THE ASSOCIATES OF BRUTUS: A PROSOPOGRAPHICAL STUDY
THE ASSOCIATES OF BRUTUS:
A PROSOPOGRAPHICAL STUDY

By

DON EDWARD SUTTON, B.A.

A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Master of Arts

McMaster University
September 1986
MASTER OF ARTS (1986)  
(MASTERS PROGRAM)  
(McMaster University)  
Hamilton, Ontario  

TITLE: The Associates of Brutus: A Prosopographical Study  

AUTHOR: Don Edward Sutton, B.A. (McMaster University)  

SUPERVISOR: Dr. G. M. Paul  

NUMBER OF PAGES: v, 183.
ABSTRACT

Marcus Junius Brutus is chiefly known for his assassination of Julius Caesar. The consequences of this deed forced him and Cassius to leave Italy and defend themselves in the East against their enemies, the Triumvirate. This thesis focuses on all those who supported Brutus from the time of the Ides of March until the battle of Philippi. These men are collected and analyzed in terms of their interrelationships, and their relations to Brutus against the background of the society and history of Rome. It is argued that Brutus was the leader of a political factio which could trace its roots back to the opposition to Pompeius at the beginning of his career in 70 BC. Also many individuals of various former political alliances joined Brutus because the political circumstances of the last decade made it necessary for them to unite against the Triumvirate. In this way, Brutus’ associates were motivated by traditional socio-political motives and by situations characteristic of the end of the Republic. All dates are B.C. unless otherwise noted.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. G. M. Paul, for suggesting the topic and for his help, suggestions, accessibility and, above all, patience at every stage of the project. I would like to thank Dr. R. J. A. Talbert for his helpful criticism, particularly concerning the format of the prosopography, and Dr. P. Kingston for his comments on the manuscript. In addition, thanks go to Drs. Slater and Dunbabin for the use of their computer.

The support and understanding of three people have aided me throughout. I dedicate this work to my father and mother and, of course, to Jayne.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 1
CHAPTER ONE: THE PREDECESSORS TO BRUTUS .......................... 7
CHAPTER TWO: BRUTUS' YOUNG NOBILES: THE REFORMATION OF
THE CATONIANS ............................................................... 32
CHAPTER THREE: BRUTUS IN THE EAST: CAESAR’S OFFICERS ............ 59
CHAPTER FOUR: THE MAKING OF A FACTIO ................................ 79
CONCLUSION ........................................................................ 101
PROSOPOGRAPHY .................................................................. 105
APPENDIX ONE: PLUTARCH’S BRUTUS ..................................... 144
ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................... 150
FOOTNOTES ........................................................................... 152
FOOTNOTES ON STEMMA ONE ............................................. 176
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................... 177

GENEALOGICAL TABLE: STEMMA ONE .................................... 12
INTRODUCTION

Quod errare me putas, qui rem publicam putem pendere in Bruto, sic se res habet. Aut nulla erit aut ab isto istisve servabitur.

Cic. Ad Att. 14.20 (SB 374)

Cicero, writing two months after the assassination of Caesar, believed the survival of the Republic depended on M. Junius Brutus and his associates. These men held various political views and came from varied social backgrounds. Previous supporters of Caesar, Pompeius, the young sons of Cato's supporters, those proscribed by the Triumvirate and others all found themselves in Brutus' camp. Nevertheless, the formation of such a diversified faction cannot be said to be surprising in the final days of the Republic, considering the previous political upheavals. Some of the relatives of Brutus' companions were leaders of the opposition to Pompeius and Caesar in the sixties and fifties. Under the leadership of Q. Lutatius Catulus and M.
Porcius Cato, these men struggled to maintain their stature in the senate. While the senate was still the central power in Rome, Catulus had to combat Pompeius in the curia and in the forum. Later, when the Triumvirate had usurped the power of the senate, Brutus had to contend with Caesar's heirs on the battlefield of Philippi. The difference between the positions of Catulus and Brutus is very great, yet it came about within one generation. The causes of the fall of the Republic and its ruling factions are numerous, but Sulla's forceful ascendancy is of primary importance. Fatal precedents were created. It became all too apparent that an adventurous dux could control the government. Thus the Republic, which existed only through the loyalty of her generals, perished after a succession of civil wars. The oligarchy, for centuries using the structure of the Republic to glorify and perpetuate itself, perished as well.¹

It is the plan of this work to investigate the supporters of Brutus drawn from the orders of the senate and equites from the assassination of Caesar in March of 44 until the final battle of Philippi in November 42. A prosopography of the men who furthered the cause of Brutus during this period may be found at end of this work. The examination of such a wide variety of different men and their backgrounds will show how an association or political interest group was composed in the last days of the Republic as well as explain the political and social
reasons which brought it together.

The first chapter will establish the existence of an association of senators, linked by marriage and politics, whose sons, nephews and friends formed the core of Brutus' association. Brutus' political predecessors can be coherently linked to the rise of Pompeius and Caesar, and the subsequent political reaction to them. The multiple relationships which bound together the Lutatii, the Servilii Caepiones, the Liciniii Lucullii, the Forcii Catones, the Domitii and others will be noted as well as their attitudes and activities which would later influence Brutus and his men.

The second chapter will investigate the ties between Cato's political friends and their relations with the companions of Brutus. Brutus' career up to the assassination of Caesar will be examined in order to comprehend his special relations with Cato as well as to understand some of the motives which prompted him to lead a conspiracy against Caesar. Brutus' character and political views are often misinterpreted, not least because of his Stoic reputation which grew in the Imperial period and culminated in Plutarch's Life. A discussion of the problems which arise in dealing with the Brutus legend is found in the appendix.

The third chapter will deal with the small group of men who at one time were found closely allied with Caesar.
during the Gallic and civil wars. A few of these men such as C. Trebonius and L. Tillius Cimber are among the assassins of their benefactor while others associated with Brutus after the deed. Further, several men who held or were about to hold military commands at the time of the assassination played a crucial role in bringing the East over to the Liberators.

The fourth chapter will deal with all other individuals who aided Brutus but cannot be strictly separated into further groups because the reasons behind their allegiance are too varied or unknown. This will include those forced to escape to the eastern provinces because of the proscriptions of the Second Triumvirate. The thesis, as mentioned, will conclude with a prosopographical list and commentary on all these men and a discussion of Plutarch's *Brutus*.

Prosopography is emphasized in this thesis. The formation of Brutus' following from its antecedents is studied here in regard to an individual's relationships and connections in the context of Roman society and history. Modern historians of antiquity are hindered by the use of this method. First, lack of evidence about even the most vital social information brings about generalized conclusions. Precious little is known about the sixty men in the prosopography, some being no more than mere names. Any attempt
to discover their political tendencies from their family background is always tenuous and sometimes results in contrived conclusions about their politics and family trees. Such guesswork is avoided here, and assumptions are duly noted. For example, Brutus’ friend Atilius may be safely said to be a relative but anything more precise is speculative. As well, the appellations, Caesarian, Catonian and Pompeian, given to denote a man’s political attitudes, are broad terms covering any action on behalf of a leader. It must be remembered that a Roman primarily worked for his own political advancement, and any political cooperation between men or factiones was often temporary, depending on a variety of circumstances. Visionaries, like Caesar, who had views on the state they desired and the means to implement their wishes, were few. Secondly, as L. Stone has shown, personal motivations remain the unknown quantities in historical research. Romans can be said to act in such ways as are congenial to our understanding of their society. But when war or political upheaval occurred men acted for quite personal reasons, reasons which often remain closed from a historian’s scrutiny. Such are the conclusions of Shackleton Bailey’s "The Roman Nobility in the Second Civil War".

Still, the merits of prosopography out-weigh its drawbacks. It is established that Roman politics operated along the lines of fluid groups linked by family connections, clientage, amicitia and the like. Prosopography
is ideally suited to this type of evidence. Examinations of these relationships provide a solid foundation for studies of political and social groups in the Roman world, their changing natures and how they affected the course of history. In this way, the reasons why Brutus’ men came together may be more important for an understanding of the late Republic than what they in the end accomplished.
Marcus Brutus claimed descent from L. Brutus, who drove the Tarquin kings from Rome, and C. Servilius Ahala, murderer of a potential tyrant. When Caesar came to power, Brutus found his tribunal littered with messages reminding him of his ancestry. After Caesar’s assassination, Cicero said he had no need to prompt Cicero into the deed; the imagines of Brutus advised him of his duty. In Brutus’ case, the maiores could potentially be influential. But perhaps more immediately persuasive for Brutus and his aristocratic followers were their fathers, uncles and cousins who had held power in Rome and who had fought both in civic life and on the battlefield to retain their preeminence. Just as Brutus, M. Lucullus, L. Calpurnius Bibulus, young M. Porcius Cato, Q. Hortensius and others found themselves fighting against the Triumvirate of Octavianus, Antonius and Lepidus, their predecessors had struggled against Pompeius and Caesar. An examination of the workings and structure of the family in Roman politics as well as the activities and the attitudes of Brutus’ forebears will be instructive for understanding the formation of his association at Philippi.
A father’s or grandfather’s achievements could determine the course and success of a man’s political career. To maintain prominence in politics, powerful families allied with each other by means of marriage or adoption for mutual political self-interest. Alliances bound by family links or amicitia promoted candidates for office, military commands and prestigious priesthoods all trying to frustrate the designs of opposing factiones, their enemies’ alliances. The predominate families formed the governing oligarchy, the optimates, and only accepted newcomers of particular talent who could aid in perpetuating their dignitas and their line. Over the centuries, some dynastic clans became extinct or faded into obscurity, others survived in minor branches of the family while still others rose to prominence after decades of decline. In the late Republic the process became accelerated. Larger families found themselves at a disadvantage because political upheavals and wars forced men to choose sides, often in disregard of family loyalty. A gens trying to remain at the political center by means of a great host of different alliances became fragmented, and antagonism arose even itself. In addition, men like Pompeius, Caesar and Cato attracted a following through their own activities and personal magnetism leading to the breakdown of traditional family loyalty. In crises, men linked through amicitia, intermarriage or patronage could no
longer be relied upon. Instead of feuds and reconciliation between individuals and ruling families taking place over generations, the late Republic saw the process happen over years and even months. Still, the traditional means of conducting politics through the family continued, although strained, and it is in this context that the forerunners to Brutus' association will be discussed.

Brutus' own father (tribune 83) had aided the revolt of M. Aemilius Lepidus in 79, showing a lack of concern for the family tradition of preserving the Republic. Despite this, the antecedents of Brutus' association can be traced to this time. Among all the political manoeuvrings and alliances during the years before the civil war, a number of men consistently tried to preserve the control of the government which Sulla had placed in their hands and tried to prevent the accumulation of political power by Pompeius Magnus and Julius Caesar. Q. Lutatius Catulus, L. Licinius Lucullus and Q. Hortensius Hortalus came to power under Sulla and were in the forefront of activities during the seventies and sixties. Beginning in the late sixties and continuing to the eve of the civil war, M. Porcius Cato, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, M. Calpurnius Bibulus and M. Favonius were prominent opponents of Pompeius, and later, Caesar. Although these men were in the forefront of
activities they did not provide the only opposition to Pompeius, Caesar and their associates. Without the aid of the other dynastic families in Rome they would have achieved little. Nor were associations of Catulus, Cato and even Brutus exclusive to their families. For instance, C. Calpurnius Piso (cos. 67) worked along with Catulus, Hortensius, Lucullus as well as Bibulus but no apparent family relations between them can be detected. Also, caution must be used in assuming that family links can automatically explain the political outlook of individuals. When civil wars forced men to take up a stance, families became divided as men often chose a leader or a cause in disregard of old loyalties, sometimes because of personal and undiscernible reasons. During the late Republic family loyalties counted less and less. The fact that a prominent Roman family was related to every other important family, including their enemies is significant and frequently overlooked. This is normal considering the nature of political and social life in Rome. In a later chapter, the many associates of Caesar who joined Brutus will be discussed. But the association of men from Catulus to Brutus was more closely related, and it is because of this that Brutus' predecessors warrant attention.  

Catulus, Lucullus and Hortensius all emerged from the dominatio of Sulla to become consuls within a
decade of the dictator's death. Catulus and Lucullus served under Sulla during the civil wars of the 90s and it was during Catulus' consulship that the Sullan constitution was first defended against the revolt of Lepidus. Lucullus successfully continued Sulla's war against Mithridates and the oratory of Hortensius was essential for the control of the senate and lawcourts. Catulus and Hortensius were prominent in their opposition to Pompeius, while Lucullus and his brother later allied with them, breaking with the Claudio-Metellan faction which supported Pompeius. The Metelli, like other gentes, followed no one political course other than the promotion of their interests. Such a large, politically conscious family naturally attached itself to the leading figures of the day, but also quite easily became independent of them when the time was right. Still it is quite plain that Pompeius' links to the Metelli at this point were a source of his power and it is significant that his allies among them were all of the younger generation.

The intricate relationships between Brutus' predecessors appear more complicated when their connections with the companions of Cato are examined. A Domitia, sister of the consul of 96, Qn Domitius Ahenobarbus, was the first wife of Catulus' father. Catulus' mother was a Servilia, daughter of Q. Servilius Caepio
Stemma 1.
(Adapted from R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, Table 2, p. 512.)
(pr. 91) whose daughters (or nieces) became wives to Lucullus and M. Junius Brutus (tribune 83). Catulus' own sister married his friend Hortensius. In addition, Hortensius' daughter married a further Q. Servilius Caepio, Brutus' adoptive father, who was either Cato's half-brother or another unattested son of the praetor of 91. Lucullus and Hortensius were acquainted in their youth and along with Catulus and Lucullus' brother, M. Terentius Varro Lucullus, were patrons of the Greek poet Archias whom they defended in 62. As well, these men were notorious for the luxuriousness of their villas, earning them the nickname piscinarii and of their care for their fishponds. Not only were these men firmly related by politics and family connections but it can be assumed that they fostered the intimate connections of their younger contemporaries.

By the consulship of Pompeius and Crassus in the year 70, the Sullan constitution had already begun to be dismantled. Pompeius had arrived in Rome with his army fresh from the war with Sertorius and the disturbance with Spartacus. He refused to disband his army until his triumph with Metellus Pius. In fact he wished to become consul without having held any previous office. The senate graciously disregarded the lex annalis of Sulla for Pompeius and he was subsequently elected. The making of one of the generals who would plunge the Republic into
As well, the rights of the tribunate, curtailed by Sulla, were restored in 70 at the prompting of Pompeius. Under the *lex Aurelia* the *equites* became *judices*, participating fully with the senators in the law courts. Censors were elected, who rid the senate of sixty-four of its members, probably men who entered the *curia* when Sulla enlarged its membership. The reform of the courts did not meet with great opposition. Cicero relates that even Catulus felt the inclusion of the *equites* would be morally beneficial. But Catulus and his associates were active in their opposition to the restoration of the traditional rights of the tribunate. As intended, the tribunate could arouse popular resentment against the senate and seriously affect its traditional power. Sulla in his reforms had rendered the office powerless. But the struggle for the restoration of the tribunate continued. In 75 the tribune Q. Opimius tried to exercise an illegal veto. The consequences proved severe. He was successfully prosecuted by Catulus and Hortensius, and suffered a fine and confiscation of some property. In the next years Catulus, the Luculli and Mam. Lepidus (Cato's uncle and Brutus' great-uncle) were involved in suppressing the agitation of the tribunes. But the resistance was not continued. In 71, Pompeius returned from Spain and promised the reinstatement of the tribunate if he was elected. It was duly restored. Catulus and his
friends are nowhere in evidence. E. S. Gruen has suggested that the restored tribunate posed no threat to their faction of the senate and the issue had become more a symbol of the Sullan establishment, to be preserved or destroyed. But the acquiescence of Catulus and his friends reveals weaknesses in their political thinking.

The senate gave Pompeius a special command to fight Sertorius. It also permitted him exemption from the lex annalis, and allowed him to pass legislation, previously vigorously opposed by Catulus and others, which had the potential of seriously weakening the Sullan constitution, and eventually did. Many new senators who could be counted on to follow the line of the Sullan principes had been purged from the senate. The supporters of the Sullan constitution had not tried to stop Pompeius. True, they could not foresee Pompeius' extraordinary commands which were still to come, but their inactivity at this point needs to be explained.

Sir Ronald Syme believes that Pompeius used force to procure his consulship. Although this opinion has had notable detractors, it finds modified support. Catulus, Hortensius and their colleagues, it is argued, feared a military takeover by Pompeius. His consulship as well as many other 'popular' programmes were extorted out of them by threat of force or by the implications which the adolescensulus carnifex with a loyal army would present.
Unfortunately the evidence does not support the theory. The belief that Pompeius was a revolutionary is unsubstantiated. An examination of his early career proves that although his situation was unusual, he had always worked with the approval of the senate. His ties with the Metelli, his cooperation with the senate previously, and his behaviour upon his return to Rome in 71 make this evident. The reasons for the compliant behavior of Catulus and his associates must be found elsewhere.\textsuperscript{12}

The antagonism between Pompeius and the associates of Catulus before 70 is not well documented. It is recorded that Pompeius was at odds with Catulus because of an incident which occurred during the conflict with Lepidus. After their victory, Pompeius refused Catulus' order to disband his army. They appear in confrontation years later when Pompeius is given the extraordinary command against the pirates. It has been assumed that their enmity continued from 77 to 67. Evidence for this is lacking, and the quarrel about Pompeius' refusal can be regarded as exaggerated due to their later animosity. There is abundant evidence in Republican history that generals were uncooperative both with each other and their legates. Also the question of whether Pompeius was a legate of Catulus or whether he held an independent command is not settled.\textsuperscript{13} If there was no open hostility between Pompeius and the leaders of the senate, the events of 71-70 become more easily understood.
In fact, early in their careers, Hortensius had spoken in the courts on behalf of Pompeius soon after the death of Pompeius' Strabo father. The senate continued to be indebted to Pompeius who seemed to be the only general willing to undertake the difficult task of contending with Sertorius in Spain. His success proved his value. As mentioned, Pompeius' predicament was not typical. In 71 he was thirty-five years old, he had celebrated a triumph and was about to celebrate another, yet he had not held a civil magistracy as he had spent most of his adult life fighting for the senate. The popular agitation about the bans on the tribunate made the issue an easy one for Pompeius to promote. Had Catulus and the rest realized what the return of the tribunate would entail, they would have surely provided strong opposition.

The reforms of the tribunate proved to be fatal. Three years later, in 67, the full extent of these newly restored powers became apparent. The tribune A. Gabinius proposed that Pompeius receive an unprecedented command to rid the Mediterranean of pirates. Those opposed to the motion were led by the consul C. Calpurnius Piso, lifelong enemy of Pompeius and later of Caesar. The consul, publicly criticizing Pompeius, was nearly killed by the mob. Catulus urged the people not to expose Pompeius to further perils and Hortensius vigorously voiced his disapproval. Despite this the programme was adopted. Had the
tribunical powers not been restored and had the vote been taken in the senate, the result would have been otherwise. As it happened, two weapons which Catulus and his friends were powerless to oppose, were used to pass the law, Pompeius' popular support and the tribunate.15

The next year proved no better for the fortunes of the men opposed to Pompeius. The tribune C. Manilius proposed that Pompeius be given the provinces of Cilicia, Bithynia and Pontus, and the command against Mithridates. L. Lucullus had gradually lost parts of his provincia; Asia in 69, and Cilicia in 68 by decree of the senate, and Bithynia and Pontus in 67 by the motion of Gabinius. Again opposition to the law was fierce with Catulus and Hortensius leading the resistance. But, as with the pirate command, the law was passed by the people's assembly.16

Pompeius had capitalized on Lucullus' bad luck. Lucullus' harsh discipline and the activities of his brother-in-law, P. Clodius, caused a mutiny among his troops, enabling Mithridates and Tigranes to recover their territory.17 Pompeius, fresh from his spectacular victory over the pirates, was the only choice as his successor. Although he had previously obtained his commands with the approval of the senate, he now had enemies in the persons of Catulus and Hortensius. The antagonism between Lucullus and Pompeius seems to have had its roots in this situation. No friction is recorded before this time, and Lucullus
even aided Pompeius with funds during the pirate campaign. As mentioned Lucullus may have been involved in a Claudio-Metellan factio which was sympathetic to Pompeius. The Manilian law changed this. Pompeius refused to recognize the edicts which Lucullus had decreed in the East as well as those of the commission of his brother which was established to reorganize the territory of Pontus. In addition, Lucullus believed that Pompeius was unfairly robbing him of his gloria in a long and arduous war. In disgrace he returned to Rome in 66 to find his brother facing prosecution and his own triumph delayed, all by the work of a follower of Pompeius, the tribune C. Memmius. The reaction was swift. Lucullus divorced his wife Claudia and married a sister (or niece) of Cato. Cato then aided the Luculli in the confrontation with Memmius. Later, another follower of Pompeius, C. Cornelius, tribune in 67, was prosecuted for maiestas by Catulus, Hortensius, Q. Metellus Pius, Mam. Lepidus Livianus and M. Lucullus. The Luculli were now to be counted among the opponents of Pompeius.19

Intricately connected with the rise of Pompeius is the almost passive resistance of Catulus, Hortensius and the Luculli. These men emerged as leaders after the Sullan regime and, until 70, no hostility with Pompeius is documented. Indeed it is understandable why they took the
action they did, and did not oppose Pompeius more strenuously or earlier in his career. Their position as 
principes in the senate was secure. They had all lived 
through the Marian terror and subsequent civil war, and 
they may have been more than a bit hesitant to aggressively 
 oppose a young general who found great popularity both among 
the Roman mob and the army.

If the political activities of Catulus and others 
are to be regarded as 'conservative', that is, protecting 
the status of the Sullan constitution, it is because they 
themselves were products of the regime. Any diminution of 
the constitution would result in a weaker political 
position. This necessarily entailed an alliance of those 
with similar backgrounds, particularly those with whom they 
were related. Similarly, as we shall see, their younger 
relatives took up a conservative stance to try and regain 
the influence which their predecessors had lost. Thus the 
alliance functioned both politically and socially because of 
similar interests.

The composition of this group began to change 
gradually at the end of the 60s. Catulus, Lucullus and 
Hortensius grew older; Catulus died about 61, 
Lucullus in 58, after several years of retirement. 
Hortensius lived until the eve of the civil war but mainly
kept himself to the courts. This allowed for the emergence of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, M. Calpurnius Bibulus, M. Favonius and especially M. Porcius Cato.

The politics changed as well as the participants not least because of C. Julius Caesar. His growing importance heightened the battles between Pompeius and his opponents. As a young man Caesar had maintained his Marian connections and by the late sixties was one of many who tried to further their careers by attaching themselves to Pompeius. Although his determination and ambition had yet to be made known before his consulship, his time in Gaul presented him with prestige and power nearly equal to Pompeius and he became as great an enemy to Cato.1

The legend of Cato, like that of Brutus, grew considerably after his death. Undeservedly labelled the 'prig' of Roman politics, Cato spent the decade before the civil war grappling with Pompeius, Caesar, Crassus, Clodius and others, using strategies different from his predecessors, as his abilities dictated. When Caesar resorted to strong-arm tactics, it was Cato who stood against him and was for a time successful. Cultivating an image of a stern, conservative, uncompromising Roman politician in the model of his great-grandfather, he was not above bribery, using the tribunate to disrupt legislation or distributing grain to the Roman plebs. He was not afraid to use violence when it was called for. But
his obstinancy must not be seen as a negating factor at this time. It has been said that he brought change to every office he held and he was genuinely concerned with electoral corruption. Cato was at home with the aggressive politics of the 50s, and was perhaps at his best during these riots. He physically obstructed the tribune Metellus Nepos from delivering legislation in 62 and was wounded twice in the gritty campaigns of Bibulus and Domitius. He was more than once threatened with prison by a presiding magistrate and encountered mob violence daily as he made his way to the praetorian tribunal in 54. The change in political style from his elder contemporaries was vast.

Cato’s political associates are well known although not blessed with his integrity or determination. L. Domitius Ahenobarbus had a distinguished ancestry, and Cicero even labelled him a consul from birth. His brother had been a Marian supporter and had been among the young aristocrats executed by Pompeius, providing Domitius with a blood feud against the general. Also, despite an early family link to Caesar, Domitius was at odds with him, a situation which increased when Caesar robbed him of his hereditary clientela in Gallia Narbonensis. Involved in electoral bribery during his consulship, he clearly did not try to emulate Cato. During the civil war his doggedness at Corfinium may have been a deliberate snub to Pompeius.

