

**THE EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS ON IRAQ**

**THE EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS ON IRAQ**

By

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A Thesis

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies  
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements  
for the Degree  
Master of Arts

**McMaster University**

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**MASTER OF ARTS (1997)**  
**(Political Science)**

McMaster University  
Hamilton, Ontario

**TITLE:** The Effects of Sanctions on Iraq  
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**NUMBER OF PAGES:** vi, 118

## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis was to examine the impact and the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed on Iraq, and to determine whether the impact prompted Iraqi compliance with the goals of the sanctioning coalition. This thesis argues that although Iraq was an ideal target and the impact on the country was indeed calamitous, this has not induced the effects desired by the sanctioning coalition. The punitive nature of the sanctions, in conjunction with the ambitious agenda outlined by the sanctioning coalition have prevented Iraq from complying with the goals of the sanctions. By indefinitely prolonging the sanctions, the Iraqi population continues to suffer from insufficient food and medicine, while the Iraqi regime remains impervious to the sanctioning coalition's demands. The Iraqi case study has provided strong evidence that the premise underlying international economic sanctions is false; sanctions should not be imposed under the assumption that increasing the damage to the population will induce compliance.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to take this opportunity to thank Dr. Nossal not only for his patience, but for his infinite enthusiasm and inspiration. I also thank my family for supporting my efforts over the past six years, and for putting up with the unending demands along the way. Brian and Vince deserve recognition for their inexhaustible ability to distract and entertain me. And last but not least, thanks to Brian and Vanessa for putting up with me through the bad times as well as the good.

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## INTRODUCTION

Economic sanctions can be imposed for a variety of purposes, and have become a relatively popular tool of statecraft when states feel compelled to take firm action, yet are unable or unwilling to engage in a military solution. It is this willingness to resort to sanctions which necessitates an examination of the utility of economic sanctions. Iraq provides a case study in which the sanctioning coalition was able to impose and monitor comprehensive sanctions which were highly effective in terms of the negative economic impact; however, questions remain concerning the ability of the sanctions to induce sufficient policy change to fulfil the purposes of the sanctioning coalition. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the impact and the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed on Iraq, and to determine whether the impact prompted Iraqi compliance with the goals of the sanctioning coalition.

The premise which underlies economic sanctions is the concept that "the reduction in economic welfare which [the sanctioners] inflict should produce psychological and

political results."<sup>1</sup> Hufbauer and Schott further indicate that the heavier the costs of economic sanctions to the target, the more likely it is that the sanctions will be successful. Their survey of sanctions determined that the average successful case cost the target state more than two per cent of the gross-national product.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, according to the premise of economic sanctions, and given the magnitude of the impact of the sanctions imposed on Iraq, this particular sanctions episode should have been successful.

The sanctions imposed on Iraq were not only comprehensive, but well enforced. **Iraq was highly vulnerable to the sanctions because they were so dependent on one commodity: oil. This vulnerability implies that the sanctions should have been effective if a reduction in economic welfare causes political results.** While Iraq provides a useful case study to examine this premise, it should be noted that it is not representative of sanctions episodes more generally due to the comprehensive nature of the measures imposed by the international community.

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<sup>1</sup>Margaret Doxey, *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective*, (London: MacMillan Press, 1987): pp. 8.

<sup>2</sup>Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History & Current Policy* (Institute for International Economics, 1985): pp. 89.

However, as the sanctions imposed on Iraq received extensive support from the sanctioning states, it is conceivable that sanctions similar in nature and structure could result from the precedent set by this sanctions episode. While an equal consensus may not be reached in the future, this does not preclude the possibility that the comprehensive nature of the sanctions could be duplicated. An examination of the Iraqi case study will provide sufficient evidence that the premise of economic sanctions is flawed and that similar sanctions would be equally ineffective in inducing their policy goals.

I will examine the existing literature on international economic sanctions to determine the purposes of sanctions according to orthodox sanctions theory. It will become evident that sanctions are not used exclusively for one goal, but for a variety of purposes ranging from compellance to retribution. This chapter will also address a variety of theories regarding the effectiveness of sanctions and will address several authors' criteria for successful sanctions.

The following chapter will address the purposes and the effectiveness of the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq. This chapter commences with a discussion of the purposes of the sanctions imposed on Iraq. It will become evident that compellance, deterrence, symbolism, the restriction of economic and military capabilities, and retribution were all

factors in the decision to impose sanctions on Iraq. However, following the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty, the purposes shifted somewhat and compellance, which was initially the paramount purpose, was cast aside for other purposes, while retribution rose on the American agenda.

It will then be necessary to determine the degree to which Iraq complied to the goals of the sanctioning coalition. It becomes evident that ~~several conditions set by the sanctioning coalition were not met.~~ Saddam Hussein remained in power; Iraq consistently failed to disclose information required by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), shedding doubt on the ability to account for all of Iraq's weapons capabilities; ~~several hundred missing persons and prisoners of war have not been accounted for;~~ Iraq remains in possession of Kuwaiti military and private property which has not been returned; and the question of human rights abuses lingers. It is apparent that the ~~purposes outlined by the sanctioning coalition have not been met.~~ This necessitates an examination of the impact of sanctions on Iraq; for if the premise of sanctions is correct, the impact could not be great or the purposes would have been fulfilled.

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The discussion of the impact of sanctions begins with an examination of the Iraqi economy prior to the Gulf War.

I will argue that Iraq's dependence on oil made them vulnerable to the sanctions. The freezing of their assets, in conjunction with the prohibition on the export of oil, essentially brought Iraq's international financial transactions to a standstill. The country's infrastructure, including the water system, the sewage treatment system and the health facilities could not be repaired following the Gulf War as Iraq was prohibited from importing the commodities necessary to repair the infrastructure. The differentiation between the effects of the war, as opposed to the effects of the sanctions will be discussed below. Not only was Iraq incapable of repairing the infrastructure, per-capita income decreased, consumer prices rose, purchasing power dropped, inflation was being measured in thousands of per cent and gross domestic product (GDP) decreased from between \$64.4 billion and \$66.2 billion to less than ten per cent of these figures as of 1996.

Although the economy was clearly negatively affected by the sanctions, the social costs were equally detrimental. This will be the focus of the third chapter. As a result of the absence of electricity, water could not be purified and sewage could not be treated, this caused water-borne disease to flourish resulting in a high prevalence of gastroenteritis, cholera and typhoid. However, perhaps the most pervasive problem involves malnutrition, which was

uncommon in Iraq prior to the Gulf War. ~~One fifth of the Iraqi population were at severe nutritional risk as of September 1995.~~ Malnutrition disproportionately affected Iraqi children. A survey of child mortality and nutrition indicated that 24.7 per cent of children were experiencing stunting, 14.2 per cent were underweight and 3.6 per cent were experiencing wasting which indicates extreme food deficit; however, the majority of severely malnourished children would have died prior to the survey.<sup>3</sup> In addition, the effects of sanctions on women were highly detrimental resulting from the additional responsibilities brought on by illness, water-borne diseases and insufficient food.

It becomes evident from this brief survey that the impact of the economic sanctions was indeed detrimental to both the Iraqi economy and to the Iraqi population. In this area, economic sanctions have been successful, yet the negative impact experienced by Iraq has not induced the policy changes outlined by the United Nations and the sanctioning coalition. This serves to undermine the premise that the negative impact on the economic welfare of the

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<sup>3</sup>Robert Chase & Time cote et al., "Child Mortality and Nutrition Survey: A Public Health Study" in International Study Team, *Health and Welfare in Iraq After the Gulf Crisis: An In-Depth Assessment*, (UNICEF, the MacArthur Foundation, the John Merck Fund, and Oxfam-UK: October, 1991): Section 5.3.

target will in fact cause political change. The Iraqi case study provides evidence that this premise should indeed be reexamined. In addition, it will be necessary to examine alternatives to sanctions. For example, Franklin Lavin's concept of "oxygen" or engagement, as opposed to "asphyxiation" or sanctions, provides a useful policy alternative and will be addressed in the conclusion.<sup>4</sup>

There are however, several difficulties with this case study. The Gulf War caused significant damage to the Iraqi infrastructure which increased the damaging effects of the sanctions astronomically. Had the Gulf War not occurred, the hospitals, water-treatment facilities, sewage treatment centres and electrical power facilities would have been functioning and the instance of water-borne disease and cross-infection would have been substantially less. It is difficult to differentiate between the negative impact caused by the sanctions and the negative impact caused by the war. In short, the impact of the war served to exacerbate the conditions brought about by the sanctions. It is impossible to predict the effects that the sanctions would have had on Iraq without the war; however, this does not negate the utility of the Iraqi case study. The

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<sup>4</sup>Franklin L. Lavin, "Asphyxiation or Oxygen? The Sanctions Dilemma" in *Foreign Policy*, (Vol. 104, Fall, 1996): pp. 140.

exaggerated impact of the sanctions caused by the Gulf War only provides further evidence that a more severe decrease in the economic welfare of the target does not increase compliance to the purposes of the sanctions."

Another issue which causes difficulty when assessing the Iraqi case study involves the objectivity of the available information. Because Iraq strenuously opposed the sanctions from their inception, and has always had a clear interest in lifting the sanctions, it is therefore in Baghdad's best interest to characterize the impact of the sanctions in highly detrimental terms. The more destructive the effects of the sanctions on Iraq appear, the more likely it is that members of the sanctioning coalition will begin to question the utility of maintaining the sanctions. The majority of reports on the effects of sanctions were accomplished by conducting interviews in Iraq; all of the authors stated that they were able to conduct their studies without government intervention and indicated that they had virtually unlimited access to every region they wished to examine. Any exceptions to their freedom will be noted when discussing the study in future chapters. However, several economic indicators within the country are difficult to assess due to the necessity of relying on information provided by the Iraqi government. One example is provided by estimations of gross domestic product (GDP) following the

Gulf War. Alnasrawi, in a study discussed in Chapter Three, calculated the GDP for 1990 by subtracting 26.4 per cent in output, which represented the losses claimed by the Iraqi government as a result of the sanctions, from the 1989 GDP. Similarly, the 1991 GDP was calculated by deducting the loss in oil revenue estimated at 42.1 per cent of GDP in 1990. Not only do these estimates rely on information supplied by the Iraqi government, which will be discussed below, they neglect to consider the value of non-oil GDP.

In the case of information produced by the Iraqi government, which will be cited primarily under references to the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), it should be noted that the information is inherently subjective. The information published by the Iraqi government not only portrays the worst possible scenario to those observing the effects of sanctions, but also attempts to portray the Iraqi regime as the party responsible for their country's perceived upturns. The objectivity of the Iraqi government is, for these reasons, highly questionable; therefore, information published by the Iraqi government will be compared and contrasted to similar studies conducted by more impartial organizations.

Despite the difficulties inherent in an assessment of the impact of the sanctions, ranging from the effects of the Gulf War, to the objectivity of the information released by

the Iraqi government, it will become apparent that the ~~sanctions~~ have had a highly detrimental impact on the Iraqi economy and people without inducing the appropriate foreign policy changes. Essentially, a reduction in economic welfare does not necessarily produce the desired political ~~results~~, which negates the premise of sanctions. For this reason, sanctions should not be imposed under the assumption that increasing the damage to the population of the target state will induce the compliance sought by the sanctioner.

**CHAPTER 1:**  
**SANCTIONS IN REVIEW**

Economic sanctions are imposed for a variety of purposes; however, these purposes are not necessarily clearly defined by the sanctioner nor are they used exclusively for one foreign policy goal. This chapter will examine the existing literature on international economic sanctions. I will address the purposes of sanctions as outlined by orthodox sanctions theory with reference to specific case studies. I will then discuss a variety of theories concerning the effectiveness of economic sanctions. The reasons generally cited for the failure of sanctions to secure the policy goals defined by the sanctioners, as well as their criteria for successful sanctions will also be addressed.

**Orthodox Sanctions Theory**

~~The traditional sanctions literature delineates five~~

purposes of sanctions.<sup>1</sup> One such purpose is compellance. This involves an attempt to compel the target to alter the status quo or to abandon the behaviour which does not conform with international standards and norms. This purpose was evident in the attempts of the US-led sanctions against Libya, which began in 1992, whereby the sanctioners attempted to compel the government of Moammar Qadhafi to extradite those individuals involved in airline terrorism. However, this is frequently the primary purpose of sanctions. Another example involved the sanctions imposed on Rhodesia in 1965 which were a result of the efforts of the sanctioning states to compel the white minority government of Ian Smith to advance the participation of African nationals in the government. Similarly, in 1961, United Nations adopted economic sanctions against Portugal with the object of compelling the government to accept the principle of self-determination for the inhabitants of its

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<sup>1</sup>The purposes outlined here are from David Leyton-Brown, *The Utility of International Economic Sanctions* (London: Croom Helm, 1987): pp. 303-305; Kim R. Nossal, *Rain Dancing: Sanctions in Canadian Australian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994): pp. 8-13; Gary C. Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy*, (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1985): pp. 4-10.

African territories.<sup>2</sup>

The second purpose is deterrence. Not only is the target deterred from committing further wrongful behavior, but other countries are deterred from committing actions that are similar in nature. Leyton-Brown indicates that sanctions employed for such a purpose "should be explicit, proportionate to the act being deterred, and credible". This purpose has been illustrated frequently in the past. One of the earliest cases involves the sanctions imposed by the League of Nations on Italy in 1935-1936 to condemn their actions against Ethiopia. In October 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia and the League of Nations immediately imposed sanctions. The primary purpose of these sanctions was to deter the government from engaging in further aggression in Ethiopia. The sanctions imposed on Cuba in 1960 were ostensibly imposed to deter other countries in the western hemisphere from aligning with the Soviet Union and thereby destabilizing Central America.

The third purpose is symbolic and involves signals of resolve to both the target and the sanctioner's domestic population. Sanctions can communicate outrage, firmness and/or solidarity to the target as well as diffusing

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<sup>2</sup>Margaret Doxey, *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective* (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1987): pp. 34-35.

pressures for more extreme action and satisfying others that the government is acting firmly against the target.<sup>3</sup> Essentially, sanctions "add teeth to international diplomacy" when more extreme measures are perhaps excessive".<sup>4</sup> One example of this type of symbolism was evident in Haiti after Gen. Raoul Cedras ousted Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the democratically elected leader of Haiti who was in power for a period of only seven months. Sanctions allowed the sanctioners to communicate outrage, firmness, and solidarity at the atrocities being committed by the junta, which served to diffuse pressures for more extreme action. In addition, this satisfied the domestic population of the sanctioners that the government was acting firmly against the target.

The fourth purpose is to restrict the economic and military capabilities of the targets. Sanctions have always been used to disrupt the war effort of the enemy. For example, during the Napoleonic Wars, the First World War and World War II, sanctions were used to disrupt the enemy's war effort. Immediately following World War II, sanctions were still used for military goals. These goals range from

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<sup>3</sup>Leyton-Brown, *The Utility of Economic Sanctions*: pp. 305.

<sup>4</sup>Hufbauer & Schott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*: pp. 10.

encouraging the withdrawal of troops from border areas, to discouraging plans for invasion or other military adventures.<sup>5</sup> The sanctions imposed on Argentina in April 1982 as a result of their invasion of the Falkland Islands is yet another example of an attempt to restrict economic and military capabilities.

