TILLICH & JUNG: A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THEOLOGY & PSYCHOLOGY
PAUL TILLICH AND CARL JUNG:
A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THEOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

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TITLE: Paul Tillich and Carl Jung: A Dialogue Between Theology and Psychology

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This thesis explores the relationship between theology and psychology through a reflection on the thought of Paul Tillich and Carl Jung. Tillich's formal theological method -- the method of correlation -- provides a framework for understanding the relationship between these disciplines and serves as the basic structure of this thesis. According to the method of correlation, the relationship between psychology and theology is correlative; they speak to each other as question and answer. Consequently, I attempt to determine the degree to which Jung's psychological analysis of the human condition and the questions implied in this analysis can be correlated with Tillich's theological answers. This exercise begins with an examination of the method of correlation in which I argue that correlation is not, for Tillich, a simple pairing of psychological questions and theological answers, but an exercise which involves a critical examination of the questions. Such an examination serves to draw them into the "theological circle." According to Jung, the questions implied in the human condition are questions about alienated existence. In a critical examination of this position, I argue that the symptoms of alienation identified by Jung actually point to a more serious condition than he acknowledges -- a condition which not only involves alienation from our own being, but also alienation from the being of God. This draws Jung's position into the theological circle. Tillich's theological answer to this condition of complete alienation is the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. Although Jung offers a potent criticism of the symbol of Christ as an answer to the human condition, Tillich's position is capable of responding to this criticism and therefore stands as a powerful response to the questions implied in Jung's analysis.
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This thesis is dedicated to Paul Bramadat -- I cannot adequately express how much his support has meant to me, except by promising that I will never again undertake a project such as this for as long as we both shall live.

Karen Palmer
Paul Tillich and Carl Jung: A Dialogue Between Theology and Psychology

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Chapter One: Introduction

In the Western world, the relationship between psychology and theology has historically been characterized by a certain degree of antagonism. For the most part, theologians have been suspicious that psychologists harbour an unacknowledged antipathy toward religion. As early as 1891, Pere Maisonneuve, of the Catholic Scientific Congress in Paris, declared that "psychology is an enemy of Christian philosophy."\(^1\) Admittedly, not all theologians shared this opinion. For example, Desire Mercier, a professor at the University of Louvain and a contemporary of Maisonneuve described psychology as "a young science, neither spiritualistic nor materialistic"\(^2\) and anticipated future developments in psychology with some measure of optimism. Mercier, however, found himself in the minority on this issue.

The tendency toward suspicion of psychology and its methods was strengthened with the publication of Sigmund Freud's works on religion. After all, Freud claimed that religion was no more than a defence against the superior force of nature and a meagre

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consolation for the shortcomings of civilization. As such, he felt it was "the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity." Freud's analysis of religion helped to usher in a long period of virtual silence between psychology and theology. As Brendan Collins points out, even in the late 1970's the relationship between these disciplines was "cautious and tentative." More recently, however, there has been increased discussion about possible interconnections between psychological and theological thought. This renewal in the dialogue is evidenced by a growing number of articles and books exploring the nature of these interconnections.

Although this publishing explosion did not begin until the early 1980's, there were earlier efforts to overcome the antagonism between the two disciplines. Psychologists (such as Carl Jung, Viktor Frankl, and Gordon Allport) and theologians (such as Paul Tillich and Victor White) attempted to incorporate both psychological and theological insights into their work, thereby challenging the formerly rigid boundaries separating the two areas of thought.

In an effort to bring into focus some of the more interesting dimensions of the relationship between psychology and religion, I shall explore the thought of Carl Jung and Paul Tillich; the first a depth psychologist, the second a liberal Christian theologian. As I shall argue, these two seminal thinkers are natural conversational partners in this

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dialogue between psychology and theology. Furthermore, Tillich’s theology provides a framework for understanding the relationship between these disciplines, namely, the method of correlation. According to this method, the relationship between psychology and theology is correlative: they speak to each other as question and answer. Appropriately, I shall structure my own reflection according to this method. In particular, I shall attempt to correlate Jung’s psychological questions about the human situation with Tillich’s theological answers in terms of Christian symbols and doctrine. In other words, this thesis will be an exercise in correlation. Before elaborating the structure of this exercise, I shall begin by considering the natural affinity which exists between Tillich and Jung.

Partners in Dialogue: Jung and Tillich

Jung and Tillich are appropriate conversational partners for this dialogue between psychology and theology for various reasons: both attempted to renew the lines of conversation between their two disciplines, and both are "boundary thinkers," not fitting neatly within the dimensions of either psychology or theology. Furthermore, there are surprising structural similarities in their thought.

Within the psychological arena, Jung sought to re-establish connections between psychology and theology by demonstrating that the religious impulse is innate, that it is part of the structure of the psyche, and as such must be expressed. In contrast to Freud,
Jung argued that it was a potentially life enhancing force. Indeed, in *Psychotherapists or the Clergy*, Jung claimed that the improvement of his patients in the second half of life was invariably accompanied by the recovery of a religious sense. And in *The Undiscovered Self*, he made the more dramatic claim that the only "antidote" to the tyranny of conformism and the subsequent alienation and neuroticization of modern man is the renewal of the religious attitude.

This is not to say that Jung's analysis of religion was exclusively positive or that theologians embraced his psychology without critical reserve. With respect to Jung's reception among theologians, it is true that he was initially celebrated as a positive alternative to Freud. As Clifford Brown points out, Jung's break with Freud was perceived by many to be connected to their differing interpretations of religion. And, because the theological community had discerned in Freud's analysis of religion an extremely negative view of it, "they expected and hoped all the more to find in Jung someone who would set forth an explicitly positive evaluation of the religious dimension of human life." Theologians, however, became more reserved in their acceptance of

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Jung's psychology once the critical aspects of his analysis of religion became clear.°

Indeed, Jung was critical of religion and what he saw as its destructive potential. He attacked certain Christian doctrines (most notably, the privatio boni doctrine of the origin of evil) as psychologically inadequate and even proposed the restructuring of Christianity along quaternitarian, rather than trinitarian, lines. He went so far as to describe Jesus as an incomplete symbol of wholeness, incapable of expressing the fullness of the human self.10

Even though Jung's psychology is not exclusively positive in its evaluation of religion (and Christianity in particular), Jung attempted to articulate a theology which would be more open to religious phenomena and their doctrinal expression. From Jung's own perspective, his criticisms made possible a deeper appreciation of Christian symbols and doctrine by revealing their source in the depths of the psyche. Rather than undermining the openness of his psychology, he felt his proposed restructuring of Christianity made it more responsive to the needs of modern man and deepened the

°This "loss of innocence" experienced by some theologians is evident in Victor White’s relationship with Jung. Originally enthusiastic about the possibility of a collaboration between theology and Jungian thought, White eventually became quite critical of Jung. Toward the end of their relationship, White described Jung's article "On the Self" as "somewhat confused and confusing pages ... another infelicitous excursion of a great scientist outside his orbit ... and a brief unhappy encounter with scholastic thought." F.X. Charet offers an insightful look into this interesting relationship in "A Dialogue Between Psychology and Theology: The Correspondence of C.G. Jung and Victor White" (in The Journal of Analytic Psychology, 35(4) (October, 1990).

relationship between psychological and theological thought. As John Dourley notes, Jung "understood his work to be in the defence and service of the religious nature of man."\(^{11}\) Jung was grieved by his lack of reception among theological circles: feeling that his religious ideas were not properly understood or appreciated, he frequently remarked that "they would have burned me at the stake in the Middle Ages!"\(^{12}\)

Within the theological arena, Tillich saw depth psychology as a great asset to theology. According to Tillich, it provided new insight into the nature of the self,\(^{13}\) stood as an ally with theology in the fight against the dehumanizing effects of modern society,\(^{14}\) and provided a heightened sense of sin as the universal estrangement of human beings from their essential nature.\(^{15}\) Tillich asserted that he "did not think it is possible today to elaborate a Christian doctrine of man, and especially a Christian doctrine of the Christian man, without using the immense material brought forth by depth psychology."\(^{16}\) In fact, Tillich’s interest in psychology led him to form what was called

\(^{11}\text{John P. Dourley, C.G. Jung and Paul Tillich: The Psyche as Sacrament (Toronto: Inner City Books, 1981), 7.}\)


\(^{14}\text{Paul Tillich, The Spiritual Situation in Our Technological Society, ed. J. Mark Thomas (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1988), 136.}\)

\(^{15}\text{Ibid., 123.}\)

the "New York Psychology Group," which met in New York between 1941 and 1945. The group included a variety of therapists and intellectuals such as Eric Fromm and Rollo May.17

This receptivity to psychological insight is exemplified in Tillich's attempt to correlate psychological accounts (as well as other non-theological, "existential" accounts) of the human condition with the Christian message. In fact, this is the essence of the formal theological method which structures Tillich's Systematic Theology -- the method of correlation. Through this method the theologian "makes an analysis of the human situation out of which the existential questions arise, and demonstrates that the symbols used in the Christian message are answers to these questions."18

Tillich, however, did not embrace psychology without reservation. He argues that psychology is incapable of differentiating existential and pathological anxiety19 and does not acknowledge the dimension of responsibility which characterizes existential estrangement. (ST II, 46) Furthermore, psychology, like all "existential" endeavors, is limited: it can only pose the questions of human existence and cannot, Tillich contends, provide answers to these questions.


"Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, I (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), 62. Hereafter, all references to Systematic Theology shall be cited parenthetically within the body of this thesis, by volume number and page number.

From Tillich's own perspective, however, acknowledging these limitations does not prohibit a fruitful dialogue between psychology and theology. To the contrary, such acknowledgment serves to clarify the ways in which these disciplines can speak to each other. In *The Courage To Be*, Tillich delineated the limits of each discipline in order to reveal some "principles for the co-operation of the theological and medical [(psychological)] faculties in dealing with anxiety." Like Jung, Tillich understood his criticisms and clarifications as facilitating a "relationship of mutual interpenetration" between the disciplines.

As outlined above, Jung neither completely embraced nor completely rejected religion; similarly, Tillich neither completely embraced nor completely rejected psychology. Both Jung and Tillich also had ambiguous relationships with their own disciplines. Although his psychology attained some measure of popularity, Jung did not feel welcome within the psychological community. Indeed, the publication of *Symbols of Transformation* marked Jung's departure from the Freudian theory of the libido and served to alienate Jung not only from Freud but also from the psychological community which was dominated by Freudian thought. In his autobiography, Jung described the intellectual isolation he encountered: "After the break with Freud, all my friends and acquaintances dropped away. My book was declared to be rubbish; I was a mystic, and

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"Ibid., 73.

that settled the matter."\textsuperscript{22}

Similarly, Tillich felt somewhat estranged from the theological community. Like Jung, he adopted a position which was at odds with the dominant trends within his discipline. In particular, Tillich's theology attempted to mediate between the demands of contemporary culture and the eternal message of Christianity. But of course, Tillich pursued this theological goal during what has been called "the Barthian captivity of modern Christian thought."\textsuperscript{23} That is, that period in which Barth's view that "any attempt to reconcile the Christian revelation with philosophy or science was fundamentally erroneous and doomed to failure"\textsuperscript{24} dominated theological reflection. Tillich's experience of alienation in this context prompted him to describe himself as \textit{christianis paganus}, "to the Christians a pagan."\textsuperscript{25}

Tillich and Jung found themselves at the boundary between disciplines. In \textit{On the Boundary}, Tillich argued that the boundary was the best place to find knowledge, and suggested that the concept of the boundary was a fitting symbol for his life, as at almost every point he had "to stand between alternative possibilities of existence, to be

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23}John P. Clayton, \textit{The Concept of Correlation: Paul Tillich and the Possibility of a Mediating Theology} (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1980), 7.
\item \textsuperscript{24}F.X. Charet, "A Dialogue Between Psychology and Theology: The Correspondence of C.G. Jung and Victor White," in \textit{The Journal of Analytical Psychology} 35(4) (October 1990), 437.
\item \textsuperscript{25}John P. Dourley, \textit{C.G. Jung and Paul Tillich; The Psyche as Sacrament}, op. cit., 7.
\end{itemize}
completely at home in neither and to take no definitive stand against either. As boundary thinkers, Tillich and Jung are sensitive to the demands of each discipline.

