POLITICAL IDEALISM IN POLAND
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By

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Despite the complexity of the Polish August, political idealism stands out as the most pervasive and pressing influence on Polish society during that period. Moreover, the Polish crisis fits a pattern in Polish history which has been dominant since the 18th century.

Ever since the partitions, the Poles have had to make certain assumptions about their political dilemma. The focal point of the political debate in Poland has centred on combating foreign oppression. Therefore, the great divide in Polish political thought has characteristically been between two opposing schools of thought.

On the one side, the political idealists, or the "romantics", as the Poles call them. On the other side, the political realists, or the "positivists". This division cuts through various social and political groupings and tends to split the Poles between those who advocate independence as a first priority and those who advocate organic work.

Because of the pivotal role played by these two competing forces in Polish history, they have been able to bring into their ranks the different political groups with varied ideologies that have existed in Poland over time. While Poland, like other nations, has been divided on internal social reform, the division between the idealists and realists is still the most dominant feature of Polish politics.

The dynamics of the competition between the realists and idealists has produced a characteristic cyclical rhythm in Polish politics, where one of the two groups would gain the confidence of the Polish people and then, for some reason, lose it to the other.

By the end of 1981, and especially after the Solidarity Congress in October, political idealism had become the guiding force. The Poles were unwilling to moderate both their desire for extensive economic and political reforms and their historical dream of Polish independence.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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This study is dedicated to my father, who stimulated my interest in politics, and to my mother, who insisted that her six sons obtain a university education. I thank them for the sacrifices they made on our behalf and for making the long journey to Canada.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER ONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER TWO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER THREE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER FOUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER FIVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABBREVIATIONS

Note: In order to maintain uniformity I have retained the original initials for Polish terms.

AK Armia Krajowa (Home Army)
ChD Chrzescijanska Demokracja (Christian Democrats)
ChSS Chrzescijanskie Stowarzenie Spoleczne (Christian Social Association)
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
DiP Doswiadczenie i Przyszlosc (Experience and Future)
ILO International Labour Organization
KIK Klub Inteligencji Katolickiej (Club of Catholic Intelligentsia)
KKK Klub Krzywego Kola (Crooked Circle Club)
KOR Komitet Obrony Robotnikow (Workers' Defence Committee). Later KSS-KOR, Komitet Samoobrony Spolecznej (Social Self-Defence Committee)
KOS Komitet Oporu Spolecznego (Committee of Social Resistance)
KOS² Kola Oporu Spolecznego (Circles of Social Resistance)
KOWS Komitet Obrony Wiezniow Sumienia (Committee for the Defence of Prisoners of Conscience)
KOZiR Komitet Obrony Zycia i Rodziny (Committe in Defence of Life and the Family)
KPN Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej (Confederation of Independent Poland)
KPP Krajowa Komisja Porozumiewawcza (Solidarity's National Coordinating Commission). After the 1981 Solidarity Congress, KKP was renamed KK, Komisja Krajowa (National Commission).
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPRSN</td>
<td>Komitet Porozumienia na Rzecz Samostanowienia Narodu (Committee for the National Self-Determination)</td>
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<td>KSC</td>
<td>Komitet Samoobrony Chlopskiej (Peasants' Self-Defence Committee)</td>
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<td>KSLW</td>
<td>Komitet Samoobrony Ludzi Wierzacych (Belierers' Self-Defence Committee)</td>
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<td>KUL</td>
<td>Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski (Catholic University of Lublin)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KZ WZZ</td>
<td>Komitetety Zalozycielskie Wolnych Ztwiazkow Zawodowych (Initiating Committees of Free Trade Unions)</td>
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<td>MKS</td>
<td>Miedzyzakladowy Komitet Stajkowy (Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee). After the founding of NSZZ Solidarity, MKS was renamed MKZ, Miedzyzakladowy Komitet Zalozycielski (Inter-Enterprise Founding Committee).</td>
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<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Narodowa Demokracya (National Democrats). Sometimes known as Endencja.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOWa</td>
<td>Niezalezn Orzyczyna Wydawnycza (The Independent Publishing House)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSZZ</td>
<td>Niezalezny Samorzadny Ztwiazek Zawodowy &quot;Solidarnosc&quot; (Independent Self-Governing Trade Union &quot;Solidarity&quot;).</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>Polska Akademia Nauk (Polish Academy of Sciences)</td>
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<td>PAX</td>
<td>Strowarzyszenie PAX (Catholic Social Movement)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNPN</td>
<td>Polska Narodowa Partia Niepodleglosci (Polish National Independence Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPN</td>
<td>Polskie Porozumienie Niepodleglosciowe (Polish League for Independence)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPR</td>
<td>Polska Partia Robotnicza (Polish Workers' Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPS</td>
<td>Polska Partia Socialistyczna (Polish Socialist Party)</td>
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<td>PPS²</td>
<td>Polska Partia &quot;Solidarnosc&quot; (Polish &quot;Solidarity&quot; Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRL</td>
<td>Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa (Polish People's Republic)</td>
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<td>PRON</td>
<td>Patriotyczny Ruch Odrodzenia Narodowego (Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish Peasant Party)</td>
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<td>PSW</td>
<td>Porozumienie Solidarnosc Walczaca (The Association of Fighting Solidarity)</td>
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<td>PZKS</td>
<td>Polski Związek Katolikow Spolecznych (Polish Catholic Social Union)</td>
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<td>PZPR</td>
<td>Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (Polish United Workers' Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFE</td>
<td>Radio Free Europe</td>
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<td>RMP</td>
<td>Ruch Młodej Polski (Young Poland Movement)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROCH</td>
<td>Niezależni Ludowcy-ROCH (Independent Peasant Activists)</td>
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<td>ROPCio</td>
<td>Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela (Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights)</td>
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<td>RWD</td>
<td>Ruch Wolnych Demokratow (Movement of Free Democrats)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SB</td>
<td>Sluszba Bezpieczeństwa (Security Services)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Stronnictwo Demokratyczne (Democratic Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDKPiL</td>
<td>Socjal-demokracja Krolestwa Polskiego i Litwy (Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SKS</td>
<td>Studencki Komitet Solidarnosci (Students' Solidarity Committee)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TKK</td>
<td>Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacjna (Temporary Coordinating Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TKN</td>
<td>Towarzystwo Kursow Naukowych (Society for Academic Courses). Sometimes known as &quot;The Flying University&quot;.</td>
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<tr>
<td>UL</td>
<td>Uniwersytet Ludowy (The People's University)</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>WRON</td>
<td>Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego (Military Council of National Salvation)</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>WSN</td>
<td>Wolnosć, Sprawiedliwość, Niepodległość (Freedom, Justice, Independence)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZOMO</td>
<td>Zmotoryzowane Odwody Milicji Obywatelskiej (Mobile Units of the Citizens’ Militia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZSL</td>
<td>Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe (United Peasant Party)</td>
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All the main countries of Europe passed through the Romantic experience; but in Poland it was particularly intense. Arguably, it has provided the largest single ingredient of modern Polish culture. Indeed, since the oppressive hothouse conditions which fostered Polish Romanticism in the first place have continued in many respects to the present day, the Romantic tradition still reigns supreme in the Polish mind.

Norman Davies

INTRODUCTION

The emphasis of this thesis is on political idealism in Polish politics, and especially during the crisis of 1980-81. Despite the complexity of the Polish August, political idealism stands out as the most pervasive and pressing influence on Polish society during that period.

The Polish crisis fits a pattern in Polish history which has been dominant since the 18th century. Ever since the partitions, the Poles have had to make certain assumptions about their political dilemma. The focal point of the political debate in Poland has centred on combating foreign oppression.
Specifically, the Poles recognized that their country's internal affairs are dominated by external factors.

Poland's dismemberment was partially explained by the fact that its power and status had declined during the 17th and 18th century. However, on the continent of Europe located on its periphery - other former great powers, such as Spain, Sweden, or Turkey, had also experienced a decline. Yet, these countries continued to retain their independence. The major cause for the partitions of Poland, therefore, can only be explained by its central geographic position between Germany and Russia. Moreover, the aggressive political nature of Poland's neighbours played a crucial role in determining its fate.

With hostile and powerful states to both the west and the east, the Poles have frantically tried to protect their independence and existence. In this context Polish politics have been characterized by Primat der Aussenpolitik, or what the Poles call primat polityki zewnetrznej - the primacy of external relations over internal events. This situation does not simply mean the need for foreign diplomatic aid, but rather the recognition that no fundamental change in Poland can take place without substantive transformations on the international scene.¹

From the First Partition of 1773 until 1871, Poland's plight was decided by the maze of alliances and rivalries between Austria, Prussia, and Russia. With the rise of the German Reich and the eclipse of the Austrian Empire, Poland's fate was
dominated by the competition between Germany and Russia. The end of World War I in 1918 brought about the collapse of the old order in Central Europe. The defeat of the German and Austria Empires by the Western powers, and the revolutionary changes that gripped Imperial Russia were significant historical events that would later effect the entire globe. For the moment, however, the upheavals of 1918 brought the necessary fundamental changes in the international arena hoped for by the Poles.

After 150 years of partitions, the Polish state once more became a fixture on the European scene. Unfortunately for the Poles, their newly won independence was short-lived. Economic, social, and political turmoil fueled the instability of the Polish Republic, while Poland’s neighbours grew in strength. The emergence of Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany juxtaposed Poland once again between too hostile and powerful, albeit transformed, states.

In spite of the ideological differences between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, on 1 September 1939, these two supposed "allies" again partitioned Poland. World War II radically changed the situation for Poland. The unparalleled destruction throughout large parts of Europe - including Poland, the final defeat of Germany in 1945, and the eventual emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower, left the Polish nation under the determined policies of Moscow.
II

The great divide in Polish political thought has characteristically been between two opposing schools of thought. On the one side, the political idealists, or the "romantics", as the Poles call them. On the other side, the political realists, or the "positivists". This division cut through various social and political groupings and tended to split the Poles into insurrectionary and anti-insurrectionary elements. The political idealists, "in line with their psychological predilections, have taken a rigid, moralistic stand. They have claimed that to deprive Poland of its place in the international sphere was an unjust act and they have insisted that this should be corrected."\(^2\)

Therefore, for the political idealists, restoring Poland's independence is a foremost priority. Ready to make great sacrifices, the idealists call for an unyielding struggle against the foreign occupier.

The political realists, on the other hand, according to their psychological disposition, have taken a more pragmatic stand. They have repudiated the relentless struggle for independence and argued that the sacrifices of the political idealists have brought more harm than good to Poland. The realists insist that Poles must find "a modus vivendi with their more powerful neighbours. The primary objective of political
realists, then, has been to protect the nation from any further blows and to secure for it as much opportunity for normal internal development as possible."

The typical Polish idealists have always claimed that they are just as pragmatic as their realists opponents, only that they have a different view of pragmatism. The typical realists claim that they are no less in favour of Polish independence than the idealists, only their method for achieving it is both beneficial to Poland's long-term development and avoids the disastrous and futile uprising. To be sure, both the Polish political idealists and political realists are patriots, each defining a different programme of action in hopes of gaining Polish independence.

Because of the pivotal role played by these two competing forces in Polish history, they have been able to bring into their ranks the different political groups with varied ideologies that have existed in Poland over time. The division between idealism and realism "cut right through the middle of all the other social and political groupings in Poland, splitting the social classes... the political parties such as the PPS or PSL into 'national revolutionary' or 'non-national revolutionary' factions." Moreover, the range of ideological views, from the extreme left to the extreme right, espoused by the idealists and realists has at times made strange bedfellows of some political movements. While Poland, like other nations, has been divided on internal social
reform, the division between the idealists and realists is still the most dominant feature of Polish politics.

Certainly, the traditional debate in Polish political thought, between the idealists and realists is not altogether unique. "It is nothing more than a local variant of the age-old dispute between the Platonists and the Aristotelians. As Albert Sorel once put it, politicians must be divided between those 'who seek to change the world to suit their ideals' and those 'who seek to modify their actions to suit the world'."6 Nonetheless, the dichotomy between idealism and realism in Polish politics is unique in so far as "it is possible to observe a continuity in these political traditions from the eighteenth century until today."7

Finally, the dynamics of the competition between the idealists and positivists has produced a characteristic cyclical rhythm in Polish politics, where one of the two groups would gain the confidence of the Polish people and then, for some reason, lose it to the other. Specifically, after "each period of idealistic struggle there has ensued a phase of realism that has ended only when a new generation that no longer remembers the sufferings and defeats of its parents attempts to expand the nation's freedom once again."8

The generational cycle between idealism and realism "must be seen not merely as the successors to the generations of Stanislaw Leszczynski and Stanislaw-August, but also as the
precursors of the generations of Wladyslaw Gomulka and Lech Walesa.\(^9\) The Poles have tried, at times, to synchronize their goal of independence with international events. And, as in 1918, they were successful. However, since the rise of the Soviet Union to the status of a superpower, and the dawning of bi-polar politics on the international scene - with its characteristic division of Europe into two spheres of influence, the Poles have lost a great deal of maneuverability in attempting to gain greater autonomy from their "fraternal" ally.

Soon after Poland became an integral part of the Soviet bloc, the realists were able to gain the upper hand and dominate the Polish political scene. However, with the emergence of a new generation of Polish youth, the political atmosphere of the 1970s became largely influenced by the idealists.

The contemporary Poles have been unwilling to accept limited sovereignty. Moreover, by the summer of 1980, these Poles once again rose in a national, albeit peaceful, uprising. The fact that the rise of the Solidarity movement occurred in a non-violent manner has led some analysts of the Polish crisis to conclude that the emergence of Solidarity was proof of a "realistic uprising". Indeed, that the Polish crisis was dominated by the tradition of political realism.\(^{10}\) It is this assumption that this study aims to assess. More precisely, was Solidarity a "realistic uprising", or the outcome of a process which began with the rise of political idealism shortly after the
students' protests of 1968.

The catalyst for this study was a book published by Stanislaus Blejwas, entitled Realism in Polish Politics: Warsaw Positivism and National Survival in Nineteenth Century Poland. The author concluded: "Herein lies the paradox of Solidarity: it was not a romantic, but a realistic uprising." To be sure, Blejwas' conclusion is a sharp contrast to the published works of both Adam Bromke and Norman Davies on the Polish crisis.

III

This particular study is divided into five chapters. The first chapter is a review of some essential literature on the Polish crisis. Almost six years since the declaration of martial law in Poland, on 13 December 1981, new volumes on the Polish crisis still keep appearing. The first chapter is divided into four parts. The first part, History, reviews the works by historians Norman Davies, R.F. Leslie, and Stanislaus Blejwas. The value of the books written (in the case of Leslie, edited) by these authors is that they put the Polish crisis of 1980-81 into a broader historical perspective.

The second part, Historical Traditions, reviews the works by Rudolf Jaworski and Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier. The value of these studies is their focus on Polish political traditions in light of the Solidarity period. Moreover, the valuable study by
Valknier specifically deals with the history of Polish historiography since the end of World War II and helps shed light on the Polish August from the perspective of how the Poles use their history in times of crisis.

The third part, The Crisis, specifically reviews the works, in varying detail, of some twenty-five writers, and includes brief mentions of many others. The aim of this section is to outline the different historical and social science perspectives on the Polish crisis. Moreover, it includes the studies of both English language (including translations) and Polish language writers. The last section, The Superpowers, spans the important studies produced by American politicians (including former President Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Alexander Haig), and the official Marxist-Leninist arguments on the nature of the Polish crisis.

The second chapter provides a detailed theoretical analysis of the idealism versus realism perspective on Polish politics and deals specifically with the question posed by Stanislaus Blejwas about Solidarity. Moreover, this chapter critically reviews the debate between Piotr Wandycz and Adam Bromke on the validity of the idealism versus realism perspective as an analytical tool for the study of Polish politics.

Chapter three reviews and analyses the nature of Polish politics since the decline of "neopositivism" in the mid to late-1960s from the perspective of idealism versus realism.
Furthermore, it provides an analysis of the organized political opposition movements which rose in the mid to late-1970s.

Chapter four, is a critical analysis of the Polish crisis of 1980-81, reviewing both the positions taken by the Solidarity movement, from the perspective of idealism versus realism, and the popular assumption that the Polish crisis was a "self-limiting" revolution. And finally, chapter five, discusses the post-martial law period, emergence of the new opposition movements, and the future of political idealism in Polish politics.
ENDNOTES


2 Bromke, Poland's Politics, p.2.

3 ibid., pp. 2-3.

4 Davies, op. cit., p.201.

5 ibid.

6 ibid.

7 Bromke, Poland's Politics, p. 3.


9 Davies, op. cit., pp. 212-213.


11 ibid., p. 208.
The Polish crisis of 1980–81 has been a subject of considerable attention in the Western world. The books, monographs, pamphlets, and articles published on Solidarity, martial law, and its aftermath have assumed formidable proportions. To be sure, not all of the volumes provide the interested scholar or general reader with the appropriate analysis or answers to profoundly difficult questions. However, some outstanding studies have been produced.

The multi-dimensional character of the Polish crisis of 1980–81 is generally recognized by most of the writers analyzing the events. As could be expected, the academics naturally differ about the specific importance of the wide-ranging political, economic, social, demographic, psychological, and historical factors which caused the Polish upheaval in the summer of 1980. A study which balances and extensively documents the long-term
causal factors with the particular aspects of the Gierek period has also yet to be written. However, it is still far too early to expect a fully rounded synthesis like H. Gordon Skilling's comprehensive study *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution*.¹

The criteria for the selection of the works cited below is based on a subjective interpretation of their utility and relevance. The shelves of works published forces the reviewer to be highly selective and only English-language and Polish-language studies have been considered. The review is subdivided into four categories: History; Historical Traditions; The Crisis; and finally, The Superpowers. Many of the footnotes also include a list of pertinent books.

**History**

British historian Norman Davies has produced a magisterial and original two volume study of Polish history, entitled *God's Playground: A History of Poland*.² While the Polish crisis is not specifically discussed, there are two important themes that are worthy of mention. First of all, Davies outlines the debate between Polish romantic and positivist thought and notes that these two opposing viewpoints had a lasting influence in forming even the contemporary Polish political character. He suggests, for example, that the Polish youth of the
late 1970s may be drawn to romantic insurrectionist tendencies and hints at the crisis that gripped Poland in 1980. Davies elaborates: "seen in the context of the historical traditions of Polish politics, the present predicament of the communist movement does not inspire confidence...the period since 1956 has been an episode of Conciliatory, or Realistic politics of unusual longevity. But now...there is a real danger that the younger generation will be drawn towards the romantic revolutionary alternative."

The second theme is the role of foreign interests in Polish history. Yet Davies does not look to geography to explain Poland's historical dilemma. The emphasis is on Poland's own particular development. The Polish People's Republic was not preordained in the Marxist sense nor simply the product of powerful neighbours. Poles are as much responsible for their present condition as is the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Davies points out that in today's context Polish independence is governed primarily by Soviet interests.

Another study by Norman Davies, Heart of Europe: A Short History of Poland, concluded in 1984, set forth to analyse the Polish crisis. This historical survey places an emphasis on those elements of Polish history Davies believes had the greatest impact on the present situation. This study is not as rigorous as his earlier two volumes. Davies is purposely ambiguous and thus his arguments are contradictory at times. Nevertheless, Davies'
analysis of Solidarity and the Polish crisis is not without merit.

The following arguments are made by Davies: (i) Solidarity was a noble and courageous movement but appeared frustrated by its heterogeneous character; (ii) the Polish crisis proved conclusively that the Polish communist regime had lost confidence of most of the people; (iii) a compromise between the ruling elite and Solidarity was possible but failed due to extreme demands on the one hand and communist intransigence on the other; (iv) Solidarity rejected the violent aspects of the romantic tradition; (v) martial law was less offensive by its physical cruelty than by its moral corruption and its intellectual absurdity; and (vi) Soviet power prevailed in the Polish crisis of 1980-81. While Davies' analysis is not novel, it is sound.

The most fascinating and satisfying feature of Heart of Europe is its elaboration of the role of the past in Poland's present. Davies argues convincingly that the political traditions of Poland since the period of the partitions in the late eighteenth century to the latest Polish crisis are not mere echoes of the past. The traditions of loyalism, positivism, and romanticism are part of the historical record and their continuity cannot be denied. Furthermore, the characteristic cyclical rhythm of Polish politics dominated by the dynamics of the debate between the romantics and positivists can be gauged in the Polish crisis of 1980-81.

To be sure, not all of the elements of the past are
reproduced in the present. Davies recognizes that history does not repeat itself. The realities and tactics observed during the Polish crisis have changed - in some cases dramatically - when compared to the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, Davies adds, the burden of Polish history cannot be ignored. Davies not only accepts that a discussion of the Polish crisis from the perspective of romanticism/idealism versus positivism/realism is valid; the dichotomy is apparent. According to Davies, "the characteristic political cycle was put into motion not merely by the loss of statehood but rather by the intervention of foreign powers... and must be expected to continue as long as foreign oppression persists. In this light, the Romantic and Positivist generations of the mid-nineteenth century must not be seen merely as the successors to the generations of Stanislaw Leszczynski and Stanislaw-August, but also as the precursors of the generation of Wladyslaw Gomulka and Lech Walesa."6

The next major English-language history of Poland was edited by another British scholar, R.F. Leslie. The History of Poland Since 18637 is without doubt a major contribution to our understanding of modern Polish history. This volume was penned by four eminent specialists of Polish history, each writing on his preferred area of research.8 Unfortunately, the book is rather uneven. There is little attempt to synthesise the major themes - the struggle for independence and modernization - in a coherent fashion.
The authors note that their aim was to write a Polish history text that stressed the social and economic aspects of the political developments in Poland's past. To this extent, the stated aim was achieved. The documentation and discussion of Poland's socio-economic development in the modern period, greatly affected by uneven and separate economic growth, persistent pre-modern class divisions, proud nationalism coupled with a sometimes xenophobic attitude towards its minorities, and an almost medieval reverence of the Roman Catholic Church, is analysed in a splendid fashion.

They add that the two principle approaches to the political dilemma faced by Poland - either the realist/positivist or the idealist/insurrectionist perspective of Polish history - is not their focus. Indeed, they refuse to align themselves with either approach. While they recognize the merits of both views and the cyclical element in Polish history, the authors claim they want to strike a balance between a too optimistic or a too pessimistic interpretation of Poland's history.

The Polish crisis of 1980-81 is discussed in the Epilogue. However, the chapters written by Zbigniew Pelczynski - the only non-professional historian of the group - are profoundly important. Pelczynski credits those Polish communists who tried, even if unsuccessfully, to synthesise Polish political aspirations and geopolitical reality on the one hand and largely ameliorate the socio-economic backwardness of Poland on the other.
One of the most poignant and lasting observations made by Pelczynski is reflected in his concluding remarks about the Gomulka regime. Pelczynski states that the redeeming features of "Gomulka's career were his patriotism, courage, personal integrity, modesty, common sense and moderation. His devotion to socialism and to his country's welfare, as he understood them, was unquestionable. He never abused political power for personal ends, though he became a virtual autocrat." In essence, Pelczynski also argues that the actions of some communists must be viewed as more than self-interest or because Marxism-Leninism claims to be inherently progressive. Some Polish communists are not just communists, they are also patriots.

Pelczynski's analysis concludes with a study of the overwhelming failures of the Gierek regime. Despite the rapid economic growth and apparent support for Gierek in the early years of his rule, Pelczynski clearly maps the economic and political vulnerability of the system. By the second half of the 1970s the collapse of the Gierek regime was being fueled by the following: (i) indebtedness; (ii) failed promises; (iii) ideological sterility; (iv) a public force-fed on an ideology of socialism that promised to deliver everything for nothing; (v) a popular attitude of moral superiority that nurtured an ever-present demand for greater autonomy from a regime that blazed further into the vacuum of illegitimacy; and finally, (vi) corruption in all levels of Polish society but particularly damaging within the ruling
elite.

The Epilogue accommodates a balanced precis of the rise and fall of Solidarity. The most striking statement predicts further—potentially disastrous—confrontation in Poland, if the Jaruzelski regime also falls victim to sterility. The major drawback to the Epilogue is its lack of an overall historical perspective. There is no attempt to identify the Solidarity experience with the broader questions in Polish history. Nor is there an attempt to shed light on the nature of Solidarity or the Polish crisis in general. An uncritical reading of the Epilogue might well suggest that the Solidarity period was simply an economic crisis with no long-term historical antecedents.

American historian Stanislaus Blejwas has written a particularly significant study of Polish history, entitled Realism in Polish Politics: Warsaw Positivism and National Survival in Nineteenth Century Poland.11 Blejwas notes in his excellent volume that the Polish response to statelessness after the third partition of Poland took two diverging paths. The more famous response was armed insurrection as represented by the romantic tradition. The second response opted for "organic work" as represented by the positivist tradition. The proponents of this view repudiated armed insurrection and stressed instead cultural and economic endeavours. These Poles believed that "organic work" was the most proficient method for defending the interests of the nation during its period of subjugation.
Many historians have concluded that the positivist tradition was alien to Polish political thought because it rejected independence. To be sure, while positivism was not viewed as being altogether an aberration, it has nonetheless been portrayed as a distasteful alternative. It is that assumption that Blejwas questions. While the book focuses on the Warsaw positivists of the nineteenth century, the well-structured arguments have lasting positive implications for Polish political realism.

Realism in Polish Politics helps fill a gap in a badly neglected area of research on Polish politics. The fact that the romantic tradition has appeared - for some scholars - to be a more appealing response to the Polish dilemma, and the very complexity of the positivist response, are partly responsible for the rejection of the positivists. Nevertheless, Blejwas clearly points out that in return for a recognition of the existing geopolitical reality, the positivists were able to preserve the national identity through their advancement of education, commerce, and economic reform.

The most striking part of the book is the Afterword. The reader is quickly led through a discussion of political realism from the rejection of positivism in the 1880s, to the Solidarity period. However, with respect to the rejection of positivism, Blejwas stresses that neither Warsaw positivism nor political realism was altogether abandoned in Poland. The National
Democratic movement, for example, did not dismiss the heritage of positivism and organic work, only the passivity of positivism was rejected. In short, the National Democrats fused the economic goals of the positivists with the political goals of the idealists.

Led by Roman Dmowski, the National Democrats called for the following: (i) organic work at the grassroots level to forge a modern and ethnically unified nation; (ii) active struggle for Polish independence based on existing realities - while rejecting insurrection; and, (iii) rapprochement with Russia because Germany was perceived as a far greater threat to the Polish nation. However, the most controversial aspects of Dmowski’s programme - particularly as reflected by his later writings - was his anti-democratic tendency and opposition to Jews, Ukrainians, and Belorussians.

In the final analysis, Dmowski’s attempts to promote organic work were only marginally successful and his conciliation with Russia failed to change the anti-Polish policies of the Czarist regime. Nevertheless, Dmowski willingly risked being called a Russian loyalist in order to internationalize the Polish question. The emergence of an independent Poland in 1918 ended the discussions about loyalism and collaboration with regards to political realism. The question of realism now focused around Poland’s foreign policy.

Blejwas notes that Poland’s lack of resources and its
independent foreign policy, in the face of German and Soviet power, was not enough to sustain independence. World War II caused the fourth partition of Poland. This time, the magnitude of the German occupation, which threatened Poland's biological existence, excluded any realistic rapprochement with the occupier.\textsuperscript{14} However, the end of World War II, and the subsequent communist take-over, renewed the discussion of realism and idealism for the Poles. Nevertheless, the tragic defeat of the Polish Home Army, Western rejection of aid to Poland, and Stalinist rule deprived the Poles of many options.

The Polish October of 1956 brought with it a renewed - if limited - discussion on the future of Poland. Blejwas then describes the birth of "neopositivism", led by some Polish Catholics who recognized the nation's geopolitical difficulty. These neopositivists were permitted to have five deputies elected to the Sejm (Parliament) and formed the Znak (The Sign) parliamentary circle.\textsuperscript{15} In short, Znak was willing to repudiate the "all or nothing mentality" of the idealists.

Yet Blejwas is unwilling to take his analysis to its logical conclusion. He refutes the notion that the student protests of 1968, the workers' protests of 1970, and the opposition to the proposed 1976 constitutional amendments were the revival of the romantic tradition in Poland. His evidence is partly based on the opposition having rejected armed insurrection and the earlier writings of Jacek Kuron, which Blejwas argues...
reflect some of the views of nineteenth-century positivist Aleksander Swietochowski.\textsuperscript{16}

Blejwas also makes sweeping conclusions about Solidarity. He insists that the paradox of Solidarity lay in it not being a romantic, but a realistic uprising.\textsuperscript{17} This interesting conclusion, however, is weakened by the meagre and selective evidence used to support it.

Solidarity quickly became a victim of the frustration most Poles felt after thirty-five years of failed promises and corrupt rule. Furthermore, Solidarity's repudiation of insurrection did not eliminate the other elements of the romantic tradition.\textsuperscript{18} The messianic image Solidarity displayed in the just belief of its cause, the almost taunting attitude of some senior Solidarity advisors - many of them felt that the Soviets would not act against a ten-million member organization, the openness of anti-Russian sentiments in Poland, and reliance upon the West for support of Solidarity, are just a few examples.

\textbf{HISTORICAL TRADITIONS}

Rudolf Jaworski, in his excellent article "History and Tradition in Contemporary Poland"\textsuperscript{19}, provides an insightful look into the uses and role of Polish history during the Solidarity period. The Polish crisis has provided Jaworski with significant evidence concerning the historical and traditional consciousness
of the Polish people. \textsuperscript{20}

Jaworski argues that for many Poles, the past is still an integral part of the present. More important, history is a phenomenon of collective memory rather than the domain of individual historians. After experiencing 150 years of foreign domination, the Poles use history and tradition as weapons for the maintenance of their national identity. Threatened with extinction, the primacy of foreign policy is one of the dominant features in Polish political culture. \textsuperscript{21}

Jaworski claims that the continuity between traditional and socialist Poland stems from the following: (i) Poland for the first time in its history has achieved ethnic unity; (ii) the postwar economic system has had a leveling effect which guaranteed a democratization of the historical/cultural inheritance; (iii) a formal basis for a modern state was created and secured after World War II by the communists—despite the fact that many Poles rejected or fought against communism; (iv) prevailing conditions in Poland during the 1945-48 period increased the power of the Catholic church and thus assured the continuing role of the church as a bastion of Polish nationalism; (v) Poland's interwar inequalities and conflicts, coupled with the disastrous German occupation, promoted egalitarian socialist tendencies but did not overcome traditional values; (vi) the Soviet role in establishing communism in Poland guaranteed that dogmatic Marxism would be considered alien to most Poles; and (vii) the Polish communist
party rationalized its programme and severely modified the internationalist tendencies which made its predecessor totally insignificant.

Postwar Polish leaders, Jaworski argues, usually pay more attention to national traditions than Marxist-Leninist ideology. The gradual acceptance of the Piast concept of the prewar National Democrats, the rehabilitation of the 19th century uprisings for independence, and the rehabilitation of the non-communist (if not anti-communist) Home Army (AK), are just a few examples Jaworski provides.22

Two Polish institutions also aid in the convergence between traditional Poland and the socialist one. First, the Catholic church has often orientated towards the status quo. Conflicts between the church and Polish regime are as much governed by real differences over principles as by a need to stake out their respective areas of influence over society. Also, the restrictive and doctrinal nature of the church assured that its own peculiar interests were secured first.23

The second institution is the intelligentsia - like the church an important bastion of Polish historical traditions.24 Despite the fact that the intelligentsia nourishes much of the serious criticism towards the communists system, its self-identity fits well into the socialist order. The intelligentsia is egalitarian in principle, anti-capitalist and anti-bourgeois. Finally, the intelligentsia receives - and takes advantage of - a
special elite status in socialist Poland which is far more comprehensive than that of pluralistic societies.  

