SINO-SOVIET BOUNDARY DISPUTE IN THE 1970s

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By

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To justice and peace

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ABSTRACT

The main aim of this thesis is to assess the nature and the development of the boundary dispute between China and the Soviet Union in the 1970s. Dealing with the historical, military, diplomatic and academic aspects of the dispute, it attempts to illuminate the linkages between national interests and ideological inclination and the effect of the conflict on the overall relations between the two great powers.

It examines in a systematic way the Sino-Soviet border negotiations and outlines both the political rationalizations and the bargaining positions of the two sides. A special section is devoted to the "disputed areas" along the Sino-Soviet border, and three maps prepared by the Chinese scholars regarding boundary changes between the two countries are presented. In the author's opinion, the frontier conflict is the most important issue that continues to undermine relations between China and the Soviet Union.

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INTRODUCTION

Few frontier conflicts have had greater impact on the world politics of our era than the boundary dispute between the People's Republic of China (hereafter as: the PRC) and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (hereafter as: the USSR). Having emerged amidst the Sino-Soviet "political debate" in the early 1960s, this dispute has become one of the major causes of Sino-Soviet rift in the ensuing years, looming as a crucial determinant of the future health of the relations between the two great powers.

China and the Soviet Union share one of the longest borders in the world, more than 7,300 kilometres; it falls into two major sections -- the eastern or the Far East with over 4,300 kilometres, and the western or the Central Asian with about 3,000 kilometres. Between these sectors lies the People's Republic of Mongolia.[1] The eastern section of the Sino-Soviet boundary extends from the Sino-Mongolian-Soviet tri-conjunction in the uplands of Transbaikalia eastward and then southward to the Sino-Korean-Soviet tri-conjunction at the Tumen River, involving

the Erhkuna/Argun, the Heilong/Amur, and the Wusuli/Ussuri Rivers. The western sector starts from the tri-joining point of the Sino-Mongolian-Soviet boundaries in the Altai Mountains and ends in the Pamirs in the south.[2]

Since the middle of the seventeenth century, boundary conflict has often become a major factor affecting the overall bilateral relations between China and the Russian Empire/the Soviet Union.[3] Various historical frontier issues left unresolved in the past still confront the governments of the PRC and the USSR. In view of both the enduring nature of the conflict and the importance of the political roles the PRC and the USSR play in the world arena, the Sino-Soviet boundary dispute has caused world concern and deserves thorough scholarly attention.

Before this border problem came to public attention in 1963, there was a period of benign neglect concerning this important subject. Among the few scholarly works dealing with this question was W. A.D. Jackson's book, The Russo-Chinese Borderlands.[4] The author, a professor of geography, dealt briefly with the history and political geography of these frontier regions in question. Nevertheless, the historically unresolved issues between the two countries were glossed over despite their potential explosiveness.

In the middle of the 1960s, scholarly interest in the subject was awakened as the conflict became overt. The various monographs of this period, such as The Frontiers of China, by Professor F. Watson, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, by Professor D.J. Doolin, and The Ili Crises, by I.C.Y. Hsu, greatly enhanced the world's awareness of the Sino-Soviet polemics concerning their shared border. It was noted that the present boundary between the PRC and the USSR is not "the result of the shrinkage of the zones of contact between two expanding land-empires,"[5] but is "the result of the encroachment of a strong Russian Empire into a weak Chinese Empire."[6] Study of the subject, nonetheless, still remained rather underdeveloped, and topics such as the failure of the PRC and the USSR to produce, between 1950 and 1963, any document to verify their common boundary did not receive sufficient attention.

In the spring of 1969, a series of bloody border incidents over the sovereignty of the tiny Chenpao (Damansky) Island in the Wusuli/Ussuri River brought China and the Soviet Union extremely close to the point of war.[7] These incidents also shocked the world. Consequently, the early 1970s saw a flood of literature dealing with the conflict. Most of it discussed, at length, such questions as

whether the border dispute would end in large-scale war between the two powers or what were the merits of the case on each side.[8] The analytical methodology applied in these studies, however, suffered considerably from a lack of substantial inquiries into the nature and, more importantly, the causes of the confrontation. Hence, satisfactory answers were very difficult to obtain.

