THE VISIONS OF HILDEGARD OF BINGEN AND
NEW MEDIEVAL THEORIES
REVISING HILDEGARD'S HABIT: VISIONARY WRITING AND THE NEW MEDIEVALISM

By

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ABSTRACT

This paper explores the effects that various forms of literary theory such as semiotics and deconstruction have affected the field of medieval studies. In particular these new theories, now embraced by most medieval scholars, have been integrated into medievalism concurrently with the rise of feminist medievalism. The 'New Medievalism' as it has been called by scholars such as Gabrielle Spiegel and Stephen Nichols, combines the traditional fields of hermeneutics, philology and historicism with the aforementioned literary theories into a 'renovated' methodology. Both the content and the structure of this 'new' scholarship is interpreted throughout this paper by utilizing the visionary work, Scivias, written by the twelfth-century female abbess Hildegard of Bingen. Hildegard's work as a visionary, abbess, artist and playwright make her an ideal choice for a new interpretation because her work is so rich and varied. By attempting a New Medieval interpretation of one of Hildegard's visions the strengths and weaknesses of the current theories are made available.
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"Every perfection of the soul, which is not always in act, is a habit."

– Thomas Aquinas

NOLI DESPERANDUM
Introduction

RE-VISIONS: Back to the looking glass through the eyes of the medieval prophet,
Hildegard of Bingen

Not in rhetoric alone, then, but in the phenomenon of understanding as well the universality of human linguisticality proves itself to be an intrinsically limitless element which carries everything which -- not merely the cultural heritage transmitted through language, but through everything pure and simple; for nothing that is can remain outside the realm of interpretation and intelligibility in which we have our common being. Hence the validity of Plato’s fundamental assertion that he who beholds things in the mirror of speech becomes aware of them in their full and undiminished truth.

And there is an equally profound and accurate insight to be had from Plato’s doctrine that all cognition is first what it is only as re-cognition; for a ‘first cognition’ is as little possible as a first word.

– Hans Georg Gadamer

O fragile human, ashes of ashes, and filth of filth! Say and write what you see and hear. But since you are timid in speaking, and simple in expounding, and untaught in writing, speak and write these things not by a human mouth, and not by the understanding of human invention, and not by a human mouth, and not by the understanding of human invention, and by the requirements of human composition, but as you see and hear them on high in the heavenly places in the wonders of God. Explain these things in such a way that the hearer, receiving the words of his instructor, may expound them in those words, according to that will, vision and instruction. Thus therefore, O Human, speak these things that you see and hear. And write them not by yourself or anything other human being, but by the will of Him who knows, sees and disposes all things in the secrets of His mysteries.

– Hildegard of Bingen, Scivias

Hildegard of Bingen, empowered with Sapientia, called aloud in the streets and raised her voice in the public squares. Her words covered the earth like mist and morning dew providing moisture, the basic nutrient of all fertility. Called to build her life on the foundation of the obsculta, Hildegard of Bingen ran to accomplish the work given her to do, while there was still light – the light of Sapientia – Hildegard Ryan, O.S.B.
Hildegard of Bingen (1098-1179) was a German prophet and visionary, often called ‘the Sybil of the Rhine’. She wrote extensively on her visions in a work entitled *Scivias*, the meaning of which is uncertain but seems to come from the Latin *Scito vias Domini*, or *Know the Ways of the Lord*. The work was prepared during the years 1141-1151 and stands as Hildegard’s best known text because it contains not only her visions but her interpretation of them through artwork and biblical exegesis. The end of the *Scivias* also contains one of the earliest known liturgical plays. Hildegard utilizes a great many female symbols as representative of the Church in her work. Hildegard seems to have been aware that her experience, as revealed through her visions, letters, art and music was a valid method of intellectual and spiritual didacticism. She always fought to have her voice heard, especially because through her it was God’s voice and not only hers which spoke. There are many issues about the relationship between ‘self’ and ‘other,’ ‘individual’ and ‘community’ which arise from Hildegard’s opening paragraph to *Scivias*, reproduced above. These issues, ones which Hildegard was very aware of, concern identity, both gendered and religious. Hildegard goes to great pains in order to convince her audience that they should focus on God and not specifically on ‘her voice.’ This idea has radical implications for current feminists who feel that women have no ‘voice’ because it has been surrendered both to man on earth as well as a ‘masculine’ God in the sky. It does not seem to be so with Hildegard. This ‘community of voices,’ not only God’s and Hildegard’s but also the various translators, echoes and scribes which make up the work,
echoes part of Gadamer’s idea about ‘words’: words which seem to have no gender, or which contain both genders at once. Gadamer’s fundamental assertion, in the quotation cited at the outset of the Introduction, is really that all understanding, universal or otherwise, is universal in that it comes from our own personal world view. In this way Hildegard’s voice and God’s are one, even as they can only be variants of one another. Hildegard, in other words, can only hear and understand God’s voice when it is a voice she has already heard: her own. And so, Gadamer might respond to the ‘visionary experience’ by saying all visions are re-visions. This idea forms the introductory premise of this thesis. A re-vision is a communal experience as well as a personal one. A re-vision is inspired as well as pragmatic because of its fundamental grounding in re-presenting important concepts, ideas, thoughts, in a way that reveals both individual and worldly/scholastic viewpoints. The reasons for these re-presentations are often varied and multi-focused, kaleidoscopic in iconography and intention.

This paper will look at Hildegard’s re-visions and re-presentations of the Divine in light of the ‘New Medievalism/ new philology’ which came on to the literary/historical scene around 1990. In looking for a fruitful avenue from which I could speak convincingly about the ‘new’ medievalism I chose to focus on Hildegard studies for two reasons. The first is because both seemed to flower at a similar chronological juncture. At the same time that there was renewed interest in Hildegard a ‘new’ form of medieval textual interpretation was being developed from theories of semiotics and deconstruction.
This ‘new’ interpretation, though, was one which seemed to have evolved from the ideas of Wilhelm von Humboldt and other Hermeneuticists of the nineteenth century. The second reason I chose to write on Hildegard is because her writings are both beautiful and useful, the two necessary components, if we agree with William Morris, that are necessary in any household. I believe both the ‘new’ methodology of the medievalists as well as Hildegard’s writings to be what Maud Burnett McInerney calls “an overlap between the pragmatic and the prophetic” (McInerney xx). It is the hope that a methodology which links theory and practice on an enlightened level is coming into fashion that has brought me to this juncture.

The late twentieth-century proved a flourishing time to study the works of Hildegard and consequently a great deal of criticism, scholarly and otherwise was prepared on the female prophet. McInerney, in the introduction to her edited collection of essays on Hildegard, writes that

the thrust of feminist medieval scholarship over the past decade or so, with its emphasis on depathologizing and recontextualizing the experience of medieval women, encourages us to read Hildegard’s life and her works in increasingly complex and nuanced ways. The rehabilitation of Hildegard’s reputation, in English at any rate, begins with the work of Peter Dronke in his 1970 book *Poetic Individuality in the Middle Ages* and has been carried on by the work of scholars such as Barbara Newman and Joan Cadden in the United States and Sabina Flanagan in Australia, to name only a few (McInerney xxiii).

This paper concentrates on Hildegard studies in English, beginning in the first chapter with
some readings of Dronke, Newman, and Flanagan's scholarship. A great deal of beauty exists within these scholar's voices, regardless of their sometimes problematic scholarship. The point is that with the necessity of feminism within the medieval scholarly tradition, voices and experiences which were not seriously studied fifty years ago have come to light. Those which, we discovered, were not dead but merely had been silenced for years, now are being heard again from an advanced perspective.

For the most part Hildegard studies has focused on the prophet’s gender in relation to her spirituality. Her works, originally written in Latin, were translated by myriad scholars in the hope of revealing her word to the world. Work done in tandem with literary theory was part of what aided scholar’s interest in this medieval female and her time. New ideas about interpretation meant that scholars were no longer persuaded into presenting literary analysis which focused on facts, statistics, or translations that medievalists might never uncover. Even more importantly late twentieth-century feminist texts were being written that relied heavily on creativity and interest rather than on scholarly rigueur. New categories of literary analysis made work on a female figure like Hildegard seem impressive, fresh, and useful to the cause. Chris Weedon, in a text which seeks to combine feminism and literary theory, asserts,
to practice literary criticism is to produce readings of literary texts and in the process of interpretation temporarily to fix meaning and privilege particular social interests. Feminist criticism seeks to privilege feminist interest in the understanding and transformation of patriarchy. How the feminist critic fixes meaning will depend on the framework within which she reads a text (Weedon 136-137).

For the medievalist there are many implications tied to these ideas.

There has been a great deal of reticence in applying poststructuralist, or postmodern theories to the Middle Ages resulting from lack of textual evidence, the necessity of translation and the reluctance to accept post-enlightenment doctrine. In looking at Hildegard of Bingen's work as it has been interpreted by literary critics (and historians) I will uncover some specific challenges arising within their work and the theories which they expound because of that reticence. There are many avenues of interpretation, both textual and contextual, which are currently being ignored and which I intend to reveal and comment on within this paper. The main issue I have dealt with is the relationship between text and context, that which concerns the realm of historicism. Because the realm of literary criticism that has been adopted by most current Hildegard scholars involves a great deal of creativity it has rapidly become a trap where literary and historical veracity has become merely the plaything of the puppet called the literary analyst. Wilhelm von Humboldt, speaking to budding historians in 1821 warned them of this particular danger:

[There] exists a crucial difference between the historian and the poet which eliminates all danger, in that the historian subordinates his imagination to experience and to the exploration of reality. In this
subordination the imagination does not function as pure imagination and is therefore more properly called faculty of presentiment (Ahnungsvermögen) and talent for combination (Verknüpfungsgabe)... Two paths must therefore be followed simultaneously in order to approach the historical truth: the exact, impartial, critical determination of what has taken place and the connection of the results of this investigation, the intuitive conjecture of that which is not attainable by the former means (von Humboldt 106-107).

This type of scholarship, which comes from the Hermeneutic tradition, fully supports historicism and text analysis (which focuses on evidence rather than inference). While I do not suggest that all literary critics of the twenty-first century fully support nineteenth-century Hermeneutics it is rather an important point to note that literature-as-text should and must stand as praxis before the analyst applies her/his own interpretive and intuitive/imaginative strategy. Most of the current medieval theory that I support in this thesis owes a debt to both the Hermeneutic method and poststructuralism, not to mention Anthropology, Psychology and the Social Sciences. I have chosen to look at Hildegard from a literary perspective in this paper, however, for two reasons. The first is that medievalism is becoming an endangered realm of literary analysis. Too often medievalists are seen as book-worm scholars uninterested in current theory and methods of analysis. The rise of the 'New Medievalism' suggests that this is changing. The second reason for looking at Hildegard from a literary perspective is because a great deal of feminist studies of Hildegard have also been written in this way. Like Barbara Johnson I believe that “the question of gender is a question of language” (Johnson 37) and opening up the boundaries of history to include more recent literary modes is the fullest expression of
Johnson's idea.

If looking at Hildegard from a perspective which is both historical and literary is now acceptable a great deal of thanks are due to the New Historicists who opened the realm up in the early 1980's. Scholars such as Stephen Greenblatt and Louis Montrose, in summary, argued that New Historicism revealed "an array of reading practices that investigate a series of issues that emerge when critics seek to chart the ways texts, in dialectical fashion, both represent a society's behavior patterns and perpetuate, shape, or alter that culture's dominant codes" (Cadzow 535). Although these ideas will come up when I speak at length about the 'New Medievalism/philology' it is important to note at the outset how theories about identity, context, gender, and history have come together to form the basic foundation of this paper.

There are as many 'types' of interpretations focused on Hildegard as there are texts written by Hildegard herself. Sabina Flanagan, in a recent book of essays on Hildegard suggests that this is because of the broad focus of her work:

Why should the work of this Benedictine nun attract such intense attention nine centuries after her birth and at the turn of the new

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1 The major proponents of New Historicism are Steven Greenblatt, whose work Renaissance Self Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (1980) was an early contribution. Other New Historicists include W. B. Michaels and Peter Stallybrass, Staging the Renaissance: A Reinterpretation of Elizabethan and Jacobean Drama (1990). The scholarly journal Representations, (U. Of California Press) also figures New Historicist writings.
Millennium? Part of the answer lies, no doubt, in the broad sweep of her interests, from music, theology, ethics and cosmolagy to zoology and medicine. Nor were those interests mainly theoretical. The subjects over which she let her visionary imagination and understanding play also informed her own activities in the world and her practical alignment with it. (Flanagan xiii)

Hildegard is an inspiration because she could comprehend a great deal and work with great skill in many different areas; she was what we might today call a ‘multi-tasker’.

What seemed to be, for the medievalist, about learning about the way the world worked in its intricacies, now seems to be simply about the process of acquiring more and ‘doing it all’ in order to prove one’s worth. More than these particular differences are the ways in which scholars have interpreted Hildegard’s position as a feminist (or not as a feminist).

Certainly she falls into the category of ‘the woman who did it all’. Her marriage to Christ and her work with the Church make her truly an overwhelming figure.

Within the work I have previously done on literary historicism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries I have found the relationship between feminism and historicism to be fascinating if not endlessly paradoxical. To add further fuel to the fire medieval feminism is perhaps the most challenging place to do research because the roles and position and attitude toward women is, as yet, so incomplete and ambiguous. Within the ‘New

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My previous work has involved, from a historical perspective, the work of Hermeneuticist Philip August Boeckh. I have looked at the benefits of historicism for contemporary history through a review article (unpublished) on Natalie Zemon Davis’ The Return of Martin Guerre.
Medievalism' feminism finds a welcome home. The aid that current literary theory, with its emphasis on difference and variance, coupled with the still lively vigour of textual analysis, can provide still remains to be seen. This paper will provide an introduction to the way this practice might work. Like a game of chess things will inevitably become more challenging as well as more clear as the pieces are removed from the board. While looking at Hildegard's work in a clearly outlined methodological framework makes a great deal of work unnecessary the framework itself is perhaps more difficult to work within than a more traditional narrative.

Medieval writers loved to play games and used rhetoric to a degree that we, in the twenty-first century, find almost impossible to comprehend. To this end my personal studies on Hildegard are limited. What I have done in my own interpretation of this woman's work is always to be aware that Hildegard was foremost a devout Christian; consequently, the mirror of truth and speech for the medieval writer, especially as a visionary, is unending and eschatological. The medieval viewpoint is always on the end of time, unlike my own presentist viewpoint. To this end my own criticism and interpretation has involved expanding notions of awareness rather than disavowing secondary texts written about Hildegard. Medieval scholars could benefit from broadening their viewpoint contextually as well as contracting their focus textually. This would result, perhaps, in analyses that cover less material in more detail. In this way they might "depict each event as part of a whole, or, in other words, on the basis of a single event depict the form of
history itself' (Humboldt 108). Humboldt's view of analysis seems to relate well to the issue of Hildegard and her writings. We may find, within her texts, a view of the world that is both social (macrocosmic) and individual (microcosmic). This revelation is highly re-visionist because it allows us to rethink the relationship that we have with a text and what I see as the 'textual community': all the factors and writings that come together in the producing of a manuscript and its transmission.

In the first chapter of this work, I spend a great deal of time looking at the most popular articles and texts written about Hildegard, looking at their structure and content, especially relating to feminist ideas and practices. After looking at the interpretations of Hildegard in Chapter One of this text, those which do not seem to adopt poststructuralist ideas, I want to outline new medieval interpretive strategies which do take current theory into practice. In doing this I will look specifically at how these new theories might relate to a type of medieval feminism. This type of feminism would focus not on a 'present' definition of the term but instead would look contextually at definitions of sex and gender and proceed to look at women from that angle.

Chapter Two will deal with the current state of literary and historical interpretive theory, in particular by looking at Ferdinand de Saussure and the semioticians and the feminist theorists Julia Kristeva and Hélène Cixous and the feminist medievalist Judith Bennett. I will then show how these theorists have affected the realm of medieval theory
and practice (which we will see as having been resistant to change for the most part).

Philip August Boeckh, the brilliant Hermeneutic scholar and literary critic of the
nineteenth-century once prophesied that, "[w]hen an age is hostile to criticism, because it
is viewed as either pedantic or destructive, either false criticism prevails or true criticism is
unrecognised" (Boeckh 144). Certainly studies of the Middle Age have, in the critical
past, lived up to this truth. But perhaps not without doing a present credit to the
discipline. Boeckh also wrote that the “best critic is swift to conjecture but slow to
express judgement” (Boeckh 145). I think we will see that this too has been the case with
medieval literary critics and historians.

Chapter Three takes as its topic the new form of medieval hermeneutic as it might be
practiced from a feminist position. Within my final chapter I want to look specifically at
how one of Hildegard of Bingen’s texts, the Scivias, was interpreted before the ‘New
Medievalism’ was introduced and how it might benefit from the practices that are now
being used in many medieval circles. To do this I will be adopting much of the method
(and methodology) outlined at the end of Chapter Two. There are already many books
being written on Hildegard to help with understanding how a new interpretation would
work; of great benefit to this study are those scholars who have been open to new
methods and criticism throughout their career. It is my hope that increasing interest in
presenting medieval literature from this new theoretical viewpoint will expand the amount
of knowledge we have about the Middle Ages, about women, and about literary
historiography in general. Hildegard’s work is overwhelmingly inspirational and a joy to behold. By looking at her from a new and more critical perspective I hope that it may appear even more so. I begin then, in the ‘light’ of Sapiencia, to delve into both our world and Hildegard’s, that the two voices succumb and surrender to a higher interpretive power and are seen to prevail.
Works Cited


Chapter One

I KNEW I LOVED HER BEFORE I MET HER: Current receptions and analysis of Hildegard’s work

The widespread reception of the ‘New Medievalism’ across disciplinary boundaries points to its far reaching implications. The reception of these restored theories, however, has not been standardized. For the ‘old’ medieval literary scholar the emphasis was on providing plausible facts to be offered up about a past which is so terribly far gone that its remains are only good to find their way into flashy historical romance novels, such as Umberto Eco’s The Name of the Rose or Hollywood films such as Excalibur or First Knight. Most of these new fictional interpretations (although admittedly each exist on a different degree of intensity of fictionality) focus heavily on the omnipresent Arthurian cycle, the one aspect of medievalism which never seems to die. It has become fashionable for medieval scholars who seek a wide audience only to look for texts which have dramatic value. Natalie Zemon Davis’ text, The Return of Martin Guerre was turned into a play as well as a film starring Richard Gere, not to mention the original film made in France starring Gerard Depardieu. I believe that Hildegard of Bingen has become the new Martin Guerre. Hildegard’s work yields volumes in this regard not only because of her gender but also possibly because she produced so much writing, both rational and

creative, under 'patriarchal' suppression within the Christian church. Regardless of historical context or even textual evidence most medievalists overwhelmingly seem to agree that Hildegard is a 'hot topic' for those who belong to a feminist school of thought. It is a sad reality that most scholars are aware that our material needs to appeal not only to a particular school of thought's agenda, whether that be postcolonialism or feminism, but also to a critical reading public both within the University and in the general academic reading public. We have little luxury to study the topics we really feel close to any longer in a way which feels both theoretically and historically sound. The reluctance of poststructuralism to accept historicism is evidence of this. To this end politics and economics have decided both the way that agendas are developed as well as the type of text studied. The historical trend for French historians to write about the French Revolution, regardless of patriotism, is evidence of this trend. In the case of Hildegard's extant writings it has been her letters, music, and scientific texts which take up the front of the line. Further than this current academic politics has held great sway over the way that textual interpretations are being written. It is not often that a medieval text is presented in any form other than a narrative history. In fact the narrative form is so standard that it seems at present there is no other option. The danger here is that what hides behind the structural and interpretative demands of the present day is often the received text itself.

4 It strikes me that the works of Lynn Hunt are quite helpful in this regard, especially: Beyond the Cultural turn: new directions in the study of society and culture (1999), Histories: French constructions of the past (1995), Telling the truth about history (1994 edited with Joyce Appleby) and The family romance of the French Revolution (1992).
Important issues of analysis must be forgone in order to present material in an interesting and persuasive fashion. Catchy book titles often make radical suggestions far from the real issues that the actual text reveals. Although it is true that current literary analysis is better than fiction there are myriad forms of evidence showing how it tends towards a type of media-driven text byte. These text bytes, according to current computer jargon, give only bits and pieces of information, leaving any sense of unified interpretive ‘story’ up to the current fashion of the day-- the narrative. The form of the interpretation of texts is therefore mediated not by the text itself, but by some arbitrary trend. Further, the particular methods of analysis are dictated not by known evidence but by individual interest. It is one thing for a scholar to choose a topic out of desire and to look at it from only one angle, but to ignore obvious contextual evidence in order to sustain personal value judgements is academically imprudent. The subject matter of most of the studies compiled on Hildegard of Bingen, put together mainly by a small clique of interested scholars has often tended this way. Desired outcomes predict factual information.

At the current time there seem to be three ‘canonical’ secondary sources for Hildegard’s visionary work. Although there are many other texts and articles written on

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I need to point out here that I am not dealing with any texts which have appeared on Hildegard’s music both because I cannot make any claims to have expertise in that area and also because the amount of work done on this topic is too large to be adequately covered here. There have, as well, been a great deal of texts assigned to discussing her works on science and medicine. For the same reasons they have been omitted here.
the abbess, for the purpose of brevity and clarity I have chosen what seem to be the most widely read and used in academic circles. Barbara Lachman's *The Journal of Hildegard of Bingen* will be the first text I look at. This work, rather than being strictly academic, is rather a fictional text which is covert in its scholarly operations. The second text I have analyzed is Sabina Flanagan’s *Hildegard of Bingen: a Visionary Life* which is an introductory biography. The last and most scholarly text I have looked at is Barbara Newman’s *Sister of Wisdom: St. Hildegard’s Theology of the Feminine*. Newman provides an extensive analysis of most of Hildegard’s work and her interpretation has been widely acknowledged as the best on the topic.

In this chapter I want to discuss the function of these texts as representative feminist literary analyses, by looking at the epistemological background of the authors, the form of their work, their chosen school of thought, and the place of historicism in their work’s content. Other examples of ‘typical’ scholarship will also be discussed, as necessary, in this context in order to flesh things out and broaden the frame of reference with regard to the current state of Hildegard studies.

*Singling her Praises: Barbara Lachman and ‘Hildegard as muse’*

Barbara Lachman’s portrayal of Hildegard of Bingen was inspired by her own desire to validate early female spiritual experience. She addresses and assumes the persona of
Hildegard of Bingen in her work, creating a journal out of one year in the life of Hildegard. Lachman's text begins with the abbess' chronology up until the year she writes about in the text, 1151. She does not finish off Hildegard's life (via the chronological format) until the journal has ended, much like the form of a Hollywood historical film, which reveals the outcome of the life before the credits run. Lachman's first admonition to her readers, as she addresses them as literary historian, in her preface is that "[w]omen find themselves enormously drawn to [Hildegard] for inspiration. But attempts to turn

Hildegard into a feminist can be misleading... On the other hand, if living the life of a feminist means 'to articulate a self-consciousness about women's identity both as inherited cultural fact and as process of social construction,' then Hildegard was indeed a pioneering feminist" (Lachman x). Scholars such as Augustine Thompson, Bernard Scholz, and Prudence Allen are quick to make the same point; although Hildegard was a woman and wrote about women she never once claimed superiority over men. Allen's article "Two Medieval Views on Woman's Identity: Hildegard of Bingen and Thomas Aquinas" contains an extremely lucid literary exegesis of Hildegard's understanding of sexual identity. Within her writing Hildegard articulated the idea that both men and women were equal but meant to perform different functions, what Allen calls a theory of 'sex complimentarity' which "argues for the fundamental equality of worth and dignity for women and men while at the same time arguing for a philosophically significant difference
between the two sexes” (Allen 21). The matter of gender is complicated with regard to Hildegard, especially considering so much rests on creating Hildegard as a type of role model for current spiritualists and medieval feminist scholars.

Lachman is not a typical Hildegard scholar. She speaks of her research on Hildegard as ‘revealed,’ a part of her own spiritual development, alongside of which evolved a “traditional technique of laying on of hands” (Lachman xi). This type of bodily possession inspired Lachman further, as she wrote Hildegard’s journal, to “read the same 150 psalms she sang each week, used the same Vulgate version of the Bible she knew, and read the sermons and other writings of the great Church Fathers that she and her nuns chanted during the long night office of Matins. In all [her] activity [she has], like Hildegard, observed prolonged periods of silence, most especially but not always during flare-ups of chronic illness” (Lachman xii). Her plea to her readers is to “read the journal entries aloud to themselves with moving lips, in the same way that words were always read in the twelfth century” (Lachman xii). Because she is using a great deal of source material in

Allen compares Hildegard and Aquinas on four different points in the article: creation, generation, resurrection and wisdom, revealing that Hildegard’s understanding of the trinity was the basis for her theory of sexuality. She believed that God, the father was both male and female, Christ, male, and the Church female (with the clergy male as well, and necessarily so to provide the appropriate pairing of Church and clergy in parallel to Adam and Eve, Jesus and Mary -- cf. Thompson’s article “Hildegard of Bingen on Gender and the Priesthood” Church History 63: 349-363 and Bernard W. Scholz’ “Hildegard von Bingen on the Nature of Woman,” American Benedictine Review 31:3, pp. 361-383 especially on the latters’ highly erudite explication of Hildegard’s understanding of gender roles and the trinity). Allen’s final reason for Hildegard’s unique view is contextual. He argues that she has not yet been introduced to Aristotelian wisdom and has therefore based a great deal of her knowledge from her society -- made up of both males and females because Hildegard worked within a double monastery (Allen 32-35).
order to reconstruct Hildegard’s life she points out that “[n]ames of historical people and places in the text are identified in brief notes or commentaries on the pages where they occur,” but again, Lachman urges that “the entries can be read, heard, and experienced without critical notes” (Lachman xii). Like Mary Ford-Grabowsky’s article, “Angels and Archetypes: a Jungian approach to Saint Hildegard” a great deal of emphasis is put on making Hildegard’s work applicable for spiritual, or at least ‘psychological’ development, what Jung terms ‘spiritualization’ (Ford-Grabowsky 4). Ford-Grabowsky looks within Hildegard’s work to see how symbols are used in order to ‘amplify’ meaning (Ford-Grabowsky 5). She also looks at the relationship between the religious images that appear throughout Hildegard’s work in similar fashion to the way that Lachman explores Hildegard’s intimate relationship with music in her text. Looking at music Lachman takes a great deal of care in preparing her work. Special translations of Hildegard’s songs are prepared by Lachman herself and appear at the end of her novel along with a glossary of terms (Liturgical) and an impressive bibliography/discography. As for the novel itself there appears to be a great deal of interpretation covered without methodological concern, at least not any that Lachman speaks of. A typical journal entry seeks to expound commonly held beliefs and knowledge about the twelfth century such as part of the entry for ‘December 28, 1151, Feast of the Holy Innocents and the Octave of Christmas’ where Hildegard tries to decide on plans for the cloister church within her new abbey:

Should it be of dazzling color - the heavenly Jerusalem’s jeweled walls expressed as they are in the Cluniac houses, as urged by Odo - or is it as Br. Bernard so vehemently insists, that the open space of the Cistercian houses,
with their clear glass, the honest and simple proportions themselves, carry the Divine Office more directly to the Most High? I still tend towards color, the warmth and passion of representation and color. I believe that, as my women and I enter into liturgical time, through the contemplative act of singing, we can also focus and meditate upon representations of exemplary lives painted on the ceiling or the walls that will mirror our sounds in a spectrum of color...

[No one apparently believes that I—a mere woman, frail and untaught—have seen enough of the architectural jewels of the world to understand what we need (Lachman 20).

Lachman chooses to infuse her journal entries with architectural history, art history, rhetorical tropes (such as the humility topos at the end of the above section), liturgical scholarship, epistolary and church history as well as spiritual insight. It is her interpretation of Hildegard's visionary experience which takes Lachman's focus. Lachman contends that it was "[i]n her [Hildegard's] forty-third year she began to record visions she had received since early childhood; once begun, her creative output never stopped, in spite of her gender, poor health, lack of formalized schooling, and the intermittent but intimidating opposition of a male hierarchy" (Lachman ix). The first journal entry and footnote where Hildegard's (Lachman's) view of the visionary process occurs takes place ‘January 20, 1152, Feast of St. Agnes, virgin and martyr’ and involves mainly the division between a dream and a vision:

The restlessness these dreams have caused me is remarkable considering how little of substance actually transpires in them, how little I understand or even remember what has happened in these minutes—or is it hours?—when they invade my sleep. And where is it happening exactly? Most of all, I wonder about the source of such dreams.

