STRUGGLING ON MANY FRONTS: GENDER, WORK AND UNIONIZATION
STRUGGLING ON MANY FRONTS:
GENDER, WORK AND UNIONIZATION

By
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ABSTRACT

In the early 1980s, during the most severe economic crisis in Canada since the Great Depression, workers in a textile and garment factory in Montreal chose to unionize. This would seem to be a curious initiative to undertake since the industrial relations literature argues that workers tend not to seek unionization during periods of recession. The central purpose of this thesis is to refute this argument and to question the "appropriate time" for organizing so prevalent in the industrial relations literature.

Using Richard Edwards' "contested terrain" thesis, I argue that the union drive represents the workers' opposition and resistance to their employer and to the latter's restructuring strategies of the factory and working conditions. Through an investigation of the workers' reasons for seeking a union, combined with an analysis of the labour process in the factory, I challenge the mainstream industrial relations writers' characterization of workers as "passive", and ideologically undifferentiated from that of the employing class.

This thesis makes a second argument that the heterogeneity of the workforce in the factory, and the diversified production processes across the six floors of the factory, hindered the successful development of worker
solidarity, ultimately resulting in the defeat of the union drive. A well organized anti-union campaign within and outside the factory complicated the union's organizing task.

The data for this thesis was gathered through fieldwork observation and a series of interviews with men and women shopfloor workers, union organizers, management personnel, and the owner of the factory. This research project was carried out from June to early September 1988.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis would not have been written without the cooperation and support of the workers of Texgar. They, more so than any other group of people, must be thanked for participating in the completion of this thesis. I also thank those informants who were interviewed and did not labour for a wage in Texgar.

The transference of fieldwork data into a coherent and presentable thesis was undertaken with the guidance, encouragement and support of these key people: Dr. Carl Cuneo, Dr. Julia O'Connor and Dr. Jack Richardson. As a friend, Dr. Cuneo, was always supportive and patient with my work (and me), particularly when I doubted my ability to complete this thesis. As my supervisor, Dr. Cuneo was meticulous, rigorous and always constructive with his criticism of my work. Dr. Jack Richardson was supportive of my work from the start, and always prompt with his replies to my chapters. Dr. Julia O'Connor was patient and her comments poignant. It is clear that without them this thesis would remain to be written.

Many of my friends were also responsible for the completion of this thesis. I take the opportunity here to identify them and thank them for their inestimable contribution. Katherine Watson many times initiated discussions with me on the themes in this thesis.
Unselfishly, she put aside her own work to engage me in long telephone conversations on this thesis. Alice Reynolds patiently read this thesis from cover to cover, offered many helpful comments and computer-related expertise, improved my grammar, and suffered with me through periods of depression and doubt, but also the joy at the completion of this work. She did all this while remaining the primary care-giver to our daughter Gabriella. Obrigada meu Amor!

Dr. Julio Tresierra and Dr. Chris McAll were instrumental in seeing that I try graduate work. I thank them both for their encouragement throughout my MA stage. Dr. Charlene Gannage did not read this thesis, but her influence on it is easily recognizable. To her, I say thank you for writing Double Day, Double Bind. Dr. Hermann Kurthen read chapters five, six and seven and made many helpful suggestions for their improvement. Though this thesis has been improved by the input of the people mentioned above, final responsibility for any inadequacies or weaknesses rests solely with me.

Lastly, but certainly not least, I thank my parents, Noemia and Carlos. If it were not for their many sacrifices and emotional support, I would have never reached university, much less undertaken graduate work. This thesis is dedicated to them, to Alice and Gabriella, and to Tony Faria who, sadly, died in 1990.
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 1</strong> Introduction and Theoretical Perspective</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critique of the Literature</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Cycle Theory</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Economic Recovery Thesis</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants' Militant Past Experiences</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Homogeneous Workforce Argument</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical Perspective and Themes in Thesis</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Canadian Garment and Textile Sector</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Workplace as a 'Contested Terrain'</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions of this Thesis to the Literature</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brief Introduction to Chapters</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 2</strong> Methodology and Data Collection</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement of Research Interest</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preliminary Fieldwork Arrangements</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Contact with the Factory</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Contact with the Union</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparing for the Field</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brief Lay-out of Texgar</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition to Gaining Access</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access Denied</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaining some Important Information</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing with the Denial of Access</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing Networks of Respondents</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Problems due to Denial of Access</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopfloor Supervisors</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Company Records</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Informants</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Sources of Data</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3 The Canadian Garment and Textile Sector</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of this Chapter</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Features of the Canadian Textile and Garment Sector</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Textile and Garment Industries in Quebec</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Textile Industry in Quebec</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Garment Industry in Quebec</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Restructuring of the Garment and Textile Sector</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restructuring Initiatives at the Sectorial Level</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restructuring the Textile Industry</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restructuring in the Garment Industry</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Homeworking'</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Contracting'</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology in the Garment Industry</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Trade and the Garment and Textile Sector</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4 The Company</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background of Albert Saltzman</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Stage: Establishing Texgar and Early Features of the Factory</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis District</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Stage: Restructuring the Factory</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversifying Production</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 7 Ethnicity and the Labour Process

Introduction

Brief Background of Labour in Garments and Textiles

Ethnic Distribution Across Shopfloors

Ethnicity on the Shopfloors

Links Between the Community and the Factory

Changing Ethnic Workforce in the Factory

Conclusion

Notes

CHAPTER 8 Working Conditions and Control

Introduction

Work Schedules

Systems of Wage Payment

Work Schedules and Systems of Wage Payment in the Sample Room and Casualwear Divisions

The Labour Decree in the Women's Garment Industry in Quebec

Work Schedules

Systems of Wage Payment

'Piece-work'

Control Across the Shopfloors

'Simple Control'

Supervisors Controlling Ethnic Workers with whom they Share Ethnicity

'Technical Control'

Conclusion

Notes

CHAPTER 9 The Attempt to Organize Texgar

Introduction
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Knitting and Dye House Departments</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Dye House and Finishing Departments</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The Sample Room Division</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The Casualwear Division: The Production Department</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The Casualwear Division: The Finishing Department</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Interviewees by Division and Gender</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Interviewees by Ethnicity and Division</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nombre d'employeurs et de salaries par region [garments only]</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Manufacturiers et contracteurs dans le vetement</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Repartition du nombre d'etablissements selon la taille de l'entreprise en chiffres absolus et en pourcentage [au Quebec]</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Composition of New Investments in the Textile Industries and in Manufacturing, 1981-1988</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Grandeur d'etablissements et nombre d'employees</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Distribution of Gender Across the Shopfloors</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ethnic Heterogeneity in Quebec's Garment Industry</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Average Hourly Wages in all Manufacturing Industries and in the Textile Industries</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Loss in Real Wages, 1978-1982</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

At the peak of the most severe economic crisis in Canada since the Great Depression, a group of workers in a garment and textile factory ("Texgar") in Montreal chose to organize. This would seem to be an unusual goal to undertake, given the harsh economic conditions of the 1981-1983 period in Canada. According to the industrial relations literature on unionizing there is an "appropriate time" for organizing, and it is not during poor economic periods. During these periods, workers are expected to reject unions in order to protect their jobs. It is during upturns in the business cycle that workers organize.

This is an unsatisfactory explanation that simply dismisses organizing in poor economic periods as "deviant", and thus should be rejected. In attempting to understand why Texgar workers initiated their drive to organize the factory, this thesis explores the following questions. What impact did the political economy of the textile and garment sector have on the organization of work within Texgar during the recession? What grievances and conditions emerged from the organization of work that led workers to attempt to organize despite the severe crisis in the Canadian garment and textile sector? What role did gender and ethnicity play
in the organizing drive? What obstacles in the organization of work across the factory hampered the organizing drive? These questions orient the methodological and analytical stages of this thesis.

An explanation for organizing Texgar is developed around the following themes: the structure of the Canadian textile and garment sector, the history of Texgar, and the labour process within the factory. My aim is to present a theoretical argument on organizing that combines the larger structures of capitalist economy with the concept of the labour process in the workplace. The bulk of the literature on unionizing explains organizing by either relying on some of the macro features of capitalist economy (e.g. the elasticity of the labour market) or by stressing some sociological characteristics of the workforce involved. My position is that the larger structures of the economy do indeed impact on the workplace; their impact will be greater during economic crises. In Texgar, the crisis impinged on the owner of the factory who, in turn, sought to change working conditions within the workplace. But this impact does not necessarily mean that labour quiescence is the result or that workers will comply with the employer's definition of the economic situation and his/her's strategy to confront it. I argue, instead, that the economic crisis of 1981-1983, as experienced by the workers in Texgar, acted
as an impetus on workers to organize, determined to protect their standard of living, protest against greater intensity of labour without any increase in wages, and establish a union to represent them against the employer. Contrary to most of the industrial relations literature on unionizing, I conceive of the workplace as a "contested terrain" where workers do have their own agenda that collides with the employer's. This conception is central, but insufficient, to explain the organizing attempt in Texgar. We must engage in a thorough examination of the shopfloor to reveal the various ways workers produce commodities, how they are controlled, and how they resist in the capitalist workplace. This is the goal of this thesis.

The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section one discusses the relevant literature on union organizing. Section two presents the theoretical perspective that helps to explain organizing in the factory under investigation. Section three provides the reader with a brief outline of the themes and content of each of the chapters.

CRITIQUE OF THE LITERATURE

This section details a critique of the relevant literature on unionizing. Four perspectives are examined: the "business cycle theory", the "economic recovery period", 
the "immigrants' militant past experiences", and the "homogeneous workforce".

Business Cycle Theory

Within the industrial relations literature, the 'business cycle' theory represents a prominent perspective in explaining the 'timing' of union organizing [1]. Writers in this perspective believe that unionization occurs during economically prosperous periods because it is then that workers are more aware of the economic and non-economic gains a union can get for them. Their awareness of the benefits of unionization is reinforced by the reduced size of the reserve army of labour during economically prosperous periods (i.e., unemployment is low). Employers too, according to this theory, facilitate unionizing because they are "least resistant to the unionizing activities of their employees during phases of business expansion" (Swidinsky, 1974:435; Wolman, 1936). Daniel Nelson makes the business cycle position explicit when he discusses labour organizing in the American rubber industry.

If the industry influenced the character of union activity, the business cycle largely determined its timing. When jobs became plentiful and the future seemed promising, workers organized. There were no exceptions. Conversely, when the economy declined and opportunities were more limited, workers abandoned their unions and remained deaf to outsiders' appeals (Nelson, 1988:6).

Union organizing in times of economic crisis is dismissed as
"deviant" by business cycle theorists. They argue that unionization doesn't occur as often in economically crisis periods because workers are afraid for their jobs (because of an expanded reserve army of labour) and would rather protect themselves than engage in militancy. Employers too, they continue, are less sympathetic and less willing to satisfy workers' grievances and demands in periods of economic decline.

I do not accept this theory of an 'appropriate time' for union organizing for three reasons. First, it concentrates exclusively on the labour market for an explanation, thereby neglecting the labour process as an arena for worker militancy, solidarity and organizing. There is little doubt that the elasticity of the labour market is important in considering unionization. But, one must not overemphasize this aspect of the capitalist economy since it may ignore the fact that the reserve army of labour may not be useful to the employer since the skills the latter requires for his/her factory may not be found in the unemployed mass. Moreover, as Craig Heron (1988:98) has argued, some employers establish a "web of dependency" through welfare programmes within the workplace thus tying workers to the company. These workers are then defined as crucial for the operation of the instruments of labour on the shopfloor and thus not easily replaceable [2]. Lest we
not forget too, trade unions' protection of jobs mediates the labour market.

Second, I reject the business cycle theory because it portrays workers as 'passive' and capitalists as benevolent employers who at certain times (presumably during economic booms) are "more willing" to satisfy workers' demands and "less resistant" to unions. Implicitly, in marking out these roles, business cycle writers credit employers with the "active" role in the production process and workers with "passivity" and dependence on the former's benevolent nature to improve working conditions and social benefits on the floor [3]. In doing this, these writers fail to recognize that worker militancy might just be the proper course of action to take to fight for workers' interests, regardless of the economic state of the industry or country. Moreover, in my readings I have yet to come across an account of an employer promoting his/her workers' grievances and their right to organize [4].

Third, I reject the business cycle theorists' guiding question for investigation. These writers establish their research projects on the basis of answering the question: "when do workers organize?" The researcher then undertakes to answer this question by analyzing unionization rates through time and connecting them to the state of the economy and the elasticity of the labour market. The
results are a foregone conclusion: in times of economic prosperity workers organize because their labour is in high demand. In economically hard times, they tend to reject organizing because of the threat to their jobs from an expanded reserve army of labour. Perhaps this approach indicates patterns of unionization over time, but it does not explain why workers organize.

On the contrary, I find it more revealing to begin an analysis by considering the question: "why do workers organize during economically hard times?" By taking this approach, the analysis becomes much broader and includes investigations of the labour process, union leadership, the structure of the industrial sector under study, as well as the gendered labour market and the gender and ethnically divided organization of production. This type of analysis is also more concrete and focuses on the class relation in the labour process, instead of simply collecting general economic indicators absent from any relation to the class organization of the capitalist economy.

My theoretical position on organizing will become clearer as this chapter develops. At this point, I must critically consider other explanations of the organizing drive within Texgar.
The Economic Recovery Period Thesis

The economic recovery period thesis is also concerned with determining "when" workers organize. According to this theory, workers don't necessarily unionize at the height of economic prosperity or economic depression. They seem to seek unionization just as the economy begins to recover and take its upswing turn toward economic prosperity. For writers in this perspective, the economic crisis period does play an important role in unionizing: it acts as a "trigger" to union growth which follows the crisis.

Irving Bernstein, one of the proponents of this theory, "noted that in such periods union membership begins to expand not at the depth of the depression but after the upswing has commenced, thereby indicating that 'the cycle exerts a trigger effect under these special circumstances'" (Bain and Elsheikh, 1976:14). This period is crucial because social unrest emerges as workers lose faith in the business class and in their ability to manage the economy. Bernstein identifies three forces promoting union growth:

(1) labour unrest: 'A severe and prolonged depression imposes heavy burdens upon workers and their families, causing them to develop sharp grievances against the existing social order' (in Bain and Elsheikh, 1976:14) leading to unionization. (2) A severe depression reveals
the ineffectiveness of businesspeople in managing the economy, and a loss of confidence in the economic system itself. This leads workers to seek unionization. (3) These two factors combine to create a third source of union growth: government intervention to stimulate union growth by protecting the right of workers to organize and to bargain collectively.

While the economic recovery thesis does not explain organizing in economic crisis periods, it does nonetheless recognize that a crisis plays a critical role in organizing. It is the background to workers' dis-satisfaction with the economic system which leads them to organize as the economy recovers. This thesis, however, is not useful to us since workers in Texgar organized a union drive just when the economic crisis was at its worst.

Although the union drive in Texgar only became official in 1984 - at which time, one may argue, the Canadian economy was in its upswing, the actual organizing within the factory began in 1982. Moreover, the crisis in the Canadian textile and garment industries' was prolonged beyond the 1981-1983 crisis period [5]. And, in 1984, Texgar itself was threatened with financial collapse by the banks (Chapter Four). Hence, while most sectors in the Canadian economy were in the upswing towards economic recovery and stability, the economic crisis continued in the
textile and garment sector and at Texgar.

Other theories do not focus so much on the state of the economy or on the labour market. Rather, their approach to unionization focuses on sociological aspects of workers, including their ethnic background. Let us quickly consider two theories that espouse this approach.

Immigrants' Militant Past Experiences

It has been argued with respect to immigrants organizing that their militant trade union and political experience in their country of origin plays a pivotal role in organizing Canadian workplaces. The best example of a work that draws on the radical background of immigrant workers to explain labour radicalism in Canada at the turn of the 20th century is Donald Avery's book, 'Dangerous Foreigners'. In this book, Avery (1980) argues that the pervasiveness of militant immigrant workers' resistance and organizing ability within the Canadian economy was largely due to their "experiences" and "political cultural life" in their countries of origin. Upon arriving in Canada, this militant workforce "brought the traditions of an established trade union movement" (Williams, 1975:3). This facilitated organizing within the workplace because workers were already aware of the importance of unionization. In some cases, militant working class organizers from overseas found
themselves in Canada where they promptly helped organize their fellow ethnics combat Canadian capitalism (Avery, 1980) [6].

I believe that involvement in radical working class organizations were strong features of the early immigration waves into Canada, and that it played (and probably continues to play) an important role in the development of the Canadian Labour Movement [7]. But an investigation of the background of the immigrant workers in Texgar, interviewed for this thesis does not reflect trade union experience or radical party participation in their past. In fact, the contrary is true of the experience of workers in Texgar. The data gathered through interviews with shopfloor workers reveals that they come from countries where fascist dictators ruled their countries for prolonged periods of recent history. Under such a system of political and economic repression, trade unions, if not altogether illegal, were the object of careful surveillance by the repressive apparatuses of the state - the secret police, the army and the police [8]. Furthermore, only two of the fifteen Portuguese women interviewed had experienced wage labour in Portugal [9]. For the majority of the workers in this thesis, wage labour in a capitalist workplace was a totally new experience. And, to keep their jobs, they had to adapt quickly to work patterns and rhythms absent from
the 'pre-industrial' societies they left behind (Thompson, 1967). It is safe to assume, therefore, that Texgar workers had no or very little trade union experience prior to emigrating.

The Homogeneous Workforce Argument

Another common explanation for organizing is the thesis that stresses the importance of a homogeneous workforce in the workplace which facilitates organizing because workers are less likely to be separated by language or culture. Hence, the dissemination of organizing literature and strategy is facilitated by a workforce that shares an ethnic background (see Avery, 1980).

Employers long ago recognized cultural homogeneity as a threat to unionization and control on the shopfloor. Hence, most workplaces actively seek out to employ a heterogeneous workforce. Some employers seek diversity of language and culture to divide workers on the shopfloor. Donald Avery (1980) found that many Canadian employers also preferred a workforce with a diversity in language and culture. Consider the following passage from an employment agent in a meatpacking factory describing how he consciously sought to employ immigrants from different ethnic backgrounds.

"Last week we employed Slovaks. We change about among various nationalities and languages. It prevents them..."
from getting together. We have the thing systematized. We [meat-packing managers] have a luncheon each week with the employment managers of the large firms of the Chicago district [meat packing industry]. There we discuss our problems and exchange information (Quoted in Barrett, 1986:235).

Hence, some employers engage in a labour recruitment practice that consciously seeks an ethnically heterogeneous workforce for the workplace. This, it follows, creates divisions and barriers to communication between workers. As a result, unionization is made difficult.

Texgar has never, in its 39 year-history, employed exclusively one ethnic group of workers. It has emphasized the recruitment of specific ethnic workers for the factory. Some ethnic groups have numerically dominated the shopfloor in Texgar, while the shopfloor remained culturally mixed. Beginning in the fifties with east Europeans and now with Portuguese workers in the seventies and eighties, the employer has, over the years, consistently drawn on the ethnic ghetto surrounding the factory for 'cheap' labour. As a result, within the factory, certain ethnic groups were numerically dominant; and as the ethnic population in the neighborhood surrounding the factory changed, so did the ethnic character of the numerically dominant group in the factory.

But despite a numerically dominant ethnic group workforce, Texgar has remained un-unionized. And it was only in 1982 that workers tried to organize the factory.
Why? How has Texgar remained unorganized given the fact that a significant number of workers in the factory were of the same ethnic background? I argue in this thesis that 'simple control' (Edwards, 1979) played, and continues to play, an important role in controlling the workforce in the factory. I also argue that the fact that the factory was located in the Portuguese community did not help the workers organize because worker solidarity in the community did not emerged. In contrast, the employer was able to appeal to the Portuguese petite-bourgeoisie [10] and the Portuguese Church for support in crushing the union drive in Texgar. These themes are discussed in chapter nine.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE AND THEMES IN THESIS

The literature discussed above can be classified into two different camps: one economic, the other sociological. The economic camp stresses the objective forces of the capitalist economy to explain unionization. Thus, both the business cycle theory and the economic recovery thesis turn to the state of the economy, including the elasticity of the labour market, to explain the "timing" of unionization. In contrast, the sociological camp stresses the characteristics that workers share amongst themselves in the workplace. This includes their ethnicity, trade union experience, and extent of political activism.
The central problems identified with these two camps is that they are mutually exclusive: one (the economic) focuses on the macro features of capitalist economy and ignores the organization of work. The other stresses the characteristics of the workforce but ignores the impact and impetus of the macro economic system on workers and their role in the organization of production.

The perspective that I think best explains organizing Texgar is one that combines macro features of the capitalist economy with the class and ethnic contradictions of the organization of production on the shopfloor. I argue here that an investigation of the macro features of a capitalist economy must be complemented by an analysis of the labour process and vice versa. These two levels of analysis are not mutually exclusive. I also believe that the relationship between them is dialectical - each influencing the other. The laws of the capitalist economy establishes the "rules of the game": competition. In order for a capitalist to remain in business, he/she must consistently seek to recreate conditions for the accumulation of capital. This in turn will allow him/her to retain or increase his/her's market share of the commodities he/she sells. In order to remain competitive, and retain the market share, the capitalist may pursue any (or all) of the following strategies simultaneously: the replacement of
an existing workforce by a "cheaper" group of workers, the extension of the working day, the introduction of new technology and the rationalization of the production process.

Under capitalism, the owner of capital and the wage worker meet each other in the market as "free" individuals—the former in need of labour to operate and maintain his/her instruments of labour; the latter in need of wage income to survive and reproduce his/her labour power. The capitalist purchases a worker's capacity to work for a certain number of hours. This is a fact of the capitalist system. But the bearer of this labour power is a thinking human being. Thus, he/she also brings into the workplace her/his' own goals, which often collide with those of the employer. Hence, workers have their own grievances and demands within the workplace. These are particularly visible when the employer introduces changes to the shopfloor which workers do not agree with and therefore resist and protest. Within Texgar, the owner of the factory introduced changes to the working conditions as a result of a restructuring strategy to increase profits and to recreate the conditions of accumulation during an economic crisis. The workers in the factory resisted and protested these changes which cut their standard of living by reducing their hours of work and wages. The point here is that the macro
changes that forced the employer to introduce change in the workplace impacted on the shopfloor, and workers used the consequences of the changes as an impetus to organize.

The labour process level of analysis demonstrates that, despite the objective laws of the capitalist economy, workers have an influence on capitalist relations of production. They do this by the crucial fact that the capitalist needs them to produce the commodities that he/she sells on the marketplace. And workers, because they are not the employer, have a different set of interests and agenda. Because of this, I think that the workplace becomes an important arena of struggle and investigation [11].

The Canadian Garment and Textile Sector

Perhaps more than any other sector in the Canadian economy, the textile and garment sector has suffered from high levels of competition in the domestic market. Particularly since the late 1950s, Canadian textile and garment manufacturers have had to contend with "Asian" garment and textile manufacturers. Manufacturers from this region of the world have been particularly successful in penetrating and gaining an increasing share of the domestic market because of the cheap labour they employ in producing commodities. And since the 1950s, at intermittent periods, Canadian manufacturers have cried "foul!" against foreign
manufacturers.

The competition has been particularly intensive in the last couple of decades. This is again due to foreign imports eroding the domestic market. In response to this threat to market share, Canadian garment and textile manufacturers have also turned to successive waves of immigrants for cheap labour. The current strategy also includes heavy investment in technological change for both the textile and garment industries, and a resurgence and growth of "homeworking", and "contracting out" for the latter sector. There are questions as to the success of this restructuring for capitalists. But for the workforce in this sector, the results have been clear: massive job loss and reduction in the unionized workforce.

Shopfloor workers collectively impact on the larger economic structure through class struggle. A militant workforce will partly succeed in defining the rate of exploitation within the shopfloor. And the employer may have to accede to certain workers' demands in order to implement his/her restructuring strategy. This shows that the workers' struggle to organize enables them, in the end, to improve their working conditions and gain social welfare benefits from the employer. In the next couple of pages I elaborate on the important role of the labour process in capitalism and in this thesis specifically.
This thesis views the workplace as a 'contested terrain' where the interests of the workers and employers differ and collide to the dissatisfaction of both (Edwards, 1979). And this clash of interests is inevitable given that there are two classes on the shopfloor: workers and employers. This thesis also emphasizes the need to incorporate into the conception of the labour process the elements of gender and ethnicity. In doing so, we expand our conceptualization of the workplace as a 'contested terrain' and include issues of gender and ethnicity, which like those of class, are crucial in the workplace. The emergence of the union drive in Texgar resulted from a combination of grievances tied to the different characteristics of the workforce and organizations of production across the factory.

The Workplace as a 'Contested Terrain'

In 1974, Harry Braverman published his path breaking study of the labour process under (US) monopoly capital [12]. He discussed the transformation of work, and the 'de-skilling' of the American labour force as more advanced technological instruments were introduced into the workplace across American industries. Marxists praised the intellectual contribution of this work, (though their acclamation was qualified [13]), to the discipline of
industrial relations and studies of the capitalist workplace.

Richard Edwards (1979) was amongst a group of marxists who, while praising the path-breaking work of Braverman, took issue with some of the themes the latter theorized (or failed to theorize). Specifically, Edwards questioned Braverman's passive portrayal of the working class in the capitalist workplace (14). Edwards argued that workers are not passive, obedient employees always succumbing to the wishes of the employer. Rather, in his study of the organization of work and 'control' in the American workplace, Edwards rejects the passive portrayal of workers and argues that (15) in fact the workplace is a 'contested terrain'. That is, within the workplace "workers resist the discipline and the pace that employers try to impose" (1979:14). Workers behave this way because it is in the workplace that the class relationship of labour-capital is unravelled. And, as it unravels on the shopfloor, so does conflict: "because the interests of workers and those of employers collide, and what is good for one is frequently costly for the other" (Edwards, 1979:12). Edwards (1979:12) points out that "unlike the other commodities involved in production, labour power is always embodied in people, who have their own interests and needs and who retain their power to resist being treated like a
commodity." Hence, "the labour process becomes an arena of class conflict, and the workplace becomes a contested terrain" (1979:16).

This conception of the workplace was Richard Edwards' first significant contribution to labour process theory. But his has not remained an influential conception without critiques and modifications by subsequent writers. Socialist-feminists, in particular, have argued that Edwards' conception of the workplace and the organization of production is genderblind. They argue that he ignores gender as both an analytical tool and theoretical concept in his historical survey of American workplace organization over the last one-hundred years. Charlene Gannage (1986), for example, argues that within the workplace there exists a gender division of labour which has women, generally speaking, performing the monotonous, repetitive tasks in production, and men engaging in creative tasks. She adds that this gender division of labour in the workplace is tied to the double day of labour that women perform in Canadian capitalist-patriarchal society. This means that in bourgeois patriarchal society, a woman's primary role is reproductive and domestic. This historically-created role constrains women from participating in the 'public sphere' on the same level as men. Long before women entered the labour market they were responsible for the domestic sphere.
Today, as women increasingly join the labour force, they are nevertheless segregated into the 'secondary labour market' which is dominated by 'woman's work' (Armstrong and Armstrong, 1983; Phillips and Phillips, 1983).

Socialist-feminists, although praising Braverman for discussing women in the capitalist workplace, point out that he ignores the gender division of labour and women's experience of work. They also argue that his analysis is limited since it does not forge a link between the capitalist workplace and the household. Instead, gender-conscious writers argue that women's wage labour experience is mediated by their domestic role, and that within the workplace they perform specific tasks in the organization of production often related to the work they do in the home.

In this thesis, we discuss the gender division of labour across Texgar and find that women perform "woman's work", and men "men's work". We also find that the same justification for this division of labour is used by men and women: it exists because of the definite role differences that exist between men and women in society at large.

Richard Edwards' second significant contribution to labour process theory is his discussion of the 'forms of control' across capitalist industry. In his investigation of American industries, Edwards discovered three common
forms of control, they are: 'simple control', 'technical control', and 'bureaucratic control'. He shows that each is an essential aspect of the organization of production and that each has been implemented to maintain control in the workplace. This is crucial because once the capitalist purchases labour power, he/she has no guarantee that workers will work the mutually-agreed upon number of hours and use the instruments of labour properly and efficiently, and must thus develop forms of control. 'Simple control' is typical in workplaces across the small business sectors of the economy. In this type of workplace, the owner is usually supported by a small number of shopfloor supervisors and managers who together rule the firm. Both groups exercised power personally, intervening in the labour process often to exhort workers, bully and threaten them, reward good performance, hire and fire on the spot, favor loyal workers, and generally act as despots, benevolent or otherwise. They had a direct stake in translating labour power into labour, and they combined both incentives and sanctions in an idiosyncratic and unsystematic mix. There was little structure to the way power was exercised, and workers were often treated arbitrarily. Since workforces were small and the boss was both close and powerful, workers had limited success when they tried to oppose his rule (1979:19).

'Technical control' refers to an organization of work where the machinery embodies workers' skills and is organized to set the pace of work. Under this form of control, workers are merely machine-attendants.

'Bureaucratic control', the third form of control,
is prevalent in large firms where its implementation rests "on the principle of embedding control in the social structure or the social relations of the workplace" (1979:21).

The defining feature of bureaucratic control is the institutionalization of hierarchical power. 'Rule of law' - the firm's law - replaces 'rule by supervisor command' in the direction of work, the procedures for evaluating workers' performance, and the exercise of the firm's sanctions and rewards; supervisors and workers alike become subject to the dictates of 'company policy'. Work becomes highly stratified; each job is given its distinct title and description; and impersonal rules govern promotion. 'Stick with the corporation,' the worker is told, 'and you can ascend up the ladder.' The company promises the workers a career (1979:21).

Although many labour process writers have found these forms of control useful in analyzing control on the shopfloor, (e.g. Gannage, 1986, 1987; Game and Pringle, 1983) these concepts have also been criticized and improved upon. Game and Pringle (1983:20) argue that these three forms of control are patriarchal "although Edwards, in his gender blindness, does not recognise this". They point out that simple control "is control by the 'father', often in a symbolic sense but frequently quite literally, in small enterprises and family companies" (1983:20). In these types of organization of work, the company "would look after you" [the employee]. Game and Pringle extend their patriarchal critique of Edwards' forms of control also to technical and bureaucratic forms of control (1983:21-22).
I too have found Richard Edwards' discussion of 'control' useful in my analysis of the organization of work across Texgar. And while I have acknowledged Game and Pringle's critique of the patriarchal nature of Edwards' forms of control, my data has alerted me to the need to further revise Edwards' original conception of 'control'. In *Contested Terrain*, Richard Edwards (1979) argues that the forms of control he identifies succeed one another in the workplace [17], and that because of the uneven development of capitalist industry, some forms of control that predominated in the last century are still present in some workplaces in contemporary sectors of the economy. [18] However, Edwards does not say that within a workplace in a contemporary industrial sector, two or more forms of control can exist simultaneously. In other words, the form of control in the contemporary capitalist workplace is not homogeneous as Edwards' suggested. Instead, one finds, as is the case in Texgar, that simple control and technical control are still very much prevalent forms of control in the contemporary workplace.

My examination of control in Texgar goes further than this; it clearly shows two forms of control co-existing in the same workplace. Simple control is evident in the ethnic workers' comments about the owner of the factory, even though the latter no longer participate directly in the
work process. Technical control is tied to the recent introduction of the E-Ton System 2001 of garment distribution in the sewing section on the sixth floor.

But there is much more to the capitalist workplace than Edwards' systems of control. The capitalist enterprise must perform in the marketplace in order to survive. Hence, competition in the market entails strategies in the organization of production to ensure the generation of surplus value.\(^{19}\) Among the options a capitalist possesses is the revolutionizing of the instruments of labour. But this does not necessarily entail a homogeneity of working conditions and workforce facilitating the organization of workers into unions (Marx and Engels, 1988; Braverman, 1974). This type of unilinear view of the development of the labour process has not materialized in the contemporary workplace. Instead, capital has created a heterogeneous workplace with a fragmented working class. Hence, the capitalist organization of production, as is the case in this case study, has created divisions in the working class including those relating to gender, race, and ethnicity. Under this form of organization of production, communication and solidarity between workers against their employer is made difficult. It is clear to me, and I hope that the data show it, that the division of labour in Texgar acted as a barrier to the development of a homogeneous union drive
across the factory, and thus played a critical role in failure of the union drive (see Kelly [1989] for a discussion of this perspective).

CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS TO THE LITERATURE

This thesis makes a number of contributions to the labour process literature. First, it challenges the mainstream industrial relations literature's explanation of unionization. This thesis argues that, instead of interpreting poor economic conditions as barriers to organizing, this case study shows that the effects of the crisis on the shopfloor acted as an impetus to workers' determination to organize Texgar. Second, it discusses Portuguese women workers, their experience of the capitalist labour process and the gender division of labour. Third, this case study makes a contribution to Richard Edwards' typology of control by showing that a combination of forms of control exist in Texgar. Fourth, I attempt to add the element of ethnicity to the concept of 'simple control'. I argue that some workers identified with the owner of the factory because he, like them, was an immigrant to Canada. And, for some workers, the owner of the factory had realized "the immigrant dream": acquiring wealth after difficult immigrant years. The ethnicity identity also blurred the workers' perception of the class relationship between them
and the owner of the factory. Fifth, this thesis contributes to the literature on gender by showing that indeed men and women perform different tasks within the workplace. A common gender ideology is used by Texgar workers to explain the gender division of labour across Texgar. (The validity of this ideology was not questioned either by the workers themselves, nor by the union organizers).

**BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTERS**

Chapter two of this thesis describes the methodology and data collection techniques used during the research phase. It discusses the problem of entering "the field" and developing strategies to overcome the obstacles encountered. Chapter three is a discussion of the structure of the Canadian textile and garment industry. The state of this industrial sector in Quebec is highlighted since Texgar is located in this province. In Chapter four we begin our analysis of Texgar. I describe in cursory fashion the major developments in Texgar since it was established in 1951. The more recent changes in the factory, as well as its new restructuring strategies, are also discussed. Chapter five discusses the technical division of labour in Texgar. Of particular importance here is the recognition that Texgar is a complex workplace made up of four divisions, each of which
is independent of the others. Chapter six discusses the social division of labour and the gendered labour process within Texgar. It also discusses the workers' explanation/justification for the existence of a gendered division of labour in Texgar. Chapter seven discusses the ethnic division of labour across the four divisions of the factory. Chapter eight describes the working conditions that workers experience across the four divisions of the factory, and the systems of control they are subjected to. Chapter nine tackles the union drive in Texgar. It begins with a discussion of the economic conditions at the time the union drive emerged. This is followed by an analysis of the origin of the union drive and the strategies to expand it throughout the factory. We also discuss the legal framework of union certification that took the workers within Texgar four years to find out whether or not they were going to be represented by a union. Chapter ten concludes the thesis. It summarizes the findings of this thesis, and suggests future implications of the Texgar case study.

CONCLUSION

This chapter began with a critique of the business cycle theory of unionization. It was argued that this theory is inadequate for explaining this case study because the union drive within Texgar emerged at the height of the
worst economic crisis in Canada in fifty years. Three other theories were discussed. They were also found to be inadequate because the situation in Texgar does not correspond to the central tenets that these theories build their explanation upon. I also pointed out that these theories analyze only one level of reality in studying unionizing. For example the business cycle theory focuses on the macro features of capitalist economy to explain unionization. The homogeneous workforce argument, on the other hand, studies the ethnic characteristic of the workforce in the workplace in an attempt to explain unionization. According to this theory, a homogeneous workforce is more likely to organize than a heterogeneous one. These theories, however, do not try to combine both the macro features of the economy and the characteristics of the workforce in the factory. This is what this thesis attempts to do.

This thesis brings together the macro features of the Canadian textile and garment sector with the reality of the workplace in Texgar to explain the emergence of a union drive and its defeat.
NOTES

1. See Roy Adams (1983) for a discussion of the different theoretical perspectives within the discipline of industrial relations.

2. Craig Heron (1988:98) says that this strategy was used to tie skilled labour to the company. But he prefaces this point with the comment that unskilled workers were not included under this strategy because there was always a steady supply of them coming from Europe and Eastern Canada. But can one argue that if the reserve army of labour was reduced, and the importation of labour declined, unskilled labour would also be considered indispensable?

3. This explanation reinforces the view that only the bourgeoisie can organize and lead a society.

4. "Contrary to popular belief, many employers have never given up such tactics as black lists, the hiring of armed thugs, and the use of other forms of violence" (Goldfield, 1987:51).

5. "During the period 1982-1984, a period covered by the system of bilateral restraint agreements currently in force, the Canadian economy underwent a year of severe recession, followed by a moderate recovery in activity since the beginning of 1983. The textile and clothing industries were directly hit by the recession, and subsequently there was little significant recovery: imports captured the major share of any increase in demand" (Textile and Clothing Board, 1985a:3; see also Textile and Clothing Board, 1985b).

6. "In Finland the labour and socialist movements had both class and national characteristics. Indeed, the 1901 conscription riots and the 1905 general strike in that country were as much directed against Russification as against capitalism. After the 1905 upheaval Finnish intellectuals, such as the utopian socialist Matti Kurikka and the syndicalist Leo Kauikki, were forced to flee to North America, and thus strengthened the already well-established radical point of view among Canadian Finns" (Avery, 1980:49).

7. Another body of literature on immigrant labour argues that new immigrant waves were often used as strike-breakers, and refrained from supporting the 'native' working class struggles against capital (Roseblum, 1973). Aronowitz (1973:140) argues that ethnicity was one of the divisions within the American working class that "constituted the critical deterrent to the development of a
unified working class and political movement."

8. There are three main ethnic groups working in Texgar - Portuguese, Pakistani, and Haitians. Portugal, Pakistan and Haiti are three of the poorest countries in the capitalist world. ("Le Portugal était, en 1981, le plus pauvre des vingt-quatre pays de l'Organisation de cooperation et de développement économique après la Turquie, avec un produit national brut (PNB) annuel per capita de 2330 $" [Labelle et al., 1987:35]). And for long periods in their recent history, the population in these countries have been ruled by fascist dictators. For example, in Portugal fascism ruled for fifty years (de Figueiro, 1975:9). Under this system trade unions functioned as an instrument of the state controlling the workforce on the shopfloor. Internal trade union elections could not proceed until after a list of candidates was submitted to the secret police (PIDE [International Police for the Defense of the State]) for approval (Robinson, 1987:85).

9. Most of the Portuguese workers in Texgar are originally from the Portuguese Azores Islands. All of the women interviewed originate from Sao Miguel - the largest of nine islands that make up the Azorean archipelago. It is only recently that Azorean women have begun to work for a wage in the Islands. In 1970, only 10.2 per cent of women were active in the labour force (DREP, 1984:39). By 1981, this figure had climbed to only 18 per cent (DREP, 1984:39).

10. I use the term Portuguese "petty-bourgeoisie" loosely, and I use it to refer to those individuals who own community newspapers, and the Portuguese television and radio programmes, and who sided with Albert Saltzman against the Portuguese workers in Texgar.

11. Business cycle writers ignore class in the labour process, and instead concentrate their studies on the rules and regulations that ensure stability in the workplace (Hyman, 1975).


14. In addition to Edwards, Bryan Palmer (1975) and David Montgomery (1979) have argued that the working class is not "passive" in the workplace.

15. The 'passive' characterization of workers within the workplace is not accepted by all labour process writers as a pertinent critique of Braverman's work. Dan Clawson (1980) and Andrew Zimbalist (1979a) have attempted to show that Braverman did indeed see conflict on the shopfloor.

16. On this Braverman (1974: 283) writes:
The work of the housewife, though it has the same material or service effect as that of the chambermaid, restaurant workers, cleaner, porter, or laundry worker, is outside the purview of capital; but when she takes one of these jobs outside the home she becomes a productive worker. Her labor now enriches capital and thus deserves a place in the national product.

17. Edwards does say, however, that 'simple control' is still evident in the small business sector of the American economy.

18. However, "[a]s capitalist production has developed unevenly, modern industry is characterised by the existence of all three structures of control in different sectors" (Thompson, 1989: 145).

19. Marx and Engels (1988) view of trade union organizing as a direct result of the increasing concentration of workers in the capitalist workplace, has not occurred. This view underestimates the role of the division of labour in preventing worker solidarity, and the employer's strategy to keep workers separated from each other.
CHAPTER TWO

METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION

INTRODUCTION

In her important, but gender blind text on fieldwork methodology, Rosalie Wax (1971:16) suggests that there are three stages involved in field research. The first, she calls the 'initiation' or 'resocialization' stage. During this stage the researcher attempts to establish contact and familiarity with the setting and people he/she is interested in studying. The second, she defines as the actual data collecting stage; and the third, the post-field writing stage. According to Wax (Ibid: 16), however, most fieldworkers ignore or quickly pass over a discussion of the first stage of the fieldwork process [1]. "This is unfortunate", she argues,

because it is during the first stage that the fieldworker finds, is offered, and accepts the lines of communication and the social vantage points through and from which he[she] will make his[her] observations and will be permitted to participate. It is also during this stage that he[she] will find out whether or not he[she] will be able to do the work he[she] wishes to do. And, quite frequently, it is during this stage that the character, scope, and emphasis of his[her] problem or investigation is determined.

This is fundamental advice since it warns researchers to be flexible with their research design once they arrive in the field. It is the people whom they are interested in
studying that decide whether or not the research can take place, and determine as well what can and cannot be 'researched' in the setting. It also stresses to fieldworkers that the reaction the field-study 'population' offers them has important implications for the kind of data they are privy to, and the kind of interpretation they develop in the post-field writing stage.

Even if fieldwork begins and develops under 'normal' conditions of study, a chapter discussing the preliminary research stage of the investigation should be included in all final research reports. This should be a truism for all investigations using the fieldwork methodology. Unfortunately, as Wax has already pointed out, many researchers today still fail to provide us with such a chapter. Two recent fieldworkers who fall in this lacuna are Sallie Westwood (1985) and Gregory Teal (1985).

Sallie Westwood (1985), in her fascinating study of 'work culture' at 'Stitch Co.' in 'NeedleTown', England, tells us that she gained access to the factory with the assistance of a 'contact'. However, nowhere in her book does she explain who this contact is, what his/her relationship is to the factory, or what role (if any) he/she played in the development and direction of the investigation. Gregory Teal (1985), similarly, leaves us in the dark when he fails to discuss why he chose the factory
he did for investigation, how he gained entry to the workplace and got a job on the shopfloor, and most importantly, how he selected workers for his study [2]. In my view these are serious omissions since they stand in the way of the reader and his/her attempt to critically evaluate the arguments made in the study [3]. To make such an evaluation, the reader needs to know more than just the theoretical conclusions reached by the author; he/she needs to know the conditions under which the investigation was undertaken, how data was collected and the characteristics of the population under study. Therefore, to enable the reader to make the most complete evaluation possible of my study, I have chosen to include in the thesis a methodological chapter describing the problems faced in the field, how they were dealt with, and the manner in which the data was collected for this thesis.

This chapter discusses the opposition to access encountered from a prominent factory manager once in the field, and the methodological changes made to deal with this opposition. The refusal of access to two-thirds of the factory had important implications for the conduct of fieldwork: field observation was restricted to two of the six floors in the factory making it difficult for me to reach potential respondents in the floors I could not enter for observation. As a result, different methodological
techniques were used to reach potential respondents; they are also discussed in this chapter.

The lack of access to some floors of the factory had another important consequence for the development of this investigation: it impeded the researcher from contacting certain groups of workers. The identity of these groups of workers are also discussed in this chapter.

In addition to fieldwork, other sources of data were investigated and consulted for information on the Canadian textile and garment industries, on Texgar itself, on the workforce in the factory, and on the union drive. These are discussed in the latter part of this chapter.

Finally, the object of this chapter is to include a description of the preliminary fieldwork stage in research write-ups and to 'ply the full searchlight of methodic sincerity' (Malinowski [1922] (1961:3) to eschew the presentation of field facts out of context.

STATEMENT OF RESEARCH INTEREST

I chose to study Texgar for two reasons; one personal, the other academic. Here is the personal. I became aware of the organizing drive in Texgar in the summer of 1984 when I worked there briefly. I followed the organizing attempt when I returned to the factory in 1985 for another summer job. From then on, I would discuss the
different stages of the union drive with members of my family [5], and people more directly involved in the technical, bureaucratic and class biased legal process of union certification (Krahn and Lowe, 1988, chapter 7; Hyman, 1979). I have no doubt that my background knowledge of the struggle to organize Texgar, and acquaintance with some of the people involved in the unionization process, facilitated immensely the design of this research project, and its completion in only three months of fieldwork [6].

The academic/theoretical reason for undertaking this project is to determine why workers in Texgar chose to organize at a time when the textile and garment industries were in a severe crisis? As noted in Chapter One, there is a common perspective in the industrial relations literature that speaks of an 'appropriate time' to organize. Writers in this perspective argue that the time to organize is when an industry (or workplace) is experiencing an economically prosperous period. But, as this thesis will demonstrate, workers in Texgar did not follow this 'timing' pattern for organizing. Why didn't they? The underlying purpose of this study is to answer this question with data collected during three months of fieldwork.

PRELIMINARY FIELDWORK ARRANGEMENTS

Pre-fieldwork arrangements were made through a first
informant (Manuel Correia) in January 1988 (see Appendix B for Interview Guide). Manuel had worked in the Casualwear Division of Texgar first as a 'spreader' and then later as a 'cutter'. And while at Texgar, he had always maintained a good relationship with Albert Saltzman. (The latter founded Texgar 38 years ago, and is still part owner of the company today.) Manuel went many times to Mr. Saltzman's office to ask for money to pay the registration fees for the company's soccer team. When I contacted Manuel in January 1988, I learned that he no longer worked for Texgar and instead was an editor for one of the three Portuguese community newspapers. Because I knew Manuel personally and was aware of his relationship with Mr. Saltzman, I asked him to call the owner of the company to set up an appointment for me. I felt that if Manuel contacted Mr. Saltzman first and briefly told him about my interest in the factory, my chances of gaining access to the 'site' would improve. Manuel didn't object to my request and was instead pleased to help out since for many years he had worked at Texgar, and was aware of the many injustices practiced by office management and shopfloor supervisors in the factory.

First Contact With The Factory

On January 5, 1988, I met with Mr. Saltzman in his office. He greeted me with a firm handshake and some
paternalistic advice on how I should proceed to achieve success in academia or the business world. He recalled that a couple of years back I had worked in the fabric division of the factory, and told me that I was partially responsible for the firing of Mr. Shannik. (The latter was then manager of the fabric division when I worked at the factory). During one of Mr. Saltzman's first illegal meetings with the workers denouncing their struggle for a union, I had spoken out against management practices of using people to work sixty and seventy hours a week - frequently without paying them overtime pay. Apparently, Mr. Saltzman thought Mr. Shannik responsible for allowing this practice to go on in his factory, and as a token gesture, fired him - a year later.

During our first meeting in January 1988, I asked Mr. Saltzman for permission to use his factory to study its organization of production and the relationships this created between shopfloor workers of different gender and ethnic backgrounds. He did not object and was glad to help an ex-Texgar worker who had used his company as a 'stepping-stone in life'. His only warning was that I not interfere with the workers' responsibilities during work-time, and to remain neutral in the organizing drive within the factory.
First Contact With The Union

During this same pre-fieldwork period, the research project was also introduced to the organizing agent from the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) responsible for the Texgar 'dossier', and to three prominent male activists in the 'Syndicat pour les Employees de Texgar'. All four men responded positively to the research interest, but warned that their assistance would be minimal at least until the final decision from the Labour Commissioner regarding union certification would be known. This was good enough for me and I returned to school in early January confident that the research would develop smoothly.

Preparing For The Field

From January to early June, I wrote a thesis proposal and constructed an interview guide (Appendix B). The interview guide contains questions on workers' social background, prior membership in unions, the labour process, domestic labour, gender and ethnic division of labour in the factory, participation in the union drive, and other similar themes. At the suggestion of my supervisor, French and Portuguese copies were also made of the original English interview guide. This was done because we felt that it would facilitate discussions with respondents during
interviews if I brought with me a copy of the guide in the language that the respondents could better express themselves in. Unfortunately, I was not able to translate the guide into Pakistani since at this moment I am fluent in only three languages – Portuguese, English, and French. Pakistani workers, therefore, were interviewed in English. Confidently on June 8, 1988 I left for the field.

BRIEF LAY-OUT OF TEXGAR

Texgar is composed of four independent (of each other) production divisions; only two of them are controlled by the same authority in the corporate structure of the factory [7]. The Fabric Division occupies the first two floors of the factory, and is controlled by Albert Saltzman. Here, an all male workforce transforms yarn into fabric for sale to garment manufacturers in the province. On the third floor, the Women's Sweaters Division is found. In this division, a gender mixed workforce produces women's sweaters and children's clothing. The ultimate authority dictating production in this division is Lenny Long. The latter is also Albert Saltzman's son-in-law. On the fifth floor, three groups of women shopfloor workers make garment samples in the 'Sample Room' Division for three different clothing base-lines. Two of these base-lines, Nouveauwear and TG Active, are owned by Texgar; the third, 'Michel Robichaux',
is owned by the Canadian designer of the same name. The garment samples made in this division are sold to retailers, and then either mass produced in the factory or through contracting. The final division in the factory is the Casualwear Division which occupies the fourth and sixth floors. On these two floors, a gender mixed workforce mass produces some of those garment samples created in the 'Sample Room' Division, and which have been sold to retailers. Jerry Saltzman, Albert Saltzman's son, is the controlling authority in this division.

OPPOSITION TO GAINING ACCESS

Fieldwork is not a static technique for gathering data, but rather "a continuous process of entering the field and of meeting and establishing relationships with informants" (Zinn in Zavella 1987:18). In this section I discuss first, how and why field access was blocked to four of the six floors of the factory, and second, the process by which I established contact with respondents on those floors I could not physically enter for study.

Once in the field, I called Manuel again and asked him to speak to Mr. Saltzman and let him know that I was in Town ready to begin the study. The following day at 10:30 am I met with Mr. Saltzman in his office and briefly reminded him of my research interest and fieldwork
methodology. He did not object, but reminded me to refrain from taking workers away from their job because "we [he] in this factory pay time." Before I left Mr. Saltzman's office to return home to prepare for fieldwork on the following day, Mr. Saltzman asked me to go see Mr. Amadeo Grazianni on the sixth floor to let him know that I intended beginning field observation on his floor the next day. I did as he suggested.

Access Denied

As I began to inform Mr. Grazianni of my research interest and methodological approach to the factory, it became clear to me he had not been made aware of my purpose at Texgar. This was so despite the fact I had requested Mr. Saltzman to distribute to his managers and shopfloor supervisors copies of a letter of research interest I left with him in January 1988. Mr. Grazianni, nonetheless, listened attentively. I emphasized to him my unobstructive approach to shopfloor observation, and respect for workers' personal space. In addition, I informed him that all discussions with workers would be held in the cafeteria during their coffee 'breaks' and lunch hour. He stared at me with a puzzled look on his face, but said that I should return the next day to begin fieldwork.

My fieldwork strategy was to arrive early at the
factory and go straight up to the cafeteria on the fifth floor and introduce myself to the workers there before they began working. This I hoped, would permit me to develop some fieldwork confidence with the men and women of the shopfloor. Once on the shopfloor, I wanted to observe each work-area in order to understand the labour process, the ethnic division of labour, and the gender division of labour peculiar to each floor. This strategy would be repeated on each floor; and men and women from different work-areas and ethnic backgrounds would be approached for interview dates. But to my surprise, on the following morning, the receptionist in the lobby said that she had been told to inform me that I was not to enter the factory until Mr. Saltzman arrived. So I sat in a chair in the lobby and waited until 8:30 am when the owner of the factory came through the doors of the reception area. Mr. Saltzman was surprised to see me and quickly warned me that he had no time for me and any discussion regarding his company. I assured him that my purpose in the factory was to commence field observation on the sixth floor, and not to interview him. At that moment, the receptionist called Mr. Saltzman and told him that Mr. Grazianni had said that I was not to begin field research until they held a meeting together to discuss my access to the factory. This sudden change in attitude to my presence in the factory was unexpected,
particularly since the day before Mr. Grazianni had agreed to let me begin field observation. And, at no time during my meetings with Mr. Saltzman had he once indicated that I might face opposition to enter the factory. Mr. Saltzman turned to me and said that there was nothing he could do since Mr. Grazianni was the boss upstairs (in the Casualwear Division) [9]. His only suggestion was that I call Mr. Grazianni the following day and try to talk him into granting me access to the floors he controls. Access to the third and fifth floors, was also denied. Mr. Saltzman:

I dare not ask my son-in-law [for access permission], I don't want to start a family fight. When you came to the factory I told Mr. Grazianni about your research, but I didn't say anything about it to my son-in-law... If he is in a good mood, he will tell me to 'bug-off', if he is in a bad mood, he will tell me to 'fuck-off'.

Albert Saltzman's son-in-law is Lenny Long. The latter controls the Women's Sweaters Division on the third floor, as well as part of the 'Sample Room' Division on the fifth floor [10].

The next two days were spent on the telephone trying to reach Mr. Grazianni to bargain with him for entry to the garment division of the factory. When I did finally reach him, he refused to grant access on the basis that my presence on the shopfloor would disrupt the work routine and interfere with workers' work rhythm and their concentration on the job. He also felt that the workers, instead of doing their job properly, would 'gossip' amongst themselves,
inquiring after each other about my purpose in the factory and the kinds of discussions I might have with some of them. My guess is that Mr. Grazianni felt threatened by my presence on the shopfloor, and the advantages the workers might take of me and my tape-recorder to vent their frustrations about Texgar. But even after I stressed to him once again my unobstrusive field observation and restriction of all discussion to the cafeteria, Mr. Grazianni held his position and refused to grant access to his division of the factory.