It was not until 1973, when Professor An Tai Sung contributed his research work, The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute,[9] that sufficient emphasis was given to the historical-chronological approach, and that, as a result, reliable clues were provided for a better understanding of the Sino-Soviet polemics on the various issues concerning their frontier. There has been, however, a serious lack of consistency in the amount of attention paid to this problem thereafter. Apart from the studies carried out in the PRC and the USSR, few attempts have been made elsewhere to keep track of the dispute.

The majority of Western scholars, realizing that available information is limited and the subject has become more complicated, have shown little interest in pursuing any in-depth inquiries into the matter. What may have further hindered the study is a belief that little development either in the content of the dispute or in its potential consequences had taken place in the 1970s.[10]

To this author's knowledge, up to this date no one has ventured to investigate the subject independently, although, occasionally, observers who concentrated on Sino-Soviet relations in general have presented inadequate analyses which treated only the outward manifestations of the quarrel. Consequently, the lack of a proper assessment of this important aspect of Sino-Soviet relations has adversely affected the understanding of their bilateral affairs as a whole.

It is the writer's contention that, in the past decade, the Sino-Soviet boundary dispute has entered a new stage characterized by an unprecedented level of military confrontation, fruitless negotiations and academic warfare, and that neither the essence nor the potential consequences of the conflict has been fully explored. The large volume of government publications produced by both countries has provided, in recent years, invaluable revelations on the various issues that are at stake. Even though the "inevitable" war between China and the Soviet Union which some political observers foresaw in 1969 has not occurred, the importance of the conflict has not diminished. The boundary quarrel can hardly be regarded simply as a reflection of the Sino-Soviet animosity since it indeed has been a cause of the abnormal bilateral relations between the PRC and the USSR.

The objective of this thesis is to record, analyze and evaluate this boundary dispute as it developed in the past decade, hopefully shedding new light on the subject. This research work is founded on the historical-chronological and analytical-descriptive methods. In this analysis, the following questions are raised: What is the historical basis for the Sino-Soviet boundary conflict? How and why did the border dispute come into the open in March 1963? What role does military strength play in this conflict? What are the military risks involved? What are the perceptions of the two countries in the past and in the present concerning this dispute? What are the issues at stake in their still-current border negotiations? Why have the two countries failed to achieve any agreement in the talks? What is the significance of the "academic debate" carried on between the scholars of the two countries? Is there a genuine danger that the conflict might escalate into full-scale hostilities in the wake of the long-deadlocked border negotiations? What impact has the conflict had on the bilateral relations between the PRC and the USSR or even on the trilateral relationship between China, the Soviet Union and the United States?

In exploring these questions, the author has presented his research work in four chapters, dealing

separately with the historical, military, diplomatic, and academic aspects of the border dispute. The possible directions of future developments with regard to the conflict will be discussed in the conclusion.

The very precondition for a sound understanding of the present is a thorough understanding of the past. Sino-Soviet border conflict has its roots in historical as well as in ideological realms. Without recognizing the various historical issues involved, it would be totally impossible to assess accurately the polemics involved in the dispute. In Chapter One, an attempt will be made to provide a concise examination of the events which gave rise to the creation of the Sino-Soviet boundary, and to identify the various causes of the present dispute, thus laying a basis for the discussion of those issues which were contentious in the 1970s.

In Chapter Two, the dynamics of border confrontation will be examined. The two expressions of this confrontation -- military buildup and border incidents -- will be treated separately. It appears that, on the one hand, military strength has been a major premise on which the boundary policies of the respective governments have been formulated. On the other hand, the border incidents seem to have reflected clearly the effects of such policies.

Thirdly, the border negotiations between the two countries, which were held from October, 1969, to the summer of 1978, will be carefully studied. Special efforts will be made to identify the key positions of the two sides, and to review the negotiating tactics of the two adversaries. It is hoped that such an approach may result in unveiling the mystery as to why the nine-year Sino-Soviet border negotiations have failed to produce any agreement.