As William R. Rogers notes, there are specific parallel elements between Jung's and Tillich's thought as well as "fundamental similarities in the structure" of their thought. For both men, the religious impulse is innate and can be a life-enhancing force which seeks to balance and expand our life and consciousness. Both Jung and Tillich recognized that our current interpretations of Christianity did not offer much "spiritual sustenance." And both sought to restore a deeper, richer sense of religion and Christianity and to revive modern man's weakened symbolic sensibility. As John P. Dourley emphasizes, these points of similarity "could be of great importance in the deepening and revitalization of both psychology and theology, by showing practitioners of each discipline the points of interconnection."

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77As Ann Belford Ulanov suggests, this boundary place signalled Tillich's "reaching out to include all manner and forms of disciplines from which to build his theological system." (See "The Anxiety of Being," in The Theology of Paul Tillich eds. James Luther Adams, Wilhelm Pauck, and Roger Lincoln Shinn (San Francisco: Harper and Row Publishers, 1985), 120).

38William Rogers, "Tillich and Depth Psychology," op. cit., 110. (Italics added)

An Exercise in Correlation

The first and central task of this thesis is to determine what it means to correlate Jung’s psychology and Tillich’s theology, and hence how to proceed with this exercise in correlation. Consequently, in chapter two, I shall consider Tillich’s formal explanation of his theological method through his definition of the term ‘correlation’ as well as his more informal explanation in terms of the metaphor of question and answer. I shall argue that his metaphor connecting existential/psychological/philosophical questions with theological answers provides insight into what would be involved in an exercise in correlation. Specifically, this metaphor suggests that the kind of questions involved in the correlative exercise are questions about the nature of estranged existence. Furthermore, it suggests that correlation is somewhat more involved than simply pairing up existential questions with the appropriate theological responses. Rather, correlation begins with a critical reflection on the existential analyses of the human situation. This criticism reveals the limitations of such analyses and serves to draw them into what Tillich calls "the theological circle."

This interpretation of Tillich’s method of correlation means that correlating Jung’s psychological understanding of the human condition with Tillich’s theological response will focus on their differing accounts of estrangement and alienation. It also means that the correlative exercise will involve the following stages: (i) a description of Jung’s analysis of estrangement, (ii) a critical reflection on this understanding, and (iii) a demonstration of how Tillich’s interpretation of Christian symbols responds to the Jungian
position.

Given this general structure, chapter three will consist of a description and analysis of Jung's position. According to Jung, alienation is a product of psychological development: although we begin life in a primitive state of wholeness, this wholeness is fractured under the weight of experience. The resulting cleavage between the conscious mind and the recreative depths of the unconscious is a psychic wound which can be healed only by claiming our individuality and achieving a more mature form of wholeness. As I shall argue, for Jung, the experience of estrangement and the movement toward reconciliation is an entirely intrapsychic process, occurring within the individual.

In applying a Tillichian-like criticism to this understanding of the human condition, I shall argue that the symptoms of alienation identified by Jung actually point to a more serious condition than Jung acknowledges. This more serious condition suggests that alienation is not merely intrapsychic in nature but occurs in relation to an extrapsychic, transcendent God.

In chapter three, I shall outline Tillich's theological answers to the questions and dilemmas posed by Jung. In particular, I shall reflect on Tillich's understanding of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. The adequacy of these correlative answers will be tested by Jung's own criticisms of Christianity and the symbol of Christ.
The Interpretive Context

It is useful to place this thesis in the context of other projects addressing similar themes. This thesis has a great deal in common with both Guyton Hammond’s *Man in Estrangement* and John P. Dourley’s *C.G. Jung and Paul Tillich: The Psyche as Sacrament*.

In *Man in Estrangement*, Hammond attempts to correlate Tillich’s thought with Eric Fromm’s psychological account of the human condition. Hammond begins with an insightful analysis of the method of correlation, in which he argues that Tillich’s method is built around the idea of existence as self-estrangement. He argues further that correlation involves the critique and "elevation" of non-theological analyses of human nature through the criterion of self-estrangement.

I believe that my attempt to correlate Jung’s and Tillich’s thought will build on Hammond’s work in a variety of ways. Hammond’s attempt to show that correlation involves a process of "elevation" is interesting and useful. In fact, Hammond’s interpretation bears resemblance to my claim that the method of correlation involves criticism which serves to draw non-theological positions into "the theological circle."

While I clearly agree with much of Hammond’s interpretation, I disagree that "elevation" is driven by the criterion of self-estrangement in the way that Hammond suggests. I shall reflect on these difficulties in the context of my own attempt to understand the method of correlation in chapter two of this thesis.

In *C.G. Jung and Paul Tillich: The Psyche as Sacrament*, John P. Dourley
explores the similarities and differences in the thought of Jung and Tillich under various themes; for example, the nature of God and of the psyche. Although Dourley acknowledges that tensions do exist between their respective positions, he does not explore these differences since, for Dourley, "the correspondences remain striking and deeper than the tensions."30 I aim in this thesis to address not only the surprising affinity between the thought of these two men, but also to provide a more sustained analysis of the tensions which divide them. I believe that by exploring the lines of dissent it is possible to put the relationship between psychology and theology into sharper focus than one could simply by simply considering points of congruence.

Having outlined the reasons why Tillich and Jung make natural conversational partners in this dialogue between theology and psychology, and having outlined the structure and organization of my discussion, I shall now begin this exercise in correlation.

\[\text{Ibid., 27.}\]
The Theological Context of the Method of Correlation

As Tillich acknowledges, "a method is not an 'indifferent net' in which reality is caught" (ST I, 60): the method employed to explain or explore reality is itself an element of our understanding of that reality. Indeed, Tillich's theological method is intimately connected with his understanding of human nature, the being of God, and the relationship between the human and the divine. I shall begin this chapter with a brief description of the broader features of his theology in order to provide both content and context for my subsequent discussion of the method of correlation.

Tillich calls the distinction between essence and existence "the backbone of the whole body of theological thought." (ST I, 204) Acknowledging that these terms are burdened by a degree of ambiguity, he describes essence as

the nature of a thing without any valuation of it, it can mean the universals which characterize a thing, it can mean the ideas in which existing things participate, it can mean the norm by which a thing must be judged, it can mean the original goodness of everything created, and it can mean the pattern of all things in the divine mind. (ST I, 202-3)

By contrast, existence
can mean the actuality of what is potential in the whole realm of essences, it can mean the 'fallen world,' and it can mean a type of thinking which is aware of its existential conditions. (ST I, 203)

Existence is the actualization or the "standing out of" the "mere potentiality" of essence.

For human beings, the essential state is one of "dreaming innocence," characterized not by perfection but by "undecided potentialities." (ST II, 34) It is a state of innocent, but immature, union with God which precedes self-consciousness. The development of consciousness, however, initiates the fall from the essential state to the conditions of existence. The fall from essence to existence represents a loss, for in this process, potentialities are rejected, and those that are actualized are not perfectly realized. Hence existence, although ontologically a higher state of being, "is a distortion of and a falling away from essential possibilities."31 As we come into existence, not only do we lose connection with our essential self, but we also lose our unambiguous, though preconscious, unity with the divine ground of being. These losses are profound for they involve a separation from that to which we essentially belong. (ST II, 45)

The profundity of these losses means that we are unable to rescue ourselves from this condition: "in spite of the power of finite freedom, [man] is unable to achieve the reunion with God." (ST II, 79) However, we always retain some residual connection to our essential being and God. This connection makes possible reconciliation from beyond estranged existence -- reconciliation which is initiated and sustained entirely by the power of God.

The fall into existence also initiates a separation from others and from the world. This sets up what Tillich calls the self-world polarity: that is, the awareness that "man is both over and against the world, as a subject, and in the world, as an object." This ambiguous relationship means that human life is made up a flow of energy between opposites (individualization and participation, dynamics and form, freedom and destiny) which are held in tension.

Tillich urges that "a symptom of both the essential unity and the existential separation of finite man from his infinity is his ability to ask about the infinite to which he belongs: the fact that he must ask about it indicates that he is separated from it." (ST I, 61) But who, or what, is the object of our questioning? What is Tillich's concept of God? Tillich elaborates his understanding of the divine through several interrelated themes: God as ultimate concern, as the power of being, as the unifier of opposites. Perhaps the most accessible of these themes is that of the divine and the dynamics of ultimate concern. That which unconditionally or ultimately concerns us "transcends every preliminary finite and concrete concern." (ST I, 211) As Tillich suggests, it transcends "the whole realm of finitude in order to be the answer to the question implied in finitude." (ST I, 211) As such, our ultimate concern speaks to us at the depths of our experience and need. According to Charles Hartshorne, this is offered as an "abstract translation" of what is implicitly demanded in the commandment to "love the Lord thy

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God with all thy heart.”

In addition to this reference to our religious life, we can conceive of God as the power of being. Tillich suggests that:

The concept of the being as being, or being itself, points to the power inherent in everything, the power of resisting non-being. Therefore, instead of saying that God is the first of all beings, it is possible to say that he is the power of being in everything and above everything, the infinite power of being. (ST I, 236)

The concept of "being itself" seems to suggest a static understanding of the divine. This is, however, not Tillich's intention. Because being itself always exists in relation to the non-being which it must constantly overcome, it is, for Tillich, a dynamic concept. This point is highlighted in The Courage To Be, where Tillich argues that "the ground of being that is, is not a dead identity without movement and becoming; it is living creativity."

As the power of being, God is dialectically at one with the being of humanity. We encounter God at the depths of our being. Despite this intimacy between human beings and God, God remains transcendent for Tillich. This transcendence is a function of "infinite divinity and finite human freedom." (ST I, 263) That is, God's holiness and "the freedom of the created to turn away from the essential unity with the creative ground of its being." (ST II, 8) Consequently, God is both immanent in the world as the power

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35Paul Tillich, The Courage To Be, op. cit., 34.
of being and transcendent to it through freedom.

It is by virtue of this paradoxical position that God is capable of reconciling the polar tensions within life. As Guyton Hammond points out, "power derived from one pole of the self-world polarity tends to destroy the other pole; one loses either oneself as subject or one’s participation in one’s world." As a result of divine transcendence, "God is neither subject nor object, and his power is the ground of both self and world."37

The Formal Definition of Correlation

According to Tillich, then, God is the transcendent ground and power of being from which we are estranged. This estrangement, though profound, is not absolute: we remain in broken unity with the divine. This understanding of God, humanity, and their relation is, as we shall see, the foundation of Tillich’s theological methodology.

In the first volume of Systematic Theology, Paul Tillich describes the goals of theology in terms of the metaphor of message and situation:

A theological system is supposed to satisfy two basic needs: the statement of the truth of the Christian message and the interpretation of this truth for every new generation. Theology moves back and forth between two poles, the eternal truth of its foundation and the temporal situation in which the eternal truth is received.


37Ibid., 114.
From his perspective, most theological systems fail to achieve a balance between these two basic needs. Some systems sacrifice the truth of the Christian message to the demands of the temporal situation. Others tend to exclude the concerns of contemporary reality from theological reflection in order to preserve the "kerygma" from the perils of relativism. Tillich is particularly concerned about this latter tendency as it often becomes brittle orthodoxy which cannot speak to the needs of the present situation. Consequently, for theology to avoid this problem, it must enter into dialogue with politics, science, art, economics, and, of course, psychology -- all of which express the interpretation of existence and self-understanding of an age.