Surely they are not in the same category as my visions, for those come to me when my eyes are open, through my inner senses, in the clear light of day, but lit from above, in the Shadow of the Living Light. These dreams that are
plaguing me come only when I am deeply, nearly deathly, asleep, in a sleep that is both deeper and more troubled than is normal for me. And how do they prophesy? Not in the sense of telling future events, for we do not normally understand the gift or act of prophecy in that way. When Daniel was able to explain the dreams of Nebuchadnezzar, the signs and gestures that were presented had meanings connected to the divine mysteries, even though the dreamer himself was an infidel. And of the other Old Testament prophets, their role was never to predict, but to interpret. Just so, in my visions, the Voice of Wisdom explains the significance of particular colors and figures, the lessons and meanings condensed into gestures, actions, and even tableaus that unfold to me in the Shadow of the Living Light. These dreams are different: unclear and confusing, without any interpreting voice, they are never direct with me. What is their relationship to me? Is it possible they could be of the Devil? Of course this is what I fear most and what has prevented me from speaking about them as yet to Volmar, a poor decision on my part. Is the old Dragon at it again, and just how is he trying to get at me this time? And what, specifically, could I have done that evoked him, if it is he in the guise of my recent bouts of dreaming? (Lachman 31-2)

Lachman’s Hildegard is endlessly worried about the nature of her visions (which are real and terrifying for her). She is, however, careful to point out that dream visions do have a precedent in the Bible and that she (Hildegard) must be able to make something useful out of them. Lachman remains convinced throughout her text that Hildegard’s visions are real for her and they are conveyed without special pride or vanity.

Barbara Lachman’s version of Hildegard is highly fictional. Lachman constructs Hildegard as a woman consumed by only two things: the ultimate necessity for music in her abbey (which she sees threatened by other superiors who do not see things her way), and her insistence that the Church be ruled by a visionary path (composed of the ‘Virtues’ which we find in her liturgical play, and by the liturgy itself) that is decreed by God as
opposed to the 'dragon' (*draco in Latin, another word for the devil*). A footnote in Lachman’s text reveals that Hildegard was never formally taught music, that she, Hildegard, was “brought forth and sang chant without instruction of anyone, and sang although she had never learned either musical notation or singing” and Lachman interprets this as “more than saying she has not been to a school, because what was taught in school was called *musica*, not *cantus*, and was theoretical (theorems of Pythagoras, ratios, modes, music of the spheres, its relationship to geometry and arithmetic) rather than the practical matter of singing the corpus of Mass and Divine Office chants... Hildegard is protesting that she didn’t even have that kind of formal training -- which makes the exercise of her musical gifts all the more remarkable” (Lachman 82, n114.). Lachman’s Hildegard is blunt about her gifts from God, and ultimately proud in her temperament. She compares the music created within her female choirs to those made up only of men:

> It certainly supports and gives clarity to encouraging each of the female Virtues in my *Ordo* to differentiate herself not only by what she sings but also by the quality of sound she brings. Contemptus Mundi needs to be one of our older frog voices, proud and hoarse with a watery gargle, which Humilitas has not; a simple, but a tempered sweetness; Discretio, a voice of controlled intelligence; and Castitas may surprise them all with the sensuous range and rounding of her passionate melodies. Still, it is a far different thing from the kind of high-voice, low-voice division that characterizes the monastic choirs in men’s houses (Lachman 103).

These descriptions comparing the work done in Bingen to that done in other monasteries exists throughout the journal, which is interpreted by Lachman as a place to relax from the
mundane tasks of the day, a place to air out problems not to God but simply to a general listener, and a place by which to point out the cultural refinements and adornments of the day. Lachman’s prose is simple, natural and full of rich imagery that is clear in its intent to evoke God. She describes colours as though they were gemstones because of their symbolic meaning. She writes of the “glorious, cerulean blue sapphire, gold-flecked and laden with symbolic meaning for those of us who adore the stone most reflected, that lapis who is Christ, who becomes the cornerstone of Heavenly Jerusalem (Lachman 106).

Lachman is determined to present Hildegard as impenetrable as this stone. Hildegard is staunchly determined to present her understanding of God as she has been shown through her visions. She is also determined to prevail as a woman although she repeatedly, through Lachman’s prose, notes that “[p]erhaps it is worse for women’s minds, since we are weaker to start with” (Lachman 108). She even goes so far as to have Hildegard offer up proof of women’s weakness by revealing a ‘shallow conversation’ between two of her sisters (Lachman 109-110), which is really an evocation of Hildegard’s bitterness over not being invited to the Synod of Trier because of her gender. She comments that “compared with conversations that must take place at synods like Trier, or even at monasteries like Citeaux, ours are more often petty, lacking the knowledge that provides at least aesthetic, if not theological dimension” (Lachman 111). Hildegard’s justifiable bitterness over her exclusions, various as they are, tends towards a discernable unhappiness over the situation of the abbess. I sensed that Lachman’s Hildegard wished that she were a man were it not for her ability to invoke visions because of her weakness as a woman. Bernard W. Scholz
writes that "Hildegard shared society's expectations of woman, and to compensate for her own deviation in a world ruled by men she dwelt on her own frailty as well as the conventional notions about the sins and weakness of her sex" (Scholz 381-2). This echoes the correspondence between Hildegard and another contemporary visionary, Elisabeth of Schonau. Barbara Newman, in an article titled "Hildegard of Bingen: Visions and Validation" writes that

[n]o less than Hildegard, Elisabeth felt this liability [being a woman] keenly. She debated whether or not to publish her visions, fearing that some people would dismiss them as satanic delusions or mere feminine fancies (muliebria figmenta). When, like Hildegard, she felt herself called to prophetic preaching, she needed assurance that God would help her fulfill what she felt to be a masculine role. Hence the angel of the Lord commands her, 'Arise... and stand upon your feet, and I will speak with you; and fear not, for I am with you all the days of your life. Play the man [viriliter age] and let your heart take courage'.

Within Lachman's text the interplay between meekness and superiority is keenly felt.

Most scholars seem to agree that Hildegard, regardless of her conventional view of women, as opposed to the later visionary of Christine de Pisan, for example, still felt herself to take on a role of authority (Scholz 380). Hildegard shows her own situation, frame of mind and attitude to be superior. However Hildegard compares herself to Elisabeth of Schönau in Lachman's work:

I fear that what I have so far heard of Elisabeth's visions at Schönau elaborate details too fantastic for the minds of most, fanning the traffic in relics more than feeding us from the inside or informing us with a special way of knowledge. My visions tell me of mysteries greater that all the combined details of the slaughter of Ursula and her 11,000 companions: passion that is
devotion, consummation and steadfast love. Elisabeth has recently written that she is slandered and misunderstood and looks to me for sisterly support. I can sympathize; nevertheless she is imprudent, without discretio, and I fear she will unwittingly serve those whose coffers overflow from the sale of those beautiful heads and lustrous bones so revered in Cologne. The elaboration for such details says little to illuminate Ursula’s courage when the forces of worldly men are thrown up against her in jeers and actions. My texts in her honor are everywhere concerned with these matters (Lachman 126).

This seems a peculiar admission, for Hildegard to show some display of superiority over her fellow visionary. Although the two did disagree on some points, contemporaries seem to have favoured linking the two together in a show of support (Newman 173).

Lachman’s use of the Latin words, like discretio, are not further defined within the text although it is obvious that they have some wider, or theological meaning beyond simply ‘discretion’ and seem to point towards some natural dislike for the fellow seer that cannot be understood within current linguistic usage. Leaving such words in their original language now seems to imply quaintness rather than, more importantly, a deeper meaning.

Lachman’s main idea in writing Hildegard’s journal was to present her life and visions as understandable, timeless, priceless jewels. Lachman is focused on presenting Hildegard as a strong female figure. She is always fraught with humility and determined to act within her gendered boundaries. At the close of the journal Hildegard (Lachman) writes: “[o]ver this liturgical year, our cloister church has miraculously materialized, manifest from stone, wood, shapes of arches, proportions of certain ratios to amplify certain configurations of sound. And we ourselves have brought forth new songs of praise
and will continue to grow and change and bring forth fruit. Or not” (Lachman 162). The ‘journal’ then closes with no additional context for the novel save the closing of Hildegard’s chronology. No other setting of visionary significance in the Middle Ages is offered, nor is any geographical placement given other than that which exists within the constructed text proper. Without scholarly footnoting it is impossible to tell what has been ‘made up’ by Lachman and what comes from the sources unless one has already read them thoroughly themselves. What this creates is a bilateral frame of reference for readers. Regular readers, spiritual or otherwise might find joy in the text and, supposedly, scholars too can find their own happiness at being presented with a version that is easy to read and unencumbered by impossible source dating and unprovable data. The idea that Lachman seems to present is that Hildegard was a human being, not a text. She asserts, through the form of her work, that scholarly interpretation takes away from the beauty of the personal. There are problems with the veracity of many points in Hildegard’s life because certain types of data that exist about Hildegard are fictional and the type of ‘history’ that we are used to (one centred on proving facts) was simply not a part of medieval life.

*Flanagan’s Heavy-Handed Introduction: Viewing Hildegard from a critical perspective*

Sabina Flanagan’s text, presented in a second edition (1998), moves from the ‘inspirational fictional’ realm into one of ‘scholarly biography’. It is meant to act as an
introduction to the visionary's life. This has often swayed Flanagan into taking a rather nineteenth-century approach to literary history because she favours a linear narrative full of 'facts' over what may appear to be a discontinuous narrative of source interpretation and social construction. By doing this she is able to interpret Hildegard's visions with ease. Helen J. John, in a review essay entitled "Hildegard of Bingen: A New Twelfth-Century Woman Philosopher" looks at Flanagan's work from the perspective she can offer her readers because she has succumbed to presenting the 'factual data'. She points out that more than creating a general introduction Flanagan also brings forward a "sociological and psychological explanation of how she did what she did [as a visionary]" (John 116). It is this particular methodology which makes Flanagan's work stand out. She takes great pains to outline what she believes in Hildegard's methodology and her 'agenda'.

Flanagan's chapter titles are indicative of the general approach that she takes within the text: Chapter One is "Life and Death," Two is "World and Cloister," Three is "Opportunities and Constraints." Flanagan's view of Hildegard is made clear in her Preface to the First Edition: "'Meek' and 'ordinary' are the last words to describe her, as even slight acquaintance with her story will show" (Flanagan ix). John disagrees with this, however, as she feels that "[Flanagan's] stress on sociological, psychological, and physiological explanations seems to play down the significance of her heroine’s accomplishments" (John 120). But Flanagan writes that "Hildegard's written work not
only surpassed those of most of her male contemporaries in the range of their subject matter... but also outshone them in visionary beauty and intellectual power” (Flanagan ix-x). Flanagan’s position comes from her educational, rather than spiritual, background, beginning with a PhD thesis (Flanagan x) and coming to a point where she felt that she was equipped to provide a necessary introduction to the work. Her approach is, as she puts it, “traditional” because she feels that she can choose no other way until “more persuasive evidence, whether external (to corroborate or disprove some of the many dates given in the text) or intertextual (to settle the relationship between the *Vita* and the other sources...)” is given (Flanagan n. 205). John admits that this admonition to stay “close to the primary sources [is] no mean scholarly task, given the range and bulk of Hildegard’s own writings and the abundant documentation of her life by her contemporaries” (John 119-120). This it would seem is the reason that Flanagan feels so bound to providing a conservative interpretation of the work. Flanagan states early on that her work is not meant “[t]o provide a general account of twelfth-century natural history, cosmology, or theology” because this “is beyond the scope of [her] book” (Flanagan xi) although she says that her text “presents [Hildegard’s] life and writings in the context of her times” (Flanagan xii). Flanagan’s narrative is consistent. She chooses to disregard rhetorical, allegorical, or questionable evidence in order to present a seamless portrait of Hildegard. She paints Hildegard as a woman who has had visions since she was five years old, and whose work, *Scivias*, was truly a gift from God. She writes that,

[t]he real turning point in her [Hildegard’s] career came... in 1141, as she
recalled in the preface to her first major visionary work, which she was to call *Scivias*, apparently a contraction of *Sci Vias Domini*, ‘Know the ways of the Lord’:

And it came to pass in the eleven hundred and forty-first year of the incarnation of Jesus Christ, Son of God, when I was forty-two years and seven months old, that the heavens were opened and a blinding light of exceptional brilliance flowed through my entire brain. And so it kindled my whole heart and breast like a flame not burning but warming... and suddenly I understood the meaning of the expositions of the books, that is to say of the psalter, the evangelists, and other catholic books of the Old and New Testaments.

This is how Hildegard described the sudden access of understanding by which she felt able to penetrate to the inner meaning of the texts of her religion. Of even greater importance for her subsequent career was the command she received at the same time: ‘O, fragile one, ash of ash and corruption, say and write what you see and hear. So there might be no mistaking the directive to write down and publicize what she understood from her visions, it was repeated three more times in similar terms (Flanagan 4).

Flanagan’s straightforward narrative recapitulation of writings by and about Hildegard continue throughout the work. Her particular analysis of the texts of Hildegard are usually structural and thematic. She uses such words as “trite,” (58) “laboured” and “rambling” (56) to describe Hildegard’s process of explicating her visions. She performs one close analysis of a vision from *Scivias*. Her choice to focus on descriptive analysis reveals the process by which Hildegard unpacks her visions. After looking at the structure of the work she then goes on to look at the content and what she calls “purpose” (61). She recounts the linear and digressive attempts by Hildegard to use scripture (61), rhetoric (61,67), audience selectivity (62), and social practices (63-65) in order to create, in Flanagan’s words, a “‘how-to’ book rather than an abstract meditation on theological...
questions” (Flanagan 67) or a “way of grappling with the problem of how people should best live their life in order to reach the Heavenly City” (Flanagan 69). Flanagan’s interpretation of Hildegard’s work therefore reveals her understanding of important notions of genre; that what appears to be a journal, for example, may in reality be a political tract or a piece of propaganda. John writes that:

Flanagan implies that Hildegard’s claim to a prophetic role was a more or less conscious strategy for advancing her ‘hidden agenda’ of joining ‘the male literary and theological elite’. Disturbingly, she raises, but never really resolves, the question as to whether ‘Hildegard’s appeal to her privileged source of authority could be seen as cynically manipulative in her personal dealings and intellectually dishonest in her writings’ (John 120).

It is certainly true that Flanagan does not try to ignore the political realities and advantages that came from Hildegard’s visionary activity. She is perhaps unique as a scholar for raising this issue with regard to Hildegard’s life.

In her final chapter, entitled “Potent Infirmities” Flanagan begins to question the validity of Hildegard’s visionary work as a whole by looking at the way that Hildegard’s visions presented themselves in light of current medical analyses. This is unlike the text’s outset where fact could easily be discerned even within the confines of typically hyperbolic works such as the *Vita*. In this last chapter Flanagan calls upon ‘new’ evidence which may suggest that Hildegard suffered from migraine headaches that were the cause of her visionary blackouts. John points to Flanagan’s interpretation of these migraines as “a wonderfully adaptive instrument” (Flanagan 200, John 120). Flanagan indeed brings up all
of the information in Hildegard’s work where she explains the ‘light’ that she sees and then juxtaposes that with some current medical research as it has been done by Charles Singer (1951) and then the more noted criticism by Oliver Sachs (Flanagan 185-197). Taking this evidence into account as well as her own research Flanagan’s final comment on Hildegard is that it was “a combination of factors that finally allowed Hildegard to capitalize on her accumulated visionary experience by recording it in written form” (Flanagan 197). Significantly, the early parts of the Scivias contain visions which can be closely linked with migraine aura effect, are relatively discontinuous, and are interpreted by Hildegard in terms of fairly basic Christian teachings (Flanagan 197). Barbara Newman points out, as does John, that “such a diagnosis may be correct; but unlike Singer [Sachs is not discussed in this work], we must avoid the reductionist error of assuming that physiological cause (or better correlative) of the visions excludes the possibility of any higher inspiration” (Newman 1985, 167). In a famous incident in the life of Hildegard we read of her desire to move from Disibodenberg to Rupertsberg, one which lands her in bed for a long period of time. In fact, it is written that when someone came in to try and move her head it would not do so. In the end she would not get well until it was decided upon that the move would take place (recounted in Newman 1997, 9). Hildegard’s motive for the move, rather than being simply a call from God, is thought by Miriam Schmitt, in an article on Hildegard’s relationship with her magistra (teacher), Jutta, to be about “[f]reedom from the monks’ control and domination” (Schmitt 182). It is difficult to reconcile such an obvious political move with the condition of the visionary state but it
must be remembered that Hildegard was both prophet and abbess. Being so it seems obvious that the function of her visions could take on many roles. In an article entitled “Illness as Privilege: Hildegard von Bingen and the Condition of Mystic Writing,” Caroline Molina goes even further, suggesting that even if Hildegard’s visions were the result of illness she made it her manifesto to use that illness “as the precondition for mystic expression, and thus central to the ‘being’ of the mystic identity itself” (Molina 85). Molina sees ‘illness as privilege’ because it can act as a subversion to the norm, not unlike Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s illness in the nineteenth-century. Molina writes of Hildegard that, “[b]eyond a tropological reading of Hildegard, then, I will place her in the context of a medieval spirituality that not only posited an alternative to the scholastic worldview, but also challenged ecclesiastic authority while at the same time usurping its redemptive functions” (Molina 86). This would mean that as a woman writer, the condition of illness provides a unique station for what would appear to be non-threatening subversion. Because she is ill she is not common; because she is ill she has a gift. Molina cites Hildegard as saying that indeed, her visions are ‘cause’ and ‘cure’, that she has been given the suffering in order to find its release in writing, even beyond writing, in God’s self and further points out that as “the pre-linguistic, pre-conceptual source of mystic expression, the vision induces a physical suffering accompanied by silence and mitigated only when the silence is broken” (Molina 86). Molina’s claim that Hildegard’s illness was bound in a type of hermeneutic circle is tempered by her recognition that this type of relationship is never-ending and provides her with a way to celebrate Hildegard’s situation as unique
She writes that Hildegard's illness was "essential to her very identity, her 'being' as a mystic" (Molina 88). Stepping beyond Flanagan and Newman then, Molina argues that "Hildegard's affirmation of woman's embodiment as one of frailty can thus be seen as a glorification of that very embodiment on several levels" (Molina 89). But Flanagan's overall tone in discussing Hildegard is so much more cautious. Flanagan paints the abbess as one whose work was a "backwater in her own day" but one whose works "have contributed to a broader and more enduring stream of speculation about the interrelations of divinity, humanity and the natural world" (Flanagan 204).

Effeminate Times, Hard Times: Coming to grips with Barbara Newman

It is this kind of 'enduring stream of speculation' that Barbara Newman tackles in her text, Sister of Wisdom: St. Hildegard's Theology of the Feminine. Written in 1987 and reprinted in 1997 with a new preface, bibliography and discography this text is still the standard interpretation of Hildegard's work from a feminist scholarly perspective. The structure of the work is both analytical and narrative. Newman takes pains to look closely not only at Hildegard's writing, but also the music, drama, scientific texts, and artwork. She makes mention of Flanagan's text as a "critical biography" as well as pointing out that historical novels are now available (Newman xv). As for her own learning on Hildegard she writes that "if one is trying to fathom the unfamiliar thought-world of a twelfth-century Christian, one can do far worse than to approach it from the perspective of a mid-
twentieth-century Catholic” although she asserts that “valuable as [she] found this scholarship [she does] not intend to produce more of the same” (Newman xvi). It was her mistrust and inability to deal with old forms of history and literary analyses which led her to construct her own methods of interpretation.

Newman is dedicated not only to creating Hildegard as an inspirational figure, but also to remaining very close to the primary sources. She terms this the “new feminist historiography” a type of scholarship which “bridges two worlds -- the historically and ecclesiastically based medievalism in which [she] was trained and the creative, freewheeling realm of feminist spirituality” (Newman xvi). This makes Hildegard part of what Newman calls the “sapiential tradition” whose theologians “favor the use of feminine imagery for the Holy Spirit, the church, and the cosmos” (Newman xxi).

Newman does claim that Hildegard is “the first Christian thinker to deal seriously and positively with the feminine as such, not merely with the challenges posed by and for women in a male-dominated world” (Newman 1997, xxi). John, in her review essay, also calls attention to Newman’s claims about Hildegard’s status in literary history. She points out that Newman is not so caught up in claiming Hildegard’s feminism that she ignores the reality that Hildegard uses the masculine names for God, and indeed, is quite entrenched in religious and social conservatism (John 117, Newman 3). Using one of Hildegard’s most often quoted lines Newman writes that “she [Hildegard] insisted that God had chosen a poor, frail, untutored woman like herself to reveal his mysteries only because those to
whom he had first entrusted them— the wise, learned, and masculine clergy — had failed to obey. She lived in a ‘womanish age’ (muliebre tempus) in which men had become so lax, weak, and sensual, in a word, effeminate — that God had to confound them by making women virile” (Newman 3). Newman’s understanding of the role of feminism in Hildegard’s work comes from her symbolic feminine images and it is “[t]o see the feminine as a species of incapacity and frailty, yet also as a numinous and salvific dimension of the divine nature: herein lies the characteristic strain of what [she] has called Hildegard’s ‘theology of the feminine’” (Newman 36). John writes that “Newman... [argues] Hildegard saw her own womanhood as archetypal at once of the human and of the divine” (John 117). To this end Newman devotes a great deal of her text to a close analysis of Hildegard’s writings and letters, taking great pains to make sure that her readers understand both the texts and particular contexts (mostly literary) for her writings. She points to ‘Biblical wisdom literature’ such as Proverbs, the wisdom of Solomon, Boethius’ *Consolation*, as well as other Platonizing cosmologists (Newman 42-44).

Newman points out, though, in an effort to make Hildegard into a more unique figure, that “[u]nlike most visionary women of the later Middle Ages, Hildegard wrote not

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7 This is the same interpretation which we had with regard to Elisabeth of Schonau when she heard the voice of God tell her to ‘play the man’ (Newman 1997,37). What is interesting for me in this type of interpretation is that it seems to suggest a dichotomy between mind and body (both of which are made up of gender stereotypes) which exist on a sliding scale. This is not to say that Hildegard ever supported being a man. Newman points this out at the end of her text by quoting Johannes Braun, “writing in 1918” who contrasted “‘the serious, almost masculine Hildegard’ with the ‘soft feminine’ Elisabeth”’ (Newman 254). If the issue remains unclear it is so because it is even more unclear within Newman’s text.
to relate her subjective experience of God, but rather to teach faith and morals of the authority of this experience which her works everywhere presuppose but seldom elaborate. Throughout her writings, the moral, doctrinal, and political aspects of her message far outweigh the element of personal religious expression” (Newman 1985, 163-64). Like Molina in her article on ‘illness as privilege’ Newman agrees that “[b]roadly speaking Hildegard had learned to see her infirmity, like her gender, as one of those saving weaknesses through which the power of God could be manifest” (Newman 1985, 167).

Coming back to the important issue of Hildegard’s illness it is a fine line which makes texts on such mystical writings able to be used as a valuable literary source. It is not often that the issue of religious belief comes up in texts on Hildegard. In fact, within the small group of scholars dedicated to preserving her work the theme of ‘faith’ does not seem to come up at all. Newman does concede that among “her contemporaries the gift appeared ‘strange’ and ‘unheard-of’ and we must finally concur” (Newman 1985, 169). By looking at Hildegard’s visions as both didactic and prophetic Newman can conveniently play both worlds of historical veracity and spiritual simplicity. These two fields are integral to the structure and mode of interpretation laced throughout Newman’s work. It comes up most clearly with regard to the issue of Hildegard’s learning. Over and over Hildegard claims herself as unlearned, that frail, weak woman well versed in the ‘humility topos’. But Newman points out that most of her humility topoi are often followed with “claim[s] to high authority” (Newman 1985, 169). Newman fervently points out that “the pages of this ‘simple, untutored woman’ are so redolent of old manuscripts that, unless we are to
charge her with duplicity, a stronger explanation must be offered” (Newman 1985, 169).

For Newman this means tracing the imprints of both spiritual uniqueness and symbolic history in Hildegard’s work, a gift which is half learned and half revealed (Newman 169-170). In an intriguing article, Bruce Hozecki compares the liturgical play of Hildegard (which appears at the end of the Scivias) to a play written almost two hundred years earlier by Hrotsvitha of Gandersheim that contains similar themes and content. He points out that both “Hildegard and Hrotsvitha were early playwrights, both were Benedictines, both were German, although they are separated by two centuries of historical time” (Hozecki 42). His argument that there is a great possibility that the earlier work was transmitted to Hildegard either through written manuscript or word of mouth (since Hildegard went on a great deal of preaching tours) is convincing and it also leads to an assertion that Hildegard was far more learned that she might care to admit (Hozecki 48). This small piece of evidence may go far to convince current scholars that historicism is a valid method for understanding texts.

Hildegard’s role as a strong female in the twelfth century shines through Newman’s work most strongly when she writes about the abbess’ success in administering her didactic teaching to the masses while still remaining ‘feminine’ in temperament. Most scholars on Hildegard have wondered how a woman could “provide her new house with modern features, such a plumbing to pipe in water, [freeing it] entirely from the control of her former abbot, [securing] her nuns a voice in the selection of a prior, [refusing] to
accept an advocate, [obtaining] the special protection of the emperor, and [recognizing] only the archbishop of Mainz as her superior” while still refusing to accept that females should be part of the clergy (Scholz 363). Bernhard Scholz points out that in Hildegard’s “periodization of salvation history an age of ‘masculine fortitude’ is followed by an age of women, tempus muliebre, a period of corruption and trouble, symbolized by a fiery dog, which includes her own time” (Scholz 373). Coming back to this important point, Barbara Newman takes great pains throughout her text to place Hildegard within the ecclesiastical politics of her time as a conservative reformer, rather like the early Martin Luther. Kathryn Kerby-Fulton calls this position “reformist apocalypticism” because Hildegard’s vision of reform seems to be one which looks to the past, to the ecclesia primitiva, for aid (Kerby-Fulton 383). But where Kerby- Fulton and Newman differ in their approach to Hildegard’s motivation in politics is made clear by Newman’s assertion,

[v]isionary forms like Caritas, Sapientia, and Ecclesia [the latter of which reveals Hildegard’s condemnation of the Church] do not strike the reader as reified abstractions of allegorical constructs. On the contrary, they have far more solidity than any historical individuals described by the abbess... She was a Platonist not only by virtue of this or that opinion, but in her most fundamental habits of thought and perception. This characteristic of Hildegard’s may help to account for a fact that is bound to trouble contemporary readers. In spite of her extensive feminine imagery of the Church and the priesthood, she not only assented to but actively supported the exclusion of women from the clergy and other forms of female subordination. Coming from a presentist standpoint it is difficult to find inspiration in a woman so bent on upholding the gender-stereotypes of her day (Newman 246-247).

Although it certainly is defensible that Hildegard was a Platonist and that her symbolic
temperament was overreaching it seems naive to feel that this was more important to her than a simple desire to ameliorate her society. Kathryn Kerby-Fulton draws attention to Hildegard’s “four lengthy preaching tours between 1158 and 1171 to promote monastic reform and clerical reform, denouncing simony, avarice, negligence and immorality in churches and monasteries throughout Germany” citing Newman as her source (Kerby-Fulton 385). Kerby-Fulton points to Hildegard’s letters for proof on these points. She argues that it is within her letters that Hildegard’s true hope for the clergy is revealed. She further points out the subtle changes in style and method that Hildegard adopts within the letters in order to suit her audience:

These differences in tone and even in the substance of her message range from the withering denunciation of the letter to the Cologne clergy, to the stringent idealism of the letter to the Cistercians of Eberback, to the sublime reassurance of the Proeminarum to the Life of Saint Disibodius written for the monks of her own Disibodenberg. The result of this subtle shifting of stance is that her views on the post-chastisement state of the clergy have to be pieced together and interpreted from what is at best a fragmented batch of hints and suggestions (Kerby-Fulton 392-392).

It is a letter from Hildegard to King Konrad (ca. 1150) that has provided the main impetus for the controversy surrounding Hildegard’s conservative feminism and it is interesting to note how Newman tackles this “deep inconsistency” (Thompson 350). Newman questions,

[w]hat exactly did Hildegard mean by the muliebre tempus? When she used the word effeminate in a pejorative sense, she did not refer simply to the appearance of feminine traits in men; these, as we have seen, maybe either good or bad. It is more likely that the tag denoted what is left of the feminine
when its two positive attributes – virginity and maternity – have been stripped away, leaving only the generic ‘feminine frailty’. In her vehement denunciations of the effeminate age, Hildegard condemned a Church whose vain, pleasure-loving prelates had lost all manly fortitude and zeal for the Word of God in their craving for worldly honor, soft living, and wealth. Ironically, these effeminate priests are the very same she attacked elsewhere for their lack of motherly care (Newman 239-240).

