DYSTOPIA AND THE MODERN SUBJECT
DYSTOPIA
&
THE MODERN SUBJECT

A STUDY OF ETHICS IN ALDOUS HUXLEY’S BRAVE NEW WORLD
AND IDEOLOGY IN GEORGE ORWELL’S NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR

BY:

CHRISTINA DOLORES PÉREZ, M.A.

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AUTHOR: Christina Dolores Perez, M.A.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores the connections between dystopia and modern theorizations of human subjectivity in Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* and George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. These two pioneering dystopias confront their reader's understanding of being human, as well as considering notions of responsibility, freedom, self and subjectivity by challenging modern assumptions of the nature of human reality. My introduction considers dystopia, and both authors' philosophical concerns as they emerge in the citizens of their dystopian worlds. These citizens function as analogies to the modern self that has gone astray and fallen into a state of nihilism. My second chapter focuses on the ethical construction of the citizens of Huxley's *Brave New World* and explores his critique of the ethics of scientism which shapes and influences their lives. My third chapter similarly considers the ideological complexities of the citizens in Orwell's even harsher dystopia *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, where ideology threatens the prospect of meaningful being in the world. By examining the way Huxley and Orwell meditate on the malaise of the modern self through their dystopian citizens, and identifying, with the help of modern theories on the self, their philosophical position on humanity's present condition, this study considers the great value of the modern dystopia. I highlight the importance of the dystopian search for a deeper understanding of the truth of reality, and meditate on the nature of being human, as dystopia describes what humanity is by describing what it is not.
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ABBREVIATIONS

AE - Against Ethics, Caputo
AH - Aldous Huxley: Novelist, Ferns
EPS - Ethics, Politics Subjectivity, Critchley
F&H - “Freedom and Happiness.” George Orwell
GM - On the Genealogy of Morals in Kaufmann.
HatH - Human, All-too-Human in Kaufmann.
IHTT - “I Have Tried to Tell the Truth.”
NU - Narrating Utopia, Ferns
SIM - Simulacra & Simulation, Baudrillard
SSM - In the Shadow of the Silent Majority, Baudrillard

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CHAPTER ONE
Dystopia & The Subject
An Introduction

While reading a copy of Walter Kaufmann's 1967 edition of Friedrich Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals*, I stumbled upon a small footnote to Nietzsche's discussion of Homer's *Hesiod*. This note struck me quite unexpectedly, and at the time I did not realize its implications, nor did I conceive of the role it would play in shaping the groundwork of the present study:

If the present section is not clear enough to any reader, he might turn to Zarathustra's contrast of the overman and the last man (Prologue, sections 3-5) and for good measure, read also the final chapter or two of Part One. Then he will surely see how Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* and George Orwell's *1984* — but especially the former — are developments of Nietzsche's theme. Huxley, in his novel, uses Shakespeare as a foil; Nietzsche, in the passage above, Homer. (GM I:11, 43 fn.6)

I was not as intrigued by the relevance of this small note to Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals* as much as I was excited by Kaufmann's thought of enlightening Nietzsche's thematic point by aligning it with the perspective of Huxley's and Orwell's dystopias. While Kaufmann's editorial note might seem irrelevant to the
reader of Nietzsche’s polemic on morals, it is quite a fascinating point of departure for the reader of dystopia, for Kaufmann indirectly sustains the proposition that dystopias “concern themselves with the moral [and ideological] structure of a fictive society” (Sisk 6). Not yet sure how or why, I kept this note in mind, I started to consider more seriously the philosophical aspects of dystopia in Aldous Huxley’s *Brave New World* and George Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, not solely in the effort to grasp at Kaufmann’s thinking on this connection, but also to unpack the way Huxley’s and Orwell’s dystopias uniquely deliver philosophical ideas on the self.  

Several useful and important meditations on dystopia in modern scholarship have attempted to bridge the gaps between dystopia and history (Peter Ruppert), dystopia and language (David Sisk), dystopia, modern science & politics (Krishan Kumar), and dystopia, gender & narrative (Chris Ferns). Despite these and other attempts to explore more fully the realm of dystopia there is still a great gap in studies between dystopia and philosophy, and more specifically, dystopia as it deals with the modern subject. I do not claim that the question
of selfhood in dystopia has not yet been asked in recent criticism on Huxley and Orwell. On the contrary, there are many critiques which allude to these questions on one level or another. However, I would like consider dystopia more explicitly as a porthole, an opening to various philosophical theories on the nature of being human; something which has not been done. I am not sure why this topic has not been more thoroughly discussed. Perhaps there still exists the belief that such a focus on philosophy in dystopia would detract from the aesthetic quality of its pages and merely reduce it to a pedantic study of the flaws of humanity. Yet the more I consider it, the more I am convinced that the dystopia needs to be taken more seriously as a genre that posits particularly important philosophical concerns paralleling modern notions of human existence.

Dystopia’s interest in humanity is located within the larger philosophical investigation of the nature of “selfhood” growing out of a long history of Western thought, from before the time of the Bible, and shifting through thinkers like Plato, Descartes, Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, the phenomenologists, the postmodernists, the deconstructionists, and theorists of gender, race,
sexuality and ideology. In my understanding, dystopia joins this exploration and particularly highlights the divisions within recent deliberations on selfhood, including the main question at the heart of this investigation of the subject, “What is Being?”, a question which asks the guiding question of philosophy, for “the possibility of the subject is the very possibility of philosophy” (Critchley, EPS 53).

In general, according to the argument between Cartesianism & theories on being human after Nietzsche and Freud, the human being may take two forms that are useful in considering dystopia. Firstly, there are those theorists fascinated with the human as a self that emerges as a whole, tangible, autonomous being. This understanding of being human arises from the Cartesian view of the ego as self-defining by thought, and describes a claim to a metaphysics of presence. As Simon Critchley explains:

The determinations of the subject...in Descartes, Kant and Husserl - would all seem to equate the subject with consciousness, self-consciousness, or reflection. They assume that I am the being who is conscious of having these doubting thoughts, and insofar as I have them it cannot be doubted that I exist at that moment as a thinking thing; or that I am the being who synthesizes these representations and who is self-conscious as the being to whom these representations belong. (Critchley, EPS 55)

On the other hand, there are those who remain skeptical
about any notion that humans exist as anything other than subjects who are always already subjected to the power of some authority. In this conception, the self is merely an illusion, a dream. In contrast, the human as a subject, literally meaning “thrown under” (Critchley 51), becomes a site or frame upon which a synthesis of scripts articulate themselves and shape consciousness; the human as a subject becomes decentred, unconscious, and “defined in terms of lack at the heart of its Being” (Critchley 56). As a result, the latter view can imply the absence of the freedom, equality, autonomy, and individuality that are deemed present in the former. In light of these two standpoints, twentieth-century human beings are left faced with a personhood that is both desired agent, yet subdued subject.

The realistic novel has been extensively studied as part of this exploration of being human because of its supposed mimetic “truth.” Sharing with its reader “a fidelity to actuality” through its ability to sketch “real” people, thoughts and settings in eidetic ways, the realistic novel seems to relay the true understanding of the nature of humanity and therefore seems to illuminate the truth of being more precisely than other genres of
fiction. This leaves aside genres like utopia and dystopia, both of which seem unconcerned with the "real world" because they present fantastic and often futuristic portrayals of human life. Taken literally, utopia and dystopia are surely guilty of fantasy, the great crime against realism.

This bias against utopia and dystopia tends to arise when critics too easily reduce this kind of fiction to "only escapist dreams that over simplify the way things really are" (Foucault qtd. in Ruppert ix). Science fiction author Ursula K. Le Guin firmly rejects this misreading of speculative fiction in her essay "On Not Reading Science Fiction," where she contemplates how easily the seemingly non-realistic novel is always deemed "inhuman, elitist, and escapist" in that it "evades what ordinary people really have to deal with in life" (Le Guin 3). Darko Suvin’s essay "Science Fiction and Utopian Fiction: Degrees of Kinship" further notes the problem with certain interpretations of utopian/dystopian fiction as pictured by Northrop Frye’s description of "its exclusive interest in socio-political construction on the basis of postulated, more or less stable, human nature" (Frye qtd. in Suvin 39). For Frye, this makes utopia
"naturally fall" within the "form and tradition of 'anatomy,' rather than within the form and the tradition of Defoe to Henry James" (Suvin 39). Yet even if "there is no point in expecting from utopia’s/dystopia’s characterization and plotting, the qualities and criteria established in the psychological novel," (Suvin 39) they cannot be deemed unable to support a lifelike view of the world, let alone the being human.  

Mainstream criticism has been all too preoccupied with realistic fiction as the only way of contemplating the status of humanity, but it is important to realize (as have writers on speculative and dystopian literature) that genres like dystopia also offer a provocative and in some ways more effective study of humanity, at least on a theoretical level. Dystopia confronts our understanding of reality and the world in a circumlocutory way, more specifically by using the realm of the fantastic to lay out its philosophical perspectives. As Chris Ferns notes, this enables the author of dystopia to "present his views more effectively than he could have done in a more realistic setting" (Ferns, AH 140). Though the realistic novel seems more capable of presenting a familiar picture of reality, one must be wary of the question of whether
or not that understanding of reality is in fact realistic, for as Paul Ricoeur points out, “when we ask whether metaphorical language teaches reality, we presuppose that we already know what reality is” (Ricoeur xxx). In light of this statement, which draws attention to the limits of human understanding, what I find intriguing about dystopia is the particular way it challenges the very assumption that humanity has any clue as to the nature of its reality.

Dystopian literature is characterized by its discontent with the assumptions built into utopianism (or those precepts founded upon the propensity toward utopia) and primarily reproaches the valued philosophy that urges human beings to reach a state of absolute perfection which might remain fixed in time. Skeptical of this desire for an unblemished model of the ideal human subject, and its motivations, the dystopia “turns human perfectibility on its head by pessimistically extrapolating contemporary social trends into oppressive and terrifying societies” (Sisk 2). Thus, utopianism is the “foil of dystopian writers” with which they mount a critique on both the human desire for progress, and the human understanding of itself and what it must progress
toward (Hoffecker 46). Dystopia's contemplation of the nature of this desire highlights the manner in which humanity seeks out a "better way of being and living" (Levitas 7) at the cost of ignoring the need first to attend to the many human weaknesses, and flaws not yet confronted or acknowledged by humankind. Utopia seeks a better way of "being," which essentially lies in effecting social change that recovers what is truly human for all humans -- this is part of the utopian attempt to solve the "felt problems" (Levitas 11) of humanity. Dystopia seeks to confront this possibility by first asking the question of being human through its vision of a desolate, alternate future, in order to pinpoint what it is about humanity that is still in need of improvement. As a modern text, dystopia may also engage in a genealogical query of modernity's actual knowledge of the truth of human whereby it observes that truth via the lie of dystopia.

The question of being as posed by dystopia generally illuminates the conflict between the concept of the self or the free individual, and the submissive subject always already subjected by power. Dystopia probes for any human ability or inability to think freely, to conduct
independent actions, and to live a self-supporting life. Like utopia, dystopia is useful as a theoretical model with which to "express our deepest fantasies and fears about communal life, allowing us access to the constraints and contradictions that limit social possibilities" (Ruppert 104). On the most obvious level, dystopia carefully examines the relationship between the human as subject to power, whether it be in the form of Big Brother or Our Ford. Both figures represent absolute "subjects of action" and aid the reader in considering the erasure of the subject by the strong hand of authority. On the surface, dystopia seems fixed upon the notion that the human as a subject is a product of an external force or power which limits any prospects of selfhood, identity and individuality. As Chris Ferns notes, dystopia shows us that "we are already products of our social environment, and that it is only the unpredictable outcome of competing conditioning influences that creates the illusion of individual freedom and essential identity" (Ferns 107). On another, less evident level, the dystopia examines the human failure to seek a deeper understanding of the truth of its reality. From the reader’s perspective, it therefore
considers humanity and its potential and possibility for change in a world where selfhood or individuality is always already condemned to remain in a repressed, unmoveable state. By suggesting the conflict between the human desire for selfhood and the always already human subjection to power, dystopia invites the reader to ponder the very notions believed to be essential to human existence, including the possibility of agency, politics, freedom, and responsibility. The negative landscape of dystopia does not at first appear to encourage or support any fundamental claim to these things, yet as the reader soon learns, dystopia indirectly contemplates of their important function in human life.

If “utopia is about how we would live and what kind of a world we would live in if we could do just that” (Levitas 30), it is also concerned with ethics and ideology. These two concepts are always present in utopia’s consideration of a better way of being since they both concern the attitudes one has toward life and living in the world among others. Yet in light of dystopia’s critical perspective on the desire to prescribe how individuals and societies should think and live, ethics and ideology must also be reevaluated. Since
they both play a large part in shaping the human into a subject, ethics and ideology can provide ways of thinking about the nature of humanity as dystopia reveals it, especially the way human subjects are always one with the community. In modern dystopias, namely Huxley’s and Orwell’s, ethics and ideology outline how the human self is shaped or manipulated by some power or force larger than itself; they describe how the community influences the individual, and the individual seems unable to exist without the community.

Ethics represents that branch of philosophy seeking to comprehend the nature, purposes, justification and founding principles of moral rules and the systems they comprise. In the case of ethics, the “individual” is called to find action right or good based upon the principle that an action is truly right or good, and therefore not in any need of questioning. Presupposing every act as being autonomous and born of one’s free will, ethics judges the human self as uninfluenced by others, and therefore understands it to possess a freedom of action arising from an understanding of what is right and what is wrong; ethics explores how the subject should live, allowing for an investigation of values and how
those values essentially affect the self and others.\textsuperscript{11}

However, as dystopia demonstrates, the practice of ethics introduces several complications, such as the community’s persistent desire to mold its citizens according to its prospects of stability and progress. Since “moral law can be encapsulated in the Categorical Imperative” it can sometimes be manipulated to suit the ethical perspective of those in charge of society (those who are not necessarily concerned with seeking truth\textsuperscript{12}). In the case of \textit{Brave New World} progress lies in Bokanovskification and conditioning; in the case of \textit{Nineteen Eighty-Four} progress is attributed to the state of constant war and the people’s willing desire to submit to Big Brother. In both cases, Brave New World’s and Oceania’s societies are manipulated by the desire for advancement, subsequently producing in ethics an ideological ground that is opposed to the ethical need for truth.\textsuperscript{13}

As I discuss in Chapter Two, in \textit{Brave New World}, Aldous Huxley unveils the true face of ethics practiced by the citizens of his world and the way that ethics controls, influences, or manipulates individuals into submissive subjects. His critical focus is on Brave New
World's scientism, an ethic arising from each citizen's belief that the truth of Fordian science should be understood as utopian and therefore applied to every aspect of life. Krishan Kumar suggests that "It is fair to call Brave New World an anti-utopia of science, in fact the anti-utopia of science" (Kumar 254). Always remembering that "what Huxley is attacking is not science as such so much as scientism," Huxley's dystopia does not reject authentic science (Kumar 254). Rather, he confronts the problem of a science which predetermines values condoning the manipulation of the mind through imposed biological alteration, the arousal of drugs, and mind-control through conditioning as a means to a supposedly happy end. People are scientifically created, molded, and designed (a method which is metaphorically comparable to the reader's own world of propaganda through the media) to conform to the standards of infantile normalcy that Fordian science deems perfect, and as a consequence, are unable to sustain a possibility of selfhood or sense of individuality. While scientism seems to provide a technologized ideal of self toward which the citizens of Brave New World must strive, the driving force behind scientism must nevertheless answer
to the way its supposed ethical truth also prevents the emergence of any individualized identity. As I will explore in Chapter Two, the rule of the community forms the subject which is typically empty and unable to grasp the concept of its own humanity and human potential.

_Nineteen Eighty-Four_ is an even harsher dystopia than _Brave New World_ and mainly concerns itself with a critique of ideology. On the surface, Orwell’s dystopia critiques totalitarian rule, which demands that each person love Big Brother. This demand prevents the individual from ever emerging. The protagonist, Winston Smith, one of the last citizens with a sense of humanity, observes and questions his society, trying to understand why it is the way it is. As the reader moves throughout the nightmarish world of Oceania, s/he observes, through the eyes of Winston Smith, the power of ideology over the self.