According to Tillich, then, the theological task is to explain the contents of the Christian faith through such a dialogue. This, however, is simply the goal, and not an explanation, of the method of correlation. In the first volume of Systematic Theology, Tillich begins his formal explanation by defining the meaning of the term 'correlation.' He does so by relating the theological meaning of the term to its range of uses in ordinary language. Here, he distinguishes three ordinary uses of the term correlation: (1) the statistical correspondence which obtains between different series of data; (2) the logical interdependence of ideas, or concepts; and, (3) the "real interdependence of things or events in structural wholes." (ST I, 60)

Tillich then suggests that these three kinds of correlative relationships have important applications in theology:

There is a correlation in the sense of correspondence between religious symbols
and that which is symbolized by them. There is a correlation between concepts denoting the human and those denoting the divine. There is a correlation in the factual sense between man’s ultimate concern and that about which he is ultimately concerned. (ST I, 60)

In *The Concept of Correlation: Paul Tillich and the Possibility of a Mediating Theology*, John P. Clayton argues that Tillich’s attempt to explain ‘correlation’ in the first volume of *Systematic Theology* is deeply flawed. In particular, Clayton claims that the attempt to translate ‘correlation’ from its ordinary uses to its special theological uses is "perplexing": "it is not altogether clear that the two series of uses correspond with one another in the way that Tillich seems to claim." Clayton offers a potent criticism of Tillich’s definition, and is worth further consideration.

Tillich first suggests that correspondence, understood in the sense of the relationship between different sets of data, is exemplified in the correspondence between religious symbols and that which they symbolize. According to Clayton, Tillich does not distinguish between the different kinds of relationships which obtain between symbols and that which they symbolize (for example, the relationship between a word and that to which it refers versus the relationship between a work of art and that which it represents). Consequently, Clayton chooses to limit his comments to selected features of the relationship between words and objects.

The relationship between different sets of data can simply indicate a degree of statistical regularity or can suggest a causal connection between variables. Tillich, however, specifically claims that he does not use correlation in the former, weaker,
sense; thereby suggesting that he uses the term to indicate causal connection. But is the relationship between word and object properly described as causal? As Clayton suggests, "one might go so far as to say that the existence of an object occasions the need for it to be named. There is here a kind of correlation between object and word, but it is ... more nearly habitual than causal."

Tillich's second example of correlation is the logical interdependence of concepts (such as polar relations), which he relates to concepts denoting the divine and those denoting the human/world. As Clayton points out, the meaning of the phrase "logical interdependence" is somewhat obscure in this context. Consequently, Clayton takes it to mean mutual implication, "such that one cannot speak of a without implying b and vice versa without making a (or b) logically self-contradictory or incoherent," as with the pairs in/out, up/down, or even parent/child. This would suggest that it would be incoherent to speak of God existing before the world existed or after the world ceased to exist; but, as Clayton contends, it would not be incoherent to suggest this within the context of Tillich's theology.

The third instance of correlation is "the real interdependence of things or events in structural wholes," which Tillich applies to the relationship between "man's ultimate concern and that about which he is ultimately concerned." (ST I, 60) Clayton uses the "constellation of forces and factors in a historical event" as an example of a structural

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39Ibid., 72.
40Ibid., 73.
41Ibid., 75.
whole. He argues that the relation between such forces and factors is contingent in nature, whereas the relation between one’s ultimate concern and the object of that concern is, for Tillich, "more nearly a relationship of mutual implication than a relationship of contingent fact." 42

These arguments strive to demonstrate that these three "ordinary" uses of correlation listed by Tillich fail to correspond to their theological use in the ways that Tillich claims. Clayton’s criticisms also, and I think more importantly, show that Tillich’s definition of correlation does not serve to clarify or explain the method of correlation. I think it would be possible to respond to these criticisms by challenging Clayton’s interpretation of phrases such as "the logical interdependence of ideas," or "the real interdependence of things or events in structural wholes." But such an effort would only serve to highlight a more basic problem with Tillich’s definition; namely, his definition of correlation does not clarify the method of correlation. To the contrary, it introduces a whole range of interpretive problems regarding Tillich’s understanding of certain central ideas. Tillich’s formal definition of terms obfuscates rather than elucidates what is involved in the correlative exercise.

42Ibid., 75.
The Metaphor of Question and Answer

Tillich's formal definition fails to give insight into his theological method; but this is not a devastating problem for his theology. He also presents his theological method through the rich metaphor of question and answer: he suggests that the questions of human existence find their response within the symbols of the Christian tradition. This metaphor is intimately connected with that of message and situation, but the former is more consistently developed than the latter.

According to Tillich, the questions involved in correlation are expressed "in terms which today are called 'existential.'" (ST I, 62) He suggests that the existential movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries emerged, in part, as a response to Hegel's essentialist claim that estrangement is overcome and human beings are reconciled with their true being. By contrast, Tillich contends, existentialists argued that this reconciliation is still to be anticipated, that existence is characterized by alienation. Or, as Tillich expresses it, "the question is human existence itself." (ST I, 64)

Although Tillich describes existential questions in reference to the philosophical movement, he does not limit the posing of such questions to philosophy. Various cultural disciplines -- such as psychology -- also raise queries about the nature of estranged existence. Consequently, he describes psychology as belonging fundamentally to the

"It is important to point out that Tillich is employing a definition of existentialism which most existentialists would reject. It is clear that his understanding of this philosophical movement is shaped by his own account of human existence and the experience of estrangement."
whole existentialist movement insofar as "both existentialism and psychology are allies
in the fight for genuine life."

The analysis of human existence as estranged existence does not find its first
expression in existentialism. Rather, "such analyses are much older than existentialism;
they are, indeed, as old as man's thinking about himself, and they have been expressed
in various kinds of conceptualization since the beginning of philosophy." (ST I, 62)

According to Tillich, such analyses grow out of our experience of ourselves and the
world; in particular, out of our awareness that we are simultaneously a part of and alien
to the world of objects. On the one hand, we are strangers to the world and our efforts
to understand it are somewhat limited. On the other hand, we are connected to the world
in the sense that whatever understanding we have of it, we gain through understanding
ourselves first. As Tillich suggests, man "himself is the door to deeper levels of reality,
[and] in his existence he has the only possible approach to existence itself." (ST I, 62)

Human beings are alienated from the world to which they essentially belong.

Tillich attempts to clarify how these questions about existence are related to the
answers implied in the revelatory events of Christianity through the criteria of
independence and interdependence. In the method of correlation, question and answer
are independent of each other because "it is impossible to derive the answer from the
question or the question from the answer." (ST II, 13) The answer cannot be derived
from the question since the question is "man himself in the conflicts of his existential

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"Paul Tillich, The Spiritual Situation in our Technological Society, op.cit.,
129."
situation." (ST II, 13) Estranged existence cannot be the source of its own answer; to the contrary, the answer must come from beyond the alienated condition, and therefore a theological answer is required. Tillich acknowledges that existentialists do provide answers: he argues that these answers are not derived from their existential analyses but from unacknowledged religious sources. (ST II, 26)

The logical distinction between question and answer also means that the question implied in human existence cannot be derived from the revelatory response. In a strictly logical sense, an answer is not meaningful as an answer unless there is a question to which it replies. In the context of the spiritual life, questions cannot be derived from answers for this would mean that they would not originate in the deep needs and uncertainties of the human heart. As Tillich urges, "man cannot receive answers to questions he has not asked," (ST I, 65) for such answers would be like "strange bodies from a strange world." (ST I, 64)

The method of correlation also requires that questions and answers are also interdependent in some respects. While the content of the answer (the revelatory event) is independent of the questions, the form of the answer depends on the form of the existential questions. As Tillich suggests,:

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"One of Tillich's concerns is to avoid "naturalistic" or "humanistic" methods of relating the contents of the Christian tradition to man's spiritual existence. This model of the relation "identified man's existential with his essential state, overlooking the break between them." (ST I, 65) This means that the contents of the Christian tradition would be explained "as creations of man's religious self-realization in the progressive process of religious history." (ST I, 65) The theological implication is that man could heal his own estrangement without the reconciling power of the divine."
If theology gives the answer, "the Christ," to the question implied in human estrangement, it does so differently, depending on whether the reference is to the existential conflicts of Jewish legalism, to the existential despair of Greek Scepticism, or to the threat of nihilism as expressed in twentieth century literature, art and psychology. *(ST II, 16)*

For Tillich, the problem posed by the interdependence of question and answer is solved in the context of what he calls "the theological circle." The theological circle is the sphere of religious commitment within which the dialogue between question and answer occurs. Tillich argues that in any attempt to elaborate theology, there is a point "where individual experience, traditional valuation, and personal commitments must decide the issue." *(ST I, 8)* These commitments are the starting point of theology; they determine its unfolding as well as its eventual conclusions. For example, if an inductive approach is employed, the theologian will look to experience in its vastness and diversity. The systematic theologian selects certain features of this experience to form the empirical basis of a unified theology. And she does so according to "an a priori of experience and valuation." *(ST I, 8)* In other words, the religious philosopher necessarily formulates her existential questions within the broader context of her religious commitment and, therefore, the form of her question is determined "by the theological system as a whole." *(ST II, 15)*

For Tillich, no religious philosopher/theologian can escape the theological circle. This, however, does not mean that she is trapped in a *vicious* circularity. Rather, the theological circle involves an awareness and acknowledgement of the limitations of philosophical and theological reflection. As Tillich suggests, "every understanding of spiritual things ... is circular." *(ST I 9)* This is the case not only for the theologian, but
also for the apparently neutral philosopher of religion. The concept of the theological circle has the methodological consequence that all theological systems involve the mutual dependence of question and answer. As Tillich expresses it:

neither the introduction nor any other part of the theological system is the logical basis for the other parts. Every part is dependent on every other part. The introduction presupposes the Christology and the doctrine of the church and vice versa. The arrangement is only a matter of expediency. (ST I, 11)

Critical Responses to Tillich’s Metaphor

The method of correlation has received a great deal of critical attention. Many criticisms focus on the application of the method of correlation within the three volumes of Systematic Theology. They point out that Tillich either privileges the existential questions or the theological answers in the elaboration of his system. This kind of critical approach is important given Tillich’s own insistence that a theological method is "not different from the system which is built upon it" and that therefore "system and method belong to each other and are to be judged with each other." (ST I, 8) It seems to me, however, that some of the more revealing criticisms are those that focus on the theoretical implications of the method itself rather than the problems involved in its application. Consequently, I shall turn my attention to these more theoretical criticisms; I shall enter into dialogue with them in order to introduce and clarify my own understanding of Tillich’s theological method.

Generally speaking, the "theoretical criticisms" tend to fall into two broad categories: those that question the interdependence of question and answer, and those that
question their independence. For some commentators, Tillich's claim that the questions implied in human existence and the answers of the Christian message are in some sense dependent amounts to an assault on God's freedom. For example, in *The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich*, Alexander J. McKelway, a pupil of Karl Barth argues that Tillich's method renders God dependent upon the human capacity to ask questions and implies that God can only respond to questions that have been asked. This, McKelway contends, subverts divine revelation to human control at some level.46

McKelway's criticism I submit, and others like it, do not really get at the heart of Tillich's method. McKelway seems to suggest that if human beings failed to ask existential questions, then God would be unable to reveal himself to the world. But Tillich is clear that we do not choose whether or not we will pose such questions. Rather, we cannot help but ask these questions for our very being is the question of existence. Or, as Tillich expresses it, "the question, asked by man, is man himself." (*ST II*, 13) We ask after God and our own being by virtue of our being in the world, whether or not we inquire verbally.

Furthermore, McKelway has failed to give full consideration to Tillich's reasons for claiming that question and answer are, in some sense, mutually dependent. First, Tillich suggests that this dependence is a necessary feature of any attempt to understand spiritual reality. Tillich merely elevates this feature of all theological systems to a criterion within his own. Second, Tillich urges that the limitations imposed on

theological answers are limitations of form: the questions (and the theological system as a whole) cannot create or command the answers, they can only give shape to them. Theological answers are thus limited simply because human beings are limited: we cannot understand or appreciate "revealed truths which have fallen into the human situation." (ST I, 64) Such truths are unmediated, alien, incomprehensible. Thus, the criterion of interdependence is a function of human, rather than divine, limitation.

Another, deeper criticism highlights the independence of question and answer in Tillich's system. Consider, for example, the position articulated by Douglass Lewis in his article, "The Conceptual Structure of Tillich's Method of Correlation." Lewis is concerned with the idea that question and answer operate in different realms of discourse. But, he argues, "one cannot raise questions in one realm of discourse and answer them in another." After all, the meaning of concepts varies according to their logical context, and therefore the concepts of the existential questions have different meanings within a theological context. Consequently, answering existential questions with theological answers involves a deep inconsistency. As Lewis argues:

> Raising questions out of philosophy, psychology, physics, or some non-theological context and answering them out of a theological context is like a physicist asking: 'What is the (physical) source of light in the world?' and the theologian answering: 'Jesus Christ is the light of the world!' The question and answer are clearly not logical correlates and never can be, for they derive their meaning from two different logical contexts.

