CANADIAN-CHINESE RELATIONS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVEREIGNTY
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IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVEREIGNTY

By

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to investigate the Sino-Canadian relationship in terms of shifts in policy and within the context of sovereignty. Canada's China policy since 1949 has been distinguished by three distinct phases: "no China", "one China" and "greater China" strategies. The thesis reviews the reasons attributed to the Canadian government's adoption of each of the three approaches. Furthermore, this thesis outlines the characteristics of Canada's "no China", "one China" and "greater China" policies.

The conceptualization of sovereignty outlined in the works of Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes provides a framework in which the evolution of Sino-Canadian relations may be analyzed. Negative and positive sovereignty present the different attributes of sovereign power. In terms of the exercise of sovereignty, the notions of final and ultimate recourse are useful in interpreting the Chinese perception of sovereign authority. It is only when a foreign state, such as Canada, intrudes upon the Chinese government's ultimate authority that a genuine intrusion upon Chinese sovereignty occurs. Conversely, the use of final sovereignty by Hong Kong, Taiwan and the Chinese provinces does not represent legitimate possession of power but merely the exercise of it; the sovereignty of the Chinese state remains paramount. This thesis outlines the characteristics and usage of both final and ultimate sovereign authority.
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Introduction
Sino-Canadian Relations: An Evaluation

In a review of Reluctant Adversaries: Canada and the People's Republic of China, Lee-Anne Broadhead makes a general observation that the lack of work on Sino-Canadian relations represents a gap in Canadian foreign policy literature. Broadhead's observation is especially noteworthy considering the high international profile that the Trudeau Government secured by drawing the PRC back into the international community in 1970. Canada's foreign policy towards the People's Republic of China (hereafter China or PRC) has gone through three distinct phases: deferral of recognition, "one China" and "greater China". The Canadian governments in the 1949-1968 period were constrained from establishing diplomatic relations with China and merely deferred the issue. The Trudeau Government's recognition of the PRC in 1970 established the beginning of Sino-Canadian diplomatic relations and the shift to Canada's "one China" policy. The change in Chinese leadership in 1976 marked another change in Canadian policy from a "one China" approach to a "greater China" strategy.

The perceived lack of Sino-Canadian work is especially unfortunate considering the growing importance of the PRC in international affairs at the end of the twentieth century. The PRC experienced double-digit GNP growth in the early and mid-1990s. The Chinese economy in the 1990s ranks as the third largest globally and has the potential for being the largest market in the world. However, a potential concern for the global community is that the continued overheating of China's economy could result in domestic turmoil and international instability. In addition, the Chinese navy increased its presence in the post-Cold War South China Sea to fill a vacuum left by American and Russian forces. Hong Kong and Macao are scheduled to return to China
in 1997 and 1999 respectively and China and Taiwan have had talks in the early 1990s pertaining to the reunification of island territory to the Chinese mainland. To exacerbate the preceding issues and their potential problems, the make-up and policy direction of a post-Deng Xiaoping Chinese leadership is uncertain. A reconsideration of both China and its international partnerships is important for all states.4

This thesis is devoted to two interconnected issues: a survey of Sino-Canadian relations from 1949 until the mid-1990s and how the relationship has affected the concept of sovereignty. As previously mentioned, Canada's foreign policy towards China may be distinguished by three general themes. Chapter one corresponds to the period in which the government deferred the recognition of the PRC. In effect, the deferral of the China issue translated into Canada's "no-China" policy in which the government officially recognized the Taiwan regime as the legitimate Chinese representative and shunned the PRC as a pariah. Although the "no-China" approach was officially adopted, the St. Laurent, Diefenbaker and Pearson Governments all accepted the importance and inevitability of establishing diplomatic relations with China. The government's proactive attitude with China did not translate into official policy as a result of a number of constraints. More so than any other case study in Canadian foreign policy, Ottawa's delay in recognizing Beijing came to be seen by critics as the primary example of Canada's failure to develop a so-called "independent foreign policy."5

Chapter two outlines the government's adoption of a "one China" policy from 1968-1976. Prime Minister Trudeau's personal commitment to the China issue was central to the establishment of Sino-Canadian diplomatic ties. The beginning of bilateral diplomatic ties in 1970 represented a change in Sino-Canadian relations from primarily being dependent upon American reaction to becoming genuinely a function of Chinese
and Canadian factors. The successful conclusion of diplomatic relations represented a legitimate solution to a dilemma that had been problematic for other states. The bilateral goodwill and Canada's adherence to a strict "one China" policy translated into an extremely amicable visit to the PRC by Trudeau in 1973. In addition, the Canadian government's refusal to allow Taiwanese athletes to represent the "Republic of China" at the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games was an example of Canada's commitment to a rigid "one China" policy.

The third phase of Canada's China policy is outlined in chapters three and four. The death of Chinese leader Mao Zedong and the eventual ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping facilitated the shift from Canada's rigid "one China" policy to the adoption of a "greater China" approach. The "greater China" strategy not only strengthens Canadian relations with the Beijing leadership but the government also openly expands its ties to the separate Chinese provinces, Taiwan and Hong Kong. The context of those relations are mainly economic, social and cultural but noticeably not political. The reasons attributed to the change towards China's acceptance of the expansion of international interaction with the Chinese provinces, Hong Kong and Taiwan are outlined in chapter three.

Chapter four examines how the Tiananmen Square Incident of 4 June 1989 affected Canada's China policy. Although initial responses from the Mulroney Government appeared to be damning of the Chinese military's attack upon pro-democracy demonstrators, the long-term Sino-Canadian relationship since has not been substantively altered. The expulsion of three Canadian MPs from the PRC in January 1992 also did not provoke a severe response from the Canadian Department of External Affairs. High levels of economic interaction and general exchange have been generally established to pre-Tiananmen Square levels for a number of reasons. If a harsh strategy
of sanctions was pursued, then the international community could have possibly provoked a renewed era of Chinese isolation from global politics and the Canadian government could have impaired domestic interests in the dynamic Chinese economy. An appraisal of Canada's post-Tiananmen Square "greater China" policy is presented in chapter four.

The Canadian government's three different China policy approaches have implications for the conceptualization of sovereignty. The section that follows this introductory segment outlines the conceptual paradigm of sovereignty to which this thesis will adhere. First, the link between the notion of sovereignty and the absolutist state will be established. A comparison of the works by Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes affirms the idea that sovereignty may only exist within a state with a defined authority. Consequently, only the state government can possess and exercise legitimate sovereign authority.

Having established the connection between the sovereign authority of the state and the legitimate possession of sovereign power, two further sets of details about sovereignty are outlined. Negative and positive sovereignty are two notions that are closely related to negative and positive liberty. Negative sovereignty denotes the right of a state to pursue national objectives independent of any direct international interference. Positive sovereignty is recognized as a state's pursuit of explicit national objectives. Only with the existence of negative sovereignty in a government's jurisdiction can a state exercise positive sovereignty. Another important difference between the two ideas is that negative sovereignty may be perceived as a totality while positive sovereignty is employed at different times; possession of positive sovereignty does not necessarily warrant its usage.
In addition to specific attributes of sovereignty, another important question is how absolute sovereignty is exercised by the government. In other words, it is important to perceive the government as possessing decision making power in the last resort and thereby to differentiate between "final" and "ultimate" recourse of sovereign authority. If an institution has the final prerogative, it may represent the last stage of consultation but it is still subject to overrule or veto by the ultimate seat of sovereignty. Referring to Bodin's and Hobbes' works, the state is the legitimate ultimate appeal because it owns sovereign authority in perpetuity. The government's delegation of power to an agent merely means that, in Bodin's words, the agent is a representative of sovereign power and may only exercise it. At the same time however the representative does not possess genuine sovereign authority. In effect, the agent has final sovereign prerogative but is still subject to the state. The state, which is the only legitimate recourse of ultimate sovereignty need not necessarily exercise its positive sovereign power.

A number of ramifications result from the conceptualization of final and ultimate recourse. One implication is that the ultimate resort of sovereign authority is also the final appeal although vice versa is not true. Secondly and more importantly, only the ultimate appellant is the legitimate sovereign authority and only it can legitimately possess negative and positive sovereignty. While the final agent may appear to exercise negative and positive sovereignty, only the ultimate resort can genuinely retain them. Conversely, the final agent may conduct "pseudo-sovereign" relations with states but again, they are conditional upon the ultimate authority's implicit or explicit approval.

The designation of negative and positive sovereignty as well as final and ultimate recourse is useful in understanding and explaining perceptions of Chinese sovereignty as well as China's conduct of foreign relations. The Canadian government's recognition of
the PRC was also a legitimization of Chinese negative and positive sovereignty. In chapters one and two, the approach taken by China reflects a rigid and uncompromising position of "one China". In the conceptual framework of this thesis, the Mao Government only allowed diplomatic relations on the basis of a recognition of China's negative and positive sovereignty. Furthermore, the Mao Government exercised its final prerogative while maintaining its ultimate source of authority. In other words, the Chinese state was the last recourse of decision making.

The Mao Government insisted upon recognition of its inflexible "one China" position as the basis of any diplomatic relations. During the period outlined in chapter one however the Canadian government was unwilling to officially accept the PRC's claims of "one China" and itself maintained a "no China" policy. Instead the governments from 1949 to 1968 publicly conceded the negative and positive sovereignty of the Taiwan regime in China. The reasons attributed to Canada's rejection of a "one China" policy are outlined in chapter one. In chapter two, the Trudeau Government was willing to concur with the communists' demands of a rigid "one China" perception. The recognition of the PRC symbolized Canada's acceptance of Chinese ownership of negative and positive sovereignty as well as acknowledgement of the Chinese government's ultimate recourse of sovereignty. The Trudeau Government's de facto de-recognition of the Taiwan regime translated in delegitimization of Taiwan's claims to negative and positive sovereignty.

In the absence of official diplomatic relations however the Canadian governments utilized an effective tool of economic engagement. In the early 1960s, the government adopted a policy of initiating economic relations with the PRC. One long term effect of Canada's engagement policies was that a foundation of bilateral goodwill was established
which proved to be beneficial in future diplomatic negotiations. In addition, a form of bilateralism, albeit not political, was founded and the Canadian government ensured that the Chinese state was not ostracized nor isolated from the international community. Once the PRC was officially recognized, the Canadian government embraced the same engagement strategy with the Taiwan regime by maintaining and increasing Canadian-Taiwanese trade.

Chapters three and four correspond to a more flexible and compromising approach to sovereignty by the Chinese government. The death of Mao Zedong and the rise of Deng Xiaoping as leader of the PRC represented the turning point in the revision of Chinese perceptions of its ultimate sovereign authority. The Deng Government was more tolerant than Mao's government to other countries conducting relations with the Chinese provinces, Taiwan and Hong Kong, which were all considered to be constituent parts of China. The proposition of Canadian intercourse with the constituent parts of China was perceived by the pre-1976 PRC leadership as a de facto recognition of Taiwanese and Hong Kong "statehood", and an intrusion upon Chinese authority in its provincial jurisdictions. However, as a means to facilitate the construction of a modern Chinese economy, the government delegated its final authority to the constituent parts of China in the post-1976 period. Effectively, the provinces, Hong Kong and Taiwan were Bodinian representatives of sovereign authority but were still subject to veto of the ultimate source of sovereignty: the Chinese government.

Chapter three examines the rigid Maoist and the more flexible Dengist interpretations of sovereignty. The reasons attributed to the shift from an uncompromising to a pragmatic position of authority are outlined in detail in chapter three. The chapter also surveys the two levels of Canada's "greater China" policy:
Canadian relations with China proper and "pseudo-sovereign" ties between Canada and both Hong Kong and Taiwan. Chapter four profiles an instance where the Chinese government used its ultimate sovereign authority: the Tiananmen Square Incident. Although final sovereignty was given to the constituent parts of China, the Chinese government did not use its ultimate prerogative because it wanted to facilitate an ideal impression for foreign investors and there was no substantial threat to the security of the state. In the Chinese government's perception, the Tiananmen Square Incident was a challenge to its negative and positive sovereignty.

The after effects of the Tiananmen Square Incident upon China's vision of its sovereignty are twofold. First, the Chinese were eager to re-establish the pre-Tiananmen Square economic development levels but in order to attract foreign investors, the government had to adopt a flexible position towards sovereignty and ensure that the constituent parts of China had a level of final sovereign authority reminiscent of the pre-Tiananmen Square era. This first point reinforces the circumstances under which ultimate sovereignty is used: the exercise of final sovereignty is tolerated as long as state security and government goals and objectives are not threatened. Second, although the Chinese government was eager to encourage a "business as usual" mentality, it also became more emphatic in reminding the world community of where ultimate sovereignty in China remained.

The engagement strategy that proved beneficial first with the Diefenbaker Government in 1960 and then the Trudeau Government in the early 1970s was pursued in the post-1976 period. In the absence of official state level relations between Canada and both Hong Kong and Taiwan, the Canadian government's best strategy was to forge a
type of bilateral engagement. In the Deng era, the Canadian government was able to increase its primarily economic ties with Hong Kong and Taiwan.

The possibility of such a relationship was again attributed to the Chinese government's implicit delegation of final sovereignty to Hong Kong and Taiwan. Only with the tacit approval from Beijing is Canada allowed to conduct bilateral engagement with the two territories. Furthermore, by increasing the level of bilateralism and maximizing Hong Kong's and Taiwan's final sovereignty, the Canadian government would be able to encourage an image of "statehood" to each of the island territories. As was the case of the PRC in the early 1960s, the founding of bilateral engagement policies maintained and strengthened a foundation of international goodwill between Canada and Hong Kong and Taiwan when diplomatic relations were not possible. Furthermore, Canada's engagement policies allows Hong Kong and Taiwan interaction in the global arena and conversely prevents them from ostracism and isolation.

Two additional observations from the next segment of the introduction are noteworthy for the rest of this thesis. The perception of sovereignty specifically utilized in this thesis is presented. An epistemic concern with "sovereignty", as with any term used in international relations, is that it is a functional term that varies as particular circumstances change. In other words, words have uses rather than a single comprehensive meaning. The functionality of terms is an advantage to this thesis: the explanation and understanding of political phenomena is greatly enhanced by different and diverse uses. Camilleri and Falk argued that "[it] needs to be recognized from the outset that the theory of sovereignty is a product of particular social and economic conditions."
An approach that Bodin adopted for his own works will also be utilized in this analysis of the notion of "sovereignty" and the Sino-Canadian case study. In addition to the value of Bodin's contribution of the first theory of sovereignty, he also provided a historical methodology as a means to developing his ideas. The advantages of using Bodin's reflective method are to note the factors that contributed to the variations of "sovereignty's" meaning and extract practical components of that term.

In addition to the specific arguments presented in each of the chapters, there are a number of general conclusions that may be made from the following survey of Sino-Canadian relations. Canada's China policy went through three phases: a deferral of the recognition of the PRC which effectively meant a "no China" policy; a "one China" approach and finally; a "greater China" strategy. The reasons explaining each of the phases are detailed in each of the chapters. Throughout the next four chapters however it was apparent that Canada's China policy was dependent upon external influences. The Canadian governments since 1949 have shown an interest in diplomatic relations with the PRC. However, the pursuit of such a policy depended upon the potential American reaction and the unwillingness of the Chinese government to be internationally active. The expansion from a "one China" to a "greater China" approach was primarily attributed to the Chinese government's shift to a flexible perception of its sovereignty after the death of Chairman Mao. The Canadian government's actions to the Tiananmen Square Incident was largely ineffective because the Department of External Affairs had to be sensitive to the possible negative reaction from the Chinese government of a more stringent and damning response.

The findings of this thesis also have implications for the conceptualization of sovereignty. Until 1976 the Mao era was exemplified by a rigid vision of Chinese
sovereignty. The Chinese government retained negative and positive sovereignty but was uncompromising in its paramount position as China's sovereign authority. The Dengist period however showed a clearer division of the final and ultimate recourse of sovereign authority. Deng was willing to allow the constituent parts of China final authority while retaining the ultimate prerogative in Beijing. The only circumstance under which the ultimate prerogative is used by the state is when its security is threatened. Although the provinces, Hong Kong and Taiwan did exercise apparent "sovereign" attributes, only the Chinese government legitimately possessed negative and positive sovereignty. As a juxtaposition to Bodin's conceptualization, the Chinese government is the legitimate ultimate authority since its maintenance of power is perpetual and may be utilized at any point in time. Therefore, the expansion of Canada's relations to a "greater China" strategy is not an intrusion upon Bodinian absolute sovereignty.

**Sovereignty and the State**

The following section has two purposes. The first objective will be to underline the importance of the "state" and "sovereignty" in political analysis regardless of one's international relations theoretical persuasion. The close link between the two terms will be noted in the next section by examining works by Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes. The second intention of this conceptual section is to present one of the apparent problems in the analysis of political ideas: the search for a universally acceptable meaning for concepts. The underlying approach of this thesis however is to examine the plurality of definitions and usages of "sovereignty" and amalgamate them into a conceptual framework. A survey of additional works by Bodin and Hobbes will contribute ideas
towards formulating an appropriate paradigm of sovereignty in the context of Sino-Canadian relations.

The concept of sovereignty will be examined in conjunction with the development of the absolutist state since the evolution of "sovereignty" and the "state" are directly related. Bodin argued that the element of sovereignty was the distinguishing factor between the state and other forms of human association: "[i]dentity of a state...depends on the identity of its sovereign." The connection between the two concepts was the focus in international relations theory in the immediate post-World War II period. The central actor in the Realist paradigm was the state and its main concern was how to acquire power. Morgenthau's philosophy was a reflection of an issue at the beginning of the cold war: the state and its sovereignty in the context of military security. The state remains an important feature in international relations despite other theories that emphasize, among other things, economic, technological, and social considerations. Although the case study of Sino-Canadian relations illustrates the effects of different factors, such as economic, on the usage of sovereignty, the state remains the primary agent of sovereign authority. However, despite the plethora of theories that are not centered upon the state, an analysis of the original interpretation of sovereignty and the state is essential since it will provide a starting reference point from which modifications to their meanings may occur.

The difficulty in assessing the state and sovereignty seem to originate from an epistemological concern, or more specifically, using nomenclature without a universally accepted definition. Vincent attributed this perceived dilemma to three general interpretations of the state: empirical, historical and personified. The dilemma need not be viewed as a problem, but rather an advantage to the understanding of political
concepts. First, a consideration of all the various states in the international community would show that each has different structures, political institutions, cultures, values and interpretations of ideology, among other distinct features. Thus, empirical observation of states leads to the conclusion that no one specific model is characteristic of all states and as a result, an outline of the generic state is thus pointless. Consequently, the broad applications of sovereignty within the context of different forms of states make the meaning of the term more vague.

Secondly, different scholars have debated the origin of the modern state and sovereignty. Hinsley rejected the notion that the Greek polis was the first instance of the modern state since the city-state did not satisfy the characteristics of sovereign statehood. Instead, he argued that the European states system in the sixteenth century indicated the emergence of the modern era. Arguably, any discussion of the state would be problematic since the roots of its historical development range from the ancient Greek city-states to medieval Europe, depending upon which opinion one subscribes to. Accordingly, the beginnings of sovereignty are also open to debate. One of the themes of this thesis is that sovereignty is a functional term that varies as particular circumstances within a polity change.

The final epistemological concern that Vincent cited was the personification of the state. The proponents of organic statism embraced the analogy between the state and a living organism. Ratzel's notion of Lebensraum referred to the space needed by the collective social organism to live in. James personified the state when he made analogies between the emergence of sovereignty and the life processes, using words such as "conception" and "birth". Hegel also argued that the state had been transformed from "an artificial creation" to a natural organic entity. The inherent problem with these
views is that it gives the impression that the state is actually conducting its own affairs. Rather than accepting individuals as state representatives, the state, in the form of a person, is acting upon its own volition. The personification of the state must be contrasted with the corporate personality of a state. Klein envisioned the state as an amalgamation of different and conflicting personalities acting in concert. The idea espoused by Klein closely mirrors that in Hobbes' *Leviathan* where the state is a manifestation of the collective consciousness of society.

Vincent's three arguments raise a principal question of using the state and sovereignty in universally acceptable manners. It will become evident that specific interpretations of sovereignty and the state vary slightly. Rather than explicitly defining the terms, outlining commonly held principles and practical components of "state" and "sovereignty" in order to grasp a better understanding would have some value. James noted that "words have uses rather than a single correct meaning... there is no reason why terms such as 'state' and 'sovereignty' should have a single meaning [emphasis added]." At first glance, this would appear to exacerbate the perceived epistemological problems that James presented. However, the minor differences need not be perceived as a dilemma. The lack of a single meaning is arguably an advantage to a term since a number of different and diverse uses may be found to explain and understand political phenomena. The remainder of this introduction will outline the conceptual parameters and interpretations and by doing this, the contextual framework of the arguments in the empirical case study will be provided.

The initial section highlighted the relationship between "sovereignty" and the "state". While the connection between the two terms was central in the Realist paradigm, the usefulness of the "state" and "sovereignty" in other strands of international relations
theoretical perspectives cannot be ignored. The next two sections will trace the concomitant development of the notions of the absolutist state and absolute sovereignty. One epistemic problem of using the terms "state" and "sovereignty" is that there is lacking a universally agreed upon definition of those notions. However, the methodology used to develop the conceptual framework of this thesis exploits the plurality of different meanings and positively utilizes practical components from a number of different perceptions.

**Bodin and Hobbes: Comparison and Contrast of Absolutism**

The following section outlines the inter-related notions of the absolutist state and sovereignty by means of contrasting Jean Bodin's *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem* (1566) (henceforth *Methodus*) and *Six livres de la république* (1576) (henceforth *République*) as well as Thomas Hobbes' *De Cive* (1642) and *Leviathan* (1651). The conceptualization of sovereignty was problematic for Bodin in *Methodus* because he envisioned a mixed-type of state that had numerous wielders of authority. The problem of juxtaposing a concrete definition of sovereignty with a state that was not absolutist in nature was also inherent in Hobbes' *De Cive*. The dilemma was rectified however in subsequent works by Bodin and Hobbes. In both the *République* and *Leviathan*, a clearer understanding of sovereignty was established because an absolutist form of state government was introduced.

*Methodus* outlined Bodin's first thoughts of sovereignty and its scope of power. Bodin explicitly renounced absolutism in *Methodus* and argued that the concentration of authority in one seat was not ideal. He suggested that the "limited supremacy" of the ruler (in other words, subjection of a sovereign to laws and procedures of society) was
not only the proper conceptualization of sovereignty but also the model structure of the
monarchy in Europe.\(^{17}\) Although Bodin argued in the \textit{République} that sovereign power
was both absolute and perpetual, his earlier work indicated otherwise. The centrality of
sovereignty in Bodin's work appeared after he flatly rejected the existence of mixed types
of states. A polity could adopt a monarchical, aristocratic or democratic structure but not
a combination of the three.

The inherent contradiction of his term "limited supremacy" is obvious: an
individual's powers cannot be restricted if one is paramount. Compounded with the
absence of absolutism in his original inquiry in \textit{Methodus}, Bodin was ambiguous as to
the governmental structure of the state (or in Bodin's terminology, the commonwealth).
The monarchical sovereign was only one of three autonomous groups in society charged
with the function of governing; the senate and the assembly were responsible to an
aristocracy and a democracy respectively.\(^{18}\) In his mixed state system, Bodin divided the
scope of sovereign authority among three seats of power, each of which represented a
different governmental system: a monarchy, aristocracy and democracy.

In his critique of Bodin's works, Franklin underlined the ambiguity and apparent
contradiction in \textit{Methodus} as the weakness of Bodin's first published work. Franklin
argued that sovereignty was monarchical in connotation:

\begin{quote}
\textit{it [sovereignty] immediately suggests the 'sway or dominion' of one person over
others, the first ruling and the others being ruled. But in a pure democracy, this
relationship of ruler and subject does not obtain in any obvious or determinate
sense. The entire society, as it were, is included in the 'subject' of sovereignty.
Mutatis mutandis, the same peculiarity applies to aristocracies as well.}^{19}\end{quote}

Thus based upon the notion of allocating sovereign authority to government structures
other than the monarch, Franklin questioned the validity of Bodin's argument. The basis
of his claim was that the monarch was the legitimate final and ultimate recourse in
exercising sovereign power. Second, Franklin argued that sharing sovereign authority was contradictory in nature. The concerns that Franklin had were non-existent in Bodin's second work République.

Hobbes differed slightly in his notion of a mixed state system. In De Cive (1642), Hobbes admitted that instead of a mixed state, the existence of a mixed form of government was possible. Bodin argued that a commonwealth could have a mixture of monarchical, aristocratic and democratic forms of government. Hobbes, on the other hand, argued that a state could have only one of the three forms but that it could possess attributes of the other two.20 As was the case of Bodin, Hobbes also allocates sovereign authority between the three autonomous groups. Although one could argue that each perspective is worded or focussed differently, the general idea in both works remains the same: within a state, different forms of government may exist, each possessing sovereign authority. The idea of a mixed form of government in the state was rejected in Leviathan in which Hobbes argued that the division of the state into three factions (monarchy, aristocracy and democracy) was not one independent commonwealth but three independent factions.21

Once both philosophers further developed the notion of the absolutist state as the final and ultimate recourse of power in the République and Leviathan, a more definite interpretation of sovereignty emerged. Although Bodin's République and Hobbes' Leviathan each represent slightly different interpretations of the sovereign's hegemony, they are considered precedent-setting works in the literature pertaining to sovereignty. Bodin's work was the first comprehensive and general definition of the exercise of sovereignty that emerged from the development of the modern states system in the sixteenth century.22 The political ideas in the République represented a departure from
the constraints of medieval thinking and shifted them to the context of the modern states system.

Leviathan was a watershed for it solidified the idea that sovereignty was not divisible.\textsuperscript{23} Hobbes' work was initially excluded from discussion of the nature of authority because it de-emphasized the role of theology in political philosophy. More specifically, Leviathan rearranged the hierarchical relationship between the sovereign and God by elevating the sovereign's power over the church.\textsuperscript{24} Hinsley noted that the furor over Hobbes' work was based upon the shift "from theological to rationalist premises in the approach to political issues."\textsuperscript{25} As a result, Hobbes' work received negative responses since he down-played the predominant role of religion in political thought.

The usage of two slightly different schools to explain the absolutist school again underlines a general approach of this introductory conceptual section. Despite the variations of the different philosophies, both represent a more general notion of sovereignty. Hence, practical components of each paradigm will be used to illustrate the concept of sovereignty rather than to furnish an explicit definition. Again, the value of utilizing different interpretations is to provide a more comprehensive understanding of sovereignty. In light of that position, however, each distinct explanation does not make it more valid than the other.

Absolute sovereignty differs only slightly in the République and Leviathan. Bodin and Hobbes separately suggest that the public power within a state lies with a sovereign, whether it be a person in the République or an entity in Hobbes' Leviathan. The general conceptualization of absolutism is the same although Hobbes takes a more extreme position than Bodin. Both also argue that the interests of the sovereign reflect
those of the state, whether it be national security or other defined objectives or goals. Each work differs however as to the exact relationship between the ruler and the ruled. More specifically, how the sovereign is allotted its dominion from society is unique in each reading: the interpretation of Bodin is more explicit in society's legitimization of a sovereign's power than *Leviathan*. République and *Leviathan* espouse the same general principles but there are small differences between Bodin's puissance absolue or puissance souveraine and Hobbes' *Leviathan*.

The development of the absolutist state and the notion of sovereignty correspond and are inter-related. The idea of one centralized seat of power within a polity (summa potestas) emerged only after the first conscious philosophical formulation of the absolutist state. As a consequence, it is important to reiterate that absolute sovereignty can only preside within an absolutist state system. In order to qualify that claim, a clarification of "absolute" should be made. Although the point will be expanded later, absolute in this context denotes ultimateness or paramountcy, rather than the totality of control of the dominion. This contextual interpretation of absolute could also be extended to include the monarchy, senate or assembly in separate instances, as wielders of absolute sovereignty. The point is that the notion of an absolutist state should be expanded not only to include the medieval interpretation of a monarchy but any form of commonwealth that has a single governmental structure that has access to sovereign power.

Vincent's definition of the absolutist state is useful for it underlines its basic tenets as well as the differences between Bodin and Hobbes:

the idea that the ruler, *however much he may be responsible to God...* does not require the consent of any other human agent in making public policy [or that] it is a form of monarchical government in which the prince's authority is in fact free (unbound, absolute) from check by any higher authority or
organ of popular representation [emphasis added].

The phrase "however much he may be responsible to God" is emphasized because religion had a different impact on Bodin's philosophy than it did on Hobbes'. In *Leviathan*, there was no direct relationship between the Leviathan and God whereas in the *République*, religious considerations influenced who the monarch was accountable to as well as his hierarchical standing in the commonwealth. Hobbes took absolutism more to an extreme in two ways: the Leviathan was less accountable to society than Bodin's monarch and; the Leviathan was not liable at all to God.

In addition to Bodin's sovereign being relatively more responsible to society and God than the Leviathan, there was also a difference in the method of allocating a sovereign's dominion from society. Whereas Bodin's society apportioned sovereign authority *explicitly* to the sovereign, Hobbes' society did it *implicitly*. Another difference is that each sovereign takes a different form: a monarch in Bodin's paradigm and a persona ficta in *Leviathan*. The interests of both soverigns however reflect the prerogatives of the state.

*Six livres de la république* (1576) was a departure from the pluralistic notions of the mixed state that Bodin wrote about in *Methodus* ten years previously. Starting from the *République*, the fundamental principle of Bodin's political theory was that "there must be somewhere in the state a supreme and absolute authority." Thus power had shifted from different agents of the political community into a single concentrated governing individual or entity. More specifically, Bodin modified his vision of the commonwealth to be monarchical in character with a single sovereign authority.

At the outset of his analysis in the *République*, Bodin stated a precise definition: "sovereignty is that absolute and perpetual power vested in a commonwealth." The two terms, perpetual and absolute, have specific meanings. Bodin made a distinction
between delegating power to an agent for a particular period of time and giving authority
to a sovereign for the term of his natural life. In the former scenario, a "representative" is
given only the exercise of power and not the possession of power. That authority,
furthermore, must be forfeited at the end of a specified duration. Legitimate sovereignty
can exist only when absolute authority is granted for the term of the sovereign's life, or
using Bodin's terminology, in perpetuity.\textsuperscript{30} The condition of perpetuity underlines one of
the specific conditions that Bodin places upon controlling sovereignty. It is insufficient
merely to represent sovereign power or exercise it for an allotted time; a sovereign must
inherit and have inalienable control of authority in order to be legitimate.

