THE ORIGIN OF THE SETTLEMENT OF NIAGARA-ON-THE-LAKE

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OF
NIAGARA-ON-THE-LAKE

By

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A Thesis

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies

in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements

for the Degree

Master of Arts

McMaster University

June, 1986

MASTER OF ARTS (1986) McMASTER UNIVERSITY

(Geography) Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: The Origin of the Settlement of Niagara-on-the-Lake

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SUPERVISOR: Professor A.F. Burghardt

NUMBER OF PAGES: v, 225

ABSTRACT

This thesis describes the major policies that contributed to the creation of the settlement at Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario. These policies, that involved the blending of political, historical and geographical ingredients, were in general executed during the administration of Sir Frederick Haldimand within the framework of British colonial policy. The settlement that resulted was a unique expression of the response of an eighteenth century policy-maker to two major factors: the American War of Independence and the continuance of a British fur trade monopoly in North America.

Research aimed at isolating the principal locational policies that led to the development of the settlement; firstly as a means of understanding the choice of locational site, and secondly, as an example of the degree of influence that one administrator can have on past and present locational patterns.

The thesis has focused on the significant contribution made by Frederick Haldimand to the political and historical geography of Canada; a contribution that has been largely overlooked in historical and geographical literature. It has also shown that the historical, political and geographical administrative framework can contribute to an understanding of present day patterns of settlement, and in fact has had far more influence on such patterns than previously indicated by the literature.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I firstly with to thank my supervisor Dr. A. Burghardt for his supervision of this thesis and his personal interest and belief in the topic. Dr. L. Gentilcore's constructive criticism and advice, particularly in relation to the settlement aspects of this study, has been very helpful. Special thanks are also extended to the Lloyd Reeds map librarians for their assistance in providing access to historical maps of the study area. For his helpful assistance in providing early documentary sources I wish to thank Brian Dunnigan of Old Fort Niagara, as well as John Burtniak of the Brock University library who gave me much appreciated access to the Special Collections room of the library which provided so much in the way of supportive resource material. For access to the Niagara Historical Resource collection, in particular, the Haldimand papers, I wish to thank Gerda Molson and the Niagara-on-the-Lake Public Library staff and especially Linda Gula for her patient assistance. Joan Beardmore ensured the completion of this thesis by solving a typing crisis and a special thank you is extended to my typist Jean Gruhl for her efficiency and professionalism. Lastly I wish to thank my family for their patient endurance during the writing of this thesis.

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INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis is to examine the origins of the settlement of Niagara-on-the-Lake from a political, historical and geographical point-of-view. The thesis takes this multidisciplinary approach because of the three different facets of the origin of this settlement on the west bank of the Niagara river. The political approach is appropriate because it is concerned with the policies that led to the creation of the settlement. These policies were the result of governmental action designed to retain the power and economic prestige of Britain in the North American colonies. The historical approach is legitimate in the context of this thesis because the events that led to the settlement of Niagara-on-the-Lake were in the past; that is, in the eighteenth century during, and immediately following, the American War of Independence. The geographical approach places the settlement on the landscape and describes it.

There are two basic hypotheses that will be presented during this thesis; the first argues that defence was one of the two major policies that led to the creation of the settlement on the west bank of the Niagara. Concomitant with this hypothesis, the second argues that the Peltry trade (Fur trade) was the second major policy

that led to the Niagara-on-the-Lake settlement. It is further argued that although defence was the most pressing reason for settlement, the Peltry trade was the dominant reason for the settlement. The British government was determined to retain the "Upper Posts" as a means of preserving a trade that had become economically advantageous in the context of mercantile monopolies in eighteenth century colonial possessions.

Before introducing the nature of this present study it is necessary to clarify the use of the word 'Niagara' within this thesis. Due to the overlay of Fort Niagara upon the farming experience on the west bank, Niagara can refer to either Fort Niagara and/or its dependencies Fort Schlosser and Fort Erie, Fort Niagara plus the settlement on the west bank, or the settlement on the west bank alone. In other words Niagara is a loose terminology used to describe the area of Fort Niagara and cannot be used specifically for the settlement on the west bank. Thus the settlement on the west bank will be described by its location in a geographic sense; that is, Niagara on the west bank, Niagara-on-the-Lake not being in use at this time. This will distinguish the west bank settlement from the Fort on the east bank.

The present study is an area study, rather than

an at-a-point study. The main reason for this is that the lack of geographic data and maps make it difficult to be precise about the original locations of early settlement structures. The study encompasses part of an area of land donated (by treaty deed) by the Mississaugua Indians on both banks of the Niagara river, to a depth of four miles, from Lake Ontario to Lake Erie. The cut-off point for the early settlement however, is the summit of the escarpment to Fort Schlosser on the east bank, and the lower reaches of the escarpment on the west bank. The settlement which originated during the administration of Frederick Haldimand, as governor of Canada, must be seen as an integral part of Fort Niagara located at the mouth of the Niagara river, on the east bank.

The theoretical approach taken within this study is that of an historical reconstruction assembled from a primary data source--the Haldimand papers. Such theories as the Turner frontier theory,[1] the Marchland theory[2] and the Gateway theory[3] have been rejected because of their inability to describe the settlement from a reconstruc-

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[1] Put forward by Frederick Jackson Turner in 1893.

[2] Where a territory is seen as 'in front' or on the outer edge of a territory.

[3] Discussed by Burghardt as a place of entrance into, or exit from an area (Burghardt, 1971, pp. 269-285).

tion point-of-view. They do not fit the data, and although they contain seeds of relevance to this study, as with Niagara being a frontier, a marchland and gateway into the interior, are not relevant to the factual description of a historic settling process.

The present township of Niagara-on-the-Lake is situated on the northeastern extremity of the Niagara peninsula bounded by Lake Ontario to the north, the Niagara river to the east (also an international boundary), the ridge of the Niagara escarpment to the south, and the border between Niagara township and the Welland Canal to the west (see Map 1). This corresponds roughly with the original settlement area, although the original settlement was bounded in the west by the line of Four Mile creek (see Map 2).

Physiographically the settlement area included four regions; Lake Ontario, the Niagara river, the Lake and river plains, and the Niagara escarpment. Lake Ontario, the most easterly of the Great Lakes, was described as "a mass of fresh water, very deep, with a moderate steep bank and gravelly shore along the south side" (Pownall, 1776-9, p. 120). One feature that affected the development of a harbour near Fort Niagara was a bar created by the river as it entered Lake Ontario


43
44
45
46
47
648000m E.
10'
90
4793000m N.
92
91
15'
90
89
88
87
86
85
84
83
82
10'
20
79
78
Niagara-on-the-Lake Town Mun
St Catharines City Mun
Niagara Falls City Mun
Port Weller
Port Weller East
Port Weller Beach
Gates
Marina
Municipal Beach
Park
Sewage
Distillery
Pk
Drawbridge
Dry Dock
Lane
Trans Sta
Eight Mile Pond
McNab
Airport
Eight Mile Creek
Bikkin Drain
Four Mile Creek
Four Mile Point
Two Mile Pond
Butts
Rifle Range
Mississauga Beach
Four Mile Pond
DND
MDN Sewage
Gate
Cemetery
Camping
Park
Mississauga Point
Fort Mississauga
Golf Course
Fort Niagara
Wells
Fort Niagara Beach
FORT NIAGARA STATE PARK
Fort George National Historic Pk
Le fort George parc historique national
Senior Citizens Home
Factory
Shopping Ctr
Marina
Palatine Hill
Pumping Sta
Hospital
Junk Yard
Senior Citizens Home
Lumber Yard
Tree Nursery
Trans Sta
Arena
Virgil
NIAGARA
ON-THE-LAKE
Butlers Burying Ground Pk
McFarland Point
Museum
Airfield
Condition Unknown
Town Limits
Youngstown
Towers Corners
Blairville
Trailer Park
Golf Course
Porcupine Creek State Park
Gas Pipeline
Seminary
Shrine
Riverside Manors
Lewiston
Queenston
Lewiston Heights
Ramsey Ridge
Escarpment
Niagara Escarpment
Niagara Regional Municipality
Niagara River
New York
Ontario
Canada
USA
Lower Niagara River State Park
Porter TP
Lewiston TP
Moses Parkway
Robert Moses Parkway
Fortmile Creek
Sixmile Creek
Four Mile Creek
Bergen Drain
Thompson Drain
Mile Creek
Harrison
Airport
Eight Mile Creek
Canal
Queenston Hamilton
Heritage
Highway
Pipeline
Gas
Oil
Waste
Res
Water
Tower
Silos
Dump
Winery
Tree Nursery
Junk Yard
Trailer Pk
Motel
Stadium
Gate
Weir
Lift
Automobile Plant
Chem Plant
Elevator
Sewage
Silo
ST CATHARINES AIRPORT
Control Tower
Homer
St Davids
Queenston
Reservoir
189±
655±
562±
Power House
Cemetery
Niagara University
Sump
Club
Res Golf Course
Trans Sta
Water Reservoirs
Niagara-on-the-Lake Town Mun
Niagara Falls City Mun
CANADIAN NATIONAL
Queenston Hamilton
Lines
Fish
Creek
Airfield Condition Unknown
Water
Tower
Pumping Station
Gas Pipeline
Golf Course
Trailer Park
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Club
Res Golf Course
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Water Reservoirs
Niagara-on-the-Lake Town Mun
Niagara Falls City Mun
CANADIAN NATIONAL

THE
NIAGARA FRONTIER



FROM MAP OF 1815 AND 1817
by C. Th. de Ham.
Capt C.O.R.
FEB. 20-07

NOTE.
Roads are shown thus:
Land under Cultivation
Scale: 1" = 4 MILE.
R.F. 1/15840

(Pownall, 1776-9, p. 120). Thus the west bank was chosen for wharf and harbour development.

The Niagara river ran nearly due north to meet Lake Ontario at a point level with Fort Niagara. Its banks were high and steep topped with "extensive plains" (Weld, 1795-7, pp. 296-7). The lower strait of the Oghniagara[4] was characterized by being "easily passable some five or six miles with any ship, or ten miles in all with canoes" at which point one was "obliged to make a portage about eight miles . . . to avoid that stupendous fall of Oghniagara" (Pownall, 1776-9, p. 120).

The lake and river plains were described as being "very level" (Weld, 1795-7, p. 309) while the escarpment was regarded as the dominant physiographic feature of the area. This "sudden change of the face of the country" (Weld, 1795-7, p. 310) was a "line of inland cliffs . . . (with) a height of more than three hundred feet" (Smith, u.d., p. 199). This ridge ran east/west at right angles to the river, on both sides of it, and acted as a hindrance to the transportation of goods along the river, and the settlement of peoples on its face. The streams in the area tended to flow north/south because of the configuration of the escarpment in relation

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[4] An old Indian term for the Niagara river.

to Lake Ontario (see Map 1).

Geologically the area was glacial in origin, a remnant of the Wisconsin glacier and a part of the St. Lawrence lowland. The settlement of Niagara on the west bank was situated on what was originally the old lake plain of Lake Iroquois, approximately six miles in width at this point (Allen, 1970, p. 48).

Climatically the area was influenced by its latitude (43 N), its location relative to Lakes Ontario and Erie, and its situation relative to the prevailing westerly winds. The reasonably mild climate, and the calcareous soils[5] led to a 'Rondeau' type vegetation (Allen, 1970, p. 70) characterized by a mixture of maple, birch, beech and oak, with pine, hemlock, cedar and other types of evergreens intermingling with it. The timbers most frequently mentioned in the Haldimand papers were oak, cedar and pine, commonly used for the ship-building carried on at Navy Hall. Poplar was also mentioned in connection with the building of Butler's barracks (H.P., 42, p. 358). Animal and birdlife included the bear, beaver, wolf, elk, deer, wild-cat and rattlesnake. Lake Ontario abounded with salmon and other salt-water fish as well as "a great variety of fresh-water fish . . ." (Weld, 1795-7,

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[5]Suitable for making pipe-clay and bricks (Lewis, u.d., p. 465).

p. 295).

These physical features led to a favourable fostering of the infant settlement on the west bank; a settlement which had advanced sufficiently in the three years since its inception to be included in the Loyalist settlements established by Haldimand immediately following the Peace treaty between the newly created United States of America and Britain.

In describing the inception of this settlement Chapter One will discuss the principles of the settlement on the west bank and the settling process, which will include a description of the early buildings that formed the small settlement. This chapter will act as a 'model' of the agricultural and defence schemes through which Haldimand established the three Loyalist settlements at Sorel, Cataraqui, and Niagara.

Chapter Two will discuss Frederick Haldimand, his life and his policies in order to give an understanding of the creation of the policies that led to these early settlements. It will also discuss the War of Independence, which circumstances shaped the administration of Haldimand. Haldimand forms the crux of this thesis because it was to his organization, initiative and defensive policies that the settlement on the west bank of the Niagara owed its inception.

Chapter Three will discuss the first of the two hypotheses of this thesis, that of Haldimand's defence policy, the immediate prime motivator behind the settlement on the west bank of the Niagara. This policy was three-pronged, each prong having its own significant impact on the Niagara area and its settlement.

Chapter Four will substantiate the existence of the Peltry trade in Canada and at Niagara and establish the viability of the second hypothesis; that of the Peltry trade being the reason behind the British fight for supremacy in North America, and an important element in the retention of the Upper Posts, of which Niagara was one. One of the policies through which such posts as Niagara would be retained would be that of agricultural self-sufficiency established by dedicated Loyalists or Rangers--this was the pre-eminent reason for the west bank settlement.

CHAPTER ONE

THE SETTLEMENT ON THE WEST BANK OF THE NIAGARA

This chapter on settlement will be divided into two sections: the first will discuss the basic principles of the settlement; the second will describe the settling process and the settlement that resulted. In this thesis the term 'settlement' is used loosely to describe people living temporarily or permanently on the land. It involves the building of houses, mills and other structures such as fences, wharves, roads, as well as such farming activities as the growing of crops and the husbandry of animals. This description is necessary for two reasons: the first is that the exact location of the original homes is not known, and the second is that it can be used to describe the occupation of the land without municipal status. It wasn't until the government officially recognized Niagara as a Loyalist settlement that its municipal status was assured.[6] There will be little attempt to distinguish between military and civil structures as the lines between both were blurred at Niagara. The settlement was originally for military

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[6] It is interesting to note however that early township maps show considerable conformity with present township patterns suggesting that these patterns may have begun in its pre-municipal status.

purposes and as such its structures military in accordance with military precedent of the time. Thus any structure erected on the west bank, whether civil or military, will be defined as part of the settlement. A further distinction is necessary between settlement established prior to Haldimand and that established as part of his defence policy. The only settlement considered here is that established as part of the Haldimand regime.

The first principle applicable to the settlement on the west bank of the Niagara is that it was unique.[7] There are seven aspects of the settlement that emphasize this uniqueness. The first is that it was not, as is generally assumed, established on 'virgin' or wilderness territory. 'Virgin' in this context does not mean 'never entered' or unoccupied, but land that is regarded as never having been entered or occupied by white man, or land that is in its 'natural' state such as forest, meadow or mountain. This thesis argues however that Indian or 'native' civilization is as valid a form of land occupancy as that by the white man and as such territories have been occupied to a much greater degree than previously supposed. Indian occupancy was the situation at Niagara prior to, and including, the time of British

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[7] Here the term is used in its colloquial sense to mean 'unusual.'

settlement, and it is argued that the Indians had made a considerable impact on the landscape, one that greatly assisted the new settlers. This does not imply that the Indian occupancy was as intensive as that by the white man, but accounts in the eighteenth century give evidence of the ability of Indians to make considerable impact on the landscape by such activities as farming and settlement.[8] To the Indian Niagara was an important trading centre, its accessibility by water routes being as important to him as it was to the British. One of the chief qualities of the area however was the mystical quality of the "thundering waters" through the Niagara gorge into the 'Strait of Oghniagara.'

Indian land occupancy however, was not the only form of land use that assisted the new settlers on the west bank. In 1761 General Amherst, then in charge of British North American affairs, had given grants of land to three white men, one of whom is documented as having "twelve hundred feet of river frontage on the west bank" for farming and for the construction of a water-operated

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[8]When General Sullivan penetrated into the Genesee Indian country he found that "though an Indian country and peopled only by wild men of the woods, its rich intervales presented the appearance of long cultivation, and were then smiling with the harvests of ripening corn" (Ryerson, 1880, p. 113).

grist-mill[9] (Braider, 1972, p. 129). In 1765 Navy Hall was erected on the west bank near the mouth of the Niagara river for the purposes of the "accommodation of naval officers on the lake during the winter season" (Weld, 1795-7, p. 299). These structures and occupancy, together with wood-cutting associated with the ship-building at Navy Hall, had contributed to the clearing of land which later facilitated settlement.

The second aspect of uniqueness lay in Niagara being a planned settlement. This settlement did not just evolve from obscure origins but its commencement date was known and the reasons for its location clearly spelled out. Thus it was placed on its site as evidence of the prevailing military circumstances in Canada at the time. It can be argued however, that the choice of the west bank over such a location as Fort Toronto further around the lake was a reflection of the dominance of Fort Niagara in the area and the long established French and Indian presence prior to the British administration. However, prior to this presence, the reasons for the choice of the mouth of the Niagara river as the location for Fort Niagara become more obscure, and as

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[9] These three families were the Stirling, Stedman and Servos families probably located above the falls, somewhere in the vicinity of Fort Schlosser.

such the settlement on the west bank is in part a response to influences that were not the result of planning. This argument demonstrates the difficulties inherent in pinpointing the exact reasons for the location of a settlement and the difficulties involved in estimating the degree of planning in its location. However despite this, any degree of planning in a frontier settlement is unique.

The third unique aspect of the settlement lay in its association with a military fort. In essence the settlement on the west bank was to be a military farm, operated, at least in relation to the Loyalists, according to the 'corvee' system re-established by Haldimand under the tenets of the Quebec Act.[10] To the Rangers involved, the farming was regarded as a part of their military service that ensured survival along the frontier. This attitude changed once their families were allowed to join them and the settlement then began to take on aspects of permanence. Up until this point the overriding principle that governed the settlement of individuals around military forts or garrisons was that "no Building of any kind . . . shall remain at any of (the) Posts in the Upper Country, except . . . upon the necessities of

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[10]The corvee system was a French institution whereby private individuals donated free service to aid military operations. Haldimand directed that instead of free service the 'habitants' be paid a fair wage for their contribution to the government.

the Service . . . " (H.P., 45, p. 186). Thus the settlement was not designed to have its own municipal status, or as in many frontier settlement, eventually to acquire it. In this sense it was unique.

The fourth unique aspect of the Niagara settlement was its location on the west bank, on the opposite side of the river to the fort. The principal reason for this location was the objection of the Mississagua Indians to any permanent or non-military structures being erected on the east bank. This objection was based upon two Indian treaties[11] which established the principles of land not being granted outright to the British[12] and land being used only for military or trade purposes.[13] Although these treaties were specifically directed at the Niagara portage,[14] to prevent permanent British occupa-

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[11]The first treaty was in April, 1764 between the Senecas and the British, negotiated by Sir William Johnson, and the second was in 1768 at Fort Stanwix.

[12]This principle was based upon the statement that "the Six Nations would not suffer any Grant . . . of their Lands on the Portage" (H.P., 42, p. 118) and that the Indians would not grant "one Inch of Land but what these Forts stood upon . . . " (H.P., 44, p. 118).

[13]This was essentially a ratification of a treaty with the French in which the French king had been granted the right of trade only (H.P., 44, p. 118).

[14]The portage was the transport route running from the Lower Landing at the foot of the Niagara escarpment, on the east bank of the Niagara river, to Fort Schlosser above the falls. It was established to permit the portaging of goods around Niagara Falls.

tion along this important route the Senecas (the overlords of the Mississaguas) agreed to deed the land "on the East side of Niagara Straits (of a depth of four miles) to Fort Erie, and of two miles on the west side provided it was solely reserved for the use of the Crown, for ever . . . " (H.P., 45, p. 120). The British did not act immediately upon this deed in relation to the development of the west bank, except for the erection of Navy Hall and its accompanying structures. Thus by the time that Haldimand was considering the settlement of Loyalists in the area it was necessary to re-negotiate the terms of the deed with the Indians. The Mississagua Indians, the principal negotiators, still maintained that they could not permit permanent settlement on the east bank due to their alliance with the rest of the Six Nations who may disapprove.[15] However, as an alternative, they suggested the west bank because it was considered as belonging solely to the Mississaguas and thus could be legitimately deeded to the British for permanent settlement. It can be argued that behind this suggestion, despite the reasons stated, lay considerable political acumen. This was implied by the statement by the Indians

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[15]They argued that permanent settlement on the east bank would "lay a foundation for disputes; which, after the great expence Government has been at to bring about this alliance with the Six Nations, ought to be avoided . . . " (H.P., 42, p. 97).

that one of the advantages of the west bank was that it was located "in the Government of Canada," (H.P., 42, p. 97) and thus, at least theoretically, out of rebel hands.[16] The British agreed to this Indian alternative and on the 7th of May, 1781 a strip of land on the west side of the Niagara river, four miles wide, and running between Lakes Ontario and Erie, was deeded to the British (Cruikshank, 1927, pp. 30-32) (see Map 3). Thus the small Loyalist and Ranger settlement found itself separated by a river from the rest of the fort.

The fifth unique aspect of the Niagara settlement was its association with the Loyalists. The Loyalist situation was certainly unique, it being the first time that the British had experienced, in any of its colonies, anything like the civil war engendered by the American revolution. The Loyalists were a new class; they were not regarded as being truly British because of their long association with the colonies, and as such were viewed with a certain amount of reserve if not suspicion. Their loyalties were questioned because many expected that they would return 'home' once hostilities ceased and the revolution was put down by the British. The

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[16]The Indians further stated that other advantages of the west bank were that its location effectively prevented Indian raids on gardens and livestock and that the soil and situation were preferable to the east bank.


Grand River Reserve
Lake Ontario
Niagara

Loyalist attitude to the continuation of the British colonial system in North America can not be disputed,[17] although General Howe argued that "some are loyal from principle; many from interest; (and) many from resentment" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 268). It is sufficient to say that very few wanted to be in Canada and, as refugees, longed for the day when they could either return to their properties or use the proceeds from the sale of such lands to re-establish themselves in their former style of life either in Canada or elsewhere. This attitude set the government policy in relation to the settlement of Loyalists. Haldimand considered such settlements as temporary[18] and useful as a defence measure to populate areas along the frontier that would otherwise be targets for rebel advancement.[19] The basic problems in relation to settling these Loyalists was their disillusionment in

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[17]McIlwraith states that "During the war no less than twenty five thousand Tories took up arms for the maintenance of the British connection" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 253).

[18]Haldimand stated that lands would be "distributed to such Loyalists who are . . . desirous of procuring . . . a comfortable maintenance for their families until such Time as, by Peace, they shall be restored to their Respective Homes . . . " (H.P., 44, p. 120).

[19]Sorel in particular was to "be settled as soon as possible with old Soldiers, in order to form a barrier at that entrance of the province" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 255).

Canada, and in many cases, inexperience in handling pioneer settlement. Niagara, however, displayed little such disillusionment or inexperience largely because of Rangers forming the core of such settlement,[20] and the settlers being small in number and carefully chosen.[21] The closeness of the Niagara area to their former homes, its previous long association with white settlement, its ready access by transportation routes both to the east coast and the inland and its mild climate made Niagara so popular with the Loyalists that in 1784 620 people were listed as desirous of settling at Niagara (H.P., 85, p. 36).

The sixth unique aspect of the settlement was the insertion of an international boundary between Fort Niagara and the west bank, under the terms of the Peace Treaty signed in Paris on 30th November, 1782. The significance of this boundary line was that it changed the status of the settlement on the west bank from temporary to permanent, and from military to non-military. It also gave impetus for the development of municipal status. In

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[20] Of the original census taken in 1782 10 out of the 16 Heads of families were Butler's Rangers (Cruikshank, 1927, p. 42). These Rangers were familiar with the area and used to farming.

[21] Haldimand instructed Bolton to pick settlers "who are good husbandmen . . . " (H.P., 45, p. 18).

terms of the changing of the settlement from temporary to permanent it must be emphasized that even up until 1783 Haldimand still stated that the farmers were "not to consider that they have the smallest right to any Part (of their land) . . . --they will hold their Possessions from Year, to Year . . . " (H.P., 45, p. 120-1). The delimitation of the boundary line precipitated a change in this attitude and Sorel, Cataraqui and Niagara were chosen as the centres for government-directed settlement. At the conclusion of the Peace negotiations George III issued a directive that "Fortification and all Public Works . . . must cease" (H.P., 45. p. 364) at the Upper Posts. Fort Niagara thus lost its principal raison d'etre--that of being a military defence post. Theoretically, the farming settlement on the west bank was included in this directive.[22] However, Haldimand allowed the settlement to continue its public works, and in this respect the unofficial mandate for a non-military settlement came prior to that officially given with the settlement of Crown lands in 1784. This can be coupled with the fact that the farmers also sought an official mandate in their request for permanent tenure prior to 1784 (H.P., 45, p. 372). This request was very

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[22]The public works projects then in progress at Niagara on the west bank were the building of the Saw and Grist mills.

likely a response to rumours of the status of the Peace agreement and the concomitant loss of the Upper Posts.[23] Thus the settlers hoped that Niagara on the west bank would assume, in a civil sense, the military status formerly enjoyed by Fort Niagara on the east bank.

The seventh and last unique aspect to the settlement at Niagara was its premier role, along with Sorel and Cataraqui, as the first settlements in Quebec instituted under the newly independent Canadian colony.[24] In this sense these settlements were not only unique politically but geographically and socially. Their economic status was still heavily dependent on Great Britain and former trade monopolies, such as the Fur trade and the Fisheries industry, were to be continued. To this end they were an experiment in loyalty and in determination to survive along a new national frontier.

The second principle applicable to the Niagara settlement is that it was settled according to an agricultural scheme proposed by Haldimand and endorsed by

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[23] John Butler had stated in March of 1783 that the Peace would "probably make a great alteration in the Situation of the Officers and Men, many of them . . . looking about for Settlements . . . " (Cruikshank, 1927, p. 49).

[24] Independent not from Britain, but from association with the Thirteen American colonies, now part of the United States of America.

George III. This scheme can be defined as a system of gardens and farms around each garrison or fort for the purpose of growing enough crops and vegetables to enable the self-sufficiency of the garrison. It also included the catching of fish and game so that where possible the import of salt pork, beef and fish, along the frontier, could be avoided. Haldimand saw this scheme as the answer to the high cost of provisioning the troops at the Upper Posts particularly with foodstuffs that were either grown in eastern Canada or imported from England.[25] This "plan of agriculture" had been a hallmark of Haldimand's various administrations throughout the North American colonies and upon his governorship of Canada was put into operation in earnest. It was not to be limited just to Niagara but was to include "the several posts in the Upper Country" (H.P., 45, p. 20). By the time of its institution at Niagara it was "already in some forwardness at Carleton Island" and was in the process of being put "into execution at Detroit" (H.P., 45, p. 20).

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[25]Haldimand stated that "the expediency of this measure is sufficiently evinced not only by the injury the service has . . . from a want of a Sufficient Supply of Provisions as well for the present unavoidable consumption of the Indians, as for the support of the Troops . . . , but likewise to diminish the immense Expence and Labour attending so difficult, and so distant, a Transport . . . " (H.P., 45, p. 124).

Haldimand's original plan for his agricultural scheme had been to use Loyalists[26] as the farmers. He had three reasons for this. The first was that it would provide occupation for some Loyalists and their families who would otherwise remain idle during the war. The second reason was that the Loyalists, apart from the Troops and Indians, made up a significant portion of the extraordinary expenses[27] of Haldimand's budget. Thirdly the plan of agriculture would supply food at the official source of Loyalist entry into Canada; that is at Sackett's Harbour, Oswego and Niagara.[28] However the plan was not to be restricted to Loyalists. At Detroit, in August of 1780, prisoners from the Ohio river area were to be settled there as part of the agricultural scheme (H.P., 45, p. 132).

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[26]Haldimand instructed Bolton, commanding at Niagara, that "if you can find amongst the distressed families (Loyalists) three or four, who are desirous to settle upon the opposite side of the river (from Fort Niagara) . . . I would have you Establish them there . . . " (H.P., 45, p. 18).

[27]Extraordinary expenses are those that are not a part of the day-to-day expenses involved in the administration and operation of the colonial government or of a war.

[28]McIlwraith states that "parties from the revolted colonies who wished to remain under British rule were told to report themselves at Sackett's Harbour, Oswego and Niagara, where large numbers were fed and sheltered" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 250).

This agricultural scheme was not to be haphazard, but was to be a well-planned scheme. Bolton noted in 1779 that "Your Excellency was pleased to mention to me some time ago" about the plan of agriculture (H.P., 42, p. 96). This plan was to be accompanied by "Instructions for carrying it into execution" (H.P., 45, p. 20). Although the amount of land involved is not stated, while at Pensacola, Florida, Haldimand had suggested that "three square miles of open country be left around each fort for garden needs" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 71). As well he had "enclosed a large piece of ground for gardens" at the garrison (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 67). Thus at Niagara Haldimand could either have envisioned most of the four mile tract of land on the west bank being eventually cultivated or a large tract of land, directly opposite to the fort, being cultivated. At Niagara both gardens and farms were operational.

In regard to the actual setting up of these farms Haldimand was quite explicit. The number of farmers was to be small, no more than three or four. These farmers were to be allowed to bring their families, Haldimand wisely perceiving that the farms would work more efficiently if the whole family was involved. Family life would also help to minimize the disillusionment associated with settlement along a frontier. The advantage of allow-

ing families on the frontier far outweighed Haldimand's misgivings about the dangers of Loyalist settlement in the path of possible rebel attack. The other qualification of these Loyalists was that they were to be "Good Husbandmen . . . " (H.P., 45, p. 18).[29] A knowledgeable and competent gardener himself, Haldimand realized that experienced farmers would virtually guarantee the success of the experiment, as well as needing the minimum in support from the government. Equally important however, was that they must realize that they were only tenant farmers, not landowners. In stating this latter qualification Haldimand was naive in not realizing that experienced farmers, in particular, once having placed a stake in their new country would be very reluctant to give it up, despite the terms of settlement. As far as Haldimand was concerned, the farmers were to "tend as much to the supplying of the Garrison, as to their private advantage" (H.P., 45, p. 18). Personal or private gain was not the object of this experiment.