But is it legitimate to claim that questions formed in one realm of discourse cannot

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48Ibid., 269.
be answered by a response originating in a different realm of discourse? John P. Clayton argues that there are questions which are in principle unanswerable from within their own context and can be answered only by reference to another conceptual realm. He suggests that some questions are unanswerable because they are products of a "limited understanding of the scope or nature of a discipline." Such questions, however, can be answered indirectly by subjecting them to "a more penetrating analysis" which removes the factors which prompted the question in the first place. Through this process, the questioner is led to a new way of seeing things, a new conceptual context. So, such questions are not answered (in a strict or direct sense), but are resolved by a shift to a new conceptual context. This amounts to a kind of mediation between two logical contexts which makes it legitimate, if not necessary, for some questions to be answered from another realm of discourse.

As Clayton acknowledges, this response to Lewis has two problems. First, Tillich considers the questions he attempts to correlate to be meaningful questions. And the importance of these questions is not mitigated by the fact that they cannot be answered from within the existential situation in which they are asked. Second, for Tillich, existential questions do not disappear as the meaning of the problem is made more precise. Clayton, however, does not feel that these problems undermine the response to Lewis, and, therefore, does not explore this issue further.

I would agree that the above response does show, contra Lewis, that the

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*John P. Clayton, *The Concept of Correlation, op. cit.*, 188.

*Ibid.*, 188.
independence of question and answer does not introduce a deep inconsistency into Tillich's theological system. I would, however, argue that this issue warrants further discussion; furthermore, by dealing with the two problems noted above, it is possible to arrive at a better understanding of the method of correlation.

It seems to me that the method of correlation is more involved than simply matching up existential questions with the appropriate theological response. To the contrary, the method involves a critical process in which existential questions are subjected to a critical analysis. Although these questions are meaningful, they are in some sense incomplete because they arise out of estranged existence. In particular, such question often do not acknowledge the depth of this estrangement, and critical, philosophical analysis serves to reveal the full dimensions of alienation. Furthermore, these questions do not disappear in this critical process. Rather, these questions are transformed and deepened. These questions are drawn into the theological circle.

This understanding of the method of correlation can be demonstrated with one of Tillich's own examples from Systematic Theology. Tillich considers the following question, "what can I do to overcome radical doubt and the feeling of meaninglessness?" (ST III, 228) He argues that this question cannot be answered as "every answer would justify the question which implies that something can be done." (ST III, 228) But, of course, for Tillich doubt and feelings of meaninglessness are symptoms of the deep estrangement that characterizes human existence -- the estrangement that is beyond human repair.

With respect to this question, Tillich suggests that one can only reject the form
of the question and point to the "seriousness of despair in which the question is asked." (ST III, 228) In other words, one must respond to the question by subjecting it to a deeper analysis, thereby revealing the unmitigated, unanswerable despair which underlies the question. By doing this, the original question is transformed and becomes a question about the depths of estrangement. As Tillich suggests, the original question itself is not rejected, merely its form.

This transformation in form draws the original question into the theological circle, for "the seriousness of despair in which the question is asked is itself the answer." (ST III, 228) He explains this in the following way:

In the situation of doubt the truth from which one feels separated is present in so far as in every doubt the formal affirmation of truth as truth is presupposed. But the analogous affirmation of meaning within meaninglessness is also related to the paradox of justification, not of the sinner but of him who doubts, which has led to this solution. Since in the predicament of doubt and meaninglessness God as the source of the justifying act has disappeared, the only thing left (in which God reappears without being recognized) is the ultimate honesty of doubt and the unconditional seriousness of the despair about meaning. ... In the seriousness of [our] existential despair, God is present to [us]. (ST III, 228)

So, once the original question is analyzed and the questioner appreciates the depth of her estrangement, she can experience the answer: God and her essential unity with the ground of being.

Indeed, Tillich is quite clear in his discussion of the criterion of interdependence that the correlation of question and answer takes place within the theological circle. (ST II, 15) The questions involved in correlation are questions shaped within the sphere of religious commitment. Consequently, existential questions originating outside of this sphere must be drawn into the sphere of religious commitment as a part of the correlative
This interpretation is supported by other features of Tillich’s theology. First, this interpretation suggests that there is a critical element in correlation. Indeed, Tillich is consistently critical of existential analyses of the human situation: even though he takes the claims of psychology (as well as other non-theological positions) seriously, he does not accept them without reservation. For example, in “Anxiety Reducing Agencies in our Culture,” he criticizes psychology for describing estrangement in purely individualistic terms without reference to the unity of life as a whole. If estrangement is total, he contends, then it embraces both our individual and collective lives. If correlation simply involved the matching up of questions and answers, then we would hardly expect this kind of critical commentary. Second, this interpretation is consistent with Tillich’s repeated claim that correlation involves the questions implied in analyses of the human situation.

In his book Man in Estrangement: A Comparison of the Thought of Paul Tillich and Eric Fromm, Guyton Hammond puts forward an interpretation of the method of correlation. He understands the method “not as a correlation between philosophical questions and theological answers, but as an ‘elevation’ through the criterion of self-estrangement of ... [existential] ideas of estrangement and reconciliation into the framework of Christian theology.” I shall consider Hammond’s position in order to

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elaborate further my own understanding of Tillich’s method.

I have suggested that the method of correlation involves a critical analysis of existential questions, which serves to draw these questions into the theological circle. This interpretation of Tillich’s theological method grows out of a consideration of independence and interdependence in the relationship between question and answer. Hammond’s interpretation, however, grows out of his reflections on Tillich’s treatment of existentialism. Hammond notes that Tillich "brings to bear a critique on the ideas of estrangement, rather than accepting these ideas as autonomous philosophical analysis." Hammond also points out that the formulation of the method allows for a methodological disregard for the ‘answers’ articulated by the existentialists.

In response to these two criticisms of Tillich’s approach to existentialism, Hammond points out that, for Tillich, existential analyses of estrangement have a religious basis and presuppose certain Christian doctrines. According to Hammond, this foundation legitimizes subjecting existential analyses to theological criticism: if the understanding of the human condition is essentially a religious intuition, then it should be interpreted in light of the development of certain religious principles. In particular, Hammond suggests that Tillich’s criticisms of existential analyses of the human condition serve to "elevate" non-theological ideas of estrangement and reconciliation beyond themselves. Existential analyses are "driven" to the "point where no autonomous answer is possible" by the criterion of self-estrangement.

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"Ibid., 16.

"Ibid., 19."
Self-estrangement, Hammond claims, indicates that human beings are separated from their own true being. This is a condition that is profound: every aspect of a self-estranged being needs healing and reconciliation. But, because human beings never forfeit their essential unity with their true selves, reconciliation is always possible. According to Hammond, this criterion lies behind the method of correlation: when existential analyses fail to appreciate the depth of human estrangement, they must be "criticized and elevated to the point of self-estrangement. But when this point is reached no autonomous answer is possible, an answer from beyond estranged existence, and therefore a theological answer, is required."55

While I agree with the general structure of Hammond's position, there are two issues which require further consideration. First, Hammond describes self-estrangement as the complete alienation from one's being. While this description is consistent with Tillich's account of the human situation, it obscures an important aspect of Tillich's position. In particular, it fails to point out that, for Tillich, the separation of human beings from their essential nature involves the separation of human beings from God. Hammond does attempt to rectify this oversight toward the end of his analysis. However, he pays relatively little attention to this very important aspect to Tillich's understanding of alienation.

Second, Hammond seems to suggest that the theologian can "pull rank"56 on the

55Ibid., 21.
philosopher/psychologist/non-theologian, and therefore is justified in criticising the psychologist's analysis of the human situation. Tillich, however, argues that theologians cannot criticise psychologists from the perspective of theology: the posing of existential questions is, for Tillich, a psychological or philosophical task rather than a theological one. Consequently, I would argue, contra Hammond, that the critical process involved in correlation is philosophical in nature. In particular, the critical process involves exploring the existential question/analysis to reveal its latent philosophical inconsistencies.

Summary

Through this dialogue with a few of Tillich's detractors and defenders, I have attempted to articulate an interpretation of Tillich's method of correlation. His account of the method through the metaphor of question and answer reveals that the questions involved in correlation are questions about estranged existence. Tillich's own understanding of alienation is operative here: we are estranged from ourselves, others, the world, and the ground of our being (God). This estrangement is not absolute, for some tenuous connection to our essential nature remains; but it is nonetheless profound and is not correctable by the application of human effort. The metaphor of question and answer also suggests that the method involves a critical element. Specifically, existential questions are subjected to a philosophical (rather than theological) analysis which serves to draw these questions into the theological circle. It is in this sphere of religious concern that the correlative exercise takes place.
Given this interpretation, the correlative exercise of this thesis will take the following shape: (i) a description of Jung's analysis of estrangement, (ii) a critical reflection on this analysis, and (iii) a demonstration of how (if) Tillich's interpretation of Christian symbols responds to the Jungian position. The first two of these steps will comprise the next chapter of this thesis.
Chapter Three: Jung’s Analysis of the Human Condition

The Foundations of Jungian Psychology

Before describing and analyzing Jung’s account of the human situation, it will be useful to gain a sense of the terms and concepts which comprise the foundations of his psychology, and, in particular, his psychology of religion. I shall also attempt to point out some similarities between Jung’s and Tillich’s thought.

The concept of the psyche is the framework and starting point of Jung’s thinking. It is, however, one of the most elusive terms in his writings. In fact, Jung resists any attempt to define psyche in deference to what he claims is its unknowable nature.7 Avoiding any systematic definition, he employs the term to designate "the totality of all the psychic processes, both conscious as well as unconscious." (CW IV, 240) This

7Jung says "Our psyche ... remains an insoluble puzzle and an incomprehensible wonder, an object of abiding perplexity -- a feature it shares with all of Nature’s secrets." (See C.G. Jung, Civilization in Transition in Collected Works X, eds., Sir Herbert Read, Michael Fordham, Gerhard Adler, and William McGuire, trans., R.F.C. Hull (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), 269. Hereafter all references to Jung’s Collected Works will be cited parenthetically within the body of this thesis by volume and page number.)
somewhat tautological statement points to the bipolar (involving both conscious and unconscious processes) and comprehensive (embracing the totality of the human personality) nature of psychic activity.

Jung intends psyche to be a metaphysically neutral concept: he resists the materialistic tendency to reduce it to supposedly more elementary physical or biological factors as well as the idealistic tendency to explain it in terms of "soul substance." Appropriately, Jung adopts a "phenomenological" or "empirical" approach to the study of the psyche; meaning that he treats psychic events as realities within their own terms.

Ira Progoff explains this methodology in reference to Kantian epistemology:

In the question of reality in general, Jung agrees with Kant that we are not able finally to know the thing-in-itself. Within the experience of the individual, however, things may be 'psychologically real,' in the sense that they involve great intensities of psychic energy, and thereby great emotional affect. The symbols that are activated in the psyche operate within the personality of the individual as real things; that is they have a force and power of their own ... Psychic phenomena have in themselves a specific empirical existence and are to be taken as an area of reality in their own terms.

Generally, the psyche is a sort of non-physical space in which psychic phenomena occur. Jung describes these phenomena in terms of the movement of psychic energy which is generated by the dynamic tension between conflicting opposites. He asserts that

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58Jung is especially critical of Freud's and Adler's attempts to reduce psychic processes to the essentially biological concept of the drive or instinct. (See, for example, C.G. Jung, "Psychotherapists or the Clergy," in Pastoral Psychology 7(63) (April 1956), 28.)

59Many commentators have criticized Jung for his failure to observe this methodological principle. This issue will be explored at greater length later in this chapter.

"everything depends on a condition of inner antithesis; for everything exists as a subset of energy. All life is energy and therefore depends on forces held in opposition." These forces are manifested in the following pairs: matter/spirit, male/female, introversion/extroversion, individual/collective, and, of course, conscious/unconscious.