Fourthly, the academic aspect of the conflict will be examined with close reference to the official publications of the PRC and the USSR. After a series of exchanges between the two governments in 1969, both sides apparently invested a great deal of manpower in preparing academic publications and in marshalling facts and arguments in favour of their respective positions.

During the 1970s, therefore, a new dimension of the dispute was the burgeoning body of literature on the various historical issues. The ideological implications of this "paper war" may have significant effects on the peoples of both countries, and therefore, deserve serious attention. Devoted primarily to the review and analysis of this "academic warfare," Chapter Four will also attempt to gauge the likelihood of a future resolution of the conflict.

Finally, in the conclusion, an overall evaluation of the dispute will be given in light of its impact on the bilateral relations between China and the Soviet Union. The future prospect of possible resolutions to the dispute will also be explored.

In carrying out this research, the author has endeavoured to use, as much as available, original documents from the three major sources, namely Chinese, Russian/Soviet and Western publications. In this respect, the historical archives of the various Chinese dynasties are of critical importance since they are the only original sources which have dealt with the pre-1644 (i.e., the pre-Russian) history of the present Soviet Far East. These archives, though explored, on a limited scale, before the turn of the century by some British and French scholars, have been almost entirely neglected in recent decades by Western scholars. Even such key monograph as Chouban Yiwu Shimo (A complete account of the management of foreign affairs) of the Qing (Ch'ing; also written as Ching) Dynasty which is an invaluable source for students of the Sino-Russian relations during the latter half of the nineteenth century, has not received adequate attention.[11] The fact that these primary sources have not yet been translated into Western languages seems to be the main cause of

this neglect.

The availability of contemporary Chinese publications in English is very limited too. So far, none of the works in the field prepared by scholars of the PRC has been translated into Western languages. Consequently, most of the observers in the West have to rely mainly on the few articles in Beijing Review or releases of the Xinhua News Agency. Although the establishment of such translating centers as the Joint Publications Research Service of the United States(JPRS) has improved the situation to a certain extent, the problem of the paucity of Chinese material in English has not been resolved. As a result, analyses of the Chinese views often lack the necessary historical perspective.

On the other hand, Russian archives dealing with tsarist Russia's penetration into Asia appear to be more familiar to the English-speaking world as result of the work of scholars such as J.F. Baddeley and F.A. Golder.[12] Soviet sources, however, appear difficult to assess in terms of consistency or quality in that, during the sixty-five years since 1917, the Soviet attitude on the subject has changed fundamentally, from condemning the imperialistic expansionist policy of the Russian Empire to eulogizing Russian colonization of Central and Northeast

Asia.[13] The significance of this shift of position, has, more often than not, been overlooked by observers in the West. This fact has adversely limited the effectiveness of their research in exploring the complexities of the conflict, its international repercussions within the rapidly changing international scene of the 1970s, and in projecting the likely trends of the 1980s.

It is hoped, therefore, that this work will contribute to the enrichment of the literature on this important subject, and be useful in evaluating the overall relations between China and the Soviet Union. It does not, however, claim to provide complete and comprehensive solutions to the many complex questions involved in the conflict. It is designed hopefully to provide a chronological examination and an objective assessment of this enduring boundary dispute as it has developed in the past ten years.

INTRODUCTION:NOTES

1. The People's Republic of Mongolia (the PRM) was formerly a part of China known as Outer Mongolia. Although the first government of the PRM was founded as early in 1924, it failed to obtain official recognition from the government of the Republic of China until January 5, 1946. For further references see: Tang, Peter S.H., Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia 1911-1931, Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1959, pp. 299-310; Friters, Gerald, "The Prelude to Outer Mongolian Independence," Pacific Affairs, June, 1937, p. 168 and Chapter One of this thesis.

