A THEORETICAL EXAMINATION OF REVOLUTIONARY IRAN

A THEORETICAL EXAMINATION

OF

REVOLUTIONARY IRAN

By

SHEILA MARY NICHOLAS, B.A.

A Thesis

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree

Master of Arts

McMaster University

October, 1983

MASTER OF ARTS (1983)   McMASTER UNIVERSITY
(Political Science)   Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: A Theoretical Examination of Revolutionary
         Iran

AUTHOR: Sheila Mary Nicholas, B.A. (Wilfrid Laurier
                                              University)

SUPERVISOR: Dr. Michael Stein

NUMBER OF PAGES: v + 213

ABSTRACT

The advent of the Iranian revolution has provided social scientists with another example of rapid social transformation. An important feature of the revolution was the role of the clergy in leading the successful revolution against the apparently stable regime of the Shah, and in establishing an Islamic Republic in Iran. Most theories of revolution fail to address the role of culture in social processes. In his book, <u>Revolution and the Transformation of Societies</u>, S.N. Eisenstadt makes culture into a usable variable. Eisenstadt's five categories provide a schema to analyze the international, political, economic, social and cultural factors which contributed to the Shah's downfall, as well as the outcome of the revolution. The clergy emerge as a disembedded elite motivated by both symbolic and material interests. They led a revolutionary movement which demanded social and political reforms while asserting their Islamic identity.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would first like to thank my committee: my advisor, Dr. Michael Stein for his patience and understanding throughout the various stages of the thesis; Dr. Gordon Means for his aid with organizing some of the more difficult sections; and Dr. Stefania Szlek-Miller for her helpful comments and wholehearted encouragement. I must also thank my sister Barbara for tireless typing of earlier drafts, and my parents for their moral support. Most important, I must thank David Matheson for always knowing what to do when things seemed darkest.

INTRODUCTION

Both the occurrence of the Iranian Revolution in
1979 and its outcome surprised scholars and laymen alike.[1]
After fifteen years of apparent political stability and a
decade of real economic growth, it seemed that the Shah's
regime fell during its zenith. Although opposition to the
Shah's rule existed, most observers were led to believe
that the dissension was limited to traditional religious
opponents of the regime, as well as radical leftist groups.
Admittedly, the Shah's modernization plan was placing a
strain upon traditional ways of life, but the progress of
industrialization and rising standard of living seemed to
overshadow the temporary problems of high inflation, trans-
portation and housing shortages, and inadequate water
supplies. In 1978, it appeared that sentiments of poli-
tical oppression and socio-economic dissatisfaction arose
suddenly, and were effectively mobilized to dismantle the
constitutional monarchy of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

The Shah appeared to have faced similar problems
during the early part of the 1960's. The boom which
occurred after the fall of Mossadeq was giving way to
serious economic and social problems. Corruption
increased, as did serious inflation, while the security

forces discouraged trade-union organization, keeping wages low. Open discontent emerged after the elections of 1960 and appeared to have been engineered by officials in the government. In response to these broad problems, the Shah appointed Ali Amini, who pursued major social and institutional reforms. The Land Reform decree of 1962 was met by protest from university students in Tehran. Unrest continued despite attacks on the National Front and other opposition groups which resulted in the arrest of many of their supporters. The White Revolution, announced in 1962, was a program of major reforms. The resulting clerical opposition, labelled reactionary by the Shah, was joined by nationalist supporters who objected to the regime's autocracy and dependence upon the West.

Ultimately, the Shah managed to maintain control of Iranian society. His attempts at reforming the system of land ownership gained the acquiescence of some of his opponents. However, a large number of the opposition were arrested, and others were discouraged from displaying their discontent openly. A cursory glance at the 1978-1979 crisis in Iran reveals its similarity to the earlier events. Consequently, the analyst is interested in discovering the critical factors present in the latest opposition movement which led to the downfall of the Shah.

Given the predominance of secular nationalist protest movements, as exemplified by the National Front in

the 1960's, the leading role of religious elites and symbols during the 1978-79 revolutionary movement is indeed surprising. Perhaps even more unusual from the point of Western social scientists, however, is the creation of an Islamic republic in Iran. [Virtually all approaches to social change, Marxist and non-Marxist, have assumed that there is a secularization of culture through the displacement of traditional religious beliefs and symbols by a system of values compatible with the needs of a nation-state undergoing modernization.] Religion has declined in relevance as a political factor since the separation of church and state has been assumed with the passing of traditional societies.

It is perhaps difficult for members of modern Western society to view religion as a dominant force in social affairs. Furthermore, the values which fostered the development of Western institutions and technology seem most appropriate for modern society. ⟨Muslims, however, point to the bankruptcy of materialism and the alienation of large segments of society as an argument against adoption of Western culture. Many followers of Islam see within it the possibility of preserving man's spiritual nature while pursuing the opportunities offered by technology.

For the social scientist, Islam is an important consideration in the understanding of the political sys-

tems of the Middle East. Islam is a powerful medium through which to express concerns over the influx of Western values. In the case of Shi'ism, especially in the symbol of the martyr Husayn,[2] there exist images which portray the absence of social justice and the resulting hardships. Under Ayatollah Khomeini's charismatic leadership, Islam was used to mobilize both religious and secular segments of the society against the Shah's regime. The result of such a religio-political movement is the current existence of an Islamic republic in Iran.

ii

A definition of revolution is dependent upon the theorist's perception of social processes. Most definitions recognize that a revolution is distinguished from other forms of radical, non-institutional change by virtue of the wide-reaching consequences. Sigmund Neumann offers a definition which reflects the general understanding of a revolution:

> sweeping fundamental change in political organization, social structure, economic property control and the predominant myth of social order.[3]

Revolution, then, results in far reaching change in all aspects of society so as to indicate a break with the previous form of development.

Applying this definition to Iran, it can be dis-

cerned that the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 holds the potential for such all-encompassing change. Islam presents Quranic prescripts for all aspects of society. The implementation of Islamic directives would entail a reorganization of the political, economic and social aspects of society signalling an end to the Shah's policy of secularization and the modelling of social and political systems after Western examples. The manifestation of such changes will depend upon Khomeini's ability to maintain control long enough to institutionalize his plans for the Islamic state. Consequently, the study of an event as recent as the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 suffers from an insufficient historical perspective.

Nevertheless, in light of the potential for the present regime in Iran to successfully implement widespread changes, it is appropriate to consider the Iranian crisis under the category of revolution. Having determined this, the task for any student of revolution is to understand the causes, processes and outcomes of social upheaval. Given the complex interaction of the numerous factors which contribute to the occurrence of a revolution, the analyst requires a framework to begin the investigation. Many approaches can be taken to the study of any particular phenomenon. However, for political scientists, the method of cross-national comparison is one way to gain a sense of the relative contribution made by specific elements to a

given situation. The comparative method may also help the
social scientist to understand general trends in political
and social relations. In addition, use of the comparative
method may lead to a greater comprehension of what contri-
butes to a stable, responsive society.

iii

There are two important questions which are to be
considered in this study. The content of these questions
will help to determine the analytical framework which will
be needed in order to address the inquiry appropriately.
The first question concerns the identification of the
factors which led to the downfall of the Shah. A prelimi-
nary look at the revolutionary movement reveals the exis-
tence of international, economic, political and social
themes of protest. An approach which could help to shed
light upon the Iranian revolution would have to encompass
all four areas of influence.

The obvious role played by Islam and the Islamic
clergy in the protest movements which led to the collapse
of the Shah's monarchy, and in post-Pahlavi Iran, suggests
another focus of inquiry. The second question considers
the processes which led to the domination of the opposi-
tion movement by the clergy, and the utilization of Islam
as a mobilizing force in Iranian society. An explanation

of religious fervour is too simple to explain the partici-
pation of non-Muslim groups in the revolutionary process.⌐
The theory of revolution which will be adopted would have
to incorporate the cultural variable within its explanation.

The establishment of an Islamic republic raises a
more general, albeit secondary, issue for the social
scientist. The creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
challenges assumptions about the characteristics of
modernization, especially with regard to the separation
of church and state. Nikki R. Keddie warns that the terms
'tradition' and 'modernization' are dangerous categories
because both are in constant flux and, therefore, are very
difficult to define adequately.[4] A society's response to
the influx of science and technology, and the corresponding
values, depends in part upon the culture of the society.
Despite Western indifference to the political influence of
religion, values and culture maintain their importance as
determinants of broad-based social policies and individual
behaviour. The divergences in culture may help to explain
differences in the propensity for revolutionary change.

iv

Chapter II will consist of a review of five
theories of revolution which represent the predominant
approaches to the study of this phenomenon in political

science and sociology. The knowledge acquired through a
preliminary investigation of the Iranian revolution will
help the analyst to choose from the review a theory which
can assist in conducting a systematic analysis of the
recent events in Iran. Chalmers Johnson addresses the
subject of revolution from the standpoint of a structural-
functionalist. Also representative of the consensual
paradigm is Ted Gurr's social-psychological approach to
political violence. Charles Tilly, in reaction to the
psychological-motivational framework, offers an alterna-
tive way to study the processes of political upheaval.
The conflict paradigm which subsumes Tilly's work is also
represented by Theda Skocpol's theory of revolution in
terms of class analysis, international factors and the
contribution of peasants to political upheaval. The work
of S.N. Eisenstadt does not fit within the realm of either
the consensual or conflictual paradigms. Rather, his
approach represents recent attempts to synthesize struc-
tural-functionalist, symbolic-interactionist, neo-
evolutionist and Marxist theories. It is from amongst
these theories that an approach will be adopted so as to
facilitate the isolation and analysis of the relevant
factors in the Iranian revolution.

REFERENCES

[1]The element of 'surprise' was mentioned by such
authors as: Eric J. Hooglund, "Book Reviews: The Iranian
Revolution", The Middle East Journal (Autumn, 1980), p.
485; G. Treverton, ed., Crisis Management and the Super-
powers in the Middle East (Westmead, England: Gower
Publishing Co. Ltd., 1981), p. 96; L.P. Elwell-Sutton,
"The Iranian Revolution", International Journal, XXXIV,
no. 3 (Summer, 1979), p. 371.

[2]For further discussion of the symbol of Husayn,
see Gustav Thaiss, "Unity and Discord: The Symbol of
Husayn in Iran", in Charles J. Adams, ed., Iranian Civili-
zation and Culture (Montreal: Institute of Islamic Studies,
McGill University, 1972); also by G. Thaiss, "Religious
Symbolism and Social Change: The Drama of Husain", in
Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Scholars, Saints and Sufis (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1972); and Mary Hegland,
"Two Images of Husain: Accommodation and Revolution in an
Iranian Village", in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Religion and
Politics in Iran (New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 1983).

[3]S. Neumann, "The International Civil War", World
Politics, I, no. 3 (April, 1949) as quoted in C. Johnson,
Revolution and the Social System (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1964), p. 2.

[4]Nikki R. Keddie, "Introduction", in Michael E.
Bonine and Nikki R. Keddie, eds., Modern Iran: The
Dialectics of Continuity and Change (Albany: State Univer-
sity of New York Press, 1981), pp. 16-17.

FIVE THEORIES OF REVOLUTION: AN OVERVIEW

The five theories which are to be reviewed in this chapter represent the predominant approaches of comparative politics and sociology. After World War II, structural-functionalism, based upon a consensual view of society, was a popular approach to the study of politics and society. Chalmers Johnson has been chosen as the representative of this framework because he directly addresses the issue of revolution rather than the broader question of systemic change, more frequently discussed by structural-functionalists. Another aspect of the consensual paradigm is presented by Ted Gurr. Gurr's approach is "widely acclaimed as an outstanding psychological theory of political violence".[1] Because he integrates many of the assumptions and variables of the several social-psychological explanations of revolution, Gurr is an appropriate spokesman for this framework.

It can be argued that Charles Tilly's theory represents the transition from the political sociology paradigm to the political economy approach, which has gained popularity in recent years. Tilly perceives conflict arising from competition among various groups for

power, as a fundamental characteristic of society. Within the same paradigm, Theda Skocpol represents the political economy approach to the investigation of revolutionary phenomena. She exceeds the limitations of class analysis by adopting Tilly's conflict approach to explain the processes of revolution. Skocpol also represents the thrust of recent neo-Marxist theory granting the state an element of autonomy.

The last theory to be examined is unusual, since it falls into neither the consensual nor the conflictual paradigm. S.N. Eisenstadt is a distinguished theorist of modernization. His theory can be described as a synthesis of many of the assumptions and concepts contained in the previously mentioned theories: Eisenstadt considers the way in which international, economic, political and social factors contribute to the creation of a revolutionary situation. Most importantly, he contributes one additional variable to the study of revolution: culture.

The following commentaries on the five theories of revolution will endeavour to explain each theorist's understanding of social processes. Such an analysis will reveal the contribution of certain factors to the creation of a revolutionary situation. The theories will be evaluated for their degree of internal consistency, the clarity of their concepts and their explanation of the mechanics of social change. There will also be a

practical consideration, parsimony, which cannot be
achieved if the theory is as complex as the phenomenon
which it is purported to explain.[2]

It is obvious from the recognition which these
theorists have achieved in their areas that their respec-
tive approaches contribute to the study of revolution.
Consequently, it will be difficult to select an appro-
priate theory on the basis of the above criteria only.
The content of the two aforementioned questions, based
upon a preliminary examination of Iran, will also be used
to decide upon a theory which would lead to the most
fruitful explanation of the Iranian case. Furthermore,
the excluded theories may offer important insights to
enhance the approach which will ultimately be adopted in
this systematic investigation of the Iranian revolution.

i

Chalmers Johnson's theory of revolution falls
within the structural-functional tradition established by
Talcott Parsons. The theory found in Revolutionary Change
and Revolution and the Social System looks at social
integration and change from a macro-sociological perspec-
tive. The social system consists of a set of institutions
which are the concrete manifestations of societal values.
The social system maintains a homeostatic equilibrium by

meeting the needs of pattern maintenance or socialization,
adaptation to the environment, goal attainment, and inte-
gration and social control. Stability can be maintained
if the value structure and the environment are synchronized
with each other. Should the values of the system become
dissynchronized with the demands of the environment, the
result is system disequilibrium which necessitates change.

When dissynchronization occurs, the response of
the governing elite may take two forms. A stable social
system is based upon shared value patterns to legitimize
power and authority such that dysfunctional conditions
which disrupt the value coordination of a system results
in 'power deflation'.[3] This in turn necessitates an
increase in the use of force to maintain social integra-
tion. Johnson presents the loss of authority, or power
deflation as a necessary cause of revolutions.

The governing elite may choose another response
which is to pursue a policy of purposeful change, ranging
from conservative change to elite intransigence. If the
elite is acquainted with the social conditions, and is
able to identify the essential values to maintain the
system, conservative change may be successfully imple-
mented.[4] The policies must sustain the support of the
system's non-deviant actors, or further loss of authority
will occur.[5] Johnson suggests that the system will
persist if the leaders can successfully use the armed

forces to coerce social interaction, until changes can be implemented and the values and environment resynchronized. Thus, the second necessary cause of revolution hinges upon the 'quality of purposeful change' undertaken while a system is disequilibrated.

The third sufficient cause of revolution is identified as a catalyst which either may prevent an elite from enforcing social behaviour, or spur revolutionaries to attempt to seize power. These factors, which at one point Johnson says are provided by 'fortune', are called 'accelerators' of which there are three types.[6] The first group includes those factors which directly influence the armed forces. A disruption of the effectiveness of the armed forces will produce a revolution.[7] Another type of accelerator is the ideological belief held by revolutionaries that they will successfully challenge the governing elite's monopoly of power. The third category of accelerator is composed of the strategies pursued by the revolutionary conspirators against the armed forces.

Accelerators are events which do not in themselves threaten the existence of a functional society. It is the combination of power deflation and a loss of authority, in addition to an accelerator, which undermines deterrence based on force in a social system which has been disequilibrated by a change in either the structure of values or the patterns of labour division. The outcome of the revolution

will depend upon the loyalty and solidarity of the armed

forces and the valid transfer of culture from the pre-

revolutionary system to the new regime.[8]

For structural-functionalists, the subject of

change has always been a controversial one for several

reasons. One of the basic assumptions of this theory is

that survival of the system is its goal. Unlike examples

of biological systems, the order of the human social

system is not predetermined. Because the political order

of the social system can be drastically changed by men's

intentions, unlike the social order of beehives, survival

cannot be assumed to be the telos of a system. Ethical

considerations should determine the form and content of the

'good' society.

Explanatory problems occur due to the vagueness

of terms used by structural-functionalists. There is

disagreement as to what constitutes systemic change as

opposed to dissolution of the system. If a system under-

goes fundamental changes economically, politically, and

culturally, there is some doubt as to whether the previous

system can be said to persist. Similarly, structural-

functionalists must justify why revolution occurs rather

than the destruction of the system.

Some confusion arises from Johnson's use of terms.

He proposes that system disequilibrium is the result of

value-environment dissynchronization, which is defined as

the mismatching of the social set of values with the division of labour which is adapted to the environment. Although the concepts are clear at the theoretical level, application is made difficult because there is no scale given by which to judge the severity of disequilibrium apart from a post hoc analysis. If revolution occurred in a system, it can be concluded that system disequilibrium was sufficient to cause a revolution. The structural-functionalist's analysis moves from the outcome to the origins of the phenomenon.

The definition of deviancy is an example of how structural-functionalism tends toward self-reference. Because the existence of the system is assumed, all explanations must occur within terms of the 'system'. Deviancy is defined by Johnson as the maintenance of values opposing the social set of values without critically assessing the appropriateness of the societal values. The values of the 'deviant' actors may be justified outside the considerations of systemic survival. In a revolutionary situation, it would appear to be more important for the political decision-makers to gain the support of the deviant actors--those wishing justified value changes--as opposed to already supportive actors, or at least to dampen their criticisms. Deviant behaviour is considered "pathological to the functioning of the social system" rather than a form of systemic progression.[9]

The third and sufficient cause of revolution is a catalyst, which Johnson labels an accelerator. The defining of an accelerator as a cause seems to confuse preconditions with precipitants. Eckstein isolated pre-conditions: "circumstances which make it possible for precipitants to bring about political violence" from precipitants which are events which initiate the political violence.[10] Accelerators appear to be precipitants rather than actual causes.

In summary, Johnson's structural-functional approach explains revolutions generally in terms of system maintenance. The critical variable of Johnson's theory is system equilibrium which, if upset by any number of initial events, may cause value-environment dissynchroni-zation, and ultimately, revolution. On the abstract level, structural-functionalism is a sophisticated theory which maintains internal consistency and justifies the isolation of system equilibrium as the important variable within the explanatory framework. When the theory is applied, however, the variables are revealed to be vague, and difficult to measure. Because of the complex rela-tionships between variables, application of Johnson's theory is an undertaking of great proportions. Although values are an important element of the structural-functionalist's understanding of society, the theorist is not concerned with the normative question of whether

the system should be sustained. System maintenance is the telos of the system.

ii

Ted Gurr presents a theory of political violence which combines multiple social and psychological factors to explain the occurrence of political rebellion. Political violence refers to the class of collective actions within a political community against the political regime and its actors.[11] Political violence may take three forms, such as the spontaneous, popular participation of 'turmoil', the highly organized, limited participation upon which 'conspiracy' is based, or the highly organized violence with widespread popular participation which accompanies the state of 'internal war'.[12] Revolutions are examples of the last category.

Gurr's theory is composed of a complex set of interrelated hypotheses and corollaries which outline the psychological and societal causes of the potential for political violence. It is not within the scope of the paper to discuss most of the hypotheses. Rather, the objective in this section will be to explain Gurr's terms, to identify and discuss the four major variables and their relevance to the theory.

Gurr's theory is founded upon two assumptions.

The first concerns the motivational basis of violence as described by the frustration-aggression model. When goal-directed behaviour is obstructed so as to prevent its fulfillment, aggression results, aimed at the frustrating agent. The greater the frustration, the greater the quantity of aggression.[13] The second assumption originates in the work of J.C. Davies. Davies proposes that states of mind ultimately determine political stability and instability rather than the tangible grounds of inadequate/ adequate supplies of things such as food and political liberty.[14] Gurr links these two assumptions through his model of perceived or relative deprivation-anger-political violence which is the social analogue of the frustration-aggression model. The social process leading to political violence consists of the following three steps: the development of discontent; secondly, the politicization of discontent; and finally, the actualization of violence against political objects.

Discontent develops from relative deprivation which is defined as "a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectation and their value capabilities".[15] Value expectations are those goods and conditions to which people feel they are entitled whereas value capabilities are the goods and conditions which people believe they are capable of attaining.[16] In addition to these psychological factors, are societal variables such as cultural sanc-

tions for violence, extent of past political violence by reactionary groups and the degree of coercion employed by the regime. Once it is perceived that the political actors are responsible for the conditions of deprivation, violence against the political actors gains normative and utilitarian justification. The form which the politicized discontent will acquire when it is actualized will depend upon the "patterns of coercive control and institutional support."[17]

Gurr's analysis focuses upon four variables which form the general hypotheses concerning the sources, magnitude, and forms of violent political phenomena. The first variable, the "potential for collective violence", is calculated by measuring the extent and intensity of discontent among the members of the society. The second variable, the 'potential for political violence', is a measurement of the degree to which the discontent is politicized, that is to say, the extent to which widespread violence is directed against the political regime. Gurr labels these two variables as intervening ones initially, but they are later identified as primary dependent variables in his causal model, an obvious conceptual inconsistency. The magnitude of political violence is another variable which has three components, namely the scope or extent of participation, intensity, or destructiveness of action, and duration of the violence. The

fourth variable, the forms of political violence, is
also considered a dependent variable.

The greatest problem facing the application of
Gurr's theory is the complex interrelationship of the
hypotheses and corollaries. Although it is true that
complex phenomena may require a complex explanation,
parsimony is important. Furthermore, if the theory is
to explain revolution, it must not only specify the
relevant variables, but justify the use of these variables
as causes rather than correlates.[18]

This problem may originate with Gurr's use of the
frustration-aggression model as an analogue to the
occurrence of political violence. Political violence is
perceived to be similar to interpersonal aggression;
therefore the variables used to analyze aggression in
psychological studies can be transferred to the analysis
of political violence. Thus, relative deprivation is
analogous to reinforcement.[19] The theory "does not
explain why the variables included...are related to
political violence."[20] The strength of Gurr's argument
rests upon the appropriateness of the analogy. One case
deals with aggression on an interpersonal level while the
other is concerned with groups in political situations.

What might be determinants of individual
behaviour, may at the social level become merely linkages
or correlates. Furthermore, many of the variables which

Gurr argues affect the manifestation of political vio-
lence come not from the frustration-aggression model.
Rather, they are plausible factors that arise from the
social and political contexts.[21]

The importance of the cognitive states of the
masses to the occurrence of political violence cannot be
disputed. The notion of relative deprivation as opposed
to actual deprivation is critical for explaining why
revolutions have not occurred in states where there are
widespread economic problems. Relative deprivation
causing frustration may result in political demonstra-
tions and political violence which are precipitants of
revolution. Actual deprivation does exist in revolu-
tionary situations and should be given consideration
within the explanatory framework.

Applying Gurr's theory may be difficult because
one must choose from approximately eighty hypotheses and
corollaries, and it is uncertain whether the list is
complete, given the complexity of social interaction. In
light of this, Gurr's full theory fails the criterion of
parsimony, but the primary relationships discussed above
form a causal model upon which to order data of collective
violence. The concepts of the social-psychological
paradigm are ill-defined and their relationship to the
general hypotheses of the theory are unclear. Further-
more, it is not apparent that the leap from the causes of

political violence to a general theory of revolution is
justifiable or adequate to explain revolutionary situa-
tions.

iii

The third theory to be presented is derived from
the interest group approach in political science.
Charles Tilly offers for consideration a theory of
political conflict as a condition of a particular
government. For Tilly, a revolution is "an extreme
condition of the normal political process," and is
characterized by multiple sovereignty, intensity of
conflict and the magnitude of resources utilized to
resolve the conflict.[22] Violence is a correlate of
revolution, not its essence.[23]

There are three types of actors in the conflict
theory of revolution. Tilly identifies the 'government'
as possessing the concentrated means of coercion; it is
differentiated from the 'state' which is delineated by
territory and a formally coordinated and centralized
bureaucracy. The second group of actors, labelled 'con-
tenders for power', consist of "every group within the
population which during some specified span of time
collectively applies resources to influence the govern-
ment."[24] On a more general level, the 'polity' includes

all the contenders which regularly and successfully lay
claims against the government. 'Challengers' are non-
members which contend for power. Interaction within the
polity consists of members applying resources to influence
government, nonmembers seeking influence and membership
in the polity, and members testing each other's qualifica-
tions through wealth, status and parliamentary debates for
example. Such constant changes make actors more willing
to use violence to gain or secure membership.

Given the continuous alternation in membership,
mobilization is an important aspect of Tilly's theory.
The mobilization of contenders occurs through normative
resources such as commitments to ideals, coercive resources
which include punitive capacities, and, in addition,
utilitarian resources which consist of those things which
men find rewarding. The mobilization process begins to
occur when a group increases "its collective control over
any of these three varieties of resources."[25] Once
mobilization occurs, steps toward collective action may be
taken. Tilly has classified collective action into three
types: (1) competitive action in which the resources of
another group are sought; (2) reactive collective action,
as a response to such a claim; (3) provocative collective
action, in which one group tries to interrupt another's
attempt to claim a resource. The form of violence which
results from this interaction is dependent upon the rela-

tionship of the participants to the existing power structures.[26] Governments are major participants in the challenging and resisting of these actions.

Tilly views the occurrence of revolution to be based upon three necessary conditions. The first is the appearance of contenders which possess exclusive alternative claims to control over the government. The proliferation of multiple sovereignties develops under four conditions which are as follows: (1) subordination by an exogenous power; (2) attempts by nationalist movements to remove a government perceived to be external; (3) the gaining of control over a portion of the government by non-member contenders; and (4) fragmentation of the existing polity eventually merging into a coalition.[27] The second necessary cause of revolution involves the commitment of a significant proportion of the population to the alternative claims. The final necessary cause is the inability or unwillingness of government agents to suppress the alternative coalition or commitment. In addition to these three necessary causes, there is a fourth facilitating condition; a coalition must be formed between polity members and the contenders laying claims against the government. The most critical sign of an impending revolution is the emergence of an alternative polity.[28]

Generally, Tilly's theory hinges upon contests for exclusive power within a political community. Although he

warns against trying to discover causes of a revolution separate from the general context of social processes, Tilly's understanding of revolutionary outcomes is limited by virtue of its generality. Revolutionary outcome is the "displacement of one set of power holders by another", what the acquired power consists of and how it is utilized is unimportant to the process of the revolution.[29] Results such as class transformation are to be treated as variables. Thus, Tilly's criterion for a revolutionary outcome may be easily met by situations such as coup d'etats and palace revolts which most theorists would not consider revolutionary.

Tilly has attempted to take a new approach to the theory of revolution, learning from the shortcomings of earlier approaches. The concept of multiple sovereignty as a cause of revolution is useful, but it appears to be a component of the process of revolutionary change, rather than a precondition of revolutions. Yet, Tilly has not explained why multiple sovereignty occurs, although it appears that through understanding the motivation for mobilization, the preconditions of the revolution could be revealed. In summary, Tilly's approach is a description of what occurs in order that a revolution may be carried out, rather than an explanation of what brings men to accept revolution as a means to change their political situation. Nevertheless, it is useful in the

comprehension of the revolutionary process.

iv

The attempts of Johnson, Gurr and Tilly to explain revolutionary processes have several shortcomings. The events which are believed to initiate the pattern of revolutionary change are vaguely defined and, consequently, difficult to observe and measure. J.A. Goldstone points out that the proponents of these theories conclude that revolutions could be prevented if government elites pursued appropriate action even though precipitating events had started the revolutionary process.[30] Radical change was not viewed positively, rather, especially for Johnson and Gurr, social disruption was the result of inadequate social control.

Tilly's perception of conflict as an essential characteristic of the social system was one of the initial assumptions of theorists such as Theda Skocpol, Joel S. Migdal, Kay Trimberger and Jeffery Paige. Their perspectives are rooted in the political economy approach to government and society. The emphasis of their works differ from previous views in several ways. These theorists perceive that conflict arises from class relations and understand the basic social contradictions to be the initial points of an explanatory model. Radical

change may be a necessary path to progress and to the transformation of existing relationships. They are interested also in the structure of peasant communities and their role in the revolutionary process, something that has been ignored by both Marxists and non-Marxists. These theorists believe as well that international conditions, both economic and political, are important contributing factors to both processes and outcomes.