Gaining Some Important Information

A researcher's experience of the initial stage of fieldwork doesn't have to be all negative; in fact, a lot of insight about the field setting can be gained during this stage by a perceptive observer. Anna Pollert (1981:7), for example, in her study of women tobacco factory workers, says that when she found out that a union officer and factory manager had ignored her request to have them distribute to the women on the shopfloor her letter explaining her purpose and interest in the factory, it indicated to her 'the level of union organization and the way the women and younger girls [in the factory] were regarded'. This initial impression was later confirmed and reinforced by the women of the shopfloor in their conversations with Pollert.
My own experience was similar to Pollert's. While I was bargaining with the owner of the factory for access to the field setting, I was also discovering that the responsibilities for the running of the factory had been divided amongst three people: Mr. Albert Saltzman, Mr. Jerry Saltzman, and Mr. Lenny Long. And that Mr. Saltzman had restricted his authority and control to the Fabric Division - the first two floors of the factory. This was important information, as I later discovered, because the distribution of control was tied to a restructuring of the factory (completed in 1984), and ostensibly to the (fabric) workers request for union certification deposited at the Quebec Labour Commission the same year [11]. This is explained in chapter 4.

However, this information would be worthless unless I could reach shopfloor respondents to discuss with them the internal structure of the factory and the union drive. It was naive of me to think that, with a union drive in the factory and an important upcoming Labour Commission decision on the fate of the 'Syndicat pour les Employees de Texgar', I could just waltz onto the shopfloor and carry out my observations. Lou Morais, a shopfloor worker in the knitting department (Fabric Division), did not hesitate to clarify the situation for me:

I know why they [management] are hesitant to grant you access to the factory: they are afraid that you might
add fuel to the fire concerning the unionization struggle in the factory. Right now, nothing is yet final concerning the union drive so they are afraid that you might cause problems for them in their attempts to stop the union drive.

Lou never did explain what might be some of the 'problems I might cause' for management, and perhaps I did not ask him to elaborate. But I had reason to believe that access to Texgar would not be a problem. From our first meeting together Mr. Saltzman never hinted that access would be a problem, but rather maintained that the factory was mine to observe and investigate. As it turned out, however, observation and investigation were restricted to the fabric division of the factory (the first two floors). Left with no other option, field observation began there.

DEALING WITH THE DENIAL OF ACCESS

Perhaps because Manuel Correia is an editor of one of the Portuguese community newspapers, Mr. Saltzman, who has longer and stronger ties with the Portuguese Community than any other of the two people responsible for the factory [12] felt it strategically unwise to deny me access to his division of the factory. To deny me access would have been to indirectly offend Manuel and the Portuguese media, a serious mistake Mr. Saltzman did not want to make at a time when he was seeking support from the Portuguese Community in his attempts to defeat the union drive in the factory [13].
For this reason, I think, observation and investigation of the textile division of the factory was never threatened from the beginning of the research in early June to the end of it in early September.

Fieldworking in the fabric division had two purposes: one, to study the organization of production in the division through field observation and discussion with workers in it, and two, to develop with the help of the fabric division workers a network of potential respondents on the floors where access was forbidden. This was the only hope left to try and reach respondents from the other four floors to discuss with them their experiences of the labour process and their views and attitudes on the union drive pervading all floors.

The union drive emerged and developed in the fabric division in the early 1980s, and for that reason alone a large part of the study would have to be dedicated to investigating the labour process in that division. But it was never my goal to exclusively investigate this division—although the denial of access to two-thirds of the factory did, temporarily, threaten to cancel the study altogether—since even if everybody in the Fabric Division was interviewed, it would only constitute about 20% of the total workforce in the factory. Furthermore, it would have been a biased account of the union drive since all data would have
been collected from an all-male workforce in the textile division. I was not prepared to ignore almost 80% of the workforce in the factory, the majority of whom are women.

Developing Networks of Informants

In the fabric division, Mathieu [14] was crucial in introducing my project to the shopfloor workers of the division. Mathieu is Haitian and has a good relationship with workers from the various ethnic groups in the fabric division. This served me well since it provided me with easy entry to the different ethnic-tied work groups in the division. I stressed to the workers my academic interest in the factory, and the absolute independence of this study from any organization or person — including Mr. Albert Saltzman. The workers were also guaranteed anonymity and complete confidentiality should they choose to take part in the study. I managed to interview 8 workers from the 53 that work in the fabric division. They took advantage of my interest and tape recorder to express their frustrations and concerns about working at Texgar and the union drive. Most interviews, lasting approximately an hour in length, took place after working hours and were usually held at bars or restaurants near the factory. After each interview, requests were made to each respondent for assistance in reaching potential respondents from the floors where access
had been blocked. Mathieu, once again, furnished me with a few Haitian contacts in the other divisions of the factory, and they were subsequently contacted and interviewed. A couple of Portuguese fabric workers also helped me get in touch with shopfloor workers on the floors off-limits to investigation. And they too were subsequently contacted and interviewed. A total of four ex-Texgar workers were also interviewed mainly because I wanted to find out if they had been fired because of union activities.

Two patterns emerged in the development of this network of respondents between floors and labour process divisions in the factory. First, the network developed along ethnic ties, with Mathieu putting me in touch with other Haitian workers in the factory, and the Portuguese workers furnishing me with other Portuguese workers in the other divisions. Second, the network developed along a male gender connection — all respondents contacted with the help of the workers in the fabric division were male. This is not surprising once we consider the ethnic and gender division of labour in the factory. Texgar is typical of the textile and garment factories in the industries: workers are overwhelmingly women and from a variety of ethnic backgrounds. These two central features of the labour process will be discussed in another chapter of the thesis. As a result, shopfloor women workers remained out of reach
for investigation. To remedy this, another network had to be established to put me in touch with women workers for interview. But this new network of respondents developed its own boundaries which were impossible to break out in the short three month period of fieldwork. This is discussed next.

More Problems Due to Denial of Access

At Texgar, all shopfloor women are employed on the four floors where access had been forbidden. To reach these women, I turned to my sister-in-law, Ana, for help. She works on the fifth floor in the 'sample room'. She put me in touch with women workers on the fifth, fourth and sixth floors for interviews. Linda works on the third floor as a sewing machine operator. I met her through her husband who was aware of the study and told me that he would ask his wife if she was interested in participating in the study. Linda agreed to an interview and, throughout the research period, she furnished me with respondents from the floor she works on.

All the women in this study were interviewed in their homes usually after dinner, but some were interviewed on weekends. They were all Portuguese, from the Azorean Islands Region, and ranged in age from 17 to 60 years old. The interviews themselves lasted approximately an hour, but
often the most interesting discussions took place either prior to or after the semi-structured interview. The women took particular pleasure in showing me their houses and pointing out to me the latest decorations they had bought for their homes.

But the network of women respondents moved only among Portuguese (Azorean - another important feature) shopfloor workers; no contact was established with women shopfloor workers from other ethnic backgrounds in the factory. I realize that this is a gap in the study, but one that had more to do with the ethnic division of labour in the factory than with my competence as a fieldworker. Later in the thesis when I discuss the ethnic division of labour, it will become clear why networks in the factory only developed along same-gender and same-ethnic lines. For now, suffice it to say that various approaches were tried without success to reach a cross-ethnic sample of women workers in the factory. I am convinced that with free access to all floors, this would not have been a problem in the investigation. Hence, information gathered from Portuguese women workers will only be used to discuss their position in the factory; I will not attempt to generalize the Portuguese women's position or views on the labour process and the union drive to women of non-Portuguese origin.
Shopfloor Supervisors

The denial of access also prevented me from contacting and interviewing shopfloor supervisors on the third, fourth and sixth floors. The supervisors I did reach, those in the fabric division, were denied permission to participate in the study from their bosses in the different offices in the factory. This was unfortunate since their position on the union drive and role in the campaign to defeat it could have been more clearly illuminated by their own words. Moreover, their relationship with workers from their own ethnic group which they supervise could also have been more clearly understood.

The information I possess on the role of shopfloor supervisors came from interviews with shopfloor workers and from a report found at the Labour Commission Bureau. One supervisor was interviewed for this study. He agreed to participate in the study only because we have known each other for a few years, and on condition his bosses in the Casualwear Division were not made aware of his participation.

Official Company Records

The last gap in this investigation is the lack of official company records to support some of the claims made in the study concerning the number of workers and their
distribution along gender and ethnic lines. Of course, official production statistics on the factory are also absent in this study since these too weren't offered to me for analysis. As a result, the numbers presented in this study are approximations made by the author on the basis of the information gathered from interviews. Those numbers that are official are indicated as such in the proper reference manner.

The denial of access presented problems to my investigation of the union drive at Texgar. Numerous methodological strategies were employed to overcome this barrier; some were more successful than others. Above I have tried to explain all the changes made to the original research design to overcome the obstacles erected by management at Texgar. Next is a summary of the research sample studied for this thesis.

**TOTAL NUMBER OF INFORMANTS**

Fieldwork for this thesis began in June 1988 and lasted until two days after Labour Day weekend. In all, 43 people were interviewed for this thesis, 27 of them from the shopfloor. Here is a further breakdown of these numbers first by division and gender,
Table 1  
Interviewees by Division and Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fabric</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's/Children's</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample Room</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualwear</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and then by ethnicity and division.

Table 2  
Interviewees by Ethnicity and Division

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Fabric</th>
<th>Sweat.</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Cas/wear</th>
<th>Mgmnt</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portug.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haitian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to these 27 shopfloor workers of mixed ethnicity, the following were also interviewed:

- 2 ex-Texgar women workers (all Portuguese);
- 4 men from the union leadership;
- 3 ex-Texgar male workers; and
3 men (and one woman) from management (including the owner of the factory).

3 government officials (one from the Labour Commission, and the others from the Ladies' Clothing Joint Commission)

With the exception of Mr. Saltzman and Mr. Grazianni, all interviews were done away from the factory. This was important considering the sensitivity of the issues included in the interview guide. With the exception of two interviews (done over the telephone), all other interviews were tape recorded and transcribed verbatim immediately after each interview. During field observations, notes were taken in point form and immediately expanded once out of the research site. All respondents were guaranteed anonymity and given fictitious names in this thesis; they were also all thanked individually for their participation with a letter.

OTHER SOURCES OF DATA

In addition to field observation and interviews, data was gathered from several other sources. These include, federal and provincial government publications on the two industries, the Canadian Textile and Clothing Board, newspapers (including community newspapers), union literature in the form of pamphlets and articles with specific reference to Texgar and cut-outs of magazines, previous academic studies on these two industries, and
business magazines which carry the occasional article on the textile or garment industry. The interested reader should consult the bibliographical section of this thesis for the referenced material discussed above [15].

The investigation and consultation of these various data sources were undertaking to enable me to develop a more accurate understanding of the textile and garment industries, of contemporary Texgar itself, of the workers in the factory, and finally, of the struggle to organize the factory.

CONCLUSION

The central concern of this research has always been the investigation of the union drive at Texgar Knitting Mills. From its earliest conception, the methodological strategy of field observation and semi-structured interviews had always been considered to be the most expedient for this type of study. This approach would enable me to easily discuss the relevant points to the study in the language that the workers preferred to speak. Moreover, since many of the respondents don't speak English, much less read it, field observation and semi-structured interviews seemed ideal. But gaining entry to the factory had always been taken for granted because the author possessed strategically located contacts in and out of the factory. And if for some
unexpected reason access was denied, the author was confident that the union involved in the organizing drive would cooperate in the study by furnishing contacts from the factory capable of discussing the emergence and development of the union drive at Texgar, and the attacks Mr. Saltzman has made on the union drive in his attempts to defeat it. However, when the problem of access presented itself, and the union leadership was late in cooperating in the study, certain techniques had to be implemented to get the study off the ground and overcome these early barriers. 'Networking' was particularly useful for reaching respondents from all floors, including those floors where access had been denied.

The purpose of this chapter has been to describe to the reader the circumstances under which this study developed. This is important if the reader is to make a proper and critical evaluation of the study before him/her. This chapter has demonstrated the strategies used by the fieldworker in the field to deal with the problem of access and to transcend its imposed limitations on the maneuverability of the investigation. As might be expected, certain obstacles set by the problem of access proved to be too difficult to transcend in the short three month period of research. These obstacles and their effect on the research were discussed in this chapter. Finally, I have
included the total number of persons interviewed for this study and the other sources of data used in addition to field observation and interviewing.
NOTES


2. Interestingly enough, both of these authors are anthropologists by training; a discipline known for its use of the fieldwork methodology for gathering data. Many scholars in the discipline have recognized and encouraged the use of fieldwork methodology to gather data in the research site. Among these is Bronislaw Malinowski, the founder of social anthropology (Kuper 1983:1), who many years ago, when disciplines in the social sciences sought to resemble the natural sciences to achieve 'scientific' status, put it most clearly:

The results of scientific research in any branch of learning ought to be presented in a manner absolutely candid and above board. No one would dream of making an experimental contribution to physical or chemical science, without giving a detailed account of all the arrangements of the experiments; an exact description of the apparatus used; of the manner in which the observations were conducted; of their number; of the length of time devoted to them, and of the degree of approximation with which each measurement was made. In less exact sciences, as in biology or geology, this cannot be done as rigorously, but every student will do his[her] best to bring home to the reader all the conditions in which the experiment or the observations were made ([1922] 1961:2-3).

While I do not claim to present a 'scientific' work (in Malinowski's sense) in this thesis, I do try to present to the reader all the troubles and satisfactions involved in my field research investigation.

3. On the other hand, both Patricia Zavella (1987) and Charlene Gannage (1986) do an excellent job in describing fieldwork methodology in their books.

4. Unless otherwise indicated, all names in this thesis, including that of the factory, are fictitious. This practice has been adopted to guarantee confidentiality and complete anonymity to all those who agreed to participate in this research.

5. In our nuclear family, we are five; and four of us worked for Texgar at one time or another. My sister-in-law is the only one still working for Texgar today.
6. Patricia Zavella (1987, chapter 1) discusses the politics of researching a minority community with whom one shares ethnicity. Maxine Baca Zinn (1979) and John L. Aguilar (1981) discuss the 'insider-outsider' controversy on who is best qualified to conduct research in a minority community: a member of that community, or an 'outsider'?

7. This paragraph is simply a brief introduction to the lay-out of the factory. The history of the factory is discussed in chapter four; while the technical division of labour in each division is described in chapter 5, and the social division of labour in chapter 6 and 7.

8. At the time of fieldwork, Amadeo Grazianni was general manager of the Casualwear Division. This division stretches over two floors, the fourth and the sixth. I was told by the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) union organizing agent that he had been pried away from Dominion Textiles for a reported annual salary of $200,000.

Today, the general manager of the Casualwear Division is the former supervisor of the 'spreaders' and 'cutters' in this division since Amadeo Grazianni no longer works for Texgar.

9. In reality, however, the boss in the Casualwear Division is Jerry Saltzman.

10. Lenny Long's contemporary position in the factory is discussed in chapter 4.

11. Initially, in 1984, the organizing drive was only discussed and pursued in the fabric division (first two floors) of the factory. It wasn't until 1986, that the union sought to include in the union drive workers from the other divisions in the factory. The union drive is discussed in chapter 9.

12. Mr. Saltzman established Texgar in the early 1950s in the St. Louis Square area of Montreal. This geographical location has always been an immigrant enclave (see chapter 4 for details) in the city. Over the years many different ethnic groups have settled consecutively, and sometimes simultaneously, in this area. In the late 1960s, the Portuguese began to numerically occupy this area. And, Mr. Saltzman looked to this new settling immigrant group for labour power. As a result, Mr. Saltzman had a definite relationship with the community, and probably even a certain amount of respect and deference. Most important, perhaps,
is the fact that the community knew him as the owner of Texgar, perhaps the largest Quebec employer of Portuguese wage labour.

This isn't the case for Mr. Jerry Saltzman (Albert Saltzman's son). The former studied in New York for a while and it is only recently that he has been full-time at the factory. The same holds true for Lenny Long. Although the latter has had a long business (as well as personal) relationship with Albert Saltzman, it is only since the early 1980s that he has been in Texgar. As for Amadeo Grazianni, he had been at the factory only seven or eight years.

13. For example, in the last edition prior to the union certification vote in the factory, Albert Saltzman bought a full-length page advertisement (at a cost of only $250) in _A Voz de Portugal_ community newspaper describing the contributions he has made to the Portuguese standard of living. At another time during his assault on the union drive, he brought to the factory a French Canadian priest working in the Portuguese church and counselled him on the union drive and the union leaders. On subsequent Sundays, the priest denounced the union drive, the leaders of the union drive, and unions in general, during his sermons.

14. I had originally met Mathieu in 1984 when I worked at the factory the first time.

15. Some articles used in this thesis have been deliberately left out of the bibliographical section. These article have in their title the legal, recognizable name of the factory investigated and discussed in this thesis. Therefore, in order to carry through my promise of complete confidentiality to the owner (i.e. Albert Saltzman) of the factory, and more importantly to the workers in the factory, I have taken the liberty of excluding these articles from the bibliography.
CHAPTER THREE

THE CANADIAN GARMENT AND TEXTILE SECTOR

INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces the textile and garment sector. It is important to include such a chapter in this thesis since it will enable us to develop links throughout the study between the micro level of the workplace and industrial change taking place at the macro level of the industry. I will also discuss here the restructuring of this sector (in Quebec principally) and how it has affected the labour force in this industrial sector.

Our investigation shows that technological change, the resurgence and growth of homeworking, as well as the growth of contractors, are integral elements of a restructuring strategy to accumulate capital in a domestic market intermittently eroded by foreign imports. The effects of this restructuring strategy on the working class in this sector has been devastating: in both the textile (and now) the garment industry, thousands of jobs have been eliminated due to technological change. In the garment industry, the fragmentation of production has transferred some of the 'executable' shopfloor stages of production from the factory shopfloor to the home where thousands of women
work for wages below the minimum level and with no special social benefits. This restructuring has also initiated a dramatic drop in union membership and increased attacks on workers' gains in this industrial sector. Hence, another goal of this chapter is to discuss the effects of restructuring on workers' organizations in the Canadian garment and textile sector.

The inclusion in this thesis of a separate chapter on the textile and garment sector is relevant because it enables us to interpret the conflict within Texgar (the promises of and objections to unionization) in the context of restructuring. A discussion of the context is crucial since changes at the sectoral level impinge on the organization of work within a factory. This can set options (as well as limits) for workers struggling to organize. This thesis shows that the union drive within Texgar had to contend with the legal and illegal anti-union activities of the employer, the latter's personal attacks on some of the leaders of the union drive within the factory, and factors 'outside' the factory which allowed the employer strategic maneuverability against the threat of unionization and over which those workers directly involved in the union drive had no control. The 'outside' factors impinging on Texgar and the union drive are highlighted in our discussion of the contemporary organization of the textile and garment sector.
Finally, the issue of 'free trade' for the Canadian textile and garment sector is too important and pervasive to ignore. Thus, the last section of this chapter discusses the future of the textile and garment industries under free trade and forecasts some of the effects the trade deal will likely have on workers in this sector. [1]

The Organization of this Chapter

The first section of this chapter describes the contemporary structure of the Canadian garment and textile industries by focusing on ownership, the gender composition of the workforce, and the primary locations of this sector in Canada. The second concentrates on the specific structure of this sector in Quebec. The 'import problem' in the garment and textile industries in Canada is discussed in the third section. The fourth section discusses the restructuring of the textile and garment sector in Quebec. And the fifth and final section discusses 'Free Trade' in the Canadian garment and textile sector.

FEATURES OF THE CANADIAN TEXTILE AND GARMENT SECTOR

In this first section we highlight some of the changes in the structure of the Canadian garment and textile industries, the most evident of which is the increasing
foreign control of the textile and knitting industries. In contrast, foreign ownership in the garment industry has remained consistently insignificant.

The Canadian textile and garment sector was one of the few remaining sectors that was predominantly owned and controlled by domestic capital. In 1970, foreign capital owned only 13% of the establishments in the textile industry, 9% in knitting and just 3% in garments (Mahon, 1985:4). [2] More recent data, however, reveals a significant increase in foreign ownership. In textiles, the percentage of foreign ownership (based on the number of establishments) had reached 47.2% by 1975. But if calculations of ownership is also based on the distribution of workers across this sector, then foreign ownership of Canadian textiles climbs even higher to 49.8%. [3] Within the textile industry, foreign ownership is principally concentrated in the primary textile sub-sector where large foreign corporations claimed 63% of sales and 75% of profits in 1984. "The top four companies account for 65 per cent of production" (The Canadian Labour Congress [henceforth CLC], 1989:4).

In the knitting industry, foreign ownership has more than doubled in five years. In 1970, only 9% of this industry was in foreign hands. But by 1975 this percentage was up to 21.5% (Canadian Textile Journal, January 1984:45,
It is only in the garment industry that Canadian control has remained strong over the years [4]. The absence of foreign ownership in this industry is said to be due to the 'ease' with which one can set-up a workshop in this sector [5], and to the fragmented nature of the contemporary industry.

The Canadian textile and garment sector employed 178.3 thousand workers in 1987 - the highest employment total since 1981 - contributing 6.2% of the total manufacturing output in Canada (CLC, 1989:4). However, in the first quarter of 1988, the employment level in this sector had already dropped by over 5,000 workers to 173.9 thousands (Appendix C, Table I). This sector is also "the second largest industrial employers in Canada, employing 12 per cent of the manufacturing labour force; only the food and beverage industrial group employs slightly more" (Cohen, 1987:22-23). Furthermore, the textile and garment sector is the largest employer of women among the manufacturing industries (Gannage, 1986:79). The gender distribution between these two industries, however, is uneven. Eighty percent of the workforce in the garment sector are women, while women only comprise 40% of the total workforce in the textile industry. In real numbers these percentages are translated thus: of the 47,508 total workforce in the textile industry, women number 18,991. On the other hand,
75,997 of the 96,636 workers in the Canadian clothing industry were women workers in 1983 (Cohen, 1987:23, table 1).

Both the garment and the textile industries have employed immigrant labour since late in the last century; but ethnic (female) labour has always been more pervasive in the garment sector: today, immigrant women still make up as much as 75% of the total workforce in the Canadian garment industry (CLC, 1989:6). The ethnic proportion of the total labour force in the textile industry is less overwhelming primarily because companies in this sector tend to settle in medium and small size communities in rural Quebec where immigrants constitute a less significant proportion of the population (CLC, 1989:5; Mahon, 1985:55-56).

In 1987, a 'textile worker' earned 76.2% of the average wage in the manufacturing sector [7]. This is the lowest proportion ever - with the exception of the crisis year of 1982. [8] As low as this average wage is for a 'textile worker', those working in the garment industry earn significantly less. "The average weekly earnings [in the garment industry], as a percentage of those of all manufacturing, went down from 59 percent in 1981 to 56.1 percent in 1987 and 55 percent during the first quarter of 1988" (Appendix C, Table II). This appallingly low average
weekly income remains despite the fact that between 1981 and 1987 average hourly earnings rose 32% in textiles, 26% in clothing and 33% in the rest of the manufacturing sector (Textile and Clothing Board, 1989:18). These increases, however, were undermined by high inflation growth (Calvert, 1984:5, table 4).

THE TEXTILE AND GARMENT INDUSTRIES IN QUEBEC

This section describes briefly the central features of the garment and textile industries in Quebec. It is followed by a discussion of the 'import problem', and the restructuring changes in the garment and textile in this province.

The Canadian textile and garment sector is almost exclusively concentrated in Quebec and Ontario. According to the Textile and Clothing Board (1989:13), close to 90% of employment and 94% of new investments is located in these two provinces. The Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) (1989:6) adds that 88% (57% in Quebec and 31% in Ontario) of garment production also takes place in these two provinces [9]. Let us now take a closer look at each of these industries in Quebec.

The Textile Industry in Quebec

The large textile companies (over 100 workers) in
the province are predominantly located in rural communities outside Montreal. This is because textile production processes require large floor space to accommodate the means of labour on the shopfloor. In addition, land prices tend to be cheaper in rural Quebec and textile companies take advantage of this to settle there. At the same time, local municipal governments offer textile companies financial incentives and tax breaks to encourage them to set up their businesses in rural communities (Appendix C, Table III). Some writers also claim that this settlement pattern is further motivated by the textile companies’ desire to escape unionization attempts which are more common in large urban centres like Montreal. The argument here is that since textile companies usually absorb a large percentage of the available workforce in the rural towns where they settle, workers have no other employment alternatives and therefore become ‘dependent’ on the company for a wage. As a result of this ‘dependency’, they become passive and are thus thought to be less likely to engage in militant union organizing (Montreal Gazette, April 9, 1988:B4). But this is a conservative view since workers in one-industry towns across the country tend to be militant unionists (see Lucas, 1971; Abella, 1974; Clement, 1981).

Seventy percent of textile establishments in the Quebec [10] employ less than 50 workers; 49% (or 178
establishments) employ less than 20. Only three establishments in the industry employ over 1,000 workers, with another group of three employing between 500 and 1,000 workers. In 1980, there were six establishments employing between 500 and 1,000 workers in the industry. And in 1972, fifteen different firms employed 500-plus workers.

La repartition des établissements [Table D, Appendix I] confirme la dichotomie observée précédemment au niveau sectoriel. On trouve d'un cote un petit nombre de tres grands établissements (filature du coton, de la laine, fibres artificielles et synthétique, tapis et carperettes) et, de l'autre, un grande nombre de petits et moyens établissements spécialises dans les multiples produits et sous-produits du textile (Commission de la sante et de la securite du travail [henceforth CSST], 1987:41).

In employment terms, the four largest companies in the textile sector in the province employ 35% of the workers, and the top 10 companies employ almost half (50%) of the total labour force in textiles (Appendix C, Table IV).

The proportion of male workers in the textile industry increased between 1950 and 1965 when men constituted 70.6% of the labour force in this industry. However, this rate has declined progressivly since 1965 to 65.2% of the total labour force in the industry. The declining rate of men in the textile industry in Quebec has been most noticeable in the 'administrative' occupations in the industry (Commission de la sante et de la securite du travial [CSST], 1987:52). Women, on the other hand, represent 35 per cent of the total workforce in the textile
industry. And many have replaced men in performing the 
'administrative' functions in factories across the industry.

Le textile est, avec l'industrie du vêtement, le secteur 
manufacturier qui emploie traditionnellement la plus 
grande proportion de main-d'oeuvre feminine. Celle-ci 
compose l'essentiel de la main-d'oeuvre non specialisée 
des grandes entreprises de filature et tissage. En 
1980, les entreprises de filature et tissage du coton, 
de la laine et des fibres artificielles et synthétiques 
employaient 33% de la main-doeuvre feminine de 
l'industrie. La plus grande partie de les travailleuses 
(45%) etaient a l'emploi des industries textiles divers 

The largest companies in the textile sector are 
found in the spinning and cotton weaving sub-sector of the 
industry. The number of establishments in this sub-sector 
has remained stable since 1970. But this is the exception 
rather than the rule. The number of establishments in the 
wool-weaving sector has declined in a consistent manner even 
though this sector has maintained its contribution to the 
industry in terms of employment and value-added production. 
The cotton, wool and artificial fibers sectors combined 
represent the essential productive activity in the 
industry. They employed, in 1970, 64 per cent of the labour 
force and produced close to 60% of value added. 
Establishments in these three sectors (spinning cotton, 
wool-weaving, and artificial fibers) produce primary textile 
products requiring large production runs. Many other 
companies produce a diversity of products geared towards 
specialized markets.
Other sectors in the textile industry make rope, industrial felt, linen fabrics or produce dyeing, impression, embroidery, etc. The companies engaged in these production processes also produce for specialized market. "C'est ce qui explique que ces sous-secteurs soient de petite taille" (CSST, 1987:27).

Many of the small specialized establishments in the industry are subsidiaries of large parent companies since the latter tend to be well integrated with factories producing a range of goods from yarn to the final product. For example, the production processes in the subsidiaries of the three principal sectors in the textile industry (cotton, wool, and synthetic fibers) are determined by the needs of these three sectors.

En effet, les grandes entreprises textiles sont fortement integrees et controlent l'ensemble des operations allant des files jusqu'au produit fini. Presque toutes les entreprises de tissu de laine et de coton ont realise leur integration, depuis la fabrication des files jusqu'a la teinture et l'appret des tissu. Les principaux etablissements de files pour la vente appartiennent aux fabricants de tissu et leur production est destinee a d'autres sous-secteurs de l'industrie comme celui des tricots ou des tissus lourds (autres fins que l'habillement) (CSST, 1987:27-28).


In brief, we presented above an outline of the textile industry in Quebec. Our next task is to introduce (also in outline form) the garment industry in Quebec.
The Garment Industry in Quebec

More than half of all clothes made in Canada are produced in garment factories in Quebec (Globe and Mail, Feb. 24, 1990:B1). In Montreal, 35% of the city's manufacturing labour force is found in the garment industry. And, it is estimated that 1,400 garment firms exist in Quebec (Globe and Mail, Feb. 24, 1990:B1) employing 63,209 workers (Les Comites Paritaires et al., 1988:10, table 4) in 1985. Fifty-seven percent of the Canadian labour force in the garment industry was found in Quebec in 1985. However, between 1961 and 1975 Quebec's proportion of the total Canadian garment workforce was maintained at 65% (Les Comites Paritaires, et al. 1988:11).[11] Thus, in the ten-year period 1975-1985, Quebec's proportion of the total Canadian garment workforce dropped by 8 percentage points. Most garment factories are located in the north-central district of Montreal which has recently been dubbed the 'Cite de la mode' (Globe and Mail, Feb. 24, 1990:B1). In 1988, the total industry revenue in Quebec reached $3.8 billion.

Like the textile industry, establishments in the garment industry are spread throughout the province. But 71% of employers and 55% of the labour force in this industry are in Montreal (see table below).
Table 3 [12]
Nombre d'employeurs et de salaries par region
[garments only]
Novembre 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Nombre d'employeurs</th>
<th>Nombre d'employes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bas St. Laurent</td>
<td>6 (.4%)</td>
<td>250 (.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>31 (2%)</td>
<td>1272 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec Sud</td>
<td>61 (4%)</td>
<td>2414 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauricie-Bois-Francs</td>
<td>133 (9%)</td>
<td>3628 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estrie</td>
<td>35 (2%)</td>
<td>2293 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal-Centre</td>
<td>1029 (71%)</td>
<td>17361 (55%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laurentides</td>
<td>34 (2%)</td>
<td>1063 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montregie</td>
<td>72 (5%)</td>
<td>2293 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanaudiere</td>
<td>23 (2%)</td>
<td>660 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laval</td>
<td>29 (2%)</td>
<td>138 (.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outaouais</td>
<td>2 (.1%)</td>
<td>20 (.06%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1455 (99.5%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>31 402 (99%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 1985, about half (50.8%) of all garment factories in Quebec employed 19 or fewer workers. And, only 9.9 percent of garment firms in the province employed one hundred or more workers (Les Comites Paritaires, et al., 1988:16, table 6).[14] In the women's garment sector in Quebec, only 8.3% (or 75 factories) of 904 establishments employed fifty or more workers in 1987 (Les Comites Paritaires, et al., 1988:18, table 7).

The preceding section has described in broad terms the principal features of the textile and garment industries
in Quebec. There are both common and different factors between the two industries. One common factor is that both industries are characterized by a very small number of large establishments (over 1,000 workers) and a large number of very small factories (under 20 wage workers). There is a difference between the two industries in terms of the degree of foreign ownership: the textile industry is heavily foreign owned (49.8%), while only 4.4% (measured in sales) of the garment industry in Quebec is in the hands of foreign capital. Another is that most garment factories (71%) are located in Montreal and employ primarily women of ethnic origin. In contrast, the largest textile establishments are located in rural communities outside Montreal and employ primarily Quebecois (male) labour power. Let us not forget either that in the garment industry women comprise almost eighty percent of the workforce, and only about 35 percent in the textile industry.

Thus far the discussion of the Canadian garment and textile industries has been dry and static in presentation. This cannot be otherwise since quantitative data and information tables tend to have this effect. However, I do not wish to instill in the reader the idea that the garment and textile industries themselves are static and permanently fixed in structure. On the contrary, over the last few years these two industries have undertaken a restructuring
strategy to enable them to survive in an increasingly competitive domestic marketplace. The purpose of this strategy is to combat the threat of imports which undermine the profit levels of the local industries. At one level, domestic capital has pressured the state for relief measures against foreign imports; and for the most part it has been successful in receiving state assistance both in the form of protectionist measures against imports, and financial assistance for modernization and replacement of instruments of labour. At another level, the textile and garment sector has introduced its own sectoral strategies to continue the accumulation process, even in times when tariff barriers against imports are in place.

The next section begins with a discussion of the 'import problem' and some of the federal government's restructuring strategy for the textile and garment industries. This is then followed by a discussion of the restructuring process at the sectoral level engaged in by the textile and garment sector.

THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE GARMENT AND TEXTILE SECTOR

For the last forty years or so, Canadian garment and textile manufacturers have had to compete with foreign imports from the 'Third World' and selected industrialized countries for a share of the domestic market. In some
years, however, the level of foreign imports in the domestic market is so high that a crisis situation develops as foreign manufactures claim larger and larger shares of the market away from Canadian textile and garment manufacturers. When this occurs, these two Canadian industries engage in a strategy to reclaim (and even increase) their share of the Canadian market, and in the process temporarily stop foreign manufacturers from increasing their share of the Canadian market. In the late 1960s, one such occasion of foreign import expansion and domestic garment and textile retreat in the Canadian market, occurred [15].

Since the late 1950s, Canadian garment and textile manufacturers have been plagued by the threat of domestic market erosion from foreign imports [16]. This threat became a reality first in 1957 when Japan suddenly captured 25% of all clothing imports, rising to 44% two years later (Textile and Clothing Board, 1977:V2). Only a series of agreements on voluntary bilateral restrictions of imports (especially cotton and man[woman]-made fibers) between Canada and Japan temporarily stopped the further erosion of the Canadian market from the Japanese source. But while restrictions on Japanese imports were introduced, the domestic market was not protected from imports originating from other Asian countries such as Hong Kong [17]. As a result, by 1966 Japan had given way to other Asian countries
whose exports to the Canadian textile market had gained a 40 per cent share of the domestic market (Mahon, 1984:46). [18] Two years later, the share of the domestic market by foreign imports was even higher - 42.3 per cent (Dinel, 1976:145).

I point out this particular instance of foreign market erosion because it seems that the Canadian government took a decidedly different, more engaging course of action in the development of the Canadian garment and textile sector at this time [19]. Until the late 1960s, the government seemed content with continuing a policy of voluntary bilateral agreements between exporting and importing countries. In 1971, the Canadian government, through the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Commerce, created a new Textile Policy with the explicit goal of creating conditions necessary for the accumulation of capital for domestic textile and garment capital. In the words of Rianne Mahon (1985:14-15), this policy was

a comprehensive and forward-looking policy, dealing not only with protection against disruptive competition, but just as importantly, for restructuring and for the optimum use of new technology, creative research and design.

The basis of this policy was the recognition that the Canadian textile and garment sector could not (ever) compete with the wage rates being offered to labour in the 'Third World'. And only a new policy direction with a commitment to creative research and design, and investment in new
technologies, could enable the Canadian establishments in this sector to remain competitive with imports [20]. Both the Quebec government and the federal government would financially support the restructuring strategy for this industrial sector.

In spite of the 1971 textile policy and a new direction for the textile and garment market, it didn't take long for the garment and textile market to come once again under attack from imports [21]. "From 1971 to 1976 domestic clothing producers' share of the Canadian market dropped from 73 per cent to 55 per cent. During the same period employment in clothing dropped by 20,000 jobs and in textiles by 12,000 jobs" (Cohen, 1987:25). At this point, the Federal Government imposed article 19 of GATT which allowed it to impose a global quota on textile and garment imports from sources flooding the domestic market (Textile and Clothing Board, 1984:44). However, a textile committee complained that the government moves too slow in dealing with low-wage imports, and when it does, it only negotiates restraints with the offending countries rather than slapping them with an embargo or surtax (Globe and Mail, November 21, 1975:B4). In trying to remedy the crisis of accumulation for textile and garment capital, the government established in 1977 a special emergency fund to provide the textile industry with $15 million assistance commitment and another
$2 million for technical assistance. In addition, the Federal Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, through its General Adjustment Assistance Program, provided almost $25 million in loan guarantees to the textile industry between 1968 and 1977; 60% of this total has gone to the textile industry in Quebec as a way of securing investment funds. The Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE), since its creation in 1968 to the end of 1976, had provided the textile industry with more than $52 million investment in incentive grants; more than 61% or $32 million of this total went to textile firms in Quebec (Government of Canada, 1979:34). The Quebec textile industry has also received funds from the provincial government through the following programmes: La Societe pour le developpement de l'entreprise du Quebec (SODEQ), La societe de fonds industriel, and La societe generale de financement.

In addition to the federal government's initiative towards the Canadian textile and garment industries in the early 1970s, textile and garment capital in Quebec also made many other claims on both the provincial and federal governments. For instance, textile capital, through the Canadian Textile Institute, complained to the federal government about 'direct taxation' and argued that the level of personal taxation should be made comparable to that of neighboring jurisdictions. It also complained about
deductions for the Quebec Pension Plan, the Quebec Health Insurance Plan, and the Workmen's Compensation Commission. It was successful in convincing the Quebec government to eliminate a tax on the sales of children's clothing in the province. These complaints [22] were meant to show that financial contributions to different organizations hampered the competitive position of Quebec's garment and textile sector against that of Ontario (where taxes are lower), and foreign manufacturers, since it impeded manufacturers in this sector from investing in new technologies (Aguiar, 1988:19).

In June 1981, the federal government announced a new national policy for the Canadian textile and garment sector. The most important component of this policy was the establishment of a new government agency, The Canadian Industrial Renewal Board (CIRB). The purpose of this agency was to allocate financial assistance to this industrial sector from a budget of at least $250 million.

The Canadian Industrial Renewal Board (CIRB), could be interpreted as an attempt to rectify some of the weaknesses of the 1971 policy. The new board, with a budget of at least $250 million to spend over five years, is able to provide fairly generous assistance to the smaller textile and clothing capitals previously unable to develop or to finance restructuring plans. In addition, the CIRB can offer enriched incentives to attract new industries to textile-dependent towns and a variety of direct labour adjustment measures (Mahon, 1984:129).

Although the CIRB has enabled textile and garment
manufacturers to restructure their factories (as the following section will show), the new textile and garment policy has been unable to prevent the increasing flow of imports into the domestic market. Today, the threat of domestic market erosion remains: Canadian garment manufacturers control only 60% of the domestic garment market (Gannage, 1988:395), and 60% of the domestic textile market is controlled by foreign manufacturers (Cohen, 1987:24). According to the Textile and Clothing Board (1989:24), 'low-cost' countries hold 80 percent of the garment market share which is in foreign hands; the remaining 20 percent is shared between six industrialized countries including, of course, the United States. In contrast, the threat of foreign textile imports invading the Canadian market comes from industrialized countries. The Textile and Clothing Board (1989:24) remarks that 76% of the total imports in 1982, originated in six industrialized countries. By 1987, the share of the Canadian textile market by these six countries had dropped to 62 percent. The import problem takes on greater significance when one realizes that this Canadian industrial sector produces primarily for the home market; they are not major exporters. In fact, the trade deficit in textiles and clothing is large and is growing year by year. In 1979 it was $1.8 billion—by 1987 it had grown to a record $3.9 billion (Textile and

RESTRUCTURING INITIATIVES AT THE SECTORAL LEVEL

Canadian garment and textile capital has sought to combat foreign imports on several levels. We described above some of the Canadian government's measures against imports and its commitment to assist financially the textile and garment industries' rationalization, modernization and diversification of its production processes. What was ignored was the restructuring process initiated by these industries at the sectoral level. The following section discusses the restructuring process at the sectoral level, focusing on the introduction of technology to both the textile and garment industries. We also discuss the resurgence of 'homeworking' and the growth of 'contracting' in the garment industry in Quebec [23].

Restructuring the Textile Industry

The introduction of new technologies in the textile industry has long preceded its contemporary introduction in the garment industry. As a result, the textile industry is often described as a capital intensive sector and the garment sector as a labour intensive industry. Within textiles, technology has made its most significant impact through computer utilization in production. "In textile
production, computers are used for producing designs and coupling them to looms or knitting machines" (Harding and Slater, 1986:16). Some writers argue that the implementation of new technologies on the shopfloor has created a need to reskill the labour force in the industry [24]. Others claim that the pressing problem for textile firms is now "what to do with the worker whose capacity for re-training is low, and the question of how to effectively and efficiently re-train workers who are capable of assuming the more complex tasks" (Etcovitch, 1987:27). According to Barbara Etcovitch (1987:30), new technologies and the need to 'reskill' the workforce is not resulting in a loss of jobs:

Although a higher level of education is definitely required of workers, the demand for a better level of skills is not causing the loss of jobs, for workers who are less capable of being educated for more complex tasks can be streamed into other positions at the [Consoltex] mills.

In support of her argument, Etcovitch quotes the vice-president and executive assistant of the outerwear division at Consoltex, Aime Robinson, when he says that '[(t)here will always be places for inspectors, packers, and persons who oil the machinery' (1987:30).

Other studies on the effect of technological change in the textile industry have produced very different results. Ginette Chalifoux (1985:37) argues that two factors have played a crucial role in the 'development' of
the textile industry in Quebec - competition from imports and the effects of technological change. These have led to fewer and fewer textile jobs in the province: in 1973 the total number employed in textiles in Quebec was 39,000, but by 1984 this had dropped to 30,000; a drop of 23.1 percent (Chalifoux, 1985:37). [25] "Entre 1965 et 1980, la baisse du nombre d'établissements est très nette [baisse de 438 à 360] et s'accompagne d'une baisse importante de l'emploi [de 45,700 à 32,920]. Depuis 1980, le nombre d'établissements semble s'être stabilisé alors que la diminution de l'emploi se poursuit à un rythme accéléré" (CSST, 1987:15).

Yvon Jacques' [26] study of technological change in the textile industry also revealed the negative effect of technology on employment. Jacques says, "l'arrivée d'une technologie nouvelle dans une entreprise entraîne un risque important de mise à pied. Un(e) travailleur(euse) sur cinq (5) touche(e) directement par un changement l'est par le biais du chômage: il perd son emploi" (1984:40). [27] Finally, we take the case of Dominion Textile (DomTex) as an illustration of the consequences of technological change for the workforce in the industry. In 1980, Dominion Textile employed over 10,000 workers and invested $23 million in its plants in Quebec. By 1989, the company's investment plan totaled $63 million, but its workforce had been dramatically reduced to under 4,000 workers [28].
Restructuring in the Garment Industry

In the garment industry, the problem of imports and increased competition in the Canadian market has consistently threatened the process of capital accumulation. To combat this threat, and to improve its competitive position in the domestic market, garment capital has had to restructure its industry. The restructuring process includes the resurgence of 'homeworking', the growth of 'contracting' and a significant shift in capital investment in new technological innovations created specifically for the industry [29]. For garment manufacturers, 'homeworking' and 'contracting' is a means of defraying production costs and investment risk. Instead of purchasing labour power and/or technology to perform certain production functions in the factory, manufacturers use contractors and (less commonly) homeworkers [30] to perform certain production functions at the latter's financial cost. This restructuring process in the garment industry is described below.

'Homeworking'

'Homeworking' in the garment industry in Quebec [31] reemerged in 1974 "en partie par la concurrence des pays importateurs a bas salaire et par l'absence du developpements technologiques qui favoriseraient le travail
en atelier" (Grant and Rose, 1985:475). In Quebec, it is most common in the women's and children's clothing sectors, and rare in the men's clothing sector since the latter sector possesses a more standardized production technology due to greater capital investment (Grant and Rose, 1985:475). There are approximately 30,000 homeworkers in the garment industry in Quebec (32) (Grant and Rose, 1985:475). The overwhelming majority of homeworkers are married immigrant women with children (Jean, 1982). Their average age is 40, and 65% of those interviewed in the Montreal area have less than a grade eight education. According to the homeworkers themselves, this occupation allows them to combine family responsibilities with earning an income. It also allows them to remain at home, work under a slower pace (than in factories) and free from the abuses of supervisors (Jean, 1982:57-58). But they also confess that homeworking is low paying and with little or no social benefits (Jean, 1982:59-60). Officially, homeworkers in the garment industry fall under the jurisdiction of the garment industry-wide labour decree [33] supervised by the Parity Commission. However, over 90% of homeworking in the province is done without the knowledge of the Parity Commission (Rose and Grant, 1985:482). And according to Paul Boivin, Head of Inspectors at the Women's Joint Commission Bureau in Montreal, Joint Commission Inspectors
are particularly concerned with the wave of 'Chinese' immigrants increasingly engaging in homeworking clandestinely.

'Contracting'

Some garment manufacturers employ their own 'homeworkers'; but in Quebec, it is mostly contractors [34] that employ them. 'Contracting' takes many forms [35]; and in Quebec their number has also increased significantly between 1975-1985. At the same time, the number of garment manufacturers has declined significantly (see table 2).

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Manufacturiers</th>
<th>Contracteurs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>38.7%</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Les Comites Paritaires et al., 1988:18, table 8.

According to one source, a principal characteristic of the reorganization of the women's garment industry in Quebec has been the growth of contractors. The following passage explains the growth of contractors and their intermediary role in the garment industry.

La principale caracteristique dans ces changements qui ont marque l'organisation de l'industrie et de la production des vetements concerne l'augmentation du
nombre de sous-traitants dans des petits ateliers. Tres souvent le sous-contracteur travaille pour un seul manufacturier et effectue une production homogene et specialisee. Le recours aux sous-traitants s'integre d'ailleurs dans une strategie plus globale axee sur la recherche de souplesse. Les sous-contractants sont aussi les premiers a ressentir les contrecoups d'un ralentissement d'activite. A leur tour, ils recherchent la flexibilite dans l'organisation des reponses aux commandes de production qu'ils recoivent. C'est pourquoi nous voyons les sous-traitants dans le secteur du vetement pour dames confier la couture a des femmes qui travaillent a domicile; la technologie requise se reduit a la possession d'une machine a coudre. La sous-traitance constitue donc la principale filiere par laquelle le travail parvient au domicile (Les Comites Paritaires, 1988:29).

The workforce in contracting firms is particularly vulnerable to high levels of exploitation due to the poor working conditions [36]. One of the reasons for this is that the increase in the number of contractors has created fierce competition between contractors for contracts from garment manufacturers. Thus, in order for a contractor to win a contract from a manufacturer, he/she must offer better business conditions (while promising high quality of product) to that manufacturer than competing contractors. The bargaining process that usually ensues is at the cost of wages for those workers in the contracting workshops or working at home for the contractor. Because they are without unions and have very little protection, workers in contracting firms or at home suffer the abuses of their employer in order to retain their jobs. This is particularly so in times of economic slump in the garment
industry. Since contractors are producing to the "peak demand of the manufacturers, [and] not the normal demand" (Textile and Clothing Board, Vol.1, 1985:61), they feel the greater effects of the downturn in economic activity, and must be sufficiently flexible in order to survive. This flexibility is usually done at the cost of the workforce he/she employs.

The increasing competition for a market share in the Canadian garment market has forced the Canadian garment sector to restructure itself in order to survive. Homeworking and contracting-out have been integral strategies of this restructuring process.

Les conditions de concurrence tres vive incitent donc les entreprises a recourir a des strategies de gestion qui vont leur permettre d'obtenir la plus grande flexibilite possible. Il n'est donc pas surprenant que face a la pression enorme des importations des pays a bas salaire, le nombre d'etablissements de petite taille connaissent un essor significatif (Les Comites Paritaires, et al., 1988:14).

As a result, the contemporary structure of the garment industry in Quebec is largely dominated by an increasing number of small factories (19 workers or less), and a decreasing number of large factories (100 workers or more).
Table 5

Repartition du nombre d'établissements selon la taille de l'entreprise en chiffres absolus et en pourcentage
Quebec

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0-19 Salaries</th>
<th>20-49 Salaries</th>
<th>50-99 Salaries</th>
<th>100 et plus Total Salaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>672 (45.7%)</td>
<td>412 (28%)</td>
<td>210 (14.3%)</td>
<td>178 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>828 (50.8%)</td>
<td>423 (26%)</td>
<td>216 (13.2%)</td>
<td>161 (9.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Les Comites Paritaires et al., 1988:16, table 6.

Table three shows that the absolute number of garment firms in Quebec has increased by 156 and that this increase is distributed amongst those areas of the industry that possess the least number of workers (19 and less workers) [37].

Technology in the Garment Industry

Technology is also playing a central role in the organization of the contemporary garment industry in Quebec. Many writers have complained about the lack of technological sophistication in this industry. However, as the following discussion shows, the image of the garment industry as largely labour intensive may quickly fade.

The injection of money into new technologies for shopfloors across the garment industry has been the most significant development in the industry over the last ten years. And contrary to past practice, the largest
proportions of this investment are being injected into new machinery and equipment instead of improvements to or expansions of existing buildings. Consider the shift (measured in terms of dollars granted) to technological priority evident in the following table:
Table 7

Composition of New Investments in the Textile Industries
And in all Manufacturing, 1981-1988
Per Cent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Textile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>86.9</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>85.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>86.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knitting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>77.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Textiles</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>85.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Manuf. Industries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>83.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table four shows that with the exception of 1987, slightly over 80% of new investments in the clothing industry have been directed towards machinery and equipment [38]. This tremendous shift in investment priority is being increasingly directed to computer technology:
Les progres technologiques dans le methodes de production du vetement sont substantiels. Le tracage, la gradation et la reproduction peuvent etre entierement automatises tout en assurant l'utilisation optimum des tissus. Des tables a succion d'air permettent de superposer parfaitement des tissus en un grand nombre de couches. La coupe peut se realiser par ordinateur et des machines automatisées confectionnent des bontonnieres et apposent des poches exterieures (Les Comites Paritaires, 1988:27-28).

There are apparently 350 systems of grading and marking in the clothing industry worldwide, with 80 in the United States, 53 in Canada and 26 in Quebec. There are also six computer cutting apparatuses in use in Canada, three of which are in use in the garment industry (Poirier, 1985:56).

It is still common today to remark that the garment industry lacks technological sophistication in production because the nature of the fabric requires 'dexterity' in its manipulation. This fact, it is argued, does not lend itself easily to the development of a technology capable of handling and manipulating the fabric. This is, however, an outdated view which can no longer be used as an explanation for the lack of technological development in the Canadian garment industry. Instead, I would suggest that Canadian garment manufacturers have been reluctant in the past to invest in the development of technology because they relied on the continuous availability of immigrant labour coming into the country. Today, restrictions on immigration have been imposed primarily because of the stagnant development of the Canadian economy and the high unemployment rate in
the country [39]. In addition, second-generation immigrant children refuse to work in 'sweatshops'. Consider the dilemma of an assistant-director of a garment factory in Montreal:

'Il nous a fallu 6 mois pour recruter un operateur', confie un assistant-directeur. 'Autrefois les immigrants-es se bousculaient pour travailler. Maintenant, leurs enfants refusent ce genre d'emplois. Comme l'immigration a ete freinee depuis trois ans, la nouvelle main-d'oeuvre, qui vient de Turquie et du Moyen-Orient est insuffisant' (Quoted in Liaison St-Louis, 17 aout 1988:1).

The shift in technological priority in the garment industry has been due to the consistent competition from 'cheap labour' imports and Canadian manufacturers' goal of reducing production costs [40]. In their strategy to compete with foreign imports, garment capital has invested in many of the production functions considered to be too complex for technology. One of these functions was material handling. This is no longer so.

Draper Laboratories in the United States has been at the forefront of research into material handling technology for use in the garment industry. The goal of this research is to develop automation technology to make the American apparel industry more productive and competitive against Asian countries with cheap labour' (Toronto Star, July 18, 1989:C7). Witness the efficiency of the 'Draper Knitwear Machine':

For sweat pants, Draper developed pincers, which
'pinch' the cloth and lift it from a bin onto a table where the cut material is separated, folded and manipulated. Two high-speed sewing machines simultaneously sew the crotch seam. The cloth is then opened and moved down to a device that jumps up from below and folds the fabric several times so both inseams can be automatically sewn. Total lapsed time: 17 seconds without any human intervention.

[And], when the robotic system is chugging at full speed, as many as nine pairs of pants move through the system's six substations, reeling off a conveyor belt at three pair per minute. With most of the assembly and sewing done, only the pants cuffs, pockets, a waist string and insignia are left to be sewn on human-operated sewing machines (Toronto Star, July 18, 1989:C7).

This system is not yet available in the market, but Draper officials say that this machine will eventually "assemble and stitch a pair of sweat pants in 10 to 15 seconds." By comparison, in the United States today, it takes three workers over one minute to make a pair of sweat pants (Toronto Star, July 18, 1989:C7).

What has been available in the Canadian market since the late 1970s is an earlier material handling technology (made in Sweden) and known as the E-Ton 2000, and the more sophisticated E-Ton 2001. Both of these systems have replaced (where this technology is in place) the traditional 'bundle system' of distributing component parts of clothing to shopfloor women sewing machine operators [41]. For management, this technology makes two important contributions: one, it increases significantly the time sewing operators actually spend sewing (Gannage, 1987), and
two, it introduces onto the shopfloor the system of labour control known as 'technical control'. (The system E-Ton 2001, as operating in Texgar, and the concept of 'technical control' as also evident in Texgar, are discussed in chapter seven of this thesis).