L. Calpurnius Bibulus had the misfortune of sharing
his magistracies with Caesar and his accumulated frustration no doubt brought about his "iracundiam summam." During the worst of the violence of his consulship he was forced to remain within his house and issue edicts condemning Caesar and his actions. Taking the province of Syria in 50 for his proconsulship, it is recorded that he was not cooperative with Cicero in neighbouring Cilicia. While there, his two older sons were murdered in Egypt; his youngest survived to fight with Brutus. At the beginning of the civil war he deliberately was absent from the peace meetings lest his temper upset the negotiations.23

Of a different sort was M. Favonius. Although not related to his friends by marriage, perhaps because of his novitas, he is the only member of this group to survive the civil war. Little is known about his background but he modelled his career on Cato’s and often tried to compete with Cato in his refusal to succumb to the dynasts. An example of his stubbornness was the occasion when he refused to take the oath to uphold Caesar’s agrarian law although Cato had acquiesced. He nevertheless achieved the praetorship in the fateful year of 49, showing his importance during that time. He escaped from Italy with many other senators during Caesar’s invasion but continued to be a thorn in Pompeius’ side. He lived quietly under the dictatorship of Caesar but was active with Brutus during the eastern campaigns.23
The ties between these men and their predecessors were very close. Cato's half-sister (or niece) married Lucullus, and Cato was the guardian of their son Marcus. Porcia, Cato's sister, married Domitius, and his daughter Porcia married Bibulus. In addition, Cato divorced his second wife Marcia who in turn married Hortensius in order to produce more heirs. After Hortensius died, Marcia remarried Cato. Cato's first wife was an Atilia, daughter of the consul of 106, Atilius Serranus. Her brother adopted a son of Domitius' who died in November 54. As will be observed in the following chapter, all these connections produced the aristocratic core of Brutus' following.\textsuperscript{24}

The Catilinarian conspiracy showed the different personnel who had emerged in Roman politics and who played crucial roles in Rome until the civil war. Catulus had disgracefully lost the election for Pontifex Maximus to Caesar who had bribed his way into the prestigious priesthood. In revenge Catulus and C. Piso sought to implicate him in the conspiracy of Catiline and Cicero barely saved him from a mob of equites. During the debate on the fate of the captured conspirators, it was not the speech of the princeps Catulus who turned the senate against the proposal of Caesar but that of the tribune-elect Cato. The speech seems to have made Cato's reputation. Plutarch says that about this time Cato assumed the
leadership against Pompeius and Caesar from Lucullus. But from
the start he was in a weaker position than his older
contemporaries since the dynasts began to use an increasing
amount of violence to bring about their designs.²⁵

The years 62 and 59 illustrate well the opposition
Cato led and the reaction they encountered. In 62, with
the Mithridatic wars at an end and the Catilinarian
conspiracy recently put down, the praetor Caesar and the
tribune Metellus Nepos sought to recall Pompeius on the
excuse that the state was still in danger. The situation
would be used to increase the auctoritas of the conquering
general as well as his gratitude to Nepos and Caesar.
Cato, having stood as tribune specifically to frustrate
Nepos, exercised his tribunicial powers by vetoing the
motion of Nepos. During the meeting in the people’s
assembly, undaunted, Cato, in the midst of Nepos’ armed gang
struggled to the tribunal and physically grappled with
Nepos to prevent the law from being read out. A riot ensued
and the law seems to have been successfully vetoed when
Nepos’ armed bands could not intimidate Cato, and a force
from the consul Murena appeared. Both Nepos and Caesar
were suspended from office though Caesar was eventually
reinstated. In this instance, in a direct confrontation
with tribunicial violence, Cato was victorious.²⁶

The significance of this incident is not to be
underestimated. Pompeius and his adherents so far had been successful at forcing their _leges_ in the people’s assembly. Although the faction of Catulus relied on its own tribunes to combat Gabinius, Cornelius and Manilius in the 60s, they were unsuccessful. Perhaps they lacked resolution as they were employed on behalf of Catulus and his friends rather than having their own vital stake in the activities. Cato changed this. He was prepared to take up the tribunate specifically to frustrate the designs of Nepos. Courage and determination, with the timely aid of Murena blocked Nepos’ bill and effectively defeated an attempt to add to the _gloria_ of Pompeius. Cato knew how to deal with his enemies and the formation of the alliance between Pompeius, Caesar, and Crassus shows that they acknowledged his power.27

Two years later in 59, Caesar was prepared to prevent Cato from prevailing again. Cato and his associates planned to make Caesar’s consular year a difficult one. Cato’s son-in-law Bibulus was elected by means of bribery to be fellow consul, and no lucrative provinces available afterwards; Caesar was to receive the maintenance of the "silvae callesque." Caesar was undeterred. His new pact with Pompeius allowed him to use the general’s _clientelae_ as he wished. Violence and intimidation would be vital for his designs.28

Caesar’s first confrontation with Bibulus and Cato concerned the agrarian law for Pompeius’ veterans. The bill
was presented in the senate and Cato carefully planned to obstruct it. Caesar saw through this and tried to have Cato led taken to prison by virtue of his power of coercitio. This seems to have been what Cato wanted. Led off to prison, he was accompanied by the majority of the senate and a part of the populous. Lest he lose the support of the Roman mob, Caesar had Cato released and the bill was brought to the people's assembly. Caesar called in armed mobs to help pass the legislation and although Bibulus and three tribunes tried to disrupt the proceedings by the tactic of obnuntiatio and the declaration that the rest of the year was to be dies comitiales, they were ignored. The next day Bibulus tried again but armed bands prevented Cato and Bibulus from even reaching the Rostra, and Cato and the three tribunes suffered wounds for their efforts. Bibulus retired to his home, ostensibly to 'watch the skies' but probably because he was powerless to stop Caesar without risking his life. All Caesar's legislation was passed for the year including the ratification of Pompeius' acts in the East and the acquisition of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum as his own proconsular provinces. Caesar had learned in 62 that extreme tactics were needed to defeat Cato and his associates, and that only the strongest would prevail.

Although clearly defeated by the tactics of the Triumvirate, the associates of Cato did not despair. They continued their attacks on Pompeius and Caesar despite
Caesar's nine year absence and although troops were used for intimidation purposes as the gangs were in 59. In 57, as tribune, Clodius proposed that Cato take up a special commission and annex the island of Cyprus. The office was a sly trick, perhaps prompted by Pompeius to keep Cato out of Rome for a period of time. His refusal of such an office, enacted by the people, would have done him greater political harm. But he made the best of this bad situation and eventually returned to a hero's welcome. As far as his friends' abilities and resources would allow, they did what they could in his absence, which sometimes amounted to little. On his return the battle with the dynasts continued.39

Rome in the 50s was plagued with mob violence so that the traditional political activities were disrupted. Still, one of the main weapons Cato could use was his reputation in Rome for integrity and uprightness. These qualities were fostered so that the use of force against him and his friends was seen as tyrannical. Cato, it is said, fought for the Republic, not for his own designs. This situation naturally has parallels with the case of Brutus who, after the assassination, cultivated his image as the liberator of the Republic against the despotism of Caesar. Naturally in Roman politics it was crucial to appear to work on behalf of the state and to show that one's political antagonists were enemies of the state.
Sallust’s observation on late Republican politics is noteworthy:

post illa tempora quicumque rem publicam agitaverent honestis nominibus, alii sicuti populi iura defenderent, pars quo senatus auctoritas maxima foraret, bonum publicum simulantes pro sua quisque potentia certabant. Neque illis modestia neque modus contentionis erat; utrique victoriam crudeliter exercabant.

In 52, Cato and his associates nominated Pompeius for the sole consulship. This activity is not to be linked with their uneasy alliance with him during the civil war. Mob violence continued in Rome, culminating in the murder of P. Clodius Pulcher. Order had to be restored by someone and Pompeius was the only man with the capabilities to end the turbulence. The generous offer by Cato and company should be regarded only as a measure to prevent him from obtaining the dictatorship. As the civil war neared, the evidence for Catonian activities becomes less abundant, while the actions of the Claudii Marcelli and the tribune C. Scribonius Curio, all trying to detach Caesar from Pompeius for their own various reasons, come to the forefront. But some kind of thaw between Pompeius and Cato can be detected. Ap. Claudius, a senator of independent views and politics, was accused of misbehavior in his province of Cilicia. Through him Cato and Pompeius were related (Brutus and the eldest son of Pompeius married his daughters) and at his trial he had
the support of Pompeius while Hortensius and Brutus spoke on his behalf. Moreover, Claudius and Domitius had become good friends during their consulship. These events show that the Catonians could be flexible, as were all Roman political associations.32

When the war did come, the positions of Cato and his friends were firm. When Caesar was declared a hostis, Domitius received Caesar's province, no doubt with great pleasure. Plutarch records that when the crisis came, all turned to Cato and Pompeius, and Cato advocated that Pompeius become sole commander of the senate's forces. Unfortunately, Cato's friend's attacks on the dynasts left them in the embarrassing situation of choosing which side to fight on. A tie with Pompeius seemed less compromising and the general could be controlled by the other prominent men who sought his company. More unfortunate perhaps was that their aggressive stance in the 50s encouraged the Marcelli and others to force the issue of Caesar's terminal date of command in Gaul onto Pompeius. He could not allow any more concessions to Caesar at the expense of his dignitas. But even when Caesar was on the march, Cato still entertained hopes of negotiation. Favonius was adamant and would not allow the chance of a peaceful settlement. When C. Marcellus offered the command of armies of Rome to Pompeius, he accepted.33
The history of Brutus' predecessors is one of a gradual decline in power from the dominatio of Sulla until the civil war. Faced with the rise of Pompeius and Caesar, the return of tribunicial power, and the growing use of violence to pass legislation, the group led by Catulus and Cato had lost its ascendancy. The traditional opposition in the 60s had proved ineffective and prompted assertive tactics on behalf of Cato in the 50s. His work only incited more violence. When Caesar was victorious in the civil war he gave Brutus and his friends honoured offices but even less power in affairs, which resulted in even more aggressive actions on their behalf. After the assassination, the sons, nephews and other associates of the statesmen of the 60s and 50s would continue the struggle against a new set of dynasts.
CHAPTER TWO
BRUTUS’ YOUNG NOBILES:
THE REFORMATION OF THE CATONIANS

The more prominent and enduring a Roman politician was, the more enemies he was likely to have. Such is the case with Caesar who found himself contending with successive generations of men; he defeated Pompeius in 48 only to fight his sons in 45; Cato was his greatest political enemy, Cato’s nephew his murderer. The links between generations were strong. Although L. Lucullus, M. Cato, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus and M. Calpurnius Bibulus were all dead by 46, their struggles in the senate and on the battlefield with Caesar were remembered by their sons, nephews and cousins. M. Brutus, the young M. Cato, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, M. Lucullus and L. Calpurnius Bibulus were all alive and awake to the fact that they would not be able to emulate the power of their predecessors because of Caesar’s domination.

Although most were not involved in the murder of Caesar, these men afterwards formed a coherent and identifiable group within Brutus’ following in the East. For them, Cato’s indomitable spirit was replaced by Brutus’ leadership. With Caesar dead, the factiones could in theory
exist on a more even basis; the sons of Caesar's enemies had to contend with Caesar's legal and political heirs, C. Octavianus and M. Antonius. M. Brutus, quite surprisingly in view of his career previous to the Ides of March 44, had a following of young aristocrats, all hoping to have a prominent place in the res publica, through the policies of their leader. The important factor to consider is not that Brutus was the leader of a group of family members, but that this association of men was so interrelated by politics and social connections that it was almost fated to become prominent, given the proper cause and leader. Brutus provided both. This is the difference between these men and the others who followed Brutus. For an adequate study of the connections and political traditions which Brutus' aristocratic following inherited from Cato and his friends, he and his group must be examined to explain their place in the politics of the day.

Perhaps the most important influence on Brutus was the memory of Cato. The links were very strong between the two men both politically and by family ties. Brutus' father was murdered by Pompeius in 77, and at some point later Brutus was adopted by his uncle, Q. Servilius Caepio, who was probably Cato's half-brother. From this time onward Brutus' official name was Q. Servilius Caepio Brutus. When he was still a young man, he accompanied his uncle east to
annex the island of Cyprus. Brutus’ second wife was Porcia, Cato’s daughter. After Cato’s suicide at Utica, Brutus composed a panegyric in his honour. Later, when Brutus was in control of Greece, Cato’s son fought with distinction under the banner of the Liberators. Together, Cato and Brutus were regarded as the last leaders of the Republic.¹

In connection with Brutus’ relations with Cato, a word must be said about his mother Servilia, Cato’s half-sister. She was one of the more prominent women in the late Republic, famous for the political power she could muster, being the mother of Brutus and the mistress of Caesar. She could even exert influence over Cato. She successfully intervened to prevent her brother from prosecuting her second husband D. Iunius Silanus. During the Catilinarian conspiracy she infuriated Cato, who was debating with Caesar, by sending her paramour lovenotes during the proceedings. The relationship proved advantageous for Brutus. Caesar protected him when he had no other cause to, and even promoted Servilia’s son and son-in-law Cassius although they were former enemies. The marriages of her daughters were politically practical; one married P. Servilius Isauricus, consul of 48, one married Cassius, and the third married the triumvir, M. Aemilius Lepidus. She also apparently had the influence to secure a cancelation of a decree of the senate concerning her son and son-in-law. Such a woman must have had a considerable control over
Brutus and her quarrel with his second wife Porcia shows it being exercised. With such people as Cato, Servilia and Caesar looking after Brutus' welfare, his political outlook must have been complicated and clouded with personal relationships.  

Politics makes strange bedfellows and the civil war which followed the crisis of 49 produced very unusual and even hypocritical alliances to the modern historian. Pompeius, now commander of the Republican forces, had M. Calpurnius Bibulus as one of his admirals and placed L. Domitius Ahenobarbus in command of the forces at Corfinium. Domitius' brother had been murdered by Pompeius and this fact may have been a deterrent to cooperation between them. Domitius' proud nature prevented him from obeying Pompeius's orders and the legions at Corfinium were subsequently lost. After the defeat at Dyrrhachium, Bibulus and Domitius died, Bibulus from the strain of his naval command and Domitius at Pharsalus. Brutus' presence in Pompeius' camp was also unusual. Like Domitius he carried a blood feud with Pompeius over the treacherous murder of his father.  

Brutus' actions gave him a subsequent reputation for high principles and integrity which warrant a discussion about his character and life. He was more of a scholar and philosopher than a man of action although as events show when he believed in a cause he could act effectively. In the
Brutus, Cicero mentions that Brutus was cut off from public life by civil war and should have been one of the leading men at Rome even though he was deeply dedicated to study and thought. He wrote a couple of philosophical works including the de Virtute and was an accomplished orator, perhaps even Cicero's heir in that category. Elaborate discussion of Brutus' motives and character is hampered by Plutarch's well known but idealized portrait of him. An attempt to clarify this problem is found in the appendix.

Brutus was born about 85 and was six years old at the time of his father's death. After that, it is uncertain with whom he and his mother lived. It may have been with Cato's family or that of Servilia's brother Q. Servilius Caepio. The interest which Brutus had in philosophy may have stemmed from his early and long relationship with Cato who was an avid Stoic and patron to philosophers. The first reference to Brutus was during the notorious Vettius affair.

The details and meaning of the affair are sketchy. In 59, an informer, L. Vettius, claimed that some nobles, including Bibulus, Aemilius Paullus, the younger Curio and Brutus, were involved in a conspiracy to murder Pompeius. Vettius' testimony was confused as Bibulus himself had informed Pompeius about a plot which endangered his life and Aemilius Paullus was in Macedonia at the time. The next day, Vettius was called before the consul Caesar. The intervening night caused him to change his testimony. Brutus
was not mentioned, and a number of enemies of Caesar and Pompeius were announced as being conspirators, L. Lucullus, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus and C. Piso. The tribune Vatinius sought an investigation into the whole affair but no one was convinced that a plot really existed. Vettius was imprisoned and was later found strangled. 6

Modern scholarship is divided on the question of who was behind the affair. 7 It is assumed that Vettius was put up to informing on various enemies of Pompeius but that he bungled his role by not being consistent with the names he gave. Brutus, Domitius and Aemilius Paullus were obviously included in the plot because their relatives had all died at the hands of Pompeius. Caesar and Clodius have been touted as being behind the affair for various reasons. The inclusion and then removal of Brutus’ name from Vettius testimony is important. Cicero writes “ut appareret noctem et nocturnam deprecationem intercessisse.” 8 This has been interpreted as meaning that Caesar had influence over Vettius and in the night between his two testimonies Caesar induced him to drop Brutus’ name from the alleged plot. Servilia, Brutus’ mother, probably instigated Caesar’s action. Although Brutus was Cato’s nephew, it did not prevent Caesar from looking after the young man because of Servilia, a relationship which was to aid Brutus in the future.

The attempts by F. Münzer and others to link Brutus
to Caesar by a proposed marriage to his daughter Julia are unrealistic. Suetonius records that Caesar's daughter was betrothed to a certain Servilius Caepio. To identify this Servilius Caepio with Brutus (who was also known by that name) would be to disregard the fact that the proposed son-in-law was an active supporter of Caesar against Bibulus. Brutus would hardly have campaigned against Bibulus who was an ally of his uncle Cato. This connection with Caesar, although intriguing, must be abandoned.7

In 58, Brutus helped Cato annex Cyprus. He was given the task of appropriating Ptolemy Auletes' property when Cato was detained in Rhodes. His first official appointment was in 54 as one of the mint masters (tresviri monetales) of Rome. L. Brutus, Servilius Ahala and a personification of 'Libertas' appeared on his coins. In 53, Ap. Claudius Pulcher took Brutus, his son-in-law, to Cilicia as quaestor. Brutus had apparently refused Caesar's invitation to join him in Gaul. When Claudius returned in 51, he was tried for extortion. Brutus, who had returned a year earlier, successfully defended him accompanied by the aging Hortensius. About this time, Brutus was gaining quite a reputation in the courts for his speaking abilities. The specific cases are not known but Cicero claims that Brutus was on his way to becoming the foremost orator in Rome.10

At some time in the mid fifties, Brutus attacked Pompeius with a speech De Dictatura Pompei. The
circumstances of the speech were probably the proposed
dictatorship of Pompeius due to the increased political
violence after his second consulship. Brutus continued his
feud with Pompeius. In the year of Pompeius' consulship,
there was the sensational murder of Clodius and the trial of
Milo. A defence of Milo was published by Brutus and it
stated that the murder should be sanctioned since Clodius
was harmful to the res publica. This line of argument of
course appears once again in Brutus' later life.\(^\text{11}\)

When the civil war broke out, Brutus joined his
uncle in opposing Caesar, but did not accompany him to
Sicily or Africa. He at first was a legate of Sestius in
Cilicia but then made his way to Pompeius' camp at
Pharsalus. Pompeius greeted him warmly although Brutus' own
emotions at the meeting with his father's murderer are
unknown. He took an active part in the fighting and survived
perhaps due to the fact that Caesar had given orders that he
should not be killed. Servilia's presence was again
felt.\(^\text{12}\)

At the defeat of Pompeius' armies, Brutus retreated
to Larissa where he wrote to Caesar. It would be interesting
to speculate on the contents of this letter but in any case
Brutus was fully pardoned and was accepted as part of
Caesar's company.\(^\text{13}\) In view of his relationship to Cato his
acceptance of Caesar's mercy must be understood. In 46,
while Cato tried in vain to resist the Caesarian armies in
Africa, taking his own life rather than submit, Caesar appointed Brutus governor of Cisalpine Gaul. One wonders what Brutus thought about the switch in his political allegiances at this time. Perhaps Brutus’ failure to resist Caesar further was a contributing factor in the assassination; disillusioned at Caesar’s political programme and remembering his uncle’s death, it is understandable that he murdered Caesar to allay his guilt. But without emphasizing his actions in March 44, it is perhaps conceivable that Brutus surrendered and received Caesar’s clementia simply because he was able to, and the only alternative was to fight on and die like Cato. Such an action for Brutus the assassin is hard to believe, but the man of 46 was like many Romans who had followed Pompeius. For them, the political game between Pompeius and Caesar had ended, and Caesar was the victor. In the company of such recipients of Caesar’s pardon Cicero, Cassius and others, Brutus had nothing to feel shameful about and perhaps had much to hope for as he enjoyed a political career under the dynamic and merciful Caesar.

After Pharsalus, Caesar pursued Pompeius to Egypt on the advice of Brutus. But three days before Caesar arrived Pompeius was murdered by order of Ptolemy Auletes XIII. Installing Cleopatra on the throne of Egypt, Caesar quickly defeated Pharnaces at Zela in August of 47. He returned to Rome and dealt with the pressing economic situation and with
his own dissatisfied troops. As well, he pardoned many followers of Pompeius including Cicero. In December of 47, he proceeded to Africa to contend with the Republican armies. By the spring he was victorious at Thapsus, and his political rival, Cato, died by his own hand. A ten year dictatorship was given to Caesar for this victory. The Republican cause then rose again in Spain under the leadership of Pompeius' sons. Caesar made his way to that province and by the fall of 45 returned to Rome once again victorious. He planned to put Rome in order before proceeding to the East for a campaign against the Parthians in the new year.

Honours of an unprecedented nature were heaped upon Caesar. He was given, among other trappings of his superior status, a golden throne to be used in the senate and at the games. M. Antonius was made a flamen to the deity Divus Julius. Only C. Cassius Longinus is said to have voted against the proposals. Rumours that Caesar wished to be king flourished and Antonius tried to crown him at the Lupercalia. At this time he was made dictator perpetuus. The increasing hostility among men who resented Caesar's power could not be contained and the conspiracy against him was formed.14

Even when Caesar was campaigning, Rome felt his presence through his friends, as Caesar controlled the elections for the magistracies. In 48, he made P. Servilius
Isauricus, Brutus' brother-in-law, his fellow consul and M. Antonius his *magister equitum* for the years 48 and 47. M. Aemilius Lepidus shared the consulship with Caesar in 46 as well as being his *magister equitum* in that year and for the next two. From the year 48 onwards, the consuls were all men who had been approved by Caesar including those who would hold office during his absence in Parthia. P. Dolabella would replace him as consul on his departure in 44, C. Vibius Pansa and A. Hirtius were scheduled for 43, D. Iunius Brutus and L. Munatius Plancus for 42 and Brutus and perhaps Cassius for 41. Although Caesar was more than merciful to the pardoned Pompeians, with the exception of Brutus and Cassius his government was stacked with his closest supporters. Men could not hope for political prominence without a close association with Caesar.  

As mentioned, Brutus was the proconsul of Caesar's old province, Cisalpine Gaul, where he is reported to have been popular. In 45, he seems to have been willing to let Caesar govern now that the war was over. He may even have professed a certain loyalty to him despite Cicero's belief that the end of the Republic had come. In June of 45, Brutus had written to Cicero exonerating Caesar of the suspicious death of M. Marcellus. Later, Brutus, after meeting Caesar on his return from Spain and the battle at Munda, wrote enthusiastically, claiming that Caesar was
joining the "bonos viros." Cicero found this unbelievable, but understood Brutus' position; "Sed quid faciat?" From Cicero's letters to Atticus it is clear that he thought Brutus was firmly in Caesar's camp.16

Had Brutus any hostility towards Caesar it would certainly have come out in his eulogy of Cato. Both he and Cicero completed works on Cato soon after his death at Utica. Although it has been suggested that Cicero's work was not totally favourable to the memory of Cato, the works were sufficiently disturbing for Caesar to reply with an Anti-Cato as did his lieutenant, Hirtius. These Catses were certainly opportunities to attack Caesar's regime and Cicero saw problems in writing his Cato. Even if he did not include any of Cato's political views, a discussion of his character would be enough to offend the Caesarians.