Some would expand on this purpose to include subversion, which involves altering the target's behaviour by subverting and eventually causing the overthrow of the government. The ultimate goal of subversion would be to replace the existing authorities with a new government that would abandon the policy which caused the implementation of sanctions. Sanctions imposed on Cuba since August 1960 provide a clear example of an attempt at subversion. The United States imposed unilateral sanctions on Cuba months after Fidel Castro came to power as a result of the Cuban expropriation of American property without compensation. These sanctions were tightened subsequently to include bans on all Cuban exports. While the sanctions imposed by the Organization of American States were lifted, the United States maintained trade sanctions and expanded them to include extraterritorial measures with the Helms-Burton legislation of 1996. It becomes evident that the sanctions

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid: pp. 4.

imposed on Cuba are being used simply to "make things difficult for the target but are not related to specific acts of wrong-doing."<sup>6</sup> The United States appears content to maintain the sanctions until Fidel Castro is no longer in power.

The fifth purpose is retribution. Sanctions are employed in this instance to punish the target; the primary motivation is to make the target suffer a penalty. Leyton-Brown states that this type of sanctions serves to define unacceptable behaviour and thereby contributes to international norms of legitimate conduct.<sup>7</sup> One example of sanctions imposed for this purpose involves the sanctions imposed on Cuba by the United States. The Helms-Burton legislation, which served to extend the existing sanctions to any company engaged in trade with Cuba regardless of their country of origin, was adopted to punish the Cuban government for the shoot-down of the Cessnas flown by the "Brothers to the Rescue" exile group in February 1996. This shoot-down provided the catalyst for President Bill Clinton to sign the legislation. Similarly, the sanctions imposed on Rhodesia in 1965 were adopted to punish the regime of Ian

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<sup>6</sup>Doxey, *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective*: pp. 64.

<sup>7</sup>Leyton-Brown, *The Utility of International Sanctions*: pp. 303.

Smith for its unilateral declaration of independence without securing the advancement of African participation in the white minority government.

Another purpose, which is not generally examined in the traditional sanctions literature, involves a challenge to the previously outlined goals. While sanctions may be ineffective in the five purposes indicated, they may initiate a process of redefinition of certain international standards of behaviour. This view holds that the international sanctions imposed on South Africa were a success due to their promotion of a particular definition of democratic, nonracial South Africa.<sup>8</sup> While this goal has not been clearly elucidated by the sanctioning states in the past, it has been a more general consideration by the international community which constitutes a purpose of all sanctions episodes. This goal may be attained incrementally as sanctions are applied to similar cases. This purpose is closely related to deterrence in that a particular sanctions episode will deter other nations from committing similar violations of international norms thereby strengthening the norm indirectly.

Lastly, it becomes evident when examining the examples

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<sup>8</sup>Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1995): pp. 170.

cited above that international economic sanctions are applied for multiple purposes. The purposes outlined above, can all be goals of one sanctions episode, ranging from efforts to punish the target; to deter further military invasion, as well as similar actions by other countries; to compel the target to comply with goals of the sanctioners; to restrict military and economic capabilities and relatedly to subvert government; to signal resolve to both the target and to the sanctioner's domestic populations that the actions committed by the government were unacceptable; and to attempt to initiate a process of redefinition of international norms or standards of behaviour. This comprises the orthodox theory of the purposes of sanctions. Now I will address a variety of theories regarding the effectiveness of sanctions.

### Theories of the Effectiveness of Sanctions

Johan Galtung provided the initial criticism of the effectiveness of economic sanctions. In an examination of the effects of sanctions on Rhodesia, Galtung described the relationship between economic warfare and political disintegration as "naive theory". This refers to the belief that there is a limit of value-deprivation that a state can stand, at which point the split occurs between the leader

and the population. Galtung indicates that this naive theory also disregards the possibility of political integration. In this case, "value-deprivation creates the social condition under which much more sacrifice is possible so that the limit for political disintegration will be reached much later."<sup>9</sup> This can result in three conditions: the attack is perceived as an attack on a group as a whole, as opposed to simply one fraction thereof; there is either a weak or negative identification with the sanctioning nation; there is a belief in the value of the stated goal of the target state and no alternative can be envisioned by this state.<sup>10</sup>

Essentially, there are two weak points of economic sanctions envisioned by Galtung. The first involves the perceived proportionate relationship between political and economic disintegration, as discussed previously, and the second is the concept that there are no counter-measures for economic disintegration. The counter-measures which can be used involve adaptive measures, which are made easier when there is visible sacrifice by the leaders, restructuring of

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<sup>9</sup>Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia" in Miroslav Nincic and Peter Wallensteen, *Dilemmas of Economic Coercion: Sanctions in World Politics*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983): pp. 302.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid: pp. 389.

the economy and smuggling. In addition, the government will undoubtedly engage in a propaganda campaign to create and maintain "pluralistic ignorance".<sup>11</sup> This type of propaganda campaign has been taken in the past by several leaders. One example is Mussolini who stated that: "To sanctions of an economic character we will reply with our discipline, with our sobriety, and with our spirit of sacrifice"<sup>12</sup>.

*Sense of Shame* → David Baldwin criticises economic sanctions from a slightly different perspective. His objection involves the fixation with economic ends. He believes that it is essential to state more specific, higher-level goals as opposed to the more commonly stated goal of the deprivation of the target state. The focus should not be on the immediate economic effects. Baldwin indicates the necessity of considering the effects which can result from non-economic influence bases and cites examples such as a sense of shame and/or isolation.<sup>13</sup> It will become evident that both Baldwin's and Galtung's theories have considerable weight when considering the Iraqi case study. While the population suffers, the sense of shame and isolation

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid: pp. 399.

<sup>12</sup>Hufbauer & Schott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*: pp. 10.

<sup>13</sup>David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985): pp. 62.

necessary to make sanctions effective, according to Baldwin, are absent. This will be addressed further in the following chapters.

Hufbauer and Schott, in their comprehensive work on the effects of sanctions, outline limitations to the effectiveness of sanctions. These limitations are as follows: the sanctions may be inadequate to achieve the objectives sought; the goals may be elusive, the means insufficient, or the cooperation of allies absent. In addition, sanctions may create their own remedy, for example, they may unify the target country both in support of the government and in terms of commercial alternatives. Sanctions may also provide the catalyst for the support of powerful allies in favour of the target state. Finally, sanctions create a backlash both domestically and internationally; different goals may develop among allies and business firms at home who suffer a loss of income as a direct result of sanctions.<sup>14</sup>

These limitations facilitate an examination of the Iraqi case study. The inadequacy of the sanctions imposed on Iraq becomes evident when examining the purposes of the sanctions; perhaps the best example of this involves the

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<sup>14</sup>Hufbauer & Schott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*: pp. 10 & 11.

attempt to subvert the government in power. This will be discussed in the following chapter. While sanctions have not created their own remedy, it will become evident that they have served to unify the target country to some degree, against the coalition forces, particularly against the United States. The sanctions have also created a backlash internationally. Both the leaders of the Gulf monarchies and the European states are experiencing increasing malaise concerning Iran's growing strength at the ~~expense~~ of Iraq. For example, Turkey is experiencing the most profound difficulty and is feeling betrayed by their American ally. There are two aspects which have caused the Turkish dilemma: the sanctions have cost Turkey between \$10 billion and \$20 billion and this number is increasing constantly; the threat to Turkish territorial integrity has been posed as a result of the de facto secession of Iraqi Kurdistan.<sup>15</sup> It becomes clear that the limitations outlined by Hufbauer and Schott can be applied, with the exception of the provision of support by a powerful ally, to the case of Iraq.

Daoudi and Dajani provide another examination of the effectiveness of sanctions. They indicate that while the majority of studies assume that the purpose of sanctions is

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<sup>15</sup>Eric Rouleau, "The View from France: America's Unyielding Policy toward Iraq" in *Foreign Affairs*, (74 Jan./Feb., 1995): pp. 70.

to regain the status quo, the goal of sanctions is not ordinarily so ambitious. They indicate that:

Sanctions may not have the power to topple governments, change political systems or even induce drastic foreign policy changes, yet they have the power to cut fresh inroads, impose heavy sacrifices on the target, and inflict deep internal cleavages in the political fabric of the target regime - cleavages hard for the untrained eye to see on initial impact.<sup>16</sup>

It will become clear in the following chapter that the purposes outlined by the United Nations for the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq do not follow this logic.

Daoudi and Dajani indicate that sanctions can be defined as successful if they prevent the use of force. The prevention of force can be accomplished using the following methods:

- a.) maintaining the perception that sanctions are inflicting damage on the target;
- b.) expressing morality and justice;
- c.) signifying disapproval or displeasure;
- d.) satisfying the emotional needs of the sanctioners;
- e.) maintaining the sanctioner's positive image and reputation;
- f.) relieving domestic pressure on the sanctioner;
- g.) inflicting symbolic vengeance.<sup>17</sup>

It will become evident that all of the above criteria were fulfilled in the Iraqi case study; however, the sanctions imposed immediately following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait

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<sup>16</sup>M.S. Daoudi & M.S. Dajani, *Economic Sanctions: Ideals and Experience*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983): pp. 160.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid: pp. 161.

did not avert the use of force and could therefore, by their definition of success, be deemed highly unsuccessful.

However, their definition of success must be questioned.

On 4 June 1991, the US Department of Defense reported that approximately 100,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed in combat with civilian casualties amounting to between 5,000 and 15,000. This number increased by between 70,000 and 80,000 people who died shortly following the war as a result of cholera, typhoid and gastroenteritis which originated from the water purification plants which had been destroyed by the Gulf War.<sup>18</sup> In comparison, the number of people who have died as a result of the sanctions is very high and is increasing daily. The estimated number of children under the age of five who, according to a study by Zaidi and Smith-Fawzi, have died as a direct result of the sanctions between August, 1990, and December, 1995, was 567,000.<sup>19</sup> This study will be discussed at length below. The necessity of preventing military conflict is put into question by the number of casualties inflicted by the sanctions. This will be addressed further in the following chapters.

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<sup>18</sup>Roger Hilsman, *George Bush v. Saddam Hussein: Military Success! Political Failure?* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992): pp. 206-207.

<sup>19</sup>Sarah Zaidi, Mary C. Smith Fawzi, "Health of Baghdad's children" in *The Lancet*, (Vol. 346, December, 2, 1995): pp. 346.

Daoudi and Dajani have a list which outlines their conclusions regarding the imposition of sanctions and the lessons which should be learned from sanctions imposed by international organizations. Perhaps the most interesting conclusion involves what they call the "bull's eye fallacy". This involves the erroneous idea that unless sanctions are successful in attaining the purposes initially outlined by the sanctioning nations, they have failed.<sup>20</sup> However, I question whether the goals of "[cutting] fresh inroads, [imposing] heavy sacrifices on the target, and [inflicting] deep internal cleavages in the target regime"<sup>21</sup> are sufficient to warrant "success". Does punishing the population constitute success?

Daoudi and Dajani describe sanctions in the following manner:

Like cancer, international economic sanctions kill minute cells within the economic structure of the target nation which are hard for the naked eye to detect at first. But an accumulation of these dead cells leads to the eventual corruption of the economic-political ability of the sanctioned nation to meet its domestic daily demands, weakening its integrity and eventually causing its collapse.<sup>22</sup>

It would appear that these are the symptoms of the sanctions

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<sup>20</sup>Daoudi & Dajani, *Economic Sanctions*: pp. 168.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid: pp. 160.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid: pp. 168 & 169.

imposed on Iraq, yet the weakening of its integrity to the point where it collapses is nowhere in sight. It appears that in attempting to define a effective or successful sanction, Daoudi and Dajani have fallen into Galtung's definition of "naive theory" whereby they equate economic and political collapse. Disregarding this problem, it again brings into question the concept of success being equated with the suffering of the population.

While there is a tendency to analyze the success of sanctions in terms of the achievement of the stated purposes, another body of literature addresses their success in terms of the value of sanctions in affirming the commitment to certain international norms, for example the norm against the forcible acquisition of disputed territory. Yet another definition of effectiveness involves the degree to which the sanctions are implemented successfully. This includes a variety of questions ranging from the enforcement of sanctions, to the degree of compliance in the target state.<sup>23</sup> The effectiveness as defined by each of these definitions will become evident in the following chapters as the effects of the sanctions on Iraq are addressed more thoroughly.

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<sup>23</sup>Lori Fisler Damrosch, *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993): pp. 277-278.

Fisler Damrosch determines two criteria with which to evaluate collective sanctions programs that are addressed to internal conflicts. The first criterion is conflict containment; this involves the attempt by the sanctioning coalition to contain the conflict and to mitigate the level of violence. The second criterion involves the concept of differentiation which simply indicates an effort to target those who perpetuated the unacceptable behaviour as opposed to civilians who are not in a position to influence such behaviour.<sup>24</sup> She argues that the containment criterion was met by the UN sanctions on Iraq: the sanctions neither contributed to the violence, nor did they escalate existing violence. However, the second criterion involving the differentiation between those committing the unacceptable behaviour, who should be targeted, and innocent civilians is brought into question. She indicates that "the regime has been so manipulative in portraying the sanctions as the cause of the country's misery as to call into question whether the genuine will of the population could even be formulated, let alone ascertained."<sup>25</sup> She further states that devastating effects can be attributed to this particular sanctions episode and it is quite possible that

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<sup>24</sup>Ibid: pp. 279.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid: pp. 304.

the "civilian impact threshold" could already have been surpassed. However, despite this assertion, and because of the bad faith which has been demonstrated with respect to weapons of mass destruction, she states that any loosening of the sanctions would be likely to increase the "destructive capabilities of the regime as opposed to easing the burden on the civilians."<sup>26</sup> This issue will be discussed further in the following chapter.

The purposes of international economic sanctions include compellance, deterrence, signals of resolve to both the target and the sanctioner's domestic population, the restriction of economic and military capabilities, retribution and the promotion or redefinition of certain international standards of behaviour. However, the effectiveness of economic sanctions is limited for a variety of reasons ranging from the belief that there exists a proportionate relationship between economic welfare and political disintegration, and the fixation with economic ends, to the differentiation between those who perpetuated the unacceptable behaviour as opposed to civilians who are not in a position to influence such behaviour. It will become evident in following chapters that if these

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid: pp. 304.

limitations had been taken into consideration when addressing the possibilities of policies available to the sanctioning coalition, there would have been much less enthusiasm for the form of sanctions adopted by the coalition. Having discussed the purposes of sanctions more generally, the following chapter will address the purposes of the sanctions imposed on Iraq. I will then examine the effectiveness of the sanctions in attaining compliance to the goals outlined by the sanctioning coalition. It will become evident that the sanctions imposed on Iraq disregard the limitations on the effectiveness of economic sanctions described by the authors discussed in this chapter.

CHAPTER 2:  
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON IRAQ

It is important to determine the difference between the impact and the effectiveness of sanctions. It will be argued in future chapters that the economic sanctions on Iraq have had a devastating impact; however, as this chapter will argue, the sanctions regime has not been effective in terms of Iraq's compliance to the purposes set out by the United Nations and the sanctioning states. The purposes of the economic sanctions as described in the previous chapter will be assessed in light of the Iraqi case study. After addressing the purposes of the sanctions regime both before and after the Gulf War, the effectiveness of the sanctions in initiating political changes in keeping with these purposes will be examined. It will become evident that neither the purposes defined by the United Nations, nor those defined by the United States, were met after six years of sanctions which have crippled the economy and drastically decreased the standard of living for the majority of the population.