The restructuring process in the textile and garment industries shows the changes that this industrial sector has undergone in order to remain competitive. It shows principally that textile and garment capital has not remained stagnant against the increased threat to their hold in the domestic market. On the contrary, since the early 1970s, they have been engaged in an ambitious restructuring process and includes today the introduction of new technologies.

This restructuring, however, has proceeded at tremendous costs to the labour force. Many have lost their jobs, while others work at home as homeworkers or in contract shops for low wages and with minimal legislative protection. Women, as the large majority of workers in 'homeworking' and 'contracting-out' (as well as in the garment industry as a whole), have suffered particularly under this restructuring process. And the future for women workers in the garment industry is likely to be a lot of the same experience.

In addition to the consequences of the restructuring
process for workers described above, there has also been a dramatic decline in membership in the International Ladies Garment Workers Union [ILGWU] in Quebec. According to Carla Lipsig-Mumme (1987:46), membership dropped from 17,500 members in 1976, to 13,000 in 1981, to 10,000 in 1983 and 7,500 in 1985. This rapid drop in union membership is due to the restructuring strategy of the industry described above. But Rianne Mahon (1983:157) also argues that this decline, and other problems that workers face in this sector, are due to a lack of workers' alternative in the restructuring of textile and clothing industries. This is because, she points out, organized labour is represented by six different unions each with its own political tradition and agenda for change [42]. The fragmentation of organized labour in this sector has permitted textile capital to take the leading role in defining the issues and developing the strategies to resolve them. As a result, workers' agenda for the industry has not been prioritized.

Rather, continental rationalisation, which pits organised Canadian workers against unorganised workers in the American South, and technological change, which already has produced changes in work organisation, job content and the number of jobs, have become the major issues... The unions seem to have responded to the crisis by modifying their political support in exchange for concessions in collective agreements in the form of 'technological change' clauses as well as the maintenance of historic wage patterns (Mahon, 1983:157).

As part of its restructuring strategy to accumulate
capital in a market increasingly threatened with erosion from foreign imports, garment capital has supported the 'deregulation' of the 'regime des decrets de convention collective' proposed by a study done by Reed Scowen and associates (Les Comites Paritaires, et al., 1988:1). This 'regime' is peculiar to labour relations in Quebec, and it refers to the creation of an industry-wide collective agreement to cover workers in workplaces not represented by a union. The purpose of such a 'regime' is to create a more or less 'level playing field' between capitalists in the same industry. After three years of deliberation on the future of the 'regime des decrets de convention collective', the Quebec Minister of Labour, Yves Seguin, announced that the decree will not be eliminated but warned that it will undergo close examination in order to "corriger les lacunes de plus an plus nombreuses causees par l'evolution de l'economie et du marche du travail" (La Presse, 6 mai 1989:A25). No one really knows what will happen to the 'regime' system in Quebec, except that changes will be introduced.

One thing that everyone involved in the study of Canadian political economy is certain about is the further loss of employment in the garment and textile industries in Quebec under the 'Free Trade' Agreement between Canada and the United States. The next (and last) section of this
chapter discusses the effect that the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States is likely to have on workers in this industrial sector.

FREE TRADE AND THE GARMENT AND TEXTILE SECTOR

Long before the Free Trade Agreement was signed, experts were already predicting the demise of the Canadian garment and textile sector. The Royal Commission Inquiry into the future of Canadian economic development (Macdonald, 1985, Vol.1, p.345), identified the textile and garment industries among the group of 'loser' industries under a potential free trade agreement between Canada and the United States (Drache and Cameron, 1985:18). This prognostication was supported by independent studies on the subject. David Dodge, a senior economist for the Canadian government, appearing before Canadian Senate hearing on free trade, also identified the textile and garment sector as losers under a free trade agreement. Marjorie Cohen (1987) argued that women of ethnic origin would be particularly hard hit by free trade since they make up a significant percentage of the labour force in the industries considered to encounter difficulties under a free trade agreement.

This grim view of the future of the textile and garment sector is shared by the parties directly involved in this industrial sector. The anti-free coalition in Quebec-
the CEQ, CSN, FTQ, and UPA (1988) - predicts that free trade will eliminate 76,000 jobs over the next ten years; 40,000 of these jobs will be eliminated in the textile and garment industries in Quebec alone (Le Devoir, 8 de novembre 1988) [43]. The Canadian Apparel Manufacturers' Institute, which groups the bourgeoisie in the garment and textile sector, believes that between 35,000 and 50,000 jobs will disappear with the free trade agreement (Montreal Daily News, 29 July 1988).

After a year and one-half into the free trade agreement, we could already see the effects of the trade deal on workers in the Canadian textile and garment industries. According to an inquiry by the Canadian Labour Congress (1990:24), 72,000 jobs have been eliminated already since the ratification of Free Trade Agreement on January 1, 1989. Included in this total are 3,874 jobs lost in the textile and garment sector (Canadian Labour Congress, 1988: calculated from data on pages 26-51).

Jobs in the Quebec textile industry will be fewer and fewer in the future. Ginette Chalifoux (1985:42) cites three models used to project employment levels in the textile industry between 1984 and 1992. All three models predict a decline in the number of jobs in the industry; and one of the models predicts a 33% drop in employment in the industry by 1992. This decline will be due to the
modernization of Quebec firms and the consequent increase in productivity. Chalifoux concludes her discussion of employment projection for the textile industry by saying:

As textile manufacturers pursue their efforts to increase productivity through a gradual modernization and rationalization of their operation, the textile industry as a whole will be offering fewer and fewer employment possibilities. We believe that by 1992 the number of jobs in the industry will have dropped to the 23,000 level (1985:44).

It is clear from the different sources quoted above that employment in the textile and garment industries will decline at a steady pace. And free trade will accelerate the restructuring process necessary in this sector to survive against American textile and garment competition.

To assist the Canadian garment industry compete with American manufacturers under free trade, the federal government promised initially a programme of tariff relief and duty remission of about $200 million (Toronto Star, March 24, 1988:C1). But this figure was subsequently scaled down to a promise of $63 million. It seems that this scaling down in financial assistance to Canadian garment manufacturers was due to American pressure on the Canadian Finance Minister, Michael Wilson [44].

Canadian textile manufacturers, on the other hand, are not at all happy with this duty remission programme. They argue that a reduction of protective tariff on cloth, yarn, fibres and other imported textiles, will make imports
even less expensive and increase the likelihood of Canadian garment manufacturers buying foreign instead of domestic fabrics (Montreal Gazette, February 25, 1989:G1; Hamilton Spectator, February 6, 1988:C7). The implementation of such a programme has prompted one textile manufacturer to ask, 'Are we having a free-trade agreement with the U.S. or with the whole world?' (Hamilton Spectator, February 6, 1988:C7). At this time, the Canadian Tribunal on Exterior Commerce is studying the feasibility of eliminating tariffs on imported textiles. Representatives of the textile industry have presented briefs to this Tribunal arguing, among other things, that the duty-remission programme will result in massive job loses for workers in the textile industry (Le Devoir, 14 juin 1989:13). [45]

The Federal Government has also set up an Advisory Council charged with studying the adjustments that Canadian industries will have to undergo in order to compete under free trade, and with the impact of these adjustments for the Canadian labour force [46]. After postponing the release of the final report (Globe and Mail, December 16, 1988:A5), the Advisory Council on Adjustment finally published its results. With regard to labour adjustment, the reports says that "Recommendations regarding labour adjustment are intended to apply equally and universally to all Canadian workers, regardless of age or sex, enabling everyone to
participate fully and fairly in the growth of Canada's economy" (Report of the Advisory Council on Adjustment, 1989:xix). It is obvious that this report does not take gender and ethnicity into consideration. By ignoring these two fundamental elements in the labour processes of an industrial sector like textiles and garments, the Advisory Council cannot recognize the different problems that women (and immigrant women specifically) and (immigrant) men face in the restructuring of this sector of the Canadian economy.

I also believe that under a free trade environment, those workers who will retain their jobs in the garment and textile sector will also experience great pressures to 'cooperate' in the restructuring of the sector. A number of things may happen: they (workers) may encounter pressures from their employers to decertify unions; those workers without union representation may face great difficulties in organizing to form a union; and they may be subject to increasing innovative forms of labour control, such as 'technical control' on the shopfloor. When we discuss the union drive in Texgar (chapter eight), we will describe how Albert Saltzman used the potential free trade agreement between Canada and the United States to intimidate and discourage workers from supporting the union drive in the factory.
CONCLUSION

The inclusion of this chapter in the thesis is necessary since it allows us to understand Texgar in the context of the structure of the textile and garment sector in Quebec. I believe that an accurate understanding of the facts and development within Texgar cannot be grasped without an explanation of the larger perspective of the structure of the garment and textile industrial sector. Outlining this industrial sector and the changes it is undergoing has been the goal of this chapter.

This chapter showed that the textile and garment industries have undertaken a restructuring process long before the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States was ratified. In the textile industry, this restructuring process has been geared primarily towards increasing capital investment in technological change. This has transformed the industry from a labour intensive one to a highly capital intensive one. In the garment industry, the restructuring process is a combination of strategies. There is a resurgence in 'homeworking', and the remarkable increase in the number of 'contractors' in the industry. But the most significant strategy, I would say, has been a noticeable increase in the introduction of technology on the shopfloor. The result is that the garment industry may soon no longer be identified as a labour intensive industry,
but rather a capital intensive one.

This chapter has also discussed some of the consequences of this industrial restructuring strategy for the workers labouring in both the textile and garment industries. Some of these consequences include a significant drop in employment in both industries, and renewed attacks on workers within this sector. We added, in our discussion of the Free Trade Agreement, that in the future workers within this industrial sector are likely to suffer even more economic hardships and that they may not be able to turn to unions for protection and organization since they (unions) may too suffer increasing attacks from capital and the state.
NOTES

1. Originally, a separate chapter on the global structure of the garment and textile industries was also considered for inclusion in this thesis. However, due to time and space constraints, the writing of this chapter was not pursued. Readers interested in the changing global structure of the garment and textile industries should consult Froebel, et al. (1979), and Clairmonte and Cavanagh (1981). Swasti Mitter (1983), Wendy Chapkis and Cynthia Enloe (1983), The North-South Institute (1985) and June Nash and Maria Patricia Fernandez-Kelly (1983) are also useful sources on the 'Third World' garment and textile industries and women workers' role in it.

2. Within the textile industry foreign capital was concentrated in the man(woman)-made fibre sector; and Dupont and Celanese/Chemcell dominated it (Mahon, 1984:167, footnote 4). Both of these companies are American owned and at one point ranked second and third in employment figures in the Canadian textile industry.

3. In 1981, American capital controlled 54.2% of textile sales in Ontario (La coalition quebecoise d'opposition au libre-echange, CEQ, CSN, FTQ, UPA, 1988:10, table 5).

4. In 1981, only 4.4% of total garment sales in Quebec were under the control of American capitalists (CEQ, CSN, FTQ, UPA, 1988:10, table 5).

But in the Canadian clothing industry there are some large firms controlling both the production activity and the labour force in the sector. For example, in the clothing industry in Manitoba, 50 percent of the total factory shipments were attributed to 10 companies, the largest of which include Tan Jay, Wescott Fashions, Silpit Industries and the Sterling Stall Group (Ghorayshi, 1990:277). And according to Peter Nygard (Tan Jay), 75 percent of garment workers are employed by eight firms (Ghorayshi, 1990:291, footnote 33). Some of these clothing firms are amongst the largest business operations in Manitoba:

In 1986, Nygard International, Wescott Fashions, and Freed and Freed of Canada were listed among the top one hundred Manitoba businesses, with annual sales of $200, $44 and $25 million respectively (Ghorayshi, 1990:277).
5. The garment sector has been a favoured sector for those immigrants with petty-bourgeois business aspirations:

Immigrants tend to open businesses in those economic sectors where barriers of entry are very low. This has always been the case with the garment industry (Morokvasic, 1988:84).

6. As in Quebec and Ontario, it is primarily immigrant women that labour in garment factories across Manitoba. Mochoruk and Webber (1987) discuss the working conditions of immigrant women in the Manitoban garment industry in the first half of the twentieth century; Lepp, Millar and Roberts (1987) discuss working conditions for immigrant women in this same sector from the 1940s onward.

7. Because this figure is gender blind, one cannot say whether or not men and women earn the same average wage level within the textile industry.

8. According to the Canadian Labour Congress (1989:4), in 1988 the average wage of a textile worker "dropped from 78 per cent to 75 per cent of the average manufacturing wage. (It is currently [1989] $9.63 per hour)."

The average wage for a 'textile worker' seems to be rising slightly. For the first quarter of 1988, it had reached 76.8% of the average wage in the manufacturing sector (Textile and Clothing Board, 1989:18, table 16).

9. Manitoba is the only other province where there is also a significant level of garment activity. In Winnipeg, the garment industry employs about 8,000 workers (Toronto Star, March 29, 1988, p. A13) producing 6% of the total garment activity in Canada (CLC, 1989:6). There are more than 3,600 people employed "in the textile industry in British Columbia and the Atlantic Region also has a small textile industry" (The Government of Canada, 1979:56).

10. Unless otherwise indicated, the data on the textile industry contained in this section is taken from La comission de la sante et la securite du travail (CSST), Textiles au Quebec: Monographie sectorielle. Montreal: CSST, 1987.

11. "Employment in women's clothing has been declining in Quebec and increasing in Ontario. One major reason for this disparity is that the Ontario women's
clothing industry employs skilled operators who make the whole garment. In Quebec, changes in work organization, technology, and an increase in 'contracting-out' work to homeworkers, caused a decline in employment. The Ontario industry has claimed a shortage of skilled workers compared with Quebec. Employment has been declining in men's clothing in both Ontario and Quebec" (Gannage, 1986:79-80).

A further reason for the decline in the labour force in the garment industry in Quebec and the increase in this same industry in Ontario, is the presence of an industry-wide 'labour decree' in Quebec. According to this decree, union wages and working conditions are guaranteed to workers in non-unionized workplaces in the industry. As a result of this decree, some employers prefer to shift their businesses out of Quebec (Montreal Gazette, Tuesday, February 21, 1989:F1).

12. Unfortunately, this table does not break down the regional distribution of the garment industry in terms of each of its sectors (men's clothing, women's clothing and shirt and leather glove sectors).

13. The percentages have been calculated by this author; and the percentage figures do not equal 100 per cent because of 'rounding-off'.

14. The polarization in the size of establishments in the clothing industry is also characteristic of the clothing industry in Manitoba where only 20 firms employ over 100 workers, 45.2% of firms have less than 20 workers, and only two firms (Nygard International and Wescott) employ over 500 workers.

15. It is not my purpose in this section to examine in any great detail the role of the government in arresting the deterioration of the Canadian garment and textile industries and in restructuring this industrial sector; this job has been done admirably well by Rianne Mahon (1984).

16. This problem, of course, is not unique to Canada. In the Post-World War II period, there has been a remarkable shift in the production of garments from Britain to Japan, 'Third World' countries, and centrally planned economies. As a result of this shift, Western market economies' share of world production of clothing has declined from 70.2% in 1963 to 52.3% in 1980. On the other hand, that of Japan, 'Third World' countries, and centrally planned economies has increased from 29.8% to 47.7% in the same period. "Clothing imports into Canada reflect this worldwide shift, having increased from 65 million units in
1981 to 237 million units in 1984" (Ghorayshi, 1990:276).

17. The rapid increase in production of textiles from low-wage countries became an acute problem for the industrialized countries in the late 1950s. Strong competition came from countries such as Hong Kong, India, Japan, Pakistan, Taiwan, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea. For example, exports of textile products from Hong Kong to the 24 member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), rose from $30 million in 1955 to $190 million in 1960 - an increase of more than 500 per cent (The Government of Canada, 1979:23).

18. The emergence of Japan and other Asian countries was due to the export-led industrialization of those countries. Their prominence in the world trade market goes beyond their presence in the Canadian market.

By the mid-1960s, Japan and other low-wage producers had captured nearly one-third of world textile trade. And, although Japan would subsequently shift to more sophisticated exports like automotive and electronics, there remained a large number of low-wage countries eager to follow the path it had blazed (Mahon, 1984:46-47).

19. "Federal intervention in favour of one particular industry was a relatively new departure. Hitherto, government action in the industrial field had been directed either to increased general productivity and competitiveness by offering incentives available to any firm that satisfied the various programs' criteria for eligibility or to attempting to correct regional disparities by encouraging entrepreneurs to invest in designated areas.... The textile policy, in contrast, was intended as a development strategy for an industry geared almost exclusively to the domestic market. In theory, the import restraint measures (for which it provided) are just part of the supportive package, not the essence of the policy" (Pestieau, 1976:14,15).

20. The Canadian Government (1979:33) describes the main aims of this policy thus:

"to create conditions under which the Canadian textile and clothing industries can continue to move progressively toward viable lines of production on an increasingly competitive basis internationally and domestically;
to provide special, temporary measures of protection against imports in instances where the Textile and Clothing Board formally determines that there is serious injury or threat of serious injury and where domestic producers submit suitable adjustment plans to improve their competitiveness;

to join with other countries in seeking liberalization of international trade in textiles;

to assist Canadian manufacturers and their workers in meeting the problems of changing trading conditions through the provision of adjustment assistance and programs to improve productivity and marketing capability."

The following measures have been established to meet these objectives:

- the creation of the Textile and Clothing Board;
- tariff rationalization and more effective control over imports;
- adjustment assistance to textile firms;
- the establishment of productivity and development centres;
- the establishment of a Fashion Canada program to assist fashion designers;
- the promotion of exports;
- assistance to displaced workers from the textile and clothing industry (Government of Canada, 1979:33-34).

21. "Tout au long de cette période, la politique canadienne a été selective et s’est faite produit par produit et pays par pays; elle ne couvrait en général qu’une période d’une année. De plus, des interventions n’étaient envisagées que lorsque le préjudice sérieux ou la menace de préjudice sérieux était démontré" (Gouvernement du Quebec, 1983:31).

22. But complaints from textile and clothing capitalists have not stopped here. Capitalists in this sector have also complained about indirect taxation and the government's imposition of a sales tax on children's clothing. This tax encouraged retailers to purchase clothes
from abroad rather than buy from local manufacturers. Textile and clothing capital has also complained about the Quebec government's minimum wage legislation. According to this legislation, every six months wage workers must receive a wage increase. It is believed that in many textile and garment workplaces (non-unionized), management still fails to follow this law primarily because workers are not aware of this legislation (Aguiar, 1988:19).

Garment capital also successfully lobbied the government for the elimination of a tax on children's clothing sold in the province.

23. The relocation of production processes to the 'Third World', or to 'peripheral areas' within North America engaged in by Canadian textile and garment multinationals is not discussed here even though this is an important part of the restructuring process in this industrial sector. I choose not to discuss this because this is out of reach for most textile and garment manufacturers in Canada, given the small size or their enterprises. But there are Canadian multinationals (e.g. Tan Jay for garment and Dominion Textile) engaged in the 'global' factory of textile and garment production.

24. Modernization has had an influence on the level of skills required of workers in the textile field. In most cases, a higher level of knowledge and thus a greater degree of education has been (and is) necessary (Etcovitch, 1987:27).

25. Over this same period, the manufacturing sector lost only 4.4% of its total jobs. And "[t]he textile industry's share of manufacturing sector employment has therefore been declining, going from 6.6% in 1973 to 5.1% in 1984" (Chalifoux, 1985:37).

26. Professional Director of the Canadian Federation of Textile Workers Inc. (C.S.D.)

27. Mr. Jacques also found that in many factories new technologies were introduced without the knowledge of the workers. And, "[d]e façon générale, la technologie nouvelle entraîne des risques d'accidents de travail et de maladies professionnelles" (1984:30).

28. Le Point (chaine de television francaise numero 25 a Toronto), jeudi le 1 mars, 1990.
29. These are only some of the central restructuring features of the garment industry. Parvin Ghorayshi (1990:276) describes the restructuring features of the garment industry in Manitoba:

There has been a conscious attempt to reduce costs through mechanization, reallocation of some phases of production to less developed capitalist economies, more extensive use of subcontracting and small shops, direct marketing by establishing retail stores, and direct import and export of garments. In short, the rise of multinationals, the drive of the developing countries to industrialize, and the new international division of labour have all played important roles in producing the domestic condition in Manitoba.

30. The transfer of production to the ’home’ is highly cost-efficient for garment manufacturers:

It allows the manufacturer to reduce labour costs by shucking off responsibility for minimum wages, vacation pay, sick benefits, maximum hours, pensions, maternity leave, overtime and assorted production costs (Lipsig-Mumme, 1987:46).

31. The renaissance of ’homeworking’ is tied to a farreaching transformation in the organization of work and the international division of labour, linked on the one hand to the spread of the submerged economy and numerous forms of precarious or fragmented employment, and on the other to the growing competition between labour-intensive enterprise in the First and Third Worlds (Lipsig-Mumme, 1983:545).

32. Homeworking is also a strategy in the garment industry in Ontario. According to the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) in Toronto, there are 14,000 homeworkers in Ontario, with 5,000 in Toronto alone (these figures are quoted in Basic Poverty Action Group, 1989:8).

33. "Tout en se basant sur les resultats d'une negociation collective conclue entre les parties patronales et syndicale, cette loi assure pour l'ensemble des travailleurs (euses) d'un secteur d'activites, qu'ils (elles) soient syndiques (es) ou non, l'etablissement de conditions minimales de travail, generalement plus generuses que celles specifiees par la loi sur les normes du travail" (emphasis in the original; Grant and Rose, 1985:484).
34. "A contracting firm can be defined as an independent firm owning production equipment, which negotiates contracts with manufacturing firms to carry out part of the manufacturing operation. A contracting firm in the clothing industry does not own the raw materials, materials in process and finished products, buys only some findings such as sewing threads, and is not involved in selling" (The Textile and Clothing Board, Vol.1, 1985:60).

35. "There are contractors who are also clothing manufacturers and who will accept contract work in order to more fully utilize their production capacity. There are contractors who work exclusively for one firm. This firm may have contributed to the establishment of the contractor. There are contractors who seek work of a homogeneous nature only. These contractors are highly specialized, working only on products within their specialty. In general, these contracting firms are just as well equipped, if not better equipped, than the manufacturers of such products, because their specialization and their volume enables them to acquire highly sophisticated equipment."

"It should also be noted that the contractors, particularly general contractors, face higher risks than manufacturers. When there is any slowdown in activity in the clothing industry, they will be the first to be affected, since they are producing to the peak demand of the manufacturers, not the normal demand. Manifestly, some contractors have been sufficiently flexible to survive through difficult years" (The Textile and Clothing Board, Vol.1, 1985:61).

36. In contract shops, "[t]he working conditions are typically in gross violation of most minimum provincial standards. The Inquiry heard of an example, typical of sweatshops, where people working in a residential area in a basement were not paid. However, the piece rate they received worked out to less than $2.00 per hour for all of the work they had done" (Basic Poverty Action Group, 1989:18).

37. There has also been an increase of 14.8% in the number of small (less than 20 workers) factories in the women's clothing sector of the garment industry and a decrease in the number of the bigger (more than 50 workers) factories in this same sector. Consider the following table:

Table 6

Grandeur d'établissement et nombre d'employes
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Salaries (%)</th>
<th>Salaries</th>
<th>et plus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>542 (59%)</td>
<td>254 (27.6)</td>
<td>123 (13.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>667 (73.8)</td>
<td>162 (17.9)</td>
<td>75 (8.3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Les Comites Paritaires et al., 1988:18, table 7.

38. Unfortunately we cannot say how much has been invested in wages relative to technology.

39. There are factories, however, that are benefiting from the large presence of 'refugees' in the country. Texgar is one of these factories.

40. "In all probability, the investment efforts of the textile and clothing industries are the result of two factors: the absolute necessity of increasing the competitive ability of domestic producers against imports, and the favourable investment climate created by the Canadian Industrial Renewal Board (CIRB). These two factors have brought about an acceleration of the systematic modernization which these industries are trying to achieve" (Textile and Clothing Board, 1984:27).

"... the only way to combat this erosion in competitive ability is to make new investments aimed at reducing production costs" (Textile and Clothing Board, 1984:31).

41. Dr. Charlene Gannage (1987:4) describe the 'bundle system' thus:

The component parts of several garments are tied together into 'bundles' in the cutting room and carried by hand or transported by push cart to the production room.

42. "In 1977, the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Union (ACTU) was the largest with 29,291 workers, followed by the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (21,403), the United Textile Workers of America (6,771) and the United Garment Workers of America (2,294). The CSD [Centrale des syndicats democratiques] textile and clothing affiliates together had 15,007 members and the Canadian Textile and Chemical Union had 1,766. The CSN [Confederation des
syndicats nationaux), which lost most of its textile and clothing members when the CSD was formed in the early 1970s, has less than 1,000" (Mahon, 1983:172, footnote #14).

The ACTU, for example, has its origins in the CIO and a 'social democratic' philosophy. The UTWA, on the other hand, "has pursued a 'Gompersian' strategy since the early fifties" (Mahon, 1983:157).

43. The International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) predicts that 25,000 jobs will be eliminated in the garment industry in Ontario (cited in Gannage, 1988:394).


45. L'industrie canadienne du textile n'apprécie qu'avec l'entrée en vigueur du traité de libre-échange avec les américains. Et encore moins la perspective de voir les producteurs asiatiques vendre avec plus de facilité leurs produits ici (Le Devoir, 14 juin, 1989:13).

46. This Advisory Council is composed of five members (all men), including Jean de Grandpre (Chairperson) and Gordon Cummunigs. The former's company is the majority shareholder in Northern Telecom, and the latter is the chief executive officer of National Sea Products Ltd. (Toronto Star, December 16, 1988:A1 and A2). Telecom is in the process of transferring jobs in Aylmer, Quebec and Belleville, Ontario to Atlanta, Georgia. This transfer will put 925 workers out of work (Toronto Star, December 15, 1988:A8). Very recently National Sea Products has layed-off thousands of fish processing workers in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland.

Hence, with these two individuals as members of the Advisory Council on Adjustment, one cannot help but be suspicious of their recommendations of labour adjustment policies [why not capital adjustment policies?] in a free trade environment.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE COMPANY

INTRODUCTION

For analytical purposes, I have divided the history of Texgar into three stages of development. The aim of this chapter is to present each of these in turn.

The first stage is defined by the establishment of the factory, and its early features of the organization of production. Of particular interest here is the early establishment of the relations of production in the factory.

The second stage discusses the restructuring of the factory in the mid-1970s. My focus is on the diversification of production (installation of various production lines), and the turn towards new and emerging garment markets in the garment sector. This stage is particularly important for understanding this thesis. I believe that the diversification of production in the factory influenced the emergence of the union drive, and at the same time, facilitated the defeat of the union drive by the owner, Albert Saltzman. This argument is elaborated on in later chapters.

The third stage of the history of Texgar deals with the most recent changes in the labour processes. In
describing this stage, I will argue that contemporary Texgar has achieved the status of 'modernist' firm in the garment industry. The constitutive elements of a 'modernist' firm will be defined before I proceed to present evidence that allows me to categorize Texgar as such.

BACKGROUND OF ALBERT SALTZMAN

Albert Saltzman fled his native Hungary with his newlywed wife in the mid-1940s for Paris, France. In 1947, he immigrated (with his wife) to Montreal with petty-bourgeois aspirations "... of independence in the sense of 'working for oneself' or being 'your own boss'" (Clement, 1988:109). Once in Montreal, however, Albert Saltzman began working for a wage for a trucking company in the city. His wife did not undertake wage work but did housework nonetheless. After seven months of driving a truck, Albert Saltzman quit this job to work as a knitter in a textile factory. At the time anti-semitism was pervasive in Montreal [1]; and when management in the textile company found out that Saltzman was Jewish, they [management] fired him immediately. But Albert Saltzman quickly found another job as a knitter; this time in a textile factory owned by Jews. For four years he worked at this factory, climbing the hierarchy at work to the level of purchasing agent. Finally, in 1951, he announced to his boss that he was
leaving the company to start his own business. Albert Saltzman says that

it was there [in the two factories] that I learned a lot about the business aspect of the industry... the technical knowledge of the trade I already had since I finished textile college in Hungary. My father did not want me to become a lawyer or a doctor. He told me that my 'temperament' was more 'suitable' for business, and so he pushed me into textile college. I have never regretted that decision and I thank him for pushing me into textiles.

The low-entry barriers of the garment industry have enabled many ex-garment workers to become employers in this industrial sector (Morokvasic, 1988). Unlike entrepreneurship in the primary natural resource industries (e.g., mining, forestry), the novice petty-bourgeois entrepreneur in the garment industry does not need (at first anyway) large sums of capital to invest in the means of production. Instead, the novice businessperson can rent floor space for a work area, rent the sewing machines needed, use unpaid family labour, and perhaps hire one or two wage workers to start operations [2]. Jewish immigrants in the past have been able to take advantage of these low-entry barriers to enter the class of employers in the garment industrial sector. Thus, in 1931, Jewish immigrants represented 55% of the class of owners and managers in garment manufacturing in Quebec [3]. Let us see how Albert Saltzman established his capitalist enterprise, and in the process attained membership in the capitalist class.
FIRST STAGE:
ESTABLISHING TEXGAR, AND EARLY FEATURES OF THE FACTORY

In the early 1950s, the Quebec textile industry was thriving. Between 1950 and 1955, the number of textile establishments increased by 19%, from 382 to 455 (Commission de la sante et de la securite du travail [hereafter CSST], 1987:16) [4]. In spite of this, the number of workers in the industry dropped by 14%, from 46,002 in 1950 to 39,496 in 1955 (CSST, 1987:16, table 1) [5]. The garment industry, likewise, was also thriving: during the time of the Korean War it employed approximately 100,000 workers (Textile and Clothing Board [hereafter T&CB], 1977:VI-1) [6]. The virtual devastation of the textile industry in Europe during the Second World War, and the ability of Canadian clothing manufacturers to secure large contracts from the Canadian army involved in the Korean War, supported the numerical growth of factories in the textile and garment industry in general in the decade following World War II (Boucher, 1982:44). At that time, too, the Canadian textile and garment industries had not yet encountered the threat of erosion to their domestic market from 'Third World' imported clothing goods. Thus, in 1949 'Third World' clothing imports held an unthreatening 3% share of the Canadian domestic market (Dinel, 1976:145) [7]. Subsequently however, and especially after Japan was re-introduced into
the capitalist economic sphere of dominance through its ascension to GATT under the status of 'most favoured nation', foreign clothing manufacturers began to capture an increasing share of the domestic clothing market. Consequently, by 1957, Japanese clothing imports made up 25% of all clothing imports into Canada. Two years later, Japan's share of the Canadian clothing market reached the critical level of 44% (T&CB, 1977:V2). By the mid-1960s, other Asian countries (e.g., South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and People's Republic of China) replaced Japan as main threats to erosion of the Canadian clothing domestic market.

My purpose here is not to discuss the clothing 'import problem', or the various ways capitalists in this industrial sector have attempted to respond to serious intermittent market erosion. Instead, the statistics presented above serve merely as a background to the establishment of Texgar and the 'favorable' business climate in the clothing industry in the early 1950s.

On a boulevard once commonly known as the 'commercial artery' and/or 'economic backbone' of the city of Montreal [8] (Langlais and Rome, 1986:75), in 1951 Albert Saltzman rented 250 sq. feet of floor space in a commercial building in 1951 to install Texgar. In this workshop, Albert Saltzman employed two immigrant workers (a male knitter and a woman sewing machine operator), his wife's
unpaid labour, and his own labour to knit women's sweaters on two old but re-built knitting machines he bought. Albert Saltzman insists that he and his wife did the bulk of the work: Mrs. Saltzman 'helped' in the shipping department, while he worked nights as a knitter, did some of the 'shipping' and all the administrative work. To keep Texgar stable during the first crucial months of operation, he continued to work for a wage to supplement the business income he was getting from the factory. This organization of production is typical of the garment industry, and characteristic of that defined by marxists as the petty-commodity mode of production (Sacouman, 1980).

Three months after the opening of the factory, Albert Saltzman hired another male worker to do the 'cutting' and the 'finishing'. Fourteen months later, he moved his business to a larger area (2,000 sq. ft.) in another building but still on the same boulevard. Texgar remained at this location for one year. For its third year of operation, and to accommodate its expanding capitalist labour process, Texgar moved once again to an even larger work area. The factory was installed in the St. Louis District. This relocation was accompanied by more capital investment in the instruments of production:

I bought the first high-powered production knitting machine for ladies' sweaters in 1955. This new machine was producing six-and-one-half times more than the old machines I had been using. The other companies were
afraid to invest in this machine because they didn't believe that production could go up that much. I did. Six months later, I bought another machine and within one year we had four machines producing as much as any of our competitors in Canada. We grew very fast... we were producing basic pull-overs... (Albert Saltzman)

By the end of the fourth year of operations, and with increasing investments in the instruments of production in Texgar, the number of workers Albert Saltzman employed increased to 100.

At this time, Albert Saltzman still shared his business address and floor space with three garment contractors and three garment manufacturers, all involved in women's clothing [9]. To accommodate Mr. Saltzman and his expanding production process, the owner of the building where Texgar was installed expanded the building to twice its original size. Before long, Albert Saltzman took over three of the six floors in the building. But he still wasn't satisfied with this floor space because he felt that the further expansion of the company was inevitable. Therefore, in 1972 he bought the building which Texgar had occupied. As soon as the transaction was complete, Mr. Saltzman requested all tenants in the building to leave because he was going to expand production in Texgar to include all six floors. By 1975, Texgar occupied all six floors in the building.
St. Louis District

Albert Saltzman made one of his shrewdest moves when he relocated Texgar to the St. Louis District in the mid-1950s. In doing so, he opened the doors of the factory to waves of 'cheap' immigrant labour settling in this traditional 'reception area for immigrants' (Teixeira, 1986:87). Up to the Second World War, this District was primarily settled by Jewish immigrants who began arriving in Canada during the first half of the 20th century (Langlais and Rome, 1986; Alpalhao and Da Rosa, 1980:75). (Along with French-Canadians, the Jews made up the majority of the labour force in the garment and textile industries (Teal 1985) [10]. From the Second World War onwards, other waves of immigrants have consecutively and sometimes simultaneously, settled in the area [11]; the Portuguese are the last numerically dominant ethnic group still residing in this area [12].

For the development of Texgar, Mr. Saltzman hasn't hesitated to use the 'District' as a source of 'cheap' immigrant wage labour. In fact, the development of Texgar, and the enrichment of Albert Saltzman is directly linked to the exploitation of immigrant labour living in the Square. This is a focal point in my discussion of the ethnic division of labour in the factory in Chapter Seven.
SECOND STAGE:
RESTRUCTURING THE FACTORY

In 1975, the object of labour in Texgar was still the production of knitted women's sweaters. And until then, the expansion of the labour process was primarily undertaken to accommodate changes in this production process. But after 1975, Albert Saltzman began an ambitious restructuring process with the goal of diversifying production and transforming the factory into several production lines. By doing this, he hoped to expand the factory into other garments markets.

But restructuring wasn't particular to Texgar; the majority of textile and garment manufacturers were also engaging in it. There are two principal reasons for this. First, the program put forth by the Canadian state in the Textile Policy of 1971 did not produce the results everyone was hoping it would. For a variety of reasons (see Mahon, 1985; Ahmad, 1988), the state was unable to protect the Canadian domestic market from foreign imports. Secondly, by the mid-1970s, Canadian clothing manufacturers were concerned with a fall in their rates of profit. With the influx of clothing imports from Pacific Rim countries, domestic producers had a difficult time attracting the Canadian retail sector who preferred to buy cheaper garments from foreign manufacturers. In 1976, Hong Kong, Taiwan,
South Korea, and the People's Republic of China, collectively held 67% of the Canadian garment market. With the erosion of the Canadian domestic market, Canadian manufacturers profit levels declined to the benefit of the foreign competition. Consequently, Canadian manufacturers set out to restructure and improve the industry, and at the same time, circumvent foreign competition in the domestic market.

In the mid-1970s, a survey of 300 clothing manufacturers on their adjustment plans contemplated for the future revealed that $1,675,000 million (or 20%) of capital was targeted for investment in the expansion of existing facilities. Furthermore, 96 (32%) and 76 (25%) firms respectively, said that they were contemplating modernizing operations and concentrating in specialized lines.

Of the 76 companies intending to add product lines, individual responses indicated that the following specific lines would be required: sportswear, children's and juniors' wear, slacks and T-shirts, ladies' outerwear, boys' wear, high quality ladies' and young men's leisure wear (T&CB, 1977:Appendix 10, p.2).

Albert Saltzman and Texgar opted for the strategy of diversifying production to provide more physical space for existing production, and to capture new, emerging garment markets. These markets included women's casualwear fashion and women's sportswear.
Diversifying Production

In order to commence diversifying production, Albert Saltzman bought a fire department station and 34 apartment flats behind the factory, tore them down, and expanded the physical floor space of the factory to 201,000 sq. feet. An initial sum of $1 million was furnished by the Quebec government as part of its commitment to the restructuring of the factory. And through the years of restructuring, Texgar has been well served by the state, as we will see later.

According to the Textile and Clothing Board (1977:V4-5), diversification was a widespread restructuring strategy in the garment industry with certain clear advantages:

There have been [in the clothing industry] mergers and acquisitions to develop multi-divisional operations whereby common services would result in reduced costs. Optimum size and control of operations has been one of the characteristics in the development of multi-plant operations. The separation of operations into a number of specialized plants, each producing similar or like items but tied into a central organization for overall direction, has resulted in stronger management at all levels.

Other advantages of the 'multi-divisional' type of operations:

It avoids duplication of senior administrative staff;

The larger group can negotiate better financing arrangements and rates. When financing needs are pooled, the flexibility of the company and its component units is strengthened;

Fabric and other material purchasing is combined advantageously;
Production can be more evenly scheduled; and
selling and showroom expenses can be reduced. By coordinating lines, buyers can be influenced to make fewer stops.

Texgar and New Garment Markets

Morokvasic et al. (1986) argue that the fashion orientation of Western clothing manufacturers has enabled them to resist the challenge of foreign imports to their market. The reason for this is that production in fashion-oriented factories are more standardized and as a result, fashion orientation has proved to be an important factor in maintaining competitiveness, especially for women's wear, which has maintained its export potential and has resisted import penetration better than other sectors ... (Morokvasic et al., 1986:401).

By the end of the 1970s, there was a growing fashion trend towards sports and leisure clothing; many 'lines' of clothing were subsequently created.

It once was the case that only a few manufacturers supplied clothing for the sporting world with that clothing mainly limited to sports such as hockey and tennis. Now many companies in Canada, France and the United States, are producing athletic clothing for consumers throughout the world. (Chronicle-Herald, June 22, 1983, p.24-25).

This shift in fashion trend is also visible in the changes in clothing merchandizing that some retail stores carry. For example, Cleve's Argyle Street Store in Halifax carried 80% of sports clothing in 1983. This was a tremendous increase from the 20% it used to carry seven years earlier.
Women have been a central target for manufacturers of sportswear. The designers in this market have given women's sports clothing a 'feminine' look by using different pastel shades. Furthermore, with the surge in aerobics and dansercise, designers have created fashionable sweat suits and leotards that can not only be used in sporting activities, but can also be worn with a skirt for casual wear. According to some sources, the attractiveness of this type of clothing lies in the diversity of styles, designs and colours, the stress given fit and sports clothing flexibility makes it easy for the consumer to feel relaxed even if that person doesn't participate in the sport for which the clothing was intended (Chronicle-Herald, June 22, 1983, p. 24-25.)

For Texgar to take advantage of the new women's sportswear market and compete successfully in it, Mr. Saltzman had to expanded the building to accommodate the diversity of production in the factory. On the fifth floor of the factory, women's sporting clothing are designed. Mr. Saltzman explains:

Before the company was manufacturing knits, cutting knits, and selling them. But the market changed tremendously: the ladies' sportswear market became open. Now I made knits, but how do I sell them [in this new market]? Because knits from ladies' sportswear moved into active sportswear like the jacket, or the pull-over, or the shirt you are wearing... It's not the same as our market was before, if I don't expand, I would lose my market share. In order to save the market share, we had to do this [i.e., expand].

By the early 1980s, the physical expansion of the building
and the diversification of production to include women's sportswear and casualwear clothing was complete.

Also, with the expansion of the factory, Lenny Long established his women's sweaters and children's clothing business on the third floor of the factory. Teo (ex-Texgar worker fired on suspicion of stealing from the company, now union organizer):

He [Albert Saltzman] moved many workers from the fifth and sixth floors to work on the third floor. Lenny Long also hired some workers to operate the machines on the third floor.

According to most workers, even though he was Albert Saltzman's son-in-law, Lenny Long operated in the factory as a tenant would [13].

Finally, with the larger area in the factory in the early 1980s, Albert Saltzman was able to gather further income by renting floor space to contractors. For example, on the fifth floor of the factory, Michel Robichaux rents floor space for his clothing design business.

Crisis in Texgar

After restructuring the factory, and expanding the production processes to produce for new markets in the garment industry, Saltzman expected to increase the return on his capital investments. These returns, however, were not forthcoming. Instead, Texgar went into a severe crisis that threatened to destroy the factory completely in 1984.
In many ways, this crisis was symptomatic of the general crisis in the Canadian clothing industry [14]. But, Texgar had specific problems of its own which required immediate resolution. Some of these problems included increased city taxes, increased interest rates, heightened competition from garment imports, etc. The situation in Texgar was exacerbated by an ultimatum from the bank manager with whom Albert Saltzman does his financial borrowing. In a letter to Mr. Saltzman, the bank manager warned him that unless he paid what he owed the bank, the factory would be seized by the bank and closed. This letter was received by Mr. Saltzman on May 24, 1984, and the bank manager gave him one week to satisfy the bank's demand. However, the company survived because (1) Albert Saltzman put all his savings into the business, and (2) he was able to work-out a timely loan from the government.

As part of the resolution of the crisis in the factory, the corporate structure and stocks in the company were redistributed. Albert Saltzman remained president of the fabric division only. His son Jerry became president of the Casualwear division, and Lenny Long became president of the sweaters division. More importantly, each man was now responsible for his own division, and thus better able to supervise and dictate the production activity in his division. Albert Saltzman:
I'm old. Listen, I'm too old to look after everything. [In 1988, Mr. Albert Saltzman was 63 years old.] I used to be the president of the whole thing [the factory], but now I'm president of one division, and I am happy. My son is the president of the garment division, and my son-in-law is president of the sweaters division and our US operations.

THIRD STAGE:

TEXGAR AS A 'MODERNIST' FIRM

In her examination of the restructuring process of the British clothing industry after the 1978-1981 crisis, Cynthia Cockburn (1985:45) found that very few companies ascended to large firm status in the industry [15]. Those few firms that did, Cockburn calls them 'modernist'. They are identifiable by the following restructuring characteristics: increased investment in new technologies, contracting-out work, homeworking, and supplementing domestic (i.e., UK) production with off-shore production activity (Ibid, 44-45) [16]. In this last section of the chapter, I want to describe the identifiable characteristics that have allowed me to categorize Texgar a 'modernist' firm [17]. We have already seen that Texgar has diversified its production, and redistributed control and supervision in the factory [18]. But there are other restructuring features that make Tex/Gar a modernist firm.

In 1986, Texgar expanded its casualwear fashion division of women's clothing into the United States.
Elle [Texgar] entend intensifier ses efforts de ventes vers le marché [des États Unis] au cours des prochaines années [19].

According to Albert Saltzman, the production of women's clothing for the US market is done differently there than in Montreal. In the United States, Texgar operates through contractors:

We have started a very successful operation in the States. We are not making the garments in Canada, you can't compete with Canadian labour wages in the United States. If it goes well, maybe within one year that operation will be as big as we are in all our divisions here. [How many employees do you have in the States?] Ah! it is done differently there than here (in Montreal) - sales, merchandising and administration only. We make our business through contractors, we work with contractors. In the US we are making the same 'lines' that we are making here. We are making the samples here (at Texgar) and we are selling them in the United States to stores. And whatever we sell to customers, we buy the material the same way (as in Texgar in Montreal), but it goes to cutting contractors, who then cut the material, and the sewing contractor who sews and then the garment is ready for shipping. We have a shipping room and an office (in the cities where they operate). Presently we have sales offices in New York, Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, and three or four other cities in the US. I have no idea how big the shipping area is... maybe 35 sq. feet?

Luis: What are your reasons for expanding into the United States?:

Several things brought us to start up this business in the United States: the most important was the 'common market'. We started in such a way that we were afraid that the US would stop us from exporting manufactured goods made in Canada. Also, the labour costs here in Canada are much higher. In Canada, you also have to contribute to certain benefits: vacation pay, paid holidays, etc. (Mr. A. Saltzman) [20]

Recently, Mr. Saltzman also encouraged one of his
former employees to establish a cutting contracting workshop. Joe, one of the partners in this workshop, said that Mr. Saltzman provided him with some initial capital to put this workshop on its feet. It isn't unusual for garment manufacturers to financially support ex-employees's attempt at setting-up garment contract shops. For manufacturers, it helps them cut down on some overhead costs and circumvent labour legislation (Morokvasic, 1988:87) [21].

The state continues to assist Albert Saltzman in restructuring Texgar. On April 8, 1987, it was announced that Texgar had been the recipient of a $1.3 million loan from the Quebec government. The same public announcement stated how the money was going to be spent in the factory. Some of it is for the introduction of new machines in the knitting, dyeing, and sewing departments, and some on 'grading' computers capable of adjusting a garment sample size ten to other ranges of sizes. From this same government sum, a percentage is for the purchase of an automatic robot system that distributes work to women sewing machine operators. Charlene Gannage (1986:80) describes briefly this robot system known as the E-ton system. Finally, the Saltzmans will use the money to create a more dynamic marketing department, and to support new designs of styles in the factory [22].

Texgar's most recent restructuring has been the
purchase of a children's clothing manufacturing company earlier this year (1989). Of the 200 workers employed at this children's clothing factory, only 30 have been retained by Texgar. And according to an informant, these were the 30 most skilled workers. The remaining 170 workers were laid-off.

CONCLUSION

Today, Texgar is constituted by four main divisions of Labour: the Fabric Division; the Sweaters Division; the Sample Room Division; and the Casualwear Division. In the Fabric Division, an all-male workforce transforms yarn into fabric for sale to garment-making manufacturers. In the Sweaters' Division, a gender divided workforce knits and makes sweaters (and children's clothing) for sale to retail stores and large department stores (e.g. Sears, The Bay, etc.) across Canada. A predominantly (skilled) female workforce makes 'samples' of fashion designs in the Sample Room Division. These 'samples' of new fashion creations, after they have been sold to customers and salesmen bring back customer orders to the factory, may be mass produced at Texgar, or sent out to contractors to be mass produced. Finally, in the Casualwear Division, a gender divided workforce mass produces some of the creations made by fashion designers in the Sample Room Division. Together,
there are approximately 450 shopfloor workers in these four divisions: Women make up at least 70% [23] of this total; and the Portuguese are the dominant ethnic group working for Texgar. The production processes in Texgar, and all the workers in it (including office personnel) occupy an area of 201,000 square ft.

In this chapter, I have described some of the changes in the corporate and production structures in Texgar. No attempt has been made here to analyze the labour processes themselves within the factory; this is a concern for the next three chapters. The data on the history of Texgar may be somewhat incomplete in some parts. But we can nevertheless understand the complex process of restructuring that Texgar is undergoing in order to remain competitive in the clothing industry.

We also looked briefly at the class and ethnic background of Albert Saltzman, the founder of Texgar. In chapter seven, I will examine how his background and the element of 'simple control' (Edwards, 1979) served to obscure the class differences between Albert Saltzman and the workers at Texgar.
NOTES

1. Langlais and Rome (1986:94) say that much of the growing anti-semitic feeling in Quebec began with Yiddish immigration at the turn of the century, and did not subside until WWII. To these authors' surprise, anti-semitism was particularly prevalent in rural Quebec, and not in the city of Montreal where the Jewish population was concentrated.

Hillel (1987) in his photographic catalogue on the different ethnic groups that have settled along the south to north pole of boulevard St. Laurent, quotes Irving Layton as saying that when the latter was young and still residing in 'The Main', he was often a participant in bloody confrontations between Jews and other ethnics in the neighborhood. According to Layton, bottles, bricks, sticks, and stones were used as 'weapons' during the clashes. These 'weapons' were thrown between fighting groups perched on roof tops in the neighborhood.

2. The following numbers on the establishment and closure of companies in Quebec's garment industry between 1983 and 1987 suggest a tough competition level in the industry. The number below also show the incredible number of contractors involved in the Quebec garment industry.

Number of new companies (1590):

421 manufacturers
1169 contractors

Number of closures (1249):

336 manufacturers
913 contractors

(Les Comites Paritaires, et al., 1988:17)

3. 'Souvent les proprietaires et gerants de manufactures de vetements sont aussi d'origine juive (55 pourcent en 1931 au Quebec' (Rouillard, 1981:254, n.2). Unfortunately, Rouillard's data above does not distinguish, in percentage terms, between owners and managers.

4. 455 is the largest number of textile factories in the last 49 years of the industry.

5. There was, however, a significant drop in the number of textile establishments after 1955. 51 textile establishments disappeared from the industry, and almost ten
141

thousand jobs (9, 510) were lost between 1955 and 1960 (CSST, 1987:16, table 1).

6. But with imports flooding the domestic market for the first time in the mid-1950s, by the end of the decade the number of workers in the garment industry had declined to about 86,000. But beginning in the 1960s, the number of workers rose again to reach a peak of 119,000 in 1973 (Textile and Clothing Board, 1977:VI-1).

7. However, this situation changed quickly: by 1969, "Third World" textile and garment imports had captured an unprecedented 42.3% share of the Canadian domestic market (Dinel, 1976:145).

8. This boulevard was also known as the 'corridor of immigrants' (Teixeira, 1986:87).


The women wear manufacturers were: Adorable Junior Garments Inc. (employing between 26 and 50 workers), Belgo Garment Inc. (employing between 11 and 25 workers), and Sternthal Bros. LTD. (employing between 26 and 50 workers (Directory of [Women's] Manufacturing Establishments, 1971:various pages).

10. It should also be noted that prior to WWII Jewish men also formed the majority of garment manufacturers (Teal, 1985:33-34).

11. It was also along this financial centre that successive waves of European immigrant labour first settled when they arrived in Montreal. The immigrant men found in this part of the city a labour market, and affordable housing where they could accommodate their large families who subsequently joined them in Montreal (Teixeira, 1986:57; Alpalhao and Pereira Da Rosa, 1980).

12. But the Portuguese are now also moving out of the area (see Teixiera, 1986). And contrary to past settlement patterns in the District, it is now French Canadians 'yuppies' who are settling there.
13. In an article in a business weekly (Affaires: anonymous date and year) in Montreal, it was announced that, in 1984, Lenny Long's business was officially integrated into the corporate structure of Texgar. Lenny Long added to his personal portfolio the title of president of the women's sweaters and children clothing division, and president of US operations.

14. The crisis in the Canadian clothing industry in the late 1970s and early 1980s, is discussed in an introductory section in the chapter on the emergence of the union drive. Suffice to point out at this stage that between 1979-1983, 15,000 jobs were lost in Quebec's garment industry. These jobs were lost primarily because of high rates of bankruptcies (in 1982, of 91 bankruptcies in the Canadian garment industry, 71 were in Quebec and 45% were in the women's sector), numerous closures of workshops, and the resurgence of homework (Grant and Rose, 1985:474; 480).

15. During the 1978-81 crisis, the proportion of small clothing factories (less than 100 workers), in the British clothing industry increased to 98% (Cockburn, 1985:45).

16. Cockburn also mentions their attachment to big retail stores, thus securing a market for their production. This is not a characteristic of contemporary Texgar. But when the physical structure of the factory was expanded in the early 1980s, management attached to the first floor a retail store that sells fabric that is usually defective in some way.

17. In a community newspaper (À Voz de Portugal, 1988) article published the week of the union certification vote in the factory, Texgar is characterized as the most modern factory in the garment industry. And the following features of the factory are highlighted:

- system of air conditioning;
- new modern restaurant for lunch;
- workers have one of the best welfare plans of any factory in the province (there is no mention in the article that this welfare plan was only introduced after the Saltzmans felt the pressure of the union presence in the factory.); and
- company provides 100 free parking spaces for its employees.
18. As far as I can understand her writing, Cynthia Cockburn (1985) does not include corporate restructure as a defining characteristic of a 'modernist' firm.

19. In the methodology chapter, I made it a point to warn the reader that some reference would not be identified in this thesis for the purpose of preserving anonymity of the factory and all participants in this study. The source of this quote, therefore, shall remain anonymous.

20. Mr. A. Saltzman also gives as reasons for expanding into the United States the lack of unions in many southern US states, the lack of minimum wage rates in many states, and easier labour laws.

21. See Laura Johnson (1980) and Grant and Rose (1985) for the increased use by garment manufacturers of 'homework' as a means of producing goods with a 'cheaper' female workforce. Carla Lipsig-Mumme (1983) discusses some of the challenges that garment 'homeworking' presents for unions in organizing workers and encouraging the decertification of unions.

22. Upon reporting the amount of money Texgar received from the Canadian State, one Portuguese newspaper publisher asked: 'Para quando o aumento os trabalhadores de [Texgar]'? Translation: 'When will the workers in Texgar get a raise?'

23. These figures are based on information given to me by the workers interviewed.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE TECHNICAL DIVISION OF LABOUR

INTRODUCTION

The preceding chapter dealt with the more important developments in the history of Texgar. At no point in that chapter, however, was there an attempt made to look inward to the organization of production in the factory and examine it. This chapter, therefore, examines precisely what was ignored in the previous one: the technical production processes in Texgar.