Theda Skocpol's work, States and Social Revolution, has been chosen as representative of this group. She perceives a revolution to be a complex, unique phenomenon, which cannot be considered under the general rubric of political violence or social unrest. Rather, revolution must be considered in its entirety as a social process which has both domestic and international elements. Thus, Skocpol argues that "a holistic frame of reference is indispensable, one that includes states, class structures and transnational economic and military relations."[31]

Skocpol defines social revolution as a "rapid, basic transformation of a society's state and class structure" which is concomitant with, and partially the result of, class-based revolts from below.[32] It can be distinguished from a political revolution which alters state structures only, and is not necessarily accomplished by class conflict. Skocpol accepts the view of capitalist society as consisting of objective structural contradic-

tions between the mode of production and the social rela-

tions of production. She comments on the Marxist concep-

tion of class relations as an "indispensable theoretical

tool for identifying one sort of basic contradiction in

society."[33] Not only do class relations form a pattern

for social and political conflict, Skocpol argues that

class conflict has figured prominently in previous

revolutions. Class analysis can only identify the cause

of revolutions and not the process, therefore, Skocpol

uses the political conflict approach which describes the

process of mobilization and the development of multiple

sovereignties in combination with class analysis.

One of Skocpol's major criticisms of structural-

functionalist, social-psychological, and Marxist theories,

is the way in which the revolutionary process is viewed.

These approaches share a similar three-stage conception:

(1) development of changes in the society which give rise

to grievances and create a potential for mobilization;

(2) a mass-based movement appears, united by ideology and

organization with the purpose of overthrowing the govern-

ment and altering the social order; (3) finally, the

emergence of a revolutionary movement which challenges

the existing authorities with the intent of establishing

themselves in power.[34] This 'purposive image' "suggests

that the ultimate and sufficient condition for revolution

is the withdrawal of the consensual support and, con-

versely, that no regime could survive if the masses were consciously disgruntled."[35] This view is not useful in explaining the continued existence of intensely repressive regimes, nor the varied outcomes of revolutions. Consequently, employing the political conflict approach can help the investigator discover "how and when class members find themselves able to struggle effectively for their interests."[36]

Skocpol contends that the structural perspective portrays the emergence of the revolutionary situation as the result of international conditions and socioeconomic contradictions. "Collective action is based upon group organization and access to resources," and what emerges is a spontaneous process of revolutionary action which is not the result of any one group's conscious or coordinated effort.[37] Given the varied interests of the groups and the inevitable multiple conflicts, Skocpol feels that to explain processes and outcomes by the activities and intentions of a revolutionary vanguard is too simple an explanation. Institutional determinants, intergroup relations, and the interaction of states within a growing international system, must be considered within a world-historical context.

There is another important element which must be considered in greater detail, and that is Skocpol's notion of the state and its role in the revolutionary

process. The state is central to her analysis which
revolves around three important relationships: (1) state-
state interaction; (2) state-economy relations, both
domestic and international; (3) and state-class coopera-
tion and conflict. Skocpol does not perceive the state
to be a response to the various modes of production, or
an instrument of the dominant class. Although the state
may represent the basic contradictions of the society, the
state has separate goals which, if not fulfilled, will
result in political crises. For Skocpol, the state is a
"set of administrative, policing, and military organiza-
tions headed, and more or less well coordinated by, an
executive authority" which extracts resources from the
society for its maintenance.[38] The state also includes
institutions with special actors who are involved in
policy-making and implementation. Most importantly,
the nation-state exists within the international state and
capitalist system which is characterized by unequal
development and inter-state competition.

Unlike some political economists, Skocpol does not
believe that the international system can be reduced to a
'world capitalist system'. Rather, the international
system "represents an analytically autonomous level of
transnational reality--interdependent in its structure and
dynamics with world capitalism, but not reducible to it."[39]
The nation-state emerged as a way to maintain control of

home territories and peoples in order to compete with

other states in the international state system. The

international system is the "transnational structure of

military competition."[40] The competition in the inter-

national system plays an important role in the occurrence

of social revolutions because they have occurred "only in

countries situated in disadvantaged positions within

international arenas."[41] Weakened by threats of invasion,

military inferiority, and colonial conflicts, state

authorities are no longer able to control domestic pro-

blems. Furthermore, political leaders are constantly

reacting to international influences, such as models for

change provided by revolutions in other states, underlin-

ing the importance of 'world-historical contexts.'

Given that the state has its own goals of survival

in the international system and maintenance of domestic

order, it may be "caught in cross-pressures between domes-

tic class structures and international exigencies."[42]

Faced with external threats, the state may be forced to

redirect the national economy against the wishes of the

dominant class, which in turn results in the loss of

support of the politically powerful and mobilized groups,

and ultimately, the coercive organizations. Once the

executive authorities and their armies break apart, the

way is open to mobilized groups to challenge their

authority. The political contradictions which launch

social revolutions are found at the conjunction of inter-
national conditions and pressures, class-structured
economies, and politically organized interest groups.

Skocpol notes that social revolutions have
occurred in predominantly agrarian states with a centra-
lizing bureaucracy. Typical of the political economy
theorists, she emphasizes the 'crucial insurrectionary
ingredient' which peasant revolts played once the govern-
ment's coercive organizations were interrupted. Urban
radicalism could not produce the socio-economic transfor-
mations for which the peasant revolts were responsible.
Peasant revolts, aimed at landlords, weakened the basis
of the socioeconomic and political orders as well as
limiting the possible options for the elite contending
for power. Agrarian social structures must be examined
in terms of the historically specific institutional
relationships between the direct producers and their
lands, their tools, and each other. The peasants' rela-
tionship to the land, including whether they are serfs
or owners of small holdings, is important for defining
the autonomy and solidarity of peasant communities.

Large estates with landless labourers are less
likely to experience peasant revolts than smallholder
peasant family communities which potentially unite fami-
lies against the landlords. In addition, the central
government's connection with the peasant communities,

either through its own agents, through the landlord, or through peasant representatives, determines the degree of freedom enjoyed by the peasants.

When considering the outcome of social revolutions, Skocpol incorporates within her tripartite analysis centered around the state three other considerations; namely, the struggles surrounding the emergence and consolidation of the state, the contribution of the political leaders, and the role of ideology. Skocpol observes that all leaders of social revolutions were from the educated marginal elites who had connections with the state. She argues that it is natural for them to perceive the state as a tool to implement change, and they should be considered to be state-builders whose success or failure depended upon how well they met the challenges of the new state. The state-builders used ideologies to justify the use of resources to consolidate the new regime. Their ideological leadership was limited by the existing social conditions and the crises created by the revolution, as well as by world-historical and international contexts.

Regarding her argument, Skocpol says that it would be impossible to generalize causal relationships because they are dependent upon the historical and international circumstances of the countries involved. The circumstances that gave rise to the classical revolutions are no longer in existence. The state machinery of the modern

military establishment represses the possible mobilization
of popular groups, and thus, peasants no longer have the
opportunities to assert their interests. It appears that
the important variable in Skocpol's work is the breakdown
of the coercive power of the state. This argument corres-
ponds to a point made by H. Eckstein that revolutions
occur because "forces heading towards them are strong, but
also because forces tending to inhibit, or obstruct them
are weak or absent."[43] On the other hand, using the world-
historic context to explain differences in processes and
outcomes does not provide clear explanatory variables to
the extent that it becomes an all encompassing explanation.
All differences could be explained in terms of the his-
torically specific circumstances, rendering the creation
of a general theory a very difficult task, if not an
impossible one.

Another confusing element in the analysis of
revolutions is the role which ideology plays. Skocpol
says that although the ideologies were "undoubtedly
necessary ingredients," the cognitive content of the
ideologies are not a predictive key to outcomes or the
activities of the revolutionaries.[44] This is obviously
true, but Skocpol does not define the role of ideology
clearly. Furthermore, she does not answer questions
concerning the variance of cultural values and concep-
tions of social relations with regard to the revolutionary

process as well as outcome.

Another problem, one which Skocpol has inherited from the political conflict approach, concerns the mobilization of the peasant groups. Skocpol argues that psychological and ideological approaches which propose that peasant revolts are reactions to exploitation turn a "constant feature of the peasant condition into an explanatory variable."[45] Peasant revolts are the result of structural and situational conditions. Eric Wolfe, another political economy theorist, understands the eruption of peasant revolts to depend upon 'internal leverage', which is an "organized capacity for collective action."[46] Yet this does not explain the rise of peasant revolts. It is hard to imagine that a peasant resigned to living at subsistence levels would be willing to risk his livelihood in order to suddenly take advantage of structures which have always existed. The leap to action must be made with the help of charismatic leadership or an ideology. In Skocpol's work there is no accommodation for a charismatic leader, nor a mobilizing ideology. Furthermore, among the political economy theorists, there is a variety of causal relations which attempt to explain the reason why peasants revolt.[47]

v

A second example of a complex multi-variable approach to the study of revolution is found in Revolution and the Transformation of Societies by S.N. Eisenstadt. Eisenstadt, like Skocpol, is interested in the combination of socio-historical factors which is responsible for the unique phenomenon of revolution, rather than an alternate form of social change. Eisenstadt's book contains an analysis of social movements in terms of the dynamic interaction between social structures and cultural orientation, which provides the society with behavioural guidelines, considered in an historical, international framework.

The various approaches to date stressed certain aspects of social systems to explain social change. Conflict analysis, systems paradigms, symbolic interactionists, structuralists, and Marxist approaches supplied Eisenstadt with both positive and negative components from which he hoped to make a synthesis. The synthesis would involve a theoretical convergence of symbolic and institutional aspects of social order which would emphasize the symbolic dimensions of cultural orientation as well as the organizational aspects of the social division of labour. Eisenstadt's work appears to have been greatly influenced by Max Weber's economic sociology. It was Weber's

discussion of the types of authority, particularly charis-
matic authority, which led to Eisenstadt's "identification
of the organizational mechanisms of the social division of
labour and acceptance of the social order" as being the
dynamic components of change.[48] For Eisenstadt, conflict
is inherent in society because the mechanisms of the
social division of labour which organize production,
distribution and use of resources, result in both coopera-
tion and conflict, since meaningful obligations and trust
are not inherent in the organizational framework.

The mechanisms or ground rules of social interac-
tion as Eisenstadt refers to them define the forms of
social interaction. The ground rules contain the rules
for membership in collectivities, rules for and
legitimation of distributive justice in terms of rights,
obligations, and the access to resources, and the criteria
for the use and regulation of power in the institutional
and social spheres. In addition, the mechanisms provide
the collectivity with a sense of meaning and a perspective
of social and concrete needs and goals such as justice
and equity.[49]

The origin of the ground rules of social inter-
action is the symbolic code of the society. The symbolic
code is the religious or cultural orientation (belief
system) which is the focus for discussion of the inter-
relationship between the 'cosmic' and 'mundane' worlds.

It is also the vehicle for the conceptualization and
expression of the problems of human existence, such as
individual goals, creativity, responsibility, and freedom,
which become questions of meaning, continuity, and order
at the social level.

Acceptable solutions to the fundamental 'exis-
tential' problems are limited by the symbolic code;[50]
however, because the symbolic code may justify many solu-
tions embodied by the social structures, a "consciousness
of the arbitrariness of the official answers is
generated."[51] Thus, the pattern of social interaction
connects the institutional order with answers to the basic
symbolic problems of human and social existence. Change,
then, is the product of the dynamic interaction of the
behavioural and normative components of a society within
specific historical circumstances.

It is upon this view of society and change that
Eisenstadt has based his theory of revolution. The pattern
of change which is generally recognized as characteristic
of the archetypical revolution (such as the American or
French Revolution) is a combination of internal and exter-
nal factors which have specific historical and socio-
cultural conditions. This model of revolution, Eisenstadt
argues, is the 'modern' revolution that results in the
replacement of traditional structures with those charac-
teristics of the modern nation-state, such as the separa-

tion of church and state, rational-legal framework, .
greater participation in social institutions and class
structures, cultural orientations, and elite structures.

Eisenstadt perceives the society not as an
isolated entity, but as occurring within the interna-
tional economic and political systems. Military competi-
tion pressures the finances of the state and necessitates
redirection of political and material resources away from
internal problems. The specific historical condition
which contributed to the occurrence of the modern revolu-
tion was the emergence of the international capitalist
system and its intrusion upon the domestic economy. The
alteration of traditional economic relationships results in
corresponding adjustments in the other social relationships.

Using historical comparative analysis (another
way in which Weber has been influential), Eisenstadt
examines the structures of state in which the 'modern'
revolution occurred, and finds that all states could be
defined as 'Imperial' or 'Imperial-feudal' societies.
These societies were characterized by a high degree of
distinctiveness of their centers.[52] The centers impinged
upon the periphery (broader groups and strata) through
their respective institutions, thus articulating collec-
tive identity and goals, as well as regulating justice,
conflicts, and the access to power in the society.[53]
The distinctiveness of the centers structure social hier-

archies and formed strata that could exist independently
of the political and cultural spheres. These separate
collectivities, consisting of new elites of special
occupational groups, enjoyed a high degree of distinct
symbolic articulation which justified the pursuit of
certain goals and delimited access routes to resources,
ultimately providing the respective members with a sense
of place in society (stratum consciousness).[54]

Although each sector was highly autonomous,
coalescence was a goal, and ideological symbolization
brought together religious, political, and national collec-
tivities, as well as the centers and the periphery.
Eisenstadt argues that it is the existence of this
pattern of coalescent change which is responsible for the
model of revolutionary transformation encompassing all
(social, political, economic, and symbolic) spheres of
society.[55]

The ideological symbolization which united the
separate collectivities of the Imperial or Imperial-feudal
societies was their cultural orientation. Generally,
these societies had a culture highly articulated by
specific groups and institutions which made universal
claims transcending ethnic, regional, and political
boundaries. There existed a sharp distinction between
the 'cosmic' (religious) and 'mundane' (social) orders
concurrent with a recognition of their interaction,

resulting in a tension between these two orders. It was also the belief of these societies that the gap between the transcendental cosmic order and the social order could be closed through this-worldly activity in the military, political, cultural, and economic spheres, and in this way, salvation could be achieved. In addition, there was a high level of commitment to the social and cultural orders among the different elements of the population. Eisenstadt argues that it was the tension between the 'cosmic' and 'mundane' orders and the belief that this tension could be resolved through this-worldly activity which prepared the 'high civilizations' for wide-reaching cultural and social change.[56]

Another consideration is the contribution of the principal participants, especially the role of the elites, to the process of revolutionary change. By comparing societies in which a 'pure' revolution occurred, Eisenstadt is able to identify the unique pattern formed by the characteristics of the participants. In all societies in which revolution occurred there existed:

> ...traditional but potentially modernizing
> monarchs with strong Absolutist tendencies
> who variously combined traditional closure
> with certain modernizing tendencies...[57]

The modernizing tendencies were partially in response to changes in the domestic economy necessitated by expanding

external capitalist markets. Intra-elite competition developed between diversified upper and middle landed classes and urban groups during the attempt to take advantage of the emerging economic system. Peasant groups, dislocated by the new economy but wanting to utilize their opportunities, also competed with the elites for the new markets.

Other participants in the revolutionary process were new to the traditional society, such as an emerging urban proletariat, as well as new intellectual and religious movements. Most important, however, was the emergence of new political elites. The potential to develop an elite which was able to articulate the demands and interests of broader groups was rooted in the structures of the 'Imperial' or 'Imperial-feudal' societies. The highly independent centers spawned elites which were 'disembedded'. That is to say, the elites had access to potentially 'free-floating' resources which were not entirely absorbed by the institutional spheres or their symbols, and thus could be redirected.[58] Examples of 'free-floating' resources are an elite's access to markets outside the institutional scope of markets, or access to resources which are not controlled by institutions. Out of the potential for autonomy arose the 'institutional entrepreneurs', who were oriented towards this-worldly activity and appeared to use their private resources for

the collective purpose of restructuring the symbolic and institutional spheres.[59] Furthermore, the autonomy of the elites allowed them to pursue coalitions with broader groups and the peripheries, creating a potential for collective action. The more autonomy which the institutional entrepreneurs could claim, the greater their potential to "activate the alternative conceptions of social order and serve as the organizers and mobilizers of newly freed resources."[60] The autonomy of the elites is a key variable which links changes in the symbolic code with modification of the institutional sphere, making possible widespread social change, and ultimately, a modern revolution.

To summarize Eisenstadt's theory, there appear to be five relevant preconditions of a revolution. Culturally, the society possesses an orientation which promotes this-worldly resolution of the tension between the mundane and transcendental worlds. Protestantism provided such an orientation for the modern revolution in the European states. Another important precondition of a revolution concerns the structure of the state and its goals. Structures such as those found in Imperial or Imperial-feudal societies fostered centers that sought to reorganize the periphery. Arising from these structures are independent, competitive elites, whose wide-ranging interests give them the potential to form coalitions with broader strata. The above social, historical, and

cultural conditions, when combined with international

pressures in the form of military competition and intru-

sion by the world capitalist system, create a revolu-

tionary situation. The outcome of protest movements in

such a situation could resemble the archetypical modern

revolution.

Eisenstadt also applies his theory to the outcome

of the revolution, something which has been unexplained

by earlier theorists of revolution. He argues that the

outcome of the revolution is determined in part by the

international standing and economic development of the

state. In addition to the cultural orientation, the

structure of the elites and their relationship to the

centers and broader strata is a crucial factor in

determining the outcome. The institutional entrepreneurs

continue to play an important role in restructuring the

centers and their institutions. Eisenstadt argues that

the degree of isolation/solidarity of the elites is a

determinant in the revolutionary outcome. He notes that:

> ...the more autonomous and disembedded the major
> elites, the more they tended to generate new
> meanings of institutions and to promote far-
> reaching symbolic and organizational restruc-
> turing of institutional spheres and center-
> pheriphery relations...[61]

A third critical variable which intervenes between

the centers and the outcome of the revolution concerns the

resources available to the centers. The quantity and quality of resources to which the center has access determine how well the transition to modernity will be made. The centers must also be able to incorporate new avenues of access and new members while establishing "links with the broader strata in order to attempt institution building."[62] Furthermore, Eisenstadt explains that these variables interact with the degree of change, or continuity-discontinuity, in the institutions and ground rules of social interaction. The degree of violence is also an independent variable.

Eisenstadt's work represents an attempt to formulate a synthesis of the competing paradigms of society and social change. He argues that the potential for contradiction and conflict exists concomitant with the internal momentum of the society's institutions and values toward continuity. Eisenstadt perceives society as an organic system (consisting of both structural and symbolic elements) which demonstrates emergent properties and boundary maintenance. Definition of a situation arises not only from the given values, but also from the interaction of the people involved; an incorporation of the symbolic-interactionist's dynamic view of the symbolic sphere. Eisenstadt also introduces into his model 'conflict' which he perceives as the result of a society's inherent tendency to generate internal contra-

dictions. The institutionalization of a certain cultural code becomes closely tied to the social division of labour and the distribution of power and resources. Because man is biologically endowed with the potential to shape the environment, individuals and groups challenge the institutionalized accesses to power and resources. Ultimately, this leads members of the society to contest the symbolic code upon which the institutions are based.

Eisenstadt's understanding of the process of revolution also draws on several theories. He recognizes the important role played by elites in directing the revolutionary movement. Their linkages with broader groups, who are articulating their feelings of relative deprivation in political terms, is achieved through broad social movements. The themes of protest which stem from the cultural orientation of the society mobilize the various segments, creating the potential for revolution. Eisenstadt recognizes that leaders of the movements are not only motivated by altruistic visions of the good society, but are also concerned with acquiring more power in the restructured system. Although this analysis of Eisenstadt's synthesis has been brief, it is possible to discern the ways in which he has adopted concepts from the various approaches. Most importantly, Eisenstadt's theory captures the essence of the dynamic nature of society as it responds to both forces of cohesion and

dissolution.

Eisenstadt's most important contribution to the
study of revolution is the incorporation of symbolic
interests in his analysis of revolution. In the litera-
ture concerning modernization and political development,
culture has been used to explain what were otherwise
incomprehensible differences. Eisenstadt has attempted
to make the variable of culture a more useful tool for
the analyst of revolutions. He has identified three
aspects of culture which influence a society's propensity
for revolution. The degree of symbolic articulation of
the problems of human existence is a fundamental indicator
of a society's potential for coalescent change. Eisen-
stadt argues that the extent to which a society either
accepts as given or questions its symbolic sphere--thus
opening the way for reformulation of symbols--is indicated
by the degree of abstraction of the existential problems.[63]
Closely related to the degree of symbolic articulation is
the society's perception of the tension between the mun-
dane and transcendental worlds. Eisenstadt suggests
that if a society believes there to be a low level of
tension between the two 'worlds', or if the tension is to
be dissolved by an 'other-worldly' resolution, the social
consequence is the lack of motivation to pursue struc-
tural and symbolic changes. Similarly, if there exists a
low level of commitment to socio-political order among

the society's members, coalescent change will not occur.

The problem which arises with such an analysis is the absence of an objective measure to discern a society's cultural orientation. This problem is especially critical with respect to the homogeneity of a cultural orientation, not only in terms of sects and religious/ intellectual movements, but also with regard to the orientation of different strata. Nevertheless, Eisenstadt's classification of these components of culture allows a degree of precision when applying this variable to a case study.

Having incorporated the cultural variable into his theory, Eisenstadt is able to eliminate the challenge of explaining the process of mobilization, which is only partially met by the political conflict approaches. Entrepreneurial elites articulate the cultural symbols, values, and ideologies, which mobilize the broader strata. These contenders for power represent widespread interests (material and symbolic) and have access to resources unbound by institutions.

The function of the elites in the revolutionary process is a focal point of Eisenstadt's theory. Although it is not wrong to emphasize the importance of the elites, he largely ignores the role of the peasantry. Eisenstadt remarks that the Imperial and Imperial-feudal societies were characterized by a "relatively free peasantry" as

compared to patrimonial societies in which "peasant families became tenants."[64] This vague reference hints at the importance of the structures of peasant communities to revolutionary changes, but this relationship is explored in passing comments only. Even in his discussion of the Chinese Communist Revolution, Eisenstadt focuses upon the peasants' lack of class consciousness rather than their relationship to the land.[65]

Eisenstadt's attempt to create an all-encompassing explanatory model of revolution has resulted in a complex, multi-variable theory. The concepts which are used to explain the occurrence of revolutions are consistent with his perspective of society and are justified by his understanding of social processes. However, Eisenstadt wishes to create a general theory of revolution, and he presents to the analyst broad, open categories and preconditions. For example, much is left to the analyst to discern such things as state goals or elite orientations. Both concepts require an informed understanding of the society under scrutiny before they can be properly utilized as contributing factors to a revolutionary situation. Eisenstadt illustrates the application of the categories through his theoretical analysis of several societies. Given the complex nature of the phenomenon in question, Eisenstadt risks using variables beyond those mentioned in the theory. Moreover, understanding

the complex theory is hindered by the relative incompre-
hensibility of his writing. The reader faces a text
filled with jargon that is ill-defined and a writing
style which is wooden and difficult to follow.

One other element which deserves examination is
the historically specific conditions of revolution.
Eisenstadt argues that the historical condition which led
to the rise of the 'modern' revolution is the emergence
of Protestantism. He is intrigued by Weber's investiga-
tion into the relationship between Protestantism and the
rise of capitalism. Eisenstadt queries whether the "fact
that the first revolutions took place in Europe and the
later ones occurred only under the impact of European
expansion" was but an historical accident.[66] He accepts
Weber's conclusion that the Western progression to
modernity is unique. Western expansion appears to have
elicited in some societies 'modern' revolutions given
similar internal characteristics and historical circum-
stances. Given this belief, it could be argued that the
intrusion of Western values and institutions should be
one of the international pressures which contributes to
neo-Western revolutions.

Despite the problem of complexity and the
related concern with parsimony that arises when consider-
ing his theory, Eisenstadt makes a valuable contribution
to the study of revolutionary phenomena. His synthesis

of the competing paradigms of society incorporates both elements of systemic order and inherent contradictions which lead to conflict. Furthermore, Eisenstadt's delineation of the role of culture in the preconditions and processes of revolution renders his theory an important addition to the literature on revolution.

vi

It is obvious from the above discussion that each of the theories of revolution examined make an important contribution to an understanding of a revolutionary situation. The two questions outlined in the previous chapter help to narrow the choice. To answer the question pertaining to the causes of the Shah's downfall, it is necessary to use an approach which includes international, political, economic and social elements. The theories of either Skocpol or Eisenstadt could provide a framework for analyzing these factors. The second question addresses the contribution of Islam and its institutions to the revolutionary situation. Cultural symbols and structures played a crucial role in the revolutionary process and continue to do so in the Islamic Republic. Therefore, analysis of the culture variable is necessary to understand the events in Iran. In light of this, it is apparent that Eisenstadt's theory is the most appropriate

framework with which to investigate the Iranian revolution, although contributions to the analysis may be made by the other theories.

One variable which should be added to Eisenstadt's theory concerns the intrusion of Western ideals upon a non-Western society. Consideration must be given to the differing impact which modernity has upon a society when it is imposed (such as in the case of Iran), or when it emerged from within the structures and symbols of the society (such as in the Western states). The reconstruction of the social and political orders according to the premises of European modernity may not achieve mass support, ultimately hindering coalescent change. Eisenstadt argues that the adoption of socialism by non-European societies is a way to incorporate the ideas of modernity and simultaneously, to display a dislike of the West.[67] Perhaps a far-reaching cultural movement which addresses both mundane and transcendental problems, such as Islam, can play the same role as socialism in non-Western societies.

Islam outlines for its believers a complete view of the world providing behavioural and institutional guidelines for the social, political, and economic spheres. It embraces knowledge, science, and technology as a way to better the material existence of man while proposing the observance of a universalistic moral code to avoid the

alienation of Western society. Thus, Islam shares many
of the characteristics of socialism which Eisenstadt
enumerates in his discussion.[68] This proposition will be
considered with regard to Iran.

The following three chapters will examine the
Iranian revolution using the categories which Eisenstadt
has outlined. Chapter III will consider the international
military and economic pressures faced by Iran, especially
with regard to the Americans' and the Shah's emphasis
upon Iran's security role in the Persian Gulf. In addi-
tion, the impact of the dramatic rise of oil prices upon
the modernizing Iranian economy will also be explored.
Chapter IV will focus upon the structures of Iranian
society and the relationships between the elites and
strata. The emergence of institutional entrepreneurs and
their interaction with the political centers in the seven-
ties will also be investigated. In both Chapters III and
IV, mention will be made of the predominant goals of the
Shah's regime. Finally, the fifth chapter will utilize
Eisenstadt's 'cultural' variable to examine the cultural
orientation of Iran and its role in the revolutionary
processes and outcomes.

REFERENCES

[1]B. Salert, Revolution and Revolutionaries: Four Theories (New York: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co., 1976), p. 51.

[2]These criteria have been influenced by B. Salert as presented in her work Revolution and Revolutionaries: Four Theories, p. 21 and H. Eckstein, "Introduction Toward the Theoretical Study of Internal War" in Internal War: Problems and Approaches, ed., H. Eckstein (Toronto: Collier-Macmillan Canada Ltd., 1964), pp. 7-23.

[3]Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 91.

[4]Ibid., p. 94.

[5]Ibid., p. 91.

[6]Ibid., p. 99. Michael Freeman in his work "Review Article: Theories of Revolution", British Journal of Political Science, 2:3 (July, 1972), 339-359, argues that Johnson's idea of fortune suggests that the elements which create a revolution may be linked by a time sequence rather than causal sequence.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Ibid., p. 106.

[9]J. Horton, "Order and Conflict Theories of Social Problems as Competing Ideologies", The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LXXI, no. 6 (May, 1966), 706.

[10]H. Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal War", History and Theory (Vol. 4, 1965), p. 148.

[11]Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 4.

[12]Ibid., p. 11.

[13]Ibid., p. 9.

[14]J.C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", in I.K. Fierbend, R.L. Fierbend and Ted Gurr, eds. Anger, Violence and Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1972), p. 68.

[15]Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p. 13.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Ibid., p. 319.

[18]B. Salert, Revolution and Revolutionaries, p. 66.

