The Genealogy of William Wordsworth's Educational Philosophy

"INSTRUCTING SIMPLE CHILDHOOD'S READY EAR"

THE GENEALOGY OF WILLIAM WORDSWORTH'S EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

By

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Abstract

This study, comprising two parts, examines the social implications of William Wordsworth's plea in *The Excursion* for a system of national education. Utilising Michel Foucault's concern with power relationships, I show that in Book IX of the poem the Wanderer constitutes an index to emerging eighteenth-century social forces.

From an assertion that notions of order and discipline inform the Wanderer's discourse, part one moves to a discussion of some Enlightenment philosophers and their educational theories. Concluding with a consideration of some lesser known educational theorists, it introduces Dr. Andrew Bell's "Madras" system of education by which Wordsworth was heavily influenced.

Part two begins with a consideration of Wordsworth's political position. I then draw upon Foucault's notion of "genealogical analysis" to demonstrate that traditional interpretations of Wordsworth prevent critics from recognising the reactionary element in Wordsworth's early philosophy. Following an examination of the poet's concern with social order, the study concludes by showing that Foucault's work on "Docile Bodies" is applicable also to an analysis of eighteenth-century educational institutions.

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Table of Contents

Page

Introduction 1

Part One.

Enlightenment and Counter Enlightenment 6

Part Two.

Education, Order, and Discipline 38

Conclusion 84

Bibliography 86

Introduction

Traditional conservative approaches to eighteenth-century thought see the Enlightenment as the attainment of an intellectual maturity. European philosophers were united in their rejection of the witchcraft and superstition that had impeded scientific discovery, breaking down barriers in both the natural and, what Hume describes as, the "moral sciences" (Gay 8). To provide a fertile environment for learning development demanded pedagogical reform. In England, the underclass, in the main previously excluded from educational benefit, were to be the beneficiaries of methods such as Dr. Andrew Bell's "Madras" system. To what extent pedagogical reform was in fact motivated by the putatively progressive ideals of the Enlightenment is precisely a question motivating this thesis. For the purposes of my argument, the answer to that complex question must begin with another, namely: "What is Enlightenment?"[1] In separate essays written two hundred years apart, essays bearing precisely this question as their title, Immanuel Kant and Michel Foucault provide revealingly different answers, the one forming the basis for a traditional interpretation of the intellectual and social situation of Europe through the later eighteenth and early nineteenth century, and the other opening up a radically different view. It is that view that informs a great deal of what I want to say in this thesis.

I am concerned with the implications of one area of Enlightenment thought, namely the way in which an ostensible concern with educational reform masks the school as an institution

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[1] Foucault, Michel. "What is Enlightenment". *The Foucault Reader*. Rabinow, Paul, ed. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984.

that becomes a location for the exercise of power. The pedagogical theories of philosophers like Kant, John Locke, and Helvetius reflect a concern with order and discipline; their works also portray a desire to mould citizens through the agency of education. It is inevitable that there will be a conjunction of educational institution and disciplinary practice in the service of the state. An awareness of the school as an efficient disciplinary regime evades traditional commentators who see only a desire to ameliorate the condition of the educationally deprived.

Analysing Enlightenment thought on education reveals connections between pedagogical theories and political visions. It is precisely because of these links that *discipline* is important to this study. "Discipline "'makes'" individuals" (Foucault 170). It is not necessary that such discipline be harsh; indeed it takes study to identify its presence at all in some cases. I am interested in reversing that interpretation of discipline that sees as its goal the creation of a conforming mass. I prefer to show how education, with its individual disciplinary attention -- its "humble modalities, minor procedures" (Foucault 170) -- creates and shapes persons that will be useful to the state.

To assist in illustrating the school's significance, I offer as part of this study an analysis of a section of the Wanderer's speech on education contained in Book IX of William Wordsworth's *The Excursion*. To present an alternative reading requires that the philosophical context against which it is written be clearly delineated: hence the reason for separating the study into two distinct parts. Only by identifying the concerns that typify Enlightenment philosophy may the full significance of the Wanderer's vision be recognised. Examining eighteenth-century positions quickly dispels the notion of philosophical unity. Instead of fostering the traditional illusion that the Enlightenment is synonymous with a progression on humankind's developmental curve, we may see it, as does Foucault, as a period typified by an interest in discipline, and its

potential for exerting social power. Consequently, social forces represented by the commercial middle class, the church, and the mobile poor oppose each other. The resolution of these emerging conflicts demands the development of efficient techniques of power. I use the Wanderer as an index to the position of the various social forces. His speech, when given an alternative reading, indicates Wordsworth's endorsement of a specific methodology by which power may be exercised. The study's purpose is to explore the genealogy of Wordsworth's educational philosophy, and the philosophical environment is an integral part of the analysis. It is not that the context of the Enlightenment provides origins from which we may trace specific influences; that is the method of the traditional historian. The philosophical background confirms the existence of conflicting forces that reveal themselves in Wordsworth's work, both poetry and prose.

> - The discipline of slavery is unknown
> Amongst us, - hence the more do we require
> The discipline of virtue; order else
> Cannot subsist, nor confidence, nor peace.
> Thus, duties rising out of good possessed,
> And prudent caution needful to advert
> Impending evil, do alike require
> That permanent provision should be made
> For the whole people to be taught and trained.
> (*The Excursion* Bk. IX 352-360)

The lines above, coming near the conclusion of the Wanderer's discourse on education, assert the necessity for social discipline as a means to maintain an orderly society. To this end a system of national education is being proposed. Superficially innocuous, the quotation, when given an alternative reading, reflects a number of complex issues.

A concern with discipline predominates. The rejection of "The discipline of slavery" reinforces the notion of England's inherent freedom, and the speaker envisages a method by which "The discipline of virtue" may be imposed. Thus freedom is expressed in terms of order

and control. What might otherwise be interpreted as an altruistic approach by which the impoverished would become (at least partially) intellectually enriched is based on a fear of the lower orders of society. Since discipline is being forwarded as a solution to "Impending evil", the inference is that those who would impose it are able to do so. Far from constituting a vision of wider access to educational facilities, a concern with power and its efficient delivery propels the lines. To be sure, these concerns are not readily apparent. They are concealed within the Enlightenment language of the Wanderer's disquisition, and represent the anxieties of a particular social class. Lying beneath the surface of the text are multiple references to "a system of beliefs characteristic of a particular class or group" (Williams 55); in other words, an identifiable, though unreflected ideology informs Wordsworth's verse.

My purpose in examining the topic of education as represented in the Wanderer's speech is to expose the political motivations underwriting the text. I am concerned with the ways in which educational institutions were used as an aid to establishing a conservative notion of social order. In *Discipline and Punish* (DP), Michel Foucault is primarily concerned with the prison system and the degree to which surveillance, or panopticism, evolved within it. My approach to the political inferences in eighteenth-century education is heavily influenced by Foucault's observations. Consequently I will incorporate his interest in the efficient distribution of power in my analysis of the type of educational institution favoured by Wordsworth. As a result I will provide an alternative interpretation to the traditional view of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment which, in the main, sees that period as one of progress, and ignores the evidence that indicates a move toward systematic subjection of society's less advantaged orders.

Considering that much of *The Excursion* was written during the Enlightenment, and that critical opinion seems unified in its support of Wordsworth arguing for the improvement of

the underprivileged in this poem, one must ask whether an alternative approach is justified. To answer that question requires a consideration of the Enlightenment and some of its leading philosophers. An analysis of their positions leads both to an identification of the social context within which Wordsworth wrote *The Excursion*, and a re-evaluation of some of the published criticism regarding Wordsworth's concern for education of the poor.

Part One

Enlightenment and Counter Enlightenment

I

One's view of the Enlightenment is necessarily one of perspective. Philosophers like Kant, Voltaire, and Rousseau were concerned with what they saw as the potential for human emancipation through increased knowledge. Support for their perception has proven to be powerful and enduring -- with some twentieth-century commentators appearing equally as convinced as the thinkers about whom they write. Peter Gay, for instance, in describing the "experience of the eighteenth century" as "'the recovery of nerve'" (5-6), sees its influence as "ubiquitous and irresistible" (11). Frank E. Manuel enthuses that "the eighteenth-century intellectuals raised the curtain on a new world" (1), and Isidor Schneider sees a "secularization of life [which] was accompanied by a general relaxation of institutional ties" (19).

Roy Porter, though, criticises notions that present the Enlightenment as being typified by a broad philosophical consensus. Admitting that "The issue of unity and diversity of the Enlightenment could obviously have been posed from many ... thematic angles: religious, linguistic, topical, and so on" (viii), he chooses to analyse it within a series of national contexts. It remains for Michel Foucault to question the socio-political foundations of what has become known as the Enlightenment movement.

The forces at work within the Enlightenment were many and varied. Although the aims of the period's predominant thinkers may appear to be uniform -- the removal of despots, the reform of education, the denial of the superstition that informs revealed religion --, there is, nonetheless, an identifiable fear of the underclass that influences many of the Enlightenment's

philosophers. Porter astutely remarks, "the Enlightenment in England sought patterns which would embody order" (15). Although Porter's methodology is essentially traditional, his observation regarding order coincides with one of Foucault's major areas of interest. The French philosopher's cultural critique demonstrates that the Enlightenment period was not based on a desire to reveal hitherto concealed truths, but was concerned with the efficiencies and disciplines involved in maintaining the hierarchy of social relations.[2]

Since many of the French *philosophes* were prominent in the European Enlightenment, it appears somewhat fashionable to suppose that France was the birthplace of a clarity of thought that "presented a different view of the physical world, of the nature of man, of society, of religion, and of history" (Manuel 2). Manuel describes France as being "the great continental transmitter" (2) of thought, and Isidor Schneider asserts that "though the contemporary philosophy of England was deeper and its literature richer, intellectually France took, and for many decades held, the lead" (24). The influence of the *philosophes* cannot be denied; nevertheless the ideas for which the French proponents of the Enlightenment have become renowned owe much to earlier English thinkers such as Locke, who had a considerable influence on educational thought.

When considering the period and the ideas with which it has become associated, it is helpful to establish the social class to which the majority of the *philosophes*, both English and French, belonged. Roy Porter asserts in *The Enlightenment in National Context*: "Instead of hypostatizing the Enlightenment as the destiny of Humanity we should see it rather as the ideology of particular articulate elites with defined interests" (7). I would argue that it is the

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[2] See Foucault's later works including, *Discipline and Punish*, *Madness and Civilization*, and *The Birth of the Clinic*.

plural form of the noun that is important here. The changes in thought that would eventually be classified as the Enlightenment comprise the separate philosophical positions of a number of elites. Possibly in Europe the lines of opposition were more clearly drawn. Porter quotes from E.P.Thompson:

> In France the armies of Orthodoxy and the Enlightenment faced each other. But Britain ... was more like a weakly occupied country in which, whenever Orthodoxy had repelled a small frontal attack, it found itself harassed on its flanks, at its rear, and even within its own midst (7).

The military imagery employed by Thompson enhances the confrontational nature of the debate, but to a certain extent it creates something of a false impression. One gets the idea that the British thinkers formed a type of intellectual commando whose colours were not necessarily readily identifiable, whereas their French counterparts were both unified and unambiguous in their opposition to established scientific, political, and religious ideas. The likes of Voltaire were not reticent in their criticisms of the established church and the monarchy, and yet many of their ideas owe little to a humanistic view of the future of mankind. Indeed, the doctrines they espouse are in some cases chillingly close to those embraced by rulers whose despotic approach to the government of the people alarmed many other enlightened thinkers of the day.

Immanuel Kant would argue in *What is Enlightenment?* that "Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage" (85). Foucault, however, exposes the Enlightenment's concern with the development of efficiencies and disciplines that were employed to transform and expand the subjection of human beings -- the creation of what he calls "Docile Bodies" (135-169). In this sense "subjection" includes the construction of the body as "object and target of power" (136); docility, incorporating the required malleability and receptiveness to instruction, arises not only from the imposition of discipline, but also from utilising the information that arises from

seeing the body itself as a subject to be studied. Kant's essay begins by asserting that humankind is trapped by its dependence on those in positions of power whom he calls "guardians" (85). Castigating society for its "Laziness and cowardice" (85), Kant commands his readers to "'Have courage to use your own reason!'" (85). Although he recognises the guardians' influence, it is obvious that he locates the cause of society's lack of freedom within the control of its individual members.

But for Kant both enlightenment and freedom are intellectual states. Foucault examines the ways in which power is employed to create, or substantiate, relations between different social classes. Where Kant speaks of freedom, Foucault analyses "*enclosure* ... the protected place of disciplinary monotony" (141), demonstrating how by the placing of individuals within their own specific spaces -- institutional, social, but also conceptual and discursive -- they may be observed and surveyed. Kant, though, appears not to be concerned with ways in which the class structure may be analysed or its development understood. He sees freedom as society's emancipation from the inability to reason independently. It is because he views freedom in intellectual, not corporeal, terms that he can state "if only freedom is granted, enlightenment is almost sure to follow" (86). Since Kant maintains that freedom does not extend to physical emancipation, he sees the intellectual limitations that arise from the overthrow of established regimes. "Perhaps a fall of personal despotism or of avaricious or tyrannical oppression may be accomplished by revolution, but never a true reform in ways of thinking" (86).

One must constantly recall what freedom represents for Kant. Only by appreciating that freedom extends purely to the ability to think and reason independently within an established social hierarchy can one reconcile the paradox that he poses when he quotes: "'Argue as much as you will, and about what you will, but obey'" (87). The paradox demands to be justified, and

this Kant attempts to do by differentiating between what he calls the public and private use of reason (87). He explains that "Private use I call that which one may make of it in a particular civil post or office which is entrusted to him" (87). When Kant proceeds to illuminate the type of situations where the "private use" is justified a further significance of Foucault's concentration on "Docile Bodies" appears. Kant explains:

> Many affairs which are conducted in the interest of the community require a certain mechanism through which some members of the community must passively conduct themselves with an artificial unanimity, so that the government may direct them to public ends .... Here argument is certainly not allowed - one must obey (87).

The passivity which Kant endorses is doubly significant. Not only is obedience required from those members of the community who are to be governed, but it is required also from the persons who function as the government's instruments of power. In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault shows that the effects of power may be felt differently among the lower orders. Nevertheless, it is power with which he is concerned. Power, regardless of class boundaries, shapes and designs institutions which evolve into locations where that power is exercised. By using Foucault's analysis as an alternative approach to *What is Enlightenment*, we appreciate that what emerges from Kant, and what is vital to the establishment of any bureaucracy, is the moulding, training, and subjection of society's middle orders. Kant devotes a considerable portion of his essay to a consideration of the church's function in society, pointing out the dual responsibility of the priesthood. Arguing that a priest must carry out the private use of reason in delivering official dogma, Kant also allows that "the clergyman in the public use of his reason enjoys an unlimited freedom to use his own reason and to speak in his own person" (88). Interestingly he describes the priesthood as "guardians of the people (in spiritual things)" (88-89), thereby introducing an apparent contradiction into his argument.