The source of sovereign authority ultimately rests with society. While the ruler
exercised sovereign power, the majestas lay with the people.\textsuperscript{31} Society was the source of
the ruler's power and only it could explicitly delegate the Divine Right of Kings, the seat
of supreme authority, upon the sovereign monarch in perpetuity. Again, for a monarch to
be legitimately sovereign, he must not merely temporarily exercise power but have
unconditional possession.

Hobbes' \textit{Leviathan} (1651) also focussed upon the state's relationship with society.
Yet in this respect, Hobbes departs from Bodin in one slight variation. In \textit{Leviathan}, the
sovereign is the manifestation of the body politic and thus possessed its soul. This notion
differs from Bodin's argument of society explicitly delegating sovereign authority to the
monarch. The presence of the Leviathan, according to Hobbes, is contingent only upon
the existence of society. As a result, the sovereign represents the citizens and its
judgment is a reflection of society's general interests.\textsuperscript{32} Furthermore, since man
renounced his individual right of private judgement, the Leviathan constituted the
collective conscience of society.\textsuperscript{33} Thus implicitly, by renouncing their rights, society
gives supreme authority to rule to the state. In either Bodin's or Hobbes' case, the authority of a sovereign is dependent upon the existence and in Bodin's case, approval, of the community.

Each perception has specific implications for conceptualizing the relationship between the sovereign and society. In Bodin's case, while the sovereign is given his authority to rule from society, he nonetheless remains superior to the political community. Thus the framework for sovereignty for Bodin is a social contract between the ruler and ruled. Since the Leviathan is a manifestation of all of society, the relationship is not as clear cut. The Leviathan represents the values and ideas of the political community while at the same time rules over it; "[l]aw itself, as the command of the sovereign, is nothing but an [aggregated] expression of the will [of the polity]."34

A concept of particular interest to this thesis is the notion of "absoluteness". The allocation of absolute power translates into the total control and imposition of legislative power by a sovereign within the state regardless of the consent of the subjects contained therein (Bodin refers to this as toute puissance). A consequence of his interpretation, however, is that while the monarch sets the laws of the state (in Bodin's terminology, positive law), he is generally not bound by them.35 Moral constraints restrict the monarch since he must consider and be bound to any agreements which "touch the interests of his subjects individually or collectively."36 In other words, the king must always have the best interests of society in mind. Furthermore, the monarch must adhere to promises made to other sovereign rulers. In terms of foreign policy, therefore, the king is bound by covenant, a mutual undertaking between sovereigns. Bodin also recognized the judicial and administrative role of the crown but argued that its most fundamental power was to make law.37
In contrast to the argument put forth in the Methodus, Bodin unequivocally rejected the concept of a mixed sovereignty in République, in terms of separating authority among different seats of governmental power, particularly the king, lords and assembly. He argued in République that the unity of the medieval European legal system "logically required" the unification of power in a single ruler or single ruling group. Bodin further extended his argument to note that there could be no limitations upon how that sovereign power was exercised (except those conditions that existed by the sovereign's will), even if the result was tyranny. Theoretically, a tyrannical sovereign or one who misrules can still be legitimate and thus could not be subject to restraint, deposition nor assassination.

Although Bodin's conception of absolute has a connotation of totality of power, one qualification does exist. The monarch remains subservient only to God and subject to deterministic natural law:

all the princes of the earth are subject to them, and cannot contravene them without treason and rebellion against God... they must bow their heads in fear and reverence before His divine majesty. The absolute power of princes and sovereign lords does not extend to the laws of God and of nature.

Thus absolute power implies freedom in relation to positive and not natural laws. The idea of the Divine Right of Kings suggested that only a monarch who was subject solely to God could have the legitimate claim to sovereign authority. The monarch's position to God and natural law was also a reflection of the commonwealth's universal acceptance of divine determinism as a theocratic principle in basic political thought. The king's unconditional freedom over positive law fulfilled a need to check the unlimited and dynamic scope of the political community. However, since natural law was ultimately pre-determined by God, the king could not have any control over its destiny. The
sovereign's sub-ordinate status to God was consistent with the primacy of religion in medieval European society.

The structural relationships between the sovereign, God and society was based upon the nature of the political community. In République, the exercise of sovereign power addressed the needs of the community, not merely to the monarch's claims of raison d'être. In other words, the only way for the political community to maintain the security of its borders and prevent societal disharmony and ultimately anarchy was to recognize an ultimate power which in tum could employ control over society. Thus sovereign rule over positive law was not necessarily synonymous with absolutism per se but it performed a regulatory function in the political community. The Leviathan also performed the same role in Hobbes' interpretation. Self-interest and self-preservation motivated man and as a result, individuals in society needed a power that enforced obedience in society: the Leviathan. The role of the sovereign was to create a public system of checks out of a moral and legal vacuum. Hobbes' philosophy differs from Bodin, however, when he includes the conduct of the church within the scope of the sovereign's authority.

A reexamination of Bodin's work will also provide insight into the methodology and approach that he took towards the analysis of sovereignty. Bodin emphasized the utility of historical experience rather than using his philosophy in a predictive context. Through the comprehension of history, Bodin sought to develop an understanding of the exercise of sovereignty. His approach compared historical examples to contemporary factors as a means to explaining the phenomena of a particular case study.

In recognizing that sovereignty was a product of specific social and economic factors, Camilleri and Falk also underlined the importance of a historical perspective.
In his address to the Australia and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science, G.V. Portus examined how the concept of sovereignty evolved and concluded that it was a malleable term that changed in function to suit a particular time period or circumstances: "...sovereignty has changed over and over again in different hands. Men have used it for what they wanted to get out of it."47

The focus on history as a tool to understand political concepts is valuable for two reasons: the variations in the "state's" and "sovereignty's" meaning are noted but also the factors that contributed to those changes. Therefore, in addition to providing a conceptual framework for sovereignty, Bodin's work is also useful since it provides a method of drawing forth the useful components of that term. Bodin's reflective method will also be the methodology utilized in this thesis. A survey of the history of Sino-Canadian relations will underline some specific interpretative changes in China's sovereignty throughout the period. Furthermore, this approach will also provide a means to which these changes may be explained.

In summary, the evolution of the concept of sovereignty occurred concurrently with the historical development of the absolutist state. In Methodus and De Cive, Bodin and Hobbes respectively had difficulty establishing a non-contradictory conceptualization of sovereignty because the state had more than one recourse of authority. A comprehensive notion of sovereignty was developed only when Bodin and Hobbes established an absolutist state with a single authority. Although both Hobbes and Bodin represent the absolutist notion of the state, each perspective differs slightly in the specific relationships among the sovereign, society and the church. The fact that different philosophers may subscribe to their own distinctive attributes of the same general paradigm does not make any one philosophy more valid than another; having specifically
different perceptions does not negate their affiliation with the general term. Furthermore, the Bodinian historical methodology utilized in analyzing sovereignty within the context of Sino-Canadian relations was presented in the previous section. It is the reflective method that will be used in presenting the empirical Sino-Canadian case study.

**Exercise of Negative and Positive Sovereignty**

Negative and positive sovereignty are derivations of Isaiah Berlin's ideas of liberty. Man's negative liberty is essentially his inherent formal-legal right to be free from being interfered with by another member of society. D'entrêves cited John Stuart Mill's notion of negative liberty as "the only freedom which deserves the name, is that pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it [emphasis added]." Hence, from a reading of both Mill and Berlin, a person is free from external influence and cannot intrude upon another individual's freedom. Furthermore, in order for negative liberty to be legitimate, individuals must recognize one's right to act freely.

Positive liberty, on the other hand, is the actual exercise of freedom. It is the cognitive pursuit and realization of one's own goals. From the two ideas, a general conclusion maybe deduced that only with the possession of negative liberty may positive liberty be legitimately exerted; the former is a necessary pre-condition for the latter. Negative liberty cannot by itself enable man to become self-determining but merely provide the opportunity for persons to legitimately pursue self-determination. Only when members of society enjoy the privilege of unobstructed activity can they genuinely facilitate the pursuit of their objectives. Another differentiation between negative and positive liberty is that negative liberty may be viewed as a totality while positive liberty is
relative; the latter is exercised in different degrees at distinct times. Similar to the example of negative liberty, society must recognize another person's positive liberty or ability to legitimately wield a freedom to conduct themselves in a self-deterministic manner.

The ideas of negative and positive liberty influenced both Schwarzenberger's and Jackson's perceptions of sovereignty. The state's legal freedom from interference from other states may be perceived as negative sovereignty; nonintervention is the key concept. Schwarzenberger added that beyond the freedom to act, the state is also justified in determining the scope of its policy (ius civile). Since the negative sovereign state is not influenced by any other, it has the privilege of creating its own political institutions. In turn, these instruments provide a firm foundation in the exercise of sovereignty in the positive sense. Its relationship to absolutism revolves around the concept of nonintervention from an external party. For a state to be legitimately sovereign, other states must recognize it to possess negative sovereignty. Without the element of recognition, an entity is not viewed as a state and cannot genuinely employ positive sovereign attributes.

The exact transposition of the ideas of negative liberty to negative sovereignty is not without problems though. As Jackson noted, potential goals and benefits for the state and individuals cannot be assumed to be the same. While the individual is the sole agent in society, the state represents many and complex agents with conflicting interests. Furthermore, the seat of accountability differs in the negative liberty concept and the negative sovereignty paradigm. An individual is responsible solely for himself whereas the sovereign must consider the differing interests in the state as well as other sovereigns. The discrepancies make the conceptualization of a state's negative sovereignty somewhat
more complicated than an individual's negative liberty. The ideas of Berlin and Mill provide a basic, albeit inexact, framework in which to grasp a better understanding of the intricacies of sovereignty.

Berlin's idea of positive liberty also has value in looking at the notion of positive sovereignty. As with the case of positive liberty, a positively sovereign state not only benefits from nonintervention from external agents but also possesses the means to take advantage of its position and pursue explicit national objectives (ius gentium). The state essentially exhibits a self-deterministic character. Again, a state cannot legitimately pursue its substantive goals without the formal-legal right of self-determination. A state's positive sovereignty must also be recognized by other countries for it to legitimately collaborate with other governments and engage in international agreements. While a state is either sovereign or not in formal-legal terms, the exercise of positive sovereignty cannot be perceived as a totality but rather it is employed in varying degrees at different times. The concept of absoluteness may also be described within the context of positive sovereignty. The sovereign state remains the only institution that has final and ultimate authority to pursue goals on behalf of society. So while positive sovereignty may or may not be exhibited or exercised, the institution that will always wield it is the state.

The imprecise transposition of negative and positive liberty to negative and positive sovereignty respectively should not negate the usefulness of using Berlin's and Mill's ideas to conceptualize sovereignty. The recognition of a state's negative sovereignty results in the legitimate opportunity for that state to exercise its freedom of choice. Beyond the possession of negative sovereignty, a state's positive sovereignty represents its actual use of authority. Therefore a state may possess positive sovereign
power but may not necessarily always exercise it. The dormant quality of positive sovereignty will be explained further in subsequent chapters but suffice to note at this point that it is not necessary to exercise positive sovereignty in order to legitimize it.

The Sino-Canadian case study is a clear illustration of the Canadian government's recognition of China's negative and positive sovereignty. Canada's establishment of diplomatic ties with the PRC in 1970 officially acknowledged the legitimate authority of the communist government in Beijing. In addition, acknowledgement of China's negative sovereignty implicitly legitimized the PRC's positive sovereignty. However as the survey of the post-Mao period shows, China's positive sovereignty generally remained dormant and was not exercised. The factors that influenced the Chinese government's hesitation to employ its positive sovereign authority are explored in chapter three.

**Seat of Absolute Sovereignty: Final or Ultimate Recourse**

In the République, the monarch had final legislative power subject only to God and natural law. In Bodin's paradigm, the crown represented the "final" recourse of absolute authority. Final, in this context, refers to the last recourse of consultation in most circumstances. Although the king's decision was final, the crown was theoretically subordinate to the implicit or explicit approval of God and natural law. God theoretically represented the ultimate recourse of authority because the power of God was paramount to the king although God did not have to exercise positive sovereignty as a means of legitimation. However since divine intervention was effectively not possible, Bodin interpreted the king also as the ultimate recourse of sovereign authority. Hobbes' Leviathan had supreme power in the sense that its exercise of sovereign authority was
subject to no other institution. Therefore, the Leviathan symbolized not only the final but also the ultimate sovereign authority.

One slight discrepancy between "final" and "ultimate" is that if one is the ultimate, then that agent is also the final recourse of sovereignty. Conversely, while one may represent the final recourse of sovereign authority, this does not necessarily mean that it has ultimate power. If someone is the final agent consulted, there still remains a higher application of sovereignty: the ultimate source. This minute disparity was emphasized by Morgenthau in Politics Among Nations: "in [any] state, democratic or otherwise, there must be a man or a group of men ultimately responsible for the exercise of political authority [emphasis added]."57 Again, in his interpretation of ultimate, Morgenthau underlined the paramountcy of the sovereign authority rather than which agent was the last consulted. The German notion Kompetenzkompetenz was simply the "'power of power' or the power of an entity to determine the scope of its own competence and to regulate its exercise [read "whether to act or not"]."58 In all cases, legitimate sovereign governments represent the ultimate resort of sovereign power, as illustrated in both Bodin's and Hobbes' works.

One implication of the differentiation of final and ultimate power is that in the latter case, the sovereign does not necessarily have to exercise its authority. Positive sovereignty need not necessarily be employed since the wielder of that power is ultimately the absolute source of authority. Another way one could look at the kinetic nature of ultimate sovereignty is its usage in relative terms. Observing the employment of sovereignty in terms of ultimate recourse leads to the conclusion that the nature of legitimate sovereignty when defined in terms of consent is not a concept of totality. James presented an analogy:
sovereignty is like a cake which starts off at the same size for all states but which is cut into by different amounts and at different times in accordance with the acceptance of legal obligations—a slice here and a sliver there.59

The assertion of a state's ultimate sovereignty in its international relations could be perceived as a relative principle. The sovereign who possesses absolute authority exercises it discriminately depending on particular circumstances. Furthermore, the possession of legitimate sovereign authority always lies in the hands of the ultimate sovereign power not the final sovereign power. The exercise of final sovereign power may include "pseudo-sovereign" pursuits that may be legally binding between state governments but these covenants are still subject to an ultimate source of sovereignty.

Final and ultimate may also be distinguished by relating them to Bodin's condition of perpetuity. In order for a monarch to be legitimate, Bodin argued that absolute sovereign authority had to be ordained in perpetuity. A deduction may be made that a final sovereign authority may possess sovereign attributes under tacit approval of the ultimate source. However, the latter allocation of authority to the former merely makes the final source what Bodin referred to as a "representative" of sovereign power. Conversely, the ultimate source of sovereign power is the custodian of sovereign power in perpetuity.

In reference to the present case study, the central Chinese government in Beijing has ultimate sovereign authority although in particular circumstances it may act as the final recourse when it employs positive sovereign authority. The constituent parts of China (Hong Kong, Taiwan, the separate provinces) could conduct final "pseudo-sovereign" pursuits although they may do so only with tacit approval from Beijing. The Chinese Government does not necessarily have to react to "pseudo-sovereign" decisions of Taiwan, Hong Kong or the provinces, but the effective sovereign authority remains
with the CCP in Beijing. Again, the reasons attributed to the dormancy of the CCP's exercise of its ultimate sovereignty will be examined in greater detail in chapter three. The last chapter will also probe the circumstances of which the Chinese government would employ its ultimate authority. Therefore, with the categorization of absolute negative sovereignty into final and absolute headings, the conclusion may be deduced that the activities of the Canadian Government are not intrusions of China's ultimate sovereignty at all. Chapters three and four of this thesis will examine the circumstances under which China has exercised less of its final prerogative, allocating that to its constituent parts.

**Summary**

The purpose of the preceding section was to provide the conceptual groundwork for the following empirical case study of Sino-Canadian relations. The different interpretations of concepts was noted as an advantage to the study of the state and sovereignty since nomenclature in political science has varied usages rather than explicit definitions. The presence of sovereignty within a society was a direct result of the existence of the absolutist state. Another theme noted that "sovereignty" was a functional term that changed in meaning and usage depending upon the political environment in which it was used. Related to the first point, the context of "absolute" was explicitly stated to denote ultimateness in terms of recourse to power rather than the totality of its possession.

A number of differences are noted from a comparison of Bodin and Hobbes. *République* and *Leviathan* were examples of absolutist sovereignty although the latter presented a more extreme interpretation. The form of the sovereign in each case also
differed: Bodin cites the existence of a monarch whereas Hobbes presents a more abstract persona ficta, the Leviathan. The primary difference between the two schools is that Bodin reaffirmed the traditional predominance of theocracy in political thought whereas Hobbes diminished the role of religious institutions. This difference was the primary underlying source of dissension between the two interpretations.

The separation of sovereignty into negative and positive divisions provided a more focussed approach to its analysis. The negatively sovereign state may be conceptualized in terms of totality; either the state has negative sovereignty or does not. Negative sovereignty merely provided an opportunity for a country to pursue self-determination. The pursuit of state objectives was referred to as positive sovereignty. Contrary to negative sovereignty, positive sovereignty could be employed in various degrees at different times depending upon the circumstances.

Finally, after the scrutiny of absolute, a specific context of the term becomes apparent. Rather than denote a totality or complete hegemony, absolute sovereignty refers to the ultimate recourse of sovereign power within a state. In order to describe the meaning of ultimate, it was compared with the idea of having final dominion. If an institution is the final recourse, there remains another ultimate alternative of appeal. Conversely, there is no other agent after the ultimate source of power. By extending this line of argument, an ultimate authority is also the final alternative; the converse, however, is not true. As a consequence, an ultimate authority, such as the Chinese Government, has the luxury of choice to react to Canada's "pseudo-sovereign" relations with China's constituent parts or not. Furthermore, ultimate also means that the Chinese Government possesses sovereign authority in perpetuity and may delegate temporary final power to its constituent parts as illustrated in chapters 3 and 4; the Chinese
Government's prerogative of final authority does not necessarily have to be exercised. The reasons attributed to Beijing's allocation of final power to Taiwan, Hong Kong and the provinces will be examined throughout the remainder of the thesis and it is the conclusion of this thesis that Canada has not infringed upon China's ultimate sovereignty.
Chapter One
Deferral of China's Recognition 1949-1968: Introduction

The Canadian government's sentiment and policy towards China were each uniform between 1949 and 1968. The St. Laurent, Diefenbaker and Pearson Governments were all in favour of identifying the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter CCP) as the legitimate government of the People's Republic of China (hereafter PRC or China). Moreover, the government also doubted that the American-backed KMT regime on Taiwan would take effective control of the mainland after the Nationalists' defeat in the Chinese civil war. The governments throughout the initial 1949-1968 period accepted the reality of communist control of the mainland along with the banishment of the Nationalists to Taiwan. However, the Canadian government's acceptance of a communist China was not reflected in its official China policy. The Prime Ministers realized both the importance and necessity of recognizing Mao Zedong's regime yet each was constrained by a variety of factors. The difficulties that the Department of External Affairs (hereafter DEA) faced in the 1949-1968 period compelled the government to defer the recognition of the communist government's sovereign authority.

There were three general considerations that dissuaded the government from establishing diplomatic ties with China. Until the early 1960s, there was domestic apathy in public opinion pertaining to the China issue; Canadians were indifferent to the recognition of the CCP government until the success of the Diefenbaker Government's first wheat sales in December 1960. Despite the favourable public sentiment in the 1960s, it still was not sufficient encouragement for the government to accept the legitimacy of the CCP's sovereign authority. Second, the anti-foreign political turmoil in China would have made acknowledgement of the CCP government a contentious and
unpopular issue between Ottawa and both the Canadian population and the government's international allies. Finally, the international political environment was not conducive for the Canadian government to actively pursue diplomatic relations with the communist regime in China since such a policy would have aggravated Canada's relationship with the United States. The possible negative effects upon the Canadian-American relationship in a pro-active China policy was the most important consideration for the Canadian government. A theme throughout this chapter is that the Canadian government's handling of the China issue during the 1949-1968 period was primarily a function of Canadian-American relations.

**St. Laurent and Pearson: 1949-1957**

The following section examines the St. Laurent Government's management of the PRC recognition issue and the three primary factors that influenced the policy makers. Although St. Laurent and his Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, initially showed enthusiasm towards establishing diplomatic relations with the Mao Zedong Government, that eagerness did not translate into positive policy measures. The DEA maintained that the basis of diplomatic relations was stipulated by international guidelines and not upon an arbitrary acceptance or rejection of a foreign government's ideology. Despite the encouraging position suggesting an eventual formation of state level relations, St. Laurent faced a number of constraints that either discouraged PRC recognition or at the very least, did not encourage the start of bilateral contact. For example, the pursuit of Sino-Canadian relations would not have been ideal for the St. Laurent Government domestically. In addition, Chinese involvement in the Korean War would have made any Canadian diplomatic initiative an unpopular move with Canada's
Cold War allies, especially the United States. Since Sino-Canadian relations during the St. Laurent period was largely a component of Canada's interaction with the United States, any Canadian China policy had to consider the possible reaction from the Americans. A pro-China sentiment was evident in the government throughout the St. Laurent period, but as a result of a number of constraints, that position could not be translated into official policy.

Although the relationship between China and Canada before 1949 was negligible for the most part, one specific point should be highlighted. The largest Canadian impact in pre-communist China consisted of missionary work. Academics have suggested that the Canadian missionaries' influence was not important at all.\(^1\) While the actual work of the missionaries may not have been important, several Canadians who were raised in missionary compounds during revolutionary China eventually influenced and shaped policy towards the recognition of China after 1949: Arthur Menzies, John Small, Robert Edmonds, Chester Ronning and E. Herbert Norman all had pro-recognition positions.\(^2\) Therefore, the missionary presence in China could largely be overlooked but it cannot be ignored completely since it did provide an opportunity for Canadians to develop an influential lobby that was supportive of the communist regime in Beijing.

When the People's Republic of China was proclaimed on 1 October 1949, the issue of recognizing the sovereign authority of the CCP was handled cautiously by the Canadian government. Pearson initially favoured acknowledging the legitimacy of the Beijing regime yet resisted stating so explicitly. Pearson had preferred to adopt a position similar to the British approach: recognition of, but not necessarily approval of, the communist regime in Beijing. The stance of the St. Laurent Government was a stark contrast to the support given to the Guomingdang by the United States after June 1950 and the beginning of the Korean War. The DEA had argued that the acceptance of a new
government would be based solely upon international legal requirements and not whether Canada approved of that government's ideology. Recognition of a new government was based upon four international legal conditions: the ability of the government seeking recognition to exercise effective authority over a well-defined territory with a semblance of permanence; the extent to which the government has the obedience or support of a major portion of the state's population; its willingness to honour its international commitments and its ability to demonstrate freedom from external control.¹

The DEA's first reaction to the communist victory in the Chinese civil war was delivered by Pearson in November 1949. Despite the CCP's embrace of Marxist-Leninist principles, Pearson noted that differences in ideology would not be a constraint to recognition of a government nor would recognition indicate approval of a government's ideology.² Moreover, the Secretary of State for External Affairs also hinted that if the CCP met all international legal requirements, then the Canadian government would have to acknowledge its authority as the sovereign power in China.³

At the inaugural conference of the Colombo Plan in January 1950, Indian Prime Minister Nehru appealed to the member states of the Commonwealth to recognize the CCP as the legitimate government in China in order to prevent ostracizing the Chinese communists from the international political arena. Pearson, who had led the Canadian delegation to the Colombo Plan conference, had intended to recommend recognition upon his return to Cabinet; a recommendation that St. Laurent also favoured.⁴

The pro-China sentiment of St. Laurent was also evident during his visit to New Delhi in 1954. Both the Canadian and Indian Prime Ministers again stated that Mao's communists would have to eventually be recognized as the legitimate government of China since the CCP was effectively in control on the mainland.⁵
Therefore, two themes in the Canadian government's initial reaction to the communist takeover in China may be underlined. First, while the government stressed that it did not approve of communist ideology, it noted that would not be a constraint to the recognition of a government. Second, both St. Laurent's and Pearson's comments hinted that the eventual recognition of the communist regime as the sovereign authority in the PRC was likely. Acknowledgement of an "eventual" recognition of the communists was important because it was not an explicit refusal of the legitimacy of the CCP as the government of China.

Despite the government's initial enthusiasm for establishing Sino-Canadian diplomatic ties, St. Laurent and Pearson faced a number of domestic obstacles. St. Laurent's electoral victory in 1949 was based upon a national unity platform; issues that would have divided Canadian public opinion, especially along regional cleavages, would be avoided. Anti-communist sentiment in the Canadian population and the official opposition in the House of Commons had gained momentum since the beginning of the Cold War and particularly the start of the Korean War in June 1950. The only political party that wholeheartedly supported recognition was the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation while hostility towards China ran deep with Roman Catholics and immigrants from Eastern Europe, especially those in Quebec. Furthermore, St. Laurent faced opposition from the Quebec provincial government, where Premier Duplessis had suggested that the federal government was "soft on communism".

In 1950, a poll measuring the support for the Canadian government's establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC was inconclusive but underlined the divisiveness of opinion on the issue. While 39% had opposed establishing official bilateral relations, 38% were in favour and 23% of the respondents had no opinion (See Table 1). Thus, while particular domestic factors did not explicitly present an "anti-
China" position, the anti-communism lobby in Canada would have provided a strong enough opposition to any recognition policy. Since the China issue would have been so nationally divisive, the question of recognition did not seem important enough for the Prime Minister to take a firm pro-active stand. Although the Canadian government realized the eventuality of recognizing the communist regime, the domestic costs of doing so would have outweighed the benefits. The Canadian government's China policy did not reflect the government's attitude towards recognition and as a result, it merely deferred the issue to subsequent administrations.

In addition to negative domestic circumstances, the St. Laurent Government also faced an international community that was not receptive to the pursuit of a recognition policy. One of the central themes of Sino-Canadian relations in the 1949-1968 period was that the relationship was a function of the Canadian relationship with the United States rather than China. Whether or not the government decided to concede Mao's regime as legitimate, either decision would have had negative ramifications for the St. Laurent Government. If the DEA sought to establish diplomatic relations with the communist government, then it risked to strain relations with the United States, an important bilateral political and economic partner and an important Cold War ally. Conversely, if no action on the recognition issue was taken, then the government would appear to be acquiescent to American whims, especially considering the Prime Minister's and External Affairs Minister's pro-China positions.

Thus either an activist or passive policy would have been self-defeating but a more important question was which posture would be less costly politically to the Canadian government. The DEA realized the need to establish relations with Beijing, but could not do so if other more important foreign and domestic policy goals were jeopardized.11 The policy of non-recognition was more preferable because Canada's
involvement in China was limited at that point in time and the government's relationship with the United States was more important.

The Canadian government's limited contact with China may be categorized under three headings. Economically, Canada not only had limited interests in China but in Asia-Pacific generally. Militarily, the CCP's victory in the Chinese civil war did not pose any realistic threat to Canada's Pacific borders. Any hypothetical threat from the Chinese on the North American continent would have been averted by American forces. In addition, since Canada had been opposed to participation in a Pacific defence pact, the Chinese communists' victory had no direct impact upon Canada's defence agenda. In general, the Asia-Pacific region was peripheral in Canadian foreign policy during the 1940s and 1950s.

Chinese involvement in the Korean War was an obstacle to Canada's establishment of diplomatic ties in two ways. In the multilateral theatre, an activist Canadian engagement policy with the PRC would have received a negative reaction from Canada's Cold War allies. Second, the Korean War also made recognition a particularly contentious issue especially between the Canadian and American governments. It would have been politically unwise for the St. Laurent Government to consider establishing diplomatic relations with the Beijing regime since that would have indirectly endangered Ottawa's relations with Washington. Although it would be speculative as to whether or not President Eisenhower would have publicly denounced a possible Canadian relationship with China for fear of showing signs of a rift in the American-led side of the Cold War, undoubtedly such an action from Ottawa would have negatively influenced American policy-makers in future Canadian-American relations.
Despite the official non-recognition of the Beijing regime, Pearson stated in 1954 that the conflict in the Koreas or any future problem in the Far East would have to involve consultation or negotiation with the communist regime in China:

[w]e cannot ignore one very important fact. When problems arise which directly concern China, we have now to deal with the government which is in effective control of the Chinese mainland. It so happens that at this time this effective government of China is the Peking Communist regime. In order to find a solution to the problem of peace in the Far East we have to accept the fact of Communist power in China...  

By stating that future matters of security in the Far East had to involve the Chinese communists, Pearson's statement indicated that the absence of diplomatic relations did not necessarily mean a non-recognition of the state and that the Canadian government recognized the CCP as the de facto sovereign authority in China.

During March 1956, St. Laurent and Pearson travelled to the United States to personally inform President Eisenhower of the Canadian government's unequivocal intent to pursue the establishment of diplomatic relations with Beijing. It was after Eisenhower protested St. Laurent's pro-active stance with China that the Canadian government demoted the recognition issue on its agenda. Eisenhower's response to St. Laurent and Pearson was indicative of maintaining a united western position against the perceived communist threat in Asia. Three aspects of Eisenhower's hostile response to the Canadian delegation should be noted. First, the President noted that recognizing a state that was directly involved in the death of American soldiers in Korean War was inconceivable. Eisenhower also argued that if Canada had pursued political engagement with China then other nations would follow, specifically France, Belgium and Italy. Finally, the President emphatically stated that the United States would withdraw from the United Nations and eject that international organization from American territory if communist China was seated at the UN.
The Canadian government's acquiescence to the American President's threat could be attributed both to its responsibility as a member of the United Nations and a partner in the bilateral Canadian-American relationship. The United Nations was arguably already weak from the lack of a communist Chinese delegation representing about 500 million people and would be further undermined by the retraction of American support. The Canadian recognition of communist China would have cost the United Nations a degree of effectiveness and legitimacy reminiscent of the problems of the defunct League of Nations. In addition to the multilateral considerations, the Canadian government would have jeopardized its bilateral relations with the United States if it had pursued a policy of Sino-Canadian diplomatic association. As an ally of the United States, the Canadian government had to adhere to American policy in order not to instill negative bilateral sentiment nor undermine the American government. Although it would be inappropriate to speculate what substantive steps the American government would have taken, the Canadian-American relationship would have been at the very least strained if Eisenhower's response was any indication.