Jung describes the psyche as having three layers: at the surface is consciousness; below it is the personal unconscious; and at the foundation is the objective or collective unconscious. At the very beginning of our psychological development, there is no differentiation between the different layers. As will be described later, consciousness emerges from this original union. It is a thin and relatively fragile layer of the psyche which offers a clear, rational, but narrow, understanding of reality. Its regulative centre is the ego.

Underlying consciousness is the personal unconscious. This is acquired during life and contains psychic events that were once conscious but became unconscious because they either lost their intensity or were forgotten or repressed, as well as those drives and desires that did not have sufficient intensity to reach consciousness. The personal

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62 Jung differentiates the ego from the Self, which he conceives of as the centre of the total personality (rather than just consciousness).

unconscious is essentially the same as what Freud refers to as the unconscious -- the conscious repressed.

The largest and deepest layer of the psyche is the collective unconscious. Unlike the personal unconscious, the collective unconscious is common to all people -- it is impersonal and universal. As such, it is our "ancestral heritage" containing the history of "mankind's evolution, born anew in the brain structure of every individual." According to Jung, this is "no more than a hypothesis." (CW IX, II, 7) But it is one to which we are driven by the weight of the empirical evidence, namely, the striking similarity of the myths of different peoples.

The contents of the collective unconscious are archetypes, which are "forms or images of a collective nature which occur practically all over the earth as constituents of myths and at the same time as individual products of unconscious origin." (CW XI, 51) Archetypes are the structural forms of the material which eventually becomes conscious -- though archetypes themselves, by definition, cannot emerge into consciousness. Jung emphasizes that the symbolic expression of archetypal energy is a product of the archetypes themselves, rather than any consciousness effort by human beings.

Originating within the unconscious and operating within consciousness, symbols play a mediating role between the different layers of the psyche. Because consciousness emerges from the unconscious with great difficulty, it exists under the constant threat of being overpowered by subterranean forces and becoming unconscious once again. Despite this danger, consciousness must remain in contact with the forces of the

"Ibid., 45."
unconscious as they are the swirling source of psychic life: as such, these forces serve to balance and expand the limited conscious mind, directing it toward greater wholeness. In their mediating role, symbols unite consciousness with the depths of the psyche, acting as channels for archetypal energy, thereby permitting the flow of psychic energy in a controlled way.

Religion is a rich source of symbols. Jung suggests that doctrine, creed, and ritual are also capable of connecting conscious life with its recreative depths within the psyche. Along with symbols, they are the codified expression of a particularly powerful experience -- that of the "numinosum ... a dynamic agency or effort not caused by an arbitrary act of the will." (CW XI, 7) The numinosum "seizes and controls the human subject who is rather its victim than its creator." (CW XI, 7)

Jung describes these powers which "seize and control" the human subject as gods. In fact, he suggests that "gods are personifications of the collective unconscious, for they reveal themselves through the unconscious activity of the psyche." (CW XI, 163) This raises an important interpretive issue -- namely, whether or not God is, for Jung, no more than a psychological experience, a projection lacking an existence independent of the human psyche. However one chooses to resolve this interpretive dilemma, it does point to a certain continuity between God and man insofar as God approaches consciousness from its depths. The intimate nature of the divine-human relationship is the foundation of what Jung describes as man's innate sense of God. Consistent with this, Jung expresses astonishment at those who seek to prove the existence of God. For

65 This issue will be explored later in this chapter.
Jung, God is not an idea to be proved or even believed, but a psychological fact of immediate experience.

**Jung and Alienation**

Jung describes the condition of estrangement in the context of his account of human psychological development. According to Jung, human beings begin life in a state of original wholeness: in our earliest infancy, neither ego nor consciousness exists. Rather, the latent ego is in complete identification with the structures of the unconscious. As Edward Edinger points out, as a result of this identification, the infant experiences him/herself "quite literally as the centre of the universe." The earliest encounters with reality, however, fracture this original unity: the infant's demands eventually begin to be rejected by the world, and this limitation displaces the child from its place of privilege. The child is exiled from paradise, and a "permanent wounding and separation occur." Jung calls this wounding alienation.

This division within the psyche also produces consciousness which offers a clear, but necessarily narrow perspective on reality. Jung's account of the emergence of consciousness from a primitive state of wholeness is strikingly similar to Tillich's account.

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67Ibid., 12.
of consciousness appearing from the state of dreaming innocence. Not only do Tillich and Jung describe the preconscious state in similar terms, but they also describe the estrangement from this state in terms of the imagery of the Fall.

This initial experience of estrangement is constantly reinforced throughout life through conflict with the external world as well as conflicts arising from within the psyche: the deep and powerful archetypal stirrings within the unconscious constantly threaten to overcome the fragile lucidity of consciousness. These threats yield to one of two possibilities: as Antonio Moreno expresses it, "either we fall into the false suffering of neurosis or we experience the genuine suffering necessary to achieve maturity." 68

Despite the separation between conscious and unconscious, there is, in most healthy persons, a continuing link between the two realms. This link preserves the integrity of the total personality. Neurosis, however, involves the dissociation of the personality, a loss of balance wherein the vital connection between the different layers of the psyche is broken. In most cases, this radical division occurs when the unconscious seeks expression in actions or beliefs which our culture deems to be immoral. In neurosis, the conscious mind wants to retain its own moral ideal and rejects the challenges of the unconscious. But the unconscious is powerful -- as Jung acknowledges, "if we understand anything about the unconscious, we know that it cannot be swallowed. We know also that it is dangerous to repress it and that the life repressed will live against

Indeed, that which is repressed will send up destructive powers in the form of neuroses.

The conflict between the claims of the unconscious against those of consciousness can also be invitations to growth. Rather than suppressing the subterranean forces of the psyche, we can also seek to understand and integrate them into our conscious life. Jung calls this the process of individuation -- that is, "the psychological process that makes a human being an 'individual' -- a unique, indivisible unit or whole man."\(^7^0\)

In individuation, there is a shifting of man's psychological centre from the ego to the self. This process is painful insofar as it entails the sacrifice of the ego: "every step forward along the path of individuation is achieved only at the cost of intense spiritual suffering, a passion for the ego for the violence done to it by the self."\(^7^1\) This process is also restorative in that it involves the reconciliations of the polar tensions within life. The emerging self combines these polarities in a higher synthesis which heals the divisions within the psyche. Jung describes God as the universal symbol of wholeness and the harmony of opposites; consequently, he speaks of the self as an image of God. This resembles Tillich's claim that God, among other things, unifies the polar opposites of life.

Although individuation is as variable as are individual people, there is a basic shape to the process, a shape determined by the appearance of a certain definite number


\(^{70}\)Ibid., 3.

\(^{71}\)Ibid., 32.
of archetypes at different stages in the process. The conscious mind must come to terms with the shadow, the figure of the unknown man (animus) or unknown woman (anima), the wise old man or the great mother, all prior to the emergence of the self.

Although each stage brings its own challenges, the awareness and integration of the shadow is, in many ways, the most difficult. The shadow is often described as the negative, evil aspect of the personality. For Jung, the shadow is a remnant of our animal ancestry: as such it is the source of primitive and inferior drives and emotions, the lowest level of which is indistinguishable from animal instincts. These drives are typically not in accord with the expectations and regulations of conscious, civilized life. Consequently, the integration of the shadow into consciousness is primarily a moral problem. And it is the fear of what lurks in these psychic depths that makes the process of integration so difficult. Jung urges, however, that the shadow is also the source of "normal instincts, appropriate reaction, realistic insights, and creative impulses."??

Individuation and the Symbol of Christ

As John P. Dourley points out, "for Jung, the drive to individuation is the empowering telos of life, a holy task in which man rediscovers his nature as an image of

God." For Jung, the symbol which mediates this experience of rediscovering oneself as an image of God is the symbol of Christ. For him, Christ is the "still living myth of our culture" (CW IX, II, 36) -- a symbol capable of illuminating divine wholeness as well as the struggles of the individuating self and ego.

The dominant theme in Jung's account of the symbolic nature of Christ is that of Christ as a symbol of the self. Jung suggests that the circumstances of Christ's life and the qualities attributed to him ("consubstantiality with the Father, coeternity, filiation, parthogenesis, crucifixion, lamb sacrificed between opposites, one divided into many, etc." (CW XI, 248)) all evoke the phenomenology of the self. In Transformation Symbolism in the Mass, Jung describes how, mediated by the rituals of the Mass, the sacrificial act of Christ is replicated in the life of the ego as it is sacrificed to the demands of the emerging self. Even more importantly, Christ exemplifies the unions of opposites which is achieved in the state of wholeness: "as an historical personage, Christ is unitemporal and unique; as God, universal and eternal. Likewise the self: as the essence of individuality it is unitemporal and unique; as an archetypal symbol it is a God-image and therefore universal and eternal." (CW IX, II, 63)

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7John P. Dourley, The Psyche as Sacrament, op. cit., 78.

7Jung, however, is critical of this symbol -- these criticisms will be addressed in chapter four of this thesis.

7Given the correspondence between Christ and the archetypal forces of the self, Jung asks, "Is the self a symbol of Christ or is Christ a symbol of the self?" (CW IX, II, 68) Jung affirms the latter possibility on the grounds that there have been other potent images of the self in Western history -- most notably, the lapis philosophorum of the Alchemists. Jesus was one particularly important expression, as expression made possible by a deep affinity "between the figure of
Alienation and Modernity

So far, I have considered Jung’s analysis of alienation in fairly abstract, non-historical terms. As Ira Progoff points out, Jung’s psychology is contextualized by sociological and historical considerations. This is so because Jung’s purpose “is to go beyond the academic side of psychology and come to grips with the actual problems of individuals as their lives are lived now in the turmoil of history.” Appropriately, Jung’s analysis of the human condition does not treat alienation simply as an abstract feature of existence, but also as the defining experience of this period of Western civilization: according to Jung, modernity has come as an "almost fatal shock." Consequently, it is important to consider the particular nature of alienation within the modern context.

Jung attributes the heightened alienation characteristic of modernity to the rise of science and the subsequent decline of religion. He argues that under the influence of "scientific rationalism," there has been a gradual levelling down and reduction of the individual to a statistical average. The sacrifice of individuality to statistical truth renders us vulnerable to the influence of mass organization: convinced of the nullity and futility of individuality, we abdicate more and more of our responsibility to the state. Jung also argues that appeals to theoretical assumptions and statistical averages undermines self-

the redeemed and the contents of the unconscious."(CW IX, II, 181)


knowledge, "for the object of self-knowledge is an individual -- a relative exception and an irregular phenomenon." As we sacrifice our individuality, we become enigmas to ourselves.

Contemporary society is characterized not only by the ascendancy of science but also by the atrophying of our spiritual lives. In particular, our conception and interpretation of Christianity has "become antiquated in the face of the present world situation." The central symbols of our culture, the Christian symbols, no longer speak to us at our depths (although Jung does note that these symbols carry the seeds of further development and renewed life). Since psychic problems emerge when symbols no longer express the yearnings and hopes of the soul, the decline of religion has caused a "general neuroticizing of modern man."

In the absence of living religious symbols, the various pressures of Western society all subtly urge the individual to seek meaning in externals and material security. However, as Jung acknowledges, it takes more than an ordinary dose of optimism to have faith in material progress. Furthermore, because it is the "particular, not-to-be duplicated subjectivity of the individual which is the real source of human meanings," we increasingly come to see life as little more than mere grinding banality.

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Ibid., 74.

Ibid., 77.

C.G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul, op.cit., 204.

Edward F. Edinger, Ego and Archetype, op.cit., 108."
By way of comparison, Tillich, like Jung, argues that the nature of contemporary society serves to heighten this experience of alienation. In The Spiritual Situation in Our Technical Society, Tillich argues that the decisive feature of our current predicament is the loss of the dimension of depth. By this he means that modern man "has lost the courage to ask questions of infinite seriousness -- as former generations did -- and he has lost the courage to receive answers to questions wherever they may come from."\(^3\) Like Jung, Tillich attributes the present situation to the subjection of life and nature to the scientific and technical control of man. Under the influence of technological reason (the driving force of industrial society), the dimension of depth is replaced by life in "the horizontal dimension."

