

METAPHYSICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS IN SPENGLER'S
DER UNTERGANG DES ABENDLANDES

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THE METAPHYSICS OF
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ABSTRACT

This thesis is an elucidation of the metaphysics embodied in Oswald Spengler's Der Untergang des Abendlandes. The elucidation consists primarily in revealing the implicit metaphysical presuppositions which Spengler never fully discussed or recognized. The accomplishment of this task is partly achieved by comparing and contrasting Spengler's view of Being with the views of his two major predecessors, Goethe and Nietzsche. It is in this connection that the implicit presupposition, that Not-Being is real or constitutes an aspect of reality, is brought to light. An extensive analysis of key concepts in the Spenglerian philosophy such as longing, fear, time, and the depth-experience, and an analysis of the general theory of Culture and Civilization are undertaken in order to see how Not-Being is implied. Further clarification of Spengler's metaphysical view is gained by comparing and contrasting key statements from the Untergang with passages from Leibniz' philosophical writings. In this way one becomes aware that many fundamental principles of Leibnizian monadism are implicit metaphysical presuppositions. The theme is set forth that Spengler's philosophy of Culture implies a pre-established harmony similar to, but not identical with the Leibnizian harmony. As further substantiation of this interpretation, the themes of the ~~pre-established~~ harmony and of Not-Being are employed to interpret difficult areas of Spengler's philosophy of history, in particular the questions of race and fellahism.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND REFERENCES

Ap.	<u>Aphorisms.</u> (Spengler).
DW.	<u>The Decline of the West.</u> (Spengler).
FrZ.	<u>Frühzeit der Weltgeschichte.</u> (Spengler).
Ged.	<u>Gedanken.</u> (Spengler).
Goethe.	<u>Gedenkausgabe der Werke, Briefe, und Gespräche.</u> (Goethe).
Leibniz.	<u>Die philosophischen Schriften von G.W. Leibniz.</u> (Leibniz).
LS.	<u>Leibniz Selections.</u> (Leibniz).
MT.	<u>Man and Technics.</u> (Spengler).
MuT.	<u>Der Mensch und die Technik.</u> (Spengler).
Nietzsche.	<u>Friedrich Nietzsche: Werke in drei Bänden.</u> (Nietzsche).
RuA.	<u>Reden und Aufsätze.</u> (Spengler).
SE.	<u>Selected Essays.</u> (Spengler).
UdA.	<u>Der Untergang des Abendlandes.</u> (Spengler).
Urf.	<u>Urfragen.</u> (Spengler).

Complete details of these works may be found in the Bibliography.

For the most part, quotations from the works of Spengler, Leibniz, Nietzsche, Goethe, and others will be taken from the original language. Immediately following a quotation in German or French a translation in English will be given. Whenever possible, a translation from a qualified source will be used. In cases where works have not been translated or are not obtainable, they will be translated by the author.

All translations of Nietzsche's work will be taken from Dr. Oscar Levy's edition, The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche (New York, 1964). References to this work will include the specific book or essay and volume. A complete list of the translations and translators used from this edition will be found in the Bibliography.

Unless otherwise stated, all translations of Leibniz' work will be taken from one of the following: Philip P. Wiener's edition, Leibniz Selections (New York, 1951), George R. Montgomery's edition, Discourse on Metaphysics, Correspondence with Arnauld, and Monadology (La Salle, 1924), and Diogenes Allen's edition, Theodicy (Dor Mills, 1966).

All translations of Spengler's Der Untergang des Abendlandes, Jahre der Entscheidung, and Der Mensch und die Technik will be taken from Charles F. Atkinson's translations, Decline of the West (New York, 1961), Hour of Decision (New York, 1934), and Man and Technics (New York, 1932). Translations from Spengler's Gedanken will be taken from Gisela Koch-Weser O'Brien's translation, Aphorisms (Chicago, 1967). Most of the translations of Reden und Aufsätze will come from Donald O. White's Selected Essays (Chicago, 1967).

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INTRODUCTION

A complete philosophical treatment of Spengler's metaphysic in Der Untergang des Abendlandes has never been written. In consideration to such fine studies as Armin Baltzer's Oswald Spenglers Bedeutung für die Gegenwart, Ehehard Gauhe's Spengler und die Romantik, Ernst Stutz's Oswald Spengler Als Politischer Denker, and Manfred Schröter's Metaphysik des Untergangs—all of which tend more toward the clarification and criticism of Spengler's interpretation of history or his understanding of political and social questions, or finally his position within the German tradition of philosophy—, no work has dedicated itself solely to the analysis of the metaphysical side of Spengler's philosophy. This is the task here.

The aim of the following dissertation is the elucidation of the problem of Being as it is envisioned in the Untergang. This means not only that the major themes of Spengler's metaphysic will be discussed but also, and more significantly, that the fundamental implications of this metaphysic will be delineated and expounded. The challenge consists in comprehending the cosmological and ontological principles as they are formulated in the Untergang, and in searching out metaphysical presuppositions which Spengler himself did not recognize or discuss explicitly.

Such an undertaking is, of course, difficult for a number of reasons. First of all, it assumes as minimal a thorough acquaintance with the Untergang, as well as with the later writings, namely Reden

und Aufsätze, Urfragen, and Frühzeit der Weltgeschichte. Further, a metaphysical inquiry into these works demands a sense for a strand of thought which is both orthodox and unorthodox. As will be seen, Spengler shares a deep affinity with Leibniz, Goethe, and Nietzsche. The mere mention of these figures gives an idea of the range which must be covered and of the singularity of the enterprise. But over and above these difficulties, there is an inherent problem in a metaphysical investigation of a philosophy which seeks primarily to present a view of human history. It is impossible to speak in any depth of the metaphysics of the Untergang without at the same time dealing with its particular interpretation of historical facts. To be sure, both are inseparable. This is the fundamental character of the Untergang: it is a metaphysical description of human history. The overt interrelating of metaphysics and the history of the "higher Cultures" is a peculiarity which may be called "Spenglerian". A successful account of human history, according to Spengler, is not possible without bringing in all the great problems of Being in all their aspects. Likewise, metaphysical insights are substantiated only if they are intuited in the course of a Culture's history. It is this quality of Spengler's thought which imposes specific limitations and assumptions upon the present investigation. Specifically, it requires, for the sake of this investigation, that one must not concern oneself with the questions of the validity of Spengler's view of history, nor with his explanation of individual historical facts, nor with his diagnosis of the artistic, social, and political situation of the present day West. The avoidance of these extremely crucial aspects of Spengler's philosophy is necessary because

they are irrelevant to the task before us. Since the present concern is pure metaphysics, and since the Spenglerian metaphysic cannot be treated without reference to a particular understanding of history, the reader must here provisionally accept the Untergang's approach and view of history in order to understand its metaphysical vision and implications.

Even with the provisional acceptance of Spengler's historical framework, there remains a further difficulty which plagues any serious inquiry and scholarly estimation of the Untergang. This work alone calls for an overwhelming acquaintance with many areas of knowledge. It is debatable whether Spengler himself was master of all he discussed and, indeed, whether anyone is capable of the universality which the Untergang presupposes. The preeminent historian, Edward Meyer, found the all-encompassing reach of Spengler one of the most important qualities of this work:

In ganz hervorragender Weise hat Spengler alle ihre Schöpfungen dafür herangezogen, Musik und Drama, die bildenden Künste, Religion und Philosophie, Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft, Staatsgestalt und Politik, und ebenso die Gestaltung des Wirtschaftslebens. Hierin liegt ein grosses Verdienst seines Werkes, das eine wesentliche Förderung unserer Gesamtauffassung bringt. (Spenglers Untergang des Abendlandes [Berlin, 1925], p. 13.)

In an outstanding way, Spengler has drawn upon all of its [Culture's] creations—music and drama, the plastic arts, religion and philosophy, mathematics and science, forms of government and politics, as well as the structure of economic life. A great contribution of his work lies in the fact that it significantly furthers our total comprehension.

If Edward Meyer found himself moving beyond his areas of competence in discussing and criticizing the Untergang, it cannot be surprising that most commentators of the Spenglerian philosophy (the present author

included) often speak about matters which require far more erudition than they have. Yet, it is the case that if one required the scholarship which the Untergang assumes, then practically no one could ever make a systematic investigation into this philosophy of history. The only way here to handle the lack of highly specialized knowledge and Spengler's encyclopaedic treatment of history is to adopt a policy of referring to facts and scientific details as little as possible. Any discussion of this aspect of Spengler's work shall have for its sole purpose the elucidation of philosophical ideas. The selection of examples which shall serve this purpose will be for the most part arbitrary. But again, the justification for the arbitrariness, as well as the subduing of factual reference, is that everything which does not deal primarily with the Spenglerian metaphysic is secondary or irrelevant to the thesis.

The purpose of an inquiry into the metaphysical foundations of the Untergang is the same as that of most metaphysical inquiries into a philosophy. By revealing a philosopher's position on the question of Being and its related problems, one comes to a final understanding of the given framework by which a philosopher sees the world and orders his thoughts. Such a task hopes to clarify the ultimate constituents of a Weltanschauung. In a sense, it aims at giving a limited answer to the questions of how and why a philosopher thinks the way he does. A successful investigation of this sort should result in gaining insight into the basis of a philosophy, and perhaps into the tradition or type of thought which this philosophy represents. This means that a systematic examination of the Untergang primarily seeks to throw light upon

Spengler's central thesis, viz. Cultures are organisms which necessarily undergo periods of development and decline and end with death. The problem that is to be dealt with here can be formulated: what are the ultimate metaphysical principles and implications of Spengler's organic view?

To treat this problem, the investigation shall be divided into four main parts. In the first part, Spengler's method of explaining history will be seen as a synthesis of the method found in Goethe's botanical and zoological writings and of the intuitive method found in Nietzsche's philosophy. The purpose here is to demonstrate that in employing the methods of his two predecessors, Spengler shares with them a general metaphysical view. At the same time, however, it will be necessary to contrast Spengler's metaphysic and determine how it is unique in relation to Goethe's and Nietzsche's views. In this way, the first major presupposition implicit in the Spenglerian metaphysic will be introduced, namely the Eleatic paradox; Not-Being is. In the second part, the theme of Not-Being will be developed through an analysis of Spengler's notion of Destiny and the Destiny-Idea. The first of these notions will be elucidated by reference to Spengler's own discussion of the moments of Destiny, i.e. longing and fear, time, and Waking-Being or conscious Being. This section will culminate in an analysis of the depth-experience. It is here that Spengler's theory of consciousness will be examined in order to show how the reality of Not-Being is necessarily assumed. Next, Spengler's notion of the Destiny-Idea will be treated through the dichotomy, Culture-Civilization, for the purpose of revealing that "Culture" means form and that its opposite, "Civilization"

and the post-civilized state of Culture, fellahism, mean formlessness or Not-Being. (At this point, a section will be given which summarizes for the reader Spengler's historical perspectives on the various Cultures and illustrates how each Culture's individual Destiny-Idea is the particular form of a Culture.) The conclusion of this part will make evident that the theories of the depth-experience and of Culture as form are ultimately identical in that both rest upon the notion of movement and as such cannot be divorced in the Spenglerian framework from the notion of Not-Being. The third part of the investigation shall begin with a step by step comparison of key passages of the Untergang and of Spengler's later writings with passages out of the writings of Leibniz. The purpose of this discussion will be to prove that many principles of Leibnizian monadism, in particular the principle of a pre-established harmony, are implications in Spengler's vision of history. However, the fundamental difference between the Leibnizian view and an implied Spenglerian monadism will emerge, and this will lead back to the theme of an ontologized Not-Being. The last part of the investigation will seek to clear up some difficult sections of the Untergang, for example the question of race, landscape, and post-civilized or fellaheen peoples, by bringing together the themes of a pre-established harmony and Not-Being.

With this preliminary sketch, the intentions and scope of the present inquiry become clear. The real question which faces the critical reader is: has the author interpreted the Spenglerian philosophy correctly? The answer must be based solely upon the demonstration of these novel themes within the philosophy of the Untergang. The word "novel" or

"original" is appropriate here. No critic or scholar of the Spenglerian philosophy has as yet recognized the implications of an ontologized Not-Being within this metaphysic. And though there has been some awareness of an inward relationship between the Leibnizian and Spenglerian philosophies, no critic or scholar has perceived that within the latter there is the fundamental presupposition of a pre-established harmony. With the demonstration of these major themes, it will become possible to regard this philosophy of history in a different light.

PART I

METHODOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS,

Chapter I

THE GOETHEAN-NIETZSCHEAN METHOD AND ARGUMENT IN THE SPENGLERIAN PHILOSOPHY

1. Introduction: Presuppositions of Method

The method by which a philosopher expresses his thoughts is intimately related to the foundations of these thoughts. A study of the methodology used in the Untergang will reveal many of the most central metaphysical principles of Spengler's philosophy of history.

Every method presupposes a metaphysic of the world. One has only to ask oneself the nature and purpose of any modus operandi to understand the connection of it with a view of the world. All methods arise for the sake of problem-solving. They serve as a means to the end of overcoming, explaining, or reducing a certain problem. A problem emerges for a mind, and the uniqueness and character of the problem reveal it is a problem for a specific mind engaged in a particular enterprise. This mind will produce or adopt that procedure which will serve as a means to the "solution". As such, the method finds itself already embodied in the world-view. The problem is only a problem within a certain determined view, and the method employed is the natural product of the mind which possesses this view. This is as much as saying that a specific problem is confronted by a certain intellect for whom alone it is a problem, and it can only be conceived and possibly solved according to the standards and framework of that intellect's outlook. The method, therefore, being the tool that is created or chosen by the intellect

for clearing an obstacle within its view, will consciously or unconsciously mirror certain assumptions of this view.

Spengler would have agreed that a thorough investigation into his method of philosophizing would illuminate in advance many of the major themes and conclusions of his philosophy. He himself once stated the connection between the method of a philosophy and its results:

"Methode ist die Art, wie ein Geist zu einem ihm natürlichen Ziel, zu seinem Resultat gelangt. In jeder echten Methode liegt das Resultat schon bereit."¹ (Method is the way in which a mind arrives at a goal natural to it. Every genuine method already contains the result.)²

Furthermore, Spengler would have approved of the investigation of his mode of philosophizing in order to bring to light the metaphysical foundations upon which his thought rests. The first philosophical undertaking of Spengler, his dissertation Heraklit, makes use of the same approach which we intend here to apply to his thought. Here one reads:

Für jeden denkenden Menschen gibt es eine Form des Denkens, die aus denselben psychischen Ursachen wie die Weltanschauung und die Denkergebnisse entspringend, mit ihnen eng verknüpft ist. Im weitesten Sinne, nicht nur als instinktive Art der logischen Gedankenführung, sondern auch als unbewusste Methode der Auswahl und Verwertung von Eindrücken jeder Art ist sie als Vermittler zwischen Persönlichkeit und System, unter Umständen sogar als selbständiger Anlass zu Ideen von Wert.³

For every thinker there is one form of thought that is derived from the same psychic origins as the thinker's world view and the substance of his thought and is closely linked with them. As an instinctive way of thinking and as an unconscious method of selection and utilization of impressions of all sorts, it serves as mediator between personality and system, in certain circumstances even as an independent inducement to worthwhile ideas.⁴

Spengler believed that the deeper one penetrates into the form of one's

philosophizing the more one finds that the content, meaning, and basis of thought are contained therein.

No mistake can be made in coming to understand the method of the Untergang. Spengler gives a clear account of it. There are two terms which we could call his method: (1) Morphological or (2) Physiognomic.⁵ Strictly speaking, however, both of these terms refer to different aspects of his form of reasoning. In the forward to the revised edition of the Untergang, Spengler tells his readers that he owes his method to Goethe and his questioning faculty to Nietzsche.⁶ In general, the morphological side of Spengler's approach derives from the scientific writings of Goethe, and that which Spengler calls the science of physiognomy stems from Nietzsche's intuitive or artistic manner of philosophizing.⁷ It will be part of the task of this chapter to determine exactly how Spengler makes use of the two styles of his predecessors to arrive at his own peculiar brand of thinking. From what has just been said on the nature of method, it follows that Spengler's metaphysic of the world must be similar to that of Goethe and Nietzsche. Thus an elucidation of the Spenglerian method for the purpose of ascertaining the metaphysical foundations of the Untergang, the major concern here, will be accompanied by a comparison of the metaphysic of the two predecessors.

2. Contemplation and Cognition

The point of similarity in the method of all three thinkers—Goethe, Nietzsche, and Spengler—is found in what we shall call an aesthetic intuition, or to use Goethe's term, a contemplation or vision (Anschauer). The commencement of Goethe's study of living Nature

(lebendige Natur), of Nietzsche's critique of drama, morality, and science, and of Spengler's philosophy of world-history is this particular kind of intuition.

To come to an understanding of what the aesthetic intuition is and means, what it involves and how it is employed within the broader methodologies of Goethe's morphology and the Nietzschean-Spenglerian physiognomy, it is necessary to contrast it with its exact opposite, viz., the cognitive approach of more critical methods. Indeed, any method of thought which begins with an aesthetic intuition can only be considered an unorthodox method in respect to the more accepted procedure of the modern scientist or the logician or even the transcendentalism of Kant. Thus it is no surprise that one finds Goethe's theory of colour presented along with an extensive polemic of the Newtonian mode of procedure, or that one finds Nietzsche and Spengler constantly speaking of the shallowness of scientific justifiability. The philosopher who holds that the artist and poet see deeper into the nature of things will generally feel compelled to express his thought in an argumentative fashion, seeking to vindicate his insights and the method which allowed him to reach them by trying to expose the impotence of more critical methods. It is a necessity—at least these three thinkers must have felt so—to demonstrate the viability of their thought and the unorthodox method they practiced by seeking out the limitations of the accepted norms of science and philosophy. Otherwise, we conjecture, they knew their "opponents" within the academies would condemn their efforts before the reading public on the grounds of not being critical or scientific. Nothing could irritate Goethe more than the

criticism that his poetical endowments prevented his undertakings in the various sciences from progressing beyond the dilettante stage.⁸ Likewise, the same objection is found in the philologist's criticism of Nietzsche's unscholarly approach in Der Geburt der Tragödie. The work is condemned on the very fact that it, just as Spengler's Untergang, is an investigation of history seen through the eyes of the artist.

The immediate question then is how does the aesthetic style of thought, epitomized in the philosophical writings of Goethe, Nietzsche, and Spengler, distinguish itself from the more critical mode of thinking that begins with a cognitive intuition? Spengler appears to have investigated this question in a more systematic fashion than his predecessors, though they undoubtedly held more or less the same position that he does. The artist begins by intuiting the fact-world through the interplay of sensation, reflection, and the spontaneous acts of the imagination; the critical thinker begins by intuiting the fact-world through the category of causality.⁹

The essential argument is that the contemplative or aesthetic vision leaves the phenomenal world intact, while the cognition (Erkenntnis) of it by the means of causality fundamentally transforms it into a corrupt representation. Sensory awareness presents an external world of continuously changing things and events as well as an inner world of ceaselessly altering feelings and impulses. The artist grasps this inner and outer world in regard to its Becoming (Werden), that is, as Heraclitean flux. By passively reflecting or contemplating reality in its Becoming, a deeper feeling or understanding can then emerge through

the spontaneous creation of an imaginative idea—i.e. the aesthetic intuition itself—which portrays the world as Becoming. When Goethe says, "Die wahre Vermittlerin ist die Kunst. Über Kunst sprechen heisst die Vermittlerin vermitteln wollen . . .,"¹⁰ (The true mediator is art. To speak about art means to want to mediate the mediator,)¹¹ he underlines the passive nature involved in this contemplative vision: one lets the fact-world act upon one's senses, one contemplates it, and the imagination will of itself freely produce that artistic idea as the mediator between the world-as-Becoming and a felt-understanding of it. In contrast, the cognizing of the world demands the active intervention of the intellect. To cognize is to superimpose the category of thought, causality, upon our sensations, and this is to transform the intuition of the world in its Becoming into a world of the Having-Become (Gewordenheit).¹² The critical thought which arises out of this comprehension regards the world primarily as a chain of causes and effects. This means that reality operates mechanically as things and events already complete, fixed, and Become. Thus, to the aesthetic mode of thinking, critical comprehension begins on the wrong foot: the innocence of Becoming, to use Nietzsche's phrase, is congealed into a lifeless machine of causal relations.¹³

Such is the essence of the argument set forth by Spengler and his two masters. Let us consider the argument now in detail. The method of Goethe and Nietzsche strove towards the intuition of the primordial nature of inner constitutive character (referred to variously as the idea, the essence, the soul, the spirit) of a particular phenomenon which revealed itself in its Becoming to the imagination.

In all of his scientific undertakings, Goethe sought to elucidate what he called the Urphänomen, the ideal archetype which serves as the universal structural plan which each individual phenomenon realizes as its inmost nature or being. The intellectual procedure by which one comes to recognize among individual plants and animals a universal type or species is the same by which Goethe came to establish the Urphänomen of the entire plant and animal kingdom. By observing and reflecting upon the forms, habits, and styles of infinitely diversified plant life, it is possible to intuit the Urpflanze of which every living plant is only a variation. The highest task of any natural science, according to Goethe, was to establish the Urphänomen, and this Goethe did not only in botany, but also in comparative anatomy, optics, and geology. However successful he was in these enterprises is not our major concern. What we should note is that the intuition of a prime phenomenon meant the capturing of nature in its continuous flow or Becoming. The prime phenomenon for Goethe (as also for Spengler in his study of world-history) presupposes the Becoming of individual forms. And though the establishing of prime forms is foreign to Nietzsche, it cannot be denied that the same aesthetic approach is applied in his study of music and composition, science, morality, contemporary society, poetry, religion, and philosophy. Whatever becomes the object of his gaze, his mind penetrates to the inner core to locate the ruling spirit of the particular phenomenon. Greek drama reveals a conflict of two opposing souls, and a study of the tragedies and comedies bears out in the essential details the conflict between what is portrayed as the Apollinian and Dionysian forces of life.

Likewise the genealogy of morality reveals the outward conduct of man as either a predominantly noble spirit or a servile spirit. The point is the same. In Nietzsche's style of philosophizing, every facet of the historical and social life of man expresses in the actualizing or Becoming of itself a particular soul or spirit.

One may find a difficulty here in reconciling the notion of the aesthetic intuition as an act of the imagination with the understanding that in comparison to the cognitive intuition it is a relatively "passive" event. The problem is cleared up when one notes that the aesthetic or contemplative intuition does not involve the fantastical or whimsical productions of the imagination.¹⁴ The intuition of the form, essence or soul of a living, becoming actuality comes after the sensing, observing, and reflecting on the phenomenon which is in question. Goethe uses the expression "exakte sinnliche Phantasie" (precise perceptual imagination) to distinguish the spontaneous imagination from the fantastical imagination.¹⁵ The precise imagination reveals of its own accord the intuition of the Urphänomen. The passivity of this event lies in the fact that the intuition is an automatic or instinctive creation, accomplished without the direct interference of the self.

Of course, such an approach is not scientifically justifiable. The divination of the essence of nature and human history is not attained by an inference from empirically tested hypothesis, nor through an a priori deduction from self-evident principles. Yet Spengler, like his predecessors, chose this unorthodox mode of understanding reality through the fundamental conviction that it alone

allowed one to picture the world in its continuous flux.¹⁶

The empirical method which begins with an act of critical, causal comprehension, it is argued, has fundamentally excluded itself from the possibility of sensing the Becoming of reality. This is essentially the meaning in Goethe's aphorism: "Der denkende Mensch irrt besonders, wenn er sich nach Ursache und Wirkung erkundigt: sie beide zusammen machen das unteilbare Phänomen."¹⁷ (The thinking man errs particularly when he inquires according to cause and effect: they both together make the indivisible phenomenon.)¹⁸ In other words, the unity of reality as a continuous flow is broken by superimposing an artificial relation between two distant phenomena. Once this violation has occurred it is no wonder that nature and history are looked upon as the mechanical acting and interacting of things, atoms, or bodies.

In Die fröhliche Wissenschaft Nietzsche clarified further the polemic against the causal mode of ordering knowledge:

Ursache und Wirkung: eine solche Zweiheit gibt es wahrscheinlich nie--in Wahrheit steht ein Kontinuum vor uns, von dem wir ein paar Stücke isolieren; so wie wir eine Bewegung immer nur als isolierte Punkte wahrnehmen, also eigentlich nicht sehen, sondern erschliessen. Die Plötzlichkeit, mit der sich viele Wirkungen abheben, führt uns irre; es ist aber nur eine Plötzlichkeit für uns. Es gibt eine unendliche Menge von Vorgängen in dieser Sekunde der Plötzlichkeit, die uns entgehen.¹⁹

Cause and effect: there is probably never any such duality; in fact there is a continuum before us, from which we isolate a few portions;--just as we always observe a motion as isolated points, and therefore do not properly see it, but infer it. The abruptness with which many effects take place leads us into error; it is however only an abruptness for us. There is an infinite multitude of processes in that abrupt moment which escape us.²⁰

A view of reality which rests upon causal inference should be denied altogether. According to Goethe and to Nietzsche, there are no "real"

causal connections; there are no "things"; there are no events which stand isolated and apart from other events.²¹

If Goethe's and Nietzsche's anti-causal arguments have any cogency, then any science which raises itself upon causal inference does so with the same fundamental defects. Scientific laws, which the nature researcher believes to rest on the direct sense observation of uniform and regular occurrence of events, find their origin in the perspective of critical comprehension. Only by the act of cognizing do the events of the world take on the systematic order and logical uniformity they appear to have. Again to quote Nietzsche: "Die 'Regelmässigkeit' der Aufeinanderfolge ist nur ein bildlicher Ausdruck, wie als ob hier eine Regel befolgt werde: kein Tatbestand. Ebenso 'Gesetzmässigkeit'. Wir finden eine Formel, um eine immer wiederkehrende Art der Folge auszudrücken: damit haben wir kein 'Gesetz' entdeckt, noch weniger eine Kraft, welche die Ursache zur Wiederkehr von Folgen ist."²² (The "regularity" of a sequence is only a metaphorical expression, not a fact, just as if a rule were followed here. And the same holds good of "conformity to law". We find a formula in order to express an ever-recurring kind of succession of phenomena: but that does not show that we have discovered a law; much less a force which is the cause of a recurrence of effects.)²³ Scientific laws are causal laws; hence they are construed, not discovered. Reality—as Goethe's "living Nature" or as history—is not the totality of things and events operating according to systematic laws.

The scientist and philosopher who seek to formulate eternal laws which govern the movement of things in the universe may not deny

the Heraclitean flow of reality, yet their very attempt to systematize demands that they disregard it as such. That which obeys a universal law of nature must be regarded as a thing Having-Become, not a Becoming.²⁴ Only the fixed, complete, the set-fast and rigid—i.e. only substantial things—can enter into the external relationship with other substantial things and function to fulfill an eternally valid law. A mechanized world operating according to a number of physical and chemical laws is a world of consequences or results, which means a world in which things are viewed as to their extendedness and externality. The nature researcher speaks as though these object-things carry a necessity bestowed upon them by a universal covering law.²⁵ However, the only necessity which a physical law carries is the inorganic necessity of causality imposed by the act of cognition. This act alone is responsible for the appearance of the world as the totality of things Become, and of the mechanical necessity which it displays.

Goethe may at times refer to laws of nature, but he does not conceive of them as the physicist does, i.e. as unvarying uniformity of the Become under similar circumstances. The use of the term "law" in his scientific writings must be taken in the context of his efforts to intuit the world first in its ceaseless Becoming.²⁶ The laws of Goethe's living Nature signify the basic metamorphic patterns of certain plant and animal species or of the development of geological strata. Likewise, when we come to consider Spengler's theme of the ever recurring life-patterns of the higher Cultures, we must understand that here also the Destiny of a Culture fulfills itself in an ideal life-form in the Goethean sense. The logic of metamorphic laws rests upon

the principle of things Becoming.²⁷ Spengler states in the Urfragen:

Idee'=innere Form, Formtendenz, Urbild.

Idee der Pflanze, des Tieres, der Sippe, der Kultur, des Sonnensystems, des Staates usw.—sie sind nur durch Schauen und Ahnung zu erleben (Goethes Urphänomen?), durch eigenes rhythmisches Mitschwingen, empfangenden Eindruck, Einfühling etc.. Irgendwie wird die Idee eines Wesens durch Sinne—gesehen, gehört, getastet—vermittelt (Umarmung, Kuss), erlebt aber nur seelisch.

Eine Idee lässt sich nur durch symbolische Mittel vermitteln (Dombauten, Gemälde, 'Faust', 'Tristan'), die denen, die sie nacherleben können, das andeuten, was der Schöpfer dieser Werke geahnt hat. 'Mithahnung', 'Mitschau' sind notwendig, exakte sinnliche Fantasie.

Fantasie ist das, was ich Schauen nenne, das Ahnen der Idee im Wirklichen, Wirkenden.

Goethes 'Metamorphose' ist Entwicklung, Verwirklichung der Idee von der Möglichkeit zur Wirklichkeit, zur Vollendung. Das ist Schau des Wirklichen, während das 19 Jh. Evolution mechanisch fasste, als unendliche Reihe.²⁸

'Idea'=inner form, form-tendency, fundamental notion or picture.

The Idea of the plant, of the animal, of the clan, of the Culture, of the solar system, of the state, etc.—they are to be experienced only through viewing and divination (Goethe's Urphänomen?) through one's own rhythmic bent or sympathetic vibration, receptive impression, inward moving feeling, etc. Somehow the Idea of an entity, being, or essence [Wesen] is communicated (the kiss or embrace) through the senses—seen, heard, touched—but experienced only through the soul.

An Idea can be communicated only through symbolic media which signify to those who can re-experience them that which the creator of those works (cathedral structures, paintings, 'Faust', 'Tristan') intuited. 'Empathy' and 'vision' are necessary, the precise sensuous fantasy.

Fantasy is that which I call vision [Schauen], the divination of the Idea in that which is effective, working.

Goethe's 'Metamorphosis' is development, realization of the Idea from possibility to actuality, to fulfillment. That is the contemplation of the actual, whereas the nineteenth century conceived of evolution as a mechanical process, as an infinite series."²⁹

Nevertheless it is obvious that Goethe, Nietzsche, and Spengler, like everybody else, express themselves in causal terminology. Does this indicate a contradiction in their proceedings, or does it reveal that the aesthetic or contemplative method is insufficient on its own

and must have recourse to critical comprehension to arrive at its findings? The fact of the matter is that cause-and-effect thinking, and its concomitant mechanized world, figures in a subordinate role in their philosophizing. Spengler says that both contemplating and cognizing the world, despite the contradictory views they present, are found continually operating together: "So sehr Werden und Gewordenes Gegensätze sind, so sicher ist in jeder Art von Verstehen beides vorhanden."³⁰ (However great the contrast between becoming and the become, the fact remains that they are jointly present in every kind of understanding.)³¹ However the man who is more prone to contemplate the world in its Becoming will use critical comprehension as a means to substantiate his own mental vision. In this way Nietzsche speaks of the simplified conceptions constructed by the understanding (e.g. will, matter, or object) as an inner "stimulus" (Reiz) for a man of action to think out the plan of his conduct.³²

Likewise Goethe mentions the scientific necessity of using hypotheses and the trial-and-error process to justify physical theories. Yet Goethe says that the substantiation of the theory is never the end-in-itself of research. He compares the relationship of a theory to that of the vision of the prime Idea or Urphänomen as that of a scaffold to a building: we must not confuse the scaffold with the building; once the building is erected, the scaffold should be removed.³³ The point of this is that all the mental faculties are to be used as means in reaching the goal of one's research, in the imaginative and contemplative intuition of the qualitative essence of phenomenal reality. This is why we say that Goethe, Nietzsche, and Spengler have

as the basis of their methods of reasoning the aesthetic vision: it remains the fundamental task throughout their research. From their point of view, they understand that the physicist has as his methodical basis the cognitive intuition, and conversely the use of imaginative insight in his theorizing serves as a means to its end of viewing the world as a mechanism.³⁴ Consequently, though both contemplative and critical intuition may be present in every method of understanding the world, they are contradictory to each other, and one must serve the aim of the other.

3. Becoming and Having-Become

Spengler inherits from Goethe and Nietzsche the method which begins with an aesthetic or contemplative intuition. With this he takes over a particular metaphysical position which holds reality to be Becoming. The attempt to intuit the essence of phenomena presupposes that the world is nothing other than the working out of particular forms. This metaphysical view of reality stands in complete opposition to the mechanical world-view of critical, causal understanding. Spengler remarks in the Untergang that his entire philosophy was comprised in a statement of Goethe to Eckermann:

Die Gottheit ist wirksam im Lebendigen, aber nicht im Toten; sie ist im Werdenden und sich Verwandelnden, aber nicht im Gewordenen und Erstarren. Deshalb hat auch die Vernunft in ihrer Tendenz zum Göttlichen es nur mit dem Werdenden, Lebendigen zu tun, der Verstand mit dem Gewordenen, Erstarren, dass er es nutze.³⁵

The Godhead is effective in the living and not in the dead, in the becoming and the changing, not in the become and the set-fast; and therefore, similarly, the reason (Vernunft) is concerned only to strive towards the divine through the becoming and the living, and the understanding, (Verstand) only to make use of the become and the set-fast.³⁶

Goethe referred to the world of Becoming as "living Nature". All reality, even that which we are accustomed to call "inorganic", is to Goethe "living" in the sense that it is changing, forming itself anew, and passing away. This doctrine, like the Leibnizian monadology, may be styled "pan-organism". Spengler states that history (this word regarded here in its broadest sense to include not only human, but animal, plant, geological, and astronomical history) is Goethe's living Nature.³⁷ In a certain respect, Spengler may therefore be classified with Leibniz and Goethe as a "pan-organist".

However, in a very fundamental way, Spengler differs from the pan-organists. In the flux of human history, there is intuited along with the formative essence or idea of phenomenal reality another aspect which cannot figure as a really significant role in the views of Leibniz, Goethe, or even Nietzsche. It is death. When Goethe speaks of the world as Becoming, he indeed implies that with the formation of things there is also given their disintegration and "passing-away". The same is the case with Nietzsche. Yet neither Goethe nor Nietzsche has a place in his metaphysical understanding for the blank nothingness of death. Ultimately, death for them means a transitory state in which somehow the principle of Becoming or life begins anew. Goethe endorsed the idea, though not the reasoning and proof, of the immortality of the Leibnizian monad.³⁸ Thus the world of living Nature has no room for death. Similarly, Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence in a universe bounded by finite space and eternal time leaves no place for non-existence. Nietzsche mentions the inherent difficulty of this problem: "Das Sein—wir haben keine andere Vorstellung davon

als 'leben'—wie kann also etwas Totes 'sein'?"³⁹ (Being—we have no other idea of it than 'life'—how then can something dead 'be'?)⁴⁰
 But his impassioned desire to seek out and underline all that which possesses or promises future, life, and power blots out the notion of Not-Being as a fundamental constituent of reality. In Der Wille zur Macht, one reads:

Die neue Welt-Konzeption: Die Welt besteht; sie ist nichts, was wird, nichts, was vergeht. Oder vielmehr: sie wird, sie vergeht, aber sie hat nie angefangen zu werden und nie aufgehört zu vergehen—Sie erhält sich in beidem Sie⁴¹ lebt von sich selber: ihre Exkremente sind ihre Nahrung.

The new concept of the universe. The universe exists; it is nothing that grows into existence and that passes out of existence. Or, better still, it develops, it passes away, but it never began to develop, and has never ceased from passing away; it maintains itself in both states It lives on itself, its excrements are its nourishment.⁴²

When Spengler studied his two masters he experienced in the notion of Becoming a vision which he alone possessed. His notion of history is more than Goethe's living Nature. Hence in the Urfragen, Spengler speaks of Goethe's "weakness":

Goethes Schwäche, die Zartheit seiner Seele, erweckte ihm Angst vor Tod, Bestattung, Krankheit etc.. Deshalb findet man in seinem Denken nur die Entwicklung als Entstehen, Blühen, Reifen betont, Schweigen jedoch über die notwendige Vollendung, das Welken, Sterben und Vergehen.

Nicht Leben und Tod sind Gegensätze, sondern Geburt und Tod, Leben und Nichtmehrdasein.⁴³

Goethe's weakness, the tenderness of his soul, aroused in him anxiety before death, burial, sickness, and so forth. One finds therefore in his thoughts only development as emergence, flowering, ripening stressed but silence over the necessary fulfillment, withering, dying, and passing away.

Life and death are not opposites, but birth and death, life and no-longer-being.⁴⁴

Spengler, therefore, unlike Goethe and Nietzsche, postulates

that the real is not only ceaseless Becoming or formation of individual spiritual principles, but also the cessation and non-existence of these principles. In a word, non-existence possesses some sort of ontological status. It will be seen later that the entire Spenglerian philosophy rests upon the metaphysical presupposition that reality is an inexplicable unity of Becoming and Not-Being. The word which denotes this unity is Destiny. It is the basic theme of the Untergang. Generally speaking, Destiny is the movement towards fulfillment and disintegration into non-existence. Thus it is a universal principle characterizing every plane of history—plant-, animal-, human-, earth-, and stellar-history—and Spengler often uses the word interchangeably with the word "History". No doubt, the meaning of Destiny is contradictory; thought cannot fathom a metaphysical unity of existence and non-existence. Perhaps this is why Spengler once remarked: "Wer je einen tiefen Blick in die Voraussetzungen lebendigen Denkens getan hat, der wird wissen, dass eine widerspruchslose Einsicht in die letzten Gründe des Daseins uns nicht gegeben ist."⁴⁵ (He who has ever seen deeply into the presuppositions of living thought will know that a view into the ultimate grounds of Being without contradiction cannot be obtained by us.)⁴⁶ However, Spengler held that the meaning of Destiny could be grasped otherwise than through pure thought: "Schicksal ist ein Wort, dessen Inhalt man fühlt."⁴⁷ (Destiny is a word whose meaning is felt.)⁴⁸ Though one cannot understand how, one is aware that the existence of oneself is bound up with the non-existence of death. It is this felt awareness which gives one the sure sense of Destiny.

The detailed treatment of the individual role of death in

Spengler's philosophy must be reserved for the next chapter. For the present, we must deal with this topic and that of Destiny in a more general way and in the context of Spengler's predecessor, Goethe.

It has been noted already from Spengler's Eckermann quote that Goethe characterized the Having-Become as the dead. For him, all critical or analytical thinking (which includes not only the causal approach of the physical sciences, but also the mode of thought of mathematics and logic) deals with the world as Having-Become. Objects, things, relations, and numbers are cognized as lifeless entities; they are already actualized, fixed, stiff, and extended. To Goethe, the mechanical world-view treats reality as though it were a corpse. Now Spengler has taken this intuition and given it an epistemic and metaphysical basis. The act of cognizing is itself a living event; hence it is itself a Becoming. Cognition, on the other hand, is the Having-Become of the act.⁴⁹ Critical comprehension, therefore, is obtained by the super-imposition of the category of causality upon sensation, transforming the sensuous, living world into a rigid, lifeless world. Spengler says that critical understanding kills: cognition is the death or finale of a living, becoming act.⁵⁰

The basic distinction between Goethe's and Spengler's use of the terms "Becoming" and "Having-Become" can now be clarified. For both thinkers these expressions indicate the two basic ways of intuiting and ordering knowledge. But in the Untergang, the Having-Become reflects a phase of reality which cannot be divorced from the other phase of reality, viz. Becoming. In the further examination of Spengler's thought, we must be careful to differentiate between

the view of the world as, and the wrld itself of Becoming and Having-Become.

Let us consider briefly the methodical view of the world as Becoming and Having-Become in order to determine what Spengler maintained intact, developed, and transformed from Goethe's view. Then let us consider the metaphysical reality of Becoming and Having-Become, upon which the Spenglerian method alone rests.

Goethe's living Nature, the continuous Becoming or realization of individual forms, is for Spengler the World-as-History. Like Goethe, Spengler presents criticism against any view which sees and orders the world as Having-Become, the World-as-Nature (Welt als Natur). Once again, this is reality cognized as the mechanical operation of cause-and-effect. In the Untergang the anti-causal arguments of both Goethe and Nietzsche are taken up by Spengler and developed further into his own critique of causality.

The problem here which Spengler considers is, as Nietzsche remarked, the breaking-up of the continuum of Becoming and transforming it into isolated static parts.⁵¹ What is genuine with Spengler is the treatment of this transformation of the Becoming into the Having-Become with the problems of time and space. The world as it appears in simple sense-experience (pre-reflective awareness) and in the contemplative awareness of it (reflective and imaginative awareness, i.e. Goethe's "exacte sinnliche Phantasie") is the world as Becoming or the World-as-History, and this is the world perceived as the expression of time. One is immediately aware of what time is by the recognition that every event in life is a once-occurring fact, a

happening that can never be re-lived; it is unique and irrevocable. From this same inner certainty, one becomes aware that the world carries in every respect the same hall-mark of time, direction or irreversibility.⁵² However, with the cognizing of facts—with the attempt to bring them into the light of critical understanding—actuality is viewed no longer in its directional fate or as time, but in its Becomeness, i.e. as though everything has already Become.⁵³ Spengler argues, therefore, that the World-as-Nature is timeless; it has no regard for things as Becoming, for things having a destined future to be actualized. According to Spengler, the superimposing of the category of causality upon the sensation or contemplative intuition of things in their irrevocable Becoming is at the same time the superimposing of a spatial framework upon the temporal order.⁵⁴ Critical cognition always presupposes a spatially extended world in which every cause precedes an effect. Thus, whereas the World-as-History has directionality or irreversibility as its prime attribute, the World-as-Nature has extension as its prime attribute.⁵⁵ This is why all things Having-Become are characterized as rigid, set-fast, and are associated with number. Only that which is extended can be counted, measured, and divided. The mathematician like the physicist deals with the world as Become. Only such a world is capable of systemic order and universal laws.⁵⁶

This critique of causality is of extreme importance in understanding the uniqueness of Spengler's method and thought. We shall have reason to go into far greater detail on this topic in the coming chapters. The brief presentation here helps us not only to get a glimpse

of its development out of the criticism of Goethe and Nietzsche, but also to prepare us for an understanding of the dominant metaphysical theme of the Untergang.

So far we have arrived at the understanding that the aesthetic or contemplative intuition of Nietzsche and Goethe does not, as it does with Spengler, lead to the postulation of Not-Being. Destiny, to repeat, means for Spengler the passage of existence into non-existence, of life—understood as the individual organism or as the giant social organism of a Culture—into death. Since cognition kills, since the World-as-Nature reveals the world as if it were dead, then the attributes which characterize this view also characterize this latter facet of reality. The Having-Become of life signifies its extinction or its death, and the secret of the Having-Become is the primary property of space, extension. All things that are lifeless are extended, stiff, external; they are wholly matter and space. The empty nothingness or non-existence is grasped in the Spenglerian philosophy by the term "extension" (Ausdehnung) or rigid-space. Conversely, the secret of Becoming or of life reveals itself in the primary property of time, directionality. All that which is in the process of self-realization and fulfillment moves in a unilinear direction towards the Having-Become and death. Out of this, the principle of Destiny is formulated by Spengler as the movement of time into space, of directionality into extension, of Becoming into Having-Become, of existence into non-existence. For Spengler, Destiny is the principle of the Cosmos, and its manifestation in human history is the theme of the Untergang.

Chapter II

GOETHEAN MORPHOLOGY

1. The Urphänomen

We have begun with the understanding that the basis of Spengler's philosophical method is the same as that of Goethe and Nietzsche: the World-as-History is to be understood through a contemplative (aesthetic) intuition. To approach reality this way is to regard it as the Becoming of ideas, forms, or essences. In contrast, a method which has as its basis a critical cognition understands reality as an inorganic mechanism functioning according to eternally valid laws.

Let us now focus upon the specific method which Spengler adopted from Goethe's scientific researches in order to apply it to the study of human history.¹ It has already been remarked that Spengler employed for this purpose Goethe's morphological method. From a discussion of this method, we shall be able to extend our comparison of the metaphysic of Goethe and Spengler.

The morphological method can be described as the mode of thinking which seeks to establish its findings through a comparison of forms. The ultimate task is to grasp through a contemplative intuition the "type" which underlies and serves as the structural pattern for the concrete manifestations of the similar forms.² Goethe demonstrates this comparative procedure pre-eminently by his search for

the Urphänomen in the plant and animal kingdoms. An Urpflanze (or an Urtier) emerges through a comparison of the innumerable simple and complex forms of vegetation (or animal life), which leads to a twofold result: (1) the revelation of the "archetypal form" of all plant or animal organisms, and (2) the highlighting of the uniqueness of each organism by its variation on this ideal model.

Now Spengler likewise sets as his main task the intuition of the prime phenomenon of all the formations of human history. And; as Goethe found that the prime phenomenon of plant-life is the leaf, so Spengler found the prime phenomenon of world-history to be the Culture.³ Though Spengler never used the expression, "Urkultur", we shall take the liberty to do so when we speak of Spengler's idea of Culture in the way Goethe spoke of the leaf as the Urpflanze.⁴ An Urkultur emerges through a morphological comparison of all the present and past Cultures which have appeared on the face of the earth. Consequently, the main content of the Untergang is the characterization of this universal prime form, the Urkultur, which every higher Culture has displayed in its historical unfolding, and the description of the uniqueness of each of these Cultures through its variation on the Urkultur.

As already noted, Goethe's morphological method, with its search for the Urphänomen, postulates that the world is the unfolding of formal principles. Reality as Becoming means here the continual realization of individual forms. Adopting the same position, Spengler quotes Goethe: "Die Gestalt ist ein Bewegliches, ein Werdendes, ein Vergehendes. Gestaltenlehre ist Verwandlungslehre."⁵ (Form is something

mobile, something becoming, something passing. The doctrine of formation is the doctrine of transformation.)⁶ However, the Urphänomen should not be confused with the individual forms of the world. When Goethe speaks of the leaf as the prime phenomenon or form of the plant kingdom, of the plant as the prime phenomenon of all organic life, or of magnetism as the prime phenomenon of all being, he does not mean that it is the formative source out of which all the individual concrete forms emerge. His clarification of this point is quite explicit: "Ferner ist ein Urphänomen nicht einem Grundsatz gleichzuachten, aus dem sich mannigfaltige Folgen ergeben, sondern anzusehen als eine Grunderscheinung, innerhalb deren das Mannigfaltige anzuschauen ist."⁷ (Furthermore, an Urphänomen is not to be identified or regarded as a principle out of which manifold consequences emerge, but as a basic phenomenon which is intuited within the manifold.)⁸ The Urphänomen is an intellectual creation. For Goethe, there is no particular plant or animal which serves as the concrete epitome of the Urphänomen.⁹ The case is the same for Spengler. No one Culture which has appeared in world-history is the Urkultur. Through the morphological comparison of the specific formations of all the Cultures, Spengler intuits the idea of the Urkultur.

Therefore, the prime phenomenon for Goethe and Spengler should be understood as a regulative idea. Its reality consists in its being intuited and known. As such, it forms the ultimate point of reliable knowledge, beyond which theory, faith, guess-work, and inclination guide one's research.¹⁰ It is important to note that both of these thinkers are reluctant to engage in a metaphysical speculation about

the prime phenomenon or what lies behind appearances. To them, what is real is what unfolds itself before their eyes; which are individual forms, either specific plants or animals, or past and present Cultures. Spengler accepts Goethe's statement of philosophical prudence: "Das Höchste, wozu der Mensch gelangen kann, ist das Erstaunen, und wenn ihn das Urphänomen in Erstaunen setzt, so sei er zufrieden; ein Höheres kann es ihm nicht gewähren, und ein Weiteres soll er nicht dahinter suchen: hier ist die Grenze."¹¹ (The highest to which man can attain, is wonder; and if the prime phenomenon makes him wonder, let him be content; nothing higher can it give him, and nothing further should he seek for behind it; here is the limit.)¹² Whether or not the Urphänomen implies a metaphysical reality is a point to which neither Goethe nor Spengler will ever commit himself officially. Both, therefore, maintain a pluralistic position which understands the world as the manifold realizations of individual forms.

At times it may seem as though Goethe refers to the Urphänomen as the eternal essence or model in or behind the Becoming of things.¹³ Again, this does not mean that the Urphänomen is a formative principle somehow existing "outside" the flux of the world and producing its individual forms. To speak of the Urphänomen as the eternal essence or model is to refer to its meaning and what it characterizes. Thus, when Goethe discusses the development of the plant and demonstrates that the cotyledon, the leaf, the corolla, the blossom, and fruit are all leaf-like structures, the reader is to understand that each of these developing structures of the plant symbolize the idea of a leaf, which is the Urphänomen of the plant; Similarly, when Spengler speaks

of the life-span of the Greco-Roman world, of the Arabian world, of the West, or when he speaks of feudalism and early temple or cathedral architecture as Springtime creations of a particular Culture, and of Caesarism and megapolis as late manifestations of a people, what is to be gathered is that each of these formations symbolizes the Urkultur. The point is that the individual phenomena reflect the universal essence or meaning in their own particular Becoming.¹⁴ The corolla, blossom, and fruit are identical for Goethe in that they all bear the same meaning which the leaf portrays; the Western world with all its history is identical to the Classical world in that both symbolize the Urkultur. We have said that according to Goethe and Spengler no particular case is ever completely identical to the Urphänomen. Every particular case possesses a meaning other than that of the Urphänomen, otherwise one individual could not be distinguished from another. However, the individual has as its most universal character the Urphänomen.

We can summarize what we have said on the nature of the Urphänomen by citing Goethe's brief description of it:

Urphänomen:

ideal als das letzte Erkennbare,
 real als erkannt,
 symbolisch, weil es alle Fälle begreift,
 identisch mit allen Fällen.¹⁵

Urphänomen:

ideal as the ultimate knowable;
 real as the known,
 symbolic because it contains all the instances;
 identical with all the instances.¹⁶

What the Urphänomen exactly means cannot be precisely

conceived at the beginning of the morphological study. Only by following out the course of the comparison of forms in Goethe's Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen and Vorarbeiten zu einer Physiologie der Pflanzen can one grasp the final meaning of the leaf as the prime phenomenon, and as already said, one of the essential tasks of the Untergang is the continual revelation of the meaning of the Urkultur. However, it is possible here to sketch out the basic notion of this prime phenomenon. Like the leaf or like the Urpflanze, Urkultur carries the fundamental meaning of Becoming, the inherent transformation of possibilities into actualities, which is Destiny. Furthermore, as Goethe's Urpflanze reveals specific developmental stages and structures (seed, stem, leaf, roots, flower), so the Spenglerian Urkultur is a picture of the progressive stages and structures of the higher Cultures.¹⁷ The Untergang teaches that the prime phenomenon reveals the political structure of every Culture to be a progression which begins with feudalism, evolves into small aristocratic states, matures into the absolute state, changes into mass-money-democracy, and ends with Caesaristic government. Furthermore, the Urkultur signifies the Destiny of every Culture's artistic and spiritual expressions, beginning with religious myth and ornamental architecture of the country town, passing into the scholasticism and individual urban arts of the early city, maturing gradually into the critical rationalism and intellectual sciences of the completely ripened Culture-city, and expiring in the problematic ethos of the irreligious megapolis. All this one learns step by step, detail by detail, through the comparison of the Destiny which past Cultures have

experienced with the present-day West.

From this it is observed how the Urkultur functions in the morphological method as a regulative idea. Every significant fact in the histories of each of the higher Cultures derives its significance for Spengler from the idea of the Urkultur. All individual details and ideas ultimately find themselves synthetically united to the final meaning of the Urkultur. Thus the aim of this method is to attain to a contemplation of the meaning of the whole of cultural history. Goethe had sought in his studies of plant and animal life a similar contemplation of organic life. Forming the ultimate boundary of human knowledge, the prime phenomenon was for him the goal of all his research into living Nature. The study of each particular plant and the study of each vertebrate animal were initiated by the desire to demonstrate that their structures conformed to the ideal leaf or vertebrate type, and the investigation into what one today calls "inorganic nature" led Goethe to the notion that magnetism was a fundamental characteristic of all reality. The deepest meaning one can derive from a study of each plant or animal, according to Goethe, is the prime phenomenon of the plant or animal, and considering reality in general, polarity, tension, attraction, and repulsion constitute its final meaning. In contrast to any analytical procedure which comes to an aggregate of specialized conclusions, the morphological approach aims at the attainment of one universal concept or idea by witnessing the correlation of individual parts to a unified whole, viz. the Urphänomen.¹⁸

The morphological method, therefore, is a synthetic approach

which strives towards a broad universal understanding of its subject matter. To grasp the Urphänomen as a regulative idea means to have a contemplative vision of the whole. The more that is learned about each individual case (the several higher Cultures for Spengler, the leaf or vertebrate structures for Goethe) the clearer this vision of the whole becomes. The morphological method can thus be described as a steady progression towards a clarification of the universal meaning of the whole, viz. of the Urphänomen. A full grasp of the prime phenomenon, as Spengler and Goethe visualized it, is possible only after the study and comparison of individual cases. True enough, a morphological comparison of similar forms as parts presupposes the ideal archetypal form as the whole. Accordingly, some inkling of the whole, i.e. some presentiment of the meaning of the Urphänomen, is postulated at the beginning of the study. Through the course of investigating, each case or part of the whole takes on more definite tone, colour, and form. It has to be said that the process of bringing the Urphänomen in focus is an indefinite procedure since the concrete examples to be synthesized appear to be innumerable. Thus Spengler says: "Ein Blick über die Gruppe der Kulturen erschliesst Aufgaben über Aufgaben."¹⁹ (A glance over the group of the Cultures discloses task after task.)²⁰

The use of visual terminology to express the contemplative intuition of the whole is not accidental. To realize the meaning of the Urphänomen means, for Goethe and Spengler, to intuit the whole with the "inner eye".²¹ The progressive, indefinite, and unattainable nature of visualizing the Urphänomen as a prime symbol with its

universal meaning is expressed by Goethe: "Die Symbolik verwandelt die die Erscheinung in Idee, die Idee in ein Bild, und so, dass die Idee im Bild immer unendlich wirksam und unerreichbar bleibt und, selbst in allen Sprachen ausgesprochen, doch unaussprechlich bliebe."²²

(Symbolism transforms appearance into Idea, the Idea into an image, and as such, the Idea in the image remains infinitely productive and unattainable—though it be expressed in all languages, it would remain inexpressable.)²³

The meaning of the Urkultur is like the Urpflanze in being a synthesis of many intuitions, and hence it cannot be expressed adequately by any one particular term. We have said that the meaning of Urkultur contains the principle notion of Destiny, but this notion in turn attaches itself to many other notions, e.g. the developing stages of the political, artistic, and economic structures of the higher Cultures. Consequently, what is realized in grasping the meaning of this term is not a scientifically definable concept. The synthesis of all these intuitive notions into a single term can only be realized by the particular inner feeling it evokes. The contemplative vision of the whole of world-history, just as of the whole of plant or animal life is realized, as Spengler puts it, by a "felt-understanding" of the prime phenomenon. The whole content of history or "living Nature" is to be felt in the artistic vision of the prime phenomenon. The further one progresses in the Untergang and in Goethe's botanical and scientific writings, the more distinct the vision of the Urphänomen is to become and the more keenly a particular emotion is to be experienced. The success of these morphological investigations depends upon the degree the Urphänomen is inwardly visualized and felt.

2. Homology and Differentiation

Perhaps the best way to understand the morphological method is to outline briefly the steps which Goethe followed in carrying out his scientific research. From this we shall see how Spengler used the same steps in his undertaking. The charts at the beginning of the first volume of the Untergang reveal in advance the scope and the results of this method.

It is possible to ascertain four major steps which Goethe used in his morphological research. All these steps center around the main endeavour of obtaining an intuition of the Urphänomen. For the sake of simplicity, let us exemplify the method by reference to his zoological writing, Über den Zwischenkiefer, keeping in mind however that the same steps can be traced in his other studies.²⁴

The first step is to arrange all phenomena under consideration in a series from the most complex to the simplest forms. Thus in one chart Goethe arranges horizontally the lion, the beaver and the dromedary, and in another chart, we see the buffalo, bear, and pig.²⁵ It is possible to arrange all the vertebrates in one single series.

The second step requires the intuiting of the common developing structures of the series and arrangement of these forms in vertical series. In our example, Goethe is concerned with the bone structure of the vertebrae, and so we have, set out before us, the various bone formations from the head to the pelvis. The Urphänomen which emerges from these two steps is what Goethe calls "the vertebrate-type".

After the establishment of these two series, one must compare all the complex and simple animal forms in order to find what features are similar. In other words, one studies the modifications of form between one species and another to find what organs or bone structures are morphologically equivalent or homologous. In the Zwischenkiefer essay, it can be seen at a glance that all the vertebrate bones in the lion are homologous to the vertebrate bones in the beaver.

The final step is to note the modifications of these homologous components in each individual case. After establishing what is morphologically common, one must then look for the differentiation in the various animals. All the animals of the vertebrate type reveal difference in shape, size, and position, which emphasizes the uniqueness of each particular animal.

Now, the same general course provides a progressive intuition of the Urkultur. The path is prefigured in Spengler's three tables depicting the spiritual, cultural, and political structures of the higher Cultures.

We observe first the various Cultures--Egyptian, Classical, Arabian, Western, Chinese, and Indian--arranged horizontally across the head of the charts. However, there are not Cultures with varying degrees of complexity as there are plant and animal forms.

Secondly, the common developing-structures and epochs of each of the Cultures are vertically set down at the margin of the charts. Every Culture experiences the same stages of growth, maturity, and senility (spring, summer, autumn, and winter). Each of these periods has its unique and unrepeatable characteristics, its particular

art style and world consciousness, its own political, economic, and social formations. Goethe uses the phrase "successive metamorphosis" to express the corresponding idea of periods of progressive development in the plant and animal kingdoms. The Urphänomen of all plants, the leaf, is revealed in the metamorphic structures of the cotyledon, leaf, corolla, and fruit, and the stages of the growth of the head and segments of the spinal column demonstrate the successive metamorphosis of the "vertebrate type". In a similar fashion, the Urkultur is disclosed in successive metamorphosis of every higher Culture.

The next step is to examine the specific formations in the metamorphosis of the Cultures in order to determine which of them are morphologically equivalent. Spengler uses the word "gleichzeitig" (contemporary) to refer to Goethe's idea of the homology of animal organs and bones.²⁶ Whereas the lungs of mammals and the swim-bladders of fish, the wings of birds and the hands of humans are homologous, Indian Buddhism and Roman Stoicism, (Napoleon and Alexander, the cathedral, the early pyramid, and the Doric temple, Islam and English Puritanism are "contemporaneous". Hence one discovers in the progressive history of a Culture the exact counterparts in the corresponding historical phases of all the other Cultures. The logic which is behind this comparative search for homologies of fact is what Spengler refers to as an "organische Logik" (organic logic). It is organically necessary that the zenith of mathematical thought of the West was reached with Euler, Lagrange, and Laplace around the turn of the nineteenth century and that it was "contemporaneous" in

the Classical world with the mathematical thought of Archytas and Plato. And though the mathematical formulations have been lost at the same comparative period of the Indian Culture, it is organically necessary that the zenith of mathematical expression is reached at this same point in its history. Thus, for Spengler the organic logic of the morphological method allows for the reconstruction of lost periods of a Culture's history. On the same ground Spengler also finds it possible to predict the period of duration and the spiritual forms which the West can expect in its future through a comparison with the Civilizations of all past Cultures.²⁷

Finally the differentiation of each Culture is to be considered. Each Culture is different in accomplishing the inevitable stages of its history.²⁸ Though each Culture is similar in regards to its unfolding, forming, maturing, declining, and dying in definite metamorphic phases, each is different in regard to the character of these phases.²⁹

Every Culture has experienced the organic necessity of transforming itself from the rural life of feudalism into the urban life of the absolute state, and from this into megapolitan Civilization. Likewise every Culture will express itself artistically and spiritually in its early life with religious ornament, architecture and mystical-metaphysical thought, and in its later life it will express itself with a group of individual art forms and rational-scientific thought. However, a particular kind of architecture and type of thought

(mystical or scientific in form) will reveal itself in each Culture.

The same unique character which manifests itself in these forms reveals itself also in a distinctive style of feudalism or megapolitan

life. The political, social, economic, artistic, and scientific character of the West is "Faustian", of the Greco-Roman world, "Apollinian", and of the Arabian world, "Magian". What Spengler exactly means by each of these terms, i.e. how these various Cultures are different in character, will be reserved for later discussion.

The previous section showed that the morphological method led to the twofold result of characterizing the Urphänomen and noting the individual variation on the Urphänomen. In the Untergang the constant comparison of homologous (contemporary) forms among the Cultures clarifies the common qualities which constitute the Urkultur. When these same forms are examined for the purpose of noting their differentiation of character, (Faustian, Magian, Apollinian) then one observes the variation of the actual Culture on the Urkultur.

3. Metaphysical Considerations of Morphology

Now that we have a more definite understanding of the morphological method, let us return to the question of the particular metaphysical outlook presupposed by this method.

The first part of this chapter brought out that Goethe and Spengler understood reality to be the realization of individual principles or forms. What led to this conclusion was that the aesthetic or contemplative intuition, the basis of the morphological method, approaches the world in its Becoming. This type of intuition was contrasted with the cognitive intuition, the basis of the critical method, which regards the world as Having-Become. The essential reason for the opposition to this latter approach is that comprehension

by the category of causality transforms the world into the mechanical operation of material entities. The contemplation of the Urphänomen intuits reality as metamorphosis (formation) not as thing-like entities or substances.

It has been noted that the morphological method implies a pluralistic outlook for Goethe and Spengler. The Urphänomen is sought by means of a comparison of many similar forms. This similarity may predispose one to think of a deeper principle which serves as a final unified origin out of which the individual forms emerge, but such a metaphysical deduction never figures as objective knowledge for Goethe or Spengler. One may be induced to think and believe in a common foundation of various independent forms, but what its nature is can never be adequately intuited or cognized by the human mind.

Despite the many warnings not to go beyond the Urphänomen and speculate about deeper principles of reality, Goethe found himself as poet, philosopher, and scientist constantly inspired to express his feelings and convictions about the transcendent realm. We read in the Versuch über die Gestalt der Tiere his belief that creatures most similar to each other in structure emerge from a common principle. Though the exact nature of the primal type can never reveal itself to the contemplative intuition, the feeling of an underlying principle of all the similar forms is too strong to be avoided. Furthermore the awe which Goethe experienced before the infinite diversity of life and the universe led him to affirm his belief in a divine unity of all being. We find Goethe expressing this felt conclusion:

Wir können bei Betrachtung des Weltgebäudes in seiner


weitesten Ausdehnung, in seiner letzten Teilbarkeit uns der Vorstellung nicht erwehren, dass dem Ganzen eine Idee zum Grund liege, wonach Gott in der Natur, die Natur in Gott, von Ewigkeit zu Ewigkeit, schaffen und schaffen und wirken möge.³⁰

As we contemplate the edifice of the universe, in its vastest extension, in its minutest divisibility, we cannot resist the notion that an idea underlies the whole, according to which God and Nature creatively interact forever and forever.³¹

And though Spengler follows Goethe's advice (more so than did Goethe himself) not to indulge in metaphysical speculation about the transcendent realm, one can even find him at rare moments wondering about a common source of the various higher Cultures:

Und eben deshalb, weil Gegensätze sich berühren, weil sie auf ein vielleicht Gemeinsames in der letzten Tiefe des Daseins verweisen, finden wir in der abendländischen, faustischen Seele jenes sehnstichtige Suchen nach dem Ideal der apollinischen³²

And it is because extremes meet—because it may be there is some deep common origin behind their divergence—that we find in the Western Faustian soul³³ this yearning effort towards the Apollinian ideal



Nevertheless the belief and feeling in a final foundation of reality is not intrinsically related to the morphological method. Goethe and Spengler share the sense of the boundless polymorphism and mystery of life, which underlies their use of this method, but beyond this point it is a question of their particular predisposition that distinguishes their outlook. Spengler is not given to believing in a divinely ordered world. In conformity with his description of the irreligious, cold-metal nature of the civilized fact-man of late cultured periods, Spengler found himself unable to have faith in God. It is not that he is a man without faith. Quite the contrary, Spengler stresses the point time and again that all philosophy, poetry, and

systematic knowledge arise out of a faith in something³⁴, and thus he would be the first to confirm Goethe's remark: "Man sieht aus allem, der Mensch ist zur Glauben und nicht zum Schauen gemacht."³⁵ (One sees from everything that man is made for believing, not seeing.)³⁶ But what Spengler has faith in is Destiny.³⁷ The full implication of this word can only be grasped towards the end of our thesis, but let it suffice for now to say that its meaning excludes Goethe's pantheistic vision of the cosmos. "Destiny" as Spengler understands the word is fundamentally different from the way Goethe understands it. Never does it carry the optimistic meaning which Goethe gives it in the following:

Die Vorsehung hat tausend Mittel, die Gefallenen zu erheben und die Nieder gebeugten aufzurichten. Manchmal sieht unser Schicksal aus wie ein Fruchtbaum im Winter. Wer sollte bei dem traurigen Ansehn desselben wohl denken, dass diese starren Äste, diese zackigen Zweige im nächsten Frühjahr wieder grünen, blühen,³⁸ sodann Früchte tragen könnten; doch wir hoffens, wir wissens.

