A THEORETICAL EXAMINATION OF REVOLUTIONARY IRAN
A THEORETICAL EXAMINATION
OF
REVOLUTIONARY IRAN

BY
SHEILA MARY NICHOLAS, B.A.

A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Master of Arts

McMaster University

October, 1983
MASTER OF ARTS (1983)  McMaster University  Hamilton, Ontario
(Political Science)

TITLE: A Theoretical Examination of Revolutionary Iran

AUTHOR: Sheila Mary Nicholas, B.A. (Wilfrid Laurier University)

SUPERVISOR: Dr. Michael Stein

NUMBER OF PAGES: v + 213
ABSTRACT

The advent of the Iranian revolution has provided social scientists with another example of rapid social transformation. An important feature of the revolution was the role of the clergy in leading the successful revolution against the apparently stable regime of the Shah, and in establishing an Islamic Republic in Iran. Most theories of revolution fail to address the role of culture in social processes. In his book, Revolution and the Transformation of Societies, S.N. Eisenstadt makes culture into a usable variable. Eisenstadt's five categories provide a schema to analyze the international, political, economic, social and cultural factors which contributed to the Shah's downfall, as well as the outcome of the revolution. The clergy emerge as a disembedded elite motivated by both symbolic and material interests. They led a revolutionary movement which demanded social and political reforms while asserting their Islamic identity.
I would first like to thank my committee: my advisor, Dr. Michael Stein for his patience and understanding throughout the various stages of the thesis; Dr. Gordon Means for his aid with organizing some of the more difficult sections; and Dr. Stefania Szlek-Miller for her helpful comments and wholehearted encouragement. I must also thank my sister Barbara for tireless typing of earlier drafts, and my parents for their moral support. Most important, I must thank David Matheson for always knowing what to do when things seemed darkest.
INTRODUCTION

Both the occurrence of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and its outcome surprised scholars and laymen alike. After fifteen years of apparent political stability and a decade of real economic growth, it seemed that the Shah's regime fell during its zenith. Although opposition to the Shah's rule existed, most observers were led to believe that the dissension was limited to traditional religious opponents of the regime, as well as radical leftist groups. Admittedly, the Shah's modernization plan was placing a strain upon traditional ways of life, but the progress of industrialization and rising standard of living seemed to overshadow the temporary problems of high inflation, transportation and housing shortages, and inadequate water supplies. In 1978, it appeared that sentiments of political oppression and socio-economic dissatisfaction arose suddenly, and were effectively mobilized to dismantle the constitutional monarchy of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

The Shah appeared to have faced similar problems during the early part of the 1960's. The boom which occurred after the fall of Mossadegh was giving way to serious economic and social problems. Corruption increased, as did serious inflation, while the security
forces discouraged trade-union organization, keeping wages low. Open discontent emerged after the elections of 1960 and appeared to have been engineered by officials in the government. In response to these broad problems, the Shah appointed Ali Amini, who pursued major social and institutional reforms. The Land Reform decree of 1962 was met by protest from university students in Tehran. Unrest continued despite attacks on the National Front and other opposition groups which resulted in the arrest of many of their supporters. The White Revolution, announced in 1962, was a program of major reforms. The resulting clerical opposition, labelled reactionary by the Shah, was joined by nationalist supporters who objected to the regime's autocracy and dependence upon the West.

Ultimately, the Shah managed to maintain control of Iranian society. His attempts at reforming the system of land ownership gained the acquiescence of some of his opponents. However, a large number of the opposition were arrested, and others were discouraged from displaying their discontent openly. A cursory glance at the 1978-1979 crisis in Iran reveals its similarity to the earlier events. Consequently, the analyst is interested in discovering the critical factors present in the latest opposition movement which led to the downfall of the Shah.

Given the predominance of secular nationalist protest movements, as exemplified by the National Front in
the 1960's, the leading role of religious elites and symbols during the 1978-79 revolutionary movement is indeed surprising. Perhaps even more unusual from the point of Western social scientists, however, is the creation of an Islamic republic in Iran. Virtually all approaches to social change, Marxist and non-Marxist, have assumed that there is a secularization of culture through the displacement of traditional religious beliefs and symbols by a system of values compatible with the needs of a nation-state undergoing modernization. Religion has declined in relevance as a political factor since the separation of church and state has been assumed with the passing of traditional societies.

It is perhaps difficult for members of modern Western society to view religion as a dominant force in social affairs. Furthermore, the values which fostered the development of Western institutions and technology seem most appropriate for modern society. Muslims, however, point to the bankruptcy of materialism and the alienation of large segments of society as an argument against adoption of Western culture. Many followers of Islam see within it the possibility of preserving man's spiritual nature while pursuing the opportunities offered by technology.

For the social scientist, Islam is an important consideration in the understanding of the political sys-
tems of the Middle East. Islam is a powerful medium through which to express concerns over the influx of Western values. In the case of Shi'ism, especially in the symbol of the martyr Husayn, there exist images which portray the absence of social justice and the resulting hardships. Under Ayatollah Khomeini's charismatic leadership, Islam was used to mobilize both religious and secular segments of the society against the Shah's regime. The result of such a religio-political movement is the current existence of an Islamic republic in Iran.

A definition of revolution is dependent upon the theorist's perception of social processes. Most definitions recognize that a revolution is distinguished from other forms of radical, non-institutional change by virtue of the wide-reaching consequences. Sigmund Neumann offers a definition which reflects the general understanding of a revolution:

sweeping fundamental change in political organization, social structure, economic property control and the predominant myth of social order.

Revolution, then, results in far reaching change in all aspects of society so as to indicate a break with the previous form of development.

Applying this definition to Iran, it can be dis-
cerned that the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 holds the potential for such all-encompassing change. Islam presents Quranic prescripts for all aspects of society. The implementation of Islamic directives would entail a reorganization of the political, economic and social aspects of society signalling an end to the Shah's policy of secularization and the modelling of social and political systems after Western examples. The manifestation of such changes will depend upon Khomeini's ability to maintain control long enough to institutionalize his plans for the Islamic state. Consequently, the study of an event as recent as the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 suffers from an insufficient historical perspective.

Nevertheless, in light of the potential for the present regime in Iran to successfully implement widespread changes, it is appropriate to consider the Iranian crisis under the category of revolution. Having determined this, the task for any student of revolution is to understand the causes, processes and outcomes of social upheaval. Given the complex interaction of the numerous factors which contribute to the occurrence of a revolution, the analyst requires a framework to begin the investigation. Many approaches can be taken to the study of any particular phenomenon. However, for political scientists, the method of cross-national comparison is one way to gain a sense of the relative contribution made by specific elements to a
given situation. The comparative method may also help the social scientist to understand general trends in political and social relations. In addition, use of the comparative method may lead to a greater comprehension of what contributes to a stable, responsive society.

iii

There are two important questions which are to be considered in this study. The content of these questions will help to determine the analytical framework which will be needed in order to address the inquiry appropriately. The first question concerns the identification of the factors which led to the downfall of the Shah. A preliminary look at the revolutionary movement reveals the existence of international, economic, political and social themes of protest. An approach which could help to shed light upon the Iranian revolution would have to encompass all four areas of influence.

The obvious role played by Islam and the Islamic clergy in the protest movements which led to the collapse of the Shah's monarchy, and in post-Pahlavi Iran, suggests another focus of inquiry. The second question considers the processes which led to the domination of the opposition movement by the clergy, and the utilization of Islam as a mobilizing force in Iranian society. An explanation
of religious fervour is too simple to explain the participation of non-Muslim groups in the revolutionary process. The theory of revolution which will be adopted would have to incorporate the cultural variable within its explanation.

The establishment of an Islamic republic raises a more general, albeit secondary, issue for the social scientist. The creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran challenges assumptions about the characteristics of modernization, especially with regard to the separation of church and state. Nikki R. Keddie warns that the terms 'tradition' and 'modernization' are dangerous categories because both are in constant flux and, therefore, are very difficult to define adequately. A society's response to the influx of science and technology, and the corresponding values, depends in part upon the culture of the society. Despite Western indifference to the political influence of religion, values and culture maintain their importance as determinants of broad-based social policies and individual behaviour. The divergences in culture may help to explain differences in the propensity for revolutionary change.

Chapter II will consist of a review of five theories of revolution which represent the predominant approaches to the study of this phenomenon in political
science and sociology. The knowledge acquired through a preliminary investigation of the Iranian revolution will help the analyst to choose from the review a theory which can assist in conducting a systematic analysis of the recent events in Iran. Chalmers Johnson addresses the subject of revolution from the standpoint of a structural-functionalist. Also representative of the consensual paradigm is Ted Gurr's social-psychological approach to political violence. Charles Tilly, in reaction to the psychological-motivational framework, offers an alternative way to study the processes of political upheaval. The conflict paradigm which subsumes Tilly's work is also represented by Theda Skocpol's theory of revolution in terms of class analysis, international factors and the contribution of peasants to political upheaval. The work of S.N. Eisenstadt does not fit within the realm of either the consensual or conflictual paradigms. Rather, his approach represents recent attempts to synthesize structural-functionalist, symbolic-interactionist, neoevolutionist and Marxist theories. It is from amongst these theories that an approach will be adopted so as to facilitate the isolation and analysis of the relevant factors in the Iranian revolution.
REFERENCES


II

FIVE THEORIES OF REVOLUTION: AN OVERVIEW

The five theories which are to be reviewed in this chapter represent the predominant approaches of comparative politics and sociology. After World War II, structural-functionalism, based upon a consensual view of society, was a popular approach to the study of politics and society. Chalmers Johnson has been chosen as the representative of this framework because he directly addresses the issue of revolution rather than the broader question of systemic change, more frequently discussed by structural-functionalists. Another aspect of the consensual paradigm is presented by Ted Gurr. Gurr's approach is "widely acclaimed as an outstanding psychological theory of political violence".1 Because he integrates many of the assumptions and variables of the several social-psychological explanations of revolution, Gurr is an appropriate spokesman for this framework.

It can be argued that Charles Tilly's theory represents the transition from the political sociology paradigm to the political economy approach, which has gained popularity in recent years. Tilly perceives conflict arising from competition among various groups for
power, as a fundamental characteristic of society. Within the same paradigm, Theda Skocpol represents the political economy approach to the investigation of revolutionary phenomena. She exceeds the limitations of class analysis by adopting Tilly’s conflict approach to explain the processes of revolution. Skocpol also represents the thrust of recent neo-Marxist theory granting the state an element of autonomy.

The last theory to be examined is unusual, since it falls into neither the consensual nor the conflictual paradigm. S.N. Eisenstadt is a distinguished theorist of modernization. His theory can be described as a synthesis of many of the assumptions and concepts contained in the previously mentioned theories: Eisenstadt considers the way in which international, economic, political and social factors contribute to the creation of a revolutionary situation. Most importantly, he contributes one additional variable to the study of revolution: culture.

The following commentaries on the five theories of revolution will endeavour to explain each theorist’s understanding of social processes. Such an analysis will reveal the contribution of certain factors to the creation of a revolutionary situation. The theories will be evaluated for their degree of internal consistency, the clarity of their concepts and their explanation of the mechanics of social change. There will also be a
practical consideration, parsimony, which cannot be achieved if the theory is as complex as the phenomenon which it is purported to explain. 2

It is obvious from the recognition which these theorists have achieved in their areas that their respective approaches contribute to the study of revolution. Consequently, it will be difficult to select an appropriate theory on the basis of the above criteria only. The content of the two aforementioned questions, based upon a preliminary examination of Iran, will also be used to decide upon a theory which would lead to the most fruitful explanation of the Iranian case. Furthermore, the excluded theories may offer important insights to enhance the approach which will ultimately be adopted in this systematic investigation of the Iranian revolution.

Chalmers Johnson's theory of revolution falls within the structural-functional tradition established by Talcott Parsons. The theory found in Revolutionary Change and Revolution and the Social System looks at social integration and change from a macro-sociological perspective. The social system consists of a set of institutions which are the concrete manifestations of societal values. The social system maintains a homeostatic equilibrium by
meeting the needs of pattern maintenance or socialization, adaptation to the environment, goal attainment, and integration and social control. Stability can be maintained if the value structure and the environment are synchronized with each other. Should the values of the system become dissynchronized with the demands of the environment, the result is system disequilibrium which necessitates change.

When dissynchronization occurs, the response of the governing elite may take two forms. A stable social system is based upon shared value patterns to legitimate power and authority such that dysfunctional conditions which disrupt the value coordination of a system results in 'power deflation'. This in turn necessitates an increase in the use of force to maintain social integration. Johnson presents the loss of authority, or power deflation as a necessary cause of revolutions.

The governing elite may choose another response which is to pursue a policy of purposeful change, ranging from conservative change to elite intransigence. If the elite is acquainted with the social conditions, and is able to identify the essential values to maintain the system, conservative change may be successfully implemented. The policies must sustain the support of the system's non-deviant actors, or further loss of authority will occur. Johnson suggests that the system will persist if the leaders can successfully use the armed
forces to coerce social interaction, until changes can be implemented and the values and environment resynchronized. Thus, the second necessary cause of revolution hinges upon the 'quality of purposeful change' undertaken while a system is disequilibrated.

The third sufficient cause of revolution is identified as a catalyst which either may prevent an elite from enforcing social behaviour, or spur revolutionaries to attempt to seize power. These factors, which at one point Johnson says are provided by 'fortune', are called 'accelerators' of which there are three types. The first group includes those factors which directly influence the armed forces. A disruption of the effectiveness of the armed forces will produce a revolution. Another type of accelerator is the ideological belief held by revolutionaries that they will successfully challenge the governing elite's monopoly of power. The third category of accelerator is composed of the strategies pursued by the revolutionary conspirators against the armed forces.

Accelerators are events which do not in themselves threaten the existence of a functional society. It is the combination of power deflation and a loss of authority, in addition to an accelerator, which undermines deterrence based on force in a social system which has been disequilibrated by a change in either the structure of values or the patterns of labour division. The outcome of the revolution
will depend upon the loyalty and solidarity of the armed forces and the valid transfer of culture from the pre-revolutionary system to the new regime.

For structural-functionalists, the subject of change has always been a controversial one for several reasons. One of the basic assumptions of this theory is that survival of the system is its goal. Unlike examples of biological systems, the order of the human social system is not predetermined. Because the political order of the social system can be drastically changed by men's intentions, unlike the social order of beehives, survival cannot be assumed to be the telos of a system. Ethical considerations should determine the form and content of the 'good' society.

Explanatory problems occur due to the vagueness of terms used by structural-functionalists. There is disagreement as to what constitutes systemic change as opposed to dissolution of the system. If a system undergoes fundamental changes economically, politically, and culturally, there is some doubt as to whether the previous system can be said to persist. Similarly, structural-functionalists must justify why revolution occurs rather than the destruction of the system.

Some confusion arises from Johnson's use of terms. He proposes that system disequilibrium is the result of value-environment dissynchronization, which is defined as
the mismatching of the social set of values with the division of labour which is adapted to the environment. Although the concepts are clear at the theoretical level, application is made difficult because there is no scale given by which to judge the severity of disequilibrium apart from a post hoc analysis. If revolution occurred in a system, it can be concluded that system disequilibrium was sufficient to cause a revolution. The structural-functionalist's analysis moves from the outcome to the origins of the phenomenon.

The definition of deviancy is an example of how structural-functionalism tends toward self-reference. Because the existence of the system is assumed, all explanations must occur within terms of the 'system'. Deviancy is defined by Johnson as the maintenance of values opposing the social set of values without critically assessing the appropriateness of the societal values. The values of the 'deviant' actors may be justified outside the considerations of systemic survival. In a revolutionary situation, it would appear to be more important for the political decision-makers to gain the support of the deviant actors--those wishing justified value changes--as opposed to already supportive actors, or at least to dampen their criticisms. Deviant behaviour is considered "pathological to the functioning of the social system" rather than a form of systemic progression.
The third and sufficient cause of revolution is a catalyst, which Johnson labels an accelerator. The defining of an accelerator as a cause seems to confuse preconditions with precipitants. Eckstein isolated preconditions: "circumstances which make it possible for precipitants to bring about political violence" from precipitants which are events which initiate the political violence. Accelerators appear to be precipitants rather than actual causes.

In summary, Johnson's structural-functional approach explains revolutions generally in terms of system maintenance. The critical variable of Johnson's theory is system equilibrium which, if upset by any number of initial events, may cause value-environment dissynchronization, and ultimately, revolution. On the abstract level, structural-functionalism is a sophisticated theory which maintains internal consistency and justifies the isolation of system equilibrium as the important variable within the explanatory framework. When the theory is applied, however, the variables are revealed to be vague, and difficult to measure. Because of the complex relationships between variables, application of Johnson's theory is an undertaking of great proportions. Although values are an important element of the structural-functionalist's understanding of society, the theorist is not concerned with the normative question of whether
the system should be sustained. System maintenance is the telos of the system.

Theodore Gurr presents a theory of political violence which combines multiple social and psychological factors to explain the occurrence of political rebellion. Political violence refers to the class of collective actions within a political community against the political regime and its actors. Political violence may take three forms, such as the spontaneous, popular participation of 'turmoil', the highly organized, limited participation upon which 'conspiracy' is based, or the highly organized violence with widespread popular participation which accompanies the state of 'internal war'. Revolutions are examples of the last category.

Gurr's theory is composed of a complex set of interrelated hypotheses and corollaries which outline the psychological and societal causes of the potential for political violence. It is not within the scope of the paper to discuss most of the hypotheses. Rather, the objective in this section will be to explain Gurr's terms, to identify and discuss the four major variables and their relevance to the theory.

Gurr's theory is founded upon two assumptions.
The first concerns the motivational basis of violence as described by the frustration-aggression model. When goal-directed behaviour is obstructed so as to prevent its fulfillment, aggression results, aimed at the frustrating agent. The greater the frustration, the greater the quantity of aggression.\textsuperscript{13} The second assumption originates in the work of J.C. Davies. Davies proposes that states of mind ultimately determine political stability and instability rather than the tangible grounds of inadequate/adequate supplies of things such as food and political liberty.\textsuperscript{14} Gurr links these two assumptions through his model of perceived or relative deprivation-anger-political violence which is the social analogue of the frustration-aggression model. The social process leading to political violence consists of the following three steps: the development of discontent; secondly, the politicization of discontent; and finally, the actualization of violence against political objects.

Discontent develops from relative deprivation which is defined as "a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectation and their value capabilities".\textsuperscript{15} Value expectations are those goods and conditions to which people feel they are entitled whereas value capabilities are the goods and conditions which people believe they are capable of attaining.\textsuperscript{16} In addition to these psychological factors, are societal variables such as cultural sanc-
tions for violence, extent of past political violence by reactionary groups and the degree of coercion employed by the regime. Once it is perceived that the political actors are responsible for the conditions of deprivation, violence against the political actors gains normative and utilitarian justification. The form which the politicized discontent will acquire when it is actualized will depend upon the "patterns of coercive control and institutional support." 17

Gurr's analysis focuses upon four variables which form the general hypotheses concerning the sources, magnitude, and forms of violent political phenomena. The first variable, the "potential for collective violence", is calculated by measuring the extent and intensity of discontent among the members of the society. The second variable, the 'potential for political violence', is a measurement of the degree to which the discontent is politicized, that is to say, the extent to which widespread violence is directed against the political regime. Gurr labels these two variables as intervening ones initially, but they are later identified as primary dependent variables in his causal model, an obvious conceptual inconsistency. The magnitude of political violence is another variable which has three components, namely the scope or extent of participation, intensity, or destructiveness of action, and duration of the violence. The
fourth variable, the forms of political violence, is also considered a dependent variable.

The greatest problem facing the application of Gurr's theory is the complex interrelationship of the hypotheses and corollaries. Although it is true that complex phenomena may require a complex explanation, parsimony is important. Furthermore, if the theory is to explain revolution, it must not only specify the relevant variables, but justify the use of these variables as causes rather than correlates. 18

This problem may originate with Gurr's use of the frustration-aggression model as an analogue to the occurrence of political violence. Political violence is perceived to be similar to interpersonal aggression; therefore the variables used to analyze aggression in psychological studies can be transferred to the analysis of political violence. Thus, relative deprivation is analogous to reinforcement. 19 The theory "does not explain why the variables included...are related to political violence." 20 The strength of Gurr's argument rests upon the appropriateness of the analogy. One case deals with aggression on an interpersonal level while the other is concerned with groups in political situations.

What might be determinants of individual behaviour, may at the social level become merely linkages or correlates. Furthermore, many of the variables which
Gurr argues affect the manifestation of political violence come not from the frustration-aggression model. Rather, they are plausible factors that arise from the social and political contexts.\textsuperscript{21}

The importance of the cognitive states of the masses to the occurrence of political violence cannot be disputed. The notion of relative deprivation as opposed to actual deprivation is critical for explaining why revolutions have not occurred in states where there are widespread economic problems. Relative deprivation causing frustration may result in political demonstrations and political violence which are precipitants of revolution. Actual deprivation does exist in revolutionary situations and should be given consideration within the explanatory framework.

Applying Gurr's theory may be difficult because one must choose from approximately eighty hypotheses and corollaries, and it is uncertain whether the list is complete, given the complexity of social interaction. In light of this, Gurr's full theory fails the criterion of parsimony, but the primary relationships discussed above form a causal model upon which to order data of collective violence. The concepts of the social-psychological paradigm are ill-defined and their relationship to the general hypotheses of the theory are unclear. Furthermore, it is not apparent that the leap from the causes of
political violence to a general theory of revolution is justifiable or adequate to explain revolutionary situations.

iii

The third theory to be presented is derived from the interest group approach in political science. Charles Tilly offers for consideration a theory of political conflict as a condition of a particular government. For Tilly, a revolution is "an extreme condition of the normal political process," and is characterized by multiple sovereignty, intensity of conflict and the magnitude of resources utilized to resolve the conflict. Violence is a correlate of revolution, not its essence.

There are three types of actors in the conflict theory of revolution. Tilly identifies the 'government' as possessing the concentrated means of coercion; it is differentiated from the 'state' which is delineated by territory and a formally coordinated and centralized bureaucracy. The second group of actors, labelled 'contenders for power', consist of "every group within the population which during some specified span of time collectively applies resources to influence the government." On a more general level, the 'polity' includes
all the contenders which regularly and successfully lay claims against the government. 'Challengers' are non-members which contend for power. Interaction within the polity consists of members applying resources to influence government, nonmembers seeking influence and membership in the polity, and members testing each other's qualifications through wealth, status and parliamentary debates for example. Such constant changes make actors more willing to use violence to gain or secure membership.