Early in the essay Kant describes guardians as those who "first [make] their domestic cattle dumb and have made sure that these placid creatures will not dare take a single step without the harness of the cart to which they are tethered" (85). In what appears to be an effort to deny the power of the church Kant opposes "a society of clergyman ... obligating itself by oath to a certain unchangeable symbol in order to enjoy an unceasing guardianship over each of its members" (89). But it is, after all, the entering into an agreement that is being opposed. Whether or not "unceasing guardianship" is desirable becomes secondary to the consideration that "Such a contract, made to shut off all further enlightenment from the human race, is absolutely null and void" (89). Kant, then, appears to be pre-occupied with the visible form or apparatus of control: "But to unite in a permanent religious institution ... to make a period of time fruitless in the progress of mankind toward improvement ... that is absolutely forbidden" (89-90). He does not consider that in the absence of an agreement the church will still exercise an unequal degree of control. When the power relationships are analysed we see that the concern with the contract prevents a consideration of the church's power that exists with, or without, a written agreement. Improvement is envisaged to be, as it were, a terminal state, an end in itself, the path to which is typified by progression. In "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" (NGH), Foucault, as will be seen later, refutes the concept of development, preferring instead to see history as "a profusion of entangled events" (155). Kant's concept of enlightenment crystallizes one of the differences between what Foucault identifies as "traditional" and "effective" history" (153). "'Effective'" history ... deals with events in terms of their most unique characteristics" (154); it destroys the notion of history as continuity.

The distinction that Kant makes between freedom and liberty becomes even clearer at the essay's conclusion. Opposing greater "civil freedom", he posits that "a lower degree of

civil freedom ... provides the mind with room for each man to extend himself to his full capacity" (92). Earlier in *What is Enlightenment* Kant poses the question "'Do we now live in an *enlightened age*?'" to which he replies "'No,' but we do live in an *age of enlightenment*" (90). For Kant enlightenment denotes not an expansion of civil liberties, but the ability to exercise one's reason. The correlative to restricted personal freedom is the subjection and observation of the individual that such a restriction encourages. Ignored by many commentators on the Enlightenment, the potential to *create* and *construct* subjects interests Foucault.

Nevertheless critical opinion focuses mainly on the perception that many established notions in the realms of Science, Politics, Religion, and Education were being seriously challenged. To a certain degree this is an accurate portrayal:

> It was a time in which philosophers - most of them philosophes - invented new sciences, all of them in the service of man's power over his environment; the Enlightenment was the age of what David Hume called "'the moral sciences'": sociology, psychology, political economy, and modern education (Gay 8).

Ignoring for a moment the implications of Gay's reference to power (a facet of the Enlightenment that he does not develop), a moment's thought will reveal that all of the areas that he mentions are, in some way, interconnected. A belief in scientific truth arising from an increasing interest in empirical observation undermines the doctrines of established revealed religions. This in turn has profound political reverberations; many despotic rulers had relied on the so-called "Divine Right of Kings" to justify both their positions and the abuse of their subjects. Deism, which argued for God's role in creation while challenging notions of God's continuing authority, also exacted an influence. "When God becomes nature, or is so clearly identified with nature that all supernatural interference is incredible, the basis of a divine right of any particular family, caste

or constitution is destroyed" (Stephen 131). Obviously, any challenge to the religious underpinnings of authority had the potential to unleash powerful political forces.

The English philosopher John Locke, whose philosophy bridges pre-Enlightenment and later eighteenth-century thought, can in many respects be viewed as something of a transitional figure. In that the "virtually unitarian" (Jeffreys 32) approach of *The Reasonableness of Christianity* was so fundamentally opposed to the established position held by the Anglican church, Locke may be viewed as particularly radical, and in that respect exerted a larger influence on many of his Enlightenment successors.[3] Much of his work, though, can be demonstrated to have a considerably conservative bias -- a bias influencing philosophers such as Rousseau and Voltaire, whose views of society's less privileged ranks are remarkably similar to Locke's.

Enlightenment saw a change in focus on the part of its ostensibly progressive thinkers. Revolving around humankind's place in the universe, the concern now lay with persons as individuals as opposed to their being *a priori* members of the larger community - physically or philosophically.[4] That is not to say that no thought at all was given to the individual's place in society. On the contrary, Locke was extremely interested in those forces that shaped the larger community of humankind. It is at this point that the boundary between religious dogma and

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[3] "Locke argued that the thinking man must be a believer, precisely because Christianity's central doctrines -- belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, benevolent creator, the duty of obeying and worshipping Him, and so forth -- were all perfectly consonant with reason and experience. Being a Christian was a rational commitment; *but the reasonable Christian was not obliged to accept any feature of traditional faith at which his reason balked. No irrational leaps of faith were required*" (Porter 37 My emphasis).

[4] The concern with the individual leads to the process of "individualization" by which the effects of power are efficiently concentrated. Comments on this aspect of Foucault's work appear later in this study.

political doctrine becomes indistinct. Opposing the established Christian view that we are born in sin and must spend the rest of our lives in an attempt to assuage the inherent guilt, Locke maintained that we are born innocent. This belief is related to his *tabula rasa* position in that the notion of inherent innocence carries with it the parallel belief that humankind is born with no innate feelings. In that respect we are a function of our environment. This has profound political implications, and it was the French philosopher Helvetius who would develop this theory further.

He "thought that education could make man into almost anything, saw all men as endowed with the same bundle of potentialities" (Gay 168). Helvetius brings to the Enlightenment a distinct element of egalitarianism with which Locke was not in agreement. We must remember, however, the context into which he introduced his ideas. If we are born without original sin, then seventeen hundred years of Christian teaching is being challenged. Furthermore, such an approach leaves an enormous imponderable to be considered. If we are not encumbered with sin, into what condition are we then born? What social form does innocence assume? Locke's answer to this is that humankind naturally belongs to the state of Nature.

Locke in his *The Second Treatise on Civil Government* maintains, "A man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another; ... " Proceeding from here to speak of the governing body, the legislative, he admonishes:

> Their power in the utmost bounds of it is limited to the public good of the society. It is a power that has no other end but preservation, and therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects ... Thus the law of Nature stands as an external rule to all men (Penniman 144-145).

The ambiguity that underlies much of Enlightenment thought is evident here. What is immediately apparent in Locke's thinking is that, although refuting the doctrine of original sin, he nonetheless

admits to the existence of a Natural law: It is "external ... to all men". This approach identifies Locke as being far removed from the ranks of later thinkers such as Hume who:

> was able to show ... that reason did not and could not possibly play a part in furnishing any of the ideas upon which our understanding of morality, justice, politics, and religion were founded ... and upon which our sense of moral autonomy depends (Porter and Teich 30).

For Locke the Natural law cannot be refuted and forms the framework within which one's morality is constructed.

He does not try to convince his readers that the state of Nature is the ideal existence for which all should strive. Rather, he is at pains to illustrate that it is the very precariousness of this state that causes man to seek the solidarity of the community, to form "commonwealths." In that Locke restricts his analysis of social development to those with property to protect, he inadvertently, perhaps, reinforces the schism between the social classes. It is property, or rather its protection, that motivates man into forming communities:

> The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property; to which in the state of Nature there are many things wanting (139).

The political significance of Locke's analysis of history is obvious. Humankind voluntarily subjects itself to government. It is a government into which its members unite, and Locke uses this position as a base from which to argue against imposed external rule. Ignoring, momentarily, the implications arising from the property basis of his argument, his position clearly threatens the apologists of despotic rule. There is no room in his argument for government that derives its justification from any notion of divine right. Thus we see Locke subverting the alliance of Church and Throne in his developing political theory. It is a theory that empowers the population. Government, in his view, is "of the people". The community forms itself out of a common desire

to protect what is theirs. The nature of power has, at least theoretically, been transformed to permit the community's participation in governmental decisions.

What is absent, of course, is a remedy for those who have no property, and in this respect Locke's treatise is far from being revolutionary. He proposes no agrarian reform, but talks at length of the conditions that justify ownership of land.

> Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a "'property'" in his own "person". This nobody has any right to but himself. The "'labour'" of his body and the "'work'" of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men (Penniman 88).

There is an apparent ambiguity in his theory. While, on the one hand, he promotes ownership (seemingly justifying the appropriation of title to the detriment of land held in common), there is, on the other, no remedy advanced for those whose situation renders them propertyless.

The *Second Treatise on Civil Government* was published in 1690; the extent to which the notion of socio-political reform was to advance within the next fifty years is evident from the writings of one Morelly about whom "Very little is known ... not even his Christian names" (Manuel 115). He was certainly part of "the extreme radical minority among the *philosophes*" (115), and we shall probably never know the origin of the political influences that acted upon him. What is clear, though, is that his vision of society excludes any notion of property ownership whatsoever: "Nobody will own anything in the Society individually or as an estate, except the things which he is currently using for his needs, his pleasures, or his daily work" (117). His concern is with redistribution, and his "laws" are notable for the predominant use of the imperative: "The territory of each city *will* be as compact and regular as possible, not to form

a landed estate, but just adequate for the subsistence of its Inhabitants" and again: "According to *the sacred Laws*, nothing *will* be sold or bartered among Fellow-Citizens" (120-121 My emphasis).

Whereas the emphasis in Locke is to demonstrate his hypothesis of the Natural law "external to all men", Morelly seeks to reverse society's structure. Locke is concerned to explain the existence of an order that, it seems, merely requires a certain refinement to establish its improvement for humankind's society. He entertains no thought that this law may be broken. Locke looks to the past for models for the future. His treatise is typified by the use of the conditional tense. Envisaging the popularity of America (itself a supposition that is open to political criticism), he imagines that "the possessions that he [Man] could make himself, upon the measures we have given, would not be very large nor even to this day, prejudice the rest of mankind or give them reason to complain ..." (92).

Nevertheless, for all the differences between Locke and Morelly, differences that are too numerous to catalogue here, they share, to a certain extent, one fundamental belief; they both refute any notion of the concept of "Original Sin". Morelly argues that his purpose is "to make evident this first Point of deviation which has always kept our moralists and Law-makers distant from the truth" (Manuel 115). According to Morelly this deviation lies in "the following important proposition: *Man is born vicious and wicked*" (115). This criticism of the established doctrine links two Enlightenment thinkers who, in other ways, are distinctly opposed. Similar consistencies, and also oppositions, manifest themselves in the works of other notable thinkers of the period.

No survey of the eighteenth-century can legitimately omit a consideration of the philosopher who has become the figurehead of European Enlightenment opposition: Rousseau.

The provision of a treatise on his analysis of society and history is the purpose of his *Social Contract*, and some mention of that work is essential when establishing the philosophical framework of the Enlightenment. The work's opening line (which has been variously translated) enunciates the paradox of the human condition as Rousseau understands it: "Man is born free, and yet is universally enslaved" (Manuel 127). The first part of the sentence owes much to Lockean thought on man's being born into the state of Nature. The second part represents a considerable divergence of perception. Rousseau's position relative to other *philosophes* immediately emerges. Locke sees "Men" as joining together in "Commonwealths" for the basic reason that individual property must be protected. This protection requires the submission to government. Rousseau cannot accept the resultant loss of liberty. "To renounce one's natural liberty, is to renounce one's very being as a man; it is to renounce not only the rights, but even the duties of humanity" (132).

In Locke's view it is necessary that human beings form communities because the Natural law that governs the state of Nature is deficient in those areas that would otherwise ensure the regulation of harmonious co-existence: "an established, settled, known law ..., a known and indifferent judge ... power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution" (139). The necessity for such order arises from the bourgeois need to establish and maintain title to property. Property and its possession inform the logic of Locke's argument. Rousseau on the other hand has a decidedly darker view of human nature. Although he holds that we are born free, he argues that we are driven by nothing but self-interest, and that we are governed by "our very nature; [its] first law being that of self-preservation, our principle concerns are those which relate to ourselves" (128).

There is, it must be stated, some agreement between the arguments of the two philosophers that concern the need to abandon one's individual status in favour of some kind of association. There is, for example, a concentration on the individual's belongings. Rousseau tends to echo his English predecessor when he argues that the problem faced by society is:

> To find that form of association which shall protect and defend, with the whole force of the community, the person and property of each individual; and in which each person, by uniting himself to the rest, shall nevertheless be obedient only to himself, and remain as fully at liberty as before (136).

The articulation of the problem seems to define the logical rocks upon which a solution must founder since the process of unification requires the subordination of the individual to the common good.

Locke is less ambiguous on the subject. He expresses the problem's solution in terms of power, asserting that in any type of commonwealth "the legislative ... is not ... absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people. ... For nobody can transfer to another more power than he has in himself" (144). Rousseau appears to move toward Locke's understanding of the situation when he finally states the terms of the contract in its barest form:

> We, the contracting parties, do jointly and severally submit our persons and abilities to the supreme direction of the general will of all; and in a collective body, receive each member into that body as an indivisible part of the whole (137).

I say that he appears to approach Locke's solution because he omits one essential element: the nature of the legislative body. Rousseau neglects not only to define how the "general will of all" is to be ascertained, but also how it is to be executed. Locke devotes a considerable portion of *The Second Treatise on Civil Government* to the envisaged composition of the executive body in a community. Rousseau is content to leave this vital element undefined, other than to state that

the community engendered by common agreement becomes the "sovereign" or "body politic" (Schneider 238).

This lack of definition typifies the ambiguity in Rousseau's work. In fact, in purely legal terms, it is a misnomer to describe his proposed solution as a contract at all. Louis Althusser makes this quite clear in his essay "The Social Contract (*The Discrepancies*)" (Bloom 83-117). Basing his argument on the need for the contracting parties to exist separately and external to the contract being formed, he questions how it is possible for the individuals in the community to receive anything in return for their "alienation" into the larger community (94). That is to say that the consideration given by the individual members is their loss of personal control. As parties to the contract they should receive a benefit for the consideration given. Althusser's point is that no benefit can accrue because the other party to the contract, the community, does not exist prior to the execution of the agreement; the community's existence arises out of the performance of the contract. The solution as proposed by Rousseau is therefore unworkable. Now, what might hitherto have been attributed to intellectual fuzziness becomes a lot more pernicious. Althusser comments on the solution's inviability. "Rousseau knows it, but it is symptomatic that he is content to reflect this singularity of the structure of the Social Contract by masking and *denegating* it in the very terms by which he signals it" (95).

II

Clearly the Enlightenment was concerned with more than the pursuit of pure truth. Foucault concentrates on the political necessity for disciplining the individual as a result of which a more profitable and efficient societal order is to be created. When the broader implications of order are examined in an educational context relative to the poorer classes, the need for control becomes clearer. What emerges is that the Enlightenment was far from being representative of an intellectual revolution in which the lower social classes might anticipate a realistic degree of intellectual and physical emancipation. Rather, Enlightenment, or the possession of "enlightened values" (Porter and Teich 11) was the manifestation of what Porter describes as "hegemony" which, quoting from Hay's "Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law", he defines as "the universality of the law" (11). As such, his understanding of the word (in a political context) seems to be at variance with that of Raymond Williams who explains that "Marxism extended the definition of rule or domination to relations between social classes, and especially to definitions of a *ruling class*" (108). Williams' definition seems more appropriate since, as Porter observes, "The pioneers of Enlightenment were propertied elites" (11). Thus, it then becomes easier to understand the irritation with which these same elites viewed those who would not or could not accept the order into which they were to be formed.

There is, of course, a tremendous irony that emerges here. The very champions of emancipation and free-thinking are governed by their own self-interest. Influenced by radical Enlightenment thinkers, "assertive claims for freedom [were] echoing down the social order" (Porter and Teich 11). The Enlightenment was also a time when "England's free-market economy ... was accelerating by deepening consumption down through the social spectrum" (11). An

attempt was made, therefore, to weave "a fabric of stability" (11) in order to "assimilate as many people as possible within enlightened values" (11). There was little room for those whose religious or social persuasions did not permit their inclusion in the newly enlightened population. "Religious fanatics, obdurate criminals and the idle and undeserving poor mocked the consensus, and so were subjected to what became severe social discipline" (11).