Providence has a thousand ways of raising up the fallen, succoring the weary. Our destiny sometimes has the appearance of a fruit tree in winter. Looking at its dreary aspect, who would think that these stiff branches, these jagged twigs, will turn green again and bloom next spring and then bear fruit. Yet this we hope, this we know.³⁹

Again the principle of Destiny in Spengler's outlook embraced the notion of Not-Being as real. For Spengler, world history is a tragedy in which the individual person, nation, and Culture must meet Not-Being as death.⁴⁰ For Goethe nothing really dies. He says: ". . . ich habe die feste Überzeugung, dass unser Geist ein Wesen ist ganz unzerstörbarer Natur; es ist ein fortwirkendes von Ewigkeit zu Ewigkeit."⁴¹ (. . . I have the firm conviction that our spirit is a being of an

entirely indestructible nature; it is a persistent activity from eternity to eternity.)⁴² In contradistinction to Spengler's understanding of death, Goethe holds that the end of life is only a means to produce new life. Thus he states: ". . . der Tod ist ihr [der Natur] Kunstgriff, viel Leben zu haben."⁴³ (. . . and death is her [Nature's] device for having more life.)⁴⁴ Death means transformation into a new mode of existence. Goethe's conviction that God is identical to infinitely creative nature and that death is only a transient state from which new life surges into the light-world are complementary notions.

Thus the morphological method does not imply a commitment to a final outlook which both Goethe and Spengler can completely share. However, the method is inherently antithetical to the hypothesis that similar forms of life evolve out of other forms. Morphology, as Goethe and Spengler understood it, leads to a denial of the Darwinian and Spencerian theories of evolution and to the affirmation of a theory of predeterminism.

The philosophy of the Untergang stands strictly opposed to the idea that a Culture can evolve out of another pre-existing Culture, or is the offspring of other Cultures. It is impossible that Western cultural forms (their social, economic, and political institutions or their artistic and mathematical ideas) "derive" from either the Greco-Roman world or the Jewish-Arabian Culture.⁴⁵ The metaphysical reasoning behind the rejection of this familiar interpretation of history is the same reasoning which would have made Goethe repudiate the Darwinian view that present plant or animal species are the ancestral products of no longer existing plant or animal species. The opposition between the

Goethean-Spenglerian morphology and the Darwinian-Spencerian kind of evolution is that of Becoming and Having-Become. The Urphänomen, we said, is intuited from a world understood as the metamorphosis of individual forms. The morphology of living Nature and world history is the study of these similar forms in their Becoming. In contrast, Darwinism postulates a mechanistic world. The increasing fitness of all species for life is the slow and accidental outcome of chemico-physical factors acting on a primordial germ plasm. Whether it is natural selection, sexual breeding, or acquired characteristics that account for the fitness, evolution is, in Spencer's words, "an integration of matter and concomitant motion" ⁴⁶ In brief, reality is conceived as the world of Having-Become wherein extended elements causally interact with each other.

The employment of the morphological method is wholly antithetical to the attempt to explain historical and natural events in quantitative terms. According to Goethe and Spengler, the scientist and historian are doomed to the superficial causal understanding of the uniqueness of events when the goal of their efforts is "proving" the cogency of a physical model. ⁴⁷ Morphology, however, appeals directly to the individuality of the phenomenon. The final step in the intuition of the Urphänomen is the observation of the variation of the individual from the ideal type. From the above analysis, it was noted that it is this final step which is responsible for the awareness of the qualitative particularity of the plant or animal and the essential character or soul of each Culture. This differentiation of each type of organism and Culture from the ideal type underlies the pluralistic vision of

reality. Each separate individual reveals its universal or common qualities in the Urphänomen, but at the same time this universality sets off the concrete unfolding of the particular form. Thus the morphological method does not aim to verify hypothetical principles or reduce the manifold of the world to abstract quantitative formulas. Rather, it seeks to look at and to observe the universal and individual nature of the particular phenomenon.

Furthermore, the concern for the uniqueness of the phenomenon rests upon the understanding that the qualitative nature or character of the organism or Culture is predetermined.⁴⁸ Goethe believed that the specific type which every plant and animal revealed was predetermined at or before its creation. A tree is foreordained to be an aspen, oak, or ash tree—indeed, a specific kind of aspen, oak or ash—before its appearance in the fact-world. This position is completely opposite to the evolutionary theory that physical factors as environmental influences or sexual selection determine the nature of living organisms. To Goethe, Darwin's view would have been inconceivable. If reality is the Becoming of individual forms, then the mechanical interplay of motion and matter cannot serve in any way to account for the inner qualitative nature of these forms. An organism does not acquire the characteristics of its species, subspecies, genus, and class during its own lifetime or the lifetime of its parents. Rather they are given at birth and revealed throughout its metamorphosis. Goethe does not doubt that environmental factors circumscribe and help shape the individual fate of a plant or animal, but he would hold as unthinkable that they determine the essence of the organism.

The same reasoning leads Spengler to claim that the definite characteristic tendencies of each Culture were established prior to its actual history. Just as every plant and animal species appeared suddenly as it was or is, and not as a "transitional species", so every Culture appeared with its own unique outlook and soul in the earliest stages of its history.⁴⁹ The climate, landscape, soil, ancestors, friendly and hostile neighbors--none of these factors account for the Apollinian psyche of the Classical world, or for the Faustian in the West. They play an essential role in the history of the Culture, but they do not "cause", "make" or "give" the Culture its historical, living being.

From this point of view, any scientific theory which tries to answer the question of what makes a plant what it is, or any historical thesis which tries to account for how a cultural people came to be is doomed to failure or superficiality from the start. The inquiry into the "how" and "why" of a living or Becoming form cannot be legitimately raised. Such questions presuppose a causal explanation in which the Becoming is treated as Having-Become. The unique individuality which every plant or animal reveals in its metamorphosis can only be conceived as the realization of a particular nature already established in its entry into the world. The morphological method which has as its highest task the observation of the specific inner character of the individual presupposes the acceptance of the inexplicable predetermined character of the form.

We can now see how far apart the implications of morphology are from Darwinian mechanism. Nevertheless Goethe's scientific explanations have been considered a forerunner of nineteenth century evolutionary

theories, and Spengler's understanding of history has often been said to be an outgrowth of the same. One of the central reasons for these conclusions derives from a misunderstanding of Goethe's metaphysical principle of Steigerung. Though Spengler does not often employ the same word, the Untergang is pervaded with the same principle. The fundamental meaning of Steigerung for Goethe is that all living things strive towards the perfection of their nature or type. Every plant-organism reveals an inherent tendency in its metamorphosis to go beyond the predetermined limits of its type and become more perfect than what it can be. Likewise each of the higher Cultures continually seeks greater perfection in its expressions. The confusion of this principle with Darwinism results when the idea of the increasing perfection of type and expression is taken to mean increasing fitness for life.

The exact meaning which Goethe gives to Steigerung can be understood from a famous passage of Die Wahlverwandtschaften:

Alles Vollkommene in seiner Art muss über seine Art hinausgehen, es muss etwas anderes, Unvergleichbares werden. In manchen Tönen ist die Nachtigall noch Vogel; dann steigt sie über ihre Klasse hinüber und scheint jedem Gefiederten andeuten zu wollen, was eigentlich singen heisse.⁵⁰

Everything that is perfect in its kind must go beyond its kind, it must become something different and incomparable. The Nightingale is in many tones still a bird, but then it goes beyond its class and seems to want to indicate to each feathered creature what real singing means.⁵¹

Of all the class of birds, the nightingale demonstrates this innate principle of going beyond the natural limits of its class through its unique way of singing. The "unique" and "incomparable" manner in which Steigerung manifests itself in the world is illustrated in Goethe's morphological procedure. The nightingale's music is a characteristic

which differentiates itself from its type. Whereas the Urphänomen establishes the most universal characteristics of the type, the trait which manifests the urge to break the predetermined limits of the type is the most individualistic characteristic of that particular type.

In one sense, therefore, Steigerung is, like the Urphänomen, a relative concept, which means it depends on the type being compared. Each class of animals and plants for Goethe displays its own particular intensification, just as it does its own Urphänomen. When the entire plant kingdom is considered as a type, the tree is the Steigerung, and with the osteological type, and with all of nature considered as a whole, it is man that is the Steigerung: "Das letzte Produkt der sich immer steigenden Natur ist der schöne Mensch."⁵² (Beautiful man is the last product of ever-striving Nature.)⁵³ However, unlike the Urphänomen, the Steigerung of a type or class signifies the realization of a metaphysical principle in concrete form. Man, for example, is the zoological entity of all living Nature which is most highly organized. The specific structure of the bones and muscles reveals that man is the most perfectly constituted, and hence, according to Goethe, he stands at the height of the animal kingdom. All other animals reveal in an ascending scale a Steigerung towards the structural characteristics of man.⁵⁴ In no way does this indicate that man has evolved out of the lower species. His constitution does not mean that in comparison to his ancestors or the lower forms of life he is better adapted for living. If Goethe had thought this to be the case, then Steigerung would not be an organic principle, but a mechanical law.⁵⁵

As an innate tendency in all organic life, Steigerung is to

be understood as part of the given nature of life. It is that trait of the total predetermined characteristics of the organism which strives to go beyond its preordained limit. However, this unconscious longing to go beyond the bounds of its type only serves to make clear the limited potentialities of the organism. In the straining to transcend its kind, the nightingale succeeds in giving the clearest and most distinctive expression of the potentialities of its type.

Spengler's study of the various Cultures rests upon the same awareness of Steigerung in world history. As before, it is both a relative concept and a metaphysical principle. Thus we are told that of all cultural media and forms, art is the highest means of expression,⁵⁶ meaning thereby that it is able to give the clearest and most direct revelation of the inner spiritual characteristics of a cultured people.⁵⁷ When we compare the progressively developing art forms of the various Cultures, it becomes apparent that each Culture will prefer certain forms over others and will finally come to select and exploit one medium which best sums up the character of its soul. The statue represents the Steigerung for Classical man, and music signifies the same for the West.⁵⁸ What Spengler calls the Apollinian soul—the deep-felt sense for the sensuous instant, the preference for the close, the visible, and the distinct, the unhesitating acceptance of the corporeal and finite—is most perfectly portrayed by the nude statue in the round.⁵⁹ On the other hand, the Faustian soul—the longing for endless space and distance, the desire for the bodiless and dynamic—finds its most definite fulfillment in orchestral and chamber music of the eighteenth century.⁶⁰ The history of Greek art from the Doric temple to Polycletus' canons of

proportion (including the small development of Greek music)⁶¹ is dominated by the idea of Body.⁶² Conversely, the art of the West from the Gothic cathedral to Stamitz's four-part sonata (including the fragile development of sculpture) is to be understood as a development towards and culmination in music form.⁶³ Spengler goes so far as to say that the music of the violin, and in particular the last string quartets of Beethoven, form the final point of the West's artistic development and give the most transcendent experience of Faustian yearning.⁶⁴ Yet, the force and fire of life, Steigerung, figures in every other cultural form. In the political life of a Culture, various states and people will exemplify, at different periods, the manifestation of this principle. The history of the Classical world attests to the fact that the points of political dominance move after Syracuse, Athens, and Sparta, to Alexandria, and then to Rome. In the West, the movement has been from the Rome of Innocent III, to Madrid, then Paris, London, and finally, New York.⁶⁵ Furthermore, if we take the social structure of any Culture and trace the history of the primary estates, the nobility and priesthood, and of the other classes, the bourgeoisie and proletariat, in order to find the point of its Steigerung, we shall find that Spengler considers the ultimate realization of cultural life (expressed in custom, manners, diplomacy, dress, taste, and intellect) to be the aristocratic court life of the absolute state.

Consequently Spengler's employment of the morphological method leads to another deep affinity with Goethe's metaphysical outlook. The striving to go beyond the potentialities of type is the metaphysical principle of Steigerung for both Goethe and Spengler.⁶⁶

A final question now presents itself: since Spengler's philosophical method and the metaphysical presuppositions behind it are so similar to Goethe's way of thinking, why did not Goethe arrive at an historic world-view like Spengler's? Being primarily interested in the investigation of nature, Goethe did comparatively little research into the problems of the dynamics of history. Nevertheless, some of his less known works and aphorisms show that he had a view of history which proves to be, in many respects, similar to that of the Untergang. Goethe's most concise treatment of the question of human history appears in his essay, Geistesepochen.⁶⁷ Spengler's appreciation of this work can be surmised from a reference to it:

Goethe hat in seinem kleinen Aufsatz "Geistesepochen" eine Charakteristik der vier Abschnitte jeder Kultur, der Vorzeit, Frühzeit, Spätzeit, und Zivilisation, von solcher Tiefe gegeben, dass sich heute noch nichts hinzufügen lässt. Vgl. die damit genau übereinstimmenden Tafeln in Bd. I.⁶⁸

Goethe, in his little essay "Geistesepochen", has characterized the four parts of a Culture—its preliminary, early, late, and civilized stages—with such a depth of insight that even today there is nothing to add. See the tables at the end of Vol. I, which agree with this exactly.⁶⁹

In this essay, Goethe sets forth a cyclic view of history with the idea of Culture serving as its prime phenomenon. Like Spengler, Goethe understands that every Culture has a plantlike growth, which is accomplished in four stages: germination, flowering, ripening, and decay. Though Goethe does not compare the history of any actual Cultures, one understands that his depiction of the four progressive stages is valid for all Cultures. Thus what Goethe describes is in essence what we have early called the "Urkultur". In the same manner as Spengler, Goethe seeks to synthesize all the characteristics and concepts of each

of the four periods into a contemplative idea of Culture. Furthermore, a quick perusal of the Geistesepochen proves that Goethe's vision of the Urkultur is similar in all major points to Spengler's interpretation.

The progressive life of a Culture is presented by characterizing the spiritual disposition of the people and their artistic-philosophical accomplishments. Before the actual rise of a Culture, in the pre-period (Vorzeit) of germination, there is sensed great uneasiness and fear of the world. The longing to free oneself from a chaotic existence filled with grave presentiments is reflected in the conglomeration of philosophy, poetry, myth, and science into one work.⁷⁰ The first age of the Culture dawns when the obscure and confused feelings about the world give way to a new and fresh intuition into the nature of things. The man of the early period (Frühzeit) endows the external world with this new living faith, and the world suddenly loses its abstruse and threatening aspect. What Goethe calls "Volksglaube" signifies the common felt-belief which casts its spell over the individual lives of the people. A sense of nobility, proficiency, and excellence (tüchtige), reflected in strongly imaginative poetry, characterizes this period.⁷¹ However, as this inner faith and new sense of inner being knows no boundaries, the next age is ushered in by an aspiration to elucidate the secrets and wonders of the world as the emanation of divine beings. A priestly faith arises out of the Volksglaube, and in place of imaginative poetry, rational theology attempts to formulate a reality peopled with benevolent and evil spirits. "Heilig" is the word Goethe uses to name this age.⁷² But the urge to objectivity ceases only when the

theological interpretation is transformed into an age of great individualistic philosophies. Volksglaube and Priesterglaube are not overthrown, but understood by the new critical minds as useful (Nützliches) or praiseworthy (Löbliches)—even as expressing elementary truths of the world.⁷³ The spread of the sentiment of articulate understanding ends with the last phase of the Culture, which is called the age of prose (Prosa). The world-view which had been slowly built up from the Volksglaube has been exhausted. The great tradition of art and life is destroyed. A faithless, aimless, arbitrary existence now takes over, which again betokens the end of cultured life and the return of the chaotic state which preceded the rise of Culture.⁷⁴

Spengler's view of history is much the same. The movement of Culture from beginning to end is one from a life dominated by a mystical-religious outlook to hard prosaic existence.⁷⁵ Goethe would have completely agreed with Spengler's summation of Culture: "Das Wesen aller Kultur ist Religion; folglich ist das Wesen aller Zivilisation Irreligion."⁷⁶ (As the essence of every Culture is religion, so—and consequently—the essence of every Civilization is irreligion.)⁷⁷ Religion, as Spengler speaks of it here, means not the schooled training in a learned doctrine, but the instinctive faith of the heart, the kind one lives and feels.⁷⁸ Likewise irreligious does not mean anti-religious, but "seelenlos"⁷⁹, incapable of having any faith at all. Goethe and Spengler are therefore in agreement by understanding that a people of a Culture possess a common soul or Volksglaube and that the people of the last stage of the disintegrating Culture have no soul.⁸⁰ Hence, Goethe and Spengler held that human history is not the compilation of successive

events forming a progressive linear phenomenon, but an organic phenomenon which must be apprehended through a morphological treatment.

Despite all this, there is a deep separation in their outlooks. Spengler once touched upon this matter in his small essay, Nietzsche und sein Jahrhundert. In contrasting Goethe's Classicism with Nietzsche's Romanticism, Spengler states: "Das 18. Jahrhundert und der Klassizismus, auch Goethe, glaubten an 'die' Kultur, die eine, wahre, sittlich-geistige als Aufgabe der einen Menschheit."⁸¹ (The eighteenth century, and Classicism, including Goethe, believed in "culture"--a single, true, mental and moral culture as the task of a unified humanity.)⁸²

Though it is perhaps an oversimplification to say that Goethe accepted the unquestioned conviction of the progress of human nature, he did recognize the idea of enduring artistic and scientific contributions towards the establishment of what he, along with Herder, called "Humanität."⁸³ Further, there is admitted an innate capacity, a Steigerung, towards moral perfection.⁸⁴ Goethe went so far as to maintain that Christianity, serving as the ideal height of the perfection of moral and religious feeling, could never disappear from the face of the earth and would remain, despite the catastrophes of history, a goal which mankind could realize.⁸⁵ Goethe believed in the reality of an absolute goodness and of an absolute truth and beauty. Regardless of the cultural background and personal colouring in the diverse interpretations, and despite the insurpassable difficulty of establishing a guiding criterion, he understood the intellectual and spiritual efforts of man to be aimed at the elucidation of absolute values. Truth and beauty are, in the end, too immense for any one finite mind to comprehend, but

continual progress towards their realization is the story of artistic, intellectual, and moral Culture. The belief in this one permanent Culture of man is an essential part of the notion of a common psychic basis in all people.⁸⁶ A given universal quality in man leads him along the road to Humanität.

For Spengler, the morphology of world history implied an extreme skepticism towards these tenets of Humanität. The very fact that each of the ~~higher~~ Cultures fulfills a cyclical life-pattern means that there is no one set of absolute values or truths. There are as many truths as there are Cultures. The individual growth of each Culture signifies the development of its own distinctive style in art, its own mathematics and physics, its own spiritual view-point, and the decline of the Culture betokens the extinction of the outlook which developed into these various forms. We have already noted that the predetermined character or soul of each Culture excluded the possibility of an alien Culture assimilating or taking over the values of another. A man of the West sees the world with different eyes than a man from China, and there is no way that one can truly perceive the world as the other. The organic logic of world history precludes this possibility. What the ancients saw, heard, and thought of as upright and praise-worthy, what they understood as the basic nature of the world, died when their Culture died. According to Spengler, there can be no mankind, but only different types of man, each distinguished from the other in its passions, its image of the world, its will and feelings.⁸⁷

If the cyclical view of world history presents us with Spengler's relativism, then how can Goethe, who described the life-patterns of Cultures

in the same way, maintain his belief in Humanität? This is a difficult question, and an answer can only pass here as conjecture. There is evidence that Goethe combined his cyclical interpretation with his notion of Humanität by viewing the whole of history in a way reminiscent of Vico. Every Culture repeats the organic process of growth and decline, but the Cultures which follow upon older ones may inherit a legacy to build upon:

Der Kreis, den die Menschheit auszulaufen hat, ist bestimmt genug, und ungeachtet des grossen Stillstandes, den die Barbarei machte, hat sie ihre Laufbahn schon mehr als einmal zurückgelegt. Will man ihr auch eine Spiralbewegung zuschreiben, so kehrt sie doch immer wieder in jene Gegend, wo sie schon einmal durchgegangen. Auf diesem Wege wiederholen sich alle wahren Ansichten und alle Irrtümer.⁸⁸

The cycle which mankind has to complete is definite enough, and notwithstanding the great standstill caused by barbarism it has traveled its course more than once. Even if one would assign to it a spiral motion, still it always returns to that region which it had previously traversed.⁸⁹ On this road all true views and all errors are repeated.

By virtue of the basic universal nature of man, individuals or groups of individuals can re-experience in their own historical setting certain truths and values bequeathed by the Cultures of the past. In this way, there is continual recurrence of the life cycle, but each cycle brings a new spiritual outlook, enriched by the older one: "Alles ist neu und doch immer das Alte."⁹⁰ (Everything is new and yet always old.)⁹¹ The one history of mankind presents a spiral growth pattern. The values which one particular Culture nurtures and cherishes can be passed down to another people and thereby escape the destruction of time. Hence, there is, or can be, a continual heightening (Steigerung) of Humanität.

Spengler's respect for Goethe's historical insight comes

essentially from the Geistes Epochen and not at all from any statement on the idea of an enduring Culture of mankind. The morphological treatment of history draws Spengler close to Goethe, but the latter's reluctance to understand the extinction of what he loved most in man strikes a chord of deep disagreement. Whether or not Goethe held a Vico-like view of history cannot be dealt with here. It is clear, however, that he never would have accepted the Spenglerian thesis that truth and value are dependent on the instinct and blood of a certain type of man and that, consequently, the death of this man entails the disappearance of the artistic, intellectual, and moral values which rose out of him. Once more the question of death reveals the decisive metaphysical division between Goethe and Spengler. The death of a Culture means for Spengler the total disappearance into oblivion of a unique people who once possessed their own particular sense and feeling for the world. The passage of Religion into Irreligion is the transformation of a gigantic soul from spring to winter, from directional Becoming to extended Having-Become, from living time into fixed space. The death which follows this process is an irrevocable outcome of life. Such is Spengler's understanding of Destiny. But for Goethe, new life awaits on the other side of death. Destiny does not end in ultimate nothingness. Cultures follow an organic law and disintegrate into barbarism, yet the peaks of enlightenment which have been reached can be reached again. There is an irreducible final element in the psyche of man which exists outside the temporal realm and which can be cultivated and trained to look beyond the relative world of blood and instinct

to eternal truths. When Civilizations collapse, this irreducible element remains to build man back up once again into a high cultured form. Deep beyond the spiritual difference of every person, there is for Goethe this universal point of the psyche that does not cease to be with the death of the individual or his Culture.⁹²

Chapter III

NIETZSCHE AND SPENGLER

1. Nietzschean Physiognomy

In an earlier discussion, the starting point for Goethe, Nietzsche, and Spengler was referred to as the aesthetic or contemplative intuition. Out of this beginning, there arose for Spengler Goethe's morphological method. It shall now be seen that out of this same root arises Nietzsche's particular method which Spengler calls "Physiognomy." What Nietzsche refers to as the "sixth sense", the historical sense, or sometimes as the psychological instinct, is this sense for physiognomic tact or beat.¹

In Nietzsche und sein Jahrhundert, Spengler expresses clearly how he has adapted the physiognomic style of thinking and with it a particular metaphysical outlook to his own style of thinking. Here one finds Spengler referring to Nietzsche as the real discoverer and creator of the art of physiognomy.² Unlike any philosopher before him, Nietzsche cultivated that ability which only could have belonged to a "born musician."³ It is the ability to sense and feel one's way into the style, melody, and tempo behind all human events, behind foreign Cultures with their art, theories, customs, wars, language, and religion, behind all types of men, states, professions and levels of society.⁴ The musical technique of Nietzsche struck Spengler as the most impressive means of penetrating to the uniqueness of human character and historical

peoples. Thus what Spengler says of Nietzsche's approach applies equally to himself:

Seine Prosa ist gehört, fast gesungen, nicht "geschrieben". Die Vokale und Kadenzen sind wichtiger als die Vergleiche. Und so war das, was er in den Zeiten fühlte, ihre Melodie, ihr Takt. Er entdeckte die Tonart fremder Kulturen. Niemand hat vor ihm etwas vom Tempo der Geschichte gewusst. Eine ganze Anzahl seiner Begriffe—das Dionysische, das Pathos der Distanz, die ewige Wiederkehr—sind durchaus musikalisch zu verstehen. Er fühlte den Takt in dem, was man Adel, Sitte, Heldentum, Vornehmheit, Herrenmoral nannte. Er hat zuerst in dem Geschichtsbild, das die gelehrte Forschung damals aus Daten und Zahlen aufgebaut hatte, die rhythmische Folge der Zeitalter, der Sitten und Denkweisen, der Rassen und grossen Einzelnen wie eine Symphonie erlebt.

His prose is not "written", it is heard—one might even say sung. The vowels and cadences are more important than the similes and metaphors. What he sensed as he surveyed the ages was their melody, their meter. He discovered the musical keys of foreign cultures. Before him, no one knew of the tempo of history. A great many of his concepts—the Dionysian, the Pathos of Distance, the Eternal Recurrence—are to be understood quite musically. He sensed the rhythm of what is called nobility, ethics, heroism, distinction, and master morality. He was the first to experience as a symphony the image of history that had been created by scholarly research out of data and numbers—the rhythmic sequence of ages, customs, and attitudes.

The "Überblick", which Spengler says he owes to Nietzsche, is just this musical sense of detecting the "physiognomic rhythm" of the various phases of cultured life and history. The distinctive soul of each Culture—the Faustian West, the Apollinian ancient world, the Magian of the Jewish-Arabian Culture, and the Tao of the Chinese—all these prime ideas were evoked by a sense for physiognomic tact, for a feeling of the rhythm, tempo, and key of each Culture.?

Ultimately, therefore, the understanding of the themes in the Untergang depend upon the reader's own innate musical sense or physiognomic tact. The meaning which history reveals is experienced when it

is felt and heard in the way Nietzsche felt and heard it. According to Spengler, everyone possesses in varying degree this artistic sensitivity.⁸ It is, as previously explained, the ability to capture the essence of phenomenal reality in its Becoming. Though particular credit is given to Nietzsche, Spengler recognizes the same employment of this instinctive technique in the writings of Goethe and others, but it is at bottom an unconscious method of thinking freely used by everybody in practical activity.⁹ Thus physiognomic intuition is not a mystical way of reasoning which only a few select talents possess. The constant need for intuitively perceiving the mental dispositions of people through their outward actions, of trying to sense their personality through mien, gait, habits, and dress attests to the practice of physiognomy in daily commerce with other individuals.¹⁰ In the end, its employment is necessary for survival. Spengler holds, therefore, that physiognomic tact is a matter of course with all outward activity, and for those who are engaged in a profession requiring constant decision and action, it is their chief mode of thinking. The difficulty of this instinctive approach to life begins with the effort to raise it to a completely developed and successful mode of philosophizing. Nietzsche was, in Spengler's eyes, the first to do this. Other philosophers have lacked a sufficient amount of this instinct or have been reluctant to try this feat. Although everyone, without exception, necessarily practices this style of thinking, a strange thing often happens, Spengler claims, when one sits down and becomes a reader of books or writer of essays and papers.¹¹ The inherent sense of tact is replaced by a more artificial mode of thinking. Instead of thinking in the way which is natural to

all men, one begins to construct abstract concepts and demand that conclusions be logically verifiable. In brief, one analyzes in a causal or systematic fashion. This approach can be rewarding only insofar as phenomena are considered as scientific objects, the dead extended substance of the World-as-Nature. However, as far as Nietzsche and Spengler are concerned, when phenomena are recognized as expressions of a living spirit—person, state, or Culture—then one encounters the world in its historical flow and Becoming, and no other technique but an instinctive intuition can properly decipher its meaning.¹²

Consequently both Nietzsche and Spengler agree on the fundamental point of how human history is to be understood and written. History is the sweep of events and happenings which one experiences as the living-activity of oneself and others. As Spengler puts it: "Erlebtes ist Geschehenes, ist Geschichte."¹³ (That which has been lived is that which has happened, and is history.)¹⁴ Man is naturally equipped with the capacity to seize the meaning behind these events. To develop this instinctive power in oneself is to become an artist.¹⁵ The historian must be an artist and present history as a tragedy or as a symphonic composition. That is, he must first of all use his instinctive sensibilities to experience or imaginatively re-experience those happenings which determine his own personal history or the history of others. He must then reveal the essence of this history by arousing in his readers those instincts and feelings experienced by himself and others in the sweep of events. Only as art is history presented in its Becoming. To try to write a scientific history, i.e. to systematically analyze the events and happenings of a certain time and place paralyzes

the living stream of events into rigid phenomena and kills the felt-meaning behind them. Nietzsche says:

. . . und nur wenn die Historie es erträgt, zum Kunstwerk umgebildet, also reines Kunstgebilde zu werden, kann sie vielleicht Instinkte erhalten oder sogar wecken. Eine solche Geschichtsschreibung würde aber durchaus dem analytischen und unkünstlerischen Zuge unserer Zeit widersprechen, ja von ihr als Fälschung empfunden werden.¹⁶

. . . only perhaps if history suffer transformation into a pure work of art, can it preserve instincts or arouse them. Such history would be quite against the analytical and in-artistic tendencies of our time, and even be considered false.¹⁷

Spengler puts the same thought in other words:

Die grosse Geschichtsschreibung . . . ist überhaupt keine "Wissenschaft"—so wenig als echte Philosophie Wissenschaft ist—, sondern eine Kunst, schöpferische Dichtung, Verschmelzung der Seele des Schauenden mit der Seele der Welt. Sie ist mit der grossen Epik und Tragödie und der grossen Philosophie in der Tiefe identisch. Sie ist Metaphysik.¹⁸

Great historical writing . . . is not a "science"—just as genuine philosophy is not a science—it is an art, a fusing of the observer's soul with the soul of the world. At bottom it is identical with great tragedy, epic poetry, and philosophy. It is metaphysics.¹⁹

The Untergang is written with the same musical and poetic flair which pervades Nietzsche's works. It is a direct appeal to one's inner feelings by rendering through word, sound and image the subjective feelings which Spengler experienced as his own visionary outlook. Such an approach turns the study of history into a psychological art of symbol-reading. Nietzsche's Die Morgenröte and Die fröhlichen Wissenschaft had taught Spengler that every facet of life had its own unique soul—there is a soul of an age, an estate, a profession, of the priest, hero, man, and woman.²⁰ One must regard the outward expression of the soul as a symbol in order to intuitively sense its meaning. The description


of the Greek soul through its drama, or the characterization of the healthy or diseased type of man or Culture through the manifestations of social customs and moral conduct are both examples par excellence of symbol-reading or physiognomy. Intangible and tangible forms--mores, sculpture, laws, ceremonial dress, political constitutions, temples, weapons, fountains, parks, mathematical and scientific formulas--stand as symbols representing the outlook and disposition of a soul.

Thus, with Nietzsche as his example, Spengler learned to treat every cultural form and medium as a symbol. Whatever served as a symbol proved to be a means to the end of sensing intuitively the spiritual meaning behind it.²¹ Both Nietzsche and Spengler hold that historical phenomena are studied for the main purpose of determining the felt-meaning they bear for their creators and for others. The World-as-History is the world in relation to a conscious soul. Symbols carry meaning only for a person. In contrast, scientific investigation is concerned with the world-in-itself--i.e. with the way the world "is" apart from the intentions of a knowing perceiver. The treatment of phenomena as symbols already presupposes that the world is Becoming--it is the Becoming of human intentions, ideas, and instincts into concrete (symbolic) form. To try to handle history with the aim of explaining its phenomena in terms of scientific laws would be to ignore the primacy of the unique and manifold nature of life in favour of a mechanized world. To paraphrase Nietzsche, an essentially mechanical world would be an essentially meaningless world.²²

Yet it cannot be doubted that the study of past ages and foreign Cultures needs something of the investigating procedure of the learned physicist and chemist. What Nietzsche once referred to as the noble

aspects of the scientific spirit—discipline, severity, cautious forbearance, and lucidity—must not be lacking in the treatment of history.²³ These qualities along with many others rise out of a desire for what we call "objectivity". As with the mathematician and scientist, the historian must stand back from the phenomena and not let his prejudices influence his conclusions. However, while this capacity is easier to achieve in the strict disciplines of science, it is, and always has been, quite the other case for history.²⁴ The chronological ordering of events may not involve this problem, but the understanding of them does so at every point. Though the desire for historical objectivity be the same as scientific objectivity, its actual accomplishment must be quite different. The object that the historian studies is not like the object which the physicist, biologist, or chemist studies. Again, the final goal of the historian is the felt-understanding of living passions, ideas, and instincts of a soul struggling for form and order in the world.

Consequently the specific problem of detachment from the object (die Distanz vom Gegenstand) presents itself as a dilemma to physiognomy. If physiognomic tact rests upon the re-experience of the inward feelings of another in oneself, then how is "objectivity" possible? What in the symbol allows the historian to overcome his own perspective to interpret its meaning as it was originally intended? The implications of Spengler's morphological outlook denied outright this possibility. Similarly, Nietzsche's philosophy from first to last sets forth the skeptical doctrine that all interpretations, scientific explanation included, are perspective valuations. But relativism should not defeat the historian.



The very fact that one's view is finite provides the key to the possibility of the historian's detachment. The awareness that one's viewpoint is only one among many, and that all absolute standpoints in regard to world history should be forsaken, is the basis of the peculiar objectivity necessary to its study.²⁵ According to Spengler, what has plagued West European research up to Nietzsche is the prejudice of trying to make history appear as the unified sequence of events, or the unfolding of a purposive plan.²⁶ Even though many historians have increasingly made concessions to the finitude of their perspective, they still have not avoided the tendency of placing their time and place in a privileged position in the total out-lay of world history.²⁷ In particular, the Ancient-Medieval-Modern scheme has forced the investigator into working under the handicap of "tempocentricity", not allowing him to obtain a broader insight into the structures of far-away Cultures.²⁸ Equally distorting and harmful has been the personal prejudice of giving priority of one cultural form over all others (religion or science over economics, art or philosophy over politics and law, or vice versa) and holding that this one form is the substance of history, while the rest are its accidental off-shoots.²⁹ Skepticism, Spengler claims, blows all this away.³⁰ The criterion of treating no final view as absolutely right or wrong, of recognizing the relative character of one's data and understanding, provides what Spengler and Nietzsche have described as the vantage point from which the whole fact of Man and his individual Cultures can be observed from an immeasurable distance in the same way that one sees mountain peaks on the horizon.³¹ Skepticism is itself the fundamental criterion for

the historian.

Even so, one can find an inherent problem in this Nietzschean-Spenglerian relativism: how can the historian and the philosopher of Culture overcome the limited perspective of his own Culture, age, and personal disposition? How is it possible to obtain a perspective free of all prejudice, independent of the causal approach and yet exemplifying the lucidity and forbearance of the scientist? The classic objection emerges: relativism defeats itself. However, the problem as it is formulated here is unfair. It demands that there be a correct or incorrect perspective for the historian. The essence of Nietzsche's and Spengler's relativism is a rejection of this demand as illusory. Truth and falsity do not exist in this sense for the historian.³² Physiognomic tact, being essentially the same type of procedure practiced by the artist, is not a matter of seeing the world correctly or incorrectly. It is a matter of seeing things deeply or not deeply.³³ A painter creates not a true or false portrait, but one in which character and life are revealed in a profound or superficial manner. The historian is in the same league. His portrayal of alien peoples and their history is not true or false as in mathematics, but deep or shallow.

It follows that the objectivity and discipline practiced in the writing of history must be of the same nature and judged in the same way as that of great masters of art. Like the poet and dramatist, the historian must be constantly searching for the exact term, symbol, and style which will most forcibly represent the inner nature of the living existence of events and facts.³⁴ This is what is demanded when history is treated physiognomically and not systematically. What Spengler and

Nietzsche seek to do is to speak of historians, in the way one speaks of painters and musicians, as being more or less masterful in execution and style. Nietzsche states:

. . . und so hoffe ich, dass die Geschichte ihre Bedeutung nicht in den allgemeinen Gedanken, als einer Art von Blüte und Frucht, erkennen dürfe: sondern dass ihr Wert gerade der ist, ein bekanntes, vielleicht gewöhnliches Thema, eine Alltags-Melodie geistreich zu steigern und so in dem Original-Thema eine ganze Welt von Tiefsinn, Macht und Schönheit ahnen zu lassen.

Dazu gehört aber vor allem eine grosse künstlerische Potenz, ein schaffendes Darüberschweben, einliebendes Versenktsein in die empirischen Data, ein Weiterdichten an gegebenen Typen—dazu allerdings Objektivität, aber als positive Eigenschaft. So oft aber ist Objektivität nur eine Phrase. An Stelle jener innerlich blitzenden, äusserlich unbewegten und dunklen Ruhe des Künstlerauges tritt die Affektation der Ruhe; wie sich der Mangel an Pathos und moralischer Kraft als schneidende Kälte der Betrachtung zu verkleiden pflegt.³⁵

. . . I hope history will not find its whole significance in general propositions, and regard them as its blossom and fruit. On the contrary, its real value lies in inventing ingenious variations on a probably commonplace theme, in raising the popular melody to a universal symbol and showing what a world of depth, power, and beauty exist in it.

But this requires above all a great artistic faculty, a creative vision from a height, the loving study of the data of experience, the free elaborating of a given type—objectivity in fact, though this time as a positive quality. Objectivity is so often merely a phrase. Instead of the quiet gaze of the artist that is lit by an inward flame, we have an affectation of tranquillity; just as a cold detachment may mark a lack of moral feeling.³⁶

The evaluations of the merits of an historian are never scientifically justifiable. In the end, the same physiognomic tact is used to judge the depth of an historian as he himself uses in portraying his subject matter. As earlier noted, the instinctive practice of physiognomy was universal but difficulty arose at the point when it was used in the manner of Nietzsche as a conscious method of historic research and

philosophy.³⁷ The difficulty lies in the fact that there are no specific rules to be learned as there are in the strict sciences. "Zur Naturerkenntnis kann man erzogen werden, der Geschichtskenner wird geboren."³⁸ (The nature-researcher can be educated, but the man who knows history is born.)³⁹ No doubt, the successful employment of this given instinct can be cultivated in the same way an artist develops his inherent talents through continual practice, and this in turn rests upon conditions being favourable to creativity. However, all this is futile unless one is born with a sufficient amount of the instinctive gift for physiognomy. It is intrinsic to the thought of Nietzsche and Spengler that profundity and masterfulness are not consciously acquired from without, but given and nourished from within.

With this we are led to consider the idea of the "rare spirit", the "great man", and "genius". It follows from the artistic and intuitive basis that a philosophy of history which both Nietzsche and Spengler conceive demands the unusual faculties of a rare mind. The perfection of a philosophy of history or an historiography, like the perfection in an art work, derives from physiognomic tact, and if genius be found in artistic enterprises, so it must also be possible in the philosophizing of history.⁴⁰ Great imagination and psychological instinct are requisite for the historian to re-experience the moments of the past as they were lived in all their fullness. Only a great mind can delve into the spirit of a great age and people and sense its meaning by feeling what is noble in himself and in his own age. This is what Spengler means when he says: "Die Welt verstehen nenne ich der Welt gewachsen sein."⁴¹ (Understanding the world means being its equal.)⁴² Nietzsche senses

the same in all great history writing:

Nur aus der höchsten Kraft der Gegenwart dürft ihr das Vergangne deuten: nur in der stärksten Anspannung eurer edelsten Eigenschaften werdet ihr erraten, was in dem Vergangenen wissens—und bewahrenswürdig und gross ist. Gleiches durch Gleiches! Sonst zieht ihr das Vergangne zu euch nieder. Glaubte einer Geschichtsschreibung nicht, wenn sie nicht aus dem Haupte der seltensten Geister herauspringt⁴³

You can only explain the past by what is highest in the present. Only by straining the noblest qualities you have to their highest power will you find out what is greatest in the past, most worth knowing and preserving. Like by like, otherwise you will draw the past to your own level. Do not believe any history that does not spring from the mind of a rare spirit.⁴⁴

This criterion is not learned, but innate.⁴⁵ One finds oneself gifted with artistic talent.⁴⁶ This does not mean that great learning is irrelevant for the philosophy of history. But it does mean that learning alone is insufficient. Spengler states that the ant-like industry of collecting data by the typical historian is only a step by which the rare mind reaches to a grand view of the World-as-History.⁴⁷ For the typical historian, Nietzsche gives his advice:

Es kann keiner zugleich ein grosser Historiker, ein künstlerischer Mensch und ein Flachkopf sein: dagegen soll man nicht die karrenden, aufschüttenden, sichtenden Arbeiter gering-schätzen, weil sie gewiss nicht zu grossen Historikern werden können . . . diese Arbeiter sollen allmählich grosse Gelehrte werden, können aber deshalb doch nie Meister sein. Ein grosser Gelehrter und ein grosser Flachkopf—das geht schon leichter miteinander unter einen Hut.⁴⁸

No one can be a great historian and artist, and a shallow pate at the same time. But one must not despise the workers who sift and cast together the material because they can never become great historians. . . . These workmen should gradually become extremely learned, but never, for that reason, turn to be masters. Great learning and great shallowness go together under one hat.⁴⁹

As Nietzsche sees it, what can be characterized as exceptional,

powerful, masterful, and exquisite in a human undertaking has its center of gravity in the life-affirming instincts, the Dionysian side of life, which must be taken as the direct living-force of human existence. The more powerful these impulses are, the greater perfection one can realize. Both Nietzsche and Spengler agree on this aspect of the "rare mind". Physiognomic tact must be sharper in some than in others, and sharpest in the potentially great man. Physiognomy is not to be consciously acquired since that would necessarily imply cause-and-effect reasoning. The techniques and knowledge of science can be learned by anyone, but not so the creation and understanding based on this intuitive method.⁵⁰ The real objectivity of the artist is this inward strength. Again, however, this capacity, according to Nietzsche and Spengler, depends on the harmony of the rare soul with his world. In order for this strength to be tapped, the potential master of history writing must live and experience the greatness of his time. Indeed, Spengler explains that the "innate" character of the unusual historian is the greatness of his time itself:

Ein Denker ist ein Mensch, dem es bestimmt war, durch das eigene Schauen und Verstehen die Zeit symbolisch darzustellen. Er hat keine Wahl. Er denkt, wie er denken muss, und wahr ist zuletzt für ihn, was als Bild seiner Welt mit ihm geboren wurde. Es ist das, was er nicht erfindet, sondern in sich entdeckt. Es ist er selbst noch einmal, sein Wesen in Worte gefasst, der Sinn seiner Persönlichkeit als Lehre geformt, unveränderlich für sein Leben, weil es mit seinem Leben identisch ist.⁵¹

A thinker is a man who is destined to represent symbolically his age through his own observation and understanding. He has no choice. He thinks what he must think; for him ultimate truth is the picture of the world born within him. He does not invent this; he discovers it within himself. It is himself, his nature conceived in words, the meaning of his

personality formed into doctrine; it is⁵² immutable for him because it is identical with his life.

And Nietzsche agrees with this idea: "Also, Geschichte schreibt der Erfahrene und Überlegene. Wer nicht einiges grösser und höher erlebt hat als alle, wird auch nichts Grosses und Hohes aus der Vergangenheit zu deuten wissen."⁵³ (Thus, history is to be written by the man of experience and character. He who has not lived through something greater and nobler than others will not be able to explain anything great and noble in the past.)⁵⁴

2. Will-to-Power

In turning to the metaphysical presuppositions of the physiognomic method, one notes that the insights which derive from this method cannot be scientifically verified. Neither Nietzsche's portrayal of the Greek soul as the antithesis of Apollo and Dionysus, nor Spengler's portrayal of the Western Faustian soul as the longing to actualize infinite distance can be systematically proved. This means that the World-as-History (and not only the history of man, but as well the plant-animal, earth and stellar history) is not in the last analysis disposed to scientific understanding.⁵⁵ Thus physiognomic tact assumes the anti-scientific outlook of Nietzsche and Spengler.⁵⁶

In the Untergang, Spengler declares that Nietzsche's greatest philosophical merit was the confronting of all science with the question: what is the value of truth and knowledge?⁵⁷ This question signaled the end of epistemology and the problem of the types of knowledge in Western philosophy.⁵⁸ Only an attitude which can no longer accept the unquestioned belief that the Real is Rational and that the problems of

life can be solved by the powers of knowledge can pose this question in all seriousness.

Without a doubt, the greatest impact of Nietzsche's thought on the philosophy of the Untergang is the conception that life determines thought and not vice versa. No matter how highly knowledge and thinking have been praised by philosophers, scientists, poets, and idealists, its position in the milieu of life is over-rated.⁵⁹ In the end, thought is only an appendage of life, used as an organ in its service, and never can it raise itself to master and direct life.⁶⁰ Nietzsche makes this quite clear when he states in Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie:

Soll nun das Leben über das Erkennen, über die Wissenschaft, soll das Erkennen über das Leben herrschen? Welche von beiden Gewalten ist die höhere und entscheidende? Niemand wird zweifeln: das Leben ist die höhere, die herrschende Gewalt, denn ein Erkennen, welches das Leben vernichtete, würde sich selbst mit vernichtet haben. Das Erkennen setzt das Leben voraus, hat also an der Erhaltung des Lebens dasselbe Interesse, welches jedes Wesen an seiner eignen Fortexistenz hat.⁶¹

Must life dominate knowledge, or knowledge life? Which of the two is the higher, and decisive power? There is no room for doubt: life is the higher, and the dominating power, for the knowledge that annihilated life would be itself annihilated too. Knowledge presupposes life, and has the same interest in maintaining it that every creature has in its own preservation.⁶²

Leben means here for Nietzsche what it means also for Spengler: will-to-power, instinct, and blood.⁶³ Thought often raises its powers in order to control the inner forces of life, but the very attempt to do so will always prove that it serves life, not itself.⁶⁴ As Spengler says: "Das Denken herrscht, trotz allem, nur im 'Reich der Gedanken'."⁶⁵ (Thought rules, after all, in spite of all, only in the "realm of thought".)⁶⁶

Schopenhauer had already set forth this view. But for Spengler, a great distance separates Nietzsche from Schopenhauer. Nietzsche's answer to the question of the value of knowledge, and of all things, is straightforward: "Das Leben ist um so wertvoller, je stärker seine Instinkte sind" ⁶⁷ (Life is all the more valuable, the stronger its instincts are.) ⁶⁸ Here we are not concerned with the conception of life will, or instinct. ⁶⁹ What predominates in Nietzsche's philosophy is the fact of the will in world-history creating and destroying cultured and civilized man. ⁷⁰

We find, therefore, as an integral theme of the Untergang the Nietzschean idea that the man who is rich in impulses values or cares for the fact-world. ⁷¹ The deeper his impulses are, the more he is concerned with history—the more he himself is history. His care shows a will to survive, endure, and succeed in the world of Becoming. This is life itself, the will to continue, conquer, prosper, and overcome all opposition, even death. ⁷² The man of strong will knows instinctively that life is synonymous with conflict and war. ⁷³ He does not need to be consciously instructed that life is a struggle to preserve itself, for he finds himself living accordingly. In contrast, those whose instincts are weak show a proportional lack of concern for the world of history and Becoming. They are priestly in character, and long for an ideal realm beyond the tortures of the present world. ⁷⁴ Other-worldliness is a distinguishing mark of the powerful intellect which looks down with secret contempt upon the primitive Dionysian forces of life.

The idea which Spengler gathered from Nietzsche's contrast of strong and of weak souls was that these two fundamentally different

characters necessarily manifest their opposition in their style of thinking.⁷⁵ The affirmation of life connects itself with physiognomy.⁷⁶ As the instinctive method of thinking, physiognomic tact merges together with acting and living itself. Hence it prevails in those whose life is directed primarily towards practical success in the realm of the here-and-now, i.e. in the world of historical realities.⁷⁷ For Nietzsche, the aristocratic type of personality lives artistically by sensing intuitively the way to his goals. The noble is not an intellect—he does not formulate his ideas on paper.⁷⁸ The religiously oriented man, on the other hand, is like the scientist in establishing eternal truths, principles, and laws. As Spengler puts it, what is of importance to the priest and the scientist is not the questions of when and where, but the questions of why and what, questions which demand a causal explanation.⁷⁹ From Nietzsche's distinction of hero and saint, of instinct and reason, of the assertion of life and its negation, Spengler learned that the primary enigma of humanity lies between the fact-man of history and the man of otherworldliness, and not as traditional philosophy taught, between religion and science. Though the physicist may substitute profane causes for sacred causes, he reveals his deep common origin with the priest in his effort to finalize reality into a causally apprehended world.⁸⁰ Both the creeds of religion and the theories of science—and for that matter, every other manifestation of a will-to-knowledge—strive to get beyond Becoming and eternalize the world into a systematic, fixed order.⁸¹ All systematizing, which is at bottom the aim of rational thought, is priestly and, as such, is an inherent renunciation of physiognomy and the organic order of birth, death, victory,

defeat, in the World-as-History.

The tough Will-to-Power theme which emerges mainly out of Nietzsche's critique of morality is repeated and developed by Spengler. What is to be understood in the duality of master morality and slave morality is that aristocratic goodness-and-badness designates an altogether different spiritual being from the saintly man of goodness-and-evil. To the former belong the instinctive ethic of unconscious breeding over several generations, while to the latter belongs the ethic born of conscious conviction. According to Nietzsche, reverence for oneself, dignity, and pride in one's position, birth, blood, and race naturally grow within the select individuals of a knightly class.⁸² Priestly askesis rests upon ultra-mundane ideals which must be learned and continually reiterated in one's waking-thoughts, and even then they are never there in the fact-world of history, but exist only as true in the saint's other-worldliness. No doubt every man, Cesare Borgia included, has his convictions, and hence something of the priestly about him, but one side of life will prevail over the other, and one is thus ultimately a man of action and honour or a man of thought and reverence. Spengler accepts from Nietzsche that deed and thought, success and redemption, strength and holiness are mutually exclusive⁸³ and from these contrary qualities, one finds in every higher Culture (and thereby as a descriptive element of the Urkultur) that its early life is constituted by nobility and priesthood and that its later life continues this opposition between the soldier, general, entrepreneur, judge, political organizer, businessman, gambler, and peasant on the one side and the priest, scientist, savant, and idealist on the other side.⁸⁴ But Spengler does not embrace

Nietzsche's master-slave distinction. In conformity with Goethe's depiction of Culture as a movement from early intuitive religiousness to late prosaic understanding, Spengler holds that the saint only appears at the beginning of the Culture, when he, like his fellow man, is profoundly under the sway of strong instincts, and consequently his inward struggle for the supremacy of the ideal over the blood is experienced at its highest degree of intensity.⁸⁵ Furthermore, he claims that every priesthood in its infancy patterns itself on the newly arising nobility and that the members of the holy orders often lead the secular life of a politician, landowner, courtier, and warrior, enjoying the artistic style of a connoisseur of wine and food, having a family, following the hunt, and supporting mistresses.⁸⁶ Only with the progress of Culture to late maturity is the instinctive knightly side of the priest lost and the victory of reason over blood is won effortlessly. Nevertheless, the message of Nietzsche sounds through all this: it is the aristocratic virtues of hardness, bravery, and strength, and not the religious virtues of piety and renunciation which prevail in history. When the early priesthood loses its instinctive affirmation of life, it loses its historical sense and Will-to-Power.⁸⁷

If, therefore, this historical sense which Spengler calls physiognomic tact is inherently an expression of Nietzsche's affirmation of life and Will-to-Power, then it should be understood as a means to an end. A philosophy whose understanding of every upsurge of reality as Will-to-Power must understand its own method as an instrument of a pulsating Will-to-Life. Both Nietzsche and Spengler go beyond the mere characterization and critique of human history to offer their own

practical advice and ethic. Physiognomic tact as the instinctive capacity of symbol-reading implies decision and response to the "life" that expresses itself in outward symbols and features.⁸⁸ But here a discrepancy shows itself in the physiognomy practiced by Nietzsche and Spengler and Goethe's contemplation (exacte sinnliche Phantasie) of the Urphänomen. No aesthetic intuition, according to Nietzsche, can be "disinterested and passive" the way Goethe or Kant believed, for this notion directly violates the instinctive principle of the Will-to-Power as the essence of reality. If an intellectual intuition can detach itself from the hidden motive, then mind and thought are not in the service of blood and instinct, and knowledge is realized for the "sake of knowledge" and not for the Will.⁸⁹ However, the "passivity" in the aesthetic intuition, which, as mentioned before, underlies both physiognomy and Goethe's morphological method, is not taken by Spengler to mean intellectual detachment. The World-as-History connotes reality as active, striving forces (Will-to-Power), and hence there is no passivity and rest except with death. The aesthetic intuition is a relatively low grade of living activity in which the human mind disposes itself towards the expression of other lives. To repeat, Nietzsche and Spengler believed that the historian, like the artist, must imaginatively re-experience within himself the meaning and outlook of another soul in order to achieve the profundity requisite for a felt-understanding of history.⁹⁰ The "passive" frame of mind in the artist is what the historian must possess to express himself. Now, however, it is necessary to distinguish to what extent the historian differs from the artist. Spengler and Nietzsche's particular manner of describing history

indicates that unlike the artist, the historian uses his philosophy for practical ends. In the last analysis, the artist is, in Spengler's eyes, priestly, for his efforts ultimately aim towards the realization of an ideal beyond Becoming and death.⁹¹ Spengler's conception of the historian is that he is in kinship with the statesman and general, using physiognomic tact for the realization of a Will-to-Power in the world of facts.⁹² Historical knowledge here is an instrument of a will, and the problem before the historian is expressed by Nietzsche: "Wenn wir nur dies gerade immer besser lernen, Historie zum Zwecke des Lebens zu treiben."⁹³ (If we could only learn better to study history as a means to life.)⁹⁴ Furthermore, he says: ". . . dass die Kenntnis der Vergangenheit zu allen Zeiten nur im Dienste der Zukunft und Gegenwart begehrt ist, nicht zur Schwächung der Gegenwart, nicht zur Entwurzelung einer lebenskräftigen Zukunft" ⁹⁵ (The knowledge of the past is only desired for the service of the future and the present, not to weaken the present or to undermine a living future.)⁹⁶

Consequently, the ethic of both Nietzsche and Spengler, being based on the metaphysic of Will-to-Power, could be called an ethic of Voluntas superior intellectu.⁹⁷ What is to be valued in the world is the instinctive, aristocratic assertion of life and all that which contributes to living-duration, and this, in turn, implies the negation of priest-like virtues as servile. However, beyond this general agreement, the ethic of the two philosophers becomes quite dissimilar in tone and import. The doctrine which Nietzsche continually moves towards in the progress of his writings, "the transvaluation of all values", never

takes on a specific outline of conduct. After the delineation of master-morality, the practical problem of the program by which the selection and breeding of the higher, ruling types is to be accomplished is left open to interpretation. Spengler, on the other hand, prescribes concretely. After the morphological analysis of the various Cultures, Spengler shows that present-day Western man has only a limited number of possibilities which can be meaningful—i.e. which can contribute to the life-duration of one's own type. The forms of art—painting, music, architecture, poetry, drama—have exhausted themselves, and the truly organic possibilities in mathematical, scientific and philosophical creations are near exhaustion. Life for modern man should be directed outwards towards external possibilities, and this means for Spengler that one should devote one's life to techniques, to politics, to business enterprises, and to a life in the military.⁹⁸ Twentieth-century man of the West is living in an age of Caesarism, an age which spiritually parallels the late period of the Classical World between C. Flaminius and Trajan. The old age of our Culture determines what can be significant (successful) for our existence.

What is important here is not the particular advice which Spengler presents, but the aspect of his ethic in relation to Nietzsche's ethic. The general and nebulous quality of the latter and the concise and specific nature of the former are indicators of a fundamental and, for the most part, unconscious difference in their understanding of the principle of Will-to-Power.

What distinguishes Nietzsche's and Spengler's metaphysic of the

Will from Schopenhauer's is that it is pluralistic, not monistic.⁹⁹

The physiognomic tact of Nietzsche presupposes not only Voluntas superior intellectu, but also a plurastic-reality.¹⁰⁰ In Der Wille zur Macht we read: "Die Einheit (der Monismus) ein Bedürfnis der Inertia; die Mehrheit der Deutung Zeichen der Kraft. Der Welt ihren beunruhigenden und enigmatischen Charakter nicht abstreiten wollen!"¹⁰¹ (Unity [monism] is a need of inertia; Plurality in interpretation, is a sign of strength. One should not desire to deprive the world of its disquieting and enigmatical nature.)¹⁰² The intuition of different types of soul behind the manifold facets of Culture and human history is an extension of this pluralism. Indeed, the pluralism of the World-as-History is the basis of Nietzsche's and Spengler's relativism. Every Culture, every nation, every individual has its own perspective which emanates from its own individual Will-to-Power. However, it is precisely in the treatment of relativism that the difference between Nietzsche and Spengler reveals a metaphysical opposition.

Spengler consciously addresses his ethic of the will to a specific type of people, the Western, at a particular point in history, early twentieth century, even to a particular nation, Germany, and to the ruling elite of that nation.¹⁰³ The relativistic view of the Untergang stresses not only the different cultural styles in art, politics, social life, and ethics, but also Spengler's own ethical pronouncements. Thus Spengler says:

Wahrheiten gibt es nur in bezug auf ein bestimmtes Menschentum. Meine Philosophie selbst würde demnach Ausdruck und Spiegelung nur der abendländischen Seele, im Unterschiede etwa von der antiken und indischen, und zwar nur in deren heutigem zivilisierten

Stadium sein, womit ihr Gehalt als Weltanschauung, ihre praktische Tragweite und ihr Geltungsbereich bestimmt sind.¹⁰⁴

Truths are truths only in relation to a particular mankind. Thus, my own philosophy is able to express and reflect only the Western (as distinct from the Classical, Indian, or other) soul, and that soul only in its present civilized phase by which its conception of the world, its practical range and its sphere of effect are specified.¹⁰⁵

But it is not the same with Nietzsche. Those of the master-morality are to bring about for themselves a transvaluation of all values. Nietzsche is aware that master-morality is an ethic relative to a certain type of man. The question, however, is: who exactly are these masters? Who are to be their slaves? In one place in Der Wille zur Macht Nietzsche speaks of a "future European race" as the inheritor of his philosophy.¹⁰⁶ This is as definite as Nietzsche becomes. There is thus some justification of Spengler's accusation that Nietzsche was inconsistent with his own relativism by prophesying a moral absolute and eternal, "beyond all good and all evil", for all times. His romantic temperament, which made him turn his back upon the people of his day and speak to a distant future, compels him in priestly fashion to renounce the actualities of his age for a dreamed world. Spengler says of Nietzsche: "Man ist nicht Psycholog ersten Ranges, solange man noch Romantiker ist."¹⁰⁷ (One cannot be a first class psychologist as long as one is still a Romantic.)¹⁰⁸ Physiognomy is a presupposition of relativism, and for Spengler, the ethic which one espouses from this position can only be an "ethic of the moment", true (successful) for one time and one particular people and not for eternity.

The rough deduction which can be made is that the universal vantage point from which Nietzsche speaks in setting forth his ethic

reflects a view that reality is infinite and eternal, and the finite point of view from which Spengler philosophizes reflects that reality is finite. Once again, it is Spengler's unique vision of the reality as Being (Becoming) and Not-Being (Becomeness), as life and death, which set off the Untergang from its predecessors. Nietzsche's theory of the Will-to-Power as ceaseless, eternal Becoming defies all limit and extinction. The ethic of master-morality, true for all times, exists in a world without end. Such an ethic is rooted in the otherworldliness of timeless truth. Spengler's criticism of Nietzsche derives from a position that sees every surge of Will-to-Power as doomed to pass into dark oblivion. Success and duration in one element of Becoming is never lasting success and duration, but only a fleeting phenomenon. This again is what Spengler means by Destiny. In fact, Spengler tells us in his small essay Pessimismus? that Relativism is an affirmation of this concept of Destiny:

Denn es handelt sich hier [beim Relativismus] um einen durchaus ethischen Blick über die Welt, in welcher das einzelne Leben sich abspielt. Niemand wird das Wort verstehen, wenn ihm der Schicksalsgedanke entgangen ist. Der Relativismus in der Geschichte, wie ich ihn sehe, ist eine Bejahung der Schicksalsidee. Das Einmalige, Unwiderrufliche, Niewiederkehrende alles Geschehens ist die Form, in welcher das Schicksal vor das menschliche Auge tritt.¹⁰⁹

For it [Relativism] is a completely ethical view of the world in which individual lives take their course. To those who have not understood the concept of Destiny, this term will be meaningless. As I see it, Relativism in history is an affirmation of the idea of Destiny. The uniqueness, irrevocability, and nonrecurrence of all events is the form in which Destiny manifests itself to the human eye.¹¹⁰

The terms "Einmalige", "Unwiderrufliche", and "Niewiederkehrende" describe the notion of Destiny as the passage of time into space, of

Will-to-Power into death. Such a vision is foreign to Nietzsche's vision of Will-to-Power.

Chapter IV

CONCLUSION: SPENGLER'S POINT OF VIEW

From the foregoing discussion, it is now possible to understand how the method of the Untergang is a blend of Goethean morphology and Nietzschean physiognomy. From Goethe, Spengler derived his great organizational power. The secret of this power lies in the intuition of the Urphänomen, which we have seen to be both the synthesizing of all individual phenomena under one Idea and the distinguishing of all phenomena from this Idea. What was referred to as the Urkultur is the prime Idea of human history. Spengler's depiction of Western Culture aims at the revelation of the Urkultur, which thus presents the similarity in the organic structure of the West with Classical antiquity, with the Arabian, Indian, Chinese, and other Cultures, as well as the uniqueness in character of the West from the others. But Goethe's Urphänomen, being a regulative Idea, is used by Spengler in a way hitherto not mentioned. The Faustian West, Apollinian antiquity, the Magian and Tao worlds of the Arabs and Chinese all denote the spiritual differentiation of each Culture upon the Urkultur, but each of these spiritual beings or souls is in turn treated as a prime Idea. The entire compass of Western history is symbolized in the longing of Faust, and yet every cultural formation of the West (the various art and philosophical schools, the different systems of government or national customs) presents its own version of Faust. It is at this point that Spengler

drew from Nietzsche's approach. The ultra-fine capacity to sense the peculiar atmosphere surrounding peoples, nations, landscapes, music, social habits, and laws was taken over from Nietzsche to grasp the detailed nature of the World-as-History.¹ Roughly speaking, therefore, the morphological method provides the intuition of the universal, and this combines with the physiognomic method, being itself primarily concerned with the intuition of the particular, to establish the Spenglerian method.

As previously emphasized, the unity of Goethe and Nietzsche is accomplished only by virtue of a metaphysical vision which Spengler holds in common with his masters. Foremost is the lesson that reality is Becoming, and this necessarily implies a direct denial of a mechanically operated world. This is not the Becoming of one absolute Spirit or Will, but the Becoming of innumerable individual principles or essences. Furthermore, the plurality of the real is felt—even by Goethe—as purposeless striving and Will-to-Power. Each principle of Becoming is instilled with a specific quantum of vitality, and the actualization of this energy is a Steigerung towards more life. The only purpose of life, Goethe says, is life itself.² Hence Goethe, Nietzsche, and Spengler are anti-teleologists. Things Becoming cannot have a purpose outside of them, since there cannot be an "outside". Formation and transformation is the only reality, and an effort towards finding a causal explanation for this world corrupts its qualitative change into stiff mechanistic motion.