Given the continuous alternation in membership, mobilization is an important aspect of Tilly's theory. The mobilization of contenders occurs through normative resources such as commitments to ideals, coercive resources which include punitive capacities, and, in addition, utilitarian resources which consist of those things which men find rewarding. The mobilization process begins to occur when a group increases "its collective control over any of these three varieties of resources." Once mobilization occurs, steps toward collective action may be taken. Tilly has classified collective action into three types: (1) competitive action in which the resources of another group are sought; (2) reactive collective action, as a response to such a claim; (3) provocative collective action, in which one group tries to interrupt another's attempt to claim a resource. The form of violence which results from this interaction is dependent upon the rela-
tionship of the participants to the existing power structures. Governments are major participants in the challenging and resisting of these actions.

Tilly views the occurrence of revolution to be based upon three necessary conditions. The first is the appearance of contenders which possess exclusive alternative claims to control over the government. The proliferation of multiple sovereignties develops under four conditions which are as follows: (1) subordination by an exogenous power; (2) attempts by nationalist movements to remove a government perceived to be external; (3) the gaining of control over a portion of the government by non-member contenders; and (4) fragmentation of the existing polity eventually merging into a coalition. The second necessary cause of revolution involves the commitment of a significant proportion of the population to the alternative claims. The final necessary cause is the inability or unwillingness of government agents to suppress the alternative coalition or commitment. In addition to these three necessary causes, there is a fourth facilitating condition; a coalition must be formed between polity members and the contenders laying claims against the government. The most critical sign of an impending revolution is the emergence of an alternative polity.

Generally, Tilly's theory hinges upon contests for exclusive power within a political community. Although he
warns against trying to discover causes of a revolution separate from the general context of social processes, Tilly's understanding of revolutionary outcomes is limited by virtue of its generality. Revolutionary outcome is the "displacement of one set of power holders by another", what the acquired power consists of and how it is utilized is unimportant to the process of the revolution. Results such as class transformation are to be treated as variables. Thus, Tilly's criterion for a revolutionary outcome may be easily met by situations such as coup d'états and palace revolts which most theorists would not consider revolutionary.

Tilly has attempted to take a new approach to the theory of revolution, learning from the shortcomings of earlier approaches. The concept of multiple sovereignty as a cause of revolution is useful, but it appears to be a component of the process of revolutionary change, rather than a precondition of revolutions. Yet, Tilly has not explained why multiple sovereignty occurs, although it appears that through understanding the motivation for mobilization, the preconditions of the revolution could be revealed. In summary, Tilly's approach is a description of what occurs in order that a revolution may be carried out, rather than an explanation of what brings men to accept revolution as a means to change their political situation. Nevertheless, it is useful in the
comprehension of the revolutionary process.

iv

The attempts of Johnson, Gurr and Tilly to explain revolutionary processes have several shortcomings. The events which are believed to initiate the pattern of revolutionary change are vaguely defined and, consequently, difficult to observe and measure. J.A. Goldstone points out that the proponents of these theories conclude that revolutions could be prevented if government elites pursued appropriate action even though precipitating events had started the revolutionary process. Radical change was not viewed positively, rather, especially for Johnson and Gurr, social disruption was the result of inadequate social control.

Tilly's perception of conflict as an essential characteristic of the social system was one of the initial assumptions of theorists such as Theda Skocpol, Joel S. Migdal, Kay Trimberger and Jeffery Paige. Their perspectives are rooted in the political economy approach to government and society. The emphasis of their works differ from previous views in several ways. These theorists perceive that conflict arises from class relations and understand the basic social contradictions to be the initial points of an explanatory model. Radical
change may be a necessary path to progress and to the transformation of existing relationships. They are interested also in the structure of peasant communities and their role in the revolutionary process, something that has been ignored by both Marxists and non-Marxists. These theorists believe as well that international conditions, both economic and political, are important contributing factors to both processes and outcomes.

Theda Skocpol's work, States and Social Revolution, has been chosen as representative of this group. She perceives a revolution to be a complex, unique phenomenon, which cannot be considered under the general rubric of political violence or social unrest. Rather, revolution must be considered in its entirety as a social process which has both domestic and international elements. Thus, Skocpol argues that "a holistic frame of reference is indispensable, one that includes states, class structures and transnational economic and military relations."\(^31\)

Skocpol defines social revolution as a "rapid, basic transformation of a society's state and class structure" which is concomitant with, and partially the result of, class-based revolts from below.\(^32\) It can be distinguished from a political revolution which alters state structures only, and is not necessarily accomplished by class conflict. Skocpol accepts the view of capitalist society as consisting of objective structural contradic-
tions between the mode of production and the social relations of production. She comments on the Marxist conception of class relations as an "indispensable theoretical tool for identifying one sort of basic contradiction in society." Not only do class relations form a pattern for social and political conflict, Skocpol argues that class conflict has figured prominently in previous revolutions. Class analysis can only identify the cause of revolutions and not the process, therefore, Skocpol uses the political conflict approach which describes the process of mobilization and the development of multiple sovereignties in combination with class analysis.

One of Skocpol's major criticisms of structural-functionalist, social-psychological, and Marxist theories, is the way in which the revolutionary process is viewed. These approaches share a similar three-stage conception: (1) development of changes in the society which give rise to grievances and create a potential for mobilization; (2) a mass-based movement appears, united by ideology and organization with the purpose of overthrowing the government and altering the social order; (3) finally, the emergence of a revolutionary movement which challenges the existing authorities with the intent of establishing themselves in power. This 'purposive image' suggests that the ultimate and sufficient condition for revolution is the withdrawal of the consensual support and, con-
versely, that no regime could survive if the masses were consciously disgruntled." This view is not useful in explaining the continued existence of intensely repressive regimes, nor the varied outcomes of revolutions. Consequently, employing the political conflict approach can help the investigator discover "how and when class members find themselves able to struggle effectively for their interests." 

Skocpol contends that the structural perspective portrays the emergence of the revolutionary situation as the result of international conditions and socioeconomic contradictions. "Collective action is based upon group organization and access to resources," and what emerges is a spontaneous process of revolutionary action which is not the result of any one group's conscious or coordinated effort. Given the varied interests of the groups and the inevitable multiple conflicts, Skocpol feels that to explain processes and outcomes by the activities and intentions of a revolutionary vanguard is too simple an explanation. Institutional determinants, intergroup relations, and the interaction of states within a growing international system, must be considered within a world-historical context.

There is another important element which must be considered in greater detail, and that is Skocpol's notion of the state and its role in the revolutionary
process. The state is central to her analysis which revolves around three important relationships: (1) state-state interaction; (2) state-economy relations, both domestic and international; (3) and state-class cooperation and conflict. Skocpol does not perceive the state to be a response to the various modes of production, or an instrument of the dominant class. Although the state may represent the basic contradictions of the society, the state has separate goals which, if not fulfilled, will result in political crises. For Skocpol, the state is a "set of administrative, policing, and military organizations headed, and more or less well coordinated by, an executive authority" which extracts resources from the society for its maintenance. The state also includes institutions with special actors who are involved in policy-making and implementation. Most importantly, the nation-state exists within the international state and capitalist system which is characterized by unequal development and inter-state competition.

Unlike some political economists, Skocpol does not believe that the international system can be reduced to a 'world capitalist system'. Rather, the international system "represents an analytically autonomous level of transnational reality--interdependent in its structure and dynamics with world capitalism, but not reducible to it." The nation-state emerged as a way to maintain control of
home territories and peoples in order to compete with other states in the international state system. The international system is the "transnational structure of military competition." The competition in the international system plays an important role in the occurrence of social revolutions because they have occurred "only in countries situated in disadvantaged positions within international arenas." Weakened by threats of invasion, military inferiority, and colonial conflicts, state authorities are no longer able to control domestic problems. Furthermore, political leaders are constantly reacting to international influences, such as models for change provided by revolutions in other states, underlining the importance of 'world-historical contexts.'

Given that the state has its own goals of survival in the international system and maintenance of domestic order, it may be "caught in cross-pressures between domestic class structures and international exigencies." Faced with external threats, the state may be forced to redirect the national economy against the wishes of the dominant class, which in turn results in the loss of support of the politically powerful and mobilized groups, and ultimately, the coercive organizations. Once the executive authorities and their armies break apart, the way is open to mobilized groups to challenge their authority. The political contradictions which launch
social revolutions are found at the conjunction of international conditions and pressures, class-structured economies, and politically organized interest groups.

Skocpol notes that social revolutions have occurred in predominantly agrarian states with a centralizing bureaucracy. Typical of the political economy theorists, she emphasizes the 'crucial insurrectionary ingredient' which peasant revolts played once the government's coercive organizations were interrupted. Urban radicalism could not produce the socio-economic transformations for which the peasant revolts were responsible. Peasant revolts, aimed at landlords, weakened the basis of the socioeconomic and political orders as well as limiting the possible options for the elite contending for power. Agrarian social structures must be examined in terms of the historically specific institutional relationships between the direct producers and their lands, their tools, and each other. The peasants' relationship to the land, including whether they are serfs or owners of small holdings, is important for defining the autonomy and solidarity of peasant communities.

Large estates with landless labourers are less likely to experience peasant revolts than smallholder peasant family communities which potentially unite families against the landlords. In addition, the central government's connection with the peasant communities,
either through its own agents, through the landlord, or through peasant representatives, determines the degree of freedom enjoyed by the peasants.

When considering the outcome of social revolutions, Skocpol incorporates within her tripartite analysis centered around the state three other considerations; namely, the struggles surrounding the emergence and consolidation of the state, the contribution of the political leaders, and the role of ideology. Skocpol observes that all leaders of social revolutions were from the educated marginal elites who had connections with the state. She argues that it is natural for them to perceive the state as a tool to implement change, and they should be considered to be state-builders whose success or failure depended upon how well they met the challenges of the new state. The state-builders used ideologies to justify the use of resources to consolidate the new regime. Their ideological leadership was limited by the existing social conditions and the crises created by the revolution, as well as by world-historical and international contexts.

Regarding her argument, Skocpol says that it would be impossible to generalize causal relationships because they are dependent upon the historical and international circumstances of the countries involved. The circumstances that gave rise to the classical revolutions are no longer in existence. The state machinery of the modern
military establishment represses the possible mobilization of popular groups, and thus, peasants no longer have the opportunities to assert their interests. It appears that the important variable in Skocpol's work is the breakdown of the coercive power of the state. This argument corresponds to a point made by H. Eckstein that revolutions occur because "forces heading towards them are strong, but also because forces tending to inhibit, or obstruct them are weak or absent." On the other hand, using the world-historic context to explain differences in processes and outcomes does not provide clear explanatory variables to the extent that it becomes an all encompassing explanation. All differences could be explained in terms of the historically specific circumstances, rendering the creation of a general theory a very difficult task, if not an impossible one.

Another confusing element in the analysis of revolutions is the role which ideology plays. Skocpol says that although the ideologies were "undoubtedly necessary ingredients," the cognitive content of the ideologies are not a predictive key to outcomes or the activities of the revolutionaries. This is obviously true, but Skocpol does not define the role of ideology clearly. Furthermore, she does not answer questions concerning the variance of cultural values and conceptions of social relations with regard to the revolutionary
process as well as outcome.

Another problem, one which Skocpol has inherited from the political conflict approach, concerns the mobilization of the peasant groups. Skocpol argues that psychological and ideological approaches which propose that peasant revolts are reactions to exploitation turn a "constant feature of the peasant condition into an explanatory variable." Peasant revolts are the result of structural and situational conditions. Eric Wolfe, another political economy theorist, understands the eruption of peasant revolts to depend upon 'internal leverage', which is an "organized capacity for collective action." Yet this does not explain the rise of peasant revolts. It is hard to imagine that a peasant resigned to living at subsistence levels would be willing to risk his livelihood in order to suddenly take advantage of structures which have always existed. The leap to action must be made with the help of charismatic leadership or an ideology. In Skocpol's work there is no accommodation for a charismatic leader, nor a mobilizing ideology. Furthermore, among the political economy theorists, there is a variety of causal relations which attempt to explain the reason why peasants revolt.
A second example of a complex multi-variable approach to the study of revolution is found in *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies* by S.N. Eisenstadt. Eisenstadt, like Skocpol, is interested in the combination of socio-historical factors which is responsible for the unique phenomenon of revolution, rather than an alternate form of social change. Eisenstadt's book contains an analysis of social movements in terms of the dynamic interaction between social structures and cultural orientation, which provides the society with behavioural guidelines, considered in an historical, international framework.

The various approaches to date stressed certain aspects of social systems to explain social change. Conflict analysis, systems paradigms, symbolic interactionists, structuralists, and Marxist approaches supplied Eisenstadt with both positive and negative components from which he hoped to make a synthesis. The synthesis would involve a theoretical convergence of symbolic and institutional aspects of social order which would emphasize the symbolic dimensions of cultural orientation as well as the organizational aspects of the social division of labour. Eisenstadt's work appears to have been greatly influenced by Max Weber's economic sociology. It was Weber's
discussion of the types of authority, particularly charismatic authority, which led to Eisenstadt's "identification of the organizational mechanisms of the social division of labour and acceptance of the social order" as being the dynamic components of change. For Eisenstadt, conflict is inherent in society because the mechanisms of the social division of labour which organize production, distribution and use of resources, result in both cooperation and conflict, since meaningful obligations and trust are not inherent in the organizational framework.

The mechanisms or ground rules of social interaction as Eisenstadt refers to them define the forms of social interaction. The ground rules contain the rules for membership in collectivities, rules for and legitimation of distributive justice in terms of rights, obligations, and the access to resources, and the criteria for the use and regulation of power in the institutional and social spheres. In addition, the mechanisms provide the collectivity with a sense of meaning and a perspective of social and concrete needs and goals such as justice and equity.

The origin of the ground rules of social interaction is the symbolic code of the society. The symbolic code is the religious or cultural orientation (belief system) which is the focus for discussion of the inter-relationship between the 'cosmic' and 'mundane' worlds.
It is also the vehicle for the conceptualization and expression of the problems of human existence, such as individual goals, creativity, responsibility, and freedom, which become questions of meaning, continuity, and order at the social level.

Acceptable solutions to the fundamental 'existential' problems are limited by the symbolic code; however, because the symbolic code may justify many solutions embodied by the social structures, a "consciousness of the arbitrariness of the official answers is generated." Thus, the pattern of social interaction connects the institutional order with answers to the basic symbolic problems of human and social existence. Change, then, is the product of the dynamic interaction of the behavioural and normative components of a society within specific historical circumstances.

It is upon this view of society and change that Eisenstadt has based his theory of revolution. The pattern of change which is generally recognized as characteristic of the archetypal revolution (such as the American or French Revolution) is a combination of internal and external factors which have specific historical and socio-cultural conditions. This model of revolution, Eisenstadt argues, is the 'modern' revolution that results in the replacement of traditional structures with those characteristics of the modern nation-state, such as the separa-
tion of church and state, rational-legal framework, greater participation in social institutions and class structures, cultural orientations, and elite structures.

Eisenstadt perceives the society not as an isolated entity, but as occurring within the international economic and political systems. Military competition pressures the finances of the state and necessitates redirection of political and material resources away from internal problems. The specific historical condition which contributed to the occurrence of the modern revolution was the emergence of the international capitalist system and its intrusion upon the domestic economy. The alteration of traditional economic relationships results in corresponding adjustments in the other social relationships.

Using historical comparative analysis (another way in which Weber has been influential), Eisenstadt examines the structures of state in which the 'modern' revolution occurred, and finds that all states could be defined as 'Imperial' or 'Imperial-feudal' societies. These societies were characterized by a high degree of distinctiveness of their centers. The centers impinged upon the periphery (broader groups and strata) through their respective institutions, thus articulating collective identity and goals, as well as regulating justice, conflicts, and the access to power in the society. The distinctiveness of the centers structure social hier-
archies and formed strata that could exist independently of the political and cultural spheres. These separate collectivities, consisting of new elites of special occupational groups, enjoyed a high degree of distinct symbolic articulation which justified the pursuit of certain goals and delimited access routes to resources, ultimately providing the respective members with a sense of place in society (stratum consciousness).  

Although each sector was highly autonomous, coalescence was a goal, and ideological symbolization brought together religious, political, and national collectivities, as well as the centers and the periphery. Eisenstadt argues that it is the existence of this pattern of coalescent change which is responsible for the model of revolutionary transformation encompassing all (social, political, economic, and symbolic) spheres of society.  

The ideological symbolization which united the separate collectivities of the Imperial or Imperial-feudal societies was their cultural orientation. Generally, these societies had a culture highly articulated by specific groups and institutions which made universal claims transcending ethnic, regional, and political boundaries. There existed a sharp distinction between the 'cosmic' (religious) and 'mundane' (social) orders concurrent with a recognition of their interaction,
resulting in a tension between these two orders. It was also the belief of these societies that the gap between the transcendental cosmic order and the social order could be closed through this-worldly activity in the military, political, cultural, and economic spheres, and in this way, salvation could be achieved. In addition, there was a high level of commitment to the social and cultural orders among the different elements of the population. Eisenstadt argues that it was the tension between the 'cosmic' and 'mundane' orders and the belief that this tension could be resolved through this-worldly activity which prepared the 'high civilizations' for wide-reaching cultural and social change.56

Another consideration is the contribution of the principal participants, especially the role of the elites, to the process of revolutionary change. By comparing societies in which a 'pure' revolution occurred, Eisenstadt is able to identify the unique pattern formed by the characteristics of the participants. In all societies in which revolution occurred there existed:

...traditional but potentially modernizing monarchs with strong Absolutist tendencies who variously combined traditional closure with certain modernizing tendencies...57

The modernizing tendencies were partially in response to changes in the domestic economy necessitated by expanding
external capitalist markets. Intra-elite competition developed between diversified upper and middle landed classes and urban groups during the attempt to take advantage of the emerging economic system. Peasant groups, dislocated by the new economy but wanting to utilize their opportunities, also competed with the elites for the new markets.

Other participants in the revolutionary process were new to the traditional society, such as an emerging urban proletariat, as well as new intellectual and religious movements. Most important, however, was the emergence of new political elites. The potential to develop an elite which was able to articulate the demands and interests of broader groups was rooted in the structures of the 'Imperial' or 'Imperial-feudal' societies. The highly independent centers spawned elites which were 'disembedded'. That is to say, the elites had access to potentially 'free-floating' resources which were not entirely absorbed by the institutional spheres or their symbols, and thus could be redirected. Examples of 'free-floating' resources are an elite's access to markets outside the institutional scope of markets, or access to resources which are not controlled by institutions. Out of the potential for autonomy arose the 'institutional entrepreneurs', who were oriented towards this-worldly activity and appeared to use their private resources for
the collective purpose of restructuring the symbolic and institutional spheres. Furthermore, the autonomy of the elites allowed them to pursue coalitions with broader groups and the peripheries, creating a potential for collective action. The more autonomy which the institutional entrepreneurs could claim, the greater their potential to "activate the alternative conceptions of social order and serve as the organizers and mobilizers of newly freed resources." The autonomy of the elites is a key variable which links changes in the symbolic code with modification of the institutional sphere, making possible widespread social change, and ultimately, a modern revolution.

To summarize Eisenstadt’s theory, there appear to be five relevant preconditions of a revolution. Culturally, the society possesses an orientation which promotes this-worldly resolution of the tension between the mundane and transcendental worlds. Protestantism provided such an orientation for the modern revolution in the European states. Another important precondition of a revolution concerns the structure of the state and its goals. Structures such as those found in Imperial or Imperial-feudal societies fostered centers that sought to reorganize the periphery. Arising from these structures are independent, competitive elites, whose wide-ranging interests give them the potential to form coalitions with broader strata. The above social, historical, and
cultural conditions, when combined with international pressures in the form of military competition and intrusion by the world capitalist system, create a revolutionary situation. The outcome of protest movements in such a situation could resemble the archetypical modern revolution.

Eisenstadt also applies his theory to the outcome of the revolution, something which has been unexplained by earlier theorists of revolution. He argues that the outcome of the revolution is determined in part by the international standing and economic development of the state. In addition to the cultural orientation, the structure of the elites and their relationship to the centers and broader strata is a crucial factor in determining the outcome. The institutional entrepreneurs continue to play an important role in restructuring the centers and their institutions. Eisenstadt argues that the degree of isolation/solidarity of the elites is a determinant in the revolutionary outcome. He notes that:

...the more autonomous and disembedded the major elites, the more they tended to generate new meanings of institutions and to promote far-reaching symbolic and organizational restructuring of institutional spheres and center-periphery relations...61

A third critical variable which intervenes between the centers and the outcome of the revolution concerns the
resources available to the centers. The quantity and quality of resources to which the center has access determine how well the transition to modernity will be made. The centers must also be able to incorporate new avenues of access and new members while establishing "links with the broader strata in order to attempt institution building." Furthermore, Eisenstadt explains that these variables interact with the degree of change, or continuity-discontinuity, in the institutions and ground rules of social interaction. The degree of violence is also an independent variable.

Eisenstadt's work represents an attempt to formulate a synthesis of the competing paradigms of society and social change. He argues that the potential for contradiction and conflict exists concomitant with the internal momentum of the society's institutions and values toward continuity. Eisenstadt perceives society as an organic system (consisting of both structural and symbolic elements) which demonstrates emergent properties and boundary maintenance. Definition of a situation arises not only from the given values, but also from the interaction of the people involved; an incorporation of the symbolic-interactionist's dynamic view of the symbolic sphere. Eisenstadt also introduces into his model 'conflict' which he perceives as the result of a society's inherent tendency to generate internal contra-
dictions. The institutionalization of a certain cultural code becomes closely tied to the social division of labour and the distribution of power and resources. Because man is biologically endowed with the potential to shape the environment, individuals and groups challenge the institutionalized accesses to power and resources. Ultimately, this leads members of the society to contest the symbolic code upon which the institutions are based.

Eisenstadt's understanding of the process of revolution also draws on several theories. He recognizes the important role played by elites in directing the revolutionary movement. Their linkages with broader groups, who are articulating their feelings of relative deprivation in political terms, is achieved through broad social movements. The themes of protest which stem from the cultural orientation of the society mobilize the various segments, creating the potential for revolution. Eisenstadt recognizes that leaders of the movements are not only motivated by altruistic visions of the good society, but are also concerned with acquiring more power in the restructured system. Although this analysis of Eisenstadt's synthesis has been brief, it is possible to discern the ways in which he has adopted concepts from the various approaches. Most importantly, Eisenstadt's theory captures the essence of the dynamic nature of society as it responds to both forces of cohesion and
Eisenstadt's most important contribution to the study of revolution is the incorporation of symbolic interests in his analysis of revolution. In the literature concerning modernization and political development, culture has been used to explain what were otherwise incomprehensible differences. Eisenstadt has attempted to make the variable of culture a more useful tool for the analyst of revolutions. He has identified three aspects of culture which influence a society's propensity for revolution. The degree of symbolic articulation of the problems of human existence is a fundamental indicator of a society's potential for coalescent change. Eisenstadt argues that the extent to which a society either accepts as given or questions its symbolic sphere—thus opening the way for reformulation of symbols—is indicated by the degree of abstraction of the existential problems. Closely related to the degree of symbolic articulation is the society's perception of the tension between the mundane and transcendental worlds. Eisenstadt suggests that if a society believes there to be a low level of tension between the two 'worlds', or if the tension is to be dissolved by an 'other-worldly' resolution, the social consequence is the lack of motivation to pursue structural and symbolic changes. Similarly, if there exists a low level of commitment to socio-political order among
the society's members, coalescent change will not occur.