Although the recognition of Mao's government was deferred, it remained a policy goal with Canadian policy makers after the Korean War. St. Laurent maintained his administration's interest in establishing diplomatic ties with communist China during his meetings with Prime Minister Nehru in 1954. In addition, after the Korean War, St. Laurent noted that "[a]s long as the war had continued in Korea, Canada had not been able to recognize China. However, now that hostilities were over...Canada could once again consider recognition of Peking." Although the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs stated that the Canadian government was not pursuing diplomatic relations with China at the time, neither explicitly rejected the possibility in the near future. Comments from the government were either supportive or neutral to
the recognition issue but more importantly, neither St. Laurent nor Pearson overtly rejected establishing diplomatic relations with the communist government.

Despite St. Laurent's and Pearson's support for the legitimization of the CCP as China's government, Pearson also reiterated the government's reluctance to offend the United States. The marginalization of the China issue during the St. Laurent era seemed to be attributed to the negative reaction from the United States rather than dependent upon the Canadian government's own rejection of it. At the conclusion of the Korean War, a pro-China position in the government remained as well as a renewed enthusiasm for actively pursuing official relations with the CCP. The sentiment of the Canadian government was either positive or neutral but not overtly negative towards the China issue which implied a pro-recognition stance.

By way of summarizing the preceding section, a number of recurring themes of the first chapter may be underlined. The realization of the importance of bringing the CCP government into the international political arena was shown by the Canadian government's willingness to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. The government's favourable attitude towards the Beijing regime was not translated into tangible policy, however, because it faced a number of restrictions. The domestic political environment did not encourage engagement with the CCP; there was a strong anti-communist sentiment in the country and public opinion polls did not provide a conclusive gauge of the population's impressions towards PRC recognition.

Internationally, Chinese involvement in the Korean War provided a multi-faceted basis for Canadian non-action with the PRC. Any Canadian diplomatic initiative towards China would have been viewed negatively by Canada's allies in a time of conflict between the United Nations and Chinese-backed North Korean military. Furthermore, the Canadian-American relationship would also have been aggravated since it would
appear that Canada was conducting state level relations with a country that was encouraging communist ideals in the Asia-Pacific theatre. In more general terms, the question of whether or not to institute state level relations between Beijing and Ottawa was primarily dependent upon the reaction from the United States rather than any other actor.

**The Diefenbaker Government: 1957-1962**

An examination of the 1957-1962 period illustrates that the prevalent constraints evident throughout the St. Laurent Government in terms of formulating a pro-active China policy were also manifest during Prime Minister John Diefenbaker's era. The handling of the China issue during the Diefenbaker period was also contingent upon domestic political turmoil in China, Canadian public animosity towards the China issue and the Prime Minister's problematic relationship with the United States, particularly with President Kennedy.

Despite the differences between the CCP's ideology and Prime Minister Diefenbaker's personal anti-communist convictions, the government recognized the importance of both encouraging China's participation in international affairs and establishing bilateral diplomatic relations with Beijing. As was the case of the St. Laurent Government, however, a positive pro-active stance towards China did not necessarily translate into tangible official policy. While political ties were not formalized, an important difference between the St. Laurent and Diefenbaker periods was that bilateral economic interaction was established with Alvin Hamilton's sales of wheat to China in 1960.

The Canadian government's pro-China position continued from the St. Laurent period into the Diefenbaker era, although Canada's official policy of non-recognition of
the CCP regime in Beijing also remained unaltered. Moreover, the conditions for the acknowledgement of Mao's government remained contingent upon predefined conditions and was not based upon the acceptance of CCP ideology. Diefenbaker's first Secretary of State for External Affairs, Sidney Smith, had stated if the PRC fulfilled all of its international obligations, then its recognition could be possible since Canada conducted state level political relations with countries which had political systems that were inconsistent with Canada's. Smith outlined in 1958 a long-term plan of incremental action with the Chinese government. Basically, incremental action would involve unofficial contacts, most notably in trade, gradually expanding to unofficial discussion and consultation.

Furthermore, the government recognized the eventuality of acknowledging the communists as the legitimate government in China. The inevitability of diplomatic relations with the PRC merely reflected Canada's acceptance of China's importance in international politics. Both Secretaries of State for External Affairs in the Diefenbaker Government, the aforementioned Smith and Howard Green, noted the inherent dangers of isolating China diplomatically. Although it was not reflected in any tangible political policy, the government continued to hold a favourable position towards establishing ties with the PRC.

Domestic constraints prevented the government from actively pursuing diplomatic negotiations with the PRC. Canadian public opinion indicated increased antipathy towards the China issue from the St. Laurent period to the Diefenbaker era. Another Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (CIPO) poll indicated that in 1959, 44% of respondents did not favour establishing diplomatic ties with China while 32% did and 25% had no opinion (See Table 1). The 44% who did not support establishing diplomatic relations with China represented a 5% increase from the June 1950 survey.
The 5% increase and the 2% increase in respondents who had no opinion both came at the expense of public opinion favouring Sino-Canadian diplomatic relations. Opponents of recognition cited three arguments: recognition would encourage communism and succour its opponents in Asia; the communist government in China was too warlike to be fit for admission in the international community; recognition did not necessarily increase bilateral trade.24

A definite conclusion pertaining to Canadian perceptions of the China issue cannot be made however since there is no clear margin of majority to either response. Yet a comparison of the 1950 and 1959 surveys indicates a negative trend on the China issue; the number of respondents favouring recognition decreased while opposition increased. Therefore, domestic public opinion indicated more opposition to the government pursuing diplomatic relations with the PRC in the Diefenbaker era than the St. Laurent period. However, as the later discussion of the Alvin Hamilton initiative indicates support for establishing diplomatic ties as well as replacing the KMT with a communist delegation at the United Nations increased after the initial success of the heat sales.

As was the case with the St. Laurent Government, Diefenbaker followed a passive policy towards China that primarily depended upon international factors rather than his government's set policy guidelines. Mao's government pursued a series of economic and social policies that were supposed to concurrently promote Chinese self-sufficiency. The entire Great Leap Forward episode illustrated the Chinese government's reluctance to pursue any economic or political relationships with foreigners. In turn, the Chinese government's introspection was a major constraint and made the Canadian government's pursuit of a recognition policy difficult. Furthermore, instances of Chinese militarism also made it difficult for the government to initiate diplomatic negotiations.
without international repercussion. In particular, the Chinese attacks on the Quemoy and Matsu islands were sensitive issues for the Americans since those strikes directly involved the Taiwanese military.

From the inception of the PRC in 1949, the Chinese economy was developed in part with the aid of Soviet-style Five Year Plans. By the late-1950s however, Mao had argued that the continued development of the economy could be self-sustaining without the help of outside forces. Mao's government pursued a series of economic policies coined the Great Leap Forward that were supposed to promote Chinese self-sufficiency by decentralizing and allocating power to the lower levels of the government hierarchy. By promoting Chinese self-sufficiency, Mao had wanted to decrease China's dependence on foreigners, particularly the Soviet Union. The material objectives of the Great Leap Forward were to match the level of Great Britain's industrial output within fifteen years and realize a self-sustaining agricultural sector by organizing the population into self-governing communes.

The failure of the Great Leap Forward could be attributed to Beijing's mismanagement and misunderstanding of the developing Chinese economy. The peasants did not produce any significant amount of industrial nor agricultural goods since everyone was guaranteed an equal level of subsistence regardless of the amount of production from each worker. Therefore, Mao's collectivist policies in the communes did not provide incentives for the peasants to produce more than anyone else. In order to increase China's steel output, the population was encouraged to smelt excess scraps of metal in government-installed furnaces. An over-zealous population eventually started to smelt all available pieces of metal, including those used in tools. The strategy of smelting steel was self-defeating also because a low grade of pig iron was produced of which could not be used in manufacturing finished products. The backward economic
policies during the Great Leap Forward eventually led to a three year famine that lasted from 1960-1962 and caused more than thirty million deaths.

In addition to the Great Leap Forward, the Chinese government's bombardment of the off-shore islands in the Taiwan Straits also deterred the Canadian government from recognizing the CCP's sovereign authority in China. The military strikes on the offshore islands not only represented aggressive actions on the part of the Chinese communists but also a potential threat to Taiwan, the latter of which still benefitted from official American support. The Canadian government's position with respect to the Quemoy and Matsu islands was that any fighting there was merely a continuation of the Chinese civil war, not an issue for either UN intervention or the Canadian government. The difficulty of fully adhering to that position was that it differed completely from the American attitude that any communist attack on the island chain could represent a threat to Taiwan, a threat that necessarily involved the multilateral organization. Consequently, the Canadian government's reaction to the communist attack on the off-shore islands had to consider any possible American repercussions.

The Canadian government's desire to initiate bilateral recognition negotiations was also marred by its relations with the United States. In 1958, when Prime Minister Diefenbaker suggested to President Eisenhower that the Canadian government had supported China's admission to the United Nations, Eisenhower reiterated his threats to withdraw American support from the United Nations. The threat from the American government was reminiscent of the meeting that St. Laurent and Pearson had with Eisenhower previously at White Sulphur Springs. The threats from the President deterred Diefenbaker in his pursuit of an official policy of recognizing China and lobbying for the communist government's admission to the United Nations.
The Canadian government's influence in bilateral relations with the United States waned during the last two years of the Diefenbaker period as a result of Pearson's lingering image and President Kennedy's negative opinion of the Prime Minister. Diefenbaker had to persevere with the international perception of Pearson as the renowned statesman, especially after Pearson's award of the Nobel Peace Prize. Not only was Pearson's international shadow difficult for the Prime Minister and his External Affairs Ministers to contend with but Diefenbaker's own image was further belittled when President Kennedy made indignant comments about him. Consequently, the likelihood of the Canadian government to deviate from the American policy strategy and pursue a China-policy was diminished as a result of the lessened credibility of Diefenbaker's government and for fear of further aggravating the American executive.

During the Diefenbaker Government, a dilemma with the American government reminiscent of the St. Laurent Government developed. Canada had to remain committed to the American-led Western alliance even at the expense of state level relations with the Chinese. Canadian public opinion during the period did not indicate an urgency to seek an official diplomatic relationship with China. Antagonizing the Americans on an issue that the President felt strong about would have also been counter-productive for the Canadian government. Canada's initiation of diplomatic talks with the Chinese would have undermined American containment policy in Southeast Asia and its international leadership role in general. It was advantageous to follow the American strategy of non-interaction with China and appease Canada's most important economic and political partner rather than possibly aggravate the President and Congress over an issue that Canadians were largely indifferent to.
Hamilton and Diefenbaker: Economic Engagement

Despite the lack of political interaction between the Chinese and Canadian governments during the Diefenbaker period, bilateral economic engagement was initiated by Alvin Hamilton, Diefenbaker's Minister for Agriculture. Since the government had to abandon its plans to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC, the next best option was to introduce a business relationship with China. The food shortage that resulted from the Great Leap Forward provided lucrative financial possibilities as well as domestic and international political opportunities for the Canadian government. Sales of grain to China enabled the government to make a financial profit from Canada's surplus supply of wheat. The sales agreement that was established between the Chinese and Canadian governments also garnered domestic political support in the western wheat producing provinces for the Diefenbaker Government. Finally, the economic interaction between the two governments would prove to be advantageous in the eventual establishment of diplomatic relations because the contracts forged a positive and trustful relationship, a considerable advantage considering China's inherent suspicion of foreigners.

The episode of Canadian wheat sales to China showed the importance and benefits of setting up non-political affiliations when diplomatic association was not possible. The Canadian government's interaction with China, albeit not political, symbolized a measure of goodwill towards the Chinese and ensured a form of active participation between the CCP and Canada. The Canadian government, especially Hamilton and Diefenbaker, demonstrated its commitment towards interaction with the Chinese during this episode. Hamilton's initial wheat sales to China partially laid the foundation for the possibility of Sino-Canadian political relations in the future. As the surveys of Canada's relations with Taiwan and Hong Kong in chapters two and three illustrate, the process of economic and other non-political ties ensures bilateral
interaction and secures a foundation of established goodwill when diplomatic relations are possible.

The Minister of Agriculture, Alvin Hamilton, and Prime Minister Diefenbaker were the key players in the initial sales of wheat to China because both pursued an activist trade policy with China despite the possible negative response from the United States. Hamilton concluded an initial cash purchase of 28 million and 12 million bushels and wheat and barley respectively for CDN$60 million with a Chinese delegation in December 1960. The initial negotiations of grain sales from Canada to China were kept secret however for fear of negative reaction from the American government, a concern that Hamilton himself had:

\[\text{[t]he McCarthy period was just barely slowing down in the United States and any person who had anything to do with the Communists was really labeled, so we decided to keep it quiet.}\]

By conducting secret negotiations with the Chinese delegation at the potential expense of Canadian-American relations, the Canadian government demonstrated a commitment to establish a form of interaction with the Chinese government. It must be noted furthermore that Canada had not agreed to comply with an American led trade embargo of goods to China. Thus the opportunity for bilateral trade was present without taking a position of outright defiance towards the United States.

Subsequent sales of grain to the PRC were more contentious within Cabinet because credit guarantees had to be extended to the cash depleted Beijing government. Concerns from certain ministers were founded upon the ability of the Chinese government to pay the loans back and what the possible ramifications of the loans on Canadian-American relations would be. Differences that arose within the Diefenbaker Cabinet were not centred around ideological concerns. The Chinese argued that they could pay off the loans if they could sell more of their own products abroad and Hamilton
promised that he would try and help them expand their export markets; this commitment forged a lasting bond between Hamilton and the PRC. Furthermore, Hamilton offered to resign from Cabinet if the loans were not paid back by the Chinese government.

By making a commitment to the Chinese government to promote Chinese exports in Canada and threatening to resign from Cabinet, Hamilton again demonstrated a personal commitment to an activist position with the Chinese government. The dissenting Ministers eventually supported the extension of credit to the Beijing government and Hamilton announced in April 1961 a series of contracts with China worth CDN$363 million of wheat and barley over the subsequent two and a half years, three-quarters of which was guaranteed by the Canadian government for 270 days, making China the second largest customer of Canadian wheat behind the United Kingdom.

Although it seemed as though Diefenbaker would be an unlikely supporter of the grain sales to China, he too was a central figure in securing the initial contract in 1960. Diefenbaker had not kept his anti-communist sentiment a secret and as Opposition Leader he emphasized his party's objection to China's entry into the United Nations. Despite his apparent anti-China stance, Diefenbaker realized the importance of interaction with the communist regime in China. Diefenbaker perceived Hamilton's offer to resign from Cabinet as a firm personal commitment from the Agriculture Minister and subsequently he personally supported Hamilton's position in Cabinet; Hamilton himself credits the Prime Minister with making the final political decision in Cabinet to initiate the sales.

Some critics noted the discrepancy with actively conducting trade with a communist government that the Canadian government did not recognize nor approve of. The Prime Minister, however, argued that there was nothing inconsistent in trading with
a country that Canada did not recognize nor ideologically approved of; he took a Pearsonian stance that recognition did not necessarily mean approval of a state's regime; the only important considerations were set out in international law.\textsuperscript{36} He also re-iterated the belief that a state did not necessarily have to recognize another in order to conduct bilateral economic interaction.

The wheat sales to China were advantageous to the Diefenbaker Government both financially and politically. Chinese purchases of grain proved to be extraordinarily popular with western farmers who had produced a tremendous surplus of grain in the early 1960s; the sales to China brought a much needed influx of money to the western Canadian economy.\textsuperscript{37} A Gallup poll indicated that 63\% of surveyed Canadians supported the sales of non-strategic goods to communist countries, while only 26\% opposed that policy; the strongest support came from western Canada.\textsuperscript{38}

Support for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC also increased after the first grain sales. There was a significant increase of support for the establishment of ties with the communist government in Beijing with corresponding decreases in the proportion of opponents and those who had no opinion. In 1964, 51\% of respondents agreed that the Canadian government should recognize the CCP government, whereas only 34\% disagreed and 16\% had no opinion.\textsuperscript{39} The financial infusion to the western agricultural sector restored the government's popularity with the farmers. Diefenbaker was confident to call an election in 1962 partly because of the success of the grain sales in the western provinces. The wheat contracts with the PRC gave the Progressive Conservative Party a strong support base that proved important in the 1962 election and prevented a clear Liberal majority in the April 1963 election.\textsuperscript{40}

The effects from the famine forced the hand of the Chinese government to open up to foreign aid and limited relations. Although the openness of the Chinese
government could be primarily attributed to the number of deaths from the famine, the effects of the initial interaction were nonetheless advantageous for Sino-Canadian relations in the long term. Howard Green, Diefenbaker's Minister for External Affairs noted that:

[t]he Chinese were very grateful to us for getting them the wheat.... I remember an evening I spent in Geneva with Chen-yi, the foreign minister of China, in 1962. He was very profuse in his thanks to us for selling them wheat. He said, 'The Americans wouldn't sell us wheat. We couldn't get it anywhere. We didn't have facilities for storing it in China and we are very grateful to Canada for selling us wheat.'

A positive Chinese perception of Canada could be nothing less than advantageous for the Canadian government in the future recognition negotiations. The sales of wheat to China played a positive role in future Sino-Canadian recognition negotiations since direct relations, albeit economic, and the implicit goodwill stemming from those interactions were established.

Although the Canadian administrations in the 1949-1968 period were hesitant to acknowledge the CCP's sovereign authority in China, they made attempts to maintain a form of relationship with the Chinese government. By establishing a link of economic engagement, the Canadian government was sustaining non-political links with the CCP government. The strategy underlying Alvin Hamilton's wheat sales to the PRC during the Diefenbaker era may be attributable to the ideas of the so-called Manchester School. The pacifist group of economists argued that increased trade between states would increase international cooperation since states would have an economic interest in peace and consequently make international conflict costly. Essentially, it would be to both states' best business interests to maintain an acceptable level of interaction. The engagement policies with China are stressed in this section because they mirror the approach that the Canadian government adopted in its relations with Taiwan and Hong Kong.
The Diefenbaker government, and most notably Alvin Hamilton, adopted the strategy suggestive of the Manchester School in its wheat sales to China. Therefore, engagement with the Chinese was also a means to prevent the ostracism and isolation of the PRC government. Hamilton argued that the quickest way to achieve peace with enemies was to start trading with them. By promoting economic trade contact, a dialogue would be established. Although it was not political in nature, a dialogue was maintained nonetheless since each player would be interested in maintaining its own economic interests.

In summary of the Diefenbaker period, a number of recurring themes may be reiterated that were also present during the previous St. Laurent Government. The pro-China environment in the government did not translate into a positive shift in political policy towards establishing diplomatic relations with the CCP. Why it did not happen may again be attributed to three factors. The Great Leap Forward represented a period in history that was marked by introspection and avoidance of foreign influence and Mao's desire to build a self-reliant Chinese society. Domestically, Canadian public opinion was initially indifferent towards the China issue and consequently, did not make it imperative for the government to act. Finally, the American government was again a strong influence in Canada's foreign policy towards China. To further aggravate Ottawa's dependence upon Washington, the two governments had a tumultuous relationship in the final two years of Diefenbaker's government.

What differentiated the Diefenbaker from the St. Laurent periods however was the former's steps towards Sino-Canadian entente. In 1960, the first substantive bilateral engagement between the two states was initiated via Hamilton's wheat sales to China. A consequence was the beginning of bilateral contacts between the two states although not at the political level. Hamilton's business contracts with the Chinese proved to be
advantageous for the Diefenbaker Government domestically, both in financial and political contexts. Moreover, the foundation of international goodwill between the two states was also established, the first step towards the forging of diplomatic relations between Canada and China. It was after the start of the wheat sales that Canadian public opinion began to show support for closer political and economic interaction with the communists as well as the CCP's vie for the Chinese seat at the United Nations.

**The Pearson Governments: 1962-1968**

Prime Minister Lester Pearson faced similar obstacles to recognizing the CCP government as the St. Laurent and Diefenbaker Governments. Although domestic support increased during the Pearson period for the recognition of the CCP government as well as the Chinese communists' admission to the United Nations, the Canadian government's pursuit of such a policy was again constrained by Chinese political turmoil as well as a less than ideal Canadian-American relationship. In principle, Pearson and his External Affairs Minister, Paul Martin, favoured recognition but the number of arguments against pursuing such a position officially were more compelling.

In specific, while domestic conditions became more conducive for the government's pursuit of recognition, they did not present a strong enough counterweight to the possibly negative international ramifications, particularly from the United States. It was within the Pearson era, however, that political steps were taken towards the recognition of the CCP government. Although the measures initiated by the DEA did not ultimately result in bilateral diplomatic ties at the end of the Pearson period, they did represent a slight shift towards a more activist China policy than previously. Therefore, the Canadian government during the Pearson years favoured the pursuit of bilateral diplomatic relations but particular factors such as Chinese anti-foreign policies and
possible negative American reaction constrained the government from officially doing so.

One long-term ramification of the Diefenbaker government's grain sales to China was increased public support for both the recognition of the CCP as the legitimate sovereign authority in China and the admission of the Chinese communists to the United Nations. When asked whether or not Canada should establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, 51% of respondents in 1964 responded favourably, 34% negatively and 16% had no opinion. In 1966, those who responded favourably, negatively and had no opinion were 55%, 26% and 17% respectively (See Table 1). The figures of 1964 and 1966 showed significant increases in the number of Canadians who wanted the government to recognize the PRC government as the legitimate sovereign authority in China. Furthermore, there was also an increase in the percentage of respondents who favoured the admission of the PRC into the United Nations as the Chinese representative.44

The political turmoil during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was a deterrent for the Canadian government to recognize the government in Beijing. The Cultural Revolution 1966-69 was another attempt by the Chinese leaders to shut out foreign elements and to encourage a domestic renewal of society based upon self-reliance. Despite the tension between the two communist parties (particularly between Mao and both Stalin and Khrushchev), the only significant ally of post-revolutionary China was the Soviet Union. By the late-1960s, however, the Sino-Soviet split was complete and China fully submerged itself into a period of isolationism.

Mao's faction in the Chinese leadership called for a purification of the masses by means of denouncing elements that were not congruent with Mao Zedong thought and purging Mao's political opponents and foreign influence from society. The three year period of political purges, self-rectification programs and indoctrination of Maoist dogma
resulted in a significant setback for Chinese society. The Cultural Revolution, in the international context, symbolized yet again China's rejection and suspicion of the outside world and a desire to progress as a self-reliant society.

Pearson and Martin faced an American government that was still resistant to recognition of the PRC. The Canadian initiation of diplomatic relations with the PRC could appear as either criticism of the American role in Indochina or tacit support for the Chinese-backed North Vietnamese forces. Either interpretation would have provoked a negative reaction from President Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. In fact, Johnson's firm stand in the Vietnam War during a period of escalating conflict necessitated an increased American commitment in Indochina. After meetings with Rusk in 1963 and 1964, Pearson and Martin concluded that for Canada to dissent from the American position in Vietnam and acknowledge the legitimacy of the communist regime in Beijing would have been politically unwise and offensive to the American government. Whatever the Canadian government would have gained by establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing and supporting the CCP's case of admission to the United Nations, it would not have compensated for the detrimental effects upon Canadian-American relations.

It was during the Pearson era that positive political steps were taken towards a more activist China policy. Both Pearson and his Minister for External Affairs Paul Martin accepted the inevitability and necessity of recognizing the Beijing government and admitting it to the United Nations as the legitimate Chinese representative. Pearson consistently hinted towards an activist policy with the Chinese and the possibility of establishing diplomatic ties with Mao's government when he was Minister of External Affairs in the St. Laurent Government. As Prime Minister, however, Pearson seemed to become more cautious in his approach towards the China issue. The difficulty that the
government faced was again finding an acceptable solution that satisfied the Chinese, Taiwanese and American sides.

Rather than to attempt attracting the Chinese into the international political arena unilaterally, the Canadian government sought to use the United Nations. Martin had encouraged the principle of universality of UN membership, which was common in the DEA's attempts to encourage the Chinese communists to become active participants in international politics. In 1964, the DEA's first resolution to admit both Taiwan and the PRC as members of the United Nations found no international support and met with strong American opposition. The DEA's "one-China", "one-Taiwan" resolution was shelved but it represented a positive step towards both recognition and admission. Rather than inaction, the DEA's resolution symbolized the immediacy of finally addressing the reality of the CCP's victory in the Chinese civil war and consequently its claims as China's legitimate sovereign authority.

There were two important United Nations resolutions pertaining to CCP admission. An American resolution declared the question of Chinese representation in the UN "an important question". Any matter that was deemed "an important question" required the consent of a two-thirds majority in order for it to pass; if a two-thirds majority was not obtained, the status quo in regard to Nationalist control of the Chinese seat at the UN was maintained. The Albanian resolution sought to restore the legal rights and entitlement of China to the communist regime. Acceptance of the Albanian resolution would effectively give the Beijing government the Chinese seat at the UN and consequently expel the KMT.

As a contrast to Pearson's conservative approach, Martin seemed to be more aggressive in addressing the China problem, as exemplified by the number of DEA draft resolutions. In many instances, Martin applauded and encouraged the continued increase
in bilateral non-political contacts between Canadian and Chinese society and reiterated the government's desire to bring China into the mainstream of international affairs. Despite its continued support for the American resolution, the Canadian delegation at the UN ended its trend of abstaining on the Albanian resolution in 1966 which symbolized not only a slight deviation from the American anti-China position but also its commitment to settling the China question.

The Canadian voting pattern on the Albanian resolution in 1966 represented a shift in China policy. Traditionally, the Canadian delegation at the United Nations voted in favour of the American resolution and opposed the one from the Albanian representatives. By 1966, there were signs that the American government had become more flexible in its approach to the PRC admission question. In addition to the more flexible American stand, Martin announced a new China policy approach:

We consider that the isolation of Communist China from a large part of normal international relations is dangerous. Canada was now prepared to accept the reality of the victory in mainland China in 1949. Taiwan remained a problem, and the 'two Chinas' solution was impossible so long as both Taiwan and mainland China denounced it.

The Liberal party Conference in October 1966 had approved a resolution that would support a policy of recognition of Beijing and admission of the communists to the United Nations. Thus an opportunity had arrived for the government to make a stronger case for PRC representation at the UN.

Rather than voting against the Albanian resolution, the Canadians abstained in 1966 and 1967. Originally, Pearson gave instructions to vote against the Albanian resolution, but at the insistence of Martin and Pierre Trudeau, both of whom were a part of the Canadian delegation, the Prime Minister allowed a Canadian abstention. The Prime Minister was unwilling however to expel Taiwan from the UN despite the government's positive position towards PRC recognition and admission to the UN.
Although abstention of the Albanian resolution did not reflect its acceptance, the Canadian vote represented its non-rejection; a considerable difference from outright rejection. Therefore, the Canadian abstention of the Albanian resolution represented a small symbolic shift towards supporting the PRC's claims in the United Nations.51

In light of the precarious relationship with the United States, Canada had to pursue a China policy cautiously so not to aggravate its southern neighbour. Although there were slight indications of a softening attitude towards the PRC from the State Department, the American policy still remained officially staunchly anti-Chinese. The Canadian government could not pursue a unilateral approach in attracting the PRC into the international political arena for fear of provoking a negative reaction from Washington. Within a multilateral organization, however, a small step towards ending China's isolation would be possible since it would not necessarily tarnish the United States' international image. Canada reaffirmed its commitment to the United States by accepting the American resolution in 1966 but by abstaining from the Albanian resolution's vote, Canada did not reject the CCP's legal claims to China's rights.

The analysis of the Pearson era underlines a number of similarities of post-war Canadian governments' China policies as well as an important difference. The Cultural Revolution marked another episode of introspection and anti-foreign sentiment in Chinese history similar to the Great Leap Forward. Given the momentum of the Cultural Revolution, it would have proved difficult for any foreign government to have any influence in China. Furthermore, the American government officially maintained its protest against any of its allies pursuing a diplomatic relationship with China. President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk both voiced their negative reactions to the Canadian government when the issue of recognition was brought up. Canadian public opinion, however, seemed to have shifted towards encouragement for closer economic and
political interaction between Canada and China. The Pearson Government took another positive step towards PRC recognition near the end of its term in 1966. Canada's abstention on the Albanian resolution denoted a departure from its traditional rejection. Although largely symbolic, the abstention marked a move towards Canada's more vociferous support for the CCP admission into the international political arena.

Canada and Taiwan: 1949-1968

Throughout the 1949-1968 period of non-recognition of the communist government in China, the factor of Taiwan was an important consideration in the decision making process of the Department of External Affairs. Canadian-Taiwanese relations were largely irrelevant in terms of bilateral political ties and trade until 1970 when the Trudeau government formally recognized the Beijing government in China. Despite the apparent negligible bilateral ties, Taiwan remained an important deterrent to the Canadian government's recognition of China because the United States had still considered the island territory as within the American sphere of influence in Asia. From the beginning of the Korean War, the American government remained adamant about maintaining the KMT as the official government of China as well as the legitimate representative of China to the United Nations. American support for the Nationalists made Canadian recognition of the Beijing regime more difficult because the DEA's explicit rejection of the KMT would have provoked a negative response from Washington.

A distinction must be made, however, between the Canadian government's rejection of the Nationalists on Taiwan and its interest in the Taiwanese population. The Canadian government's position in regard to Taiwan during the initial 1949-1968 period was more concerned with the self-determination of the Taiwanese population than the
survival of the self-proclaimed Nationalist government. While the American
government was content in giving Taiwan to the Chiang regime in perpetuity, the DEA
noted that the future of the island still had yet to be decided; a decision that ultimately
would be based upon the Taiwanese themselves. Furthermore, the Canadian
government wanted to ensure that the Taiwanese population was not unilaterally
assimilated by the communists into the mainland against their will. Thus, the Canadian
approach to the Taiwan situation during the 1949-1968 period was to first and foremost
preserve the principle of self-determination for the Taiwanese population; obligation to
the American-backed KMT regime was secondary.