As discussed in the previous chapter, orthodox

sanctions theory hypothesizes that sanctions can be imposed for multiple purposes: compellance; deterrence; symbolism; the restriction of economic and military capabilities and, relatedly, subversion; retribution; and although not in keeping with traditional sanctions literature, the initiation of a process of redefinition of certain international standards of behaviour. The purposes of the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq will be discussed in this order.

#### The Purposes of the Sanctions Imposed on Iraq

Compellance is perhaps the most important purpose of the sanctions imposed on Iraq immediately following their invasion of Kuwait. The sanctions were ostensibly imposed in an attempt to compel Iraq to "bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait,"<sup>1</sup> in the words of Security Council Resolution 661. The attempt to compel Iraq to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty was the initial purpose that was agreed upon by each of the

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<sup>1</sup>S/RES/661, (1990), 6 August, 1990 in United Nations, *The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996*, (New York: United Nations, 1996): pp. 167; subsequently referred to as *The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict*.

coalition members sanctioning Iraq.

The second purpose, and undoubtedly foremost on the agenda of George Bush, the president of the United States, was deterrence. The United States government clearly stated that the purpose of the sanctions was to deter an invasion of Saudi Arabia. If the Iraqi government had control over Iraqi, Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian oil fields, they would have controlled a large percentage of the oil upon which the developed world is dependent.

While the United States wished to deter Iraq from invading its neighbouring countries for geopolitical/economic reasons, there was also a wider concern for the norm against the forcible acquisition of disputed territory that pervaded the United Nations. All members of the United Nations, particularly the smaller nations potentially subject to similar threats from larger neighbours, have an interest in protecting the sovereignty of the nation state as it could easily be their sovereignty at stake.

The third purpose involves signals of resolve to the domestic populations of both the target and the sanctioner as a symbol of outrage, firmness, and solidarity to the target. The signal of resolve to Iraq was resounding in its repudiation of Iraqi actions. The simple fact that eleven hours after the invasion, the UN Security Council met and

unanimously adopted resolution 660 condemning the invasion and demanding unconditional withdrawal of Iraq to their previous positions, indicates both outrage and solidarity within the international community. Four days later, on 6 August 1990, the Security Council adopted resolution 661 which imposed comprehensive sanctions on Iraq. This resolution clearly indicated that such flagrant disregard for the internationally accepted norm against forcible acquisition of disputed territory would be managed with a firm hand. Among the domestic populations of the sanctioning countries, there was abhorrence at the disregard for Kuwaiti sovereignty; however, there was no immediate call for military intervention. Under these circumstances, governments within the international community felt compelled to take firm action, yet they were unwilling to engage in a military solution. This clearly indicated the necessity of taking the middle road, as any other course of action would have been unacceptable at that time.

The fourth purpose of the sanctions imposed on Iraq was to restrict Iraq's economic and military capabilities. This purpose is somewhat intertwined with the previous purposes in that the attempt to compel Iraq to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty and the attempt to deter Iraq from further military aggression are both attempts to restrict the military capabilities of the target. The attempt to

restrict economic capabilities is intrinsic to economic sanctions and forms an equally vital component of the attempt to restrict Iraqi capabilities more generally.

Subversion, which is addressed under this more general purpose, comprises one of the United States' purposes. The United Nations does not have the capability to subvert the government of a member nation, nor would it chose to do so. However, the Bush administration openly stated that the US would only agree to lift the sanctions when Saddam Hussein was removed from power. Perhaps more important in terms of actively sponsoring the subversion of the Iraqi leader was Bush's authorization for the CIA to recruit Iraqi dissidents in an attempt to remove Saddam Hussein from power.<sup>2</sup> While the subversion of the Iraqi government may not have formed an official purpose, it was nonetheless a vital component of the American agenda and, therefore, the sanctions regime.

Retribution, which is the fifth purpose, involves an attempt to punish the target and to make it suffer for their unacceptable behaviour. The punitive nature of the sanctions in place against Iraq was evident in a statement made by Bush on 12 August 1990 to Pentagon employees. He stated that:

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<sup>2</sup>Bob Woodward, *The Commanders*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991): pp. 282.

Saddam has claimed that this is a holy war of Arab against infidel - this from the man who has used poison gas against the men, women and children of his own country; who invaded Iran in a war that cost the lives of more than half a million Moslems; and who now plunders Kuwait. Atrocities have been committed by Saddam's soldiers and henchmen. It is Saddam who lied to his Arab neighbours. It is Saddam who invaded an Arab state. And it is he who now threatens the Arab nation.<sup>3</sup>

By casting Saddam Hussein as the villain, which peaked in the subsequent comparisons to Hitler, the administration was partly responsible for creating the perceived necessity of punishing the transgressions which were described in ~~newscasts daily~~ Perhaps the most indicative statement of personal animosity made by Bush occurred when the decision was made to send Baker to Baghdad and to receive Tariq Aziz in Washington on November 30, 1990. When asked whether it was a session to find common ground, Bush indicated that this was not the case as "[Hussein] doesn't deserve it."<sup>4</sup> On March 20, 1991, after the Gulf War had ended, Bush publicly stated that the US would continue to apply sanctions until Saddam Hussein was no longer in power.<sup>5</sup> It must be noted that the administration of President Bill

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid: pp. 282.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid: pp. 338.

<sup>5</sup>Roger Hilsman, *George Bush v. Saddam Hussein: Military Success! Political Failure?*, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992: pp. 211.

Clinton did not depersonalize the conflict; "it also showed a virulent ideological hostility toward Baghdad that was unmatched by the previous administration"<sup>6</sup>. The most powerful member of the Security Council was unwilling to lift the sanctions for reasons which can be attributed at least in part to the perceived necessity of retribution.

The initiation of a process of redefinition of certain international standards of behaviour, which constitutes the final purpose, was not clearly stated by the sanctioning coalition in the Iraqi case study. It is however, a more general consideration by the international community which constitutes a purpose of all sanctions episodes. This goal may be attained incrementally as sanctions are applied to similar cases. This purpose is closely related to deterrence in that a particular sanctions episode will deter other nations from committing similar violations of international norms thereby strengthening the norm indirectly. This purpose is difficult to assess when considering a single case study, particularly within such a short period of time.

It becomes evident when examining the ~~Iraqi case study~~ that the sanctions were imposed for multiple purposes. The

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<sup>6</sup>Ahmed Hashim, "Iraq: Fin de Regime?" in *Current History*, (January 1996): pp. 10.

purposes outlined above are all applicable to this case study. The sanctions were very clearly imposed to punish Iraq for the atrocities committed by the regime. While retribution would not have topped the agenda put forward by the United Nations, it would most certainly play a central role in the United States' agenda. Sanctions were also implemented to deter any future invasion, particularly of Saudi Arabia, as well as similar actions by other countries. The effort to compel Iraq to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty was the primary goal of the sanctions imposed following the Iraqi invasion. The restriction of military and economic capabilities was a purpose which was clearly stated in resolution 687 by the United Nations, whereas the subversion of the Iraqi regime, which was absent from UN resolutions, was paramount to the United States. A signal of resolve was also a purpose as the United Nations wished to demonstrate to both the Iraqi government and to the coalition's domestic populations that the atrocities being committed against the Kuwaiti people were intolerable. In addition, the promotion of the international norm against the forcible acquisition of disputed territory played a role in the imposition of sanctions.

## Purposes of the Sanctions Imposed on Iraq Following the Gulf War

It must be noted that the purposes of the sanctions regime which followed the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty on 28 February 1991 are somewhat different than those imposed following the Iraqi invasion. Resolution 687 clearly outlines the official purposes of the sanctions. These, involve the demarcation of the Iraq-Kuwait border, the "destruction, removal, or rendering harmless" of chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres. In addition, Iraq had to agree unconditionally not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. Resolution 687 provides for the adoption of measures preventing the reconstitution of the nuclear weapons program, even after the sanctions have been lifted. In addition, this resolution established the creation of a compensation fund to cover damages incurred by Kuwait during its occupation.<sup>1</sup> Compliance, which was initially the paramount purpose of the sanctions imposed by the United Nations, was cast aside for other purposes. Retribution appears to have been a primary purpose of the United States for implementing the sanctions following the Gulf War.

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<sup>1</sup>S/RES/687, 3 April 1991 in *The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict*: pp. 193-198.

Naturally, the other purposes played a role, if not for the United States then at the United Nations. Deterrence, symbolism and the reduction of military capabilities were the central purposes of the United Nations, whereas retribution and the subversion of Saddam Hussein seemed to be paramount to the United States. Since the US has the power to maintain sanctions even when the remaining members of the Security Council are in favour of lifting them, their purposes must be weighed equally.

#### United Nations' Resolutions

The Security Council has not established a clear guideline for lifting the sanctions imposed on Iraq. Resolution 687 appears to advocate a staggered approach to the removal of sanctions. Upon fulfilling the arms control obligations outlined in paragraphs eight to thirteen of resolution 687, the export prohibition on Iraqi commodities and products, including oil, would be lifted; however, permission for Iraq to import goods other than medicine and health supplies would be reviewed "in the light of the policies and practices of the Government of Iraq" in an attempt to determine whether to reduce or lift the prohibitions on the

import of such goods.<sup>8</sup> The "policies and practices" of the Iraqi government could conceivably include a consideration of human rights abuses within Iraq. The concern with such issues was evident in Security Council resolution 688 which demanded an end to the repression of the Iraqi population and stated that the consequences of this repression threatened international peace and security in the region.<sup>9</sup> It was similarly apparent in a General Assembly resolution concerning allegations of human rights abuses, such as arbitrary detention, extrajudicial killings and hostage-taking.<sup>10</sup> It becomes evident that a decision to lift any part of the sanctions regime is a somewhat arbitrary one which is subject to the interpretation of the members of the Security Council, including the United States. Therefore, not only are the United Nations' resolutions to be upheld, the purposes of powerful member states, which are not necessarily in accord with UN resolutions, must also be fulfilled.

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid: pp. 197.

<sup>9</sup>S/RES/688 (1991), in *The Iraq Kuwait Conflict*: pp. 199.

<sup>10</sup>A/RES/46/134, 17 December 1991, in *The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict*: pp. 370.

### The Effectiveness of the Sanctions: Has Iraq Complied?

It is obvious that one condition set by the US - ~~the removal~~ of Saddam Hussein - has not been met. Nor is it likely to be met in the near future. Saddam Hussein has "capitalized on [the Iraqi people's] mounting resentment over their conditions of life" and used

the political myth of a single, united Arab people, combined with a shrewd exploitation of their actual suffering and discontent [which has] resulted in a broad recognition of the Iraqi dictator as a "great hero" of our time.<sup>11</sup>

Another source indicates that Hussein's political career, which was focussed exclusively on matters of intelligence and security has "given him an almost uncanny ability to detect and swiftly nip in the bud any threats to regime security". This led the author to conclude that "Reports of Saddam Hussein's impending demise may turn out to be greatly exaggerated."<sup>12</sup> Another issue which strengthens his regime is the ~~depletion of the middle class~~ which has resulted from the sanctions, and the creation of a large gap between the rich and poor. The rich class is composed of the privileged ruling elite, wealthy merchants, and traders; the remainder

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<sup>11</sup>Kamil Abdullah, "Saddam as Hero" in Fran Hazelton, ed., *Iraq Since the Gulf War: Prospects for Democracy*, (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1994): pp. 53 & 56.

<sup>12</sup>Ahmed Hashim, "Iraq: Fin de Regime": pp. 15.

of population comprises the poor. The wealth obtained by the ruling class, who are members of the Takriti clan to which Saddam Hussein belongs and more importantly, his tribe, the al-Bunasser, will serve only to perpetuate the regime as they have a vested interest in remaining in power. As one senior Baathist official stated: "Waiting for Saddam to go is like waiting for Godot to arrive."<sup>13</sup>

In terms of the goals of the Security Council, the first purpose to be addressed will be Iraqi compliance to paragraphs eight to thirteen of resolution 687 involving the destruction or removal of weapons of mass destruction. On 18 April 1991, Iraq made its first declaration in accordance with resolution 687 outlining the locations, amounts and types of chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles and nuclear capabilities. The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) was created for on-site inspection of biological, chemical and missile capabilities and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was charged with the inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities. In June 1991, both UNSCOM and the Action Team designated by the IAEA conducted missions which determined the inadequacy of the initial declarations made by Iraq. Iraq subsequently made a revised declaration on 7 July 1991. The discoveries made by

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<sup>13</sup>Ibid: pp. 14.

UNSCOM and the Action Team again indicated "flagrant violations" of its obligations and resulted in the adoption of Resolution 707, which demanded the disclosure of its weapon programmes and unconditional access for both UNSCOM and the Action Team.<sup>14</sup>

The Iraqi government persistently failed to provide adequate assurances in the ensuing declarations that the appropriate ballistic missiles and chemical weapons had been destroyed unilaterally. On 12 March 1992, Iraq made its first "full, final and complete report" on its nuclear capabilities. When the IAEA expressed dissatisfaction with this report, a revised version was written on 5 June 1992. Baghdad also made its first "full, final and complete report" to UNSCOM regarding chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles which was described rather succinctly as "grossly inadequate".<sup>15</sup> Iraq persisted with such behaviour and submitted new (full, final and complete) declarations in July 1992, February 1993 and October 1993. On 26 November 1993, the Iraqi government accepted Resolution 715, which demanded that Iraq comply with the plan introduced by the IAEA and UNSCOM regarding weapons of

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<sup>14</sup>Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Introduction" in *The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict*: pp. 80-83.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid: pp. 84.

mass destruction. It submitted its previous declaration, with all of its inadequacies, as evidence of its wish to comply to the resolution.<sup>16</sup>

In January 1994, Iraq made another declaration on all of its weapons of mass destruction with major deficiencies in the statement regarding biological weapons. In December 1994, UNSCOM discovered evidence that a full scale programme had been undertaken to produce biological weapons. Iraq denied the existence of such a programme until March 1995 when the government in Baghdad indicated that the issue might be resolved. However, such progress was not evident in the April 1995 report. On 7 August 1996 General Hussein Kamel Hassan, who was formerly the Director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Corporation, left Iraq for Jordan. Following his departure, the Iraqi government, afraid that he would disclose further information on their nuclear weapons programme, invited the Action Team to investigate "important information" on the prohibited programmes. UNSCOM discovered a more extensive biological and chemical weapons programme, and Iraq admitted to greater progress in the production of missile engines. The Iraqi government also admitted to a crash programme which had been initiated in September 1990 in the hope of having sufficient

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid: pp. 89.

highly enriched uranium for a nuclear device by April 1991. Before leaving Iraq, the Action Team collected 680,000 pages of printed documents, and a variety of computer disks, videotapes, microfilms and microfiches.<sup>17</sup>

The Iraqi government claims that it intended to convert the enriched uranium to metal "buttons" by April 1991 during the IAEA's scheduled inspection; however, it has become evident that the Iraqi government could not have finished processing the fuel into metal by the self-imposed deadline. As of December 1995 the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* stated that:

Today the Iraqi nuclear program has been derailed, but most observers believe it is just a matter time before Iraq tries to get it back on track...In addition, Iraq's long history of lying and "revising" declarations leaves many analysts worried that even after the latest revelations about a crash program, Iraq may still be hiding something.<sup>18</sup>

UNSCOM and the IAEA claim that they have sufficient information to understand the "big picture" in each area; however, they have some concerns about their ability to account for all of the capabilities associated with the programmes.<sup>19</sup> It must be noted that when considering the

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<sup>17</sup>Ibid: pp. 93.