Newman proceeds to describe Hildegard’s attack on the Church through her symbols of Ecclesia (the Church) and through her artwork. As for her ‘feminism’ Newman attributes that only to her age, arguing

[i]n spite of her extensive feminine imagery for the Church and the priesthood, she not only assented to but actively supported the exclusion of women from the clergy and other forms of female subordination. This is not surprising in light of her historical circumstances, but neither is it inevitable... And the mere fact that she raised the issue at all, and spoke as strongly as she did, indicated that she was aware of a possible alternative. Her self validation as a female prophet for an effeminate age only makes her an exception to prove the rule: women may continue to prophesy as long as the times remain womanish, but when they return to normal such exceptions will presumably be needless. It is significant that the sequence of apocalyptic ages prophesied in the Scivias and the Activity of God gives no hint of a coming era in which gender roles would be reversed or altered (Newman 247).

Here Newman stringently opposes any sense of Hildegard’s feminism in any modernist sense, always feeling that despite Hildegard’s annoyance at the present state of the clergy new men would rise up and save the world. Newman suggests that Hildegard’s theology is focused on “the feminine [as] the immanent divine principle that mediates between the transcendent God and his creatures. She is Wisdom and Love, energy, synergy, and beauty” (Newman 250). But she is not the powers that run the earth. This is man’s realm.
Newman remains skeptical to the end of Hildegard’s use for current feminist theory. She reflects that

[with all her contemporaries, Hildegard delighted in the Virgin’s maternity, but, when she turned to actual women, it was only the virginal and not the maternal element that retained its sacred character. The cult of virginity, even in its sublimest praise for the ‘form of Woman, sister of Wisdom,’ carries the all but inevitable converse: rejection of sexuality; but the revulsion itself is not to be denied... Hildegard saw the maiden beauty of Wisdom revealed in the elite world of the nunnery, while her maternal, nurturing aspect is scarcely embodied in women at all but rather in priests, bishops, and abbots. It is not the least of Hildegard’s paradoxes that, while the male humanity of Christ is symbolized by woman, the maternity of the Church is chiefly incarnate in men (Newman 252).

It seems that, for Newman, the particular uniqueness of Hildegard lay not in her feminism but in her ability to see God as both masculine and feminine. In her acceptance of feminine images as well as masculine ones Newman argues that she actually conflates the two into one, that of “the living Light” (Newman 270) a state which is beyond the beyond, that which we should strive for.

Throughout the three texts and additional articles I have presented my goal has been to provide an unbiased account of the current writings on Hildegard. It is not my goal to completely deconstruct these works or merely to criticize them for their shortcomings. What I have asserted here is that both the content and style of works on Hildegard appear to be noncommittal and scholastically uncertain. The status of works on Hildegard puts them in the category not so much of scholarship but rather of varying degrees of historical
fiction. This is obviously a great deal more true for the work of Barbara Lachman than for Barbara Newman. It is uncertain whether or not it is the issue of feminism that seems to obscure Hildegard studies but certainly there is a tendency among contemporary scholars to delight more in looking at Hildegard from a modern eye than from a medieval one. In my next chapter, when I turn to look at the current state of medieval methodology I want the issues concerning feminism in light of the New Medievalism slowly to come into focus. Then when I move into my specific analysis of the *Scivias* as it currently works in theory and as it might look in practice, ideas about feminism and medieval studies may become clarified.
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Chapter Two

MEDFEMMES: Medieval studies and Feminism in light of new theories

"In medieval studies, philology is the matrix out of which all else springs."
- Stephen Nichols

"Thus, the object of a critical reading is both a text and an event. As a text, it is materially identifiable, as an event, it is not given, but chosen. This choice cannot be innocent."
- Paul Zumthor

"Medievalism and Feminism: an odd and unwelcomed couple."
- Judith M. Bennett

The relationship between ‘text’ and ‘context’ is the integral challenge which threatens the relationship between Medieval studies and current literary theory. With the introduction of feminism into medieval studies the relationship is even more confusing. Yet it is integral. We can already find, from the previous chapter, that a working knowledge (or lack therein) of medieval context can severely change the analytical outcome of an interpretation. The criticism that Sabina Flanagan has suffered because she feels that Hildegard’s illness may have been a political tool points to many issues of context and raises many questions about the particular world view Hildegard may have had regarding illness in society. The sticking point between many poststructuralist literary theories and Medieval studies centres heavily on this idea: that the answer to these
questions might never be known. From this high theoretical concern many possible outcomes have emerged. In most circles the result has been increased segregation between literary theory and medieval textual interpretation. Another result has been an increased interest in narrative histories and historical fiction. If history is not verifiable, the logic seems to run, than fiction which is 'based' on history is just as valid. It seems to have been partly the result of this idea that an increasing number of novels like Barbara Lachman's have been written, texts which encourage us not to bother with critical notes or scholarly editions. Context, within this framework is unnecessary. More than this, philology, that branch of the humanities which focuses on the relation between text and context, has cleverly been hidden in the Annals of clever scholars who would rather stick to what they believe than what current theory would convince them to believe. In medieval studies the implications of such a radical denial of the epistemological foundations of the past are very deeply felt.

Philology and the Plight of the Medieval storm-troopers

It appeared to come in like a storm. The 1990 special issue of Speculum specifically dealt with the problem some medievalists saw resulting from the postmodern scorn for philology and its methodological viewpoint. Sensing and responding to the variety of new theoretical models, Stephen Nichols, Suzanne Fleischman, R. Howard Bloch, Gabrielle Spiegel, and Lee Patterson put forward new philological models that sought to ground the
study of language in the analysis of social and historical contexts. Their work identified and sought to clarify a trend that was developing, which they termed the ‘New Medievalism’, the methodology of which has been in employed in a number of contexts including some work on Hildegard (which will be dealt with in Chapter Three). As we will see after 1990 this ‘New Medievalism’ provoked an even greater interest than that which brought it to the attention of Speculum. In particular its implications spread across disciplines and subjects that are still not yet fully developed or well documented, most notably into the realm of feminism. The major impetus for the ‘New Medievalism/Philology’ seems to have sprung out of the movement of New Historicism, whose roots date as far back as the Middle Ages themselves. I have already briefly mentioned the New Historicists but I will look deeper into their works at this point.

Sarah Kay, in a 1999 article entitled "Analytical Survey 3: The New Philology," part of a series entitled New Medieval Literatures, outlines the previous careers of these scholars, drawing special attention to the North American nature of their viewpoint even though obviously their chosen areas of study are European. Kay believes that the "New Philology thus sets out to be an outflanking manœuvre whereby medievalists could go one better than their colleagues of the Renaissance" (Kay 298). Kay completely ignored the actual content of the New Philology and does not mention it even once in her article choosing instead to attempt to place the ‘term’ New Philology infra structurally among the myriad other theories boasting their ‘newness’ (Kay 299). Kay writes, quoting an article from a volume entitled Towards a Synthesis? Essays on the New Philology, edited by Keith Busby that "New Philology clearly provokes a similar suspicion that it offers medievalists, as one lengthy and enthusiastic review of the Busby volume put it, a 'short-cut to get themselves into print, allowing them to put forward as criticism of a medieval text the most arrant nonsense one could imagine'...For many contributors to the debate, their main objection seems to be the shaky grasp of facts, indeed even the ignorance, of its proponents" (Kay 299). She then writes that "there is never an admission on their part that a refusal to look beyond the material survival of the past might be new-positivist in its latching on to factual evidence in preference to intellectual exploration" (Kay 317-318). Kay points out her main objection to the New Philology is that it seems to ignore Lacanian and Kristevan epistemology and that most of the New Philologists are "less Oedipally inclined" than she would like them to be (Kay 310,312).
The first widespread introduction to New Historicism was in 1982 when Stephen Greenblatt wrote an explosive introduction to a special issue of the journal *Genre*. Within his article he outlined a new type of criticism which helped him with his own focus on Renaissance studies. Hunter Cadzow writes that “Greenblatt and his colleagues were reluctant to consign texts to an autonomous aesthetic realm that dissociated Renaissance writing from other forms of cultural production and unlike the prewar historicists, they refused to assume that Renaissance texts mirrored, from a safe distance, a unified and coherent world-view that was held by a whole population, or at least by an entire literate class” (Cadzow 535). The New Historicists then decided that “critics... must delineate the ways the texts they study [are] linked to the network of institutions, practices, and beliefs that constituted Renaissance culture in its entirety” (Cadzow 535). The problem with New Historicism, especially for medievalists, is that it was never intended to be a theory; it was meant only to act as a guideline for interpretation (Cadzow 535). Louis Montrose, an influential New Historicist, felt that “critics must problematize or reject both the formalist conception of literature as an autonomous aesthetic order that transcends needs and interests and the reflectionist notion that writing simply mirrors a stable and coherent ideology that is endorsed by all members of a society” (Cadzow 535). It was Montrose who did the most work in bringing together history and literature, feeling that

notions of textuality from deconstruction and poststructuralism [were] useful for the practice of historical criticism, for their emphasis on the discursive character of all experience and their position that every human act is embedded in an arbitrary system of signification that social agents use to make
sense of their world [to allow the critic] to think of events from the past as
texts that must be deciphered (Cadzow 536).

But New Historicism was not enough, and critics have looked at its theoretical tenets in a
negative light. Critics felt that most of New Historicism’s proponents downplayed the
difference which exists within society and “thereby suppress[ed] the fact that in a given
political formation different paradigms... exist simultaneously... Some feminists, such as
Carole Levin, have claimed that the New Historicists have appropriated their assumptions
and interpretative strategies but have not contributed much to the study of gender
relations” (Cadzow 539). All of these issues have become important for feminist
medievalists who have been looking for new ways to combine new theory with old.

Philology and the Birth of the Maiden who Birathed the Maiden: A Brief Historiography

Karl Uitti dates the earliest use of philology back to the fifth century in a text by
Martianus Capella called The Marriage of Mercury and Philology (De Nuptiis Mercurii et
Philologiae), text which was influential in the Middle Ages (Uitti 567). Uitti writes that
“together with her husband Mercury, Philology became the custodian of the Seven Liberal
Arts – the entirety of learning as well as the means of acquiring it” (Uitti 567). This
makes philology the methodological key to textual interpretation. In Chapter One most of
the key issues of analysis figured on precise definitions of Latin words, some of which, like
discretio in Lachman's novel, were left untranslated. Siegfried Wenzel explains that

[in its wider sense, philology preserves the basic urge to understand a work of verbal and usually written communication, but in doing so it goes beyond the strict concentration on language and its aspects, to include whatever contextual information might help to elucidate a text: first of all its sources...political and other aspects of history, biography... socioeconomic conditions...the conditions and processes of writing or copying a document and of printing, the religion or Weltanschauung of the culture from which the text comes, the intended use of the text (its *sitz im leben*, to use the fashionable phrase), and much else (Wenzel 12).]

The tradition of philology is perhaps not understood in the way that Wenzel describes it.

The early medieval notions of philology came to its peak in the twelfth century. Uitti writes about the way that philologists take on the difficult task of restoring texts by re-
visioning them, by commenting on them, like medieval monks did in their biblical glosses. He further notes that it is as though the philologist is a detective whose task is to uncover what has been hidden, linguistically or otherwise, in texts, and then to reveal their significance (Uitti 567, 568). The height of traditional philology came with the works of Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) whose work served to factualize and standardize the practice (Uitti 569). These practices continued until the nineteenth-century when philology came to mean "all university standard activity related specifically to the study of language; the term covered textual criticism, general linguistics, historical reconstruction of texts and languages... lexicography, sociolinguistics, and language geography” (Uitti 570). Eventually, however these aspects of philology became disciplines of their own and philology “became almost exclusively associated with textual and linguistic study of the
earlier epochs” (Uitti 570). This interpretation of philological study was rigourously scientific and ‘technical’ in its application of grammatical analysis and ‘authenticity’ claims. Ignorance, misunderstanding, and that dread abhorrence for the medieval seemed part of the impetus for later critics to abandon traditional notions of philology.

Unfortunately the attack on philology was successful and philology, at least by the end of the nineteenth-century, was typically understood as being an outdated and unreliable method. It was a method of grammatical roleplaying, where dice were rolled and various interpretations simply rationed out numerically. But scholars such as Ernst Robert Curtius have never understood philology as such. Uitti points out that the ‘tyranny of the ‘definitive,’ whether as applied to an edition or to a view of history, has, at least provisionally, been consigned to the dustbin” and then suggests that “philology... is the human activity that makes change and enrichment possible” pointing to Curtius as exemplar of this definition. Curtius writes, as a way of introducing his text European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, that his work “is not the product of purely scholarly interests. It grew out of vital urges and under the pressure of a concrete historical situation. But in order to convince, I had to use the scientific technique which is the foundation of all historical investigation: philology” (Curtius x). Curtius then goes on to say that: “[t]he accidental truths of fact can only be established by philology... But if the subject of the book is approached through philological technique, it is nevertheless clear, I hope, that philology is not an end in itself. What we are dealing with is literature –, that is, the great intellectual and spiritual tradition of Western culture as given form in language”
(Curtius x). Like the New Historicists, Curtius' brand of philology was never meant to be the ultimate theoretical reality, only a type of all-encompassing framework that took the texts themselves as the vision and let the writer act as the 're-visionary' through which the text's message might be translated and interpreted. This type of methodology is both conscious and unconscious. It works in accordance with past and present; it both allows the text to speak and for the text's analyst to also have a voice. It is this type of self-consciousness which is only really beginning to burgeon into the mainstream in the twenty-first century.

Architexts: The 'New Medievalism' and the 'New Philology' in an introductory sketch

Understanding the way medieval studies is currently being viewed was the first task for those involved in the Speculum issue. From that place, the scholars set out to forge a new path for current medieval scholarship, one which could maintain an alliance between contemporary theory and the somewhat antiquated methods of many philologists. As Nichols points out "medievalists are frequently viewed by modernist colleagues as hostile or indifferent to contemporary theory" (Nichols 1990, 1). This comes from the sad reality that many medievalists are still boasting that they 'have the facts'. Perhaps this is because medievalists like Barbara Newman and Sabina Flanagan have a much larger investment in maintaining the concreteness of history in order to present their findings. It certainly is true that this belief runs counter to the deconstructionist argument that history is not real
and never was.

According to the Speculum panel, what philology sets out to do is to provide a bridge between the material text we seek to understand, and the original sitz im leben, or 'context' of its construction. My word for this type of analysis is 'architextual' because it combines the architecture--the context of a work--as well as a philological text-based analysis. An architext is a hermeneutic interpretation, a new text which takes the old as its foundation and builds upon it solidly. The more concrete the contextual foundation the stronger the text analysis will be. Historicism plays itself out in the new philology by providing a frame for language. Within each culture are various 'readings' of texts, and the assumption is that in order to understand a text within a culture, it must be understood how that culture understood the text. This, for 'new' philologists is not about a return to scientific notions of the 'true' interpretation but about what happens in a situation of variance. This method is completely hermeneutic in that each method of understanding requires the Other. If current literary theories refuse to confront the past, the Oedipal father, then philology looks it dead in the eye. Current poststructuralist theorists, tending slightly more towards philosophy than criticism, seem to feel more comfortable surmising about ideas than applying them. And for good reason. It is impossible to escape the present, meaning the past can never be pure. This radical notion, now called the "Linguistic Turn" has completely redefined the way we see the world and it would seem that academia is still reeling from the shock. The first task of the philologist, however, is
to come to terms with understanding the past through the source, or text, itself. To shirk the shock of history’s inevitable inability to present ‘truth’ the philologist must come up with something both plausible and persuasive. It was “…[t]he need to go back to the sources, a need felt as much by the Humanists as by the reformers (many Humanists were among the chief proponents of the Reformation), that led to the formation of philology” (qtd in Nichols 1990, 2). During the nineteenth century, scholars like Friedrich Schleiermacher and Philip August Boeckh⁹ spent a great deal of time trying to fulfill just those principles Siegfried Wenzel points out: the relationship between the linguistic text and the social context. But to an enlightened society driven towards an increasingly ‘scientific’ understanding of texts, what was once a general philology quickly turned into a philology of grammar. It is this form of philology which comes under the most intense criticism as we move through the twenty-first century. What was missing for medievalists, after struggling to accept New Historicism’s effect on philology, was found in the introduction of semiotics. The break really came, as Gabrielle Spiegel points out, in 1916, with Ferdinand de Saussure’s publication of his Course in General Linguistics and “continuing with the successive emergence of structuralism, semiotics, and poststructuralism” (Spiegel 4).

Semiotics and deconstruction: The Final Conflict between the Medievalists and the

⁹ Boeckh, whose work is severely underappreciated in the English-speaking world, appears only in The Hermeneutics Reader (ed. Kurt Mueller/Vollmer).
The ways in which philology was increasingly interpolated by scholars came from a misunderstanding about the linguistic nature of the method. The original problem was that many scholars in the twentieth-century, bombarded by war and intent on isolation, began to feel that context could only exist 'within a text' and never outside. Spiegel agrees that "it follows that literature, as an instance of linguistic utterance, cannot transparently reflect a world outside itself, since that 'world' is only a linguistic construct, and what it reflects, therefore, is merely another articulation of language, or discourse" (Spiegel 5). Following from this perspective Saussure began to construct a theory which would allow for texts to be interpreted only as worlds in and of themselves. But he still needed a workable methodology in order for people to interpret the text at all. Saussure proposed the methodology of semiotics and the concept of the 'sign'. Paul Perron, in an excellent and extensive discourse on semiotics writes that "[a]s can be demonstrated by numerous cultural traces (verbal, pictorial, plastic, spatial artifacts, etc.), the role of signs in human life has been an ongoing concern over the ages" (Perron 658). These signs became antithetical to philologists because they accentuated the inability to operate outside of their own relationship to their signified objects. This can result in radical shifts of understanding, "a text identified today as being religious in the Middle Ages is seen as literary today" (Perron 659). This is true for my own study of Hildegard. The lack of genre interpretation is a key tenet of the New Medievalism as I understand it because of its
relationship to historicism. Hildegard was not writing 'literature;' her work had other functions and other purposes that require an understanding of the particular religious context that she was writing in. What both 'literature' and 'religious' mean, both individually and in relation to one another are important for a philologist and consequentially for the New Medievalist.

Beginning with "Saussure's notion of words as 'signs,' conceived as arbitrary (because conventional) 'signifiers' capable of producing multiple significations (or 'signifieds'), semiotics focused attention on the performative aspect of language as the production of meaning, dependent upon the deployment of formal signs. Saussure wrote that semiology is "a science that studies the life of signs within society" (Saussure 16). He felt that language was fixed:

A linguistic system is a series of difference of sound combined with difference of ideas, but the pairing of a certain number of acoustical signs with as many cuts made from the mass of thought engenders a system of values...Although both the signified and signifier are purely differential and negative when considered separately, their combination is a positive fact. (Saussure 1974, 120)

This means for Saussure that a signifier has only one meaning specifically that is within its own system. These systems are mainly textual for the literary semiotic. Semioticians insist that "meaning is produced by the internal relations of signs to one another, rather than by reference to extralinguistic phenomena" (Spiegel 6). From this perspective, any branch of philological inquiry was necessarily fallacious. Any external concept could not interrupt
the internal structure of the signs within the work and was therefore unnecessary.

Gabrielle Spiegel writes, “Semiotics inevitably dehistoricized literature by denying the importance of a historically situated authorial conscious, a dehistoricization of the literary text that was tantamount to the denial of history” (Spiegel 6). After Saussure broke down the text into signifiers and signifieds, it did not take much for certain theorists to construct a method for understanding and interpreting their system, which was really only a play of different signs against each other. Thus deconstruction was born: “[o]nce language was considered to be a system of arbitrary codification, the obvious response in the presence of codes was to decode and ‘deconstruct’ them... The goal of deconstruction is to unmask the varied and contradictory meanings that linger within the text’s imposed silences” (Spiegel 7). Umberto Eco, in an attempt to move forward from such an ‘internally dialogic’ textual structure suggested that “an author must form a model of a possible reader and must also assume that the set of codes relied upon is shared by the reader” (Perron 662). Thus Eco seems to be suggesting historicism (as well as reader-reception theories) as a way out of the microliterary assertions of some kinds of semiotic analysis.

Like the dream which exists only in the mind of the dreamer, and which can never fully be explicated because of the impossibility of language, the literary analyst is continually confronted with the impossibility of their own work. This is complicated even further for the medievalist because the dream is in the long gone past. Lee Patterson confronts this ‘deconstructionist’ notion by pointing out that “[f]or deconstruction, writing
absorbs the social context into a textuality that is wholly alienated from the real” (Patterson 59). According to Jacques Derrida, the founder of deconstruction, there are real flaws with Saussure. Chris Weedon interprets: “[f]or Derrida there can be no fixed signifieds (concepts), and signifiers (sound or written images), which have identity only in their difference from one another, [they are only] subject to an endless process of deferral” (Weedon 25). To understand this deferral requires a theory of analysis which involves constant re-visioning of texts. Deconstruction “theorizes the discursive context as the relationship of difference between written texts, and while insisting that non-discursive forces are important, does not spell out the social power relations within which texts are located” (Weedon 25). In this model even context becomes simply another text, and one which should not be used in order to affect the original source in any way. It also means that history is void save those texts which we construct as a story in the present. The lines between fiction and context (which is much different from ‘fact’) are therefore muddled. Derrida tried to come to terms with a world that did not exist before the present moment. But Gabrielle Spiegel points out an important point of grounding: “[l]iterary text and historical context are not the same thing, and if one should not be reduced to the other, neither should they be held up as identical foci of the scholar’s gaze. While the text is an objective given, an existing artifact (in its material existence if not in its constitution as a specifically ‘literary’ work), the object of historical study must be constituted by the historian long before its meaning can begin to be disengaged” (Spiegel 22). For the medievalist, coming to terms with a manuscript utterly foreign to the material reality of its
existence is often the first marker for interpretation. It forces the scholar to focus and identify ‘other’ texts which may shed light on its origin as well as choosing a context by which the text shall be interpreted. This is why philology has always been important to medievalists. Setting up a structure by which to begin interpretation has been one of the only ways medieval scholars have been able to work through the often disjointed and scattered amount of textual information and remaining data. Perron gives credit to the ‘new medievalists’ when he writes that they are part of semiotics natural amelioration and evolution: “Paul Zumthor, Donald Maddox, and Eugene Vance\(^{10}\), among others, have been instrumental in reshaping a ‘new kind of linguistically informed medievalism that is as much oriented toward studying the discursive consciousness of medieval intellectual life as it is toward the documentation of events’” (Perron 662). And so, confronting semiotics and deconstruction, the ‘New Medievalism’ came onto the scene.

The ‘New’ Medievalism requires an acceptance of social and textual systems which exist outside of the text itself. Further, new medievalists also accept that ‘signs’ have particular meanings which change over time. This has not been a comfortable change because it means that: “if texts can be shown to bear meanings that do not accord with

\(^{10}\) All of these writers have written influential works in the field of Medieval studies. Examples include: Zumthor’s article “The Text and the Voice” (New Literary History 16, 1984), Donald Maddox’ *Transtextualities of Cycles and Cyclicity in Medieval French Literature* (1996) and *Froissart across the Genres* and Eugene Vance’s *From Topic to Tale: Logic and Narrativity in the Middle Ages* (1987).
what has always been taken to be authentically medieval, then the notion of a homogeneous, monolithic Middle Ages that has always provided interpretive stability to the entire project, and respect for the disciplines of medieval studies in all their austere rigor, is called into question” (Patterson 103). The challenge for medieval literary scholars in the face of the postmodern condition is the philologists’ pronouncement that texts do not exist in a vacuum. Deconstruction accentuates the uncertain relationship between past and present and the ways that texts, and indeed historical periods intermediate and are interdependent upon one another by pointing out that we can only understand through difference (Weedon 25). Lee Patterson summarizes this historiographically by pointing out that even for postmodernism the concept of understanding through difference is problematic

For postmodernism the issue centers on the ambiguity of its relation to the modernism it at once contests and recuperates, and specifically to modernism’s purist erasure of history... Modernity is the Derridean desire for ‘the unmediated, free act that knows no past,’ what Jürgen Habermas calls ‘a longing for an undefiled, immaculate, and stable present,’ the Heideggerean condition in which ‘the self, as a living presence, is in free possession of itself and its actions’ and so it must efface all those social determinants that reveal not merely the impossibility of originality but the illusoriness of ‘the unmediated, free act’ per se (Patterson 88).

The problem is therefore obvious: how can the study of historical periods like the Middle Ages continue if historicism, that basic foundation of all philological understanding, is dead? But perhaps it is not. Suzanne Fleischman argues that “the utterances of a text are... not decontextualized pieces of language, even the act of writing, which may sever
them physically from their origin, does not ipso facto obliterate connections to a speaker, a
context, and the locutionary act that produced them – in French, their *énonciation*”
(Fleischman 29). At the heart of the historicists’ continuing argument seems to be both a
plea to accept the material reality of the text as well as the existence of ‘other’ texts by
which it might be compared: “[Leo] Spitzer recalled that Fustel de Coulanges insistently
asked his students when they made a historical statement: ‘Avez-vous un texte?’ Spitzer’s
own response held that ‘the student in historical semantics must ask: ‘Have you many
texts?,’ for only with a great number of them is one enabled to visualize their ever­
recurrent pattern’” (qtd in Nichols 3). One of the first problems that postmodernism has
for the medieval scholar is in its singularity. Even if postmodernists agree to the material
reality of a text from the ‘past,’ the difference is that “the philologist’s task should be
comparison, not archaeology, since the latter reduces to singularity what acquires meaning
precisely though plurality, through variation” (Fleischman 25). This is not a new form for
the medieval scholar who has a keen understanding of the ways in which medieval
hermeneutics worked: “[m]edieval literary aesthetics... was until the end of the thirteenth
century founded on an ‘écriture de la variance,’ which the prevailing methodology of
textual criticism served to camouflage” (qtd in Fleischman 25). These ideas of variance
have provided the most persuasive argument for choosing to integrate poststructuralist
notions with philology in medieval studies.

Once a few literary theorists, feminists, marxists, anthropologists and historians
opened up to contextualizing their work a great deal of new scholarship was done. Novel
ty was even written idealizing the relationship that history and literature could have. The
problem with that kind of idealism is that too often "[]iterary critics have been accustomed
to get their history secondhand and prepackaged and have tended, in practice if not in theory, to
treat it as unproblematic, something to be invoked rather than investigated" (Spiegel 20). Like
Lachman's text, it has often been the case that the literary scholar has relied on historians for 'proof'
evidence rather than doing the work themselves. As for the relative nature of contemporary
theory's relation to historicism it seems to have been decided that context is something which
takes up two paragraphs of a hundred-page text or which only involves recounting a heavily
fictionalized and idealized narrative. This is simply because most historians too have
abandoned real contextualization. As another example, although Umberto Eco's The Name of the Rose
is a brilliant story it is far from historically accurate, whatever 'real' names are inserted here
and there. Eco may not have been trying to write history, but the issue is that, as a theorist
and writer, Eco does not comment on the difficult relationship between text and context,
that generally when context breaks down, texts fall soon after because there is no referent.
There are extensive sections written within Eco's novel that are only in Latin, and they are
some of the most important. No translations are offered in the versions I have seen, no
ttempt at philological analysis. Although I would agree that they might not be

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11 This is the popular "biography" or "setting" section of most texts.
completely necessary for all readers it seems, both scholarly and generally, that the deeper an understanding we have of context the more we can understand our own relationship to the events unfolding.

One issue in particular that comes from the new trend towards narrative interpretation is that of factual data. The refusal to grant that 'facts' exist at all (a viewpoint which stems directly from poststructuralism), instead of leading to a methodology which stresses possibilities (as opposed to 'facts') has often simply led to fictionalization. Eco's text is only one example. Lee Patterson argues that this is because "postmodernist historicism is... gestural, mere pastiche: since a self-defining historiographical narrative is absent, postmodernism is unable either to confront the social and economic determinants of historicism or to deal with the transactions between past and present required for genuine historical understanding" (Patterson 89). This point is relative to the New Medievalism because it seems that they have taken a different (if not new) viewpoint than poststructuralists who have abandoned 'fact' altogether. Some critics, most strongly from the discipline of History, are very afraid of the abandonment of 'fact.' Gabrielle Spiegel writes that "looking at the current critical climate from the vantage point of a historian, one has an impression of the dissolution of history, or a flight from 'reality' to language as the constitutive agent of human consciousness and the social production of meaning" (Spiegel 4). It seems that it is the fault of the eternal dichotomization of fact/fiction which has caused medievalists (or conscientious scholars in
general) to remain wary of poststructuralist’s insistence on variance. Medievalists, even those I am studying, are more prevalently interested in sustaining an interpretation rather than providing one based on variance. The adoption of New Medievalist methods attempts to provide that possibility of truth, or rather ‘truths,’ without giving up the rigourous use of good scholarship.

