level. See Doreen Barrie, "Political Recruitment in Federal States: Career Paths in Canada and Australia," Unpublished PhD. Thesis, University of Calgary, 1988. Chapter Four.

system that encourages longer political careers.

In summary, political parties are dominant features of the Canadian opportunity structure. Yet measuring the effect of the party system on political careers is not an easy task. Strategic politicians must work through the party throughout their political careers. First, they are nominated through the party apparatus. A political career rarely begins, and seldom lasts long, without an attachment to a party.

Second, MPs' electoral fortunes are tied to their party and their party leader. Liberal MPs have had longer political careers than non-Liberals. Strategic politicians seeking a long political career are more likely to find one in the Liberal party than elsewhere. Even Liberal MPs, however, are not guaranteed a long political career. The emergence of a stable third party in Canada has increased the chances of minority governments occurring.[56] This in turn has decreased the potential life span of half of the Parliaments since 1957. Members of parliament in Canada are fighting elections more often than ever before. Members now must be more successful at the polls and spend more time thinking and planning for re-

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[56] Hugh Thorburn argues that the Canadian party system works better than most party systems in "providing governmental majorities in parliament". [Hugh Thorburn, ed. Party Politics in Canada, 5th ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1985) p.31] Canada's 'two and half' or three party system in comparison to nations with a multi-party system does have fewer changes in government. All that is being suggested here is that Canada has the necessary political conditions, namely a third party, for minority governments to occur.

election if they wish to sustain a longer political career. It may also be keeping provincial politicians out of the federal arena as majority governments are far more common at the sub-national level.

Third, advancement in the House of Commons goes through the party hierarchy. Positions of leadership are not decided by the caucus but by the party leader. The positions do not hold the power or prestige of cabinet, however they can act as a training ground for future members of the cabinet. There is no evidence to date that demonstrates the effect of these positions on career length. There is reason to believe, however, that if these posts held more power they might become more attractive to House members, they might be more sought after. If they were awarded on a more democratic basis, perhaps along the same lines as the Australian Labour Party chooses its cabinet members, it might serve to lengthen political careers.

In the United States, a federal legislator has an arms length relationship with his or her party. Once elected, the length of a congressperson's career is not inexorably bound with his or her political affiliation. This is not the case in Canada. Canadian MPs cannot use their positions within the House to increase their chances for re-election back home. The dominance of party means that MPs with personal support bases are rare. In this sense at least, political parties are a fundamental part of the opportunity structure of Canadian federal office.

NO APPRENTICESHIP IN THE PROVINCES? THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERALISM

Although studies of Canadian political careers are few, there is one characteristic of this career upon which most analysts agree. Few political careers in Canada follow the typical career path of American legislators set forth by Joseph Schlesinger. Figure 3.A delineates the prior political experience of MPs from 1867 to 1984. Close to sixty per cent of MPs come to Ottawa without prior service at either the municipal or provincial level. Over one quarter of all MPs have first served at the municipal level. Only 13.1 per cent of MPs have served in a provincial legislature before moving to Parliament Hill.

There is therefore a paucity of MP's who have moved from municipal to provincial to federal service. The lack of apprenticeship at the provincial level is of concern for two reasons. First, it should be noted that the benefit for the House of Commons of members who have apprenticed at the provincial level is not necessarily a longer career in Ottawa. MPs who have served in the provinces do not have longer national careers that other MPs. The average length of a political career for someone with provincial experience is not significantly different than the length of a federal career that comes without prior provincial experience. Yet the importance of provincial experience at the federal level does not lie in career length. Service at the provincial level closely

PRIOR POLITICAL EXPERIENCE OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT
1867 – 1984



DIAGRAM 3.1

LEGEND

NO PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE	=	1,930
MUNICIPAL EXPERIENCE	=	893
PROVINCIAL EXPERIENCE	=	293
MUNICIPAL AND PROVINCIAL EXPERIENCE	=	135

SOURCE: Roger Gibbins and Doreen Barrie "Parliamentary Careers in the Canadian Federal State". This diagram includes only prior political experience of MP's in post Confederation Assemblies.

resembles the federal legislative experience (or at least much more so than municipal service does). If more MPs came to Ottawa with provincial legislative experience, the House of Commons would have a larger contingent of politically knowledgeable newcomers; individuals that may not require three or four years to become familiar with the informal rules and functions of the job. In this manner, there could be an overall increase in legislative experience without an increase in the length of federal careers.

Second, the opportunity of getting into cabinet appears to be more open to those with provincial experience than it is for those without it. When provincial legislators successfully make the move to the federal arena, their experience at the provincial level does seem to provide an advantage in obtaining a cabinet seat. Seventeen per cent of MP s who apprenticed in the provinces have served in the federal cabinet. This compares to 12.2 per cent of all MP's having spent some time in cabinet, and 11.3 per cent of MP's with no provincial experience. Following a career path that includes provincial service therefore, increases - though not drastically - ones opportunity to become a federal cabinet minister. Why then do so few members of parliament begin, or at least spend a part of, their political career at the provincial level?

This section suggests that the principal reason for this lack of provincial experience among federal members lies in the opportunity structure of federal office. Despite the advantage

(albeit limited) of provincial experience for those seeking seats at the federal cabinet table, Parliament, as an institution or set of opportunities, may not be the ultimate objective for politicians with progressive ambition. For provincial MLA's progressive ambition may be better satisfied at the provincial level.[57] Given the opportunity costs of leaving the province to run federally, a provincial career may satisfy the career ambitions of most sub-national office holders. These opportunity costs are rooted in the difference between federal and provincial political parties, the size of the assemblies, and the similarities of structure between the provincial and federal legislatures. If this is the case, then most provincial members will not incur high risks for limited rewards.

PARTY STRUCTURE AND FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL CAREER CHOICE

The party structure in Canada has two separate levels, national and provincial. Provincial parties have little formal or informal ties with their national counterparts. This bifurcated party system has reduced the crossover of office holders from sub-national to national office.

Rand Dyck suggests that until 1917 the federal and provincial wings of political parties were well integrated, both formally and informally. The conscription crisis and the formation of the Unionist Government caused this integration to

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[57] Members of Provincial Legislatures will be distinguished from Members of Parliament by referring to the former as MLA's, Members of a Legislative Assembly.

collapse and marked the beginnings of a more separate provincial and federal party structure. This distinction was maintained and grew until separate formal party structures were established.[58] Today most provincial and federal party wings raise funds separately, have separate executives and even have separate local (riding) organizations.[59] In most cases separate riding associations are a necessity, since provincial and federal districts do not overlap. Even where they do overlap however, it is not uncommon to have separate local executives.

Figure 3.B shows that the declining incidence of politicians moving from federal to provincial office has coincided with the split between federal and provincial parties. It was during the first fifty years of confederation that the greatest number of politicians moved from provincial to federal office. Well over half, 55 per cent, of MPs with provincial service at some point in their political careers were members of a entry class prior to the 1917 general election. Further, only 13 per cent of MPs with provincial experience were elected to the House of Commons for the first time after 1957.[60]

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[58] Rand Dyck, "Relations between Federal and Provincial Political Parties", in Alain Gagnon and Brian Tanguay ed., Canadian Parties in Transition, (Scarborough: Neilson Canada, 1989) ch.8. See also Garth Stevenson, Unfulfilled Union, (Toronto: Gage Publishing ltd. 1897). ch. 9.

[59] Richard Van Loon and Michael Whittington, The Canadian Political System: Environment, Structure and Process, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987, fourth edition). ch. 10.

[60] It is interesting to note that it was more common for premiers to go to move on to a federal career in earlier periods of our history than it has been in more recent times. For an

THE DECLINING NUMBER OF MPS WITH PROVINCIAL EXPERIENCE
THREE GROUPS OF ENTRY CLASSES: 1867–1984



If the separation of party structures is part of the cause for a lack of training at the provincial level, there is little evidence to suggest that this trend will turn around. Dyck suggests that the formal separation of party wings is an increasing trend since "the advent of election expense legislation at both levels of government".[61] Spending laws have made provincial parties less financially dependent upon their federal counterpart and therefore they have less need for more formal integration. Past attempts by the federal wing of political parties to gain control of the provincial wing have usually ended up weakening the linkages even further. Van Loon and Whittington suggest that this feature of Canadian political parties may be "appropriate in a federal system where intergovernmental bargaining is a critical dimension of policy making" and indeed political life.[62] Party may be a dominating factor in organizing Canadian political life but only within levels and not between them.

Given these conditions it is possible that many provincial MLA's feel little kinship to their federal party and federal leader. This may be especially true in provincial political

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examination of the number of provincial premiers who have spent time in the House of Commons see David Bell, "Provincial Premiers in the Federal Cabinet", The Archivist, Ottawa; The National Archives of Canada, (September- October 1989). pp.5-7.

[61] Dyck, "Relations Between Federal and Provincial Political Parties", pp.213-215.

[62] Van Loon and Whittington. The Canadian Political System. p.324.

parties where the leader dominates the party and "fashions it in his/her own image", such as the Alberta Conservative Party under Peter Lougheed.[63] In cases such as this it is conceivable that MLAs' may feel personally or at least electorally bound to their leader.

This loyalty to party leader at the provincial level may also be related to long periods of one party dominance at the federal level and part of a provincial politician's rational calculations about the best place for advancement. Opportunities for career advancement may be better in the provincial capital if the party an individual represents is not the governing party in Ottawa. For example, provincial Conservative Members in Alberta or Ontario had little to gain in terms of advancement by moving to Ottawa during the Trudeau era. The best opportunity for success lay in the provincial capital. The risk of running federally to get on the government or opposition backbenches may not be worth leaving a provincial seat.[64]

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[63] Doreen Barrie, "Political Recruitment in Federal States: Career Paths in Canada and Australia," Unpublished PhD. Thesis. University of Calgary, pp.118-120.

[64] In Ontario in 1984 four prominent Liberals, Don Boudria Sheila Copps, Eric Cunningham and Albert Roy did vacate their provincial seats to run federally. However, they did so after a change in federal leadership and while changes in the party establishment were also underway. As well, the fortunes of the provincial Liberals looked bleak and the opportunity for advancement by remaining at Queen's Park seemed remote.

THE STRUCTURE OF PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES

As was suggested in the previous chapter, in the United States the opportunity structure of individual state Assemblies seems to influence a state representatives pursuit, or lack thereof, of a national political career. Squire, Copeland and others take as given that all things being equal most state legislators want a national career and if they do not pursue one it is a function of the state opportunity structure constraining personal desire.[65] It was argued by Squire that some legislatures act as springboards, propelling state representatives to Washington. Other legislatures provide enough services, benefits and possibilities for advancement that representatives maintain careers at the state level. A third type of assembly provides neither form of career path and as a result suffers from high turnover and unstable membership. The data on Canada suggest that there is at least some support for Squire's hypothesis. No provincial legislature acts as a 'springboard' to federal office. However, provincial bodies which offer relatively high salaries and at least some opportunity for internal advancement tend to send less of their members to Ottawa than smaller, less professional provincial

[65] See Copeland "Choosing to Run: Why House Members Seek Election to the Senate", and Robeck, "State Legislator Candidacies for the United States House", for examinations of the progressive ambition often assumed to be inherent in U. S. politicians.

assemblies.[66]

In terms of physical size, March suggests that provincial experience in federal politics is almost proportional to the number of seats in provincial assemblies. With the exception of Manitoba, the fewer the number of seats a legislature has the higher the percentage of provincial members it is likely to send to Ottawa.[67] A further deterrent to provincial members seeking federal seats is the comparative size of ridings. In most provinces, the federal riding encompasses more than one and often several provincial seats. An MLA seeking federal office must therefore seek support beyond his or her personal base. A secure provincial seat does not automatically translate into a secure federal seat.

Beyond just the number of seats, is there further evidence to support Squire's contention as applied to the Canadian experience? Larger, full-time legislatures where sub-national legislators are paid higher salaries and are given more resources should be better able to hold their members than smaller legislatures where sessions are shorter and services to members are not as great.

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[66] Because so few provincial office holders move to the federal level, particularly since 1957, it is not possible to draw any substantive conclusions from the data. All that can safely be said is that Squire's hypothesis - adapted to the Canadian experience - holds some validity.

[67] Roman March, The Myth of Parliament, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1974) p.37. Manitoba had the fourth largest legislature but was ranked fifth in the Number of MLA's that moved on to federal politics.

The services and structure of legislatures outside the Atlantic provinces are such that a member can both make a living and hope to advance within their provincial legislature. In terms of salary, while the federal House offers the highest paying elected positions, only 27 per cent of all MPs held leadership positions which entitled them to earn more than the base salary for provincial backbenchers. By contrast, Ontario and Quebec both offer over half of their MLAs additional indemnities. All four Western provinces provide at least one third of their MLAs with additional income beyond the base salary for private members. All four Atlantic provinces provide additional indemnities to more than one quarter of their members, but neither the base salary for Atlantic Canadian legislators nor the additional salary for leadership positions are as generous as that provided by Western and Central Canadian provinces.[68]

In Canada therefore, provincial members from Ontario and Quebec should be less likely than Atlantic office holders to want to move to the federal level. In terms of career opportunities Western Legislatures should be able to hold their own members more so than the Atlantic provinces but less so than Ontario and Quebec.

In fact, this turns out to be exactly what has happened.

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[68] Robert Fleming, Canadian Legislatures, 1988/1987, p.100. Nova Scotia is in the unique position of paying every member of the Assembly more than the basic indemnity. As a result, their numbers are not a true indication of additional salaries earned in leadership positions.

As Barrie found in her examination of career paths,

> MPs from the Atlantic region are 3 times more likely to have had provincial experience than those from Ontario and Quebec. The proportion of Western MPs with provincial experience, though twice as high as Ontario or Quebec's is almost half the proportion of Atlantic MP's.[69]

Ian Stewart suggests that in Prince Edward Island at least, anyone serious about a full time political career should look to Ottawa. PEI sends a higher percentage of provincial members to Ottawa than any other province.[70] For these provincial office holders, "election to the national Parliament is, understandably, still considered to be a significant advancement and the proportion of Island MP's with provincial experience remains relatively high".[71] The same is true for other Atlantic provinces where the session are shorter than federal or other provincial sessions.

Much of this can simply be explained by the opportunity structure of the legislatures. First, for Atlantic politicians, anyone seeking a full-time career must either hope to get into the cabinet provincially or run federally. In Prince Edward Island for example, only cabinet ministers are full-time politicians. In non-Atlantic provinces the choice is somewhat greater as the provincial legislature offers the opportunity for

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[69] Barrie, "Political Recruitment and Career Paths", p.133.

[70] Ian Stewart, "A Damn Queer Parliament", in Gary Levy and Graham White, ed. Provincial and Territorial Legislatures in Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989) pp.13-28.

[71] Stewart, "A Damn Queer Parliament", p.19.

a full-time career. As well, given that most provincial politicians in Atlantic Canada hold down some form of outside occupation, the risks in running for federal office are not as great. If their attempt at federal office is unsuccessful, they will not be without some form of employment, albeit part-time.