In terms of the amount of government support given for the new scheme Haldimand defined it as "Whatever Assistance . . . Necessary, whether by a little

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[29]During his administration at Three Rivers Haldimand had asked Lord Halifax, British minister for colonial affairs, for skilled agriculturalists to emigrate to Canada (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 57).

Provision or a few labourers . . . " (H.P., 45, p. 18). Provisioning at the Upper Posts was by the Ration system.[30] The Niagara farmers were only allowed half rations (Cruikshank, 1927, p. 34) probably as an incentive to make their farms self-supporting, as well as it being a reflection on the status of some as partly pensioned soldiers.[31] It is doubtful if the "few labourers" ever materialized because the settlers are documented as building their own houses and doing their own farming.[32]

Besides the assistance of provisions, government help came in other forms. A list of tools issued to Loyalists (see Table 1) gives 27 different varieties of tools presumably issued for beginning settlement. Not only the diversity of tools is important however, but the number given to each man. This list, for twelve men, shows that the quantity of such important tools as axes,

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[30] An example of a daily ration given to Seamen and Artificers was 1½ lbs. of flour or Biscuit, 1 lb. Beef or 8 ozs. Pork, ¼ pint Pease, 1 oz. Butter, 1 oz. Oatmeal or Rice (H.P., 45, p. 9). It was worth two shillings at Niagara in 1781 (H.P., 47, p. 20).

[31] Haldimand was explicit that the farmers could only be discharged from the army if they were unfit or old (H.P., 46, p. 288).

[32] Walter Butler documented in 1781 that one Michael Showers was building a house and "clearing & Planting and Commencing Farming" (H.P., 46, p. 217). John Butler also noted that "four or five families . . . have . . . built themselves houses . . . " (H.P., 46, pp. 191-192).

adzes, saws, trowels, hammers and spades was not sufficient for each man to have his own set of tools. This deficiency could prove very limiting in a new settlement, particularly when the farmers are intended to produce enough crops in the first year or so to support not only themselves but a garrison. This deficiency was illustrated at Niagara by the request for items in short supply, such as "Iron . . . fit for Plow Sheers, iron for axes and hoes, a Forge, four grindstones and a dozen hoes" (H.P., 46, p. 215).

The government also issued "some Spring Wheat, Indian corn, & small seeds . . . " (H.P., 46, p. 211). At Niagara this was specifically listed as "10 bushels of Spring Wheat, 4 bushels of Buckwheat, 4 bushels of Oats and 4 bushels of pease and some small seeds" (H.P., 46, p. 211). The small seeds were probably pumpkin. Potatoes were also sent up to "supply the settlers until they could produce enough to support themselves" (H.P., 45, pp. 125-6). A dozen breeding sows were also requested and likely received judging from the census of 1782 which lists 103 hogs (Cruikshank, 1927, p. 42). However, the same problems existed in the supply of seeds for planting as in the supply of tools--undersupply. The gross difference between John Butler's initial request

TABLE 1

A LIST OF TOOLS ISSUED OUT OF THE ENGINEER'S STORE TO THE NEW YORK LOYALISTS: N.B., NUMBER TWELVE MEN IN ALL

viz.	Falling Axes	9
	Broad Axes	7
	Augurs	9
	Adzes	6
	Hand Saws	2
	Chissels	10
	Crosscut Saws	3
	Drawing Knives	6
	Pit Saw Files	8
	Gimblets	5
	Iron Squares	2
	Two feet Rules	2
	Pit Saws	3
	Masons Trowels	2
	Claw Hammers	2
	Pick Axes	1
	Spades	3
	Chalk Lines	1
	Iron Wedges	1
	Iron Trow	1
	Barrells Lime	4
	Tennant Saws	1
	Spikes	50
	Boards	7
	Pounds of Nails	78
	Squares of Glass	21
	Sheets of Iron	8

John Ross, Major

M. Tinling, Actg. Engineer & Lieutenant

(H.P., 44, p. 382)

for seeds[33] and the amount actually received illustrates the ever-present difficulty of supplying the frontier and the wisdom behind Haldimand's agricultural scheme.

The terms under which the farmers received payment for their crops presented a paradox: on the one hand there was the principle of supplying the garrison and on the other the possibility of "private advantage." This paradox was possible because of the dichotomous nature of land and crop ownership. The ownership of land was vested in the Crown but crops and stock belonged to the farmer. Thus over and above his own personal consumption and supply to the garrison he could seek markets either locally or further afield. This gave him incentive in the form of a personal stake in the farming operation. However "private advantage" was greatly limited at Niagara by monopolistic price setting by the government superintendent of the 'king's store.' The farmers complained that they were being forced to "furnish excess as well as necessary provisions for the garrison . . . at such price as the commanding officer thinks proper . . . " (H.P., 44, p. 375). Thus not only was their margin of excess crops for trade being dimin-

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[33]John Butler, commander of Butler's Rangers, requested "Sixty bushels of Spring Wheat and Oats, and Twelve of Corn, Buckwheat and a Barrel of Indian corn early in the spring for planting" (H.P., 46, pp. 203-4).

ished but their margin of profit. As well, the only merchants they could deal with locally[34] were present at the Post under the same terms as the farmers. The merchants, more so than the farmers, were private individuals who made a living by trading with the garrison, the local farmers, the fur traders and the Indians. However their stock was their only investment and the prices at Niagara reflected the cost and difficulty of getting supplies to the Upper Posts via military vessels, together with the low margin of profit gained by their trade with the garrison based on government-set contract prices (H.P., 41, p. 41). The farmers complained that the amount received for their crops from the commanding officer at the fort did not give them enough to afford the prices charged by the local merchants for necessary supplies. This discontent eventually led to a petition for permanent tenure and the right of private ownership (H.P., 45, p. 372).

The second aspect of Haldimand's agricultural scheme at Niagara did not involve Loyalists but military personnel. It concerned a tract of land directly administered by, and for the use of, the garrison. This land

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[34]Some of these merchants were Taylor and Forsyth, Taylor and Duffin, Thomas Robison, Hamilton and Cartwright, John Thompson, Samuel Street and Co. and Douglas and Symington.

was called the "King's Field" and was again located on the west bank. It was stated to be fertile, 25 acres in area, partly cleared, and sown with Indian corn and Buckwheat (H.P., 44, p. 324). The farming of this land was done by the Rangers.

The third aspect of his scheme had been begun prior to Haldimand's administration in Canada. This was the garden operated by John Stedman for the 'King's Service.' Stedman, who had the government contract for carrying provisions and supplies over the Niagara portage, was ordered "to cultivate as much land . . . as possible about the Fort (Niagara), at least to lay a foundation of by degrees, supplying entirely the Post with Bread, and the rearing of cattle is likewise possible" (Cruikshank, 1927, p. 8).

The fourth aspect of the Niagara agricultural scheme was the encouragement of Indian gardens. The major settlement at Buffalo Creek was to be an example to the rest of the Indians not only to feed themselves, but also to help supply the garrison, mainly with Indian corn (H.P., 57, pp. 29-30).

The previous section of this chapter has dealt with the basic principles of settlement during the Haldimand administration. The next section will deal with the settling process--or the process of putting the

settlement on the geographical landscape. There are three basic divisions appropriate to the settlement on the west bank. The first is settlement prior to the Haldimand administration--a period of time from the acquisition of Fort Niagara by the British in 1759 to the commencement of the Haldimand administration in 1778. The next period of time runs from 1778 to 1782 when the International boundary separated the Fort from the west bank. This can be called the 'military' or 'pre-permanent' phase of settlement. The third period of time runs from 1782 till the end of the Haldimand administration in Canada in 1784. This can be called 'civil' or permanent phase of settlement. In general the settling process at Niagara was orderly, largely because the settlers were government directed and needed government permission and supplies in order to farm on the west bank. As well, the number of settlers involved was small and easily controlled, making it more manageable for government control. As earlier described in the definition of settlement there is a blurring of the distinction between temporary and permanent settlement largely because of the government policy on this issue. There is therefore no clear line drawn between military and civil settlement unless it is specifically designated as such.

There was little settlement on the west bank prior to the Haldimand regime except for one or two documented private houses and a military structure. One private house was owned by a Captain Servos[35] who, in 1761, was granted twelve hundred feet of river frontage in order to operate a grist mill and a farm (Braider, 1972, p. 129). This grant by General Amherst caused considerable unrest among the Indians because it was on Indian lands not yet deeded to the British. The other documented structure was Navy Hall. This was erected in 1765 (Gage Papers, 45. p. 5) for the accommodation of naval officers who wintered at Niagara. It was also the official wharf for the landing of all the merchandise destined for Niagara or the interior as well as a naval shipbuilding yard. Its location was on the lower Niagara river upstream from the Fort (see Fig. 1). The location, on the west bank, of Navy Hall and its wharf is reasonable in terms of the bar at the east mouth of the Niagara river (see Map 4). The position of the bar shows an eastward moving current at the mouth of the river thus giving credence to the erection of Navy Hall on the west bank. A political reason for this location could have been the desire to lay claim to lands recently deeded to the British

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[35]Captain Servos had taken part in the defeat of the French by the British, at Fort Niagara in 1759.

A Plan of Niagara (Pfister, 1771)


18, 16 & 15 mile Creeks
12 mile Creek
Marais a la Biche or
7 mile Creek
Mill
Marais Norman
or 4 mile Creek
43 : 13
Navy Hall
Niagara
43 : 15 : 30
Indn Village
6 mile Pond
Johnson's Landg
43 : 16
12 Mile Creek
Landing Place
Indian Village
Tuscororas

by the Mississagua Indians, as well as the British policy of maintaining the distinction between the land and sea military forces.

In appearance Fig. 1 shows a rectangular building for the shape of Navy Hall, surrounded by gardens similar to those at Fort Niagara. As the earliest saw mill in the area was only being built in 1768 (Gage Papers, 82, p. 1) it is probable that the building was log, unless the materials for its construction were brought in by ship. The wharf is shown as being larger than the hall itself, a response to its function as a major transshipment centre for the Upper Posts. The naval shipyard was probably included as part of this wharf and ships built at Niagara included the Scone, Caldwell and Mohawk, as well as two Gun boats (H.P., 41, p. 125). All of these were operational on Lake Ontario during the Haldimand administration. The wood for the shipyard came from various locations. The oak timber was cut near Navy Hall itself while the pine was cut at Sixteen Mile Pond[36] usually in the winter (H.P., 42, p. 85). This wood was then rafted either to the garrison or to Navy Hall (H.P., 43, p. 84). Navy Hall has more relevance as a settlement structure than as contributing to settlement population

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[36] It is assumed that this was on Sixteen Mile creek shown on Map 2.

because its personnel were temporary and present solely for the purposes of defence, trade being secondary. It has been included here however, although it is not a structure erected during Haldimand's administration, because it acted as a spearhead to settlement on the west bank, and as physical evidence of British territorial rights on the west bank.

The period of time from the commencement of the Haldimand regime to the beginnings of Loyalist settlement marks the first phase of settlement on the west bank of the Niagara river under the Haldimand administration. This settlement can be classified as primarily for military purposes. The principal structures erected during this period were the military barracks for Butler's Rangers. These barracks were erected on the west bank as the result of a dispute between the Commanding Officer at Fort Niagara and Walter Butler, son of John Butler, Commander of Butler's Rangers (H.P., 46, p. 128). This location was a response to a principle, later discussed in this thesis, that the Corps' of Provincials, serving during the Revolutionary War, be not considered as part of the regular army, and therefore not garrisoned with them. The building of the Rangers' barracks was in progress in November of 1778 and it is likely that they were completed before the winter or in the early spring

of 1779. The barracks consisted of two buildings with about twenty rooms in all. Walter Butler claimed that these were inadequate for the housing of his troop of 300 men and their officers (H.P., 46, pp. 176-177). The location of these barracks is uncertain but Appendix 1 suggests a location back from the river somewhere in the vicinity of Navy Hall.[37] The barracks were probably log, plastered on the outside and whitewashed inside (H.P., 42, pp. 358, 401). In the spring of 1779 further construction took place on the west bank that included some log houses and a hospital for the Rangers (H.P., 46, p. 154).

It was in the Fall of 1780 however, that the settlement commenced which was to be the foundation for the permanent settlement established later. In response to Haldimand's agricultural scheme "four or five families" were in residence[38] on the west bank and "would have put wheat in the ground . . . had it arrived in time" (H.P., 46, pp. 191-2). Although a settlement primarily populated by Rangers, the settlers were stated

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[37]Powell, commanding at Niagara, stated that the location was an "improper spot" hampered by its preventing a "retreat in case of necessity" as well as its inability "to have retarded any attack upon this Place . . . " (H.P., 42, pp. 387-8).

[38]John Butler noted that they had "built themselves houses . . . " (H.P., 46, pp. 191-2).

to be "advancing in age or having a large family . . . " (Smy, 1975 , p. 21). Thus the settlement was set up primarily as a full-time farming concern, rather than one settled by absentee landlords.

Although the settlement of 1780 is regarded as the forerunner of permanent settlement on the west bank it must not be assumed that these were the only settlers. Servos is already documented as having been settled since 1761 and it is highly likely that there were others, also a legacy from the defeat of the French at Niagara. The large volume of Loyalists passing through Niagara made it difficult for the commander at the Fort personally to supervise their living arrangements; and such a centre of civilization must have seemed very welcome to the Loyalists after their enforced flight from their homes. As well, the distance of Haldimand's government from Niagara meant a certain laxity at this Post in regard to administrative policy, especially that concerning the sending down of Loyalists to Montreal or Quebec. Thus this thesis assumes that some stayed and likely settled on the west bank, a little distance from the fort.

The location of the new settlers is not specifically stated. However some indication of their spread is given by the stated location of the Peter Secord farm

at the "Sources of the Four Mile Creek" (H.P., 85, pp. 71-2). This would put this farm at the outer limit of the four mile area on the west bank, possibly backed into the base of the escarpment. The names of the new settlers show a heavy bias in favour of selection from Butler's Rangers, rather than from non-active refugee Loyalists, as previously suggested by Haldimand (H.P., 44, p. 120). Thus the settlement on the west bank can be said to be one for the participants in the Revolutionary War, rather than for its victims.

The time schedule for the commencement of farming was for the planting of wheat in the Fall of 1780, but as the wheat did not arrive in time (H.P., 46, pp. 191-2) it had to be postponed till the Spring of 1781. At this time the settlers wished to plant Indian corn, pumpkin seed and Wheat; however, they were forced to plant the seeds sent up from Montreal by the government; these included Spring Wheat, Buckwheat, Oats, small seeds (probably pumpkin) and Pease. Indian corn and breeding sows were also added to the farm crop roster. As noted earlier the settlers were hampered by their shortage of tools plus the very essential grindstones for milling their grain into flour and a forge for the ironwork so necessary to farming in the eighteenth century. A blacksmith was supplied by John Butler "out

of the Rangers" (H.P., 46, p. 215) but his work was limited by the lack of a forge, especially as he did not have adequate tools (H.P., 46, pp. 222-3).

The year 1781 was a busy one for the settlers. Clearing, planting and sowing continued until December as the winter was moderate (Cruikshank, 1927, p. 34). The remarkable feat of these farmers was that by September of 1781 they had grown enough to "maintain themselves" despite their lack of adequate equipment. This certainly suggests that some land had already been cleared on the west bank, no doubt assisted by the shipbuilding activities at the naval wharf.

In keeping with the organizational principles of the Haldimand administration (see Chapter Two) a census was taken in 1782 to show the progress of the settlement (see Table 2). The "four or five families" were sixteen heads of households, thus suggesting a settlement with the potential for active growth despite government restrictions on its size and operations. There were 236 acres of cleared land averaging about 15 acres per settler. The crops under cultivation were wheat, Indian corn, oats and potatoes, the largest acreage being sown to Indian corn. Gentilcore notes that if not much oats were grown the cattle would have to forage for food (Gentilcore, 1963, p. 75). This would necessitate both

TABLE 2

A SURVEY OF THE SETTLEMENT AT NIAGARA--AUGUST 25th, 1782

Heads of Households	Married Women	Young and Hired Men	Boys	Girls	Male Slaves	Female Slaves	Horses	Oxen	Cows	Steers & Heifers	Sheep	Hogs	Flour	Produce of This Year				Acres of Cleared Land
														Wheat Bush's	Indian Corn Bush's	Oats Bush's	Potato Barr's	
Isaac Dolson	1		3	2			4		4	2		14		80	60	6	100	30
Peter Secord	1		3	2			5		6	2		10		15	200	4	70	24
John Secord	2		1	1			6		7	3		3		50	50		70	27
James Secord	1		1	3			3		3		11	3		7	100		30	20
George Stuart	1		2				3		2	2		9		4	20		30	9
John Depue	1		3	3			3		3	2		6			200		50	16
George Fields	1		2				4		2	1		8		50	50		30	22
Daniel Rowe	1		2				2		2	1		3			30		40	6
Elijah Philips	1						3		1						20		20	8
Philip Bendor	1		1	2			2		2	1	19	10			10	20	30	12
Samuel Lutes	1		4	1			3		4	3		8			100		20	18
Michael Showers	1		2	4			2					3			40	6	15	12
Harmonious House	1		3	2			2		3	2		6			20		60	12
Thomas McMicken	1	1	2		1		2		1			20			10	10	10	8
Adam Young	1						2		2						12		15	4
McGregor VanEvery	1						3								4		40	8
Total	17	1	29	20	1		49		42	19	30	103		206	926	46	630	236

The Expences for Building a Saw & Grist Mill at Peter Secord's farm will amount to £500 N.Y. Currency for Cutting & Haroling Boards & Timber, building, digging & filling in both Dams, nails, Iron, Stones, bolting, Cloth & Saw excepted. The Saw Mill to be built first to get boards & small Timber for the Grist Mill. The Expence at the Head of the Four Mile Creek will amount to £50 more where there is plenty of water for both Mills which the other has not.

The 1782 Census of the Settlement at Niagara (H.P., 85, pp. 2-4).

the building of fences and larger farm acreages than for farms under Oats cultivation. Cattle included horses, oxen, cows, steers and heifers, sheep and hogs.[39] There was only one hired man and one slave thus indicating that most of the work was being done by the settlers themselves, without the promised assistance in labour from the government. This survey does not indicate the degree of supplemental fishing from the lake (H.P., 45, p. 16; 43, p. 133) or game hunting in the woods, but there can be no doubt that this formed a vital part of the survival economy.

One of the major problems of the infant settlement was the lack of a grist mill to grind the grain into flour so that it could be used for bread. In 1782 the farmers who had harvested 206 bushels of wheat were to take this to the 'King's Store' at Fort Niagara "for which they received flour" (H.P., 44, p. 137). This flour had been imported into Niagara from either Montreal or Britain, while their wheat was sent down to the east for milling. The farmers were beginning to resent the inconvenience and cost of such a procedure, particularly as Haldimand had established the settlement to provide self-sufficiency for Fort Niagara as well as

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[39] The largest animal producer was a non-Ranger indicating that animal husbandry was labour intensive.

a means of diminishing such transportation expenses.[40] The other problem was the lack of a saw mill. Log houses were draughty and needed chinking. A saw mill would permit the sawing of logs into boards and facilitate the erection of frame dwellings. Thus John Butler suggested that these two mills would be "a great acquisition to this Post" (H.P., 46, p. 280).

The terms of the erection of these mills however, was to run counter to one of the basic principles of Haldimand's settlement policy--that is, no private ownership of land or accompanying structures erected on that land. It had been suggested that the two Secord brothers would build the mills on their farm as well as purchase the grindstones and iron-works for the mills "in Canada" (H.P., 85, pp. 2-4). As well, they wanted permission to have the stones and iron-work "sent up in the King's Bateaux" (H.P., 46, p. 280).[41] Haldimand's reply to this arrangement was blunt. Despite the urgent need for the mills by the farmers he would "by no means permit them

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[40] The farmers also relied upon this wheat for provisions. In June, 1783 it was noted that the fort had been obliged to "furnish the farmers with provisions . . . as they cannot make use of their own wheat" (H.P., 44, p. 162).

[41] This latter request was a mere formality because all shipping to the Upper Posts was by Government vessels.

to build on that footing . . . " (H.P., 45, p. 308). However he did suggest an alternative. After noting the estimated cost of the project[42] it was decided to build the mills but not on Secord's farm. Instead they would be located on the "Four Mile Run" (H.P., 44, p. 330) probably where Four Mile creek entered Four Mile pond (see Appendix 1). The Saw mill was to be built first in order to get the boards and timber for the Grist mill and the project would be administered by Lieut. Brass of Butler's Rangers (H.P., 43, P. 210). Work began in the Spring of 1783 but was delayed by the fact that the millstones and iron work were not sent up till the Fall of that year. The mills began operation later that year. This delay in providing the equipment for the mills provides further illustration of the difficulty in administering Posts at great distance from administrative headquarters, especially with the complications of War and a very limited budget.

The year 1783 marked the third phase of settlement on the west bank under the administration of Haldimand. It was the year that settlement in Canada was organized as a separate process from the other

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[42] It was noted that the "Expences for Building a Saw & Grist Mill at Peter Secord's farm . . . amount to £500 N.Y. Currency for Cutting and Haroling Boards & Timber, Building, digging & filling in both Dams, nails, Iron Stones . . . " (H.P., 85, pp. 2-4).

American colonies which were now independent of Great Britain. It also saw the influx into Canada of Loyalists who knew that they were not going to be returning to their former homes and properties.[43] Furthermore, 1783 saw the international boundary divide Fort Niagara from its west bank annex (see Map 1) and the beginning of settlement on the west bank as a permanent and independent civil process.

Although Haldimand kept a close watch on the number of persons at the Upper Posts the census of the Corps of Rangers taken at Niagara in 1783 (see Appendix 2) seems unusually detailed in that it gives names and ages, in years and months, of persons in, or dependents of, the Corps. Such detailing was probably in preparation for the settling of the Corps, who, unlike most of the men in other Regiments, were long-time residents of North America and wished to stay in it. It was also an inventory of those who had already settled on the west bank. The Ontario Register suggests that the names were necessary in order to provide rations for the families who had joined their men stationed at Niagara once the war was concluded (Ontario Register, 1968, p. 197).

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[43] Colonel Butler stated that the Rangers would "rather go to Japan (than) . . . go among the Americans where they could never live in peace" (H.P., 44, p. 77).

A comparison of this census with those requesting Crown lands at Niagara in 1784 (see Appendix 3) shows that most did intend to remain permanently at Niagara and not be moved elsewhere. By now the number of settlers on the west bank had grown from 68 in 1782 to 102 persons. Their average age was 44 for men and 38 for women indicating the refugee status of these settlers.

Despite the apparent success of the settlement by 1783 the Peace negotiations between the rebel colonies and Great Britain had triggered uncertainty in the minds of the farmers in relation to their land tenure. The farmers therefore petitioned Haldimand that they pay rent for their farms after an initial period of free use for eight years: this rent would act as a guarantee of right of future ownership. Haldimand's response to this was that he would show the farmers "every Indulgence" but could not consider these terms at the present time (H.P., 45, p. 372).

Haldimand's refusal to commit himself on the question of the farmer's memorial seems logical in view of the weight of responsibility on him at this time to organize the new settlements for the Loyalist influx. One of the big differences between the settlement of the American west and the Loyalist migration to Canada was the fact that the Loyalists wanted and needed government

protection and security. They were therefore willing to be directed to settlement areas laid out for them by the government. At Niagara John Butler had already suggested to Haldimand that "The Lands to the Twelve Mile Creek and westward as far as Lake Erie, are in general very good and may be . . . purchased from the Indians . . . " (Cruikshank, 1927, p. 49).

Immediately after the notification of the ratification of the Peace Treaty Haldimand, with instructions from George III[44] began organizing the settlements for the troops and Loyalists who wished to remain in Canada. Haldimand had three locations in mind--Sorel, Cataraqui (now Kingston) and Niagara. The latter location was probably chosen more in response to pressure from the Butler's Rangers than in a belief of its suitability for Loyalist settlement. Its major problem was that it was too far from the rest of civilization and too close to the border. While Sorel was to be principally a settlement for "old soldiers" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 255), Cataraqui was to be for refugee Loyalists, many of whom did not fight at all during the Revolutionary War. This

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[44]George III directed Haldimand to "measure and lay out such a quantity of Land as you . . . shall deem necessary & convenient for the Settlement of our . . . Loyal Subjects . . . " (Cruikshank, 1927, p. 55).

settlement at Cataraqui was to prove the model "in all other parts of the Province while Loyalists shall be Settled" (H.P., 45, p. 380). Niagara was to be a settlement principally for the Butler's Rangers and the farmers already on the west bank. In keeping with a now familiar policy of administrative organization Haldimand's plans of organization for the new settlements were explicit. The basic principle was that "the Strictest Impartiality shall be observed in the distribution of . . . Lands . . . " (H.P., 45, p. 380). Thus the lots were to be distributed by a system of drawing lots which theoretically prevented partiality.

The distribution of lands was based on three categories of recipient: lands for servicemen; lands for Loyalists; and lands for Indians. There was also a clear distinction between 'town lots' and 'farm lots.' In the case of lands for military personnel Field Officers received 5000 acres each, captains 3000 acres, subalterns 2000 acres, 200 acres to a noncommissioned officer, 100 acres to a private and an extra grant of fifty acres for a wife and each child (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 255). However at Sorel Haldimand wished to settle the area thickly so that the settlement would provide a barrier to possible rebel advancement into the area. Thus the town lots were only to be 60 acres, while the

remainder of land owing to each serviceman was given out at either Chaleur Bay or Cataraqui. In the case of the Loyalist settlement at Cataraqui the Royal instructions stated that each master of a family would receive 100 acres but in this case Haldimand specified that each family would receive 120 acres; at the coming of age of their children each would receive 200 acres in addition to the grant of 50 acres for each member of the family, not including the head. The shape of the townships were to be six miles square and contain 175 lots of 120 acres each. Each lot was to be rectangular in shape, the longest side of the rectangle at right angles to the front of the lot. The townships were also to contain a military or Crown land reserve and 400 acres of 'common' for the use of the town. This common land could be either leased to settlers for thirty years or settlers could obtain a permit which would however require them to move off the land if it was needed by the town. Haldimand's rationale for choosing this system was that it was the one that the "people to be settled there are the most used to . . . and will best answer the proportion of Lands I propose to give to each family . . . " (H.P., 57, p. 34). Indian settlements were to be dealt with separately and are not discussed in this paper.

Haldimand's plans for the settlement of Loyalists had been somewhat anticipated at Niagara by Colonel Butler's attempt to lay out lots on the west bank for officers of Butler's Rangers and the regiments stationed at Niagara (see Appendix 1). Haldimand was informed that "Seventy Lotts of land, 30 of which are nominated for different persons" (H.P., 45, p. 380) had been marked out in readiness for settlement. Butler had already asked Haldimand for land on the west bank for his corps of Rangers and despite his reiteration of the principle of impartiality Haldimand was "pleased that Col. Butler has made a beginning as it will forward my intention" (H.P., 45, p. 380). As at Cataraqui, Niagara would follow the principle of laying out lands under the supervision of a Surveyor-General.

In April of 1784 Butler supplied Haldimand with his second census of the farms on the west bank[45] (see Appendix 4). There were now 46 heads of households, all of which applied for government land grants in July of 1784 (Cruikshank, u.d., pp. 41-4). As compared with the 1782 survey, the acres of cleared land had increased from 236 acres to 713 cleared acres. As with the 1782 survey corn is still the principal crop with 218 acres

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[45]This survey was probably done in the Fall of 1783.

to be sown in the Spring of '84. It has been suggested that the predominance of corn in the pioneer economy can be attributed to the influence of Indian agriculture on the new settlers (Gentilcore, 1963, p. 73). The acreage sown to Oats was now 70 acres suggesting increased attention to animal husbandry. Although hogs were still the principal animal, largely because of the tradition of salted pork in the diet, the animal population in general had increased, no doubt associated with the fact that by now half of the settlers had barns.

The lack of security in tenure of the pre-permanent military settlement caused a carry-over into the permanent settlement particularly in relation to the settlement of Butler's Rangers. In May of 1784 the farmers had been joined by about eighty of the Corps of Butler's Rangers, who now wished to become full-time farmers. Amongst this group was John Butler himself. Whether the location of this group corresponds with Appendix 3 is not clear, but it is quite likely that at least some of the corps had already commenced farming prior to this time. The problem with this phase of settlement was that Butler and four or five officers had lands that fell "within the limits ordered by His Excellency to be reserved for the King's use . . . " (H.P., 46, p. 391). As these limits had not been known

when the officers settled on the land they requested "Deeds in which clauses might be inserted granting the user the rights to the improvements on the land should any parts of them Lots be hereafter wanted . . . " (H.P., 46, p. 391). Thus unlike the status of the farmers under the agricultural scheme these officers wanted evidence of rights of private ownership of houses, barns and farm structures erected prior to the government township survey by the surveyor-general. They did not want to be included as part of the agricultural scheme.

At the same time that this permanent settlement was being set up John Butler was ordered to "purchase all the Lands between the three lakes Huron, Erie and Ontario . . . " (H.P., 46, p. 391) for future settlement. Thus the settlement on the west bank along with Cataraqui and Sorel, was destined to become a spearhead for the development of the Niagara peninsula and the future settlement of Canada as a whole.

CHAPTER TWO

SIR FREDERICK HALDIMAND AND THE AMERICAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

The basic reason for the importance of Sir Frederick Haldimand to this thesis is that it was his administration that directed the settling process along the new Canadian frontier with the United States. He thus was responsible for the settlement of Niagara on the west bank. The great dearth of literature and autobiographical material on Haldimand[46] gives clear evidence of the lack of understanding of the major role this administrator and soldier played in the settlement of Canada, particularly Ontario. In this respect McIlwraith's comment that Haldimand was "the founder of Ontario" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 271) is not mistermed.

This chapter on Haldimand will be divided into two sections: firstly a discussion of Haldimand--the man and his policies, giving a brief biographical sketch and then outlining his political and administrative career; secondly a discussion of the War of Independence as the context within which Haldimand operated.

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[46] The principal autobiography of Haldimand is Jean McIlwraith's biography of Haldimand, one of the Makers of Canada series.