Again, Foucault's observations are illustrative. He demonstrates that social discipline was used, not merely to enforce conformity, but to create the notion of the "abnormal individual" (DP 199). Where Porter sees society's exclusion of those who don't conform, Foucault highlights the relevance to control of "binary divisions" (199): "individualize the excluded, but use procedures of individualization to mark exclusion" (199). The tentacles of discipline extended into all of society's institutions as Foucault demonstrates. There is an indication that underneath the reason and rationality of the Enlightenment there lies a need to establish the existence of an irrefutable order, both socially and philosophically, which does not exclude but categorises those who do not constitute the norm. Foucault, in showing that political and social thought was more conservative than radical in many cases, has illustrated the ways in which the dynamics of power underwent significant and identifiable changes during the eighteenth century. He identifies the body, that is the individual, as the emergent site in and upon which a new political economy of power was being enacted. His analysis is important to this study since much eighteenth- and nineteenth-century thought, hitherto considered progressive and motivated by an interest in reform, can be shown to be propelled by a politically driven desire for social order and discipline.

III

Although I have been attempting to illustrate some of the wider social implications of the Enlightenment, the main concern here is with education. Accordingly, a different perception of the Enlightenment necessitates a re-evaluation of the eighteenth-century's approach to educational theories, methods, and institutions. In this section, an examination of Locke's *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* will lead to a consideration of the debate on public and private education. Citing various positions taken by Locke, Kant, and Rousseau, I will demonstrate the influence exacted on their theories by the growing concern with efficiencies and disciplines. These are fundamental elements to Foucault's critique of the eighteenth century, and I will employ his perspective to illustrate the political significances of the philosophers' positions.

Locke's *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* was an influential work which "enjoyed lasting influence in Britain and on the Continent" (Gay 35). However, it would be incorrect to expect from it a technical treatment of pedagogy, and it should be read as a collection of thoughts. Although he was qualified in such diverse areas as medicine and economics, Locke's practical experience as a teacher was limited, his exposure arising from some periods during which he was employed as a tutor. Nevertheless, in his treatise there are many "references to occasions when Locke ... observed specific behaviour by children, and parents' attitudes towards them" (Yolton 6), and it seems that he bases his theories on the results of close empirical examination.

Some Thoughts Concerning Education arose from a series of letters that Locke wrote to his "close friend, Edward Clarke and his wife [who requested] some advice on rearing their son" (Yolton 5). Locke's theories and advice are coloured by the social position of his

correspondent, and many of his suggestions are not applicable to the families of lesser means, let alone the increasing numbers of the poor and disadvantaged in eighteenth-century England. For example, when defining the ideal tutor for Clarke's son, Locke advises:

> In all the whole Business of Education, there is nothing like to be less hearken'd to, or harder to be well observed, than what I am now going to say; and that is, that I would from their first beginning to talk, have some *Discreet*, *Sober*, nay *Wise* Person about Children ... I think this Province requires great *Sobriety*, *Temperance*, *Tenderness*, *Diligence*, and *Discretion*; Qualities hardly to be found united in Persons that are to be had for ordinary salaries ... (Locke 148).

He then proceeds to counsel Clarke that the expense in finding and maintaining just such a person is justified by the eventual attainment by the child of a "good mind, well principled, temper'd to Vertue and Usefulness, and adorned with Civility and good Breeding" (148).

Locke does not extend to the children of the labouring poor the same concern with the need for education; he "stressed the part which the children played in forming the national deficit" (Jones 29). Commenting on the large size of the families of the labouring classes, Locke held that "their children were an ordinary burden to the parish" (29). Admitting that such a social encumbrance terminated with the entry of such children into indentured employment, he nevertheless complains that "from babyhood to apprenticeship they were usually maintained in idleness" (29). Curiously, this "idleness" does not appear to be either recognised, or viewed as a cause for alarm in *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*. In *John Locke: Prophet of Common Sense* M.V.Jeffreys observes that the philosopher "calls *idleness* 'this sauntering humour'" (82). Locke implies, initially, that idleness may be an affliction. His use of "humour" indicates a reluctance to distance himself from the pre-Enlightenment belief in the influences of the Cardinal

humours over one's behaviour;[5] Jeffreys, however, omits to explore the implications inherent in the euphemism that Locke employs. Locke's view of the "idleness" that he observes in the children of the labouring poor is harsh and judgemental, and, significantly, he frames his complaint in economic terms.

Economy and efficiency are key elements in Foucault's analysis of the Enlightenment. He identifies discipline as being grounded in the need to achieve the highest efficiency in terms of movement and production. It is not accidental that Locke's educational philosophy, demanding, as we have already seen, a strong disciplinary component, should be complemented by a socio-political perspective that categorises the population by reference to its relative economic utility. There is a cost involved to the parish and the inference is clearly that the wealth both of the property owning elite and the emerging bourgeois middle class is being drained by the presence of these wretches in the community. There is little evidence of the human charity that we might expect from Locke toward the offspring of the families who provide the pool of labour from which capital is amassed.

The child who is lucky enough to be raised in accordance with the ideas in Locke's essay is not so strictly admonished. Instead, the "sauntering humour" and "listless carelessness" (Locke 186), although not praiseworthy, do not convey in their tone the same degree of censure. The observation implies an almost gentlemanly air of condescension and forgiveness. The children of the poor are judged as being idle by virtue of their very existence, whilst more economically advantaged children are given considerably more latitude. In their case the Father

[5] Locke's assertion that this "humour" is "one of the hardest to be cured where it is natural" (82) establishes idleness as potentially curable in economically privileged children. He does not extend the possibility of cure to the poor.

should "carefully observe", determining whether the indolence is a part of the child's nature or whether it is merely a reaction to the activities in which it is engaged. If the latter, then, says Locke, "I think it may be easily cured. If it be in his Temper, it will require a little more Pains and Attention to remedy it" (Locke 186).

There is a marked degree of difference in the level of understanding extended to the children of the different classes. Both in language and approach the social contours continue to be firmly delineated. Initially we may be surprised at this apparent contradiction in attitudes. When M.V.C. Jeffreys describes Locke as bringing "to a clear focus the new spirit of empirical enquiry that was destined to revolutionize philosophy and science, and, with them the theory and practice of education" (vii), we may expect a more enlightened approach to children of all backgrounds. That "Locke taught that man was not flawed by original sin" (Porter and Teitch 10) also suggests that the philosopher might extend a degree of Christian understanding to the underprivileged. Nevertheless, in Locke's view, as Peter Gay writes, "the vulgar were, and would doubtless forever be, prey to passion and superstition; reason was beyond them ... For Locke, education was designed not to subvert, but to confirm, the class system" (518-519).

Central to Locke's approach is his concept of *tabula rasa*. The mind, which he sees as a blank sheet, is influenced by all to which it is exposed. In other words, the human being matures, in the intellectual sense, by virtue of the effect of the experiences upon the developing mind which at birth is, metaphorically speaking, devoid of relevant detail. For Locke, these experiences constitute education in the broadest sense. He sees the object of education as being "Vertue then, direct Vertue, which is the hard and valuable part to be aimed at ... All other

Considerations and Accomplishments should give way and be postpon'd to this" (Locke 132).[6] From this it is quite apparent that Locke's concept of education has a distinctly moral content. There is more to his purpose than the instilling of facts and raw knowledge; "education for Locke provides the character formation necessary for becoming a person and for being a responsible citizen" (Yolton 3). The character formation that Yolton recognises anticipates the emphasis that Wordsworth places on the training of the population. Locke's treatise is not a mere statement of pedagogical theory; the conformity that is essential to his single-mindedness requires the imposition of the discipline that Foucault has analysed in such detail.

The eighteenth century also witnessed an ongoing debate concerning the relative merits of private and public education. It soon becomes apparent, however, that what propelled the argument was an underlying desire to create a particular kind of citizen. Rousseau could be unequivocal in this respect. Giving advice regarding "the reform of the Polish government" he opines, with a distinctly autocratic sentiment, "It is education which must shape their minds in the national mould, and which must direct their tastes and their opinions, till they are patriotic by inclination - by instinct - by necessity" (Curtis 267).

Kant, for his part, places a high value on discipline in the educational process. "By discipline men are placed in subjection to the laws of mankind, and brought to feel their constraint. This, however, must be accomplished early" (Kant 3). When Kant specifically addresses the opposing concepts of public and private tuition his treatise initially seems ambiguous, or even irreconcilable.

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[6] For Foucault, "Virtue" signifies a certain strategy on the part of the writer. This concern is addressed in connection with the Wanderer's discourse in section II of the second part of this study.

> Education is either *private* or *public*. The latter is concerned only with instruction, and this can always remain public. The carrying out of what is taught is left to private education. A complete public education is one which unites instruction and moral culture. Its aim is to promote a good private education (24).

But "public" and "private" have a special significance for Kant in terms of one's freedom.[7] The repetition of the words in the context of so vital a topic as the nation's education is surely not coincidental. One's duty in the private sphere is, according to Kant, to obey. Thus the distinction between "instruction" and "what is taught" is suggestive. Obedience is the foundation of the educational structure that Kant foresees. Importantly, "Instruction in the practical matters of life - to act with wisdom and discretion - [are] the work of the private tutor or governess" (30). By virtue of the private nature of this instruction with its implicit suggestions of obedience, the individual "is educated as a citizen" (31). The importance of "the public use of one's reason" (87) that Kant expounds in *What is Enlightenment* has now become, apparently, submerged in the necessity to create a subject "of value to his fellow citizens" (31).

As part of his treatment of private and public education, Kant considers the suitability of home tuition. He sees the difficulty that arises from "the division of authority between parent and teacher" (25) as mitigating in favour of "parents [surrendering] the whole of their authority to the tutor" (25). Locke on the other hand, as M.G.Mason demonstrates in "John Locke's Proposals on Work-House Schools" (Ashcraft 269-280), perceives the onus of responsibility to rest with the parents. Mason quotes from Locke's *Second Treatise on Civil Government*: "The nourishment and education of their children is a charge so incumbent on parents for their children's good that nothing can absolve them from taking care of it" (274). Locke makes no specific mention of the obvious necessity to ensure that the parental

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[7] This topic is dealt with in section II.

responsibility is being met. This requirement infers consideration of the establishment of a parallel system of surveillance and measurement. Foucault sees an extension of an apparatus of analysis by which it is "possible to supervise the parents, to gain information as to their way of life, their resources, their piety, their morals" (DP 211). The control of parents may not have concerned Locke; however, the potential to embrace the family unit within the discipline of power relations did not escape the attention of later educationalists. The administrators of charity schools quickly saw the possibility of subjecting parents to periodic examination as a condition of their childrens' continued attendance at the institutions.

What begins to emerge, then, is the realisation that the debate over private and public education arises from the need to achieve the most efficient method of subjection. Kant's suggestive employment of "public" and "private" indicates his concern. The problem for him is one of economics. Certainly the educational environment is important (witness his comments on home education), but an anxiety over costs and efficiencies subordinates a consideration of the location of the educational process. Kant recognises that "There cannot be many [educational institutions] since the fees must of necessity be high" (24), and he laments "If only parents ... were well educated themselves, the expense of public institutions might be avoided" (25). He would clearly prefer a public system -- "I am inclined to think ... public education is the best" (25-26) -- but must accept the less efficient method represented by individual tuition at home.

Economics are also of interest to Rousseau. In apparent contradiction to his comments to the Polish government he states: "We see, on every side, huge institutions where our youth are educated at great expense, and instructed in everything but their duty" (Curtis 272). Admittedly his criticism was written some ten years before he offered his expertise to the Poles, and one's ideas can, of course, change. However, it seems more likely that despite the

predominant argument of the *Emile*, and his caustic comments on large educational institutions, Rousseau was concerned with the cost and efficiencies of delivering education. That the pupils are not receiving instruction in their "duty" makes the expenditure all the more unpalatable.

Creation of a subject infers the need to observe, analyse, and correct. Kant recognises the necessity to experiment in the pursuit of establishing the ideal school, and presumably the ideal subject. "*Experimental schools* must first be established before we can establish *normal schools*" (21). Kant's description of an experimental school is imprecise, limiting his portrayal to "one in which the teachers were free to work out their own methods and plans, and in which the teachers were in communication with each other and with all the learned men of Germany" (23). Quite obvious is the fact that the benefits of experimentation pertain to the teachers, those who exercise the power. The instructors "were free to work out their own methods and plans", but the extent of the effect on their charges is not mentioned. That an experiment was being conducted suggests the need to gather information. While the schools may be envisaged as experimental, it is the pupils upon whom the experiments are actually performed. Thus subjected, they become part of an observable and analysable population. Their visibility is mandatory. Kant's vision forms part of what Foucault calls the progression in "the construction of those 'observatories' of human multiplicity" (DP 171). The gathering of data and knowledge serves to reinforce the machinery of control, the significance of which would not be lost on those who would later develop "radical" systems of education.

The nature of the "subject" as envisaged by Locke, Kant, and Rousseau is essentially passive. The pupils are materials to be moulded in the interests of the state. One can appreciate the efficiency with which Kant enlists the pupils themselves to assist in the process of their own subjugation. It is not necessary to make the subject completely dependent: "The will of children

... must not be broken, but merely bent in such a way that it may yield to natural obstacles" (Kant 54-55). Presumably a population consisting of those whose spirit has been destroyed would be an impediment to the efficient realisation of national ambitions. "Breaking a child's will makes him a slave, while natural opposition makes him docile" (57). The subtlety consists in Kant's envisaging docility. A docile body is useful; it "may be subjected, used, transformed, and improved" (DP 136). A broken-willed body suggests the need for those who would direct it to give continuous guidance. The destruction of will is, therefore, in the long run inefficient since it requires a concentration of valuable resources to ensure its compliance with direction; by their formation into "Docile Bodies" the subjugated act as agents of their continued subjection.

The realisation that utility could be extracted from such a body did not, apparently, escape William Wordsworth. In Book IX of *The Excursion* he parallels the politico-conservative thought that typifies the educational theory of Kant and others. The Wanderer's stated desire for a system of national education conceals an emerging interest in social engineering by means of which the poor may be enlisted to further Britain's imperial ambitions. The necessity to his vision of "allegiance" (295) and the assertion that those who are to be educated are "born to ... obey" (297) reinforce the image of docility that the system demands.

In terms of the educational debate, then, the Enlightenment is notable for an apparent concentration on reform of established educational methods. The theorists of the time agreed in some cases, differed in others, and, as has been illustrated, displayed a disconcerting ambiguity in many areas. An element of conservatism runs through much of their thought, there being a readily identifiable correlation between the various goals of education (development of virtue, morality, and duty for example). Lending itself to a particular kind of socio-political manipulation, this conservatism manifests itself in a lack of concern with the children of the poor.

When the country's economic difficulties can be blamed on the existence of the poor in society, it is easier to justify their exclusion from the benefits afforded by a more accessible system of education. Hence arguments in favour of ensuring that the children of the poor form part of the workforce as quickly as possible gain currency. The perception that the poor are a resource to be used in the furtherance of the country's economic goals, domestic and international, results in educational institutions that conceal the necessity to create "Docile Bodies" to be used in the nation's service. From a modern perspective it might initially appear that the availability of education at all levels of society is a laudable idea. It was obvious, nonetheless, to those in positions of power that an educated lower class could also prove to be a destabilising influence. Although he offers neither criticism nor condemnation, Gay recognises the tensions in the eighteenth century: "As society grew more complex ... the respectable classes resisted the aspirations of the lower orders" (35).