Brutus' predicament was even more serious. As Cato's nephew enjoying the favour of Caesar his writing had to be more delicate, lest he jeopardize his new relations with Caesar or the memory of his uncle. Perhaps this is why his Cato turned out so badly. Cicero said that Brutus had gotten some of the facts wrong about Cato's part in the debate concerning the Catilinarian prisoners, and Caesar was critical of its literary style. In retrospect, it is easy to believe that Brutus meant to eulogize his great uncle and then avenge him by murdering Caesar. But considering Brutus' political position, it may be more likely that the work was
a simple memorial to Cato without any obvious political implications. Brutus was not penalized by Caesar but continued to be promoted and Caesar's criticism of the work was only stylistic.\textsuperscript{17}

Much has been made of Brutus' divorce of Claudia and his marriage to Porcia at this time. Cicero says that the divorce was unpopular, but from whose point of view is uncertain. Servilia was at odds with Porcia during the marriage and this could be what Cicero meant. As Claudia was the sister-in-law of Pompeius' elder son, a divorce would please the followers of Caesar. Yet marrying Porcia, Cato's daughter and Bibulus' widow, made his ties to Cato even stronger. Some believe that this marriage to Porcia signalled the time when Brutus turned against Caesar. This cannot be true as the marriage took place in the summer of 45 and Brutus had intentions of greeting Caesar on his journey from Spain in August. Perhaps Brutus was only marrying his childhood sweetheart now that she was a widow. In any case the marriage seemed not to have offended Caesar.\textsuperscript{18}

Over his more senior colleague Cassius, Brutus was chosen \textit{praetor urbanus} in 44, another example of Brutus' popularity with Caesar. It was of course during this praetorship that Brutus and Cassius formed their conspiracy and assassinated Caesar. The causes of the assassination can
not be discussed in great detail here but it is clear that there was a wide variety of reasons for it. Superficially, under Caesar’s new regime Brutus had done well and would continue to have a fine career, praetor urbanus for 44 and consul designate in 41 during Caesar’s absence. But as Brutus was appointed to these offices by a superior instead of winning them by virtue of his own auctoritas any glory received would be given by the hand of the dictator. As a young man growing up among the violent, aggressive politicians of Rome, Brutus would not be satisfied with empty honours and offices bestowed by a benevolent but omnipotent dictator. Nor would Brutus ever be included among Caesar’s close advisers and supporters. The real power in Rome was shared among Caesar’s able and long-time partisans; M. Antonius, M. Aemilius Lepidus, P. Cornelius Dolabella, L. Munatius Plancus, A. Hirtius, C. Vibius Pansa, L. Cornelius Balbus and others. Brutus had these and other reasons for the assassination and, although Cassius was a totally different man in character from Brutus, he also found himself in the same situation.1

The earliest references to Cassius say that he served as proquaestor to Crassus in his Syrian campaign. His father was consul in 73 and the Cassii had a large clientela in Transpadana, by way of the father’s proconsulship there. Cassius’ brother was a partisan of Caesar during the civil
wars, presumably bringing the two brothers into conflict, although there is not any animosity recorded between them. Lucius Cassius prosecuted Plancius in opposition to Cicero in 52, and in 44 he was a tribune, antagonizing M. Antonius and speaking against his own brother’s command in Syria. He seems to have been quite popular that year, but later had to beg mercy from Antonius. His son, Lucius, joined his uncle Gaius when he went east and fought at Philippi.\textsuperscript{20}

Gaius Cassius Longinus himself is often contrasted with Brutus. His fiery temper and his alleged greed make him a much more easily understood assassin, and his abilities as a general made him a formidable opponent. His friendship with Brutus is certainly odd but then again they had both fought against Caesar and were friends of Cicero. Most of all, they were brothers-in-law as Cassius married one of Brutus’ half-sisters. It was Brutus who helped Cassius gain a pardon from Caesar.\textsuperscript{21}

Cassius’ abilities as a soldier were well known because he brought back the remnants of Crassus’ army into Syria after the defeat at Carrhae and with great skill managed to repel the Parthians from the province. Brutus, in Cilicia at the time, knew this better than most. Until Bibulus took the province in 50, Cassius remained in Antioch fighting off the invaders and plundering the inhabitants. When he returned home to face possible extortion charges, civil war had broken out. Like Brutus, Cassius chose to
fight for Pompeius although whether he was pro-Pompeius or anti-Caesar cannot be discerned. As mentioned previously, he married one of the daughters of Servilia and in this way became related to Brutus. From the letters he and Cicero exchanged in the East and after the war, they seem to have been well acquainted. He served as a tribune for Pompeius patrolling the east coast of Italy but on the news of the defeat of Pharsalus he made his peace with Caesar and campaigned in the East with him. Here again we see that Cassius, like Brutus and others, abandoned the cause. Cicero writes to him in August of 47 saying that the continued fighting after Pharsalus was useless and it would only lead to more bloodshed. Cassius sums up his feelings about the domination of Caesar in a letter to Cicero about a year and a half later saying that "malo vete rem et clementem dominum habere." 22

Still, Cassius resented Caesar and in turn Caesar mistrusted him. As well, as the obvious discomfort of living under the dictator’s sway, Cassius had a more personal grudge against Caesar. Caesar had appropriated some lions of Cassius’ which he had prepared for his aedileship and had also passed him up in favour of Brutus for the office of urban praetor. In addition, he was perhaps irritated by the fact that Caesar had not thought to take him along for the Parthian campaign although he was the most experienced man in that area. These may seem petty but for one with such a
temperament as Cassius these slights, along with Caesar's absolute domination may have been enough to provoke him into murder. Cassius had spent three years fighting in Syria and no doubt had hoped his reputation would earn him more political prominence. But the intervention of the civil war prevented this. In fact, Cassius' achievements caused very little sensation in Rome and Caelius Rufus even doubted that Cassius was ever at war, referring to Cassius' enemies as Arabs dressed as Parthians. In this way Cassius' glory was denied him. True he was praetor in 44 and was perhaps scheduled to be consul in 41 but these were all offices given by Caesar, perhaps to placate him. Like Brutus, he would be overshadowed by Caesar's men. Cassius, though not associated with the party of Cato, organized with Brutus the assassination of Caesar which gave him control of his own destiny and the prestige he sought.

In 47 Gaius Trebonius, one who owed his career to Caesar, had approached Antonius with the proposition of removing Caesar. Some had personal grudges against Caesar like Cassius and L. Minucius Basilus whom Caesar refused a provincial command and tried to bribe instead. Others like Q. Ligarius, the pardoned Pompeian, were just revenging themselves on their great enemy. For the majority in the senate, Caesar had risen too high too quickly and they were not yet complacent enough to accept changes which cut off
them off from traditional sources of power. In February of 44, Caesar took the title *dictator perpetuus*. Acquiring a short term dictatorship to reform the constitution was perhaps acceptable and even had a precedent in Sulla. But to have a permanent hold on the government was an insult to all aristocratic Roman values. Belzer calls the right of murder which the conspiracy performed "die ungeschriebene Verfassung der Republik," as traditional and predictable as the murders of T. Gracchus and M. Livius Drusus. Although he had more than rewarded his supporters and honoured his enemies, Caesar miscalculated when he believed that the Romans would accept him as master. *Novi homines*, who owed their entire careers to Caesar, such as Trebonius and L. Tillius Cimber could not tolerate his new status and turned against him. With such a reaction by Caesar's close supporters, it is not surprising that Brutus, heir to the Catoonian opposition to Caesar, planned to strike him down. On the Ides of March 44 Caesar was assassinated in the Curia Pompei.24

If Brutus had plans to take control of the government after Caesar's death, he never implemented them. Brutus had met with Antonius and an amnesty was granted to the tyrannicides. In a show of goodwill, the assassins disbanded their bodyguards. But disturbances among the populus, angered at the death of Caesar, forced Brutus and Cassius to flee from Rome. Brutus had supporters outside the
city but did not use them. Cicero complained of his inactivity. In May, Cicero reported to Atticus that Brutus was considering exile. The senate, at the instigation of Antonius, prepared a special commission for Brutus and Cassius, to superintend the collection of grain, hoping that they would remove themselves from Italy. The similarities between this gesture and the commission devised by Clodius for Cato in 58 is interesting. Three days after the offer was made, a conference took place in Antium to discuss the situation. Brutus, Cassius, their wives, Servilia, Favonius, and Cicero were all present. Cassius considered the commission an insult and intended to go to Greece to prepare for war. Brutus wished to return to Rome to see out his praetorship, if only he could guarantee his own safety. Servilia said she would get the commission rescinded. Even two months before leaving for Greece, Brutus still wished for a compromise with Antonius.26

Near the end of July, Antonius published an edict favorable to Brutus and Cassius, allowing them to return to Rome. But in the meantime Antonius’ troops forced him to reconcile himself with Octavianus, Caesar’s heir. Relations between Antonius and the Liberators deteriorated, and the two men replied with a strong edict threatening Antonius. Antonius publicly accused the two of collecting troops and money, testing the loyalty of the army and sending messengers overseas, presumably to Greece and Asia. Perhaps
Antonius was right although the charge was denied. It is hard to believe that Brutus and Cassius were inactive at this time considering the rapid military build up in the East. About this time, the senate awarded Brutus and Cassius the harmless provinces of Crete and Cyrene. Brutus finally left for Greece in late August and Cassius followed him soon afterwards.

It will never be known whether the assassins could have worked together as a political group under normal political circumstances. Events in the years following Caesar’s death prevented this. Many, such as Trebonius, Tillius Cimber and D. Brutus, took up provincial offices assigned by the dictator and because of this, they became separated from each other as well as from Rome. Although the names of the majority of the conspirators have not survived many probably fought with the Republican armies against Antonius either with D. Brutus or with the consuls Hirtius and Pansa. Some found themselves in the East after Caesar’s death and subsequently aided Brutus and Cassius out of loyalty or necessity. Of the eighteen conspirators whose names survive, eight aided Brutus and Cassius in the East. Of the men who assassinated Caesar, with the exception of Brutus, none can be said to have been related to the group of men who sided with Cato in the 50’s. Lack of resolution on the part of Cato’s successors, judging from their later
activities in the East, does not seem likely. The relatives of Cato were unable to attend Brutus on the Ides of March for various reasons. Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus had probably lost his status as a senator, L. Calpurnius Bibulus and M. Licinius Lucullus were not yet members of the order and M. Favonius, in semi-retirement, was not enthusiastic about the topic of tyrannicide. Brutus and Cassius formed the conspiracy out of disgruntled Caesarians, Pompeians and others while the formation of their own following was yet to come.²⁷

The Catonians had not fared well in the civil war, with only Favonius surviving from the group. After losing one election Favonius finally became praetor in 49, when the friends of Caesar, Pompeius as well as others tried to win the coveted office. Although playing an active role in the civil war, he continued to attack Pompeius, criticizing the delays and lamenting his separation from the figs back home in Tusculum. When Pompeius escaped east, Favonius accompanied him, probably less out of loyalty than concern for his own life. His whereabouts after Pharsalus are unknown.²⁸

In the second pseudo-Sallustian letter to Caesar Favonius is regarded as having no place in Caesar’s reconstruction of the Roman state. Although the letter is certainly not genuine, it accurately represents Favonius as
being unwelcome among the Caesarians after the war. Although he resided in Italy there is no evidence that he was fully pardoned by Caesar. Favonius' absence from political life under Caesar suggests this. On the other hand, like Cicero, Cato's amulator could have found political life under Caesar distasteful as well as unwelcome. After the defeat of Pompeius and the deaths of his friends, Favonius probably settled down to political obscurity under Caesar, perhaps thankful to be alive and to have gained the prominence he did as a novus homo without any family connections to the aristocracy. Brutus, testing if he was interested in the conspiracy, questioned him whether civil war or an illegal monarchy was the greater evil, and Favonius replied civil war, apparently relatively complacent under Caesar. Nevertheless he claimed to have been part of the conspiracy after it had been completed and quickly associated himself with Brutus and Cassius after the Ides of March. He is next heard of in their company at the conference at Antium in the summer of 44, and later was with Brutus in Greece. 29

A man who was less than complacent under Caesar was the son of his old enemy, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus. His mother was Cato's sister and he was a cousin to Brutus' second wife. In 50, he made his first public appearance in court charging Cn. Saturninus, who was instrumental in bringing about his father's defeat in the election to the augurate. Later he accompanied the elder Domitius in the
campaigns during the civil war. He was besieged by Caesar at Corfinium and was captured but later released. Separating from his father who went to Massalia, young Domitius continued into Italy to Formiae and then to Naples where he met his mother, Porcia. A letter to him from Cicero seems to hint about his activities after this. It has been conjectured that he fought with his father at Dyrrhachium and Pharsalus and may even have been with the Republican army in Africa. In any case, his activities after Corfinium seemed to have displeased Caesar who did not see fit to pardon him a second time. Back in Italy, Cicero, in a letter dated to the beginning of the year 46, consoled him on the loss of his father and uncle and advised him not to carry on the fight in Spain. Whether Cicero convinced him or not, he decided to remain in Italy. Cn. Domitius’ political outlook can be surmised as being much like his father’s although he was known to be much more even-tempered than the elder Domitius. After the war, his relations with his cousin Brutus continued. In the summer of 45 Porcia, Domitius’ mother died and Cicero sent a eulogy to both men.

Domitius certainly had good reasons for joining the conspiracy to slay Caesar but his involvement in the assassination is controversial. Although Cicero names him as a conspirator in his *Philippics*, like many others, he associated with the conspirators only after the deed.

Suetonius in the life of Domitius’ great-great-grandson,
Nero, mentions that he had no part in the murder. Clearly, if he had been deprived of his status by Caesar he would not have been permitted in Rome, let alone in the Senate. When the opportunity did come after the assassination, Cn. Domitius united with his kinsman Brutus. Cicero, planning to leave for Greece in July 44, found Domitius in Puteoli along with Brutus and Bucilianus preparing a fleet for their own trip to the East. 36

Another man whose father died in the civil war was L. Calpurnius Bibulus. Like Cn. Domitius, he was well connected with Cato and Brutus, as the elder Bibulus married Cato's daughter Porcia, and after his death Brutus became Lucius step-father. He was Cato's only grandchild to survive into adulthood. In addition, the younger Bibulus married a Domitia, probably the sister of Cn. Domitius. The elder Bibulus had asked Cicero to lend his support to Lucius in the election to the augurate in 50. L. Bibulus did not fight in the civil war because of his age; as late as 44 he was studying in Athens. No doubt he and Domitius shared the same outlook, that the prospects for the sons of Caesar's great enemies were bleak. When Brutus arrived in Athens to organize his army, the younger Bibulus was continuing his studies like several other young Romans; such as Marcus Tullius Cicero, the son of the orator and Q. Horatius Flaccus, the poet. Like them, he did not hesitate to join the cause. His biography of Brutus was a main source for
A young man who also had family connections with Cato and Brutus was M. Licinius Lucullus, son of L. Lucullus, the old enemy of Pompeius. His father had married one of Cato’s half-sisters and in this way the younger Lucullus was a cousin to Brutus. When his father died in about 57, the young Lucullus came under the guardianship of his uncle Cato, and during the civil war remained in Rhodes with his mother. After Cato’s death, Cicero became his new guardian, although contact with the orator seems to have been limited, as the young Lucullus had come of age by 44. Cicero saw Lucullus in the company of Brutus at Nesis while they were making their final preparations for their journey to Greece. As he is listed among those who fought at Philippi, Lucullus must have accompanied Brutus from this point onwards.

M. Cato deserves to be mentioned, the son of Cato Uticensis. He was old enough to accompany his father to Africa in 46 and was pardoned by Caesar afterwards. Little more is known about him until May 43 when he turns up in Brutus’ company in the East. Fighting bravely, he died at Philippi. His presence there with his close relatives Brutus, Bibulus and Domitius, need not be explained further. A future under Caesar was as disheartening as that of the sons of Pompeius, and like them he continued the fight of his father.
One further associate and relative of Brutus' remains to be discussed. Plutarch writes of an Atilius who participated in Brutus' war counsel on the eve of the battle of Philippi. Nothing further is known about him but an investigation into the family of Cato shows that he was certainly a relative of Brutus, perhaps a close one. It will be recalled that Cato's first wife was Atilia, granddaughter of the consul of 106. One of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus' sons was adopted by the Atilii Serrani. Münzer conjectures that some arrangement was made between the families to keep the old and noble Atilii Serrani from dying out. Cato's father-in-law would have adopted one of Cato's sons, had he had more than one by Atilia. As Cato's sister had two sons by L. Domitius, one was given to the Atilii. A graft on to the prosperous and prolific Domitii Ahenobarbi would be even more advantageous. But this adopted son died young. The Atilius who was at Philippi could not have been Cato's father-in-law nor the son of Atilius Serranus Domitianus. He may have been the tribune of 57 but this man was an enemy of Cicero's and had no discernible connection with Cato and his followers. Brutus' Atilius remains unknown. That he was a relative and a minor political associate is probable but it is not able to be proven.55

Cato, Lucullus, Domitius Ahenobarbus, Bibulus, Favonius, the names are all reminiscent of the last decade
of the Republic before Caesar's ascendency, an honour roll of those men whose values were not compatible with those of the dynasts who tried to monopolize the Roman government. The same names, but, for the most part, different men renewed their political ties now that Caesar was dead. Unlike the majority of Brutus' men in the East, if Caesar had not been assassinated, these young nobiles would continue to be closely related. The ties between Roman family members were strong, and under any circumstances, even during a civil war in the provinces, the clan of Cato continued to operate as normally as possible. Through the guidance of Brutus, the sons of Cato's companions came together and re-formed into a political unit. Powerless under Caesar's domination, they had a chance to battle Caesar's heirs for the power they believed they rightfully owned and which their forefathers enjoyed. Brutus turned from being the leader of a conspiracy to the leader of the resurrected Catonian factio. His association of men would continue to grow in the coming years, although with more diverse, less traditional elements.
BRUTUS IN GREECE: CAESAR'S OFFICERS

In 43, M. Antonius accused Cicero of representing a revived Pompeian faction on whom he wished to avenge Caesar's death. The appellation 'Pompeiani' is used for effect. Antonius wished his audience to believe that disgruntled and jealous followers of Pompeius had murdered the dictator. Antonius feared otherwise; the conspiracy had come from the heart of Caesar's own partisans. D. Brutus, C. Trebonius and others were Caesar's lieutenants in war and peace, yet, led by Brutus and Cassius, they contrived to kill him. Additional individuals who served Caesar fell in with the conspirators in the days after the Ides of March and still more aided Brutus and Cassius while in the East.

The political turnabout is striking to modern historians, and, even among the ancients, the men who betrayed Caesar are damned as often as they are praised. A profile of these men is necessary to discover the nature of their relationship with Brutus and his overall following. While investigating some individuals, previous loyalties have been hard to determine. Any of Brutus' associates who held or was elected to an office
during Caesar's dictatorship or who is described as an associate of Caesar's has been included in this chapter, although without supporting evidence they can be regarded as political partisans of Caesar's only tenuously. Obviously, a partisan turned assassin like Trebonius broke with Caesar at some point. This generalization may oversimplify the politics of these individuals about whom there is little evidence, but it gives an overall view of them as a group.

The most important factor which led to the strong military position of Brutus and Cassius was the number of their supporters who held magistracies in Greece and Asia subsequent to Caesar's assassination. Four assassins took up promagisterial offices in the East; C. Trebonius and L. Minucius Basilus in Asia, and L. Tillius Cimber and D. Turullius in Bithynia and Pontus. Later, many more men stationed in Asia Minor who had little or no contact with Brutus and Cassius previously, joined their company, often supplying funds and legions. Their loyalty is not suspect, even though many joined the campaign only after confronting the legions of Cassius. No one needed to join under duress. Status Marcus, Marcius Crispus and others enthusiastically gave themselves and their troops over to the cause. Further, their appearance
in the East at the same time is not coincidental. It is probable that Caesar promoted many of his followers and former officers to these eastern posts for his forthcoming Parthian campaign. They would be involved directly in this campaign or would advance supplies, money and manpower to their commander. Caesar's death and the rise of Brutus and Cassius prevented this monumental expedition, and the resources of the eastern provinces went to another cause. Before these men are examined in relation to the following of Brutus, a brief historical excursus will provide the background for the events which led these Caesarians to murder their chief and unite with Brutus and Cassius.

Brutus has often been accused of lack of foresight. Although he carried out one of the most spectacular assassinations in history, he was content to let events force him out of Rome, out of Italy and finally onto the battlefield at Philippi. Cicero condemns him for not killing Antonius, for not attempting to seize the government and for not rousing the populous to his side with his famed oratory. Brutus had a firm advantage over Antonius on the Ides of March and he let it slip from his grasp. The charge has been repeated by modern historians.¹

The activities in the East prove that more long range
planning went into the conspiracy than is usually admitted. Three of the conspirators (Trebonius, Tillius Cimber, and D. Turullius) knew that they were to take up offices in the East in the new year, while three others (Murcus, Lentulus Spinther, and Patiscus) sided with Brutus after the assassination and likewise went east to their posts. It was obvious to Brutus shortly after the Ides of March or even at the beginning of the conspiracy that it was in the East where he would find a strong following. Cassius had made a reputation for himself at Carrhae and Brutus was also familiar with the area. If war was to come, Brutus' stand would have to be taken in the eastern Mediterranean, where allies and resources were abundant.

Brutus and Cassius departed from Italy in the late summer of 44 and proceeded to Athens. Cassius then made his way to Asia Minor to arrange for war while Brutus lingered in Athens, attending philosophical lectures and secretly making preparations. By March of the next year, Brutus had enough resources for Cicero to boast of his "legionum, equitatus, auxiliorum, magnae et firmae copiae." As well, Q. Hortensius, the son of the orator and proconsul of Macedonia, gave his forces to Brutus who now claimed to have the province, Illyria and Greece under his control. At this time his command of the area was legitimized by the senate in Rome.
In the meantime, a complicated series of events was taking place in Syria. After Caesar's death, the assassins Trebonius and Tillius Cimber advanced to their allotted provinces of Asia and Bithynia and Pontus. Proceeding eastward at the same time was L. Staius Murcus. Like many others he had associated himself with the assassins on the Capitol and left Rome for his province of Syria. There, the pro quaestor, C. Antistius Vetus, was struggling with a renegade legion under the command of the Pompeian, Caecilius Bassus. The legion had been assigned to a relative of Caesar's, Sex. Julius Caesar, but Bassus had persuaded the soldiers to mutiny, and the commander was murdered. Unable to defeat Bassus, Antistius asked for aid from the newly arrived Murcus and the retiring proconsul of Bithynia and Pontus, Q. Marcius Crispus. Together these three men managed to force Bassus into the town of Apamea on the Orontes, but he eluded final capture and a siege began.

Cassius made his way through Asia collecting supplies, funds and men from the proconsul Trebonius. When he reached Apamea, he won over the combined armies of Antistius Vetus, Marcius Crispus, and Staius Murcus as well as those of Bassus. No doubt Cassius' reputation at Carrhae and promised donatives brought many troops over. All this was completed by the early spring of 43.

While this was happening, P. Cornelius Dolabella,
the proconsul of Syria for the year 43, had arrived early in
the year. A favourite of Caesar's, who promoted him beyond
his age, he reaffirmed his Caesarian connections with an
uneasy alliance with M. Antonius. When Dolabella reached
Asia, the proconsul Trebonius was cautious but not
hostile towards him. Dolabella had quarrelled with Antonius
before and might be a potential ally. Dolabella was
barred from the cities of Asia but Trebonius continued to
feed and supply his armies. Perhaps wishing to stop the
military build-up before it could get too strong, he
attacked Trebonius at Smyrna and killed him, after
reportedly torturing him for two days. Two legates of
Trebonius, P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther and C.
Minucius Basilus managed to flee while Dolabella's
officer, A. Allienus was sent to Egypt to bring back
four legions. On Allienus' return he met Cassius in
Palestine and the four legions from Egypt swelled
Cassius' growing forces. Dolabella tried to strengthen his
position but was defeated at sea by Lentulus Spinther and
turned toward Syria. Repulsed from Antioch he was besieged
at Laodiceia by Cassius and then committed suicide in late
July or early August of 43. 7

Cassius was building up his position, and Brutus had
received funds for his own army from Antistius and M.
Appuleius, the quaestor in Asia. Crossing the
Bosphorus, Brutus made his way down the coast of Asia raising money and troops. A meeting was convened with Cassius in Smyrna near the end of 43 and the two planned their strategies for the forthcoming confrontation with the Triumvirs. In Rome, Antonius had broken with the senate and along with Octavianus and M. Aemilius Lepidus had taken control of the government. The proscriptions followed, money was taken to pay the armies in the West while many of those proscribed escaped from Italy and augmented the followers of Brutus and Cassius. Although these men were forced to flee to the East under the threat of death, the Caesarian following of Brutus was loyally committed to him.

The lives and activities of Caesar's supporters who joined Brutus' company are not easy to reconstruct due to the lack of evidence. But one fact stands out distinctly. For Trebonius, Tillius Cimber, Basilus and others, Caesar was general and patron; they owed their careers to him. Yet, as his assassins, they decided that they did not need or could not tolerate their benefactor any further. A new champion was better suited to their political views.

C. Trebonius was typical of how fully a novus homo could achieve success under Caesar. The son of a well-known eques, he was elected quaestor in about 60 and then
became attached to Caesar's following. As tribune he showed his talents by procuring a five year extension on the commands of Caesar, Pompeius, and Crassus. Cato, Brutus' uncle, actively opposed the law. Trebonius retaliated and nearly had him thrown into prison. After this term in office Trebonius became Caesar's legate in the Gallic and civil wars, continuing to support Caesar as praetor in 48 and in his proconsulship in Spain during the next two years. Caesar made him praetor urbanus over the nobilis M.

Cælius Rufus and his crowning achievement was the consulship in 45. Caesar had used Trebonius’ talents and rewarded him with the consulship, one of eleven men of non-senatorial origins to gain the office between 100 BC and Caesar’s death.

Yet as early as 46 Trebonius had plans for the removal of Caesar, seeking out Antonius as an accomplice. When the conspiracy of 44 was formed, he was one of its leading members. No personal grudges against Caesar are recorded, but, although he was one of the few novi homines to reach the consulship the honour turned out to be less than glorious; Caesar laid down his sole consulship in October of 45 and Trebonius and Fabius Maximus were chosen to preside for the rest of the year. In fact when Fabius died on the last day of his term, Caesar appointed a consul to see out the rest of the day, a flagrant violation of
custom and law. It has been shown that, although Caesar welcomed many more novi homines into the consulate, the conditions with which they took up the office were less than ideal. Like the other conspirators, including Brutus, who had received benefits from Caesar, Trebonius delayed leaving for his province of Asia long enough to take part in the assassination in March of the new year.