The issues I have been focusing on have specific considerations for feminist medievalists and I want to mention them here. Abandoning the debate about text/context, the literary historian (like Sabina Flanagan) knows that there are more issues involved than simply understanding that each text has its own ‘linguistic reality’. There are also issues of gendered textual construction which cannot be ignored. Not only is the very act of writing by women rare in the Middle Ages, but it is often the case that it was only the religious leaders or scribes who did the writing. The question of authorial intention and motivation becomes clouded and the necessity for context (for the reader of today) is absolutely necessary. Stephen Nichols points out, in furthering this notion specifically as it was held in the Middle Ages was that “[t]he apparently straightforward act of copying manuscripts [was] not free from mimetic intervention, either. In the act of copying a text, the scribe supplants the original poet, often changing words or narrative order, suppressing or shortening some sections, while interpolating new material in others” (Nichols 8). This is increasingly becoming a concern for Hildegard studies because her work was the combined effort of both men and women. The groundwork for this concern
seems to be the result of an increased interest in historicism. It also connects to the poststructuralist (and semiotic) interest in the specific function of signs within a text. This ‘textual variance’ was the prevailing basis upon which the medievalists who espoused the ‘New Medievalism’ chose as the bridge between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ philology.

The 144,000: ‘New Medievalism’ and its proponents

What makes up the ‘new’ philology involves a mediation between not only the historical context/theory which comes from within the text but also an understanding of the medievalist’s relationship with that text, semiotic and otherwise. Stephen Nichols writes that “what is ‘new’ in our enterprise might better be called ‘renewal,’ renovatio in the twelfth-century sense. On the one hand, it is a desire to return to the medieval origins of philology, to its roots in a manuscript culture where, as Bernard Cerquiligni remarks, ‘medieval writing does not produce variants; it is variance’” (Nichols 1). Perhaps then it will be the medievalists who bridge the ever-widening gap between literature and history. Those valuable epistemological truths gained from postmodernism, Siegfried Wenzel argues, were known to the philologist all along: “[t]o begin at the end: an awareness of the contemporary discussion of cognitive theory, based on such fundamental, even if by now banal, insights as that one’s question will determine the answer one gets, or that an investigation of facts always implies interpretation, is certainly a most desirable asset in a good philologist” (Wenzel 13). Further, as Gabrielle Spiegel argues in the face of
semiotics, "if language is an implicit social contract that brings members of the linguistic community to prescribed usages, without which communication and the production of meaning would be impossible, then any given language is necessarily a historically specific occurrence, for the investigation of which historicism appears to hold out the best hope" (Spiegel 8). Further, according to Spiegel, "what is needed is the elaboration of a theoretical position capable of satisfying the demands of both literary criticism and history as separate yet interdependent disciplinary domains with a common concern for the social dimensions of textual production in past times" (Spiegel 24). The bridge between both disciplines comes from a general understanding that the variety of factors which influenced a text's construction, although only discernable within the text's form and content (which function hermeneutically), might be chosen specifically by the historian or literary critic but always have their foundation in the text. In this way, although context is a 'social reality' it must be present and discernable within the text in order for it to be applicable.

Gabrielle Spiegels' notion of philology strikes me as the most persuasive and utilitarian explications of the 'new' methodology for the field of medieval studies in English. Her notion of how texts should be interpreted centres around a notion of the 'social logic'. She writes that "texts represent situated uses of language. Such sites of linguistic usage, as lived events, are essentially local in origin and therefore possess a determinate social logic of much greater density and particularity than can be extracted from totalizing constructs like 'language' and 'society'" (Spiegel 24). Spiegel believes that
a theory of philology which would satisfy both the postmodernists and the medievalists would have to take into account the historiographical basis of theory. She calls Saussure, Derrida, and Foucault to the forefront pointing out their strengths in uncovering that context is always within the text. There is both a refusal to deny a social ‘reality’ (which was the medievalists dilemma) as well as a refusal to succumb to interpretations which refuse to accept the impossibility of a social truth that is not wholly existent within particular texts and both shaping and shaped by their linguistic structure. She explains that texts both mirror and generate social realities, which they may sustain, resist, contest, or seek to transform, depending on the case at hand. There is no way to determine a priori the social function of a text or its locus with respect to its cultural ambience. Only a minute examination of the form and content of a given work can determine its situation with respect to its broader patterns of culture at any given time. What this means is that a genuine literary history must always to some extent be both social and formalist in its concerns, must pay attention to a text’s ‘social logic’ in the dual sense of its site of articulation and its discursive character as articulated ‘logos’ (Spiegel 24-25).

What Spiegel offers as an explanation of the way textual interpretation works is essentially a hermeneutic circle, whereby text and context can only exist in relation to other another. The method she offers up is a philological one, but one which sees beyond only the grammatical interpretation. Stephen Nichols provides a general definition in the “Introduction” to the Speculum volume: “What is ‘new’ in the philology common to all the contributions may be found in their insistence that the language of texts be studied not simply as discursive phenomena but in the interaction of text language with the manuscript matrix and of both language and manuscript with the social context and networks they
inscribe" (Nichols 9). These networks and matrices are the product of an intense form of interpretation and it is important to note that the assumption that the process of inscription is not merely a recall to grammatical philology. Inscription is "not to be confused with written in the traditional sense of 'recorded.' Rather, it represents the moment of choice, decision, and action that creates the social reality of the text, a reality existing both 'inside' and 'outside' the particular performance incorporated in the work, through the latter's inclusions, exclusions, distortions, and stresses" (Spiegel 26). It was a return to philology using poststructural ideas that allowed this to happen. Stephen Nichols, as editor to a collection of essays using 'new medievalist' methodology, writes that "poststructuralism freed medieval studies from the generic and linguistic taxonomies imposed by the invention of the discipline in the nineteenth century...Instead, one was free to consider the nature of medieval discourse as a manifestation of a culture to be reconstructed afresh" (Nichols 1991, 2). This form of 'reconstruction,' like the concept of 're-visioning,' is one which allows for a more open concept of interpretation which still remains faithful to the original form of textuality. Nichols asserts that,

[i]n the Middle Ages, one senses a fascination with the potential for representation, even more than with theories or modes of representation: something like an attempt to seek ways for extending the range of what was known of the material world and the world beyond matter through alchemy, through science, through physical and psychical voyages. Oneiric narratives – dream visions – can be seen from this viewpoint as an attempt to penetrate the boundaries of the known (Nichols 2).

This concept of a visionary matrix is an important one because it accentuates and embraces the variety of heuristic categories that the scholar utilizes (including their own
particular school of thought with its own analytic methods) in order to construct an interpretation. In the same way as people from the Middle Ages sought to understand God (the unknown), medievalists also seek to understand the Middle Ages (the unknown)\textsuperscript{12}. They may have a text available to them, but it still remains for it to be read. This hermeneutic process is outlined by Suzanne Fleischman:

> Once the data are established (not to minimize the effort involved in this undertaking), it still remains to interpret them. Radically simplifying, we can divide this hermeneutic process into two stages. The first... involves deciphering the texts as linguistic documents: what the language means, how it works; how its grammar responds to demands of the communicative contexts in which is was used... The subsequent hermeneutic stage... involves investigating the texts as monuments - poetic and/or historical artifacts (these two categories do not exhaust the typology, nor are they discrete) of a premodern culture - and seeking out new ways to make them continue to speak to us (Fleischman 27).

It is perhaps a new phenomenon to realize that medieval scholarship may invigorate our own lives, that when a text speaks its voice might shake us like God’s would. The intricate web of life which existed in the Middle Ages is now being used to shed light, both spiritual, theoretical, literary and otherwise, on present day life. This seems particularly

\textsuperscript{12} The writers of the Middle Ages also give the new medievalists a solid groundwork for their new form of interpretation. In a footnote Stephen Nichols writes that:

Inventing a new form of representation did not seem to pose a problem requiring theoretical elaboration in the Middle Ages. Understanding the implications and significance of such initiatives did. Consequently, one finds treatises on reading, like Hugh of Saint Victor’s \textit{Didiscalion} or Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s \textit{Poetria Nova}. The \textit{artes poeticae} of the Middle Ages, as well as prefaces to vernacular works, all stress the arduous task of reading as an almost mystical activity of penetrating veils (Nichols 1991, 23 n.3).

This too is my focus on writing about Hildegard. It is through the act of reading in a ‘new medieval’ sense that I am curious about, not what she did.
applicable in the realm of feminism where individual figures are being interpreted according to present day concerns. This is because, as Lee Patterson points out, the best way for us to understand ourselves is by difference, by accepting the Other:

[In the ironic history of a historicist postmodernism, the hierarchical Modernist binarism of present and past is rewritten as difference. What Ferdinand de Saussure said about language can now be applied to historiography: 'In language there are only differences. Even more important: a difference generally implies positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are only differences without positive terms.' It is this 'constitution of identity negatively through difference,' in Anthony Gidden's words, that prevents historiography from effacing one moment in order to know the other, and that allows it to replace a totalizing metanarrative with a plurality of micro narratives' (Patterson 90).

The benefits of constructing a literary context from a micro approach is that context is confined to a moment which can be seen clearly within the text. But the 'New Medievalism' does not presume to construct an entire universe out of a city record. It does not, as the New Historicism attempted to, suggest that all texts contain enough information to use them as an archaeologist might a piece of pottery. A 'renovated' philologist realizes the complexity and scattered nature of life and language and is focused on variance. Using the term 'materialist philology' Nichols, in the Introduction to a work entitled The Whole Book: Cultural Perspectives on the Medieval Miscellany (1996), asserts that,

[Materialist philology [another term for the New Philology] thus goes beyond traditional textual criticism. It continues to consider versions for a given work as variant forms that must be evaluated, placed in a hypothetical textual history of the work, and mined for clues that allow the textual critic to
reconstruct what the author wrote. But in addition, it demands that one look closely at the relationship of the individual version to its historical context in a given manuscript. Arguing that the individual manuscript contextualizes the text(s) it contains in specific ways, materialist philology seeks to analyze the consequences of this relationship on the way these texts may be read and interpreted (Nichols 1996, 2).

The methodology outlined in the perspectives offered by the ‘New Medievalists/philologists’ is rigorous and heavily slanted towards the practical, rather than the theoretical. When applied the ‘renovated’ philology provides a wide basis for a variety of interpretive strategies. The particular fruits which might be gleaned through a reappraisal of medieval literature from a ‘renovated’ philological perspective are now being rapidly produced. The collected works Stephen Nichols has edited attest to this. In one particular collaboration edited by Nichols and R. Howard Bloch they emotionally decree

Word’s out. There’s something exciting going on in medieval studies, and maybe in the Renaissance too... The institutional signs of a New Medievalism are everywhere: in the appointment of medievalists at major universities, many of which remained without specialists...after the death or retirement of the dominating philological figures of the 1940s to 1960s; in renewed interest among graduate students...in a number of recent scholarly gatherings...in the founding of scholarly journals such as Assays, Exemplaria, Médiévales, and Envoi devoted to the Middle Ages; in special issues...and – mirabile dictu – in the recent appearance of an issue of Speculum devoted to the so-called New Philology (Nichols and Bloch 1-2).

The two editors further point out that this new phenomenon is not limited only to medieval studies. Instead of attempting only to create a niche for their own writing they assert that the new methods they are adopting can be applicable across time period and
interest. They have articulated these new methods as follows: a written outline of the relationship between analyst and text, an insistence on using medieval techniques for interpretation of medieval texts, an insistence on correlating an identity between the Middle Ages and our own, and an increased amount of dialogue between medievalists and professionals from other disciplines (Wenzel and Nichols 2-4). Each of these important methods can be traced out practically through the history of Philology, New Historicism, semiotics, and deconstruction. Paul Zumthor, in an excellent text entitled *Speaking of the Middle Ages*, feels that:

> We have become aware of the fundamentally historical nature of the human sciences, but aware also of that impasse which has been reached the philosophy of history. We feel more and more clearly the urgent need not to sever the semiological aspect of the sign from the interpretation of the meaning; but we cannot ignore the tendency, deeply rooted in philological practice (which nothing has yet allowed us to put aside), to refuse whatever is separate from the letter, to deny that the ‘rest’ is analyzable or even worthy of critical consideration (Zumthor 16).

The benefits which medievalists have incurred both from poststructuralism and a renovated philology have been considerable.

*A Woman's Words Worth: Feminism and Medieval studies in the ‘New Philology’*

As a feminist writing this paper I have taken into account some aspects of the New Medievalism’s methodology that have appealed to me. The first of these is writing in the first person. The second is criticizing “works of fiction by academics known primarily for
their scholarly writings" (Nichols and Wenzel 6) such as Barbara Lachman and Umberto Eco. My reasons for this are many and they are backed up by Paul Zumthor who writes:

Along the way, I will not apologize for speaking in the first person. This is not a stylistic device, but an intellectual necessity...What remains to be said? Only this: from this zone of extreme poverty to which we have come wearing our critic's garb, the territory traversed in middle life begins to take on relief and fresh color as we turn and look back. For a long time we walked there with our eyes half closed (Zumthor 3, 4).

It was Zumthor's ability (like that of the feminists of the 60s and 70s) in 1987, which allowed me to feel comfortable identifying 'myself' within the realm of 'the' critical interpretation being prepared. Zumthor writes about historicism in the same vein, having realized that in contextualizing a text we must also contextualize ourselves as texts. He wants his readers to know that

It is not so much history as such that we must emphasize here as the respective historicities of the reader and his or her object... The idea of historicity, with reference to the specific quality of being-in-history as well as being-history, implies some appropriation of the real: it manifests itself on the level of type-situations, significant stages that lead a person to this appropriation; situations which, at times, can only be contingent and immediate realization of a possible, inscribed in time (Zumthor 32).

Zumthor's ability to recapitulate the necessity of historicism, poststructuralism and philology has been immensely important to this study. The only thing more important has been the realization of the even more important contribution to the field of medieval studies by feminists. What feminism has really driven home for medievalists as-they-

(continued...)
had-been was the need for re-historicization right down to the linguistic level. Diane Elam writes that the “feminist work takes as its starting point the premise that gender difference dwells in language rather than in the referent, that there is nothing ‘natural’ about gender itself” (Elam 242). Elam’s argument is important for medievalists who study women because the terms ‘feminine’, ‘masculine’, even simply ‘woman’ and ‘man’ take on radically different meanings from the twelfth-century to the twenty-first. It is my own concern about these terms which helped me to problematize some of the current work being done on Hildegard. Hélène Cixous, an important feminist who understands “feminist writing as a bisexual political act” also feels that writers should “[get] rid of words like ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine,’ ‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity,’ even ‘man’ and ‘woman’” (qtd. in Elam 243). Julia Kristeva, a Lacanian feminist, has responded to Cixous by maintaining that even when bisexuality is the norm one of the sexes will always be privileged (Elam 245). These issues are relevant for medievalists because notions of gender in the Middle Ages were extremely untidy.

Biologizing the Speculum: What the Feminist Medievalists have to say.

13(...continued)

This contribution has not been noticed only by me. Stephen Nichols and R. Howard Bloch point this out in the introduction to their work, Medievalism and the Modernist Temper (1996). “We do not mean to imply that Zumthor’s essay caused the sudden irruption of a personalized subject in the otherwise dispassionate discourse of medievalism. Certainly, both American and Continental feminism are responsible more generally for such a trend” (6).
Nancy F. Partner, writing the Introduction to Speculum's second special issue (the first being the one devoted to the New Philology) writes:

Now that women medievalists and medieval women are visibly and permanently part of the scene, there remain some major disagreements over how centrally the result of more than two decades of scholarship on women have been incorporated into the main body of medieval studies: as Judith Bennett sees it, 'although women are better assimilated into medieval studies in the 1990s, feminist scholarship is not,' while in Allen Frantzen's view, 'feminist scholarship today pervades the disciplines of art, history, law literature, and religion' (Partner 305).

Judith Bennett, in her article "Medievalism and Feminism" provides some statistics on just how many articles are being written by women. She writes: "First, consider scholarly journals. In the twenty years from 1971 to 1990 Speculum published less than one article per year on a topic even remotely connected to women. The publishing records of Medieval Studies and Medium Aevum are even less satisfactory, with about one such article every two years" (Bennett 316). Studies on Hildegard have been an extremely fruitful place for these new feminist medievalists to share their talent, but it was not until after 1990 that things really start to change. However, as they stand, most of the works on Hildegard do not adhere to the New Medievalists demand for an integrated approach of historicism, philology and poststructuralism. This is beginning to change. Bennett points to Lee Patterson's article "On the Margin" as an important starting point because it was there that he pointed out how medievalists "have retreated into an isolated and
Opening up to feminism has caused a great deal of change in medieval studies because of its ambiguity and interdisciplinarity. Bennett points out how much trouble this has caused for medievalists; but while she does point out how difficult it now is for medievalists to assert the 'truth' about their topic she underlines the importance of seeing that what is 'true' about these texts is their multi-dimensionality, their ability to present contradictions and puzzles. Her praise for feminism throughout her paper revolves around one important idea: "feminism has prompted scholars to look at the Middle Ages in new ways, but it has not dictated either what we have found or how we have described our findings" (Bennett 322). This point runs throughout the New Medievalism, with its indebtedness to the ambiguity of the New Historicists who refused to give a solid method to their work. It also gives lauds to Ernst Robert Curtius who felt that philology was a way of thinking that included some method but was not ruled by it. The importance, each of these scholars and epistemological positions imply, is in the text itself.

Medieval Tongue Twisters: Feminism and Linguisticality in the New Medievalism

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14 Bennett also comments that Patterson is the only 'new' medievalist to speak about feminist medievalists, because he "praised 'the sense of connectedness [between the past and the present] that lends urgency to their work.' Hence, in drawing inspiration from a critical engagement between present concerns and the past remains, feminist medievalists are working within an intellectual tradition of medieval studies that is both long and distinguished" (from Bennett 323, Patterson 107).
According to Gabrielle Spiegel "[t]he more complex, fractured, and heterogenous the critic’s view of literary language has become, the greater the necessity for a ‘lucid’ historical context against which to develop and, ultimately, adjudicate interpretive positions" (Spiegel 19). This is definitely the case for Feminist Medievalists who believe that it was language in the first place which silenced women. It is now their particular area of interest in medieval studies. Bennett argues that: "Feminists, then, are revising the field of medieval studies from three directions: adding new information, answering old questions in new ways, and creating entirely new research agendas. We have helped to introduce the ‘Linguistic Turn’ to medieval studies, and we are taking all of the Middle Ages (men as well as women, masculinity as well as femininity) under our view" (Bennett 327). Bennett points to the article written by Gabrielle Spiegel as a prime example of this work as well as numerous others. Part of the reason why feminists are so concerned about language has already been given but for the most part these women (and men such as Peter Dronke) are interested in language because it has not traditionally been women’s realm. Studies on Hildegard by such writers as Sabina Flanagan or Caroline Walker Bynum have flourished most likely because so much of the visionaries work involved women both in the clergy and in the outer world. On account of this contextual framework within Hildegard’s writings (because there are so many letters and actual manuals written for her society) could benefit immensely from New Medievalism’s insistence on the prevalence of philology and historicism. Sadly Speculum’s special issue on feminism and medieval studies seems to be a one-of-a-kind. Although books are being written by
feminist medievalists there are, as of yet, no solid theories being written, little self-consciousness. This might be for the better. Perhaps a methodology like the one the New Medievalists suggest can include feminism within its boundaries. However, rather than acting as a token sub-category, feminism as a ‘category of analysis’ could become a mainstream topic in all medieval interpretive strategies. This is certainly my ideal, my hope, and my suggestion.
Works Cited


Chapter Three

The Re-(visio)nary process: Putting the New Medievalism to Work

"Between the method which attempts to grasp the 'thing,' and the process, or practice, which produced that thing, there is not so much a distance as a radical difference, depending on the nature of the energy invested and the work accomplished."

- Paul Zumthor

"Reading is when we are informed by the rules and precepts in the writings which we read."

- Hugh of St. Victor

"Every creature in the world is like a book and a picture and a mirror for us"

- Alain de Lille

In this final chapter I would like to propose a workable method for considering Hildegard from the perspective of the New Medievalism. There have already been some attempts made by Hildegard scholars to update their work according to new theories.

Sabina Flanagan, in the first section of Maude Burnett McInerney's Hildegard of Bingen: A Book of Essays describes the process that she underwent in order to make her scholarship more current and viable:

I tried to reconstruct Hildegard's early life in a way that made sense of my understanding of the times, of Hildegard herself, and of the available but sometimes conflicting evidence. In that account, her enclosure at the age of eight was quite rapidly followed by the expansion of the anchorage into a de facto convent of nuns where Hildegard duly took the veil when she was about fifteen.

One of the risks of publishing is that what you once thought tends to become hardened into a kind of orthodoxy when issued in book form, and
thence taken up and repeated by others. But there is another side to publishing in that sometimes what you wrote is not so readily accepted but is, on the contrary, disputed; for making me think again about the nature of Hildegard's entry into religion I have to thank some of those people who reviewed my book, especially Kathryn Kerby-Fulton, although she might well dispute my new conclusions.

In the course of my recent reflections on Hildegard's early life it occurred to me that a change of medium might, as it were, provide a different angle on the problem. Suppose I were to make a film about Hildegard's life? (Flanagan 1999, 1).

What Flanagan has provided us with here is one aspect of hermeneutics that comes from an introduction to the New Medievalism. In her article she focuses on variance and contextual perspectives especially by looking to other disciplines for aid. In looking at an example of the ways that Hildegard has been interpreted, specifically through looking at two of the possible ways that Hildegard could have entered into the convent when she did. Flanagan notes that "there is support for both of them in our sources" (Flanagan 1999, 2). She points out that in "previous accounts of Hildegard's early life the tendency has been to utilize every scrap of information from whatever source that is not obviously contradictory" (Flanagan 1999, 6). This signifies, from the perspective of epistemology, that something must have convinced Flanagan that it was better to be unsure of the 'facts' in order to remain true to the evidence. This type of epistemological understanding is at the root of the poststructuralist plea for variance and it appears, in the case of Flanagan's argument, to have had a great effect on her writing. She has accepted historicism and variance as the two key tenets of her interpretation. She uses other written sources from the areas around Germany to help her understand Hildegard's enclosure better, she even
goes so far as to provide another example of an enclosed male to act as an analogy, only keeping the dates contemporary. Her final interpretation of Hildegard's entry into the nunnery, rather than coming specifically from any outside sources, remains completely faithful to Hildegard's texts on the matter themselves. She remains vague about the 'facts' because Hildegard does so as well, she uses imagery from the text, and although she admits that hers is the "more complicated scenario" (Flanagan 1999, 10) it reads beautifully and most persuasively because it is written by both Flanagan and Hildegard.15

Functionalizing the Process: Coming to the issue of Hildegard's Scivias

Now that the issues of New Medievalist theory have been discussed (in the previous chapters), it is only left to look at how the new methodology will function within one of the visions from Hildegard's Scivias. To add to this single interpretive act I have also included a discussion of one of the Latin words that Barbara Lachman utilized in her Journal: the word discretio. To do this I want to propose using a variety of analytical

15 The full interpretation by Flanagan is important enough to repeat here especially since comparisons between my own hermeneutic method and Flanagan's might be desirable. My regrets to Horace. Flanagan's text is as follows:

Hildegard's entrance into religion #3: Once again we are in the monastery church, guttering candles create large and threatening shadows...this time Hildegard's parents are seen from below, looming above the child; the child's hands are once more wrapped in the altar cloth and the promise read - cut to ram with bound horns struggling on the altar under the sacrificial knife - cut to Christ in agony on the cross, the child momentarily assumes his bloodstained garment. back to the rows of grim-looking monks (though not the grotesques from The Name of the Rose). Then a swift passage through the dark...noise, crowds, flaring torches. Entry to the reclusorium: the interior is small-scale, clean swept, and bare but lit by the steady glow of several candles, next, the abbot's final blessing and departure. His shutting of the door stills the confused external noise but makes the candles waver and dip. Then the candles start to burn steadily again...silence and light (Flanagan 10).
techniques that focus on revealing philological and contextual possibilities for textual interpretation. I have broken down the data into an integrated text/context framework according to philological and poststructuralist methods and theories. The hermeneutic I have adopted centres around the main ideas within the text, including its key terms, rhetoric, style, thematic, as well as an analysis of the form of the text, its structure and genre. Interspersed within all of this is an analysis of the context of the work as revealed by the work. This involves comparing the text with others and looking for unique traits. More than this it involves branching out into Hildegard's time period to look for comparable works and relative textual and belief structures. These tools for textual analysis have been compounded from textual practices adopted by the Hermeneutic tradition.  

16 It is important to note them here because most of them, if not all, are being used by the New Medievalists.  

In addition to the present methods used in my interpretation I have looked to also looked to medieval hermeneutics. In past studies in medieval iconological analysis (mainly

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16 I really am indebted to Dr. Richard Schneider at York University for most clearly outlining the Hermeneutic practice with regard to interpreting texts from a historicist and Hermeneutic framework (both visual and written) throughout my study with him from 1997-1999. The main scholars of the contemporary Hermeneutic tradition are Jurgen Habermas and Hans-Georg Gadamer, while Schleiermacher and Boeckh comprise the nineteenth-century list of scholars.

17 It is beyond the scope of this study to show precisely the ways in which these methods play themselves out in each of the New Medievalist's works but the most lucid and obvious use of them can be found in Gabrielle Spiegel's work, *The Past as Text* (1999).
of Byzantine and Gothic Art) I have found the methods discussed in Hugh of Saint Victor's *On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith* (1136 C.E.) as well as in Augustine’s *On Christian Doctrine* (426 C.E.) absolutely essential to any successful interpretation of medieval texts. I believe the same success will come from applying Hugh of St. Victor's four analytical areas for analysis, a very popular form of biblical exegesis (and any type of religio-literary interpretation) in the Middle Ages. His four angles through which each text must be interpreted are the historical, the tropological, the anagogical and the allegorical.\(^\text{18}\)

I think these will apply to any medieval text, especially Hildegard's since her work is contemporary with Hugh of St. Victor's. Augustine's four levels of meaning (which really differ very little from Hugh of St. Victor's) in biblical exegesis also prove extremely useful.\(^\text{19}\) Both Augustine and Hugh of St. Victor contributed widely to the twelfth century

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\(^{18}\) There is a wonderful explication of these tenets in Rita Copeland’s entry on "Medieval Theory and Criticism," in *The Johns Hopkins Guide to Literary Theory and Criticism*, pp.502-503. In Copeland's discussion of Augustine she goes to great pains to emphasize that "reading figuratively does not just mean analyzing verbal tropes: it means recognizing the symbolic value of things (material realities and events), what Augustine calls 'transposed signs'" (502). This is especially important to the New Medievalism because it interconnects philology with historicism.

\(^{19}\) These are summarized by E. Ann Matter in *The Voice of My Beloved: The Song of Songs in Western Medieval Christianity*. (Pennsylvania): "In the treatise *De Utilitate credendi*, Augustine has located four levels of meaning in the biblical text: historical (that which has been written or done), etiological (the cause for which a thing is done), analogical (showing that the Old and New Testaments do not conflict), and allegorical (showing some things are to be understood figuratively rather than literally)" (Matter 53). Matter then goes on to show how Augustine put these methods to work in his interpretation of Genesis. Matter goes on to utilize the works of the fifth-century monk, John Cassian in developing the frame of medieval interpretation and cites a great deal of "historical, allegorical, tropological, anagogical" frameworks (Matter 54). For the best criticism on Augustine's *On Christian Doctrine* I suggest any of James J. Murphy's texts, especially *Three Medieval Rhetorical Arts* (California 1971). Edward Peter Nolan's *Now Through a Glass Darkly: Specular Images of Being and Knowing from Virgil to Chaucer* (Michigan) also gives an excellent interpretation of Augustine's hermeneutics as well as Sarah Spence in...
notion of interpretation, both textual and worldly because they attributed a variety of layers of meaning to single topics or themes. Their insistence, in this way, on variance shows little difference from that which has again become popular. Augustine and Hugh of St. Victor were very popular in their own times for the reason that their particular epistemologies were inclusive rather than constrictive. Frank Tobin goes so far as to assert that “[w]ith the exception of a few writers who differ in respect to details rather than in principle, the medieval attitude towards an understanding of visions was determined by one person – Augustine” (Tobin 42). It is perhaps revealing that the visionary experience was validated by a reformed Christian. It was Augustinian interpretation which led to the use of eschatology to make writing acceptable. Augustine had confirmed the role of the Christian as it differed from the heretic and he, more than anyone else, could convince his audience the difference between paganism and Christianity because he had famously converted. Augustine, in De Doctrina Christiana writes that: “Those things which are to be used help and, as it were, sustain us as we move toward blessedness in order that we may gain and cling to those things which made us blessed” (De Doctrina Christiana 9). Read in a Christian sense, following this way, eschatology seems to control interpretation. This view seems to have influenced writers from the Middle Ages because it is through this type of logic that the macro/microcosmic view came into being. If all beings were moving towards a greater being, then they themselves

19(...)continued

could only ‘be’ as they were defined against the Other they were moving towards.