The expression "ideology" originated as the theory of ideas or the philosophy of mind. With the influence of Karl Marx, this definition transformed to "the system of the ideas and representations which dominate the mind of man or a social group" (Althusser 239). For Marx, this meant that consciousness is determined by one’s material
existence as found within a system of production so that, “it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness” (Marx, in Richter 569). Louis Althusser’s development of the theory of ideology explains further that “what is represented in ideology is . . . not the system of the real relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in which they live” (Althusser 242). In other words, a culture’s ideology not only describes some system of beliefs by which the seemingly real world functions, but it exemplifies the strange way that the real is not real at all, but imagined in reality.¹⁵

The concept of ideology permits an exploration of the manner in which humans come to possess their current state of reality, to investigate the nature of that reality’s emergence, and to test its truth. If “ideologies are normative,” (Johnston 15) which is to say that they attempt to establish a standard which people might believe in and comply with, and if that norm “often presupposes definite notions about what the world is, or employs unique concepts to explain or make sense of the
world of experience" (Johnston 15), then they represent a sort of regulating force that prescribes the nature of self. This force allows the subject to emerge as a result of the mandatory and unchangeable values it interiorizes. As philosophy, ideology asks about how we live and questions why we are inclined to accept the conditions of that way of living. As a theory, ideology uncovers the nature of the individual’s subjection and the manner in which that individual becomes interpellated as a subject, thus accounting for how individual identity becomes threatened in the first place.16

The philosophy/theory of ideology as a means to interpret society is not wholly different from the object of dystopia, for both ideology and dystopia operate on revealing truth and exposing various contradictions present in reality. In both cases, ideology and dystopia reveal the contradictory nature of being arising from being a citizen that is both an individual and a member of a community.

As I discuss in Chapter Three, in Nineteen Eighty-Four dialogue takes place between the subject and the ideology of Ingsoc, describing how any ideological system has the capacity to negotiate the nature of the “self”
and its beginnings. Chapter Three will survey the citizens of Nineteen Eighty-Four's Oceania in order to consider how ideology acts upon, or rules over the self. Through an assessment of each citizen's ideological make-up (which pays special attention to the way ideology frames the subject -- and how it adds to or takes away from the humanity of one's being in the world) George Orwell's philosophical lessons on modern subjectivity will become clear.

While utopia concentrates upon bringing the reader on a tour of the utopian community, the dystopia ventures deeper, to more carefully explore the utopian/dystopian citizens in that community: utopia "deal[s] with totally static societies. Perfection has been achieved; hence, change is not needed. As it is now, so it will ever be. That makes for darned little plot; at best, we usually get a conducted tour for diversion." (del Rey 344). As del Rey suggests, there seems to be no conflictual depth to utopia's scheme; its only sense of excitement is the slow revealing of the utopian world to the reader. Unlike utopia, dystopia is focused upon various individuals living in the dystopian world, thus providing the reader with a present sense of the identity of dystopia's
citizens, as mindless, ruthless, or helpless as they are. Since there is an illusion of depth added to the people living in dystopia, the reader is given the opportunity to get acquainted with these citizens on some level. Instead of only seeing dystopia from an outsider’s perspective (the utopia is usually described by a visitor to it), the reader may actually experience what it is like to live in the dystopia itself. Not limited to seeing the inhabitants of dystopia from a supposedly objective narrator, the reader is allowed to experience a subjective view of the dystopian citizens themselves, i.e., how they think, how they act and react, and how they live.

Since the author of a dystopia allows the reader access to the minds of the individual members of the dystopian state who are subject to that state’s laws and customs, the reader is also led to contemplate each citizen’s understanding of his or her rights and freedoms. In an optimistic view, to be a citizen is to possess “emancipatory potential” that may be used “to demand, and to justify, a rise in the standards of human life, and in the very sense of what it is to be human” (Clarke 144). The state therefore promises the citizen a
certain quality of life that urges the human toward a better way of being and even to a higher form of humanity - utopia's prospect in a nutshell. Even though dystopias are often utopias from the perspective of most of their citizens, that is, everyone is convinced that they are happy, and in no need of change, it does not take very long for the dystopia's reader to realize that life in dystopia will always come with a price.\textsuperscript{17}

At the same time that dystopia explores each citizen, it also complicates the entire concept of citizenship through the figure of authority presented, that is, the person in charge of mobilizing the citizens. This figure essentially questions the stability of the citizen, and resultantly the structure of dystopian society. Questions about the dystopian authority figure include: can the controller figure of dystopia be seen as a citizen as well? Does this figure have a positive function in carrying out certain "responsibilities"? Does this figure have the right to speak for other citizens? How does this figure raise the limits of hierarchical systems of rule? How is one to read the figure of authority in dystopia and that figure's affect the individual? How does this figure fit into the scheme of
the author's philosophical perspective on subjectivity?

The reader of dystopia views at least three kinds of personhood: the empowered subject of absolute authority, the subject under some visible or invisible power, and the individual/self who is a potential political agent. These models become evident to the reader of dystopia through the characters presented, and will be used to organize my discussion of dystopian selves in Chapters Two and Three. In this study I draw upon Milton Birnbaum's grouping of the characters in the dystopian novel, since his paradigm provides a useful starting place to think about the kinds of citizens in dystopia and to postulate their values. In his book Aldous Huxley: The Quest for Values, Birnbaum characterizes fictional individuals in dystopia in terms of their social status. In his model, there are the directing intelligences, the men of faith, and the herd (Birnbaum 100). In the case of Brave New World, I believe it may be more useful to create four main groups, enlarging on Birnbaum's paradigm. They are the herd, the transgressors, the world controller figure and the ascetic. In Nineteen Eighty-Four, I consider each character in a similar fashion using the hierarchical structure described by Goldstein
as “the high, the middle and the low” (*Nineteen Eighty-Four* 210).

Some useful theoretical frameworks on which I base my understanding of Huxley’s critique of ethics and Orwell’s critique of ideology are those of theorists on the modern self like Jean Baudrillard, Noam Chomsky, Simon Critchley, John Caputo, and Charles Taylor. I also find it useful to refer to the Nietzschean critique of modernity whenever possible, since it is his thought which truly marked the turn in history’s understanding of the self and the manner it which it has become lost in its own simple ways, beliefs, and thoughts.19 It seems, as Walter Kaufmann helped me to more fully realize, that Orwell and Huxley build on the Nietzschean critique of the modern subject, in that both achieve a revaluation of human values in their readers by means of a “genealogical hypothesis” of morals and ideology (GM P:4, 18). Nietzsche’s genealogical method, which is mostly “an analysis of the interaction between power and knowledge” (Cook 70), discourages the human will to power (or the “feeling of power” that arises from the belief that one holds truth), and permits modernity to re-consider morality, not as the assumed answer to the problems
raised by human interaction, or a faultless, flawless code of conduct, but as an unrealized "danger," "seduction," "prison," and "narcotic," (GM P:6, 20). Friedrich Nietzsche's analysis of selfhood in his On the Genealogy of Morals, which reminds us of the need to remember, dig up, and resurface the true nature of the subject, has proven a beneficial reference point for understanding some of the citizens of dystopia."20

The following study emerges out of an interest in the way Brave New World contemplates responsibility, and how Nineteen Eighty-Four considers freedom. Both concepts are raised for the reader of dystopia to think carefully upon as two ideas central to human existence absent from modernity's grasp. Dystopia's critical review of subjectivity in terms of ethics and ideology therefore presents, in its round about way, several possibilities for human change. By encouraging a study of the lie built into the subject, dystopia digs up the truth of its present state and points the way to its realistic improvement.21
CHAPTER TWO
Dystopia, the Subject and Ethics in Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*

In *Brave New World* Aldous Huxley explores the disintegration of self that invests in the ethical position of the community. In the view of dystopia ethics represents society's tool of manipulation whereby it ensures the individual is made to practice or to internalize the community's ethical beliefs, not by his/her own accord or contemplation, but by that collective consciousness which is externally imposed. In the case of *Brave New World*, ethics emerges as a distortion that is clouded by the mentality of hedonism, "the doctrine that pleasure is the sole or chief good in life and that the pursuit of it is the ideal aim of conduct." It is this ethical philosophy which creates this dystopian society's utopian desire for happiness, the greatest object of every citizen's actions. Huxley's dystopia recognizes this misuse of ethics behind the modern crisis of identity in which humans have fallen into a state of moral decay, moral mis-direction, and subjective nihilism. He therefore provides "an
exploration in the most significant existentialist tradition of the relationship between the self and contemporary culture” (Holmes 89) and manages a most important observation of the malaise of a modern humanity, which has lost its hold on the meaning of human life.

Huxley centers his critique on the way ethics shapes the modern subject and explores the relationship between that subject and culture through the eyes of his dystopian citizens, all of whom lack comprehension of their ethically inept states. Filled with values that are grounded in the subtly dehumanizing scientism of Brave New World society, all the citizens share the inability to fully articulate themselves as beings. This idea of non-articulation lies in these citizens’ values and ways of life which do not necessarily reflect the substance of their own wills, but actually mirror the larger will of the community. In the instances when the citizens of dystopia seek to go beyond the state’s authority, they still fail to realize their own values for themselves, rendering ethics proper in Brave New World a thing of unimportance and threatening the very possibility of the subject in several ways.
In reply to the modern non-response to the responsibility of ethical interrogation, Brave New World imagines a World State where science represents Absolute Truth, or the cause which generates the emptiness of the subject. Quite literally, this Fordian science makes present the prospect of utopia by attaining “progress,” “community,” “identity,” “stability,” and “happiness.” Desiring to achieve this vision of utopia initially imagined by Henry Ford, each citizen buys into the ethical attitudes of science which make “infantile behavior” “the socially approved norm” (114), an ideal state which is static and unchanging.

Resultantly, each citizen of Brave New World maintains a personhood that is typically dependent on the Fordian system, which leaves them ethically misdirected, and ethically deformed or misinformed. As the novel considers its ethical focus on the way the subject is, and is seen, (that is, shifting back and forth from the dumb Epsilons to the supposedly brilliant Alpha pluses, from the savages to the world controllers, and from the obedient to the disobedient), the reader can review the ethical nature of these characters and also extrapolate from that information various models of subjectivity that
Huxley's text presents for the reader's scrutiny and questioning. To reiterate, in this way, *Brave New World* can be understood as a useful study of modern subjectivity, since it draws the reader's attention to the relationships between each citizen's identity and their strange ethical understanding. What is useful to realize, however, is that Huxley satirizes both the modern subject as it is, and the modern subject as it is seen by way of addressing the supposedly stable ethics of the subject as unsatisfactory, and examining in his citizens of Brave New World how that ethics becomes internalized in the first place.

Identity in *Brave New World* is therefore determined by the citizen's ethical stance. Huxley considers various kinds of faulty ethical interrogation in *Brave New World* as it ranges from ethical ignorance, to ethical desire, to ethical distortion. These trends may be observed in the various citizens of Brave New World, namely the herd figures (Epsilons, Deltas, Gammas, Betas and Alphas), Lenina Crowne, Bernard Marx, Helmholtz Watson, John the Savage (inheritor of Brave New World), and Mustapha Mond (World Controller). In each character one may see how certain ethical perspectives and actions determine
identity.

Useful to consider in this respect is Charles Taylor’s understanding, in his book Sources of Self, that identity lies in ethics. Taylor considers how identity is delineated by the “commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I ought to endorse” (Taylor 27). This very claim to an ethical standpoint, the desire to declare what “I” want to do, is in this reading the very claim to selfhood. Taylor explains, however, that when this claim is absent what may occur is an identity crisis: “an acute form of disorientation, which people often express in terms of not knowing who they are, but which can also be seen as a radical uncertainty of where they stand” (Taylor 27). As Taylor points out, without an ethical frame of reference, or an idea of where one stands it is difficult to emerge as a subject of action since meaning will never be articulated by one who is silent and merely a subject acted upon.

Furthermore, Friedrich Nietzsche’s work on ethics presents an even more useful view of modern values and the way those values deny the subject any claim to life
whatsoever. In his threefold polemic On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche calls for a reassessment of the value of our values which seem "given, factual, and beyond all question" (GM P:6, 20). He therefore claims that this realization of morality (as a totalizing force and as anything but a source for creating meaningful individuals) will reveal the calculating prudence of those "noble, powerful, high-stationed and high-minded, who felt and established themselves and their actions as good, that is, of the first rank, in contradistinction to all the low, low-minded, common and plebeian." (GM I: 2, 26). Since humankind has forgotten its reason for an interrogation of its current values or ethical standpoint and, instead, submits itself to the rule of morality, this has given rise to the breakdown of selfhood and identity, and the resultant emptying of the subject of meaning; hence the modern nihilistic state that Nietzsche detects.

In Brave New World, Aldous Huxley similarly explores this modern identity crisis as it arises from the individual’s lack of ethical articulation. Without any claim to how “I” must act, the subject merely becomes, not a doer, thinker or mediator of ethics and what is
right to do, but a follower of the morals and mores of society. Huxley’s concern sounds like John Caputo’s, who states:

The thing that concerns me, and that I name under the not very protective cover of deconstruction, is the loss of the assurance, the lack of the safe passage, that ethics has always promised. Ethics makes safe. It throws a net of safety under the judgements we are forced to make, the daily, hourly decisions that make up the texture of our lives. Ethics lays the foundations for principles that force people to be good; it clarifies concepts, secures judgements, provides firm guardrails along the slippery slopes of factual life. It provides principles and criteria and adjudicates hard cases. Ethics is altogether wholesome, constructive work, which is why it enjoys a good name. (Caputo AE 4)

Caputo’s distrust of ethics comes out of its claim to a certain promise and delivery of “goodness”: once a certain ethics earns a reputation as “good,” and therefore right to do, it can easily take on a simply palliative character that alleviates the subject’s responsibility to evaluate the differences between right and wrong for him/herself. This trend is most apparent in the citizens of Huxley’s dystopia.

The most evident depiction of the modern subject’s collapse into a nihilistic state which results from an absence of ethical interiority is exhibited by the herd figures of Brave New World. Each is created with statistical perfection, and genetically altered to maintain his or her social destiny in body and mind. As
a result, no citizen questions the hypnotized reality that is achieved by the advanced brainwashing techniques of hypnopædic sleep teaching. Viewed as "the greatest moralizing and socializing force of all time" (24), hypnopædia is considered the most effective means of instilling Fordian beliefs among the masses. No one questions their biologically pre-determined being or their values, and most are inclined to believe that their life is perfectly normal, and in no need of further improvement. These points are crucial for the reader to consider at the end of Chapter II, for example, when the DHC "press[es] a switch" (23) to listen to the soft hypnopædic voice charming Betas:

'... all wear green,' said a soft but very distinct voice, beginning in the middle of a sentence, 'and Delta children wear khaki. Oh no, I don't want to play with Delta children. And Epsilons are still worse. They're too stupid to be able to read or write. Besides, they wear black, which is such a beastly colour. I'm so glad I'm a Beta.'

There was a pause; then the voice began again.

'Alpha children wear grey. They work much harder than we do, because they're so frightfully clever. I'm really awfully glad I'm a Beta, because I don't work so hard. And then we are much better than the Gammas and Deltas. Gammas are stupid. They all wear green, and Delta children wear khaki. Oh no, I don't want to play with Delta children. And Epsilons are still worse. They're too stupid to be able...' 

The Director pushed back the switch. The voice was silent. Only its thin ghost continued to mutter from beneath the eighty pillows. (23-24)

This process of hypnotism which implants moral and ideological principles into each citizen through
laborious repetition clarifies the way "individuals" are made to think of themselves and accept their assigned subjecthood.

The disturbing methods of moral teaching in Brave New World in this instance work to comment on the tendency to make subjects instruments of control and, as a result, mere entities of simulation. In Brave New World everyone shares the same name, the same clothes, and the same thoughts. The Betas in the passage just quoted will only see themselves in terms of the Beta identity imposed by hypnopaedic voice that dictates Brave New World’s pre-made values. Since “all conditioning aims at . . . making people like their unescapable social destiny” it is logical that these Betas will not want any other identity besides the one bestowed by the Conditioning Centre. Since, as the DHC explains, “liking what you’ve got to do” is the true “secret to happiness and virtue” (13), Brave New World society and its citizens are able to justify this process of “individual” creation through hypnotic moral teaching.