After the assassination, Trebonius made his way east where he lost his life defending his province and advancing the cause of Brutus, the first casualty on the side of the Liberators. He was acquainted with Brutus by at least 46 and perhaps earlier but how closely they knew each other before the conspiracy is not clear. The events of Trebonius' tribunate brought him into direct confrontation with Cato, but no animosity is recorded between him and Brutus, Cato's nephew. Cato's death and Brutus' defection to Caesar's side prevented an ongoing feud. By 48 Trebonius and Brutus were on the same side in the civil war and Cicero could ask Trebonius about their mutual friend by December of 46. Exactly one year later the two men were co-conspirators. Perhaps remembering the time he sounded Antonius about Caesar's murder, Trebonius refused to allow his comrades to invite Antonius into the plot. As proconsul in Asia, he kept up his commitment to Brutus by supplying him with arms and money to the Liberators. When he was murdered by Dolabella,
Cicero mourned the loss of the "optimus civis moderatissimusque homo."\(^\text{10}\)

The careers of L. Tillius Cimber and L. Minucius Basilus are similar to that of Trebonius; although not as well substantiated or as successful. Both men were novi homines and show some Caesarian connections. Tillius Cimber is not mentioned in Caesar's war commentaries but was praetor in 45 and Cicero mentioned that he had received benefits from Caesar. Seneca calls Cimber a fellow soldier of Caesar, a traitor who was previously the fiercest defender of Caesar's cause (de Ira 3.30, 5). After being an accomplice to Caesar's murder, he left for his province of Bithynia and Pontus where he helped to defeat Dolabella and raised a fleet for Brutus. Basilus' original name was M. Satrius before his adoption. A legate of Caesar and praetor in 45 along with Tillius Cimber, Staius Murcus and Hortensius, he had a private disagreement with Caesar. He tried to placate Basilus with a bribe for not having received a province after his magistracy. Unfortunately this gesture worsened their relations, as the former Caesarian was counted among the conspirators. He later appeared as a legate of Trebonius and then served Brutus.\(^\text{11}\)

L. Staius Murcus and a certain Patiscus also fall
into this category of Caesarians. Although they were not participants in the assassination, they, like Favonius and others, associated with the conspirators afterwards, hoping to partake in the glory of tyrannicide. Both men served with Caesar during the civil war, Murcus in Illyria and Paticus in Cilicia. Murcus became praetor in 45 and received the province of Syria the next year. After the affair in Apamea, Murcus helped Cassius defeat Dolabella and later successfully patrolled the Adriatic for Brutus, destroying the supply line of the triumvirs. In 43, Paticus is found in the company of Brutus’ admirals Cassius Parmensis and Lentulus Spinther.12

Other men had similar loyalties. Q. Marcius Crispus was a veteran of Caesar’s African wars while C. Antistius Vetus was a quaestor of Caesar’s perhaps dating from his governorship in Spain, and had been sent out by him in 45 to contend with the insurgent Caecilius Bassus. Antistius in particular had close ties with Caesar. Caesar had served under Antistius’ father in Spain during his own quaestorship. Marcius Crispus came to help at the siege at Apamea when his term as proconsul of Bithynia and Pontus concluded. Both men joined Cassius, and Antistius presented Brutus with his tribute money when he passed through Greece. Brutus wrote to Cicero that Antistius had expressed his willingness to join the campaign but wished to stand as
praetor in Rome in the elections of 43 if possible. Unsuccessful in his attempt, he returned to serve as Brutus' legate. Cassius wrote that Marcius Crispus joined him after Apamea although Dio records that he retired after the siege. In any case Marcius is not heard of again.\textsuperscript{13}

Other men's loyalties are harder to determine. D. Turullius and M. Appuleius both enjoyed quaestorships under Caesar; Appuleius in 45 and Turullius in 44. There is no other evidence to support the notion that they were Caesarians but any political offices given in these years can be regarded as rewards for Caesar's supporters. Turullius took part in the assassination, and, as proquaestor in Bithynia and Pontus, commanded a fleet raised by Tillius Cimber. He later gave his fleet and services to Cassius at Rhodes. Appuleius also furnished Brutus with troops and funds but it is unclear whether he joined Brutus' company. In a letter to Cicero, Brutus speaks of the hopes of Bibulus, Domitius and Appuleius in the forthcoming augural elections. Whether Appuleius returned to Rome to stand or not is unknown since he drops out of sight at this time. Bibulus and Domitius did not return to Rome and perhaps neither did Appuleius.\textsuperscript{14}

Among all these promagistrates in the East, Q. Hortensius and the brothers Gaius and Publius
Servilius Casca deserve mention. Q. Hortensius was not characteristic of Caesar’s officers. The son of the famous orator had family connections with Cato and Brutus, but his family background proves that prosopography cannot always determine a man’s political views. He was the brother-in-law of Brutus’ adoptive father Caepio, and Cato’s wife Marcia was married to the elder Hortensius for a period of time. If his relations shaped his political allegiances, they did not do so until later. A disaffected youth, he was estranged from his father who considered disinheriting him. When his father died in 50 all parental influence was gone and Hortensius did not join his kin in siding with Pompeius but was with Caesar when he crossed the Rubicon in 49. Cicero believed a corrupt life led him, like many others, to join Caesar. Later, Hortensius held a naval commission on the Tuscan sea. Praetor in 45, Hortensius was rewarded with the proconsulship of Macedonia in the next year.15

Why Hortensius joined Caesar is open to speculation. His poor relations with his father may have caused him to rebel and join Caesar’s more attractive side. Caesar exploited anyone with ability, and welcomed them regardless of any previous relations or alliances. Having the son of one of Rome’s venerable old politicians on Caesar’s side would certainly help legitimize his cause, just as it would
for Brutus' years later. Advancement in politics may have been quicker and easier with Caesar, and Hortensius' choice in joining Caesar in the war was beneficial. An important promagistracy was the reward for Hortensius' efforts and perhaps a position on Caesar's staff in the Parthian campaign.

When Caesar was assassinated, Hortensius was in Macedonia having had no part in the plot or contact with the conspirators. Although there is no recorded contact between Brutus and Hortensius up to this point, their family links were recalled by their contemporaries. When Brutus came to Greece, Antonius was prudent enough to relieve Macedonia of its crack legions lest Hortensius be persuaded to join Brutus' cause, as he eventually did. Hortensius aided Brutus in raising troops in Greece, and with the capture of C. Antonius, brother of the triumvir, who tried to take the province. Like many other officers of Caesar, Hortensius had gone over to Brutus but his case is not typical. The fact that Brutus was a relative and Hortensius was in a crucial position to aid him may have determined his choice less than any hostility to Antonius or Octavianus. Although turning his back on the family tradition in his youth, by attaching himself to the growing army of Brutus, Hortensius had returned to the traditional factio of his family.

The brothers Cascae need to be discussed at this
point. While both were assassins and Gaius is mentioned among the friends of Caesar, neither were novi homines or held positions in the East immediately after the death of Caesar. Evidence is scanty and confusing but it seems that Publius remained in Rome until Octavianus marched on the city in 43. The brothers probably fled to Greece where Publius became a legate of Brutus' at Philippi. After the battle both brothers are reported to have committed suicide.  

The Caesarian supporters of Brutus fall into different categories. Most were either involved in the plot to kill Caesar and joined Brutus and Cassius in the East or they became allied with the Liberators once they were there. What is interesting is how whole-heartedly the Roman officials in the East went over to Brutus, many without having had previous contact with him. The prestige of having murdered Caesar was very great and may have been the deciding factor for some in choosing an alliance. With the exception of Dolabella and C. Antonius there was no armed resistance on the part of Roman officers, although many cities of Asia Minor were uncooperative. The leaders and even the armies at Apamea approached Cassius and offered their services to him. Only the loyalty of the legate of Dolabella, A. Allienus,
remain questionable. Like many officers in the East at that time he was a new man who had served Caesar in the civil wars. After handing over his Egyptian legions to Cassius peacefully he disappears from view. Like the others he may have fought at Philippi but as a legate of Dolabella he may not have wished to join Brutus and Cassius and preferred to return to Rome. If he did not wish to become part of the campaign he is the only officer in the East at the time who did so.  

For the most part, ambition and opportunity impelled these men to follow Brutus. The assassins (Trebonius, Tillius Cimber, Basilus, Turullius, and the Cascae) saw the military build up in the East as the necessary conclusion to the murder of Caesar and the political turmoil in Rome. The others who rallied to the cause (Murcus, Antistius, Patiscus, Marcius Crispus and Appuleius) believed that their careers would be more successful under Brutus than his opponents. Most were in positions to help Brutus and no doubt they thought Brutus was as necessary a stepping stone in their careers as Caesar. 

The particular position of the novi homines in this group warrants attention. Six men (Trebonius, Tillius Cimber, Basilus, Murcus, Turullius and Patiscus) came from non-senatorial families and were adherents of Caesar. The evidence available shows their lives proceeding
in the usual manner of new men. Early in the *cursus honorum* they attached themselves to a successful politician or general (Caesar, in this case) and from there a reciprocal relationship began. A *novus homo* helped his leader in the forum and on the battlefield, and the leader in turn advanced his man's career. Caesar's legates fought with him during the Gallic and civil wars and were duly rewarded with offices, honours and confiscated land.

But as T.P. Wiseman's study shows, new men were resourceful by nature and had no qualms about disengaging themselves from a cause or patron if a better opportunity came by. Of course none went to the extreme of murdering their patron, but the relationship between Caesar and his murderers was exceptional. The careers of Marius and Cicero show that an individual from an obscure background could easily abandon his former policies once he felt himself established. Evidently the new men among the Caesarians believed that Caesar had furthered their careers as far as possible. If Caesar was to fall, they did not wish to fall with him. Better opportunities were to be sought in the political atmosphere after his death. Civil war and political upheaval had benefitted the *novus homo* before. For those who joined Brutus immediately after the assassination or once he was in the East, the offices and resources they had were able to make a vital contribution
to the cause, for which they hoped they would be rewarded. Since the position of the *novus homus* was tenuous such chances had to be seized, when the nephew of Cato and the hero of Carrhae came to the eastern provinces seeking aid, it was not to be denied by the legates, quaestors, and proconsuls. Their break with Caesar is not unusual. "The new man was on his own, getting support from wherever he could; consistency was more than he could afford."\textsuperscript{20}

That being said, the former friends of Caesar look unscrupulous in their decision to ally with Brutus. Were they political opportunists or merely seeking their own survival? To believe that they wished a return to traditional Republican government is naive; that era was hostile to political newcomers. They counted on the ascendancy of Brutus and Cassius, not the Republic. When Brutus wrote that he would never stop trying to bring liberty to his fellow citizens he is undoubtedly speaking on his own behalf.\textsuperscript{21} Although little evidence of their political views survives, the sentiments of the former Caesarian officers are likely to have been less than noble. In the summer of 43, Brutus had to severely punish a legion who had mutinied at the instigation of Brutus' prisoner, C. Antonius. It is unprofitable to speculate about whether any of Brutus' ex-Caesarian officers were involved as evidence
is fragmentary, but if an army could be swayed by a sole prisoner, so might Brutus’ associates. If they survived Philippi, those who murdered Caesar did not live much longer, but their colleagues continue to show their political versatility. Murcus served Sex. Pompeius for a time, D. Turullius fought for Antonius and Antistius Vetus was consul under Octavianus. Like Brutus after Pharsalus, these new alliances were made with old enemies and friends. Survival and the pursuit of status were foremost to these men. Their devotion to Caesar and even to Brutus was transitory.\textsuperscript{22}

The importance of the Caesarians to Brutus’ following is not to be underestimated. For the most part the Eastern provinces were in the hands of Brutus before he left Italy. While Decimus Brutus was destroyed because of the enemy legions surrounding him, M. Brutus’ enterprise thrived because of the abundance of allies in the area. As well, the acquisition of these men by Brutus shows how the composition of a political association was changing. Pompeius had acquired a following among the nobiles and from the new men of his native Picenum. Caesar had also attracted his share of the aristocracy and his nine year term in Gaul gave him the opportunity to draw men to his side in constant military service. As long as they thought the dictator could promote
them, their loyalty was assured. But the Caesarians who allied with Brutus were neither his family clientelae nor loyal supporters through years of association. The late republic affected the normal growth of his factio. Like Octavianus, who also had to quickly build a following through solicitation, Brutus had a cause before he had military backers. Octavianus had the name of Caesar to work with, Brutus the reputation of being a tyrannicide. Men had to be brought together quickly. Desire for promotion and power brought some men to his side, the wealth of Greece and the East brought others.

In the short period from Brutus' and Cassius' arrival in Athens in August 44 to the defeat of Dolabella in July 43, the ex-Caesarian commanders had consolidated and proved themselves loyal and successful. Their formation in such a brief time is unusual and can only be compared, as mentioned, with Octavianus' resurrection of the Caesarian factio in Italy. Without his own supporters among the Caesarians, Brutus' plans in the Eastern provinces would have been short-lived. While his relatives supplied the illustrious names of the Republic, the Caesarians brought the means with which they might succeed.
In Thucydides' digression about the *stasis* that gripped the Greek world during the Peloponnesian war, he speaks of the citizens of the cities becoming less idealistic about politics now that war and civil strife had descended upon them. Family relationships, once the basis for political cooperation, mattered little in comparison with party membership. Those who came together did so because of their complicity in unconstitutional activities.

Rome in 44 BC was similar to a Greek city during that war. Leaders scrambled to consolidate power through arms and the solicitation of eminent and powerful individuals. When war became a certainty, men had to choose sides. Neutrality and moderation were dangerous and suspicious. Antonius and Octavianus put away their differences to combat a common foe. The enemy was not only Brutus, his collection of young *nobiles* and the renegade Caesarian officers but also a wide assortment of men who were alienated from those in power in Rome, Caesar's assassins, the proscribed, former supporters of Pompeius and others. Every Roman east of the Adriatic had to be regarded as a
potential enemy by the Caesarians. In this way many of
Brutus' supporters came together by reason of mutual security
and fear of the Triumvirate. Different circumstances would
have placed many of these men on the other side of
hostilities.

The lull between the civil war of Pompeius and
Caesar, and the war of Brutus and Cassius in 44-42 was
short. Hostilities against the Pompeians had ceased at the
end of 45 and Caesar had precious few months to implement
his political programme. One of his prime tasks for healing
the Roman state had been his amnesty for his old enemies,
his famous clementia. But by the time of Caesar's
assassination there were still men who professed loyalty to
Pompeius, in spite of Caesar's attempt to reconcile them.
Pompeius Magnus had been a formidable figure in Roman
politics for decades and many men regarded Brutus as
Pompeius' successor. Although Pompeius died after Pharsalus,
animosity towards Caesar or his political heirs caused them
to continue fighting in Spain and Africa. With Caesar now
dead, the civil war that followed was not, for some, a new
political upheaval but a continuation of a previous war. The
Pompeian old guard looked to Brutus and Cassius, former
associates themselves of Pompeius, to champion their cause
against the Caesarians once again.

Among those who saw action against Caesar on a
number of occasions was the patrician Sex. Quinctilius
Varus. He was captured at Corfinium by Caesar when L. Domitianus Ahenobarbus refused to abandon the city in the opening months of the war. In his capacity as quaestor, Quinctilius was responsible for the funds given up to Caesar at the siege of the city. As with many nobles, he fled from Italy and pursued the war in another land. Two years after the fall of Corfinium, he fought against Curio in Africa and tampered with his troops to get them to switch sides.²

From this point his status and whereabouts are not known for certain. At some point he must have been pardoned by Caesar as he was probably made a praetor between the battle of Thapsus and Caesar’s death. Caesar’s clementia was a useful political tool for the incorporation of enemies such as Quinctilius Varus back into Roman society. But Varus’ allegiance to Caesar was short-lived. When civil war erupted again, Quinctilius did not choose to fight along with Antonius and Octavianus but took up the cause of Brutus and Cassius. Whether he was their strong supporter or just anti-Caesarian is unknown. Former supporters of Pompeius must have felt unwelcome in the new regime of Caesar’s heirs, even though offices had been granted to them by Caesar. Many other Pompeians like Quinctilius Varus found their way into Brutus’ camp for this reason.³

The Calpurnii Pisones have been shown to be one of the most politically flexible families of the late Republic. While most Roman gentes at least tried to keep a semblance
of family cooperation, the Pisones had the political sense to worry about their own personal survival rather than the fragmentation of the family. It was noted earlier how C. Piso (cos. 67) allied with Catulus and Hortensius to try to put an end to the extraordinary commands of Pompeius. A relative, Cn. Calpurnius Piso gained the reputation for being opposed to Pompeius and it is said he was murdered in Spain on Pompeius’ orders. But this man’s son had Pompeian sympathies for much of his career, and an uncanny sense of timing for switching sides. Although his father was involved in anti-Pompeian activities, the younger Cn. Piso took up the general’s cause in the civil war. Piso fought in Spain as a proquaestor in 49, and later in 46 commanded native cavalry under Metellus Scipio in Africa. His activities until after Caesar’s death are unknown. He may have been pardoned by Caesar, but he may also have kept out of affairs in Italy and retired. In any case he turns up in the company of Brutus in Greece although his actual designation is unknown. His anti-Caesarian sympathies did not end at Philippi. Piso renewed his old allegiance by joining Pompeius’s son in Sicily until Octavianus overran the island in 36.

The sons of Caesar’s enemies belong in this category of Pompeians also, none more than Q. Labienus. He was the son of T. Labienus, a native of Pompeius’ home country of Picenum. The elder Labienus had been promoted by Pompeius and in turn aided his patronus and Caesar as praetor. Caesar
used Pompeius' friend all through his campaigns in Gaul and Labienus proved to be his most effective lieutenant. When civil war did broke out, Labienus followed his old commander and died fighting for the Pompeian cause. Nothing at all is known about his son Quintus until Brutus and Cassius entrusted him with an important mission in 43. Any attempt to justify his choice of sides in this war is speculative. But not having a desire to fight for his father's enemies may have been reason enough for Q. Labienus to accompany Brutus to the East. Perhaps recognizing his talents, Brutus sent him to the borders of Syria to solicit aid, or at least cooperation, from the Parthians. When Labienus heard of the defeat at Philippi, he remained in Parthia.  

A more shadowy figure is a certain A. Manlius Torquatus. Atticus, after Philippi, saved the lives of a number of refugees from the battle including an A. Torquatus. It is known that a Torquatus was the quaestor of the consul Pansa at Mutina in 43. That these two are the same man seems likely. This Torquatus slipped away after Pansa's death to Brutus. If this man's father was the consul of 65, L. Manlius Torquatus, and brother of the praetor of 49, then his label as Pompeian is justified. The father was Pompeius' legate in Miletus in 67 and A. Torquatus' brother served Pompeius in the civil war. As well, other branches of the Torquati had close ties to Pompeius. Although we have no evidence to prove that this A. Manlius Torquatus was a
Pompeian, we can infer it with reasonable caution from his family background. As well, he fits the pattern of those men who fought against Caesar in 49-45 and continued to serve against the Caesarians with Brutus.

D. R. Shackleton-Bailey notes that young sons often accompanied their fathers in war. There is no doubt that the parent's influence decided for many their early political opinions. The young P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther was officially his own man (he had received his toga virilis) in 57, and he is found, along with his father, on Pompeius' side in the hostilities of 49. After Pharsalus, the elder Lentulus Spinther, consul of 57, was executed for his continued aggressive behavior, having been pardoned once by Caesar, while his son fled to Alexandria. Accepting Caesar's amnesty, the young Spinther came back to Italy and established relations with Brutus and Cicero. He had no part in the assassination of Caesar but, like many others, tried to reap the gloria of the deed by claiming to have been a conspirator. Before leaving Italy to take up his post as quaestor under Trebonius in Asia, he visited Cicero, his father's friend. It is likely they discussed the situation of Brutus and his friends. Lentulus Spinther proceeded to the East where he actively tried to retake the province after Dolabella murdered Trebonius. Two communiqués, one to Cicero and another to the senate, survive in which the quaestor sets out the situation in Asia Minor. He was
unbending in his resolve to fight for the senate and Brutus. Although Dolabella was his kinsman, as he says:

"ομνίβος μείνα θετόν πρώτον
omnibus meis bellum primus indixi.

After Dolabella’s army was destroyed Lentulus Spinther linked up with Cassius and continued the fight against the latrones - as he called them - until the conclusion of the war.

Various other men with previous affiliations with Pompeius, or who fought for him in the war, also made their way east to side with the Tyrannicides. The M. Aquinius who in 46 fought against Caesar in Africa, and also a certain Aquinius who associated with Brutus and Cassius after the assassination, are identified with the M. Aquinus who was a legate of Cassius. C. Cichorius believes that L. Cellia, another soldier who took up arms against Caesar in Africa, is to be identified with a L. Pella and a L. Iulius Mocilla due to manuscript readings. L. Pella was an associate of Cassius in Rhodes and Iulius Mocilla was sheltered by Atticus after Philippi. If these three men are to be equated with one man, L. Livius Ocella, then the pattern, which has been seen previously, matches. A Pompeian was pardoned by Caesar, joined Brutus and then sought Atticus’ protection from the Triumvirs - like Torquatus, Gellius Canus, and Volumnius. Men from humbler backgrounds also were involved
with both Pompeius and Brutus. The grandfather of the early imperial historian, C Velleius, fought against the Caesarians in both civil wars as a praefectus fabrum.¹²

A couple of the assassins whose loyalties prior to their participation in the conspiracy are unknown also appear as legates and officers under Brutus and Cassius in Greece and Asia Minor. C. Cassius Parmensis probably took up a quaestorship in the East after he participated in the murder of Caesar, but his exact magistracy and provincia are uncertain. With Trebonius dead and Asia in turmoil, he engaged Dolabella’s fleet successfully and chased them to Corycus on the coast of Cilicia. Like Lentulus Spinther, he sent news of the military operations home to Cicero.¹³ He was also responsible for certain invectives about Octavianus:¹⁴

Materna tibi farina est ex crudissimo
Ariciae pistrino; hanc finxit manibus
collybo decoloratis Narulonensis mensarius!
Parmensis continued to command his fleet after
preparing infantry for Brutus and Cassius. During the battle of Philippi he commanded troops in Asia. After taking part in the conspiracy, Pacuvius (Antistius) Labec, a novus homo, also went to Greece with Brutus and he fought at Philippi.¹⁵

Various other miscellaneous friends and acquaintances of Brutus joined him after the formation of
the Triumvirate. M. Terentius Varro Gibba served with him during his magistracy in Cisalpine Gaul. Although Shackleton-Bailey labels Varro Gibba a Caesarian for his role as Cicero’s messenger to Caesar, what little we know of him suggests that he was more of a pupil and friend of Cicero’s, and became linked to Brutus by his interest in oratory and by his term as quaestor in Gaul. In 52 he appeared as a young man along with Cicero in defense of M. Saufeius, a partisan of Milo. As tribune in 43 he probably realized that the office was particularly dangerous for one who harboured sympathies for Brutus. About this time he fled from Italy and joined his former superior in Philippi.¹⁶

M. Tullius Cicero, son of the orator, was also a natural follower of Brutus and distinguished himself in his service. At the age of twenty-one he was continuing his studies in Athens at the time of Caesar’s death. Trebonius visited him when he was passing through Greece on his way to Asia and invited Cicero to accompany him, an offer which he fortunately declined. When Brutus began to raise troops in Greece, Cicero joined his company and took control of one of legions. Brutus wrote to the elder Cicero back in Italy:¹⁷

mihi se probat industria, patientia, labore, animi magnitudine omni denique officio.
The young Cicero was placed on the proscription list along with his father in 43 and at Philippi he commanded some cavalry for Brutus.²

The orator himself almost made his way East in the summer of 43 and would have probably joined Brutus had he reached Greece. This journey, oddly enough, was in conjunction with his son-in-law, Dolabella. Dolabella took up the consulship after Caesar's death as he was designated for that office when Caesar was to leave for Parthia. Dolabella's activities at this time gave Cicero hope; he might be a useful tool against Antonius. Earning his approval for the destruction of a spontaneous cult of Caesar, Dolabella appointed the elder man to a *libera legatio*, when he proceeded to his appointed province of Asia in late 44. Cicero took up the post because it gave him the freedom to visit his son in Athens. Contrary winds kept him in Leucopetra though until he heard of a possible reconciliation between Antonius and Brutus. Cicero turned back in hopes of peace but these thoughts were premature. Nevertheless he stayed in Italy thinking that he would be of more use to the state in the senate rather than on campaign with Brutus.¹⁹

L. Cassius Longinus, nephew of Cassius, was another young man who was with the Liberators in Greece. He was the son of a Caesarian supporter and although little else is known about him, he may also have been a student in Athens
when his uncle passed through Greece on his way to Asia Minor. At one point he held a legion in Asia when the elder Cassius went to confer with Brutus on the coast. Two Volumnii also were at the battle of Philippi. Publius was with Brutus until the end and later wrote his biography. Gaius (or Tiberius) Volumnius was a friend of young M. Lucullus. Lucilius, another friend of Brutus, was with him after the battle and aided his escape by pretending to be Brutus. A certain Statilius was with Cato before his suicide at Utica. The same man was with Brutus at Philippi.

One of the more interesting aspects of the formation of Brutus' following is that many of his followers were actually forced into choosing Brutus under threat of death. In late 43, the Triumvirate, in an effort to raise money and purge Italy of their enemies, posted the names of those condemned as hostes. Three hundred senators and two thousand equites were proscribed in this manner. Although many, including Cicero, were murdered, some fled and joined Sex. Pompeius in Sicily or M. Brutus in Greece. Those killed in the proscriptions were mostly obscure and minor senators, with notable exceptions, whose wealth would fill the war chests of the Triumvirate. The names which are recorded by Appian disappear thereafter. Those proscribed who are known are usually those who had the means to survive and save
themselves. Many were pardoned in later years and went on to serve Augustus; Messalla, young Cicero, Aemilius Paullus and Lollius. Here, it is clearer than in other situations that personal loyalty often played a small role in a man's allegiances. Survival and hope for victory must have been in the minds of those who joined Brutus.