I have been demonstrating that the concern of many Enlightenment philosophers with education was propelled more by a need to maintain the social status quo through efficient indoctrination than by a desire to broaden the environment in which ideas could be challenged. Gay observes that "The philosophes were well aware that education was of strategic importance for their political and social thought" (501). The benefits arising from the more elevated pedagogical theories seem to be reserved for the children of those social classes best able to afford their purchase.

IV

The discussion on European educational thought forms a context within which to examine the practice of education in England. Seen by so many commentators as evidence of a movement toward pedagogical reform, the emerging systems of national education may be shown to be part of an overall social machinery that was more concerned with subjugation and indoctrination than enfranchisement and enlightenment. Although philosophers such as Locke are remembered for their contributions to English pedagogical theory, there were many lesser known practitioners and theoreticians who were deeply involved in the delivery of schooling in the eighteenth century. The Reverend Dr. Andrew Bell published his *Instructions for Conducting Schools on the Madras System*; Mrs. Trimmer who authored a widely circulated tract entitled *An Essay on Christian Education* also wrote instructional texts that were in use in many schools; and a number of sermons were preached that had as their central theme the connection between education and the official religion. One of the better known examples of this latter type of treatise is that delivered in St. Paul's Cathedral by the Reverend Herbert Marsh.

What becomes immediately apparent from a study of these various texts is the connection that is forged between the ostensible aims of education and the needs of the state. The Reverend Bell ties both neatly together when he defines his perception of the goal of education: "the ultimate object or end of all education, is to make good men, good subjects, and good Christians" (3). The methods which the Reverend proposes to achieve his goal are interesting to note. Published over thirty years after Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*, the content of the guide to the Madras system shows a remarkable allegiance to Smith's principles of the division of labour on the one hand, while, on the other, anticipating the necessity of constant observation

to efficient control that Jeremy Bentham would later recognise. Noting in his pamphlet on the Madras method that "This system rests on the simple principle of tuition by the scholars themselves" (3), Bell also describes the significance of the school's hierarchy. The responsibility for initial instruction is divided among a teacher and an assistant, the inspection of the school being the province of the usher and sub-usher. Maintaining a watch on the school room is "The schoolmaster" (7).[8] In case Bell's readers miss the point that observation is essential to control, he reminds them "*Last of all comes the Superintendent, or trustee, ... whose scrutinizing eye must pervade the whole machine* ..." (7-8). The crucial element in the description is that the superintendent's "eye" pervades the institution. His supervision is, therefore, not merely externally imposed, but is an integral part of the operation. The superintendent is a *panoptic* presence; his purpose is "to induce in the [children] a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power" (DP 201). While it is efficiency that informs the system's description the economy is one of the body. Each individual student receives attention, but there is an absence of a sense of movement in Bell's design. As Foucault points out in his study of "Docile Bodies", "a subtle coercion" (137) was being exercised. That the pupils' "life and motion" derives from the behest of the schoolmaster is evidence of the "infinitesimal power over the active body" (137) that the official possesses. An examination of the psychology which informs the Madras system reveals that a harsh physical discipline was not necessarily the remedy of first resort when dealing with offending pupils. Bell writes:

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[8] See Part two, pages 111-112 for a fuller treatment of this official's function.

> It is not to be forgotten that temperate and judicious correction, which need not be dispensed with, is far more effectual than that which is intemperate and severe, and ought seldom to be inflicted; that praise, encouragement, and favour, are to be tried before dispraise, shame and disgrace; ... and even solitary confinement to severe flagellation. But at all events, the authority of the master must be maintained by discipline, in one shape or the other (14).

Regardless of the elements of humanitarianism that surface in Bell's report, the suitability of his otherwise rigid system is clearly stated in the report of April 7 1807 from the trustee of the Parochial Charity Schools of St. Mary's, Whitechapel: "it is particularly adapted to instil into, and fix practically in the mind, the principles of our holy religion" (9).

Although, in many instances, the influences of other Enlightenment thinkers can be seen in the practical administration of such schools that existed, one of the persistent concerns lay with the cost of administration. This concern can be inferred from the enthusiasm with which Smith's division of labour principles were employed in the Madras system. The advantages, according to Bell, are expressed in even more readily accessible economic terms when he states:

> In every instance, it is by this system, the tuition by the scholars themselves, that the success and economy of which it boasts are to be attained; and wherever this system is not adopted, let the processes be what they may, the same success and economy cannot, in a very large seminary, be attained (30).

Obviously, a school affords an opportunity to contain and control a large and impressionable segment of the population. It has been remarked that "the eighteenth century was marked by a very real sense of pity and responsibility for the children whose physical and spiritual interests were lamentably neglected" (Jones 4). That a spirit of benevolence motivated much of the movement for change is no doubt true, but there is another level at which the growing interest in the provision of education for the poor may be engaged. *An Account of Charity Schools in Great Britain and Ireland* contains the following paternalistic observation. "It is manifest, that a Christian and Useful education of the Children of the POOR, is very necessary to their Piety,

Virtue, and honest Livelihood" (3). This document then proceeds to reflect the concern of established authority with a vagrant, potentially mobile and organised section of the populace:

> 'Tis also plain and evident, That Piety, Virtue, and an honest Way of Living, are not only of absolute Necessity to their Happiness both Here and Hereafter, but are necessary also to the Ease and Security of all other People whatsoever: For as much as there is no Body but may stand in need of their Help, or be liable to receive injuries from them (3).

Foucault has commented upon the function of discipline regarding the itinerant section of the populace: "one of the primary objects of discipline is to fix; it is an anti-nomadic technique" (DP 218). We shall have cause to recall this when analysing the Wanderer's discourse on education in *The Excursion*.

There is a distinct irony evident when comparing such schools with Kant's view of the purpose of the ideal educational establishment. The objective in the English system (as mentioned in *An Account of Charity Schools in Great Britain and Ireland)*, is "that this school may not only serve for the instruction and benefit of the children, but also of their parents, particularly of such as cannot read" (7). The facility for observation that this affords, and which for Foucault is such an important part of eighteenth-century social evolution, remains unarticulated. It is implicit, however, in the requirement that parents demonstrate their progress by reading to the inspectors the Church of England catechism.

Thus the religious, educational, and conservative beliefs of the dominant class were impressed on the lower social orders through the agency of the charity school movement. Not only would the pupils be clothed, but they would also receive instruction in the country's official religion. The insistence on religious education in the one official denomination seems to be more concerned with the deflection and erasure of dissenting or non-denominational attitudes rather

than with a genuine benevolence toward the poor. This attitude prevails in portions of the Reverend Herbert Marsh's *Sermon Preached in St. Paul's Cathedral, June 13, 1811 on the National religion the Foundation of National Education.* He leaves no doubt concerning his position regarding the necessity to promote a Church of England educational system seeing his position as being justified by law. "The plan therefore of conducting a *Church-of-England* education is very clearly prescribed, and prescribed also by authority" (4). This approach serves a double purpose, for not only does it promote conformity, but it also makes "the abnormal individual" (DP 199) readily identifiable. In a society where a particular religion has national sanction, those who stand outside its confines are more easily observed. Furthermore, they are constantly aware of the observation to which they are subjected, and this in turn exacts a measure of control over their behaviour. Marsh is rigorous in his condemnation of Dr. Bell's Madras system in that, as he perceives the situation, religious instruction has had to give way before an overall concern with economic efficiency; for Marsh, the protection of the Church of England's teaching is vital to the continuance of the State itself. Not only does he argue (albeit somewhat obliquely) for a continuance of the church's paternal power, but he also categorically confirms the importance of the connection between the State and its official religion:

> Now whether men consider religion as merely an engine of the State, or regard it also, as they ought, for its own excellence and truth, as the means of obtaining happiness in another world, they must in either case admit, that its alliance with the State implies utility to the State .... By detaching men from the church we create divisions in the State, which may end with the dissolution of both (38).

This, then, is the background against which Wordsworth wrote the Wanderer's speech. Whatever the influences might be that are reflected in the poem, it now requires that his references to education, both explicit and implicit, be examined in an attempt to define his true position.

Part Two

Education, Order, and Discipline

I

By far the predominant opinion in Wordsworth scholarship is that the poet commenced his career by writing as a political radical only to regress into a conservative position as he grew older. Since I will argue that elements of conservatism either existed, or were indicated, in much of Wordsworth's early work, it is necessary to determine in what sense he appears radical to some critics. A considerable amount of Wordsworthian criticism focuses on the revolutionary aspect of Wordsworth's poetics. It is, however, the purely political interpretation that interests me, and I concentrate on some modern critics that have commented on the socio-political aspects in his work. Nevertheless, it is, initially, interesting to note how William Hazlitt, one of Wordsworth's contemporaries, saw the political influence on the poet's work: "It [his poetry] partakes of, and is carried along with, the revolutionary movement of our age: the political changes of the day were the model on which he formed and conducted his poetical experiments" (139).

Twentieth-century critics Carl Woodring and Arthur Beatty clearly identify the political radical in the early Wordsworth. Woodring defines the poet's radicalism thus:

> he was working for the removal of political injustice, ... he anticipated no good from king or aristocracy, and that he expected general happiness to flow from change in the forms of government and society (89).

Similarly Arthur Beatty remarks that Wordsworth "was soon thrown into anger by the declaration of war against the new republic of France ... and in his resentment against his country he went

so far as to hope for her defeat" (23). Arguing that one of the reasons "why Wordsworth adopted Godwin as his guide is the revolutionary humanitarianism which pervades his writings" (25), Beatty also comments on Wordsworth's radical company. "We know that he associated with companions of a distinctly revolutionary turn of mind ... and it was the most natural thing in the world that [he] ... should turn for comfort to the *Political Justice* of William Godwin" (23).

Wordsworth's early prose writings provide fertile ground for those who categorise him as a political radical. One of Wordsworth's earliest political tracts was his unpublished "A Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff". Written in 1793, it is cited in many Wordsworthian studies as an example of political radicalism, Alan Liu describing it as "The single most violent work [Wordsworth] ever attempted" (184). The letter attacks Bishop Richard Watson's criticism of the direction of Revolutionary France. While I will be showing later that Wordsworth's letter is not as revolutionary as might at first be supposed, Mary Moorman uses Watson's criticism and Wordsworth's response to reinforce the notion of the radical poet. Wordsworth's letter, according to Moorman, arose from "the Bishop of Llandaff's smug defence of the unjust social order" (150). Asserting that the letter "was largely an attack on monarchy" (226), Moorman, in her biography of Wordsworth's early years, repeats her perception of the poet's political radicalism when she states "from the system associated with [monarchy] arose those social evils which disgrace the nation" (227).

Carl Woodring quotes another of Wordsworth's letters, this time written to William Matthews in June 1794. Using it to further his argument that "Wordsworth regarded himself as a republican" (89), Woodring excludes a section of the letter in which Wordsworth dwells on what he sees as a need for social discipline. Perhaps because Wordsworth speaks in his letter of "political justice" (Shaver 124), critical commentary has been concerned with the links between

his political sentiments and those of William Godwin.[9] The poet's language in this part of the letter indicates an element of authoritarianism that Woodring seems anxious to conceal. I will have reason to return to the letter to Matthews later in this chapter.

It is just as important to understand the way in which Wordsworth is seen by some critics to move toward a more conservative position. The commentators that I have cited in connection with his "radicalism" all share the same approach in that they try to establish the poet's early political position as being unequivocally radical. In other words, they are trying to establish the origin of his socio-political thought. Comparing his early work with that of his later years, these critics purport to show a movement from, as it were, left to right. Such an approach conforms to that of the traditional historian who defines change "in terms of a linear development" (NGH 139). The traditional approach is then to determine when the initial change in Wordsworth's political sympathies occurred. Examining Godwin's influence on Wordsworth, Nicholas Roe, for example, attempts to confirm the exact moment when Wordsworth's support for the French Revolution dissipated: "Wordsworth dates his own experience of betrayal precisely to February 1793, and the outbreak of war between France and Britain" (2). Not surprisingly, Woodring is also one of those critics that see a distinct change in Wordsworth's politics during the course of the poet's life. "The greatest change of outlook reflected in Wordsworth's later poetry is a movement toward order ... he moved toward an endorsement of order and coherence" (145).

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[9] In the edition of *The Letters of William and Dorothy Wordsworth*, revised by Shaver, the editor reminds us that the phrase, "Political Justice" was "given new currency by the publication of William Godwin's *Political Justice* in Feb. 1793" (124).

One of the most emphatic assertions regarding the poet's political views opens F.M.Todd's *Politics and the Poet*: "This book is the result of an attempt to investigate and document Wordsworth's notorious change of political heart" (11). Todd initially argues "that [Wordsworth's] poetry and its ideals were initially the product of ... a politically radical fervour" (12). Interestingly, he then posits that Wordsworth

> himself realised that the superficial liberalism of the *Lyrical Ballads* concealed all the elements of an outlook essentially conservative, essentially at variance with the philosophy and practice of political liberalism as the nineteenth century was to develop it (12)

In comparison to the other critics that I have quoted, Todd appreciates to a much greater extent the latent conservatism in Wordsworth's early work. And yet Todd's procedure is still traditional in that it is "an explanation of ... Wordsworth's political development" (12). This approach is the natural result of a methodology that compares beginnings and endings, origins and terminations. Todd's analytical method arises from his concentrating on what he sees as the symptoms of change. In his desire to inscribe Wordsworth's undeniable progression Todd must impose order instead of accepting the continued presence of conflicting forces in Wordsworth's work.

A need to confirm a distinct change in Wordsworth's political thought motivates those commentators who see in *The Excursion* an altruistic apologia for a system of national education. Such critics are prone to argue that the work represents something of a transition point in Wordsworth's life, that despite his identified conversion to conservatism there are still indications of a motivation to effect social change. This is the view held even by those critics who are most sensitive, methodologically speaking, to conflicting forces in Wordsworth's work. David Simpson, for example, maintains that *The Excursion* "was intended as a major public statement,

a long poem addressing topics of great public concern" (8). It is hard to disagree with the notion of the work being a major statement; whether or not it was of great concern to the public, or more so to the poet himself, is open to debate. In a letter dated 25 December 1804, Wordsworth writes to Sir George Beaumont advising that his "poetical labours" include a project "to express in verse my most interesting feelings concerning Man, Nature, and society" (Shaver 518). There seems to be more than a hint of Wordsworth performing a didactic role conforming to his expressed view that "Every great poet is a teacher: I wish to be considered as a teacher -- or as nothing" (Wordsworth Memoirs 167).

II

In *The Excursion* it is the Wanderer who, in the broadest sense, is the educator, but to view him as a one-dimensional apologist for improved education is to ignore his larger significance. He should be used to identify the existence of opposing philosophical forces that make necessary the development of pedagogical systems such as "Madras". Then we are better able to recognise the Enlightenment not "as the final term of an historical development" (NGH 148), but as a period in which various social forces are brought into play. In "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History", Foucault considers *Entstehung* or "*emergence*, the moment of arising" (148), stating that "Emergence is always produced through a particular stage of forces. The analysis of the *Entstehung* must delineate this interaction ... " (148-149). It is precisely this delineation that is ignored by viewing the Wanderer purely as an apologist for improved education. If we can see the Enlightenment as *Entstehung,* recognising, as does Foucault, that "Emergence is thus the entry of forces" (149), then we can recognise also that the Wanderer is much more than a quaint reactionary character. The result of examining his educational philosophy is to establish him as a location across which competing meanings form oppositions. Recognising the social forces that are revealed permits us to interpret the class struggle in a way different from Marx who sees it in terms of the relations of production. In *The German Ideology* he argues, "Empirical observation must in each separate instance bring out empirically, and without any mystification and speculation, the connection of the social and political structure with production" (Feuer 246). However, once we recognise that inter-class oppositions arise as much from a desire for power on the part of the lower orders as the dominant class's desire to subjugate, our approach to the class struggle deviates from Marx's interpretation. We realise that

what he describes as the cause -- the relationships of production -- is more a symptom of the unequal forces of power that face each other across the socio-political arena.