Failing to realize that this means of reaching a utopian end comes at the cost of doing violence to the human self, who in this case is treated like a mere
animal to be tested and bred (See Chapters 1-3), the
director, (who also speaks for society) still makes a
point of emphasizing the glory of the World State’s
scientism as if it were the solution to subjectivity
since the various castes bred are seen only as valuable
providers of social stability and progress:

‘Ninety-six identical twins working ninety-six identical
machines!’ The voice was almost tremulous with enthusiasm.
‘You really know where you are. For the first time in
history.’ He quoted the planetary motto. ‘Community, Identity,
Stability.’ Grand words. ‘If we could bokanovskify
indefinitely the whole problem would be solved.’ (5)

Underlying the director’s passion for Bokanovskification
is a narrow view of the Brave New Worlder who is seen as
a means to an end of ‘Community, Identity, [and]
Stability’ (5), and treated like a lifeless tool for
scientific progress. The flaw in his thinking, that is,
how he reduces the “individual” to a thing in the name of
improvement and progress, illustrates how the dystopian
citizen’s pre-destined social identity as an Alpha, Beta,
Gamma, Delta or Epsilon reflects the “thingification” of
the human into categories, classifications, and
representations. Even though these citizens are sometimes
referred to as “individuals” (7) and supposedly lead
their “own lives” (40), they are still only valued in
terms of their “benefaction to society” (12). What
inevitably occurs is the loss of the subject whose meaning becomes buried beneath the surface of the "individual's" "enormous" (12) contribution to the social whole.  

At the same time, however, Huxley also wishes to satirize the ignorance of the masses themselves. Declaring their worth in accordance with their conditioned education, which emphasizes the rules of what is deemed normal and therefore correct to be, "I’m so glad I’m a Beta" (23), the citizens, by internalizing the moral teachings of the state become "ghost" "thin" (24), emptied of any substance and individuality. They turn into mere puppets of manipulation who cannot think ethically for themselves, and are unable to live in the "real" world because they have given up their claim to any coherent identity as a result of their ethical non-determinacy. By willing nothing but the mores of Fordian culture, they are nothing but those mores: they have no identity or selfhood beyond that of the community.

The Brave New Worlder is even more separated from reality as a result of the pacifying, emotion-killing drug soma which further gives rise to each citizen's non-response to ethics, irresponsibility, and un-being.
Ignoring the possibility that soma is negative as John suggests, Mustapha Mond tries to argue in favor of soma as a daily prescription:

>'And if ever, by some unlucky chance, anything unpleasant should somehow happen, why, there's always soma to give you a holiday from the facts. And there's always soma to calm your anger, to reconcile you to your enemies, to make you patient and long-suffering. In the past you could only accomplish these things by making a great effort and after years of hard moral training. Now, you swallow two or three half-gramme tablets, and there you are. Anybody can be virtuous now. You can carry at least half your morality about in a bottle. Christianity without tears - that's what soma is.' (217)

Announcing how soma supplies priceless feelings of guiltless bliss and artificial grace -- the perfect means of maintaining virtue and therefore social stability without the pain or suffering -- Mond sees the inhabitants of Brave New World as having no need to deal with reality, especially one that involves "tears" (217).

This view posed by Mond can suggest different levels of Huxley's interpretation of the subject. If the subject does not maintain any sense of reality and merely possesses the desire to do away with reality when it is too displeasing, the result is an existence in what Jean Baudrillard calls the hyperreal, which is no longer even existence in reality, but an existence amid the destruction of reality, for "in fact, it is no longer really the real, because no imaginary envelops it.
anymore. It is a hyperreal produced from a radiating synthesis of combinatory models in a hyperspace without atmosphere” (Baudrillard, SIM 2). The soma experience in Brave New World, especially the soma holiday, is a metaphor that prefigures Baudrillard’s notion of the hyperreal where meaning is not only lost for the subject, but the subject has actually lost any grasp of the real itself. The apathetic quality of the silenced masses in Brave New World as brought on by soma depicts the modern subject as always wanting to go on holiday from reality, and to traverse the hyperreal, where pain and suffering do not exist. This is not transcendence, however, since happiness and bliss in Brave New World is not real either, it is merely a chemical reaction that lasts as long as the dose of soma.

The use of soma as a means for the citizen to constantly participate in the “fleeting sensations of the moment” is therefore problematic. To possess the “desirability of present pleasures [and weight it] against the pain that may [be] cause[d] in the future,” produces the dwindling attitude toward ethical responsibility. Brave New World satirizes the masses of modernity in the herd figures who only want happiness, to
reveal how the modern subject has merely become a transmitter of ethics, a willing object of manipulation, an inactive acceptor of anything and everything. *Soma* dependency in Huxley’s dystopia works as a tool to describe the reality of the subject as a dependent swaller of ethics, in this case the World State’s scientifically concocted morality. As a result, modern subjects are “not [in] a mode of communication or meaning, but [in] a mode of constant emulsion, of input-output and of controlled chain reactions, exactly as in atomic simulation chambers” (Baudrillard, SSM 25). Whether coerced into an ethical standpoint via hypnopædia, or willingly a denier of the need to seek any alternate ethical truth via the consumption of *soma*, the masses of Brave New World can thus be seen as Huxley’s chilling analogy for the lifeless state of the modern subject.

While Brave New World’s revered scientific progress easily justifies the way its citizens are bred—“People are happy; they get what they want and they never want what they can’t get” (200)—in reality this scientism only creates the illusion of ethics, the illusion of identity, and thus the illusion of life where no life
actually exists. As the reader is aware, happiness and pleasure in Brave New World are mere symptoms of the irresponsible laziness of each citizen: the horror of life for the masses in Brave New World consists in sameness, conditioning, pacification, a subtle sort of lifelessness, and death.

After introducing the mindlessness of the masses, who are subjects without substance, Huxley focuses on various ethical perspectives of the Alpha citizens of Brave New World who are given intellects so as to actively aid the World State in maintaining social stability. In the novel, Huxley uses several Alphas to provide the reader with different views of the modern subject. Since Alphas are bred in different hatchery rooms than the rest of society (Chapter I), it is assumed by all that they are to be valued as the thinkers for Brave New World. In the novel, each is given the responsibility to ensure that everything in society runs smoothly according to the ways of Ford. Having been given the privilege to acquire more knowledge and education than all other castes, Alphas learn about the scientific ways of Ford first hand. The clear distinction between the Alphas and the rest of society is immediately made
evident in the opening pages of the novel during the Alpha tour in the hatchery. In this scene, Alpha students learn to become the “backbone of [Brave New World] society” (2) as they “nervously” follow the director, and “desperately scribble” “straight from the horse’s mouth” (2). Regardless of their willingness to learn to “work intelligently” (3), this scene sets up for the reader the Alpha mentality which also easily incorporates the values of Brave New World society.

The reader is given a more complete investigation of the Alpha caste in the characters of Lenina Crowne, Bernard Marx, Helmholtz Watson, the Alpha/Beta descendant John turned Savage, and Mustapha Mond. Each of these characters maintains a more complex study of subjectivity resulting from their “rare privilege” of knowing more than other citizens of Brave New World. In this society, they are given more than others, more height, more looks, more brains, more knowledge, more authority and more respect. Yet Huxley deliberately depicts the Alphas of Brave New World in this way to critique their intellects and point out the various flaws which problematize their supposedly intellectual proficiency. A focus on the ethical outlook(s) of the main Alpha intellects
characterized in *Brave New World* will make this clear and further develop Huxley’s consideration of the nature of the modern self.

Lenina Crowne is the first citizen I would like to consider in terms of ethics and subjectivity. With the same last name as Fanny Crowne, which indicates the small differences between individuals in *Brave New World*—“but as the two thousand million inhabitants of the planet had only ten thousand names between them, the coincidence was not particularly surprising” (32)—Lenina is depicted as a voluptuous, desirable Alpha whose values are embodied by the quickness of her zippers (32, 175) and the smells of her fine talcum powder and “eight different scent and eau-de-cologne” (32). She is a woman of mass consumption and literally sees herself as “meat,” something to be consumed by others, a role she takes on in sexual play.29

Characterized by her constant repetition of hypnopaedic phrases, quoting, “Was and will make me ill,” “A gramme is better than a damn” (94), Lenina is always quick to ensure that she meets the ethical and social demands of her society, in accordance with what it deems proper and improper. When Fanny rebukes her for being too un-promiscuous (she admits that “Somehow . . . I hadn’t
been feeling very keen on promiscuity lately” (38)) and overly-monogamous with Henry Foster, Lenina quickly goes to see Bernard Marx to “publicly prove her unfaithfulness to Henry” (51) for fear of moral humiliation. Since Lenina remains firmly attached to upholding the social values of Brave New World, she cannot understand the nature of Bernard’s transgressive attitude. In her conversation with Bernard in Chapter VI when he recites the many heresies against the social order, Lenina cannot believe her ears:

'I want to look at the sea in peace,' he said. 'One can't even look with that beastly noise going on.'
'But it's lovely. And I don't want to look.'
'But I do,' he insisted. 'It makes me feel as though. . . he hesitated, searching for words with which to express himself, 'as though I were more me, if you see what I mean. More on my own, not so completely a part of something else. Not just a cell in the social body. Doesn't it make you feel like that, Lenina?'

But Lenina was crying. 'It's horrible, it's horrible,' she kept repeating. 'And how can you talk like that about not wanting to be a part of the social body? After all, everyone works for everyone else. We can't do without anyone. Even Epsilons...'

'Yes, I know,' said Bernard derisively. "Even Epsilons are useful!" So am I. And I damned well wish I weren't!"

Lenina was shocked by his blasphemy. 'Bernard!' she protested in a voice of amazed distress. 'How can you?' In a different key, 'How can I?' he repeated meditatively. 'No, the real problem is: How is it that I can't, or rather - because, after all, I know quite well why I can't - what would it be like if I could, if I were free - not enslaved by my conditioning.' (81)

Lenina’s desire to maintain her reputation for virtue causes her to invest in the values of normalcy that are absent in Bernard’s dreadful language. Distraught by
Bernard’s blasphemies and non-compliance to the larger order of Brave New World’s moral values, Lenina attacks Bernard with her surprised ‘How can you?,’ a sort of rebuke which opposes Bernard’s immorality.

In this example Huxley simulates the kind of supposed ethical interrogation which modernity tends to undergo, in which questioning simply recycles the same pre-established beliefs of society. Nietzsche explains this all-too-human moral understanding as a very narrow, binaristic, and non-complex manner of thinking, as it is influenced by a blind faith in ethics. This same sort of thinking pervades Lenina Crowne’s moral conscience, which does not ultimately possess any capacity for moral decision, just a quickness of reproof that is postulated on a non-complex understanding of what is good and bad to do:

Being moral or ethical means obeying ancient established law or custom. Whether one submits to it with difficulty or gladly, that is immaterial; it is enough one does it. “Good” is what one calls those who do what is moral as if they did it by nature. . . . Being evil is being “not moral” (immoral), practicing immorality, resisting tradition, however reasonable or stupid tradition may be. (HatH 96, 169)

For Nietzsche, the blind acceptance of moral law, no matter what the circumstances, dismisses all ethical responsibility because this structured belief in the differences between good and evil can easily give rise to
the distorted logic that “I am good because I follow the moral law” and subsequently, “I am evil because I do not follow the moral law.” In this context, Lenina’s moral evaluation of Bernard is merely an empty criticism that reveals the symptom of her own empty subjectivity. Her thoughts, which are supposed to provide her with an identity, limit her identity to that of the social, thus preventing her from ever emerging as an individual on her own accord. Even though Lenina is glad she is who she is, as signaled by her not being an Epsilon (66), she is not close to being anything more than a product of society that produces her.31

By contrast, Bernard Marx presents the reader with a more problematic perspective on the World State’s oppressive norms. He realizes, for instance, the manner in which the state imprisons the individual, wondering “what would it be like if I could, if I were free - not enslaved by my conditioning” (81). Saddened by his world, he is at first depicted with his dreary eyes “for the most part downcast” (56) and dissatisfied with his society. In various attempts to rebel, he continually refuses to take soma to relieve his feelings of pain, dislikes Obstacle golf, and “spends most of his time by
himself — alone" (39). No longer wanting to be “just a cell in the social body” (81) Bernard seeks to transcend his position and become more than what he was predestined to be.³²

In light of Bernard’s unorthodox behavior, at least in the first half of the novel, he is a heroic figure in that he reaches beyond his conditioning. As he searches to enjoy things like beauty, individuality, freedom, and emotion, his attachment to these self-determining, original characteristics sets him up in the reader’s eyes as an admirable “subject of action,” particularly in comparison to the mindless masses who cannot think for themselves. Bernard’s use of the intellect bestowed upon him as an Alpha-Plus gives him the opportunity to question the state of his life and therefore more fully participate as an individual amid a society where “everyone belongs to everyone else” and “everyone works for everyone else” (66). Bernard’s rejection of this communal identity therefore suggests the ties between personhood and active thought, something required of the subject if “life” is desired. By being an immoralist, a creature against the mores of his society, Bernard at first seems the free spirit that struggles for freedom,
a model of the subject who uses thought as a means of freeing the self. 33

Yet the remainder of the novel leaves the reader to question Bernard’s understanding of the world amid his clumsy reluctance to carry out the potential of being he at first believes himself to possess. In Chapter VI, Bernard renders his rebellious attitudes meaningless when he finally confronts the authority he imagines himself capable of morally overstepping:

He had not believed that, when it came to that point, the DHC would ever do anything. Now that it looked as though the threats were really to be fulfilled, Bernard was appalled. Of that imagined stoicism, that theoretical courage, not a trace was left. (93)

Emptied of the fearlessness that seemed to promise rebellion in the face of this adversity and the threat of losing the privileges Brave New World provides him, Bernard proves himself incapable of following through on his chances for becoming more than the World State makes him out to be. He actually becomes less and cowers before the authority of Mond. Bernard finally breaks down:

His conditioning had made him not so much pitiful as profoundly squeamish. The mere suggestion of illness or wounds was to him not only horrifying, but even repulsive and rather disgusting. Like dirt, or deformity, or old age. Hastily he changed the subject. (125)

Bernard’s sudden cowardice, arising from a fear of being annihilated -- a sort of act or instinct toward what
Nietzsche calls “the preservation of life” -- reveals the still present internalization of the law that causes him inevitably to turn against himself and any possibility of change. His unwillingness to live without the benefits of society (witness his sense of popularity when he brings back John, or his desire to live in the World State instead of on an island, or his sense of safety from self-mutilation and blood) therefore limits his chances of growth and development as a subject since he is no longer willing to think for himself. This wish to submit to authority reveals Bernard’s lack of determination to become human. His cowardly inability to deny the law is analogous to his inability to deny the social ethic that results in his rejection and loss of self.

Helmholtz Watson represents yet another example of the intellectual who is also ethically dependent on the system even though he is criticized for having too much “mental excess” (60). He is “so uncomfortably aware of being himself and all alone” because he has “too much ability” (60), and is more than what his society tells him, because he is a genius. Yet, his desire to say something, to speak for himself, as the self might do, is always disquieted by his inability to exceed his
conditioning, the excuse he uses for his writer's block:

I'm thinking of a queer feelings I sometimes get, a feeling that I've got something important to say and the power to say it - only I don't know what it is, and I can't make any use of the power. If there was some different way of writing . . . Or else something else to write about . . . 'You see . . . I'm pretty good with words that suddenly make you jump, as though you'd sat on a pin, they seem so new and exciting even though they're about something hypnopaedically obvious. But that doesn't seem enough. It's not enough for the phrases to be good; what you make with them ought to be good too. (62)

Through his ability to write (or at least, his imagined abilities that he cannot quite grasp), Helmholtz goes the heart of what it means to exist. These "queer feelings" which cause Helmholtz to realize there is more to himself beyond the hypnopaedic programming of his society or there is some truth that lies slightly beyond gives him the aura of one who is beginning to know himself. At the same time, however, Helmholtz has difficulty seeing, recognizing, and pronouncing the truth as the writer. As conditioned as he is, one wonders what prevents him from eventually seeing truth, and whether or not he will ever be capable of doing so. Near the end of the novel, Helmholtz commits a great heresy against the hallowed soma pills as he helps John to dispose of them out the window, a possible sign that he realizes the ethical circumstances under which he is controlled:

'Free, free!' the Savage shouted, and with one hand continued to throw the soma into the area while, with the other he
punched the indistinguishable faces of his assailants. ‘Free!’ And suddenly there was Helmholtz at his side - ‘Good old Helmholtz!’ - also punching - ‘Men at last!’ - and in the interval also throwing the poison out by handfuls through the open window. ‘Yes, men! men!’ and there was no more poison left. He picked up the cash-box and showed them its black emptiness. ‘You’re free!’ (195)

Yet even in this act of revolt Helmholtz fails to truly make an ethical statement. Even though Helmholtz captures a glimmering of the political/ethical act, he is still several steps short of reaching his potential or even a desire to enact that potential in Brave New World. From one point of view Helmholtz can be reckoned a poet, who understands the need for pain and suffering which will enlighten the imagination. As Guinevera Nance comments, “As a writer intent on exploring the possibilities of his creativity, [Helmholtz] chooses a bracing climate in the belief that it will stimulate his imagination. The novel leaves the impression that his banishment to the Falkland Islands will turn out to be the making of this would-be poet” (Nance 79-80). Yet his silent acceptance of his fate on an island (209) at the end of the novel might be seen as problematic. Even though he will learn what it means to suffer, he is merely assuming that suffering will give him meaning. In reality, he will only be dislocated from his society, to a place that is deemed meaningless.34
Ethically, both Helmholtz and even Bernard transgress their society's beliefs at some level, but are still attached to the system of Ford's science. While they seem to grasp a possible selfhood detached from the community to some degree through their awareness of the lack in their lives (for Bernard it is freedom (81) and for Helmholtz it is expression (62)), their identities still remain fixed in the society. Furthermore, if it is something of humanity that they seem to grasp in their desire for freedom and speech beyond hypnopædic conditioning, they still do not fully comprehend the depth of those human concepts. Take for instance the lack of understanding the concept of love (Helmholtz guffaws at Romeo and Juliet) or of freedom, which John presents as important to being human (Bernard cannot quite grasp the sensation). Moreover, while these two Alphas always feel something is missing in their lives, they are still unsure of their own values. As much as they strive to fill the lack which they sense lies at the heart of their distress, they will never know the essence of what it is to be human; meaning for themselves will never be self-evident.