Haldimand was born of Protestant parents on August 11th, 1718, in the canton of Neuchatel, Switzerland. He was one of five children, four boys and a girl.[47] His father was a notary and later a Justice of the Peace in Yverdun. It is believed that at the age of 15 Haldimand went as a cadet into the army of Charles Emmanuel, King of Sardinia. It was at this time that he made friends with Henry Bouquet, who also served in North America. At 21 Haldimand became an officer and then enlisted in the army of Frederick the Great, King of Prussia.[48] In 1750, when he was 32 years old, he and Henry Bouquet were registered as Captains Commandant, with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, in the Swiss Guards, formed in 1748. They were both posted to the Hague. In 1754 they were transferred from the Hague, and the service of the Prince of Orange, to the service of the Prince's father-in-law, George the Second. Haldimand and Bouquet were then given postings as Colonels Commandant in the new Royal American Regiment designed specifically to organize the Swiss and German Protestants of Pennsylvania and Mary-

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[47] That these siblings were important to him is evidenced by his attempt to commission his nephews in Canada, and his close relationship with a nephew in later years.

[48] McIlwraith comments that "Swiss mercenaries in the eighteenth century formed a vital auxiliary to almost every army in Europe" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 4). In this respect the term 'soldier of fortune' must be used with caution.

land into fighting units against the French in North America. They landed in America on June 15th, 1756 (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 11). Colonel Haldimand was posted to Philadelphia in the Second Battalion of the Royal Americans. Meanwhile Bouquet went to Charleston. In 1758 Haldimand was exchanged from the Second to the Fourth Battalion of the Royal Americans in order to command that Battalion on an expedition into Canada via Crown Point, at the southwesterly tip of Lake Champlain, just north of Ticonderoga (see Map 5). While on this advance he superintended the building of a blockhouse and stockade at Saratoga, on the Hudson.[49] Haldimand was slightly wounded in the defeat by the French at Ticonderoga.[50]

From 1758-59 Haldimand commanded at Fort Edward described as "a dangerous post, for what was to hinder the victorious French (at Carillon) from pushing their way . . . to Albany" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 22). In the summer of 1759 Haldimand was ordered to lead the garrison at Fort Edward by way of the Mohawk river, Oneida lake and Oswego river, to Lake Ontario to rebuild the fort

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[49]Saratoga was also Fort Edward (Kerr, 1975, p. 33).

[50]Ticonderoga was also known as Fort Carillon.

MAP 5



A map of the Arena of the Seven Years War (Kerr, 1975, p. 26).

at Oswego.[51] In November 1759, Haldimand assumed command at Oswego also called Fort Ontario. In the spring of 1760 he was involved with the successful campaign to take Montreal[52] and was sent to "take possession of one of the gates of the town in order to enforce the observation of good order . . . " (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 38).

In May of 1761 Haldimand was asked to govern at Three Rivers (see Map 5) in place of Burton on leave-of-absence to Havana, and in June he was promoted to the rank of Colonel. At this time he took out British citizenship. In 1764 Gage took Sir Jeffrey Amherst's place as Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in North America, Burton took Gage's place in Montreal and Murray was made the Governor-General of Quebec. As a result of this reshuffling Haldimand was given the governorship of Three Rivers. In the summer of 1765 Haldimand took leave-of-absence to England during which time he received notification of his promotion to the

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[51] This was the summer Wolfe was besieging Quebec, Amherst was building forts on Lake Champlain, and Prideaux was defeating the enemy on Lake Ontario, although he was later killed at Niagara. At this time Niagara fell to the British and Fort Toronto was also surrendered to the British by Douville.

[52] The campaign at Montreal was a three-pronged attack; Amherst via the Mohawk and Oswego through the St. Lawrence, Murray via Quebec, and Haviland via Lake Champlain and the Richelieu (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 33-34).

rank of Brigadier. In December 1766 he was asked to command the southern district of North America with headquarters at Pensacola in Florida, replacing Bouquet who died earlier that year. Haldimand spent six years at this post until he was posted to New York to replace General Gage on leave-of-absence.[53] In 1772 Haldimand became Major General and Colonel Commandant of the 2nd Battalion of the 60th Foot. In April, 1774 Gage returned and Haldimand remained on his staff as Major-General. He returned to England in June 1775.

In September of 1775, at the age of 57, Haldimand was appointed Inspector-General of the forces in the West Indies; there is no record of this appointment ever being acted upon although the title remained after Haldimand left his post in Canada. On January 1st, 1776 he was promoted to the rank of General in America, and Colonel Commandant of the 1st Battalion, 60th Foot.[54] The year 1776 was an eventful one for the British cause

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[53] Just after Haldimand assumed command the Boston Tea Party took place, a matter which Haldimand decided to ignore.

[54] This Battalion was formerly known as the Royal Americans (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 313). Haldimand had previously been in charge of the 2nd Battalion, 60th Foot.

in North America[55] that ended in 1777 with the defeat at Saratoga, a manoeuvre that Lower contests "indirectly lost the war for Great Britain" (Lower, 1977, p. 82). In August of 1776 Haldimand replaced Carleton, now out of favour, and became the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in North America, and Governor-General of Canada with headquarters in Quebec City. At the same time he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General of the army in North America. After six years in Canada he returned to England on the 8th January, 1785. Upon returning to England Haldimand was invested with the 'Order of the Bath' in recognition of his colonial service. Although the Gentleman's Magazine for October 7th, 1785, records that "this day Sir Frederick Haldimand took his final leave of the King previous to his going to Canada of which he is appointed governor" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 313), he did not return. He lived quietly in London until his death at Yverdun on June 5th, 1791, at the age of 73.

Before discussing Haldimand's political and

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[55] In the spring of 1776 Washington marched into Boston and there was a general confiscation of Tory property. In the winter of 1775-6 the forts on Lake Champlain surrendered to the rebels and Montgomery captured Montreal. In February Benedict Arnold was defeated at Quebec under the leadership of General Carleton, who resigned and was replaced by Burgoyne who was forced to surrender at Saratoga in 1777.

administrative policies it is necessary to clarify the use of the term 'soldier of fortune'[56] as applied to Haldimand's military career. The Pocket Oxford Dictionary describes a 'soldier of fortune' as "an adventurous person ready to serve any state . . . " (1978, p. 867) and a 'mercenary' as an "hired soldier in foreign service" (1978, p. 547). Although in the strictest of terms this applied to the first part of Haldimand's military career it did not apply to his military service after he took out British citizenship in 1761. As well the term has a connotation suggesting a lack of loyalty to any country except one's own, whereas the context of Haldimand's administration is one of a highly tuned sense of loyalty to the British cause. Furthermore, a soldier of fortune is believed to assume wealth in the foreign service; but in Haldimand's case not only did he pay out money to maintain his command posts[57] but was forced to conclude at the end of his service that "the more I know of this country (England) the more I see that it is the height of folly to trust to the generosity of the nation. Services are forgotten the

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[56]Both Lower and McIlwraith use the term.

[57]Haldimand commented while in command at Pensacola that "he of all people, who was so good with money, was ruining himself by paying for things out of his own pocket" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 69).

moment there is no longer need of us" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 330).

In discussing the administration of Haldimand the contention of this thesis is that contrary to the popular image of Haldimand as a dictatorial tyrant, he was an able and benevolent administrator with considerable expertise in North American affairs. His administration was, however, directed by two major forces; the administrative precedent of his time and the circumstances of war. In the context of the "classic age of aristocratic government" (Stephenson and Marcham, 1972, p. 657) political administrations tended to operate in an hierarchical fashion, with authority passing from the top down; that is, from George III through the English Parliament down to the colonial administration (see Fig. 2). Thus in the eighteenth century the colonial commander-in-chief would expect to have a similar authoritarian status in the colonies as the King would have in England. The authority role was further established by the fact that Haldimand's mandate came directly from the King. The checks and balances within the system occurred in the form of the English and colonial parliaments. In England the Privy Council, the House of Lords and House of Commons, with their varying degrees of power, had certain legislative roles

FIGURE 2

A POLICY CHAIN OF COMMAND IN A MONARCHICAL SYSTEM



coupled with a considerable degree of autonomy. Within these bodies such offices as that of the colonial secretary had specific powers in relation to colonial affairs. In Canada the King had made provision for a similar more rudimentary legislative system, consisting of a legislative body with 23 members, all appointed by him (H.P., 16, pp. 1, 2). It was the circumstance of war, coupled with the concomitant disruption of the reintroduction of French law after a long period of martial law, however, that played havoc with this legislative process during the Haldimand administration. It is unfortunate that the absence of legislative process[58] became one of the principal reasons why Haldimand was classified as a tyrant.

In the context of a war administration, and given the circumstances in Canada at the time, a lack of legislative process became understandable although regrettable. Without historic hindsight Haldimand did not have sufficient knowledge of the degree to which he could place confidence in the loyalty of French and English Canadians to the British cause. He knew that

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[58]The Habeas Corpus was not in effect and this angered the English as well as some of the French. As well, the Legislative Council met infrequently.

some Canadians were in touch with the rebel colonists[59] and some were responsible for having "sown in the minds of the people hopes of an invasion" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 280). Thus his rule of "say nothing, but make observation" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 324) became explicable especially in the context of the appeal to the people of Canada, to join the rebel colonists in their rebellion, by Washington and Schuyler in 1775[60] (Rawlyk, 1968, pp. 56,7).

In an attempt to provide adequate government in the light of his suspicions Haldimand tried to form a privy council of members he could trust (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 176). In this respect Haldimand was merely establishing the principle of hierarchical government by using the Royal precedent of the Privy Council in England, which acted as a buffer between the King and Parliament. This was not acceptable to the King however, and Haldimand was ordered to re-establish the

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[59] McIlwraith lists Mesplet (owner of the Montreal Gazette), Jotard (Editor of the Montreal Gazette), Laterriere, Pillon, Cazeau, Hay and duCalvet as either publishing seditious material or being in contact with such people as Gen. Schuyler (McIlwraith, 1904, pp. 273-283).

[60] Stated in a 'Letter to the Inhabitants of Canada' by Gen. Philip Schuyler, and a'Proclamation to the Inhabitants of Canada' by George Washington (Rawlyk, 1968, pp. 56,7).

Legislative Council and govern with it (H.P., 16, p. 48). Much antagonism could have been deflected if Haldimand had not only re-established this council but the principle of Habeas Corpus as well. His belief that "suspicion should be well founded to justify imprisonment" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 275) did not in any way negate the absence of Habeas Corpus.

Haldimand based his administrative policies upon the tenets of the Quebec Act. Although he had not drafted it, he considered the Act to be "both just and politic" (Rawlyk, 1968, p. 59) and the means of keeping Quebec loyal to the British.[61] In his opinion the French system of jurisprudence was necessary to maintain the loyalty of the French noblesse and clergy who had considerable control over the 60,000 French-Canadian inhabitants. Having their own system of laws would give them little cause for grievance and prevent them from turning to the House of Bourbon for support against the British.[62] This attitude was realistic when the English were in such

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[61] "It requires but Little Penetration to Discover that had the System of Government Sollicited by the Old Subjects been adopted in Canada, this Colony would in 1775 have become one of the United States of America . . . " (Rawlyk, 1968, p. 59).

[62] Early in Haldimand's governorship of Canada French ships were aiding the rebel cause.

a minority (2,000 pop.). However, to the English, this was a betrayal of their colonial rights, and the enforcement of French law by a Swiss-born administrator made it more unpalatable. However, the Quebec Act did not do away with English criminal law giving Britain the ultimate right of authority in Canada. Haldimand's exercise of this right in the interests of defence aroused the ire of both the English merchants and French Canadians.[63]

The overriding principle in Haldimand's administration was his desire to keep Canada loyal to the British. His firm allegiance to the King and an unshakeable belief that the Quebec Act could prevent disloyalty caused him to adopt an attitude that brooked no argument. In a certain sense this could be labelled as dictatorial. However, history has many examples of war administrations that have taken the same attitude. The need to make decisions quickly, the ever-present threat of invasion, disloyalty among the inhabitants of Canada, plus long periods of non-communication with Britain or other parts of North America, forced Haldimand to "act more than he could wish upon his own responsibility"

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[63]The English merchants because Haldimand prevented their freedom of trade with the rebels, together with the fact that they were not represented in a House of Assembly in Canada. The French Canadians mainly because of the limitation on the right of export of grain crops to New York and elsewhere.

(McIlwraith, 1904, p. 176). History vindicates this attitude because during the Haldimand administration, the first one that saw Canada become a separate colony from the United States, Canada remained loyal. Credit must be given to Haldimand for fulfilling his commission at such a critical time.

An important distinction in an examination of the Haldimand administration is the distinction between civil and military policies. McIlwraith states that the essential difference between the two was spelled out by the division of authority between the governors of each district, who were largely civil and the commanders of the garrisons or forts, who were concerned largely with military matters (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 89). However, this distinction was often blurred as with, for example, Haldimand's governorship of Three Rivers which involved both military and civil control. As well, Haldimand's appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in North America and as Governor-General of Canada involved the blurring of civil and military rule. It is in this area that the greatest problem lies in the interpretation of the competency of the Haldimand administration. George III described Haldimand as "always a soldier" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 321) and McIlwraith comments that during his retirement "his reading was

mostly on military subjects" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 324). This military bent, coupled with a strong sense of duty to the King and country led his opponents to criticize him as "equal to the military duties laid upon him, which were defensive and protective, but not very well fitted for his civil responsibilities as governor" (Lower, 1977, p. 82). However McIlwraith comments that French historians had to grudgingly admit that "to him were due the first modifications of British policy in favour of the Canadians, and that his administration advanced the commerce and agriculture of the country" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 29). However it is sufficient to say that regardless of his military prowess, his civil administration has not been preserved in historical records as wise and able. To place his administration in context however is to echo McIlwraith's words that "Haldimand held the country at the most trying and critical period of its existence . . . " (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 291). One must be forced to concede that to administer both the civil and military governments of a country at war took considerable skill and judgement, particularly when the country in question was located geographically near to, and in sympathy with, the rebel cause. Dr. Brymner, the Dominion of Canada archivist from 1884-9, was forced to conclude that he had "derived

from the study of the correspondence a high idea of the abilities of Haldimand and of the moderation he showed in the exercise of almost unlimited power at so critical a period" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 320).

On a personal level Riedesel[64] noted in his memoirs that Haldimand was "somewhat morose" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 299) although this was credited to an illness. He also noted that Haldimand mixed very little with the inhabitants of Quebec preferring to avoid state functions as much as possible. As Haldimand was a bachelor, and somewhat retiring, the lack of a wife in the society-conscious eighteenth century would have contributed much to the criticisms levelled at his administration. On the positive side however, was an image of a kind and thoughtful man, who not only was "kind and obliging to his friends" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 300) but also to relations and others in the service. As well, his personal generosity to the service led him to state that he could not afford to sustain the lifestyle of an officer at his administrative level because of his lack of funds (McIlwraith, 1904, p.330).

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[64] A friend of Haldimand's, commander at Sorel, and commander in charge of the German Brunswick Battalions sent by the Duke of Hesse to assist Britain in the Revolutionary war.

These personal observations help to play down the image of a harsh dictator, completely out-of-touch with the reality of his office. In fact Haldimand seems, by his experience, to have been able to keep a finger on the pulse of his commission and to maintain an administration best suited to the particular problems created in Canada by the Revolutionary war.

The basic principle of Haldimand's administrative policies was that of organization. In an administrative context this is first observed at Montreal where upon its capture Haldimand was sent to "enforce the observation of good order . . . " (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 38). At Three Rivers Haldimand divided the government of that area into four districts[65] each with a 'chamber of audience' presided over by a captain and corps of militia officers for the hearing of civil cases. Criminals were tried by court martial. At Pensacola Haldimand felt that a military government would have been best in order to unite the disparate French/Spanish/British elements, but as he had to deal with a civil government his wishes had to be sublimated in accordance with the power wielded by the civil governor in residence. At New York he maintained the government previously established by long

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[65]The four districts were Champlain and Riviere duLoup on the north shore and St. Francois and Gentilly on the south shore.

British colonial control but again had to placate the civil governor. At Boston, a year later, Haldimand again maintained a previously established administration. His political astuteness was evident at this time by his prediction of a Declaration of Independence at least two years prior to its actuality. Upon his return to Canada as governor, he administered within the context of the Quebec Act according to the tenets of British colonial administration. The image of an organized administrator is further enhanced by Haldimand's handling of the 'Vermont affair'[66] in which Haldimand was able to break off the discourse with the rebels while at the same time keeping the Canadians loyal to the British cause.

As part of his administrative organization Haldimand gave considerable attention to interpersonal relationships in the service. In a context of war the key to the effectiveness of his administration lay in the loyalty of his subordinates to the cause; one very effective method of ensuring loyalty being good relationships between himself and his subordinates and among the subordinates themselves. McIlwraith noted

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[66]This concerned the settlers between the Connecticut river and Lake Champlain, who under the influence of Ethan Allen and his Green Mountain boys, were conducting double negotiations with both the Continental Congress and the British government on the question of their allegiance. Eventually they supported the Continental Congress.

a close relationship with General Gage, Haldimand's commanding officer during his term of office at Fort Edward and Oswego, and later at Montreal, Pensacola, and New York. His willingness to accept dictates from above is exemplified by his attitude to Sir William Johnson assuming a command at Niagara that should have rightfully been his. Amherst told Haldimand to serve under Johnson because Johnson was "the only man capable of keeping the Six Nations faithful to the British . . ." (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 27). Haldimand did, and furthermore, adopted the same attitude when relieved of his command at New York. Haldimand expected the same attitude from his subordinates. In regard to the postings of officers to various places along the frontier Haldimand was constantly confronted with the "Burning question of precedence" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 159)[67]. Haldimand could sympathize with the ambitions of his subordinates particularly when military advancement also meant social and political advancement. However, McIlwraith argues that despite his sympathy "the governor was . . . strictly impartial in his dealings

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[67]For example, the Indian superintendent claimed greater rank than the officer in command of the garrison "since he had by far the larger number of warriors at his disposal . . . " (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 159).

with his officers, would not allow any to advance by favouritism over the heads of others . . . " (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 238). This attitude of impartiality is seen in the selection of land by lots for the new settlements. Haldimand made sure that it was clearly understood that, at least in terms of the location of land, precedence would not be taken into account, although those with higher rank would receive more land than their juniors. Haldimand was also a strict disciplinarian,[68] a necessary attitude in a service manned by personnel from very divergent backgrounds and attitudes, as well as widely scattered and often far from military or civil authority.

As the Haldimand administrations were in the main defensive there was more of an opportunity to develop the civil aspects of administration, although these were always subordinated to the war effort. As will be discussed later in this thesis, the costs of the colonial administration loomed large in the British administrative mentality and at each of his posts Haldimand sought to lower them. The most distinctive cost-reducing scheme that can be associated with Haldimand is his "agricultural

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[68] In a Letter to Captain Fraser of the Royal Highland Emigrants dated July 13th, 1780, Haldimand states that "I wish to acquaint you that it is only expected of officers . . . readily and punctually to execute their Contracts, without reflecting or remarking upon them except when the service may receive benefit therefrom . . . " (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 160).

scheme."[69] This was practised to a greater or lesser extent at every post that he administered. McIlwraith argues that the reason for such a preoccupation with agriculture was the fact that "having lived in Holland, the headquarters of scientific floriculture, it was probably there that he acquired the tastes which have caused him to be remembered as one of the earliest experimental gardeners on this continent" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 33). While administering at Fort Edwards, Haldimand was complimented by General Gage for being able to manage so dexterously with the supply of Hay and provisions, which led Gage to exclaim that his "fears are over" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 24). At Oswego Haldimand planted gardens and at Three Rivers he suggested that the British parliament arrange for the emigration of skilled agriculturalists to Canada to assist in making the colony self sufficient. At Pensacola he again planted gardens and advocated that land be left around each fort for garden needs. However when Haldimand accepted his commission to Canada he found wider scope for his scheme and much greater need for it. He suggested that each post employ its prisoners

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[69]This was a system of planting gardens and crops to maintain the self-sufficiency of the garrison or post, coupled with the use of fresh meat and fish caught locally to limit the necessity for the importation of salt pork or beef.

in farming, and that soldiers be detailed to supply themselves with fresh, wild fruit, as well as the raising of cattle and the catching of game. He set an example for the country by his garden at Montmorency[70] which was to show that such a scheme could be practised in Canada. This scheme even played a part in the choice of the locations for the Loyalist settlements in Canada. Haldimand favoured the upper country bordering upon Lake Ontario and the Ottawa river for the first settlements because he believed that this area would eventually "become a granary for the lower parts of Canada . . . "[71] (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 264). Agriculture, to Haldimand was one of the keys to the successful defence and survival of the colonies in North America, and an effective tool to maintain their viability apart from the 'mother country' of Britain.

Another distinctive feature of his administration was his building program. At Oswego it was almost a

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[70] In her memoirs Madame Riedesel noted that "though General Haldimand had been in Quebec but five years, his gardens were already full of fruit trees and exotic plants, which it would have been impossible to preserve in that climate had he not judiciously chosen for them a place where they had the benefit of a southern exposure" (McIlwraith, 1904, pp. 299-300).

[71] In the light of this opinion the settlement at Niagara, in a poor defensive position, would have been developed because its agricultural scheme was going well.

complete rebuilding of a long abandoned fort, while at Pensacola he was faced with rejuvenating a garrison that had long since fallen prey to tropical malaise and its location 'off centre' from the revolutionary core. This building program involved not only houses and military buildings but other improvements such as the widening and ditching of the road from Montreal to Quebec, during his term at Three Rivers. He was also responsible for the draining of a swamp behind the town of Pensacola for the provision of fresh water for the garrison. Haldimand was keenly interested in transportation especially its role in defence, and while at Pensacola suggested joining the Iberville river to the Mississippi via a canal to save British vessels entering the Mississippi from having to pass New Orleans. During his governorship of Canada he also supervised the building of a canal at Coteau du Lac to circumnavigate dangerous rapids in the St. Lawrence between Carleton Island and Montreal. His opinions on the significance of water transportation in the war were offered in his statement that the "convenience of communicating so easily with all parts of the Province by water carriage gives it singular advantage, either for advancing or retreating . . . " (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 134). In connection with water transportation in Canada he believed that the logical

military route to the Upper Posts in the interior was "between Montreal and Carleton" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 140) and then across Lake Ontario to Niagara. To this end he established a post at the point of entry of Lake Ontario into the St. Lawrence where goods could be stored ready for transshipment into the interior.

Another water route which Haldimand saw of significance in defending Canada was that of Lake Champlain.[72] Having previously been located at Saratoga, and having taken part in the Montreal campaign, he well knew the ease with which rebels from the south could penetrate into Quebec via the Hudson river and Lake Champlain (see Map 6). To this end he pressed for an early settlement of the Sorel area as a means of keeping an important part of Canada from rebel invasion. However his different reaction to the settlement at Niagara[73] shows that instead of border Loyalist settlement being a general principle it depended on the water communication route involved and its frequency of use. A major invasion via Lake Champlain had more likelihood of being effectively repulsed, as the area was more heavily populated with

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[72]Haldimand stated that "the capital Approach to this Province being by Lake Champlain" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 133).

[73]At Niagara he argued that to settle Loyalists so close to the border was dangerous.

militia Loyalists and Canadian Royalists, than an invasion in the less frequented and populated Niagara area.

In terms of defence Haldimand was greatly concerned about the distance of the Upper Posts[74] from Quebec and the small number of troops to defend them. He argued that he could keep no more than 2,500 of his 6,200 troops[75] in the field in the event of an invasion and not for more than two months at a time (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 126). In order to try to reduce this desperate situation he sent what he regarded as the most efficient troops to guard the Upper Posts. One source of military strength that Haldimand had to rely on was the loyalty of the Indian tribes. Haldimand had long experience in dealing with Indians. His post at Three Rivers had been a famous trading post for the Hurons and Algonquins until taken over by Iroquois tribes, but it was still the centre of the Fur trade in the area. One of the problems of administering such a post was the continual need to regulate the quantity of ammunition and liquor handed over for Indian use and consumption. At Pensacola he

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[74] These were Michilimackinac, the most northerly post at the narrows between Lakes Huron and Michigan; Detroit, on the straits leading to Lake Erie; Niagara, at the point where the Niagara river joins Lake Ontario; and to a lesser degree, Carleton Is. where Lake Ontario joins the St. Lawrence.

[75] Washington had 8,000 troops.

was very opposed to the Indian congresses which he called "pleasure parties . . . held at an annual cost of thousands of pounds . . . " (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 69). While in New York he received reports delivered from all over the colonies by Indian agents. At that time he felt much of the Indian unrest was due to settlers pushing their way into Indian territories and dispossessing them. Thus one of his methods for rewarding Indians was to return to them 'rebel' lands, a policy which earned him the dislike of the colonists.

It is important to realize that in his handling of the Indians Haldimand had a well-established British precedent to follow that greatly limited his initiative, and to a large extent determined his policies. On the one hand he reiterated the British attitude that "Retaining the Indians in our Interests has been attended with a very heavy expence to government, but their attachment has, alone, hitherto preserved the Upper country . . . " (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 164). However his personal opinion was that "In all excursions undertaken by the troops in this war, there has not been a single instance where the Indians have fulfilled their engagements, but influenced by caprice, a dream, or a desire of protracting the war to obtain presents, have dispersed and deserted the troops" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 170).

However despite this conflict between public and private attitudes to policy, one of the reasons that Haldimand did not give up the Upper Posts immediately after the signing of the Peace treaty was that the Indians needed more time to become reconciled to their new masters, the Americans.

One area in which Haldimand exercised considerable restraint during his governorship of Canada was in the handling of the "border warfare" between Indians, rebels and Canadian militia, largely Rangers.[76] To a professional soldier this 'terrorist-type' activity must have seemed an anathema; Haldimand's term for it was "indiscriminate vengeance" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 170). He further stated that it brought disrepute upon the cause of the King, so strongly defended by him. However, despite his aversion to such practise, Haldimand realized that it was probably one of the only ways of maintaining the Upper Posts and as such must be tolerated. His sending of provisions to the troops in the upper Country, including the Indians, and his granting military commissions to the Rangers, legitimized such activity.

During the years that Haldimand spent in the

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[76]The Rangers were indispensable for scouting duty.

American colonies he was aware of the pressure to maintain British economic interests in the colonies, such as the Fur trade, Fisheries, and export of other colonial products. Thus one of the principal reasons for retaining the Upper Posts was the need to protect and maintain such trade. These economic interests had also to be maintained in a war-time environment, which required "executive ability of no mean order" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 270).

Besides these 'weightier' matters of administration Haldimand also dealt with other administrative concerns. At Three Rivers he set up an Iron Forge for the supplying of iron to the Navy--a business which was very profitable. During his governorship of Canada he forwarded Canadian timber to the British naval yard, an enterprise which again proved profitable to Canada. He set up urban bylaws to provide for footpaths and the clearing of streets, as well as setting up a Public Library in Quebec. His concern with health extended even to St. Paul's Bay disease, a contagious ulcerous disease, which he attempted to prevent by sending a surgeon to the area. He took a census of the province, the population being around 120,000 in 1778-80. These policies proved reasonably popular, but others irked the inhabitants. Three policies which proved particularly

irksome were the levying of the old French corvee,[77] his mandate against the trade and export of Quebec products with and to New York, and his censorship of the Montreal Gazette. However these policies show Haldimand's understanding of the mood in Canada at the time, a mood which could have seen Canada pass into rebel hands. These times demanded strong leadership.

In considering the effectiveness of Haldimand's administration, it must be stated in summary that the British belief in his ability to handle his commissions was not misplaced. His ability rested securely upon his administrative organization and its consistency, regardless of geographic location. Haldimand's wide experience in North America proved crucial in his understanding of the people and their concerns. His loyalty to the British cause also ensured that he would preserve British colonial interests in North America regardless of the circumstances. It is to Haldimand's credit that this was achieved. However his crowning achievement was the settlement of Loyalists in Canada in such a way that they were able to begin the frontierization of Canada and form a nation.

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[77] This was a system in which civilians assisted the war effort by donating, or being paid for, their labour.

Although a major discussion on the causes[78] and progress of the American War of Independence is not relevant to this study, it did provide the context for the Haldimand administration and as such will be briefly discussed below. The Revolution can be divided into two parts. The first part can be called the 'legislative response,' a series of Legislative Acts originating in England largely in response to so-called "colonial attitudes." The second part can be labelled as the 'people's response,' that is, the action that was taken in the colonies as a result of these legislative acts.

In terms of the legislative Acts, a constant source of irritation for a rapidly growing and vibrant colony was the omnipresent 'Navigation Act' of 1660. This Act prescribed that certain "enumerated" articles could not be exported directly to foreign countries

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[78] One of the most succinct comments on the reasons for the American War of Independence came from a contemporary of Haldimand, Governor Hutchinson of Massachusetts. Hutchinson stated that "the prevalence of a spirit of opposition to government in the plantation is the natural consequence of the great growth of colonies so far remote from the parent state, and not the effect of oppression in the king or his servants . . . " (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 84). Although the latter part of this statement is debatable there is no doubt that geography played an important role in the revolution by acting as a separating factor, particularly in a time of arduous and lengthy sea communication between parent and colony. A natural consequence of such a dividing factor, particularly in a colony of economic buoyancy, would be the eventual separation of the colony from its parent.

without being first sent to England. By 1760 these articles included sugar, tobacco, raw cotton, naval stores, rice, beaver skins, pig iron and lumber (Nussbaum, 1957, 8, p. 30). Thus the lucrative West Indies trade, for example, had to be detoured to England before coming to American shores, a manoeuvre that cost much in terms of money, manpower, and colonial prestige. Not only did the produce have to be detoured but it also had to be carried in English ships, and with few exceptions, only English ships could bring much wanted European exports to the colonies. This of course greatly curtailed the development of a European trade market. This system was designed specifically to "strengthen the economic position of the home government" (Nussbaum, 1957, 8, p. 30) and became an increasing source of contention in the colonies. Two Acts of 1765 provided further irritation; "An Act for the Choice of Town Officers and Regulating of Township, 1765" (Rawlyk, 1968, p. 37) which repudiated the previously established republic form of Township government along the eastern seaboard, and the much reviled 'Stamp Act.' The Stamp Act was designed to gain revenue at home by the imposition of stamp, and other duties, on paper or "skin . . . vellum . . . on which shall be engrossed . . . any declaration . . . in any court of law within the British colonies

. . . " (Stephenson and Marcham, 1972, p. 659). Its negative effect on commerce in the colonies was noted by Parliament, and it was repealed to be followed by the 'Declatory Act' of 1766. Unlike the other Acts, this Act was specifically directed to the American colonies and aimed at ensuring a greater dependency of these colonies upon Great Britain. This Act was therefore in recognition of the fact that this group of colonies were becoming economically and politically removed from their mother country. This dependency was to occur specifically in the realm of the levying of taxes and duties and the limitation of the rights of legislation in general. The 'Townshend Revenue Act' followed in 1767 and was generalized as an "Act for granting certain duties in the British colonies . . . " (Stephenson and Marcham, 1972, p. 660). Nussbaum further elaborates that these Acts were made even more intolerable by a long-standing colonial "unfavourable balance of trade" under the mercantilist system[79] (Nussbaum, 1957, 8, p. 31).