<sup>18</sup>David Albright & Robert Kelley, "Has Iraq Come Clean at Last?" in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, (November/ December 1995): pp. 60.

<sup>19</sup>Boutros-Ghali, "Introduction": pp. 94.

previous "full, final and complete" reports in each area, they were always faulted for being "tailored to what the Iraqi authorities consider the Commission to know already, rather than constituting a frank and open disclosure of all the true facts".<sup>20</sup> There remains a question as to the extent to which the Iraqi government was able to hide from the inspections. It should also be noted that if sanctions were to end, the CIA estimates that Iraq could produce enough fissile material for an atomic bomb within five to seven years.<sup>21</sup>

As discussed previously, the sanctions placed on the export of oil and other commodities is dependent on an accurate picture of Iraq's weapons programmes. Due to the intrusive nature of the inspections in combination with the defection of Hussein Kamel, the IAEA and UNSCOM have created an extensive body of knowledge detailing Iraqi weapons capabilities prior to the Gulf War and have destroyed, removed or rendered harmless a variety of weapons or weapons components ranging from biological seed stocks to Scud

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<sup>20</sup>S/24984, 17 December 1992, in *The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict*: pp. 494.

<sup>21</sup>Albright & Kelley, "Has Iraq Come Clean at Last?": pp. 63.

missiles.<sup>22</sup> If the political will to lift sanctions pervaded the Security Council, it appears that UNSCOM and the IAEA would be capable of declaring their knowledge of Iraqi weapons capabilities sufficient to fulfil the requirements of resolution 687. The ongoing monitoring programme established in resolution 715 would ensure that the concerns about the ability to account for all of the Iraqi weapons capabilities would be addressed on a permanent basis. However, as the United States perceives the purposes of the sanctions differently, the opposite will undoubtedly occur. The sanctions will be maintained due to the lingering doubts concerning Iraq's honesty in their "full, final and complete" reports.

Another aspect of resolution 687 involved the demarcation of the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait. The Boundary Demarcation Commission completed its final report on 20 May 1993 which clearly established the boundary between the two countries. In July 1992, Iraq refused to participate in the Committee's meetings and disputed their decision regarding the Khawr'Abd Allah (offshore) boundary. Resolution 833 (1993) reaffirmed the Commission's decisions on the demarcation of the boundary which Kuwait then

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<sup>22</sup>For a full list of items destroyed, removed or rendered harmless by UNSCOM, see *The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict*: pp. 95.

accepted. Iraq continued to object to the Commission's decision which they believed was beyond the terms of reference available to the Commission. However, on 10 November 1994, Iraq made a declaration confirming its recognition of Kuwaiti sovereignty and of the boundary between the two countries established by the Boundary Demarcation Commission.<sup>23</sup> This is one aspect of resolution 687 with which Iraq has complied. However, it should be noted that Iraq had previously affirmed the Kuwaiti boundary in a letter dated 21 July 1932. Similarly, in the Agreed Minutes of 1963 Iraq "recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait with its boundaries as specified in the letter of the Prime Minister of Iraq dated 21.7.1932".<sup>24</sup> It should be noted that it was these two documents which provided the Boundary Demarcation Commission with their terms of reference.

~~Several other provisions of Resolution 687 have not been fulfilled. There remains several hundred missing persons and prisoners of war which Iraq has not accounted for. In addition, Kuwait claims that Iraq possesses both military and private property,~~ including official archives,

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<sup>23</sup>Boutros-Ghali, "Introduction": pp. 54.

<sup>24</sup>Document 7063, United Nations, *The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict*: pp. 166.

which have not yet been returned. The United Nations Compensation Commission, which organizes claims for loss, damage or injury resulting from the Gulf War received more than 2.6 million claims with a value exceeding \$160 billion. Iraq must comply with paragraph 19 of resolution 687 which involves arrangements for payments to be made to the Fund.<sup>25</sup> In February 1996, Iraq accepted the oil-for-food deal which involved a payment to the Compensation Fund; however, provisions for further payments must be made. It has been estimated that these claims will take thirty years to pay off if Iraqi oil production was to reach its former level.<sup>26</sup>

Perhaps the most contentious issue, which was briefly discussed earlier, involves human rights abuses. The Special Rapporteur, who was appointed in March 1991, has reported vast human rights abuses including extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions, torture, enforced and voluntary disappearances and arbitrary arrests and detention. The Iraqi government has "terrorized the population into passive submission to the extent that no oppositional opinions, expressions or associations are

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<sup>25</sup>Boutros-Ghali, "Introduction": pp.69-72.

<sup>26</sup>Alan Dowty, "Sanctioning Iraq: The Limits of the New World Order" in *The Washington Quarterly*, (Summer 1994, Vol. 17, No. 3): pp. 186.

apparent in the country."<sup>27</sup> This was evident during the October 1995 election when Saddam Hussein was elected president for a further seven years after obtaining 99.96 per cent of the vote with a voter turnout of 99.47 per cent. Out of 8.4 million voters, only 3,300 Iraqis voted against him.<sup>28</sup> Human rights abuses also encompass episodes such as the Iraqi government's economic blockade of the northern governorates, the forced relocation of the inhabitants of the southern marshes and the military attacks on both the north and the south.<sup>29</sup> In answer to a question regarding human rights advances in Iraq, Tariq Aziz stated:

...we have no lessons to learn in this area. Not from anybody!...I suggest that the holier than thou on the Security Council should pursue their investigations elsewhere.<sup>30</sup>

When taking the "policies and practices" of the Iraqi government into consideration, the pretext of human rights could easily be used to maintain the sanctions in accordance with whatever policy goals the United States chose to pursue, whether it be retribution or subversion. It must

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<sup>27</sup>Boutros-Ghali, "Introduction": pp. 104.

<sup>28</sup>"Iraq: King of a Sad Castle" in *The Economist* (October 21, 1995): pp. 45.

<sup>29</sup>Boutros-Ghali, "Introduction": pp. 106.

<sup>30</sup>FBIS-NES-96-030, "Tariq Aziz on UN Embargo, Human Rights", on Brussels *Le Vif-L'express*, (13 February 1996): pp. 26.

also be noted that the attitude espoused by Tariq Aziz does not imply Iraqi compliance on the issue of human rights.

While the purposes defined by the UN could be perceived by some to be on the edge of being fulfilled, given the position of the United States and their dislike of the practices of the Iraqi government, the sanctions are not likely to be lifted. The unwillingness of the United States to lift the sanctions until their own elusive objectives have been met necessitates an examination of the impact of the sanctions. Since the sanctions are not having the desired effects, the question of the impact remains. If the damage caused by the sanctions is greater than their positive achievements, the purposes of the sanctions must be reexamined. It will be argued that the impact far outweighs the potential benefits of maintaining the sanctions, particularly in light of the differing purposes of the United Nations and the United States.

**CHAPTER 3:**  
**THE IMPACT OF THE SANCTIONS ON IRAQ:**  
**THE ECONOMY AND THE INFRASTRUCTURE**

The economic sanctions imposed on Iraq have had a devastating effect on the Iraqi economy. Employment, economic activity, and public services have all been adversely affected by these measures. This chapter will examine the impact on the overall economy, and the impact on the infrastructure in the context of the Gulf War. An examination of the Iraqi economy prior to the imposition of the sanctions will provide a point of comparison for the impact of the sanctions regime on the Iraqi economy. The effects of the sanctions regime will then be discussed in the context of larger indicators of the Iraqi economy, such as GDP, the exchange rate, inflation, and purchasing power. Following this, I will examine the effects of the Gulf War on the Iraqi infrastructure, including the water system, the sewage treatment system and the health facilities. It will become evident that the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq have served to halt repairs to essential services damaged by the Gulf War, and to devastate the economy to levels

comparable to those in Iraq before the oil boom.

### A Brief History of the Iraqi Economy

As a result of inadequate transportation, communications and marketing facilities, in addition to their isolated market, Iraq traded a very limited number of commodities until 1950. However, after World War II, Iraq gained access to larger markets and, due to the increase in crude petroleum production, also increased the value of their trade from US\$856 million in 1960 to US\$22,275 million in 1989 which was the equivalent of a 2,500 per cent increase. The resulting improvement of the balance of payments provided the economy with foreign exchange thereby enabling it to pay for imports including capital goods and raw materials. Iraq's ability to develop economically was directly linked to the ability of the oil exports to supply adequate financial resources. ~~The government's ability to function adequately depends almost entirely upon oil revenues,~~ as the majority of the investments are made by the public sector, which is funded primarily by the oil revenues.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Amer Al-Roubaie & Wajeih Elali, "The Financial Implications of Economic Sanctions Against Iraq" in *Arab Studies Quarterly*, (Vol. 17, No. 3, Summer 1995): pp. 54 & 55.

The average annual growth rate in gross domestic product (GDP) between 1965-1973 was 4.4 per cent; this rose to 10.5 per cent until the beginning the war with Iran during which time the growth rate declined as austerity was introduced. During the latter half of the 1980s, the growth rate was erratic as oil output fluctuated and the oil price recovered. The following table illustrates these trends in the late 1980s:

TABLE 1:

TRENDS IN GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT						
GDP	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
GDP at current market prices (\$bn)	50.0	49.4	59.9	57.4	66.2	35.0
Nominal GDP growth	3.9	-1.1	20.5	-3.7	15.4	5.0

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Profile, Iraq, 1995-96*.

It should be noted that the GDP for 1989 was an estimate made by the EIU, as was the GDP for 1990. In addition, the GDP for 1990 was estimated from January to June, as opposed to the full year.

Another useful indicator of the vulnerability of the Iraqi economy involves the dependence on oil. Manufacturing in Iraq produces consumer products used in other sectors. The industrial sector remains a small part of the country's total economy and is dependent on foreign markets. This low productivity means that import substitutions may not be

capable of absorbing the impact of the boycotts.<sup>2</sup> The following table indicates the origins of GDP.

TABLE 2:

ESTIMATES OF MAIN ORIGINS OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT				
(%)	1976	1980	1988	1989
Oil	59.6	63.0	60.5	61.3
Agriculture	8.4	7.0	6.3	5.1
Industry	7.8	5.0	10.4	11.6
Services	24.2	25.0	22.9	22.0

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Profile, Iraq, 1995-96*.

### The Nature of the Sanctions on Iraq

The United Nations has maintained trade sanctions which prohibit the majority of Iraqi imports and exports, including the export of oil, which represents 90 per cent of Iraq's exports<sup>3</sup> and accounts for 90 per cent of its foreign earnings.<sup>4</sup> In addition to the United Nations' prohibition

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<sup>2</sup>Al-Roubaie & Elali, "The Financial Implications of Economic Sanctions Against Iraq": pp. 57-58.

<sup>3</sup>Although according to Al-Roubaie & Elali, it accounts for 95 per cent of Iraq's exports. (pp. 54)

<sup>4</sup>Jean Dreze & Haris Gazdar, "Income and Economic Survey" in International Study Team, *Health and Welfare in Iraq After the Gulf Crisis: An In Depth Assessment*, (World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), and the London School of Economics, October, 1991): pp. 3 and see Maggie Grey, "UN Sanctions against Iraq", in *Current*

of the export of Iraqi oil, ~~the UN froze both Kuwait's and Iraq's assets~~. The United States played an instrumental role in this process; ~~\$5 billion in assets were frozen, \$1.2 billion of which were in the United States~~. The US had three main objectives in freezing Kuwait's assets: to prevent the Iraqi government from obtaining access to \$200 billion of Kuwaiti assets; to maintain control over the assets for the future use of Kuwaiti rulers; and to use the assets to finance the war against Iraq. There were similar objectives with respect to freezing Iraq's assets: to increase pressure on the Iraqi government as part of the trade sanctions and embargoes already in place against Iraq; and to ensure reparations and compensation for US claims against Iraq. It should be noted that the ~~blocked assets included all future petrodollar revenues of Iraq and that the freezing of their assets essentially "brought the international financial transactions of the country to a standstill"~~.<sup>5</sup>

~~The Iraqi economy was highly vulnerable to the sanctions regime imposed by the United Nations. The Gulf War served to intensify this vulnerability to the extent~~

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*Affairs Bulletin* (May, 1994): pp. 11.

<sup>5</sup>Mahvash, Alerassool, *Freezing Assets: The USA and the Most Effective Economic Sanction*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993): pp. 172 & 173.

that the potential for recovery even without the imposition of the sanctions was negligible. A study conducted by the Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management in March, 1991, concluded that:

most means of modern life support have been destroyed or rendered tenuous. Iraq has, for some time to come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age, but with all the disabilities of post-industrial dependency on an intensive use of energy and technology.<sup>6</sup>

### Gross-Domestic Product

One commonly cited indicator of an economy is the gross domestic product (GDP). The following table shows Alnasrawi's calculation of Iraq's GDP from 1970 to 1991 in an effort to demonstrate the loss of income experienced by Iraq. It must be noted that the GDP for 1990 was estimated by subtracting \$17 billion, which represents losses of 26.4 per cent in output claimed by the Iraqi government as a result of the sanctions, from the 1989 GDP. The 1991 GDP was estimated by deducting the loss in oil revenue estimated at \$20 billion (42.1 per cent of GDP in 1990).<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>Marti Ahtisaari, "Report on humanitarian needs in Iraq in the immediate post-crisis environment by a mission to the area" in *The United Nations, The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996*, (New York: United Nations, 1996): pp. 187.

<sup>7</sup>Abbas Alnasrawi, "Economic Devastation, Underdevelopment and Outlook" in Fran Hazelton, *Iraq Since*

TABLE 3:

IRAQ'S POPULATION, LABOUR-FORCE AND GROSS-DOMESTIC PRODUCT 1970-1991			
Year	Population (millions)	Labour-Force (millions)	GDP Market Prices (\$ billion)
1970	9.4	2.4	3.6
1975	11.1	2,8	13.2
1976	11.5	2.9	16.4
1977	12.0	3.0	19.2
1978	12.4	3.1	23.1
1979	12.8	3.2	38.2
1980	13.2	3.2	51.0
1981	13.6	3.3	35.0
1982	14.1	3.8	40.6
1983	14,8	4.0	42.5
1984	15.4	4.1	47.6
1985	15.9	4.2	49.5
1986	16.5	4.4	47.9
1987	17.0	4.5	57.6
1988	17.6	4.7	55.9
1989	18.1	4.9	64.5
1990	18.6	5.0	47.5
1991	19.2	5.1	27.5

Source: Abbas Alnasrawi, "Economic Devastation, Underdevelopment and Outlook": pp. 87.

*the Gulf War: Prospects for Democracy*, (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1994): pp. 87.

Table 3 clearly demonstrates the increase in GDP from 1970 to 1989 and the steep decrease subsequent to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the economic sanctions imposed immediately following this event. It should also be noted that the decline would in fact be much steeper as the value of non-oil GDP was not considered. It becomes evident that the estimates for such figures are just that: estimates. However, it is necessary to examine such figures as, in this case, they represent the highest possible estimate of GDP. This gives a clear indication of the deleterious effects of the sanctions on Iraq's GDP, given that the highest possible estimate of GDP decreased by more than half from 1989 to 1991. The Economist Intelligence Unit estimated that Iraq's GDP dropped by 75 per cent by 1991, and that as of 1996, Iraq's GDP equalled that in the 1940s, prior to the oil boom.<sup>8</sup> A study conducted by the Centre for Economic and Social Rights in May, 1996 found that sanctions had caused Iraq's economy to shrink to less than ten per cent of its GDP prior to the Gulf Crisis.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>The Economist Intelligence Unit, *EIU Country Profile of Iraq 1995-96*: pp. 13.