While the Canadians placed less importance on their relations with the
Nationalists, the Americans, on the other hand, fundamentally insisted upon the
continuation of KMT representation at the United Nations as well as other international
organizations as the legitimate representative of China. The weaker Canadian support
for the KMT in relation to the Americans could be attributed to a number of factors.
First and foremost, the Canadian government never had a strong feeling of "losing China"
in the Cold War like the Americans had. The CCP's victory in the Chinese civil war was
perceived in the United States as a victory for communism and a strengthening of the
communist monolith. A subsequent loss of Taiwan to the mainland Chinese would be viewed as yet another defeat in Asia for the United States; as Holmes has argued, the
difference between the Canadian and American perspectives on China and Taiwan was
that Canada was less directly involved and less "emotionally engaged." Secondly, the
Taiwan cause did not find much sympathy among the Canadian public. Opinion tended
to be negative towards Nationalist China in Canada during the 1949-1968 period. In
addition, there was not a strong pro-Taiwan lobby in Canada as there was in the United
States.
Third, bilateral contacts between Canada and Taiwan were not significant in the 1949-1968 period. In terms of trade, it was only after the restructuring in the 1960s towards an export-oriented industrialization of the Taiwanese economy that two way trade increased to significant amounts. Bilateral political contacts between Canada and Taiwan were also weak during the 1949-1968 period. As Evans concluded, "[t]his period was marked by superficial and ineffective relations between the Canadians and Taiwanese."58

The difference of opinion pertaining to Taiwan was a source of tension between the Canadian and American governments. In 1953, President Eisenhower removed the prohibition forbidding Chiang to cross the Taiwan Straits to attack the Chinese mainland and reiterated the American pledge to defend Taiwan from the communists. Unlike the Americans, the Canadian government noted that Canada had no jurisdiction in protecting the Taiwan Straits.

Furthermore, the Department of External Affairs took the same position to military protection when the question of securing the offshore islands arose. In 1955, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, noted that Canada was free of any unilateral obligations in the Taiwan area and that any Canadian actions in regard to the Taiwan question would be conducted through the United Nations forum.59 The government noted that any conflict between the communists and Nationalists in either the Taiwan Straits or Quemoy or Matsu islands was a matter of the continued civil strife in China and not a matter of concern for the Canadian government.

**Summary and Conclusions**

This first chapter examined the period in Canada's diplomatic history when China was not recognized by the government and the reasons attributed to this. Throughout the
three periods of the chapter, a number of common denominators may be underlined. The general sentiment among the different administrations was that the diplomatic recognition of China was necessary and inevitable. The pro-China position did not mean approval of the Chinese government's Maoist ideology. The government's positive attitude towards the Beijing regime did not however translate into an official policy of recognition.

The incongruity between the government's pro-active China stance and its non-action may be explained by three factors. Initially, domestic opinion was indifferent towards Canadian interaction with China and as a result, the settlement of the China question was not imperative on the governments' agendas. Second, there were a number of events in Chinese history that promoted an anti-foreign and isolationist position. Consequently, any enthusiasm towards bilateral relations would have been met with Chinese hostility and negative reaction from the international community. Finally, any formulation of Canadian China policy was highly dependent upon the potential reaction from the United States. The American anti-China position made any hint of the Canadian government's potential engagement with China difficult.

By deferring the recognition of the communist government in China, the Canadian government until 1968 effectively adopted a "no-China" policy, or in other words, an approach that forwent any form of bilateral political contact with the Chinese government. The culmination of the potential negative ramifications outweighed any of the perceived positive benefits. While the government realized the importance and eventuality of establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC, its official policy was largely determined by factors such as initial domestic apathy towards the China issue, anti-foreign sentiment in China and probable strains upon Canadian-American relations.
The Diefenbaker Government followed a similar pattern as the St. Laurent Government towards its own China policy. The same general factors that influenced St. Laurent also affected Diefenbaker. One difference between the two periods was that steps were taken in Diefenbaker's era to engage the Chinese. In the absence of political ties, the ideal relationship between two states was based upon economic contact. Hamilton's sale of wheat to China in 1960 had started a foundation of goodwill between the two states that would be beneficial in future Sino-Canadian relations.

The Pearson Government also did not realize its ultimate objective of establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC. Pearson faced a hostile anti-foreign sentiment in China and potential negative reaction from the United States but domestic support for diplomatic relations and Chinese admission to the United States increased after the forging of significant trade ties in 1960. Political measures were taken at the end of the Pearson Government however towards the encouragement of the Chinese government into the international arena. Although the Prime Minister was wary of any attempt to accept the PRC and concurrently reject Taiwan from the United Nations, his Minister of External Affairs pursued a different approach and abstained from the Albanian resolution in the UN. The Canadian abstention was a symbol of Canada's desire to facilitate the Chinese into a more international role.

In the context of conceptual framework of this thesis, the first chapter analyzed the government's official rejection of the Chinese government's sovereign authority. For the general reasons investigated throughout the chapter, the Canadian government was constrained from acknowledging China's negative and positive sovereignty. Despite the absence of official recognition however, comments from Canadian statesman throughout the chapter indicated that the communists in Beijing had de facto sovereign authority.
All the Prime Ministers had noted the danger of excluding the PRC from the international arena.

The Canadian government incrementally realized its objective of engagement during the 1949-1968 period. The economic engagement during the Diefenbaker period was a means to ensure that the Chinese were not internationally isolated. The abstention on the Albanian resolution in 1966 was a more positive symbol of Canada's acceptance of the communists' sovereign authority. It was only after Trudeau's establishment of diplomatic ties with China were the communists' negative and positive sovereign authority recognized. Furthermore, the Trudeau Government's recognition of the PRC in 1970 also translated into its acceptance of the PRC as China's ultimate recourse of sovereign authority.
Chapter Two
Canada's "One China" Policy: 1968-1976

The following chapter outlines the formulation and application of Canada's "one China" policy. The time period begins in 1968 and Trudeau's electoral victory and ends with the deaths of Premier Zhou Enlai and Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976. Throughout this period, the Canadian government upheld the principles behind its "one China" strategy and showed no signs of deviating from it. Sino-Canadian relations during the period were more than cordial if not outright friendly. There are three primary sections in this chapter: a survey of the negotiations to establish Sino-Canadian relations; Trudeau's visit to China in 1973; and the DEA's handling of the Chinese representation at the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal.

The domestic and international elements present in the late 1960s were conducive for the Canadian government to pursue recognition negotiations. The constraints outlined in chapter one no longer had a significant impact upon the DEA's China policy. The primary constraint during the St. Laurent, Diefenbaker and Pearson Governments was the overshadowing of American influence on the decision making process. The American government was adamant about encouraging an anti-China, pro-KMT strategy with its allies. Although the hardline attitude towards Beijing had softened somewhat in the State Department during the Trudeau era, the official American position remained anti-CCP. The American factor was the most important dynamic in Sino-Canadian relations prior to 1968 but it was superseded by Trudeau's
personal commitment to a pro-active relationship with the Chinese. The important difference between Trudeau's approach and those of his predecessors was that Trudeau was willing to sacrifice Canada's relations with Taiwan in order to establish diplomatic ties with China.

Once an official Sino-Canadian political relationship was established, Trudeau travelled to China in 1973. One theme of this section is that the bilateral goodwill that was established initially with Hamilton's grain sales in 1960 translated into an easier bilateral negotiation process and a friendlier-than-usual hospitality from the Chinese hosts. The recognition of the PRC had a number of implications on the notion of China's sovereignty. Not only was the PRC's negative and positive sovereign authority acknowledged by the Canadian government but the Canadian Formula indicated that the ultimate recourse of sovereign authority remained with the communists. The acceptance of the Canadian Formula by the CCP was also based upon the tacit derecognition of the regime on Taiwan. The culmination of the wheat sales and the success and acceptance of the recognition negotiations resulted in a Sino-Canadian summit in 1973 that stressed the mutual respect of each state's regimes.

While the recognition episode was the establishment of the "one China" principle, the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games was a test of Canada's commitment to that principle. The DEA faced international pressure to allow athletes from Taiwan to be the Chinese representatives at the Olympic Games. Trudeau faced a diplomatic quagmire because the Chinese government that he considered legitimate was not represented in Montreal and the PRC opposed the participation of any athletes that claimed to be Chinese representatives. Despite international protests including the International Olympic
Committee and the United States, the Trudeau Government adhered to the principles of its "one China" policy.

The Trudeau Factor: 1968-1970

Pierre Trudeau's victory in the general election of 1968 was a turning point in Sino-Canadian relations. Trudeau again reiterated the government's desire to acknowledge the CCP's sovereign authority in China, but his administration's policy towards the PRC differed from previous administrations because it actively pursued recognition negotiations. Although the political environment was the most ideal to pursue recognition since 1949 it was not perfect. Public opinion in Canada had continued to grow in support for the recognition of China's communist government since Hamilton's sales of wheat during the Diefenbaker era. The domestic turmoil and anti-Western sentiment in China began to diminish with the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-69. Furthermore, the intensification of Sino-Soviet tension since the early-1960s was another motivation for the CCP to expand and diversify its international relations.

Despite signs of a softening American stand towards China in the White House and the State Department, the anti-China lobby in the United States remained strong and the official American policy remained adversarial towards the communists and supportive of the KMT stationed on Taiwan. In contrast, any China lobby that existed in Canada encouraged the Canadian government's recognition of the CCP government. The most decisive factor in the recognition of China, however, was Prime Minister Trudeau's personal commitment to the China issue.
The domestic political environment in Canada was conducive for the government to negotiate diplomatic ties. An anti-communist, anti-China lobby did not exist in Canada as it did in the United States. Harbron noted that unlike the strong anti-China lobby in the United States, the Canadian government faced pressure for the early recognition of China.¹ In fact, there was general support from both the Canadian public and the major political parties for the Canadian government to pursue a recognition agenda.² An examination of the polls measuring the support for the establishment of diplomatic relations with China showed a consistently high level of support (See Table 1). Furthermore, there was substantial editorial agreement supporting the recognition of the PRC among Canada's leading newspapers including the Toronto Globe and Mail, the Toronto Star, Montreal's La Presse, the Winnipeg Free Press and the Vancouver Province.³

The international political environment was also ideal for the Canadian government. Generally, by the beginning of the Trudeau era, domestic concerns about Cold War aggression from communist countries were replaced by a concern to diversify Canadian economic relations overseas.⁴ The pursuit of PRC recognition by a close ally of the United States during the Cold War would have been politically unwise. Furthermore, any attempt to conduct bilateral talks with the Chinese during a period when tensions in the Vietnam War had increased would have also been perceived negatively by President Johnson and his State Department. By the late-1960s however, the United States had begun its gradual withdrawal from Vietnam.

In the PRC, 1968 marked the beginning of the end of the Cultural Revolution, a period in which China had isolated itself from the rest of the world. The Cultural Revolution period presented difficulties for international governments, including the
Pearson Government, to establish diplomatic relations. Another factor was the growing intensity of the Sino-Soviet split in the late-1960s. The ideological debate between the two socialist superpowers had turned into heated border disputes, which eventually culminated in armed border clashes in March 1969. The conflict between the PRC and the Soviet Union pushed the Chinese Communists to look outward and establish ties elsewhere in the international arena. Thus the political stage was set for the Canadian government to initiate negotiations with China. Previous Canadian governments were plagued by obstacles that made the recognition of China unwise. By 1968 however, most of those factors no longer existed and the international climate was favourable to pursue diplomatic relations with China.

The most significant factor in the PRC’s recognition was the position of Prime Minister Trudeau on the issue. Although the momentum for the PRC’s recognition had begun during the Pearson Government, some senior DEA officials have suggested that it was Trudeau’s determination to pursue the China issue that was the difference between action and inaction. As one DEA official stated: "I think that he [Trudeau] decided on his own that he was going to push this [matter of improving relations with China] as far as he could." One of Trudeau’s initial foreign policy objectives was to bring the PRC into the international political arena vis-à-vis Canada’s diplomatic recognition.

Trudeau had always been an ardent supporter of bringing the communist regime into the global community. He had a pro-China stance since the end of the Chinese civil war and used the recognition issue as a platform in his campaign bid for the leadership of the Liberal Party and the general election that ensued in 1968. The roots of Trudeau's position may be found in his first visit to China during that country's civil war. Observers have noted that his willingness to establish diplomatic ties had also stemmed from
Trudeau being a left of centre social democrat and a sympathizer of the Marxist Soviet, Cuban, and Chinese regimes. Trudeau thus became the Canadian leader who personally committed his government to resolve the China issue.

Once it was apparent that the China issue could not be resolved within the multilateral setting of the United Nations, Trudeau's government initiated its own bilateral negotiations. The fundamental difference between Trudeau and Lester Pearson was that Trudeau was prepared to officially dissociate with the Taiwanese Nationalists politically whereas Pearson would not. Although Trudeau was undecided about what to do with Taiwan in view of Chinese communist sovereignty over the mainland, he was skeptical about the success of any PRC recognition policy that also involved Taiwan.

The next section discusses both the China recognition negotiations and analyzes the implications that the recognition issue had for Canadian foreign policy at the beginning of Trudeau's government. Trudeau's policy approach differed from previous administrations by three features: Trudeau's new Pacific outlook symbolized a shift in policy priorities, his government's decision-making was independent from American persuasion and the Trudeau China policy was starkly different from the American China policy framework and containment policy. Furthermore, as a consequence of Trudeau's pro-active China policy, Canada also played a facilitating role in encouraging other states to pursue diplomatic relations with the PRC.

Preceding the start of the bilateral negotiations, the Chinese government established three conditions for recognition: the Beijing regime wanted to be recognized as the sole legal government of China, gain support for its claim to the Chinese seat in the United Nations, and garner foreign acceptance of Taiwan as an integral part of Chinese territory. The Canadian government again had difficulties accepting the third
of the Chinese conditions, raising the question of the Taiwanese population's ability for self-determination. Beijing had an extremely hardline official position on Taiwan:

[t]he liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere... The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of 'one China, one Taiwan', 'one China, two governments', 'two Chinas', an 'independent Taiwan', or advocate that 'the status of Taiwan remains to be determined'.

The China policy framework that was established by the Americans undoubtedly had to include Taiwan. Thus, while the American government was adamant about the inclusion of Taiwan in any China policy, the Chinese refused to conduct diplomatic relations with any state unless all links with the Chiang Kai-shek regime were severed.

Initially, the Canadians had wanted to pursue a "one China, one Taiwan" policy that would recognize the negative and positive sovereignty of both regimes on their respective territories. The "one China, one Taiwan" resolution was suggested by Paul Martin during the Pearson era and re-introduced by Mitchell Sharp, Trudeau's Minister for External Affairs. A "one China, one Taiwan" policy would have been ideal because it would not only permit the recognition of the Beijing regime's sovereignty authority in China but also the sovereign authority of the American-backed Taipei regime in Taiwan. The resolution did not find much support internationally during the Pearson era and was shelved as a result of opposition from President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk. As mentioned previously, Prime Minister Trudeau was skeptical about the success of an initiative that simultaneously recognized both Beijing and Taipei regimes. The government's ultimate objective was to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, even at the cost of the status quo relationship with Taiwan.
The "one China, one Taiwan" option was problematic for the Chinese because it acknowledged the KMT's negative sovereign authority, or its freedom from interference from other states. The CCP would have rejected any endorsement of Taiwan's positive sovereignty. International legitimization of the KMT's positive sovereignty would allow the Guomindang the opportunity to exercise sovereign authority. The Chinese government claimed that Taiwan was an internal Chinese affair. In other words, matters pertaining to Taiwan would be under Chinese jurisdiction and any notion that allowed Taiwanese self-determination would be absolutely rejected.

The Canadian negotiators had been presented with a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, Canada was determined to pursue its own independent foreign policy from the United States and ultimately establish diplomatic relations with China. Yet the Chinese unequivocally rejected any notion of simultaneous recognition of Taiwan. On the other hand, Canada had to ensure that the American backed Nationalist Government on Taiwan was not alienated at the conclusion of the Sino-Canadian talks. By October 1969 however it had become apparent to the Canadian government that a continuation of its diplomatic relations with Taiwan was not possible if diplomatic relations with China were to be secured.17

The Canadian government ultimately overcame the difficult balancing act of appeasing the Chinese and the Americans. The joint communique that announced the establishment of Sino-Canadian diplomatic relations stated that:

The Chinese Government reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Canadian government takes note of this position of the Chinese Government.18

The key phrase "takes note" presented a neutral comment that did not imply Canadian agreement or disagreement with the Chinese position and thus provided an out for the
government. In fact, the joint communique was explicit in reiterating the neutral position of the government: "the Canadian Government does not consider it appropriate either to endorse or to challenge the Chinese Government's position on the status of Taiwan". The Canadian delegation's strategy of "taking note of" rather than explicitly affirming the PRC's claims over Taiwan was referred to as the Canadian Formula. The Chinese government accepted the Canadian Formula, which was a tacit approval of the communists' territorial claims because it was convinced that for all intents and purposes, the Canadians effectively accepted the PRC's position on Taiwan.19

Furthermore, the joint communique also stated that "[t]he Canadian government recognizes [recognized] the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China." While the government had no comment about PRC claims over Taiwan, it did recognize Beijing as the paramount sovereign authority in China. Thus the joint communique had established the beginning of a tacit de-recognition of Taiwan and the diminution of Canadian-Taiwanese diplomatic ties, without explicitly affirming Beijing's paramount sovereignty over the island. The objective to establish diplomatic ties with China was achieved and was done without explicitly alienating Taiwan nor the Americans outright.

The Canadian Formula had been a means to recognize the Beijing regime as the ultimate recourse of sovereign authority. The Canadian government "took note" of China's claims of territorial sovereignty over Taiwan. The phrase "takes note" by itself does not denote the supremacy of the CCP's sovereign authority especially after consideration is made of the general neutral tone of the communique. However, while the Canadian government's specific position on the status of Taiwan was somewhat ambiguous, it did recognize the CCP as "the sole legal government of China." Therefore,
although the government would not adopt a position pertaining to the status of Taiwan, it did recognize that the CCP's sovereign authority was ultimately paramount.

**Immediate Implications of Recognition**

The Trudeau Government's pursuit of diplomatic relations with China demonstrated a different approach to the issue from previous administrations. The divergence from the government's traditional deferral of the China issue could first be attributed to Trudeau's shift towards a diversification of Canada's international relationships. The Third Option sought to reduce Canada's dependence on and vulnerability to the United States and its foreign policy by suggesting three strategies: an increased national awareness among Canadians; restructuring of the foreign policy decision making process to encourage long-term planning of objectives; and expansion of external contacts across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans with a particular emphasis on the European Community and Japan.20

Specifically, the establishment of diplomatic ties with China was a part of Trudeau's desire to broaden the scope of Canada's international relations in the Pacific. Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp stated in a 20 February 1969 speech that in addition to maintaining links with the Atlantic, Canada was going to look outward to the Pacific.21 The Government's position was reiterated by Sharp in a 15 April 1969 speech, "Canada and the Pacific", where Sharp firmly committed the Pacific region as a major component to Canadian foreign policy.22

The recognition of the PRC also demonstrated that the Trudeau Government successfully diverged from the tradition of having Canadian foreign policy tacitly established by American influence. Holmes has noted that Canadian foreign policy had
followed a tradition of being implicitly determined by the Americans. As the examination of the St. Laurent, Diefenbaker and Pearson Governments in chapter one suggested, the American influence on foreign policy was strong in Canada's bilateral relations with China. Generally the Canadian government until the Trudeau era had determined that the potential benefits gained with recognition would be outweighed by the negative reactions from Canada's major ally.

Despite the possible negative reaction from the United States, however, the Trudeau Government actively pursued the establishment of diplomatic ties with the CCP. After Sino-Canadian diplomatic relations were established, the Canadian delegation to the United Nations supported the Albanian resolution in favour of giving the Chinese seat to the PRC and abstained on the American resolution making the matter "an important question" requiring two-thirds majority vote. The change in the voting pattern of the Canadian delegation at the United Nations symbolized yet another progressive step towards easing the PRC into the international arena.

The China issue was a test for the Canadian government of the independence of its foreign policy particularly from American influence. Previous to the Trudeau era, the government failed the test to meet its China policy objectives and Sino-Canadian relations remained a function of Canadian-American relations. However, the Trudeau era represented a shift of a China policy dependent upon American perspectives to a Sino-Canadian relationship based solely upon the interaction of the PRC and Canada.

The Trudeau Government's initiation of talks was met by diplomatic protests from Taiwan and the United States. Although American Secretary of State William Rogers formally objected to the Sino-Canadian talks, the Canadian Ambassador to the United States Charles Ritchie said that Ottawa would continue the talks (the Americans were in
Mitchell Sharp also responded by stating the Government's intention to proceed with recognition talks despite the initial American objections of Sino-Canadian diplomatic negotiations.

In addition to being independent of American influence during the negotiation process, the China policy that was finally established was a deviation from American foreign policy. The important difference between these two points is that although the Trudeau Government may have acted independently of American wishes, the China policy that was eventually developed may not have been different from the United States China policy nor containment strategy. The State Department stated that it would be impossible for any allied state of the Americans to seek bilateral diplomatic relations with the PRC since Taiwan's position in international politics, especially in the United Nations, would be jeopardized. Trudeau's pursuit and establishment of diplomatic ties went beyond the American defined China policy framework because Trudeau himself was prepared to sacrifice Taiwan's position in order to bring the PRC into the international political arena. In addition to deviating from the American China Policy framework, the desire of the Trudeau Government to negotiate China's recognition was also an implicit deviation from American containment policy. The willingness of the Canadians to talk to the Chinese Communists symbolized Canada's political engagement with a state that was not a part of the American defined sphere of influence in Asia. The Trudeau initiative also diluted containment policy, since Sino-Canadian negotiations were symbolic of western cooperation with a communist regime.

Finally, the success of the establishment of diplomatic ties was a catalyst for other states to pursue similar bilateral negotiations. The Canadian Formula was subsequently used by other states in their own bilateral recognition negotiations with China. In a 20
February 1969 address, Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp acknowledged that Canada was a middle power that would undertake many "varied roles" in order to achieve imperative international political goals. In terms of a "varied role", Canada was a catalyst for other states to initiate their own bilateral diplomatic negotiations. The government's pursuit of diplomatic recognition was consistent with the principle that such an action was to encourage other states to seek their own bilateral diplomatic relations and ease the PRC into the international arena.

The success of the Trudeau's China initiative may be shown by an examination of the number of other states that established diplomatic relations with the PRC since Canada's October 1970 recognition (See Table 3). Other states had observed the Sino-Canadian talks in order to note how the Canadian contingent handled the Taiwan quagmire. Italian Foreign Minister Aldo Moro stated that Canada's initiative had motivated Italy's own bilateral talks with the PRC.

Canada had increased its exposure and prestige in the international political arena by being a positive catalyst for other states to enter PRC negotiations. The incidence of other states establishing diplomatic ties with the PRC substantially increased after the successful conclusion of the Canadian negotiations. In fact, a number of states including Italy, Belgium, Peru and Lebanon used the Canadian Formula in their own negotiations with the PRC; China did not pursue the issue of Taiwan in other bilateral discussions. A survey of Table 3 shows that in the two year period after Canada's recognition of the PRC, there were an additional thirty-four instances of international recognition of the communist regime, compared to only one recognition in the two year period before Canada's. Furthermore, while it took two years after October 1970 for thirty-four
instances of recognition, the amount of time required before October 1970 for the same amount of thirty-four was almost sixteen years.

Paul Kidd, a writer for the *Calgary Herald*, remained careful not to overstate Ottawa's role in the increased incidence of international recognition. However, Peter Dobell, a foreign policy observer, stated in 1972: "[i]t is evident that the good timing of the Canadian move and the low-key formula have done much to advance China's re-admission into the world community". Dobell's view, rather than Kidd's, would be greatly substantiated by the figures in Table 3. Although the increased incidence of international recognition of China cannot be simplistically nor exclusively attributed to Canada's participation, the effect of the Trudeau initiative cannot be discounted as purely circumstantial.

Canada sought to encourage the United States into diplomatic relations with the PRC. Sharp defined the government's view of middle powers' responsibilities:

> [m]iddle powers have a right and a duty to seek to influence the actions of the superpowers.... Sometimes a middle power may be able to play a special role in a situation where the superpowers, locked in contest for world-wide influence, dare not make a move.

In the capacity of a conduit for the superpowers, Canada provided an out for the United States in its own recognition talks. Chester Ronning argued that although the Americans had not attempted their own diplomatic negotiations with the Chinese immediately after Trudeau's initiative, "Canada's recognition made it decent for Americans to talk about recognizing [Beijing]." Holmes has argued that Canada's recognition of the Beijing regime eased the United States' entry into its own bilateral talks with the PRC. Canada's successful conclusion of negotiations effectively "opened a door" for the
Americans and subsequently allowed the United States to avoid the potentially embarrassing prospect of initiating talks with the Chinese communists themselves.

However, a counter-argument may be made that the success of the Canadian divergence from American foreign policy cannot be totally attributed to a "tougher" Canadian government since it had also appeared that the Americans were softening their own attitude towards China. By February 1969 (when Canadian formally initiated the Sino-Canadian talks), William Rogers had replaced Dean Rusk as the Secretary of State in the United States. Rusk had been opposed to the idea of any ally of the United States to attempt recognition negotiations with China whereas Rogers had a more lenient position.33 Moreover, the Nixon regime subsequently relaxed some trade and travel restrictions and eventually accepted relations with China as a "necessary evil"34 and began pursuing their own engagement policies in secret in 1970.

It must be noted however that the softening official American position occurred after the Canadian government became determined to conduct talks with the PRC in 1968. Although there were signs of Dean Rusk taking a more flexible attitude on China in his discussions with Paul Martin during the Pearson Government, the official American policy still supported the Nationalists in Taiwan and disapproved of a Beijing government in international politics. So, while the American government initially may have provided an obstacle to the newly formed Trudeau regime, any substantive American concern waned as the Canadian negotiating process continued to its successful conclusion in October 1970.

The Canadian government's establishment of diplomatic ties with the Beijing regime had for the most part, only symbolic implications for Canadian-Taiwanese relations. Although Canada's derecognition of Taiwan was important, it did not however
negatively affect economic relations. The agreement of the joint communiqué acknowledged the "ultimate sovereignty" of the CCP. Effectively, the "de-recognition" of Taiwan and the replacement and development of state-to-state level relations between Ottawa and Beijing had begun. The severance of political ties did not affect Canadian-Taiwanese trade relations however. Regardless of the outcome of the political aspect of the relationship, Taiwan did not want to jeopardize its CDN$30 million annual trade surplus with Canada (See Tables 4 and 5). Two-way Canadian-Taiwanese trade increased after the de-recognition of Taiwan (See Tables 4 and 5). In fact, a survey of two-way trade indicates a tremendous increase after Canada's recognition of China in 1970, especially Taiwanese imports to Canada.

Furthermore, as the subsequent chapters suggest, the Canadian government went on to pursue engagement policies with Taiwan and Hong Kong, both of which could not be officially recognized. Mirroring the engagement policies during the Hamilton wheat sales during the Diefenbaker era, the best strategy that the government could adopt when recognition was not possible was economic engagement. The economic engagement strategy was apparent after Canada's recognition of the PRC in 1970 as evidenced by the steady increases in Canadian trade with Taiwan and Hong Kong (See Tables 4 through 7). Canada's economic engagement with Taiwan and Hong Kong will be further detailed in chapter three.

The recognition of "one China" by the Canadian government had a number of implicit ramifications for the perception of sovereignty. First and foremost, Trudeau rejected any notion that the Chiang regime on Taiwan was entitled to possession of negative sovereignty. By disallowing the KMT's negative sovereignty, the Nationalists' positive sovereignty was also dismissed by default. The communiqué that outlined the
Sino-Canadian agreement of diplomatic relations was an example of Canada's understanding that the Chinese government was the ultimate recourse of sovereign authority. While the communique was ambiguous about the jurisdictional status of Taiwan, it stated that the communists represented the only legitimate government in China. While Canada did not take a position pertaining to Taiwan directly, the government tacitly accepted Chinese claims to the island because the DEA recognized only the CCP's sovereign authority as legitimate.

**Trudeau's 1973 Visit to China**

The goodwill that was generated from the initial wheat sales and culminated into the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1970 was apparent in Trudeau's visit to China in 1973. The Prime Minister's visit with Premier Zhou Enlai and Chairman Mao Zedong was the first between Chinese and Canadian heads of state and a concerted effort was made to publicly emphasize the bilateral friendship between the two states. Observers noted that Trudeau's arrival in Beijing was given more pomp and circumstance than usually accorded to world leaders and that his greetings from Zhou and Vice-Premiers Li Hsien-nien and Deng Xiaoping were warmer than those that other diplomats had received.35

Zhou attributed China's extended hospitality to the fact that Canada was the first state in North America to establish diplomatic relations with China.36 The personal accolades and general Chinese respect for Trudeau continued as Zhou called him "an old friend" at a state dinner, a special designation used by the Chinese leadership to connote countries with whom Beijing wished closer relations. The affection between the Chinese
government and Trudeau was apparent and was a product of pre-1968 engagement policies and the Prime Minister's personal commitment to the recognition negotiations.

Both governments maintained a positive environment during both social functions and policy consultations. The editorial in Renmin Ribao stressed the cooperative nature of Sino-Canadian relations:

[these countries] whose social systems are different, nevertheless have the common desire to develop their friendly relations on the basis of the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. 37

Throughout his entire tour of the PRC, Trudeau reassured the Chinese that Canada's friendly relations with China would continue to be an important element in Canadian foreign policy. The DEA had reached an agreement with Chinese authorities pertaining to the reunification of families, an issue of which Beijing traditionally avoided in its international relations. 38 Some of the other tangible results from the visit to Beijing included a number of health, scientific, cultural, academic, sport and media exchanges and increased economic interchange such as formalization of both Most Favoured Nation trade status and a long-term wheat purchase agreement. 39 The non-political exchanges between the PRC and Canada represented a cornerstone in the foundation of Sino-Canadian relations. The variety, scope and number of the exchanges expanded from the early 1970s and continued to play an important role in bilateral relations through to the 1990s. 40

In addition to the substance of the separate bilateral agreements, the symbolic gains of Trudeau's visit were significant. Not only was the Canadian delegation successful in expanding relations with China, but it did so in an area the Chinese government was traditionally not receptive to: the reunification of families. Within the
high-level consultations however neither government compromised its different position on two key issues: Soviet and American détente and the war in the Middle East. The Canadian government had supported the Soviet-American détente and adopted a pacifist disposition in regard to the Middle East war, both starkly different to the Chinese government's positions. As a result of the differing opinions on international concerns, Zhou and Trudeau both stressed the strength of their bilateral relations rather than dwell upon their differences in their speeches. Therefore, the portrayal of a positive bilateral relationship and resolution of significant Sino-Canadian issues were paramount and overshadowed any differences that the Canadians and Chinese had in international issues. The goodwill generated from the historical relationship between the two states, albeit non-political, furthered the desire to promote friendly Sino-Canadian ties.