However the most significant Act from which the colonies rebelled was the 'Quebec Act' of 1774. In considering the influence of this Act on colonial tempers Brebner maintains that it wasn't so much "the exact

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[79]This system was a nationalist policy aimed at strengthening the economic policy and position of the Home government.

provisions of the Act" as "the interpretations which embittered Americans placed upon them" (Rawlyk, 1968, p. 12). The principal offending sections of the Act to the colonial Americans concerned the Quebec boundaries and the reinstating of the authority of the Catholic church in Canada. The inclusion of what is now Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota in Quebec was regarded as a threat to individual and commercial interests south of Quebec who wished to expand westwards, particularly in terms of the creation and maintenance of such commercial monopolies as the Fur trade. The recognition of the authority of the Catholic church in Quebec aroused the ire of Protestant colonials, many of whom had fled anti-Catholic sentiment in Europe, and feared domination by the Catholic church in their adopted colony. Others saw it as a recognition of French authority in the north giving an increased threat of French invasion southwards. The final indignity following the Quebec Act was a series of 'coercive Acts' in 1774 principally instituted to bring rebellious Massachusetts, particularly Boston, to heel.

It was at this stage that the second aspect of events just prior to the Revolution began; that is, the 'people's response.' This response came in the form of a meeting of the newly established Continental Congress

at Philadelphia in September of 1774. This meeting decided to institute a commercial boycott against England by "agreeing not to import anything from Great Britain or Ireland or any staples from the British West Indies, and after September 1, 1775, to export nothing thither" (Rawlyk, 1968, pp. 30-31). Other colonies who did not agree would also be boycotted.[80] Although this was the first major response the 'people's response' had unofficially begun with such activities as the dumping of 380 chests of tea into Boston harbour on Dec. 16th, 1773, in protest against the duties levied on such items (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 84). Other activities included the burning of Governor Tryon's house in New York in the same month.

The final protest came with the Declaration of Independence on July 4th, 1776, whereby the thirteen rebelling colonies became thirteen independent states, "no longer with any tie to Great Britain and with, as yet, no organic union among themselves" (Wrong, 1935, p. 316). However, despite this lack of union, the Declaration of Independence became the overt symbol of the intention of the rebelling colonies to become inde-

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[80] On October 26, 1774, an appeal was made to Canada to join the rebellion.

pendent from Great Britain and the constitutional and legal framework within which this independence would be achieved. It was also the context within which the Haldimand administration had to operate in Canada.

Thus the Haldimand administration had to deal with two vital issues: the first was the need to protect the frontiers as perceived from the British point-of-view, together with coping with the influx of colonists loyal to the British cause; the second issue concerned the economic investment of British capital in Canada; the most significant investment in the study area being the Fur trade. These two issues will be discussed in the next two chapters.

CHAPTER THREE

HALDIMAND'S DEFENCE POLICY AND ITS RELATION TO NIAGARA ON THE WEST BANK

In this chapter it will be argued that the defence policy was one of the prime ingredients, and a major motivating force, of the Haldimand administration, and one of two principal policies responsible for the creation of the settlement on the west bank of the Niagara river. In discussing this policy the chapter will be divided into two parts: the first will substantiate the existence of such a policy and the second will deal with its three main aspects and the relation of each to Niagara.

The need for a defence policy during the Haldimand administration was evidenced by the fact that the American Revolutionary War was given its mandate one year prior to Haldimand's appointment to Canada in 1777. Thus beside the portfolio of Governor-General of Canada, Haldimand held the military commission of Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in North America. This military role was clearly spelled out by Lord George Germaine, then colonial secretary, when he stated that "the Security and Defence of the Province (of Canada) must . . .

be the primary object of . . . Attention"[81] (H.P., 16, p. 28). Security and defence were the two principal aspects of the British military policy in relation to Canada. Security was the means by which Canada would be retained in British possession, and defence was the way by which the network of military posts would guarantee this security.

In terms of security, the Upper Posts,[82] of which Niagara was one, were to play a key role. It was considered that "the Importance of the Possession of Canada" principally depended upon the retention of these posts; the most important being Niagara and Detroit because the "Navigation of the Lakes" depended on them and rendered them "objects of particular attention" (H.P., 16, p. 119). However, the reason for the retention of these posts, and therefore Canada, was less military than civil. The Upper Posts were seen as essential in terms of "The Trading Interests of this Country . . . " (H.P., 45, p. 7). In other words, Canada was to be retained largely on the basis of its contribution to British mercantile interests; chiefly

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[81]The fact that Germaine omitted to mention an offensive role suggests that at this stage the British government expected the loss of the Thirteen colonies.

[82]The Upper Posts were the forts between Carleton Island and Michilimackinac along the Great Lakes chain.

the Fur trade from the north and western interior and the fishing trade along the Atlantic seaboard, principally in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and on the Labrador coast (H.P., 16, p. 21). In terms of the Fur trade the Upper Posts were significant because of their proximity to the fur sources[83] and their location along a water transportation network from the interior to the Atlantic seaboard. Niagara was part of this chain and thus became an integral part of the security of the province. Also important was the proximity of Niagara, as well as Detroit, to rebel centres, which increased their risk of attack from the south, thus effectually cutting off the Fur trade. Fort Niagara was particularly important in this respect because its capture would prevent Detroit and Michilimackinac from receiving supplies via the Great Lakes route, the major supply route.

The other prong of Haldimand's military commission, defence, was also particularly relevant to the Niagara area. Haldimand had two main aims in his defence policy; one was to cut off all possible rebel routes into Canada[84] and the other was to make the military posts

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[83]See Chapter Four on the role of Niagara in the Fur trade.

[84]Haldimand stated that his "first care . . . (would) be to fortify . . . the Avenues into the Provinces" (H.P., 16, p. 14).

defensible.[85] These two aims went hand in glove with each other and both were relevant to establishing the importance of Niagara and its eventual settlement.

In terms of the cutting off of rebel routes into Canada, Haldimand had four main routes which he considered of importance. The first and most important was the Lake Champlain route (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 133) (see Map 6). This was a logical conclusion in terms of the historical importance of this route to the French and British in North America. Haldimand knew the ease with which rebels would move up the Hudson and join up with Lake Champlain via Lake George. This had been one of the major routes of advance of the English against the French in 1758 while Haldimand was in command at Saratoga. This route, well known to the rebels,[86] led directly to the most populated parts of Canada and its seat of government, an area which paradoxically contained the most sympathizers to the rebel cause. Thus Haldimand saw it as the most important route to defend.

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[85] In his sketch of the military state of the Province Haldimand was concerned at the "defenceless state" of the "forts and Posts" (H.P., 16, p. 11).

[86] In 1775 Ticonderoga and the Champlain-Richelieu valley was the centre for a skirmish between Ethan Allen and the British. It was also the route that Montgomery's army took to capture Montreal (Rawlyk, 1968, pp. 15-17).



The Arena of the American Revolutionary War, 1775-83 (Kerr, 1975, p. 33).

However, from the British government and mercantile viewpoint, the most important centres to defend were the forts of Niagara and Detroit. Their position "on the back of the colonies" (H.P., 16, p. 20) led the British colonial administration to fear an attack via the Oswego/Mohawk or Ohio/Mississippi rivers, which could not be effectively repulsed because of their considerable distance from the military headquarters. Thus Haldimand was being pressured to defend all four routes; the Lake Champlain route, at the head of which was Montreal and Quebec City; the Mohawk route, at the head of which was Fort Niagara; the Oswego route via the Oswego river to Fort Oswego; and the Mississippi/Ohio line giving access to Fort Detroit and even Fort Michilimackinac.

The second part of Haldimand's defence policy, the defensibility of the military posts, also established the importance of Niagara. This centred around a survey of the defensible position of the Upper Posts conducted in 1779 (H.P., 41, p. 11). From this survey Haldimand developed both a defensive and offensive position.[87] The defensive position centred around the forts and their military strength, while the offensive position centred

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[87] It is only historic hindsight that has shown that Haldimand did not have to counter a major offensive by the rebels. His military policy had to prepare for such an eventuality.

around a policy of harassment of rebel centres along the frontier between the rebels and the British (Wrong, 1935, p. 330). Fort Niagara was targeted as a good base for such harassment and thus an important link in the chain of defence. Thus from both the aspect of security and defence Niagara was regarded as an important area to the British. This importance established its role as a centre for the application of the Haldimand policies relative to the administration of Canada; one of which was the settlement on the west bank of the Niagara.

In the application of his military policy to Niagara Haldimand combined both the aspects of security and defence, the two being closely intertwined at the administrative level applicable to the Upper Posts. The policy concerning the security and defence of Niagara was three pronged. Each prong had a part to play in the settlement on the west bank. The first prong concerned the need to garrison Niagara because of its important role as the major transshipment centre for the Great Lakes transportation route. In this process one part of the garrison would be located on the west bank forming a precursor to settlement. Brehm[88] justified the role of Niagara as a transshipment centre in his 1779 report by stating that Niagara "was the most

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[88]Brehm was Haldimand's aide-de-camp.

centrical place for the supplying of the other Posts" (H.P., 41, p. 65). Its position at a geographical break-line between the upper and lower Great Lakes made it a logical place for the storage of goods either going into the interior or returning to the east. To this end Brehm suggested "a store or Magazine" (H.P., 41, p. 65) to ensure the proper storage of such goods. The second prong concerned the need to minimize the high cost of the war effort particularly in terms of feeding and provisioning the troops, Indians and Loyalists. It can be said that this prong was the most relevant to the settlement on the west bank because it led to the development of the 'agricultural scheme' designed to minimize such costs. The third prong was an attempt to create a defensive settlement location pattern that would help to keep Canada loyal to the British colonial system. These three prongs are closely bound together by the common need for survival on the frontier, a circumstance which makes them particularly relevant to the settlement on the west bank. However their policy effectiveness was greatly hindered by the great distance between the forts and the consequent problems of communication.

In relation to the first prong of this policy, the garrisoning of Fort Niagara presented a major problem

to Haldimand. In terms of troops available Haldimand had only about 6,000 of which only 3,500 were British military regulars.[89]

A problem with these regulars was that they had only "been two winters in the Country & therefore cannot be so expert . . . as the Americans" (H.P., 16, p. 13). The non-British units were largely made up of troops belonging to, and administered by, the Duke of Brunswick in Germany (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 141). These troops also presented problems because of their mercenary status and their unfamiliarity with frontier military methods, terrain and weather.[90] A further problem related to provisioning and equipment was that in the event of an invasion Haldimand could "deploy no more than 2,500 men in the field . . . and not for more than two months" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 126). Thus Haldimand's principal aim was to find troops that were suitable for active campaign duty in the field, while being backed up by English and German troops garrisoned at the Fort. He drew such troops from two sources: the Indians and the Loyalists.

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[89]Washington had about 8,000 regulars.

[90]Haldimand stated that the Germans were "heavy troops, unused to the snow shoe, to handling the Axe & the Hatchet, only fit for Garrison duty . . ."(H.P., 16, p. 13).

The selection of Indians for scouting and raiding duty along the frontier was an unavoidable military manoeuvre. The involvement of the Indians in both the Fur trade and the Revolutionary war meant that both of these areas of influence would suffer without Indian support. As well, theoretically this dual role of the Indians would help to ease the financial burden of maintaining two separate streams of movement of Indian personnel into the interior. More importantly however, was the British concern over their tenuous hold of forts and trading posts established on Indian territorial possessions. In this respect Indian loyalty to the Crown was imperative and must be maintained at all costs. To a certain extent this British reliance on Indian assistance could be justified on practical grounds; such as, the unparalleled scouting ability of the Indians, knowledge of the frontier, acclimatization to weather conditions and a complex Indian communication network. Despite an obvious cynicism in relation to this Indian support (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 170), Haldimand believed that they would preserve the Upper country for the British.

At Niagara, the Indian department, administered by Guy Johnson[91] was seen by Brehm to be "the first and

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[91] Colonel Guy Johnson was the nephew and son-in-law of St. William Johnson.

most important . . . " (H.P., 41, p. 35). This can be measured in part by the number of people involved in its operation in 1783 (see Table 3). The loyal Indians at Niagara were the Six Nations, a confederacy that involved the Senecas in the west, the Mohawks in the east, the Onandagas, the Oneidas near Oneida lake, and the Tuscaroras and Cayugas near Lake Cayuga (Cruikshank, 1893, p. 16). As the loyalty of these Indians was not necessarily guaranteed[92] their organization into military units was specifically directed by Haldimand. The basic principles for military units involving Indians was that they were to be "strongly united . . . adopt . . . (the) system and be advised by officers of Knowledge and Experience . . . " (H.P., 45, p. 350). To this end seven companies of Indians were organized with a white officer in command. Besides the logic of having a white commanding officer used to the British system, it ensured that the Indians received adequate provisions and that there was no fraud in the distribution of such provisions (H.P., 47, p. 6).

One major problem in organizing these military units of Indians lay in the Indian adherence to

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[92] Guy Johnson advised the government to "occupy the Indians in such place and manner as would afford them least opportunity of conversing with Rebel Agents" (H.P., 47, pp. 3-4).

TABLE 3

A LIST OF OFFICERS ETC. THE INDIAN DEPARTMENT DRAWING PROVISIONS AT NIAGARA, 6th. AUGUST, 1783

NAMES	REMARKS
Mr. Dease Mrs. Dease Nicholas Miller Samuel Cox Rudolph Kyser Margaret Snick Three servants 9	 Forrester Ditto Prisoner Ditto Two extraordinary
Captain Tice Christopher Bellinger Stephen Bush 3	Prisoner Ditto
Captain Powell Mrs. Powell Negro Elizth McCammon 4	 Old Prisoner Woman
Captn Nelles Lieutn Nelles Mr. Nelles Servants 4	
Captn Lottridge Servant 2	In the Indian Country
Lieut. Bowen Servant 2	
Lieut. Dackstader John Myers Forrester 2	On command
Lieut. Daniel Service Jacob Kaderman 2	Prisoner

NAMES	REMARKS
Lieut. John Clement Mr. James Clement Two women One child Negro Boy Girl 8	 Small Prisoner Children
Lieut. B. Johnson Three children One Servant One Negro 6	By order Brigadier Genl Maclean
Lieut. Jacob Service Servant 2	In the Indian Country
Mr. Crysler Mrs. Crysler Two children Negro 5	
Mr. Young Mrs. Young Two children Negro 5	
Mr. Wilkinson Mrs. Wilkinson Servant Negro Prisoner 5	 Small Boy
Mr. Thompson Servant 2	
Lieut. W. Johnson Servant 2 63	
Mr. Nic Stevens John Stevens	

NAMES	REMARKS
George Stuart Aaron Stevens John Wood 5	 Prisoner
Timothy Murphy Barnabas Cain 2	Smiths
James McGregor Wm. Steadman Thos. Sutton Owen Connor Fredk Schermerhorn Jacob Whitherick Willm Tremble Willm Harper Benj. Beacroft 9	Serjeant Artificer Forrester Ditto Ditto Ditto Ditto Ditto Ditto
John Friel Wife Child 3	Artificer
John Simons Three Loyalist 4	Late a forrester From Detroit
Thomas McMicken Sister Prisoner 3	Farmer at ½ ration per day
Six Prisoners over the river 6	Three small children
Christopher Scoll John Scoll James Twiney Jacob van Garde Joseph Newman Sopher Hawkins 6 103	Prisoner Ditto Ditto Ditto Ditto Ditto

(H.P., 44, p. 224)

boundaries laid down by various treaty agreements amongst themselves. In 1779 Brehm commented that like any other nation "the Six Nations who live Easterly, defending their part of the country are not very willing to go toward Tuscowrowas, Beever Creek and the Kittanin . . . " (H.P., 41, p. 51). To help with this problem Joseph Brant[93] was put in command of the Six Nations to provide a rallying cry, and to be a bargaining force in dealing with other Indian nations. Another problem lay in the differing demands of the Indians for military equipment and uniforms. The Six Nations requested green cloth for their uniforms instead of red as red was too conspicuous in fighting (H.P., 41, p. 51). They also wanted fine gunpowder for their guns, which was not always readily available along the frontier (H.P., 41, p. 73).

The second group of field militia selected by Haldimand was drawn from the Loyalists.[94] The most significant group at Niagara was Butler's Rangers,

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[93]Joseph Brant was a Mohawk chief, also known as Thayendanegea.

[94]It seems likely that it is this group that was referred to in Haldimand's commission as "a corps of Canadians not exceeding one thousand men, . . . to serve a limited time . . . " (H.P., 16, p. 28).

commanded by Colonel John Butler.[95] This group would hopefully not suffer the disadvantages mentioned above specific to British and German troops fighting in a country not their own. These Rangers were not to be considered as part of the regular army because of the specific nature of their duties and their manner of organization. In terms of the nature of their duties they were essentially a guerilla force and as such were expected "to march well, to be able to endure fatigue, and to be a good Marksman . . . " (H.P., 45, p. 24). Other qualities included "dispersing and forming expeditiously, priming and loading carefully, and levelling well; these with personal activity and alertness are all the qualities that can be expected, or wished for in a Ranger" (H.P., 46, p. 160). The Rangers were also to work in closely with the Indians and to copy some of their tactics in warfare. Thus in terms of their military organization they were to remain, as much as possible, separate from the regular army corps, and such military activities as "the little Minutia and Forms of Parade" (H.P., 45, p. 24) were not to be expected of them. Due to the fact that they were not a conscripted force, and because their duties were largely

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[95]Colonel John Butler was a Loyalist who had owned property in the Mohawk valley, at Butlersburg, New York (Smy, 1975, p. 1).

offensive and highly dangerous, they were paid more than those in the regular army. Haldimand showed wisdom by stating that if such a highly paid corps were to be considered as a regular corps in the army "it would be a very bad precedent, and might even encourage desertion from other Corps on Account of the high pay" (H.P., 45, p. 24). It was in response to this policy of separateness that the Rangers were located on the west bank.

In size the Rangers consisted of eight companies, but Butler requested permission to "raise two more companies" (H.P., 46, pp. 191-2). These companies numbered about 400 excluding officers and other staff, but this number varied with the availability of men at the time of each military manoeuvre[96] (see Table 4).

With this group of Rangers it was hoped that the advantages the rebels had in their own country would be offset. This would help to balance out the military strengths on both sides of the frontier.

As stated earlier, there were also to be regular troops stationed at Niagara, largely for garrison duty, but also to be used in active duty if necessary. These troops included the Kings or 8th Regiment, the

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[96] At Canasadago, in 1779, John Butler had "near three hundred strong, exclusive of Indians . . . " (H.P., 42, p.149).

TABLE 4

DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS IN THE UPPER COUNTRY

Niagara & its Dependencies

	Rank & File	
King's Regiment	267	
34th	162	
Rangers	150	
Royal Artillery	13	592

Detroit

	Rank & File	
King's Regiment	180	
47th	138	
Rangers	50	
Royal Artillery	13	381

Michilimackinac

	Rank & File	
King's Regiment	67	
Royal Artillery	2	69

Carleton Island

	Rank & File	
Royal H. Emigrants	96	
Royal N. York Reg^{t}	200	
Yagars	200	
Royal Artillery	5	501
	Total	1543

N.B. The Rangers amount only to 200 men fit for duty.

A Distribution of Troops in the Upper Country in 1779. (H.P., 42, p. 240).

34th Regiment and the Royal Artillery. However, as shown on Table 4, the numbers of these troops were small and it is highly unlikely that they could have withstood a major siege without additional help.[97]

Besides the land troops Haldimand was also concerned about the Navy and sea defence. This was important to the course of the war because of the dependence of the British on water transport, especially its role in maintaining communication with, and between, the Upper Posts. Table 5 lists the size of the Navy on Lake Ontario as comprising six armed vessels and five gunboats carrying an estimated total of up to 950 men. Although this does not seem a large number of vessels for such a body of water as Lake Ontario, it was far in advance of anything the rebels could provide at the time. As well it had the advantage of direct communication with the Atlantic seaboard and England via the St. Lawrence. This route, if kept free from rebel control, prevented the fleet from becoming landlocked as would be the case on Lake Champlain. However, as noted earlier, Niagara was an important ship-building centre; three vessels and two gunboats having been built there. Thus, Fort Niagara, and its dependencies, must be

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[97] In 1782 it was stated that "our Whole Strength at Niagara . . . consists only in 409 men" (H.P., 43, p. 208).

TABLE 5

GENERAL RETURN OF THE FORCE AND BURTHEN OF HIS MAJESTY'S ARMED VESSELS ON LAKE ONTARIO. 10th, SEPTEMBER, 1782

Scone At Niagara

Force on Board

8 men, 2 Guns, 4 Swivells, 10 Muskets
14 Men for current service
16 Men for actual service
2 Guns, 6 Swivells, 12 Muskets, 5 Pistols ^{prs}, no spears

Dimensions

Range on the Gun Deck 51 feet
Breadth: 12 feet 10 inches
Depth of Hold: 3 feet
Height between Decks: 5'9"
Draught of Water: 7 feet

State and Condition

When & Where Built: Niagara
State of Hull: Good
Rigging: Good

Burthen

In Guns: 19
In Barrel Bulk: 200

Estimation of Troops that may be Carried

The Hold Full: 40
With the Undermentioned Barrels or Thereabout: Men 60
Barrels: 100

Other Vessels (Armed Vessels)

Lemnade — Ship built Carleton Island 1782. Carries up to 250 men. Captain David Belton.

Seneca — Snow, built near Oswegatchie 1777. Carries up to 230 men. Captain Bouchett.

Haldimand — Snow, built new Oswegatchie 1771. Carries up to 250 men. Sails good. Captain William Baker.

Caldwell — Sloop, built Niagara 1778. Carries up to 60 men. Captain David Lowen.

Mohawk — Built Niagara 1780. Carries up to 60 men. Captain Yeves Chiquett.

Gun Boats — Three at Carleton Island) Two at Niagara)--Built Niagara. Carry up to 60 men.

These are not ordinary vessels.

A General Return of Armed Vessels on Lake Ontario in 1782 (H.P., 41, p. 125).

protected by both land and sea from rebel advance, which earmarked it for government policy creation.

As well as the actual troops involved Haldimand was concerned about the physical state of the forts, especially as a considerable period of time had elapsed since their use during the French wars. At Fort Niagara Haldimand had been involved previously with a building and garden program[98] and he was very familiar with its strengths and weaknesses. To this end, during his administration, Fort Niagara underwent a program of repairs and rebuilding indicated by the reports from the Engineers Department,[99] although at Niagara the repairs on the west bank cannot be seen as indicative of permanence. The building program on the west bank did, however, give credence to its significance during the war and the possibility of future permanent settlement. To Haldimand, the Engineers reports were part of a policy of organized and consistent attention to the defence of the posts.

The second prong of Haldimand's policy concerning the security and defence of the Upper Posts was the

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[98]After the capture of Fort Niagara by the British in 1759 Haldimand was brought from Fort Oswego to "direct the repairs to the military installations above and below the Falls" (Braider, 1972, p. 125). In doing this he restored Fort Niagara, built Fort Schlosser, and established a shipyard on Navy Island.

[99]Repairs to buildings included the provision store, Navy Hall and the Rangers barracks on the west bank.

minimizing the expenses of the war effort. This aspect was vitally important because without the means to continue the war effort defence would be meaningless. This prong also led directly to the settlement on the west bank. The issue of financing the Revolutionary war was being keenly debated by the British Parliament (Smith, 1955, p. 402), and Haldimand was being pressured to minimize the costs in the colonies. Thus in accordance with the organizational policy Haldimand addressed the expenses according to the various departments of the service.[100] At Fort Niagara there were several departments involved but only the two most significant will be discussed in this thesis; that is, the Indian department and the Military department, which handled the administration of the various corps of servicement. It is difficult to discuss the departments in separate categories because of the blurring of department lines characteristic of the Haldimand papers. For example, as seen in the chapter on settlement, the military department was involved with Loyalists and their settlement, while the Indian department concerned itself with both the war and the Fur trade. At each post there was only one commander to handle all aspects of the service and in correspondence with him, often for the sake of brevity,

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[100]The service refers to the 'King's service.'

Haldimand would make no distinction between the various departments as such; the distinction being implied. In this thesis, however, an attempt will be made to discuss the departments separately in order that a clearer picture of Haldimand's policies regarding defence may be seen.

In terms of the Indian department the expenses will be considered under two headings: firstly, the expense of feeding and provisioning Indians and their families and secondly, the expense of buying Indian loyalty. Not only were both of these expenses relevant to Niagara, but they were a major expense and a significant reason for the creation of the 'agricultural scheme' to help diminish them.

The expense of feeding and provisioning Indians at Fort Niagara was in proportion to the number of Indians at the fort at any one time. These fluctuating numbers presented a considerable problem in forecasting the needs for provisions at the fort for any year. In Table 6 it is shown that for one month in 1778-9, 1,581 Indians were present out of an expected total of 2,623. An addendum to this table noted that two of the tribes would remain permanently at the post causing long-term expenses in provisioning. After the destruction in 1779 of the Genesee Indian country by General Sullivan, nearly

TABLE 6

NAMES OF THE NATIONS	PRESENT	GONE	TOTAL
Mohaishes	276		276
Senecas	260	272	532
Onandagoes	267	45	312
Ohios	9	27	36
Onidas	31	13	44
Nanticocks	78	42	120
Mycondres	4		4
Connasaragas	17		17
Penesees	5	31	36
Coyougas	128	194	322
Aughguagas	287	80	367
Delawares	41	82	123
Cughnuts	26	131	157
Phoharies	52		52
Connoys		30	30
Cook House Indians	26	52	78
Rundocks	6		6
Tuscarroras	23	26	49
Messesagas	2		2
Aughguagas	26		26
Federonas	7		7
Shimongs	10	17	27
Total	1581	1042	2623

N.B. The Mohawks and Aughguagas will remain at this Post, as the Enemy has destroyed their villages.

(Signed) Mason Bolton, Lieut. Col.

Return of the Indians at Niagara from 30th, Dec., 1778 to 26th, Jan., 1779, inclusive, with the arrivals & departures of the Several Parties of different Nations in that time (H.P., 42, p. 88).

4,000 Indians were present at Niagara all expecting "everything that government could do" (H.P., 47, pp. 17-18). This included being fed, clothed and sheltered at the expense of the British government. The Indians not only congregated at Fort Niagara for reasons of war but also because of natural calamities such as the weather. In 1781 Powell reported that there were more Indians at the fort because the severity of the last winter had destroyed most of their game, resulting in a bad year for hunting (H.P., 43, p. 7). These needs for provisions were deemed legitimate by the British and a part of the expenses of the war effort.

Food provisions were issued in the form of rations. In 1781 the ration was estimated to be "worth but two shillings York curr^{y} (currency) at Niagara . . . " (H.P., 47, p. 20). Of all the rations to the military at Fort Niagara by far the greatest number went to Indians (see Table 7). This expense bothered the commander at Niagara as shown by the addendum at the bottom. These rations included pork and beef which were luxury items at the Fort, being both perishable and bulky to transport. The numbers of Indians receiving rations meant a considerable expense to the government and a

TABLE 7

RETURN OF PROVISIONS ISSUED OUT OF THE KING'S STORE AT NIAGARA BETWEEN THE 25th, DECEMBER 1778 & THE 24th, JANUARY 1779 INCLUSIVE

COMPANIES		RATIONS
General Armstrong's	62	
Lieut. Colonel Bolton's	1966	
Major dePeyster's	1581	
Grenadiers	62	
Lernoult's	62	
Pott's	1649	
Parks'	1736	
Mompesson's	1742	
LeMaistre's	62	
Mathews' Lt. Compy.	1860	
Watts'	26	
King's or 8th Regiment		10,746
47th Regiment		744
Royal Artillery & Conductor		496
Indians & Rangers		57,341
Navy & Artificers		5,067
Teamsters		744
Commissary & Cooper		62
	Total Rations	75,200

I am really surprised at the number of rations issued to Indians in the above return.

Mason Bolton. Lt Colonel

Showing the number of Rations issued to Indians and Rangers in one month (H.P., 42, p. 87).

cause of concern to Haldimand.[101] The Indians were not however satisfied with these legitimately distributed provisions and supplemented them illegally by poaching on Crown property. Bolton noted that the "Indians not only make free with the Corn, gardens &c but often with . . . cattle . . . even with those under the cannon of this fort" (H.P., 42, p. 67). The cost of these depradations mounted up particularly where provisioning was expensive and unpredictable (see Table 8). Another illegal source of provisions was those acquired from the government contractor in charge of the portage (H.P., 44, p. 6).

One important provision issued to the Indians was rum. Unlike the other 'food' provisions, this was a symbol of loyalty for the Indians. This expenditure is fairly well documented in the Haldimand papers giving evidence of its high cost to the government and the contention surrounding its issue to Indians. Table 9 shows that the expenditure of rum was again proportionate to the numbers of Indians involved which far exceeded the numbers of both the Navy and the Garrison. Table 10

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[101] The quantity of provisions required is indicated by the estimate that "about three hundred barrels of salted pork or beef, as many of flour, beans or peas, Indian corn, and about two carcases of fresh beef were generally given out each time" (Weld, 1795-7, p. 359).

shows the cost of each batteaux load of rum from Montreal to Niagara, at a time when rum was selling in Montreal at fourteen shillings per gallon New York currency (H.P., 41, p. 43).