[19]Ibid., p. 67.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Ibid., p. 68.

[22]C. Tilly, "Revolution and Collective Violence", in R.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby, eds., Macropolitical Theory (Don Mills: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1975), p. 519. Tilly understands sovereignty to mean exclusive legitimate control of the means ofcoercion. Legitimacy is signalled by such things as the honouring of the sovereign group's symbols, the support of its institutions and observation of its laws by formally acquiescent members of the population.

[23]Ibid., p. 501.

[24]Ibid., p. 502.

[25]Ibid., p. 503.

[26]Ibid., p. 509.

[27]Ibid., p. 520.

[28]Ibid., p. 523.

[29]C. Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Don Mills, Ontario: Addison Wesley Publishing Co., 1978), p. 193.

[30]J.A. Goldstone, "Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation", World Politics, XXXII, No. 5 (April, 1980), p. 443.

[31]Theda Skocpol, "What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?" Comparative Politics, Vol. 14, No. 3 (April, 1982), p. 373.

[32]Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 4.

[33]Ibid., p. 13.

[34]Ibid., p. 14.

[35]Ibid., p. 16.

[36]Ibid., p. 13.

[37]Ibid.

[38]Ibid., p. 29.

[39]Ibid., p. 22.

[40]Ibid.

[41]Ibid., p. 23.

[42]Ibid., p. 47.

[43]H. Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal War", p. 153.

[44]Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, p. 170.

[45]Ibid., p. 115.

[46]Ibid.

[47]For a brief discussion of the different views of peasant revolts, see "What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?" by Theda Skocpol which has been cited above. Also see J.C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), Samuel L. Popkin, The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), and Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origin of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

[48]S.N. Eisenstadt, Revolution and the Transformation of Societies (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 21.

[49]Ibid., p. 28-29.

[50]Ibid., p. 31.

[51]S.N. Eisenstadt, Tradition, Change and Modernity (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1973), p. 104.

[52]Borrowing Edward Shil's notion of center and periphery, Eisenstadt explains that a center is the place in which the symbols, values and beliefs of the society are given concrete manifestation through institutions and roles.

[53]S.N. Eisenstadt, Revolution and the Transformation of Societies, p. 87.

[54]Ibid., p. 35.

[55]Eisenstadt identifies three types of change in traditional societies: segregative, exceptional and coalescent change. Segregative change is typical of patrimonial states and is characterized by a divergence between changes in the ground rules of social interaction and symbolic collectivities, and changes in the institutions and structures. Exceptional change occurs in tribal federations and city-states. The characteristics of coalescent change experienced in Imperial or Imperial-feudal societies are a convergence of transformations in

the ground rules of social interaction and a restructuring of the collectivities and institutions, among many other convergences.

[56]Ibid., p. 202.

[57]Ibid., p. 196.

[58]Ibid., p. 105.

[59]Ibid., p. 32.

[60]Ibid., p. 105.

[61]Ibid., p. 245.

[62]Ibid., p. 240.

[63]Ibid., p. 101.

[64]Ibid., p. 91.

[65]Ibid., p. 131.

[66]Ibid., p. 205.

[67]Ibid., p. 187.

[68]Ibid., pp. 183-184.

III

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

Structural-functionalists acknowledge the inter-
relationship between a social system and its environment
as a source of disequilibrating tendencies, which may
ultimately result in social change. Theorists such as
Eisenstadt and Skocpol have endeavoured to clarify the
impact of external pressures upon revolutionary situations.
Eisenstadt argues that interstate competition, caused by
the continual shifts of power and influence in the inter-
national political system, directs resources away from
domestic problems. In addition, the international
industrial system which subsumes different types of
economic systems is neither conterminous with, nor
identical to, its political counterpart. The interna-
tional economic system possesses its own power fluctua-
tions which often conflict with the power relations of the
international political system.[1]

The international political and economic systems
interact with the political and economic centers of a
society. Eisenstadt recognizes the contribution which is
made by Theda Skocpol's tripartite explanation of the

relationship between the international context and the domestic system in terms of the state's potential autonomy.[2] As described above, Skocpol perceives that the state is caught in cross-pressures by virtue of its dual goals of survival in the international system as well as the maintenance of domestic order. External threats may force a state to redirect resources away from the domestic economy against the wishes of the dominant class. Consequently, powerful groups may be alienated from the political system, and may therefore seek to mobilize groups to challenge political authorities.

Eisenstadt agrees that the redistribution of economic resources may result in political competition among different groups in society. He argues, however, that the identification of such processes does not explain why some societies experience far-reaching structural reform, rather than a revolution. Such a difference may be explained in terms of the cultural orientation. Because the rules of distributive justice are determined by the institutionalized symbolic code, the power struggle brings into question the fundamental socioeconomic relations of the society. Coalescent change, characteristic of modern revolution, demands the convergence of transformation in the economic, political, and social spheres. Eisenstadt believes that the cultural orientation of a society, especially with regard to the

commitment to the sociopolitical order, may provide the linkages necessary for revolution. Nevertheless, the international context contributes to the creation of tension within the social system, which ultimately may result in widespread social change, given the existence of other conducive elements.

While the international context of any state is a critical factor in its development, this seems to be particularly the case in Iran. [Noting Iran's geographical and (later) economic importance, the world's great powers—especially Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States—endeavoured to secure their interests within the state.] Although Iran did not manifest directly the rivalries between the great powers, the competition was one source of conflict which would be reflected in later revolutionary movements. For example, Iran's reaction to foreign control and manipulation of her role in world politics has been a pre-occupation with self-determination. [It has been argued that Mohammad Reza Shah's concern with Iran's sovereignty and security in the early part of the last decade resulted in the neglect of domestic demands.][3] The Shah's determination to return Iran to its position as one of the world's great civilizations left SAVAK, the Shah's secret police, with primary responsibility for controlling political opposition. Foreign intrusion into Iran's socioeconomic system

as well as the rejection of Westernization were prominent themes of protest among the leaders of the revolutionary movement.

Given the limitations of this paper, it is not possible to present more than a superficial overview of the international pressures which contributed to the issues presented in the Iranian revolution. Iran's position within the context of the international political and economic systems will be reviewed historically from the Qajar period to the fall of the Shah in 1979. (The effects of the international context upon the Iranian domestic system will be analyzed in terms of their contribution to the problems which occasioned the emergence of forces which successfully challenged the Shah.]

i

During the rule of the Qajar monarchs in the second half of the eighteenth century, Iran came under the influence of both Britain and Russia. Iran sought an ally against Russian advancements and turned to Britain, who promised military and financial aid if European military incursions occurred.[4] Through the alliance with Iran, Britain gained the opportunity to continue the expansion and consolidation of her colonial

empire in Asia. In addition, Iran was to be a buffer zone between British and Russian interests. Russia's colonial advances were motivated by the longtime desire for a western sea access to the Indian Ocean.[5] Following the Russo-Iranian War, the Turkmanchai Treaty in 1828 outlined considerable economic concessions for the Russians. Britain, of course, demanded equivalent concessions and was granted them in a treaty of 1841. The effect of these agreements was to reduce the independence of the Iranian government. The Qajar regime could not freely make a decision without first consulting both Britain and Russia. The rivalry between the two major powers, however, protected the nominal political independence of Iran from further reduction.[6]

The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 divided Iran into two spheres of influence: Russia in the north and Britain in the southeast, the middle being a buffer zone. It was reasoned that if Iran could not be independent, a weak state under the influence of both major powers could be used to prevent the outbreak of conflict between Britain and Russia.[7] The outbreak of World War I, however, gave Britain an opportunity to strengthen her economic and military position in Iran, while Russia faced both serious internal problems and the demands of war. The overthrow of the Czarist regime and the consequent offer of friendship extended to Iran by the

Bolsheviks in 1917 threatened British claims. Attempts to place Iran under a British protectorate failed, and British intervention was brought to a halt. Iran began to negotiate a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union which would ultimately be signed by Reza Shah in 1921. The treaty renounced the claims of Iran based upon the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, cancelled all Iranian debts and provided for the withdrawal of all Russian forces. In return, Iran was not to allow itself to be used by a third party as a base against the Soviet Union and its allies. Great power competition in Iran had been temporarily averted with Britain maintaining the greatest influence.

The rivalry between Britain and Russia fundamentally weakened the government of the Qajar kings.[8] A modernized central army was never established in Iran because the Qajars relied upon the formal commitments of military aid from Britain and Russia. The absence of a coercive force discouraged attempts to impose modernizing reforms from above because of the threat of rebellion. The construction of railways which would have encouraged the growth of a central bureaucracy was not supported by either Britain or Russia. Both great powers believed that a weak, decentralized Iranian government was in their own interest.

Perhaps the most important consequence of the

Qajar government's impotence was the increased power of the Shi'ite clergy.] The power of the Sunni clergy decreased in states such as Egypt and the Ottoman Empire which had established a centralized army and bureaucracy. Whereas the clergy in the latter Middle East states were losing their control over education and law, the Shi'ite clergy gained popularity and strength during the nineteenth century. [According to this argument, the Anglo-Russian rivalry can be said to have contributed to the prominence and strength of the clergy in the Iranian revolution.]

ii

The weak and inefficient rule of the Qajar kings, exacerbated by the political consequences of World War I, economic disarray and tribal divisions, threatened the existence of Iran as an independent state. In 1919, the British offered a treaty which would have made Iran a dependent ally. Although the treaty was signed by the Iranian negotiators, it was never ratified by the Majlis (Assembly). The growing anti-British sentiment present in the Majlis reflected similar challenges to British influence in post-war Turkey, India and Afghanistan which were host to nationalist-reform movements. The nationalist forces in Iran were led by Sayyid Zia

al-Din Tabatabai, a pro-British moderate who believed
that Iran needed an independent, strong government.[9] He
planned to overthrow the Qajar government with the help
of Reza Khan, then the commander of the Russian-trained
Iranian army. It was an alliance supported by British
authorities. Reza Khan led the Qazvin Cossack Brigade to
the capital of Tehran and seized control of the government
on February 21, 1921 in a relatively bloodless coup
d'etat.[10] Sayyid Zia was proclaimed prime minister and
Reza Khan became the war minister. The major opposition
movements protesting the new government and its policies
were finally suppressed by the early twenties, although
opposition continued throughout Reza Khan's reign.[11] Due
to the personal ambition of Reza Khan, the alliance
between him and Sayyid Zia dissolved in 1923, resulting
in the resignation of the Prime Minister. With the
support of the Majlis, the war minister crowned himself
Reza Shah in 1925.

Reza Shah's rise to power in 1921 was partially
based upon his desire to insulate Iran from major power
rivalry. He procured the ratification of the Iranian-
Soviet Treaty of 1921, and rejected the Anglo-Iranian
Treaty of 1919.[12] The acceptance of this treaty cannot
be necessarily interpreted as a move toward a closer
Soviet alliance, but rather it was an attempt to reduce
the growing economic and political control of Iran by

Britain. The major dispute between Iran and Britain
concerned the British monopoly of the Iranian oil industry
as established by the Anglo-Persian Company under the
D'Arcy Concession of 1901. The company's export
oriented style mostly benefitted the oil company itself
and the British government. Iranian dissatisfaction with
this arrangement came to a climax in 1932 when Reza Shah
cancelled the original concession, a move prompted by
declining royalties. After intense negotiations, Britain
signed a new agreement with Iran limiting the area of
concession to 100,000 square miles, but retaining British
monopoly of the oil industry.[13]

During this time, Reza Shah sought monetary and
technical assistance from other states with the intention
of establishing a "close relationship with a third power
to secure a counterbalance against Anglo-Soviet interven-
tion and rivalry."[14] The United States was perceived by
Reza Shah to be the appropriate ally in this matter.
Given American reluctance to be involved in world
affairs at that time and the recognition of Iran as
existing within the British sphere of influence, the
United States did not respond quickly to the Shah's
overtures. The United States finally changed its
position on Iran during the Second World War.

At the eruption of World War II, Reza Shah
declared Iran a neutral zone, hoping that the friendship

with its trading partner, Germany, could be maintained.
Nazi advances at the Soviet front, however, resulted in a
Soviet request for Allied help from Britain and the
United States. In addition, the number of Nazi advisors
in Iran appeared to Britain to constitute a fifth column.[15]
The withdrawal of German troops in Iran would allow the
establishment of an important link via transnational
railway between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea.
British and Russian efforts failed to persuade Reza Shah
to make such a commitment, forcing an Anglo-Soviet
invasion with American support. Iran was occupied by
Britain and the Soviet Union in the same way as the state
had been divided under the previous 1907 agreement. Most
importantly, the Anglo-Soviet invasion forced Reza Shah
to abdicate in favour of his son to ensure the
preservation of the dynasty.[16]

In power for thirty years, Reza Shah had endea-
voured to push Iran toward modernity modelled upon Western
political and social institutions. During this time,
however, he failed to gain popular support among broad
segments of the Iranian society. His forced abdication,
brought about by the great powers, placed upon the throne
an inexperienced Mohammad Reza Shah who had to immediately
contend with the social and economic upheaval arising
from the war, and a political challenge to the role of
the monarchy in Iran.

iii

The competition between Britain and the Soviet Union continued after the war despite an Anglo-Soviet-American agreement signed in 1943, which stated that the occupation of Iran would cease not later than six months after the end of the war. British and American forces withdrew by January 1, 1946. After a series of negotiations between the Iranian and Soviet government, the Soviet troops eventually evacuated the Iranian territory by May of the same year, concluding the occupation of Iran during the Second World War.

After World War II, the international political system began to change radically. As Britain was beginning to decline as a dominant world power, the United States was slowly emerging as a superpower with global interests which needed protection. During the Second World War, American policy toward Iran shifted from limited to extensive involvement for two main reasons. A pro-Western Iran was a way (geographically) to secure American interests in the Persian Gulf so as to hinder Soviet expansion in the Middle East. Furthermore, by the early 1940's, it had become clear that the major source of the world's petroleum was to be the Gulf area. Western economic security depended upon the existence of an independent, pro-Western Persian Gulf.

Although Britain and the Soviet Union continued to influence Persian Gulf politics, the United States became the major foreign power in Iran.

In the immediate post-war period, the United States provided Iran with important economic and military aid, consistent with the Truman doctrine.[17] The most critical American action in Iranian affairs occurred with regard to Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq. The occupation of Iran during World War II had rekindled traditional tribal divisions as well as the diverse ideological orientations of the beginning of the century. Dr. Mossadeq was a leading nationalist and reformer who advocated a limited monarchy and a parliamentary system as well as the nationalization of the oil industry. The revenue from a nationalized industry was to be used to implement social reforms and aid Iran's progress toward independence.[18]

This programme threatened the interests of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. It was the company's refusal to enter a 'fifty-fifty' relationship with the Iranian government that provided the Majlis with the impetus to assert its demand for full nationalization. The British government felt that allowing Mossadeq to implement his nationalization plans would cripple the British economy as well as seriously damage its prestige. Consequently, in October of 1951, the British decided that they

would force Mossadeq to alter his plans by initiating an economic blockade. British Petroleum obtained an agreement with the other international oil companies to refrain from entering any agreements with Iran: Iranian oil production dropped from 241.4 million barrels in 1950 to 10.6 million barrels in 1952.[19] Mossadeq's government was soon weakened and the United States was asked to provide diplomatic support and economic aid.

From an American point of view, the British action would result in a pro-Soviet Iranian government.[20] Washington, therefore, advised Britain to reconsider her plans. Britain countered by arguing that a pro-Soviet government was not the only alternative, since a pro-Western monarchy would provide the outlet for American security. British and American diplomatic forces were at a standstill until Mossadeq attempted to take over the emergency powers given to the Shah in the Constitution. Anti-Mossadeq forces, centered around the monarchy, provided the alternative for which the British and American governments had hoped. The American government and the C.I.A. encouraged a coup d'etat which reinstated the then absent Mohammed Reza Shah as the head of state. Consequently, much American support was given to secure the Pahlavi monarchy and to ensure American interests in the Middle East.

Protection of American military and economic

interests in the Persian Gulf motivated the government
of the United States to intervene in the domestic poli-
tics of Iran. Mossadeq was a nationalistic reformer
whose plans to modernize Iran and pursue independence
were widely supported amongst the Iranian people.
Unfortunately, the nationalization of the oil industry
threatened British economic interests. The British use
of an international boycott was supported by the United
States which was concerned with the 'communist'
tendencies in the Iranian government. Mossadeq's poli-
tical reforms which included limiting the power of the
monarchy and strengthening the parliamentary system could
have made possible the election of a pro-Soviet government
in Iran. The stronger states of the international
system were able to force their will upon Mossadeq by
using the emerging international economic system to their
advantage. The return of Mohammad Reza Shah to power was
in the best interest of the American government because
it ensured a continuous pro-Western alliance. Nikki R.
Keddie argues that the Shah would not have been able to
resume his throne without the help of the United States.[21]

iv

The unstable condition of the political system in
Iran forced the Shah to rely upon American support to

consolidate his rule. In addition to monetary aid, the American government provided technology and advisors to develop the oil industry and to reorganize the military. The United States' multi-faceted involvement in Iran ensured the security of Western interests in the Persian Gulf. It also left Iran vulnerable to American pressures. It has been argued that the Kennedy administration, concerned with increasing the Shah's support base and consolidating the monarchy, pressured the Iranian govern- ment to 'Westernize' its political and economic systems.[22] The Shah's response to the American suggestion was the 'White Revolution'. (which will be discussed in later chapters) is considered here only with regard to its economic impact.

The years included in the Third Development Plan (1962-1968) were a turning point for the Iranian economy, especially with regard to industrialization. Iran's growing industrial sector was stimulated in part by expand- ing transportation and communications.[23] Oil was becoming important as a cheap source of energy for the emerging industries, while maintaining its traditional importance as an export commodity.[24] Development of petrochemical and steel plants was promoted by bilateral agreements. The number of light industries grew with support from both the public and private sectors, resulting in the establishment of vehicle assembly plants, chemical and

pharmaceutical plants, and refrigerator and heater plants,
among others. The growth rate of the gross national
product during this time was approximately ten percent
per annum.[25] Iran's economy was benefitting from the
rapid expansion of the international economic system
during the 1960's.

The Fourth Development Plan (1968-1973) was a time
of continuing structural changes and increased national
income. The apparent political stability gained through
the reforms outlined in the White Revolution fostered the
development of the industrial and service sectors.
According to the budget proposed in the fourth plan, the
industrial and mining sectors received twenty-two percent
of the total allocations and fourteen percent was set
aside for development of the communication and transporta-
tion sectors. Agriculture was budgeted only eight per-
cent of the actual disbursements, indicating that the
government wished to direct the work force into the
industrial sector.[26] Main areas of investment in industry
continued to be iron and steel, petrochemicals, and
machine building. The growth rate of the gross national
product during the fourth plan was 16.5 percent per
annum[27] and the inflation rate was 3.4 percent per
annum.[28] Much of the increase in the gross national
product was due to slowly rising oil prices and an
increased rate of production.

There were both positive and negative changes in
the agricultural sector during this time. The Land
Reform Law of 1962 was part of the Shah's White Revolution.
In its first phase, the lands of large estates were
transferred to the peasants throughout Iran, often without
regard for the potential productivity of a given plot.[29]
Peasants faced problems caused by inefficient seed and
fertilizer distribution and insufficient irrigation
systems. In 1965, the second phase of land reform was
implemented, resulting in the distribution of remaining
villages held by landlords and the creation of farm
cooperatives. The agricultural cooperatives consisted
of consolidated peasant lands from one or more villages.
Many farmers, although benefitting from reforms, feared
the confiscation of their lands for the development of
agrobusinesses. In the case of both farm cooperatives and
agrobusinesses, the peasant shareholders were to become
working members, but the large farms were heavily
mechanized and not labour intensive.[30] Government
emphasis upon technological improvements in agriculture
in the third phase of land reform resulted in the decline
of labour intensity displacing many rural workers.
Rapid industrial development attracted many to the urban
centers in search of employment. The size of the agri-
cultural labour force decreased despite the growing
population and the increasing demand for imported agri-

cultural goods which almost doubled between 1969-70 and
1970-71.[31] Agricultural self-sufficiency appeared to be
a more distant goal than it had been at the initial phase
of the White Revolution.

V

The years of the Cold War gradually gave way to a
situation of detente between the United States and the
Soviet Union. The international system had evolved from
a bipolar division of power to a multipolar world of
diffuse power relationships which varied according to
issues. Strategic concerns were fragmented by political
and economic interests which at times, were in conflict.[32]
The Nixon Doctrine recognized the change in the interna-
tional system. In 1969, President Nixon stated that the
United States would no longer be willing to police the
states within its sphere of influence.[33] Rather, the
American government would encourage the emergence of
strong regional actors who would defend their own
interests and the interest of others, thereby protecting
American interests as well. Sharam Chubin argues that
the American policy of disengagement in combination with
the fragmentation of security issues, and the constraint
on the use of force, underlined the need for self-
reliance and strategic deterrence in such regions as the

Persian Gulf.[34]

The international context necessitated the build-up of national forces in Iran to assure security in the Persian Gulf.[35] This role was willingly accepted by the Shah who had long envisioned Iran's return to greatness. Mohammad Reza Shah's 'national mythology' emphasized the pre-Islamic past of Iran by focussing upon the glory of the Achaemenian Empire (550-330 B.C.).[36] The Shah's 1971 celebrations of 2500 years of the Persian monarchy epitomized the identification of his reign with Emperor Cyrus the Great, who ruled the Persian Empire at the height of its power.[37] The Shah believed that it was his mission to guide Iran toward the Tamaddon-e Bozorg (Great Civilization) which would be a self-sufficient economic and military power.[38] To realize his vision, the Shah needed to secure raw materials and sources of foreign investment for the development of the Iranian economy and an extensive militarization programme. Such action would allow Iran to maintain her strategic position in the Persian Gulf, and to ultimately become a world power.[39]

Given Iran's geopolitical situation, it is easy to understand the Shah's preoccupation with national security. Moscow was still interested in neutralizing the American influence in Iran. The Shah believed that the Soviet Union pursued a policy of subversion by

actively aiding the Tudeh (Communist) party and separa-
tist movements in Iran.[40] In addition, the extensive
economic importance of the Persian Gulf, not only to the
oil exporters, but to the states dependent upon Middle
East oil, placed an even greater burden upon Iran.

The instability of the Gulf countries was mag-
nified by American and Soviet interests in the region.
In order to avoid the direct presence of the superpowers
in the Middle East, there would have to be a military
option. Iranian military buildup in conjunction with
diplomatic efforts could police regional problems and
avoid global conflicts.[41] The Shah believed that defense
of the country against Arab aggression or attempts to
claim Iran by either of the superpowers would require a
strong, sophisticated military. The "Great Civilization"
could be built only if Iran was stable and secure. In
1972, President Nixon agreed to sell the Shah sophisti-
cated weaponry he desired, thus removing all restrictions
previously placed on the sale of arms to non-industrial
nations. This proposal was eagerly accepted by the Shah,
who, subsequent to the 1973 increase in oil prices was
able to take full advantage of the offer.

The nationalistic consciousness which emerged
in the 1950's and 1960's motivated oil producing
countries, which were at the mercy of the policies of
multinational oil companies, to formulate a common

petroleum policy. The result was the creation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The aim of the organization was to remove control of world oil prices and production from western oil companies and place them in the hands of the oil-producing countries.[42] OPEC was to guard the interests of its members as well as to ensure a fair return on a product which was an essential commodity and a non-renewable resource.

Both prices and production rose slowly in Iran throughout the 1960's. The 'Declaratory Statement of Petroleum Policy in Member Countries' adopted by OPEC stated that its objectives were to increase control over oil production, prices, and distribution. Following the lead of Colonel Mummar al Qaddafi of Libya, who in 1971 raised oil prices, cut production, and threatened the closure of Western oil companies on Libyan territory, OPEC passed a general agreement in the same year regarding increased tax rates and oil prices, and the abolition of discounts granted to the oil companies.[43] Iran's revenue from oil production rose from "1,136 million dollars in 1970 to 1,944 million dollars in 1971".[44] Increases were to continue on a yearly basis.

With the success of OPEC, the Shah renewed his efforts to achieve the goal to nationalize the oil industry in Iran. In 1973, he announced that "all exploration,

extraction and refining activities and installations were
to come under the Iranian control" under the auspices of
the Oil Service Company of Iran.[45] The nationalization
of the oil industry occurred in time to take advantage
of the OPEC negotiations concerning price increases in
1973. Shortly after the adjournment of October
negotiations, during which one hundred percent price
increases were proposed, Iran and five other Gulf members
(Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar)
declared a seventy percent price increase. Iranian oil
revenues rose from approximately four billion dollars in 1973
to over seventeen billion dollars in 1974.[46]

The effect of the increased oil revenues was
reflected in a revision of the Fifth Development Plan
(1973-1978) which had been in effect for almost one year.
The original plan had projected increased spending in
industry, transportation, and communication, based upon a
steadily increasing gross national product. The injec-
tion of the additional oil revenues, however, created the
opportunity to increase development, consumption, and
defense budgets. More money was allocated to housing
development, to public health facilities, and to establish-
ing a free education system.[47] The goal of the revised
fifth economic plan was to raise the quality of the social,
economic, political, and cultural life of all Iranians
through rapid economic growth and development.[48]

The quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 allowed the Shah to take greater advantage of Nixon's offer. The Iranian defense budget was increased again by 141 percent from 1,525 million dollars in 1973 to 3,680 million in 1974.[49] This budget would be increased again by 72 percent in 1975 and 41 percent in 1976.[50] American trade with Iran also accelerated in accordance with the demands for arms. As of 1977, the United States was responsible for 6.4 billion dollars of the import market in Iran, of which all but 2.2 billion was incurred in the purchase of military arms and services.[51] As Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the Shah alone decided upon all major procurements of arms.

The purchase of such large quantities of arms had a great effect upon the Iranian domestic situation. Between 1971 and 1978, 32 percent of the total planned expenditure was budgeted for defense spending.[52] Iran was forced to import between fifty and eighty percent of the modern armaments because the technological sophistication necessary to make the complex weapon systems did not exist in Iran.[53] The financial burden of the military costs necessitated the diversion of resources from other projects that may have enhanced Iranian industrial and social development. Furthermore, natural resources were redirected toward military uses rather than domestic economic concerns.

The Shah was committed to rapid and balanced
development to meet his lofty target for Iranian society
despite warnings from the newly established Plan and
Budget Organization, which was responsible for altering
the fifth plan.[54] The ramifications of such high
spending rates were revealed financially and socially.
Waste, corruption, and inflation plagued the Shah's
attempts to industrialize rapidly. Inefficiency encum-
bered development projects, for the sudden demand for
construction facilities taxed the existing resources,
resulting in delays. Given the demand for skilled workers
and the inevitable delays, contractors were able to
inflate the value of their work without opposition.
Iranian ports were also inadequately prepared for the
increase of imports demanded by the Iranian people.
Bottlenecks created by the number of ships waiting
outside ports cost the Iranian government one billion
dollars in demurrage charges, and businessmen incurred
losses due to spoiled cargo.[55]

This pattern of growth with concomitant develop-
ment problems is typical of third world oil-producing
countries.[56] A weak and backward agricultural sector,
unequal distribution of income, labour and manufacturing
shortages, corruption and inflation are faced by many
Middle East countries as they try to take advantage of

the opportunities which their oil income affords them.
Those industrialists who benefitted most by the oil boom
were professionals and the middle class who were in a
position to take advantage of the opportunities.
Although the poor benefitted, their gain was not as
great.[57] In general, however, Iran experienced real
economic growth since 1973. The gross national product
rose by thirty-four percent in 1973-74, forty-two percent
in 1974-75, and seventeen percent in 1975-76.[58] The
minimum wage of urban labourers rose thirty-six percent
in 1974-75, and forty-two percent in 1975-76.[59] The
balance of payments remained strong throughout the 1970's
despite the fact that expenditures slightly outweighed
revenues in 1978-1979.[60]

vi

In his theory of revolution, Eisenstadt directs
the analyst to consider the international context which
contributes to the creation of a revolutionary situation
in two ways. Competition among states in the interna-
tional political system and emergence into the interna-
tional capitalist system places strains upon a state's
goals of survival and security. The rivalry between
Britain and Russia encouraged the continued existence
of a weak, decentralized Qajar regime which was susceptible

to foreign influence. The result of such great power
rivalry was manifest in Iran's relatively late steps
toward modernity in comparison to such Middle East
states as Egypt and Turkey. Modernization and centraliza-
tion in these countries were more gradually introduced,
beginning as early as the nineteenth century.[61]
Although modernization in Iran began at the turn of the
century, reforms gained great momentum under the direc-
tion of the Pahlavi monarchs.