Making a Method: Defining a hermeneutic position according to some New Medievalist principles

More than just simply adopting a methodological stance through which I try to ‘hear’ and interpret Hildegard, I have tried to use the same methods as Hildegard. Alongside my own externally chosen, contextual and modern, methods I have taken great pains to interpret as Hildegard’s ‘voice’ does by asking continually the question “Quomodo?” or How does this happen? What is the significance? Or, “[h]ow does this function as a re-(visio)nary process?” Especially relevant here is Elizabeth Avilda Petroff’s insistence that what the mystical prophet was experiencing could not be revealed directly: “[m]ystical literature is an oxymoronic proposition, for how can we put into words what is beyond language, and how can we understand the language in which mystical experiences were often expressed?” (Petroff 4). This leads me to believe all the more strongly in the conscious intention of the mystic to make her writing as ‘functional’

20 Chauncy Wood, in an article entitled “The Author’s Address to the Reader: Chaucer, Juan Ruiz, and Dante” writes that “To be sure, we are not really told by medieval authors what to think...they tell the reader how to think. Or, more precisely, how to read...Undoubtedly, medieval authors had a strong, if unstated, conception of this hermeneutic truism, for they regularly concerned themselves with teaching their readers how to read the texts that they, the authors, were writing” (Wood 52).

21 Peter Dronke writes: “Hildegard uses visio to designate three related things: her peculiar faculty or capacity of vision; her experience of this faculty; and the content of her experience, all that she sees in her visio. Her mode of vision is most unusual: she sees ‘in the soul’ while still fully exercising, and remaining aware of, the powers of normal perception” (p 146). Thus my suggestion, in concordance with Gadamer’s, that the writing is a re-visionary process which contains many voices re-interpreted and multi-layered into a palimpsestic work.
as possible and to use language in order to convey something beyond the world and into the realm of signification.

By continuing to look at the function of the text I have been able to incorporate what I believe are the main tenets of the New Medievalism: to accept the variant interpretive possibilities of medieval texts. This is done by looking at how its language and content might work in the context of society as well as within the text itself.22 By arguing the case for 'functionality' I believe that a great deal of the excess over-interpretation that comes from a presentist or 'old' medievalist viewpoint can be at least partially avoided.

The Vita Verifiable: Hildegard's Life as Variance

There is no way to know for sure how Hildegard actually lived her life because our only knowledge of that life come through the genre of the Vita. Barbara Newman explains that: "[r]ecent studies of medieval religion have shown an increasing and justified

22 Patrick I. Gallacher and Helen Damico, in the Introduction to an edited collection entitled Hermeneutics and Medieval Culture argue that: "[i]n medieval texts, the interplay of the literal and the tropological interests corresponds to this interrelationship between culture and work. Ricoeur's explorations of latent meanings in a text, his ability to seek out and to incorporate multiple meanings (as revealed by Freudian, Marxist, and religious interpretations), and his stance as arbitrator between different types of interpretation, recognizing them as being grounded in disparate but related experiences in existence itself, correspond to the best medieval hermeneutic activity. It is precisely these aspects – the many voices of the text, and its complementarity expressive and referential relationship with the culture – that relate medieval interpretation with contemporary hermeneutics" (Gallacher and Damico 3)."
reluctance to draw conclusions about saintly women's piety from men's descriptions of it. Not only is hagiography itself a stylized and conventional genre, often untrustworthy as a source of biographical fact, but the inevitable gap between clerical perceptions of women and their self-perceptions can make the *vitae* of female saints especially problematic" (Newman 1998, 189). Hildegard's life, already well documented and argued, is currently being put through many historical tests for accuracy. For the purposes of this work, which is focused on literary interpretation, I have chosen to take for 'truth' only what is 'true' in the text, what is actually written. This is not to say that I would not take historical documents into consideration or that the work of historians is neither carefully done nor useful. For me it is the external 'truths' presented by other critics and scholars that is untrustworthy; not to be ignored, but to be used with caution.

Hildegard's life is epitomized by her visionary process (meaning both her illnesses

23 Newman does go on in her article, however, to try and suggest that Hildegard's was an autohagiography, that Hildegard did have a great deal of control over what was being written about her life (Newman 189-195). What seems to be important, as with all of Hildegard's work, is that things function on a variety of levels that need to be distinguished in order to provide the most understandable interpretation.

24 Flanagan's work, as well as Newman's *Sister of Wisdom* are the most often cited (which is why I used them) but their problematic adhesion to factual presentation necessitates some other reading, particular with regard to using Hildegard's *Vita* as 'historical' instead of 'literary.' It has persuasively been argued that the *Vita*'s are more likely a fusion of the two. It is from an acceptance of this new concept of interpretive 'variance' that Sabina Flanagan has decided to revise her epistemology. Especially debatable seems to be Hildegard's education. For more information on this topic see Joan M. Ferrante, "The Education of Women in the Middle Ages in Theory, Fact, Fantasy," from *Beyond Their Sex: Learned Women of the Medieval Past.*
and the divine issuance they heralded) as it was documented from her forty-second to her fifty-second year while she was already an important member of the Benedictine order.

The *Scivias* is her first work of visions and coincides with her introduction as Abbess in the convent at St. Disibod. About seven years after Hildegard began writing the text she sent the unfinished manuscript to Pope Eugenius III as well as her contemporary male visionary Bernard of Clairvaux. As a result of their support Hildegard's work was approved and finished without argument about her gender or her assertion (however humble) that she was in contact with the divine. It is interesting to note that it is not until Hildegard receives lauds for her work that she receives the vision that instructed her to set out on her own (with her nuns) to a new convent called Rupertsberg near Bingen.

The move did allow Hildegard a great deal of political and social freedom. Whether this was a political act or whether she simply was too fearful to mention her vision until she

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25 Peter Dronke, in *Women Writers of the Middle Ages* writes "In her fortieth year, then, Hildegard felt an irresistible pressura to keep her gift hidden no longer. We may conjecture that the fact that the previous year, 1136, the sisters on the Disibodenberg had elected Hildegard as their abbess, to succeed her beloved former teacher Jutta, filled her with greater confidence than she had known before; then for the first time she felt a surge of health" (p148).

26 Hildegard obviously was not the first visionary to supplicate herself. See Elizabeth Avilda Petroff's *Medieval Visionary Writers* and Peter Dronke's *Women Writers of the Middle Ages* for a more general introduction to the myriad women visionaries and mystics whose work still survives. It turns out that it really was not until the 13th and 14th centuries that women were heavily censured in their visionary sharing, possibly because it began to increase in popularity. These ideas are embellished in Dronke's text as well.

27 It was here that Hildegard compiled an Explanation of the rule of St. Benedict, an interesting compilation that Caroline Walker Bynum comments on in her text, *Docere Verbo et Exemplo: An Aspect of Twelfth-Century Spirituality*, pp.147-148, emphasizing her love for silence and for the external world to reflect the purity of the spiritual.
was safe is uncertain. In either case (or possibly both) the move was successful and Hildegard was able to complete the *Scivias*.

*Skirting the Scivias: Making a move*

Hildegard's *Scivias* is divided into three main sections: The Creator and Creation, The Redeemer and Redemption, and The History of Salvation symbolized by a Building. These recall the trinity and three-fold nature of God. These three sections are preceded by a *Declaratio*, a statement made (with use of a humility topos) in order to 'justify' Hildegard’s production of a text of visions\(^28\). The work took, according to the ‘Declaration,’ ten years (1141-1151) to produce under the aid of two other people, a “certain noble maiden of good conduct” and “that man I had secretly sought and found”, the former is assumed to be Hildegard’s confidante, Richardis of Stade, and the latter the monk, Volmar.\(^29\) What precisely the role of these two ‘helpers’ was is uncertain yet bears great impact on the scholarly assertion that the works of Hildegard were completely under

\(^{28}\) A great deal of work has been done in explaining and expanding upon the specific structural outline of the *Scivias*. Obviously Hildegard has stressed importance on the symbolic and numeric mode of understanding, but see Umberto Eco, *Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages* and especially James J. Murphy’s *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages* (1974). Some scholars argue that Hildegard was not using a humility topos but merely trying to explain her subjective reality.

\(^{29}\) The BBC has produced a highly creative and interesting portrait of Hildegard’s relationship with Richardis and Volmar in a short film (app. 52 minutes) simply entitled *Hildegard* (Dir. James Runcie, 1994).
her own direction and come completely from her own hand. 30 Certain works compiled from an overly presentist viewpoint have failed to validate the communal experience as one which is valuable and didactic. 31

Each of Hildegard’s three sections of the Scivias are broken down further into groups of visions which some scholars attribute to her contemporary, Hugh of St. Victor. 32 Hildegard’s particular use of numeric symbolism bears great resemblance to the work and beliefs of her contemporaries. In the first section she includes six visions (I have

30 In a relatively recent study of the visionary process called God’s Words, Women’s Voices, Rosalynn Voaden analyzes:

One of the major problems in studying the writings of medieval women visionaries is the question of agency in their construction. Generally, this question manifests itself as a concern with distinguishing the relative contribution to the text of the visionary and her associates - spiritual director, scribe, translator and/or editor. In medieval Christian culture, the voice of the woman was rarely heard in the land. May it be heard in the text? My belief is that it may, but in a way which is ambivalent and deeply problematic; this question is inextricably entwined with questions relating to the ways in which that culture shaped the medieval woman visionary’s articulation of her experience, and indeed her experience itself (Voaden 2).

Voaden’s text is ultimately coherent and extremely integral to any understanding of the way that the medieval palimpsestic culture is maintained through the use of material culture to act as a vehicle for God’s voice.

31 Carolyn Walker Bynum, in her text Jesus as Mother argues that “the concentration of scholars on the discovery and intense scrutiny of self in twelfth-century religious thought has sometimes implied that this individualism meant a loss of community – both community support and community control” (Bynum 84). Bynum has an entire chapter devoted to the important ways that communities existed that is very useful.

32 Barbara J. Newman, in the translation I have chosen to use by Mother Columba Hart, draws direct correlations between the two works in her “Introduction,” pp.23-24. The similarity seems worth noting for many reasons, not simply to draw a parallel between the two writers but to the use of the form in general as it reveals common socially agreed upon (and biblically agreed upon) notions of numeric order and ‘significatio’: divine significance.
chosen to study the third vision) which, from at least one interpretive angle appears convincingly to signify God's creation of the world in six days, leaving the seventh as a resting day. If this is the case, Hildegard has provided a text that functions on many levels. E. Ann Matter speaks to this idea:

First of all, the gap between the 'historical' sense of the text and various levels of allegorical interpretation is not a chasm; rather, all levels of meanings are directly linked to the text as it is read even before the process of allegory begins, with the assumption, that there is a complete story to be told which must unfurl on several levels. As Paul Zumthor has written about this method, it develops in relation to events defined on different points of a chronological (or perhaps cosmogenic) scale, conceptually linking past and future, thus, 'the dynamism which, according to medieval cosmogony, attaches natura to figura justifies them intellectually (Matter 57).

Reading Hildegard's ideas according to this mode proves very fruitful. Her visionary exegesis and description if read over six days would translate to the readers actually living out God's act of creating the world. Readers would be taking part in the creation themselves as well as bearing witness to Hildegard's understanding of that creation through her text. By breaking down the sections of visions Hildegard seems to be 'teaching' her readers through symbolism that this is 'how' it should be read. Jean LeClercq has equated this type of writing with an eschatological world-view:

The manner of presentation is determined by the end in view; to incite to the practice of virtue and promote praise of God, the events once recorded must, to a certain extent, be interpreted. Above all they must be situated in a vast context; the individual story is always inserted in the history of salvation. Events are directed by God who desires the salvation of the elect" (LeClercq The Love of Learning and the Desire for God, 158).
This type of interpretation works very well in looking at Hildegard because of her admonition that her work should serve as a propaedeutic for salvation.

The remaining two sections of Hildegard’s *Scivias* follow the same pattern of vision followed by its interpretation. Part Two has seven sections and concerns Christ’s introduction into Christianity and his role in the Church. This section’s last vision is of the Devil, a persona who figures even more strongly in Part Three, which concerns the virtues and the building of the Church.

Hildegard never fails to draw out as much of her visionary experience as possible, nor does she keep anything from her readers. She is intent on being as clear as possible about the meaning of what she has seen. She is also focused on keeping her reader’s attention. Her visions are all subdivided into the common text-gloss model, specifically in Hildegard’s *Scivias* by her vision followed by ‘And again I heard the voice from Heaven, saying to me:’ whereby Hildegard goes on to explicate her visions. In that explication, (mostly chronological) she moves in sections with reference to the Old and New Testament, condemnations of present practices, recognition of eschatology (reference to the Apocalypse highly likely) and then finally how (*quomodo*) the vision should be read and understood. At the end of each section Hildegard makes reference to what comes next. She will often end a section by saying ‘So says _____ (insert Gospel or Old Testament Prophet),’ and then begin the next section header ‘*In the words of _____*.’ In
Vision Three there are thirty-one separate sections. The first nineteen are closely related to the exact wording of the vision (which are given in short sections throughout Hildegard's explication). These first nineteen sections also contain an expansion of the ideas presented in the vision showing their significance in the Old and New Testament as well as through the directly transmitted words of God. The last sections (twenty through thirty-one) are condemnations of Christian practice as they relate to the vision indirectly. They also teach 'how' (quo modo) to read the world as good and as bad.

Part One, Vision Three\(^3\) of the *Scivias* concerns the Universe, a central and important topic not only to the first part of Hildegard's work but to her opus as a whole. The vision artistically presents the universe as a type of oval featuring stars and tri-heads blowing out air. These heads appear at intervals around the oval, there are four of them like there are four winds. Each ‘wind’ has three heads (like the trinity). At the centre of this oval there is a circle with some unidentifiable shapes. The top of the oval reveals three small stars, each above the other with a fourth, larger star at the bottom, and then two smaller stars below it. Below the largest star there appears to be a sun with a moon inside of it. The entire oval is surrounded in a type of flame which reaches beyond the drawn-in square border of the entire drawing. The only place where the flames leap outside the drawing are on the topmost pinnacle, which we can easily assume represents

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\(^3\) The picture and text (in both English and Latin) for this vision are included in Appendix A and B i and ii.
the heavenly realm which has no structure/enclosure. There are many stars too inside the oval, both large and small. The outermost rim of fire encircles another layer (delineated by a thick border), which contains a positioning of twenty-three stars and a drawing of the west wind, making twenty-four, a number which may correlate with the twenty-four elders of the Bible. The image is colored in, mostly in blue, red, and gold leaf (only the flames are in gold leaf). The image is usually translated as having an egg shape. Carolyn Worman Sur, in her PhD. dissertation entitled it the cosmic egg and draws out the visions symbolic order as it represents the micro/macrocospical structure of the egg/universe.34

There are three general ideas that come from this vision and interpretation. Following the idea set out by Hugh of Saint Victor these should come first from history, second from analogy and third from tropology.35 The first has to do with manifestation. This vision concerns the nature of the universe as it is available, in physical form, as a vehicle to God.36 In this way the narrative act of the vision implies a re-vision from what


35 Hugh of Saint Victor, in On the Christian Faith and the Sacraments (De Sacramentis) writes: "Now of this subject matter [human kind] Divine Scripture treats according to a threefold sense: that is, according to history, allegory, and tropology. History is the narration of events, which is contained in the first meaning of the letter; we have allegory when, through what is said to have been done, it is signified that something ought to be done" (On the Sacraments 1:14).

36 Again the indebtedness to the ideas in this regard as they are found in Augustine, Macrobius, etc. can be found in Umberto Eco's Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages, Translated by Hugh Bredin, 1986,
is unmanifest (the truth of God) into a visible form (literally a picture). The visual attachment to this image seems to function in part as this physical form. On a narrative level the picture and the content of the vision are ordered and structured according to a hierarchical sequence. The vision is extrapolated in order as it appears to have been seen. The difference is that as the vision must have happened there would likely have been no order; the vision would have just 'appeared'; what Hildegard has contributed then, to the re-visionary process, is the 'ordering' of God's created Universe according to the bodily order she sees on earth.

The second main idea that comes from the vision is that likeness and signification are the key to understanding. This is the definition of allegory itself. Hildegard's voice urges the reader to "magnify Him [Christ] as the true son of God incarnate through the true Virgin" (95). The idea of 'incarnation' seems to imply the process of signification. Hildegard seems to be saying here: 'Do not be foolish, the world only signifies God. Find Wisdom through the bodily manifestation and serve God in Wisdom'. In this regard the

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…I have already noticed, with chagrin, how impossible it is to speak of the 'auctores,' the author of this text, because, as I have already attempted to show in some small way, the 'real' author of the text is not Hildegard, but a community of writers, speakers, artists, etc. Even beyond all of this, there is the heavenly element. Hildegard makes it clear that these voices come 'through' her from beyond. In this way it seems that when I speak of Hildegard we do bear in mind that though I draw on 'one' name that she too is the vehicle through which all else is given speech. Poststructuralism asserts that we should pay attention to 'otherness' and 'alterity', that we should not only privilege the obvious voice. Gabrielle Spiegel asserts: "[i]nsofar as the emblematic figure of the postmodern world is the displaced person... It is hardly surprising that the two obsessions of postmodern thought are bound up with language and the body"
visual image would seem to act also as a representation of this idea. What appears in the image is but a signified image of something beyond: the image is the 'incarnation' and appears to be similar to the idea of the 'egg' signifying the Universe. Both Christ and the Universe are the direct result of God's physical 'incarnation'. The egg-shaped form is the same as that which surrounds so many copies of the icon "Christ in Majestas".²³

Hildegard specifically addresses this issue within her visionary exegesis. She describes the Universe as a natural creation (and thus a physical one) whose function is to make manifest the 'invisible' (*invisibila*) and eternal (*aeterna*) from the 'visible' (*visibila*) and 'temporal' (*temporalia*). Thus the Universe is described as an egg (*oui*) which is under the sway of the elements (earth, air, fire and water) with the winds, thunder, fire, and lightning. Hildegard also uses stones which seem to symbolize the earthly representation of God. These 'natural' elements are directly attributed to heavenly practices as well as ecclesiastical doctrines, i.e. baptism. In this section the focus is solidly directed towards showing how the darkness/light or Devil/God dichotomy should be reflected in nature, the third main idea of the text.

Hildegard concerns herself with presenting her readers directly with the image of the Apocalypse, of the reality of burning in Hell should humans not seek salvation. This is

³⁷(continued)

(Spiegel 42).

³⁸See Appendix C for a detail of a contemporary "Christ in Majestas" from Pala D'Oro, Spain.
where the tropological level of Hildegard’s discourse becomes identifiable. Through Hildegard’s narrative of the vision and her allegorical comparisons, both on the universe-as-female genitalia and on the allegory which works within her interpretation Hildegard has made a statement which demands that her readers live a Christian life. Hildegard seems to focus didactically on the idea that it is not creatures who can reveal the future of the apocalypse, not augury that will bring truth, but only the experience of God through already visible creations. Hildegard’s theme is on life and light as revealed by nature:

when your salvation is complete in both worldly and spiritual matters, you will leave the present world and pass on to that which has no end.\(^{40}\)

\[\textit{cum salus tua tam in saecularibus quam in spiritualibus completa fuerit, praesens saeculum mutabis et ad illud quod terminum not inueniet transibis} (I 3: 505-508)\]

Hildegard’s particular themes and topics in vision three are directly related to these ideas. She is concerned with providing her readers a ‘way’ to serve God in the world and how to use the body to see God’s grace. She does this by focusing on the elements that humans must live with in the world. She reveals how the world functions macrocosmically

\(^{39}\) The overall content and structure of the \textit{Scivias} demands that the reader accept \textit{Sapientia}, or Wisdom as the guide to a more pure way of life. Hildegard focuses her readers on the practical concerns of intelligent people and in so doing reveals to those readers the course of history.

\(^{40}\) Translation from the standard English version by Mother Columba Hart and Jane Bishop (1990). I have chosen to use this particular translation because it is the most widely utilized in criticism. Where major differences exist in other translations (particularly with regard to words that are linked to female images) they will be noted in footnotes.
(through the battle between God and the Devil) and then how humans must live microcosmically by being able to 'see' the truth that the world will reveal. She speaks in this way about augury/divination *(magicam artem)* and how it can be used by the Devil. But beyond all of her warnings she still seems to put forth the assertion that what makes humans the direct creation of God is their ability to learn that all things are mirrors of all things from God. She then asks that her readers live by allegory:

This openly shows [her vision] that, of all the strengths of God's creation, Man's is most profound, made in a wondrous way with great glory from the dust of the earth and so entangled with the strengths of the rest of creation that he can never be separated from them (Hart-Bishop 98).

*qui manifeste ostendit in fortitudine creaturarum Dei hominem profundae considerationis de limo terrae mirabili modo multae gloriae factum degentem, et uirtute earundem creaturarum ita obuolutum quod ab eis nullo separari ualet* (I 3: 293-297)

Hildegard's rhetoric is always bound up with this idea, as is the direct form of her work. She speaks directly from the spirit, through her own words, to a listener intent on hearing the words of God as they would apply to life. In this way, like Abbot Suger of St. Denis in his famous work,41 she is creating a type of spiritual Baedeker for her monastery and for her readers.

Hildegard utilizes a great deal of allegorical rhetoric in this section, drawing on

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41 I am referring here to the famous work, as it is translated and edited by Erwin Panofsky, *Libellus de consecratione ecclesiae s. Dionysii* (On the Abbey Church of St. Denis and its Art Treasures) (1946)
parable, biblical imagery, gospel explication, the direct use of the word of God, and direct analogies. Each of the sections range from one to three paragraphs which take three to five minutes to read out loud. Sometimes the voice in them seems to come directly from Hildegard, or at least from someone who is meant to be preaching to the public. Her use of 'natural' images suggests the direct relevance of her work to the agrarian public (both within and without her monastery walls). She uses images of animals, stones, the world as "plowed and cultivated" (Hart-Bishop 104), illness, birth and death, the elements, and light and dark. Hildegard's rhetoric centres mainly on using the functionality of these natural images to provoke sanctity, knowledge and humility. The hortative style makes her language logical and easy to understand. The view again is apocalyptic; Hildegard often exhorts her readers through the phrase, "Oh, wretched ones" -- "O miserī". While she creates her Universe she seems to have two aims in mind: gathering all Christians to prepare for the end of time and teaching them how to live in the meantime. To do this she turns to nature and its likeness to God. She uses mainly metaphors, the 'egg' as universe (*œuf*) in order to explain nature's elements. She uses the analogy of a minter and his coin to explain how religion works:

For creatures fulfil My commands when it pleases Me, in the same way as when a minter, making a coin, strikes it with the requisite form, then that coin displays the form stamped on it, but has no power to know when the minter may decide to impress another form on it, for neither in the long nor in the short run does it understand the form it has" (Hart-Bishop 100).

Nam cum mihi placuerit, creatūrāe iussionem meam ostendunt, uelut cum faber nummum faciens in eo congruentum formam caelat, sic quod idem
Hildegard, in this section, seems to be speaking not only about religious practice, but also about having children, for although the impressions (of both parents) can easily be seen, their child may appear much differently from them. The formation of the intellect of women and children is also described in these terms. With God as minter, each child will appear only as God wills it. She also seems to be saying that although people may appear to act one way, with God's will things may turn around. Typically with Hildegard the allegory appears multi-layered and with multiple meanings. Christ is referred to in the visionary explication as a grape who is pressed into "such wine that it gave forth the greatest odor of sweetness" -- "tale unum fecit quod maximum odorem suavitatis dedit" (1 3: 628-629) but who then treads "with His warlike foot upon the head of the ancient serpent" -- "pede militiae suae os antique serpentis conculcuauit" (1 3: 630-631) in the same analogy (Hart-Bishop 105). These biblical images validate the analogy with 'proofs' from the Bible shows Hildegard's awareness of the ways in which examples both widen and clarify the topic at hand.\[42\] Part of the historiographic background for this is Augustinian:

\[42\] The first image comes from Ephesians 5:2, the second from Genesis 3, 15.
For Augustine, all analogies are cracked looking glasses. Indeed it is the perception of the crack, the way in which the one member of an analogy is false to the other, in which the image is false to the original, that allows us to make any epistemological headway at all. It is the very discrepancy between the model and the thing it is a model of that triggers the speculative mind into useful and creative action (Nolan 57).

Looking at Hildegard studies in this way, which is really a useful description of the New Medievalism through Augustine, we can see that what is valid about a text can often be seen through a variety of other interpretations. As an example, if we do not see each other as mirrors, then as what? What might be seen as most important is that Hildegard has no difficulties juxtaposing variant interpretations together in order to provoke understanding. It does not matter ‘what’ you are seeing, only ‘how’ you are seeing it. And ‘how’ is always with the eyes of God working through us.

On an allegorical level I believe the vision to signify the universe as it is revealed through the female genitalia and the ability to bear children and act as an excretory mechanism. Feeling comfortable with pushing this idea I sensed that Hildegard may have been attempting to understand ‘how’ the human body reflects the creation of the universe.

43 This really should not be surprising since Hildegard, in her later career, makes a great deal about the nature of bodies. At this early juncture of her career, however, most critics are silent about Hildegard’s language/body relations. Carolyn Worman Sur, in a doctoral thesis entitled, *The Feminine Images of God in the Visions of Saint Hildegard of Bingen’s Scivias* merely calls the Universe an “ovoid or cosmic egg” (Sur 69). Sur interprets the egg as an egg, symbolizing the “origin of life” (Sur 69). Sur, however, disagrees and makes little mention of the egg as a genital shape, merely alluding to a definition from *The Woman’s Dictionary of Symbols and Sacred Objects* by Barbara G. Walker which states that the genital symbol would have been an almond (no particular reason is given).
Since the vagina is the place where humans (God's most important creation in the universe) are born and because Hildegard wrote so many natural and medicinal works, perhaps looking to the female form was the primary vehicle through which she understood her visions. It is on the allegorical level that this idea may prove fecund. Seeing Hildegard's description of the universe and also seeing an artistic representation of her vision through the female genitalia is likely to spawn many questions about the validity and the repercussions of such an interpretation. Obviously the issue of the role of women's bodies and how they relate to mystical experience is important to this study, as is the specific issue of Hildegard's own viewpoint. Her experience in a female convent whilst engaging in medicinal cures and physical study is likely enough to merit her use of the female body to represent Christian ideas. Springing from this preliminary choice of image is Hildegard's later decision to rearrange things completely. Her last vision of the universe is in a circular shape featuring Christ at the centre. There seems to be a discrepancy between Hildegard's desire to universalize (pardon the pun) her pictures as well as keep them close to her vision. Within the re-visionary framework Hildegard is able to provide the kind of language which appears simple but contains a more detailed allegorical structure. She tends to compartmentalize language (as she does through her own developed Lingua Ignota, a self-constructed set of approximately 10,000 words). One

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44 This image is highly representative of most 12th century mystics and cosmologists.

45 (continued...)
reason to link the two might be the relative interest in science. Both Hildegard's visions and her 'new' language present a didactic framework for living. The result of both undertakings is the presentation of a 'text' which is dedicated to God by the service which it expects. Using the language and the visions provides the reader with a 'way to God's salvation'. Jeffrey Schnapp writes that the way medieval languages were constructed has to do with a conscientiously apocalyptic society, one which has been punished for its inability to live chastely. Seeing Hildegard's work as the result of Eschatology makes the model perfect. This is because if one lives the individual life (the micro world) under the shadow of God (the macro world) salvation in the future through the present becomes possible without recourse to astrology or divination. The two (Heaven and Earth) are interdependent in Hildegard's vision if we accept her universe as revealing itself through a physical form. Her word for the universe, 'like a shadowy skin' -- "quasi pellem umbrosam" (1 3: 45) seems to imply the way that God has fit order over the world like a "skin". This word is usually translated as "zone" but "skin" brings up a great deal of the interplay between language, God, and the body. This interplay resulted, in the Middle Ages, in the sincere desire to make reconciliation for the fall of Babel and to return to the garden of Eden before it was tainted through linguistic forms (Genesis 11). Geoffrey T. Schnapp explains that,

\[45\text{(...continued)}\]

The most accessible article written on Hildegard's mysterious "Lingua Ignota" comes from Jeffrey T. Schnapp's article "Virgin's Words" from which I have quoted widely in this section.
[a]s a result, the imaginary languages of the medieval period explicitly situate themselves, horizontally between Adam's private act of naming and the pleromic tongue of the eschatological city and, vertically, between the babble of Babel and the prophetic wind of Pentecost. Yet, despite the biblical coordinates, an identical linkage continues to obtain between imaginary languages and otherworldly or utopian discourse, between visionary modes of cognition and scientific language (Schnapp 277).