TABLE 8

The Crown D^{r}.

To Phillip Stedman

1781					
March 6	To transporting 5034 Barrels of Stores, Provisions, Baggage &c. For His Majesty, and Persons employed in His Service (exclusive of 2000 Barrels agreeable to Contract) over the Carrying Place of Niagara, from 6th. March, 1780 to the above date, at 3/-Sterling p^{r} Barrel (p^{r} account) 755.2.0				
	To my Salary for the year 1780	100.0.0			
	Sterling (Dollars & 4/8)	855.2.0	1465	17	0
	To Wages for a Wheelwright as p^{r} receipt		72	0	0
	To Oxen & Horses Killed & destroyed by the Indians on the Carrying Place, between 6th. March, 1780 & 6th. March, 1781, as p^{r} voucher		962	10	0
	New York Currency		2500	7	0

Phillip Stedman

H. Watson Powell

The cost of cattle killed by the Indians on the Carrying Place in the year March 1780 - 1781 (H.P., 43, p. 45).

TABLE 9

		Galls	Pts
To the Garrison		757	
To the Navy		2025	1
To Indians of the King's Store	3736 4		
For Ditto purchased from Mr. Edn. Pollard	623 6	4360	2
Total		7142	3

Expenditure of Rum at Niagara from the 11th. May, 1777 to the 10th. May, 1778 Inclusive (H.P., 41, p. 5).

TABLE 10

			£ Hallifax Currency
22	Barrels 35 Gal^{ns} ea is 770	a 5/6	211.15.0
22	"	a 10/-	11.00.0
7½	Loads to LaChine	a 7/6	2.15.0
3	Loads at y^{r} Cedars	a 7/6	1. 2.6
1	Load at the Mill	a 3/9	3.9
4	Men at 20 Doll^{s}	is	20. 0.0
4	Blankets	a 12/6	2.10.0
56	lbs Pork	a 10^{d}	2. 6.8
150	lbs Biscuit	a 22^{d}	1. 7.6
½	Bushel Peas	a	3.1½
4	Gall^{s} Rum	a 6/-	1. 4.0
?	Bags	a 3/6	10.6
1	?	a	4.2
	Kettle)		
	?) Proportion		
	Painter) as may serve		
	Sail) again		7.6
	Boat Hire		3. 0.0
10	p^{r} c^{t} Wastage on ?		25. 2.0
	Freight from C. I. of 22 B^{ls} a 6/3		6.17.6
			286. 9.2
	Plus 8% gives £291.13.4		
		New York currency	£458. 6.8

Estimate of the cost of a Batteaux-Load of Rum from Montreal to Niagara (H.P., 41, p. 7).

The issue of rum to Indians was a contentious one. At Niagara it was complained that "for these seven years past . . . (Indians have been) lying drunk about this place . . . " (H.P., 44. p. 40). To help solve this problem Haldimand ordered a strict control of rum issuance. No employees of the Indian department were to purchase locally any "Rum, Liquors . . . for the use of the Indians . . . " (H.P., 45, p. 192). All rum supplies were to come from headquarters in the hope that some control could be kept of its issuance. It is important to note however, that the issue of rum was regarded as a major method of keeping Indians loyal, a practise which had been in effect since the beginning of the colonial domination of the Americas. As such, although the practise was deplored, it was continued.[102]

As well as food provisions the Indians were issued with clothing. Bolton noted in 1778 that he would have "two or three thousand Indians who will certainly assemble here in order to receive clothing" (H.P., 42, p. 67).

Besides the expense of food, rum and clothing provisions, the Indians needed military equipment in

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[102]Severance noted the marked slackening off of the Fur trade at Forts Niagara and Frontenac under French rule when the sale of brandy was restricted (Severance, 1906, p. 184).

order to engage in border raids. In terms of rifle powder the Indians preferred fine powder (H.P., 42, p. 181) over coarse powder or buckshot, and in one year they were issued with 101and a half barrels of gunpowder (H.P., 42, p. 181). As this gunpowder was highly explosive it was difficult to transport and therefore expensive to ship to the Upper Posts. It also provided a threat to shipping on Lake Ontario because of the possibility of rebel attack. It was also necessary to outfit the Indians with the military equipment issued to the regular troops. One expensive problem was that, after outfitting, the Indians often did not turn up to serve with the regular troops. "In 1779, of 150 Indians outfitted, only 50 turned up to serve with the Butler's Rangers" (H.P., 42, p. 214) the rest having their uniforms as a present from the British government.

However, as noted earlier, it was the buying of Indian loyalty that represented by far the greatest expense to the British government during the war. The agreement that the British made with the Indians regarding loyalty was stated by Governor Hamilton to the western Indians; "If they would continue their alliance with His Majesty and take up arms in favour of Government, they and their Family's would be supported, their wants supplyed, and their rights to their lands maintained . . ."

(H.P., 41, p. 35). Rum and presents are not mentioned in this agreement but these had become the traditional medium through which favours from the Indians were brought.[103]

The presents issued to Indians ranged from arm-bands and earrings, to tomahawks, brass kettles, brass tomahawks and husbandry equipment (see Table 11). These presents also included rum, noted earlier as a food provision, which it was argued, "The Indians cannot be deprived of . . . however destructive it is, without creating . . . discontent . . . " (H.P., 39, p. 74).

There were several problems associated with the issue of presents to the Indians, which increased the expense of distribution of such presents. One problem was the discrimination between Indians on presents issued for particular services rendered.[104] One group singled out for special attention were the chiefs. Table 11 shows the issue of such textiles as serge, linen, striped cotton, and fine black stroud as well as fine blankets and ribbons. Other gifts included

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[103] It was estimated that these presents plus the salaries of the officers in the Indian department cost the British Crown £100,000 Stg. per annum (Weld, 1795-7, p. 360).

[104] Guy Johnson suggested "that some Indians of Superior Utility . . . should have superior Marks of favour . . . " (H.P., 47, p. 8-9)

knives, rings, brooches and crosses. These had to be imported from England and were a significant expense. Joseph Brant, described as "better instructed and much more intelligent than any other Indian" (H.P., 44, p. 98) was also given special favours because of his valuable service to government.[105]

Another problem arose with the differing demands, for presents, of Indians according to their nationality and nature. Guy Johnson recorded that "the Six Nations are not so fond of gawdy Colours, as of Good and Substantial things . . . " (H.P., 47, pp. 8-9). However as the preferences of the various Indian nations became known it was easier to plan for their presents and not only cut down on wastage, but on the expense associated with such wastage.

As the war progressed however, there was more encroachment on Indian land by the rebels and the British as well as the creation of uncertainty amongst the Indians as to the outcome of the war. As a result, the Indians became more demanding and the expenses rose proportionately. Guy Johnson complained that "the demand for Axes, hoes, kettles &c . . . is far beyond what I

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[105]Brant was sent "one hundred coats, waistcoats and breeches with . . . Blankets and leggins which . . . may be distributed to whoever Brant chuses . . . " (H.P., 45, p. 16).

have been able to supply . . . " (H.P., 47, p. 6). The desires of the Indians had also been extended to many Articles "some of them Expensive . . . which they (the Indians) had not formerly received or expected" (H.P., 47, pp. 8-9). This increasing demand posed a threat to the British cause unless it could be met.

TABLE 11

INVENTORY OF INDIAN PRESENTS SENT TO COLONEL BUTLER FOR THE USE OF CHIEFS &c, AS OCCASION MAY REQUIRE

25	Pairs 11' point Blankets (Triple)
26¼	yds. Serge
34	yds. fine Black Stroud
152	yds. Callicoe
228	yds. Callimancoe
272	yds. Linen
22	pieces Ribbon
38	yds. Russia Sheeting
45 3/4	yds. Striped Cotton
6	dozen Knives
13	dozen Rings
12	Moons
157	Broaches
10	Crosses
24	Pairs Armbands
6	Pairs Wristbands
6	Gorgets
5	Boxes

(Signed)

R. Wilkinson

A List of Presents given to the Indian Chiefs (H.P., 44, p. 98).

The method by which such provisions and presents were distributed was a further source of expense to government. They were usually distributed either at the fort or at Indian councils (see Appendix 5). The Indian councils in particular were a considerable financial drain on government. At Niagara Bolton commented that "the meeting of the Indians in December 1777 cost Government £14,000 besides presents sent . . . to the amount / as I am informed / of £20,000 more N.Y. currency . . . " (H.P., 42, p. 81). To a major extent this expense was regarded as the high price of loyalty. Haldimand noted that to retain the Indians in "our interests has been attended with a very heavy expense . . . " (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 164). However the commanders at the Posts became disillusioned over this expense and Bolton, at Niagara, informed Haldimand that "to keep the Indians in good temper (as it is called) has cost old England much more than all the Posts are worth" (H.P., 42, p. 82). Despite this, the system was continued because it was familiar to, and expected by, the Indians and provided the greatest advantage to them.

Not only did the system continue but as the Revolutionary war drew to a close there was pressure on the government by the Indians to increase their pay-offs in the face of rumours concerning the newly established

boundaries between the rebel colonies and Canada. At Niagara Maclean stated the Indian principle that they were to have their own country secured to them and not ceded to America (H.P., 44, p. 118). Thus there was pressure on Haldimand to keep the Indians in "Good Humour" (H.P., 44, p. 99) in the face of treaty arrangements unfavourable to Indians loyal to the British. Thus present-giving was to continue unabated. It was to counteract this that such schemes as the 'agricultural scheme' were initiated.

Another expense to the British government was the need to maintain white loyalty to the Crown; chiefly the loyalty of the Loyalist Rangers, who were closely associated with the Indian department. This loyalty was maintained chiefly through the high pay issued to the Rangers in return for service along the frontier; the provisioning of Loyalists and their families throughout the war, and the attention to the settlement of Loyalists at the end of the war. Loyalty through Ranger settlement will be discussed later in this chapter. At Niagara, apart from the settlement on the west bank however, the government showed its indulgence to the Rangers in other ways. The List of Sundry Articles wanted for the Use of Butler's Rangers (H.P. 46, p. 145) includes such luxuries on the frontier as soap, candles, chocolate, coffee, tea

and sugar. Thus despite the difficulties of getting provisions to the Upper posts it could be arranged by government if it felt that the cause warranted it. This sort of discrimination was typical of the Haldimand administration's attitude to extraordinary devotion to service during the war.

The second department within which expenses were to be minimized was that of the Military department or the white army service. This department will be divided into two sections according to the nature of the service. The first section is that of the regular army. The second is that of the corps of provincials raised in Canada--the most prominent of which at Niagara were the Butler's Rangers. As was discussed earlier these are not regarded as part of the regular army because of their nature of service, military experience and high pay.[106]

In regard to both the regular service and the Rangers there were two principal expenses at the Upper Posts; the cost of provisioning the troops with food, and the cost of military equipment. As with the Indian department, these were the most significant expenses at Niagara and a major reason for the 'agricultural scheme.'

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[106] In computing the army expenses those of the regular army were called 'ordinary'while those of the Provincials or Rangers were called 'extraordinary.'

In terms of the food expenses the costs were three-pronged; the supplying of "Good, Sound and Wholesome Provisions, the Regularity of Those Supplies, and their Safe Arrival at the Place of Destination . . . " (H.P., 16, p. 28). In supplying provisions the policy of government was that the goods be supplied from the King's store at each post, which in turn was supplied with goods either from Montreal, Quebec City or London, England. To a certain extent Haldimand condoned this policy by stating that it was better "to secure flour in England rather than from Quebec as the English flour was superior"[107] (H.P., 16, p. 28). As Haldimand's main concern was his army, he could ill-afford to take chances with their diet, so the most reliant system would win. However he suggested that these flour imports be supplemented by that grown in Canada to the extent of "one half of the Flour wanted for the Troops" (H.P., 16, p. 28). By now Haldimand was well aware of the problems with the import of such flour. One of the major problems was that it had to be sent in late March

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[107]The reason for this was that "the Grain, being mostly Spring Wheat, has not . . . Solidity or Consistence . . . " (H.P., 16, p. 28). Other problems associated with provisioning with flour from Canada were related to the packing of the flour for transport and droughts in summer.

or the first week of April in order for it to be useful for passage to the interior. Other problems that arose from this were an under-supply from England, (H.P., 16, p. 163) provision ships being sent and intercepted en-route, and the spoiling of goods upon their arrival in Canada.

The problems were magnified once the second leg of the journey began--from Montreal to Niagara. In this sense the three-pronged expenses at the Upper Posts became one. Haldimand noted that due to inadequate understanding of packing procedures and the length of Transport "to far distant Posts, such as Niagara" the flour grows "sour and . . . musty and therefore cannot be used" (H.P., 16, p. 28). One problem in shipping was that goods were often sent from Montreal "in common trunks, often without a Rope . . . and the Key . . . tyed to the Handle; . . . therefore such as intend robbing them, can find no difficulty . . . " (H.P., 43, p. 260). Another problem was that in bad weather holes had to be bored into the casks to let the pickle out so that the barrels could be lightened (H.P., 41, p. 65). Thus by the time the food reached Niagara it was bad. There was also the problem of goods not being sent up in time which led to them either remaining by the way, or arriving too late and being spoiled (H.P., 41, p. 65).

The direct result of these problems was that the commanders at Niagara began to buy goods locally "at a great and advanced price" (H.P., 41, p. 65).

It was the purchase of goods from local merchants that Haldimand most wished to avoid. The principal reason for this was that the merchants had to import their goods via the same means as the government, using the King's ships. The difference was however, that the cost, in the case of the merchant import, was borne privately. Thus there was a mark-up on goods at Niagara in order to cover these costs, as well as the inclusion of a profit margin over and above the cost of transport. Haldimand therefore gave specific instructions as to the purchase of goods from local merchants. The first instruction was that the provisions were to be paid for in money, rather "than by returning it in kind" (H.P., 45, p. 20). The returning payment in kind was likely a payment of rum which could either lead to the illicit distribution of rum to soldiers or Indians, or a highly priced black market distribution of rum. The second instruction was that the officers at the fort and in the Indian Department must not purchase rum, liquors or provisions for

private distribution principally to Indians[108] (H.P., 45, p. 192).

As well as these problems of supplying food provisions to regular troops and Rangers at the garrison, the Rangers had special needs in the field. After Sullivan's destruction of the Indian towns and countryside, and the Rangers and British militia destruction of "a good part of the Rebel frontier" Butler noted that "The Rangers have not only farther to go, but are obliged to buy provisions / when they can get any / at an advanced price . . . " (H.P., 47, p. 15).

Haldimand's policy of lessening the costs at Niagara therefore meant attention to the details of these food provisioning costs. Brehm suggested that as an immediate measure the stores sent to the Upper Posts should be sent with "a proper person . . . who should after delivering them, bring a Receipt of the Same, . . . of haveing delivered them in good order and condition . . . " (H.P., 41, p. 65). As well an adequate storeroom was to be built at Niagara to contain the provisions adequately (H.P., 43, p. 227). Haldimand further advised that "None but those whose services are

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[108] Maclean noted that Guy Johnson of the Indian department was issuing wine, tea and sugar to Mohawk Indians in his house. He felt that these articles were not only "Extraordinary, new and uncommon" but also "extravagant" (H.P., 44, p. 114).

required and cannot be dispensed with may be supply'd from . . . (the) stores" (H.P., 45, p. 6). This would prevent nonmilitary personnel from being able to subsist adequately at Niagara thus lessening the numbers of mouths to be fed.[109] These immediate cost-cutting measures however were only the tip of the iceberg. Haldimand was to be forced to consider the major cost of importing at least half of the army provisions into Canada, and the further cost of transporting all the provisions for the army into the interior. Therefore his "plan of Agriculture" became an increasingly logical solution to such costs.

The second major provisioning cost at Niagara was that of provisioning both the regular militia and the Rangers with military equipment. This provisioning will also be seen to include barracks to house the militia which has important relevance to the west bank settlement. The military equipage required by the regular troops in Canada is shown in Table 12. The clothing is the same for both the regulars and the emigrants and provincials,

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[109]Haldimand informed Bolton that he wanted "all Prisoners and Idle People from the frontiers sent down to either Quebec or Montreal" (H.P., 45, p. 18) in order to lessen the expense at Fort Niagara.

but they differ in one respect--that of military accessories. The regulars were not to be issued with tents, haversacks, canteens, campkettles, hand hatchets and wood axes. This implies that they were not to be involved in field duty but were to be restricted mainly to garrison duty, unless in an emergency, such as a major rebel advance.[110] The emigrants and provincials equipment was extra to that already present at the Posts, including the extra blankets for the regulars, and thus was an extra expense to government. The regular army's expenses had already been estimated as part of the defence budget but the Rangers expenses had not. The cost of keeping the Rangers in the field under increasingly arduous conditions was an unexpected surprise to government. Subsistence for the Butler's Rangers alone was almost half that of the subsistence for all provincials (H.P., 39, p. 307) and likely to increase as conditions along the frontier deteriorated.

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[110]The discrimination between British regulars and 'Provincials' would have caused dissension in the service and run counter to Haldimand's policy of fairness to all, had it not become increasingly obvious to all involved in the service that the circumstances of the war required particular skills and experience. The regular army was far less able to handle the rigors of this war than their more highly paid colleagues.

TABLE 12

For the Regulars in Canada

5 Battalions-----at 700 Men each-----3500
1750 Pairs of Blankets Exclusive of those for the Barracks
3500 Pairs of Mittens
7000 Pairs of Shoes
7000 Pairs of Shoe Soles
3500 Pairs of Leggings
7000 Pairs of W. Worsted Stockings
Linen and Thread for 7000 Shirts
Drill for 3500 Pairs of Breeches

Emigrants & Provincials

1000 suppose 2000
Tents for 2000 Private Men
1000 Pairs of Blankets
2000 Pairs of Mittens
4000 Pairs of Shoes
4000 Pairs of Shoe Soles
2000 Pairs of Leggings
4000 Pairs of W. Worsted Stockings
Linen and Thread for 4000 Shirts
Drill for 2000 Pairs of Breeches
2000 Haversacks
2000 Canteens
500 Camp Kettles
500 Hand Hatchets
200 Wood Axes

Geo Germain

To the Lords of the Treasury

A List of the Military Equipage for the Troops in Canada (H.P., 16, p. 127).

Military equipage also included medicines in case of wounding or sickness. Due to their strenuous duty and lack of adequate provisions in the field the Rangers were often sick (H.P., 43, p. 198). The surgeon at Niagara frequently complained of furnishing both the sick regulars and the Rangers with medicines paid for out of his own pocket.[111] (H.P., 42, p. 359). This was later acknowledged by government by a payment of fifty pounds New York currency "in consequence of the Extra Expences of Medicines & Trouble at this Post since the beginning of the Present War . . . " (H.P., 43, p. 30). This payment was inadequate to cover the cost of administering medicines to an average of a hundred sick soldiers per year (H.P., 43, p. 30). The fact that the war dragged on for so long, under such debilitating circumstances, was unforeseen by the government and even such 'minor' expenses as that of medicines became a drain on government that it was reluctant to meet.

Housing of the troops was an important consideration at Niagara; the effectiveness of the accommodation reflected by the state of well-being of the forces. Apart from the rebuilding of Fort Niagara to a standard sufficient for housing troops on active duty, Haldimand

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[111]The surgeon was allowed a shilling stg. per day for expenditure on medicines (H.P., 42, p. 376).

was faced with the building of barracks for the Rangers. Due to the policy, previously stated by Haldimand, of keeping the Rangers separate from the regular troops, Bolton was determined to keep the Rangers from being accommodated in the fort at Niagara. At this time they were housed "in the Bottom, where in Fall and Spring, there is half leg deep of water and mud . . . " (H.P., 46, p. 128). After some discussion the barracks for the Rangers were built on the west bank at an estimated cost of £2527.19.2 (H.P., 45, p. 3). Despite these new arrangements the Rangers were crowded and it was argued that unless log houses were built, in addition to the barracks, the Rangers would not be fit for active service (H.P., 46, p. 182). It can be argued that these log houses were the true forerunners of permanent settlement on the west bank. The constant need for repairs and maintenance on these barracks[112] was a continual drain on the expenses at Fort Niagara and consequently on government. Once the war ended, and Fort Niagara lost its defence priority, it must have seemed a welcome relief to Haldimand to be able to plan settlement that could be expected to give a reasonable return for government expenditure.

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[112]The poor condition of the barracks suggests that they were only intended to be a temporary solution to the need for troop accommodation, and not the beginnings of permanent settlement.

The third prong of the policy concerning the security and defence of Niagara was the attempt to create a defensive settlement location pattern that would keep Canada loyal to the British. The relevance of this prong to the west bank cannot be disputed because it saw the vindication of Ranger and farmer opinions on the efficacy of maintaining settlement at that location. This phase of settlement must not be confused with the 'agricultural scheme' that was created as an integral part of the war effort. That was a contingency to reduce the high expense to government of the war. This defensive settlement was a permanent colonizing scheme that began after the institution of an international boundary along the frontier.

There were two basic principles behind the settlement of Loyalists in Canada. The first principle was that Haldimand was to "form a barrier" by settling "old soldiers" at key points of the province in order to prevent the possibility of Canada being invaded by rebels from the south (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 255). The second principle was that he was to ensure that Canada remained loyal and did not defect to the south. There were three 'key points' that Haldimand considered worthy of 'barrier settlement.' These were Sorel, Cataraqui (Kingston) and Niagara. Sorel was located between

Montreal and Quebec City at a point where the Richelieu river enters Lac St. Pierre. The Richelieu river connected Lake Champlain to Lac St. Pierre, part of the St. Lawrence system. The British ministry, as well as Haldimand, considered this area of prime importance being so strategically located in relation to the heavily populated eastern seaboard in both Canada and the rebel United States. As previously stated, it was also the traditional route of approach into Canada from the lower eastern seaboard. Cataraqui was strategically located at the point where Lake Ontario narrows into the St. Lawrence river. It was also at a point of easy access from the south via Wolfe Island. As well, Sackett's Harbour, where Loyalists had been told to report during the war, was just to the south, and many Loyalists were in the area. Niagara made another logical point for strategic settlement. It was already a strategic point of access to the interior, although much of its importance diminished with the new boundary line. However its close proximity to former Loyalist properties, its location on a site of Loyalist entry into Canada, and its infant settlement, led Haldimand to establish it as a permanent settlement.

Having made the choice of location sites for settlement Haldimand began the process of organizing the settlements themselves. There were several basic principles in regard to the function and organization of these defence settlements. The first principle was that the settlements were not to be peopled haphazardly. Each settlement was to be settled by a specific group of people. Sorel was specific to "old soldiers"[113] and recent Loyalist refugees from the south, many of whom had already spent a considerable period of time in either Montreal or Quebec. Cataraqui, having been bought off the Mississagua Indians, (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 265) was specific to both Loyalist refugees and Indians. Niagara was principally reserved for Butler's Rangers or other provincials. The reason for such a specific location of settlers was based on Haldimand's belief in minimizing friction; to have the settlers in groups with which they were familiar, and a location acceptable to them laid the groundwork for a stable settlement pattern.

The second principle was that the base of the settlement occupation be agricultural. Haldimand hoped that both Sorel and Cataraqui, in particular, would

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[113]Old soldiers were citizens of Britain who served in the war.

become "a granary for the lower parts of Canada . . . " (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 264). The small settlement at Niagara, even under conditions of war, had already demonstrated the feasibility of such a plan. An agricultural settlement base was also a logical step in the frontierization of a new area.

The physical layout of the settlements gave ample evidence that these were essentially defence settlements. Although not all the settlements followed Haldimand's plan to the letter the basic principle was that of thick settlement; thus the lots were to be small --it being proposed at Sorel that sixty acres be the size for each lot (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 255). The suggested size of the lots at Cataraqui however, was 120 acres (H.P., 57, p. 30) indicating that not only were the defence values of each settlement not equal but that Haldimand used more of his own initiative with Cataraqui than with Sorel.

The fourth principle of settlement was that the lots were to be distributed impartially by the drawing of lots, any discrimination between individuals was to be based on the size of lot rather than its location.[114]

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[114]See the amount of land given to each person in the chapter on settlement.

The system of distribution of land by lots served to prevent resentment on the part of the new settlers against any person that they felt may have been favoured by government. This was an important consideration in settlements where the defence of Canada and loyalty to the British government were prime considerations. These lots were organized according to a government survey that was a prerequisite of all the settlements (H.P., 45, p. 380). This was an orderly planning of settlement that took the pattern of each settlement out of the hands of the settlers. The survey plan for the townships at Cataraqui was to "be followed in all other parts of the Province where Loyalists shall be settled" (H.P., 45, p. 380).

The survey plan for these defence settlements was a four-point plan that covered the physical organization of the settlements and the terms of ownership of the land. The first point was that the land was to be surveyed and that there must be reserved sufficient space for fortification; thus reinforcing the principle of a defence function. Secondly, owing to the fact that the land for the townships of Cataraqui and Niagara had been recently purchased from the Indians, there was to be land reserved for Indians "where some of the most noted

might be allowed to build"[115] (H.P., 57, p. 34). This land was to be part of a Crown reservation for the use of the garrison and for a wharf with accompanying ship-building. Thirdly, a common of 400 acres was to be reserved "for the use of the town" but it could be leased by settlers "for a term not exceeding 30 years" or until the town needed the land. The reason for the leasehold was that Haldimand felt that the "people, for the present, will be glad to be as near the town as possible" (H.P., 57, p. 34). This showed considerable sensitivity by Haldimand to the plight of the Loyalist, many of whom had no experience in pioneer environments. It also meant however, that this group of Loyalists would probably never move farther from the town into the country. The fourth point concerned the laying out of the townships in six mile squares which Haldimand considered the best system to be followed. He gave two reasons for this conclusion. The first was that the people were used to it, being the system followed in the other American colonies prior to their independence. The second reason was that it would "best answer the Proportion of Lands I propose to give to each family"

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[115] Haldimand also made provision for Indian settlement at Buffalo Creek (H.P., 43, p. 20) and along the Grand river (H.P., 44, p. 326).

(H.P., 57, p. 34). This proportion was 120 acres of which six were to be in the front of the lot (19 chains) while the depth was to be 63 chains 25 links. Each township was to comprise 175 lots with a 25 lot frontage and a depth of 7 concessions.

There were other stipulations as well. At Cataraqui the town included a church, grist and sawmill, a pattern repeated at Niagara, at least in terms of the mills which were already in operation. The settlers were to be "fed and clothed at the expense of government for three years" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 266) with implements and seeds being provided for them. This would help reduce the frustration of beginning life again in a new country.

Although these settlements were primarily for defence, Haldimand showed wisdom in pinpointing key strategic locations, that were already populated to a degree, for his new settlements. This greatly diminished hardship and helped to create stability that was so crucial to his scheme. The degree of organization of these settlements also helped to minimize the possibility of failure or the Loyalists wishing to move elsewhere. It is important to note that the organization of these settlements and the government assistance that they received was in marked contrast to the form of settlement that

became a part of the western pioneer landscape in North America, Haldimand's defence settlements had a clearly stated function not seen in settlements that were a natural evolution of a pioneering phenomenon.

Thus in the three prongs of his defence policy Haldimand was being directed to establish settlement on the west bank of the Niagara river. This chapter has established the importance of Niagara to the war effort, an importance which did not immediately diminish after the close of the war. Thus settlement which began as the direct result of diminishing expenses grew in stature because of its location on an historically strategic site. As the economic base for retaining such an important post remained, Chapter Four will discuss the reasons for settlement on the west bank in this context.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE FUR TRADE

The second major policy of the Haldimand administration in Canada concerned the Fur trade. It is argued in this chapter that this trade was one of the principal reasons for the retention of the Upper Posts, and therefore Niagara, in British hands. As such it has direct relevance to Niagara and its administration, which included the settlement on the west bank. However, at Niagara the Fur trade policy did not have the same locational ties to the west bank as did the defence policy. In the first instance, the 'agricultural scheme' did not include the settlement of fur traders or merchants on the west bank, both of which were closely tied in with the fur trade. Secondly, the portage along which the accoutrements of the trade were carried was on the east bank. Thirdly, there is no geographic evidence in the Haldimand papers of the exact location of the administrative headquarters of the Indian department, also closely linked to the Fur trade, but it is logical to assume that these were on the east bank because of its proximity to Fort Niagara. The significance of this third point is that given the location of the Indian department on the east bank, it is reasonable to suppose that the Indians

themselves were camped near their supply and distribution centre; thus also being located on the east bank. Despite this lack of locational ties to the west bank however, it is argued that the Fur trade policy was vitally important to the settlement on the west bank for two reasons. Firstly, it created an environment conducive to the promotion of settlement at Niagara by encouraging the settlement of merchants and traders who were not connected with defence, and who thus could devote their time to providing goods and services to the small farming community on the west bank. Secondly the peltry trade was as dependent on Indian assistance as was the defence of Canada and thus the high expense of maintaining the Indian connection was shared by both the defence and Fur trade policies. In this respect the 'agricultural scheme' was as much a result of the expenses of the operation of the Fur trade as it was the expenses of defence in Canada. Thus the Fur trade policy did have locational ties to the west bank, albeit more indirectly than those of the defence policy.

As it is hypothesized that the Fur trade was one of two major reasons for the settlement on the west bank it is important firstly to establish the existence of the Fur trade at Niagara and then to discuss its relationship to the settlement on the west bank. This chapter will

therefore attempt to show that the Fur trade was such an important part of the colonial mercantile system that the system within which it operated was not only maintained through the Revolutionary War but that the geographic location that was so vital to its continuance, that of Niagara, was to become one of the principal sites for permanent settlement along the frontier. In order to do this logically this chapter will be divided into five parts. The first part will substantiate the existence and importance of the Fur trade in Canada. The second part will discuss the role and importance of Niagara in relation to this trade, a necessary prerequisite to establishing the relationship of the peltry trade to the west bank. The third part will examine the Fur trade routes, which will attempt to show Niagara's role in the geographic location of the trade. The fourth part will discuss the importance of these routes and thus Niagara's significance to the trade. The fifth part will discuss the administration and organization of the Fur trade and the support this system gave to the west bank settlement.