The Wanderer's ancestry is relevant to *The Excursion*; the biographical changes that occur between earlier and later versions of the poem indicate the increasing metaphorical significance that Wordsworth places on the Wanderer's birthplace. Manuscript B describes the Wanderer as being "born of lowly race / On Cumbrian hills" (Butler 44), quite clearly establishing him as English with a geographical affinity to the area beloved by Wordsworth. By the time the Wanderer's biography is revised in Manuscript M his nationality has changed. "Among the hills of Perthshire he was born" (Butler 393) the poet tells us, this information identifying this pivotal character with central Scotland. With the publication of the 1814 version of *The Excursion* the Wanderer's birthplace is even more precisely defined. Now it is "Among the hills of Athol [where] he was born" (112). Superficially, these details seem to achieve little in developing the Wanderer's significance, but the refinements are surely more than pedanticism, or biographical padding leading to "the verbosity of *The Excursion*" (168) about which Jonathan Wordsworth complains.

Anand Chitnis reminds us that "the Enlightenment was not apparent all over Scotland; ... Its location was essentially that limited geographical area of the central, lowland belt bounded by Glasgow in the west and Edinburgh in the east" (4-5). Being located in Perthshire (once the transition to Scottish ancestry has been made), and then more specifically in Athol, places the Wanderer's birthplace only marginally in that area identified with the type of progressive thought considered dangerous by the establishment institutions of religion and law. No matter that subsequent analysis can demonstrate many Enlightenment philosophies to be dubious. At the time, the deeper social implications were not recognised, and hence the area from

which the Wanderer hails is important. The alternative would have been to have remained satisfied with Cumbrian ancestry in which case the metonymic utility arising from his association with a particular area of Scotland would not have been realised. The same argument pertains when considering whether a simple change of nationality would have sufficed. Merely to have been Scottish would not have created the required effect. It is necessary also that the Wanderer come from a rural background; however, to identify him too readily with the highlands of Scotland would also have defeated the purpose since the Jacobite invasion of 1745 relied heavily upon clan support from the north of the country. The identification of the Wanderer and the family into which he was born with a specific region is not accidental and carries considerable symbolic weight.

But the Wanderer has left his family, and this presents us with a paradox. As Anand Chitnis writes, "The study of man as a social and sociable being was a central interest of the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment" (6). Where, then, does the Wanderer stand in relation to this debate? On the one hand he forsakes his community for an itinerant's existence, and yet on the other he is a conduit through which the threads of social intercourse are woven. Reinforced, especially in Book IX, by his concentration on virtue and discipline, the Wanderer represents a force for conformity and order. But such qualities should signal a warning. "Whenever [Foucault] hears talk of ... virtue and goodness, he looks for strategies of domination" (Dreyfus 109). The Wanderer's strategies are easy to identify; nevertheless, to appreciate them requires that we look to the Wanderer for indications of "force relations working themselves out in particular events, [and] historical moments" (109). When we view the Wanderer's vision of England's destiny in this way, we are better able to recognise the

reactionary strategies of the dominant social class, a class that believes itself to be threatened by the lower order's unruly desire for power.

Examining the philosophical significance of the Wanderer's ancestry necessitates a consideration of David Hume. Hume, long the cause of internal dissent within the Church of Scotland, holds an eminent position in the history of Scottish Enlightenment thought. In his major work, *The Treatise of Human Nature*, he argues "that reason did not and could not possibly play a part in furnishing any of the ideas upon which our understanding of morality, justice, politics and religion were founded" (Porter and Teich 30). When we closely examine much of the Wanderer's philosophy we see that it is in distinct opposition to that argued by Hume, who considers religious belief to be grounded in "imagination, custom and habit and not reason" (30). The Wanderer is unable to construct a reasoned argument to support his position, being able only to offer in Book IV a repetition of the very dogma that Hume opposes:

> One adequate support
> For the calamities of mortal life
> Exists, one only; an assured belief
> That the procession of our fate, howe'er
> Sad or disturbed, is ordered by a Being
> Of infinite benevolence and power,
> Whose everlasting purposes embrace
> All accidents, converting them to Good. (11-18)

By serving to reveal an opposing philosophical force, the Wanderer's function extends to focusing our attention on the oppositions of secular powers. It is possible to demonstrate that the change in the Wanderer's nationality serves a covert political purpose. Lest it be thought that this argument stretches the bounds of credibility there are other instances where the Wanderer's opposition to the evolving thought of Enlightenment philosophers is more directly stated. His dismissal of Voltaire's *Candide* as a "dull product of a scoffer's pen" (Bk. II 513) is, I would

suggest, unambiguous. Nonetheless, Frances Ferguson argues for a greater significance regarding the book's physical location which "in the midst of stones and moss / And wreck of party-coloured earthen-ware / Aptly disposed, had lent its help to raise / One of those petty structures" (Bk. II 459-462). Ferguson sees the Wanderer's rejection of the book as "an ironic commentary on the Wanderer's disquisition" (Ferguson 227), an argument that appears to be based on the belief that the episode "seems designed" (227) to support the French author's satirical position. Ferguson argues her position forcefully, and enlists some remarkable coincidences in its defence; she weakens her argument, however, by relying on the need to believe that the irony is "designed". We may conclude that "an ironic commentary" is in progress, but when the Wanderer's relevance is seen in terms of power relationships (in this instance opposing philosophical camps that typify the emergence of the Enlightenment), it is hard to accept that any existing irony is intentional.

Geoffrey Hartman sees no irony whatsoever in the Wanderer. Hartman's view is that "this strange old man" (293) "waxes in eloquence [as] he also grows in religion: The poem ... becomes on occasion a defence of the Established Church" (301). A much more recent criticism implies a lack of intentional irony in the way Wordsworth depicts the Wanderer. James K. Chandler interprets "The Wanderer's aspersions against a French dominated continent [as showing] that Wordsworth has joined 'the admirers of the British Constitution'" (234). While neither of these two commentaries give any support to Ferguson's observation, David Simpson acknowledges the possibility of an element of irony in the Wanderer. "We cannot go so far as to argue that he is consistently presented ironically ... but there are moments in the narrative where such seems to be the case" (202). Nevertheless, I would argue that the Wanderer's function

as a site of conflicting meanings, mitigates against the argument that sees him ironically; the indication of philosophical and inter-class oppositions is too constant a factor in his character.

If the episode with the Solitary's discarded novel is open to some discussion, the Wanderer leaves no room for doubt when he talks of the "Men for whom our Age / Unbaffled powers of vision hath prepared / To explore the world without and world within" (Bk. IV 944-946). Not content to criticise the efforts of the new breed of scientists, he ridicules them: "Oh! there is laughter at their work in Heaven" (956). When the Wanderer attacks those who engage in "An impious warfare with the very life / Of our own Souls" (967-968), he seems to be recognising the emerging influence of moral sciences:

> Just as Isaac Newton had apparently brought some sense of order to, and the hope of understanding the puzzling ways of, the inanimate part of the universe by showing that the natural sciences could explain its behaviour in terms of 'laws of nature', so it seemed to [Hume] that this task could in principle be undertaken for the science of human nature (the moral sciences) (Gilmour 64).

The significance of the Wanderer's nationality, then, lies in his identification as an apologist for a certain kind of entrenched reactionary thought. Much of the available criticism that deals with the Wanderer's views on education does not recognise the importance of locating him within what is a discernible politico-philosophical camp. Failure to make this identification leads inevitably to a related failure to understand the larger implications of his position.

III

The ability to appreciate the significance of the Wanderer's speech on education rests on an appreciation of Wordsworth's concern with social order. In this respect his earlier writings anticipate the overt conservatism of his later work. Referring to "A Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff", James K. Chandler observes that since "the arguments of the Letter ... are largely derivative from other radical writing, scholarly attention to the Letter tends to focus on its intellectual sources" (15). He then proceeds to show that while Wordsworth's rhetoric may reflect the influence of Thomas Paine, the greater political influence belongs to the conservative, Edmund Burke.

Quite early in the "Letter", the poet addresses the subject of education. "It is the province of education to rectify the erroneous notions which a habit of oppression, and even resistance, may have created, ... it belongs to her to create a race of men who, truly free, will look upon their fathers as only enfranchised" (Owen and Smyser 34). The surface sentiment seems consonant with the revolutionary timbre of the Letter. It is radical in that it argues for the redress of oppression, but the eventual solution indicates a much more conservative point of view. Following oppression's defeat, the task that befalls "education" is the creation of a "race of men". The desire to re-form and construct society appears to underlie Wordsworth's vision. We note that the newly emancipated are not permitted to design their own futures. Indeed, no consideration is given this possibility; the opposite is, in fact, the case. Once the yoke of oppression is removed, the populace is to be indoctrinated. Moulded by the apparatus of education (the State is implied, but for obvious reasons not explicitly stated), this "race of men" will justify their manipulation by criticising the immediate past. They "will look upon their

fathers as only enfranchised" (34). The educational machinery has an explicitly stated national purpose. It will not simply educate, but will create a specific "race of men". Power relations propel this vision. The individual members, shaped by an education designed to instill in them the values of the dominant social order, become sites upon which the power is exercised. As a result, the dominant class registers its power in the successful creation of a conforming "Docile Body".

The task at hand is one for which Bell's system (held in such high regard by Wordsworth) is well suited. Madras provides a blueprint for the exercise of power by which individuals may be shaped into objects of conformity. Wordsworth did not read *An Experiment in Education made at the Asylum of Madras* until his composition of *The Excursion* was well advanced. His initial reaction, although favourable, was not marked by what would be his later unqualified enthusiasm. Writing to Francis Wrangham in the Autumn of 1808 he remarks "that it is a most interesting work and entitles [Bell] to the fervent gratitude of all good men: but I cannot say [?it has made] any material change in my views of [.] [I] would however strenuously recommend [ ] the system wherever it can be adopted" (Moorman 269-270). The quality of the surviving manuscript from which the letter's editor quotes is not of the best quality, and the obliterated word (which otherwise would give the reader a much clearer appreciation of the poet's established views) is a source of frustration.

In a letter of March 13 1815, however, written shortly after *The Excursion* was published, Wordsworth enthuses to Thomas Poole about Dr. Andrew Bell's Madras system of education, taking care to inform his correspondent that the poem stresses the benefits that Wordsworth believes the system to deliver. "If you have read my Poem, the 'Excursion', you will there see what importance I attach to the Madras system" (Moorman and Hill 210). He then

proceeds to make a truly extravagant claim regarding its social significance. "Next to the art of Printing it is the noblest invention for the improvement of the human species. Our population in this neighbourhood is not sufficient to apply it on a large scale; but great benefit has been derived from it even upon a small one" (210). Virtually obscured within his lavish recommendations is the fact that it is the process that is singled out for high honours. We should recognise also the terms in which the potential beneficiaries are described. No longer is the system expressed to be advantageous merely to children. The euphemistic quality of the word in its earlier sense now becomes apparent. Wordsworth can now be more forthright, and it is humans as a "species" that will benefit. For Foucault the delineation of a species reflects forces in opposition: "the emergence of a species (animal or human) and its solidification are secured 'in an extended battle against conditions which are essentially and constantly unfavourable'" (NGH 149). We may now recognise that the poet reflects the interaction of power relationships that led to Bell's system being developed. Wordsworth's uncharacteristic use of scientific terminology reveals also the impetus to his earlier enthusiasm that arises from a, by now, barely concealed interest in observation and control. It suggests too a movement toward a society typified by what Foucault identifies as "individualization" (DP 193). The creation of a large obedient or "Docile" body requires that discipline be imposed individually: "as power becomes more anonymous and more functional, those on whom it is exercised tend to be more strongly individualized; it is exercised by surveillance rather than ceremonies, by observation rather than commemorative accounts ..." (193). The object is to create a useful body, not a mindless herd. "Instead of bending all its subjects into a single uniform mass, it separates, analyses, differentiates, carries its procedures of decomposition to the point of necessary and sufficient single units" (170). Exemplifying "Hierarchical observation" (170), the pupil-tutor method employed in Bell's system permits the

"improvement of the human species" by delivering individual attention in the most economic way possible. Nowhere in his letter does Wordsworth mention that the delivery of education is in and of itself a state to be sought after. It is the system and its efficiency that interests him.

We recall the Wanderer's vision of the future in which the State would provide "The rudiments of Letters". Added to that we now have an efficient method by which this may be achieved. Generalisation and conformity propel Madras, and Bell's method is, therefore, most suitable for the delivery of a large scale national education system, with all its attendant disciplinary effects, whose purpose is grounded in a desire to promote not only "The rudiments of Letters" but also the country's national religion.

David Simpson devotes some space to an overview of Bell and his Madras system, and while he acknowledges that "Wordsworth's thoughts on education are somewhat confused in their finer details and implications even as his general priorities are clear" (198), he nevertheless sees the Wanderer's purpose as signifying an "appeal for a national education founded in the ideal of universal literacy" (199). Simpson has some difficulty in justifying his interpretation. He is quick to illustrate the probable influence of Jeremy Bentham on Andrew Bell, but is reluctant to recognise any of Bentham's influence, direct or indirect, in Wordsworth's work. Simpson extracts an important quotation from Bell's treatise:

> Utopian schemes, for the universal diffusion of general knowledge, would soon realise the fable of the belly and other members of the body, and confound that distinction of ranks and classes of society, on which the general welfare hinges, and the happiness of the lower orders, no less than that of the higher, depends (197).

Andrew Bell explicitly states what much of Wordsworth's poem and private letters may be seen to imply. Simpson argues that the Wanderer's intention that "the poor" be taught "to 'write and cypher'" (197) is not replicated in Bell's intentions. This may be imputing too large a spirit of

social generosity to the Wanderer. Undeniably, as Simpson illustrates, Bell saw the "danger of 'elevating, by an indiscriminate education, the minds of those doomed to the drudgery of daily labour, and thereby rendering them discontented'" (197). But is the Wanderer's proposition so far removed from Bell's more explicitly stated position? Any consideration of a universal system of education is bound to come up against the barrier imposed by the instruction in "The rudiments of Letters".

Almost by accident, it seems, Kenneth R. Johnston invokes an image of another level at which the Madras system may be applied, reminding us in the process of the significance of the system's title. Johnston's position is that "Wordsworth's vision of a national *or imperial education system* is not a tacked-on digression reflecting his passing enthusiasm for Dr. Andrew Bell's 'Madras system'" (320 My emphasis). I will argue later that education on a national scale can be utilised to mould the population from which the enforcing military might of imperial expansion may be recruited. By the same token, if such a system may be successfully exported to the colonies, then an efficient cultural replacement may be effected. The development of Bell's system in an asylum in Madras indicates the imperial ambitions of his method while reflecting his concern to perfect his system in the most efficient manner.