The existence of a decentralized government in
nineteenth century Iran allowed the growth of ulama
independence and power. The ulama expanded their tradi-
tional involvement in the legal, education and welfare
systems of Iran, functions generally considered to be the
concerns of a government. Modernization threatened the
ulama's independent power base among the rural and lower
class urban populations. The position of the ulama in
modernizing Iran will be discussed in greater detail
below. It should be noted, however, that the ulama's
changing role in Iranian society has been influenced by
the competition between Britain and Russia in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries.

Reza Shah's rise to power signalled the beginning
of a program of rapid modernization in Iran. A centra-
lized secular bureaucracy was established which assumed
the responsibilities of education, justice and welfare,

consequently limiting the _ulama_'s traditional role in
these matters. Furthermore, Western culture and
institutions were mimicked, resulting in the alienation
of not only the clergy, but other traditional segments
such as the _bazaari_ and the peasants. Before Reza Shah
could gain support for his reforms from alienated groups,
he was forced to abdicate by British, Soviet and American
military interests during World War II. The legitimacy
of the Pahlavi dynasty, and the institution of the
monarchy, was questioned in the immediate years following
Reza Shah's abdication.

The ascension to the throne of a young, inex-
perienced monarch, Mohammad Reza Shah, initiated a flou-
rish of political activity which reflected the political
and social cleavages in Iran. Nationalist and
reformist movements, by virtue of their proposals to
gain Iran's independence from great power competition,
threatened the existence of the pro-West Shah. Given
Iran's strategic importance to the West, the United States
wished to ensure a friendly government in Iran. Conse-
quently, when endogenous reform movements successfully
deposed the Shah, the United States aided his return to
power. Reformist and nationalist movements were crushed
not only in the interest of the Shah's security, but also
with the aim of ensuring American interests in Iran.

Throughout the remaining years of the Shah's

reign, he was caught in the power struggle between the
United States and the Soviet Union. He sought to create
a strong military so as to remove Iran from the manipu-
lative strategies of the Superpowers. Such independence
was supported by the United States which encouraged
Iran's immense military build-up. Iran's military
ranked as the most outstanding force in the Middle East,
a position achieved during the 1970's. Securing Iran's
independence absorbed much of the Shah's attention and
consumed resources which could have been used to develop
the Iranian domestic system. Toward the end of the 1970's,
it was no longer clear to Iranians that the military
expansion was accomplishing the goal of independence.
The United States was the dominant source of military
equipment, rendering Iran dependent upon American
advisors and supplies for the maintenance of the armed
forces. Many Iranians perceived the Shah as a pawn of
American strategists who were saved from the expense of
direct military involvement in the Middle East.

Iran's emergence into the international economic
system caused far-reaching changes in its socioeconomic
system. Under Mohammad Reza Shah, rapid economic
modernization continued with the help of the West,
especially the United States. The biggest boost to the
Iranian economy occurred when the international capitalist
system pushed Iran into a position of power by virtue of

her vast oil resources. The dramatic increase in revenues was followed by the Shah's extravagant development plans for the Iranian economy.

Programmes initiated during the last half of the 1970's introduced new opportunities to Iranians. Because of the influx of oil revenues, many more young Iranians were sent to universities abroad where they encountered Western ideas and values. Greater access was gained to European cities where Western-styled clothes and luxuries could be purchased. Sophisticated communication systems and the influx of Western films facilitated the exchange of cultural codes.[63] Western values were adopted by the urban middle and upper classes while the traditional segments of society remained relatively resistant to the cultural influx. Such a cultural cleavage was reinforced by disparities in economic opportunities between the urban and rural sectors.

Disruption of traditional socio-economic patterns and the displacement of Islamic values by Western culture was blamed upon the United States by leaders of the Iranian revolution. The United States was depicted as the 'Great Satan', who robbed Iranians of their spiritual and economic well-being.[64] A popular belief held by many Iranians viewed the United States as the latest addition to the list of external forces which had invaded and corrupted Iranian civilization.[65] The impact

of the international political and economic systems upon
Iran forced Iranians to feel that they must secure their
identity and independence from destruction by the West.

REFERENCES

[1]S.N. Eisenstadt, Revolution and the Transformation of Societies (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 182.

[2]Ibid., p. 220.

[3]James A. Bill, "Power and Religion in Revolutionary Iran", The Middle East Journal, XXXVI (Winter, 1982), 26.

[4]Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution (New York: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 41.

[5]M. Ganji and A. Milani, "Iran: Developments During the Last 50 Years", in Jane W. Jacqz, ed., Iran: Past, Present and Future (New York: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1976), p. 33.

[6]Ibid., p. 34.

[7]M.E. Yapp, "1900-1921: The Last Years of the Qajar Dynasty", in Hosein Amirsadeghi, ed., Twentieth-Century Iran (London: W. Heinemann Ltd., 1977), p. 12.

[8]The following discussion of the effects of Anglo-Russian competition upon Iran and the Shi'ite clergy is drawn from Nikki R. Keddie, "Ulama's Power in Modern Iran", in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Scholars, Saints and Sufis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 197w), pp. 213-216.

[9]W. Knapp, "1921-1941: The Period of Riza Shah", in H. Amirsadeghi, ed., Twentieth-Century Iran (London: W. Heinemann Ltd., 1977), p. 24.

[10]M.E. Yapp, "1900-1921: The Last Years of the Qajar Dynasty", p. 22.

[11]N.R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 89.

[12]Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 21.

[13]Ibid., p. 23.

[14]Ibid., p. 21.

[15]W. Knapp, "1921-1941: The Period of Riza Shah", p. 47.

[16]Ibid., p. 48.

[17]J.C. Hurewitz, "Iran in World and Regional Affairs", in Ehsan Yar-Shater, ed., Iran Faces the Seventies (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 123.

[18]A. Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 37.

[19]Ibid., p. 41.

[20]Ibid., p. 42.

[21]Nikki R. Keddie, The Roots of Revolution, p. 140.

[22]A. Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 80. Also noted in John Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1981), p. 68.

[23]Ibid., p. 86.

[24]R.W. Ferrier, "The Development of the Iranian Oil Industry", in H. Amirsadeghi, ed., Twentieth-Century Iran (London: W. Heinemann, Ltd., 1977), p. 110.

[25]F. Vakil, "Iran's Basic Macro-Economic Problems: A 20-Year Horizon", in Jane W. Jacqz, ed., Iran: Past, Present and Future (New York: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1976), p. 83.

[26]K. McLachlan, "The Iranian Economy, 1960-1976", in H. Amirsadeghi, ed., Twentieth-Century Iran (London: W. Heinemann Ltd., 1977), p. 148.

[27] F. Vakil, "Iran's Basic Macro-Economic Problems: A 20-Year Horizon", p. 96.

[28] Ibid., p. 83.

[29] David S. McMorris, "Agriculture", in Richard F. Nyrop, ed., Iran: A Country Study, Area Handbook Series (Washington: American University Press, 1978), p. 340.

[30] K. McLachlan, "The Iranian Economy, 1960-1976", p. 154.

[31] Ibid., p. 153. The Iranian year runs from March 21 to March 20 on the Gregorian calendar.

[32] S. Chubin, "Iran's Foreign Policy, 1960-1976: An Overview", in H. Amirsadeghi, ed., Twentieth-Century Iran (London: W. Heinemann Ltd., 1977), p. 200.

[33] Ibid., p. 199.

[34] Ibid., pp. 200-201.

[35] Ibid., p. 199.

[36] Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1979), pp. 58-59.

[37] S.A.A. Rizvi, Iran: Royalty, Religion and Revolution (Canberra, Australia: Ma'refat Publishing House, 1980), p. 287.

[38] This view is gleaned from passages of Mohammad Reza Shah's book Besu-ye Tamadden-e Bozorg (Tehran: Sherkat-e Offset-e Sahami-ye 'Amm, 1978) as presented in Fereydoun Hoveyda, The Fall of the Shah (New York: Wyndhem Books, 1979), pp. 118-170, and pp. 151-152.

[39] A. Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 138.

[40] Ibid., pp. 138-139.

[41] S. Chubin, "Iran's Foreign Policy, 1960-1976: An Overview", pp. 218-219.

[42] J.A. Bill, and Carl Leiden, Politics in the Middle East (Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), pp. 372-374.

[43] R.W. Ferrier, "The Development of the Iranian Oil Industry", p. 121.

[44] A. Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 116.

[45] R.W. Ferrier, "The Development of the Iranian Oil Industry", p. 123.

[46] R. Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), p. 84.

[47] Ibid., p. 80.

[48] Ibid., pp. 81-83.

[49] Laurence W. Martin, "The Future Strategic Role of Iran", in Hosein Amirsadeghi, ed., Twentieth-Century Iran (London: W. Heinemann Ltd., 1977), p. 285.

[50] Ibid.

[51] John D. Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution, p. 72.

[52] Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, pp. 71-72.

[53] Ibid., p. 94.

[54] R. Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, pp. 77-78.

[55] D. Housego, "Survey: Iran", The Economist, London (August 28, 1976), p. 21.

[56] F. Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Democracy, p. 167.

[57] D. Housego, "Survey: Iran", p. 21.

[58] Ibid., p. 15.

[59] Ibid., p. 15.

[60] "Iran", Europa Yearbook, 1981 (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1981), pp. 547-549.

[61] Nikki R. Keddie, "Introduction", in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Religion and Politics in Iran (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), p. 7.

[62] Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, pp. 202-205.

[63] See Hamid Nacify, "Cinema as a Political Instrument" in Michael E. Bonine and Nikki R. Keddie, eds., Modern Iran: The Dialectics of Continuity and Change (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981), pp. 341-361.

[64] William O. Beeman, "Images of the Great Satan: Representations of the United States in the Iranian Revolution", in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Religion and Politics in Iran (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), p. 192.

[65] Ibid., p. 196.

IV

SOCIAL STRUCTURES, SOCIAL STRATA AND STATE GOALS

It is argued by Eisenstadt that the internal push

toward revolutionary upheaval originates from tensions

between a society's structures and its members. It is

not sufficient, however, to argue (as do Johnson and Gurr)

that the government and institutions fail to meet the

demands or expectations of the population. As Skocpol

has noted, repressive regimes continue to survive despite

the dissatisfaction of the masses. The emergence of a

revolutionary situation depends upon the spontaneous

interaction of existing socioeconomic structures, group

interests and actions, as well as international conditions.

In his comparative study of societies which have

undergone revolutionary transformation, Eisenstadt reveals

that these societies have in common the structures

associated with Imperial or Imperial-feudal systems.

That is to say, that in varying degrees these societies

possessed differentiated and centralized administrative

and military hierarchies under the control of absolute

monarchies. Eisenstadt argues that the differentiation

and distinctiveness of the decision-making centers as articulated in unique symbols and institutions creates a social system which is conducive to revolutionary change.

The differentiation of functions in Imperial and Imperial-feudal societies results in the emergence of special occupation groups that are the basis for the hierarchically organized social strata. Each stratum may articulate status or class identity which is distinct from, but related to, the political and social spheres. The centers attempt to control inter-group relations by regulating access to the markets and delimiting the flow of economic and political resources. The autonomy of the centers fosters the development of elites who seek to gain a degree of autonomy from the political center. To enhance their position in society, elites seek to control free-floating resources, to develop new symbols, and to forge broad coalitions between each other and the periphery. Ultimately, these actions are for the purpose of augmenting the political power and influence of the elites.[1] Changes in the relations of economic activity, especially in the areas of production and distribution, result in shifts in the relative strength of various elites, leading to intra-elite and inter-elite competition.

Eisenstadt notes, as did Skocpol, that elites play a major role in the revolutionary process. Because

elites are most often tied with the political structures,
they are led to articulate their sense of relative
deprivation (a term taken from J.C. Davies and T. Gurr)
in the form of political demands. Ideological and reli-
gious movements form the link between discontented elites
and the broader strata who, in turn, perceive their
feelings of deprivation as a mandate for social change.
Depending upon the cultural orientation of the society,
the coalition between autonomous, insurrectionary elites
and the periphery may lead to revolution.

 Eisenstadt explains the social dynamics in terms
of the center-periphery dichotomy. He distinguishes the
decision-making nuclei of the social system from the rest
of society. The distinction between the center and the
domestic periphery can be made in terms of urban and rural
divisions, and the attendant consideration of comparative
levels of modernity and tradition, which may lead to
cleavages within the society. Center-periphery relations
in Imperial and Imperial-feudal societies are marked by
the permeation of the periphery by the center, not only
for the purpose of extracting resources, but also for the
imposition of structures and symbols which accompany goals
such as modernization and industrialization. Permeation
of decision-making centers by the periphery is weaker and,
Eisenstadt argues, is largely dependent upon the weaken-
ing of social closure and the development of an active

periphery.

In order to provide a background to the social conditions which existed at the time of Mohammad Reza Shah's ascension to the throne, this chapter presents a brief outline of the socioeconomic and political structures of traditional Iranian society. The domestic setting will explain in part the Shah's goals of legitimacy and security, which were the major impetuses behind the social policies, and how the pursuit of these goals was detrimental to his position. A depiction of the social changes as exemplified in strata variations will reveal possible sources of popular discontent and, in addition, the potential for mobilization against the regime. It is hoped that what will become clear is the way in which the revolutionary situation emerged from the interaction of traditional structures, policy directives and socioeconomic changes.

A.K.S. Lambton notes that at the end of the 1950's, Iran's socioeconomic system was, for the most part, the same as it had been a century earlier. Agricultural production was the mainstay of the economy: approximately seventy to eighty percent of Iran's population derived a livelihood from agriculture.[2] Moreover, land ownership remained the pivotal condition for status in Iranian society.

The land system in Iran was the result of both

geographical and historical factors. Only twelve percent of the land area in Iran can be used for sedentary farming, and much of this land is in areas of poor soil conditions and inadequate rainfall.[3] Consequently, there is a low yield, forcing landowners to cultivate large areas to make a profit. Unlike feudal Europe, in which the land system formed the basis for moral and military obligations, land ownership in Iran was perceived primarily as a source of income. During the Qajar period, the shahs often rewarded their loyal subjects with large grants of land. The land was held at the pleasure of the monarch, but the weak administration of certain kings created opportunities for some to transform their grants into private property. The emergence of a hereditary landed aristocracy was prevented, however, by Islamic laws of inheritance. Islamic prescripts require the estate of the dead to be divided amongst the closest relatives so as to maximize the distribution of wealth.[4] Nevertheless, in 1951, it was estimated that 56 percent of the land annually cultivated was owned by 0.5 percent of the total population.[5]

Land ownership was a traditional indication of economic security and social status. Prestige in Iranian society was directly related to the amount of land owned, regardless of its productivity.[6] Consequently, landowners could be found among all segments

of society, although the majority of land was owned by members of the ruling family, high ranking officials, tribal leaders, and merchants. In most cases, these landlords were absentee, leaving the management of their villages and lands to the kadkhuda, whom they had chosen to convey their orders to the peasants. After 1930, the kadkhuda was also the channel for dispensing government information to the villagers.

Sharecropping was the most common land tenure arrangement throughout Iran. The landlord gave the tenant cultivation rights and possibly supplied him with water, seed, and oxen. For each contribution, the landlord received one-fifth of the crop. Oxen were sometimes owned by the sharecroppers but more often, they were rented from independent owners who received twenty percent of the harvest in return. In addition, twenty percent of the peasant's share often went to the village official in charge of the water supply. The peasant may also have been required to provide certain personal services such as transportation of the crops, or general labour in the village. In some areas, peasants were encouraged to keep grazing animals or to grow fruit and nut trees in order to supplement their diets. During years in which the crops failed, a responsible landlord may have assisted his tenants by distributing grain from other villages. More often, however, the tenants were forced to ask for an

allocation of grain in advance, permanently indebting them to their landlords.[7]

Generally, life for the peasant was defined by the village in which he resided. Each settlement possessed its own merchants, craftsmen, and sometimes a gendarmerie, rendering the village an almost self-sufficient unit. The local culture and Islamic values guarded by the mullahs (low ranking clergy) provided the peasant with moral sustenance. Given the relative isolation of the villages from the central government, the peasant had a low political consciousness of national affairs.[8]

In addition to private property, land was designated in three ways. Large portions of Iran were considered to be dead or wastelands, which could be privately owned if they could be reclaimed for agricultural production. Much of this wasteland could become cultivatable only with the employment of high-cost technology. Ultimately, however, improvement is limited.[9] The land classified as public domain consists of forests for the most part. The third type of land designation refers to endowment lands. An endowment (vaqf, pl. ouqaf) is devoted to a special purpose such as a charity or the upkeep of a religious shrine or school (madrasa). Under the reign of the Safavid Kings in the sixteenth century, the Islamic clergy were given inalienable ownership of

large tracts of land. The profits from these lands were to be used for religious purposes. The relationship between the vaqf administrator and his tenant was similar to that of a landlord and peasant. In addition to charitable ouqaf, there were also private endowments owned by the Shah for the benefit of his family. During the 1920's and 1930's, Reza Shah expropriated 2,100 villages (formerly owned by the Qajar family), making the Pahlavi family the largest landowners in Iran.[10] Mohammad Reza Shah later returned ownership of many of these villages.

As mentioned earlier, many members of the upper class received their large land holdings in the form of grants from the reigning monarch. Such gifts ensured the continued allegiance of the most influential class to the government. The absentee landlords resided in the urban centers such as Isfahan, Shiraz, and Tehran which were also political centers. Through participation in the political system, the members of the upper class gained economic security and increased their prestige and power in society.

i

Leonard Binder argues that the Iranian institution of the monarchy developed under influences from Greek

philosophy and Shi'ite ideas.[11] Themes of both the philo-
sopher-king and the Imam can be found in the political
philosophy surrounding the monarchy. The two conceptions
of a political leader were combined in the sixteenth cen-
tury under the rule of the Safavid kings. In the eigh-
teenth century, however, the Qajar shahs rose to power on
the claim that their appointment to the throne was God's
command. The claim of divine right was used by the Qajars
to maintain control over the regions of Iran in spite of
a small and poorly trained army. The shahs used such
titles as the 'Asylum of the Universe', the 'Guardian of
the Flock' and the 'Shadow of God' to convey to Iranians
that they owed obedience to their kings as the temporal
representation of God's power. This charismatic element
of the shah's position was part of the tradition surround-
ing the monarchy. Despite attempts to limit the role
of the monarchy in the political system, the throne
maintained a symbolic importance in Iranian society.

The constitutional movement in the early twentieth
century was an attempt to restrain the absolute power of
the Qajar kings. The Constitution of 1906 and the Amend-
ments of 1907 laid the foundations for a constitutional
monarchy in Iran. The powers of the state were divided
into three segments. The legislative branch consisted
of the Majlis (Assembly), whose deputies were popularly
elected for a four year term, and the Senate, a council

of sixty members, half of whom were appointed by the Shah.
The <u>Majlis</u> was responsible for the enactment of all
financial bills and the interpretation of the laws.[12]
The judicial branch encompassed both civil and Islamic
courts of law and ensured that Islamic prescripts would
dominate the formulation of laws. The executive branch
included the powers of the king and those held by the
ministers he appointed. Although it appears that the
powers of the executive were to be limited by the legis-
lative branch, the Qajar kings did not respect the
constitution. It was hoped by the Iranian people that
Reza Shah would obey the laws of the constitution, but
this did not occur. Rather, Reza Shah used his executive
powers to legitimize and consolidate his position in the
political system. He placed his supporters in the <u>Majlis</u>
and recruited the talented, educated and wealthy of Iran
to the reorganized and expanded bureaucracy.

When Mohammad Reza Shah ascended to the throne,
he appeared to be contented to reign. This, in part,
stimulated the <u>Majlis</u> to "become the seat of political
power and symbol of democracy in Iran" in the years
immediately following the war.[13] Both Britain and Russia
also were responsible for the revival of party dynamics.
During the occupation of Iran by Britain and Russia, the
two major powers had tried to politicize the inhabitants
of their respective zones. The British organized the

Erade-ye Melli (National Will Party), an anti-communist
political party, in response to the Soviet reorganization
of the banned communist party, later renamed the Tudeh
(Masses) Party. An assassination attempt made on the life
of the Shah was thought to be an action of foreign
powers working through the Tudeh Party. The party was
officially banned in 1949 and many of its members were
arrested, but the remaining members managed to maintain
an underground network which emerged from time to time to
criticize the Shah.[14] Despite the growth of party poli-
tics during this time, the Majlis was weakened as a demo-
cratic institution. The numerous, divergent parties made
effective decision-making a difficult task.

In the late 1940's, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq emerged
as the spokesman of the National Front (Jebhe-Ye Melli).
As previously noted, Mossadeq was a long-time nationalist
reformer who had advocated constitutional monarchy. He
had been involved in the constitutional movement in the
early part of the century. Pushed out by Reza Shah's
rise to power (which he opposed), Mossadeq returned to
power in 1941 at the head of the National Front, which
was a coalition of diverse factions consisting of the
Iran Party, Toilers Party, Sunka Party (Nationalist-
Socialist), Pan-Iran Party, and the Devotees of Islam.[15]

Mossadeq's proposal to limit the power of the
monarchy had gained the support of the Majlis. This

emphasized to the Shah the fragility of the monarchy and convinced him that he would have to take steps to ensure that future political activity would not threaten his position. The powers of the Majlis were "reduced to that of a rubber stamp", legitimizing what the executive power passed down.[16] The Shah also established that he could by-pass the assembly by a royal decree, or veto any bill passed in the legislative branch. Consequently, this ensured that the Shah was the chief decision-maker in all important matters of government.

In addition, the Shah became actively involved in the daily functioning of the government. The Monarch presided over councils and committees, and held weekly meetings with the heads of state departments. Khalid Bin Sayeed, in an article written for the 2,500 year anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire, somewhat apologetically states that in committee meetings, the Shah presented his ideas "clearly and forcefully, and had worked out in his mind some of the solutions" to the problems faced by the council.[17] This indicates that the Shah took a leading role in the policy decisions of his ministers.

Typical of political systems in the Middle East, the Shah's regime was supported by a large bureaucracy characterized by personal relationships. The Shah used his executive power of appointment to co-opt talented

Iranians into the political elite by offering them posi-
tions of status with the bureaucracy, Court or Majlis.
Marvin Zonis argues that this method of recruitment
allowed the Shah to uncover Iranians of outstanding
capabilities and promote them to positions which made the
most of their talents. Furthermore, co-optation
hindered the formation of counterelites because indivi-
duals with leadership qualities could be incorporated
into the political system, thus confining their activi-
ties.[18]

Such a method of recruitment held another advan-
tage for the Shah. Because advancement rested on gaining
his favour, the system was characterized by competing
members intent on maintaining the favour and attention of
the Shah. The resultant divisions prevented the poli-
tical elite from collaborating against the regime.
Khrosrow Fatemi, an official of Iran's Ministry of
Commerce and a leading economist in the National Iranian
Oil Company, observed that such conditions of rivalry in
combination with overlapping responsibilities and the
absence of lateral communication lines, created a bureau-
cracy which owed much to the Shah and offered him the
utmost loyalty in return.[19]

Marvin Zonis concludes from his study of the
Iranian political elites that the Shah's tactics of
recruitment and advancement left the elite with "little

independence of action vis-a-vis the Shah".[20] The reality

of the bureaucratic life supported the elites' insights

(acquired during student days in universities abroad)

into the functioning of the monarchy. Their frustration

with the political system and their insecure position

within it reinforced the political elite's feelings of

cynicism while simultaneously discouraging action. Fear

of drawing the attention of the monarch because of disrup-

tive acts forced many members of the elite to adopt an

attitude of quietude in order to cope with the restraints

of the system. Ultimately, as Zonis concludes, such

consequences are conducive to the Shah's wish to increase

his control of the political system by maximizing the

number of decisions which he makes personally.[21]

The Shah also inherited from the institution of

the monarchy the charisma which accompanied the position.

As Mohammed Reza Shah actively pursued his aim to become

the pivotal power within the Iranian government, he could

more rightly claim to be "the chief of all three powers--

executive, legislative, and judiciary".[22] The Shah

considered himself to be the model, planner, protector

and educator of Iran; the source of all ideas and programs

within society. Fereydoun Hoveyda, longstanding Iranian

ambassador to the United Nations and the brother of Amir

Abbas Hoveyda, Prime Minister of Iran from 1965-1977,

described the Shah's need to be the origin of all ideas

upon which the success of modern Iran depended.[23]   In an

abstract from his book <u>Towards the Great Civilization</u>, the

Shah reveals his perception of his part in the 'new' Iran:

> The monarchic regime as soul, essence, exis-
> tence, source of energy and foundation of
> the national sovereignty and unity constitutes
> the solid basis of the great civilization....
> Having an absolute faith in this, it was my
> duty to set the nation such a goal, not only
> as the person responsible for its destiny
> but also as the father, guide and friend of
> every Iranian.[24]

The absolute power of the Shah was represented in his

institutional authority and the charismatic appeal of the

symbol of the monarchy.

ii

The Shah's feelings of insecurity were fostered

not only by reformist movements among the <u>Majlis</u>, but also

by weak popular support for the monarchy. Legitimacy, if

the Shah was to heed the words of his critics, would

entail economic and political reforms. The latter, how-

ever, threatened to undermine his position at the apex

of political power. Consequently, the Shah attempted to

consolidate his power by projecting the "image of a

nationalist, a forward-looking reformer who favoured a

strong modern army to hold the realm together".[25]

Although security and legitimacy are goals simultaneously

held by many states, the methods which the Shah chose
to achieve these aims often worked at cross-purposes,
hampering the fulfillment of both.

The Shah believed that the successful implementa-
tion of his plans for the 'new' Iran depended upon the
existence of a strong, loyal military. According to the
Constitution of 1906, the Shah was the Commander-in-
Chief of the armed forces. Although the army was a
traditional instrument of monarchical power, it was a
weak institution in Iran. The Qajar kings possessed only
a small and poorly trained army which enforced the will
of the monarch ineffectively, hampering the implementa-
tion of any proposed reforms. Around the turn of the
century, foreign aid helped to establish three separate
military units to strengthen the coercive power of the
central government: the South Persian Rifles, trained
and commanded by British officers; a gendarmerie, com-
manded by Swedish officers; and the most effective unit,
the Persian Cossack Brigade.[26] As noted earlier, it was
with the help of this brigade that Reza Shah seized power
in 1921. The unification, expansion and modernization
of the armed forces was the basis for Reza Shah's control.
The oppositional forces which threatened to dethrone the
Pahlavi monarch were continuously suppressed by the army.

The armed forces continued to play an important
security role in domestic politics during the reign of

Mohammad Reza Shah. The Shah was returned to power in
1953 by American support and his own army under General
Faztollah Zahedi. Following this incident, the Shah
concentrated upon boosting the power of the Iranian army.
Because the Americans believed that protection of their
interests in Iran depended upon the Shah's leadership, the
United States offered to supply Iran with military aid
and advisors. The Imperial Iranian Armed Forces and the
Imperial Gendarmerie were expanded, and subsequently,
commanded an increasing role in Iranian society.

The military received the personal attention of
the Shah because he recognized that it was the source of
security for both his regime and the social structure in
general. The existence of better facilities and numerous
privileges beyond those given to the civil service
encouraged the loyalty of military personnel. Military
salaries were often raised and military officers were not
required to pay customs duty on imported luxuries.[27] In
addition to ensuring the faithfulness of the armed forces,
the Shah was also careful to prevent the possibility of a
military coup d'etat. Relations between high-ranking
officials were dominated by rivalries for the Shah's
attention. His personal approval was needed for promotion
beyond the rank of a major. The Shah reinforced the
competition by preventing any general to meet with another
without the monarch's permission.[28] As in the case of

the bureaucracy, the patron-client relationship between the Shah and the military officers prevented the armed forces from becoming a subversive element.

Fred Halliday suggests in his book, <u>Iran: Dictatorship and Development</u>, that the army had not fostered a hereditary elite because it had not existed as a continuous institution in Iranian society.[29] Because the army was not perceived to be a path of upward mobility, many of the officers who entered the army during the 1920's and 1930's were the sons of small landowners and civil servants.[30] This pattern of recruitment was maintained throughout the Shah's regime, although class differences became more pronounced during the rapid expansion of the military in the 1970's. Officers were enlisted from upper class and urban middle class families who were of 'good standing'. The conscripts, who had little opportunity for promotion, were recruited from the lower classes.[31] This division was to have great ramifications during the crisis in 1978 and 1979.