The 1976 Montreal Olympic Games: "One China" Policy in Effect

Canada's commitment to the de jure and de facto derecognition of the Taiwan regime was tested in 1976, six years after the establishment of diplomatic relations with China. Prior to the commencement of the Olympic Games in Montreal, the Trudeau Government demonstrated its adherence to a strict "one China" policy by disallowing athletes from Taiwan entry into Canada and participation in the Games. There were a number of potential negative ramifications from the decision. First, International Olympic Committee (IOC) President Lord Killanin threatened to remove official Olympic sanction from the Montreal Games and halt awarding any medals if Trudeau did not soften his hardline position against Taiwan. Second, the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) warned that American participation would be removed if the Taiwanese delegation was not admitted to the Games. However despite the international
pressure, the Trudeau Government remained firmly committed to the blockade of athletes claiming to be from the "Republic of China".

Initially, the Canadian government faced a dilemma of whether to accept Taiwan to the detriment of Sino-Canadian relations or reject Taiwanese athletes only to be subject to international complaint. The DEA remained firm on the latter position partly because of the exclusion of the PRC from the Games. Although the PRC met the formal international requirements for admission to the games as the sole representative of China in 1975, the IOC stalled on its decision to admit Chinese athletes to the 1976 Montreal Games; effectively the IOC rejected any notion of a "two-Chinas" sports policy.43

China claimed that a Taiwan team must not be allowed to participate in the Olympic Games but did not object to the involvement of Taiwanese athletes as "stateless" individuals.44 As the de facto Chinese Olympic Committee, only The All-China Sports Federation could represent China in the Olympic Games; the Chinese government asserted that The All-China Sports Federation was the only legitimate state organization governing sports in China "including Taiwan province".45 The IOC response to protests of China's exclusion was that the Chinese could apply for co-existence with Taiwan. The IOC position represented a "two Chinas" policy, of which the Beijing government flatly refused. There were two apparent choices to the Trudeau Government: either accept Taiwan as a legitimate participant in the Montreal Games and tacitly undermine its position of "one China" or bar the entry of the Taiwan team into Canada which represented an adherence to the legitimacy of Chinese claims to territorial sovereignty.

As a result of the exclusion of the PRC and continued inclusion of Taiwan in the Olympic movement, Chinese leaders requested that the Canadian government deny entry to all Taiwanese Olympians. If the request was not honoured, the CCP stated that all
bilateral relations, notably trade, would be affected. The DEA faced a diplomatic impasse: adhere to the ruling of the IOC and welcome Taiwanese athletes on Canadian soil or acquiesce to the Chinese government. The Trudeau Government decided that safeguarding and developing its young and vulnerable relationship with the PRC was more important. A recommendation was made by DEA in April 1976 (approved by Trudeau on 25 May 1976) that stated a Taiwanese team could enter and take part in the Montreal Games as long as none of its athletes proclaimed themselves members of the "Republic of China", and did not use the flag, anthem of other symbol that included the word "China".

The two primary streams of criticism of the Canadian "one China" position came from the IOC and the American government. IOC President Lord Killanin charged Canada with a breach of fundamental Olympic principles by discriminating against Taiwanese athletes on the basis of political affiliation. Trudeau argued however that it was the IOC that was mixing sport and politics by allowing Taiwan to participate under a flag that laid claim to territory it did not rule. The IOC version of events noted that as a condition of awarding Montreal the Olympic Games, the Canadian government agreed in 1970 to admit all members of the IOC.

Minister for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, however, qualified his government's adherence to the IOC terms by stating that all parties would be free to enter Canada "pursuant to the normal regulations." The Trudeau Government used Sharp's stipulation to justify its exclusion of Taiwan; reference to the stipulation was legitimate since the IOC had not openly objected to it originally:

We recognized in 1970 the PRC as the sole legal government of China and in so doing we withdrew recognition from the Taiwan regime which claims as well to be the sole legal government of China...A necessary consequence is
that Canada discourages all official contact with the Taiwan regime.\textsuperscript{50} Since Canada had no official contact with Taiwan, then the government was justified in adhering to its normal regulations and oppose the entry of Taiwanese athletes who claimed to represent the "Republic of China". The allowance of Taiwanese to enter Canada and compete as the "Republic of China" would have provided a source of inconsistency in Canada's policy of recognition of the PRC as well as a source of potential conflict in Sino-Canadian relations.

The Canadian rejection of Taiwanese athletes provoked criticism from the American government and the USOC. Despite the threats from the IOC to remove its sanction from the Montreal Games, the DEA held its position firmly. The possibility of a withdrawal from the IOC also prompted the USOC to threaten to do the same. American President Gerald Ford criticized the Canadian position arguing that Canada had mixed international politics with the "non-political" arena of international sports.\textsuperscript{51} Trudeau justified his government's position to President Ford by responding that "the United States would not appreciate American expatriates to compete as Americans."\textsuperscript{52} The Taiwan lobby in the United States saw Canada offering aid and comfort to a communist nation.\textsuperscript{53} Regardless of the potential absence of the American team in Montreal, the Canadian government remained firm and disregarded any possible ramifications from the IOC and the United States.\textsuperscript{54}

The IOC and Canadian government both compromised their respective positions and agreed that Taiwan could compete if only and if the athletes from Taiwan would compete under an IOC flag with no name. The IOC-Canada compromise addressed both parties' primary concerns: the Trudeau Government ensured that representatives claiming to be from the "Republic of China" were not present in Montreal and the IOC secured the participation of athletes from Taiwan at the 1976 Olympic Games. More
important to the Trudeau Government was the fact that its "one China" policy was not compromised.

When the potential settlement was presented to Taiwanese Olympic officials, however, they denounced it and threatened to withdraw from the Montreal Games. The rejection of the IOC-Canadian accord prompted Trudeau to announce the possibility of the Taiwanese delegation using its own flag and anthem as long as members of the Olympic team did not call themselves representatives of the "Republic of China" nor the ROC. The mollified Canadian position was overwhelmingly accepted by the member states of the IOC including, notably, the USOC. Yet again, however, the delegation from Taiwan rejected the proposal arguing that it had the right to proclaim itself as the representative from the Republic of Taiwan and it formally withdrew from the 1976 Olympic Games on 16 July 1976.

The stand-off between the Canadian government and the delegation from Taiwan underscored the uncompromising objectives of each side. The Taiwanese delegation would have settled for nothing less than acknowledgement that it was the Chinese representative at the Games. The DEA had adhered to its "one China" policy and by doing so, it was recognizing that the ultimate recourse of sovereign authority was in the possession of the communists. Furthermore, the Canadian government respected the PRC's positive sovereign claim that only the athletes from the PRC could be the Chinese representatives in Montreal.

The international reaction to the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games conflict was mixed. There was support for the Trudeau government's position, most notably from the Canadian, Swedish and French media. The Chinese government and Chao Cheng-hung, the President of The All-China Sports Federation, separately expressed gratitude.
for Canada's support. Trudeau remained true to his "one China" policy during the Olympic Games debate yet drew global criticism and risked Canada's relations with the United States. Negative criticism of Trudeau's government ranged from mild to more harsh comparisons to Hitler's desire to exclude Jews from the 1936 Berlin Games. The issue of Taiwan again presented itself as a point of contention between the Canadian and American governments. The difference between the Trudeau era and previous administrations was that Canada did not acquiesce to the State Department's persuasion. Again, China policy in the Trudeau period was dependent upon Sino-Canadian relations not on American perspectives.

The government's hardline position during the 1976 Montreal Olympics may be explained within three contexts. First, Trudeau's personal commitment to a pro-China stance during the months leading up to the July 1976 Games was apparent; he had no qualms about excluding Taiwan if its athletes persisted in representing the "Republic of China" on Canadian soil. As a result of Trudeau's personal objection, the Canadian government interpreted that the Taiwanese claim to representing the "Republic of China" as a means for the regime in Taiwan to promote an identity that was separate and independent of the legitimate government on the mainland. By allowing the Taiwanese athletes to compete under circumstances other than under IOC auspices, the Trudeau Government could be viewed as tacitly accepting those athletes as representatives of the "Republic of China". Secondly, the Trudeau Government's position on Taiwan's involvement in the Montreal Games differed markedly from the United States' stance. For Canadian foreign policy makers, the refusal to accept athletes from Taiwan as representatives of the "Republic of China" was an important counterweight to the influence of the United States. Trudeau's actions corresponded with his government's
general attempt to diminish Canada's dependence upon American influence and develop closer economic and political ties with other countries such as China. Although there was a potential risk to Canada's international image and its relations with the Americans, the government remained committed to its "one China" policy.

The 1976 Montreal Olympics episode was the first major test of Canada's commitment to its "one China" policy. Throughout the entire episode, the government reiterated its recognition of China's ultimate territorial sovereign jurisdiction as including the "province" of Taiwan. The DEA also respected the wishes of the Chinese government in regard to excluding the athletes from competing as representatives of the "Republic of China". Furthermore, the Trudeau Government upheld Chinese claims that only the PRC could legitimately represent a Chinese delegation in Montreal. By endorsing the communists' claims and demands, the Canadian government had tacitly acknowledged the legitimacy of the CCP's positive sovereignty.

Summary and Conclusions

The principles of the "one China" policy were strictly adhered to during the 1968-1976 period by the Canadian government. The establishment of diplomatic relations in 1970 was facilitated by a set of generally ideal domestic and international factors. Domestically, public opinion polls showed a trend of positive feedback from Canadians pertaining to establishing diplomatic ties with Canada and allowing the CCP to hold the Chinese seat at the United Nations. Furthermore, there was a pro-China lobby in Canada which encouraged the politicians to seek political ties unlike the anti-China groups in the United States. In the international forum, the anti-foreign sentiment that existed in China prior to 1968 was on the wane as evidenced by the end of the Cultural Revolution and the
Sino-Soviet split. The Cultural Revolution marked another period of introspection and self-rectification in Chinese history. The eventual split between the Chinese and Soviet communist parties also motivated the CCP to develop political ties with non-traditional allies.

The official American position concerning China remained belligerent as it did prior to the Trudeau period. However, there were signs that the White House and the State Department were softening their hardline strategy with the PRC and accept the necessity of establishing a form of bilateral interaction. Despite the new attitude in Washington, the United States remained officially opposed to Canada's recognition initiatives. Prior to the Trudeau era, such protests from Washington would have resulted in Canada's acquiescence to American China policy whims. American influence would not affect Canada's China policy in the post-1968 period however because Trudeau adamantly opposed and ignored any international protests of his government's actions. The Prime Minister was the most important factor in following the recognition of China to its complete conclusion. One important long-term ramification of Trudeau's commitment was that American influence was no longer the most important dynamic in Sino-Canadian relations after 1968.

The goodwill established from Hamilton's grain sales in the early 1960s and the government's adherence to a "one China" policy further strengthened the foundation of friendly Sino-Canadian relations as evidenced by Trudeau's 1973 visit to Beijing and Shanghai. In terms of sovereignty, the Canadian government had acknowledged the negative and positive sovereign authority of the CCP. Furthermore, the ultimate recourse of sovereign authority was understood to be in the communists' jurisdiction. Although the notion of final and ultimate will be expanded upon in the next two chapters, Canada's
acknowledgement that the CCP was the sole legal government on China was the first understanding of China's paramount and ultimate seat of power. Although, the Trudeau Government did not directly accept China's claims to Taiwan, it did not have to since acceptance of the PRC's negative and positive sovereignty was also an indirect admission to the legitimacy of Chinese claims.

The final section of this chapter empirically showed "one China" principles in effect. The DEA was presented with a situation in 1976 where it had to either acquiesce to international pressure and allow participation of Taiwanese athletes in the Montreal Olympic Games or uphold its acceptance of China's sovereign authority. Although there were a number of compromises to Canada's conditions for Taiwanese participation, none jeopardized the primary tenet of the "one China" strategy that only China could represent the Chinese. In no uncertain terms, the delegation from Taiwan was not allowed to be Chinese representatives, a designation bestowed only upon citizens of the PRC. Furthermore, the DEA respected the Chinese government's wishes to prohibit the delegation from Taiwan from participating in the Montreal Games as representatives of the "Republic of China".
Chapter Three
Canada's "Greater China" Approach: Post-1976

Chapter three explains Canada's "greater China" strategy and the reasons attributed to China's acceptance of a less-rigid definition of sovereignty. The post-1976 era marked the expansion of Sino-Canadian relations from exclusively state-level to include Canadian contact with Chinese provinces and municipalities as well as Hong Kong and Taiwan. The primary motivation behind the "greater China" approach was Deng Xiaoping's acceptance of a flexible approach towards state sovereignty and the CCP's devolution of decision making authority. The difference between the Maoist and Dengist periods symbolized the stark contrast between the rigid and pragmatic perceptions of Chinese state sovereignty.

Canada's "greater China" approach may be surveyed on two levels: Canadian relations with China proper and engagement policies with Hong Kong and Taiwan. Sino-Canadian contact in the post-1976 period may be characterized by increased bilateral trade, CIDA aid and non-economic activity. Furthermore, Canadian provinces and cities were also encouraged to twin with Chinese counterparts as a means of non-political engagement. The Central People's Government in Beijing tacitly delegated final sovereign authority to the provinces and cities so that they could pursue economic development with Canadian provinces and cities. Twinning did not represent a lost of Chinese sovereignty however because the state government still retained ultimate sovereignty and has the prerogative, if the PRC wished, to veto any decision reached by the provinces or cities.

The second level of the "greater China" policy was Canada's increased engagement with Hong Kong and Taiwan. The PRC government had always maintained
that Taiwan was a part of Chinese jurisdiction. The Sino-British Joint Declaration 1984 established the type of political system that would be permitted in Hong Kong under Chinese sovereignty. The Canadian government however established non-political bilateral contact with Taiwan and Hong Kong. The Deng Government has implicitly allowed Canada's "pseudo-sovereign" relations with Taiwan and Hong Kong because the Chinese still retained ultimate sovereign status while Taiwan and Hong Kong exercise final sovereign authority. The Canadian government maintained non-political ties with Taiwan and Hong Kong but that was dependent upon the implicit approval from Beijing.

The Changing of the Old Guard

The death of Mao Zedong in 1976 represented a watershed in Chinese foreign policy and a change in the leadership style in China. A stark comparison may be made between Mao's vision of China's territorial sovereignty and Deng Xiaoping's perception. A common thread in both the Mao and Deng periods was that sovereign claims, and international law in general, had primarily a functional role in realizing each government's foreign policy objectives. The foreign policy objectives of Mao nonetheless differed strikingly from those of Deng. It was the change in leadership and national priorities that brought about the shift from a hardline "one China" perception of the Chinese government's gradual acceptance of a "greater China".

The usage of international law and the perception of sovereignty by the Chinese government during the Mao era was based strictly upon Maoist ideology and depended upon the arbitrary whims of the leadership. The Chinese interpretation of international law was an expression of Chinese political needs and as a result, the formulation of legal theory was absolutely subservient to the national interest, which at the time was
recognition by the rest of the world of the PRC as a sovereign state.\(^1\) Suzanne Ogden noted that, as a tool of the state, "[international legal theory's] truth [was] less important than their usefulness, and this [was] gauged by how well it serve[d] to justify the objectives of China's foreign policy."\(^2\)

The interpretation of international law and sovereignty starkly differed in the Deng Xiaoping era. Deng opted for a more general pragmatic approach than the ideologically based Mao and his immediate successor Hua Guofeng.\(^3\) Hua adopted a strategy coined the "two whatevers" which was based upon the principle that Mao's writings and actions still determined Chinese policy.\(^4\) Deng criticized Hua's "two whatevers" theory by arguing that a strict adherence to Maoism was inappropriate and that the correct approach was to adapt Marxist principles to the context of the social circumstances in China.\(^5\)

Deng also found it necessary to remove ideology from the law as a means to attract international commercial investment. Foreign investors had to be assured that their interests were not subject to erratic CCP whims and the government had to ensure that China was guarded from any possible hegemonic intrusion upon its sovereignty: "[in order] to avoid the legal disputes that had plagued the Qing state and led to the imposition of extraterritoriality by the West, the PRC government would have to offer new kinds of [unarbitrary legal] safeguards."\(^6\) Thus, Deng's conceptualization of law remained a means for the state to realize its economic objectives. However, by emphasizing its more pragmatic usage and removing its ideological context and acknowledging the principles of impartiality in the legal system, the Chinese government attempted to promote an ideal investment environment for foreign capital.

While the state remained committed to the functional usage of international law in its foreign policy, the priorities during the Deng period were unlike those in the Mao
era. The revised conceptualization of legal theory decreased the emphasis on a rigid state sovereignty as a means to facilitate international cooperation with the Chinese state. As a basic principle, Deng noted that: "[f]or the interest of our own country the goal of our foreign policy is a peaceful environment for achieving the four modernizations." Deng's prioritization of international cooperation was an essential precondition for the success of China's domestic economic reforms.

Although less immediacy was given to a rigid interpretation of sovereignty during the Deng era, the perpetuation of the CCP's ultimate sovereign authority nonetheless remained an important concern. China's sovereignty was subject to a more flexible definition in the Deng era than before in order to facilitate its economic modernization goals:

while sovereignty is still central in Chinese international legal rhetoric, especially in the opening round of lawmaking or negotiating processes, its [Chinese perception of international law] uncompromising attitude [has] modified to accommodate the functional requirements of China's deepening involvement with capitalist world systems [emphasis added].

The shift in the conceptualization of international law is a reflection of the state's priorities during the Deng period. While Mao concentrated on establishing a rigid understanding of sovereignty, Deng refocussed the Chinese state towards a program of economic construction. Mao and Deng each took starkly different approaches to governing. Mao was sensitive to and sought to prevent possible intrusions on Chinese sovereignty while Deng was willing to take a more low key and pragmatic approach to ruling, more tolerant to "liberal" ideas than Mao but he still retained paramount power.

In the framework of final and ultimate sovereignty, the Deng Government became less concerned with employing its final sovereign prerogatives. As long as China was recognized as the paramount ultimate sovereign authority, then the CCP did not necessarily have to exercise it as a means of legitimation. As a result, the license of final
recourse of sovereign authority could be afforded to China's constituent parts (Hong Kong, Taiwan and the separate provinces). It is by the fact that the CCP has ultimate authority that the constituent parts may conduct "pseudo-sovereign" relations without protest from the Beijing government. By having ultimate authority, the CCP government may either tacitly approve of China's constituent parts' "pseudo-sovereign" relations by doing nothing or disapprove to particular bilateral measures by exercising its right to veto.

The Era of China's Economic Construction

The revisionism of the CCP's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence was solidified at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party (hereafter the Third Plenum) in December 1978. Deng's primary task at the Third Plenum was to "shift the emphasis of the Party's work to socialist modernization" or in effect, replace the Maoist ideological notion of class struggle with economic modernization as China's priority. Thus, it was not a coincidence that the moderated interpretation of sovereignty was set as the government introduced the practical institutionalization of the Four Modernizations: development of China's agricultural and industrial sectors; emphasis on science and technology; and maintaining a strong national defence. This chapter will only focus upon industrial reform since China's "Open Door" policies necessitated the PRC's moderated position on sovereignty. Chinese foreign policy had to adopt "Open Door" measures that would encourage and ensure other states' participation in the economic modernization of China, even if that included a more flexible interpretation of its sovereignty.

The Third Plenum proclaimed the existence of "objective economic laws" which dictated that the production of goods was directed primarily by market forces, such as
consumer demand and profitability. The new economic strategy signified a stark shift from the economic command structure that dominated the Mao era. The decision-making process of industrial enterprises was decentralized from central government planners to the individual factory and plant management teams. The motivation for production also changed from one based upon CCP stipulated guidelines to profit-making. Industrial reform faced problems immediately after its initiation however, which necessitated imposition of moderate state control over prices, wages and investment.

The new approach outlined at the Third Plenum also had international ramifications. The former Maoist introspective and self-reliant economic policies were rejected in favour of "Open Door" policies which promoted expanded foreign trade and development of industrial regions. As Evans and Zweig noted:

The most visible and significant aspect of China's external posture in the 1980s has been the "open door" offered to commercial and to a lesser extent, cultural influences from developed economic nations.

Initially, the CCP concentrated its efforts in cultivating the economic potential of China's coastal region by the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in July 1979. The government encouraged the involvement of foreign capital investment and technology in developing joint business ventures in Zhuhai, Shenzhen, Shantou and Xiamen by offering a number of incentives. In addition to the Chinese commitment to build the factories, the PRC government also enticed foreign investors with a low cost labour force, promises of a developed infrastructure and a 16.5% corporate income tax rate that was half of the conventional amount of 33%. The eventual success of the SEZs resulted in the opening of additional areas to foreign investment in the mid-1980s and a reaffirmation of the government's more "liberal" economic reforms.
Canada and "Greater China"

Canada's relations with the PRC in the post-Mao era expanded at two levels. First, the "greater China" strategy included further engagement policies between Canada and the PRC proper. Two-way Sino-Canadian trade increased noticeably in the post-Mao period. Furthermore, the Canadian government sought to use its extension of official Canadian aid to China and non-economic interaction as means toward further engagement and establishing a position of influence with the Beijing government. In addition, relations between the Canadian provinces and cities with their Chinese counterparts were encouraged throughout the 1980s. A "pseudo-sovereign" relationship that involved a Chinese jurisdiction that bypassed the central government would have been unheard of during the Mao era. However, the establishment of "non-state level" engagement between the different provinces and cities, or twinning, was allowed by Deng because it was a way to facilitate further economic growth at a micro level. The CCP's transfer of final sovereign authority to its lower levels of government allowed for a bypass of the central government in decision-making.

The second and perhaps more contentious level of the "greater China" strategy was the de facto state level relationship between Canada and both Taiwan and Hong Kong. While Prime Minister Brian Mulroney maintained that paramount authority remained with the Beijing regime, his government made a commitment to further expand Canada's contacts with Taiwan and Hong Kong. The strategy of sustaining ties with Taiwan and Hong Kong mirrored that of Hamilton's 1960 wheat sales. When official political ties with China and Taiwan were not possible in the 1960s and 1970s, then economic engagement was an ideal means to preserve a form of bilateral contact.
Establishing a form of relationship with Taiwan and Hong Kong may appear to be an intrusion upon Chinese sovereignty because the Canadian state was conducting seemingly state-level relationships. On the contrary, it was only with the tacit approval of the Beijing government and Canada's recognition of China's ultimate sovereign position that Canada could conduct relations with Taiwan and Hong Kong without immediate concern from the CCP. The thought of promoting Canadian relations with Taiwan or Hong Kong would have been unheard of during the Mao period. Canada's engagement with the two island territories was possible again because of Deng's flexible approach to sovereignty. By delegating the final sovereign recourse to the Taiwanese regime and British colonial administration on Hong Kong, the Chinese government ensured that it appeased those foreign governments which contributed to China's own economic construction. As long as the final decision-making of the different administrations of Hong Kong and Taiwan did not jeopardize Chinese economic development or security, the CCP did not exercise its own ultimate sovereign prerogative.

"Greater China": Level One

The first level of Canada's "greater China" policy to be discussed will be the specific contact between the Canadian and Chinese governments as well as the exchanges of the different Canadian provinces and cities and their counterparts. The Canadian government's most visible financial presence in China was the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). In 1979, the Canadian International Development Research Council established the first bilateral development program between China and a western country since the founding of the PRC thirty years
previously. The aid package primarily provided emergency food relief aid but more importantly, it established a Canadian commitment to provide aid assistance to China.

Mark MacGuigan, the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the minister responsible for CIDA, developed an aid program for the PRC despite the opposition from other parties. MacGuigan argued that the CIDA China initiative was "a way of continuing the process of drawing China into the world community." Again, the initiation of a bilateral aid package symbolized Canada's commitment to ensuring not only its own activist strategy with the PRC but also to prevent a renewed Chinese isolationism from the international political arena.

The initial commitment from CIDA concentrated on technology transfer and human resource development in the agriculture, forestry, industrial management and energy sectors. The first disbursements amounted to CDN$20 million annually in 1981. The total amount of assistance grew over the next decade to CDN$132.12 million annually, which represented the second largest disbursement of Canadian aid to any country. The bulk of the program disbursements administered by the Special Programs Branch of CIDA was in the form of direct country to country aid which totaled CDN$75 million or 60% of all Canadian aid (the remaining CDN$57 million in aid was contributed through multilateral channels). The funds were primarily channeled to the Industrial Cooperation Program and specific institutional linkage programs. In the mid-1980s, Canada competed with West Germany and Japan for the position of top foreign aid donor to China.

The official mandate of CIDA's China Program in the mid-1990s did not deviate greatly from the original goals. The strategy not only promoted China's economic development efforts as well as its activist role in international affairs but also sought to promote good governance in China. By means of increased bilateral aid, the Canadian
government sought not only to promote the development of the Chinese economy but also influence the decision makers in Beijing.

Another positive spin-off effect of sending Canadian assistance to China was strengthening the foundation of bilateral cooperation. From the Chinese perspective, the Diefenbaker Government's economic engagement with the Chinese communists prior to the 1970 recognition established a trustworthy and workable bilateral relationship especially since Hamilton's wheat sales was a contentious issue between the government and its international allies. In the same vein, the support given from CIDA not only represented material benefits for the Chinese government but also a symbol of continuing Canadian goodwill. Roy noted that the goodwill demonstrated during the Trudeau recognition talks translated into a genuine and "rewarding" environment in Sino-Canadian trade and bilateral aid cooperation.23

Prime Minister Mulroney's first visit to China in 1986 was noteworthy because it encouraged a more intense Sino-Canadian relationship in terms of trade, aid and forms of non-economic exchanges. Prior to Mulroney's trip, the government announced its intent to double CIDA's bilateral aid commitments over the next five years from a projected CDN$100 million to a proposed figure of CDN$200 million.24 Bilateral trade improved markedly immediately following the Mulroney visit, especially the total value of exports from Canada to the PRC (See Tables 8 and 9).

The success of the Mulroney visit prompted a review of Canada's strategy with China. The reassessment was exhaustive and involved many federal and provincial government departments as well as the private sector. The China strategy that was formulated in April 1987 encouraged an even greater level of bilateral interaction that included additional commitments to exchanges and trade development. Furthermore, the
government encouraged increased government, business and academic consultation and cooperation as a means towards defining informed China policy and strategy positions.\textsuperscript{25} 

The government's strategy in regard to the PRC was expanded to include the entire Asia-Pacific region. Pacific 2000 was a general strategy not only to further improve Canada's official relations with Asia-Pacific but also to increase Canadians' awareness of the region. Specific initiatives included the establishment of a Japan Science and Technology Fund, an Asian Languages and Awareness Fund and a Pacific 2000 Projects Fund which offered financial support to Canadian activities in the region.\textsuperscript{26} The Mulroney Government's initiatives were concerted efforts to further strengthen Canada's relationship with China and the Asia-Pacific region in general. The timing of the pro-active position in Asia-Pacific was unfortunate however, since it immediately preceded the incident in Tiananmen Square on 4 June 1989.

One potential point of contention in the context of Chinese sovereignty might occur in the interpretation of twinning. Since the inception of an "Open Door" policy mentality, the incidence of provincial and municipal twinning has risen. Twinning refers to exchanges, primarily economic and cultural, that occur between a Canadian province or city and a Chinese counterpart. One built-in spin-off effect of twinning is that state-level political influence is effectively lessened. More specifically, the constituent parts of China, namely the provinces and cities, are responsible for conducting de facto international relations in their own jurisdiction with only broad guidelines to promote joint business ventures from the central authority in Beijing.

Bypassing the Central People's Government in Beijing may be interpreted as a breach of China's legitimate sovereignty. However, since Beijing has delegated final authority to the separate provinces and cities, the central government still retains legitimate ultimate sovereignty. Thus, twinning agreements could be interpreted as a
challenge to Beijing's sovereign authority but this is not the case. Since twinning agreements affect authority only at the final level, they are still subject to the ultimate sovereign authority of the Central People's Government.

As a means of augmenting state level trade development programs, provinces have initiated bilateral economic contracts and agreements with their Canadian counterparts. One advantage of the province-level agreements is that specific Chinese needs could be met at a smaller and more effective micro scale than at the state level. Although most of the Canadian provinces engage in a variety of interaction with a number of Chinese state governmental agencies, formal ties exist between three sets of provinces: Alberta and the northern province of Heilongjiang; Saskatchewan and the northern province of Jilin and; Ontario and Jiangsu, the latter of which is located in east central China. Since one of the major goals of twinning was the development of trade, economic and technology exchange, efforts were made to find "twins" of similar economic focus. Alberta and Heilongjiang are both abundant in natural resources and livestock production while Saskatchewan and Jilin specialize in agriculture, especially grain production.

Ontario and Jiangsu are both provincial manufacturing centres. As a means to encourage joint ventures and facilitate opportunity for technology transfer between the two provinces, the Ontario-Jiangsu Science and Technology Centre was opened in January 1987 under the auspices of both the Ontario Ministry of Industry Trade and Technology and the Jiangsu Science and Technology Committee. The Centre promoted the economic development of Jiangsu by matching the region's technological needs with a potential Ontario firm. One ramification of provincial twinning on the traditional Chinese perception of state sovereignty was that Jiangsu (and the other provinces in the
same position) was delegated decision-making authority over its own economic matters without direct influence or scrutiny from the central government.

Twinning at the municipal level also occurs with a number of large Canadian metropolitan centres: Montreal is matched with Shanghai; Vancouver's twin is Guangzhou and; Edmonton and Calgary have Harbin and Daqing respectively as their Chinese counterparts. Since the introduction of "Open Door" policies, as the case as provincial twinning, the state authority in Beijing has sacrificed some of its sovereign authority in order to allow China's different constituent parts to develop independently. Rather than the guarded protectionist attitude of the Mao era where authority was only in the central leadership, control over economic jurisdictional matters was delegated to the municipal level.

The relationship between Toronto and Chongqing underlines the final sovereign authority given to the municipal level of Chinese government. Toronto and the Szechuan city were twinned in 1987 in order to facilitate economic interaction and technology transfer as well as promoting cultural, educational and medical exchanges. However, since Chongqing is so large, the central government in Beijing afforded it a degree of autonomy. The special status allowed local officials the authority to approve of international deals of value up to US$5 million without the permission of the government in Beijing. Again, as was the case between the provincial twinning arrangements, the matter of economic development was prioritized over concerns of maintaining a rigid notion of state sovereignty.