While Bernard and Helmholtz possess a limited
ethicaI understanding of their humanity, the outsider John the Savage seems to demonstrate a more fruitful ethical perspective. John Savage, inheritor of Brave New World by virtue of his ancestry (Linda - the Beta, and Tomakin the Alpha-DHC), is an interesting entity in Brave New World since he represents hope for the problem of subjectivity while he also fails to provide the answer. Influenced by the works of Shakespeare and the Bible, he maintains a sense of Brave New World’s lack of freedom. This belief in freedom peaks in the scene where he rebukes the stupid Delta workers for their infantile behaviour:

‘But do you like being slaves?’ the Savage was saying as they entered the hospital. His face was flushed, his eyes bright with ardor and indignation. ‘Do you like being babies? Yes, babies. Mewling and puking,’ he added, exasperated by their bestial stupidity into throwing insults at those he had come to save. The insults bounced off their carapace of thick stupidity; they stared at him with a blank expression of dull and sullen vestment in their eyes. ‘Yes, puking!’ he fairly shouted. Grief and remorse, compassion and duty - all were forgotten now and, as it were, absorbed into an intense overpowering hatred of these less than human monsters. ‘Don’t you want to be free and men? Don’t you even understand what manhood and freedom are?’ Rage was making him fluent; the words came easily, in a rush. ‘Don’t you?’ he repeated, but got no answer to his question. ‘Very well then,’ he went on grimly. I’ll teach you; I’ll make you be free whether you want to or not.’ And pushing open a window, he began to throw the little pill-boxes of soma tablets in handfuls out into the area. (194)

John’s questions are valid and point out the important role that freedom plays in the question of subjectivity.
He alludes to the essence of freedom which the Deltas do not realize they should possess. Jean Luc Nancy describes how freedom is, “the leap into existence in which existence is discovered as such,” whereby “this discovery is thinking” (Nancy 58). The decision which “frees freedom” (Nancy 141) resultantly presents the possibility of an ethics or a “'shelter' of being which is its ownmost ethos as the ethos or abode of the human being who dwells in the possibility of his free decision” (140 Nancy). Yet, as Levinas states in Totality and Infinity: “The freedom involved in the essence of truth is not for Heidegger a principle of free will. Freedom comes from an obedience to being; it is not man who possesses freedom; it is freedom who possesses man” (Levinas 45). While there is a need to understand freedom as the necessary condition of moral behaviour, it is also important to understand how the structures of freedom itself exist beyond the human will. In light of John’s understanding of freedom, I am not sure if he truly understands what freedom is or how it operates. His inability to comprehend that the Deltas (whom he strives to convert into rebels) do not themselves understand freedom or its value signals his own naive perspective, especially as it
deals with freedom.

Yet, even though John wants to shepherd the herd as he valorously introduces the concept of freedom to Brave New World, he still possesses the ideals of the savage lifestyle and the ideals of masochism and asceticism depicted by his own society’s savage ways: “Once, . . . I did something that none of the others did: I stood against a rock in the middle of the day, in summer, with my arms out like Jesus on the cross” . . . “I wanted to know what it was like to be crucified” (125). The problem with John’s understanding of self-denial is his inability to comprehend this aspect of Christ’s salvation. He merely sees suffering as an act of heroism which does not in the end “cure his [own] unhappiness” so much as allow him to participate in meaningless suffering.

In other instances, John finds it difficult to move beyond his own orthodoxy, an orthodoxy which closes his mind to any absolutism that is grounded in yet another systematized, ethical perspective. Though Shakespeare and the Bible provide some ethical direction for John, an education which lifts him above the other savages and places him on the level of Mustapha Mond, the text does not allow him to exceed his under-civilized ways of
thinking. Ethically, John provides some hope of freedom and humanity, but he will inevitably be unable to live among others, a relationship which ethics presupposes in its definition. Even though this perspective is in opposition to Brave New World, and posits the ideals of freedom, his philosophy still leads him to suicide and death as the only radical alternatives. Whether or not it is the fault of Brave New World society which has driven him to self-annihilation, or his own, he is left unable to signify himself in a world that has no symbolic order or meaning. Understood by Brave New Worlders as belonging to a race of unrefined “animals” (94) who are unable to learn (94), John is doomed to signification in death. As Jean Baudrillard says, “Against industrial organization of death, animals have no other recourse, no possible defiance except suicide” (Baudrillard Simulations 131). Unable to claim the humanity that he strives toward, John is finally reduced to a pair of rotating feet, dangling in a lighthouse, like lights that only point but do not illuminate anything:

Slowly, very slowly, like two unhurried compass needles, the feet turned towards the right; north, north-east, east, south-east, south, south-south-west; then paused, and after a few seconds, turned as hurriedly back towards the left. South-south-west, south, south-east, east... (237)
In the final scene, John becomes a subject without a possibility for any real existence, as he is thrown into a brave new world that he cannot change or save by his ideals. Though he believes in freedom as the essence of man, he cannot, as in the Delta scene (Chapter XV), enact freedom (what he needs to be more human) in a world that does not wish to know it. The tragedy of John’s being lies in an ideal of freedom that is as closed-minded as Brave New World society’s ideal of un-freedom. As he boldly chants ‘O brave new world’ after Linda’s death (190-191) while “imagining the possibility of transforming even the nightmare into something fine and noble” (191-192), John loses sight of his own impulsive actions guided merely by agitated emotions, and a naive, romantic belief that he might save Brave New World from its own annihilation. In truth, he cannot hope to change the citizens’ minds and make them “men” by merely opposing the ethical “goodness” of their reality. As another dissenter from within the society, he cannot enlighten its closed-minded citizens. Even though John desires to encourage life and humanity through teaching about the need for freedom in this society’s ethical perspective, his self-righteousness will only be defeated
because its rage does not account for the emptied, closed minds it attempts to change, nor the possibility that his ethical standpoint will be undervalued. Why would any citizen of Brave New World (even Deltas who “howl” at the Savage) desire “unhappiness” (that which they deem as evil, bad, and undesirable), when they can have the good fruits of Ford’s promise of eternal “happiness”?

From another perspective, one might also read John’s rebellion in Brave New World as a sort of slave revolt in morality. In the Nietzschean view, “In order to exist, slave morality first needs a hostile external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all – its action is fundamentally reaction” (GM I: 10, 37). In his critique of morality, Nietzsche rebukes a certain Judaeo-Christian mentality which he describes through the figure of the ascetic ideal who both wills himself to nothingness and raises himself over others:

Now I can really hear what they have been saying all along: ‘We good men - we are the just’ - what they desire they call, not retaliation, but ‘the triumph of justice’; what they hate is not their enemy, no! They hate ‘injustice,’ they hate ‘godlessness’; what they believe in a hope for is not the hope of revenge, the intoxication of sweet revenge, but the victory of God, of the just God, over the godless; what there is left for them to love on earth is not their brothers in hatred but their ‘brothers in love,’ as they put it, all the good and just on earth. (GM I:14, 48)
The savage’s rebuke of Brave New Worlders similarly grows out of an “intense overpowering hatred of these less than human monsters” (194), a sort of revenge. In the face of his bitterness, (which might also be optimistically taken as zeal for his beliefs in freedom and humanity), his victory is nonetheless flawed. Even though John’s revolt ethically seeks to proclaim the truth of the ignorance of Brave New World’s citizens and draw attention to their moral ineptitude, he does not actually seek to enact a realization of this truth so much as to attempt to declare Brave New World’s truth as false [so that he “falsifies the image of that which [he] despises” (GM I: 10, 37)] in order to proclaim his own without explanation or justification. To say it in another way, since John will never figure out how to make anyone understand his ethical standpoint, his insistence on making others see his perspective assumes that they will understand him. (This is a truly savage means of accomplishing this task in comparison to the technological advancement of Brave New World’s hypnopaedic process.) Yet even though John does make apparent the ironic truth of being a citizen in Brave New World, which consists of being a slave, a baby, a
prisoner, he is still helpless to change their minds or enlighten them with Truth. When John asks, 'Don’t you want to be free and men? Don’t you even understand what manhood and freedom are?' (194), he might as well be speaking to walls. This scene works on two levels since Huxley is doublehandedly mounting his own critique of the ignorance of the Deltas who haven’t a clue about freedom and being, and also drawing attention to John’s own ignorance of politics or ethics which are too blindly idealistic, rebellious and utopian to actually bring about reform. All he is able to do is provide an excess of power against the larger community (that will eventually crush him at the end of the novel), thus making John’s heroic quest for human-ness and moral change just as complicated and vexed as those of others who “rebel” in the novel.

The last Alpha citizen of interest in Brave New World is the magnanimous Mustapha Mond. As one of ten World Controllers Mond is portrayed as the good shepherd of all the herd, the physical manifestation of Ford himself. When he enters a room, everyone is compliant and congenial, and enthusiastic about his presence. At the beginning of the novel the narrator describes the Alpha-
Plus students’ reaction:

His lordship Mustapha Mond! The eyes of the saluting students almost popped out of their heads. Mustapha Mond! The Resident Controller for Western Europe! One of the Ten World Controllers. One of the Ten . . . and he sat down on the bench with the DHC, he was going to stay, to stay, yes, and actually talk to them . . . straight from the horse’s mouth. Straight from the mouth of Ford himself. (29)

Treated like a savior, the all seeing and all knowing subject of action, Mond is revered by his society as the mediator between themselves and Ford. Unlike O’Brien, whose overbearing ruthlessness is more evident in Nineteen Eighty-Four, Mond’s personality is subtle. He epitomizes Machievelli’s Prince; he is the ideal to strive toward while he is also the sly wolf in a good shepherd’s clothing, the illusion of magnanimity, the believer in the view that “the optimum population” is one with 8/9 below the water and 1/9 above (204). It is with this guise of friendliness that he may achieve the ends of his political and ethical goals.

Yet amid his gross misuse of power and the faculty of reason under the guise of “duty” toward society, Mustapha Mond provides yet another medium displaying Aldous Huxley’s ethical worries. Throughout the novel, the reader is constantly called to question Mond’s logic, especially in terms of his ethical perspective, which he constantly seeks to excuse. In the scene where John
points out the great flaw in the Brave New World system of hierarchy, that is, that the ruled may not undercut the ruler (Kumar 284), Mond displays his convoluted endorsement of Brave New World’s creative decisions:

‘I was wondering,’ said the Savage, ‘why you had them at all – seeing that you can get whatever you want out of those bottles. Why don’t you make everybody an Alpha Double Plus while you’re about it?’ Mustapha Mond laughed. ‘Because we have no wish to have our throats cut,’ he answered. ‘We believe in happiness and stability. A society of Alphas couldn’t fail to be unstable and miserable. Imagine a factory staffed by Alphas – that is to say by separate and unrelated individuals of good heredity and conditioned so as to be capable (within limits) of making a free choice and assuming responsibilities. Imagine it!’ (202-203)

Mond’s logical conclusion that stability can only exist in a society with the smallest number of free choosing individuals hides the perverted philosophy beneath such a statement. Behind Mond’s justification of Brave New World’s multi-tiered society as opposed to a society of Alpha-Pluses who would “go mad if [they] had to do Epsilon Semi-Moron work” (203) lies a denial of the way Brave New World enslaves individuals. In order to “get people willingly to act the way they should act” (Kumar 260), the science of Brave New World ensures that every molecule is accounted for and made to serve the larger communal whole. From an ethical standpoint Mond clearly takes advantage of his privileged position as one who can explain why everything is the way it is. Not only does
Mond irresponsibly ignore John’s illuminating point, that he might use his knowledge to create a better society, but before John is able to “expose the lies [of this] government,” and provide an analysis of its “actions according to [the] causes and motives” hidden in its ambitions (TCR - Chomsky 60), Mond quickly evades giving a direct answer by once again providing a fallacy filled, unrelated argument that justifies his cause from his own warped perspective. His misuse of the intellect, especially when he is given the power and ability to use it to improve himself and society proves a waste of education since he only means to reproduce the myth of power, something which the sly intellect might create in order to continually re-invent himself as indestructible truth.

Mond also represents the subject who fails to acknowledge truth, and therefore reality. When Mond speaks of his own intellectual adeptness and scientific creativity as an Alpha, he brags of once fighting the orthodoxy of his dictatorial superiors through “illicit cooking” (196). Yet despite Mond’s capacity to participate in, and understand the benefits of a legitimate, authentic kind of science (one that is not
permitted in Brave New World), he still opts for the lie of inauthentic science. His willing involvement in the crooked Fordian method of science reveals what Aaron Ridley would characterize as a "way of life" or an ethics in which "participation in what one might term the industrialization of knowledge represents a special determination not to challenge that ideal or offer any alternative to it" (Ridley 97). In this consideration of the scientist in terms of Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Ridley pinpoints the problem of the scientist who practices an inauthentic science which resists any other experimental outcome but his own. Nietzsche himself calls this sort of scientist the great 'ally' of the ascetic ideal which offers some contingent, ideal notion of truth that suits the metaphysical ends of the intellectual. Mustapha Mond's decision to rule Brave New World after being "forced" to embrace a false, instead of a true science which he could only practice on an island, shows an all-too-quick willingness to function on the pretext of the lie of science, instead of the truth of science. When Helmholtz asks, 'Then why aren't you on an island yourself?,' Mond's response can be viewed as the epitome of this great lie that Huxley's dystopia makes present in
Mustapha’s ethical philosophy:

‘Because, finally, I preferred this.’ . . . ‘I was given the choice to be sent to an island, where I could have got on with my pure science, or to be taken on to the Controllers’ Council with the prospect of succeeding in due course to an actual Controllership. I chose this and let the science go.’ After a little silence, ‘Sometimes,’ he added, ‘I rather regret the science. Happiness is a hard master – particularly other people’s happiness. A much harder master, if one isn’t conditioned to accept it unquestionably, than truth.’ He sighed, fell silent again, then continued in a brisker tone. ‘Well, duty’s duty. One can’t consult one’s own preferences. I’m interested in truth, I like science. But truth’s a menace, science is a public danger. As dangerous as its been beneficent. it has given us the stablest equilibrium in history’ (207)

In denying truth as a public danger, Mond represents Huxley’s understanding of the dishonesty behind utopian politics, the abuse of control to speak for and manipulate others into compliance and submission, and the sadly irresponsible misuse of the intellect (destroying the potential for the subject through a petty desire for power) by the scientist who holds the potential of seeking truth. Since the rest of society believes in his words so strongly, he is the false human whom everyone in Brave New World attempts to interiorize at the same time that he symbolizes one source of their death.37

In Brave New World, Aldous Huxley invites his reader to inspect the subjective nature of his citizens as that nature is revealed by their mismanaged ethical perspectives. In doing so, he makes a fictional analogy
to the reader’s world and complicates the modern tendency to swallow morality without realizing the costs of selfhood and humanity. While the citizens in Brave New World seem to live where “individualistic values are given priority over social values” (Ruppert 107), each citizen’s desire for personal happiness actually renders selfhood impossible, since it is merely the illusion of selfhood that they own. Huxley therefore makes ridiculous through his dystopia those citizens of Brave New World, who buy into the supposed promises of happiness, self-improvement, stability, and identity all of which tend to lead humans astray from their humanity.
CHAPTER THREE
Dystopia, the Subject and Ideology
in George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four

“1984” is “Animal Farm” writ large and in purely anthropomorphic terms. One hopes (against hope?) that its successor will supply the other side of the picture. For what is “1984” but a picture of man unmanned, of humanity without a heart, of a people without tolerance or civilization, of a government whose sole object is the maintenance of power, of its absolute totalitarian power, by every contrivance of cruelty.