Here the examination focuses on the 'technical division of labour' or the actual existing technology (Harvey, 1982:99) in each of the four divisions in the factory. Such an undertaking begins with the assumption that each production process is organized for the satisfaction of a human want - i.e., the production of a use-value. Determining what is precisely the purpose of work in each division is the first concern of this chapter. The second is a discussion of the object of labour in each division and the instruments of labour made available to workers in each division for the generation of surplus value (Marx, 1977:284). These latter two constitutive elements of the means of production (Thompson, 1989:39) are also thus centrally focused in this examination of production in
Texgar [1].

The examination of the factory in this manner reveals two crucial characteristics in three production processes in the factory. Firstly, production is fragmented. Workers on the shopfloor are responsible for performing a partial operation in the specific object of labour in the division. There exists on the shopfloor therefore a 'detailed division of labour' (Braverman, 1974:) with workers divided horizontally between themselves according to the specific 'operation' they perform in production. Secondly, shopfloor workers in Texgar are also divided vertically between the four divisions. Each division is independently (from the others) producing a specific use value [2]. And each employs its own workforce working under different conditions [3].

However, the 'Sample Room' division does not quite fit the characteristic of a horizontal division of labour as described in the previous paragraph. The object of labour in this division is garment sample making which requires a skilled workforce capable of making a complete garment without assistance from any other shopfloor worker. Hence, on this shopfloor there is no horizontal division of labour between workers. Shopfloor workers here use a variety of instruments of labour to make an entire garment sample themselves. But the separation of conception from execution
is evident on the floor since workers produce garment outfits conceived and designed by management.

This chapter begins with an examination of the Fabric Division. This division occupies the first two floors of the factory, and the basement which is used for storage. The object of labour here is the transformation of imported natural yarn into fabric for sale to garment manufacturers in the province of Quebec. Following this is an examination of the Women's Sweaters Division which is located on the third floor of the factory, and produces women's sweaters and children's clothing. The 'Sample Room' Division is described next. This division is found on the fifth floor. Here, three different groups of workers make garment samples for three different clothing 'base-lines'. Two of these base-lines (Nouveaufewear and TG Active) are sub-divisions of the Sample Room Division and are owned by Texgar. The third ('Michel Robichaux') is owned by a designing contractor who rents part of the fifth floor. Finally, the last section of this chapter describes the technical division of labour in the Casualwear Division. This division spreads over two floors - the sixth and fourth floors - as well as having a fundamental link with one of the sub-divisions on the fifth floor. The workers in this division collectively produce women's casualwear garments:
skirts, pants, dresses, coats, and the like.

Our examination of the technical division of labour in Texgar begins with the Fabric Division.

THE MANUFACTURING OF FABRIC

The object of labour in the fabric division is the transformation of acrylic, polyester, and poly-cotton yarns to fabrics. The most popular fabrics manufactured here include fleece, terry and velour. Once made, these fabrics are then sold to garment manufacturers in the province, and used thereafter as raw materials ('dead' labour) in labour processes organized to produce towels, jogging suits, T-shirts, etc. But management in the fabric division does not simply instruct the making of these fabrics as it pleases; it must follow the style, texture and dimension that the customer specifies in a contract with the division. Therefore, the fabric division must possess a technical division of labour capable of making fabrics according to the customer's specifications. It is precisely the manifestation of the technical division of labour in fabric making that is examined here. This examination reveals a detailed division of labour between three departments, with workers within each department performing partial operations in the transformation of yarn to fabric.
THE TECHNICAL DIVISION OF LABOUR IN THE FABRIC DIVISION

The technical division of labour (Harvey, 1982:99) in the fabric division is fragmented along three coordinating departments: 'knitting', 'dyeing' (or as it is called in Texgar, the 'dye house'), and 'finishing'. The instruments of labour in this division are, technologically speaking, unevenly developed within and between departments. In one department, one finds side-by-side highly sophisticated machinery, and old and even dangerous tools of production. Hence, in the fabric division there is both labour intensive activities and capital intensive operations. Let us look briefly at the technical division of labour in each of the three departments.

The Knitting Department

The knitting department is located on the second floor of the factory and is made up of three sections (see figure 1). The first section is storage. The yarn transported by truck to the factory for the fabric division is kept here. With the exception of a crane, used only occasionally to stack boxes of yarn high on top of each other to save floor space, mechanization is absent. Instead, male workers exert 'physical strength' on a hand truck to remove boxes of yarn from storage to the knitters across the floor. They also use the hand truck to unload
the boxes of yarn from trucks in the 'receiving area' of the factory and transport them on a freight elevator to the
FIGURE 1

Knitting & Dye House Departments

- Knitting Machines Area (approx. 24 Machines)
- Yarn Stockroom
- Shredding Machine (Finishing Dept.)
- Tack Machine (Dye House Dept.)
- Preparation Machine (Dye House Dept.)

< Corridor >

- Exit
- Office of Knitting Dept. Supervisor

- Freight Elevators

- Management Offices - including Mr. Saltzman's

- Fabric Stockroom
storage section on the second floor as new stock.

At the time of investigation three men worked in this section. They were all Latin American with refugee status and working on a 'work permit' [4]. None of the three spoke English or French; and instructions were communicated to them by Portuguese co-workers acting as interpreters for the supervisor.

The second section in the department is referred to as the knitting machines area. There are approximately 24 knitting machines in this division, with each worker attending three, sometimes four, machines during his work-shift. The knitting machines here are highly sophisticated since they are regularly replaced by the latest, most modern machines Albert Saltzman finds on the market. Right now Texgar carries the 'MK 7 Moratronik' and Model IL 144 knitting machines, both manufactured by Sulzar Morat [5]. In a trade journal advertisement, the capacity of 'MK 7 Moratronik' is highlighted:

- unlimited patterning possibilities due to electronic needle selection and computer control
- versatile field of application even for terry, fleece structure, cast-off designs, single jersey plated, etc.
- extremely high production speed due to closed needle tracks
- easy machine operation, short set-up time by means of changeable cams from outside and monitoring system, to control and to increase productivity [6]
The features of Model IL 144 are similarly described:

[It has] specially developed needles and clamming new conception, it attains performances that were considered nil-high \([\text{nearly?}]\) impossible for the production of fabrics for piece dyeing and print cloths [7].

For Texgar these machines satisfy - only temporarily - the accumulation of relative surplus value (Marx, 1977). This is because competition between firms in the industry creates the need for new technological innovations capable of reducing the socially necessary labour time in production which, at the same time, increases surplus value. New technologically sophisticated machines also means greater control over operators since 'the skill is in the machine', and workers become superfluous. Some of the older workers in the department maintain that this is the only section in the division that regularly undergoes change in technology.

Lou:

On the second floor they \([\text{management}]\) have introduced more modern, faster machines ... what they are really interested in are faster machines... In the last four to five years they have modernized about 50% of machines on the second floor. These machines do the same thing but at a much faster pace.

Furthermore, the workers recognize that the purpose of this new technology is to increase productivity and give management 'flexibility' as to what fabrics they can produce with the same machine. Lou Morais, however, assured me that even though management has greater 'flexibility' with the new improved knitting machines, it is only on occasion when
management in the division receives an unusually large order for a particular fabric that all the machines are set-up to make the one fabric. It is more common, Lou says, for management to keep a certain group of machines set-up to make a specific fabric, and another group of machines to make a different fabric.

Mathieu has also witnessed the technological changes in the department, and adds a further perceptive comment on it that 'the technology [skill] is in the machine':

During the five years that I have worked at this machine [the 'preparation' machine], nothing in terms of technology and the manner of doing my job has ever changed [8]. It has always remained the same. The only changes that I have seen on the floor is that they [management] once in a while bring new machines into the knitting area... but the way they [machines] make the fabric never changes. [...] I have seen that new machines are brought in to make the same fabric but to do it with greater speed and efficiency... the technology is in the machine...

Technological change benefits management in another way by reducing workers to mere appendages, thereby making them easily replaceable [9].

Knitting machine operators make rolls of fabric that weigh about 30 lbs. each. When the operator sees that a roll is approaching the 30 lb. range, he removes the roll from the machine and brings it to the 'examiner' in the stockroom section of the department - the third section of the knitting department. The 'examiner's' role is to inspect the fabric for quality. In fact, the 'examiner'
inspects only a sample of the rolls deposited at his/her work-station in the stockroom section. In the stockroom, stalls are organized by rows and each row has an identifying corresponding number. This number makes it easy to locate the 'LOT' in the stockroom when it has to be removed to undergo further processing before 'shipping'. Each 'LOT' contains approximately 30 rolls of fabric and each roll carries stapled to it a 'ticket' indicating the style of the fabric and the number of the knitting machine that made the roll. Lou collects all the ticket numbers from the LOT (the 30 rolls) and records them on a sheet of paper. He also adds to this sheet the number that corresponds to the row where the LOT is located. When this is done, Lou takes the sheet to the office where a supervisor specifies on the side of the same sheet the processes the LOT must undergo before it can leave the factory.

Prior to the physical transformation of the building, the fabric division used yarn that was already dyed and thus did not need to undergo 'dyeing' in the division - the factory did not have a 'dye house'. But with the expansion of the building, a dye house was installed. Today, the division uses all natural yarn which means that it is the fabric piece (i.e., individual roll) that is dyed, not the yarn itself. The dyeing process in the division is known as 'piece dyeing'. Let us look now at the dye house.
The Dye House Department

Before the fabric goes into the dyeing machines, it has to undergo some preliminary preparations. The first of these preparations is carried out at the 'preparation machine'. Here the rolls in each LOT are sewn together to create a continuous flow of fabric running from roll number 1 through roll number 30. The rationale for this practice is that it is much less time consuming to dye a LOT of thirty rolls than to dye a roll of fabric at a time. The operator of the 'preparation machine' retrieves the LOT from the stockroom following the row number Lou has indicated at the top of the LOT sheet. He brings the rolls in a plastic truck to his machine, throws one end of a roll over a horizontal bar, and lets a mechanism pull the fabric over the bar, simultaneously unrolling the roll in the plastic truck. Once the machine has pulled one roll, the operator stops the machine and sews the other end of the roll to another roll in the plastic truck. When all the rolls have been sewn together, and if the fabric is poly-cotton, it goes straight to the dye house on the first floor. But if it's velour, it must go through further preparation before it can reach the dye house.

A machine 'opens' the velour along the middle of one
side, and then the operator moves the LOT to the 'shredding machine'. The operator of this machine runs the fabric through the machine and a razor sharp blade in the machine cuts the 'loops' [10] of velour. The level of the cut can be controlled with the rotation of an iron wheel on the side of the machine. Antonio:

A worker has to have a 'good vision' of work to work at the shredding machine because if you don't cut the material right the first time, it is rare that the material leaves the factory in good condition ... that's because there were 'loops' left uncut. Before I began working at this machine, the man operating it was afraid of cutting the material [i.e., fabric] and very often we would get the same 'lot' back from the customer who was dissatisfied with the condition of the fabric. The fabric would then have to go through a re-processing to cut the loops. It is preferable to cut a lot the first time and then to simply clean the dust on the material the second time on the shredding machine than not to cut enough.

Once the 'loops' have been cut satisfactorily, the operator moves the fabric in a truck over to the side where the 'tacking machine' is located. The purpose at this machine is to 'tack' [11] together at two foot intervals the two sides of the fabric, thereby 'closing' it. The operator presses a button on the floor next to his/her foot, setting the machine in motion and drawing the 'tacked' fabric through two hard wooden wheels at the same time. When the operator has to 'tack' the fabric, he/she presses the button again to stop the machine. Ahmed, the operator, says that this is a very old and dangerous machine because even after he presses the button to stop the machine, it continues to
pull the fabric a few more inches through the wheels.

Ahmed:

The machine I work with is dangerous. The wheels on the belt that pull the fabric up and over the horizontal bar and into the truck on the other side of it are made of solid wood. When you push the switch, the wheels go and keep going for a few more inches, so the worker must be very careful not to get his hand caught in the wheels... the machine keeps going even when you release the button. One lady got her hand caught in there... I was in the back and I heard a loud scream, and I was wondering where it was coming from but soon I realized that it had to come from the machine and she must have had her hand crushed by the wheels on the machine [12].

From the tacking machine the fabric is brought to the dye house on the first floor.

All fibers require precise chemical solvents to give them qualities such as 'glitteriness', and to make them resistant to light and wash (Commission de la Sante et Securite au Travail, [hereafter CSST] 1987:237). There is a variety of equipment in dye houses across the province; we are concerned with describing the dyeing process in Texgar only.

There are seven dyeing machines in the department. On each machine facing the shopfloor, there are sets of three circular shaped windows through which the operators monitor the dyeing process in the machines. In each machine, there is also water in which the chemicals are mixed. Across each machine is a horizontal bar that spins in a turnstile-like fashion. The operators of these
machines throw one end of the LOT over this horizontal bar, and as it spins, the fabric is lowered into the water and the dyeing chemicals. The other end of the LOT that is in the truck is tied by the operators to a handle on the outside of the machine (CSST, 1987:247). Once the fabric has been washed in the water for some time, the operators pull the wet fabric out of the dyeing machine by the end they tied to a handle outside the machine and put it into another plastic truck.

The greatest danger workers are exposed to in this kind of work is the inhaling of the chemical fumes with which they work. La Commission de la Sante et Securite du Travail (1987:231) claims that working with a high concentration of these chemicals can increase a worker's chance of developing cancer. I do not know the level of tolerance under which workers can safely work, but on most days when I approached the factory I could smell at least a block away the chemical fumes coming from the dye house.

The Finishing Department (see figure 2)

The plastic truck with wet, dyed fabric is pushed towards another machine that functions to burst the 'tacks' that hold together the two sides of the fabric, and to squeeze some of the excess water from the fabric. When the truck is empty and all the tacks have been removed from the
FIGURE 2

Dye House & Finishing Departments

- Store

- Various Fabric Drying Machines

- Exit

- Dye House (approx. 7 Dying Machines)

- The Frame Machine

- Finishing Dept Office

- Padding Machine

- Calendar Machine

- Napping Machine

- Receiving/Shipping Area

- Office
fabric, the fabric is dropped into a drying machine. At this machine, regardless of the season, the temperature is always over 30 degrees celsius. Alfred only wears a pair of shorts at this job [13]. When the fabric is dry, it goes back to the second floor to the shredding machine (most frequently) to clean the dust or lint that has gathered on it as it has moved from one machine to another in the division. From the shredding machine the fabric goes back down to the first floor and to the 'padding machine'. This machine functions to mix chemicals into the fabric that will serve as a foundation for the development of a 'softer', 'shinner' looking fabric.

The next machine the fabric moves through is the 'napping machine'. The function of this machine is to 'nap' the texture of the fabric and to give it a 'softer' feel and a 'fuller' look. Finally, the fabric moves to and through the 'frame'. This is the most impressive machine in the finishing department, and the most crucial since practically all fabric must move through this machine before it leaves the division. According to Leo:

about 75% of the fabric in the textile division goes through the 'frame'. The 'frame' sets form to the fabric with temperature. A customer will make an order to Texgar and he will stipulate that the fabric has to come to him in a certain width and a certain weight per meter (ounces and meters). For example, in the case of fabric for T-Shirts, we have to stretch the fabric in the frame so that it will be a certain width and certain weight; it is obvious that fabric for T-shirts ought to weigh less than fabric for a 'tougher' garment. T-shirt
fabric will weigh between 3 and 5 ounces whereas fabric for coats, sportswear etc., will vary between 8 and 12 ounces per yard. And the people in the factory would then convert the fabric from yards to meters.

The remaining 25% of fabric runs through the 'calendar machine' and is sold to small contractors, or brought to the store on the southwest side of the factory to be sold to customers.

The 'frame' runs about 20 yards in length and is internally divided into four sections. Each of these sections is capable of different degrees of temperature, but the last section operates only in cold temperature. Leo, who operated the 'entry' end of this machine for 14 years before he was fired for suspicion of union activism, says that it is the contraction of the different degrees of heat and cold in the four sections that give uniformity in width and texture to the fabric running through the machine. At the exit end of the frame, three workers attend the machine. One worker indicates to a second worker where the stitch (which was made by the preparation machine operator when he/she sewed together all the rolls in a LOT) is on the fabric so that the latter can cut the fabric with an eight foot wide blade and make rolls out of the fabric once again. A third worker at this end of the machine manipulates two eight-foot long iron rods, and puts cardboard tubes over them so that when the fabric is cut it wraps itself around each of the rods. The end result is that rolls are once
again made from the original LOT of fabric. These rolls are then put into plastic bags and stacked by the frame. It is then Andre's (another shopfloor worker) responsibility to see to it that the LOT leaves the factory for a client when it is supposed to.

This first section has described the technical process of transforming yarn into fabric. It was shown how the manufacturing of fabric is divided between three departments knitting, dye house, and finishing [16].

The next section describes the technical division of labour in the Women's Sweaters Division. As in the fabric division, the technical division of labour in the women's sweaters division has the shopfloor workers performing fragmented operations in a production process organized to produce women's sweaters and children's clothing.

THE WOMEN'S SWEATERS DIVISION [17]

It is only since the physical expansion of the factory was completed in the early 1980s that the Women's Sweaters Division exists in Texgar. Prior to that, the third floor was used for storage of fabrics and garments from the other floors. But with the enlargement of floor space in the factory, Lenny Long (Saltzman's son-in-law) moved his Women's Sweater's and children's clothing business onto the third floor of the factory. According to some of
the workers interviewed from this division, the women's sweaters' division remained independent of the other production processes in the factory, and of Mr. Saltzman's control. They also said that Lenny Long operated his business much like a contractor does: renting floor space and use of machinery, etc., from Texgar.

In April 1987, in a provincial business magazine [18], it was noted that the Women's Sweaters Division was officially integrated into the Texgar corporate structure. This division ceased to be a tenant in the factory, and instead became part of the Texgar corporation. During fieldwork, Mr. Long remained in control of this division, and was also vice-president of Texgar and president of the company's U.S. operations.

Albert Saltzman says that despite the merger, the Women's Sweaters Division remains an independent division (from the rest of the factory) with its own designing and pattern-making staff, as well as its fabric-making production process. Luz, a 'clipping thread' worker in the division, corroborates this statement:

Our floor is like an independent floor from the others, we do everything to the material [fabric] on the third floor... we don't make men's clothes.

Carlos [19] supports Luz's comment:

On the third floor is the [...] Division and they have their own creator [designer] and the rest of the process.
It is not quite clear whether or not workers in this division know that a merger took place between Lenny Long and Texgar. But during interviewing, workers still referred to Mr. Long as the owner ('o patrao') of the Division [20]. The union organizers at the International Ladies Garment Workers Union office, on the other hand, were very much aware of the merger, and in fact, provided me with literature on the recent changes in Texgar.

THE TECHNICAL DIVISION OF LABOUR IN THE WOMEN'S SWEATERS DIVISION

To facilitate description of the technical process of transforming yarn into fabric, and fabric into garments, this Division is divided into its two constitutive departments: 'production' and 'finishing' [21]. In production, workers 'knit', 'press', 'cut', and 'sew' fabric; in finishing, they 'clean', 'press', 'bag', and 'ship' garments. The purpose of the following section is to describe in greater detail the technical elements in each department. As in the fabric division, the technical division here appendages workers to individual tasks in a fragmented production process.
The technical process of transforming yarn into fabric in the women's sweaters division is similar to the process carried on in the fabric division. In the Women's Sweaters Division, knitters thread dyed yarn through the needles in the machines to produce fabric [22]. After the fabric is made, 'examiners' inspect a sample of it for quality content. The vast majority of rolls are of good quality. From this initial process, the fabric is brought to the 'pressers' for 'steaming'. The purpose of this activity is to remove the wrinkles from the delicate fabric made in the knitting area. As soon as this is done, a general shopfloor worker takes the fabric in a plastic buggy (truck) to the cutting area on the floor. In this work-area, the spreaders lay the fabric on the cutting tables and the cutters take their electric knives and cut the fabric into a specific number of pieces with precise sizes. When the pieces of fabric are cut, the spreaders tie the pieces together (backs, fronts, sleeves, collar, etc.), making sure that they are so tied according to the style recorded on the 'LOT' work-sheet. Another general shopfloor worker will then sew the 'piece-work tickets' on each garment piece. These tickets record the time rates for piece-working for the sewing machine operators.

From the cutting area of work, the bushels of
garment pieces are picked up and are brought to the sewing machine operators on the floor. In this section of the floor, she separates the different pieces of garment in each bushel and distributes them to the sewers according to who does what operation with what machine. The task for the sewers is to sew one 'operation' on the garment that is socially produced in this division of labour.

The Finishing Department

The finishing department located on the third floor begins with machine operators stitching buttons holes ('casas'), buttons, hems, etc. on garments. Linda:

In my work section there are about ten women. These women do various jobs: some set lining on the neck or wrists of jackets, others sew collars, or labels, or zippers, etc. All the women in my section [there are three sections of sewers] work with a sewing machine. There are two women who don't work with a machine, they work on their feet 'marking' the garment to indicate to the sewers where they should sew the label, collar, etc.

When these tasks have been performed, 'cleaning' is the next process in the technical division of labour. Luz describes her work process:

I have my own table and so do the other five ladies that work with me in this area. There are two ladies ahead of me, and the other three are besides me [vertically] one after the other. There is a corridor that runs between the two sets of tables where we are located. On this corridor, are boxes with clothes to be 'cleaned'. For my work I need two scissors. The larger [regular] scissors I use when I'm doing another job. 'Clipping' thread ends ['cortar pontas'] is cutting with scissors pieces of thread that are left on
the garments by the sewing machine operators. We get the garments with the stitched side out. Our job is to clip the loose threads on these stitches and then turn the stitched side of the garment inside it. When we are finished, we also remove the 'ticket' from each garment and put it aside so that later in the day we can put them in our individual production sheet [23]. We also drop our finished work into a truck located besides us, and then we take other clothes for clipping. Then, a woman working as a general worker takes the completed garments to the pressers for steaming.

Dalila, who is one of the general shopfloor workers in this division, is responsible for removing all the garments from these various trucks and for arranging them according to style and colour. Dalila:

I usually fix the garments at the 'cutting the thread' [Portuguese literal translation: 'cortar pontas'] area according to LOT numbers. The shirts I fix them and put them on the shelves and from there a guy comes to pick them up... When the garments go to the ladies that cut the threads, they mix-up the LOT numbers because they are always receiving more garments from the women doing the sewing. These garments are dumped into the trucks beside the women cutting [clipping] the threads, so the LOT numbers of the garments get mixed up. The women that work cutting thread don't stand there and sort out the garments according to LOT numbers, they just cut and put them into a truck. I'm the one that takes out the production sheet, and separate the numbers on the shirts, fix them up and put them on the shelves.

When Dalila is done, the garments go back to the pressers for final steam press. After this process, a group of women inspect the final garment verifying that it is complete and without fault. These women also put the garments into plastic bags. Finally, another group of shopfloor workers take the plastic bags of garments and put
them into cardboard boxes to be shipped by truck to clients across the province and the country.

I have tried above to present a brief description of the technical transformation of yarn to fabric and fabric into complete garments. It was also pointed out above that the Women's Sweaters' Division is independent from the Fabric Division [and the other divisions - as we will see below]. This division works with dyed imported yarn to produce creations designed in the sample room section of the floor.

Next is the examination of the technical organization of production in the two remaining divisions of the factory. This examination begins with the 'Sample Room' Division.

THE SAMPLE ROOM DIVISION

A central purpose of the preceding description of the fabric and women's sweaters divisions was to show how the technical division of labour in each of those divisions is structured by a fragmentation of tasks among workers in the making of a specific product. This technical process also requires some machinery; and I have tried to include in the description some basic information on the tools for production in those divisions. Thus, in the fabric division, for example, some workers knit fabric, others
'prepare' fabric, others 'dye' fabric, and still others 'finish' the fabric and then ship it. However, in the Sample Room division, there isn't a horizontal division of labour between workers; workers are not performing fragmented tasks in the technical organization of production. Instead, shopfloor workers in this division use their 'skills' to make a complete garment outfit (i.e., a dress, or a coat). Toni:

... it is a garment that is ready to be worn, if someone was waiting to be clothed, he would leave the sample room completely clothed.

In this division, shopfloor women workers make the entire garment themselves. This is possible because they are skilled dressmakers ('costureiras') capable of producing a whole garment outfit simply on the basis of a pattern produced by a management employee. Their skill is also evident in their manipulation of the various instruments of labour made available to them for the creation of garment samples.

The purpose of the following analysis is to discuss the technical aspects of garment sample-making in this division, and to show that it is a worker's skill rather than machinery that is central to garment sample making.

On the fifth floor of the factory (see figure 3), six shopfloor workers make garment samples for three different clothing 'base-lines' [24]. The base-lines that
make up the sample room division are TG Active, Nouveauwear, and Michel Robichaux. I have termed each of these a sub-division of the Sample Room Division. The TG Active and Nouveauwear sub-divisions (or base-lines) are owned by Texgar; the other, 'Michel Robichaux', is owned and controlled by the internationally recognized Canadian clothing designer of the same name [25]. In the following section of the chapter, I describe in greater detail the technical process of making garment 'samples' in TG Active and Nouveauwear. I concentrate my
FIGURE 3

Sample Room Division

- Cafeteria
- Cutting Room
- Computer Area and
  Workers making patterns
- Sample Room
- Storage of Fabrics
- Offices
- Shipping
discussion on these two base-lines because both are owned by Texgar, and workers in these two division were potential members of the bargaining union. On the other hand, shopfloor workers in the Michel Robichaux sub-division are not part of Texgar, and therefore would not form part of the bargaining unit had the union drive been successful. As a result, the technical aspect of production in this sub-division is not discussed.

TG Active Sample Making

TG Active is owned by Texgar and is ultimately under the direction of Lenny Long. (The latter also runs the women's sweaters division on the third floor of the factory). In this room, there are seven workers: only two women are shopfloor workers making the 'samples' for this clothes-line [26]. Manuel describes what each worker does in the TG Active sample room:

The designer makes a sketch of a new fashion style for the new season. When the sketch is done, he takes a picture of it and gives it to the pattern-maker. From this picture, the pattern-maker reproduces on paper with specific measurements a model that will enable the women workers to make the sample garment. The women workers take some fabric which corresponds to the colour and style that is needed to make the garment, cut it, and then sew it together to make a clothing outfit. When the sample is made, it is brought to the pattern-maker and to the manager of the division who looks over the sample to evaluate whether or not the complete sample has turned out as good as they imagined it would. If it has, the sample is given to the salesman who shows it to potential retail customers across the province and the country. If the sample
does not turn out like the manager expected it to, the women workers will re-do the sample, perhaps with a fabric of a different colour, etc. The samples in this division are made in size ten.

The designer and the pattern-maker (both management employees), in this sub-division as well as in Nouveauwear, were formally trained in private institutions for the practice of their craft. But this is not the case of the sample maker in TG Active (and Noveauwear). Nevertheless, Ana demonstrates excellent skill when she describes the range of tools she has to work with in making a complete garment outfit. Ana:

When I get to work, if there aren't any [pieces of fabric] from the day before, I must cut the fabric that I need to make a sample. When I arrive in the factory, the pattern-maker tells me that there are three or four pieces of garments to cut and make. Usually she will get me the models [patterns] that I need to make a sample. To make a sample I use scissors, the 'plain stitch' sewing machine, the 'overlock' machine that sews the hems, the 'blind and stitch' machine, and the sewing machine that makes the button holes: I use four sewing machines. I also use the iron to iron the garment when it is finished, a chalk to make lines on the fabric to cut, a pencil and a ruler. The majority of work I do passes through all these operations. The final things I do is iron the final sample that I make and then put it on a rack.

When Ana has finished making a sample, the following discussion usually takes place between the pattern-maker, and this sub-division's manager:

When a sample is finished, it goes to the office and there they [manager and pattern-maker] arrange it with other samples of clothing. They try to fit a skirt with a blouse, or pants with a certain colour shirt, etc. When they have decided which samples they like and will try to sell, then I have to make a couple more
copies of the original sample. A copy is kept in the division and another is given to the salesmen that works in our division. The only time that I make the same sample more than two or three times is when they tell me to make the same sample but in a different colour or with a different kind of fabric. Sometimes they don't like how a sample looks, so they want to see how it looks with a different colour, or sleeve length or skirt length ... Other times the sample doesn't look on the [professional woman] model as good as they thought it would. So I have to make the same sample with some modifications.

Very often the samples Ana makes are not created by TG Active designers. They are copies from creations made by designers in New York, Paris or China. These copies are brought back to TG Active by the pattern-maker and the TG Active manager returning from business trips to these places. Gregory Teal (1985:256) says that this is known in the industry as 'style piracy'. Ana explains why this occurs:

Sometimes they [the manager and the pattern-maker] go to New York to purchase some garments already made. They know that these garments will sell well, and will be popular in the new fashion season. From these garments they make a similar design, modifying what they want. Some other times, from these new garments they get new ideas for the creation of their own lines of clothing or whatever else they want. Sometimes all they do is change labels on the garments they have purchased. For example, sometimes they change the labels on the garments that they have purchased in New York. But when they want to show this garment to a buyer, they don't want him [the buyer] to see that they have bought it in New York, so they tell me to remove the 'old' label from New York, and to sew the TG Active label on the back of the neck of the garment. They don't sell these garments, they just use them to show to potential buyers: people who come to the factory to buy clothes and want to see what clothes will look like. I think that they tell me to remove the label to give the buyer the impression that it is Texgar made
cotton clothing when in fact it is made in New York or Paris or China, etc. They simply modify some features of the piece or sometimes leave it intact.

Once the garment samples are made, and the manager approves its 'look', the salesman takes a copy of the sample and brings it with him across Canada. The latter's job is to sell the garment sample to clothing retailers across the province, and across the country. If he is successful in doing so, he returns to the factory with client orders for a certain quantity (e.g., 5,000 garments) of the sample for his client. However, these client orders are not mass produced by TG Active - this would be impossible for Ana to do - but by contractors. Ana [27]:

If the potential buyer likes the sample and makes an order, it is then the contractors that fulfill this order.

Nouveauwear

Nouveauwear is also owned and controlled by Texgar; Jerry Saltzman (Albert Saltzman's son) is president. Contrary to TG Active, the majority of the samples made in this sub-division are mass produced in Texgar on the sixth and fourth floors of the factory (the Casualwear Division). Some Nouveauwear creations have been recently exported to the United States and are mass produced there for Texgar by contractors only.

The technical division of labour in the Nouveauwear
division is very similar to that described by Ana for TG Active. Toni:

Making samples is the following: there is a man designer that draws the design and takes a picture of it. This picture goes to the pattern-maker who reproduces it on a paper pattern. Once the sample has been transferred to the paper pattern, I do the rest.

Toni continues describing the skill involved in her work:

I have to cut the fabric needed to make the piece, and follow the paper pattern that I am given by one of my superiors. I make the whole piece. I use scissors, and the singer sewing machine ("que fecha a costura"). Once the stitch ("costura") is closed, I have to use the overlock machine which makes the final stitch ("costura") so that the fabric won't disintegrate ("desfilar"). We work with the singer and the overlock a lot because no piece of garment leaves our area without going through these two machines. Once the piece is almost ready from the singer and the overlock, it goes to the machine that makes the button holes. If you are doing a skirt then you also have to pass the fabric through the machine that sews hems. The people that work in the sample room have to know how to use all the machines since they are all needed for the work that has to be done. I have to start with the scissors because I have to cut the fabric to make the garment. Then to sew the lining inside of some piece of garment we have to stick it [lining] and use the iron to put it in the garment. So in the sample room we have to do everything. I also use the iron because our production isn't like the one upstairs [sixth floor] which runs through two floors. All our work is done in the sample room.

Toni points out that her work is not like that of women sewing machine operators in the production department on the sixth floor. She has to know how to operate various means of production, and share some of the responsibilities in Nouveauwear:

I have to control the fabric that I use to make the sample. For example, I have to know how wide the
fabric has to be... if I have a 60 cm piece of fabric but the blouse I am making only uses 40 cm, I am then responsible for the 20 cm of fabric left because when the production department gets the order they are not going to waste 20 cm of fabric every time they make a blouse. So I have to control the fabric... When I'm left with that amount of fabric [20 cm] after I'm done, I have to talk with the pattern-maker and tell her about the fabric that is left over. It is her that is responsible since she is the one that made the pattern. I tell her 'there is going to be fabric left over and that the production department won't accept this. What you need to do is open your model in the middle and make a stitch in the middle of it or somewhere else'. She then fixes her model to compensate for the error. At this point, when I begin to work with the fabric, it becomes my responsibility.

In the past, Toni says, Nouveauwear management also practiced 'style piracy':

In the past they [management] would go to New York or Vancouver or some other place and buy some garments. They would return to the factory with these garments... they weren't stealing someone's idea because it was already on sale, but they would duplicate the garments in the division. They gave up this idea because it can't replace the creativity of someone and didn't give them any room to add things or replace other things on the duplicate. Today, they have a Chinese man creating the 'line' of clothing.

I have attempted to describe here the technical division of labour in each (section) of the fifth floor. I have used extensive verbatim quotes from workers in this Division to provide the most accurate picture possible of the technical aspects of production in the Division. The data shows, contrary to the other divisions (including the casualwear division that I will describe next), that there isn't a technical division of labour on this shopfloor with each worker performing an individual operation in the
collective making of garment samples. Instead, Ana and Toni each make an entire garment themselves. The verbatim quotes from these two women shopfloor workers demonstrate their skill in making a garment outfit and in operating several instruments of labour.

Next, I describe the last Division in the factory the Casualwear Division.

THE CASUALWEAR DIVISION

The technical division of labour in the Casualwear Division is a continuation of a process that begins in Nouveauwear on the fifth floor of the factory. As I described above, the technical division of labour in Nouveauwear is organized to make garment samples of new fashion creations drawn up by the two designers in the division. These samples are sold to retail stores in the province of Quebec, and across the country by a salesperson working for Nouveauwear. The retail orders that the salesperson brings back are then mass produced in the Casualwear Division. Toni describes the coordination between Nouveauwear and the Casualwear Division:

We work with many different fabrics and they [fabrics] change according to the season. For the 'winter line', we use mostly wool. In the spring and the others season 'lines', the fabrics change. We use a fabric that corresponds to the season line of the year. From one season's line to the next, the first fabric that comes to the factory comes to us so that we can make the sample to show to the salesman and customers. Once
the sample is approved by the salesman, that is when they order the fabric so that they can make the stock upstairs and it goes from the fifth floor to the sixth floor where all those people work to produce the orders for the customers.

The examination of the technical division of labour in this division reveals a fragmented process of women's garment making, with workers performing individual tasks in the overall manufacturing of a garment. Some operations require the use of expensive and sophisticated garment-specific technological tools (i.e., 'grading'), others involve monotonous tasks characteristic of sewing machine operations. This difference will be clear in the description below.

The Casualwear Division occupies the sixth and fourth floors of the factory. It is controlled by Jerry Saltzman. He became its president during the corporate restructuring of the factory in 1983.

According to Carlos, it is only occasionally that the casualwear division relies on the fabric division for fabric. For the most part, it is an independent division from the others in the factory:

We stock fabric that we use to make different styles for the costumers. We practically don't use any fabric from downstairs [i.e., fabric division]. We do use some of the fabric from downstairs for the Spring Season. All they can do [in the fabric division] is velour, fleece and interlock. Who uses velour? Fleece you make T-shirts, its not a big seller; with interlock you make sweatsuits. The fabric we use on the sixth floor is from the States, the Orient, wherever we can...
The object of labour in this division is the production of women's casualwear clothing for the Canadian market. It includes ready-to-wear pants, skirts, blouses, coats, etc.

Like the women's sweaters division, the Casualwear Division is also made up of two departments: production and finishing. This section of the chapter elaborates the technical division of labour found in each of these departments. The production department is located on the sixth floor of the factory, while finishing occupies the fourth floor.

THE TECHNICAL DIVISION OF LABOUR IN THE CASUALWEAR DIVISION

The Production Department (see figure 4)

The technical division of labour in the Casualwear Division spreads over two floors in the factory. Carlos describes where different operations in the casualwear division are done in the factory:
Casualwear Division: The Production Dept.

- Sewing Machine
- Operators

- Office of Sewing Machine
- Supervisors

- Sewing Machine Operators using E-Ton System

- Freight Elevator

- Spreading and Cutting Tables

- Spreading and Cutting Tables

- Offices
- Stockroom

- -Grading Machine

- -Office of the Supervisor for Cutters and Spreaders

- Exit

<←Corridor→>
The 'marking', the 'grading', the 'spreading', the 'cutting', and the 'sewing' is done on the sixth floor; the 'pressing', the 'finishing', the 'bagging', and the 'shipping' on the fourth floor.

The garment samples in Nouveauwear are made in size ten. However, since only a limited number of women fit this 'ideal' size, the salesperson will invariably get orders from clients which will demand that the sample be manufactured within a range of sizes 6 to 20. In this Division, the 'grader' uses the grading computer to automatically scale the original size ten sample to any size [28]. Carlos explains the 'grading' process:

Before you can begin to make garments, you need a 'grader' to adjust the sample style according to different sizes to fit all women. The salesman takes with him only the sample style size ten, but when he returns with customer orders, they are usually for garments of all sizes to fit the person on the street. The job of the grader is to adjust the sample style to make all the different sizes possible.

Moses does the grading in this division. But to operate the grading machine, Moses took a two-week training course in computers at a local college. Moses:

They used to have to do the adjustments of sizes on paper, it was all done on paper [prior to the grading machine]. I worked many years as a grader doing it by hand, but then they [management] bought a computer. To learn to operate the computer, they [management] paid for me to attend a two-week training course at Lasalle College. But at the college, I just learned the basics since the computer that Texgar eventually got was different from the one they said they were buying and that was like the one I used in school... even the programmes were different.

Only after the grading is done can production begin on the
On the sixth floor, a shopfloor worker requests a specific fabric from one of the fabric stockroom workers. The shopfloor worker brings this fabric to the 'cutting area'. Here, both 'spreaders' and 'cutters' manipulate the fabric to make it manageable for the workers in the production process. Arturo explains the spreading of fabric:

My job is spreading fabric. I take the fabric, put it on the machine and then spread it. If one roll isn't enough, I take another and do the same thing. This is an electric machine with a space on the side where you will stand and ride along the table on it spreading the fabric. The machine also has an accelerator peddle which you press to move you along the table. The tables are about 20 or 25 meters long and 5 meters wide. The fabric is put on an iron rod over the top part of the machine, the machine then unrolls the fabric from the rod as the operator accelerates the peddle. There are only men at this job because some of the rolls of fabric are very heavy; sometimes you need two men to put the roll on the machine, they are enormous rolls. So you spread the fabric with the machine until you have spread the quantity they wanted you to. Once you have finished spreading an order, you go onto another.

According to Arturo, these spreading machines are highly sophisticated:

On the [spreading] machine, there is also a light that ensures that all fabric is lined right on the side of the cutter or spreader. This is important because the pieces that are cut must all be the same width and size. If they are not lined up right when the cutter cuts, some of the pieces aren't good since they are not the right size to sew by the women. This machine also keeps track of the meters of fabric you spread, and this is important since you have to keep track of the fabric you have worked with. Once you have spread a piece of material according to the length they want
[ten meters for each piece, for example] then you press a button on the machine and the machine has a type of knife which will then cut the piece of fabric.

There are also guide lines that the spreaders must following in doing their job. Arturo:

There are also orders that you have to follow when you are spreading. For example, when you have to spread 'face-to-face'... this means that you can spread the fabric without stopping the machine. The machine will spread pieces of the fabric of ten meters each on top of each other without stopping to cut each piece separately. When it is 'face-to-face', the fabric is the same on both sides. But when you are spreading 'face-up', you have to cut each piece individually after you have spread the appropriate number of meters. The reason for this is that the fabric is not the same on both sides.

When a Lot of fabric has been spread, the spreader will usually move to another table and begin spreading more fabric on it. The spreader then puts over the fabric a paper pattern that outlines to the cutter the different pieces he/she has to cut from this LOT and which will eventually be a garment by the end of the production process. Moses:

The fabric is spread on the table, and then a paper with the design of all the pieces to make a shirt or whatever is laid over the fabric. When there is a pile of 100 or 200 fabric layers, I cut the fabric with an electric knife... one wrong turn and the entire pile is wasted. The blade of the knife is about ten inches in length, and it moves like an electric saw. There is also a handle on the knife which you hold and push it along the fabric in the direction you want it to go.

Once the fabric is cut, a shopfloor worker ties together the different pieces cut, in the process making sure that different styles of fabric and different pieces of garment
do not get mixed up. This same worker is also in charge of clearing the 'spreading' table so that a spreader can repeat the same process with another lot of fabric. From the 'cutting' area, this shopfloor worker brings the pieces of fabric to women workers who separate the pieces of fabric according to size. These workers also sew the 'tickets' (that record the piece-work rates for the sewing machine operations in another section on the floor) onto the different pieces of fabric. These pieces are then put on shelves until the order from another section of the floor arrives requesting a particular fabric.

The next work process in the technical division of labour is 'fusing'. This involves inserting pieces of cotton into collars, pockets, and wrists in order to stiffen them. This work is done with a machine which expels heat onto the fabric to make a piece of cotton stick onto a specific spot on the fabric. Once complete, the pieces of garment are brought to the sewing machine operators for sewing.

Two sections of sewing machine operators make up this work area in the technical division of labour. In one section coats and blouses are sewn; in the other, skirts and pants. In both sections, the same kinds of sewing machines are used: overlock, and the singer. In Ida's sewing section, work is done with the recently introduced E-Ton
computerized system. Under this system, the pieces of garment are delivered automatically to a sewer, who performs her task on the garment and then sends the garment by the same system to another worker responsible for performing the next task on the garment. According to Ida this is a new system in the division, and one which was introduced on a trial basis to evaluate its results in the division. Ida maintains that management will soon extend this system to include the other sewing machine operators in the division [29].

Lina (6th floor) works in the sewing machine section opposite to Ida. This is her work process in the technical division of labour:

I have always done the same job in Texgar, closing [sewing] pants and skirts. I do the following: I receive pants in four pieces and my job is to close all these pieces and make a pair of pants. Once I have closed the pants, they then go to someone else who sews other pieces of the pants; a pair of pants goes through different machines always in the same section. Usually we get about 7,000 or 8,000 pants to sew and when the job is big, there are two of us sewing pants. When the work is slow, I'm the only one that sews the pants. Sometimes, like right now, when there is a lot of work, we are three sewing pants only, or skirts. The machines we work on only 'close' the pants or skirts. The 'seaming' is the name of the machine I work with and it sews only straight. It does not make turns.

While Lina is responsible for sewing the pants together, other sewing machine operators in her section sew on the zippers, hems etc.
The finishing department

The garments manufactured on the sixth floor of Texgar are sent down by a chute for 'finishing' on the fourth floor (see figure 5). Maria is the first worker to receive these garments. Her job is to find out from the ticket on each garment what operation each garment requires in the finishing department. This done, she then distributes the garments to the workers responsible for performing each operation. Maria describes her work process and that of her co-workers in the same vicinity:
FIGURE 5

Casualwear Division: The Finishing Dept.

Area where Thread Trimming and Inspection of complete Garment is done

Presses

Area where Button Holes and Button Stitching is done

Exit

Shipping

Offices

Shipping
My job is to check the clothes that come from the sixth floor whether they take buttons, and where the buttons have to be stitched. If it does, I give the clothes a to a woman worker responsible for using the 'slope' which indicates on the clothes where the button holes have to be sewn. Once the 'marking' woman worker has done her job, I take the work and bring it to the women responsible for sewing the buttons holes. From there, I again take their work and bring it to the button sewing machines. Once the women sewing buttons have finished their work, I take the clothes again and pass them on to the woman distributor on the 'clipping clothes ends' section.

There is on the shopfloor a woman worker whose job is to distribute work to the other wage workers on the shopfloor. This woman will distribute work to (among others) the women workers 'cleaning' the garments. This activity is simply the removal of thread lines from the stitches on the clothes that the sewing machine operators have sewn on the garment. Once this operation is performed, the garments are brought to the pressers. There are approximately twelve pressers on this floor. Their job is to steam press the larger garments that pass through the division of labour. Each of these workers steams a different garment; one will steam press coats, another skirts, another blouses, etc. In this same work area, there are four shopfloor women workers hand ironing the smaller garments or smaller pieces in the large garments. They will iron collars, the fronts of blouses, etc.

From the press/ironing section, the garments are put on hangers on an electrical conveyor belt above the
shopfloor, and passed along to the 'examiners' work area. Here, workers remove the clothes from the hangers on the electrical belt and inspect them to make sure that all operations have been performed on the garment, and that they have been done so correctly. From here, another group of shopfloor workers sew price tickets on the garments, and the style number on each piece of clothing. Finally, the technical division of labour ends with the 'bagging' and the 'packing' of the clothes into cardboard boxes for shipment to the clients.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has been a description of the technical division of labour in each of the four divisions of labour in Texgar. The examination of the factory in this manner has revealed that each of the divisions has its own object of labour, and instruments of labour. But that isn't all that was found.

It was also found that in three divisions workers were divided horizontally between themselves in conformity with the fragmented production process organized in each division. Within this organization of production, they do partial operations in the overall manufacture of the product for which production is organized in each of the divisions. In the Sample Room, shopfloor workers are not divided
horizontally and each makes a complete garment. However, the organization of production did reveal a 'Taylorist' feature: the separation of conception from execution. That is, women workers produce complete garments conceived and designed by management.

Finally, the discussion of the technical division of labour has also revealed that workers in Texgar are divided vertically between the four divisions in the factory. As a result, they face different organizations of production and work under different working conditions in each division. Moreover, contact between workers of the different divisions is minimal.
NOTES

1. Of course these simple elements of the labour process do not produce use values by themselves. In the following chapter, we will discuss the character of the workforce putting to work the means of production in the factory. In particular, we will focus on the gender and ethnic divisions of labour in the factory.

2. There is, however, a connection between the production process in one of the 'clothing-lines' (Nouveauwear) in the Sample Room Division and the Casualwear Division. Two women shopfloor workers in Nouveauwear create garment samples from patterns drawn by the pattern-maker. These garment samples are then sold to customers by a salesperson who returns to the Division with customer orders which are then mass produced on the shopfloor of the Casualwear Division.

But within the Sample Room Division, there are still two 'clothing-lines' that are independent of the production process of the Casualwear Division, and of the other two Divisions in Texgar.

3. By 'working conditions' I mean the systems of wage payments and work schedules in the factory.

4. This is also known as an 'employment authorization form' (Plaut, 1985:145).

Prior to December 28, 1988, a refugee could engage only in wage work with this government authorization form, and any refugee caught working without it would face immediate deportation. His/her employer would also be liable to pay a fine of up to $5,000 and imprisonment for two years if it could be proven that he/she knowingly hired a refugee worker who did not have a work permit (Robinson, 1984:483). Those employers who have been found guilty of employing refugees who do not carry work permits, have paid fines in a range between $75 and $500 (Ibid).

But on December 28, 1988, Barbara McDougall, Minister of Immigration, announced that refugees in Canada prior to January 1, 1989, would be able to engage in wage work without a work permit. Refugees, however, complained that immigration authorities are unaware of the change in legislation, since they tell them to refrain from taking a job without first having a work permit. This complaint is confirmed by employers since they too have been told by immigration officials to refrain from hiring refugees until
so authorized (Toronto Star, Wednesday, February 1, 1989, p.10).

On January 16, 1989, a press release from the Minister of Immigration Office, indicated that immigration regulations had been amended 'to allow those without employment authorization to work'. But only those refugees who arrived in Canada after May 21, 1986 and before January 1, 1989, will benefit from this legislative change (Ibid).

5. These machines are very expensive: '... a Sulzer loom costs around $50,000 in 1980 and an open-end spinning frame $200,000' (Chalifoux, 1985:33).


8. Mathieu is absolutely right when he says that the 'prepartion machine' has not been technologically upgraded. However, he has witnessed technological change in the machinery in the department, especially the knitting machines. Mathieu's verbatim quoted here, therefore, does not contradict my argument that new machinery is frequently introduced into the shopfloor.

9. For a discussion of technology involving the deskillling of workers see Harry Braverman's Labor and Monopoly Capital (1974). For an opposite thesis that argues that technology will make work less tedious and more intellectually stimulating, see Blauner (1964). Daniel Bell (1973) also follows the latter camp with respect to the benefits of technology.

10. By 'loops' I mean the patterns on the fabric once it is knitted.

11. In order to 'tack' together the two sides of the fabric, the operator takes an instrument made in the shape of a gun with a trigger and a thin sharp point on the barrel of this 'gun'. To 'tack' the fabric, the operator pushes the sharp point of the 'gun' through the two sides of the fabric and then 'pulls the trigger'. This releases a plastic tag that serves to hold together the two sides of the fabric.

12. Women workers in the fabric division worked either as 'examiners' in the stockroom, or as operators of the 'tacking machine'. At the time of fieldwork, there were only two women workers employed by the Fabric Division. But
these women worked as secretaries in the division's office.

13. In summer time, the humidity on this floor is unbearable. Most workers on the first floor work just in shorts. However, those in the dye house must wear boots and protective gowns while on the job. I did not see any of the workers in the latter department wearing protective goggles.

14. This machine gives a particular touch to cotton fabric (CSST, 1987:258). The use of this machine depends, of course, on what the customer wants done to the fabric.

15. Along with the expansion of the factory and the fabric division, a store was established on the southwest corner of the first floor. In this store, fabric is sold in bulk to shoppers.

16. Part of my focus in the following chapter is a discussion of the characteristics of the workforce and their working conditions in the factory generally. I will also draw on the gender and ethnic composition of workers in some of the Divisions to illustrate some of the arguments I will make in that chapter.

17. Workers in this division also manufacture children's clothes. However, I have decided to call this division simply 'The Women's Sweaters Division' because this is how Albert Saltzman referred to it during my interviews with him.

18. The title of this magazine is Affaires. But for confidentiality and anonymity purposes, I have decided not include the title of the article from which this information was gathered nor the date of publication. To do otherwise, would reveal the actual name of factory discussed in this thesis.

19. Carlos was the only shopfloor supervisor that granted me an interview. He is Portuguese and is in charge of the stockroom on the sixth floor.

20. As I explained in the methodology chapter, Lenny Long could not be reached for an interview because Albert Saltzman said that it was not a good idea and that he (Saltzman) wasn't even going to bring up to Long the possibility of an interview. In hindsight, I wish I had pursued (independently of Albert Saltzman) Lenny Long for an interview. But at the time I had already been granted access to the Fabric
Division, and I did not want to jeopardize this by ignoring Albert Saltzman's warning concerning his son-in-law.

21. This is also how workers described during interviewing the make up of this division.

22. There are two main differences between the two divisions. The first is that knitters in the fabric division use all-natural yarn and dye the fabric by a process known as 'piece dyeing'. In contrast, in the women's sweaters division, the yarn used is imported from the Far East, and comes to the factory already dyed. Therefore, knitters in this division thread the needles in the knitting machines with different colour yarn depending on the style and colour of garment they are asked to produce collectively. The second difference is that in the fabric division, the yarn made there is sold to garment manufacturers. In the women's sweaters division, the yarn is kept in the division and is used to manufacture women's sweaters and children's clothing.

23. These 'tickets' are for 'piece-work' rates. Louise Lamphere (1979) describes the complicated fashion in which calculations of piece-rates are arrived at. She remarks that the obscurity of piece-work calculation by management is another way of controlling workers. None of the workers I interviewed were able to tell me how a particular piece-work rate was arrived at. Some of them just pointed out that it was the 'piece rate fixer' who came on the floor once in awhile to time the sewing machine operators; he is the one who sets the piece-work rate.

24. By a 'clothing base-line', I mean the brand name of a specific line of clothing sold in the market.

25. In 1983, Michel Robichaux celebrated his twentieth anniversary in the clothing business. He concentrates his designing efforts on making ready-to-wear collections. These are produced by Canadian garment manufacturers and then sold across the country. The Robichaux motto is:

To make good-looking, quality clothes available to the greatest number of Quebecers at acceptable prices (Montreal Gazette, February 15, 1983, p.C8).

26. There are also three men working in the 'shipping' department of TG Active. For reasons discussed in the methodology chapter, I was unable to interview them.
27. When I recently saw Ana, she told me that management has brought into her workplace a machine known as 'computer-aided design and manufacturing' (CAD/CAM). She said that this machine does not affect her directly, but that pattern-makers in TG Active (and Nouveauuwear since garment sample makers here use the same machines) were turning out patterns four times faster than before the machine was on the shopfloor. Ana also said that she felt that the two pattern-makers that work with her had suddenly changed their behaviour, and were now rather quite reserved and elusive. She thinks that this change in behaviour is due to the new machine in the division.

I would not be surprised to find that the pattern-makers fear losing for their jobs. Consider the pace and deskillng potential of CAD/CAM (all three quotes below are from Heisey, 1984):

Computer-aided design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM) have increased the speed of pattern making, fabric cutting, and to a lesser extent, sewing... (p.10)

CAD/CAM has significantly reduced the time it takes to make a pattern and prepare it for cutting. The skilled hands of an artisan no longer need to touch the pattern during production. A digitizer is used to convert the basic block or pattern shape into coordinate data and to enter the data into computer memory. Monitoring the process of pattern development on a video display terminal, a pattern maker can instruct the computer to relocate darts, convert darts into gathers, a pleat or flare, add seam allowances, and so forth, to produce a pattern for a specific garment style. In essence, many time-consuming manipulations once performed by hand can be accomplished quickly and accurately with computer aid (p. 10-11).