As alluded to before, twinning affords some of the Chinese provinces and cities a final sovereign recourse. For instance, Jiangsu and Chongqing appear to have negative and positive sovereignty. The province and city have the freedom with which both can pursue economic self-determination and each has exercised that prerogative. However,
an entity possesses legitimate sovereignty only if it has absolute and perpetual power. Sovereign power was allocated to Jiangsu and Chongqing from the central authority, making the province and city "representatives" (using Bodin's terminology) and not possessors of sovereignty. The power was delegated from the Chinese central government to its constituent parts. Jiangsu and Chongqing only represent the final recourse because both are still subject and accountable to the Chinese government which symbolizes the ultimate dominion that legitimately has sovereignty authority in perpetuity.

"Greater China": Level Two

The second level of Canada's "greater China" strategy was its expanded relations with Taiwan and Hong Kong during the 1980s. Hong Kong will revert to Chinese sovereignty legally in 1997 and international opinions differ as to the nature of Taiwan's independence from the PRC. The government in Beijing effectively regarded Hong Kong as Chinese territory under British administration until 1997 and considered Taiwan as Chinese territory under an illegal regime. Therefore, the contact between the Canadian state and the separate administrations of Taiwan and Hong Kong could be interpreted as an indirect challenge to China's claims to jurisdictional authority. In one case, Canadian contact with the Nationalists could be construed by the Chinese to mean de facto state level contact between Ottawa and a non-Chinese government body on Taiwan. Canada's relations with Hong Kong could be interpreted by the PRC government as Ottawa's attempt to present an illusion of the British colony's "statehood" prior to Hong Kong's reversion to Chinese control.

The CCP has tacitly delegated Taiwan and the British administration on Hong Kong the possession of final recourse of sovereignty. The Chinese government however
retained the prerogative of ultimate sovereignty. The case of delegating the exercise of sovereignty to Taiwan and Hong Kong as Bodinian representatives was analogous to the previous survey of giving authority to parts of China proper in twinning arrangements. The circumstances under which Beijing does not exercise its ultimate prerogative are complex. The Chinese government would ultimately have no reason to object to other states conducting "pseudo-sovereign" relations with Taiwan and Hong Kong as long as economic aid continued to be directed towards China. In fact, it would be in China's best interest to remain relatively apathetic towards Canadian-Taiwanese and Hong Kong ties as long as Chinese interests (economic, security or other) were not jeopardized. Furthermore, the CCP remained apathetic towards foreign states' relations with Taiwan and Hong Kong just as long as the world community respected the communists' ultimate sovereign authority.

**Taiwan**

The evolutionary change in the functionality of sovereignty may be most clearly illustrated by the three-way relationship between China, Canada and Taiwan since the Canadian recognition of the PRC in 1970. Initially China's refusal to allow another state to concurrently conduct relations with both the Beijing and Taipei Governments clearly illustrated the communists' rigid claims to a "one China" stand. However, foreign states' international relations with Taiwan were becoming more tolerable and acceptable to Beijing under the "Open Door" policies.

China's official position towards Taiwan reflected a rigid stand that did not tolerate any foreign interference. The legal stand that the Chinese communists had towards Taiwan was laid out in a statement on the normalization of relations with the United States in 1979:
As is known to all, the Government of the PRC is the sole legal government of China and Taiwan is a part of China.... As for the way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland and reunifying the country, it is entirely China's internal affair.30

The tacit implication of the Chinese government's sentiment was that, as Spence noted, Taiwan was still Chinese territory, "a province that had temporarily lost its home."31 The Chinese promotion of a "one China" perception and how that stipulation remained a constraint to Canada's pursuit of diplomatic contact with China was underlined in chapter one. During the negotiations to establish Sino-Canadian political relations, the Chinese government would not compromise its position to either a "one China", "one-Taiwan" or a "two-Chinas" policy. Subsequent to Trudeau's recognition of "one China" and effective derecognition of the Taiwan regime, the Beijing authority remained adamant about its Taiwan strategy until the initiation of the "Open Door" policies.

The Canadian approach towards Taiwan since 1970 was analogous to Canada's strategy when it could not establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. In the absence of formal political ties, the Canadian government during the Diefenbaker years established a plan of economic contact with the Chinese communists. The economic engagement, albeit not political, maintained open bilateral contacts between the two states and prevented the possibility of renewed Chinese isolationism. The same strategy of ensuring bilateral interaction may also be applied in the case of Canada and Taiwan in the post-1970 period.

In the official response to the announcement of Canada's recognition of the Beijing government, the Taiwanese Nationalists stated that:

The government of the Chinese Republic is convinced that the break in diplomatic relations between both countries does not impair the friendship that exists between the people of the two countries.32
Conversely, in notifying its intention to formalize diplomatic ties with the Beijing government, the DEA drafted a statement to other ministers:

> While we wish the break in our relations with the Nationalist Chinese to appear as complete as possible, it is clear that we cannot and will not wish to sever all contacts with them. It is intended to create in the very near future, an interdepartmental body made up of representatives of departments and agencies with continuing interests in Taiwan to study and coordinate future unofficial relations with the Taiwanese. 33

The accounts from both the Taiwanese Nationalists and the DEA indicated that some form of continued engagement was desired from both sides in the absence of formal political relations. External Affairs Minister Clark reiterated the position that "[preclusion of] official relations [did not] mean that private and commercial contacts shouldn't occur". 34 As was the case in Sino-Canadian engagement during the 1960s, the informal relationship between Canada and Taiwan in the post-Mao era was to be primarily economic.

A measurement of the amount of Canadian-Taiwanese contact illustrates a closer form of bilateral engagement despite Canada's de facto termination of political ties with Taiwan. Pre-1970 two-way trade averaged less than CDN$70 million dollars annually (see Tables 4 and 5). In fact, the amount of bilateral trade between Canada and Taiwan increased after the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC. Since 1970, Taiwan has maintained a trade surplus with Canada. During the early-1990s, Canada remained Taiwan's ninth largest export market and was Taiwan's twelfth largest trading partner in terms of imports. 35 Major Canadian exports include natural resources, such as wood pulp and agricultural products, as well as high-tech telecommunications and transportation equipment. Taiwanese products sent to Canada primarily included consumer goods, such as toys, footwear, sports equipment and furniture, and unfinished mechanical and precision equipment.
The cooperative nature of the Canadian-Taiwanese relationship in the post-Mao era was formally symbolized in 1986 with the opening of the Canadian Trade Office in Taipei (CTOT) with a complementary Taiwan Desk in Ottawa and the establishment of the Canada-Taiwan Business Association (CTBA). The CTOT was supported by the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and its mandate was to promote Canadian business enterprises in the Taiwanese market which was becoming increasingly inundated with other OECD countries; provide information on the Taiwan market to Canadian business, and organize visits between Canadian and Taiwanese business interests. Although the promotion of trade was the primary intent of the CTOT, other functions such as visa processing and general immigration inquiries were included in 1990. The Taiwan Desk and CTBA performed similar functions. In effect, the CTOT has gradually expanded its scope from a purely economic institution to an organization that conducted consular functions.

The case of Canadian-Taiwanese relations in the post-1970 recognition period underlines two themes of this chapter. First, the Canadian government had no choice but to sever its ties with Taiwan after recognition but it still wished to maintain a form of Canadian-Taiwanese contact. The general objective of the government's strategy was to preserve a type of bilateral engagement when official state-level ties were not possible. This engagement strategy was also used by Canada in the 1960s with the PRC and the post-Mao era with Hong Kong.

The second theme addresses the context of sovereignty. During the Mao period, any state that wished to have diplomatic relations with China could not conceivably be allowed the same arrangement with Taiwan. The Deng government however tacitly delegated final sovereign authority to the regime on Taiwan. While Taiwan exercised negative and positive sovereign powers, it did not possess those privileges. In the view
from Beijing, Taiwan was merely a representative of sovereign authority and any international decisions it made remained subject and accountable to the Central People's Government in Beijing. The PRC maintained its claim to ultimate paramount sovereign power over the Taiwanese jurisdiction. So while the Canadian government conducted its affairs with the "pseudo-sovereign" Taiwanese regime, it could do so only with the tacit approval of the Chinese government. As long as Canadian-Taiwanese relations either benefitted or at least did not affect the development of the Chinese economy, then the CCP would not claim its ultimate sovereign authority over Taiwan.

Hong Kong

Although Canada's relations with Hong Kong were not traditionally as deep-rooted or strong relative to the Canadian-Taiwanese relationship, they gained relative symbolic importance during the 1980s. By establishing links with Hong Kong, albeit primarily economic in nature, Canada pursued a form of engagement as it did in the 1960s with the PRC and in the post-recognition era with Taiwan. Furthermore, the Canadian government's ties with Hong Kong were consistent with its "greater China" strategy. The general aim of the Canadian strategy was to ensure that Hong Kong had a strong international role established before it reverted from a British colony back to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. By creating and maintaining a number of forms of engagement, Canada hoped to establish a position of influence with a post-1997 Hong Kong. This added another dimension to its relationship with China.

Representatives from both Hong Kong and Canada have established offices on each other's territory. In the post-recognition period, Canada established a commission in Hong Kong which combined immigration and trade facilities. After its founding in 1971, the commission expanded the range of functions to include political reporting of regional
affairs to the DEA, consular services for Canadian citizens and promotion of bilateral cultural activities in addition to processing immigration requests and promoting bilateral trade. By the late 1980s, the Canadian Commission in Hong Kong had grown to be the third largest in Asia after Tokyo and New Delhi. The Canadian government made a commitment to increase domestic awareness of Hong Kong and encourage bilateral linkages. A branch of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong was founded in 1977 and has remained the largest outside of Canada. In addition to federally funded institutions, all the provinces, except for Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, have set up trade representative offices in Hong Kong.

Hong Kong’s presence in Canada has primarily been a "quasi-governmental" organization: the Hong Kong Trade Development Council. The Hong Kong Trade Development Council (HKTDC) was established globally in 1966. It provided a link between manufacturers and exporters based in Hong Kong and other countries to organize trade connections and business missions to and from Hong Kong as well as supplying general business information. The HKTDC established a branch in Toronto in 1971 and in Vancouver in 1988.

Until the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989, the bilateral relationship was more a function of private business contact rather than any form of political ties between Canada and the administration in Hong Kong. The extensive Canadian commercial links included the further development of Hong Kong harbour by Canadian Commercial Corporation in 1989, financing of the Bank of China Tower by Chubb Canada and the selection of an Ontario firm in 1990 to be financial advisor to the Chek Lap Kok airport development project.

The general pattern of Canada-Hong Kong trade had been steadily increasing and in 1992, Hong Kong was Canada's 14th largest trading partner and fifth largest in Asia.
In 1992, two-way trade totaled CDN$1.9 billion of which CDN$757 million were Canadian exports and CDN$1.135 billion were imports from Hong Kong (See Tables 6 and 7). As was the case with Taiwan, Canada has had a trade deficit with Hong Kong. The HKTDC noted that the discrepancy in bilateral trade patterns is attributable to Hong Kong being an entrepôt for Chinese-origin exports to Canada. Canadian exports included semi-processed items such as metals, plastics and paper as well as gold coins while Hong Kong sent consumer items like clothing, toys, and sporting goods.

The Canada-Hong Kong political connection may be related back to Canada's acceptance of the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 outlining the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997 and the Basic Law, a constitution to take effect in the post-1997 Hong Kong. Copithorne has argued that provisions in the Sino-British Joint Declaration 1984 allowed Hong Kong to maintain and develop relations and conclude agreements "with states, regions and relevant international organizations", giving Hong Kong a "quasi-international personality". While Copithorne's interpretation of the Sino-British Joint Agreement 1984 would give Hong Kong a general illusion of an independent and sovereign character, an analysis of the Basic Law could support the notion that it would merely give Hong Kong a final, not an ultimate, recourse of sovereign authority. In other words, while the administration of a post-1997 Hong Kong would be given an opportunity to have degrees of negative and positive sovereign authority, it would still be subject and subordinate to Chinese ultimate sovereignty.

The general criticism of the Basic Law is that it is heavily tilted in China's favour since it does not provide adequate checks and balances between the Chinese dominated Executive Council (Exco) and the Legislative Council (Legco) which is composed of Hong Kong residents. Article 45 of the Basic Law states that "The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be selected by election or through
consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People's Government." The problem with the seemingly democratic nature of Article 45 is that Chinese officials have implied that they have a veto power over the selection of the appointee. Therefore, the Chinese government may not have the final claim to the executive appointment but it does have the paramount and ultimate power to overrule the selection of the Chief Executive.

Furthermore, the Chief Executive is only accountable and responsible to the Chinese Central People's Government (Article 43). The Chief Executive responsibility to the Legco is primarily symbolic and not even defined by the Basic Law. The effective power that the position has over policy-making in Hong Kong is clearly defined in Articles 48-52 which outline the powers and functions of the Chief Executive. Bills passed by the Legco have to be approved by the Chief Executive before they may be enacted into law, thus allocating a veto power over bills to that position. The Chief Executive may still refuse to sign the bill even after further Legco revisions and as a result, may dissolve the Legco.

Again, the potential for a pro-Chinese Exco to exercise a form of ultimate sovereignty over Hong Kong legislation exists. Although the Legco can theoretically impeach the Chief Executive, impeachment can only occur with the approval from the Beijing government. The provisions outlined in the Basic Law provided Hong Kong political institutions with a form of final sovereignty yet implicitly retained the more effective ultimate sovereignty for the Chinese government in Beijing. As long as economic development proceeds in China and further economic growth continues in Hong Kong and there is no challenge to China's sovereign authority in Hong Kong, then the Chinese government should have no reason to exercise its ultimate sovereignty.
Conversely, the Legco's check and balance function upon the Chief Executive is limited since the latter has the power to "decide in the light of security and public interest, whether government officials or other personnel in charge of government affairs should testify or give evidence before the Legco." In other words, there would be an opportunity for inquiries into public misdoing to be ignored or influenced by the Chief Executive's discretion. Thus, by allowing the Chief Executive censorship powers, any effective system of checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches may be dismissed; effectively, the rule of law is indirectly subordinated to the Chinese sovereign authority.

The preceding survey of Hong Kong underlined two themes. Canada's strategy with Hong Kong was to furnish bilateral ties, albeit not political, when diplomatic association was not possible. This point has been reiterated through the analysis of Hamilton's wheat sales in 1960, and Canada's relations with Taiwan. More importantly, an investigation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration 1984 and the Basic Law indicated that the foundation has been laid for Hong Kong's ability to have final sovereign recourse while being subject to China's ultimate source of sovereignty. The appearance of establishing a Hong Kong governmental system that was independent of the Central People's Government in Beijing was overshadowed by the fact that the CCP ultimately has paramount authority over the decision-making institutions laid out in the Basic Law.

The second level of Canada's "greater China" policy was another example of the difference between final and ultimate sovereignty. China had implicitly delegated final sovereign authority to Hong Kong and Taiwan as a means to placate foreign governments. Canada's bilateral ties with Taiwan and Hong Kong were possible only with the tacit approval of the Chinese government. Relations between foreign states and
Hong Kong and Taiwan were allowed under certain conditions. Foremost, the development of the Chinese economy and the goals of the CCP could not be hindered.

Another condition under which other states were allowed to engage Hong Kong and Taiwan was international recognition of the ultimate sovereign power of the Chinese government. In other words, the concerns and authority of the communists in Beijing were paramount to any agreements between foreign governments and Hong Kong and Taiwan. France and Germany were two examples where relations with China superseded those with Taiwan, a final sovereign authority. The lessons drawn from the experiences of both nations could also be translated into the context of Sino-Canadian relations. An examination of the reaction of the Chinese government to French and German economic ties with Taiwan would provide a good indication of a similar response if Canada had infringed upon Chinese state security.

The 1992 French sale of Mirage fighter jets to Taiwan drew Chinese criticism and subsequent French military contracts with Taiwan were cancelled. Franco-Taiwanese economic relations were largely overlooked by the Chinese until a possible threat to Chinese security prompted the French government to respect the CCP's ultimate sovereignty. Although access to the Chinese market was a quid pro quo, the cancellation of the military sales to Taiwan also represented French acceptance and consideration of Chinese ultimate sovereignty; the Sino-French communiqué, dated 12 January 1994 stated that:

> [t]he Chinese side reaffirms that the sale of any type of arms will bring harm to China's sovereignty, security and reunification and the Chinese Government firmly opposes it.\(^{50}\)

A similar situation occurred with the German government. In 1993, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl cancelled a series of "lucrative" ship-building contracts with Taiwan in order to appease an annoyed Chinese government.\(^{51}\)
The French and German cases were examples of which a foreign government respected Chinese ultimate sovereignty as paramount and superseded any relations with Taiwan or Hong Kong. Although the Canadian government had not pursued any military contracts with Taiwan, the examination of the French and German experiences provided an indication of China's reaction to any challenge to its security. If the French and German cases were any indication, the Chinese government would have reacted similarly if Canada had established contracts that Beijing did not approve of. For the most part, economic contact between Taiwan and Hong Kong and foreign governments is allowed by the Beijing regime. However, once an economic relationship posed a threat to China, the CCP exercised its ultimate power. In order to placate the PRC, the perpetrated states respected the wishes from the Chinese government even at the expense of their relations with Taiwan.

Summary and Conclusions

Chapter three outlined the major aspects of Canada's "greater China" strategy. Increased bilateral activism between the Chinese and Canadian states maintained the foundation of international goodwill. The establishment of bilateral provincial and municipal ties was an example of international relations that did not involve state governments. Canada's non-political relations with Taiwan and Hong Kong established a form of bilateral engagement when diplomatic relations were not present, a scenario reminiscent of Canada's sales of wheat to China in 1960.

Canada's adoption of a "greater China" policy was possible primarily because of the change in the Chinese leadership. Until the change in leadership in 1976, the PRC protected a rigid interpretation of its sovereignty. Although maintaining the paramountcy of China's sovereign authority was important after Mao's death, other priorities took
precedence. In order to encourage the development of a modern Chinese economy, the CCP had to adopt a more flexible vision of sovereignty. The CCP was tolerant of economic relations with the Chinese provinces, cities and Hong Kong and Taiwan as long as they did not conflict with the goals and objectives of the communists in Beijing and did not hinder the development of the economy.

The bilateral provincial and municipal relationships and Canada's contact with Taiwan and Hong Kong could be perceived as a challenge to China's sovereign authority and jurisdictional claims. The CCP however has tacitly delegated final sovereignty to the provinces, cities and Taiwan and Hong Kong. The constituent parts of China proper were authorized to make binding decisions but were still subject to Beijing's approval. In the case of Taiwan and Hong Kong, foreign governments recognized that in spite of their relationships with Taiwan and Hong Kong, Chinese approval and concerns remained paramount.

Deng Xiaoping had used a flexible perception of sovereignty in the post-1976 period as a means to facilitate China's economic development. The sections that outlined Canadian/Chinese provincial and municipal cooperation and Canada's relations with Taiwan and Hong Kong each stressed the primacy of aiding the construction of a modern Chinese economy. The strengthening of the Sino-Canadian relationship during the period symbolized the fundamental importance of the paramountcy of Chinese sovereignty.
Chapter Four
Tiananmen Square: Implication for Chinese Perception of Sovereignty?

Chapter four reexamines Canadian "greater China" policy and the Chinese perception of sovereignty after the Tiananmen Square Incident of 4 June 1989. Unlike the previous three chapters, the current survey does not outline a stark substantive change in either Canada's China policy or an interpretation of Chinese sovereign authority. Despite its initial protests, the Canadian government eventually reestablished a pre-Tiananmen Square cooperative relationship with China. The Tiananmen Square Incident did not radically change the Chinese government's perception of its sovereign power. The PRC remained tolerant of Canada's relations with Hong Kong, Taiwan and the provinces but became more emphatic in its claim to ultimate sovereignty. The CCP's response to both the pro-democracy demonstrators on 4 June 1989 and to foreign governments' criticisms showed the government's exercise of its ultimate sovereignty.

The Tiananmen Square Incident presented a dilemma for the Canadian government. The Mulroney Administration had tied a state's human rights record to its suitability to receive Canadian economic aid. If the government had adhered to its principle of human rights conditions and placed sanctions on the PRC then Canadian business interests would have been compromised. The course of action that the DEA did adopt was cautious. In order not to disadvantage Canadian trade interests and to avoid ostracizing China diplomatically, Mulroney had no choice but to adopt the inadequate measures.

The visit of a delegation of three Canadian MPs to the PRC symbolized a direct challenge to the Central People's Government in Beijing. The fact finding mission travelled to Beijing in early 1992 in order to raise public awareness of China's apparent
human rights abuses. The delegation's agenda was an open defiance to the wishes of the
Chinese government and as a result, the three MPs were expelled from the country. The
expulsion marked another example of China's use of its ultimate sovereignty. The
Canadian government's reaction to the MPs' deportation from the PRC was again mild.
The reasons for the subdued reaction were again founded upon Canadian economic
concerns and avoiding a provocation of the Chinese government.

In the context of sovereignty, two inter-related themes are important to note in the
post-Tiananmen Square era: the Chinese government was eager to reestablish the levels
of pre-Tiananmen Square international cooperation in order to facilitate economic
development, and the CCP became more emphatic in its claims to ultimate sovereign
authority. In other words, the Chinese leadership was willing to readopt a cooperative
environment as a means to continue the building of a modern Chinese economy but it
was also resolute to remind the world community of where legitimate sovereignty in
China rested and that challenges to that authority would not be tolerated.

The intersection of the two themes presents a delicate balancing act for the
Chinese and Canadian governments. On the one hand, the Chinese government was
more adamant about its sovereignty and was more explicit in its claims. On the other
hand, the CCP wanted to maintain pre-Tiananmen Square economic development levels,
which meant the return to a flexible integration of its sovereign authority and toleration
of foreign states' relations with Hong Kong, Taiwan and the Chinese provinces.

**Tiananmen Square: Diplomatic Balancing Act**

Until 1989 the Deng Government had demonstrated a flexible approach to
sovereignty as indicated by its tolerant position towards international relations with the
Chinese provinces, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Furthermore, Deng did not employ his right to ultimate sovereignty in the above areas since there was no immediate threat to the security of the Chinese state nor to the goals of the CCP leadership. China's use of paramount sovereignty was illustrated by the Tiananmen Square Incident and the events following it. A more hardline rhetoric about absolute sovereignty was the result of the Chinese government's perception of a counter-revolutionary riot by the pro-democracy demonstrators and foreign governments' criticism of China's human rights record.

Although the CCP did not demand a return to a "one China" position, the government ensured that all foreigners knew where the ultimate source of authority in China resided. The CCP adopted its pre-Tiananmen Square "business as usual" approach to Chinese foreign policy. While the Chinese were eager to reestablish the pre-Tiananmen Square economic development levels, the government became more emphatic in reminding the world community that the CCP was the only legitimate sovereign in China.

The Tiananmen Square demonstrations began in mid-April 1989 after the death of former CCP Secretary-General Hu Yaobang. Deng had used the reform-minded Hu as a scapegoat for the 1986-87 student protests and as a result Hu was purged from the CCP. Chinese students had initially gathered in Tiananmen Square to pay their respects to Hu. However, the mass assembly provided the students with a forum to voice a number of concerns they had with the Chinese government. The protesters' primary concerns included the corruption and nepotism that occurred in the government structure. The students demanded more democratic participation in the CCP's decision making process. The students' movement gained momentum throughout May 1989, especially during the visit of the champion of the Soviet reform process, Secretary-General Mikhail Gorbachev, to the Chinese capital and Shanghai. Tiananmen Square became an apex for
society's demands for political reform and eventually attracted more than one million people by the end of May 1989.¹

The attack on pro-democracy protesters by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Tiananmen Square by order of the Chinese government drew criticism and negative reaction from foreign governments because of the high number of fatalities.² The official Chinese justification of the attack was that "any sovereign state had the right to take measures to promote international stability and that what began as a peaceful demonstration had become a violent counterrevolutionary riot".³ The Chinese government's statement a few days after the Tiananmen Square Incident reiterated the notion that the CCP's ultimate exercise of sovereignty merely reflected the primacy of state security:

It must be said that with regard to this counterrevolutionary violence and the struggle to end this violence, at present international opinion is not quite the same.... As far as that is concerned, I [State Council Spokesman Yuan Mu] have been authorized by the State Council Leaders to explain two things before international opinion. First, we are not afraid. No matter whatever means, whatever accusation and whatever sanctions are levelled against us the Chinese government will never agree to any and people will never agree to any interference in our internal affairs. We are not soft spined. Even if this causes us some temporary difficulties, we will get by.... Second, we hope that international opinion and foreign governments will take a long term view.... If they take a long term view they will see that it is not enough to take extreme measures to excite the feelings of the Chinese government and people.⁴

In the CCP's perception, the illegal riot in Tiananmen Square justified the employment of its ultimate sovereign power and the use of force. The government statements following the Incident showed that security interests of the state were paramount over any economic interests or positive international image. Once the security of the state was threatened, the Chinese government utilized its sovereign power to quell the civil disorder.
The Tiananmen Square Incident underlined the circumstances under which the CCP would employ its sovereign power. Once the era of Chinese economic construction began, the communists were willing to delegate "pseudo-sovereign" authority to the provinces, Hong Kong and Taiwan. The CCP was amenable to the constituent parts conducting their own relations with Canada as long as China's economy continued to benefit and there was no threat to Chinese security. The Tiananmen Square protests however represented a threat to the security of the government's sovereign authority. It was under the threat of state security that the government justified its attack upon the protesters.

The Tiananmen Square Incident had put the Canadian government in an awkward position. On the one hand, the Conservative Government had taken a hardline position on international human rights violations particularly as a condition of receiving aid from Canada (bilaterally and multilaterally). The government could not legitimately conduct "business as usual" with a Chinese government that had, in DEA's perception, violated "basic human rights". On the other hand, despite the negative publicity that China had received in the international arena, the government did not want to jeopardize its economic relations with China. Furthermore, in the global context, the Canadian government wanted to ensure that whatever actions it took did not ostracize the PRC into a renewed era of isolation.

The Canadian government's response to the Tiananmen Square Incident was arguably cautious. Minister of External Affairs Joe Clark's immediate response after the PLA's attack in the Square avoided any condemnation directly of the Chinese government. Specifically, Clark's speech outlined a number of measures of protest: the suspension of high-level visits and signing of a number of development assistance programs including nuclear cooperation consultations; the cancellation of military sales
and aid programs from Canada to the Chinese military, Public Security Bureau or propaganda agencies, and Canada's support for using moral suasion against China in the United Nations. Clark was careful not to engage in an official direct confrontation with Chinese government officials in spite of the general course of action that the DEA adopted; rather, the government sought to be "critical of the policies of the government and not the government itself." Rather than pursue hardline policies that would uphold the government's promotion of human rights, the Mulroney Government adopted a primarily reactive and, in the long term, ineffectual response in regard to the Tiananmen Square Incident. The Canadian government's policies to Tiananmen Square could be judged as ineffective for a number of reasons. First, the Mulroney Government's protests did not persuade the CCP to change its original position on the Tiananmen Square Incident. Secondly, the government's protests and agenda of mild sanctions were eventually succeeded with a return to the high levels of pre-Tiananmen Square engagement. In general, the government's reaction symbolized a modest complaint to the CCP but did not notably affect Sino-Canadian relations in the long term.

Clark's China policy focused primarily upon benefiting Chinese society directly rather than concentrating upon Chinese government development strategies. For example, a new emphasis was given to "people to people" exchanges as a means to continued international social engagement. Furthermore, aid programs that were deemed to benefit the hardline policies of the Chinese government were rescinded. The concentration of resources into social exchanges resulted in a concurrent cancellation of a number of bilateral projects, the most prominent of which was the Three Gorges Hydroelectricity Feasibility Project. Rather than attempt to establish new bilateral Sino-
Canadian links, the DEA stipulated that existing ties between Canadian and Chinese government, industry and academics were to be preserved and strengthened.

In consultation with government agencies, business and academic leaders, the DEA outlined four aspects that would guide Canada's future relations with the PRC. The consensus of the consultations was to pursue a mild form of protest to the Chinese government that would not substantially affect bilateral relations. One of every three Canadian wheat farmers depended upon sales to the PRC for income. As a means not to jeopardize business interests, corporations advocated the "business as usual" approach supported by the Chinese government. The only groups that advocated any form of protest were academics and governmental agencies but only to the extent that any action would not endanger existing programs and linkages.

The first part of the DEA's post-Tiananmen Square China policy was the Canadian government's rejection of the Chinese "business as usual" international approach. The DEA argued that the Sino-Canadian relationship had been transformed although specific details as to how it had changed were not given. Second, the government stated that it would not become anti-Chinese government in order not to jeopardize Canada's friendship with the Chinese people. The third guideline was to adopt a multilateral approach and coordinate with like-minded countries in order to maximize the impact of Canadian measures.

The fourth aspect of Clark's China policy was to avoid any actions that would urge China into a period of renewed isolationism. In hindsight, it seemed as though that it was this principle that was paramount in the decision-making process of the DEA's China policy. The government had to select policy options that represented its dissatisfaction with the events of 4 June 1989 in order to uphold its own human rights
principles yet ensure that the Chinese government was not overly aggravated by its protests. One Chinese official reiterated China's position on foreign intrusion:

Any attempt by any foreign government to bring pressure to bear on the Chinese government and interfere with China's internal affairs in this [the Tiananmen Square Incident] or that manner is unwise and futile and can only result in harming themselves.\(^{10}\)

In effect, the lack of substantial action from the Canadian government was a recognition of China's sovereign authority over the matter.

The Mulroney Government adopted ineffective steps towards expressing disapproval to the Beijing regime.\(^{11}\) Despite demands from the Canadian-Chinese community for effective economic sanctions and diplomatic protests, the government pursued a policy that did not impact upon bilateral trade or political relations in the long term.\(^{12}\) The Canadian condemnation in the House of Commons of the Chinese government's use of force was futile since the Canadian politicians did not criticize the Beijing regime directly. Furthermore, the Canadian Ambassador to the PRC, Earl Drake, was recalled for consultation and the Chinese Ambassador to Canada, Zhang Wenpu, was summoned to meet with External Affairs Minister Clark; high-level political relations were immediately severed but for only a short time.

Neither political action served to be useful in the long run however since the Chinese government remained adamant that any criticism from Canada still represented an intrusion upon Chinese internal affairs. Furthermore, high-level political contact was reestablished between China and Canada as symbolized by Agriculture Minister Bill McKnight's trade mission in November 1991, and International Trade Minister Michael Wilson's and Constitutional Affairs Minister Joe Clark's visits in April 1992 and March 1993 respectively. In addition, the separate high-level visits by Vice-Premiers Zhu Rongji and Zou Jiahua in May 1993 and April 1994 also represented a reestablishment of
state-level visits. The reestablishment of high-level bilateral contact was symbolic of both governments' desire to establish a positive Sino-Canadian relationship reminiscent of the pre-Tiananmen Square era.