The most important observation made by Jaworski is his conclusion that the patriotic, or idealistic, tradition is the most influential and pervasive in contemporary Poland. The tradition of the patriotic uprisings of the 19th century overshadows all other traditions. "In Poland," Jaworski elaborates, "romanticism has never been just a phase defined by literary history, idealism not a philosophical school of thought. Both, up until today, have remained valid collective maxims for survival".  

As an example of the imbalance which stresses the patriotic tradition, Jaworski points to the evolution of the Solidarity movement. Jaworski argues that "the Polish workers too often were effectively approached and mobilized by calling up traditions belonging to the whole nation rather than the traditions of the Polish workers' movement." To be sure, striking workers, along with many advisors from the opposition intelligentsia, set forth demands which were consistent with the ideological premises and values of socialism. Nevertheless, manifestations of patriotic, nationalist, and Christian, sentiments were not uncommon. It is significant, for example, that Solidarity's official Programme ignored the use of the word 'socialism', as if to broaden the documents appeal in Polish society.
Jaworski concludes that Polish traditions lend themselves to political idealism because many Poles refuse to embrace unpalatable realities which appear in conflict with already established political goals. More important, since national catastrophes have historically worked to strengthen Polish resolve, trends towards pragmatism in the political culture are simply discredited as being un-Polish.

Jaworski also acknowledges that history does not repeat itself, however, this should "not exclude the possibility that [history]...can generate a kind of compulsion for repetition, as we have known from analyses of individual life histories. By this we mean repeated efforts to achieve a certain goal in whatever constellation, which in the end leads to incurable fixations".\(^{30}\)

In short, Jaworski is convinced that Polish historical traditions, set in the 19th century and expressed in the contemporary period, are primarily guided by two goals: struggle for civil freedom and national sovereignty.

American political scientist Elizabeth Kridl Valkenie\(\text{r}^{3}\), in her meticulously documented analysis of postwar Polish historiography, confirms the view that the studying and teaching of history is more than just an academic discipline in Poland. Her article, entitled "The Rise and Decline of Official Marxist Historiography in Poland, 1945-1983",\(^{31}\) is a significant contribution to our understanding of the Solidarity movement. She provides detailed information about a largely ignored factor which
influenced the Polish August. In particular, the role of a heroic past in a history conscious society gripped by crisis. As Valkenier asserts: "In times of adversity history has served as an affirmation of national values." in Poland.

On the eve of the changes that gripped Poland in 1968, the 19th century uprisings had pretty well been rehabilitated. Following the turmoil of that year, Marxist revisionists and Catholics took the lead in re-examining Poland's recent history. The changes in official historiography were greatly aided when workers in Gdansk and Poznan protested against the economic policies of the Warsaw government, causing the collapse of the Gomulka regime. The new government, led by Edward Gierek, wanted to strengthen its legitimacy and decided to go along with the on-going rehabilitation of Poland's history in order to connect itself with the achievements of Poland's past. "On the face of it, the interests of party, society, and the [historical] profession seemed to coincide after 1970."  

One of the most significant publications of the 1970s was Bogdan Cywinski's *Geneology of the Unbowed.* As Valkenier describes it, Cywinski, a prominent Catholic historian, "analyzed the nineteenth-century independence movements in terms of the moral and ethical choice which individuals made in coping with Poland's adversities. The book's avowed aim was to uncover the motives of nineteenth-century Poles in order to strengthen 'our moral stance' of today." Moreover, "the Catholic historian's
interpretation was meant to inspire society to act for itself, true to its vision and value system, in order to change the political system.\textsuperscript{36}

Also, it should be noted that other writers agree with Valkenier's assessment of Cywinski's volume. They also share her view that the book had a powerful impact on Poland's youth.\textsuperscript{37} Indeed, The Lexicon of the Solidarity movement said of Cywinski's work: "Despite a small edition of 3,500 copies, it was one of the most significant books published in postwar Poland. By representing the story of two magnificent generations of the intelligentsia, whose heroic effects were crowned with independence...it served as a true inspiration to the generation presently in their thirties...It can be said without exaggeration that it shaped many of the activists of August 1980."\textsuperscript{38}

Gierek was never really able to capitalize on the rehabilitation of Polish history during his tenure of power. The vindication of interwar Poland only served to emphasize the lies which dominated Polish history texts and official pronouncements about the outbreak of World War II and the establishments of People's Poland. "As subsequent years were to demonstrate," Valkenier continues, "the failure to face up to some 'uncomfortable' facts in recent Polish-Soviet relations and domestic politics made history a weapon ready at hand in society's battle with the regime."\textsuperscript{39}

Valkenier points to 1978 as the most important year in
the liberalization of Polish history. This phase lasted until martial law was declared. Two factors dominated this period: the youth of Poland and underground publications. The younger generation was devoted to a diffuse set of liberationist ideals. "Their obsession with national independence, as constituting the essence of Polish history, was very much a part of the mounting turmoil." As evidence, Valkenier cites a well known survey conducted among students at the University of Warsaw. The survey showed a rise of an "activist" vision of history. Polish youth was now interested in the individuals who fought for Polish independence.

The second factor, the emergence of countless underground publications, also testified to the growing crisis. The focus of most publications was the official falsification of history. To be sure, some publications, such as the reports of DiP, attempted to give some constructive advice to the Gierek government. Most of the other publications, however, avoided moderate tones. In fact these publications "sought to tell the 'full truth' about some controversial issue, the Katyn massacre for instance. But their content was hardly objective; they testify more to the deep-seated hatred of Soviet domination than to any concern for historical veracity. In short, they expressed the gut response of a frustrated society." The extent to which some Poles felt obliged to express a plurality of views on a number of important topics could only have
been perceived as a threat by the PZPR. Valkenier points out that at the annual meeting in 1979, the Historical Association demoted historical materialism from its position as the sole method of scholarship. This change was in fact a compromise, since the Association wanted to totally eliminate any mention of historical materialism in its official statute.  

The emergence of Solidarity in August 1980 liberalized Polish society to a level without precedence in the Soviet bloc. Valkenier outlines two reforms in particular: "history teaching in schools and the validation of the most recent - post-1947 - history." The founding in Warsaw of Solidarity's official newspaper, Tygodnik Solidarnosc ("Solidarity Weekly"), and the establishment of countless public lectures, also gave the Polish public access to sensitive historical discussions. Unfortunately, Valkenier does not mention the informative "letters to the editor", primarily in the Solidarity paper, Warsaw's influential Polityka ("Politics"), and the Catholic Tygodnik Powszechny ("Universal Weekly") of Cracow, which attest to the public's awareness of historical controversies and passion for Poland's past.

The most revealing aspect of Valkenier's article is her discussion of Polish historiography after the imposition of martial law. Historians and Polish society lost their autonomy after the military crackdown, but the "changed and changing situation brimmed with paradoxes, reversals, small gains, impasse,
much hesitance, and plain muddle."\(^{48}\) Even the liberal wing of the party produced a relatively honest assessment - *The Kubiak Report* - of the causes of the political crisis.\(^{49}\)

Furthermore, Valkenier points out, the "profession did not suffer severe purges, even though historians had been very active in political and cultural renovation."\(^{50}\) The regime's main concern, with regards to the teaching of history in this period, was to enlighten the disaffected Polish youth about certain geopolitical realities. In discussing the negative impact of the new law on higher education passed in 1985, Valkenier writes: "Despite this depressing setback, the valiant endeavor of teachers and professors to retain and restore professional ethics has not been in vain."\(^{51}\) The effects of Solidarity cannot be erased.

Finally, the public's thirst for historical subjects still carries on the spirit of the debates that took place in Poland while Solidarity was legally active. The major difference between the past debates about history and the present ones, Valkenier poignantly suggests, is that the goal of historical objectivity has been replaced with a moral one. The focus is also on which of two programmes should guide Polish society: evolution or active opposition. The question remains: "What is the historical tradition that has guided and should guide the Poles in times of adversity? Is it the romantic spirit of revolt and intransigence, or the realistic spirit of accommodation and slow organic work?"\(^{52}\)
Adam Bromke, in *Poland: The Protracted Crisis*,\textsuperscript{53} has put together a collection of twenty-three studies, essays, and interviews published in various scholarly journals and newspapers from 1969 to 1982. The overriding framework for all the chapters in this book is Bromke's "model" of Poland's politics—the dichotomy between idealism and realism. The result is a volume analyzing the political and economic crisis which led to the birth of the Solidarity movement in August 1980 to the declaration of martial law and its aftermath.\textsuperscript{54}

For the most part, the essays have withstood the test of time. And while the volume suffers from some of the usual faults found in any compilation (such as repetition), it contains much that is valuable to our understanding of the causes and rise of Solidarity. Also, Bromke's focus on Poland's foreign policy since the Gomulka era and Poland's position as an essential—if unruly—ally of the Soviet Union, is particularly significant. The most obvious conclusion that leaps from most of the essays is that the power of the Polish state is not limited by any law, but rather by Moscow's will. In this context, it is unfortunate that Bromke did not include a review or detailed analysis of the extent to which Poland's ruling party, security service, military, and communications system are integrated into the corresponding Soviet
institutions.

With regard to the Polish crisis, the most important study is "The Revival of Political Idealism in Poland". Bromke asserts that the "cycle of Polish history has once more worked with the precision of the proverbial Swiss watch. After a period of political realism in the 1950s and 1960s, with the rise of a new generation, political idealism triumphed in the 1970s. It culminated in the rise of 'Solidarity' in August 1980 and continued during the sixteen months of 'incremental revolution', until the imposition of martial law". Furthermore, Bromke is highly critical of the "extremists" in Solidarity for pushing the movement to the brink and therefore placing Poland in jeopardy of being invaded by troops from the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The Soviet threat, compounded by Poland's severe economic plight, Bromke adds, left the Jaruzelski regime with few options. For Bromke, martial law - although a tragedy for Poland - was a lesser evil and preferable to a Soviet invasion.

To be sure, some critics contend that Bromke's "realism" is merely an acceptance of the status quo in Poland. A reading of this book, however, suggests that Bromke is profoundly in favour of Poland's independence from the Soviet Union. Bromke points out that both the Polish opposition and the communist leadership must try to adopt evolutionary policies towards change in Poland. On the other hand, Bromke believes that under the present system of power operating in Europe, Poland's
liberalization is not governed solely by the will of the Polish people. For that reason, the vast majority of Poland's political opposition needs to adjust their rhetoric and actions to the geopolitical reality of Soviet power. They consider the collapsing state of the Polish economy as the foremost political problem faced by the Polish nation. The goal of further democratization and independence need not be abandoned, only temporarily mitigated.

Bromke also saves some of his criticisms for Poland's ruling elite. "The direct reason for the popular upheaval in Poland in 1980-81", Bromke points out, "is...the profound and persistent failure of the communist system...Each time promises of reform were made, and each time they were not kept...By 1980 the ruling Communist party had lost all its credibility. This time the Poles were going to take events into their own hands - to participate in the reform of the communist system and, if necessary, to replace it with democracy." The disastrous Gierek leadership, however, was only one element of the crisis. The other element, no less intensive Bromke argues, was tied with a new cyclical transition from realism to idealism. This peculiar aspect of Polish history came into force when Poland lost its independence in the 18th century and successive generations of Polish youth felt obliged to fight for their nation's liberty.

Several significant changes, both domestic and international, have caused the revival of idealism in Polish
politics. First, Poland's youth - free of the defeatist memories of World War II and its aftermath - demanded broader political freedoms and questioned the restrictive policies of the communist regime. The student demonstrations of 1968 signalled a new atmosphere in the country. From the young activists of 1968 emerged the seasoned opposition leaders (such as Adam Michnik) of the 1970s. And after the workers' protests in 1970 and 1976, the opposition strove to merge its activities with those of the working class. Furthermore, the emergence of West Germany's Ostpolitik, the signing of the Warsaw-Bonn treaty of 1970, and détente in East-West relations, diminished the Soviet Union's role as a guarantor of Poland's territorial integrity.

Another major change was the growing dissent movement in the Soviet Union. The Soviet dissent phenomenon of the 1970s inspired some Polish hopes for impending liberalization in that country. Bromke elaborates: "Although in the second half of the 1970s the human rights movement in the USSR actually declined, the Poles clearly hoped, that this was the beginning of a broad popular upheaval which would bring major changes in the Soviet Union." And finally, the election of Karol Cardinal Wojtyla to the Papal throne in 1978 - combined with his triumphal visit to Poland in 1979 - greatly aroused the already acute Polish national and patriotic pride. The Catholic church's emergence as a vocal exponent of human rights and democratic reform also helped overcome the traditional hostility between Catholics and liberal
intellectuals. Indeed, many leading "Marxist" opposition leaders concluded that it was time for both the Catholics and Secular Left to put aside past hostilities and join in an alliance for the democratization of Poland.

As the leading proponent from the Secular Left, Adam Michnik, put it: "For us - the Secular Left - the encounter with Christianity, centering on such values as tolerance, justice, human dignity and the search for truth, opens the way for an ideological community in a new dimension, important for the formulation of the direction of our struggle for democratic socialism."62

A leading Polish scholar of political philosophy and former member of the DiP group, Andrzej Walicki, echoes some of the earlier criticisms of both Solidarity and the Polish ruling elite. Walicki adds that the only solution to the tensions in Poland on the eve of martial law could have been achieved through free elections - a solution tantamount to the total surrender of communism in Poland and one that would never be accepted by the Soviets. In "The Main Components of the Situation in Poland: 1980-83,"63 Walicki also concludes that from the early 1950s to the late 1970s, the Polish political system evolved from a system legitimized by Marxist theory of social progress to a de-ideologized system of arbitrary political commands and into a system without stable and general rules of law. The whole process resulted in the de-ideologization of the ruling party and the
total loss of legitimacy for communist rule in Poland. Irresponsible economic decisions were therefore common and widespread corruption became the norm.

As for the Solidarity movement and the Polish crisis, Walicki observed: "Martial Law was precisely what I had expected. It was clear to me that Martial Law was the only alternative to a Soviet invasion...the non-violent revolution had already achieved a point of no return. No government in the world would be able to survive with such an overwhelmingly powerful extra-parliamentary opposition as existed in Poland." Political realism, Walicki continues, had given way to a new and powerful wave of traditional Polish 'political romanticism'. Not only the Polish working class, but even the Polish peasants joined in the barrage against the state. These two social groups, together with the intelligentsia, had decided that they would no longer be ruled - the nation was united in a belief that it would rule itself.

The intelligentsia - a vital key to the crisis - exhibited in its behaviour both the virtues and faults of the Polish national character. On the one hand, Walicki points out, the intelligentsia displayed remarkable principledness and on the other hand, it lacked ordinary common sense. More important, the moderate opposition intelligentsia surrendered its mediating function. This group feared that their precious alliance with the working class - effected soon after the formation of KOR - would be damaged if criticism of Solidarity was voiced. The effects of
such a relationship needs little elaboration. Those in Solidarity's leadership who insisted that the movement proceed with caution were quickly labelled - as Walicki states - "traitors" to the working class.

In terms of Poland's future, Walicki is pessimistic about the chances for economic reform. Walicki argues, that the country lacks, at a minimum, the desire for political and moral concessions necessary for reforms to work. Walicki is also convinced that the historically conditioned Polish national character is not congenial to Soviet-type socialism. Despite the regime's many attempts, Polish patriotism cannot be mobilized by the communists. Indeed, Walicki goes so far as to state: "Polish society clearly...[lacks] the German ability to do honest, well organized work under any government." [Walicki's emphasis]. And finally, the centralized bureaucratic model of socialism makes it impossible for Poles to pursue honest private interests, necessary for Poland's economy to survive. Therefore, since Solidarity's experiment in participatory democracy and in dual power was too unrealistic to succeed, the Jaruzelski regime needs to allow the broadest liberalization possible. "Something must be done to break this stalemate", Walicki concludes, and "it is obvious that it should be done by the government."67

Three other articles by Andrzej Walicki also need brief mention. In "Mysli o sytuacji politycznej i moralno-psychologicznej w Polsce," ("Thoughts on the Political and
Moral-Psychological Situation in Poland" \(^6\) Walicki provides a detailed critique of Poland's intelligentsia during the Solidarity period. He advances the thesis that leading advisors to Solidarity encouraged the movement to move along the road of "peaceful revolution", which amounted - despite the facade of a peaceful dialogue - to political confrontation. The second article, "Tradycje polskiego patriotyzmu," ("The Traditions of Polish patriotism") \(^6\) is significant because Walicki takes issue with some opposition leaders, who claim that their political programme is based on political realism.\(^7\) In particular, Adam Michnik's reading of Roman Dmowski and the conclusion that the programme of active opposition - as practiced by Solidarity and the post-martial law underground - reflects Dmowski's political realism.\(^7\) To be sure, Walicki concludes that Michnik, and his colleagues, do not adequately understand Dmowski's political realism. Walicki argues that Michnik takes from Dmowski only those aspects of his thought which justify the opposition's radical policies. In a final note of caution to Poland's opposition movement, Walicki warns that Poland is not a private possession that can be either appropriated, given away, or gambled with. Poland's domestic position is affected by a deep economic crisis and no amount of wishful thinking or "active protest" will save it unless Poles take an active part in re-building the economy.

Finally, in "The Paradox of Jaruzelski's Poland," \(^7\)
Walicki comes to some important and revealing – if not still controversial – conclusions. First, he argues that "Jauzelski’s government is more tolerant, more intelligent and flexible than the ‘liberal’ regime of Gierek". While problems with Jaruzelski’s rule are still very real and pressures against moderation abound, Walicki is nevertheless convinced that real positive changes have taken place in Poland and more could follow. At the very least, "Jaruzelski’s Poland deserves to be seen in the West as a country in which the process of de-totalitarianization of ‘real socialism’, characteristic also of other countries of East-Central Europe, is the most advanced."74

In *Communism in Crisis*, British political scientist George Sanford has produced an extremely well documented study which goes beyond the mostly journalistic and first-person accounts that make up the majority of volumes published on the Polish crisis. Sanford’s subtle and coherent analysis of the first year of the Polish "renewal" begins with the premise that no fundamental change in Poland’s communist system – if not all Soviet-type systems – is possible if not led by the ruling party. More specifically, if Solidarity had synchronized its goals with the moderate and reformist elements in the party, a Polish *fait accompli* could have been presented to the Soviets.

With a strong Polish party and the ten-million member Solidarity movement, the leaders in Moscow would have had to take seriously Poland’s desire for changes in the communist system. As
Sanford put it: "For a while, certainly until after the Ninth PZPR Congress in July 1981, it appeared possible, even quite likely, that the reformist and centrist elements within the PZPR would, as in 1956, find common ground with the moderate elements in Solidarity; in this way they would face the Kremlin, as in 1956, with an insuperable, although not wholly unacceptable, Polish domestic fait accompli."76

While Sanford is particularly critical of Solidarity, he does admit that the party was also unable to seize the initiative of reform until it was finally too late. The rise of Solidarity first paralyzed and then demoralized the party. From October 1980, the party was split over bitter ideological disputes and pressured by the Soviets. However, when the reformers finally had the upper hand after the July Party Congress, Solidarity was not prepared to compromise. Soon after, Jaruzelski took full command and announced that the time for government concessions had ended. The mounting pressures from the Soviets and by Polish party hard-liners, forced Jaruzelski to adopt a more stringent line against Solidarity. The movement responded with a similar policy of intransigence; the whole process ended in stalemate and finally martial law.

Unfortunately, the weakest part of Sanford's analysis is the lack of a comprehensive explanation of why the party reformers were defeated. Although, Sanford does allude to the extensive Soviet pressures which were in total opposition to Solidarity, the
quickly declining economy, and the rising political antagonisms of 1981, as part of the explanation. As for the reformers, Sanford provides convincing evidence that as early as September 1980 there was a significant number of Polish party members who were ready to accept and support reforms. This reform-minded group was sincere, Sanford asserts, in their acceptance of limited grass-roots autonomy and independent trade unions, as long as the trade union remained outside the larger political arena and confined its activities to local problems.

There is one more volume which provides a detailed analysis of the course and political dynamics of the crisis. However, unlike Sanford's study, Neal Ascherson's *The Polish August* is an interpretive political history that pays particular attention to Poland's historical background thus having a more limited coverage on the actual course of the crisis. Ascherson, a professional journalist, gives us an excellent day-by-day account of the Polish events. His lively style, and quick pace, makes the book a valuable introduction for both the general reader and interested scholar. For Ascherson, the Polish drama is explained primarily in economic terms. And Solidarity is analyzed principally as a workers' movement.

Ascherson details the Polish workers' struggle with Soviet-style communism and clearly shows the disillusionment faced by the working class after the failed hopes of 1956, 1970 and 1976. Furthermore, the failing Polish economy of the late 1970s
was the last straw for many Poles. Also, Poland's "imported" socialism had little chance of survival. Ascherson rightly asserts that many Polish workers were not opposed to socialism as an abstract ideal, but against Soviet domination and the Kremlin's willing Polish followers. In fact, Ascherson concludes that it was the workers' perception about the PZPR as a willing agent of Moscow, which was particularly offensive to Polish society and mobilized the workers for the sixteen months of upheaval.

In Solidarity: The Analysis of a Social Movement, French sociologist, Alain Touraine, asserts that Solidarity was neither a party nor a revolutionary trade union: it was a movement for the liberation of society and culture dominated by the state. His book is a collaboration with Polish social scientists and Solidarity members at the local level. Touraine's eclectic methodological approach is, to say the least, imposing. Nevertheless, the methodology made the rapid field work, in a number of settings, possible. In short, Touraine evaluates the movement's values, development, and goals from the perspective of rank-and-file Solidarity members.

Unfortunately, Touraine's "sociological interventionist approach" forced the researcher's to be highly selective in their sample of participants. The interviews with some ten members of Solidarity in each of six cities gives us only partial insight into the movement. More important, "gut" reactions, rather than comprehensive analysis is the response of most participants. The
generalizations from these interviews do not provide either a synthesis or profile of the movement. Also, too much emphasis is put on almost every word uttered by the participants in this study. Nevertheless, Touraine's interviews with important opposition figures, such as Adam Michnik and Leszek Moczulski, are revealing. Overall, the book's value is in its portrayal of Solidarity as a multi-dimensional phenomenon.

One of the most influential advisors of Solidarity, Jadwiga Staniszkis, in Poland's Self Limiting Revolution⁷⁹, argues that the Polish crisis of 1980-81 was a "self-limiting revolution". In 1980, for the first time, Poland's workers managed to organize on a class level against the communist party and profoundly changed the traditional relationship between the rulers and ruled in Soviet-Marxist society. The feeling of mass achievement and subsequent pride played a significant role in the crisis. Polish workers looked upon their gains against the self-appointed and defeated regime with much satisfaction. However, the conflict between Solidarity's goal for democratization and the party's authoritarianism was also present in the mass movement. Solidarity was unable to provide the unity needed to battle the party because its evolution allowed for the incorporation of all viewpoints found in Polish society. This contradiction between pluralism and unity made conflict, within Solidarity, inevitable.

Solidarity could not effectively mobilize its members at
the local level and a gap between the goals of the leadership - itself divided - and the rank-and-file grew. A weak Communist leadership, not in favour of extensive reforms, made the usual promises, but failed to implement them. In the end, Staniszkis adds, the regime took advantage of its own intransigence, the "revolution of frustrated expectations", and the widening gap between the various segments in Solidarity. Not surprisingly, Staniszkis is critical of the workers - primarily after the Bydgoszcz incident - and sympathetic to the "intellectuals" in Solidarity. Staniszkis points out that the intellectuals and experts of Solidarity - with some members of the working class, including Lech Walesa - tried to mitigate the influence of rank-and-file radicals, but the "revolutionary" pressures were too great.

The major problem with this very valuable book is its poor translation, organization, and liberal use of sociological jargon. Staniszkis started by trying to write a corporatist study of Poland under the communist system. Unfortunately, she neither purges nor adequately synthesises that perspective within her analysis. Furthermore, Staniszkis argues that all crises in Poland were manipulated by the party. However, Staniszkis contradicts this by adding that the party lacks substantial control over some aspects of Poland’s economy because of poor investment priorities, planning, and extensive hard-currency indebtedness. Staniszkis also accepts that large segments of
Polish society have found autonomous methods for self-expression. She even points out that the Poles have been operating their own separate "society" with an established state since the 19th century.

Staniszkis seems to be forcing her conclusion about the "self-limits" of Solidarity's revolution. If anything, Staniszkis gives an excellent account of the gradual radicalization of a spontaneous and massive revolutionary movement. Furthermore, Staniszkis' detailed accounts with regards to the excessive moralism, symbolism, and posturing, within Solidarity leads the reader to conclude that the movement in fact reflected an "incremental revolution". Finally, Staniszkis gives a clear impression that Solidarity was moving towards a final confrontation with the Jaruzelski regime.

Four more books analyzing the Polish crisis need brief mention. Stan Persky's At The Lenin Shipyard. Poland and the Rise of the Solidarity Trade Union, portrays the strength and determination of Polish popular resistance to the communist regime. Persky also details the power contest between Solidarity and the party. Persky adds that the regime failed to tolerate the forces of opposition because the Soviets provided an easy way out for the PZPR. Finally, Solidarity did not provoke martial law, the party forced in on Poland. To a large extent, Persky's analysis is correct. However, he is not clear about the recognized Soviet pressures opposing reform and also fails to note
the very real weaknesses within the party.

Jean-Yves Potel, in *The Promise of Solidarity* provides another first-hand journalistic account of the early months of Solidarity. Above all, Potel tries to remain true to the Solidarity ideal and offers - if not uncritical - full support to its activists. The French journalist, is also influenced by his sympathy for non-Soviet communism and praises the "true" Marxist nature of the workers' uprising. Finally, Potel is obsessed with the pursuit of political power. He argues, for example, that KOR should have moved from its tactic of uniting society to a tactic which actively encouraged the workers to move against the totalitarian system. Unfortunately, Potel does not tell us how this was to be done.

Peter Raina's *Poland 1981: Towards Social Renewal*, analyses the Polish events from the perspective of a failed "socialist renewal". To a large extent, Raina was influenced by Sanford's study. Raina assumes that the reforms accepted by the party - demanded by Solidarity - were signs that the crisis need not have ended with martial law. The analysis is sound. On the other hand, Raina should also have focused on the limits within which Polish communism operates. Overall, this is a balanced account of the Polish crisis of 1980-81. Raina's contribution - as with his earlier volumes on Polish opposition politics - is noteworthy primarily for the addition of many unedited documents.

One school of thought, best represented by Alex
Pravda's, "Poland 1980: From 'Premature Consumerism' To Labour Solidarity," argues that the Polish crisis demonstrates the bankruptcy of the Soviet political and economic bureaucratic command model. Polish workers were not satisfied by the failed promises of 1956, 1970, and 1976 and therefore demanded guarantees on the right to strike and form self-governing trade unions. Another line of explanation has it that the crisis was an economic collapse caused by poor investment, over-centralized planning, and excessive indebtedness to the West. When the political factor of rising public expectations - aggravated by Gierek's unrealistic economic promises - is added, the outcome is crisis. Moreover, young, modern, materialist, and consumer-minded Poles wanted more than the system could provide. It is not surprising that the Polish regime is to a large extent in agreement with the above assessment.

The most significant conclusion reached in many of these economic studies is that unless the West aids Poland with new debt schedules, and even further loan schemes, Poland's economic collapse may become a reality. At the very least, Poland's poor economic position might cause it to become more dependent on the Soviet economy. However, the authors of these works caution against expecting too much from Western economic aid. Nevertheless, they argue that if the Jaruzelski regime in fact institutes serious economic reforms, aid from Western governments should be extended.
Many commentators were influenced by Jadwiga Staniszkis' analysis of the Polish crisis. George Kolankiewicz, in "Bureaucratized political participation and its consequences in Poland," for example, agrees with Staniszkis that Gierek's corporatist techniques of protest-absorption exacerbated stratification in Polish society and stimulated a working-class revolt. Also reflecting Staniszkis' analysis, Daniel Singer and Andrzej Szczypiorski contend that the communist system in Poland divided the ruling elite from the rest of Polish society. While the rulers benefited from the system, they became oblivious to the real interests and desires of the majority of the Polish population.

Also available, is a type of analysis of the crisis which accepts the popular Western image of the "heroic" Polish worker, peasant, and intellectual struggling against tyranny. This perspective is best represented by Timothy Gaton Ash's journalistic study, The Polish Revolution, and Andrew Targowski's Red Fascism: Polish Revolution, 1980. While neither book is particularly satisfying, there are some interesting points of view expressed. The major purpose of both books is to counter any sort of criticism about Solidarity among Western writers.

Jack Bielasiak and Maurice D. Simon have edited an excellent volume on the Polish crisis. Despite the suggestive title, Polish Politics: Edge of the Abyss is the best overall analysis of Poland's politics from 1945 to martial law. First,
there is a balanced introductory and concluding chapter which does the best job so far of synthesizing the Polish August. The remaining thirteen chapters cover Poland's economy and agriculture; Solidarity's self-government scheme and an excellent discussion on Solidarity's attitudes towards socialism; public opinion during the crisis; the political elites, intellectuals, the Catholic church, the PZPR, and the military. Finally, both Soviet and East European responses to the crisis are remarkably well analyzed.

The most interesting chapter, "Polish Intellectuals in Crisis," written by Jane Leftwich Curry and Joanna Preibisz, is also the most controversial. The authors conclude that Poland's intelligentsia sat on the sidelines during the crisis, while Party and Solidarity representatives ran the show. However, this chapter has problems defining "intelligentsia" and asks more questions than it answers.

The Polish communists, after the declaration of martial law, began to publish extensive studies and articles in the press on the causes of the crisis of 1980-81. In Polityka, the newly-established weekly Tu i teraz ("Here and Now"), and other press organs, a variety of writers endeavoured to explain the years before Solidarity, and the causes of the Polish crisis. Indeed, in 1983 an anthology of the more important press articles was published by Jerzy Adamski.

Janusz Reykowski, an academic, acknowledged that the
broad appeal, popularity, and social strength of Solidarity was to be explained by "the declining standard of living, the ineptness of public and state institutions, corruption, nepotism and lawlessness." Not only was the Gierek regime implicated, but the PZPR itself. More important, Reykowski denied the dogmatic communist argument which postulated that Solidarity had no "rational basis". Publicist Krzysztof Teodor Toeplitz pointed out that cosmetic changes in both the economic sphere and political arena (although to a lesser extent) will not do. The workers, he argued, must be shown that the system can make substantive changes. And while he acknowledged that "there can be no retreat from socialism in Poland, there can [also] be no return to the situation which existed before August 1980." The major stress in many of these articles was that the political and economic situation cannot remain unchanged. Moreover, unless the PZPR found a way in making the workers feel they had a say in the economy, economic progress would not be possible.