Unlike mechanical systems of automation that require lengthy retooling to respond to change, computer controlled automation is flexible. Only the programming needs to be changed, not the machinery (p.11)

28. Cynthia Cockburn (1985:53) describes the 'grading' process, and argues that it is one of the most skilled positions in the garment industry. She also points out that, in the garment industry, 'grading' is an occupation dominated by men. On the sixth floor, there two 'graders', a woman and a man.
There are also 'graders' in the Women's Sweaters Division (on the third floor), but I am not certain of their gender.

29. A clearer picture of this system and its implications for workers on the shopfloor is discusses in the union chapter.
CHAPTER SIX

GENDER AND THE LABOUR PROCESS

INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter we examined the object of labour, the means of labour, and the technical division of labour at Texgar. Our examination showed a structural division of the factory into four production processes (the Fabric Division, the Women's Sweaters Division, the Sample Room Division, and the Casualwear Division), and the fragmentation of shopfloor work in three of the four divisions. Only in the Sample Room Division were women shopfloor workers not subjected to performing individual tasks in the production process. Instead, all were skilled workers, each performing all the necessary operations in the creation of a complete garment outfit.

In this and the following chapter, we turn our analysis to the workers operating and manipulating the various instruments of production in each division, and in the process producing surplus labour for the owners of Texgar, in return for a wage. The 'workers' labouring for Texgar are not a homogeneous group. They are heterogeneously divided according to gender and ethnicity [1]. The aim of this chapter is to describe the gender division of labour as integral to the labour processes in
the factory. We seek to describe 'woman's work' and 'man's work' on the shopfloor, and, at the same time, present the gender ideology supporting this division of labour in the factory. The workers' 'explanations' express a patriarchal view of gender roles on the shopfloor and in society generally. This 'explanation' proposes a 'biological deterministic' interpretation of gender roles in society: men and women do different work because they are biologically different. It also ignores the social construction of gender roles.

This chapter commences, first of all, with a brief discussion of the conceptual definition of the social division of labour in order to contextualize the gender and race/ethnic discussion within Texgar. This is followed by a description of the gender division of labour.

CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION OF THE SOCIAL DIVISION OF LABOUR

The social division of labour is a system whereby groups of workers are allocated to different branches of production. In capitalism, this allocation occurs through the market [2]. Gender is a central determining factor in this process, and this is evident in the empirical data available on the industrial and occupational gender segregation of the Canadian labour force.

Prior to WW II, Canadian women took on wage-labour
after completing school and before marrying (Heron and Storey, 1986:9-10). But following the War, they began to join the labour force at unprecedented levels. The result is that the rate of increase in women's participation in wage labour has more than doubled that of men since 1941 (Armstrong and Armstrong, 1978:16). In the period between 1961-1971, women represented 55% of labour force growth in Canada. Between 1975 and 1985, women's participation in the labour force grew from 3,680,000 to 5,382,000 - an increase of 46.3 percent (Labour Canada, The Women's Bureau, 1987:3). The labour force participation of men for the same period, on the other hand, increased only by 15.3 percent - from 6,294,000 in 1975 to 7,257,000 in 1985. As a result, in 1985 women made up 42.6 percent of the total labour force in Canada; this is up from 36.9 percent in 1975 (Labour Canada, The Women's Bureau, 1987:3). Without a doubt, the most significant feature of the Canadian labour force over the last fifty years has been the increasing participation rate of women [3].

Despite Canadian women's increasing participation in wage labour, their situation in the labour force has not changed significantly. Instead, they "remain segregated in many of the least attractive and low-paying jobs. There are simply now many more women doing the same kinds of work" (Armstrong and Armstrong 1978:20). When women began to
increasingly join the paid work force in 1951, 2/3 of them held jobs in just four industries: trade; finance and real estate; community business, and financial services; and public administration and defence. By 1971, this hadn't changed much: 3/4 of all working women were concentrated in those same industries (Armstrong and Armstrong, 1978:25-26). The industrial segregation of women workers persists since as recently as 1985, women constituted the majority of labour force participants in the service industry and the finance, insurance and real estate industry (61.8% and 60.4% respectively) (Labour Canada, The Women's Bureau, 1987:3). Furthermore, nearly one-half (46.4%) of women wage workers in 1985 were segregated in the service industry [4].

The gender division of labour within industry is similarly revealing. In 1978, Pat and Hugh Armstrong (1978:34, table 6) recorded that more than half of the paid women workers could be found in just 10 occupations. By 1984 and 1985, little had changed: "women continued to predominate in the clerical, medical and health occupations where they made up over three quarters of all participants. They also dominated the teaching and service occupations where they constituted over half of all labour force participants" (Labour Canada, The Women's Bureau, 1987:3). Thus, in 1985, 59.3 percent of all women in the labour force were concentrated in the clerical, sales and services

The occupational structure, like the industrial structure, reflects the response of women to particular labour force demands. In spite of the enormous growth in female labour force participation, it is clear from the data that women continue to be segregated in many of the jobs and industry divisions characterized by low recognized skill requirements and low labour productivity levels. The labour force is divided into women's work and men's work, a situation that has remained remarkably stable over the forty years covered by the last five census (Armstrong and Armstrong, 1984:41).

Gender segregation is also evident in the average earning income for full-time work. The average wage earnings of full-time working women in 1985 was 59.6 percent of men's average earnings for full-time work. And in 1984 and 1985, "there were no occupational categories where the average earnings of women exceeded those of men (Labour Canada, The Women's Bureau, 1987:35-36).

In addition to gender segregation in paid wage work, the social division of labour also burdens Canadian women with domestic duties: day-in-and-day-out they begin their double day early in the morning (before wage labour) and don't get any relief from it until late into the night. The double day of labour under capitalism - and State-socialist societies - chains women to the household and to the reproduction of the future labour force. For example, the labour force participation rate for single women across all age categories in 1985 was 65.7 percent. This is a full 11 percentage points higher participation rate than that of
married women across the same age categories (54.7 percent) (Labour Canada, The Women's Bureau, 1987:4).

Domestic labour also hampers women from taking part in existing working class organizations (e.g. trade unions) (Edelson, 1984) working towards improving the position of women and the labour force in general in the Canadian capitalist labour market [5]. In contrast to their male counterparts, Canadian working women must manage their double day of labour in order to provide necessary income for the maintenance and reproduction of the household (Aguiar, 1989). This restricts them from access to many opportunities for advancement and at the same time, perpetuates their role as reproducers of wage labour and nurturing mothers, and as dependents on the wages of their partners.

The garment and textile industries are (and have always been) a women's 'ghetto' labour market. As recently as 1983, 32.4% (or 94,988) of women workers in the manufacturing sector of the economy laboured in garments and textiles (calculated from Cohen, 1987:23, table 1).[6] But these official statistics conceal the gender division of labour and the justification for its 'permanency' on the shopfloor in the garment and textile sector. Moreover, it is also commonly believed that women naturally possess 'nimble fingers' and are not 'technically inclined' which
makes them ideal workers for the garment industries where such 'skills' are said to be essential for activities like 'sewing' [7]. A description of gender distribution across the four divisions in the factory will be discussed first [8].

DISTRIBUTION OF GENDER ACROSS FOUR DIVISIONS

Because of problems of access to some of the shopfloors, I had to turn to a variety of data sources to put together a complete picture of the gender distribution in the factory. Among these sources were: Portuguese community newspapers, an independent report on Texgar authored by an agent from the Quebec Labour Commission Bureau, and interview data. These sources were crucial in providing me with a basic idea of the gender composition on the shopfloor in the factory. However, getting official numbers on the gender distribution of workers in Texgar was frustrating, particularly for the casualwear division - by far the largest division in the factory. I have indicated in the text which numbers have been drawn from official sources and which have not.

Texgar employs 550 workers [9]. Over 50% of them are women [10], and 48% of this group of women come from the Portuguese Islands of the Azores originally. Of the 550 total, only 75 (14%) workers have been with the factory less
than 5 years [11]. Conversely, 25 workers have been with the factory 25 years or more. Another group of 75 workers have been with the factory between 15 and 20 years [12]. These numbers demonstrate a long employment pattern for some workers at Texgar. But this information is incomplete since it does not distinguish between shopfloor workers, and management employees in the factory: and which of these two has the employment longevity in the factory? Moreover, gender is also obscured in this information.

My examination of an independent labour commission report on the factory reveals that there are 412 shopfloor workers at Texgar. Assuming that 550 workers equal the total numbers of workers in the factory, we can calculate that there are 138 (25%) non-shopfloor workers. That is 1 out of every 4 workers in the factory performs work that is not directly involved with the transformation of a raw material into a product. This seems a very high percentage, particularly for a company in the garment or textile industry. However, we must keep in mind that there are four divisions in Texgar, each with its own management and office personnel.

In this same report, it is also recorded that 57 workers work in the fabric division, and that they are all men. In the women's sweaters division (third floor), women outnumber men by almost a 3 to 1 ratio: there are 43 workers
in this division - 32 women and 11 men.

Thus far we have accounted for the gender distribution of 100 shopfloor workers in two of the four divisions in the factory. We have also established that 32 workers of this total are women and that they all work on the third floor. Conversely, only men (57) work in the fabric division.

An account of the gender distribution in the two remaining divisions in the factory is not as official as the numbers quoted above since they originate from other data sources. Therefore, my account of the remaining 312 workers in the sample room division and the casualwear division relies on information gathered through interviews.

In the preceding chapter I noted that there are eight women workers in the sample room division. I want to add here to this shopfloor total three men working in the shipping department of this division. These men are primarily responsible for 'boxing' and 'shipping' garment samples made in the division, which are then forwarded to private contractors or to clients across the province.

The remaining 301 shopfloor workers are found on the fourth and sixth floors (the Casualwear division) of the factory. Clearly, this is by far the largest division in the factory: 73% of all shopfloor workers in the factory are found here. According to a reliable source, there are 236
women and 65 men in the Casualwear division of Texgar. Of this total number of women workers in this division, 130 are sewing machine operators on the sixth floor [13]. Most of the other women did 'button sewing', 'thread trimming', and other typical 'woman's work' in the division.

For summary purposes, I include the following table on the distribution of gender across the shopfloor of Texgar.

Table 8
Distribution of Gender Across the Shopfloors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divisions</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fabric</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>57(42%)</td>
<td>57(14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Sweaters</td>
<td>32(12%)</td>
<td>11(8%)</td>
<td>43(10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample Room</td>
<td>8(3%)</td>
<td>3(2%)</td>
<td>11(3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualwear</td>
<td>236(86%)</td>
<td>65(48%)</td>
<td>301(73%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

276(101%) 136(100%) 412(100%)

GENDER DIVISION OF LABOUR

A gender analysis of the labour process starts with the assumption that men and women perform different tasks in the production process, and that these tasks are allocated to them according to a gender ideology that still makes a
distinction between 'man's work' and 'woman's work'. In this section of the chapter, I will briefly describe the gender division of labour at the shopfloor level in Texgar. The data demonstrates that women and men perform different production tasks across the four divisions in the factory. It also reveals a gender division in the over-all physical structure of the factory where, within the fabric division, no women participate in the labour process. Moreover, our focus on the workers' own views and explanations of the gender division of labour within the factory show that they have a 'biological deterministic' (Armstrong and Armstrong, 1978) interpretation of gender and its organization on the shopfloor. 'Biological Determinism' views gender from a 'naturalist' ideology that stresses the different biological make up of men and women as explanations for their different roles in society. According to this theory, women perform 'women's work' because it is more 'suitable' for them in light of their biological make-up. Moreover, in tying gender division in society and work to biology this theory expounds a conservative ideology with the maintenance of the gender status quo as priority. I say this because according to this view "[g]ender is experienced as something natural, inevitable, and unchangeable" (Game and Pringle, 1983:15).

After discussing the centrality of gender in the organization of production in the factory, and analyzing
workers' own views and explanations of the gender division of labour on the shopfloor, this section concludes by arguing that if the organization of production obscures the class nature of the labour process (see Burawoy, 1979), surely it must then also obscure the dominant position of men on the shopfloor.

Gender Division of Labour on the Shopfloor

Whether one is investigating Universal Mechanical and Electrical Components Limited (UMEC) in England (Cavendish, 1982), the 'Maquiladoras' on the Mexican-American border (Fernandez-Kelly, 1983), textile and garment factories in the New Industrializing Countries (Mitter, 1986; Chapis and Enloe, 1983), or Texgar in Montreal, Canada, the gender division of labour is a permanent organizing feature of the labour process. That is if one chooses to be gender-conscious in one's analysis [14]. In this case, the gender organization of production at the shopfloor level can be blatantly obvious. Witness Ruth Cavendish's (1982:79) reflection on the gender division of labour in UMEC:

I knew the sexual division of labour would be like that, but it still shook me everyday. You could see the differences so clearly on the shopfloor: everyone who was working was a woman, and the men in their white coats were standing around chatting, humping skips or walking about to check the number of components. It was obvious that the only qualification you needed for a better job was to be a man.
Unfortunately, Texgar does not deviate from this characterization of the gender organization of production. Instead, the gender division of labour in Texgar is rigid: women "distribute garment pieces", "sew garment pieces together", "trim garment threads", "iron garments", "inspect garments for quality" and "pack garments" in plastic bags to be put into boxes and shipped to clients at a later date. Men, on the other hand, "knit", "dye", "spread", "store", "press" and "ship" garments and fabrics across the four divisions of the factory. Edite describes the typical gender division of tasks in production:

On the fourth floor, only men do the 'pressing'. But there are three or four women that work with the 'hand-irons' and not the big 'presses'. The women that work with the 'hand-irons' will iron a collar, the front of a blouse, hems, etc. The men with the 'presses' press everything: skirts, coats, blouses, everything... everything that passes through my hands will also pass through the presses. But every 'presser' has his own job. One will press pants, another will press only coats, etc. There are between ten and twelve men working on the 'presses'. [15]

In the Sample Room Division there isn't a technical division of labour at the shopfloor level. Here, skilled women shopfloor workers make an entire garment outfit themselves from a pattern copied from an original garment design [16]. Nonetheless, gender is central: the work that they do (they are seamstresses) has always been 'women's work'. And the designer of the new garment outfits is a man.
In addition to a gender division of labour on the shopfloor of the four Divisions, the nature of work in each of the divisions has also determined who carries out the production process. Thus, the garment divisions in the factory (the Women's Sweaters Division, the Sample Room division, and the Casualwear Division) all use predominantly women workers, of course with a gendered production process. In contrast, the Fabric Division (the only textile division in the factory) use an all-male work force. The explanations for this structural division of the factory reveals a 'biological deterministic' view of gender and patriarchal assumptions of gender roles within the organization of production. Using verbatim quotes, let us take a closer look at the workers' explanations of the gender division of labour at Texgar.

Explanation #1: 'Physical Strength'

The first explanation reveals that workers (both men and women) believe that the inherent requirements of the job defines which gender performs it. Accordingly, the 'physical strength' required for work in the fabric division justifies the absence of women from the shopfloor production process. Mathieu (Haitian):

Listen, those are men's jobs [in the fabric division]. Those jobs involve the exertion of physical force... those jobs demand a 'man's strength'. For example, on the first floor it is all machinery... it is not work
for women... it is work for men. Sometimes you have to work with a lot of heavy material, the [plastic] trucks [with fabric in them] that you have to push weight a lot. Since I've been working for Texgar, I have never seen a woman working on the first floor. The job that I used to do before did not involve just sewing [ends of one roll of fabric to another], I also had to get material [rolls of fabric] from the stockroom and I had to either carry it on my shoulders or push it in a buggy; that was not a job for a woman. To bring the material [fabric] to my machine demands a little bit of strength; and you know how Lou Morais used to stack them [rolls of fabric] one on top of the other... for me anyway, it was a man's job.

Lou Morais (Portuguese):

The jobs on the second, the first floor and the basement are 'men's work': they are heavy jobs. They aren't jobs for women because they require strength and they are also dirty jobs. For example, workers that work in the dye house have to wear jackets, pants and boots because the job is so dirty. In the past, they [workers] didn't even have any of these garments to wear while they were working.

Howard (Pakistani):

Women can't do my job because it is hard work. Every roll [of fabric Howard carries] weighs about 18 kgs. So to carry many rolls everyday would mean that their [women's] arms would fall off. It is heavy work that is not suitable for women.

The above responses express the views that only men perform the physical demanding work in the factory, and only they operate the machinery in the division. Howard makes this explicit in the passage above quoted from him.

Explanation #2: Work is too 'Dangerous for Women'

Mira's (Pakistani) verbatim quote suffices as an example of the second explanation commonly offered to me for
the absence of women from the shopfloor in the fabric division. In this explanation, Mira puts forth the view that work in the fabric division is too 'dangerous' for women. Mira:

It's [work in the fabric division] a very hazardous job. It involves, especially in the dye house, a lot of pushing trucks and loading them, and working with very harmful chemicals. You see the people in the dye house wear boots to here [pointing to his knees] and they wear safety glasses, and there is masks to protect them from the powders that they use... It's very dangerous stuff. Just last night this guy was loading this stuff [chemicals into the dyeing machines] and he got some of it in his eyes and I think that they took him to the doctors - I don't know what happened. Last year, there was this guy who got his arm all tangled up by the trash compactor; he's been out [of the factory] ever since.

The responses collected from workers in the fabric division and quoted above, show that they make a distinction between 'women's work' and 'men's work'. This distinction is based on what the workers see as the inherent objective requirements of each job, and a 'biological determinist' notion of gender. Only men work in the fabric division because there is a lot of pushing and pulling, as well as heavy machinery that has to be operated. According to the men interviewed from the fabric division, this makes work in the division strictly for men. These explanations remain consistent regardless of the ethnicity of the workers interviewed.

These responses also express a patriarchal view of gender relations where men are the 'beasts of burden' and
the 'providers' for the household and thus work any job including those that are 'dangerous' and 'physically strenuous'. Women, on the other hand, are 'delicate' and 'fragile' and thus need to be spared from a work process that is physically strenuous and most of all dangerous.

I am not sure that women in Texgar want to work in the fabric division or that it would be a good thing for them to do so considering the poor working conditions in this division. However, it is important to state that at the time of fieldwork no woman [17] was part of the labour process in the fabric division, and that the reasons for it were presented in the verbatim quotes above [18].

The gender division of labour is characteristically part of the labour processes in the other three divisions in the factory. In these divisions, women perform one kind of work, while men perform another. Together they collectively embody living labour in the production of commodities for sale in the market and thus enrich the capitalist. Since gender is still a fundamental organizing element of the labour processes in the other divisions of the factory, what are women's explanations for the gender division of labour on their shopfloor? Do their explanations differ from those of the men quoted above? If so, what implications does this have for the success of the union drive? Let us consider the data.
Lina (sixth floor):

In Texgar, there is a sexual division of labour. For example, the people that work with the 'presses' and make the crease on the pants, it is men that work there. The working on the presses is more physically demanding, the steam of the presses goes to the person, it is hard work, so only men work there, there are no women. In my section [sewing machine] too, only women work; there are no men workers. There are no men distributing work, it is only women.

Luz (third floor):

There are no men cutting ends, because there is no need for them, the [bosses] don't want them. It is a woman's job, how is a man supposed to cut ends? The men on the third floor do different jobs from those that women do. They are not going to do that job!

Ana (fifth floor):

There are jobs in my area that only men do, and that it is because women can't do them. But some of the jobs that the men are doing, a woman can also do them. I don't know why women aren't doing them, but maybe it's because... in the shipping area of our floor there are three men. I know that one of their jobs is not suitable for a woman since it involves a lot of heavy work like lifting boxes and other things like that... he [male worker] brings to the contractors with the company car. But the other is simply verifying the number of the clothes... So unless this man does something else that I haven't seen, I don't think that a man can do my job [Ana is a skilled seamstress] because it is difficult to see a man working with a sewing machine. If he was taught, he could do the job, but sewing has always been done by women.

It seems that Ana has tried to understand the gender division of labour in her division. But in the end, she settles for the 'physical' requirements of the job, and the traditional practice of 'sewing having always been done by women' as her explanation for the gender division of labour.

Edite (fourth floor):
On the fourth floor, only men do 'pressing'. But there are three or four women that work with 'hand-irons', not with the big 'presses'. Only men work on the 'press' because it is a hard job and there aren't too many women that can do that job... because it is a physically hard job (e um trabalho pesado) and too hot (i.e. too much steam) for a woman. It is the garments that are hard, difficult, and it is also the heat from the press... it isn't anybody that can do that job (nao e qualquer um que se aqueça ali). Ironing [which is done by women] is not physically demanding, it is just like you iron at home.

It is clear from the data above that men and women share a common view on the gender division of labour. This is a view that accepts the gender division of labour; and which so prominently structures their experiences of work in Texgar. Both genders express the belief that the anatomical features of men and women are the criteria upon which they are allocated work in the production process.

Twenty-five years or so of organized second-wave feminism and meticulous feminist research has shown that women perform a double day of labour. This research has shown that although there did exist a gender division of labour prior to capitalism, this mode of production has exacerbated and further entrenched the gender division of labour in society. Feminist research has also argued that the double day of labour is both a class phenomena and an ideological justification for the oppression of women in society. Writers from this perspective have tried to show that girls and boys are socialized differently from the early years of childhood. The former are socialized to
become housewives or to limit their professional ambitions to occupations that do not challenge that of men (financial, status, etc.). This is realized through socialization and streaming during school years. Boys, on the other hand, are socialized to be the 'providers' of the household and to pursue their inner-most professional interests. Again, this is reinforced and realized predominantly through the educational system.

The verbatim quotes above demonstrate perfectly the different roles of women and men and in the workplace. In this study, men do the 'physically strenuous' and 'dangerous' work (which usually means working with machinery), and women the 'safe' jobs in the production process. And this division of production according to gender is perfectly normal according to the men and women interviewed for this thesis. This being the case, and knowing what we do about gender socialization, we conclude that both men and women are obfuscated by a gender ideology that justifies the existing gender roles in society.

Two insights come to mind with this sort of explanation. First, the workers' explanations have patriarchal undertones suggesting a view of the male gender as the 'provider' and the 'protector' of the woman. Second, women are not 'technically inclined' and therefore cannot operate the heavy machinery in the division (Elson, 1983).
But concomitantly taking place with this explanation are the benefits that this holds for the owner of capital. For as long as this gender ideology justifies the gender division of labour in the workplace, the subordinate position of women workers in the labour process will continue. In other words, within Texgar, women will continue to work primarily as sewing machine operators earning a wage under the superexploitative system of piece-work. And men, on the other hand, will remain the 'beasts of burden' since the capitalist will continue to define the maximum physical capacity the workers can exert in performing their task. For as long as it remains solely the capitalist defining setting this standard, he (Texgar in this case) will pursue the purchase of new technology with only the criteria of how labour saving it is for his labour process [19]. Under this scenario the total disregard for the effects that new technology will have on the workers on the shopfloor will persist.

CONCLUSION

We began this chapter with a brief discussion of women in the Canadian economic structure. Two points were revealed here: First, women's participation in the Canadian labour force has consistently increased since World War II, but their position in the economic structure has been
restricted to four main industrial sectors. Second, within the industrial sectors that women work, they tend to overwhelmingly occupy positions of clerical work.

Our next discussion was a description of gender across the four divisions in the factory. And even though some of our data was incomplete, it is clear that the Casualwear Division in the factory employs (by far) the majority of women workers in Texgar.

Following this background, we examined the gender division of labour on the shopfloor and the workers' explanations for its 'permanency' within the factory. Similar to other garment factories, women do the 'sewing', 'trimming', and 'inspecting' of garments on the floor; while men do the 'knitting', 'dying', and 'pressing' in the factory. We also found that workers have a 'biological deterministic' interpretation of gender and the gender division of labour across the shopfloors in the factory. In other words, according to those workers interviewed, men and women perform different work because of their biological make-up. We pointed out that this is a conservative view since it implies that the gender division of labour is 'natural' and 'unchangeable'.

In the following chapter we continue our discussion of the social division of labour, and examine more closely the ethnic division of labour at Texgar.
NOTES

1. Harry Braverman's (1974) work has been heavily criticized for portraying a homogeneous picture of the working class. In fact, the reverse is true: the American working class is fragmented along many lines, two of which include gender and ethnicity.

2. The technical division of labour (or the division inside the workplace), on the other hand, refers to the division of tasks between workers (Thompson, 1989:180). This is "the special product of capitalist society" consolidated with the transformation of formal subordination of labour to real subordination of labour, as Harry Braverman so well described it (Braverman, 1974:72).

In Labor and Monopoly Capital, Harry Braverman (1974:73) summarizes the distinction between the social division of labour and the technical division of labour thus:

While the social division of labor subdivides society, the detailed [technical] division of labor subdivides humans, and while the subdivision of society may enhance the individual and the species, the subdivision of the individual, when carried on without regard to human capabilities and needs, is a crime against the person and against humanity.

3. Several explanations for the increase in women's participation in the labour market have been proposed. The two most influential theories are: (1) women are a 'reserve army of labour' which is called upon when there is a shortage of male labour power (Connelly, 1978); (2) women have been able to participate in wage labour due to the cut-backs in the male wage and to the increase of household appliances making it possible for them to leave the house for wage labour (Armstrong and Armstrong, 1978).

The history of labour in the textile and garment industry, however, appears to contradict these two explanations. Women were not seen as a reserve army of labour which the early merchants and contractors in the industry sought out when they were short of male workers. Nor did women wait for state sponsored child-care programmes or new appliances in the home in order to join the labour force. On the contrary, women have been an integral part of the labour process in the garment and textile industries since their origins. For instance, according to the census of 1871, 42% of the industrial labour power in Montreal was
made up of women and children. What seems to have been the pattern in the garment industry in Quebec, however, is the fact that the women workers in the industry were primarily working at home either for contractors or for clothing manufacturers themselves. According to writers like Gregory Teal, there seems to be two reasons for women joining the garment industry: (1) the poor economic state of the Quebec worker; and (2) the garment contractors desire to exploit women workers in a highly fragmented division of labour.

With respect to my data and my thesis, this seems to be the most plausible explanation. The Portuguese women interviewed for this thesis told me bluntly that in order to survive in Canada a family needs at least two incomes, and that when they arrived in Canada it was understood that they were going to join the labour force. At the same time, clothing manufacturers, like Albert Saltzman, thrived on immigrant workers (like the Portuguese men and women described in this thesis) for 'cheap labour'.

For a discussion of the position of women in the class structure, the reader can consult any of the following important books on the subject: Engels (1981); Barrett (1985); Khun and Wolpe (1978; Eisenstein (1979); Segal (1987); Crompton and Mann (1986).

4. This is also up from the previous year when 45.8% of women wage workers laboured in the service industry (Labour Canada, The Women's Bureau, 1987:3).

5. Men tend to be more frequently members of unions, and since most do not have many domestic duties, they can influence the direction of their union by participating in many aspects of union work. Women, on the contrary, are less frequently union members, and are more restricted from taking part in union work by their double day of labour.

6. This number (32.4%) is even more significant when one considers that the next highest employer of women workers in the manufacturing industries is the food industries sector. The latter employ about 14% women (calculated from Cohen, 1987:23 table 1).

7. Diane Elson (1983) has examined these (and other) myths as they are used as justification for the gender division of labour in the garment and textile industry in 'Third World' countries. Even governments in 'Third World' countries will use these myths as 'selling points' to attract multinational firms into their countries. An official Malaysian investment brochure included the
following quotation:

The manual dexterity of the Oriental female is famous the world over. Her hands are small and she works with extreme care. Who, therefore, could be better qualified by nature and inheritance to contribute to the efficiency of a production line than the Oriental girl? (quoted in Elson, 1983:5-6)

8. Some of the numbers presented in the section below are only approximations of the exact gender distribution in the factory since they were based on shopfloor workers' statements and not on official data from company records. The difficulties encountered in gaining access to the factory and to company records are discussed in Chapter Two.

9. This figure is drawn from an anti-union article published in a Portuguese community newspaper during the week of the certification vote in the factory. The total of 550 workers included office personnel and management-level employees.

10. This figure is taken from an article in a Portuguese community newspaper also published the week of the certification vote. The author does not say, however, how he got the figures of 50% and 48%. The table on page 10 was constructed from interview data and it shows that women constitute almost 70% (66.9%) of the total shopfloor workforce in the factory.

11. Drawn from same article as stated in note 10.

12. Same source as note 10.

13. This number is taken from a copy of a letter written by a woman working in the sewing machine area of the sixth floor. This woman sent her letter to the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union complaining that the E-Ton 2001 system was being introduced onto the shopfloor which she felt would eliminate several jobs. With this letter, she told the union representatives that many more women were now willing to support the union drive because they felt that the new technology would result in job losses.

14. In his survey of the treatment of women workers in the industrial relations literature, Richard Brown (1976:21) found that they have been treated in one of two ways: "on the one hand as indistinguishable from men in any
respect relevant to their attitudes and actions at work; and on the other as giving rise to special problems for the employer and/or the families or communities from which they come."

15. In fact, with the exception of 'cutting', there isn't a job in the factory that men and women perform together.

'Cutting' is the only activity on the shopfloor production processes that both men and women perform. This is unusual since this activity has been described in the literature (e.g. Steedman, 1986; Gannage, 1986) as a male occupation, and one which men have in the past consistently attempted to exert control over by restricting the infiltration of 'unskilled' workers (including women), and even the advances of the owners of capital in their attempts to 'deskill' this craft and undermine workers control on the shopfloor. I am not sure why this is different in Texgar, but regardless both women and men cutters are supervised by a foreman.

16. There doesn't exist a work-per-task division of labour in this division. However, the conception is with management - the designer who creates the new styles and then with the pattern-maker.

17. There are two women working in the fabric division. They are secretaries in the division's main office. One of is Portuguese, the other French-Canadian.

18. I have no reason to believe that Albert Saltzman would hire the workers differently; I will discuss the hiring process in the next couple of sections.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ETHNICITY AND THE LABOUR PROCESS

INTRODUCTION

Ethnic discrimination in the labour market has just recently begun to receive research attention from sociologists concerned with analyzing the configuration of the Canadian working class in the context of a changing economy [1]. Therefore, in doing my part to continue to develop this kind of analysis, this chapter begins with a short background of immigrant labour in the garment and textile industries in Quebec. This is then followed by an investigation of the ethnic division of labour within Texgar. It has already been recognized that 'workers' labouring for Texgar are not a homogeneous group; instead, they are heterogeneously composed according to gender and ethnicity. The previous chapter dealt with the discussion of gender across Texgar.

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the ethnic division of labour which is also integral to the labour processes in the factory. There are two concomitantly occurring phenomena in the factory with respect to the ethnic division of labour. First, the history of wage labour in Texgar is one of a substitution of one ethnically numerically superior group of workers by another. This
practice was initiated by Albert Saltzman in the 1950s when Italian immigrants became the predominant ethnic group in the factory, and this pattern is still evident today except that it is Portuguese (women) workers who are the most recent numerically dominant ethnic group on the shopfloor. We try to show in this chapter that this was possible because the owners of the factory encourage an informal labour recruiting network between those workers already in the factory and their family members, acquaintances, and compatriots residing in the neighborhood surrounding the factory.

Second, there is evidence that Texgar is once again undergoing a transformation in the ethnic composition of its workforce. In the Fabric Division, for example, the once numerically dominant Portuguese workforce is now gone and has been replaced by Pakistani workers. This pattern of "ethnic group workforce substitution" is less evident in the three other divisions of the factory. Nonetheless, many Portuguese informants remarked that they have been increasingly working side-by-side with 'Chinese', and 'Spanish' workers.

BRIEF BACKGROUND OF LABOUR IN GARMENTS AND TEXTILES

Canadian garment and textile industries are a 'ghetto' for immigrant labour - immigrant women in
particular [2] who suffer extreme forms of exploitation, work under poor working conditions, and are under-unionized. We will discuss briefly the background of immigrant labour in the Quebec garment and textile industries before we proceed with a discussion of the ethnic labour in Texgar.

Just prior to the turn of the century, Canadian capitalism expanded into western Canada and communities began to establish themselves in the West following the expansion and the building of the Canadian Pacific Railroad. The Canadian garment and textile manufacturers in the East were able to benefit from this geographical expansion since it opened up to them many new potential clothing markets. At the same time, the Canadian Federal Government enacted the National Policy tariff of 1879 which put in place a series of protectionist measures geared to sheltering Canadian industry, including textiles and garments. By erecting tariff barriers against foreign imports, in particular those originating from the United States, the federal government enabled Canadian industry to acquire a position in the domestic market.

The growth of the textile and garment industry was fuelled by immigrant wage labour. In the 1880s and 1890s the industrial centres in the East (Montreal, Toronto and Hamilton) absorbed the immigration population coming into the country. At first, this labour power originated from
eastern Europe and Jewish immigrants constituted the majority of immigrants. At the garment industrial shopfloor level, both a gender division of labour, and a spatial division between workers were in place: men cut and packed the garments in the factory, while women did the sewing and trimming of garments in their homes, usually in rural Quebec (Teal, 1985:174). [3].

Until the 1940s, Jewish and French Canadian women were the dominant ethnic groups in the Quebec textile and garment industries. But from then on, new waves of immigrant labour from southern Europe (Italy, then Portugal and Greece) subsequently replaced this 'older' ethnic workforce in the industry. Bernard Bernier (1979) points out that from the 1950s onward, successive waves of immigrants replaced one another in the garment industry in Quebec. He says that the mainly French Canadian female workforce in the garment industry was slowly replaced by Italian women workers in the 1950s. By the late 1960s, however, the once numerically dominant Italian women working in the garment industry also began to be replaced by a 'newer' wave of southern European immigrant labour. It was at this time that Portuguese and Greek women workers began to enter shopfloors across the garment industry [4].

On a donc vu le remplacement de la main-d'oeuvre autochone par la main-d'oeuvre immigrante, et la composition de la main-d'oeuvre immigrante s'est modifiee avec l'arrivee de nouveaux groupes ethniques.
Today, as the following table shows, the ethnic heterogeneity of the contemporary workforce in the garment industry in Quebec is still central to the industry.

Table 9

[Ethnic Heterogeneity in Quebec's Garment Industry]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mother Tongue</th>
<th>Garment [5]</th>
<th>All other sectors of activity except garment and textiles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Les Comites Paritaires, et al. 1988:35, table 15)

There are several problems with this table [7]. But it does show the presence of more recent ethnics (i.e.
'Chinese' and 'Vietnamese') in the workforce of the garment industry. Both the 'Chinese' and the 'Vietnamese' immigrants to Quebec form part of the most recent wave of immigrants coming to North America. This new wave is primarily from 'Third World' countries in Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America (Portes and Walton, 1981), and tend to be women (Phizacklea, 1983).[8] Moreover, an increasing number of this latest migrant wave is comprised of 'illegal' immigrants who have by-passed the traditional immigration procedures.

Similar to the 'older' southern European immigrants that preceded them, this new wave of immigrants is socially relegated to the 'secondary' labour market (Phillips and Phillips, 1983). Ng and Das Gupta (1981:84) found that non-English speaking immigrant women are most commonly recruited into three kinds of industries: (1) office cleaners or domestics in private service; (2) manufacturing and retail industries such as light manufacturing in textiles and garments; and (3) in-service industries such as restaurants, hotels and other food industries. In these industries they are exposed to low-wages, long hours of work, lack of union representation, and insufficient Provincial labour legislation protection.

More than any other group, women immigrants are located in the poorly-paid labour market sectors where they work as domestics, chamber maids, building cleaners, dishwashers, waitresses, sewing machine operators and
plastic workers. Ignored by unions and inadequately protected by provincial labour legislation, they occupy the bottom rung of the 'vertical mosaic' (Arnopoulos (1979:3).

But unlike the 'older' southern European immigration wave, this new immigrant wave is increasingly composed of 'political refugees' coming into Canada and entering the labour force under a 'work permit' or employment authorization form. This 'work permit' is in reality a contract tying the worker to an employer for a specific period of time, after which the employer is not obliged to renew the worker's 'work permit' with the Department of Employment and Immigration. If the worker is unable to find another employer with whom to renew his/her 'work permit' contract, he/she can be deported back to his/her country of origin. Some writers have compared the Canadian system of 'work permit' contracting to the policy of transient 'guestworkers' commonly practiced by certain west European countries (e.g., Wong, 1984).

Now that we have discussed some of the labour background in the garment and textile industries in Quebec and some of the recent changes in the immigration pattern affecting the workforce composition in these industries, we can turn our focus to the ethnic division of labour within Texgar. A brief outline of the ethnic distribution of workers across the factory is first presented.
ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION ACROSS SHOPFLOORS

It is difficult to put forth a figure on the ethnic distribution across the shopfloors since the data sources consulted for this research do not contain this kind of information. What I have done instead is to use the workers' own statements to obtain clues as to the ethnic distribution across the factory. Fieldworking in the Fabric Division also alerted me to the particular ethnic composition of the workforce in this division.

The Portuguese are the numerically dominant group in the factory. More precisely, it is Portuguese women who dominate numerically the shopfloors in all divisions except the Fabric Division. An article in the Portuguese community newspaper *A Voz De Portugal* reports that over 50% of workers in the factory are women and that 48% of them are Portuguese. I believe that these figures are too low, as noted in the previous chapter. The workers themselves confirm that Portuguese women dominate the shopfloor. Ida (sixth floor, Casualwear Division):

The majority of women that work with me are Portuguese, but there are Chinese, Black, Italian, and Spanish women too.

Lina (sixth floor):

In my section there are women from many ethnic groups: French, Spanish, Haitian, Chinese, but the Portuguese make up most of the workers.

The majority of Portuguese women perform either
sewing machine operations or trim threads from garments in the technical division of labour in the Women's Sweaters Division, and in the Casualwear Division. In the Sample Room division, on the other hand, skilled women workers perform all the necessary operations in creating a sample garment. Women of other ethnic groups, including Haitian, Vietnamese, Latin American, Greek, and Italian, are mixed in with the Portuguese doing sewing machine operations or trimming garments. Therefore, even though Portuguese women are numerically dominant on the shopfloor, one cannot say that the ethnic division of labour is the basis for the systematic distribution of tasks among workers on the floor. Instead, gender is central on the shopfloor as men perform particular tasks and women perform different tasks.

There are, however, two occupations in the factory that are held by two specific ethnic groups in the factory. Haitian men in the Casualwear division on the fourth floor work with the 'presses'. Eleven of the twelve pressers in this division are Haitians. This is one of the most difficult jobs in the factory. The 'presser' stands in front of the press and has to reach across the 'open-face' of the press to bring the top cover of the press toward him and down on the garment, laying on another part of the press in front of him. The purpose of this task is to remove with steam from the presses all the wrinkles from the garments.
As the worker is steaming the garment, he also has to endure this steam on himself, as he does this task many times a day every day of the week. This is a physically draining job.

The other occupation in the factory that is ethnic-specific is in the Fabric Division. Here, only one of the twelve workers in the dye house is not Pakistani. The majority of the workers in the finishing department of this division are also Pakistani. I believe that the predominance of the Pakistani workers in the fabric division is part of a changing pattern of the workforce in the Fabric Division. This newer Pakistani workforce has replaced the Portuguese who were once the numerically dominant workforce in this division. We will discuss below the changing ethnic workforce in the Fabric Division.

ETHNICITY ON THE SHOPFLOORS

In many ways Texgar is typical of most garment and textile factories: over the years it has consistently employed an ethnic workforce to operate its instruments of labour; it is owned by a Jewish immigrant family; and it was established in the early 1950s by Albert Saltzman after he had spent a few years working on the shopfloor at a couple of textile factories in Montreal.

But it is also untypical of the industry,
particularly with regard to its employment practices towards ethnics. Over its 39-year history, Texgar has consistently employed an ethnic workforce made up of one numerically dominant ethnic group on the shopfloor. That is, the owner(s) of the factory has chosen to employ one ethnically dominant group after another in the development of the factory. The Portuguese are, therefore, simply the most recent dominant ethnic work group at Texgar. Below, I will discuss the factory's reasons for this practice, as well as the Portuguese workers' reasons for turning to Texgar for employment.

According to Donald Avery (1981), Canadian employers of ethnic workers at the turn of the century practiced two hiring strategies towards immigrant workers. First, some employers sought an ethnic heterogeneous workforce in their workplace in order to maintain barriers of language, culture, and communication between workers which made it more difficult for them to come together and organize against their employer. A second, but much less popular, employment strategy, sought the contrary. Other Canadian employers preferred an ethnically homogeneous workforce in their workplace. "[T]his homogeneity was an asset to an employer: a steady supply of labour was assured and individual worker differences minimized" (Avery, 1980:10). The latter employment strategy is the pattern that the
history of wage labour at Texgar reveals. Over the 39-year history of the factory, Albert Saltzman (and later the other members of the executive) has tended to employ a workforce that is dominated by one ethnic group. And the ethnic background of the workforce in the factory has changed as the ethnic settlement pattern of St. Louis Square in Montreal has also changed.

Links Between the Community and the Factory

Very early on in its development, Texgar was moved to St. Louis Square. This geographical area of the city of Montreal has been a residence locale for waves of immigrants since the late 19th century; one ethnic group after another has numerically and culturally dominated this area. Until the 1950s, Jewish immigrants dominated this area. After them came the Italians, the Poles, the Hungarians, and later the Greeks. But from the early 1970s until today, this area is popularly known in the city of Montreal as the Portuguese enclave [9].

Within Texgar, Italians dominated the factory in the 1950s, as they did the Square. When they began to move out of the area surrounding the factory, they also left Texgar for other forms of employment in the city. The Hungarians replaced the Italians in the factory. But soon, they too were gone from the neighborhood and the factory. Greek
immigrants took the place of the Hungarians in the factory. Today, it is the Portuguese who are the latest ethnic group to numerically dominant the shopfloors in the factory.

When the Portuguese began to settle in the Square, they looked for work in close proximity to their homes. This way they could save on a further expenses (i.e. transportation costs to and from work), as well as remain in the area they were slowly making their own [10]. For Portuguese women, working in Texgar had other advantages as well. For those women with pre-school children, working in a factory in the neighborhood allowed them to find babysitters who were within walking distance of the factory or close to their home. For those women whose children attended school, the proximity of the factory to home allowed them to return home at lunch time to prepare lunch for their children (who also attended school in the neighborhood) and to spend some time with them (Aguiar, 1989).

Within the factory, workers were encouraged to bring into the factory their family members, friends or acquaintances from the 'old' country who were also settling in the enclave surrounding the factory. Tony:

My mother-in-law worked at Texgar and she asked Mr. ... if he needed someone; he said that he did and I came to work. I started on the second floor working on the 'rolls' and about a week or two later they needed someone for the finishing departments, so I took the job; I've been there for the last eleven years. My
mother-in-law didn't work on the second floor but Mr. ...'s wife was my mother-in-law's 'bossa' and through her, my mother-in-law got me the job.

For other Portuguese workers it was their brother that got them a job at Texgar:

When I came to Montreal I started working in a restaurant washing dishes. But I didn't like that job, and since my brother was working in Texgar, he got me a job there.

For most of the Portuguese men and women working in the factory, Texgar is the only place in Montreal where they have worked. Four days after Teo arrived from Portugal, he took to the streets in the Portuguese community to find a job. And until last year, when he was fired on accusations of being a thief, Texgar remained the only place he had worked in Canada. For Teo, an old friend from school was unexpectedly found in Texgar and he helped him get the job in the factory.

When I arrived from Portugal my friends and acquaintances here were not aware that I was here, so after being home for four days, I decided to go out and look for a job. I lived on Coloniale street and I decided to go for a walk close to home so that I wouldn't get lost. The first place I approached for a job was the fishmarket. I had been told that many Portuguese men worked there. But at the time I walked into the fishmarket, the workers there were trying to organize and the manager told me to come back when everything in the market had been resolved. I turned around and walked up Coloniale street and saw the factory. I didn't know that Portuguese people worked there. I went in and Mrs. ... saw me and asked me what I wanted. I told her that I had just arrived from Portugal and that I was looking for work, I showed her all my immigration papers. (I spoke to her in French since I had learned it in Portugal when I was in school.) As I followed her to her office, I met a
friend of mine who used to attend college with me in Portugal. This friend had been at the factory many years and knew Mrs. ... well. He told her that he knew me, and that we went to school together and that I was a hard worker. Mrs. ... took my friend's advice and gave me the job.

This informal labour recruiting network was also used by Portuguese women. Linda (third floor):

I was 15 years old when I came to Canada with my mother. Both of us went to work at Texgar - you know that when you come from Portugal all you want to do is earn money so that you can pay what you owe back there [in Portugal]. I have worked at Texgar for 15 years. My sister-in-law asked them [boss] for a job for us, and I've been there since and hope to stay there. Today, it is only me and my sister that work in Texgar; my mother is home receiving her pension.

Luz (third floor):

I can't even remember when I started at Texgar, it was so long ago that I have trouble remembering the year. But I know that I have been working there for 14 years. A woman that was my neighbor got me the job in the factory. I started by ironing clothes; I used to iron blouses and sweaters all day. [At the time of the interview, Luz was 'trimming threads' on garment outfits.]

For Saltzman, hiring wage labour from the same background guaranteed him a steady flow of labour into the factory. Also, by encouraging an informal labour recruiting practice between the Portuguese workers within the factory and their compatriots settling in the area surrounding the factory, [11] Albert Saltzman created an atmosphere of 'community' among his mainly Portuguese workforce in the factory, while at the same time, removing himself from direct contact with workers and the hiring and firing of
them. Finally, in employing a predominantly immigrant workforce, Albert Saltzman receives 'gratitude' and 'loyalty' from a new ethnic group in Montreal in need of income. The Portuguese workers feel that since Albert Saltzman is an immigrant himself, he understands their needs and concerns, and for that, many of them are grateful to him [12].

Within the factory, the language of work on the shopfloor is Portuguese. Workers communicate with each other in Portuguese and receive their work instructions also in Portuguese since most of the shopfloor supervisors are also Portuguese. In departments where the supervisor is not Portuguese, an English (or French)-speaking Portuguese shopfloor worker acts as an intermediary between management and the Portuguese shopfloor workers. Some of the workers interviewed like working with other Portuguese. Luz:

I work with Portuguese ladies and I like working with them. Every day we say to each other so many things and so we are always laughing and of course this helps the day pass and makes the day seem much shorter. If I worked with French or English ladies how would I talk to them? I would be quiet all day; this way I say something to one, something else to someone else and we all laugh, the day goes much faster, it gets to 5 o'clock much faster and time to go home.

Others do not enjoy working with a same ethnic workforce since this prevented them from, among other things, developing their language skills. Rosa:

In my opinion it is better to work with people that are not Portuguese. First of all, we lose the English
language [those who speak it] by working with Portuguese. Portuguese people of a certain age don't speak the language, so we are forced to speak Portuguese with them everyday. Thus we also lose our English language. But working with English and French speaking people helps us learn the language. People from Our Land understand what we are saying, what we are talking about and many times they don't accept it, they are not in agreement with things that we discuss concerning work. In my opinion I think that it is better to work with English or French workers.

The fact that there are many members of the same family working in the factory further 'humanizes' the workplace. Workers in this case talk about their common ethnic experience, their home country, the football matches in Portugal, etc.

Fieldwork in the Fabric division made me aware that the workforce in this division is predominantly Pakistani and that the latter have been slowly replacing the Portuguese in this division [13]. Today, Pakistani form the numerically dominant workforce in the division. The language on the shopfloor of the dye house and in most of the finishing department (see chapter four for a discussion of the different departments in the Division) is Pakistani since the large majority of workers are from this ethnic background, as are the shopfloor supervisors (and a manager) in this department.

I suspect that in the other divisions more recent immigrant groups of workers have also joined the Portuguese workforce in the factory. However, because of a lack of
access to the other divisions, and only flimsy but suggestive data, I cannot pursue this point. I am also unable to confirm the wage rates of the newer workforce in comparison with the older Portuguese workforce leaving the Fabric Division. Some of the Portuguese workers interviewed argued that Pakistanis are just the latest form of cheap wage labour entering the factory. As they (the Portuguese) were the new, cheaper workforce entering the factory in the early 1970s, the Pakistani are now. Leo:

The Indians [i.e. Asians] created all the problems... they screwed up things by coming to the factory as low wage labour and basically accepting every injustice without any complaints. Some of them don't even have a working card [Social Insurance Card] and work with a permit given to them by the immigration bureau. Many are also refugees and thus (like us before them) need the money and therefore are willing to submit to low wages and poor working conditions.

Changing Ethnic Workforce in the Factory

In his study of three garment factories in Montreal, Bernard Bernier (1979) found that a new, more recent immigrant workforce was added to a 'core' group of workers already in the factory. In time, he points out, this 'core' group too would slowly begin to leave the factory as more and more recent immigrants formed the new 'core' of workers in the workplace. In Martha Sportswear, for example, Bernier found that the 'older' Quebecois female labour power was replaced by a more recent Italian and Portuguese
immigrant workforce (Bernier, 1979:129). This pattern of one ethnic workforce replacing another is what has taken place in the fabric division of Texgar.

This ethnic change in the character of the workforce in the fabric division was pointed out to me by no less an authority on factory matters than Albert Saltzman himself. In the following quote, Saltzman also proudly expresses the use he has made of the labour power surrounding the factory:

We [Texgar] have always had employees that reflected the people living in the Cartier [St. Louis Square]. When we moved to this location, our first group of employees were Italian immigrants. After the Italians were here awhile, they started to move out of the Cartier and began to settle in places like Laval, Montreal North and other locations in the city of Montreal. Once the Italians began leaving the factory, Hungarian immigrants replaced them in the factory. The Hungarians invaded the Cartier as well as the factory. When the Hungarians began leaving, the Greeks came to the factory for work. Today most of our employees are Portuguese, but I can see them leaving our business right now. In the fabric division Portuguese workers like [...] have left for other jobs or have returned to Portugal. Portuguese workers are no longer the majority of workers in the fabric division... I hope that the few that are still with us stay because they are good workers. [14]

Albert Saltzman states clearly above that the ethnic character of the workforce in the fabric division is changing. My fieldwork in the fabric division reveals that it is Pakistani workers who are replacing the once-numerically dominant Portuguese workforce in the factory. But unlike the Portuguese, and the 'older' immigrant waves of the past, some of the Pakistani workers interviewed are
in an unstable and precarious situation in Montreal. This is primarily due to the Canadian government's change in immigration laws. Most of those whom I interviewed were still refugees working on government-granted 'work permits'. Howard's immigrant status is typical of most Pakistani in the division:

I'm 30 years old and single. I come from Pakistan and I have been in Canada for a year-and-a-half. I am still a refugee, however, a political refugee [15].

Unlike the Portuguese workers who preceded them in the fabric division or those in the other divisions of the factory, the Pakistani workers do not live in the neighborhood surrounding the factory. Most of those I interviewed live in Notre-Dame-de-Grace (NDG) in the western end of the city.

The hiring practices of the factory vis-a-vis the Pakistani workers in the fabric division differs from that once practiced by the Portuguese. Whereas the Portuguese workers in the factory were encouraged to develop a labour recruiting network between the division and the Portuguese community, today in the fabric division it is the two Pakistani supervisors in the division who hire male workers from their own ethnic background. Lou (Portuguese):

I would say that it is through word-of-mouth that these guys are hired. If you look at things, Javet and Shakil are both Pakistani and the refugees that work in the division are all Pakistani. For me, I think that it is through word-of-mouth that they [Pakistani] are hired. Many other people come to the factory and fill
out applications but this is to cover people's eyes. In reality the [Pakistani] bosses have already hired their workers. This practice of being hired through application forms doesn't exist in the factory. [16]

Mira (Pakistani) corroborates what Lou says:

The workers in the dye house are Asians because Javet does the hiring and firing. He likes to hire his own people because he feels that they are more dependable and will listen to him more, and that's true. He [Javet] speaks to them in their own language, he understands them, and he feels for them a little bit. They are mostly immigrants here and he can communicate with them better.

We will elaborate on the role of the ethnic supervisor on the shopfloor when we discuss 'control' in the following chapter.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have attempted to describe the social division of labour and how workers are discriminated on the basis of their ethnicity. Our focus is on Texgar, and our discussion of the ethnic division of labour began with a description of the ethnic ghettoized background of the workforce in the garment and textile industries in Quebec, followed by an investigation of the ethnic division of labour within Texgar. This revealed that the Portuguese are numerically dominant in all the divisions in the factory with the exception of the Fabric Division. In the latter division, Pakistani workers have replaced the Portuguese to now become the numerically dominant workforce in this
division.

The following chapter examines the working conditions across Texgar, and the role of the "Labour Decree" in the Quebec women's garment sector. It also discusses the two forms of control identified in Texgar. They are 'simple control' and 'technical control'.
NOTES

1. For example, Armstrong and Armstrong (1978) discuss women's 'double ghetto' but do not take ethnicity into account. As a result, the particular difficulties faced by ethnic women in the labour market and in the household are not investigated.

But there are, it must be said, an increasing number of socialist-feminists in social history, and sociology making ethnic women their central research interest. Within Canadian social history, people like Franca Iacovetta, Ruth Frager, and Frances Swyripa come immediately to mind. Within sociology, there is Charlene Gannage, Roxana Ng, and others.