The problem which arises with such an analysis is the absence of an objective measure to discern a society's cultural orientation. This problem is especially critical with respect to the homogeneity of a cultural orientation, not only in terms of sects and religious/intellectual movements, but also with regard to the orientation of different strata. Nevertheless, Eisenstadt's classification of these components of culture allows a degree of precision when applying this variable to a case study.

Having incorporated the cultural variable into his theory, Eisenstadt is able to eliminate the challenge of explaining the process of mobilization, which is only partially met by the political conflict approaches. Entrepreneurial elites articulate the cultural symbols, values, and ideologies, which mobilize the broader strata. These contenders for power represent widespread interests (material and symbolic) and have access to resources unbound by institutions.

The function of the elites in the revolutionary process is a focal point of Eisenstadt's theory. Although it is not wrong to emphasize the importance of the elites, he largely ignores the role of the peasantry. Eisenstadt remarks that the Imperial and Imperial-feudal societies were characterized by a "relatively free peasantry" as
compared to patrimonial societies in which "peasant families became tenants." This vague reference hints at the importance of the structures of peasant communities to revolutionary changes, but this relationship is explored in passing comments only. Even in his discussion of the Chinese Communist Revolution, Eisenstadt focuses upon the peasants' lack of class consciousness rather than their relationship to the land.

Eisenstadt's attempt to create an all-encompassing explanatory model of revolution has resulted in a complex, multi-variable theory. The concepts which are used to explain the occurrence of revolutions are consistent with his perspective of society and are justified by his understanding of social processes. However, Eisenstadt wishes to create a general theory of revolution, and he presents to the analyst broad, open categories and preconditions. For example, much is left to the analyst to discern such things as state goals or elite orientations. Both concepts require an informed understanding of the society under scrutiny before they can be properly utilized as contributing factors to a revolutionary situation. Eisenstadt illustrates the application of the categories through his theoretical analysis of several societies. Given the complex nature of the phenomenon in question, Eisenstadt risks using variables beyond those mentioned in the theory. Moreover, understanding
the complex theory is hindered by the relative incomprehensibility of his writing. The reader faces a text filled with jargon that is ill-defined and a writing style which is wooden and difficult to follow.

One other element which deserves examination is the historically specific conditions of revolution. Eisenstadt argues that the historical condition which led to the rise of the 'modern' revolution is the emergence of Protestantism. He is intrigued by Weber's investigation into the relationship between Protestantism and the rise of capitalism. Eisenstadt queries whether the "fact that the first revolutions took place in Europe and the later ones occurred only under the impact of European expansion" was but an historical accident. He accepts Weber's conclusion that the Western progression to modernity is unique. Western expansion appears to have elicited in some societies 'modern' revolutions given similar internal characteristics and historical circumstances. Given this belief, it could be argued that the intrusion of Western values and institutions should be one of the international pressures which contributes to neo-Western revolutions.

Despite the problem of complexity and the related concern with parsimony that arises when considering his theory, Eisenstadt makes a valuable contribution to the study of revolutionary phenomena. His synthesis
of the competing paradigms of society incorporates both elements of systemic order and inherent contradictions which lead to conflict. Furthermore, Eisenstadt's delineation of the role of culture in the preconditions and processes of revolution renders his theory an important addition to the literature on revolution.

It is obvious from the above discussion that each of the theories of revolution examined make an important contribution to an understanding of a revolutionary situation. The two questions outlined in the previous chapter help to narrow the choice. To answer the question pertaining to the causes of the Shah's downfall, it is necessary to use an approach which includes international, political, economic and social elements. The theories of either Skocpol or Eisenstadt could provide a framework for analyzing these factors. The second question addresses the contribution of Islam and its institutions to the revolutionary situation. Cultural symbols and structures played a crucial role in the revolutionary process and continue to do so in the Islamic Republic. Therefore, analysis of the culture variable is necessary to understand the events in Iran. In light of this, it is apparent that Eisenstadt's theory is the most appropriate
framework with which to investigate the Iranian revolution, although contributions to the analysis may be made by the other theories.

One variable which should be added to Eisenstadt's theory concerns the intrusion of Western ideals upon a non-Western society. Consideration must be given to the differing impact which modernity has upon a society when it is imposed (such as in the case of Iran), or when it emerged from within the structures and symbols of the society (such as in the Western states). The reconstruction of the social and political orders according to the premises of European modernity may not achieve mass support, ultimately hindering coalescent change. Eisenstadt argues that the adoption of socialism by non-European societies is a way to incorporate the ideas of modernity and simultaneously, to display a dislike of the West. Perhaps a far-reaching cultural movement which addresses both mundane and transcendental problems, such as Islam, can play the same role as socialism in non-Western societies.

Islam outlines for its believers a complete view of the world providing behavioural and institutional guidelines for the social, political, and economic spheres. It embraces knowledge, science, and technology as a way to better the material existence of man while proposing the observance of a universalistic moral code to avoid the
alienation of Western society. Thus, Islam shares many of the characteristics of socialism which Eisenstadt enumerates in his discussion. This proposition will be considered with regard to Iran.

The following three chapters will examine the Iranian revolution using the categories which Eisenstadt has outlined. Chapter III will consider the international military and economic pressures faced by Iran, especially with regard to the Americans' and the Shah's emphasis upon Iran's security role in the Persian Gulf. In addition, the impact of the dramatic rise of oil prices upon the modernizing Iranian economy will also be explored. Chapter IV will focus upon the structures of Iranian society and the relationships between the elites and strata. The emergence of institutional entrepreneurs and their interaction with the political centers in the seventies will also be investigated. In both Chapters III and IV, mention will be made of the predominant goals of the Shah's regime. Finally, the fifth chapter will utilize Eisenstadt's 'cultural' variable to examine the cultural orientation of Iran and its role in the revolutionary processes and outcomes.
REFERENCES


2. These criteria have been influenced by B. Salert as presented in her work Revolution and Revolutionaries: Four Theories, p. 21 and H. Eckstein, "Introduction Toward the Theoretical Study of Internal War" in Internal War: Problems and Approaches, ed., H. Eckstein (Toronto: Collier-Macmillan Canada Ltd., 1964), pp. 7-23.


4. Ibid., p. 94.

5. Ibid., p. 91.

6. Ibid., p. 99. Michael Freeman in his work "Review Article: Theories of Revolution", British Journal of Political Science, 2:3 (July, 1972), 339-359, argues that Johnson's idea of fortune suggests that the elements which create a revolution may be linked by a time sequence rather than causal sequence.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., p. 106.


12. Ibid., p. 11.
13 Ibid., p. 9.


16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., p. 319.

18 B. Salert, Revolution and Revolutionaries, p. 66.

19 Ibid., p. 67.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., p. 68.

22 C. Tilly, "Revolution and Collective Violence", in R.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby, eds., Macropolitical Theory (Don Mills: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1975), p. 519. Tilly understands sovereignty to mean exclusive legitimate control of the means of coercion. Legitimacy is signalled by such things as the honouring of the sovereign group's symbols, the support of its institutions and observation of its laws by formally acquiescent members of the population.

23 Ibid., p. 501.

24 Ibid., p. 502.

25 Ibid., p. 503.

26 Ibid., p. 509.

27 Ibid., p. 520.

28 Ibid., p. 523.


32 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 4.

33 Ibid., p. 13.

34 Ibid., p. 14.

35 Ibid., p. 16.

36 Ibid., p. 13.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid., p. 29.

39 Ibid., p. 22.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., p. 23.

42 Ibid., p. 47.


44 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, p. 170.


Ibid., p. 28-29.

Ibid., p. 31.


Borrowing Edward Shil's notion of center and periphery, Eisenstadt explains that a center is the place in which the symbols, values and beliefs of the society are given concrete manifestation through institutions and roles.

S.N. Eisenstadt, Revolution and the Transformation of Societies, p. 87.

Ibid., p. 35.

Eisenstadt identifies three types of change in traditional societies: segregative, exceptional and coalescent change. Segregative change is typical of patrimonial states and is characterized by a divergence between changes in the ground rules of social interaction and symbolic collectivities, and changes in the institutions and structures. Exceptional change occurs in tribal federations and city-states. The characteristics of coalescent change experienced in Imperial or Imperial-feudal societies are a convergence of transformations in
the ground rules of social interaction and a restructuring of the collectivities and institutions, among many other convergences.

57 Ibid., p. 196.
58 Ibid., p. 105.
59 Ibid., p. 32.
60 Ibid., p. 105.
61 Ibid., p. 245.
62 Ibid., p. 240.
63 Ibid., p. 101.
64 Ibid., p. 91.
65 Ibid., p. 131.
66 Ibid., p. 205.
67 Ibid., p. 187.
68 Ibid., pp. 183-184.
III

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

Structural-functionalists acknowledge the interrelationship between a social system and its environment as a source of disequilibrating tendencies, which may ultimately result in social change. Theorists such as Eisenstadt and Skocpol have endeavoured to clarify the impact of external pressures upon revolutionary situations. Eisenstadt argues that interstate competition, caused by the continual shifts of power and influence in the international political system, directs resources away from domestic problems. In addition, the international industrial system which subsumes different types of economic systems is neither conterminous with, nor identical to, its political counterpart. The international economic system possesses its own power fluctuations which often conflict with the power relations of the international political system.¹

The international political and economic systems interact with the political and economic centers of a society. Eisenstadt recognizes the contribution which is made by Theda Skocpol's tripartite explanation of the
relationship between the international context and the domestic system in terms of the state's potential autonomy. As described above, Skocpol perceives that the state is caught in cross-pressures by virtue of its dual goals of survival in the international system as well as the maintenance of domestic order. External threats may force a state to redirect resources away from the domestic economy against the wishes of the dominant class. Consequently, powerful groups may be alienated from the political system, and may therefore seek to mobilize groups to challenge political authorities.

Eisenstadt agrees that the redistribution of economic resources may result in political competition among different groups in society. He argues, however, that the identification of such processes does not explain why some societies experience far-reaching structural reform, rather than a revolution. Such a difference may be explained in terms of the cultural orientation. Because the rules of distributive justice are determined by the institutionalized symbolic code, the power struggle brings into question the fundamental socioeconomic relations of the society. Coalescent change, characteristic of modern revolution, demands the convergence of transformation in the economic, political, and social spheres. Eisenstadt believes that the cultural orientation of a society, especially with regard to the
commitment to the sociopolitical order, may provide the linkages necessary for revolution. Nevertheless, the international context contributes to the creation of tension within the social system, which ultimately may result in widespread social change, given the existence of other conducive elements.

While the international context of any state is a critical factor in its development, this seems to be particularly the case in Iran. Noting Iran's geographical and (later) economic importance, the world's great powers—especially Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States—endeavoured to secure their interests within the state. Although Iran did not manifest directly the rivalries between the great powers, the competition was one source of conflict which would be reflected in later revolutionary movements. For example, Iran's reaction to foreign control and manipulation of her role in world politics has been a pre-occupation with self-determination. It has been argued that Mohammad Reza Shah's concern with Iran's sovereignty and security in the early part of the last decade resulted in the neglect of domestic demands. The Shah's determination to return Iran to its position as one of the world's great civilizations left SAVAK, the Shah's secret police, with primary responsibility for controlling political opposition. Foreign intrusion into Iran's socioeconomic system
as well as the rejection of Westernization were prominent themes of protest among the leaders of the revolutionary movement.

Given the limitations of this paper, it is not possible to present more than a superficial overview of the international pressures which contributed to the issues presented in the Iranian revolution. Iran's position within the context of the international political and economic systems will be reviewed historically from the Qajar period to the fall of the Shah in 1979. The effects of the international context upon the Iranian domestic system will be analyzed in terms of their contribution to the problems which occasioned the emergence of forces which successfully challenged the Shah.

During the rule of the Qajar monarchs in the second half of the eighteenth century, Iran came under the influence of both Britain and Russia. Iran sought an ally against Russian advancements and turned to Britain, who promised military and financial aid if European military incursions occurred. Through the alliance with Iran, Britain gained the opportunity to continue the expansion and consolidation of her colonial
empire in Asia. In addition, Iran was to be a buffer zone between British and Russian interests. Russia's colonial advances were motivated by the longtime desire for a western sea access to the Indian Ocean. Following the Russo-Iranian War, the Turkmanchai Treaty in 1828 outlined considerable economic concessions for the Russians. Britain, of course, demanded equivalent concessions and was granted them in a treaty of 1841. The effect of these agreements was to reduce the independence of the Iranian government. The Qajar regime could not freely make a decision without first consulting both Britain and Russia. The rivalry between the two major powers, however, protected the nominal political independence of Iran from further reduction.

The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 divided Iran into two spheres of influence: Russia in the north and Britain in the southeast, the middle being a buffer zone. It was reasoned that if Iran could not be independent, a weak state under the influence of both major powers could be used to prevent the outbreak of conflict between Britain and Russia. The outbreak of World War I, however, gave Britain an opportunity to strengthen her economic and military position in Iran, while Russia faced both serious internal problems and the demands of war. The overthrow of the Czarist regime and the consequent offer of friendship extended to Iran by the
Bolsheviks in 1917 threatened British claims. Attempts to place Iran under a British protectorate failed, and British intervention was brought to a halt. Iran began to negotiate a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union which would ultimately be signed by Reza Shah in 1921. The treaty renounced the claims of Iran based upon the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, cancelled all Iranian debts and provided for the withdrawal of all Russian forces. In return, Iran was not to allow itself to be used by a third party as a base against the Soviet Union and its allies. Great power competition in Iran had been temporarily averted with Britain maintaining the greatest influence.

The rivalry between Britain and Russia fundamentally weakened the government of the Qajar kings. A modernized central army was never established in Iran because the Qajars relied upon the formal commitments of military aid from Britain and Russia. The absence of a coercive force discouraged attempts to impose modernizing reforms from above because of the threat of rebellion. The construction of railways which would have encouraged the growth of a central bureaucracy was not supported by either Britain or Russia. Both great powers believed that a weak, decentralized Iranian government was in their own interest.

Perhaps the most important consequence of the
Qajar government's impotence was the increased power of the Shi'ite clergy. The power of the Sunni clergy decreased in states such as Egypt and the Ottoman Empire which had established a centralized army and bureaucracy. Whereas the clergy in the latter Middle East states were losing their control over education and law, the Shi'ite clergy gained popularity and strength during the nineteenth century. According to this argument, the Anglo-Russian rivalry can be said to have contributed to the prominence and strength of the clergy in the Iranian revolution.

The weak and inefficient rule of the Qajar kings, exacerbated by the political consequences of World War I, economic disarray and tribal divisions, threatened the existence of Iran as an independent state. In 1919, the British offered a treaty which would have made Iran a dependent ally. Although the treaty was signed by the Iranian negotiators, it was never ratified by the Majlis (Assembly). The growing anti-British sentiment present in the Majlis reflected similar challenges to British influence in post-war Turkey, India and Afghanistan which were host to nationalist-reform movements. The nationalist forces in Iran were led by Sayyid Zia
al-Din Tabatabai, a pro-British moderate who believed that Iran needed an independent, strong government. He planned to overthrow the Qajar government with the help of Reza Khan, then the commander of the Russian-trained Iranian army. It was an alliance supported by British authorities. Reza Khan led the Qazvin Cossack Brigade to the capital of Tehran and seized control of the government on February 21, 1921 in a relatively bloodless coup d'état. Sayyid Zia was proclaimed prime minister and Reza Khan became the war minister. The major opposition movements protesting the new government and its policies were finally suppressed by the early twenties, although opposition continued throughout Reza Khan's reign. Due to the personal ambition of Reza Khan, the alliance between him and Sayyid Zia dissolved in 1923, resulting in the resignation of the Prime Minister. With the support of the Majlis, the war minister crowned himself Reza Shah in 1925.

Reza Shah's rise to power in 1921 was partially based upon his desire to insulate Iran from major power rivalry. He procured the ratification of the Iranian-Soviet Treaty of 1921, and rejected the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919. The acceptance of this treaty cannot be necessarily interpreted as a move toward a closer Soviet alliance, but rather it was an attempt to reduce the growing economic and political control of Iran by
Britain. The major dispute between Iran and Britain concerned the British monopoly of the Iranian oil industry as established by the Anglo-Persian Company under the D'Arcy Concession of 1901. The company's export oriented style mostly benefitted the oil company itself and the British government. Iranian dissatisfaction with this arrangement came to a climax in 1932 when Reza Shah cancelled the original concession, a move prompted by declining royalties. After intense negotiations, Britain signed a new agreement with Iran limiting the area of concession to 100,000 square miles, but retaining British monopoly of the oil industry.¹³

During this time, Reza Shah sought monetary and technical assistance from other states with the intention of establishing a "close relationship with a third power to secure a counterbalance against Anglo-Soviet intervention and rivalry."¹⁴ The United States was perceived by Reza Shah to be the appropriate ally in this matter. Given American reluctance to be involved in world affairs at that time and the recognition of Iran as existing within the British sphere of influence, the United States did not respond quickly to the Shah's overtures. The United States finally changed its position on Iran during the Second World War.

At the eruption of World War II, Reza Shah declared Iran a neutral zone, hoping that the friendship
with its trading partner, Germany, could be maintained. Nazi advances at the Soviet front, however, resulted in a Soviet request for Allied help from Britain and the United States. In addition, the number of Nazi advisors in Iran appeared to Britain to constitute a fifth column.\(^{15}\)

The withdrawal of German troops in Iran would allow the establishment of an important link via transnational railway between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. British and Russian efforts failed to persuade Reza Shah to make such a commitment, forcing an Anglo-Soviet invasion with American support. Iran was occupied by Britain and the Soviet Union in the same way as the state had been divided under the previous 1907 agreement. Most importantly, the Anglo-Soviet invasion forced Reza Shah to abdicate in favour of his son to ensure the preservation of the dynasty.\(^{16}\)

In power for thirty years, Reza Shah had endeavoured to push Iran toward modernity modelled upon Western political and social institutions. During this time, however, he failed to gain popular support among broad segments of the Iranian society. His forced abdication, brought about by the great powers, placed upon the throne an inexperienced Mohammad Reza Shah who had to immediately contend with the social and economic upheaval arising from the war, and a political challenge to the role of the monarchy in Iran.
The competition between Britain and the Soviet Union continued after the war despite an Anglo-Soviet-American agreement signed in 1943, which stated that the occupation of Iran would cease not later than six months after the end of the war. British and American forces withdrew by January 1, 1946. After a series of negotiations between the Iranian and Soviet government, the Soviet troops eventually evacuated the Iranian territory by May of the same year, concluding the occupation of Iran during the Second World War.

After World War II, the international political system began to change radically. As Britain was beginning to decline as a dominant world power, the United States was slowly emerging as a superpower with global interests which needed protection. During the Second World War, American policy toward Iran shifted from limited to extensive involvement for two main reasons. A pro-Western Iran was a way (geographically) to secure American interests in the Persian Gulf so as to hinder Soviet expansion in the Middle East. Furthermore, by the early 1940's, it had become clear that the major source of the world's petroleum was to be the Gulf area. Western economic security depended upon the existence of an independent, pro-Western Persian Gulf.
Although Britain and the Soviet Union continued to influence Persian Gulf politics, the United States became the major foreign power in Iran.

In the immediate post-war period, the United States provided Iran with important economic and military aid, consistent with the Truman doctrine. The most critical American action in Iranian affairs occurred with regard to Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq. The occupation of Iran during World War II had rekindled traditional tribal divisions as well as the diverse ideological orientations of the beginning of the century. Dr. Mossadeq was a leading nationalist and reformer who advocated a limited monarchy and a parliamentary system as well as the nationalization of the oil industry. The revenue from a nationalized industry was to be used to implement social reforms and aid Iran's progress toward independence.

This programme threatened the interests of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. It was the company's refusal to enter a 'fifty-fifty' relationship with the Iranian government that provided the Majlis with the impetus to assert its demand for full nationalization. The British government felt that allowing Mossadeq to implement his nationalization plans would cripple the British economy as well as seriously damage its prestige. Consequently, in October of 1951, the British decided that they
would force Mossadeq to alter his plans by initiating an economic blockade. British Petroleum obtained an agreement with the other international oil companies to refrain from entering any agreements with Iran: Iranian oil production dropped from 241.4 million barrels in 1950 to 10.6 million barrels in 1952. Mossadeq's government was soon weakened and the United States was asked to provide diplomatic support and economic aid.

From an American point of view, the British action would result in a pro-Soviet Iranian government. Washington, therefore, advised Britain to reconsider her plans. Britain countered by arguing that a pro-Soviet government was not the only alternative, since a pro-Western monarchy would provide the outlet for American security. British and American diplomatic forces were at a standstill until Mossadeq attempted to take over the emergency powers given to the Shah in the Constitution. Anti-Mossadeq forces, centered around the monarchy, provided the alternative for which the British and American governments had hoped. The American government and the C.I.A. encouraged a coup d'etat which reinstated the then absent Mohammed Reza Shah as the head of state. Consequently, much American support was given to secure the Pahlavi monarchy and to ensure American interests in the Middle East.

Protection of American military and economic
interests in the Persian Gulf motivated the government of the United States to intervene in the domestic politics of Iran. Mossadeq was a nationalistic reformer whose plans to modernize Iran and pursue independence were widely supported amongst the Iranian people. Unfortunately, the nationalization of the oil industry threatened British economic interests. The British use of an international boycott was supported by the United States which was concerned with the 'communist' tendencies in the Iranian government. Mossadeq's political reforms which included limiting the power of the monarchy and strengthening the parliamentary system could have made possible the election of a pro-Soviet government in Iran. The stronger states of the international system were able to force their will upon Mossadeq by using the emerging international economic system to their advantage. The return of Mohammad Reza Shah to power was in the best interest of the American government because it ensured a continuous pro-Western alliance. Nikki R. Keddie argues that the Shah would not have been able to resume his throne without the help of the United States. 21

The unstable condition of the political system in Iran forced the Shah to rely upon American support to
consolidate his rule. In addition to monetary aid, the American government provided technology and advisors to develop the oil industry and to reorganize the military. The United States' multi-faceted involvement in Iran ensured the security of Western interests in the Persian Gulf. It also left Iran vulnerable to American pressures. It has been argued that the Kennedy administration, concerned with increasing the Shah's support base and consolidating the monarchy, pressured the Iranian government to 'Westernize' its political and economic systems.\(^{22}\) The Shah's response to the American suggestion was the 'White Revolution'. (which will be discussed in later chapters) is considered here only with regard to its economic impact.