The most important publication was the so-called Kubiak Report. Both in 1956 and in 1970 special party commissions were appointed to report on the causes of the crises in those years. Neither report was ever made public. However, the commission set up by the PZPR at the IX Congress in July 1981 to look into the sources of all postwar Polish crises did publish its report - The Kubiak Report. Admittedly the version published constituted an 80-page synthesis of an allegedly 10,000 page study. It is also
alleged that the final — and sixth — draft was a considerably
toned-down version of the very critical earlier drafts.\textsuperscript{100}

In the alleged earlier draft, the commission noted that
since 1948 a concentration of political power has become the rule.
As a result, the fundamental causes of social crises in People’s
Poland has been the method of governing and the attitudes of the
authorities to society. More important, the alleged earlier draft
dismissed the notion that political opposition fomented crises.
Indeed, the opposition arose when the appropriate conditions in
society had already risen. More important, the crises were caused
by negative internal developments and not precipitated by the
international situation; that the nature of the government system
since 1945 — never adequately reformed — engendered crises.\textsuperscript{101}

The official version reflected some of the criticisms in
the alleged earlier draft, however, there was also a long list of
platitudes about socialist democracy, intra-party democracy,
social justice, and socialist patriotism. Another important study
was written by political scientist Jerzy Wiatr (also a member of
the Kubiak Commission).\textsuperscript{102} Wiatr argued that the recurrent cycle
of crises was the product of the "alienation of government", the
opposition between the "governing" and the "governed". In his
view, we can treat the question of institutional reform — in the
economy as well as in politics — as the key problem of the whole
1956–80 period. Significantly, Wiatr added, that martial law
decided the issue of political power, but the issue of economic
and political reform has not been eliminated. Also, there is a need, he added, to end the cleavage between government and society so that the system can adequately react to signals of unrest.

However, Wiatr's analysis and calls for reform, merited special criticism. A Soviet writer, A.V. Kuznetsov, writing in Voprosy filosofii, argued that Wiatr's assessment - blaming the Polish crisis on "excessive centralization of power" which led from the leading role of the party - was erroneous. Kuznetsov inferred that Wiatr's whole analytical scheme was both false and dangerous. And that Wiatr's calls for reforms were unnecessary. For Kuznetsov, Polish crises were merely produced by anti-socialist forces trying to turn the tide of history.

The Superpowers

Nicholas Andrews, in Poland 1980-81, has written a passable analysis of the Polish crisis. However, as a retired director of the State Department's East European desk in the 1970s, more than a pedestrian account of events could have been expected. Andrews spent 1979-81 in the U.S. embassy in Warsaw, but his book benefits little from the many vital contacts he would have had. On the other hand, Andrews does give a serviceable account of the political history of 1980-81, when "pluralism ran wild" in Poland. Finally, the discussion of U.S. policies towards Poland, the issue of a possible Soviet invasion, and Soviet-Polish
preparations for martial law, are surprisingly uninformative and bland.

The memoirs, of former United States President Jimmy Carter, Carter's National Security Assistant, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and President Reagan's former Secretary of State, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., have greatly contributed to our knowledge of both American perceptions and policies towards Poland during its time of crisis. Brzezinski's contribution is significant for two reasons: first, it provides further evidence that the U.S. intelligence services were convinced that the Soviets were preparing to invade Poland and that the Carter Administration sincerely attempted to calm both the Soviets and the Solidarity leadership; second, as far as the Carter Administration was concerned, Solidarity was far too confident about its chances for success. The most important memoir is General Haig's. Haig clearly points out that many in the Reagan Administration were less interested in the plight of the Poles and wanted to use the Polish crisis for both domestic reasons and as a means to pressure the West European democracies. In short, Haig's analysis provides ample proof that the Reagan Administration's policy towards Poland is no more than "moralism cum indifference". 

In The Polish Crisis: American Policy Options, Jerry F. Hough provides a balanced - if limited - assessment of the Polish crisis and recommends that United States policy towards Poland recognize geopolitical realities and not use economic
pressures as a means to punish either the Polish people or the Soviet regime. In short, Hough is convinced that economic sanctions hurt the Polish people more than the regime and increase East-West tensions.\textsuperscript{108} On the other hand, in "Poland: The Politactics of Sanctions,"\textsuperscript{109} M.S. Daquidi and M.S. Dajani argue in favour of a hard-line American Policy against Poland. The authors provide substantial evidence that the sanctions have worked — in economic terms — and add that sanctions should be extended to pressure the Jaruzelski regime into reform.\textsuperscript{110} However, while the authors prove that the sanctions imposed on Poland worked, they are unable to prove that this had any effect on the Jaruzelski government. In any case, the discussion is simply academic since almost all of the Reagan imposed sanctions against the Soviets and Poland have been removed. American-Polish relations, however, have not improved.

It was two weeks after Solidarity was legalized that the Soviet media made its first official mention of the self-governing trade union. In that announcement, Moscow hinted that strikes by Polish railway workers threatened supply links with East Germany and therefore Soviet security interests. As the events unfolded, the Soviets escalated their subtle hints of opposition to Solidarity and began to forcefully voice their displeasure of the Polish August.\textsuperscript{111} Among other things, the Soviets stressed two important points. First, the Kremlin made it clear that it desired the West — the Americans in particular — to take into
account the fact that Poland was a vital Soviet interest. And second, the Soviets also stressed the "unshakeable" alliance between the Polish and Soviet peoples. The Soviets made every effort to let the Poles and the West know that nothing should threaten communism in the Polish People's Republic and that every effort would be made to save the "fraternal alliance".\textsuperscript{112}

The final category of books which purport to analyse the Polish crisis of 1980-81 is made up of the publications espousing the official Marxist-Leninist interpretation of events. When seriously compared to the earlier volumes discussed, these "official" studies lack both depth and objectivity - or at least the appearance of objectivity. Nevertheless, their lack of sensibility is made up for by their originality. More important, the official interpretations clearly show that the Solidarity movement, if anything, was perceived as a real threat to communist rule in Poland. A reading of these books indicates that their aim was more than a simple rationalization for martial law. They emphasize the desperate position of communist governance in Poland and the extent to which Poland's "fraternal" allies are willing and able to combat Polish society's demands for autonomy and political freedom. Underneath all of the propaganda and half-truths there is a sense that the communist rulers recognize a real and long-term political and economic stalemate in Poland. All this said, there is also an obvious indication that the Polish (and Soviet) regime knows of no quick solution to the dilemma.
The importance of Modzelewski's volume is accentuated by the glowing review it received in a Moscow-based periodical. The review article also noted a Czech and Soviet publication on the Polish crisis. A reading of the Polish publications and the review article points out the overall similarity in the official interpretations about the nature of the Solidarity movement. Without exception, all of the books in the final category refer to almost the same points and criticize the same things.

In essence, the following arguments are put forward:

(i) People's Poland had become - and still is - the focus of a massive and hostile campaign by the forces opposed to socialism;
(ii) the agents of imperialism took advantage of the weak Polish economy and of the "serious political errors" made by some Polish communists;
(iii) the agents of imperialism tried to eliminate the gains made by the working people of Poland;
(iv) the "carefully hatched" conspiracy against Poland was aimed at aggravating the international situation and attempted to whip up anti-communist sentiments in the world;
(v) anti-socialist elements in the West led the campaign against Poland and were aided by the forces of counter-revolution inside the country;
(vi) the PZPR made "serious miscalculations" in the 1970s when it allowed revisionist groups to operate in Poland;
(vii) the aim of
the revisionists was to fan the fires of nationalism and weaken Poland's historic ties with the Soviet Union and other friendly socialist countries; (viii) the two main anti-socialist groups - KOR and KPN (Workers' Defence Committee and Confederation for an Independent Poland) - led the attacks against Marxism-Leninism and threatened the PZPRs leading role in Polish society; (ix) KOR and KPN leaders became the extremists in Solidarity and forced the movement to adopt its counter-revolutionary programme; (x) Poland's anti-socialist forces had wide ranging contacts in the reactionary Polish emigre community and received financial aid from these Western contacts; (xi) American intelligence services directed the extremists in Solidarity (Kuron, Michnik, Walesa, and Moczulski); (xii) the counter-revolutionaries almost caused Poland to "fall into an abyss", but General Jaruzelski halted the regressive process; and finally, (xiii) all communists must be vigilant in their stand against further economic and political deterioration, counter-revolution, and Western imperialist pressures.

Finally, from the review article, it is noteworthy that the Czech writer also blames the crisis on the Catholic hierarchy in Poland and the Vatican. He also adds that Poland's problems were similar to those of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Soviet writer implies that Poland's problems are of a particularly sensitive nature to Moscow because of the revisionist aims of the NATO powers.
ENDNOTES


3 *ibid.*, pp. 631-632.


5 Davies notes that the general discussion on the dichotomy between romanticism and positivism in Polish politics is indebted to the published works of Adam Bromke. Bromke prefers to use the terms idealism and realism.

6 Davies, *Heart of Europe*, pp. 212-213.


8 Leslie wrote Chapters 1-3, Polish history from 1863 to World War I; Antony Polonsky wrote Chapters 4-7, World War I and interwar Poland; Jan M. Ciechanowski wrote Chapters 8-11, Poland during World War II and the immediate postwar years; and Zbigniew A. Pelczynski wrote Chapters 12-17, the Stalinist period to 1975.

9 Leslie, op. cit., p. ii.


12 An important critical review of the National Democratic movement and its controversial leader, Roman Dmowski, can be found in Alvin Marcus Fountain II, *Roman Dmowski: Party, Tactics, Ideology* (Boulder, Col.: East European Monographs, 1980).

13 One of the most serious and controversial subjects in
Polish history is that of Polish-Jewish relations during the interwar period and World War II. For two contrasting points of view see Richard Lukas and Abraham Brumberg, "Poland and the Holocaust (An Exchange.)," The New Republic, January 27, 1986, p. 6.

For a splendid study of the gravity of Nazi occupation policies in Poland, and Polish responses to them, see Richard C. Lukas, Forgotten Holocaust: The Poles Under German Occupation, 1939-1944 (Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 1986).


Blejwas, op. cit., p. 205.

ibid., p. 208.


22 The Piast concept of the National Democrats envisaged the nation as an ethnographically homogeneous entity. This is based historically on the Piast Dynasty of the early Medieval period, when Poland's boundaries were "similar" to the present ones. This view of Poland is in contrast to the so-called Jagiellonian Federation, as represented by the Jagiellonian Dynasty in the late Medieval period. The vision of Poland as a large, multi-ethnic state, belongs primarily to the romantic tradition and was last represented by the ideals of Marshal Jozef Pilsudski during the interwar era.


25 See also Walicki, "Mysli o sytuacji politycznej,"

26 Jaworski, op. cit., p. 358.

27 Jaworski, op. cit., p. 356.

28 There is some debate on whether or not support for socialism among Poles translates into support for Marxism. Furthermore, apparent support for socialism in Poland is mitigated by a rejection of the type applied in the country and only grudgingly accepts the implication that Poland's ties to socialism are connected to the Soviet Union. See David S. Mason, Public Opinion and Political Change in Poland, 1980-1982 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), esp. pp. 73-78. Mason's study is an extremely valuable volume on the many public opinion polls gathered and published during the Solidarity period.


30 Jaworski, op. cit., p. 359.


32 ibid., p. 663. A similar conclusion was echoed by Adam Bromke twenty years earlier, see his "History and Politics in Poland," Problems of Communism, Vol. XV, No. 5, (September/October, 1966), pp. 65-71.

33 ibid., p. 668.


35 Valkenier, op. cit., p. 669.

36 ibid. Valkenier also points out that Cywinski's book was chosen by many young Poles as the best work about the road to independence because it gave them insight into the historical process. See also "Co czytac?," Znak (Cracow), No. 10-11 (1978), pp. 1332-1347.


38 Cited in and translated by ibid. See also Solidarnosc. Leksykon zwiazkowy (Gdansk, 1981), esp. pp. 22-23.

39 Valkenier, op. cit., p. 670.

40 ibid.


42 Reports of the "Doswiedzenie i Przyszlosc" group have been published in English by Jack Bielasiak, op. cit. The Collegium of the Society for the Free Polish University organized DiP in November 1978. And was based on questionnaires sent to some 50 Society members, representing a broad spectrum of the intelligentsia. Copies of the reports were sent to three government officials (E. Gierek, first secretary of the PZPR; H. Jablonski president of the Council of State; and S. Gucwa, speaker
of the Sejm) and Poland's Catholic Primate, Cardinal Wyszynski.

43 Valkenier, op. cit., p. 671. One of the volumes which stand out among the emotional studies produced during this period was also written by Cywinski. See Bogdan Cywinski, Zatruta humanistyka (Warsaw: Glos, 1979).

44 ibid.

45 ibid., p. 673.

46 Tygodnik Solidarnosc was first issued on April 3, 1981. I had an opportunity to attend one of the fascinating and energetic public meetings on Polish history during the summer of 1981. The debate, at the students' club in Cracow, was between historian and Solidarity advisor, Adam Michnik and a young Polish communist - Waldemar Swirgon. Swirgon was the youngest member of the Central Committee of the PZPR.

47 Mieczyslaw Rakowski, the former editor of Polityka, has published a collection of "letters to the editor", Od sierpnia do grudnia (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1981), which covers the sixteen months of Solidarity.

48 Valkenier, op. cit., p. 675.

49 At the extraordinary Ninth Party Congress held in September 1981, a commission, headed by professor Hieronim Kubiak, was appointed to investigate the causes of the crisis of 1980. Two English versions of The Kubiak Report have been published in the West, in Survey, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Summer 1982), pp. 87-107; and Adam Bromke's, Eastern Europe in the Aftermath of Solidarity (Boulder, Col.: East European Monographs, 1985), pp. 120-175.


51 ibid., p. 680.


54 At times Bromke feels compelled to join in the political debates that take place in Poland. See, for instance, his interview in the Catholic Social Weekly, Lad, "Realism and Idealism, The Need for a New Synthesis," in ibid., pp. 200-201.

56 ibid., p. 230.

57 It is significant that the former Director of the U.S. National Security Agency, Admiral Bobby Inman, argued that the Soviet Union was prepared to invade Poland during the crisis of 1980-81. Inman, speaking on a public affairs television program ("American Interests," PBS, July 4, 1986), suggested that the Soviet military was planning to mount a second invasion of Afghanistan after the 1980 Moscow Olympics but was forced to keep important combat divisions nearer to its rebellious ally.

58 Indeed, some of Bromke's critics erroneously interpret his views as "collaboration with the enemy". See, for example, Jacek Bierczin, "Z pustymi i puszczy," Kultura (Paris), No. 6/441 (1984), pp. 137-140. See also Bromke's response in Mysl Polska (London), No. 14/16 (1 August/15 August 1984); and a letter to the editor questioning Bierczin's extreme opinions by American historical scholar, Piotr Wandycz in Kultura (Paris), No. 9/444 (1984), p. 163.


60 After the 1976 workers' protests, KOR (the Workers' Defense Committee) was formed by leading Polish opposition leaders. KOR functioned as both an umbrella organization for Poland's opposition intelligentsia and as a clearing house for the legal protection of workers' rights. For an excellent history of KOR - written by one of its co-founders - see Jan Jozef Lipski's KOR (London: Aneks, 1983). An English-language edition has also been published, see Lipski, trans. by Olga Amsterdamska and Gene M. Moore, KOR: A History of the Workers' Defense Committee in Poland, 1976-1981 (Berkley: University of California Press, 1985).

61 Bromke, The Protracted Crisis, p. 232. Members of Poland's opposition movement regularly corresponded with Soviet and other East European dissidents. In fact, a KOR representative met with Professor Andrej Sakharov in Moscow in 1979 and a number of KOR members met on several occasions with members of
Czechoslovakia's "Charter 77" movement. See Lipski, KOR: A History, pp. 278-285. Lipski's discussion of these meetings is characteristically sub-titled, "For Your Freedom And Ours". A favourite phrase of the 19th century Polish insurrectionists.


64 Ibid., pp. 4-5.

65 Ibid., p. 5.

66 Ibid., p. 11.

67 Ibid., p. 16.

68 Walicki, "Mysli o sytuacji politycznej," pp. 82-104.


73 Ibid., p. 167.

Neal Ascherson, *The Polish August* (New York: Penguin Books, 1981). The most serious drawback to Ascherson’s book is his poor knowledge of Polish history before the imposition of communist rule in Poland. Ascherson makes not only many erroneous statements, but also repeats too many myths about the interwar Republic and Poland’s role in World War II.


Jean-Yves Potel, trans. by Phil Markham, *The Promise of Solidarity: Inside the Polish Workers’ Struggle, 1980-82* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982). Another study based on a socialist perspective — although less radical — is Martin Myant’s *Poland: A Crisis For Socialism* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1982). Unfortunately, Myant never tells us why the Polish events of 1980-81 were in fact a "crisis for socialism". Nevertheless, it is a fairly good straight forward narrative account.


See Rzadowy Raport o Stanie Gospodarki (Warsaw, July 1981) [Mimeographed].


Daniel Singer, The Road to Gdansk (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982); and Andrzej Szczypiorski, trans. by Celina Wieniewska, The Polish Ordeal: The View From Within (London: Croom Helm, 1982). Szczypiorski was active in Solidarity and as a former journalist for Polityka, has some interesting things to say about his former editor, Mieczyslaw Rakowski.


See also Mason, op. cit.
93Bielasiak and Simon, op. cit., pp. 186-211.

94For a thorough review of the arguments on the causes of the Polish crisis, presented by Polish communists, see Bromke, Eastern Europe, pp. 34-41. Some of the English translations of this section are also taken from ibid.


96Cited in Bromke, Eastern Europe, p. 35. See also a collection of Reykowski's writings, Logiika walki, szkice z psychologii konfliktu społecznego w Polsce (Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1984).


98Cited in Bromke, Eastern Europe, p. 35.


101ibid., pp. 164 and 170-172.


106 See Leszek Gluchowski, "Roosevelt, Reagan and the Polish Question: Moralism cum Indifference," East European Quarterly (To be published in the forthcoming edition). See also the Polish translation, Roosevelt, Reagan a kwestia polska: moralizarstwo i obojetnosc (Hamilton, Ont.: McMaster University, 1986). Gluchowski compares the policies of the Roosevelt Administration and Reagan Administration and concludes that both American leaders were only concerned with Poland when it affected U.S. domestic politics. The rhetoric notwithstanding, neither Roosevelt nor Reagan adopted meaningful policies to aid the Polish people.


110 This perspective is also adamantly argued by Jerzy Milewski, Krzysztof Pomian, and Jan Zielonka, "Poland: Four Years After," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Winter 1985/86), pp. 337-359. The authors of this article all live in Europe and help co-ordinate Solidarity's office abroad in the Netherlands. Also, the authors assume that the West's real interests are primarily with Solidarity's underground leadership. The reality belies such an assumption.


112 Cf. A. Sergeyev, "The Hypocritical Intrigues Around
Poland," International Affairs (Moscow), No. 4 (April, 1982), pp. 67-76; and Y. Nikolayev and V. Belyshev, "The Unshakeable Alliance of Two Fraternal Peoples," International Affairs (Moscow), No. 5 (May, 1982), pp. 92-94. Also, for a very good Western analysis of the Soviet reaction to the Polish crisis, see Sidney I. Ploss, Moscow and the Polish Crisis (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1986).


114 A. Gorshkov, "Imperialist Conspiracy Against Poland," International Affairs (Moscow), No. 10 (October 1983), pp. 142-145.

Patiently enduring so long as it seemed beyond redress, a grievance comes to appear intolerable once the possibility of removing it crosses men's minds.

Alexis de Tocqueville

CHAPTER TWO

IDEALISM VERSUS REALISM AND THE POLISH CRISIS

A review of literature and analysis of the Polish crisis of 1980-81 clearly indicates that no one single interpretation of the causes, success or failures of Solidarity, or the reasons for the imposition of martial law will satisfy all of the interested scholars. Moreover, the multi-dimensional aspect of Poland's popular upheaval is seldom questioned. On the other hand, there is a clear consensus among the many analysts that the most direct reason for the worker's strikes in July-August 1980 was the monumental failure of communism in Poland. The vast majority of Polish society, using the tested weapon of work stoppages, clearly indicated their disapproval of the Soviet-imposed model of political and economic governance in Poland with the emergence of NSZZ Solidarity.

The process of communist decay in Poland is almost as old
as the Polish People's Republic. As Adam Bromke has observed: "Regime after regime went down in disgrace: in 1956 the Stalinists', in 1970 Gomulka's, and in 1980 Gierek's. Each time promises of reform were made, and each time they were not kept."\(^1\)

Since many of the critics of Poland's communist movement dismiss the PRL as a foreign aberration, totally unrelated to Poland's native traditions, and simply a product of Soviet imperialism, the obvious corruption and feebleness of Polish communism in recent years is not surprising. A clearer reading of postwar Polish history, however, suggests that the former argument is overstated. "The end is hardly in doubt", Norman Davies points out, "but there was a season when it looked for a while that Polish communists seemed to be adapting themselves to national political traditions. Whatever one may think about the involuntary imposition of communism on to Poland in 1944-45...It is inaccurate to regard all Polish communists exclusively as Soviet creatures from start to finish. There was a tiny, but genuine Polish Communist Party before the war; and there were significant numbers of bright-eyed enthusiasts in the postwar era who were eager to give the new 'socialist' ideology its chance."\(^2\) Seen in this light, the failure of Polish communism is particularly glaring.

If the future of communist ideology in Poland is dubious, the reality of communist power is not. Almost all of the writers on the Polish crisis described the disintegration of the PZPR soon
after the recognition of Solidarity; setting in motion the possibility of a peaceful revolutionary change of Poland's communist system. Yet no one predicted what the Polish regime itself called "the state of war". To be sure, writers with a profound knowledge of Soviet determination in East Europe suspected a repeat of the Czechoslovak scenario of 1968 to end the process of renewal and revolutionary change that gripped Poland.

The fact that Western observers did not foresee martial law specifically is, of course, of secondary importance. Of primary concern is the stark reality that Solidarity's leadership underrated the determination and power of the Jaruzelski regime and the Soviets. Jadwiga Staniszkis, a former Solidarity advisor-expert, asserts: "Solidarity leaders believed that the power vacuum (the ruling group's inability to control the real processes in society and the economy) was synonymous with the ruling group's inability to use repression." Furthermore, Staniszkis continues: "leaders of Solidarity also assumed that, even if confrontation were to come; the ruling group would begin with mild and legal methods...with its characteristic situation of stalemate...The assumption that parliamentary procedure would precede eventual confrontation...led Solidarity to overestimate...its ability to choose the most convenient terrain for confrontation."³

While a Soviet invasion never materialized, Solidarity's reaction to this element of the crisis is nevertheless
enlightening. Alexander Hall, a former advisor to Lech Walesa, and acknowledged leader of RMP, reflectively wrote: "The danger of a Soviet threat, no doubt, contributed to the realism of the strikes and the moderate nature of the accords which emerged from them...As time went on, however, and Solidarity scored more and more successes, the awareness of the external threat, among both the masses and the elites [in Solidarity], declined...The view prevailed that 'since they had not invaded so far, they never will'. By the fall of 1981 most people did not expect a confrontation. It had taken little more than a year for the people to forget the past." 4

Since Adam Bromke's Poland's Politics: Idealism vs. Realism was published in 1967, the Western scholars have been aware of one of the great traditional conflicts in Polish history: the tensions between political idealism and political realism. 5 In this context, Bromke has argued: "The crisis of 1980-81 fits neatly into the pattern of Poland's history over the last two hundred years. Since the country's decline as a great power in the eighteenth century the Poles, threatened by stronger neighbours to the east and west, have desperately endeavoured to protect their independence...The situation has traditionally provoked two different responses. The idealists...give first priority to the restoration of the country's independence...In contrast, the realists...advocate the acceptance of a limited autonomy." 6 More important, Bromke adds that since the students'
protests of 1968 there has been a revival of political idealism in Poland. And that the Solidarity movement of 1980-81 was an "incremental revolution" in the tradition of Polish political idealism.

In contrast, Stanislaus Blejwas argues: that "Solidarity, which proved to be a peaceful revolution and an astonishingly broad social movement, was a triumph of political realism in Polish political thought and action." To be sure, Blejwas does not altogether disagree with Bromke; particularly in so far as both writers agree that there exists two responses in Polish political thought towards the perennial question of Poland's independence: idealism and realism. Blejwas' interesting conclusion about the Solidarity movement, on the other hand, questions some fundamental premises made by Bromke about the Polish August. For that reason, the primary aim of this thesis is to re-examine the dichotomy between idealism and realism in Polish politics during the Polish crisis of 1980-81.

There are, of course, other reasons for the adoption of this approach to the study of the Solidarity period. First, the element of sheer intellectual curiosity is a major motivating characteristic. This aspect of the inquiry was in fact influenced by two factors. As Blejwas has correctly pointed out, there is in the West "a vague, monolithic perception of Poland and the Poles as the quintessence of romantic idealism." Indeed, the Western image of the heroic Pole fighting for independence and liberty has
only been heightened by the East-West contest. Significantly, there is a constituency, in the Polish emigre community and inside Poland, that neither disagrees with the former premise nor is interested in denying that image. Also, many Poles with a vague or specific knowledge of Polish history have been taught, usually by their relatives, that despite the enormous obstacles blocking their nation's liberation from foreign dominance, an independent Poland will someday emerge. More important, a denial of that "noble dream" is tantamount to denying ones Polishness. 9

Citing the views of a leading Ukranian dissident, Vasyl Stus, a Radio Free Europe analyst illustrated this point: "Stus averred that 'in the totalitarian world' there was no other nation that defended its human and national rights as resolutely as the Poles and declared: 'I regret that I am not a Pole.'" 10 Furthermore, in Stus's opinion, psychologically the Ukranians are probably closer than any other of the Soviet peoples to the Poles, but he described them as lacking the most important element that consolidated the Poles - 'ardent patriotism.' 11

Another reason for the adoption of Bromke's approach to the study of Polish politics is the publication of varied political and historical studies which have a profound effect on the discussion of the Polish crisis from the perspective of idealism versus realism. Other than those studies already covered in the first chapter (Davies, Blejwas, Jaworski, Valkenier, and Walicki), there are the works published by, for example, Alexander
Hall, Adam Michnik, and Piotr Wierzbicki. Both Hall and Michnik had an intimate knowledge of the Solidarity movement from the perspective of expert-advisors. Also, they had been involved in the Polish opposition movement for a number of years before the emergence of Solidarity. Wierzbicki, a well-known Polish essayist, was connected with the opposition press since the mid-1970s, and interned after the declaration of martial law.

The passage of some five years since the declaration of martial law has given analysts of the Polish crisis and the active participants adequate time to reflect on its nature. And while the crisis, in so far as the Solidarity movement is concerned, has ended, Poland's economic crisis has deepened and oppositionist sentiments in Poland have not declined; despite the fact that almost all of underground Solidarity's original leadership has either been captured or voluntarily surrendered to the authorities. Indeed, much of Polish society has still not reconciled itself to the defeat of Solidarity.

Finally, the political, economic, and moral crisis faced by the Jaruzelski regime underlines the fact that neither Poland nor its ruling elite are "out of the woods". To this extent, the dichotomy between idealism and realism in Polish thought and action provides a useful tool of political analysis. Moreover, the debate between idealism and realism has been both a source of analysis for a number of scholars and, at the very least, has stirred up much fruitful academic controversy.¹²
II

Major political events, as always, produce a crop of new "experts". The Polish crisis is no exception to this phenomenon. Writers who previously paid no attention to Polish affairs, and whose knowledge of the events before 1980 (or at least the postwar period) are the norm rather than the exception. Historian Norman Davies has noted - with a sense of self-confidence:

Political scientists who analyse 'Soviet-style systems' without reference to the fourth [historical] dimension are strong on the defects of official policy, but weak on the specific characteristics of Polish society. Economists, who correctly recognize the portents of Poland's distress, have frequently attributed the political explosion of the 1980s to the mistaken economic policies of the 1970s, not realizing that economic failure was itself but the outward manifestation of political conflicts of much greater duration.

Even the sympathetic reporters who wrote descriptive (in some cases analytical) studies on the stirring scenes in the Lenin Shipyards, or watched as the dreaded ZOMO's triumphed against "people power", only vaguely were able to perceive the Poles' own sense of history in action. These reporters were largely unable to discern the echoes and symbols of Poland's past in its present. Nonetheless, the almost endless news coverage of the Polish events from July 1980 to at least 1983 has helped enlighten much of the
interested Western public to at least one significant reality: there was more at stake during the Polish crisis than the price of meat or the perennial shortage of consumer goods in a communist system. 14 Ironically, the West's greater awareness of the Polish upheaval, adds to its romantic image of the Poles. Nonetheless, "few people in the outside world had the means to look beneath the surface," Davies writes, "and to glimpse the depth and antiquity of the issues involved." 15

Many discussions of the Polish crisis from a historical perspective also recognize that the roots of the upheaval, and the emergence of the Solidarity movement, are to be found in the labyrinthine social, political, and religious peculiarities specific to Poland in the 1970s. And while it would be impossible to assign any single causal factor a predominant value, the role played by the working class - frustrated by a gap between the fiction and reality of Soviet-style communism - can hardly be underestimated. Moreover, the generational pressures of Poland's youth; the influence of the bourgeoning democratic opposition; and, the power of the Catholic church, are also important factors.

Yet it is also clear that any attempt to shed light on the crisis needs to include a study of Poland's historical traditions and the interplay between its geopolitical position and domestic evolution since the loss of statehood in the late 18th century. In this context, British political scientist George Sanford has pointed out that the debate between political idealism
and political realism is one of the most basic and long running themes in Polish politics. And it certainly recurred with a pronounced sharpness and was a major staple of political debate during 1980-81.16

Studies analysing the conditions for political legitimacy in communist systems;17 on the nature of intra-party democracy and self-management;18 about social conflict and the socio-economic dynamics of the Gierek regime's concept of developed socialism;19 or elaboration on the role of the military in the Soviet bloc;20 and finally, studies concerning the crisis in elite resource management of the 1970s,21 are all highly enlightening. And while these varied social science perspectives add to our knowledge about the dynamics of the Polish crisis - including politics in the Soviet bloc 22- they have not provided a satisfactory overall explanation of the course and likely outcome of events from August 1980 to December 1981. On the other hand, the idealist versus realist approach is able to adopt the many limited and specific studies, thereby providing a clearer picture of the crisis.

This discussion should not suggest, however, that the historical profession has a distinct advantage over social scientists in providing a good analysis of recent events. With regards to the generational cycle between idealism and realism in Polish political history, Davies remarked: "Historians, of course, are congenitally suspicious of theories. Many will challenge the details of any overall scheme; and all of them will
reject the notion that the generational cycle could work with the mathematical accuracy of a Swiss watch.²³ Davies is obviously at odds with the many traditional historians in his profession. Indeed, he argues that the generational cycle of competition between the romantics and positivists in Polish history need not be confined to the period of partitions. Davies elaborates: "The modern political cycle in Poland may well have been turning not just for four or five generations, but for eight or nine. By this beguiling reckoning, with nine generations at thirty years per generation stretching from the Battle of Poltava to the birth of Solidarity, the modern political tradition in Poland is considerably senior to the Constitution of the United States, and only marginally junior to the parliamentary democracy of the United Kingdom."²⁴

The traditional historical perspective is eloquently presented by the noted American historian of Poland, Piotr Wandycz. In a stimulating polemic with Bromke, Wandycz argued that the idealism versus realism scheme is flawed.²⁵ His views can be summerized in four points: a) the terms idealism and realism, even romanticism and positivism, are imprecise; b) mapping broader historical regularities is difficult; c) drawing analogies between Poland in the 19th century and the contemporary situation is also difficult; and finally, d) there is a danger that such analogies may be exploited by Poland's communist authorities. The reservations voiced are indeed legitimate.
Bromke's reply, on the other hand, also deserves mention. In the first place, Bromke agrees that the terminology is not precise and therefore susceptible to some confusion. The Polish terms "romanticism" and "positivism" were deliberately replaced with the better known Western terms "idealism" and "realism". And while these terms are taken from literature and philosophy, their use (specifically idealism and realism) in numerous political studies is not uncommon. Indeed, with regards to literature and politics, Davies has noted: "Polish literature was not concerned exclusively with politics by any means...but the fact remains that literature served as the most common surrogate for political debate." 