Some researchers have even analyzed the wage labour participation of women of a specific ethnic group. This is always important since it allows us to understand that not all immigrant women work in the garment/textile industries. A case in point is Lindstroom-Best (1988) study of Finnish women in the Canadian labour force. (Dr. Lindstroom-Best is also of Finnish origin). Whereas the majority of southern European women immigrants looked to the garment and textile industries for work, Finnish women preferred to work as live-in domestics, as camp cooks, laundresses, rooming-house keepers, bootleggers, and prostitutes in northern Ontario. "Unlike many southern European and Jewish women, Finns shunned working in the factories or doing piece-work at home" (Lindstrom-Best, 1988:84-85).

2. This section follows Phillips and Phillips' (1983) discussion of the 'secondary labour market'.

3. Bettina Bradbury (1984) has studied the role of women in Montreal at the end of the last century. She found that married women's greatest contribution lay not in wage work, but "in the transformation of the wage of others into sustenance and shelter. The family's standard of living varied both with the amount of wages that could be earned and with the ability of the wife to stretch that wage by careful shopping, cooking, and household management" (p.11).


5. This does not include textiles.
6. The 'older' immigrant workforce (Italian, Portuguese and Greek) comprise 22% of the labour force in the garment industry in Quebec. I suspect that more detailed data would also include Haitians as a significant number in the workforce. There is also a significant number of Chinese and Vietnamese (6%) - these two groups represent some of the more recent immigrants in the industry.

7. First, it does not distinguish between the owners of capital in the industry, the managers, and shopfloor workers. If it did, I would expect the English in the industry would be found at the clerical and managerial level of the industry. Also, why aren't Jews represented on this table? Are they classified under the category of 'English'? Second, this table doesn't take gender into account. Consequently, the tremendous contribution of women's labour power to this industry left unnoticed. Third, the category of 'other' takes up a large percentage of the total workforce in the industry. I believe that this category should of been analyzed to draw out some other important cultural groups in the industry (e.g. Haitians).

8. Micheline Labelle, et al. (1987) have identified Haitian and Columbian women as part of the more recent migration wave into Quebec. The Portuguese and Greek women, who are also discussed in their book, form part of the older southern European immigration wave of the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s.

9. It has been estimated that the Portuguese number 40,000 in Metropolitan Montreal. But the greatest concentration of Portuguese (12,000 or 30%) in the city is found in St. Louis Square (Alpalhao and Da Rosa, 1983:149).

10. Although it is located in the center of Montreal, the St. Louis district is one of the poorest areas of the city, with a lack of green space and old and run down buildings. The monotonous brick has been painted in bright colors by the Portuguese, giving the district a more cheerful look (Alpalhao and Da Rosa [1983:156, endnote #6] paraphrasing Beaupre, 1976:10).

11. Micheal Maguire (1987) has argued that the informal labour recruiting practice between a workplace and the community surrounding it can be used to control labour on the shopfloor. This is so because those shopfloor workers hiring their friends through the informal labour market often act as informal supervisors over their friends on the shopfloor, making sure that they behave according to the rules of the workplace.
To some extent, I think that Maguire's argument is true and applicable to Texgar. However, I also think that he over-emphasizes it and in the process fails to consider the 'advantages' that the workers get out of this employment practice.

12. These are all characteristics of 'simple control' (Edwards, 1979). In the last section of this chapter, I discuss the different forms of control operating in the factory.

13. Leo:

When I began working with 'the frame' [in the Fabric Division in the mid-1970s], there were basically three groups of workers: Portuguese, Italians and two Haitians. And the Portuguese constituted, and I am not exaggerating, 80% of the workforce.

14. In typical capitalist garb, Albert Saltzman makes no statement to the effect that the working conditions might also have been reasons for the departure of the former Portuguese workers in the fabric division. My data also shows that some of the militant workers from this division who were actively involved in the union drive were also dismissed on the accusations of being thieves.

15. Prior to emigrating, Howard was a political organizer in Pakistan fighting against the authoritarian regime of President Zia.

16. As a matter of fact, the two times I was hired for a summer job in the factory, I was recruited by family members and I only 'filled-in' a job application form two or three days after I had been hired.
CHAPTER EIGHT

WORKING CONDITIONS AND CONTROL

INTRODUCTION

In the 'company chapter', I characterized Texgar as a 'modernist firm' because of the way management has restructured it to adjust to the changing economic situation in the garment and textile marketplace, and to thus ensure a certain level of profit. But when we consider the working conditions and systems of wage payment in the factory, Texgar is anything but 'modern'. In fact, the working conditions within Texgar in many ways resemble those found in garment and textile workplaces in the last century. Workers are expected to work long hours, many do not receive overtime pay, and the systems of wage payment, in particular 'piece-work', have remained in use to "goad workers to higher levels of production" (Heron and Story, 1986b:8), and control the quantity and intensity of work achieved through the self-supervision of the workers themselves (Alexander, 1980:27).

An investigation of the working conditions in the factory is important because it reveals a further division between workers in the factory. This chapter will show workers further divided according to different work schedules and systems of wage payment. The importance of
bringing this out empirically is that it highlights the barriers between workers which obviously make solidarity among workers across the factory very difficult. In the following chapter I discuss the barriers between workers in different divisions and the effect of this on the union drive in the factory.

This chapter describes the working conditions across Texgar, and the role of the Labour Decree in the Quebec women's garment sector. This is followed by a discussion of the forms of control present in Texgar to control workers. For the purpose of this chapter, I have defined 'Working Conditions' as work-shift schedules and systems of wage payment. My investigation of the working conditions in the factory will begin with a discussion of the Fabric Division and the Women's Sweaters' Division jointly. The Casualwear Division and the Sample Room Division will then be discussed as part of the same section. I do this because the working conditions in each of the divisions within each group resemble one another.

Work Schedules

In the fabric division, workers in the stockroom, the storage, and the finishing department earn overtime pay only after 44 hours of work; but their regular work schedule is almost 50 hours a week. Their work shift begins at 7:30
am and ends at 5:30 pm. Workers in the dye house and in the knitting machines area of the second floor of the factory work under a different work-shift schedule, and their regular work-week is almost 60 hours. For these workers, a work day stretches from 7:00 am to 7:00 pm. They also alternate weekly between the day-shift and the night-shift. The knitters on the second floor must also check the work schedule posted on the wall outside the supervisor's office every Monday in order to find out what day their shift starts every week. Vince:

I don't have a set work schedule. This week I worked from Monday to Thursday, rest on Friday, and then return on Saturday, and then rest again on Sunday. Every week I have to check the work schedule to see what days I have to work.

In the Women's Sweaters Division, the work schedule is different from that in the Fabric Division. Here, a regular work-week is 42 hours for all workers with the exception of the knitters. The latter work two shifts of twelve hours each. The rest of the shopfloor workers begin their work day at 8:00 am and end it at 5:00 pm. During busy periods of the clothing season, workers are also expected to work Saturday mornings.

According to the shopfloor workers interviewed from this division, they do not receive overtime pay when they work beyond the regular work week of 42 hours. Delia (general worker):
When I work overtime I'm not paid time-and-a-half, I just get the usual hourly wage rate. I don't know why I don't get paid an overtime rate, maybe it's because there is no union or something. A regular work week for me is 42 hours and all other hours that I make after these, I'm still paid the same hourly rate as before the 42 hours. The overtime that we do isn't paid to us.

Some of the workers also complained about not receiving their 'vacation pay' in full. Luz:

I started my vacations on Friday and we were to receive more money than we did. We didn't receive the money because they didn't give it to us. I don't know if they have to give us the money by law or not... They just gave us 'uma bacatela de dinheiro' and we were to receive a lot of money. This is our vacation pay which is a percentage of our yearly income earned, but they are not going to give it to us. We didn't complain, you can't say anything in there because they will fire you. We are afraid. [...] We can't say anything in there, they are going to keep the other 2%, they are going to put it into their pockets. I think that everybody on the floor is going to lose the other 2% and nobody says anything or does anything.

There seems to be some confusion over the issue of 'vacation pay'. Delia believes, contrary to Luz, that the annual 4% vacation pay is given back to workers in two installments of 2% each. If this is the case, then surely the company benefits tremendously by repeating this practice since it collects a huge amount of money in bank interest by delaying the full payment of vacation pay to a later date [1].

Systems of Wage Payment

In the fabric division an all-male workforce transforms cotton yarns into fabric for sale to garment
manufacturers across the province of Quebec. The standard system of wage payment for workers in this division is the hourly wage rate system. I do not have a figure on the average wage rate in the division, but from those workers who volunteered their earnings, it is clear that they are paid below the average in the industry in general [2]. Antonio has worked in this division for 13 years, mostly as an operator on the shredding machine on the second floor, and earns only $8.40 an hour [in 1988]. This wage rate was the average rate in the textile industry in 1984. Mathieu has been at the factory for 11 years but his average weekly take home pay ranges between $270 and $300 net a week. This is a very low salary considering that Mathieu's work week is about 50 hours:

I would like to have a better pay cheque, but textiles are not strong; they [management] cannot permit themselves to pay high wages. The reason they don't pay high wages is because textiles is a 'soft industry'; if they started paying high salaries imagine what would happen... I have also heard that other textile factories pay higher wages than Texgar but what do you want? I don't work anywhere else.

At the time of the study, Vince had been working in the division for nearly six months. His hourly pay was $6.50 even though he is an experienced knitter who came to Texgar from a knitting job at another factory which he quit because management there wanted him to work the night shift.

The second form of wage payment in the fabric division is the 'salary rate'. This form of payment is
primarily reserved for non-shopfloor workers such as managers and shopfloor supervisors. But there are two or three workers in the division who get their pay in this form too. Lou explains:

In a contract at a weekly rate, you have to negotiate with management the specifics of your schedule. Usually the people that they offer contract to are bosses [and supervisors] and people that have been with the company a long time. Other than that, workers are paid on an hourly rate.

Under a 'salary rate', management pays the worker the same rate regardless if he/she works overtime or not. On the other hand, if a worker misses a half day for whatever reason, he/she will still receive the same set wages. Of course if a worker skips too many hours of work too often, not only will he/she be dropped from this wage system arrangement, but he/she will also quickly find himself/herself out of a job.

In the Women's Sweaters Division, there are three forms of wage payment: hourly wage rate, bi-weekly 'salary rate', and piece-work. In this division, there no male shopfloor workers earning their wages through piece-work; most are paid by a hourly rate, and very few by salary rate.

In the Women's Sweaters Division only women sewing machine operators are paid by 'piece-work'. Sewing is a fragmented division of labour with different women in this occupation doing different tasks to the garment as it passes through each worker's machine. Thus, some women will only
sew sleeves, others only hems, etc. Many other women work in this division; they distribute work, trim garments, inspect garments, etc. This latter group of women, however, are paid an hourly wage rate.

Under a piece-work system of payment, pay is dependent on output. To measure a worker's output, management has introduced the practice of 'ticket' saving where all pieces of garment carry a ticket stub which records the time a sewing machine operator should take to sew an item if she wants to earn the exact amount recorded on that ticket [3]. Linda explains:

A bushel of clothing has about ten to fifteen blouses and on the 'ticket' of each of these blouses is marked how much time a worker must take to earn piece-work rate. For example, 'as bainhas' [hems] takes 80 seconds, and if the worker does the blouse (or skirt) in 80 seconds she receives eight cents. For five button holes, it should take 50 seconds or less to earn 5 cents a blouse.

In this division, the 'rate fixer' is a Polish man working in the office. Every so often he emerges from the office to set a new piece-work rate by timing workers as they sew different pieces of garments. Linda:

[This Polish man] comes with a stop watch, stands besides a worker and checks how long it takes her to do the job. From this timing, he then sets the piece-work rate. The time that a worker he checks takes to do a piece is that time that he sets for everyone in the section. For example, today that person is doing a new job and checks to see the time she takes and then sets that time for the rest of the section. Next time he checks another lady since they are doing the same job. If a woman takes time to do a piece, he knows that it is difficult material and so he gives a few
more seconds; the contrary also occurs: when he sees that the women are doing the job very fast, he cuts the time they have to do a piece. For example, if he has given the women 2 minutes to make a blouse in the singer machine and then he sees that the women are making too many pieces and therefore too much money. He cuts the time to 1 minute or something like that. When this happens, the workers get mad at him and curse him in every language.

The evidence in piece-work studies shows that the 'rate-fixer' commonly uses a fast sewing machine operator to set the piece work rate. This rate is then established for all sewing machine operators who must meet its standards in order to earn money by the piece.

Women piece-workers have a base salary which they will receive even if their piece-work output does not correspond to the base salary they are guaranteed. In non-unionized clothing firms, the base salary rate is "often set at the minimum-wage level: 'For instance, a base rate of five dollars an hour corresponds with a certain level of output. If an employee attains 130% of that base output then she would receive 130 x the base rate of 5 dollars. In this case, she would receive $6.50/hour ($5 base rate x 130 output = $6.50)'" (Cuneo, 1990:62). But the experience of women sewing machine operators on piece work is that their base rate falls under the minimum wage level as they are often delayed in their work by machines that brake down (Cuneo, 1990:62). An even more serious problem for women sewing machine operators is the contradictory nature of
piece work. Linda explains:

These ladies that work by piece-work don't want to slow down their work because they want to make money. Therefore, in order for them to make money they have to work fast and try to make as many pieces as they can. In the process, they are also cutting the time on the tickets to do the piece. If they don't make many tickets they are paid by the hour. They do many packages of clothing in a day and some work takes longer than other and so they can never complete everything in the time that it is recorded they should. The women argue a lot with this man [the 'rate-fixer'] when he comes to check them...

The point to keep in mind from this discussion is the work schedules, and the systems of wage payment. In particular, the reader will realize that only women are paid through the piecework system.

Work Schedules and Systems of Wage Payment in the Sample Room and Casualwear Divisions

Workers in the Sample Room and the Casualwear Divisions labour under better conditions than do those working in the Fabric and Women's Sweaters Divisions described above. This is because workers in the two former divisions are protected by a 'labour decree' guaranteeing them certain working conditions and wage rates [4]. This decree, however, does not extend to workers in the Fabric Division nor does it to the men and women in the Women's Sweaters Division. This is because the products manufactured in the two latter Divisions are not under the jurisdiction of the decree. Hence, within Texgar there
exists a strata of shopfloor workers who work under 'relatively better' conditions than do those working in the Fabric and Women's sweaters divisions.

The purpose of the section below is to discuss (1) the Working Conditions of this 'privileged' strata in the Sample Room and Casualwear Divisions of the factory, and (2) to briefly outline the 'labour decree' governing certain job classifications in the Quebec women's garment industry. This section begins with the latter discussion first.

The Labour Decree in the Women's Garment Industry in Quebec

The labour decree is an industry-wide collective agreement extending certain provisions of union contracts in the industry to all non-unionized workers in the (garment) industry. This collective agreement ensures minimal working conditions for workers and, at the same time, establishes a level of competition that is more or less balanced for all competing manufacturers in the industry [5].

Cette loi [the labour decree] permet a des travailleurs non syndiques de jouir des conditions de travail doumont negociées dans certaines entreprises. Quant un syndicat est créé dans une entreprise et qu'un convention collective est signée, l'employeur se retrouve souvent en mauvaise posture devant ses concurrents ayant des couts de main-d'oeuvre plus bas. Le decret permet de niveler la concurrence, du moins au niveau local, et d'accorder un traitement salarial similaire dans l'ensemble d'un secteur economique concerne (La Presse, 6 mai 1989:25).

The decree in the Quebec garment industry covers ten
provisions among which are: the territorial jurisdiction of the decree, hours of work, overtime hours, wage rates, annual vacation with pay, and term of the decree (Ladies' Clothing Joint Commission, 1986:3-12). Under the provision of jurisdiction, the decree covers all manufacturers (and their employees) in the women's garment industry in the province of Quebec. It also covers an extensive range of garments or parts thereof geared to women consumers (see Ladies Clothing Joint Commission 1986:4). However, the decree does not cover knitted sweaters and "capes, coats, suits, parkas, Eskimo suits, windbreakers, vests and jackets of all types for girls from birth to size 16 inclusive" (Ladies' Clothing Joint Commission, 1986:4). Both knitted sweaters and children clothing are central to the production process in the Women's Sweaters Division on the third floor of Texgar.

The Joint Commission (also known as the Parity Commission) in the women's garment industry groups an association of employers' representatives in the industry, an equal number of union representatives, and provincial government officials. The purpose of this Commission is to formulate the labour decree, and to administer and supervise the extension of the provisions of the decree on an industry-wide basis [6]. Michel (organizing agent for the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union) explains:
the Commission groups the employer, the union and the [provincial] government in the women garment industry. This group formulates a 'decree' which is in effect a part of the collective agreement of the union that is transferred to those workers that are not unionized.

Within the Parity Commission industrial labour relations mechanism, unions and employers are viewed as equals and in non-adversarial terms. The goal of this Commission is to ensure a consensus approach to the industry (in our case, women's garments) between the union's and the employers' representatives. Gerard Latulippe and Kevin O'Farrell (1982:645):

... le paritarisme est fonde sur la reconnaissance et l'acceptation de l'interdependance des parties, et la reconnaissance que certains sujets se traitent mieux, par consequent, en dehors du champ conflictuel. Parfois cette constatation peut provenir des parties elles-memes, parfois l'Etat sera a l'origine d'un tel mouvement. De toute maniere, les parties s'engagent dans la discussion comme partenaires et non comme adversaires, dans les meilleurs interets de l'industrie entiere.

The Ladies' Joint Commission (as it is called in the women's garment industry) offers its 'adherents' inspection and judicial services with respect to the content of the labour decree. It is also a centre of information on the women's garment industry for private and public organisms as well as researchers (Les Comites Paritaires, et al.,1988:39). The information collected by the Commission relates to issues such as homeworking in the industry, labour force, and health and safety standards. Most of the commission's work, however, concentrates on the inspection
and verification of rules regarding the decree (Les Comites Paritaires, et al., 40). "De plus, les comites paritaires se chargent de percevoir les salaires dus en cas de faillite. L'ensemble de ces services est finance par les parties elles-memes, sans aucune forme de subvention ou autre participation financiere de l'etat (Les Comites Paritaires et al., 1988:40).

According to the Decree, employers in the women's garment industry shall "remit to the ladies' Clothing Joint Commission an amount equal to .5% of their payroll for the employees governed by the decree (Ladies Clothing Joint Commission, 1986:16). The employees too shall remit to the Joint Commission .5% of their wages. This is collected by the employer who remits it to the Joint Commission with his/her monthly report. The employees amount is given back to them in the form of vacation pay (Ladies' Clothing Joint Commission, 1986:16).

However, even within the women's garment industry, not all non-unionized workers are protected by this labour decree. For example, stockroom workers storing and retrieving fabric for the 'spreaders' or the 'cutters' are not under the jurisdiction of the labour decree. This is the case even though the stockroom may be located on the same shopfloor (as it is in the Casualwear Division of Texgar) where other workers are covered by the decree.
Furthermore, one should not confuse the Joint Commission with a trade union. Bernard Bernier (1979:136) explains the fundamental difference between the two: 'le Comite Paritaire ne garantit que des avantages minimaux: salaires, boni, conges payes, pause-cafe, etc. Il n'assure ni permanence, ni conge de maternite, ce qu'un syndicat peut negocier.' What is clear in this study is the anti-union function of the Labour Decree. This will be obvious in the discussion in the next chapter. A militant trade union (through the bargaining process) can challenge the gender division of labour in the workplace it represents and fight for women's access to all levels of the social organization of work. On the other hand, the Joint Commission's administration of the labour decree is gender-blind since it is simply concerned with attaching certain salary rates to the job classifications it covers regardless of the gender occupying that job. In other words, it cannot alter the gender division of labour because it simply deals with administrating the labour decree and ensuring that the rules and regulations of the decree are not violated. For example, the Commission's role is to ensure that on September 1, 1987, a 'cutter' with class 1 status began to earn $11.13 an hour. It is not concerned with eliminating the gender discrimination that women face in the workplace in their attempts to enter a skilled male dominated job. 
like 'cutter'. This is not necessarily so a task that a (any) union will take on. But if it wanted to, it could make this a union issue. In sum, the Joint Commission is an institution in Quebec's labour relations system that views labour and capital as equals, and in a 'non-partisan' and 'objective' way functions to ensure a consensus between union and employers for the good of the industry. By claiming to being 'neutral' and 'objective' in its role, the Commission participates in the maintainence and reproduction of class relations in the industry. The Parity Commission


My next task is to examine the working conditions in the Sample Room and Casualwear division of Texgar. Workers in these two divisions indeed work under better conditions than their counterparts in the other two divisions described above. These working conditions are a result of the labour decree governing the labour relations process in the factory.

Work Schedules

Following the labour decree in the women's garment industry in Quebec, workers in the Sample Room Division and
the Casualwear Division work a regular workweek of 35 hours. They are also paid time-and-a-half for overtime hours after 35 hours, and their work-day begins at 8:00 am and ends at 4:00 pm, as the decree stipulates. They have an hour for lunch and two fifteen minute 'coffee-breaks', one in the morning and another in the afternoon. These are all guaranteed by the labour decree.

During interviewing, informants did not complain about overtime wages or vacation pay, as did those working in the other two divisions discussed previously. But this does not mean that workers in these two divisions do not have complaints or are not unjustly treated despite the decree. Union representatives in the Joint Commission who visit different workplaces every three months or so found that Arturo was not being paid properly by Texgar under the stipulation of the labour decree. Arturo explains:

I had been working as a 'spreader' for more than six months but I was only making about $4.75 an hour. When they [joint commission] arrived in the factory, my foreman didn't want the Joint Committee people to talk to me... they couldn't believe that I was still making that money after I had been there six months. A few weeks later I received retroactive pay and a wage increase. The next year the same thing happened. I was supposed to be making a certain wage level and I wasn't. The Joint Committee saw to it again that I got my money and an increase in wage.

Systems of Wage Payment

In the Sample Room Division (fifth floor) [8], the
sample makers earn their wages on an hourly basis, as do the male shopfloor workers labouring in the shipping room of the same division. According to the labour decree, on September 1, 1987, a 'sample maker' earned $8.20 an hour, an increase of .32 cents from the previous year (Ladies Clothing Joint Commission, 1986:7). It is difficult, on the other hand, to establish the hourly wage rate of the male shopfloor workers in the shipping room in the division. This is because their job is not classified under the Decree governing the industry and the women sample makers.

In the Casualwear Division, as in the Women's Sweaters Division discussed above, there are three standard forms of wage payment. They are hourly-wage, set salary rate, and piece-work. The majority of the workers in the division are paid by hourly rate. As for 'piece-work', it is a form of wage payment that is strictly reserved for the women sewing machine operators in the division. But there is one new twist to the way in which management in this division 'goads higher productivity from workers' through piece-work. The next section explains what I mean.

'Piece-Work'

Some writers stress 'piece-work' as a way of 'goad[ing] workers to higher levels of production (Heron and Storey, 1986:8). Others stress that 'piece-working' is a
form of control because it gives workers the illusion that they control their pace of work and therefore have some measure of freedom on the shopfloor (Gannage, 1986:122). Among workers, it is an equally contentious issue:

Some operators argue that piecework allows them to work without the constant vigilance of their employers, so that they feel as if they work for themselves. Others say the nonstop pressure to keep up pace with faster workers, or just to make enough money, is oppressive (Weiner and Green, 1984:283).

Such disagreement does not exist among employers; in fact they have a very clear idea of piecework. 'Employers seem to have no such disagreement: piecework keeps the factory humming and the garment flying (Weiner and Green, 1984:283).

I like to stress that piece-work, as it is part of the production process in the Casualwear division, is both a means of increasing worker productivity and a form of labour control. Here (as in most discussions in the literature on factories) piece-workers collect 'tickets' from the garments they sew and keep a record of these by gluing them on a sheet (or two or three depending on their output) of paper. This sheet is then handed in to the office where an office employee will calculate the piecework wage payment. There is also a 'rate-fixer' who times the piece-workers and (usually) reduces the time allotted for sewing a piece of garment. And, as in most other workplaces where piecework is used as a form of wage payment, the pieceworker has to discipline herself in order to attain a certain level of
productivity which will allow her to earn a decent wage and, at the same time, keep management off her back. But just in case the pieceworker cannot motivate herself to increase output, management in this Division has put in place a coercive scheme to pressure sewing machine operators to increase their daily productivity. The sewing machine operators refer to this scheme as the 'make-up' system [9].

The idea behind piece-work is that the more the worker produces the more money he/she will make. But time and time again this has been proven to be untrue since the piece rate is 'calculated in such a way that payment per piece decreases proportionately as output rises' (Alexander, 1980:27-28). All sewing machine operators on piece-work in this division earn an hourly base salary which they will get if their 'ticket output' is calculated to be less than the hourly base salary they earn. When a sewing machine operator produces less than what she is to receive in her base salary, management records on the tail of her cheque the 'make-up' management had to pay her because she 'underproduced'. Lina explains:

The 'make-up' scheme is a notation on the tail of my cheque letting me know how much money they [management] gave me because I was unable to produce work corresponding to my hourly wage. When this happens, I say to myself, 'look what that bastard put on my cheque'... It tells you that you didn't make enough production even to match the wages you get an hour.

Ana further elaborates the 'make-up' scheme:
Suppose you figure out that if you were paid on an hourly basis [and not on piecework] you would earn $150 a week. Well, if you're on piece-work, management expects you to produce weekly at least those 150 dollars. If you produce under that, let's say $100, then they [management] will write on the back of your cheque the 'make-up' of $50 they had to give you. If you produce over $150 a week, they will also pay you the extra money in the form of a bonus.

Management does not take into consideration the problems that might occur on the shopfloor that might 'put back' an operator as she tries to meet a certain production quota. For example, one day she may work with a particularly difficult fabric, or the sewing machine breaks down; all of these will affect the production level they put out every week. In addition to the physical strain that piece-workers must endure, there is also the psychological pressure and stress they experience from the 'make-up' system. Ana:

In my case I used to go upstairs to the sixth floor [when there was a shortage of work in the sample room division (fifth floor) where she works]. I didn't feel good because the people upstairs would know that I was having problems and wasn't as fast as they are... and so they would look at me... I knew that I wasn't able to make as much as they. But I couldn't make as much as they, because a person, to acquire the level of rapidity that they have, needed practice, and it wasn't in two or three weeks that I was going to acquire the practice. The work that I do [on the fifth floor], sample making is completely different to the work that the sewing machine operators do in the production department on the sixth floor; our work is varied. So I detested going to work upstairs, and I used to go upstairs only not to say no and not create problems, but I didn't like going upstairs because I didn't like to see them to put on my cheque the money I lost (to) the owner. And, I was always under pressure and stress to go faster [sew faster], and I used to get mad and nervous all the time, but I never succeeded in acquiring the rapidity of the other women because I
wouldn't last more than three weeks on that job because I would return to the fifth floor and sample making.

According to Ana, women sewing machine operators have good reason to fear the 'make-up' system:

When there is a shortage of work, the women that are unable to make the amount of money they are paid a week, they are the first to be laid-off. Or after some time if they didn't need so many workers and some woman had difficulty in making the money she was paid, she would be the first to be fired.

On the other hand, if a sewing machine operator produces over the production quota, she will be paid for the extra work. Very often, however, this only amounts to ten or fifteen dollars. Lina:

If we make a lot of production we receive a bonus; I'm not quite sure how they calculate the bonus. This bonus is based on some kind of percentage. Sometimes I'll receive twelve or fifteen dollars a week in bonus. I get $7.96 an hour and if I'm working and I happen to make eight or nine dollars an hour, I'm making over my hourly rate, and the boss is also happy because I'm giving him good production. On the cheque, it will show your bonus. This bonus is based on the production you make over what you get an hour. For example, I earn $7.96 an hour and if my production works out that I make $8.96 an hour, which is a dollar more than what I usually get, they will give me a percentage of that dollar as a bonus.

I have tried to argue in this section that pieceworking is both a means by which management goads workers to increase their output, and, at the same time, controls workers. Piece-work forces workers to discipline themselves in order to attain an acceptable level of output, and to keep pace with the faster workers in the division. This is important since in times of slow economic
activity in the division, the first group of workers to be usually laid-off are those who have trouble meeting the production output established by management. My discussion of the 'make-up' system also shows another way through which management presses the workers to maintain high output. In the following section, the last one of this chapter, I will discuss other labour control features in the factory. In this discussion, ethnicity is central.

CONTROL ACROSS THE SHOPFLOORS

It is not enough for the capitalist to simply hire labour power on the market to operate and manipulate his/her's instruments of labour in the workplace. In addition, the capitalist must set up ways of controlling labour on the shopfloor in order to ensure that his/her instruments of labour are used properly, and that workers use them for the entire work-shift for which they are paid their wages. Richard Edwards (1979) has tackled this issue of control on the shopfloor by examining historically the development of the organization of work in US industry. In his work he proposes a typology of three forms of control: 'simple control', 'technical control' and 'bureaucratic control'. For our purpose and understanding of social relations within Texgar, 'simple control' and 'technical control' are especially relevant.
In this last section of the chapter, therefore, I will examine the different forms of control on the shopfloor and claim that 'simple control' and 'technical control' operate in Texgar to control labour. I add, however, that ethnicity and gender, which Richard Edwards did not take into account, are important elements of 'simple control'.

I also claim, in this last section of the chapter, that ethnicity is crucial for our understanding of how Texgar controls a workforce that is significantly composed of a large number of Portuguese workers. I have shown that the Portuguese numerically dominate the workforce on the shopfloor and that the Pakistani do likewise in the Fabric Division. This being so, how does Texgar then control these cultural work-groups on the shopfloor? I argue that Texgar uses Portuguese to control other Portuguese on the shopfloor, and Pakistanis to control fellow Pakistanis on the floor. This is elaborated below.

'Simple Control'

Richard Edwards (1979:19) defines 'simple control' as the omnipresence of the capitalist on the shopfloor directing and intervening in the labour process "often to exhort workers, bully and threaten them, reward good performance, hire and fire on the spot, favour loyal workers, and generally act as despots, benevolent or
otherwise." He adds that "[t]here is little structure to the way power is exercised, and workers are often treated arbitrarily. Since workforces are small and the boss is both close and powerful, workers have limited success when they tried to oppose his rule" (Edwards, 1979:19). Although 'simple control' was pervasive in workplaces of American industry in the 19th century, Edwards admits that it persists today in the small-business sectors of the US economy.

Richard Edwards' typology of control is an important development in the labour process literature. I add, though, that a system of control like 'simple control' can be much more analytically accurate when it encompasses gender and ethnicity as central elements in the analysis of the organization of work. Ann Game and Rosemary Pringle (1983) have criticized Edwards' typology of control for being gender blind. They argue that 'simple control' is very often "control by the 'father', often in a symbolic sense but frequently quite literally, in small enterprises and family companies" (1983:20).[10] My discussion of the early corporate structure of Texgar reveals that Albert Saltzman was the 'patriarchal father' directing and managing the labour process in the workshop from the shopfloor itself. If you recall, Albert Saltzman stood working side-by-side with his hired wage workers, and also benefited from
his wife's "help". Today, the corporate structure of Texgar is still patriarchal, with the added feature of the family business concept. Thus, Albert Saltzman controls the Fabric Division, his son Jerry does likewise in the Casualwear Division and part of the Sample Room Division, and his son-in-law Lenny Long controls the Women's Sweaters Division and the other part of the Sample Room Division. As for Mrs. Saltzman, none of the workers interviewed were able to tell me what she did in the factory, except that once in awhile she will come around to the women in the Sample Room Division and distribute their pay-cheques to them.

The contemporary features of 'simple control' in Texgar are not a result of the presence of Albert Saltzman (or of any of the two other owners of Texgar) on the shopfloor and his direct intervention in the organization of work in the factory, as Richard Edwards believes. Instead, many workers (men and women) are "loyal" to Albert Saltzman because they share immigrant status with the owner of the factory, and view him as "kind" and "unselfish" for providing them with a job in a new country. For this reason, many workers feel that Albert Saltzman was responsible for their adaptation and start in a new life in Canada. Luz:

He [A. Saltzman] is a wonderful man because he is giving us a lot of work to do. Isn't that good... earning money? He's a 'saint'... giving us a lot of work to do.
Ida includes the entire Saltzman family in her praise:

I have always had a good relationship with Mr. Saltzman... they [family] are all very nice people. Mr. Saltzman is a very nice person and very honest. He has a nice appearance about himself, all of them do. They are all good to the workers. All the family is very nice and honest, they are also friends to the workers.

Why shouldn't they (the Saltzmans) be nice and friendly to the workers? After all it is the workers who create wealth... Besides, it is the owner(s) of the factory who has everything to lose with a class conscious workforce. Ida's verbatim quote above makes clear the power of 'simple control': its practice on the shopfloor obscures the antagonistic class relation that underlie the relations between the capitalist and the worker, while simultaneously perpetuating that exploitative relationship with acts of 'simple control'.

One of the shopfloor workers interviewed had even invited the entire Saltzman family to her wedding. Lilia:

When I got married, I invited them [the Saltzmans] and they all attended my wedding. He [A. Saltzman] knows how to approach the workers, he is nice and friendly to them...

Carlos (a Portuguese shopfloor supervisor in the Casualwear Division) admires Albert Saltzman for what he has done since coming to Canada as an immigrant over 40 years ago:

Mr. Saltzman is a man that I respect a lot because he is a man that started from scratch, and then became somebody. He came here with nothing, and now he has
been in business 37 or 38 years. I don't think that he needs to work anymore...

Not all workers were this exuberant over Albert Saltzman; some were very critical of him and the factory in general. We shall discuss this other view of the factory in the following chapter on the union drive.

Supervisors Controlling Ethnic Workers with whom they share Ethnicity

Earlier in this chapter I argued that in terms of employment practice Texgar differs from most other workplaces in the industry. Whereas most factories seek to employ an ethnically heterogeneous workforce, Texgar has leaned towards employing an ethnic specific group of workers. We have already seen that the Portuguese dominate numerically three divisions in the factory. This being so, we must ask ourselves the following question: how has Texgar been able to manage a large Portuguese ethnic workforce? This is the question that we try to answer here.

It is possible that Texgar has been able to control the successive numerically dominant ethnic group in the factory simply by the fact that every so often it replaces one ethnic group by a more recent immigrant group in Montreal. As soon as the ethnic homogeneous group in the factory is able to understand their legal rights as workers and become aware of the avenues available to them for
recourse to action against their employer, the Saltzmans are already bringing into the factory another immigrant workforce to replace the "older" ethnic group in the workplace. However, the Portuguese have been now the numerically dominant group in the factory for at least 10 years. And even though many of them today still don't speak English or French fluently, one would think that over this period of service to Texgar some leader(s) would have emerged from the shopfloor to lecture the Portuguese within the factory on their rights. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that this happened prior to the emergence of the union drive discussed later in this thesis.

I believe that Texgar has been able to control the homogeneous Portuguese workforce in the factory in two ways. First, simple control and the workers allegiance to Albert Saltzman; second, management's policy of promoting Portuguese workers from the shopfloor into the rank of shopfloor supervisor and office personnel. With respect to the latter, Bella and Lilia's "careers in Texgar" illustrate my point. Bella:

I started in Texgar as a 'bundle girl' distributing material to the women working as machine operators. From this job, I then worked 'cutting ends' [cortando pontas'] from garments. I did this work for awhile. I did other jobs too [...] until I began to work part-time in the office in the pay-roll department in the office. I also worked as a receptionist for six years. Today I work full-time in the office in the pay-roll department.
Lilia:

My first job in Texgar was 'fusing'. This is when you put something in the collar of the shirt or the wrists of the shirt. I used to work in the 'fusing' section on the sixth floor, and I did that for about one week. The following week I did 'piece-work' sheets. This was for the 'spreaders' and the 'cutters' and organize how many pieces according to size and colour they had to cut. I did this job for about two weeks just learning. After these two weeks I did some 'spreading', but after a week and a half, I didn't like the job and I went back to 'piece-work' sheets. After sometime there, they took me into the office and told me that I was responsible for ordering all the 'trimmings' necessary for the garments. ['Trimnings' are buttons, zippers, etc.] This is the job that I'm doing right now and it is a job in the office—an 'office-job'. The job that I'm doing is also on the sixth floor but in the office area.

Our discussion of the union drive (and its defeat) in the following chapter, will show the role that Portuguese supervisors and office personnel played in pressuring workers to ignore the union drive. This group of workers acted as interpreters for Albert Saltzman as he held illegal meetings with shopfloor workers concerning the union drive, moved around the shopfloor handing out to the workers anti-union literature written by them in Portuguese, pressured shopfloor workers to sign anti-union cards, etc.

I have previously pointed out that the majority of workers in the factory are Portuguese and that they are primarily Portuguese women. My investigation of the labour processes across the factory reveals that the majority of Portuguese shopfloor women are supervised by a Portuguese woman who herself used to be a shopfloor worker. So, almost
without exception, wherever Portuguese shopfloor women work, there is a Portuguese shopfloor supervisor supervising and controlling them. This is the case in the Women's Sweaters Division where Portuguese women sewing machine operators are supervised by their compatriots Natalie and Terry (11). Delia:

There are two bosses, one takes care of one side of the factory and the other takes care of the other side of the factory. Terry [...] takes care of the end where I work and Natalie takes care of the other end. They are both women, both are Portuguese and they supervise Portuguese women.

This is also the case in the Casualwear Division. In the Production Department on the sixth floor, Theresa and Beatrice are in charge of the sewing machine operators. In the Finishing Department on the fourth floor, it is Rosa who supervises the large number of Portuguese women workers there.

'Simple control' is not limited to firms "so small that the only boss was the capitalist" (Edwards, 1979:26). In fact, the capitalist is aided in his/her management and control of the firm "by a coterie of managers, straw bosses, and foremen" (Edwards, 1979:26). According to Richard Edwards (1979:26),

[what was essential, however, was that the entrepreneurial firm was small enough for all, or nearly all, the workers to have some personal relationship with the capitalist and that the group of managers was small enough for each to be effectively directed, motivated, and supervised by the capitalist. Thus, even though it was impossible for a capitalist to
be the immediate supervisor of all the workers in a firm employing two or three hundred people, it was still possible for him to supervise all the bosses and to know all the workers.

In chapter four we discussed the corporate structure of Texgar and explained that all three co-owners of the factory are present daily in the factory. And, none of the owners participate directly in the production process, though each maintains a separate office in Texgar. Hence, the personal touch of the employer in the production process is absent in Texgar. What is very much evident is the use of shopfloor supervisors to control the workforce in the factory. These shopfloor supervisors have the authority to lay-off whomever they choose when there is a slack economic period in the division; the power to hire and fire their workers; and to maintain control over their workers by favouring some workers over the majority. The problem of 'favouratism' has been identified in studies of clothing factories (e.g., Gannage, 1986; Teal, 1985), and in the following chapter we shall see how shopfloor workers have reacted to this form of control within Texgar.

In the Sample Room Division, the majority of the sample makers are Portuguese, but their supervisors are two French-Canadian women responsible for transferring the clothing design from paper into a paper pattern. Both of these women have followed a career pattern that brought them to trade schools in Montreal and to the learning of the
skill of pattern making. This is according to information
gathered from the women shopfloor workers interviewed from
this division.

According to the shopfloor workers interviewed, the
input of the shopfloor supervisors in the overall strategy
of production in each of the divisions is limited. Their
power in the factory is supervising and controlling the
women shopfloor workers. To begin with, supervisors share
the same language with the shopfloor workers they supervise.
This is especially troublesome for those workers trying to
discuss the union and recruit workers' support for the union
campaign in the factory. In addition, Texgar does not have
an institutionalized, formal hiring employment department
recruiting workers through employment centres in the city of
Montreal. Instead, as I have shown before, it is the
shopfloor workers already in the factory who recruit their
family members and acquaintances into the factory. It is
then the shopfloor supervisors who hire (and fire) the
workers coming into the factory [12]. Many of the women
interviewed, therefore, complained about the 'favoritism'
that these Portuguese shopfloor supervisors display in their
treatment of some workers on the shopfloor. Della's
comments are exemplary of the complaints gathered in the
interviews:

I work with a lot of different people... Spanish, French, Black, all different people. I do find that
one group of people do tend to be better treated or worse treated than another but it depends on the boss. Like the boss I have, Terry, she treats some women better than others: the women that she likes would be better treated than others. The women that she didn't like, she didn't pay that much attention to... If the person she liked would do something wrong, she [Terry] would cover it up or she would give her a second chance or something. But if it was some that she didn't like, she would give her shit all the time, she would argue with them all the time. I find that the boss should treat everybody the same... just because you like someone better, that shouldn't be a reason for you to treat them better than other workers that you supervise. The women that she didn't like were from all different kinds of language, as long as she didn't like them... she didn't really care... just one little mistake and she would be at their throat... I didn't think that was a very good thing to do.

Many of the women workers also complained about the 'favoritism' that their supervisors display which, they feel, is particularly evident when the factory has to temporarily lay-off workers because of lack of work. For example, very often in times of slow activity in the factory, women are sent home for a couple of weeks or months until work picks up again. But the supervisors, the workers complained, will keep the faster sewing machine operators in the factory and send home workers who may not be as fast or are not liked by the supervisor but have seniority over those that the supervisor decides to keep in the factory. This strategy of 'favoritism' also turns workers against each other since those workers who are seen to be the 'favorites' of the supervisors are avoided and not trusted by the rest of the workers. We will have more to say about
this and other complaints and grievances in the following chapter.

Some of the Portuguese men doing unskilled work, like storing fabric on the sixth floor, were supervised by a Portuguese person (Carlos in this case), but other Portuguese men, like the 'cutters', are supervised by an Italian man who had been hired from outside the factory. Hence, there doesn't seem to be the same ethnic group worker - same ethnic group supervisor pattern with respect to the Portuguese men on the shopfloors across the factory.

In the Fabric Division, until recently, the Portuguese dominated the shopfloor. But, they have never been supervised by a Portuguese compatriot. This was not, however, due to lack of trying by Albert Saltzman. Leo:

We always had many Portuguese workers in the fabric division and it is true that we never had any Portuguese boss. But on more than one occasion, Mr. Saltzman came to me and asked me if I was interested in being the boss in the fabric division. But I never accepted the job, maybe because there were many Portuguese workers, people that were born in the same Land that I was, and Mr. Saltzman wanting his bosses to make his workers produce. Perhaps I would have troubles with the Portuguese workers on the floor if or when they would not follow my orders.

Today in the Fabric Division, Pakistani workers have replaced the Portuguese in the Dye House and Finishing Departments of the Division. And, according to field observation and interviews, the two shopfloor supervisors in these two departments are also Pakistani. Lou Morais
explains why this is so:

I have been working at Texgar for 12 years and I have seen many people come and go. There is a change in the ethnic background of the workers in the [fabric] division. There is a difference in the ethnic workforce because of the supervisors' background. For instance, if you're Italian and the boss is also Italian, you have a better chance of being hired than someone who is not Italian. If the boss is 'Indian' then workers will tend to be 'Indians', etc. Bosses like to hire people from their own nationality because they have more confidence, and they feel that they can depend more on people from their own race.

When I pointed out to Lou that until recently the Portuguese were numerically dominant in the Fabric Division despite the fact that there has never been a Portuguese supervisor in this division, he responded:

It is true that there wasn't any Portuguese bosses downstairs [finishing department] but those that were in the division liked Portuguese workers. For example, Remo was Italian and he liked to hire Portuguese workers because he felt that they were similar in character to Italian workers... there was always a better chance of a white worker being hired.

Lou Morais continues:

The new workforce replacing the older Portuguese and Haitian workers in the division are Pakistani, Latin American and from other 'Third World' countries. The Pakistani have been in the factory since the early 1980s and some of the workers feel that it is because the boss in the dye house is Pakistani that all but one worker in that department isn't Pakistani. There are other Pakistani workers in the finishing department, and the workers also see this as due to the Pakistani boss in the finishing department.

Mira, a Pakistani working in the Dye House Department corroborates Lou's explanation:

The workers in the dye house department are Asians because Javet does the hiring and the firing and so he
likes to hire his people because he feels that they are more dependable and will listen to him more, and that's true. Javet speaks to them in their language, he understands them, and he feels for them a little bit. They're mostly immigrants here and he can communicate with them better.

Howard, another Pakistani working for the dye house department, relates what Javet (Pakistani supervisor) told him when he started his new job:

When I started at the 'preparation machine', he [Javet] told me 'try it for one or two days and see how you manage; if after two or three days you feel comfortable in the job... don't come to me a month later and say that you are leaving and don't want to work here no more. I won't like that. I will be angry with you'.

I believe that this 'coaching' is part of the supervising and controlling process that Pakistani workers experience on the floor from their Pakistani supervisors. Therefore, in this division, and in the others as they relate to the Portuguese women workers on the shopfloor, the practice at Texgar is to have a shopfloor supervisor that shares the same ethnic background with the workers he/she is told to supervise.

'Technical Control'

In his discussion of the continuum of systems of control in US industry, Richard Edwards (1979) argues that as a workplace increases in size and as new technology is introduced into it, 'technical control' becomes the new dominant form of control on the shopfloor. He suggests that
it is in the manufacturing sector of the economy that work is likely to be subject to 'technical control'. Whereas 'simple control' deals with the social relations in the workplace between the capitalist and the workers, 'technical control' refers to the physical structure of the labour process itself: the machinery in the workplace is organized to 'direct' the labour process and set the pace of work [13]. Under this form of control, workers become "attendants of prepared machines", and the capitalist can replace workers easier. In the following paragraphs, I want to argue that some of the new technology being introduced into the factory, the Casualwear Division in particular, exhibits the features of 'technical control'.

The sewing machine area in the Production Department of the Casualwear Division is divided into two sections. In each, sewing machine operators work on the different garment pieces. In Lina's section (described above) women sewing machine operators sew skirts and pants; in Ida's section (described below), they sew garment pieces in order to make coats and blouses. In both sections the 'singer' sewing machines are the same, and only the 'overlock machine' is slightly different in each. Ida:

The women on the other section [i.e. Lina's] don't work with this system [see below], yet. They still work as we did before this new system: they have to undo and re-do the 'bundles' of clothes in order to sew the pieces. There are women on the floor that distribute these 'bundles' and that take them to the next worker,
and so on... When you don't have work to sew you have to call one of these persons [women distributing work] to bring to you some clothes. The women in this section also work by piece-work. They don't work as fast because they work under a different system.

The difference between these two sections that concerns us most is that which Ida keeping hinting at: in her sewing machine section of the production department, management has recently introduced the 'E-Ton 2001 computerized system' of garment distribution and pick-up to the sewing machine operators on the floor [14]. Ida says that this system was first introduced in her section because management wanted to evaluate the performance level of workers under this system. She also says that management is convinced that the system works well, and that it won't be long before the 'E-Ton 2001 System' is extended to the other section on the floor.

Along with the 'E-Ton', management has installed characteristics of the 'technical control' system of work organization. In addition, this new technology is labour saving with the purpose of increasing the exploitation of women sewing operators. Ida:

The work is brought to us through the intermediary of a new system. We now work with a computerized system. In front of us at arm's length on our machine there is a button which we press and then a robot arm [that moves along a conveyor belt-type apparatus above the floor and the sewing machine operators] will lower the clothes on a hanger on our machines. I then remove the clothes from the hanger, sew what I have to, and when I'm finished. I set the garment on the hanger and set it on the robot arm which pulls the clothes again and then the process continues to the next worker...
The labour-saving purpose of this new technology on the floor is clear in the next comment from Ida.

Before [this system] we'd get the bundle of garments then we would have to undo this bundle and separate the garments into neat little piles each of different type of work required. When we were finished sewing, we would have to tie the bundles together again and write our number on each bundle. Now with this new system, we don't undo and re-do bundles. We don't write our number down on each bundle... it is just work always coming to you which you do and then send to the next person. Sometimes you don't realize how much or how fast you are making things. What I used to do in one day in the past, I do now in half a day with this new system; the work is done much faster, and it comes to you much quicker. The work gets done so fast but you don't even realize how fast you are going with this new system: it comes to you, you sew it, and set on for the next person, and it's repeated again, [and again, and again...]

As in the other sewing machine areas in the factory, women operators here are paid on a piecework basis, although they do have a base salary which works out to almost $8 an hour. Again like piecing in the other divisions of the factory, the piecework rate is calculated on the basis of the seconds and minutes management determines an operator ought to take to sew a garment piece. In an earlier part of this chapter, I have already discussed the different features (some of them unique to Texgar) of piecing in the factory. But the data recorded in my interview with Ida reveals clearly the fundamental underlying rationale behind the piecework system and it is evident in the way the 'E-Ton 2001 System' is set up on the shopfloor. According to Martin Shaw (1977:18) the assumption about 'human
behaviour' that underlies the piecework system is 'classical': "man (and woman) was rational and always sought to maximise his/her self-interest, i.e. to achieve higher wages." The next quote from Ida clearly describes her drive to produce and achieve higher wages for herself, but this must be understood in the context of the work environment within which she is being forced to work. In addition, the quote describes the de-humanizing reality of pieceworking and 'technical control' that the 'E-Ton 2001 System' entails. Ida:

The work is brought to us through a new system; we now work with a computerized system. On the left side of my machine where I sit there is an electrical box. I have (as do all the women working with this new system) a smaller box (similar to a TV remote control box) with my name and my own 'punch-card' number on it. I take this smaller box whenever I start to operate the machine and lock it into a space in the larger electrical box. As soon as I place my little box in the larger electrical box, it (the smaller box) flashes on immediately the time of the day, and also records the exact time I start work. As I am working, I can turn to my left and read on my little box the amount of [piecework] money I'm making an hour, the number of pieces I've made, and the total amount of money that I have already made since I started my day. Yesterday at 10 o'clock I had already made $20.00 for myself, and I had already made forty pieces from 8 to 10 o'clock. Yesterday I was doing collars on sweaters that had zippers and I also had to sew the [Division] label on. On another space in my little box, it also tells me how long I take to sew each piece.

True to Richard Edwards' definition of 'technical control', the new machinery (in this case the 'E-Ton 2001 System') which workers must conform to, 'dictates and directs' the labour process and the pace of work on the floor. Ida:
If I don't need anything for my machine I will go days without talking to her (or even seeing her) [i.e. supervisor]. But if I'm doing work that I'm not too certain about, I call her (on the telephone also attached to my machine) for an explanation. Before this new system the bosses were demanding of the workers, but now they don't even bother because it is up to us now. If we don't work hard it will show because our little box is keeping count. It is different now. In the past they [supervisors] were more demanding. In the past, she would say to us, 'if you want to make money you have to work hard, you have to push yourselves', and we did.

Our work moves from one worker to another, and each of our machines has its own number. For example, right now I'm sewing shoulders. I have a telephone on the side of my machine for when I need some help with the machine or more thread, or a mechanic, etc., and the boss tells the person operating the computer that my machine, number 36, will do shoulders and that the machines after me will do other jobs (e.g. collars, wrists, etc.) on the same piece of material. We all have to be very fast because our work goes from one worker to the next and if you're slow, you hold up the rest of the workers on your section working with the same piece as you. Even if you wanted to slow down a bit, you can't because the work just keeps coming to you: you press a button and the work is automatically lowered on to your machine, you work on it and then send it right up again [to the line]... and press the button again and the work is lowered onto your machine, its always COMING, COMING... there is no time to rest, IT COMES AT YOU CONSTANTLY ['aquilo e sempre a seguir...']. You have to keep up otherwise it... its like a truck that you fill and when there isn't anymore room in the truck you put the rest around the truck. Here, we are buried by the clothes besides us. You have to move constantly...

Ida has clearly demonstrated that the 'E-Ton 2001 System' controls the line and by extension the workers who have become dependent on the 'line' for work. The control and pacing of work on the shopfloor are central characteristics of Richard Edwards' concept of 'technical
control'. But Ida seems to indicate that workers under the 'E-Ton' control each other because if one falls behind in production it affects the output and the wages of the rest of the women sewing machine operators on 'the line' working with the same garment. The end result is that forced conformity to the pace of the machinery ensures management a consistently high level of production output (unless the machinery breaks down), and at the same time, obscures the class-driven purpose for installing the de-humanizing but highly financially efficient E-Ton 2001 System on the shopfloor. That is, workers vent their frustrations on the machinery and against each other rather than on those who control and exploit them for profit through the machinery.

CONCLUSION

Our examination of 'Working Conditions' in the factory revealed that workers (men and women) in the Sample Room and the Casualwear Divisions are relatively 'better off' than those in the other two divisions in the factory. This is so because workers in the two former divisions are under the jurisdiction of the government supervised 'Labour Decree' in the women's garment industry.

Our investigation of 'control' within Texgar revealed that two forms of control are operating
simultaneously on the shopfloor. They are 'simple control' and 'technical control'. The first is particularly evident among the Portuguese in the factory and their 'loyalty' towards its owner. The owner of the factory has perpetuated this system of control by keeping active and informal labour recruiting networks among the Portuguese in the factory and in the neighborhood surrounding the factory. Also, the employer uses ethnic supervisors to control workers with whom they share ethnicity. We have identified that management uses Portuguese women supervisors to control Portuguese women sewing machine operators. In the Fabric Division, the predominantly Pakistani workforce is also controlled by two Pakistani supervisors. We have identified 'technical control' in only one section of one Division. This form of control is tied to recent technology implemented on the shopfloor. According to the women workers in this division, this form of control might soon be extended since management plans on extending the new technology to other sections of the division.

This chapter, and the three that have preceded, show clearly the fragmentation of the workforce in Texgar: heterogeneity of workers on the shopfloor is one way the capitalist erects barriers between workers and controls them (Gannage, 1986; Teal, 1985). In this factory, workers are divided between four Divisions, each with specific working
conditions. They also perform tasks that are specific to their gender; they are ethnically heterogenous (although the Portuguese are numerically dominant); and they are subject to two forms of labour control - simple, and technical. Given these conditions of employment, it seems hard to believe that Texgar workers actually gathered enough support to attempt to organize Texgar. The following chapter discusses the union drive campaign at Texgar.
NOTES

1. The Parity Commission (see next section for a definition) does not specify in the Decree that the vacation pay has to be paid in one full installment of 4% every year.