<sup>9</sup>Center for Economic and Social Rights, *Unsanctioned Suffering: A Human Rights Assessment of United Nations Sanctions on Iraq*, (New York: May, 1996): pp. 17.

## The Iraqi Exchange Rate

In an attempt to continue to finance government expenditures, the Iraqi government simply printed sufficient money to cover this amount. As a result, Iraq has experienced extremely high inflation, which has in turn resulted in the dramatic increase in the exchange rate of the US dollar to the Iraqi dinar. In August 1990, the exchange rate was one dinar to three US dollars. The World Health Organization indicated that as of December, 1995, one US dollar bought 3,000 Iraqi dinars. This value rose following the food-for-oil deal to the rate of 500 dinars per US\$1.<sup>10</sup> It must be noted that an FAO report in November 1993 indicated that the average unofficial exchange rate was 260 times higher than the official one.<sup>11</sup> The exchange rate also fluctuates dramatically from day to day. During the ten day stay of a study team from the Centre for Economic and Social Rights, the exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar fluctuated between 700 and 1200 dinars to the US dollar.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>The World Health Organization, *The Health Conditions of the Population in Iraq Since the Gulf Crisis*, (March 1996): pp. 2.

<sup>11</sup>Food and Agriculture Organization, *Nutritional Status Assessment Mission to Iraq*, (November, 1993): pp. 5.

<sup>12</sup>Centre for Economic and Social Rights, *Unsanctioned Suffering*: pp. 17.

It is evident that the exchange rate has in fact increased by astronomical proportions which clearly affected the purchasing power of the Iraqi citizens. This will be discussed in further detail below.

It is interesting to compare the exchange rates reported by international missions with the exchange rates reported by the Iraqi government. For example, a report by Baghdad Iraq Television Network in February 1996 asserted that the exchange rate had soared to 2.66 million dinars per US dollar by December 1995.<sup>13</sup> It is clear from such huge discrepancies that the Iraqi government is intent upon portraying the worst possible scenario to those observing the effects of sanctions in order to make their pleas for the lifting of the sanctions more acceptable. It is also evident that they wish to portray themselves as the party responsible for their country's perceived upturns. This was clearly demonstrated by the same television broadcast which stated that the rise in the exchange rate, which in fact resulted from the impending food-for-oil deal:

shows that the real recovery of the Iraqi dinar confirms the sound course charted by the message which leader President Saddam, may God preserve and protect, addressed to the cabinet to tackle inflation. It also reflects the sound bases on which the Iraqi economy is

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<sup>13</sup>FBIS-NES-96-030, "Iraq: Review of Dollar-Dinar Exchange Rate", *Baghdad Iraq Television Network*, (9 February 1996): pp. 30.

founded.<sup>14</sup>

### Inflation and Purchasing Power

In addition to the issues discussed above, further damage to the Iraqi economy has resulted from such government policies as the calling in of 25 dinar notes in May of 1993 in combination with a one-week closing of the country's borders. This was necessary because the exchange rate for Iraqi dinars was being driven up as a result of speculation by neighbouring countries, but in the process 12 billion dinars in 25-dinar notes lost their value. Inflation was being measured in thousands of per cent (as much as 5,000<sup>15</sup>) and industry was operating at only 10-15 per cent of its capacity due to the shortage of imported replacement parts and raw materials. As a result of the shortages of electrical power which will be discussed below, industrial unemployment was estimated at more than 70 per cent in 1993.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid: pp. 30.

<sup>15</sup>Eric Rouleau, "America's Unyielding Policy toward Iraq" in *Foreign Affairs*, (Vol. 74, Jan/Feb., 1995): pp. 65.

<sup>16</sup>Victor Kocher, "The Sanctions Against Iraq" in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, (August, 1993): pp. 14.

As a result of the sanctions regime, there were severe ramifications for the incomes of the Iraqi citizens. From August, 1990 to August, 1991, employment and monthly earnings changed relatively little; however, during the same period, consumer prices rose substantially. The food price index increased approximately 2,000-fold during this time. This led to a virtual collapse of real earnings in the secondary, tertiary and informal sectors. Essentially, purchasing power dropped to between five and seven per cent of the pre-Gulf War levels.<sup>17</sup> The effects of such price increases on the Iraqi population will be described in the following chapter in an attempt to determine the consequences on their health and welfare. The price increases can be seen in Table 4:

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<sup>17</sup>Jean Dreze & Haris Gazdar, "Income and Economic Survey" in International Study Team, *Health and Welfare in Iraq After the Gulf Crisis: An In Depth Assessment*: pp. 11 & 12.

TABLE 4:

FOOD PRICE INCREASES IN IRAQ SINCE SANCTIONS BEGAN			
Food Item	Price per unit (Iraqi dinars) Aug. 1990	Price per unit (Iraqi dinars) Aug. 1991	Percentage increase over one year
Wheat-flour	0.05	2.42	4,531%
Milk (Powdered)	0.75	27.33	3,661%
Bread (per piece)	0.01	0.33	2,857%
Baby milk (tin of 450g)	0.45	10.00	2,222%
Sugar	0.20	4.42	2,208%
Cooking oil	0.48	10.33	2,138%
Rice	0.23	4.08	1,801%
Tea	1.70	23.67	1,392%
Tomato	0.27	1.25	469%
Chick-peas	0.65	2.92	449%
Potatoes	0.45	1.92	426%
Eggs (carton of 30)	3.83	12.50	350%
Onions	0.37	1.25	341%
Dates	0.52	1.75	339%
Meat (lamb)	7.00	16.33	233%
Meat (beef)	6.83	16.90	247%

Source: Dreze & Gazdar, "Income & Economic Survey" in International Study Team, *Health and Welfare in Iraq After the Gulf Crisis*: pp. 37.

#### The Availability of Food and Health Care

As a result of the sanctions regime, the domestic economy suffered a tremendous blow. As discussed earlier, Iraq was

heavily dependent on imports prior to the Gulf War. The oil export earnings, which had amounted to approximately \$15 billion annually, virtually disappeared as a result of the sanctions. Iraq earned approximately \$600 million a year through exports of oil to Jordan, which have been approved by the Security Council, and from smuggling to Turkey and Iran.<sup>18</sup> The remaining expenditures made by the regime were covered by unspecified private reserves. It was estimated that between \$1.2 and \$1.5 billion were spent on imports of basic foodstuffs until mid-1993.<sup>19</sup> Against the most recent estimate of GNP, which was at \$3 billion,<sup>20</sup> it is evident that this is a priority of the Iraqi government. Another indication of this priority was evident in a broadcast by the Baghdad Iraq Television Network which stated the the Trade Ministry was offering large quantities of foodstuffs, such as lard, rice, tea, building materials, spare car parts, and electrical home appliances. The broadcast indicated that the citizens:

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<sup>18</sup>However, there are estimates that Iraq was able to smuggle as much as \$700-\$800 million as of February, 1995 through Turkey and Iran in "Iraq said to sell oil in secret plan to skirt UN ban", *New York Times*, (February 16, 1995).

<sup>19</sup>Kocher, "The Sanctions Against Iraq": pp. 13.

<sup>20</sup>Centre for Economic and Social Rights, *Unsanctioned Suffering*: pp. 17.

had largely stopped buying these items. They are now buying as much as they need, but not in large amounts, because they are available all the time...In addition, there has been a large drop in prices, and citizens are confident of the state's ability to provide food supplies and other necessary items at reduced prices.<sup>21</sup>

It is evident that the government is concerned with the appearance of being capable of providing for the Iraqi population.

In 1991, the International Study Team clearly indicated that the food rationing system was highly effective; a study by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) in 1995 found that the system remained effective in its goal of reaching the majority of the population.<sup>22</sup> The effectiveness of this system does fluctuate. During the time of the Gulf War, the rations supplied one third of the recommended energy intake, they supplied up to 70 per cent following the war and were decreased to only 40 per cent in 1994 as the Iraqi's purchasing power deteriorated.<sup>23</sup>

The following table clearly illustrates the

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<sup>21</sup>FBIS-NES-96-030, "Iraqi Trade Ministry Continues to Offer Supplies at Low Prices", *Baghdad Iraq Television Network*, (2 February 1996): pp. 18.

<sup>22</sup>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Technical Cooperation Programme: Evaluation of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq*, (September, 1995): pp. 9.

<sup>23</sup>Omar A. Obeid, Abdul-Hussein Al-Hadi, Letter to the editor in *The Lancet*, (Vol. 347, January 20, 1996): pp. 199.

deterioration of the factors influencing the health of the Iraqi population which have been discussed above. This study was conducted in Baghdad where the conditions are likely to be better than in the rest of the country as the majority of the reconstruction funds have been spent in the capital.

**TABLE 5:**  
**CHANGES AFFECTING HEALTH OF IRAQI POPULATION**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>Increase in:*</b>							
Food prices:	Baseline	10	20	30	50	250	1000
Wages:	Baseline	None	None	2	10	50	100
Currency devaluation:*	Baseline	3	5	30	60	600	3000
<b>Availability of:</b>							
Health services:	High	High	Low	Med	Med	Low	Low
Clean water:	High	High	None	Med	Med	Med	Low
Sewage disposal:	High	High	None	Low	Med	Med	Med

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- 1: Pre-sanctions
  - 2: Sanction to war
  - 3: War and civil unrest
  - 4: One year after the war
  - 5: Two years after the war
  - 6: Three years after the war
  - 7: Four years after the war

\* Numbers are multiples (fold).  
Source: Abbreviated version of the table in Obeid & Al-Hadi, *The Lancet*, Jan. 20, 1996: pp. 199.

Although this is perhaps not indicative of the country on the whole, it gives an impression of the deterioration of the economy. Table 5 also illustrates the problem discussed earlier with respect to the effects of the exchange rate on

the purchasing power. According to these figures, the Iraqi currency had been devalued 3000-fold by March/April, 1995, whereas food prices had increased 1000-fold and wages rose only 100-fold.

### The Infrastructure: The Medical System

It is evident that the economy has suffered as a result of the sanctions regime; however, the infrastructure has also been damaged. Perhaps one of the most important areas of modern life which was affected by the Gulf War was the medical system. Before the Gulf War, there were 131 hospitals and 851 community health centres which provided health care for more than 90 per cent of the Iraqi population. Many of these facilities were damaged either during the Gulf War or in the civil uprisings which ensued. A report by the Harvard Study Team conducted shortly after the Gulf War documented various cities, such as Erbil, in which only five of 42 community health centres were functioning and in Basrah, only five of 19. In addition to the low numbers of health facilities left open there was also a significant increase in the influx of patients. One facility in Basrah which previously served 40,000 people served approximately 150,000 as of May 1991. Of the hospitals surveyed by the study team, 69% had inadequate

sanitation due to damage incurred by the water purification and sewage treatment plants which will be discussed below. The loss of electrical power also resulted in the depletion of heat-sensitive vaccines and medicines which require refrigeration.<sup>24</sup>

Following the Gulf Crisis, there were severe shortages of both medicines and staff. In the Erbil Pediatric Hospital, one month's supply of medicine had to be stretched over four months and this same hospital was short by two-thirds of its doctors and one-half of its nurses.<sup>25</sup> Many of the qualified staff left the hospital system to work privately or had taken jobs which earned higher incomes than, for example, the doctors who made only 3,000 dinars, or US\$5 per month. Those doctors and nurses who remained complained of working in conditions reminiscent of Iraqi medical practice 50 years ago.<sup>26</sup>

Before the implementation of sanctions, \$360 million worth of drugs were imported annually. In 1996, under the

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<sup>24</sup>Harvard Study Team, *Public Health in Iraq after the Gulf War*, (Boston, MA: Harvard University, May, 1991): pp. 17-19.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid: pp. 14-15.

<sup>26</sup>Centre for Economic and Social Rights, *Unsanctioned Suffering*: pp. 23.

Jordan Protocol<sup>27</sup>, the Iraqi government was permitted by the Security Council to spend \$13 million on drugs which had 50 per cent of their content manufactured in Jordan. Only \$20 million were donated by international agencies thereby leaving a substantial shortage of pharmaceuticals. The UN had included certain drugs on the list of sanctioned goods, including the cytotoxic drug Mustine, since it contained mustard which could potentially be of military value in the manufacturing of mustard gas.<sup>28</sup> In a report prepared for the United Nations in July, 1991, Sadruddin Aga Khan reported that unless a mechanism was established whereby the Iraqi government was able to procure its own medical supplies, the health of the population would deteriorate significantly.<sup>29</sup> The deleterious effects of the shortages in supplies, and insufficient pharmaceuticals and equipment on the Iraqi population will be addressed in the following chapter.

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<sup>27</sup>The Jordan Protocol was a bilateral agreement between Iraq and Jordan which was approved by the Sanctions Committee allowing Iraq to import the drugs described above. CESR, *Unsanctioned Suffering*: pp. 23.

<sup>28</sup>Centre for Economic and Social Rights, *Unsanctioned Suffering*: pp. 23.

<sup>29</sup>Sadruddin Aga Khan, "Report to the Secretary-General on humanitarian needs in Iraq" in The United Nations, *The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict*: pp. 274.

## The Electrical System

Not only were medical facilities damaged by the war, but the majority of electrical power plants were also destroyed. By the end of the war, only two of the country's 20 power stations, which generated less than four per cent of Iraq's pre-war output were operating. The electrical plants played a vital role in water purification; both the purification and distribution system came to a virtual standstill due to the destruction of the electrical power plants.<sup>30</sup> Several of the damaged generating facilities were destroyed beyond repair and needed to be rebuilt; others could be repaired only by using parts of the power plants destroyed by the war as sanctions prevented the import of spare parts.<sup>31</sup>

In February 1996, the Ministry of Industry and Minerals succeeded for the first time in Iraq in expanding an electricity power transformers factory. The spokesman for the Ministry stated that the success of the project was dependent on Iraqi capabilities and local resources, and that the transformers were very much in demand, "especially under the conditions of the unjust blockade which was

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<sup>30</sup>Harvard Study Team, *Public Health in Iraq after the Gulf War*: pp. 15 & 17.

<sup>31</sup>Sadruddin Aga Khan, "Report to the Secretary-General on humanitarian needs in Iraq": pp. 274.

imposed on our beloved country."<sup>32</sup> The effects of the absence of electrical power will be discussed in the following chapter.

### Water Treatment Plants

The damage to water-treatment plants and the inability to obtain spare parts resulted in 2.5 million Iraqis being cut off from obtaining pre-war levels of water supply. The 14.5 million who continued to receive water were allowed only one quarter of the pre-war level. As indicated previously, the quality of the water provided was often in question due to the absence of electrical power.<sup>33</sup> As of January, 1993, only 50 per cent of water purification and sewage treatment plants were functioning. According to a study conducted by UNICEF, 35 per cent of drinking water samples were polluted; 40 per cent of these samples were without chlorine.<sup>34</sup> In a similar study conducted by UNICEF in August, 1994, it was found that 40 per cent of the tap water in Basrah had no chlorine and 58 per cent showed bacterial contamination. In

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<sup>32</sup>FBIS-NES-96-030, "Ministry Expands Power Transformer Factory", *Baghdad Al-Qadisiyah*, (13 February 1996): pp. 33.