The structure of office acts as a filter in Atlantic Canada. Only members who want to pursue political life full-time will run for federal office. In other provinces, there is no real reward for apprenticing first at the provincial level. If individuals wish to move beyond local politics it frequently will entail moving to another city (either the national or provincial capital) and giving up their non-political career. Atlantic politicians are afforded the opportunity to 'break into' legislative life more slowly. With this type of opportunity absent a politician in central or western Canada may decide to just run federally and bypass the province altogether.

Finally, given the differences between parties and the greater popularity of non-traditional parties in the West (the NDP and Social Credit) there may be less reason for some MLAs to move to the federal level. New Democratic MLAs in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and British Columbia for example, all have greater opportunities to serve in a provincial Cabinet than they do of sitting on the government side of the House in Ottawa. As such, the provincial legislature provides more of a career structure - by way of opportunities for internal advancement - than the federal House.

In sum, the level of legislative experience in parliament could be increased if more politicians treated provincial office as a stepping stone to a seat in the House of Commons. Members of parliament who began their legislative careers at the provincial level are also more likely than other MPs to sit in the executive. Despite this however, few members of parliament go through provincial assemblies on their way to Ottawa.

Part of the reason for this stems from the Canadian federal system itself. As political parties started to develop separate federal and provincial bodies, the number of politicians with experience at both levels of government began to decrease. As provincial governments began to play roles in federal politics, successful politicians in provincial cabinets could likewise become active on the national stage without leaving their provincial seats. For some rational actors, Conservatives in Ontario and Alberta in the 1970's for example, the chances for re-election and promotion remained better at the provincial level than at the federal level. The risk of giving up ones seat in the province for an unsure seat in Ottawa simply was not worth it. Likewise, for members of the New Democratic Party - a party with strong provincial and national links - there has always been a greater chance of advancement within provincial legislatures than there has at the national level.

The structure of legislatures has also played a role in keeping federal and provincial careers separate. Larger, full-time assemblies such as Ontario and Quebec hold onto their

members better than the smaller legislatures of Eastern Canada. If Eastern politicians want a full-time career, they really have no option but to seek federal office. Thus any movement from the provinces to Ottawa comes from Atlantic Canada. Where career possibilities exist in the rest of the country, most provincial politicians seem content to minimize the risk of losing office and therefore remain at the provincial level.

CONCLUSION

Proponents of a rational choice analysis of political careers suggest that opportunities help to structure the choices politicians make about serving in elected office. Traditional analysis in the United States has set forth an opportunity structure than resembles a train moving from local to state to national office. Depending upon the opportunities for advancement at the sub-national level, strategic politicians may decide to get off the train at the state capital only briefly or remain there for the rest of their political career. If they choose to move on, the timing of their move will depend upon a number of factors, whether or not there is a vacancy in Washington or the likelihood that their train to Washington will be derailed on election day. Similar considerations are weighed by U.S. Representatives deciding upon a Senate or Gubinatorial career.

The opportunity structure of Canadian political careers is far different than the United States. In fact given the

opportunity structure in Canada, it is small wonder that the Canadian House of Commons is composed of relatively inexperienced politicians.

Positions of real leadership and policy making opportunities in the House are limited to the cabinet. Access to the cabinet table is controlled by the prime minister. The size of the cabinet and the political considerations that go into the selection of who becomes a cabinet minister decreases the opportunity for many members of parliament to achieve cabinet status. Those who do make it into cabinet tend to have longer political careers than private members.

Parliamentary positions outside of cabinet are also controlled by the party hierarchy and merit and hard work are sometimes overlooked in favour of political considerations when filling these positions. It is not yet known whether individuals serving in these non-cabinet leadership positions have longer careers than strictly backbench members of parliament. It was found however, that politicians seeking a longer political career stand a better chance of doing so if they join the Liberal party. However, being a member of the Liberal caucus is not enough in and of itself to guarantee a long political career. A high turnover rate and an absence of a personal vote has meant that many members do not control the length of their political career. Since 1957 this has been exacerbated by an increasing number of minority governments. Individuals are now faced with more election more often.

Building up political experience is becoming harder to achieve with the propensity of minority governments.

If any Canadian career train exists, it tends to run directly from municipal office to Ottawa. Since 1957, trains going through the provincial capital have been all but non-existent. With few exceptions, politicians in Canada choose between a provincial and a federal career. It was suggested in chapter one that parliament would benefit from having more experienced politicians. If more parliamentarians had experience in provincial legislatures, this lack of federal experience might not seem so pronounced. As it is, most members arrive in Ottawa naive to legislative rules and norms. Those members that do have provincial experience tend to come from the Atlantic provinces where provincial legislatures are smaller and least reflect the national parliament.

The structure of opportunities in Canada is therefore is discouraging of long political careers. Strategic actors weighing the merits of seeking a political career in Ottawa may be inclined to look elsewhere. For those who do go to Ottawa, much of the opportunity structure - in particular advancement and survival - is often beyond a member's control. Rational politicians evaluating their careers may look upon these future prospects in an unfavourable light.

These findings suggest an unflattering view of political life in Ottawa. If politicians are solely rational actors, they

should be easily turned off of this unstable lifestyle that offers only limited opportunities for advancement and re-election. Are members of parliament first and foremost rational actors who construe elected office as an efficient means to a preconceived career end, i.e. cabinet? If so, once elected and familiar with life in Ottawa do these members re-evaluate their political careers and based on this opportunity structure decide to leave political life? The following chapter will examine the exit patterns of federal office holders to see if this discouraging opportunity structure influences the decisions rational actors make about staying or leaving public office.

CHAPTER FOUR

LEAVING OFFICE: JUST HOW DISCOURAGING IS THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE?

The previous chapter argued that the opportunity structure of Canadian federal office is discouraging of long political careers. Only a fortunate few make it to the executive and enjoy longer political careers. Many talented, hard working, and in some cases experienced MPs get passed over for cabinet service. The strength of the party system in Canada also acts as a constraint on the strategic office seeker as he or she is beholden to the party for electoral assistance and internal advancement. Finally, the confederal form of political parties and the opportunity structure of provincial legislatures has encouraged potential lawmakers to limit their career aspirations to one level of government.

Yet if the constraints on the opportunity structure of political office are as great as the analysis in the previous chapter has suggested then there should be a contingent of incumbent MPs who have calculated their probabilities of advancement and have decided to leave federal office.[1] If the

[1] If the structure of opportunities is this discouraging then there should also exist a number of potential office seekers who have evaluated the constraints facing them and decided not to seek office at all. An analysis of these individuals is well beyond the scope of this thesis. Unfortunately no such work of this nature

rational choice model of political ambition is a valid framework for explaining and understanding Canadian political careers then this cadre of dissatisfied MPs should be both sizable and composed of members who have been shut out of senior leadership positions in parliament. This chapter will examine those individuals who have left the House of Commons since 1965. Based on the substantive size of this 'dissatisfied' group of exiting members, it will be argued that the opportunity structure model is a beneficial, but not an all encompassing, tool for explaining the nature of political careerism in Canada. Specifically, the application of the American rational choice framework when adapted to the Canadian context explains much, but by no means all, of the career patterns in parliament.

The first section of this chapter will examine those MPs who have left office both by electoral defeat and of their own volition. Based on a comparison of Canadian and U.S. exits, it will be suggested that voluntary exits in Canada have made a substantial contribution to our high turnover rate. It will also be shown that those who voluntarily terminate their political careers end a far different career than those who have been defeated.

In the second section of this chapter the implications of

the rational choice model as applied to the Canadian experience has been undertaken in Canada. U.S. studies in this field include, Linda Fowler and Robert McClure, Political Ambition: Who Decides to Run for Congress, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), and Linda Fowler, "The Electoral Lottery: Who Decides to Run For Congress," Public Choice, 34, (December 1979) pp.399 -418.

will be tested and evaluated. Precisely, it will be shown that the opportunity structure does not discourage rational politicians from pursuing long political careers. Among those who leave political office on their own terms are a number of members who have had lengthy political careers despite an inability to advance to significant leadership positions. While a considerable number of politicians leave after a short career where they were unable to achieve a cabinet or party leadership position, the size of this group does not pose a threat to the stability and continuity of the House. This chapter will conclude by suggesting that a fuller explanation of Canadian political careerism must move beyond the rational choice argument.

THE DATA

As discussed in the introductory chapter, basic information was gathered for 713 former parliamentarians who were in office between the years of 1965 and 1989. Of this group, 305 MPs left political life voluntarily, 387 were defeated in a general election, and 21 died while still MPs. Out of this total, a random sample of 207 members was drawn. Of this sample group, 99 MPs voluntarily left office, 100 were defeated, and 8 members died while serving. Information was collected for this sample group from Canadian Parliamentary Guides, Canadian General Election Results, and The Journals of Parliament. The analysis in this chapter will concentrate primarily upon the sample group and in particular on the 99 voluntary retirees.

VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY EXITS

Franks has suggested that the number of voluntary exits ranks a close second to defeats as a cause of turnover and that these exits contribute significantly to maintaining a Commons full of inexperienced Members. He also argues that the percentage of MPs who leave Canadian House voluntarily is "often higher than turnover from all causes, including defeat... of congressmen and senators in the United States."[2]

This section will demonstrate that compared to the United States, voluntary resignations in Canada remain a secondary reason for the high turnover and that unlike the United States, the rate of voluntary exits in Canada is not increasing. In addition, a closer comparison between MPs who are defeated and those who resign will show that retirees tend to be parliamentary veterans. This last finding suggests that for most MPs, the opportunity structure of political office does not discourage them from pursuing a political career.

Table 4.1 below compares the incidence of retirement and electoral defeat of Canadian and U.S. federal legislators for the period between 1967 -1979. Almost two thirds of turnover in the United States is caused by voluntary vacancy, compared to Canada, where just under half of exits from office come as a result of voluntary retirement. During this time the turnover rate for the United States House of Representatives was

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[2] C.E.S. Franks, The Parliament of Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), p.78-79.

15.6 per cent, compared to 34.7 per cent for the Canadian House of Commons.

TABLE 4.1

CAUSES OF TURNOVER IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES: 1967-1979

CANADIAN MP S				UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVES			
VOLUNTARY VACANCY		ELECTORAL DEFEAT		VOLUNTARY VACANCY		ELECTORAL DEFEAT	
#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
178	47.7	195	52.3	259	63.5	149	36.5

U.S. source: James Cooper and William West, "Voluntary Retirement, Incumbency and the Modern House," Political Science Quarterly, 96,2,(Summer 1982). pp. 279-300. Percentages are given for the individual countries and not collectively. Deaths in office were not included in either total.

If overall turnover levels are controlled for, as in Table 4.2 below, the influence of voluntary vacancy becomes greater in Canada than in the United States.

TABLE 4.2

IMPACT OF VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 1967-1979

	CANADA	UNITED STATES
NUMBER OF VOLUNTARY EXITS	178	259
NUMBER OF ELECTIONS 1967-79	4	6
TOTAL NUMBER OF SEATS AVAILABLE	1074	2610
PERCENTAGE OF SEATS VACATED VOLUNTARILY	16.5%	9.9%

At first blush, it would appear that the Canadian

opportunity structure does encourage rational actors to abandon their political career. The data show that Franks is correct in his comparative survey of exit patterns between the two countries. The tables show that voluntary exits play a greater role in overall turnover in Canada than they do in the United States. Yet this initial analysis overestimates the impact of voluntary departures in Canada by suggesting that all voluntarily exiting members could win re-election if they choose to run for one more term. Such an assumption can easily lead to an overestimation of the role that voluntary exists plays in threatening stability in the House of Commons.

In the United States the election rate for incumbents is well over ninety percent. This is not the case in Canada.[3] Even if all incumbent MPs were to stay and contest the next election and no members voluntarily stepped down, overall turnover would not be reduced by 16.5 per cent (the amount of overall turnover caused by voluntary exits. see Table 4.2). In fact based on the respective re-election rates in Canada and the United States if, during the period between 1967 and 1979 every voluntary retiree in both countries were to have stayed and fought in the next election, the United States would have lost

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[3] For examination of the advantages of incumbency in the U.S. re-election rates see Gary Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections, 2nd. ed., (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983). See also Sandy Maisel, "Electoral Competition and the Incumbency Advantage in the U.S. House of Representatives," Paper prepared for the Conference On Campaign Finance Reform and Representative Democracy, Washington, (February, 1989).

less than 7% of its 'retiring class' to electoral defeat. By contrast, all things being equal, over one quarter of the Canadian class would have fallen at the polls. Hence, a substantial proportion of the retiring Canadian class would be lost whether they made the decision to leave voluntarily or not.

Further, while turnover in the United States is increasingly being caused by voluntary departures, the number of Canadians choosing to leave office has remained relatively stable over time. Table 4.3 below compares the number of members leaving Ottawa voluntarily to the number being defeated for each of the past seven elections.

TABLE 4.3
DE-RECRUITMENT FROM THE CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS: 1965-1988

GENERAL ELECTION	HOUSE SIZE	VOLUNTARY VACANCY	DEFEATED IN ELECTION	TOTAL*	PERCENT WHO LEFT BY CHOICE
1968	264	52	53	105	49.5%
1972	264	49	58	107	45.7%
1974	264	17	39	56	30.3%
1979	282	60	45	105	57.1%
1980	284	12	42	54	22.2%
1984	284	56	88	144	38.8%
1988	295	59	62	121	48.7%
TOTAL		305	387	692	44.1%

* Not included in this table are the 21 former members who died in office.[4]

[4] Voluntary vacancies include all incumbents who chose not to run in the election indicated. This includes those who left office without completing their term. For example, in 1968 under Voluntary Vacancies, 52 members who were elected in the 1965

There appears to be a trend, albeit slight, towards a decreasing proportion of parliamentary retirees. More noticeably however, any variation in the incidence of voluntary exits seems to be related to the length of parliament. The longer the parliament, the higher the level of voluntary vacancies. Only once since 1968 has the number of retirements surpassed the number of defeats. This abberation occurred in 1979 after a Parliament that lasted five years. By contrast, between 1967 and 1979 in the United States only once has the number of electoral defeats surpassed the number of retirements. That abberation occurred in the first post-Watergate off-year election of 1974.[5] While Canada loses more members to voluntary exit than the United States, voluntary exit in Canada is second to defeat in causes of turnover. These findings do not suggest that Franks is wrong in his assessment that voluntary termination of political careers in Canada is higher than overall turnover in the United States. However, it does help to place Franks concern in proper perspective. The voluntary retirement rate in Canada remains relatively stable. In the United States, voluntary retirement rate is increasing with time, and far outstrips electoral defeat as the prime cause of congressional turnover.

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general election either retired between 1965 and 1968 or decided not to contest the 1968 general election.

[5] Cooper and West, "Voluntary Vacancy" p.281. Figures beyond 1979 are not available, although the number of retirements continues to dominate exit patterns in the United States. See for example, Robert Kuttner, "Getting There", The New Republic, (15 February 1988) pp.22-23.