2.

Table 10

AVERAGE HOURLY WAGES
IN ALL MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
AND IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRIES
(Current [1985] dollars and per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Manufacturing Industries</th>
<th>Primary Textiles</th>
<th>Clothing and Knitting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dollars</td>
<td>Per cent of (1) Dollars of (1)</td>
<td>Per cent of (1)</td>
<td>Dollars of (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>9.17</td>
<td>7.11</td>
<td>77.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>10.24</td>
<td>7.86</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>10.61</td>
<td>8.28</td>
<td>78.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>11.16</td>
<td>8.82</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985 I</td>
<td>11.47</td>
<td>9.11</td>
<td>79.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985 II</td>
<td>11.52</td>
<td>9.18</td>
<td>79.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3. More will be said on the piece-work system when we discuss the working conditions in the Casualwear and the garment Sample Room Divisions of the factory. Suffice to say here that management uses a very complicated system of calculating the piece-work rate, and workers know very little about the way their piece-work wages are calculated (Lamphere, 1979).

4. Some of the minimal working conditions that the labour decree guarantees include:

. a standard workweek is 35 hours (Monday-Friday)
. a regular day-shift is 8:00 am to 16:00 pm
. work done beyond 35 hours is overtime, paid at a
time-and-a-half rate
. it prohibits work on: Sundays, National Holidays, New Year's Day and Christmas Day, and during the July annual vacation period (Ladies' Clothing Joint Commission, 1986:5,6)

In terms of wages, the labour decree specifies a scale of wage rates defined by experience on the job and respected by the employer. For example, under this wage scale, as of September 1, 1987, a 'sample maker' received a hourly rate of at least $8.20. A 'cutter' of first class status received as of the same date an hourly wage of $11.13 (Ladies' Clothing Joint Commission, 1986:7).

5. Jean-Louis Dube (1976) discusses the legalistic history of the "l'Extension juridique des conventions collectives au Quebec." Celine Saint-Pierre (1975), on the other hand, discusses this same topic from a Poulantzian framework.

6. Industry-wide collective agreements also exist in Quebec's garment industry for men, the shirt and leather glove industry (Les Comites Paritaires, et al. 1988), and in the construction industry (Coleman, 1986).

7. Bernard Bernier (1979) investigates three factories in the Montreal area. He found, among other things, that two of the three factories were unionized, and that the third was governed by the Parity Commission. Bernier discovered that in the factory where the workers were governed by the Parity Commission, the wages women received were higher than those of women working in the two factories governed by the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union. Parts of the following chapter in this thesis will argue that the presence of the Parity Commission in the Casualwear Division, and the minimal working conditions it provided workers with, resulted in the rejection of the union drive by most of the workers in this division.

8. Here, I am specifically referring to TG Activewear and Nouveauwear. These two sample rooms are part of Texgar. The third sample room on the fifth floor is 'Michel Robichaux' which is owned by the person of the same name.

9. Nina Shapiro-Perl (1979:269) describe 'make-up' in a jewelry factory as a practice where workers would hold back their production output because they considered
management's quota too high, and thus were hoping that in doing this management would eventually reduce the production quota to a more acceptable level. This is not what 'make-up' means for the sewing machine operators in the Casualwear Division.

10. They also critique the concepts 'technical control' and 'bureaucratic control' for being gender blind.

Technical control is patriarchal in a less direct though no less powerful sense than simple control. Machines, particularly new ones, are represented as masculine. It is perhaps ironical that men are frequently put on to new machines because 'women don't understand them', given the extent to which 'skills' are actually incorporated into the machines. Men too are being controlled by capital's masculine machines—but the masculinity of them goes some way to disguising this (Game and Pringle, 1983:21).

Bureaucratic control is the form frequently preferred by women. They can say, 'we don't need a male patron; we can make it on merit'. This form of control operates through denial that there is any discrimination. It is asserted that gender is irrelevant, that women can make it on the same terms as men, that all will be rationally and fairly evaluated, according to the same criteria. This ignores the specific problems faced by women workers and the ways in which the whole world of work is structured around male norms (Game and Pringle, 1983:21).

11. In fact these two women also supervise and control the women 'thread trimmers', and the women 'general workers' in the factory.

12. Women shopfloor workers were frustrated by their supervisors' unfair treatment of some workers. This was a complaint even from those women who were anti-union. Many of the women supporting the union drive did not so much because they realized their different class interests from those of Albert Saltzman et al., but because of the injustices of their supervisors.

13. However, we must not assume that this means that technology has an independent existence from the capitalist and that it is therefore the technology that is exploitative and oppressive. Instead, we must recognize that the technology is invented with the purpose of serving the goal of reducing socially necessary labour, thereby increasing
exploitation of workers. See Dan Clawson (1980) for a discussion of 'technological' and 'bureaucratic' determinism. See also Marx (1977) for a theoretical discussion of the role of technology in the labour process.

14. Dr. Charlene Gannage (1987) also has an excellent discussion of the most recent technology, including the E-Ton 2001 system, in use in the garment industry.
CHAPTER NINE

THE ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE TEXGAR

INTRODUCTION

My investigation of the organizing drive in Texgar calls forth a different explanation of union organizing than that commonly proposed in the industrial relations literature where a group of writers believe in an 'appropriate' time for organizing. This 'appropriate timing' is tied to the swings of the economy: unionization occurs in periods of economic prosperity because it is then that workers are aware of the gains unions can win for them, and employers are more responsive to workers' demands. This is because an increase in demand for labour puts unions in a stronger labour organizing position.

Conversely, in economic crisis periods, unionizing doesn't occur as often because workers retreat to protect their jobs, and employers are more reluctant to satisfy workers' demands. Thus, with a rapid increase in the reserve army of labour during an economic crisis, organizing is difficult. The key factor in this explanation of labour organizing is the elasticity of the labour market; and it is this factor that the 'business cycle theory' uses to explain unionization (Swidinsky, 1973; Bain and Elsheikh, 1976; Stepina and Fiorito, 1986; Nelson, 1988).
I reject this theory of the 'timing' of unionizing and I have explained my reasons for doing so in chapter one. The business cycle theory is inadequate because it cannot explain unionization in periods of economic crisis. Moreover, workers are portrayed as 'passive' and employers as benevolent entrepreneurs sympathetic to workers' demands. This characterization is problematic; there is an extensive body of literature that shows employers fighting tooth and nail to keep their workplaces union-free, regardless of the state of the economy. Moreover, employers often-indirectly through anti-union committees - support worker-led union-busting campaigns within their workplace.

This thesis proposes that to understand unionization, research must focus on the workplace and on the concept of the labour process rather than exclusively on the labour market. This concept embodies a class relation, as well as the technical and social division of labour in the workplace. The contradictions of these components must be examined to understand the organization of production in the workplace. But an investigation of the labour process would be incomplete if it did not examine the role of the external business environment and social institutions impinging on or conditioning it. This thesis has attempted to examine thoroughly the elements that comprise the labour process in Texgar in order to explain the emergence,
development and defeat of the union drive. Our explanation (as it is shown here) does not view workers as passive and employers as benevolent, but stresses instead the emergence of grievances on the shopfloor resulting from a combination of the organization of work in the factory and the changing structure of the textile and garment industries in Canada. Pressures from competition in the capital market forced the employer to reorganize the shopfloor which, in turn, threatened the workers' standard of living and job security. But the workers too pushed forth their own agenda by organizing to protect and promote their own interests.

Part one of this chapter discusses the crisis of Canadian capitalism in the early 1980s and the extent of this crisis in the Canadian textile and garment sector. This discussion lays out the context within which workers at Texgar chose to organize. In addition, this discussion describes Texgar as embroiled in its own company crisis. Part two discusses the grievances behind the union drive and the expansion of the latter throughout the factory. The role of the International Ladies Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU) in the organizing drive is also discussed. Part three discusses opposition to the union drive within Texgar. We discuss consecutively shopfloor opposition to the union drive, opposition from supervisors, and Albert Saltzman's anti-union strategy within Texgar. Part four suggests
reasons for the defeat of the union drive. The ILGWU's organizing strategy within the factory, as well as the legal process of certification, did not facilitate the organizing drive.

PART ONE:

THE CRISIS IN CANADIAN CAPITALISM IN THE EARLY 1980s

The Canadian economic crisis of 1981-1983 matched in severity only that of the Great Depression [1]. All economic factors indicate that the economic situation in this country was disastrous for the working population. Inflation remained consistently over 10 per cent through this period, and in 1981 reached 12.5 per cent (Calvert, 1984:15). Interest rates averaged 13.1 in the first four years of the decade (calculated from table 5 in Calvert, 1984:6). And in 1981, they reached an unprecedented level in Canadian history: the Bank of Canada's prime rate jumped briefly over 20 per cent.

But perhaps the best economic indicator of the crisis and its impact on the working class is the unemployment rate. In 1982, 1983, and 1984, the Canadian unemployment rate remained consistently over 10 per cent (Therborn, 1986:16). [2] In some parts of Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces it exceeded 20 per cent, and even 30 per cent in real terms (Calvert, 1984:2). Young people (25
years of age and under) were especially hard hit by the crisis in the province of Quebec: half of all the unemployed were in this category (Confédération des Syndicaux Nationaux [CSN] and the Centrale de l'Enseignement du Québec [CEQ], 1987:222).

Real wages and living standards of the Canadian working population deteriorated [3]. This was a result of inflation, government-imposed wage controls and the establishment of a bargaining climate that undermined the negotiating strength of unions (Calvert, 1984:7). Moreover, the federal and provincial governments introduced cuts to social programmes and services, thereby complicating further the working class's efforts to make ends meet.

The economic crisis also affected women, as an increasing number of them entered the labour market. In 1980, Canadian women comprised 50.3 per cent of the labour force in the country (Yanz and Smith, 1985:17). But despite this, women were still segregated into the secondary labour market where they perform 'woman's work' and remain largely unorganized (see Armstrong and Armstrong, 1984; Phillips and Phillips, 1983). In 1982, Canadian women's unemployment rate was marginally lower than that of their male counterparts, 10.8 per cent compared to 11.1 per cent for men [4]. This is further illustrated in the following comparison: the unemployment rate in male-dominated
industries for 1982 was 14.9 per cent, but a relatively low 8.5 per cent in the service sector where most women work. It would seem, therefore, that the segregation of women into the secondary labour market sheltered them from the high unemployment levels affecting men in the primary industrial sectors (Armstrong, 1984). Nonetheless, in March, 1983, there were 633,000 (38%) women officially unemployed from an official total unemployed population of 1,658,000 (Armstrong, 1984:100). Most of these women lost their jobs in the small business sector where, just in 1982, some 40,000 bankruptcies occurred.

The impact of the crisis on women was felt not only in the labour market and within the workplace; it was also felt in the household where the sustenance and reproduction of the labour force takes place (5). In times of economic crisis the household "reduces expenditures on goods and services and increases labour to compensate for falling incomes" (Armstrong, 1984:92). Since under capitalism (and state-centered socialism) it is working class women that manage the household, regardless of whether or not they work for a wage outside the home, the responsibility falls to them of developing strategies to reduce expenditures on household goods and increasing labour time to transform commodities into their consumable form. And in times of economic crisis, they usually do this with a reduction in
family income and declining state assistance.

The Canadian garment and textile sector was severely affected by the crisis of the early 1980s. Many manufacturers went bankrupt, while others rationalized their operations and laid off thousands of workers in order to survive the crisis.

The Crisis in the Garment and Textile Sector

The Canadian textile and garment industries are periodically involved in sectoral crises; in Chapter Three we explained why this is so often the case. But in the early 1980s the crisis that embraced the entire Canadian economy threatened - like no other crisis before - the very survival of these industries. In 1981 clothing imports rose by 18.3 per cent from $854 million to $1,038 million. Comparatively, in 1980 imports had dropped by 3 per cent (Government of Quebec, 1983:32). In Quebec in 1981, clothing imports reached $582.6 million, an increase of 18.6 per cent over 1980. These imports originated principally from Hong Kong (22.9%), South Korea (20.1%), Taiwan (17%) and China (8%) (Government of Quebec, 1983:33). And while imports flooded the domestic market, garment manufacturers in Quebec faced stagnant domestic demand for their goods because retailers and large department store chains preferred to buy the cheaper imported goods. Consequently,
in the first six months of 1982, the value of shipments declined by 5 per cent.

Exports, which do not constitute a large proportion of the total Canadian garment production anyway, declined in 1982 by 9.5 per cent - from $113 million to $102 million. At the same time, foreign garment imports increased by 5 per cent to $484 million (Government of Quebec, 1983:1). Under these tough economic conditions, 91 bankruptcies occurred in the Canadian garment sector in 1982, 71 in Quebec. Close to half (45%) of all bankruptcies in the Canadian garment industry were in the women's garment sector. In Quebec, "l'industrie des vetements pour dames est la plus touchee par les faillites et ce, depuis 1979" (Government of Quebec, 1983:23).

The competition from foreign imports in the domestic market, combined with low domestic demand for Canadian-made clothing and high interest rates (resulting in bankruptcies) resulted in high levels of unemployment. Data for the period 1977-1983 shows that in the "total clothing sector employment in Quebec declined by nearly 25 per cent; the bulk of the losses were in the men's and boys' shirts and women's clothing sub-sectors, in that order" (Textile and Clothing Board, 1984:17-18). In the interval 1981 to the end of 1982, there were 8,300 fewer workers in the garment industry in Quebec [6]. This represents about 60
per cent of the total loss in employment in the garment sector in Canada for this period (Government of Quebec, 1983:1). One union counselled its membership to partake in 'work-sharing' programs [7] to remain employed (Globe and Mail, June 18, 1982:B3).

In 1983, the situation in the garment industry did not improve as clothing imports soared by 22 per cent in the first two months of the year. This increase enabled foreign manufacturers to claim 35 per cent of the Canadian garment market (Toronto Star, April 7, 1983:E3). The effects of this were immediately felt by domestic garment manufacturers and garment workers: shipments by domestic producers decreased by 13.2 per cent and in December 1982 the number of hours worked in the industry were 18 per cent below that of June 1981 (Montreal Gazette, April 15, 1983:B5). According to Chris Kuzik, Director of the Toronto Dress and Sportswear Manufacturer's Guild, 50,000 jobs were lost in the Canadian garment industry between 1980 and mid 1983 (Toronto Star, April 7, 1983:E3). Some garment manufacturers implored publicly the Canadian government to regulate access to the domestic market in order to guarantee domestic manufacturers a consistent share of the Canadian market. Arthur Sanft, President of Bevirini Inc., argued that government regulation is necessary since modern equipment is not sufficient to compete with foreign
manufacturers: "Hong Kong and Korea buy the latest equipment and their wages are lower. To survive, we need quotas guaranteeing that domestic producers will have 75 per cent of the domestic market" (Montreal Gazette, April 15, 1983:B5).

The situation in the textile industry was equally bad. Between 1980 and 1982, there was a $90 million drop in value added to manufacturing. According to the Commission de la sante et de la securite au travail (CSST), this indicates

une manifestation de la sensibilite de l'industrie textile aux bouleversements conjoncturels qui ont frappe l'ensemble de l'activite manufacturiere au Canada et au Quebec a cette epoque, auxquels il faut ajouter la pression insistante des importations, que les tarifs et quotas ne parviennent pas a endiguer (CSST, 1987:17).

Gilles Gauthier of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) added that 5,000 jobs were eliminated between 1980 and 1983 in the Quebec textile industry (Montreal Gazette, May 25, 1983:A8). As in the garment industry, foreign competition in the domestic market affected adversely the textile industry. But contrary to garment imports, it is from the United States and not the 'Third World' that textile imports originate.

The following section examines how Texgar was affected by the crisis and the types of strategies it implemented on the shopfloor to survive the crisis. This is
followed by an examination of the effects of the crisis on the shopfloor workers and their response to the owner's initiatives.

The Crisis within Texgar

When the Canadian economy was reeling from the worse crisis since the Depression and the textile and garment sector was fighting for survival, Texgar was engaged in its own struggle to avoid collapse. Through quotes from Albert Saltzman, we describe next the severity of the crisis in the factory and the factors that threatened to bankrupt Texgar. These quotes also reveal Mr. Saltzman's lack of concern for his workforce and his failure to give sufficient credit to workers in his factory for its survival.

In Chapter Four we described in broad fashion the development of the labour process at Texgar. In the last section of that chapter, we noted that Texgar had expanded its physical structure to 201,000 square feet. We also explained that the enlargement of the factory was undertaken because Albert Saltzman wanted more shopfloor space to create new production lines in order to compete in newly emerging markets like women's casualwear and women's sportswear clothing. I also stated briefly that Albert Saltzman was frustrated when returns on his investment (i.e. the expansion of the factory) were not forthcoming. In
fact, the completion of the expansion of the factory coincided with the crisis in the Canadian garment and textile industries. As a result, the company almost collapsed. Albert Saltzman describes the severity of the crisis within Texgar:

Luis: What brought on the crisis in Texgar?

A. Saltzman:

A lot of things brought on the crisis we faced five years ago [1983]: the market we were losing like crazy to the imports. At the same time, there was a lot of pressure from interest rates (the bank interest rates went from 10% to 24%, 22%). That was an enormous extra cost. Also, we had doubled the size of the building and I was supposed to increase my sales, but with the shrinking market [due to imports] I was not able to do so. Let's say that the 'overhead' before [the expansion of the factory] was 2 million dollars. With the doubling of the building, it went up to 3 million dollars. When your 'overhead' goes from 2 million to 3 million dollars, hopefully you will increase your sales from 1 million to 2 million or 3 million dollars. But the market was just not there; and I had to borrow money from the bank and pay a helluva lot more money in interest... the squeeze was too tight... it almost killed us.

Luis: How did you manage to survive?

A. Saltzman:

I put all my personal money into the business, and then the bank saw that, and the mortgage company saw that, and the government mostly saw that too, and they let me stay alive. Plus, we had a $1.1 million program from the government. That money went to the bank to pay the bills... we used it to keep the company alive. When the Parti Quebecois came to power, they were just about ready to kill every business in Quebec. They said that all the businesses in Quebec were in the hands of the English and they came out with extremely difficult laws: there were difficult labour laws; the city board came with the city tax... we were paying $90,000 in city taxes, but that was raised to $420,000 from one
year to the next because we made the building bigger. I couldn't cope with $420,000... in two years. The Parti Quebecois government had pushed us into, 24%, 25% wage increase [due to increases in the minimum wage]. Suddenly the manufactures in Ontario were paying $5.00 an hour and we were paying about $7.50 an hour on average... Quebec increased the minimum wage (let's say) from $2 to $5 (I'm telling you numbers, they are not the accurate numbers). They [Parti Quebecois government] needed the revenue because businesses were moving like crazy out of the province, and they were taxing the people like crazy who remained in here [in business]. We couldn't fight...we had no money. We used to be a nationally advertised name (Texgar) spending $200,000, $300,000 a year in advertising. When all this took place, we didn't spend a cent in advertising because we had to cut somewhere. We couldn't buy machinery... if you don't modernize, you fall behind the Ontario manufacturers. What the Parti Quebecois government did in the textile and garment industries was this: the 175,000 employees dropped to 120,000 employees; Ontario went from 0 to 45,000 employees. The jobs were not lost, they were just transferred from Quebec to Ontario. A lot of people lost their jobs in the company because of these problems. [8]

Luis: Did you make any other adjustments?

A. Saltzman:

My son Jerry came up very nicely... he was an assistant to me and he became a better man then I am - he took a tremendous amount of responsibility. But everything was slowly corrected: we won our case against the city concerning the taxes on our expansion of the factory, we won $570,000 back from the city we had paid in taxes; we got a $1.1 million grant from the government; I put all my money into the business, and slowly we started to move again. On March 24, 1984, the bank wanted to close us down, and if the government hadn't granted us the $1.1 million dollars, it didn't matter how much money I put into the business, believe me we would be finished, we would be history.

The passages above show that Texgar suffered from the economic crisis that was gripping the textile and garment sectors generally. But they also show that Texgar
had problems specific to its own. The problem of the increase in city taxes which led to the withholding of money usually used for advertising is an example. Albert Saltzman maintains that the company survived because of his effort, that of his son, and a timely government loan. Absent from these statements is an insight into how the crisis in the factory affected workers on the shopfloor, and the latter's response to it.

The following section discusses the workers' grievances and the organization of the union drive in the Fabric Division.

PART TWO:
ORGANIZING THE UNION DRIVE

The union drive in Texgar did not emerge from the spontaneous collective activities of the workforce across the four Divisions of the factory, all fighting the same working conditions and seeking the same demands through the union. Rather, it was a fractured approach to organizing, beginning first in the Fabric Division and then (two years) later in the rest of the factory. The union drive developed according to different shopfloor grievances tied to the organization of production specific to each Division, and to gender and ethnicity/race factors in the labour processes across the factory. By following the emergence and
development of the union drive, first in the Fabric Division, and then later in the other three Divisions of the factory, we flush out its main features. I must also add that some grievances overlapped factory gender and ethnic divisions. These are also discussed.

Grievances from the Fabric Division

The crisis in the clothing and textile sector sent its employers scrambling to adjust and restructure to remain profitable. In Chapter Three we discussed some of the restructuring strategies of employers in the Canadian (and Quebec) textile and garments industries. This restructuring process resulted in high unemployment and a reduction in the number of hours of work across the two sectors [9]. Albert Saltzman and Texgar were, too, embroiled in this crisis.

Within the fabric division in Texgar, management reduced the hours of work (Albert Saltzman specifically) and put a two-year freeze on wage increases in this division. According to Teo, these were two of the grievances behind the push to organize the workforce. Teo:

The determination to organize the factory [i.e., the division] began in 1982. It began at this time because the old factory was lacking in space in relation to the orders that the company was receiving, the factory was evolving. It was necessary for the 'patrao' to expand the factory because the structure of the factory was too small for the workers to do their jobs and to modernize the factory. [At this point] the 'patrao' had a meeting with the workers and told us that he was going to expand the factory because it was becoming too
small for his operation. He also told us at that time that in all likelihood it would be impossible for him to give us a raise for one or two years. He also said that he needed our collaboration and help, and that after one or two years the workers would be able to recuperate their lost wages through increases in pay. The workers were willing to help because they saw that since the factory would expand there would be more work. So they told him that they would cooperate.

The majority of the workers interviewed believe that the garment and textile industrial sector is a 'soft' sector, periodically subject to intense competition from foreign manufacturers and the erosion of the domestic market. Employers in this sector argue convincingly that they cannot pay high salaries because foreign manufacturers benefit from extremely low cheap labour in their areas of operation. Because of this, foreign manufacturers undersell Canadian-made goods in the domestic market and still make a profit. The perils of the domestic textile and garment sectors convinced workers within the fabric division that they could only earn a decent wage by working overtime. But when management in the division decided to cut the hours of work, as well as other incentives, they (management) threatened directly the workers' ability to earn a decent wage and their standard of living [10]. The shopfloor workers in the fabric division did not accept the changes in the working conditions and the threat this posed to their income level. Consequently, they sought to organize. Tony describes some of the incentives workers had prior to the
expansion of the factory and which were eliminated with the crisis in Texgar. Tony:

In the past we used to have a bonus after a certain number of meters were run [through the machines]: we'd get 10% or 20% of our salary in bonus. For example, if your weekly salary was $500 and if the bonus was 30%, you make an extra $150. But this didn't last long. Maybe it was because new bosses came to the factory; with A. and S. this was all eliminated. After that the only workers that received bonuses was Leo and Teo; they worked on the 'frame'. Now I think only the bosses receive bonuses. I said this because many times early in the week work is slow, but towards the end of the week a lot of material suddenly appears and I think that this is so because they want to make the bonus quotas. Also, towards the end of the week, the bosses have us work with material that only needs washing (and not dyeing as well). That way the material leaves the factory much faster. This material is on the second floor and when they want it, they ask Mathieu to send it down [to the first floor].

Antonio describes some of the other changes in working conditions in the fabric division:

J. [supervisor on the second floor] was the one who fucked us the most. Saturdays was double time for us, we used to make many hours, 5 days twelve hours a day. It was 60 hours for five days and then Saturdays we were paid double time. We didn't work five days, we worked six days and there were some guys that worked seven days. Why did these guys work 84 hours a week? It was because Saturdays we earned double time and Sundays we also earned double time. But on top of all this we used to get a bonus on the amount of production you did: so we used to work and work because the guys [bosses] demanded a certain production level and in order for you to get a bonus you had to make that production quota.

But when J. H. became boss of the second floor he cut all that. We were paid overtime after 44 hours, but the minimum of hours that someone worked was 60 hours and many of the workers used to work 70 - 75 hours a week, and there were even some guys that used to work over 80 hours a week. This 'Indian' guy Bobby, who no longer works at Texgar once did 100 to 110 hours of
work in a week. One time he did three days and three nights consecutively, that is 72 hours without rest. At that time you worked like a dog... J. H. took away from us the following: 'double time', paid half hour for lunch, and the bonus. He also started cutting our hours and giving us more machines to look after; that was another stupid thing he did. When I started working we were responsible for two velour machines which is already a heavy work load. When J. became boss, we started working on three machines and sometimes even four; so he doubled your work load but with less privileges, and less money. This is where the whole story concerning the union began. The whole question about the union began in 1981, the more recent drive started five years ago [-1983].

Antonio describes the reduction in the number of hours, and management's increase in the intensity of labour by assigning a greater number of knitting machines to each operator. These changes, accompanied by the changes in working conditions of the division, were too much for Antonio:

I started with $3.00 an hour in 1977, but outside Texgar you could easily find work for $3.50, $4.00 an hour. We weren't paid well and we worked very hard. It was difficult work because of the working conditions: there were many knitting machines and the heat that these machines gave off was incredible. For example, I used to make velour; and velour running in the machine gives off a certain dust - sometimes I would lay a black piece of cloth on the floor and two minutes later it was all white from the dust of the velour. Where do you think that dust used to go? It would go into my nose and then into my lungs. There wasn't air conditioning, and I don't think that even today there is air conditioning. The working conditions were terrible, and we couldn't say anything [complain] because when you tried to say something they would tell you: 'if you're not happy, leave the factory'.

Antonio quit Texgar in 1984. And, he points out that when he left the factory he was earning less money than when he
started working there in 1977. Antonio:

I left Texgar because I saw that there was no future in it for me. When I left (in 1984) I was earning $6 an hour. But this was less money than what I was earning in 1977. This was because in 1984 there was no more 'double time', no bonus, less hours of work. I finally realized that I was working a lot more and earning little [less than in 1977]. It was then that I decided to find another job.

Many other changes took place in the factory in the interval 1981-1984. At the same time as the physical expansion of the factory was completed, and the intensity of the crisis in the sector and within Texgar developed, many workers (especially Portuguese) left the Fabric Division. The vacant job positions were filled by Pakistani workers.

Teo:

With the renovations of the factory, many people left and wages weren't increased for four years. New immigrant groups, like "Indians" which served as cheap labour, came into the division. More workers started receiving their pay on a weekly basis (instead of hourly wage rates) and our hours and permission to work long overtime hours disappeared. As a result of these changes, a serious interest grew among the workers for a union in 1984.

This change in the ethnic composition of the workforce angered the 'core' (Bernier, 1978) Portuguese workforce still in the division. The anger is clearly racist. Leo:

The "Indians" [11] created all these problems: they screwed up things by coming to the factory as low wage labour and basically accepted every injustice without any complaints. Some of them don't even have a 'working card' [Social Insurance Number] and can only work with a permit given to them by the immigration bureau. Since many of them are refugees, they are willing to accept low wages and poor working conditions.
Lou Morais:

Before the "Indians" came, most of the workers in the Fabric Department were Portuguese. The Portuguese worker was more resistant than the 'Indian' today; they were used to different jobs and that isn't all. The Portuguese worker is different: he likes to work but he also likes to earn money; he likes to receive money. If an 'Indian' is offered $4.50 an hour, he will stay in the factory earning that money. But the Portuguese worker will never accept that.

Clearly, both Leo and Lou express stereotypical attitudes of others different from their own culture and colour [12]. Their racist preconceptions led them to categorize 'Indians' as 'passive' and thus susceptible to easy manipulation by supervisors (of their own ethnicity) and Albert Saltzman against the union drive. (In the last chapter we discussed the role of the ethnic supervisor in controlling a workforce with whom he shares ethnicity). And in the Fabric Division two Pakistani supervisors control a largely Pakistani workforce. But Amir (a Pakistani) says that the 'Indians' do have an interest in the union drive:

The old people, the people that have been working here for a long time need some sort of job security and they feel that a union will fulfill this need. Mr. Saltzman feels that he will lose a lot of control if the union comes in, so he is trying to fight it off. I think that he is not worried because he has pretty good lawyers that can do the job to try and stop this unionization... I think that workers are justified for their claims [in wanting a union], you have to look at it from their perspective: I don't think that they have much of an education to find a job anywhere else so this is where they are happy, and if they lose this job, they are going to feel pretty bad... so they are justified in trying to get a union to protect their interests.
But all Pakistani workers (just like all Portuguese workers) weren't supporters of the union drive.

Getting the ILGWU Involved

Faced with changing working conditions and a threat to their living standard, workers in the fabric division sought to organize. Teo:

The workers on the first and second floor didn't have any protection, they didn't have any means to defend themselves. One, two, three and four years went by and the workers were still without any wage increase. At the same time the workers were working hard since management was being very demanding. If a worker needed to stay home a day, he couldn't. They would call him at home and tell him that he had to come in to work, otherwise he would lose his job. For four years there weren't any wage increase. Holidays? We never had any set holiday time; many times the workers were forced to come to work. Otherwise they would lose their job. They would tell us, 'listen, we have a lot of work and most of the other factories are closed for two weeks. In those two weeks we have to work very hard in order to stay ahead of them'. So, at that time we would have irregular holidays, sometimes three days, other times a week, and other times three weeks... some people wanted to go to Portugal or the United States but couldn't because of the demands he used to put on the workers. The workers in the fabric division were slaves, working conditions were terrible (fumes, gases from the dye house, etc).

Teo contacted the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) to organize the union drive. The ILGWU told him to measure the workers support for the union drive by asking them to sign union cards [13]. This he did. Then, the ILGWU deposited a petition for union certification at the Labour Commission Bureau [14]. In this petition, the
bargaining unit was defined thus:

'Tous les salaries des departements de la fabrication et de la teinture des tissus, en excluant les employes de bureau'.

But the employer (through his lawyers) contested this bargaining unit. From this point onward the complex legal process of union certification began to unfold, and this constrained and delayed the union drive.

With the employer's contestation of the bargaining unit, the union engaged in a struggle to unionize Texgar on two fronts. The first focused on organizing and maintaining support for the union drive within the Fabric Division and (later) extending it to the remainder of the factory. The second, challenging all the employer's complaints about the union drive and developing counter strategies to the employer's.

EXTENSION OF THE UNION DRIVE TO THE REMAINDER OF TEXGAR

While the ILGWU sustained its support in the fabric division and battled Albert Saltzman at the Labour Commission, Alexandre (and others) tried to ascertain the relevance of the union drive for workers in the remaining division of the factory. Alexandre:

Before we brought the third request [see next section for clarification] for certification, we met with a large group of women. One after the other made it clear to us that they wanted a union. At that point we knew that we could proceed with the certification request for all floors.
Alexandre and the ILGWU withdrew their petition for union certification of the fabric division from the Labour Commission. On June 16, 1987, Mr. G. Roy (President of the Quebec Joint Council of the ILGWU) sent a letter to the Labour Commissioner responsible for the Texgar dossier, informing him of the union's wish to desist from its petition of union certification [15]. Alexandre of the ILGWU, explains that the withdrawal of the petition had a double purpose:

the workers on the other floors began to show interest in the union drive and wanted to unionize. We were aware, in our struggle, that the company was doing everything possible to stop the unionization process on the first two floors. And, if we were successful, the company would not offer the unionized workers much because we didn't have the other floors (unionized). Because we saw a movement, interest in the union from the workers on the floors, we proposed to the workers on the first two floors that a request for certification be deposited at the Labour Commission for all six floors [16]. Our situation was that we were taking a risk and we might lose. Also, we knew that the Portuguese community was important and certain links had begun to develop between the community and our struggle to unionize. This link [which is discussed below] with the community would be even more important considering that there are many more Portuguese workers on the other four floors. The workers - the women - started to call us and we began to work towards unionizing the entire factory.

On June 17, 1987, the ILGWU through the 'Syndicat pour les Employes de Texgar' (SPET) and aided by the FTQ, submitted a third petition for union certification to the Labour Commission Bureau [17]. The employer's lawyers immediately objected to this petition, charging that it
violated Article 40 of the Labour Code. This article reads:

A petition for certification shall not be renewed within three months of its refusal by a labour commissioner or withdrawal by a petitioning association unless the petition is not admissible under section 27.1,... (Quebec Labour Code, 1987:18)

The Labour Commissioner ruled that the petition was legal since it had been made by a union (SPET) other than the ILGWU [18]. After this period of discussion, the SPET's new potential bargaining unit became:

'Tous/toutes les salaries-es au sens du code du travail a l'exception des employes-es de bureau et vendeurs/vendeuses, travailleurs/travailleuses a domicile, etudiants/etudiantes.'

The employer again contested the bargaining unit and protested that homeworkers and students not be excluded. It is not clear in the data files consulted why the employer sought to include homeworkers and students in the bargaining unit. But I suspect that this strategy was adopted because homeworkers are difficult to organize (e.g. Johnson, 1982) as are students (Reiter, 1988). After a lengthy debating period, on March 18, 1988, the potential bargaining unit became:

'Tous les salaries au sens du Code du travail, a l'exception des employes de bureau et des vendeurs'.

But,

'les deux parties interessées desiraient maintenir leur position quant aux etudiants et aux travailleurs a domicile. Lors d'une seance ultérieure, il y a eu entente pour y inclure les etudiants et en exclure les travailleurs a domicile: cela est conforme a la jurisprudence reconnue'.
This resolved, the next major task for the ILGWU was to develop support for the union drive beyond the fabric division. The ILGWU in cooperation with Teo, Leo, Eddie (the leadership of SPET), concentrated on expanding the union drive throughout the remainder of the factory (four floors). This would be a tremendous challenge for the ILGWU, considering its 'business unionist' traditions (Gannage, 1986) and lack of commitment to an ethnic women workforce - which composed the majority of the three remaining divisions of Texgar. This was further complicated by the fact that all organizers were men. I will elaborate on these points later.

Grievances in the Remaining Divisions of Texgar

The analysis of the data in this section demonstrates a link between women's work experience on the shopfloor and the kinds of grievances they express. Some of the grievances discussed, however, do overlap gender and division.

The Women's Sweaters division right now occupies the third floor of Texgar. This division was established with the expansion of the factory in the early 1980s. It is owned by Albert Saltzman and his son-in-law, Lenny Long; but the latter controls its operations. Prior to the expansion of the factory, the third floor was primarily used as
storage space for raw materials and manufactured goods from the other floors. With the expansion of the factory and the establishment of the women's sweaters' division, some workers from the fifth and sixth floors were moved to the third. Teo explains what effect this relocation had on these workers and the growth of the union drive:

At that time [expansion of the factory], the third floor had workers but they were small in numbers. But to give the company more profit and save some money, he [A. Saltzman] moved many workers from the fifth and sixth floors to work on the third floor. He also hired more workers to operate a new section that he created on the third floor called "Victors". The workers that were moved from the fifth and sixth floors had lost some wages, but they were told that they would have a Joint Commission. But they didn't get a Joint Commission or anything else. They were in the same situation as the workers of the first and second floors. When the workers realized what had happened to them, and that they were lied to, they revolted.

According to Teo, both men and women shopfloor workers complained about no longer being under the umbrella of the Joint Commission. (The latter was discussed in Chapter Eight where I showed that it does not encompass women's sweater makers and children's clothing). In addition, workers complained about the lack of an advance notice from management concerning the temporary lay-off due to slow activity in the division. Delia:

I think that a union would help the workers in the factory [on the third floor]. With the union we know that we have some right but without the union we have no rights at all. One thing that they did to me that I didn't like was when they sent me to unemployment insurance. They didn't give me a week's notice. Just one day you come in and they give you the papers for
unemployment. They should give you at least one week's notice [of lay-off]... saying that you are going to go on unemployment, but usually at the end of the day they come up to you and tell you that you have to go on unemployment insurance and they give you the papers. I don't think that is very nice ... [if they would give you a week's notice] at least you know what you are going up against. You are working so hard and then suddenly you just get that piece of paper at the end of the day... it is kind of a shock when you get it.

Women workers in the Women's Sweaters division complained specifically about the arbitrary treatment they received from (Portuguese) women shopfloor supervisors. Linda elaborates:

If the union comes into the factory I know that it won't allow the 'bossas' [women supervisors] to do many of the things that they do: they take a person from one machine and put another person there replacing her. The other person who has experience in the machines is put somewhere else on the floor - she will go 'cut ends', and go here and there... a union won't consent to this type of manipulation. Many times they ['bossas'] tell us 'if you don't want, if you're not happy, there's the door!'. The workers who just want to earn money have no choice but to succumb to the bossas' manipulation.

Linda doesn't say this, but I suspect that women sewing machine operators lose piece-work money when they are jerked away from one machine and put on another. It takes time for them to walk over to another machine and prepare themselves to begin working. The elapsed time between moving from one machine and setting oneself up to work on another machine is not taken into account in a piece work scheme of wage payment.

Shopfloor women workers also condemned supervisors
for the way they treat women of colour. Lucia:

Sometimes they [supervisors] pick on people of colour. The bossas are stupid sometimes. If we tell them something, they give us a very dirty and mean look. The Portuguese bossas love to pick on a black woman that works with us. Many times she threatens her: 'if you aren't happy, there's the door... if you aren't happy there's the door'...

For many women workers the union represents an organization capable of instilling respect and dignity on the shopfloor. Maria describes the verbal abuse women shopfloor workers suffer from their bossas [woman supervisor]:

I think that the union would be able to keep an eye on how they treat people sometimes. First thing that I don't like is the way they talk: they don't really respect people (the workers). This one bossa, Natalie, she doesn't know how to respect people. She just goes around and says these 'bad words' to workers and I don't think that it is very nice; there are old ladies there that are old enough to be her mother and she talks to them as if they are her kid sister... just because she is a bossa that doesn't mean that she shouldn't respect the workers. If she wants them to respect her, she should also respect them. But she doesn't respect workers, she is always swearing at them. I think that the union would demand some respect towards the workers from the bossas.

Grievances in the Casualwear Division

Particularly in the Casualwear Division, women sewing machine operators vehemently complained about the 'favoritism' that Portuguese bossas displayed towards some women workers on the floor. This was the issue most often heard from women workers. Ana believes that the union drive extended to the Casualwear Division because workers were
tired of the injustices practiced towards them by one bossa in particular. Ana:

I don't really know what brought on this push for the union and sometimes I would ask myself what could have brought it about and kept it strong. Some people said that it was because of Teresa A. - a bossa on the sixth floor. People would say that in slow times of work she would keep workers that were her friends: she would keep who she wanted, who she likes, those that were from her town in Portugal. Those that she sent home were women that had been there a long time, longer than some of the women she kept... many people didn't like her. Some people still maintain that it was her that caused it all; the women were fed-up with her injustices and that it was from there that they sought to support the union drive. Teresa A. doesn't work in Texgar anymore.

In this atmosphere of widespread favoritism and discrimination, many women workers did the logical thing. Ana:

It was never my habit but there were many women that brought gifts to the bossas (and male bosses as well) in order to maintain a good relationship with them. ... Every time they returned from Portugal, they brought with them bottles of booze and offered them to the bossa. When it was the bossa's birthday, many women again offered the bossa gifts. And around Christmas time, the workers would get together, collect money from each worker and buy her a Christmas gift. But there were also some women who went beyond this; there was always those that would give her something 'under the table'. There were many people that worked there and wanted to stay there even when the season was slow. So they did this to stay at their jobs. For this reason there were many people that complained about these practices and some women would complain and say that they were going home and that some other women were staying because they were able to give gifts to the bossas and thus remain working.

In the last chapter I described the introduction of the new E-Ton System 2001 for distributing garment pieces to
work-stations in the sewing section of the Casualwear Division. For the employer, this system presents many advantages. Some of these include greater efficiency in the distribution of garments to the work-stations and the increased rapidity of garment pieces moving between workers. As we have pointed out before, this efficiency eliminated wasted time (unwrapping and wrapping bundles of garment pieces) which allows workers to spend more time sewing. Ida explains the advantages of the E-Ton 2001 system for the employer, and its consequences for the workforce in the division.

This new system eliminates many workers. In the past when we worked in the old way there were always other women around us who helped us turn collars, to do many things around us that would help us sew the pieces we had to. Now, we don't have anybody, we do everything: we sew the collars, turn the collars... everything. There isn't anybody around us anymore. A woman will come around us only when we call the boss to send someone to bring thread, needles, or the mechanic for the machine. There is also the bossa who teach us how to sew a new piece that we haven't had before. But before this new system we had people standing besides us who would help us do our sewing faster. There was one person per machine. But now there is no one... they are all gone and we do everything ourselves. What this all means is that they save on workers; there are less workers. When this new system arrived, many women were let go because they were no longer needed.

Ida and other workers who use this system recognize that it presents them with the opportunity of earning more money since they are less likely to be delays in the distribution of work. However, workers also recognize the tremendous advantages this system presents for the employer: it
eliminates workers (and thus the employer saves on wages) and increases production.

Anticipating the job-losses consequences of the E-Ton System 2001, some workers in the Casualwear Division sought the union to protect them against this technology and the lay-offs that its installment on the floor would entail. A woman worker sent the following letter to the headquarters of the ILGWU, expressing her wish for the union drive to expand to the Casualwear Division:

Monsieur,
aux nom de tous les employes de la compagnie TEXGAR situe a [...] - nous cherchons votre aide. Nous sommes traiter comme des esclaves par le gerand. Ils va mettre un computer et nous allons perdre beaucoup de nous employes. Nous travaillons tres fort et il veu nous pousser encore plus. Si, vous essayer tres fort de rentre l'union vous alles reussir cette fois. C'est le temps... Venez nous aider... Nous sommes pas des robots... Ils vont couper nos salaires aussi. Le gerand pense pour faire beaucoup d'argent pour sa poche... Venez c'est le temps l'union devra entre et cest le temps. Oui il faut l'union maintenant #1987 a Texgar. Vous pouvez avoir confiance que cette fois la porte est ouverte pour l'union.

Perhaps because the Joint Commission already provides these workers [Casualwear Division workers] with a comparatively good wage (vis-a-vis other divisions) and at least one annual wage increase, wage increases were not a common concern. Rosa was the only worker interviewed who wanted a better wage:

I don't have any real complaints concerning work... what I would simply ask the union to do for me is to ask for a raise. Besides a raise, I don't see anything that I would need from the union. [Husband interjects:
she's been working at Texgar over ten years and she still doesn't make $8 an hour.] In the factory, we only receive a wage increase when the government says so [through the 'joint commission']. Everybody on the fourth floor with the exception of the bosses is a member of the [Joint] 'committee'.

The final and most often expressed grievance recorded was the lack of job security that workers felt in Texgar. For both men and women workers, the union represented an organization capable of ensuring job security, and fighting unfair dismissals. Women workers also felt that the union would curtail the shopfloor supervisors' favouritism on the floor, and get them off their backs. Job security became a central concern for the workers, especially after Teo and Leo were fired by Albert Saltzman on charges of theft. Their firing, however, was motivated by the fact that Teo was involved in the union drive and Leo was suspected of being a sympathizer to the union cause. In part three we elaborate on the anti-union strategy within the factory and the role Albert Saltzman played in it.

PART THREE:
OPPOSITION TO THE UNION DRIVE

The topic of discussion in this part of the chapter is workplace opposition to the union drive. This discussion shows the direct involvement of the employer in intimidating and discouraging shopfloor workers from joining the
organizing drive. This is followed by a presentation of the results of the union certification vote held in Texgar on October 13, 1988.

Opposition from the Shopfloor

We have argued that workers' grievances and support for the union drive was tied to the working conditions they experienced in their Division within Texgar. Similarly, opposition to the union drive is linked to the workers' experience of the working conditions across the divisions of the factory. Toni is a seamstress in the Noveauwear division of the Sample Room on the fifth floor. She makes the entire garment from a pattern specifying the different dimensions required in the measurements. Working for Noveauwear, Toni is guaranteed certain working conditions by the 'Joint Commission'. Toni:

I have never been involved or very much aware of the union drive in the factory. We have a union (the 'committee conjointe') that protects us, me in my work area. In the area that I work we don't need a union; it would be a sin ('um pecado') to try and bring in a union. A union wants to protect things that the patrao isn't in agreement with... we don't like someone to order us in our own house. I'm not in favour of a union and I am not in favour of the patrao. In my department I don't need a union. A union wouldn't be able to improve my salary much more than what I'm getting right now: I earn a good salary, I'm well protected, I have various privileges, and if I ask for a favour they will usually give it to me. I can truly say to you that it was Texgar that gave me a start in life in this country. With my work its true, they didn't give it to me free... it didn't give me anything free. What I have today is due to the work that Texgar
has given me over the years. I know that a union offers protection, but that is for people that need it. A union protects you from being unjustly dismissed, and it gives you certain privileges. I think that whoever needs it should look for it ['quem precisa que procure'].

The most significant and damaging opposition to the union drive was recorded from workers in the Casualwear Division. It is here that almost 70 per cent of the factory's workforce is found, and where the majority of women work. By numbers alone, it would seem imperative that the ILGWU build solidarity among workers across the factory for the successful development of the union drive. Instead, the workers in the Casualwear division rejected the union drive by pointing out the working conditions they have was a result of the guarantees ensured by the Joint Commission. It is here that Texgar workers have the best working conditions. They are protected by the Ladies Joint Commission which, among other things, guarantees a 35 hour work-week and an annual wage increase. These working conditions are exclusive to the Casualwear and Sample Room Divisions.

Many workers interviewed from both the Casualwear and the Sample Room Divisions argued that the Joint Commission is their union and that they therefore do not need another. Ida:

I prefer things the way they are; I'm not crazy about about the union. It is possible that the union may offer some guarantees. I'm not saying that it doesn't,
but it operates differently. We also have a 'committee' which is good and operates like a union. The 'parity committee' is a type of union. The only difference is that we don't pay any dues, whereas we do for a union $10, $15, it depends. I have been called several times to the office to give my signature [to sign anti-union stand in the factory] and I have always said that I'm not interested in the union - the company has always given me work. I feel a certain loyalty to the company. Whenever I've been called downstairs for questions, I have always said, 'I have no complaints about the company, the company has always given me work, and I have no interest in the union'.

The confusion of collapsing the Parity Commission with a trade union was also found by Gregory Teal (1985) in his study of a garment factory in Montreal. Bernard Bernier (1978) too has pointed out that a parity commission only guarantees minimal working conditions and is powerless to prevent unfair worker dismissal and impotent in negotiating wage increases. However, in his study of three garment factories in Montreal, he found that the factory that wasn't unionized offered the best working conditions for women workers. In this factory ('Star Creation'), the workers are protected by the Joint Commission, "dont un permanent vient a tous les trois mois verifier les salaires et les conditions de travail" (Bernier, 1978:135). Bernier concludes by correctly remarking that the discrepancies in the working conditions between the unionized and non-unionized factories has more to do with apathy and passivity of garment unions rather than with the benefits that the parity commission guarantees to the workers.
Shopfloor workers like Ana who are protected by the parity commission and support the union drive are rare. Ana (TG NEW SPORT) said that she is satisfied with her working conditions, but that her need for job security and compassion to help others improve their working conditions pushes her to support the union drive. Ana:

In the situation I'm in and the job I do, I feel that I don't need a union. But I need someone to protect me and my seniority. If there is going to be lay offs, I don't want to be sent home if I'm the oldest worker there. But when I compare my job with most of the other workers, I don't see how much more the union can improve my job; I'm satisfied with my job. But because of my concern for seniority and out of compassion for others in the factory, I support the union because many people don't have the working conditions I do. And the fact that once in awhile they [management] send me upstairs to work on the production, and I've learned that it is a very hard job, very tiring, and there is always, still, favoritism on the part of the bosses towards certain workers... when times are slow in my work area, they always send home those ladies that they don't like even though they've been at the factory longer than those that they keep in slow periods of production. So because I'm familiar with this type of job, I know that it is a hard, tiring job, that I think that the union can help these workers.

Opposition from Supervisors

Shopfloor supervisors (and office personnel) across the factory also played a critical role in opposing and defeating the union drive. Neither the shopfloor supervisors nor the office personnel formed part of the bargaining unit. This did not, however, impede them from interfering in the organizing drive. Carlos, the only
supervisor I interviewed, said the following of the union drive:

I don't believe in unions. Who ever wants a union is 'full of it' because they need someone to protect them because they are not good enough to work. Because in Montreal and Canada the only one that can speak for you is yourself... you don't need anybody to speak for you because if you are a good worker, you will get what you want, you will get the raise; if you aren't a good worker why should you get a raise?

According to the shopfloor workers interviewed, supervisors participated in the anti-union campaign by translating and transmitting to the shopfloor workers Albert Saltzman's messages concerning the problems the workforce would face with a union in the workplace.

Saltzman's Anti-Union Campaign

Albert Saltzman's anti-union campaign began with his contestation of the ILGWU/SPET attempt to represent the workers of Texgar before the Labour Commission Bureau. But this process was not as readily visible to the workforce in the factory as was his intense harassment of union leaders within the factory. This harassment was manifested when he fired Teo and Leo; the two most prominent union organizers in the factory. But according to Teo, Albert Saltzman did not end his persecution with the firing:

He knew that I was involved in the union drive but decided not to fire me for that but by accusing me and Leo before all the workers of Texgar as thieves. He sent a letter to every Texgar workers' home stating that the reason he fired us was because we were thieves
and had stolen from the company. He also asked the workers in this same letter if we were the kind of people that they wanted to head the union in the factory; and that they should think very seriously about what we had done and if they were willing to run the same risk of having something like this happen to them as we headed the union. But the truth always is truth. Some workers believed his accusations about us, but the majority didn't since they knew that we had worked in the factory for 12 [Teo] and 18 [Leo] years and only after all these years they had discovered that we were thieves? It was from this time on that their persecution of me and other members of the union began. [19]

Mr. Saltzman's message in firing both Teo and Leo is clear. It was a warning to workers in the factory that, should they support the union drive, they too would likely experience the same fate. And it also showed the workers the insecurity of their position in the factory. Some shopfloor workers, however, considered this action completely unjust and turned against Albert Saltzman.

Marco:

The workers became really mad when the owner of the factory fired Teo and Leo after accusing them of being thieves. The union started to develop more seriously on the sixth floor because of this. The owner of the factory called them thieves because he knew that they were at the head of the union push. I was hoping mad, and I was called to the office where I stayed for four hours discussing the firing with Maria T., Ana M., Fernanda, and others. These women believed the story [accusations]. But I told them that I knew these workers personally and that they would never steal anything from the factory.

There were more clashes between workers supporting opposing sides. Arturo was dismissed because he argued with women workers who accepted Mr. Saltzman's charge of theft levied
One day I had a really heated argument with M. Torres and then I was called into the office. Our discussion was over the fact that the owner of the factory would call meetings almost everyday, and he would call workers in groups into the office on the second floor. He would defame the union saying that they were thieves; all they want is your money and my money, ... and he would close the door of the factory if the union came into the factory. One day everybody was called into the office except me, Z. and D. It was then that we knew that there was a conspiracy against us. When this lady returned from the meeting, I asked her: 'you told the boss everything we talk about?' At this time I was spreader and cutter. We started to argue and our voices were raised and then she started to cry and the bosses came over. The next day they suspended me for a week without pay. Mr. Saltzman called me to the office and said that he was going to fire me but that only the lady [with whom he had argued] told him not to fire me. He also said that he didn't want anybody to insult his workers and that what this lady was doing came directly from him and she was doing her job.

When I returned [from suspension], I never talked to the women again and in April, the foreman came to me two minutes before lunch and told me that I was going to stay home for two weeks because there was no work for me. I asked him why only me and he said that soon other workers would have to be sent home because work was diminishing. They [management] haven't called me back yet [and this is August] and I have talked to workers I used to work with and they have told me that there is work in the factory.

For most workers, the union represented an organization capable of protecting and serving workers. The shopfloor workforce felt that, with a union, their dignity and self-respect would be restored.

But the employer, in this case Albert Saltzman, rarely relies on one anti-union strategy. Albert Saltzman also began to 'contract-out' work as a way of further complicating the union drive in the factory.
"Contracting-Out"

In the industry chapter, 'contracting-out' is described as an important strategy used by garment manufacturers to defray production costs (e.g. wages, electricity bills, repair bills, etc.) onto the individual contractor with whom he/she is under contract. Our discussion of Texgar in chapter four shows that contracting is an important component in the accumulation of capital for the owner(s) of Texgar. But the organizing campaign within Texgar gave contracting-out an added dimension: management turned increasingly to contracting to cut work in the factory and thus warn workers that if they continued to support the union drive, soon they would be out of a job. This strategy succeeded in intimidating the workforce.

Linda:

He [Mr. Saltzman] had [client] orders for us to work on but he didn't want us to work on them until the union threat was removed... we went on like this from the month of January to May. Now we have a lot of work because of this 'slow down'; the orders from the month of May, we are doing right now [July] in order to meet the deadlines. I heard it in the factory that there was work but that Mr. Saltzman was giving it to contractors instead. We heard this in the months of January to May when there wasn't work for us and we were doing only three days a week.