The relationship between Babel and Pentecost lay in their ability to provoke the absolute necessity for ‘living in the moment’. Because no one knew when the end would come and because ‘science’ was such a contentious issue in the twelfth century (with regard to divination)⁴⁶ there seems to have been a great impetus to create a world which is holy in its attempt, if not bodily, subdermally, to create a society founded on purity and salvation. The idea of the subdermal in Hildegard’s visions finds its contemporary (as well as Medieval) heritage in language. The relationship between language and the body is importantly fore grounded in the Scivias and seems to find its resolution in the Lingua Ignota.

⁴⁶ The importance of astrology (outside of the obviously trepidacious view of its assets in the Scivias) are outlined in Wetherbee’s text:

Astrology plays a complex role in twelfth-century attitudes toward the situation of man. It implies a determinist view of life which inevitably generated pessimism and what must seem to us an absurd preoccupation with the divinatory aspects of astrological calculation; but, viewed in another way its very status as a science implied the possibility of transcending the stars by mastering the knowledge they offered, and, if not evading one's fate, at least accepting it as one's human lot and meeting it nobly, thereby asserting a certain superiority (Wetherbee 9-10). Transcending the ‘stars’ is a great deal like applying a gloss (or interpretation) to a text.
By looking into some of the possible motivations for Hildegard’s ‘re-vision’ of the universe a simple pattern emerges. Each vision, through various methods, is explicit in its direct application to life and to holy living, even on a structural level. What seems to be repeated by Hildegard through a variety of forms is that: 1. There is God, 2. This is how we know God, 3. The body is how we know God. Hildegard uses the rhetorical “quo modo” to indicate this. It occurs nine times in Book Three, Vision Seven. In Part Two, Vision Six it is repeated sixty-seven times. In the vision I am concerned with it only appears up three times but its intention for clarity and simplicity is evident. Hildegard’s use of repetition helps to develop the didactic issue of “how” to understand the universe as a logical form even on earth.

The particular vision of the universe I am dealing with comes early not only in Hildegard’s visionary career but also in the text of the Scivias. It falls between Hildegard’s vision of the “Creation and Fall” and is followed by “Soul and Body,” both of which show ‘how’ all of humanity came into being. The vision of the universe is, as an image, both pragmatic and intuitive. It parallels many aspects of the world with those which appear to come from God. With her vision Hildegard creates (or is revealing) a multi-sensory experience which incorporates visible bodily images through which the invisible may be glimpsed. Mother Columba Hart speaks about this by seeing Hildegard as [a] visionary who took her revelations as a text for exegesis, not an experience for re-living, Hildegard was not, technically speaking, a mystic at all. She wrote not about union but about doctrine, although her attention to
bodily phenomena such as sexual desire or menstrual cramps sets her apart from other visionary theologians of the twelfth century (Hart 2-3).

The specific context which Hart puts her in is rather unique. Looking at Hildegard as someone coming from a twelfth century context of eschatology, however, where death is the expected everyday friend, the body and its decay takes on great primacy. Her interest in the female body with its ability to produce life, as the Virgin Mary indicated, from this perspective becomes important. It seems no coincidence that Hildegard was writing the *Scivias* at the same time that she produced her texts on medicine (Hart 14).

Mother Columba Hart, seeing Hildegard’s production of the *Scivias* as a herald of Love for humanity describes

> Reverent meditation on the cosmos and its proportions which all have their analogues in the microcosm of the human body, leads to the same eternal center as meditation on history in its divinely ordained stages. Just as the human form is inscribed in the center of the universe in a celebrated illustration of this text, so Christ or incarnate Love is inscribed on the center of time (Hart 16).

From this viewpoint the issue, again, of Hildegard’s ‘hidden’ language is a good comparative ‘text’. Her creation of specific terms for body parts coincides with her explication of her visions. She is providing a ‘vehicle’ to God through her linguistic revision. The more specific spiritual meaning the body takes on the more wise her reader

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47 There are some articles and books about the *ars moriendi*: Richard Macksey has an article entitled "The Artes Moriendi and a Transtextual Genre" (1983), Phillip Ariès a book called *En Face de Mort* (1983), another by James M Clark called *The Dance of Death in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance* (1950). There is also an article in German that relates death to Hildegard’s work: Michaela Diers, *Vom Nutzen der Tränen: über den Umgang mit Leben und Tod im Mittelalter und heute* (1994).
becomes as a body on earth. These readers were likely those within the church, visiting women in need of aid, and more generally the needful public. If Hildegard's language therefore is mainly geared towards reproducing words for the female body this may be the result of, not as Schnapp suggests, that Hildegard was unhappy about the way her society viewed 'the body', but merely an indication of how multi-layered the current meaning may have had or even that Hildegard wanted to create her words with the kind of specific analogic potential that I have suggested. This would make them useful in their easy applicability. Schnapp remarks on Hildegard's inclusion of a great deal of 'uncommon' terms such as that for feces, sweat, the penis and vulva (Schnapp 286-287) but all these would seem to point to Hildegard's understanding for all these terms as analogous to the workings of God. While there does not seem to be particularly direct evidence within the vision for this, aside from looking at things allegorically, there is evidence of the same trend in later works. In her *Book of Divine Works* (Divine Works) Hildegard writes that "the clouds themselves have breasts, so to speak, from which they pour rain down upon the Earth, just as milk is suckled from a breast" (Vision 4:8). This is very similar to the vaginal image from the *Scivias*. There the universe is, as a "vast instrument, round and shadowy, in the shape of an egg, small at the tip, large in the middle and narrowed at the bottom" -- "*maximum instrumentum quod uides rotundus et umbrosum secundum similitudinem oui, superius artem et in medio amyllum ac infeius constrictum*" (1 3:115-117) which contains, allegorically, a clitoris, represented as a fire. In that space,

[in that fire [which is correlative to the hair surrounding the vaginal lips]
there is a globe of sparkling flame, so great that the whole instrument is illuminated by it... over which three little torches are arranged in such a way that by their fire they hold up the globe lest it fall (Hart-Bishop 94-95)

\[\text{in igne isto est globus rutilantis ignis tantaeque magnitudinis quod idem instrumentum totem ab eo illustratur... super se tres faculas sursum ordinate positas habens, quae suo igne eundem globum ne labatur continent} \ (1 \ 3:136-144).\]

Hildegard attributes this analogy to showing

how by its arrangement the Son of God, leaving the angels in heavenly places, descended to earth and showed humans, who exist in soul and body, heavenly things, so that, glorifying him by serving him, they reject all harmful error, and magnify him as the true Son of God incarnate through the true Virgin [arriving, bodily, through Mary's vagina], when the angel foretold him and when humans, living in soul and body, with faithful joy received him (Hart-Bishop 95).

\[\text{Uidelicit sua administratione demonstrantes quod idem Filius Dei de caelo ad terras descendens, angelis in caelestibus relictis, hominibus etiam qui in anima et corpora subsistunt caelestia manifestavit, qui suae claritatis obsequio ipsum glorificantes omnem nociem errorem abiciunt, cum eum uerum Dei Filium de uera Virgine incarnatum magnificant, ubi ipsis eum angelus praemuniatuet et ubi homo in anima et corpore uiuens eum fidei gaudio suscepit} \ (1 \ 3:144-151).\]

There are images too which seem to suggest the urethra, which is a second "zone" or 'skin' beneath the "globe" and through which "truth rushes forth and spreads with words of justice"(Hart-Bishop 96) – "\text{uera diffamatio cum iustis sermonibus procedit}\" \(1 \ 3:184-185\). I believe Hildegard writes about menstruation as well (which was the bodily repercussion Eve suffered in the Old Testament for eating the forbidden fruit, saved spiritually by Mary's purity in the New Testament). From the Scivias vision:
In this zone [which appears to be the actual vaginal canal] there is a dark fire of such horror that you cannot look at it. This means that the ancient betrayer’s most evil and most vile snares vomit forth blackest murder with such great passion that the human intellect cannot fathom its insanity; whose force shakes the whole zone, because murder includes in it horror all diabolical malignities [this echoes the book of Leviticus] ... While it makes its thunders heard, the bright fire and the winds and the air are all in commotion, because when murder cries out in its eagerness to shed blood, it arouses the justice of Heaven and an outburst of flying rumors and increased disposition to vengeance on the part of right judgement (Hart-Bishop 96).

In eadam quoque pelle quidam tenebrosus ignis tanti horroris est quod eum intueri non potes: qui declarat quod in pessimis et in nequissimis insidiis antiqui perditoris taeterrimum homicidium tanti feruoris erumpit quod insaniam illius humanus intellectus discernere non ualet; qui totam pellem illam sua fortitudine concutit: quondam homicidium omnes diabolicas malignitates suo horrore complectitur...qui dum sonitum suum eleuat, ille lucidus ignis et uenti et aer commouentur: quondam dum homicidium in avaritia effusionis sanguinis stridet, superna iudicia et exspirationes uolantium rumorum et expansions fluentium dispositionum in ultione recti iudicii suscitantur (13:196-213).

Hildegard’s notions of the realm of eschatology (which manifests itself in fire) is saved by the waters of birth that burst forth from the universal womb of God. Hildegard’s knowledge about order and balance seems to have been epitomized in her ability to structure her argument so that the multi-layered nature of her words is clear. Recounting his reading of Hildegard’s structure in creating the Lingua Ignota Schnapp outlines:

The categories covered are the following (in sequential order and according to my own nomenclature): first, the supernatural sphere, second, the human order; third, the church; fourth, the secular order; fifth, time measurements; sixth, the socio-economic sphere; and seventh, the natural world. (Schnapp 284).

Even Hildegard’s construction of a ‘secret’ language held many levels of interpretive
potential. There is the obvious correlation between the seven categories with the seven liberal arts as well as the seven ages of men [sic]. Macrobius writes about the correlation between seven and the body: "The operations of the senses are performed through seven openings...What is more, all bodies have seven motions...The number seven is distinguished for having so many functions, whether exercised in the combinations amounting to seven or by itself, that it is deservedly considered and called full"

(Commentary on the Dream of Scipio VI: 81, 82, 83). The question than meant to be asked is, "What is the true meaning of 'ignota' in Hildegard's language? -- is it really 'hidden' or does it refer more to 'mystery' as paralleled in the 'mystery of Christ.' This could link an important emphasis on functionality that I believe is at the heart of all of Hildegard's writing. If Hildegard has attempted an intentional link to an Adamic world language where the sins of Eve have been eradicated than her utopianism may provide clues to a deeper understanding of the Scivias. An important link between the two is their insistence on the macro/micro world system (Schnapp 285). This tendency within Hildegard's work is part of what makes her work so useful for the New Medievalism; it (the text) challenges the reader by providing them with information which can only be gleaned by a multi-faceted and mirrored gaze.48 I would argue that Hildegard's work is

48 Peter Dronke comments on the German scholar Hans Liebeschütz's approach to Hildegard's work: "Liebeschütz recognized that, while there is a vast literature, late-antique and medieval, relating the macrocosm to the microcosm - a relationship always rich in allegorical potential - Hildegard's macrocosmic-microcosmic parallels were distinctive: her way of developing the analogies was so extensive, so fundamental to her world-view, and so original in many details, that it seemed constantly to elude the earlier treatments of this topic and was largely inexplicable in terms of older sources" (Dronke (continued...))
indebted to her scholarly world view in this regard, in her knowledge of other texts that adopt the same method. One such work may have been Plato's *Timaeus*. Rita Copeland summarizes *Timaeus'* cosmology by writing that "the human world is a microcosm of a transcendent order of Being, and the materiality of the world renders that higher order partially intelligible to our senses" (Copeland 500-501). Seeing the universe as a 'body' like the human form directly relates to the Neoplatonism of the twelfth century as indicated by Hildegard's work. Sarah Spence outlines the way that the body can be represented textually (as Hildegard does in the *Scivias*). Spence believes that "the link between body and text derives from a belief that reading correctly is a key to living correctly; the semiotics of the flesh that fascinates each author lies at the heart of both their text and their theology" (Spence 1). In accordance with such widely held viewpoints Hildegard writes that: "[t]herefore, all these arrangements in space are ordained according to a definite standard, so that the curvature of the wheel of our world may assume its proper orbit in the firmament. And thus, all this order is indicated by our human form" (Divine Works V4:14, 90). The particular vision from *The Book of Divine Works* is a retelling of the "universal" model according to more stereotypical views (such as those of Hugh of St. Victor) of the ‘cosmological wheel of life’ defined by such attributes as the

\[48\] (...continued)

1998, 1). Dronke himself is later surprised by the extent of Hildegard's use of allegory: "In her Gospel homilies she uses allegory in the sense of *allegoresis*- a meticulous and often wholly unexpected allegorical reading of the sacred text. She makes the Gospels sung on the major Church feasts into allegories of the macrocosm and the microcosm" (Dronke 1998, 6). Winthrop Wetherbee identifies these ideas in Plato's *Timaeus* as well as the medieval neo-Platonists: Macrobius, Martianus Capella and Boethius (Wetherbee 2-3).
four winds, tempers, gospels, and elements. This image of Christ does seem to suggest a direct link from the "egg" as "uterus" or "vagina" which brings forth children of God. Hildegard even writes that she "saw the image of a woman who had a perfect human form in her womb. And behold! By the secret design of the Supernal Creator that form moved... so that fiery globe that had no human lineaments possessed the heart of that form" (Divine Works V4: 109). In these later works I am convinced that Hildegard was sure that being blunt was a better way of revealing her re-visionary ideas about the human form's ability to represent the cosmos. She had, more than likely, a great deal more textual examples available to her. One such example likely came from Macrobius' Commentary on Cicero's "Dream of Scipio", an author likely known to Hildegard who wrote that "the world is man writ large and man is the world writ small" (qtd. In Eco 33). From this perspective Hildegard's vision of the universe as a female vagina seems likely if not confirmed.

Hildegard's writing as typically representative of a universal/bodily metaphor is one which situates context as it is inherent in the text's themselves. The themes which Hildegard makes use of – the end of time, the need for chastity, the particular ways how

49 Umberto Eco writes that "Boethius explained all of this in terms of the theory of proportion. The soul and the body, he said, are subject to the same laws that govern music, and these same proportions are to be found in the cosmos itself. Microcosm and macrocosm are tied by the same knot, simultaneously mathematical and aesthetic. Man conforms to the measure of the world, and takes pleasure in every manifestation of this conformity: ‘we love similarity, but hate and resent dissimilarity’" (Eco 31). In this vision, a little different from Hildegard's man is again the centre of the 'world puzzle'; in Hildegard's the two are more mirror-like, more intertextual de rigeur.
the world is constructed – all are reflective of her apocalyptic world view and the necessity for purifying the flesh. This is evidently a view circumstantiated by a context of ordered chaos in an eschatological sense. Gabrielle Spiegel calls a context like this a “perceptual grid” (Spiegel 103) something which represents the social/intellectual/theological forms and functions which society’s symbols play themselves out textually. Because Hildegard’s visions are so multi-layered it would seem that different contexts too might be possible. Because of my interest, focused on Hildegard’s views on women, attention to the ‘cosmic egg,’ as it is often called, was a key interest of mine. This is because regardless of Hildegard’s views of ‘women and power’ (in a contemporary sense) one gets a greater sense that it was not power but function which defined gender in the twelfth century. By the time Hildegard wrote the Scivias power was likely not an interest at all; she was already an important abbess. What stands out as her interest was the eschatological role, the bodily ‘playing out’ of the world that ‘made’ gender revelatory. For a woman in the Middle Ages this is a suggestion which has great potential.

*Coming to the text with discretion: Making the philological case*

It was in fact my interest in the way that Hildegard used her ‘power’ to reveal the particular role of eschatology within her writings that prompted me into further analysis of the word *discretio* in her works. Barbara Lachman’s limited use of the word prompted me to look into the variety of possible uses philology could bring to a New Medievalist
interpretation of Hildegard’s work. The particular word is utilized by Hildegard over seventy times in the *Scivias*, most of them in different contexts. Peter Dronke, in a discussion on some of Hildegard’s letters teases out the word in one of Hildegard’s letters to Hazzecha, an abbess from Strausberg:

The keynote of the letter is Discretio. In *Scivias* (III 6, 34), this personified virtue is described as ‘the most skilled sister’ (*sollertissima cribratrix*) of all things’, she who, ‘in the breast of human minds, contains all that is apt and fitting, even in their most minute counsels and arts’. Discretio, we might say, is Hildegard’s counterpart in the spiritual sphere to the troubadour ideal of courtly *mezura*. (Dronke 187).

Rosalynn Voaden extends the virtue of Discretio towards an ecclesiastical doctrine. She writes that the “*discretio spirituum*” is a “discerning of spirits” which “defined the visionary experience, decreed the virtue and deportment of the visionary, established forms of expression and laid down criteria for assessment. And it facilitated -- or restricted -- dissemination of the writing of visionaries under an implicit *imprimatur*” (Voaden 4).\(^5\) Importantly, what Voaden brings out is that *discretio* is an active verb, meant to inspire adherence to rules and principles. When we remember that Hildegard warned her contemporary Elisabeth of Schönau to have more ‘discretio’ she may have been warning her against bending the rules too far. Hildegard makes

\(^5\) Voaden’s main argument for her, *God’s Words, Women’s Voices* is that using *discretio spirituum* was the foundation of all visionary writing. She points out that there was a rule for conformity in the creation of women’s visionary work and she takes great pains to point out resistances and penalties in her text when discretion was not followed (Voaden 4-5).
comments about discretio as it befits the mortification of flesh, "circumdata mortificatione carnis" (Scivias III, 6, 909). Or, if we take into account Dronke's find, that Discretio is also a personified Virtue, then we see Hildegard making the actions she undertakes in life according to a greater power which is spiritual rather than pragmatic. Macrobius wrote: "Virtues alone make one blessed and only through them is one able to attain the name" (Commentary on the Dream of Scipio VIII:3). For Hildegard this idea seems to have taken on great meaning. In effect, what Hildegard seems to succeed in is continually bridging the two worlds of materiality and spirituality - or: she found one through the other.

What I have attempted to do here, as briefly as I could, was to show how deeply we might penetrate a text through both traditional and contemporary methods. By accepting variance and philology we are opened to a world with more imaginative possibilities. We are then more concerned with 'how' things might work, than why we believe they did. I have also attempted to show, more by way of example than through an explanatory method, how a feminist reading of a medieval text may look. I have focused on 'feminism' as a category for analysts rather than a particular methodology with its own rules. The reason for this is because the entire notion of 'school of thought' while useful, necessitates, usually, a dismissal of certain types of data or a variety of categories of analyst that do not meet the 'agenda'. Particularly in the realm of feminism (which is often under attack) New Medievalists need to make sure that they widen their contextual
framework as widely as possible because there is little data already available which is easy to interpret. If the New Medievalist can work hermeneutically from a feminist viewpoint (and not methodology) than she/he would not have to feel overly encumbered by the type of infrastructure which caused philology and historicism to come under attack initially. Further, by accepting historicism as a ‘renovated’ and valid method Hildegard then becomes an important source for many works written only by male visionaries in the twelfth century. Through a direct comparison between her works and, for example, Bernard of Clairvaux perhaps new information about the structure and content of the twelfth century visionary model could be found. From a feminist perspective work may be found in interpreting not the scholarly foundations of visionary writing, but that which is ‘natural,’ ‘inspired,’ and ‘from above, not below.’ I do not mean to say that these particular categories are more ‘female’ than male but because women definitely received less education than men on the whole in the Middle Ages a study of the differences that may result in would be interesting if not revealing. By broadening the categories and methods of analysis for medievalists Hildegard would become not an entity on her own, a model for idolatry, but a member of a community of social people both creating and being created by the logic they are presenting through their texts and in their daily lives.
Works Cited


Conclusion

It seems fitting to conclude this paper by comparing the current state of New Medievalist theory and practice with bodily illness. A link between Hildegard’s illness and her visionary writings reveals itself between the structure of the texts as well as their highly hermeneutic content. One of the reasons why Hildegard might have wanted to create a text with such a variety of interpretive possibilities is the virtue in the structural creation (as it too mirrors the physical body as well as the universal). When the body is ill, it requires a more thorough attempt at interpretation:

It is the bandaging of a wound that constitutes this virtuous activity [hermeneutics]; the very process of reading and interpreting is virtue, charity, itself, while its opposite, cupidity, is the action of focusing on the unglossed text as it is, and that unglossed object, which is called by Augustine 'quodlibet corpore' (any corporeal thing), is also perceived as a body that is wounded (Spence 6).

This idea is important for the New Medievalist because it raises certain issues about the depth and intensity of the interpretive task. It also clarifies (through the metaphor of the body) certain aspects of the interdependence between the data in the text and the textual interpretation. Throughout this paper I have attempted to outline previous attempts at practicing medieval interpretation without disdaining them. For it is through our wounds that we might find healing. The current state of the New Medievalism is encouraging because it has both the potential for popularity on an interdisciplinary level as well as
having a sound theoretical and practical grounding. Feminist scholarship has played a key role in this new development and its inclusion into the medieval canon has been integral. By no means completed, the interpretation I have offered on one of Hildegard's visions aims at including some of the key precepts of the New Medievalism: its insistence on variance, its appreciation of language as performative, its refusal to ignore historicism, its multidisciplinarity, above all its ludic aspects and its imaginative frameworks. Because Hildegard of Bingen (in her personality and her writings) mirrors many of these precepts utilizing her work has been joyful.

Because Hildegard dealt with both the worldly realm (in running a convent) and the spiritual (by receiving visions) her work was likely a correlative meeting of the two. I have looked at her visions and felt this to be true. Within the Scivias I have felt sure that what Hildegard was trying to present was a didactic text on 'how' to live in the beauty of the world. I see Hildegard's feminism as the outgrowth of her worldly experience rather than as a political move and I would say the same is true of her illness. Hildegard was a woman who knew how to 'see' the world around her and to 'use' it as a vehicle to a higher truth. More than this she could see how her visions would always be relative to bodily experience. St. Augustine felt that "The greatest prophet is he [sic] who is endowed with both gifts, namely, that of seeing in spirit the symbolic likenesses of corporeal objects and that of understanding them with the vital power of the mind" (The Literal Meaning of Genesis 12:9). Augustine's quotation is reminiscent of Hildegard's vision of the universe-
as-female body because what is being teased out of the relationship between the two is their interdependent, though hierarchical, status. Although the spirit is beyond the corporeal, because of the intellect, the mind, the one can reveal the other. Hildegard’s decision throughout her life to pay attention to the uses of the body is likely the direct result of this kind of thinking. Augustine writes that "According to this distinction, then, I have designated as spiritual the kind of vision by which we represent in thought the images of bodies even in their absence" (The Literal Meaning of Genesis 12:9). Hildegard was not likely interested in the female form sexually or even on as erotic a level as later female mystics such as Julian of Norwich but rather all of her interest seems to be on ‘how’ to utilize the image of the body, the language of the body, to reveal the truth of God. She directly interpreted the body as the microcosm for all things. Likening her work to Augustine again -- "But I think it is sufficient now to demonstrate this one fact, namely, that there exists in us a spiritual nature in which the likenesses of bodily things are formed" (The Literal Meaning of Genesis 12:23)-- it seems that Hildegard saw an ephemeral beauty in the body because it was formed (in ‘figura’) in Heaven. Interpretation, whether medieval or poststructuralist, seems to be presented in a similar matter: the process of understanding (which is akin to the spiritual) comes from the actual body of the text, the remains of the context and author as they are materially extant. This reveals itself logically in the New Medievalism. We can accept that the past can never be revealed; it is a mystery like the mystery of God, but we can take the text that we have as far as we believe it has come from the hand of God and interpret it beyond what it appears to be.
This is why the process of allegorēsis is integral; the more ‘concretely’ multi-layered we can assert something to be the more ‘imaginative’ we can be in our assertions. This is where I believe the New Medievalism can take literary studies. With its increasing focus on feminism both the theoretical background of medieval texts as well as the subject matter has been broadened extensively.

The issue of the New Medievalism and its effect on scholars will most likely increase as writers decrease their emphasis on sticking with the ‘facts’. Hopefully the issues that come out of readings of particular texts will be those of contextualization. The correlation of macro and micro readings in the New Medievalism is a revealing one for that reason because it has its foundations not in Derrida or Saussure: its roots are in the medieval period itself. As Pseudo- Dionysius wrote, "[t]his, at least, is what was taught by the blessed Bartholomew. He says that the Word of God is vast and minuscule, that the Gospel as wide-ranging and yet restricted" (The Mystical Theology 1:1). What I have learned from Hildegard on this topic is that in order to make the correlation between these bodies the best way is through a re-visionary process. The scholar, looking for ‘revealed truth’ first consults the text as mystery, the vision. She then breaks it apart, piece by piece, draws upon relevant outside sources, pays close attention to language while still feeling free to extrapolate, and remains always with the motivation to teach and provide a useful tool for living. This will help readers because as they read they will be taught how to read, like St. Anne taught Mary as a child. In Neoplatonic tradition, Macrobius teaches
us that "The purpose of the dream is to teach us that the souls of those who serve the state well are returned to the heavens after death and there enjoy everlasting blessedness"

(Commentary on the Dream of Scipio IV:1). Adrienne Rich looks beyond death in her article, "When We Dead Awaken: Writing as Revision," and calls "revision – the act of looking back, of seeing with fresh eyes, of entering an old text from a new critical direction – is for women more than a chapter of cultural history: it is an act of survival". Rich too has taken the concept of revision and forged a new dream, a glossed dream. Hildegard's visions in the Scivias are glossed heavenly dream-texts. These texts are covered with the bodily eyes of Wisdom, looking from the philological past, and from the poststructuralist future, with the intention of revealing the medieval present in order to teach and to live today.
Works Cited


After this I saw a vast instrument, round and shadowed, in the shape of an egg, small at the top, large in the middle and narrowed at the bottom; outside it, surrounding its circumference, there was bright fire with, as it were, a shadowy zone under it. And in that fire there was a globe of sparkling flame so great that the whole instrument was illuminated by it, over which three little torches were arranged in such a way that by their fire they held up the globe lest it fall. And that globe at times raised itself up, so that much fire flew to it and thereby its flames lasted longer; and sometimes sank downward and great cold came to it, so that its flames were more quickly subdued. But from the fire that surrounded the instrument issued a blast with whirlwinds, and from the zone beneath it rushed forth another blast with its own whirlwinds, which diffused themselves hither and thither throughout the instrument. In that zone, too, there was a dark fire of such great horror that I could not look at it, whose force shook the whole zone, full of thunder, tempest and exceedingly sharp stones both large and small. And while it made its thunders heard, the bright fire and the winds and the air were in commotion, so that lightning preceded those thunders; for the fire felt within itself the turbulence of the thunder.

But beneath that zone was purest ether, with no zone beneath it, and in it I saw a globe of white fire and great magnitude over which two little torches were placed, holding that globe so that it would not exceed the measure of its course. And in that ether were scattered many bright spheres, into which the white globe from time to time poured itself out and emitted its brightness, and then moved back under the globe of red fire and renewed its flames from it, and then again sent them out into those spheres. And from that ether too a blast came forth with its whirlwinds, which spread itself everywhere throughout the instrument.

And beneath that ether I saw watery air with a white zone beneath it, which diffused itself here and there and imparted moisture to the whole instrument. And when it suddenly contracted it sent forth sudden rain with great noise, and when it gently spread out it gave a pleasant and softly falling rain. But from it too came a blast with its whirlwinds, which spread itself throughout the aforementioned instrument.

And in the midst of these elements was a sandy globe of great magnitude, which these elements had so surrounded that it could not waver in any direction.
But as these elements and these blasts contended with each other, by their strength they made it move a little.

And I saw between the North and the East a great mountain, which to the North had great darkness and to the East had great light, but in such a way that the light could not reach the darkness, nor the darkness the light.

And again I heard the voice from Heaven, saying to me:

1 The visible and temporal is a manifestation of the invisible and eternal

God, Who made all things by His will, created them so that His Name would be known and glorified, showing in them not just the things that are visible and temporal, but also the things that are invisible and eternal. Which is demonstrated by this vision you are perceiving.

2 The firmament in the likeness of an egg and what it signifies

For this vast instrument, round and shadowy, in the shape of an egg, small at the top, large in the middle and narrowed at the bottom, faithfully shows Omnipotent God, incomprehensible in His majesty and inestimable in His mysteries and the hope of all the faithful; for humanity at first was rude and rough and simple in its actions, but later was enlarged through the Old and New Testaments, and finally at the end of the world is destined to be beset with many tribulations.