The connection between politics and literature in Poland has continued in People's Poland. "From the very beginning," Jan Jozef Lipski writes, "KOR was convinced that journalistic publications alone were not sufficient. There was a need to exploit the possibilities offered by the very fact of independent organizing...but also to serve a constantly persecuted Polish culture. The goals were to...enrich the spiritual culture of the intelligentsia, the workers, and the peasants by offering them works that help to understand social processes, history, and a complicated reality; to give to young people and to all of society books that are not mendacious". As an illustration, the underground literary quarterly, Zapis ("The Record") was formed. Zapis was closely linked to KOR and many of its editorial board
members were KOR members or associates. The underground publishing house, Niezależna Oficyjna Wydawnicza ("The Independent Publishing House" - NOWa), was also closely tied to KOR and published some important books. The Third of May Publishing House, on the other hand, was closely connected with the ROPCiO opposition movement.

Bromke prefers the terms idealism and realism because they "imply certain psychological predispositions on the part of individuals participating in the historical events. The realists tend to be by temperament more down to earth and cautious, while the idealist are more emotional and prone to euphoria or despair." In this sense, he suggests that the psychological divide between idealists and realists is "somewhat akin to the split between the westerners and Slavophiles in Russia [and] persists in Poland today." Bromke adds that using the terms "insurrectionists" and "conciliationists" - as does Davies - is also problematic. The insurrectionists and conciliationists only enjoyed brief moments of complete control, and Poland's political situation usually reflected a peculiar amalgam of both programmes. As Blejwas clearly outlines, the Warsaw Positivists of the 19th century, while loyal to the Russian throne, were still engaged in conspiratorial activity. Also, even Jozef Pilsudski closely cooperated with the Austrian authorities in Galicia while preparing a military force.

In any case, idealism and realism are representations of
two political extremes and the programmes of the opposition movements are spread on a broad spectrum between these two poles. "The existence of the two extremes of idealism and realism enables us to undertake a typology of political programmes - depending on where they fit on the continuum - at any given time. This, in turn, allows us to compare them in time, and by doing so to trace their lineage." In order to trace the various political programmes, Bromke has set out a set of classificatory criteria. The essential distinguishing traits are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Idealists</th>
<th>Realists</th>
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<tr>
<td>3. Strong anti-Russian sentiments.</td>
<td>Greater awareness of the danger from Germany (occasionally combined with an ideology common with the Russians).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Expectations of assistance from the West.</td>
<td>Disillusionment with the West.</td>
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In response to Wandycz's skepticism about the cyclical aspect of idealism and realism, Davies has already acknowledged that not all historians would accept such a proposition. The problem is heightened by the fact that the extreme forms of idealism and realism are rarely manifested in their pure forms. On the other hand, both the traditional historians and those who accept the cyclical theory agree that the linear theory of history (ie: Poland's independence is inevitable, or Marxist historical materialism) is too mechanical and, of course, ideological in
nature. Furthermore, all of the writers who accept the cyclical theory in Polish politics make every effort to point out that history does not systematically repeat itself. In contrast to the linear theory, the cyclical theory is purely empirical in character. Bromke elaborates: the cyclical theory "is based upon merely the observing of a repetition of two situations where similarities are more pronounced than differences. It does not deny, moreover, the existence of new elements in each phase, nor does it claim that the cycle must necessarily be constantly repeated. Indeed, should its roots be eliminated and an entirely new situation emerge, the cycle will end too."36

Political scientists are not adverse to cyclical theories. Hans J. Morgenthau, for example, postulated the cyclical "balance of power" theory in international relations. 37 And recently, Zbigniew Brzezinski has helped reawaken Halford John Mackinder's theory of international relations: the geopolitical clash between a great oceanic power, and the dominant land power. Brzezinski argues that, in a cyclical fashion, the United States is the successor to Great Britain (earlier, Spain and Holland) and the Soviet Union to Nazi Germany (earlier, Imperial Germany and Napoleonic France). The Americans being the oceanic power and the Soviets the land power, both competing for global predominance.38

The works, for example, of Blejwas, Bromke, Davies, Fountain, and Jaworski affirm the existence of cycles in 19th century Polish history. Wandycz does not altogether reject the
idea that some phenomena are repeated, however, he suggests that the steadfast national character of the Poles is primarily responsible for the apparent repetition. This may be true, but the notion of national character is elusive and prone to change. Bromke argues that a specific historical determinant is responsible for the cycles. He adds: "the roots of the cycle in Polish history can be found in the vulnerability of the Polish nation in the international sphere and the persistent primacy of external over internal developments in Polish politics, which has left the Poles with basically two options: either struggle for independence or adopt a conciliatory policy toward the foreign rulers." This same conclusion is reached by Jaworski and Walicki (and tacitly argued by Davies).

The existence for cycles in 20th century Poland, especially since the end of World War II, is also reaffirmed by Blejwas, Bromke, and Davies. The emergence of People's Poland - with a highly limited form of autonomy - has not ended the cycles between the idealists and realists. The major difference is that Blejwas disagrees with Bromke about the nature of the movement of 1980-81. The difference in views stems primarily from a different reading of Poland's post-1968 opposition movement. Bromke puts emphasis on the generational changes, marked by the absence of defeatist memories among young Poles. "Many insurgents from 1863 and 1944 subsequently embraced realism, and, in turn, their sons, no longer remembering the lost battles, raised the banner of
idealism once again." This point is also emphasized by Davies. Blejwas, on the other hand, does not take into consideration this aspect of the generational change, but curiously accepts such a phenomenon with regards to the rise of the Warsaw positivists after the defeats of 1863.

There is another important element to the cycles in Polish history. External developments and the internal changes in Poland have not always been complimentary. Polish aspirations for independence during World War I coincided with the emergence of a favourable international situation. It was in the interest of the British, French, and Americans to have an independent Poland, both to balance the power of Germany and the Bolsheviks. In 1831, 1863, and 1944, however, Polish insurrections failed because the Poles did not synchronize their uprisings with international developments.

In response to Wandycz's criticisms, the cycle between idealism and realism is not deterministic. External factors have had - and still can have - influence on the Polish situation. Despite the obvious limitations on contemporary Polish society, the Poles can either continue to struggle - against all odds - for independence, improve their position by accommodating with the foreign rulers, or consciously seek the optimum amount of freedom available at a given moment - combining both idealism and realism.  

Finally, Wandycz's warning that the idealism versus
realism application can be exploited by the Polish communist authorities also requires a response. In the first place, Wandycz is correct, the Polish authorities may well exploit political realism. However, political realists can also exploit the authorities. Political realism does not suggest surrender. Similarly, political realism does not suggest self-interested opportunism. When Piotr Wierzbicki—also associated with KOR—wrote "A Treatise on Ticks [Lice]", he argued that the acceptance of any form of cooperation with the communist authorities carried with it the burden of self-delusion, opportunism, and even perfidy. Adam Michnik responded by drawing attention to the fact that it is far too easy to label as "ticks" many people who should be attracted rather than rejected, and who in their jobs often played an indispensable role in society by defending actual cultural and scientific values. Their presence in official life might be beneficial rather than harmful to society. Michnik also noted the dangers of what might be called "opposition conceit". The idea that "whoever is not with us is against us", since only the opposition is good and noble.

Stanislaus Blejwas curiously begins his study of Warsaw positivism with the statement: "Polish politics cannot be reduced
to a simplistic idealist versus realist dichotomy, as has been attempted by some historians and political scientists.\textsuperscript{45} In the first place, as the previous discussion has shown, the idealist versus realist dichotomy is not simplistic. To be sure, there are methodological weaknesses. Yet it does provide an adequate method for the study of Polish politics and history. It is neither deterministic nor linear. More important, it is flexible and allows for the compartmentalization of the substantial amount of information about the political opposition – particularly the Solidarity movement. And finally, it is an approach which takes into account the varied socio-political, cultural, economic, demographic, and, of course, historical peculiarities of Polish politics. The universal paradigm-builders in the social sciences have – for the moment – not provided a satisfactory overall study of the Polish crisis, but some of the more specific work is enlightening. For their part, the traditional historians have produced rewarding monographs, but have refused to take a broader perspective.

Secondly, Blejwas – after making what appears to be a gesture to the historical profession – then proceeds to discuss Poland’s romantic political thought and positivist political thought (interchanging with the terms idealist and realist) from the 19th century to the Solidarity period. It is this obvious apprehension in the final part of Blejwas’ study which weakens his conclusions about Solidarity. Moreover, Blejwas’ splendid account
of the Warsaw positivists - including his thorough passion for the positivist/realist tradition - has led him to overemphasize that tradition for the Poland of the 1970s and early 1980s. Indeed, Blejwas insists that in Poland the tradition of political realism may even be stronger than the romantic idealistic one. Also, Blejwas - reflecting Wandycz's position - puts more emphasis on the elusive Polish national characteristics as an explanation for the apparent repetition of certain elements in Polish history. And therefore overemphasizes Polish internal developments and under plays the primacy of external developments in Polish politics.

In terms of the roots of the Polish crisis itself, Blejwas correctly points out that the failure of the revisionists and neopositivists in the late 1960s was primarily based on the Gomulka regime's unwillingness to make substantial concessions and compromises to Polish society. Moreover, the repression of the student protests of 1968, the anti-Semitic purge within the PZPR, (and Polish society), the increased power of the hardline "partisan" faction within the party, and the Warsaw Treaty Organizations (WTO) invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, helped cause the death of revisionist aspirations in Poland. Conversely, the post-1968 events saw the rise of a new determination to strive for extensive change within the system; without the PZPR. As Blejwas outlined:
In Adam Michnik's view, the student intellectual movement in 1968, the worker's uprisings in December 1970, the opposition of the intellectuals to the constitutional "reforms" proposed by the PZPR...and the workers' protests of June 1976, all undermined the validity of the revisionists' hopes for internal party reform and the neopositivists' policy of compromise. Both the policies of the ruling PZPR and the growing social conflicts of the late 1960s and early 1970s, which were the consequences of the failures of the ruling elite, invalidated post-October evolutionism.

It is at this point, however, that Blejwas questions the rise of idealism in Poland. The crucial element to Blejwas' analysis is his tacit rejection of the idealist tradition as being - under the right conditions - a positive force in Polish politics. Since Blejwas fully sympathizes with the opposition movement of the 1970s and, of course, Solidarity, Blejwas is forced to reconcile - what he considers to be - the apparent contradiction. This, in fact, at least to his own satisfaction, he does. Blejwas compares the conspiratorial activities of the 19th century positivists with those of Jacek Kuron in the 1970s and concludes their goals were similar: neither gave up the goal of Polish independence; both rejected the idea of a violent insurrection; both recognized the Imperial Russian/Soviet threat; and finally, both engaged in conspiratorial underground activities, which had as its goal the education of the masses and protection of Polish culture.

The first problem with Blejwas' analysis is his reading of the idealist tradition. One does not have to assume that
Poland's opposition movement is a negative phenomenon simply because of the geopolitical realities. There is no contradiction in sympathizing with the opposition and still concluding that its rise was a reemergence of political idealism. Both Bromke and Davies, on more than one occasion, have noted their sympathy with the general aims of the opposition movement and Solidarity. Yet they have also pointed out that the post-1968 developments saw the rise of the idealist tradition. The major difference separating Bromke and Davies is the value they attach to this realization.

Since Davies does not propose "a cure for the symptom", his analysis does not provoke a harsh response. Furthermore, Davies is rather fatalistic about the Polish question. He feels that the romantic tradition is much stronger in Poland and therefore its tendency to reappear is more than natural: it is the proper response to communist autocracy. Indeed, Davies adds: "On balance, recent events have confirmed the conviction that the Polish Romantics, had a more profound understanding than their Positivist rivals of their own and their country's nature, and that, in the final analysis, they are more realistic than the self-professed 'realists'." 5¹

Bromke, on the other hand, in calling for a synthesis between idealism and realism, overtly questions the oppositionist programmes and attempts to provide some meaningful critique of opposition policies. In fact, and unlike Davies, Bromke is an ardent advocate of his approach and is therefore the object of
some criticism from various groups. In some cases, such as Wandycz, the criticism is constructive. In other cases, such as Bierezin,52 the criticisms are very vicious and ad hominem. For their part, some Polish communists have also attacked Bromke's views.53 With the exception of Wandycz, the criticism has been over prescription rather than description.

As mentioned in the first chapter, Bromke at times feels compelled to join in the political debates in Poland. Furthermore, a sympathetic reviewer of *Poland: The Protracted Crisis*, noted that Bromke's use of the words "foolhardy" for idealists and "thoroughgoing" for realists, clearly possess a negative and positive image. This may explain some of the controversy.54 In response, Bromke asserts:

[While] most Polish writers, both at home and abroad have accepted my presentation of the dichotomy between idealism and realism, they have taken strong exception to the political conclusions for present-day Poland that I have drawn from this model. Those attacks only intensified as I elaborated my ideas further, especially in Polish-language publication. Obviously, I must have touched upon a very sensitive nerve in the modern Polish national consciousness.

The second, and more fundamental, problem with Blejwas' analysis is his coupling of Jacek Kuron's political views with the views of the entire political opposition in Poland. As Blejwas puts it: "Jacek Kuron, a former member of the PZPR and a founding member of KOR, formulated a new programme for the political
opposition in *Mysli o programie dzialania* ("Thoughts on a programme of action," October 1976). This suggestive essay, in several ways, evokes comparison with the positivists and the positivism of the previous century.  

In the first place, Kuron's political views did not represent the views of the entire opposition movement of the 1970s. More important, some members of KOR rejected Kuron's views altogether and wanted to have him thrown out of the movement. Kuron also had a problem with many ROPCiO and RMP members, despite the fact that the general KOR leadership got along fairly well with both movements. As Lipski puts it:

Stefan Kaczorowski...former secretary-general of the Christian Democratic party...came from Lodz in order to make a formal motion for the exclusion of Jacek Kuron from the committee on the grounds that Kuron was a crypto-communist and a traitor; as evidenced by two ideas set forth in Kuron's inverviews and political writings: (a) the "finlandization" of Poland as a real and positive goal, and (b) an eventual understanding between society and Moscow, over the heads of the authorities of the PRL, guaranteeing that Poland did not wish, and would not seek, to harm the USSR. (At a later time Stefan Kisielewski advanced similar proposals).

Moreover, what Blejwas does is simply discuss the early opposition programme of Jacek Kuron. Blejwas makes no mention, for example, of Kuron's calls for the formation of a self-governing republic on 22 November 1981, and the subsequent formation of the controversial club "Self-Governing Republic: Freedom, Justice, Independence". And finally, the paradox posed...
by Blejwas about the Solidarity movement; that it was a triumph of political realism, is interesting but he fails to elaborate on it. The only substantial point made by Blejwas about Solidarity - not an unimportant one - has been accepted by all analysts of the Polish crisis. Citing underground Solidarity leader, Witold Kulerski, Blejwas concludes: the "year and a half of Solidarity was one of our great national uprisings, a bloodless uprising."61

This leads us to consider a discussion of the opposition, the Solidarity movement, and the declaration of martial law on 13 December 1981. The question is apparent: was Solidarity a realistic uprising, or was it in fact caught up in the dynamics of an incremental revolution?
ENDNOTES


8 Ibid., p. xi.

9 This particularly reflects my own experience.


11 Ibid., p. 171.

14 ibid.
15 ibid.
18 See Ch. 1 Endnotes, no. 75.
20 See George C. Malcher, Poland's Politicized Army: Communists in Uniform (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984). Malcher's study is excellent for its use of primary sources. However, his conclusion that Poland's military has systematically been "penetrating", since the early 1970s, all spheres of life in Poland and especially the PZPR - suggesting a conspiracy - is questionable. See also, Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski, ed., Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982).
21 See Ch. 1 Endnotes, nos. 84, 85, and 86.
22 A penetrating comparative study between the Polish crisis of 1980-81 and the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 was also written. Unfortunately, its conclusions are limited by the fact that the study was completed shortly before the declaration of martial law in Poland. See David W. Paul and Maurice D. Simon, "Poland Today And Czechoslovakia 1968," Problems of Communism (Sept. - Oct. 1981), pp. 25-35.
23 Davies, op. cit., pp. 211-212.
24 Davies, op. cit., p. 213. Davies calculates 270 years from 1980 and puts the starting-point at 1710, the year in which Stanislaw Leszczynski was dethroned by the Russian victory at Potilava and August II restored as King of Poland. The formal establishment of the Russian protectorate over Poland is dated by Davies to the so-called Silent Sejm of January 1717. The first partition of Poland took place in 1773. See ibid., p. 213 n.

See Adam Bromke, "The Meaning and Uses of Polish History," (To be published by East European Monographs, Boulder, Col.), p. 47, [Mimeographed.].

Davies, op. cit., p. 213. The use of literature, for political purposes is by no means a Polish phenomenon. However, the extent to which it is done in Poland can hardly be denied. Cf. Czeslaw Milosz, The History of Polish Literature (2nd ed. Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1983). Indeed, during the Polish crisis the extensive underground Polish press published the works of literary figures — many of whom wrote political tracts — along with the works of oppositionist historians and other opposition writers.


Some of the underground publications included: The Black Book of Polish Censorship; and the Experience and Future seminars. Other independent publishing houses, "Glos", "Krag", and the Cracow Student Publishing House, were closely connected with the Polish opposition.

See Lipski, op. cit., pp. 178-183.


ibid., p. 48.

ibid., p. 49.

ibid.

ibid., p. 50.


40 ibid., p. 52.

41 ibid., pp. 53-54.

42 Bromke does not directly respond to this criticism made by Wandycz in the 1st ed. of his manuscript.


44 Adam Michnik, "Ticks and Angels," in ibid., pp. 178-185.

45 Blejwas, op. cit., p. xi.

46 ibid.

47 Blejwas is also at odds with Wandycz. Wandycz argues that the romantic tradition is stronger in the Polish national character. Andrzej Walicki, a specialist in political philosophy, in his Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism: The Case of Poland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), agrees with Wandycz. Walicki, however, adds that the positivist/realist tradition is quite strong in Poland and is also a very patriotic tradition.

48 The revisionists were a loose group of Marxists associated mostly with the philosopher Leszek Kolakowski and included people like Jacek Kuron. They hoped for reforms in the Marxist doctrine and pushed for democratization within the PZPR. See Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski, "Open Letter to Party members," in Stan Persky and Henry Flam, ed., The Solidarity Sourcebook (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1982), pp. 35-56. The neopositivists were Catholics, predominantly centred around the weekly Tygodnik Powszechny and included Stanislaw Stomma and Stefan Kisielewski.


51 Davies, op. cit., p. x.

52 Cf. Ch. 1 Endnotes, no. 58.


55 Bromke, "Poland's Idealism and Realism in Retrospective," in op. cit., p. 4.


57 Lipski, op. cit., p. 59.

58 See ibid., p. 123; and Staniszkis, op. cit., p. 125 n.

59 Lipski, ibid., p. 58.


KOR stated clearly that among its goals was the recovery of Polish independence.

Jan Jozef Lipski

CHAPTER THREE

POLAND'S ORGANIZED OPPOSITION

It is rather doubtful whether the mass movement of the summer of 1980 would have been so united, powerful, and effective had it not been for the large number of influential smaller movements which preceded it. This should not suggest, however, that the opposition movements of the 1970s were directly responsible for the strikes of July and August 1980. The Polish regime was directly responsible for the protests by workers against unannounced changes in the system of meat sales which effectively amounted to price increases of 90 to over 100 percent. The Gierek regime's arrogance - the decision to implement price increases was finally announced in a matter-of-fact fashion by a lower level bureaucrat - received a prompt reply from Polish workers.

Soon after the 2 July 1980 price increase was made public, some 17,000 workers went on strike in Ursus (also the scene of strikes in 1976), near Warsaw, and in Tczew, near Gdansk.
Work stoppages were also reported at the Warsaw steelworks, and in Lodz. To be sure, some followers of the Polish political scene had anticipated something to happen in Poland. However, no one anticipated that the 1980s would bring the emergence of the Soviet bloc's first independent trade union. Philosopher Leszek Kolakowski, in the West since 1968, also an official member of KOR since October 1977, and co-organizer of international action to help KOR, in 1979 wrote:

Nobody can predict what might happen in Poland by the time this issue of Survey is printed. Many of the people (by no means all) involved in the democratic opposition movement feared that, given the accumulation of social tensions of various kinds, the neverending and apparently deepening economic difficulties and the utter loss of the government's credibility, an accident, a trifle in itself, could easily trigger off an uncontrollable surge of strikes and popular riots similar to, yet on a larger scale than, those of 1970 and 1976.

If Polish worker activists were quick to react and organize the rank-and-file after the price increases were announced, Poland's opposition movements were no less spontaneous in aiding the activists. When the Ursus and Tczew workers began their strikes, KOR organized a meeting of its members in Warsaw and issued a statement which confirmed the strikes, expressed its solidarity with the strikers, and demanded that full official information about price increases be made available to the public. KOR also sent a warning to the government "against provoking the public", and demanded that government officials
Since KOR representatives were widely known by Western press correspondents in Poland, KOR also became the "official" strike information agency. Moreover, KOR members had long established relations with worker activists in a large number of enterprises and factories throughout Poland. For that reason, KOR's July 2 statement was directed at the workers already on strike and those contemplating strike action. KOR could also be sure that its statement would not only reach the West, but also many Polish workers. KOR's appeal to the workers read as follows:

We appeal to all work crews throughout Poland, warning them against protests which the authorities might exploit in order to provoke riots.

The methods which can be used most effectively - and with the greatest safety for the entire nation - by workers demanding recognition of their interests and the interests of the whole society, involves self-organization in the work places and democratic elections of independent workers' representatives who will present demands in the name of the workers, conduct negotiations with the authorities, and lead the actions of the workers in a responsible but decisive manner[...]

We appeal to the entire society to support the worker's demands with expressions of solidarity.

To be sure, the July 1980 strikes were not organized by KOR, or any other opposition movement, the workers reacted spontaneously to the price increases. However, as Lipski proudly adds: during the late 1970s, KOR "taught that society had to demand the rights it deserved. It familiarized workers with the idea of a strike as a means of achieving goals that were otherwise
impossible to achieve, it indicated the possibility of strike demands that would go beyond economic issues: free trade unions, the elimination of censorship. KOR also suggested...remaining locked up in the factories instead of taking to the streets". In short, KOR - as well as other opposition movements - helped set the groundwork for a new relationship in Polish society. The PZPR would no longer dictate from the top to the workers at the bottom. Society began to realize, as the strikes grew and the party watched in disbelief, that limited, case-by-case, economic demands could be replaced by calls for comprehensive reforms. The key elements for success appeared to be national solidarity and disciplined strikes.

A symbiotic relationship between the opposition intelligentsia - many of whom became Solidarity advisors - and workers quickly became recognizable in the summer of 1980. The opposition needed the workers and the workers needed the opposition. Walicki poignantly described the relationship in this manner: "We had...a situation where the intelligentsia saw confirmation of their wishful thinking [Walicki's emphasis] in the workers, and the workers saw theirs in the intelligentsia. On one side the feeling was: 'we are invincible because the masses are with us'; on the other side was the belief: 'we can proceed boldly for the wise men are with us'."

This important relationship, between the workers and opposition movements, was by no means an accident. In the first
place, worker activists had been meeting and organizing since the Gdansk strikes of December 1970. By the time KOR was formed on September 27, 1976, contacts between the worker activists and opposition intelligentsia had already been established. The founding of KOR, however, was the first step in the formalization of relations between workers and the opposition intelligentsia. Also, inspired by the growing list of underground publications, in September 1977 the first issue of the biweekly Robotnik ("The Worker") was established by worker activists. The founding of a working class underground journal was a significant event for two reasons: a) the working class had a publication which reflected its particular interests; and b) worker activists could organize, discuss, and generally coalesce under one periodical.

Much of what was printed in Robotnik was directed at specific working class interests: wages, work safety, health conditions. However, there was also an emphasis on broader national, societal, and political issues. Robotnik did its utmost to inform its working class readership that they could influence broader political reforms in Poland. Indeed, that the working class could also participate in issues of national concern. As the introductory statement to Robotnik's first issue noted:

In June 1976 when the working class was in distress it was a large group of critical individuals of various professions in Polish society, which openly and consistently defended the rights of the working class. The solidarity of the intelligentsia with the workers' cause convinced many worker activists that the interests
of both social groups were identical, their purposes coincided... Many consultations and discussions took place between workers and activists and members of the intelligentsia. The result was, the founding of an independent journal, Robotnik[...].

Moreover, the most important aim which Robotnik had set for itself, was the formation of independent working class structures which would replace the moribund state-controlled trade unions.

As Lipski significantly points out, the name of the new workers' publication, Robotnik, was not unimportant. The "periodical carried on a tradition: between 1884 and 1906 under the Russian partition, an irregular and illegal organ of the Polish Socialist party (PPS) bore the same title and, like the party, promoted a programme of social revolution, political democracy, and Polish independence among the working class." 13

The most important and farreaching chapter in the history of Robotnik involved the extremely close cooperation between the worker activists from the Gdansk region and members of both KOR and the Gdansk-based Young Poland Movement (RMP); RMP members usually published in their own underground publication entitled Bratniak ("Fraternity").

In October 1979, Bogdan Borusewicz, Andrzej Gwiazda, Bogdan Lis, Anna Walentynowicz, Lech Walesa, and others, founded the Gdansk-based journal Robotnik Wybrzeza ("The Coastal Worker"). As is already well known, it was these activists which galvanized...
the Polish coastal area and organized the strike at the Lenin shipyards that took the lead in forming NSZZ Solidarity. Moreover, the friendships and alliances cultivated in Gdansk in the 1970s, put KOR and RMP members in a special position within the Solidarity movement.  

II

The story of the rise of Poland's opposition, since the decline of Stalinism, has been well documented. And while relatively little information has been recently published, specifically analyzing the opposition of the 1970s, many of the most important documents from that period are now available in the West. The one exception, however, is Lipski's history of KOR. The KOR study is the first thorough historical account of any of the major opposition movements which operated and exerted influence in Poland. Indeed, with respect to the KOR movement, Lipski argues, and not without substantial evidence, that some of Solidarity's roots can be traced to KOR; while the roots of KOR can be directly traced to the post-Stalinist Crooked Circle Club (KKK).

The key period for our discussion begins in 1968. Since 1968 manifestations of widespread political opposition in Poland had surpassed every other country in the Soviet bloc. To this end, three major forces in Polish society had been engaged in a
number of activities, ranging from letter writing campaigns and dissemination of underground periodicals, to active protest marchers and strike actions, all aimed at significantly reforming the communist system. These three forces: the intelligentsia and students; the workers; and the powerful Roman Catholic church, represented a substantial portion of Polish society.

The Polish peasants were the last social group to organize in opposition to the state. On the other hand, the peasants were the first to receive substantial concessions from the post-Stalin communists - the vast majority of Polish agricultural land was never collectivized. Hence, Polish peasants were both rid of the prewar gentry and spared the horrors of collectivization endured by their eastern neighbours.

The roots of Poland's opposition go back to the immediate postwar period; as Jacques Rupnik observed: "The period of 1968-78 has been marked by the evolution of [the]...three main components of the Polish opposition from isolation to a degree of convergence in their challenge of the party's grip over the society." The year 1968 marks another significant change in Polish politics. Polish protests against "real socialism" had evolved from a desire for renewal, or the humanization and democratization of Marxism, to the abandonment of "the Bolshevik ideology" - as Lipski calls it. Poland's youth, after the events of March 1968, underwent an "enormous change in consciousness", especially among students at the universities.
By the late 1960s an important demographic change had also taken place in Poland. Almost two-thirds of the population was under the age of forty. Significant strides in the education, since the end of World War II, brought Poland a better trained population. In 1938, for example, Poland only had some 12,000 trained engineers. By 1968 there were 130,000 engineers. Modernization in Poland also brought with it pressures for greater economic reform.

The demographic changes had another important impact on Poland's postwar evolution. In 1968, more than half the population was composed of people under the age of thirty, who had no defeatist memories of World War II. These young people had also shown a keen interest in Poland's history. Moreover, the 1960s saw the rapid rise in nationalist sentiments.

In 1964 the "Letter of the 34", written by thirty-four members of the intellectual elite, was sent to the authorities. The authors were publicly protesting against censorship and the government's restrictive cultural policies. Indeed, in the mid-1960s the Polish regime quickly began to lose the support of leading intellectuals. In 1966, for example, on invitation from the Polish Union of Socialist Youth, Professor Kolakowski was asked to speak to students at the University of Warsaw. Kolakowski spoke to his young audience about the ten years of squandered hopes, and thereby subjected the Gomulka regime to shattering criticism. As a result, one of the most ardent early
supporters of People's Poland was expelled from the PZPR and from his position at the University of Warsaw.

The final death knell to an essentially Marxist revisionist dissent came in early 1968. In February, the Warsaw branch of the Writers' Union publicly protested against the banning of the 19th century Mickiewicz play, Forefathers' Eve. Moscow's ambassador to Warsaw walked out during a performance of the play: protesting its anti-Russian sentiments. Soon after the PZPR banned the play, University of Warsaw assistants/students, led by Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik, among others, issued the following statement:

We, the student youth of Warsaw, protest against the decision forbidding the performance of Adam Mickiewicz's Forefathers' Eve at the National Theatre. We protest against the policy of nibbling at the progressive tradition of the Polish nation. 27

The frustration felt by some members of Poland's intellectual elite merged with the unrest among the youth. 28 In March 1968 the Warsaw students took to the streets and began to vigorously protest against the banning of Mickiewicz's play. Soon, students from other cities began to riot and stage sit-in strikes which continued for almost three weeks. Without doubt, the student protests reflected much of the sentiments felt in most segments of Polish society. And while the protesting students were suppressed, the tensions nevertheless persisted.
To be sure, the workers did not openly support the students and intellectuals in the late 1960s. Indeed, when the workers went on strike in 1970, forcing the downfall of Gomulka, their predominantly economic demands received little support from the intellectuals. Moreover, both in 1968 and 1970 the church protested against the repression, but never actually endorsed the intellectuals' or the workers' demands. Yet the 1970s brought not only a new regime, under Edward Gierek, but the "most significant change in the development of the Polish opposition in the 1970s [had]...been the broadening of its social base, fostered by the creation of new ties between the three main forces of opposition."  

In 1975, both the intellectuals and the church protested against proposed amendments to the Polish constitution of 1952. A draft of these changes included language about placing greater emphasis on Poland's "external alliances" with the USSR, using such expressions as "unshakable fraternal bonds with the Soviet Union," describing the party dictatorship as the "leading force" in all aspects of Polish life, and linking citizens' rights with the fulfillment of duties toward the motherland. These specific phrases were opposed in December, in a letter known as the "Manifesto of the 59," sent to the speaker of the Polish Sejm. Other, similar communications were signed by approximately 300 professors, students, and legal experts.  