~ Fredric Warburg

In the same way that Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World may be seen as a reflection on the troublesome nature of the modern subject in terms of ethics, George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four may be understood as a critique of the nature of the modern subject as it is governed by ideology. Politically speaking, ideology seems more embedded in Orwell’s dystopia than in Huxley’s, since Nineteen Eighty-Four depicts a more rigid system of government than is immediately apparent in Brave New World. Whereas Brave New World, as Orwell himself explains, “shows less political awareness and is more influenced by recent biological and psychological theories,” the more brutal world of Oceania, ruled by a totalitarian regime, adds a political charge to Orwell’s
dystopia (Orwell, F&H 14). It is in this seemingly horrifying world (where Orwell directly deals with government, propaganda, memory and history) that the reader comes to grasp Orwell’s conception of the modern subject and the extent to which ideology jeopardizes the very prospect of meaningful being in the world.

Like Huxley, Orwell also engages the reader in a genealogical analysis of “self,” especially of what Connelly names the post-historical self (Connelly 50) or the self that has lost its memory of its past, and consequently of itself. This idea of the self lost in history is closely linked to ideology, or what may be called false consciousness: an imaginary conception of self and social order “that summons the individual into a certain social reality” (Kavanaugh 310). The idea of false consciousness as derived by Friedrich Engels posits that “the real motive forces impelling [the individual] remain unknown to him” (Engels qtd. in Meyerson 4) and is useful to consider in terms of Orwell’s dystopia as it provides a theoretical link to Orwell’s own creation of the violent ideology of Ingsoc in Nineteen Eighty-Four.

The more menacing aspect of Orwell’s dystopia is reflected in the life of the citizens ruled by the Party
of Big Brother, a dictatorship delimiting any potential for rebellion or transgression. By keeping its citizens under constant surveillance by strategically placed telescreens and the oppressive thoughtpolice (the face of Big Brother is watching everywhere), the government of Oceania has the power to ensure that no one, whether politically aware or not, holds any thoughts or commits any actions that might desecrate the great purity of the Party’s reputation. The citizens of Oceania must therefore remain on constant guard by attending the actions and thoughts of themselves and of others so as to prevent any possibility of thoughtcrime, the greatest offense against the Absolute Truth of the Party: “At all times the Party is in possession of absolute truth, and clearly the absolute can never have been different from what it is now” (223). In the end, any irreverence for this truth is immediately dealt with by certain death.

*Nineteen Eighty-Four* specifies Ingsoc as the official ideology of Oceania, which Orwell uses draw attention to the underlying structure and function of ideology as false consciousness. He accomplishes this more precisely with the concept of Doublethink which supports the Party ideology in the novel. In Nineteen
Eighty-Four this concept of Doublethink underlines the manner in which the citizens come to develop their false sense of reality deemed just by the Party. In his concept of Oceanic Doublethinking, Orwell explores the political ignorance of modernity which continually fails to digest the world as it really is. One might call this false sense of reality or false consciousness the delusion of modernity which Orwell's concept of Doublethink satirizes. As a "vast system of mental cheating" (224) Doublethink provides the individual with "the power of holding two contradictory beliefs" at once, and "accepting both of them" (223). Erika Gottlieb further explains that Doublethink is a form of controlled schizophrenia practiced by a ruling class that no longer has a legitimate function, trying to convince others, but most of all itself, of its own importance. But Doublethink represents the methodological "falsification" (Orwell 172) of an entire thought system, designed to perpetrate the "false view of the world" (Orwell 172) implied in the totalitarian mentality. Originally designed "to sustain the mystique of the Party and prevent the true nature of present-day society from being perceived" (Orwell 180), Doublethink embodies the very essence of the implications of totalitarianism" (Orwell v.4 520), "any perversion of thought" (Orwell 172) that is endemic to the totalitarian mentality. Therefore, at various levels of sophistication Doublethink is to be practiced by everyone in Oceania, by both the Deceived and the Deceiver. (Gottlieb 117) This precept of Doublethink upon which Oceaniac society is built describes the formation of the subject in contradiction, paradox, and lies. The deception is self-
deception in the play of reality vs. unreality, truth vs. falsehood, black vs. white, all of which affect the emergence of the individual in Oceania in a way that encourages belief in the opposite of what one thinks, a letting go of oneself to the contradictions that one is taught to believe are present and also correct. The self therefore operates on the paradox that one mentally thinks the opposite of what one believes (that is, if anyone actually has any personal beliefs in dystopia). 41

Doublethink represents the perfect means of maintaining the ideology of Ingsoc which controls the masses under a totalitarian hierarchy. If ideologies are "beliefs not provable as true or false" (Schmitt 75), then the unprovable-ness of Ingsoc as a negative ideology, a notion which Doublethink prevents in any case, makes the "absolute truth" of the Party even stronger (223), and the citizen of Oceania even more restricted to that "truth." With the help of Newspeak which prevents any sort of heresy against the Party, Doublethink engages the false consciousness which the Party ideology needs to maintain its power: "That was the ultimate subtlety: consciously to induce unconsciousness, and then, once again, to become unconscious of the act of
hypnosis you had just performed. Even to understand the word 'doublethink' involved the use of doublethink" (38). Orwell describes in this metaphor of Doublethink a notion that Nietzsche also alludes to as the process of forgetting that one forgot to forget. Nietzsche refers to this as "a faculty of repression, that is responsible for the fact that what we experience and absorb enters our consciousness as little while we are digesting it" (GM II:1, 57). To forget that one has forgotten in this context, where that which is soaked up by the subject is then subject to "an active forgetfulness" (GM II:1, 58), represents the ultimate function of ideology as false consciousness, or "beliefs that no one would adopt on rational grounds, beliefs that have been instilled in people by force or deception" (Schmitt 71).

Orwell's Doublethink, which operates in the novel at different levels, allows him to engage his reader in an exploration of the violent way that ideology as false consciousness shapes the subject, and of the absurd reality through distortion which the subject irrationally absorbs.42 Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four identifies and explores the root of subjectivity as it lies in the false consciousness of ideology through his protagonist, the
Outer Party member, turned defector, Winston Smith. It is through his consciousness that the reader comes to recognize the insanity of Doublethink and its absurd way of seeing the world. Winston’s personal experiences in the text reveal the living conditions of Oceania in which the Party ideology shapes its people. In the novel, Winston is bored with his life, tired of his job, and makes an effort to find someone like himself who might reassure him in his conscious response to the menacing, insane and terror filled world of Oceania.43

Winston’s understanding of his world continually clashes with that of others: when he considers the world around him, he feels something is wrong. This sense creates a disjunction between Winston’s interpretation of how the Party ideology affects him, and how it affects others around him.44 This divide between Winston and others acts aids Orwell in mounting a critique against the kinds of non-rational mentalities that rule over the actions and thoughts presented by the party members, the proles, and the ruthless O’Brien.45

It is while the reader experiences Winston’s search to understand his own and others’ place in Oceania, that is, his quest to unveil the “why” of the ideological
system which represses the emergence of the "ideally" free-thinking autonomous subject, that Orwell's philosophical perspective and study of subjectivity becomes clear. I wish to proceed realizing that the reader must observe Winston as well as observe through Winston. Although Orwell sets up the text through the eyes of Winston, who deeply thinks about the contradictions within his society, it is inevitably the reader who must dig beneath the surface of Winston's observations and uncover the ideological analysis taking place in the fantasy of Orwell's text. Winston's alienation from his society is therefore important to consider in terms of Orwell's move toward re-creating the subject that is denied its existence. Winston's alienation from his society in the novel is focussed in three main sections of the text, each of which describes his movement as he turns away from the ideology of his society and its supposed truth, which he is not always sure about.

Winston's desire for rebellion against the Party initially arises from his reluctance to meet the repressive demands of conformity and the destiny of his death. For instance, he comes to recognize the violent
extent of the ideological indoctrination of all members of the Party and therefore makes it his goal to remain conscious, and "stay alive as long as possible" (30). Living with the possibility of vaporization at any moment (that state of an always already carried out sentencing that entails death), Winston longs for escape and freedom via some political act while attempting to reconstruct a certain memory of the past that will allow the truth, or some truth of reality to emerge.

Winston’s actions of disobedience in the battle to retain autonomy (Connelly 51) also introduce the possibility of a citizen’s ability to denounce the ideology of Ingsoc and fight the false consciousness that it imposes. Since he maintains a sense of inner freedom, or what Hannah Arendt calls "the inward space into which men may escape from external coercion and feel free" (Arendt 440), Winston constantly has the urge for transgression and craves the political act. This takes several forms: exercising self-expression through writing his journal; placing his hope in the proles -- "strength would change into consciousness" (229); taking pleasure in the sexual act with Julia -- "the blow struck against the party" (133); and arranging a meeting with the
possibly unorthodox O’Brien. Winston thus becomes the main source of hope in the text for the emergence of the true human subject despite the controlling force of the state.

At the same time, Winston feels alone and alienated; he is unsure of his own capacity to be sane or not:

He wondered, as he had many times wondered before whether he himself was a lunatic. Perhaps a lunatic was simply a minority of one. At one time it had been a sign of madness to believe that the earth goes round the sun: today, to believe that the past is unalterable. He might be alone in holding that belief, and if alone, then a lunatic. But the thought of being a lunatic did not greatly trouble him: the horror was that he might also be wrong (83).

Initially believing his own existence to be a certain contradiction by virtue of his various thoughtcrimes (30), Winston constantly sees himself as “the dead” (a dead man walking). When Winston realizes (with the help of Julia) that he is “not the dead yet” (142), he eventually puts his faith in the desire to remain human:

‘I don’t mean confessing. Confession is not betrayal. What you say or do doesn’t matter: only feelings matter. If they could make me stop loving you – that would be the real betrayal.’ (173)

She thought it over. ‘They can’t do that,’ she said finally. ‘It’s the one thing they can’t do. They can make you say anything – anything – but they can’t make you believe it. They can’t get inside you.’

‘No,’ he said a little more hopefully, ‘no; that’s quite true. They can’t get inside you. If you can feel that staying human is worth while, even when it can’t have any result whatever, you’ve beaten them.’ (174)

His strategy to remain alive by holding onto a memory of
his own humanity --despite the fact that “thoughtcrime does not entail death; thoughtcrime IS death” (30)-- supports the novel’s theme of retaining the essence of his humanity, or what Winston sees as the possibility of sanity. He concludes:

They could not alter your feelings: for that matter you could not alter them yourself, even if you wanted to. They could lay bare in the utmost detail everything that you had done or said or thought; but the inner heart, whose workings were mysterious even to yourself, remained impregnable. (174)

Winston’s desperate desire to affirm himself and his feelings agrees with the Enlightenment notion of the subject and its possibility for autonomy, or “the condition of being self-legislating or self-governing, free and independent of any external constraint” (Cupitt 69). This notion fits into Immanuel Kant’s promulgation that “we are rational and must take a deterministic view of the physical world” (Culpit 70), a notion which Winston seems to comprehend in his constant scrutiny of the various aspects of his world which Orwell provides in the detailed narration of Oceania’s setting. Believing himself to be capable of creating within himself his own values by attempting to arrive at truth that lies beyond his present reality, Winston also reflects on the ability to pursue life beyond the ideology of the Party and to
find a past that he cannot yet prove: “everything faded into mist. The past was erased, the erasure was forgotten, the lie became truth.” (78). The quotation continues: “Just once in his life he had possessed -after the event: that was what counted - concrete, unmistakable evidence of an act of falsification.” The past and memory are important in this novel in terms of this evidence. Winston’s desire to take hold of the past and to retain memories contributes to his effort to reconstruct his own identity. If he can maintain a conscious memory of the past -- as he attempts to do when he reminisces about his wife Katherine (140-141), and his father, mother and sister (168-172) -- he can somehow prove his own existence through the memory of those others who might remember him when his own vaporization and becoming an unperson takes place. In search of memory, Winston hypothesizes the human need for history in a world that manipulates history and simultaneously announces the death of history. He desires to prove both of his gut feelings correct: that something is wrong with the world, and that he somehow exists in his ability to think and remember, despite the fact that “thoughtcrime is death” (7). His quest begins by finding others who think like
him, who may also reassure him: of his sanity, of the
need for freedom, of the possibility of truth beyond the
lie.

Winston’s job in the Records Department, “the only
single branch of the Ministry of Truth, whose primary job
was not to reconstruct the past but to supply the
citizens of Oceania . . . with every conceivable kind of
information” (45) makes him an expert at reconstruction.
In Part I Winston contemplates other Party and non-Party
members (the proles), by observing and interpreting their
thoughts and actions. Winston’s observations consequently
reveal to the reader the ideological construct of his
friends from the Ministry, (Syme and Parsons), the
proles, and O’Brien and uncover the distortions of truth
that ideology enacts in the subject, where it prevents
any life beyond the death.

Made to love Big Brother unquestioningly, all Party
members and their families learn to interiorize and live
out the ideals of the Party: doublethink, crimestop,
blackwhite, and newspeak which produce the inability to
think “too deeply on any subject whatever” (220).46 Even
though the Party members are the intellectuals of society
--some more than others since Inner Party members are
merely supposed to be the “hands” without any “determining” abilities (217)--Winston has little hope that they might somehow come to understand their own “unfreedom” (as sometimes destined unpersons (48)) and ignorance. When he first speaks to the party member Syme, (the philologist of Newspeak), Syme’s disposition seems to hint that he understands the world and Winston as well: “I know you,’ the eyes seemed to say, ‘I see through you. I know very well why you didn’t go to see those prisoners hanged’ (52). Winston imagines Syme’s “large dark eyes” able to penetrate his psyche as it searches for signs of thoughtcrime. Trying to avoid the scrutiny of Syme’s roving eyes, Winston changes the topic of conversation to the “technicalities of Newspeak” (52). Syme immediately uses this topic as a platform to brag about the language and its progress of narrowing “the range of thought” (55). As Syme says, “It’s a beautiful thing, the destruction of words” (54). As he prides himself on the prospect that “thoughtcrime will be literally impossible, because there will be no words in which to express it” (55), Syme reveals a sheer ignorance of the propaganda of Newspeak which denies each citizen their very right to speech. Syme’s pointless study of
language as a means to deny the possibility of thought displays a misuse of the intellect which Orwell’s dystopia denounces. Rather than being used for developing empty ideas, the intellect might be used instead to “enlarge the range of meanings and enhance possibilities of thought and expression” (Kumar 320). The destruction of words that Syme supports contributes to the destruction of the subject. As Syme practices and participates in the rapid elimination of Oldspeak words, he assists the compression of meaning, the elimination of subtlety, and thus the diminution of thought -- a result of blind beliefs in the orthodoxy of the Party. When he exclaims, for instance, “How could you have a slogan like ‘freedom is slavery’ when the concept of freedom has been abolished?” (56), he does not himself realize the value of freedom, nor does he manage to care that it has been abolished. The reduction of key terms like “freedom” or what Orwell calls “the loss of vocabulary” (Orwell, IHTT 221) results in the loss of articulation, and a further loss of the self. Syme’s misuse of language discourages any possibility for his own consciousness as a result of his inability to grasp the importance of words like freedom -- he ignorantly misses the subtlety of the
paradox that “freedom is slavery”-- thereby delineating the obvious to the reader, and Winston: he is another walking dead man.