Little is known about M. Livius Drusus Claudianus, a distant relative of Brutus. In 54 he was charged with praevarication and was reluctantly defended by Cicero. Shackleton Bailey suggests that he was a Caesarian supporter because he gave his daughter to Ti. Claudius Nero, an active partisan of Caesar's and father of the emperor Tiberius. Drusus was a praetor in 50 and in 43 made himself unpopular with the triumvirs when, along with L. Aemilius Lepidus Paulus, he proposed that D. Brutus should retain certain legions. During the proscriptions he escaped to Greece and fought at Philippi for Brutus.25

As mentioned, Drusus' supporter in the proposal about the legions was L. Paullus, another man who found himself proscribed. Paullus was the son of the rebel consul of 78, and like his father joined a M. Brutus in civil conflict. In 66 he tried to prosecute Catiline but lacked support for the charge de vi. As has been mentioned, he was one of the young men accused, along with Brutus, of being involved in a scheme to murder Pompeius in the notorious Vettius affair. Both men's fathers had been killed as a
result of the young Pompeius' actions. As consul in the year 50, Paullus carried on his blood feud with Pompeius but he was not a follower of Caesar either. It was a surprise to his contemporaries that when war did break out Paullus was devoted to Caesar. But like many of Caesar's supporters, the money from Gaul was able to buy Paullus' support; he needed the funds to renovate the Basilica Aemilia. Although Paullus was a supporter of Caesar and brother to the Triumvir, M. Aemilius Lepidus, he was nevertheless proscribed. His participation as envoy of the senate to Sex. Pompeius in order to receive aid for Mutina angered Antonius. Plutarch suggests that Marcus Aemilius was not in a strong position to defend his brother against Antonius and Octavianus, to whom Paullus was hostile. In any case, Paullus fled along with his son to Brutus and served at Philippi. His son of the same name captured the island of Cyprus for the Liberators.26

Another patrician who was proscribed was M. Valarius Messalla Corvinus. His father was Messalla Niger, consul of 61, who opposed his colleague M. Fiso, at the trial of Clodius. He spoke out against Clodius who was accused of sacrilege and was supported by the predecessors of Brutus; Catulus, Hortensius and Lucullus, as well as Cato, Favonius and C. Fiso. His son's career actually starts at Philippi. On his way to Brutus in 43 Messalla delivered letters to him from Cicero, and the orator highly recommended his
pupil to Brutus. In his absence he was proscribed but his name was rapidly taken off the list of the condemned. Velleius Paterculus records that Messalla was next to Brutus and Cassius in auctoritas. This is certainly questionable and may only be flattery directed toward his descendants. There were many other men of higher rank than Messalla at Philippi, many other sons of consuls. After the battle of Philippi, the remnants of Brutus’ following looked to Messalla to lead them. Along with Messalla came his half-brother L. Gellius Poplicola. Dio records that the younger Gellius planned to murder Brutus in his early campaigns in Macedonia, perhaps in conjunction with a scheme of M. Antonius to rescue his brother Gaius. Although his plan was foiled, Brutus did not punish him and only sent him away. Gellius later turned up as a partisan of Antonius.27

Like Messalla, another man who was to play an important part in affairs at and after Actium was M. Lollius. Appian writes that he was with Brutus at Philippi, but, disguising himself as a slave after the battle, was sold to the man who eventually became his colleague in the consulship, Aemilius Barbula.28 The story may be doubtful, but it is an example of the information collected by Appian, characterizing the great social turmoil of the period.

In civil war desertions were not uncommon. Officers who were serving in some military capacity were prone to
find themselves, once a conflict had begun, fighting for someone they would rather not. A case in point is T. Labienus, Caesar's marshal who switched to Pompeius in 49. As indicated by the enthusiastic response of the Caesarian legions of Apamea, who invited Cassius to lead them, desertion in the wars of 43-42 must have been frequent. Two legates of Dolabella, C. Tittius and Sex. Marius, both otherwise unknown, jumped ship to join Lentulus Spinther.29

Little is known about a few men except that they fought for Brutus and Cassius. Some such as L. Sestius Quirinus or the poet Horace appeared at Philippi and then went on to live diverse but successful lives under Augustus. Sestius in the summer of 44 aided Brutus when he was preparing a fleet in Campania and was a proquaestor in the East afterwards. Put on the proscription list, he was later pardoned by Augustus and made consul in 23 despite his continued public devotion to Brutus.30

Horace, the son of a freedman and an eques, joined Brutus in Athens, probably while he was there continuing his education. Horace himself tells us that he was made a military tribune but it was probably because there was a lack of men with proper military experience. Brutus may have looked for such a group of young enthusiastic men to lead a legion in lieu of a legate. Horace's supposed behavior on the battlefield is not to be taken seriously. Throwing away
his shield in the thick of battle was a literary reference to Archilochus and others. Along with Horace came his friend Pompeius, perhaps also an aeques.31

A Flavius whom Plutarch reports died trying to save Brutus' life at Philippi has been identified with the C. Flavius (cognomen-Hemic...?) whose coins have confirmed his support of Brutus. Flavius tried to persuade Atticus to organize a fund for Brutus' campaign, which he declined to do.32 Another acquaintance of Atticus was Q. Gellius Canus whom he sheltered after Philippi. He may have been the father-in-law of young Q. Cicero's prospective bride.33

A tribune of 43, M. Servilius, was among those whose activities after 44 made them unpopular with Antonius and Octavianus. He organized a meeting in the senate be protected from Antonius' mob tactics. This roused Cicero to attend and deliver his first Philippic. Servilius also proposed in the senate that Cassius be given the command against Dolabella in 43. Working for the Liberators in this capacity, Antonius probably forced him to leave Italy. His coins attest his service with Brutus.34 Two other men are known only from their coins, Pedanius Costa and L. Plaetorius Cestianus.35

Other officers are known to have fought for Brutus. A Clodius guarded and then executed C. Antonius.36 Another Clodius was sent to Rhodes with a fleet of thirteen ships. After Philippi he escaped with Cassius Parmensis and joined
Staius Murcus and Domitius Ahenobarbus. L. Sextilius Rufus commanded a fleet against Dolabella and later occupied Tarsus. L. Varus was ordered to occupy Rhodes, after it very reluctantly opened its gates and coffers to Cassius.

A Fabius was left in charge of Damascus while a P. Licinius took Cyrene. Each man was a component in the operations which saw Brutus and Cassius take control of the entire East with the exception of Egypt.

If Brutus' following of young nobiles recalls the political battles of the late Republic, his other supporters stand out for their own variety of political attitudes. Many followed Brutus out of necessity, some from ambition, others perhaps from apathy. More than a quarter century of intense political activity had elapsed before the civil war between Caesar and Pompeius. The latest civil conflict only aggravated hostilities in old and new alliances. Personal enmity and party politics merged. These factors forced many to choose Brutus in a war that they did not wish to fight or follow a leader in whom they put little loyalty. Gellius Poplicola, it must be remembered, tried to kill Brutus; the commander himself had waited until the last hope for a peaceful settlement vanished before being forced to take up arms.

Many who filled Brutus' ranks were opportunists, like Caesar's former officers, throwing in their lot with
the senator who slew Caesar and rallied the Eastern provinces around him. Others under the threat of death fled Italy; the proscribed and those whose political intrigues made their stay in Rome impossible. Octavianus and Antonius forced them into service with Brutus. He did not draw these men to himself for his cause. Those Pompeians who nursed grudges against Caesar and his successors may have thought similarly. Lentulus Spinther and Q. Labienus lost their fathers in that war.

However, Brutus, as a prominent figure, also attracted many men to himself, and these brought their own companions. The young Lucullus joined his cousin Brutus bringing Volumnius. Young Cato, another cousin, was perhaps accompanied by Statilius, his father's close companion. Brutus himself had some friends and acquaintances to take up arms for him. Varro Gibba, his former quaestor, fought beside him as did Cicero's son. Gellius Canus was a friend of Cicero and Atticus. One of Cicero's pupils, Messalla, joined Brutus, perhaps at Cicero's request. Cicero may have personally recommended many men to Brutus. A letter of recommendation to Brutus for a centurion, C. Nasennnius, is extant.41 As well, his fellow assassins must have looked for Brutus' leadership in the forthcoming war as they did during their plans to assassinate the dictator. A few men, such as C. Velleius, may have been career soldiers who hoped to find in Brutus a winning general to promote them in their
military or civilian lives. Other legates, C. Tittius, Sex. Marius and even perhaps A. Allienus switched to the Republican side when Dolabella seemed doomed. All types of men were welcome in the crusade of Brutus and Cassius. Less dedicated to Brutus, they, nevertheless, through choice or necessity, felt equal animosity to the Triumvirate. The policies of Antonius, Octavianus and Lepidus had more to do with the formation of this particular group of men than Brutus' war against tyranny. Like many political associations, these men were not attracted to each other by similar political views but stood together under the command of Brutus in Greece and Asia Minor for self-preservation.

After consolidating in Asia Minor, Brutus and Cassius met at Sardis and marched north at the head of nineteen legions, crossing the Hellespont in August of 42. Following them on the coast were the fleets of Tillius Cimber, Staius Mucrus and Domitius Ahenobarbus. C. Norbannus Flaccus and L. Decidius Saxa, sent by the Triumvirs to stop their advance, had to retreat across northern Greece. Near Philippi, the Liberators set up their camps, and the fleet anchored at nearby Neapolis. Antonius marched quickly to meet them, as did Octavianus, whose illness hampered operations. The Triumvirs' twenty-eight legions outnumbered Brutus' but they had a much weaker supply line.

On October 23, the first battle was fought. With
skirmishes occurring during the building of trenches and palisades, Brutus attacked Antonius' forces and then turned on Octavianus. All four armies fell into the battle. Brutus stormed Octavianus' camp, and the young Caesar barely escaped. But Antonius took Cassius' camp and and the latter, believing that all was lost, committed suicide.

Brutus united his army with Cassius', and at first refused a second battle, hoping that he could weaken the enemy, whose supplies were running out. News reached him that the convoys of the Triumvirate had been destroyed by Murcus and Domitius Ahenobarbus. But it is said that Brutus was implored to offer battle by his officers. He finally gave in. On November 16 he led out his troops, and was swiftly defeated by Antonius. Brutus and the survivors scattered to the nearby mountains, and a night later, amid his friends' desperate attempts to save his life, Brutus also committed suicide. Velleius Paterculus writes "Hunc exitum M. Bruti partium...fortuna esse voluit."^32

Although the majority of the men of Philippi were killed in the battle or disappear from history afterwards, nevertheless an examination of Brutus' factio would not be complete without a brief excursus on those who survived. This is not only enlightening for the period before and after Actium, but also puts into perspective the formation of political associations.
After Philippi, some men, such as Messalla, made their peace with the Triumvirs while others fled to continue the fight elsewhere. Atticus sheltered C. Volumnius, Livius Ocella, Torquatus and Gellius Canus. Murcus and Domitius continued to patrol the Adriatic, harassing Octavianus when possible, and even attacking Brundisium. C. Velleius found his way back to Italy to serve Ti. Claudius Nero, but committed suicide when age no longer permitted him to accompany Nero abroad. Domitius Ahenobarbus was eventually welcomed into Antonius' camp while Murcus allied with Sex. Pompeius'. In the East, Bibulus, Gellius Poplicola and the assassin Turullius served Antonius. The young Cicero, along with Calpurnius Piso Frugi, joined Pompeius in the West. Q. Labienus led the Parthians to overrun parts of the eastern provinces, styling himself 'Parthicus Imperator'. He continued to trouble Antonius until 39 when he was killed by Ventidius. In the same year Staius Murcus was executed by Sex. Pompeius. Before Actium, Calpurnius Bibulus, proconsul of Syria, died in office. His brother-in-law, Domitius Ahenobarbus, switched to Octavianus after his consulship in 32 and likewise passed away. In the year of Actium, Messalla was consul. He reminded Octavianus that he himself had always fought on the better side, whether at Philippi or Actium. Turullius was executed by orders of Octavianus. Soon after this, the last surviving assassin, C. Cassius Parmensis, was murdered in Athens.
It is perhaps ironic that although Brutus died in 42 his followers continued to be influential well into Octavianus' reign. The first emperor was as anxious for political reconciliation as his father Caesar. Ten men, who were with Brutus at Philippi, became consuls six under Octavianus: Marcius Crispus and Gellius Poplicola in 36, Aemilius Paullus in 34, Domitian Ahenobarbus in 32, Messalla in 31, Ciceron and Antistius Vetus in 30, Calpurnius Piso and Sestius Quirinalis in 23, and M. Lollius in 21. In 23, when Augustus was ill, he bestowed documents concerning the state of the Republic on the consul, Calpurnius Piso, his onetime enemy. M. Lollius became a close associate of Augustus—one of his 'hard-headed, hard-faced men.' He served as an important legate all over the empire and supervised the young C. Caesar. The role Brutus' men played in imperial affairs culminated in 2 BC. Messalla Corvinus, friend of Brutus and Ciceron, stood in the senate and proposed that Augustus include among his honours the title pater patriae.
CONCLUSION

The formation of Brutus' group conformed to the traditions of Roman society but was influenced by the unique characteristics of the late Republic. As illustrated by the groups of men led by Catulus and Cato, relatives cooperated in their political affairs. Once the leaders of the senate, Brutus' predecessors had been weakened by the rise of Pompeius and Caesar, and were powerless against their violent tactics. Brutus, after his assassination of Caesar, took up the sons and surviving members of a political factio which had its roots in the Sullan regime. Most of these men were the relatives of those who had provided opposition in the senate to Pompeius and Caesar, and later fought against the latter in the civil war. Young Cato, Bibulus, Domitius and Lucullus had close ties with Brutus by politics and by family. Unreconciled under Caesar or his successors, they renewed their fathers' association under Brutus. As well, Brutus brought with him miscellaneous supporters, friends and contacts who regarded him as their patron. They varied in social status and rank, and included Favonius, the orator Terentius Varro Gibba, Cicero's son, and friends Volumnius, Statilius and Lucilius. In this way a normal Roman factio
operated, bonded by ties of kinship and clientage, led by a popular and powerful Roman aristocrat, in a manner typical of the Roman Republic.

In contrast to this normal social phenomenon, many of the men who fought at Philippi were directly affected by the past three years of Roman politics, which motivated them to join Brutus. The end of the Republic was a period of political and social disruption. In the previous centuries, the factionalism between political families and groups could be put away in a crisis, such as a war with a foreign nation. But the emergencies of the late Republic were for the most part civil disturbances, and the factionalism was not lessened but heightened. Politics, which in other times fostered political associations based on the family, patronage and other social relationships, now seriously damaged these institutions. The various groups of men discussed here did not operate together in the senate to achieve mutual benefits. They were forced to band together, many under war-time conditions.

Some of those who sided with the Liberators did so only because the alternatives were worse. A few who served Pompeius renewed the fight against Caesar’s successors. They did not find in Brutus a common leader but found common enemies in Antonius, Octavianus, and even Dolabella. For the late Republic, where so many interest groups acted in various combinations, this process does not seem unusual.
The senate, with the consuls Hirtius and Pansa, worked with D. Brutus and Octavianus against Antonius in 43. Later, Antonius and Octavianus worked in combination against the senate and Brutus and Cassius. The alliances many men had with Brutus can only be judged as transitory; their consulships in the period after Philippi show how easily Romans could take up other causes if political advantage was to be had. Further, those who were proscribed had no alternative but to join Brutus or Sex. Pompeius, and, for some, the choice of Brutus may have been arbitrary. Many fled en masse to the East regardless of family connections or former political activities. Obligatory membership of this type in a political following is quite unusual and can be only paralleled with the refugees Sulla collected from the terror of Marius and Cinna.

Proconsuls, proquaestors and legates in the East, former officers of Caesar, who participated in or approved of the assassination of Caesar, were with Brutus. Their break with Caesar shows how weak traditional political patronage had become in the late Republic. These men were not driven by love of Brutus either; ambition and hopes for advancement encouraged them. Around them, Brutus and Cassius made a foundation for their military operations. Like Octavianus, Brutus had his share of novi homines among his supporters. Most were those who had risen under the patronship of Caesar. Others, like Favonius and Statilius stayed loyal to
their previous political following and chose to side with their old patron's nephew, Brutus. A few novi homines are likely to have been conducting business in the East when hostilities broke out and then joined Brutus. This is likely in the case of Patiscus, most of whose career as a civilian and magistrate was spent in the East. In all, like their senatorial counter-parts, the novi-homines brought varied political attitudes to Brutus' camp. They are distinguished from the senior order though by their opportunism and political obscurity.

The breakdown of traditional socio-political mores in the late Republic is illustrated by this side of Brutus' following. The stakes in Roman politics had been raised to an extremely high level, and the outcome of this was some very disturbing political behavior. Only one symptom of the changing political atmosphere was the various political hues which the men who supported Brutus had. Under the stimulus of victory or destruction, a desperate and diverse group followed Brutus to the battlefield at Philippi.
This prosopography covers the men who aided Brutus from Caesar's death until the battle of Philippi. Only with caution may some be termed 'supporters'; their degree of enthusiasm or loyalty for Brutus' cause is discussed in the text. Offices which each man held are listed in chronological order, as well as references to rank and social standing. Each entry is classified as a senator or an eques, patricians and novi homines are noted, the latter with references where possible. Senator's sons who had yet to obtain a magistracy, while technically equites are also noted. A separate list (B) is included for the men who were likely, but cannot be positively proven, to have been with Brutus. Appropriate citations are made to T.R.S. Broughton, Magistrates of the Roman Republic, T.P. Wiseman, New Men in The Roman Senate, the Pauly Wissowa Real Encyclopädie, and the Prosopographia Imperii Romani.
A. ATTESTED SUPPORTERS OF BRUTUS

1. L. AEMILIUS (81) LEPIDUS PAULLUS

Patrician Senator
Praetor 53 (Cic. Mil. 24)
Consul 50 (Cic. Ad Fam. 8.4, 1; SB 81)

Proscribed by his brother Marcus the triumvir (Appian BC 4.12; and 37; Plut. Ant. 19; Vell. 2.67), he escaped and joined Brutus in Greece (Appian BC 4.37), and after Philippi retired to Miletus (Dio 47.8, 1).

P-W I, 565, von Rohden.

2. L. AEMILIUS (82) LEPIDUS PAULLUS

Senator
Proquaestor Cyprus 43-42 (Appian BC 5.2)
Consul Suffectus (July 1) 34 (Dio 49.42, 1)
Censor 22 (Dio 54.2, 1)
Son of the above, Paullus is almost certainly the P. Lepidus whose coins have been found in Cyprus. The initial P. has been shown to stand for Paullus by R.D. Weigel in "A Note On P. Lepidus" CPH 73 (1978) 42-45. He captured Cyprus for Brutus (Appian BC 5.5, 2) and survived Philippi. Although probably proscribed with his father, he was pardoned by Octavianus, fought against Sex. Pompeius, and eventually attained the consulship and censorship. He completed the work begun by his father on the Basilica Aemilia (Dio 49.42.1).

Grant Imperium 35-36; R. Syme, "Review of Broughton, MRR" CPh 50 (1955) 135; P-W I, 565, von Rohden; PIR I, 373

3. C. ANTISTIUS (47) VETUS

Senator
Quaestor Spain ? (Plut. Caes. 5.3)
Tribune 56 (Cic. Ad Q.F. 2.1,3;SB 5)
Quaestor propraetor Syria 45-43 (Dio 47.27,2-4)
Legatus 43 (Cic. Ad Brut. 1.11,2; SB 16)
Promagistrate (or Legatus) 35-34 (Appian, Illyr. 17)
Consul Suffectus July to Sept. 30 (Vell. 2.90, 4)
Legatus 25 (ibid.)
His quaestorship in 61 is contested (Broughton, MRR 214, n.2.). Sent in 45 to destroy the Pompeian Caecilius Bassus in the city of Apamea in Syria by Caesar (Cic. Ad. Att. 14.9, 3; SB 36; Dio 47 2,7), he was unsuccessful until relieved by Staius Murcus. On his way to Rome he gave his tribute money to Brutus (Plut. Brut. 25), and eventually returned to serve as a legate (Cic. Ad. Brut. 1.11.2; SB 16 1.12.1; SB 21). He was pardoned by Octavianus and served him in some capacity in Gaul by attacking the Salassi in 35 (Appian Illyr. 17). He later became consul with Octavianus.

P-W I, 2558, Klebs; PIR I, 770.

4. M. APULEIUS (13, cf. 14)

Senator
Quaestor Asia 45-43 (Cic. Phil. 10.24;)

In his capacity as quaestor he gave troops (Appian BC 3, 63; Cic.Phil. 10.24) and money (Appian BC 4.75; Cic.Phil. 13.32) from Asia to Brutus. See also Cic. Ad Brut. 1.7,2; SB 19. Probably not the consul of 20 who was a distant relative of Octavianus (G. V. Sumner, "The Lex Annalis Under Caesar," Phoenix 25 (1971) 361-363).

Syme RR 129, n.4; P-W II, 258, Klebs and von Rohden; PIR I, 959.
5. M. AQUINUS (5 cf. Aquinius 2)

Senator Novus Homo (B. Afr. 57; "hominem novum parvumque senatorem")

Legatus 46 (B. Afr. 57, 89.5)
Legatus 43-42 (Crawford, RRC 513)

Broughton makes the identification of the Aquinius who fought against Caesar in Africa and the Aquinus whose coins cite him as a legatus of Cassius at Rhodes. Probably also the man who joined the assassins after Caesar’s death. (Appian BC 2.119).

Broughton M.R.R. suppl. 7; P-W II, 334, Klebs.

6. Atilius (5) Serranus (?)

With Brutus at Philippi (Plut. Brut. 39.6) he was perhaps a relative. See chapter two, p. 57.

P-W II, 2076, Klebs.

7. L. CALPURNIUS (27) BIBULUS

Senator

Legatus 42 (Appian BC 4.104)
Praetor Designate 36 (Grant Imperium 43,52)
Legatus 36 (Hor. Sat. 1.10.86)
Proconsul Syria 34-32 (Appian BC 4.38)

As a youth he joined Brutus while still studying in Athens (Cic. Ad Att. 12.32, 2; SB 271) and was proscribed (Appian BC 4.38). He was Brutus' step-son as his mother had been married to M. Bibulus previously. In the east (Cic. Ad Brut. I 7,1; 14,1; SB 19, 22), he led the march to Philippi (Appian BC IV 104) and later surrendered to Antony (Appian BC 5.38, 136). He was an envoy for Antonius (Horace Sat. I, 10, 86) and proconsul of Syria in 32 where he died (Appian BC 4.38). He wrote a pamphlet book on Brutus (Plut. Brut. 23).

F-W III, 1367, Cichorius.

8. CN. CALPURNIUS (95) PISO FRUGI

Senator

Proquaestor 49 (Crawford RRC 597)
Legatus 46 (B. Afr. 3.1, 18.1)
Legatus (?) 43-36 (Tac. Annales 2.43)
Quaestor (?) 42-36 (Grant, Imperium 31)
Consul Suffectus 23 (Dio 53.30,1)
from June 14
Having fought against Caesar in the civil war he later served with Brutus at Philippi (Tacitus Ann. 2.43) and later became an officer with Sex. Pompey (Grant, Imperium 31) until the Triumvirs took Sicily in 36. He was asked to be consul in 23 by Augustus, and was responsible for documents on the state of the empire when Augustus was near death.

P-W III, 1391, Münzer; PIR II, 286.


9. C. CASSIUS (59) LONGINUS

Senator
Quaestor Syria
Proquaestor Syria
Tribune
Praefectus
Legatus
Praetor Peregrinus
Proconsul Cyrene
Proconsul Syria
with maius imperium
in the East
Early in his career Cassius accompanied Crassus to Syria in his unsuccessful attempt to invade Parthia. After the annihilation at Carrhae, Cassius took control of the province and fought off a Parthian advance. On his return to Rome he sided with Pompeius during the civil war but with Brutus’ aid, made his peace with Caesar after Pharsalus. Praetor in 44 and perhaps consul designate in 41 (see H. Bruhns, Caesar und die römische Oberschicht in den Jahren 49-44 v. Chr. 147-148), Cassius, along with Brutus, formed a conspiracy against Caesar and murdered him in March 44. Forced to flee Italy, Cassius went to the East where he won over many commanders in a short period of time and formed a large force. He marched with Brutus to Philippi where he committed suicide after the first engagement.


10. L. CASSIUS (15) LONGINUS

Senator’s son

Legatus 43-42 (Appian BC 4.63)
The nephew of Cassius (above), he was in command of a legion when his uncle visited Brutus in Asia. (Appian BC 4.63). He fell at Philippi.

P-W III, 1679, Münzer.

11. C. CASSIUS (80) PARMENSIS

Senator Novus Homo
Quaestor Asia (?) 43 (Cic. Ad Fam. 12.13; SB; 419)
Proquaestor Asia (?) 42 (ibid.)

Assassin; he came east and was in command of a fleet which fought against Dolabella’s ships (Cic. Ad Fam. 12.13; Appian BC 5.2). After Philippi he joined Domitius and Statius Murcus and was later murdered in Athens after Actium (Vell. 2.87). On his novitas see Wiseman, New Men, no. 108.

P-W III, 1743, Skutsch.

12. CLODIUS (3)

Eques
Praefectus 42 (Appian BC 5.2)
Sent to Rhodes by Brutus with thirteen ships, he escaped after Philippi with Cassius Parmensis to join Staius and Domitius (Appian BC 5.2).

P-W IV, 64, Münzer.

13. CLODIUS (8)

Eques

He supervised the execution of C. Antonius (Dio 47.24,2)

P-W IV, 64, Münzer.

14. P. CORNELIUS (239) LENTULUS SPINTHER

Senator

Quaestor 44 (Cic. Ad Att. 14.11,2; SB 385)

Proquaestor Asia 43 (Cic. Ad Fam. 12.14; SB 405)

Legatus (?) 43-42 (Appian BC 4.72)

Having fought for Pompeius during the civil war he was apparently pardoned by Caesar and claimed to have been part of the conspiracy (Appian BC 2. 119; Plut. Caes. 67, 2; Cic. Ad Fam. 12.14,6; SB 405). He probably went east with Trebonius, where he wrote to Cicero (Ad Fam. 12.14; SB 405) and the
senate (Ad Fam. 12.15; SB 15) on the conditions in Asia after Trebonius' death. He then escaped to Brutus and returned to Asia. He fought against the Rhodians (Appian BC 4.72) and since nothing is heard of him after 42 it is assumed that he died at Philippi. On his adoption to the Manlii Torquatii see Shackleton Bailey Two Studies 113.