But there is a profound difference between Spengler's metaphysical image and that of Goethe and Nietzsche. Though it does not reveal

itself in method, the difference is manifest in the general understanding of the World-as-History. To repeat, reality is finite for Spengler; nothingness constitutes part of its being. "Destiny" embraces both Becoming and Becomeness, Being and Not-Being, Life and Death, Time and Space. The upsurge of any form is connected necessarily to the extinction of that form. To sense the Destiny immanent in the world is to sense this organic connection as history. Life is doomed to pass away into oblivion. There is no infinite Will-to-Power in any one aspect of earthly life. This gives us a tragic picture of history, but no other presentation of things is worthy for Spengler except this one.³

Out of this understanding of Destiny, one can cipher the two modes or orders of knowledge, the World-as-History and the World-as-Nature, and the contradictory order of reality as Becoming and Becomeness. Goethe saw that one could understand the world either as Becoming or as Having-Become, but Spengler's philosophy indicates that the two orders of knowledge reflect the dual nature of all existence.⁴

It may be useful to clarify what is implied when Becoming and Become are treated as orders of knowledge. That one can either view the world as history or as nature stems from the fact that Becoming and Becomeness are, according to Spengler, forms of consciousness. It is therefore self-evident what Becoming and Becomeness mean. But as opposites, both forms are extremes of a continuum.⁶ A point of view or outlook signifies the degree one conceives the world in its Becoming and its Having-Become. No one can conceive the world as pure History or Becoming or as pure Nature or Becomeness.⁷ As noted earlier, causal cognition is found without exception in every person, even the most

intuitive philosopher. Conversely, physiognomic tact is present to some degree in every systematist.⁸ For Spengler, it is inexplicable why some people tend to view the world more in its Becoming and others see it more in its Becomeness. In the end, no two people, Spengler says, have the same identical outlook, the possibilities between pure Becoming and pure Becomeness being innumerable. The same is the case when one refers to the point of view of any social group or type. One Culture is more prone to see the world in its Becoming than another.⁹ Classical man, and the Indian, for example, are highly disposed to comprehend the world in its Becomeness, while Western man, the Chinese, and the Egyptian all reveal a fundamental tendency to picture it in its Becoming. Cultures never see the world in the same way; they only approximate to another's view-point. Likewise, every nation within a Culture has its own distinctive view, and every age or period of a nation's or Culture's history, as well as every estate and profession, possesses somewhere on the scale of Becoming-Become, its own unique outlook.¹⁰ However, Spengler makes it clear that even though an outlook is defined in terms of the varying degree of Becoming and Becomeness, these forms of consciousness are contradictory and can never be reconciled in a completely harmonious view. Consequently, all insight and all systematic thought must involve contradiction. To write history scientifically is contradictory, Spengler says, yet he is aware that his own morphological approach involves elements of Becomeness and system.¹¹

In the consideration of the polarity of Becoming and Becomeness as orders of reality, the contradiction inherent in an outlook is only

one manifestation of the contradictory nature of human existence. Life and death, Being and Non-Being, time and space—these opposites cannot be divorced from each other. Reality is constituted by both. For the mind bent on causal understanding, the union of the two is a hopeless contradiction; for the intuitive thinker, the union is felt as the deepest of all enigmas. Human existence magnifies this duality. Not only can one be vividly aware of them as the extreme boundaries of life, birth and death, but also one can feel them as the continual, progressive transformation of life. Each period, each waking-moment, has its beginning and end—each has its actualization and solidification into stiff and dead space. It is Destiny—the directional, irrevocable movement of living, finite time towards fulfillment and completion—which is the perplexing unity of Becoming and Becomeness. And it is the same union that underlies the Destiny of a cultured-people. The passage of Culture into Civilization is the unifying, non-recurring movement of progressive Becoming into fixed Becomeness. History does not present any dialectical movement in which civilized man can return to the state of a cultured man. Becoming precedes Becomeness, and ends with Becomeness. Never can the process be reversed. Destiny moves forward, always into the future, and reaches its finality with the exhaustion of this drive.

FOOTNOTES

Part I METHODOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS

Chapter I THE GOETHEAN - NIETZSCHEAN METHOD AND ARGUMENT

1. Spengler, Ged., p. 47.
2. Spengler, Aph., p. 56.
3. Spengler, "Heraklit", in RuA., p. 9.
4. Spengler, Aph., p. 60.
5. Spengler, UdA., I, 136.
6. Ibid., p. ix.
7. Ibid., 163.
8. Goethe, XVII, 90.
9. Spengler, UdA., I, 76f.
10. Goethe, XVII, 695.
11. My translation.
12. Spengler, UdA., 127-40.
13. Nietzsche, II, 977.
14. Goethe states: "...dass die Phantasie ihre eigenen Gesetze hat, denen der Verstand nicht beikommen kann und soll. Wenn durch die Phantasie nicht Dinge entstanden, die für den Verstand ewig problematisch bleiben, so wäre überhaupt zu der Phantasie nicht viel." (Eckermann, 5/7/1827.) XXIV, 257. "The imagination has its own laws which the understanding can and shall not penetrate. If things would not arise through the imagination which remain eternally problematic for the understanding, then there would not be very much accorded to the imagination." My translation.
15. Goethe states in Schriften zur Natur und Wissenschaftslehre: "So wird ein Mann, zu den sogenannten exakten Wissenschaften geboren und gebildet, auf der Höhe seiner Verstandesvernunft nicht leicht begreifen, dass es auch eine exakte sinnliche Phantasie geben könne, ohne welche doch eigentlich keine Kunst denkbar ist." XXVI, 884f. "A man who is born to and educated in the so-called exact

sciences will not easily conceive from the heights of his understanding and reasoning (Verstandesvernunft) that there would be an exact perceptual imagination without which no art is ultimately conceivable." My translation.

16. Spengler, UdA., I, 129f.
17. Goethe, XVII, 746.
18. My translation.
19. Nietzsche, II, 120.
20. Nietzsche, The Joyful Wisdom, X, 158.
21. Ibid.
22. Nietzsche, III, 489.
23. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, XV, 11f.
24. Cf. Spengler, UdA., I, 132.
25. Nietzsche says in Der Wille zur Macht: "Die Mechanik zeigt uns nur Folgen, und noch dazu im Bilde Bewegung ist eine Bilderrede). Die Gravitation selbst hat keine mechanische Ursache, da sie der Grund erst für mechanische Folgen ist." III, 775. "Mechanics only show us the results, and then only in images (movement is a figure of speech), gravitation itself has no mechanical cause, because it is itself the first cause of mechanical results." The Will to Power, XV, 163.
26. From Goethe's poem Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen: "Alle Gestalten sind ähnlich, und keine gleicht der andern / Und so deutet das Chor auf ein geheimes Gesetz." II, 247. "All have a similar form, yet none is the same as the other / So this chorus of growth shows a mysterious law." My translation. Goethe also states in Aphorismen und Fragmente: "Was man Idee nennt: das, was immer zur Erscheinung kommt und daher als Gesetz aller Erscheinungen uns entgegen tritt." XVII, 702. "What we call 'idea': what is constantly in appearance, and thus what strikes us as the law of all separate appearances." My translation.
27. Spengler, UdA., I, 136ff.
28. Spengler, Urf., p. 144.
29. My translation.
30. Spengler, UdA., I, 131f.
31. Spengler, DW., I, 96f.

- 32. Nietzsche, III, 913.
- 33. Goethe, XVII, 726.
- 34. Spengler, UdA., I, 132. Cf. also Urf. p. 267.
- 35. Spengler, UdA., I, 67n.
- 36. Spengler, DW., I, 49.
- 37. Spengler, UdA., 131.
- 38. Falk, 1/25/1813 and von Müller, 10/19/1823. Cf. also Eckermann 5/2/1824, Zelter 3/19/1827, and Eckermann 9/1/1829, 2/4/1829.
- 39. Nietzsche, III, 483. Cf. also Spengler, Urf.; p. 149.
- 40. My translation.
- 41. Nietzsche, III, 703.
- 42. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, XV, p. 428. Nietzsche continues to say: "Die Hypothese einer geschaffenen Welt soll uns nicht einen Augenblick bekümmern. Der Begriff "Schaffen" ist heute vollkommen undefinierbar, unvollziehbar; bloss ein Wort noch, rudimentär aus Zeiten des Aberglaubens; mit einem Wort erklärt man nichts. Der letzte Versuch, eine Welt, die anfängt, zu konzipieren, ist neuerdings mehrfach mit Hilfe einer logischen Prozedur gemacht worden, zumeist, wie zu erraten ist, aus einer theologischen Hinterabsicht." III, 703. "We need not concern ourselves for one instant with the hypothesis of a created world. The concept "create" is today utterly undefinable and unrealisable; it is but a word which hails from superstitious ages; nothing can be explained with a word. The last attempt that was made to conceive of a world that began occurred quite recently, in many cases with the help of logical reasoning, - generally, too, as you will guess, with an ulterior theological motive." The Will to Power, XV, p. 428f.
- 43. Spengler, Urf., p. 150.
- 44. My translation.
- 45. Notation for Spengler's planned autobiography, cited by A.M. Koptanek in Oswald Spengler in Seiner Zeit (Munich, 1968).
- 46. My translation.
- 47. Spengler, "Pessimismus?" in RuA., p. 66.
- 48. Spengler, "Pessimismus?" in SE., p. 138.
- 49. Spengler, UdA., I, 129.

50. Ibid., p. 138. Cf. also Spengler, FrZ., p. 23.
51. Cf. Spengler, Urf., p. 285.
52. Spengler, UdA., I, 139 and Urf., p. 253.
53. Spengler, UdA., I, 140.
54. Ibid., p. 156f.
55. Ibid., p. 129.
56. Ibid., pp. 138f and 154-6.

Chapter II GOETHEAN MORPHOLOGY

1. Spengler, UdA., I, 151-3.
2. The morphological method has been called the typological method.
3. Spengler, UdA., I, 141f.
4. Cf. Spengler, FrZ., p. 80.
5. Spengler, UdA., I, 132.
6. Spengler, DW., I, 47.
7. Goethe, XXI, 741.
8. My translation.
9. Goethe states: "Kein organisches Wesen ist ganz der Idee, die zugrunde liegt, entsprechend; hinter jedem steckt die höhere Idee." IV, 267. "No organic being corresponds exactly to the underlying idea; behind every such organic being lies the higher idea." My translation.
10. On this point Goethe says: "Wir müssen umsehen lernen, dass wir dasjenige, was wir im Einfachsten geschaut und erkannt, im Zusammengesetzten supponieren und glauben müssen. Denn das Einfache verbirgt sich im Mannigfaltigen, und da ist's, wo bei mir der Glaube eintritt, der nicht der Anfang, sondern das Ende alles Wissens ist." Letter to Sulpiz Boisserée, 2/25/1832. "We must learn to comprehend that what we see and recognize in the simplest things we must believe and presume to be in synthesis or unity. For the simple hides itself in the manifold, and as such this is for me where faith enters, which is not the beginning, but the end of all knowledge." My translation.

Goethe learned originally through Schiller the meaning of the Kantian regulative Idea and came to regard the Urphanomen as a regulative Idea. However, the Urphanomen is, of course, not identical to the a priori regulative Ideas of Kant's philosophy. The leaf, for example, is not an a priori form of reason, but like God or Soul, it is an Idea by which one synthesizes empirical knowledge of the world.

11. Spengler, UdA., I, 142f.
12. Spengler, DW., I, 105.
13. In a letter to Müller, Goethe says: "das . . . geheime und unbezwingliche Vorbild, in welchem sich alles Leben bewegen muss." 11/24/1829. "...the secret and unconquerable model, in which all life must move." My translation.
14. Spengler, UdA., I, 213 and 217f. Goethe says: Das ist die wahre Symbolik wo das Besondere das Allgemeinere repräsentiert, nicht als Traum und Schatten, sondern als lebendig augenblickliche Offenbarung des Unerforschlichen." IX, 532. "True symbolism occurs when the particular represents the general, not as dream and shadow, but as the living-momentary revelation of the unexplorable." My translation.
15. Goethe, XVII, 693.
16. My translation.
17. Spengler, UA., I, 48-51.
18. André Fauconnet has described this synthetic way of reasoning by philosophers like Goethe and Spengler: "...l'écrivain, hanté par une idée unique, semble l'installer au centre d'une sphère d'où irradie une infinité de rayons. Qu'à ce centre soient rattachées toutes les idées de détail, toutes les opinions fragmentaires, et celles-ci, émanant de la même source, seront nécessairement corrélatives. Même divergentes, elles s'unissent toujours dans l'intuition initiale et créatrice. Le morcellement n'existera que pour celui dont l'oeil est impuissant à saisir l'ensemble." Un Philosophe Allemand Contemporain: Oswald Spengler, (Paris, 1925), p. 41. "...the author, haunted by a unique idea, installs it as it were at the center of a sphere from whence radiates an infinity of rays. All the detailed ideas, all the fragmentary opinions are attached at this center, and these, emanating from the same source, will be necessarily correlated. Even when diverging, they always are united in the initial, creative intuition. The parcelling out exists only for those whose eye is unable to grasp the totality." My translation. Cf. also Charlotte's statement to Edward in Die Verwandtschaften "Das Vereinen ist eine grössere Kunst, ein grösseres Verdienst. Ein Einungskünstler wäre in jedem Fache der ganzen Welt willkommen." IX, 43. "It is a higher art, and it is a higher

merit to unite. An artist of union is what we should welcome, in every province of the universe." Goethe, Elective Affinities (New York, 1962), p. 35.

19. Spengler, UdA., II, 44.
20. Spengler, DW., II, 38.
21. Cf. Spengler, UdA., I, 229.
22. Goethe, IX, 639.
23. My translation.
24. Goethe, XVII, 288ff.
25. Ibid., pp. 325f.
26. Spengler, UdA., I, 151-3.
27. Spengler, UdA., I, 153.
28. Ibid., pp. 170ff.
29. Spengler states: "Gestalt = Charakter = Wesen = Idee (Weinhandl, Goethe 304ff), Charakter einer Landschaft, eines Gesichtes, einer Bewegungs-art der Gattung, einer Epoche, eines Kunstwerks, eines Menschen-es ist das Einmalig-Besondere des Individuums. Charakter ist Individualität." Urf., p. 143. "Form = Character = Essence = Idea (Weinhandl, Goethe, 304ff), character of a landscape, of a countenance, of a form of motion peculiar to a species, of an epoch, an art work, a people - all this is the once-occurring particularity of the individual. Character is individuality." My translation.
30. Goethe, XVI, 872.
31. Goethe's World View (New York, 1963), p. 66. Cf. also Goethe's statement in F.H. Jacobis Auselesener Briefwechsel: In dieser Konsequenz des unendlich Mannigfaltigen sehe ich Gottes Handschrift am allerdeutlichsten." XIV, 383. "I see God's handwriting most clearly in this consistent pattern of infinite multiplicity."
32. Spengler, UdA., I, 107.
33. Spengler, DW., I, 78.
34. Spengler, UdA., I, 385-7.
35. Goethe, XXII, 540.
36. My translation.

37. In the diary of Spengler's sister, Dr. Hildegard Kornhardt, Spengler is quoted: "Uns ist die Fähigkeit zum Glauben abhanden gekommen. Das Einzige, was uns geblieben ist, ist der Schicksalsglaube, und der ist germanisch. Ich geniere mich selbst, das auszusprechen, weil es so ähnlich klingt wie das, was das Pack da proklamiert und was nichts weiter ist als verwässertes Christentum mit Rassequatsch." Quoted in A.M. Kocktanek's Oswald Spengler in Seiner Zeit (Munich, 1968), p. 481.
38. Goethe, IX, 529.
39. Goethe's World View, p. 66.
40. Cf. Spengler's statement: "Es gibt keine Versöhnungen in der wirklichen Geschichte. Wer an sie glaubt, muss ein ewiges Grauen vor dem Narrentanz der Ereignisse empfinden, und er flüchtet sich nur in eine Selbsttäuschung, wenn er meint, ihn je durch Verträge beschwören zu können. Es gibt nur ein Ende des ewigen Kämpfens, den Tod. Den Tod des einzelnen, den Völkertod, den Tod einer Kultur. Ged., p. 40. "There is no reconciliation in history. He who believes that there is must feel perpetual horror at the mad dance of events, and he only deceives himself if he believes he can ever stop it through covenants. There is only one end to perpetual strife - death. Death of the individual, death of a nation, death of a culture." Aph., p. 49.
41. Goethe, XXIV, 115.
42. My translation.
43. Goethe, XVI, 923.
44. My translation.
45. We shall discuss the question of cultural influence and derivation more fully in Part III.
46. Herbert Spencer's, First Principles (London, 1910), 367.
47. Spengler, UdA., I, 154f.
48. Ibid., p. 191.
49. Ibid., pp. 145-7.
50. Goethe, IX, 207.
51. My translation.
52. Goethe, XIII, 421.
53. My translation.

54. Goethe, XXII, 423, 440f, and 469. Cf. also Spengler, MuT., p. 17.
55. Spengler, Urf., pp. 217 and 252.
56. Spengler, UdA., II, 159.
57. Ibid., I, 247.
58. Ibid., pp. 292-301.
59. Ibid., p. 229.
60. Ibid., p. 297.
61. Ibid., p. 296.
62. Ibid., p. 331.
63. Ibid., p. 300.
64. Ibid., pp. 328f.
65. Ibid., pp. 44f., and 94-8.
66. Spengler, Urf., p. 198.
67. Goethe, XIV, 613ff.
68. Spengler, UdA., II, 42f.
69. Spengler, DW., II, 37.
70. Goethe says: "So haben wir in der ältesten Zeit Betrachtung, Philosophie, Benamung, und Poesie der Natur alles in einem." XVII, 613. "So we have in the oldest time the reflection, philosophy, the naming, and the poetry of nature all in one." My translation.
71. Goethe says: "Das Reich der Poesie blüht auf, und nur der ist Poet, der den Volksglauben besitzt oder sich ihn anzueignen weiss. Der Character dieser Epoche ist freie, tüchtige, ernste, edle Sinnlichkeit durch Einbildungskraft erhöht." XVII, 613. "The kingdom of poetry flowers, and only he is poet who possesses the Volksglauben or is able to adopt it for himself." Free, vigorous, serious, and noble, sensitivity raised through imagination characterizes this epoch." My translation.
72. Goethe says: "Diese Epoche dürfen wir die heilige nennen, sie gehört im höchsten Sinne der Vernunft an" XVII, 614. "This epoch we may call holy; it belongs in the highest sense to reason." My translation.
73. Goethe says: "Dieser Epoche kann man ein edles, reines, kluges


Bestreben nicht absprechen, sie genügt aber mehr dem einzelnen wohlbegabten Menschen als ganzen Völkern." XVII, 614. "One cannot deny to this age noble, pure, intelligent endeavors, but they belong more to the individual well-gifted men rather than the people as a whole." My translation.

74. Goethe says: "Und so wird denn auch der Wert eines jeden Geheimnisses zerstört, der Volksglaube selbst entweiht..." XVII, 615. "And so the worth of each mystery is destroyed; the Volksglaube itself profaned." My translation.
75. Spengler, UdA., I, 453-5.
76. Ibid., p. 461. A qualification is necessary here. Goethe does not understand by the word "Zivilisation" Spengler's meaning of it, viz. the final phase of a Culture's life. For Goethe "Zivilisation" is synonymous with Culture.
77. Spengler, DW., I, 358.
78. Spengler, UdA., I, 460.
79. Ibid., p. 461.
80. Ibid., II, 61. Cf. Goethe's statement in Noten und Abhandlungen "Alle Epochen, in welchen der Glaube herrscht, unter welcher Gestalt er auch wolle, sind glänzend, herzerhebend und fruchtbar für Mitwelt und Nachwelt. Alle Epochen dagegen, in welchen der Unglaube, in welcher Form es sei, einen kümmerlichen Sieg behauptet, und wenn sie auch einen Augenblick mit einem Scheinglanze prahlen sollten, verschwinden vor der Nachwelt, weil sich Niemand gern mit Erkenntnis des Unfruchtbaren abquälen mag." III, 504f. "All epochs in history dominated by faith, under whatever form, are brilliant, inspiring, and fruitful for those who live them as well as for posterity. In contrast, all epochs in which non-faith, in whatever form, achieve a wretched victory and for a time perhaps even display the trappings of splendor, disappear before posterity. For no one likes to struggle toward familiarity with what is sterile." My translation.
81. Spengler, "Nietzsche und Sein Jahrhundert" in RuA., p. 119.
82. Spengler, "Nietzsche and his Century" in SE., p. 190.
83. In a letter to C. von Stein, Goethe said: "Auf Herders dritten Teil freu ich mich sehr, hebe mir ihn auf, bis ich sagen kann wo er mir begegnen soll. Er wird gewiss den schönen Traumwunsch der Menschheit dass es dereinst besser mit ihr werden möge trefflich ausgeführt haben. Auch muss ich selbst sagen halt ich es für wahr dass die Humanität endlich siegen wird, nur fürcht ich dass zu gleicher Zeit die Welt ein grosses Hospital und einer des andern humaner Krankenwärter werden wird." 6/8/1787. "I look forward with

- interest to Herder's Part Three [of his Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit]; I shall keep it until I find out where he and I can meet. He has no doubt written marvelously on mankind's lovely dream-wish of better times in some future age. I think it is true that humanity will win out in the end, but I am afraid that at the same time the world will become one great hospital, with each his fellow's kindly nurse." My translation.
84. In a letter to Riemer (24/3/1807), Goethe said: "Die Formel der Steigerung lässt sich auch im Ästhetischen und Moralischen verwenden." XXII, 44. "The formula of Steigerung is applicable also to aesthetics and morals." My translation.
85. Goethe, VII, 172.
86. Ibid., IX, 189.
87. Spengler, UdA., I, 62f.
88. Goethe, XVI, 247. Cf. also in Italienische Reise, Goethe's letter 5/3/1787, XI, 210.
89. My translation.
90. Goethe, XVI, 921.
91. My translation.
92. An additional consideration is Goethe's other major principle of living— Nature which, however, is not fundamentally connected with the morphological method. Beside Steigerung is the other driving-wheel of life - Polarity (Polarität). According to Goethe, the upsurge of life always proceeds in a rhythmic movement between extremes. In the development of a plant, there is first an expansion of the cotyledons into a leaf, then a contraction of the calyx, expansion into the corolla, contraction into stamen and pistil, and finally expansion into fruit. The movement between the two poles of light and darkness underlie all color phenomena in the Farbenlehre. The concept of polarity extends into the spiritual realm: "Wir und die Gegenstände, Licht und Finsternis, Leib und Seele, zwei Seelen, Geist und Materie, Gott und die Welt, Gedanke und Ausdehnung, Ideales und Reales, Sinnlichkeit und Vernunft, Phantasie und Verstand, Sehnsucht und Sein." XVII, 707. "We and Objects, Light and Darkness, Body and Soul, two Souls, Spirit and Matter, God and the World, thought and extension, ideal and real, sensation and reason, phantasy and understanding, longing and being." (My translation.) Spengler also observes a primal polarity which these words express. However the movement between these opposites is not, as with Goethe, an eternal to-and-fro motion, but a one directional movement. Thus it is a temporal movement of Becoming to Becomeness, of direction to extension, which underlies the antithesis of Sehnsucht and Sein, Phantasie and Verstand, Sinnlichkeit and Vernunft, Gedanke and Ausdehnung. For Spengler the movement is finite, for Goethe, infinite. The

former expresses the idea that death and nothingness constitute, along with temporal being, reality. The latter reveals that life is infinite, being is eternal. The difference can be detected in the following quotation from the Urfragen: "Der Weltatem, die Wellen des heraklitischen pantarhei, systole und diastole Goethes meinen alle jenen Rhythmus und jene Periodizität, die am deutlichsten im Entstehen und Vergehen (Geburt und Tod, Morgen und Abend) hervortreten, den Atem der Zeit. Dazu gehört auch das Werden und Vergehen der Sternsysteme; das des Lebens auf der Erde: nicht nur der Lebensstag jedes einzelnen, sondern auch der Völker, Kulturen und Rassen." Urf., p. 253. "The world breath, the waves of Heraklitean pante rhei, the systolic and diastolic of Goethe ultimately mean rhythm and periodicity which manifest themselves most clearly in rising and passing away (birth and death, morning and evening). With this belongs also the Becoming and passing away of the star systems and of life on earth: not only the daily life of each individual but also of peoples, cultures, and races." My translation.

Chapter III NIETZSCHE AND SPENGLER

1. Nietzsche defines in Jenseits von Gut und Böse the historical sense as "...die Fähigkeit, die Rangordnung von Wertschätzung schnell zu erraten, nach welchen ein Volk, eine Gesellschaft, ein Mensch gelebt hat, der "divinatorische Instinkt" für die Beziehungen dieser Wertschätzungen, für das Verhältnis der Autorität der Werte zur Autorität der wirkenden Kräfte." II, 686. "...the capacity for divining quickly the order of rank of the valuations according to which a people, a community, or an individual has lived, the divining instinct for the relationships of these valuations to, for the relation of the authority of the valuations to the authority of the operating forces." Beyond Good and Evil, XII, p. 167.
 2. Spengler, "Nietzsche und sein Jahrhundert" in RuA., p. 120.
 3. Ibid., p. 112. Cf. Nietzsche's remark in Menschliches, Allzumenschliches: "Mangel an historischem Sinn ist der Erbfehler aller Philosophen..." I, 448. "Lack of historical sense is the inherited defect of all philosophers." Human, All-too-Human, VI, p. 15.
 4. Cf. Spengler, UdA., I, 137.
 5. Spengler, "Nietzsche und sein Jahrhundert", in RuA., p. 112.
 6. Spengler, "Nietzsche and his Century", in SE., p. 181f.
 7. Spengler, UdA., I, 140-2.
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8. Ibid., p. 134.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., pp. 136-8.
11. Spengler, "Pessimismus", in RuA., p. 70.
12. Spengler, UdA., I, 135f. Cf. also FrZ., p. 26.
13. Ibid., p. 129.
14. Spengler, DW., I, 95.
15. Spengler, UdA., I, 130-2.
16. Nietzsche, I, 252.
17. Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, V, 58.
18. Spengler, Ged., pp. 49f.
19. Spengler, Aph., p. 58.
20. Spengler, "Nietzsche und Sein Jahrhundert", in RuA., 120.
21. Spengler, UdA., I, 213-20.
22. Nietzsche, II, 249.
23. Nietzsche, I, 725f. and 728.
24. Spengler, UdA., I, 127f.
25. Spengler, Urf., p. 67.
26. Spengler, UdA., I, 29.
27. Cf. FrZ., p. 10.
28. Spengler, UdA., I, 24 and 32.
29. Ibid., pp. 39-42.
30. Ibid., p. 62.
31. Ibid., pp. 127f.
32. Cf. Spengler, FrZ., p. 22.
33. Cf. Spengler, UdA., I, 33-5.
34. Spengler, FrZ., p. 31. The standpoint and argument of historic

relativism here by Spengler must be carefully considered in order to see that it carries its own internal consistency. A great deal of the popular criticism directed toward the Untergang has claimed that Spengler's depiction of the psychic natures of other Cultures stands in contradiction to the inherent impossibility of understanding foreign peoples. Many believe this to be the Achilles' heel of the Untergang: a theory which understands the fate of all Cultures to be in the fulfillment and loss of a unique mental and spiritual type is an absolute view and cannot be logically maintained with a relativistic criterion. However, Spengler leaves no doubt that he regards his own conclusions on the subject of human history not as eternal "Truths". He says that his philosophy is an expression of a view limited and determined by Culture, age, and place. See UdA., I, 63. Furthermore, he states: "Was hier darüber gesagt wird, ist nicht "wahr" sondern für diese Kultur und diese Zeitstufe innerlich notwendig, und es überzeugt andre nicht, weil es nur eine Wahrheit gibt, sondern weil sie derselben Epoche angehören." UdA.; I, 191. "...what I say here about it is not "true", but inwardly necessary for this Culture and this time-phase of it, and if it convinces you, it is not because there is only one "truth" but because you and I belong to the same epoch." DW., I, 146. From this it should be clear that the judgments about, and the characterizations of foreign Cultures in the Untergang, indeed the whole organic theory of history, are qualified by Spengler to the extent of saying "This is how I see it". Moreover, qualifications here should not be taken as an attempt to be systematic. It shall be discussed later how Spengler is firmly committed to the conviction that no one can exactly agree with another's point of view, whether or not the other is from a foreign Culture. The case here is that the Spenglerian relativism is essentially a part of the general theme of Destiny. The limited, finite viewpoint of each Culture and person is an affirmation of the once-occurring, irrevocable quality of life. Spengler remarks in Pessimismus? that his philosophy is destined in the hands of future generations to be transformed and to pass away. A theory or view which claims to transcend all limitations and to be absolute would be inconsistent to what Spengler understands as Destiny. On this point, however, one may still claim that Spengler's Destiny cannot be consistently formulated: to say, for example, that Spengler's theory of history is a once-occurring phenomenon, destined to pass away is to make a perennial or absolute statement, which is either true or false. This objection is the same as before: relativism defeats itself because it cannot assert its validity. But as before, this objection is not wholly applicable to the Spenglerian orientation. Given the distinction between the World-as-History and the World-as-Nature, between sensing and understanding, the assertion of the finite once-occurring nature of a viewpoint, idea, or event is an assertion not of a truth, but of a fact. It is not an answer to the question of what? or how?, nor does it presuppose a causal framework.

36. Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, V, 54.
37. Spengler, UdA., I, 138.
38. Ibid.
39. Spengler, DW., I, 102.
40. Spengler, FrZ., pp. 15 and 20.
41. Spengler, Ged., p. 51.
42. Spengler, Aph., p. 59.
43. Nietzsche, I, 250.
44. Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, V, 55.
45. cf. Spengler, Urf., p. 286.
46. Ibid., p. 173.
47. Spengler, UdA., I, 138.
48. Nietzsche, I, 250f.
49. Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, V, 55f.
50. Spengler, UdA., II, 421.
51. Spengler, Ged., p. 47.
52. Spengler, Aph., p. 56.
53. Nietzsche, I, 25.
54. Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, V, 56.
55. Cf. Spengler, UdA., I, 202.
56. Cf. Spengler, Urf., p. 193.
57. Spengler, UdA., II, 15, and Nietzsche, II, 567.
58. Spengler, "Nietzsche und sein Jahrhundert" in RuA., p. 121.
59. Spengler, UdA., II, 14.
60. Ibid., p. 13.
61. Nietzsche, I, 282.
62. Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, V, 96.

63. Cf. Spengler, Urf., pp. 200 and 206f.
64. Nietzsche says of philosophy in Jenseits von Gut und Böse: "... man muss noch den grössten Teil des bewussten Denkens unter die Instinkt-Tätigkeiten rechnen, und sogar im Falle des philosophischen Denkens" II, 569. "...the greater part of the conscious thinking must be counted amongst the instinctive functions, and it is so even in the case of philosophical thinking." Beyond Good and Evil, XII, p. 8
65. Spengler, II, 14.
66. Spengler, DW., II, 11.
67. Spengler, "Nietzsche und sein Jahrhundert", in RuA., p. 121.
68. Spengler, "Nietzsche and his Century", in SE., p. 194.
69. Spengler, Urf., p. 203.
70. Ibid.
71. Spengler, "Nietzsche und sein Jahrhundert", in RuA., p. 121.
72. Nietzsche says in Jenseits von Gut und Böse: "...Leben selbst ist wesentlich Aneignung, Verletzung, Überwältigung des Fremden und Schwächeren, Unterdrückung, Härte, Aufzwingung eigener Formen, Einverleibung und mindestens, mildestens, Ausbeutung.... Die "Ausbeutung" gehört nicht einer verderbten oder unvollkommen und primitiven Gesellschaft an, sie gehört ins Wesen des Lebendigen, als organische Grundfunktion, sie ist eine Folge des eigentlichen Willens zur Macht, der eben der Wille des Lebens ist - Gesetzt, dies ist als Theorie eine Neuerung - als Realität ist es das Urfaktum aller Geschichte: man sei doch soweit gegen sich ehrlich II, 729. "...life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of peculiar forms, incorporation, and at the least, putting it mildest, exploitation.... "Exploitation" does not belong to a depraved, or imperfect and primitive society: it belongs to the nature of the living being as a primary organic function; it is a consequence of the intrinsic Will of Life. - Granting that as a theory this is a novelty - as a reality it is the fundamental fact of all history: let us be so far honest towards ourselves!" Beyond Good and Evil, XII, 226f.
73. Spengler states: "Das Leben ist der Kampf zwischen der inneren Seele und der fremden (den fremden Seelen) der Welt--hoffnungslos tapfer oder feige. Urf., p. 145. "Life is the battle between the inner soul and the foreign (the foreign souls) of the world - hopelessly brave or cowardly." My translation.
74. Spengler, UdA., II, 20-4. Zarathustra says: "Ich beschwöre euch, meine Brüder, bleibt der Erde treu und glaubt denen nicht, welche

euch von überirdischen Hoffnungen reden!" II, 280. "Remain faithful to the earth, and do not believe those who speak to you of other-worldly hopes." Thus Spake Zarathustra, XI, 7.

75. Nietzsche, II, 584f.
76. Spengler, UdA., II, 137.
77. Spengler, Urf., pp. 194-7.
78. Nietzsche, II, 648.
79. Spengler, UdA., II, 9.
80. Ibid., pp. 361-75.
81. Spengler, UdA., I, 414f.
82. Nietzsche, II, 596.
83. Spengler, "Nietzsche und sein Jahrhundert" in RuA., p. 122.
84. Spengler, UdA., II, 20-3.
85. Ibid., pp. 419f.
86. Ibid., p. 416.
87. Ibid., pp. 432-9.
88. Cf. Spengler, FrZ., p. 34.
89. Spengler says of Nietzsche: "Was zuerst Nietzsche klar gesehen hat, ist, dass der Erkennenstrieb nicht auf ein Wissen gerichtet ist, sondern auf ein Tun. Das Leben, als Mikrokosmos im Makrokosmos isoliert, muss 'logisch' handeln, um nicht zu vergehen. Infolge dieser beständigen Notwendigkeit wächst das Erkennen aus dem Antasten heraus." Urf., p. 199. "Nietzsche was the first to see clearly that the cognitive-drive (Erkennenstrieb) is not directed towards knowing, but towards doing. Life, isolated as Microcosm in the Macrocosm, must act 'logically' in order not to perish. Due to this constant necessity, cognition grows out from groping." My translation.
90. Spengler, UdA., I, 155.
91. Ibid., pp. 95f.
92. Cf. Spengler, UdA., II, 449-53, 548-55, and Urf., p. 298.
93. Nietzsche, I, 218.

94. Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, V, 15.
95. Nietzsche, I, 231.
96. Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, V, 50.
97. Spengler, UdA., I, 139.
98. Ibid., pp. 54f.
99. Cf. Spengler, FrZ., p. 3.
100. Spengler, UdA., I, 347.
101. Nietzsche, III, 495.
102. Nietzsche, Will-to-Power, XV, 101. Not only does the pluralism of the Will-to-Power distinguish Nietzsche and Spengler from Schopenhauer, but also this pluralistic reality implies a natural order of rank based upon the degree of inherited Will-to-Power.
103. Spengler, UdA., I, 50.
104. Ibid., p. 63.
105. Spengler, DW., I, 46.
106. Nietzsche, III, 430.
107. Spengler, UdA., I, 444.
108. Spengler, DW., I, 346.
109. Spengler, "Pessimismus?", in RuA., p. 68.
110. Spengler, "Pessimismus?", in SE., p. 140.

Chapter IV, CONCLUSION: SPENGLER'S POINT OF VIEW

1. Cf. Spengler, Urf., p. 279.
2. Goethe (Weimar Aufgabe), IV, 11, 22.
3. Spengler, Ged., p. 123.
4. Henry Kissinger has fallen into error when he states: "The World-as-History and the World-as-Nature are, after all merely metaphysical abstractions for the apprehension of events, not objective modes of real occurrences." The Meaning of History: Reflections on Spengler.

Toynbee, and Kant (Harvard Univ. Archives nd.), p. 42. .We have demonstrated the very opposite. The World-as-History rests upon the fact of Becoming, and likewise the World-as-Nature, rests upon the fact of Becomeness. The way the world is to be understood arises out of the dual nature of reality. One can know the World-as-History by the fact that one lives, and hence is and makes history, and the World-as-Nature, as other-worldliness, rests for its ideal construction likewise on the facticity of pulsating life under the shadow of real death.

5. Spengler, UdA., I, 73f.
6. Ibid., pp. 130-2.
7. Ibid., p. 170.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., pp. 138-40.
10. Ibid., II, 330.
11. Ibid., I, 131f.

PART II

THE SPENGLERIAN PHILOSOPHY

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION: THEME AND SCOPE OF THE UNTERGANG

The foremost theme in the Untergang is Destiny, and this word is presented by Spengler through the expressions "Becoming and Becomeness", "life and death", "time and space". All other themes of the Untergang play a subordinate role in comparison to that of Destiny. That every higher Culture unconsciously and inevitably manifests in all of its culture-forms an Idea, that each Culture has its own particular existence and historical extinction—these themes rest upon the strength of the metaphysical insights surrounding Spengler's intuition of Destiny. Further the themes that blood and instinct, not intellect and thought rule the history of man, that reality is Will-to-Power, and that human history is tragic, purposeless, yet sublime—these themes serve as moments to the general theme of Destiny, and their expositions are ultimately expositions on the various connotations which Spengler attaches to this key word. The task in this chapter is to attain to an intuition of Destiny as it emerges through these various subordinate themes.

Progress has already been made towards an elucidation of the Destiny theme through understanding that Spengler's view presupposes in its own way the Eleatic paradox: Nothing somehow is. Since "Destiny" embraces both Becoming and Having-Become, Being and Not-Being, the words "space", "extension", "death", and "matter" must serve as expressions of the notion of nothingness. Hence a full clarification of

Spengler's Destiny theme must also serve to demonstrate the correctness of this interpretation. Contained in the notion of Urkultur and Destiny is the mortality of every higher Culture, and this requires an account of how Spengler sees the disappearance of a Culture's Destiny-Idea and therewith its own significance and history.

Chapter II

DESTINY

1. Longing and Fear

Spengler begins his exposition of Destiny in the Untergang with a re-evaluation of the ideas of time and space. In contrast to the traditional treatment of time in the formal sciences, Spengler finds that the expressions "Destiny" and "Becoming" are interchangeable with "time".¹ The common meaning behind all three of these terms cannot be conveyed through mathematical and scientific conception. In keeping with the physiognomic approach, Spengler holds that the final meaning of these terms must come through an inwardly felt experience which these words evoke.² Ultimately the meaning of space is also to be introspectively sensed and not intellectually understood through abstract concepts.³ Both time and space, just like the notions of history and Destiny, require not systematic understanding, but an appeal to self-consciousness and intuitive insight.⁴

According to Spengler, the two most basic feelings of all animal life are Sehnsucht (yearning or longing) and Angst (fear or dread).⁵ It is these two feelings that reveal to the individual the real significance of time and space.⁶ Longing is responsible for producing the enigma of time as the cosmic process of aging, and fear is the primordial reaction to the awareness of the world as extended, lifeless space.⁷ The interplay of these two feelings gives rise to the instinctive

awareness of the fundamental opposition between time and space.⁸

One becomes aware of these two prime feelings at the moment of sensing the isolation and vulnerability of oneself in the world. With loneliness, one feels an acute longing to be at one with one's world (Umwelt) and to make everything that is alien proper to oneself. But forever accompanying this longing for the world is the fear of the world.⁹ Animal-fear has its origin in the awareness of otherness, of the alien, and consequently it vivifies the separation of 'I' and 'thou', self and world. On the one hand, Spengler connects longing with the notion of direction: longing is detected in the involuntary reaching into the world and the effort to establish oneself in an harmonious unity with the world. On the other hand, Spengler associates fear with the notion of distance: fear is the impulsive recoil from the otherness of the world.¹⁰ From the constant attempt to appropriate the external world, the child soon becomes sensible of the one-directional flow of life and of each living-moment as irrevocable and once-occurring.¹¹ Longing is thus indicative of the organic logic of Becoming. This uncanny feeling of the steady movement of life towards fulfillment and death, i.e. life as Destiny, is comprised in, rather than denoted by the word "time". With the increasing consciousness that the gap of 'I' and 'world' can never be finally bridged, the child senses the meaning of his own mortality.¹² While animal-fear arises from the awareness that the other possesses a numen, and hence is a source of unknown desire and possible hostility, distinctively human-fear (dread or anxiety) includes the consciousness that one possesses the alien element of irreversibility.¹³ The feeling of the non-repeatable flow of time, which is longing itself,

becomes the root of dread. According to Spengler, dread is experienced with the awareness that the impersonal cosmic movement of living-time will carry the 'I' to death. The dread of death is a dread of becoming like the Become, fixed and set-fast, i.e. like all that which is comprised in the word "space".¹⁴ In brief, the real meaning of "time" is revealed through longing, and the meaning of "space" is revealed through the dread of death. Both of these prime feelings, though intimately intertwined in every man's existence, emerge out of opposing aspects of human reality.¹⁵

Longing arises out of the irreversible movement of life towards fulfillment and death, and this movement signifies for Spengler what "time" is in its deepest sense. We ourselves are time insofar as we live, Spengler says.¹⁶ It is in the reflection upon one's past existence as something which is over and done with, and upon one's future-oriented hopes and enterprises as that which is yet-to-be that one becomes aware of longing as the prime feeling of the unconscious flow of life or time.¹⁷ Another word which is closely related and often interchangeable with "life" and "time" is the term, "Dasein". In the Untergang, "Dasein" specifically denotes the existence or being of either the individual or the Culture as a living whole, but it carries also the connotation that either of these beings consists of particular drives which aim towards further duration.¹⁸ Thus Dasein, time, life, Becoming, direction, instinct—all belong together.¹⁹

World-fear and dread, however, bring out another side of human reality.²⁰ Whereas longing reveals the unconscious, irrevocable flow of living-time, fear manifests itself in the states of consciousness.

For Spengler, consciousness means tension or polarity between self and world, I and thou, proper and alien.²¹ As such, consciousness presents the extended, rigid domain of the spatial world which exists as the presupposition of all polarity between ego and non-ego. "Wachsein" (Waking-Being) is the word which Spengler uses to signify the state of Dasein oriented by consciousness.²² The domain of Wachsein is causal comprehension. One may concern oneself with a practical matter or with a theory. In the first case, one thinks in terms of ends and means; in the second case, one thinks in terms of grounds and consequences.²³ In either mode, one necessarily employs a form of causality.²⁴ Thus Wachsein belongs with space, causality, and extension.²⁵

As Spengler describes it, all Culture has its source in longing and fear, that is, in the Dasein side and the Wachsein side of reality. Indeed, Culture is a manifestation of this contradictory nature. According to Spengler, in all sublime forms of Culture (e.g. great art or epoch-making deeds), it is possible to detect the presence of the felt-opposition of longing and fear.²⁶ Yet, as in the case of viewing the world as Becoming or as Becomèness, one side of life predominates, and one is thus directed in life basically by longing or by fear.

All that comes under the heading of knowledge owes its existence to fear. Animal-fear of the alien as well as the inward human dread of death lie behind all systematic understanding. This feeling, Spengler declares, is the most creative of all feelings.²⁷ From it emerge preeminently all great religions, science, philosophy, and mathematics. The compelling need to create the picture of the World-as-Nature, the systematic, causal view of the world, is generated by

the desire to free oneself from this prime feeling.²⁸ Spengler exemplifies the psychology of fear in the first and clearest example of knowledge, name-magic.²⁹ Primitive mankind found the foremost means of appropriating and subduing the threatening powers of the alien world by naming. To be able to name the deities and daemons is to know them, and this means somehow to be able to placate, conjure, bind, or bridle them.³⁰ The name casts a spell over the alien numen and renders it less threatening, less alien. By coupling names together, deities could be evoked to dispel other deities. As Spengler sees it, all systematic knowledge is, in the last analysis, naming.³¹ It is the ability to label the cause of an effect. Knowledge of the cause is defense against the alien, and the more one understands—i.e. the more linkages of cause-and-effect one knows—the further one drives away world-fear. It was seen in the last chapter how Spengler regarded knowing as a "killing procedure".³² Causality presupposes a spatial realm in which it can operate, and causal cognition makes the alien numen an essential part of stiff, extended space. Thus the Spenglerian psychology of knowing and naming is an intuitive presentation of the effort to transform the Becoming powers of the alien world into dead objects of the Become.³³

World-fear also plays a role in that side of human existence which has nothing to do with systematic thought. The crowding together of individual egos into the unity of a state (and therewith political and economic being) is tainted with fear of the alien and death. However, it is longing which is the real, dominant feeling in secular life. What is significant in the existence of the statesman, soldier,

and businessman as opposed to the priest, philosopher, and scientist is the instinctive will-to-endure and will-to-succeed in the world.³⁴ The former type follows more closely the urge of longing; the latter reacts more to world-fear. This is the key to the conflicting tendencies of every man. Longing directs one to the active life of this world; fear drives one into other-worldliness. As the inward sensation of irrevocable Becoming and time, longing is the urge to live on. Spengler notes that the two symbols of duration are the warrior with sword in hand and the mother with child at her breast.³⁵ Each represents the desire to maintain life and to care for future life. The instincts of Dasein seek to have a future, and this entails experiencing the fact-world and its history. In contrast, the attempt to drive away dread tends in the direction of re-casting the world into another form or image. The overcoming of inward forebodings by wresting out the secrets of existence leads to the renunciation of the fact-world and the creation of a World-as-Nature.³⁶ It could be considered an axiom of Spengler's philosophy that the more one knows, the less one cares for this world and its history. A man who is strong in intellect concerns himself first with timeless truths and laws that an image of the World-as-Nature has proved, and second (if at all) with problems of factual success.³⁷ In such a person, Wachsein rules over Dasein. The artificial creations of the World-as-Nature not only free one from the cares of the fact-world, but also give one a sense of superiority over it. Priestly askesis is the highest manifestation of a life driven by a deep-seated fear into the renunciation of the sensuous realm for a superior, timeless world.³⁸ But, according to Spengler, every born-intellectual feels the

same superiority and freedom of his mind over his body, of his thought over the historical events around him.³⁹

For Spengler, every man's life is a mysterious combination of longing and fear. Any art work or any great deed which reveals the whole existence of a man will necessarily reflect elements of both of these feelings.⁴⁰ Even the deepest world-shy scholar can display in his thought elements of unconscious longing, and likewise the most practical type of person is not without some sort of metaphysical or theoretical convictions. Yet in every person one side of life dominates, and one is basically a man of thought or a man of action. The one type of man regards the "facts" around him as most significant, while the other considers the "truth" of these facts as more significant. In the former, longing predominates, in the latter, world-fear. According to Spengler, this divergence creates the deep opposition between the soldier and the priest, the merchant and the idealist, the politician and the savant. The man of facts lives the world in its Becoming, and his existence, though he might not "know" it, is the living proof of volunta superior intellectu. On the other hand, the existence of the man of truths is a living expression of the ideal that the constantly possible is ever-superior to the irrevocable fact.

The basic contrast of longing and fear pervades every layer and form of Culture in the Untergang. Yet, it is important to realize at the outset that longing is the more primordial feeling and that fear, though being fundamentally opposed, rises out of longing and thus presupposes longing.⁴¹ It was said above that the felt awareness of the irrevocable movement of living, directional time, which is longing,

gives birth to the dread of death. As Spengler puts this thought, ". . . denn auch die Sehnsucht liegt der Angst zugrunde; sie wird zur Angst, nicht umgekehrt . . ." ⁴² (It is the longing that underlies the dread, becomes the dread, and not vice versa.) ⁴³ In general, every conjugation of the Dasein side of life underlies and ontically precedes the Wachsein side of life: extended matter, the corpse, and causality presuppose the temporal-being of Destiny, life, and history. However, many critics of the Untergang, as J. Volhelm, E. Troeltsch, and A. Baltzer, who have spoken of Spengler's great powers of intuition, find that this fundamental relationship between longing and fear is "undurchdacht". ⁴⁴ It is worth quoting Baltzer's objection in full:

Die "Sehnsucht" geht nicht der "Weltangst", das Zeitempfinden nicht dem Raumeindruck voraus, wie Spengler auf S. 115 des I. Bandes und an anderen Stellen irrtümlich meint. Denn der Schritt zur Abwehr erfolgt, ehe sich in den—als "eigen" wiedererkannten—Formen dieser Abwehr "Weltsehnsucht" ausdrückt. Jedoch nicht nur den intuitiven Darstellungen Spenglers liegt die wahre Reihenfolge Angst-Sehnsucht, Raumeindruck-Zeit zugrunde, auch aus seinen schon mehr reflektierenden Gedanken geht sie hervor. Denn nach Spenglers oben angeführten Darlegungen ist das Todeserlebnis, die "Weltangst", das richtungweisende grosse erste Erlebnis von Einzelmensch und Kultureinheit. An einer Stelle sagt er auch ausdrücklich, dass sich der Mensch im Kindesstadium stets zuerst des (der "Weltangst" zugeordneten) "Räumlichen" und danach des (der "Weltsehnsucht" zugeordneten) "Zeitlichen" bewusst wird. (Bard I, 12)

Dennoch sieht Spengler das Geschehen mit seinem Bewusstsein meist in einer anderen Reihenfolge. Wo liegt die Fehlerquelle? Sie ist zu suchen in seiner mangelhaften Unterscheidung zwischen Raumeindruck, Raumbewusstsein, "Weltangst" am Beginn jeder organischen Kulturentwicklung einerseits und dem Vordringen der tödenden Raumwirklichkeit andererseits, die sich mit dem Fortschreiten der Kultur stetig verstärkt.

Die "Zeit" kommt als Reaktion auf den räumlichen Eindruck, auf die "Weltangst" hin zustande und führt ihrerseits gerade die Raumwirklichkeit, den Tod herbei, dem sie danach zwangsläufig unterliegen muss. ⁴⁵


The "longing" does not precede "world-fear", nor the perception of time the impression of space, as Spengler erroneously asserts on page 115 of the first volume and in other

places. For the step to defence before "world-longing" expresses itself in the "proper" recognized forms of this defence. However, the true sequence, fear-yearning, space impression-time not only is the basis of Spengler's intuitive presentations, but also proceeds from his more reflective thoughts. For according to Spengler, as was seen in the above analysis, the death-experience (world-fear) is direction-giving (richtungsweisende) and the first great experience of individual man and culture-unity. In one place he says expressly that man in the period of childhood is at first continuously aware of the "spatial" (subsumed under world-fear) and afterwards of the "temporal" (subsumed under world-longing). (Volume I, 12)

Nevertheless Spengler sees the events with his awareness mostly in a different sequence. Where lies the source of the mistake? It is to be sought in his defective distinction between the impression of space, consciousness of space, "world-fear" at the beginning of each organic Culture development of the one hand and on the other hand the urgency of the deathly actuality of space, which continually intensifies as Culture progresses.

"Time" comes about as reaction to the spatial impression, to the "world-fear" and brings about for its part the actuality of space, i.e. death, to which it eventually must forcibly succumb.⁴⁶

This objection seems valid, especially so when one reads Spengler's account in section XI of the chapter, "Vom Sinn der Zahlen". Longing cannot underlie fear, for the awareness of longing entails self-consciousness, and as Spengler states at the beginning of this section, loneliness--and therefore fear--mark the beginning of the awareness of the individual ego.⁴⁷ It will be seen further on that the birth of a national sense, a "we" or rational-I, as well as the sense of a Culture-I, has likewise its beginning in world-fear and dread of death. Before one can experience the meaning behind the longing to overcome the alien world and make it proper (eigen), one must first be aware of the distinction of self and world, and with this one must experience the fear of death.⁴⁸ The realization of time as life and aging is a reaction to the awareness of the spatial world as rigidity



ard pure lifeless extension.

However, what is overlooked in this objection is that Spengler's thought is not in disagreement with it at a deeper level. In another part of the Untergang, it is stated:

Die Zeit ist ein Gegenbegriff zum Raume, so wie erst im Gegensatz zum Denken nicht die Tatsache, aber der Begriff des Lebens, und erst im Gegensatz zum Tode nicht die Tatsache, aber der Begriff des Entstehens, der Zeugung entstanden ist. Das liegt tief im Wesen allen Wachseins begründet.⁴⁹

Time is a counter-conception (Gegenbegriff) to Space, arising out of Space, just as the notion (as distinct from the fact) of Life arises only in opposition to thought, and the notion (as distinct from the fact) of birth and generation only in opposition to death. This is implicit in the very essence of all awareness.⁵⁰

When it is a question of temporal priority, the awareness of world-fear, spatial perception, and the conceptualization of space and death necessarily precede the awareness of longing and the conceptualization of time. To repeat, the meaning of longing as the becoming of one's life is only possible in reflection upon past and future events, and the state of reflection entails the realization of self-awareness and detachment from the alien world.⁵¹ When Spengler states that longing precedes fear, he is referring not to the temporal priority of awareness (Wachsein), but to the metaphysical priority of existence (Dasein).

It is another way of expressing the Nietzschean thesis that consciousness and the intellectual side of man in general serve as instruments of unconscious Will and Life. Furthermore, when Spengler states that longing becomes fear, he is expressing in another way the peculiar nature of the Destiny of both the individual person and the Culture.⁵²

Though the term "longing" is often taken by Spengler to mean simply the

felt-awareness of life, he often uses this term in such a way as to be synonymous with will, life, and Dasein.⁵³ Consequently, the passage of longing into fear signifies that human life is essentially the realization of unconscious Dasein into Wachsein. It is another way of saying that Destiny is the transformation of time into space.

2. Universal Time and Directional Time

With this characterization of longing and fear, it is now possible to see how unique Spengler's understanding of time is in comparison to the physicist's conception of it.

Longing is ultimately responsible for the awareness of future, because as instinctive Will and Becoming, it is the future. As Spengler sees it, this primordial desire to achieve unity and stability in the alien world prefigures the yet-to-become or the still-to-be-actualized (Vollendende).⁵⁴ What stands as one's living possibilities describes one's future, and the subduing and appropriating of the alien world is the actualizing of these possibilities or one's future.⁵⁵ Spengler equates the meaning of future with the notion of Soul (Seele). The yet-to-be-accomplished possibilities of an existence (Dasein) are the Soul of a particular individual, class, nation, or Culture.

On the other hand, the term "World" denotes for Spengler the accomplished or actualized (Vollendete).⁵⁶ Since dread is initially the awareness of death as the fixed, rigid Becomeness of oneself, the extended world stands for the actualized or no-longer-possible which follows from the yet-to-be-possible. The world is then the past, the outcome of the realization of a soul. The dread of death is the dread

of becoming like the world, (extended, inert) of becoming past, of having no future.

Time, as the one-directional movement of Dasein, is therefore the incomprehensible transformation of the yet-to-be into the accomplished, future into past, soul into world.⁵⁷ The actualizing itself, i.e. the launching out into the future, gives rise to the sense of the present. This actualization is a continuous effort to accomplish a unity of soul and world. Spengler calls this effort "Life".

The contrast between this intuitive concept of time and the time of physical and mathematical formulations is evident. Spengler remarks that one has only to substitute the word "Destiny" for the word "time" in any physical law to see how the decisive property of direction is altogether absent.⁵⁸ The "time" which the physicist treats is not real time at all, but only a "phantom time" (das Phantom einer Zeit), having nothing to do with the experience of history.⁵⁹ Expressions like "development", "fulfillment", "vocation", "scope", "aim", "birth", "aging", and "death", words which particularly evoke the feeling of directionality or Destiny, do not figure in the vocabulary of a strictly mathematical or physical image of the world. Neither "future" nor "past" play a role in any picture of the World-as-Nature. Such a terminology has definite meaning only insofar as one senses reality physiognomically.

As before, the misrepresentation of reality stems from causal comprehension.⁶⁰ Real directional time, as one lives it, cannot be cognized by the category of causality, and therefore, all attempts to understand it scientifically are impossible.⁶¹ It was seen in the

chapter on methodology that critical cognition of living reality (Dasein) is the artificial transformation of reality as Becoming into the spatial form of it as the Become. Directional time belongs to the domain of the organic and Becoming, and eo ipso is beyond causal comprehension. But the "phantom time" of physics, Spengler claims, is nothing other than this spatial form of real time.⁶² The misrepresentation is magnified when one attempts to set up a relation between real time and mathematical number. Spengler criticizes Kant in particular for trying to demonstrate a connection between arithmetic and time:

Weil der lebendige Akt des Zählens mit der Zeit irgendwie in Beziehung steht, hat man immer wieder Zahl und Zeit vermengt. Aber Zählen ist keine Zahl, so wenig als Zeichnen eine Zeichnung ist. Zählen und Zeichnen sind ein Werden, Zahlen und Figuren sind Gewordnes. Kant und die andern haben dort den lebendigen Akt (das Zählen), hier dessen Ergebnis (die Verhältnisse der fertigen Figur) ins Auge gefasst.⁶³

Because the living act of numbering is somehow or other related to time, number and time are constantly confused. But numbering is not number, any more than drawing is a drawing. Numbering and drawing are a becoming, numbers and figures are things become. Kant and the rest have in mind now the living act (numbering) and now the result thereof (the relations of the finished figure)⁶⁴

Time as it is lived in the acts of numbering, measuring, dividing, and calculating is completely different from time conceived as a universal form which can be numbered, measured, divided, and calculated. In the former, time is a directed or fated course; in the latter, it is conceived as a mere extended line, directionless, divisible, reversible.⁶⁵

Now, though Spengler finds it necessary to criticize this scientific treatment of time, he nevertheless thinks that physics and all system-building philosophy must distort the felt-image of the world in its Becoming. It is not simply a question of the impossibility of

a World-as-Nature being constructed out of the physiognomatic experience of directional time, i.e. of soul (future) transforming itself into world (past).⁶⁶ The formulation of "phantom time" in every image of the World-as-Nature derives directly from the inward dread of death.⁶⁷ Once again, it is a matter of sensing the alien "it" within oneself as the flow of real time. The deeper the dread of irrevocability and mortality, the more waking-consciousness (Wachsein) anxiously seeks to halt the march of time, to cast a spell over it, and thereby to silence the threat of death. Thus, it is more a necessity of life than of thought that the category of causality creates another world, a world of pure timeless nature, to console the self from the world of Destiny. Out of dread and, as Spengler also says, out of hatred of the unknown, death, and Destiny, a convincing picture of an anti-fated, eternal world emerges.⁶⁸

Spengler observes the timeless quality of the scientific-vision most clearly in formulated laws.⁶⁹ It is a fundamental characteristic of all natural laws to deal only with the continuously possible and never with the singularly possible.⁷⁰ For the physicist and chemist, it does not matter whether any particular possibility has ever been actualized. What matters is by what law the possible event must take place. Spengler remarks that as long as a law is demonstrably possible—though it never manifests itself as a Fact—it would still have a place in the fixed system of nature as a Truth.⁷¹ What is significant in the World-as-Nature is not facts in their once-occurring, non-repeatable character. What is important is the form the facts take on, i.e. the universal, timeless relationship among facts and things.

It is the abstract relationship of the facts, viz. the natural law, and not the facts themselves, that are repeatable or constantly possible.⁷² The source of this eternal relationship is causal cognition. To cognize an event as an effect or cause of another event means to see it no longer in its coming into being, i.e. in its uniqueness and irreversibility. Spengler states: "Alles Erkannte aber ist zeitlos, weder vergangen noch zukünftig, sondern schlechthin 'vorhanden' und also von dauernder Gültigkeit. Dies gehört zur inneren Beschaffenheit des Naturgesetzlichen."⁷³ (Everything cognized, on the contrary, is timeless, neither past nor future but simply "there", and consequently permanently valid, as indeed the very constitution of natural law requires that it should be)⁷⁴ Directional time is not denied by the physicist, but it is disregarded all the same.⁷⁵

It is of the utmost importance to understand here that Spengler's antithesis between truth and fact, the constantly possible and the singularly possible, universal time and directional time rests ultimately upon a functional relationship. The World-as-Nature—be it a physical image of reality, theological doctrine, or metaphysical system—emerges from the sense of mortality. World-fear, therefore, is directly responsible for the projection of a counter-world and for setting up the opposition between timeless truth and the irrevocable fact. But it has already been noted that longing as Dasein and Becoming underlies fear and is presupposed by it. This entails that what a finite intellect holds as a timeless truth or sees as an eternal law derives ultimately from a living existence.⁷⁶ Whatever image may pass as the World-as-Nature is an expression of a particular Dasein, the yearning and

actualizing of a certain soul. Looked at from this angle, it can be seen why Spengler regards every theory, doctrine, equation, natural law, and faith to be in a final way similar to social customs, political tact, economic and industrial enterprises. Despite the antithesis of the World-as-Nature and the World-as-History, the former as well as the latter is a manifestation of psychic principles. As such, every timeless truth is taken by Spengler to be a symbol, and every symbol stands in functional dependence upon a living or once-living soul.

The understanding of time as the movement of soul into world is in fundamental accord with this functional relationship. That every World-as-Nature is a reflection of a particular soul means that every World-as-Nature is a reflection of the living possibilities which were open to a certain age.⁷⁷ Inherent in all Baroque philosophy and physics is not merely the individual outlook of certain great intellects, but also the inner forms and principles that reveal the character of an aging Culture's soul. Every natural law and mathematical formula, just as every state constitution, or artistic school, must experience the cosmic process of time. The fact that every truth has a history means that its appearance depends upon life and must suffer the Destiny of passing away. That world-systems arise, hold the day, and then forever disappear, signifies either that the soul which created them and thought about them has encountered different (later) possibilities or that the soul has exhausted all its possibilities and is no longer alive. In brief, all truths and images of Nature, being functions of a particular Dasein, must experience the history of that Dasein.⁷⁸ This is Spengler's

understanding of Destiny and of Goethe's last stanza of Faust II:
 "Alles Vergängliche ist nur ein Gleichnis".⁷⁹ (All we see before us
 passing/ Sign and symbol is alone.)⁸⁰

3. Dasein and Wachsein

The expressions "time", "Destiny", and "Dasein" are in the end interchangeable words which Spengler uses to indicate the actualization of a soul.⁸¹ Consequently the term "Soul" means something other than what it has meant in scientific psychology. The characterization of soul as Future sets aside all attempts of conceiving it as an object of study. Spengler's polemic on the understanding of time as an abstract form is inwardly the same as his polemic on the discipline of psychology. There can be no "soul-science" since the soul is not an object. Physics, chemistry, biology—all have fixed objects to analyze and dissect.⁸² But the soul does not belong to the realm of the Become—it belongs with Becoming.⁸³ No matter how much philosophers and psychologists have sought to avoid presenting the soul as a thing-like substance or form, it cannot be systematically treated and therefore it has no place in a picture of Nature.⁸⁴ Likewise, all the terms which are used to depict the soul—will, desire, reason, fear, jealousy, hatred—refer to a reality that cannot be causally cognized.⁸⁵ As Spengler puts it, "Seele ist ein Geheimnis, nur geahnt, nicht begriffen."⁸⁶ (Soul is a secret, only divined, not conceived.)⁸⁷ The only type of psychology acceptable to Spengler is one whose method is physiognomy.

In one way, Spengler speaks of the soul of a Culture, nation, people, estate, or individual person as Nietzsche had done. It is that

incomprehensible something which one physiognomically intuits in the fact-world as character or style.⁸⁸ "Soul", in this sense, refers to an unconscious disposition of something that is living. But by equating the soul with future and the uniquely possible, Spengler underlines the fact that this unanalyzable something is intangible and Becoming. As a result, the word "soul" indicates uniqueness of character as well as the irreversible impersonal element of this character.⁸⁹

Therefore the word "soul" as Spengler understands it does not mean the conscious 'I' or ego. Rather, a soul, in the case of animal and human Dasein, has a conscious 'I'.⁹⁰ Awareness is an aspect, and by far not the most essential aspect, of a living soul. In the Untergang, "soul" signifies the coming into being of a particular organic principle (Dasein), and consciousness—or better a particular consciousness—is a manifestation (just as the visible, tangible body is a manifestation) of this Becoming.⁹¹ Every act of consciousness is thus a state of a specific soul, expressing the momentary, transient quality of it,

Yet in the Urfragen Spengler stresses the uniqueness of consciousness in the actualizing of a soul: "'Seele' gibt es nur wachend, wenn auch noch so dumpf und dunkel. Wachen und Schlafen sind seelenhaftes und seelenloses Leben. Die Seele ist mikrokosmisch im Makrokosmos."⁹² (There is only a waking soul, even when it is dull and dark. Waking and sleeping are soul-full and soul-less life. The soul is microcosmic in the Macrocosm.) What must be gathered first from these statements is that consciousness, though itself not the unique reality, is a sign or manifestation of the unique reality of a soul. Indeed, the relationship of consciousness to soul is basically of the same nature as that

between universal time and directional time, fear and longing, causality and Destiny.⁹⁴ The former owes its being to the latter. As longing realizes itself, in part, in the transformation of itself into fear, so the soul realizes itself, in part, in a particular consciousness. Seen in this light, Spengler's inherent understanding of the nature of consciousness comes to the fore. As a manifestation of the soul, consciousness must be different from the soul. The progressive acts of consciousness are moments of the progressive realization of the soul. Consciousness, in general, therefore, is the result, i.e. something chronologically past, fixed, and Become, of a soul, which again is a Becoming.