A segment of the population that was both vagrant and mobile had been a cause for concern in England since before the Elizabethan era. It was this concern that prompted the Elizabethan government to effect "a poor law which remained in its essence until the nineteenth century .... Any poor person found away from his or her native parish was to be sent back there ... " (Youngs 121). The same fear informs the thinking of M. Louis René de Caradenc de La Chalotais who, having been instrumental in the movement against Jesuit-run education in France, "came out in the year 1763 with an *Essai d'education nationale*" (Hazard 198). This paper's

essential argument, as Hazard paraphrases it, is that "The nation must never let education get into the hands of the people whose aims and ideas run counter to those of the country as a whole. The schools have to form good citizens, men capable of serving their country ..." (198). In this extract there are resonances with Bell's comments on the connection between education and "Good subjects" that were mentioned in the first part of this study. It is easy to recognise the influence of social power that works this variety of education. Its goal is servility and obedience to that vision of national purpose held by an emerging powerful middle class. If the system of values that is to be imposed remains constant, then a network of schools represents the economy of scale by which the schools' populations may be indoctrinated. The next stage is to economise within the schools themselves with regard to the number of teachers employed. The monitorial method that is the foundation of Bell's Madras system traces its roots to this concern with efficiency. It is not surprising, however, given La Chalotais' comments, that the employment of monitors was first developed in France.[10]

Admittedly, Wordsworth does not give voice to La Chalotais' precise sentiments in his "Letter". It seems, though, that there is a similarly conservative influence at work. Subjugation by physical force is to be replaced by control effected through institutional discipline. The envisaged remedy provided by institutionalised education reminds us of Foucault's comment that discipline "is an anti-nomadic technique" (DP 218). Wordsworth recognises that, following

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[10] "In December 1792, F. Lanthenas had presented a report to the French National Convention on behalf of the Committee of Public Instruction. In this report the following passage occurs: 'The schoolmasters as well as the schoolmistresses will make use of the help of those scholars whose intelligence has exhibited the most rapid advance. In that way they will very easily be able, at one and the same sitting, to bestow upon four classes of pupils all the care needed for their progress. At the same time the attempts of the most capable children to teach their schoolmates what they themselves know, and to inculcate it upon them, will instruct themselves much more effectively than would their master's lessons'" (Adamson 24).

liberation, the former subjects of repression will not be immediately suitable for the purposes of the new government. Thus, a further "province of education" is to "soften this ferocity of character proceeding from a necessary suspension of the mild and social virtues" (Owen and Smyser 34). Wordsworth's assertion ostensibly provides an alternative to the horrifying events in France that were following the Revolution. Superficially promoting freedom, his solution cloaks his own method of control. Despite appearing to be revolutionary, the "Letter" contains the embryo of a politically conservative position, a feature of some of Wordsworth's other earlier works.

In another letter to Matthews (23 May 1794) that is concerned in part with the establishment of a new political journal, Wordsworth warns that "it will be impossible ... not to inculcate principles of government and forms of social order of one kind or another" (Shaver 119). It is comments like this that further the perception of Wordsworth the radical, and yet his observation, when examined, is not so revolutionary after all. The only way in which such principles could avoid inculcation is to refrain from political criticism altogether. Wordsworth's stated intention is far from a radical treatment of all forms of "government and ... social order". He is necessarily imprecise when he concludes the statement of his intentions by casting the net "of one kind or another" over his envisaged subject matter.

The poet is not promoting a complete reversal of recognised forms of order as is apparent from the content of a letter written to Matthews the following month. "There is a further duty incumbent upon every enlightened friend of mankind; he should let slip no opportunity of explaining and enforcing those general principles of the social order which are applicable to all times and to all places" (Shaver 124). The language he uses is reminiscent of that in "A Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff". We can hear echoes of the notion of responsibility for the education

of the masses, but now his phraseology is more explicit. The earlier tract speaks of the need "to rectify the erroneous notions"; in the subsequent letter the requirement to ensure compliance with the new order will be obtained by "enforcing" the rules. Wordsworth implies an interest in discipline as a tool to be used in the establishment of "social order". Foucault has commented upon the importance of discipline to training: "The chief function of the disciplinary power is to 'train' ... It does not link forces together in order to reduce them; it seeks to bind them together in such a way as to multiply and use them" (DP 170). Wordsworth's language reveals an evolving awareness of the benefits to be obtained from institutionalised control. It is easy to see why he would eventually endorse the Madras system so vigorously.

The certainty that invests Wordsworth's vision of the future is alarming. The "general principles of the social order ... are applicable to all times and all places" (124). It would seem that in Wordsworth's opinion there are no exceptions to the rules that govern all societal conduct. Regardless of the fact that he attempts to justify his position by asserting that "the farther any government deviates [from the principles] the more effectually must it defeat the object for which government was ordained" (124), his position is grounded in his own brand of authoritarianism. He admits of no extenuating circumstances and, significantly, expresses the requirements for enforcement in terms of "duty". This is a word that appears often in his thoughts upon education. Its earlier employment is no accident, and forms an important connection between the output of his "radical" period and his later writing.

A concern with social stability is never far from the surface in much of Wordsworth's correspondence, although it is not always readily apparent and must sometimes be confirmed by an analysis of some of his subsequent opinions. Two letters written some seven years apart are illustrative in this regard. Writing in 1801 to Charles James Fox, Wordsworth

complains about the "rapid decay of the domestic affections among the lower orders of society" (Shaver 313). This he blames on the profusion of "workhouses, Houses of Industry, and the invention of Soup-shops" (313). It is not, we quickly realise, the conditions within the new manufacturing establishments that give him cause for alarm. Rather it is the exodus from the land into what Foucault describes in another context as "the floating population" (DP 218), that worries him. Wordsworth expresses a concern for the demise of "the spirit of independence [that] is, even yet, rooted in some parts of the country" (314). The rural society appears to be most laudable especially when Wordsworth proceeds to paint an attractive picture of "a class of men who are now almost confined to the North of England" (314). He advises that "They are small independent *proprietors* of land ... men of respectable education who daily labour on their own little properties" (314). The scene that he depicts is not as pastorally idyllic as it might at first appear. Wordsworth has chosen his words with care, his use of "proprietors" being especially suggestive. He uses it in preference to the more forthright and less ambiguous "owners" and, I would argue, for good reason. Proprietorship denotes the duty of stewardship without necessarily inferring the possession of clear title. A little historical background helps establish the context in which his comments are made. A report made in 1794 to the Board of Agriculture makes the following comments regarding landholdings in the area of the country about which Wordsworth wrote:

> There are probably few counties where property in land is divided into such small parcels as in Cumberland ... and those small properties so universally occupied by the owners, by far the greatest part of which are held under the lords of the manors, by that species of vassalage, called customary tenure, subject to the payment of fines and heriots on alienation, the death of the lord ... We cannot pretend to be accurate but believe that two thirds of the country are held by this kind of tenure in tenements (Hughes 209).

The authors of the report also remark on "'the backwardness and the general lack of improvement everywhere evident'" (210). Seventeen years earlier it was noted by "Nicolson and Burn, the county historians ... [that] Every man lives upon his own small tenement" (Hughes 25). The rural dwellers' cottages did not inspire enthusiasm, being "'mean beyond imagination, made of mud and thatched with turf'" (25). With these various comments in mind we can better appreciate the element of duplicity in Wordsworth's language, be it poetry or prose. That which is portrayed as pastoral peace and innocence is in reality something quite different. It is not hard to understand how the furtherance of this "species of vassalage" aids the continuance of control of the rural population. Firmly anchored to their "little properties" there is a diminished opportunity for congregation. Wordsworth not only values "proprietorship" but he also gives a special significance to the inheritance of property. He acknowledges its importance when he provides details of the Wanderer's family history: "he was born: / There on a small hereditary farm" (Bk.I 112-113). When Wordsworth asserts that "Their little tract of land serves as a kind of permanent rallying point for their domestic feelings" (Shaver 314-315), he is not restricting his allusions to the family unit. The "domestic feelings" serve also as a metaphor for feelings of national pride. Wordsworth regrets the demise of "This class of men" (315) because of the potential for social upheaval represented by their transfer from a rural to an urban location. He is, naturally, reticent to comment upon the reasons for their rapid disappearance; the departure from the small plots of land represents a potential threat that must be addressed.

The use of institutionalised discipline as an aid to securing an otherwise mobile populace is of concern to Foucault. We recognise Wordsworth's position to be informed by the very fear that Foucault identifies, but the poet's solution remains firmly grounded in the vestiges of England's feudal system. Not until he is exposed to the Madras system will Wordsworth fully

appreciate that "discipline ... arrests or regulates movements; [and] dissipates compact groupings of individuals wandering about the country" (DP 219). Wordsworth's recognition of the social utility to be derived from disciplinary institutions becomes evident from the Wanderer's discourse.

The second of the two letters reveals the potential for continued, albeit disguised, subjugation inherent in the rural society's structure. On this occasion writing to Francis Wrangham, Wordsworth engages the subject of the provision of reading material for the poor. He is now deliberately concerned with the landless classes, and the necessity to introduce an element of order. Seven years earlier, Wordsworth had valourised "the spirit of independence" (314) of a class of people possessing "an almost sublime conviction of the blessings of an independent domestic life" (314). The subject of his letter then was a desire to maintain the rural social order thereby cementing the English class-based power relationships. In 1808, however, he dispenses with his earlier cloak of sentimentality, being, on occasion, openly contemptuous of the mental faculties of the rural poor:

> The labouring man in agriculture generally carries on his work either in solitude, or with his own Family, persons whose minds he is thoroughly acquainted with, and with whom he is under no temptation to enter into discussions, or to compare opinions (Moorman 247).

There is obviously no threat to social stability from those persons who are not encouraged to criticise opinions or to make themselves aware of the events in the world at large. The solitude, or relative isolation, in which the majority of these people work increases both their individual and collective docility. It is, as Wordsworth makes clear, "peaceable; and as innocent as (the frame of society and the practices of Government being what they are) we have a right to expect" (247). The description of the rural labourer clarifies and develops what we recognise as the

inferences of his letter of 1801. Wordsworth is also much more explicit in his letter to Wrangham concerning the new urban population. "The situation of Manufacturers is deplorably different" (248) he writes. The fear of congregation and the potential end result is now quite obvious.

> Their work is carried on in clusters, Men from different parts of the world, and perpetually changing; so that every individual is constantly in the way of being brought into contact with new notions and feelings and of being unsettled in his own accordingly (248-249).

The same fears that underwrote his opinion of rural labourers also inform his concern in this respect. The answer to the threat lies in the imposition of *discipline*, albeit in the guise of education. Wordsworth recognises (even if he only strongly hints at the fact) the counter-force represented by the urban workers. Inspiring his approach is the need to "master all the forces that are formed from the very constitution of an organised multiplicity" (DP 219). Wordsworth's language now reflects the mechanism of control, employing metaphors from the very institutions that he supposedly despises. "A select library ... may be of the same use as a public Dial, keeping every Body's clock in some kind of order" (249). The disciplinary register of his observation is immediately recognisable. The clock symbolises both efficiency and control: "'In the large factory, everything is regulated by the clock'" (DP 174). Wordsworth may equate a mechanical device with a literary asset, but both aim for the goals of conformity, one temporal, the other ideological. In the poet's view, both serve the same purpose, an assertion that indicates the extent to which his interest in order increasingly informs his opinion. Fundamentally significant is Wordsworth's comment that "piety and religion ... will strengthen with the general strength of the mind; and that this is best promoted by a due mixture of direct and indirect nourishment and discipline" (249). The letter to Wrangham, from which these comments are extracted, was written approximately six years before the first edition of *The Excursion* was

published, and it is interesting to observe Wordsworth's thoughts on a system of national education:

> I deem any plan of national education in a country like ours most difficult to apply to practice ... Heaven and Hell are scarcely more different from each other than Sheffield and Manchester, etc. differ from the plains and vallies of Surrey, Essex, Cumberland, or Westmorland. ... What form of discipline; what Books or doctrines, I will not say would equally suit all these (249-250).

Again Wordsworth is inflexible, this time complementing his approach by an acknowledgement of the need for discipline. He entertains no deviation from a uniform and generalised methodology. Discipline is essential to underwrite a system that will unify the country's disparate elements. We must note that Wordsworth does not flatly deny the existence of the relevant form of control. He merely recognises his current inability to identify the most appropriate method. That he will later regard the Madras system as the ideal vehicle suggests that he sees in it "the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise" (DP 170). By means of Bell's method he is able, it seems to me, to see a way by which the apparent disparities, once combined, may be enlisted in support of national imperial ambition. Education is enlisted to perform a more recognisable political task.

Wordsworth seeks to imbue his readers with *his* perception of the land and those who live on it. He sees the existence of "free schools, or schools with some endowment" (250) as being a correlative of "land [that] is far more than elsewhere tilled by Men who are the Owners of it" (250). His statements regarding ownership have already been shown to be suspect, and there is no evidence to illustrate that his assertion in this letter is any more accurate than his previous comments. The letter creates the impression that the majority of the local population actually owns the land from which it draws its living. But it has already been established that the

greater proportion of the population in the area are copyholders, and whether at the time "Parents [had] more ability and inclination to send their Children to School" (250) is certainly disputable. Perhaps it was true of the minority. It is hard to equate the appetite for learning that Wordsworth suggests in this letter with his earlier view of the rural population whose intellectual acuity was dulled to such an extent that new ideas were, supposedly, of little importance. The letter's concluding paragraph indicates that Wordsworth may be speaking of a minority landed class. He advises Wrangham to "begin your Education at the top of society; let the head go in the right course and the tail will follow" (251). It seems that his desire to "create a race of men" through the agency of education is no less diminished at this point in his life.

It is not germane to this study to identify the literature that exerted a potentially conservative influence on Wordsworth, and yet one poet, John Dyer, should be singled out for special attention. Wordsworth held the Welshman in high regard making the following recommendation in a letter to Lady Beaumont in November 1811:

> I will ... conclude with a sonnet, which I wrote some time ago upon the poet John Dyer. If you have not read *The Fleece*, I would strongly recommend it to you. The character of Dyer, as a patriot, a citizen, and a tender-hearted friend of humanity, was, in some respects, injurious to him as a poet, and has induced him to dwell, in his poem, upon processes which, however important in themselves, were unsusceptible of being poetically treated. Accordingly, his poem is, in several places, dry and heavy; but its beauties are innumerable, and of a high order. *In point of imagination, and purity of style, I am not sure that he is not superior to any writer in verse since the time of Milton* (Moorman 521).

This is fervent and virtually unqualified praise in light of which we need to examine one section of Dyer's epic which is unironically subtitled "The Happy Workhouse and the Good Effects of Industry" (Lonsdale 172). The importance lies in the fact that this passage can be shown to have chilling undertones of control and subjugation. I consider it necessary to demonstrate this aspect since, by lavishing such praise on Dyer, Wordsworth implies an endorsement of those

sentiments. His comments on the Welsh poet's patriotism deflect our attention from the less easily digestible passages of *The Fleece*, and obscure what appears to be a serious contradiction in Wordsworth's professed views concerning the growth of manufacturing institutions. Writing to Sir George Beaumont in 1806, he comments on the changing face of the countryside and refers to the small estate received as a gift from Beaumont some three years earlier:

> Applethwaite, I hope, will remain in my family for many generations. With my will it should never be parted with, unless the character of the place be entirely changed, as I am sorry to say there is some reason to apprehend; a cotton-mill being, I am told, already planted, or to be planted, in the glen (Moorman 76).