3 On the bright fire and the shadowy zone

Outside it, surrounding its circumference, there is bright fire with, as it were, a shadowy zone under it. This shows that God consumes by the fire of His vengeance all those who are outside the true faith, and those who remain within the Catholic faith He purifies by the fire of His consolation; thus He throws down the darkness of devilish perversity, as He did also when the Devil wanted to oppose Himself to God though God had created him, and so fell defeated into perdition.

4 On the placement of the sun and the three stars

And in that fire there is a globe of sparkling flame, so great that the whole instrument is illuminated by it, which in the splendour of its brightness shows that within God the Father is His ineffable Only-Begotten, the sun of justice with the brilliance of burning charity, of such great glory that every creature is illumined by the brightness of His light; over which three little torches are

arranged in such a way that by their fire they hold up the globe lest it fall; that is, the Trinity shows how by its arrangement the Son of God, leaving the angels in the heavenly places, descended to earth and showed humans, who exist in soul and body, heavenly things, so that, glorifying Him by serving Him, they reject all harmful error, and magnify Him as the true Son of God incarnate through the true Virgin, when the angel foretold Him and when humans, living in soul and body, with faithful joy received Him.

5 On the ascent of the sun and what it signifies

Therefore the globe sometimes raises itself up, so that much fire flies to it and therefore its flames last longer. This means that when the time came that the Only-Begotten of God was to become incarnate for the redemption and uplifting of the human race by the will of the Father, the Holy Spirit by the power of the Father brought celestial mysteries wonderfully to pass in the Blessed Virgin; so that when the Son of God too in virginal chastity showed marvellous splendor and made virginity fruitful, virginity became glorious for the longed-for Incarnation was brought to pass in the noble Virgin.

6 On the descent of the sun and what it signifies

So, indeed, sometimes it sinks downwards and great cold comes to it, so that its flames are more quickly subdued. This shows that the Only-Begotten of God, born of a virgin and hence inclined to be merciful to human poverty, incurred many miseries and sustained great physical anguish; but after He had shown Himself to the world in a bodily shape, He passed from the world and returned to the Father, while His disciples stood by, as it is written:

7 Words from the Acts of the Apostles

"While they looked on He was lifted up, and a cloud received Him" [Acts 1:9]. Which is to say: When the children of the Church had received the Son of God in the interior knowledge of their hearts, the sanctity of His body was lifted up into the power of His Divinity, and in a mystical miracle the cloud of secret mystery received Him, hiding Him from mortal eyes, and the blasts of the winds showed themselves His servants.

8 On the first wind and its whirlwinds

But, as you see, from the fire that surrounds the instrument issue a blast with whirlwinds, which shows that from Almighty God, Who fills the whole
world with His power, truth rushes forth and spreads with words of justice, which truly demonstrate to humanity the same living and true God.

9 On the second wind and its whirlwinds

But from the zone beneath it rushes forth another blast with its own whirlwinds because the rage of the Devil, knowing God and fearing Him, sends out the worst dishonor and the most evil utterances, which diffuse themselves bitter and thither throughout the instrument, since in the world useful and useless rumors spread themselves abroad in many ways among the peoples.

10 On the dark fire and the thunder and the sharp stones

In this zone also there is a dark fire of such horror that you cannot look at it. This means that the ancient betrayer's most evil and most vile snares vomit forth blackest murder with such great passion that the human intellect cannot fathom its insanity; whose force shakes the whole zone; because murder includes in its horror all diabolical malignities. In the first man born hatred boiled up out of anger and led to fratricide, full of thunder, tempest and exceedingly sharp stones large and small, for murder is full of avarice, and drunkenness and extreme hardness of heart, which run riot relentlessly both in great murders and in minor vices. While it makes its thunders heard, the bright fire and the winds and the air are all in commotion, because when murder cries out in its eagerness to shed blood, it arouses the justice of Heaven and an outburst of anger and led to fulfill its own, and an increased disposition to vengeance on the part of right judgment; so that lightning precedes those thunders, for the fire feels in itself the turbulence of the thunder, for the manifestation of divine scrutiny exceeds and suppresses evil, since the Divine Majesty, before the sound of that insanity manifests itself in public, foresees it with that watchful eye to which all things are naked.

11 The purest ether and the placement of the moon and two stars

But beneath that zone is purest ether, with no zone beneath it; for beneath the snares of the ancient betrayer shines most serene faith, with no uncertainty or infidelity hiding in it, since it is not founded by itself but dependent on Christ; and in it you see a globe of white fire and great magnitude, which is the true symbol of the unconquered Church, which, as you can see, assert in faith innocent brightness and great honor; over which two little torches are placed, holding that globe so that it does not exceed the measure of its course, which signifies that the two Testaments given from Heaven, the Old and the New, connect it to the divine rules of the celestial mysteries, holding the Church back from rushing into a variety of different practices, for both the Old and the New Testaments show it the blessedness of the supernal heritage.

12 The placement of the other stars and what it signifies

And therefore in that ether are scattered many bright spheres, into which the white globe from time to time pours itself out and emits its brightness; for in the purity of faith many splendid works of piety are done by which the Church, though it may suffer words of disdain, passes on the beauty of its miracles. Though plunged in sorrow, it still marvels at the brightness of the works done by the perfected through others; and therefore, it moves back under the globe of red fire and renews its flames from it, and then again sends them out into those spheres, for, moving in contrition back under the protection of the Only-Begotten of God, and receiving from Him the pardon of divine consolation, it again shows the love of heavenly things in blessed works.

13 The third wind and its whirlwinds and what they signify

Therefore also from the ether a blast comes forth with its whirlwinds, which spreads itself everywhere throughout the instrument; for from the unity of faith there comes forth to help humanity a strong tradition of true and perfect statements, which swiftly penetrate to the ends of the earth.

14 The watery air and the white zone and what they signify

And beneath that ether you see watery air with a white zone beneath it, which diffuses itself here and there and imparts moisture to the whole instrument; for thus, under the faith possessed by the ancient and the modern fathers, baptism in the Church for the salvation of believers is truly shown to you, which, founded on blessed innocence and stability, propagates itself everywhere by divine inspiration and brings to the whole world the overflowing waters of salvation for believers. When this zone suddenly contracts, it sends forth sudden rain with great noise, and when it gently spreads out it gives a pleasant and softly falling rain; for sometimes baptism is presented by the apostles of truth with all their enthusiasm of preaching and depth of mind, and so manifests itself to the astonishment of humans with a rapid abundance of words and a flood of preaching, and sometimes that same baptism is presented by those preachers with sweet moderation, so that it reaches the people for whom it is meant discreetly by a gentle watering.
15 On the fourth wind and its whirlwinds

Therefore from that air too comes a blast with its whirlwinds that spreads itself throughout the aforementioned instrument; for when the flood of baptism brings salvation to believers, a true report of the words of forcible sermons goes forth and pervades the whole world with its manifest blessedness, so that the people, forsaking infidelity and seeking after the Catholic faith, openly declare it.

16 On the sandy globe of the earth and what it signifies

And in the midst of these elements is a sandy globe of great magnitude, which these elements have so surrounded that it cannot waver in any direction. This openly shows that, of all the strengths of God's creation, Man's is most profound, made in a wondrous way with great glory from the dust of the earth and so entangled with the strengths of the rest of creation that he can never be separated from them; for the elements of the world, created for Man's service, wait on him, and Man, enthroned as it were in their midst, by divine disposition presides over them, as David says, inspired by Me:

17 Words of David on this subject

"Thou hast crowned him with glory and worship, and given him dominion over all the works of Thy hands" [Psalms 8:6-7]. Which is to say: You, O God, Who have marvellously made all things, have crowned Man with the gold and purple crown of intellect and with the sublime garment of visible beauty, thus placing him like a prince above the height of Your perfect works, which You have distributed justly and rightly among Your creatures. Before all Your other creatures You have conferred on Man great and wonderful dignities.

18 On the movement of the earth and what it signifies

But, as you see, as these elements and these blasts contend with each other, by their strength they make the globe move a little; for at certain times the report of the Creator's miracles comes to all of God's creation, so that miracle is piled on miracle in a great thunder of words; and then Man, struck by the greatness of these miracles, feels the impact on his mind and body, and in these wondrous deeds considers with astonishment his own weakness and frailty.

19 The great mountain between the North and the East

And you see between the North and the East a great mountain, which to the North has great darkness and to the East has great light. This shows Man's great choice between devilish impiety and divine goodness, evil deception giving the many miseries of damnation to the reprobate, and salvation giving the great happiness of redemption to the elect, but in such a way that the light cannot reach the darkness, nor the darkness the light; for the works of light do not come down among the works of darkness, and the works of darkness do not ascend to the works of light, though the Devil often tries to obscure the latter through evil people, like pagans, heretics and false prophets, and those whom they try to attract to themselves by fallacious deception. How? Because they want to know what it is not for them to know, imitating the one who wanted to be like the Most High. And because they follow him, by their own will he shows them a lie as the truth. Hence they are not with Me, and I am not with them; for they do not walk in My ways, but love strange paths, seeking out the false things a foolish creature shows them about future events. And in their perverse seeking this is what they wish to have, despising Me and rejecting My saints, who love Me with a sincere heart.

20 Those who perversely examine the future by means of creatures

But these people who obstinately tempt Me by perverse art, examining creatures that were made for their service and asking them to show them things their wilfulness wishes to know—can they, by practicing this art, lengthen or shorten the time their Creator has given them to live? They cannot, by a day or by an hour. Or can they postpone what God has predetermined? In no way. O wretches! Do I not sometimes permit creatures to show you what will happen? They can show you these signs because they fear Me, God, as a servant can sometimes display the power of his master, and as the ox, the ass and other animals show the will of their masters when they faithfully do their bidding. O fools! When you consign Me to forgetfulness, neither looking to Me nor adoring Me, but looking to a creature subject to you for what it portends and shows, then you are obstinately casting Me aside, worshipping the frail creature instead of your Creator. Therefore I say to you: O human, why do you worship that creature, which cannot console you or help you and which cannot make you prosper in happiness, though it is affirmed that they can by astrologers, teachers of death and followers of pagan unbelief, who say the stars give life to you humans and determine all your actions? O wretches, Who made the stars?
But at times, with My permission, the stars by certain signs do manifest themselves to humanity, as My Son shows in His Gospel, where He says:

21 Words of the Gospel

"There shall be signs in the sun and the moon and the stars" [Luke 21:25]. Which is to say: By the light of these lights service is rendered to humanity, and in their revolutions the times of times are displayed. So in the latest times, by My permission lamentable and dangerous epochs will be foretold in them, so that the radiance of the sun and the splendor of the moon and the brightness of the stars will be dimmed, that human hearts may be stirred up to action. Thus also by My will the Incarnation of My Son was shown by a star. But no human being has a star of his own, which determines his life, as a foolish and erring people tries to assert; all stars are at the service of all people. That star only shone more brightly than all other stars because My Only-Begotten, unlike all other humans, was born without sin from a virgin birth. But that star gave My Son no aid, except in faithfully announcing His Incarnation to the people; for all stars and other creatures, fearing Me, fulfill My command, but do not have any knowledge of anything about any creature. For creatures fulfill My commands when it pleases Me, in the same way as when a minter, making a coin, strikes it with the requisite form; then that coin displays the form stamped on it, but has no power to know when the minter may decide to impress another form on it, for neither in the long nor in the short run does it understand the form it has. What does this mean?

O human, if a stone lay before you on which, if you looked carefully, you could read what was going to happen to you, then in your mistaken thoughts, saddened by your misfortune or elated by your prosperity, you would say, "Alas, [ach] I shall die!" or "O joy, [wach] I shall live!" or "Alas, what misfortune," or "O joy, what prosperity is mine!" Now what would that stone have conferred on you? Would it have taken away or given you anything? It could not be either against you or for you.

And likewise neither stars nor fire nor birds nor any other creatures of this kind can either harm you or help you by your examining them. But if, rejecting Me, you trust in a creature made for your service, I also in My just judgment will cast you out of My sight, taking from you the felicity of My kingdom. For I do not want you to scrutinize stars or fire or birds or other creatures for signs of future events; and if you persist in scrutinizing them, your eyes are obnoxious to Me, and I will cast you out like the lost angel, who deserted the truth and threw himself into damnation.

O human! When the stars and the other creatures were made, where were you? Did you give God advice about their arrangement? But the presumption of such scrutiny arose in the first of all dissensions, when Man forgot God to such an extent that he arrogantly inspected one kind of creature after another and sought in them signs of future events. And thus, indeed, the error arose about Baal, because people who were deceived worshipped the creature of God instead of God, to which the Devil's mockery incited them, because they were mindful of the creature rather than the Creator and desired to know what they were not meant to know.

22 How the Devil mocks humanity by the art of magic

Therefore, worse things than this appeared, for humans through the Devil began to be crazy for magic arts, so that now they see and hear the Devil, and he speaks to them deceitfully and shows them one sort of creature in their scrutiny as if it were another. It is not My will to say how the first seducers were taught by the Devil, so that now those who seek him see and hear him; but they are very guilty in this wickedness of theirs, for they deny Me, their God, and imitate the ancient seducer. O human! I have sought you by the blood of My Son, not in malicious iniquity but in great justice, but you forsake Me, the true God, and imitate him who is a liar. I am justice and truth; and therefore I admonish you by faith and exhort you by love and recapture you by penitence, so that, though you are bloody in the pollutions of sinners, you may yet rise from your fall into ruin. But if you despise Me, understand the comparison in this parable, which says:

23 Parable on this subject

A certain lord who had many servants under him gave each of them a full set of warlike arms, saying, "Be upright and useful, and renounce tardiness and indolence." But while they were marching with him, these servants saw beside the road a certain impostor, inventor of evil arts; and some of them, being deceived, said, "We wish to learn this man's arts!" And, casting away their arms, they ran to him. The others said to them, "What are you doing, imitating this impostor and provoking our lord to anger?" And they answered, "How does this harm our lord?" But their lord said to them, "O wicked servants! Why have you thrown away the arms I gave you? And why is it dearer to you to love this vanity than to serve me, your lord, whose servants you are? Go, then, follow this impostor as you desire, for you do not wish to serve me, and see how his folly will profit you." And he cast them out. Which is to say:

This lord is Almighty God, ruling all peoples with His power, Who has armed every person with intellect, commanding him to be active and vigilant in the exercise of virtue, and rid himself of perverseness and negligence. But
as people are going along the way of truth, disposed to walk in the divine commands, they are met by many temptations; for the Devil, the seducer of the whole world and the wicked contriver of many vices, waits for them not in the way of truth but in deceptive ambushes. Therefore, certain of them, who love injustice more than right, are seduced by the Devil and are more eager to imitate the vices of the ancient seducer than to embrace the virtues of God. And that intellect, which they ought to have used for the divine commandments, they twist to the vices of earthly iniquity and submit themselves to the Devil. The Doctors, as their companions, cite to them often the sacred Scriptures, reproaching them for their deeds and loudly asking why they follow the Devil’s illusions and bring down divine vengeance on themselves. But they almost always deride these admonitions, claiming that they sin in few things and do not offend God by pride at all. Therefore, when they persevere in that obduracy, they receive the divine sentence; for these servants of iniquity are asked why they suffocated their God-given intellect and why they preferred the deceptions of the ancient seducer to loving their Creator, Whom they should actively have served. Thus they too are despised for devilish illusions according to their works, since they refused to serve God, and they are forced to consider what their wicked seduction has profited them since, thus cast out, they incure damnation, because they have disregarded the divine precepts and tried to follow the Devil rather than God.

For I do not will that humans should despise Me, when they ought to know Me in faith; for if they reject Me to examine a creature subject to them, thus imitating the ancient seducer, then I permit them to achieve the desires of their hearts both as to the creature and as to the Devil; and thus they learn by experience how much the creature they have adored will profit them, and what the Devil whom they have followed will give them.

24 Humans go out of the world whenever their salvation and use is complete

And, O foolish humans, why do you scrutinize a creature about the length of your life? For none of you can either know or avoid or get through the period of his life except as I decide he will live, for, O human, when your salvation is complete in both worldly and spiritual matters, you will leave the present world and pass on to that which has no end. For when a person has such fortitude that he burns for Me more ardently than other people, and, aware of the earthly dregs of stinking sin, is active in avoiding the snares of the ancient serpent, I do not take his spirit from his body before his fruits have fully ripened with sweetest fragrance. But if I find one who is of such frailty that in pain of his body and terror of the evil lurker he is too delicate to bear My yoke, I take him away from this world before his soul, wasting away in weakness, begins to dry up. For I know all things. But I want to caution the human race with all possible justice, so that no person can excuse himself: When I strike them with a sentence of death as if they were about to die, when in fact they are to live for a long time yet, I warn and exhort people to do justice. For no one can have or make for himself any time unless I see usefulness in him and by My will allow him to live; as indeed Job testifies, when he says:

25 Words of Job on this subject

“‘You have appointed his bounds, which cannot be passed’ [Job 14:4]. Which is to say: You Who are above all and foresee all before it comes to pass have indeed established in the secret of Your majesty the bounds of human life, so that they cannot be exceeded by humans either by knowledge, by prudence or by understanding, for any reason, in infancy, youth or old age, except according to Your secret providence, which willed to make Man for the glory of Your Name.

26 Words of God on this subject

I, O human, knew you before the foundation of the world. Nevertheless, I will to consider your days in your works and judge of their usefulness, and diligently and sharply examine your deeds. But if I suddenly withdraw anyone from this life, the usefulness of his life is complete; and if his life were extended longer, it would not keep on in freshness bearing good fruits but, tainted by the flesh, would only give off smoke like the empty sound of words and not attain to Me in the inmost depth of its heart. Therefore I do not grant him a prolongation of this life, but withdraw him from this world before he falls into the apathy of this infertility. But to you, O human, I say: Why do you despise Me? Did I not send My prophets to you, and give My Son on the wood of the cross for your salvation, and choose My apostles to show you the way of truth through the Gospel? So, having all good things through Me, you cannot excuse yourself. And why then do you put Me off?

27 God will no longer tolerate auguries from creatures

But I will no longer tolerate this perverse error, your seeking signs for your actions in the stars or fire or birds or any other creatures; all those who by the Devil’s persuasion first fell into this error despised God and threw down His precepts, for which they themselves are despised. But I shine...
above every creature in the glory of My Divinity, and My miracles are manifested to you in My saints; so I wish you not to practice this error of augury any more, but to look toward Me.

28 Concerning human foolishness and stubbornness

O fool! Who am I? None other than the Supreme Good. Therefore I grant you all good things when you diligently seek Me. And whom do you believe Me to be? I am God, above all things and in all things, but you want to treat Me as a serf who fears his lord. How? You want Me to do your will, while you despise My precepts. God is not thus. What does this mean? He does not remember a beginning nor fear an end. The heavens contemplate Me and resound with My praises and obey Me in that justice by which I established them. The sun, moon and stars appear among the clouds of heaven on their proper course, and the blasts of the wind and the rain move through the air as is appointed for them, and all do the bidding of their Creator. But you, O human, do not fulfills My precepts, but follow your own will, as if you the law's justice were neither established nor manifested. And although you are but ashes, you are in such a state of contumacy that the justice of My law does not suffice for you, though it is plowed and cultivated in the body and blood of My Son and well trodden out by My saints of the Old and New Testaments alike.

29 Analogy of the goat, the hart and the wolf

But in your great foolishness you wish to lay hold of Me, threatening Me and saying, “If God wants me to be just and good, why does He not make me righteous?” Wishing to catch Me like this is as if a wanton goat wished to catch a hart; it would be thrown back and pierced by the hart's strong horns. So, when you try to behave wantonly and play with Me, I too will crush you in My just judgment by the precepts of the law as if by My horns. These trumpets resound in your ears, but you do not follow them; you run off after the wolf, which you think you have so mastered that it cannot hurt you. But the wolf will devour you, saying, “This sheep strayed from the road and did not want to follow its shepherd but ran after Me; therefore I will to have it, for it chose me and forsook its shepherd.” O human, God is just; so everything He does in heaven and earth is justly ordained.

30 Analogy of the physician

I am the great Physician of all diseases and act like a doctor who sees a sick man who longs to be cured. What does this mean? If the illness is slight, he cures it easily, but if it is serious, he says to the sick person, “I require silver and gold from you. If you will give them to me, I will help you.” I too, O human, do this. Lesser sins I wipe away in people's groans and tears and good resolutions, but for graver faults I say, O human, apply yourself to penitence and amendment, and I will show you My mercy, and give you eternal life. You shall not scrutinize the stars and other creatures about future events, or adore the Devil, or invoke him or ask him anything. For if you seek to know more than you ought to know, you will be deceived by the ancient seducer. The first man sought more than he should have sought, and was deceived by him and went to perdition. But the Devil did not foresee the redemption of Man, when the Son of Man slew death and broke Hell asunder. The Devil at first conquered Man through the woman; but God at last crushed the Devil through the woman who bore the Son of God, who wondrously brought the works of the Devil to naught; as My beloved John testifies, saying:

31 Words of John

“For this reason the Son of God appeared, that He might destroy the works of the Devil” [1 John 3:8]. What does this mean? The great brightness, the Son of God, appeared for the health and salvation of humanity, taking on the poverty of a human body, but shining like a burning star amid shadowy clouds. He was placed on the wine-press, where wine was to be pressed out without the dregs of fermentation, because He the cornerstone fell upon the press and made such wine that it gave forth the greatest odor of sweetness. He, shining as a glorious human being amid the human race, without any admixture of polluted blood, trod with His warlike foot upon the head of the ancient serpent; He destroyed all the darts of His iniquity, full of rage and lust, as they were, and made him utterly contemptible.

Therefore, whoever has knowledge in the Holy Spirit and wings of faith, let this one not ignore My admonition, but taste it, embrace it and receive it in his soul.
multae et clarae sphaerae ubique positae fuerant, in quas idem globus interdum se aliquantulum euacuans claritatem suam emisit, et ita sub praefatum rubeum igneumque globum recurrens et ab eo flammas suas restaurans, iterum illas in easdem sphaeras efflauit. Sed ab ipso aethere quidam flatus cum suis turbinibus se effundebat qui se in praefatum instrumentum ubique dilatabat.

Sub eodem autem aethere aquosum aerem uidebamus albam pellem sub se habentem, qui se hac et illac diffundens omni instrumento illi umorem dedit. Quidum se interdum repente congregaret, repentinam pluviam multo fragore emisit, et dum se leniter diffudit, blandam pluviam leni motu dedit. Sed et ex eo quidam flatus cum turbinibus suis exiens per praedictum instrumentum se ubique diffudit.

Et in medio istorum elementorum quidam arenosus globus plurimae magnitudinis erat, quem eadem elementa ita circumderant quod nec hac nec illac labi poterat. Sed dum interdum eadem elementa cum praedictis flatibus se inuicem concurrerent, eundem globum sua fortitudine alicantum moueri faciebant.

Et uidi inter aquilonem et orientem uelut maximum montem, qui uersus aquilonem multas tenebras et uersus orientem multam lucem babebat. ita tamen quod nec lux illa ad tenebras nec tenebrae illae ad ipsam lucem pertingere potuerunt. Audiuique iterum uocem de caelo dicentem mihi.

I. QVOD PER VISIBILIA ET TEMPORALIA EA QVAE INVISIBILIA ET AETERNA SVNT MANIFESTATVR

Deus qui omnia in sua voluntate condidit, ea ad cognitionem et honorem nominis sui creavit, non solum autem ea quae...
Pars Prima

110 visibilia et temporalia sunt in ipsis ostendens, sed etiam illa quae invisibilia et aeterna sunt in eis manifestans. Quod et visio haec quam cernis demonstrat.

2. De Firmamento ad Similitudinem Ovi Facto et Qvid Significet

115 Nam hoc maximum instrumentum quod uides rotundum et umbrosum secundum similitudinem oui, superius artum et in medio amplum ac inferiorius constrictum declarat fideliter omnipotentem Deum in maiestate sua incomprehensibilem et in mysteriis suis inaestimabilem et spem omnium fidelium existentem, cum primitus homines rudes et simplices in actibus suis essent, sed postea in ueteri ac in novo testamento se dilatantes, tandem circa finem mundi multas aeternas in angustiis suis passunt.

125 3. De Lucido Igni et Vmbrosa Pelle et Qvid Significet

In cuius exteriori parte per circuitum lucidus ignis est, quasi pellem umbrosam sub se habens, qui designat quod Deus illos qui extra ueram fidem sunt ubique per ignem ultionis suae exurens, hos qui intra fidem catholicam manent ubique per ignem consolationis suae purificat, ita diabolicae peruersitatis tenebrositatem prosternens, sicut et factum est cum diabolus, quando a Deo creatus est, Deo se opponere volens in perditionem deuictus corruit.

133 Quaeritque totum a Deum, et in totum a circuituo et recta mensura eorum similium almum assimilatur. Hie autem in totum a circuituo et recta mensura eorum similium almum assimilatur. Hie autem in totum a circuituo et recta mensura eorum similium almum assimilatur.
4. DE POSITIONE SOLIS ET TRIVM STELLARVM

Et in igne isto est globus rutilantis ignis tantaeque magnitudinis quod idem instrumentum totum ab eo illustratur: qui splendore claritas suae ostendit quia in Deo Patre est ineffabilis Unigenitus eius, sol iustitiae fulgorem ardentis caritatis habens, tantaeque gloriae existens quod omnis creatura claritate eius illuminatur, super se tres faculas sursum ordinate positas habens, quae suoe igne eundem globum ne labatur continent, uidelicet sua administratione demonstrantes quod idem Filius Dei de caelo ad terras descendens, angelis in caelestibus relictis, hominibus etiam qui in anima et corpore subsistunt caelestia manifestauit, qui suae claritatis obsequio ipsum glorificantes omnem nocuum errorem abiciunt, cum eum uerum Dei Filium de uera Virgine incarnatum magnificant, ubi ipsis eum angelus praenuntiavit et ubi homo in anima et corpore uiiuens eum fideli gaudio suscepit.

5. DE ASCENSV SOLIS ET QVID SIGNIFICET

Quapropter et idem globus se aliquando sursum eleuat, plurimusque ignis ei occurrit, ita quod exinde flammæ suas longius producit: significans quia ubi tempus illud uenit quod Unigenitus Dei pro redemptione et sublevatione humani generis per voluntatem Patris incarnari debuit, Spiritus sanctus in uirtute Patris superna mysteria in beata Virgine mirabiliter operatus est, ita quod eodem Filio Dei in uirginali pudicitia secunda uirginitate
mirificum fulgorem dante, virginitas gloriosa effecta est; quoniam in nobili Virgine exoptabilis incarnatio demonstrata est.

6. DE DESCENSV SOLIS ET QVID SIGNIFICET

Et ita etiam se aliquando deorsum inclinat, multumque frigus ei obviam unuit, ita quod et ex hoc flammas suas sitius subducit, declarans quoniam idem Vnigenitus Dei ex Virgine natus et ita ad paupertatem hominum clementer inclinatus plurimi miseriis ipsi occurrentibus multas corporales angustias sustinens, cum se mundo corporali ostenderat, de mundo transiens ad Patrem rediit, discipulis etiam ipsius astantibus, velut scriptum est.

7. VERBA ACTVS APOSTOLORVM AD IDEM

Videntibus illis elevatus est, et nubes suscepit eum. Quod dicitur : Filii ecclesiae in interiori scientia cordis sui Filium Dei suscipientibus sanctitas corporis eius elevata est in potentia divinitatis ipsius, et in mystico miraculo nubes secreti mysterii suscepit eum, mortalibus oculis tegens ipsum, fabrisque uentorum ipsi famulatum exhibentibus.

8. DE PRIMO VENTO ET TVRBINIBVS EIVS ET QVID SIGNIFICET

Sed et, ut uides, de igne illo qui idem instrumentum circumdederat flatus quidam cum suis turbinibus exiebat : qui ostendit praetendens quoniam ab omnipotente Deo totum mundum sua potestate complectitur, cum uerae diffamatio cum iustis sennobus procedit, ubi ipse uiuus et verus Deus hominibus in ueritate demonstratus est.

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In eadem candida ditoris proditoris 200 qui totam hominum homicidiam complentur, cum ueritate. 203 et acutissimae, quia homicidium acutissimae duri in magnis hominibus non uita, 210 et aer communis effusion rationes volanti positionum in fulgura sonit.

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f 190 ignorans non ~ 191 caput diuini exam
Et de pelle illa quae sub eo est alius flatus cum turbinibus suis ebullit: quia etiam de diabolica rabie Deum non ignorans timet pessima infamia cum nequissimis locutionibus exit, qui se in ipso instrumento hac et illac diffundunt: quoniam in saeculo diversis modis utiles et inutiles rumores inter populos se dilatant.