Tillich also claims that the loss of depth characteristic of modern society is connected to the loss of the religious symbols of Christianity and Judaism. This loss is not primarily a result of scientific criticism. Rather, it is a consequence of the pathology of literalism. When symbols are read literally, their true power is lost and they are therefore eventually dismissed. When this happens, we also lose access to our deeper humanity from which symbols come and to which they should lead. Consequently, when we lose access to the dimension of depth and the symbols which express it, we also lose our very selves. As Tillich expresses it, "under these conditions, man can hardly escape the fate of becoming a thing among the things he produces, a bundle of conditioned reflexes without a free, deciding, and responsible self."\(^5\) As such we become mere

\(^3\)Paul Tillich, The Spiritual Situation in Our Technical Society, op. cit., 42.

\(^5\)Ibid., 45.
units within the larger collectivity, deprived of that which makes us fully human. Or, as Jung expresses it, we lose our very individuality.

**Areas of Difference Between Tillich's and Jung's Conceptions of Alienation**

Throughout my reflections on Jung, I have attempted to point out some of the similarities between Jung's and Tillich's understandings of the human condition. There are, however, two potential areas of difference between the two men on this topic. First, as was noted earlier, it is not entirely clear whether or not Jungian psychology admits the existence of a transcendent God. This issue is important insofar as Tillich understands alienation as separation from the transcendent ground of being. Second, it is also somewhat unclear whether or not Jung deems estrangement to be correctable through human effort. This issue, of course, highlights Tillich's claim that the profound nature of estrangement means that no human answer is possible. I shall now consider these two issues as a prelude to my critical reflection on Jung's account of alienation.

As noted earlier, Jung adopts a phenomenological approach to his subject matter. This applies to God as well: "epistemological criticism comes forward with the assertion of the experience of God. God is a psychic fact of immediate experience." *(CW VIII, 328)* Jung attempts to remain agnostic with respect to the existence of a transcendent God.

Many theologians, however, have argued that Jung fails to observe this
methodological principle, for example, Raymond Hostie (*Religion and the Psychology of CG Jung*), Victor White (*Soul and Psyche*), and Joseph Goldbrunner (*Individuation: A Study of the Depth Psychology of Carl Jung*). Most notably, in *The Eclipse of God*, Martin Buber argues that Jung's psychology of religion is a "religion of pure psychic immanence" which reduces God to a mere psychic experience. He suggests that "if religion is a relation to psychic events, which cannot mean anything other than to events of one's own soul, then it is implied by this that it is not a relation to a Being or Reality which, no matter how fully it may from time to time descend to the human soul, always remains transcendent to it." In other words, Jung betrays his professed agnosticism: in his attempt to relate to God in the depths of the human soul, Jung eliminates the possibility that God exists "independently as well as related to the human subject."

In his book, *Jung's Hermeneutic of Doctrine*, Clifford A. Brown attempts to defend Jung from this kind of criticism. Brown argues that Buber (and other theological critics of Jung's thought) need to take a closer look at Jung's psychological method before accusing him of reductionism. According to Brown, Jung elucidates the depths of meaning in fantasy and religious doctrine by a method of displacement: Jung 'displaces' the object of his inquiry from the context or frame of reference in which it originally finds itself into another, distinct context. This shifting of contexts effects a transformation of meanings. For example, Jung displaces fantasy from its personal,

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clinical context into the realm of myth and the collective imagination: this reveals the archetypal structure of the individual’s inner life. Jung, Brown suggests, also displaces doctrine from its exclusively theological context to a psychological context which "opens up the religious mind to the psychic roots of language and life." This methodological strategy makes Christian doctrine relevant to modern man’s self-understanding and experience, and reveals the symbolic dimensions of religious life.

Brown asserts that Jung does not reduce the religious realm (and therefore God) to the psychological, but translates it into psychological terms. Brown urges that this method is essentially dialectical in the sense that "the transposition is not intended to be irreversible." In other words, Jung’s translation of religious doctrine and the concept of God into psychological terms is open to a retranslation back into theological terms. Brown even invites theologians to take this invitation and to attempt to effect this reversal.

Brown’s defence of Jung is interesting, but, I think, ultimately unsuccessful in its attempt to demonstrate that Jung’s concept of God is not reductive in nature. First, it is

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"It is interesting to note the similarity between the psychological method of displacing and idea from its original context and the theological method of drawing an idea into the theological circle.

"Ibid., 159.

"Peter Homans makes a very similar argument, suggesting that Jung’s approach to religion is a "double movement of reduction and retrieval of meaning" (See "CG Jung: Christian or Post-Christian Psychologist?" in Essays on Jung and the Study of Religion, eds., Luther M. Martin and James Cross (Lanham, New York, London: University Press of America Books, 1985), 27.)
significant that Jung does not (as Brown acknowledges) attempt to translate his psychological understanding of God back into standard theological terms. After all, Jung was quite troubled by the charge of reductionism and attempted to defend himself against his theological critics. If Jung believed that his psychological translation could be reversed, then it would be reasonable for him to respond to his critics by pointing out or demonstrating this possibility. But Jung did not do this.\textsuperscript{92}

Jung does not effect such a retranslation because he cannot do so. Indeed, Jung’s epistemology would likely not permit the retranslation of psychologized doctrine and symbol into theological terms. According to his Kantian-inspired approach, psychic phenomena are to be treated as realities in their own right, without reference to the external world of things-in-themselves. While this approach does not imply that psychic realities are merely psychic realities, it also makes it quite impossible to say that they are substantially more than this. Jung’s epistemology restricts -- or should restrict -- Jung to adopting an agnostic stance with respect to the external extra-psychic existence of God. In other words, this supposed agnosticism is betrayed not only by reductionism, but also by the kind of hopeful leap to the thing-in-itself entailed in Brown’s retranslation.

\textsuperscript{92}In "The Challenge of Jung’s Psychology for the Study of Religion," John P. Dourley suggests that the desire to "get God out of the psyche" would be highly problematic for Jung. He writes the following: "Jung might well look askance at the motives of those interested in "getting God out of the psyche. For Jung, success in this dubious enterprise would result in variations of depression or rage. For these are the inevitable consequences of depriving oneself of those libidinal energies which fund life’s efforts... This removes from the fabric of life itself the psychic energies which fund life, or it projects the source of these energies beyond life into transcendent deities whose ability to lend life is greatly impaired by the projection itself." (See Studies in Religion, 18(3) (Summer 1989), 302-3.)
The above argument simply demonstrates that Brown's proposed retranslation does not and could not occur, provided that we take Jung's claims to agnosticism seriously. This argument does not, in itself, show that Jung's account of God is psychologically reductive. I would argue further that not only does Jung fail to overcome the tendency toward reductionism, but that he does not wish to do so.

Indeed, throughout his writings, Jung describes the experience of the divine in intrapsychic terms. He consistently argues that "not only does the psyche exist, it is existence itself," and that there is no "Archimedean point" beyond the psyche from which God enters consciousness. As (CW XI, 12) Admittedly, there are also a few occasions in which Jung seems to refer to a reality beyond the limits of the psyche: for example, in "The Psychological Foundations of Belief in Spirits," (CW VIII) Jung makes reference to the "transpsychic." But, as John P. Dourley urges, Jung makes it "obvious that the so-called transpsychic remains in organic unity with human consciousness within the total psyche, infinitely extended though it be through Jung's pleromatic nature of the unconscious." Despite these apparent references to a God or gods beyond the psyche, Jung is clear that "the world of gods and spirits is truly 'nothing but' the collective

Furthermore, as Antonio Moreno points out, Jung asserts that the image of God in man is *homoousia*, that is, if the *same* nature of God, rather than *homoisia*, or of *similar* nature. He cites Jung as saying that "it is impossible for psychology to establish the difference between the image of God (or the Self) and God himself (ie., in reality) not merely conceptually." (See Antonio Moreno, *Jung, Gods, and Modern Man* (Notre Dame: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1970), 137.

unconscious inside me."95

It also seems that Jung does not necessarily wish to overcome such reductionism - at least this seems to be the case in his reply to Buber. In his reply, Jung pursues two major lines of 'defence:' (i) he argues that he is an empiricist rather than a metaphysician, and (ii) he reconsiders the basis of his psychology of religion and argues that the unconscious is the source of "everything one could wish for in a psychic Thou." (CW XVIII, 665) In his first line of response, Jung seems to use the term 'metaphysician' to denote one whose claims to knowledge are based merely on faith rather than on any kind of experiential evidence. Metaphysicians, Jung contends, "for one reason or another think they know about unknowable things in the beyond." (CW XVIII, 664)96 It is interesting that Jung uses 'metaphysician' in this way, rather than using it to refer to one who makes claims about the basic structure of reality. By focusing his attention on metaphysician-as-man-of-faith, rather than metaphysician-as-ontologist, Jung does not address Buber's charge that his psychology includes an implicit (and reductive) metaphysics. In his second line of response, Jung simply explores the archetypal foundation of religious life. Rather than argue that Buber has misunderstood his understanding of God, Jung restates his understanding of the "psychic Thou." Jung simply emphasizes that, for him, God is encountered within the depths of the human psyche -- in contrast to Buber's transcendent, absolutely other Thou.


96In contrast, Jung the empiricist bases his speculation on data -- mythology, folklore, religion, as well as individual dreams and fantasies.
Jung’s reply to Buber seems rather ineffective: he does not address the charge about his implicit, reductive metaphysics, and he simply restates his understanding of God. Why would Jung offer such an apparently toothless response? It seems to me that Jung’s primary intention is to prove that his psychology is not simplistic, or dismissable. In other words, he is not so much interested in demonstrating that his empiricism does not involve an undesirable, implicit metaphysical position, as he is interested in demonstrating that his empiricism is grounded on solid, undeniable evidence. Similarly, he is not so much interested in demonstrating that his concept of God is not one of "pure psychic immanence," as he is interested in demonstrating that his understanding of the divine resonates with and accounts for religious experience. Jung accepts the foundational difference between himself and his critics: he simply does not want his thought to be dismissed on the basis of these differences.

Despite Brown’s creative defence of Jung, it seems that Jungian psychology does involve an entirely psychological account of God which ignores divine transcendence. For Jung, however, this is not a problem: divine immanence permits a certain intimacy between human beings and God and is the foundation of religious experience.

Guyton Hammond points out another potential area of difference between Jung’s and Tillich’s conceptions of estrangement. According to Hammond, Tillich is critical of Jung (as well as Fromm) for being utopian in his approach to alienation: Jung supposedly fails to appreciate the depths of estrangement because he holds that "estrangement is characteristic of present day society which can be overcome by
subsequent social or psychological development." The problem with this 'utopian vision' is that it implies that alienation is correctable through human effort, either "on the individual level through psychiatric techniques or on the social level through social reform." This utopian vision, supposedly held by Jung, stands in contrast to Tillich's own view; that is, that existential estrangement penetrates to the depths of our being and therefore can only be overcome (and then only fragmentarily) by a transcendent power from beyond estranged existence.

But is Jung utopian in the sense attributed to him by Tillich and Hammond? First, while Jung is sensitive (as is Tillich) to the particular demands of modern society, he does not attribute alienation to the conditions of contemporary life. Rather, Jung describes estrangement as a product of psychological development: the resulting divisions within the personality are simply exacerbated by the decline of traditional religion, the literalization and death of its symbols, and the unmitigated demands for conformity characteristic of modern life. Indeed, the underlying cleavage between the unconscious and consciousness is the precondition for the neuroticization of modern man.

It is, however, not clear whether or not Jung believes that alienation can be overcome through the process of psychological development. On the one hand, he describes estrangement in the context of the unfolding of consciousness. And Jung does understand this process of individuation as leading toward wholeness and the achievement of selfhood. Furthermore, Jung suggests that the psychotherapist can facilitate this


*Ibid., 120.
process: "this rounding out of the personality into a new whole may well be the goal of any psychotherapy that claims to be more than a mere cure of symptoms." (CW IX, I, 289)

On the other hand, Jung also speaks of individuation as a never ending process (not unlike this thesis). In *Transformation Symbolism and the Mass*, Jung suggests that there are limits to the achievement of selfhood: "since this growth of personality comes out of the unconscious which is by definition unlimited, the extent of the personality now gradually realizing itself cannot in practice be limited either." (CW XI, 258) Given the infinite dimensions of the task of psychological development, no person can legitimately claim to have achieved wholeness. For, in doing so, she would identify with the self and would "come to hold some partial completion as total and so abort [her] fuller growth and balance." Consequently, "for Jung the self always remains beyond, a lure onwards, and man moving towards it always suffers some privation of its fullness."