In this chapter the Fur trade, both governmental and private will be discussed as one because of the difficulty of obtaining data specific to both. However, it must be recognized that there were both governmental and private interests in the trade. It is reasonable to say

that the government involvement was indirect in the sense that it did not own the Fur trade companies. Nevertheless its influence occurred in the form of political support of private economic interests. Also, because of the close relationship between defence and the Fur trade the government was concerned with monitoring the trade along the frontier for defensive and security reasons. The principal geographic area of government involvement was along the Great Lakes route and at the Posts. The commanders at the Posts were responsible for the distribution of presents and provisions to Indians as well as the selling of supplies to Indian agents and traders. The Indian department was administered from the Posts and as well, all goods brought to or fro over the Great Lakes waterways were conveyed in government ships, or with passes issued with government permission. The private trader was essentially limited to the Ottawa river route or the Mississippi and Illinois route if he wished to be entirely independent of government transport, although he still needed a government pass. Thus because of the close relationship between the private and governmental aspects of the Fur trade, the whole trade will be discussed as a unit in this thesis.

It is important to stress that the policies and administration of the Fur trade were inherited by

Haldimand from his predecessors who had been administering the trade for almost a century. It would have been disrupting for Haldimand, especially in a historical period of slow change, to make sweeping changes in such a well established system. As previously discussed, the Indians in particular, who were an integral part of the system, would have bitterly resented any attempt to change a system that brought such personal and national[116] advantages. Thus in examining the policies of Haldimand in relation to the Fur trade it must be realized that he was operating within an 'ipso facto' system where change was effected through policy administration rather than policy formation. As well, the reason for dealing with the Fur trade after defence was less a matter of its being of secondary importance than that the matter of defence being more urgent. Without retaining Canada there would have been no colonial Fur trade and thus defence took prime importance in the Haldimand administration. However, one of the principal reasons for a military presence in Canada was to sustain trade in furs and fish which had become an integral part of the British colonial system.

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[116] Brehm stated that "The Indians have their Policy like other nations" (H.P., 41, p. 51).

The importance of the colonial Fur trade rested upon three factors: firstly, the nature of the British colonial mercantile system; secondly, the relationship of the Canadian trade to the British manufacturing base; and thirdly, the historical importance of the Fur trade in Canada. The first significant factor in the importance of the Fur trade was its role in the British mercantile system. This factor is principally a governmental one, in which the government, for political reasons, supports a trading system advantageous to itself. The basis of this system during the eighteenth century was trade "through colonization" in which settlements were established "for the sake of commerce" (Knorr, 1944, p. 126). The system was characterized by a monopolistic interchange between Britain and a 'plantation' or 'colony,' in which the advantages accrued primarily to Britain. Silburn argued that the basis of the British colonial trade network was mercantile interests principally in the West Indies and the Americas, (Silburn, 1971, p. 285) with the flow of such commodities as sugar, spices, coffee, tea, furs and fish into Britain. In 1786 Quebec alone exported £343,262.19.6 worth of commodities such as wheat, flour, biscuit, flaxfeed, lumber, fish, potash, oil, ginseng and furs, the lion's share of which was £285,977 worth of furs (Morse,

1795, p. 474). The importance of the Fur trade to the British government was measured by a capital investment in Canada and North America of over £200,000 in the form principally of Fur trade personnel and provisions, together with some installations such as trapping cabins and trading posts. With such an investment it was felt that the Fur trade "so essential a Branch of trade" (H.P., 39, p. 110) was "an object deserving of all the encouragement and protection" (H.P., 41, p. 81) of government. Its importance to government was further underscored by the fact that it provided a means for Britain to free itself from a dependence on Russian fur sources. Thus Britain gained not only sole monetary control of its own trade but a release from economic reliance on a political rival in trade.

The second significant factor was the involvement of private British manufacturing interests in the Fur trade. As with the government, these private interests had invested considerable money, both at home and abroad, harvesting, processing and marketing imported furs. This trade, administered by government under "well digested regulations" (H.P., 16, pp. 15-28) was considered to be worth all the expenses that maintaining it entailed. It was felt that if, as a result of the Revolutionary War, the trade should be discontinued, it

would be "very hurtful to the Merchants of London, Shippers of Goods . . . " (H.P., 41, p. 81). These merchants did not have the cost of maintaining the war levelled at them and thus were free to pursue the trade for profit alone. Their influence on government was such that despite considerable opposition at a parliamentary level[117] and despite the war, there was pressure to maintain the trade in North America.

The third significant factor in the importance of the trade was its historical importance in Canada. Two important principles, of later significance to the Fur trade at Niagara, emerge from this factor; one is, that the Fur trade was dependent upon the system of forts for its existence, and the other is that the trade was dependent upon Indian participation.

The tradition of the Fur trade in Canada began with the French occupation and trade with the Indians. The French possessions included the Laurentian lands and a chain of posts extending from the St. Lawrence, down the Mississippi to Louisiana on the Gulf of Mexico. These posts were fortified, the rationale being that

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[117] In February, 1783, Shelburne argued in the House of Lords that what loss would it be if the entire Fur trade sank into the sea. Was the trade worth the continuance of Britain in a war "of which the people of England . . . have declared their abhorrence?" (Knorr, 1944, p. 209).

distance from home and an often hostile environment necessitated defence and protection of the trade. Thus the "Upper Posts" of which Niagara was one, were part of this fortified chain, area-specific to the Great Lakes, which was responsible for the defence of French fur trade interests in Canada. The English presence in the trade began with the chartering of the Hudson Bay Company which specified the "erecting of forts and the finding of some trade for furs . . . "[118] (Cawston and Keane, 1968, p. 159). The Hudson Bay Company was area-specific to the Hudson and James Bay but eventually the English and French systems began to intermingle. Both systems worked on the principle of exchange and barter with the Indians,[119] a principle which was well established by Haldimand's time. However, by his time, barter in terms of goods only had been added to by barter with goods on the one hand and loyalty or service on the other; the value of loyalty or service limited only by the willingness of the British to maintain it and the means with which to procure it. The means with which it was

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[118]Furs and skins included beaver, stag, marten, otter, cat, fox, wolverine, bear, wolf and wood chuck (Cawston and Keane, 1968, pp. 170-171).

[119]One beaver's skin was procured for "half a pound of gunpowder, or four pounds weight of lead-shot, or two hatchets, half a pound of glass beads, one pound weight of tobacco, eight or six large knives . . ." (Cawston and Keane, 1968, p. 162).

procured was essentially through the system of present giving to the Indians, which by this time included such items as "glass-beads, broadcloth, brandy, sugar, thread, vermilion, buttons, fish-hooks, fire-steels, files, flints, guns, mittens, . . . looking-glasses, sashes, tobacco, and finery for . . . squaws" (Cawston and Keane, 1968, p. 173). Thus Haldimand inherited well-established practises for the operation of the peltry trade in Canada, which were to become a significant drain on his administrative budget and a source for reform within the trade.

Haldimand also inherited a five point directive, instituted in 1764, (H.P., 16, p. 22) relevant to the administration of the trade. Firstly, the trade was to be free and open to all British subjects. Secondly, trading licenses were necessary to operate in the trade. Thirdly, the trade was to operate within "Stated Times and Places." Fourthly, there were to be fixed Tariffs on goods and furs. Fifthly, the sale of rum to Indians was to be strictly limited. Thus the Fur trade was to be a structured and regulated trading concern, closely bound up with the defence of the colony.

Niagara was an important and integral part of the Fur trade for two reasons: firstly, it was one of the forts which helped sustain the trade, and secondly, it was on a Fur trade route as well as being in the

centre of a fur gathering area of its own. Of these two reasons the first is considered the most important because it was the reason for the continuing operation of the trade. Haldimand argued, in relation to the Upper Posts and their importance for defence reasons, that if the "Posts above be cut off, what will become of the Fur Trade . . . " (H.P., 16, p. 11). To him, both defence of the Upper Posts and the Fur trade were inexplicably bound together; if the Posts went then so did the trade. Niagara was particularly important in this respect. As it has already been stated that Niagara was the central area for the supplying of the Upper Posts; if it was not kept operable the Upper Posts, dependent on supplies that passed through Niagara, would also not remain in operation. It was upon their remaining open that the success of the Fur trade depended. The Upper Posts supplied the provisions and presents for traders and Indians alike, persons upon whom the whole Fur trade depended. They also supplied a base at which the exchangers of furs and presents could be together. Thus the Upper Posts became governmental collection and distribution centres which greatly assisted in the packaging and shipping of furs to the east. Although the Posts weren't the only exchange and

distribution centres they were the principal suppliers of provisions along the frontier and a lifeline for those involved in trade at such a distance from centres of white civilization. Thus the most significant factor in the maintenance of the Fur trade was not the sources of the furs or the means by which they reached Montreal or Quebec, but the system of forts by which the major part of the trade was kept viable. Thus Niagara had a crucial role in helping to maintain this viability.

The second reason for Niagara's importance in the trade was that it was on a legitimate fur trade route as well as being in the centre of a fur gathering area. The fur trade routes, their size and importance, will be discussed later in this chapter, but in terms of Niagara being the centre of a fur gathering area Weld stated that "the quantity of furs collected at Niagara is considerable" (Weld, 1795-7, p. 304). Thus Niagara had a legitimate place in the operation of the Fur trade. It is argued that this legitimate place strengthened the importance of Niagara as a settlement area, not related to military affairs, and thus hastened its permanent settlement on the west bank.

There were four main Fur trade routes along the Canadian frontier and in the interior. These routes include both the routes along which the furs actually

travelled and the routes between the fur collection centres and their point of preparation ready for marketing. Although it is recognized that there were other fur routes along the frontier during this time, this thesis argues that the routes discussed below were the principal routes by which the Fur trade was conducted. Of prime importance to the establishing of Fur trade routes were the numbers of Indians peopling the surrounding areas--the Indians being the principal source of fur pelts and knowledge of fur-bearing areas, and thus essential to the trade. They were also important because it was through their tolerance of the white presence on Indian lands that the trade was able to be maintained.

MAP 7



The Grand Portage Fur trade route between the Grand Portage and Rainy Lake (Kerr, 1975, p. 45)

The first route was that between the Northwest and the Grand Portage, which was located on the western side of Lake Superior. (see Map 7) It was a route that served the area from Lake Winnipeg, Lake of the Woods and Rainy Lake, to Lake Superior, an area which was part of the Chipeway Indian territories. (see Map 8) The second route lay between the Grand Portage and Montreal. This route passed over Lake Superior to Fort Michilimackinac, via the Straits of St. Mary. From Michilimackinac, which served as a collecting and provisioning post, the route then went along the northeast side of Lake Huron into the French river, passed via a portage[120] into Lake Nipissing and then via another portage into the Ottawa river. This route reached the St. Lawrence at Lachine approximately 280 miles to the southeast. The total distance was approximately 700 miles, necessitating 36 'carrying places'[121] and a total time of about 26 days if there were no accidents en route. The area of this route was also included in the Chipeway Indian territories which stretched over much of this part of the

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[120] A portage is where the rapids, a sharp change in river height, or an obstruction necessitates the boats and goods being lifted from the river and carried along a track beside the river.

[121] This is where goods have to be taken out of the canoes and carried by hand or on the back.

MAP 8



An extension of the Grand Portage route showing the fur trade posts of the Interior (Kerr, 1975, p. 45).

interior. (see Map 9) The third route began with Fort Michilimackinac between Lakes Huron and Michigan (see Map 10) and passed along the south side of the Great Lakes waterway to Montreal. This route included collection centres such as Fort Detroit and Fort Niagara. Included in this route is a secondary route that fed into the Great Lakes from the Illinois country. This route passed from the Mississippi to the Onisconsing river. From the Onisconsing there was a portage of three miles to the Fox river which fell into Lake Michigan at Green Bay. This route was even more significant in the fall, when the Onisconsing and Fox rivers overflowed and canoes could pass directly between the two rivers without portaging. This area served such Indian nations as the Naudowessies, Ottigamies, Saukies, and Winnebagos. (see Map 9) The Indian tribes around Detroit and Niagara were mainly those belonging to the Six Nations. The fourth route included the area north of the St. Lawrence which sent furs to Quebec City and Trois Rivieres.

In discussing the relative importance of each of these areas two principles emerge: the first principle is that the big fur pelts, although fewer in number, were worth more, and the second principle is that the importance of the trade is less a question of the value

MAP 9


Lake Du Bois
A large Band or Canton of the Chipeways live on these lakes called by the French the Lake la Plue Sauvage
British Miles 69½ to a Degree
This Country is possessed by the Nipegon's Tribe
Red Lake R
This River joins the Assiniboils River a little above the place called Fort Lorain
Hands of Origan
White Bear Lake
Red Lake
Lake R.
Marshy Lake
Marshy R
Little Lake R.
Rock Lake
Naudowessie of the Plains.
Towards the Head of St Pierre R.
About here the Author wintered in 1766
The Country of Naudowessie & the Plains from this place the plains are unbounded extend to the South sea
Vard R
Red Marble R
Country of Peace
In these mountains are large quarries of Red marble where their nations resort to get their
neighboring Calemaux of Peace
Naudowessie Country
River St Pierre called by Natives Waccapaumenessoté
Falls of St Anthony
Cuivres R.
Rum R
Cold R
Bark River
Yellow R
This is the Road of War between the Naddowessie & Panneas & Illinois Nations.
This Country is in some Branches of the Missorie possessed by the Panneas & a great number of other Nations allies to the Spaniards
THE GRAND PORTAGE
Isle Royale
LAKE SUPERIOR
West Bay
Pic
Pointe aux Pins
Round I
Boston Bay
Stone Cross
Tommahawk R.
Three Sisters
Hope Bay
Falls St Marie
Ft Cadots
Fort Michillimacknac
THE CHIPEWAY TERRITORIES
LAKE MICHIGAN
LAKE HURON
Saukies Land
Ottigaumies Land
Nipegon Land
Lower Town
Upper Ottigaumie T.
Saukies Chiefs Town
Quiscanstic River
Lead mines
Fort St Joseph
Pouteuallamie Town
A PLAN of Captain Carvers Travels in the Interior Parts of North America in 1766 & 1767.



Showing the fur trade route between Fort Michilimackinac and Montreal (Kerr, 1975, p. 31).

of exports than it is the means by which the trade was sustained. The question of the importance of each of these routes, so vital to establishing the role of Niagara in the trade and its link to settlement at Niagara, must therefore consider not only the size and value of the pelts and the size of operation along the route, but also the means by which the trade was sustained.

In terms of the size and value of the pelts the Grand Portage route handled the biggest and most valuable pelts, such as bear, moose and stag. Thus although the volume of pelts from this area was less, largely because of bulk, the export value for each pelt was far greater than along other routes (Hadfield, 1785, p. 109). Also of importance along this route was that its great distance prevented the bringing of inferior pelts that would not prove cost-effective at market. It is logical that this area, with very little human occupation and an extensive hinterland of large fur-bearing animals, would prove such a lucrative source of furpelts and skins. Table 13 shows the quantity and value of the furs from this area. From this table it can be seen that £103,000 Stg. of the annual export of furs from Canada came from the Northwest/Grand Portage and Grand Portage/Montreal routes. Thus out of an estimated £200,000 Stg. worth of

fur and peltry exports from Quebec (H.P., 41, p. 81) about half came from these two routes. In terms of persons and canoes employed one estimate states that the Great Portage route employed about five hundred persons (H.P., 41, p. 1) and about 33 canoes (H.P., 41, p. 81). Thus in the light of these figures Weld was forced to conclude that the Grand Portage and Ottawa river route constituted "by far the principal part, both as to quantity and value, of those (furs) exported from Montreal . . . " (Weld, 1795-7, p. 306).

TABLE 13

Route	Packs	£ Stg. each	Total in £ Stg annually
Grand Portage	700	40	28,000
Mackinac	5000	15	75,000
Detroit	3000	10	30,000
			£133,000

Showing the Different Quantities and Values of Fur Pelts and Skins for three Fur Trade Routes based upon Sales in London in 1777 (Hadfield, 1785, p. 109).

The Lakes route, via Detroit and Niagara was estimated to account for another one fourth of the annual export. (see Table 13) The principal collection post was

Detroit largely because of the Mississippi, Onisconsing and Fox river routes. However, as previously stated, Niagara was also a collection post as well as being the post through which all furs from Detroit, and many from Michilimackinac, passed. The other fourth of the annual export came via Quebec and Trois Rivieres.

Despite the importance of the Northwest in terms of value and quantity of furs, the second principle applicable to these routes gave Niagara a premier place in the trade. The Fur trade could not have been sustained in size and volume without the support of the Great Lakes route and the Posts on this route. Not only did these Posts stand as evidence of British nationality and authority, but they provided the wherewithal for survival--not only in terms of food and clothing but in maintaining the loyalty of the Indians upon whom the whole system rested. In this respect they gave evidence of good faith on the part of the British and a continuing supply of products necessary, in Indian eyes, to maintain this faith. This system was maintained via the Great Lakes, principally through Niagara as the major transshipment area. Thus Niagara's usefulness to the trade far outweighed the monetary value of the fur supplies drawn from its hinterland.

The next section of this chapter will discuss the administration and organization of the trade in relation to Niagara, within which the support system for the settlement on the west bank was established. It is important to stress that both of Haldimand's policies in regard to defence and the Fur trade established Niagara as a viable part of the frontier, and one of the centres vital to the continuation of British influence in North America. Thus both policies lay down patterns of occupancy that set Niagara apart as a settlement target. It is also important to understand that the Fur trade and defence were closely linked, largely through their reliance on the cooperation of the Indian nations, and the use of the same facilities along the frontier. Thus policies created for one department have reference to the other and vice versa. As stated earlier the Fur trade accounted for more indirect seeds of settlement than did defence, which was the instigator of settlement on the west bank through the 'agricultural scheme.' However, the Fur trade brought merchants and traders to the area who although initially nonpermanent, set up patterns of land occupancy that encouraged the growth and development on the west bank. Thus the Fur trade had an important role to play in the creation of Niagara on the west bank, a response to a continuing sense of the

need for settlement at this strategic frontier site.

In terms of the government involvement in the Fur trade there were several reasons for strict regulation of the trade along the frontier and for the selection of specific sites, such as Niagara, for the government controlled operation of the system. The first of these was the result of the system by which the trade was conducted, that is, through companies or private individuals. The Fur trade during the Haldimand administration was partly carried on by the North-west company[122] which operated out of Montreal, and partly by private individuals. The North-west company carried on its trade principally via the Ottawa river and in 1795 it was estimated that it employed about two thousand men (Weld, 1795-7, pp.6,7). One of the principal means of establishing interest with, and loyalty from, the Indians was for the principal company agent to 'marry' the daughter of an eminent chief in order to establish himself within an Indian tribe.[123] It can be assumed that the private trapper and trader would use the same

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[122] In 1780 the North-west company was recorded as being divided into sixteen shares. It comprised the names of Todd, McGill, Frobisher, Paterson, McTavish, Holmes, Grant, Madden, McBeath, Ross and Oakes (H.P., 41, p. 81).

[123] Weld states that "these marriages . . . are not considered as very binding by the husband . . . " (Weld, 1795-7. p. 189).

system if necessary. This placed these individuals in a favourable position for trade, but in a perilous position, particularly in regard to the distance from 'white' civilization, should they be found 'wanting' by the Indians. Besides this problem the North-west company came under fire from other private traders because of its size and influence and the "improper preferences" given for the transport of goods (H.P., 41, p. 81). It was also argued that there was favouritism by government for particular "attachments" or service to government (H.P., 41, p. 138) a practice which led to the Indian trader becoming a government agent as well. The whole operation of the Fur trade was carried on "at great Expence, Labour and risk of both men and property . . ., " (H.P., 41, p. 81) which put considerable pressure on forts such as Niagara to support and protect the interests of the trade and traders passing through their territory. One of the principal reasons for government involvement however, was the Revolutionary war. Defence was of prime importance along the frontier and disloyal agents represented a threat to the cause of government, particularly among the Indians. There was particular concern at Niagara that "Goods sent to Niagara and Detroit are exposed to the danger of falling into yr hands of the Rebels . . . " (H.P., 41, p. 138). On the other hand,

the government perceived that loyal Indian traders could prove invaluable in influencing the Indians to remain loyal, particularly in regions remote from government influence. With these reasons for interference in mind the government provided "well-digested regulations" with which those involved in the Indian trade were forced to comply. It was these regulations which led to the involvement of the fur trade personnel, either directly or indirectly, in the defence of the frontier. This dual involvement in both defence and the fur trade meant the servicing of the government settlement on the west bank, thus providing the key to the locational ties of fur trade personnel, and thus the Fur trade, with the west bank settlement.

At Niagara these regulations covered all aspects of the Indian trade.[124] These regulations were primarily administered under the auspices of the Indian department because the trade was so closely bound up with Indian affairs.[125] It is important to point out that Haldimand was well acquainted with Indians, particularly during his administration at New York where he received reports from

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[124]The Indian trade is another name for the Fur or Peltry trade.

[125]The Indian department was administered by Guy Johnson and his deputy John Butler, two men who had close association with Indians and knew the frontier well.

Indian agents operating in all parts of the North American colonies (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 147). Haldimand, because of his policy of administrative organization, was determined that despite the geographical locale, complicated by great distance and lack of white civilization, the Fur trade would operate within a well-regulated system, giving opportunity for all to participate.

The regulation of the Fur trade was also, in part, a response to the limited seasonal cycle within which the trade could operate. In accordance with his original directive Haldimand specified the date each year when the fur trade canoes could set out 'en masse' for their own particular territories.[126]

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[126]The fur trade canoes were about 30' long and 6' wide and weighed about 500 cwt. They were sharp pointed at each end and made of light wood covered with birch bark, jointed with gum. They were navigated by a French Canadian who was contracted to a trader (H.P., 41, p. 1) and they usually left from Lachine for the Grand Portage or Montreal for the Great Lakes. They were manned by eight men and a clerk and rarely returned the same year (Weld, 1795-7, p. 184). The furs were usually packed either at the Grand Portage or at the Forts, by agents of a trading company or a private agent. As the packs all weighed the same only a certain number could be put in each canoe and as a result there was very little embezzlement of furs (Weld, 1795-7, p. 184). The canoes had to bring in the furs before the end of September for shipping to England in October before the onset of winter. The trade via the Great Lakes was usually conducted in batteaux, which were shallow flat-bottomed craft, square-sailed and sharp pointed, that were navigated by five rowers and a helmsman.

The system of organization of the trade was similar to that of defence, comprising departments or categories of personnel each with specific functions and controlled by specific government regulations. At Niagara these categories of personnel were as follows: the Indian department, including both its officers and the Indians themselves, the Indian agents or traders, the private merchants at the post, the contractor in charge of the portage, the navy in charge of the shipping of goods from Montreal and the commanders at the posts. These categories varied in the degree of government regulation but all were subject to some government control, particularly in the context of the exigencies of war.

The Indian department at Niagara (see Table 3) was the largest of the categories and the one most closely allied with the defence policy. This department had a dual function: to assist Indians suffering war losses and maintain their loyalty, and to foster the Fur trade thus maintaining British Crown and merchant interests in North America. As argued in the previous chapter defence was to be a servant of commerce which Haldimand argued "must be protected; everything must give way to this . . . " (H.P., 45, p. 5). Thus, the maintaining of the loyalty of the Indians was as much a part of

fostering the Fur trade as it was a part of defence and the same methods were used. These methods included the supplying of food provisions, clothing and rum, and the distribution of presents as a reward for loyalty or fighting service. The cost to the British government was so great that Haldimand argued that the expenses of the Indian department far exceeded "all ordinary and Extraordinary expences in the Province . . . " (H.P., 46, p. 134). As one of Haldimand's chief aims was to reduce expenses, (hence the 'agricultural scheme' of settlement) he took special care to note the areas in which expenses were considerable.

Within the Indian department expenses developed from abuses of the system either by government personnel or the Indians. The principal established within the department and reiterated to the Indians was that no favours were given without the Indians responding by protecting the trade in their territories (H.P., 39, pp. 51-53). Haldimand believed that to punish the Indians for such lack of support was both necessary and prudent for the British cause. Thus he ordered that the commanders at the posts should be very discriminating in the distribution of presents, and that rum, in particular, could only be supplied from the King's store (H.P., 45, p. 24). This policy of holding back rewards

made the commanders at the Posts uneasy because of the fear that the slightest lessening of provisions or gifts to Indians would lose their loyalty, (H.P., 43, p. 45) and thus endanger the Posts. This uneasiness was compounded by the intermittent supply of provisions and presents to the Upper Posts, especially in view of the government fear that too many supplies at the Posts would attract Indians or rebels (H.P., 41, p. 138). Thus, to a considerable extent, the commanders distributed presents "with an increasingly lavish hand" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 304) which not only led to the Indians becoming more choosy but the supply becoming even more diminished.

As the supply of provisions and presents waned other ways were devised for pleasing and placating Indians. One of these was for the commander at the Post to receive "offerings," usually in the form of fur pelts or skins, from Indians privately, in return for additional supplies of presents (H.P., 39, p. 360). Even the superintendent of the Indian department at Niagara was not immune to entertaining Indians in a grand manner in return for favours rendered by Indians.[127]

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[127]Colonel Johnson at Niagara was said to have "kept a very expensive house" where "chiefs frequently dined at his table" (H.P., 44, p. 114).

These practises fostered an unhealthy dependence of the Indians on the Upper Posts, particularly Niagara,[128] which in turn led to their neglecting the hunt. As this had an adverse effect on the Peltry trade it was Haldimand's concern to reduce the dependence of the Indians on government provisions as well as to correct any abuses within the Department. The Indians were to be encouraged to apply themselves "to their hunting and providing cattle to support themselves" (H.P.,45, p. 41). The commanders at the Upper Posts and the Indian superintendents were to cease taking kick-backs from the Indians as well as ceasing their "private issues to Indians exclusive of presents"(H.P., 45, p. 360). It is no wonder that Haldimand selected Niagara, with its large number of Indians living permanently at the Post, for his agricultural settlement scheme. He hoped that this scheme, together with the correction of abuses, would have the dual effect of fostering the Fur trade and diminishing the expenses at the Post.

The next category of personnel most closely connected with the Fur trade were the Indian agents, traders

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[128]Johnson and Butler both argued that since the loss of much of their country after General Sullivan's Genesee campaign, the Indians, who formerly lived 100-300 miles distant, were now continually at the fort expecting and receiving provisions and presents for themselves and their families.

and trappers. As previously noted these were usually employed either by the North-west company or self-employed. They were knowledgeable about Indian affairs which gave them a greater flexibility of movement throughout the Indian country. These persons were often used by the government to foster defence strategies in the interior. Those traders "who . . . manifested their Zeal for the King's Service to the prejudice of their Private Interests" were given particular government preferences or placed "in the most advantageous Trading Posts . . . " (H.P., 39. pp. 51-53). Thus a division arose within the traders--those who were marked as government agents and others whose interests were strictly commercial. The difference between them was that government agents were authorized to speak on behalf of government,[129] or could make on-the-spot rewards for furs, service or loyalty (H.P., 39, p. 94).

This degree of control of the Indian traders was achieved firstly, through the system of 'passes' permitting authorized traders into the Indian country, and secondly, by confining "trade to the Environs of . . . (the) forts" (H.P., 41, p. 138). The passes, or trading licenses, in a sense, contradicted George III's commission to Haldimand that the trade be free and open to all

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[129]Usually at an Indian council meeting.

British subjects (H.P., 16, p. 22). The licenses, which allowed biased selection of fur trade personnel,[130] were issued in time for the seasonal passage of the canoes upriver and not only gave permission to trade with the Indians but also controlled the territory in which the trader could operate. Haldimand felt that the passes were particularly important because of the wintering of the traders among the Indians or at the fort, and the possibility of abuse of the system by unscrupulous individuals.[131] Thus only those persons who were willing to abide by the rules of government could secure passes. The system of passes gave rise to the criticism of government favouritism in their issue, particularly where defence was at stake.

The principle of confining trade to fort environs was an attempt to enable the commanders at the forts to assess the traders first hand, particularly in their negotiations with the Indians. It also guaranteed

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[130]There may have been good reason for such bias because Sinclair at Michilimackinac expressed uneasiness at traders who "I cannot help thinking, under a pretext of exercising the Fur trade, . . . do many things injurious to the King's Interests, and likewise to the reputation of the Trade"(H.P., 39, p. 110).

[131]Haldimand wrote that "I mean to oblige every Wintering trader to give Security for his good behaviour, his properly supplying the Indians, and his keeping to the place allotted him by his Pass . . . " (H.P., 39, p. 224).

a greater degree of loyalty to the Crown by keeping the trader close to its official representative. In another sense however, it created further provisioning and present expenses by drawing the Indians closer to the fort, a situation which Haldimand was trying to prevent.

The traders were bound to follow the system of Indian rewards established by the government. Along the frontier each trader paid "at so much per canoe" for the cost of the presents he would need in his trade (H.P., 41, p. 1). Apart from this payment the trader was forced to buy additional presents needed in his trade. These were to be purchased from the King's store at the various posts along the frontier. Tariffs were included on these goods as per the original directive to Haldimand. The goods were usually purchased on credit by the trader and paid for when the furs were brought in (H.P., 41, p. 81). This system of credit put the trader in considerable debt during the season particularly in light of the estimate that each canoe arriving at the Grand Portage for the start of the season cost £750 Quebec currency to transport (H.P., 41, p. 81). One of the reasons for the formation of such fur trade companies as the North-west company was to help eliminate some of the high cost of transportation to the interior (H.P., 41, p. 81).

A considerable amount of discontent arose out of the directive to purchase from government stores when goods could be purchased more cheaply elsewhere. It was this complaint that fostered the arrival at Niagara of private merchants unrelated to government service. These merchants breached Haldimand's policy of "useless mouths" being at the Posts during the war, although they did prove useful at times when the King's store ran low in provisions.[132] At Niagara these merchants represented, prior to the Loyalists, the first nonmilitary personnel in residence around the fort, and thus paved the way for the introduction of nonmilitary settlers into the area. Military and governmental regulations governed the operations of the merchants. One regulation stated that a private merchant could not trade with the garrison unless he had been given this privilege in the form of a governmental contract (H.P., 44, p. 228). The obtaining of government contracts was important to the merchants as they could provide a source of steady income in such an isolated outpost. It also helped to diminish the high cost of

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[132]Some of the merchants in residence at Niagara during Haldimand's term of office were Taylor and Forsyth, Taylor and Duffin, Thomas Robison, Hamilton and Cartwright, John Thompson, Samuel Street and Co. and Douglas and Symington.

transporting their goods to the post, a cost which increased the further the post was from Montreal. Thus there was considerable competition at Niagara for government contracts (H.P., 41, p. 41). As the government was not always prompt with its payments the merchants usually charged a fairly high rate of interest on accounts unpaid (H.P., 41, p. 7) a factor which further increased the expenses at the Posts. This was particularly true of rum which was a bulky and expensive commodity to transport (see Table 10) and one in constant demand at the Posts.