What is of importance to note for now is the weight which Spengler puts upon the advent of consciousness. What it means is that the Dasein of all animal-life is no longer the plant-like cosmic process of birth, time, and death. With conscious life, cosmic oneness is broken asunder into the duality of 'I' and otherness. For a soul to possess consciousness indicates that a soul has awakened to the difference between the "here" and the "there", the "proper" and the "alien". The world suddenly takes on meaning insofar as an 'I' can relate itself to it.⁹⁵ The state of life in which an 'I' must continually orient itself to its counterpart, the alien world, is Wachsein. It is the beginning of all intellectual life. As Spengler summarizes it, "Seele und Bewusstsein=Wachsein."⁹⁶ (Soul and consciousness=Waking-Being.)⁹⁷ The plant, in contrast, experiences nothing of Wachsein, meaning, and the tension of two poles of actuality.⁹⁸ For its life is only the unfolding of the will of a genus or class. Each particular plant is in servitude

to a greater reality and is, as such, wholly cosmic. But an animal is in itself a small cosmos in a larger one, a Microcosm facing a Macrocosm. Consciousness separates it from the universe and makes it stand in opposition to it.⁹⁹ Characteristic of all free-moving life is the consciousness of this life, the sense of 'I' standing over against an alien world and defining its position towards it.¹⁰⁰ Spengler is fond of comparing the soul of an animal to a kernel and the world to the shell of this kernel. The soul is like a living flame or center of force which seeks to radiate out beyond its conscious boundary and establish a cosmic unity with the world.¹⁰¹

The question of how Wachsein (micro-macrocosmic being) emerged out of Dasein (cosmic being) constitutes, for Spengler, one of the greatest mysteries of life.¹⁰² It is a question which no will-to-understand can ever answer. But upon this mystery Spengler bases the final thoughts of his philosophy. The life and history of all animal-being, from the one-cell creature to man, is essentially a matter in which an 'I' must continually take its bearings in a particular environment and direct itself towards the final end of enduring in this environment.¹⁰³

Spengler notes that the plant has no specific bearings to take, no right or left, no forward and backward. Orientation and willed movement belong to Wachsein and thus come only with consciousness. Unlike the self-moving animal, the soil-bound plant is at one with the environment—it is the environment.¹⁰⁴ Yet, according to Spengler, what sends the microcosmic animal along its directed course in a macrocosm is the plant-like (cosmic) nature in it.¹⁰⁵ To be sure, it is not the sensitive or intellectual nature of Wachsein, but primordial will, instinct, or longing

of Dasein which drives the animal towards making the environment proper to itself. To use Spengler's examples, it is Dasein, not Wachsein, which is expressing itself in the even turning and gliding of a flock of birds, in the uniform dancing and working of a bee colony, in the rhythmic strokes of the fish.¹⁰⁶ In brief, it is cosmic 'it', not a conscious 'I' that is expressing itself here. Generally speaking, the microcosmic animal is compelled by the inner force of Dasein (of the cosmic being within itself) to break down the polarity of 'I' and otherness, Microcosm and Macrocosm, and to establish a plantlike unity with its environment. As said before, the 'I' of every man feels a deep-seated longing to overcome the alien nature of the Macrocosm, to subdue it, and to bring it in harmony with himself. The 'I' may mistakenly take this longing to be a projection of its own particular individuality, but the longing of the soul is synonymous with the compulsions of an 'it', and as such, it is an 'it'—the irrevocable temporal element—that presses the 'I' to seek plantlike unity with the alien. Once again, the life of the 'I', Wachsein, is in servitude to Dasein and is thus an expression and means for its ends. Hence Spengler's paradoxical view of all conscious life: the microcosmic animal seeks to overcome the alien, and its inherent instrument for this end is consciousness, that which imposes a barrier between itself and the alien.¹⁰⁷

The contradictory nature of animal-being is expressed in the word "Microcosm". For Spengler it signifies the combination of Wachsein and Dasein. Though the former arises in behalf of the latter, it tends towards inhibiting the aim and course of Dasein. It was observed earlier how Spengler associated fear and consciousness and considered

fear to be the prime reaction of Wachsein.¹⁰⁸ In general, fear of otherness or dread of the alien keeps the alien at a distance. At the same time, however, fear indirectly expresses the underlying desire for cosmic unity.¹⁰⁹ In the presence of danger, the child clinging to its mother, the huddling together of a herd, the striving of a man to find God--all this is an effort to escape the polarity of Wachsein for plantlike oneness.¹¹⁰ As Spengler observes, it is with the increasing diminution of consciousness that the sense of detachment, estrangement, and fear is lost, and life comes to be more and more felt as a matter of the will of Dasein. In sleep the animal leads only a vegetative existence. It is known that Wachsein in the higher forms of animal-being is reduced during sleep to fleeting moments of dreams, which are in themselves intimately regulated in some way by unconscious Dasein.¹¹¹ But Spengler also notes that in the case of man, the animal whose intense alertness far outrivals all other animals, life in the waking hours is predominantly lived at a lower grade of consciousness than is generally admitted or realized.¹¹²

From the Spenglerian viewpoint, man is distinct in the animal kingdom in that a very sharp conflict can arise between Wachsein and Dasein. To a certain extent, all animal-life experiences, by virtue of consciousness, an antagonism with specific impulses of Dasein.¹¹³ However, the will and instincts of the genus are always the master of the waking-life in every animal, and if necessary, the individual 'I' is sacrificed to the continuation of the genus. As Spengler sees it, every animal is not merely a small conscious organism. More importantly, it is an organ of a genus-organism which endures far beyond the

life-span of its finite members, and this willed duration of the genus or species signifies that the will of the cosmic whole, i.e. the will of a form of Dasein, is dictating the course of the individual 'I'. But with man, the first serious attempt is made by Wachsein to rule Dasein. That is, the individual 'I' in man seeks to free itself from Dasein or the genus-drive and become its own independent principle of being.¹¹⁴ Acute consciousness detaches man from Dasein and makes him feel free—too free to accept blind fate and irrevocable time, too free to be in servitude of the impersonal drives of Dasein. The growth of cognitive awareness (causal knowledge), which means both muscle power over the alien world and inner power of thought over the unknown, leads to the point where the 'I' is convinced of its freedom from the impersonal cosmic All. In such a case, knowledge or reason claims to be the director of the unconscious drives of life. Above all, in the thirty or forty generations of cultured-people, the intellectual powers of the 'I' are concentrated upon the "cultivating" of instinct into its own personal style or form. Spengler often speaks of the steady growth of Cultures as the increasing formation of Wachsein over Dasein. The longer a Culture lives, i.e. the further it has run the path of its life, the higher Wachsein mounts toward complete and undisputed mastery.¹¹⁶ Human Culture is thus different from animal Cultures in that the former does not remain a pure organism, like the bee and ant colony. Human Culture slowly transforms its instinctive organic nature into conscious, artificial organization.¹¹⁷ Seen from this angle, Culture is an enterprise by which man continually strives to direct completely his own fate. Spengler understands it as the Promethean attempt of man to

free himself from the hidden powers of reality and to make himself a source of divine power.¹¹⁸

Every higher Culture, therefore, symbolizes in Spengler's view the rebellion of Wachsein against Dasein.¹¹⁹ Indeed, culture-man is distinguished from proto-culture and late civilized peoples in that he strives through many generations to channel the inner drives of himself and the external world into what he considers to be forms of his own creations. The controlling, harnessing, and re-directing of the raw forces of nature by a conscious soul is the "cultivating" of impersonal and unconscious Dasein into highly personal Dasein. For Spengler, the word "Culture" means in its deepest sense the intended breeding and shaping of the given elements of life into specific forms of living, thinking, and acting.¹²⁰ These cultured forms--which include everything from dress to schools of philosophy--symbolize the soul of a people bringing life into a style reflective of its own peculiar being. It is part of the vocation of making the alien proper to oneself.¹²¹ But the training and disciplining of the self is never enough for the growing Wachsein of culture-peoples. The passage of early (rural) Culture into late (urban) Culture is signaled by the will of a sharp intellect to escape all dependence upon the cyclic rhythms of nature. This effort expresses itself in the imperialistic extending of one will over the will of all others, in being economically free from the life of the country-side and peasantry, and in the technical alteration of nature around the megapolis.¹²² The last possibility open to the Wachsein of culture-man is the complete organization of Dasein by planned-out, purpose-oriented thought.¹²³ It is the final effort which culture-man

feels necessary to exert in prevailing over the authority of impersonal Destiny and the flow of time.

As Spengler presents it, the rebellion of man against the given nature in him and around him, of Wachsein against Dasein, is doomed to failure from the outset. For what the individual 'I' takes to be its own individual will in the state of Wachsein is really in some unknowable way a part of a greater cosmic will.¹²⁴ In the last analysis, what the rebellious soul of culture-man believes it has freely created and performed in appropriating the alien world is in itself the result of a fated course expressing itself through the 'I'. The breeding and shaping of a personal Dasein is actually the realization of a finite instinctive will acting as a single organic principle through many generations. An individual cannot be an organic member of a stream of being (i.e. of Culture) without being himself caught up in the wave of the inner form which gives unity and life to this stream. When the 'I' of Wachsein is no longer able to carry on and develop further the ethos, manners, music, or whatever else is bequeathed by its ancestors, then the inner force of this stream of being is fading. Consequently, the impetus behind all creations of culture-peoples is an instinctive drive or will, not a conscious decision, ideal, plan, or thought. The major objective of the Untergang is to demonstrate physiognomically that the mathematical, scientific, philosophic thinking, as well as artistic and secular history of a Culture have been rooted in the innate disposition of a type of person and thus are ultimately determined by the fate of unconscious being.

With this discussion of the conflict in man between Wachsein

and Dasein, it is possible to arrive at some of the presuppositions of the Untergang which Spengler never fully clarified. The understanding that the Wachsein-side of man is the manifestation of particular drives, brings into clearer focus Spengler's picture of Culture and man.

Spengler states at one place that all culture-forms—which include the Wachsein of man—are expressions of particular cosmic forces.¹²⁵

In general, the effort of man to raise himself above mere animal impulses belongs to Wachsein, and this means that the intellectual life of culture-man is itself the outcome of Dasein. In particular, the phenomenon of early culture-man training and disciplining himself into a specific living-style, as well as the phenomenon of late culture-man attempting technically to transform nature, are the expressions of a conscious soul (a Microcosm) being instinctively motivated to direct the more impersonal instinctive urges of Dasein by means of a highly developed intellect.¹²⁶ The conclusion is that man, and in particular culture-man, must be for Spengler the agent of opposing cosmic drives.¹²⁷

What Spengler understands as the rebellion of Wachsein against Dasein is then the conflict of cosmic forces which serve as a single principle of Culture-Being with the other forces of Dasein.¹²⁸ It will be seen after more analysis that this interpretation is confirmed through the further understanding that the Wachsein of early culture-man is the result of a more or less inner harmony of Culture-Being with the cosmos or All, while the Wachsein of late culture-man is the outcome of this principle of Culture seeking to free itself from the cosmic harmony.

It becomes evident why Spengler regarded the history of Culture as a tragedy.¹²⁹ The longing to overcome death, to halt the flow of

time, to build an artificial existence which aims at enduring forever— all this is an impossible task, but man is driven to it by unique compulsions within him. The principle that puts this longing in the soul of man possesses itself the quality of directionality, and is thus finite. The revolt, therefore, is predestined from the outset to failure. Spengler once remarked that the knowledge of failure and impending doom could never stop man from the effort of trying to overcome nature. Man rebels because he must rebel. Spengler's depiction of man as a creation of Culture, and of Culture as a inner revolt against the given, or Dasein, leads to the understanding that man is the vehicle of cosmic strife and that all culture-forms are a reflection of his tortured existence.

What then must be deduced is that the attempt of Wachsein to overcome Dasein in the case of man and Culture presupposes that reality itself (Dasein) is, at bottom, contradictory.¹³⁰ For since Wachsein emerges out of Dasein, it must be that Dasein creates it in opposition to itself. What makes Wachsein an independent principle is Dasein, and this means that Dasein is turning upon itself, rebelling against itself, and is in contradiction to itself. Through analysis of Spengler's understanding of consciousness, it will be seen that the presence of consciousness indicates this inward struggle of Dasein.

4. The Depth-Experience

From the discussion of the opposition of longing and fear, universal and directional time, Wachsein and Dasein, it is now possible to approach the Spenglerian presupposition that human reality is

constituted in part by Not-Being.

The finitude of living reality is preeminently revealed through world-fear.¹³¹ The conscious 'I' fears the world because the world not only represents death, but also is death. When Spengler says that the world, as the counter-pole to the 'I', is alien, he means that the world is not like the 'I'. The world is stiff, rigid, set-fast. The 'I' is living. The opposition between the 'I' and the world is that of Becoming and Becomeness, living and death. More correctly, however, it is the soul, and not the waking-state of the soul, the 'I' of Wachsein, which is the counter-pole to the extended world. The determined possibilities of the soul stand against the non-living actualities (the facts) of the world.¹³² Again, the soul is the future, the world the past. What then the conscious 'I' inwardly fears or dreads is the loss of the soul to the world. To no longer have possibilities before one, to have everything past, is to be dead or not to be.

The inward fear of death is always accompanied by deep loneliness and vulnerability.¹³³ With this, man is forced to recognize the finitude of his own being. The 'I' fears its soul becoming like the world, but as noted before, the experience of loneliness and vulnerability arises with the awareness that the soul is this Becoming and that life is an irreversible passage towards death.¹³⁴ Thus to the 'I', the soul itself comes to be foreign and incomprehensible. The 'I' senses its uniqueness and isolation in the cosmic process of Becoming. But according to Spengler, the felt-awareness of death marks the birth of the 'I'.¹³⁵ It is the point at which the soul awakes. The profoundest experience of the child is the awareness of death. From the pure extendedness of

a corpse, the child comes to possess a notion of its own transient nature. Life is felt as a finite, irreversible movement towards extinction. Again, this is the basic feeling of directional time or Destiny which Spengler calls longing. The same sensation is also experienced in all those who have been historically sensitive to the singularity of their own Culture. What Spengler calls the awakening of a new Culture begins with a glimpse of death as the secret of the extended world. The artistic, intellectual, and spiritual life of a Culture starts its course with a deep preoccupation with death: .

Der ägyptische Stil beginnt mit den Totentempeln der Pharaonen, der antike mit dem geometrischen Schmuck der Graburnen, der arabische mit Katakomben und Sarkophagen, der abendländische mit dem Dom, in welchem sich der Opfertod Jesu unter den Händen des Priesters täglich wiederholt.¹³⁶

The Egyptian style begins with the tomb-temples of the Pharaohs, the Classical with the geometrical decoration of the funerary urns, the Arabian with catacomb and sarcophagus, the Western with the cathedral wherein the sacrificial death of Jesus is re-enacted daily under the hands of the priest.¹³⁷

It has already been noted that fear and the yearning to escape the fact-world and Destiny lie behind all systematic images of the World-as-Nature, and that the even more primordial impulse of longing, as it makes itself felt in every statesman and entrepreneur, is an assertion of life over death. From this, it can be seen that Spengler understands the roots of all the higher Cultures to lie within the dread of death or the will to overcome it—and "death" can mean here nothing else but final extinction and nothingness.¹³⁸

However, it is also the case in the Spenglerian orientation that the finitude of man is realized in a fundamental way in the acts of consciousness. The connection between Not-Being and consciousness

must be clarified through an analysis of one of Spengler's most original and important notions, namely the depth-experience (Tiefenerlebnis).

The elucidation of this notion leads not only to the revelation of consciousness as a form of nothingness, but also to the understanding of how one's outlook is, a priori, a determined expression of a Culture.

Spengler states that the initial awareness of death (the awakening of the soul to the opposition of 'I' and world) is the point which marks the frontier between child and man.¹³⁹ Heretofore the child had certain basic experiences of the world, but there was no "knowledge" of what they meant.¹⁴⁰ The world takes on definite form and meaning only at the moment when death is sensed as the fixed and rigid. With this, the child learns the difference between world and 'I', past and future.¹⁴¹ Ever after the awareness of death, the world of extended objects appears at a certain distance, which means that a rigid space has set itself up between the 'I' and the world. In the act of waking from sleep, or in the simple act of passing from a pre-reflective to a highly alert state of consciousness, one experiences depth as a movement from the "here" to the "there".¹⁴² With the full awareness of the distance between the proper and the alien, the 'I' realizes that the extended world has meaning for it and thus becomes a Macrocosm for the 'I'.¹⁴³

This understanding of the depth-experience requires a different view of the role of space in perception. It has been the custom of the various mathematical systems to regard depth along with length and breadth as the three dimensions of space. But Spengler holds that depth is the only real dimension. In fact, he claims that the word "dimension"

(Dimension) is synonymous with the word "depth" (Tiefe), for both mean extension (Ausdehnung). The so-called three-dimensional space is an abstraction, while the depth-experience is an immediate sensation of extension proceeding from the "here" outward and ending with the "there". This means that the act of experiencing depth is a process by which sensation is converted into cognitive contemplation.¹⁴⁴ The 'I' comes to full awareness of light-resisting things by first experiencing the living sensation of expanding distance and then interpreting this distance between self and objects. Consequently, the depth-experience is to be thought of as the transformation of the sensation of distance into the cognition of extended objects in homogeneous space. Thus, in opposition to Kant and others, Spengler maintains that space is a form of the perceived and not a form of perception.¹⁴⁵ Space is cognized as pure extension only after the involuntary act of judging the immediate sensation of expanding depth.

What should attract our attention first concerning the depth-experience is the aspect by which the fact-world appears as essentially stiff and dead. According to Spengler, in sleep or in the dream-like preconscious state of mind, the world does not appear at a rigid distance. Indeed, there is not yet an 'I' standing over against the world. Even when one gazes into the distance with his senses, the welter of undistinguished impressions does not appear at a distance. The depth-experience belongs with these living sensations which play upon the fantasies. It is itself a sensation of extending.¹⁴⁶ But the final act of interpreting distance is a critical act of the understanding.

The world "begins" at this moment. When the 'I' becomes aware of things and events as distant and alien, then everything is set up to be viewed in terms of causes and effects. Once again, to intuit the world by means of causality is to put the living content of sense-experience into rigid space as the Become.¹⁴⁷

As Spengler explains it, this "killing procedure" by which sensation passes into cognitive awareness is an irrevocable process.¹⁴⁸ The sensation of expanding distance is an organic event, and as such, it possesses the distinguishing characteristic of all that is organic, viz. irreversibility. Its being (Dasein) consists in directional (temporal) movement. When the depth-experience is cognized as the perceived in space, the living process of self-extending reaches its goal and stands as an accomplished thought. Comprehension is the death of sensation, for it marks the end of the living act of the depth-experience.¹⁴⁹

Now the secret of the depth-experience within Spengler's philosophy begins to reveal itself when it is remembered that "Becoming" must be equated with "Being". Ultimately for Spengler, only that which is or has life has Being or Dasein. Conversely, "Becomeness", the end of a process or movement, is synonymous with "Not-Being". Becomeness is death, and that which is dead has no Being. The property of spatial extension is not the mark of Being, but the mark of Not-Being. Spengler's organic logic confers Being solely on that which possesses directionality, and the depth-experience is such a reality. Further, the alert consciousness of critical understanding, though not occupying physical space, is in itself lifeless and must be considered to belong

to the realm of the extended and Not-Being.

What does this entail? First of all, consciousness in itself, i.e. as causal cognition and the result of the depth-experience, is Not-Being or Nothing insofar as one considers it "in-itself", apart from a living soul. However, when it is considered as the organic outcome of the depth-experience, then it is considered as a manifesting state of a soul. This brings us back to the point that consciousness for Spengler is an instrument in the service of a soul or realizing Dasein. The servitude can be characterized ontologically as "for-itself": consciousness is for a soul.¹⁵⁰ This means that consciousness has no Being of its own. It belongs to a soul and functions to present to a soul the alien world. However, it would not be wholly consistent with Spengler's philosophy to characterize consciousness as "for-itself". The other aspect to be considered is that consciousness belongs to the world. To say that consciousness has no Being, that it is Not-Being, signifies that it is not a Becoming, but a Becomeness. As Having-Become, consciousness, or better, the states of consciousness are completed facts and thus are of the world, the realm of the fixed and rigid.

The accuracy of this interpretation can be noted when one understands that Spengler regards the depth-experience as the active realization of a waking-soul (Wachsein). The sensing and comprehension of depth, Spengler says, is an act of interpretation, and thus every act in which the alien world comes into critical focus must be taken as the realizing of a Weltanschauung.¹⁵¹ Indeed, according to Spengler, the perception of depth is relative to a disposition, and this trait,

as will be discussed shortly, becomes evident among peoples of different Cultures. Generally speaking, consciousness of the world is a priori determined by one's innate tendency to sense depth in a particular manner. As such, the alien world is never presented to an 'I' by a "pure" or "general" consciousness. World-consciousness entails a world-perception or view. The alien world has a certain meaning for a soul whose peculiar sense of depth created a perception of it. In this way, one can say that world-consciousness is for a self: it is the interpretation of a Macrocosm by a Microcosm. For Spengler this means that the alien world is looked upon as a sum total of symbols in relation to a Wachsein.¹⁵² But on the other hand, the perception which the 'I' has of the world is of a self: it is the manifestation of a soul. Like everything else in the Macrocosm, a perception is a symbol of finite Dasein and belongs as an accomplished fact to the world. It is in this latter respect that the ontological status of consciousness within the Spenglerian philosophy must be unavoidably regarded as Not-Being. When Spengler makes statements to the effect that thoughts, lines, numbers, formulas, and laws are nothing, then it must be understood that critical consciousness belongs also under this categorization.¹⁵³ For like the rest, consciousness, as attained cognizance, is alien or other to the soul. That is, it is a Becomeness, not a Becoming, and therefore completely different in nature to the particular depth-experience or soul which created it.

True enough, one is not accustomed to consider one's perception or world-consciousness as nothing or Not-Being. As well, one could say to Spengler that the lines and numbers in a mathematical system or

the formulas and laws of a science cannot be considered by their creators as nothing—they have a specific meaning for those who created them and for those who can ascertain their inner form. However, this position is essentially in accord with Spengler's. The point is made in the Untergang that everything which rises for Wachsein as an expression of Culture is the endowment of the world with personal meaning.¹⁵⁴

Indeed, it is part of the general theme already discussed that human life is at bottom the instilling of the "proper" into the "alien".

Yet a further point can be read into this theme. The created forms of Culture are not felt as alien and Not-Being insofar as a soul continually endows meaning in them. They do not slip away into Not-Being as long as a soul can re-experience that original spontaneous intuition (re-live the depth-experience) which resulted in a concrete form. The same is the case with a perception. The microcosmic soul continually relates itself to the macrocosmic world, and in doing so, it projects in intuiting and cognizing the world its own world-view.

What then is implicit in Spengler's discussion of the depth-experience is that consciousness must be considered first, as for-itself, i.e. as the spontaneous perceiving of the world by a soul and second as in-itself, i.e. as the completed perception and the Having-Become of every act of perceiving. The depth-experience is this perceiving—it is the spontaneity of a specific principle of Becoming which Spengler refers to as a soul. Cognition, however, is the transformation of this perceiving into a finished perception. As described in the Untergang, cognition marks the point at which the 'I' awakes to the otherness of the world and realizes it in all of its rigidity and

extendedness. In other words, with the fulfillment of the depth-experience in cognition, the alien world appears to the 'I' as the realm whose principle is space and whose logic is causality. Hence Spengler's definition of consciousness, viz. the tension of 'I' and world, can be further understood as the opposition between living or Becoming and Becomeness or Not-Being.¹⁵⁵ The tension exists by virtue of the flow of for-itselfness into in-itselfness, Becoming into Becomeness. The 'I' constantly experiences depth and projects anew its world-view into the alien, thereby making, or seeking to make the alien proper to itself. The world is not Not-Being as long as a perceiving soul projects its meaning and creates a Macrocosm for itself. Yet the alien quality of the world, its deadness and extendedness, continually crops up with every completed cognition. The world is sensed in its otherness, its Not-Being and Becomeness with full causal awareness, i.e. when consciousness of the world becomes itself a fact of the world. One could say, in measure, that the depth-experience continually enlivens the world, while cognition constantly kills it.

This same general interpretation can be transposed into temporal terms. Spengler speaks of the depth-experience as a thrust into distance.¹⁵⁶ The word "distance", he states, refers not only to spatial distance, but also to temporal distance.¹⁵⁷ What is far can be either the horizon or the future.¹⁵⁸ Furthermore, he notes that we are inherently disposed to associate the future with that which stands before us and needs to be reached: we continually move towards the future.¹⁵⁹ Conversely, the past is felt as that which is behind

us: every backward look is a glance at the past or history. What underlies these associations is the depth-experience. The sensation of expanding distance is the future within us becoming present, i.e. becoming present in the form of growing consciousness (perceiving). And the completed consciousness of this distance is the past in the form of a cognized world (perception). Every cognition means that an 'I' has realized a bit of its future by relinquishing what was an inner possibility to the eternally fixed past. This process describes for Spengler the impersonal (cosmic) passage of future into past, or soul into world.¹⁶⁰ Yet it is also the ground for conflict. For it is a question not merely of any Dasein, but of a conscious soul (Wachsein), which "knows" its Dasein, itself, as future, that opens the way for an internal antagonism between future and past. With the awareness of the past as the never recurring, dread arises--dread not of the past per se, but of the future necessarily becoming the past, and thus finally of all possibilities solidifying into the eternal past, which is what death means. As seen earlier, the sudden realization of mortality is the initial birth of the 'I' in the alien world, and from this moment on, the 'I' seeks anxiously and vainly through a World-as-Nature or through force of deed to direct the future in overcoming death. There is, however, within this effort an internal contradiction. On the one hand, there is an 'I' which dreads the world as past and dead, and on the other hand, there is an aimless, impulsive longing of a future to actualize itself. The conflict is such that the future realizes itself in conscious states, i.e. in the perceptivity of a world by an 'I', while the 'I' itself in dread seeks to halt this

irrevocable/actualizing of future into past.

Consequently, there are in Spengler's statements on the depth-experience and consciousness two inter-related moments of conflict which need to be analyzed. The first moment arises from the depth-experience transforming itself into cognition. A conflict takes place with the sensation of this transformation as the movement of future into past. This temporal process was above provisionally described as consciousness for-itself becoming consciousness in-itself: it is the process of projecting one's innate view upon the alien and thereby causally cognizing the alien world. The conflict presents itself with the inner recognition that this process is a passage into Not-Being. This awareness introduces the second moment of the conflict. For the awareness is dread—dread of the past, the rigid, extended death. This prime feeling rests upon the deeper awareness of the 'I' being subject to this irrevocable process. Therefore, the conflict in the first moment between the depth-experience and cognition presupposes the conflict of the second moment between the 'I' (which awakens with the cognition of the world) and the directionality of time contained within the depth-experience. In other words, the 'I' fears the world as the past and actual insofar as it dreads its soul becoming itself past and actual. Thus, at bottom, the 'I' stands in opposition to the source which created it and its perceived world (Macrocosm), namely the soul or depth-experience. The 'I' dreads its death, the final moment of becoming completely past, of having no future before it, i.e. of Not-Being. Insofar as each cognition of waking-life is a step in which future becomes past, it is a realization of Not-Being and therefore is

inwardly associated by Spengler with death. However, as before, the 'I' and its Macrocosm, i.e. the perceptions of the alien world and self by the 'I' are spared the complete realization of Not-Being to the extent that a new depth-experience recreates in the following moment a new perception and therewith a new 'I' and its world.¹⁶¹ That is, the past is not Not-Being as long as a future creates the past anew in the present. This point is exemplified in memory.¹⁶² Every thought or experience can only be retrieved from the Becomeness of the past as an element of memory, and memory entails the presence of a living future instilling life back into the past as part of the continual realization of itself. This point can be seen in a wider context. Spengler speaks of the sense of inner emptiness that every thinker feels after a hard struggle for a conclusion, or of the artist after the completion of his work.¹⁶³ This feeling can be regarded here as the experience of the loss of future, of goal and purpose, and therefore as the momentary experience of Not-Being. Only with the upsurge of a future in the form of a new task, can this sense of meaninglessness be cancelled. Finally, the Spenglerian theme of the historyless nature of civilized and post-civilized periods can be considered in this context. It will be seen later that the death of Culture is, according to Spengler, the exact counterpart to the death of the individual, and so the encounter of Not-Being in the late periods signifies the end of a type of world-view. Civilization and the post-civilized state which Spengler calls Fellahism mean that no future exists to be injected into what is handed down from the past as actualized-forms of a once flourishing Culture.

The analysis of the depth-experience into the conflict of the Being of Becoming and the Not-Being of Becomeness must now be understood in connection with the conclusions arrived at in the analysis of the Wachsein-Dasein theme. For the conflict between the depth-experience and cognition, or more concisely between the conscious 'I' and the soul, reflects the inner duality of man and his inherent rebellion against the given nature of his existence. Specifically, the Wachsein of 'man consists of the depth-experience and the resulting perception of the world by an 'I'.¹⁶⁴ Thus the effort of man to raise himself above animal-being and to direct the other forces of life within and around him are directly traceable to the principle which actualizes itself through perception. In a word, it is Culture which the individual realizes as the particular principle of his sense of depth, and it is a culture-form which the individual is aware of as his world-perception or Macrocosm.¹⁶⁵ In the last section, the following presupposition was revealed: the attempt of Wachsein to overcome Dasein was contradictory in that Wachsein consists in its own particular Dasein. This situation is exactly the same as that which has been analyzed here: the attempt of the 'I' to overcome the irrevocable process of future flowing into past is contradictory in that the 'I' and its perceived-world is created by a future becoming past. The same functional relationship reappears: the 'I' and its Macrocosm live from moment to moment by virtue of a soul creating it, and thus ultimately both 'I' and Macrocosm have no independent being. But with this second analysis, it is possible to reveal something more that is contained within

this presupposition. The fact that the 'I' senses its own personal vocation of overcoming time and death signifies that its source is in contradiction and in antagonism with itself. The conscious 'I' is not itself in conflict, it only symbolizes a conflict. What is at odds is that element or side of the principle which emerges after the depth-experience into the 'I' and Macrocosm with the impersonal cosmic movement of future into past. The consciousness of self as a subject of irrevocable time, and the dread which arises from it, is an indication of the dissatisfaction of Wechsein with its fate, i.e. of becoming a Not-Being in death. The opposition, then, is between Wachsein which wills to have an eternal future and the impersonal element of time. The rebellion of man aims towards freeing himself from a Destiny to which the entire cosmos is subject. Insofar as the depth-experience is the surge of Culture, it can be seen that every Culture is an effort to overcome death and to live on forever.¹⁶⁶ It is an impulsive will not to accept the plant-like nature which is part of human and cultural existence.

Spengler's tragic picture of man and Culture can now be restated in different terms. Insofar as the depth-experience is the continual unfolding of what is innately contained in one as soul and character, it constitutes the inner Destiny which man must live out.¹⁶⁷ This is the "personal" side of the living quality of Culture in the individual, for it is what he longs to have live on forever.

However, in that the depth-experience is the irreversible movement of time, it constitutes an impersonal side, and thus it is felt as alien and belongs to what one must suffer as an outer Destiny.¹⁶⁸ Every

Culture must lose the battle against this outer Destiny, for time belongs to the inner Destiny of man as form to content.¹⁶⁹ Yet the battle must be fought against Not-Being—indeed, it must be fought from moment to moment.

With this we come to the last and most important aspect of the depth-experience. As Spengler presents it, the experience of depth is manifestly different among individuals of different Cultures, and therefore, he speaks of the peculiar way one perceives depth as the realization of one's Destiny-Idea (Schicksalsidee).¹⁷⁰ It is the Destiny-Idea which gives the inner form and personal element to the entire course of a Culture's history, its arts and sciences, its ethos and customs, its mathematical thought, its political and economic structures. Spengler spends the greatest part of his energy in the Untergang explaining that what Western man has always striven to find in his world-perception is infinite space. That is, his experience of depth is one that extends from himself to infinity. Consequently, what is the prime symbol in all Western creations from the early Gothic style of the tenth century to the highly technical life of present urban existence is pure and limitless space. Only endless space could symbolize the intense direction-energy or thrust which one senses in the cathedral architecture of Gothic and Baroque times, in the landscapes of Claude Lorrain and Rembrandt, in the fugue style of Bach, in the invention of the infinitesimal calculus, the printing press, and long-range firing weapons. The yearning for infinite space is what Spengler calls "Faustian". Quite different was the experience

of depth for Classical man. The Canon of Polyclitus, Euclidean geometry, the lay-out of the polis, and all other cultural forms of the Greco-Roman world manifested a denial of distance, horizons, and infinity in preference to the near and the present.¹⁷¹ The "Apollinian" soul of the Classical Culture sought always to perceive the world in terms of the strictly limited and self-contained.¹⁷² What endless space is to the Faustian soul, visible and tangible body is to the Apollinian soul. But in contrast to these prime symbols, the cavern stands as the symbol of the Jewish-Arabian Culture whose history extends from the time of Christ to the year 1000. Here the "Magian" soul possessed a depth-experience which realized only enclosed space.¹⁷³ The secret of the world is felt as inward, and from this feeling proceeded the architecture of the central dome, alchemy, astrology, algebra, and arabesque, as well as the scriptures of the Persians, Christians, Manichaens, Jews, and Arabs. The same is the case for every other Culture: each perceived depth differently, and thus each had its own prime symbol.

Chapter III

THE DESTINY-IDEA

The discussion on longing and fear, universal time and directional time, Dasein and Wachsein sought to clarify the meaning which Spengler attaches to the word "Destiny". Furthermore, the elucidation of the depth-experience revealed how Spengler understands that the Destiny-Idea of a Culture prefigures what possibilities may proceed from the individual.¹ What has to be explored now is how these individual moments of Destiny play a part in Spengler's historical perspectives and how each of the higher Cultures distinguishes itself through its individual Destiny-Idea.

1. Culture and Civilization

People living today in Western Europe and America are, according to Spengler, civilized people, not cultured people. The same was the case for the Latin and Greek peoples from 350 B.C. to their demise around 200 A.D.. Likewise the Arab world from about 800 A.D. and the Indian from the late Buddhism of 100 B.C. to the present are in the fellaheen state of a decayed civilization. What does this mean?

The distinction between Culture and Civilization is usually sensed as an ethical one, but for Spengler, it is a periodic one.² Civilization is the last stage of Culture life. It marks the period of decline of a Culture. Yet in another way, Civilization is a state of affairs which is completely different from the state of Culture.

As a state of dissolution and approaching death, it is the exact opposite of Culture, which is the development and fulfillment of life. Culture, thus, is Becoming, Civilization is the Having-Become.³

The essence of Spengler's distinction between Culture and Civilization lies in the understanding that the higher Cultures are organisms. To say that Cultures are like plants or animals is to mean in the Spenglerian orientation that they possess the same characteristics of life as plants and animals. The criterion of life here is not the property of protoplasm or any other bio-chemical substance. "Life" is a metaphysical expression, synonymous with "Becoming".⁴ For both Goethe and Spengler, "Becoming" always indicates the unfolding of the qualitative essence or inner nature of an entity. Thus, to live means to actualize the predetermined principle or Idea which forms the essential future of a plant, animal, or Culture.⁵

From this an exact parallel (and not a figurative one) can be made between plant-animal life and the higher Cultures. In the same way as every organism in the plant and animal kingdoms possesses a rigorous structure and definite articulation of parts, so every Culture--as a living being--possesses a clear yet intricate build.⁶ Every part of a plant is an integral part of the whole, revealing the inner unity of the plant. This integration and completeness is characteristic of life, i.e. of that which possesses a predetermined idea as its essence.⁷ The unfolding of the Destiny-Idea is to be found in every branch of a Culture--in its myths, architecture, science, national politics, techniques, classes, and peoples. Each of these culture-forms will express the same primary Idea and thereby reveal the inner unity--the life--of the Culture.⁸

Life, therefore, is a translation of that which is essentially spiritual into concrete, actual form, and a Destiny-Idea is the particular inner essence or soul which gives particular form to a society and its enterprises.⁹ Culture-peoples, thus, are always distinguished from other peoples, particularly civilized peoples, in that they inherently express a basic, common form in their activities, and the history of a Culture-people as a whole stands out as a single gesture in comparison to the chaotic ups and downs of all other histories.¹⁰ To speak here of the structural form of a Culture and of its unified movement is to refer to two aspects of the same phenomenon.¹¹ When Spengler discusses the builds of the Cultures—of the Classical polis in opposition to the Western nation (Land) or Magian consensus as the determined forms of political and social activity, or of Greek drama as the drama of the act in comparison to Western drama of the character—all this is a consideration of a culture-life in prime form. The consideration of a Culture "in form" is the observation of a Destiny-Idea actualized in various modes without regard to the Becoming—i.e. actual historical occurrences—of the Destiny-Idea. In this way the highly articulated nature of the organism is observed. However, all forms of the living are evolving forms of an inner essence,¹² and when Spengler discusses the various Destiny-Ideas in their historical context, he is looking at history, as he says, on the go.¹³ The passage of the individual arts in Classical antiquity from vase and fresco painting, to sculpture-in-relief, and ending with the free standing statue in the round, or the passage of Western philosophy from Gothic scholasticism to the

rational and mathematical systems of Descartes and Leibniz and finally to the grand conclusive thought of Kant and Hegel—all this speaks of the development of a single Destiny-Idea in various modes of expression. In this respect, the Culture is observed as a unified organic movement of one soul.

If we first of all investigate what is contained in the notion of Culture as being "in form", we shall find that Spengler uses this expression in the same manner as it is employed in athletics. A ball-player, a wrestler, or a steeple-chaser is in form when all movements are performed as though they were "second-nature".¹⁴ The same is the case for an army, an estate, a nation, or a Culture. According to Spengler, all culture-peoples live and act instinctively.¹⁵ What they actualize in the way of dress, speech, art, manners, diplomacy, and every other distinctively human attribute of waking-life, is performed as a matter of course. Every structure in the flowering of a Culture—from the economic and political activity of its nations to the lay-out and skylines of its growing cities—is achieved unconsciously, and therefore all life continues "in form". The fact that all this is self-evident reveals that the Destiny-Idea is an inherent part of the psychic constitution of the people. It is always the case that the realization of a Destiny-Idea expresses itself to the outsider as a spiritual form from which he is inwardly excluded. It is not, therefore, a matter of conscious deliberation whether a nation taken as a whole, or an art school, or an estate will be in good form or not, nor is it a question of which spiritual form they choose to actualize. One is either in form or not—~~one~~ one is a man of

Culture or not, and the idea which one actualizes stamps one irrevocably as an expression of a particular Culture-type.¹⁶

With this characterization of Culture, it is easy to see how Spengler's Dasein-Wachsein theme fits in. The emergence of the Destiny-Idea within a people is nothing other than the upsurge of unconscious Dasein into the light world as a specific form and condition. The Wachsein of culture-peoples is completely ruled by the form which unconsciously manifests itself in them and draws them into a great spiritual unity. What serves as the real governmental constitution of these individuals is never what is formulated in written laws based on theories of the nature of man and society. Rather it is the self-evident, the "natural", which determines the inner social structure as well as the outer political life of the people.¹⁷ A particular customary ethic, and not consciously conceived laws or moral systems, underlies the human conduct in a given society,¹⁸ and it is a deep feeling and not an eternal criterion generated by thought which ultimately determines a scientific picture of the world.¹⁹ Likewise, the basis of every school of art is an innate impulse, not studied techniques, aesthetic doctrines, and ideals. It is always the unwritten and indescribable, the purely felt and assumed which outweighs every deliberate judgment and gives the particular life-beat and style to culture-peoples.

The form which a particular mode of culture-life takes over many generations is called a "tradition", and a tradition is a living and strong tradition as long as it is easily and instinctively expressed.²⁰ The painting schools of Holland and Italy were traditions

of this sort, as well as the Prussian officer corps from the time of the early Hohenzollerns to the First World War.²¹ What makes a living tradition impressive is that it is a silently growing order and not a fixed, articulated system establishing the one eternally "correct" or "just" method. It is, as Spengler says, in the blood, which means that it takes charge of the individual and draws him under its spell.²² The individual never consciously directs a tradition. Rather the tradition provides him with the form to live and work within. Maestria in any field or enterprise is the ability to handle the forms which reach down through generations of life in a spontaneous and original manner. All individual Western arts between 1500, the end of late Gothic, to 1800, the end of Rococo, developed in strict Faustian form. The dominant art of music had in its southern aspect unconsciously evolved from the a cappella style of Palestrina and Orlando di Lasso to the orchestrally-conceived forms of Carissimi's oratorio, Viadana's cantata, and Monteverdi's opera. In its northern aspect, a tradition of music developed through many now-forgotten composers to reach its highest forms of maturity in Bach, Gluck, Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven.²³ But for Spengler, the great tide of tradition finds its most vital significance in the political arena.²⁴ Nowhere else does the importance of being "in form" count so much as when the statesman works in the current and spirit of a heritage. For it is only a well-developed political tradition, as that carried on by the Roman Curia before the age of Caesarism, that maintains a nation of people in condition for the struggle of its existence against other nations

and peoples.²⁵ Indeed, a developing tradition in this respect is the breeding of a ruling minority highly skilled in the tactics of keeping itself in harmony with the people while guiding them on the road of their history. Such statesmanship does away with the "outstanding" personalities (Napoleon, Alexander, Caesar), for it does not need them. Spengler sees the English politics of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, performed in the public forms of liberal party-politics, yet maintaining behind the scene the old estate-principle of dynastic rule by family, as a prime example of statesmanship in good form.²⁶

In the Spenglerian framework, a living tradition in any mode is a synonym for Culture. It is history unfolding itself in high form. The history of the nations within a Culture does not take place in an accidental and chaotic manner. Tradition of any sort is the working out of a specific spiritual idea through several generations and centuries, and as such, it is an orderly, organic movement.

But Civilization is the converse of this. It is either the breakdown of tradition or the solidifying of it into dead repetition.²⁷ In either case, one is not "in form". Generally speaking, civilized peoples have no form, or what implies the same thing, no soul.²⁸ Consequently, the history or life of civilized peoples gradually becomes more and more aimless or directionless. For Spengler, this is only another way of saying that their history is inorganic. The Destiny-Idea which gives organic structure and a specific form to culture-history begins to fade in civilized-history, and as a result history

is no longer the unconscious shaping, forming, and fulfillment of an Idea through many generations, but chaotic, ambiguous existence responding to the pressures and needs of the moment.

The only over-all image which all civilized-periods present is a three-stage process of dying: first, the revolt and release from the preceding Culture, second, the replacement of it with thoroughly intellectualized forms, and third, the final hardening of these forms.²⁹ It always begins under the banner of "freedom" and "return to nature".³⁰ What this means is freedom from the unconscious traditions which have steadily built themselves up over centuries and the return to the formless state of pre-culture life.³¹ It is an indication that late-man of Civilization can no longer feel instinctively at home in the over-ripe forms of the Culture. What the musicians from Palestrina to Mozart, or the sculptors from Myron to Phidias and Praxiteles could achieve without difficulty and as a matter of routine could only be achieved with Beethoven and Lysippus by straining, and with Wagner and Pergamene Art, the loss of strict inner form and discipline to self-conscious sophistry and theatrical effects becomes manifest.³² After this, artists of the "modern era", or of the Hellenistic-Roman period find that it is only possible to create without any restrictions at all. The need for complete "freedom", however, leads only to a sporadic series of rapidly changing fashions, "isms", "tendencies", borrowings, and revivals which, like sport and all other nerve-excitement, could only intrigue megapolitan consciousness. There is only one direction after this phase, viz. the transformation of all art into a fixed stock of

forms. Roman art from Trajan to Aurelián, the gigantic buildings of Luxor in the nineteenth dynasty (1350-1205 B.C.) and of the Mongol period in India (1250 A.D.), and above all Chinese landscape painting of the present millenia are the repetitious and intellectualized craft-work on motives and problems established and overcome long ago in living Culture. What civilized man lacks, not only in art, but also in the whole vast form-worlds of religion, state, and social life is the inherent harmony of a deep-felt sense of mission, ability, and the passionate drive to accomplish.³³ All this the Destiny-Idea provided for culture-man.

Spengler finds in the civilized logic of "freedom" and "return-to-nature" the inevitable, organic result of Wachsein overcoming Dasein. The intellect senses freedom from inner feeling and innate instinct and comes to believe that it is master of them.³⁴ In civilized periods, clear-sighted causal reason, not blood and the felt-tradition in the blood, rules waking-life.³⁵ Man returns to a state of formlessness when Wachsein has complete sway over Dasein.³⁶ But again, formlessness is a sign of death. It must be remembered that Wachsein is ultimately an aspect of Dasein and that all intellectual life is at an end when Dasein is extinguished. In this respect, Civilization is regarded as the inevitable sequence of Culture. With birth there is implied death; with the upsurge of Culture there is given the disintegration of Civilization. This is Destiny.³⁷

Culture, therefore, is the unfolding of soul or the living future in the Becoming of an Idea. Civilization is the dying beat

of this soul in its late hours, when life is almost all past. At the same time, however, this transference of directionality into fixed extendedness is equated by Spengler with the reversal of Wachsein-in-servitude-of-Dasein into Dasein-in-servitude-of-Wachsein. This reversal is the organic outcome of Wachsein slowly eating up Dasein.³⁸

We can sketch this transformation as Spengler sees it by noting the major social-economic phases characteristic of early and late man. Every Culture without exception dawns with the emergence of a landed nobility and priesthood raising itself out of peasant stock.³⁹ To feudalism belongs the economy of the townless countryside. The ranked order and relation of lord and vassal in both estates is the complement of an economy and society built around barter and ownership of land and possessions.⁴⁰ In this state, it is impossible for life to be ruled by causal intelligence. Economic life is completely dominated by the cosmic elements of soil, climate, landscape, and by the spirit of the country and village peasant. The "privileged" estates find themselves as rulers and guardians of the people or laity by a felt sense of divine investiture and honour.⁴¹ Only with the appearance of the city and the growth of the burgher class is this economic and social order challenged by waking-consciousness.⁴² Yet even in the decline of feudalism and the rise of the absolute states, economic value still is based upon landed property, and money has only a token value.⁴³ This was the case in the Gothic or Doric town, Baroque or Ionic city, as well as the late Rococo or Corinthian city. However, the more advanced in age the city is, the greater

its inhabitants feel themselves "free" of the landscape. The belief in the omnipotence of reason is a creation of the "Third Estate".⁴⁴ Human achievement and causal explanation, not privilege and feeling, become the criteria of all value, and what is incomprehensible is eo ipso worthless. But the "age of reason" is the final stage of culture-life, and with the dawn of cosmopolitanism, the clear forms of understanding can justify only a materialistic outlook of utility or pragmatism.⁴⁵ Every Civilization begins with what Spengler calls "democracy" and its instrument, abstract money. Freedom in the political sphere means freedom from the traditional rule of certain blood lines, and economically it means freedom for the domination of money.⁴⁶ In fact, money is the political force which makes or breaks authorities. This is itself the sign that Wachsein has liberated itself from Dasein. For money has power only for that waking-consciousness that recognizes it no longer as token-value, but the absolute value by which land (home and abroad), possessions, even life, are to be measured.⁴⁷ But if the dictatorship of money begins in the chessboard extendedness of the megapolis, there it also ends. The final phase of Civilization completes itself with primitive force-politics of the sword: Caesarism and crude despotism rule over a formless mass, the fourth estate, behind the screen of old, dead traditions which are understood to be significant, but not felt so. After this, Spengler says, there is only Nothingness.⁴⁸

2. The Destiny-Ideas as State and Spiritual History

The development of Culture and its passage into Civilization.

is a process which occurs again and again. However, each time it occurs it differs in its inward form. According to Spengler, the Destiny-Idea proper to a Culture will give each Culture its own unique characteristics and history.

It is necessary now to investigate in more detail how the Destiny-Ideas of the various Cultures realize each in its own way the transformation of Culture into Civilization. But this task must be accomplished primarily within the context of the metaphysical moment of longing and fear. It has been noted above that Spengler, in the manner of Nietzsche, intuits the presence of two different types of men, the Destiny-Man and the Causality-Man.⁴⁹ The former experiences the World-as-History, for his life is under the sway of longing, and this means that his existence is an expression of will-to-power, success and duration. The latter experiences the World-as-Nature, for his life is directed by deep fear of reality as time and death, and thus he seeks not to live the world as a realm of facts, but to know it in the form of eternal truth. Every Culture possesses these two fundamentally different types, but their distinction is eclipsed when one detects that behind each a common Destiny-Idea is being expressed.

Every Culture begins with the rise of two primary Estates (and almost closes with their demise in Civilization), viz. nobility and priesthood.⁵⁰ The one is a living symbol of time, the other of space. Thus two completely different metaphysics separate the two. Nobility is the clearest world-historic manifestation of the will-to-duration. The longing of life expresses itself most

fundamentally in the continuation of one's family and progeny. All nobility find themselves in servitude to the deep unconscious impulse to see the duration of their blood in the future. This desire, however, is intimately related to the possession of land. Nobility is plantlike, for it propagates itself always in a particular landscape. "Having" is a feeling which begins with the deep rootedness of the plant, and the notion of property or possession is only a derivation from this prime state of attachment to the soil. Therefore, like the plant-like peasantry from which it grew out, early nobility is firmly bound to the land and thus exists in close harmony with the cyclic rhythms of nature. As Spengler says, nobility is cosmic.⁵¹ But priesthood is the exact opposite of all this.⁵² Not blood, but spirit, not family, but celibacy, not a life of honour, but a life of sinlessness, not land and castle, but cloister and cathedral—all this symbolizes the priesthood.⁵³ Fear of life inhibits the flow of it, and this presupposes that Wachsein is attempting to direct Dasein. This also is the condition for knowledge of the eternal truth. All priestly askesis derives from fear of falling victim to earthly temptation, i.e. Dasein, and so a state of vigilance must be constantly kept.⁵⁴ Such a state is "Microcosmic": one is shut off from the cosmic and faces it as one's opposite, the Macrocosm.

All forms of life exist as particular species or types. Spengler expresses this idea by stating that all forms of life have race.⁵⁵ Nobility, however, is distinctive in that it breeds itself further into an even more determinate type or race.⁵⁶ Just as

rare kinds of plants or animals are bred by man, so the noble, by training or breeding (Zucht, Züchtung) the already given instincts ("pulse" or "beat" as Spengler says), brings himself into a highly personal form. This process of self-breeding is Spengler's understanding of the word "Culture" in its most final sense.⁵⁷ What is essentially being cultivated is that given feeling which is the basis of the family and family descent, viz. care. The prime feeling of longing has transformed itself into care for that which is future. When a nobility enhances this quality, it sows the seeds for the state, which like the family is the symbol of duration and history.⁵⁸ The traditional role of the noble is the protector of the state. In feudalism, he is the state. A flowering nobility occupies itself exclusively with politics and administration, and all of the training in the milieu of elegant aristocratic forms and social intercourse aims ultimately towards the attainment of a high degree of physiognomic tact requisite for living as a statesman.

A knightly class sprung up in Egypt around 2700 B.C. as well as in India and China around 1200 B.C. and in the Classical world about 1100 B.C..⁵⁹ The Faustian nobility, however, distinguished itself from these by its passionate will-to-infinity, which comes to expression in its genealogical principle. No other Culture shows a history so dependent on marriage contracts and archival proofs of many-branched families. The Egyptian and Chinese ancestor-worship also expresses a strong will-to-future, but the direct descent from one line, which is the straight path of being or the Tao of being that arrives at one goal, is what determines the dynastic idea in

these two Cultures. In contrast, Classical nobility, which begins in Homeric times and encompasses an area that stretches from Etruria to Asia Minor, demonstrates an inward relationship to the agnatic family and mythical origin. The Apollinian feeling for near and present, its shunning of the historical sense which looks backward to the long ago or forward to the distant future, manifests itself in a dynastic idea that saw after the grandfather its source in Classical gods. Membership in the present family, and not in distant hereditary lines, is what kept the nobility in orderly form up into the civilized period.

Simultaneously with the appearance of each of these nobilities, their counter-estates emerged.⁶⁰ Though the priesthood is initially cut off from family by celibacy and thus inwardly from state history, it often finds itself in its early period fighting with sword, bribery, or treaties either to exist or to rule in the fact-world. Side by side with a spiritual history, a priesthood may unfold a secular history, which, like the former, will be in accord with its Destiny-Idea. The Faustian priesthood comes into definite form at the time of the first Gothic cathedral with the Papacy serving both as a seat of investiture and as a symbol of God's dynamic space.⁶¹ A militant church in the style of feudal nobility struggles against the nobility and its instinct of infinite blood-duration in order to assert the idea of an infinitely expanding rule of the clergy over ~~the state~~. The real conflict of Church and State ends after the Reformation when Wachsein is in control of Dasein and the priesthood can no longer justify a secular history.

Depending on the Destiny-Idea, the opposition of the two estates may or may not come to open expression. Spengler states that the Tao-Idea required the supremacy of nobility, while in India the prime symbol, which is the indefinite or measureless infinity, required the primacy to remain in the priesthood.⁶² In Egypt, the prime symbol of the way or path which is first detected in the rows of flat-relief, ranked columns, and tomb temples of the Old Kingdom (2900 B.C.) demanded equal striving in space and time, and so one finds a history of continuous opposition to the end.⁶³ For the Magian Culture, home of the domal mosque and stem-tracery, the cavern principle demanded eventual inclusion of the two estates.⁶⁴ The Monophysites, Nestorians, Jews, and all other sects in early Arabian Culture were formed by the consensus of the faithful, and with this, despite continual outbreaks of hostilities, the nobility found itself in inward harmony with the priesthood.

Thus, a priesthood may experience a secular history, but it does so in painful contradiction.⁶⁵ Its real center of gravity lies in the World-as-Nature, which demands the suppression of cosmic Dasein in favor of microcosmic Wachsein.⁶⁶ A priesthood cannot breed itself into an unconscious life-unit. Rather it comes together by sharing a common set of beliefs and teachings.⁶⁷ It is not streams of blood, but the linkages of thought that underlie a conscious-unit.⁶⁸ Unlike the instinctive training in a living tradition, the priest is shaped to cognize reality causally. In this way, the priesthood in every Culture is the beginning of a spiritual or intellectual history. What is to follow in this type of history

is the Culture's distinctive philosophy and science, which is only a more abstract formulation of principles already inherent in early priestly dogma.⁶⁹ The spiritual history of a Culture is an organic history by virtue of the fact that ultimate principles expressive of a Destiny-Idea serve as its living form.

As well, the entire life-course of the Culture's secular history, from feudalism to Caesarism, evolves in accord with a Destiny-Idea. Here one can only contrast the Apollinian and Faustian ideas and pick out a few highlights from Spengler's detailed discussion on this matter. Afterwards, a parallel evolution within the Cultures' spiritual histories can be analyzed.

The rise of the national State out of feudalism presupposes the adolescence of the city and the replacement of baronage and castle with city-aristocracy and capital as the center of political history.⁷⁰ In every Culture, the feeling of national unity is realized at first in the minority of a nobility which has moved from rural strongholds into city palaces.⁷¹ In the West, the formation of strictly aristocratic states can be understood basically as an intensification of the genealogical principle already inherent in its feudalism.⁷² The emergence of the national state, encompassing peoples of different languages, backgrounds, and landscapes through long-range plans of marriage between ruling houses is unparalleled in world history. That a Burgundian or a Lotharingian nation failed to develop reflects the fall of its houses, and the doom of the Hohenstaufen family meant the failure of a united German-Italian nation, while the permanent establishments of an Austrian and a

Spanish nation is traced to the carefully considered marriage politics of the Habsburgs.⁷³ But this will-to-history, the yearning for future and expanse, is altogether lacking in Classical man. The history from Homer to the first Tyrannis is one which continually thwarts any vestige of continuous long-distant dynasties. What began with hereditary kinship passed to the rule of the most conspicuous and powerful nobles, and this policy in turn evolved into the separation of offices from dignities (just as it did within the priesthood), which meant that the noble families chose among their ranks (first for a life-term, but gradually for an annual term) whose turn it would be to officiate as leader. Thus, the Apollinian feeling for the here and now slowly produced, in contrast to the Faustian genealogical state, the oligarchy state.⁷⁴

The development of the oligarchy state is intimately related to the Apollinian phenomenon of synoecism, the crowding of the country inhabitants into the narrow confines of the city.⁷⁵ With this, the Classical state as a nation reaches full maturity in the static, corporeal unit called the polis.⁷⁶ It is not Dorian, Hellenic, or Latin peoples, but the Athenians, Spartans, Corinthians, or Romans in their city-states who constitute the idea of nation for the classical world. In accord with Apollinian ideals, the polis is an expression of Euclidean feeling in political and social form, and the state is made up of a visible and surveyable cluster of people who can collect themselves as a body at one point in the city, the Forum or Agora.⁷⁷ The polis never extended beyond, but only thickened within the city walls. With increasing population, the

polis could multiply into innumerable other city-states, but then, again, only around the Mediterranean. The same denial of distance in time and space led the city-state in external affairs to maintain a self-limited policy of continual war with the sole object of annihilating the other city-state. Internally, the city-state, with the brevity of office and immediate improvisation, never attained permanent stability. Carpe diem is a motto which applies to all forms of Classical life. The period between First and Second Tyrannis (500 B.C.-340 B.C.), corresponding in the West to the period between First and Second Fronde (1648-1789) is the age in which the idea of an aristocratic state struggles with the new idea of an absolute state. The social unrest during this period of Classical history is one which appears disorderly and subject to incident, while in the West, events were determined by a life which was ordered by long-range cabinet policy and tradition.⁷⁸ As well, Faustian diplomacy in this age (which occurs within the development of counterpoint) took place among a "concert"⁷⁹ of powers according to strict conventions and shaped history on the other side of the globe. Likewise, every Faustian nation stretches across a geographical space with a seat of government as a center of force radiating outwards to remote regions of the country, and every city, in contrast to the increasingly cramped and narrow streets of the polis, invades the wide countryside with a complex network of roads and fast-moving traffic.⁸⁰ This situation is self-evident in Western Culture and in a world dominated by Western forms, but in every other Culture, these forms are either altogether absent or felt as alien

and ipso facto unnatural. Even with the advent of Civilization-- the period of inward disintegration of national peoples into formless megapolitan population--the last forms are governed by a Destiny-Idea. This is especially evident in the attitude towards money.⁸¹

The same Classical tendency to view the world as a sum of sensual bodies and forms, like the free-standing statue of a god, regards money as magnitude.⁸² Wealth in the city-states is a sum of tangible, movable objects like the stamped coin, vessels and statues carried off in triumph as ready cash--never land possessions.

Classical slavery rose out of the need to find another source of body-money for an expanding but static economy in the Greco-Roman world. The slave was not needed for the exploitation of work, i.e. for the transformation of muscle energy into another form of energy, but simply to exist, like the coin, as an object of wealth.⁸³

Both the custom of melting down precious metals of a defeated city and the selling of its inhabitants into slavery meant the same thing--corporeal objects are used as money. Quite different is Faustian money. The check and credit system makes money into a function whose value depends on effects, not existence.⁸⁴ Paper money itself

is only the historic evidence by which a certain personality (like an incorporeal center of force) vouches for a particular heightening of economic activity. It is thinking, inventing, organizing, and ordering which generates money and gives value to any object except the thought itself. The present day firm, wholly unthinkable in the atomized Classical economy, shows a maximum of organizational activity, by which the proprietor dynamically possesses and directs

economical fields of force.⁸⁵

Likewise, every creation within a Culture's spiritual history owes its particular character to its Destiny-Idea. The real difference between secular and spiritual history is that the former—expressed in the political, economic, and social structure of the state—is a direct manifestation of unconscious cosmic 'it', and the latter is a direct expression of the microcosmic 'I'. What lies at the foundation of family and state is instinctive yearning and care for life. In contrast, religion, philosophy, and science—all pictures of the World-as-Nature—have their immediate source not in fear for, but fear of life and directional time. But this does not alter the fact that the domain of Wachsein derives life and content from unconscious Dasein. Spengler explains the connection between the World-as-Nature and the Cosmic through the possession of "faith": "Das erste und vielleicht das einzige Ergebnis des menschlichen Verstehenswollens ist der Glaube. 'Ich glaube' ist das grosse Wort gegen die metaphysische Angst und zugleich ein Bekenntnis der Liebe."⁸⁶ (The first, and perhaps the only, outcome of man's will-to-understanding is faith. 'I believe' is the great word against metaphysical fear, and at the same time it is an avowal of love.)⁸⁷ The dread of mortality can be subdued only when one believes in alien, but causally ascertainable Numina—be it ephemeral spirits, gods, categories, or photons. The alien Numina serve as the ultimate explanation of the world in its directional Becoming, and with this an intellectual love (completely different from the instinctive love of sex and race) of microcosmic tension between 'I' and otherness is born. But this

faith in something comes as a vision (revelation for the saint, world-view for the philosopher, theory for the scientist), and a vision is always rooted in a given disposition, which cannot itself be subject to any critical scrutiny even though it makes possible all methodical inquiry. A vision of the World-as-Nature necessarily contains the metaphysical principles of a Culture's Destiny-Idea. All philosophers in the same Culture present ideas which are inwardly akin to their common secular history by virtue of being an organic expression of the same cosmic flow.

From Spengler's detailed discussion of nature-knowledge, a rough comparison can be made between Greek and Western physics in order to sense the Apollinian and Faustian Destiny-Ideas behind intent, theory, discovery, and method.

Generally speaking, Greek science is described as a physics of the near and Western physics of distance, just as Euclidean geometry is a mathematic of the near and the infinitesimal calculus a mathematic of unlimited space. The words "polarized light-rays", "errant ions", "gas particles", "magnetic field", "electric currents", and "waves" would have been entirely inaccessible to the ancient mind, in the same way that the key scientific terms in Classical physics are inaccessible to the Western mind.⁸⁸ Being constituted to view the world a priori as static, fixed, and corporeal, the ancient Greek presents as his scientific picture of the Become an aggregate of impressions, well-ordered and self-complete.⁸⁹ This picture is a quiet meditation upon the world and stands in complete contrast to the Faustian dynamic picture which is always accompanied

by the question, what possibility is there of mastering the invisible motive forces of Becoming? The Greek physicist would not and could not approach the world with a concern for conquering it.⁹⁰ The main question which intrigued the passive experience of Apollinian physicists was: what is the essence of visible, sensuous being? To this question belongs the ruling conception of matter and form. In contrast, Western physics from the outset is conceived as a method or as a working hypothesis, and its ruling passion is expressed in the conception of force and mass.⁹¹ An inward agreement stands on the one hand between the stoical attitude, the pathos of Oedipus, and the Greek atomic theory, and on the other hand between Socialism, the aggressiveness of Macbeth, and the atom theory of Leibniz, Rutherford, Bohr, and Planck. If one considers the atom theory of Leucippus and Democritus, one finds the simplest possible form-units are conceived with the purpose of noting their aspects, not workings. Each atom is a self-contained unit, incapable of being reproduced, and consequently no eternal laws governing their behaviour and the physical world in general can be formulated.⁹² Each atom is knocked about and suffers what blind chance brings. As plastic, indivisible units, differing not in capacity or energy, but in form and magnitude, each atom is like a polis or statue in having a definite shape, locality, and private existence. Quite different is the Faustian atom which is not a miniature form requiring only a simple sense-image to be grasped, but a minimal quantum of energy consisting of invisible vibrations and radiations and requiring the power of inner vision to grasp its character.⁹³ Yet the

Faustian energy-picture is accessible and necessarily connected to its aggressive conquest of the nature-world.⁹⁴ Inherent in the scientific experience of forces commanding space and identical to space is the systematic and exhaustive exploitation of this Faustian experience. The experience of force and the vision of ultimate reality as energy-systems and tension-relations is accompanied by the demand for the harnessing and human control of this reality. Thus measurement, experiment, and thereby formulation of absolute laws governing existence—activities completely foreign to Apollinian science—are inherent for knowing the world. The Faustian scientist does not know Nature until he has it in his hands. For him, knowledge is power.⁹⁵ With the formulation of universal laws, one has discovered the secrets of nature and eo ipso has power over it. The elements of Lavoisier's theory of combustion, in contrast to the four visible elements of Empedocles, established a way to the transformation of the landscape. For Faustian man, and only for him, every law is an expression of a spiritual need to wrest from nature its forces and actualize dynamic space.⁹⁶

Chapter IV

CONCLUSION: NOT-BEING AS PRESUPPOSITION

It is now necessary to return to the theme of Not-Being or Nothingness. What must be demonstrated is that the idea of Civilization, as well as the continuous unfolding of various Destiny-Ideas, presupposes the reality of Not-Being. This conception lies within the notion of Culture, as a movement. Like the plant and the animal, Culture is an organic movement from birth to death. Movement here, which is synonymous with the word "aging", is Being as Becoming, and thus is intimately bound up with the conception of Not-Being as the Having-Become. Reality conceived in this way is a finite movement, and the word "Destiny" must be taken as an expression of the finitude of living reality.