As was suggested in chapter two, the changing opportunity structure of congress has been largely responsible for the increasing number of retirees. This changing opportunity structure has also been responsible for increasing the number of congressmen who leave having served less than ten years. Prior to the mid 1970s congressional leadership positions were allocated, with few exceptions, on a seniority basis. As Bullock states, the "development of the seniority system as a technique for choosing committee chairmen and frequently subcommittee chairmen" acted as a guarantee that those who enjoyed longer careers would also enjoy more power.[6] The opening up of these positions - they are now elected by the majority party caucus - has served to devalue the reward for apprenticeship. Among other fallouts, the elimination of seniority as the guiding principle for promotion has increased the competition for power among Members of the same party. Hibbing has suggested that this has resulted in a "lack of co-operation and collegiality among majority party members" and has turned both young and experienced members away from continuing their career in the House. Previous to these changes, most House retiree's were senior congressional representatives who were close to, if not over, the regular retirement age of sixty

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[6] Charles Bullock, "House Careerists: Changing Patterns of Longevity and Attrition," American Political Science Review, 66, (1972) pp.1295-1200.

five.[7]

In Canada, by contrast, the internal opportunity structure of parliament has remained relatively stable since 1965. While the parliamentary reforms of the past thirty years have outstripped all previous reforms, they have not radically altered the opportunity structure for political promotion. As Pauline Jewitt argued, far from giving MPs more opportunity for advancement, the reforms of the early 1960's simply gave MPs more work while making the House more efficient for the executive.[8] In a similar fashion the subsequent Trudeau reforms of 1968 "were designed essentially to expedite the proceedings in the House."[9] Of all the post 1960 reforms, only the most recent those recommended by the McGrath Committee in 1985, have

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[7] John Hibbing, "Voluntary Retirement from the U.S. House: The Costs of Congressional Service," Legislative Studies Quarterly, VII, 1, (February 1982). pp.57-74. Hibbing and others also cite the amount of time incumbents spend fundraising, time spent away from family and foregone income as factors which have contributed to increasing dissatisfaction with a House career. See for example, Fred Barnes, "The Unbearable Lightness of Being a Congressmen," The New Republic, (15 February 1988) pp.18-22.

[8] Pauline Jewitt, "The Reform of Parliament" Journal of Canadian Studies, 1, 3, (November 1966) pp.11-15.

[9] Robert Jackson and Michael Atkinson, The Canadian Legislative System, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Gage Publications, 1980). p.134. It should be noted that, despite the original executive centred purposes of the 1968 Trudeau reforms, the internal opportunity structure did open up somewhat. As Atkinson and Nossal point out, between 1968 and 1979 "standing committees of the Canadian House have acquired some independence in leadership selection," and that this independence "complemented a growing democratization within the Liberal caucus." See Michael M. Atkinson and Kim Richard Nossal, "Executive Power and Committee Autonomy in the Canadian House of Commons: Leadership Selection, 1968-1979," Canadian Journal of Political Science XIII:2 (June 1980). pp. 287 - 308. (quotes from p. 306.).

begun to place more decision making authority in the hands of individual members.[10] Even these latest reforms however, do not radically restructure the opportunity structure or significantly lessen the strength of political parties in controlling the advancement prospects of individual MPs.

While members of the U.S. House of Representatives have watched the rewards for long service slip away, Canadian office holders have been faced with an intransigent internal structure of opportunities where long service has never been the primary prerequisite for advancement to senior positions. Reform of the House of Commons has been executive-centred and has not decentralized authority to individual members. In fact the only rewards for service that have increased have been the financial rewards - salary and pension - associated with the office of MP. It is not surprising therefore that the incidence of voluntary retirements is neither greater nor less today than it was in 1968.[11]

It is apparent from Table 4.3 that few MPs leave parliament voluntarily at the end of minority governments. The number of

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[10] It is too early to see if or how the changes of the McGrath Report will alter the attitude and legislative behaviour of Members of Parliament.

[11] While it is true that these increased financial rewards may act an incentive for members to stay in the House longer in hopes of eventually making cabinet, it is also true that the increased salaries and services for members are a reflection of the growing demands of the job. While increased staff allocations help to make the duties of an MP less onerous, it, and the increased pay for members, are also a recognition that an MPs job is full-time. Members of today cannot easily move back into the job they left to come to Ottawa.

departures by choice at the end of the 1972 Trudeau and 1979 Clark governments is at least half the size of retirement contingents of other Parliaments.[12] There may be three factors which influenced the decisions of politicians to stay and fight another election after a minority government. First, both Parliaments were short lived and new members had yet to fully appreciate the opportunity structure or experience the day to day lifestyle of a federal politician. New members who may have been thinking of leaving office may have decided to give the House "one more chance." Likewise, veteran members thinking of making this their last parliament may have felt cheated out of a full session. This may be particularly true with the Clark government of 1979 whose early fall came unexpectedly and surprised even veteran politicians.[13] Because of the sudden fall of the government, those members thinking of making this their last parliament had insufficient time to plan their post-parliamentary career.

A second possible reason for few retirements during a minority government is that job satisfaction is greater during minority governments. Certainly the role of committees and the ability of opposition members to push through amendments to

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[12] The retirement class of 1968 is large in comparison to 1972 and 1979. However, the 27th Parliament (1965-68) is somewhat unusual in that both major parties chose new leaders to fight the 1968 general election. The stepping down of both John Diefenbaker and Lester Pearson ushered in major personnel changes in both parties.

[13] Jeffery Simpson, Discipline of Power, (Toronto: Personal Library Publishers, 1980) Chapter One.

government legislation are greater during minority governments. The feeling that "members matter" during minority parliaments may encourage individual members to look less harshly at the opportunity structure of office.[14]

Finally, the dissolution of a minority government in which the two major parties held a near even number of seats, provides a potential opportunity for advancement for most members of the House, providing they survive the election. Individual members - at least Liberal and Conservative MPs - may see realistic opportunities of their party winning the election after a minority Parliament dissolves. Forming the government, after all, is the first obstacle that must be overcome in the MP's quest for a cabinet position.

While there is no empirical evidence to support these hypotheses, the structure of opportunities in minority situations is more inviting for strategic actors because individual members play a larger role within Parliament where the outcome of votes, particularly in committees, are not pre-

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[14] During the House of Commons debate on the McGrath Report, some private members suggested that their role is particularly small during majority governments. Not all these members explicitly suggested that minority governments provided a more open opportunity structure but they did suggest that private members had a more meaningful legislative role during minority governments. (See Canada. House of Commons, Debates. February 11 - 13, 1986, pp. 10659-10804.) However, others have argued that governments in minority situations treat the House of Commons, and by extension the House members, no differently than governments that have majorities. (See Linda Geller-Schwartz, "Minority Government Reconsidered" Journal of Canadian Studies, 14,2, (Summer 1979). pp.67-79.

determined. As well, members of the two major parties have realistic expectations for future advancement if they successfully defend their seats.

CHOOSING TO LEAVE VERSUS ELECTORAL DEFEAT

Information collected on the random sample of former House members uncovered some significant differences between voluntary departees and those who were defeated in general elections. Some of these differences are directly related to the opportunity structure of political office. For example, as Table 4.4 illustrates, people who leave parliament voluntarily have far longer political careers than members who are defeated. These members who do choose to leave politics on their own terms choose a political career that averages close to twelve years, just three years short of a full pension. Over one third of these voluntarily exiting members (34) choose to end their political career after they are eligible for full pension. By comparison, the average career length for those defeated at general elections is six and a half years. If the number of terms served is employed as a measure of career longevity instead of years in order to control for short parliaments the difference is even more apparent. Of those defeated, 72 per cent have exited Parliament after serving fewer than three terms. This compares with the 75 per cent of retiring members who served at least three terms before deciding to leave office.

TABLE 4.4

PARLIAMENTARY EXPERIENCE OF EXITING MEMBERS

	VOLUNTARY EXITS		ELECTORAL DEFEATS	
	MEAN	MEDIAN	MEAN	MEDIAN
YEARS SERVED*	11.5	11.0	6.4	5.0
TERMS SERVED*	4.1	4.0	2.2	1.0
NUMBER OF CABINET MINISTERS AND PARTY LEADERS	34		15	
CAREER LENGTH OF** CABINET MINISTERS	13.6	15.0	9.5	11.0

* difference of means is significant at the .01 level. N = 200
** difference of means is significant at the .05 level. N = 49

It appears therefore, that unlike Franks and other conventional analysts suggest, most MPs do not arrive on Parliament Hill, stay for a short time, decide they don't like it, and leave. The conventional wisdom that the job of MP is not appealing and the assumptions of the rational choice model that the risks of staying in office and fighting for re-election outweigh the rewards of office, do not hold to the information above. There is evidence to suggest that voluntary retirement is not the real impediment to a parliament composed of experienced members. Those who choose to leave tend to be parliamentary veterans. Forty percent of retirees during this period have served for at least twelve years. The fact that members who choose to leave Parliament tend to do so after spending a minimum of ten years in Ottawa indicates that the

opportunity structure does not discourage rational thinkers to quite the degree expected. It may be that Franks has overestimated the number of MPs who reach Ottawa "only to discover they dislike the job" and leave.[15]

This pattern of exits is not dissimilar to the exit patterns found in the United States. Among veteran congresspersons, voluntary exit is the most common method of exiting political life. For example, just over 80 per cent of congress members who have served for a minimum of fourteen years leave office by choice and not defeat.[16] It is true, as Cooper and West point out, that "turnover caused by defeat tends to be confined to the junior ranks; [while] in contrast, turnover caused by voluntary retirement tends to be widely dispersed across tenure ranks."[17] However, at the early stages of congressional experience (six years and under) electoral defeat outranks retirement as a cause of turnover.

It appears that electoral defeat is largely responsible for the high number of inexperienced rookies in each new Canadian parliament. Predicting how long a political career a defeated member might have served is a matter of conjecture. However, by running for re-election these defeated members have demonstrated their desire to serve at least one more term in office. These

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[15] C.E.S. Franks, The Parliament of Canada,p.76

[16] Joseph Cooper and William West, "Voluntary Retirement," p.298. Figures are based on exiting Members of Congress between 1973-1979.

[17] Ibid. p.297.

people cannot be considered discouraged by the opportunity structure of office, at least not at this point in their political career. [18]

A fundamental difference between those who are defeated and those who choose to leave office is that cabinet ministers are overwhelmingly in the latter group. Table 4.4 also suggests that few politicians who have sat in cabinet are defeated in general elections. As well, the average length of a cabinet career for those who choose to leave office is 13.6 years, less than a year and a half away from full pension eligibility. Most cabinet ministers who leave cabinet by choice do so only after a much longer career than their backbench colleagues.

EXITING BY PERSONAL CHOICE OR BY PUBLIC CHOICE? A MODEL

As distinct groups, those who leave parliament voluntarily, and those who are defeated, have different political careers. The voluntary retirement class had more political experience and included more cabinet ministers than the class that left politics because of rejection at the ballot box. Yet the analysis to date has not looked at voluntary retirement or electoral defeat at the micro level. Specifically, do different levels of political success - such as the ability to obtain a

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[18] If one half of these defeated members had been re-elected and were able to extend their careers by even one more term (three and a half years) the overall level of experience in the House would rise from 8.9 years to just under ten years. Figures are based on the random sample.

cabinet position and the level of popular support a member has at home - affect the decisions made by rational actors about leaving office? A model was created in an attempt to determine this using voluntary exit and electoral defeat as a dichotomous dependent variable.

A cabinet position rests at the pinnacle of the federal political career, therefore politicians who have made it to cabinet should have a higher degree of career satisfaction than those who do not. Once in cabinet a politician is less likely to want to leave office and therefore may only leave when the electorate decides to end their political career. Initially, therefore, one might expect to find a high proportion of cabinet Ministers among those members who are defeated in elections.

Yet while a position in cabinet produces career satisfaction, members who eventually reach cabinet may well feel that they have finally accomplished their career goal. Simply by running for office, politicians have demonstrated a degree of progressive ambition. While the constraints of office may temper that ambition, strategic actors may not be easily sidetracked from the goals they held when they originally sought election, at least in terms of a desire to be in the executive. In other words, ambitious politicians may not want to leave office until they have reached cabinet even if this requires staying in parliament longer than originally was planned. If politicians as rational egoists want to leave political life on their own terms, they should be more likely to leave political

office only after they have achieved cabinet status, despite the discouraging odds they face in trying to get there.

Other factors which influence the decision to leave politics voluntarily include the continuous responsibilities, seemingly endless travel, and the frustrations of elected office all of which eventually take their toll on politicians. As Walter Baker reflected,

> Being an MP can be worthwhile, which is why most of us came here. The job can be absorbing. which is why most of us stay. In the long run it can be exhausting, discouraging and fruitless, which is why many of us leave.[19]

The desire to form the government and/or reach cabinet reduces the effects of these hardships but eventually they are felt.

Members are more likely to leave office after they have qualified for a parliamentary pension. Therefore, the longer a member has served - and the closer he or she reaches full pension - the more likely that member will choose to leave Ottawa of their own volition.[20] As well, the closer that an MP gets to the normal retiring age of sixty five, the more likely they are to consider retiring from office. As such, age should also be a factor in the decision making process.

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[19] Ibid. p.11377. For a discussion between former members of the costs of legislative life see Keith Penner, Jack Ellis and Jim Manly, "It's an MPs' Life: Expectations and Realities," Parliamentary Government, 8,2 (1988), pp.5-8.

[20] Full pension is 75 per cent of a Members best six years salary average. At twelve years service an exiting member would receive 80 per cent of their total possible pension. The additional salary given a cabinet minister is included in the computation of their pension.

Another influence on the decision to maintain or leave a political career may be the potential risk that all politicians face of losing the next election. It is expected that the rational actor would want to plan their own political exit rather than have it made for them on election day. Fear of losing office may be a consideration in planning whether or not to seek another term. Members whose previous victory was won by a low margin may be tempted to step down and leave politics while they are on top.[21]

The fear of losing may be accentuated if redistribution has altered the boundaries of a members constituency. Between 1965 and 1968 there electoral boundaries were readjusted three times. If a member's future is at least partially dependent upon running in unfamiliar territory they may choose to avoid the 'unknown' and leave office on their own terms.[22] Hence it would be expected that members whose ridings have been effected by

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[21] A counter to this assumption is that members, even those with low previous margins of victory, will feel protected by their incumbency status. However, as Krashinsky points out, incumbency has historically been worth no more than five per cent and is often not enough to hold up to national swings. See Michael Krashinsky, "Additional Evidence on the Effect of Incumbency in Canadian Elections" Canadian Journal of Political Science, XVIII:1 (February 1985), pp.155-165.

[22] Little has been done on Members perceptions of redistribution in Canada. See however, John Courtney, "Theories Masquerading as Principles: Canadian Electoral Boundary Commissions and the Australian Model," in John Courtney, ed. The Canadian House of Commons, (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1985) pp.135-172. See also Norman Ward, "A Century of Constituencies" Canadian Public Administration, X:1 (March 1967), pp.105-122. For an interesting examination of the importance of redistribution to U.S. politicians see Richard Fenno Jr. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts, (Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1979), Chapter One.

redistribution would be more likely to choose to retire than members who were running for re-election in those years where redistribution was not a factor (or if their riding was not touched by redistribution).