After the Mossadeq incident, the Shah also approached the United States for help in the establishment of a surveillance agency in Iran. The Central Intelligence Agency assisted the Tehran government in the establishment of the Iranian State Intelligence and Security Organization (Sazman-e Ettela'at Va Amniyat-e Keshvar, or SAVAK).

SAVAK was an extension of the Prime Minister's office,[32] and its chief, who held the rank of Deputy Prime Minister, was appointed by the Shah. The principal responsibilities of SAVAK were to obtain information of all types, to prevent subversion and espionage counter to the security of the regime, and to maintain surveillance of groups and individuals who opposed the regime. Officials of SAVAK also acted as the:

> military magistrates in judging crimes falling
> within their jurisdiction, in accordance with
> the military tribunal system set up to try
> political crimes.[33]

SAVAK was "an omnipotent and brutal force in runing the affairs of the state, under the Shah's direct control".[34] It was under the direction of General Nasiri, a long-time colleague of the Shah, that SAVAK became a pervasive force of political repression. The responsibility of the International Security and Action Branch (one of nine branches) of SAVAK was the identification of Iranian citizens who opposed the Shah's regime. It was a power that was greatly abused. SAVAK was a "secret organization with a public face"[35] whose powers rested on its infiltration of factories, offices and universities, making free expression a rarity. More importantly, SAVAK used harsh methods of interrogation to intimidate would-be dissidents. The influential report published by the

International Commission of Jurists on human rights
violations in Iran condemned the methods of arrest and
trial, and the conditions of the detention centers.
Reports by Amnesty International documented tortures
suffered by Iranians at the hands of SAVAK and these were
confirmed by the 1500 Iranians who appeared before the
United Nations' International Commission in February,
1980.[36] The overall effect of SAVAK's activities was to
create a 'politics of distrust' which alienated Iranians
from each other as well as the government. Moreover, it
prevented the development of political expression and
participation in Iran.]

Having begun his plan to enhance the security of
his regime, the Shah made sporadic attempts to institute
a program of modernization. In 1951 the Shah distributed
a portion of the crown lands among the peasants. The
program was accelerated partially in response to growing
political opposition during 1959 and 1960. Political
repression, economic recession and poor living conditions
spawned student riots and social unrest in 1961 and
1962. /In 1963, the Shah presented to the Iranian public
the "White Revolution" which promoted socioeconomic
reforms under the direction of the traditional monarchy.]
The royal decree set out the programme which included the
abolition of the feudal landlord-peasant system through
land reform, election law reform, profit-sharing for

workers, the sale of state-owned industry, emancipation
of women and programs to increase literacy, and the
general improvement of the living conditions of Iranians.
As could be expected, the reforms were widely accepted
in a popular referendum in 1963. It is, however, as A.K.S.
Lambton recognizes, difficult to judge the degree of
genuine support which the reforms received.[37]

The land reform law of 1963 attempted to change
radically the form of socioeconomic relations in Iran's
rural areas and to undermine the efforts of the Shah's
opposition. The implementation of a land reform program
faced the seemingly insurmountable obstacles created by
the absence of a cadastral survey and a land survey
department.[38] Dr. Hasan Arsanjani, the primary force
behind the land reform plans, proposed that the land be
given to the peasants which were cultivating it, thus
circumventing these survey problems. Landlords were
limited to the ownership of one village. The rest were
to be purchased by the government for redistribution
among the peasants. In return, the landlords received,
in several installments, the value of their lands accord-
ing to previous tax payments. The land reform program
also laid the foundations for the establishment of rural
cooperative societies, joint-stock corporations and large
agrobusinesses. These enterprises were designed to
optimize the geographical and technological limitations

faced by the agricultural sector in Iran.

The economic success of the land reform program was varied. A.K.S. Lambton notes that the reforms were generally successful in increasing the peasant proprietorship and raising the living conditions of the peasants.[39] The benefits which the peasants derived from land reform depended upon "the extent of their poverty, and the degree of the subjugation to the landlords" as well as their literacy and their agricultural competence.[40] There was inadequate financing for the newly independent peasant who needed to buy seed, or to take advantage of fertilizers and new equipment. Moreover, the land reform program omitted to improve the condition of the landless peasants who accounted for one third of the rural population in Iran.[41]

The agrobusinesses, rural cooperatives and corporations were also plagued by poor facilities and financing. Many more peasants were dislocated by the advent of farm machines. Generally, the reorganization of the rural socioeconomic system destroyed traditional village life as a complete cultural, social and economic unit. The lack of work forced many peasants to migrate to the cities to seek employment. Moreover, the land reform program did not increase agricultural productivity in Iran.

The immediate political consequences of land reform appeared to be beneficial to the Shah's image as

a reformer. The implementation of the reforms undermined his critics' calls for change and consequently, decreased their popularity among the citizens.[43]   In addition, the Shah had also further weakened the Majlis, whose numbers were predominantly landowners. The Shah believed that the transfer of ownership to the peasants would result in an independent peasantry.[44]   Gaining the support of a strengthened periphery would extend the Shah's political basis to a sector of the population that had been previously ignored. Not only would a rural-based revolt be avoided, but the Shah would have support among broad segments of the people, inhibiting any attempts to mobilize them by the political elite.

The political success of land reform was mixed. It did appear that the Shah had made an important link with the peasantry and had gained their support. Given that wealth, status and proximity to the political center were necessary conditions for political power, however, the rural peasants had limited political impact. Farhad Kazemi argues that by extending government responsibilities to the rural areas, the Shah actually created another potential source of opposition. Crop failure, for example, was blamed upon government mismanagement rather than landlord irresponsibility.[45]   Moreover, there remained the problem of the landless peasants who perceived the government as responsible for the elimination of any work they

might have had, further deteriorating their weak position in society.

The land reform program had broken the traditional base of power for the wealthy in Iran. The government, however, encouraged this segment of society to invest their money in commercial and industrial endeavours which were presented by the latest surge of economic growth. Consequently, the elites maintained their status and wealth, but the basis of this wealth was diversified, and was in some cases, invested in more profitable ways.[46] Nevertheless, the Shah's land reform program alienated many of the wealthy landowners who resented the imposition of such sweeping reforms. It is only to be noted here that opposition to land reform and the White Revolution came from the ulama; this will be discussed in the succeed-ing chapter.

Concurrent with land reform, other changes pro-posed in the White Revolution were implemented. Forest and pasture lands were nationalized "to prevent their misuse and waste in the hands of private owners."[47] The economic conditions of workers benefitted from government attention, which resulted in the institution of a legis-lated minimum wage, a social insurance policy, and a profit-sharing scheme. Notably, the military performed modernizing functions above the responsibility of the maintenance of internal order and defense of the terri-

torial integrity of the state. It was from the ranks of
the military and SAVAK that the Shah organized the
Literacy Corps, Development Corps and Health Corps. In
lieu of military service, young men and women were
assigned to work in rural areas to provide education,
medical facilities, surplus labour, and training in new
agricultural techniques. This program established
contact between the political center of Iran and the
peripheries. Furthermore, it "provided the government
with a source of legitimacy to emphasize the importance
of the civilian role of the armed forces, and thus boost
the image and justify the expansion of the Shah's
military power base."[48]

iii

In addition to the changes imposed by the Shah,
the expansion of the international capitalist system also
fostered changes in Iran's social structures. Tradi-
tionally, there were three classes based loosely upon
relations in the land. The upper class, consisting of
the royal family, the traditional aristocracy and the
large landowners, also comprised the political and
economic elites. The middle class was a mixture of
civil servants, merchants, artisans, and craftsmen living
in the centers of Iran, affording them greater opportunity

for advancement. The lower class consisted of the peasants, farmers, merchants, and artisans who resided in the rural areas. The demands of economic moderniza- tion gave rise to the emergence of new strata. Indus- trialization necessitated expanding the labour force at factory level, as well as managerial positions. The new economic positions resulted in changes in the traditional social strata, especially within the middle and working classes. Increasing mechanization combined with the displacement of much of the unskilled rural population was responsible, in part, for the creation of an urban poor.

James A. Bill, in his book, The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization, categorizes the new middle class as the professional-bureaucratic-intelli- gentsia, mainly because it is distinguished by a modern, often Western education. Although the first secular primary school was opened at the turn of the century, it was not until the development of an education program under Reza Shah that a 'modern' school system was established. As of 1977, however, only thirty-seven percent of the adult population was literate, although the rate is much lower among the rural adult population.[49] Education, especially at the post-secondary level, remains the option of the wealthier classes and is an important criterion for economic advancement.

One result of the late development of a modern
system of education in Iran is the number of students
studying abroad. Although the exact number of students
enrolled in foreign universities is not known, it is
generally believed that in 1975 approximately 60,000
Iranian students were attending post-secondary
institutions in the United States, West Germany and Great
Britain.[50] According to government statistics, the
number of students abroad equalled the number of Iranian
students attending universities at home. The exposure to
Western culture encountered by students abroad influenced
their perception of Iranian society. They felt a stronger
commitment to the ideas of social progress and change
than did their counterparts who remained in Iran.[51]
Throughout the 1960's many Iranians studying at foreign
universities remained after the completion of their
studies because of the attractive job opportunities in the
West.[52] During the 1970's, however, this trend was
reversed somewhat. Many post-secondary graduates
returned to Iran to assume positions within the bureau-
cracy, the major employer of educated people in Iran.
Bill reports that the professional-bureaucratic-intelli-
gentsia was the fastest growing class in Iran, having
increased by sixty percent between 1956 and 1966.[52] By
1976, Bill claims, twenty-five percent of Iranians were
members of this class.[54]

The professional-bureaucratic-intelligentsia is a politically diversified group. Because modernization created opportunities for members of the traditional classes to improve their position in society, many members of the new middle class originated in other strata. Consequently, the professional middle class held linkages with other strata that could be used to mobilize broad segments of society.[55] Due to this diversity, however, it cannot be argued that the new middle class was a homogeneous group. In some ways, this class owed much of its prosperity to the Shah's programs of modernization. Many members of this stratum favoured "reforms that would improve economic stability and government efficiency" thereby enhancing their own positions.[56] University professors and students and teachers were more critical of the Shah's regime as demonstrated by the student riots during the crisis in the early 1960's. Generally, the professional middle class was divided according to perceptions of, and allegiance to, the Shah's political system. Their education and high level of political consciousness rendered them a potentially powerful group in Iran.

Fred Halliday, in his work, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, emphasizes the rapid development of another class in Iran, namely the working class, which developed concomitantly with the industrialization of

Iran. Halliday claims that of 6.8 million people working in the non-agricultural sector, 2.5 million are employed in the industry.[57] The growth of the working class is important because it represents a new social force which had been prevented "from playing an independent political role or finding an independent expression."[58]

The most important feature of the working class, Halliday argues, is the fact that many members are of peasant origin. The recent migration of peasants into urban areas has resulted in an urban population of forty-seven percent.[59] The majority of these people are un- skilled and illiterate, therefore falling outside the demands for skilled and managerial personnel.[60] All evidence indicates that the working class is a potentially powerful source of social change. The Shah's government appeared to recognize that successful implementation of industrialization programs depended upon the cooperation of the working class. Forced wage increases and workers' shares were instituted to try to help the 'proletariat', who were subject to high rents and inflated consumer prices. The working class, however, had "been denied the right to any independent political activity" because even trade unions were organized by the state and monitored by SAVAK.[61] Labour unions were not allowed to be involved in any political activity, although they were allowed to indicate a preference for political parties.[62]

Consequently, most working class Iranians felt alienated from the political system.

Modernization programs in Iran resulted in the creation of another stratum, the urban poor. The failure of land reform to address the problem of the 'landless' agricultural workers pushed many peasants to migrate to the cities. Between 1966 and 1976, approximately 2,111,000 rural Iranians moved to urban centers.[63] Tehran absorbed much of the migrant population to the extent that fifty percent of Tehran's population was migrant.[64] Most of the migrant poor were unskilled and illiterate, and consequently could not find jobs. They settled in slums and squatter settlements, concerning themselves solely with subsistence. Farhad Kazemi surveyed the migrant poor in Iran during the summer of 1977. Despite the fact that the urban poor had many grievances caused by unemployment, inadequate affordable housing and extravagant food costs, Kazemi found that they did not engage in political activity against the regime. Many did not link their destitution to government policies and consequently, did not direct their frustration towards the Shah's governance.[65] In a direct reference to Gurr, Kazemi points out that although it may be expected that the migrant poor were frustrated by unfulfilled expectations, most preferred their present life in the city.[66] Moreover, Kazemi found that many

migrant poor did not feel uprooted by their move to the city. Many maintained an extensive network of communication with friends and relatives in the rural areas.[67] Volunteer religious associations called hey'ats were an important community activity. Fearful of anti-regime uprisings, the Shah's police carefully monitored such organizations. The hey'ats allowed social concerns to be considered in the guise of religious discussion. Kazemi notes that "the religious dimension remained the dominant mode of expression for the migrant poor."[68]

iv

Political modernization had not kept pace with the rapid changes in the economic and social systems. After Mossadeq, the Majlis was no longer afforded the opportunity to challenge the Shah's position. A two-party system controlled by the Shah was established in 1957. The imposition of this system, modeled after Western democracies, "grew out of a desire to permit renewed public political activity while retaining control."[69] The party "in power" was the conservative Hezb-e Melliyun (Nationalist Party) under Prime Minister Eqbal and the 'loyal opposition' was the liberal Herb-e Mardom (People's Party) led by Asadollah 'Alam, a long-time friend of the Shah. The Mardom party had a platform which argued for

land redistribution, woman suffrage, and the reduction of
illiteracy. The Melliyun party called for less drastic
reforms.[70] The leaders of the two parties "collaborated
in drawing up their membership lists"[71] after assigning
members to a party. The Shah allowed greater freedom
of speech during the election in June 1960. The National
Front, Toilers' Party, and Teachers' Association were
allowed to voice their opinions, although they were not
encouraged to run as independent candidates. The oppor-
tunity for Iranians to express their views was accompanied
by disturbances at polling stations and questionable
electoral practices.[72] As a result, the election was
cancelled and rescheduled for February 1961. The Melliyun
party was alleged to have participated in the obstruction
of the elections and was subsequently discredited. In its
place was formed the Hezb-e Iran-e Novin (New Iran Party)
under Hasan-Ali Mansur.

In 1967, the Hezb-e Iran-e Novin, which was
supported by the lower middle class and labour groups,
emerged as the strong majority party, with 180 seats in
the Majlis. The Hezb-e Mardom stood as the minority
party with only twenty-nine seats in the Majlis followed
by the Pan-Iran Party which managed to earn five seats
in the assembly. This division of popular support was
repeated in the 1971 election; however, the Pan-Iran Party
boycotted the election in a bid to force the government to

institute free elections. The platforms of the parties were largely supportive of the Shah's regime, because any criticism of the Shah would have been repressed. The Iran Novin Party under Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda dominated Iranian domestic politics. In 1965, however, another attempt was made on the life of the Shah, and all further political participation was repressed until 1975. The political mobilization that did occur was funneled into parties organized by the state. Political opposition was repressed by SAVAK, while corruption of public officials seemed to be widespread and largely ignored.[73]

In 1974, student unrest was growing in conjunction with Ayatollah Khomeini's call for an Islamic political revolution to overthrow the Shah. The two-party system had not achieved the objective of encouraging spontaneous political participation, because the parties presented "approved" platforms rather than represented the views of their party members.[74] Given the threat of reprisals by SAVAK forces in the event of criticism of the regime, and the alienation of the Iranian citizens from the political process, it is not surprising that the Shah continued to face a crisis of political legitimation. It is claimed that the Shah announced "that opposition to Iran-Novin would be permitted in the 1975 elections"[75] which was interpreted as an attempt to achieve a wider support base for the regime. The resulting abundance of

political activity which appeared to threaten the exis-
tence of the monarchy convinced the Shah to rescind his
proposal. A single party was created called the
Hezb-e Rastakhiz-i-Melli or National Resurgence Party.
In his announcement of the new party, the Shah proclaimed
that the Rastakhiz Party would provide the form of
political mobilization and participation demanded by many
Iranians. Dialogue within the party was to consist of
constructive criticism which could open the lines of
communication and deflate some of the growing opposition.
The Shah warned that anyone who rejected the party would
be encouraged to leave the country.[76] The Rastakhiz
Party failed to be the forum for creative criticism for
the same reason the two-party system had failed--the
absence of the opportunity for political participation.

The political promise and initiatives of the Shah
to decentralize the state bureaucracy and increase poli-
tical participation did not materialize. The issue of
human and political rights came to a climax with the
investigation of the Shah's policing policies by Amnesty
International. The report by members of Amnesty Inter-
national exposed the methods used by SAVAK, the Shah's
information gathering and policing service, outlining
the form of arrests, widespread intimidation, and alleged
torture of critics of the Shah's regime. Furthermore,
the election of President Carter, who stressed human

rights and threatened to withdraw aid to countries sus-
pected of violations added pressure to the criticisms of
SAVAK's questionable operations.

Having gained courage from world criticism of the
Shah's lack of respect for human rights, a group of
professionals and intellectuals published their grievances
in several petitions and open letters to the Shah in the
spring and summer of 1977. Two important protests were
made during this time. The first one to be considered is
a two page letter to the Shah signed by Karim Sanjabi,
Shahpour Bakhtiar and Darioush Forourhar.[77] These men
had served under Prime Minister Mossadeq and had remained
staunch critics of the Shah's regime. Forouhar had
served in the labour ministry of Mossadeq's government,
and Karim Sanjabi, a former dean of the law faculty of
Tehran University, had "represented Iran at the Hague
International Court during the oil nationalisation
dispute under Mossadeq."[78] Dr. Bakhtiar, a member of the
powerful Bakhtiar tribe, was a well-known supporter of
political reform in Iran. The letter addressed the Shah's
failure to conform to the Iranian Constitution and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It attacked the
economic reforms and policies which had resulted in
inflation and shortage. The letter also contained a
request for the release of political prisoners, an end to
censorship by reinstating a free press, and free elec-

tions. Another letter sent to Prime Minister Hoveyda and signed by forty professors and writers, echoed the demand for the return of social and political rights.[79] Both received wide circulation.

The second important protest during this time came from a group of lawyers who authored several letters concerning the Iranian judicial system. This progressive group of professionals, protesting the injustice in the Iranian legal system, demanded "an end to special courts, curtailment of the constant encroachment by the executive on the powers of the judiciary, and observance of the rule of law.[80] Another letter, supported by 110 retired judges, was sent to the head of the Supreme Court stating similar complaints. Ultimately, these 'institutional entrepreneurs' formed the Iranian Jurists Association consisting of 143 lawyers who set for themselves the task of monitoring the observance of human rights in Iranian society.[81] It is important to realize that without world-wide attention and support for these protests, those involved would have been persecuted.

Amid growing social problems, the Shah's government continued to follow a policy directed by the goals of security and legitimacy. As a symbol that changes would occur, the Shah dismissed Prime Minister Hoveyda in 1977. The Iranian authorities claimed that Hoveyda had been behind the thoughtless economic planning that had

resulted in the crisis which faced Iranians. Dr. Jamshir
Amouzegar was appointed to succeed Hoveyda, and proposed
a slower rate of growth, the development of low cost
housing, and the implementation of a number of social
welfare programmes. The Shah also faced the difficult
situation of increasing political participation while
ensuring the continuation of his regime. Any attempts
by the Shah to increase the access of the periphery to the
political center was accompanied by an increase in police
vigilance of the more critical sectors of society. This
action did not diminish the number of serious riots that
continued to occur, and Dr. Amouzegar was forced to resign
his post.

His successor was Ja'fer Sherif-Emami who attempted
to pacify the growing opposition to the Shah by means of
conciliation. Emami promised to establish an independent
judiciary, freedom of the press, and free elections to be
held in 1979. This prompted several political parties to
apply for recognition. One very important party which
emerged during this time was the Union of National Front
Forces consisting of a coalition of the Iranian Nationa-
list Party (INP) led by Darioush Forouhar, the Iranian
Party of Shapour Bakhtiar, and the Society of Iranian
Socialists whose leader was Karim Sanjabi. The aim of
the Union of National Front Forces was to fight dictator-
ship within the bounds of the law.[82] The leaders argued

that if Prime Minister Sharif-Emami's attempts to cooperate
with the demands of the opposition were sincere, then the
policies which more closely answered the call for reform
could be implemented. They suggested the institution of
a twelve-point programme which included the dissolution
of SAVAK and the release of political prisoners.

Emami addressed himself to the problems created
by the Shah's national mythology. As Eisenstadt suggested,
the political center tries to infiltrate the periphery by
imposing a certain set of symbols. The rural and urban
periphery for the most part consisted of Iranians who
were strongly observant of Islam and consequently, had
strong links with the Islamic clergy. [Mohammad Reza Shah,
as had his father, perceived the clergy as a threat to the
supremacy of the throne in Iran. The Shah's propaganda
which linked his reign to the pre-Islamic empire of
Cyrus the Great was aimed at undermining the Islamic ties
by emphasizing the Persian heritage.] Religious opposition,
however, was growing in Iran. Late in 1977, students
began to stage pro-Khomeini protests in the campuses of
several universities in Iran. Although he had been exiled
since 1964, Ayatollah Khomeini had maintained contact with
students and clergy in Iran. [The traditional relationship
between the bazaaris (traditional merchants) and the
clergy was exploited to create a network through which
taped and printed messages from Khomeini were distributed

to the citizens of Iran. Khomeini was perceived as a
leader in the anti-Shah campaign; Khomeini's life was a
symbol of religious and political opposition to the
Iranian government. In recognition of the increasing
religious opposition, Emami reinstated the Moslem lunar
calendar, closed casinos, and established a new ministry,
Head of Endowment, which was to oversee the financing of
theological schools, maintain the shrines and mosques,
and bestow scholarships to students of theology. Such
reforms were intended to signal the Islamic clergy and
his followers that the Shah acknowledged their demands
and recognized their power.

The beginning of September, 1978, was a time of
anti-Shah demonstrations resulting in the deaths of several
people and the imposition of martial law. On September
7, the bazaars were closed in support of the rallies,
despite a ban on public gatherings. The following day
which was later named 'Black Friday', was one of major
confrontation between the Shah's military forces and
protesters. Anti-government demonstrators were fired
upon by the army, resulting in deaths of approximately
250 people, although the opposition claimed that over
2,000 had been killed.[83] Several of the leaders,
including Ayatollahs Rohani and Nouria, Mehdi Bazargan
and Dr. Moghaddam were arrested. Ayatollahs Khomeini and
Shari-atmadari advocated passive resistance to the

government's actions to avoid further bloodshed.

Widespread strike action and work stoppage in the civil service and oil sectors was demonstrative of the feelings of deprivation experienced by the broader groups. The momentum of the strikes was a strong political weapon which forced the Shah to address the criticisms levied against his regime. On October 19, 1978, employees of the National Iranian Oil Company walked off their jobs, consequently reducing the production of oil to one quarter of the previous level.[84] The employees demanded the suspension of martial law, the release of political prisoners, and the trial of the former head of SAVAK, General Nasiri.[85]

Recognizing the extent of discontent and the degree of organization of the demonstrations and strikes, the Shah perceived that the only way to gain support for the corrective measures which he hoped to implement would be an appeal to Khomeini and the members of the Union of National Front Forces to form a coalition. In order to prepare a stance on the Shah's proposal, Karim Sanjabi met with Khomeini in Paris, where the Ayatollah was living after his expulsion from Iraq. Khomeini firmly rejected any possibility of a coalition with the Shah's regime, and repeated his intention to remove the Shah from power and establish an Islamic government in Iran. Khomeini's refusal to compromise gained him respect and support

among Iranians as compared to the Shah's uncertainty.[86]

Violent anti-regime demonstrations, which began on the campus of Tehran University, and continuing strikes caused the Shah to dismiss Prime Minister Emami on November 6. He appointed General Gholam Reza Azhari to the task of creating a military government. During this time, the army seized the major newspapers in Tehran as well as the radio and television stations. Prominent government officials such as ex-Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda and General Nassiri were arrested and charged with corruption. Ayatollah Khomeini used tactics to infiltrate and neutralize the army. The Ayatollah appealed to police and soldiers not to fire upon their Muslim brothers and threatened retaliation against the soldiers' families if he was not heeded.[87] In addition, Khomeini tried to exacerbate the dissension between the privileged high ranking army officials and the junior officers and conscripts. The conscripts came from the lower and middle classes and were particularly subject to revolutionary appeals.[88] This appeared to be effective, especially with the new conscripts, who could be found fraternizing with the demonstrators.[89]

December 2nd was the beginning of the holy month of _Moharram_ which, in Islamic tradition, is the month of mourning for the death of Husayn, Ali's son, who symbolizes justice under corrupt, autocratic governments.

Usually a time of high emotion for Muslims, the occasion

was of even greater significance due to the recent

protests against the Shah. All religious processions

were banned by General Azhari unless previously cleared

by authorities. In addition, the Prime Minister promised

that non-Islamic laws would be revised to conform to

Islamic principles through consultation with the reli-

gious leaders.

Throughout the month of Moharram, mass demonstra-

tions continued despite attempts to control the protesters.

In an article by William H. Sullivan, the American

ambassador to Iran, it is reported that the Shah realized

that suppression of the revolution would necessitate an

even greater degree of autocracy which would eventually

explode under the reign of his son.[90] Consequently, the

Shah negotiated a political solution with the members of

the Union of National Front Forces. The Shah accepted

their proposal of a reduction in his power to that of a

constitutional monarch at the head of a government respon-

sible to parliament. He also agreed to a re-organization

of SAVAK, the establishment of an independent judiciary

and a free press (which had already been promised by Prime

Minister Emami). Despite these concessions, the army

clashed with anti-regime demonstrators who argued that the

Shah would not relinquish his power as long as he was in

the country. Thus, on December 29th, the Shah declared

that he could take a long vacation during which time Dr. Shahpor Bakhtiar would form a new government.

Early in January, Bakhtiar's proposed changes, which included the dissolution of SAVAK and the inclusion of the clergy in a draft of the legislation for the propagation of Islam, were presented to the Shah for his approval. Among members of the opposition, Bakhtiar gained the support of the moderate faction, but was denounced by Khomeini and Sanjabi. During this time, Ayatollah Khomeini declared his intention to form a provisional revolutionary council which would establish an Islamic republic with an elected constitutional assembly. On January 16, 1979, the Shah left for Egypt and Bakhtiar offered Khomeini the option of an Islamic republic with an elected constitutional assembly. Moderates such as Ayatollah Shari'atmadari gave hesitant support to Bakhtiar's government, but Khomeini would not compromise his intention to overthrow Bakhtiar. Following the Shah's depature, pro-Khomeini rallies erupted in the streets declaring a victory for the opposition.

Bakhtiar's attempts to prevent Khomeini's return to Iran were unsuccessful, due to pressure exerted through a series of violent protests. On the first day in February, Ayatollah Khomeini arrived at the Tehran airport after a fourteen year exile. He announced the formation of a provisional government headed by Medhi

Bazargan that would replace Bakhtiar's 'illegal' govern-
ment. Bakhtiar refused to sign the proposal for an
Islamic government, which also included his resignation
until the holding of free elections, which were scheduled
for June, 1979.

The collapse of Bakhtiar's government appeared
inevitable. His ministers were resigning, and administra-
tive and police functions were being assumed by forces
loyal to Khomeini. Portions of the armed forces joined
civilians in demonstrations against Bakhtiar which left
the Shah's Imperial Guards to fight guerrilla groups.
After several days of intense fighting, the Imperial
Guard was defeated. On February 11, Bakhtiar was forced
to admit defeat. Khomeini was now free to institute
his own government.

v

To a great extent, Iran was typical of the
Imperial-feudal societies described by Eisenstadt. Moham-
mad Reza Shah was a modernizing monarch with strong
absolutist tendencies. When he ascended the throne in
1941, Iranian society existed largely as it had a century
earlier. Reformist movements in the Majlis convinced the
Shah that if he was to achieve Iran's independence and
mocernization, and thereby gain the support and legitimacy

he wanted, he would have to implement widespread reforms.
In order to convince reluctant Iranians to follow his
plans, the Shah believed he needed to secure his absolute
power. Consequently, he established SAVAK to maintain
control over the opposition in society. The Shah reduced
the independence of the political center by taking an
active role in the decision-making process of the execu-
tive branch, reducing the power of the legislative branch,
and limiting access to the political elite. The closure
of the political center resulted in a cleavage between
this center and the rural and urban peripheries.