The Eleatics spoke long ago of the logical incompatibility of the categories of Being and Not-Being, and therefore found it necessary to deny the reality of motion and Not-Being. Spengler himself states in one place that the Eleatic arguments, from the standpoint of pure logical thought, have not and cannot be refuted.¹ However, it was established in the chapter on method that the instinctive, "organic" logic, which is presented through physiognomic tact, entails the vision of reality as the movement of Destiny. There it was first stated that Being meant for Spengler Becoming, and this was characterized through such terms as time, direction, irreversibility,

soul, and life.² Other terms which further symbolize Becoming are pulse, beat, rhythm, and future.³ Conversely, Not-Being as the Having-Become is grasped in the notions of space, extendedness, rigidity, reversibility, death, and past. There is no scientific justification of Spengler's view. Indeed, it is inherent in the Spenglerian orientation that a world-view is innate and simply "there" as Dasein, and consequently the question of its validity is irrelevant. What must be understood here however is that the Being of any individual or Culture is incomprehensibly connected with its Not-Being as the finitè movement of a Destiny-Idea.

It has likewise been explained in the present chapter that this organic logic leads to the conception of Becomeness as a condition of Becoming.⁴ That is to say, the aspect of reality which is Not-Being or Becomeness is a chronological, not logical consequence of Being as Becoming--and never vice versa. This idea is only another formulation of the theme that Destiny is an irreversible or organically necessary movement.⁵ All of that which possesses life or Destiny expresses itself in a definitely extended form. It is the only way in which the living manifests itself in the phenomenal world. The form itself symbolizes the expression and fulfillment of an inner principle or soul.⁶ The relation of living soul to the purely extended form is that of Becoming to Becomeness, and the latter is and means nothing without the soul giving it life and meaning, i.e. Being.⁷ Thus, the extended form, serving as a reflection of an inner living principle, is a function of that principle, and without this subservient role, the extended form is Nothing.

This point was particularly important in connection with Spengler's understanding of human consciousness. The depth-experience, the awakening of soul to the alien world, is presented as an irrevocable, necessary movement of living sensation into causal understanding.⁸

With the cognition of spatial distance, the world appears to an 'I' as a rigid mechanism. But the comprehension of depth is conditioned beforehand by the a priori presence of a Destiny-Idea within a living sensation. Therefore, on the one hand, the consciousness of the world is the world in lifeless rigidity, viz. the world as alien and Not-Being. On the other hand, the conscious world receives meaningfulness and life by virtue of the fact that it is created and continuously re-created by a Destiny-Idea. The inherently lifeless and extended world of the 'I' is animated from moment to moment by a perceiving Dasein realizing a Destiny-Idea.

With this understanding of the role of human consciousness, it becomes clearer why Spengler says:

Jede Tatsache, selbst die einfachste, enthält bereits eine Theorie. Eine Tatsache ist ein einmaliger Eindruck auf ein wachendes Wesen, und alles hängt davon ab, ob es ein Mensch der Antike oder des Abendlandes, der Gotik oder des Barock ist, für den sie da ist oder da war.⁹

Every fact, even the simplest, contains ab initio a theory. A fact is a uniquely-occurring impression upon a waking being, and everything depends on whether that being, the being for whom it occurs or did occur, is or was Classical or Western, Gothic or Baroque.¹⁰

For cultured-man, consciousness of facts organically entails that a Destiny-Idea is expressing itself. Consciousness involves the presence of a world-view of a particular soul. There can be no general, "objective", presuppositionless, or "scientific" consciousness

of purely extended Nature or living History. World-consciousness is an organic outcome of a living principle—the creation of a soul—and the perceived-world has significance insofar as it can be continually cognized as an expression of this principle. The exhaustion of this living-principle—the death of the soul—means the loss of the organic and functional relation of Becomeness to Becoming, consciousness to sensation. What is left is nothingness, viz. pure meaningless extension. Spengler states:

Ist eine Kultur zu Ende und damit das schöpferische Element, die Bildkraft, die Symbolik erloschen, so bleiben "leere" Formeln, Gerippe von toten Systemen übrig, die von den Menschen fremder Kulturen ganz buchstäblich als sinnlos und wertlos empfunden, mechanisch beibehalten oder verachtet und vergessen werden. Zahlen, Formeln, Gesetze bedeuten nichts und sind nichts. Sie müssen einen Leib haben, den ihnen nur ein lebendes Menschentum verleiht, indem es in ihnen und durch sie lebt, sich zum Ausdruck bringt, sie innerlich in Besitz nimmt. Und deshalb gibt es keine absolute Physik, nur einzelne, auftauchende und schwindende Physiken innerhalb einzelner Kulturen.¹¹

When a Culture is at its end and the creative element—the imaginative power, the symbolism—is extinct, there are left "empty" formulae, skeletons of dead systems, which men of another Culture read literally, feel to be without meaning or value and either mechanically store up or else despise and forget. Numbers, formulae, laws mean nothing and are nothing. They must have a body, and only a living mankind—projecting its livingness into them and through them, expressing itself by them, inwardly making them its own—can endow them with that. And thus there is no absolute science of physics, but only individual sciences that come, flourish and go within the individual Cultures.¹²

Not only Nature-knowledge, but every other expressive culture form—including the individual person—serves as a function and symbol, and with the extinction of a Destiny-Idea, all culture forms enter forever the domain or state of nothingness. This idea is implied in another statement:

Alle Kunst ist sterblich, nicht nur die einzelnen Werke, sondern die Künste selbst. Es wird eines Tages das letzte Bildnis Rembrandts und der letzte Takt Mozartscher Musik aufgehört haben zu sein, obwohl eine bemalte Leinwand und ein Notenblatt vielleicht übrig sind, weil das letzte Auge und Ohr verschwand, das ihrer Formensprache zugänglich war. Vergänglich ist jeder Gedanke, jeder Glaube, jede Wissenschaft, sobald die Geister erloschen sind, in deren Welten ihre "ewigen Wahrheiten" mit Notwendigkeit als wahr empfunden wurden. Vergänglich sind sogar die Sternwelten, welche den Astronomen am Nil und Euphrat "erscheinen", als Welten für ein Auge, denn unser—ebense vergängliches—Auge ist ein anderes.¹³

All art is mortal, not merely the individual artifacts but the arts themselves. One day the last portrait of Rembrandt and the last bar of Mozart will have ceased to be—though possibly a coloured canvas and a sheet of notes may remain—because the last eye and the last ear accessible to their message will have gone. Every thought, faith and science dies as soon as the spirits in whose worlds their "eternal truths" were true and necessary are extinguished. Dead, even, are the star-worlds which "appeared", a proper world to the proper eye, to the astronomers of the Nile and the Euphrates, for our eye is different from theirs¹⁴

In general, there is no "the", but only "a" world-consciousness (Wachsein), which as function and expression of a living Dasein, presents a particular Destiny-Idea. Once this inner principle is exhausted, the particular world-perception is lost, and what previously was a meaningful symbol becomes timeless extension.

Consequently, Not-Being, as the conceptual counterpart to Becoming, is an inherent part of the intuition of the Urkultur. For every Culture must be considered first as an organic movement and second as a single organism with a particular ego and world-consciousness. To repeat, this latter aspect is a derivative of the former since a world-consciousness characterizes the unconscious psychic unity of a specific species of men and therefore the Becoming

of a particular Destiny-Idea.¹⁵

With this explanation, Spengler's conception of the relation of individual man and Culture comes again to the foreground. Man does not create Culture, rather Culture creates man.¹⁶ Just as religious dogma and mathematical theorems symbolize a common cultural principle, so men (for there is no "man") symbolize the same. In the end, specific types of men (which stratify into nations, estates, and classes) are manifestations of an underlying Destiny-Idea and thus, like every other culture form, express an underlying prime symbol.¹⁷ This idea corresponds with previous statements made to the effect that individuals are not their own centers of force, but the states of hidden forces.¹⁸ To speak figuratively, Culture comes through the individual as Cosmic will and creates a specific world for the conscious 'I'. Each individual 'I' possesses the image of the world which the Destiny-Idea of Culture has given it. It is never the world-in-itself, but a world, or to use Spengler's terminology, a Macrocosm (viz. reality as a sum total of symbols) which the 'I' knows and lives in. A Macrocosm always stands in relation to a Microcosm, which is an 'I' with all the prepossessions of its Culture. As a Microcosm, the 'I' is never a blank waiting to be impressed by an external world, rather it is the organic outcome of incomprehensible Dasein or the cosmic It. In the last chapter, Dasein was seen to be pluralistic for Spengler, and therefore, it should be understood from the analysis, in this chapter that the various Destiny-Ideas of the higher Cultures are the principles of various streams of Being struggling to emerge into the light-world

of the 'I'.¹⁹ Each Culture has a Destiny--each is a Destiny, because as a stream or movement, each is a Becoming with a future to be actualized. Spengler summarizes Culture-history as the inner development and struggle of an Idea against a background of chaos, darkness, and extinction, and the individual is the vehicle by which its cultural idea realizes its movement.

As far as Spengler is concerned, the Destiny-Idea is everything to the individual. It is that which establishes in him a sense of identity among the whirl of events by giving him the impulse towards greater and greater form. It is the Idea--the "inner form" of a Culture--that raises the individual above the turmoil of happenings by making him the center and subject of them. Spengler says somewhere that Culture-man rides the tide of history instead of suffering and enduring it.²⁰ Insofar as one is the subject of an unfolding Idea, one is at the helm of a Destiny. Only Culture-man has the opportunity of living and experiencing history as the fate of his own private life, for the events of history become the expression of the developing form which he feels as his innermost being. The historical events which span the thirty to forty generations of a Culture take on a uniformity, coherency, and regularity that only an individual within the movement can identify as his history.

Now the role of nothingness in this picture of history and Culture can be understood by contrasting the meaning implied in the notion of organic development with the notion of non-organic occurrences. All that Spengler says concerning the nature of

Culture-peoples and their history implies the converse for un-cultured peoples and their history. The logic behind this conclusion is the physiognomic logic which regards Being as Becoming or an organic movement and Not-Being as Becomeness or the end of organic movement.

"Form" is the word Spengler uses to capture the ideas of organic life in general and of the peculiar character of an organism.²¹ Every movement has form, and it is always a particular form which distinguishes one type of organic movement from another. But with this conception of Form, Spengler connects the temporal notion of Takt (pulse, beat, or rhythm). Every organic formation has a kind of periodicity peculiar to it alone.²² It is part of its character. Close observation of any plant will prove that part of its uniqueness is manifested both in the cycle of seasonal flowering and fructification and in the progressive, regular way it accomplishes its life-course as a whole. The same is the case with the animal and the Culture. Every organism has its own peculiar tempo. Another way Spengler refers to the ability to intuit the soul or Destiny-Idea of another life-form is to say that physiognomic Takt is the inherent talent of sensing the particular rhythm or periodicity of another being. But the awareness of this temporal quality leads also to the awareness of another factor. The Takt of the plant or animal entails further that every observable part of the organism is in close harmony with every other part of the organism. "Harmony" means temporal unity of parts into one uniform whole or spirit. The formation of any organism and its progression through various stages of life implies that every member of the organism is an

integral part of the whole by virtue of being in servitude, in harmony, or accord with the living whole. To be "in Form" is to be in tune to the particular moment and epoch of the actualization of a Destiny-Idea. It shall be elucidated in the next chapter that Spengler's image of Culture includes not only the aspect that every individual, nation, and estate is necessarily in harmony with the developmental stage of the Culture's Destiny-Idea, but also that in a far more mysterious way the Culture—just like every present species of plant-animal life—is in a deep harmony with the cosmic flowings of the universe.

Consequently, harmony, like Takt, belongs inherently to the notion of formation or Becoming of a unique principle of Being, and the contrary of this state—disharmony, irregularity, capriciousness, and chaos—express what nothingness as Becomeness means. An organism that is dying shows increasing malfunction of parts and disorganization. Death is complete dismemberment and decentralization. What at first appears as a sign of death, the breaking down of the inner unity and form, is actually the transformation into death, the total decomposition of the organism. Whereas increased integration and harmony of parts describe an organism that has a future before it, that is young and not diseased, disorder and incoherence serve as signs and attributes of death. The opposition here between life and death, or Being and nothingness is what was earlier seen as the opposition of time and space. The logos of a plant, animal, or Culture is living time or Destiny. But with the death of the organism, the altogether different logos of space takes over. The

organic movement is replaced by physical, or mechanical motion of stiff, inert matter. Such a state is inherently chaotic and unpredictable. It is nothingness because it is formless. Instead of a ruling Idea bringing the extended world into a coherent unity and harmony, extended objects move through space in a completely disorganized manner. The position they take up is a question of chance, that is, it depends on the moment which object happens to be a cause of another's motion. The causality here is not the a priori form of a mind forming a systematic understanding upon the extended world—for systematic understanding presupposes the presence of a living Idea. Again, this is nothingness, and as such, it is impossible to conceive, for conception requires the cognition of something by the category of causality. Likewise it is impossible to conceive of the pure havoc of matter in motion for any length of time without imposing involuntarily a certain order in the image. But for the Spenglerian orientation, it is not a question of possible concepts being established or contradictory concepts being reconciled. Since nothingness, death, and amorphism denote a side of reality and are intimately tied up with movement, their meanings from the Spenglerian framework can only be intuitively felt and not analytically dissected.

Therefore, if Civilization betokens the end of a movement, it also means the entrance into nothingness. Fellohism, as it appears today in China, India, Arabia, and will begin to appear in a few centuries in the West, is defined by Spengler as the post-civilized residue of a once flourishing Culture. What determines the course

of events in this end-state is what the moment brings. Instead of individuals being the subjects of history by living in the inward development of a Destiny-Idea, late civilized and fellaheen peoples are the "objects" of history, i.e. they experience history only as the external impact of foreign peoples or as the meaningless alternation of soldier-leaders ambitious for booty and power. With Fellaahism, centuries of uninterrupted stillness may pass as in the case of Egypt before the Roman Imperium, or the individual lives of whole multitudes (after believing they had attained to eternal stability) may go under overnight as in the cases of the Mayan and Classical worlds. Fellaheen existence is the very opposite of the temporal, orderly phenomenon of Culture. Fellaahism is the causal, spatial phenomenon of formless masses of people being knocked about and used as objects of another's will. This state of affairs is nothingness, for it is both chaotic and meaningless. As Spengler sees it, there is no inner idea which unifies people into well-defined nations and estates and eo ipso makes them the center of force. Without an idea by which reality can be measured, no new genuine art or organic thought can appear, and without the political-social forms of this same idea, existence takes on no more significance than that which the beast in the jungle experiences from day to day. Only with a super-personal Idea can the grand course of events be an expression and have meaning for the individual. When the unconscious, organic logic of an "it" rules, history is not subject to chance. Destiny eliminates the incidental from determining the course of events. Fellaahism, however, is the extinction of the Idea

and therefore the end of the form which accompanies its development or movement.

The other major way Spengler describes the growth and disintegration of Culture is through the idea of increasing consciousness.²³ Such a characterization is not fundamentally different from characterizing Culture as an organic movement with a particular form. Indeed, consciousness in Spengler's philosophy, we have seen, is the outcome of an organic movement which is called "the depth-experience". This entails that consciousness must be considered from two angles. First, it is an expression of a spiritual principle, and thus its meaning and reality is functionally dependent on this principle. Secondly, being the result of a formative principle, consciousness is itself Not-Being. This leads to the paradoxical conclusion that consciousness depends for both existence and content on non-conscious reality (Dasein).

In this section, the Destiny of a Culture was explained as the gradual inversion of Wachsein-in-servitude-of-Dasein into Dasein-in-servitude-of-Wachsein. The life of early Culture-man is dominated by the dread of or the longing to overcome death. Though the priesthood is a living symbol of space and the World-as-Nature stands opposite to the knight as the symbol of time and duration, both are under the unconscious spell of accomplishing their ends through the same fundamental form. That both estates in early springtime live and experience the world through the same form as something that is self-evident indicates the presence of a Destiny-Idea

which is too deep within their being to be consciously recognized. However, after the dread of death has been causally explained away by the ever-growing systematic consciousness of late Culture, and after the instinctive longing of the soul must constantly justify its goals before almighty Reason—then Wachsein comes to rule Dasein. This ushers in the first part of Civilization—the only period in the life-course of the Culture wherein abstract ideals and money¹ thought spun out by a purely urban intelligence determine political and social existence.²⁴ For Spengler, this situation indicates that Dasein can only be a function of Wachsein when the "it" has lost its generative power and begins to fade out of individual life. Wachsein has no longer any real opponent. The inner flame to live on and endure as a unified people has died down, and instinct no longer dictates what is and must be. With the dawn of Fellahism, conscious life experiences the fact that without Dasein there is nothing.²⁵ In other words, (as Nietzsche says) intellect dies when instinct dies.²⁶ The power that was behind every great thought and deed in the Culture and which made its way into the pictures of nature or the facts of history came from a deep felt-necessity. It was a Destiny-Idea that inspired individuals to ward off the surrounding darkness and fear and to make the world into an ordered whole. It was this that instilled in the individual's blood and mind the way the world should and would appear in formula and fact. But without this cosmic drive, formlessness and chaos crowd back in. Fellahism is a situation in which the psyche of the civilized residue feels

no need to put into shape a world either of nature or history. It is a phenomenon of dead tradition and uninspired thought which a formless population mechanically takes over from its ancestors. With these dead forms—be they technical, artistic, economic, religious or linguistic—the population may keep at bay the encroachment of a foreign soul, but being lifeless forms, the population often demonstrates the readiness to cast aside these traditional forms for any more effective forms coming from the outside. Whatever forms fellahēen people have or will adopt is a matter of accident, not Destiny.²⁷

Consequently, whether Spengler considers the life-course of a Culture either as a movement from beginning to end or as the functional relation of Dasein to Wachsein, the message of irrevocability and necessity—Destiny—emerges to let one know that life and soul are mortal. From this, it becomes essential to realize that nothingness forms an essential complement to Becoming in Spengler's vision of reality.

FOOTNOTES

Part II THE SPENGLERIAN PHILOSOPHY

Chapter II DESTINY

1. Spengler, UdA., I, 160.
2. Ibid., pp. 154-70.
3. Ibid., pp. 221-5.
4. Ibid., p. 183.
5. Ibid., pp. 160-2.
6. Ibid., pp. 107f.
7. Ibid.
8. Cf. Spengler, Urf., p. 305.
9. Spengler, UdA., I, 108.
10. Spengler, Urf., p. 279.
11. Spengler, UdA., I, 108f.
12. Ibid., p. 214.
13. Ibid., p. 109.
14. Ibid., pp. 216f.
15. Spengler, Urf., pp. 305-11.
16. Spengler, UdA., p. 161.
17. Ibid., p. 108.
18. Ibid., II, 16f.
19. Ibid., p. 5.
20. Spengler, Urf., p. 307.
21. Spengler, UdA., II, 5-7.
22. Ibid., p. 8.

23. Ibid., p. 13.
24. Cf. Spengler, Urf., p. 196.
25. Ibid., pp. 326-30.
26. Ibid., pp. 218-22.
27. Spengler, UdA., I, 108.
28. Spengler, Urf., pp. 126f.
29. Spengler, UdA., I, 109 and 162.
30. Ibid., pp. 109f.
31. Ibid., pp. 514f.
32. Ibid., p. 138.
33. Ibid., II, 514f.
34. Ibid., pp. 20-2.
35. Ibid., I, 180.
36. Ibid., p. 110.
37. Cf. Spengler, FrZ., p. 21.
38. Spengler, UdA., II, 416.
39. Ibid., p. 14.
40. Ibid., I, 108.
41. Ibid., p. 109.
42. Ibid., I, 403.
43. Spengler, DW., I, 79.
44. Cf. J. Volhelt, "Die Grundbegriffe in Spenglers Geschichtsphilosophie", Historische Vierteljahresschrift, XX (1920/21), 257, and E. Troeltsch, "Spengler", Historische Zeitschrift, 1920, 281.
45. A. Baltzer, Spenglers Bedeutung für die Gegenwart (Neheim-Hüsten, 1959), pp. 77f.
46. My translation.
47. Spengler, UdA., I, 107f.
48. Ibid., pp. 217ff. N.B.: "Das Selbstbewusstsein--das ist Wissen und

das eigene Ich, entsteht nicht aus dem Gegensatz Ich- Welt, sondern aus dem Begreifen von Vergangenheit-Gegenwart-Zukunft. Damit ist das Ich dem selbstverständlichen Jetzt und Hier entzogen, und nun erst sieht es auch den Gegensatz von bleibendem Ich und bewegter Welt." Urf., p. 259. "Self-consciousness - that is knowledge and one's I - emerges not out of the opposition I-world, but out of the concepts Past-Present-Future.* With this the I is withdrawn from the self-evident Now and Here, and only then does it see the opposition of the constant I and the moving World." My translation.

49. Spengler, UdA., I, 167.
50. Spengler, DW., I, 126f.
51. Cf. Spengler, Urf., p. 295.
52. Spengler, UdA., I, 109.
53. Ibid., II, 5 and Urf., pp. 164 and 243.
54. Spengler, UdA., I, 74.
55. Cf. Spengler, Urf., p. 244.
56. Spengler, UdA., I, 74f.
57. Spengler, Urf., p. 108,
58. Spengler, UdA., I, 163f.
59. Ibid., p. 161.
60. Ibid., p. 158.
61. Ibid., pp. 154-60.
62. Ibid., p. 163.
63. Ibid., p. 166.
64. Spengler, DW., I, 125f.
65. Spengler, Urf., p. 279.
66. Ibid., p. 112.
67. Spengler, UdA., I, 162f.
68. Ibid., p. 158.
69. Cf. Spengler, Urf., p. 158.
70. Spengler, UdA., I, 207f.

71. Ibid.
72. The opposition between facts and truth was seen in the discussion on methodology in the form of questioning. Spengler says that the World-as-Nature concerns itself solely with the question of How? and Why? Satisfactory replies to these questions can only be in the form of timeless truths, eternal laws. The World-as-History concerns itself with the questions of Where? and When? Only facts can answer these questions. Truths follow from each other: facts follow one another. The former belong to the realm of Wachsein, the latter to Dasein. Cf. Spengler, Urf., p. 252, and UdA., I, 165.
73. Spengler, UdA., I, 129.
74. Spengler, DW., I, 95.
75. Spengler, UdA., I, 140.
76. Ibid., pp. 218-22.
77. Ibid., p. 391.
78. Ibid., p. 222.
79. Ibid., p. 210.
80. Spengler, DW., I, 102.
81. Spengler, Urf., pp. 106 and 347.
82. Spengler, UdA., pp. 385-7.
83. Spengler, FrZ., p. 89.
84. Spengler, Urf., pp. 27 and 157.
85. Spengler, UdA., I, 385.
86. Spengler, Urf., p. 166.
87. My translation.
88. Spengler, FrZ., p. 24.
89. "Statt 'so-sein' besser Charakter, Physiognomie sagen. Alles was ist, hat sein besonderes Gesicht. Nie kommt zweimal dasselbe vor. Die Abstraktion des Beständig-Möglichen, die Formel des Identischen ist nicht Wirklichkeit aufgeprägt wird. Das Wesen eines Einzelnen offenbart sich nur durch Wirkung. Wie er lebt, d.h. wirkt, nicht was er 'ist' - das bleibt Geheimnis." Urf., p. 142. "Instead of 'being-so', better to say character or physiognomy. Everything which exists has its own particular countenance. The same thing

never occurs twice. The abstraction of the continuously possible, the formula of the identical, is not actuality, but a production of the understanding which is stamped on the picture of actuality. The essence of the individual reveals itself only through effect. How it lives, i.e. takes effect, not what it 'is' - that remains a secret." My translation.

90. Spengler, Urf., P. 158.
91. Ibid., p. 156.
92. Ibid., p. 178. As will be seen in Part IV, Spengler is not consistent with his explanation of the word "soul". In the Untergang and Urfragen, the word is often used to denote spiritual principles lacking consciousness.
93. My translation.
94. Spengler, UdA., II, 9-17.
95. Spengler, Urf., p. 296.
96. Ibid., p. 175.
97. My translation.
98. Spengler, Urf., p. 170.
99. Ibid., p. 214.
100. Ibid., p. 177.
101. Ibid., p. 168.
102. Spengler, UdA., II, 6.
103. Spengler, Urf., p. 297.
104. Spengler, UdA., II, 3f.
105. Ibid., pp. 8f.
106. Ibid., p. 4.
107. Spengler, Urf., pp. 174-6.
108. Cf. Spengler, UdA., II, 323f.
109. Cf. Spengler, Urf., p. 45.
110. Spengler, UdA., II, 3-6.
111. Spengler, Urf., pp. 43f.

112. Spengler, UdA., I, 130.
113. Spengler, Urf., p. 301.
114. Spengler, MuT., pp. 35ff.
115. Spengler, UdA., II, 221f, and FrZ., p. 2.
116. Spengler, FrZ., p. 83, and Urf., p. 284.
117. Spengler FrZ., p. 80.
118. Spengler, MuT., pp. 44ff.
119. Spengler, FrZ., p. 4.
120. Spengler, UdA., II, 408f.
121. Spengler, Urf., p. 164.
122. Ibid., pp. 408ff.
123. Cf. Spengler, FrZ., p. 53.
124. Ibid., p. 2.
125. Ibid., p. 9.
126. Cf. Spengler, UdA., II, 437-45.
127. Cf. Spengler, FrZ., p. 8.
128. Cf. Spengler, Urf., pp. 176 and 234.
129. Cf. Spengler, FrZ., pp. 9 and 25.
130. As confirmation of our interpretation, one can find in the Urf. the following statement: "Die grosse Entzweiung: Natur gegen Natur, Mensch gegen Welt, und zuletzt im Menschen 'Geist' gegen Blut, verschärft bis zum tragischen Konflikt in der Seele. 'Leben' ist vollzogene Entzweiung." p. 211. "The great schism: nature against nature, man against world, and finally in man 'Intellect' against blood, intensifies to the point of tragic conflict in the soul. 'Life' is realized schism." My translation.
131. Spengler, Urf., p. 181.
132. "Denken erfasst beim Tode das Nichtsein, also Leben Sein." Urf., p. 149. "Thinking grasps death as Not-Being, thus life as Being." My translation.
133. Spengler, UdA., I, 216-22.

134. Spengler, Urf., p. 181.
135. Spengler, UdA., I, pp. 217f.
136. Ibid., p. 218.
137. Spengler, DW., I, 167.²
138. Cf. Spengler, FrZ., p. 32.
139. Spengler, UdA., I, 227.
140. Ibid., p. 218.
141. Ibid.
142. Ibid., p. 220.
143. Ibid., p. 219.
144. Ibid., pp. 220-2.
145. Ibid., p. 228.
146. Ibid., pp. 225-7.
147. Ibid., pp. 500f.
148. Ibid.
149. Spengler, Urf., p. 278.
150. Spengler, UdA., I, 109 and 219.
151. Ibid., p. 500.
152. Ibid., p. 215.
153. Ibid., p. 493.
154. Ibid., p. 215.
155. Ibid., II, 33ff.
156. Ibid., p. 10.
157. Ibid., p. 500.
158. Ibid., I, 226f.
159. Ibid.
160. Ibid., p. 227.

161. Ibid., I, 220f.
162. Ibid., II, 216f.
163. Ibid., I, 108.
164. Ibid., pp. 221 and 227.
165. Ibid., pp. 228f.
166. Ibid.
167. Ibid., p. 228.
168. Spengler, Urf., p. 234.
169. Ibid., p. 237.
170. Spengler, UdA., I, 229-36.
171. Ibid., p. 237.
172. Ibid., p. 239.
173. Ibid., p. 229.

Chapter III THE DESTINY - IDEA

1. Spengler, FrZ., p. 89.
2. Spengler, UdA., I, 42-9.
3. Ibid., pp. 49f.
4. Spengler, Urf., p. 161.
5. Ibid., p. 144.
6. Spengler, UdA., I, 104f.
7. In Part III, it shall be further clarified that the nations which constitute a Culture, as well as the classes and individuals within the various nations, are also understood to be organisms with specific structure and form. Hence, Spengler says: "Je entschiedener eine Nation im Stil echter Kultur geprägt ist, desto reicher ist ihr Wuchs gegliedert nach Stand und Rang. Eine Gesellschaft besteht aus Rangordnungen.... Ungleichheit der Teile ist mit organischer Gestaltung identisch.... Es gibt starke und schwache, zur Führung berufene und ungeeignete, schöpferische und

unbegabte, ehrenhafte, faule, ehrgeizige und stille Naturen. Jede hat ihren Platz in der Ordnung des Ganzen. Je bedeutender eine Kultur ist, je mehr sie der Gestaltung eines edlen tierischen oder pflanzlichen Leibes gleicht, desto grösser sind die Unterschiede der aufbauenden Elemente." Jahre der Entscheidung (Munich, 1933), pp. 63ff. "The more perfectly a nation represents, shows the true stamp and style of, its Culture..., the richer its organic disposition by status and rank, ... it is constituted according to rank..., the inequality of the parts is identical with organic formation.... There are strong and weak natures, natures born to lead or not to lead, creative and untalented, honourable, lazy, ambitious, and placid natures. Each has its place in the general order of things. The more significant the Culture, the more it resembles the structure of a noble animal or vegetable body and the greater are the differences between its constituent elements.... Hour of Decision (New York, 1963), pp. 88ff.

8. Spengler, Urf., p. 161. Spengler tells us that this inner unity is only the case for the "higher Cultures". In the so-called primitive cultures which appeared on the earth before the old Babylon and Egyptian Cultures and still appear in remote places of the world, and in the proto-type cultures - the quickly formed and dissolved unities of peoples like the Visigoths, Lombards, Dorians, and Achaens - this is not the case. These Cultures are neither organisms nor sums of organisms. One cannot find in these peoples a common Idea being expressed in their techniques, marriage ceremonies, art, or social structure. For arguments against this position see Leo Frobenius' Paideuma (Munich, 1921), Chapter XIV.
9. Spengler, UdA., II, 59.
10. Ibid., pp. 46-57 and 202f.
11. Spengler, Urf., p. 346.
12. Spengler, FrZ., pp. 34 and 40.
13. Spengler, UdA., II, 446-9.
14. Ibid., pp. 407f.
15. Spengler, Urf., p. 283.
16. Spengler, UdA., II, 446f.
17. Spengler, FrZ., p. 8.
18. Spengler, UdA., II, 421.
19. Ibid., pp. 548-57.

20. Ibid., pp. 555f.
21. Ibid., p. 418.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., I, 297-302, 310f., and 364-8.
24. Ibid., II, 418f.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., pp. 417f. and 548-57.
27. Ibid., p. 418.
28. Ibid., I, 61 and 117.
29. Ibid., II, 109.
30. Ibid., pp. 439-42.
31. Ibid., pp. 127-32.
32. Ibid., I, 375f.
33. Ibid., p. 376.
34. Cf. Spengler, Urf., p. 283.
35. Cf. Spengler, UdA., II, 439ff.
36. Cf. Spengler, Urf., p. 284.
37. Cf. Spengler, FrZ., p. 27. "Das Geistesleben (Denken) ist ursprünglich ein Teil des Lebens, ein dienender Teil: Dann wächst es über die dienende Rolle hinaus. Endlich verkümmert das Leben durch diese Tyrannei - damit hat der Geist seinen Nährboden verloren." Urf., p. 284. "Intellectual life (thinking) is fundamentally a part of life, a serving part. But then it grows beyond the serving role. Finally life atrophies through this tyranny, and thereby the intellect has lost its nourishing ground." My translation.
38. Cf. Spengler, Urf., pp. 284f.
39. Spengler, UdA., II, pp. 408f.
40. Ibid., pp. 598-603.
41. Ibid., pp. 412-21.

42. Ibid., pp. 432ff.
43. Ibid., pp. 479ff.
44. Ibid., pp. 375ff.
45. Ibid., I, 70.
46. Ibid., II, 571.
47. Ibid., pp. 607f.
48. Ibid., pp. 541-6.
49. Ibid., pp. 20ff.
50. Ibid., pp. 412f.
51. Ibid., pp. 424-7.
52. Ibid., pp. 427-30.
53. Ibid., p. 428.
54. Ibid., pp. 421-4.
55. Ibid., p. 261.
56. Ibid., pp. 421ff.
57. Cf. Spengler, FrZ., p. 61 and Urf. p. 197.
58. Spengler, UdA., II, 434.
59. Ibid., pp. 434-52.
60. Ibid., pp. 436-9.
61. Ibid., p. 437.
62. Ibid., p. 335. Spengler does not explain the relationship between the Tao-Idea and aristocracy or the indefinite-infinite Idea and the priesthood. It seems the basic thought behind these connections is that the idea of wandering through nature to a fixed goal described a temporal process and therefore can only be achieved by nobility, not the priesthood. On the other hand, indefinite-infinite is a spatial idea and belongs properly to the priesthood to actualize it. According to Spengler, India presented a Culture that is in many respects similar to the Classical Culture since both were highly disposed to grasping the world in its Becomeness. China resembled the West and Egypt in realizing the world in its Becoming. For details on this similarity see UdA., II, 516f.

63. Spengler, UdA., II, 437f.
64. Ibid., p. 436.
65. Ibid., pp. 427-30.
66. Ibid., pp. 323-7.
67. Ibid., p. 331.
68. Ibid., pp. 21f and 133-5.
69. Ibid., I, 492.
70. Ibid., II, 465-7.
71. Ibid., pp. 459f.
72. Ibid., pp. 440f.
73. Ibid., p. 415.
74. Ibid., pp. 434f and 472.
75. Ibid., p. 476.
76. Ibid., p. 473.
77. Ibid., pp. 477-9.
78. Ibid., p. 487.
79. Ibid., p. 486.
80. Ibid., pp. 207-37.
81. Ibid., p. 603.
82. Ibid., pp. 610f.
83. Ibid., pp. 612-4.
84. Ibid., p. 614.
85. Ibid., pp. 616-9.
86. Ibid., p. 328.
87. Spengler, DW., II, 269. Cf. also FrZ., p. 100.
88. Spengler, UdA., I, 490f.
89. Ibid., 497-500.

90. Ibid., pp. 499-510.
91. Ibid., p. 498.
92. Ibid., II, 500-2.
93. Ibid., I, 509.
94. Ibid., p. 516.
95. Ibid., II, 510.
96. Ibid., I, 499f.

Chapter IV CONCLUSION: NOT-BEING AS PRESUPPOSITION

1. Spengler, UdA., I, 505.
2. Spengler, Urf., p. 161.
3. Spengler, UdA., II, 4f.
4. Ibid., I, 73.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., pp. 385-7.
7. Cf. Spengler, FrZ., p. 15.
8. Cf. Spengler, UdA., I, 225.
9. Ibid., p. 490. Cf. also Urf., p. 286.
10. Spengler, DW., I, 379.
11. Spengler, UdA., I, 493.
12. Spengler, DW., I, 382.
13. Spengler, VdA., I, 219f.
14. Spengler, DW., I, 168.
15. Cf. Spengler, UdA., I, 390-2.
16. Ibid., II, 38f and 197.
17. Ibid., pp. 207ff.

18. Ibid., pp. 46-57.
19. Ibid., pp. 133f.
20. Ibid., pp. 38-57.
21. Ibid., pp. 446f.
22. Ibid., pp. 3-7.
23. Ibid., pp. 354-82.
24. Ibid., pp. 565-82.
25. Ibid., pp. 125-7.
26. Nietzsche, II, 928, 972 and 1017.
27. Ibid., p. 447.

PART III

LEIBNIZIAN PRESUPPOSITIONS

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION: INFLUENCE AND SIMILARITY OF PHILOSOPHIES

It is difficult to trace out the influence of one philosopher on another. Whatever evidence is drawn in support of certain connections and conclusions can always be questioned. Inherent in such an undertaking is the ever-present uncertainty about the actual chain of thought and events which were working together in a philosopher's mind when he came upon an idea. It is not uncommon that the philosopher himself cannot establish the origins of his most significant ideas. From this consideration, the question of influence appears to be misdirected. What is it, then, that investigators seek to find when they bring different philosophers together under one critique?

It was stated in the introduction that our purpose is to reveal the explicit and implicit presuppositions of the Untergang. In order to achieve this end, other philosophers are brought alongside of Spengler not just to observe, but to elucidate affinities. Another investigator of the Spenglerian metaphysic has used the same approach. Dr. Eberhard Gauhe has in his Spengler und die Romantik (Junker u. Dünhaupt Verlag, Berlin, 1937) carefully demonstrated the similarities of Spengler's philosophy with that of several philosophies of the early nineteenth century.¹ Here one finds the most essential concepts of the Untergang being connected to

such distant philosophies as that of Schelling, Schlegel, Savigny, as well as to the historical writings of Ranke and Novalis. It is not, according to Gauhe, a matter of Spengler deriving certain notions and insights from each of these thinkers in particular or from any other thinker of this age. Rather, it is that Spengler shares in many essential features a view of reality which is similar to a general view of the German Romantic school. Yet it must be said that Gauhe's work is not an exhaustive treatment (nor did he claim it was) of the Spenglerian metaphysic. The metaphysical concepts which Spengler holds in common with the romantics can be found outside the nineteenth century. All the similarities which Gauhe finds, as well as others, can be found in one particular philosophy, the Leibnizian.

How could this be possible? On the surface, the Spenglerian philosophy stands to the Leibnizian as night to day. Nothing could be so far from the enlightened optimism, eternal love, joy, and piety proceeding from Leibniz' interpretation of the world, than Spengler's view that there is only one end to the strife of living—death: "Den Tod des einzelnen, den Völkertod, den Tod einer Kultur."² (Death of the individual, death of a nation, death of a culture.)³ It cannot be enumerated how many times Spengler speaks out against the idea of an ultimate teleology of the universe. It can be surmised from the foregoing discussion of "Destiny" that Spengler has in his view no room for a principle of absolute perfection and reason ruling in a divinely thought-out world. Despite all this, there is a deep affinity between Leibniz and Spengler.

Many of Spengler's critics have been aware of this,⁴ and Spengler himself made an oblique comment to the same effect in his 1922 preface to the Untergang. By reading between the lines, it is possible to detect Spengler's awareness of a deep kinship with Leibniz:

Zum Schlusse drängt es mich, noch einmal die Namen zu nennen, denen ich so gut wie alles verdanke: Goethe und Nietzsche. Von Goethe habe ich die Methode, von Nietzsche die Fragestellungen . . . Goethe aber war in seiner gesamten Denkweise, ohne es zu wissen, ein Schüler von Leibniz gewesen.⁵

And now, finally, I feel urged to name once more those to whom I owe practically everything: Goethe and Nietzsche. Goethe gave me method, Nietzsche the questioning faculty . . . But Goethe was, without knowing it, a disciple of Leibniz in his whole mode of thought.⁶

At a first glance, it is easy to observe a general similarity between Leibniz and Spengler in that both held final reality to be eternal flux as well as the development and breakdown of archetypal forms. But the similarity goes much farther than this. By a step-by-step comparison, it is possible to demonstrate that Spengler's understanding of history and Culture ultimately presupposes a pre-established monadic harmony. In arriving at this conclusion, it is also possible to find in the Untergang the inherent employment of other principles as that of plenitude and continuity. However, it is necessary to repeat that the presence of such Leibnizian presuppositions in Spengler's philosophy does not indicate a complete metaphysical accord between the two philosophers. The task at hand is to determine to what extent Spengler's culture philosophy shares a Leibnizian view. Once again, the role of Not-Being in Spengler's

philosophy will prove to be the decisive factor in this determination.

Chapter II

PRINCIPLES OF THE IDENTITY OF INDISCERNIBLES AND CONTINUOUS CHANGE

Perhaps the most concise indication that Spengler involves himself in a monadic pluralism is his relativistic statement that every individual conscious soul, as well as every collective unity of human society has its own unique, non-repeatable understanding or interpretation of the world:

Und deshalb gibt es so viele Welten, als es wache Wesen und im gefühlten Einklang lebende Scharen von Wesen gibt, und im Dasein jedes von ihnen ist die vermeintlich einzige, selbständige und ewige Welt—die jeder mit dem andern gemein zu haben glaubt—ein immer neues, einmaliges, nie sich wiederholendes Erlebnis.¹

There are therefore as many worlds as there are waking beings and like-living, like-feeling groups of being. The supposedly single, independent and external world that each believes to be common to all is really an ever-new, uniquely-occurring and non-recurring experience in the existence of each.²

The metaphysical view that Spengler expresses here is essentially the same as the view which Leibniz expresses in the Monadologie:

. . . il arrive de même, que par la multitude infinie des substances simples, il y a comme autant de differens univers, qui ne sont pourtant que les perspectives d'un seul selon les differens points de veue de chaque Monade.³

. . . it happens that, as a result of the infinite multitude of simple substances, there are as it were so many different universes, which are nevertheless only the perspectives of a single one, according to the different points of view of each monad.⁴

In chapter one, it was noted that, as a central tenet of

Spengler's physiognomic method, every individual has his own point of view or reality. Since then it has been learned that every individual person, according to Spengler, brings his own meaning to bear in his particular experiences of the extended world.⁴ A Macrocosm, a world or order of definite symbols and meaning arises for a Microcosm in its continuous attempt to overcome and subdue the "there", and to make it "proper" to its own self-being. The life of the individual soul, as Spengler understands it, is thus the continual realization or becoming of those inward possibilities which will transform the "there" into the "here", the "alien" to the "proper", the Not-I to the I, and this means, to recapitulate, that the soul in the temporalizing process of fulfilling these inward possibilities expresses its point of view of the world, viz. its Macrocosm.⁵ From this characterization of the soul as a Microcosm, it can be seen that the Spenglerian Microcosm is like a Leibnizian dynamic monad in being a continual activity, moving from a state of potentiality to actuality and expressing as it does its own unique point of view. As each monad lives out its history, it unfolds what Leibniz calls its individual notion or concept, and Spengler says approximately the same thing when he speaks of the cosmic longing of the soul: "Es ist die Sehnsucht nach dem Ziel des Werdens, nach Vollendung und Verwirklichung alles innerlich Möglichen, nach Entfaltung der Idee des eigenen Daseins."⁶ (It is this [longing] that urges "becoming" towards its goal, that motives the fulfillment and actualizing of every inward possibility, that unfolds the idea of individual being.)⁷ Indeed, it is this spiritualistic understanding

of the individual soul as a self-contained unified evolution of an intrinsic, qualitative denomination, which allows for the extensive similarity between the philosophies of Leibniz and Spengler. The Leibnizian universe is a realm of continually changing orders of monads with each monad viewing the universe differently and so realizing its own particular concept of it. Just so the Spenglerian vision of history presents a realm of continually changing orders (nations, families, septs, tribes, races, and Cultures) of Microcosms, each experiencing one world in itself, but understanding it differently and thereby realizing its separate point of view. For Spengler, as for Leibniz, there is only one independent world or cosmos, but there are as many worlds or Macrocosms (points of view) as there are individual waking-beings or monadic souls.⁸ It is thus possible to see straight away the inherent presence of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles in Spengler's metaphysical picture of human history: human history, metaphysically speaking, consists in an innumerable plurality of individual perceiving souls, each experiencing the cosmos separately and deriving its singular macrocosmic point of view of it. The identity of indiscernibles is an important point to notice in this study, for it shall become evident later that the entire justification of the Spenglerian Culture as an organism, actualizing itself through a specifically determined prime symbol, can be found to rest upon this principle. Hence, it is not for the philosophy of the Untergang any more than it is for the Monadologie a case in which individual perceiving beings consciously encounter the world and

arrive at different points of view. In the last analysis, it is not simply an empirical consciousness of the self and world which is the ground for the absolute necessity of having a unique, non-repeatable point of view in either Leibniz' or Spengler's philosophy. Rather the final reasoning which underlies the implicit presence of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles in the philosophy of the Untergang is essentially the same reasoning as for its explicit presence in the philosophy of monadism. According to Leibniz, the novelty in outlook of every monad stems from its individual Concept being "innate" or predetermined before its creation. Each monad in the universe perceives the world in its own original fashion by virtue of unfolding its own fixed particular Concept. Likewise, Spengler understands that every individual soul as a Microcosm is predetermined to experience the cosmos in such a way as to possess its unique view. To be sure, this is what Spengler implies by saying in the above quote " . . . nach Entfaltung der Idee des eigenen Daseins." (. . . unfolds the idea of individual being.)⁹ Consequently, Spengler, like Leibniz, accepts the fundamental position that human nature is given in such a way as to disallow the possibility of any two persons having exactly the same point of view and personality.

The justification of Spengler's Leibniz-like predeterminism can be further established through an analysis of the following quote from the Gedanken:

Das erste, was dem Menschen als unentrinnbares Schicksal entgegentritt und was kein Denken begreifen und kein Wille abändern kann, ist Zeit und Ort seiner Geburt: jeder ist in

ein Volk, eine Religion, einen Stand, eine Zeit, eine Kultur hineingeboren. Aber damit ist bereits alles entschieden.¹⁰

The first thing that confronts a man as inescapable-- his mind cannot comprehend it nor his will alter it-- is the time and place of his birth; everyone is born into a nation, a religion, a time, a culture. But with this everything is already determined.¹¹

Spengler never denies the determining influence of the empirical world with its manifold conditions upon the development of the individual, as can be seen from this quote on the nature of fate. The same is the case with Leibniz. In the Monadologie, one finds after the a priori exposition of the distinctive qualitative nature of the monad's inner being, the empirical justification for the acceptance of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles.¹² Thus both the empirical observation and the a priori reasoning complement each other in substantiating this principle, just as Leibniz' scientific investigations in general served to complement his a priori reasoning on the metaphysical reality of monadic life. The point of the matter is that empirical explanations need not be in contradiction to metaphysical accounts when, as here with Leibniz, the empirical world is not considered as final reality, but a phenomenal world (bene fundata) derived from final reality. The same point applies to Spengler. One can find in all of Spengler's writings the idea of the phenomenal world "affecting", "conditioning", or "influencing" an individual's mind and way of life, but one must connect this way of speaking with the central argument that cause-and-effect understanding is

inherently prevented from grasping ultimate reality, viz. Dasein in its Becoming. For Spengler, the immense variety of the phenomenal world is the streaming of incomprehensible Dasein into the sense world of conscious being.

To be sure, there are not in the Spenglerian orientation two acceptable procedures of thinking which will complement each other. It was brought out in the part on method that human history, as far as Spengler is concerned, cannot be properly treated through causal analysis. Furthermore, the general tenor of Leibnizian monadism speaks against the notion of perception being ontologically reduced to Not-Being. However, the real point of similarity here between Leibniz and Spengler consists in the fact that both understand the macrocosmic world of each microcosm and monad to be the outcome of a unique and predetermined constitution. "Uniqueness" and "predeterminism" belong together: each soul has its unique view of the world because it is predetermined to have a unique view. For Leibniz, every perception which the monad will experience in its history is determined from eternity. For Spengler, an individual is determined at birth to think, act, and feel Faustian, Magian, or Apollinian. Every prime symbol of the higher Cultures serves as an a priori category for the man of the higher Culture, and as Spengler contends, there are even more specific qualitative a priori determinations, such as nationality, race, and estate, which serve to establish further one's point of view.¹³

Obviously the Spenglerian a priori is different in kind from the Kantian a priori. Basically the a priori acts for both

Spengler and Kant as the transcendental ground for the conception of the sensed world, but the Spenglerian a priori does not carry the stamp of universal validity. On this issue, Spengler says:

Neben gewissen Zügen von zweifellos weitreichender Geltung, die wenigstens scheinbar unabhängig davon sind, zu welcher Kultur, in welches Jahrhundert der Erkennende gehört, liegt allem Denken auch noch eine ganz andere Notwendigkeit der Form zugrunde, welcher der Mensch eben als Glied einer bestimmten und keiner anderen Kultur mit Selbstverständlichkeit unterworfen ist.¹⁴

There are doubtless certain characters of very wide-ranging validity which are (seemingly at any rate) independent of the Culture and century to which the cognizing individual may belong, but along with these there is a quite particular necessity of form which underlies all his thought as axiomatic and to which he is subject by virtue of belonging to his own Culture and no other.¹⁵

Here Spengler places his version of the a priori Culture form beside the Kantian concept of the a priori to emphasize the character of transcendental necessity. But he must from the standpoint of relativism disagree with Kant over the question of universal validity. According to the theory of the depth-experience, every Culture has its own style of conceiving the world. As seen above, every individual possesses a unique mode of knowing and understanding the world. This means for Spengler that the Kantian presupposition of the universal validity of the forms of all knowledge is not a defensible position: "Kant setzt mit ihm, ohne sich die Mühe eines Beweises zu geben—der sich auch gar nicht erbringen lässt—, sowohl die Unveränderlichkeit der Form aller Geistestätigkeit als ihre Identität für alle Menschen voraus."¹⁶ (Kant postulates—without attempting to prove what is quite incapable of proof—both unalterableness of form in all intellectual activity and identity of form

for all men in the same.)¹⁷ Spengler claims there is only a varying degree of universality with the Kantian forms of knowledge, and hence they carry no absolutely universal validity. At the same time, and somewhat contradictorily, he says that the issue of a definition of the exact boundary between his particular kind of a priori and the Kantian, and along with this an irrefutable demonstration of their nature, can never be attained—necessarily never, because historic Destiny does not allow two persons ever to agree exactly on the nature of final things.

With this it becomes clear how the principle of identity of indiscernibles plays the identical role in Spengler's outlook as it does in the Leibnizian system of monadism. The essence of the simple monad, the concept which it unfolds in its living existence and represents to the universe of other monads as its particular point of view, is given in such a way that it cannot possibly be identical to the essence or concept of any other monad. It is the same with Spengler. The essence of each human soul is pre-established. The values which each person reveals in his way of thinking and acting are expressions of a unique character. Spengler says precisely this in his discussion on the nature of belief and critical thought:

Und da ist primitives und kultiviertes, dann chinesisches, indisches, antikes, magisches, abendländisches, endlich sogar deutsches, englisches und französisches Denken anders angelegt, und endlich gibt es überhaupt nicht zwei Menschen mit genau der gleichen Methode.¹⁸

And even so the thought has a different disposition according as it is primitive or cultured; Chinese, Indian, Classical, Magian, or Western; and even German, English, or French.

In the last resort, there are not even two individuals with exactly the same method.¹⁹

For both Leibniz and Spengler, it is the unique and fixed qualitative content which gives one inner being and establishes self-identity. The upsurge of final reality as the self-determining spontaneity of monads or as the cosmic directionality of the human soul is not merely the pure, bloodless advent of existence, but the realization of the qualitative essences of all existences. Spengler would never hold that existence precedes essence. The soul is not simply an "Existenz" which acquires or develops its character or essence in the fact-world alone. "Was ist die Seele?" Spengler asks, and his response: "Das ist schon eine zu abstrakte Frage . . . denn die meisten sehen 'die Seele', indem sie sie unabhängig von dem Charakter des lebendigen Wesens, seinem täglichen Trieb und Getriebensein, 'an sich' betrachten."²⁰ (What is the soul? That question is already too abstract . . . Too many people consider the soul independent of the character and daily impulses of the living being.)²¹

The fact of the matter is that a human soul is essentially from beginning to end a particular soul, distinguishable in innumerable ways of type, race, nation, age, and place. For this reason, Spengler says: "Es gibt keinen 'Menschen an sich', wie die Philosophen schwatzen, sondern nur Menschen zu einer Zeit, an einem Ort, von einer Rasse, einer persönlichen Art" ²² (There is no "man as such", as the philosophers prattle. There are only men of a given time, place, race, and type)²³ With this comparison of the Spenglerian Microcosm and the Leibnizian monad, it becomes necessary to re-investigate the implications behind the word "perception".

From Monadologie number fourteen, it is clear that Leibniz does not simply mean by this word, the conscious act of sense-perceiving. Rather, it signifies that as an activity the monad is expressing and representing to itself and others the unique Concept which will unfold as its history. This means that when the monad perceives, it is "reflected", i.e. it is a determinative element in the self-expression and history of other monadic beings. To use the word "perceive" in this way signifies that Leibniz has not so much a sense-data theory of appearance in mind as a metaphysical theory of spirit. In the last analysis, "perception" is a paraphrase for the monad as an activity or a process by which a predetermined Concept unfolds itself amongst the unfolding of other Concepts. This can also be recognized as Spengler's basic position. Fundamental to our discussion of the depth-experience was the understanding that the soul is a self-originating activity by which it projects for itself an innate view of the world. Likewise, the expression of this view is essentially connected to the understanding of world-history as strife, agreement, and interaction among Microcosms. Consequently, the projection of a world out of spontaneous activity, i.e. perceiving, is not the thesis of the creation of the Not-I out of the I, or the idealistic theory of the world existing insofar as it is perceived by a knowing subject. What is created by the monad of Microcosm is not the world universally shared by all perceiving souls, but one necessarily peculiar to the predetermined outlook or concept of it.²⁴ Both Leibniz and Spengler, therefore, are committed to an idealistic theory of knowledge, but this does not

imply that they are committed to an extremely subjective idealistic theory of reality.

The doctrine of perceiving leads to Leibniz' principle of continuous change. Perceiving is the change undergone by the monadic soul as it moves from its non-actual state to its realized distinctive world-view. In this respect, "change" signifies the translation of potentiality into actuality, and it stands in complete contrast to change as the movement through extended space. The opposition between these two concepts of change is a classic problem in the history of natural philosophy. With Leibniz the problem came to the fore over the nature of substance, or the final constituent of reality which gave unity and continuity to the physical world. Whether the pure extended substance of Descartes, or the hard-massive atom of the Newtonians was taken as final reality, the result was that in both cases change was considered as a mechanical movement in extended space. Hence, the principle of mechanical change postulates an inert, independent, self-subsistent being, enduring through time, having the same factual character as all other actualities of the world. Mechanical change is thus a motion of this inert being or substantial thing, and consequently it is conceived as a condition of being. The Leibnizian monad, however, is just the reverse of this conception. For Leibniz, being is taken as a condition of change, and not the other way around: a thing is not what it is but what it does. The monadic soul consists in the change of perspective activity; it is identical to its own perceiving.

This understanding of change is also the basis of Spengler's metaphysic. From the discussion on methodology, it was ascertained that Spengler, like Goethe, understands the phenomenal world in general to be founded on an infinite number of spiritual principles. And when it comes to the question of human reality, it is the same: Becomeness is founded on Becoming. In the last part, it was seen that a soul is a constant Becoming or realization of future possibilities at every moment, while its actuality at any moment is what it has realized. The microcosmic soul is thus the same as Leibniz's perceiving monad insofar as both are considered as pure indivisible activity by which a predetermined qualitative essence is transformed from its potentiality to its actuality. When it is kept in mind that monadic perceiving means the expressing of this predetermined essence, then it is seen that the resulting world-view or perception is the Becomeness or actuality of the perceiving. The particular point of view of the phenomenal world, for both Leibniz and Spengler, is the actuality of a dynamic, predetermined Concept or Idea.

The parallel here between the perceiving monad and the microcosmic waking-soul can be further extended through an analysis of the following quotation from the Untergang:

. . . stets und immer, solange von wachem Leben überhaupt die Rede sein kann, verleihe ich dem Aussermir den Gehalt meines ganzen Selbst, von den halb träumerischen Eindrücken der Welthaftigkeit an bis zur starren Welt der kausalen Gesetze und Zahlen, die jene überlagert, und bindet.²⁵

. . . it is continuously and always, for as long as my life can be considered to be a waking life at all, that I am endowing that which is outside me with the whole content

that is in me, from the half-dreamy impressions of world-coherence to the rigid world of causal laws and number that overlies and binds them.²⁶

From this it is clear that the life of the ich continuously and always endows the alien, extended world with the Gehalt, the content of his inner self, because the ich is nothing other than the transformation of this entire Gehalt, into its peculiar point of view or Macrocosm. Note, however, that this transformation is stets und immer as long as life is a waking, active life. As such, it resembles one aspect of another Leibnizian principle, namely the principle of continuity.²⁷

For Leibniz, the principle of continuous change is incorporated in the notion of monadic perceiving as pure activity, and it works along with the principle of identity to give a complete picture of the nature of the monad. That is, the principle of the identity of indiscernibles leads to the understanding of the pre-determined essence of the monad, and thus to the individuality or particularity of every monad, and the principle of continuous change underlines the universal or formal aspect of the monad. Despite the uniqueness of every monad, all are alike in that they all undergo continuous change. There is no logical difficulty involved here when it comes to a question of the rational monad (human soul) establishing its identity, in spite of the continual change of its perceiving. The peculiar Concept emerging from the changing soul incorporates the universal aspect of change.²⁸ The individual Concept maintains the identity of itself even though at the same time it contains in its nature a law of the continuation of the

series of its own operations and " . . . tout ce qui luy peut jamais arriver" ²⁹ (. . . everything which can ever happen to it) ³⁰

The human soul fulfills continuously that specific Concept predetermined at its birth, but the continual fulfilling of the Concept means that from moment to moment it must perceive the world differently. The same logic is implied in the Untergang.

Speaking of either the individual person or the Culture, Spengler holds that the microcosmic soul, from childhood to old age, continually and necessarily unfolds its predetermined Idea. As with Leibniz, it is always the same Idea, even though it changes from moment to moment. Spengler says: "Vergänglich ist nicht nur; was geschieht—denn kein Geschehnis lässt sich zurückrufen—sondern auch jede Art von Bedeutung." ³¹ (That which happens is, of course, transient, for a happening is irrevocable, but every kind of significance is also transient.) ³² The soul as a continuous projecting existence is a happening, and so transient; but the value-determined outlook that the soul projects as its possibility is equally transient by being the outcome of the soul. In the Leibnizian monadism, it follows from the principle of continuous change that no perception can ever be exactly the same as another perception; there is always continual advance to new perceptions. ³³

Hence no view of the world can ever possibly be the same as it was at a prior moment in time by virtue of the principle of continuous change. Spengler is just as particular as Leibniz on stressing the continuity of flux in one's point of view no matter how minute or imperceptible it might appear: "Kein Zeichen, und sei es noch so

bekannt und gewohnt, wird je in genau derselben Bedeutung wiederholt. Deshalb kehrte ursprünglich kein Zeichen jemals in genau derselben Form wieder."³⁴ (No sign, however well known and habitually used, is ever repeated with exactly the same connotation; and hence it is that originally no sign ever recurred in the same form.)³⁵

Consequently, the continuous change of outlook, for both Leibniz and Spengler, means not that a soul's outlook changes entirely with the moment, but that within one's comprehensive view, certain values and significances are necessarily and continually changing. Again, the necessity involved in this alteration is an "existential" or "organic" necessity. It is not the alien, external environment "affecting" a change in one's world-view which brings about this constant renewal of interpretation and understanding. Rather, it is the surging forward of a predetermined essence that necessitates continual re-interpretation of the world. This is what is behind Spengler's remark: "Das Bedeutungsgefühl ist lebendig und wie alles, was mit Zeit und Schicksal zusammenhängt, einmalig und nie wiederkehrend."³⁶ (The feeling of significance is a living feeling and, like everything else belonging with Time and Destiny, it is uniquely occurring and non-recurring.)³⁷

There is one final point to be examined under the topic of perceiving and continuous change. Leibniz states:

L'action du principe interne, qui fait le changement ou le passage d'une perception à une autre, peut être appelé Appétition; il est vrai, que l'appétit ne sauroit tousjours parvenir entièrement à toute la perception, où il tend, mais il en obtient tousjours quelque chose, et parvient à des perceptions nouvelles.³⁸

The action of the internal principle which causes the change or the passage from one perception to another, may be called appetition; it is true that desire cannot always completely attain to the whole perception to which it tends, but it always attains something of it and reaches new perceptions.³⁹

"Appetition" is the word Leibniz uses to denote the principle of continuous change, and its analogue in Spengler's philosophy is,

as we saw formerly, Sehnsucht, or longing:

Es ist die Sehnsucht nach dem Ziel des Werdens, nach Vollendung und Verwirklichung alles innerlich Möglichen, nach Entfaltung der Idee des eigenen Daseins.⁴⁰

It is this [longing] that urges "becoming" towards its goal, that motives the fulfillment and actualizing of every inward possibility, that unfolds the idea of individual being.⁴¹

Appetition and Sehnsucht are analogous because both indicate a basic agreement on the question of time. Spengler's thesis of time, we recall, is presented through the notion of soul as the future or the not-yet possible and the world as the past and actualized. The movement of future into past is the once-occurring, irreversible movement of "directional" time, as Spengler calls it. The inner-subjective time of the monad is of the same nature. Leibniz states: "Et comme tout present état d'une substance simple est naturellement une suite de son état precedant, tellement que le present y est gros de l'avenir."⁴² (And as every present state of a simple substance is naturally the consequence of its preceding state, so its present is big with its future.) Though the Leibnizian monad never dies, every moment of its present life is an instant of a continuous futurizing whereby once-occurring possibilities become fixed actualities of the past. As with the Microcosm, every act of the

perceiving monad is the translation of possibility into a fixed perception.

Now, it is this common understanding of intra-monadic time and directional time as "real" time which underlies Leibniz' and Spengler's view of public or universal time as ideational. The latter sort of time, viz. the time of the clock and the calendar—the time of the physicist—is not primary but derivative. It derives from the inner sense of life as continuous actualization. However, a disagreement appears between Spengler and Leibniz on the subject of ideational time. The discussion of Spengler's analysis of time in part two dealt primarily with the demonstration of the contradictory nature between directional time of the World-as-History and the universal, extended time of the World-as-Nature. The general conclusion of this analysis was that the latter sort of time is a "phantom" time that does not and cannot approach reality in its Becoming. In contradistinction, Leibniz' discussion of universal time leads to it being "well-founded". For Leibniz, the dual nature of time is ultimately not incompatible. In fact, the continuity of monadic appetition is the ground for the continuity of universal time, viz. "un ordre de successions."⁴⁴

How is it then possible that such a disagreement can emerge when both philosophers hold that universal time is derived from inner-subjective time? It should be noted that the contention is not over the question of universal time being ideal, nor over the nature of this universal time. Both Leibniz and Spengler hold that universal time and space are forms of perception—that is, perception

as the perceived, not as the perceiving. The transformation of inner subjective time into universal objective time is accomplished in the movement of perceiving into the perceived. Thus, whether it is considered as "phantom time" or "the order of non-contemporaneous things", universal time is a realized form (a Becomeness) being functionally dependent upon a realizing form (a Becoming). Only as a form of the perceived does universal time take on the spatial quality of universal extendedness by which things can be numbered, measured, and divided.