The years included in the Third Development Plan (1962-1968) were a turning point for the Iranian economy, especially with regard to industrialization. Iran's growing industrial sector was stimulated in part by expanding transportation and communications.\(^ {23}\) Oil was becoming important as a cheap source of energy for the emerging industries, while maintaining its traditional importance as an export commodity.\(^ {24}\) Development of petrochemical and steel plants was promoted by bilateral agreements. The number of light industries grew with support from both the public and private sectors, resulting in the establishment of vehicle assembly plants, chemical and
pharmaceutical plants, and refrigerator and heater plants, among others. The growth rate of the gross national product during this time was approximately ten percent per annum. Iran's economy was benefitting from the rapid expansion of the international economic system during the 1960's.

The Fourth Development Plan (1968-1973) was a time of continuing structural changes and increased national income. The apparent political stability gained through the reforms outlined in the White Revolution fostered the development of the industrial and service sectors. According to the budget proposed in the fourth plan, the industrial and mining sectors received twenty-two percent of the total allocations and fourteen percent was set aside for development of the communication and transportation sectors. Agriculture was budgeted only eight percent of the actual disbursements, indicating that the government wished to direct the work force into the industrial sector. Main areas of investment in industry continued to be iron and steel, petrochemicals, and machine building. The growth rate of the gross national product during the fourth plan was 16.5 percent per annum and the inflation rate was 3.4 percent per annum. Much of the increase in the gross national product was due to slowly rising oil prices and an increased rate of production.
There were both positive and negative changes in the agricultural sector during this time. The Land Reform Law of 1962 was part of the Shah's White Revolution. In its first phase, the lands of large estates were transferred to the peasants throughout Iran, often without regard for the potential productivity of a given plot. Peasants faced problems caused by inefficient seed and fertilizer distribution and insufficient irrigation systems. In 1965, the second phase of land reform was implemented, resulting in the distribution of remaining villages held by landlords and the creation of farm cooperatives. The agricultural cooperatives consisted of consolidated peasant lands from one or more villages. Many farmers, although benefitting from reforms, feared the confiscation of their lands for the development of agrobusinesses. In the case of both farm cooperatives and agrobusinesses, the peasant shareholders were to become working members, but the large farms were heavily mechanized and not labour intensive. Government emphasis upon technological improvements in agriculture in the third phase of land reform resulted in the decline of labour intensity displacing many rural workers. Rapid industrial development attracted many to the urban centers in search of employment. The size of the agricultural labour force decreased despite the growing population and the increasing demand for imported agri-
cultural goods which almost doubled between 1969-70 and 1970-71. Agricultural self-sufficiency appeared to be a more distant goal than it had been at the initial phase of the White Revolution.

The years of the Cold War gradually gave way to a situation of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union. The international system had evolved from a bipolar division of power to a multipolar world of diffuse power relationships which varied according to issues. Strategic concerns were fragmented by political and economic interests which at times, were in conflict. The Nixon Doctrine recognized the change in the international system. In 1969, President Nixon stated that the United States would no longer be willing to police the states within its sphere of influence. Rather, the American government would encourage the emergence of strong regional actors who would defend their own interests and the interest of others, thereby protecting American interests as well. Sharam Chubin argues that the American policy of disengagement in combination with the fragmentation of security issues, and the constraint on the use of force, underlined the need for self-reliance and strategic deterrence in such regions as the
The international context necessitated the build-up of national forces in Iran to assure security in the Persian Gulf. This role was willingly accepted by the Shah who had long envisioned Iran's return to greatness. Mohammad Reza Shah's 'national mythology' emphasized the pre-Islamic past of Iran by focussing upon the glory of the Achaemenian Empire (550-330 B.C.). The Shah's 1971 celebrations of 2500 years of the Persian monarchy epitomized the identification of his reign with Emperor Cyrus the Great, who ruled the Persian Empire at the height of its power. The Shah believed that it was his mission to guide Iran toward the Tamaddon-e Bozorg (Great Civilization) which would be a self-sufficient economic and military power. To realize his vision, the Shah needed to secure raw materials and sources of foreign investment for the development of the Iranian economy and an extensive militarization programme. Such action would allow Iran to maintain her strategic position in the Persian Gulf, and to ultimately become a world power.

Given Iran's geopolitical situation, it is easy to understand the Shah's preoccupation with national security. Moscow was still interested in neutralizing the American influence in Iran. The Shah believed that the Soviet Union pursued a policy of subversion by
actively aiding the Tudeh (Communist) party and separatist movements in Iran. In addition, the extensive economic importance of the Persian Gulf, not only to the oil exporters, but to the states dependent upon Middle East oil, placed an even greater burden upon Iran.

The instability of the Gulf countries was magnified by American and Soviet interests in the region. In order to avoid the direct presence of the superpowers in the Middle East, there would have to be a military option. Iranian military buildup in conjunction with diplomatic efforts could police regional problems and avoid global conflicts. The Shah believed that defense of the country against Arab aggression or attempts to claim Iran by either of the superpowers would require a strong, sophisticated military. The "Great Civilization" could be built only if Iran was stable and secure. In 1972, President Nixon agreed to sell the Shah sophisticated weaponry he desired, thus removing all restrictions previously placed on the sale of arms to non-industrial nations. This proposal was eagerly accepted by the Shah, who, subsequent to the 1973 increase in oil prices was able to take full advantage of the offer.

The nationalistic consciousness which emerged in the 1950's and 1960's motivated oil producing countries, which were at the mercy of the policies of multinational oil companies, to formulate a common
petroleum policy. The result was the creation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The aim of the organization was to remove control of world oil prices and production from western oil companies and place them in the hands of the oil-producing countries. OPEC was to guard the interests of its members as well as to ensure a fair return on a product which was an essential commodity and a non-renewable resource.

Both prices and production rose slowly in Iran throughout the 1960's. The 'Declaratory Statement of Petroleum Policy in Member Countries' adopted by OPEC stated that its objectives were to increase control over oil production, prices, and distribution. Following the lead of Colonel Mummar al Qaddafi of Libya, who in 1971 raised oil prices, cut production, and threatened the closure of Western oil companies on Libyan territory, OPEC passed a general agreement in the same year regarding increased tax rates and oil prices, and the abolition of discounts granted to the oil companies. Iran's revenue from oil production rose from "1,136 million dollars in 1970 to 1,944 million dollars in 1971". Increases were to continue on a yearly basis.

With the success of OPEC, the Shah renewed his efforts to achieve the goal to nationalize the oil industry in Iran. In 1973, he announced that "all exploration,
extraction and refining activities and installations were to come under the Iranian control" under the auspices of the Oil Service Company of Iran. The nationalization of the oil industry occurred in time to take advantage of the OPEC negotiations concerning price increases in 1973. Shortly after the adjournment of October negotiations, during which one hundred percent price increases were proposed, Iran and five other Gulf members (Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar) declared a seventy percent price increase. Iranian oil revenues rose from approximately four billion dollars in 1973 to over seventeen billion dollars in 1974.

The effect of the increased oil revenues was reflected in an revision of the Fifth Development Plan (1973-1978) which had been in effect for almost one year. The original plan had projected increased spending in industry, transportation, and communication, based upon a steadily increasing gross national product. The injection of the additional oil revenues, however, created the opportunity to increase development, consumption, and defense budgets. More money was allocated to housing development, to public health facilities, and to establishing a free education system. The goal of the revised fifth economic plan was to raise the quality of the social, economic, political, and cultural life of all Iranians through rapid economic growth and development.
The quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 allowed the Shah to take greater advantage of Nixon's offer. The Iranian defense budget was increased again by 141 percent from 1,525 million dollars in 1973 to 3,680 million in 1974. This budget would be increased again by 72 percent in 1975 and 41 percent in 1976. American trade with Iran also accelerated in accordance with the demands for arms. As of 1977, the United States was responsible for 6.4 billion dollars of the import market in Iran, of which all but 2.2 billion was incurred in the purchase of military arms and services. As Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the Shah alone decided upon all major procurements of arms.

The purchase of such large quantities of arms had a great effect upon the Iranian domestic situation. Between 1971 and 1978, 32 percent of the total planned expenditure was budgeted for defense spending. Iran was forced to import between fifty and eighty percent of the modern armaments because the technological sophistication necessary to make the complex weapon systems did not exist in Iran. The financial burden of the military costs necessitated the diversion of resources from other projects that may have enhanced Iranian industrial and social development. Furthermore, natural resources were redirected toward military uses rather than domestic economic concerns.
The Shah was committed to rapid and balanced development to meet his lofty target for Iranian society despite warnings from the newly established Plan and Budget Organization, which was responsible for altering the fifth plan. The ramifications of such high spending rates were revealed financially and socially. Waste, corruption, and inflation plagued the Shah's attempts to industrialize rapidly. Inefficiency encumbered development projects, for the sudden demand for construction facilities taxed the existing resources, resulting in delays. Given the demand for skilled workers and the inevitable delays, contractors were able to inflate the value of their work without opposition.

Iranian ports were also inadequately prepared for the increase of imports demanded by the Iranian people. Bottlenecks created by the number of ships waiting outside ports cost the Iranian government one billion dollars in demurrage charges, and businessmen incurred losses due to spoiled cargo.

This pattern of growth with concomitant development problems is typical of third world oil-producing countries. A weak and backward agricultural sector, unequal distribution of income, labour and manufacturing shortages, corruption and inflation are faced by many Middle East countries as they try to take advantage of
the opportunities which their oil income affords them. Those industrialists who benefitted most by the oil boom were professionals and the middle class who were in a position to take advantage of the opportunities. Although the poor benefitted, their gain was not as great. 57 In general, however, Iran experienced real economic growth since 1973. The gross national product rose by thirty-four percent in 1973-74, forty-two percent in 1974-75, and seventeen percent in 1975-76. 58 The minimum wage of urban labourers rose thirty-six percent in 1974-75, and forty-two percent in 1975-76. 59 The balance of payments remained strong throughout the 1970's despite the fact that expenditures slightly outweighed revenues in 1978-1979. 60

vi

In his theory of revolution, Eisenstadt directs the analyst to consider the international context which contributes to the creation of a revolutionary situation in two ways. Competition among states in the international political system and emergence into the international capitalist system places strains upon a state's goals of survival and security. The rivalry between Britain and Russia encouraged the continued existence of a weak, decentralized Qajar regime which was susceptible
to foreign influence. The result of such great power rivalry was manifest in Iran's relatively late steps toward modernity in comparison to such Middle East states as Egypt and Turkey. Modernization and centralization in these countries were more gradually introduced, beginning as early as the nineteenth century. Although modernization in Iran began at the turn of the century, reforms gained great momentum under the direction of the Pahlavi monarchs.

The existence of a decentralized government in nineteenth century Iran allowed the growth of **ulama** independence and power. The **ulama** expanded their traditional involvement in the legal, education and welfare systems of Iran, functions generally considered to be the concerns of a government. Modernization threatened the **ulama**'s independent power base among the rural and lower class urban populations. The position of the **ulama** in modernizing Iran will be discussed in greater detail below. It should be noted, however, that the **ulama**'s changing role in Iranian society has been influenced by the competition between Britain and Russia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Reza Shah's rise to power signalled the beginning of a program of rapid modernization in Iran. A centralized secular bureaucracy was established which assumed the responsibilities of education, justice and welfare,
consequently limiting the ulama’s traditional role in these matters. Furthermore, Western culture and institutions were mimicked, resulting in the alienation of not only the clergy, but other traditional segments such as the bazaari and the peasants. Before Reza Shah could gain support for his reforms from alienated groups, he was forced to abdicate by British, Soviet and American military interests during World War II. The legitimacy of the Pahlavi dynasty, and the institution of the monarchy, was questioned in the immediate years following Reza Shah’s abdication.

The ascension to the throne of a young, inexperienced monarch, Mohammad Reza Shah, initiated a flourish of political activity which reflected the political and social cleavages in Iran. Nationalist and reformist movements, by virtue of their proposals to gain Iran’s independence from great power competition, threatened the existence of the pro-West Shah. Given Iran’s strategic importance to the West, the United States wished to ensure a friendly government in Iran. Consequently, when endogenous reform movements successfully deposed the Shah, the United States aided his return to power. Reformist and nationalist movements were crushed not only in the interest of the Shah’s security, but also with the aim of ensuring American interests in Iran.

Throughout the remaining years of the Shah’s
reign, he was caught in the power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. He sought to create a strong military so as to remove Iran from the manipulative strategies of the Superpowers. Such independence was supported by the United States which encouraged Iran's immense military build-up. Iran's military ranked as the most outstanding force in the Middle East, a position achieved during the 1970's. Securing Iran's independence absorbed much of the Shah's attention and consumed resources which could have been used to develop the Iranian domestic system. Toward the end of the 1970's, it was no longer clear to Iranians that the military expansion was accomplishing the goal of independence. The United States was the dominant source of military equipment, rendering Iran dependent upon American advisors and supplies for the maintenance of the armed forces. Many Iranians perceived the Shah as a pawn of American strategists who were saved from the expense of direct military involvement in the Middle East.

Iran's emergence into the international economic system caused far-reaching changes in its socioeconomic system. Under Mohammad Reza Shah, rapid economic modernization continued with the help of the West, especially the United States. The biggest boost to the Iranian economy occurred when the international capitalist system pushed Iran into a position of power by virtue of
her vast oil resources. The dramatic increase in revenues was followed by the Shah's extravagant development plans for the Iranian economy.

Programmes initiated during the last half of the 1970's introduced new opportunities to Iranians. Because of the influx of oil revenues, many more young Iranians were sent to universities abroad where they encountered Western ideas and values. Greater access was gained to European cities where Western-styled clothes and luxuries could be purchased. Sophisticated communication systems and the influx of Western films facilitated the exchange of cultural codes. Western values were adopted by the urban middle and upper classes while the traditional segments of society remained relatively resistant to the cultural influx. Such a cultural cleavage was reinforced by disparities in economic opportunities between the urban and rural sectors.

Disruption of traditional socio-economic patterns and the displacement of Islamic values by Western culture was blamed upon the United States by leaders of the Iranian revolution. The United States was depicted as the 'Great Satan', who robbed Iranians of their spiritual and economic well-being. A popular belief held by many Iranians viewed the United States as the latest addition to the list of external forces which had invaded and corrupted Iranian civilization. The impact
of the international political and economic systems upon Iran forced Iranians to feel that they must secure their identity and independence from destruction by the West.
REFERENCES


2 Ibid., p. 220.


6 Ibid., p. 34.


8 The following discussion of the effects of Anglo-Russian competition upon Iran and the Shi'ite clergy is drawn from Nikki R. Keddie, "Ulama's Power in Modern Iran", in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Scholars, Saints and Sufis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 197w), pp. 213-216.


10 M.E. Yapp, "1900-1921: The Last Years of the Qajar Dynasty", p. 22.

11 N.R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 89.


28. Ibid., p. 83.


31. Ibid., p. 153. The Iranian year runs from March 21 to March 20 on the Gregorian calendar.


33. Ibid., p. 199.

34. Ibid., pp. 200-201.

35. Ibid., p. 199.


40 Ibid., pp. 138-139.


47 Ibid., p. 80.

48 Ibid., pp. 81-83.


50 Ibid.

51 John D. Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution, p. 72.

52 Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, pp. 71-72.

53 Ibid., p. 94.

54 R. Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, pp. 77-78.


58 Ibid., p. 15.

59 Ibid., p. 15.


65 Ibid., p. 196.
It is argued by Eisenstadt that the internal push toward revolutionary upheaval originates from tensions between a society's structures and its members. It is not sufficient, however, to argue (as do Johnson and Gurr) that the government and institutions fail to meet the demands or expectations of the population. As Skocpol has noted, repressive regimes continue to survive despite the dissatisfaction of the masses. The emergence of a revolutionary situation depends upon the spontaneous interaction of existing socioeconomic structures, group interests and actions, as well as international conditions.

In his comparative study of societies which have undergone revolutionary transformation, Eisenstadt reveals that these societies have in common the structures associated with Imperial or Imperial-feudal systems. That is to say, that in varying degrees these societies possessed differentiated and centralized administrative and military hierarchies under the control of absolute monarchies. Eisenstadt argues that the differentiation
and distinctiveness of the decision-making centers as articulated in unique symbols and institutions creates a social system which is conducive to revolutionary change.

The differentiation of functions in Imperial and Imperial-feudal societies results in the emergence of special occupation groups that are the basis for the hierarchically organized social strata. Each stratum may articulate status or class identity which is distinct from, but related to, the political and social spheres. The centers attempt to control inter-group relations by regulating access to the markets and delimiting the flow of economic and political resources. The autonomy of the centers fosters the development of elites who seek to gain a degree of autonomy from the political center. To enhance their position in society, elites seek to control free-floating resources, to develop new symbols, and to forge broad coalitions between each other and the periphery. Ultimately, these actions are for the purpose of augmenting the political power and influence of the elites. Changes in the relations of economic activity, especially in the areas of production and distribution, result in shifts in the relative strength of various elites, leading to intra-elite and inter-elite competition.

Eisenstadt notes, as did Skocpol, that elites play a major role in the revolutionary process. Because
elites are most often tied with the political structures, they are led to articulate their sense of relative deprivation (a term taken from J.C. Davies and T. Gurr) in the form of political demands. Ideological and religious movements form the link between discontented elites and the broader strata who, in turn, perceive their feelings of deprivation as a mandate for social change. Depending upon the cultural orientation of the society, the coalition between autonomous, insurrectionary elites and the periphery may lead to revolution.

Eisenstadt explains the social dynamics in terms of the center-periphery dichotomy. He distinguishes the decision-making nuclei of the social system from the rest of society. The distinction between the center and the domestic periphery can be made in terms of urban and rural divisions, and the attendant consideration of comparative levels of modernity and tradition, which may lead to cleavages within the society. Center-periphery relations in Imperial and Imperial-feudal societies are marked by the permeation of the periphery by the center, not only for the purpose of extracting resources, but also for the imposition of structures and symbols which accompany goals such as modernization and industrialization. Permeation of decision-making centers by the periphery is weaker and, Eisenstadt argues, is largely dependent upon the weakening of social closure and the development of an active
periphery.

In order to provide a background to the social conditions which existed at the time of Mohammad Reza Shah's ascension to the throne, this chapter presents a brief outline of the socioeconomic and political structures of traditional Iranian society. The domestic setting will explain in part the Shah's goals of legitimacy and security, which were the major impetuses behind the social policies, and how the pursuit of these goals was detrimental to his position. A depiction of the social changes as exemplified in strata variations will reveal possible sources of popular discontent and, in addition, the potential for mobilization against the regime. It is hoped that what will become clear is the way in which the revolutionary situation emerged from the interaction of traditional structures, policy directives and socioeconomic changes.

A.K.S. Lambton notes that at the end of the 1950's, Iran's socioeconomic system was, for the most part, the same as it had been a century earlier. Agricultural production was the mainstay of the economy: approximately seventy to eighty percent of Iran's population derived a livelihood from agriculture. Moreover, land ownership remained the pivotal condition for status in Iranian society.

The land system in Iran was the result of both
geographical and historical factors. Only twelve percent of the land area in Iran can be used for sedentary farming, and much of this land is in areas of poor soil conditions and inadequate rainfall. Consequently, there is a low yield, forcing landowners to cultivate large areas to make a profit. Unlike feudal Europe, in which the land system formed the basis for moral and military obligations, land ownership in Iran was perceived primarily as a source of income. During the Qajar period, the shahs often rewarded their loyal subjects with large grants of land. The land was held at the pleasure of the monarch, but the weak administration of certain kings created opportunities for some to transform their grants into private property. The emergence of a hereditary landed aristocracy was prevented, however, by Islamic laws of inheritance. Islamic prescripts require the estate of the dead to be divided amongst the closest relatives so as to maximize the distribution of wealth. Nevertheless, in 1951, it was estimated that 56 percent of the land annually cultivated was owned by 0.5 percent of the total population.

Land ownership was a traditional indication of economic security and social status. Prestige in Iranian society was directly related to the amount of land owned, regardless of its productivity. Consequently, landowners could be found among all segments
of society, although the majority of land was owned by members of the ruling family, high ranking officials, tribal leaders, and merchants. In most cases, these landlords were absentee, leaving the management of their villages and lands to the kadkhuda, whom they had chosen to convey their orders to the peasants. After 1930, the kadkhuda was also the channel for dispensing government information to the villagers.

Sharecropping was the most common land tenure arrangement throughout Iran. The landlord gave the tenant cultivation rights and possibly supplied him with water, seed, and oxen. For each contribution, the landlord received one-fifth of the crop. Oxen were sometimes owned by the sharecroppers but more often, they were rented from independent owners who received twenty percent of the harvest in return. In addition, twenty percent of the peasant's share often went to the village official in charge of the water supply. The peasant may also have been required to provide certain personal services such as transportation of the crops, or general labour in the village. In some areas, peasants were encouraged to keep grazing animals or to grow fruit and nut trees in order to supplement their diets. During years in which the crops failed, a responsible landlord may have assisted his tenants by distributing grain from other villages. More often, however, the tenants were forced to ask for an
allocation of grain in advance, permanently indebting them to their landlords. 7

Generally, life for the peasant was defined by the village in which he resided. Each settlement possessed its own merchants, craftsmen, and sometimes a gendarmerie, rendering the village an almost self-sufficient unit. The local culture and Islamic values guarded by the mullahs (low ranking clergy) provided the peasant with moral sustenance. Given the relative isolation of the villages from the central government, the peasant had a low political consciousness of national affairs. 8

In addition to private property, land was designated in three ways. Large portions of Iran were considered to be dead or wastelands, which could be privately owned if they could be reclaimed for agricultural production. Much of this wasteland could become cultivatable only with the employment of high-cost technology. Ultimately, however, improvement is limited. 9 The land classified as public domain consists of forests for the most part. The third type of land designation refers to endowment lands. An endowment (vaqf, pl. ouqaf) is devoted to a special purpose such as a charity or the upkeep of a religious shrine or school (madrasa). Under the reign of the Safavid Kings in the sixteenth century, the Islamic clergy were given inalienable ownership of
large tracts of land. The profits from these lands were to be used for religious purposes. The relationship between the vagf administrator and his tenant was similar to that of a landlord and peasant. In addition to charitable ouqaf, there were also private endowments owned by the Shah for the benefit of his family. During the 1920's and 1930's, Reza Shah expropriated 2,100 villages (formerly owned by the Qajar family), making the Pahlavi family the largest landowners in Iran. Mohammad Reza Shah later returned ownership of many of these villages.