For Winston, Syme’s inability to untangle himself from the orthodoxy of the party complicates his chances for survival in the future. Syme is conscious of his world at some level. Yet his dangerous flicker of knowing is not enough to keep him safely stupid, or make him alive:

Unquestionably Syme will be vaporized, Winston thought again. . . There was something subtly wrong, something that he lacked: discretion, aloofness, a sort of saving stupidity. You could not say that he was unorthodox. He believed in the principles of Ingsoc, he venerated Big Brother, he rejoiced over victories, he hated heretics, not merely with sincerity but with a sort of restless zeal, an up-to-dateness of information, which the ordinary Party member did not approach. Yet a faint air of disreputability always clung to him. He said things that would have been better unsaid, he had read too many books, . . . Syme’s fate was not difficult to foresee. And yet the fact that Syme grasped, even for three seconds, the nature of his, Winston’s secret opinions, he would betray himself instantly to the Thought Police. So would anybody else, for that matter: but Syme more than most. Zeal was not enough. Orthodoxy was unconsciousness. (58)

Without the ability to understand the depth of what his intellect can grasp or the discretion he needs to avoid vaporization, Syme will inevitably fail to live beyond the certain death of Winston’s prophecy.

Winston notes the uncritical nature of his Party friends in the same scene, when the “military victory” is announced by the Ministry of Plenty. When the Ministry
declares that “the standard of living has risen by no less than 20 per cent over the past year” (61), Winston cannot understand the ease with which his fellow Party members accept those figures as truth. He is convinced that this contradicts what he sees:

In any time that he could accurately remember, there had never been quite enough to eat, one had never had socks or underclothes that were not full of holes, furniture had always been battered and rickety, rooms underheated, tube trains crowded, houses falling to pieces, bread dark coloured, tea a rarity, coffee filthy-tasting, cigarettes insufficient – nothing cheap and plentiful except synthetic gin. (63)

What is worse, Parsons cannot understand the figures at all and is only “aware that they were in some way a cause for satisfaction” (61). Winston, on the other hand, easily notes the odd contradiction in the figures, for example, when he notices the chocolate rations raised to “twenty grams per a week” when “only yesterday . . . they had been reduced to twenty grammes a week” (61). Wondering, “is it possible that they could swallow that, after only twenty-four hours?” (61), Winston realizes that they in fact can:

Yes, they swallowed it. Parsons swallowed it easily, with the stupidity of an animal. The eyeless creature at the other table swallowed it fanatically, passionately, with a furious desire to track down, denounce and vaporize anyone who should suggest that last week the ration had been thirty grammes. Syme, too – in some more complex way involving doublethink – Syme swallowed it. Was he [Winston] then, alone in the possession of a memory? (62)

The quickness with which Parsons “swallows” these figures
and Syme uses his faculty of *Doublethink* leaves Winston distraught over their mis-directed understanding of reality. Parsons’ blind love of the Party ways he is made to believe allows him to accept the law without any critical scrutiny. His unquestioning support of the Party is explained by Nietzsche’s concept of breeding or conditioning, which he sees as a key trope that explains the decline of modern subjectivity into the herd-like state of unconsciousness and nihilism. Nietzsche explains that the tendency which “breeds animals” (animals is a trope for the herd) with “the right to make promises” (an action which human history has forgotten itself to do) is the way subjects are created (GM II: 1, 56). The herd is not only called into being through the visible law which calculates⁴⁸ them, but is taught to internalize the law and make it their own without question. Parsons’s pride in his children’s adherence to *crimestop* also reveals this sort of internalization where he himself has also forgotten through an act of *doublethink* that he has given up his autonomy to the law.

While the law in a liberal-democratic sense is supposed to work for the people by defending their rights and preventing chaos and disorder in their lives, it may
also be seen as a threatening entity which violently imposes undisputable regulations of conduct on the individual. In this light fairness is only afforded to "approximately equal powers" who agree (GM P:4, 18) and remain uniform in thought and action with the ideals of the community.⁴⁹

Yet despite the theory that the law calculates subjects and that the subject internalizes the law, Orwell provides an intriguing twist to his novel. Goldstein’s book explains:

He has no freedom of choice in any direction whatever. On the other hand his actions are not regulated by law or by any clearly formulated code of behaviour. In Oceania there is no law. Thoughts and actions which, when detected, mean certain death are not formally forbidden, and the endless purges, arrests, tortures, imprisonments and vaporizations are not inflicted as punishment for crimes which have actually been committed, but are merely the wiping-out of persons who might perhaps commit a crime at some time in the future. (220)

Goldstein’s text describes an interesting contradiction in Oceania where the citizen lacks free choice amid a society with no law to actually prevent that free choice. (Moreover, it explains that discipline is merely existent for those potential “criminals” who supposedly cannot break any laws!) This sets up a great irony that underlies the paranoia of Party members (mostly expressed to the reader through Winston’s own paranoia) in danger of committing thoughtcrime. The absence of any law which
should initially cause that paranoia introduces a complication to the novel which undermines the reader’s expectations, that is, that the law is what represses the subject to begin with.

The value of Goldstein’s description, which deems law non-existent, is that it highlights the Nietzschean point that subjects are themselves formed by their very attachment to the concept of law. Parsons’ attitude, while it cannot possibly be influenced by any law, describes a sort of hidden conscience which, as Judith Butler explains, “involves a turning against oneself, a body in recoil upon itself” (Butler 66). The social regulation of the subject, or that ideology which regulates Parsons is what “compels [this] passionate attachment to regulation” (Butler 66). Through Parsons, Orwell satirizes the extreme of this attachment, which is ironically a self-induced attachment, and points out yet another irony -- humans somehow do not need to be aware of the law in order to obey it.5

The orthodoxy of the mindless Party members in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* exhibits the notion that any intellectual has the capacity to recognize the totalizing force of internalized propaganda or the law in disguise.
As the privileged of Oceania, the Party members lack any true sense of intellectual engagement with political issues; they are aware of the concepts of political thought but only understand those concepts from a limited and naive perspective. Even though in Oceania “it is impossible to see reality with eyes different from those of the Party” (Varrachio 108), each Party member is interpolated into Party ideology from a young age, and “the speculations which might possibly induce a sceptical or rebellious attitude are killed in advance by his early-acquired inner discipline” (220), the text still criticizes the Party members for their lack of awareness and their manipulation by the party. Instead of realizing their capacity as intellectuals to “expose the lies of governments, to analyse actions according to their cause and motives and often hidden intentions” (Chomsky, TCR 60) despite the false consciousness/ideology that rules over them, these Party members ignore any analysis of the truth of their political states, which in the case of Oceania, is without freedom or thought. Is it perhaps possible to consider the inhumanity of Parsons and Syme as coming out of their inability to understand the nature of their
unfreedom; their too-quick belief in the lie renders themselves (their own being) a lie. Their ignorance of the violence behind this lie renders their existence a mere illusion.

One might well go on to consider how Syme eventually disappears and what vaporization might mean for the subject, that is, to be wiped out of existence: “the names of people who had been vaporized” “were therefore considered never to have existed” (44). Winston describes Withers as an “unperson” for “he did not exist: he had never existed” (48). There is a whole aspect of unpersonhood which the text seems to consider, and which might also have been interesting to consider for this study had I more time for such a discussion. The relevance of this terminated self, in time and in history, describes a subject that is not only insignificant should he break the law which is not law, but lost to signification, not merely in death but in non-existence. Indeed, the destruction of the self is most fierce when that self is not even considered to have come into being in the first place. Subjects like Parsons and Syme become mere constructs of authority and unable to exist on their own. Also taking the example of
Winston, he is himself caught up in the ways of his world. (The reader may or may not believe this can be helped.) As Winston visits prole territory, for example, he considers that the “patrols” might stop him if “he happened to run into them” (86). He imagines the questions,

May I see your papers, comrade? What are you doing here? What time did you leave work? Is this your usual way home? And so forth. Not that there was any rule against walking home by an unusual route; but it was enough to draw attention to you if the Thought Police heard about it. (86-87)

The irony posed by Winston’s “healthy” paranoia is the reality that the law is internally embedded: the individual citizens of Oceania have internalized what actions are right and wrong so deeply that there is no need for the law. Orwell continually pokes fun at this as Winston himself takes special care to make all the right moves.54

Losing hope that he will find his answers to the contradiction of existence in Oceania in the thoughts and actions of his fellow Party members, Winston wanders in search of the proles whose ties to the past he believes might help him in his quest for the definition of freedom and its possible connection to human identity. Winston’s ties to the past also come out of the desire to figure
out what is a lie, and what is the truth:

How could you tell how much of it was lies? It might be true that the average human being was better off now than he had been before the Revolution. The only evidence to the contrary was the mute protest in your own bones, the instinctive feeling that the conditions you live in were intolerable and that at some other time they must have been different. It struck him that the truly characteristic thing about modern life was not its cruelty and insecurity, but simply its bareness, its dinginess, its listlessness. Life, if you looked about you, bore no resemblance not only to the lies that streamed out of the telescreens, but even to the ideals that the Party was trying to achieve. (77)

Without something on which he can ground his understanding of reality, Winston remains unable to decipher what is important in life, and what is important for life. Believing so strongly that at least the proles “had stayed human” (172) Winston regards them as the one possible “nucle[us] of discontent” (219) for Oceanic society a hope for rebellion. Realizing that the proles represent the majority, 85% of the population, Winston believes in their capacity to rally themselves together and demand freedom. As the herd mentality of the text, the proles are still ignorant of the conditions in which they live. Since they are both “liberated”: “proles and animals are free” (75), and “natural inferiors who must be kept in subjection, like animals, by the application of a few simple rules” (74), Winston hopes that they will “somehow become conscious of their own strength” (72-73)
and "break loose at last" (73). Winston understands however that "Until they become conscious they will never rebel, and until after they have rebelled they cannot become conscious" (74), and considers the important link between consciousness and political action which the proles themselves lack:

They were judged capable of becoming dangerous; but no attempt was made to indoctrinate them with the ideology of the Party. It was not desirable that the Proles should have strong political feelings. All that was required of them was a primitive patriotism which could be appealed to whenever it was necessary to make them accept longer working-hours or shorter rations. And even when they became discontented, as they sometimes did, their discontent led nowhere, because, being without general ideas, they could only focus it on petty specific grievances. The larger evils invariably escaped their notice. (75)

As Winston reflects, the political non-agency of the proles arises from their ignorant indifference toward the world, the reason why the Party has no concern for any possibility of their rebellion. Winston must deal with the fact that the proles are not only politically inept, but they are also extremely predictable in their thoughts and actions and incapable of thought beyond "petty grievances." He sees, for example, how they are easily won over by the propaganda of Hate Songs (155), and are "normally apathetic about the war," though they sometimes engage in "periodical frenzies of patriotism" (156); invest in the lottery (89), go to the pub (88), and only
care to improve unimportant aspects of their own lives (73).

Despite these observations of the proles, Winston visits them in Part I, Chapter VIII with the innocent belief that they, these humans, will somehow remember life during the time of freedom. Winston makes this hypothesis that freedom once existed, and never really knows when it was abolished. When Winston interviews the proles who lived during the Revolution, he searches for an affirmation of the history books, which say that "life before the Revolution was completely different from what it is now" (93). Despite the fact that Winston wants his "opinion" on the state of capitalism before the revolution, the prole man can only respond by reflecting on the importance of "Top 'ats!" (93):

You are very much older than I am,' said Winston. 'You must have been a grown man before I was born. You can remember what it was like in the old days, before the Revolution. People of my age don't really know anything about those times. We can only read about them in books, and what it says in the books may not be true. I should like your opinion on that. The history books say that life before the Revolution was completely different from what it is now. There was the most terrible oppression, injustice, poverty - worse than anything we can imagine. Here in London, the great mass of people never had enough to eat from birth to death. Half of them hadn't even boots on their feet. They worked twelve hours a day, they left school at nine, they slept ten in a room. And at the same time there were a very few people, only a few thousands - the capitalists, they were called - who were rich and powerful. They owned everything that there was to own. They live in great gorgeous houses with thirty servants, they rode about in motor-cars and four-horse
carriages, they drank champagne, they wore top hats——

The old man brightened suddenly.

'Top 'ats!' he said. Funny you should mention 'em. The same thing come into my 'ead only yesterday, I dono why. I was jest thinking, I ain't seen a top 'at in years. Gorn right out, they 'ave. The last time I wore one was at my sister-in-law's funeral. And that was — well, I couldn't given you the date, but it must'a been fifty year ago. Of course it was only 'ired for the occasion, you understand.'

'It isn't very important about the top hats,' said Winston patiently. 'The point is, these capitalists.' (93-94)

Having no recollections of the past besides a slew of petty musings, this prole is much like other proles who "remember a million useless things" (96). When Winston asks, "was life better before the revolution than it is now?" and receives more pointless answers, he realizes there is "no use going on" (96). Besides being ignorant of the political happenings of Oceania, the proles do not even have an opinion on Winston’s question "Would you prefer to live then or now?" (96).

The proles in Nineteen Eighty-Four may therefore be seen in light of Marx’s own view of the proletariat who seem to “lack freedom because their work is under the control of the owners of the work place, and because political power is in the hands of the owners of the means of production” (Schmitt 29). In other words, they have no power because of their inability to access it, and have no powerful opinions because of their non-political natures. In his book, Media Control, a
skeptical argument about propaganda and the state of contemporary democratic rule, Noam Chomsky describes the sad reality of the proletariat class as it is unknowingly ruled by authority:

There is first of all the class of citizens who have to take some active role in running general affairs. That’s the specialized class. They are the people who analyze, execute, make decisions, and run things in the political, economic, and ideological systems. That’s a small percentage of the population. Naturally, anyone who puts these ideas forth is always part of that small group, and they’re talking about what to do about those others. Those others, who are out of the small group, the big majority of the population, they are what Lippmann called “the bewildered herd.” Now there are two “functions” in a democracy: The specialized class, the responsible men, carry out the executive function, which means they do the thinking and planning and understand the common interests. Then, there is the bewildered herd, and they have a function in democracy too. Their function in a democracy, he said, is to be “spectators,” not participants in action... And there’s a logic behind it. There’s even a kind of compelling moral principle behind it. The compelling moral principle is that the mass of the public are just too stupid to be able to understand things. If they try to participate in managing their own affairs, they’re just going to cause trouble. Therefore, it would be immoral and improper to permit them to do this. We have to tame the bewildered herd to rage and trample and destroy things. It’s pretty much the same logic that says that it would be improper to let a three-year-old run across the street. You don’t give a three-year-old that kind of freedom because the three-year-old doesn’t know how to handle that freedom. (Chomsky 12-13)

Chomsky outlines the strange way that democratic society seems to operate as a totalitarian society in which the specialized class takes advantage of the masses who have become mere spectators of the political happenings around them. The herd’s beliefs in freedom are merely illusions: they are not free, but only possess the ability to move freely within the limits of the law; they
imagine themselves free in a world that imprisons their right to free choice. In short, the masses do not have any real clue as to the essence of freedom, or understand that the propaganda of the dominant ideology destroys any possibility of that essential freedom to emerge.

In terms of Chomsky's argument, the political ignorance of the masses will always prevent any knowing of the true freedom which lies at the heart of being human, a position that will eventually destroy any human desire for true freedom at all. For Orwell, while the proles are not subject to the ideology of the Party, that they "must be kept in subjection, like animals" reveals how they are still moulded by the ideology of the Party which demands a certain thoughtlessness. Moreover, even though there is no attempt made "to indoctrinate [the proles] with the ideology of the Party" (74), it indirectly affects them by keeping them silent about anything political. Consequently, without politics, the self loses the possibility of signification as a subject. Jean Baudrillard explains this as a feature of the silent majority:

No one can be said to represent the silent majority, and that is its revenge. The masses are no longer an authority to which one might refer as one formerly referred to class or to the people. Withdrawn into their silence, they are no longer
subject (especially not to - or of - history), hence they
can no longer be spoken for, articulated, represented, nor
pass through the political mirror stage” and the cycle of
imaginary identifications. One sees what strength results
from this: no longer being (a) subject, they can no longer be
alienated - neither in their own language (they have none),
nor in any other which would pretend to speak for them.
(Baudrillard, SSM 22).