Antonio:

I've heard it said that he [Saltzman] has recently given work to many other factories... there is no work in the factory and he gives to other factories work that should be going to the workers in Texgar. The people in Texgar are laid-off or put on unemployment insurance. What's the story here? This is a form of
intimidation, this isn't just, if he has work, why doesn't he give it to his workers? Everybody knows that he gives to contractors thousands of pieces... Why? To show the employees that if they want a union, he won't give them work but will give it to other factories.

According to Carlos, a shopfloor supervisor in the Casualwear Division, Mr. Saltzman has used contractors for a number of years, but their use increased with the threat of unionization. Carlos:

... the workers are turning to the union now so it is probably because of this that the company is sending work to contractors.

'Contractors' were also created by Albert Saltzman as a means to stifle the union drive in Texgar. Joe Moreira used to work as a spreader and later as a cutter in the Casualwear Division. In 1987, he left the factory to set up his own cutting contract shop with financial support from Albert Saltzman. Joe:

Albert Saltzman offered me money to help me establish my contract work-shop. And since the union drive has spread to the sixth floor, I have had a lot more work to do for Texgar. I have no doubts that Mr. Saltzman uses my workshop in order to discourage workers from supporting the union drive.

"Simple Control"

In the last chapter, we argued that 'simple control' (Edwards, 1978) is a permanent control mechanism on the shopfloor. We also added that ethnicity is an important dimension of this mechanism since it plays a critical role
in controlling the immigrant workforce in Texgar. The workers admire how Albert Saltzman immigrated to Canada with nothing and today is a very wealthy man. I believe that many workers opposed the union drive because of this identity they developed towards Mr. Saltzman. Many also felt loyal towards him because, in their words, he provided them with a job soon after they arrived in Montreal (20). Even those workers who supported the union drive felt awkward and sad about developments within the factory.

Ana:

Even with everything that is happening in the factory, he [Saltzman] does not neglect to greet everybody he sees in the factory; he is very nice and personable. Sometimes it makes me sad to see what is happening in the factory [i.e. union drive].

'Simple Control' and the ethnic dimension of this concept (as it is evident in our case study) was reenforced outside the factory as Albert Saltzman engaged the Portuguese community in opposing the organizing of Texgar. He kept abreast of the community's reaction to the union drive by gathering video tapes of union leaders' discussion of the situation in the factory in the Portuguese community television program (21). But even more important and effective was his call to Father Armand to help him defeat the union drive. Father Armand is a French-Canadian priest who is fluent in Portuguese and, with two other priests, ran the Portuguese community church in the same neighborhood.
where Texgar is located [22]. According to workers interviewed, subsequent to his visit with Albert Saltzman, Father Armand made derogatory remarks in his Sunday sermons concerning unions, and the union leadership in Texgar. One of the people the priest attacked was Leo:

Somebody told me that in church during Mass, Father A. had said that the workers who had been fired by Mr. Saltzman were the ones who were creating problems for those still in the factory. He said that Texgar might close and that many people would be left without a job. He also said that we went house to house forcing people to sign [union cards]. This isn't true because people have to sign the card and pay a $2 fee for their signature... I went to see Father A. myself and I asked him if Saint Matthew, Saint Paul and all the other disciples weren't enough for the sermon... if he needed to bring my name and Teo's into the Sermon? He apologized and told me that he (and the Pope) defend unions.

Albert Saltzman also approached the weekly Portuguese community newspaper, A Voz de Portugal [The Voice of Portugal], with a $250 cheque for a one page advertisement propagating the contributions that Texgar had made to its Portuguese workforce and the threat that the union presented to the workers. This advertisement was published the same week the secret ballot took place in Texgar.

"Corporate Welfarism"

Corporate welfarism has been described as one of the tactics employers use to control the workforce. Stuart Brandes (cited in McCallum, 1990:47) defines corporate
welfarism as 'any service provided for the comfort or improvement of employees which was neither a necessity of the industry nor required by law.' In Texgar, Albert Saltzman introduced a corporate welfare programme that, combined with other anti-union activities, defeated the union drive in the factory. We must stress here, however, that were it not for the workers organizing attempt, it is very likely that such plan would not have been introduced. No such plan existed in Texgar prior to the organizing drive.

Albert Saltzman's corporate welfare programme offers workers dental insurance, life and medical insurance, as well as an optical plan and an old age pension plan specific to the workers in Texgar. In addition, he offered workers a yearly wage increase. (This is important particularly for the workers in the fabric division and the women's sweaters division who are not covered by the joint commission). With this corporate plan, Albert Saltzman has introduced differentiation: only those workers that are part of the 'square' (i.e. management) are covered 100 per cent. According to Lou Morais, shopfloor workers are only covered 75 per cent under this programme.

The workers within Texgar hold no illusion as to the reason Mr. Saltzman offered them this programme. Lou Morais says that this programme is a 'smoke screen' created by
Albert Saltzman to deter workers from supporting the union drive. Some workers think that the employer's strategy has had success in deterring workers from the union. Toni (fifth floor):

Only after this union 'cloud' developed over the factory did the patrao 'open up his arms more' [to the workers]. This was all because of the union 'cloud' that appeared over the factory. He [Mr. Saltzman] started to protect his workers more so that they would see themselves more protected and would therefore reject the union, and I'm in agreement with that [supporting A. Saltzman]. I think that his strategy worked because I haven't heard anything about the union in a while, and like I told you before we are separated from the workers on the other floors... we are an individual section.

Even Leo (an union leader) was concerned about the effect of this programme on the development of the union drive. Leo:

The owner of the factory offered to the workers a welfare programme to deter them from the union drive... things that a union will normally offer its members, he offered to them as a show that they did not need a union to have those benefits. And I think that some workers left the union push because of these benefits. But those workers that have union roots in their blood and veins will not care for these things and will continue to support the union.

Alexandre believes that Albert Saltzman's corporate welfare plan had little influence on the people in the factory that he has known for a long time. Alexandre:

The benefits that Mr. Saltzman has offered the workers in Texgar had no effect on the workers that 'really support us' [avec ceux qui sont vraiment avec nous, ça n'a pas d'effet]... at least those that I have known for a long time, and these are the key people in the factory. But Mr. Saltzman has always played on a certain disequilibrium: he gives things to certain workers and fires others. The workers know that there have been workers who have received things from
Saltzman, but they also know that many workers have been fired. The workers realize that even if they have received certain benefits from Saltzman, they have no protection against any unjust treatment or firing in the factory. This is evident in how Mr. Saltzman has treated some workers...

I agree with Alexandre's point that regardless of the corporate plan only a union is truly on the workers' side and only the union can protect and defend the bargaining unit from unfair and unjust treatment by the employer and/or management. However, my concern is that the data in this chapter suggests that the union did a poor job in transmitting to workers its commitment to them. And this is no less evident than in the fact that many workers in June and July of 1988 (the union certification vote was held on October 13, 1988) were unaware that the union was still trying to organize Texgar. This lack of contact with the bargaining unit, combined with Mr. Saltzman's anti-union activities and corporate welfare plan, was bound to convince workers to support Texgar.

Results of the Secret Certification Ballot

By now, I am certain, the reader has surmised the outcome of the certification ballot held in Texgar. Given the structure of work in Texgar, the anti-union campaign in the factory, and 'simple control', the results of the ballot are not surprising. On October 13, 1988 the union certification vote was held in the 'showroom' of the fourth
floor in Texgar [23]. The result of the secret ballot was the following:

- 195 voted "yes" to the union
- 259 voted "no" to the union
- 412 workers were eligible to vote
- 26 did not vote
- 22 votes were not counted because of some irregularity

Thus, the organizing campaign in Texgar came to a crushing halt with 65 per cent of the workers voting against the union [24]. In Part Four of this chapter, I want to quickly suggest reasons for the defeat of the union drive.

PART FOUR:

SOME EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE UNION DRIVE

The Legal Process of Union Certification

A significant obstacle to the successful union drive were the laws and regulations embedded in the Quebec Labour Code. The Labour Code is the most obvious way the provincial state is involved in the class struggle in the workplace.

State labour-relations acts appear to be in the interests of the working class, since they allow members of this class to form legal bargaining units and negotiate contracts binding on the employer. However, these units and contracts introduce an element of stability and control in the paid workplace that favours employers (Cuneo, 1990:209).
But the process leading up to certification is also biased towards the employer. For example, article 5, of the "Right of Association" division of the Quebec Labour Code, states that "[n]o person, in the name or on behalf of an association of employees, shall, during working hours, solicit an employee to join an association" (Quebec Labour Code, 1987:4). The reality of this article is that it complicates organizing for unions without restraining employer's access to workers. For the union, this article means that each worker must be individually approached concerning organizing, and this must be done away from the workplace - where all workers are present. This process of union recruitment seems to me time consuming since workers must be located and met privately. I feel that this isolates workers with their own grievances rather than promoting class solidarity and common complaints and demands from the employer.

On the other hand, the solicitation (although illegal) of workers for an anti-union campaign by the employer is less problematic since he/she has permanent contact with the workers. Under this situation, acts of solicitation will be facilitated, as will the intimidation of workers. In our case study, Albert Saltzman fired Teo and Leo, and among other things, offered the workers a corporate welfare programme.
The process of union recognition itself is also extremely long (four years officially in our case here), bureaucratic and clearly removed from workers trying to organize their shopfloor. It is dominated by highly paid technical professionals (usually lawyers) having little in common with shopfloor workers. Moreover, the employer has the funds to hire the most expensive lawyers (in our case, the employer also hired "Procureurs" [25]) with the best resources to defeat a union drive. The Ontario Federation of Labour comments on the Labour Relations Act of Ontario (Quebec's Labour Code equivalent) thus:

The Labour Relations Act frustrates and defeats thousands of Ontario workers who seek to improve their terms and conditions of work.... Owners who are determined to resist unionization at any cost know where to find counsel who will exploit every provision and procedure available to delay and defeat certification [by the Labour Board] (quoted in Cornish and Ritchie, 1980:15-16).

A union also possesses its own lawyer(s) fighting the Labour Code and the employer's representatives for recognition of the bargaining unit. But these lawyers tend to have other commitments that sometimes interfere with specific certification hearings they are involved in at a particular time. For example, on two occasions the ILGWU's lawyers in this case wrote the Labour Commissioner requesting that certain meetings be postponed because they had prior commitments that had to be met. The effects of this legal manoeuvre was a further delay in the Labour
Commission Hearings. This, in turn, delayed further the process of certification and gave the employer more time to organize/continue his/her anti-union strategy within the workplace. At the same time, workers become frustrated by the delaying tactics involved in the process, and many give up on the legal process and on the union drive. This seems evident in my data. Antonio:

The moral of this story [organizing attempt] is: Canada is not such a free country as people think; it is free but I don't think that it is for us [workers]. For to be free [and] if there exists a law [Labour Code], how do you explain that this problem has lasted years and years [to be resolved]? When it should be an easy thing to settle: have a vote and let the workers decide who they want! If the union loses, no more union; if the patrao loses, then he has to recognize the right of the union to exist and to represent the workers of the factory. Why has this lasted so long? It is because the patrao has money... he has two lawyers. The law is on the side of the patrao because Texgar is financed by the government evident in the numerous grants and loans it has given the factory. On the one hand, the government sees that this guy [Mr. Saltzman] is giving jobs to 450 people, and because of this the government plays along with the patrao and against the union. And instead of running the risk that he may close the factory, the government is on his side; which means that it is in agreement with the injustices in the factory of Mr. Saltzman.

We must also add that the fact that the secret ballot was held in Texgar was certainly disadvantageous to the union. Under this situation of stress (voting), it is not impossible to conceive that some workers may have felt ill-at-ease about voting for the union when casting their vote in their place of work. Undoubtedly, some workers felt intimidated about this process since the employer, at least
in their own minds as voters and workers, might discover subsequently just who voted for which side in the secret ballot. Needless to say, this discovery could put a pro-union voter's job in jeopardy.

The Union's Strategy

The International Ladies' Garment Workers Union is experiencing a sharp decline in membership. Chapter Three showed just how sharp is this decline. But while we recognize that this decline can partly be blamed on the attacks of the capitalist class and the state on workers' organizations (Panitch and Swartz, 1988), we cannot completely absolve unions from any responsibility for the loss in membership - at least not the ILGWU. If this case study is any indication, the ILGWU is partly to blame because it takes an 'elitist' approach to organizing and practices a patriarchal attitude towards the role of women in this process. According to this view, women are 'special' workers in need of 'special direction' in organizing. Alexandre (ILGWU business agent):

As we continue our attempt to unionize, more and more women are joining [the union drive]. This is because as time passes, people are beginning to wake up... but the 'mentality' between men and women is completely different. For instance, a man will become more involved, more active in the union, he will attend meetings, etc. With respect to women, the work has to be done at her house [union personnel must visit women in their homes in order to discuss the union]. You have to talk to the women in their homes and when you
meet with them you must talk to them with a certain discretion [avec une certain discretion].

The patriarchal attitude is clear when Alexandre says that women possess a different 'mentality' from that of men and that therefore they must be treated 'avec une certain discretion'. Implicitly, this statement suggests that women's 'mentality' does not measure up to that of men, and that it is therefore the job of the union (which is mainly composed of men) to clearly explain to women what is going on in the factory and how they should react to the situation at Texgar. The union's attitude towards women evinces the gender ideology that men are 'active' and 'militant', while women are 'passive' and need male direction.

All the union organizers were men, and in the 'Syndicat pour les employes de Texgar' [SPET] they were also Portuguese [26]. During the organizing campaign a woman union worker accompanied the organizing committee to workers' homes. And, in the final weeks leading to the certification vote, the ILGWU flew in from New York two Portuguese women union organizers to assist the local ILGWU organizing committee in developing support for the union drive amongst the Portuguese women workers in the factory. Some of the workers interviewed resented the involvement of these 'outsiders' in the union drive.

My data suggests an 'elitist' approach by the union
which failed to keep the workers abreast of the process of union certification. Leo:

We don't have anybody set on each floor [women's floors] acting as a representative of the union. The information we get from the factory and the information workers in the factory get is through telephone calls. Many people call us and let us know what the latest developments in the factory are, what the owner of the factory has done to the workers.

The ambiguity in the union's perspective on women workers in the factory is confirmed by the fact that the union made no or little effort to keep women (and men) abreast of the development of the union drive. Ana:

Sometimes I worry because I don't know what's happened with the union. Some people say that the union has been defeated and they are just delaying their announcement to us. But I once talked to one of the union leaders and he said that the union hasn't been around the factory because every time they come around the factory, the owner of the factory intensifies his anti-union activities in the factory.

Mathieu was one of the workers who was involved in the union drive from the start, but he too was no longer informed on the union drive:

Right now I can't explain to you what is happening with the union, I don't know what is going on with the union. All I know is that we wanted to bring in a union but because of reasons that I don't really know there was no positive outcome of it... to the point that nobody knows anything. The workers don't know what is going on, everybody is waiting, we don't know, we don't have any contact with the people from the union. Personally I don't know what is going on.

Rather than democratizing the unionization process by involving as many workers as possible in the union drive, the union leadership had a poor strategy of involving women,
and was also reluctant to keep the workforce informed of all the developments in their attempt to organize Texgar. It seems to me that in a place like Texgar where workers are also divided among four independent divisions in the factory, the union should have promoted solidarity and unity in their campaign within and outside the factory. Instead, the union perpetuated the isolation of the various workforces from each other by failing to democratize and involve all workers in the unionization process. The ILGWU also discriminated between ethnic groups in its development of support-ties between workers in the factory and their communities. The union concentrated on establishing connections with the Portuguese community: both Teo and Leo participated in a Portuguese television and radio programme, where they explained why Texgar had to be organized. But no similar attempt was made to develop support between other ethnic workers in the factory and their communities. Specifically, some Haitian workers complained about the union's disinterest in getting support from the Haitian community in Montreal. This significant blunder was related to me (two months prior to the certification vote) by no less a source than Alexandre.

Right at this moment I get the sense that something is happening between different ethnic groups and their participation in the union drive. We have worked a lot with the Portuguese community principally because most of the workers are Portuguese, and the community seems to be very well organized in terms of radio, television
etc - the factory is in the Portuguese community. But other communities [to which Texgar workers belong] are less well organized. Because of this, I have noticed that some workers are a little bit ticked-off, especially the Haitians. One of the [Haitian] workers has complained to me that in the Spring we ran some story in the Portuguese television program and not the Haitian one. They have put this argument to me, but it is recent [27].

This failure to reach out to the community, which would have demonstrated an interest in Haitian workers, undoubtedly cost the union drive influence within the factory, and votes on October 13, 1988. While the employer used an ethnic division of labour to divide the workforce in the workplace, the ILGWU, in this case, did little to bring together the different ethnic groups in the factory and develop a class and gender strategy to organizing.

CONCLUSION

I have argued in this chapter that workers' grievances and experience of work in Texgar led them to attempt to organize first in the Fabric Division and later in the remaining divisions of the factory. This attempt emerged in the midst of the worst economic crisis in Canada since the Depression; the garment and textile sectors were particularly devastated by this (1981-1983) crisis.

How does one explain the fact that the workers within Texgar chose to organize during these economically difficult times? My explanation is premised on the
interpretation of the workplace as a 'contested terrain' (Edwards, 1979) where workers struggle for their own demands against an aggressive, and manipulative employer. In 1980, Albert Saltzman imposed a two-year wage freeze (which subsequently turned into four years) on the Fabric Division workforce. Subsequently, he also cut their working hours, while at the same time, increasing the intensity of labour. This posed a serious threat to the workers' living standard which led them to organize in oblivion to the state of the economy.

This argument was expressed through a discussion focusing on two central issues - one, the emergence of the union drive, and two, opposition to the union drive across Texgar. I have already described briefly in the preceding paragraph the context for the emergence of the union drive. But the union drive was opposed by shopfloor workers, supervisors and managers, and legally by the bureaucratic obstacles contained in the Quebec Labour Code. The latter was particularly detrimental to the union drive since many delays occurred during the Hearings, which further frustrated the workers within the factory - even those who supported the union drive. The end result of the legal certification process was four years of legal fighting between the employer and the union; but also an aggressive anti-union campaign within the factory was able to succeed
in intimidating and even firing workers across Texgar.
NOTES


2. And "[o]ne in every eight Canadians [was] officially out of work" (Calvert, 1984:1).

3. The following table records the decline in real wages in the period 1978-1982.

Table 11
Loss in Real Wages
1978-1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average Weekly Wages and Salaries (Per Cent)</th>
<th>Increase in Consumer Prices (Per Cent)</th>
<th>Gain or Loss In Real Wages (Per Cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cumulative Loss
1978 to 1982 (per cent) [-4.6]


4. However, we cannot easily overlook the fact that immigrant women comprise almost 80 per cent of the labour force in the garment industry - an industry where they frequently experience high levels of unemployment.

5. "Economic crises are not restricted to the formal economy because households and the formal economy overlap" (Armstrong, 1984:99).

6. According to information in the Montreal Gazette, 27,000 clothing and textile workers in Quebec lost their jobs in 1981 (Montreal Gazette, October 2, 1982:G3).
7. Under a work-sharing program workers labour a reduced week and receive unemployment insurance benefits for the days they do not work. 'If we didn't have the work-sharing program, we would have to lay off a considerable number of employees' (Joseph de Blase, Director of Manufacturing for Warren K. Cotton textile firm).

8. Initially when the Parti Quebecois (PQ) assumed power it did introduce some changes in labour legislation. For example, it introduced Bill 45. Among other measures, this Bill introduced provisions designed to increase 'union democracy'; an 'anti-scab' law (this was later amended to satisfy the opposition by capitalists in the province); and "by eliminating an existing requirement that conciliation take place before a strike can be undertaken, the law eliminated all restriction on the right to strike in the private sector" (McRoberts, 1988:269).

In addition, soon after assuming power, the PQ raised the minimum wage level to $3 an hour - the highest level in North America. This increase was indexed to the cost of living.

By the end of its first term, however, the PQ had backed away considerably from its initial social reformism. In the case of the minimum wage, for instance, the government ceased in 1978 to index the minimum wage: In 1979 the minimum wage was increased by only a third of the inflation rate; in 1980 it was increased by one half of the rate (McRoberts, 1988:268).

See Kenneth McRoberts (1988) for a discussion of the rise of the Parti Quebecois to power and the rightist turn the party took soon after assuming power. See also Pierre Fournier (1981) for a strong leftist critique of the Parti Quebecois stint in power. In Fournier's book, Francois Fournier and Daniel Villeneuve (p.283) argue that the PQ is no longer a viable left alternative for the future in Quebec:

Le PQ ne doit plus etre brandi comme une formation politique qui recelerait encore d'immenses possibilites. Elle n'en recelle aucune, du moins pas sur sa gauche.

9. In December 1982, the number of hours worked in the garment industry was 18 per cent below that of June 1981 (Montreal Gazette, April 15, 1983:B5).
10. Most of the workers interviewed felt that leaving the factory was not an option because they lacked educational training, and sufficient knowledge of either of the two official languages, English and French. For women workers, their double day of labour was also a factor in remaining employed in the factory. Because the factory is located within the Portuguese enclave, women use the schools, the availability of baby-sitters, etc. in the neighborhood while earning a wage in a factory within the community.

11. I enclosed indians with quotation marks (" ") because the Portuguese workers refer to the Pakistanis and to the East Indians in the Division as "Indians". "Indians" is not necessarily a defamatory term, referring to people who immigrated from India. However, in this case, the Portuguese workers referred to both the Pakistanis and East Indians as "indians". By doing this they obfuscate the cultural differences between these two peoples. But more importantly, the Portuguese used the term "indians" in a prejudicial and even racist manner, with the connotation that this Asian population was inferior to them in all respects. The term "Indian" was used by the Portuguese much like bigots use the term "Jew" to refer to the Canadian Jewish population.

12. For an investigation of race (and ethnicity) and the labour process see: Sallie Westwood, 1985; Patricia Zavella, 1987.

13. Alexandre, the business agent from ILGWU responsible for the Texgar organizing drive, explains the problem they faced at the Labour Commission with the first petition, and why a second petition was necessary. Alexandre:

At the time [November 1984] we brought our request for certification to the Labour Commission office. This latter office was being inundated with complaints from the employer over technical aspects of the procedure. For example, it has always been the case that when you bring a request for certification to the Labour Commission that you send in photocopies of the union-collected information. But the employer wasn't satisfied with this and demanded that the originals be presented. This request was eventually defeated by the Labour Commissioner, but it nonetheless complicated things for the union - time was wasted. But because of the protests of the employer [through his lawyers], in 1985, we had to reorganize a second petition for union
certification in order to ensure that if the Labour Commissioner ruled for the employer, we already had our information and application prepared. What we did then was to have the workers [from the Fabric Division] sign union cards again (with a majority of 70% to 80% for us) and hence deposit them at the Labour Commission office as a second petition for certification. [At this time the union drive was concentrated only in the fabric division.]

14. All data relating to the legal process of union certification was gathered from the Texgar file at the Labour Commission Bureau in Montreal north.

15. Reference to this letter is made in the 'Texgar' file kept at the Labour Commission Bureau in Montreal north.

16. On this point, Alexandre added:

The law isn't clear, you can deposit a request for certification at the Labour Commission for a distinct group of workers in one company, but you then have to prove that group is distinct from the rest of the company. We maintained that the workers of the first two floors formed a distinct group from the other floors because they only knit the material and sold it not only to Texgar but to other companies. But we weren't sure that this would be enough to convince the Labour Commissioner. Often the question of whether something is accepted or not by the Labour Commissioner will depend on the idiosyncracies of the individual judge or the 'currents' at the Labour Commission office.

17. In order to avoid further delays in attempting to legally unionize Texgar, and to circumvent the legal restriction of Article 40 of the Quebec Labour Code, the ILGWU approached the Federation des Travailleurs du Quebec (FTQ) and together they organized the 'Syndicat pour les employees de Texgar' (SPET). To conform to the Labour Code, the latter presented to the Labour Commissioner its legal name, number of officials, its own constitution and declaration of principles, and the definition of the members it sought to represent. Alexandre explains the reasons for the withdrawal of the second petition:

But by law we would have to wait a period of three months before putting in a request for certification for all six floors. In order to get around this technical point in the Labour Code, we decided to get the FTQ involved. But in order to have a request made by the
FTQ, we had to withdraw our request from the Labour Commission Office.

18. In reality, the SPET was a front for the ILGWU. From 1984 to the union drive's defeat in October 1988, the ILGWU was in control of the union drive. The use of SPET was necessary to circumvent some of the limitations and restrictions of the Labour Code.

19. At the time of fieldwork, Leo and Teo were trying to clear their names in a court case against Albert Saltzman. Leo:

This [accusation] is a defamation against me and my family before my friends, the workers in Texgar, and the entire Portuguese community. As a result, my prime motivation now is to bring in the union as an act of revenge against his [A. Saltzman's] attempts. I don't need Texgar. Right now I work for a construction company making $17.50 an hour and I collect unemployment insurance of $320 a week during the winter. Also, Teo and I have taken Texgar to court on this issue and it is presently before the judge. We are confident of winning because we have done nothing wrong; we are in the right. The reason we brought our case to court is to show to the workers in the factory that we are not thieves and that Mr. Saltzman treated us unjustly.

20. Some writers (Alberto and Montero, 1976:139) have said that immigrant women are skeptical about supporting unions because they associate union activity with anti-government behaviour, which in their minds might entail deportation. Unfortunately, I did not interview workers after the final ballot. It is entirely possible that some (especially the increasing number of 'refugees' who seem to be entering the factory) may have voted against the union out of fear of deportation.

21. These videos were never returned to the television station.

22. At the time of fieldwork, Father Armand had relocated to another Portuguese parish outside the city of Montreal.

23. Alexandre:

At the time of the vote, someone from the union will be present in the factory with the agent from the Labour
Commission and also someone from Texgar. The list of workers eligible to vote is furnished by the employer which will then be checked by the agent and by the union representative.

24. Unfortunately the information that we had access to did not break down the vote by gender, ethnicity and division. Were this to have been done, we would have a clearer understanding of the loyalties and disloyalties of the workers to the union.

25. On "procureurs", the following was recorded in my field notes (August 31, 1988):

Mr. Monette [Agent in the Labour Commission] said that the 'Procureurs' act in the 'name' of some 'intervenants' in the factory. The 'intervenants' apparently contest the presence and aim of the workers' association (union) within the workplace.

Mr. Monette revealed that 'procureurs' like Mr. [...] are really paid by the employer [i.e. A. Saltzman] and they charge a flat rate. He added that they act in the name of fictitious 'intervenants' within the factory, and are found only in Quebec; perhaps "it is because of some [Quebecois] cultural distinctiveness", he said, that they exist only in Quebec.

26. The principal organizer from the ILGWU was Alexandre. Teo, Leo, Eddie, and Joao (secretary) headed the SPET. The latter four are also all Portuguese.

27. I have to take issue with Alexandre's point that the Haitian community is less well organized than the Portuguese. He uses this excuse to explain why the ILGWU did not work with the Haitian community during the union drive. On the same floor of the building where the Portuguese community has its daily radio programme is located the Haitian community radio programmer and radio transmission facilities. The same channel that carries the Portuguese television programme also carries a community affairs programme put together and geared to the Haitian community across Quebec.
CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSIONS

The theoretical position espoused in this thesis combines the macro elements of a capitalist economy with an Edwardian conception of the workplace as a "contested terrain" to explain the union drive in Texgar. This combination, I have argued, is best suited to explain the union drive in Texgar that emerged in 1982 at the height of the worst Canadian economic crisis since the Great Depression. Workers are viewed as active in the wage labour relation in Texgar: they possess their own ideology which collides with that of the employer on the shopfloor. Thus, conflict or change in the workplace is not solely due to the initiatives of the class of employers, but also to the workers' own views and interests on the shopfloor [1]. This is contrariwise to the position of writers in mainstream industrial relations as especially evident in their theory on union organizing.

Writers in this perspective argue that unionizing is unlikely during economically poor periods because workers would rather protect their jobs than undertake militant action. They point out that economically boom periods are the "right time" for organizing. This is so because during such periods the size of the reserve army of labour is
reduced, workers are more aware of the advantages of having a union, and the employer is "less resistant" to workers organizing. The underlying assumption in this perspective is that workers are "passive", ideologically undifferentiated from the bourgeoisie, and without a separate agenda to shape their own future. Even organizing is determined by the willingness of the employer. The theoretical thrust of this thesis has been to reject this position. This has been attempted on at least two counts: it has challenged the view that workers are passive on the shopfloor, and it has criticized the failure to recognize the fact that workers might just as likely undertake militancy in economic crisis periods in order to protect their jobs. (In fact, I would argue, that such militancy is crucial for the discussions of issues that relate directly to workers' condition). The mainstream industrial relations perspective has also been rejected for its failure to explain the kinds of cases investigated in this thesis. As was demonstrated, Texgar workers chose to organize when the Canadian economy was in a severe crisis, and when the factory itself was on the verge of collapsing. To dismiss this fact as 'deviant', as business cycle theorists do, explains nothing.

This thesis also argues that the heterogeneity of the workforce, and the diversification of production across
Texgar, hindered the development of solidarity and commitment of workers to the union drive. The union organizing leadership did not help matters by virtually ignoring some ethnic workers, and exaggerating their emphasis on other ethnic workers on the shopfloor. Across the factory, working conditions tended to differ amongst workers depending on the Division within which they worked. This shopfloor fact did not receive the analysis it deserved from the union leadership. As a result, a union strategy that could relate to workers' own difficulties and grievances in their immediate shopfloor experience was not developed.

The union drive in Texgar was unsuccessful because of the shopfloor opposition to it. The Texgar ownership used shopfloor supervisors to intimidate and discourage workers from supporting the union drive. In addition, the employer's anti-union campaign within the factory and in the Portuguese community which surrounds the factory served as obstacle to successful unionization.

Other theoretical explanations were considered for interpreting the findings of this thesis. But they too were inadequate for this case study. The economic recovery period theory argued that organizing doesn't occur either at economic boom periods or economic bust periods, but when the economy is in its upward swing toward recovery. According
to proponents of this position, the economic crisis acts as a 'trigger' for workers and their organized demands.

We have shown that the official request for union certification by Texgar workers was deposited at the Quebec Labour Commission in 1984 - a time period, it might be argued, when the Canadian economy was in its upward swing towards recovery. However, the organizing of the union drive within the factory emerged in 1982; and in 1984 Texgar was in a deep crisis that threatened to destroy the company. For these two reasons, the economy recovery theory was rejected as an explanation for organizing in Texgar.

Two other theoretical positions were considered for their relevance to this case study. But again, the data does not support either of the positions. A common explanation for immigrant unionizing is the wide-ranging experience they have had in left-wing politics in their country of origin. Accordingly, immigrants organized Canadian workplaces because they brought with them the values of trade unions and the foundations of counter-hegemonic working class organizations. I do not doubt that background experience in working class radical organizations played (and continues to play) a critical role in the lives of immigrant workers. However, this theory was shown not to apply to the immigrant workers in Texgar because the majority of the workers have no radical political or trade
union experience. In fact, the opposite is true. The overwhelming majority of workers in Texgar emigrated from countries where fascist dictators ruled for decades. Under this form of political oppression trade unions are very often illegal. And where they do exist, their primary function is to control the workforce rather than represent it against capital. Hence, the workers in Texgar had no, or very little, trade union experience in their past.

It is also common to argue that a homogeneous workforce increases the likelihood of organizing the workplace. This is so because workers share cultural and language identities facilitating communication and trust between them in the workplace. But while I believe that homogeneity of the workforce does indeed facilitate organizing, I would also argue that some writers overemphasized this to the neglect of other important aspects in the lives of workers. In this thesis, for example, we find that although the Portuguese numerically dominated the workforce in Texgar, organizing was impeded by the employer's use of Portuguese against Portuguese in the workplace to defeat the union drive. The employer also appealed to the Portuguese petite-bourgeoisie surrounding the factory for support in defeating the union drive.

However, when we investigate the organization of production, we find that Portuguese workers are segmented in
the internal job market of the factory. There are Portuguese workers in the Fabric Division, The Casualwear Division, and the Women's Sweaters Division. And, as we described in Chapter Six, the workers are physically divided across shopfloors, and suffer different degrees of capitalist exploitation because working conditions vary from one Division to the next. Also on the shopfloor, the owner of the factory uses Portuguese supervisors to control the predominantly Portuguese shopfloor workforce. This aspect of 'simple control', as we showed in our discussion of the union drive, revealed itself at the time of union organizing: the Portuguese supervisors and office personnel acted as mouth-pieces for the desires of Albert Saltzman.

The positions presented above did not capture the experience of organizing in Texgar. For this reason I employ a theory that combines macro economic features of the capitalist economy with a conception of the workplace as a 'contested terrain'. With respect to the former, I discussed the structure of the Canadian textile and garment industry (with emphasis on Quebec) and the contradictions that this sector is undergoing. I showed that the textile industry has become increasingly foreign owned and that it is undergoing an unprecedented restructuring due to increasing competition from foreign manufacturers in the domestic market. The result of restructuring for the
accumulation of capital has meant the loss of jobs for thousands of workers.

The Canadian garment industry, too, is under tremendous competitive pressures to restructure or die. We have seen that it is still overwhelmingly Canadian owned but in serious danger of being completely eradicated by foreign competition. Many foreign firms are able to undersell Canadian goods in the domestic market because of the cheap labour they employ and the increasing high-tech machinery they use. The Canadian garment industry response has been to embrace technological change. For workers, this has meant job loss and oppression from new forms of control, such as "technical control". The strategy of restructuring will continue as will job loss due to the Free Trade Agreement with the United States. It would seem, then, that organizing is not possible under these economically tough times.

Within this context of increasing competition and sectoral restructuring, Texgar management has fashioned its own response to the pressures of a capitalist economy. It has undertaken steps to modernize, and rationalize the factory. It has also expanded clothing lines to the USA, and has begun the process of replacing the 'core' workforce in the factory by cheaper refugee labour. Hence, the pressures of capitalist economic laws have impinged on the
factory leading management to introduce certain strategies in the workplace.

The pressures from the competitive environment outside the factory, combined with Texgar management's strategy to increase profits, clashed with the workers on the shopfloor. Our principal thesis has been to argue that the grievances expressed in the organizing drive were tied to the changes in the workplace. Thus, the workers in the Fabric Division chose to organize because they saw that the changes taking place in their workplace threatened their standard of living and that only a union could ensure job security. The protest of management's initiatives was undertaken by workers despite the economic crisis outside the factory. I believe, therefore, that organizing was required to ensure some means of protecting a threatened standard of living and tenuous job security. Rather than remain passive and "wait out the crisis" to demand security, workers in Texgar sought to organize.

CONCLUSIONS ON THE UNION DRIVE

The union drive was defeated by a substantial margin - 65% of shopfloor workers voted against the union. Our analysis of the union drive leads us to suggest the following explanations for its defeat. First, the workforce in the factory was divided across four Divisions which
occupied the six floors of the factory. Each of the divisions was independent of the other and workers laboured under different working conditions in each. Consequently, solidarity between workers was difficult to achieve since workers had different grievances. And especially important was the fact that the workforce in the largest Division (Casualwear) had significantly better working conditions than the rest of the workers in the factory. The workers in this Division are protected by the Joint Commission. Most of them felt that the Joint Commission was a union and that they, therefore, did not need another. Second, I believe that the ILGWU, which led the organizing drive, failed to recognize the technical division of labour across the factory and thus underestimated the impact of its divisiveness on workers in Texgar. The union's strategy did not indicate the recognition of the different working conditions in the factory. As a result, unity between workers across the factory did not occur. Third, the union alienated Haitian workers from the union drive by ignoring their own concerns and overstating those of one group - the Portuguese. Haitians workers specifically complained that they did not receive the same attention from the union concerning their needs in the organizing drive. Fourthly, the union drive encountered a virulent and nasty anti-union campaign organized by Albert Saltzman, inside and outside
the factory. Inside the factory, two principal union organizers were fired allegedly for stealing. Outside the factory, he solicited the Portuguese petite-bourgeoisie surrounding the factory for help in defeating the union drive. Fifth, the Quebec Labour Code played a critical role in the defeat of the union drive. The numerous delays in certification hearings and the procedures of the Labour Code resulted in, officially, a four-year campaign to organize Texgar. Understandably, many of the workers left the union drive as demands on their personal lives changed over those four years.

SOME FINAL COMMENTS ON ORGANIZING

Our examination of the role of the ILGWU in the union drive leads us to make three central critiques. First, we showed that the ILGWU alienated Haitian workers in the factory because of a strategy focusing almost exclusively on the Portuguese workforce. We quoted a union official who himself recognized the union's neglect of this ethnic group of workers. Hence, there is a pressing need for the ILGWU to reflect and represent better the interests of all workers in the industry, and not just those of a select group. Second, we argued that the union took an elitist approach to organizing: only those workers immediately tied to the ILGWU leadership were consistently
aware of the latest developments in the Labour Commission and union drive. Shopfloor workers repeatedly said to me that they no longer knew whether the union was still trying to organize the factory. This was a surprising affirmation considering that this research was carried out from June to early September 1988, and the union certification vote was held in mid-October of the same year. The union bureaucracy should extend itself to all workers in its strategy against capital. Third, we argued that the union failed to recognize the complexity of the organization of production across Texgar. The ILGWU did not recognize that, within the four divisions in the factory, workers laboured under different conditions, and that those in the Casualwear Division worked under significantly better conditions than those in the other divisions. This was because of the Joint Commission (see Chapter Nine). The latter was also not explained to the workers for what it was — a tripartite state, capital and labour association — and thus workers in the casualwear division rejected the union in the belief that the Joint Commission was a union, a union which they already had and thus in need of no other.

Some writers argue that the ILGWU is being pressured by the rank-and-file to democratize and to reflect more concretely the interests of all workers in the industry (see Berlin et al., 1978; Lipsig-Mumme, 1987). No doubt,
this is a positive development. However, we are less optimistic than these writers because, in the past, the ILGWU has consistently engaged in a class-collaboratist approach to the problems and difficulties in textile and garment industries. As Rianne Mahon (1983) has said, the clothing unions must create their own strategies in the industry in order to define the issues in workers' terms, rather than continue to collaborate with the strategies of the employers in this industrial sector. Unfortunately, there is now more evidence that the Labour Movement in Quebec is making a rightward shift to cooperation with capital, and away from a progressive class analysis of Quebec industry and society, centred on a discussion of an alternative socialist system for the province and the need for a workers' party to undertake this project (see Rouillard, 1989).
NOTES

1. Michael Burawoy (1979) also argues that workers accept and participate in their own exploitation.
APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A

LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

Women

Nubelia Amaral, June 15, 1988
Bella Amorim June 12, 1988
Ana Araujo July 13, 1988
Lucia Cardoso June 26, 1988
Edite Carmelo June 30, 1988
Dalila Fragoso, June 29, 1988
Linda Machado July 26, 1988
Maria Manuel June 20, 1988
Toni Leal, July 29, 1988
Lina Leal, July 29, 1988
Luz Pavao, July 31, 1988
Ida Roberto August 19, 1988
Lilia Roberto August 19, 1988
Delia Sebastiao August 4, 1988
Rosa Vieira August 9, 1988

Men

Ahmed, August 1, 1988
Antonio Anterio, July 10, 1988
Leo Arsenal, September 2, 1988, and March 5, 1988
Paul Boivin, November 17, 1988
Andre Bonhomme, June 21, 1988
Vince Carleton July 15, 1988
Joe Coelho, August 2, 1988
Manuel Correia, January 4, 1988, and June 9, 1988
Alexandre Duval, September 2, 1988
Tony Ferreira, July 23, 1988
Amadeo Graziani, June 11, 1988
Howard, August 10, 1988
Normand Lacoste, August 15, 1988
Maitre Jean Lemelin, November 17, 1988
Arturo Machado, August 4, 1988
Moses Marques, August 14, 1988
Mathieu Mercier, July 10, 1988
Mira Mohammed, July 13, 1988
Benoit Monette, August 1, 1988
Marco Monteiro, June 20, 1988
Lou Morais, June 20, 1988
Ramish Patel, August 30, 1988
Teo Raimundo, September 5, 1988, and March 5, 1988

373
Albert Saltzman, January 7, 1988 and August 16, 1988

Carlos Tavares, September 6, 1988
Emanuel Turcotte, June 26, 1988
Eddie Velhino, January 5, 1988
APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW GUIDE

This interview guide was constructed with two considerations in mind. First, the nature and objective of the subject matter and its development through the thesis chapters; and second, to garnish a more complete understanding of the internal structure of the factory. Hence, it will serve simply as a guide for initiating discussion with the informants. It will also enable me to steer the interviews in the general direction of my research interest. It is clear that the interviewees will do most of the talking, and undoubtedly, put me on track to many other relevant issues that would otherwise go unnoticed.

This interview guide does not include a separate set of questions for discussion with the owner of the factory and managers. A set of questions will be constructed as I become more familiar with the developments in the factory.

Finally, all informants will be guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity when taking part in this research project.
Interview No. --

1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Personal Data:

Marital status: Age:
Citizenship status: Gender:
Education -- years of schooling Ethnicity:
Household -- children at home (ages)

2. WORKING AT TEXGAR

Briefly, tell me when and how you started working at Texgar.

Labour Process: What floor do you work on? What is the principal production activity on your floor?

Describe to me as best as you can what you do at Texgar during your work-shift.

What are some of the activities that the people around you do?

Technology: Since you've been at your present job, has there been any technological changes in it that directly affect the way you do your work?

(If yes), what changes were they? How have you had to adjust to them?

Since you've been at Texgar, have you noticed any major changes to the factory? Are there any changes that management is introducing right now?

System of Wage Payment: At Texgar, by what system (i.e., piecework rate, hourly rate, weekly set rate, etc.) of wage payment are you paid? Are most workers paid by the same system as you are?

Do you know if there is a difference in the system of wage payment between men and women? In general, do you think that the males on your floor/factory are paid higher wages than the females?
Supervision: How many bosses are there on your floor? How many of them do you have to answer to?

Are your bosses male or female? What is their ethnic background?

In general, how do you get along with your bosses? Do they treat all workers equally fair?

What do you know about 'free trade' and how this agreement might affect the textile/garment industry and you?

3. THE UNION DRIVE

Work Grievances: Since you've worked at Texgar, what changes has management introduced onto the shopfloor that you don't agree with?

Has management introduced any changes to the wage structure that you do not agree with? (If yes), what are they? What do you think of these changes?

How do your co-workers feel about the changes that have taken place in the factory?

Do you think that the owner of the factory has the workers best interests in mind when he introduces changes in the workplace?

In the past, did workers ever protest against changes management made? How has the owner of the factory (and management) reacted to workers' protest against changes to the way they do their work and the kind of wages they receive?

What is the relationship between the owner of the factory and the workers? Have any changes occurred in the relationship recently?

Union Drive: What are your general impressions of unions? (Have you ever been a member of a union in Canada?) (Are you favorably disposed to one?)

At Texgar, have workers in the past tried to organize a union drive? (If yes), what were the reasons for the organizing? What was the outcome?
Some workers I have talk to have told me that there is an attempt at unionization in the factory, are you aware of this?

(If yes), when did you first hear about it (the drive)?
Do you know why workers want a union?

Is there any opposition to the union drive in the factory?
From workers? From management?

In the factory, what has been management's response to the union drive?

Have workers in the factory become discouraged in their attempts to unionize because of management's opposition?

What has been the union's strategies to keep workers focused on the union drive and away from management's side on the issue?

4. GENDER DIVISION OF LABOUR

From your familiarity with your floor/department, do men and women perform the same jobs or is there a difference between what men and women do? Can you describe to me the difference? Do you know why there is a difference between the tasks that each performs?

Do you know if there is also a difference in wages: Does one sex receive higher wages than the other even though they both perform the same (or similar) tasks? Is there a difference in the system of wage payment between the sexes?

Do you feel that women only work for 'pin' ('quick') money?

At Texgar, are there jobs that are strictly defined as 'man's work'? (If yes), what are they? Has any woman tried to get a 'man's job'?

What is the relationship between workers of opposite sex on the shopfloor? What is the relationship between supervisors and workers of opposite sex?

5. ETHNIC DIVISION OF LABOUR

In your department/floor, what is the ethnic background of most of the workers you work with?
Do members of one ethnic group perform different tasks from that of other ethnic groups?

Do the supervisors come from the different ethnic groups that make up the workforce, or do they come from one ethnic group in particular? (If yes to the latter), from which group?

Do supervisors favour workers from their own ethnic background?

What does it mean to you to work in a factory that employs many members of your ethnic/racial background?

What does it mean to you to have a boss from your own ethnic/racial background? Does this create some problems? (If yes) Explain.

Have you ever suffered racist (verbal, jokes, caricatures) attacks from your co-workers and/or management?

6. WORK HISTORY BEFORE EMIGRATING

Before coming to Canada, did you work for a wage? (If yes), what did you do? Were you member of a union?

(If no), what did you do?

Why did you emigrate? Did you emigrate alone or with your family?

How many years have you been in Canada?

What other jobs have you held in Canada? Did they have a union?

7. DOMESTIC LABOUR

Housework: Do you do domestic work? (If yes), how many hours per day? What other work do you do after you leave the factory?

Does your spouse do his/her part of the chores? What does he/she do?

How do you manage to combine domestic work and factory work? Is it possible to combine a day of work at the factory with a day of work in the home? Are there any strategies that you use to make this combination work?
When you work overtime at the factory, do special arrangement have to be made at home?

If there is a party or meeting at the factory, can you attend it? (If yes), what kind of arrangements do you have to make in order to attend?

(If no), why can't you attend the meeting or party?

Child Caring Duties: When you are at work, who takes care of the children?

Who brings the children to the babysitter? Who picks up the children after work? Where is the babysitter located (i.e., near or far from the factory? Near or far from your home)?

If (and when) one of your children falls ill, who usually stays home or leaves work early to be with him/her?
## APPENDIX C

### Table I

Employment in Textile and Clothing Industries, 1981-1988 first four Months and Percentage Change from Previous Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Textile (000)</th>
<th>Clothing (000)</th>
<th>Text. + Cloth. Inds. (000)</th>
<th>All Manuf. Industries (000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>113.7</td>
<td>178.6</td>
<td>1854.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-2.6%</td>
<td>-0.4%</td>
<td>-1.2%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>106.8</td>
<td>164.0</td>
<td>1702.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-12.0%</td>
<td>-6.0%</td>
<td>-8.2%</td>
<td>-8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>109.8</td>
<td>170.6</td>
<td>1671.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>-1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>110.6</td>
<td>170.7</td>
<td>1722.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-1.2%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>110.9</td>
<td>168.8</td>
<td>1766.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-3.7%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>-1.1%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>104.1</td>
<td>164.8</td>
<td>1739.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>-6.2%</td>
<td>-2.3%</td>
<td>-1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>117.2</td>
<td>178.3</td>
<td>1900.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jan | 60.5 | 2.7 | 111.1 | -2.8 | 171.6 | -0.9 | 1876.9 | 3.1 |
Feb | 59.4 | 2.8 | 110.5 | -5.5 | 169.9 | -2.8 | 1865.6 | 2.7 |
Mar | 59.1 | -1.8 | 109.0 | -8.0 | 168.2 | -6.0 | 1876.5 | 2.2 |
Apr | 61.1 | 0.2 | 112.8 | -2.3 | 173.9 | -1.5 | 1906.2 | 2.7 |

Table II

Average Weekly Earnings by Employees Paid by the Hour as a Percentage of Average Weekly Earnings in All Manufacturing Industries 1981-1988 1st Quarter (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>76.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All. Manuf.</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table III
The Importance of Employment in the Textiles Sector Compared by Town, in order of Importance (Province of Quebec, 1975)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Regions</th>
<th>Textile sector</th>
<th>Manuf. sector</th>
<th>Text. Employ. as a % of Tot Manuf. Employ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Magog</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>75.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Louiseville</td>
<td>1,142</td>
<td>2,174</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. St.Geo.-de-B.</td>
<td>3,573</td>
<td>7,167</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Montmorency</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>1,720</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Cowansville</td>
<td>1,683</td>
<td>3,956</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Megantic</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Drummondville</td>
<td>4,057</td>
<td>9,652</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Valleyfield (a)</td>
<td>2,863</td>
<td>6,848</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Plessisville</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td>2,792</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Asbestos</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Victoriaville</td>
<td>2,344</td>
<td>7,040</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Berthierville</td>
<td>1,069</td>
<td>3,354</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. St. A. des Mon</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>1,014</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. St.Hyacinthe(b)</td>
<td>3,679</td>
<td>12,412</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Sherbrooke</td>
<td>4,950</td>
<td>17,700</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Saint-Jean (c)</td>
<td>4,339</td>
<td>15,564</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Grand'Mere</td>
<td>1,027</td>
<td>4,067</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Grandby (d)</td>
<td>3,277</td>
<td>13,108</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Trois-Rivieres</td>
<td>3,593</td>
<td>14,854</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Montreal (e)</td>
<td>68,484</td>
<td>289,500</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Thetford Mines</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>2,957</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Joliette</td>
<td>1,103</td>
<td>5,396</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Saint-Jerome</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>5,405</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Sorel</td>
<td>1,371</td>
<td>11,027</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Longueuil</td>
<td>1,692</td>
<td>14,561</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Levis</td>
<td>1,092</td>
<td>10,362</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Quebec (f)</td>
<td>1,305</td>
<td>19,774</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (a) includes Huntington; (b) includes Beloeil and Acton Vale; (c) includes Chambly and Farnham; (d) includes Waterloo; (e) includes the following [Employment] Centres: Montreal North-East, Montreal North-West, Montreal West, Montreal South-East, Montreal Centre-North, Montreal North, Montreal Centre-South; (f) includes the following [Employment] Centres: Quebec City East, Quebec City West.

### Table IV
Nombre d'Établissements par tranche de salaires et par sous-secteur
(Quebec, 1982)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nombre de salaires</th>
<th>Sous-secteur d'activité</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,000 + 500-999</td>
<td>Fil. et tis. du cot. 2 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200-499</td>
<td>8  2  0  0  2  0  0  0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-199</td>
<td>Fil. et tis. laine 0 0 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-99</td>
<td>3  2  1  0  2  3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-49</td>
<td>Fibres artif. et synthe. 0 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>4  13 3 14 3 4 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>Corder. et ficell. 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 0 1 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feutre et trait. des fib 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 0 0 0 4 0 1 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ind. des tapis et carp. * 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4  7 2 3 0 1 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Art. en gros. toile, etc. 0 0 0 0 3 12 10 11 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acces. en tis. 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ind. text. divers 1 0 12 9 26 43 43 35 38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Inclus linoleum et tissus anoduits
Table V
Principales entreprises de l'industrie textile
(Quebec, 1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entreprise</th>
<th>Nombre de salaries</th>
<th>% par rapport à l'industrie</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominion Textile</td>
<td>4,465</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celanese Canada</td>
<td>1,865</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wabasso*</td>
<td>1,584</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les Tapis Peerless</td>
<td>1,171</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleyn &amp; Tinker</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collins &amp; Alkman</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated Textiles</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calko Canada</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satexil</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tapis Coronet</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zephir</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albany Int'l Canada</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burlington Textile</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filtex</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles Dionne</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usines Huntingdon</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.L. de Ball Canada</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leedye</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belding-Corticelli</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St.Georges International</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>J.P. Coats</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corvelle Textiles</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tapis Peeters</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lainages Victor</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tissus Hafner du Canada</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayers</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodyear Canada</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rayonese Textile</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ozite Canada</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cookshiretext</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16,274</td>
<td>63.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ensemble des entreprises de l'industrie textile 25,497 100.0


* Wabasso closed its operations in 1985 (Chalifoux, 1985:43)
Table VI

Balance of Trade in Textiles and Clothing, 1980-1987
Million dollars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1,643.1</td>
<td>424.6</td>
<td>-1,218.5</td>
<td>777.5</td>
<td>230.2</td>
<td>-547.3</td>
<td>-1,765.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,867.6</td>
<td>473.9</td>
<td>-1,393.7</td>
<td>954.4</td>
<td>263.7</td>
<td>-690.7</td>
<td>-2,084.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1,545.9</td>
<td>430.4</td>
<td>-1,115.5</td>
<td>985.2</td>
<td>241.9</td>
<td>-742.3</td>
<td>-1,858.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1,928.2</td>
<td>428.8</td>
<td>-1,499.4</td>
<td>1,195.9</td>
<td>219.6</td>
<td>-976.3</td>
<td>-2,475.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2,221.1</td>
<td>521.6</td>
<td>-1,699.5</td>
<td>1,611.3</td>
<td>290.3</td>
<td>-1,321.0</td>
<td>-3,020.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2,376.6</td>
<td>566.3</td>
<td>-1,810.3</td>
<td>1,672.6</td>
<td>326.1</td>
<td>-1,346.5</td>
<td>-3,156.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2,662.9</td>
<td>674.9</td>
<td>-1,988.0</td>
<td>2,041.3</td>
<td>382.3</td>
<td>-1,659.0</td>
<td>-3,647.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2,876.5</td>
<td>755.6</td>
<td>-2,120.9</td>
<td>2,261.3</td>
<td>451.8</td>
<td>-1,809.5</td>
<td>-3,930.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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To enable easy consultation, this reference section has been divided into three sections: 1. Newspaper Articles; 2. Government, et al. publications; 3. Books and Articles.

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Bradbury, Bettina. "Pigs, Cows, and Boarders: Non-Wage Forms of Survival Among Montreal Families, 1861-91." Labour/Le


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