<sup>33</sup>Sadruddin Aga Khan, "Report to the Secretary-General on humanitarian needs in Iraq": pp. 274.

<sup>34</sup>Victor Kocher, "The Sanctions Against Iraq" : pp. 14.

May 1996, a study conducted by the Centre for Economic and Social Rights observed that water treatment plants had not increased their output capacity and were still functioning at only 50 per cent, which demonstrated no improvement from the results of the International Study Team's research following the Gulf crisis. The estimated budget for the water system in 1996 was \$8 million, which represented 10 per cent of the pre-sanctions budget. The absence of spare parts which were formerly imported from Japan, the UK, the US, Germany, and India, in conjunction with the lack of aluminum sulphate (alum)<sup>35</sup> and chlorine were also serious problems. While Iraq is capable of producing alum, it is of such a poor quality that it not only creates buildup in the settling tanks, but damages equipment at the water plants which, due to sanctions, cannot be replaced. The cleaning process, which took one day when the appropriate pumps were operative, took three weeks when it was done manually. There are only two sources of chlorine for the entire country: UNICEF and one plant in Najaf which supplies a very poor quality of chlorine. Frequently, insufficient quantities of chlorine were used and many plants mixed treated and untreated water to maintain a sufficient water

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<sup>35</sup>Aluminum sulphate (alum) is used to purify polluted drinking water.

flow.<sup>36</sup> The lack of chlorine was particularly serious in terms of the health effects, which will also be examined in the following chapter.

### The Sewage Treatment System

The sewage treatment system, which relied on electrical power, began backing up into homes and onto streets. Sewage flowed untreated into the Tigris, Euphrates and other rivers which thereby polluted the drinking water.<sup>37</sup> Most sewage treatment plants stopped chemical treatment altogether. One half of Baghdad's waste water continued to flow untreated into the Tigris River as of January, 1993. There were similar reports from Basrah where 17,000 of the 27,000 litres which flow from Basrah into the Tigris River are untreated. In Basrah, only 25 of 135 waste water pumps were operating as of January, 1993. This resulted in pools of sewage collecting in parts of the city and its environs. Repairs to such facilities are hindered not only by the inability of the government to import spare parts, but also by the lack of chlorine and aluminum sulphate which are used

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<sup>36</sup>Centre for Economic and Social Rights, *Unsanctioned Suffering*: pp. 25.

<sup>37</sup>Harvard Study Team, *Public Health in Iraq after the Gulf War*: pp. 17-19.

to purify polluted drinking water.<sup>38</sup> As of May, 1996, the distribution network in Basrah stopped functioning and the sewage treatment plants received only a small portion of wastes. As a result of damaged pumping stations, pipes, and suction tankers, none of which could be repaired due to the sanctions, household waste was deposited in ditches along city streets. This situation was mirrored in Kerbala, Janaf, Kut, and Amarah. This creates pools of sewage that flows into people's homes. People must either shovel sand into their homes to absorb the sewage or build stone walkways to move between the rooms of their house.<sup>39</sup> The poor quality of both water treatment and sewage disposal have had severe effects on the health of the Iraqi population which will be examined in the following chapter.

#### Funding from the United Nations

A report prepared for the Secretary-General in July 1991 estimated that Iraq would require approximately \$6.8 billion over the following year to provide essential imports.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>38</sup>Kocher, "The Sanctions Against Iraq": pp. 14.

<sup>39</sup>Centre for Economic and Social Rights, *Unsanctioned Suffering*: pp. 27.

<sup>40</sup>This includes "US\$180 million for water and sanitation, US\$500 million for health services, US\$53

However, instead of approving this annual allocation, the UN, in Security Council Resolution 706, decided to permit Iraq to sell \$1.6 billion of oil subject to several conditions: the money was to be deposited in an escrow account administered by the Secretary General; the oil had to be exported through the pipeline which runs through Turkey, and was to be monitored by the UN. Iraq did not have access to this revenue as 30 per cent, or \$480 million, was to be set aside in the Compensation Fund, and \$186 million was to be set aside to cover the cost of UN agencies' activities in Iraq. The remaining \$934 million was to be used by Iraq, with the approval of the UN, to buy food, medicinal supplies and other essential civilian needs. The payment had to come directly from the escrow account, after it had been approved by the Secretary General.<sup>41</sup> The \$6.8 billion necessary to provide essential imports during the first year following the Gulf War was a far cry from the \$934 million at Iraq's disposal under the food-for-oil deal.

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million for supplemental feeding, US\$1.62 billion for general food imports, US\$300 million for essential agricultural needs, US\$2 billion for the oil sector and US\$2.2 billion for power generation." from Sadruddin Aga Khan, "Report to the Secretary-General on humanitarian needs in Iraq": pp. 275.

<sup>41</sup>Abbas Alnasrawi, "Economic Devastation, Underdevelopment and Outlook" in Fran Hazelton, ed. *Iraq Since the Gulf War: Prospects for Democracy*, (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1994): pp. 85.

It is evident that the sanctions imposed on Iraq have resulted in severe damage to the Iraqi economy. The GDP has decreased to 10 per cent of its pre-Gulf War level, and the exchange rate has decreased to unprecedented levels which serves to substantially decrease the purchasing power, not only of the Iraqi population, but of the Iraqi government. Water treatment plants were operating at 50 per cent of their output capacity and most sewage treatment plants are no longer capable of chemically treating the sewage which is dumped into rivers which provide drinking water. The health system, which was formerly the most efficient in the region, is unable to treat even the simplest of problems and has become the breeding ground for cross-infections. The breakdown in water and sewage treatment have only exacerbated the existing problems in the health system.

★ Economic sanctions are directly responsible for preventing the Iraqi government from recovering from the Gulf War. The devastation brought upon the country during the Gulf War persists. ~~Under the sanctions regime,~~ Iraq has been forced to live in conditions reminiscent of the 1940s, yet this has not visibly persuaded the Iraqi government to comply with the goals outlined by the United Nations.

## CHAPTER 4:

### THE IMPACT OF THE SANCTIONS ON IRAQ: THE PEOPLE

As discussed in the previous chapter, the international economic sanctions imposed on Iraq inflicted considerable damage on the Iraqi economy. However, perhaps even more important in terms of the future of Iraq are the social costs attached to the destruction of Iraq under the sanctions regime. The target of the sanctions imposed on Iraq was Saddam Hussein's regime and the transgressions committed by the Iraqi government; however, it was the Iraqi people who bore the consequences. This chapter will examine the effects of the irreparable Iraqi infrastructure, including the water, sewage and power systems on the health and welfare of the Iraqi population. After discussing the overall problems with health and sanitation, I will address the plight of Iraqi children and the effects of the sanctions on women. It will become evident that the international economic sanctions imposed on Iraq have been highly detrimental to the Iraqi population.

The various studies on the Iraqi infrastructure and the health consequences will be addressed in chronological

order. A study conducted by the Harvard Study Team examined several aspects of public health system following the Gulf Crisis which are of vital importance to an understanding of the health conditions of the population. The problems stemming from the destruction of the infrastructure to the medical system itself will be addressed first. As discussed in the previous chapter, there was severe damage done to the water treatment centres, sewage disposal and electrical power stations. This caused shortages of drinkable water, sewage flowing onto the streets, and insufficient electrical power which only served to aggravate the existing health problems dating from the Iran-Iraq war. However, the most important aspect of these issues involves public health. "Without electricity, water cannot be purified, sewage cannot be treated, water-borne diseases flourish, and hospitals cannot cure treatable illness."<sup>1</sup> Essentially, the irreparable infrastructure exacerbated a variety of conditions which led to public health problems that will be described below.

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<sup>1</sup>Harvard Study Team, *Public Health in Iraq After the Gulf War*, (Boston: Harvard School of Public Health, May, 1991): pp.19 & 20.

## Water-Borne Diseases

The Harvard Study Team found that water-borne diseases such as gastroenteritis, cholera and typhoid increased to astronomical proportions immediately following the Gulf War. The occurrence of gastroenteritis was particularly acute and the percentage of admissions to hospitals and health clinics rose considerably. At the Saddam Central Teaching Hospital for Children in Baghdad, the per cent of admissions suffering from this particular disease was 17.3 per cent in April, 1990 and had increased to 33.9 per cent in a comparable period in 1991. In Erbil Pediatric, Kirkuk Pediatric and Sulamaneiya Pediatric Hospitals, the prevalence of this disease among patients admitted to these facilities was respectively 84 per cent, 78 per cent and 91 per cent during study team visits. Overall, the Study Team was able to establish a fivefold increase in gastroenteritis from April, 1990 to March and April, 1991.<sup>2</sup> The prevalence of gastroenteritis persisted, and in a visit to the Basra Childhood and Maternity Hospital in 1995, two journalists questioned the doctor of a two-year old boy who had just died from the disease. The child's doctor explained that the child's family was unable to feed him properly and was

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid: pp. 8.

similarly unable to purchase the drugs required to cure the disease. The child's doctor stated: "This is sanctions -- this dead young man".<sup>3</sup>

Both cholera and typhoid had also reached epidemic proportions by April and May, 1991. However, several hospitals reported an inability to conduct appropriate laboratory tests to determine the presence of cholera which in turn indicates a shortage of hospital supplies as discussed in the previous chapter. The Study Team believes that it was denied access to one hospital in Baghdad as the government did not wish the team to observe an extremely high number of cholera cases. As a result, the team suspected a high degree of underreporting of cholera by other medical facilities which they had interviewed.<sup>4</sup>

### Medical Facilities

A study conducted by the Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) in 1996 determined that the medical facilities themselves had deteriorated dramatically under the sanctions

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<sup>3</sup>Hugh Livingstone & Kayode Olafimihan, "The UN: new dictators of Iraq" in *Living Marxism* (Issue 76, February, 1995): [http://www.junius.co.uk/LM/LM76/LM76\\_Iraq.html](http://www.junius.co.uk/LM/LM76/LM76_Iraq.html).

<sup>4</sup>Harvard Study Team, "Public Health in Iraq After the Gulf War": pp. 7-10.

regime. The poor sanitary conditions discussed in the previous chapter have resulted in the hospitals becoming breeding grounds for cross-infection whereby patients who are admitted to the hospital for one disease often catch another at the hospital. This cross-infection disproportionately affects children, the elderly and those with chronic illnesses. While many patients seek care from private hospitals, they too have shortages in supplies, equipment, and drugs and are for the most part too expensive for the majority of Iraqis to afford. The Iraqi Ministry of Health estimates that 90,000 excess deaths in public hospitals have occurred annually since the sanctions were first imposed.<sup>5</sup> Children have suffered inordinately from the sanctions regime; this study determined that children with malnutrition occupy half of the beds in the pediatric hospitals visited by the study team.<sup>6</sup> The incidence of marasmus and kwashiorkor in children has prompted the establishment of twenty Nutritional Rehabilitation Centres

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<sup>5</sup>Center for Economic and Social Rights, *Unsanctioned Suffering: A Human Rights Assessment of United Nations Sanctions on Iraq*, (New York: Center for Economic and Social Rights, May, 1996): pp. 20.

<sup>6</sup>Centre for Economic and Social Rights, *Unsanctioned Suffering*: pp. 20.

throughout the country as of March, 1996.<sup>7</sup>

The CESR study team found that the risk of cross-infection was heightened as a result of the unavailability of utility services that had been damaged during the war and not yet repaired. An example of this problem was evident in the Alaweah Hospital for Obstetrics and Gynaecology in Baghdad, where there was insufficient water to wash mothers and their newborns after delivery. Throughout the hospitals surveyed, doctors reported that they were unable to wash their hands due to shortages of water and soap. Examples of the sanitary conditions of the hospitals included blocked drainage outlets, leaky and broken pipes and the smell of garbage and fecal matter which pervaded most of the hospitals. At the Basrah Teaching Hospital, the removal of sewage necessitated the closure of the operating rooms every few days. In addition, hospitals were able to use only water to clean due to the absence of detergents and disinfectants. As hygiene is obviously difficult to maintain under such conditions, flies, mosquitos and other disease-carrying pests infested the hospitals and patients were forced to bring their own mosquito nets to protect

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<sup>7</sup>These were established by UNICEF, and the WFP in collaboration with the Ministry of Health, in CESR report: pp. 20.

themselves from insects.<sup>8</sup>

As a result of the sanctions, there were shortages in such materials as disposable syringes, blood bags, sutures, cotton wool, gauze, dressing, and plaster which necessitated the sharing of such materials, again increasing the risk of cross-infections. The study team observed patients sharing syringes or using the same syringe for 24 hours. In the Kerbala Pediatric Hospital, physicians were observed using a two millilitre syringe, instead of a fifty millilitre syringe to remove fluid from the lungs of a malnourished infant. Patients were forced to bring their own linens; those who could afford to do so must lie on dirty and bloodstained mattresses. Surgical supplies were also in demand. The CESR team witnessed a surgeon attempting to operate with scissors too blunt to cut the patient's skin and forceps which were incapable of holding up the patient's skin. There were similar shortages in oxygen, diagnostic tests and health equipment. The team witnessed the death of a patient from cardiac arrest as the emergency room did not have a functioning cardiac monitor or defibrillator.<sup>9</sup>

As a result of the sanctions, many qualified doctors have left Iraq. Frequently, the doctors who remained in

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid: pp. 20-21.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid: pp. 21-22.

Iraq took other jobs as doctors were paid an average of US\$5 dollars per month.<sup>10</sup> However, it was not only the doctors who fled the country. The total number of Iraqis who had left as of 1995 was estimated as high as four million.<sup>11</sup>

### Malnutrition

Perhaps the most prevalent health problem in Iraq resulting from the sanctions was malnutrition. During the past decade, malnutrition was uncommon in Iraq; however, it became prevalent following the Gulf War, as was indicated by the increasing incidence of marasmus and kwashiorkor cases which resulted from severe malnutrition. Following the Gulf War, the Harvard Study Team interviewed 15 hospitals and seven community health care centres and determined that "The prevalence of acute severe malnutrition was so high as to suggest the real possibility of famine in Iraq if conditions do not substantially change."<sup>12</sup> As a result of the

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid: pp. 23.

<sup>11</sup>Barbara Nimri Aziz, "Hungry State Bleeds Youth and Talent", (Gemini New Service Home Page: News-Scan International Ltd., 1995): [http://www.oneworld.org/textver/gemini/wk48\\_gemini\\_iraq.html](http://www.oneworld.org/textver/gemini/wk48_gemini_iraq.html).

<sup>12</sup>Harvard Study Team, "Public Health in Iraq after the Gulf War": pp. 12.

increased food prices described in the former chapter, the International Study Team determined that while food supply was not a problem, "nutritional deprivation remains endemic" and that as of October 1991 when their study was conducted, "effective sanctions on food remain, due to the crippling effects of general sanctions on economic activity and employment, despite the formal exemption spelt out in Resolution 687".<sup>13</sup> Similarly, the report prepared for the Secretary-General by Sadruddin Aga Khan in July, 1991 found that as a result of the inflated food prices, the nutritional status of children, pregnant and lactating mothers and households headed by women was "particularly alarming".<sup>14</sup> The prolonged economic sanctions imposed on Iraq served to exacerbate the conditions resulting in malnutrition. The inability to repair the infrastructure increased the prevalence of water-borne diseases as the decreased purchasing power of the Iraqi population prevented them from buying sufficient food to prevent malnutrition.