As mentioned earlier, many members of the upper class received their large land holdings in the form of grants from the reigning monarch. Such gifts ensured the continued allegiance of the most influential class to the government. The absentee landlords resided in the urban centers such as Isfahan, Shiraz, and Tehran which were also political centers. Through participation in the political system, the members of the upper class gained economic security and increased their prestige and power in society.

Leonard Binder argues that the Iranian institution of the monarchy developed under influences from Greek
philosophy and Shi'ite ideas. Themes of both the philosopher-king and the Imam can be found in the political philosophy surrounding the monarchy. The two conceptions of a political leader were combined in the sixteenth century under the rule of the Safavid kings. In the eighteenth century, however, the Qajar shahs rose to power on the claim that their appointment to the throne was God's command. The claim of divine right was used by the Qajars to maintain control over the regions of Iran in spite of a small and poorly trained army. The shahs used such titles as the 'Asylum of the Universe', the 'Guardian of the Flock' and the 'Shadow of God' to convey to Iranians that they owed obedience to their kings as the temporal representation of God's power. This charismatic element of the shah's position was part of the tradition surrounding the monarchy. Despite attempts to limit the role of the monarchy in the political system, the throne maintained a symbolic importance in Iranian society.

The constitutional movement in the early twentieth century was an attempt to restrain the absolute power of the Qajar kings. The Constitution of 1906 and the Amendments of 1907 laid the foundations for a constitutional monarchy in Iran. The powers of the state were divided into three segments. The legislative branch consisted of the Majlis (Assembly), whose deputies were popularly elected for a four year term, and the Senate, a council
of sixty members, half of whom were appointed by the Shah. The Majlis was responsible for the enactment of all financial bills and the interpretation of the laws.\textsuperscript{12} The judicial branch encompassed both civil and Islamic courts of law and ensured that Islamic prescripts would dominate the formulation of laws. The executive branch included the powers of the king and those held by the ministers he appointed. Although it appears that the powers of the executive were to be limited by the legislative branch, the Qajar kings did not respect the constitution. It was hoped by the Iranian people that Reza Shah would obey the laws of the constitution, but this did not occur. Rather, Reza Shah used his executive powers to legitimize and consolidate his position in the political system. He placed his supporters in the Majlis and recruited the talented, educated and wealthy of Iran to the reorganized and expanded bureaucracy.

When Mohammad Reza Shah ascended to the throne, he appeared to be contented to reign. This, in part, stimulated the Majlis to "become the seat of political power and symbol of democracy in Iran" in the years immediately following the war.\textsuperscript{13} Both Britain and Russia also were responsible for the revival of party dynamics. During the occupation of Iran by Britain and Russia, the two major powers had tried to politicize the inhabitants of their respective zones. The British organized the
Erade-ye Melli (National Will Party), an anti-communist political party, in response to the Soviet reorganization of the banned communist party, later renamed the Tudeh (Masses) Party. An assassination attempt made on the life of the Shah was thought to be an action of foreign powers working through the Tudeh Party. The party was officially banned in 1949 and many of its members were arrested, but the remaining members managed to maintain an underground network which emerged from time to time to criticize the Shah. Despite the growth of party politics during this time, the Majlis was weakened as a democratic institution. The numerous, divergent parties made effective decision-making a difficult task.

In the late 1940's, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq emerged as the spokesman of the National Front (Jebhe-Ye Melli). As previously noted, Mossadeq was a long-time nationalist reformer who had advocated constitutional monarchy. He had been involved in the constitutional movement in the early part of the century. Pushed out by Reza Shah's rise to power (which he opposed), Mossadeq returned to power in 1941 at the head of the National Front, which was a coalition of diverse factions consisting of the Iran Party, Toilers Party, Sunka Party (Nationalist-Socialist), Pan-Iran Party, and the Devotees of Islam. Mossadeq's proposal to limit the power of the monarchy had gained the support of the Majlis. This
emphasized to the Shah the fragility of the monarchy and convinced him that he would have to take steps to ensure that future political activity would not threaten his position. The powers of the Majlis were "reduced to that of a rubber stamp", legitimizing what the executive power passed down. The Shah also established that he could by-pass the assembly by a royal decree, or veto any bill passed in the legislative branch. Consequently, this ensured that the Shah was the chief decision-maker in all important matters of government.

In addition, the Shah became actively involved in the daily functioning of the government. The Monarch presided over councils and committees, and held weekly meetings with the heads of state departments. Khalid Bin Sayeed, in an article written for the 2,500 year anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire, somewhat apologetically states that in committee meetings, the Shah presented his ideas "clearly and forcefully, and had worked out in his mind some of the solutions" to the problems faced by the council. This indicates that the Shah took a leading role in the policy decisions of his ministers.

Typical of political systems in the Middle East, the Shah's regime was supported by a large bureaucracy characterized by personal relationships. The Shah used his executive power of appointment to co-opt talented
Iranians into the political elite by offering them positions of status with the bureaucracy, Court or Majlis. Marvin Zonis argues that this method of recruitment allowed the Shah to uncover Iranians of outstanding capabilities and promote them to positions which made the most of their talents. Furthermore, co-optation hindered the formation of counterelites because individuals with leadership qualities could be incorporated into the political system, thus confining their activities.  

Such a method of recruitment held another advantage for the Shah. Because advancement rested on gaining his favour, the system was characterized by competing members intent on maintaining the favour and attention of the Shah. The resultant divisions prevented the political elite from collaborating against the regime. Khrosrow Fatemi, an official of Iran's Ministry of Commerce and a leading economist in the National Iranian Oil Company, observed that such conditions of rivalry in combination with overlapping responsibilities and the absence of lateral communication lines, created a bureaucracy which owed much to the Shah and offered him the utmost loyalty in return.  

Marvin Zonis concludes from his study of the Iranian political elites that the Shah's tactics of recruitment and advancement left the elite with "little
independence of action vis-a-vis the Shah.\textsuperscript{20} The reality of the bureaucratic life supported the elites' insights (acquired during student days in universities abroad) into the functioning of the monarchy. Their frustration with the political system and their insecure position within it reinforced the political elite's feelings of cynicism while simultaneously discouraging action. Fear of drawing the attention of the monarch because of disruptive acts forced many members of the elite to adopt an attitude of quietude in order to cope with the restraints of the system. Ultimately, as Zonis concludes, such consequences are conducive to the Shah's wish to increase his control of the political system by maximizing the number of decisions which he makes personally.\textsuperscript{21}

The Shah also inherited from the institution of the monarchy the charisma which accompanied the position. As Mohammed Reza Shah actively pursued his aim to become the pivotal power within the Iranian government, he could more rightly claim to be "the chief of all three powers--executive, legislative, and judiciary".\textsuperscript{22} The Shah considered himself to be the model, planner, protector and educator of Iran; the source of all ideas and programs within society. Fereydoun Hoveyda, longstanding Iranian ambassador to the United Nations and the brother of Amir Abbas Hoveyda, Prime Minister of Iran from 1965-1977, described the Shah's need to be the origin of all ideas
upon which the success of modern Iran depended. In an
abstract from his book *Towards the Great Civilization*, the
Shah reveals his perception of his part in the 'new' Iran:

> The monarchic regime as soul, essence, existence, source of energy and foundation of the national sovereignty and unity constitutes the solid basis of the great civilization.... Having an absolute faith in this, it was my duty to set the nation such a goal, not only as the person responsible for its destiny but also as the father, guide and friend of every Iranian.

The absolute power of the Shah was represented in his institutional authority and the charismatic appeal of the symbol of the monarchy.

The Shah's feelings of insecurity were fostered not only by reformist movements among the *Majlis*, but also by weak popular support for the monarchy. Legitimacy, if the Shah was to heed the words of his critics, would entail economic and political reforms. The latter, however, threatened to undermine his position at the apex of political power. Consequently, the Shah attempted to consolidate his power by projecting the "image of a nationalist, a forward-looking reformer who favoured a strong modern army to hold the realm together". Although security and legitimacy are goals simultaneously
held by many states, the methods which the Shah chose to achieve these aims often worked at cross-purposes, hampering the fulfillment of both.

The Shah believed that the successful implementation of his plans for the 'new' Iran depended upon the existence of a strong, loyal military. According to the Constitution of 1906, the Shah was the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Although the army was a traditional instrument of monarchical power, it was a weak institution in Iran. The Qajar kings possessed only a small and poorly trained army which enforced the will of the monarch ineffectively, hampering the implementation of any proposed reforms. Around the turn of the century, foreign aid helped to establish three separate military units to strengthen the coercive power of the central government: the South Persian Rifles, trained and commanded by British officers; a gendarmerie, commanded by Swedish officers; and the most effective unit, the Persian Cossack Brigade.26 As noted earlier, it was with the help of this brigade that Reza Shah seized power in 1921. The unification, expansion and modernization of the armed forces was the basis for Reza Shah's control. The oppositional forces which threatened to dethrone the Pahlavi monarch were continuously suppressed by the army.

The armed forces continued to play an important security role in domestic politics during the reign of
Mohammad Reza Shah. The Shah was returned to power in 1953 by American support and his own army under General Faztollah Zahedi. Following this incident, the Shah concentrated upon boosting the power of the Iranian army. Because the Americans believed that protection of their interests in Iran depended upon the Shah's leadership, the United States offered to supply Iran with military aid and advisors. The Imperial Iranian Armed Forces and the Imperial Gendarmerie were expanded, and subsequently, commanded an increasing role in Iranian society.

The military received the personal attention of the Shah because he recognized that it was the source of security for both his regime and the social structure in general. The existence of better facilities and numerous privileges beyond those given to the civil service encouraged the loyalty of military personnel. Military salaries were often raised and military officers were not required to pay customs duty on imported luxuries. In addition to ensuring the faithfulness of the armed forces, the Shah was also careful to prevent the possibility of a military coup d'état. Relations between high-ranking officials were dominated by rivalries for the Shah's attention. His personal approval was needed for promotion beyond the rank of a major. The Shah reinforced the competition by preventing any general to meet with another without the monarch's permission. As in the case of
the bureaucracy, the patron-client relationship between the Shah and the military officers prevented the armed forces from becoming a subversive element.

Fred Halliday suggests in his book, *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*, that the army had not fostered a hereditary elite because it had not existed as a continuous institution in Iranian society.29 Because the army was not perceived to be a path of upward mobility, many of the officers who entered the army during the 1920's and 1930's were the sons of small landowners and civil servants.30 This pattern of recruitment was maintained throughout the Shah's regime, although class differences became more pronounced during the rapid expansion of the military in the 1970's. Officers were enlisted from upper class and urban middle class families who were of 'good standing'. The conscripts, who had little opportunity for promotion, were recruited from the lower classes.31 This division was to have great ramifications during the crisis in 1978 and 1979.

After the Mossadeq incident, the Shah also approached the United States for help in the establishment of a surveillance agency in Iran. The Central Intelligence Agency assisted the Tehran government in the establishment of the Iranian State Intelligence and Security Organization (Sazman-e Ettela'at Va Amniyat-e Keshvar, or SAVAK).
SAVAK was an extension of the Prime Minister's office, and its chief, who held the rank of Deputy Prime Minister, was appointed by the Shah. The principal responsibilities of SAVAK were to obtain information of all types, to prevent subversion and espionage counter to the security of the regime, and to maintain surveillance of groups and individuals who opposed the regime. Officials of SAVAK also acted as the military magistrates in judging crimes falling within their jurisdiction, in accordance with the military tribunal system set up to try political crimes.

SAVAK was "an omnipotent and brutal force in running the affairs of the state, under the Shah's direct control". It was under the direction of General Nasiri, a long-time colleague of the Shah, that SAVAK became a pervasive force of political repression. The responsibility of the International Security and Action Branch (one of nine branches) of SAVAK was the identification of Iranian citizens who opposed the Shah's regime. It was a power that was greatly abused. SAVAK was a "secret organization with a public face" whose powers rested on its infiltration of factories, offices and universities, making free expression a rarity. More importantly, SAVAK used harsh methods of interrogation to intimidate would-be dissidents. The influential report published by the
International Commission of Jurists on human rights violations in Iran condemned the methods of arrest and trial, and the conditions of the detention centers. Reports by Amnesty International documented tortures suffered by Iranians at the hands of SAVAK and these were confirmed by the 1500 Iranians who appeared before the United Nations' International Commission in February, 1980. The overall effect of SAVAK's activities was to create a 'politics of distrust' which alienated Iranians from each other as well as the government. Moreover, it prevented the development of political expression and participation in Iran.

Having begun his plan to enhance the security of his regime, the Shah made sporadic attempts to institute a program of modernization. In 1951 the Shah distributed a portion of the crown lands among the peasants. The program was accelerated partially in response to growing political opposition during 1959 and 1960. Political repression, economic recession and poor living conditions spawned student riots and social unrest in 1961 and 1962. In 1963, the Shah presented to the Iranian public the "White Revolution" which promoted socioeconomic reforms under the direction of the traditional monarchy. The royal decree set out the programme which included the abolition of the feudal landlord-peasant system through land reform, election law reform, profit-sharing for
workers, the sale of state-owned industry, emancipation of women and programs to increase literacy, and the general improvement of the living conditions of Iranians. As could be expected, the reforms were widely accepted in a popular referendum in 1963. It is, however, as A.K.S. Lambton recognizes, difficult to judge the degree of genuine support which the reforms received.37

The land reform law of 1963 attempted to change radically the form of socioeconomic relations in Iran's rural areas and to undermine the efforts of the Shah's opposition. The implementation of a land reform program faced the seemingly insurmountable obstacles created by the absence of a cadastral survey and a land survey department.38 Dr. Hasan Arsanjani, the primary force behind the land reform plans, proposed that the land be given to the peasants which were cultivating it, thus circumventing these survey problems. Landlords were limited to the ownership of one village. The rest were to be purchased by the government for redistribution among the peasants. In return, the landlords received, in several installments, the value of their lands according to previous tax payments. The land reform program also laid the foundations for the establishment of rural cooperative societies, joint-stock corporations and large agrobusinesses. These enterprises were designed to optimize the geographical and technological limitations
faced by the agricultural sector in Iran.

The economic success of the land reform program was varied. A.K.S. Lambton notes that the reforms were generally successful in increasing the peasant proprietorship and raising the living conditions of the peasants. The benefits which the peasants derived from land reform depended upon "the extent of their poverty, and the degree of the subjugation to the landlords" as well as their literacy and their agricultural competence. There was inadequate financing for the newly independent peasant who needed to buy seed, or to take advantage of fertilizers and new equipment. Moreover, the land reform program omitted to improve the condition of the landless peasants who accounted for one third of the rural population in Iran.

The agribusinesses, rural cooperatives and corporations were also plagued by poor facilities and financing. Many more peasants were dislocated by the advent of farm machines. Generally, the reorganization of the rural socioeconomic system destroyed traditional village life as a complete cultural, social and economic unit. The lack of work forced many peasants to migrate to the cities to seek employment. Moreover, the land reform program did not increase agricultural productivity in Iran.

The immediate political consequences of land reform appeared to be beneficial to the Shah's image as
a reformer. The implementation of the reforms undermined his critics' calls for change and consequently, decreased their popularity among the citizens. In addition, the Shah had also further weakened the Majlis, whose numbers were predominantly landowners. The Shah believed that the transfer of ownership to the peasants would result in an independent peasantry. Gaining the support of a strengthened periphery would extend the Shah's political basis to a sector of the population that had been previously ignored. Not only would a rural-based revolt be avoided, but the Shah would have support among broad segments of the people, inhibiting any attempts to mobilize them by the political elite.

The political success of land reform was mixed. It did appear that the Shah had made an important link with the peasantry and had gained their support. Given that wealth, status and proximity to the political center were necessary conditions for political power, however, the rural peasants had limited political impact. Farhad Kazemi argues that by extending government responsibilities to the rural areas, the Shah actually created another potential source of opposition. Crop failure, for example, was blamed upon government mismanagement rather than landlord irresponsibility. Moreover, there remained the problem of the landless peasants who perceived the government as responsible for the elimination of any work they
might have had, further deteriorating their weak position in society.

The land reform program had broken the traditional base of power for the wealthy in Iran. The government, however, encouraged this segment of society to invest their money in commercial and industrial endeavours which were presented by the latest surge of economic growth. Consequently, the elites maintained their status and wealth, but the basis of this wealth was diversified, and was in some cases, invested in more profitable ways. Nevertheless, the Shah's land reform program alienated many of the wealthy landowners who resented the imposition of such sweeping reforms. It is only to be noted here that opposition to land reform and the White Revolution came from the ulama; this will be discussed in the succeeding chapter.

Concurrent with land reform, other changes proposed in the White Revolution were implemented. Forest and pasture lands were nationalized "to prevent their misuse and waste in the hands of private owners." The economic conditions of workers benefitted from government attention, which resulted in the institution of a legislated minimum wage, a social insurance policy, and a profit-sharing scheme. Notably, the military performed modernizing functions above the responsibility of the maintenance of internal order and defense of the terri-
torial integrity of the state. It was from the ranks of the military and SAVAK that the Shah organized the Literacy Corps, Development Corps and Health Corps. In lieu of military service, young men and women were assigned to work in rural areas to provide education, medical facilities, surplus labour, and training in new agricultural techniques. This program established contact between the political center of Iran and the peripheries. Furthermore, it "provided the government with a source of legitimacy to emphasize the importance of the civilian role of the armed forces, and thus boost the image and justify the expansion of the Shah's military power base."48

iii

In addition to the changes imposed by the Shah, the expansion of the international capitalist system also fostered changes in Iran's social structures. Traditionally, there were three classes based loosely upon relations in the land. The upper class, consisting of the royal family, the traditional aristocracy and the large landowners, also comprised the political and economic elites. The middle class was a mixture of civil servants, merchants, artisans, and craftsmen living in the centers of Iran, affording them greater opportunity
for advancement. The lower class consisted of the peasants, farmers, merchants, and artisans who resided in the rural areas. The demands of economic modernization gave rise to the emergence of new strata. Industrialization necessitated expanding the labour force at factory level, as well as managerial positions. The new economic positions resulted in changes in the traditional social strata, especially within the middle and working classes. Increasing mechanization combined with the displacement of much of the unskilled rural population was responsible, in part, for the creation of an urban poor.

James A. Bill, in his book, *The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization*, categorizes the new middle class as the professional-bureaucratic-intelligentsia, mainly because it is distinguished by a modern, often Western education. Although the first secular primary school was opened at the turn of the century, it was not until the development of an education program under Reza Shah that a 'modern' school system was established. As of 1977, however, only thirty-seven percent of the adult population was literate, although the rate is much lower among the rural adult population. Education, especially at the post-secondary level, remains the option of the wealthier classes and is an important criterion for economic advancement.
One result of the late development of a modern system of education in Iran is the number of students studying abroad. Although the exact number of students enrolled in foreign universities is not known, it is generally believed that in 1975 approximately 60,000 Iranian students were attending post-secondary institutions in the United States, West Germany and Great Britain. According to government statistics, the number of students abroad equalled the number of Iranian students attending universities at home. The exposure to Western culture encountered by students abroad influenced their perception of Iranian society. They felt a stronger commitment to the ideas of social progress and change than did their counterparts who remained in Iran.

Throughout the 1960's many Iranians studying at foreign universities remained after the completion of their studies because of the attractive job opportunities in the West. During the 1970's, however, this trend was reversed somewhat. Many post-secondary graduates returned to Iran to assume positions within the bureaucracy, the major employer of educated people in Iran. Bill reports that the professional-bureaucratic-intelligentsia was the fastest growing class in Iran, having increased by sixty percent between 1956 and 1966. By 1976, Bill claims, twenty-five percent of Iranians were members of this class.
The professional-bureaucratic-intelligentsia is a politically diversified group. Because modernization created opportunities for members of the traditional classes to improve their position in society, many members of the new middle class originated in other strata. Consequently, the professional middle class held linkages with other strata that could be used to mobilize broad segments of society. Due to this diversity, however, it cannot be argued that the new middle class was a homogeneous group. In some ways, this class owed much of its prosperity to the Shah's programs of modernization. Many members of this stratum favoured "reforms that would improve economic stability and government efficiency" thereby enhancing their own positions. University professors and students and teachers were more critical of the Shah's regime as demonstrated by the student riots during the crisis in the early 1960's. Generally, the professional middle class was divided according to perceptions of, and allegiance to, the Shah's political system. Their education and high level of political consciousness rendered them a potentially powerful group in Iran.

Fred Halliday, in his work, *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*, emphasizes the rapid development of another class in Iran, namely the working class, which developed concomitantly with the industrialization of
Iran. Halliday claims that of 6.8 million people working in the non-agricultural sector, 2.5 million are employed in the industry. The growth of the working class is important because it represents a new social force which had been prevented "from playing an independent political role or finding an independent expression."

The most important feature of the working class, Halliday argues, is the fact that many members are of peasant origin. The recent migration of peasants into urban areas has resulted in an urban population of forty-seven percent. The majority of these people are unskilled and illiterate, therefore falling outside the demands for skilled and managerial personnel. All evidence indicates that the working class is a potentially powerful source of social change. The Shah's government appeared to recognize that successful implementation of industrialization programs depended upon the cooperation of the working class. Forced wage increases and workers' shares were instituted to try to help the 'proletariat', who were subject to high rents and inflated consumer prices. The working class, however, had "been denied the right to any independent political activity" because even trade unions were organized by the state and monitored by SAVAK. Labour unions were not allowed to be involved in any political activity, although they were allowed to indicate a preference for political parties.
Consequently, most working class Iranians felt alienated from the political system.