In order to achieve both legitimacy and security,
the Shah tried to change the peripheries structurally
and symbolically. The White Revolution was an attempt
to transform the power relations in Iran so as to increase
the independence of the peasantry while simultaneously
reducing the power of the landowning elite. The land
reform increased the Shah's support among the politically
weak peasantry, however, the feelings of resentment held
by the elites toward the Shah also increased.

The Shah endeavoured to restructure the symbols
of the predominantly Islamic periphery as well. He
recognized that the carriers of the Islamic values,
namely the ulama, were a potential threat to the
supremacy of the throne. In order to reduce the clerical
influence, the Shah emphasized the pre-Islamic history of

Iran in a 'national mythology' while simultaneously
presenting himself as a model Muslim who understood the
need for modernization. The power of the ulama in the
rural areas was usurped to a great extent by the Literacy
and Health Corps who assumed traditional roles of the
ulama.

The emergence of the Iranian economy into the
international economic system created new economic oppor-
tunities. New strata were slowly emerging with the deve-
lopment of the economy. The educated new middle class
and the working class became more conscious of their
positions in society and began to question the distri-
bution of resources within the Iranian political and
socioeconomic systems. The extravagant wealth created
by the increased oil prices exaggerated the maldistribu-
tion of money and opportunities between the opulent
elites and the urban poor. The large revenue from oil
allowed the Shah to pursue his plans for Iran's indepen-
dence and modernization at an increased rate. Often the
pursuit of military strength and freedom from superpower
pressures demanded both political and economic resources
which could have been used for political development.

Increasingly, the cleavages between the rural and
urban areas, often parallel to the division of traditional
and modern segments of society, created tensions which
were revealed in the demands for political participation.

The Shah, however, was unable to address the demands for
political participation because it would have entailed
a reduction in his power. Although the Shah may have
been content to reign rather than rule, he feared that
the opposition would not be satisfied until he was
removed from power. Believing that economic moderniza-
tion would bring about legitimacy if control of the
society could be maintained, the Shah felt that he had
no choice but to eliminate his opposition with expediency.

The universities had been a strong source of
opposition to the Shah's political process, however, the
absence of political participation had affected all strata
by the end of 1978. Institutional entrepreneurs such
as Dr. Bakhtiar, Karim Sanjabi and Darioush Forourhar,
were willing to use their resources to restructure the
political and economic centers. They gained the support
of the professional-bureaucratic-intelligentsia class
and the working class relatively late in the revolutionary
movement, but their participation was important. It is
difficult to say that any particular class experienced
'class consciousness' or a tendency to identify with a
certain ideological outlook. The National Front under
Mehdi Bazargan could be said to have represented the
moderate reformist beliefs of the educated middle class.
The workers, students, and intellectuals were represented
by secular and religious leftist groups.[91] The peasants

of the rural areas remained passive and uninvolved in the political upheaval.[92] [It appears certain, however, that no one class was strong enough to lead the revolutionary movement on the basis of the protest that the Shah's regime failed to meet the political and social demands of Iranians.] Rather, the success of the revolution depended upon the coalition of many classes and groups, the critical development of which hinged upon Ayatollah Khomeini's charismatic leadership and the strength of the principles of Islam to provide a challenge to the institutionalized symbolic code. It is now possible to consider the remaining variable in Eisenstadt's theory, the culture variable.

REFERENCES

[1] S.N. Eisenstadt, Revolution and the Transformation of Societies (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 82.

[2] A.K.S. Lambton, The Persian Land Reform 1962-1966 (London: Clarendon Press, 1969), p. 9.

[3] H. Bowen-Jones, "Agriculture", in W.B. Fisher, ed., The Land of Iran, Vol. I of the Cambridge History of Iran (Cambridge: University Press, 1968), pp. 566-567.

[4] M. Hamidullah, Introduction to Islam (Paris: Centre Culturel Islamique, 1969), p. 123.

[5] David S. McMorris, "Agriculture", in Richard F. Nyrop, ed., Iran: A Country Study, Area Handbook Series (Washington: American University Press, 1978), p. 335.

[6] E. Sunderland, "Pastoralism, Nomadism and the Social Anthropology of Iran", in W.B. Fisher, ed., The Land of Iran, Vol. I of the Cambridge History of Iran (Cambridge: University Press, 1968), p. 626.

[7] Ibid., p. 624.

[8] Leonard Binder, Iran (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), p. 168.

[9] H. Bowen-Jones, "Agriculture", p. 567.

[10] Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1979), p. 107.

[11] Leonard Binder, Iran, p. 63.

[12] Rinn-Sup Shinn, "Governmental System", in Richard F. Nyrop., ed., Iran: A Country Study, Area Handbook Series (Washington: American University Press, 1978), p. 183.

[13]Amin Saikal, <u>The Rise and Fall of the Shah</u> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 36.

[14]Donald N. Wilber, <u>Iran: Past and Present</u> (9th ed.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 240-246.

[15]A. Saikal, <u>The Rise and Fall of the Shah</u>, p. 37.

[16]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 63.

[17]Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Policy Making Process in the Government of Iran", in Charles J. Adams, ed., <u>Iranian Civilization and Culture</u> (Montreal: Institute of Islamic Studies, 1972), p. 94.

[18]Marvin Zonis, <u>The Political Elite of Iran</u> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 23-24.

[19]K. Fatemi, "Leadership by Distrust: The Shah's 'Modus Operandi'", <u>Middle East Journal</u>, XXXVI, no. 1 (Winter 1982), 49.

[20]M. Zonis, <u>The Political Elite of Iran</u>, p. 332.

[21]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 334.

[22]F. Hoveyda, <u>The Fall of the Shah</u> (New York: Wyndham Books, 1979), p. 87.

[23]<u>Ibid.</u>

[24]<u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 151-152.

[25]J.C. Hurewitz, "Iran in World and Regional Affairs", in Ehsan Yar-Shater, ed., <u>Iran Faces the Seventies</u> (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 129.

[26]James D. Rudolph, "Armed Forces", in Richard F. Nyrop, ed., <u>Iran: A Country Study</u>. Area Handbook Series (Washington: American University Press, 1978), p. 390.

[27]M. Zonis, <u>The Political Elite of Iran</u>, p. 112.

[28] Ibid.

[29] F. Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, pp. 66-67.

[30] Ibid., p. 67.

[31] James D. Rudolph, "Armed Forces", p. 408.

[32] F. Hoveyda writes that the attachment between the Prime Minister's office and SAVAK was nominal, and that SAVAK actually enjoyed a great deal of independence. See F. Hoveyda, The Fall of the Shah, p. 93.

[33] F. Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, p. 79.

[34] A. Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 55.

[35] F. Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, p. 81.

[36] N.C. Bruce and James Fleming, "Tales of Horror from the Past", Macleans (Toronto: March, 1980), p. 32. Also see Reza Barahani's book The Crowned Cannibals: Writings on Repression in Iran, New York: Vintage Books, 1977.

[37] A.K.S. Lambton, Persian Land Reform 1962-1966, p. 109.

[38] A.K.S. Lambton, "Land Reform and the Rural Cooperative Societies" in Ehsan Yar-Shater, ed., Iran Faces the Seventies (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 17.

[39] A.K.S. Lambton, Persian Land Reform 1962-1966, pp. 362-363.

[40] A.K.S. Lambton, "Land Reform and the Rural Cooperatives", p. 30.

[41] Farhad Kazemi, Poverty and Revolution in Iran (New York and London: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 35.

[42] David S. McMorris, "Agriculture", p. 344.

[43] A. Saikal, <u>The Rise and Fall of the Shah</u>, p. 85.

[44] A.K.S. Lambton, <u>Persian Land Reform 1962-1966</u>, p. 64.

[45] F. Kazemi, <u>Poverty and Revolution in Iran</u>, p. 37.

[46] M. Zonis, <u>The Political Elite of Iran</u>, pp. 28-29.

[47] A. Saikal, <u>The Rise and Fall of the Shah</u>, p. 85.

[48] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 89.

[49] David S. McMorris, "Demographic Setting and Education", in Richard F. Nyrop, ed., <u>Iran: A Country Study</u>, Area Handbook Series (Washington: American University Press, 1978), pp. 98-99.

[50] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 102.

[51] <u>Ibid</u>., pp. 100-102.

[52] See George B. Baldwin, "The Iranian Brain Drain" in Ehsan Yar-Shater, ed., <u>Iran Faces the Seventies</u>, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971, pp. 260-283.

[53] J.A. Bill, <u>The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization</u> (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1972), p.

[54] J.A. Bill, "Iran and the Crisis of '78", <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, LVII, no. 2 (Winter 1978-1979), p. 333.

[55] J.A. Bill, <u>The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization</u>, p. 68.

[56] Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 128.

[57] F. Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, p. 173.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid., p. 185.

[60] Ibid., p. 187.

[61] Ibid., pp. 202-203.

[62] Ibid., pp. 204-205.

[63] F. Kazemi, Poverty and Revolution in Iran, p. 28.

[64] Ibid., p. 30.

[65] Ibid., p. 82-83.

[66] Ibid., p. 84.

[67] Ibid., p. 64.

[68] Ibid., p. 95.

[69] Leonard Binder, Iran, p. 222.

[70] H.F. Farmeyan, "Politics During the Sixties: A Historical Analysis", in Ehsan Yar-Shater, ed., Iran Faces the Seventies (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 92.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid., p. 95.

[73] Jerrold D. Green, Revolution in Iran: The Politics of Countermobilization (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 53.

[74]S. Zabih, Iran's Revolutionary Upheaval: An Interpretive Essay (San Francisco: Alchemy Books, 1979), p. 69.

[75]J.D. Green, Revolution in Iran: The Politics of Countermobilization, p. 50.

[76]N.M. Nikazmerad, "Iran: Constitutional Chronology, 1971-1980", in Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds., Constitutions of the Countries of the World (Dobb Ferry: Oceana Publications Inc., April 1980), p. 1.

[77]R. Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), pp. 208-209, 259-260.

[78]Ibid., p. 241.

[79]Ibid., p. 209.

[80]Ibid.

[81]Ibid., pp. 209-210.

[82]N.M. Nikazmerad, "Iran: Constitutional Chronology, 1971-1980", p. 3.

[83]Ibid., p. 4.

[84]Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 251.

[85]N.M. Nikazmerad, "Iran: Constitutional Chronology, 1971-1980", p. 5.

[86]Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 250.

[87]S. Zabih, Iran's Revolutionary Upheaval: An Interpretive Essay, p. 53.

[88]Ibid., p. 70.

[89]Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 255.

[90]W.H. Sullivan, "Dateline Iran: The Road Not Taken", Foreign Policy, no. 40 (Fall 1980), p. 178.

[91]Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 268.

[92]F. Kazemi, Poverty and Revolution in Iran, p. 1.

V

SHI'ITE VALUES, SYMBOLS AND STRUCTURES

Despite the exposure to modern secular culture, most Iranians continue to "retain a profound respect for Islamic morals and traditions".[1] Muhammad Nuwayhi, a literary and social critic, argues that the greatest obstacle to a 'comprehensive cultural revolution' is religion, because objections are raised first with regard to the consistency of new ideas with Islam. Nuwayhi comments that "all religious considerations continue to outweight [sic] all other considerations in the minds of the people".[2] Mohammad Reza Shah had always recognized the strength of Shi'ite Islam and its clergy in Iran. The traditional Shi'ite values and prescriptions for the social and political systems formed an alternative to the Shah's Western-influenced society. Islam, as outlined by the charismatic Ayatollah Khomeini, became the mobilizing ideology of the revolutionary movement. Since the Shah's fall, Khomeini has attempted to make Iran the traditional center of Shi'ite Islam: Iran is to be the structural manifestation of the Islamic prescripts.

Shi'ite Islam, as a cultural orientation, gave to the revolutionary movement the incentive for 'this worldly' resolution of the tension between the transcendental and mundane worlds. The organization of the clergy, and their participation in social functions prior to the revolution, was instrumental to the clergy's survival in the face of the Shah's repressive measures. During the revolutionary process, the clergy's linkages with many elements of society provided the network for transmission of Ayatollah Khomeini's taped messages.

Islam, as a cultural orientation, will be examined using Eisenstadt's three aspects of culture; namely, the degree of abstraction of the problems of human existence; the society's solution for resolution of the tension between the mundane and transcendental worlds, and the degree of commitment of society's members to change. The Islamic clergy must be examined not only as a disembedded elite, but also as the conveyors of the Islamic traditions.

In this chapter, the philosophy and laws of Shi'ite Islam will be examined. The organization and responsibilities of the clergy will then be investigated with regard to their role in society and their political participation, both historically and currently.

i

The cultural orientation of Iranian society is created by Shi'ite Islam. One interpretation suggests that the basic doctrine of Islam can be "summed up in the profession of faith: 'No God whatsoever but Allah: Mohammad is the Messenger of Allah'".[3] A Muslim must first accept this testimony of faith, which is the concept of God's Unity (tawhid) from which all else is derived.[4] The mere profession of faith is not sufficient without practice, which strengthens the spiritual side of man.[5]

The view of the world presented in the Quran and hadith (sayings attributed to the Prophet by the Sunnis, but extended to include the twelve Imams by the Shi'ites) is theocentric: God is "Creator, Sustainer, Benefactor, and Merciful One".[6] God ascertains the time of each man's death and holds the power to resurrect him for the Day of Judgement. Although man is held responsible for the righteousness of his conduct, God, who is essentially good and merciful, desires man's welfare and salvation. Consequently, God gave man the Quran to guide him in his search for spiritual fulfillment. It is the duty of every Muslim, however, to forbid the occurrence of evil and ensure that good is done because it is believed that God judges according to both acts and intentions.[7]

Another outstanding aspect of Islam, is that it

recognizes that man is a fundamentally social being. In addition to revealing the way to spiritual happiness, the Quran outlines a conception of a social, economic and political order which is to bring the greatest benefit to man. Consequently, all aspects of a Muslim's existence, if he is observant, are bound to religion by the Shari'a (divine laws). The Quran argues that the spiritualization of temporal duties strengthens man's spirit and maintains social cohesion.

A brief discussion of the Islamic view of the economic system will demonstrate the way in which the fundamental beliefs have shaped the conception of society. Although equal distribution of wealth would be ideal, it is argued that it is not necessarily good, given that individuals possess varying capacities to handle money. Those who lack ability to use money wisely will become poor, to the benefit of others. Equal distribution of money could never be sustained.[8] In addition, the Quran presents reasons to maintain the gradations in wealth so as to motivate the poor to work. Money must not stay among the rich, and consequently, each Muslim must pay zakat as a necessity as a "member of the collectivity for the needy and also to purify one's self".[9] The zakat is set according to various types of income from agricultural products, sub-soil exploration, commercial capital, the number of domestic animals, and hoarded cash.[10] The

prescription for the economic system would establish an Islamic state which is "essentially a welfare state and is duty bound to play an important role in the economy for the fulfillment of the goals of the Shari'a".[11]

Examination of recent commentaries on Islamic economic policy reveals the importance of the 'social good'. In an excerpt from Islam va Malikiyat, Ayatollah Taliquani outlines his interpretation of Islamic economics. He argues that man's thoughts and instincts are intertwined with his material existence. Correct economic policies, therefore, are important if man's spiritual nature is to flourish. The individual owns whatever is the result of his labour, and what he receives in exchange for it. He is allowed to enjoy his profits only insofar as the 'social good' is not endangered. The 'social good' must prevail over individual gains.[12]

The argument of sovereignty of the society over the individual is presented strongly by A. Bani-Sadr. The principle of tawhid is a world view in which any human ownership is by necessity relative, because only God has absolute ownership.[13] Because the community is the primary viceregent of God, "community ownership is the condition for the individual's ownership of his/her own labour and its fruits".[14] By placing emphasis upon both the material and moral aspects of life, Muslims argue that Islam can "erect the edifice of economic well-being on the

foundations of moral values".[15]

Despite the brevity of the above discussion, it is possible to discern the way in which Islam penetrates every aspect of a Muslim's life. By the very nature of the prescriptions presented in the Quran and the haditths, the 'carriers' of the religion would be revered members of the society. The Islamic clergy augmented their predominant position through the religious institutions.

ii

Shi'ite religious institutions were not established until the Safavid King, Shah Ismail Safavi, proclaimed Shi'ism the state religion of Iran in 1501. When the Twelve Imams had passed, so too had their infallible legal judgements upon which the Shi'ites had relied to settle debates. The position of mujtahid, a legal and theological scholar who was qualified to make judgements, was created. Once the Shi'ite ulama (clergy) were established as representatives of the official religion, they began to consolidate their power as the source of continuous direction to the umma (Islamic community).

The followers of Islam are divided into two groups: "those who may act according to their judgement (mujtahid), and those who must accept the judgement of others (muqallid)".[16] Religious disputation is restricted

to those who have been trained to exercise ijtihad, logical discovery and proof of the principle of faith based on the Quran, hadith and the consensus of the learned. The ulama believe that because analogical reasoning is used, the result can only be a "contestable expression of personal opinion".[17] The muqallid is not obliged to accept the views of any one particular mujtahid since they are not infallible, however, the muqallid must follow the direction of a mujtahid. This law ensures the continuity of authority in the umma and the pre-eminence of ulama in society.

With regard to jurisprudence, the Sunni seek the consensus of the living community. The Shi'ites, on the other hand, restrict the consensus to the ulama, living and dead.[18] The highest position among the ulama is that of the marja-i taqlid (source of imitation): a mujtahid whose example and opinion (fatwa) is binding. Despite the fact that the concept of marja-i taqlid is the foundation of the clergy's power, the question of who is the most learned is but a matter of opinions. A mujtahid gains eminence by virtue of his piety and knowledge of theology. One way of determining who Muslims feel is a marja-i taqlid is by calculating the amount of money which the madrasa under the supervision of a leading mujtahid has received because it is believed that Muslims give more to the most learned of ulama.[19] Ayatollah Bourjerdi,

who died in 1961, was the last marja-i taqlid whose
eminence was widely recognized. As of 1975, there were
six mujtahids which shared the position of marja-i taq-
lid, including Ayatollah's Khomeini and Shariatmadari.[20]
As long as a living marja-i taqlid is available to give
his opinion, the ruling of a deceased mujtahid is not
allowed. But, "if it is not possible to see a living
mujtahid, the written word of a dead marja-i taqlid may
be used."[21] In this way, the link between the believer
and the mujtahid is one which is constantly renewed,
allowing for a flexible and responsive religion.

There are other distinctions among the Iranian
ulama which must be made. The sources of the divine
laws (Shari'a) which guide Muslim life are the Quran,
the hadith and the Sunna (traditions of the Prophet's
behaviour and practice). Because the Shari'a originates
from three different sources, it was necessary to create
a legal science, fiq (Islamic jurisprudence) to synthe-
size the various prescriptions. A faqih is a Muslim
authority on jurisprudence whose opinion is sought with
regard to decisions based on Islamic law. The courts of
the faqih are called the Shar' courts, in which judgement
is passed on cases which deal with personal disputes and
litigation of a commercial nature. The courts were often
in conflict with the common law courts of the state,
especially after the central government began its expan-

sion of judicial power. The faqih is also sought to
verify legal documents and land titles, a service for
which he receives remuneration. A mullah is a lower-
ranking cleric who is usually recognized by his religious
garb. He may deliver Friday afternoon sermons at the
local mosque and perform betrothals.

The functions of the ulama were many. Besides
being the spiritual guides of the community and legal
experts, the clergy were the source of charity and
education. The ulama were the guardians of the weaker
members of the society, the poor, the widows, and the
orphans, and were entrusted with the estates of minors.
The money collected from zakat was distributed by the
clergy among the needy, and for maintenance of the mosques
and madrasas (schools). The madrasas of Iran were con-
trolled by the clergy and supported by religious tithes,
and private and state endowments. In rural communities,
the ulama were the traditional source of education,
teaching their pupils those skills necessary for rural
living.

Beyond the 'elementary' schools there exists the
madrasas, free-style universities in which students attend
lectures concerning the nature of Islam and debate the
concepts of religious rhetoric and hermeneutics with
renowned clergy. The government's observance of Islamic
prescriptions was often an issue for discussion. The

madrasas attracted mostly the sons of peasant farmers,
clergy and bazaari. In 1975, there were 6500 students
in the religious center of Qum, in addition to approxi-
mately four thousand students who attend madrasas
throughout Iran.[22]

Traditionally, the Muslim shrines and madrasas
were places of refuge against the law and repressive
forces of the regime, although surveillance by SAVAK
made open opposition dangerous. This fact may be partially
responsible for the revitalization of religion in Iran.
Between 1968 and 1975, the number of religious periodicals
grew and received wider circulation. There was also a
growth in the number of religious societies which
totalled 12,300 in Tehran alone in 1974.[23] The weekly
gatherings or hey'ats were informal meetings during which
social and individual problems were discussed and coopera-
tive social programs arranged.[24] The religious associa-
tions were the organizational networks through which
Khomeini's taped messages were distributed.[25] The
informal religious nature of these associations provided
an independent network of contacts among trusted friends,
and helped to protect the clergy and their supporters
from further state intervention. As events rose to a
climax in 1978, even the shrines and madrasas were not
immune to the policing tactics of SAVAK.

The clergy had a special relationship with the

bazaari of Iran's urban centers. The bazaari, the mer-
chants of the traditional commercial centers, were
responsible for over two-thirds of domestic retail trade
and one-third of all imports.[26] Their ties to the Islamic
clergy were strong. Gustav Thaiss claims that "the
religious idiom is the basic common denominator in the
bazaari and functions to create cross-cutting ties and
bonds among bazaaris of different guilds and profes-
sions."[27] The Quran defines economic relations and
directs the bazaari to use fair measures and methods in
their commercial interaction, and the clergy act as
adjudicators in commercial disputes. Most bazaari had
been educated in cleric-run elementary schools. In
return for his efforts as judge and guide, the alim
(cleric) receives material support in the form of alms.
A portion of the alm is kept by the cleric to maintain
his family, and the remainder is distributed among the
poor and religious students, and to preserve the shrines
and madrasas.[28] This symbiotic relationship gave the
clergy a source of income independent from the control of
the state.

Thaiss notes that a "good deal of the opposition
to the government, especially in the bazaari, takes a
religious guise".[29] Both the ulama and the merchants
were concerned with growing government interruption of
traditionally held powers. The Shah believed that the

bazaars were traditional institutions which had outlived their usefulness.[30] Plans were drawn to update the urban centers by replacing bazaars with modern shops and parks. An eight-lane highway threatened to dislocate 50,000 shops of the Tehran bazaar.[31] In addition, the merchants were subject to taxes and regulations imposed by the price control commissions.[32] The government's reduction of privileges created resentment among the merchants and turned their sympathies and aid to the efforts of the clergy.

Religious endowments (ouqaf) were a major source of independence for Muslim clergy. The administrator (mutawalli) of the vaqf was, by Muslim law, allowed to take ten percent of the annual revenue.[33] Although the state oversaw the administration of the ouqaf, members of the clergy managed land set aside for religious purposes. Only approximately two percent of all land owned was reserved for religious purposes.[34] In addition, the ulama also controlled the administration of any private vaqf for their own support. Although there is no clear evidence as to how much land was privately held by ulama, they were an important landowning element in central Iran.[35]

iii

Most important to an investigation of the Iranian
revolution is the Islamic conception of the political
system as a way to resolve the tension between the mundane
and transcendental worlds. Here too lies the greatest
difference between the Sunni and Shi'ite sects, the two
major branches of Islam. According to the Quran, God is
sovereign over all things and is the source of law for
both the temporal and spiritual worlds. In Islam, there
is no separation of church and state. The government of
the state is perceived, therefore, as the viceregent of
God. Man is entrusted with the power to administer the
umma (Islamic community) according to religious law.
Any form of government is legitimate as long as it satis-
fies the well-being of man in both worlds and needs the
restrictions established in the Quran.[36]

Although this view of government is generally
accepted by both Sunnis and Shi'ites, the historical
development of Shi'ism has led to alternate interpreta-
tions. To outline Shi'ite political theory, it is neces-
sary to trace the development of Shi'ism.

If Islam can be considered a uniform religion
while Mohammed was alive, the Prophet's death initiated
the later divisions of belief among Muslims. When
Mohammed died, he left no direct male heir to continue

the position of the religious and political leader of the
umma, community of believers. Consequently, a successor
was chosen from amongst those companions closest to
Mohammad. The group which accepted the new caliph was
called Sunni because they followed the traditions of the
Prophet (Sunnah). This group became the dominant Islamic
sect in the Middle East.

The Shi'ite 'Ali (Party of Ali), on the other
hand, supported the election of the caliph from among the
Prophet's relatives rather than his closest friends.
They wished to see 'Ali, Mohammad's cousin and husband
to Fatima, Mohammad's daughter, become caliph. When 'Ali
was finally elected to the caliphate, he was beset
by troubles stemming from the murder of his predecessor.
'Ali was also murdered. The division between the Sunnis
and the Shi'ites became more distinct when the Shi'ites
later regarded the first three caliphs as illegitimate.[37]

The Sunnis and the Shi'ites also differ with
regard to their respective conceptions of the imam. The
Shi'ites believe that God gave man guidance through the
Quran and the revelations of the Prophet, and also
provided an infallible guide in religious matters; the
Imam.[38] True Imams were divinely appointed descendents
from 'Ali, and Fatima who bears the baraka (spiritual
power) of the Prophet.[39] The Twelfth Imam disappeared
miraculously when still only an infant. This disappearance

(A.D. 874) is known as the ghaybat, or 'Lesser Occula-
tion', and was the beginning of seventy years in which
the 'Hidden Imam' made his presence known to four agents.
With the last agent's death (A.D. 940), the ghaybat-i
kubri, or 'Greater Occulation', occurred. It is believed
that the Twelfth Imam is alive and his return as the
Mahdi (Messiah) will usher in the ideal state. The idea
of the Mahdi cannot be found in the Quran. Rather, it
was an innovation of the Shi'ite clergy. The idea of the
Mahdi appealed to the lower and uprooted classes because
his anticipated manifestation promised to bring the
equality and justice which did not exist under the elite-
dominated governments.[40] The messianic element of Shi'ism
was an important tool in the process of mobilization of
later protest movements, especially during the revolution
in 1978-1979.

The significance of the ghaybit-i kubri and the
closely related principle of taqiya (prudent suspension
of beliefs under threat of religious persecution) is
political. Under the Umayyads (A.D. 661-750) and to some
extent under their successors, the Abbasids (A.D. 750-1258),
the Shi'ites suffered persecution. Both ghaybat and
taqiya were adaptive measures to ensure the survival of
the Shi'ite community. Watt notes that there was an
advantage to having a 'hidden' leader which could not be
the focus of reprisals by Abbasid rulers.[41] Because of

the dominant Sunni community, Shi'ite clergy could not

establish their own institutions. Those who followed the

Hidden Imam were able to imply their denial of the

authority of the rulers with a "quietistic patience and

abstention from action," but the way was open to challenge

the temporal government at a later date.[42] Essentially,

then, the

> historic caliphs were merely de facto rulers,
> while the rightful leadership of Islam passed
> through a kind of apostolic succession of
> Imams...(who) may or may not be in a posi-
> tion to exercise political power.[43]

For Sunnis, the successor of the Prophet had only

to enforce the religious laws because successors could

not be guaranteed to have spiritual illumination.[44] The

Shi'ites, on the other hand, believed that the successor

of the Prophet was to enforce the religious law since he

possessed spiritual wisdom. Thus, the religious leader,

as the spiritual guide of man, continuously interpreted

the will of God as stated in the Quran. A religion based

upon revelation established a degree of flexibility that

was necessary for the survival of the Shi'ite clerics in

the face of oppressive Sunni regimes.

The Shi'ite notion of government has been inter-

preted in many ways by the various Islamic schools of

thought, however, it is possible to extract a general

view. Under Islamic law, God is sovereign, consequently,

the state possesses legitimate power only by observing

the Quranic principles. Nevertheless, a truly just

society cannot exist before the appearance of the Mahdi.