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<sup>13</sup>Jean Dreze & Haris Gazdar, "Income and Economic Survey" in International Study Team, *Health & Welfare in Iraq After the Gulf Crisis: An In-Depth Assessment*, (World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) and the London School of Economics, October, 1991): pp. 37.

<sup>14</sup>Sadruddin Aga Khan, "Report to the Secretary-General on humanitarian needs in Iraq" in *The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996*, (New York: United Nations, 1996): pp. 276.

In September, 1995, the World Food Programme (WFP)  
reported that food shortages were causing "irreparable  
damage to an entire generation of Iraqi children" and that  
the situation in Iraq during the two week assessment was  
comparable to the "worst scenarios" that the Chief Emergency  
Support Officer has seen in twenty four years.<sup>15</sup> The WFP  
reported that more than four million people, or one fifth of  
the Iraqi population, were at "severe nutritional risk".  
Included in this number were 2.4 million children under  
five, approximately 600,000 pregnant/nursing women and  
destitute women heads of household in addition to elderly  
people without anyone on whom they were dependent. The  
pediatric wards which had been examined during their visit  
held "extreme cases of malnutrition hardly ever seen in any  
other chronically food-deficit country".<sup>16</sup> Undernourishment  
and stunting, which indicates an ongoing nutritional deficit  
in children under five was reported to be at 29 per cent.  
They reported that:

More and more people spent their whole day struggling  
to find food for survival. The social fabric of the  
nation was disintegrating, and people had exhausted

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<sup>15</sup>World Food Programme, "World Food Programme Official  
Reports on Nutrition Crisis for Entire Generation of  
Children in Iraq", (Press Release, WFP/1018, 26 September,  
1995).

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

their ability to cope.<sup>17</sup>

### The Effects of Sanctions on Children

The effects of the sanctions on children have been particularly dramatic, as is indicated in several of the studies above. It is interesting to note that prior to the Gulf War, Iraqi children did not suffer from malnutrition. In fact, "calorie availability was 120 percent of actual requirement, nutritional deficiencies were at very low levels, while clinical disorders due to excessive and unbalanced consumption of foods were increasingly encountered."<sup>18</sup> In terms of nutritional deprivation, in late 1991, only 3.4 per cent of children under the age of five exhibited signs of wasting<sup>19</sup>, whereas, in a study conducted in 1995, the wasting rate had more than tripled to 12 per cent among the children in Baghdad.<sup>20</sup> The report by the World Health Organization also reported that nutritional

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> The World Health Organization, *The Health Conditions of the Population in Iraq Since the Gulf Crisis*, (March, 1996): pp. 2.

<sup>19</sup> Defined as emaciation requiring urgent care.

<sup>20</sup> Centre for Social and Economic Rights, *Unsanctioned Suffering*: pp. 9.

disease had all but disappeared in Iraq prior to the Gulf Crisis; however, as indicated previously, the incidence of marasmus and kwashiorkor cases, both of which result from starvation, has increased, as have nutritional anemia and deficiencies in the intake of vitamin A, iodine, and calcium.<sup>21</sup>

In a study conducted between August 25 and September 5, 1991, it was determined that infant and child mortality increased more than threefold from January through August, 1991 in comparison with the rates from the previous six years. This number represents approximately 46,900 Iraqi children under the age of five,<sup>22</sup> which is in keeping with the prediction made by the Harvard Study Team in May, 1991.<sup>23</sup> However, for obvious reasons, these deaths cannot be attributed solely to the economic sanctions, rather to the combined effects of the Gulf War, the civilian uprising and the economic sanctions. Table 6 indicates the nutritional status of Iraqi children immediately following

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<sup>21</sup>The World Health Organization, *The Health Conditions of the Population in Iraq Since the Gulf Crisis*: pp. 6.

<sup>22</sup>Alberto Ascherio et al., "The Gulf War and Pediatric Mortality in Iraq" in *The New England Journal of Medicine* (Vol. 327, No. 13, Sept. 24, 1992): pp. 933-934.

<sup>23</sup>The Harvard Study Team (pp. 12) predicted that approximately 170,000 children would die in the year following their study as a result of the delayed effects of the Gulf Crisis.

the Gulf War. There are three indicators which reflect the continuum between long-term and short-term nutritional intake. Stunting, which measures height-for-age, and as indicated previously, indicates ongoing malnutrition, would in this case predate the Gulf Crisis for those children over two years of age. Wasting, which is measured by weight-for-height, is an indicator for acute malnutrition which reflects recent changes in food intake. The final indicator measures children who are underweight, which is assessed by measuring weight-for-age. This indicates ongoing malnutrition which could be caused by reduced food intake and higher incidence of infectious diseases associated with the Gulf Crisis.

**TABLE 6:**

<b>NUTRITIONAL STATUS OF CHILDREN UNDER FIVE (1991)</b>			
<b>Age (years)</b>	<b>Stunting (Height for age)</b>	<b>Underweight (Weight for age)</b>	<b>Wasting (Weight for Height)</b>
3-11 Months	12.9%	10.8%	4.1%
1-2 Months	34.0%	20.9%	5.3%
2-3	22.2%	14.8%	2.8%
3-4	28.8%	12.9%	2.5%
4-5	23.9%	10.2%	2.8%
Total	24.7%	14.2%	3.6%

Source: Robert Chase & Tim Cote et al., "Child Mortality and Nutrition Survey: A Public Health Study" in International Study Team, Health and Welfare in Iraq After the Gulf Crisis: Section 5.3.

The height-for-age component indicates that there was ongoing malnutrition resulting primarily from the Iran-Iraq war. Wasting which indicates extreme food deficit, had reached a total of 3.6 per cent of Iraqi children; however, the majority of severely malnourished children would have died previous to the survey. Among the two youngest age groups, the incidence of malnutrition is almost twice as high as the older children. It is particularly noteworthy that the prevalence of underweight children between the ages of one and two is higher than in the other categories. It is these children who lived most of their "post-weaned" life under both the sanctions and the Gulf War.<sup>24</sup>

As a result of their special dietary needs, children under the age of one suffer the most when there is insufficient food. For a variety of reasons, Iraqi women breast-feed for a short period before introducing the infants to formula. However, infant milk formula was one foodstuff which was prohibited by the sanctions,<sup>25</sup> When the International Study Team conducted their study in 1991, the

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<sup>24</sup>Robert Chase & Tim Cote et al., "Child Mortality and Nutrition Survey: A Public Health Study" in International Study Team, *Health and Welfare in Iraq After the Gulf Crisis*: Section 5.3.

<sup>25</sup>Louise Cainkar, "The Gulf War, Sanctions and the Lives of Iraqi Women" in *Arab Studies Quarterly*, (Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring, 1993): pp. 27.

cost of infant formula had increased between 2,000 and 3,000 per cent since the imposition of sanctions.<sup>26</sup>

As a result of such increases, women used either milk powder or rice and water, both of which resulted in sickness.

Those who tried to breast feed were frequently unable to do so due to stress and anxiety.<sup>27</sup>

In a study conducted by Sarah Zaidi and Mary Smith Fawzi in August 1995 on the nutritional status and mortality of children under the age of five in Baghdad, they were able to conclude that there was a "strong association between economic sanctions and increase in child mortality and malnutrition rates."<sup>28</sup> This study compared infant and child mortality rates before the beginning of sanctions with mortality rates after sanctions. They found a two-fold increase in infant mortality and a five-fold increase in under-five child mortality which corresponded with a two-fold increase in stunting and a four-fold increase in wasting between August 1991 and August 1995. Table 7

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<sup>26</sup>International Study Team, "Health and Welfare in Iraq after the Gulf Crisis": <http://www.web.aic.org/~pgs/pages/chpgulf91.html>.

<sup>27</sup>Cainkar, "The Gulf War, Sanctions and the Lives of Iraqi Women": pp. 27.

<sup>28</sup>Sarah Zaidi, Mary C. Smith Fawzi, "Health of Baghdad's children" in *The Lancet* (Vol.346, December 2, 1995): pp. 1485.

indicates the percentage of children experiencing stunting, wasting and those who were underweight. The figures for 1991 were obtained from the study by the International Study Team, and those for 1995 come from a random selection of 25 clusters/ neighbourhoods in Baghdad. This study estimated that since August 1990, 567,000 children in Iraq have died as a consequence of economic sanctions. While some have questioned this figure<sup>29</sup>, there can be little doubt that children have died as a result of the UN sanctions.

TABLE 7:

CHANGE IN NUTRITIONAL STATUS OF CHILDREN UNDER FIVE (1995)		
Anthropometric Indicator	1991	1995
Stunting	12%	28%
Underweight	7%	29%
Wasting	3%	12%

Source: Sarah Zaidi, Mary C. Smith Fawzi, "Health of Baghdad's children" in *The Lancet* (Vol.346, December 2, 1995): pp. 1485.

The physical health of the Iraqi children is not the only indication of the effects of the Gulf Crisis and the ensuing economic sanctions. The International Study Team conducted an assessment of the psychological impact of the

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<sup>29</sup>See Milton Leitenberg's letter to the editor in *The Lancet*, (Vol. 347, January 20, 1996): pp. 199 and James Ruben, "Iraq Sanctions" on *Sunday Morning, CBC*, 23 June 1996.

Gulf Crisis on Iraqi children. The authors interviewed parents and caregivers as well as their children.

The authors of this report clearly got the feeling that it is the sanctions much more than the war itself that create aggression, feelings of revenge, and negative anti-American attitudes in the population.<sup>30</sup>

It is interesting to note that these feelings were prevalent as early as October 1991.

### The Effects of the Sanctions on Women

While many studies focus on the effects of the sanctions on children, the effects on women have also been highly detrimental and deserve further examination.<sup>31</sup> The United Nations did attempt to address the plight of women and children with resolution 666 which advocated the constant review of the situation regarding foodstuffs in Iraq and Kuwait with specific reference to "persons who might suffer specially, such as children under 15 years of age, expectant

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<sup>30</sup>Atle Dyregrov & Magne Raundalen, "Child Psychology Study: The Impact of the Gulf Crisis on Children in Iraq" in International Study Team, *Health and Welfare in Iraq After the Gulf Crisis*: Section 3.5.4.

<sup>31</sup>This aspect is further explored in Kim R. Nossal, Lori Buck, & Nicole Gallant, "The gendered effects of international sanctions" paper to the British International Studies Association, Durham, England, 17 December 1996.

mothers, maternity cases, the sick and the elderly"<sup>32</sup>. However, this consideration has had few positive results on their health and welfare. The poor health of the Iraqi children has particular relevance when considering the effects of sanctions on women. Iraqi women are responsible for health and sanitation within their families; it is their responsibility to care for sick children, to do all of the "dirty work" in the household and to acquire water.<sup>33</sup> The additional responsibilities resulting from illness, water-borne diseases and insufficient food add to the duties of the women within each household. When asked in 1991 whether such duties had increased since the crisis, 80 per cent of the women interviewed indicated that this was the case. Seventy-four per cent of these women also indicated that it was only natural that the additional responsibilities fall to the women within the household.<sup>34</sup>

While married women found themselves unable to fulfil their roles in the household, unmarried women had difficulty fulfilling the traditional expectations of marriage. There

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<sup>32</sup>S/RES/666, 13 September 1990, in *The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict*: pp. 173.

<sup>33</sup>Bela Bhatia, Mary Kavar & Mariam Shahin, "Women's Survey: The Impact of the Gulf Crisis on the Women in Iraq", in *Health and Welfare in Iraq After the Gulf Crisis*: pp. 10.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid: pp. 10.

are very few women who remain unmarried in Arab society. In fact, "most girls feel that marriage is the most important aim in life". This results from the process of socialization in which marriage is a reward for honourable behaviour. Divorcees, widows and spinsters all occupy a lower social strata than a married woman.<sup>35</sup> Under the sanctions imposed on Iraq, the opportunity to marry has decreased for several reasons. Men are incapable of providing the traditional gold jewellery as a dowry, due to the necessity of selling their valuables in order to feed themselves. Women are unwilling to forego this tradition as the mothers are concerned about their daughters' good standing among their inlaws.<sup>36</sup> In addition to the inability to behave according to traditional notions of honour, the concept of shame, which is equally important in Iraqi society, is being compromised in order to feed families. Mothers, widows and unmarried daughters are all affected by their inability to fulfil their traditional roles and are turning to activities such as begging on street corners. In more extreme cases women are resorting to prostitution in

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<sup>35</sup>Sana al-Khayyat, *Honour and Shame: Women in Modern Iraq*, (London: Saqi Books, 1990): pp. 57 & 186.

<sup>36</sup>Bhatia et al., "Women's Survey": pp. 17.

order to feed themselves and their families.<sup>37</sup>

Previously there were several methods for a single woman to earn an income. These included activities such as selling vegetables, sewing clothes and baking bread. Baker's licences were given to the destitute as a way for them to earn an income. One widow who acquired a baker's licence four years before the Gulf War baked bread for sandwiches. Prior to the war, she used between ten and twelve 85 kilogram bags of wheat flour which cost two dinars and 750 fils per bag. After the Gulf War, one kilogram cost two dinars. Just as wheat flour was no longer accessible, there were no clothes to sew and no demand for vegetables which became too expensive as a result of the sanctions.<sup>38</sup> Because of their inability to earn an income, many women were forced to sell their jewellery and other assets thereby releasing their only form of financial security.<sup>39</sup>

As women, particularly single women, were much less capable of earning an income, they were similarly incapable

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<sup>37</sup>Ibid: pp. 7; Paul W. Roberts, "Easing the suffering, but not the conscience: Why Punish Saddam's Children because you can't catch Saddam?" in *The Toronto Star*, (Sunday, June 2, 1996): pp. F5.

<sup>38</sup>Bhatia et al., "Women's Study": pp. 5 & 6.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid: pp. 1.

of providing sufficient food for their children. While government rations provide enough food to feed an average family for 15 days of each month, the remainder of the month is the responsibility of the individual or family. However, food prices spiralled by over 650 per cent in 1994 alone. At this time, the monthly salary of a civil servant was approximately 3,000 dinars. This was sufficient to feed the average family for approximately one week to 10 days. Food prices ranged from 1250 dinars for 30 eggs, to 1500 dinars for one kilogram of meat.<sup>40</sup> When prioritizing who was to be fed, women elected to feed children first, and feed themselves, including those who were pregnant, last.<sup>41</sup> This type of prioritizing led to conflict among family members; however, conflict was caused by a variety of factors. One woman stated:

Every woman I know in this town fights with her husband or son on a daily basis. They have no work and they are in the way. When they go out of the house they spend the little money that they have on coffee, tea or some beer, so that's not the solution either. Our men need jobs and we need a break.<sup>42</sup>

It becomes evident that women bore an increased burden

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<sup>40</sup>Livingstone & Olafimihan, "The UN: new dictators of Iraq": [http://www.junius.co.uk/LM/LM76/LM76\\_Iraq.html](http://www.junius.co.uk/LM/LM76/LM76_Iraq.html).