Modernization programs in Iran resulted in the creation of another stratum, the urban poor. The failure of land reform to address the problem of the 'landless' agricultural workers pushed many peasants to migrate to the cities. Between 1966 and 1976, approximately 2,111,000 rural Iranians moved to urban centers. 63 Tehran absorbed much of the migrant population to the extent that fifty percent of Tehran's population was migrant. 64 Most of the migrant poor were unskilled and illiterate, and consequently could not find jobs. They settled in slums and squatter settlements, concerning themselves solely with subsistence. Farhad Kazemi surveyed the migrant poor in Iran during the summer of 1977. Despite the fact that the urban poor had many grievances caused by unemployment, inadequate affordable housing and extravagant food costs, Kazemi found that they did not engage in political activity against the regime. Many did not link their destitution to government policies and consequently, did not direct their frustration towards the Shah's governance. 65 In a direct reference to Gurr, Kazemi points out that although it may be expected that the migrant poor were frustrated by unfulfilled expectations, most preferred their present life in the city. 66 Moreover, Kazemi found that many
migrant poor did not feel uprooted by their move to the city. Many maintained an extensive network of communication with friends and relatives in the rural areas. Volunteer religious associations called hey'ats were an important community activity. Fearful of anti-regime uprisings, the Shah's police carefully monitored such organizations. The hey'ats allowed social concerns to be considered in the guise of religious discussion. Kazemi notes that "the religious dimension remained the dominant mode of expression for the migrant poor."
land redistribution, woman suffrage, and the reduction of illiteracy. The Melliyun party called for less drastic reforms. The leaders of the two parties "collaborated in drawing up their membership lists" after assigning members to a party. The Shah allowed greater freedom of speech during the election in June 1960. The National Front, Toilers' Party, and Teachers' Association were allowed to voice their opinions, although they were not encouraged to run as independent candidates. The opportunity for Iranians to express their views was accompanied by disturbances at polling stations and questionable electoral practices. As a result, the election was cancelled and rescheduled for February 1961. The Melliyun party was alleged to have participated in the obstruction of the elections and was subsequently discredited. In its place was formed the Hezb-e Iran-e Novin (New Iran Party) under Hasan-Ali Mansur.

In 1967, the Hezb-e Iran-e Novin, which was supported by the lower middle class and labour groups, emerged as the strong majority party, with 180 seats in the Majlis. The Hezb-e Mardom stood as the minority party with only twenty-nine seats in the Majlis followed by the Pan-Iran Party which managed to earn five seats in the assembly. This division of popular support was repeated in the 1971 election; however, the Pan-Iran Party boycotted the election in a bid to force the government to
institute free elections. The platforms of the parties were largely supportive of the Shah's regime, because any criticism of the Shah would have been repressed. The Iran Novin Party under Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda dominated Iranian domestic politics. In 1965, however, another attempt was made on the life of the Shah, and all further political participation was repressed until 1975. The political mobilization that did occur was funneled into parties organized by the state. Political opposition was repressed by SAVAK, while corruption of public officials seemed to be widespread and largely ignored.

In 1974, student unrest was growing in conjunction with Ayatollah Khomeini's call for an Islamic political revolution to overthrow the Shah. The two-party system had not achieved the objective of encouraging spontaneous political participation, because the parties presented "approved" platforms rather than represented the views of their party members. Given the threat of reprisals by SAVAK forces in the event of criticism of the regime, and the alienation of the Iranian citizens from the political process, it is not surprising that the Shah continued to face a crisis of political legitimation. It is claimed that the Shah announced "that opposition to Iran-Novin would be permitted in the 1975 elections" which was interpreted as an attempt to achieve a wider support base for the regime. The resulting abundance of
political activity which appeared to threaten the existence of the monarchy convinced the Shah to rescind his proposal. A single party was created called the Hezb-e Rastakhiz-i-Melli or National Resurgence Party. In his announcement of the new party, the Shah proclaimed that the Rastakhiz Party would provide the form of political mobilization and participation demanded by many Iranians. Dialogue within the party was to consist of constructive criticism which could open the lines of communication and deflate some of the growing opposition. The Shah warned that anyone who rejected the party would be encouraged to leave the country. The Rastakhiz Party failed to be the forum for creative criticism for the same reason the two-party system had failed—the absence of the opportunity for political participation.

The political promise and initiatives of the Shah to decentralize the state bureaucracy and increase political participation did not materialize. The issue of human and political rights came to a climax with the investigation of the Shah's policing policies by Amnesty International. The report by members of Amnesty International exposed the methods used by SAVAK, the Shah's information gathering and policing service, outlining the form of arrests, widespread intimidation, and alleged torture of critics of the Shah's regime. Furthermore, the election of President Carter, who stressed human
rights and threatened to withdraw aid to countries suspected of violations added pressure to the criticisms of SAVAK's questionable operations.

Having gained courage from world criticism of the Shah's lack of respect for human rights, a group of professionals and intellectuals published their grievances in several petitions and open letters to the Shah in the spring and summer of 1977. Two important protests were made during this time. The first one to be considered is a two page letter to the Shah signed by Karim Sanjabi, Shahpour Bakhtiar and Darioush Forourhar. These men had served under Prime Minister Mossadeq and had remained staunch critics of the Shah's regime. Forouhar had served in the labour ministry of Mossadeq's government, and Karim Sanjabi, a former dean of the law faculty of Tehran University, had "represented Iran at the Hague International Court during the oil nationalisation dispute under Mossadeq." Dr. Bakhtiar, a member of the powerful Bakhtiar tribe, was a well-known supporter of political reform in Iran. The letter addressed the Shah's failure to conform to the Iranian Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It attacked the economic reforms and policies which had resulted in inflation and shortage. The letter also contained a request for the release of political prisoners, an end to censorship by reinstating a free press, and free elec-
tions. Another letter sent to Prime Minister Hoveyda and signed by forty professors and writers, echoed the demand for the return of social and political rights. 79 Both received wide circulation.

The second important protest during this time came from a group of lawyers who authored several letters concerning the Iranian judicial system. This progressive group of professionals, protesting the injustice in the Iranian legal system, demanded "an end to special courts, curtailment of the constant encroachment by the executive on the powers of the judiciary, and observance of the rule of law. 80 Another letter, supported by 110 retired judges, was sent to the head of the Supreme Court stating similar complaints. Ultimately, these 'institutional entrepreneurs' formed the Iranian Jurists Association consisting of 143 lawyers who set for themselves the task of monitoring the observance of human rights in Iranian society. 81 It is important to realize that without worldwide attention and support for these protests, those involved would have been persecuted.

Amid growing social problems, the Shah's government continued to follow a policy directed by the goals of security and legitimacy. As a symbol that changes would occur, the Shah dismissed Prime Minister Hoveyda in 1977. The Iranian authorities claimed that Hoveyda had been behind the thoughtless economic planning that had
resulted in the crisis which faced Iranians. Dr. Jamshir Amouzegar was appointed to succeed Hoveyda, and proposed a slower rate of growth, the development of low cost housing, and the implementation of a number of social welfare programmes. The Shah also faced the difficult situation of increasing political participation while ensuring the continuation of his regime. Any attempts by the Shah to increase the access of the periphery to the political center was accompanied by an increase in police vigilance of the more critical sectors of society. This action did not diminish the number of serious riots that continued to occur, and Dr. Amouzegar was forced to resign his post.

His successor was Ja'fer Sherif-Emami who attempted to pacify the growing opposition to the Shah by means of conciliation. Emami promised to establish an independent judiciary, freedom of the press, and free elections to be held in 1979. This prompted several political parties to apply for recognition. One very important party which emerged during this time was the Union of National Front Forces consisting of a coalition of the Iranian Nationalist Party (INP) led by Darioush Forouhar, the Iranian Party of Shapour Bakhtiar, and the Society of Iranian Socialists whose leader was Karim Sanjabi. The aim of the Union of National Front Forces was to fight dictatorship within the bounds of the law. The leaders argued
that if Prime Minister Sharif-Emami's attempts to cooperate with the demands of the opposition were sincere, then the policies which more closely answered the call for reform could be implemented. They suggested the institution of a twelve-point programme which included the dissolution of SAVAK and the release of political prisoners.

Emami addressed himself to the problems created by the Shah's national mythology. As Eisenstadt suggested, the political center tries to infiltrate the periphery by imposing a certain set of symbols. The rural and urban periphery for the most part consisted of Iranians who were strongly observant of Islam and consequently, had strong links with the Islamic clergy. Mohammad Reza Shah, as had his father, perceived the clergy as a threat to the supremacy of the throne in Iran. The Shah's propaganda which linked his reign to the pre-Islamic empire of Cyrus the Great was aimed at undermining the Islamic ties by emphasizing the Persian heritage. Religious opposition, however, was growing in Iran. Late in 1977, students began to stage pro-Khomeini protests in the campuses of several universities in Iran. Although he had been exiled since 1964, Ayatollah Khomeini had maintained contact with students and clergy in Iran. The traditional relationship between the bazaaris (traditional merchants) and the clergy was exploited to create a network through which taped and printed messages from Khomeini were distributed
to the citizens of Iran. Khomeini was perceived as a leader in the anti-Shah campaign; Khomeini's life was a symbol of religious and political opposition to the Iranian government. In recognition of the increasing religious opposition, Emami reinstated the Moslem lunar calendar, closed casinos, and established a new ministry, Head of Endowment, which was to oversee the financing of theological schools, maintain the shrines and mosques, and bestow scholarships to students of theology. Such reforms were intended to signal the Islamic clergy and his followers that the Shah acknowledged their demands and recognized their power.

The beginning of September, 1978, was a time of anti-Shah demonstrations resulting in the deaths of several people and the imposition of martial law. On September 7, the bazaars were closed in support of the rallies, despite a ban on public gatherings. The following day which was later named 'Black Friday', was one of major confrontation between the Shah's military forces and protesters. Anti-government demonstrators were fired upon by the army, resulting in deaths of approximately 250 people, although the opposition claimed that over 2,000 had been killed. Several of the leaders, including Ayatollahs Rohani and Nouria, Mehdi Bazargan and Dr. Moghaddam were arrested. Ayatollahs Khomeini and Shari-atmadari advocated passive resistance to the
government's actions to avoid further bloodshed.

Widespread strike action and work stoppage in the civil service and oil sectors was demonstrative of the feelings of deprivation experienced by the broader groups. The momentum of the strikes was a strong political weapon which forced the Shah to address the criticisms levied against his regime. On October 19, 1978, employees of the National Iranian Oil Company walked off their jobs, consequently reducing the production of oil to one quarter of the previous level. The employees demanded the suspension of martial law, the release of political prisoners, and the trial of the former head of SAVAK, General Nasiri.

Recognizing the extent of discontent and the degree of organization of the demonstrations and strikes, the Shah perceived that the only way to gain support for the corrective measures which he hoped to implement would be an appeal to Khomeini and the members of the Union of National Front Forces to form a coalition. In order to prepare a stance on the Shah's proposal, Karim Sanjabi met with Khomeini in Paris, where the Ayatollah was living after his expulsion from Iraq. Khomeini firmly rejected any possibility of a coalition with the Shah's regime, and repeated his intention to remove the Shah from power and establish an Islamic government in Iran. Khomeini's refusal to compromise gained him respect and support
among Iranians as compared to the Shah's uncertainty.\(^8^6\)

Violent anti-regime demonstrations, which began on the campus of Tehran University, and continuing strikes caused the Shah to dismiss Prime Minister Emami on November 6. He appointed General Gholam Reza Azhari to the task of creating a military government. During this time, the army seized the major newspapers in Tehran as well as the radio and television stations. Prominent government officials such as ex-Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda and General Nassiri were arrested and charged with corruption. Ayatollah Khomeini used tactics to infiltrate and neutralize the army. The Ayatollah appealed to police and soldiers not to fire upon their Muslim brothers and threatened retaliation against the soldiers' families if he was not heeded.\(^8^7\) In addition, Khomeini tried to exacerbate the dissension between the privileged high ranking army officials and the junior officers and conscripts. The conscripts came from the lower and middle classes and were particularly subject to revolutionary appeals.\(^8^8\) This appeared to be effective, especially with the new conscripts, who could be found fraternizing with the demonstrators.\(^8^9\)

December 2nd was the beginning of the holy month of Moharram which, in Islamic tradition, is the month of mourning for the death of Husayn, Ali's son, who symbolizes justice under corrupt, autocratic governments.
Usually a time of high emotion for Muslims, the occasion was of even greater significance due to the recent protests against the Shah. All religious processions were banned by General Azhari unless previously cleared by authorities. In addition, the Prime Minister promised that non-Islamic laws would be revised to conform to Islamic principles through consultation with the religious leaders.

Throughout the month of Moharram, mass demonstrations continued despite attempts to control the protesters. In an article by William H. Sullivan, the American ambassador to Iran, it is reported that the Shah realized that suppression of the revolution would necessitate an even greater degree of autocracy which would eventually explode under the reign of his son. Consequently, the Shah negotiated a political solution with the members of the Union of National Front Forces. The Shah accepted their proposal of a reduction in his power to that of a constitutional monarch at the head of a government responsible to parliament. He also agreed to a re-organization of SAVAK, the establishment of an independent judiciary and a free press (which had already been promised by Prime Minister Emami). Despite these concessions, the army clashed with anti-regime demonstrators who argued that the Shah would not relinquish his power as long as he was in the country. Thus, on December 29th, the Shah declared
that he could take a long vacation during which time Dr. Shahpor Bakhtiari would form a new government.

Early in January, Bakhtiari's proposed changes, which included the dissolution of SAVAK and the inclusion of the clergy in a draft of the legislation for the propagation of Islam, were presented to the Shah for his approval. Among members of the opposition, Bakhtiari gained the support of the moderate faction, but was denounced by Khomeini and Sanjabi. During this time, Ayatollah Khomeini declared his intention to form a provisional revolutionary council which would establish an Islamic republic with an elected constitutional assembly. On January 16, 1979, the Shah left for Egypt and Bakhtiari offered Khomeini the option of an Islamic republic with an elected constitutional assembly. Moderates such as Ayatollah Shari'atmadari gave hesitant support to Bakhtiari's government, but Khomeini would not compromise his intention to overthrow Bakhtiari. Following the Shah's departure, pro-Khomeini rallies erupted in the streets declaring a victory for the opposition.

Bakhtiari's attempts to prevent Khomeini's return to Iran were unsuccessful, due to pressure exerted through a series of violent protests. On the first day in February, Ayatollah Khomeini arrived at the Tehran airport after a fourteen year exile. He announced the formation of a provisional government headed by Medhi
Bazargan that would replace Bakhtiar's 'illegal' government. Bakhtiar refused to sign the proposal for an Islamic government, which also included his resignation until the holding of free elections, which were scheduled for June, 1979.

The collapse of Bakhtiar's government appeared inevitable. His ministers were resigning, and administrative and police functions were being assumed by forces loyal to Khomeini. Portions of the armed forces joined civilians in demonstrations against Bakhtiar which left the Shah's Imperial Guards to fight guerrilla groups. After several days of intense fighting, the Imperial Guard was defeated. On February 11, Bakhtiar was forced to admit defeat. Khomeini was now free to institute his own government.

To a great extent, Iran was typical of the Imperial-feudal societies described by Eisenstadt. Mohammad Reza Shah was a modernizing monarch with strong absolutist tendencies. When he ascended the throne in 1941, Iranian society existed largely as it had a century earlier. Reformist movements in the Majlis convinced the Shah that if he was to achieve Iran's independence and modernization, and thereby gain the support and legitimacy
he wanted, he would have to implement widespread reforms. In order to convince reluctant Iranians to follow his plans, the Shah believed he needed to secure his absolute power. Consequently, he established SAVAK to maintain control over the opposition in society. The Shah reduced the independence of the political center by taking an active role in the decision-making process of the executive branch, reducing the power of the legislative branch, and limiting access to the political elite. The closure of the political center resulted in a cleavage between this center and the rural and urban peripheries.

In order to achieve both legitimacy and security, the Shah tried to change the peripheries structurally and symbolically. The White Revolution was an attempt to transform the power relations in Iran so as to increase the independence of the peasantry while simultaneously reducing the power of the landowning elite. The land reform increased the Shah's support among the politically weak peasantry, however, the feelings of resentment held by the elites toward the Shah also increased.

The Shah endeavoured to restructure the symbols of the predominantly Islamic periphery as well. He recognized that the carriers of the Islamic values, namely the ulama, were a potential threat to the supremacy of the throne. In order to reduce the clerical influence, the Shah emphasized the pre-Islamic history of
Iran in a 'national mythology' while simultaneously presenting himself as a model Muslim who understood the need for modernization. The power of the ulama in the rural areas was usurped to a great extent by the Literacy and Health Corps who assumed traditional roles of the ulama.

The emergence of the Iranian economy into the international economic system created new economic opportunities. New strata were slowly emerging with the development of the economy. The educated new middle class and the working class became more conscious of their positions in society and began to question the distribution of resources within the Iranian political and socioeconomic systems. The extravagant wealth created by the increased oil prices exaggerated the maldistribution of money and opportunities between the opulent elites and the urban poor. The large revenue from oil allowed the Shah to pursue his plans for Iran's independence and modernization at an increased rate. Often the pursuit of military strength and freedom from superpower pressures demanded both political and economic resources which could have been used for political development.

Increasingly, the cleavages between the rural and urban areas, often parallel to the division of traditional and modern segments of society, created tensions which were revealed in the demands for political participation.
The Shah, however, was unable to address the demands for political participation because it would have entailed a reduction in his power. Although the Shah may have been content to reign rather than rule, he feared that the opposition would not be satisfied until he was removed from power. Believing that economic modernization would bring about legitimacy if control of the society could be maintained, the Shah felt that he had no choice but to eliminate his opposition with expediency.

The universities had been a strong source of opposition to the Shah's political process, however, the absence of political participation had affected all strata by the end of 1978. Institutional entrepreneurs such as Dr. Bakhtiar, Karim Sanjabi and Darioush Forourhar, were willing to use their resources to restructure the political and economic centers. They gained the support of the professional-bureaucratic-intelligentsia class and the working class relatively late in the revolutionary movement, but their participation was important. It is difficult to say that any particular class experienced 'class consciousness' or a tendency to identify with a certain ideological outlook. The National Front under Mehdi Bazargan could be said to have represented the moderate reformist beliefs of the educated middle class. The workers, students, and intellectuals were represented by secular and religious leftist groups. The peasants
of the rural areas remained passive and uninvolved in the
political upheaval. It appears certain, however, that
no one class was strong enough to lead the revolutionary
movement on the basis of the protest that the Shah's
regime failed to meet the political and social demands of
Iranians. Rather, the success of the revolution depended
upon the coalition of many classes and groups, the criti-
cal development of which hinged upon Ayatollah Khomeini's
charismatic leadership and the strength of the principles
of Islam to provide a challenge to the institutionalized
symbolic code. It is now possible to consider the remain-
ing variable in Eisenstadt's theory, the culture variable.
REFERENCES


7. Ibid., p. 624.


11. Leonard Binder, Iran, p. 63.


16 Ibid., p. 63.


20 M. Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran, p. 332.

21 Ibid., p. 334.


23 Ibid.

24 Ibid., pp. 151-152.


27 M. Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran, p. 112.
28 Ibid.


30 Ibid., p. 67.


32 F. Hoveyda writes that the attachment between the Prime Minister's office and SAVAK was nominal, and that SAVAK actually enjoyed a great deal of independence. See F. Hoveyda, *The Fall of the Shah*, p. 93.


43 A. Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 85.


45 F. Kazemi, Poverty and Revolution in Iran, p. 37.

46 M. Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran, pp. 28-29.

47 A. Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, p. 85.

48 Ibid., p. 89.


50 Ibid., p. 102.

51 Ibid., pp. 100-102.


55 J.A. Bill, The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization, p. 68.


58. Ibid.

59. Ibid., p. 185.

60. Ibid., p. 187.

61. Ibid., pp. 202-203.

62. Ibid., pp. 204-205.

63. F. Kazemi, Poverty and Revolution in Iran, p. 28.

64. Ibid., p. 30.

65. Ibid., p. 82-83.

66. Ibid., p. 84.

67. Ibid., p. 64.

68. Ibid., p. 95.

69. Leonard Binder, Iran, p. 222.


71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., p. 95.


78 Ibid., p. 241.

79 Ibid., p. 209.

80 Ibid.


83 Ibid., p. 4.


88 Ibid., p. 70.

90 W.H. Sullivan, "Dateline Iran: The Road Not Taken", Foreign Policy, no. 40 (Fall 1980), p. 178.

91 Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 268.

92 F. Kazemi, Poverty and Revolution in Iran, p. 1.
Despite the exposure to modern secular culture, most Iranians continue to "retain a profound respect for Islamic morals and traditions". Muhammad Nuwayhi, a literary and social critic, argues that the greatest obstacle to a 'comprehensive cultural revolution' is religion, because objections are raised first with regard to the consistency of new ideas with Islam. Nuwayhi comments that "all religious considerations continue to outweigh [sic] all other considerations in the minds of the people". Mohammad Reza Shah had always recognized the strength of Shi'ite Islam and its clergy in Iran. The traditional Shi'ite values and prescriptions for the social and political systems formed an alternative to the Shah's Western-influenced society. Islam, as outlined by the charismatic Ayatollah Khomeini, became the mobilizing ideology of the revolutionary movement. Since the Shah's fall, Khomeini has attempted to make Iran the traditional center of Shi'ite Islam: Iran is to be the structural manifestation of the Islamic prescripts.
Shi'ite Islam, as a cultural orientation, gave to the revolutionary movement the incentive for 'this worldly' resolution of the tension between the transcendental and mundane worlds. The organization of the clergy, and their participation in social functions prior to the revolution, was instrumental to the clergy's survival in the face of the Shah's repressive measures. During the revolutionary process, the clergy's linkages with many elements of society provided the network for transmission of Ayatollah Khomeini's taped messages.

Islam, as a cultural orientation, will be examined using Eisenstadt's three aspects of culture; namely, the degree of abstraction of the problems of human existence; the society's solution for resolution of the tension between the mundane and transcendental worlds, and the degree of commitment of society's members to change. The Islamic clergy must be examined not only as a dis-embedded elite, but also as the conveyors of the Islamic traditions.

In this chapter, the philosophy and laws of Shi'ite Islam will be examined. The organization and responsibilities of the clergy will then be investigated with regard to their role in society and their political participation, both historically and currently.
The cultural orientation of Iranian society is created by Shi'ite Islam. One interpretation suggests that the basic doctrine of Islam can be "summed up in the profession of faith: 'No God whatsoever but Allah: Mohammad is the Messenger of Allah'. A Muslim must first accept this testimony of faith, which is the concept of God's Unity (tawhid) from which all else is derived. The mere profession of faith is not sufficient without practice, which strengthens the spiritual side of man.

The view of the world presented in the Quran and hadith (sayings attributed to the Prophet by the Sunnis, but extended to include the twelve Imams by the Shi'ites) is theocentric: God is "Creator, Sustainer, Benefactor, and Merciful One". God ascertains the time of each man's death and holds the power to resurrect him for the Day of Judgement. Although man is held responsible for the righteousness of his conduct, God, who is essentially good and merciful, desires man's welfare and salvation. Consequently, God gave man the Quran to guide him in his search for spiritual fulfillment. It is the duty of every Muslim, however, to forbid the occurrence of evil and ensure that good is done because it is believed that God judges according to both acts and intentions.

Another outstanding aspect of Islam, is that it
recognizes that man is a fundamentally social being. In addition to revealing the way to spiritual happiness, the Quran outlines a conception of a social, economic and political order which is to bring the greatest benefit to man. Consequently, all aspects of a Muslim's existence, if he is observant, are bound to religion by the Shari'a (divine laws). The Quran argues that the spiritualization of temporal duties strengthens man's spirit and maintains social cohesion.