Even if complete integration is not possible, Jung does suggest that some movement toward this goal can occur. But can this movement be initiated by human effort? In *The Integration of the Personality*, Jung argues that "psychic happening is only for the smallest part under the control of the ego." He emphasizes that the impetus for psychological growth originates in the depths of the psyche beyond conscious control. As a result, we experience the promptings for further development as coming from

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100Ibid., 57.
101C.G. Jung, *The Integration of the Personality*, op. cit., 39.
beyond ourselves, as acts of 'grace.' (CW XI, 251) At the most, we have the choice to accept or not to accept the challenges posed by the unconscious: to the degree that we are willing to give ourselves up in an act of "deliberate self-surrender," (CW XI, 251) so are we able to participate in the movement toward wholeness.

Jung asserts that, despite this limited choice, "man is never helped in his sufferings by what he thinks for himself, but only by revelations of a wisdom greater than his own." But he is equally clear that these revelations arise from within the psyche. Even though the movement toward wholeness does not originate in the ego or conscious intention, it does originate in the activity of the unconscious. Because of these unconscious origins, we may experience the call to growth as a call from beyond ourselves. But, in the end, this is really a call from within. This is not to diminish the importance or transformative potential of such experiences, it is simply to point out that they are experiences of the immanent rather than the transcendent.

To recapitulate, Jung describes estrangement as the fracturing of the original, preconscious unity of the psyche, in which the ego becomes separated from the recreative depths of the unconscious. This crisis of individuality is exacerbated in modern society because of the pressures of conformity and the loss of living symbols and religion. Although this account of alienation bears some resemblance to Tillich's understanding of the existential state, there are some notable differences between the two thinkers on this issue. First, Tillich understands estrangement as a separation not only from one's self but also from the source of one's being, God; Jung also speaks of this

102 Ibid., 39.
separation from the divine, but for Jung it is a separation from an entirely immanent, rather than transcendent, power. Second, for Tillich, the profundity of existential estrangement requires that reconciliation comes from beyond estranged existence, beyond human effort; for Jung, reconciliation is not subject to conscious control, as it originates in the stirrings of the unconscious. However, because Jung's psychology is one of immanence, the process of integration occurs within the limits of the empirical personality. These two areas of difference form the backdrop for the next section of this thesis: a Tillichean-inspired critique of Jung's analysis of alienation.

A Tillichean Criticism of Jung's Position

In this next section, I shall attempt to articulate a criticism of Jung's analysis from within Tillich's perspective, thereby drawing this analysis into the 'theological circle.' I shall argue that Jung's account of alienation yields to a more profound understanding of this condition and therefore requires an answer which comes from the power of being, at once transcendent and present to us at the depths of our experience.103

As I have argued, Jung holds that alienation is an experience of the individual psyche: it is a function of the inner divisions and dynamics of the personality. This fracturing of the psyche occasions a loss of individuality, a loss which can only be

103 The structure of this argument is informed by a similar argument articulated by Guyton Hammond in Man in Estrangement (pp 122-130).
overcome through the painful, dangerous, and potentially endless process of individuation. The spiritual malaise of modernity, however, impedes this process in its celebration of conformity and mass-mindedness.

Tillich is well aware of the loss of individuality under the pressures of modern life. And he laments the loss of symbols which connect us with the dimension of depth and prevent us from losing ourselves and becoming "things among things." But, for Tillich, this loss of authentic individuality is accompanied by a loss of substantial participation in the world and community. In *The Courage To Be*, Tillich emphasizes that individuation and participation are "correlated." They are polar elements in the basic dialectical structure of being. As a result, he contends, "we are threatened not only with losing our individual selves but also with losing our participation in the world." Alienation, therefore, involves a double loss.

The relationship between individualization and participation is an element of the more basic polarity between self and world. For Tillich, "man has a world, although he is also in it at the same time." (*ST* I, 170) The self is a dialectical unity: it is the essential nature of the self to hold the ontological poles in relationship. Consequently, the alienation of the self entails the alienation of the world. As Tillich suggests, "what happens in the microcosm happens by participation in the macrocosmos, for being itself

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104 Paul Tillich, *The Spiritual Situation in our Technological Society*, op.cit., 45.


106 Ibid., 89.
is one." (ST I, 261) Indeed, one of Tillich’s more powerful criticisms of depth psychology is of its failure to acknowledge the broader dimensions of alienation and its tendency to deal with the individual in isolation from "the competitive, post-puritan society with the repressions, the anxiety and the compulsions it produces."107

Although Jung describes alienation as a crisis of individuality, he is cognizant of the social dimensions of this problem. His awareness, however, extends to the degree to which social conditions impede the pursuit of the self. He does not, generally speaking, consider the effects of alienation on society or the world. This is interesting, given that Jung shares with Tillich the view that life is made up of contending opposites - such as the individual and the collective.

Jung’s failure to trace the effects of alienation on the world is problematic because features of his psychology seem to point toward this possibility. First, as Tillich acknowledges, the idea of the collective unconscious gestures toward the broader dimensions of alienation. (ST II, 42) Second, Jung frequently writes about how the individual effects her world through the projection of her unconscious life: unable to accept certain aspects of the unconscious (particularly those issuing from the shadow) as a part of her own personality, the individual sees them in other people and the world. Typically, she acts with hostility toward these frailties, inferiorities, and evils. Projection can take on a collective force within a society: the repressed shadow of individuals erupts in war, conflict, disorder. Past cultural projection brought the Nazi regime; and Jung

107Paul Tillich, The Spiritual Situation in our Technological Society, op. cit., 129.
feared that current projections could bring global nuclear annihilation. This kind of peril within culture can be avoided only when individuals see through their projections and deal effectively with the world.

It seems reasonable to suggest that the sociological and psychological data recognized by Jung requires an account of alienation which includes not only the estrangement of the self but also the world; in other words, an account which recognizes not only the loss of individuality but also the loss of true participation. If it is not simply the self but the self-in-its-world which becomes estranged, then estrangement is complete. And as Guyton Hammond suggests, when estrangement is complete in this way, "we must consider the possibility of a reconciliation which comes to man from beyond his existence altogether. Existence is a question, not an answer." The profundity of the human condition requires an answer which is at once transcendent and present to us at the depths of our experience.

Interestingly, in one of his later works, *The Undiscovered Self*, Jung begins to acknowledge the need for the transcendent. Appropriately, it is in the context of his reflections on the state of the modern world that he makes this acknowledgement. He writes the following:

> Just as man, as a social being, cannot in the long run exist without a tie to the community, so the individual will never find any real satisfaction for his existence, and his own spiritual and moral autonomy, anywhere except in an extramundane principle capable of relativizing the influence of external factors. The individual who is not anchored in God can offer no resistance on his own

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resources to the physical and moral blandishments of the world.  

In summary, I have argued that Jung’s analysis of alienation as a crisis of individuality naturally yields to a more profound position -- that is, one which also acknowledges the collective dimensions of estrangement. We are estranged from our world and the world participates in our estrangement. The depth of this condition requires an answer which comes from beyond estranged existence -- a point which Jung begins to concede toward the end of his career. Thus the tensions within Jung’s analysis of existence draw us into the theological circle. And it is this context that correlation may take place.

110 C.G. Jung, The Undiscovered Self, op. cit., 34.
Chapter Four: Tillich’s Theological Answers

We have arrived at the final stage of this exercise in correlation: the articulation of Tillich’s theological response to the conditions of estrangement. The essence of Tillich’s answer is that the appearance of Jesus as the Christ, the bearer of the New Being, is the source of our healing. As Tillich argues, "the function of the bearer of the New Being is not only to save individuals and to transform man’s historical existence, but to renew the universe." (ST II, 95) Jung also understands the symbol of Christ to be central to the experience of reconciliation: Jung, however, is critical of the traditional interpretation of Christ, on the grounds that it is psychologically incomplete. Jung, therefore, offers a critical vantage point from which to evaluate the adequacy of Tillich’s theological response. In this chapter, I shall explore Tillich’s understanding of Christ as the bearer of the New Being as well as Jung’s criticisms of the symbol of Christ.

New Being: Jesus who is the Christ

According to Tillich, "the quest for the New Being is universal because the human predicament and its ambiguous conquest are universal." (ST II, 86) It is the experience
of estrangement which engenders the expectation of and hope for a transformed reality. The New Being is the fulfilment of this hope. The New Being "is the undistorted manifestation of essential being within and under the conditions of existence." (ST II, 119) It is new in two ways: "it is new in contrast to the merely potential character of essential being; and it is new over the estranged character of existential being." (ST II, 119) As such, the New Being heals the cleavage between essential and existential being characteristic of alienation.

Due to its universal import, the New Being appears in all religions, though "the character of the quest for the New Being changes from religion to religion and from culture to culture." (ST II, 86-7) There are, according to Tillich, basically two different ways in which the New Being finds expression. First, there is the non-historical type found in "Brahmanism, Buddhism, and the humanistic reactions to polytheism in classical Greece." (ST II, 87) In this type, the New Being is not the aim of history -- its promise of reconciliation does not involve the transformation of existence in this world but the transcendence of existence through "the negation of all things and the affirmation of the ground of being alone." (ST II, 87) Second, there is the historical type characteristic of western religion. This type begins with the affirmation of the whole of reality and points to the historical transformation of this reality. This process is "unique, unrepeatable, irreversible" and it is borne by historical groups such as families, nations, and churches. (ST II, 88)

Tillich argues that Christianity is the universal expression of the New Being: although it is historical in its orientation, its historicism is capable of embracing the non-
historical expectation of the New Being. Christianity is capable of this kind of universality because "the figure of the Son of Man combines transcendent roots with historical functions." (ST II, 89) Jesus who is the Christ is a fully historical person who has a transhistorical character due to "the presence and judgment and salvation in him." (ST II, 89)

The Christ is not only the universal expression of the New Being but also the final expression or revelation of this reality. In the first volume of Systematic Theology, Tillich explains that "a revelation is final if it has the power of negating itself without losing itself." (ST I, 133) Jesus as the Christ surrenders his finitude and, in so doing, "becomes completely transparent to the mystery he reveals." (ST I, 133)

Tillich offers a new interpretation of the incarnational presence of Jesus as the Christ. He criticizes the traditional theological interpretation which explains the paradox of the incarnation as the juxtaposition of polar opposites (temporal/eternal, man/God) in the person of Jesus Christ. According to Tillich, when this traditional interpretation is taken literally, then it is essentially pagan: the idea of the divine becoming human is a variant of "pagan transmutation myths." (ST II, 149) As Langdon Gilkey explains, both classical incarnational theology and pagan myths presuppose "the assumption of the finitude of God, for only a finite entity can become or have 'a nature' to which it belongs. Thus both are nonsensical if God is, as in Christian thought, the source and ground of finitude; God cannot become man without ceasing to be God."\(^{11}\)

In contrast to this "absurd" interpretation, Tillich argues that the paradox of the incarnation is "the appearance of the New Being under the conditions of existence, yet judging and conquering them." \(ST II, 92\) This is a \textit{historical} paradox: in the context of human alienation, the appearance of Jesus as the Christ brings a new reality which is counter to all expectations.

This unique event is, for Tillich, entirely the work of God. The removal of guilt and punishment is not dependent on the personal actions of the Christ. Rather, Tillich contends, "the Christ, as the bearer of the New Being, mediates the reconciling act of God to man." \(ST II, 174\) In other words, this answer to alienation is not a product of human effort (not even the effort of Jesus): it is an answer which comes from God, i.e., from beyond estranged existence.