2. For detailed information on the geography of the Sino-Soviet boundary see: "Geographic Background of the Sino-Soviet Border," in An, Tai Sung, The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 1973, pp. 165-168.

3. Quite a number of publications in English on the subject are presently highly regarded. See: Baddeley, J.F., ed., Russia, Mongolia, China, London, Macmillan and Company Ltd., 1919; Banno, M., China and the West, 1858-1861, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1964; Cahen, G., Some Early Russo-Chinese Relations, translated and edited by W. Sheldon Ridge, Shanghai, 1914; Chen, Agnes Fang-Chih, "Chinese Frontier Diplomacy: The Coming of the Russians and the Treaty of Nertchinsk," The Yenching Journal of Social Studies, Vol. IV, No. 2, Feb., 1949; Chen, Agnes Fang-Chih, "Chinese Frontier Diplomacy: Kiakhta Boundary Treaties and Agreements," The Yenching Journal of Social Studies, Vol. IV, No. 2, Feb., 1949; Golder, F.A., Russian Expansion on the Pacific 1641-1850, Cleveland, The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1914; and Ravenstein, E.G., The Russians on the Amur, London, Trubner and Coll, 1861.

4. Jackson, W.A.D., The Russo-Chinese Borderlands, Princeton, N.J., D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1962.

5. Watson, F., The Frontiers of China, London, Chatto & Windus, 1966, p. 31.

6. Ibid.

7. After many years of military confrontation along the Sino-Soviet border, armed clashes occurred on March 2 and March 15, 1969, over a tiny island called Chenpao in Chinese and Damansky in Russian. The island is one of those situated on the Chinese side of the main channel of the boundary river Wusuli/Ussuri but claimed by both sides. The incidents were followed by a series of minor skirmishes and brought the Sino-Soviet boundary dispute to the forefront of the global political arena.

For detailed information about the Chenpao incidents, see: Marxwell, N. "The Chinese Account of the 1969 Fighting at Chenpao," China Quarterly, No. 56, Oct.-Dec., 1973, pp. 730-739; Robinson, T.W., The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes, Santa Monica, The Rand Corporation, 1970; and "Chenpao Island Has Always Been China's Territory -- Statement of the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC," Peking Review, No. 11, March 14, 1969, pp. 14-15.

8. Robinson, T.W., The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes, op. cit., p. 1.

9. An, Tai Sung, The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 1973.

10. Gelman, Harry, "The Sino-Soviet Dispute in the 1970s: an Overview," in Ellison, H.J., ed., The Sino-Soviet Conflict, Seattle and London, University of Washington Press, 1982, pp. 360-361.

11. Chouban Yiwu Shimo 筹办夷务始末 (A complete account of the management of foreign affairs) was compiled by Chinese scholars Jia, Zhen, et al.

12. In his work, Russia, Mongolia and China (London, Macmillan and Company, 1919), J.F. Baddeley collected numerous original Russian documents concerning the initial stage of the frontier relations between China and Russia. Basing his research entirely on Russian archives, F.A. Golder has presented in his book, Russian Expansion on the Pacific (Cleveland, Arthur H. Clark, 1914), an objective assessment on tsarist Russia's attempt to colonize the region which is now known as the Soviet Far East.

13. Numerous Chinese and Western publications have dealt with the question. A representative work is Violet Conolly's Siberia Today and Tomorrow(London, Collins, 1975). For Chinese views, see: Shi, Xing, "Zuotian Yu Jintian(Yesterday and Today)," in Lishi Yanjiu, No. 2, 1975; Fang, Ming, "Guanyu Su E dui Hua de liangci xuanyan he Feichu Zhong E bu pingdeng tiaoyue de wenti (On the Two Soviet Russian Declarations to China and the Question of Annulment of Unequal Sino-Russian Treaties)," Lishi Yanjiu, No. 6, 1980, pp. 63-76; Shi, Yuxin, et al., Bo Huangyan de Zhizaozhe 驳谎言的制造者 (Rebut the Falsifiers' Fallacy), Beijing, Renmin Chubanshe, 1977; Shi, Yuxin, et al., Lishi Zhenxiang Bu Rong Waiqu 历史真相不容歪曲 (Historical Truth Rebuts Distortion), Harbin, Renmin Chubanshe, 1976.