The following model was employed to estimate the influence of these factors on the decisions made by politicians about sustaining or abandoning their political careers:

$$Y = a + b1(YRS) + b2(CAB) + b3(VICTOR) + b4(REDIST) \quad (1)$$

Where Y = a dichotomous variable 0 if defeated in a general election
1 if voluntary retirement

YRS = Number of years a member has served in the House

CAB = a dummy variable with value 1 if served in Cabinet
zero if otherwise

VICTOR = Margin of victory in previous election (%)

REDIST = a dummy variable with value one if constituency was altered by redistribution, zero if it was not.

The original model included a measure for the age of a politician when she or he exited office. However, an examination for multicollinearity among the variables determined that age upon exit and years served, YRS, were substantially correlated.[23] It is not surprising that some correlation exists

[23] A test for correlation between the two variables found a correlation measure of 0.64. This was not high enough to suggest serious problems with the model but given the similarities between the two measures a decision was made to eliminate one from the equation.

since there was no significant difference in ages at entry between people who retired and individuals who were defeated in elections. The number of years served and the exit age of members therefore increase at comparable rates. An initial test of the model determined that age at exit had a much lower standardized value than years served and as such years served was retained and age at exit was dropped from the model.

A discriminant analysis was employed, given the dichotomous structure of the dependent variable. As such, the values for the coefficients indicate the likelihood of an individual moving from one Y value to another. That is, the canonical coefficient indicates the probability of a change in the independent variable producing a change in dependent variable. In this case a positive coefficient for YRS would indicate the increased probability that a rational actor would chose to retire for every additional year served in the House.[24] The standardized coefficients (beta weights) indicate the relative strength of the independent variables. The results of the model are presented below.

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[24] William Klecka, Discriminant Analysis, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publishing Inc.,1980). It is important to note that a negative coefficient for YRS would not indicate the probability of a member choosing to be defeated. Rather it would indicate the choice of the individual to contest an election which they lost.

TABLE 4.5

LEAVING PARLIAMENT: COEFFICIENT VALUES FOR DEFEAT VERSUS VOLUNTARY RETIREMENTS

		(2)	(3)
YRS	Years served	.14	.73
CAB	Cabinet service (yes/no)	.54	.23
VICTOR	Margin of victory	.02	.37
REDIST	Redistribution (yes/no)	.71	.33
CANONICAL CORRELATION		23.7%	

Underlined coefficients are significant at the .01 level
Equation (2) reports unstandardized canonical coefficients
Equation (3) reports the standardized canonical coefficients

Equation (2) reports the unstandardized canonical coefficients for an estimation containing all five independent variables as specified in Equation (1). At 23.7 per cent, the canonical correlation, which is equivalent to an R-squared in multiple regression, indicates that the model explains over one fifth of an individual members' calculations about whether they will continue their political career.[25] The results of the first coefficient, YRS, indicate that, as expected, the longer a member serves, the greater the probability that they will choose to leave office of their own accord. As the number of

[25] The explanatory indicator used in discriminant analysis is the Canonical correlation. When squared, this indicator takes on the value of the R-squared in regression analysis.

years a member has served increases, so to does the desire of a member to leave office voluntarily. Next, achieving a cabinet post, as indicated by CAB, has some impact, as expected, on the decision to retire. Politicians who have received a cabinet post are more likely to step down voluntarily than backbenchers who have yet to sit at the cabinet table. It may be that members who are in the backbenches do not see their political career as being complete until they reach cabinet. As such they are less likely to retire, and therefore continue to run for re-election, until they have been called to serve in the executive.

The third variable, an MP's margin of victory in their last election, did not move in the direction expected. As the margin of victory for a member increased so too did the probability that they would choose to leave office.[26] There may be an element of pride involved in members' decisions. For example, some members may wish to retire only after they have clearly demonstrated their local popularity. However, it is more likely that the higher margin of victory for retirees is an indication of their ability to survive elections and is not a vanity driven desire to establish a reputation of invincibility. The only coefficient which was not significant at the .01 level was the fourth variable, REDIST, the dummy variable created to measure the effects of redistribution on decisions to leave office or

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[26] The margin of victory was checked against years of service for possible multicollinearity but the two indices were only mildly collinear (.30). The margin of victory was calculated as the difference between the first and second place finishers in an election as a percentage of the total vote cast in that riding.

seek re-election. It was statistically significant only at the .075 level. It was thought that members whose ridings were effected by redistribution would be more likely to step down from office. However, it appears that any empirical evidence to suggest that this is in fact the case is sketchy at best.

The standardized coefficients {Equation (3)} indicate the relative weight of each variable. The number of years a member serves is the strongest of the four indicators in the model in increasing the probability that a politician will choose to retire. Years served outweighs other considerations in determining when a politician chooses to end his or her political career. The second highest standardized coefficient was the margin of victory in the previous election. Of the three indicators that were significant at the .01 level, CAB was the weakest. Therefore while the desire to achieve a cabinet portfolio is strong amongst backbenchers and may serve to lengthen political careers, this desire is overshadowed by the number of years served by a member and by their margin of victory in the previous election sought. Members may stay in office longer than planned in the hopes of becoming a cabinet minister but after a certain length of career these individuals will leave office with their cabinet ambition unrealized.

Those who leave office by choice have had a parliamentary experience far different from those who have been defeated at election time. Members who have been defeated may not have had

the time in parliament necessary to work their way through the opportunity structure. By running for re-election these actors have indicated their desire to continue with their political careers. A comparison between those who voluntarily exit parliament with those defeated seems to suggest veteran cabinet ministers are more likely to retire by choice than by defeat.

If this is the case then it would appear that not all private members are put off by an opportunity structure that prevents very few members from achieving positions of authority. According to this scenario, members stay until they are defeated or have exhausted their possibility of reaching positions of power. But how long are backbenchers willing to stay before giving up their cabinet aspirations? Not all voluntary retirees are cabinet veterans. We know from previous analysis (Table 4.4) that of the 99 voluntary retirees in the random sample, only one third were cabinet ministers. We also know that members who run for re-election and lose are indicating their desire to sit at least one more term in office. Are backbenchers who retire by choice leaving office only after a brief career?

If the opportunity structure of office is truly discouraging of political careers then it would be expected that a high contingent of voluntary retirees would be leaving office after only a brief political career. It was argued above that length of service is longer among voluntary retirees than it is among those who have been defeated in office. Are veteran

cabinet ministers 'pushing up' this average, or is there a large contingent of long serving backbenchers in the House of Commons? The following section will concentrate solely on those members who leave parliament of their own volition to determine what differences exist within this group and if those differences say anything about the opportunity structure of office.

VOLUNTARY EXITS: 'THE SATISFIED' AND THE 'DISSATISFIED'

The model presented above served to highlight some of the factors members consider when contemplating their political future. It indicated that the probability of voluntary retirement increased with leadership experience and political longevity. However, a weakness of the model is that it segregates all office holders into two groups: voluntary retirees and defeated members. The employment of rational choice theory in the study of Canadian political careers has allowed us to establish an opportunity structure of office. This opportunity structure and conventional analysis both suggest that only those who make it to the top of the career ladder in Canada, namely the cabinet, should enjoy long, successful careers. If such suggestions are to be fully tested, they should be examined more closely using those individuals who have made a conscious choice to leave political life.

Members of parliament who have left voluntarily between 1965 and 1988 account for 43% of the total exits from the House of Commons, yet this is not a homogeneous group. These

individuals do not share identical characteristics nor do they leave office after serving similar political careers. Logic suggests that within this group of political retirees the two main types of office holders should be: those 'satisfied' MP's who have enjoyed long political careers; and a group of 'dissatisfied' MPs who have left office after serving only a brief political career. As well, it would be expected that MPs with long political careers are those that have been able to achieve positions of authority, namely cabinet ministers and party leaders. Members with short political careers should predominately be private members who have been shut out of these senior leadership positions, that is cabinet and party leader and party house leader.

This section will begin by offering a definition of a long political career. After doing so, the random sample of voluntary retirees will be examined to see who has had a long career and who has not. The results will show that, contrary to the expectations generated by rational choice theory and the opportunity structure of Canadian office, a significant number of MPs outside of positions of authority pursue long political careers and that some cabinet ministers seemingly recalculate their future in politics and decide to leave after serving only briefly. The size of these two groups suggests that the answer to understanding Canadian political careers may lie beyond an analysis of the structure of opportunities presented thus far.

The nature of elected office makes a definition of a 'full' political career a difficult, if not impossible task. Presumably someone who has spent their entire working life as an elected representative would have had a 'full' or complete political career. But must someone spend all of their working lives either in the House of Commons or the Senate to have had a full political career? Such a definition would mean that only a handful of members have been 'full' political careerists.[27] A second definition of full career is necessary.

As was pointed out earlier, members of parliament are eligible for a 'full' pension after fifteen years of service.[28] Technically, therefore, a full political career is defined as fifteen years of service. There are, however, problems with this measure. Like most pension plans, members pensions are based on the average of the best six years salary, including additional indemnities for leadership positions. A veteran House member who is short of fifteen years service but has spent his or her last three years in cabinet before being dropped in a cabinet shuffle may not receive significant financial benefits for further service in the backbenches and would be just as well off financially by retiring after leaving cabinet. As a result, some members may retire without undo financial penalty before

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[27] In fact such a definition would exclude, among others, Sir John A. Macdonald and Pierre Elliot Trudeau.

[28] For an examination of MPs' pensions see Francis Fox and Gerry St. Germain, Commissioners, Report of the Commission to Review Salaries and Allowances of Members of Parliament and Senators,(Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada), 1989.

serving fifteen years.

Therefore the term "full political career" will be avoided. Instead retiring members will be considered to have served either 'long' or 'short' political careers, the breaking point being eleven and a half years which is the average numbers of years served by MPs who have left the House voluntarily. If the average career length for all exiting members had been used - 8.9 years - more members would fall into the long political career category. Eleven and a half years - a tougher criteria than 8.9 years - is used to show that there is a strong contingent of 'long' political careerists. However, as has been suggested throughout, the opportunity structure of Canadian elected office should be discouraging of long political careers for those outside of positions of authority. Therefore given this tougher criteria it would be expected that few non-cabinet ministers would be found serving long political careers. Similarly this should increase the number of backbenchers who would be classified as having served short political careers. The more backbenchers found in the former group and the fewer found in the latter group, the more evidence there is to suggest that the opportunity structure is not the obstacle to careerism that the rational choice model suggests it ought to be.

Table 4.6 separates members who have left parliament voluntarily into one of the four following groups: members in leadership positions who have served long careers; members in leadership positions who have had short careers; private members

who have served long careers; and private members who have had short careers. If rational actors make decisions about their political careers based on the structure of opportunities, then the two largest groups should be the long serving members in leadership positions and backbenchers who have served short political careers. There should be few short career executive members or long career private members.

TABLE 4.6
CAREER LENGTHS AND LEADERSHIP POSITIONS

CAREER LENGTH	MINISTERIAL/LEADERSHIP POSITION: YES	MINISTERIAL/LEADERSHIP POSITION: NO
LONG	22 (22.3%) VETERAN LEADERS	22 (22.3%) VETERAN BACKBENCHERS
SHORT	12 (12%) JUNIOR LEADERS	43 (43.4%) JUNIOR BACKBENCHERS
TOTAL	34	65

In total, there are 55 short careers and 44 long careers. Members who fall into the 'long career' category tend to have had careers that lasted over fifteen years, while many short careerists have lasted only one term in office. As can be seen

from the Table, the two largest contingents are members who have had long careers, part of which have been spent in a leadership position, and members who have been shut out of senior leadership positions and have left after a brief career. The 34 individuals who are considered to have served at least part of their career in a 'Ministerial/leadership' position are 29 former cabinet ministers, two opposition party leaders, two opposition House leaders and a Chief Government Whip. While the opposition positions are not part of the executive they are nonetheless near the peak of the ambition ladder and are considered more senior than a parliamentary secretary or a Committee chairperson. Therefore for the purposes of this analysis, holders of leadership positions are defined as cabinet ministers, party leaders and party house leaders. Likewise, the terms backbencher or private member will be used to describe the 65 members who choose to leave parliament and did not achieve a 'leadership' position.

Expectedly, there were fewer junior or short leaders than veteran leaders. Only twelve holders of a ministerial or party leadership position chose to leave parliament before eleven and a half years. As well, the number of private members who had a long political career before leaving office is almost half that of long serving backbenchers, twenty two compared to forty three.[29]

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[29] If the average career length of all federal office holders, 8.9 years, had been used instead of 11.5 as the breaking point between long and short careers the number of veteran backbenchers

Of the sample group, twenty two members who have served in cabinet or in another leadership capacity have had lengthy political careers. As Squire suggests, responsibility for legislative continuity when a legislature fails to encourage long careers often rests with a few veteran executive members.[30] They are responsible for introducing new members to political life and maintaining institutional order. In the case of the Canadian Parliament, preserving membership continuity is the responsibility of just over ten percent of the membership.

Among the twenty-two veteran executive members and party leaders in the sample of voluntary retirees, six (or 27.3%) were in opposition at the time of their retirement. Sixteen members were on the government side when they retired and of these members, five (22.7%) still held leadership positions while eleven (50%) had returned to the backbenches. Among the veteran leadership members, there may be a group who have lost their posts, recalculated their personal opportunities within the House and made a rational decision to leave office. Some members in this group, such as Mitchell Sharp, resigned from cabinet voluntarily. Others such as Al Lawrence, were cabinet

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and veteran leaders increases substantially. Instead of forty three junior backbenchers there are twenty nine, and the number of veteran backbenchers increases from twenty two to thirty six. Likewise the number of veteran leaders increases from twenty two to twenty six and the number of junior leaders decreases by four, falling from twelve to eight.

[30] Peverill Squire, "Member Career Opportunities and the Internal Organization of Legislatures," Journal of Politics, 50 (1988), pp. 726-744.

ministers under one leader, in this case Joe Clark, but not under a second leader. Lawrence retired after four years as a government private member under Brian Mulroney. Holding onto leadership positions therefore is just as important in maintaining a long political career as achieving them in the first place.

Twelve members of the sample group who achieved leadership positions had short political careers. By leaving soon even after breaking through the obstacles to leadership positions, these individuals may be expressing dissatisfaction with political life. All but one of these members were cabinet ministers at one point during their career.[31] Only three of these twelve members were not in leadership positions at the time of their exit. This indicates that even breaking through the obstacles to leadership is not a guarantee that rational actors will want to pursue a long career in the House of Commons. However, if dissatisfaction among Commons leaders is a problem, it is a diminishing one. Two thirds of this group left the House in either 1968 or 1972. Only three of the twelve left politics after the 1980 general election. This dissatisfaction among neophyte executive members may have been a problem that was specific to the early Trudeau years (for example Eric Kierans) and is not representative of a general

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[31] The exception was Ian Deans, the New Democratic Party House Leader whose frustration in opposition may have influenced his decision to accept a government appointment. Deans was also one of the three members of this group that came to Ottawa from a provincial legislature.

dissatisfaction with cabinet service.