Consequently, the opposition between "the order of non-contemporaneous things" and "phantom time" stems not from the nature of validity of universal time. Rather, its origin lies in an implicitly different understanding of the status of perception as the perceived or phenomenal world. As we saw in the previous part, the perceived world is inherently Not-Being for Spengler. Universal time, though ideal, belongs with Not-Being, for it is the form of the perceived world, viz. the world not as Becoming, but as Having-Become. Likewise with Leibniz, universal time is characterized as not real, but phenomenal, i.e. as derivative or as a function of real intra-monadic perceiving. However, Leibniz' phenomenal world cannot be ontologically analyzed as Not-Being. True enough, the ontological status of the phenomenal world within monadism never presented itself to Leibniz as a philosophical problem, yet it is possible to see that the idea of "well-founded" phenomena is connected to a position which would not allow it to be regarded as Not-Being. Specifically, the compatibility of well-founded phenomena and monadic

reality, of the "order of non-contemporaneous things" and intra-monadic time, rest upon the immortality of the monad. There are no gaps, no jumps in the phenomenal world or in universal time, as Leibniz figuratively speaks, because monadic reality is a continuous, eternal Becoming. The change from one perception to another is infinitesimally small, so that change takes place as a smooth, continuous transition. Further, no final perception or end concludes the series of perceiving states. As such, there is no place for Not-Being in Leibnizian monadism. The case is not the same with Spengler's philosophy of Destiny. Change or transformation cannot be divorced from the reality of Not-Being. The phenomenal world, as previously explained, is saved from Not-Being insofar as Wachsein, or the depth-experience, instills meaning into it. With the death of Wachsein, there remains only Not-Being. Thus, in the Spenglerian orientation, the incompatibility of universal time and directional time reflect the contradictory nature of reality as a unity of Being and Not-Being. Universal time is a "phantom time" for Spengler because it does not express reality as the fated course of Becoming, i.e. living reality as a finite movement. It expresses reality as Not-Being—reality as already Become—because it is itself a Becomeness.

Chapter III

THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CONTINUITY OF OUTLOOK, REPRESENTATION, THE ORGANIC WHOLE, AND THE PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY

Thus far two presuppositions of Spengler's philosophy have been identified as two fundamental principles of the Leibnizian metaphysic. First, the principle of the identity of indiscernibles was elucidated through an analysis of the microcosmic individual soul. No two individuals can ever perceive—i.e. interpret, understand, and express—the world in exactly the same way. This principle led to the important insight that Spengler, like Leibniz, understands the human soul to have a predetermined point of view. A man of Western Culture is transcendently, not empirically conditioned to think, feel, and understand in the Faustian style, and if he be French or German, it is part of his predetermined essence to think and act in the peculiar style which is characteristic of the French or the Germans, and finally, to whatever estate (nobility, priesthood, bourgeoisie) the man belongs, or type he is and characterizes (man of action or thought)—all are designations which are established beforehand, as part of his given, unchangeable being (Dasein). Secondly, the principle of continual change was analyzed as the realizing of the individual's unique predetermined essence. This Leibnizian principle universally characterizes all Microcosms, which means every individual soul must continually change its world-view

because it lives. Now, it will be shown more fully that these two principles are inherently operative in Spengler's notion of the collective soul (for a race, nation, tribe, family or Culture are also Microcosms), and hence both of these Leibnizian principles will express the same monadic-like nature of the Spenglerian collective soul as it does for the individual soul. However, before this problem is discussed, it is necessary to investigate those presuppositions which allow Spengler to speak of the collective soul, particularly that of the cultural soul, as he does of the individual human soul.

What makes for a unity among different and separate individuals is, for Spengler, shared meaning. This is to say that a common outlook or interpretation of the world is what establishes a unified collective soul. This can be gathered from Spengler's statement: ". . . und andererseits ist es das Gefühl eines gleichartigen Verstehens, das Familien, Stände, Stämme und endlich ganze Kulturen aus dem allgemeinen Menschentum heraushebt und zusammenschliesst."¹ (. . . it is the sense of a homogeneous understanding that raises up the family, the class, the tribe, or finally the Culture, out of the general humanity and assembles it as such.)² The Macrocosm, the totality of all symbols in relation to a Microcosm, becomes in some degree the same Macrocosm for other individual souls, and consequently a unity, a "we-feeling", is created.³ It may appear, however, that the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, which particularizes each individual soul to the point that no individual world-view can ever be the same as another individual's, disallows

for the sharing of a Macrocosm. A qualification is necessary here to show there is no contradiction. The principle of the identity of indiscernibles rests upon the idea that each individual soul, as a Microcosm, must experience the world in a distinctly unique way, but it cannot be concluded from the diversity of all the world-views that all points of view are toto genere distinct from each other and that consequently no one can arrive at agreement in the meaning and value of something. Rather, the case is that each individual person can come to an approximate agreement in outlook with other individuals without at the same time having exactly an identical outlook. We remember from our earlier discussion on method that Spengler presupposed a continuum in world-views between the two extreme kinds of world-notions, so that an individual's point of view is determined by the degree he intuits the World-as-History (Becoming) or understands it as the World-as-Nature (Becomeness):

"Es gibt keine genaue Grenze zwischen beiden Arten der Weltfassung."⁴

(. . . there are no exact boundaries set between the two kinds of world-notion.)⁵ It is the same fundamental point in speaking of the formation of a collective soul around a commonly held Macrocosm; individual persons form an organic group to the extent that each of them shares a common point of view. The same idea is found in the Leibnizian metaphysic: "Or quoy tous expriment les mêmes phenomenes, ce n'est pas pour cela que leur expressions soyent parfaitement semblables, mais il suffit qu'elles soyent proportionelles"⁶

(Now although all [substances or monads] express the same phenomena, this does not bring it about that their expressions are exactly . . .

alike. It is sufficient if they are proportional.)⁷ As part of his metaphysical account of well-founded phenomena, Leibniz held that each monad, though unique in its predetermined world-view, can share or have a similar outlook to the degree its essence is like another's. This position of Leibniz expresses another aspect of the principle of continuity, specifically the continuous distribution of the monads' points of view. The proportional agreement among the points of view of the monads is what makes possible the unity of individual monads into organic aggregates of plants and animals, and ultimately a city of God among rational spirits. What here serves Leibniz as the metaphysical explanation for the physical, biological, and ethical life of the phenomenal world, serves Spengler as the metaphysical explanation for the organic life of social groups. The agreement of individual spiritual entities in points of view, i.e. the individual qualitative content they express in their appetition, establishes the purely ideal or spiritual unity which both philosophers conceive as the basis of life in their respective areas of study.⁸ It is and can only be a spiritual bond which inter-relates and unites what are essentially pure individual centers of activity. The bond is the common outlook that the monad or individual soul shares with other souls with the resulting unity being determined in its strength and depth by the degree each perceives and represents this outlook in its outward activity. This means that the more similar the points of view are, i.e. the more individual spiritual beings express a common Macrocosm, the stronger that spiritual unity is, and the more the individuals

act in conformity with each other. Conversely, the more dissimilar the points of view are found to be, the weaker the aggregate. This point finds expression in the Leibnizian philosophy in the doctrine of the hierarchy of structured phenomena (inert objects, plants, animals, rational souls), and in the Spenglerian philosophy as the basis of individual human relations within a spiritual community or Culture:

Allein auf der grösseren oder geringeren Verwandtschaft der einzelnen Welten untereinander, soweit sie von Menschen einer Kultur oder seelischen Gemeinschaft erlebt werden, beruht die grössere oder geringere Mitteilbarkeit des Geschauten, Erfundenen, Erkannten, das heisst des im Stil des eignen Seins Gestalteten durch die Ausdrucksmittel der Sprache, Kunst und Religion, durch Wortklänge, Formeln, Zeichen, die ihrerseits selbst Symbole sind.⁹

. . . on the greater or less degree of this interrelation depends the greater or less communicability of intuitions, sensations and thought from one to another—that is, the possibility of making intelligible what one has created in the style of one's own being, through expression-media such as language or art or religion, by means of word-sounds or formulae or signs that are themselves also symbols.¹⁰

The Spenglerian Culture, as well as any other spiritual community, is of the same build as Leibnizian monads within an aggregate. The ideal nature of an individual Microcosm sharing intuitions, sensations, and thoughts—and thereby communicating an outlook through media as language, art, or religion—carries the same metaphysical implications involved in monadic relations. Accordingly, Leibniz states: ". . . l'Ame est unprincipe representatif . . .,"¹¹ (. . . the soul is a representative principle . . .)¹² which means that in the active expression of perceiving, the monad's view serves as a representation for others. Two fundamental points

emerge from this notion of the representative monadic soul. First, the pure activity or Becoming of the monadic soul is the communicating or relating of one soul to another, and this point, as shall be discussed in detail later, entirely agrees with Spengler's broad definition of language as ". . . die gesamte freie Tätigkeit des wachen Mikrokosmos, insofern sie etwas für andere zum Ausdruck bringt."¹³ (. . . the entire free activity of the waking microcosm in so far as it brings something to expression for others.)¹⁴

Second, the outcome or Becomeness of this activity, the expression as a finished representation for others, is not a physical influence on the other, but an ideal influence.¹⁵ This latter point follows as a consequence of the monad being conceived as a self-owned activity. If the relation of one monad to another were somehow a causal relation, then the individual soul would be a mode of the extended. Therefore, there can be no causal action and re-action between souls; the representative activity of one monadic soul does not produce a physical impression in another.

No doubt, Spengler speaks as an empiric when he analyzes the waking-being's sense-orientation and communication: "Hier besteht ein deutlicher Wille zum Empfangen von Eindrücken; wir nennen das Orientierung. Dazu aber kommt von Anfang an der Wille zum Erzeugen von Eindrücken bei anderen . . . diës nennen wir Ausdruck" ¹⁶
 (Here there is a definite will to receive impression; this we call orientation. But, besides, there exists from the beginning a will to produce impression in the other--what we call expression) ¹⁷
 Here it sounds as though one soul causally effects another by willing

an impression on the other. Leibniz speaks in a similar manner:

. . . dans ce même sens on peut dire aussi que nous recevons de dehors des connoissances par le ministere des sens, parce que quelques choses exterieures contiennent ou expriment plus particulièrement les raisons qui determinent nostre ame à certaines pensées.¹⁸

In this same sense we may say that knowledge is received from without through the medium of the senses because certain exterior things contain or express more particularly the causes which determine us to certain thoughts.¹⁹

He says further: "La Creature est dite d'agir au dehors en tant qu'elle a de la perfection, et patir d'une autre entant qu'elle est imparfaite."²⁰ (The creature is said to act externally in so far as it has perfection, and to be acted on by another in so far as it is imperfect.)²¹ However Leibniz and Spengler do not think that such statements are contradictory to their basic position. Leibniz states that it is a matter of ordinary language usage which makes it sound as though the soul interacts with the world and other souls as a physical being. Then he states:

Mais quand il s'agit de l'exactitude des verités metaphysiques, il est important de reconnoistre l'étendue et l'indpendance de nostre ame, qui va infiniment plus loin que le vulgaire ne pense, quoyque dans l'usage ordinaire de la vie on ne luy attribue que ce dont on s'apperçoit plus manifestement, . . .²²

When, however, we are dealing with the exactness of metaphysical truths, it is important to recognize the powers and independence of the soul which extend infinitely further than is commonly supposed.²³

Again, the division between the realm of potentiality and Becoming and the realm of actuality and Becomene~~ss~~ must be kept in mind: reference to the latter is properly done in physical language, but reference to the former, the metaphysical realm, must be done with the understanding that physical terms do not reflect a spatio-temporal

realm of causal interaction.

How then should such physical language be interpreted when it is used to describe the interrelation of monadic souls on one another? If pure activity is the only reality, then the only alternative is Leibniz' understanding of privation or limitation. According to the "active-passive principle of perception", an individual substance suffers passively or finds itself acted upon by another substance insofar as its own activity is to a certain degree diminished. The fundamental character of the monad, viz. activity, is not altered in character by diminution. There is never any state of the soul in which it is not actively perceiving. Leibniz states that one can speak of the monad as passive or active:

. . . actif en tant, que ce qu'on connoist distinctement en luy, sert à rendre raison de ce qui se passe dans un autre, et passif en tant, que la raison de ce qui se passe en luy, se trouve dans ce qui se connoist distinctement dans un autre.²⁴

. . . active in so far as that what is known distinctly in it, serves to account for that which takes place in another; and passive in so far as the reason for what takes place in it, is found in that which is distinctly known in another.²⁵

In other words, the monad has no other actions and passions than those it itself produces. It is in this manner that one must understand Spengler's position. In the phrase ". . . ein deutlicher Wille zum Empfangen von Eindrücken . . ." the word "Wille" signifies the activity of the soul in its receiving of impressions. There is no other consistent explanation once the soul's nature is conceived as a continuous Becoming.

Consequently when Leibniz says: ". . . l'Ame est un principe

representatif . . ."²⁶ (. . . the soul is a representative principle, . . .)²⁷ and Spengler says: " . . . sie [die Seele] ist das Eigene, das sich am Fremden spiegelt, . . ."²⁸ (. . . the Proper [soul] mirrors itself on the Alien,)²⁹ it must be inferred that the soul encounters other souls as part of the alien world in such a way that the world arises as other and alien by an inward self-limitation. In the expression of its self, the soul perceives from within that its actions are circumscribed by the alien world and as such understood as self-limitations, but when the limitations to the soul's activity are understood as being beyond his control or determination, then the other is perceived as an alien force.

This much we can gather from Spengler's passing remark:

Es ist die Entzweiung zwischen Seele und Welt als den Polen der Wirklichkeit, und in dieser gibt es nicht nur Widerstände, die wir als Dinge und Eigenschaften kausal erfassen, und Regungen, in denen wir Wesen, Numina "ganz wie wir selbst" wirken fühlen. . . .³⁰

There is a dualizing of soul and world as poles of actuality; and in the latter there are both resistances which we grasp causally as things and properties, and impulses in which we feel beings, numina ("just like ourselves") to be operative.³¹

This point substantiates what was mentioned earlier in that the real 'Not-I' does not, in the Leibnizian-Spenglerian soul, rise out of the 'I'—only the idea of the 'Not-I' rises out of the 'I'. What is real for the individual soul is its active self and what is real for the other is its own active self; the idea or impression each has of the other is not the real world, but only a view each has in its own independent existence. Thus, it must be inferred here that neither Leibniz nor Spengler sees any philosophical problem of each

separate soul knowing the other as an individual active soul ("ganz wie wir selbst") even though each encounters the other not as she or he is in themselves, but only as they are for-others in the world of sense-experience. When the 'I' recognizes the other as the limiting influence on its activity, as that which it has no control or self-determination over, then it immediately endows the other with the same spiritual existence which constitutes itself.³²

The same understanding is presupposed when one considers not simply the recognition or encounter of the other, but more importantly the communication or interchange of points of view as purposes, values, and meanings. It was said above that the proportional agreement among separate outlooks in the establishment of a common outlook or Macrocosm of the collective soul is a matter of the individual outlook "ideally" influencing others in their self-originating points of view. Thus Spengler says: "Sich verständigen, Zwiesprache halten bedeutet, im andern das gleiche Bedeutungsgefühl voraussetzen."³³ (To come to an understanding, to hold a conversation, postulates that the other's feeling of significance is the same as one's own.)³⁴ One understands the other insofar as one has similar feelings of significance or an outlook like the other. The inter-relation within a Spenglerian spiritual community of many individual souls rests upon the possibility of a collective soul expressing a united outlook. According to Spengler, "Ein Mikrokosmos im Makrokosmos sein und sich anderen mitteilen können ist ein und dasselbe."³⁵ (To be a microcosm in the macrocosm is one and the same thing as having a power to communicate oneself to another.)³⁶ To

be a member of a spiritual community means to interrelate with other members, and this means to express and represent to a certain extent the outlook of the collective soul.

What then is implicit in Spengler's vision of the phenomenon of the social group expressing an outlook of the collective soul is the Leibnizian notion of the reflecting, living mirror (miroir vivant.) As a representative principle, each monad has a point of view which "mirrors" or "reflects" the points of view of other monads. As Leibniz says:

Or cette Liaison ou cet accommodement de toutes les choses creées à chacune et de chacune à toutes les autres, fait que chaque substance simple a des rapports qui expriment toutes les autres, et qu'elle est par conséquent un miroir vivant perpétuel de l'univers.³⁷

Now this connection, or this adaptation, of all created things to each and of each to all, brings it about that each simple substance has relations which express all the others, and that, consequently, it is a perpetual living mirror of the universe.³⁸

Furthermore having a unique point of view, each monad in its simple unity can reflect the multiplicity of other views only in a more or less imperfect manner, which means each monad can only approximate in likeness to another point of view and can never be totally identical to it. Leibniz expresses this thought by saying: ". . . le monde estant tout entier dans chacune de ses parties, mais plus distinctement dans les unes que dans les autres" ³⁹ (The world is entirely in each of its parts, but more distinctly in some than in others.) ⁴⁰ It was seen a few paragraphs back that the continuity principle of monadic outlooks clarified how it was possible for separate and unique points of view to come to an

approximate agreement within a monadic aggregate. It can now be seen that this aspect of the Leibnizian continuity principle emerges from the individual monads perceiving the whole aggregate in, as Leibniz would say, "varying degrees of clearness". In other words, each monad as part of a whole (a whole being the entire universe or organic aggregate) views the collective whole necessarily differently from the other monads or parts—necessarily differently because the predetermined essence is unique. What has all this to do with the Spenglerian conception of social aggregates? Briefly, it illuminates the metaphysical presuppositions in the already quoted statement:

Allein auf der grösseren oder geringeren Verwandtschaft der einzelnen Welten untereinander, soweit sie von Menschen einer Kultur oder seelischen Gemeinschaft erlebt werden, beruht die grössere oder geringere Mitteilbarkeit des Geschauten, Empfundenen, Erkannten⁴¹

. . . on the greater or less degree of this interrelation depends the greater or less communicability of intuitions, sensations and thoughts from one to another⁴²

From this statement, we can recognize the continuity principle of individual outlooks of the spiritual community. The degree of interrelation of the Microcosms is a variable of perceiving and expressing clearly that common outlook of the whole which binds them into a social unity.

For our purposes, the Leibnizian notion of the whole in the part, and the part within the whole, along with the idea of varying degrees of clearness in the reflection of other points of view, shall be called the "principle of the organic whole". In our discussion of Goethean morphology this metaphysical principle was recognized.

Goethe says: "Nichts ist der Natur gemässer, als dass sie das, was sie im Ganzen intentioniert, durch das Einzelste in Wirksamkeit setzt."⁴³ (Nothing is more consistent with Nature than that she realizes in the smallest detail that which she intends as a whole.)⁴⁴

The same idea is expressed by Spengler when he says:

Denn es tritt im historischen wie im naturhaften Weltbilde nicht das geringste hervor, ohne dass in ihm die ganze Summe aller tiefsten Tendenzen verkörpert wäre.⁴⁵

For, in the historical as in the natural world-picture, there is found nothing, however small, that does not embody in itself the entire sum of fundamental tendencies.⁴⁶

By a contemplative intuition, it is possible to cipher in the detailed phenomena of "living Nature" or the World-as-History what the fundamental tendencies and operations of the entire sum of phenomena are. This is possible for Goethe because the entire universe is conceived as a living whole, with each of its articulate parts operating functionally or organically together in rapport with the whole. This organic principle underlies Spengler's understanding of the ideal relation of the individual soul with others constituting the whole of a human spiritual community. With important exceptions to be discussed later, Spengler believes, like Goethe and Leibniz, that all facets of reality are organically related to a more extensive cosmic whole, and this means further that all parts within the All are organically intertwined with each other and that the Destiny of the most distant things and events relates in some mysterious way to all other events. Thus in speaking of man, Spengler remarks: "Sein Körperbau, seine natürlichen Funktionen, seine ganze sinnliche

Erscheinung, alles gehört einer umfassenderen Einheit an."⁴⁷ (Its [man's] physical structure, its natural functions, the whole phenomenal conception of it, all belong to a more comprehensive unity.)⁴⁸ Man is cosmic in that his existence (Dasein) functions to subserve the will of an all-encompassing unity, for he reflects in his single being the same servitude characteristic of all other animal life and plant life to the immediate environment and of this to the earth and stellar worlds.⁴⁹ The Becoming of the heavens, the earth's crust, and the forms of life are "organically" related by virtue of fulfilling an all-encompassing will of the Cosmos.⁵⁰ The phenomena of Cultures, races, and nations are cosmic as well, and according to Spengler, the events which they undergo are not isolated events within a vacuum, but events which are in a harmony with the other events of the universe. This conviction is clearly expressed in a footnote of the Untergang:

Der fünfzigjährige Abstand dieser kritischen Punkte, der sich in dem klaren geschichtlichen Aufbau des Barock besonders deutlich abhebt und auch in der Folge der drei punischen Kriege erkennbar wird, deutet wieder darauf hin, dass die kosmischen Flutungen in Gestalt des menschlichen Lebens an der Oberfläche eines kleinen Gestirns nichts irgendwie für sich Bestehendes sind, sondern mit dem unendlichen Bewegtsein des Alls in tiefem Einklang stehen.⁵¹

The fifty-year interval of these critical points, which is seen with special distinctness in the clear historical structure of the Baroque, but is recognizable also in the sequence of the three Punic wars, is yet another hint that the Cosmic flowings in the form of human lives upon the surface of a minor star are not self-contained and independent, but stand in deep harmony with the unending movedness of the universe.⁵²

The principle of the organic whole is a major metaphysical supposition

of Spengler's philosophy of Culture. Individual souls, when they are organic members of a greater whole, eg. nation or Culture, are in servitude to the life and will of that whole. An order of definite structure sets itself up when each Microcosm functions in an harmonious way with other Microcosms so that the Macrocosm of the collective soul becomes for the individual expressive of a universal will and Destiny.⁵³ Spengler states: "Aus einer Summe kleiner einzelner Welten ist plötzlich eine Ganzheit entstanden."⁵⁴ (Out of a sum of little single worlds comes suddenly a complete whole.)⁵⁵ The complete whole of a spiritual community has its soul, will, and life through the common accord of the soul, will, and life of its individuals, and it is this accord, raised to a conscious level at moments " . . . von den Stürmen der Begeisterung . . ."⁵⁶ (. . . seized by storms of enthusiasm . . .)⁵⁷ and spiritual upheavals, which comes to be felt by its members as a super-human, super-personal will identical with the Will of the Cosmos. The ideal relationships of individual to individual take on a specific structural character in the composition of the entire order, so that each individual acts to substantiate, strengthen, and develop the values which underlie this harmonious relationship of the whole order. And this means that the individual soul, at certain critical periods of its life, does not feel and think of itself as an individual Microcosm standing within, and at times at odds with one of many specific Macrocosms. Rather he feels himself at one with the will of the whole: "Hier sind die mikrokosmischen Grenzen aufgehoben."⁵⁸ (In such cases the microcosmic wall is obliterated.)⁵⁹ The will of the whole social

group can be so strongly felt by the individual that it becomes for him not only the will of a certain human order (nation, class, or Culture), but also the will of the entire cosmic order. At such times, so Spengler says, the polarity of Microcosm and Macrocosm breaks down, and only the cosmic it rules. Life is felt not as 'I', but as 'we'—a sense which overcomes all polarity and convinces the individual of a grand harmony of all things.⁶⁰

Limiting the discussion here to social orders, it can be seen that according to Spengler the will and form of a social order lives within the individual souls. Though no individual outlook is ever the same as another, each individual expresses those values and purposes of social order which serve to bring about the accord and will of the whole. Spengler says:

Unter allen mikrokosmischen Wesen bilden sich immer wieder beseelte Masseneinheiten, Wesen höherer Ordnung, die langsam entstehen oder plötzlich da sind mit allen Gefühlen und Leidenschaften des einzelnen, in ihrem Innern rätselhaft und dem Verstande unzugänglich. . . .⁶¹

Under all the plurality of microcosmic beings, we are perpetually meeting with the formation of inspired mass-units, beings of a higher order, which, whether they develop slowly or come into existence in a moment, contain all the feelings and passions of the individual, enigmatic in their inward character and inaccessible to reasoning . . .⁶²

It is thus possible to speak of the single soul of a certain people, class, order, or Culture because this universal soul is reflected in or representative of the dynamic relations of the individuals.⁶³

The universal soul of an order is, as such, an organic entity, a Becoming with its own temporal unity and indivisible activity, with

its own definite set of possibilities to actualize and individual Idea to express. This is as much as saying that each individual soul contains the universal whole within it, which is the other side of the relation of the organic principle: ". . . le monde estant tout entiers dans chacune de ses parties . . ." ⁶⁴ (The world is entirely in each of its parts . . .) ⁶⁵ as Leibniz says. The single soul of the people, class, order, or Culture is contained within the actualizing possibilities and outlook of the individual soul. Another way of expressing this thought is to say the Idea of the Macrocosm is within the Microcosm. The universal, collective soul arises out of the individual soul as an essential part of that individual soul's activity. ⁶⁶ Consequently, as a presupposition of a Spenglerian spiritual community, the collective soul and outlook is identical to that of its individual members, even though each member of the whole can never have the same exact outlook as another.

With this, it is possible to understand what serves as Spengler's metaphysical justification of the continual use of analogies when speaking of Cultures as organisms. One reads in the Untergang such statements as: "Die Seele eines Künstlers ist wie die Seele einer Kultur etwas, das sich verwirklichen möchte, etwas Vollständiges und Vollkommenes, in der Sprache einer ältern Philosophie: ein Mikrokosmos." ⁶⁷ (The artist's soul, like the soul of a Culture, is something potential that may actualize itself, something complete and perfect—in the language of an older

philosophy, a microcosm.)⁶⁸ The soul of a Culture is like the soul of the artist in imaginatively and creatively realizing what as future possibilities is its predetermined essence. Both notions, that of the individual soul and that of the collective soul of a Culture, refer to living events and thus permit the employment of analogy. And it is precisely the principle of the organic whole which underlies the thesis that Cultures are living events. A Spenglerian Culture is organic by virtue of being contained within the individual so that the future possibilities of the Culture are the future possibilities of the individual soul in concert with other individuals, and the past history of the Culture is the actualizations and accomplishment of these individual souls.⁶⁹ On the basis of the organic principle, therefore, the various moments and stages of the existence of a Culture are the same moments and stages of an individual's life. The Culture has a childhood, a period of maturity, and an old age and conversely, every person, depending on which Culture-Idea he creates, has a Gothic or Doric period, followed later by a Baroque or Ionic period. Spengler expresses this concept:

In diesem Sinne wiederholt nun auch mit tiefster Notwendigkeit jedes irgendwie bedeutende Einzeldasein alle Epochen der Kultur, welcher es angehört. In jedem von uns erwacht das Innenleben—in jenem entscheidenden Augenblick, von dem an man weiss, das man ein Ich ist—dort und so, wie einst die Seele der ganzen Kultur erwachte. Jeder von uns Menschen des Abendlandes erlebt als Kind seine Gotik, seine Dome, Ritterburgen, und Heldensagen, das "Dieu le veut" der Kreuzzüge und das Seelenleid des jungen Parzival in wachen Träumen und Kinderspielen noch einmal. Jeder junge Grieche hatte sein homerisches Zeitalter und sein Marathon.⁷⁰

In this sense, too, every individual being that has any sort of importance recapitulates, of intrinsic necessity, all the epochs of the Culture to which it belongs. In each

one of us, at that decisive moment when he begins to know that he is an ego, the inner life wakens just where and just how that of the Culture wakened long ago. Each of us men of the West, in his child's day-dreams and child's play, lives again its Gothic—the cathedrals, the castles, the hero-sagas, the crusader's "Dieu le veut", the soul's oath of young Parzival. Every young Greek had his Homeric age and his Marathon.⁷¹

On the basis of the organic principle, therefore, the nature of a Spenglerian Culture is to be understood as a universal soul, a gigantic Ego, realizing a Destiny-Idea by virtue of the individuals relating themselves to each other in an ideal, harmonious fashion and expressing thereby a common outlook through their own separate activities. The Leibnizian structured aggregate (a plant or animal organism) is of the same nature: the life and will of the whole is potentially present and realizes itself in each of its parts. We have explained that according to Leibniz, the essence of the monad is to reflect the world or universe and that each realizes its point of view of the whole in such a way as to ideally influence each other of the whole and thereby to set up a harmony of the whole.⁷² The Spenglerian Culture, like all other spiritual communities, corresponds exactly to the monadic model of the structure aggregates.

We are now in position to see that the philosophy of the Untergang presupposes a pre-established harmony which in many respects is similar to the Leibnizian pre-established harmony. The main steps which lead to this conclusion are as follows. First, the implicit presence of the identity of indiscernibles rested upon the understanding that every individual soul is predetermined to a particular

point of view. Second, the principle of representation expressed the spiritual relationship between souls as they unfold their point of view. Third, the principle of the organic whole revealed that all individual souls are essentially united into a spiritual community by virtue of their pre-established essence unfolding a common Destiny-Idea. It was noted in the last part that the Culture's Destiny-Idea is innate in every member of the Culture. Spengler expresses this notion when he states:

Angeboren ist diese Urgestalt der Welt, insofern sie ursprüngliches Eigentum der Seele dieser Kultur ist, deren Ausdruck unser ganzes Leben bildet; erworben ist sie, insofern jede einzelne Seele jenen Schöpfungsakt für sich noch einmal wiederholt und das ihrem Dasein vorbestimmte Symbol der Tiefe in früher Kindheit, wie ein ausschlüpfender Schmetterling seine Flügel, entfaltet.⁷³

. . . this prime form of the world is innate in so far as it is an original possession of the soul of that Culture which is expressed by our life as a whole, and acquired in so far that every individual soul re-enacts for itself that creative act and unfolds in early childhood the symbol of depth to which its existence is predestined, as the emerging butterfly unfolds its wings.⁷⁴

From this demonstration, a pre-ordained harmony must be postulated.

Nowhere has Spengler spoken explicitly of a predetermined harmony. Never is there such a statement made in the manner of Leibniz:

. . . tout ce qui arrive à l'ame et à chaque substance, est une suite de sa notion, donc l'idée même ou essence de l'ame porte que toutes ses apparences ou perceptions luy doivent naistre (sponte) de sa propre nature, et justement en sorte qu'elles répondent d'elles mêmes à ce qui arrive, dans tout l'univers. . . .⁷⁵

. . . everything which happens to a soul or to any substance is a consequence of its concept; hence the idea itself or the essence of the soul brings it about that all of its appearances or perceptions should be born out of its

nature and precisely in such a way that they correspond of themselves to that which happens in the universe at large,⁷⁶

Indeed, we should not expect this kind of a pronouncement given Spengler's prime interest of setting forth a morphology of history in contrast to the Leibnizian themes of finding a synthesis between the realm of mechanics and that of metaphysics (especially the mind-body conflict) and between the realm of Grace and that of Nature. Yet, it cannot be denied that Spengler's metaphysic, when traced to its final implications, involves some form of a pre-determined harmony closely resembling that of Leibniz. We have noted when demonstrating Spengler's employment of the organic principle the conviction of human events standing in a harmony with the rest of the Cosmos:

. . . dass die kosmischen Flutungen in Gestalt des menschlichen Lebens an der Oberfläche eines kleinen Gestirns nichts irgendwie für sich Bestehendes sind, sondern mit dem unendlichen Bewegtsein des Alls in tiefem Einklang stehen.⁷⁷

. . . that the Cosmic flowings in the form of human lives upon the surface of a minor star are not self-contained and independent, but stand in deep harmony with the unending movedness of the universe.⁷⁸

In discussing the term "Race" (which would apply not only to human beings, but also to all forms or species of animal and plant life)

Spengler asserts: "Rasse ist etwas Kosmisches und Seelenhaftes.

Irgendwie ist sie periodisch und in ihrem Innern von den grossen astronomischen Verhältnissen mitbedingt."⁷⁹ (Race is something

cosmic and psychic, periodic in some obscure way, and in its inner nature partly conditioned by major astronomical relations.)⁸⁰

Elsewhere, when speaking of sex-life, he states:

. . . [Geschlechtsleben] trägt immer das Merkmal der Periodizität, des Taktes, noch in seinem Einklang mit den grossen Kreisläufen der Gestirne, in der Beziehung der weiblichen Natur zum Monde, des Lebens überhaupt zur Nacht, zum Frühling, zur Wärme. . . .⁸¹

. . . [sex-life] ever bears the mark of periodicity, beat, even to the extent of harmony with the great cycles of the stars, of relation between female nature and the moon, of this life generally to night, spring, warmth.⁸²

These remarks unequivocally indicate the belief that human life performs its history in a deep harmony with other cosmic events.

In the Urfragen, Spengler states: "Der Wellenschlag der Generationen im Strom des Lebens ist rhythmisch, hat Takt und Periodizität im Zusammenhang mit kosmischem Rhythmus."⁸³ (The wave-beat of generations in the stream of life is rhythmic, has beat and periodicity in connection with cosmic rhythm.)⁸⁴

The supposition of a predetermined harmony becomes further apparent when one considers what was said earlier about Destiny and Causality. What pertains to the World-as-History, in contradistinction to the World-as-Nature, are things and events which cannot be causally related. Whether it be the history of the star-galaxies, the solar system, the earth's crust, or the plant and animal life on the earth's surface—history regarded as the actualizing, unfolding, the accomplishing of events cannot be a causal process.⁸⁵

It was seen that Spengler concurs with Leibniz in holding that dynamic Becoming disallows for causal or mechanical interpretations of ultimate reality. Things-Becoming can only be related "organically" or "functionally". The principle of the organic whole indicates

that organic relations, whole-to-part and part-to-whole, are relations in which the Becoming of something operates to serve another Becoming. In short, they exist in an established harmony with one another. Both Leibniz and Spengler hold in common what can be called an "organic logic" whereby events are understood to be functionally, not causally related to each other.

In the last analysis, no process, for Spengler, can ever be an insulated history apart from a greater history, no matter how small or insignificant it appears to the grand totality of things. Though the exact nature of the cosmic harmony be inaccessible to the human mind, it can never be assumed that no such relation exists. This, however, is exactly what is taken to be the case, according to Spengler, in a causal or mechanical theory of process as Darwin's:

Sie beschränkt die möglichen Zusammenhänge erstens auf Vorgänge, die sich in ihrem ganzen Verlauf an der Erdoberfläche vollziehen. Damit werden alle grossen kosmischen Beziehungen zwischen den Lebenserscheinungen der Erde und Ereignissen des Sonnensystems oder der Sternenwelt überhaupt ausgeschaltet und die ganz unmögliche Behauptung vorausgesetzt, dass die Aussenseite der Erdkugel ein allseitig isoliertes Gebiet des Naturgeschehens sei.⁸⁶

It limits possible causal connexions, in the first place, to those which work out their entire course on the earth's surface, but this immediately excludes all great cosmic relations between earthly life-phenomena and the events of the solar system and the stellar universe, and assumes the impossible postulate that the exterior face of the earth-ball is a completely insulated region of natural phenomena.⁸⁷

If the progressive changes of the plant or animal in the history of its species are the results of an ever-increasing fitness of life; then the earth's surface is insulated from greater organic relations of the Cosmos. To Spengler, this is an impossibility. Mechanical

efficiency, brought about by certain chemical and physical forces effecting a process of selection and adaptation, cannot account for the original tendency already established within the plant or animal. What undergoes the struggle of existence is given as the inner potential form or nature of the plant or animal. The progressive changes which its inner nature experiences in its unfolding history are predetermined and hence are of a cosmic sort.⁸⁸ Like Goethe, Spengler believes that each plant and animal realizes from within its own unalterable predetermined nature, its own purposes and values.⁸⁹ This is not, however, a teleological view of process by which life comes forth to realize certain purposes. Such a view would make life and all its changes the consequence of external causes, and thus it would be just as inorganic as the Darwinian theory of evolution. The prime forms of Goethe's Nature, which the "living doth itself unfold", are purposeless, aimless, causeless:

. . . alles, was wir sehen, zwingt uns zu der Überzeugung, das immer wieder tiefe und sehr plötzliche Änderungen im Wesen des Tier- und Pflanzendaseins vor sich gehen, die von kosmischer Art und niemals auf das Gebiet der Erdoberfläche beschränkt sind und die dem menschlichen Empfinden und Verstehen in ihren Ursachen oder überhaupt entzogen bleiben.⁹⁰

. . . all that we see about us impels us to the conviction that again and again profound and very sudden changes take place in the beings of plants and animals, changes which are of a cosmic kind and nowise restricted to the earth's surface, which are beyond the ken of human sense and understanding in respect of causes, if not indeed in all respects.⁹¹

In the final analysis, it is a mystery that life is the way it is, and no "how" or "why" can penetrate the secrets of it.⁹²

The phenomena of the higher Cultures, their Becoming, the

changes and stages they each pass through, can only be described as purposeless and aimless. No causal explanation can account for the unfolding of its predetermined Destiny-Idea. Thus Spengler says of both plant-organism and Culture-organism: ". . . [wir kennen] die innere Form des neuen Lebenslaufes, die durch alle andringenden Gewalten nur in der Ruhe ihrer Entfaltung und Vollendung gestört, nicht aber in ihrem Wesen geändert werden kann."⁹³ (. . . we do know the inner form of this new life-course; and we know that the quiet course of its development and fulfilment may be disturbed by the pressure of external powers, but never altered.)⁹⁴

Chapter IV

FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

A metaphysic which either explicitly or implicitly asserts a pre-established harmony naturally brings up the classic problem of human freedom. It is appropriate here, then, to interrupt this discussion of the Leibnizian presuppositions in order to analyze the understanding of freedom in the Untergang. For Spengler does, despite the predetermined nature of history and Culture, attest to a genuine human freedom: "Der Schaffende fühlt sich frei. In jeder Tat liegt Freiheit. Jede Tat, auch die misslingende, ist dem Wesen nach ein Sieg des freien Willens."¹ (He who creates feels that he is free. There is freedom in every act. Every act, even the unsuccessful one, is essentially a victory for free will.)² In conformity with his over-all style of writing, Spengler does not set forth anywhere a complete account of the nature of individual free will. It is necessary, therefore, to bring together many scattered statements by relating them to the general principles and presuppositions of his metaphysic. With the accomplishment of this task, it will then be possible to perceive to what degree the Spenglerian pre-established harmony differs from the Leibnizian.

Spengler tells us at one place that the idea of freedom, in whatever context it is used, consists essentially in repudiation (Ablehnung) of something.³ In other words, freedom is always freedom

from something. As such, it is a negative notion: "Die Freiheit ist wie immer lediglich negativ."⁴ (Freedom is, as always, purely negative.)⁵ To detach oneself from something and to stand apart from it is to gain freedom from this something. We will be able to see later on more concretely that this something is either tradition in any form—political, economic, artistic—or the lifestyle of urban existence. But for now it must be accepted that "Freedom" in the deepest Spenglerian sense, means detachment from and standing in polarity to the cosmos, viz. to the pre-ordained harmony of everything in servitude of the All.⁶ This point recalls what was said in an earlier chapter concerning man as a Microcosm.⁷ On the one hand, man is cosmic, i.e. he is part of the universal order of things. On the other hand, man is a conscious-being (Wachsein), which means he is detached from and in polarity to this given order.⁸ Thus, for Spengler, freedom is closely associated with consciousness; it presupposes consciousness. To be aware of the world, to cognize it, frees Wachsein from Dasein.

However, the capacity to detach oneself from the cosmos, and to become a small world in relation to it, does not distinguish the human freedom from the rest of the animal kingdom. Man shares with the other forms of animal-life microcosmic existence. Indeed, according to Spengler, consciousness is the element which serves to differentiate the animal from the plant.⁹ When the animal is tensely alert, it is a Microcosm standing opposed to the alien world. One observes a causal logic ruling in its instinctive trial-and-error techniques or in its scent, sight, or hearing of danger, and

the response to it. In contrast, the plant, as Spengler describes it, is wholly cosmic and hence its unconscious life is an integral part of the life and Destiny of the cosmos.¹⁰ The plant is attached to the soil upon which it grows and dies, and its Destiny—its birth, development, and death—is only an organic moment in the single process of Goethe's "living Nature". This is not so with the animal. What is implied in the Wachsein of animal life, is mobility, viz. the ability to move oneself independently across the land of its origin. The microcosmic organs of mobility, Spengler tells us, are the senses and nerves, which provide the material basis of consciousness.¹¹ Microcosmic freedom of the animal, in contradistinction to the cosmic servitude of the plant, is thus constituted by consciousness and its corollary, mobility.¹² Yet, Spengler states that the animal has as well its plantlike cosmic side in which the logic of Destiny or Becoming rules. The Dasein of the animal-life is all that which operates unconscious of purposive action, of means and end, of cause and effect.¹³ The blood system, along with the cyclic organs of reproduction and nutrition, in the higher genera are what Spengler understands as the organs of cosmic being.¹⁴ Unlike the microcosmic side, the cosmic side functions continually, without stop or rest; the blood circulates with a definite beat, rhythm, or periodicity. In the sleeping hours, when conscious activity has decreased, man leads only a plantlike existence.¹⁵

How then is the microcosmic freedom of man distinguished from the microcosmic freedom of the animal? It is only in

Der Mensch und die Technik that one finds a really concise answer to this question. Here we are told that animal activity is always a "genus-activity", which means that its techniques of living and surviving stem from drives of its kind or type. The will of the animal reflects not so much its individual self as it does the genus. It is the unalterable, impersonal "it", the dark unconscious will of its type which impels and manifests itself, for the most part, in the conscious activity of the animal-microcosm. Hence the conscious-life of the animal, with its impersonal responses to the alien world, operates in service of the collective demands of its genus, and thus its microcosmic freedom—its independent mobility—is dependent as ever on cosmic being (Dasein). When, however, Spengler discusses the purposive activity or technique of man, he says:

Die Menschentechnik und sie allein aber ist unabhängig vom Leben der Menschengattung. Es ist der einzige Fall in der gesamten Geschichte des Lebens, dass das Einzelwesen aus dem Zwang der Gattung austritt.¹⁶

The unique fact about human technics, on the contrary, is that it is independent of the life of the human genus. It is the one instance in all the history of life in which the individual frees himself from the compulsion of the genus.¹⁷

Man is creative in a way the animal cannot be. He can select his own method, and make the weapons and tools for living. To be sure, man is impelled by a genus-compulsion, and his conscious activity is in the end dependent on cosmic being. But unlike the animal, man is not instinctively given his techniques of living. Rather he must, in the conscious attempt to overcome the obstacles of the Macrocosm, think out the solution and create the implements which will realize

this end.¹⁸ Spengler describes this conscious activity, in contradistinction to the animal, as arbitrary, alterable, personal, inventive, and states:

Hier beginnt "Kunst" als Gegenbegriff zur Natur. Jedes technische Verfahren des Menschen ist eine Kunst und ist immer so genannt worden: die Kunst des Bogenschiessens und Reitens wie die Kriegskunst, die Künste des Bauens, des Regierens, des Opfern und Wahrsagens, des Malens und Versehmachens, des wissenschaftlichen Experimentierens. Künstlich, widernatürlich ist jedes menschliche Werk vom Anzünden des Feuers bis zu den Leistungen, die wir in hohen Kulturen als eigentlich künstlerische bezeichnen.¹⁹

Here begins "Art" as a counter-concept to Nature. Every technical process of man is an art and is always so described --so, for instance, archery and equitation, the art of war, the arts of building and government, of sacrificing and prophesying, of painting and versification, of scientific experiment. Every work of man is artificial, unnatural, from the lighting of a fire to the achievements that are specifically designated as "artistic" in the high Cultures.²⁰

Consequently, human freedom, on Spengler's showing, consists specifically in the activity of choice; man chooses from his own reasoning the techniques of living.²¹ In this way, man emancipates himself from the "genus-activity". No doubt, this view of freedom is very paradoxical. One is led to understand that conscious activity arises for man, just as it does for the animal, from the impulsive demands of the genus.²² It is once again the voluntarism which we have seen in part two. Free-moving life is ultimately in servitude of the plant-side of life, i.e. Wachsein is dependent upon Dasein. However, the soul of man stands in a more tense, a more detached position to the cosmos in that it has wrested from nature the ability to create: "Sie [die Seele] steht in unversöhnlichem Gegensatz zur gesamten Welt, von der sie durch ihr eigenes Schöpfertum

getrennt ist. Es ist die Seele eines Empörers.²³ (It [the Soul] stands in irreconcilable opposition to the whole world, from which its own creativeness has sundered it. It is the soul of an upstart.)²⁴ To be able to think out individually the process to success without relying on given know-how, and to translate this inventive thought into actuality distinguishes man. With this capacity he not only gains an advantage over the beasts and his fellow man, but he is also able to take the field against the "pre-ordained." Conscious activity is able now to turn upon its source, unconscious nature, extract secrets from her and use them to subjugate her. Spengler describes the history of man's creative freedom and the increasing estrangement from and antagonism with the Cosmos:

Man hatte es satt, sich mit dem Dienste von Pflanzen, Tieren und Sklaven zu begnügen, die Natur ihrer Schätze zu berauben — der Metalle, Steine, Hölzer, Faserstoffe, des Wassers in Kanälen und Brunnen — ihre Widerstände zu besiegen durch Schifffahrt, Strassen, Brücken, Tunnels und Deiche. Sie sollte nicht mehr in ihren Stoffen geplündert, sondern in ihren Kräften selbst ins Joch gespannt werden und Sklavendienste tun, um die Stärke des Menschen zu vervielfachen.²⁵

Man, evidently, was tired of merely having plants and animals and slaves to serve him, and robbing Nature's treasures of metal and stone, wood and yarn, of managing her water in canals and wells, of breaking her resistances with ships and roads, bridges and tunnels and dams. Now he meant, not merely to plunder her of her materials, but to enslave and harness her forces so as to multiply his own strength.²⁶

It is possible for man, at the present state of modern technology, to capture the "forces" of living nature as his spoil.²⁷

It is now possible to understand Spengler's conception of human freedom in the midst of an over-riding predetermined order:

"Der 'freie Wille' schon ist ein Akt der Empörung, nichts anderes."²⁸
 ("Free will" itself is an act of rebellion and nothing less.)²⁹ The
 creativity of Wachsein is man's rebellion against nature or cosmic
 being. It was seen in part two that in the last analysis human
 Culture is a rebellion against nature. Freedom means freedom
from nature, and the overthrow and subjugation of its dominion is
 the choosing, willing, creating, and inventing of those means of
 transforming her unconscious control. But as before, Spengler
 understands rebellious Wachsein as the outcome of an instinctive
 force. It is an instinctive will which gives the determinative impetus
 to think out and create the means to success and survival. The
 potential of the Microcosm to rebel against the cosmic comes from
 the cosmic itself, and therefore it becomes manifest that of the
 two—Microcosm and Cosmos, Wachsein and Dasein, man and nature—
 the latter is the stronger. Nature gives man enough active power
 to become a creative agent of his own, and thus he is thrown into
 his lonely, detached freedom, but at the same time he remains
 continually dependent on nature for his fight against her.
 Consequently, man can never finally break himself away or make his
 life one in which he is emancipated from the Destiny of the pre-
 ordained.

One may still wonder how Spengler could consider man to be
 free if he is forced to rebel and is doomed to suffer defeat. If
 man is only a vehicle of incomprehensible forces of Dasein conflicting
 with each other, where is there room for freedom? To this question,
 Spengler would answer that man finds freedom in doing the necessary.

As such, Spengler follows Leibniz, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and many others in understanding that freedom consists in acting from one's own determined constitution. To act from the inner necessity of one's being is to establish the sense of one's freedom, for it is to act according to one's own essential nature or Concept. This is the meaning in Spengler's aperçu: "Der Einzelne ist frei. Er tut, was er will."³⁰ (The individual is free. He does what he wants to do.)³¹ It is built into the very notion of the soul as a principle of future possibility that it is free. The soul actualizes those possibilities which constitute itself, and in so doing, it does what it wills. For Spengler, the spontaneity and authenticity of man's willed action is not taken away by the fact that his rebellion is predetermined to defeat. Man freely wills the necessary, since his own will is part of the will of the All. Hence, "Was wir tun, müssen wir tun. Unser freier Wille ist das Schicksal."³² (What we do we must do. Our free will is fate.)³³ Rather than restricting freedom, the predetermined essence of man makes possible this freedom.

Whatever one may think of this line of reasoning, there still appears the difficulty of understanding Spengler's use of the word "choice" in a pre-established order. Indeed, Spengler often speaks as though to give the idea that there is ultimately no alternative line of action. Witness the final statements in the Untergang:

Wir haben nicht die Freiheit, dies oder jenes zu erreichen, aber die, das Notwendige zu tun oder nichts. Und seine Aufgabe, welche die Notwendigkeit der Geschichte gestellt

hat, wird gelöst, mit dem einzelnen oder gegen ihn.³⁴

We have not the freedom to reach to this or to that, but the freedom to do the necessary or to do nothing. And a task that historic necessity has set will be accomplished with the individual or against him.³⁵

According to Spengler, whatever an individual decides, even that which no one could ever predict, fulfills a deep cosmic necessity. Hence:

. . . was man auch wolle oder tue—was wirklich auf alle Entschlüsse erfolgt und aus ihnen folgt, jäh, überraschend, von niemand vorauszusehen, das dient einer tieferen Notwendigkeit und fügt sich für den verstehenden Blick, wenn er über das Bild des längst Vergangenen hinschweift, einer grossen Ordnung ein.³⁶

. . . whatever one may will or do, that which actually ensues upon and issues from the resolution—abrupt, surprising, unforeseeable—suberves a deeper necessity and, for the eye that sweeps over the picture of the distant past, visibly conforms to a major order.³⁷

But what here appears as an uncompromising stance for absolute necessity is not in fact a stance for absolute necessity. In the final analysis, Spengler does not allow the individual only one choice and one line of action. The assertion that we are not free to do this or that means simply that our future is not open to any and every possibility we please to realize. Further, that we are free to do the necessary or nothing at all, means that, to act in the most meaningful way for us—i.e. to realize those possibilities which will allow us to live on in world-history³⁸—is to do the necessary, and to do anything less is to do nothing at all as far as surviving goes.³⁹ Thus the main option which is left open to the individual is to live on (fortleben) or not to live on in the battle of world-history. We remember the Nietzschean principle of Spengler's

outlook: life is all the more valuable, the stronger its instincts for life and power are.⁴⁰ The ultimate meaning of a person's life is life itself, and that life is more meaningful the stronger the will-to-power, the will-to-succeed is. Life calls upon itself to continue itself, and to affirm life is to affirm its inherent meaningfulness; not to affirm life is to renounce it for other-worldly values. But whatever choice one makes here, one fulfills Destiny: "Man entgeht dém Schicksal nicht, wenn man die Augen schliesst, es verleugnet, bekämpft, vor ihm flüchtet. Das sind nur andere Arten es zu erfüllen."⁴¹ (One does not elude fate by closing one's eyes, renouncing, fighting, or fleeing it. These are merely other means of fulfilling it.)⁴² To affirm life is to affirm Destiny and seek to be successful with the flow of it; to negate it—to hide from it, deny it, fight it, or run from it—is to allow oneself to be swept away or carried along by the inevitable. This is the choice man is presented with. It is, therefore, not at all a matter of helping to effect the inevitable, viz. death or tragic end of life, when life is affirmed and "we do the necessary", but a matter of living on as long as possible. The death of a nation or a Culture, even the death of mankind, is like the death of an individual in that it is the necessary outcome of a cosmic Destiny, and whatever man may will within this inescapable outcome cannot alter this outcome, nor, for that matter, any vital stage in its irrevocable unfolding. This is what is meant in Spengler's motto: "Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt."

Spengler's standpoint on human freedom and the predetermined

nature of man is concisely expressed in Goethe's aphorism: "Der Mensch mag sich wenden, wohin er will, er mag unternehmen, was es auch sei, stets wird er auf jenen Weg wieder zuruckkehren, den ihm die Natur einmal vorgezeichnet hat."⁴³ (Man may twist and turn, do what he will, he must ever return to the path nature has once for all prescribed for him.)⁴⁴ What nature has prescribed, no man can alter: man is caught up within the historical, cosmic flow of things, and his microcosmic freedom is limited to, and indeed consists in the working out of its inevitable process. Spengler tells us that every stage in the life of the individual or Culture has its own particular meaning to be actualized—which must and will be actualized only at the particular point of its life—and that freedom consists in the choice within the definite set of possible ways of expressing and working out the meaning or idea of the particular stage.⁴⁵ Thus, speaking about the individual, Spengler says: "Mit seiner Geburt ist dem Einzelnen seine Natur und ein Kreis von möglichen Aufgaben gegeben, innerhalb deren die freie Wahl zu Recht besteht."⁴⁶ (Each man is born with a given nature and a set of possible tasks within which free choice is legitimately his.)⁴⁷ And speaking of the life-course of a Culture, he states:

Innerhalb jeder Epoche besteht eine unbegrenzte Fülle überraschender und nie vorherzusehender Möglichkeiten, sich in Einzeltatsachen zu verwirklichen, die Epoche selbst aber ist notwendig, weil die Lebenseinheit da ist.⁴⁸

Within every epoch there is unlimited abundance of surprising and unforeseeable possibilities of self-actualizing in detail-facts, but the epoch itself is necessary, for the life-unity is in it.⁴⁹

The conclusion is that Spengler sees freedom in the selecting of one among many possible actions. What is foreordained is the set of possibilities and the fact that one must choose from this set alone.

True enough, Spengler seems at times to go beyond this position when he says that certain events of history, often accomplished by "great" figures, had to occur just as they did and not otherwise: "Einem Menschen, der eine grosse Aufgabe auszuführen hat, kann kein Unglück zustossen, solange es seine Bestimmung nicht vollendete."⁵⁰ (A man who has a great task to carry out cannot meet with misfortune as long as he has not fulfilled his destiny.)⁵¹

The same idea is expressed more emphatically:

Ich glaube nicht, dass ein tiefbedeutender Mensch in seinem Leben je durch plumpe Zufälle, das grosse Los z.B., Epoche macht. Das geschieht nur in einem Leben, das ohnehin auf die Leere gestellt ist. Das Schicksal beugt solche Missgriffe nicht, und dessen hat jeder grosse Mensch auch ein Gefühl. Er ist "kugel-fest", solange er mit seinem Werke noch unentbehrlich ist. Nietzsche, der in Monte Carlo Millionär wird, oder Goethe, durch einen Wagenunfall zum Krüppel geworden—das ist unmöglich.⁵²

I do not believe that "chance"—winning a lottery, for example—will ever affect the historical success of the life of a truly great man. Such things occur only to insignificant men. Fate does not make such blunders; every great man is conscious of this. He is "bullet proof" as long as he and his work are still indispensable. A Nietzsche becoming a millionaire at Monte Carlo, or Goethe a cripple due to a carriage accident—these are impossibilities.⁵³

If such events were pre-established to occur just as they did, and if such historical personages were protected from the meaningless incidental and all misfortune by an incomprehensible cosmic Destiny, then it would follow that there is really no room for the incidental or chance in human history (presupposing the uniformity of reality),

and this would be contradictory to Spengler's view of free choice between a number of possibilities within the epoch.

A new problem arises: how is the incidental possible within a pre-established order? Spengler believes that all events are predetermined, yet their occurrence is a matter of chance. At one point in the Untergang one reads that on the surface of human history the incalculable reigns: everything appears as a matter of accident or chance; no one can predict what will happen, or understand why things have happened as they did and why the course of events could not have been otherwise.⁵⁴ How is this position possible given the express assertion that certain men are protected from accident?

The answer to this question corresponds with the above interpretation of freedom: chance or the incidental is essentially comprised within the necessary, just as freedom or choice is comprised in predetermined nature. When events happen without any perceivable design or intended outcome, one attributes them to "chance".⁵⁵ This is as much as saying that events are not "understood", and hence they are unpredictable. Yet the very same events can come to reveal an inherent design. Thus the same events of chance can become events of necessity. This is the meaning of Spengler's aphorism: "'Alles ist Zufall' und 'Alles ist notwendig' bedeutet dasselbe. Die ganze Geschichte, alles in ihr ist Zufall und ist notwendig."⁵⁶ ("Everything is chance" and "everything is inevitable" mean the same thing. In all of history everything is both chance and inevitable.)⁵⁷ However Spengler says further that any event of any history—individual, cultural, geological, celestial—

can be contemplated as incidental or a matter of chance in the context of a greater all-encompassing reality: human-history is only a small episode in the formation of countless star-systems; it is incidental that the phenomena of scientific knowledge or the perfection of certain artistic styles appears in the alluvial period of earth-history.⁵⁸ Within a greater frame of reference, any event can be contemplated as meaningless, without design, incomprehensible. Yet, this does not exclude the incidental from taking on meaning and orderliness, even if the purpose and predictability can never be fully fathomed. Furthermore, that any event can be taken as chance means also that it is one of many possible incidents that could have occurred; it is only one possibility, without apparent design and uniformity, and hence unpredictable. All of these possible incidents form a definite set, which forms the limit of what can happen. Again, the set of possibilities is predetermined, and the one possibility which is actualized, once it has been actualized, is seen to be inevitable. In other words, whatever possible incident would have occurred would have been seen in retrospect as inevitable because the set was inevitable. Hence:

Das zufällige Ereignis selbst, ein Kristallisationsgebilde der historischen Oberfläche, konnte durch entsprechende andre Zufälle vertreten werden; die Epoche ist notwendig und vorbestimmt.⁵⁹

The merely incidental event, a crystallization-form of the historical surface, may be represented by other appropriate incidents, but the epoch is necessary and predetermined.⁶⁰

From this it is possible to understand what Spengler means

when he speaks of great historical figures being protected (kugel-fest or bullet-proof) from chance as long as they have not fulfilled their destined roles and missions. He does not mean that providence carefully watches the fortunes of a few chosen people. Quite the contrary, he states that Napoleon could have fallen anywhere in his career, but what he signified would have been carried out by some other incidental possibilities all the same.⁶¹ Likewise, Nietzsche could have become a millionaire, and Goethe could have died in a carriage accident, but the ideas that they represented, each in his respective period, would have been brought to light in another form. The prime Idea of a Culture unfolding itself in definite stages and epochs prescribes the one set of possible ways by which incidents may accomplish the necessary.⁶²

This concludes our elucidation and interpretation of Spengler's view of freedom and necessity. With this it is now possible to determine how Spengler's implicit pre-established harmony differs from the Leibnizian. In the Théodicée, one learns that God necessarily chose from infinite possibilities the best of all possible worlds. After creation every monad unfolds its private history in accord with the one universal history, viz. the best of all possible worlds. There are not within this predetermined history possibilities from which the rational monad, man, can choose. Freedom in this manner does not exist. Likewise, chance, the purely accidental within the predetermined, is ruled out. Every occurrence is specifically timed from Creation to occur just as it does. For

Leibniz, the pre-established best of all possible worlds is an a priori necessity. It is a truth of reason that God actualizes this one world, this one specific history, for otherwise, life would not be necessarily eternal and a fulfillment of divine will, i.e. it would be open to Spengler's vision of fatalism and death.

Despite this deep dissimilarity, there are two important Leibnizian presuppositions contained in Spengler's view of freedom. The first presupposition is inherently related to the Leibnizian principle of continuous perceiving. It is this: freedom is directly proportional to the grade of consciousness, so that greater or more freedom is experienced with the increase in awareness and activity; and conversely, one increasingly undergoes the state of servitude to the degree that one becomes more unconscious and less active. Leibniz held as part of his understanding of freedom a view essentially the same: an action is free in proportion to the "distinctness and clearness" of its perceptions and lacks freedom in proportion to the obscurity and confusedness of its perceptions.⁶³

Every monad in the Leibnizian universe spontaneously and continuously perceives in a more or less perfect manner, with God being the only monad which perceives perfectly. Accordingly, every monad enjoys a certain amount of freedom, with God as the only monad which enjoys perfect and complete freedom.⁶⁴ Thus in the great chain of being, from the most inactive (dimly perceiving) monad to the most active monad, freedom is experienced. Further, insofar as any one monad in this hierarchy perceives more distinctly at one time than another, it undergoes greater activity or realization of

its predetermined Concept, and as such, enjoys a greater degree of freedom. This metaphysical reasoning is immanently involved in Spengler's understanding of the cosmic-microcosmic duality of the animal. We recall that the entire animal kingdom experiences a freedom from the cosmic order by virtue of possessing consciousness and the activity of conscious sensibility, viz. mobility. It is to be understood then that in the hierarchy of animal-being the more cosmic the animal is, i.e. the closer it is to the plant world, the less conscious activity is experienced; and the more it lives within microcosmic being, the less it feels itself subject to cosmic servitude.⁶⁵ Man, the animal with highest capacity for conscious activity, and consequently the one who can live more tensely in microcosmic opposition to the world and cosmic nature, distinguishes himself from the herbivores and beasts of prey by being able to think out the means to his enterprises. In a word, man senses the greatest freedom of all animal-being because he possesses the greatest intellect.⁶⁶ In addition to this, within the order of Homo sapiens, the man who is most intellectually aware is the man who is most tense, most in polarity with the cosmic order, and therefore, the man who is most free.

Now, with Leibniz, man as a potentially rational soul tends to move throughout the stages of his life (not merely in the present life of the here and now, but more importantly in the future life of other "theaters") towards greater intellectual awareness. This parallels Spengler's analogies of the stages of each Culture-Soul corresponding to the particular type of consciousness of childhood,

of early youth, maturity, and old age. The movement from early Culture to late Culture and Civilization is a movement towards greater intellectual awareness and freedom. Whatever form or manifestation of Culture is considered—be it art, literature, religion, science, political or economic forms, the state or the visage of the city—all forms without exception disclose for Spengler the steady development from mysterious intuitiveness to critical self-consciousness.

The second fundamental similarity between the two philosophies which must be focused upon is another aspect of the principle of continuous perceiving. Both Leibniz and Spengler share the view that spontaneity—i.e. acting in accordance with one's own inner Will—forms along with consciousness or intellectual awareness the basis of human freedom. For Leibniz, the rational soul continuously unfolds the whole of its life (predetermined Concept) from within itself. Spontaneity, being an inherent part of man's nature, stresses the fact that the pre-established essence of man is no obstacle to freedom, but an integral part of it. Leibniz maintains that there is no "liberty of indifference" or an absolute undetermined choice in human decision-making, for such a state of being would be contrary to the continual, orderly realization of one perception after another in the soul's existence.⁶⁷ According to Leibniz, therefore, every choice is made by some preceding perception so that one is inclined from the start to make finally the decision which one does.⁶⁸ As demonstrated above, the same is the case for Spengler.

No doubt, Spengler's fatalistic picture of man's rebellion

against cosmic nature and the resulting tragedy stands in stark contrast to the Leibnizian picture of man inclining towards a greater integration with the world by a moral will which continually seeks to realize the best of all possible worlds. Yet, the fundamental similarity remains. The point is that Wachsein or perceptive being in general does not arise of itself, but presupposes an active unconscious element of appetition as its source. This means that man's freedom derives from super-personal forces.⁶⁹

Where Leibniz speaks of Grace, Spengler speaks of Destiny. In both cases conscious life is a function of it and thus is dependent on it. Every person may believe that the 'I' makes the choice and creates its own perceptions or representation of the world and thereby manifests its individual freedom. However, it is ultimately not the waking-I, but an unconscious "it", the predetermined, which actualizes itself through the 'I'. This is another way to say that Wachsein is in servitude to Dasein. Leibniz recognizes this position in his philosophy by stating that the sequence of all free acts must be ultimately resolved as free gifts of divine Grace.⁷⁰ Man is given freedom as part of his being—he is thrown into freedom—and must realize it. For Leibniz, this is the genuine reason for man's salvation and glory; for Spengler it is a factor of man's fall.

Chapter V

INFLUENCE, PSEUDOMORPHOSIS, AND KINSHIP

It is now necessary to analyze Spengler's understanding of the history and interrelations of Cultures in order to see the presence of Leibnizian principles. The preparation for this task has been accomplished by demonstrating that Spengler presupposes as his principle of individuality the identity of indiscernibles, and this, we recall, means that no two persons could ever feel, think, and act alike because their inner nature or essence is predetermined to realize a unique Concept or Idea. Spengler, like Leibniz, does not mean by this that a person's predetermined view is totally distinct from every other view. Rather every individual Weltanschauung differs only in degree, and consequently can come to an approximate agreement with other individual views. This leads us to understand that Spengler also visualizes in a Leibnizian manner the ideal relation and bond of the individual with others in the constitution of a living spiritual community. The principle of the organic whole expresses the nature of this relation of the individual to the whole, be this whole a family, tribe, state, class, or, what is Spengler's major concern, a Culture. However, if the individual Concept is predetermined, then it follows by the principle of the organic whole that the Faustian, Magian, Apollinian—is likewise predetermined. What unites a microcosmic soul spiritually to others

of its Culture expresses a Destiny-Idea. But all this leads in turn to the postulation of a pre-established harmony. The unfolding of the Destiny-Idea in the total span of the Culture's history is accomplished through a functional rapport of individuals with each other and, more extensively, with the history of the universe.