Baudrillard’s understanding of the silent majority is
useful for thinking about the proles, who really have no
identities to begin with.\textsuperscript{56} Winston’s attempts to disturb
the proles into some remembrance of the past are in vain,
since he is speaking to those “who can no longer be
alienated.” In each instance, he fails to make them
understand or acknowledge the truth of their existence
because they are not possessors of identities: they walk
as ignorant acceptors of the Party ideology through its
propaganda even if they are unaware of its ideology. In
short, their ignorance will never allow them to signify
in the world, even the Party does not see them as a
threat.\textsuperscript{57}

In search of Goldstein’s Anti-Party Brotherhood,
Winston’s meeting with O’Brien finally introduces the
most important consideration of ideology at work. At
first Winston looks to O’Brien for the information about
the revolution he seeks; his belief in O’Brien comes out
of this quest to seek answers beyond himself.\textsuperscript{56} Winston’s
insistent reliance on O’Brien in Parts One and Two of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* reveals how he displaces his meaning onto others, looking for truth in them. In the case of O’Brien, Winston is sure that O’Brien’s absent-minded tendencies (166/181) or nonchalant actions are signs of his rebelliousness, and decides to invest in the belief that he will provide the answers he is always searching for.

Ideologically speaking, O’Brien plays the figure of absolute power: as the Grand Inquistor “it was he who asked the questions and suggested the answers, he was the tormentor, he was the protector, he was the inquisitor, he was the friend” (256). O’Brien is the walking contradiction in Oceania, the walking ideology who is both friend and foe, savior and destroyer, truth speaker and betrayer; he functions as the main source of the lie, which Winston at first sees as truth. Winston looks to O’Brien at the very beginning of the novel during the Two Hours Hate with a “secretly held belief, . . . merely a hope — that O’Brien’s political orthodoxy was not perfect” (13).

Within Althusser’s (Lacanian influenced) scheme of ideology, O’Brien represents the God-like figure who
“calls individuals by their names” and “interpellates them in such a way that the subject responds: “Yes, it really is me!’ (Althusser 247). In Nineteen Eighty-Four, the nature of this call is such that the interpellated individual, like Winston, will eventually be convinced of his guilty nature -- of his thoughtcrimes, and eventually also learn to fall in love with Big Brother of his own free-will. The individual is therefore called to accept the truth of authority. In the reader’s mind, O’Brien is the sole obstacle to Winston’s search for freedom and autonomy. Whether or not this is yet another textual construct that Orwell uses to test readers and play with their assumptions about who is responsible, the citizen or the dictator, might be further considered in another study.

The nature of O’Brien’s ultimate power over others might be explained in terms of Althusser’s understanding of the hail of ideology. This hail, “Hey, you,” (as if uttered by a police man – i.e. the law), in Althusser’s reading of the subject and its formation, “underscores the paradox of how the very possibility of subject formation depends upon a passionate pursuit and recognition which, within the terms of the religious
example, is inseparable from condemnation” (Butler 113). Althusser’s note on “Christian Religious Ideology” sets up God as the Subject (with a capital “S”) par excellence, and those who believe in God as ordinary subjects (with a small “s”) whereby a duplication of “the Subject into subjects” takes place (Althusser 248). This model of the relationship between the Absolute subject and the subject exemplifies the way that ideology always already interpellates individuals as subjects such that the subjects recognize themselves in the Subject (and vice versa). This recognition supports the idea that whatever the Subject says, will be recognized by the subjects as Truth so that they “behave accordingly” within the system.

The character of O’Brien, who in Althusser’s schema is the Subject par excellence, the dystopian citizen who speaks for Big Brother and in doing so speaks for others, represents Orwell’s exploration of the notion of the Absolute Subject, who calls people, in this case the people of Oceania, into being. Unlike Huxley’s Brave New World, Nineteen Eighty-Four presents a more disagreeable, sadistic dictator. His characterization provides a study
of Totalitarian leadership, but even more presents a violent counterpart to the hero, strikingly introducing the reader to Orwell’s satirical point that modern democracy (as the reader might understand it) isn’t far from this.

Depicted as the key to meaning for Winston, O’Brien’s presence in the text validates the Marxian argument that “it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness” (qtd. in Richter 569). Marx describes ideology as a phenomenon which causes consciousness to exist, not in the individual’s agency, but in an external influence shaping it. Nineteen Eighty-Four likewise suggests that the mind is not derived by one’s own accord, but is imposed by some ideological force pressing down upon the individual who is always subjected and vulnerable to its powerful hold. O’Brien is key to making this model of being in the world clear. In the Ministry of Love he explains:

You preferred to be a lunatic, a minority of one. Only the disciplined mind can see reality, Winston. You believe that reality is something objective, external, existing in its own right. You also believe that the nature of reality is self-evident. When you delude yourself into thinking that you see something, you assume that everyone else sees the same as you. But I tell you, Winston, that reality is not external.
Reality exists in the human mind and nowhere else. Not in the individual mind, which can make mistakes, and in any case soon perishes: only in the mind of the Party, which is collective and immortal. Whatever the Party holds to be truth, is truth. It is impossible to see reality except by looking through the eyes of the Party. That is the fact that you have got to re-learn, Winston. It needs an act of self-destruction, an effort of the will. You must humble yourself before you can become sane. (261)

O’Brien delineates the sad truth of subjectivity, which describes the “self” not merely as a product of thought as Winston believes, but more a product of ideology. From an optimistic perspective, O’Brien’s point is not one that destroys the possibility of selfhood beyond ideology, but alludes to the strange way that individuals do not themselves realize how ingrained in consciousness ideology can be, the very point that Althusser makes: “ideology has always-already interpelle ted individuals as subjects. Hence individuals are ‘abstract’ with respect to the subjects they always already are” (Althusser 246). O’Brien’s presence in the novel serves to remind the reader and even Winston of the underlying ideological structures that build consciousness.

Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four represents O’Brien as example of the unfitness of totalitarian dictatorship as a way of governing society, and at the same time deems it an impossible kind of authority to truly annihilate. I am not sure if this will mean that ideology will always
have the upper hand where humanity is concerned. For the dystopia, it will, but for the reader’s world — it does not have to be this way. O’Brien is both a reminder of what holds humanity back, and a reminder of what humanity continues to invest in. In light of O’Brien’s dual function, Orwell draws attention to the ways these hierarchical systems will never change because the classes created within that hierarchy will never change.60 As Richard Schmitt explains: “The possibility of a critique of ideology is narrowly connected with the fact that in class societies rival ideologies reflect the dominant and appositional institutions from the perspectives of different classes” (Schmitt 73). Since the point of O’Brien’s authority is to ensure that no rival ideology exists, Orwell sees the impossibility of rebellion where there is no possibility for critique.

Just as Huxley explores through dystopia the nature of modern subjectivity in light of ethical attitudes and beliefs, Orwell puts to the reader the various ways the subject is subject to, transformed, determined by, and made to conform to ideology, INGSOC. Orwell’s consideration of ideology as it shapes the citizens of his imaginary society is wake-up call to responsible
intellectual thought in its reader: a call to reassess the stuff of ideology that subjects are made of. Like Huxley, Orwell is concerned for the future of human existence and uses dystopia as a means to explore the complexities of identity that is formed solely by ideology. Winston’s death at the end of the novel, his final annihilation which occurs when he learns to love Big Brother, does not have to be seen as a despairing elegy for humanity. It can be read as a realization on Orwell’s part that humanity will always meet its fate in death if ideology is the only source of its being. When Winston loses his desire for freedom and identity at the end of Nineteen Eighty-Four he is no longer human, but ruled by those values which make humans walking puppets of ideology who not only die, but desire their own death.
THE VALUE OF DYSTOPIA

CONCLUSION

"The world as a world is only revealed to me when things go wrong."

~Arland Ussher~

The value of Huxley’s and Orwell’s dystopias has yet to be fully discussed by critics of society. In this dissertation, I have attempted to begin a study of how their innovations in the genre of dystopia consider the subject as it comes into being in various ways and challenge our assumptions about what we moderns know or think we know about our own humanity. As a genre dystopia sustains a useful medium to observe humanity and the paradox upon which it is built. From the distance of fiction, we can more easily recognize the realities of our own repressed state and mourn the lost qualities of responsibility and freedom which, when present, serve to impart agency and the possibility of independent existence that is not always ruled by boundaries or laws.

On the one hand, dystopias are melancholic texts. They mourn the loss of the subject and of the human
spirit amid a human arrogance that believes itself to be firmly understood. In its seriousness, dystopia attempts to explore a world where life has been drained away, especially in its melancholic citizens: the herd, the supposed individuals, and the world controllers. The search in dystopia for the semiotic amid “the immense process of the destruction of meaning,” where “he who strikes with meaning is killed by meaning” (Baudrillard 161), seems to leave the citizen of dystopia with no alternative for life, or escape from death.

Yet, for all of their mournfulness, dystopias manage to encourage the reader’s thoughts on the composition of human subjectivity and to arouse a desire for something beyond the emptiness portrayed in the citizens of dystopia. Where dystopia may seem a dead end, it truly provides some small light, a beginning place, a sign of faith that it is possible to recognize what humanity is, even if it is achieved by describing what humanity is not. Dystopia therefore aims toward a truth behind the meaning of human life -- a truth which cannot be bottled up or stored in an ideal created by utopianism -- by challenging the realities that we are unable to recognize as in need of challenge. Dystopia opens our minds to the
reality of our own closed-ness and teaches us how to be wary of the lies of the world (whether they are found in ethics or ideology) which deny humanity the fullness of its existence. As Charles Holmes summarizes from the words of Aldous Huxley:

In our necessary rationalizations of feelings, desires, and moods . . . we employ untranscendental, psychological structures (Beliefs and Actions) and live in watertight compartments, separated by formidable bulkheads, which can be unified only by ironic juxtaposition. (And Wanton Optics)(Holmes 82)

Here Huxley realizes the need to identify the confined and narrow existence which humans sometimes allow themselves to live within, a necessary observation which his and Orwell’s dystopias share.

The dystopian study of the subject also asks whether being a subject is something which is up to us, who is being up to, and whether we still want to be subjects:

If being a human being does not always and inherently mean being a subject, if human beings became subjects only in the course of history, and thus acquired an awareness of their position in the world as knowing and acting subjects, then they must also be capable of leaving this position behind, of abandoning this specific form of self-awareness, or at least of thoroughly modifying it. (Guzzoni 201)

Ute Guzzoni meditates, in his essay "Do we still want to be subjects?," on the possibility that life is more than merely being a subject, for “as subjects individuals have suppressed their own inclinations and needs, while
generalities have excluded those elements which could not be incorporated" (Guzzoni 215). There is a great need therefore, in our modern age, to rethink the nature of our own subjectivity, to ask ourselves whether or not subjectivity is merely a construct created by ethical and ideological beliefs. If dystopia can locate humanity’s tendency to coerce itself into truth -- as when it is blindly faithful to some plausible ethics or ideological belief which lead one astray from reality and the desire for the truth of human life -- then dystopia is not merely a fantasy, or a topsy-turvy-ville which tells us how bad things might be in the future, but a place that provides a means to deal with the present reality of our indifference to truth, and our reluctance to incorporate it and make it present.

Dystopia not only describes how the community acts upon its citizens, how its citizens are unfamiliar with their political/ethical/juridical intellects and wills, and how its citizens are formed by their dependence on power as much their opposition to power -- but also studies contradiction in its own contradictory landscape to emphasize the values of “debate, inquisitiveness, [and] intellectual restlessness” (Davies 212). Dystopia
furnishes its reader with a desire to find the true essence of humankind, and in doing so, accomplishes what is necessary for the future of humanity. That is to say, in its asking of the question of being which allows us to know ourselves dystopia reminds us to open our eyes. What we see is sometimes only what we want to see, and if we are really and truly interested in being humans and not merely subjects, then dystopia reminds us that we have work to do. Our ability to change, improve and progress as humans does not lie in creating for ourselves ideals that keep us ignorant; it lies in our asking of ourselves that dystopian question: what have we forgotten?
1. In his note, Kaufmann is not himself clear about the theme, which he refers to, though I would postulate by the passage he footnotes that it is the theme of culture, and the manner in which it shapes humankind. In this section of On the Genealogy of Morals (I:12), Nietzsche alludes to the world of Homer in which the culture is divided into epochs: “first the epoch of the heroes and demigods”; “then the bronze epoch, the form in which that same world appeared to the descendants of the downtrodden, pillaged, mistreated, abducted, enslaved: an epoch of bronze, as aforesaid, hard cold, cruel, devoid of feeling or conscience, destructive and bloody” (GM I:12, 42).

2. I have chosen to consider Huxley’s Brave New World and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four since they represent the beginning place out of which all other dystopias follow, after Yevgeny Zamyatin’s We. As David Sisk constantly notes, their influence on future dystopias is enormous: “Dystopian writers since 1949 have been forced to locate their works, more or less explicitly, on a spectrum between the archetypes presented by Huxley and Orwell” (Sisk 37-39).

3. On Brave New World Charles Holmes considers, for example, that “selfhood . . . must be allowed and then nourished by culture. John’s suicide, motivated by guilt, symbolizes the fact that in this world no true self can survive” (Holmes 89).


5. One might also note Mikhail Bakhtin’s dialogic understanding of the subject who is both author of itself, and a result of the voice of the other. For a useful introduction to Bakhtin’s work, see Gary Saul Morson & Caryl Emerson’s Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics (1990).
6. Suvin also takes note of Roland Barthes who states, "the plot of utopian fiction is a panoramic sweep conducted along the well-known, culturally current socio-political categories (geography, etc.)" (qtd. in Suvin 39).

7. One paper in favor of dystopia's ability to discuss philosophical issues is W. Andrew Hoffecker's article "A Reading of Brave New World: Dystopianism in Historical Perspective." Hoffecker alludes to the need "to locate dystopian literature in the broad sweep of the history of ideas" and that there is a significant relationship between dystopia and contemporary society's "underlying presuppositions about man" (Hoffecker 46). Hoffecker's article makes this important remark, but only has room for a historical reading of Brave New World that includes a comparison of the novel's philosophical premise with Plato, St. Augustine, and Roger Williams. See Christianity and Literature XXIX (Winter 1980) 2.

8. The irony of being in utopia is the need for the individual to remain in a stasis which does not allow for change or growth. Utopia can function well so long as everything remains as perfect as it is imagined.

9. This term as used by Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault refers to a method of uncovering the hidden and true origins (the history) of apparent knowledge. Foucault explains that the single aim of genealogy is to reveal the "vulnerability to criticism of things, institutions, practices, discourses" (Foucault qtd. in Cook 79). Nietzsche further describes the need for this inquiry in his On the Genealogy of Morals:

I emphasize this major point of historical method all the more because it is in fundamental opposition to the now prevalent instinct and taste, which would rather be reconciled even to the absolute fortuitousness, even the mechanistic senselessness of all events than to the theory that in all events a will to power is operating. (GM II: 12, 78)

10. See the Random House Webster's Dictionary. At the same time, ethics is both a responsibility and an internalization of law whereby one's response to that law is internal - a result of one's conscience. For a more complete study of this see Nietzsche's second essay in On
the Genealogy of Morals, and Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punish for a more theoretical view point of conscience on the subject.

11. This concept of free will arises from the Christian Theology of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. See Augustine's Confessions or City of God, and Aquinas' Summa Theologiae.

12. Kant summarizes the categorical imperative in the following advice: 'Act only on that maxim that you could at the same time will to be a universal law'; and 'Act always so as to treat yourself and others as an end in themselves and not as a mere means' (Kant qtd. in Clarke 311). The problem with Kant's categorical imperative (something which Brave New World also critiques) is the motivation which causes any law to become universal truth. In its most ideal form, Kant looks to this model of conduct as a means to ensure that one acts in accordance with justice, the truth, that reason will "surely" lead to. However, as dystopia recognizes, the categorical imperative can be used in a negative manner which forces individuals to submit to some universal law of "truth" that is not always based in truth or justice. Hence the world of dystopia, where the categorical imperative disguises itself as a universal, "good," unquestionable ethics, but is in reality a ruse for the ethics of Ford's scientism.

For a more complete study of ethics as a means to attain truth, that is, ethics as deconstruction, or deconstruction as ethics, see Simon Critchley's book The Ethics of Deconstruction. This book considers the question of responsibility and the ethical demand, which Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida explore. Also see John Caputo's Deconstruction in a Nutshell, which explains how deconstruction as ethics is hospitable to truth. Derrida rejects ethics as "juridical calculation" (Derrida qtd. in Caputo, DiN 122), and instead, sees ethics as a door that always welcomes the other, a gesture which allows for truth to emerge. This is not to say that Truth is something which might be constantly modified in a meaningless way that deems truth as "anything goes." Rather, Truth is something which might be more deeply understood only when one is open to its fullness. With this in mind, the difficulty with the
Categorical Imperative is that it tends to reduce Truth to an ethical certainty, which rejects any possibility for any truth otherwise. Though I will not expand on Huxley’s own understanding of this idea that humanity is too caught up in the Categorical Imperative, I would like to suggest that his critical method in *Brave New World* may be seen as deconstructive in light of Levinas’s and Derrida’s theories on ethics.