During the constitutional movement at the turn of the

century, Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Na'ini published a book

concerning 'modern' Shi'ite political theory. He argued

that although a just society could not be achieved before

the return of the Hidden Imam, it would not offend God

to strive for justice.[45] Therefore, a constitution

implemented by a council of ulama could ensure that

future laws were in agreement with Islamic principles.[46]

Another important approach to political theory is

presented in the work of Dr. Ali Shariati, a sociologist

who combined Islamic and socialist ideals. Although he

did not systematically address the structures and organi-

zation of a true Shi'ite state, his search for an Islamic

ideology had a significant impact upon Iranian intellec-

tuals.[47] Shariati perceived Islam to be the social force

which would unite Iranians for the cause of creating a

truly just society as based upon the concepts of Shi'ism

and socialism. Although Khomeini was the pivotal point

of the revolutionary movement, Shariati's thought was

greatly responsible for revealing Islam to be the

'religion of protest' to the intellectuals, students and

educated middle class.[48] Islam was to give Iranians the

cultural focus which was needed to build an independent

Iran.

Khomeini's view of the state differs from the interpretation of government which is generally accepted as representative of the Shi'ite position. In Khomeini's first book, Revealing of the Secrets, he criticized Reza Shah's lack of observance of the 1907 Constitution, but did not call for the end of that government because a tyrannical government was better than the chaos which would result if there was no government at all.[49] This is the traditional argument for the maintenance of the state. Khomeini's view changed during exile in Najaf, Iraq. The most concise work concerning his opinions on the form of government are set forth in a book entitled Islamic Government, which is a series of lectures Khomeini gave during exile. The book begins with the notion of valayat-i faqih, or the governance of the jurist.[50]

The valayat-i faqih is to "execute divine law, establish the just Islamic order, and serve mankind".[51] The establishment of such a government, Khomeini argues, is commanded by the life of the Prophet and by Islam itself. The separation of church and state is a Western concept that has no historical support in Shi'ite Islamic political thought.[52] The religious laws which include prescriptions for political, economic, and cultural aspects of the society support the argument that an Islamic government is the logical conclusion.

Proof for the existence of the <u>valayat-i faqih</u>
occupies much of the argument in Khomeini's book.
Although he argues that such a view of government has
always existed, it is actually new to Islamic political
thought.[53] Khomeini also challenges the accepted view
of the clergy's role with respect to politics. Given
the Islamic command to 'enjoin the good and forbid evil',
the religious scholar has a moral duty to become politi-
cally active "in the face of the oppressive and deviant
ruling classes".[54] A <u>jihad</u>, or holy war, must be under-
taken to remove the tyrannical governments and replace
them with <u>valayat-i faqih</u>. It was in these lectures that
Khomeini called for an Islamic revolution to remove the
Shah from power.

Because Shi'ite Islam allows for the reinterpreta-
tion of Quranic texts, such changes by Shariati and
Khomeini are acceptable. More so than Sunni political
thought, Shi'ite theory of politics has reflected the
evolving social and political systems of the time. This
has allowed Shi'ites to exist despite anti-Shi'ite
governments and modernization programmes which have
attempted to remove their power. Furthermore, Islamic
interpretative changes can result in a powerful ideology
which, when used by a charismatic leader, can mobilize a
population. [The successful revolution could not have
occurred without the unique contacts which the clergy

maintained in Iranian society.

As outlined in the previous discussion, the cultural orientations of Islam were of special importance to the Iranian revolution. Islam exhibits a high degree of symbolic articulation of the problems of human existence. This is evident with regard to religious discussions, such as those which consider God and the relationship between God and the individual. Shi'ite Islam in particular has fostered the ability to question and reconceive existential problems. The ulama are the source of continual direction to the Islamic community (umma), however, it is recognized that their interpretation of the Quran and hadith is only an opinion from logical proof. Because the Shi'ite clergy accept the interpretation of a living marja-i taqlid as an immediate authority, Shi'ism has remained responsive to changing social needs.

Most important in an examination of the role of Shi'ite Islam in the revolutionary process is the perception that there exists a high level of tension between the mundane and transcendental worlds. This tension is believed to be solved through 'this-worldly' activity, especially political and military activity. The concept of the umma, the political-religious community which is an institutionalization of the prescriptions in the Quran and hadith , epitomizes the 'this-worldly' orientation of Islam. The universalistic element, as defined by the

equal access of all Muslims to God, cuts across all strata. Moreover, the clergy's independence from other centers and elites was assured by their access to resources (such as endowments and alms) which were not restricted by other institutions.

Because of the historical persecution of the Shi'ite clergy by the dominant Sunni rulers, the ulama were forced to dissociate themselves from the political centers. Their passivity was also reflected in the minimal degree of organization, which actually helped them to sustain the persecution of unsympathetic governments. The ulama tended not to develop strong linkages with the political and economic centers, but their connections with the peripheries were strong. Islam united diverse tribal, urban, and rural groups which had little in common but their religious beliefs.

The high degree of commitment to the socioeconomic order resulted in the rise of institutional entrepreneurs from the religious elite. Although the ulama's passivity and autonomy from the political and economic centers was not conducive to the development of coalescent change, the strong 'this-worldly' orientation of Islam encouraged change in all spheres. Khomeini's interpretation of Islamic political philosophy created a dynamic ideology which encouraged coalescent change, and ultimately, revolution.

Ulama as opponents to the state

The ulama have long been the leaders of opposi-
tion against the state. As guardians of the poor and
oppressed, the clergy were often critical of what they
saw as unjust government policies. In the government's
view, the ulama were a traditional elite who had the
potential to challenge the authority of the state in two
ways. As a Muslim, the ruler too was required to follow
the opinions of a marja-i taqlid, effectively undermining
the supremacy of the state.[55] In addition, the ulama
maintained intimate contact with the merchants, peasants,
and intellectuals, as well as acted as protectors of the
'abased'. This position gave the clergy the opportunity
to forge linkages which cut across strata. Government
attempts to decrease the power of the clergy simply
served to strengthen the political consciousness of the
group, fostering the emergence of institutional entre-
preneurs who were inspired to further action.

From the inception of Islam, politics and religion
were bound together. The Prophet Mohammad fled from
Mecca to Medina where he was proclaimed as the religious
and political ruler of the city. It was at Medina that
Mohammad organzied his followers into an army and began
the conquest of Mecca and the surrounding Arab lands,
thus giving Islam a warlike precedent and theory exempli-
fied in the jihad or holy war. Although the acceptance
of the conquering culture and traditions by the indigenous

population does not necessarily follow territorial
usurpation, the expansion of Islam into the surrounding
areas occurred at a critical time for the conquered
societies. The flourishing agricultural and trading
center of Mecca had promoted the emergence of class
structures with no legal or welfare safeguards for the
lower classes, thus creating social discontent.[56] The
prescriptions for society outlined by Mohammad provided
a satisfactory alternative.

Similarly, the spread of Islam into the Byzantine
and Persian empires occurred at a time when these empires
were weakened by class divisions, tribal antagonism, and
religious conflict. Montgomery Watt describes the men who
accepted the Quranic vision as those caught in the
emerging socioeconomic system. A view of the world which
proclaimed that

> events are controlled by God and not by money
> and big business...enabling men to feel they
> were living significantly, although by the
> standards of money and big business they were
> relative failures.[57]

Watt argues that this does not mean that Mohammad's
followers became social reformers, nor does it appear
that the extension of territory was aimed at conversion.
Rather, Islam provided an ideology which helped to unify
the populace and nomadic tribes into a state.[58] From
the onset of Islam, then, religion and politics were

intertwined.

The mobilizing capability of the Shi'ite ulama was
first apparent during the emergence of the powerful poli-
tical movement which brought the Safavid kings to power
in 1501.[59] More recently, the revolutionary potential
of the clergy was revealed during the protests of the
tobacco concession in 1890. The consolidation of foreign
power (especially British) during the late 1800's had
resulted in the first bazaari petitions against competi-
tion from foreign business. The concession of a monopoly
on the production, sale, and export of all Iranian tobacco
was granted to a British subject. Tobacco was a widely
grown crop in Iran, and was very important to local
economies. When signs were posted declaring that all
tobacco must be sold to the company's agents in 1891,
massive protests erupted. A leading ulama decreed that
the sale and use of tobacco was outlawed as long as the
concession existed.[60] The power of the clergy was such
that the fatwa (decree of authority) was closely observed.
The initial protest movement, combining ulama, modernists,
and merchants, and supported by the general population,
ultimately forced the cancellation of the British
concession. The success of the tobacco movement demon-
strated that the religious-radical alliance had the
"potential for changing the course of Iranian policy".[61]

This alliance was successful again in 1906, when
it had become apparent to many that Western penetration
threatened the social and economic basis of Iranian
society. The Qajar kings appeared to be aligned with the
non-Muslims who were slowly usurping their power. The
ulama realized that reform was necessary if Iran was to
remain an Islamic state.[62] The clergy once again mobilized
the support of twelve to fourteen thousand Iranians who
took refuge (bast) on the mosques of Qum. The merchants
closed their shops in the Tehran bazaar as a show of
support for the ulama's cause. The demands of the pro-
testers consisted of the institution of a representative
assembly (majlis), and a constitution.

This view was reflected in the second article of
the 1907 amendments to the constitution, which declared
that the laws of Iran were to be in accordance with the
prescriptions of Islam. In order to ensure the observance
of Islamic laws, a committee of five persons--mujtahids
and religious doctors acquainted with the requirements of
the Shari'at (Islamic laws)--would be elected.[62]

Unfortunately, the constitution was never really
observed. The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 effectively
removed political power from the Qajar kings, and conse-
quently, their attempts to centralize their rule were
unsuccessful. The lack of a centralized bureaucracy and
a standing army helped to maintain the Qajar's subser-

vience to foreign power. It was perceived by the clergy
that the moral decay of the society and the removal of
elementary education from the control of the clergy was
the result of foreign influence.

Reza Shah's rise to power was initially supported
by the _ulama_ as an alternative to the corrupt Qajar kings.
The clergy's complaints against the monarchy continued
to center around the lack of defense of the national
territory, the economy, and culture.[64] When it became
clear that Reza Shah was interested in establishing an
Iranian republic, clerical support was dropped. The
ulama generally opposed what they perceived to be an
imposition of a Western form of government into the
Iranian political system. Reza Shah assured the _ulama_
that he would abide by the prescripts of Islamic law in a
bid to regain the support of the clergy. This assurance
placated the _ulama_, who were hoping that the second article
of the constitution would be instituted.[65]

Once he had declared himself king, Reza Shah took
direct steps toward diminishing the power of the clergy.
Between 1925 and 1928, several laws were passed which
undermined the influence of the clergy and the religious
institutions. A new Commercial Code was instituted which
limited clerical direction of rules of trade and the
charging of interest.[66] The Conscription Law of 1925
determined those who qualified for exemption from military

service, a decision which had traditionally been the
right of the ulama.[67] Clergy were exempted from military
duty, but to qualify, ulama and religious students had
to appear before a board of lay examiners. The Unifor-
mity of Dress Law of 1928 insisted upon a similar proce-
dure if the ulama were to be exempted from this law which
required the adoption of Western-style dress for men.[68]
These two laws forced the clergy to gain state recognition
of their position within the religious organization.
Such a regulation worked toward undermining the ulama's
independent power. Civil and criminal codes were also
declared in 1928, usurping the role of the Shari'a and the
Shar' courts as the legal system of Iran.[69]

Since the turn of the century, the governments
of Iran had slowly removed education from the control of
the clergy. By 1911, there existed over one hundred
secular-styled elementary schools in Tehran.[70] Under Reza
Shah, standards were imposed on teachers and students of
madrasas and a new curriculum was legislated which
controlled religious instruction.[71] Moreover, a program
was initiated to expand the secular education system in
Iran, but it was limited to the urban centers. Perhaps
the most far reaching of Reza Shah's reforms was the
establishment of the Ministry of Endowments. Among other
regulations, lands were to be registered and unclaimed
lands were to come under the jurisdiction of the state.

Furthermore, revenues from charitable endowments were deposited in a trust account until such time that they were allocated to secular education and social funds.[72]

Reza Shah successfully reduced the institutional power of the clergy during his reign and, despite the ulama's profound objections to his reforms, little protest occurred. This was mainly due to the fact that the ulama were routinely arrested and imprisoned for actively criticizing the regime. By the end of this period political repression, intraelite competition, and an absence of social support, caused the clergy to return to a policy of political quietism similar to that maintained during the pre-Safavid Period.[73]

The abdication of Reza Shah in 1941 signaled a resurgence of political activity amongst the clergy. Economic disruption, the intrusion of foreign military powers, and the decay of Islamic culture in the face of growing Western influence, spurred the clergy to political participation. The ulama demanded the return of the veil (which had been dropped in accordance with the dress codes) and the repeal of the ban imposed upon passion plays.[74] Fatwas were issued by mujtahids against the enfranchisement of women and in favour of the nationalization of the oil industry. S.A. Arjomand argues that clerical support in 1953 was as critical to Mohammad Reza Shah's return as the military help of the C.I.A.[75]

It appears that the ulama had good reasons to support the
Shah. From 1941 until 1953, the Shah had proven to be a
weak leader. Clerical influence was once again flourish-
ing socially and politically. The xenophobic ulama
feared that the 'leftist' tendencies of the Mossadeq
government would signal a decline of their recently
regained power. It appears that the clergy assumed the
continuation of these trends after the return of Mohammad
Reza Shah.

As has been discussed earlier, the early 1960's
were a time of economic and political problems. Ayatollah
Bourjerdi, the leading marja-i taqlid, opposed the land
reform program proposed by the Shah in 1969. Bourjerdi
objected to the limitation of the size of Islamic
estates, since such a restriction would be contrary to
Islamic laws.[76] Moreover, the Ayatollah Behbehani was
critical of the state's arbitrary confiscation and
distribution of privately owned lands.[77] There was also
concern over the impact land reform would have upon the
revenues from religious endowments.[78] Since there is no
evidence which indicates the extent of private endowments
held by the clergy, it is difficult to argue that the
motivation for the objections was based on the fear of
losing their holdings. This was probably a concern of
some ulama, but as Anne Lambton points out, the Islamic
principle, which states that the public good takes

precedence over private gains, would have overcome the clergy's objections.[79] To argue that the ulama objected to land reform on the basis of material interests alone is an oversimplification.

Land reform was just one aspect of the White Revolution which included the enfranchisement of women, and the establishment of the Literacy Corps, which would usurp the strong clerical institutions in the rural areas. Ayatollah Khomeini was one of the most outspoken critics of the White Revolution. Khomeini denied "harbouring any objection to the principle of land reform and had no holdings in Iran himself which might be endangered by its application."[80] Khomeini criticzed the land reform program because it would not bring about an improved lifestyle for the peasants.[81] The main thrust of Khomeini's criticism was against the autocratic rule of the Shah and the influence of foreign (especially American) powers in Iran.[82] Khomeini condemned the Shah's diplomatic and commercial relationship with Israel as well. Because of his criticisms of the Shah's regime, Ayatollah Khomeini was arrested, which in turn caused students to riot in protest. Recognizing that the popularity of Khomeini threatened his rule, the Shah ordered the exile of the Ayatollah.

From his home of exile, Khomeini called for a jihad against the Shah and his policies of secularization

and Westernization. It is indicative of his charismatic appeal that Khomeini was able to engineer a revolution from outside Iran. Khomeini developed his reputation for holding nationalistic and moral concerns early in his career. His view of Islam as an all-encompassing religious force won him many admirers, and his life in exile represented to many the oppression of the Shah's regime. The Ayatollah emphasized Islamic values in comparison to the Shah's embrace of Western ideals which was felt by many Iranians to be the cause of their problems. Perhaps most importantly, Ayatollah Khomeini appeared to be incorruptible, just, and pious—a vivid contrast to the view most Iranians held of the Shah. It is, of course, impossible to measure the Ayatollah's impact upon the actualization of the revolution. It appears, however, that Khomeini's charisma, augmented by his proponents' reference to him as the Mahdi, was responsible for attracting many to support his call for the overthrow of the Shah, and the establishment of an Islamic republic in Iran.

Eisenstadt argues that socialism has been accepted by some non-Western societies as a way in which to establish a separate cultural identity, while still maintaining certain aspects of Western civilization conducive to their development. Islam performed such a function in the Iranian revolution. For Khomeini, Islam is a belief system which incorporates the achievements of

science and technology, but circumvents the problems of
Western society. In the revolution, Islam was used to
create a new collective identity for Iranians which set
them apart from Western influence, and consequently, the
pro-Western regime of the Shah. The establishment of the
Islamic Republic of Iran represents the institutionaliza-
tion of the unique cultural identity of Iran.

iv

The common aim of all revolutions is the restora-
tion of 'social justice'. Advocates of change propose
plans to equalize the distribution of wealth and political
rights. These recommendations stem from the interpreta-
tion of social justice which participants in the revolu-
tionary movement have derived from traditional values or
recent ideologies. Political victory entails the concreti-
zation of philosophies which were once vague. Inevitably,
the period following a successful upheaval is violent
because the struggle for power continues between revolu-
tionaries until one group secures control of the society.

This has been precisely the case in Iran following
the end of the Shah's reign. Although united by the goal
of deposing the Pahlavi monarchy, it appears that the
coalescence of revolutionary interests has distintegrated
since the victory. To the members of the National Front,

the fall of Shapour Bakhtiar's government in February of
1979, signalled the opportunity to establish the 'profes-
sionals and bourgeoisie' in control.[83] Even if this had
been acceptable to Khomeini, the strategy of centraliza-
tion pursued by the Shah left Iran without effective
political institutions or leadership.[84] Many of the
professionals and technicians needed to rebuild Iran had
left because they disliked and feared Khomeini's plans
for an Islamic republic.[85] Despite the National Front's
platform of judicial reform, political pluralism, and
democracy, it appeared to receive little support from the
general populace. Iranians may have felt that the National
Front's programs were inspired by Western ideals of
government and consequently, they were loathe to support
a party which was subject to the same influences that
were believed to have created the Shah's regime.
Khomeini and his Islamic ideals were a clear alternative
and, therefore, were able to undercut the power of the
National Front and prevent the institution of a Western-
styled state by dismissing Mehdi Bazargan from the
nominal government.

Khomeini's plans for an Islamic republic entailed
not only political and economic changes, but a modifica-
tion of the morality of the society. The Constitution of
the Islamic Republic of Iran states that it is based upon
Islamic principles such that the state may develop towards

its ultimate goal, namely God, the epitome of the perfection of the transcendental world. In the preamble, it is declared that the struggle of the militant clergy, workers, and intellectuals, began in 1963 and was subsequently successful because it followed an Islamic and ideological path.

One of the founding principles of the Republic is belief in the Imamate, which justifies the mandate of the velayat faqih (religious leader) to rule in the absence of the hidden Twelfth Imam. A member of the clergy who is recognized by the people as the outstanding leader rises to this position. The Constitution secures the position of velayat faqih for Ayatollah Khomeini for the rest of his life (stated in Article 107). Following his death, an elected council of religious experts will choose either an individual, or three or five people to provide the leadership of the velayat faqih. The powers of the velayat faqih include the appointment of six clergy to the Council of Guardians as well as the highest authorities in the judiciary. The faqih must approve the president, and may dismiss this official at any time. Furthermore, the faqih may appoint the head of the Revolutionary Guard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and commands the Armed Forces.

Because legislation is based upon the Quran and hadith (sayings of the Prophet), the clergy are the

appropriate experts to interpret the meaning and application of the prescriptions. The Council of Guardians consists of six clerical members appointed by the faqih, and six lawyers who have been approved by the National Assembly and the High Council of the Judiciary. The Council of Guardians oversees management in everything concerning "civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, laws and regulations" (stated in Article 4). The Council, by virtue of its existence, legitimizes the other branches of government (stated in Article 93).

The Constitution professes equality before the law, freedom of the press, and allows for popular elections. The President is popularly elected, and nominates a Prime Minister who is then approved by a vote of the National Assembly. If approved, the President may formally appoint the Prime Minister to his post, and he in turn names ministers to head his cabinet. The Prime Minister heads a majority party in the National Assembly, which consists of 270 representatives elected for a four-year term. The number of clergy in office has grown with each election. In the First Islamic Majlis, 1980-81, of two hundred identifiable deputies that were elected, forty-three were mullahs (clerics). The number was raised to fifty-five the following year, clearly indicating the greater clerical representation since the fall of the

Shah.[86]

The number of political parties in Iran has
increased since the demise of the Shah. The Islamic
Republican Party was formed in 1979, and was led by
Ayatollah Behesti, until his death in 1981. This party
is generally identified with Ayatollah Khomeini. The
Muslim People's Republic Party was led by Ayatollah
Shariatmadari until he was implicated in a plot against
Ayatollah Khomeini's life. Shariatmadari was subsequently
arrested, and his reputation besmirched by pro-Khomeini
supporters.[87] Taking a moderate stance to reforms in
Iran, Shariatmadari preferred the reinstitution of a
five member cleric committee, as outlined in the
Constitution of 1907, to an Islamic Republic. The Muslim
People's Republic Party had a membership of over 3.5
million people, rendering Shariatmadari a potentially
powerful rival to Khomeini's supremacy.[88] There are
smaller Islamic parties in addition to those mentioned
above, but the most serious opponents to Khomeini's
regime now, are the left wing parties of which there are
several. The Communist Tudeh Party was outlawed from
Iran in early 1983 because of its pro-Soviet stance.[89]
The Mujahedin-e Khalq, an Islamic Guerrilla group, is
the strongest opponent of the Islamic Republic, and is
responsible for the assassination of leading clerics
and ministers since Khomeini's takeover.[90] Ayatollah

Khomeini's punishment of those opposed to the regime is actually more brutal than that of the Shah. Many reports state that executions at the hands of the Revolutionary Courts occur on a daily basis.[91]

With regard to the economic situation, the Constitution states that the economic system is to be 'designed to provide the proper groundwork such that all forms of human creativity can emerge' (stated in the Preamble). Khomeini has pursued a programme to ensure agricultural self-sufficiency by increasing the acreage of cultivated land. Figures regarding production in the industrial sector are not readily available, but it is known that the assets of the fifty-one richest industries have been expropriated by the government.[92] Insurance companies and banks have been nationalized and now adhere to Islamic regulations. Oil production and export have decreased due to damage sustained during the Iran-Iraq war.[93] The private sector is very small to the extent that it is almost inconsequential. Workers have used widespread strikes to increase the role played by workers in the management of factories. Generally, inflation and unemployment are at least as high as they were during the end of the Shah's reign.[94]

The citizens of Iran are still experiencing the consequences of social and political upheaval. Ayatollah Khomeini has tried to implement the prescriptions for a

just society as outlined in the Quran. Former first President of the Islamic Republic, A. Bani-Sadr, claims that Iranians are seeking the sovereignty and independence which has been denied them due to their longstanding position as a pawn of world powers.[95] The revolution was an attempt to achieve freedom of cultural identity and independence which appeared to be threatened by relationships with the West. Islamic ideology offered Iranians an opportunity to reassert cultural identity as well as gain a vision of a just and democratic society.

It is yet to be seen if Khomeini will be able to re-establish political order in Iran. The Ayatollah appears to be preoccupied with destroying opponents to the Islamic Republic. Iranians have been allowed more involvement in the political system, but within the bounds of Islamic prescripts. Khomeini has always rejected democracy as a Western import, arguing that Islamic rules for political participation are more appropriate for Iran.[96] Nevertheless, repression of political dissidents continues to be a part of Iranian society. It may be that Iranians will find that the Islamic definitions of justice and political participation as interpreted by Khomeini do not foster the just and democratic society that they have envisioned.

REFERENCES

[1] M.M.J. Fischer, _Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. viii.

[2] M. Nuwayhi, "A Revolution in Religious Thought", in John J. Donahue and John L. Esposito, trans., eds., _Islam in Transition_ (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 160.

[3] S.A.A. Rizvi, _Iran: Royalty, Religion and Revolution_ (Canberra: Ma'refat Publishing House, 1980), p. 109.

[4] W.C. Chittich, ed., trans., _A Shi'ite Anthology_, intro. Sayyed Hossein Nasr (London: Muhammadi Trust of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 1980), p. 23.

[5] M. Hamidullah, _Introduction to Islam_ (Paris: Centre Culturel Islamique, 1969), p. 37.

[6] S.A.A. Rizvi, _Iran: Royalty, Religion and Revolution_, p. 110.

[7] M. Hamidullah, _Introduction to Islam_, p. 105.

[8] _Ibid._, p. 121.

[9] _Ibid._, p. 168.

[10] _Ibid._, p. 67.

[11] M.U. Chapra, "The Islamic Welfare State", in J.J. Donahue and J.L. Esposito, eds., _Islam in Transition_ (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 227.

[12] Ayatollah M. Taliquani, "The Characteristics of Islamic Economics", in J.J. Donahue and J.L. Esposito, eds., _Islam in Transition_ (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 211-212.

[13]A. Bani-Sadr, "Islamic Economics: Ownership and Tauhid", in D.A. Albert, ed., Tell the American People: Perspectives on the Iranian Revolution (Philadelphia: Movement for a New Society, 1980), p. 193.

[14]Ibid., p. 194.

[15]M.U. Chapra, "The Islamic Welfare State", p. 288.

[16]Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), p. 6.

[17]Ibid., p. 7.

[18]Ibid., p. 9.

[19]M.M.J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution, p. 88.

[20]Ibid.

[21]H. Algar, Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906, p. 10.

[22]M.M.J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution, p. 78.

[23]S.A. Arjomand, "Shi'ite Islam and the Revolution in Iran", Government and Opposition, XVI (Summer 1981), 312.

[24]G. Thaiss, "The Bazzar as a Case Study of Religion and Social Change", in E. Yar-Shater, ed., Iran Faces the Seventies (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 202.

[25]S.A. Arjomand, "Shi'ite Islam and the Revolution in Iran", p. 313.

[26]S.A.A. Rizvi, Iran: Royalty, Religion and Revolution, p. 296.

[27] G. Thaiss, "The Bazaar as a Case Study of Religion and Social Change", pp. 193-194.

[28] G. Thaiss, "Religious Symbolism and Social Change: The Drama of Husain", in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Scholars, Saints and Sufis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 362.

[29] G. Thaiss, "The Bazaar as a Case Study of Religion and Social Change", p. 204.

[30] J.D. Green, Revolution in Iran: The Politics of Counter-mobilization (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 41.

[31] S.A.A. Rizvi, Iran: Royalty, Religion and Revolution, p. 296.

[32] Ibid.

[33] M.M.J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution, p. 114.

[34] F. Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development (Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1979), p. 106.

[35] S. Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran (Albany: University of New York Press, 1980), pp. 96-97.

[36] M. Hamidullah, Introduction to Islam, p. 100.

[37] Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 5.

[38] G. Thaiss, "Religious Symbolism and Social Change: The Drama of Husain", p. 350.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 7.

[41]W. Montgomery Watt, What is Islam? (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1968), p. 129.

[42]H. Algar, Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906, p. 2.

[43]E. Mortimer, Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1982), p. 44.

[44]W.C. Chittich, A Shi'ite Anthology, p. 136.

[45]H. Algar, "The Oppositional Role of the Ulama in Twentieth Century Iran", in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Scholars, Saints and Sufis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 240.

[46]Ibid., p. 239.

[47]S. Akhavi, "Shariati's Social Thought", in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Religion and Politics in Iran (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), p. 125.

[48]M. Bayat-Philipp, "Tradition and Change in Iranian Socio-Religious Thought", in Michael E. Bonine and Nikki R. Keddie, eds., Modern Iran: The Dialectics of Continuity and Change (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981), p. 54.

[49]S. Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period, p. 163.

[50]Ayatollah R. Khomeini, "Islamic Government", in Hamid Algar, trans., ed., Islam and Revolution (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), p. 27.

[51]Ibid., p. 66.

[52]Ibid., p. 38.

[53]Nikki R. Keddie, "Religion, Society and Revolution in Modern Iran", in M.E. Bonine and Nikki R. Keddie, eds., Modern Iran: The Dialectics of Continuity and Change (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981), p. 33.

[54] Ayatollah R. Khomeini, "Islamic Government", p. 113.

[55] H. Algar, "The Oppositional Role of the Ulama in Twentieth Century Iran", p. 235.

[56] Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, pp. 5-6.

[57] W.M. Watt, What is Islam?, p. 96.

[58] Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 5.

[59] Ibid., p. 11.

[60] N.R. Keddie, "The Roots of the Ulama's Power in Modern Iran", in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Scholars, Saints and Sufis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 224.

[61] Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 67.