A program of Canadian trade sanctions would have had an impact upon China. By 1988, Canadian imports from China totaled CDN$955 million and the total value of exports was CDN$2.6 billion of which included almost CDN$1.7 billion in Canadian wheat sales (See Tables 2, 8 and 9). The gains in exports to China, especially wheat sales, were unparalleled previously in Sino-Canadian trade. Grain sales had increased 130% from 1987 and total exports experienced an 81% rise from the previous year. The economic sanctions that the government did impose in response to the Tiananmen Square Incident were not only limited to negligible sectors but were largely ineffectual. The only significant measure adopted by the Canadian government however was the curtailment of foreign aid. Generally, CIDA restricted the disbursement of funds to any projects that would aid the Chinese government directly in military or propaganda purposes. Canada's CDN$13 billion contribution to the Three Gorges Hydroelectric Feasibility Project on the Yangtze River was also suspended.15

The DEA's mild criticism to the Tiananmen Square Incident was based upon two economic and political factors. Reducing bilateral trade and CIDA aid was consistent with the Mulroney Government's concern with human rights. The imposition of more harsh economic sanctions however would have been a disadvantage to Canadian exporting interests, especially if other foreign countries that did not adopt similar policies took advantage of the vacuum left by Canada. Furthermore, a strong international condemnation of China would have translated into a global disengagement with the PRC and a period of Chinese isolation from global politics and confrontation reminiscent of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. A Chinese pariah state was clearly
not the objective of foreign governments. A consideration of the preceding economic and political factors justifies the Mulroney Government's modest criticism of the Chinese leadership after the Tiananmen Square Incident because the costs of pursuing more punitive measures would have outweighed any potential benefits.

The Expulsion of MPs from the PRC

Another form of protest from Canada was a Canadian delegation's visit to the PRC in January 1992. The delegation's pursuit of its human rights agenda symbolized a challenge to the PRC's negative and positive sovereign authority. The delegation of Canadian MPs that included Geoffrey Scott, Beryl Gaffney and Svend Robinson, travelled to the PRC on a privately-funded human rights fact finding mission, which was to include interviews with Chinese political prisoners, and a wreath-laying ceremony in Tiananmen Square to honour the pro-democracy protesters. Although the MPs' visit was at a non-governmental level, Scott, Gaffney and Robinson were still members of the Canadian government. Regardless of the absence of the delegation's "official" status, the antagonistic remarks made by the MPs could have been interpreted by Beijing as a challenge to the Chinese government.

On a more general level, the purpose of the trip was to increase the awareness of perceived human rights abuses in China and as the delegation stated, "to offend and embarrass the Chinese government" for its "poor" human rights record. The Chinese government had objected to the delegation's agenda and the MPs were cautioned about the activities during their stay in the PRC. Once the PRC realized that the MPs were not going to respect its warnings and were going to further provoke the Chinese government, the Canadians were expelled from the country.
The official Canadian reaction was mildly critical. Although External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall denounced the Chinese government's actions as an "affront to the institution of Parliament", DEA officials doubted that the expulsion would have any long-term negative effects upon Sino-Canadian relations. The difficulty for the Canadian government to formulate a more damning response to Beijing was that the delegation openly disrespected the wishes of the sovereign authority and defied the warnings of the Chinese government. Regardless of whether or not the Chinese government's final actions were justified, the expulsion was precipitated initially by a foreign challenge to the Chinese negative and positive sovereign authority. The three MPs and the Canadian government found little sympathy in domestic newspaper editorials in their claims of maltreatment.

Although Scott, Gaffney and Robinson were on a privately funded trip and did not officially represent the opinions of the government, they were nonetheless representatives of Ottawa. This designation of public official comes with additional and perhaps unwritten responsibilities such as handling affairs, even in a private capacity, in a diplomatic, not antagonistic, manner. From the Chinese point of view, the delegation's open defiance could have been interpreted as a more official point of view merely coming from a private source. Since the delegation was expelled against its wishes, it could be seen by Ottawa as maltreatment which should have been grounds for a more harsh response.

The incident did underline a delicate balancing act that is central to this section. First and foremost, the overall mild response from the DEA signified that the government ultimately respected the claims that the Chinese sovereign authority had made. A more vehement Canadian protest of the Chinese government could have damaged Sino-Canadian economic relations and provoked a negative political response.
The incident also underlined the flexibility of Chinese claims to sovereignty. The PRC's reaction to the incident was relatively mild considering Beijing's threat that interference with China's internal matters would be detrimental to Sino-Canadian relations. Despite its claims to a more rigid form of sovereignty, the Chinese government did not react more harshly with the Mulroney Administration other than the expulsion itself. The PRC's unresponsiveness may be attributed to the CCP's pragmatic vision of sovereignty. The government showed that it was willing to overlook minor incidents of intrusion as long as economic construction continued and national security was not undermined. The Chinese government's decision not to pursue the incident once the expulsion had taken place indicated China's desire not to provoke a negative reaction from DEA.

The expulsion of the MPs itself did represent the Chinese government's exercise of its ultimate sovereign authority. The open defiance of the Canadian delegation represented a direct challenge to the PRC's negative and positive sovereign authority. The Deng Government publicly denounced the agenda of the Canadian human rights fact finding mission and explicitly remarked that any contravention of the PRC's wishes on Chinese territory would not be tolerated. Despite the warnings from the PRC, the delegation contested the Chinese government's paramount jurisdictional claims. Not only was Chinese authority questioned but so was the PRC's prerogative to exercise that authority. The act of the MPs' repudiation of Chinese negative sovereignty also represented a challenge to the legitimacy of CCP policy objectives and goals.

**Summary and Conclusions**

The Tiananmen Square Incident had ramifications upon the Chinese view of sovereignty. One of the conclusions reached in chapter three was that the Chinese
government wanted to reestablish a pre-Tiananmen Square environment of international financial cooperation. One of the means towards attracting foreign investment in Deng's initial Four Modernizations period was the less stringent rhetoric about a Maoist rigid state sovereignty. However, the Tiananmen Square episode illustrated the CCP's use of ultimate sovereignty. In addition, the Chinese government since 1989 has been more adamant about its possession of ultimate sovereign authority. Within these principles and pragmatic objectives lies a future balancing act for the CCP: place more emphasis on the security of the state by maintaining state sovereignty or encourage further international investment by readopting a pre-Tiananmen Square notion of flexible sovereignty?

The pattern would seem to indicate that constructing a modern Chinese economy was more of a concern for the Chinese government than justifying its ultimate sovereign authority. Having noted that however, it is also important to reiterate that the CCP has become more adamant about reaffirming its sovereign power. In addition to rebuilding China's economy, the Chinese government also has other economic and political gains to be made by tolerating an increased final sovereign authority to Hong Kong and Taiwan. In April 1986, Hong Kong became a separate contracting party to the GATT with tacit approval from the PRC government. China's silent concurrence of Hong Kong's entry into the GATT process could encourage an illusion of "statehood" for Hong Kong while ultimate sovereign authority remained with the Chinese government.

While Canada and other western states continue to trade with Hong Kong and China continues to use Hong Kong as an entrepôt for Chinese products, it would be unlikely that the PRC would adopt a hardline policy since Hong Kong is a major source of hard foreign currency for the PRC. Hong Kong's participation in the GATT would ultimately increase the future benefits the PRC indirectly receives from Hong Kong's
economy. Conversely, jeopardizing the source of hard foreign currency would have an adverse effect on China's economic modernization.

The CCP's management of Hong Kong's reversion to Chinese sovereignty as well as its administration in the post-1997 era will be considered by international observers including the Taiwanese. Allowing an entrenched notion of final sovereignty in Hong Kong would give foreign investors a positive impression of the PRC and could attract further international capital. A problem-free relationship between the Chinese and Hong Kong would also positively benefit the PRC in the context of Sino-Taiwanese relations. Taiwan's reunification with the mainland has become an issue in the early 1990s. The PRC could use the example of an easy transition of Hong Kong from British to Chinese control as an allurement for Taiwan's reunification.

While a peaceful reunification process would be ideal, the Chinese government has indicated that it would not hesitate to use force as a show of its ultimate sovereignty. The CCP's White Paper on Taiwan 1993 stated that although:

> the common aspiration of the entire Chinese people [is] to achieve reunification of the country by peaceful means, [the PRC, like any sovereign state] is entitled to use any means it deems necessary, including military ones, to uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity.  

China's usage of its ultimate sovereignty and military power to force reunification would occur most likely if Taiwan was to demand and receive admission to the United Nations. Membership into the United Nations would represent a recognition of Taiwanese "statehood" and an absolute contradiction to China's Taiwan policy.

A reconsideration of the events of 4 June 1989 and the governments' reactions to them stress a number of fundamental points in the Sino-Canadian relationship and the delicate balancing act between basic principles and pragmatic considerations. The Tiananmen Square Incident was an occasion for the Chinese to readjust their perception
of sovereignty and an opportunity for western states to protest and question the CCP's authority. How exactly the Incident did affect Canada's "greater China" foreign policy is one of the central questions of this chapter. As the survey in this chapter indicates, the Canadian government did not respond harshly towards the Chinese government. It would be unlikely that the DEA would ever respond in such a way that would provoke a negative Chinese response, either economically or politically. As a result, any future Chinese use of force would probably be answered with another ineffectual response from the Canadian government.

An effective post-Tiananmen Square "greater China" policy would concentrate upon maximizing the final sovereign authority of both Taiwan and Hong Kong and increase the international profile of each while concurrently not aggravating the Chinese authorities in Beijing. Under Deng's flexible perception of sovereignty, the Canadian government could ensure that the image of Taiwan and Hong Kong as members of the international community would be maximized within the implicit tolerance levels of the CCP regime vis-à-vis bilateral engagement policies. Despite the heightened relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan the Canadian government would remain committed to China's paramount sovereign authority.

The dilemma faced by the Canadian government would be not knowing how far to push the limits of expanded relations with Taiwan and Hong Kong until the PRC exercised its ultimate sovereignty and objected. The possibility of the Chinese government exercising its ultimate sovereign authority increased after the Tiananmen Square Incident in June 1989. Ultimately, Canada's increased engagement with Taiwan and Hong Kong would potentially increase the unpopularity and negative international reaction of any future use of Chinese force on the island territories.
The Tiananmen Square Incident showed the dilemma of Canada's China policy. The Mulroney Government could have upheld its principles of human rights by imposing effective sanctions upon the CCP. However, a policy of sanctions could have served to possibly jeopardize Canadian economic interests and contribute to the Chinese government's ostracism. Generally, the Canadian government did not want to pursue policies that could possibly negatively affect Sino-Canadian relations. In the post-Tiananmen Square period, the Canadian government could expand its engagement policies with Taiwan and Hong Kong. However the DEA has to consider to what limit China will allow the exercise of the final sovereign authority of Taiwan and Hong Kong considering China's ultimate sovereignty. The establishment of a modern Chinese economy may deem another reconsideration of Chinese state sovereignty, in terms of final and ultimate, once economic development is no longer a priority.
Chapter Five
Canadian-Chinese Relations: Implications for Sovereignty

Apart from the specific arguments presented in the separate chapters, this thesis addressed two broad inter-connected issues: Canadian foreign policy towards the PRC and its effects upon the concept of sovereignty. Sino-Canadian relations evolved from a "no China" policy towards a "one China" and finally to a "greater China" strategy. Adherence to each of these three distinct approaches towards China was dependent upon factors beyond the control of the Canadian government. Canada's expansion of relations in its "greater China" approach has not encroached upon China's sovereignty because the CCP's ultimate sovereign authority was not compromised.

The notion of sovereignty, as outlined in the Introduction, was the conceptual foundation of this thesis. The differentiation of negative and positive sovereignty was a means of highlighting the specific attributes of sovereign authority. Furthermore, the ideas of Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes were useful in understanding the mechanics of the Sino-Canadian relationship. In Methodus and De Cive, the definition of sovereignty had been problematic since the notion of an absolutist state was rejected. In République and Leviathan, however, a clear paradigm of sovereignty was developed as both Bodin and Hobbes respectively accepted the idea of a state with one sovereign authority; only the state can possess legitimate sovereign authority.

In addition, an interpretation of Bodinian and Hobbesian absolute sovereignty underlines a distinction between resorting to either the final or the ultimate sovereign authority. Since the ultimate sovereign authority delegates power to the final sovereign authority, the former is the only legitimate possessor of sovereignty. Not only is the final sovereign authority's power conditional upon the ultimate sovereign authority, but the
former infinitely remains subordinate to the latter's paramount approval. In sum, since
the ultimate recourse of sovereignty is the only legitimate authority and that only the state
can possess sovereignty, then only the state has ultimate sovereign authority. The
distinction between final and ultimate recourse of sovereignty was illustrated by the Sino-
Canadian case study, especially in chapters three and four of this thesis.

Chapter One surveyed the 1949-1968 period in which the different Canadian
administrations deferred the issue of China's recognition. Substantively, the deferral of
establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC translated into Canada's "no China"
policy. The government retained official ties with Taiwan and state level political
contact with the Chinese in Beijing did not occur. Prime Minister St. Laurent faced a
number of domestic and international constraints which would have made the recognition
of China politically costly for his government. Foreign policy makers during the 1949-
1968 period had to be sensitive to how Canadian China policy could have affected
Canadian-American relations. The disapproval of the American Presidents and the State
Department made any attempt to politically engage the Chinese extremely costly.

Domestic opinion pertaining to the China question was inconclusive. A distinct
negative or positive position towards the recognition of China could not be determined
from poll results. As a result, it would have been potentially nationally divisive if St.
Laurent had pursued a China recognition agenda; he was careful not to address any issue
that could have been aggravated regional divisions especially if there was not a clear
majority of people in favour of recognition. Furthermore, Canadian contact in Asia was
generally negligible. Canadian economic interaction with Asia-Pacific was not
substantial nor was Canadian input and involvement in regional security issues. The
international constraints and the domestic indifference towards the issue convinced the
The Diefenbaker Government faced similar international and domestic constraints. The American position remained hostile towards any of its allies engaging the Chinese politically. In addition, the Chinese had experienced introspection, self-reliance and rejected relations with the West during the Great Leap Forward period. The introverted domestic policies of the CCP as well as Chinese military aggression against its neighbour states and territories would have made Canada's recognition of China an extremely unpopular policy. The domestic antipathy pertaining to the China issue increased in the Diefenbaker era until 1960. Canadian opinion towards the Chinese turned pro-active only after the government's initial wheat sales to the PRC in 1960.

The economic engagement that resulted from the sales of grain to China represented an important component in each of the "no China", "one China" and "greater China" Canadian policy approaches. In the first chapter, economic engagement with China was the best possible bilateral relationship in the absence of formal diplomatic ties. Maintaining international business relations ensured that a Sino-Canadian dialogue was established. The positive ramifications of a Sino-Canadian economic engagement strategy were establishing a foundation of international goodwill and ensuring that the Chinese government was not totally isolated from the global community. The benefits that the Diefenbaker Administration received from its engagement policies were also experienced by subsequent governments.

Pearson's government was the first to take positive political steps towards acknowledging China's sovereignty. Since the success of the initial grain sales to the PRC in 1960, domestic support for the establishment of Sino-Canadian diplomatic relations and the admission of the communists as the Chinese representatives at the
United Nations had increased. In spite of the favourable domestic factors, the international constraints could not be ignored. The United States government remained adamant about maintaining China's isolation from the global community and a rekindled anti-western sentiment in the PRC during the Cultural Revolution were both strong arguments against initiating diplomatic ties with the communist government.

Although the Pearson Government did not launch diplomatic negotiations with the Chinese, it did take steps in the United Nations forum towards China's inclusion in the global community. Despite initial Pearson's objections, the Canadian delegation at the UN abstained from voting on the Albanian resolution in 1966 which would have replaced the Taiwanese representatives with communists from Beijing. The Canadian abstention symbolized the eventual acceptance of China's sovereignty.

In the context of sovereignty, the "no China" policy in the first chapter represented an official rejection of the communists' sovereign authority in China and maintaining the Taiwanese regime's sovereignty. Another theme throughout chapter one however was that the Canadian government's official rejection of Chinese sovereignty did not reflect the attitude and policy objectives of the different Prime Ministers. St. Laurent, Diefenbaker and Pearson all accepted the inevitability and importance of establishing diplomatic ties with the communist government in Beijing since it represented the effective power holder in China. Furthermore, the three Prime Ministers acknowledged that forging bilateral political ties was a means to ensuring Chinese involvement and input in international affairs. However, despite their governments' wish to politically engage the Chinese, other international and domestic factors were more significant in the decision making process.

The strategy outlined in chapter two was the "one China" approach. The chapter surveyed the Canadian government's recognition of China, the strong bilateral
relationship between the two states initially after the establishment of diplomatic ties and an episode during which Prime Minister Trudeau's adherence to his "one China" policy was tested. One of the arguments presented in chapter two was that the presence of Trudeau as Prime Minister was the most important factor in finally negotiating diplomatic ties with the PRC. Both the domestic and international environments were conducive towards the recognition of China but the individual commitment of Trudeau was the compelling force behind the initiation of negotiations in 1969. The shift from Canada's "no China" to a "one China" policy was an official acknowledgement of the proactive China stance that the previous governments had. Furthermore, Canadian foreign policy makers were less concerned about the potential negative ramifications of China's recognition upon Canadian-American relations; Sino-Canadian relations were more dependent upon Canadian and Chinese factors than on American reactions.

In terms of conceptualizing sovereignty, the recognition of China legitimated the communists' negative and positive sovereignty and highlighted China's ultimate recourse of sovereign authority. The establishment of diplomatic ties with the government in Beijing also represented an effective de-recognition of the Taiwanese regime. As a consequence, the Canadian government acknowledged the communists' liberty to unfettered self-determination as well as the CCP's legitimate power to pursue self-defined objectives.

Furthermore, the communique outlining the bilateral agreement of diplomatic relations illustrated Canadian acceptance of the Chinese government as the ultimate recourse of sovereign authority in China. The Canadian negotiators in Stockholm were explicit in expressing neutrality towards China's claims to Taiwan, merely noting the CCP's position towards the matter. However, the joint communique also noted that the Canadian government recognized the communists as the sole legal government of China.
Although the Canadian government did not endorse the specific claims of the PRC government, it did recognize the communists as the only legitimate sovereign authority in China.

Canadian-Taiwanese relations were not negatively affected economically by Canada's recognition of China. Although formal political ties between Canada and Taiwan were severed, the bilateral relationship was not strong even during the period of official ties. In fact, the economic engagement between Canadian and Taiwanese business interests grew after Canada's recognition of China in 1970. Both the Canadian government and the Taiwanese regime had noted that a form of bilateral engagement was desired despite the impossibility of formal political ties. Just as the wheat sales in 1960 illustrated, the establishment of economic engagement in lieu of political relations was the best possible form of bilateral relations. The Taiwanese regime remained active with Canada and the global community.

The international goodwill established between the Chinese and Canadian governments from 1960 onwards was apparent in the relative ease of the bilateral negotiations in 1969. Furthermore, the foundation of friendly relations was also evident during Trudeau's first visit to the PRC in 1973. The Prime Minister's trip was given more fanfare and positive treatment than usually accorded to foreign guests of the Chinese state. Both Trudeau and Zhou Enlai emphasized the mutual friendship between the two states despite having strong differences of opinion in international political matters.

If the recognition of China was the establishment of the "one China" principle, then the government's handling of the 1976 Olympic Games was a test of Canada's commitment to that principle. The Trudeau Government refused to allow the participation of Taiwanese athletes claiming to represent China in the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games. The government faced criticism and pressure from the International
Olympic Committee and other countries, notably the United States, but did not acquiesce to demands of Taiwanese participation. The episode of the Olympic Games illustrated Canada's adherence to its "one China" policy.

In chapter three, the Canadian China policy shifted from a "one China" to a "greater China" approach. The "greater China" strategy may be explained on two levels: engagement with the Chinese state, provincial and municipal levels of government; and development of Canada's non-political relations with Taiwan and Hong Kong. Thus the "greater China" strategy implicitly expands the scope of activity and increases the number of actors in the "Chinese" theatre. The phenomenon of twinning could appear to be an intrusion upon the communists' sovereignty in the interpretation that the Chinese provinces and cities conduct "pseudo-sovereign" business with their Canadian counterparts and bypass the central authority in Beijing for approval. Canada's engagement policies with Taiwan and Hong Kong may also appear as intrusions upon Chinese territorial claims since there is an illusion of "state-to-state" relations between Canada and both Hong Kong and Taiwan.

The two levels of Canada's "greater China" policy are not intrusions upon the communists' ultimate sovereign authority however. The different instances of engagement with the provinces and cities and Taiwan and Hong Kong are possible only with the tacit approval of the CCP government in Beijing. The Chinese government has allowed the liberties associated with final sovereign authority to the different constituent parts of China (the Chinese provinces, cities, Hong Kong and Taiwan) while retaining the ultimate recourse prerogative. Furthermore, final authority can be revoked from the provinces and cities by the central government but not from Taiwan or Hong Kong until 1997. With possession of final sovereign authority, the constituent parts of China may exercise and conduct "pseudo-sovereign" relations. Although the provinces and cities do
not possess sovereignty, they are able to exercise what seems to be positive sovereignty with their Canadian counterparts. However, as the introduction outlined, positive sovereignty is only legitimate only with the possession of negative sovereignty; the provinces and cities exercise sovereignty but do not have it.

Hong Kong and Taiwan are subject to the same conditions as the Chinese provinces and cities. In Bodin's terminology, the constituent parts of China that exercise final power are representatives of sovereignty. Only the legitimate ultimate sovereign, the state, retains authority in perpetuity. The implicit allowance of final sovereign authority to Hong Kong and Taiwan however encourages an illusion of "statehood" for each territory. Canadian interaction with Hong Kong and Taiwan again symbolized the engagement strategy that the government utilized with the PRC in 1960. Canadian policy decision makers conduct relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan yet are always sensitive to any possible reaction from the ultimate recourse of sovereign authority: the communist government in Beijing. Although Chinese authorities may not use their ultimate sovereignty, the latter is still respected nonetheless by foreign states, as illustrated by the examples of French and German relations with Taiwan and China. Therefore, a possessor of ultimate sovereignty does not necessarily have to exercise it to legitimate it as long as it is recognized that it is the ultimate sovereign authority.

The delegation of final sovereign authority to the constituent parts of China may be attributed to the change in Chinese leadership and national priorities in 1976. The death of Mao Zedong and the ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping symbolized a shift from a rigid to a more flexible interpretation of sovereignty as a means to facilitate the building of a modern Chinese economy. The Deng Government's promotion of Canada's relations with the constituent parts of China aids the development of the economy and placates international investors who want to conduct business with Hong Kong and Taiwan as
well as the PRC. The government will continue to implicitly allow the exercise of final authority as long as the Four Modernizations continues and national objectives and security are not threatened.

As outlined in chapter four, the Tiananmen Square Incident on 4 June 1989 was an example of the use of the communists' ultimate sovereign authority. The Incident was interpreted as an internal counterrevolutionary riot and threat to state security and the government approved the use of military force against the pro-democracy demonstrators. The notion of flexible sovereignty did not mean that the PRC would tolerate criticism of its internal affairs, domestic challenges to the leadership or threats to state security. Flexible sovereignty was confined primarily to the international relationships that transpired from the economic realm.

The Canadian response to the Incident was largely ineffective in the long term. The Mulroney Government's reaction to the Incident merely underlined the difficulty of formulating an effective agenda of sanctions towards China. Furthermore, the delegation of three Canadian MPs to China must also be noted because the mission to China represented a challenge, albeit a private and not official one, to Chinese negative and positive sovereignty. The delegation's explicit disregard for the Chinese warnings to abandon its human rights agenda ultimately resulted in its expulsion from Chinese territory in January 1992. Although the three Canadian MPs' trip was funded privately, they were nevertheless members of the Canadian government. So while Scott, Gaffney and Robinson may not have been representative of the official opinion of the government, they still had a responsibility to represent the Canadian state in a diplomatic and tactful manner.

The Chinese government's post-Tiananmen Square approach to its international relations generally resembles the pre-Tiananmen Square strategy. The perceived threats
to Chinese sovereign authority did not result in a return to a period of Chinese isolation nor a "one China" policy as a Mao Government might have demanded. The CCP instead adopted a pre-Tiananmen Square pragmatic approach to sovereignty in order to re-establish pre-1989 development levels. In spite of China's "business as usual" strategy, the government has become more emphatic in reminding the global community of its possession of ultimate sovereignty in China.

In the post-Tiananmen Square era, two sets of dilemmas persist. As well as ensuring that other states recognize Chinese ultimate sovereign authority, the CCP does not want to be so adamant about this that potential international investors are drawn away from China's economy. In the same vein, the Canadian decision makers want to expand relations and maximize potential gains for domestic business interests with Hong Kong, Taiwan and the provinces and cities but do not know to what extent the Chinese government will tolerate increased engagement? The Chinese state, especially its economy, is too important globally for Canada not to be sensitive to Chinese reactions. Any vacuum left by Canadian business would be quickly filled by interests from other states eager to have a stake in the development of the Chinese economy.

With both sets of concerns in mind, the Canadian post-Tiananmen Square policy should maximize the final sovereign authority of Hong Kong and Taiwan. Further engagement with the island territories would strengthen the illusion of Hong Kong and Taiwan "statehood". Such a policy would only increase the image of "statehood" rather than recognizing it since Hong Kong and Taiwan would only have final sovereignty. Only an absolutist state may possess legitimate or ultimate sovereign authority. Such an approach again would be contingent upon the implicit approval and tolerance of the Chinese government. The PRC government would accept a Canadian relationship with Hong Kong and Taiwan if Sino-Canadian economic engagement continued unhindered
and the benefits for the Chinese economy remained unaffected. By maximizing Hong Kong's and Taiwan's "statehood" illusion, it would become more internationally unpopular for the Chinese government to exercise its ultimate sovereign authority against them, possibly jeopardizing future investment opportunities in the PRC.
Tables
Table 1

Support for Establishing Diplomatic Relations with the PRC

(Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Should Recognize</th>
<th>Should Not Recognize</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
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Table 2

Wheat Exports To The
People's Republic of China
(1961-1993)

(Thousands of CDN$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Change from previous year (%)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961 (a)</td>
<td>122,811</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1962 (a)</td>
<td>147,157</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963 (a)</td>
<td>104,411</td>
<td>-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964 (a)</td>
<td>136,162</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>104,625</td>
<td>-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966 (b)</td>
<td>182,819</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967 (b)</td>
<td>89,191</td>
<td>-51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 (b)</td>
<td>157,746</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969 (b)</td>
<td>119,776</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970 (b)</td>
<td>121,562</td>
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<td>1971 (c)</td>
<td>190,699</td>
<td>57</td>
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<tr>
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<td>232,006</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
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<td>186,791</td>
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<td>333,803</td>
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<td>527,363</td>
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<td>1981 (d)</td>
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Statistics Canada Classification as follows:
(a) "Barley", "Wheat"
(b) "Durum Wheat", "Alberta Winter Wheat", "Wheat"
(c) "Wheat"
(d) "Barley", "Hard Spring Flour", "Other Cereals, Milled"
(e) "Cereals"
*January to September 1993

Source: Statistics Canada, Exports by Country, various years
Table 3

Status of the People's Republic of China's
Diplomatic Relations Ending December 1972

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<td>Sudan</td>
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(Continued)

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(a) United with Tanganyika in 1964.
(b) Diplomatic relations were established at the consular level.
(c) Suspended diplomatic relations resumed.
(d) Diplomatic relations were elevated to the ambassadorial level.

Table 4

Exports From Canada To Taiwan (1968-1993)

(Thousands of CDN$)

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*January to September 1993

Source: Statistics Canada, *Exports by Country*, various years
Table 5

Imports to Canada
From Taiwan
(1968-1993)

(Thousands of CDN$)

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*January to September 1993

Source: Statistics Canada, Imports by Country, various years
Table 6

Exports From Canada
To
Hong Kong
(1968-1993)

(Thousands of CDN$)

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*January to September 1993

Source: Statistics Canada, *Exports by Country*, various years
Table 7

Imports to Canada From Hong Kong (1968-1993)

(Thousands of CDN$)

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<td>1990</td>
<td>1,057,777</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1,021,119</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1,134,665</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993*</td>
<td>901,608</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*January to September 1993
Source: Statistics Canada, Imports by Country, various years
Table 8

Exports From Canada
To The
People's Republic of China
(1968-1993)
(Thousands of CDN$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Change from previous year (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>163,242</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>122,891</td>
<td>-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>141,995</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>204,053</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>260,682</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>273,293</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>437,870</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>376,422</td>
<td>-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>196,170</td>
<td>-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>369,148</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>503,427</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>604,132</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>871,100</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,017,554</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1,227,857</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1,606,688</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1,236,477</td>
<td>-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1,278,323</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1,118,969</td>
<td>-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1,432,079</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>2,593,135</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1,121,319</td>
<td>-57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1,650,855</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1,844,093</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2,132,796</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993*</td>
<td>1,099,815</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*January to September 1993

Source: Statistics Canada, Exports by Country, various years
Table 9

Imports to Canada
From the
People's Republic of China
(1968-1993)

(Thousands of CDN$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total (Thousands of CDN$)</th>
<th>Change from previous year (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>23,439</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>27,421</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>19,028</td>
<td>-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>23,302</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>48,377</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>52,904</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>61,349</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>56,328</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>88,368</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>82,154</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>94,599</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>167,451</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>155,087</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total (Thousands of CDN$)</th>
<th>Change from previous year (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>220,013</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>203,654</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>245,772</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>333,502</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>403,487</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>566,594</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>770,901</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>955,357</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1,182,146</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1,394,368</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1,852,836</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2,447,154</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993*</td>
<td>2,303,147</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*January to September 1993

Source: Statistics Canada, Imports by Country, various years
Table 10

CIDA Aid to
The People's Republic of China
(1982-1992)

(Millions of CDN$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country to Country (Direct bilateral aid)</th>
<th>Total CIDA Aid to China (bilateral and multilateral)</th>
<th>Total CIDA Aid to Asia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982-83</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-84</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>7.27*</td>
<td>354.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-85</td>
<td>8.37</td>
<td>13.51*</td>
<td>410.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>15.46</td>
<td>21.8*</td>
<td>409.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
<td>36.35</td>
<td>76.97</td>
<td>892.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td>42.76</td>
<td>98.43</td>
<td>913.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-89</td>
<td>50.31</td>
<td>104.64</td>
<td>935.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-90</td>
<td>45.07</td>
<td>94.87</td>
<td>812.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-91</td>
<td>73.52</td>
<td>124.53</td>
<td>822.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-92</td>
<td>74.99</td>
<td>132.12</td>
<td>889.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These figures represent only Country to Country aid (direct CIDA and other Canadian agencies)

Source: Canadian International Development Agency, Annual Report, various years
Endnotes for Introduction


2The new found wealth in China is not evenly distributed. While the south eastern coastal regions have experienced rapid development the Chinese interior has not. Furthermore, there is a widening income gap between the rural peasantry and the urban society. A further exacerbation of the economic and societal differences could result in domestic upheaval which would translate into international instability. See Carl Goldstein, Lincoln Kaye and Anthony Blass, "Get Off Our Backs", Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 July 1993, pp 68-70; Carl Goldstein, "A Wild Ride", Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 March 1994, p. 47; Carl Goldstein, "Doctor's Orders", Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 February 1994, pp. 44-45.