A statement by Roman Catholic bishops (also signed by
Karol Cardinal Wojtyla) subsequently revealed that the church hierarchy had also raised objections with the government regarding the draft amendments. Both laymen and clergy based their case on the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and the Final Act signed at Helsinki in 1975. The Warsaw regime, forced by public pressure, finally made some concessions. The Sejm passed new amendments that changed the wording to read "inviolable fraternal bonds..." and referred to the party as a "guiding political force in the construction of socialism." Citizens' duties were confined to honest fulfillment of duties to the motherland, but civil rights were no longer dependent on such conduct. While opposition to the constitutional amendments was only partially successful, the church's opposition to them, and its calls for greater observance of human rights, helped forge a new understanding between Catholics and a large number of opposition members - many of whom were suspicious of the Catholics.

In June of 1976, the government announced that food prices would be raised. Soon after the announcement was made, public demonstrations took place. Although the government reversed the order within 24 hours, many workers were later arrested. This led to the formation of the Committee for Defence of Workers (KOR), organized by 14 intellectuals to aid victims of the "June Events". KOR successfully raised funds and provided assistance to strikers' families; largely through its efforts, one year later, all jailed strikers had been released.
By mid-1978, membership in KOR had grown to 31 participants. The new KOR members mostly came from the student movement of 1968, but also included some prewar social democrats. KOR also expanded its activities to include publishing, greater demands for civil and human rights throughout Poland, and appealed for cooperation with dissenters from the USSR and Czechoslovakia. Finally, as Lipski puts it, KOR "stated clearly that among its goals was the recovery of Polish independence."\(^{34}\)

The sterility of communist policies during the 1960s, the changes in Poland's demographics, the intellectuals' protests of the 1960s, the student protests of 1968, the decline in Marxist revisionist hopes for reform, and finally, the emergence of opposition movements in the mid-1970s, all combined to move the Poles away from political realism to political idealism. Similarly, the changes in the international arena during the 1970s also played an important role in the Poles' shift towards idealism.

The Polish-German border dispute diminished; Poland's relations with Western powers improved; the Helsinki Final Act and East-West detente emboldened the Poles; and finally, the rise of dissent in the Soviet Union inspired Polish hopes for impending changes in that country.\(^{35}\) This final point was of particular importance. As Lipski describes it: "An awareness of a common fate shared with other nations of the empire was one aspect of the political sensitivity of KOR activists, especially of those
activists for whom links with dissident groups in other East European countries and in Russia stirred an impulse to action. 36

Indeed, even though the activities of the Soviet dissidents had considerably decreased by the end of the 1970s, after the Soviet regime took decisive action, the Polish opposition still held high hopes for changes in the Soviet Union. To this end, KOR member Zbigniew Romaszewski was dispatched to Moscow to meet Andrei Sakharov. As a KOR communique declared:

On January 20 and 21, 1979, a representative of KSS "KOR", Zbigniew Romaszewski, met in Moscow with Professor Andrei Sakharov and his associates from the Committee in Defence of Human Rights. During the meeting, information was exchanged about the respect and defence of human and civil rights in Poland and the USSR. Principles of cooperation were agreed on.

III

The Polish historical struggle for independence, beginning at least in 1795 - Davies sets the date at 1710 - has not necessarily united the various Polish political movements over the last two centuries. If the struggle to regain Polish independence has been a dominant feature of Polish politics, it has not been the sole feature. Similar to the struggles in other nations, the Poles have also been concerned with the modernization and reform of their society. As Bromke recently observed: "The
political movements, thus, have divided not only along horizontal, but also along vertical lines, ranging from the conservatives who upheld the existing status quo to the revolutionaries who have striven to overthrow the existing system by force.\textsuperscript{38}

The relationship between the vertical (left wing vs. right wing) and horizontal (realist vs. idealist) divisions among the numerous political movements has not always been simple. The fact that one movement may have adhered to ideological principles which put it on the left of the political spectrum, and another movement adhered to principles which put it on the right of the political spectrum, did not altogether suggest that one group was more "progressive" than the other. During the interwar period, for example, sizable factions within the Polish Socialist party (PPS), the National Democratic party (ND), and the Polish Peasant party (PSL), advocated astonishingly similar viewpoints with regard to agricultural reform.

Movements which subscribed to an organic notion of society, which also emphasized evolution over revolutionary change - this included the Warsaw positivists, the National Democrats, and the Pilsudskiites - had complimentary views towards independence and social progress. And while these movements differed over substantial issues, ranging from the question of minorities to foreign policy, their perspectives on organic work, later, on internal strengthening of the Polish state, served their common goals of national independence. However, the revolutionary
movements were faced with more complex problems.

Both the socialists and populists tended to be split between those who gave national independence the first priority in terms of political action, and those who were preoccupied with social revolution. The PPS advocated independence first and social change second; while the radicals within the PPS, advocated social revolution. The Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland (later the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL)), on the other hand, not only advocated social revolution, they totally rejected Polish independence. The Populists, likewise, were split between the reformist and radicals.

The horizontal and vertical divisions, to be sure, produced some strange bedfellows. The Galician conservatives wanted to maintain their autonomy, and the status quo, and therefore supported the Hapsburg Empire. Pilsudski, on the other hand, joined the socialist movement because its revolutionary emphasis could be utilized in the struggle for Polish independence. The SDKPiL advocated a union with their eastern neighbours in a revolutionary state, and, in so far as the horizontal division is concerned, found itself positioned with the conservatives. Nevertheless, the horizontal and vertical divisions are able to provide a clearer picture of the distribution of the major Polish political movements at a given time.
As an illustration, Bromke has produced two diagrams. By applying the idealist versus realist criteria, he traces the lineage of the post-1863 Polish political movements. The first diagram begins with the 1863 political movements and follows them until World War I. This period is presented in the following diagrammatic fashion:

(SEE DIAGRAM I)\textsuperscript{40}

When Poland regained independence in 1918, the horizontal division lost its significance. Only the Polish Communist Party opposed independence. World War II, however, revived the horizontal divisions. By 1942, the Polish communists had learned from their mistakes and advocated, even if highly limited, Polish independence. And while the Poles were not enthusiastic about the postwar developments, their country was spared direct incorporation into the USSR.

Since the Polish Workers' Party - after 1948 the PZPR took power in Poland, the communists have moved between total obedience to Soviet wishes and a blind duplication of its political system (ie. the Stalinist era), to some internal autonomy and social experimentation (ie. 1945-47 and after 1956). In the second diagram, Bromke illustrates the post-1944 configuration of the political scene in Poland. And includes the rise of the democratic opposition in the mid-1970s. A clear and
The movements which stayed in existence over a long period of time often changed their position. Thus, the National Democrats moved during World War I toward openly advocating Poland's independence, while at the same time the Pilsudskiites largely abandoned their goal of social revolution.
stable pattern from 1863 had emerged. The situation is presented in the following diagrammatic fashion:

(SEE DIAGRAM II)\textsuperscript{41}

After World War II, Poland's political position, when compared to the short-lived interwar period, declined considerably. However, when compared to 150 years of partitions, the Poles had conquered a century and a half of statelessness.

A comparison of the two above diagrams illustrates that there has been considerable continuity in Polish politics. Yet, the military defeat of the Poles by the Germans, particularly after the failed Warsaw uprising, and the Soviet presence in postwar Poland, effectively destroyed Polish hopes for a military struggle of independence. Indeed, a number of factors, such as: the East-West competition; collapse of Western European predominance in international relations; the rise of the nuclear age; and a de facto, (if not de jure - at least according to Soviet principles outlined in the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine), division of Europe; have all combined to mitigate the future programme of any Polish opposition movement. After 1956, with the exception of some individual extremists, no serious leader of the various opposition movements had publicly called for an insurrection.

This should not suggest that the drive for Polish
 Movements on the right were liquidated in the late 1940s, by outright suppression, as were the ND and the Pilsudskiites, or by merging their left wings with pro-Communist parties, like the PSL with the ZSL and the ChD with the SD; while the PPS merged directly with the PPR in 1948, assuming the name PZPR. In 1956, the Catholic Znak group came into existence. First it espoused the realist position but by the 1970s it moved toward idealism. Retaining its own organization, it was replaced in the Sejm by the neo-Znak group, which continued to adhere to the more realist programme. The staunchly pro-regime Pax group during the Solidarity period also moved closer toward idealism, but after 1981 it promptly reverted to its traditional position.
independence had been dampened. The cycle from realism to idealism appeared after 1968, took on momentum after 1976, and manifested itself in Solidarity in 1980. On the other hand, after 1976, the overriding problem for the opposition became the problem of limits; the question of insurrection was shelved. The recognition of some limits, however, was not a continuation of the realist/positivist tradition - as Blejwas suggests. Even the 19th century insurrectionists recognized that their power was limited and that they could be defeated. On the other hand, the insurrectionists believed that their moral position was above reproach, the West was with them, and that they would conquer.

In this sense, the general views of the postwar democratic opposition is very similar to the insurrectionists. Moreover, and again similar to the insurrectionists, elements within the democratic opposition argued that the threat of a catastrophe (Soviet invasion) was not enough of a reason to stop pushing the communist regime towards objectives it was not willing to adopt. More important, the opposition insisted that by adopting peaceful means, it denied the communists the major motive for military action.

During a debate within the ranks of the democratic opposition in 1979, for example, Jacek Kuron argued forcefully that an explosion might cause a "national tragedy" (Soviet invasion). Nevertheless, Kuron pointed out that peaceful means and active pressure was necessary. Indeed, while admitting that
attempts to overthrow the system were "irresponsible", Kuron also added: "unless we are forced to do so". Lipski and Michnik, in a reply to Kuron, disagreed on certain tactics proposed by their colleague (methods for social self-organization), however, they also added: "We fully share his concern about the possible consequences, but we believe that the problem of the functioning of a democratic opposition in society is broader than, and partially independent of, the vision of an approaching explosion." 42

IV

The large number of post-1976 opposition movements can be charted along the horizontal and vertical divisions, described earlier, in much greater detail. The major benefit of such a categorization is that it gives a clearer perspective on both the extent and variant of the Polish democratic opposition. This is particularly important because the smaller opposition movements tend to receive far less attention. To be sure, the influence exerted by the different movements varied greatly. However, the Young Poland Movement (RMP), which played a significant role from 1979 to 1981, has received only slight attention. Also, the KPN is curiously given limited attention by many writers. Indeed, the openly nationalistic KPN is normally described as without significant influence in Polish society. Lipski, on the other
hand, adds: "the popularity and actual influence of this group [KPN] was clearly on the increase."  

Polish protests after 1976 were no longer expressed by isolated intellectuals and tiny groups. The post-1976 opposition involved thousands of intellectuals, workers, and peasants. Their focus also changed from limited appeals to the regime, to appeals aimed at the entire Polish nation. Indeed, even appeals to the international community.

The convergence of the various social groups and opposition movements helps explain the broadening of opposition aims and calls for reform. However, despite the cooperation between the different opposition movements, their programmes were not uniform. As for the vertical division, the opposition was represented by movements on both the left and right of the political spectrum. Nevertheless, the horizontal division, between idealism and realism, illustrates the remarkable cohesiveness amongst the opposition movements. As Lipski points out:

Despite the fact that social-democratic and PPS tendencies were strong in KOR, its cooperation with [the]...right-wing group was still possible. At some point during the formation of a free Poland their paths would have to part, but at this point the cooperation could be quite close.  

Lipski's statement also suggests that the postwar Polish opposition movements owe their lineage to the political movements
of the past: based on both the vertical and horizontal divisions. From 1976 until the rise of Solidarity in August 1980, Polish political movements could be presented in the following diagrammatic fashion:

(SEE DIAGRAM III)

The publications, communiques, and manifestos of the various opposition movements were not just read by other activists. Former editor of Polityka, and until recently, Poland's Deputy Prime Minister, Mieczyslaw Rakowski, said of the publications: "Articles and essays in (their journals) covered issues which were discussed in the sessions of various conferences, meetings, over vodka, in meetings of families and friends...[Also, the] problem of an open battle with elements of the opposition are basically the fact that the dissidents both knew our 'soft spots' and knew well which of the difficulties are the result of objective conditions and are not our responsibility and which are the result of incompetence and errors of our government." 45

To be sure, the majority of Poles never read the actual programmes of all the various movements. However, that was not the primary aim of these movements, it was the activists, or potential activists, these movements wanted to influence. In any case, during the late 1970s it was also clear that what went on in
NOTE: I prefer to distinguish the contemporary political movements charted on the horizontal axis by the terms Realism and Idealism and thus avoid the negative value judgement inherent in the terms Conciliation and Insurrection.
the opposition community was no secret. Moreover, what the opposition wanted was to have their general views discussed openly. They aimed for gradual penetration of the population with information and encouragement of independent thinking and independent action.  

Before reviewing the different opposition movements, a brief discussion on the term "opposition" is necessary. If by opposition one means a political movement or political party which proposes an alternative programme to an electorate, as in the West, then Poland does not have, and cannot have, an opposition. Only the PZPR is allowed to govern in contemporary Poland. Many analysts therefore argue Poland's "opposition" is in fact a "dissent" movement. "This is most unfortunate", Tadeusz Szafar poignantly argues, "because it tends to obscure the true character of the 'opposition', and in particular, the differences between the situation in Poland and in other communist-ruled countries." Dissent suggests not agreeing, discordant, different, or separating from the established "religion". The term cannot be applied to people who never belonged to the "church", who left the "church" altogether, who "do not want to reform it, nor indeed, believe that any such reform is possible within the established 'church', nor to those who have no 'religion' at all...Such terms might therefore be legitimately used in relation to a Sakharov or a Medvedev, but not to a Solzhenitsyn or a Bukowsky."  

Szafar prefers the description "political resistance
movement"; however, World War II identified resistance with armed struggle. Therefore, Szafar adds, until someone comes up with a better word, "opposition", is the best description of what existed (and still exists) in Poland. Moreover, the most common term used in Poland to describe the different democratic groups is opozycja - or opposition.

Finally, the above diagrams of Polish politics outline only an approximation of reality. Wandycz is correct when he observed that no two historical situations are exactly identical. Therefore, in drawing historical analogies, care must be taken to point out not only the similarities, but also the differences between the political movements. In fact, to a large extent the differences between political movements separated by a period of time are quite obvious and need little elaboration.

The drawing of diagrams of historical situations and comparing them over time, should nevertheless perform a useful function. At the very least, these diagrams help sort out the various movements into different and definable categories. Coming to terms with the almost endless amount of political movements in modern Polish history, and bringing them "out of the fog", is important. Moreover, the diagrams "provide a coherent analytical framework where otherwise unrelated events can be sorted out and their relationship systematically examined. And in this way any regular patterns in Polish politics can be discerned."

Finally, the diagrams use the terms conciliation and
insurrection to represent the extremes on the horizontal division because these terms seem to be the best in describing the opposite polls of realism and idealism. Extreme conciliation, for example, represents a form of political action which surrenders the goal of Polish independence. On the other hand, the extreme form of insurrection represents a form of political action which favours a total struggle for independence. To be sure, these terms are not altogether satisfactory. However, they do project the intended meaning.

In January 1978, some sixty Polish intellectuals announced the founding of the Society of Academic Courses (TKN). The Society was less a movement and more an underground institute of education. The independent instruction provided by this "Flying University", as it was sometimes called, was aimed at inspiring independent thought and action among Poland's youth. TKN lecturers were mostly, although by no means exclusively, associated with KOR. The authorities were particularly anxious about TKN because they feared its lecturers would inspire oppositionist ideas among the youth of Poland, especially since well-known opposition leaders, such as Michnik, Kuron, Baranczak, and Borusewicz, among others, were some of the regular lecturers.

It was in Russian Poland, in 1885, that the first independent academic institution was formed in Poland. Its purpose, in response to Czarist oppression, was to preserve the national identity and inspire independent thought among Polish
youth. The instruction was conducted by well-known scholars and took place in private homes, hence the name, the Flying University. In 1905, the Society of Academic Courses was legally instituted and continued its work until the outbreak of World War I. The modern TKN took both its name and objectives from the late-19th century educational institution.\textsuperscript{75}

Another organization, the Society for Scientific Courses, also emerged in this period. However, this group tried to stay separated from the opposition as a whole. On the other hand, the Polish Episcopate, especially through Cardinal Wojtyla in Cracow, gave the Scientific Society quarters to operate in.\textsuperscript{76} The Society specialized in teaching courses in the natural, pure, and applied sciences. This Society's major aim was to disassociate themselves with the official organizations.

The Initiating Committee of Free Trade Unions (KZ WZZ), was formed in mid-March 1978, in Katowice. Their members were close to KOR and ROPCiO. The KZ WZZ soon expanded its activities to the Gdansk coast and to other Polish cities. KZ WZZ was made up primarily of Robotnik and Robotnik Wybrzeza activists. Its programme was also an extension of the Robotnik programme; discussed earlier. The difference, however, was that the worker activists decided to found a movement with one primary goal: establishing free trade unions in Poland.\textsuperscript{77}

In November 1978, the Believers' Self-Defence Committee (KSLW) was formed. KSLW aimed at defending the religious rights
of Poles and was associated with ROPCiO. The major demand of this movement was to have Mass broadcast on radio and television.\textsuperscript{78} There was also the Committee for the Defence of Life and Family (KOZiR). Formed in the fall of 1977, its aim was to repeal the liberal abortion laws in Poland. This group was openly nationalistic and anti-communist. In their publication, \textit{Samoobrona Polska} ("Polish Self-Defence"), KOZiR openly reverted to the traditions of the prewar National Democrats.\textsuperscript{79}

ROPCiO did not exist long in the form in which it was conceived. Some eighteen months after it was formed, Leszek Moczulski split from ROPCiO and formed the Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN) on 1 September 1979. The announcement of the founding of KPN was made to some 4,000 persons commemorating the 35th anniversary of Polish independence at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Warsaw. KPN was also openly nationalistic, regularly made antagonistic references about the communists, and, as its "Declaration of Principles" states: "In forming the Confederation of Independent Poland we appeal to all Poles here and abroad to unite in actions for freedom and independence."\textsuperscript{80}

At the same time as KPN emerged, the Committee for National Self-Determination (KRPSN) was also founded. It was led by Wojcieh Ziembinski.\textsuperscript{81} Both the KRPSN and KPN laid claims to the cult of Jozef Pilsudski. Despite the splits, relations between ROPCiO, KPN and KRPSN (which remained a tiny movement) were friendly. KRPSN was made up of ex-AK officers and together
with KPN indulged in attacks against the Soviets.

Another group which split from ROPCiO was the Movement of Independent Democrats (RWD) from Lodz. This movement was led by Karol Glogowski, Andrzej Mazur, and Andrzej Ostoja-Owiany, among others. RWD had fairly poor relations with ROPCiO, KPN, and KRPSN, while its relations with KOR, Lipski called "correct." RWD was less radical than KPN, suggesting that KPN's non-recognition of People's Poland was unrealistic. While RWD proclaimed its opposition to the regime and called for Polish independence, it added that contemporary existing realities had to be recognized. On the other hand, RWD criticized ROPCiO for trying to work with the regime in promoting human rights. RWD insisted on totally independent structures in promoting Poland's independence.

The Young Poland Movement (RMP) was formed also as a result of the split with ROPCiO and emerged on 27 July 1979. RMP was centred in Gdansk around the Bratniak group and headed by Aleksander Hall. RMPs relations with almost all of the other opposition groups was fairly good. Indeed, despite the fact that the RMP had a neo-endecja orientation, KOR respected its young members for their organizational skills and intellectual abilities. As Lipski describes RMP, the Young Poland Movement was not anti-Semitic, had a moderate nationalist ideology, and was without a trace of authoritarian ideas. However, RMP still adhered to some aspects of Roman Dmowski's thought. At this
stage, RMP advocated a programme of political action which stressed underground activities and opposition to the regime.\textsuperscript{86} Indeed, RMP frequently initiated patriotic protests and participated widely in various opposition activities. Finally, RMP members played a significant role in Solidarity’s secretariat.

On 30 July 1978, some 200 peasants from 18 villages in the province of Lublin held a rally in Ostrowek and formed the Peasants’ Defence Committee (KSC). The regime reacted sharply against the formation of KSC and arrested its leaders. However, KSC supporters refused to deliver milk unless the authorities released the organizers. The government relented and the peasants held elections for the first KSC executive. The KSC programme called for the following: a) village self-government; b) authentic representation of the political interests of the peasants; c) tax reform on land; d) revised taxes on agricultural equipment; and, e) a change in the retirement laws.\textsuperscript{87} Janusz Rozek became the first chairman of Lublin KSC.

KSC had excellent relations with both KOR and ROPCiO. In fact, KOR edited its first communiqué and gave KSC its name. On 9 September 1978, near Warsaw, a second KSC was founded. The Warsaw KSC, however, was "spiritually led" by Rev. Czeslaw Sadlowski. The fact that a priest led the Warsaw KSC was not insignificant. The Lublin KSC suffered extensive government reprisals during its existence, while the Warsaw KSC had few problems with the authorities.
By the end of 1979, three more KSCs were formed in Poland. One, however, near Bialobrzegi, took the name Committee for Independent Trade Union of Farmers. This committee also published its own journal, *Postep* ("Progress"). The KSCs and The Union of Farmers, together with the KSLW, also formed the People’s University (UL). It was mostly peasant activists who took the UL courses; from TKN and KOR activists. The objectives of the UL was to teach peasant activists the opposition techniques developed by KOR, and other movements, to teach the history of Poland’s peasant movements, and to teach the need for independent action.  

The final group of political movements shown in Diagram III is the official ruling communist party and its allies. The PZPR, the Democratic party (SD), and United Peasant party (ZSL), provided little indication that they were aware of the emerging political crisis in the 1970s. This, despite the fact that many of the politically conscious persons in Poland were either organized in an opposition movement or tried to distance themselves from the regime. Indeed, the PZPR, which was supposed to represent the workers, while the SD existed for the intelligentsia, and the ZSL for the peasants, by the end of 1979, represented only the staunchest supporters of the regime. 

Even the Catholic Social Movement, *PAX*, was showing signs of moving away from the regime. Anna Kowalska, a former *PAX* member (keeping her job and contacts with the *PAX* association), had become a KOR member. Moreover, Jerzy Sienkiewicz, the
chairman of the Jastrzebie MKS during the Solidarity strikes of July-August 1980, was also a PAX member.\textsuperscript{90} In fact, Sienkiewicz was instrumental in having the important Jastrzebie Agreement signed by the PZPR in 1980.

The policy of inaction followed by the PZPR, however, also worked in favour of the opposition movements. The gradual societal move from realism to idealism, was accelerated by the ineptitude of the PZPR after the rise of Edward Gierek in 1970. More important, the relatively "liberal" policies of the Gierek regime during its reign of power also enabled the Polish opposition to function in the open. Thereby providing the opposition further "legitimacy" in Polish society.

In a final effort to channel at least some of the open intellectual opposition, the regime permitted the establishment of a discussion group called "Experience and Future" (DiP).\textsuperscript{91} DiP held its first meeting on 4 November 1978, in Warsaw. About 100 scholars, writers, economists and artists had been asked to discuss current social problems. Included were non-party intellectuals and well-known Catholic leaders. However, as Lipski concludes:

\begin{quote}
 It is impossible to ignore the subsequent works of DiP, since they played a significant role in the formation of attitudes among the intelligentsia. In any case, the Report on the State of the Commonwealth and on Roads Leading to Its Repair was an important and valuable work. It is not surprising that it was immediately discussed in detail in the Information Bulletin, and then immediately duplicated by NOWa. Almost on the eve of the strikes in
\end{quote}
the summer of 1980, the second document from DiP was published. This was entitled "How Do We Get Out of This?" and was completed on April 30. It was based on a survey conducted among members of the intelligentsia, to which there were 141 replies. Over one third of these responses were made by party members. This work did not have the social resonance of the first work; one felt that it was simply too late.

VI

By the end of the 1970s, the turn of the century Polish political idealists, Bogdan Cywinski's so-called "unbowed", had greatly influenced their modern counterparts. To be sure, the differences between the political idealists of the late-19th to early-20th century, and the political idealists of the post-1968 period, are very real and need little elaboration. Indeed, the most important and obvious difference was that the modern political idealists rejected the use of violence and insurrection. On the other hand, the similarities are also noteworthy. "In both cases, in formulating political programmes a significant role was played by the humanists, who tended to appeal to emotion rather than to reason." The literature of protest ranged from the sophisticated prose of Tadeusz Konwicki to the passionate poetry of Stanislaw Baranczak.

Even the moralism of the modern political idealists reflected the tone of their predecessors. In assessing the opposition intelligentsia, Andrzej Walicki wrote that the
opposition was unable "to avoid romantic emotionalism in politics...treating political activity not so much as the 'art of the possible' but rather as the public expression of moral attitudes; thinking too much about the future moral judgement of history...As a rule, politically active Polish intellectuals were also too inclined to apply to politics the 'ethics of principles' and to reject, somewhat hastily, the Weberian 'ethics of responsibility', as too close, in their eyes, to opportunism and cynicism."\(^97\)

While armed struggle for independence was rejected, the open calls for Polish independence, uniformly voiced by the Polish opposition of the 1970s, was a strong motivating factor in the political programmes of the opposition. The modern political idealists, on the other hand, did not reject the other three characteristics of the historic romantic struggle for Polish independence. In the first place, underground activity flourished. Indeed, the "illegal" and "unofficial", or "uncensored", activities of the opposition movements became so pervasive the by the end of the decade, some members of the opposition began to speak of an independent Poland as a foregone conclusion. One need only mention the statement made earlier by Lipski: "At some point during the formation of a free Poland their [the different opposition movements] paths would have to part, but at this point the cooperation could be quite close."\(^98\)

The rise of nationalism during the 1960s also reached its
peak in the 1970s and continued well into the Solidarity period.\textsuperscript{99} This led to an open manifestation of anti-Russian, or anti-Soviet, sentiments throughout Poland. As Bromke notes: "Strong Polono-centrism, reminiscent of the Pilsudski years, re-emerged. Poland's significance in the international sphere was exaggerated. Traditional anti-Russian sentiments were revived. Historic Polish grievances against the Soviet Union, and especially the Katyn murders [during World War II], were openly ventilated."\textsuperscript{100} Indeed, in 1979 The Katyn Institute of Poland was formed and issued an "appeal" to Polish society. The appeal called for a revealing of the truth about Katyn, guaranteeing reparations to the families of the victims, and added that Polish-Soviet cooperation would be judged "only on the foundation of truthfulness and mutual trust."\textsuperscript{101}

Finally, the traditional reliance on Western aid was also manifested. Almost without exception, the political opposition called upon the West to recognize and aid the "human rights" movements in Poland. Indeed, the leaders of the opposition actively sought Western support for their cause. This should not suggest, however, that such a policy was incorrect or that the West must reject aid to those seeking greater political freedoms in their countries. On the other hand, the expectations of assistance from the West is nevertheless a characteristic of the early Polish political idealists. And in this sense, the political opposition of the 1970s carried on that tradition.
Moreover, and unlike the early political idealists, the political idealists of the 1970s argued that the West was obliged to aid the Poles in their struggle for democracy and independence.

As Jozef Kusmierek, a Polish journalist who frequently published in the underground press, wrote: "Sometime in 1978 we stopped greeting each other in Poland by the normal 'Good day', 'What's new?', and replaced it with the disturbing 'When will it finally erupt?', 'What will happen with us?', 'Will this ever end?'. Of course, no one really had the faintest idea that it would erupt, or that something terrible would happen...Everyone was comforted by the belief that...somewhere among the top intellectual elites, in the womb of the church hierarchy, in the opposition, there were people who would show us the correct path; away from disaster. We were united in the knowledge, that the West, especially America, must help us."


3 ibid.

4 ibid., p. 427.

5 This point is emphasized by Lipski, see ibid., p. 423.

6 ibid., p. 424.


8 Jan Litynski, a KOR member, was also the editor of Robotnik.

9 Many of the Robotnik editorial board members and contributors were workers (ie. mechanics, electricians, miners). However, many were also university trained. For example, Bogdan Borusewicz was a historian and KOR member, as was Wojciech Onyszkiewicz, Jan Litynski was a mathematician, Henryk Wujec was a physicist, and Andzej Gwiazda - who became the KPP vice-president - was an engineer.

10 See, Lipski, op. cit., p. 228.

The PPS Robotnik was edited for a long time by Jozef Pilsudski.


In fact, shortly after World War II Stanislaw Manturzewski and Jan Jozef Lipski organized a youth club called the "Neo-Pickwickians," and during the Stalinist period they participated (about a dozen young scholars) in illegal studies in the social sciences. Lipski argues that this club had formulated the concept of the "new class" even before Yugoslavia's Djilas had made this concept popular in 1953. The Polish Security Service disbanded the club, however, many of the original members formed a core of activists around the publication Po Prostu in 1957 and finally took over the leadership of the first formal dissent group centred around the Crooked Circle Club. See Lipski, op. cit., p. 513.

Cf. Tokes, op. cit.

The only publication that deals specifically with Poland's peasants during the Solidarity period is C.M. Hann's, A Village Without Solidarity: Polish Peasants in Years of Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). Hann's study is limited in that it only deals with one Polish village during the crisis. However, it is an interesting analysis and the only volume on the Polish crisis which is written from an anthropological perspective. See also the studies on the Polish

19 Political opposition in Poland was always present. Immediately after World War II, the anti-communist underground was widespread and received much support from the local population. The communist authorities had to institute special military units to combat the resistance; which lasted, in some areas, until 1949.

20 Rupnik, op. cit., p. 60.

21 Lipski, op. cit., pp. 16-17.


23 Ibid.


25 The "Letter of the 34" is reprinted in Raina, Political Opposition in Poland, pp. 74-75.

26 In attendance was also Adam Michnik, who was one of the students signaled out by the SB as an "active" discussant. Michnik also faced disciplinary actions by the University of Warsaw after the Kolakowski speech.

27 Cited in Raina, op. cit., p. 115.

28 Already in 1964 the first arrests of students opposing the communist regime took place in Warsaw. Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski, two young assistants at the University of Warsaw, published the "Open Letter to the Party", their Marxist critique of Polish communism helped land them in prison in 1965. By the mid-1970s Kuron and Modzelewski had disavowed themselves of the still highly Marxist views expressed in the 1964 letter.

29 Lipski practically avoids mention of the workers' strikes of 1970 in his study.

30 Rupnik, op. cit., p. 60.
31 See Lipski, op. cit., pp. 23-29.

32 See Ostoya-Ostaszewski, op. cit., pp. 11-24. Also, only one Sejm deputy abstained from voting: Stanislaw Stomma from the Catholic Znak group.

33 This new understanding is forcefully reflected in Lipski’s writings. See also the important study written by Adm Michnik, "The Church And The Left: A Dialogue," in Frantisek Silnitsky, et. al., ed., Communism And Eastern Europe (New York: Karz Publishers, 1979), pp. 51-95. Not all Catholics, however, agreed with Michnik’s assessment of the Roman Catholic church, see Jan Drewnowski, "Kapitulacja ideologiczna i ofensywa potityczna," Krytyka (Warsaw, an underground journal published by NOWa), No. 2 (Fall 1978), p. 99-105. [Mimeographed.].

34 Lipski, op. cit., p. 76.


36 Lipski, op. cit., pp. 278-279.

37 Cited in ibid., p. 279.

38 Adam Bromke, "The Meaning and Uses of Polish History," (To be published by East European Monographs, Boulder, Col.), p. 55. [Mimeographed.]. Bromke adds that a third important issue in Polish politics, namely, the relationship between the Poles and the other nationalities living with them, had divided Polish political movements. However, since the end of World War II this issue has lost considerable significance.