<sup>41</sup>Bhatia et al., "Women's Survey": pp. 25.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid: pp. 16.

caused by the damaged infrastructure and increased health problems resulting first from the Gulf War and subsequently from the sanctions which have asphyxiated the nation. These effects range from the dutiful acceptance of an increased domestic burden, to a necessary compromise of traditional notions of honour and shame. However, the children have also suffered inordinately as a result of the economic sanctions in place in Iraq. Malnutrition and disease have resulted in deaths estimated to be in excess of 500,000 and the children under five who persevere must battle various forms of malnutrition and its effects. All of this is in the context of steadily deteriorating conditions in health facilities and equipment which entail such practices as the reuse of syringes, shortages of oxygen and even soap. This would have been unimaginable in Iraq previous to the imposition of sanctions. The social costs of the economic sanctions have not only decreased Iraqi living standards, they have been responsible for the deaths of people who are incapable of altering Saddam Hussein's behaviour so that it conforms with the UN resolutions which would in turn lift the sanctions that continue to devastate the country.

*Genocide*

## CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis was to examine the impact and the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed on Iraq, and to determine whether the impact prompted Iraqi compliance with the goals of the sanctioning coalition. Iraq appeared to be the ideal target in that it was highly dependent on a single commodity which made the country exceedingly vulnerable; however, while the impact of the sanctions was indeed severe, this did not induce the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein to comply with the purposes espoused by the sanctioning coalition. This refutes a basic premise of orthodox sanctions theory which advocates the deprivation of the target state in an effort to enforce compliance with the stated goals. I will revisit the issues addressed in previous chapters, including both the effectiveness of the sanctions in terms of compelling Iraq to conform with United Nations resolutions, and the impact of the sanctions on the economy and the people of Iraq. I will then address two observations which serve to make economic sanctions less effective. Alternatives to sanctions will then be discussed briefly.

Initially, the economic sanctions were imposed on Iraq primarily to compel them to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty. However, following the Gulf War, the purposes of the sanctions shifted. United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 outlined the requirements of the international community which had to be fulfilled before lifting the sanctions. However, as every Security Council member had the power to veto a decision to lift sanctions, their purposes also had to be considered. In order to lift the prohibitions on Iraqi exports, the Iraqi government had to comply with the weapons provisions which involve the "destruction, removal, or rendering harmless" of all chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, as well as unconditional agreement not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. In order to lift the sanctions on the import of goods other than medicine and health supplies, the UN had to review "the policies and practices of the Government of Iraq". An additional purpose declared by the United States was the removal of Saddam Hussein.

It becomes evident that even if Saddam Hussein were to be removed from power, which is unlikely at best, the unacceptable "policies and practices" of the Iraqi government could be used to prolong economic sanctions indefinitely. The Iraqi government simply could not comply

to all of the demands made on their regime. Even if all of the issues in resolution 687 were resolved, the question of human rights which was addressed by resolution 688<sup>1</sup> could conceivably remain longer than Saddam Hussein's regime. As long as human rights are included in the consideration of the policies and practices of the Iraqi government, the sanctions will remain in place.

As the sanctions are prolonged indefinitely, the negative impacts on the country increase. The impact manifests itself on all aspects of Iraqi life. The medical system provides a clear illustration of the damage caused by the sanctions: health centres remained closed after the Gulf War and those that remained open experienced shortages of both medicines and staff. Water-treatment plants which could not be repaired due to the prohibition on the import of spare parts resulted in 2.5 million Iraqis being cut off from obtaining pre-war levels of water supply. The similar inability to repair the sewage treatment system resulted in sewage flowing into several rivers and polluting drinking water, and pools of sewage were flowing into homes and onto streets.

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<sup>1</sup>Resolution 688 demanded an end to the repression of the Iraqi population and stated that the consequences of this repression threatened international peace and security in the region.

The economy itself was severely damaged by the sanctions. Prior to the Gulf War, oil export earnings had amounted to \$15 billion annually. As of 1996, gross national product (GNP) was reportedly three billion dollars and inflation was being measured in thousands of per cent. The exchange rate prior to the Gulf War was one dinar to three US dollars; as of December 1995, one US dollar bought 3,000 Iraqi dinars. This has clearly affected the purchasing power of the Iraqi citizens. The gross domestic product (GDP) dropped by 75 per cent in 1991, and as of 1996, the per capita GDP equalled that of the 1940s. Another study found that the sanctions had caused Iraq's economy to shrink to less than ten per cent of its GDP prior to the Gulf Crisis.

As a result of the damage to the infrastructure, water-borne diseases became prevalent, and hospitals became breeding-grounds for cross-infection. Malnutrition was perhaps the most pervasive health problem in Iraq, which was clearly illustrated by the fact that one fifth of the Iraqi population were at severe nutritional risk as of September 1995. Children suffered inordinately as a result of the sanctions. As of 1995, stunting had increased to encompass 28 per cent of children under five, underweight children comprised 29 per cent and wasting comprised 12 per cent. Estimates of child mortality ran as high as 567,000 deaths

as of December 1995. The burden on women has also been heavy as they carry the additional responsibilities resulting from illness, water-borne disease and insufficient food.

The impact of the sanctions has been so marked due to the large number of countries in the sanctioning coalition and their compliance to the strict guidelines advocated by resolution 687. There are very few ways in which the Iraqi government is able to thwart the sanctions. The Iraqi government earns approximately \$600 million from its trade with Jordan, which was approved by the United Nations Sanctions Committee. There is evidence that smuggling occurred with Turkey and Iran; however, the amount was uncertain. One report estimated that as of February, 1995 approximately \$700-800 million from this source; another indicated that total foreign earnings were estimated at \$2 billion a year. ~~However, to put this number into context, it should be noted that Baghdad spends between \$1.2 and \$1.5 billion on the import of basic foodstuffs.~~ While it is evident that some level of smuggling occurs, it is minimal compared to the annual income from oil exports prior to the Gulf War. ~~The sanctions have indeed been effective in terms of the damage they have wrought on the Iraqi economy.~~

~~It is also evident that the sanctions permeate every aspect of life in Iraq, yet the deleterious impact has not~~

prompted Iraqi compliance to the purposes outlined by the sanctioning coalition. This clearly contradicts this aspect of orthodox sanctions theory, epitomized by one of Hufbauer and Schott's nine commandments: "In for a penny, in for a pound."<sup>2</sup> Hufbauer & Schott state that the heavier the costs to the target, the more likely it is that the sanctions will be successful. Their survey of sanctions determined that the average successful case cost the target state over two per cent of their GNP. This qualification was obviously met in Iraq, yet after several years of enduring the impact described above, compliance has not increased.

As the impact of the sanctions has been so detrimental without inducing compliance in the target state, this has led a number of scholars to examine the morality of economic sanctions<sup>3</sup>. Just war theory provides the basis of this line of argument which contends that noncombatants must be afforded some form of protection from the indiscriminate

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<sup>2</sup>Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History & Current Policy*, (Institute for International Economics, 1985): pp. 89.

<sup>3</sup>See Drew Christiansen, S.J. & Gerard F. Powers, "Economic Sanctions and Just-War Doctrine" in *Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World?* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995) & Albert C. Pierce, "Just War Principles and Economic Sanctions" in *Ethics and International Affairs*, (Vol. 10, 1996) & Lori Fisler Damrosch, *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993).

effects of sanctions. Economic sanctions may "inflict serious harm on an entire population to affect political and military authorities", which is the behaviour that just-war theory regards as immoral.<sup>4</sup> Lori Fisler Damrosch incorporated just war theory into her evaluation of economic sanctions by using a differentiation criterion which involves making an effort to target those who perpetuated the unacceptable behaviour as opposed to civilians who are not in a position to influence such behaviour. It is evident that the differentiation criterion was not met in the case of Iraq<sup>5</sup>; however, this argument poses a different set of questions which goes beyond the scope of this paper.

Having examined both the impact and the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed on Iraq, it is now necessary to draw several lessons from this examination. The first involves the punitive nature of the sanctions. When a primary goal of the sanctions is retribution, it makes the sanctioner's goals virtually impossible to achieve. This occurs because of the shifting nature of the sanctions; as one goal is fulfilled, another replaces the first. This process can be observed in the Iraqi case study. **After Iraq.**

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<sup>4</sup>Drew Christiansen, S.J. & Gerard F. Powers, "Economic Sanctions and Just-War Doctrine": pp. 102.

<sup>5</sup>Lori Fisler Damrosch, *Enforcing Restraint*: pp. 279 & 304.

had been driven out of Kuwait by the US, the purposes shifted. The sanctions were to be maintained until Iraq had fulfilled the arms control obligations outlined in resolution 687, and a review of the "policies and practices" of the Iraqi government elicited a positive response to questions such as human rights abuses, the provision of, further information on missing persons and Kuwaiti documents, and agreement on payment provisions to the Compensation Commission.<sup>6</sup> Upon fulfilling the arms control obligations, it becomes evident that any variety of issues could prevent even a partial lift of the sanctions.

It can be argued that what prevents the sanctions from being lifted is their punitive purpose. This serves to maintain the sanctions indefinitely which only increases the damage caused by the sanctions. As has been established, the increasing damage does not serve to increase compliance to the sanctioner's goals, particularly when the goals that are set are too ambitious to be met.

This leads to the second general observation: the more ambitious the sanctioner's goals, the less likely it is that the sanctions will induce full compliance.<sup>6</sup> The United

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<sup>6</sup>This is mentioned by Hufbauer & Schott in a different context. They state that the greater number of senders, the less likely the sanctions will be effective. This is due in part to the more ambitious goals, which are less likely to induce policy change; however, the inability to induce

Nations Security Council resolution 687, which outlined the purposes of the sanctions incorporated the following: the demarcation of the boundary between Kuwait and Iraq; the deterrence of violations of this boundary to be monitored by an observer unit; the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles with a range of over 150 kilometres; the unconditional agreement not to develop nuclear weapons; the return of Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq; compensation for damages or injury to foreign governments, nationals and corporations during the Gulf War; Iraqi cooperation with the Red Cross; and Iraqi agreement not to sponsor international terrorism. This does not include the purposes of the sanctioning coalition's members, such as the United States, which has stated that one of the purposes is the removal of Saddam Hussein. Perhaps the most important indication of the ambitious nature of the sanctions is the ability of the United Nations to maintain the sanctions until an examination of the "policies and practices" of the Iraqi government satisfies the Security Council. This allows them to maintain the sanctions even if all of the above requirements were met, yet another issue, such as human

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change is related to the inability of a large number of states to cooperate.

rights abuses, continued to be pervasive. When the goals of the sanctions are so ambitious, they are exceedingly difficult to meet.

These two observations suggest that we question the validity of economic sanctions more generally. If the sanctions imposed on Iraq have set the standard for international economic sanctions in the future, and similar comprehensive sanctions continue to be imposed, they will not be capable of inducing full compliance as a result of their ambitious nature.' In addition, since sanctions are inherently punitive, this also makes the purposes virtually impossible to achieve, which in turn serves to maintain the sanctions indefinitely. Such exhaustive sanctions imposed over a long period of time increases the damage to the target. As it has become apparent from this case study that increasing the damage does not increase compliance, it is necessary to question whether sanctions of this nature can be effective. Iraq was an ideal case, in that it was highly vulnerable, and the impact was damaging enough to warrant success according to orthodox sanctions theory, yet neither of these factors has induced Iraqi compliance.' The question then becomes: can compliance be induced? If so, how?

It is interesting to examine alternatives to a policy of sanctions. One such option is constructive engagement, which is defined by Franklin Lavin as a policy of "oxygen";

as opposed to one of "asphyxiation", or sanctions.<sup>7</sup> If sanctions are ineffective, perhaps a policy of constructive engagement would be more effective. The premise of this approach is that greater economic activity will inevitably lead to positive political consequences. The development of this argument is outlined by Franklin Lavin as follows: growth will destabilize the existing regime by increasing diversity to the point where neither centralized or localized rule will be acceptable and a division of the authority will ensue; prosperity creates groups which will in turn seek greater political freedoms, development ends isolation; economic progress means that the government no longer holds a monopoly over socioeconomic mobility. He also notes that ~~this~~ approach is more humane as it improves the daily life of the population, as opposed to sanctions which serves to worsen them.<sup>8</sup> When considering policy alternatives, a policy of engagement should be examined as a viable alternative, if only for humanitarian concerns. However, if sanctions are necessary for symbolic reasons, such as the perceived obligation to respond to wrongful behaviour, a policy of oxygen, or engagement, would be an

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<sup>7</sup>Franklin L. Lavin, "Asphyxiation or Oxygen? The Sanctions Dilemma" in *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1996): pp. 140.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid: pp. 141.

insufficient and therefore inadequate policy option. The necessity of imposing sanctions will persist as long as the certain states feel the need for retribution. The villainization of Saddam Hussein necessitated action on the part of the sanctioning coalition. This problem made a policy of engagement an improbable choice. It would have been difficult to justify an increase in foreign aid and trade with Iraq after their invasion of Kuwait. For this reason, economic sanctions will remain the only option available to governments that feel it is necessary to make a symbolic demonstration of the unacceptable nature of a target's actions without the use of force. Essentially, sanctions provide a useful middle road between engagement and the use of military force.

This leads to the necessity of examining the structure of the sanctions imposed on Iraq. The aspect of the sanctions which causes the majority of the detrimental impact involves the sanctions on the export of Iraqi oil. If this were to be lifted, the government would have sufficient funds to import the medical and food supplies that are necessary to decrease the humanitarian impact of the sanctions. If in fact the Iraqi government chose not to import sufficient food and medical supplies, the blame for the population's hardship could be laid on the Iraqi government, as opposed to the sanctioning states.

If the primary issue of contention between the Iraqi administration and the UN Security Council involved weapons, perhaps an arms embargo of a similar magnitude to that outlined in resolution 687, in addition to the restrictions on the import of commodities other than humanitarian supplies, would have been sufficient. This would have decreased the burden on the civilians and would have responded in proportion to Iraqi transgressions. It would also have allowed Iraq to begin making reparations payments. Fidler Damrosch's criterion of differentiation would have been fulfilled; the focus of the sanctions would be on the regime, as opposed to the population.

It follows from this line of reasoning that the only option which would ease the impact of the sanctions would be to remove the sanctions on the export of oil. It would be difficult for Saddam Hussein to do greater damage than has already been done by the economic sanctions. By lifting the sanctions on the export of oil, this alone would ameliorate the human suffering, as the only commodities which could be imported are medical supplies and foodstuffs. In addition, the symbolic nature of the sanctions could be preserved, thereby satisfying the desire of the sanctioning coalition to be seen accomplishing a certain function, while easing the burden on the population which has no control over the their regime's actions.

It becomes evident that although Iraq was an ideal target, and the impact on the country was indeed calamitous, this has not induced the effects desired by the sanctioning coalition. The punitive nature of the sanctions, in conjunction with the ambitious agenda outlined by resolution 687 have prevented Iraq from complying with the goals of the sanctions. By indefinitely prolonging the sanctions, the Iraqi population continues to suffer with insufficient food and inadequate medicine, while the Iraqi regime remains impervious to the sanctioning coalition's demands. It is necessary to revise the assumption that increasing the damage inflicted on the target increases its compliance. This necessitates an examination of the alternatives to sanctions, or at least a different approach to the imposition of sanctions which would prevent the target's population from suffering without purpose. The Iraqi case study has provided strong evidence that the premise underlying international economic sanctions is false; sanctions should not be imposed under the assumption that increasing the damage to the population will induce compliance in the target state.

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