[62] R.W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), p. 142.

[63] Ibid., p. 143.

[64] S. Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, p. 28.

[65] Ibid., p. 31.

[66] Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 95.

[67] S. Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, p. 37.

[68] Ibid., pp. 42-43.

[69] Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 95.

[70] S. Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, p. 33.

[71] Ibid., p. 54.

[72] Ibid., pp. 57-58.

[73] R.W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 148.

[74] S. Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, p. 61.

[75] S.A. Arjomand, "Shi'ite Islam and the Revolution in Iran", p. 299.

[76] A.K.S. Lambton, The Persian Land Reform, 1962-1966 (London: Clarendon Press, 1969), p. 56.

[77] W.M. Floor, "The Revolutionary Character of the Iranian Ulama: Wishful Thinking or Reality?", International Journal of Middle East Studies, XLL (1980), 504.

[78] S. Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, p. 98.

[79] A.K.S. Lambton, The Persian Land Reform, 1962-1966, p. 56.

[80] H. Algar, "The Oppositional Role of the Ulama in Twentieth Century Iran", p. 246. Anne Lambton's observation confirms that Khomeini's objections to the White Revolution were not on the grounds of land reform.

[81] S. Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, p. 101.

[82] H. Algar, "The Oppositional Role of the Ulama in Twentieth Century Iran", p. 246.

[83] M.M.J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution, p. 216.

[84] J.A. Bill, "Power and Religion in Revolutionary Iran", The Middle East Journal, XXXVI (Winter, 1982), 28-29.

[85] Ibid., pp. 29-30.

[86] Ibid., p. 33.

[87] E. Mortimer, Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam, p. 332.

[88] Iran", Europa Yearbook, 1981, p. 552.

[89] P. Iyer and R. Samghabadi, "Hatred Without Discrimination", Time, Toronto (May 16, 1983), p. 25.

[90] "Chronology", The Middle East Journal, XXXVI (Winter 1982), p. 74.

[91] J.M. Kennedy, "Paranoia Marks Life in Iran", Hamilton Spectator (April 27, 1982), p. 35.

[92] K. Fatemi, "The Iranian Revolution: Its Impact on Economic Relations with the United States", International Journal of Middle East Studies, XII (1980), 312.

[93] S. Hendersa, "Iran", Middle East Review, 1982, p. 153.

[94] Ibid.

[95] A. Bani-Sadr, "Enough of Khomeini", Sunday New York Times (November 7, 1982), p. 78.

[96] Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 252.

VI

CONCLUSIONS

From the above discussion, it is possible to understand how the revolution in Iran emerged from the interplay of several major elements. Similar to the events surrounding the occurrence of civil unrest in the early 1960's, the Iranian revolution was the result of a combination of internal and external factors. In addition to the international conditions which the Shah believed to require most of his attention, Mohammad Reza Shah attempted to institutionalize reforms that would accelerate the rate of progress, and in turn, bring security and legitimacy for the Pahlavi monarchy. The imposition of reforms, however, resulted in economic strains and political tensions. Iranians could not express their feelings of dissatisfaction and alienation due to SAVAK's strict policing of regime opposition.

Also similar to the earlier disruption of social order was the role which the clergy played as a voice of criticism during the political movement in the 1970's. The ulama resented the Shah's efforts to reduce the

influence of traditional Islamic institutions and values.
This situation was exacerbated by the introduction of
Western culture through the expansion of international
communication systems and the importation of technology
and advisors. Whereas the concern for Iran's cultural
identity had a limited following in the 1960's, Iranian
identity became an issue for the masses during the late
1970's. The many social ills were understood to be the
result of reform styled after Western models of political
and social organization. The encroachment of Western
culture upon a society, which historically was a pawn of
world powers, made the emergence of anti-Western senti-
ments almost inevitable. Consequently, for many Iranians,
the demand for reforms in the Shah's regime were voiced
within the assertion of their Islamic heritage. The spe-
cial position of the ulama as the traditional defenders
of the oppressed, and as a disembedded elite who were
motivated by religious and material interests, magnified
their symbolic and structural propensity to lead the
revolutionary movement against the Shah.

Islam proved to be a powerful tool of mobilization
when combined with Khomeini's charismatic leadership. The
transcendental nature of Shi'ite Islam showed Iranians the
potential for a just state. Shi'ism set the objectives of
the revolutionary movement not only by virtue of its pre-
scriptions for an ideal society, but also by reference to

the Mahdi, a messianic symbol readily used by Khomeini's
supporters. Khomeini presented Islam as a belief system
which incorporated the West's emphasis upon progress
through scientific and technological advancements, while
simultaneously perpetuating a concern for man's soul.
The Ayatollah argued that man suffered from such problems
as alienation and depression because Western societies
had pursued progress at the expense of moral sentiments
and needs. The secularization of society, then, was
responsible for many of the West's problems. Islam could
prevent these problems from occurring in Iran because it
does not separate religion from the state. Islamic
principles permeate all aspects of society, while keeping
in mind the development of man's spiritual nature as well
as his material comfort.

Such a complex interaction of contributing ele-
ments needs a multi-variable approach. Eisenstadt's
theory provides the analyst with a holistic view of the
internal tensions and international context which com-
bined to produce a revolutionary situation. Social
change is explained as the result of the contradictory
pressures of order and dissolution which exist simul-
taneously within society. Man's ability to create his
social order also gives him the capacity to redefine the
symbolic code upon which his institutions are built.
The biological endowment of creation is the ultimate cause

of social change.

Beyond his conception of social transformation,
Eisenstadt's approach to the study of revolutions does
not differ significantly from the traditional method of
investigation in political science. He recognizes the
importance of the international context to explain the
tensions created by inter-state political and economic
competition. In addition to this variable, Eisenstadt
considers the domestic strains produced by the structures
of the system which may result in such problems as legi-
timacy. Moreover, Eisenstadt is concerned with the role
of elites and elite interaction as the way in which the
protest movements acquire leadership and direction.
These four variables, international competition, elite
dynamics, state goals and social strains, are components
of the historical approach to the study of political
phenomena. However, Eisenstadt's understanding of
revolutionary transformation includes a determination of
the effects which a specific cultural orientation has
upon the forms and issues of a protest movement. Although
any of the five theories reviewed could have enlightened
aspects of the events leading to the downfall of the Shah,
only Eisenstadt's theory presents a methical way to
examine the impact of Iranian culture upon the revolution.

There are three problems which arise with the
operationalization of Eisenstadt's theory. The categories

which Eisenstadt provides the analyst of revolutionary
transformation are highly abstract. This, of course, is
the problem of any general theory. Nevertheless, the
task of defining the content of specific variables and
their interaction remains. The analyst is required to
possess extensive knowledge of the state in question in
order to identify the state's goals, or the strains
caused by its structures. One is forced to determine
the consequences of messianic movements, religious
fervour and charisma upon the process of revolutionary
change with little insight from Eisenstadt.

Nor does Eisenstadt complete his conception of the
role of the international context in contributing to the
emergence of a revolutionary situation. He does not
appear to conceive the intrusion of Western culture upon
non-Western societies as a component of international
conditions. Beyond the effects of economic and political
influences, the international system may threaten a
society's cultural identity. The result of cultural
competition is the assertion of a traditional belief
system such as Islam. Consequently, religious systems,
in addition to ideas of socialism, may serve as a way in
which a society asserts its unique identity against
pressures to assimilate with the West.

In spite of the problems created by the level of
abstraction, Eisenstadt's categories provide a fruitful

schema by which to isolate the origins of social strain.

The five categories focus upon the sources of social

issues such as the division of labour, changes in tradi-

tional values, and the domestic tensions created by the

demands of the international systems. When considering

the evolution of protest movements, Eisenstadt points to

the role of elites and the cultural orientation as

molders of the issues and processes of the revolutionary

movement. These directives give Eisenstadt's theory a

great capacity to trace the emergence of a revolutionary

situation.

Despite Eisenstadt's attempts to provide his

theory with a predictive capability, the approach fails

to achieve this goal beyond the assumption that change

is an inherent component of the social system and will

always occur. Moreover, in the later part of his book,

Revolution and the Transformation of Societies, Eisenstadt

acknowledges that revolutionary transformation in the mode

of the archetypical revolution of European societies is

no longer a trend in modern, postindustrial societies.

Nevertheless, Eisenstadt's theory is most appropriate for

analysis of revolutions of modernization.

Eisenstadt's approach contains an obvious bias.

He, as do most Western social scientists, assumes the

separation of the church and the state as a basic com-

ponent of modern political organization. Modernization

theorists from third world countries have argued that the model of development presented by the West may not be appropriate for countries developing under the present global circumstances. The West's response to the emergence of the international political and economic systems was spawned by the cultural and historical conditions of the time. The present situation is very different, given the obvious changes in the historical context. An Islamic society holds the potential to achieve many of the criteria for modernization while maintaining the unity of the church and the state. Islamic prescripts may be a viable alternative to the Western model of society. The success or failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran will give social scientists the opportunity to test their understanding of modernization.

Eisenstadt's theory stands as a useful schema through which to analyze the preconditions and outcomes of revolutionary transformation. Although the result of the present social forces in Iran cannot be foreseen by using his approach, Eisenstadt's theory will aid the task of investigating the emerging trends. Ultimately, the study of the revolutionary developments in Iran may contribute to a clearer conception of social processes and revolutions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ahmad, Khurshid. "Islam and the Challenge of Economic Development", in J.J. Donohue and J.L. Esposito, eds., Islam in Transition. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 217-222.

Ajami, Ismail. "Agricultural and Rural Development in Iran", in Jane W. Jacqz, ed., Iran: Past, Present and Future. New York: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1976, pp. 131-156.

Akhavi, Shahrough. Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980.

--------. "Shariati's Social Thought", in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Religion and Politics in Iran. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983, pp. 125-144.

Algar, Hamid. Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969.

--------. "The Oppositional Role of the Clergy in Twentieth Century Iran", in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Scholars, Saints and Sufis. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972, pp. 231-255.

Alimard, Amin and Cyrus Elahi. "Modernization and Changing Leadership in Iran", in Jane W. Jacqz, ed., Iran: Past, Present and Future. New York: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1976, pp. 217-225.

Arjomand, Said Amir. "Shi'ite Islam and the Revolution in Iran", Government and Opposition, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Summer, 1981), pp. 293-316.

Baldwin, George B. "The Iranian 'Brain Drain'", in Ehsan Yar-Shater, ed., Iran Faces the Seventies. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971, pp. 260-283.

Bani-Sadr, Abūl Hasan. "Tauhidi Economics", in D.A. Albert, ed., Tell the American People: Perspectives on the Iranian Revolution. Philadelphia: Movement for a New Society, 1980, pp. 193-199.

Bani-Sadr, Abūl Hasan. "Enough of Khomeini", <u>Sunday New York Times</u>, November 7, 1982, p. 78.

Bayat, Mangol. "Islam in Pahlavi and Post-Pahlavi Iran: A Cultural Revolution?", in J.L. Esposito, ed., <u>Islam and Development</u>. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1980, pp. 78-103.

--------. "Tradition and Change in Iranian Socio-Religious Thought", in Michael E. Bonine and Nikki R. Keddie, eds., <u>Modern Iran: The Dialectics of Continuity and Change</u>. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1981, pp. 37-58.

--------. "The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79: Fundamentalist or Modern", <u>Middle East Journal</u>, XXXVII, no. 1 (Winter 1983), 30-42.

Beeman, William O. "Images of the Great Satan: Representations of the United States in the Iranian Revolution", in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., <u>Religion and Politics in Iran</u>. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983, pp. 191-217.

Bill, James A. "Modernization and Reform From Above: The Case of Iran", <u>Journal of Politics</u>, XXXII, no. 1 (February 1970), 19-40.

--------. <u>The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization</u>. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1972.

-------- and Carl Leiden. <u>Politics in the Middle East</u>. Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1979.

--------. "Iran and the Crisis of '78", <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, LVII, no. 2 (Winter 1978-79), 323-342.

--------. "Power and Religion in Revolutionary Iran", <u>Middle East Journal</u>, XXXVI, no. 1 (Winter 1982), 22-47.

Binder, Leonard. <u>Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society</u>. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962.

Bonine, Michael E. "Shops and Shopkeepers: Dynamics of an Iranian Provincial Bazaar", in Michael E. Bonine and Nikki R. Keddie, eds., <u>Modern Iran: The Dialectics of Continuity and Change</u>. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1981, pp. 233-258.

Bruce, N.C. and James Fleming. "Tales of Horror from the Past", Macleans. Toronto, March 1980, p. 32.

Chapra, M.U. "The Islamic Welfare State", in J.J. Donohue and J.L. Esposito, eds., Islam in Transition. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 223-229.

Chittick, William C., trans. and ed. A Shi'ite Anthology. Selected and foreward by Allamah Tabataba'i. Introduction by Sayyed Hossein Nasr. London: Muhammadi Trust of Great Britain & Northern Ireland, 1980.

"Chronology: Iran", Middle East Journal, XXXVI (Winter 1982), 73-75.

Chubin, Sharam. "Iran's Foreign Policy, 1960-1976: An Overview", in H. Amirsadeghi, ed., Twentieth-Century Iran. London: W. Heinemann Ltd., 1977, pp. 197-222.

Cole, Juan R. "Imami Jurisprudence and the Role of the Ulama: Mortaza Ansari on Emulating the Supreme Exemplar", in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Religion and Politics in Iran. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983, pp. 33-46.

Cottam, Richard W. Nationalism in Iran. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964.

Curtis, Michael. "Introduction", in Michael Curtis, ed., Religion and Politics in the Middle East. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981, pp. 1-8.

Dekmejian, R. Hrair. "The Anatomy of Islamic Revival: Legitimacy Crisis, Ethnic Conflict, and the Search for Islamic Alternatives", in Michael Curtis, ed., Religion and Politics in the Middle East. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981, pp. 31-42.

Eckstein, H. "Introduction. Toward the Theoretical Study of Internal War", in H. Eckstein, ed., Internal War: Problems and Approaches. Toronto: Collier-Macmillan Canada Ltd., 1964.

--------. "The Etiology of Internal War", History and Theory, IV, no. 2 (1965), 133-163.

Eisenstadt, S.N. "Transformation of Social, Political and Cultural Orders in Modernization", in S.N. Eisenstadt, ed., Comparative Perspectives on Social Change. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1968, pp. 256-279.

Eisenstadt, S.N. Tradition, Change and Modernity.
    Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1973.

--------. Revolution and the Transformation of Societies.
    New York: The Free Press, 1978.

-------- and M. Curleau. The Form of Sociology--Paradigms
    and Crises. Toronto: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 1976.

Elwell-Sutton, L.P. "The Iranian Revolution", Interna-
    tional Journal, XXXIV, no. 3 (Summer 1979), 391-407.

Enayat, Hamid. Modern Islamic Political Thought. Austin:
    University of Texas Press, 1982.

Farmayan, Hafez F. "Politics During the Sixties: A
    Historical Analysis", in Ehsan Yar-Shater, ed.,
    Iran Faces the Seventies. New York: Praeger
    Publishers, 1971, pp. 88-116.

Fatemi, Khosrow. "The Iranian Revolution: Its Impact
    on Economic Relations with the United States",
    International Journal of Middle East Studies, XII
    (1980), 303-317.

--------. "Leadership by Distrust: The Shah's 'Modus
    Operandi'", Middle East Journal, XXXVI, no. 1
    (Winter 1982), 48-61.

Ferrier, Ronald W. "The Development of the Iranian Oil
    Industry", in H. Amirsadeghi, ed., Twentieth-Century
    Iran. London: W. Heinemann Ltd., 1977, pp. 93-128.

Fierabend, I.K., R.I. Fierabend, and T. Gurr, eds.
    Anger, Violence and Politics: Theories and Research.
    Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
    1972.

Fischer, Michael M.J. "Persian Society: Transformation
    and Strain", in H. Amirsadeghi, ed., Twentieth-
    Century Iran. London: W. Heinemann Ltd., 1977, pp.
    171-196.

--------. Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution.
    Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980.

Fisher, W.B., ed. The Land of Iran. Vol. I of The
    Cambridge History of Iran. Cambridge: Cambridge
    University Press, 1968.

Floor, William B. "The Revolutionary Character of the Iranian Ulama: Wishful Thinking or Reality?", International Journal of Middle East Studies, XII (1980), 501-524.

Freeman, Michael. "Review Article: Theories of Revolution", British Journal of Political Science, II (July 1972), 339-359.

Ganji, M. and Abbas Milani. "Iran: Developments During the Last 50 Years", in Jane W. Jacqz, ed., Iran: Past, Present and Future. New York: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1976, pp. 33-56.

Goldstone, J.A. "Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation", World Politics, XXXII, no. 3 (April 1980), 425-453.

Graham, Robert. Iran: The Illusion of Power. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980.

Greaves, R.L. "1942-1976: The Reign of Mohammad Riza Shah", in H. Amirsadeghi, ed., Twentieth-Century Iran. London: W. Heinemann Ltd., 1977, pp. 53-93.

Green, Jerrold. Revolution in Iran: The Politics of Countermobilization. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982.

Guerreiro-Ramos, A. "Modernization: Towards a Possibility Model", in W.A. Beling and G.O. Totten, eds., Developing Nations: Quest for a Model. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1970, pp. 21-59.

Gurr, Ted R. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970.

Habiby, Raymond N. and Fariborz Ghavidel. "Khomayni's Islamic Republic", in Michael Curtis, ed., Religion and Politics in the Middle East. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981, pp. 139-151.

Halliday, Fred. Iran: Dictatorship and Development. Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1979.

Hamidullah, M. Introduction to Islam. Paris: Centre Culturel Islamique, 1969.

Hassan, Farooq. The Concept of State and Law in Islam. Washington: University Press of America, 1981.

Hegland, Mary. "Two Images of Husain: Accommodation and Revolution in an Iranian Village", in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Religion and Politics in Iran. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983, pp. 218-235.

Hendersa, Semar. "Iran", Middle East Review, 1982, pp. 151-157.

Hetherington, N.S. "Industrialization and Revolution in Iran: Forced Progress or Unmet Expectation", Middle East Journal, XXXVI, no. 3 (Summer 1982), 362-373.

Homan, Roger. "The Origins of the Iranian Revolution", International Affairs, LVI, no. 4 (Autumn 1980), 673-677.

Horton, John. "Order and Conflict Theories of Social Problems as Competing Ideologies", American Journal of Sociology, LXXI, no. 6 (May 1966), 701-713.

Housego, David. "Survey: Iran", Economist, August 28, 1976.

Hoveyda, F. The Fall of the Shah. New York: Wyndam Books, 1979.

Hudson, Michael C. "Islam and Political Development", in John L. Esposito, ed., Islam and Development. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1980, pp. 1-24.

Hurewitz, J.C. "Iran in World and Regional Affairs", in Ehsan-Yar-Shater, ed., Iran Faces the Seventies. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971, pp. 117-142.

"Iran", Europa Yearbook. 2 vols. London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1981, 1982.

Israeli, Raphael. "The New Wave of Islam", International Journal, XXXIV, no. 3 (Summer 1979), 369-390.

Iyer, P. and R. Samghabadi. "Hatred Without Discrimination", Time, Toronto, May 16, 1983, p. 25.

Johnson, Chalmers. Revolution and the Social System. Stanford University, 1964.

--------. Revolutionary Change. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966.

Kazemi, Farhad. Poverty and Revolution in Iran. New
    York and London: New York University Press, 1980.

Keddie, Nikki R. "The Roots of the Ulama's Power in
    Modern Iran", in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Scholars,
    Saints and Sufis. Berkeley: University of California
    Press, 1972, pp. 211-230.

--------. "Iran: Change in Islam: Islam and Change",
    International Journal of Middle East Studies, XI
    (1980), 527-542.

--------. Religion, Society and Revolution in Modern
    Iran", in Michael E. Bonine and Nikki R. Keddie,
    eds., Modern Iran: The Dialectics of Continuity and
    Change. Albany: State University of New York Press,
    1981, pp. 21-36.

--------. Roots of Revolution. New Haven: Yale Uni-
    versity Press, 1981.

--------. "Introduction", in Nikki R. Keddie, ed.,
    Religion and Politics in Iran. New Haven and
    London: Yale University Press, 1983, pp. 1-18.

Kennedy, J.M. "Paranoia Marks Life in Iran", Hamilton
    Spectator, April 27, 1982, p. 35.

Knapp, Wilfrid. "1921-1941: The Period of Riza Shah",
    in H. Amirsadeghi, ed., Twentieth Century Iran.
    London: W. Heinemann Ltd., 1977, pp. 23-52.

Laing, M. The Shah. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1977.

Lambton, A.K.S. The Persian Land Reform, 1962-1966.
    London: Clarendon Press, 1969.

--------. "Land Reform and the Rural Cooperative Socie-
    ties", in Ehsan Yar-Shater, ed., Iran Faces the
    Seventies, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971, pp.
    5-43.

Lewis, Bernard. "The Return of Islam", in Michael Curtis,
    ed., Religion and Politics in the Middle East.
    Boulder: Westview Press, 1981, pp. 9-30.

Lewy, Guenter. Religion and Revolution. New York:
    Oxford University Press, 1974.

Martin, Lawrence W. "The Future Strategic Role of Iran",
    in H. Amirsadeghi, ed., Twentieth-Century Iran.
    London: W. Heinemann Ltd., 1977, pp. 223-252.

209

McLachlan, Keith. "The Iranian Economy, 1960-1976", in H. Amirsadeghi, ed., Twentieth-Century Iran. London: W. Heinemann Ltd., 1977, pp. 129-170.

Mortimer, Edward. Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam. London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1982.

Mottale, Morris M. "Politics in Post-Revolution Iran", Middle East Focus, IV, no. 5 (January 1982), 17-21.

Mutahahhari, Ayatullah Murtada. "The Iranian Islamic Movement", in John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, eds., Islam in Transition. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 308-313.

Nacify, Hamid. "Cinema as a Political Instrument", in Michael E. Bonine and Nikki R. Keddie, eds., Modern Iran: The Dialectics of Continuity and Change. Albany: State University Press, 1981, pp. 341-361.

Nasiri, Farzeen, "Iranian Studies and the Iranian Revolution", World Politics, XXXV, no. 4 (July 1983), 607-630.

Nikazmerad, Nicholas M. "Iran: Constitutional Chronology, 1971-1980", in Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds., Constitutions of the Countries of the World. Dobsferry, New York: Oceana Publications Inc., April 1980, pp. 1-12.

Nuwayhi, Muhammad. "A Revolution in Religious Thought", [translated by J.J. Donohue and J.L. Esposito] in John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, eds., Islam in Transition. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 160-168.

Nyrop, Richard F., ed., Iran: A Country Study (Area Handbook Series), Washington: American University Press, 1978.

Operating in Iran: An Economy Coming of Age. Business International Corp., 1978.

Rezum, Miron. "A Note on the Religious Context of the Iranian Revolution", Middle East Focus, V, no. 4 (November 1982), 12-17.

Rizvi, S.A.A. Iran: Royalty, Religion and Revolution. Canberra: Ma'refat Publishing House, 1980.

Roberts, D.S. Islam: A Westerner's Guide. London:
    Kogan Page Ltd., 1981.

Rose, Gregory. "Velayat-e Faqih and the Recovery of
    Islamic Identity in the Thought of Ayatollah Khomeini",
    in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Religion and Politics in
    Iran. New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
    1983, pp. 166-188.

Rosenthal, E.J. Islam in the Modern National State.
    Cambridge: University Press, 1965.

--------. Studia Semitica Vol. II: Islamic Themes.
    Cambridge: University Press, 1971.

Rouleau, Eric. "Khomeini's Iran", Foreign Affairs, LIX,
    no. 1 (Fall 1980), 1-20.

Saikal, Amin. The Rise and Fall of the Shah. Princeton,
    New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980.

Salert, B. Revolutions and Revolutionaries. New York:
    Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co. Inc., 1976.

Savory, Roger M. "Iran: A 2500-Year Historical and
    Cultural Tradition", in Charles J. Adams, ed.,
    Iranian Civilization and Culture. Montreal:
    Institute of Islamic Studies, 1972, pp. 77-90.

--------. "The Problem of Sovereignty in an Ithna Ashari
    ("Twelver") Shi'i State", in Michael Curtis, ed.,
    Religion and Politics in the Middle East. Boulder:
    Westview Press, 1981, pp. 129-138.

Sayeed, Khalid Bin. "Policy Making Process in the
    Government of Iran", in Charles J. Adams, ed.,
    Iranian Civilization and Culture. Montreal:
    Institute of Islamic Studies, 1972, pp. 91-110.

Skocpol, Theda. States and Social Revolutions. Cambridge:
    University Press, 1979.

--------. "What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?", Compara-
    tive Politics, XIV, no. 3 (April 1982), 351-375.

Spooner, Brian. "Religion and Society Today: An Anthro-
    pological Perspective", in Ehsan Yar-Shater, ed.,
    Iran Faces the Seventies. New York: Praeger Pub-
    lishers, 1971, pp. 166-188.

Stempel, John D. Inside the Iranian Revolution.
    Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press,
    1981.

Sullivan, William H. "Dateline Iran: The Road Not
    Taken", Foreign Policy, no. 4 (Fall 1980), 175-186.

Tabari, Azar, "The Role of the Clergy in Modern Iranian
    Politics", in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Religion and
    Politics in Iran. New Haven and London: Yale
    University Press, 1983, pp. 47-72.

Taliquani, Ayatollah Mahmud. "The Characteristics of
    Islamic Economics", [translated by William Darrow]
    in John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, eds.,
    Islam in Transition. New York: Oxford University
    Press, 1982, pp. 210-216.

Thaiss, Gustav. "The Bazaar as a Case Study of Religion
    and Social Change", in Ehsan Yar-Shater, ed.,
    Iran Faces the Seventies. New York: Praeger Pub-
    lishers, 1971, pp. 189-216.

--------. "Unity and Discord: The Symbol of Husayn in
    Iran", in Charles J. Adams, ed., Iranian
    Civilization and Culture. Montreal: Institute of
    Islamic Studies, 1972, pp.

--------. "Religious Symbolism and Social Change: The
    Drama of Husain", in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Scholars,
    Saints and Sufis. Berkeley: University of California
    Press, 1972, pp. 349-366.

Tibi, Bassam. "The Renewed Role of Islam in the Political
    and Social Development of the Middle East",
    Middle East Journal, XXXVII, no. 1 (Winter 1983),
    3-13.

Tilly, Charles. "Revolution and Collective Violence" in
    R. Greenstein and N. Polsby, eds., Macropolitical
    Theory (Handbook of Political Science, Vol. III).
    Don Mills: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. Inc., 1975,
    pp. 483-555.

--------. From Mobilization to Revolution. Don Mills:
    Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc., 1978.

Treverton, Gregory, ed. Crisis Management and the Super-
    powers in the Middle East. Westmead, England:
    Gower Publishing Co. Ltd., 1981.

Vafai, Changai, trans. "Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran", in Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds., Constitutions of the Countries of the World. Dobsferry, New York: Oceana Publications Inc., April 1980, pp. 1-74.

Vakil, F. "Iran's Basic Macro-Economic Problems: A 20-Year Horizon", in Jane W. Jacqz, ed., Iran: Past, Present and Future. New York: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1976, pp. 83-104.

Watt, W. Montgomery. What is Islam? New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968.

————. The Formative Period of Islamic Thought. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1973.

————. "The Significance of the Early Stages of Imami Shi'ism", in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Religion and Politics in Iran. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983, pp. 21-33.

Weber, M. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Edited by Talcott Parsons; translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons. New York: Free Press, 1947.

————. On Charisma and Institution Building. Edited by S.N. Eisenstadt. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968.

Wilber, Donald N. Iran: Past and Present. 9th ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.

Yapp, Malcolm E. "1900-1921: The Last Years of the Qajar Dynasty", in H. Amirsadeghi, ed., Twentieth-Century Iran. London: W. Heinemann Ltd., 1977, pp. 1-22.

Zabih, Sepehr. Iran's Revolutionary Upheaval: An Interpretative Essay. San Francisco, California: Alchemy Books, 1979.

Zonis, Martin. "Higher Education and Social Change: Problems and Prospects", in Ehsan Yar-Shater, ed., Iran Faces the Seventies. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971, pp. 217-259.

————. The Political Elite of Iran. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.

Zonis, Martin. "Iran: A Theory of Revolution from Accounts of the Revolution", World Politics, XXXV, no. 4 (July 1983), 586-606.