P-W IV, 1398, Münzer.

15. CN. DOMITIUS (23) AHENOBARBUS

Senator
Praefectus Classis (?) 44 (Cic. Ad Att. 16.4.4; SB 411)
Legatus (?) 43 (Cic. Ad Brut. 1.5.3 SB 9)
Legatus (?) 42 (Appian BC 4.86)
Promagistrate 41 (Appian BC 5.26)
Promagistrate Bithynia and Pontus 40-34 (Appian BC 5.63)
Consul 32 (Appian BC 5.73)
Legatus 31 (Suet. Nero 3.2)

After fighting alongside his father during the civil war, he was probably not pardoned by Caesar. He joined his cousin Brutus after the assassination (Cic. Ad Att. 16.4.4; SB 411) and was later proscribed. He fought against
Dolabella in Asia (Cic. Phil. 10, 13) and helped Murcus blockade the triumvirs (Appian BC 4.86). Surviving Philippi he held an independent command in the Adriatic, and attacked Brundisium (Appian BC 5.50). Asinius Pollio convinced him to join Antonius (Appian BC 5.50). He governed Bithynia and Pontus for Antonius and participated in the Parthian campaign. Consul in 32 he switched to Octavianus on the eve of the battle of Actium and died shortly afterwards (Dio 50.13).

P-W V, 1328, Münzer.

16. FABIUS (3)

Eques
Praefectus 43-42 (Josephus AJ 14.295-7; BJ 1.236-9)

He governed Damascus for Cassius.

P-W VI, 1743, Münzer.

17. M. FAVONIUS (1)

Senator Novus Homo
Quaestor before 59 (Plut. Cat. Min. 32)
Aedile 52 (Plut. Cat. Min. 46)
Praetor 49 (Vell. 2.53.1)
Proquaestor Macedonia 48 (Dio 41.43.2-3)

A close associate of Cato he served Pompeius in the civil war (Caes. BC 3.36) and then retired perhaps unpardoned by Caesar. He joined Brutus after the conspiracy (Plut. Brut. 34.2-4) and was put to death at Philippi (Suet. Aug. 13.2). On his novitas see Wiseman, New Men, no. 173.

P-W VI, 2074, Münzer.

18. C. FLAVIUS (11) HEMIC ...(?)

Senator

Legatus propraetore 43-42 (Crawford RRC 516)

Plutarch (Brut. 51.1) believes him to be Brutus' chief of engineers, but according to his coins he was a legatus pro praetore. He tried unsuccessfully to persuade Atticus to contribute funds to the Liberators' cause (Cic. Ad Brut. 1.6.4; SB 12 17.3; SB 26 Nepos Atticus 8,1). On
his coins and cognomen see Crawford R.R.C 516 no. 504 and note 1.

P-W VI, 2526, Münzer.

19. L. GELLIUS (18) POPLICOLA

Quaestor propraetore 41 (Crawford RRC 525)
Consul 36 (Dio 49.1,1)
Legatus 31 (Vell. 2.85,2)

Son of the Pompeian general and half-brother to Messalla he was with Brutus in Macedonia. He tried to murder Brutus but was detected (Dio 47.24,3). He became a partisan of Antonius and probably died at Actium. Almost certainly Catullus' Gellius in poems 88-91.

P-W VII, 1003, Münzer.

20. Q. HORATIUS (10) FLACCUS

Eques
Military Tribune 43-42 (Suet. Vit. Hor. 1)
A military tribune of Brutus at Philippi, he was pardoned after the battle. He became a scriba quaestorius in Rome and in about 38 his poetry brought him to the attention of Maecenas. He eventually received Augustus' patronage.

P-W VIII, 2336, Stemplinger.

21. Q. HORTENSIUS (B) HORTALUS

Senator

Legatus/Praefectus Classis 49 (Suet. Jul. 31.1)
( Appian BG 2.47)

Praetor (?) 45 (Cic. Phil 10.26)

Proconsul Macedonia 44-43 (ibid.)

A Caesarian during the civil war he was in charge of Caesar's Parthian legions in Macedonia. Instead of stepping down to his successor, C. Antonius, in 43, he joined his relative Brutus, captured Antonius and later executed him. (Cic. Phil. 10.12,13,24,26; Plut. Brut. 25.2;
Dio 47.21.4). After Philippi Antony had him executed (Vell. 2.71.2).

G. V. Sumner Phoenix 25 (1971) 358; P-W VIII, 2468, Münzer.

22. Q. LABIENUS (5)

Senator's Son

Legatus 42 (Vell. 2.78,1)

He was sent by Brutus to solicit aid from the Parthians, and after Philippi led them against Antonius. He continued to raid Syria and Asia Minor until he was defeated and killed in 39 by Ventidius (Vell. 2.78.1; Dio 48.19.4, 39.3, 49.19ff).

P-W XII, 258, Münzer.

23. M. LICINIUS (110) LUCULLUS

Senator's Son

The son of Lucullus Ponticus and a cousin of Brutus, he was with him shortly before he left Italy (Cic. Ad Att. 16.1,1;
SB 409), and fought at Philippi (Vell. 2.71.2).

P-W XII, 418, Miltner.

24. P. LICINIUS (not in P-W)

Senator

Proquaestor Cyrene 43 (Grant, Imperium 35)

Otherwise unknown, his coins show his proquaestorship under Brutus and Cassius.

25. M. LIVIUS (19) DRUSUS CLAUDIANUS

Senator

Praetor 50 (Cic. Ad Fam. 8.14,4; SB 97)

Father of Octavianus' wife Livia, he was among the dead at Philippi (Vell. 2.72.2).

P-W XIII, 881, Münzer.
26. L. LIVIUS (25) OCELLA

Senator

Praetor late republic (Plut. Brut. 35)

Manuscript readings suggest that Ocella is to be identified with 1.) the L. Cella pardoned by Caesar at Utica (Br. Afr. 89.1); 2.) the L. Pella, an associate of Cassius at Sardis (Plut. Brut. 35); and 3.) the L. Iulius Mocilla whom Atticus sheltered after Philippi (Nepos Att. 11.2).

C. Cichorius Römische Studien 253-7; Broughton, MRR Vol. II, 464, suppl. 36; and P-W XIII, 887, Münzer.

27. M. LOLLIUS (11)

Senator

Legatus (?) 43-42 (Appian BC 4.49)

Proconsul Galatia and Pamphylia 25 (Vell. 2.97,1)

Consul 21 (Dio 54.6,1)

Proconsul Macedonia 17-18 (Dio 54.20,3)

Proconsul Gallia Comata 17-16 (Dio 54.20,4)
After being proscribed, he was in some sort of military capacity under Brutus. Appian writes that after Philippi he was sold as a slave. He later became consul along with his former master (Appian 4.49). As a member of Octavianus' inner circle he played an important role in imperial affairs until he was disgraced in 2 AD.

Syme, RR 362, 429; P-W XIII, 1377, Groag;
PIR V, 311.

28. A. MANLIUS (72) TORQUATUS

Senator
Quaestor 43 (?)

An A. Torquatus was sheltered after the war by Atticus (Nepos Att. 11.2; 15.3) and this could very well be the quaestor of the same name who fought with Pansa against Antony (Cic. Ad Brut. 14 (1.6); SB 12; Appian 3.75). If this is so he is the only recorded person to fight for the senate in Italy, escape to Greece and then fight for the Liberators in Greece, something which is not impossible. He could also be the Torquatus whom Horace addresses in a couple of poems (Ep. I 5.3; Carm. IV 7.23).

29. Q. MARCIUS (52) CRISPUS

Senator by 58 (Cic. Piso 88)

Aedile

Legatus Macedonia 57-55 (ibid.)

Praetor between 54-46

Proconsul Bithynia and Pontus 45 (Cic. Phil. 11.30)

Consul Suffectus (?) 36 (Fast. Cap. Degrassi 31.)

A Caesarian partisan he brought his legions to Staius Murcus for the siege against Caecilius Bassus and then gave them to Cassius (Cic. Phil. 9.30; Ad Fam. 12.11.1; Vell. 2.69.2; Appian BC 3.77, 4.58). Although Cassius says that Marcius Crispus gave himself and his troops over to his authority, Dio writes that immediately after the death of Dolabella he retired (47.28.4). He may be the mysterious consul Marcius of 36. On the confusion concerning his magistracies see Broughton MRR suppl. 39.


30. SEX. MARIUS (27)

Senator (?)
Legatus 43 (Cic. Ad Fam. 12.15.3; SB 406)

One of Dolabella’s officers who deserted to Lentulus Spinther’s fleet.

P-W XIV, 1820, Münzer.

31. L. MINUCIUS (38) BASILUS

Senator Novus Homono

Praetor 45 (Dio 43.47.5)

Legatus 44-43 (Cic. Ad Brut. 1.6.3; SB 12)

Assassin: originally M. Satrius (Cic. de Off. 3.74), by which name Brutus refers to him. A disgruntled partisan of Caesar’s, he became Trebonius’ legate after the Ides of March and continued his service under Brutus (Caes. BG 7.90.5; Dio 43.47.5; Appian BC 3.113). After Philippi he was murdered by his slaves (Appian BC 3.98.409). R. Syme, “Senators, Tribes and Towns” Hist. 13 (1964) 121-2, argues persuasively for the identification of Basilus with Satrius. Shackleton Bailey Two Studies 53f denies this. On
his novitas see Wiseman, New Men, no. 379.

G. V. Sumner, Phoenix, 25 (1971) 358; P-W XV, 1948, Münzer.

32. PACUVIUS (ANTISTIUS 35) LABEO

Senator Novus Homo

Legatus Greece 42 (Plut. Brut. 51)

Assassin; little is known about Pacuvius except his role as a conspirator and later legate of Brutus. After Philippi he had a slave kill him (Appian BC 4.135). E. Badian "The Attempt to Try Caesar," Polis and Imperium: Studies in Honour of E.T. Salmon 152 attempts an identification. He is mistakenly named Antistius in confusion with his son's adoption see SB Two Studies 11. On his novitas see Wiseman, New Men, no. 32.

P-W I, 2558, Klebs.

33. Q. PATISCUS/PATISIUS (1)

Senator Novus Homo

Legatus 48 (?) (B. Alex. 34.5)
Proquaestor Asia 43 (Cic. Ad Fam. 12.15; SB 406)

An envoy of Caesar’s to Cilicia he is probably to be identified with the officer of Trebonius and Lentulus Spinther as well as the businessman who dealt in panthers in Cilicia in the 50s (Cic. Ad Fam. 8.9.3; SB 82). On his novitas see Wiseman New Men no. 310.

Shackleton Bailey, Epistulae ad Familiares Vol.1, 395; P-W XVIII, 2170, Münzer.

34. PEDANIUS (2) COSTA

Senator Novus Homo

Legatus 43-42 (Crawford RRC 517)

Otherwise unknown, his coins identify him as Brutus’ legate.

Cichorius Römische Studien 174f; P-W XIX, 19, Münzer.

35. L. PLAETORIUS (15) CESTIANUS

Senator

Quaestor (Proquaestor ?) 42 (Crawford, RRC 518)
Known only from his coins.

P-W XX, 1950, Münzer.

36. POMPEIUS (50) (VARUS ?)

Eques (?)

Horace's friend, he fought at Philippi (Ode 2.7).

P-W XXI, 2262, Kiessling-Heinze.

37. M. PORCICUS (13) CATO

Senator's son

Legatus 43-42 (Plut. Cat., Min. 73)

Son of Cato Uticensis, he was envoy to Cappadocia of Brutus and Cassius and later died at Philippi (Vell. 2.71.2; Plut. Brut. 49.5; Appian BC 4.135).

P-W XXII, 166, Miltner.
38. SEX. QUINCTILIUS (8,17) VARUS

Patrician Senator
Quaestor 49 (Caes. BC 1.23,2)
Praetor 44 (?)

Although little is known about him, he fought for Pompeius in the previous civil war and was probably pardoned by Caesar. He fought at Philippi (VeII. 2.71.2).

Broughton, M.R.R. suppl. 52; P-W XXIV, 902, 905, Gundel.

39. L. (QUINCTILIUS 11) VARUS

Senator (?)
Legatus 42 (Appian BC 4.74).

Otherwise unknown Cassius left him in charge of a garrison at Rhodes.

R. Syme "Missing Persons," Hist. 5 (1956) 208, Broughton, MRR Suppl. 52; P-W XXIV, 905, Gundel.
40. Q. SERVILIUS CAEPIO BRUTUS [M. IUNIUS (53) BRUTUS]

Senator
Quaestor Cilicia 53 (Auct. Vir. Ill. 82.3-4)

Legatus 49-48 (Plut. Brut. 4.2)
Legatus propraetore Cisalpine Gaul 46-45 (Cic. Ad Fam. 6.6,10 SB; 234)

Praetor Urbanus 44 (Cic. Ad Fam. 7.21; SB 145)

Proconsul Macedonia and East 43-42 (Cic. Phil. 10.25-26)
Consul Designatus 41 (Cic. Ad Fam. 12.2,2; SB 344)

The nephew of Cato accompanied him to Cyprus and his father-in-law A. Claudius Pulcher to Cilicia. In the civil war Brutus sided with Pompeius but was pardoned by Caesar. Under him Brutus served as governor of Gaul in 46-45 and praetor in 44. At this time he formed a conspiracy against Caesar with Cassius. After the Ides of March he and Cassius were eventually forced to flee Italy. Brutus went to Greece, and raised an army and funds for the forthcoming war. After his defeat at Philippi he committed suicide.

G. V. Sumner Phoenix, 25, (1971) 365-366;
M. L. Clarke, The Noblest Roman; Max Radin Marcus Brutus; F-W X, 973, Gelzer.
41. (C.) SERVILIUS (52) CASCA

Senator
Tribune (?) 44 (Dio 44.52.2)

Assassin; he fought at Philippi along with his brother (Dio 44.52.2; Cic. Phil. 2.27; Anth. Lat. 457). On the possible confusion between him and another Casca who was tribune in 44 see Broughton M.R.R. suppl. 578.

P-W A, II, 1788, Münzer.

42. P. SERVILIUS (53) CASCA LONGUS

Senator
Tribune 43 (Cic. Ad Att. 16.15)
Legatus 42 (Crawford, RRC 517)

Assassin: forced to leave when Octavian marched on Rome (Dio 46.49.1), he became an officer of Brutus' fleet (Plut. Brut. 45.5-6). He fought at Philippi (Anth. Lat. 457).

Broughton M.R.R. suppl. 58; P-W A, II, 1788, Münzer.
43. M. SERVILIUS (21)

Senator

Tribune 44 (Cic. Phil. 4.16)

Legatus 43-42 (Crawford, RRC 516)

Having made a proposal in favor of Cassius' command against Dolabella (Cic. Ad Fam. 12.7.1; SB 367), he later served Brutus as a legate.

P-W II, A, 1766, Münzer.

44. L. SESTIUS (3) QUIRINUS

Senator

Quaestor 44 (Appian BC 4.51)

Proquaestor Macedonia 43 (ibid.)

Consul Suffectus 23 (Dio 53.32,4)

He raised a fleet for Brutus and Cassius (Cic. Ad Att. 16.4.4; SB 411, Crawford R.R.G. 515 no. 502) and followed him to Greece. He later became consul suffect under Augustus. Perhaps the Sestius of Horace Ode I.4.

Broughton M.R.R. supplement 59; P-W II, A, 1685, Münzer.
45. L. SEXTILIUS (24 Cf. 23) RUFUS

Eques
Praefectus Classis

He commanded the fleet of Cassius against Dolabella and occupied Tarsus for him (Dio 47.31.3).

P-W II, A, 2037, Münzer.

46. L. STAIUS (2) MURCUS

Senator Novus Homo
Legatus
Praetor
Proconsul Syria
Legatus

Formerly a partisan of Caesar he became a proconsul of Syria and besieged Caecilius Bassus with Marcius Crispus (Cic. Ad Fam. 12.11.1, SB 249; Vell. 2.69.2; Appian BC 3.77; Dio 47.27,5).

He then became an admiral and helped defeat Dolabella (Dio 47.30.4). Under Brutus he blockaded the triumvirs (Appian BC 4.115, 5.8; Plut. Ant. 47.2-3), and continued to harass
them after Philippi (Vell. 2.72.4; Appian 5.2; Dio 47.18.3-4). Later he joined Sextus Pompey who put him to death in 39 (Appian 5.50, 70). On his novitas see Wiseman, New Men, no. 411.


47. Statilius (2)

Senator Novus Homo

A follower of Cato Uticensis, he was with Brutus at Philippi (Plut. Cat. Min. 65,4; 66,3; 73,3; Brut. 12,2; 51,3). For his Epicureanism see A. Momigliano, review of B. Farrington, Science and Politics in the Ancient World, JRS 31 (1941) 149-157. On his novitas see Wiseman New Men no. 412.

P-W III, A, 2184, Münzer.

48. M. TERENTIUS (89) VARRO GIBBA

Senator
Quaestor Cisalpine Gaul 46 (Cic. Ad Fam. 13.10)
Tribune 43 (Dio 47.11,3)
Having served Brutus in Cisalpine Gaul he joined him in Greece (Vell. 2.71.2) when he was proscribed.

P-W V, A, 704, Münzer.

49. L. TILLIUS (5) CIMBER

Senator Novus Homo
Praetor 45 (?)
Proconsul Bithynia and Pontus 44–43 (Appian BC 3.2)
Legatus 42 (Appian BC 4.102)

Assassin; formerly a partisan of Caesar, he succeeded Marcius Crispus in Bithynia and Pontus, and raised men, money and a fleet for Brutus (Appian BC 3.6; Cic. Ad Fam. 12. 13.3; SB 259). He sent a fleet against Dolabella and marched against him in Asia (Cic. Ad Fam. 12.13.3; SB 259; Cic. Ad Brut. 1.6.3; Dio 47.31.1-2). He then joined Brutus at Philippi (Appian 4.102-5). On his novitas see Wiseman, New Men, no. 430.

50. C. TITIUS (9)

Legatus 43 (Cic. Ad Fam. 12.15.5; SB 406)

One of Dolabella's legates who deserted to the fleet of P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther.

P-W VI, A, 1556, Münzer

51. C. TREBONIUS (6)

Senator Novus Homo (Cic. Phil. 3.23)

Quaestor 60 (?) (Cic. Ad Fam. 15.21.2; SB 364)

Tribune 55 (Plut. Cat. Min. 43)

Legatus Gaul 54-49 (Caes. BG 5.17,2)

Praetor 48 (Caes. BG 3.20,1)

Proconsul Hispania Ulterior 47-45 (B. Alex. 64.2)

Consul Suffectus 45 (Dio 43.46,2)

(Oct. 1)

Proconsul Asia 44-43 (Appian BC 3.2)

Assassin; formerly a legate of Caesar, he made his way to the province of Asia after the Ides of March, and there aided Brutus and Cassius (Cic. Ad Att. 14.10.1; SB 364 Ad)
While trying to contain Dolabella he was captured and executed (Cic. Phil. 11 passim; 12.21, 25; 13.22, 36-9, 14.8; Ad Brut. 2.3.1, 5; SB 3; Appian 3.26, 61; Dio 47.29; Vell. 2.69. 1; Josephus AJ 14. 225). On his novitas see Wiseman, New Man, no.444.

P-W VI, A, 2274, Münzer

52. M. TULLIUS (30) CICERO

Praefectus Equitum 49-48 (Cic. de Off. 2.45)
Legatus 43-42 (Plut. Brut. 26.2)
Consul Suffectus 30 (Appian BC 4.51)
(from Nov. 1)
Proconsul Asia 27-25
Proconsul Syria ? (Appian BC 4.51)

Interrupting his studies in Athens to join Brutus he became an effective cavalry commander (Plut. Cic. 45.2; Brut. 24.2; Appian BC 4.20; Cic. Ad Brut. 1.5; SB 9). He was proscribed (Appian 4.19, 20) and after Philippi joined Cassius Parmensis, Murcus and Domitius Ahenobarbus (Appian BC 4.2). He escaped to Sex. Pompeius but later became allied with Octavianus after the amnesty of 39. He became consul suffect in 30.

P-W VII, A, 1281, Hanslik.
53. D. TURULLIUS (1))

Senator Novus Homo
Quaestor 44 (Cic. Ad Fam. 12.13.3 SB 419)
Proquaestor (?) 43 (ibid.)
Praefectus Classis 42 (Appian BC 5.2)
Praefectus 32-31 (Val Max. 1.1,19)

Assassin; he was a quaestor of Tillius Cimber and fought against Dolabella. After Philippi he fled with Cassius Parmensis, and joined Antonius but was executed by Octavianus after the battle of Actium (Dio 51.8.2). For his novitas generis see Wiseman, New Men, no. 450.

Broughton, M.R.R. supplement 64; P-W VII, A, 1451, Goessler.

54. M. VALERIUS (261) MESSALLA CORVINUS

Senator Patrician
Legatus 43-42 (Vell. 2.71,1)
Praetor Suffectus 40 (Josephus AJ 14.384)
Praefectus Classis 36 (Appian BC 5.102)
Consul Suffectus 31 (Tac. Ann. 13.34, 1)
(until May 1)
He followed Brutus to the east (Cic. Ad Brut. 1.12.1; SB 21; 1.15.1; SB 23) and was proscribed but was quickly removed from the list (App 4.38, 5.113; Dio 47.11.4-5, 49.16.1). Velleius says he was in auctoritas next to Brutus and Cassius at Philippi (2.71.1) and commanded Brutus' left wing but refused to lead the survivors and joined Antony (Appian 4.38, 136, 5.113). He later (after 36) became allied with Octavianus and became very prominent during the Augustan age, as an orator and patron to a literary circle. In 4 BC he proposed the title Pater Patriae for Augustus (Suet. Aug. 58.2).

P-W VIII, a, 131 Hanslik.

55. C. VELLEIUS (2) (PATERCULUS)

Eques
Praefectus Fabrum 40 (Vell. 2.76,1)

He served under Pompeius and Brutus, probably as an engineer. For his novitas see Wiseman, New Men, no. 472.

P-W VIII, A, 637, Dihle.
56. C. (or T.) VOLUMNIUS (9)

Eques

Killed by Antony at Philippi, he was a friend of M. Lucullus (Val. Max. IV.VII, 4).

P-W IX, A, 876, Gundel

57. P. VOLUMNIUS (2)

Eques

A philosopher and historian who accompanied Brutus east and was with him at his suicide at Philippi. He wrote a biography of Brutus (Plut. Brut. 43, 51) and was perhaps the man who was later sheltered by Atticus (Nepos Att. 9,10), if he was not Volumnius Flaccus. It seems unlikely that he can be identified with Flaccus who was an envoy of D. Brutus in Gaul (Cic Ad. Fam. 11.18,1; SB 397) or Volumnius Euterpulus as Wiseman suggests (New Men no.507).

P-W IX, A, 1, 876, Gundel.
B. LIKELY SUPPORTERS OF BRUTUS

This lists those who probably were with Brutus but information about their involvement remains unclear.

58. A. ALIENUS

Senator Novus Homo

Legatus 61-59 (Cic. Ad Q.f. 1.1.10 SB 1)

Tribune 55 (?) (Lachmann, Römische Feldmesser 1.263)

Praetor 49 (Cic. Ad Att. 10.15,3; SB 207)

Proconsul Sicily 48-46 (B. Afr. 34)

Legatus 43 (Cic. Phil. 11.30)

A partisan of Caesar, he was a legate of Dolabella and was sent to Egypt to procure three legions. On his way back he met Cassius and these legions were taken from him (Cic. Ad Fam. 12.11,1; SB 366; 12.12,1; SB 387; Appian BC 3.78; 4.59-61). He may have joined the campaign but no mention of him
is made afterwards. On his novitas see Wiseman New Men no. 21.

P-W I, 1585, Klebs.

59. CAECILIUS (1) BUCILIANUS

Senator

Along with his brother he participated in the assassination of Caesar (Appian 2.114). Later, he aided Brutus in preparing a fleet in Campania (Cic Ad. Att. 16.2,4; SB 411). Whether he followed Brutus to Greece is unknown.

P-W III, 986, Klebs

60. Q. GELLIUS (15) CANUS

Eques (?)

Sheltered by Atticus after the proscriptions (Nepos Att. 10), there is no evidence to confirm he was at Philippi but may have been part of the group along with Ocella and Volumnius to which Atticus gave aid after the battle. He may also have been the same man who betrothed his daughter to
Cicero's nephew (Cic. *Ad Att.* 15.21; SB 398), and was the brother to L. Gellius Poplicola. See Shackleton Bailey *Letters to Atticus* Vol. II, p. 174.

P-W VII, 1001, Münzer.
APPENDIX ONE: PLUTARCH’S BRUTUS

In a prosopographical study of a group of men it is crucial to determine their motives which made them different from other individuals. The emphasis of this work is on the composition and workings of Brutus’ supporters. But it is also important to evaluate their leader. Without an accurate estimation of the reasons which encouraged Brutus in the course of his political life, a study of his followers would be deceptive. The problem is recognizing that Plutarch, one of the main sources of information about him, is highly biased and to interpret what Plutarch is trying to achieve.