14. See Kumar (pg. 254-256). He provides a context for Huxley’s critique of scientism, and the way that his book was received by scientists themselves who rejected, i.e., “his not seeing the possibilities of atomic energy” (255). It is important to realize that Huxley’s *Brave New World* does not critique authentic science that searches for facts: “starting with particular things, science builds up a structure of universal truths, that is, truths that go beyond the limited number of laboratory experiments on which they appear to be based” (Rothschild 17).

15. If the real is not real, and just imaginary, then it is in need of reevaluation.

16. Judith Butler characterizes interpellation, or the call as something “figured as a demand to align oneself with the law, a turning around and an entrance into the language of self-ascription – “Here I am” – through the appropriation of guilt” (Butler 107).

17. While these two modes (utopia/dystopia) have come to establish themselves as opposites, it is important to note that recent scholars are more sceptical of the validity of the lines separating utopia from dystopia. In one perspective, there exists a clear line of division between the two worlds of dystopia (which is clearly the negative no-place, or horrible society) and the contrasting utopia (or the positive, good place). Yet from a different perspective, any stable definition of utopia or dystopia represents a sheer impossibility where any attempt at calculating a definition becomes peculiarly suspicious. Scholars like Marina Leslie, for instance, regard More’s *Utopia* as having a “much more complexly modulated surface” where “all perspectives are
partial and simultaneous; none predominates and none is entirely consistent" (Leslie 4). In this reading, More's *Utopia* becomes both utopia and anti-utopia (dystopia), thus providing a "prototype for both genres" (Leslie 4). This is an important consideration because any investigation of utopia or dystopia, including this one, should be aware of the ambiguities present in these terms themselves. I therefore raise this point because I do not want to suggest that utopia is not in itself problematic. Even Sir Thomas More's *Utopia* presents the contradictions of citizenship to the reader.

18. Birnbaum also extrapolates from Dr. Sheldon's classification of the individual in terms of psychology as "cerebrotonic, viscerotonic, the somatotonic, and "ideal" (Birnbaum 44). This approach, while fascinating, does not apply here.

19. Though I haven't the space to explore fully Nietzsche's and others' thoughts on modern subjectivity, and the way it is particularly relevant to dystopian concerns (a much larger study might fit in all there is to consider), I hope to begin thinking of dystopia in terms of modern philosophy and use it to understand and theorize each citizen of dystopia more fully.

20. *Beyond Good and Evil*, *Daybreak*, and *Twilight of the Idols* contain similar material which might also be considered. Nietzsche raises his critique of morality throughout the entirety of his work, though these three and *On the Genealogy or Morals* are particularly useful places to consider Nietzsche's ethical and ideological concerns.


22. "Hedonism," Microsoft (R) Encarta. Copyright (c) 1994 Microsoft Corporation. Copyright (c) 1994 Funk & Wagnall's Corporation.

23. Again, see Simon Critchley's *The Ethics of Deconstruction* (1992). Ethical interrogation in Levinas and Derrida refers to the "ethical demand," or the "duty of deconstruction": "One might sketch the movement of
Levinas's thinking . . . by saying that ethics occurs as the putting into questions of the ego, the knowing subject, self-consciousness, or what Levinas . . . calls the Same" (Critchley 4). In this reading, ethics is analogous to responsibility, rather than merely representing some fixed moral system. For Levinas and Derrida, deconstruction is ethical since it provides an event like opening to that "otherness," (the infinity that lies beyond totality, which allows for something like truth to emerge. For Levinas, being does not merely lie in the ego, Being is exteriority (Totality and Infinity 290). In Brave New World the lack of ethical interrogation by most citizens results in their lack of "Being."

24. In this context, where Nietzsche deduces the manner in which the good are "good" only by their own self-labeling, Nietzsche attempts to draw attention away from the imagined notion that one's perception of self-goodness is not non-motivated or concerned with utility, or the desire to really do good. See the first essay in On the Genealogy of Morals, "Good and Evil," "Good and Bad" (GM I).

25. With the help of scientific progression that has spawned a society filled with highly sophisticated technology, the citizens of dystopia are either drawn by the magnificence of its elements (as are the Alpha students who "ooh" and "ahh" at the wonders of human growth in test-tubes), or conditioned to believe in nothing but the facts of Brave New World society's inscrutable, clockwork motion.

26. "So many individuals of such and such a quality" (7).

27. The flaw in this thinking, which also locates the self in a certain pool of knowledge (as seen in the example of the hypnotized Beta) might be explored in Michel Foucault's The Order of Things which contemplates the problems inherent in the rise of the Human Sciences. Foucault describes the way institutions have come to categorize, classify and represent the human, resultanty drawing humans, not toward, but away from an understanding of themselves.

29. Though I am not going to consider the aspect of the body in this study, as wonderful as that would be for this study on subjectivity, I wish to quickly note how Lenina's sense of herself as meat, theoretically speaking, presents her as a subject turned object. She can only posit her own meaning through the meaninglessness of her sexuality which is itself lifeless and controlled by the instinctual desire Brave New Worlders are made to feel. See the scene between Lenina and John pp. 174-179.

30. The rest of this passage is definitely useful to review as well. See pg. 82-85 or all of Chapter VI, Part I.

31. One could go on about her cosmetics, and her room, in Chapters III and XIII which describe how she is a product of her society.

32. This results also from his physical height which makes him a social peculiarity. Shorter than other Gammas, he is not given respect for his Alpha status, and lives with "a chronic fear of being slighted" (58).

33. When Bernard wants "to look at the sea in peace" (81) one might interpret the vastness of the ocean as symbolic of his desire to exceed his conditioning, at least at the beginning of the novel.

I will not expand on this example, but I think that Kant's notion of the imagination would fit in here quite nicely, i.e., the romantic concept of the individual who uses reason to free himself from the grasp of unreason or evil.

34. He may have the opportunity to explore "his creativity" and even selfhood as Nance suggests, but that creativity may be inevitably malnourished in the nowhereland he will have to exist in. Even though the text does not elaborate on the islands, or the nature of their surveillance, it does not elevate the islands as ideal places where creativity or selfhood might be
otherwise explored.

35. I do not assume that any human being could so easily separate itself from the ethic of the community. However, I raise this point about Bernard’s and Helmholtz’s inability to grasp any sense of “selfhood,” in order to draw attention to Huxley’s larger critique of the tendency to displace responsibility when it might instead be assumed.

36. In this short passage, Nietzsche complicates the definition of justice which seems to arise where the belief in “truth” (God here is the figure for Truth) might undermine any other potential truth which might exceed the ONE TRUTH proclaimed. As Nietzsche’s example implies, there is reason for concern with any perspective which fails to see that Truth in its essence cannot be pinned down to one or another model, formula, pattern or understanding of a deity. I would add, that it also forgets to acknowledge the properties of Truth which allow Truth to transcend mere systematization while it at the same time paradoxically remains constant and unchanging, no matter what the time or place in history.

If this is the case, then John the Savage and his ethical truth becomes just as problematic as those uplifted by Brave New World society. When he proclaims, “I’ll teach you; I’ll make you be free whether you want to or not” (194), John’s anger does not allow him to see the great fallacy in this insistence on truth (in the name of justice) which he intends to beat into his listeners. In this frame of reference, the motivation behind John’s philosophy is not unlike that of Mustpha Mond and other world controllers who proclaim, in the names of justice, the goodness the victory of “our Ford.” In both cases, the medium of ethical valuation is abused.

37. This is not to say that Mond should be blamed for Brave New World society and its ethical, political, and juridical attitudes. Huxley is always setting up various traps for his reader to fall into; in the case of Mond, the reader is tested as to whether or not his presence will be seen as the cause of a dead society or the effect - he nonetheless also represents the violence of speaking for the other.


41. Since Doublethink is ingrained in the Oceanic language of Newspeak, it is useful to refer to final appendix of the novel: The Principles of Newspeak (312-326) which states that “The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought impossible” (312). Newspeak prevents heresy, but it also helps the individual to create the illusion of thought which the Party demands everyone have.

42. The debate on this idea that false consciousness is analogous to ideology is expressed by Denise Meyerson in her book False Consciousness. She states that since Engels, “it has been a matter for debate among Marxists whether ideological beliefs are necessarily false, or involve ‘false consciousness’” (Meyerson 4). Meyerson disagrees with either notion, though I am not convinced that one can rule out the notion of ‘false consciousness’ so easily, especially in Orwell’s understanding of how it operates for the individual. The movie, The Matrix (1999) seems to also agree with this dystopian idea that people exist on a certain plane of existence which is not itself real, but false. Jean Baudrillard’s Simulacra and Simulation provides further analysis of this notion. I will allude to Baudrillard later in this chapter.
43. Winston’s point of view, while based in a supposed realism that seems true to the landscape around him, is unreliable; he is not always responding to the world around him in a rational way. Although I recognize this aspect of the novel, I am not interested in denouncing Winston’s perspective so much as seeing him as a camera lens through which the reader might view the other citizens of Oceania. It is through Winston’s deliberations (whether reliable or unreliable) that the various kinds of subjectivity are explored in the text. Since the limited-omniscient narrator reveals dystopia through the descriptions of Winston (whether of his own citizenship or others in Oceania), the reader sides with Winston and approves of his beliefs. His movements are realistically portrayed; this aspect of the text allows the reader to take on Winston’s feeling of the grotesqueness of every single thing he hears, smells, sees, and feels. (This may also be seen as Orwell’s way of testing the reader’s perceptions? Yet even if Winston does not understand everything that he sees, his reactions are useful for thinking about human reaction.)

44. Take for example the first line of the novel, “It was a bright cold day in April, and the clocks were striking thirteen” (3) which foreshadows the ensuing signs of disjointedness in the text that Winston comes to feel: 1) in his desire to communicate with the future; 2) his desire for knowledge of the past which the story of the three rebel men incites (78-84); 3) The way he constantly struggles with Party beliefs as in the example: “Freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two make four” (84).

45. Julia will not be considered in this study since she does not seem to fit the convoluted mold of these deluded people that Winston meets. Julia functions on several levels in the novel, which I haven’t the time to discuss, though I am inclined at this point to believe in her not so much as an example of Orwell’s critique of modern subjectivity, but as a means to provide the reader a way of assessing Winston from an outside perspective. Julia is the only really “sane” individual in the novel since she operates, not on ideology --although she does her best to fake her adherence to it, “if you kept the small rules you could break the big ones” (135) -- but on practical knowledge and instinct: “She obviously had a practical cunning which Winston lacked” (133). (See
Ferns, NU 123 which elaborates on this point). Her presence provides a contrast to Winston and she is in many ways his superior. Although I definitely believe she is a worthwhile character to pursue in terms of an alternative to the sort of “intellectual” way that thinking and therefore selfhood is derived in the novel, since I cannot possibly do justice to her in this short study, I shall sadly leave her aside for now. Another chapter/study of her and Winston’s relationship would probably support a more fruitful exploration of her significance in terms of Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four and the alternatives to the various subjectivities which Winston comes to examine in the novel.

46. Refer to Goldstein’s Chapter I, Ignorance is Strength found in Part II which explains the class structure of Oceania and the reality for the Party member:

Everything about him is “jealously scrutinized. Not only any actual misdemeanour, but any eccentricity, however small, any change of habits, any nervous mannerism that could possibly be the symptom of an inner struggle, is certain to be detached. He has no freedom of choice in any direction whatever. On the other hand his actions are not regulated by law or by any clearly formulated code of behavior. In Oceania there is no law. Thought and actions which, when detected, mean certain death are not formally forbidden, and the endless purges, arrests, tortures, imprisonments and vaporizations are not inflicted as punishment for crimes which have actually been committed, but are merely the wiping-out of person who might perhaps commit a crime at some time in the future. A Party member is required to have not only the right opinions, but the right instinct. Many of the beliefs and attitudes demanded of him are never plainly stated, and could not be stated without laying bare the contradictions inherent in Ingsoc. If he is a person naturally orthodox (in Newspeak a goodthinker), he will in all circumstances know, without taking thought, what is the true belief or the desirable emotion. But in any case an elaborate mental training, undergone in childhood and grouping itself round the Newspeak words crimestop, blackwhite and doublethink, makes him unwilling and unable to think too deeply on any subject whatever. (219-220)

47. See David Sisk’s book on language and dystopia for a discussion of language in Nineteen Eighty-Four.

48. I provide a more thorough investigation of calculation and Nietzsche in my paper, “Nietzsche, Justice and the Limits of Calculation: Untimely
Meditations in On the Genealogy of Morals" found in theory@buffalo (September 2000). The concept of calculation as I mean to use it in this context involves the way the law, as Nietzsche understands it, can be a more threatening entity, which violently imposes undisputable regulations of conduct on the individual. Refer to Endnote 12 in this study.

49. Dystopia, of course, has not quite forgotten this action of the law - but indeed draws attention to it to consider in metaphorical terms the way some modern societies still tend to operate on totalitarian principles, instead of democratic ones.

50. In her work, Judith Butler attempts to describe how power forms the subject, and show how the subject is a subject by virtue of its subjection. She states: "a subject is passionately attached to his or her own subordination" (Butler 6) which helps to describe Parsons’ own love of his subordinate position.

51. See for example Goldstein’s description of the Outer Party members in his book in Part III where he describes their limited knowing (they are not the “brain of the State” (217)); or the Hate Week scene in Part I which describes the way one could “switch one’s hatred this way or that by a voluntary act” (17), an inconsistency always present in the Party members’ limited political understanding.

52. Bernard Crick notes that “from his own experience [George Orwell] deeply believed in the potential moral superiority of the self-taught over the institutionally educated” (Crick 3) as being less inclined to reproduce the beliefs of others.

53. As subjects, the Party members are comparable to Brave New World’s Alphas, who interiorize the ways of society at the cost of losing their own sense of who they are.

54. See Part I, for example, “Winston turned round abruptly. He had set his features into the expression of quiet optimism which it was advisable to wear when facing the telescreen” (6). In passages like these, Winston is
constantly aware of being watched and adjusts his movements to this awareness.

55. Orwell figures the proles as an analogy to the English working class which he describes in his piece on The English People. See “Publication of The English People” in VOLUME XVI I Have Tried to Tell the Truth. Orwell “was commissioned in September 1943 by W.J. Turner” (editor) to write this piece. In it, Orwell contemplates the people of England from a moral, political, and linguistic perspective.

56. Baudrillard’s vision is more pessimistic than Orwell’s. In his reading, the subject is vanquished, as in Oceania when one gets vaporized, becomes non-existent, and turns into an unperson. On the other hand, perhaps the spirit of Orwell’s dystopia provides a precursor to Baudrillard’s understanding of the modern subject and its annihilation as it floats, not in the real but in the hyperreal.

57. O’Brien further explains his position on the proles in Part III Chapter II.

58. I do not go into the ending in Room 101 where Winston believes, “To think, to think, even with a split second left - to think was the only hope” (299). I am not sure whether or not this hope is in vain amidst Winston’s torture, or if it shares Orwell’s continual belief in the need to think against all odds. It is Winston’s final loss of the desire to think which is the great tragedy of this dystopia, though I am not sure if Orwell means to reflect on Winston as a hopeless case or a sign of hope.

59. See his Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy in the section On Greek Art in Its Time.

60. The dilemma of self-loss vs. self-preservation is present in the Party member Winston Smith, who, in contrast to O’Brien, possesses the desire to maintain his humanity regardless of the reality that he is always doomed to fail in his quest: in this nightmare he cannot wake-up. Ideologically speaking, Winston represents the attempted transgressor of the laws of ideology, which hold that subjects are always and already subject. He is the hope of the novel for the reader and the key to the
question of whether or not the spirit of man exists, and Orwell’s archetypal non-hero whose search for Truth is all but a dream. If “the reluctance of workers to struggle to improve their lot does not have to do primarily with ideology but with alienation” (84) then perhaps Winston’s alienation is still a healthy one.
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