A brief discussion of the Islamic view of the economic system will demonstrate the way in which the fundamental beliefs have shaped the conception of society. Although equal distribution of wealth would be ideal, it is argued that it is not necessarily good, given that individuals possess varying capacities to handle money. Those who lack ability to use money wisely will become poor, to the benefit of others. Equal distribution of money could never be sustained. In addition, the Quran presents reasons to maintain the gradations in wealth so as to motivate the poor to work. Money must not stay among the rich, and consequently, each Muslim must pay zakat as a necessity as a "member of the collectivity for the needy and also to purify one's self". The zakat is set according to various types of income from agricultural products, sub-soil exploration, commercial capital, the number of domestic animals, and hoarded cash.
prescription for the economic system would establish an Islamic state which is "essentially a welfare state and is duty bound to play an important role in the economy for the fulfillment of the goals of the Shari'a".11

Examination of recent commentaries on Islamic economic policy reveals the importance of the 'social good'. In an excerpt from Islam va Malikiyat, Ayatollah Taliquani outlines his interpretation of Islamic economics. He argues that man's thoughts and instincts are intertwined with his material existence. Correct economic policies, therefore, are important if man's spiritual nature is to flourish. The individual owns whatever is the result of his labour, and what he receives in exchange for it. He is allowed to enjoy his profits only insofar as the 'social good' is not endangered. The 'social good' must prevail over individual gains.12

The argument of sovereignty of the society over the individual is presented strongly by A. Bani-Sadr. The principle of tawhid is a world view in which any human ownership is by necessity relative, because only God has absolute ownership.13 Because the community is the primary viceregent of God, "community ownership is the condition for the individual's ownership of his/her own labour and its fruits".14 By placing emphasis upon both the material and moral aspects of life, Muslims argue that Islam can "erect the edifice of economic well-being on the
foundations of moral values". Despite the brevity of the above discussion, it is possible to discern the way in which Islam penetrates every aspect of a Muslim's life. By the very nature of the prescriptions presented in the Quran and the hadiths, the 'carriers' of the religion would be revered members of the society. The Islamic clergy augmented their predominant position through the religious institutions.

Shi'ite religious institutions were not established until the Safavid King, Shah Ismail Safavi, proclaimed Shi'ism the state religion of Iran in 1501. When the Twelve Imams had passed, so too had their infallible legal judgements upon which the Shi'ites had relied to settle debates. The position of mujtahid, a legal and theological scholar who was qualified to make judgements, was created. Once the Shi'ite ulama (clergy) were established as representatives of the official religion, they began to consolidate their power as the source of continuous direction to the umma (Islamic community).

The followers of Islam are divided into two groups: "those who may act according to their judgement (mujtahid), and those who must accept the judgement of others (mugallid)." Religious disputation is restricted
to those who have been trained to exercise *ijtihad*,
logical discovery and proof of the principle of faith
based on the Quran, *hadith* and the consensus of the
learned. The *ulama* believe that because analogical
reasoning is used, the result can only be a "contestable
expression of personal opinion". The *mugallid* is not
obliged to accept the views of any one particular *mujtahid*
since they are not infallible, however, the *mugallid* must
follow the direction of a *mujtahid*. This law ensures
the continuity of authority in the *umma* and the pre-
eminence of *ulama* in society.

With regard to jurisprudence, the Sunni seek the
consensus of the living community. The Shi'ites, on the
other hand, restrict the consensus to the *ulama*, living and
dead. The highest position among the *ulama* is that of
the *marja-i taqlid* (source of imitation): a *mujtahid*
whose example and opinion (*fatwa*) is binding. Despite
the fact that the concept of *marja-i taqlid* is the
foundation of the clergy's power, the question of who is
the most learned is but a matter of opinions. A *mujtahid*
gains eminence by virtue of his piety and knowledge of
theology. One way of determining who Muslims feel is a
*marja-i taqlid* is by calculating the amount of money which
the *madrasa* under the supervision of a leading *mujtahid*
has received because it is believed that Muslims give
more to the most learned of *ulama*. Ayatollah Bourjerdi,
who died in 1961, was the last marja-i taqlid whose eminence was widely recognized. As of 1975, there were six mujtahids which shared the position of marja-i taqlid, including Ayatollah's Khomeini and Shariatmadari. As long as a living marja-i taqlid is available to give his opinion, the ruling of a deceased mujtahid is not allowed. But, "if it is not possible to see a living mujtahid, the written word of a dead marja-i taqlid may be used." In this way, the link between the believer and the mujtahid is one which is constantly renewed, allowing for a flexible and responsive religion.

There are other distinctions among the Iranian ulama which must be made. The sources of the divine laws (Shari'a) which guide Muslim life are the Quran, the hadith, and the Sunna (traditions of the Prophet's behaviour and practice). Because the Shari'a originates from three different sources, it was necessary to create a legal science, fiq (Islamic jurisprudence) to synthesize the various prescriptions. A faqih is a Muslim authority on jurisprudence whose opinion is sought with regard to decisions based on Islamic law. The courts of the faqih are called the Shar' courts, in which judgement is passed on cases which deal with personal disputes and litigation of a commercial nature. The courts were often in conflict with the common law courts of the state, especially after the central government began its expan-
sion of judicial power. The faqih is also sought to verify legal documents and land titles, a service for which he receives remuneration. A mullah is a lower-ranking cleric who is usually recognized by his religious garb. He may deliver Friday afternoon sermons at the local mosque and perform betrothals.

The functions of the ulama were many. Besides being the spiritual guides of the community and legal experts, the clergy were the source of charity and education. The ulama were the guardians of the weaker members of the society, the poor, the widows, and the orphans, and were entrusted with the estates of minors. The money collected from zakāt was distributed by the clergy among the needy, and for maintenance of the mosques and madrasas (schools). The madrasas of Iran were controlled by the clergy and supported by religious tithes, and private and state endowments. In rural communities, the ulama were the traditional source of education, teaching their pupils those skills necessary for rural living.

Beyond the 'elementary' schools there exists the madrasas, free-style universities in which students attend lectures concerning the nature of Islam and debate the concepts of religious rhetoric and hermeneutics with renowned clergy. The government's observance of Islamic prescriptions was often an issue for discussion. The
Madrasas attracted mostly the sons of peasant farmers, clergy and bazaar. In 1975, there were 6500 students in the religious center of Qum, in addition to approximately four thousand students who attend madrasas throughout Iran.22

Traditionally, the Muslim shrines and madrasas were places of refuge against the law and repressive forces of the regime, although surveillance by SAVAK made open opposition dangerous. This fact may be partially responsible for the revitalization of religion in Iran. Between 1968 and 1975, the number of religious periodicals grew and received wider circulation. There was also a growth in the number of religious societies which totalled 12,300 in Tehran alone in 1974.23 The weekly gatherings or hey'ats were informal meetings during which social and individual problems were discussed and cooperative social programs arranged.24 The religious associations were the organizational networks through which Khomeini's taped messages were distributed.25 The informal religious nature of these associations provided an independent network of contacts among trusted friends, and helped to protect the clergy and their supporters from further state intervention. As events rose to a climax in 1978, even the shrines and madrasas were not immune to the policing tactics of SAVAK.

The clergy had a special relationship with the
bazaari of Iran's urban centers. The bazaari, the merchants of the traditional commercial centers, were responsible for over two-thirds of domestic retail trade and one-third of all imports. Their ties to the Islamic clergy were strong. Gustav Thaiss claims that "the religious idiom is the basic common denominator in the bazaari and functions to create cross-cutting ties and bonds among bazaaris of different guilds and professions." The Quran defines economic relations and directs the bazaari to use fair measures and methods in their commercial interaction, and the clergy act as adjudicators in commercial disputes. Most bazaari had been educated in cleric-run elementary schools. In return for his efforts as judge and guide, the alim (cleric) receives material support in the form of alms. A portion of the alm is kept by the cleric to maintain his family, and the remainder is distributed among the poor and religious students, and to preserve the shrines and madrasas. This symbiotic relationship gave the clergy a source of income independent from the control of the state.

Thaiss notes that a "good deal of the opposition to the government, especially in the bazaari, takes a religious guise". Both the ulama and the merchants were concerned with growing government interruption of traditionally held powers. The Shah believed that the
bazaars were traditional institutions which had outlived their usefulness. Plans were drawn to update the urban centers by replacing bazaar with modern shops and parks. An eight-lane highway threatened to dislocate 50,000 shops of the Tehran bazaar. In addition, the merchants were subject to taxes and regulations imposed by the price control commissions. The government's reduction of privileges created resentment among the merchants and turned their sympathies and aid to the efforts of the clergy.

Religious endowments (ouqaf) were a major source of independence for Muslim clergy. The administrator (mutawalli) of the vaqf was, by Muslim law, allowed to take ten percent of the annual revenue. Although the state oversaw the administration of the ouqaf, members of the clergy managed land set aside for religious purposes. Only approximately two percent of all land owned was reserved for religious purposes. In addition, the ulama also controlled the administration of any private vaqf for their own support. Although there is no clear evidence as to how much land was privately held by ulama, they were an important landowning element in central Iran.
Most important to an investigation of the Iranian revolution is the Islamic conception of the political system as a way to resolve the tension between the mundane and transcendental worlds. Here too lies the greatest difference between the Sunni and Shi'ite sects, the two major branches of Islam. According to the Quran, God is sovereign over all things and is the source of law for both the temporal and spiritual worlds. In Islam, there is no separation of church and state. The government of the state is perceived, therefore, as the viceregent of God. Man is entrusted with the power to administer the umma (Islamic community) according to religious law. Any form of government is legitimate as long as it satisfies the well-being of man in both worlds and needs the restrictions established in the Quran. 36

Although this view of government is generally accepted by both Sunnis and Shi'ites, the historical development of Shi'ism has led to alternate interpretations. To outline Shi'ite political theory, it is necessary to trace the development of Shi'ism.

If Islam can be considered a uniform religion while Mohammed was alive, the Prophet's death initiated the later divisions of belief among Muslims. When Mohammed died, he left no direct male heir to continue
the position of the religious and political leader of the umma, community of believers. Consequently, a successor was chosen from amongst those companions closest to Mohammad. The group which accepted the new caliph was called Sunni because they followed the traditions of the Prophet (Sunnah). This group became the dominant Islamic sect in the Middle East.

The Shi'ite 'Ali (Party of Ali), on the other hand, supported the election of the caliph from among the Prophet's relatives rather than his closest friends. They wished to see 'Ali, Mohammad's cousin and husband to Fatima, Mohammad's daughter, become caliph. When 'Ali was finally elected to the caliphate, he was beset by troubles stemming from the murder of his predecessor. 'Ali was also murdered. The division between the Sunnis and the Shi'ites became more distinct when the Shi'ites later regarded the first three caliphs as illegitimate. The Sunnis and the Shi'ites also differ with regard to their respective conceptions of the Imam. The Shi'ites believe that God gave man guidance through the Quran and the revelations of the Prophet, and also provided an infallible guide in religious matters; the Imam. True Imams were divinely appointed descendents from 'Ali, and Fatima who bears the baraka (spiritual power) of the Prophet. The Twelfth Imam disappeared miraculously when still only an infant. This disappearance
(A.D. 874) is known as the ghaybat, or 'Lesser Occulation', and was the beginning of seventy years in which the 'Hidden Imam' made his presence known to four agents. With the last agent's death (A.D. 940), the ghaybat-i kubri, or 'Greater Occulation', occurred. It is believed that the Twelfth Imam is alive and his return as the Mahdi (Messiah) will usher in the ideal state. The idea of the Mahdi cannot be found in the Quran. Rather, it was an innovation of the Shi'ite clergy. The idea of the Mahdi appealed to the lower and uprooted classes because his anticipated manifestation promised to bring the equality and justice which did not exist under the elite-dominated governments. The messianic element of Shi'ism was an important tool in the process of mobilization of later protest movements, especially during the revolution in 1978-1979.

The significance of the ghaybit-i kubri and the closely related principle of taqiya (prudent suspension of beliefs under threat of religious persecution) is political. Under the Umayyads (A.D. 661-750) and to some extent under their successors, the Abbasids (A.D. 750-1258), the Shi'ites suffered persecution. Both ghaybat and taqiya were adaptive measures to ensure the survival of the Shi'ite community. Watt notes that there was an advantage to having a 'hidden' leader which could not be the focus of reprisals by Abbasid rulers. Because of
the dominant Sunni community, Shi'ite clergy could not establish their own institutions. Those who followed the Hidden Imam were able to imply their denial of the authority of the rulers with a "quietistic patience and abstention from action," but the way was open to challenge the temporal government at a later date. Essentially, then, the historic caliphs were merely de facto rulers, while the rightful leadership of Islam passed through a kind of apostolic succession of Imams... (who) may or may not be in a position to exercise political power.

For Sunnis, the successor of the Prophet had only to enforce the religious laws because successors could not be guaranteed to have spiritual illumination. The Shi'ites, on the other hand, believed that the successor of the Prophet was to enforce the religious law since he possessed spiritual wisdom. Thus, the religious leader, as the spiritual guide of man, continuously interpreted the will of God as stated in the Quran. A religion based upon revelation established a degree of flexibility that was necessary for the survival of the Shi'ite clerics in the face of oppressive Sunni regimes.

The Shi'ite notion of government has been interpreted in many ways by the various Islamic schools of thought, however, it is possible to extract a general view. Under Islamic law, God is sovereign, consequently,
the state possesses legitimate power only by observing the Quranic principles. Nevertheless, a truly just society cannot exist before the appearance of the Mahdi. During the constitutional movement at the turn of the century, Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Na'ini published a book concerning 'modern' Shi'ite political theory. He argued that although a just society could not be achieved before the return of the Hidden Imam, it would not offend God to strive for justice. Therefore, a constitution implemented by a council of ulama could ensure that future laws were in agreement with Islamic principles.

Another important approach to political theory is presented in the work of Dr. Ali Shariati, a sociologist who combined Islamic and socialist ideals. Although he did not systematically address the structures and organization of a true Shi'ite state, his search for an Islamic ideology had a significant impact upon Iranian intellectuals. Shariati perceived Islam to be the social force which would unite Iranians for the cause of creating a truly just society as based upon the concepts of Shi'ism and socialism. Although Khomeini was the pivotal point of the revolutionary movement, Shariati's thought was greatly responsible for revealing Islam to be the 'religion of protest' to the intellectuals, students and educated middle class. Islam was to give Iranians the cultural focus which was needed to build an independent
Iran.

Khomeini's view of the state differs from the interpretation of government which is generally accepted as representative of the Shi'ite position. In Khomeini's first book, Revealing of the Secrets, he criticized Reza Shah's lack of observance of the 1907 Constitution, but did not call for the end of that government because a tyrannical government was better than the chaos which would result if there was no government at all. This is the traditional argument for the maintenance of the state. Khomeini's view changed during exile in Najaf, Iraq. The most concise work concerning his opinions on the form of government are set forth in a book entitled Islamic Government, which is a series of lectures Khomeini gave during exile. The book begins with the notion of valayat-i faqih, or the governance of the jurist.

The valayat-i faqih is to "execute divine law, establish the just Islamic order, and serve mankind". The establishment of such a government, Khomeini argues, is commanded by the life of the Prophet and by Islam itself. The separation of church and state is a Western concept that has no historical support in Shi'ite Islamic political thought. The religious laws which include prescriptions for political, economic, and cultural aspects of the society support the argument that an Islamic government is the logical conclusion.
Proof for the existence of the *valayat-i faqih* occupies much of the argument in Khomeini's book. Although he argues that such a view of government has always existed, it is actually new to Islamic political thought. Khomeini also challenges the accepted view of the clergy's role with respect to politics. Given the Islamic command to 'enjoin the good and forbid evil', the religious scholar has a moral duty to become politically active "in the face of the oppressive and deviant ruling classes". A *jihad*, or holy war, must be undertaken to remove the tyrannical governments and replace them with *valayat-i faqih*. It was in these lectures that Khomeini called for an Islamic revolution to remove the Shah from power.

Because Shi'ite Islam allows for the reinterpretation of Quranic texts, such changes by Shariati and Khomeini are acceptable. More so than Sunni political thought, Shi'ite theory of politics has reflected the evolving social and political systems of the time. This has allowed Shi'ites to exist despite anti-Shi'ite governments and modernization programmes which have attempted to remove their power. Furthermore, Islamic interpretative changes can result in a powerful ideology which, when used by a charismatic leader, can mobilize a population. The successful revolution could not have occurred without the unique contacts which the clergy
maintained in Iranian society.

As outlined in the previous discussion, the cultural orientations of Islam were of special importance to the Iranian revolution. Islam exhibits a high degree of symbolic articulation of the problems of human existence. This is evident with regard to religious discussions, such as those which consider God and the relationship between God and the individual. Shi'ite Islam in particular has fostered the ability to question and reconceive existential problems. The ulama are the source of continual direction to the Islamic community (umma), however, it is recognized that their interpretation of the Quran and hadith is only an opinion from logical proof. Because the Shi'ite clergy accept the interpretation of a living marja-i taqlid as an immediate authority, Shi'ism has remained responsive to changing social needs.

Most important in an examination of the role of Shi'ite Islam in the revolutionary process is the perception that there exists a high level of tension between the mundane and transcendental worlds. This tension is believed to be solved through 'this-worldly' activity, especially political and military activity. The concept of the umma, the political-religious community which is an institutionalization of the prescriptions in the Quran and hadith, epitomizes the 'this-worldly' orientation of Islam. The universalistic element, as defined by the
equal access of all Muslims to God, cuts across all strata. Moreover, the clergy's independence from other centers and elites was assured by their access to resources (such as endowments and alms) which were not restricted by other institutions.

Because of the historical persecution of the Shi'ite clergy by the dominant Sunni rulers, the ulama were forced to dissociate themselves from the political centers. Their passivity was also reflected in the minimal degree of organization, which actually helped them to sustain the persecution of unsympathetic governments. The ulama tended not to develop strong linkages with the political and economic centers, but their connections with the peripheries were strong. Islam united diverse tribal, urban, and rural groups which had little in common but their religious beliefs.

The high degree of commitment to the socioeconomic order resulted in the rise of institutional entrepreneurs from the religious elite. Although the ulama's passivity and autonomy from the political and economic centers was not conducive to the development of coalescent change, the strong 'this-worldly' orientation of Islam encouraged change in all spheres. Khomeini's interpretation of Islamic political philosophy created a dynamic ideology which encouraged coalescent change, and ultimately, revolution.
The ulama have long been the leaders of opposition against the state. As guardians of the poor and oppressed, the clergy were often critical of what they saw as unjust government policies. In the government's view, the ulama were a traditional elite who had the potential to challenge the authority of the state in two ways. As a Muslim, the ruler too was required to follow the opinions of a marja-i taqlid, effectively undermining the supremacy of the state. In addition, the ulama maintained intimate contact with the merchants, peasants, and intellectuals, as well as acted as protectors of the 'abased'. This position gave the clergy the opportunity to forge linkages which cut across strata. Government attempts to decrease the power of the clergy simply served to strengthen the political consciousness of the group, fostering the emergence of institutional entrepreneurs who were inspired to further action.

From the inception of Islam, politics and religion were bound together. The Prophet Mohammad fled from Mecca to Medina where he was proclaimed as the religious and political ruler of the city. It was at Medina that Mohammad organized his followers into an army and began the conquest of Mecca and the surrounding Arab lands, thus giving Islam a warlike precedent and theory exemplified in the jihad or holy war. Although the acceptance of the conquering culture and traditions by the indigenous
population does not necessarily follow territorial usurpation, the expansion of Islam into the surrounding areas occurred at a critical time for the conquered societies. The flourishing agricultural and trading center of Mecca had promoted the emergence of class structures with no legal or welfare safeguards for the lower classes, thus creating social discontent. The prescriptions for society outlined by Mohammad provided a satisfactory alternative.

Similarly, the spread of Islam into the Byzantine and Persian empires occurred at a time when these empires were weakened by class divisions, tribal antagonism, and religious conflict. Montgomery Watt describes the men who accepted the Quranic vision as those caught in the emerging socioeconomic system. A view of the world which proclaimed that

events are controlled by God and not by money and big business...enabling men to feel they were living significantly, although by the standards of money and big business they were relative failures.

Watt argues that this does not mean that Mohammad's followers became social reformers, nor does it appear that the extension of territory was aimed at conversion. Rather, Islam provided an ideology which helped to unify the populace and nomadic tribes into a state. From the onset of Islam, then, religion and politics were
The mobilizing capability of the Shi'ite ulama was first apparent during the emergence of the powerful political movement which brought the Safavid kings to power in 1501. More recently, the revolutionary potential of the clergy was revealed during the protests of the tobacco concession in 1890. The consolidation of foreign power (especially British) during the late 1800's had resulted in the first bazaari petitions against competition from foreign business. The concession of a monopoly on the production, sale, and export of all Iranian tobacco was granted to a British subject. Tobacco was a widely grown crop in Iran, and was very important to local economies. When signs were posted declaring that all tobacco must be sold to the company's agents in 1891, massive protests erupted. A leading ulama decreed that the sale and use of tobacco was outlawed as long as the concession existed. The power of the clergy was such that the fatwa (decree of authority) was closely observed. The initial protest movement, combining ulama, modernists, and merchants, and supported by the general population, ultimately forced the cancellation of the British concession. The success of the tobacco movement demonstrated that the religious-radical alliance had the "potential for changing the course of Iranian policy".
This alliance was successful again in 1906, when it had become apparent to many that Western penetration threatened the social and economic basis of Iranian society. The Qajar kings appeared to be aligned with the non-Muslims who were slowly usurping their power. The ulama realized that reform was necessary if Iran was to remain an Islamic state. The clergy once again mobilized the support of twelve to fourteen thousand Iranians who took refuge (bast) on the mosques of Qum. The merchants closed their shops in the Tehran bazaar as a show of support for the ulama's cause. The demands of the protesters consisted of the institution of a representative assembly (majlis), and a constitution.

This view was reflected in the second article of the 1907 amendments to the constitution, which declared that the laws of Iran were to be in accordance with the prescriptions of Islam. In order to ensure the observance of Islamic laws, a committee of five persons--mujtahids and religious doctors acquainted with the requirements of the Shari'at (Islamic laws)--would be elected.

Unfortunately, the constitution was never really observed. The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 effectively removed political power from the Qajar kings, and consequently, their attempts to centralize their rule were unsuccessful. The lack of a centralized bureaucracy and a standing army helped to maintain the Qajar's subser-
vience to foreign power. It was perceived by the clergy that the moral decay of the society and the removal of elementary education from the control of the clergy was the result of foreign influence.