This concern would seem to have evaporated by the time of his later correspondence when he can so adamantly endorse a poem which contains the plea "O when, through ev'ry province, shall be raised / Houses of labour, seats of kind restraint" (Lonsdale 172).

Wordsworth directly acknowledges Dyer's influence on *The Excursion*.[11] In a note concerning lines 111-112 of Book VIII he writes:

> In treating this subject, it was impossible not to recollect, with gratitude, the pleasing picture, which, in his Poem of the Fleece, the excellent and amiable Dyer has given of manufacturing industry upon the face of this Island. He wrote at a time when machinery was first beginning to be introduced, and his benevolent heart prompted him to augur from it nothing but good. Truth has compelled me to dwell upon the baneful effects arising out of an ill-regulated and excessive application of powers so admirable in themselves" (DS4 469).

The concern with the effect of cotton mills and similar institutions on the countryside's character has been replaced, it would seem, by a concern with a lack of *regulation*. "The powers so admirable in themselves" are not the subject of criticism, and neither are the conditions within the burgeoning factories.

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[11] See *Wordsworth's Poetical Works*. (DS4), edited by E. De Selincourt.

It is possible, of course, to see Wordsworth's admiration as pertaining only to Dyer's poetic skill. The comparison to Milton supports this argument, and the sonnet "To the Poet, John Dyer" commencing "Bard of the Fleece, whose skilful genius made / That work a living landscape fair and bright;"[12] (DS3), certainly seems more concerned with the poet's form than with the epic poem's content. However, when comparing the workhouse passage to the Wanderer's speech on education, a number of similarites become apparent, indicating that the influence of the one work upon the other may extend further than pure poetic technique. The Wanderer's entreaty -- "Oh for the coming of that glorious time" (Bk.IX 289) shares a formal similarity that is recognisable in Dyer's: "O when, through ev'ry province, shall be raised" (Lonsdale 172). *The Fleece*, especially in the passage under consideration, is overtly paternalistic. In arguing for the benefits provided by the institution, Dyer refers at one point to the potential inmates as "children of affliction" (172). The device establishes a sense of gratitude through which the poor are constructed as societal debtors whose duty it becomes to accept the largesse (doubtful though it may be shown to be) of the manufacturing elite, and as a result "be compelled / To happiness" (172). The "Houses of labour" are an example of the eighteenth-century's "'great confinement' of vagabonds and paupers" (DP 141), and evidences a step in the institutionalised creation of what Foucault describes as "Docile Bodies" (DP 135-169) -- a phrase which captures all the overlapping qualities essential to the success of disciplinary regimes, namely *teachability*, *manageability*, and *submissiveness*.

Not surprisingly, Wordsworth uses children in a passage concerned with education. Having seen how Dyer employs the same word permits us, however, to offer a more sinister

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[12] See *Wordsworth's Poetical Works* (DS3) Vol. III, edited by E. De Selincourt and Helen Darbishire.

interpretation of Wordsworth's phraseology. Whereas in *The Fleece* it is "the mansion" (172) within which secular and spiritual needs are satisfied, in *The Excursion* a larger and more embracing entity is responsible for the poor. Expressing the relationship in almost contractual terms, Wordsworth sees the State as being in a position of benevolence relative to "the Children whom her soil maintains" (299). The subject of the verb is the soil, a metonymy for the nation. The children are passive in a transaction that results in their condition of obligation. Certainly Wordsworth professes a reciprocal obligation on the part of the nation, but it is minimal in comparison. "Children", in the social context of his verse, is no longer applicable only to youth. The word embraces a whole social class. It constitutes those "who are born to serve ... and obey" (297), and this obligation extends by inference into their later years.

The fear of a disgruntled segment of society informs Wordsworth's sentiment. I have shown previously how this fear was present even prior to the Elizabethan era, and whereas "A Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff" may only hint at that concern, now the poet's concerns are more blatant. Wordsworth reflects the rising middle class's fear of a disgruntled, unemployed working-class. The manufacturers, the owners of capital, are in a somewhat different relationship to the underclass than were the Elizabethan landed classes. The accumulation of capital depends, in part, on a supply of cheap labour. A mobile mass of unemployed persons is a double cause for concern. Not only does unemployment threaten order, in terms of social peace, but it also diminishes one of the resources from which profits will be exacted. This is not a facet of concern unique to the poet, but it is an indication of his preoccupation with control on the one hand while acknowledging the influence of Dyer on the other. In *The Fleece* the "poor ... / ... / who stroll abroad / From house to house with mischievous intent" (172) create the apparent need for the workhouse. The Wanderer (somewhat more subtly, but no less fearfully) portrays national

education as a means of preventing " ... none / However destitute ... / ... [to] run / into a wild disorder" (302-305). The possibility also exists that the capitalists anticipate what Marx would later see as the cause of the bourgeoisie's eventual destruction:

> The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the ground are now turned against the bourgeoisie itself.
>
> But not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons - the modern working class - the proletarians (87).

IV

The question of authority and the perfection of disciplinary methods by which to establish a regime of political conformity does not concern most of the critics who have interpreted the Wanderer's exposition. The prevailing opinion seems to be that Wordsworth uses the Wanderer to advance an argument in favour of an egalitarian approach to education. Carl Woodring sees in the Wanderer's vision that "the key to future hope is compulsory education for all" (136). Mary Moorman elevates the purpose to "an eloquent plea for national elementary education, to be undertaken immediately by the state" (177), and David Simpson, while recognising the ambiguities in Wordsworth's position, nevertheless maintains that the poet "is genuinely and articulately anxious to offer a positive prospect for wider education" (198).

Chandler seems to be alone in his opposition to these critics. He sees "the Wanderer's dream [of] national education [as being] in the service of hereditary monarchy, not of republican government" (232). However, Chandler does not develop his observation's full potential. He reverts to a traditional position that sees the Enlightenment "as a means of criticizing and regulating those social institutions such as authority, prejudice and example that might be summed up under the name of tradition" (233) rather than considering the possibility that within Enlightenment thought lay an increasing interest and awareness in the body as a subject to be studied; that is to say that the more knowledge that could be accumulated, the more efficiently could discipline be dispensed. Consequently, Chandler can only see the Wanderer as representing the antithesis of the Enlightenment as opposed to being its symbol.

None of these interpretations is guilty of a misreading of the text. The fault that they all share, however, is that they concentrate on the obvious and the superficial. No thought is

given to the possibility that "education", far from being a means of social improvement, conceals the development of a location (the school) in which power relations manifest themselves -- albeit in new and subtler forms. Woodring, while seeing a universal system of education being promoted, hints that he is about to criticise the Wanderer's philosophy. He is not convincingly ironic when he remarks that "once the discipline of virtue takes root in Britain, then the swarms of tomorrow can be dispatched across the seas as successive communities of virtuous colonists. ... But emigration is secondary" (136). Unfortunately, Woodring ignores the political implications of large scale emigration. Moreover, having referred to the "discipline of virtue", he fails to deliver any analysis at all on a phrase that, using Foucault's approach to the eighteenth century as a means to interpret *The Excursion,* I have already illustrated to be politically suggestive.

The Wanderer, we recall, describes England as "this Imperial Realm" (Bk.IX 294). The adjective is not the product of poetic necessity; it serves a political function. England was indeed imperial, and the country's political ambitions went far beyond the establishment of colonies overseas. Not only did England wish to colonise other areas of the world (and in this respect was being faced with increasing European competition), but she also wished to benefit from an economic advantage both monetarily and in terms of raw materials. The cotton mills about which Wordsworth was apparently concerned could operate at a greater margin of profit if the raw material was obtained at the least expense. Moreover, imperial expansion required greater military force, and this might be achieved by drawing on that section of the population that, otherwise left outside the bounds of social discipline, would represent a threat to internal order. In return for providing "rudiments of Letters" (300) to those "who are born to serve her and obey" (297), England "exacts allegiance" (295). The Wanderer does not elaborate upon the nature of such allegiance. There is little need to do so given the register of the following lines

which portray the benefits of elementary schooling as a sacred right. But the colonisation that will be introduced a few lines later in the poem demands that "England [be safe] / From interference of external force" (332-333), and the means of protection (the manpower) must be recruited somewhere.

Can it also be accidental that it is only "The rudiments of Letters" (300) that will be taught? This is hardly the language one would expect from an apologist for a system that "anticipated by nearly fifty years the national education act of 1870, but exceeded its limiting details" (Woodring 136). This approach is consonant with Wordsworth's position regarding the education of the upper classes. The provision of "rudiments of Letters" furnishes the consideration required by the State to fulfil its terms under the "contract", but it is not as if the newly "educated" underclass are likely to become Enlightenment philosophers as a result. We can recognise too that this represents an example of the growing awareness of the utility to be gained from an economic exercise of power. By providing "rudiments of Letters" the objective of delivering "education" is most efficiently achieved, but more importantly the required allegiance is economically extracted from the "Docile Bodies".

The social *status-quo* must after all be maintained. It is the constancy of the monarchy that sets England apart, "the Sovereignty of these fair isles / Remains entire and indivisible" (345-346). It is not a recognition of injustice that has toppled thrones in Europe; it is "ignorance ... which acts / Within the compass of their several shores / To breed commotion and disquietude" (347-349). Again, we can appreciate the way in which Wordsworth employs rhetoric to disguise the advancement of a social system that incorporates a wider and more oppressive political agenda.

Mary Moorman follows a similar argument to Woodring. Asserting that in *The Excursion* "the ninth and last book consists largely of a call to the State to educate its citizens" (179), she ignores the opportunity to ascertain any alternative reasons for the poet's vigour. In fairness to Moorman and the other commentators who take her approach, it must be said that the argument in favour of viewing the final book of *The Excursion* as a plea for a broader accessibility to education is both strong and popular. Educational reform is, after all, being suggested, but its purpose, the development of locations where the exercise of power may be perfected escapes the attention of these commentators. Consequently Moorman is restricted in her thinking to arguing that it is merely "all the Children whom her soil maintains" (299) that England should educate. The political significance of the use of "children" has previously been remarked upon, but the question of maintenance deserves further comment. Just as the phrase may be assumed to include all of the nation's children, it may equally be seen to *create* a specific class. The "soil", or the country, keeps these children. There is no hint of familial independence, despite Wordsworth's valorising of Cumbrian statesmen in his letter to Fox. Similarly his reference to the "destitute" (303) is open to an alternative interpretation. Moorman sympathises with those who would otherwise remain unschooled forming "A savage Horde among the civilised" (308), and while she recognises the potential for their raising "their hand against every man" (180) she does not expand upon the deeper social implications that such a "Horde" represents to society. Neither does she draw the reader's attention to an apparent contradiction between lines 308 and 309: "A savage Horde among the civilised / A servile Band among the lordly free!". The "savage Horde" of the first line is immediately transformed into "A servile Band" in the next. The fear that surfaces in the first reference requires, it would seem, to be diluted. The connotation of "A servile Band among the lordly free" is considerably different from

that provided by the imagery in the preceding line. It supports the argument that sees this section of *The Excursion* as a statement in favour of reform. This is not a view to which Wordsworth's contemporary William Hazlitt subscribed. He objected strenuously to "the unmistakeably reactionary outlook and tone of *The Excursion*" seeing in it a poem which "frankly rejects all efforts towards political change" (Everest 77).

Hazlitt, it should be noted, believed that Wordsworth had betrayed his earlier ideals. This betrayal would have been particularly wounding to Hazlitt who, "brought up within a tradition of incipient revolt against established authority" (Hazlitt 12), maintained his own beliefs in the principles that spawned the French Revolution. Reflecting the connection between political opinion and poetry that drives his approach to Wordsworthian criticism, Hazlitt remarks in *The Spirit of the Age* "His later philosophic productions have a somewhat different character. They are a departure from, a dereliction of, first principles" (144). Hazlitt wrote this in 1824, some ten years after *The Excursion* was published. One of the critic's earlier essays, however, confirms the direction of his opinion. E.D. Mackerness, in editing *The Spirit of the Age*, notes that in *On Consistency of Opinion* Hazlitt "reviles Wordsworth for having in recent years gone back on the principles implicit in his earlier poetry" (361).

It is tempting to draw on Wordsworth's comments on *The Excursion* in his *Memoirs* to provide ammunition to refute Hazlitt's criticism. After all, Wordsworth regrets the fact "that so little progress has been made in diminishing the evils deplored, or promoting the benefits of education which the "'Wanderer'" anticipates" (47). But it is not change itself, but the nature of change that should concern us. When we read that "Sir James Graham's attempt to establish a course of religious education among the children employed in factories has been abandoned, in consequence of what might easily have been foreseen, the vehement and turbulent opposition of

the Dissenters" (47), we recognise an abiding adherence to the principles of Church of England education that infuse the philosophy of Dr. Bell and his Madras system. Mary Moorman invites an examination of Wordsworth's educational philosophy when she opines that "Wordsworth's demand for universal education was firmly grounded on great principles in which he passionately believed" (179). How great the principles and how passionate Wordsworth's belief in them may be judged by reviewing some of his other comments on education.

V

Wordsworth graduated from Cambridge in 1791, and in December of that year his sister Dorothy remarked that "he means to pass the Winter for the Purpose of learning the French Language which will qualify him for the office of travelling companion to some young Gentleman" (Shaver 66). Clearly, then, Wordsworth envisaged employment in the capacity of private tutor. Apparently he was still seeking this type of position two years later, a fact that is confirmed by Dorothy in another letter to Jane Pollard when she comments "He is looking out and wishing for the opportunity of engaging himself as Tutor to some young Gentleman" (Shaver 95), and a month later we learn that a hoped for position "as tutor to Lord Belmore's son is at an end" (103). His interest in this method of earning a living seems to have dissipated with time, and three years following the publication of *The Excursion* Wordsworth occupies a thoroughly different position. "As to private tuition it is such an irksome thing that scarcely any of those who undertake it do their Duty" (Moorman and Hill 397) he writes to Daniel Stuart. His letter reflects his growing concern with efficiency, a factor that is predominant in his endorsement of Bell's Madras system. Indeed, he complains that it is beyond the capability of even "Persons of known Competence" (397) to maintain the necessary progress required by the several scholars to whom tuition is being given. Although his solution is enrolment in "one of our great public Schools" (398), he does not provide any detail concerning the advantage to be thus obtained. Wordsworth's imprecision indicates a certain inconsistency. His proposal incorporates no mention of the Madras system, and yet we can determine that Wordsworth maintains an admiration for its methods. In 1819 he defends the system to his brother confirming that "one of the fundamental principles is; that so far from want of quickness being an objection, the efficiency of the new system is chiefly

shewn in the treatment of slow boys" (Moorman and Hill 513). The poet, admittedly motivated in this instance by a sense of grievance at the refusal of Charterhouse school to accept his son John, makes a scathing criticism of the very same public school system that he had recommended only two years previously. Referring to the headmaster of Charterhouse, he writes:

> if he be determined by selfish notions grounded upon the great name of the School, then, he must submit to the charge brought against most Masters of Public Schools, viz., that of indifference concerning the mass and the slower Boys provided a few at the top can make a brilliant figure (513).

Wordsworth's inconsistency increases our difficulty in establishing what exactly informs his position regarding education in general and the Madras system in particular. Kenneth R. Johnston considers that Wordsworth had a "passing enthusiasm for Dr. Andrew Bell's 'Madras System' of pupil-tutors" (320). Apart from the fact that the implications of the system went much further than the employment of "pupil-tutors", the fact that Wordsworth was still enamoured of it at least eleven years after reading Bell's book demonstrates a degree of permanent affection that, it seems, contradicts Johnston's argument.