Plutarch’s account was written almost a century and a half after Philippi. Plutarch is not primarily concerned with historical accuracy but is content to instruct his readers by illustrations of noble characters. Moreover, by the time Plutarch came to write about Brutus, the reputation of the Tyrannicide had grown to be a symbol for those opposed to imperial rule. In Plutarch’s time men exhibited, albeit privately, busts of Brutus and Cassius and celebrated them in verse.¹ Plutarch’s work had a wide appeal and his portrayal of the philosopher
in action is all too familiar. A modern biographer speaks of Brutus’ virtus as a philosophically tempered trait which shaped his life. Conversely, in view of the history of the late Republic, Brutus can be comfortably seen as one of a number of Roman oligarchs who, frustrated in his attempts to acquire his proper status, rebelled against the existing government and was forced to defend themselves by arms. If the historical Brutus is retrievable, his motives for murdering Caesar and participating in the armed conflict that followed must be recognized and understood.

Plutarch relates the life of a philosophically-minded Roman who resists an easy servitude under a tyrant and, making good his own spiritual beliefs, slays him. Quiet, contemplative and scholarly, Brutus had a reputation as a young man for virtue and fairmindedness, a reputation which foreshadows his future activities. The man portrayed is not to be tarnished. Plutarch illustrates his subject by contrasting him with Cassius, who had petty or private reasons for murdering Caesar. Brutus neither gave any thought to personal gain nor to his relationship as a beneficiary of Caesar’s; a tyrant was harming the state, Brutus would therefore remove him without malice. The conspirators wished that Antonius should also be made a target of the plot but Brutus insisted that they only murder the tyrant; Antonius would see the nobility of the
enterprise (18). Brutus' humanity is illustrated later when he treats the cities of Asia Minor with compassion while seeking funds for his campaign, and grieves when destruction befalls the city of Xanthus (31-32). In the end however, fate had decreed that Rome would be ruled by one man and Brutus' campaign was ultimately doomed to failure (47). In the preface to his Life of Dion, with whom the Brutus is paired in the collection, Plutarch states that for a noble soul to succeed, wisdom and justice must be paired with power and good fortune. Brutus lacked the latter quality to achieve his goals.

Brutus and Dion are attractive personalities for Plutarch to chronicle. Unlike most of his figures in the Lives, Plutarch has two men whose characters were enriched by the philosophy of Plato; Dion at first hand, and Brutus by devoted study. As Plutarch’s purpose is to teach virtue by example, these two men should be presented as paragons. In his account Plutarch explicitly states that the Academy was the driving force in Brutus' life.3

The Brutus of Cicero’s letters is a different man. Brutus was haughty and curt with Cicero, and the social relationship between the venerable old novus hom and the young aristocrat is immediately clear. As with his other friends among the nobiles, Cicero wished to please and be friends with Brutus but he was plainly irritated at having to compromise himself for the other’s financial interests.4
Although Plutarch had access to Cicero's letters, he does not mention the notorious incident with the Salaminians in Cyprus. Brutus had asked Cicero in his capacity as proconsul of Cilicia to look into the matter of one of his associates, Scaptius, who had given a loan to the city and was having trouble collecting the interest. When Cicero did look into the matter he was surprised to learn that the interest rate was 48% and Scaptius had tried to extort the money by besieging the city fathers in their curia and starving five of them to death. Further, Cicero eventually found out that Brutus was not acting on behalf of Scaptius but had loaned the money himself and set the conditions for it. Although the senate had limited interest rates to 12%, Brutus, through his influence had procured two senatorial decrees exempting himself from the provisions of the earlier law. "The whole business stank of corruption."

Similar philosophical interests brought Brutus and Cicero together through Atticus. They dedicated treatises to each other on philosophy as well as being students of oratory. How large an influence philosophy played in Brutus' life is impossible to answer. Romans took up philosophy as a pastime and kept philosophers in their households along with poets, historians and, it may be said, prize horses and hounds. Stoicism was compatible with traditional Roman *bonae artes* but a casual adherent
could pick and choose concepts as he wished. An Epicurean like Atticus could keep to his doctrine and shun public life, while another such as Julius Caesar could disregard dogma completely and still have a reputation as being an Epicurean. But when political crises threatened, philosophical played a small role in Roman affairs.

The discrepancies between M. Junius Brutus and Plutarch's portrayal of him are wide but understandable. Plutarch inherited a history of Brutus' achievements which had grown more splendid and noble as the years went by. Brutus' memory was cherished by those who lived in an oppressive political atmosphere, and idealized events and men who tried to save the res publica. Brutus is given lofty reasons for murdering Caesar and taking control of the Eastern Mediterranean and Plutarch's characterization is the product of a Greek philosopher after one hundred years of imperial rule.

That being said, Brutus becomes more easily understood in the context of the society of his time. The reasons behind his actions lay in the history of the late Republic. Like his associates in his later career, Brutus tried to rely on the traditional family values while he pursued his career. But since he lived in a time when life or death depended on one's politics, his life became complicated. His break with Cato in 47, his assassination of Caesar, and the civil war he subsequently waged, are all
cogent to a Roman's values; political survival and, if possible, political ascendency. His philosophy and his patriotism could legitimize his cause, but Brutus was only trying to regain his traditional place in society. Plutarch, as said, would have Brutus assassinating Caesar on purely moral grounds, to bring Libertas back to the Republic. But for Brutus and his associates 'freedom from tyranny' only meant the traditional dominance of a tiny minority over the peoples of the Mediterranean basin. As G. E. M. de Ste. Croix shows, the Roman aristocracy thrived not on philosophy but on peace, prosperity, position, patronage, and power. Because Brutus was denied the last privilege, he simply acted in the only way he thought possible to retrieve it. The loss of Libertas was merely "something that corrupted the free essence of oligarchic political life." Further, when Caesar was dead, Brutus held an extraordinary command and displayed his image on his coins - both in imitation of Caesar. Perhaps if Brutus had been victorious at Philippi he would have found, like Dion, that power was too irresistible to lay down.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANRW</td>
<td>Aufstieg und Niedergang Der Römischen Welt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>Ancient Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascon. 1 C.</td>
<td>O. Asconius Pedini Dratorum Ciceronis Quinque Enarratio ed. A.C. Clark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJP</td>
<td>American Journal of Philology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broughton, MRR</td>
<td>T. R. S. Broughton, Magistrates of the Roman Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAH</td>
<td>Cambridge Ancient History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJ</td>
<td>Classical Journal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPh</td>
<td>Classical Philology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CQ</td>
<td>Classical Quarterly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CW</td>
<td>Classical World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast. Cap.</td>
<td>Degrassi, Fasti Capitolini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant, Imperium</td>
<td>M. Grant, From Imperium to Auctoritas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSPhs</td>
<td>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hist.</td>
<td>Historia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

150
JRS

Gruen, LGRR

E.S. Gruen The Last Generation of the Roman Republic

LCM

Liverpool Classical Monthly

MH

Museum Heviticum

Taylor, PP

L. R. Taylor, Party Politics in the Age of Caesar

P-W

Pauly-Wissowa Real Encyclopédie Classischen

Münzer, Röm. Adels.

F. Münzer, Römische Adelsparteien

Rhein. Mus.

Rheinisches Museum

Syme, RR

R. Syme, The Roman Revolution

Crawford, RRC

M. Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage

SB

D.R. Shackleton Bailey's commentary on Cicero's letters

Two Studies

Shackleton Bailey, Two Studies in Roman Nomenclature

TAPA

Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association

Wiseman, New Men

T.P. Wiseman, New Men in the Roman Senate

1) For discussions on the fall of the Republic see R. Syme RR 1-9; id., "A Roman Post-Mortem; An Inquest on the Fall of the Republic," The Todd Memorial Lecture no.3 (Sydney, 1950), (Reprinted in Roman Papers I, 205), E.S. Gruen LRRR 498-507.


3) Brutus’ father; Plut. Brut. 4.1-2; Pomp. 16,2-5. Brutus said he would not tolerate the tyranny of his own father if he had lived (Cic. Ad Brut. 24.5 or 1.16 [SB 25]).

4) A cautious warning about stringent separations of families into political parties is given by T.P. Wiseman, "Factions and Family Trees" Liverpool Classical Monthly 1, (1976) 1-3.

5) The association of these men; Syme RR 21, Taylor PP 119-132, Gruen, LGRR 49-52. Briggs Twyman in "The Metelli, Pompeius and Prosopography" ANRW I, 1, 816-874, argues that Lucullus was a close member of a Claudio-Metellan factio until his recall from the east. The
question of whether the Metelli were allied with Catulus, Hortensius and the Luculli or with Pompeius is
highly controversial. Syme RR 26, sees relations between
Pompeius and the Metelli gradually diminishing through the
years. B. Twyman (above) believes that Pompeius' alliance
with the Metelli was pivotal for his rise to power, and
includes the Luculli in the factio. This in particular is
vigorously rebuffed by R. Seager Pompey: A Political
Biography 1979, 19 note 54, but no counter-argument is
offered. On the other side of the argument, T.P. Wiseman in
"Factions and Family Trees" L.C.M 1 (1976) emphasizes the
existence of Catonian-Metellan relations and B.A. Marshall,
"O. Cicero, Hortensius and the Lex Aurelia" Rheinisches
Museum 68 (1975) 140-142, apparently unaware of
Pompeius' marriage to Mucia, makes a case for the
Metelli (including Lucullus) siding with Catulus and
Hortensius against Pompeius. Concentration on some and
not other connections, political activities and trials
can lead to varied results, a hazard not always avoided
in prosopography.

6) See stemma p.12 for the interrelationships of these
men. For additional discussion on this clan; Münzer Röm.
Adels, 328-347, Gruen LGRR 52-53. For a view of the the
role of women and marriage in this family; J.P. Hallett,
Fathers and Daughters in Roman Society 49-52, 57-59, 157-
158. Brutus' adoptive father note 1 chapter two. The name of
Catulus' wife is not preserved. From Catiline's letter to
him it is known that he had children (Sall. Cat. 35.6). No sons are recorded but see P-W XIII, 2096, Münzer,
"Lutatius" (25). On the piscinarii Cic. Ad Att. 1 19, 6
(SB 19) and also M. Jaczynowska, "The Economic
Differentiation of the Roman Nobility at the End of the
Republic," Hist., 11, (1962), 486-499. It is notable
that Marcius Philippus was included among the piscinarii
(Macrob. 3.15.6) but had no relations with the other men.
Cicero, of course, is speaking of these men in relation to
their luxuriousness, not their politics.

7) Pompeius' return and his triumph; Vell. 2,30;
Cic. leg. Man. 62; Plut. Pomp. 21; Crassus; Liv. Per. 97 and
also R. Seager Pompey: A Political Biography 1979, 23.

8) The restoration of the tribunate; Cic. 2Ver
5.163, Vell. 2.30.4; Plut. Pomp. 22. The lex Aurelia; Cic.
2Verr. 2.174-5f., 3.223f., 5.177f. Catulus' comments; Cic.
Verr. 1.144. The trial of Verres also took place in 70.
L. R. Taylor, PP 102f. and E. Badian Foreign Clientelae
believe that the Metelli, Pompeius and Hortensius united to defend him. Catulus was one of the jurors.

9) The activities of the tribunes and the reaction; Cic. Verr. 2.1.155-156; Ps. Ascon. 255 Stangl; Plut. Luc. 5.4; Cic. Pro C.fluent. 110, 136; Ps. Ascon. 189 Stangl; Sall. Hist. 3.48.11, 23; Asc. 79, C. On the question of whether the renewal of the tribunate was not harmful to Pompeius’ enemies see Gruen LGRR 26-27.

10) The command against Sertorius; Plut. Pomp. 17.1-4; Appian B. Civ. 1.108; Cic. leg. Man. 30, 62; Phil. 11.19.

11) RR 29.


15) The proposal of Gabinius and the reaction to it; Plut. Pomp. 25-27, Cic. leg. Man. 51; Dio 36.24,3-4, 30.1-2, 37.2-3. The importance of the tribunate in regard to Pompeius’ rise to power in spite of the efforts of Catulus and Hortensius; D. Stockton "The First Consulship of Pompey" Hist. 22 1973 212ff. When Catulus asked the populace who they would have take Pompeius’ place,
should he be killed, they answered with a resounding "You"; Plut. Pomp. 25.3. Two tribunes, P. Servilius Globulus and L. Trebellius tried to block the legislation of Gabinius. Trebellius exercised his veto, but, in the fashion of Ti. Gracchus, Gabinius attempted to have Trebellius expelled from office, by a vote in the tribal assembly. Trebellius withdrew his motion before he was ejected (Cic. Corn. 1, fr.30; Asc. 72 C.; Dio 36.24.4, 30.1-2.)

16) The Manilian law; Cic. leg. Man. passim; Plut. Pomp. 30; Luc. 35, 7; Appian Mith. 97; Dio 36.42-44. The loss of Lucullus' provincia Dio 36.2.2 (Asia and Cilicia) and Cic. leg. Man. 5, 26 (Bithynia and Pontus). The opposition of Catulus and Hortensius Cic. leg. Man. 51-61.

17) Clodius in the East; Plut. Luc 34.1-2; Dio 36.14.3-4, 17.2; Appian, Mith. 87

18) Lucullus' financial aid to Pompeius; Plut. Luc. 37.4. Lucullus as a member of the Claudio-Metellan factio; note 5 above. Pompeius rejection of the enactments of the Luculli; Plut. Pomp. 31, 38.1; Luc. 36; Dio 36.43.2, 46.1-2. Memmius and the Luculli; Plut. Luc. 37, Cat. Min. 29.3. Pompeius had some ties with the Memmii as his sister married another C. Memmius (Plut. Pomp. 11). Lucullus' divorce; Plut. Luc. 38. The trial of Cornelius; Asc. 58-61 C. and G.V. Sumner, "Manius or Marmecus?" JRS 54, (1964) 41-48 who believes the M. Lepidus of Asc. 60 C. to be Mam. Livianus.

19) Caesar's early attachment to Pompeius; M. Gelzer, Caesar: Politician And Statesman trans. by P. Needham, 34 and Gruen LGR 75-81.

20) J.P.V.D. Balsdon labels Cato a prig, Julius Caesar and Rome (1967) 64. Cato's approval of bribery to get Bibulus elected consul; Suet. Jul. 8.4, Plut. Cat. Min. 26.1. These allegations may have their roots in the anti-Catonic literature promoted by Caesar in the middle 40s. His fight with Nepos Plut. Cat. Min. 26-29. His aid to Bibulus and Domitius Plut. Cat. Min. 22, 23. The threats to have Cato sent to prison; Plut. Cat. Min. 41, 43 and for his year as praetor; Plut. Cat. Min. 44. Cato as an innovator during his magistracies; A. Dragstedt, Cato's Politeuma", Apollo 3 (1969) 71-72. His programme for limiting corruption consisted of his reorganization of the treasury during his quaestorship, including the prosecution of one
of his clerks (Plut. Cat. Min. 16-18), as praetor, holding deposits of tribunial candidates, to be forfeited in case of improper conduct (Ad Att. 5 15.7 [SB 108], Plut. Cat. Min. 44.2-7) and discovering that Favonius was nearly the victim of forged election ballots (Plut. Cat. Min. 46).

21) Cicero describes Domitius as "qui tot annos, quot habet, designatus consul fuerit" (Ad Att. 4, 8a, 2; SB 82). In 70 he calls Domitius "princeps iuventutis" (In Verr 2, 1, 139). The activities and death of his brother; Plut. Pomp. 11-12, Sall. Ad Caesarem 1,4,1, Val. Max. 6,2,8. Domitius’ brother Onaeus and Caesar both married daughters of Cinna; Münzer, Röm. Adels. 330. Domitius and his relations with Gallia Narbonensis; Syme R.R 444 n.4. Domitius’ scandal during his consulship; Cic. Ad Att. 4 17,2 (SB 91) and his action early in the civil war; A. Burns “Pompey’s Strategy and Domitius Stand at Corfinium" Hist. 15, (1966) 74-95.


25) The intrigues of Catulus and Piso; Sall. Cat. 49, also L.R. Taylor, “The Election of the Pontifex Maximus in the Late Republic" C.Ph. 37, (1942), 421-424. The mob’s attack on Caesar; Plut. Caes. 8, Suet. Jul. 4. Catulus’ first motion; Plut. Cic. 21,3, Caes. 6,1, Cic. Ad Att. 12,21,1 (SB 260). For Lucullus handing the leadership to Cato; Plut. Luc. 42.3-6.

26) Cato’s actions and the events of that meeting; Plut. Cat. Min. 26-29, Suet. Jul. 19-20, Cic. Seisat. 62, Dio 37.43. For the violence in this year; R.E. Smith “The Use of Force in Passing Legislation in the Late Republic,” Athenaeum, 55 (1977), 162 who believes that Cato’s courage was crucial to the thwarting of Nepos and Caesar.

28) The only mention of the “silvae callesque” appears in Suetonius Jul. 19.4 For modern scholarship on this curiosity; John C. Rolfe, "Some Notes on Suetonius", TAPA 44 (1913) xlvii and " The So-Called Callium Provincia, AJF 36 (1915) 336; C.A.H. vol. 9 513, J.P.V.D. Balsdon "Consular Provinces under the Republic II: Caesar’s Gallic Command" JRS 29 (1939) 180-183, and P.J. Rhodes "Silvae Callesque" Hist. 27 (1978) 617-620. The term seems to have been a phrase which specifies Italia as a province which the consuls were periodically given.


30) Cato and his friends worked against the dynasts during the years after the Catilinarian conspiracy. Cato and Lucullus blocked Pompeius’ eastern settlement in 60 (Dio 37.50.1, Plut. Pomp. 46.3, Luc. 42.6, Cat. Min. 31.1) and Cato made Caesar forfeit his triumph the next year (Suet. Jul. 18, Plut. Caes. 13, also Versnel Triumphus 352-354 Leiden 1970, and R. Payne The Roman Triumph London 1962). Cato and the special commission; Plut. Cat. Min. 40, Cic. pro Sextio 59-63 and Taylor PP 138 and Dragstedt Agon 3 (1969) 79-81. Favonius attacked Pompeius over the slaughter of the Alexandrian envoys and believing that the general was involved on behalf of Ptolemy Auletes asked for an investigation (Dio 39.14.1). Cato returned and aided Domitius in his election for the consulship, losing in his first attempt in 56 and winning in 55 (Plut. Pomp. 52, Cat. Min. 41,42, Cic. Ad Att. 4 17.2; SB 91). In the trial of
T. Annius Milo, Hortensius spoke on his behalf as well as Cicero. Cato sat among the judges and Favonius appeared as a witness (Asc. 41, 54 C.; Cic. pro Mil. 1-3). Caesar’s lieutenant M. Antonius became a member of the augurate over Domitius in 51; Cic. Ad Fam. 8 14.1; SB 97. In the late 50s Cato also announced that he would prosecute Caesar under the lex Cornelia de maiestate after his return to Rome (Suet. Jul. 30.3).

31) On Caesar using his soldiers to influence elections at Rome; Dio 39.31.2, Lintott (above) 74-75, Gruen LGRR 444-445, and Smith Athenaeum 55 (1977) 163-165. A soldier could not enter the pomerium of the city and thus Dio’s statement is suspect. When Pompeius was elected sole consul he was allowed to enroll soldiers for use within the city walls (Cic. pro Milone passim; Asc. 30-33, 35, 42-43 C.; Plut. Pomp. 54, Cat. Min. 47). The use of mobs, veterans and soldiers for intimidation in the late 50s seems to have been the natural result of the events of 59 and can be traced back to the tribunate of Gabinius in 67 and to the Gracchi. Brutus regarding himself as the defender of the Republic; Cic. Ad Brut. 25.6 or 1.17 [SB 17]. On the quotation from Sallust, see Cat. 38.3.

32) The Catonians’ support of Pompeius’ sole consulship; Asc. 33, 36, C.; Plut. Pomp. 54.4, Cat. Min. 47.2-3. Claudius and his political views; Gruen “Pompey, the Roman Aristocracy and the Conference at Luca” Hist. 18, (1969) 102-103. The trial of Claudius; Cic. Brut. 230, 324.

33) Domitius receiving Gallia Transalpina; Caes. B.C. 1.6.5-6, Suet. Jul. 34, Appian B.C. 2.32. Cato and Pompeius on the eve of the civil war; Plut. Cat. Min. 52. Cato’s and Favonius’ opinions of the situation in January 49; Cic. Ad Att. 7.15, 2 (SB 139). The events which led up to the civil war; Gruen LGRR 449-497. The terminal date of Caesar’s command; Gruen LGRR 475-477.
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER TWO

(pages 34-35)

1) The question of who was the adoptive father of Brutus is open to controversy. His adoptive father was a Q. Servilius Caepio, but just who this Caepio was is disputed. Münzer (Röm. Adels 337ff.) claims that he was Cato's half-brother, and Servilia's brother, while J. Geiger, "The Last Servilii Caepiones of the Republic" AS 4 (1973) 155, favors identifying him with an otherwise unattested son of the praetor of 91 by a previous marriage. Geiger's theory involves identifying the adoptive father with the bridegroom of Caesar's daughter in 59 (Suet. Jul. 21), which is itself a problem. It is certainly curious that a relative of Cato's should have come close to being a son-in-law of Caesar, but someone certainly was and Geiger may well be right. Conversely, Brutus' close ties to Cato would be explained if Cato's half-brother Caepio adopted him. To complicate matters further, an inscription (Homolle, Bulletin de correspondance hellénique, 3, 1879, 159) has been found on Delos mentioning Hortensius, son of the orator. It is dated to 43 when Hortensius and Brutus were both in the area. Hortensius is described as a son of Caepio (Brutus), the adoptive mother's brother. Therefore, Brutus' adoptive father, Caepio, married the Hortensia, daughter of the orator and Brutus had the younger Hortensius as his adoptive uncle.

Brutus' trip to Cyprus; Plut. Brut. 3. His marriage to Porcia; Plut. Brut. 2. His Cato; Cic. Ad Att. 13.46 (SB 338). The younger Cato with Brutus; Plut. Brut. 49.5.

2) Servilia; J. P. Hallett Fathers and Daughters in Roman Society (1984) 49-52. T. Africa in "The Mask of an Assassin: A Psychohistorical Study of M. Junius Brutus" Journal of Interdisciplinary History 8 (1978) 412 suggests the Freudian interpretation that since his mother's lover was Caesar, Brutus regarded the dictator as an unconscious rival, something which promoted hostility against him. This hostility toward Caesar continued to grow as Brutus become more reliant on him.

(pages 36-38)

4) His speaking abilities; Cic. Brutus 332.


Brutus' and Cato's philosophical interests; Plut. Brutus 2, 4: *Cat. Min.* 10.

6) Ancient sources for the affair; Cic. Ad Att 2.24,2 (SB 44); In Vat. 24-26; Pro Gest. 132; Suet. Jul. 20.3; Dio 38.9.2-4; Plut. Luc. 42.7-8.


8) Ad Att. 2.24,3 (SB 43).


10) His journey with Cato; Plut. Brut. 3. Brutus' coins; Crawford RRC 445-6. His quaestorship; *Auct.* *Vir.* Ill. 82.3-4. His oratory; Cic. Brutus 22, 192, 324.
11) Brutus’ speech against Pompeius; Quintilian Inst. 9.3-5, (H. Malcovati, Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta 1955 460f). The proposed dictatorship; Plut. Pomp. 54. His work on the trial of Milo, Asc. 36 C. His appearances in court with Cicero; Cic. Brutus 324.

12) Plut. Brut. 4, 5. Brutus, while on campaign in the East, tortured and executed Theodotus who had persuaded Ptolemy to murder Pompeius (Plut. Brut. 33, Pomp. 80.3).

13) Plut. Brut. 6

14) For these honours and Cassius’ dissent; Dio 44, 3-7; 7,1; 8,1.

15) For a full account of Caesar’s activities, honours and legislation after Pharsalus see Gelzer Caesar chapts. 5 and 6.

16) Brutus’ governorship in Gaul; Plut. Brut. 6. The correspondence between Brutus, Cicero and Atticus at this time; Cic. Ad Att. 13.10,3; (SB 318), 39,2; (SB 342) 40 (SB 343).


18) The unpopularity of the divorce; Cic. Ad Att. 13.9,3 (SB 317). The feuds between Porcia and Servilia; Cic. Ad Att. 13.22 (SB 329). The marriage to Porcia as the turning point of Brutus’ political views; J.P.V.D. Balsdon “The Ides of March” Hist. 7, (1958), 93. Porcia as Brutus’ childhood sweetheart; W. Stewens Brutus als Politiker (1963) 16. Shackleton Bailey (Cicero’s Letters to Atticus Vol. 7, p. 362-3) suggests that divorcing Claudia, a relation to Pompeius, may have been regarded as an attempt to please Caesar and so Cicero hoped that he would quickly marry Porcia.