Another important regulation stated that the merchants had to transport their goods to Niagara on the King's ships. This was considered necessary for several reasons; it would protect the goods from attack by rebels during transit, regulate the amount of goods going to the Post as well as prevent the merchants from becoming too independent of government control. It was a particularly contentious issue as the merchants complained that "undue preferences" were given to certain merchants in the transport of the goods while goods of other merchants that arrived at Carleton Island (the place of embarkation) first "have been left behind . . . " (H.P., 41, p. 138). It is logical to assume that preferences would be given to the merchants who had government

contracts.

A further regulation concerned the ownership by the merchants of their business and its property. Haldimand's policy in regard to the Upper Posts was that there be no private ownership of land or buildings. This discouraged any permanent settlement around the Posts. Thus the merchants, and later the settlers on the west bank, were prevented from private ownership. Table 14 shows a list of merchant buildings illegally erected at Niagara "without the permission of the commanding officer." In the event of rebel attack Haldimand had further directed that "all Officers commanding Posts where Merchandise or any other Stores whatever are lodged, (are) to destroy the same . . . sooner than suffer them to fall into the Hands of the Enemy" (H.P., 42, p. 175). At Niagara the commander was constantly concerned about the amount of merchandise, owned by merchants, that was stored around the fort (H.P., 42, p. 44). The fact that despite these regulations, and the precarious existence at the Posts, the merchants continued at Niagara, gives evidence of Niagara's importance to the Fur trade, both in relation to its importance as a storage and distribution centre as well as its local collection of furs and the presence of fur traders.

TABLE 14

Houses &c.	Dimensions Length in Feet	Dimensions Breadth in Feet	When Built
A Dwelling House	45	24	1772
Ditto and Shop	43	36	1778
Ditto (Tavern)	78	20	1776
A Shop and Office	60	24	1765
A Store House	35	24	1771
A Stable	45	24	1776
Ditto	30	18	1776

Exclusive of Two Large Kitchens, Two Large Root Houses or Cellars, a Slaughter House, Garden &c.

A List of Houses, Store Houses &c. at Niagara belonging to Messrs Taylor and Forsythe, which have not the Commanding Officer's Permission (in writing) agreeable to a Form received from Canada in 1779 (H.P., 43, p. 55).

The merchants could not have had such facility in operation at Niagara without the assistance of the fourth category of personnel; the government contractor in charge of the portage on the east bank of the Niagara river. This vital transport route was on Crown land deeded by the Indians "for the sake of trade only" and entirely

controlled by the government. The contract for the carrying of goods, both government and private, over the portage had been given to the Stedman family (H.P., 43, p. 91). The portage which extended from a point immediately at the foot of the escarpment, called the Lower Landing, to Fort Schlosser above the Falls, was nine miles in length (see Fig. 3). The seven miles of road between Fort Niagara and the Lower Landing was an alternative to shipping the goods upriver from Fort Niagara to the Lower Landing.

At the Lower Landing there was a "capstan, cradle and ways" (H.P., 43, p. 84) completed in 1764, that was designed to pull goods by a system of pulleys from the river to the top of the bank and then the goods were either "rolled in barrels up the incline" or face of the escarpment (H.P., 43, p. 55) or else taken up the steep incline by oxcarts. Although there was a sergeant and twelve privates stationed at the Lower Landing (H.P., 42, p. 128) it was still under Stedman's control. Due to the fact that the Lower Landing was at the commencement of the portage it was the temporary repository for all the goods passing onto the other Upper Posts and the interior. At one stage there was "forty batteauxloads of goods . . . at the Landing" (H.P., 42, p. 208) which posed a threat because of its possible attraction to both


Lake Ontario
Navy Island
THE
PORTAGE
Plan of the Road and River Between Niagara and fort Schlosser with the different Posts Forts on the Communication, by order of Colonel Bradstreet in June 1761.
Scale of Two English Miles or 3520 yards.
Surveyd by Lieut Feltser
Plan of the Principal Entrenchment on Mount Hope
Precipice of 318 feet high
Plan and profil of one of the Redoubts on the Carrying Place, all the Rest Conformable.

rebels and Indians. In view of this some of the local merchants were given permission to erect a storehouse with the proviso that "the preference be reserved for government . . . should it be wanted . . . " (H.P., 43, p. 55).

At the top of the escarpment was the Upper Landing, probably at the point where the goods were drawn up over the escarpment. In order to relieve some of the pressure of overcrowding at Fort Niagara, it was suggested that this location be used for "a strong log house" to house 40 or 50 men (H.P., 42, p. 63). There was also a blockhouse located here to provide protection for merchant's goods. As the storehouse was not sufficient for the volume of goods passing over the portage Stedman was directed to "build a large storehouse . . . which will be entirely covered" (H.P., 42, p. 98). Along the portage were blockhouses for the protection of goods en route to Fort Schlosser. The portage road was often in poor condition due to the weather and the passage of goods was often delayed (H.P., 42, p. 1). The protection afforded to this portage, and the structures erected on it in response to merchant demands give evidence of its importance both to the government and the merchants and the associated importance of Niagara to the operation of the Fur trade.

There were considerable advantages that accrued to Stedman as a result of this contract, which included

£1,000 in profit annually including 300 tons of hay per year, a farm at Fort Schlosser and at Goat Island, 60 horses, "and as many oxen, besides waggons . . . " as Stedman pleased (Hadfield, 1785, p. 93). In return however he paid £1500 stg. per annum for the contract that obliged him to carry all government provisions for the Upper Posts at a specified amount.[133] The profit to Stedman rested in the carrying of goods for the private merchants and persons. As with the Indian agents Stedman was also to provide government assistance, such as cultivating as much land as possible around the fort, "supplying entirely the post with bread" (Cruikshank, 1927, p. 8) and rearing cattle for garrison use. Stedman however, because of the nature of his contract, had difficulty in complying with government orders not to erect buildings on the portage. The Indians complained that he had made "too great improvements" (Cruikshank, 1927, p. 10) especially in the way of storehouses to accommodate the volume of goods passing over the portage. With such a system it was evident that government transport and merchant goods would need to be carried over the portage "in a regular rotation" (Cruikshank, 1927, p. 12) so that although the preference was to government the

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[133]This charge was six shillings New York currency per gross hundred weight (H.P., 41, p. 75).

merchants could not complain of personal favouritism. In spite of this there were complaints that the goods were "damaged by rain, whilst in the Waggons . . . " (H.P., 45, p. 182) and that Stedman charged too much. He was also accused of issuing unnecessary provisions to Indians, a favour that led to Indian reprisals if it wasn't maintained. Despite these problems the responsibility on Stedman to maintain the portage was heavy for without this route the Upper Posts could not have been adequately provisioned, and Niagara would have not remained open to the Fur trade.

Another category of personnel important to the Fur trade at Niagara was the Navy. The role of the Navy, although vital to the continuation of the Fur trade was taken for granted. Not only did it transport the furs on Lake Michigan, Huron, Erie and Ontario, but it was also responsible for the shipping of many of the furs to England where they could be marketed. From the government point-of-view the Navy not only ensured the safety of the furs in transport but also monitored the number of packs and the traders involved, a necessary precaution in terms of maintaining the loyalty of the Indians along the frontier, and preventing rebel sympathizers from infiltrating into Indian territory. To this end Haldimand's instructions regarding the transport

of goods upon the Lakes, particularly Lake Ontario, was that all goods were to be carried "in the King's vessels" (H.P., 41, p. 138) unless otherwise authorized. Thus the merchants had to rely "on the vacant space offered by the Commanders of the King's ships, who had orders to accept private freight insofar as it did not interfere with the 'King's Service'" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 303), (H.P., 41, p. 3). As well the "traders had to bear all the risk; they had to give certificates to cover the carriage charge which were left unsettled; and their goods had to wait their turn which sometimes meant a year's delay" (McIlwraith, 1904, p. 303). Thus the irony was that the Navy ordered to assist and foster the Fur trade actually slowed it down by the small amount of freighting space available, the preference to government and the limited number of months annually that the goods could be transported. It was in response to this that the traders of the North-west company preferred to use the Lachine/Grand Portage route because it could be carried on with the minimum of government interference. The influence of the Navy on the settlement on the west bank was more direct than its promotion and assistance to the Fur trade. It can be argued that the location of Navy Hall on the west bank further promoted the settlement on that side of the river simply because of

its existence and the structures, such as the wharf, that surrounded it. The clearing of the immediate area to Navy Hall and the cutting of logs from the forest for ship-building not only paved the way for further settlement but gave credence to the concept of permanent settlement on the west bank.

The last category of the Fur trade personnel were the commanders at the Posts who were given the commission of keeping overall control of the trade operating in the vicinity of the Posts. Their authority was supreme at the Posts, although they were answerable to Haldimand, and thus they had the responsibility to see that firstly the interests of defence, and secondly those of the Fur trade, were being met and government regulations observed. One of their responsibilities was control of the Fur trade personnel. They were to be very "particular upon the Subject of Persons employed in the Service of Government . . . " (H.P., 39, p. 110). In particular the commanders were to make sure that the traders were qualified by experience and knowledge to engage in the trade (H.P., 39, p. 110). One way of ensuring this was to give reputable persons small amounts of goods to take into the Indian country on an infrequent basis, and then, if successful, gradually increase the amount until they became professional

traders. Another control on trading personnel was Haldimand's directive that the traders first come to the commanding officer at the fort before they could go into their territory (H.P., 41, p. 138). However many bypassed the forts on their route into their territories and thus did not contact the commander. Even if the traders did come to the fort it was very difficult for a commander at the post, with up to 4,000 Indians to care for, such as at Niagara, to keep an eye on traders who appeared infrequently and often in Indian dress with a tribe. Thus Sinclair's fear of "disaffected persons" who had inadvertently been given licenses at Montreal, inciting the Indians to rebellion, or practising illegal trade, was justified. The commander at Niagara was also to prevent the erection of permanent buildings or dwellings at his post, or any violation of the regulations concerning permanent settlement along the frontier. However, short of forcibly ejecting the offenders from the Post, the commander could not interfere with non-permanent structures erected by private merchants without government contracts. He could however, prevent their obtaining goods while at Niagara by preventing them from being carried on the 'King's ships.' Despite the regulations on permanent settlement however, there can be little doubt that the commander may have overlooked

Loyalist settlement, particularly on the west bank, or the presence of other non-military personnel without adequate authorization, simply because of his preoccupation with other matters. It was also to his advantage to have supplies of merchants goods at the fort, even if housed in unauthorized structures, because the problem of provisioning at the post was so acute. Thus this thesis argues that the commanders at the posts may have fostered pre-permanent settlement even before the beginnings of settlement on the west bank with the 'agricultural scheme.'

With the commander at Niagara intensely aware of the need to lessen expenses at his post,[134] together with the abuses that led to such expenses, Haldimand's suggestion that there be a practical solution was well received. The policy was that the Fur trade must be maintained, despite the cost, and the posts retained by defensive, or offensive, measures if necessary, in order to keep control of the Fur trade. The encouragement of self-sufficiency at Niagara, already evidenced by the entrenchment of Stedman and his farms, together with the healthy state of merchant business at the Post, was as much in response to the needs of the Fur trade as it was

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[134] Such as the provisioning of unnecessary persons in the Indian department, or the purchase of presents from private merchants.

a response to those of defence. The means of achieving self-sufficiency were within reach, thanks to the existence of a Fur trade base at Niagara, and the west bank provided the area to achieve it. Thus it is not only in response to military pressures for economy, but also to economic pressures, based on a political motive, that Niagara on the west bank owes its existence.

CONCLUSION

This study of Niagara-on-the-Lake is of the origins of the settlement of Niagara-on-the-Lake complicated by the changing political and administrative status of the settlement on the west bank; the time period of the permanent settlement being too short to draw conclusions as to its pattern of occupancy through time. As well, it must be noted that as most of the administrative period of this study was bound by the parameters of war, the settlement on the west bank must be seen as a unique response to the artificial conditions created by war. Therefore the conclusions drawn will be appropriate within this context only. Thus the settlement, at least in its initial phase, although located along a frontier, is not a response to the frontier conditions of the American west hypothesized by the Turner frontier thesis.

In conclusion, the two basic hypotheses of this thesis, that the settlement on the west bank of the Niagara owed its existence to both the defence and Fur trade policies of Haldimand, have been supported by the

research. Both of these policies can be said to have political motives because both were connected with British colonial dominance. However, although the defence policy was the most pressing reason for the settlement it was instituted in order to protect a mercantile system that had long traditions in colonial America, that of the Fur trade. Thus the Fur trade, at least in the context of the Haldimand papers, can be seen as the primary reason for the existence of defence interests along the rebel/Canadian frontier and therefore by implication the primary reason for the settlement on the west bank.

From a political viewpoint these policies were instituted during the administration of Frederick Haldimand. The Haldimand administration, largely directed by the administrative precedent of the time and the circumstances of war, was based upon the tenets of the Quebec Act. The over-riding principle of this administration was the desire to keep Canada loyal to the British. This was accomplished through an organizational network that hinged on the two basic policies of defending Canada and maintaining its economic base, which included the Fur trade. One of the major problems of this administration was the budget and it was in direct response to a cost-reducing scheme that the

settlement on the west bank was born. The American War of Independence coloured this administration to such an extent that the policies created during this time, at least until the signing of the Peace treaty with the rebel colonies, must be seen as a response to military defence rather than to a civil administration. Thus the historical component of this thesis is an over-riding factor directing the creation of policies and their eventual denouement on the landscape.

The reasons why these policies were directed at Niagara were not only because of its function as one of the frontier forts but also because of its premier role as the principal gateway and transshipment centre into the Upper Great Lakes. During the Haldimand administration the Great Lake routeway served as the principal waterway for the carriage of goods and personnel from the Atlantic to the interior and thus preserving Niagara to the British cause was of crucial importance.

It has been argued, and shown by the research, that defence was the most pressing reason for the settlement on the west bank. This policy which hinged on both security and defence had two aims: to cut off the rebel routes into Canada and to make the military posts defensible. Both were relevant to Niagara and in order

to put them into effect Haldimand took a three-pronged approach to this Post. The prongs were the garrisoning of the fort, the minimizing of the high cost of the war effort and the establishing of a defensive settlement landscape. Of these three the most relevant to the initial phase of settlement was the minimizing of expenses, which led directly to the 'agricultural scheme' of settlement on the west bank.

The relevance of the garrisoning of the fort to the west bank lay in the involvement of both the Indians and the Butler's Rangers in the Revolutionary war. The direct influence of the Indians on the settlement came through their refusal to allow settlement on the east bank. Instead they suggested the west bank as an alternative. However, the west bank may have lain fallow for much longer than it did had it not been for the need to garrison the Butler's Rangers. This provincial corps was not regarded as part of the regular army and thus the commander at the Fort had no desire to garrison them within its confines. The west bank provided an alternative. It was this Corps that formed the crux of not only the initial phase of settlement, but also the permanent settlement that resulted from the signing of the Peace treaty.

The second prong was by far the weightier in terms of causing an immediate policy reaction by Haldimand to the high expenses of conducting the war effort along the frontier. These expenses arose not only from the defence policy but were also part of administering the Fur trade as well. They arose largely out of the joint problems of feeding and provisioning Indians and buying their loyalty, and feeding and provisioning the troops and ensuring their loyalty. Of these two the expenses of the Indians were by far the greater, which led to the significant role of the Indian department during the Haldimand administration. Thus the Indians had a vital influence, both directly and indirectly, on the settlement on the west bank. It can be concluded that the problems of expenses were more relevant to the pre-permanent phase of settlement however, than it was to permanent settlement.

It was these first two prongs that had the greatest relevance to the 'military' phase of settlement on the west bank. The "vicious cycle" of administrative policy creation and resultant expense led directly to the 'agricultural scheme' for settlement on the west bank. Although very small in scale, the scheme was designed to provide the answer to two problems: one,

the cost of maintaining and provisioning the Upper Posts, and the other, the temporary settlement of small groups of selected Loyalists at the Posts. This scheme not only had relevance to the defence policy but to the Fur trade as well because of the dual role of both the Indians and the Posts in both. The first problem was by far the most important as the number of Loyalists settled through this scheme was infinitesimal compared with the large number daily seeking entrance into Canada. However at Niagara the selection of settlers was particularly relevant because some were already members of Butler's Rangers, who were stationed at Niagara, and thus were familiar with the area. This created a strong bond of loyalty of the settlers to the area which was no doubt important in the selection of the area for permanent settlement after the Peace.

The 'agricultural scheme,' designed to be entirely government owned and directed, or in other words, to be a military scheme, was not intended to provide a permanent farming settlement. Instead it was an 'ad hoc' solution to the high cost of provisioning posts at a considerable distance from permanent administration and settlement areas in the east.

The third prong of the defence policy concerned the permanent or 'civil' phase of settlement. The per-

manent Loyalist settlements established by Haldimand at key defence sites were established on different principles than those of the 'agricultural scheme.' These sites at Sorel, Cataraqui and Niagara were designed to provide compact settlement of loyal British subjects as a means of discouraging rebel influence or infiltration. Their key principle was that the Loyalists be settled equitably so that disharmony and subsequent rebellion be avoided at all costs. To this end Haldimand's site location and principles of settlement did maintain Canadian loyalty to the British Home Government. The relevance of this prong to the settlement on the west bank cannot be disputed because it saw the first permanent non-military settlement on the west bank--or in other words, the beginnings of civil settlement. The basic reasons for the choice of Niagara in this location scheme was its historic strategic defence priority, its close proximity to former Loyalist properties, its location on the site of Loyalist entry into Canada and the infant settlement already established on the west bank.

In connection with the Fur trade hypothesis research also showed its relevance to the west bank settlement. Although it has been argued in this thesis that it was not the most immediate reason for the settlement on

the west bank, its influence on the whole British presence in Canada and its connection with Fort Niagara made it of prime importance to the location of settlement on the west bank. This influence can be seen as both indirect and direct. In terms of an indirect influence, this can be seen by the British colonial monopoly of such American cash crops as furs and fisheries. Although Niagara was on a fur trade route that only generated one-fourth of the total fur export, its monetary importance to the trade was far outweighed by its role as a supporter of the system that maintained the trade. This importance can be measured by the transshipment of personnel, provisions and presents into the Upper Country through Niagara, which was designed not only to sustain the posts above it but to keep the Indian connection loyal. However, it had a more direct role to play in the settlement on the west bank. This occurred chiefly through the creation of an environment at Niagara conducive to the institution of a settlement on the west bank. As well, the blurring of civil and military lines in Canada with an associated overlapping of the role of the Indian in both the military manoeuvres along the frontier, as well as in the Fur trade of the British presence in Canada, created policy interconnection between the Fur trade and Defence. Thus the

expenses that led to the evolution of the 'agricultural scheme' at the Upper Posts, including Niagara, were as relevant to the Fur trade as they were to defence.

The settlement that resulted from these policies served as a unique expression of colonial settlement along a frontier. It was unique in that it was not settled on 'virgin' territory; it was a planned phenomena; it was associated with a military fort; it was located on the opposite side of the river to this fort; it was associated with Loyalists, who were a unique response to a colonial rebellion; it was eventually separated from the fort by an international boundary; and it was one of the first settlements instituted along the new Canadian/United States boundary line.

This settlement, which was instituted according to an 'agricultural scheme' was well planned, if somewhat less well executed. One of its principal problems was its distance from administrative headquarters and the precarious provisioning problems that led to its institution in the first place. The military phase of the settlement saw the farmers as little more than farm labourers without the benefit of property or tool ownership, except the right to the excess of their produce. The civil phase of settlement saw the beginnings of land ownership. The period of time during which Haldimand

administered this second phase is too brief to draw any conclusions as to its pattern of land occupancy, or sequential changes of occupancy. The 'agricultural scheme' however, which led to the settlement on the west bank depended on support structures such as the merchants, largely located on the east bank, the contractor in charge of the portage and his associated farming activities, the 'King's field' farmed by the garrison, and the Indian gardens in the vicinity.

Thus it is concluded that both the military and civil phases of settlement were the result of processes that were a unique response to a historical context appropriate to a specific political framework. The settlement that resulted was thus a Canadian phenomenon significantly different from the hypothesized development of frontier settlement in the American west. This thesis has attempted to show therefore, that governmental policymaking and settlement location are intrinsincally bound together, and that the settlement on the west bank of the Niagara was a direct response to historical, political and geographical factors. Furthermore, the settlement marked a watershed between settlement on the largely uninhabited frontier for defence purposes, and the beginnings of nonmilitary government directed settlement along the frontier.

It is hoped that this study has generated interest in the origins of settlement as a field of interest that would prove profitable for further research. Studies on the origins of settlement prior to the physical planting on the ground can help provide some rationale for the location and distribution of settlements within Canada. In this present study, the great degree of influence that one individual had on establishing the settlement patterns of Upper and Lower Canada gives testimony to the ability of individuals with administrative influence to lay down patterns of occupancy that persist to the present time. Concomitant with this administrative power is the question of the degree to which changes of such patterns could be effected with changes in administrative personnel or with the exigencies of war. Other questions emerge from this study such as the degree of influence that the principles of settlement location have on locational permanency; the types of administrative ability necessary to effect such a profound influence on the landscape; or the influence of private manufacturing and economic interests on governmental policymaking in relation to the formation of landscape patterns. Studies of the colonial experience could prove profitable in the context of such questions because the structure of governmental administrative

policymaking is less complex, and the interrelationships between government, industry, and even defence, and their influence on locational organization can be more clearly seen. Such studies could then furnish principles applicable to the modern experience.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1. Map of the river line from Niagara Falls to the Four Mile Pond on the west side of Lake Ontario with its courses and windings. The map is called 'New Settlement,' Niagara.

Appendix 2. The 1783 census compiled by the Ontario Register.

Appendix 3. Part of the township of Newark, New Niagara by Thos. Rideout Survey Genl., Dec. 2nd, 1784, showing the arrangement and size of lots and concessions.

Appendix 4. Return of the rise and progress of a settlement of Loyalists on the west side of the river Niagara, 18th. April, 1784.

Appendix 5. A list of Indian councils held at Niagara between 1779 and 1783.



Plan of the River Line from Niagara Falls to the four Mile pond on the West side of Lake Ontario With its Courses & Windings

APPENDIX 2

Return of persons under the description of Loyalists in Capt. John McDonnell's Company of the Corps of Rangers, Niagara, 30 November 1783

	Age yrs	ms
Capt. John McDonell	26	
Lt. Alexander McDonell	21	
Lt. Chichest'r McDonell	18	
Sgt. Silvester Stats	29	3
Frany Stats	27	2
Wm Stats		1
Sgt. David VanEvery	26	2
Selly VanEvery	21	
David VanEvery	4	3
Samuel VanEvery	2	2
McG'r VanEvery	66	
Mary VanEvery	50	3
Andrew VanEvery	10	
Hanry VanEvery	7	2
Phebe VanEvery	15	4
Benja'n Doyl	33	
Catey Doyl	19	
Henry Doyl	1	8
Edmen Horton	46	3
Ruthy Horton	26	
Jonas Larway	52	
Batsy Larway	47	7
Isaac Larway	22	1
Jacob Larway	21	3
Jonis Larway	7	5
Dority Larway	19	
Mary Larway	17	3
Hanny Larway	8	6
Eave Larway	7	2

	Age yrs	ms
Hanry Smith	22	4
Caty Smith	19	
James Hoghtalin	56	3
Charrity Hoghtalin	50	
Johany Hoghtalin (male)	18	
Phebe Hoghtalin	15	
Lodwick Hornbeck	24	3
Cathy Hornbeck	22	4
Hyatt Lazear	23	7
Alathu Lazear	27	
Sarah Lazear	10	7
Elizabeth Lazear	8	4
Jeny Lazear	3	2
John Stoner	42	10
Caty Stoner	23	7
Hanry Stoner	5	2
Oldrake Stoner (male)	3	1
Sgt. John Row	23	4
Corporals:		
Cornelius Lamberd	29	3
Jacob Deow	23	6
John Dingman	29	7
Drummers:		
John Withy [this entry was crossed out]	27	7
Jack Stout	19	7
33 single private men		

N. B. 6 women, 6 boys and 8 girls yet in the Colonies, but daily expected.

Return of persons under the description of Loyalists in Capt. Andrew Bradt's Company of the Corps of Rangers Niagara, 30 November 1783

	Age yrs	ms
Capt. Andrew Bradt	28	
Rachel Bradt	19	4
Lt. Ferris	36	
Eloner Ferris	32	
John Ferris	11	4
David Ferris	10	6
Samuel Ferris	2	4
Sgt. John Willson	42	
Mary Willson	36	
Huwe [Hugh] Willson	10	
John Willson	12	
Andrew Willson	8	
Minderd Willson	3	
Susanna Willson	6	
Cpl. Jacob Buskark	36	
Gertrauy Buskark	30	
Chatrine Buskark	13	
Mary Buskark	5	
Jacob Buskark	8	
Cpl. James Hayslep	31	
Catay Hayslep	36	
John Hayslep	11	7
Peggey Hayslep	13	4
Conred Johnson	35	
Mary Johnson	30	
Jacob Johnson	9	6
Yocham Johnson	10	6
Ide Johnson (female)	17	
Rachel Johnson	15	

	Age yrs	ms
John West	36	
Chatrine West	30	
Mary West	3	
Henry Windacker	46	
Elizabeth Windacker	40	
George Windacker	14	
Magdelen Windacker	12	
Berber Windacker	10	
Margret Windacker	8	
Aron VanPatter	39	
Marta VanPatter	25	
Phillip VanPatter	4	
Johana VanPatter	6	
George Larence	26	
Sary Larence	21	
William Larence		8
Sgt. Rich'd Larraway	29	
Sgt. Joseph Sinn	30	
Cpl. Jac'b Vroman	20	
D'r Gerret Vanslike	15	
D'r Peter Vanevery	13	
William Hare	17	
Andrew Ferow	36	
Jacob Vanalstine	26	
John Harris	49	
Peter Houk	23	
John Spore	23	
Matthew Garner	40	
Peter Row	20	
Gilbert Sharp	19	

Capt. Andrew Bradt's Company - Cont'd.