39 See ibid., pp. 56-57.

40 ibid., p. 58. The diagram is reproduced in its entirety.

41 ibid., p. 59. The diagram is reproduced in its entirety.


43 ibid., p. 124.

44 Lipski, op. cit., p. 357.

45 Cited in Preibisz, op. cit., p. vii.
46 Ibid., p. ix.

47 See, for example, Jane Leftwich Curry, in ibid.


49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.


52 The announcement of KORs formation was made public at a news conference in London (with Kolakowski, Michnik, and another academic, Włodzimierz Brus). RFE relayed the news to Poland. See the statement in Raina, Political Opposition in Poland, pp. 299-302. The first members of KOR included: Jerzy Andrzejewski, Stanisław Baranczak, Ludwik Cohn, Jacek Kuron, Edward Lipinski, Jan Jozef Lipski, Antoni Macierewicz, Piotr Naimski, Antoni Pajdak, Jozef Rybicki, Aniela Steinsbergowa, Adam Szczypiorski, Rev. Jan Zieja, and Wojciech Ziembinski. Among the later members: Halina Mikolajśka, Mirosław Chojecki, Emil Morgiewicz, Wacław Zawadzki, Bogdan Borusewicz, Jozef Sreniowski, Anka Kowalska, Stefan Kaczorowski, and Wojciech Onyszkiewicz.

53 In January 1979, Jacek Kuron faced one of the harshest violent acts initiated on a KOR member. The attack was led by a large number of members from the official students' organization. See Lipski, op. cit., pp. 266-273.

54 See Bromke, "Opposition in Poland," p. 40; and Lipski, ibid., pp. 391-392. Lipski also discusses KORs first meeting with Wyszynski.

55 See Lipski, op. cit., pp. 155-158.

56 Ibid., p. 159.

57 Ibid., pp. 159-160.

58 Ibid., p. 62.

59 Ibid., pp. 75-77.

60 See ibid., pp. 196-197.

61 Ibid., p. 196.

63 See Lipski, op. cit., p. 18.

64 Arkuszewski and Ostrawski were also imprisoned for a short period in Mokotow Prison after the Pyjas protests.

65 See Lipski, op. cit., pp. 116-121.

66 "Ruch" was a secret opposition movement formed in the last months of Gomulka's rule and disbanded by the SB in 1970. Most of its leaders came from Lodz and included Jacek Bierezin. KOR members Wieslaw Kecik, Marzena Kecik, and Emil Morgiewicz were also "Ruch" members. Morgiewicz later joined ROPCiO.

67 During the late 1960's, Moczulski was one of the people connected with the illustrated weekly Stolica. During the 1968 protests this periodical was connected with Moczar and his "Partisans". Moczulski also wrote a number of articles in Stolica attacking the students and intellectuals. For more details, see Lipski, op. cit., p. 117.

68 For a list of the initial ROPCiO members, see Raina, Independent Social Movements, pp. 314-315.

69 See Preibisz, op. cit., pp. 326-328.


71 For a review of the discussions in Bratniak, see Preibisz, op. cit., pp. 11-17. This group was Catholic, nationalistic (although opposed to all forms of xenophobia), and its leader Aleksander Hall, a historian, is an admirer of Roman Dmowski. However, Hall rejects Dmowski's xenophobic and authoritarian tendencies.

72 Lipski, op. cit., p. 176. SKS members who took on powerful roles in Solidarity included, for example, Boguslaw Sonik, chairman of the Malopolska region delegation to the First Solidarity Congress, and Aleksander Hall, an advisor to Lech Walesa and leader of the Solidarity underground until Hall returned to public life.


74 Bromke, "The Opposition in Poland," p. 44.


See Bromke, "The Opposition in Poland," p. 43.


*ibid.*, p. 517 n.


Lipski, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

*ibid.*, p. 439.


Lipski, *op. cit.*, pp. 412-413.


Bromke, *ibid.*


See Endnote, no. 44.

for a comprehensive discussion of the rise of nationalism in the 1960s, see Valkenier, op. cit.

Bromke, op. cit., p. 349.

See Preibisz, op. cit., p. 321.

CHAPTER FOUR

POLAND'S INCREMENTAL REVOLUTION

The wave of strikes, after the 2 July 1980 price increase, continued sporadically throughout the country for some six weeks, varying in degree and significance, until mid-August when they reached their peak in Gdansk. During this six week period general strikes had paralysed entire towns, such as Zyrardow, and a transport strike in Lublin had similar affects. Even Warsaw was hit sharply by a wave of strikes.\(^1\) It was also at this time that KOR had set itself up as the official information agency for Western journalists. Indeed, one newspaper entitled its article: "For Polish strike facts, dial KOR,"\(^2\) Lipski describes the situation:

Jacek Kuron's telephone always functioned as the information center in KOR. Anyone who learned anything considered it his or her responsibility to call Jacek. Much information came in over other telephones...but
finally it all went to Kuron. Usually the phone was answered by Jacek, his wife Grazyna, their son Maciej... When the phone began ringing nonstop, Ewa Kulik... moved into Kuron’s apartment. She spent twenty-four hours a day near the phone... She knew English well, they managed wonderfully: people throughout the world called to find out what was happening[...]

During the initial wave of strikes, Gierek ordered the managers of the largest factories, at a "secret" meeting on 11 July, to stand firm against concessions in order to weaken the growing discontent. However, this policy did not bring the desired results and the strikes continued until 18 July. Then, in an effort to make some concessions, the Politburo informed the Lublin strikers that a special commission - headed by Deputy-Premier Jagielski - would be set up to examine all of the workers grievances. Nonetheless, Gierek still refused to give substantial wage increases to the workers and also refused to reverse the order instituting price increases. The regime still held out hopes that the situation would calm itself down.

The extent of the strikes was even revealed by the ruling party when Stanislaw Kania, a PZPR Politburo member since 1975, noted that work stoppages had affected 533 factories in all of the provinces and that some 640,000 workers had participated in the strikes. Moreover, the sheer magnitude of the problem may have stopped the regime from using the para-military police, fearing that the nation-wide strikes would further escalate. Finally, in a last ditch attempt, Gierek ordered his enterprise managers to
settle the strikes on a case-by-case basis, allowing the managers
to make concessions on a large number of economic and social
issues.

By 23 July, however, the regime realized that its entire
approach was having little effect on the striking workers.
Despite economic concessions, PZPR authority began to diminish at
a rapid rate. For example, in union elections to the Lublin
railway workers' executive, some one-half of the positions were
filled by candidates nominated directly by the rank-and-file
membership. The PZPR candidates quickly began to lose their
credibility and authority. Moreover, the demands of the Lublin
workers was a sign of things to come. Free elections to the
official trade unions being the most significant and farreaching.

The almost neverending process of strikes was marked by a
number of characteristics. First, the workers stayed in their
factories. The occupation strike, or what the press sometimes
referred to as the "Polish" strike, gave the regime little room
for manoeuvrability. More important, the spontaneous nature of
the strikes did not cause the workers to neglect self-organization. Also, many new, and independent negotiators
began to appear at the talks with government officials. Moreover,
the six weeks of strikes gave the workers sufficient experience in
factory self-rule and it became apparent that these workers were
in no mood to turn their power over to official state
representatives.
Another important characteristic of the July-August strikes was the participation of KOR. Echoing Lipski, Polish sociologist, Stanislaw Ehrlich, stated:

The [strike] leaders and a few dozen strong KOR [activists]...did not call up these events but they foresaw and inspired them (the workers took the very concept of independent trade unions from KOR writings) and in a few centres they helped the organizers of the [workers'] councils and above all they became the information network.

Anna Walentynowicz, a co-founder of the Gdansk MKS, and a Robotnik Wybrzeza and KZ WZZ activist, in the film Workers 80 praised the "training" she had received from KOR members. Indeed, many Gdansk KZ WZZ activists had received systematic, self-instruction, as Lipski called it, from KOR members and associates. To be sure, KOR's pivotal connections were with students and intellectuals. Nonetheless, all the opposition movements in Poland had close contacts with each other, the church, and worker activists. In Lublin, for example, many KOL students and opposition intellectuals gave workers advice during the July strikes.

Finally, there was more at stake during the July-August strikes than simply mere economic demands. The striking workers that agreed to settlements in July, receiving 10-20% wage increases, ensured that some tensions would be eased. This helped prevent "the workers from taking to the streets, but workers'
demands were only partially about pay and factory conditions. They were also directed against the whole centralized Communist system and in particular the unresponsiveness of the official unions to workers' wishes. The systemic failures of the PZPR were also compounded by the new wave of patriotic sentiments that swept Poland. The election of Karol Cardinal Wojtyla to the Papal throne, and his triumphal visit to Poland in 1979, changed the overall character of the strikes. As Lipski suggests: "During the period between the Pope's visit and the wave of strikes of 1980 a number of patriotic demonstrations took place in Poland, especially in Gdansk and Warsaw...They played an important and generally positive role in the molding of social attitudes."9

The depth of Polish patriotic sentiments was clearly revealed in the summer of 1980. There was hardly a factory which did not drape its entrance with the national flag and adorned the surroundings with pictures of the Pope. Significantly, many of the workers also wore the red and white arm bands reminiscent of Polish wartime resistance.10 To be sure, the Polish crisis of 1980 bore little resemblance to the uprising of 1944, or the string of earlier insurrections from the late 18th century to the mid-19th century. Nonetheless, visitors to Poland, during those sixteen months of renewal, could not avoid being struck by the euphoria and open patriotism of that period.

The course of events which caused the downfall of the Gierek regime and which led to the formation of Solidarity is well
known and hardly needs to be recounted. The one common feature of all the reports from the Gdansk shipyards was that it must have been a marvellous site for a mass occupation strike. The flurry of activity, the strikers' sense of purpose and history cannot be denied. There were, of course, some tense moments during this period and some clashes with the Gdansk militia did take place. However, the magnitude of the events overshadowed the minor setbacks. Indeed, the Gdansk workers also taunted the authorities by regularly making references to their dead colleagues who fell in December 1970. Nonetheless, the discipline of the Gdansk strike was closely followed by most Poles. Despite the cuts in communication links throughout Gdansk, the crucial strike at the Lenin shipyards rapidly turned into a regional protest and was only a step away from becoming a national revolt.

The Gdansk shipyard director, between August 14 and 16, almost managed to settle the strike himself with a 1,500 zloties per month pay raise and a pledge that no negative government response would follow. The director also ordered the immediate reinstatement of Anna Walentynowicz (her firing was a major cause of the strike). However, the workers reconsidered the director's concessions. The strikes no longer reflected the economic and job related issues which had sparked them in the first place. Indeed, the situation soon escalated both in terms of geography and in the shift from largely social and economic demands to political ones.

On the initiative of KOR and RMP advisors, on 16 August,
the first Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee (MKS) was formed in Gdansk. The Gdansk MKS (later transformed into the Provisional Council of Trade Unions, then KPP, Solidarity's governing body) tabled 21, mostly political, demands. The most obvious and farreaching demands were the right to form free trade unions and the right to strike.\textsuperscript{13} It was with these political demands that "the real struggle for the future of Poland began".\textsuperscript{14}

The formation of the MKS's was, without doubt, historically significant. "The MKS's ensured that the regime would be unable to use force and would be forced into direct negotiations with the strikers which it was bound to lose. They also provided the framework for the future evolution of Solidarity, a national MKS writ large, which ensured that the outside possibility of 'free trade unions' assuming a local or enterprise organizational form was buried right from the outset."\textsuperscript{15}

II

The reaction to the strikes by the Gierek regime, as we have seen, was an attempt to isolate the strikes and negotiate on a case-by-case basis with "bread and butter" concessions. Moreover, the enterprise managers were expected to divide the strikers from themselves. This tactic usually failed, as Jadwiga Staniszkis illustrates:
One of the clerks of the shipyard personnel office which had been responsible for the expelling of Anna Walentynowicz from her job gave a long speech [at the shipyards], it was very fluent and bombastic. He underlined the workers' right to protest but, at the same time, vigorously defended Gierek's policy. He received loud applause, which slowly died when Mrs. Walentynowicz, nearly crying, said: "What are you doing? Do you know who he is?" The applause then changed to an aggressive attack.  

In order to show that everything was still "normal" in Poland, the official media ignored the industrial unrest until mid-August; and even then they referred to the strikes euphemistically as "work stoppages". Moreover, the PZPR stressed the seriousness of Poland's economic situation. To this end, many statistics were revealed for the first time in order to show the gravity of Poland's economic crisis. Also, the Gierek leadership did not attempt any major initiative until Prime Minister Babiuch's televised speech of 15 August. This is probably because Gierek, who had curiously left for a three week vacation with Leonid Brezhnev on 27 July, did not return to Poland until 15 August.

On television, Babiuch defended the belt-tightening measures, although he admitted that the authorities were largely to blame for not informing the public about the growing economic crisis. Babiuch also added that the major problem facing Poland was the need to ameliorate the country's staggering balance of payments crisis. To be sure, Babiuch was correct in his economic appraisal. However, no one was reassured politically.
Lech Walesa responded to Babiuch's "appeal" by saying: "Babiuch's sweet voice can no longer convince anyone," Andrzej Gwiazda added: "the authorities will no longer be able to ignore demands for the democratization of public life." 

Feeling the pressure, Gierek made a direct appeal to society on 18 August. Gierek noted that he understood the reasons for the social discontent, however, he also condemned the strikes for bringing harm to Poland. Economic demands, such as freezing of meat prices, price controls, and measures to aid the poor, would be considered, Gierek declared. He also added that negotiations with the striking workers were possible. Finally, Gierek pointed out that the strikes harmed Poland's political order and that this situation could not be tolerated, nor could it change the political reality.

Gierek's appeal, was ignored by the strikers. What Gierek pathetically had not realized was that society had galvanized in opposition to both his rule and the communist monopoly of power. Moreover, there were plenty of members within the party ranks who sympathized with the strikers and who also wanted to distance themselves from the Gierek regime. In the final analysis, the rapid flow of events overwhelmed both Gierek and the PZPR as a whole. And there was little that Gierek could do but negotiate.

The Presidium of the Council of Ministers went ahead with the reform measures proposed by Gierek and the head of the party
commission negotiating with the Gdansk workers, Tadeusz Pyka, was replaced on 21 August by senior Deputy Premier, Mieczyslaw Jagielski. While Jagielski was dispatched to Gdansk, Kazimierz Barcikowski was sent to Szczecin to negotiate with the striking workers there. This time, both Jagielski and Barcikowski dropped the party's demand that the workers represent themselves according to individual enterprises. With this development, the regional MKS's became the focal point of negotiation for the workers.

In response to the negotiation steps taken by the regime, the Gdansk MKS requested that a group of special "experts" from Warsaw assist them. These experts included: Tadeusz Mazowiecki (editor of the Catholic monthly Wiez); Andrzej Wielowiejski (Secretary of the Warsaw KIK); Professors Bronislaw Gieremek (a medieval PAN historian); Jadwiga Staniszewska (a University of Warsaw sociologist); Waldemar Kuczynski (an economist); Tadeusz Kowalik (also an economist); and Leszek Kubicki (a legal scholar from the PAN Institute of Law). As Kowalik describes it:

On the afternoon of 23 August, Bronislaw Gieremek telephoned me in Warsaw from...Gdansk...to report that Walesa and the Inter factory Strike Committee had requested the formation of a Commission of Experts...[We] all agreed to go to Gdansk and if I had some difficulty in convincing them, this was not of the usefulness of this initiate, but of the authenticity of my information (Cywinski's reaction was: 'Tadeusz you must be drunk, sleep it off and ring me later') I did not speak to Staniszewska who had already gone to the shipyard on the suggestion of someone there. The rest of us were due to leave the following morning, Sunday 24 August, at 9:00 a.m.
Almost all of the experts, excluding Jadwiga Staniszkis, were associated with KOR, TKN, or the semi-oppositionist DiP. When one includes the worker activists involved in the negotiations, and the advisory role played by KOR and RMP members from the outset of the 2 July strikes, the Gdansk MKS negotiations brought together almost the entire elite of the opposition. It is little wonder that the strikers won all of their demands. And, unlike 1970 and 1976, made almost no concessions.

After the government accepted the Gdansk MKS as a negotiating partner, it "was tantamount to the recognition by the authorities of the principle of free collective bargaining for the first time in a communist state."24 The dramatic talks began on 23 August and ended in agreement on 31 August.25 Moreover, the emotional signing ceremony of the Gdansk accord was broadcast live on national television.26 The Gdansk and Szczecin strikes were declared over.27

III

The Gierek regime was unprepared for the revolt in Polish society. More important, the PZPR was divided over a response to the upheaval. The conservatives, who wanted to redouble the propaganda campaign, arrest large numbers of opposition leaders - which was done28 - and force a decisive showdown with the strikers; were led by the PZPR's chief ideologue, Jerzy
The thinking of the conservatives was best exemplified by a confidential letter, written by Lukaszewicz, to PZPR members:

The demand to form so-called free unions is being put forward not out of concern for the improved representation of workers' interests but in order to gain within their framework the institutionalized possibilities of conducting counter-socialist activities directed against our party and our people's state.

The more pragmatic and centrist elements in the PZPR, on the other hand, largely rejected Lukaszewicz's stand and looked to Stanislaw Kania for guidance. Indeed, some of the pragmatists, such as Mieczyslaw Rakowski, editor of Polityka, reverted to the ideas of the early 1970s as the basis for new reforms. Soon after the 2 July strikes, Rakowski wrote that decentralization was needed in the economic system, which had ceased to react in any coherent fashion and usually contrary to all common sense. In the beginning of August, Rakowski added that extensive reforms were also necessary because social unrest threatened the entire system in Poland; a threat which he tacitly implied could force a Soviet invasion.

The subtle, but clear, threats of a Soviet invasion and arrests of opposition activists, were completely ineffective, and balked at by the vast majority of Polish society. At the Fourth Plenum, on 24 August, Gierek lost some of his closest supporters. Babiuch, Lukaszewicz, Tadeusz Wrzaszczyk (head of the Planning
Committee), Tadeusz Pyka (deputy Prime Minister), and Zdzislaw Zandarowski (the Central Committee Secretariat boss), had all been replaced. Stefan Olszowski took over the Secretariat and joined the Politburo, Jozef Pinkowski became Prime Minister, Opole PZPR chief, Andrzej Zainski, also joined the Politburo as a candidate member, and Tadeusz Grabski joined the Central Committee and became a Deputy Premier.  

A series of more extensive changes in the PZPR leadership soon followed the Fourth Plenum. The case of Maciej Szczepanski, a friend of Gierek, and head of the Committee on Radio and Television, is particularly revealing. The calls for the firing of Szczepanski became a sort of causes celebres for the Solidarity movement. Szczepanski's life-style of "spectacular corruption and debauchery on state funds", became a catalyst for Solidarity supporters to demand more extensive changes within the PZPR.

The 24 August changes in party ranks had little effect on Solidarity. This was as much caused by the failure of Gierek's 1970 promises, as by the firm belief held within the higher ranks of the Solidarity movement that only institutional agreements could guarantee reforms. However, the institutionalization of the right to form free trade unions and the right to strike caused new problems. The most obvious problem was the role of the PZPR. It was never clear what role the party was to play in post-Gdansk Poland. To be sure, the PZPR insisted that its constitutional guarantee as the country's leading political force was
unquestionable. As Article 2 of the Gdansk Agreement states:

The Interfactory Strike Committee declares that the new, independent, self-governing trade unions will accept the basis of the Polish Constitution. The new trade unions will defend the social and material interests of employees and do not intend to act as a political party... While acknowledging the leading role of the Polish United Workers' Party in the state and not questioning the established system of international alliances, their purpose is to provide working people with appropriate means of exercising control, expressing their opinions and defending their own interests [...]35

On the other hand, as Sanford notes:

Article 2 of the Gdansk Agreement, on the surface, seemed clear enough but Jagielski's victory in formulating it was a Pyrrhic one... The detailed and sweeping package of varied political, economic and social concessions, agreed to by Jagielski on the PZPR's behalf, was bound to produce recurring bitter conflicts over the manner and time scale of their implementation - let alone as to whether they were justified, or even feasible. Such issues as the working week, increased wages and special benefits for the lower paid and those with large families had been conceded at a time of grave economic crisis. Disputes over these topics as well as poisoning the political atmosphere did much to aggravate inflation and consumer demand and to build up the 'queuing psychosis', which later did so much to render sensible politics difficult in Poland.36

The ambiguity of the sixteen months of renewal was also reflected in a statement made by Walesa, soon after the Gdansk Agreement: "We have not achieved everything, but we have achieved much, and the rest we will obtain in the future because we have our independent and self-governing trade unions."37 Moreover, the
strikes were not over after the Gdansk-Szczecin Agreements were signed. In fact, from July 1980 until 31 December 1981, there was hardly a day when some part of Poland was not affected by a strike.

On 3 September 1980 the Silesian MKS also signed an agreement with the government. The Jastrzebie Agreement,\(^38\) as it was called, indicated the national character of the reform movement which took its lead from the Baltic coast.

The most important development was the international reaction to July-August 1980. The West was pleased with developments in Poland. However, the Warsaw Pact's response was just the opposite. Only the Hungarians gave factual accounts of the strikes. However, this too changed over time. The Romanians were concerned about a possible invasion, while the Soviets, Czechs, and East Germans (later the Hungarians) made every effort to discredit the striking workers and their supporters. Since the PZPR had signed the Agreements, the Soviet bloc reserved its criticism of the Polish party for private talks. As time went by, however, not so subtle hints of disapproval from the fraternal allies, aimed at the Polish public, began to increase.\(^39\) As the reform movement gained momentum, the allies began to fear a collapse of the Polish party and the possibility that Poland's "disease" might spread.
Soon after the signing of the Jastrzebie Agreement, Polish television announced that Edward Gierek had been hospitalized with a heart disorder. On 5 September, Gierek was replaced as PZPR First Secretary by Stanislaw Kania. The same day, the official press also announced that the right to form trade unions was available to all workers whether or not they wanted to strike. No doubt, this announcement was based upon the fact that MKS's had formed throughout the country and the government could not negotiate with all of them individually.

After Kania assumed power, Polish politics became dominated by workers' protests and the rise of independent professional associations. The situation was best described by Andrzej Szczypiorski, who wrote: "the totalitarian structure of power, the whole system, was falling like a pack of cards."

Solidarity's newly formed National Coordinating Commission (KPP), wasted no time in reminding the government that the many promised reforms had not been instituted, nor was Solidarity given access to the mass media. The authorities argued that it needed more time and that the economy could not withstand a five-day work week and universal wage increases. In short, the government refused to give guarantees that the demands would be met on schedule. In response, a one-hour general strike was
called by Solidarity. The strike took place on 3 October and was a tactical success. This first general strike had shown that the KPP had control of the national situation and that the workers would act against the government.

The question of access to the mass media was of particular significance. Solidarity had argued that the reason their demands were not being implemented was because they did not have access to the press or television. However, there was a more important problem. The media frequently targeted KOR members as the "radicals" within the Solidarity movement. The fact that Kuron, for example, had been appointed an advisor to the Gdansk MKS, later the KPP, aggravated the situation. Lipski defends KOR's role in Solidarity, arguing that KOR members were moderate and never pushed for unrealistic demands. Nonetheless, as Raina observed: "Knowing how sensitive the party leadership had been to the past performances of these politically committed individuals, the question arises whether it was tactful on the part of Solidarity to bring them into its ranks at such a decisive and critical moment."45

The situation in Poland eased on 24 October after Warsaw's Provisional Court ruled that Solidarity could finally be registered. However, the Court also amended Solidarity's statute to include provisions stating that the new union did not aspire to becoming a political party, that it recognized the leading role of the PZPR, and that it did not intend to undermine Poland's
alliances. Solidarity leaders called the amendments a betrayal and angrily denounced the ruling. The charges and counter charges between Solidarity and the government lasted well into the new year. Throughout the Solidarity period, one incident after another enraged either Solidarity or the government. While the political climate degenerated the growing economic crisis fueled the animosities on both sides.46

With hindsight, it is fairly simple to indicate which problems during the Polish crisis were most damaging to the process of renewal. To be sure, the government can be blamed for much of the conflicts which erupted. However, Solidarity must also share part of the blame. Not necessarily because its demands were not noble or necessary, but because its calls for extensive reforms were unacceptable to the regime. On the other hand, it is doubtful if Solidarity could have restricted itself to limited reforms. The euphoria of that period, aggravated by the collapsing economy, and the primal attitude of the PZPR leadership which steadfastly held to its last vestiges of power, fed a neverending cycle of increasing conflict. Even the widespread belief among many Solidarity officials that their reforms would not endanger the existing political status quo fueled the conflict.

When Poland's Supreme Court declared that the Warsaw Court could not change Solidarity's statutes, the Solidarity leadership halted the threat of a new general strike. However,
numerous strikes continued and new demands were again proposed. The government, of course, used delaying tactics, threats, and did its utmost to halt the process of change. Nevertheless, some real concessions were also made by the party.

Without doubt, many Solidarity members had displayed a remarkable degree of composure during the delicate months of Solidarity's existence. The movement was frequently called irresponsible or imprudent by the official press and was even threatened with Soviet power. To demonstrate its goodwill, the KPP leadership pledged to help lead the country out of its crisis. However, had "Solidarity limited itself to this, the government might have been less critical. But Solidarity appeared to be entering the political arena rather than merely representing the workers' grievances".47

An example of the political direction which Solidarity followed was the demand for the release of political prisoners. Solidarity insisted that its purpose was not to estimate the political aims of those people who had been arrested, nor did it wish to interfere in the affairs of the Ministry of Justice, on the other hand, they declared their opposition to the arrest of people on the grounds that their political views differed with the authorities.48 "Solidarity was here contradicting itself", Raina suggests, "If it did not want to interfere in the proceedings of the Justice Ministry, why then did Solidarity's [KPP]... announce (on 10 December) the founding of a committee for the Defence of
Prisoners of Conscience [KOWS]? More importantly, why did Walesa participate as a KOWS member and include a KOR representative as its director (Zofia Romaszewska)? KOWS presented itself as a Committee - with clear political aims - under Solidarity's leadership.

The church was also concerned about Solidarity's evolution. On 12 December 1980, the Episcopate warned it would be unwise "to undertake actions that might endanger our motherland with the threat of violation of freedom and statehood". Moreover, the church declared that determined will was "needed to oppose all attempts to arrest the process of national renewal, to stir up differences within society, and to exploit the existing difficulties for purposes alien to the well-being of the people and the state."50

By the spring of 1981, the "renewal" movement that swept the country began to penetrate the party. This led the PZPR "to embark on house-cleaning and reforms of its own."51 The bulk of the initiative came from the rank-and-file of the party, while the leadership generally opposed extensive changes. More importantly, as David Mason points out:

The changes that did occur were extensive enough to worry the Soviet party leadership, which issued a number of
warnings to its Polish counterpart. As the party became less hierarchical and less disciplined, as party members continued to join Solidarity, and as Solidarity continued to mount its challenge to the centralized Polish political system, the regime apparently feared a total collapse of the party - a collapse creating a vacuum that only Solidarity or the army could fill.\textsuperscript{32}

The escalating demands of the Solidarity movement, compounded by the looming collapse of the party, were significant developments. More important, these developments were probably the major factors considered by the Jaruzelski regime when it planned and executed (with Soviet encouragement) martial law. The Polish upheaval had been so extensive that the PZPR leadership, having taken a significant number of steps backwards, was not inclined to make any more retreats and thereby surrender control to either Solidarity or the Soviets. The party "therefore banked everything on surviving and on using its own political and other resources to save its system and its rule."\textsuperscript{53}

Andrzej Walicki puts a large part of the blame for the rising tensions, after the Gdansk Agreements were signed, on the shoulders of Solidarity. He argues that the formation, indeed, legalization, of the free trade unions was an unprecedented accomplishment which should have been held onto at all costs. The Solidarity leadership should have tried to make the free unions a permanent feature of the political system. "Instead," Walicki adds, "everything possible was done to transform the trade unions into a battering-ram to destroy the political system".\textsuperscript{54}
Three episodes in Solidarity's history reflect the maximalist goals of Solidarity: 1) the organization of the movement; 2) the Bydgoszcz incident; and 3) the resolutions adopted at the Solidarity meetings in Radom and Gdansk at the end of 1981. Echoing the argument set forth by Denis MacShane, Walicki asserts that the development of NSZZ Solidarity's organization along geographic lines made it inevitable that disparate, professional, and economic interests of the organic parts that made up the movement, would become secondary to the overall objectives of the social renewal (ie. democracy and independence). Moreover, the structure of the movement would make it a "battering-ram" in the political struggle. Finally, once that struggle began, it escalated and could not be stopped. If the movement wanted to be a trade union, it should have organized as one, certainly after its legal right to exist was upheld.

Even Staniszkis admitted that while Solidarity was established as a trade union, and gained official recognition as such, it obviously "was something very different from a trade union - even in Western democracies." Staniszkis also adds that the obvious political nature of the movement made it go beyond the scope and issues of a real trade union. However, she argued that this was necessary because of the limiting nature of a "quasi-totalitarian state." Indeed, Staniszkis is correct in pointing out that it was necessary for Solidarity to be more than a trade union. Solidarity became an umbrella organization for the
political movements in Poland which aimed at establishing a democracy in Poland and desired to gain independence. Thus, as Staniszkis concludes, "until full political freedoms were restored in Poland and people could also associate freely in political parties, Solidarity had to pretend to be a labour union". 59

The Bydgoszcz incident in March 1981, 60 is the second episode described by Walicki. Despite a warning from the government that the formation of a "Rural" Solidarity would be considered illegal, the peasants' representatives, aided by Solidarity leaders, went ahead with a national congress on 6 March in Szczecin to debate the forming of a Solidarity movement for Poland's farmers. As expected the congress overwhelmingly approved a call for the formation of "Rural" Solidarity.

Representatives from the Szczecin Congress, and Solidarity leaders, went to a meeting at the Bydgoszcz People's Council to discuss a number of grievances. With three items left on the agenda, however, the chairman of the People's Council suddenly adjourned the session. The Solidarity representatives demanded to be heard, when the government representatives left, the Solidarity people stayed at the Council Hall and decided to draft the resolution to form "Rural" Solidarity. A militia detachment came inside the hall and asked that the Solidarity people leave the building. The Solidarity representatives refused, a fight ensued, and some of the Solidarity representatives were left unconscious. Jan Rulewski, Mariusz
Lubentowicz, and Michal Bartoszcze, of Solidarity, were among the victims. As Walicki points out:

The film showing Solidarity leader Jan Rulewski talking with the militia officer has clearly revealed the demagogic nature of Rulewski's position. Had he wanted to, he could have left the room with dignity, and he should have been aware of the dangers inherent in his refusing to do so. The Solidarity leaders in Bydgoszcz went beyond the terms of the existing agreements and Solidarity's own by-laws. One, then, should not claim that it was only the government which did not respect the agreements and that it was not provoked. It was imperative to avoid provocations and, unfortunately, in Bydgoszcz the provocations were not just confined to the beating of the Solidarity activists by the militiamen [...].