The first point to consider is the central motif of the Untergang: a Culture is an individual spiritual entity, a gigantic soul with its own consciousness. Spengler claims as well that any social order can be an organic whole and possess its own soul and consciousness:

Eine Seele haben alle echten Stände und Klassen, die Ritterschaften und Orden der Kreuzzüge, der römische Senat und der Jakobinerklub, die vornehme Gesellschaft unter Ludwig XIV und der preussische Adel, der Bauernstand und die Arbeiterschaft, der grossstädtische Pöbel, die Bevölkerung eines abgelegenen Tales, Völker und Stämme der Wanderzeiten, die Anhänger Mohameds und überhaupt jede eben begründete Religion oder Sekte, die Franzosen der Revolution und die Deutschen der Freiheitskriege.¹

A single soul is the mark of every genuine order or class, be it the chivalry and military orders of the Crusades, the Roman Senate or the Jacobin club, polite society under Louis XIV or the Prussian country "Adel," peasantry or guilds, the masses of the big city or the folk of the secluded valley, the peoples and tribes of the migrations or the adherents of Mohammed and, generally, of any new-found religion or sect, the French of the Revolution or the Germans of the Wars of Liberation.²

However, according to Spengler, the higher Cultures embrace all these lower organic orders to form one mighty organism.³ An individual person may belong to many orders at the same time (e.g. family, estate, guild, state) but the Culture is the most universal social order of which he is a member and often the order most unconsciously realized

in his active existence.⁴

Since the Culture is the exact counterpart to the individual, the Culture must reveal the same monadic principles which have been analyzed so far. First of all, the principle of a Culture's essence is possibility: "Die Geschichte einer Kultur ist die fortschreitende Verwirklichung ihres Möglichen."⁵ (The history of a Culture is the progressive actualizing of its possible.)⁶ Like the monad, or better, like an organic aggregate of Leibnizian monads, the Culture is the totality of its possibilities, and the actualization of these possibilities in the fact-world is the actualization of its unique Idea. Spengler says:

Ich unterscheide die Idee einer Kultur, den Inbegriff ihrer inneren Möglichkeiten, von ihrer sinnlichen Erscheinung im Bilde der Geschichte als der vollzogenen Verwirklichung.⁷

I distinguish the idea of a Culture, which is the sum total of its inner possibilities, from its sensible phenomenon or appearance upon the canvas of history as a fulfilled actuality.⁸

Two principles are contained in this assertion: first, the principle of continuous change and second the principle of individuality.

Every Culture, at every moment of its history, is a potentiality, i.e. a soul, and has as its phenomenal manifestation customs, arts, politics, religions, and even the people themselves, their classes, orders, and states. Spengler summarizes this idea by saying:

Hohe Kultur ist das Wachsein eines einzigen ungeheuren Organismus, der nicht nur Sitte, Mythos, Technik und Kunst, sondern auch die ihm einverleibten Völker und Stände zu Trägern einer einheitlichen Formensprache mit einheitlicher Geschichte macht.⁹

The high Culture . . . is the waking-being of a single huge organism which makes not only custom, myths, technique, and

art, but the very people and classes incorporated in itself the vessels of one single form-language and one single history.¹⁰

Furthermore, that every Culture has its non-repeatable way of viewing the world means that its identity and therefore its history, is established in its essence or Idea. Hence:

Aus dem Sinne, welcher hier der Kultur als einem Urphänomen und dem Schicksal als der organischen Logik des Daseins gegeben wurde, folgt, dass notwendig jede Kultur ihre eigne Schicksalsidee besitzen muss, ja dass in dem Gefühl, jede grosse Kultur sei nichts anderes als die Verwirklichung und Gestalt einer einzigartigen Seele, diese Folgerung schon eingeschlossen liegt.¹¹

It follows from the meaning that we have attached to the Culture as a prime phenomenon and to destiny as the organic logic of existence, that each Culture must necessarily possess its own destiny-idea. Indeed, this conclusion is implicit from the first in the feeling that every great Culture is nothing but the actualizing and form of a single, singularly-constituted soul.¹²

It is not the environment, the landscape, or the neighboring states which causally influence the psyche of a people. These empirical factors have been excluded from consideration by understanding the constitution of a Culture as an organic aggregate of monads exhibiting a common outlook. In a word, the identity of a culture-people is pre-ordained.

Connected with the notion of the Culture as a singularly constituted, predetermined soul is another Leibnizian principle heretofore not discussed. According to Leibniz, each monad continually actualizes its perception in a pre-established accord with its concept of the universe of other monads: not only is the final perception of the world (the point of view) determined by the monad's predetermined concept, but also the manner of the perceiving is determined to be

more or less clear in accordance with the dictates of the monad's Concept. In Leibniz' own words:

Car il faut savoir que toute substance simple enveloppe l'univers par ses perceptions confuses ou sentimens, et que la suite de ces perceptions est réglé par la nature particuliere de cette substance, mais d'une maniere qui exprime tousjours toute la nature universelle¹³

For it is plain that every simple substance embraces the whole universe in its confused perceptions or sensations, that the succession of these perceptions is regulated by the particular nature of this substance, but in a way which always expresses all the nature in the universe.¹⁴

The same is the case for Spengler. The Destiny-Idea predetermines not only the style and nature of artistic, scientific, or religious forms of the Culture, but also the very unfolding of the events and epochs. This is a point which can easily be overlooked in the Untergang. Spengler uses the word "Habitus" to refer not only to the style-manifestations of a Culture, but also to the duration of its life-history and the "tempo"—i.e. the manner in which each of its epochal events realizes itself in the world.¹⁵ In speaking of this latter quality, Spengler says:

Der Takt des antiken Daseins war ein anderer als der des ägyptischen oder arabischen. Man darf vom Andante des hellenisch-römischen und vom Allegro con brio des faustischen Geistes reden.¹⁶

The rhythm (Takt) of Classical existence was different from that of Egyptian or Arabian; and we can fairly speak of the andante of Greece and Rome and the allegro con brio of the Faustian spirit.¹⁷

In other words, each event in the Greco-Roman world from the destruction of Troy to the battle of Actium occurred at certain pre-established moments and intervals of its life-duration so as to be in harmony with its Destiny-Idea, the Euclidean space-denying,

Apollinian Idea.¹⁸ Furthermore, even though the life-span of a Culture is more or less the same for each Culture, the periods of childhood, youth, adolescence, maturity, and old age will somehow vary likewise in accordance with its Destiny-Idea.¹⁹ The unique duration and tempo of each Culture, just like each individual monad, is a consequence of a pre-ordained Concept.

How these Leibnizian principles are suppositions in Spengler's view of intercultural relations can now be investigated. The first problem is one of the most controversial of the Spenglerian philosophy, namely the problem of "influence". It necessarily follows from the idea of a self-contained and pre-ordained Destiny-Idea that a man of a particular Culture can never think, act, and feel in the exact same manner as a man of an alien Culture. Because an individual of one Culture expresses himself and understands the world by virtue of a Destiny-Idea, he is prevented from understanding the world, and expressing himself with the same exact meaning as individuals of other Cultures. Spengler tells us that the people of Faustian nature can never perceive the world as the Greeks did, or as the Chinese, or the Arabs, nor has the West been influenced by them in such a way as to alter its essential Faustian outlook. The same is the case for individuals of every Culture: "Die tiefe seelische Einsamkeit, die sich zwischen das Dasein zweier Menschen von verschiedener Art legt, wird durch nichts gemindert."²⁰ (Men of two different kinds are parted, each in his own spiritual loneliness, by an impassable gulf.)²¹

It is easy to realize why Spengler's conclusion here has never

been popular. Many historians have devoted their main efforts to proving how and to what extent one people is influenced by another in some respect. Thus, for example, one may have been taught that Renaissance Italy was both in its political structures and in its artistic enterprises under the influence of the Classical Culture, or that ancient Greece was influenced by the Egyptians in taking over the column, that China was permanently affected by Indian Buddhism, that much of the philosophical ideas of the ancient philosophers live on in modern thought, and so forth. However these matters may stand to the learned historian, their validity rests entirely upon a world which operates according to the principles of cause-and-effect, and this we know is counter to Spengler's vision of reality.²² The metaphysical grounds for Spengler denying the possibility of causal influence among the higher Cultures rests upon his Goethean-Leibnizian standpoint: final reality is dynamic Becoming, not static being. To review once more this point; a thing is what it does, and this makes Becomeness a condition or outcome of Becoming, and not the other way about. To reiterate, the Spenglerian Soul is like the Leibnizian monad in that its reality is pure activity (perceiving) and that the manifestation, the Becomeness (perception), of this perceiving is the phenomenal world. The phenomenal manifestation of the Culture is its own distinctive sculpture, painting, mathematic, religion, political and economic systems, and physics. One people cannot be impressed to take over these cultural forms from a foreign people and develop them with the same meanings and intensions as they had formerly. From the

Spenglerian point of view, Cultures cannot be causally influenced in this way because they are self-contained, self-evolving realities. A man of one Culture is like a plant in that he is the outcome of a predetermined type or species and cannot be internally altered by external influences of another kind. If the individuals of one Culture could be causally influenced by an alien people so as to change their outlook on the world (in other words, so as to derive from the alien Culture their aesthetic, moral, metaphysical, scientific awareness of the world), then they would be like unalterable atoms subject to external impact from the outside by other atoms, and not spiritual realities evolving from within. For Spengler any view which holds that one cultural view profoundly and meaningfully influences another cultural view presupposes that reality is matter or extension and that it functions causally. As such, world-history eo ipso would not be a question of organic realities and spiritual being, but would be pure physics.

Therefore Spengler's denial of the concept of intercultural influence is founded upon the same argument against causal interaction presented by Leibniz in the Monadologie:

Il n'y a pas moyen aussi d'expliquer, comment une Monade puisse être altérée ou changée dans son intérieur par quelque autre créature, puisqu'on n'y sauroit rien transposer ny concevoir en elle aucun mouvement interne, qui puisse être excité, dirigé, augmenté ou diminué là dedans, comme cela se peut dans les composées, où il y a de changement entre les parties.²³

There is also no way of explaining how a monad can be altered or changed in its inner being by any other creature, for nothing can be transposed within it, nor can there be conceived in it any internal movement which can be excited, directed, augmented or diminished within it, as can be done

in composites, where there is change among the parts.²⁴

From Spengler's point of view, scientific laws, theorems of geometry, the political events of an epoch, paintings and mosaics, and religious dogma, are forms or expressions. Specifically they are expressions of something living, i.e. they are symbols for waking-consciousness. Those who believe that intercultural influence is possible reverse this order. In Spengler's words: "Man verwechselt Dasein und Wachsein, das Leben mit den Mitteln, durch die es sich zum Ausdruck bringt."²⁵ (Being has been confused with waking-being, life with the means by which it expresses itself.)²⁶ To admit the concept that alien cultural forms can effect the inner being of another person is to commit oneself to maintaining that art, science, religious dogma, and the like can determine the inner character of life. It is to hold that the phenomenal world of Wachsein, that of thought and reason, can transform, control, or direct the realm of unconscious life and instinct, i.e. Destiny. This directly conflicts with Spengler's voluntaristic position.

Given these metaphysical grounds against the idea of intercultural influence, many of us may still wonder how Spengler could deny what appear to be obvious facts. The corpus of scientific knowledge continually grows and shapes the minds of men throughout human history. How can Spengler deny that the discovery and development of Euclidean geometry by the Greeks and of algebra by the Alexandrian mathematicians influenced later mathematicians of the West by helping them to prepare their own minds for the discoveries they introduced to mathematical thought? Is there not a

scientific Culture which is open to any person to learn despite the type of humanity which he represents? Moreover, how can Spengler account for such clear facts as the teachings of Christ, a Magian phenomenon, spreading throughout the late-Classical world and into the early Germanic kingdoms to become the dominant religion of Western Culture? Spengler's answer to these questions is straightforward: one-cultured people can accept certain forms of another cultured people, but they never take over the same meanings attached to these forms.²⁷ A higher Culture, particularly a young one, will set up from its inner being a few relations to an older Culture and take over some of the latter's forms to be used as a means for its own creative endeavors. In no way is Spengler conceding to the notion of causal influence. It is not a matter of Wachsein critically selecting that art form, theological doctrine, or number-system which best expresses absolute "Beauty" or eternal "Truth". If this were the case, one individual's perception of the world would certainly affect another's perception. Spengler emphasizes the point that countless forms of an alien Culture or Cultures have surrounded a new Culture, but only a very few have been accepted by the young Culture as part of its means to express its own sense of beauty and truth.²⁸ The fact that only a few are admitted among innumerable possibilities is an indication for Spengler that it is an instinctive, not a rational selection. This is what Spengler means when he says: "Nicht die mikrokosmischen Einheiten also wandern, sondern die kosmischen Einheiten wählen sie aus und eignen sie sich an."²⁹ (It is not, then, microcosmic units that move, but cosmic entities that

pick amongst them and appropriate them.)³⁰ What further is involved in Spengler's understanding of the acceptance of an alien form is that it never expresses the same meaning as it did formerly. Thus the words of the Holy Scripture were the same for the Magian-man, the Roman, and Western-man, but each one necessarily endowed the words with his own unique meaning. The same is the case for all alien forms; they are assimilated into a Culture by being interpreted in accord with the Culture's own a priori Destiny-Idea. Otherwise they are meaningless.

Since it is not our purpose to pick up the dispute here and try to decide wherein lie the merits and defects of Spengler's thinking on the problem of influence, we cannot be of any immediate help to the critical historian. However, the grounds of Spengler's philosophical stand can be elucidated. Accordingly, the explanation that only certain alien forms are appropriated and not their meanings can be appreciated as another consequence of Spengler's Leibnizian-like presuppositions. It was seen above that the monad perceives other monads by creating within itself (from its own Concept) its own perception of them and not by receiving a physical representation of them. For Leibniz as well as for Spengler, there exists no outer world which affects the inner world.³¹ There is only an internal world of monadic souls, each having a phenomenal world for itself. Leibniz expresses what this means for the human soul:

Et en effect nostre ame a toujours en elle la qualité de se représenter quelque nature ou forme que ce soit, quand l'occasion se présente d'y penser. Et je croy que cette qualité de nostre ame en tant qu'elle exprime quelque nature, forme ou essence, est proprement l'idée de la chose, qui est

en nous, et qui est toujours en nous, soit que nous y pensions ou non. Car notre ame exprime Dieu et l'univers, et toutes les essences aussi bien que toutes les existences. Cela s'accorde avec mes principes, car naturellement rien ne nous entre dans l'esprit par dehors, et c'est une mauvaise habitude que nous avons de penser comme si notre ame recevoit quelques especes messageres et comme si elle avoit des portes et des fenestres. Nous avons dans l'esprit toutes ces formes, et même de tout temps, parce que l'esprit exprime toujours toutes ses pensées future, et pense déjà confusement à tout ce qu'il pensera jamais distinctement. Et rien ne nous sauroit estre appris, dont nous n'ayons déjà dans l'esprit l'idée qui est comme la matiere dont cette pensée se forme.³²

As a matter of fact our soul has the power of representing to itself any form or nature whenever the occasion comes for thinking about it, and I think that this activity of our soul is, so far as it expresses some nature, form or essence, properly the idea of the thing. This is in us, and is always in us, whether we are thinking of it or no. (Our soul expresses God and the universe and all essences as well as all existences.) This position is in accord with my principles that naturally nothing enters into our minds from outside. It is a bad habit we have of thinking as though our minds receive certain messengers, as it were, or as if they had doors or windows. We have in our minds all those forms for all periods of time because the mind at every moment expresses all its future thoughts and already thinks confusedly of all that of which it will ever think distinctly. Nothing can be taught us of which we have not already in our minds the idea. This idea is as it were the material out of which the thought will form itself.³³

The same metaphysical understanding in Spengler's vision of two Cultures meeting is presented in the following statement:

Zwei Kulturen können sich von Mensch zu Mensch berühren oder der Mensch der einen die tote Formenwelt der andern in ihren mitteilbaren Resten sich gegenübersehen. Tätig ist in jedem Falle der Mensch allein. Die gewordene Tat des einen kann von einem andern nur aus dessen Dasein heraus beseelt werden. Sie wird damit sein inneres Eigentum, sein Werk und ein Teil seines Selbst.³⁴

Two Cultures may touch between man and man, or the man of one Culture may be confronted by the dead form-world of another as presented in its communicable relics. In both cases the agent is the man himself. The closed-off act of A can be vivified by B only out of his own being,

and eo ipso it becomes B's, his inward property, his work, and part of himself.³⁵

It can be expected that a similar Leibnizian understanding is behind the very special case of intercultural relation which Spengler calls "historische Pseudomorphosen". A younger Culture is said to suffer historic pseudomorphoses when its native landscape is pervaded with the expressive forms of an alien, older Culture so that the latter is not able to recognize its own distinctive being and develop forms proper to its Destiny-Idea, but expresses itself unhappily in the alien, older forms. There are two people-groups who have undergone this situation, the Jewish-Arabian Culture³⁶ and present-day Russia.³⁷ Spengler gives an extensive historical account of the early beginnings of the Magian-soul (from pre-Christian times to the Christological controversies) as the spring period in which it grew up amidst the senile forms of the Late Classical world, and he analyzes the recent history of Russia, as a history dominated by Western forms, (from Catherine the Great to Lenin) which will in the future gradually throw off these pseudo-forms to realize better its own unique outlook. The supposition of the historical pseudomorphosis is the representative principle which governs the interrelation of the monads: one monad perceives confusedly or in a limited way to the degree to which it mirrors the perceptions of other monads and clearly to the degree to which it mirrors its own perception.³⁸ This principle was shown to be the basis of Spengler's understanding of the ideal nature of person-to-person relationships. It is also the ground of historic

pseudomorphosis. Thus, the Magian-soul suffered pseudomorphosis to the degree it represented confusely its Destiny-Idea in Apollinian forms. This same thought is expressed by saying that the Magian-soul underwent pseudomorphosis to the degree it was passive or inhibited in expressing properly its own Idea. The relation of the Arabian world to the Classical world (which is like the relation of Russia to the West) was one that became increasingly more active by representing more and more clearly to itself its own proper Idea and not that of the Classical world. The problems of pseudomorphosis are resolved when a Culture achieves consciousness of its own proper style and self, just as the monadic-soul passes from obscure to clear perceptions (less activity to greater activity) when it achieves recognition of the individuality of itself.

The next consideration in this analysis of inter-Culture relations seemingly denies the possibility of a continual comparison with the Leibnizian metaphysic. It could be objected that the monadic system of Leibniz is not a model by which one can elucidate Spengler's presuppositions because of one very central point. It has been shown that all monads in the Leibnizian universe are functionally related to each other, no matter how unlike in their predetermined Concept and point of view they may be. Indeed, this was the metaphysical basis by which the organic wholes or spiritual communities (family, estate, state, tribe, Culture, etc.) are realized: organic unities form to the degree that certain microcosmic souls approximate to an identical outlook. The principle of the organic whole in the Leibnizian universe emerges from the idea that every monad perceives

every other monad, which means that each monad has within its predetermined Concept an idea (albeit very dim and confused for the most part) of every other monad in the universe, and this makes possible the pre-established harmony of all things. If, therefore, the Leibnizian monadic model serves as the foundation of the Spenglerian Culture, then would it not follow that the individual soul of one Culture has within its psyche some predetermined Concept by which it is functionally related to the individual souls of another Culture? Specifically, if the separate monads in the unfolding of their Concepts function to bring about an organic Cosmos, then should it not be the case that the higher Cultures, being nothing other than individual spiritual aggregates of lower orders, function together somehow to bring about a cosmic harmony? Individuals of different Cultures should not be so disparate as to exclude a certain degree of mutual understanding and outlook, and therefore the unfolding of their separate history should reveal (if Spengler's presuppositions are the Leibnizian principles we are claiming) some higher order or logic by which the distinct cultural cycles are related. Spengler makes his view clear on this matter:

Die Gruppe der hohen Kulturen ist keine organische Einheit. Dass sie in dieser Zahl, an diesen Orten und zu dieser Zeit entstanden, ist für das menschliche Auge ein Zufall ohne tieferen Sinn.³⁹

The group of the high Cultures is not, as a group, an organic unit. That they have happened in just this number, at just these places and times, is, for the human eye, an incident without deeper intelligibility.⁴⁰

The higher Cultures do not function together to form a greater organic unity in the manner that different states, nations, estates,

and other orders function together to form the higher organic aggregate of the Culture.

However, a deeper elucidation of Spengler's thought shows more than ever that the Leibnizian model serves a further aspect concerning the relationship between Cultures. True enough, Cultures are not functionally related in some pre-established order—at least, they are not visibly so related. Thus, the possibility of their being so is not denied. This is an important point. It was noted before that Spengler believes that the individual person and his life within the higher Cultures forms a higher organic unity of the Cosmos and exists as such within a pre-established harmony with all other cosmic events. It would seem from this standpoint that the higher Cultures would have to be organically related in order not to be an exception to this harmony. In fact, one can find those passages—heretofore unmentioned by Spengler's critics—which reveal that the higher Cultures, in some obscure way, are akin.

Note the following remark:

Jetzt erst lässt sich der elementare Gegensatz des antiken und abendländischen Seelentums ganz übersehen. Es gibt innerhalb des Gesamtbildes der Geschichte höheren Menschentums bei einer solchen Menge und Stärke historischer Beziehungen nichts innerlich Fremderes. Und eben deshalb, weil Gegensätze sich berühren, weil sie auf ein vielleicht Gemeinsames in der letzten Tiefe des Daseins verweisen, finden wir in der abendländischen, faustischen Seele jenes sehnstüchtige Suchen nach dem Ideal der apollinischen, die sie allein von allen andern geliebt und um die Kraft ihrer Hingabe an die sinnlich-reine Gegenwart beneidet hat.⁴¹ [my emphasis]

And now for the first time it is possible to comprehend in full the elemental opposition of the Classical and the Western souls. In the whole panorama of history, innumerable and intense as historical relations are, we find no two things so fundamentally alien to one another as these. And it is

because extremes meet—because it may be there is some deep common origin behind their divergence—that we find in the Western Faustian soul this yearning effort towards the Apollinian ideal, the only alien ideal which we have loved, and, for its power of intensely living in the pure sensuous present, have envied.⁴² [my emphasis]

Here we have the first statement in the supposition that the Apollinian and Faustian souls are cosmically related. One could surmise that if these two souls, so different in outlook, have a deep relation, so must the other Cultures in some way. Again, these expectations are met. Spengler gives us a more definite statement of the similarity between the Egyptian, Chinese, and Western Cultures on the one hand and the Classical and the Indian Cultures on the other. Despite the manifest difference of the Destiny-Idea and its cultural forms amongst these higher Cultures, the physiognomy of the former three are markedly stamped by the primordial feeling of Care, and consequently, concern for the future, while the latter two are marked by the seemingly total lack of this feeling.⁴³ Care, according to Spengler, embodies itself most notably in the state-formations of the Chinese, the West, and Egypt in the enduring, future-oriented idea of dynastic succession, though it may take on different forms according to its Destiny-Idea: ". . . die innere Verwandtschaft dieser drei dynastischen Ideen ist wieder ein Beweis für die Verwandtschaft des Daseins in diesen Kulturen überhaupt."⁴⁴ (The inward relationship between these three dynastic ideas is yet another proof that Being in these three Cultures was akin.)⁴⁵ The inward relationship of Being in these three Cultures is further detected by Spengler in their diverse art-media and forms, in that space, the symbol of future and

past, is treated as a direction into the far-away and thereby experienced as a continual Becoming.⁴⁶ In contrast, the Indian and Classical Cultures appear to be inwardly related by having souls which live for the present moment:

Und demgegenüber erscheint zweimal ein Bild sorglosester Hingegenheit an den Augenblick und seine Zufälle: der antike und der indische Staat. So verschieden an sich Stoizismus und Buddhismus, die Altersstimmungen beider Welten sind, im Widerspruch gegen das historische Gefühl der Sorge, in der Verachtung also des Fleisses, der organisatorischen Kraft, des Pflichtbewusstseins sind sie einig, und deshalb hat an indischen Königshöfen und auf dem Forum antiker Städte niemand an das Morgen gedacht, weder für seine Person noch für die Gesamtheit.⁴⁷

And on the other hand we have in two examples--the Classical and the Indian world--a picture of utterly care-less submission to the moment and its incidents. Different in themselves as are Stoicism and Buddhism (the old-age dispositions of these two worlds), they are at one in their negation of the historical feeling of care, their contempt of zeal, organizing power, and of the duty-sense; and therefore neither in Indian courts nor in Classical market-places was there a thought for the morrow, personal or collective.⁴⁸

The Classical passivity as expressed in its many forms finds itself akin to the Indian passivity even though their symbols reveal otherwise quite different Destiny-Ideas. Spengler at one point compares their life-feeling to that of the other three and states:

Überhaupt wird man finden, dass dem im höchsten Grade aktiven Lebensgefühl der faustischen Kultur die chinesische und ägyptische, dem streng passiven der Antike die indische näherstehen.⁴⁹

. . . more generally, we shall find that the immense activity of the Faustian life-feeling is most nearly matched in the Chinese and the Egyptian, and the rigorous passivity of the Classical in the Indian.⁵⁰

We find then from this passage and the others that Spengler does not regard the inner being or Concept of each Culture to be so different

as not to allow some inward kinship amongst them.

It is Spengler's major task in the Untergang to demonstrate that the ruling Destiny-Idea determines the individual life-history of each Culture, and this entails the denial of the possibility that Cultures themselves form an organic unity amongst themselves. Cultures pass into Civilizations before they set up an organic relation with others. Nevertheless, it follows from Spengler's implicit pre-established harmony that somehow they are akin. Though they are not directly in a harmony, they must in some way be in a cosmic harmony. Hence Spengler says: ". . . dass die kosmischen Zusammenhänge, welche das Schicksal der Gattung Mensch beherrschen, unsrer Berechnung vollständig entzogen sind."⁵¹ (. . . the cosmic connexions that govern the history of man as a genus are entirely inaccessible to our measures.)⁵² Furthermore, one should not think that because the Cultures do not form a higher organic community amongst themselves Spengler is "un-Leibnizian" on this point. In the Leibnizian scheme, organic aggregates or wholes do not necessarily form further organic wholes even though they distantly form the single whole of the Cosmos. The same should be understood to be the case with Spengler: the various higher Cultures, though not sharing in the structure of each other's Culture, are cosmically related in the final analysis, i.e. their separate Ideas in some way reflect each other.

Chapter VI

CONCLUSION: VINCULUM SUBSTANTIALE

What has been established so far concerning the nature of the Spenglerian Culture are the Leibnizian principles involved in the description of it as a spiritual entity in its own right and in its relationship with other Cultures. The soul of a Culture is like the soul of the individual person in that its essence is understood through the continuous movement from potentiality to actuality (principle of possibility or continuous change). All individual members of a Culture, and the lower spiritual orders within the Culture, form this giant spiritual order of the Culture by sharing a basic point of view of the world (principle of the organic whole). This vast spiritual community actualizes its own peculiar Destiny-Idea and thereby realizes how its soul is distinguished from the being of all the other higher Cultures (principle of the identity of indiscernibles). The Destiny-Idea determines not only the style of its artistic, political, economic, social, and scientific forms, but also the tempo of its unfolding history (principle of maximation). Consequently, the soul of each Culture is to be understood as a windowless monad (or aggregate of monads) having no causal influence on the spiritual being of another Culture, nor able to duplicate in external forms the identical outlook of an alien Culture, yet existing in a mysterious cosmic relation with the other Cultures

(principle of the pre-established harmony). As a follow-up on this analysis of Culture, the final task of this part is to investigate in more detail the notion of the Spenglerian Culture as a dynamic structure. It has already been shown that the structure of the Spenglerian Culture is like that of the Leibnizian monadic aggregate insofar as it is a spiritual community composed of differently perceiving individual souls realizing a basic outlook or Concept. The logic of this aspect of monadism must now be traced out to demonstrate that Cultures as spiritual communities develop, reach maturity, and decline in the manner of an organic aggregate of monads.

According to Leibniz, the metaphysical basis of all organisms displays a specific structure of interrelating monads. An organism (plant, animal, man, angel) is only an organism if the monads composing it are related in such a way as to form an hierarchic structure. This is to say that an organism is only a real individual unit when the monads not only closely and fundamentally agree in their outlook on the world, but also agree in such a way that the more clearly perceiving monads avail themselves of the activities of less clearly perceiving monads. A hierarchy of monads, based on the degree of perfection or imperfection (the degree of clear or confused perception) forms itself by more domineering monads using the perceptive activity of less dignified monads to establish a more encompassing view of the whole. Again, this is not a causal relation, but one in which the structure of monads operates in a predetermined harmony. Leibniz was especially concerned in employing this dynamic, hierarchic system of monads to explain the interaction of mind and body: the rational

soul is the dominant monad perceiving the less dominant body of monads. Actually when man or any other highly complex organism is considered, a predominant monad perceives only the more complex structured monadic aggregates of monads (e.g. organs) which are themselves composed of lesser orders of monads (e.g. the cells of the organs).¹ Consequently, highly developed organisms are in reality highly complex structures of monadic aggregates, with each monad of the whole system occupying (to speak in spatial terminology) its own appropriate position in relation to the totality of monads.² What Leibniz calls the "vinculum substantiale" is the substantial bond which links the hierarchy under the rule of a dominant monad thereby fusing the system into an individual organic unity of definite form.³ In this state, one will rule the organism.

The Spenglerian Culture is of the same build as the Leibnizian organic aggregate. As was seen in another chapter, a flourishing Culture means for Spengler that several national peoples are "in-form". This expression should be associated here with the Leibnizian monadic hierarchy in a plant or animal organism. The social-political systems of nation-peoples are organic structures within the encompassing Culture expressing separate Destiny-Ideas, but at the same time manifesting the one common Destiny-Idea of the Culture. Depending on which phase of life the Culture is experiencing, the State-form of a nation is fulfilled by the interest of the estates of nobility, or possibly the priesthood, or finally by an upper layer of the bourgeoisie. Throughout the duration of a nation's life, all the estates, classes (peasantry and proletariat included), professions,

even the private life of family all function separately, yet in a harmony (despite all social discord on the surface) to establish the unified form of the nation, and this in turn, of the Culture. Thus each social form, from the family to the nation, is an organism functioning as an organ to fulfill the will of a higher organism. Once again, it is the understanding that historic reality for Spengler is the dynamic interplay of indivisible spiritual units, which allows for this fundamental similarity with Leibnizian monadism.

The concept of "being in-form" contains also for Spengler another idea, namely the inherent necessity of rank and leadership in the structure of any spiritual unity.⁴ This notion corresponds to the notion of the hierarchy of dominant monads in the organic aggregate, for according to Leibniz an organism has a definite form by virtue of more perfect, more active perceivers employing the activity of less perfect perceivers for the well-being of the whole. With Spengler, every social aggregate is organic to the extent it has leaders who can direct the whole towards its instinctive goal. Thus it is possible to speak of a riotous crowd or a primitive tribe or a family as being in-form, though its life-duration be not filled by a deep Destiny-Idea. The point of the matter is that for any social group to endure for any length of time and to be able to act as a unit, a leader must emerge and express the will of the whole.⁵ Spengler makes this point when he says:

Der urwüchsige Staatsgedanke ist immer, mit einer bis tief in die Tierwelt hineinragenden Selbstverständlichkeit mit dem Begriff des Einzelherrschers verbunden. Das ist ein

Zustand, der sich für jede beseelte Menge in allen entscheidenden Lagen ganz von selbst einstellt, wie es jede öffentliche Zusammenrottung und jeder Augenblick einer plötzlichen Gefahr aufs neue beweisen. Solche Mengen sind gefühlte Einheiten, aber blind. "In Form" sind sie für die andrängenden Ereignisse nur in der Hand eines Führers, der plötzlich aus ihrer Mitte entsteht und eben aus der Einheit des Fühlens mit einem Schlage ihr Kopf wird und unbedingten Gehorsam findet. Das wiederholt sich in der Bildung der grossen Lebenseinheiten, die wir Völker und Staaten nennen, nur langsamer und bedeutsamer 6

The State-idea in its sturdy youth is always--and self-evidently, with a naturalness rooted deep in animality itself--bound up with the conception of an individual ruler. The same holds good, with the same self-evidence, for every roused crowd in every decisive situation--as every riotous assembly and every moment of sudden danger demonstrates afresh. Such crowds are units of feeling, but blind. They are "in form" for the onrush of events only when they are in the hands of the leader, who suddenly appears in their midst, is set at the head in a moment by that very unity of feeling, and finds an unconditional obedience. This process repeats itself in the formation of the great life-units that we call peoples and states, only more slowly and with surer meaning.⁷

Real leaders, according to Spengler, are born leaders, and this we understand to mean that it is a metaphysical necessity--in the same way that the dominant monads of an organic aggregate are predetermined to be dominant monads--that certain individuals express the will of the whole, and conversely, it is of the same necessity that others be non-dominant beings or followers. It is not that any one gifted leader creates or effects the unity-of-being in a social group or that the leader somehow brings about its structure any more than one dominant monad creates the organic aggregate, but that a leader expresses the form of what is already predetermined as the underlying Idea of the whole. This is confirmed by Spengler when he describes the situation of the statesman:

Der Einfluss, den selbst ein Staatsmann von ungewöhnlich starker Stellung auf die politischen Methoden besitzt, ist sehr gering, und es gehört zum Range des Staatsmannes, dass er sich darüber nicht täuscht. Seine Aufgabe ist es, mit und in der vorliegenden geschichtlichen Form zu arbeiten⁸

Even a strong statesman has very little influence upon political methods, and he of all people should not delude himself about this. His task is to work with and within the existing historical structure⁹

Furthermore, Spengler holds that within the ruling estate there is a higher ruling minority. The minority itself refines itself to the point where there is one de facto ruler.¹⁰ When it is considered that only one nation rises at a time as the most active and creative in the life course of a Culture, it follows that this hierarchic structure expresses best the will and Destiny-Idea of the Culture. Here we see the Leibnizian parallel: dominant monads become always fewer in number in comparison to the lower non-dominant monads when we move from lesser to greater complex systems of monadic aggregates, until finally one dominant monad co-ordinates all the activities of the other monads and systems of monads by perceiving in higher degree of clearness the totality of the whole. The vinculum substantiale for Leibniz and for Spengler is the predetermined Concept or Idea of the whole living in each of its parts, but is best represented in its higher ruling members.

Finally the metaphysical logic behind the gradual break-up and death of this highly structured system of monads serves the same purpose of accounting also for the declining stages of Late Culture or Civilization and the subsequent death of Fellenism. According to Spengler, the spiritual entity which he calls Culture begins its

decline at the point when it begins to actualize the last possibilities of old age.¹¹ The Destiny-Idea of the Culture and the separate Ideas of the nations of the Culture have slowly fulfilled themselves over the centuries and arrived at near-exhaustion with the advent of Civilization. In contrast to the early stages of Culture when the various national peoples were bit by bit moulded into a well-functioning unity, the late period is the biography of these unities deteriorating into uncoordinated segments. In a word, the Idea has Become, and there is no metaphysical power which keeps the people in-form. We can understand this late condition of Civilization by comparing it to the interplay of the monadic aggregate: an organism gradually dies by the individual substances of the various systems no longer agreeing in their outlooks. When the monads realize more and more a viewpoint which separates them from each other and the totality of the whole, then the unified structure starts on the road to becoming a mere formless aggregate, having no deep internal relation, i.e. vinculum substantiale, to the whole. That which is formless indicates that it is without a soul.¹² The disintegration of the plant or animal means that it has actualized its predetermined Concept, and though it retains for as long as it lives the dominant monad which is its soul, the slow falling away of all other dominant monads is a sign for Leibniz of its passing into another theater of reality. For Spengler, the formlessness of a people is a sign of eternal death.¹³

FOOTNOTES

Part III LEIBNIZIAN PRESUPPOSITIONS

Chapter I INTRODUCTION

1. Dr. Ebehard Gauhe, Spengler und die Romantik (Berlin, 1937).
2. Spengler, Ged., p. 40.
3. Spengler, Aph., p. 49.
4. See Arnold Toynbee's A Study of History (London, 1961), VII, 586.
5. Spengler, UdA., I, ix.
6. Spengler, DW., I, xiv. in "Pessimismus?" Spengler says: "Das Einmalig-Wirkliche mit seiner Psychologie, das bei Kant und Schopenhauer keine Rolle spielt, beherrscht die historischen Sammlungen von Leibniz ebenso vollständig, wie die Naturbetrachtung Goethe's und die Vorlesungen Hegels über Weltgeschichte." RuA., 74. "The historical compilations of Leibniz, Goethe's observations on nature, and Hegel's lectures on world history were all written in clear view of factual reality - something that cannot be said of Kant's and Schopenhauer's works." "Pessimismus?" in SE., p. 137.

Chapter II PRINCIPLES OF THE IDENTITY OF INDISCERNIBLES AND CONTINUOUS CHANGE

1. Spengler, UdA., I, 215.
2. Spengler, DW., I, 164.
3. Leibniz, VI, 616.
4. "Monadology" in LS., p. 544.
5. Spengler, UdA., II, 213-7.
6. Ibid., I, 107.
7. Spengler, DW., I, 78. Cf. Spengler, Urf., p. 165.
8. Spengler, UdA., I, 215. We can see from Leibniz's letter to

Christian Wagner (1710) that the definition of the soul corresponds in essentials to that of Spengler's understanding: "Broadly speaking, soul will be the same as life or vital principle, that is, the principle of internal action existing in the simple thing or monad, to which external action corresponds." We shall see later that Leibniz's notion of monadic perception corresponds to Spengler's general conception of the soul's expressive activity. Hence the rest of Leibniz' definition applies to the use of the phrase "monadic soul": "And this correspondence of internal and external, or representation of the external in the internal, of the composite in the simple, of multiplicity in unity, constitutes in reality perception." Translated from the Latin (Leibniz, VII, 504f.) in LS, pp. 504ff.

9. Supra., footnote 6 and 7 in this chapter. Cf. Urf., p. 220.
10. Spengler, Ged., p. 1.
11. Spengler, Aph., p. 15.
12. Monadology no. 8 and no. 9.
13. Spengler, UdA., II, 350n.
14. Ibid., I, 82.
15. Spengler, DW., I, 60.
16. Spengler, UdA., I, 82.
17. Spengler, DW., I, 60.
18. Spengler, UdA., II, 330.
19. Spengler, DW., II, 270. Cf. FrZ., p. 18.
20. Spengler, Ged., p. 27.
21. Spengler, Aph., p. 38.
22. Spengler, Ged., p. 21.
23. Spengler, Aph., p. 33.
24. Cf. Spengler, Urf., p. 297.
25. Spengler, UdA., I, 215.
26. Spengler, DW., I, 164f.
27. The principle of continuity pervades the entire Leibnizian philosophy, and thus it refers not only to the dynamic actualizing monad, but

also to the monadic hierarchy of views and perfection or clarity of perceptions, as well as to the plenum of space, species of living creatures, and mechanical notion. From the discussion of the Goethean Steigerung and the nature of a world outlook in part I, it can be seen that the principle of continuity, though not to the same extent as with Leibniz, also pervades Spengler's philosophy.

28. Nicholas Rescher translates from the Latin (Leibniz II, 264): "That there is a certain persisting law which involves the future states of that which we conceive as the same - this itself is what I say constitutes the same substance." The Philosophy of Leibniz (Englewood Cliffs, 1967), pp. 14f.
29. Leibniz, IV, 436.
30. Nicholas Rescher, The Philosophy of Leibniz, p. 15.
31. Spengler, UdA., I, p. 217.
32. Spengler, DW., I, p. 166.
33. Monadology no. 15.
34. Spengler, UdA., II, 161.
35. Spengler, DW., II, 135. Cf. also Spengler's statement: "... wir gebrauchen nie ein Wort zweimal in derselben Bedeutung; niemand versteht je ein Wort genau so wie der andere." UdA., II, 12. "We never use a word twice with identical connotation, and no one ever understands exactly as another does." DW., II, 9.
36. Spengler, UdA., II, 160f.
37. Spengler, DW., II, 135.
38. Leibniz, VI, 609.
39. "Monadology" in LS., p. 535.
40. Spengler, UdA., I, 107.
41. Spengler, DW., I, 78.
42. Leibniz, VI, 610.
43. "Monadology" in LS., p. 537.
44. Leibniz, VII, 363.

Chapter III THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CONTINUITY OF OUTLOOK,
REPRESENTATION, THE ORGANIC WHOLE, AND THE
PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY

1. Spengler, UdA., I, 214.
2. Spengler, DW., I, 96.
3. Spengler, UdA., I, 215. In das 'Gemeinschaftsbewusstsein' wächst jedes Exemplar hinein. Die Menschen haben eine 'gemeinsame Welt', nicht 'meine', sondern unsre Vorstellung." Urf., p. 127. "Each exemplar grows within the collective consciousness. People have a 'common world'; not 'my', but 'our' representation." My translation.
4. Spengler, UdA., I, 131.
5. Spengler, DW., I, 96.
6. Leibniz, IV, 439.
7. "Discourse on Metaphysics", in LS., p. 316.
8. Leibniz, VI, 615.
9. Spengler, UdA., I, 215f.
10. Spengler, DW., I, 165.
11. Leibniz, VII, 410.
12. "Letters to Samuel Clarke", in LS., p. 265.
13. Spengler, UdA., II, 134.
14. Spengler, DW., II, 115.
15. Cf. Spengler, Urf., p. 238.
16. Spengler, UdA., II, 158.
17. Spengler, DW., II, 133.
18. Leibniz, IV, 452.
19. "Discourse on Metaphysics", in LS., p. 329.
20. Leibniz, VI, 615.
21. "Monadology", in LS., pp. 542f.

22. Leibniz, IV, 452.
23. "Discourse on Metaphysics", in LS., p. 329.
24. "Leibniz, VI, 615.
25. "Monadology" in LS., p. 544.
26. Supra., footnote 11 and 12 in this chapter.
27. Ibid.
28. Spengler, UdA., I, 214.
29. Spengler, DW., I, 164.
30. Spengler, UdA., I, 214.
31. Spengler, DW., I, 164.
32. By virtue of apperception or self-consciousness, the rational soul, unlike any other percipient beings, recognizes its own being and thereby opens the way to recognizing the being of opposing active souls.
33. Spengler, UdA., II, 159.
34. Spengler, DW., II, 133.
35. Spengler, UdA., II, 157.
36. Spengler, DW., II, 132.
37. Leibniz, VI, 616.
38. "Monadology", in LS., p. 544.
39. Leibniz, VII, 544.
40. My translation.
41. Spengler, UdA., I, 215f.
42. Spengler, DW., I, 115.
43. Goethe (Weimar Aufgabe), II, 40.
44. Goethe's World View (New York, 1963), p. 103.
45. Spengler, UdA., I, 64.
46. Spengler, DW., I, 47.

47. Spengler, UdA., I, 35.
48. Spengler, DW., I, 26.
49. "Jeder grössere Organismus enthält als Form der Verwirklichung kleinere in sich: Weltall-Erde, Erde-Leben, Leben-Biographie." Urf., p. 119. "Every great organism contains as a form of actualization smaller organisms in itself: universe-earth, earth-life, life-biography." My translation.
50. Spengler, UdA., I, 141.
51. Ibid., II, 488.
52. Spengler, DW., II, 392.
53. "Die Kosmische Seite der Seele ist lebendig mit dem Kosmos, in Sehnsucht auf ihn hingewandt, periodisch im Einklang mit ihm strömend." Urf., p. 312. "The cosmic side of the soul is living with the Cosmos, directed towards it in its yearning, periodically flowing in harmony with it." My translation.
54. Spengler, UdA., II, 5.
55. Spengler, DW., II, 5.
56. Spengler, UdA., II, 23.
57. Spengler, DW., II, 18.
58. Spengler, UdA., II, 5.
59. Spengler, DW., II, 5.
60. Spengler, UdA., II, 3-5.
61. Spengler, UdA., II, 22.
62. Spengler, DW., II, 18.
63. Spengler, Urf., p. 128.
64. Leibniz, VII, 544.
65. My translation.
66. Spengler, Urf., p. 182.
67. Spengler, UdA., I, L39.
68. Spengler, DW., I, 102. It is my opinion that this "Ältere Philosophie" is the Leibnizian.

69. Spengler, UdA., I, 141.
70. Ibid., p. 150.
71. Spengler, DW., I, 110.
72. Spengler states: Der Wille ist individuell, weil er Ich ist. Gesamtwille einer Mehrheit ist nicht das Ursprüngliche. Aber die Verwandtschaft, der Einklang des Willens vieler Ichs ist ursprünglich." Urf., p. 201. "The will is individual because it is I. The collective will of a majority is not fundamental. Rather is the relationship, the harmony of the will of many Is fundamental." My translation. Cf. the following quotation of Leibniz: "On peut même dire que la substance porte en quelque façon le caractère de la sagesse infinie et de la toute-puissance de Dieu, et l'imite autant qu'elle en est susceptible. Car elle exprime quoiqu'il y ait confusion tout ce qui arrive dans l'univers, passé, présent ou à venir, ce qui a quelque ressemblance à une perception ou connoissance infinie; celle cy à leur tour et s'y accommodent, ou peut dire qu'elle étend sa puissance sur toutes les autres à l'imitation de la toute - puissance du Createur." Leibniz, IV, 434. "It can indeed be said that every substance bears in some sort the character of God's infinite wisdom and omnipotence, and imitates him as much as it is able to; for it expresses, although carefully, all that happens in the universe, past, present, and future, deriving thus a certain resemblance to an infinite perception or power of knowing. And since all other substances express this particular substance and accommodate themselves to it, we can say that it exerts its power upon all the others in imitation of the omnipotence of the creator" "Discourse on Metaphysics" in LS., pp. 301f.
73. Spengler, UdA., I, 228.
74. Spengler, DW., I, 174.
75. Leibniz, IV, 458.
76. "Discourse on Metaphysics", in LS., p. 338.
77. Spengler, UdA., II, 488.
78. Spengler, DW., II, 114.
79. Spengler, UdA., II, 133.
80. Spengler, DW., II, 114.
81. Spengler, UdA., II, 5f.
82. Spengler, DW., II, 5.

83. Spengler, Urf., p. 253. Cf. also the following: "Das Dasein wechselt zwischen bewusstem und bewusstlosem Leben, Wachen und Schlaf, mit dem Gang der Gestirne, also kosmisch bestimmt." Urf., p. 300. "Existence alternates between conscious and unconscious life, waking and sleep, with the course of the stars - thus cosmically determined." My translation. Cf. also Urf., pp. 332f.
84. My translation.
85. Spengler, UdA., I, 141.
86. Ibid., II, 35.
87. Spengler, DW., II, 31.
88. See Spengler, UdA., II, 35ff for the empirical justification of the criticism of Darwin's theory.
89. Spengler is so convinced of the depth of the Goethean approach of morphology that he states in one place: "Die Biologie der Zukunft wird ohne Zweifel die vorbestimmte Lebensdauer der Arten und Gattungen - im Gegensatz zum Darwinismus und mit grundsätzlicher Ausschaltung kausaler Zweckmäßigkeitsmotive für die Entstehung von Arten - zum Ausgang einer ganz neuen Problemstellung machen." UdA., I, 149. "Without doubt the biology of the future will - in opposition to Darwin and to the exclusion in principle of causal fitness - motives for the origins of species - take these preordained life durations as the starting point for a new enunciation of its problem." DW., I, 109.
90. Spengler, UdA., II, 37.
91. Spengler, DW., II, 33.
92. Spengler, UdA., ~~IV~~, 38.
93. Ibid., p. 43.
94. Spengler, DW., II, 37.

Chapter IV FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

1. Spengler, Ged., p. 4.
2. Spengler, Aph., p. 18.
3. Spengler, UdA., II, 572.
4. Ibid.

5. Spengler, DW., 456.
6. "Vielmehr geht das Kosmische im Mikrokosmos mit der Wandlung mit. Immer besteht innere Harmonie der inneren Form drinnen und draussen. Die Macht der Landschaft formt das Kosmische Element im Einzelleben. Der freieste, schwächste, abhängigste, sieghafteste Typus des Lebens heisst Mensch." Urf., p. 217.
"Rather the cosmic in the micro-cosmic goes along with the transformation. Inner harmony always consists of an innerform inside and outside. The power of the landscape forms the cosmic element in individual life. The most free, weakest, the most dependent, the most victorious form of life is man." My translation.
7. Cf. Spengler, Urf., p. 215f.
8. Ibid., pp. 181-3.
9. Ibid., p. 219.
10. Spengler, UdA., III, 5.
11. Ibid., p. 6.
12. Spengler, Urf., pp. 225 and 233.
13. Spengler, UdA., II, 4.
14. Ibid., p. 6.
15. Ibid., p. 4.
16. Spengler, MuT., p. 17.
17. Spengler, MT., p. 30.
18. Spengler, MuT., p. 19.
19. Ibid., p. 24.
20. Spengler, MT., p. 42.
21. Spengler, MuT., pp. 20f.
22. Ibid., p. 23.
23. Ibid., p. 23.
24. Spengler, MT., p. 42.
25. Spengler, MuT., p. 48.
26. Spengler, MT., p. 84.
27. Spengler, MuT., pp. 48f.

28. Ibid., p. 35.
29. Spengler, MT., p. 44.
30. Spengler, Ged., p. 14.
31. Spengler, Aph., p. 17.
32. Spengler, Ged., p. 3.
33. Spengler, Aph., p. 7.
34. Spengler, UdA., II, 635.
35. Spengler, DW., II, 507.
36. Spengler, UdA., I, 185.
37. Spengler, DW., I, 507.
38. Spengler, FrZ., p. 43.
39. Spengler, Ged., p. 9.
40. Spengler, "Nietzsche und Sein Jahrhundert", in RuA., p. 121.
41. Spengler, Ged., p. 6.
42. Spengler, Aph., p. 19.
43. Goethe, IX, 526.
44. Goethe's World View, p. 103.
45. Spengler, UdA., I, 190.
46. Spengler, Ged., p. 2.
47. Spengler, Aph., p. 16.
48. Spengler, UdA., I, 191.
49. Spengler, DW., I, 145.
50. Spengler, Ged., 7, 21.
51. Spengler, Aph., 20.
52. Spengler, Ged., 7f.
53. Spengler, Aph., 21.
54. Spengler, UdA., I, 183.

55. Spengler, FrZ., p. 36.
56. Spengler, Ged., p. 7.
57. Spengler, Aph., p. 20.
58. Spengler, UdA., I, 187.
59. Ibid., p. 195. Cf. also a statement in Pessimismus? "Wir wissen, dass jede Tatsache ein Zufall ist, unvorhergesehen und unberechenbar, aber wir wissen, mit dem Bilde der andern Kulturen vor uns, ebenso sicher, dass Gang und Geist der Zukunft kein Zufall sind, beim einzelnen so wenig wie im Leben einer Kultur, dass sie zwar durch den freien Entschluss des Handelnden in prachtvollem Ablauf vollendet oder in Gefahr gebracht, verkümmert, zerstört, aber nicht in Sinn und Richtung abgelenkt werden können." p. 73. "We realize that every fact is a chance occurrence, unforeseen and unpredictable. Yet with the picture of other cultures before us, we can be just as sure that the nature and course of future life, of individuals as well as of cultures, are not accidental. Future developments can, of course, be brought to perfection, threatened, corrupted, and destroyed by the free choice of active persons. But they can never be diverted from their real direction and meaning." "Pessimismus?" in SE., p. 146.
60. Spengler, DW., I, 148.
61. Spengler, FrZ., p. 40.
62. Spengler, UdA., I, 191.
63. Robert Latta, Leibniz Monadology (London, 1898), pp. 145f.
64. Ibid.
65. Again, Spengler does not explicitly discuss the continuous grades of conscious animal-being, but we surmise from several places in his work that such is the case. He speaks of animal life as a higher grade of life in comparison to the plant (UdA., II, 3f and MuT., Ch. II); of the two levels of animal life, the herbivores and beasts of prey, the latter is the higher type in being more mobile (Ibid.), and of Homo sapiens, the woman is more plantlike than the man (UdA., II, 403ff.). Furthermore, Spengler discusses the upward series of the animal senses with sight as the most powerful allowing greater conscious activity among the "higher" types of animals, and man, the highest type, has alone an "inner eye".
66. Spengler lays great stress on the fact that the animal does not live with the anxiety of death before him; the animal fears it, senses it, sees it, lives with it, but does not know it. Man lives with Angst as the basic mode of Wachsein, and therefore he knows his Destiny. As we saw, this is the foundation of his intellectual activity. The awareness of death evokes an awareness of birth and the senses of life as a one-directional movement towards it. This knowledge, the awareness of death and life, is the great enigma which serves as the

psychological foundation of all other knowledge. See Spengler's UdA., II, 19f and Urf., p. 295.

67. See Leibniz, V, 155ff.
68. Ibid.
69. Leibniz indicates this view when he says in the Théodicée: "Mais nous ne formons pas nos idées, parce que nous le voulons; elles se forment en nous, non pas en conséquence de notre volonté, mais suivant notre nature et celle des choses. Et comme le foetus se forme dans l'animal, comme mille autre merveilles de la nature sont produites par un certain instinct que Dieu y a mis, c'est à dire en vertu de la preformation divine...." Leibniz, VI, 356. "But we do not form our ideas because we will do so, they form themselves within us, they form themselves through us, not in consequence of our will, but in accordance with our nature and that of things. The foetus forms itself in the animal, and a thousand other wonders of nature are produced by a certain instinct that God has placed there, that is by virtue of divine preformation...." "Theodicy" (Don Mills, 1966), p. 167.
70. Leibniz, IV, 452f.

Chapter V INFLUENCE, PSEUDOMORPHOSIS, AND KINSHIP

1. Spengler, UdA., II, 23f.
2. Spengler, DW., II, 18f.
3. Spengler, UdA., II, 24.
4. Spengler speaks of all these orders and states: "Und trotzdem hat das alles, unabhängig von Alter, Stellung, und Zeit des einzelnen einen gemeinsamen Grundzug, der die Gesamtheit dieser Bilder, ihr Urbild, von dem jeder andern Kultur unterscheidet." UdA., II, 30. "And yet to all of these, irrespective of individual age, status, and period, there is a common basis that differentiates the ensemble of these figures, their prime-image, from that of every other Culture." DW., II, 27. From this point of view, it can be said that for Spengler all the significant actions of the individual soul reveal the soul of the Culture. This is another way of stating that the individual is a product of its cultural history and not the author of it. Here it would seem that Spengler, like Hegel, could be cited for neglecting the value and dignity of the individual by picturing him as a vehicle for the greater universal Destiny in which he has no say or control. Indeed Spengler makes his position clear on the matter: "Die Geschichte lehrt, dass es auf das einzelne Ich nicht ankommt; die Religion predigt das Gegenteil." Ged., p. 15.

"History teaches that the individual ego does not matter; religion preaches the opposite." Aph., p. 28. Despite this position, we have already come across sufficient evidence which reveals Spengler's view of the inherent complexity and mystery of the individual. The notions which have led to the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles have made us aware that each individual person is necessarily unlike any other individual. In the manner of Leibniz, Spengler understands that the uniqueness of each individual soul, being infinitely difficult to analyze, can never be objectified for human knowledge (UdA., II, 33n). The universal concepts, particularly the Destiny-Idea of the Culture, do not deplete the nature of the individual.

5. Spengler, UdA., I, 142.
6. Spengler, DW., I, 104f.
7. Spengler, UdW., I, 142.
8. Spengler, DW., I, 104.
9. Spengler, UdA., II, 41.
10. Spengler, DW., II, 36.
11. Spengler, UdA., I, 170. Cf. also pp. 65, 148f, and 228.
12. Spengler, DW., I, 129.
13. Leibniz, VI, 356.
14. Theodicy (Don Mills, 1966), p. 168. This Leibnizian principle has been referred to by Rescher (pp. cit. pp. 26f and 50f.) as the principle of plenitude or existence-maximization principle: the degree of clarity of the monad's perception is determined by the amount of the perfection built into its Concept so that the principle of existence is its degree of perfection. As we see here, this notion finds a place in the suppositions of Spengler, but since he does not develop this point of a variation of rhythm in the Culture's progressive life to any great extent, we have reason only to mention it here.
15. Spengler, UdA., I, 147.
16. Ibid., p. 148.
17. Spengler, DW., I, 109.
18. Ibid., p. 146.
19. Ibid., pp. 148f.
20. Spengler, UdA., II, 65.

21. Spengler, DW., II, 57.
22. Spengler, Urf., p. 214.
23. Leibniz, VI, 607.
24. "Monadology" in LS., pp. 533f.
25. Spengler, UdA., II, 62f.
26. Spengler, DW., II, 55.
27. Spengler, UdA., II, 66.
28. Ibid., p. 65.
29. Ibid., p. 64.
30. Spengler DW., II, 56.
31. Spengler says: "Zwischen dem wachen Ich und Du liegt die makrokosmische Scheidewand des Raumes. Zwischen den Seelen liegt nichts. Da gibt es kein 'zwischen'." Urf., p. 171.
 "Between the waking I and Thou lies the microcosmic partition of space. Between the souls lies nothing, for here there is no 'between'." My translation.
32. Leibniz, IV, 451.
33. "Discourse on Metaphysics", in LS., pp. 327f.
34. Spengler, UdA., II, 64.
35. Spengler, DW., II, 57.
36. Spengler, UdA., II, 230, 237-9, and 288-316.
37. Ibid., pp. 231-7.
38. Monadology no. 49 and no. 52.
39. Spengler, UdA., II, 43.
40. Spengler, DW., II, 37.
41. Spengler UdA.; I, 107.
42. Spengler, DW., I, 78.
43. Spengler, UdA., I, 179.
44. Ibid., II, 471. Cf. also FrZ., p. 38.

45. Spengler, DW., II, 380.
46. Spengler, UdA., I, 247.
47. Ibid., I, 180f.
48. Spengler, DW., I, 137f.
49. Spengler, UdA., I, 406.
50. Spengler, DW., I, 315. Cf. the following statement of Spengler:
 "Ich bin überzeugt, dass die Nationen Chinas, die zu Beginn der
 Dschouzeit im Gebiet des mittleren Hoangho in grosser Zahl entstanden,
 ebenso wie die Gauvölker des ägyptischen Alten Reiches, von denen
 jedes eine Hauptstadt und eine besondere Religion besass und die
 noch zur Römerzeit förmliche Religionskriege gegeneinander führten,
 ihrer inneren Form nach den Völkern des Abendlandes verwandter
 gewesen sind als den antiken und arabischen. Indessen ist die
 Forschung auf solche Fragen noch gar nicht aufmerksam geworden."
UdA., II, 214. "I am convinced that the nations of China which
 sprang up in members in the middle Hwang-Ho region at the beginning
 of the Chóu dynasty as also the regional peoples of the Egyptian
 Old Kingdom (which had its own capital and its own religion, and
 as late as Roman times fought each other in definitely religious
 wars), were in their inward form more closely akin to the peoples
 of the West than to those of the Classical and the Arabian worlds.
 However, research into such fields has hitherto been conspicuous
 by its absence." DW., II, 178. See also pp. 51f. for Spengler's
 few brief remarks on the inward similarity between the Mexican
 Culture with that of the Classical, Chinese, and Egyptian Cultures.
51. Spengler, UdA., II, 42.
52. Spengler, DW., II, 36.

Chapter IV CONCLUSION: VINCULUM SUBSTANTIALE

1. Leibniz, VI, 235.
2. Rescher, The Philosophy of Leibniz, p. 118.
3. Leibniz, II, 121.
4. Spengler, FrZ., p. 61.
5. Ibid., pp. 92f.
6. Spengler, UdA., II, 467.
7. Spengler, DW., II, 376f.

8. Spengler, Ged., 104.
9. Spengler, Aph., 82.
10. Cf. the following quotation from UdA.: ". . . es ist stets eine einzige soziale Schicht..., von welcher, gleichviel ob verfassungsmässig oder nicht, die politische Führung ausgeht. Es ist immer eine entschiedene Minderheit, welche die welthistorische Tendenz eines Staates vertritt, und innerhalb dieser wieder eine mehr oder weniger geschlossene Minderheit, welche die Leitung kraft ihrer Fähigkeiten tatsächlich, und oft genug im Widerspruch mit dem Feist der Verfassung in Händen hat. Und wenn man von revolutionären Zwischenzeiten und von cäsarischen Zuständen absieht, die als Ausnahme die Regel bestätigen, wo Einzelne und zufällige Gruppen die Macht lediglich mit materiellen Mitteln und oft ohne jede Begabung behaupten--so ist es die Minderheit innerhalb eines Standes, welche durch Tradition regiert...." II, 457f. "...it is always a single social stratum which, constitutionally or otherwise, provides the political leading. It is always a definite minority that represents the world-historical tendency of a State; and, within that again, it is more or less self-contained minority that in virtue of its aptitudes (and often enough against the spirit of the Constitution) actually holds the reins. And, if we ignore, as exceptions proving the rule, revolutionary interregna and Caesarian conditions, in which individuals and fortuitous groupings maintain their power merely by material means (and often without any aptitude for ruling), it is always the minority within an Estate that rules by tradition." DW., II, 370.
11. Spengler, FrZ., p. 22.
12. "Wir späten Beobachter grosser Städte verstehen unter Individuum ein Einzelwesen. Tieferes Eindringen in die Erscheinung des Lebens lehrt und, dass diese Annahme selbst etwas Spätes ist. Individuen, in ihrer Lebensweise ganz und gar unteilbar, sind die Arten--der Mensch, der Löwe, die Biene; ebenso die Generation und der Schwarm. In ihm ist das Exemplar nur Bruchstück, für sich allein gar nicht lebensfähig --eine verirrte Biene, ein Bauer allein (ohne Gemeinde und Familie) im Tal. Gesund ist das Individuum, so lange das Lebensgefühl und Bewusstsein im Einzelwesen die Gattung repräsentiert, hoffnungslos, wenn es nur noch sich selbst repräsentiert. Zerfall des grossen Individuen (Stadt, Stande usw.) ist Verwesung der Seele." Urf., p. 121. "We late observers of large cities think of individuals as single beings. Yet a deeper study of the phenomenon of life reveals to us that this suposition itself is something late. Individuals--man, the lion, the bee--are the various genera. And it is the same for a generation or a swarm or flock. The exemplar in it is only a fragment. The individual alone, e.g. a stray bee or a peasant in a valley without community and family, is totally incapable of living. The individual is healthy as long as its feeling for life (Lebensgefühl) and consciousness represents the particular essence of the class. It is hopeless when it represents only its own self. The falling apart

of the great individuals, e.g. the state, the classes or estates, etc., is the decay of the soul." My translation. Cf. also UdA., II, 61.

13. "Individuation ist Vereinzelung des Lebens, Zerfall der Daseinsströme (der Flamme) in Reihen von Einzelwesen (Funken, Einzelbrände).
"Individuation is the isolating of life, the disintegration of the flow of being (the flame) into a series of single beings (sparks, single embers)." My translation.

PART IV

LANDSCAPE AND BLOOD

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Chapter I

RACE

Two major principles in Spengler's Untergang remain to be discussed. Though it is not until the beginning of the second volume that the principles of landscape and blood are presented, they both figure as essential elements in Spengler's primary image of reality. Just what Spengler meant by these two terms is no easy matter to portray. However, by piecing together from the text what Spengler has said on this matter, and by considering the two main themes discussed in the previous parts, it is possible to come to an understanding of these principles. As a conclusion to the present thesis, the discussion of landscape and blood will be a synthesis of the theme of the existence of Not-Being with the theme of monadic harmony. These two themes have been presented as inherent presuppositions of Spengler's philosophy, and as a final test and confirmation of this interpretation, they must somehow figure in a very important way in the clarification of landscape and blood.

Generally speaking, the Untergang presents the idea that landscape and blood somehow work together to determine the psyche and character of a people. In accord with Spengler's critique of causality, "determine" here cannot mean causally determine. The fact that landscape and blood are two factors which deal with the psyche indicates that they are metaphysical elements and therefore

cannot be cognized in a systematic or mechanical fashion.¹ Landscape and blood are not for Spengler merely physical entities. Rather they are manifestations of something which is essentially spiritual. Blood, Spengler always says, is a symbol of the living, and therefore it is not a question of particular corpuscles being the cause of a certain mind and disposition.² Biology or scientific psychology could never establish a connection between one's blood and mentality. That blood is the manifestation of the living connotes that it possesses inherent individuality of character. The same is the case for landscape.³ It is not simply a matter wherein the soil and the vegetation of a certain region produce a type of character. A landscape for Spengler is a living entity. The plantlife, the soil, and the structure of the land form one living whole. And so, to every particular landscape there belongs a character peculiar to it alone.⁴ Both blood and landscape, therefore, are words like Culture, People, Nation--words denoting the living formation (Becoming) of specific spiritual principles.