3Professor Lee Ngok argued that China would gain a hegemonic role in the South East Asian region. As a result the international community should continue to strengthen its engagement policies in order to protect its interests in South East Asia. See Professor Lee Ngok, "China's Changing Defence Posture and Regional Conflicts in the Asia-Pacific Region", Asian and International Studies, Griffith University, 1991. Also consult Sheldon W. Simon, "China and Southeast Asia: Suspicion and Hope", The Journal of East Asian Affairs (Winter/Spring 1991), pp. 185-202.

4See "Asia Unleashed", The Economist, 3 April 1993, pp. 15-16; "Gripped by China", The Economist, 27 November 1993, pp. 15-16.


10Hinsley sets out four conditions of which entities must satisfy in order to be considered a state: the existence of the state; the functions and roles of the community and government are distinct; community and government are integrated; a historical tradition of the evolution of sovereignty. The example of the Greek polis did not satisfy the second factor. The polis was an amalgamation of state and society, thus the functions of each were blurred. See F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (second edition) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 27-45.

12Ratzel outlined the seven laws of state growth: The space of States grows with the expansion of the population having the same culture; Territorial growth follows other aspects of development; A State grows by absorbing smaller units; The frontier is the peripheral organ of the State that reflects the strength and growth of the State [hence it is not permanent]; States in the course of their growth seek to absorb politically valuable territory; The impetus for growth comes to a primitive State from a more highly developed civilization; The trend toward territorial growth is contagious and increases in the process of transmission. See Martin Glassner and Harm de Blij, Systematic Political Geography (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1989), p.224.

13Vincent, Theories of the State, p.143.


15Klein, Sovereign Equality Among States, p.3.


20Hobbes gives the example of a mixed monarchy where the naming of Magistrates and the arbitration of War and Peace was under the jurisdiction of the King, the judicial function given to the Lords and control of monies to the people. Although primarily monarchical in character, the influence of aristocracy and democracy are present in the latter functions respectively. See Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (edited and translated by Howard Warrender) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 108.


23Hinsley, Sovereignty, p. 144.


Franklin, Lousse as cited in Vincent, *Theories of the State*, p. 47.


Bodin made reference to the monarch as an ideal sovereign since the King transcended all classes and interests, see F.H. Hinsley, *Sovereignty*, p. 106. Bodin explicitly noted that "The essential mark of sovereignty is the power to command and command he says, must proceed from a single will. Collective sovereignty belongs to the realm of ideas rather than of actualities, so that in times of crisis, when immediate and decisive action is necessary, all types of commonwealth tend to revert temporarily to monarchy by the institution of a dictatorship, or some such expedient." See introduction in Bodin, *Six Books of the Commonwealth* (Abridged and Translated by Tooley), p. xxxi.

Bodin did not refute the importance of the judicial and administrative function of the sovereign but maintained that the legislative role was the most essential, see Vincent, *Theories of the State*, p. 53; Q. Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought* (vol. 2) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 289; W.F. Church, *Constitutional Thought in Sixteenth Century France* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1941), p. 229.

40 See Book II, chapter 5 entitled "Whether it is lawful to make an attempt upon the tyrant's life and to nullify and repeal his ordinances after he is dead" in Jean Bodin, *On Sovereignty* (Edited and Translated by Franklin), especially p.120.


42 Hinsley, *Sovereignty*, p.132. Bodin noted that "To God, as the author of his authority, He is in all things answerable. The sovereign is not therefore a law unto himself, but the instrument of divine law, bound to make his laws conform to its principles." See introduction in Bodin, *Six Books of the Commonwealth* (Abridged and Translated by Tooley), p.xxvi. Also see the chapter, "The Theory of the Divine Right", in Carlyle and Carlyle, *A History of Medieval Political Theory* (vol.6), pp.185-91.


49 One could even argue that "negative" is a redundant qualifier for the term "liberty". Mills argues that "negative liberty" is synonymous with freedom and non-intervention but the very notion of "liberty" prima facie denotes the same qualities. See the chapter on negative sovereignty in D'entreves, *The Notion of the State*, pp. 200-210.


51 Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.27. The basic precepts in "negative sovereignty" may also be further separated into internal and external sovereignty, the latter two notions of which were
outlined by Alan James. *Internal sovereignty* underlines the sovereign's paramount authority over all the other authorities within the same territory. It is inward looking in that it emphasizes the delegation of ultimate legislative power within the state to the sovereign. *External sovereignty* focusses upon the sovereign's right to be juridically free of any outside authorities. Externally sovereign states are theoretically recognized internationally as equals. This view is more outward looking for it notes a state's standing in relation to others; again the component of non-intervention is re-iterated. See James, *Sovereign Statehood*, pp. 20-1.


55 Dentrèves notes that negative sovereignty was "inherent in the very structure of the community, in the *status reipublicae*: because without it, there would be no 'state'". See Dentrèves, *The Notion of the State*, p. 94.

56 Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World*, p. 29. Jackson throughout his treatment of negative and positive sovereignty makes reference to a state's independence. In referring to negative sovereignty, he mentions the state's independence to make its own decisions. Jackson also argued that a state exercised its positive sovereignty by taking advantage of its independence from external factors (such as other states). This thesis purposely avoided using the term "independence" because the author believes that it is problematic. First, the terms sovereignty and independence are not synonymous. Second, a state, when exercising its sovereign power, is never independent of other factors; a state's actions is always, to a certain extent, dependent on internal factors (such as societal pressure) and external elements (such as other states). "The awareness of human dependence thus lies at the root of all our reflections on the nature of the State... although it is a mistake to believe that dependence can be treated as an empirical datum...", see Dentrèves, *The Notion of the State*, p. 9.

57 Morgenthau and Thompson, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 344.


59 James, *Sovereign Statehood*, p. 207. "Sovereignty should be conceived not in absolute terms of yes or no but in the relative terms of more or less.", see James, *Sovereign Statehood*, pp. 209-22.
Endnotes for Chapter One


2Roy, "Has Canada Made a Difference? North Pacific Connections: Canada, China and Japan" as cited in English and Hillmer (editors), Making a Difference?, pp. 150-1.

3Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, #54/49, Lester B. Pearson, "Should Canada Recognize Red China?", 7 November 1954, p. 8; Dale C. Thomson and Roger F. Swanson, Canadian Foreign Policy: Options and Perspectives (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1971), p. 111. Although both sources cite a government's ability to demonstrate freedom from external control as a condition for recognition of its sovereignty, the author questions the validity of the upholding such a requirement in all instances.

4Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, #49/43, Lester B. Pearson, "Canada and World Affairs", 16 and 17 November 1949, p. 8.

5Pearson's stated that "If the fact of communist control of China is demonstrated and an independent... Chinese government, able to discharge its international obligations, is established there, which is accepted by the Chinese people, then in due course... we will... have to recognize the facts which confront us." See Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, #49/43, Lester B. Pearson, "Canada and World Affairs", 16 and 17 November 1949, p. 8.

6Thomson and Swanson, Canadian Foreign Policy: Options and Perspectives, p. 111.

7Chester Ronning argued that the Canadian government's shift towards a more conscious activist approach to recognizing the regime in Beijing was a result of St. Laurent's talks with Nehru, see Chester Ronning, A Memoir of China in Revolution: From the Boxer Rebellion to the People's Republic (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), p. 180; Thomson and Swanson, Canadian Foreign Policy: Options and Perspectives, p. 112.


9Thomson and Swanson, Canadian Foreign Policy: Options and Perspectives, p. 111.

10As the survey indicates and the authors note, there is a deficiency in the amount of material available measuring the Canadian public's response towards the China issue during the 1949-1970 period. Of the existing polls conducted by the Canadian Institute for Public Opinion (CIPO) on the recognition issue, only five were done in the period of 1949-1970: June 1950; May 1959; February 1964; October 1966 and March 1969. See Paul A. Evans and Daphne Gottlieb Taras, "Canadian Public Opinion on Relations with China: An Analysis of the Existing Survey Research" (Working Paper #33) (Toronto: University of Toronto/York University Joint Centre on Modern East Asia, 1985), pp. 6-7.
Previous to the general election of June 1957, Pearson explained that the government had not thought it wise to recognize the Peking regime at that time because it did not consider it worth "having a first-class row with the United States over a matter on which public opinion in our own country is strongly divided." See James Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs: 1955 to 1957 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 82; Stephen Beecroft, "Canadian Policy towards China, 1949-1957: The Recognition Problem" as cited in Paul M. Evans and B. Michael Frolic (editors), Reluctant Adversaries: Canada and the Peoples Republic of China 1949-1970 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), pp. 53 and 63.


...the actions of the [Chinese] Communists were seen by Canadian policy makers as decisive in preventing Canadian recognition. Every time momentum seemed to be building toward a normalization of Sino-Western relations, a new crisis emerged. Obstacles to recognition of Chinese origin include the Korean conflict, the offshore islands dispute, China's "liberation" of Tibet, Sino-Indian border clashes and support for the communist movement in southeast Asia among others. See Beecroft, "Canadian Policy towards China, 1949-1957: The Recognition Problem" as cited in Evans and Frolic (editors), Reluctant Adversaries, p. 63.

Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, #54/49, Lester B. Pearson, "Should Canada Recognize Red China?", 7 November 1954, p. 2.


Chester Ronning outlined the incident in detail:
The story was that Canada had decided to recognize Peking. Prime Minister St. Laurent and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, went to the United States to inform President Eisenhower at a meeting in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, of Canada's decision to recognize China before making a formal announcement. Without saying so, they had decided to talk to the President rather than to the Secretary of State, expecting that Eisenhower would be less emotional about the subject than John Foster Dulles. To their surprise, the Canadians very quickly learned that Eisenhower was, if possible, even more emotional against recognizing China than Dulles.

The President blew up and asked how Canada could think of recognizing 'Communist China, whose hands were dripping with the blood of Americans killed in Korea.' And if Canada recognized China, he said, France, Belgium, Italy and other nations would certainly follow. Canada's recognition would undoubtedly result in China being seated in the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. Public opinion was against 'Communist China', Eisenhower said, and nothing could stop the United States from withdrawing from the United Nations and kicking the United Nations headquarters out of the United States if Communist China was seated. See Ronning, A Memoir of China in Revolution, p. 182; Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs: 1955 to 1957, p. 76.

18Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, #54/19, "Recognition of China", 25 March 1954, p. 3.

19St. Laurent emphasized"...the policy of the Canadian government...is to keep an open mind as to whether or not at any time, under any conditions which may develop in the future, there should be recognition of the government which at that time will exist as a matter of fact in China.... We should keep an open mind as to when if ever conditions may be such that it will be in the interest of peace and stability in the world to recognize diplomatically whatever government happens to in control of the forces of China." Pearson also stated that "I do not think that we should tie ourselves down to any rigid commitments that never will we recognize any Communist Government in China". See Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, #54/19, Louis St. Laurent, "Recognition of Communist China", 25 March 1954, p. 5; Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, #54/49, Lester B. Pearson, "Should Canada Recognize Red China?", 7 November 1954, p.2.


21Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, #59/14, Sidney Smith, "Relations with Communist China", 26 February 1959, pp. 17-8; Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, #61/19, Alfred Brooks, "Red China and the United Nations", pp. 2-3.

22Beecroft, "Canada's China Policy, 1949-57" as cited in Evans and Frolic (editors), Reluctant Adversaries, p. 67.

23Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, #59/14, Sidney Smith, "Relations with Communist China", 26 February 1959, pp. 15-20. Green stated that "So vast and numberless a people cannot be ignored. The world is too interlocked with its common dangers to exclude almost one-quarter of the human race from the areas of major political settlement.", see Richard Preston, Canada in World Affairs: 1959 to 1961 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 119.


25Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs: 1955 to 1957, p. 82.


30Patrick Kyba, "Alvin Hamilton and Sino-Canadian Relations", as cited in Evans and Frolic (editors), Reluctant Adversaries, p. 170.
31 Kyba, "Alvin Hamilton and Sino-Canadian Relations", as cited in Evans and Frolic (editors), Reluctant Adversaries, p. 172. Albinski and Raabe argued that the basis of the success of the wheat sales was the generous credit terms allowed by the Canadian government, see Henry S. Albinski and F. Conrad Raabe, "Canada's Chinese Trade in Political Perspective", as cited in Arthur Stahnke (editor), China's Trade with the West: A Political and Economic Analysis (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 121.

32 Stursberg, Diefenbaker, p. 136.


34 The argument could be made that Diefenbaker's anti-communist stance could be attributed more to Canada's strategic alliance with the United States rather than its disapproval of communist ideology. Diefenbaker argued that "because of her /sic/ geographical position, if for no other reason, it would be impossible for Canada to remain neutral in any conflict between the USSR and the United States, see Donald Masters, Canada in World Affairs: 1953 To 1955 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 107 and 117; Peyton Lyon, "The Evolution of Canadian Diplomacy Since 1945" as cited in Painchaud (editor), From Mackenzie King to Pierre Trudeau, p. 22.

35 Diefenbaker read Hamilton's resignation out in Cabinet and said, "I think if a minister is willing to put his portfolio on the line for something that he believes in, offering to resign in the case that they don't pay, we should back him". Hamilton personally attributes credit of making the final decision to Diefenbaker. See Stursberg, Diefenbaker, p. 136.


37 See Albinski and Raabe, "Canada's Chinese Trade in Political Perspective" in Stahnke (editor), China's Trade with the West, pp. 91-96; Kyba, "Alvin Hamilton and Sino-Canadian Relations", as cited in Evans and Frolic (editors), Reluctant Adversaries, p. 173.

38 Thomson and Swanson (editors), Canadian Foreign Policy: Options and Perspectives, p. 112.

39 See Table 1. The proportion of interviewed Canadians that supported the recognition of China increased to 51% in 1964 from 32% in 1959; the non-supporters decreased 10% in the same period to 34% and those with no opinion decreased 9% in the same 5 year period.

40 Lyon, Canada in World Affairs: 1961 To 1963, p. 420. In fact, Diefenbaker was so confident about the wheat sales that he called an election on the foundation of its success in 1962, see Kyba, "Alvin Hamilton and Sino-Canadian Relations" as cited in Evans and Frolic (editors), Reluctant Adversaries, p. 174. Arguably, the wheat sales in the early 1960s has remained one of the successes of the Diefenbaker era. From 1961 to 1980, China consistently purchased about 20% of Canada's total wheat exports and the PRC was Canada's largest export market from grain in 1990. See Patricia Roy, "Has Canada Made a Difference?" North Pacific Connections: Canada, China and Japan" as cited in English and Hillmer (editors), Making a Difference?, p. 141.
41 Stursberg, Diefenbaker, p. 138.


43 Hamilton noted that "[the Canadian government] hold[s] to the belief that world peace is only possible when you are talking and trading with potential enemy countries." See Kyba, "Alvin Hamilton and Sino-Canadian Relations", as cited in Evans and Frolic (editors), Reluctant Adversaries, p. 174.


45 John English, "Lester Pearson and China" as cited in Evans and Frolic (editors), Reluctant Adversaries, p. 139.

46 English, "Lester Pearson and China" as cited in Evans and Frolic (editors), Reluctant Adversaries, p. 143. Although Martin had strongly supported the resolution, he too saw its limited success, see Norman St. Amour, "Sino-Canadian Relations, 1963-1968: The American Factor" as cited in Evans and Frolic (editors), Reluctant Adversaries, p. 110.

47 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, #64/13, Paul Martin, "Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World", 22 May 1964, pp. 1-16.

48 In his meetings with Secretary of State Rusk in February 1966, Martin "surprisingly" found Rusk more flexible on the admission question than before. Although official American policy denounced PRC admission, few elements of the State Department believed that Chiang represented the government of China and there was a growing realization of the inevitability of the communist control of China's seat at the UN. See English, "Lester Pearson and China" as cited in Evans and Frolic (editors), Reluctant Adversaries, p. 141; St. Amour, "Sino-Canadian Relations, 1963-1968: The American Factor" as cited in Evans and Frolic (editors), Reluctant Adversaries, p. 122.

49 English, "Lester Pearson and China" as cited in Evans and Frolic (editors), Reluctant Adversaries, p. 143. Although English noted that Martin's position represented a new China policy, careful consideration must be made for the qualifier "new". Although it did represent a new policy, the attitude espoused in Martin's speech merely reflects the position of the governments throughout the 1949-1970 period.


Paul Evans, "Canada and Taiwan: A Forty Year Survey" as cited in Frank Langdon (editor), Canada and the Growing Presence of Asia (Vancouver: Institute of International Relations, Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia, 1990), p. 84.


Holmes, "Canada and China" as cited in Holmes, The Better Part of Valour, p. 204.

Evans, "Canada and Taiwan: A Forty Year Survey" as cited in Langdon (editor), Canada and the Growing Presence of Asia, p. 83.

Evans, "Canada and Taiwan: A Forty Year Survey" as cited in Langdon (editor), Canada and the Growing Presence of Asia, p. 83.

Evans also recounted the increasingly weakened ties between the two governments: "[i]t is not surprising that one of the [Republic of China] ambassadors to Canada in the 1950s spent more time in Washington than in Ottawa. See Paul Evans, "Canada and Taiwan: A Forty Year Survey" as cited in Langdon (editor), Canada and the Growing Presence of Asia, p. 84.

Endnotes for Chapter Two


7 Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, p. 175. Also see F.Q. Quo and Akira Ichikawa, "Sino-Canadian Relations: A New Chapter" Asian Survey 5, p. 387.

8 "We shall be looking at our policy in relation to China in the context of a new interest in Pacific affairs generally... Canada has long advocated a positive approach to Mainland China and its inclusion in the world community. We have an economic interest in trade with China... and a political in preventing tension between China and its neighbours, but especially between China and the United States. Our aim will be to recognize the PRC Government as soon as possible and to enable that Government to occupy the seat of China in the United Nations, taking into account that there is a separate Government in Taiwan." as cited in the press release from the Office of the Prime Minister 29 May 1968, see J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 180. Trudeau recounts his experiences in China with his travelling companion Jacques Hebert. A common theme that both authors underline throughout the memoir is the necessity to understand China and Chinese society better and the importance of the country in international relations. See Jacques Hebert and Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Two Innocents in Red China (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968).

9 Eric Downton, Pacific Challenge: Canada's Future in the New Asia (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co., Ltd., 1986), p.166. Granatstein and Bothwell make an argument that along with Trudeau's relations with the USSR, he was effectively labelled a communist or sympathetic to the communist cause. See Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, pp. 178-203.

During the 1968 election campaign, Trudeau stressed the primary importance of recognizing the Beijing government, even at the expense of the Nationalists, see Thordarson, *Trudeau and Foreign Policy*, pp. 76, 175.


See endnote 11 of chapter two.


The "First Option" was to maintain the status quo Canadian-American relationship in place since World War II. The "Second Option" was a concerted effort to closer integration with the United States. See, Harold von Riekhoff, "The Third Option in Canadian Foreign Policy" as cited in Brian Tomlin (editor), *Canada's Foreign Policy: Analysis and Trends* (Toronto: Methuen, 1978), pp. 87-9. Also see *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, Canada, by Authority of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, vol 6 Pacific (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970).


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agreement was renewed every three years until 1985 when renewal was automatic. In addition, an Economic Cooperation Protocol governing increased bilateral activity in a number of sectors was signed in 1979 as an addendum to the trade agreement; see "People's Republic of China: A Guide for Canadian Exporters", Department of External Affairs and International Trade, 1991, p. 36.

40For a comprehensive examination of the major non-political exchanges between China and Canada from Norman Bethune's involvement in the Chinese civil war to the late-1980s period, please consult Sylvia DuVernet, Canada-China Cultural Exchanges (Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 1989).


45Munro, "Republic of China Mustn't Take Part, Peking Tells Games", Globe and Mail, 6 July 1976, 1.


48Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, p. 188.


51Lawrence Martin, "Canada Stops Taiwan Athletes at Detroit Airport, Dispute Still Unsettled with Games a Week Away", Globe and Mail, 6 July 1976, 4. Ford's idealistic notion that international sports and politics cannot be mixed seems to be unrealistic position that is shared by many. Franks et al. outlines the link of international sports as a tool of Canadian foreign policy, see C.E.S. Franks, Michael Hawes and Donald Macintosh, "Sport and Canadian Diplomacy", International Journal (Autumn 1988), pp. 665-73.

52"Ottawa Drops Ban on Taiwan flag", Globe and Mail, 16 July 1976, 2.

53Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, p. 188.


The Swedish newspapers Dagense Nyheter and Aftonbladet in addition to the French government supported the Canadian position, as did the Globe and Mail. See "It Hardly Seemed Worth Mentioning [editorial]", Globe and Mail, 6 July 1976, 4; "Jabs in World Press on Taiwan Olympic Ban Give Canada a Black Eye", Globe and Mail, 14 July 1976, 1.

Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, p. 188; Lawrence Martin and Richard Cleroux, "7 African Nations, Taiwan Quit Games", Globe and Mail, 17 July 1976, 1.

That remark was made in the London Daily Mail. The Washington Star called the government's conduct both "cowardly and deceitful". The New York Times laid equal blame to both the IOC and Trudeau Government, a view also expressed in the Hamburg-Bildezeitung. See "Jabs in World Press on Taiwan Olympic Ban Give Canada a Black Eye", Globe and Mail, 14 July 1976, 1.
Endnotes for Chapter Three


2 Ogden, "China and International Law", Pacific Affairs 49, p. 28.

3 The ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping and the de facto demotion of Hua Guofeng was a process that lasted from the arrest of the Maoist Gang of Four in late 1976 until Hua's formal removal from the weakened position of Chairman in 1982. Deng's installation of his supporters in key positions of the state, party and military bureaucracies eventually gave him effective control of the Politburo and concurrently diluted the power of Hua. For a concise survey of the events in the power struggle in the CCP leadership during this period consult Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution: Reform After Mao (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 40-69; Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic (London; Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1986), pp. 448-69.


6 In fact, the development of the legal field grew from the beginning of the Deng era and as a result, more students were admitted to international legal studies programs and the number of legal articles and texts also increased. See Spence, The Search for Modern China, pp. 658, 709.


8 Kim, "The Development of International Law in Post-Mao China", Journal of Chinese Law 1, p. 158.


11 The decentralization of decision making also occurred in the agricultural sector. In September 1980, the production responsibility system was introduced. Individual peasant households would contract the usage of land and farming tools from a production team. In exchange for a stipulated production quota for the government, each household would be able to produce additional crops for personal consumption or sale in the market. Therefore, while state needs for grain and other crops were met, the responsibility
system provided incentives for peasant entrepreneurs. The responsibility system was also extended to cover other light industrial enterprises.

12Meisner, Mao's China and After, p. 455


17A comprehensive outline of the more recent larger Sino-Canadian projects is presented in Policy, Programming and Evaluation Division of the Asia Branch of CIDA, CIDA Programs in Asia: China, June 1993, pp. 9-25. Also see K. Lorne Brownsey, "Canada" in Zhang Peiji and Ralph Huenemann (editors), China's Foreign Trade (Halifax: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1987), pp. 132-47; "Canadian Contracts and Projects in China", Globe and Mail, 6 April 1987, C18.


19Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, CIDA Annual Report 1991-92, August 1993, p.49. Direct country to country disbursements totaled CDN$74.99 million and total Canadian payments multilaterally amounted to CDN$57.13 million. Also see Table 10.


21James Rusk, "Embassy Efforts to Promote Trade Show Results", Globe and Mail, 6 April 1987, C6.

22Policy, Programming and Evaluation Division of the Asia Branch of CIDA, CIDA Programs in Asia: China, June 1993, pp.5-6.


25Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, Joe Clark, "Notes for a Speech, Edmonton Alberta", 15 April 1988, p. 2. Specifically, Clark noted that "the government adopted a strategy intended to ensure a focused, coordinated and dynamic approach to Canada's relations with the PRC and take advantage of the opportunities and challenges flowing from China's Open Door and modernization policies" which included annual high level political consultation; targeting China as a priority market in the National Trade Strategy; sending a Consul General to Shanghai; doubling the CIDA commitment; establishing an Export Development Corporation concessional financing facility.

26Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, Joe Clark, "Canadian Partnership in Pacific 2000", 16 May 1989. The specific details of the Pacific 2000 strategy are contained within this speech.


28James Rusk, "Nanjing Centre Provides Focus of Ontario Drive", Globe and Mail, 6 April 1987, C10. Sino-Canadian joint ventures are established along similar lines. The particular needs of a Chinese region are established and government sponsored agencies try to establish a match between a Canadian company and a similar Chinese business would facilitate the development of an international enterprise. The Ontario-Jiangsu relationship concentrates on the food industry, fibre optics, conservation and new sources of energy, computer software and renovation of small and medium sized businesses. For a further sample of joint contracts and projects available, see "Canadian Contracts and Projects in China", Globe and Mail, 6 April 1987, C20.

29Paul Taylor, "Toronto's Hopes are High for its 'Twin' in Chongqing", Globe and Mail, 6 April 1987, C22. Deals that are worth up to US$5 million can be authorized by local Chongqing officials without central government approval. This special status is also given to Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin as well as other city centres.

30Spence, The Search for Modern China, p. 667.

31Spence, The Search for Modern China, p. 667.

32The full text of the Nationalist statement appears in the Globe and Mail, 14 October 1970, 11.


34Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, Joe Clark, "Notes for a Speech, Edmonton Alberta", 15 April 1988, p. 3.

35Department of External Affairs.

37Paul M. Evans, "Canada and Taiwan: A Forty Year Survey" as cited in Langdon (editor), Canada and the Growing Presence of Asia, p. 89.

38This engagement strategy was not exclusive to Canada's relations with China. For example, when Japan recognized the PRC (and derecognized Taiwan) in 1972, a Japanese trade office was allowed to remain in Taipei. As was the case with Canada, Japan was able to continue an economic relationship with Taiwan even during the Maoist period.


40Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, Joe Clark, "Notes for a Speech, Edmonton Alberta", 15 April 1988, p. 2. The Hong Kong Action Plan also sought to encourage Canadian exporters to take advantage of Hong Kong's re-export market as a gateway to China and other Asian markets.

41"Hong Kong-Canada: Pacific Partners", Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, 1991.

42Hong Kong Trade Development Council, November 1993.

43Hong Kong Trade Development Council, November 1993.

44Copithorne, "The Canada Hong Kong Relationship" as cited in Langdon (editor), Canada and the Growing Presence of Asia, p. 104.


48Cheng, "The Post-1997 Government in Hong Kong", Asian Survey 29, p. 738. Although the Legco is empowered with the ability to impeach the Chief Executive, it does not have the power to impeach other members of the Exco. Even if the Chief Executive is impeach, one must remember that the Central People's government still has an influential position in choosing a successor.


51"Kohl Scuttled", Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 November 1993, p. 9. Similar to the French case, the German government's cancellation of contracts with Taiwan addressed two problems: Chinese concerns of a threat to state security and access to potential lucrative Chinese markets. The cancellation of contracts with Taiwan symbolized German acquiescence to China's possession of "ultimate" sovereignty as well as a quid pro quo for promised increased Sino-German economic ties. The end result was less than
Endnotes for Chapter Four


3 This official position was voiced by the Chinese Ambassador to Canada as cited in B. Michael Frolic, "Canada and the People's Republic of China: Twenty Years of a Bilateral Relationship, 1970-1990" as cited in Frank Langdon (editor), Canada and the Growing Presence of Asia (Vancouver: Institute of International Relations, Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia, 1990), p. 56.


5 Minister of Supply and Services Canada, Sharing Our Future: Canadian International Development Assistance, 1987, pp.31-2.

6 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, Joe Clark, "Statement from the Government Concerning the Situation in China", 5 June 1989. In addition to the recall of Canadian Ambassador Earl Drake from Beijing and cancellation of high level visits, the Mulroney Government suspended the Program of Defence Cooperation with China and cancelled all trade in military equipment and technology.

7 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, #89/32, Joe Clark, "China and Canada: The Months Ahead", 30 June 1989, p. 3.


12 Raymond Chan, a spokesperson for the Toronto Committee of Concerned Chinese Canadians Supporting the Democracy Movement in China demanded an immediate suspension of economic and
cultural ties, recall of Canada's ambassador to the PRC and an emergency debate in the United Nations. See Mary Nemeth, "Rage and Sorrow", Maclean's, 19 June 1989, p. 29. Chan became the first Secretary of State for Asia-Pacific in the Liberal government, the latter of which was elected in October 1993.

Of added significance to Zhu's and Zou's visits is that each is a high-profile possible successor to Premier Li Peng and symbolizes China's interests to re-establishing pre-Tiananmen Square bilateral trade and aid cooperation. See Brenda Daglish, "China Comes to Call", Maclean's, 2 May 1994, p. 34.

Patricia Roy, "Has Canada Made a Difference? North Pacific Connections; Canada, China and Japan" as cited in John English and Norman Hillmer (editors), Making a Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order (Toronto: Lester Publishing Ltd., 1992), p. 141. The significant decrease in wheat exports in 1989 was attributed to a draught in western Canada rather than to the government's refusal to sell to China.

Despite the government's official withdrawal from the Three Gorges Project, several Canadian companies and provincial utilities have noted an interest in development contracts for the project along with other smaller power producing ventures in other parts of China. See Brenda Daglish, "China Comes to Call", Maclean's, 2 May 1994, p. 35.


The state of war with the mainland was terminated by the Taiwanese in 1991. Effectively, this declaration ended Taiwanese rhetoric about reclaiming the mainland under the KMT flag. Although China has been more enthusiastic about the idea of reunification than Taiwan, they have had a series of talks from mid-1993. See Julian Baum, "Divided Nations", Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 September 1993, p. 10.


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