Reza Shah's rise to power was initially supported by the ulama as an alternative to the corrupt Qajar kings. The clergy's complaints against the monarchy continued to center around the lack of defense of the national territory, the economy, and culture. When it became clear that Reza Shah was interested in establishing an Iranian republic, clerical support was dropped. The ulama generally opposed what they perceived to be an imposition of a Western form of government into the Iranian political system. Reza Shah assured the ulama that he would abide by the prescripts of Islamic law in a bid to regain the support of the clergy. This assurance placated the ulama, who were hoping that the second article of the constitution would be instituted.

Once he had declared himself king, Reza Shah took direct steps toward diminishing the power of the clergy. Between 1925 and 1928, several laws were passed which undermined the influence of the clergy and the religious institutions. A new Commercial Code was instituted which limited clerical direction of rules of trade and the charging of interest. The Conscription Law of 1925 determined those who qualified for exemption from military
service, a decision which had traditionally been the right of the ulama. Clergy were exempted from military duty, but to qualify, ulama and religious students had to appear before a board of lay examiners. The Uniformity of Dress Law of 1928 insisted upon a similar procedure if the ulama were to be exempted from this law which required the adoption of Western-style dress for men. These two laws forced the clergy to gain state recognition of their position within the religious organization. Such a regulation worked toward undermining the ulama's independent power. Civil and criminal codes were also declared in 1928, usurping the role of the Shari' a and the Shar' courts as the legal system of Iran.

Since the turn of the century, the governments of Iran had slowly removed education from the control of the clergy. By 1911, there existed over one hundred secular-styled elementary schools in Tehran. Under Reza Shah, standards were imposed on teachers and students of madrasas and a new curriculum was legislated which controlled religious instruction. Moreover, a program was initiated to expand the secular education system in Iran, but it was limited to the urban centers. Perhaps the most far reaching of Reza Shah's reforms was the establishment of the Ministry of Endowments. Among other regulations, lands were to be registered and unclaimed lands were to come under the jurisdiction of the state.
Furthermore, revenues from charitable endowments were deposited in a trust account until such time that they were allocated to secular education and social funds.\textsuperscript{72}

Reza Shah successfully reduced the institutional power of the clergy during his reign and, despite the ulama's profound objections to his reforms, little protest occurred. This was mainly due to the fact that the ulama were routinely arrested and imprisoned for actively criticizing the regime. By the end of this period political repression, intraelite competition, and an absence of social support, caused the clergy to return to a policy of political quietism similar to that maintained during the pre-Safavid Period.\textsuperscript{73}

The abdication of Reza Shah in 1941 signaled a resurgence of political activity amongst the clergy. Economic disruption, the intrusion of foreign military powers, and the decay of Islamic culture in the face of growing Western influence, spurred the clergy to political participation. The ulama demanded the return of the veil (which had been dropped in accordance with the dress codes) and the repeal of the ban imposed upon passion plays.\textsuperscript{74} Fatwas were issued by mujtahids against the enfranchisement of women and in favour of the nationalization of the oil industry. S.A. Arjomand argues that clerical support in 1953 was as critical to Mohammad Reza Shah's return as the military help of the C.I.A.\textsuperscript{75}
It appears that the ulama had good reasons to support the Shah. From 1941 until 1953, the Shah had proven to be a weak leader. Clerical influence was once again flourishing socially and politically. The xenophobic ulama feared that the 'leftist' tendencies of the Mossadeq government would signal a decline of their recently regained power. It appears that the clergy assumed the continuation of these trends after the return of Mohammad Reza Shah.

As has been discussed earlier, the early 1960's were a time of economic and political problems. Ayatollah Bourjerdi, the leading marja-i taqlid, opposed the land reform program proposed by the Shah in 1969. Bourjerdi objected to the limitation of the size of Islamic estates, since such a restriction would be contrary to Islamic laws. Moreover, the Ayatollah Behbehani was critical of the state's arbitrary confiscation and distribution of privately owned lands. There was also concern over the impact land reform would have upon the revenues from religious endowments. Since there is no evidence which indicates the extent of private endowments held by the clergy, it is difficult to argue that the motivation for the objections was based on the fear of losing their holdings. This was probably a concern of some ulama, but as Anne Lambton points out, the Islamic principle, which states that the public good takes
precedence over private gains, would have overcome the clergy's objections. To argue that the ulama objected to land reform on the basis of material interests alone is an oversimplification.

Land reform was just one aspect of the White Revolution which included the enfranchisement of women, and the establishment of the Literacy Corps, which would usurp the strong clerical institutions in the rural areas. Ayatollah Khomeini was one of the most outspoken critics of the White Revolution. Khomeini denied "harbouring any objection to the principle of land reform and had no holdings in Iran himself which might be endangered by its application." Khomeini criticized the land reform program because it would not bring about an improved lifestyle for the peasants. The main thrust of Khomeini's criticism was against the autocratic rule of the Shah and the influence of foreign (especially American) powers in Iran. Khomeini condemned the Shah's diplomatic and commercial relationship with Israel as well. Because of his criticisms of the Shah's regime, Ayatollah Khomeini was arrested, which in turn caused students to riot in protest. Recognizing that the popularity of Khomeini threatened his rule, the Shah ordered the exile of the Ayatollah.

From his home of exile, Khomeini called for a jihad against the Shah and his policies of secularization
and Westernization. It is indicative of his charismatic appeal that Khomeini was able to engineer a revolution from outside Iran. Khomeini developed his reputation for holding nationalistic and moral concerns early in his career. His view of Islam as an all-encompassing religious force won him many admirers, and his life in exile represented to many the oppression of the Shah's regime.

The Ayatollah emphasized Islamic values in comparison to the Shah's embrace of Western ideals which was felt by many Iranians to be the cause of their problems. Perhaps most importantly, Ayatollah Khomeini appeared to be incorruptible, just, and pious—a vivid contrast to the view most Iranians held of the Shah. It is, of course, impossible to measure the Ayatollah's impact upon the actualization of the revolution. It appears, however, that Khomeini's charisma, augmented by his proponents' reference to him as the Mahdi, was responsible for attracting many to support his call for the overthrow of the Shah, and the establishment of an Islamic republic in Iran.

Eisenstadt argues that socialism has been accepted by some non-Western societies as a way in which to establish a separate cultural identity, while still maintaining certain aspects of Western civilization conducive to their development. Islam performed such a function in the Iranian revolution. For Khomeini, Islam is a belief system which incorporates the achievements of
science and technology, but circumvents the problems of Western society. In the revolution, Islam was used to create a new collective identity for Iranians which set them apart from Western influence, and consequently, the pro-Western regime of the Shah. The establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran represents the institutionalization of the unique cultural identity of Iran.

The common aim of all revolutions is the restoration of 'social justice'. Advocates of change propose plans to equalize the distribution of wealth and political rights. These recommendations stem from the interpretation of social justice which participants in the revolutionary movement have derived from traditional values or recent ideologies. Political victory entails the concretization of philosophies which were once vague. Inevitably, the period following a successful upheaval is violent because the struggle for power continues between revolutionaries until one group secures control of the society.

This has been precisely the case in Iran following the end of the Shah's reign. Although united by the goal of deposing the Pahlavi monarchy, it appears that the coalescence of revolutionary interests has disting­

ished since the victory. To the members of the National Front,
the fall of Shapour Bakhtiar's government in February of 1979, signalled the opportunity to establish the 'professionals and bourgeoisie' in control. Even if this had been acceptable to Khomeini, the strategy of centralization pursued by the Shah left Iran without effective political institutions or leadership. Many of the professionals and technicians needed to rebuild Iran had left because they disliked and feared Khomeini's plans for an Islamic republic. Despite the National Front's platform of judicial reform, political pluralism, and democracy, it appeared to receive little support from the general populace. Iranians may have felt that the National Front's programs were inspired by Western ideals of government and consequently, they were loathe to support a party which was subject to the same influences that were believed to have created the Shah's regime. Khomeini and his Islamic ideals were a clear alternative and, therefore, were able to undercut the power of the National Front and prevent the institution of a Western-styled state by dismissing Mehdi Bazargan from the nominal government.

Khomeini's plans for an Islamic republic entailed not only political and economic changes, but a modification of the morality of the society. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran states that it is based upon Islamic principles such that the state may develop towards
its ultimate goal, namely God, the epitome of the perfection of the transcendental world. In the preamble, it is declared that the struggle of the militant clergy, workers, and intellectuals, began in 1963 and was subsequently successful because it followed an Islamic and ideological path.

One of the founding principles of the Republic is belief in the Imamate, which justifies the mandate of the velayat faqih (religious leader) to rule in the absence of the hidden Twelfth Imam. A member of the clergy who is recognized by the people as the outstanding leader rises to this position. The Constitution secures the position of velayat faqih for Ayatollah Khomeini for the rest of his life (stated in Article 107). Following his death, an elected council of religious experts will choose either an individual, or three or five people to provide the leadership of the velayat faqih. The powers of the velayat faqih include the appointment of six clergy to the Council of Guardians as well as the highest authorities in the judiciary. The faqih must approve the president, and may dismiss this official at any time. Furthermore, the faqih may appoint the head of the Revolutionary Guard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and commands the Armed Forces.

Because legislation is based upon the Quran and hadith (sayings of the Prophet), the clergy are the
appropriate experts to interpret the meaning and application of the prescriptions. The Council of Guardians consists of six clerical members appointed by the fāqih, and six lawyers who have been approved by the National Assembly and the High Council of the Judiciary. The Council of Guardians oversees management in everything concerning "civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, laws and regulations" (stated in Article 4). The Council, by virtue of its existence, legitimizes the other branches of government (stated in Article 93).

The Constitution professes equality before the law, freedom of the press, and allows for popular elections. The President is popularly elected, and nominates a Prime Minister who is then approved by a vote of the National Assembly. If approved, the President may formally appoint the Prime Minister to his post, and he in turn names ministers to head his cabinet. The Prime Minister heads a majority party in the National Assembly, which consists of 270 representatives elected for a four-year term. The number of clergy in office has grown with each election. In the First Islamic Majlis, 1980-81, of two hundred identifiable deputies that were elected, forty-three were mullahs (clerics). The number was raised to fifty-five the following year, clearly indicating the greater clerical representation since the fall of the
The number of political parties in Iran has increased since the demise of the Shah. The Islamic Republican Party was formed in 1979, and was led by Ayatollah Behesti, until his death in 1981. This party is generally identified with Ayatollah Khomeini. The Muslim People's Republic Party was led by Ayatollah Shariatmadari until he was implicated in a plot against Ayatollah Khomeini's life. Shariatmadari was subsequently arrested, and his reputation besmirched by pro-Khomeini supporters. Taking a moderate stance to reforms in Iran, Shariatmadari preferred the reinstitution of a five member cleric committee, as outlined in the Constitution of 1907, to an Islamic Republic. The Muslim People's Republic Party had a membership of over 3.5 million people, rendering Shariatmadari a potentially powerful rival to Khomeini's supremacy. There are smaller Islamic parties in addition to those mentioned above, but the most serious opponents to Khomeini's regime now, are the left wing parties of which there are several. The Communist Tudeh Party was outlawed from Iran in early 1983 because of its pro-Soviet stance. The Mujahedin-e Khalq, an Islamic Guerrilla group, is the strongest opponent of the Islamic Republic, and is responsible for the assassination of leading clerics and ministers since Khomeini's takeover. Ayatollah
Khomeini's punishment of those opposed to the regime is actually more brutal than that of the Shah. Many reports state that executions at the hands of the Revolutionary Courts occur on a daily basis.\(^91\)

With regard to the economic situation, the Constitution states that the economic system is to be 'designed to provide the proper groundwork such that all forms of human creativity can emerge' (stated in the Preamble). Khomeini has pursued a programme to ensure agricultural self-sufficiency by increasing the acreage of cultivated land. Figures regarding production in the industrial sector are not readily available, but it is known that the assets of the fifty-one richest industries have been expropriated by the government.\(^92\) Insurance companies and banks have been nationalized and now adhere to Islamic regulations. Oil production and export have decreased due to damage sustained during the Iran-Iraq war.\(^93\) The private sector is very small to the extent that it is almost inconsequential. Workers have used widespread strikes to increase the role played by workers in the management of factories. Generally, inflation and unemployment are at least as high as they were during the end of the Shah's reign.\(^94\)

The citizens of Iran are still experiencing the consequences of social and political upheaval. Ayatollah Khomeini has tried to implement the prescriptions for a
just society as outlined in the Quran. Former first President of the Islamic Republic, A. Bani-Sadr, claims that Iranians are seeking the sovereignty and independence which has been denied them due to their longstanding position as a pawn of world powers. The revolution was an attempt to achieve freedom of cultural identity and independence which appeared to be threatened by relationships with the West. Islamic ideology offered Iranians an opportunity to reassert cultural identity as well as gain a vision of a just and democratic society.

It is yet to be seen if Khomeini will be able to re-establish political order in Iran. The Ayatollah appears to be preoccupied with destroying opponents to the Islamic Republic. Iranians have been allowed more involvement in the political system, but within the bounds of Islamic prescripts. Khomeini has always rejected democracy as a Western import, arguing that Islamic rules for political participation are more appropriate for Iran. Nevertheless, repression of political dissidents continues to be a part of Iranian society. It may be that Iranians will find that the Islamic definitions of justice and political participation as interpreted by Khomeini do not foster the just and democratic society that they have envisioned.
REFERENCES


6S.A.A. Rizvi, Iran: Royalty, Religion and Revolution, p. 110.

7M. Hamidullah, Introduction to Islam, p. 105.

8Ibid., p. 121.

9Ibid., p. 168.

10Ibid., p. 67.


14 Ibid., p. 194.


17 Ibid., p. 7.

18 Ibid., p. 9.

19 M.M.J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution, p. 88.

20 Ibid.


22 M.M.J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution, p. 78.


26 S.A.A. Rizvi, Iran: Royalty, Religion and Revolution, p. 296.


29 G. Thaiss, "The Bazaar as a Case Study of Religion and Social Change", p. 204.


31 S.A.A. Rizvi, Iran: Royalty, Religion and Revolution, p. 296.

32 Ibid.

33 M.M.J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution, p. 114.


36 M. Hamidullah, Introduction to Islam, p. 100.


39 Ibid.

40 Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 7.


46 Ibid., p. 239.


51 Ibid., p. 66.

52 Ibid., p. 38.


55 H. Algar, "The Oppositional Role of the Ulama in Twentieth Century Iran", p. 235.

56 Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, pp. 5-6.


58 Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 5.

59 Ibid., p. 11.


61 Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 67.


63 Ibid., p. 143.

64 S. Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, p. 28.

65 Ibid., p. 31.

66 Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 95.

67 S. Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, p. 37.

68 Ibid., pp. 42-43.

69 Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 95.

70 S. Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, p. 33.
71 Ibid., p. 54.
72 Ibid., pp. 57-58.
73 R.W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 148.
74 S. Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, p. 61.
75 S.A. Arjomand, "Shi'ite Islam and the Revolution in Iran", p. 299.
78 S. Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, p. 98.
80 H. Algar, "The Oppositional Role of the Ulama in Twentieth Century Iran", p. 246. Anne Lambton's observation confirms that Khomeini's objections to the White Revolution were not on the grounds of land reform.
82 H. Algar, "The Oppositional Role of the Ulama in Twentieth Century Iran", p. 246.
83 M.M.J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution, p. 216.
85 Ibid., pp. 29-30.

86 Ibid., p. 33.


94 Ibid.


96 Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 252.
VI

CONCLUSIONS

From the above discussion, it is possible to understand how the revolution in Iran emerged from the interplay of several major elements. Similar to the events surrounding the occurrence of civil unrest in the early 1960's, the Iranian revolution was the result of a combination of internal and external factors. In addition to the international conditions which the Shah believed to require most of his attention, Mohammad Reza Shah attempted to institutionalize reforms that would accelerate the rate of progress, and in turn, bring security and legitimacy for the Pahlavi monarchy. The imposition of reforms, however, resulted in economic strains and political tensions. Iranians could not express their feelings of dissatisfaction and alienation due to SAVAK's strict policing of regime opposition.

Also similar to the earlier disruption of social order was the role which the clergy played as a voice of criticism during the political movement in the 1970's. The ulama resented the Shah's efforts to reduce the
influence of traditional Islamic institutions and values. This situation was exacerbated by the introduction of Western culture through the expansion of international communication systems and the importation of technology and advisors. Whereas the concern for Iran's cultural identity had a limited following in the 1960's, Iranian identity became an issue for the masses during the late 1970's. The many social ills were understood to be the result of reform styled after Western models of political and social organization. The encroachment of Western culture upon a society, which historically was a pawn of world powers, made the emergence of anti-Western sentiments almost inevitable. Consequently, for many Iranians, the demand for reforms in the Shah's regime were voiced within the assertion of their Islamic heritage. The special position of the ulama as the traditional defenders of the oppressed, and as a disembedded elite who were motivated by religious and material interests, magnified their symbolic and structural propensity to lead the revolutionary movement against the Shah.

Islam proved to be a powerful tool of mobilization when combined with Khomeini's charismatic leadership. The transcendental nature of Shi'ite Islam showed Iranians the potential for a just state. Shi'ism set the objectives of the revolutionary movement not only by virtue of its prescriptions for an ideal society, but also by reference to
the Mahdi, a messianic symbol readily used by Khomeini's supporters. Khomeini presented Islam as a belief system which incorporated the West's emphasis upon progress through scientific and technological advancements, while simultaneously perpetuating a concern for man's soul. The Ayatollah argued that man suffered from such problems as alienation and depression because Western societies had pursued progress at the expense of moral sentiments and needs. The secularization of society, then, was responsible for many of the West's problems. Islam could prevent these problems from occurring in Iran because it does not separate religion from the state. Islamic principles permeate all aspects of society, while keeping in mind the development of man's spiritual nature as well as his material comfort.

Such a complex interaction of contributing elements needs a multi-variable approach. Eisenstadt's theory provides the analyst with a holistic view of the internal tensions and international context which combined to produce a revolutionary situation. Social change is explained as the result of the contradictory pressures of order and dissolution which exist simultaneously within society. Man's ability to create his social order also gives him the capacity to redefine the symbolic code upon which his institutions are built. The biological endowment of creation is the ultimate cause
of social change.

Beyond his conception of social transformation, Eisenstadt's approach to the study of revolutions does not differ significantly from the traditional method of investigation in political science. He recognizes the importance of the international context to explain the tensions created by inter-state political and economic competition. In addition to this variable, Eisenstadt considers the domestic strains produced by the structures of the system which may result in such problems as legitimacy. Moreover, Eisenstadt is concerned with the role of elites and elite interaction as the way in which the protest movements acquire leadership and direction. These four variables, international competition, elite dynamics, state goals and social strains, are components of the historical approach to the study of political phenomena. However, Eisenstadt's understanding of revolutionary transformation includes a determination of the effects which a specific cultural orientation has upon the forms and issues of a protest movement. Although any of the five theories reviewed could have enlightened aspects of the events leading to the downfall of the Shah, only Eisenstadt's theory presents a methodical way to examine the impact of Iranian culture upon the revolution.

There are three problems which arise with the operationalization of Eisenstadt's theory. The categories
which Eisenstadt provides the analyst of revolutionary transformation are highly abstract. This, of course, is the problem of any general theory. Nevertheless, the task of defining the content of specific variables and their interaction remains. The analyst is required to possess extensive knowledge of the state in question in order to identify the state's goals, or the strains caused by its structures. One is forced to determine the consequences of messianic movements, religious fervour and charisma upon the process of revolutionary change with little insight from Eisenstadt.

Nor does Eisenstadt complete his conception of the role of the international context in contributing to the emergence of a revolutionary situation. He does not appear to conceive the intrusion of Western culture upon non-Western societies as a component of international conditions. Beyond the effects of economic and political influences, the international system may threaten a society's cultural identity. The result of cultural competition is the assertion of a traditional belief system such as Islam. Consequently, religious systems, in addition to ideas of socialism, may serve as a way in which a society asserts its unique identity against pressures to assimilate with the West.

In spite of the problems created by the level of abstraction, Eisenstadt's categories provide a fruitful
schema by which to isolate the origins of social strain. The five categories focus upon the sources of social issues such as the division of labour, changes in traditional values, and the domestic tensions created by the demands of the international systems. When considering the evolution of protest movements, Eisenstadt points to the role of elites and the cultural orientation as molders of the issues and processes of the revolutionary movement. These directives give Eisenstadt's theory a great capacity to trace the emergence of a revolutionary situation.

Despite Eisenstadt's attempts to provide his theory with a predictive capability, the approach fails to achieve this goal beyond the assumption that change is an inherent component of the social system and will always occur. Moreover, in the later part of his book, Revolution and the Transformation of Societies, Eisenstadt acknowledges that revolutionary transformation in the mode of the archetypical revolution of European societies is no longer a trend in modern, postindustrial societies. Nevertheless, Eisenstadt's theory is most appropriate for analysis of revolutions of modernization.

Eisenstadt's approach contains an obvious bias. He, as do most Western social scientists, assumes the separation of the church and the state as a basic component of modern political organization. Modernization
theorists from third world countries have argued that the model of development presented by the West may not be appropriate for countries developing under the present global circumstances. The West's response to the emergence of the international political and economic systems was spawned by the cultural and historical conditions of the time. The present situation is very different, given the obvious changes in the historical context. An Islamic society holds the potential to achieve many of the criteria for modernization while maintaining the unity of the church and the state. Islamic prescripts may be a viable alternative to the Western model of society. The success or failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran will give social scientists the opportunity to test their understanding of modernization.

Eisenstadt's theory stands as a useful schema through which to analyze the preconditions and outcomes of revolutionary transformation. Although the result of the present social forces in Iran cannot be foreseen by using his approach, Eisenstadt's theory will aid the task of investigating the emerging trends. Ultimately, the study of the revolutionary developments in Iran may contribute to a clearer conception of social processes and revolutions.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


--------. *The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization*. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1972.


--------. "Iran and the Crisis of '78", *Foreign Affairs*, LVII, no. 2 (Winter 1978-79), 323-342.


--------. "The Etiology of Internal War", *History and Theory*, IV, no. 2 (1965), 133-163.


Hetherington, N.S. "Industrialization and Revolution in Iran: Forced Progress or Unmet Expectation", Middle East Journal, XXXVI, no. 3 (Summer 1982), 362-373.


Horton, John. "Order and Conflict Theories of Social Problems as Competing Ideologies", American Journal of Sociology, LXXI, no. 6 (May 1966), 701-713.


--------. "What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?", Comparative Politics, XIV, no. 3 (April 1982), 351-375.


Sullivan, William H. "Dateline Iran: The Road Not Taken", *Foreign Policy*, no. 4 (Fall 1980), 175-186.