Spengler begins his account of blood and landscape by associating them with the ideas of time, direction, and Dasein. Blood represents the vegetative or plant-side of animal-being.⁵ In contrast to the uniquely animal organs of the nerve and sense systems, blood is fundamentally connected with the cyclic and reproductive organs.⁶ The former are essential for consciousness and mobility, the latter are essential to life. Thus the contrast between the purely plant-side and the purely animal-side is actually the opposition between Wachsein and Dasein.⁷ The hallmark of the one is tension, i.e.

polarity of I and world, while that of the other is directionality and periodicity.⁸ Furthermore, unlike the plant which is firmly rooted to the soil, the animal (from Infusoria to Man) possesses the quality of locomotion, and with this, it demonstrates a kind of freedom.⁹ The ability to move oneself about, to seek, will, and defend, describes microcosmic life, viz. Wachsein orienting itself towards an alien world. The plant, however, is wholly cosmic.¹⁰ The plant does not face the universe and move as a little world of its own across the landscape. Being rooted to the soil, the plant is in servitude to the general life of the landscape. A plant does not have a soul of its own.¹¹ Every individual plant in a landscape constitutes and lives in temporal harmony with the universal soul of the landscape.¹² Likewise, the ceaseless movement of the blood in the animal, whether in the waking state or in sleep, and particularly evident in female nature, is in a deep periodic relation to the movements of celestial bodies. However, with Homo sapiens, the circulating of the blood is not only in accord with the flowings of nature. The blood of the mother courses through the veins of her body to that of the child without interruption, and though the birth of the child is the beginning of microcosmic individuality and freedom, the same blood continues to cycle with the same pulse-beat.¹³ The circling of common blood through many generations gives rise to the unconscious spiritual unities of families, septs, tribes, and nations—all of which possess the same cosmic beat as their ancestors.¹⁴

Both landscape and blood, Spengler states, belong together. The intermingling of common blood among different tribes and clans

can take place only within a more or less limited region. As the people are gradually forged together into a unity of blood, they show at the same time a more and more definite tendency to root themselves in the landscape. In this way, blood and landscape work together to invest a people with the character of duration.¹⁵ This cosmic bond Spengler calls "Race." All plants and all animals possess race.¹⁶ Where a plant takes root, Spengler says, there it dies, and though many animals are free to move or migrate to other areas, it is more the case than not that they confine their migrations to certain regions.¹⁷ A particular race of men exhibits the same tendency. A particular landscape is home for it. Like a species of plantlife, a race of men is a stream of Being whose Destiny and identity are intimately tied up with the land.¹⁸ Everyone who belongs to this stream may or may not become aware of the cosmic pulse which is shared with others—all the more so since it is "there" (Dasein, not Wachsein) as a force that is unifying. (All), super-personal (We), and unconscious (It) in the individual.¹⁹

Since landscape and blood are metaphysical ideas, their combination in the idea of race means that this latter notion must be taken also as a felt-conception of something wholly metaphysical.²⁰ When Spengler speaks of a particular race, what he is referring to is a certain psychic quality or character. Like the soul of a man, nation, or Culture, this psychic quality is something that is living and Becoming, and therefore it cannot be cognized as something which is scientifically analyzable, measurable, or divisible. For Spengler, any other attitude towards the term "race" would imply pure materialism.

In the Frühzeit der Weltgeschichte, Spengler's last work, one reads:

Rasse: Der Grundfehler, an dem alle Rasseforschung noch heute leidet, ist der ihrer Geburtszeit, der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts: der Materialismus. Sie ging vom grob 'Stofflichen' aus, von dem, was man sehen, betasten konnte, und nahm es nicht als Ausdruck, als Symbol in Goethes Sinne, sondern als das Wesen dessen, was man untersuchte und suchte. Da man damals ausser dem Stoff nur die Intelligenz anerkannte, rationalistisch wie man war, so sah man von früheren Menschen die Knochen und in diesen den Schädel als sein Wesen an. Bei lebenden Rassen kam dann, so flach als möglich, Haut-, Haar-, Augenfarbe dazu. Zum Materialismus gehört, dass man—à la Darwin—Änderungen nur kausal, nur physikalisch zulässt. Aber Lebendiges ändert sich ohne Ursache, in sich selbst. Die 'Seele' eines Lebensstromes—'Kette von Generationen'—spiegelt stets auch die Seele der Landschaft wider, in der sie atmet.²¹

Race: The basic error under which all investigation into race even today suffers is that found in its birth in the mid-nineteenth century, namely materialism. It began with the crude "matter," with what one could see or touch. It was not taken as expression or symbol in Goethe's sense, but as the being of which one investigated and sought after. As one recognized at that time, outside of the material, only intelligence, rationalistic as one was, so one examined bones, especially the skull, as the essence of early man. Living races came to be looked upon as superficially as possible through skin, hair, and eye colour. To Materialism belongs that way of regarding alterations—à la Darwin—only in causal, physical terms. But the Living alters without cause, in itself. The soul of a stream of life—the chain of generations—mirrors over and over again the soul of the landscape in which it breathes.²²

Hence, Spengler is concerned with distinguishing his use of this word from the use made of it by various philologists and ethnologists when they speak of an "Indogermanic Race" or of an "Aryan Race" and a "Semitic Race".²³ Whatever these words mean to some, they are empty concepts to Spengler.²⁴ Neither can the term "race" be used in any really meaningful way as a regulative idea or concept.²⁵ To speak of the integer "Man" as a race, and then to divide this into

the distinction, say, of Caucasian, Negro, and Mongol races, would have had no significance from the point of view of the Untergang.²⁶ Furthermore, the speaking of similar languages—or for that matter the same language—never has nor ever can produce a living unity among people.²⁷ The possession of a common language or languages can only produce a conscious unity by establishing the possibility of thought to be shared. Language is solely a matter of Wachsein, and thus can be learned by anybody. It succeeds in establishing a linkage among individuals, but not a stream of Being.²⁸ Likewise, the ideal of blood purity is only an ideal, not a reality,²⁹ and no ideal from the Spenglerian standpoint could ever stir anyone to action.³⁰ Besides, Spengler asserts that no people were ever held together by physical origin for over ten generations. Again, the word "race" has meaning for Spengler only if it denotes a people that share a common Destiny.³¹ This means that a people form a unity by force of character and therefore stand as a symbol of living time. The Ostrogoths, Franks, and Swabians were once races, no matter how short their duration. French Noblesse and German Landadel are race-denotations.³² Ultimately all the nations within a Culture can be considered as different races.³³

"Race", therefore, designates for Spengler a type of man, but not a physical type. "Race" refers to a common innate disposition and personal constitution, a general will and unconscious tendencies. Thus the question emerges of the distinction between race and nation or Culture in Spengler's philosophy, since all these terms refer to the same aspect of existence. A nation possesses an I-feeling or

I-consciousness.³⁴ A race does not necessarily have consciousness of itself.³⁵ All nations are first and necessarily a race of people.³⁶ Common blood and landscape are the sine qua non of nationhood and therefore also of Culture-being. A nation can only be a nation insofar as it is essentially a living unity of blood and landscape. A nation, so to speak, is a race that has somehow awakened to this spiritual unity. As Spengler puts it, something happens in the blood that cannot be elucidated, but the result can be seen that a race is more tightly drawn together, more firmly rooted in the landscape, and more capable of acting as one person.³⁷ This is indicative of the possession of a common Idea. Whether or not the people can clearly describe for themselves the nature of this Idea is a matter of no importance. What they sense is the inward feeling of a common national character which is the expression of this underlying Idea.³⁸ The passage of race from preculture peoples (Urvölker) and tribes (Stämme) into the awakening of nations is described by Spengler:

Eine solche Schichtenfolge führt von den Kimbern und Teutonen über die Markomannen und Goten zu den Franken, Langobarden und Sachsen . . . Im 10. Jahrhundert erwacht plötzlich die faustische Seele . . . Aus den Volksgebilden des Karolingerreiches, den Sachsen, Schwaben, Franken, Westgoten, Langobarden sind plötzlich die Deutschen, Franzosen, Spanier, Italiener entstanden.³⁹

Such a superposition of phases leads from the Cimbri and Teutones through the Marcomanni and Goths to the Franks, Lombards, and Saxons . . . In the tenth century of our era the Faustian soul suddenly awoke . . . Out of the people-shapes of the Carolingian Empire—the Saxons, Swabians, Franks, Visigoths, Lombards—arise suddenly the German, the French, the Spaniards, the Italians.⁴⁰

With the I-consciousness, a nation is at the stage where it can act

from generation to generation with the consistency of character that is found in a single person.⁴¹ At this point, the nation is aware of its own Destiny among other nations. Urvölker, on the other hand, are without this strong sense of identity, and their Destiny is often one of mixing and migrating with other younger races to form a new race.⁴²

The phenomenon of migration brings up an important point. Blood and landscape, it was said, belong together as race-determining factors. People of the same blood have a strong tendency to settle in the same landscape. It is important, however, to realize that even though these two factors work together in this way, they are different and come into conflict when peoples migrate to another environment.⁴³ Races are plant-like and therefore, according to Spengler, do not migrate.⁴⁴ Somehow the soul of the landscape binds the blood to itself. It is not the race that detaches itself from the soil and leaves the "home". If a race is no longer found in the landscape, it has become extinct. It is not because it has migrated. Migration is always a matter of individuals breaking themselves off from the original stock. Spengler speaks of the European migration to America:

Nicht Engländer und Deutsche sind nach Amerika ausgewandert, sondern diese Menschen sind als Engländer und Deutsche gewandert; als Yankees sind ihre Urenkel jetzt dort, und es ist seit langem kein Geheimnis mehr, dass der Indianerboden seine Macht an ihnen erwiesen hat: Sie werden von Generation zu Generation der ausgerotteten Bevölkerung ähnlicher.⁴⁵

Englishmen and Germans did not migrate to America, but human beings migrated thither as Englishmen and Germans, and their descendents are there as Americans. It has long been obvious

that the soil of the Indians has made its mark upon them— generation by generation they become more and more like the people they eradicated.⁴⁶

A new and different race sprang up in the New World to form an American type out of individuals of many older races.⁴⁷ With this, a conflict of character resulted. Both blood and landscape struggled with each other for the production of a new stream of Being. Though Spengler does not describe the Yankee character to any great extent, it can be surmised that the predominance of Nordic blood has meant the continuation of the Faustian type and Destiny in the New World. However, the factor of the landscape has made its common mark not only on the late people of the West, but also on every other people of diverse background. It is a general phenomenon, Spengler states, that whites of all races, Indians, and Negroes conform to the same average in body-build and that newly arriving immigrants will conform within one or possibly within the same generation to the same average build of the settlers.⁴⁸ This race-trait Spengler attributes to the "power of the landscape". Generation by generation the new inhabitants are taking on the physical appearance which resembles more and more the American Indian.⁵⁰ Again, this is a phenomenon that is not a particular case, but a general one. The wanderings of the most various peoples and tribes to any new landscape always demonstrate that skeletal structure will change to that which corresponds to the previous inhabitants.⁵¹ However, it must be kept in mind that the physical build of a people is only a race-trait, i.e. an expression of race-being, not the Being itself. The real problem, therefore, that needs to be looked into is the

relationship of the landscape (either in conflict or in unity) with the blood in the Being of a people. That is, how do the two race-determining factors reveal themselves in the single character of a people?

Spengler does not answer this question directly. It must take considerable interpretation to arrive at an answer that is consistent with what Spengler has said on this matter and with his over-all outlook. As already indicated, however, the solution to the whole question of race, landscape, and blood should conform in some significant way to what has been established about Spengler's thought in the previous chapters.

Chapter II

FROBENIUS

In coming to a decision about this aspect of the Untergang, it will be helpful to compare another theory of race which appears in all essentials to be the same as Spengler's. More than this, the anthropological writings of Leo Frobenius appear to present in both method and philosophical content a view that is identical to Spengler's. To be sure, Spengler and Frobenius were diametrically opposed concerning the status of tribal peoples in Africa and came into bitter dispute concerning the nature of pre-historical man. However, there is found in as early a work as Frobenius' Der Ursprung der Kultur the same emphasis on understanding all Cultures as living plant-like beings.¹ One even finds here the message that the development and decline of Cultures must be studied morphologically with an eye to the uniqueness of inner soul.² For Frobenius also, man is the bearer of Culture and not the creator of it.³ Even more significant for the present matter is Frobenius' brief description of the "physiological significance of the soil". Both early Greek Culture and Persian Culture are contrasted in order to demonstrate that their opposing Habitus is reflected in their opposing character. The former Culture is spoken of as insular in character. Its city-building, colonizing, political freedom, mythology, science, and art reveal this basic quality of the landscape. The continental

Culture, on the other hand, is described as extensive, colossal, and uniform in all its life expressions.⁴

All of these ideas of Frobenius are presented with more concern for their philosophical implications in his later Paideuma.⁵ With Spengler's pluralistic view in mind, Frobenius presents his world-view of the development of two opposing cultural types, the Weitenpaideuma and the Höhlenpaideuma.⁶ The source of this opposition derives from the Umwelt or Lebensraum.⁷ Frobenius expresses his position on the relationship of this to that of race-Being of a people by citing Goethe:

Daher kommt es denn auch, dass man der Pflanzenwelt eines Landes einen Einfluss auf die Gemütsart seiner Bewohner zugestanden hat. Und gewiss! wer sein Leben lang von hohen, ernsten Eichen umgeben wäre, müsste ein anderer Mensch werden, als wer täglich unter luftigen Birken sich erginge. Nur muss man bedenken, dass die Menschen im allgemeinen nicht so sensibler Natur sind, als wir andern, und dass sie im ganzen kräftig vor sich hingehen, ohne den äusseren Eindrücken soviel Gewalt einzuräumen. Aber so viel ist gewiss, dass ausser dem Angeborenen der Rasse sowohl Boden und Klima als Nahrung und Beschäftigung einwirkt, um den Charakter eines Volkes zu vollenden.

Therefore it happens that the plant-world of a country has exercised an influence on the disposition or temperament of its inhabitants. And certainly! he whose life is surrounded by high, stately oaks must become another man in comparison to he whose daily life takes its course under airy birches. One must only consider that men in general are not so sensitive to nature, as we, and that they proceed in all their strength without so much as conceding to the force of external impressions. But so much is certain: outside of the innate qualities of the race, soil and climate as well as nourishment and activity work together in order to complete the character of a people.⁹

From Goethe, Frobenius set forth the thesis that the Lebensraum in the form of soil, climate, nourishment, as well as the predominant

activity or work serves as the presupposition of all cultural flowering and race-Being. Though there are only two basic character-types which emerge, the infinite variety of landscapes is enough to insure innumerable variations upon the Höhlenpaideuma and the Weitenpaideuma. It is not the inborn qualities (blood) that a people receive from their ancestors so much as the surrounding landscape that molds a race into one of these two character-types. Indeed, the whole Destiny of a race as it passes through various stages of development and disintegration is determined primarily in its early beginnings. It is in primitive, unconscious barbarism that the "Daemon" of the land exercises its profoundest influence upon what corresponds to the childhood of a race. From this early period on, the history of the people will be the working-out of this irrevocable experience of the Lebensraum.

Despite the idea of the duality of character-type, it is evident that Frobenius holds much in common with Spengler. Race, like Culture, is essentially a matter of the psyche. People of the same race possess a living unity by virtue of character and soul. Furthermore, landscape or Lebensraum is also a key race-determining factor. The specific "Paideuma" or soul of any one people can be traced back to a specific landscape. Spengler states that his use of the term, "Höhlen", to depict the prime symbol of the Magian Culture derives from Frobenius' use of it in the Paideuma. Though Frobenius applies this particular label to many culture-peoples which Spengler would not, it is clear that the same philosophical idea is being expressed: the history of a people is determined by a specific

disposition towards space as "cavern-like". Regardless of what a Culture may experience in the way of accident or chance encounters, of other foreign peoples and races, it is an inwardly organic necessity that its entire life be a uniform expression of a deep Höhlengefühl. For Spengler, the Arabian Culture, whose birth dates somewhere around the time of Augustus, is an image of the desert landscape which stretches in the triangle of cities Edessa, Nisibis, and Amida.¹⁰ No matter how different the items of dogma may be with the early Christians, Persians, Manichaeans, Nestorians, Syncretists, and Islam, there is in all of them a common religiousness reflected in the concern of substantiality and in cult-buildings, basilicas with golden Byzantine mosaics, mosques with arabesque, and all architecture of the central dome.¹¹ The true home of astrology and alchemy, whether it is practiced in Imperial Rome, Alexandria, or Spain, is the starry domal landscape of the desert. For Frobenius, the cavern-feeling is evidenced in every tribal people whose early myth and poetry pictured an enclosed universe which no god, devil, or bird could escape from, whose mode of communal living was to huddle together in one fixed place, and whose colonization was not a matter of expanding into distant areas, but to multiply into tightly organized villages on the same ancestral land. These areas seem to be for the most part lowlands and desert landscapes as well as coastal regions.¹² It seems also to be the case for Spengler that the Daemon of the land can be found stirring in pre-cultural peoples long before their awakening into a definite cultural-Being. The Höhlengefühl is perceptible throughout the Old Testament period, just as the Faustian

yearning for infinite distance is found as early as the Viking wanderings.

Nevertheless there is a basic philosophical difference between Frobenius' understanding of the role of landscape and Spengler's understanding of it. It is clear that in Frobenius' account, races and culture-peoples acquire their character from a certain environment. That is, there is a direct causal relationship between the two entities, the landscape and the psyche of a people. Though Frobenius openly accepted in the Paideuma the intuitive, anti-causal approach of Spengler, landscape for him is a causal factor which shapes, or helps shape the character of a people. Both Höhlenpaideuma and Weitenpaideuma are the results of the influence of the landscape. But this is not the case for Spengler. For reasons already discussed, the psychology of a people can, to Spengler's way of thinking, be no more a matter of causality than the psychology of an individual. That "landscape" is a metaphysical term denoting a formative principle indicates that causal understanding must be eliminated. The only way that different principles can possess a relationship with each other is through a pre-established harmony. When Spengler speaks of landscape and blood as race-determining elements, this must be taken to signify that blood and landscape as separate and different principles are in temporal harmony with each other. Otherwise the idea of race would deal not with a metaphysical problem, but a physical one. This is the situation Frobenius encounters by taking Goethe's statement too literally. As such there is a fundamental contradiction in the Paideuma between the attitude of regarding race as a matter of

the psyche and understanding it in a causal manner. If race is something that is living and becoming, then eo ipso it can neither deal with spatial-physical elements and causal relationships, nor be treated as though it could. For Spengler, a specific bloodline and a specific landscape are metaphysical principles which constitute the metaphysical reality of a certain race of people. "Constitute" here has definite meaning as long as it indicates not causal constituting, but rather organic or temporal constituting. With this interpretation, the ideas of race, landscape, and blood—just as Culture, nations, and peoples—stay within metaphysics and physiognomy.

Chapter III

THE PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY

What Spengler ultimately means by the word "landscape" can be most easily seen in the context of the higher Cultures. In the same way that Spengler perceives the Höhlengefühl of the desert landscape within the various forms of the Arabian Culture, he detects also the Faustian yearning of the West in the high forests of the northern plains of Europe.¹ As the dome is the clearest expression of the Magian soul, so the Gothic cathedral is the architecture of the deciduous forests. The form of the Faustian cathedral—the clustering together of pillars that lose themselves in the interlacing of high rib-vaulting, the transformation of walls into gigantic windows that fill the interior with a mysterious light—is spiritually the same as the upward straining of the trees and branches in an endless, twilight wood. Oaks, beeches, lindens, and ashes, according to Spengler, are symbols of unending space, bodilessness, boundless energy, and stand in contrast to the corporeal and Euclidean quality of cypresses and pines.² Whereas the oak branch strives restlessly towards distant light, the cypress with its predominantly conical structure expresses itself in the same columniation as the Greek temple of the south.³ The cypress and pine belong with the Classical Culture to the clear, brilliantly lit islands and coast line of the Mediterranean. What Spengler is saying, then, is that the southern

landscape is Apollinian and the grey north is Faustian.⁴ Every cultural form that has proceeded from these two areas reflects the soul of its "Mutterlandschaft". This is not to say that the landscape and the Culture possess the same being. It was explained in the last part that the Leibnizian pre-established harmony is inherently bound up with the principle of the organic whole. With this principle in mind, it can be understood that the common soul of culture-peoples possesses the same Idea as the soul of the landscape. Both Culture and landscape are in harmony by virtue of possessing the same Idea.⁵

Consequently the relation of the landscape to the Culture is basically the same as that of the nation to the Culture. As previously seen, each Culture is in Spengler's view an organic whole of several nations. Each nation possesses its own Idea, but each nation-Idea is only a variation on the one common cultural Idea. The same situation is the case with the landscape. An unconscious organic whole is set up between culture-peoples and mother landscape through the possession of one common Idea. Again, however, "organic whole" entails that each particular Becoming or formative principle contains to a greater or lesser degree the same predetermined essence. Hence the Apollinian Culture did not acquire its character from the Mediterranean landscape, rather its character is similar to it. In this way, it can be said that the Greek temple is in harmony with the land of the south, the cathedral with the deciduous forest, and the Chinese temple with the landscape of horizon behind horizon.

From this explanation, it would follow that culture-peoples which happened to inhabit an area previously occupied by a deceased

Culture would possess certain qualities which characterized the former Culture. Spengler in fact states in one place that there is a like element which links the Sumerians (the Persians of 500 B.C.) and the Persians of Islam as well as the Etruscan people and Renaissance Tuscany.⁶ The example of the migration to America also indicates in this connection that the landscape is an independent principle of Being with which the inhabitants had to come into harmony. At the same time, the element of the blood must be considered as the principle which distinguishes the character of a people from previous inhabitants. Just as in the case of the European migration, Tuscan blood was predominantly nordic, and the Faustian Idea ruled the psyche of Tuscan people as it does today in the Yankee. It can be surmised, therefore, that in Spengler's metaphysical picture of race, the landscape, in comparison to the blood, functions as a more or less permanent factor.⁷ The principle of the blood, on the other hand, is something that is ultimately more transient.⁸ Young primitive races can quickly change their character by amalgamating with other races, or a race can become altogether extinct. To paraphrase a remark by Spengler, various streams of blood have travelled as flesh over the fixed skeleton forms of the land.⁹

It is illustrative to refer once again to Spengler's discussion of race-traits. A distinction is made between vegetal race-traits and animal race-traits which more or less corresponds to the same distinction between landscape and blood. The former traits suggest all those characteristics which deal with "position" (Lage), while the latter deal with all those of "motion" (Bewegung).¹⁰ The

skeletal structure, as earlier mentioned, is the trait reflective of the land, and like the land, it has more staying power. Flesh, in contrast, is the locus of the living-expression of the blood. What Spengler has in mind here are the innumerable unique characteristics in the play of facial features—the characteristics which are immediately extinguished with death.¹¹ Included under this category of the blood is every other trait that only expresses itself in a movement—foot-fall, sound of speech and laughter, gestures—all qualities in fact that elude any systematic or scientific ordering.¹² The same blood line will carry these same expressions from generation to generation independent of the land. In fact, it is in movement as opposed to position that race most clearly reveals itself and stamps an individual as a member of a particular family, clan, and nation. However, Spengler at one place in the Untergang speaks of the syntony of close human connections as a race-making factor whose traits cannot be definitely attributed either to the physiognomy of position or to the physiognomy of motion. Spengler states:

Was man das Versehen der Schwangeren nennt, ist nur eine wenig bedeutende Einzelheit aus einem der tiefsten und mächtigsten Gestaltungsprinzipien alles Rassehaften. Dass greise Eheleute nach einem langen innigen Zusammenleben sich überraschend ähnlich geworden sind, hat jeder schon gesehen, obwohl die messende Wissenschaft ihm vielleicht das Gegenteil "beweisen" würde. Man kann die Gestaltungskraft dieses lebendigen Taktes, dieses starken innerlichen Gefühls für die Vollkommenheit des eigenen Typus gar nicht hoch genug anschlagen. Das Gefühl für Rassenschönheit—im Gegensatz zu dem sehr bewussten Geschmack reifer Stadtmenschen für geistig-individuelle Schönheitszüge—ist unter ursprünglichen Menschen ungeheuer stark und kommt ihnen eben deshalb gar nicht zum Bewusstsein. Ein solches Gefühl ist aber rassebildend. Es hat ohne Zweifel den Krieger- und Heldentypus von Wanderstämmen immer reiner auf ein leibliches Ideal hin geprägt, so dass es einen Sinn gehabt

hätte, vom Rassebild des Normannen oder Ostgoten zu sprechen, und dasselbe ist bei jedem alten Adel der Fall, der sich stark und innig als Einheit fühlt und eben damit ganz unbewusst zur Ausbildung eines körperlichen Ideals gelangt. Kameradschaft züchtet Rassen.¹³

What is called the "Versehen" of a pregnant woman is only a particular and not very important instance of the workings of a very deep and powerful formative principle inherent in all that is of the race side. It is a matter of common observation that elderly married people become strangely like one another, although probably Science with its measuring instruments would prove the exact opposite. It is impossible to exaggerate the formative power of this living pulse, this strong inward feeling for the perfection of one's own type. The feeling for race-beauty—so opposite to the conscious taste of ripe urbans for intellectual-individual traits of beauty—is immensely strong in primitive men, and for that very reason never emerges into their consciousness. But such a feeling is race-forming. It undoubtedly moulded the warrior- and hero-type of a nomad tribe more and more definitely on one bodily ideal, so that it would have been quite unambiguous to speak of the race-figure of Romans or Ostrogoths. The same is true of any ancient nobility—filled with a strong and deep sense of its own unity, it achieves the formation of a bodily ideal. Comradeship breeds race.¹⁴

Thus the characteristic beauty and ideal-type of a race stems from a harmony of unconscious disposition and feeling amongst individuals. But this in itself can only mean that the unity in common feeling and psyche is ultimately a close harmony and working together of both landscape and blood. From Spengler's metaphysical insight that blood is not only a unique principle of the mobile animal, but also the plant-like cosmic element in the animal, it can be conjectured that blood can function to reveal itself in what otherwise appears to be a function of the landscape.¹⁵ This would mean primarily that the skeletal structure can never be solely a matter of land and environment.¹⁶ The reservation must always be made that the other element makes itself present. This supposition seems also to be the opinion of Spengler's

translator C. F. Atkinson. In the interplay of blood and landscape in Cretan history, Atkinson comments:

The cranial evidence of Crete are highly illustrative . . . they would not indeed be trusted by a modern historian without weighty collateral evidence, but here this evidence exists. Up to the latter part of Middle Minoan, the "long" head predominated heavily, not only from the outset, but increasingly as the Culture rose, until it included two-thirds of the whole, intermediates forming a quarter and "short" heads a mere handful. But from about the time of the catastrophic fall of Late Minoan II, the long heads fall to a startlingly low figure, while intermediates account for half, and short heads for more than a third. It marks the end of Minoan Civilization and the coming of the Achaeans. But just as the Minoan skull held its own throughout the Minoan Age, so now, after its fall, the short head maintained itself, through all subsequent vicissitudes, from the "Sea-peoples" through Roman, Arab, and Turk, to this day. Thus the Cretan landscape has had two skull-types successively; but the change from one to the other occurred in connexion with an immense cataclysm, nothing less than the collapse of a Civilization. The rough deduction that seems to emerge from this case is that a great Culture holds its skull, no doubt in the course of its striving towards ideal physical type of its own . . . , but that where that major organism does not exist, the skull endures as the land endures and the peasant endures. This applies also to the Alpine region, which has received the deposit of migrations, but has never been the centre of a high Culture.¹⁷

From all this, it can be seen how a pre-established harmony is the logic behind Spengler's discussion of race.¹⁸ In the case of migration, blood and landscape contend for the inner form of the "transplanted" species.¹⁹ But the blood, representative not only of microcosmic animal-being, but also of cosmic plant-being, will invariably come into a close syntony with the land and environment. Again, blood and landscape belong together, and where various streams of blood begin to come together and intermingle, there the phenomenon occurs of "taking root" in the soil, i.e. coming into a harmony with

the land. As stated before, the accord between two principles of race-Being is, for Spengler, the presupposition of all higher Cultures.

The passage from races of the Urvolk-type to races of the Culture-type is one in which an 'I' awakes.²⁰ This event, to recall what was said earlier, is accompanied by a deeper identity with the land and a tighter unity amongst the individuals of the same blood.²¹

The transition here from Urvolk to nation can only mean in the Spenglerian orientation that a closer spiritual harmony between land and blood is set up. The emergence of the "nation-race" with its I-consciousness indicates that the principle of blood reflects (using this word as previously in its Leibnizian connotation) like every other plant in the environment, the soul of the landscape.²²

The cosmic element of the blood comes to possess the same Idea as the land. When this occurs, a Culture—plantlike in every aspect—rises out of the landscape with its future inwardly determined at the outset. Every stage of the life-course of this gigantic organism will reflect the Idea that its blood and landscape share.

Chapter IV

CONCLUSION: NOT-BEING AND PEOPLES

The transformation of Urvolk into Kulturvolk brings into account the other major presupposition of the Spenglerian view, that of the ontological reality of Not-Being. If "race" is a term which refers to the unity of living principles, then the reality of races must of organic necessity encounter extinction and Not-Being.¹ This is an obvious deduction from what has been previously discussed, but no final and definite statement on this facet of the race-question is presented in any of Spengler's writings. Yet the over-all view of Culture in the Untergang allows an interpretation which is consistent both with Spengler's central premises and with the supposition of Not-Being as a reality. The suggested interpretation here is that races as living, organic streams of Being experience Not-Being insofar as they enter into a state of high Culture-Being and live the life-course of that Culture. The cogency of this interpretation hinges again upon Spengler's basic distinction between races of the Culture-type and those of the pre-culture type. A further investigation into this distinction leads to the general conclusion that Urvölker do not encounter death and extinction in the way that Kulturvölker do.

It was observed in a previous chapter how Spengler stressed the difference in history of the peoples during the Carolingian-Frankish period, the Achaean migrations and the Thinite period prior

to the Old Kingdom in Egypt with the history of the following Culture period.² Similar to the history of post-culture (civilized) peoples, the history of pre-culture peoples is formless in comparison to that of culture-peoples.³ To repeat, it is formless in the sense that no inner Idea is directing its movement. This means that the Destiny of the various streams of Being—the various races—is open to "chance": the history of a pre-culture people depends to a large extent upon the accidental encounter with other peoples. The history of the Vandals, Ostrogoths, and Lombards was inwardly determined by wars, economic relations, treaties, and marriages with alien peoples and tribes. The history of a Culture or nations of a Culture is a completely different type of Destiny.⁴ The difference lies essentially in the fact that "Culture-history" or "national-history" is not and cannot be primarily determined by the incident. The presence of a Destiny-Idea in the blood establishes the character of culture-peoples, and with this, the history that is experienced becomes fundamentally a matter of the cyclic unfolding of this inner Idea. The unpredictable clash of foreign Cultures and peoples (Ottoman Turks in Western Europe, Persian invasion of Greece), or for that matter, the internal conflicts of nations and classes within the Culture cannot alter the general course of this history nor change the character of its peoples. No doubt, Spengler believes that external and internal conflicts, along with weather, climate, and landscape "shape" the character of culture-peoples, just as much as they do the character of the Urvolk. The point is, however, that the character of a Kulturvolk is already established—it does not alter it, let alone establish it.⁵ In the

case of an Urvolk, however, character or inner being is not yet clearly established. The fact that the course of history for pre-culture peoples is constantly subject to what the moment may bring, indicates, or, in Spengler's terminology, "symbolizes," the as yet undetermined inner being or soul of a people.⁶

Now, the transformation of Urvolk into Kulturvolk and the sudden emergence of a strong I-consciousness must be equated with the possession of a Destiny-Idea and the breeding of a unique culture-form.⁷ This spiritual awakening in a race of people has been interpreted above as the establishment of a fixed identity with the soul of the landscape. That is, a harmony of being between two spiritual principles, blood and land, takes place by virtue of sharing or reflecting the same Idea. According to Spengler, the peasant is the social element which first realizes the identity of his soul with that of the land, and it is out of him that nobility, "a higher peasantry", arises with an even more marked awareness of the inward unity of self and land.⁸ In Spengler's opinion, peasantry is the vital presupposition of every flowering Culture, and the noble is the first to express instinctively in his social-political position the particular Idea of a mother-landscape, be it Faustian, Magian, or Apollinian. The feeling of "we", which is strongly sensed at first amongst a landed-nobility and later amongst urban-man and bourgeoisie, is indicative of the Idea of a landscape mirrored in the blood. It is, in brief, the sensation of a plantlike cosmic force. And though in the Spenglerian orientation the fact of "sensation" is something essentially representative of mobile-animal being, the sensation of

"we"—i.e. the consciousness of 'I' as an individual of a wholly distinct type, character, and breed—is nevertheless a manifestation of the more primordial plant-side of the animal.⁹ Nations, as Spengler understands this word, are races that are plantlike through and through.¹⁰ Where they are rooted, there they live out their allotted time-span. In Spengler's eyes, their history is basically one in which first estates, then later classes breed themselves into a high culture-form by drawing their strength out of a genuine peasant-stock.¹¹ It can be said in measure that with Spengler Culture is a matter of the upper part of a huge plant fulfilling its Destiny by sucking the life-force out of peasant roots and soil.

The phenomenon of a nation-race clinging permanently to a fixed spot goes hand in hand for Spengler with the realization of a fixed-character of race-type. A fact, noticed also by Nietzsche, is the distinctiveness and depth of character in culture-peoples in comparison to pre- and post-culture peoples.¹² Type or race is more easily detected in what Spengler understands as culture-peoples.¹³ The fact that Urvölker are races that have not yet rooted themselves permanently in the soil, and thus have not awakened to an I-consciousness correlates with a course of life that depends upon the moment. Individuals in the races of the Urvolk kind demonstrate to a much higher degree a readiness to move about and melt in with foreign peoples.¹⁴ Their unsettled nature and their predominantly peasantless qualities signify that they have not identified themselves with a homeland, and the mixing with other peoples means the absence of an I-consciousness and definite character-type.¹⁵ In brief, Urvölker

are not under the spell of a Destiny-Idea, and as such, they are in comparison to culture-peoples to a much lesser degree plant-like. It is not, as far as can be ascertained from the Untergang, a matter of pre-culture races being altogether without identity, form, and inward distinction. Early races are races insofar as they are and feel themselves to be a type and adhere more or less to a specific region.¹⁶ The same can be said for late civilized-man. He likewise characterizes a distinctive breed. But, again, Spengler states that neither pre- nor post-culture peoples possess the plantlike Destiny of culture-peoples. In our interpretation, this view means that pre-culture peoples have not reached the high degree of harmony between blood and landscape which distinguishes a Kulturvolk.¹⁷ As discussed earlier, pre-culture peoples are in this respect similar to late, urban peoples. Both are described by Spengler as being more microcosmic, more animal-like. But where the pre-period is a situation in which man has not reached an inward identity and harmony of blood and landscape (whether he ever will is a question without an answer for Spengler) Civilization is a phenomenon that has gradually lost it. Only the race-man between these two extremes is the type, as Spengler puts it, that believes it worthwhile to fight and to die for a fixed spot of land.¹⁸

From Spengler's distinction between Urvolk and Kulturvolk, it is deduced here that races of the former type do not become extinct—only the latter can really experience this fate. It can be gathered from several passages in the Untergang that pre-culture peoples can remain for what appears as an indefinite state of isolation before they are finally absorbed into cultural or other pre-cultural races

leaving no lasting trace of their former being (eg. Aztecs in the Mayan world, Celtic peoples in the West). This state of affairs is in accord with a history that depends on the moment and a social structure that is basically peasantless. Spengler opposes the Frobenian theory that all primitive and young peoples are with time and opportunity destined to enter the organic state of high Culture-Being. Races, as stated before, tend in general to take on character and duration as different lines of blood come together into a cosmic harmony with the landscape. Insofar as pre-culture peoples find themselves more and more in this state they are race-organisms.¹⁹ Presumably, however, there is in Spengler's outlook a point where this tendency becomes an unequivocal process.²⁰ When races pass from Urvolk into Kulturvolk, they are born into an existence that once entered upon is irrevocable. The living out of a Destiny in the high culture-style is one that cannot alter the character and course of its history. Other races can be absorbed into other peoples. This distinguishing aspect of Culture is, again, the consequence of a life which is determined from within itself, from an Idea, that leads its generations along the path of youth, maturity, decline, and finally death.

Since the word "race" refers in Spengler's philosophy to something that is essentially spiritual, the death of a race can signify nothing other than the loss of the cosmic, evolving Idea which had raised its bearers into the high forms of their history. Hence, the birth into Culture entails the death of race-Being insofar as it leads to the extinction of this psychic quality.²¹ In contrast,

the passage of pre-culture races into other streams of Being is not a loss of any set and developed soul. On the contrary, it appears from Spengler's late writings that the mixing of young peoples is more of a formative or generative process than one of disintegration.²² Once again, the essence of early man is that his future is not predetermined, but open to innumerable possible directions. With the state of Culture, however, there is organically connected the state of Civilization, the state of culture-life in which the Idea is losing its cosmic grip over the individuals. Spengler underlines the common microcosmic nature of pre-culture and civilized peoples, but the essential difference between the two must also be noticed. Pre-culture peoples have not yet been instilled with a common, living psychic nature, and post-culture peoples are losing it or have it no longer. The inevitable rigor mortis of Culture and Civilization is Fellahism.²³ If Culture is the harmony of various streams of blood with the soul of the landscape, and Civilization the growing discordance of this psychic unity, then Fellahism is the final breakup and death of this union.

The status and nature of Fellahism in Spengler's philosophy are by no means clearly delineated. At times Fellahism is spoken of as a final phase of Civilization, and at other times, it is treated as the state of existence that comes only after Civilization. Connected with this is Spengler's discussion of "second religiousness". As the final "organic" act and as the counterpart to Caesarism, late civilized peoples will inevitably revert to their proto-religious and early religious outlook of the long past springtime. At the same time, however,

second religiousness is unlike any other phase in the historical course of a people in that it does not pass away, but endures alongside the other "eternal", unevolving fixed forms of fellaheen people. Furthermore, Fellaahism encompasses, in Spengler's account, many heretofore contradictory qualities. On the one hand, the intuitiveness of second religiousness appears to characterize the non-civilized peasant stratum of a people, and on the other hand, the priestly caste of a fellaheen people is said to enjoy an intellectual clarity and superiority of thought unknown to the strugglings of Culture and early civilized man. What is clear on this topic is that the Destiny-Idea of the fellaheen state is the same as the preceding cultural state, and therefore the last decedents of a Culture still perceive the world as their ancestors. The difference between these two extremes appears to be that the Destiny-Idea of the fellaheen period is no longer striving to formulate itself through its people. In the final formulation of second religiousness, the Destiny-Idea bears no new fruit in the various forms of art and science. In short, the Destiny-Idea is no longer an organic principle.

This aspect of the Untergang occupies an important place in the understanding of other nations since most of the people on the face of the earth today are, in Spengler's view, fellaheen people. However, we are not in a position here to attempt to clarify all the elusive elements which Spengler raises under this facet of his theory. In line with the original intention, we can present here a partial interpretation by following out the deductions from our stated premises.

Accordingly, in a previous chapter, Fellahism was analyzed as the Not-Being of Culture. A formless and often chaotic state of affairs is the result of the death of the inner formative principle or Destiny-Idea.²⁴ According to Spengler, every fellaheen period invariably demonstrates a strange conglomeration of foreign elements, of ancient and modern techniques, of highly civilized forms alongside the most primitive and crude patterns of living.²⁵ This bizarre situation goes hand in hand with a political and historical existence which is determined by the decisions and events of foreign peoples. In brief, it is a matter of chance how fellaheen peoples live and act.²⁶ Thus, as in the case of pre-culture peoples, the pressure of the moment determines what will be. Yet, it must be within the Spenglerian point of view that fellaheen peoples are in an essential way different from their ancestors and early man. Since Fellahdom indicates a non-organic and directionless existence, fellaheen peoples cannot be races in the same way as pre-culture and culture-peoples are. What then is the essential difference? The answer can be found in the light of the above analysis of race and in the intuitive understanding that death is Not-Being. To paraphrase a statement of Spengler, Fellahdom is a state in which the population forms merely a part of the landscape. This means that it is no longer a question of two principles working together or vying with each other in the psyche of an individual. Rather, the blood of fellaheen peoples does not reflect an independent principle.²⁷ There is no Blood, there is no spiritual force, no cosmic Becoming which is seeking phenomenal expression alongside the principle of the landscape. The particular Idea which

the blood carried from generation to generation has passed into eternal Not-Being. It was noted above that the principle of blood is in comparison to the landscape the more variable and mortal factor of the two. With the cessation of the Idea in the blood, there is only the landscape that remains as the operative principle in the individual. Consequently, "fellaheen races" must be interpreted in the Spenglerian context to mean the type of people who are no longer able to breed an Idea, but are in servitude, like the plants, to the landscape.

Hence, the transition from Culture into Fellaahism signifies the disappearance of a type of man from the face of the earth. However, it does not necessarily indicate that a physical stock of people has died out. As in the cases of Arabia, India, China, and others, the fellaheen stock can live on for what appears an indefinite amount of time.²⁸ Nevertheless, people are, like everything else in the phenomenal world, symbols of invisible principles, and so the dying-out of a various physical stock can be understood as a reflection of the absence of a growing Destiny-Idea in fellaheen peoples. It is definitely Spengler's understanding that the Tao Idea, as an organic principle, and therefore the race that bore this Destiny-Idea, finalized itself before the second millennium after Christ, and the Apollinian Idea completes its course somewhere around the time of Septimius Severus.²⁹ From what Spengler says of the Classical, Egyptian, and Mayan Cultures, it appears that their fellaheen descendants are destined to become extinct or to be the raw stuff with which alien peoples can mix and possibly be elements in a new Culture. At one place, Spengler refers to the European Jew as a case in point.³⁰ After a thousand

years of ghetto life, the identity of the Jew is more and more lost to the Western megapolitan spirit. And though Spengler does not speak of the fate of present-day China, India, or Arabia, it can be surmised that he also thought of their "eternal end-state" as dead structures which will follow the same example of every other fellaheen people heretofore.³¹ If the history of fellaheen people is a function of foreign peoples, then their slow replacement and amalgamation serve in the role of the external variable.

There is one more point under the topic of Fellaahdom to be noticed. As Spengler tells it, the scattered remnants that endure the primitive quest of alien people for booty and power are peasants.³² The individual that is not sucked into the city does not experience the fate of dying Culture. Nor does he experience what world-history is. Here the basic cyclical nature of Spengler's outlook becomes clear.³³ Culture-history begins with the peasant and ends with him.³⁴ The early man of Culture found himself in mind and spirit different from the peasant.³⁵ What the nobleman, priest, and the burgher of the great urban centers more acutely sensed was the final meaning of past and future. With this, there is given the basic feature of Culture, viz. the orientation towards what one considers as self-determined goals. The final goal, however, is to raise oneself over the flow of time, to seize it, to alter it, to control it, in any case to escape death and nothingness. The city symbolizes this effort.³⁶ Ultimately it is the principle in the blood fulfilling a Destiny-Idea that drives culture-man along this path. As was seen in Part II, this Destiny-Idea emerges in the depth-experience and creates a Wachsein.

that seeks to overcome Dasein.³⁷ Here, this same idea is expressed as the attempt of the blood in the period of Civilization to detach itself from the soil and free itself from cosmic servitude to the land.³⁸ The peasant knows nothing of this effort.³⁹ Unlike the man of the city, the peasant cannot identify himself with the nation and its ideals.⁴⁰ Peasantry is basically history-less because it cannot break its bond with the landscape. To be part of the landscape and to exist as a plant, Spengler says, is to be a peasant.⁴¹ Therefore, the sinking of Civilization into Fellahism is the return of late Culture into its primal state.⁴² It must be that Spengler understands the meaningless and vacant character of the long stretches of Fellahdom to be characteristic of a society becoming, and necessarily becoming, more and more agrarian. Thus the transition of Culture into Fellahism must be interpreted to mean not only the extinction of a Destiny-Idea in the blood, but also the final victory of the landscape over the blood.

FOOTNOTES

Part IV LANDSCAPE AND BLOOD


Chapter I RACE

1. Spengler, UdA., II, 142-56.
2. Ibid., pp. 6f and Urf., p. 247.
3. Spengler, UdA., II, 151-6.
4. Spengler, Urf., p. 222. Spengler says: "Die 'Seele der Landschaft' ist Gegenwelt der Seele (Makrokosmos). Sie umfasst nicht nur Boden, Klima, Art der Landschaft (Gebirge, See), sondern auch Pflanzen und Tiere und die Kultur der Landschaft (Tradition, Standesüberlieferungen, Gesellschaftsformen, Sitte), also auch die ganze Vergangenheit. Jede Seele ist einsam in ihrer Gegenwelt, hat Furcht vor der Einsamkeit und den Willen zur Gemeinschaft." Urf., p. 235. "The soul of the landscape is a counter-world of the soul (Macrocosmos). It encompasses not only soil, climate, kind of landscape (mountain, ranges, sea), but also plants and animals and the Culture of the landscape (tradition, customs of the estates, social forms, morals) and therefore the entire past also. Every soul is alone in its counter-world, has fear before loneliness, and wills for community." My translation.
5. Ibid., p. 219.
6. Ibid., p. 247.
7. Spengler, UdA., II, 137.
8. Ibid., pp. 8f.
9. Spengler, MuT., p. 7. Cf. also Urf., p. 229.
10. Spengler, Urf., pp. 251 and 262.
11. Ibid., and p. 163.
12. Ibid., p. 201.
13. Spengler, UdA., II, 6.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 151.

16. Ibid., p. 148.
17. Ibid., p. 140.
18. Ibid., and p. 141.
19. Cf. Spengler, Ufr., p. 253.
20. Ibid., p. 161.
21. Spengler, FrZ., p. 131.
22. My translation.
23. Spengler, UdA., II, 153f. Spengler remarks in another place; "Idiotisches Rassegeschwatz, Lokalpatriotismus, parteipolitische Tendenz: die Lausitzer Kultur urgermanisch-urtschechisch, urpolnisch, urrumanisch. Das ist absichtliche Verwechselung von deutsch-germanisch-indogermanisch. Verwechselung von Rasse und Sprache." FrZ., p. 125. "Idiotic race talk, local patriotism, tendency of party-politics. 'Lausitz Culture' is held up to be primitive Germanic, primitive Czech, primitive Polish, primitive Rumanian, primitive this and that. This is an intentional confusing of German, Germanic, and Indo-European. Confusion of race and language." My translation.
24. Spengler, FrZ., p. 125.
25. Ibid., pp. 128f.
26. Spengler, UdA., II, 147. Cf. Urf., p. 152.
27. Spengler, FrZ., p. 126 and UdA., II, 134-8.
28. Spengler, UdA., II, 133.
29. Spengler, FrZ., p. 132.
30. Spengler, UdA., II, 197f.
31. Spengler, FrZ., p. 125.
32. Spengler, UdA., II, 150.
33. Spengler, FrZ., p. 133.
34. Spengler, UdA., II, 190.
35. Ibid., p. 189. Spengler says: "Seele der Landschaft ist die Tatsache: dass das Unbewusstsein in Makrokosmos und Mikrokosmos verwandt ist. Rasse ist auch eine Seite des Unbewussten, die sich z.B. in der Liebeswahl offenbart." Urf., p. 304. "The soul of the landscape is the fact that signifies that the unconscious in

the Macrocosm and Microcosm is related. Race is also a side of the unconscious, which manifests itself in the choice of love." My translation.

36. Spengler, UdA., II, 202.
37. Ibid., p. 412.
38. Ibid., p. 204.
39. Ibid., p. 202.
40. Spengler, DW., II,
41. Spengler, UdA., II, 205.
42. Spengler, FrZ., p. 72.
43. Spengler, UdA., II, 151ff.
44. Ibid., p. 140.
45. Ibid., p. 140.
46. Spengler, DW., II, 119.
47. Spengler, UdA., II, 140.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., pp. 147 and 154.
50. Cf. Spengler, FrZ., P. 7.
51. Spengler, UdA., II, 154.



Chapter II FROBENIUS

1. Leo Frobenius, Der Ursprung der Kultur (Berlin, 1898), xiii.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. xi.
4. Ibid., pp. 255-7.
5. Leo Frobenius, Paideuma (Munich, 1921).
6. Ibid., pp. 90-9.

7. Ibid., p. 98.
8. Ibid., p. 99.
9. My translation.
10. Spengler, UdA., I, 271.
11. Ibid., II, 298, 301, and 304ff.
12. Spengler, Urf., p. 219.

Chapter III THE PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY

1. Spengler, UdA., I, 512f.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., P. 513f.
4. Ibid., p. 515.
5. Cf. also Spengler's remark in the Urf.: "Es besteht ein rhythmischer Einklang von Seele und Landschaft im Menschenschlag--und zwischen Seele und All im kosmischen Takt und in körperlichen Perioden." p. 213. "There exists a rhythmic harmony of soul and landscape - in the type of man - between soul and the All in cosmic tact and in bodily periods." My translation.
6. Spengler, UdA., II, 155.
7. Ibid., p. 154. The following statement of Spengler should be interpreted in this light: "Keine Landschaft wird zum zweiten Male Mutter einer Kultur. Es waltet ein tiefer Sinn in dieser Beziehung zwischen dem Inbegriff der Welt, die wir die gestaltet wirkende Fläche der Erde (Natur) nennen, und jener andren gefühlten, die Einheit der Kultur ist. Kultur ist ein Kind, an dem seine Mutter stirbt." FrZ., p. 42. "No landscape becomes for a second time the mother of a Culture. There is given a deeper meaning in this relation between the encompassing concept of the world, which we call the formed and actualized surface of the earth (nature) and that other felt unity which is Culture. Culture is a child responsible for its mother's death." My translation. Cf. also Urf., p. 235.
8. Cf. Spengler, Urf., pp. 205 and 336f.
9. Ibid.
10. Spengler, UdA., II, 151f.
11. Ibid., p. 149.

12. Ibid. It must be remembered that Spengler considers body structure, skull formations, skin color, and other visible manifestations at most possible expressions of race. More than likely they are not. Spengler says: "Die groben Formen der Körper bedeuten bei zunehmender Vertiefung immer weniger. Man 'erkennt' den Franzosen oder Spanier sofort. Aber die nachträglich zusammengesuchten 'Merkmale' wie Hautfarbe, Schädelform etc. sind für dieses Erkennen nicht von Bedeutung." Urf., p. 213. "The course forms of the body signify in an ever-increasing extent less and less. One 'cognizes' the French or the Spanish immediately. But the supplemental, sought-for 'features' as skin-colour, skull forms, etc. are for this cognition not of importance." My translation. In the Untergang Spengler states that the little that is instructive about skeletal structure and skull forms refers to the type of landscape. Otherwise they have ceased to possess independent importance. Cf. II, 151f.
13. Spengler, UdA., II, 149f.
14. Spengler, DW., II, 126.
15. Spengler, Urf., pp. 222f.
16. Spengler, FrZ., p. 94.
17. Spengler, DW., II, 129f.
18. Cf. Spengler, Urf., p. 234.
19. Spengler, UdA., II, 151.
20. Cf. Spengler, FrZ., pp. 72 and 82.
21. Cf. Spengler, Urf., P. 239.
22. "Die 'Landschaft' ist Spiegel der Seele, auch bei Tieren. Jedes Tier hat 'seine' Landschaft. Aber die Seele des Tieres ist zugleich Spiegel der Welt. Denn das Mikrokosmische gehört zum Kosmischen (das ihm als Makrokosmos gegenübertritt)." Urf., p. 235. "The 'landscape' is mirror of the soul, even for animals. Each animal has 'its' landscape. But the soul of the animal is equally the mirror of the world. For the Microcosmic belongs to the Cosmic (which confronts it as Macrocosm)." My translation.

Chapter IV NOT-BEING AND PEOPLES

1. Cf. Spengler, Urf., 146.
2. Cf. Spengler, UdA., II, 202f.

3. Ibid., pp. 204f.
4. Ibid., p. 205.
5. Cf. Spengler, Urf., p. 203.
6. Cf. Spengler, FrZ., pp. 92f.
7. Cf. Spengler, UdA., II, 205f.
8. Ibid., pp. 104f and 114.
9. Spengler, Urf., P. 152.
10. Spengler, UdA., II, 204f.
11. Ibid., pp. 408-12.
12. Ibid., p. 205.
13. Spengler, Urf.; p. 151.
14. Cf. Spengler, II, 130.
15. Ibid., pp. 57f.
16. Ibid., p. 111.
17. Ibid., pp. 104f.
18. Ibid., p. 105.
19. Ibid., pp. 38-~~40~~.
20. Cf. Spengler, Urf., p. 128.
21. Cf. Spengler, UdA., II, 121.
22. Cf. Spengler, FrZ., pp. 273ff.
23. Spengler, UdA., II, 120-5.
24. Ibid., p. 60.
25. Ibid., I, 70.
26. Ibid., II, 61.
27. Ibid., p. 125.
28. Ibid., pp. 60 and 125.
29. Ibid., pp. 384 and 387f.

30. Ibid., p. 399.
31. Ibid., pp. 129f.
32. Ibid., pp. 123f.
33. Ibid., p. 124.
34. Spengler, Urf., P. 341.
35. Spengler, FrZ., pp. 62 and 124.
36. Spengler, UdA., II, 127f.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., II, 121 and Spengler, Urf., p. 284.
39. Spengler, UdA., II, 113.
40. Spengler, Urf., pp. 343 and 350.
41. Spengler, UdA., II, 546.
42. Ibid., pp. 546f. "Der 'Bauer' ist Sklave des Bodens, gebunden, durch körperliche Arbeit verunstaltet, seelisch gedrückt.... Der [Bauer] wird Pflanze, erdgebunden, sesshaft, vegetativ." FrZ., pp. 59f. "The peasant is slave of the soil. He is tied to it, misshapen by physical labor, mentally depressed . . . The peasant becomes a planter, earthbound, sedentary, vegetative." My translation.

FINAL STATEMENT

One who has followed the ideas of this thesis knows how much Spengler would agree with Fichte's famous statement in the Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre:

Was für eine Philosophie man wählt , hängt sonach davon ab, was man für ein Mensch ist: denn ein philosophisches System ist nicht ein toter Hausrat, den man ablegen oder annehmen könnte, wie es uns beliebte, sondern es ist beseelt durch die Seele des Menschen, der es hat.¹

The type of philosophy which one selects depends upon the type of man one is; for a philosophical system is not a dead piece of household equipment which one might take or discard, as one pleased, but it is animated by the soul of the person who has it.²

In a way this idea is more significant for Spengler, and therefore he is more emphatic about it than Fichte ever was. As was seen, Spengler was convinced that a man is born with a particular Weltanschauung and that every systematic philosophy is, at bottom, only a working out and completion of a given vision of the world. This conviction is an inherent part of Spengler's Weltanschauung. A man possesses innately a particular view, and whether or not he is ever fully aware of it and its implications, all of his understanding and experience of the world is ordered by it. To put it differently, an individual's understanding of reality is an application of a framework which is an integral part of the basic psychic disposition of a person. With this line of thinking, the question, why does one think the way one does, is essentially the same as the question, why is one the way one is?

From the foregoing discussion, it can be concluded that the Spenglerian Weltanschauung is "Faustian". Being or Dasein is dynamic. This is, as the Untergang teaches, a fundamental postulate which underlies and distinguishes the religious, philosophical, and scientific thought of the West despite the continuous conflict and manifold views in its history. For Spengler, there is no other possible way for Western man to conceive of history or nature.

However, it has been seen from the above analysis that this cultural characteristic takes on a more concrete aspect when the basic view of the Untergang is compared with those of its predecessors and with the tradition to which it belongs. In common with the main stream of the German metaphysical school, Spengler conceives Being as the dynamic or energetic transformation of the invisible and intangible into the concrete and visible. In this respect; and in this respect only, Spengler may be regarded as an "idealist". Cultures, nations, classes, families, wars, artistic objects, religions, mathematical formulas—all are the results of the actualizing of Ideas. And though Spengler does not concentrate upon history beyond the human realm, enough evidence has been cited to see that natural history, like human history, is the emerging of invisible forms, principles, essences, or Ideas into concrete forms and phenomena. But this fundamental view comes more into focus when one discovers the deep kinship it has with Leibnizian monadism. As we have demonstrated in detail, Spengler's depiction of the history and life of the higher Cultures implies the infinite plurality of individual principles or essences working

organically in a pre-established harmony to realize a predetermined type or hierarchy. The development of Culture is the continuous approximation to a common, predetermined Idea by many invisible principles, and the subsequent discord of these principles signifies the dissolution of Culture or, for that matter, of any organic form. For Spengler and for Leibniz, the appearance of any one form, entity, or event in the light-world is not the result of the unfolding and fulfillment of a single principle, but the expression of a plurality of principles working in harmony or discord. The analysis of Spengler's understanding of landscape and blood has confirmed this interpretation.

To a large extent, one could maintain that this same dynamic pluralism of Spengler and Leibniz is also at the bottom of Goethe's thought. Of all thinkers, Spengler shows the greatest appreciation and understanding of Goethe. Evidently the morphological method of Goethe was the means Spengler adopted because it is in itself a creation of a metaphysical attitude which inspired the philosophy of the Untergang. Behind it is the wisdom that is the foundation of the Untergang, namely that all living things must experience time and death. The dynamic transformation of principles into the tangible forms of the light-world is the eternal passage of Becoming into Becomeness. "Being" for Goethe and for Leibniz is neither the immaterial principles or Ideas before their realization nor the fixed forms of the phenomenal realm, but the transformation itself, the Becoming of the one into the other. This metaphysical vision is the "given", and though it necessarily involves the dim

intuition of a supersensible domain and the intuition of a sensible domain of Heraclitean flux, with the latter domain serving as a function and manifestation of the former, the vision itself cannot be further analyzed. The sense of awe and mystery which Goethe and Spengler evoke, each in his respective venture, and the philosophical warning not to engage in speculation of what is behind the screen of sense-phenomena, stem from the primordial view of all Being emanating from an unknowable, inconceivable dark realm or source. In brief, the fundamental vision of Being does not allow Being ever to be fully conceived or known. This is the meaning of Goethe's aphorisms:

Die Natur hat kein System, sie hat, sie ist Leben und Folge aus einem unbekanntem Zentrum, zu einer nicht erkennbaren Grenze.³

Nature has no system; she has, she is life; she proceeds from an unknown center to an indecipherable circumference.⁴

Sie [die Natur] spritzt ihre Geschöpfe aus dem Nichts hervor und sagt ihnen nicht, woher sie kommen und wohin sie gehen. Sie sollen nur laufen; die Bahn kennt sie.⁵

She [nature] spouts forth out of nothing her creations and says nothing of where they come from and to where they go. They shall only flow; the course she knows.⁶

Within the Goethean scheme, there is another element which, as we have seen, plays a significant role in the Spenglerian philosophy, viz. Steigerung. Though Spengler never directed his philosophical discussions in the Untergang or Urfragen to an extensive treatment of this notion, anyone familiar with this philosophy will easily recognize its presence. In a sense, Steigerung merges with the Will-to-Power theme and thereby belongs

in the over-all vision of Being as the dark principle. The attempt of every living form to go beyond its pre-established limits, the attempt of Culture peoples to escape time and the fated course of the world-order—all this derives from an internal struggle in the nature of Being. The perpetual will to succeed and live on forever is the final meaning of Being or Becoming. The dynamic, energetic nature of Dasein is felt in man as the longing or yearning to be more or other than what one is. To exist is to be dissatisfied with oneself and to be in a state of conflict with the alien forces that surround one. Even though organic forms can only endure for a length of time in the harmonious community of different essences realizing together a hierarchic structure, formation and disintegration only occur as a relentless struggle to overcome opposition and death. Therefore history, natural or human, is tragic. It is tragic not because existence has no ultimate purpose other than to exist and to continue to exist, but because the fire of existence—Steigerung—cannot satisfy the inner yearning of itself.

This account and interpretation of the Spenglerian Weltanschauung leads to the extended interpretation that Not-Being is real or is an aspect of reality. Here and there in the Untergang, one can perceive Spengler touching upon this point, but this investigation into his explicit metaphysical discussions has brought the theme to the surface. In the ultimate analysis, all things and events of the fact-world are "alive", in other words, they possess directionality insofar as they serve as expressions of unfolding principles or Ideas. They are nothing and are categorized

as Not-Being when they lose this functional relationship. This conclusion was reached not only through an understanding of Culture as form and movement, but also through an investigation into Spengler's theory of consciousness as it is contained in the notion of the depth-experience. There we saw that consciousness itself is a movement or a Becoming, and that complete cognitive awareness (causal understanding), the Becomeness of this movement, lacks both Being and meaning unless the original principle can realize its essence again as a particular sensation of depth. This explains why Spengler perceives the history of Culture as the steady transition of Dasein into Wachsein. The depth-experience, the quality which distinguishes a man of one Culture from another, is in a single act the miniature picture of the grand course and history of the Culture. It is the same irrevocable unfolding and fulfillment of the essence of a particular perception of the world. As Spengler holds, after the realization of a Culture's essence, it disappears forever. We have understood this to mean the passage into a formless state of Not-Being. Nothing endures in the fact-world of extended space unless there is a directional principle giving form and content.

As I see it, this is Spengler's fundamental vision of the world. It is what I read into the word "Destiny".

FOOTNOTES

FINAL STATEMENT

1. G.W. Fichte, Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre, (Hamburg, 1975), p. 17.
2. My translation.
3. Goethe, XVII, 177.
4. My translation.
5. Goethe, XVI, 923.
6. My translation.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Some of my readers have felt that it would be helpful for those unacquainted with the Untergang to define a few of Spengler's key terms. Many of the terms defined below are taken almost verbatim from Atkinson's translation of the Untergang.

- Civilization:** The final organic and therefore inevitable phase of Culture. Civilization is at the same time the opposite of Culture in that it is not a development, but a cessation of development, a Becomeness.
- Cosmic:** That which is cosmic is understood to be in servitude to the universe, which is regarded as an organic whole. Therefore that which is cosmic expresses the will of the whole. "Cosmic" carries the connotation of an unconscious, unifying, superpowerful "It" or "Id".
- Cultural Cycle:** The life-cycle of a Culture variously expressed by Spengler as springtime, summer, fall, and winter, as youth, maturity, and old age, or early and late hours, stages, or periods.
- Direction:** Primary attribute of time understood as Becoming.
- Extension:** Primary attribute of space understood as Having-Become.
- Fellahism:** Post-civilized state of a higher Culture.
- History:** Spengler uses this word (Geschichte) in a variety of ways. If he is not using it to refer to an inquiry or account of the past, then it could mean one of the following. (1) Reality understood as Heraclitean flux, Becoming, or Goethe's "living Nature". Thus any and every event is an expression of history, and the entire sum of events in the universe is history. (2) The inevitable outcome of events in human or natural history, viz. Destiny. (3) The events within the life-course of a higher Culture. In particular the critical events which

most clearly reveal the Destiny-Idea accomplishing the various stages of its life-course.

- Language: The free activity of a conscious soul (Microcosm) expressing a concept, idea, feeling, or will.
- Macrocosm: Actuality understood as the sum total of symbols in relation to an individual or collective soul. One's Macrocosm expresses one's understanding of the world, and thereby the Macrocosm reflects one's essence.
- Microcosm: Individual or collective soul regarded as a unit separated from the Cosmos by virtue of possessing consciousness.
- Morphology: Goethe's method of comparing concrete forms in order to note their similarity and differences.
- Nature: Spengler uses this word (Natur) in fundamentally different ways. One must determine from the context which of the following he may mean.
 (1) The world ordered by a systematic or causal understanding, viz. the World-as-Nature.
 (2) Essential character or essence of a soul.
 (3) Instincts or drives of individual organisms, the "Id", or the Cosmic. (4) Cosmos understood as Goethe's "living Nature" and therefore ultimately as history.
- Physiognomy: Instinctive art of symbol-reading.
- Soul: The character of essence of a living entity, or better, the Becoming or actualizing of character or essence.
- World-as-History: Possible mode of understanding actuality as the sum of happenings or events.
- World-as-Nature: Possible mode of understanding actuality as the sum of law imposed (causal) necessity.

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