CHAPTER ONE

THE BURDEN OF HISTORY

The Sino-Russian/Soviet frontier conflict dates back to the middle of the seventeenth century when tsarist Russia was indiscriminately expanding across Siberia to the Pacific, and, then, southward into the Far East and Central Asia. That some of the territories acquired by the Russian Empire, which later became the Soviet Union, belonged to China was well recorded in historical documents of different countries. This fact has been recognized by most of the international community.

A prominent English scholar, Sir Frederick Whyte, pointed out, in 1928, that tsarist Russia disclosed "her political and territorial purpose in the Far East, by securing successive concessions from China in the Treaties of Nerchinsk(1689), Kiachta(1727)... and finally in the Treaty of Aigun(1858) which brought her to the Pacific at Nikolaievsk and three years later to Vladivostoc(Haishenwei in Chinese)."[1] Indeed, the formation of the Sino-Russian/Soviet boundary was a history of Russian expansion and Chinese concession. "From a

historical point of view," as C.P. Fitzgerald concluded in 1967, "the Chinese have several just grievances, at least in terms of prior claims and occupation."[2]

China's grievances in the recent past, however, appear to have been concentrated not on tsarist Russia's annexation of large tracts of China's territory through one-sided treaties of the nineteenth century, but rather on the fact that both the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union had, in violation of these very treaties, encroached still further upon China's territory. In spite of China's insistent demands for the return of the territory thus occupied, the Soviet Union has, so far, adamantly refused to relinquish it.

When and how did the Chinese andthe Russians become neighbours? When did they legally establish their first boundary line? When and how did they set up the present boundary? This chapter attempts to present objectively the various historical issues that are vitally related to the current Sino-Soviet boundary dispute, and to lay out a groundwork for assessing the border conflict between the two countries in the chapters that follow.

The Roots of the Sino-Soviet Frontier Conflict

The Chinese nation had its origin in the Yellow River basin, and, as it grew, it expanded in several directions including to the northeast.[3] According to the available archives of the various Chinese dynasties, at least nine centuries before the Russians reached the present Soviet Far East, the Chinese had already claimed that the territory in question was a part of the Chinese Empire.[4] Written records show that both cultural and economic links appeared between central China and the Heilong/Amur and Wusuli/Ussuri territories (hereafter as: the two-river territories) during the Neolithic period.[5]

As early as the eleventh century B.C., the Shushen tribes[6] of the two-river territories paid their tribute in Hushishinu(stone-tipped arrow and bow) to the Court of China's Chou Dynasty (1100-256 B.C.), indicating the beginning of political relations between the local tribes and the central Chinese government. Whether the Chinese Emperors exercised their administrative power over this vast region during this period still remains questionable. Documents of a later period show that it was not until the first half of the eighth century that China's Tang Dynasty (618-907) successfully

established several local administrative bodies in the two-river territories, consisting of both local chieftains and civil officials from central China.[7] In the year of 722 A.D, Emperor Xuan Zhong appointed Nishuliji as military governor of the region. The location of this provincial level government was at the conjunction of the Heilong/Amur and Wusuli/Ussuri Rivers, called Poli (where is now located the Soviet city of Khabarovsk). In 726 A.D., a separate provincial level government, the Heishui Zhou Dudu Fu (Government of the Black River Territory), was set up specifically to govern all the tribes in the Heilong/Amur territory.[9] A local chieftain, bearing the surname Li, which was granted by the Emperor himself, was made the military governor of this region, and a high level civil official entitled Chang Shi (a civil official of the Upper Third Rank) was sent from the central government to play the role of auditor.[10]