In eadem quoque pelle quidam tenebrosus ignis tanti horris est quod eum intueri non potes: qui declarat quod in pessimis et in nequissimis insidiis antiqui perditoris taeterrimum homicidium tanti ferorius erumpit quod insaniam illius humanus intellectus discernere non ualeat; qui totam pellem illam sua fortitudine conuicit: quoniam homicidium omnes diabolicas malignitates suo horrore completit, cum in primogenitis ab ira odio ebulliens fratricidium perpetrauit, plenus sonituum, tempestatum et acutissimorum lapidum maiorum et minorum: quia homicidium plenum est avaritia et ebrietatis atque acutissimis duritiis quae sine misericordia bacchantur tam in magnis homicidis quam in minoribus uitiis. Qui dum sonitum suum elevat, ille lucidus ignis et uenti et aer commouentur; quoniam dum homicidium in avaritia effusionis sanguinis stridet, suprema iudiciationes uolantium rumorum et expansiones fluentium dispositionum in ultione recti iudicii suscitantur, ita quod fulgura sonitum ipsum praeeuent; quia ignis ille primum commotionem eiusdem sonitus in se sentit: quia dignitas ostensionis diuini examinis idem nefas
praecellendo opprimi, cum etiam divina majestas, antequam fremitus eiusdem insaniae publice manifestetur, uidente oculo cui omnia nuda sunt eum praeuideat.

II. DE PVRISIMMO AETHERE ET DE POSITIONE LVNAE ET DVARVM STELLARVM ET QVID SIGNIFICET

Sed sub eadem pelle purissimus aether est, sub se nullam pellem habens: quoniam sub insidiis antiqui perditoris serenissima fides lucet, in qua nulla incertitudo inviditatis latet, a semetipsa non fundata, sed ad Christum suspensa; in quo etiam quendam globum candentis ignis plurimaque magnitudinis uides, qui uerciter designat inuictam ecclesiam in fide candorem innocentis claritatis plurimum honoris, ut tibi demonstratur, praeten- 407 dentem, et super se duas faculas sursum clare positas habentem, ipsumque globum ne modum cursus sui excedat continentes, quae sua significazione sunt ostendentes quod ecclesiam de supernis edita duobus testimoniet, uidelicet uesteris et nouae auctoritatis, ad divina praecipitatae 235 caelestium secretorum trahunt, scilicet cum ipsa eadem ecclesiam ne in uariatatem diuersorum morum se praecipitanter extendat continent, quia et uester et noua testificatio beatitudinem supernae hereditatis ipsi ostendunt.

I.2. DE POSITIONE ALIARVM STELLARVM ET QVID SIGNIFICET


Su alba diffusa 265 quoniam bus et tibi unitatis uerso 270 dum pluus diffusa dum praec

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220/221 globus candens ignis lunae significat, cf. LDO: G p. 69sq. - PL 775C.

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sustainens, decorum miraculorum suorum tradit, cum ipsa
uelut in maerore iacens tamen claritatem operum in perfectis
hominibus per alios admiratur; et ita sub praefatum
rubeum igneumque globum recurrens et ab eo
flammam suas restaurans, iterum illas in easdem
sphaeras efflat: quoniam ipsa in contritione posita sub
protectionem Vnigeniti Dei properans et ab eo sufferentias
diuinæ consolationis accipiens, ita etiam amorem super-
norum in beatis operibus declarat.

I3. DE TERTIO VENTO ET TVRBINIVS EIVS ET QVID SIGNIFICET

Vnde et ab ipso aethere quidam flatus cum suis
turbinibus se effundit qui se in praefatum instru-
mentum ubique dilatat: quia ab unitate fidei fortissima
fama cum ueris et perfectis assertionibus in auxilium hominum
emanans fines totius orbis multa celeritate percutiebat.

I4. DE AQUOSO AERE ET DE ALBA

Sub eodem autem aethere aquosum aerem uides
albam pellem sub se habentem, qui se haec et illae
diffundens omni instrumento illi umorem dat:
quoniam sub fide, quae tam in antiquis quam in nouis patri-
bus erat, baptismus in ecclesia ad salutem creditum, ut
ut tibi uerissime manifestatur, in innocentia beatissimæ stabi-
litatis fundatus, se diuinæ inspiratione ubique dilatans, uni-
verso orbi irrigationem salutis in creditibus attulit. Qui
dum se interdum repente congregat, repentinam
pluuiam multo fragore emittit, et dum se leniter
diffundit, blandam pluuiam leni motu dat: quia
dum baptismus aliquando per assertores ueri
velocitate praedicationis et in profunditate mentis ipsorum coadunatur,
273 celeri copia uerborum in inundatione praedicationis eorum attonitis hominibus manifestatur, interdum etiam idem baptismus suauis temperamentu in ipsis praedicatoribus dilatatus, suauis irrigatione cum discretionis adiutorio populis attacket propalatur.

I5. DE QUARTO VENTO ET TVRBINIBVS EIVS ET QVID SIGNIFICET

Quapropter et ex eo quidam flatus cum turbinibus suis exiens per praedictum instrumentum se ubique diffundit: quoniam ab inundatione baptismatis salutem credentibus afferent is uerissima fama cum uerbis fortissimorum sermonum egrediens omnem mundum manifestatione beatitudinis suae perfudit, ut iam in populis infidelitern deserentibus et fidem catholicam appetentibus aperte declaratur.

I6. DE ARENOSO GLOBO TERRAE ET QVID SIGNIFICET

Et in medio istorum elementorum quidam arenosus globus plurimae magnitudinis est, quem praefata elementa ita circumdant quod nec hac nec illac labi potest: qui manifeste ostendit in fortitudine creaturarum Dei hominem profundae considerationis de limo terrae mirabili modo multae gloriae factum degentem, et uirtute carundem creaturarum ita obulatum quod ab eis nullo modo separari ualet; quia elementa mundi ad seruitutem hominis creato ipsi famulatum exhibent, dum homo uelut in medio eorum sedens ipsis divina dispositione praesidet, ut etiam per me inspiratus Dauid dicit.

I7. VERBA DAVID AD EANDEM REM

Gloria et honore coronasti eum et constituisti eum super opera manuum tuarum. Quod dicitur: O tu Deus, qui omnia

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281 exeo B 294 creaturarum iter., exp. B 295 degentem] regentem B

f 276 manifestabatur idem om. 277 in ipsis praedicatoremibus] praedicatione 279 attactis] attractis 291/292 praefata om. 293 [labi] dilabi 294/295 considerationis degentem de limo ~ 295 multa gloria 296 carundem om. f m] obulatum] circumdatum f m 297 uate] potest m 299/300 ut David inspiratus per me dicit m

mirabiliter feci 305 nissimo indum ponem eum q operum tuorum sti. Tu enim p dignitatis hom

310 18. d

Sed, ut uide praedictis fl globum sua ciunt : quia d 315 miraculum quod miraculum tur, homo eos concessionem e mirabilibus att 320 derat.

I9. DE MAX

Et uides maximum m 325 tenebras et quoniam inter magnus casus in reprobis mu salutem in elec 330 ita tamen qu brae illae ad opera lucis oper tenebrarum ad multoties per

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319 cf. Bened., Reg

300 intuuxisti] inun

mirabiliter fecisti, aurea et purpurea corona intellectus et dig-
nissimo indumento visibilis speciei coronasti hominem, ita
ponens eum quasi principem super altitudinem perfectorum
operum tuorum, quae in creaturis tuis iuste et bene dispositions.
Tu enim prae aliis creaturis tuis magnas et admirandae dignitates homini iniunxisti.

18. DE TERRAE MOTU ET QVID SIGNIFICET

Sed, ut uides, dum interdum eadem elementa cum
praedictis flatibus se inuicem concutiunt, eundem
globum sua fortitudine aliquidum moueri faciunt: quia dum congruo tempore creaturae Dei cum fama
miraculorum ipsius creatoris se inuicem complectuntur, ita
quod miraculum miraculo magni tonitruo uerborum innectit,
homo eorum miraculorum magnitudine perculsus
conuccssionem mentis et corporis sui sentit, dum in eisdem
mirabilibus attonitus imbecillitatem fragilitatis suae consi-
derat.

19. DE MAXIMO MONTE INTER AQUILONEM ET ORIENTEM
ET QVID SIGNIFICET

Et uides inter aquilonem et orientem uelut
maximum montem, qui uersus aquilonem multas
tenebras et uersus orientem multam lucem habet:
quoniam inter diabolicam impietatem et diuinam bonitatem
magnus casus hominis apparat, per pessimam deceptionem
in reprobis multas miserias damnationis, et per exoptabiliem
salutem in electis plurimam felicitatem redemptionis tenens,
itam quod nec lux illa ad tenebras, nec tene-
brae illae ad ipsam lucem pertingere possunt: quia
opera lucis operibus tenebrarum se non interserunt, nec opere
tenebrarum ad opera lucis ascendunt, quamuis diabola
multoties per malos homines offuscare laboret, uelut est in
50 PARS PRIMA

paganis, haereticis et in pseudoprophetis, et quos isti sua fallaci deceptione post se trahere conantur. Quomodo? Quia uolunt ea scire quae ipsis scienda non sunt, illum imitantes qui se Altissimo similem esse anhelauit. Et quoniam illum subseuquuntur, ideo et ipse mendacium quasi veritatem secundum uoluntatem ipsorum demonstrat. Vnde mecum non sunt, nec ego cum illis, quia uias meas non ambulant, sed extraneas semitas amant, inquirentes quid eis stulta creatura de futuris causis fallaciter ostendat. Et hoc ita uolunt habere secundum quod illud perurser exquirunt, me contententes et sanctos meos abicientes qui sincero corde me diligunt.

20. DE HISTQVI PERVERSA ARTE IN CREATEVRIS FVTVRASCRUTANTVR

Sed isti homines qui perursa arte tam pertinaciter me tentant, ita quod creaturam illam quae ad seruitutem ipsorum facta est scrutantur, sciscitantes ut rem illam quam ipsi scire uolunt eis secundum uoluntatem ipsorum ostendat, numquid possunt in scrutatione suae artis elongare uel abbreviare tempus quod eis a creatore suo constitutum est viuiere? Certe hoc nec diem nec horam facere praeualement. Aut numquid possunt praedestinationem Dei postponere? Nullo modo. Sed isti homines qui peruersa arte tam pertinaciter me tentant, ita quod creaturam illam quae ad seruitutem ipsorum facta est scrutantur, sciscitantes ut rem illam quam ipsi scire uolunt eis secundum uoluntatem ipsorum ostendat, tunc pertinaciter me abicitis, infirmam creaturam pro creatore vestro colentes. Quapropter et ego dico: O homo, cur creaturam illam colis quae te nec consolari nec tibi auxiliari pot est.

et quae tibi mathematicorum sequae uobis hominum mea in ipsis

Iuana et cl. hominum et mea incarnata stellam qua et errans posse ceteris stel cetera animalia uoluntatem dominorum suorum manifestant, cum eam in seruitute sua fideliter adimplent? O stulti, cum me oblivioni traditis, nec ad me respicientes nec me adorantes, sed aspicientes ad subjectam uobis creaturam quid ipsa portentet et ostendat, tunc pertinaciter me abicites, infirmam creaturam pro creatore vestro colentes. Quapropter et ego dico: O homo, cur creaturam illam colis quae te nec consolari nec tibi auxiliari potest.

21. VERBA EVANGELII

375 Erunt signa in sole et luna et stellis. Quod dicitur: In lumine horum luminum hominibus ministratur, et circuitu ipsorum temporae tempora ostenduntur. Vnde etiam in nouissinis temporibus lamentabilia et periculosae tempora permissione mea in ipsis demonstrantur, ita quod radius solis et splendor lunae et claritas stellarum aliiquando subtrahitur, ut corda hominum ex hoc concutiantur. Sic et per stellam ex voluntate mea incarnatio Filii mei ostensa est. Homo autem propriam stellam quae uitam ipsius disponat non habet, uelut stultus et errans populus assere conatur, sed omnes stellae omni populo cum servitiute sua communes sunt. Sed quod stella illa ceteris stellis praeclarior effusit, hoc est quod Vnigenitus meus praecelis hominibus urginali parti sine peccato natus est, ipsa nullum subleuamen eidem Filio meo conferens, nisi solum incarnationem eius populo fideliter denuntians, quoniam omnes stellae et creaturae me timentes iussionem meam tantum perficiunt, nec ullius rei in ulla creatura notitiam habent. Nam cum mihi placuerit, creaturae iussionem meam ostendunt, uelut cum faber nummum faciens in eo congruentem formam caelat, sic quod idem nummus formam sibi impositam dedarat, sed de hoc nullam potestatem habens, non nout quando faber aliam formam sibi imponere uelit, quoniam nec longum nec breue tempus suae formae discernit.
Quid est hoc?

O homo, si lapis coram te iaceret in quo aliqua signa passio

nun tum diligerenter eum intuens denotares, tunc secun-
dum fallacem aestimationem tuam aut de infelicitatis tua
contristatus aut de prosperitate tua diceres: 'Ach, moriar,'
uel 'wach, uuiam,' aut 'heu, quanta infelicitas,' seu 'wach,
qua prosperitas mea est!' Et quid tunc lapis ille tibi conferret?
Num quidquam tibi auferret uel dare t? Sed nec tibi obesse nec prodesse ualere.

Sic etiam nec stellae nec ignis nec aues huiaus
modi creatura in signis scutatstonis tua quidquam te laedere
vel iuuare possunt. Quod si in creaturam hanc quae ad serui-
tatem tuae quidquam te laedere vel iuuare possunt. Quod ut
in creaturam hanc quae ad serui-
tatem tuae quidquam te laedere vel iuuare possunt. Quod ut
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tatem tuae quidquam te laedere vel iuuare possunt. Quod ut
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tatem tuae quidquam te laedere vel iuuare possunt. Quod ut
in creaturam hanc quae ad serui-
tatem tuae quidquam te laedere vel iuuare possunt. Quod ut
in creaturam hanc quae ad serui-
tatem tuae quidquam te laedere vel iuuare possunt. Quod ut
in creaturam hanc quae ad serui-
tatem tuae quidquam te laedere vel iuuare possunt. Quod ut
in creaturam hanc quae ad serui-

22. QUALITER DIABOLVS HOMINIBVS ILLVDIT PER MAGICAM ARTEM

Vnde etiam peiora his apparuerunt, cum homines per dia-
bolum magica arte insanire coeperunt, ita quod diabolum


in marg. B (homolat.) insanire ex insanare corr. B

f 400 denotares] coniectares 401 aestimationem] estimationem 402 gauinus]
genus] gens et gens 423 quod scilicet ~
uident et audient, ipse eis fallaciter loquens et ostendens quod uelut ereaturam hane inspiciant et alia exsistat. Nolo autem dicere quomodo per diabolum primi seduetores edoeti sint, ita quod eum uident et audient qui eum hoc modo quarerunt; sed ipsi de hac nequitia sua ualde culpabiles exsistunt, cum me Deum suum hoc modo denegant et antiquum seductorem imitantur. O homo, ego in sanguine Filii mei te requisiui, non cum malitiosa iniquitate, sed cum magna aequitate; sed tu

440 me uerum Deum deseris et illum qui mendax est imitaris. Ego sum iustitia et veritas, et ideo ad minor ne in fide et exhortor in amore ac reduco te in paenitentia, ut quamuis sanguinoletus sis in pollutionibus pecatorum, tamen exsurgeas de casu ruinae tuae. Quod si me subsannaueris, parabolam huius similitudinis senties quae dicit.

23. PARABOLA DE EADEM RE

Quidam dominus multos seruos sibi subjectos habens uni-
cuique corundem seruorum suorum plurima arma bellica dedit
dicens: 'Estote probi et utiles, tarditatem et teporem abici-
cientes.' Sed dum quoddam iter cum eo agerent, idem serui
quendam illusorem et diuersae artis pessimum adinuentorem
secus uiam uiderunt, unde et quidam ex eis decepti dixerunt:
'Huius hominis artes discere vobis.' Et arma quae habebant
abicientes ad illum cucurrerunt. Quibus aliis dicerant:

455 'Quid facitis hunc illusorem imitantes et dominum nostrum
ad iracundiam prouocantes ?' Et illi responderunt: 'Quid hoc
domino nostro oberit ?' Et dominus eorum illis ait: 'O serui
nequam, cur arma quae uobis dederam abieci? Et cur
carissimus est uobis hanc uanitatem amare quam mihi domino
uestro cuius serui estis famulari ?' Ita ergo post illusorem
istem ut cupitis, quia mihi seruire non uultis, et uidete quid

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438 ego om. W' 442 te om. W'
457/458 cf. Mt. 18, 32.

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433/434 Nolo autem dicere] Tacendum autem 435 ita
quod] ita et 436 culpabiles exsistunt] reprehensibiles sunt 437 denegant]
negant 438 imitantur] sequuntur requisiui] quasiiui 439 malitiosa]
malitia et sed] araman 440 imitarii] sequens 444 subsannaueris] con-
tempseris 446 quae dicit om. 447 sibi subjectos om. 448 corundem] cor-
lacia eius proderit. Et abiecit eos abs te.
eius stultitia uobis prosit.' Et abiecit eos. Quod dicitur:

Dominus iste est Deus omnipotens omnes populos sub potestate sua regens, ita quod quemque hominem intellectu
arment, mandans ei ut strenuus et vigilans in instrumentis uirtutum sit, praeuitatem et neglegentiam a se excutiens. Sed
hominem utiam ureritatis arripuit, in diiniam mandatis
ire disponentes, ipsis multae tentationes occurrunt, ita quod
diabolum, totius orbis seductorem et multiplicium uitiorum
nequissimum artificem, non in uia ureritatis sed per deception
em in insidiis positum attendunt. Vnde et quidam ipsorum
inuistiitiae magis quam rectitudinis amatores, per eundem
diabolum seducti, plus student eisdem antiqui seductoris
uiitia imitari quam uirtutes Dei amplecti. Et intellectum quem
ad diiniam mandata convertère deberent, ad uiatu terrena
iniquitatis retorquentes, diabolo se supponunt. Quibus doctro-
res eorum uelut consodales ipsorum, per sacras Scripturas
nantes se in paevis peccare et Deum
nem in insidiis positum attendunt. Vnde et quidam ipsorum
uerant, divinam sententiam accipiunt; quoniam ipsis servis
uociferantur. Sed illi admonitiones eorum saepissime subsan-
bolica figmenta sequentes divinam ultionem sibi inducant
ad diuina mandata conuertere deberent, ad uiatu terrena
due iniquitatis a se excutiens. Sed
iniquitatis exsistentibus cur intellect
urn desuper sibi datum
multoties occurrentes, facta eorum saepissime secundum opera
runt, deputantur, ubi considerare compelluntur, quid nequis-
iniustitiae magis quam rectitudinis amatores, per eundem
iniquitatis existenter sibi inducant, quoniam hoc modo abieeti

super obiata Cuncta ... diabolica figmenta seclude. Sacramentale Fuldae saec. X
ed. G. Richter/A. Schönfelder, Fulda 1912, p. 8, nr. 47. 489/480 cf. II Par. 56, 16.

477 ipsorum] corum B 480 (admonitio)nes corum saepissime in ras. O
482 obdutatione] duratione B 483 quoniam] quia del., quoniam supra lin. Hn
484 iniquitatis supra lin. O sibi desuper ~ B 486 susceperunt W 487
ipsi quod ita ~ O 488 Deo] Domino Hn

488 iste] ille 489 in u consequens] qui omne hominem ratione et intellectu
480/481 subsannantes] itidem 482 superbi] suam add. is] illa
a Deo 489 compelluntur] coguntur

500 24. CVM

Et, o strel strae inquiri suae scire au
501 constitutum saecularibus saeculum mi
502 alis populis
510 terreni liquo antiqui serp
515 executo ante bonum finem considero, qu
515 tiam facere, sint morituri nisi secundur
518 cum dicit.

518 cautelam dat

498 conserui

499 quia] quod
504 scire] sunt praesent
519 tione 518 quia
sunt: hoc facio qi
per me prae.
damnationem incurrunt, quia diuina praecpta postponentes plus diabolum quam Deum sequi contenderunt.

Ego enim nolo ut me homines contemnant, qui me in fide scire debent; quoniam si me abiecerint et creaturam sibi suctam inspexerint, antiquum seductorem in hoc imitantes, tunc et ego permitto ut eis et cum creatura et cum diabolo secundum concupiscentiam cordis sui fiat, quatenus ita experiantur quid ipsis prosit creatura quam adorauerunt uel quid eis diabolus conferat quem subsecuti sunt.

500 24. CVM SALVS HOMINIS ET UTILITY COMPLETA FVERIT
SAECVLVM MVTABIT

Et, o stulti homines, cur creaturam de tempore uitae uerstae inquiritis? Nullus enim uestrum potest tempus uitae suae scire aut illud deuiter aut transilire, nisi ut per me sibi constitutum est uiuere; quia, o homo, cum salus tua tam in saecularibus quam in spiritibus completa fuerit, praesens saeculum mutabis et ad illud quod terminum non inueniet transibis. Nam cum homo tantae fortitudinis est quod praealiis populis ardentius in me ardet, ita quod in conscientia terreni liquoris foetentium peccatorum non torpens insidias antiqui serpentis deuitat, huius spiritum a corpore suo non excitio antequam dulces fructus suos in suauissimo odore ad bonum finem perducatis. Illum autem quem tantae fragilitatis considero, quod tener est in graui dolore sui corporis et in horrore pessimi insidioris iugum meum ferre, de hoc saeculo subtraho antequam in tepore marcescentis animi sui incipiat arescere. Omnia enim scio. Volo autem humano generi quamque iustitiam ad suam cautelam dare, ita ut uellus hominem se possit excusare, cum homines meo et exhortor iustitiam facere, quando ipsis indicium mortis incutio, uelut iam sint morituri cum adhuc diutius uicturi sint; quoniam nemo nisi secundum utilitatem quam in homine video et secundum uoluntatem meam quam ea uiuere concedo, alius tempus habere uel sibi disponere poterit, quemadmodum etiam Iob testatur, cum dicit.


493 contemnut]) contendat B 500 tam supra lin. H 511 deuiter R

f 491 quis] quod 493 Ego enim nolo] Nolo enim 490 subsecuti] secuti
504 scire| aut praem. 509 ut| quod 500 populis am. 510 terreni liquoria
suunt : hoc facio quoniam 522 utilitatem quam] fructum quem 524 testatur]
per me praem.
25. VERBA IOB AD EANDEM REM

Constituisti terminos eius qui praeteriri non poterunt. Quod dicitur: Tu qui super omnes es et omnia antequam fiant praecipues, etiam in secreto maiestatis tuae constitutisti terminos hominum uitae, ita quod nec scientia nec prudentia nec astutia ullius rei praeteriri poterunt in ulla utilitate seu in infanitia seu in iuventute seu in senectute hominum transgressi, nisi secundum proutientiam secretorum tuorum, qui homines ad gloriam nominis tui fieri iussisti.

26. VERBA DEI DE EODEM

Ego enim, o homo, ante constitutionem mundi te novi. Sed tamen dies tuos in operibus tuis volo considerare et utilitatem eorum discernere et quaque opera tua diligenter et acutissime examinare. Quemcumque autem subito de temporali vita subtraho, huius vitae utilitas completa est, ita ut si utilitatem suam aetatem seu inaetatem transgressi, nisi secundum proutientiam secretorum tuorum, qui homines ad gloriam nominis tui fieri iussisti.

27. QUOD DEVS AVGVRIA IN STELLIS ET IN CETERIS CREATVRIS AMPLIVS TOLERARE NON VULT

Sed errorem huius peruersitatis, scilicet quod signa actuum tuorum in stellis aut in igne aut in aibus seu in alia huiusmodi creatura quae est amplius tolerare; quoniam omnes isti qui errorem hunc diabolica suasionem primum adnuene-


560 ram in claritate in sanctis meis amplius hunc aspicias.

28. DE

565 O stulte, quis omnia bona tibi credes me esse? Quis me habere Quomodo? Tu 170 cepit mea contemnu et eum nec opinio laudibus meis si illam qua per me et stellae in nub 575 necnon flabri ut currunt, et haec oboedient. Tu aut voluntatem tuar nec ostensa sit. 580 sis, quod tibi non cultura est in sanitatem ueteris quae

29. SIMIL

Sed et in mag 583 hoc modo minar sim, quare non uelut si petulans cornibus cerui ueritatem non cognosce.

558/559 cf. Gen. 18, 2


runt Deum contemnentes, praecepta illius omnino abiecerunt, unde et ipsi contemphi sunt. Ego autem super omnem creaturam in claritate divinitatis meae fulgo, ita quod miracula mea in sanctis meis tibi manifesta sunt; quapropter noio ut amplius hunc errorem auguriandi exerceris, sed ut in me aspicias.

28. DE STULTITIA ET CONTVMACIA HOMINIS


29. SIMILITVDO DE HAEDO ET CERVO ET LVPO

Sed et in magna stultitia uis me apprehendere, cum mihi hoc modo minaris dicens: 'Si Deo placet ut iustus et bonus sin, quare non facit me rectum?' tu ita me capere uolens uelut si petulans haedus ceruum uelut capere, qui fortissimis cornibus cerui ualide truditur et perforatur. Sic et ego cum...
mecum petulanter in moribus tuis uis ludere, in praeceptis
legis meae quasi cornibus meis iusto iudicio meo te comminnuo.
Haec enim sunt tubae in aures tuas resonantes, sed tu illas
non sequeris, sed post lupum curris quem te putas ita domasse
quod te laedere non possit. Sed idem lupus deuorat te dicens : 'Quis
ista secus uiam errauerit, nec pastorem suum sequi uoluit,
sed post me cucurrit, unde etiam illam uolo habere, quia me
elegit et pastorem suum deseruit.' O homo, Deus iustus est,
et ideo omnia quae in caelo et in terra fecit iusta ordinatione
PL disposit.

30. COMPARATIO DE MEDICO

Ego enim sum magnus medicus omnium languorum, faciens
uelut medicus qui languidum uidet qui medelam ardenter
dsiderat. Quid est hoc ? Si languor parvus est, eum facile
curat, si vero grauis est, languido dicit : 'Ego argentum et
aurum a te exigo. Quod si ilia mihi dederis, te iuuabo.'
Sic et ego, o homo, facio. Minora peccata in gemitu et lacrimis ac in
bona voluntate hominum abstergo, grauioribus autem culpis
dico : O homo, age paenitentiam et correctionem, et ostendam
tibi misericordiam meam et utam aeternam tibi dabo. Et stel-
las et alias creaturas de causis tibi occurrentibus ne inspicias,
en diabolum adores nec eum inuoces nec quidquid ab eo
perquiras. Quoniam si plus volueris scire quam te oporteat
noscas, ab antiquo seductore deciperis. Quia cum primus homo
plua quasiusit quam quaerere deberet, ab illo deceptus est
et in perditionem iuit. Sed tamen diabolus nesciuit hominis
redemptionem, ubi Filius Dei mortem occidit et infernum fre-
git. Diabolus enim in initio per mulierem deuicit hominem ;
se Deus in fine temporum per mulierem contruuit diabolum,
quae Filium Dei genuit, qui diabolica opera mirabiliter ad
nihilum duxit, quemadmodum Iohannes dilectus meus testa-

In hoc appar
est hoc ? Propt
maxima clarit

alorum induen
fulgens, ita pos
exprimendum e
cular cecidit et
uitatis dedit. If
in humano gene
antiqui serpenti
illius omnia iac
omino contem
Vnde quicum
fide habet, iste
eam in gustu ar

---

PL

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f 623 est om. 628 fe
VISIO TERTIA, c. 29-31

31. VERBA IOHANNIS

In hoc apparuit Filii Dei, ut dissoluat opera diaboli. Quid est hoc? Propter salutem et salvationem hominum apparuit maxima claritas, scilicet Filii Dei paupertatem humani corporis induens, sed sselut ardens stella in umbrosis nubibus fulgens, ita positus in torculari, ubi unum sine sorde fermenti exprimendum erat; quoniam ipse lapis angularis super torcularum cecidit et tale unum fecit quod maximum odorem suauitatis dedit. Ipse enim absque inundatione polluti sanguinis in humano genere clarus homo effulgens, pede militiae suae os antiqui serpentis conculcuit, et dissoluens a iecore iniquitatis illius omnia iacula, quae et furore et libidine plena erant, eum omnino contemptibilem reddidit.

Vnde quicumque scientiam in Spiritu sancto et pennas in fide habet, iste admonitionem meam non transscendat, sed eam in gustu animae suae amplectendo percipiat.

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621 num. om. H  628 ita positus itur., def. W  ubi unum sine in ras. W*

f  623 est om.  628 fecit expressit  633 transcendent] transgressitur
APPENDIX C