The transformative effect of Jesus as the Christ has an objective and subjective side. The objective side of the event is the manifestation of the New Being in the Christ. In the Christ, essential humanity is expressed in the life of an actual, historical person under the conditions of existence. Tillich suggests that the fact that the New Being appears in one life makes it possible for it to appear in others: "if there were no personal life in which existential estrangement had been overcome, the New Being would have remained a quest and an expectation and would not be a reality in time and space." \(ST II, 98\) This point recalls the argument made in chapter three of this thesis, which emphasized the interrelationship of the microcosmos and the macrocosmos in the experience of estrangement: that which affects the individual also affects the collective.

In his elaboration of the "Principles of the Doctrine of the Atonement," Tillich
explains that God's atoning activity is a function of God's participation in creation\textsuperscript{112} and human beings' participation in this suffering.\textsuperscript{113} This participation, mediated by the Christ, reunites God and humanity. This healing act does not remove the consequences of estrangement, but transforms them. Thus, Tillich speaks of salvation as fragmentary and suggests that "no men are totally healed, not even those who have encountered the healing power as it appears in Jesus as the Christ." (ST II, 167)

The subjective side of reconciliation is the human reception of the divine gift: "this divine act is effective only if man reacts and accepts the removal of guilt between God and man, namely, the divine offer of reconciliation in spite of guilt." (ST II, 170) The subjective response is that of acceptance: man "must accept that he is accepted; he must accept acceptance." (ST II, 179) But this acceptance has the character of "in-spite-of" due to the fragmentary nature of salvation. Tillich emphasizes that the subjective response is possible only because of the objective reality of the New Being which necessarily precedes it. (ST II, 177)

Thus, for Tillich, the answer to the question implied in estranged existence is the reconciling power of Jesus who is the Christ and the bearer of the New Being.

\textsuperscript{112}This divine participation in existential estrangement is manifested in the Cross. (ST II, 175)

\textsuperscript{113}Tillich compares the suffering to the practice of clinical depth psychology and its requirement "of making the patient go through the torment of existential insight into his being ... before promising any healing." (ST II, 172)
Jung’s Criticism of the Symbol of Christ

Jung also acknowledges the centrality of Christ in the history of western consciousness and in the individual quest for wholeness. Indeed, he laments the declining power of Christ as a symbol. But Jung is not without critical reserve on this issue. He is critical of the prevailing tendency to literalize Christ, to emphasize the historical contingencies of his life to the exclusion of his symbolic role in human experience. And he decries the desperate need for "facts" (to bolster faith) which fuels this search for the historical Jesus. The psychologist, however, offers an even more potent criticism of Christ: he argues that this symbol is incomplete, onesided, lacking a "dark side." This claim is elaborated in the context of Jung’s understanding of the development of the Christian idea of God.

According of Jung, in early Christian-Jewish history, the image of God was balanced, incorporating both good and evil. Jung appeals to the "Yahwistic God-image" of the Book of Job and its presentation of God as loving, merciful, and yet dangerous in the exercise of his justice. (CW IX, II, 50) Jung also cites the Clementine Homilies, a collection of Gnostic-Christian writings, dating back from about 150 AD, in which "the unknown author understands good and evil as the right and left hand of God, and views the whole of creation is terms of syzygies, or pairs of opposites." (CW IX, II, 54)

The rise of Manichean dualism. Jung argues, prompted a transformation of this theological position:

It is as if Manichean dualism first made the Fathers conscious of the fact that until then, without clearly recognizing it, they had always believed firmly in the
substantiality of evil. This sudden realization might have led them to the dangerously anthropomorphic assumption that what men cannot unite, God cannot unite either. (CW IX, II, 58)

The early church Fathers averted this threat through an appeal to the doctrine of privatio boni in which evil is characterized as a mere diminution of good and is thus deprived of any substantial existence. Privatio boni, however, originates in the doctrine of the summum bonum and the claim that no darkness or evil participates in the complete goodness of God. Rather, human beings are the source of evil in the world through their free will. (CW IX, II, 46)

Similarly, Christ is entirely good -- as Jung notes, the dogmatic figure of Christ is "one-sidedly perfect." (CW IX, II, 42) As a result, the symbolism "demands a psychic complement to restore the balance." (CW IX, II, 42) The dark aspect of the archetype of the self, which is excluded in Christ, finds its expression in the figure of the Antichrist. Thus, in the history of Christianity, the Antichrist emerges as the shadow of the self and of the Christ figure.

Jung is troubled by the onesideness of the Christ-image not only because it is empirically inaccurate and fails to represent psychological experience in its totality. He is also troubled by the fact that the doctrine of the privatio boni underestimates the reality of evil and is euphemistic in its tendency to "gloss over" very dangerous evils which lurk in human nature and the world. This "lulls one into a false sense of security." (CW IX, II, 53) Furthermore, this tendency to minimize the reality of evil amounts to mockery given the historical existence of concentration camps and the rise of the Nazi regime.

Despite these criticisms, Jung does acknowledge that within our psychological
lives there is a tendency to give priority to 'good' over 'evil' regardless of whether or not doing so is suitable. Thus, the doctrine of *privatio boni* gives expression to the tendency to "increase the good and diminish the bad." (CW IX, II, 54)

Although the Christ figure is not a totality (insofar as it lacks "the nocturnal side" of psychic reality), it still is capable of symbolizing the self. Although the self is the psychic totality of the individual, "anything that a man postulates as being a greater totality than himself can become a symbol of the self." (CW XI, 156) The Christ-image is simply not as complete a symbol as it could, or should, be.

A Possible Reply to Jung

Despite his personal commitment to Christianity and the centrality of Christ within his theology, Tillich is not uncritical of traditional interpretations of Christ. As mentioned above, he offers his own account of the central Christian paradox to replace the dogmatic account of "God becoming man." Furthermore, like Jung, Tillich is critical of the importance attached to the search for the historical Jesus and the inability to appreciate the symbolic dimensions of the Christ implied in such an effort. Tillich is also critical of traditional accounts of the temptations of Christ. It seems to me that his analysis of temptation reveals his sensitivity to the kinds of criticism raised by Jung and provides a point of response to these criticisms.

According to the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ, Tillich contends, there are
"no traces of estrangement between him and God and consequently between him and himself and between him and his world." (ST II, 126) But, he urges, this conquest of estrangement should not be described with the expression "the sinlessness of Jesus." (ST II, 126) The term "sinlessness" merely rationalizes the biblical picture of Jesus as one who "conquered the forces of existential estrangement within existence." (ST II, 127) Furthermore, this term leads many theologians to deny the seriousness of the temptations of Jesus.

Tillich argues that the tendency to interpret the biblical picture of Christ in this way originates in an inability to tolerate "the full humanity of Jesus and the Christ, his finite freedom and with it, the possibility of defeat in temptation." (ST II, 127) But, Tillich counters, Jesus, like all human beings, is finite freedom. Moreover, his finitude is clearly demonstrated in the biblical accounts of his life. As Tillich points out, the biblical Jesus experiences death and anxiety about death. He wanders, homeless and socially insecure. He is visited by persistent want, desire, doubt, and hesitation. He is "subject to uncertainty in judgment, risks of error, the limits of power and the vicissitudes of life." (ST II, 131) Jesus lives a fully human life which is characterized by finitude. As a result, the temptations faced by him are real, serious.114 Indeed, "the conquest of existential estrangement in the New Being, which is the being of the Christ, does not remove finitude and anxiety, ambiguity and tragedy; but it does have the character of taking the negativities into unbroken unity with God." (ST II, 127)

114The reality of the temptations of Christ pose certain theological problems which Tillich strives to resolve. See Systematic Theology II, 127-131.
Tillich emphasizes, on the one hand, that the finitude and temptation of Jesus as the Christ are necessary for human reconciliation. He says, "Jesus could not represent the essential unity between God and man (Eternal God-manhood) without the possibility of real temptation." *(ST II, 127)* On the other hand, the Christ could have given into the desires for food, acknowledgement, and unlimited power encouraged in him by Satan. But, Tillich continues, "then he would have been demonic and would have ceased to be the Christ." *(ST II, 126)*

The interpretation of the Christ articulated by Tillich embraces the full humanity of Jesus and does not characterize him as "sinless." Rather, in this interpretation, Jesus as the Christ is a person who struggles with choices which threaten him with demonic possibility. This image of Jesus embraces something of the shadow side which is excluded in purely abstract, dogmatic analyses of his life. Consequently, Tillich's theological answer to the problems of existence seems capable of responding to the criticisms raised by Jung.

**Concluding Remarks**

We have now arrived at the end of this exercise in correlation and can review some of the conclusions made thus far. In reflecting on Tillich's method of correlation, I argued that the method involves more than a simple pairing up of question and answer; rather, it involves the application of philosophical criticism to existential analyses of the
human condition. This process draws such analyses into the theological circle where the correlative exercise occurs.

On the basis of this interpretation of Tillich's theological method, I described and analyzed Jung's understanding of alienation. For Jung, estrangement is a product of psychological development and the emergence of consciousness. As he describes it, alienation is a crisis of individuality in which we are called to claim our true self-hood through the painful, and potentially endless, process of individuation. This task is made more difficult by the demands and conditions characteristic of modern life.

Jung's account of alienation is not without its interpretive difficulties. In particular, I considered the question of the transcendence of God, and concluded that, for Jung, God is an intrapsychic reality. This means, of course, that alienation is also an intrapsychic event -- a position which stands in contrast to Tillich's claim that alienation is separation from the transcendent ground of our being. I also considered the question of the degree to which reconciliation is subject to human control. Although Jung is clear that reconciliation is not initiated by the conscious mind, he does locate the source of our healing in the depths of the unconscious. Thus, for Jung, reconciliation begins within the empirical personality. Whereas for Tillich, reconciliation originates beyond estranged existence with the healing act of God.

These differences provided the framework for a Tillichean-inspired criticism of Jung's position. Jung describes alienation as a crisis of individuality. This understanding, however, obscures the broader, collective dimensions of this condition. Indeed, there are intimations of the collective nature of estrangement in Jung's
psychology. By acknowledging that alienation afflicts both the self and its world, we see that alienation is profound, complete, and therefore requires an answer which comes from beyond estranged existence, from the transcendent ground of our being. We find ourselves, therefore, within the theological circle.

Tillich offers an interpretation of Christian symbol and doctrine which attempts to address this understanding of the human condition. The essence of his response is that Jesus as the Christ is the bearer of the New Being -- the new reality which heals the separation between essential and existential being and reunites individuals with the divine source of their being. Jung presents a powerful criticism of the incompleteness of Christ as a symbol of wholeness; if Tillich had entered into conversation with Jung on this issue, he might have responded to the latter's criticisms by emphasizing the temptations and finitude which characterized the life of Jesus.

This exercise provides a point of insight into the relationship between psychology and theology. I think that three issues of particular importance have emerged from this thesis.

(1) This correlative exercise revealed some deep similarities between the thought of Jung and Tillich. These similarities, I think, enrich both the theological and psychological enterprises in general. But, it is important to acknowledge that Tillich and Jung were liberal thinkers who stood in opposition to many traditional views. Consequently, I am not convinced that as fruitful a dialogue would be likely to occur between more traditional thinkers and liberal thinkers such as Jung and Tillich. I do, however, think it would be interesting to attempt such an enterprise.
(2) Despite the many similarities between Jung and Tillich, there are some profound areas of difference, most notably, their differing accounts of God. Although Jung claims that he is an empirical scientist rather than a metaphysician, it becomes clear that his psychology involves an implicit metaphysics. It seems to me that Jung should have been more forthcoming about the metaphysical implications of his work, as doing so might have forestalled some of the frustrations experienced by his theological interpreters. Psychologists and theologians alike need to be aware of the points of difference I outlined in Chapter Three: these differences should not be excuses for the hasty rejection of each other’s thought, but a starting point for further conversation.

(3) Finally, theologians dismiss psychology only at their peril. Jung’s psychology, in particular, reminds us that the study of religion is the study of deepest level of human reality. We need to be reminded that the theological enterprise can reveal to us the foundations of our very selves. And Jung, despite his criticisms of Christianity, still maintains that it is important to think deeply about our spiritual lives. It is regrettable that Jung and Tillich were not able to engage in dialogue during their lives; this task, it appears, falls on the present generation of psychologists, theologians, and others interested in the plight of the human condition.
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