19) Brutus being chosen over Cassius; Plut. Brut. 7. For a discussion of Caesar’s inner circle see Syme RR chap. 5.
20) Cassius in Syria; Plut. Cæs. 18. His family 
clientele; Cic. Ad Fam. 12.5.2 (SB 355). His brother; 
Cic. Ad Fam. 12.7.1 (SB 367); 14.2.1 (SB 7); Flanc 58; Appian 
BC 5.7. His nephew; Appian BC 4.135.63.
21) Cassius' pardon by Caesar; Plut. Brut. 6.
22) His feelings on the civil war and Caesar; 
Cic. Ad Fam. 15.15 (SB 174); 19 (216). His activities in the 
East; Cic. Ad Fam. 8.10 (SB 87). The charges brought 
against him Auct. Vir. Illustr. 83,3.
23) Caesar's favoritism, mistrust of Cassius 
and the affair with the lions; Plut. Brut. 7,8. The opinion 
of Cælius Rufus; Cic. Ad Fam. 8.10 (SB 87).
24) Trebonius' plans in 47; Cic. Phil 2.34; Plut. 
Ant. 11.2, 13.2. Basilus; Dio 43, 47.5. Gelzer's assessment 
of the motives for the assassination; Cæsar 300. For other 
views of the conspirators' motives; J. H. Collins "Caesar: 
The Corruption of Power," Hist., 4, (1955) 455, R.E. Smith 
"The Conspiracy and the Conspirators," Greece and Rome 4, 
(1957), 58-70, J.P.V.D. Balsdon, "The Ides of March," Hist., 
8, (1958), 90-94), V. Ehrenberg, "Caesar's Aims" Harv. 
Stud. 68, 1964, 149ff., and N. Horsfall "The Ides of March" 
25) Brutus' following; Cic. Phil 10.7. His 
inactivity and contemplated exile; Cic. Ad Att. 14.10, 1; SB 
364 and 14.19, 1 SB 372. The conference at Antium; Cic. Ad 
Att. 15.11 (SB 389). Brutus' policy of peace at this time; 
E. Wistrand, The Policy of Brutus the Tyrannicide, Göteborg, 
passim.
26) Antonius' edict; Cic. Phil. 18; Ad Att. 
16.7, 1 (SB 415). His charges and Brutus' and Cassius' reply 
are contained in Cic. Ad Fam. 11.3 (SB 336). Brutus' 
departure from Italy; Plut. Brut. 23.1-6.
27) For a list of the assassins see P-W 10, 255f. 
Also Syme RR 59-60. The eight assassins who became allied 
with Brutus after the assassination were Pacuvius Antistius 
Labo, C. Cassius Parmentis, L. Minucius Basilus, P. 
Servilius Casca, C. Servilius Casca, L. Tillius Cimber, 
C. Trebonius and D. Turullius.
28) Favonius; Vell. 2.53; Caes. BC 3, 363-8; 
Plut. Pomp. 57.4;
29) Favonius is included in the letter to the elder Caesar among the 'inertissimi nobiles' (Pseudo-Sall. 2.9,4). It is this very reference which marks the letter as being counterfeit. M. Favonius was the first man from his family to become a senator and so in no way can he be regarded as a nobilis. This point is made by R. Syme in "Damaging Names in Pseudo-Sallust" Museum Helveticum 19 (1962) 177-9, but see Shackleton Bailey, "The Roman Nobility in the Second Civil War, CQ 10, (1960) 256. For other literature on the authenticity of the Pseudo-Sallust collection see R. Syme "Pseudo-Sallust" Museum Helveticum 15 (1958) 46; Sallust Appendix: Two L.R. Taylor PF 154, 185, 232; F. Adcock, JRS 40 (1950) 139; E. Fraenkel JRS 41 (1951) 192.

Favonius at the conference at Antium; Cic. Ad Att. 15.11 (SB 389). Favonius with Brutus in the East; Plut. Brut. 34.2.

30) His appearance against Saturninus; Cic. Ad Fam. 8.14 (SB 97). His stand with his father at Corfinium; Caes. BC 1.23,4. His activities after Corfinium; Cic. Ad Att. 9.3,1 (SB 170); Ad Fam. 6.22 (SB 221) and Tyrrell and Purser's commentary on Cicero's letters Vol. 4, p. ixviii-ixix. Shackleton Bailey dates this letter to the spring of 46 so that it is possible that Domitius had fought in Africa. His loss of status and involvement in the conspiracy; Cic. Phil. 2.27. The eulogy to Porcia; Cic. Ad Att. 13.48, 2 (SB 346,340); 37, 3 (SB 345). Suetonius' evidence; Nero 3. The preparation of the fleet Cic. Ad Att. 16.2, 4 (SB 411).

31) Bibulus' attempt to have his son elected augur; Cic. Ad Fam. 2.17 (SB 117). His studies in Athens; Cic. Ad Att. 12.32, 2 (SB 271). F. Miltner (P-W XXII 216.63) believes Bibulus was about seventeen when Brutus arrived there.

32) Lucullus' activities during the civil war of Pompeius and Caesar; Plut. Cat. Min. 54.1. His relations with Cicero; Cic. de Finibus 3.7-9. His meetings with Brutus at Nesis; Cic. Phil 10, 8; Ad Att. 16.1, 1 (SB 409). His appearance at Philippi Veil. 2.71, 2.

33) The son of Cato at Utica; Plut. Cat. Min. 52, 2; B. Afr. 89, 5. His appearance with Brutus and his death; Cic. Ad Brut. 13 or 1.5 (SB 9), Plut. Cat. Min. 73, 2; Brut. 49,4; Veil. 2.71, 2; Appian BC 4.135.
34) Brutus' Atilius; Plutarch Brut. 39.6;
Atilia the wife of Cato; Plut. Cat. Min. 7.2. The son
of Domitius who was adopted by the Atilii Serrani; Cic. Ad
Q.f. 3.6.5, ((SB 26). Münzer's reconstruction Röm. Adels..
CHAPTER THREE: FOOTNOTES
(pages 61-66)

1) For example, Syme RR 98-99 and Erik Wistrand, The Policy of Brutus the Tyrannicide, (1981). Syme RR 184 sees Brutus' enrollment of the army as a way to negotiate with Antonius from a strong position. Cicero's condemnations; Ad Fam. 10.28, (SB 364) Ad Brut. 23.4 or 1.15 (SB 24), Ad Att. 15, 1a, 2. (SB 378).


4) Trebonius aiding Cassius; Dio 47.21.3; .26.1. the acquisition of the legions at Apamea; Cic. Ad Fam. 12.11 (SB 366); 12.12 (SB 387).


6) The aid given Brutus by Antistius and Appuleius; Plut. Brut. 25; Appian BC 3.63; 4.75; Cic. Phil. 10.24; 13.32; Ad Brut. 1.7, 2. For those proscribed see Appian BC 4.11-30.

7) Trebonius was the son of a eques; Cic. Phil. 13.23. His tribunate; Plut. Pomp. 52.4; Cat. Min. 43.9; Dio 39.33, 1-36. His praetorship and struggles with Caelius Rufus; Caes. BC 3.20.1-22.3, and his proconsulship in Spain E. Alex. 64.2

166
8) His alleged plans to kill Caesar in 46; Cic. Phil. 2.34.

9) H. Bruhns, Caesar und die römische Oberschicht in den Jahren 49-44 v.Chr. 149-150, notes that Caesar’s novi homines were at a disadvantage when they held the consulship because they were in office for the shortest period of time, and because they were subordinate to the dictator and his magister equitum.

10) His role in the conspiracy was to keep Antonius out of the senate house (Appian BC 2.117). Plutarch says that D. Brutus detained Antonius and not Trebonius (Caes. 66). On his way to Spain, Cicero asked him for any news on M. Brutus who was then in Cisalpine Gaul (Cic. Ad Fam. 15.20.3; SB 208). His insistence on keeping Antonius out of the plan; Plut. Ant. 13.2. Cicero’s eulogy of him; Cic. Phil. 11 passim.

11) Tillius Cimber as a supporter of Caesar; Cic. Phil. 2.27. His role in the conspiracy; Appian BC 2.113. His activities in the East; Cic. Ad Fam. 12.13.3 (SB 419). Basilus’ adoption; Cic. de Off. 3.73, R. Syme, “Senators, Tribes and Towns,” Hist. 13, (1964) 105-125 (Reprinted in Roman Papers Vol. II, 582ff), and T. P. Wiseman New Men 259 make this identification. Shackleton Bailey Two Studies 122 does not believe that the man adopted was an assassin and therefore was probably not the M. Satrius who served Brutus. Basilus’ quarrel with Caesar; Dio 43.47, 5. His service with Caesar Caes. BG 4.29, and with Brutus; Cic. Brut. 1.6, 3 (SB 12).

12) Murcus’ and Patiscus’ activities after the murder; Appian BC 2.119. Murcus in Caesar’s company; Caes. BG 3.6. Patiscus; B. Alex. 34.5. Patiscus is usually identified with the Patisius of Caesar’s commentaries and the Roman businessman Patiscus who dealt in panthers. See the prosopography for the identification.

13) Marcius Crispus in the civil wars; Caes. B. Afr. 77,2. Antistius Vetus’ quaestorship and his relationship to Caesar; Plut. Caes. 5.3; Broughton MRR Vol.2, 214, note 2 believes that because of the wording of Plutarch (above) Antistius’ quaestorship must be moved to a later date. His tribunate; Cic. Ad Q. Fr. 2.1.3 (SB 5). Antistius in Syria; Cic. Ad Att. 14.9, 3, (SB 363). His contact with Brutus and his service as a legate; Plut. Brut. 25; Cic. Ad Brut. 1.11, 2; 1.12, 1, 3; SB 16, 21. Marcius Crispus’ journey to Syria; Appian BG 3.47; 4.58. His inclusion in the armies
14) Turullius' participation in the assassination: 
Dio 51.8, 2. His activities in the East; Cic. Ad Fam. 
12.13, 3, 4; (SB 419); Appian BC 5.2. Appuleius in the East; 
Cic. Phil. 13.32; Plut. Brut. 24; Appian BC 3.63, 4.75. 
Brutus speaks to Cicero about the augural elections in Ad 
Brut. 15 (or 1.7); SB 20.

15) The relations between Hortensius and his father; 
Val. Max. 5.9, 2. His behaviour as a youth Cic. Ad Att. 6.3, 
9, (SB 117). His service with Caesar; Plut. Caes. 32.1; 
Appian BC 2.47. Cicero evaluating Hortensius; Ad Att. 10.4, 
6, (SB 195). The question of his proconsulship; Broughton 

16) Caesar's Parthian campaign; Collins "Caesar 
and the Corruption of Power," Hist. 4 (1955) 458. Caesar's 
following; Syme RR 59-96, Gruen, LGRR 112-119, and 
Shackleton Bailey, "The Roman Nobility in the Second Civil 

17) Antonius and the legions of Macedonia; Appian BC 
3.27. Hortensius' role in Greece; Cic. Phil. 3.26; 10.11, 
24, 26.

18) The participation of the Servilii Cascae in the 
assassination; Cic. Phil. 2.27. Gaius is mentioned by Appian 
(BC 2.113) as being a friend of Caesar and is traditionally 
regarded as the tribune for 44. His brother's tribunate; Dio 
47.49, 1. Their suicide; Anthol. Lat. 457. It has been 
suggested by T. J. Cadoux (Broughton MRR, supplement 58) 
that there were three Casca, not two, which has confused 
both ancient and modern commentators. His evidence for this 
is that the tribune surnamed Casca in 44 escaped a lynching 
by convincing the crowd that he was not one of the Cascae 
involved in the conspiracy (Dio 44.52, 2). Cadoux's 
suggestion is attractive, but can not be proven. The only 
evidence for a third Casca is late and the tribune of 44 
could have understandably lied to save himself from the 
crowd, had he actually been a conspirator.

19) Allienus' services to Caesar; B. Afr. 2.3. His 
troops and Cassius; Cic. Ad Fam. 12.11, (SB 366). Broughton, 
MRR Vol. II, 352, believes that Allienus was at first a 
legate of Trebonius and then of Dolabella, but this is not 
made clear by the evidence he cites (Cic. Phil. 11.32). 
If he was Trebonius' legate, he was under no compulsion to
follow Dolabella. Appian's interpretation of the events concerning Allienus; EC 3.78. Shackleton Bailey, discussing the letters above, interprets Cic. Phil. 11.30-32 as Allienus being an original legate of Dolabella and not Trebonius.

20) Wiseman, New Men 175-6. See also 173-181. For other studies about the novi homines of Caesar Syme RR 80ff., Gruen, LGRR 115ff.

21) Cic. Ad Brut. 24.9 or 1.16; SB 25.

22) Brutus' armies' mutiny; Cic. Ad Brut. 7 or 1.2 (SB 14); Dio 47.22, 4; .23, 1; Legio quarta decima mutinied under Brutus, the legion which had fought at Pharsalus and in Africa under Caesar (L. Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army, (1984), 99, 111). Cassius also had to deal with rebellious troops, Dio 47.35 6; Appian 56.64. On army revolts in this period see W. S. Messer, CPh 15 (1920) 158-175.
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER FOUR
(pages 79-83)

1) Thucydides 3.82.

2) Quinctilius at Corfinium; Caes. BC 1, 23.
His actions in Africa; Caes. BC 2.28, 1-3.

3) The reading of Vell. 2.71, 2; "Varus autem
liberti, quem id facere coegerat, manu, cum se insignibus
honorum vel asset, iugulatus est" suggests to Broughton (MRR
suppl. 52) that Quinctilius Varus must have held an office
other than a quaestorship, probably a praetorship. If this
is so, it presupposes a pardon from Caesar as Quinctilius
was fighting against Caesar as late as 46 and was a
praetorius in 42. See also R. Syme "Missing Persons" Hist. 5
(1956) 208. J. Suolahti, Junior Officers of the Roman
Republic 228 wrongly identifies this man with the L. Varus
who was a praefectus under Cassius (Appian BC 4.74).

4) For a description of the Calpurnii Pisones of the
late Republic; E.S. Gruen, "Pompey and the Pisones", CSCA 1
19.1. This is the man who was posthumously involved in the
alleged first Catilinarian conspiracy. The existence
of this conspiracy has now been refuted. See P. McGushin,
Bellum Catilinarum, Appendix IV; The relationship between the
quaestor of 65 and the proquaestor of 49; Gruen (above) 161.
On the name Cn. Calpurnius Piso Frugi; Broughton
MRR suppl.13. Piso in Spain; Crawford, BBC 463, and in
Africa B. Afr. 3.1; 18.1. Tacitus (Ann. 2.43) later names
him as an associate of Brutus and Cassius.

5) T. Labienus' career and his relations with
Pompeius and Caesar; R. Syme, "The Allegiance of Labienus,
JRS 28 (1938) 113-25 (Roman Papers Vol.1, 62). Q. Labienus'
career with Brutus and Cassius; Vell. 2.78, 1; Dio 48.24,
5.

6) Torquatus the quaestor of Pansa; Cic. Ad
Brut. 1.6, 3; SB 12. Appian BC 3.69. The Torquatus sheltered
by Atticus; Nepos, Att. 11.2; 15.4. The identification of
these two men; J. Mitchell, "The Torquati," Hist., 15 (1966)
27.

The consul of 65 had been in Miletus during the pirate
wars (Broughton MRR Vol. II, 262). See also 150-151, notes 11
170.
and 16. On the relations of the Torquati with Pompeius; Gruen, LGRR 105.

7) "The Roman Nobility in the Second Civil War", CO 10 (1960) 255-256.

8) The date of Lentulus' coming of age; Cic. Pro Sestio 144; Dio 39.17. The elder Lentulus Spinther's death; Auct. Vir. Ill. 78.9. His son in Alexandria; Cic. Ad Att. 11.13, 1 (SB 224). Young Lentulus Spinther's acquaintance with Brutus and Cicero; Cic. Ad Att. 13.10, 3 (SB 318). His association with the assassins; Plut. Caes. 67.2; Appian BC 2.119. His visit to Cicero; Cic. Ad Att. 14.11, 2 (SB 365).

9) His letters to Cicero and the senate; Cic. Ad Fam. 12.14; 15; (SB 405, 406). The quotation is from Ad Fam. 12.14.7 (SB 405).

10) M. Aquinius; B. Afr. 57.3; 89; Appian BC 2.119. M. Aquinus as a legate of Cassius; Crawford RRC 513.

11) L. Cella; B. Afr. 89.1. L. Pella; Plut. Brut. 35. L. Iulius Mocilla; Nepos, Att. 11.2. Cichorius identification; Römische Studien 253-7

12) Vell. 2.76, 1.

13) Participation in the conspiracy; Vell. 2.78, 3. His letter to Cicero and his activities in the East; Cic. Ad Att. 12.13 (SB 419).

14) His comments about Octavianus' family; Suet. Aug. 4.2.

15) Pacuvius Labeo; Plut. Brut. 12.3; 51.2; Appian BC 4.135. He has been mistakenly named Pacuvius Antistius Labeo in confusion with his son who was adopted by the Antistii; Shackleton Bailey, Two Studies 11, 103.

16) Shackleton Bailey's estimation of Varro Gibba; CO 10 (1960) 260 note 7. His role as a messenger; Cicero's letter of recommendation of him to Brutus; Cic. Ad Fam. 13.10, 3 (SB 277). His appearance in the courts; Asc. SS C.; Dio 47.11, 3f. At Philippi; Vell. 2.71, 3.

Brutus’ letter to Cicero about his son; Cic. Ad Brut. 3.6 (or 2.3) (SB 2).

18) His addition to the lists of the proscribed and his action at Philippi; Appian BC 4.19, and 73; 4.51.

19) Dolabella’s consulship and his activities after Caesar’s death; Cic. Phil 2, 79-80; Ad Att. 14.20, 2,4; (SB 374). Cicero’s letter of approval of him; Cic. Ad Fam. 9.11; (SB 326). Cicero’s post with Dolabella; Cic. Ad Att. 15.11, 4; (SB 389). In his consulship, Cicero had tried to abolish the liberae legationes; Cic. de leg. 3.18. See also Gruen LGRR. His journey; Cic. Ad Att. 16.6 (SB 414).

20) Appian BC 4.163.

21) Publius; Plut. Brut. 48; 51-52. Gaius or Tiberius; Val. Max. 4.7, 4.

22) Plut. Brut. 50.1-3; Ant. 69,1; Appian BC 4.129.

23) Plut. Cat. Min. 65.4; 66.3; 73.3; Brut. 12.2; 51.3;

24) On a detailed description of the proscriptions; Appian BC 4.3-51.

25) Shackleton Bailey’s opinion; CQ (1960) 262 note 2. Drusus’ adoptive uncle was Brutus’ grandfather on his mother’s side. His trial; Cic. Ad Att. 4.16, 5; 15, 9; 17, 5; (SB 89,90,91). Nero’s marriage to Livia; Vell 2.75; Suet. Tib. 4. Nero’s support of Caesar; Caes. BC 25, 3. Drusus being proscribed; Dio 48.44, 1. His appearance at Philippi; Vell. 2.71, 3.

26) Paullus’ attempts to charge Catiline; Sal. Cat. 31.4. For a discussion of the Vetius affair; chap. two, p.36-37. Cicero’s opinion about Paullus with Caesar; Cic. Ad Att. 6.3, 4 (SB 117). Caesar’s bribe and the Basilica Aemilia; Plut. Caes. 29.2-3. His activities in 43; Cic. Phil 13.13. With Brutus; Dio 47.8, 1. In general; L. Hayne, “L. Paullus and his attitude to Pompey”, Antiquité Classique 41 (1972) 148-155. His son; Appian BC 5.5, 2. For the identification of the younger Paullus see the prosopography.

27) Messalla Niger’s consulship and the trial of Clodius in 61; Cic. Ad Att. 1.13, 3; SB 13; 1.14, 2, 5-6; SB 14; 1.6, 2-5; SB 16; Pro Milone 73; Dio 37.46, 3; Plut. Cic. 29.4, 6. Messalla with Brutus; Cic. Ad Brut. 20 (or 1.12);
(pages 92-95)

SB 21; 23 (or 1.15); SB 24. Vell. 2.71, 1. His proscription; Dio 47.11, 4-5; Appian BC 4.38. Gellius' plot against Brutus; Dio 47.24, 3; With Antonius; Vell. 2.85, 2.

28) Lollius at Philippi; Appian BC 4.49. His career with Augustus; R. Syme, RR 426, 452.

29) T. Labienus; note 4 above. Tittius and Marius; Cic. Ad Fam. 12. 15, 5; (SB 406). Münzer (P-W XIV 1820) identifies Marius with a native of Dalmatia but this is unlikely.

30) Sestius; Cic. Ad Att. 16.4, 4; (SB 411). His proscription; Appian BC 4.51. See also Dio 53.32, 4; Crawfors RRC 515.

31) Horace as a military tribune; Sat. 1,6, 47-48; and L. R. Taylor "Horace's Equestrian Career", AJPh 46 (1925) 161-169. Horace and Pompeius at Philippi; Ode 2.7. The Archilochian imagery; Steele Commandeur The Odes of Horace (1962) 128.

32) Flavius; Plut. Brut. 51.1; Nepos Att. 8.3; Cic. Ad Brut. 1.6, 4 (SB 12); 17.3 (or 1.8); (SB 26); Crawford RRC 516. Cicero recomended him and his brother to M. Aelius in 46 (Cic. Ad Fam. 13.31 ; SB 309).

33) Gellius' Canus is not explicitly stated as having been with Brutus; See prosopography (B) no. 59.

34) Cic. Phil. 4.16; Ad Fam. 12.7; (SB 367). Servilius' coins; Crawford, RRC, 516.

35) Pedanius and Plaetorius; Crawford RRC I, 516, no. 505 and 518 no. 508 respectively. This Plaetorius and M. Plaetorius Cestianus, praetor of 64, were related but not closely. See Wiseman, New Men no. 320.

36) Dio 47.24, 2-4.

37) Appian BC 5.2.

38) Cic. Ad Fam. 12.13, 4 (SB 419); Dio 47.31, 3. He is not to be confused with the quaestor of Cyprus in 47 as Shackleton Bailey believes. See Broughton, NRR, suppl. 60.

39) L. Varus; Appian BC 4.74; this Varus is not to be confused with Sex. Quinctilius Varus who died at Philippi. See note 2.
(pages 95-100)

40) Fabius; Josephus *Ad* 14.295-7; *BJ* 1.236-9; Licinius; Grant *Imperium* 35.

41) *Ad Brut.* 16 (or 1.8); *SB* 15.

42) Vell. 2.72, 1

43) Nepos *Att.* 10.2; 11.2.

44) Vell. 2.72, 3-4.

45) Velleius; Vell. 2.76, 1; Bibulus; Appian 5.58; Poplicola; Vell. 2.85, 2; Turullius; Appian 5.2; Cicero; Appian 4.51; Calpurnius Piso; Grant, *Imperium* 31.

46) Vell. 2.78, 1; Crawford *RRC* 529.

47) Bibulus; Appian 4.38; Domitius; Dio 50.13.

48) Messalla; Plut. *Brut.* 53; Parmensis; Vell. 2.87.

49) Dio 53.30, 2;

50) Suet. *Tib.* 12; Syne *RR* 452;

FOOTNOTES: APPENDIX

PLUTARCH'S BRUTUS

(pages 140-145)

1) Pliny Epist. 1.17


3) Plut. Dion 2

4) For the other side of Brutus see Cic. Ad Fam. 6.1, 7 (SB 115).

5) D. Stockton, Cicero: A Political Biography 240. The Salaminian affair; Cic. Ad Att. 5.21, 10-13; 6.1, 5-6; 6.2, 7-9; 6.3, 5; SB 114-117. For discussions of the economics of the incident see R. Y. Tyrrell and L. C. Purser The Correspondence of M. Tullius Cicero, Vol. 33, Appendix 9 and E. Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic, (1968) 84-85.


8) V. Ehrenberg, "Caesar's Final Aims," HSPhs. 68, (1964) 159.
1) Brutus' adoptive father was a Q. Servilius Caepio, husband of Hortensia. Whether this Caepio was Cato's half-brother or not is disputed. J. Geiger "The Last Servilii Caepiones of the Republic," AS 4 (1973) 143-156, believes that Brutus' adoptive father may have been the son of Q. Servilius Caepio (pr. 91) by a previous marriage.

2) Geiger (155 above) believes that Lucullus married a Servilia who was a niece of Cato's half-brother, not Cato's sister. J. Hallett Fathers and Daughters in Roman Society 1984, 51 n. 22 challenges this on the basis that Cato's half-brother would not have been old enough to have had a daughter of marriageable age in the mid-sixties. Also M.K. Hopkins "The Age of Roman Girls at Marriage," Population Studies 18 (1965) 309-327.


4) As the younger Hortensius held a province in 44 he was likely a praetor in 45. Cic. Phil. 10.26; Dio 47.21.4-6.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


"Foreign Clientelae, Oxford at the University Press, (1950).


"The Ides of March" Hist. 7 (1958) 80-93.


Grant, M., From Imperium to Auctoritas, Cambridge at the University Press, (1946, reprinted 1967).


"Pompey, the Roman Aristocracy and the Conference at Luca," Hist. 18 (1962) 71-108.


Knieley, E. M., Quellenkritische Studien zur Tätigkeit des Brutus im Osten, H. Neubacher (Wien, 1974).


McDermott, W.C., "Vettius ille, ille noster index," TAPA 80 (1949) 351-367.


Malcovati, E., Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta (1930).


"Some Notes on Suetonius," *TAPA* 44 (1913) xlvi.


"Factio: Some Observations" JRS 52 (1972) 53.

"L. Domitius Ahenobarbus and Cicero's Election to the Consulate" LCM 1 (1976) 46.


Stiewens, W., Brutus als Politiker A. Blum (Zürich, 1963).


"Manius or Mamercus?" JRS 54 (1964) 41-48.


Suolahti, J., Junior Officers in the Roman Army in the Republican Period, Suolaahtinen Tiedekeskus (Helsinki, 1955).


"No Son for Caesar?" Hist. 29 (1980) 422-437 (Reprinted in Roman Papers, 1236-1251).


"Senators, Tribes and Towns," Hist. 13 (1964) 105-125 (Reprinted in Roman Papers, 528).


New Men In the Roman Senate Oxford at the University Press (1971).