The final episodes, without doubt the most important, were also the most damaging to Solidarity. At Solidarity's First National Congress (the first session began on 5 September and lasted until 10 September 1980; the second session opened on 26 September and ended on 7 October), the delegates were warned by Kania in his closing speech on 3 September at the Central Committees Third Plenum that "the authorities would, if necessary, declare a state of emergency". Kania was responding to a threat of strikes on the state radio and television. A strike had become imminent on account of the growing controversy between the government and Solidarity over the coverage of the Gdansk Congress by the national media.

The government refused to air the Congress proceedings unless it had the final say on what was shown on the broadcasts, Solidarity refused to concede and with the exception of a few
Polish journalists, native Poles got to know less about the Congress proceedings than the rest of the world. Moreover, the Soviets ran military exercises along the Baltic coast on the eve of the Congress. The Soviet media referred to the Congress as an "anti-socialist and anti-Soviet orgy". To be sure, the Congress was not an orgy of subversion. On the other hand, the delegates severely criticized the Polish government's record and made other tactical blunders. For example, invitations to attend the Congress, sent to the East European trade unions on 3 September, were noted as provocations by the Soviets. "But the most embarrassing moment for the Polish government was reserved for 8 September, when the Congress delegates addressed a message of 'solidarity' to the workers of East European nations." The message read as follows:

The delegates gathered in Gdansk at the First Congress of Solidarity convey their greetings and support to the workers of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Romania and Hungary as well [to the workers of] all nationalities in the Soviet Union. As the first independent labour union in Poland's postwar history, we deeply feel a sense of community [with you] through our common experiences. We assure you that, contrary to the lies spread [about us] in your countries, we are an authentic, 10 million-strong representative of the working people, [an organization] created as a result of the workers' strikes. Our goal is to struggle for an improvement in life for all working people. We support those of you who have decided to enter the difficult road of struggle for a free and independent labour movement. We trust that our and your representatives will be able to meet soon to compare union experiences.
According to the Soviet news agency, TASS, Solidarity had unmasked itself. The Soviet news agency noted that the Polish government had to undertake decisive action against those in Poland who were "trying to upset communism and to seize power".69

At the second meeting in Gdansk, the situation became progressively worse. When a former interwar General, Mieczyslaw Boruta-Spiechowicz, entered the Congress hall wearing his prewar uniform and medals, "the delegates applauded him with long and thunderous applause. And when the 90-year-old Professor Lipinski told the Congress that he had been a socialist since 1907 and that the current socialism in Poland was anything but socialism, he was given a wild cheer. These and similar manifestations hardly amused the authorities in Warsaw or Moscow."70 As the Congress progressed, the voices of idealism could be heard in greater numbers. At the meetings held to discuss the writing of a Solidarity programme, on more than one occasion, there were calls for the replacement of the corrupt communist system with free elections.71

Solidarity's Programme no longer reflected the attempts to show the regime that it was a trade union first and foremost.72 Indeed, section VI of the Programme called for "democracy and pluralism" so that the Polish people can achieve their national aspirations.73

The end was finally sealed when the Students at the Fire Officers' Training Academy in Warsaw went on strike on 26 November
1981. The government acted on 2 December when it forceably reoccupied the Academy. Walesa reacted by calling a strike warning. When the KPP Presidium met on 3 December in Radom, it called for a general strike and added the demand that elections to both the Sejm and the local People’s Councils be held. As Walicki notes: "The proposal for a referendum to express confidence in the government and for free elections, and Solidarity’s offer of guarantee to the Soviet Union (which from the USSR’s point of view was both ridiculous and provocative), and, finally the announcement of a general strike on 17 December", would have posed a real threat to the government.

The Radom incident was the final straw. In the early hours of 13 December 1981, General Wojciech Jaruzelski announced that the Council of State had declared a "State of War". No one will ever be certain whether or not the Soviets would have invaded Poland. However, in a speech to the July 1986 PZPR Congress, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, said: "It must be said here that Socialist Poland owes much to its eminent leader Wojciech Jaruzelski, to his energy and political astuteness...in finding a solution to a very complicated problem". The Polish authorities, Gorbachev added, must be praised for holding "back the attack by the enemies of socialism with their own forces."75

In the final analysis, Walicki provides a balanced, if controversial, assessment:
How could it be expected that the Soviet Union would accept such a curious arrangement? Many people, especially those who remembered the post-war period in Poland and the period of Stalinism, which followed, saw it as absolutely impossible. But the younger generation, i.e. the majority of the Poles, did not want to listen to them: for them the argument about the impossibility of such a radical change - an impossibility stemming from the very nature of Soviet 'big brother' authority over Poland - was completely discredited, since for many years it had been used and abused by the government. 'Realistic' considerations became suspect, politically and morally. People started to ask questions: What is the function of 'political realism' in Poland? - Is it not a means of protecting one's privileges, or at least, an excuse for one's passivity? How can we know what is really impossible without testing the limits of the possible?

In this way political realism had to give way before a powerful new wave of traditionally Polish 'political romanticism'. The events of 1980-81 were preceded by a long period of increasing popularity for the classics of Polish romantic literature. An outspokenly romantic variety of nationalism was propagated in the pages of the underground publications of the Young Poland Movement - a movement born among the young intelligentsia of the Gdansk region. Most of the younger Poles would have agreed with Mickiewicz, our great national poet, that 'reasonableness' is good in the daily life of an individual but not enough in times of national emergency: in such times one should be obedient to a higher reason whose spokesmen are those making heroic sacrifices for the sake of duty.

VI

The shift from political realism to political idealism in the late-1960s was completed during the Solidarity period. However, the Solidarity leadership, reflecting the stance taken by the political opposition of the mid-1970s, rejected insurrection. "Unlike thier [19th and early-20th century] predecessors who on so
many occasions in the past turned to armed struggle to attain Poland's independence, the contemporary Poles had abstained from following this romantic precept. Indeed, the most striking feature of Solidarity was that it altogether rejected the use of violence. On the other hand, Solidarity was intent on bringing about revolutionary changes in Poland. More important, the other elements of political idealism were openly manifested.

The atmosphere in Poland, during the Solidarity period, was best exemplified by the new popular culture which expressed the sentiments of political idealism. In particular, the eloquent composition by Jan Pietrzak, "Let Poland Be Poland", which virtually became Poland's second national anthem. Pietrzak's song "broke surface in a great chorus of assertion of the nation's history and of their ancient sense of longing". As a verse in "Let Poland be Poland" laments:

When the Czar was cast down from the schoolroom wall, And Father Sciejienny was saying his prayers, And Old Drzymala and his cart stood their ground, And Norwid was writing his verse with pride, Every man who could carry a sabre on high would form a legion, or an Army, and cry: 'Let Poland Be Poland, Let Poland Be Poland', (Zeby Polska byla Polska, Zeby Polska byla Polska).

Despite the wide press coverage of the Polish crisis, the "cultural content of the Solidarity era was lost on the outside world. Western reporters, whose knowledge of trade union disputes on the social and economic issues most familiar in their own
countries, did not always reach out beyond and beneath the material aspects...they failed to catch the subtler literary and historical allusions which in their way were equally significant.⁸¹ In Poland, during this period, everything from religious services, lectures, films, concerts, caberets, and literary events reflected some aspect of political idealism.⁸² Moreover, these events were cherished no less fervently than the demands for wage increases, trade union rights, or improved working conditions.⁸³

One of the most revealing aspects of the Solidarity period was the increased passion for poetry. To be sure, it was not uncommon for the intelligentsia to publish poetry in their new uncensored journals and to have that poetry recited at a protest by university students. The "marvel", as Davies calls it, of the Solidarity period was the spontaneous participation of many workers in this process. It was not altogether unusual for the workers in Catholic Poland to pray during the strikes, or to sing ancient religious hymns, but "when dockers and miners showed that they knew their Mickiewicz and Slowacki, and sought to circulate the classics of Polish literature at their meetings and demonstrations, it must have surprised and delighted even the most skeptical professors."⁸⁴ Moreover, Davies observed:

By general consent...the most popular poetry of the entire Solidarity era belonged to Juliusz Slowacki. For reasons which literary historians will no doubt dissect at their leisure, the hard-headed, hard-hatted workers of the
Polish labour force felt the greatest affinity with the works of the most Romantic of the Polish Romantics.

Political idealism was also manifested in the Solidarity press and underground publications. It was not uncommon for the insurrectionist tradition of Polish history to be uncritically endorsed. Indeed, at the University of Warsaw during the sixteen months of Solidarity, students ran a kiosk which almost exclusively sold T-shirts and buttons graphically displaying pictures of Jozef Pilsudski, the letters AK (Home Army), or the popular EA (Anti-Socialist Element).

The rise in anti-Russian sentiments was also apparent during the crisis. "Among the rank and file of the movement (which in practice included the entire Polish society) the prevailing tendency was to...shout loudly about everything that so far had been prohibited, and to give vent to emotions and sentiments." The most popular form, writes Aleksander Hall, was "the biting satires about the USSR presented in the newly uncensored cabarets. All of these were quite spontaneous. The Poles were intoxicated with their freedom and gaufled it deeply without limit". The usual Polish historical grievances towards the Russians were openly argued. Even the collapse of the Soviet Union was discussed as a real possibility.

The election to the presidency of Ronald Reagan in the United States also brought hopes in Poland that the hated Yalta agreement would be "repealed". Moreover, the Poles expected the
West to bail them out of their economic crisis. As Jozef Kusmirek put it, "Solidarity could have broken the party's monopoly of lies about the Polish situation. It could have shown the Europeans our real needs, our real problems - what more could be said - we just waited. We counted on help from the West." 91

Solidarity's acceptance of political idealism could also be gauged by the movement's embodiment of the 'republican spirit' of the old Polish gentry. Norman Davies has pointed out this parallel between the organizational structure of Solidarity and the ancient 'Republic of the Gentry'. 92 American historian Martin Malia, who attended the Solidarity Congress stated: "Indeed, it is not too much to say that this young working class, in its mentality at least, resembles nothing more than a gigantic plebian szlachta [gentry], insisting on the principle of 'nothing about us without us' and aspiring to the 'golden freedom of its ancestral lords'." 93

Even the moralism of that period reflected political idealism. For example, the indignation towards corruption, which was entirely justified in Polish society. However, the general level of corruption which had gripped Poland already in the 1970s was part of a larger problem. And while the party had more than its share of corrupt functionaries, far too many "average" Poles participated in the corruption.

The most damning assessment of this situation was provided by Andrzej Walicki:
There was no effort to oppose sovietization in the work culture. If sovietization means not to strain oneself, equality conceived as reducing everyone to the lowest common denominator, as inefficiency, sloppiness, or even theft - then, unfortunately, in these efforts our nation has caught up with the Russians. Indeed, in some respects we have even surpassed them, for in Poland there has been less fear and more a permissive attitude on the part of the government. Almost African corruption has not been confined to the ruling elite - everyone given the opportunity has voluntarily participated [...]

To be sure, Walicki does not doubt that this situation is largely attributable to the system and party. However, he adds that both the regime and the society are part of the same system. "And, therefore," Walicki points out, "if the system absolves us, then we also must absolve the system, for, after all, a systemic determinism affects first of all the rulers." Finally, Walicki writes, "I would not have taken this subject up had Solidarity not presented itself as a movement of 'moral renewal'. No doubt, there were such elements in its programme too... Yet, if criticism is to serve the 'moral renewal', then one should begin it with oneself."  

By the end of 1981, and especially after the Solidarity Congress in October, political idealism had become the guiding force. The Poles were unwilling to moderate both their desire for extensive economic and political reforms and their historical dream of Polish independence.

-184-
In defence of their idealistic objectives, the Polish opposition intelligentsia advanced three theories encouraging Solidarity to move along the road of "peaceful revolution", or incremental revolution. First, was the theory of evolutionary changes, which amounted to a political confrontation. In this context, a number of Polish scholars have carried out their own aetiologies of the country's cycle of crises and concluded that crises are necessary for the political system to change. The new theory stressed that trying to establish cooperation with the moderates in the ruling party was senseless because the party is basically homogeneous and therefore concessions must be forced by opposition pressure.

This evolution through crises theory is based on a number of erroneous assumptions. For example, it may be true that pressure on the Soviets can lead to some desired goals, which détente cannot achieve. This does not, however, lead to the conclusion that the Polish opposition can apply "force" on the communist government and achieve the same results. The Americans can apply pressure because they have power, the Poles are without the means necessary to back their demands.

The Poles, in 1980-81, could have tried to use manipulation, not force. The strikes were, of course, a powerful
tool in the hands of the opposition. Yet, it was never clear whether the strike tactic should be used to evolve the system, manipulate the party, or destroy the system. More important, manipulation could have been aimed at the hardliners to split the party. This, however, was not possible since all PZPR members were considered to be the same. Unfortunately, for the opposition, it was impossible to get rid of both the party and the system.

To be sure, the Solidarity leadership could attempt to "force" the system because it was able to mobilize the majority. However, since the PZPR does not subscribe to the principle of "majority rule", nor would the Soviets allow them to, commanding the majority was not enough to change the system. On the other hand, had Solidarity's leadership been willing to fit into the system, the PZPR moderates would have gladly accepted them since the party badly needed its rule legitimized. As Walicki puts it, this "desire opened up great opportunities for political manipulation" on the part of Solidarity. Unfortunately, the opposition wanted nothing to do with the PZPR and the system. Finally, there was a major psychological error inherent in this theory, for it humiliated the government and forced it to close its ranks and seek revenge.

The second theory, that of the "self-governing Republic", conceded to the PZPR retention of all crucial defence and economic matters, assuring Soviet interests. This theory, proposed by
Jacek Kuron, took shape late in the Solidarity period. Indeed, on 22 November 1981, Kuron and other supporters formed the Clubs for a Self-Governing Republic: Freedom, Justice, Independence (KRS), in order to carry out their "self-governing" theory. It was tactically a clever theory for mobilizing and directing the masses...For it enabled its proponents to refute the charges that they wanted to take over the government, while at the same time it led to a politicizing of the conflicts with a view to subverting the government "from below". On the one hand, the theory did not call for a storming of the barricades, while at the same time it intended to keep the masses mobilized. Moreover, this theory suggested prolonged underground activity aimed at undermining the rule of the party and projected that in the long term, a "Finlandization" of Poland was possible.

The third theory, by far the most popular, was that of the "self-limiting" revolution. This theory was first proposed by Leszek Kolakowski and was applied to Solidarity by Jacek Kuron. This theory was popularized by Jadwiga Staniszkis, and has been accepted by a number of analysts of the Polish crisis.

The "self-limiting" revolution theory admits that the process of renewal in 1980-81 was a revolution. However, the revolution's leaders moderated the extreme demands on the part of Solidarity and therefore were within the parameters of political realism. As Sanford points out, the whole theory was "self-serving...because it was thought up by intellectuals and..."
politicians who wanted to dignify the national protest at the economic down-turn and to use it to justify and to shield their domestic reformist strategies... The picture of revolutionary lava being blown out of the Polish volcano and being shovelled back into it by 'Self-Limiting' mechanisms is an intellectually stimulating one but, considered in retrospect, it has little heuristic value."\textsuperscript{105}

Moreover, Walicki adds:

The circumstances in which this theory came into being were typically Polish. The moderates, who should have done anything they could to prevent the revolution, responding to moral pressure, joined it, then tried to do whatever they could to prevent the revolution from being too revolutionary (forgetting Adam Mickiewicz's warning that "in a revolution you must act like a revolutionary"). So the radicals at first frustrated the plans of the moderates, and then the moderates became a hindrance to the revolution which they joined. It was an exact repetition of what already happened in 1863!\textsuperscript{106}

The "self-limiting" revolution theory is adamantly argued by Touraine.\textsuperscript{107} The contradictions that one finds in this type of analysis are endless. Touraine does not excuse whatever mistakes Solidarity may have made during the crisis, he justifies them on the grounds that the leadership really was moderate, self-limiting, and moved by realism. Therefore, whatever else happened during the crisis was the work of lower rank union members who could not be held responsible for their actions -
absolving Solidarity of all radical tendencies. Moreover, if it wasn't for Leszek Moczulski and the KPN, Touraine would only have the PZPR to blame for the entire outcome of events in 1980-81.108

The most interesting aspect of Touraine's analysis, however, are the models of Solidarity's aims developed by his working groups. For Touraine, the three models exemplified the "self-limiting" nature of Solidarity.109 Yet, a closer look reveals that these models, in fact, portray the incremental nature of the Solidarity revolution.

(SEE DIAGRAM IV)110

The first model, the (a) Jerzy theory, is supposed to explain the following:

The movement is defined primarily by its trade-union activity, and is seen as intervening in political problems and in the national question only inasmuch as these dimensions are bound up with the defence of workers' interests. In this sense, it is close to the spirit of the Gdansk Agreement. Solidarity is bound progressively to extend its trade-union action onto the political and national fronts, but this must only take place where the three levels are inseparable [...]

At the same time, the (b) Grzegorz theory was put forward:

[This theory] rejected the image of a movement centred on trade-union action, and proposed instead the model of a
DIAGRAM IV

a) THE JERZY THEORY

Diagram showing the relationship between Trade Union, Democracy, and Nation.

b) THE GRZEGORZ THEORY


c) THE JOZEF THEORY

movement rising by stages towards increasingly political and national action. The Gdansk Agreement...had freed the trade unions, and since then, and especially since the spring of 1981, the union's central preoccupation had been self-management, in other words the liberation of the enterprise. But the nature of the Polish economy meant that any action at factory level inevitably entailed action at the general economic level...[calling for] its replacement by a rational price structure and a free market system. Finally, once it had rebuilt the political system, Solidarity must attempt to restore the true independence of the country[...]

Soon after, the (c) Jozef theory was proposed:

Solidarity must not be defined by the aims from which it started but by its ultimate objective, which was nothing less than Polish independence. The only guarantee of free trade unions was political democracy, which in turn could not survive until the Poles were in control of their own affairs, and could establish the democratic institutions of their choice. Only Solidarity had been able to initiate this process[...]

Whichever theory one prefers, all three clearly indicate that the goals of Solidarity were democratization and independence. Moreover, these goals existed from the beginning of the 1980 strikes. The incremental nature of the movement was based on the fact that maximalist goals were disguised in a trade union format.
ENDNOTES

1 For details about the July-August strikes in Poland, and how they developed, see William F. Robinson, ed., August 1980: The Strikes in Poland (Munich: RFE Research, 1980).


4 Nowe Drogi (Sept. 1980), p. 18. Kania, since the early 1970s, was in charge of domestic security and relations with the church.


6 Lipski, op. cit., p. 424.

7 I had an opportunity to interview a number of workers from the truck factory in Lublin. They acknowledged receiving information from KOR, and from the Spotkania people in Lublin.

8 Sanford, op. cit.


12 On one occasion, for example, two strike activists, a KOR member and a RMP member, were beaten by "unknown" assailants. However, the general atmosphere stayed fairly calm. See Lipski, op. cit., pp. 427-431.

13 Lipski, ibid., pp. 429-431. Also, for a list of the 21 demands, see Anna Sabbat and Roman Stefanowski, comp., Poland: A Chronology of Events. July-November 1980, Radio Free Europe
Background Report/91 (31 March 1981) [Hereafter referred to as RAD Report], pp. i-ii.

14 Ascherson, op. cit., p. 150.
15 Sanford, op. cit., p. 51.
19 Dziennik Polski (London), 18 Aug. 1980. [All ref. to this newspaper come from mineographed copies.].
21 On the role played by those experts, see Staniszkis, op. cit., pp. 48-75.
22 There were more experts, however, they took part in the highly detailed aspects of the negotiations. See A. Kemp-Welch, trans. and Intro by, The Birth of Solidarity: The Gdansk Negotiations, 1980 (London: Macmillan, 19983), esp. Tadeusz Kowalik's, "Experts and the Working Group," pp. 143-167. The Gdansk MKS presidium included:

1. Lech Walesa (electrician) - Gdansk shipyard
2. Joanna Duda Gwiazda (shipping engineer)
3. Bogdan Lis (labourer)
4. Anna Walentynowicz (welder)
5. Florian Wisniewski (electrician)
6. Lech Jedruszewski (fitter)
7. Stefan Izdebski (docker)
8. Henryka Krzywonos (driver)
9. Tadeusz Stawny (chemical technician)
10. Stefan Lewandowski (crane driver)
11. Lech Sobieszek (locksmith)
12. Jozef Przybylski (locksmith)
13. Zdzislaw Kobyliński (warehouseman)
14. Andrzej Gwiazda (engineer)
15. Jerzy Sikorski (fitter)
16. Jerzy Kmiecik (shipbuilder)
17. Andrzej Kolodziej (welder)
18. Wojciech Gruszewski (chemical engineer)
Later the Gdansk novelist, Lech Badkowski.
The negotiations were recorded by Miroslaw Chojecki, publisher of NOWa. See the English translation in Kemp-Welch, op. cit.. See also Peter Raina, Independent Social Movements (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 1981), pp. 435-624.

For a translation of the signing ceremony in Gdansk, see Robinson, op. cit., pp. 420-422.

In fact, the Szczecin Agreement was signed a day earlier on 30 August 1980. For a translation of both the Szczecin and Gdansk Agreements, See Raina, op. cit., pp. 580-598.

On August 30 a number of KOR members and associates were charged with membership in an association having a criminal intent, and placed under arrest: Serweryn Blumsztajn, Miroslaw Chojecki, Ludwik Dorn, Adam Michnik, Jacek Kuron, Zbigniew Romaszewski, and others. The prosecutor also charged KPN's Leszek Moczulski. However, in responding to the demands of the Gdansk workers, all were released on 1 September 1980. See Lipski, op. cit., pp. 430-431.

Cited in Sanford, p. 53. See the full text in Biuletyn Solidarnosc, No. 2 (24 Aug. 1980).

Sanford, op. cit., p. 53.

Polityka, 5 July 1980.

Polityka, 2 August 1980. See also the analysis by Jozef Pajestka, Chairman of the Polish society of Economists, Polityka, 30 August 1980.

Sanford, op. cit., p. 54. For the full extent of the changes and biographies, see Nowe Drogii (Sept. 1980).

Ascherson, op. cit., p. 119.

Cited in Kemp-Welch, op. cit., p. 168.

Sanford, op. cit., p. 56-57.

Dziennik Polski, 2 September 1980.

The Jastrzebie Agreement is reproduced in Robinson, op. cit., pp. 439-443.

For a detailed biography of Kania, see Sanford, op. cit., pp. 60-63.


For a detailed account of the events from November 1980 until the declaration of martial law, see ibid.

ibid., p. 27.

ibid., pp. 27-28.

ibid.

Cited in ibid., p. 29.


ibid.

Sanford, op. cit., p. 80.


Walicki, op. cit., p. 91-92.

Staniszkis, op. cit., p. 17 n.
For details, see Raina, *Poland 1981*, pp. 82-104.


ibid., p. 320.


Raina, *op. cit*.

ibid.

Cited in ibid., pp. 320-321.

Cited in ibid., p. 321.

ibid., p. 323.


See Raina, *op. cit.*, pp. 326-389. The *Programme* is reproduced in its entirety.

ibid., p. 346.

Walicki, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.


Adam Bromke, "The Meaning And Uses of Polish History," (To be published by East European Monographs, Boulder, Col.), p. 75, [Mimeoographed].


Norman Davies, *Heart of Europe: A Short History of*
For example, Andrzej Wajda's films, Man of Marble and Man of Iron; and the 20-22 August 1981 concert held in Gdansk. An album of the concert was also produced and widely distributed in Poland. Songs, such as J. Zwozniak's "Najpiekniejsza w klasie robotniczej," Daniel Olbrychski's "Egzekutywa," P. Szczepanski's "Polonez Kosciuszki," the popular "Boze nasz," J.T. Stanislawski's biting "Uczyla mnie mama," and many others, attest to the political idealism of the period.

Davies, op. cit., p. 381.
Davies, op. cit., p. 382.
Davies, op. cit., p. 385.


Aleksander Hall, "Czynnik staly: Rosja," Polityka Polska, No. 2-3 (1983), [Mimeographed.].

ibid.
ibid.

Bromke, op. cit., p. 349. During a debate I attended in the summer of 1981, between Adam Michnik and Waldemar Swirgon (a member of the PZPR Central Committee), the demand for the Polish communists, by Michnik, to adhere to the principles of the Yalta agreement was loudly applauded by the audience. Michnik then told Swirgon that neither the Poles, nor the West, would stand any longer for the "greatest abberation" in European history - the division of Europe into spheres of influence.


ibid. p. 102.

ibid.


See Andrzej Walicki, op. cit., pp. 93-95.

ibid.


Walicki, op. cit., pp. 95-96.

See Leszek Kolakowski, "Hope and Hopelessness," Survey (Summer 1971), [Mimeographed.].


Cf. Staniszkis, op. cit.; Neil Ascherson, op. cit.; and Touraine, ibid.

George Sanford, op. cit., p. 74.

Walicki, op. cit., p. 97.

Touraine, op. cit., pp. 64-79.

ibid., p. 66.

ibid., pp. 87-92.

ibid.

ibid., pp. 87, 88, and 89-90.
I cannot understand so called Organic Work with its implication of legality and compromise.

Walery Wroblewski, an ardent supporter of the 1863 uprising.

CHAPTER FIVE

POLITICAL IDEALISM AFTER THE "STATE OF WAR"

Most definitely, history does not repeat itself, but the feelings of shock and disillusionment, felt at a national level, after a dramatic defeat have been with mankind for centuries. The forceful ending of a popular national movement of reform, especially a movement of ever expanding momentum which inspires the hopes and dreams of a generation, can have effects no less dramatic than the suppression of a military uprising for independence by ruthless foreign troops. In this sense, the modern Polish nation has experienced both the aspirations and the defeats of their forefathers.

The Jaruzelski regime's announcement of martial law on 13 December 1981, which was followed by the incarceration of thousands of Solidarity's staunchest supporters and leaders,¹ the severe curtailing of individual freedoms, and the suppression -

-198-
effective elimination - of the Solidarity "trade union" itself,\(^2\) resulted in a profound outrage and shock in Polish society. The stunning effects of martial law have "been compared to the defeat of the 1863 uprising, which marked a watershed between the initial period of idealism and the first phase of realism in Polish history."\(^3\)

The well-known social and political commentator, Daniel Passent, in an article in the first post-martial law issue of Polityka, for example, pointed out the parallel when he wrote that some one third of the newspaper's editorial staff had resigned in protest against martial law. However, he then added that after the crushing defeat of the January 1863 insurrection, some people, in Polish society desperately held on to their uncompromising views while others had recognized the new reality and worked to moderate it.\(^4\) To be sure, Passent's subtle call for a revival of political realism in Poland's politics was not missed by his Polish readers. Indeed, the debates in both the censored and uncensored post-martial law press centred primarily on one question: "What is the historical tradition that has guided and should guide the Poles in times of adversity? Is it the romantic spirit of revolt and intransigence, or the realistic spirit of accommodation and slow organic work?"\(^5\)

The post-martial law debates notwithstanding, since the rise of political idealism in Poland after the protests by students and intellectuals in 1968, reaching its peak in 1980 with
the rise of Solidarity, the activists in Poland's numerous opposition movements largely upheld a strict tradition in Polish politics, that "it is impossible to be both an inteligent and a supporter of the ruling regime". The massive appeal of Solidarity in Polish society had not only given the idealist tradition a boost, it had also turned many of those Poles who were politically indifferent into political activists. In some cases, usually for the first time, they became committed activists. These militants who had experienced pluralism for the first time had no intention of going back to the situation which existed before Solidarity, nor would they accept the existing reality.

The declaration of martial law brought with it two important developments. First, once again the division between idealists and realists became clearly visible. Second, it also became apparent that a comparison between the effects on Polish society after the 1863 uprising and the 1981 declaration of martial law is valid. In this context, the majority of Poles, unlike their forefathers, largely rejected political realism. This is not to suggest that most Poles were prepared to adopt extreme idealism either. It is merely that the effects of martial law were not as decisive as the brutal Russian suppression of the 1863 insurrection.

The contrast between 1863 and 1981 is apparent. "The defeat of the January Insurrection left the Polish nation stunned and depressed. The romantic excitement and the revolutionary
tension which had exploded in 1863 were rapidly suppressed by a superior Russian military force, as the insurrection ended in a twitching spasm of guerilla activity. Military defeat was accompanied by shocked disillusionment with the Western powers, who did not come to Poland’s assistance. Under the impact of another military and diplomatic defeat, the politically conscious elements began to reconsider the policies and attitudes of...romanticism [...] 7

Soon after the declaration of martial law, on 14 December 1981, strikes erupted in most of the larger factories in Lodz, Cracow, Warsaw, Wroclaw, and in the Gdansk-Gdynia area, as well as in several of the Silesian coal mines. Indeed, from 14 December until mid-December 1982, there were some 60 recorded strikes by workers and students (including a number of occupations of mines) and well over 100 public demonstrations. 8

The military regime, reacting to the outbursts on an individual basis gradually broke the back of the public protests. Moreover, the government had achieved its goal of subduing public opposition in a relatively bloodless manner (the worst violence occurred in Silesia, at the Wujek mine, where nine miners were killed on 16 December). While there were violent clashes with the dreaded Motorized Police (ZOMO), echoing the general view of the observers of Poland’s upheaval, Norman Davies wrote:

In spite of everything, the conduct of policy in Poland lacked many of the characteristic ingredients not only of
military take-overs elsewhere in the world but also of the usual Soviet-style programmes of 'normalization'. The repression was highly selective, and strangely half-hearted. It lacked the gratuitous violence of Afghanistan or El Salvador, with which it was competing for headline space in the world's newspapers. It lacked the wholesale social terror in Kadar's Hungary after 1956, or the systematic purges of Husak's 'normalization' in Czechoslovakia after 1968.

Significantly, there was no attempt "at mass deportations, which would have been a sure sign of Soviet initiative". Above all, Davies adds, "it lacked any direct involvement by Soviet personnel." Finally, the martial law authorities "did not feel inclined to exploit its new-found powers to the full. It was curiously inhibited, and by Soviet standards unbelievably restrained."10

The most significant contrast between 1863 and 1981 was the dominant powers' reaction to events. In 1863 the Poles were strangled into both submission and a recognition that futile uprisings could permanently destroy the nation. The post-1863 positivists gave up on insurrections, but not the long-term goal of Polish independence. In 1981, however, many of the staunch supporters of Solidarity decided to carry on with the struggle for independence through underground activities.

The uncompromising view of the modern political idealists is a contrast to the post-1863 attitudes. Indeed, Solidarity's "underground press regularly published a 'List of Collaborators' bearing the names of writers, actors, and artists who continued
working as normal under the Military Regime." The cause of the idealists was also aided by the consideration that Poles should not adopt a defeatist attitude.

The prominent Polish historian Henryk Wereszycki, for example, in May 1982 warned the Poles against defeatism. "There is always a tendency...to regard contemporary events as decisively determining the future...Yet, what actually happened in the past and what was born from a past vision are not separate, but add up to a continuity in history...The tradition of the uprising [of 1863] was one of the basic elements of the national education. It persisted from the defeat until the regaining of independence [in 1918]."