A more telling indicator of possible dissatisfaction with the present opportunity structure should be found in an examination of those shut out of meaningful leadership positions. As the upper right hand cell of Table 4.6 indicates, twenty-two members who retired voluntarily were shut out of leadership positions yet still enjoyed long political careers. It may be that many of these private members were not concerned with internal advancement. As John Bosley has suggested, some MPs "do not need the institution of parliament" in order to enjoy a long and satisfying political career.[32] If that is true, these members may be described as "constituency" representatives who see their elected role as serving the needs and desires of their constituents. For rational actors who do not desire cabinet positions but wish instead to serve constituency needs, obstacles to advancement might not be important or indeed relevant.

Yet not all members in this group display this type of static ambition. Some members within this cadre may have been willing to live with the obstacles inherent within the opportunity structure trusting that through either hard work or luck they might eventually have satisfied their progressive ambition. All of the individuals in this group were members of one of the two major parties. Half of the twenty two served at least part of their career in a junior leadership position,

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[32] Interview Mr. John Bosley, MP. May 26,1989. Ottawa

either as a parliamentary secretary or as chairperson of a Committee. Because members interested solely in serving constituency needs receive no rewards - save financial - from holding these junior leadership positions, the eleven members who initially served in these junior leadership positions must have been demonstrating interest in advancing within the system.

The size of this group of veteran backbenchers suggests that the opportunity structure model does not account for the decisions made by all politicians about serving long political careers. To begin, the measure used to determine who is a parliamentary veteran is admittedly stringent. Jack Cramer describes House veterans as anyone with ten or more years of service.[33] If Cramer's measure of veteran status is used, the size of this contingent of veterans exceeds the number of junior backbenchers who had short careers -- thirty three to thirty two.

It must also be remembered that the analysis focuses only on those members who have left voluntarily. Private members close to 'veteran' status who were defeated in an election could conceivably belong to this group. If this were the case, it is possible that a tally would indicate that over one third of all MPs who are denied leadership positions still desire a lengthy

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[33] Jack Cramer, "Parliamentary Experience and Legislative Behaviour" in Jon Pammett and Michael Whittington eds, Foundations of Political Culture: Political Socialization in Canada, (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976) pp.195-210.

political career. Using the criteria above, that is describing 'veteran members' as having at least eleven and a half years service, we have found twenty two out of sixty five backbenchers who can be considered House veterans. Even disregarding cabinet ministers who have much longer than average careers, the concern of Franks and others that most MPs have a political career that is but an "interlude in a career outside of politics" must be tempered with a recognition that fully one third of backbenchers who leave parliament of their own volition, choose to do so after a long political career.

The largest cell in Table 4.6 represents MP's who have been shut out of meaningful leadership positions and left politics after only a brief career as an MP. These members, having left by choice, have recalculated their prospects for advancement after being elected. It is these members, those whom Paul Thomas has described as "parliamentary dropouts", that are at the centre of questions of reform of the House and the opportunity structure.[34] Ward, Franks and others all suggest that changing the opportunity structure to allow these members easier access to meaningful positions in the House is the first step to creating a more experienced and stable House of Commons.

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[34] Paul Thomas, "Comments" on John Reid's "The Backbencher and the Discharge of Legislative Responsibilities," in William Neilson and J.C. MacPherson, eds, The Legislative Process in Canada: The Need for Reform (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1978). p.160.

FIGURE 4A
EXIT YEARS OF SHORT TERM PRIVATE MEMBERS



N=43

At first blush, their argument appears valid. Over 40 per cent of voluntary exits are short term members who have been denied positions of real influence. Unlike short term cabinet ministers, there has been no real decrease in these early exits over time. As Figure 4.A above illustrates, with the exception of the 1980 election, the retirement rate of private members with short political careers has been relatively consistent since 1968.

The incidence of members leaving parliament after only a

brief career appears to be constant. The reforms that resulted from the McGrath Report have, to a limited degree, given more independence to private members. The reforms of the McGrath Report include the election of the Speaker by all members of the House, a committee system that provides members more autonomy from the dictates of party and government and a increased opportunity for members to debate and vote on private members legislation.[35] These reforms however, have yet to result in fewer exits by political newcomers. The number of relatively new members leaving in 1988 is consistent with other exiting members who fall into this category.[36]

It appears that the pattern of early exiting members cuts across both geographic and party boundaries. Ten percent of early leavers are members of the New Democratic Party. This is approximately proportional to the size of the NDP caucus. The Progressive Conservatives and Liberals had 18 and 19 members in this group respectively, making up over 85% of the early exiting group. Again, the size of each group is approximately proportional to their respective caucus sizes over the time frame of the study. There was one Social Credit MP and one Independent member in the sample. An analysis of variance comparing early exiting, or junior, private members to veteran

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[35] Canada, House of Commons. Report of the Special Committee on Reform of the House of Commons. James McGrath, Chairperson. June, 1985.

[36] It still may be too soon to measure how the results of the McGrath Report will affect this group.

private members indicated that there were no significant differences between the political parties.

The same holds true for provincial representation. An analysis of variance comparing the differences between veteran and junior backbench retirees showed no significant differences by province. Examining only junior retirees by province however, does highlight some differences. As Table 4.7 below demonstrates, for the most part the distribution of private members exiting early is not dissimilar to the provincial distribution of seats. However, Alberta, Quebec and Prince Edward Island all have fewer junior retirees as a percentage of the total than they do federal seats as a percentage of all House of Commons seats.

TABLE 4.7
JUNIOR EXITING BACKBENCHERS BY PROVINCE

PROVINCE	PERCENTAGE OF EXITING MEMBERS	PROVINCIAL SEATS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SEATS*
British Col.	11.6	9.9
Alberta	2.3	7.4
Saskatchewan	11.6	4.9
Manitoba	4.7	4.9
Ontario	34.9	33.6
Quebec	18.6	26.5
New Brunswick	7.0	3.5
Nova Scotia	2.3	3.9
Newfoundland	4.7	2.4
Prince Edward I.	0.0	1.5
Yukon/NWT	2.3	1.2

* Percentages are based on a 282 seat House of Commons.

Overall, it appears that the incidence of early dissatisfaction among members of parliament is consistent over

time and space. Upon closer inspection, however, the size of this group is not as large as originally imagined. First, as was mentioned earlier, the criteria used to determine career length was quite stringent. Had ten years (or eight and a half years) been used as a benchmark instead of twelve years, the number of 'veteran' private members leaving office would be equivalent to (or greater than) the number of less experienced exiting members. Second, given the tougher definition of a 'lengthy' political career employed herein, it is not surprising that some members who are classified as 'short careerists' have remained in the House of Commons for a considerable length of time. For instance, eleven of the forty-three members in this group served for at least three terms. Members who have been re-elected at least twice have demonstrated a certain degree of fortitude in the face of an unfriendly opportunity structure. This does not suggest that the definition of a 'short' or 'junior' career used in this analysis was too broad. Using a generous definition of 'short' career and still uncovering a sizable contingent of 'veteran' members of parliament has helped to provide evidence that the problem of short careers is not as severe as conventional wisdom has suggested it is.

These points help to indicate that the number of members who leave their political careers in midstream may not be as large as first imagined. The size of this contingent clearly varies with whatever definition of 'veteran' is employed. However, even given a more generous definition, the number of

early exits by members left outside of leadership positions is large enough to suggest that a number of members, regardless of political affiliation and location, are unwilling to put up with the obstacles within the opportunity structure.

PRIVATE MEMBERS' DECISIONS: SHORT TERMS VERSUS LONG CAREERS

Politicians who achieve cabinet or party leadership positions are less likely than backbenchers to leave parliament after only a brief career. Such a finding is consistent with the assumptions made about the attractiveness of an elected career in the senior echelons of parliamentary government. At the same time, however, it was shown that among backbenchers, there is a sizable group (one third) that enjoy a long political career. The other two thirds of this backbench group left politics after a briefer career. An analysis of variance comparing these two groups of backbenchers showed no significant differences between them based on political affiliation or the province of origin. What then distinguishes those private members who leave office early from private members who have a long political career in Ottawa?

Measuring the factors that may influence a private member to disregard the obstacles of the opportunity structure and pursue a lengthy political career is not an easy task. Doing so requires answering the question: why do some private members leave the House early while others remain for much longer periods? Part of a problem in a comparison solely of private

members is that cabinet service, the most obvious indicator of career length and satisfaction, is not a factor.[37] As well, career lengths of private members are not determined by region of origin or political affiliation despite the role these two factors play in shaping the opportunities for advancement in the House.

There are, however, several factors which may influence a private member's decision about when to abandon his or her political career, factors which can be measured. First, if politicians are rational egoists they should presumably want to decide their future themselves and not have it decided for them by the electorate. Risk of losing office therefore should be a factor. The strain of campaigning for re-election increases for those members who do face a very real risk of losing their seats. Thus, if a private member is faced with a tough battle for re-election and has no guarantee of eventual advancement within the House, the fight to hold onto a seat may lose its appeal.

Second, some individuals have demonstrated a strong desire to become members of parliament by continuing to run for office despite previous unsuccessful attempts. An individual who has endured defeat prior to victory may be reticent to leave office after only a brief stay in Ottawa. Therefore, the longer the

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[37] As mentioned earlier, it is true that some backbenchers will remain in office in the hope - or perhaps assumption - that they will eventually achieve promotion to the cabinet table. Unfortunately, measuring individual desires is beyond the scope of this thesis.

struggle for office, the more reluctant a member should be to abandon their political career simply because they are still on the backbenches. The number of unsuccessful attempts at federal office before winning election was gathered for members of the sample set. However, only seven members of the sixty five had tried unsuccessfully for office before winning. Therefore this measure was not included in the model as there would be little variation in years served based on this indicator.

Finally, if static or discrete ambition is manifested after an actor enters office - then most members should not enter office with preconceived notions of serving only brief political careers.[38] Specifically, even if early leavers are put off by the opportunity structure or even the heavy demands of the job, it is expected that these individuals have entered office with the possibility of pursuing politics as a long career in mind. If this is the case then both veteran and non-veteran private members should be entering the House at approximately the same age with non-veteran members leaving at a younger age. Therefore it would be expected that members who leave politics

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[38] An argument somewhat similar to Rohde's is made by Galen Irwin, Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie, "Social Background vs. Motivational Determinants of Legislative Careers in the Netherlands," Legislative Studies Quarterly, IV, 3, (August 1979), pp.447-465. Rohde pays greater attention to the constraints of the opportunity structure than Irwin et al. who suggest that personal factors such as income and family considerations alter members career desires. Both, however, argue that these calculations are made after entering office and not before.

later on in life should be parliamentary veterans.[39]

The following model was used to test whether or not these three factors influence the decisions made by private members about continuing their political careers.

$$YRS = a + B1(VICTOR) + B2(AGE) + B3(TRIES) \quad (1)$$

Where:

YRS = The number of years served in the House of Commons by a Private Member.

VICTOR = Margin of Victory in previous election (measured as the difference between the winner and second place finisher, as a percentage of total votes cast)

AGE = Age upon Exiting Office

Since the dependent variable can be measured in terms of years of service discriminant analysis was not necessary and multiple regression was used. The results of the model are presented below.

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[39] Given that there should be no significant difference between entry ages for veteran and non-veteran backbenchers, if age upon entry had been used as a measure instead of age at exit, the variable would have to be insignificant to at least suggest support for the hypothesis. Therefore, age at exit was used as it is a better indicator of a members decision to leave or stay in Parliament.

TABLE 4.8

LEAVING PARLIAMENT: COEFFICIENT VALUES FOR LONG VERSUS SHORT PRIVATE MEMBER CAREERS

	(2) (Coefficients)	(3) (T - Ratios)
VICTOR	.060	1.85
AGE	.312	5.65
R Squared = 40.5%	N = 65	

Underlined values are significant at the .01 level.
Victor is significant at the .05 level.

In equation form the model reads as follows:

$$YRS = -8.52 + .060\ (VICTOR) + .317\ (AGE)$$

The results of the regression offers support for the two hypotheses. The R2 value indicates that age of exit and previous margin of victory explain 40.5 per cent of exiting backbenchers career length. Members whose previous electoral victories were won with high margins have a greater probability of remaining in politics for a lengthy career than members whose previous victories were won with smaller margins. The coefficient value for VICTOR suggests that a one percentage point increase in previous margin of victory will add only a .06 of a year to the political career of a private member. In other words, a twenty percent margin of victory would increase career length by 1.2 years. Those with small margins of victory therefore are more likely to leave politics after a shorter political career. Risk

of losing appears to be a factor in the calculations of rational actors determining their political future.[40]

Also as expected, members who exit federal politics later in life tend to have had a longer political career than younger exiting members. The older a member is, the more years they have served in office. Specifically, the coefficient value of .312, suggests that a member who is 60 years old is likely to have served for almost one year longer than a 57 year old MP. This suggests that there are few political actors who enter office near the end of their working life and are elected for one term as a 'reward for past services.' Older members of parliament have longer political careers than their younger counterparts.

In sum, beyond the ability to make it into cabinet, a primary consideration among private members in determining career length may be their perceived ability to be re-elected. Some private members are rational actors who would rather leave Parliament Hill by their own choice than risk being defeated in an election. That the age at exit is a significant indicator of career length suggests that members make up their minds about

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[40] Research in the United States has also found risk of losing to be a factor in the calculations of rational actors. See for example John R. Hibbing, "Voluntary Retirement from the U.S. House of Representatives: Who Quits?" American Journal of Political Science 26:3 (August 1982) pp.467-484. Hibbing however, does not distinguish between long and short careerists. Rather he compares retirees to those defeated and found that those with larger margins of victory are less likely to retire voluntarily.

career length after they are first elected. Among those who choose to leave early only a very few have entered office late in life with the objective of staying for a single term. Few private members who choose to retire from elected office have had to endure unsuccessful attempts at membership in the House.

The model above tried to find some possible reasons why some private members stay longer in office than others. The analysis in the previous section indicated that province and political party were not primary factors involved in this distinction. It appears that age of exit is a primary factor. Among the more interesting findings of the model was the significance of the margin of victory. It may be that some members wish to stay in political life longer but are not prepared to do so at the cost of losing an election. If the risk of losing was not so high, then more individuals might be prepared to continue with their political careers, either content in the backbenches or hoping for eventual cabinet selection.

SUMMARY

Voluntary exits remain a secondary cause of turnover in the Canadian House of Commons. Electoral defeat remains the number one cause of a House that continually welcomes newcomers and bids farewell to members who have stayed only briefly. Voluntary exits - one possible indication of job dissatisfaction - have remained stable since 1965. If past trends continue then

it is unlikely that voluntary exits will surpass defeat as the major cause of turnover. Nonetheless, Canada has a large contingent of MPs who do leave office of their own accord. This tends to occur more often at the end of majority government terms, but has occurred at the end of the 1965, 1972 and 1979 governments as well.