John Bruherd	20		Jacob Stater	19
John Row	21		John Smith	20
Henry Harris	18		Martain Smith	25
Gradis Vandyck	20		Henry Ramsey	26
Jacob Collier	28		Isaac Swetman	18
Peter Winney	29		Christaen Bost	30
John Fralike	19		William Monk	30
Isaac Wormer	20		John Hamelton	26
Robert Conklin	21		Richerd Stout	40
Esekiah Schomaker	28		Martain Stout	30
Henry Schomaker	23			
Peter Larence	18		"Taking prisoners:"	
Bartis Vanalstine	23		Michel Shaw	
Jeremiah Schram	20		Richard Rice	
Cherman Praut	30			

Return of persons under the description of Loyalists in
Capt. William Caldwell's Company of the Corps of Rangers
Niagara, 30 November 1783

	Age yrs	ms		Age yrs	ms
Capt. Wm Caldwell			Jacob Brunner		
Mrs. Caldwell			Hannah Brunner		
			Henry Brunner	12	
Sgt. Adam Vroman			Peter Brunner	3	
Margrit Vroman					
Rachal Vroman	2		Fred'k Seager		
			Barbara Seager		
Fred'k Smith			States Seager	7	
Benj'n Smith	12		Henry Seager	1	2
Mary Smith	18				
Margrit Smith	15		Abra'm Scott		
			Hannah Scott		
Simon Vanwaggoner			Suffea Scott (female)	1	6
Chaterine Vanwaggoner					
Elizab'h Vanwaggoner	14	4	Wm Yarns		
Hannah Vanwaggoner	12	1	Sara Yarns		
Chater'e Vanwaggoner	2		John Yarns	9	
			James Yarns	5	

Capt. William Caldwell's Company - Cont'd

Lt. Ralfe Clench	Rich'd Sutton	Robt Empson
Sgt. Dan M'Killip	Sam. Burhans	Wm Bush
Sgt. Jo. Row	James Row	Samuel Newkirk
Cpl. Jo. Elliott	Jo. Doltin	Samuel Finley
Cpl. Dan. Fields	Patrick Hill	Christean Winter
Cpl. A'w Hamelton	Jac'b Holnbake	Simon Anderson
D'r James Backer	Jo. Wright	William Hamelton
D'r John Morter	Henry Miller	Nathanal Lewis
John Davis	Jo. Scheeha	Barnabas M. Vannan
Storm Volick	Elija Wilcox	Henry Hover
John McGee	Robt Commins	Jacob Sharsback
John Moss	Daniel Carr	John Topp
Sam. Coffee	Jam's Empson	

Return of persons under the description of Loyalists in
Capt. Bernard Frey's Company of the Corps of Rangers
Niagara, 30 November 1783

	Age yrs	ms		Age yrs	ms
Capt. Bernard Frey	26		Cpl. John Wintmot	27	
Mrs. Frey	24		Mary Wintmot	24	
Elisabeth Frey	11		---- Wintmot (woman)		
			---- Wintmot [blank in		
Lt. Richard Hanson	38		---- Wintmot record]		
Mrs. Hanson	29				
Palley Hanson	14		Cpl. John McDonell	27	
Angel Hanson	12		Christane McDonell	26	
Dabreh Hanson	8		Peter McDonell Jr.	10	
Nansey Hanson	6	5	John McDonell Jr.	7	
Walter Hanson	5				
Nicklas Hanson	3	4	John Dove	48	
			Benj'n Dove	13	
Sgt. John Coon	29		John Dove Jr.	11	4
Hanney Coon (female)	12		Mary Dove	9	8
John Coon	10				
Susanay Coon	8		Christan Jacobs	24	
George Coon	6		Palliy Jacobs	15	
Bernard Coon	3				

Capt. Bernard Frey's Company - Cont'd

	Age yrs	ms		Age yrs	ms
Co'd Mysnor	39		Nicklas Forbush	30	
Mary Mysnor	31		Sary Forbush	20	
Mary Mysnor Jr.	12		Massey Forbush (female)	4	
Co'd Mysnor Jr.	9				
Catey Mysnor	7		Sgt. Peter Smith	26	
Elisabeth Mysnor	5		Sgt. Peter McDonell	24	
Margreath Mysnor	3		Privates:		
Cornelus Mysnor		7	Benj'n Quick	29	
Sary Mysnor	12		William Adams	55	
			Mathew Fradenburgh	28	
Jeremiah Kittle	43		Joel Westbrook	24	
Mary Kittle	44		Robt Bassey	23	
Angel Kittle	21		Jacob Bassey	27	
Jeremiah Kittle Jr.	10		Co'd Cuntraman	23	
			John Maselus	30	
John Hanor			George Read	19	
Mrs. Hanor			Benj'n Cottington	24	
---- Hanor			Henry Bogarth	24	
---- Hanor			John Sebach	50	
			Adam Smith	29	
Fredrick Ongol	58		John Cachall	17	
Mrs. Ongol	50		Thomas Parsons	28	
			John Stophal	28	
Oliver Arnold	38		Henry Jago	27	
Mary Arnold	28		Barnabas McQuaid	30	
Benj'n Arnold	5		Oliver Gahagon	31	
			D'r Benj'n Pickard	13	
John Anguish	30				
Hanney Anguish	20		William McClennon	36	
Hanney Anguish Jr.	4		Mrs. McClennon	31	
Derick Hanor	24		Danuel Bennot	35	
Mrs. Hanor	20		Mrs. Bennot	30	

Return of persons under the description of Loyalists in Capt. Lewis Genevay's Company of the Corps of Rangers Niagara, 30 November 1783

	Age yrs	ms		Age yrs	ms
John Brown			John Mattice		
Leana Brown			Gittey Mattice		
Eve Brown	12	2	Isaac Mattice	13	
Suffea Brown	10	1	Lanna Mattice	14	6
Chatrine Brown	7		Elizabeth Mattice	9	
Mary Brown	3	4	Hannah Mattice	6	
			Margrit Mattice	2	1
Peter Stoner					
Margrit Stoner			John Cole		
John Stoner	6		Jane Cole		
Peter Stoner	3	2	Henry Cole	15	
			Isaac Cole	10	
John Martain					
Hannah Martain			Cpl. Jo. Allen		
Richard Martain	12		Mary Allen		
James Martain	10	2			
Peter Martain	2		Cpl. Elias Anderson		
Mary Martain	8	1	Margrit Anderson		
Henry Heanor			Clement Fralick		
Garittey Heanor			Margrit Fralick		

Lt. Thos Butler	Wm May	Peter Hare
Lt. John Bradt	Jacob Crum	Isaac Lounsbury
Sgt. Stephen Secord	James Henry	John Wols
Sgt. Thos Winn	John Kyzer	Joseph Brown
Sgt. Randal MacGillice	Mathew Wormood	Joseph Wessels
Cpl. Robt Hamelton	Alexander Johnson	Will'm Quackenbush
John Burger, D'r	John Shaw	Conrade Rickard
Adam Mattice, D'r	Will'm Mattice	John Vandecor
Rubin Crum	Christ'n Vanloven	Frederick Quant
Olbart Heaner	Adam Papes	Ephrom Quick
And'w MacVight	Samuel Weeler	Peter Quackenbush
Christean Price	John Snyder	David Quackenbush
John Hutson	Crunemus Rickard	James Roberson
Abraham Fralick	Nicholas Rosecrance	John Prince

Return of persons under the description of Loyalists in Capt. Peter Hare's Company of the Corps of Rangers Niagara, 30 November 1783

	Age yrs	ms
Capt. Peter Hare	30	
Mrs. Hare	26	
Polly Hare	5	6
Cattrine Hare	3	
Sgt. John Reilly	34	
Mrs. Reilly	24	
Patrick Reilly	7	
John Reilly	5	6
Polly Reilly	3	4
Danial Reilly		7
Sgt. Jacob Tedrick	28	
Mrs. Tedrick	20	6
Cattrine Tedrick	3	2
Robt Tedrick		10
Nicolas Mattice	31	
Mrs. Mattice	26	
Macdalin Mattice (female)	7	
Paggy Mattice	5	1
John Mattice	3	
Elizabeth Mattice		2
Fredrick Markle	24	
Mrs. Markle	16	
William Pickard	56	
Mrs. Pickard	45	4
Mary Pickard	9	1
Elizabeth Pickard	6	

	Age yrs	ms
John Staty	23	6
Mrs. Staty	18	3
Jacob Staty		7
Jacob Walker	43	11
Mrs. Walker	45	1
Ann Walker	1	4
Cattrine Walker	15	8
Isaac Walker	11	6
Jacob Walker	9	7
Richard Walker	7	6
Rachal Walker	5	6
Christ'r Richards	47	
Mrs. Richards	46	
Mikal Richards	12	
Eve Richards	10	
Elizabeth Richards	6	
Lt. Calep Reynolds	26	4
Sgt. John Markle	26	
Corporals, single:		
Fred'k Row	25	
Sam'l Sherwood	24	6
Lucas Dedrick	22	6
Drummers, single:		
Danial Hause	20	4
Philip Hause	18	5
36 single privates.		

Return of persons under the description of Loyalists in Capt. Peter TenBroeck's Company of the Corps of Rangers Niagara, 30 November 1783

	Age yrs	ms
Capt. TenBrock	46	
Mrs. TenBrock	44	
Jacob TenBroeck	22	
Gitty TenBroeck	15	
Nickles TenBrock	13	
Cathrine TenBrock	10	
Hanna TenBrock	8	
John TenBroeck	4	
Sgt. Dan'l Young	28	
Elizabeth Young	20	
Dan'l Young	1	
Sgt. Randle McDonell	50	
Mrs. McDonell	56	
Wm McDonell	13	
Cathrin McDonell	10	
Cpl. Peter Winny	23	
Mrs. Winny	24	
Stoffel Winny	3	
Cpl. Peter Bowers	23	
Mrs. Bowers	23	
John Boice	40	
Mrs. Boice	34	
Sally Boice	15	
John Boice	12	
Elizabeth Boice		6

	Age yrs	ms
Nicolas Phillips	27	
Mrs. Phillips	19	
Jacob Furlow	33	
Mary Furlow	15	
Sally Furlow	13	
Jacob Furlow	10	
Elizabeth Furlow	8	
Bertha Furlow	6	
Cornelius Furlow	30	
Mrs. Furlow	26	
Cornelius Furlow	5	4
Th's Benson	39	5
Mrs. Benson	37	
Rich'd Benson	11	
John Morthy	40	
Mrs. Morthy	36	
Mary Morthy	17	
Lt. Jacob Ball	60	
Sgt. Mount	36	
Cpl. Scram	26	
Robt Campbell, D'r	16	
Abijha Benet, D'r	18	
28 single men, privates		

Return of persons under the description of Loyalists in Capt. George Dame's Company of the Corps of Rangers Niagara, 30 November 1783

	Age yrs	ms
1st Lt. John Hare	28	
2nd Lt. Philip Luk	32	
Sgt. Henry Deel	21	
Cpl. Abr'm Wintemote	28	
Cpl. Edward Broadrick	43	
Sgt. Christ'n Wanner	29	
Gertraut Wanner	25	
Mary Wanner	5	
Elizabeth Wanner	2	
Sgt. Joseph Petrey	28	
Elizabeth Petrey	25	
Mary Petrey	3	6
Philip Petrey	2	
Cpl. Benj'n Frelick	36	
Catrina Frelick	34	
Margrat Frelick	10	2
John Frelick	8	
Mary Frelick	6	6
Lehen Frelick		3
Adam Seay	40	1
Margrat Seay	32	
Peter Seay	13	
Elizabeth Seay	11	1
John Seay	8	3
Gertraut Seay	6	2
Jacob Bowman	45	
Elizabeth Bowman	44	
Anna Bowman	18	
Petty Bowman (female)	13	
Sary Bowman	11	1
Cristina Bowman	8	
Eve Bowman	5	

	Age yrs	ms
Peter Swort	51	
Ablona Swort	43	
Henry Swort	22	6
George Swort	20	
Mickal Swort	16	
Wil'm Swort	14	
Bastian Swort	12	
Thomas Swort	7	2
Eve Swort	5	3
Fred'k Angor	62	
Maria Angor	62	
Fred'k Angor	17	
Gr'o Ranceir	31	
Elizabeth Ranceir	26	
Philip Cryslor	42	
Elizabeth Cryslor	43	
Elizabeth Cryslor	18	9
Margrat Cryslor	16	
Lehen Cryslor	7	8
Evort Berckly	48	
Rahel Berckly	36	
Margrat Berckly	12	
Christ'n Berckly	11	
Philip Berckly		
Barbara Berckly	7	
Philip Bater	32	
Susana Bater	27	
Margrat Bater	11	
Rachel Bater	10	
Philip Bater	5	

Capt. George Dame's Company - Cont'd

	Age yrs	ms
John Caselman	39	
Margrat Caselman	26	
Mary Caselman	5	3
Jacob Anguish	63	
Elizabeth Anguish	54	
Jacob Anguish	20	
Henry Anguish	18	
Anna Anguish	16	
Elizabeth Anguish	10	
John Snider	36	
Maria Snider	40	
Widow Wintemote	68	
Jacob Post	36	
Catrina Post	34	
John Post	7	6
Job Berckly	38	4
Catrina Berckly	30	
Christ'n Berckly	7	
Fred'k Shaver	23	
Catrina Shaver	22	
Jacob Sagor	36	
Mary Sagor	34	

	Age yrs	ms
Philip Wintemote	41	
Henry Putman	30	
Joseph Rancier	22	
Wm Cryslor	32	
George Miller	30	
Evort Fagly	29	
Luk Cashaty	31	
Lambert Ekor	26	6
Wm Rinhart	23	
Peter Berckly	20	
Jacob Miller	32	
Benj'n Wintemote	21	
Fredk Baslor	30	
John Stynor	28	
John Sadlemier	22	
Derik Slingorland	28	
Tunis Slingorland	26	
Isaac Coon	28	
Nicolas Hart	23	
Francis Wever	25	
Jacob Quant	25	
Henry Baslor	24	
Alexander Frazer	18	
Andrew Berckly	23	
Peter Wormwood	25	
Nicolas Smith (Drum'r)	18	

Return of persons under the description of Loyalists in Lt. Col. Butler's Company of the Corps of Rangers Niagara, 30 November 1783

	Age yrs	ms
Capt. Benj'n Pawling	29	
Qr Master Jesse Pawling	27	
Sgt. Robert Campbell	27	

	Age yrs	ms
Sgt. Solomon Secord	28	
Cpl. Jeremiah Smith	22	
Cpl. Adin Bebee	22	

Lt. Col. Butler's Company - Cont'd

	Age yrs	ms
Sgt. Lewis Mabee	44	
Mrs. Mabee	43	
John Mabee	14	
Elisebeth Mabee	12	
Dorathy Mabee	10	
Catherine Mabee	8	
Mary Mabee	6	
Phillip Buck	41	
Mrs. Buck	32	
Fredrick Buck	11	
Michel Buck	9	
Phillip Buck Jr.	2	
Mary Buck	15	
Roser Buck	13	
Elisebeth Buck	6	
John Pensell	45	
Mrs. Pensell	31	
James Pensell	10	
Gradus Pensell	6	
Catherine Pensell	14	
Sarah Pensell	12	
Margrate Pensell	4	
Cornelas Bowin	39	
Mrs. Bowin	41	
John Bowin	15	
Will'm Bowin	6	
Henry Bowin	5	
Gertrey Bowin	9	6
Peter McMicken	41	
Mrs. McMicken	33	
John McMicken	4	6
Elisebeth McMicken	10	
Jain McMicken	9	3
Peter Pherow	23	
Mrs. Pherow	24	

	Age yrs	ms
George House	48	2
Mrs. House	29	
Fredrick House	12	6
George House Jr.	6	
Harmanus House	2	9
Mary House	7	
Joseph Page	43	
Mrs. Page	39	
Jesse Page	12	4
Benj'n Page	6	9
Mary Page	10	2
Joseph Roberson	45	
Sarah Roberson	10	
Margrate Roberson	6	
George Cockel	45	
Mrs. Cockel	42	
Fredrick Cockel	12	6
Peter Cockel	6	
Benj'n Knap	22	
Mrs. Knap	23	
Daniel Knap		3
Rachel Knap	2	
Henry Marrical	22	
Mrs. Marrical	29	
Will'm Marrical		7
Will'm Shell	33	
Mrs. Shell	24	
Chronamus Crysler, drummer	14	
19 single privates		
Thos. Yele, Pioneer	45	

Return of persons under the description of Loyalists in Capt. McKinnon's Company of the Corps of Rangers Niagara, December 1, 1783

	Age yrs	ms
1st Lt. Peter Ball		
2nd Lt. David Brass		
Mrs. Brass	26	
Sophia Brass	7	
Henry Brass	3	
John Brass		8
Sgt. Siles Secord	28	
Mrs. Secord	23	
Philip Mink	52	
Mrs. Mink	40	
Enney Mink (female)	20	
Elizabeth Mink	18	
Henry Mink	16	
Sarah Mink	14	
Ellener Mink	12	
William Mink	10	
Jno Mink	8	
Catherine Mink	7	
Margret Mink	3	
Jas Jones	49	
Mrs. Jones	39	
Andrew Jones	17	
Marcy Jones	15	
Samuel Jones	12	
Elizabeth Jones	11	
Jonathan Jones	9	
Sarah Jones	4	
Nansy Jones	6	

	Age yrs	ms
Cpl. Peter Wintemute	26	
Mrs. Wintemute	22	
Betsey Wintemute	4	
James Wintemute	1	9
Betsy Sipes	12	
Peter Thompson	39	
Mrs. Thompson	30	
Robt. Sipel	25	
Mrs. Sipel	22	
Elizabeth Sipel	4	
Ezekil Brown	45	
Mrs. Brown	45	
Sally Brown	15	
Sam'l Brown	11	
Mary Brown	6	
Jacob Brown	4	
Sgt. John Young	27	
Sgt. Jas Campbell	22	
Cpl. Jno Clous	32	
Cpl. Nicholas Sherer	30	
Drummers:		
Abraham Mattice	18	
Jno Crisler	15	
31 single privates		

Return of persons under the description of Loyalists Resident at Niagara, December 1, 1783

	Age		Age
Alex'r McNabb	15	John Thompson	45
		Dorothy Thompson	43
James Bennet	71	Abraham Deforrest	14
Negro man	19	Negro (man)	15
		do.	12
Samuel Street	30	do.	10
Lockwood Street	15	do.	6
Richard Cartwright	25	John Burch	42
Richard Beasley	22	Martha Burch	36
John Woodsides	54		

Return of persons under the description of Loyalists in the Indian Department, Niagara, December 1, 1783

[Note: names in brackets were marked "In the Colonies"]

	Age		Age
Capt. Gilbert Tice	44	Capt. Robert Lottridge	34
[Cristina Tice]	40	[Mary Lottridge]	30
		[John Lottridge]	13
Capt. John Powell	37	[Robert Lottridge]	11
Jane Powell	24		
		Lt. John Dackstader	32
Capt. Henry Nelles	48		
Robert Nelles	22	Lt. Brant Johnson	35
[Peter Nelles]	20	Jemima Johnson	17
[John Nelles]	18	Elizabeth Johnson	13
[Mary Nelles]	20	Sarah Johnson	8
[Henry Nelles]	16	Mary Johnson	6
[William Nelles]	14	James --- (blank in record)	24
[Warner Nelles]	12	Negro woman	37
[Ann Nelles]	10		
[Abraham Nelles]	8	Lt. Daniel Servos	35
[John Nelles]	1	[Glory Servos]	54
		[Catherine Servos]	9
Lt. William Bowen	42	[Magdelen Servos]	7
[Jane Bowen]	36		

Loyalists in the Indian Department - Cont'd

	Age		Age
Lt. Jacob Servos	24	Richard Wilkinson, secretary	
Lt. William Johnston	25	Amelia Wilkinson	
Elizabeth Johnston	64	Elizabeth Wilkinson	9
Joseph Powell	49	Walter B. Wilkinson	2
Elizabeth Powell	26	Amelia Wilkinson	½
Elizabeth Macgraw	11	Margaret Smith	15
		Negro man	25
Lt. John Clement	23		
James Clement	19	Samuel Thompson, Storekeeper	25
Catherine Clement	59	Jemima Thompson	21
Ann Clement	14	Dorothy Mabie	10
Negro man	40		
Negro woman	43	Nicholas Stevens, Interpreter	50
Lt. Adam Crysler	51	Aaron Stevens, Commissary	21
Margaret Crysler	50	John Stevens† clerk	19
John Crysler	18		
Maria Crysler	16	John Friel	42
Catherine Crysler	14	Dorothy Friel	32
		Barbara Friel	14
Lt. John Young	41	James Friel	11
Catherine Young	36	Hugh Friel	1
Abraham Young	17		
John Young	11	Forresters:	
Elizabeth Young	9	Sgt. James McGregor	28
Joseph Young	2	John Myers	31
		Sam'l Cox	24
Lt. John Ryckman	28	William Steadman	34
[Sarah Ryckman]	22	Benjamin Bearcroft	25
[Sarah Ryckman]	4	Owen Connor	37
		William Tremble	30
John Constable, surgeon	52	[Ann Tremble]	40
Jane Constable	50	[James Temble]	3
Negro woman	17		

† Two entries following John Stevens were erased: Mary Stevens aged 65 and Catharine Stevens aged 36 or 56. Both were marked "In the Colonies."

Indian Dept. - Cont'd	Age
Barnabas Cain	36
Margaret Cain	32
John Cain	9
Brants Volunteers:	
Henry Hoff	51
John Hoff	24
James Pemberton	23
John Sheverland	48
John Chisolm	30
Rudolph Johnston	29
Loudewick Teley	26
James Park	32
Daniel Secord	27
James Middagh	23
William Crumb	51
[Mary Crumb]	48
[Cornelius Crumb]	20
[Catherine Crumb]	16
[Sarah Crumb]	14

	Age
Brants Volunteers:	
Daniel Cole	40
[Susanna Cole]	36
[Jacob Cole]	14
[Charles Cole]	9
[John Cole]	11
[Henry Cole]	9
Anthony Westbrook	47
Alexander Westbrook	16
[Sarah Westbrook]	45
[John Westbrook]	13
[Andrew Westbrook]	10
[Hagiah Westbrook]	8
[Elizabeth Westbrook]	14
Robert Land	30
Late of the Dep't:	
Timothy Murphy	28
Thomas Sutton	50

Return of persons under the description of Loyalists being farmers settled at this Post, Niagara, December 1, 1783

	Age
James Seacord	53
Magdalen Seacord	49
David Seacord	23
Magdalen Seacord	19
Hester Seacord	17
Mary Seacord	13
James Seacord	10
James Forsyth	44
Unis Forsyth	38
Daniel Forsyth	11
Wm Forsyth	9
John Forsyth	2
Sarah Forsyth	5
John Davis	42

	Age
Philip Banter	40
Mary Banter	30
John Banter	8
Mary Banter	5
Sarah Banter	2
Thomas McMicken	33
Jane McMicken	66
Jane Cooper	43
Thomas Cooper	14
James Cooper	11
Haway Alexander	3
Abraham Wing [4 persons in the household for which 2 1/4 rations were issued]	--

Return of Loyalists being farmers at Niagara - Cont'd

Daniel Rose	26	Allan McDaniel [McDonell]	49
Jane Rose	25	Hannah McDaniel	35
Hugh Rose	5	William McDaniel	6
William Rose	2½	Alex'r McDaniel	3
John Rose	3/4	Hannah McDaniel	1
Peter Seacord	62	Francis Elsworth	38
Abigal Seacord	40	Mary Elsworth	27
Peter Seacord	18		
Stephen Seacord	16	George Stewart	31
David Seacord	10	Mary Stewart	23
Margaret Seacord	15	George Stewart	3
Eliz'th Seacord	14	David Stewart	2
		Charles Stewart	½
Elijah Phillips	34		
Eloner Phillips	24	John Depue	55
		Mary Depue	43
Samuel Louts	44	Charles Depue	21
Sarah Louts	36	Wm Depue	16
John Louts	14	John Depue	14
George Louts	11	Susanna Depue	12
Sam'l Louts	6	Eliz'th Depue	10
Job Louts	3	Marian Depue	7
Sarah Louts	10		
		Isaac Dolson	41
Jurden Every	42	Mary Dolsen	30
Sarah Every	43	Daniel Dolsen	10
Edward Turner	20	John Dolsen	8
Hanna Turner	14	Isaac Dolsen	6
Sarah Turner	11	Eliz'th Dolsen	12
		Mary Dolsen	3
George Fields	62	John Dolsen	81
Rebecca Fields	58		
		Thomas Millar [Millard]	54
Michael Showers	50	Mary Millar	55
Hannah Showers	43	Thomas Millar	29
Michael Showers	12	John Millar	18
John Showers	7	Noah Millar	13
Elizabeth Showers	19	Unis Millar	16
Lana Showers	17	Sarah Millar	12
Hanna Showers	14		
Ann Showers	9	Joseph Drake	40
Mary Showers	1		

Return of persons at Niagara and it's Dependencies under the description of Loyalists. December 2, 1783
King's Regt.
Five Companies: 10 women who wash &c for the men.
Mrs. Scott: 1 woman, 1 boy, 5 girls. Nurse to the hospital.
Mrs. Robertson: 1 woman, 1 girl. School-mistress.
Benj'n Seymore, Edward Boynes: 2 boys.
Mrs. Whatley: 1 woman, 1 boy, 1 girl.
34th Regt.
Six Companies: 12 women who wash &c for the men.
Sgt. Killigrew. Issuer of provisions at Fort Schlosser.
Sgt. Thornton. Issuer of provisions at the Landing.
Sgt. Palmer. Issuer of provisions at Niagara.
Mrs. Stannard: 1 woman, 1 boy.
John McLauchlan: 1 man, 1 woman. Clerk to the Commanding Officer of the upper Posts, &c.
-Return made by Major Rob. Hayes, 34th Regt.

The 1783 Census of Niagara (The Ontario Register, 1968, pp. 198-214).

APPENDIX 3

NIAGARA



Part of the TOWNSHIP of NEWARK now Niagara

Scale, Forty Chains to One Inch

Copy

C 22

Niagara Dist of Niagara

Plan of the rise and Progress of a Settlement of Loyalist On the west Side of the River Niagara

Items Names	Quantity of Clear Land on South Channel	No.	Dwelling Houses Length	Dwelling Houses Breadth	No.	Barns Length	Barns Breadth	Quantity of Land sown with wheat last Fall	Wheat	Rye	Oats	Horses	Cows	Young Cattle	Calves	Swine
			Feet	Feet		Feet	Feet									
John McDonell	50	1	24	by 100	1	24	by 16	9	..	7	7	3	..	..	..	14
Peter Hare	25	1	30	by 20	1	20	by 16	..	3	4	0	5	0			0
Barnard Frey	0	..										2	2			
Ann. Brant	5	1	30	by 20	..	..		..	..		3	3	2	..	1	3
Benj.a Pawling	0	1	14	by 14	..	..		..	4	..	4	1	1	..	..	..
Jacob Ball	11	1	25	by 20	1	20	by 16	..	3	..	7	3	4	2	..	7
Peter Ball	5	1	20	by 20	..	..		..	2		2	1	..	..	..	..
Robt Guthrie	30	1	34	by 20	1	20	by 16	4	4	0	4	2	..			
John Reilly	1	1	20	by 100	..	..		..	..	..	1	1	1	..	..	1
John Coon	6	1	24	by 20	1	100	by 16	..	..	2	3	2	1	..	..	5
Jacob Bruner	12	1	25	by 15	1	12	by 12	5	..	1	1	2	1	..	1	3
George Bruner	4	1	10	by 16	..	..		..	..	1	2	1	1	..	..	2
Jehiel Brown	4	1	16	by 14	1	14	by 14	..	4	..	4	2	4	..	..	14
Joseph Robison	0	1	20	by 100	..	..		2	..	..	3	2	1	1	1	5
Peter Thompson	6	1	16	by 16	..	..		..	..	1	3	1	1	.	..	2
John McDonell	16	1	36	by 100	1	12	by 12	..	2	3	5	2	2	.	..	3
Brant Johnson	15	1	20	by 16	..	..		..	..	2	6	2	1	..	..	3
John Bunch	20	1	21	by 20	1	50	by 45	..	3	4	3	7	3	1	..	7
Isaac Dobson	50	1	30	by 20	1	30	by 20	13	3	4	5	6	4	4	3	26
Elijah Phillips	30	1	30	by 24	1	37	by 27	12	..	5	0	5	5	9	1	24
James Secord	10	1	27	by 100	1	25	by 25	10	..	..	0	4	0	4	2	0
Peter Secord	25	1	30	by 20	1	40	by 30	5	..	5	0	0	6	0	6	44
Jam.s Secord	30	1	16	by 15	..	..		12	4	2	1	3	3	1	4	22
Geo.g Ruard	12	1	30	by 20	1	30	by 20	4	..	1	4	4	3	..	..	3
Geo.g Chrisler	25	1	24	by 100	..	..		6	3	..	0	6	2	4	1	4
John Depue	12	1	30	by 20	1	26	by 20	..	4	3	4	1	1	2	..	4
Michel Showers	20	1	25	by 14	..	..		7	..	1	7	2	1	..	1	1
Daniel Row	12	1	20	by 20	..	..		3	..	1	6	2	1	1	1	10
Wm.m McMicking	6	1	100	by 100	..	..		3	..	1	7	2	1	1	..	6
Ralph Stinson	7	1	15	by 10	..	..		3	..	1	7	2	1	1	..	6
Phillip Bunter	6	1	17	by 17	1	20	by 12	..	3	2	5	2	3	2	1	12
John Chisholm	25	1	17	by 16	1	20	by 20	3	..	..	..	5	2	..	1	7
Francis Elsworth	5	1	25	by 15	..	..		1	..	1	2	4	2	2	..	11
Jam.s Forsyth	2	1	100	by 100	..	..					2	..	..	..	..	2
Wm Miller	2	1	20	by 20	..	..				1	5	2	1	..	..	..
Allen McDonell	10	1	16	by 14	..	..		5	..	1	3	1	..	..	..	1
John Secord	50	1	32	by 16	1	35	by 25	13	..	..	16	9	6	7	2	10
Anthony Singard	3	1	22	by 17	..	..		..	..	..	1	2	2	1	1	..
Henry Hatter	10	1	15	by 15	..	..		..	4	..	4	1	1	1	1	6
Isaac Vatlick (Vallick)	11	1	100	by 15	..	..		..	..	..	0	1	..	..	..	4
Harmanus Howe	30	1	32	by 22	1	36	by 100	3	1	0	4	5	5	4	2	24
Adam Young	100	1	100	by 15	1	20	by 100	..	4	..	5	2	3	2	2	2
Joseph Peters	..	1	10	by 14	..	..		..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3
John Secord Jun.r	10	.	.	.	.	.		..	..	..	0	.	.	.	.	.
Sam.l Sikes (Soper)	4	1	10	by 16	..	..		..	..	..	4	1	1	..	..	1
Jordan Every (Shoemaker)	4	1	16	by 16	..	..		..	3	..	4	1	..	..	..	2
Total	713	44			20			123	54	70	210	124	96	64	35	332

Inventory of Indian Councels held at Niagara &c.

Year and Date	Mark on the Parcel	No. on the Speech	Where Speech Assembled	Purport of their respective Speeches
1779 January 29th	B	No. 1	Niagara	Major Butlers Speech to the Senecas, Mohawks, Onandagas &c. their Speech addressed to the Genl. for Establishing a Post at Oswego
Feby. 13th	"	2	Ditto	Aaron the Mohocks speech to the Wyandots, informing that the Shawanese and some delawares, invited the Rebels to their Country
April 2d	"	3	Quebec	General Haldimands Answr. to the Speech addressed to him, by the Deputies of the Mohocks, Admonishing them to be firm & to support the Cause of their Ancestors
March 5th	"	4	Niagara	Major Butlers speech to the Onandagoes in the Rebel Interest, inviting them to come in and Join their Brethren against the English
22d	"	5	Do	Message from the Cochnawagoes of Canada, to the Onayouegas delivered at their Village by two of Do. at Niagara inclosed in Major Butlers Letter relating to the Contents of a private paper sent by order of the French King
May 8th	"	6	Ditto	Copy of a Belt, and speech of the 6 Nations, sent by their Chiefs to Detroit
[illegible]	"	8	Ditto	Council with the Senecas, Cayougas, Onandagoes & several other Nations, respecting for the Life of their Chiefs & Warriors at Fort Detroit
1780 April 12th	"	9	Ditto	Colonel Johnson acquainting the Indians proceedings with their rebel Indians by Capt. Brant for the Six Nations to lay down their Arms, & they may return to their Habitations, with a Letter from Col. Johnson to General Haldimand & his Answers
March 28th	"	10	Ditto	Proceedings & Transactions with Col. Johnson & the Indians — to protect their trade, and to prevent encroachments on their Lands
June 17th	"	11	Ditto	Proceedings of Kayashota and other Chiefs sent to the South ward (said before Colonel Johnson) to form a Confederacy with the South & West Indians, which took place & Sayanqaraghtas application for the Rebel Indians release
July	"	12	Ditto	Proceedings at two meetings with the Rebel Indians of Canaghsera's, Onedas &c. before Colonel Johnson, begging excuse for being so ignorant as to join the Rebels
October 29th	"	13	Ditto	Proceedings at a Meeting held at Colonel Johnsons Quarters, before Brig. General Powell. Congratulating him upon his entering the Command
1781 Dec. 20th	"	14	Ditto	Speech delivered by two Onandagoes and a Huron from Detroit in answer to that from Colonel Johnson and the Six Nations; with a general Speech from them, requested to be sent to His Excellency Gen. Haldimand for assistance in the spring to destroy Fort Pitt
1783 June 30th	"	15	Oswego	Council held by Lt. Col. Butler with a few Chiefs of the Six Nations Containing report from the two Oneida Indians, that their Lands are to be taken possession of by the Americans, if resisted, they will Kill & Him, Women, and Children

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