There can be no doubt that Wordsworth had an abiding respect for the results that could be obtained by Madras. It is fair to say, I think, that he could envisage the provision of a great deal more than "The rudiments of Letters" accruing from an adherence to Bell's method, and yet in this recognition there is a problem for Wordsworth. The efficient education of the middle and upper classes is desirable. We have already seen how he favours educating society's "head", and yet he comes to admit eventually that education can be detrimental to established order. As late as 1828 he criticises people like "Mr. Brougham, who think that sharpening of intellect and attainment of knowledge are things good in themselves" (Wordsworth 184). Similarly, those who "are misled and hurried on by zeal in a course which cannot but lead to

disappointment" (184) are worthy of censure. In this category he specifically places a group of women who "are determined to set up a school for girls on the Madras system" (184). He is quick to acknowledge that the results will be notable, but despairs at the thought of the ambition that the system will foster in its female pupils; "what demand is there for the ability that they may have prematurely acquired?" he asks (184). There is no hint in his complaint of a disenchantment with the method itself; the concern is with the suitability of a class of people for the position in society that the dominant class has pre-ordained for them. Wordsworth's views correspond with those of Dr. Bell who foresees the "danger of 'elevating, by an indiscriminate education, the minds of those doomed to the drudgery of daily labour, and thereby rendering them discontented'" (Simpson 197). Wordsworth's argument may be taken as a criticism of Bell's disciples as a whole; however, it is the application of the system, not its proven methodology, that is being attacked.

The Wanderer's exposition on education in *The Excursion* has been shown to indicate England's imperialist ambitions. At this later stage Wordsworth is more direct regarding the social purposes to which education may be directed. Whereas the Wanderer sees a limited education being exchanged for "allegiance" (Bk.IX 295), no such necessity need be considered in the case of women. Wordsworth categorically confirms that withholding the benefits of the Madras system is "the best security for the chastity of wives of the lower rank" (185). I have been arguing that the Madras school system represents the refining of a specific technique by which power is delineated. In this respect it may be seen in the same way as Foucault views the *Panopticon*: "the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form" (DP 205). Exercising power, however, implies the recognition of an opposing force that must be overcome. Wordsworth's exclusion of women from the "benefits" of Madras is increasingly problematic.

If women are to be denied, the inference might be that they do not represent a recognisable force, either intellectually, or socially in terms of their ability to effect change. Alternatively, the home itself may be an efficient location in which power may be demonstrated, women's domestic restriction being further evidence of the superiority of male power; to exercise the power at another site altogether would not be an efficient use of disciplinary space. And yet again, by their exclusion, Wordsworth may tacitly acknowledge their potential to constitute a point of resistance -- an opposition -- to the creation of "Docile Bodies". In his concern with the maintenance of the social hierarchy, Wordsworth anticipates his position of some two years later where he equates the purpose of education with that of duty. Again, corresponding with his brother, he argues that "The education of man, and above all of a Christian, is the education of *duty*, which is most forcibly taught by the business and concerns of life, of which, even for children, especially the children of the poor, book-learning is but a small part" (194). In other words he is now articulating the implied sentiment of the Wanderer's passage. The extent of the duty is not elaborated upon, but it seems clear that it is expected of the same class of person who, in *The Excursion,* is categorised as being "born to serve ... and obey". Wordsworth does not reject the philosophy that informs the Madras system; he implicitly reinforces its principles. Clearly his enthusiasm for Bell's methodology endured longer than Johnston believes. The authoritarian implications of Madras remain to be examined in order to further understand Wordsworth's deeper educational philosophy.

His acknowledgement of the influence of Bell's system on *The Excursion* has been noted. It is advantageous now to review the "Object of elementary education" as Bell states it in his treatise. A connection between his statement and part of the Wanderer's speech becomes immediately apparent. Bell states his purpose as being "To render simple, easy, pleasant,

expeditious, and economical, the acquisition of the rudiments of letters, and of morality and religion" (3). It is the transfer from Bell to *The Excursion* of "the rudiments of letters" combined with Wordsworth's subsequent comments that have led so many critics to concentrate only on the obvious topic of national education without considering the social implications included in the poet's strenuous endorsement of the system.

Efficiency is obviously a motivating factor in the Madras method, but this aspect goes far beyond the economic sense of the word. Efficiency embraces measurement and movement with no detail being too small to escape consideration. Sandboxes are to be used to practice one's letters, and the dimensions for this implement are precisely stated. It must be "(Thirty-six inches by ten), with a ledge (of 1/2 an inch deep) on every side" (Bell 15). The method recognises the economy of movement necessary to efficient supervision. Referring to "*The Schoolmaster whose province it is to direct and conduct the system in all its ramifications*" (7), Bell writes, "*From his place (chair or desk) he overlooks the whole school, and gives life and motion to every member of it*" (7). There is a two-pronged significance to this assertion. There are the obvious functions of authority and supervision; the command is absolute and "the whole school" is within the schoolmaster's purview.

Not as readily obvious, but ascertainable nonetheless, is the fact that the school has no existence independent of this established authority figure. It is he who "gives life and motion to every member of it". Foucault's observations regarding the position of those members of society who are subjected to the power of total surveillance, or *panopticism*, are interesting in this regard. He points out that the subjects of observation are not external to the system; "the individual is carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of forces and bodies" (DP 217). From his ultimate position of authority the schoolmaster co-ordinates the various pieces of

the machine making them agents of the process of control that maintains their subjugation. The fundamental power of the schoolmaster's position is easily overlooked, and we might wonder whether the importance of his role has for some reason been ignored by Wordsworth in the Wanderer's speech. Again, it is necessary to compare Wordsworth's language and the language of Bell's proposal, observing in the process how the particular reference of the pedagogue becomes expanded to assume a universal and all-embracing significance in the poem.

For Bell, the schoolmaster vitalises and controls. In the larger context of the Wanderer's discourse the equivalent to the schoolmaster is "this Imperial Realm" (Bk.IX 294). Just as the schoolmaster gives "life and motion", the State "maintains" those by whom allegiance is owed. The expansion is subtle, but identifiable, and incorporates within the transfer a concealed transformation which alters that axis of the philosophical approach that Bell's system ostensibly promotes. Viewing the economics of the system and seeing a glimpse of the potential for wider exploitation, Kenneth Johnston interprets Wordsworth's interest in Madras as "an integral culmination of his wish to generalise and decentralize imagination. Pupils teaching each other are not very far removed from poets speaking as men to men" (320). Johnston's separating poets from "men" causes us to re-consider Wordsworth's appropriation of Bell's educational philosophy. It is by the agency of poetry that the political potential and attendant philosophical implications may be advanced. We are witnessing in this transformation another example of the creation of "Docile Bodies" (DP 135-169). Elaborating on this classification, Foucault explains, "A body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed, and improved" (136). Both the creation and manipulation of what would otherwise be the embryo of a disorderly and destabilising mob is at the heart of Bell's system, and requires only the genius of poetic imagination to apply it in an imperial context.

Discipline, to one degree or another, is of course a necessary ingredient for the success of the Madras method. Foucault shows that discipline need not necessarily be accompanied by an overt cruelty or savage practice. Control may be achieved by "Small acts of cunning endowed with a great power of diffusion, subtle arrangements, apparently innocent, but profoundly suspicious" (DP 139). His is an observation that is pertinent to a study of Bell's procedures. Bell promotes an atmosphere of internal competition expressing his conclusions in terms that are immediately recognisable today: "emulation or desire of excellence ... proves a powerful and unceasing incentive to laudable exertion - a mild yet effectual instrument of discipline" (5). Obviously recognising the power of "Small acts of cunning", Bell utilises an added degree of control in his method, for not only is competition being used covertly as a way to enforce discipline, but the process and the results are taking place under the ever vigilant eye of the schoolmaster.

The employment of cunning is not dissipated when the philosophy is transferred to the Wanderer's speech. He uses an effective rhetoric to introduce the subject of discipline while making its imposition seem innocuous. The Wanderer asserts the essential freedom of the English. "The discipline of slavery is unknown / Amongst us" (352-353) he intones, and then establishes the need for an alternative form of control -- "The discipline of virtue" (354). In comparison to the visions created by the reference to slavery, the brand of discipline represented by "virtue" is mild indeed. And yet it remains a form of discipline and of control. Rather than marking the path of liberation, it is evidence of the refinement of technique; the process has become more subtle, the method of explanation more cunning, but the end result, control, still pertains.

That slavery should be used as a comparison has a significance beyond its obvious rhetorical function; it connotes an individual loss of freedom. Foucault, as previously mentioned, illustrates the trend toward individualization. The movement is insidious. While the individual was being closely observed, the surveillance was, nonetheless, carried out in "observatories" that were designed for the large-scale confinement of, among others, the poor, the military, and the manufacturing classes. Hence it is necessary for any indication of individual attention or observation to be obscured in this section of *The Excursion*. There is no direct condemnation of slavery in the passage; (to be fair, it may not be the place for such criticism). The associations are left to the reader's imagination, and as a result the transformation from individual subservience to conformity to a national virtue is easily achieved. Any notion of change is destroyed with the argument's conclusion. The solution will be "permanent" (359) and no exclusions will be permitted; "the whole people [are] to be taught" (360). Ominously, they are also to be "trained" (360). Such a transition can only be achieved within the confines of an institution, and Bell's system with its pre-occupation with efficiency, is the ideal vehicle by which the moulding of the national character may be effected. The school is synonymous with "*enclosure*, ... a place heterogeneous to all others and closed in upon itself" (DP 141). In the larger arena of political ambition, an indoctrinated populace stands in a similar relationship to the political entity of its country. The invisible, but ever present, symbol of national authority is thus strengthened by an unquestioned allegiance allowing "the Sovereignty of these fair Isles / [to remain] entire and indivisible" (345-346).

Discipline arises, as Foucault observes, from the fact that "Each individual has his own place, and each place its individual ... Discipline organises an analytical space" (DP 143). The spaces become laboratories under such systems, a facet of their operation that is perhaps

unconsciously betrayed by Wordsworth in his previously quoted comments on the improvement of the "species". Foucault sees in the organisation of space a form of control whose "aim was to establish presences and absences, to know where and how to locate individuals ... to be able at each moment to supervise the conduct of each individual" (143). Such a system requires a record of absences to be maintained. Foucault quotes as an example the existence of an absentee register in a school for the apprentices "of the Gobelins" (156). Instituted in 1737, the purpose of this book was merely to record absenteeism. Sixty years later, Bell had considerably advanced the utility of this instrument of control. "A register of the daily tasks" recorded activities, while complementing it was "*The black book* [which recorded] *continued idleness ... every offence ... and animadversion*" (8). The indisputable evidence that was collected becomes a useful tool for Bell who continues to enthuse: "To this simple instrument I attach immense importance in preserving order, diligence, good conduct, and the most rigid discipline, at the least expense of punishment of which it is a great object to be frugal, and a good economist" (8). When these foundations are transferred to the rhetorical fabric of the Wanderer's speech, order is valourised for its own sake. Good conduct becomes virtue which brings with it its own inherent discipline. Injected into the mélange of benefits which will accrue is one which continually makes its presence felt: "peace" (Bk.IX 355). With the wide-scale adoption of the method, the threat to internal order will be removed.

In Foucault's analysis of the creation of "Docile Bodies" the word machine occurs again and again. In describing the "mutual improvement school" (DP 165) he writes, "The school became a machine for learning, in which each pupil, each level and each moment, if correctly combined, were permanently utilized in the general process of teaching" (165). The same word forms an important part of Bell's vocabulary: "The grand desideration is to fix attention, and call

forth exertion; ... This in the Madras school is achieved ... by the strong and permanent hold which its machinery takes of the mind, and the deep impression which it makes on the heart" (4). Obviously the feature of permanence mentioned in a slightly different context here was attractive to Wordsworth; it is a "permanent provision" for education, we remember, for which the Wanderer argues. Bell is even more forthright in developing the metaphor of the machine. Referring to the school's ultimate overseer he advises that that person's "scrutinizing eye must pervade the whole machine" (8). The metaphor emphasises the importance that Bell places on co-ordinated and efficient activity. The machine is not merely the apparatus that is imposed and utilised in the creation of the "Docile Body"; rather, it includes the very material upon which it will work.

The identification of William Wordsworth's underlying philosophy toward education has been shown to be beset with difficulties. His verse, his prose, and his personal correspondence are all replete with ambiguities. It is easier to offer a criticism of his later opinions since they are more direct, and confirm the reactionary position that he gradually assumed. Nevertheless, there is an instability in his earlier work that suggests a socio-political motivation that is at variance with much of the published opinion concerning the poet. For example, John Adamson poses the problem in terms of the essential paradox with which we are presented when considering the position of the English radicals "who were the friends, even the enthusiastic friends of the French Revolution" (10), and yet "most strenuously opposed State-controlled education in England as being opposed to religious and political freedom" (10). While Wordsworth's early allegiance to the French cause is verifiable, his support for a national system of education is equally well documented. But, as I have argued, we are required to examine the less obvious implications to gain a greater understanding of his motivations. Predictably,

Adamson joins forces with those critics who see one dimension only of Wordsworth's interest in universal education. The poet "joined in the almost universal hope which was aroused by the introduction of the mutual system of instruction" (108) writes Adamson, without offering any explanation for Wordsworth's separation in educational philosophy from those of his fellow radicals.

Conventional criticism argues that Wordsworth's political views underwent a severe change in the course of his life. What I have tried to illustrate, however, is that although his conservatism became more apparent in his later years, there are many indications in his earlier works that make his categorisation as a radical problematic. An unconventional interpretation requires that Wordsworth's views on education be analysed in terms of power relationships, rather than seeking to evidence a social conscience toward the underprivileged. Altering the basis of approach to Wordsworth's educational philosophy leads one to deduce that his emerging conservatism, while not always predictable, was nevertheless inevitable.

Conclusion

The Enlightenment, it can be argued, did not represent the attainment of intellectual maturity. What has traditionally been presented as a period typified by discovery and increasing social emancipation reveals itself to provide an arena across which entrenched forces established their opposition. An examination of some of the eighteenth-century's philosophers confirms the inherent oppositions. What is not readily apparent is the extent to which techniques of power were being developed in an effort to fortify socio-political positions.

The relationships of power invade every social institution. Michel Foucault has shown how the human body becomes a site for the exercise of power in the penal system. Influenced by his analysis, I have shown in this study that systems of national education, such as that envisaged by William Wordsworth, are grounded in a desire to discipline and re-form certain segments of society. The emerging economy of power finds the chaos of eighteenth-century education an ideal environment in which to develop techniques of supervision and control. It is within the confusion of educational systems that we must look for evidence of vested interests manifesting themselves through various controlling and subjugating methodologies.

Examining the function of the Wanderer in one specific passage of *The Excursion* has served to identify the usefulness of an educational system to imperial ambition. By investigating the architecture of, and the methods employed in, schools especially designed for the children of factory workers, a new perspective might be given to socio-economic relationships. Similarly, an investigation of the charity school movement, including reports, regulations, and geographical distributions would illustrate the locations of religious power

offensives. The raison d'être of future studies is to probe the structures, physical and human, of educational institutions to reveal the relationships of social forces. The purpose would be to determine how, and to what extent, educational institutions aided in the construction of the subject, and what methods were employed to transform pupils into objects of study and observation. Such a study would not aim to confirm traditional interpretations of the class struggle. Rather, it would identify the locations and varieties of power of which class conflict is only symptomatic.

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