Which form of turnover is more threatening to the stability of the House of Commons? An analysis of parliamentary exit patterns indicates that electoral defeat is a larger problem than voluntary exits for two reasons. First, as stated immediately above, it occurs more frequently than voluntary exits. Between 1965 and 1989 electoral defeat accounted for 54.3 per cent of turnover in Parliament compared to 42.8 per cent for voluntary exits (2.9 per cent of members died while serving in office).[41] Secondly, those who are defeated tend to be less experienced members of parliament. Members who decide to leave parliament are more likely than those defeated to have served over eleven years in the nations capital. The majority of those who choose to leave parliament have already provided the House with stability and continuity and have served as role models or teachers to younger rookie members. More Cabinet Ministers are among the voluntarily exiting veterans as well. The concern of academics and politicians over job dissatisfaction therefore may be misplaced. If students of

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[41] This does not include turnover either before, or as a result of, the 1965 General Election.

parliament are concerned about the negative affects of turnover, both in producing inexperienced members and as a result effecting the stability of the House of Commons, these students should not be overly concerned with those who choose to leave parliament and ignore those who wish to stay but are defeated in their bids for re-election. The risk of electoral defeat is built into our system of government. Defeat however, remains the number one cause of turnover and is taking out of parliament those individuals who wish to stay.

Some of the evidence found in the analysis of exit patterns poses a challenge to the opportunity structure argument that was presented in the previous chapter. Chapter three demonstrated that the opportunity was indeed discouraging of long political careers. The opportunities for advancement are such that rational actors should recalculate their career options and leave politics early on. Yet is appears that not all members are leaving parliament as inexperienced - and disillusioned - rookies. In order to determine how strong this challenge to the opportunity structure argument was a detailed analysis of those individuals who left federal politics voluntarily was undertaken.

The results of this second analysis found some support for the rational choice/opportunity structure argument. Specifically, the vast majority of members who left parliament both by choice and early were those who did not hold meaningful leadership positions. As well, of 'long career' politicians,

half were individuals who broke through the opportunity structure and achieved a leadership position. Further, it was found that politicians who lost their cabinet positions were more likely to leave than those who were still members of the executive council. Losing a meaningful position, and therefore being made to face an intimidating opportunity structure once more, seemed sufficient cause to drive some rational politicians from elected office. Also, members with small margins of victory are more than likely to step down early than members whose previous electoral battles have been clear victories. Clearly therefore, some of the empirical evidence found in this chapter supports the arguments constructed and initially explored in previous chapters.

However, evidence that the opportunity structure does not dictate career choices was also found in the analysis of exit patterns. Some cabinet ministers decided to leave politics after only a short political career. These ministers showed dissatisfaction with political life even though they were more successful than most in breaking through the obstacles to power. Comparatively however, this group is the smallest of those who have left the House of Commons by choice.

A more telling criticism of the structure of opportunities argument is the sizable contingent of members who, despite not achieving senior leadership positions, decide to stay in parliament for a 'long' career. If the obstacles to success are as discouraging as they initially appear to be then this group

of individuals should be small in number. Yet this group is approximately half the size of the cadre of short term private members.

What influences the choices of these members? Something beyond the obstacles to leadership positions is swaying these members to stay in office. The problems of the structure of opportunities is being offset by a desire to remain in political office. It may be that political parties, other members, and the institution of parliament play a more pronounced in shaping individuals attitudes towards elected life than the proponents of rational choice would lead us to believe. A full understanding of career choices cannot ignore the factors influencing the calculations of this group of members. The following chapter will propose both a further critique of the opportunity structure and a tentative exploration of an approach which may further our understanding of career choice among Canadian federal office holders.

CHAPTER FIVE

EVALUATING THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE AND THE SEARCH FOR FURTHER ANSWERS

This thesis has shown that the application of the rational choice framework helps to provide an understanding of Canadian political careers that has to this point been left unexplained. Many political careers in Canada are the product of strategic calculations made by rational actors in the context of a structure of opportunities. The main benefit of this thesis therefore, has been in the demonstration that viewing politicians as rational actors provides some explanation as to why Canada has few politicians who serve long term careers. However, the analysis presented thus far has also highlighted some aspects of political careers that could not be traced solely to the Canadian opportunity structure.

The first two chapters established the underpinnings of the rational choice use of the opportunity structure model of political career studies. It was argued that rational choice theorists focus their attention on how and why political actors make strategic choices within a given structure of opportunities. The American experience was then reviewed. The more notable studies of political careers undertaken in the United States which used the structure of opportunities and the calculated decisions of individuals as the basis of their

framework were those by Schlesinger, Squire, Copeland, Rohde and Cooper and West. Using these studies as a foundation for an analysis of Canadian political careers helped in the application of the rational choice model.

The following two sections will evaluate the opportunity structure model as a way of understanding career patterns in the Canadian federal legislature. The forth section will offer a tentative exploration of an alternative framework for understanding political careers. This alternative framework, which can be described as a neo-institutional understanding of political careers, suggests that the values and norms - and through them the choices - of individuals are more strongly influenced by institutions than the rational choice argument suggests. The chapter will not provide a full explanation of political careers based on neo-institutional theory: that task lies ahead. It will suggest however, that further research in the field of political careers would be well advised to pay greater attention to the strength of institutionally based forces in structuring career choices.

THE BENEFITS OF THE RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE

How many political careers in Canada are the product of rational calculations by strategic politicians? Chapter three suggested that the three most significant features of the Canadian opportunity structure are the cabinet (the undisputed apex of the internal office hierarchy) the strength of the

political party hierarchy, and the impact of federalism. As chapters three and four argue, there is some evidence that many individuals do make decisions about political careers based upon the existing opportunity structure which, in Canada's case, minimizes the rewards for prior political experience and makes entry into cabinet both difficult and beyond an individual's personal control. How do we know that the opportunity structure has had an effect on careers?

First, few individuals move from provincial to national office. The separate structures of sub-national and national office in Canada create few positive opportunities for would-be legislators to move from one level to another. Individuals with national aspirations concentrate their energies on Ottawa, few begin their careers in provincial assemblies. Rational provincial politicians perhaps see their two party systems as providing better job security.[1] Rohde's analysis of risk-bearing in the United States fits well with the Canadian experience. Terms of office should be longer in two party provincial assemblies. As well, the base of support necessary for reelection is smaller in the provinces. A personal vote may be built more easily in provinces where ridings are smaller.

As well, the size and internal structure of provincial legislatures may act to hold their respective members, as smaller assemblies see more of their members moving to Ottawa

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[1] Ontario and more recently Manitoba stand as exceptions to the rule of two party systems in the provinces.

than the larger, full-time sub-national legislatures. In line with Squire's arguments, larger, full-time provincial assemblies of Central Canada send fewer members to Ottawa than the smaller, less 'career' oriented assemblies of Atlantic Canada.

Second, there is evidence that some members of parliament are "turned off" of politics as a result of a structure that shuts the vast majority of members out of meaningful leadership roles. This occurs as a result of both strong party discipline and hierarchy and as a result of parliament's executive-centred organization. For party candidates, election and re-election is largely dependent on party fortunes. Incumbency can offset only a minor portion of a national swing away from a member's party. Access to meaningful leadership positions within the House is controlled by the party hierarchy. The few MPs who are not members of political parties have no access to leadership positions within the House and are virtually shut out of the legislative process. For members in opposition the path to advancement goes directly through the party system, as leaders choose their House leaders, whips and shadow cabinet members. For members of the governing party, there are numerous obstacles blocking the entrance to cabinet, including the size of cabinet, ethnicity, loyalty and geography.

Unlike the experiences of U.S. legislators described by Copeland, there are few outside constituencies on which Canadian MPs can build support bases. Some, such as ethnicity, are available, but by definition they are not available to everyone.

Even for the most calculating individual there is no one best path to follow to help ensure appointment to the cabinet. For backbenchers then, the executive dominates parliament and the probabilities of reaching the executive are low. A former member of parliament Keith Penner has argued that,

> Our parliamentary system is dominated, controlled, manipulated and at times even exploited by a far too powerful executive branch. The legislative branch is alarmingly weak. There is in Canada a serious and extreme imbalance between the executive branch and the legislative branch.[2]

Is the House of Commons therefore, in Squire's terms, a "dead end" legislature, dominated by a few and suffering from high turnover? The initial evidence in chapter three, suggested that this could be the case. Certainly the control of party over backbenchers and the relative difficulty of reaching cabinet diminishes the attractiveness of a long career in the House. Those who are not in cabinet and see little opportunity of eventually making it there may decide that a political career as a private member is not a desirable alternative. Chapter four provided some empirical evidence to support this line of thought. The vast majority of members who leave politics voluntarily after only a brief career have never been in cabinet. Other reasons may factor into the decisions of these non-cabinet members to leave Parliament. Nonetheless, the short term member does cut across both regional and party lines. As well, among federal politicians who leave national office by

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[2] Canada, Debates, December 4, 1985, p.9157.

choice the longest serving members tend to be individuals who have risen to significant leadership positions within the House. A significant portion of early departees are private members who have been unable to break through the barriers of the opportunity structure of federal office. This supports Cooper and West's contention that if long careers are to be encouraged, there must be rewards for those who 'stick it out'. Under this logic, a more clearly defined career ladder, or an opening up of access to positions of authority in the House may be necessary.

Finally, chapter four showed that cabinet ministers who have served for over twelve years tend to leave office after losing their cabinet positions. Only one third of long serving members who reached a cabinet position left Parliament Hill while still a minister. The inability to remain in cabinet, be it a result of a change in government or a cabinet shuffle does predispose members to shorten their political careers.

The application of the opportunity structure model to the Canadian legislative experience has therefore added to our understanding of Canadian political careers. One strength of the opportunity structure argument is simply that it allows us to analyze and characterize legislative structures. In the second chapter it was argued that applying the opportunity structure to the study of political careers should help to answer the question 'how do opportunity structures affect the career goals of politicians?' Using this framework has helped to answer this question. The opportunity structure limits

access to power and many rational actors do make quick exits from the political stage, most through defeat but some through choice.

THE WEAKNESSES OF THE RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE

There are however, aspects of Canadian parliamentary life that the opportunity structure framework cannot adequately explain. To begin, it was demonstrated in chapter four that significant differences exist between members who have been defeated and members who have left Parliament of their own volition. Most members who have left office by choice have had longer careers than members who have been defeated at the polls. Private members who choose to leave political life early (before serving twelve years) represent only a small percentage of all members of parliament. While former cabinet ministers show a greater propensity to leave office than those still sitting in cabinet, their decision to leave usually comes after a career of at least a dozen years, with part of that time spent at the most senior levels of Canadian office.

Additionally, there is a sizable contingent of members who stay in parliament for a long period despite their failure to break into the cabinet ranks. Coupled with this latter group, twelve of thirty four members in leadership positions (cabinet or opposition House leader) left Parliament voluntarily after

serving a 'short political career'.[3] These latter two groups, long term non-leaders and short term leaders, constitute over one third of voluntary exits. A sizable number of members therefore, choose to stay or leave office despite their failure or success in obtaining positions of importance. The career calculations of these individuals are based on factors (discussed below) that are exogenous to the opportunity structure.

The rational choice argument also fails to sufficiently address the role played by the Canadian electoral system in determining career patterns. By definition, career studies which use the rational choice model concentrate on the calculated decisions of rational egoists based upon a set opportunity structure. In Canada this structure makes political ambition difficult of satisfy. Yet as pointed out in both chapters three and four, defeat at election time is the number one cause of turnover in Canadian national politics. In fact, between 1965 and 1988, only once did more members retire from office than were defeated at election time. If were not for the large number of members who lose their seats at elections the Canadian House could not be justifiably characterized as having a large contingent of "transient individuals".[4] The high level of electoral defeat in Canada weakens the opportunity structure

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[3] These figures are from the random sample of voluntary exits analyzed in chapter four.

[4] C.E.S. Franks, The Parliament of Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987) p.259.

argument in two ways.

First, if the opportunity structure simply cannot deal with the electoral system, then as a method of examining career patterns it is structurally deficient. By at best treating the electoral system as a given and at worst ignoring how it reduces the overall level of experience in the House of Commons, the rational choice argument fails to consider the interaction of institutions in shaping career patterns. William Irvine has argued that the publics views on parties and party leaders determine election outcomes, not their views on individual candidates.[5] Michael Krashinsky found that between 1926 and 1980 incumbency was worth at best an additional four percent of votes to Liberal, Conservative and NDP/CCF MPs and that this additional support was often offset by national swings.[6] Yet the rational choice framework simply considers national swings and candidate weakness as one more factor in the calculations of political office seekers and fails to consider it as a causal factor determining career patterns in its own right.

Second, by running for re-election, a substantial number of MPs have demonstrated a willingness to put up with an

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[5] William Irvine, "Does the Candidate Make a Difference? The Macro-Politics and Micro Politics of Getting Elected," Canadian Journal of Political Science, XV,4 (December 1982). pp. 755-785.

[6] Michael Krashinsky, "Additional Evidence on the Effect of Incumbency in Canadian Elections" Canadian Journal of Political Science, XVIII: 1 (February 1985), pp. 155-165. Only in 1984 did the strength of incumbency hold up to national swings in popular support. See also Michael Krashinsky, "The Effect of Incumbency in the 1984 Federal and the 1985 Ontario Elections", Canadian Journal of Political Science, XIX: 2 (June 1986) pp.337-343.

opportunity structure that works to their disadvantage. Of course, the possible career lengths of defeated members cannot be measured. Yet simply by running for re-election they have displayed a willingness to disregard the disincentives of the existing opportunity structure. When added to those private members who are able to stay in parliament for a long career the size of this group constitutes a majority of members of parliament.

Why are so many members not bothered by the opportunity structure of office? It may be that the career ambitions of some of these members are not based on the structure of opportunities of Canadian office. Some of these members could be "constituency oriented" and do not need the prospects of advancing to the front bench in order to have a satisfying political career. Other backbenchers may have lofty ambitions, namely the executive, and are willing to bear the costs of a long career in the backbenches if that is necessary before being promoted to the front bench. They are aware that re-election is not guaranteed and that their chances of serving in the Cabinet are even dimmer, yet this has not deterred them from seeking a long political career.

This behaviour could be a product of decisions made not on the basis of the opportunity structure but rather on institutionally derived values and precepts that individuals have developed about their role as members. It is possible that any frustrations felt by members not realizing their progressive

ambition is being offset by values and beliefs not tied to the opportunity structure. Values and beliefs that temper self-interest and ambition - and that rational choice has ignored - may be a factor in persuading members to try and maintain a long political career. Rational choice presumes that self-interest dominates career choices, and that self-interest is wrapped up in personal advancement. If individual self-interest becomes tied to institutionally derived interests, members might well pursue long political careers despite being shut out of positions of power. If this is the case then the institution of parliament, and the values and norms that is encourages, becomes an important influence in the decision-making process of individuals. This will be discussed in more detail in the final section of this chapter. Suffice it to say that rational choice minimizes this influence.

A second major deficiency of the rational choice model in the study of political careers lies in its tendency to view the opportunity structure as easily changed, or at least more easily changed than the desires of individuals. Chapter one noted that among rational choice theorists, Gramm and Shepsle have argued that individuals or collectives of individuals can reshape structures - and thereby opportunities - to help fashion more desirable outcomes.[7] Likewise, Jon Elster suggests that

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[7] Gerald Gramm and Kenneth Shepsle, "The Emergence of Legislative Institutions: Standing Committees in the House and Senate, 1810-1825," Legislative Studies Quarterly, 14:1, (February

opportunities are more easily manipulated that desires.[8] This raises two salient issues with regard to political careers and the Canadian House of Commons. First, how easily changed is the opportunity structure and second, will these changes have the desired effect?