In short, once Solidarity had effectively ceased to exist on 13 December 1981, with its leadership interned (significantly, most of the Solidarity leaders and advisors were not seperated and they continued their debates on how to overcome their setback), the historical discussions were deflected from the memories of organic work after 1863. Instead, the emphasis was on the historical defeats and repressions as a guide for further action in the direction of political idealism. The political idealists argued that the rise of idealism, at the end of the 19th and early-20th century, was a better period for the drawing of parallels with the modern era. Indeed, the "events of 1863 marked the end of the first idealist phase in Polish history and ushered in the first realist period; while in contrast, the
upheaval of 1980 brought to an end the second realist phase which began after World War II.\textsuperscript{15}

II

The divide between the idealists and realists, since martial law, is reflected in the writings of some of the major participants in Polish politics. On the extreme end of the realist spectrum are the doctrinaire and Soviet-orientated members of the PZPR. "They would unflinchingly tighten the political screws on Polish society, proposing more than the mere neutralization of the opposition; instead, they seek its permanent liquidation."\textsuperscript{16} Their most vocal exponent is the Director of the Higher Party School of Social Science, Norbert Michta. As Michta wrote: Solidarity "put the party on defensive and intensified in its activities of the rightist-reformist elements." The continued existence of the opposition, Michta added, "could only lead to nationalism, undermining the very foundation of the entire Communist and workers' movement, namely, internationalism."\textsuperscript{17} Indeed, from the perspective of the conservatives, a Soviet invasion of Poland would have served their interests.

A more moderate attitude, still reflecting a tendency towards acute political realism, is represented by General Jaruzelski, with the combined backing of the top military command and the pragmatic wing of the PZPR. Jaruzelski "still clingings
to his belief in the virtue of Polish positivism...[He] earned his label of 'collaborator' from people who oppose his stand; and from a grateful regime. Moreover, it is these realists who form a majority among intellectuals connected with official circles. While many Poles, and Western critics, are scornful of the modern political realists, it cannot be denied that these realists are "as much a part in the Polish intellectual tradition as the Romantics".

The first signs of Jaruzelski's moderate road was reflected in the constraints placed on martial law, when extreme measures were available. The willingness of the Jaruzelski regime to allow foreign journalists to remain in Poland and cover martial law - including the riots, was significant. Moreover, when Jaruzelski deployed the military, "he had raised the stakes against an eventual Soviet invasion of Poland. He was the first Polish leader since the war who put Poland in a position capable of defending itself. His demarche cut both ways. He crushed...Solidarity; but he equally forstalled the prospects of a vendetta against Poland by the more doctrinaire comrades in Moscow and Warsaw."  

Finally, Jaruzelski suspended martial law in December 1982 and legally ended it in July 1983, while many of the restrictions were eased much earlier. The regime also agreed to another visit by the Pope in the summer of 1983 and instituted a number of, albeit largely symbolic, reforms. One of the more
striking features of Jaruzelski’s rule is his historic resemblance to Margrave Wielopolski, who in 1863 proceeded to introduce reforms in Poland in a similar autocratic fashion. In a clear reference to Jaruzelski, the editor of the Catholic weekly, Lad, wrote: "In order to prevent the uprising Wielopolski, ignoring the psychological predilections of the nation, resorted to drastic means." Significantly, the journal Survey also saw fit to include a section in its study of the martial law period, which contrasted the proclamation made by Wielopolski in 1861 with the proclamation instituting martial law by Jaruzelski in 1981. The similarities in both speeches are remarkably poignant.

The perspective of the party liberals, also on the realist end of the Polish political spectrum, were represented by former Deputy Prime Minister and editor-in-chief of Polityka, Mieczyslaw Rakowski. The liberals advocated extensive reforms in Poland. Their general attitude was expressed early in the post-martial law period:

Until and unless the present pattern of international relations, and the political division of the world into East and West, is altered, no good is done by emigrating, internally or externally, or by washing one’s hands. The only thing that makes sense is to get on with the job [...] Since the end of the eighteenth century, or at any rate since the Great Emigration, the Polish educated class has been confronted more or less with the same dilemma which we now have. The thirteenth of December marks neither the birthday nor the demise of Poland. If all our writers had broken their pens for fear of being accused of collaboration, we would now live in a cultural desert, and our sole oasis of liberty would lie beyond our borders. We cannot all be buried in Pere Lachaise...We must work
for a return of the Army to the barracks. Someone has to argue the case for releasing our fellow-writers, and not only them. It would be wrong to kow-tow, but equally wrong to sit back with arms folded [...] 26

Also on the realist side of the political spectrum are other various political parties in the Polish Sejm. These political groups, however, are so closely tied to the PZPR that their respective programmes are almost identical to that of the ruling communists. 27 They include the United Peasant Party (ZSL), Democratic Party (SD), and the two so-called "progressive Catholic" groups: PAX; and the Christian Social Association (ChSS). Some members of the religious groups, who earlier had moved towards Solidarity's position, after martial law, retreated to their traditional place of alliance with the PZPR. 28

In 1981, there also emerged another Catholic group, the Polish Catholic Social Union (PZKS), led by Janusz Zablocki. This group openly sympathized with the moderates in Solidarity and refused to support the introduction of martial law and the outlawing of the Solidarity movement. Nonetheless, after Jaruzelski formed the Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth (PRON) in July 1982, which expanded the WRON organization (to include the ZSL, SD, Pax, and the ChSS), Zablocki decided to participate in the new organization. Zablocki justified the move by arguing that it was based on an effort to advance reforms "within the limits of the present system, exploiting all the legal opportunities existing in it." 29 In 1984, however, most PZKS
members disassociated themselves from Zablocki. He and his allies resigned from PRON, while the new leaders moved closely behind the Communists.

The Catholics in the Sejm, between 1980-85, were often supported by some independent parliamentarians, allied in their opposition to regressive government policies, and included the writers Edmund Osmanczyk, Karol Malczynski (recently deceased), and the prominent sociologist Jan Szczepanski. In 1985, however, this group was excluded from the new Sejm.30

There were also independent voices not associated with any opposition or official movement. Many in this group accepted the post-martial law political reality, but called for extensive economic and political reforms.31 Moreover the new DiP group also issued reports recommending reforms - without advising the restoration of Solidarity.32

III

The visit of John Paul II to Poland in the summer of 1983 indicated the centrist position of the Polish Episcopate. The church continues to exercise its traditional role as both defender of national values and arbitrator in times of crises.33 While church strategy and tactics since 1980 have been complex and controversial, it still remains the most effective institution for the promotion of social peace and stability in Poland. The policy
of the Episcopate can be summed up in the following Papal statement: "Taking into account the interests of various groups, it is possible to arrive at a peaceful settlement through dialogue".34

The church set up the Primate's Committee To Aid the Interned and Arrested, in order to give moral and active support to those incarcerated and to their families. Similar aid committees were established at the parish level.35

A moderate realist programme was also advocated by the Primate's Advisory Council, formed in late 1981. The Council included, among others, Andrzej Micewski and Stanislaw Stomma. In 1982, Stomma elaborated on the Council's programme. Solidarity, Stomma argued, first followed a moderate course, but then "embraced an uncompromising struggle for sovereignty." The Soviets, he argued, would not accept substantial domestic changes in Poland. "Such are the historical realities which pose a barrier to progress. They have to be understood and taken into account." Martial law, Stomma continued, has "on the government side strengthened those who would like to suppress national aspirations altogether, and on the side of Polish society has produced emotional complexes and blind negation...It would be a tragic illusion to count upon an overthrowing of the existing system and to try to get rid of dependence. Similarly, the roots of a tragedy could lie in the calculations, still active among the rulers, that they will succeed in suppressing social
resistance...Reason dictates that the only solution for both sides is a compromise."³⁶

In the tradition of the "Primate of a Thousand Years", Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski's policies of abstaining from direct (at least public) involvement in politics were carried on after his death by Jozef Cardinal Glemp. Shortly before the declaration of martial law, Glemp had mediated a conference between Jaruzelski and Walesa, on 4 November 1981. However, both men held firmly to their positions. Continuing his role as arbitrator, after the declaration of martial law, Glemp forcefully sought the release of political prisoners.

The 1984 brutal killing of Father Jerzy Popieluszko, by members of the SB, led Glemp to stand firm and protest against the "provocation". The arrest and eventual sentencing of the men involved in Popieluszko's killing eased church/state tensions, and Glemp returned to advocating a moderate position. Moreover, Glemp at no time condoned the political activities of the "radical priests".

The "radical priests" had opted for a militant anti-government stand. Their nationalistic, strongly anti-communist, and pro-Solidarity sermons were an inspiration to both their admirers and like-minded activists.³⁷
The former Solidarity leadership, after martial law, carried on the tradition of political idealism. The opposition was represented both by underground Solidarity and, later, by former Solidarity activists who were allowed to operate in the open. The open opposition was best represented by Lech Walesa. After being released in November 1982, the regime was forced to give Walesa a considerable degree of immunity. The open opposition regularly issued appeals to society, and gave interviews to Western news correspondents—critically assessing the government's policies. Moreover, many in the opposition intelligentsia continued to publish in the underground press. The "state of war" seems to have had no visible affect on the continued production and publication of high quality samizdat materials. 38

The most heated debates in the underground press have dealt with defining a strategy for the opposition. Nonetheless, reminiscent of the situation in the mid-1970s, the post-martial law opposition is divided mainly along ideological lines. As noted in a samizdat monthly, entitled Niepodleglosc ("Independence"):

The basic dividing line in the Polish opposition does not reflect the ideological differences, but cuts across them...The controversial issues among the social democrats, national democrats and liberal democrats...
concerns specific problems in the post-Communist period. Today, however, questions of the strategy and tactics in the struggle against Communism should be paramount.

The declaration of martial law heightened the commitment to political idealism among the most politically active. The opposition focused on the argument that only Poland's political sovereignty could guarantee the systematic reforms demanded for so many years by society. A review of the underground publications indicates that there were three major strategies discussed.

The first strategy called for negotiations with the government under the following conditions: a) all political internees must be released; b) amnesty must be granted to all political prisoners; c) all vestiges of martial law must end; d) Solidarity must be reinstated; and, e) negotiations, based on the August 1980 Agreements, must begin. This group believed that the regime could not govern for long without popular support and therefore expected underground activity to last only for a short period. The advocates of this view were associated with Zbigniew Bujak, the former Mazowsze region Solidarity leader. Bujak was also the director of underground Solidarity, through the Temporary Coordinating Commission (TKK), formed on 22 April 1982 (Bujak was also arrested in the spring of 1986). Bujak argued that an uprising would be necessary only at the last stage of the struggle for independence. If the authorities refused to negotiate with TKK, Michnik wrote, then its leadership would adopt the "long
The extreme position was articulated by Jacek Kuron. From the beginning he opposed compromise with the regime because he considered them incapable of it. Therefore, he advocated preparations for a mass protest that would hasten the collapse of the regime. This group expected a popular uprising and therefore called for TKK to organize and prepare for such an eventuality. Moreover, Kuron wrote, if it becomes necessary, violence will be advocated.

A similarly militant attitude was projected by the members of Porozumienie Solidarnosc Walczaca [PSW] (Association of Fighting Solidarity), from Lower Silesia, which publishes the weekly Solidarnosc Walczaca ["Fighting Solidarity"], and by the group responsible for the monthly Niepodleglosc, from Warsaw and Katowice. Fighting Solidarity stated outright that it sought the overthrow of the regime, while Niepodleglosc scolded the TKK leadership for discounting the possibility of a popular overthrow of the authorities. Moreover, these groups advocated a Polish-German alliance to balance the power of the Soviets.

The third group, rejecting both compromise and the "final strike", opted for a strategy which would isolate the regime. In short, this group insisted that an underground society be established. The best known exponents of this view are Wiktor Kulerski (since July 1986 the director of TKN) and Adam Michnik. Also, championing this strategy are those associated...
with the Committee of Social Resistance (KOS), and the Circles of Social Resistance (KOS²). The Circles are clandestine five-man cells, consisting of family members or friends involved in local resistance activities.⁴⁷

Certainly, the post-martial law opposition groups, are not as well known as their mid-1970s predecessors. Nonetheless, the new opposition movements have evolved a wide spectrum of political trends and outlooks. And while these movements call themselves independent political associations or 'political parties', their manifestoes and political and economic programmes tend to be vague and abstract.⁴⁸

The conspiratorial nature of these groups makes it difficult to appraise their actual size, or the extent of support they have in Polish society.⁴⁹ On the other hand, the fact that many of the leaders of the old opposition movements were interned when these groups were formed (although almost all of those arrested are now free)⁵₀, suggests that there are plenty of young Poles willing to carry on the tradition of opposition and political idealism.

Freedom, Justice, Independence (WSN), founded in May 1983, takes its roots from Kuron's KRS club of November 1981 (formed by some KOR members after the Workers' Committee had disbanded at the Solidarity Congress), and was inspired by the programme of the interwar Polish Socialist party⁵¹ (PPS). It seeks to harness the growing "will for independence", and accepts
Kuron’s programme of action. As reflected in its publication, Ideas, Programme, Documents, WSN stresses its ideological affiliation with Polish activists and groups on the left in exile that advocate Polish independence.51

The Polish National Independence Party (PNPN), started out as the Niepodleglosc group founded in April 1982, and has been associated with Moczalski’s KPN since September 1982. Its programme states: “Poland’s liberation depends on changes within the whole Soviet bloc, that is in the joint action of enslaved nations against Communism and Soviet imperialism.”52 The PNPN is staunchly pro-independence, anti-Soviet, and calls for extensive underground activity by the Polish opposition. Furthermore, PNPN claims it intends on evolving into a liberal democratic party when Poland gains independence.

The Association Of Fighting Solidarity (PSW), calls itself an open political movement, which aims in building a democratic self-governing "Solidarity Republic. It is staunchly opposed to "real" communism, and calls for the dismemberment of the USSR. It also occasionally publishes in other eastern European languages. PSW found TKK’s programme of "forcing the government to make concessions," an unrealistic goal. Therefore, the "aim of Fighting Solidarity is to struggle for Poland’s independence by eventually overthrowing communist rule."53

PSW also declares its intention to aid activities in other countries of the Soviet bloc. To this end, PSW has
translated its programme in Russian and Ukrainian and had them distributed in the USSR.  

The Independent Peasant Activists (ROCH) declares itself loyal to the traditions of the prewar Polish Peasant party (PSL). While not opposed to socialism, they demand political pluralism, agrarian reform, condemn the official ZSL, and aspire to Polish independence. Moreover, they proclaim their unity with the workers and intelligentsia.

Another group is the Polish "Solidarity" Party (PPS²), established on 11 November 1982. This "party" declared itself in total opposition to the regime, calling the Warsaw authorities agents of Soviet imperialism. It roughly adheres to Michnik's call for separate social groups involved in secret activities aiming for Polish independence. Also, reflecting Michnik's "Conversations in the Citedel" article, this group bases its conspiratorial programme on the writings of the socialist thinker Edward Abramowski, Jozef Pilsudski, and the conspiratorial elements of Roman Dmowski's writings. It also publishes Glos Wolny ("The Free Voice"), and Niezalezne Wydawnictwo "Solidarnosc" (Independent Solidarity Publishers).

The final group to be discussed is centred, although not exclusively, around Aleksander Hall and reflects the views of the Young People Movement (RMP). However, since martial law, this group, which publishes the journal Polityka Polska, has advocated a moderate programme of political realism.
As the editors of *Polityka Polska* wrote: "An independent state [must] take into account the reality of the international...balance of power and [must] recognize the balance of Power in Europe and the limitations of its geographical location...A state is independent when its center of political decisions is within the country and remains independent of foreign forces." Moreover, *Polityka Polska* argues that it would be imprudent to build a vision of Polish politics in the expectation of the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union...We should unequivocally renounce participation in plans to break up the Soviet Union into nation states."57

The *Polityka Polska* group is also rather unique in that while it publishes an underground journal, its members are not involved in clandestine activities. The reason for this is that the majority of the people associated with *Polityka Polska* were RMP members. As such, after the declaration of martial law, RMP declared that it would suspend its activities and, with the notable exception of Aleksander Hall, RMP members rejected the idea of going underground.58

While Hall participated in the activities of the underground until 1983, he took advantage of a general amnesty and surrendered to the authorities. Since that time he has published extensively in *Polityka Polska*.59 Hall and his colleagues, reflecting the position taken by RMP, declared their affinity with the tradition of the prewar National Democrats. However, unlike
RMP, the Polityka Polska group rejects the "romantic" policies of the "radical, pro-independence opposition before August 1980, and, then, by the Solidarity radicals who advocated a 'quick march forward'."\(^{60}\)

The manifestoes of Poland's new opposition groups indicates that while there are differences on the vertical division, between left wing and right wing groups, the horizontal division, between idealists and realists, has united them. With the exception of the Polityka Polska group, the adherance to political idealism among the different post-martial law opposition groups is still strong. Moreover, some of the opposition groups are proposing far more extreme policies than did the 1970s opposition movements.

Taking into account the vertical and horizontal divisions, the post-martial law political movements can be presented in the following diagrammatic fashion:

\[\text{(SEE DIAGRAM V)}\]

The editors of Fighting Solidarity, controlled by PSW and under the chairmanship of Kornel Morawiecki, argued that they reject passive resistance and that the "underground society" like any other society which is forced to act illegally," will sooner or later have to defend itself against state violence. This would be defence against attack, not terrorism of the 'Red Brigades'
Diagram V

The Episcopate
The Primates
Advisor Council

Polityka Polska

Open Opposition (Right wing)

RIGHT

"Radical Priests"

REALISM

PZKS

Open Opposition (Walesa)

PZPR-Liberals

PAX/ChSS
SD
ZSL
PZPR

IDEAISM

PNPN

ROCH
PSW

TKK
PPS²
KOS
WSN
KOS²
Moreover, quoting Vladimir Bukowsky, Fighting Solidarity wrote: "In the West, people fear that terrorists will topple the government. Here in the East the terrorists are already in power."62

To be sure, the underground has not turned to violence since martial law. For example, TKK, KOS, and KOS2 reject violence as a tactic for the underground. Nonetheless, Wladyslaw Hradek, a member of underground Solidarity, noted "the existence, deep in the underground, of groups which are ready for anything—even the most desperate steps...They may resort to assassinations, destruction and sabotage."63

Even in the debates about the early weakening, or possible collapse, of the Soviet Union, the underground samizdat publications display strong anti-Russian sentiments. Furthermore, PSW's leaflets addressed to the Russians and the Ukrainians, arousing them to participate in a common struggle against communism even began with the 19th century romantic slogan "For our freedom and yours" and argued that members of Fighting Solidarity were ready "to sacrifice their blood, and, if need be their lives, to that end."64

Finally, almost all of the manifestoes, emphasized Poland's western orientation, and the country's historic ties to the West. Moreover, these groups point to the West's obligation to come to Poland's assistance. At the very least, the underground activists expect that through economic pressures, the
West will compel the Jaruzelski regime to restore Solidarity and provide the underground with a margin of security.\textsuperscript{65}

To be sure, these groups are tiny, however, they do represent the general views of a significant segment of the Polish public. Indeed, the almost total adherence to the romantic tradition in the underground publications indicates that there is little desire for any other programme in Poland. The attitude of a large segment of Polish society may well be exemplified by the following statement made by Davies about Adam Michnik: "He had no intention of compromising with the Military Regime. He was perfectly aware of his predecessors over the centuries. He is a Polish 'idealist', a Romantic of the purest type - the type from which the Polish Risings have been made."\textsuperscript{66}

The declaration of martial law was a traumatic experience for the Poles. The comparisons between 1863 and 1981, from the perspective of the dichotomy between idealism and realism, are indeed valid. Both the analogies provided by Henryk Wereszycki and Daniel Passent are noteworthy.\textsuperscript{67} Certainly, Wereszycki's aim was to enharten the Poles in their time of crisis. Passent's aim was no less noble, if dispassionate. Wereszycki wanted to emphasize that the struggle was not over. Passent, on the other hand, wanted to emphasize the fact that life must go on.
While the similarities between 1863 and 1981 are important, the differences are no less striking. In terms of the national losses after 1863, the losses suffered by the Poles after 13 December 1981 were minimal. After 1863 there was a revulsion against political idealism and insurrections. While after 1981 the Poles decided to continue with political idealism.

Even Adam Michnik argued that Poland's situation after the declaration of martial law was not the same as the situation after the disastrous 1863 uprising. Moreover, Michnik argued that the post-1981 period parallels the late-19th and early-20th century. The years which saw the rise of political idealism until Poland's independence. Adam Bromke, on the other hand, argues that the "present situation in Poland resembles more than that which existed before rather than after 1863." The differences of comparison are not unimportant. If Michnik's parallel is correct then it implies that conditions favourable for Polish independence are to be found in the not so distant future. More important, Poland needs a political opposition which will prepare the groundwork for independence. However, if Bromke's analogy is correct then it implies that the worst is not over. If the movement towards political idealism in Poland continues, the result may be another explosion in Poland. Moreover, if that explosion immediately threatens communist rule, the reaction of the Polish regime, or the Soviets, could be considerably more harsh than the action taken after the
declaration of martial law. Considering the improbability of a major change in the international arena, at least in the foreseeable future, the communists would have almost carte blanche powers to deal with Polish society as they deemed necessary. The reaction of the West notwithstanding, there is little the Poles could expect in the form of aid from their supporters.

The Polish Episcopate has tried to distance itself from the opposition. Cardinal Glemp has resisted endorsing any programme which calls a move against the government. In a homily delivered at Jasna Gora, Glemp warned his compatriots that the futile 1863 uprising only brought "annihilation, depression, destruction and, even worse, long-lasting slavery". While Glemp also demanded that the authorities release all political prisoners and enter into a meaningful dialogue with the Polish people, he implicitly rejects the aims of the opposition as being void of realism.

The opposition, for its part, continues to claim that its programme is realistic. Indeed, Adam Michnik argues that even the political realist, Roman Dmowski, advocated conspiracy in the struggle for Polish independence. In fact, Michnik writes that the idea of extensive independent underground activities, the formation of independent social structures, was partly based on a re-evaluation of Dmowski's political thought.

Andrzej Walicki, on the other hand, in a direct polemic with Michnik, wrote that Michnik only took from Dmowski one aspect
of the writings, which reflected Dmowski's political realism. Dmowski's calls for social self-organization, Walicki argued, were based on the reality of the early 20th century. The Soviet reality, Walicki adds, is such that it requires new forms of action. Moreover, Dmowski rejected the formation of permanent underground structures. Dmowski wanted to take advantage of the existing state structures. In short, Walicki continues, Dmowski was opposed to an underground opposition.

More important, Dmowski rejected moralism in politics. He divided individual morality from the interests of states. Dmowski preferred to educate society rather than to gain popularity by surrendering to its will. The modern political opposition does not adhere to any of these, or other, tenets of Dmowski's political thought.

Finally, Walicki writes, the leaders of the opposition have a duty not only to their fellow countrymen but also to Poland. If the opposition is to adhere to Dmowski's political thought, they should remember his criticism of Polish Romanticism. Citing Dmowski, Walicki concludes:

Everybody can risk his private property and sacrifice his own life. Sometimes it can be a moral duty. But no individual, no organization, and no generation can expose to danger the very existence of Poland. Because Poland does not belong to an individual, to a party or even to a single generation of Poles. She belongs to the entire chain of generations, to those of the past, those of the present and those of the future as well. The man who exposes to a risk the existence of his nation resembles a gambler who plays with someone else's money.
The dilemma for Poland is two-fold. Since the communists are utterly discredited in the eyes of many Poles, any attempt to forcefully impose the Marxist-Leninist ideology could well lead the Poles to adopt extreme political idealism. The outcome could lead to a violent clash in Polish society. Therefore, the moderate communists, and some non-communist political realists, advocate that the Poles throw their support behind the Jaruzelski regime. They suggest that strong popular pressure on the government weakens it. They argue that a weak PZPR becomes more dependent on Moscow. Conversely, a strong communist government in Warsaw can receive greater concessions from the Soviets.

The problems with this line of reasoning are obvious. The risks of abandoning all pressure on the communist authorities may play into the hands of the communists. As Bromke puts it: "For while the Polish communists may find the support at home useful in expanding their own autonomy from Moscow, they may not necessarily use it to expand the freedom of the Polish society, and instead, may continue to rule the country in an autocratic style." Moreover, Bromke adds: "Abandoning all opposition by the Poles...could amount to the voluntary acceptance on their part of a foreign rule - in effect, to national suicide."76

The cooling effects of martial law notwithstanding, the Solidarity period has given an impetus to patriotism among the Polish youth. It is therefore not likely that these Poles will surrender the goal of Polish independence. On the other hand, the
fact that many Poles have "resigned" from society is also not a hopeful sign. Many Poles do not see their future in People's Poland and have either decided to try to emigrate or have given up on political activity.

Avoiding all politics is, to be sure, not the answer. The country's economic situation is extremely grave. More important, there is a real danger that unless something is done about the severely polluted environment, the Polish population may have long-term health problems. As sociologist Aleksander Gella wrote:

The Polish society is now threatened in three ways: 1. There is a political and economic threat that may lead to an interruption of the Polish statehood; 2. There is a social threat which may lead to a gradual transformation of the Polish nation into just an ethnic community; 3. There is an ecological threat that may lead to a deterioration of the environment and of the health of the Polish nation.

Specifically, Gella adds:

[...] we pretend, or rather we delude ourselves, that we do not see the approaching total catastrophe. We take to the streets when faced with price increases, yet we are unable to cope with the major social ills. We have failed to prevent the drastic increase in infant mortality, the glaring deterioration of conditions in the hospitals, the spread of drug addiction among some 200,000 young people and the deeply damaging changes in the system of education. We did not even protest when the parliament informed us that the ecological deterioration is evident in areas inhabited by no less than 30 per cent of the population. We do not object to the disintegration of our ancient cities. Indeed, we stay silent when, instead of
drinkable water, an undefined yellow liquid flows from the taps in most Polish towns.

On the optimistic side, Aleksander Hall in a Tygodnik Powszechny article, entitled "The Two Realisms," argued that there is not only a difference between political idealism and political realism, but also between two types of realisms. Hall compares the political realism of Aleksander Wielopolski and Roman Dmowski, and concludes that there are three common features in political realism: a) a refusal to believe that the West will aid Poland; b) a repudiation of the insurrectionist tradition in the struggle for independence. Therefore, the political realists stressed organic work as the most effective means in strengthening the nation; and, c) the realists persistently strived to gain greater autonomy under foreign rule.  

The important difference between Wielopolski and Dmowski, Hall argues, is that Wielopolski considered the external factor of primary importance and therefore attempted to appease the Russian government. Moreover, Wielopolski's attitude about the Poles was that: "One can do something for the Poles, but never with the Poles." This type of realism, Hall labelled "governmental realism".

On the other hand, Dmowski's realism, which Hall labelled "dynamic realism", never neglected the internal factor. That is, Dmowski attempted to - as echoed by Walicki earlier - instill political consciousness among the Polish masses and teach them
that they must be prepared for independence, but that independence was only possible under the right international circumstances.

To be sure, Hall argued for a synthesis between political idealism and political realism. He hoped that the Poles would rediscover the value of "dynamic realism". Finally, Hall argued that it is not enough to define oneself as a realist. "It is also necessary," Hall concluded, "to define what realism means and what concrete political programme derives from it."
ENDNOTES

1. There were some 10,000 people detained in forty-nine internment camps.

2. Twenty separate, and extensively detailed, martial law decrees were issued by the Military Council of National Salvation (WRON). Among other things, sealing the country's borders; suspending basic civil rights; banning of all public gatherings; instituting a strict 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. curfew; banning the distribution of printed material; banning the use of printing equipment; sanctioning mail and telephone censorship and eavesdropping (to be applied when these services resumed); restricting all TV and radio broadcasts to one Warsaw-based channel; closing all educational institutions (except nursery schools); authorizing the armed forces to use coercion to restore "law and order"; and giving the judiciary powers to engage in military-type summary proceedings for any violations of martial law. For a complete list, see Trybuna Ludu, 14 Dec. 1981.


9. Norman Davies, op. cit., p. 27. The force used was largely discriminate. By the end of the major protests, it was reported that less than 100 people had died. See "Dead Victims of

10 Davies, op. cit., p. 27.

11 Ibid., p. 394.

12 Henryk Wereszycki, "Znaczenie powstanie styczniowego w dziejach narodu polskiego," Tygodnik Powszechny, (30 May 1982).

13 See Davies, op. cit., p. 408.


15 Bromke, op. cit., p. 346. See also the analysis by Bromke, contrasting the idealistic period since the end of the 19th century with the rise of political idealism in People's Poland., ibid., pp. 350-352.


18 Davies, op. cit., p. 398.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid., p. 28.


22 See Simon, op. cit., p. 349.


26 Passent, op. cit.


Bromke, *op. cit.*, p. 86.


For a review of the views held by Father Popieluszko and his more radical colleagues, see Grazyna Sikorska, *A Martyr For The Truth: Jerzy Popieluszko* (London: Fount Paperbacks, 1985).


Adam Michnik, "List z Bialoleki," Aneks, No. 28. (Sometimes known as "Dlaczego nie podpisujesz...").


Sabbat-Swidlicki, op. cit., p. 182.


See especially the major theoretical work justifying conspiratorial strategy in Adam Michnik, "Rozmowa w cytadeli," Szanse polskiej demokracji, pp. 210-253.


See, for example, Maciej Lopinski, Marcin Moskit, Mariusz Wilk, Konspira: Rzecz o podziemnej Solidarnosci (Paris: Editions Spotkania, 1984). This is the only major publication which interviews the leaders of Poland's post-martial law underground. Most of the leaders interviewed have surrendered to the authorities or were captured. The interviews are of the following opposition leaders: Bogdan Borusewicz, Zbigniew Bujak, Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, Aleksander Hall, Tadeusz Jedynkawa, Bogdan Lis, and Eugeniusz Szumiejki.

One of the most important opposition leaders, Adam Michnik, was released soon after the amnesty announced by Jaruzelski during the July PZPR Congress in 1986.
the series WSN Library; and WSN Self-Education Material.


53 CSS Reports, *ibid.*, p. 27.

54 See "Why Do We Struggle," in *ibid.*, pp. 30-32.


56 CSS Reports, op. cit., p. 25.


58 See Lopinski, et. al., op. cit., pp. 116-119. In an interview with Bogdan Lis (recently released after his capture), the former Solidarity official noted his anger with RMP for not participating in the underground.


60 See "Dziedzictwo narodowej demokracji." *ibid.*


62 Cited in Michalski, *ibid*. Taken from *Solidarnosc Walczaca*, No. 21 (29 May 1983).

63 Wladyslaw Hradek, *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, reprinted in *Informacja* (Montreal), No. 5, 21 July 1982. See also the poignant article by A. M. (?) "Our Goal Must Not Be Revenge," *Telos*, No. 53 (Fall 1982), pp. 150-156.

64 "Why do we struggle," *op. cit.*

65 See, for example, "An interview with KOS," *op. cit.*, p. 139.


67 See Wereszycki, *op. cit.*, and Passent, *op. cit.*
68 See Michnik, "Rozmowy w cytadeli,"


71 Michnik, "Rozmowy w cytadeli," esp. 232-241. Michnik rejects the authoritarian and xenophobic aspects of Dmowski's writings. However, he also praises Dmowski's "brilliant analytical" abilities.


73 ibid., pp. 68-77.

74 ibid., p. 76.

75 Cf., Walicki, "Mysli o sytuacji politycznej i moralno-psychologicznej w Polsce," Aneks, No. 35 (1984), pp. 82-104.


77 ibid., p. 93.


80 ibid.

81 Hall, "Dwa realizmy," op. cit.

82 See also Piotr Wierzbicki, Mysli Storoswieckiego Polaka, (Warsaw: Glos, 1985). This underground publication by Wierzbicki is a stark contrast to his earlier "Ticks" article. Wierzbicki, like Hall, calls for a revival of "dynamic realism", and criticizes the opposition movements for imprudent policies.
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