Numerous scholars and politicians have argued that reforms to the House of Commons which would increase the role of Private Members would result in more satisfying political careers. Lovink has argued that Commons committees should hold "pre-legislative hearings as a standard part of the policy-making process."[9] Politicians have also argued for an expanded committee role.[10] While Franks has questioned the appropriateness of Lovink's proposed reforms he has suggested other reforms which he states would "make the career of MP more attractive, and encourage the development of long-term secure

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1989) pp. 39 - 65.

[8] Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). pp. 22-29. It is important to note that Elster, Gramm, Shepsle et. al. are not disputing the role that opportunities play in structuring desires, they are merely suggesting that individuals have a strong capacity to alter the institutional arrangements which structure opportunities.

[9] J.A.A. Lovink, "Parliamentary Reform and Governmental Effectiveness in Canada," Canadian Public Administration, 16, 1, (Spring, 1973). p. 37.

[10] See Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Reform of the House of Commons, Report, (June 1985). See also the House debates on the McGrath Report; Canada, House of Commons, Debates, (February 11-13, 1986) pp. 10659-10804.

members."[11] Among Franks suggested reforms are raising the salaries of Committee chairmen and drastically increasing the size of the House.[12] Giving Parliamentary Committees more autonomy and authority would lessen the authority presently held by Cabinet and party leaders. This type of conventional analysis presumes that altering the opportunity structure is all that is necessary to make political careers more attractive.

Yet if this is all that is necessary to produce longer, more satisfying careers, and if the ability to alter these institutional arrangements lies in the hands of self-interested parliamentary actors, why have these changes not occurred? Perhaps it is because the ability to undertake such fundamental change lies with the House only in a formal sense. The hierarchy of Parliament rests authority with the executive who have been naturally reluctant to place too much power and independence in the hands of committees or individual backbenchers. As well, party discipline remains strong, and party leaders are also reluctant to divest themselves of the authority they hold over their caucus. The opportunity structure is not that pliable after all.

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[11] Franks, The Parliament of Canada, p. 261.

[12] Franks is neither the only nor the first to suggest substantially increasing the size of the House of Commons. See John Courtney, "The Size of Canada's Parliament: As Assessment of the Implications of a Larger House of Commons, in Peter Aucoin,ed., Institutional Reforms for Representative Government, Research Vol. 38, Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) pp.1 - 39.

The second question this observation raises, and the question more immediate to the study of political careers, is 'will such an altered opportunity structure in fact produce longer political careers?' There is little doubt that reforms which transfer some authority in policy making to more members would produce more enjoyable political careers. Yet it is far from clear that these careers would by extension become longer.

For example, electoral defeat will still claim many members of Parliament who are seeking re-election. Making the job of a backbench MP more attractive does not automatically create some form of incumbency advantage. Franks alludes to the fact that a larger House might help the electoral fortunes of incumbents but offers no evidence to support this assertion.[13] Likewise, conventional wisdom holds that better pay will attract better candidates, yet it is not clear that this reform will help to keep individuals in parliament after their initial election. Providing committees with a larger policy role and lessening party discipline to allow members to better represent the views of their constituents will also make for a more satisfied member of parliament.[14] Yet whether such moves would create a

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[13] Both Franks and Courtney do suggest that a larger House would lead to better regional representation among political parties but do not make the connection between this and some form of incumbency advantage. See Franks, The Parliament of Canada, pp.261-263. See also Courtney, "The Size of Canada's Parliament".

[14] See for example, David Kilgour, "Discipline versus Democracy," Parliamentary Government, 8,1, (Spring 1988) pp. 21-23.

situation wherein politicians could cultivate a "personal vote" along the lines of U.S. Congresspersons is unclear. One should not ignore, after all, the strength of party and party leader in dominating the Canadian electoral system. Simply put, the electoral system remains the number one cause of short careers in Canadian politics, not the individual office holders leaving Parliament due to an unwelcoming opportunity structure.

Finally, the opportunity structure argument is deficient in ignoring the possibility that MPs with different ideas about elected office - ideas gained prior to entering office - may try to alter the structure and values of the House. It was suggested in chapter two that the only type of value that was integral to the choices members made about serving in office was the level of ambition held by members. But what of preconceived notions of the role of elected members, developed at the pre-political stage and brought with them to office? Will MPs with different ideas about elected office try to alter the values and norms of elected office? If so, where are these different ideas of political office developed and how can they effect the values of members of parliament? Rational choice, with its emphasis on a pre-existing structure, pays scant attention to the effects of pre-political socialization on career choice.

Is there an alternative? One possible method of examining the ideas brought to the legislature with members of parliament is to examine their pre-political careers and the types of values that are formed by members in their careers prior to

entering office. In Britain Anthony King has argued that the changing occupational background of members of Parliament has altered the types of attitudes that members display toward their roles in the House. Many British parliamentarians still hold part-time occupations to supplement the income receive as MPs. King has noted a change in the type of secondary career for MPs, moving away from professional positions and toward what he describes as "facilitating occupations."[15] Facilitating occupations are those positions conducive to a public life, such as public relations, University lecturing, media and teaching. King considers these occupations as more attuned to political careers because they encourage the free expression of ideas and values as compared to the "hired gun approach" of lawyers or business people. He suggests that a tentative outcome of having more members with facilitating careers in Parliament is that these members will be more inclined to express personal or constituency views that run counter to party platforms and be less inclined to unquestioningly tow the party line.[16]

In Canada, there has been a recent movement towards members entering office whose prior career was what King classifies as a "facilitating career". At the same time the domination of lawyers and businessmen in the House has begun to subside. However, as Table 5.1 illustrates, the single occupational group

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[15] Anthony King, "The Rise of the Career Politician in Britain - And its Consequences", British Journal of Political Science, II (1980?) pp.261-262.

[16] Ibid. p.262.

to compete with lawyers and businessmen as an over represented body has been schoolteachers, part of King's facilitating group.[17]

TABLE 5.1
PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLTEACHERS AND LAWYERS/BUSINESSMEN IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS: NINE ENTRY CLASSES 1900-1979.

YEAR ENTERED	LAWYERS	BUSINESSMEN	TEACHERS
1900	28	33	0
1911	34	17	0
1921	18	17	2
1930	31	20	0
1940	20	15	6
1949	25	14	2
1958	23	22	3
1968	14	16	13
1979	12	12	13

Source: Roger Gibbins and Doreen Barrie data set.

This increase in the number of people from facilitating occupations and concomitant decrease in the number of "hired guns" has not brought about the changes in Canada that King has suggested have occurred in Britain. It is perhaps too soon to measure the effects of this new type of member in the Canadian political arena. However, as a framework for understanding political careers and career choices, the opportunity structure argument all but ignores the values members of parliament bring with them to office. Instead it concentrates on the role of individual ambition only after actors choose to enter the

[17] While Canada has been somewhat unique in having individuals move from the public service into public office, these moves have been few compared to the size of other occupational groups. When they have occurred however, senior public servants have usually had a quick ride to senior leadership positions in Parliament (for example, Mackenzie King, Lester Pearson and Marc Lalonde).

political field.

In sum, the rational choice use of opportunity structures as shaping career choices has several weaknesses. First, it portrays the effects of the electoral system as, at best, one of a number of calculations self-interested actors consider when debating the merits of a political career rather than a system which helps to determine the career length of many politicians. Second, the rational choice argument concentrates on the ambition of individuals to the exclusion of the values and beliefs that they both bring with them to office and those that are developed once elected to Parliament. It accepts as given that all members enter office with similar ideas or that the ideas and values that office seekers gained in their non-political careers are not integral to the choices they make about entering and leaving public office. Third, it suggests that rational actors have the capacity to change institutional arrangements to their liking. Yet in Canada at least, politicians have yet to radically alter the institutional arrangements of political office to suit their desires. Even if they did, there is no evidence to suggest that this would result in longer political careers.

Therefore despite its initial appeal as an explanatory tool, the rational choice use of opportunity structures leaves many questions about Canadian political careers unanswered. As described immediately above, it fails in part by ignoring both

the effects of the electoral system. These weaknesses of the rational choice argument all hold a common link. Simply put, the rational choice argument fails to adequately integrate institutionally induced factors into the opportunity structure of elected office. These institutionally induced factors include two components. First, it includes the attitudes and beliefs members hold about their role in political life, and second it includes the strength of institutions (for example the electoral system and the party system) in helping to shape career outcomes.

NEW INSTITUTIONALISM: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

It was suggested in the first chapter that an institutional perspective examines both the depth and breadth of institutions in shaping and channelling the choices individuals make about political life. The 'vertical depth' of an institution "refers to the extent to which the institutional structure defines the individuals actors."[18] March and Olson argue that institutions play a primal role in defining how actors perceive and define the choices available to them. They further suggest that "the polity embodies a political community and [that] the identities and capabilities of individuals cannot be seen as established apart from, or prior to, their membership and position in the

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[18] Stephen Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," Comparative Political Studies, 21:1, (April, 1988). p. 74.

community."[19] Individuals therefore see themselves as existing within an institution and the values that individuals develop are reflections of the values of the institution. The longer the relationship an individual has with an institution and the greater the history of the institution, the closer the individual's values will resemble those values expressed by the institution.

The 'horizontal breadth' of institutions refers to "the way in which a particular institution fits into a broader institutional framework."[20] Krasner suggests that institutions are not autonomous structures but interconnect with other institutions. These interconnections vary and depending upon the number of linkages any given institution has with other structures these interconnections can help to determine how resilient a structure is to change. As Krasner argues,

> If a particular activity can be changed without altering anything else, there is no linkage. If one modification requires changes in many others, then a particular activity is densely linked. Holding other things constant, the greater the number of links, the higher the level of institutionalization.[21]

If an institution is part of a 'broader institutional framework' then the constraints shaping human actors within that institution will be all the more complex. As mentioned earlier,

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[19] James March and Johan Olson, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics, (New York: The Free Press, 1989) p. 161.

[20] Stephen Krasner, "Sovereignty", p.75.

[21] Ibid. p. 75.

Elster suggests that desires are often products of the opportunities presented to an individual and that it is easier to change opportunities than desires.[22] Within an institutional framework, such an analysis must be case dependent. In situations where there exists few institutional linkages and little history -in Krasner's terms little breadth and depth - it would be relatively easy to alter the structure of opportunities. In cases where there are stronger linkages and a more substantial institutional history, the task of overcoming these obstacles would presumably be a much greater challenge.[23] The ability to alter opportunities then is dependent upon a complex meshing of a number of factors. Institutions are neither malleable nor impregnable.

A neo-institutional perspective considers the constraining feature of institutions as much more deep seated than rational choice theorists. Institutions structure actors choices by shaping their norms and values as well as structuring their opportunities. Individuals often develop their identity through the institution and in this sense at least the institution pre-

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[22] Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). pp. 22-29.

[23] Atkinson and Nigol argue that even given strong linkages the ability to change institutional arrangements may rest with "state actors who often possess considerable capacity to fashion outcomes in the face of societal resistance." See Michael Atkinson and Robert Nigol, "Selecting Policy Instruments: Neo-Institutional and Rational Choice Interpretations of Automobile Insurance in Ontario," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 22, 1, (March 1989) p.108.

dates the individuals who occupy roles within it.[24] Institutions can also structure choices simply by the number and density of linkages they hold with other structures.

It is important to emphasize that a neo-institutional perspective does not maintain that structures are impervious to human change and alteration. Legislatures, for example, can and do change with the type of person who serves in them, although this change may be slow and is often a partial result of complementary changes in connecting institutions. At the very least however, the institutionalist perspective suggests that the relationship between an institution and its members is fluid and real. Actors cannot simply use an institution, constraints and all, without both having an effect on the structure and at the same time be affected by it.

It has not been the intention of this thesis, nor is it the aim of this chapter, to provide a neo-institutional examination of political careers in Canada. Such a study cannot be given justice within the constraints of this paper. However, the following section will provide a cursory look at how a neo-institutional examination of career choices might begin to address the issues of the depth and breadth of Parliament and member's association with them. The following section will only

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[24] For a critique of rational choice's understanding of the history of institutions and individuals see Robert Grafstein, "The Problem of Institutional Constraint," The Journal of Politics, 50,3 (August 1988).

examine those issues dealing with members' attitudes toward elected life, which were used to highlight some of the deficiencies of the rational choice approach. The following section will not deal with the effects of the electoral system on career length. However, as has been made evident throughout this thesis, the horizontal links between Parliament, the electoral system and political parties are quite strong. Changes to parliamentary and party structures therefore cannot be undertaken in isolation from the electoral system but must be cognizant of the institutional linkages which exist.

NEO INSTITUTIONALISM AND POLITICAL CAREERS: A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION

The depth and breadth of Canadian political institutions helps to structure elected life. By extension therefore, beliefs and views of members that are developed through or by institutions also structure elected life. What attitudes do members hold about the role of their political parties? What are their attitudes about their own role within political parties? Finally, what beliefs and attitudes do members hold about their roles within parliament? These types of questions are much more difficult to assess than questions about the accessibility - or lack thereof -of the opportunity structure. Yet these are the types of questions that must be addressed if a study of political careers is to be undertaken which includes institutionally induced values in its analysis.

In his early examination of the United States Senate, Donald Matthews discusses six 'folkways' of legislative life.[25] These folkways are; apprenticeship, legislative work, specialization, courtesy, reciprocity, and institutional patriotism. New senators are expected to apprentice on junior committees and find an area of specialization to develop expertise in a particular policy area. All members are expected to participate in the less glamorous legislative functions, treat each other with courtesy, respect each others policy goals and perhaps most importantly, hold the institution of the Senate in esteem and never belittle it. Matthews asserts that "senators who conform to the folkways are rewarded with high esteem by their colleagues" and that "without these folkways the Senate could never operate in anything like its present manner."[26]

Matthews argues that these folkways are practised by all senators and help to maintain the status quo of the Senate. Of the six folkways, two - specialization and reciprocity - can perhaps be viewed as part of a personal opportunity structure. Senators follow these norms solely to help themselves up the career ladder and achieve both positions of authority within the Senate and local projects for their districts.[27] The other four

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[25] Donald Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960).

[26] Ibid. pp. 102-116.

[27] Reciprocity is closely linked to Wiengast's rational choice understanding of Congressional norms, where congressmen help each other achieve local projects and thus recognition in their districts and hopefully re-election.

folkways have more direct links to the institutional status quo. In helping to protect and promote the values of the institution, these latter four norms create institutional depth. These folkways have become institutional norms or values. It is not clear that they help members realize office ambitions. They certainly have pre-dated all of the senators who were observing them at the time of Matthew's study. However, these folkways continued to be observed by rookie senators who were emulating the behaviour of senior senators who in turn were emulating the behaviour of their own forbears.

Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives may come to office with initial ideas of service and find themselves frustrated when they meet an opportunity structure that is incompatible with their goals. Yet these members stay and their desires either change or become less fundamental to the goals and norms of the institution they serve in. Irwin Gertzog has suggested that this type of attitude has not been uncommon among Republican Representatives in the Democratically controlled House.[28] Despite experiencing initial frustration with elected office the majority of opposition Republicans decided to continue their career in politics.

Canadian studies have tended to focus on the role of pre-

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[28] Irwin Gertzog, "The Socialization of Freshmen Congressmen: Some Agents of Organizational Continuity" Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1970. As quoted in Christopher Deering, "The New Apprenticeship: Strategies of Effectiveness for New Members of the House," Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1984.

electoral experiences and socio-economic background shaping legislative behaviour and have treated the importance of institutionally derived values as peripheral. Nonetheless, some studies have touched upon the influence of institutionally derived values in changing the attitudes of politicians about their perceptions of elected life. Scholars who have studied in this field are not neo-institutionalists. However, some of the findings of their studies suggest that members, over time, begin to develop the values put forth by Parliament and party.

Clarke and Price, in their study of rookie members of the 1974 Parliament, found that almost all of these new members (85%) changed their ideas about their role in Parliament after getting elected. Many members expressed initial dissatisfaction over their role.[29] However, more of these members eventually left federal office by defeat than by personal choice.[30] Why? In a related study, Clarke, Price and Krause suggest that "several agents played a part in the post-election socialization of freshmen" members of the 1974 Parliament.[31] The two most

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[29] Harold Clarke and Richard Price, "Freshman MPs' Job Images: The Effects of Incumbency, Ambition and Position," Canadian Journal of Political Science, XIII,3 (September, 1980), p.589.

[30] Clarke and Price examined all 1974 rookie MPs. Of the random sample of exiting members taken for this thesis, more MP's who first entered the House in 1974 have been defeated in the elections of 1979, 1980, 1984 and 1988 than have left voluntarily.

[31] Harold Clarke, Richard Price, and Robert Krause, "The Socialization of Freshman Legislators: The Case of Canadian MPs" in Jon Pammett and Michael Whittington, ed. Foundations of Political Culture: Political Socialization in Canada, (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976), pp. 211-238.

frequently mentioned agents were other MPs - particularly veteran members - and party caucuses. Over half of rookie members mentioned these two as the prime agents of change.

Kornberg and Mishler have also all suggested that many new members of the House of Commons change their views of parliamentary life after getting elected. Among the factors influencing new members are the views of veteran members, including cabinet ministers. Like the U.S. Senate, the Canadian House of Commons has its own set of informal rules which encourage members to conform to party norms and maintain the institutional status quo.[32] And like the U.S. Senate, these informal rules and norms of the House of Commons pre-date the sitting members yet continued to be observed by rookies and veterans alike.

For those MPs who find their first few years in Parliament discouraging yet decided to continue their career, it may be that veteran members are able to convince rookie office holders that the constraints of office are not so discouraging as to warrant leaving office early. If so, members who come to terms with the organizational constraints are making decisions to pursue political careers not on the basis of office ambition but rather values that are shaped by institutional norms which pre-date even the most veteran members.

Thomas and Atkinson have stressed the need to study the

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[32] Allan Kornberg and William Mishler, Influence in Parliament: Canada, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1976) pp. 75-98.

role of parties when examining Canadian political careers.[33] Members, who gain nomination and election through the party machine, may take on the views expressed by the party hierarchy for the need for strong discipline and unity. Thomas has suggested that "most of the actions by individual [politicians] are, in fact, forms of party behaviour."[34] While structures such as caucus meetings provide an interaction between party members and the party leadership and allow a legitimate and private outlet for members upset at the party hierarchy, they also serve to keep the party united behind the party leadership. As well, the rewards for loyalty to the party help to promote among members values that originate from the party itself.

This suggests, albeit in a cursory manner, that the factors influencing members are not limited to the opportunity structure of political advancement. The institution of Parliament has a depth that may well affect the way individual members react to the opportunity structure. Likewise, parties have a long history in Canada in organizing political life. Parties may shape the values that members hold about politics and their individual role within political life. The link between parliament and party helps to strengthen their respective influence in the way that career choices are presented to

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[33] Michael Atkinson and Paul Thomas, "Studying the Canadian Parliament," forthcoming, p.38.

[34] Paul Thomas, "Parliamentary Reform Through Political Parties," in John Courtney, ed. The Canadian House of Commons Observed: Essays in the Honour of Norman Ward, (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1985) p.43.

individual office holders. MPs may not simply view themselves solely as self-interested actors maximizing opportunities but rather as members of a larger institutional community. Such a view may begin to provide an explanation as to why a large number of politicians, shut out of meaningful leadership roles, nonetheless desire to remain part of the Parliamentary community.

Yet if institutions develop members attitudes toward public life, what role is played by the pre-political values - values gained in prior occupations - that members bring with them to Parliament? If members views of themselves and their roles change after they enter Parliament, does this not contradict King's assertion that the values members gained in prior occupations affects the legislative environment? As suggested above, the strength of institutions in shaping political life is case dependent, and is often a function of the links between institutions and the depth of institutionally derived values. The types of changes that occurred in Britain may not occur in Canada simply as a result of the institutional linkages between Parliament and party and the full time requirements of MPs in Canada.

Even prior to the emergence of the facilitating career in Britain, party discipline in Westminster was not as strong as it presently is in Canada. When more members from facilitating careers began to enter office in Britain therefore, they were entering a system where party loyalty was not as overriding a

feature of the opportunity structure as it is in Canada.[35] As well, few federal members in Canada today continue in their pre-political career. While members no doubt bring to office the values and ideas they have learned in previous positions they are not reinforced on a regular basis. In relying on outside employment for supplemental income British MPs are not leaving the ideas gained in facilitating careers behind, but are continually exchanging the values of political office with the values of their secondary career. This clash of values is less likely to occur in the Canadian Parliament where in most instances Members do not hold day to day ties with their non-political career.

Nonetheless, despite the structural differences between office holder's non-political careers in Canada and Britain, the high rate of turnover in Canada suggests that the opportunity for new and different values to be injected into Parliament does exist. The Canadian political institutions of Parliament, party and the electoral system hold a strong depth and breadth and may not be as open to change as Britain's political institutions.

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[35] It is true that the increase in MPs with facilitating careers in Britain has coincided with a decrease in party discipline. Elements of independence from party have historically be more evident in Britain than they have been in Canada however. For an examination of the more recent emergence of independent MP in Britain see Philip Norton, "The Changing Face of the British House of Commons," Legislative Studies Quarterly, V, 3 (August 1980) pp.333 -357. As well, this is not to suggest that the structure in Britain provides easier access to positions of meaningful authority than the Canadian structure. The large size of the British Commons' and the limited Question Period are just two examples of the limits of the British opportunity structure.

Such changes therefore may be harder to undertake and be slower in coming about. If so, the changes which may be necessary to encourage some MPs to pursue longer political careers - namely a lessening of party discipline and the development of more independently minded MPs - may not happen as quickly as some proponents of parliamentary reform would like.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has attempted to provide an understanding of why Canadian political careers have developed in the manner that they have. It was demonstrated that the typical Canadian federal political career is relatively short and is undertaken by individuals with little previous electoral experience. Other than general observations or indirect analysis from other studies, little attention has been paid to the causes of this short Canadian political career. It is hoped that this thesis will supplement this field of research and help add to our understanding of Canadian political careers.

Using the opportunity structure of office as a framework for analysis has helped to increase our understanding of political careers in Canada. However, some flaws were found within the rubric of the opportunity structure argument. Not all politicians seemingly treat political office as an set of opportunities. The level of voluntary exits among political neophytes is not dangerously high, as some conventional wisdom has suggested. In fact, faced with a discouraging opportunity structure, many private members remain in office for at least

twelve years before choosing to leave. The question then becomes, 'what is driving, or influencing, their decisions to maintain a political career?'

Trying to answer this question forces an examination of those factors which the rational choice argument fails to adequately consider. Specifically, what other factors influence the decisions made by political actors about their political careers? This is not a question which can be easily addressed. However, some initial speculations were raised and briefly examined. For example, what kind of perceptions do members bring with them to elected office that may be a product of past careers? Does this hold the potential for shaping members views about their roles as representatives? Does this hold the potential for shaping members views about the attractiveness of a political career within the existing system? And perhaps a much more fundamental question, what roles do party and parliament play in shaping the choices politicians make about their careers and how they view their role within the legislative system?

These types of questions hold a common link. They suggest that the relationship between the institution of Parliament and its membership is a function of both Parliament, supported and interrelated structures, and of politicians themselves. This type of analysis considers institutions as shaping individuals choices in a much more fundamental manner than simply portraying life within the institution as an opportunity set. Members are

not detached from the structures of elected office but rather embrace these structures, and the values that these structures hold, when they, as individuals, choose to enter the political arena. Likewise the institution is not impervious to the desires of its membership for change. As Donald Matthews has suggested, this type of analysis sees politicians changing with the type of legislature they enter and legislatures changing with the type of members they hold.[36] To this must be added the Canadian political parties which, as demonstrated, hold strong links with the institution of Parliament, and help to provide an identity for both new and veteran MPs.

Proponents of parliamentary reform might be well advised to pay closer attention to the role of institutions in shaping politicians values and beliefs. A neo-institutional analysis suggests that changing the opportunity structure may, in and of itself, not provide the expected changes in career satisfaction. If problems in career satisfaction exist, they may be more deep-seated than has so far been suggested.

To date, research on political careers in Canada has all but ignored those members who have left Parliament. Yet studying the exit patterns of Parliamentarians has provided a useful critique of the opportunity structure problematic. Much more work in this field has yet to be done. This thesis has only identified that Parliamentary exits, and in particular

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[36] Donald Matthews, "Political Recruitment and Political Careers," Legislative Studies Quarterly, IX,4, (November 1984) pp. 572-573.

voluntary vacancies, may hold a legitimate key to unlocking our understanding of career choice. It is hoped that further exploration of political exits, which takes as its point of departure the role played by institutional depth and breadth, will further our knowledge in this important field.

APPENDIX A

ALLOWANCES FOR MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT: 1990

POSITION	SALARY/ALLOWANCE
Sessional Indemnity	$62100
Expense Allowance [1]	$20600
Total	$82700
Additional Allowances	
Prime Minister	$71000
Cabinet Minister/Speaker	$47400
Opposition Leader	$47400
Leader, other parties	$28500
Deputy Speaker	$24800
Opposition House Leader	$23000
Chief Whip, Government/Opposition	$12800
Parliamentary Secretaries	$10200
Deputy Chair/ Asst. Dep. Chair Committee of the Whole	$10200
House Leaders, other parties	$ 9800
Whips, other parties	$ 7300
Deputy Whips, Government/Opposition	$ 7300

[1] Members representing the twenty four largest ridings in the country (save the two MPs from the NorthWest Territories) receive an annual expense allowance of $25,300. The two members from the NorthWest Territories receive an annual expense allowance of $27,000.

PENSION BENEFITS FOR FORMER MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

Former members of parliament are entitled to pensions under The Members of Parliament Retiring Allowance Act. The minimum eligibility requirement under the Act is six years service and two elections. After reaching entitlement, pensions are calculated on the average best six consecutive years of pensionable service multiplied by 5 per cent multiplied by the total years of pensionable service. Once former members reach age sixty, their salaries are fully indexed in the same manner as the Canada Pension.

While sitting, members are required to contribute 11 per cent of their sessional indemnity to their retirement fund. Members who hold additional ministerial or House positions (any of those listed above) have the option of contributing 11 per cent of this additional indemnity to their retirement fund. If members leave parliament, either through defeat or resignation, before they have served six years or won two elections, all contributions are reimbursed. Of MPs who did not return to parliament after the last election (either through retirement or defeat) 55 per cent did not receive pensions from the House.[2]

The following Table shows the percentage of former members who currently receive pensions through The Members of Parliament Retiring Allowance Act.

PENSION BENEFITS CURRENTLY PAID TO FORMER MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

PER CENT		AMOUNT
5%	receive less than	$5000
28%		$10000
43%		$15000
51%		$20000
68%		$25000
82%		$30000
90%		$35000

[2] Source for statistics on Pension Benefits: Commission to Review Allowances of Members of Parliament, Gerry St. Germain, Chairmen. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1989. See also Members of Parliament Retirement Allowance Pension Procedures, House of Commons Comptroller's Office, August 1990.

APPENDIX B

AGES ENTERED AND YEARS SERVED FOR MPS BY ENTRY CLASS 1867 - 1974

ENTRY CLASS	AGE ENTERED MEAN	AGE ENTERED STD DEV	YEARS SERVED MEAN	YEARS SERVED STD DEV
1867	44.6	9.5	9.5	7.7
1872	41.4	11.0	8.6	8.0
1874	41.8	12.9	7.6	8.0
1878	41.7	10.9	8.1	5.9
1882	43.3	8.1	9.6	6.6
1887	43.7	9.7	8.1	5.9
1891	43.8	8.9	8.5	9.5
1896	45.4	9.9	8.6	6.5
1900	47.1	10.1	9.1	7.6
1904	46.0	10.5	8.6	5.8
1908	44.5	8.4	8.8	6.3
1911	44.5	9.7	9.0	5.6
1917	47.5	8.8	8.2	6.4
1921	48.1	9.3	9.2	6.9
1925	50.2	9.7	8.8	6.2
1926	45.3	10.4	9.1	7.3
1930	47.7	10.6	8.5	5.5
1935	47.7	10.2	11.5	7.4
1940	46.2	9.9	11.1	7.5
1945	46.0	10.0	9.1	5.5
1949	46.8	10.4	8.5	5.8
1953	44.5	9.6	8.0	5.7
1957	44.0	9.2	8.4	7.1
1962	42.4	10.2	8.1	6.0
1963	42.8	11.2	7.8	5.9
1965	42.4	9.6	10.3	6.3
1968	40.1	11.7	9.2	5.0
1972	40.1	13.1	8.8	4.3
1974	37.0	12.5	8.0	10.2
1979	34.3	19.2		
1980	42.5	8.5		
1984	41.3	12.7		

Source: Gibbins/Barrie data set

APPENDIX C

AN ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION AND CAREER LENGTH

An analysis was undertaken to try and measure the effects of political parties on the career length of individual members. As party affiliation is only a nominal level measure, an analysis of variance was performed using the length of political careers as a dependent variable and political affiliation as an independent variable. The results below - like the results of the regression analysis in chapter three - suggest that rational actors are better off joining the Liberal Party. The average career length for Liberal MPs is just over one year longer than that of Progressive Conservative MPs and almost two years longer than New Democratic and Social Credit MPs.

CAREER LENGTH BY POLITICAL PARTY: 1867-1984

	PROG. CONS.	LIBERAL	NEW DEMOCRAT	SOCIAL CREDIT
ETA*	-.57	.68	-1.13	-.97
MEAN YEARS SERVED	7.84	9.09	7.27.	7.42
NUMBER	1408	1471	104	70

R2 = 8.9
*all coefficients are significant at the .01 level

The results of analysis using entry classes for the three periods, 1867-1911, 1917-1953 and 1957-1984 produced similar results.

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