Appointing local chieftains as local governors to act on behalf of the Emperor was one of the essential ways for the ruling class in feudal China to govern the multi-national Empire, especially the remote regions. Regardless of which ethnic group became the ruling class, the pattern was always the same. Chinese records clearly indicate that the two-river territories were constantly controlled by either a central government or a rival

government of the Chinese Empire. They were under the Liao Dynasty (916-1211), Jin (i.e., Chin) Dynasty (1115-1234) with the Nuzhens (the descendants of the Shushens) on the throne, and Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368).[11]

After the collapse of the Yuan Dynasty, the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) re-established a fairly complete administrative network in the region consisting of three levels: Du Zhihui Shi Si (a provincial level government), Suo (township level government) and Wei (village level government). The Annals of the Ming Dynasty recorded that, by the beginning of the fifteenth century, "there have been set up 384 Weis and 24 Suos."[12] The Puludan River Wei was established in 1407;[13] the Guli River Wei in 1409;[14] the Gelin Wei in 1409;[15] and the Qianzhen River Wei in 1408.[16]

The well-known Nurkan Du Zhihui Shi Si was set up in 1409 in Tirin near the estuary of the Heilong/Amur River, governing the whole of the two-river territories. This fact has been recorded not only in the Chinese documents but also in Russian (Soviet) monographs and in those of other countries as well.[17] Taxes were collected and the governors were appointed by the central government of the Ming Dynasty. Their authorities were defined by their official certificates of appointment which were issued by the Ming Court.[18] "The area the

empire controlled in the northeast extended as far as the coast north of the Tumen River and the Kurile Islands. In the north, a considerable portion of Siberia above the Amur lay within the frontier of China."[19]

Like its predecessors, the Ming Dynasty was seriously weakened by civil uprisings and rebellions that in the late sixteenth century it gradually lost its tight control over the Northeast. Power fell into the hands of a local military governor, Nurhaci, who was an influential chieftain of the Jianzhou Nuzhens (a branch of the Nuzhens who were descendants of the Shushens) in the Liao River region. In 1616, Nurhaci rebelled against the Ming Court, and established a rival dynasty of his own called the Hou Jin. The first step Nurhaci took was to expand his power over the entire area of China's Northeast, including the two-river territories. It appears that Nurhaci and his successor Huang Taizong (i.e., Huang-tai-chi) accomplished this task with much ease.[20] In 1635, Huang Taizong, now the ruler of the Hou Jin, forbade the use of name Nuzhen in reference to his people, and decreed that the Nuzhens should now be known as Manchus.[21] In 1636, Huang Taizong changed the name of his dynasty to Qing (Qing which in Chinese means pure), and proclaimed himself Emperor. The Manchus became so powerful that they

seized the throne in Beijing in 1644 when the Ming Dynasty finally collapsed. They soon reunified China.

The ascendancy of the Manchus in China coincided with tsarist Russia's expansion into Siberia. It might seem that Siberia, being a natural extension of the great Eurasian plain, had also always been Russian territory. But a brief survey of Russian expansion since the sixteenth century belies any such assumption.

The Muscovy Principality became a unified country only towards the end of the fifteenth century. When Ivan IV proclaimed himself the Tsar of all Russia in 1547, his empire was still a purely European one, possessing no Asiatic territory.

In the following decades, however, tsarist Russia expanded with amazing speed into north Asia, and pushed its frontier right to the Pacific Ocean by 1643, despite the constant attacks from native peoples.[22] One should note, nevertheless, that this territory annexed by the Russians was merely a belt of semi-permafrost land extending from fifty-five to sixty-five degrees north latitude. The country could produce little food. As result, the Russian colonialists naturally turned the direction of their expansion to the warm areas in the south. In so doing, they trespassed into

the realm of the Chinese Empire, and sowed the seeds of recurring frictions and conflicts between the two great powers.

As J.F. Baddeley correctly pointed out, the Heilong/Amur River was "first heard of in 1636, first seen by Russians in 1644."[23] It was on July 15, 1643, that a Russian force of a hundred and thirty-two men, headed by Vasilii Poyarkov, left the then main Russian fort Yakutsk heading for the south in search of grain. In October, Poyarkov and some of his men crossed the Outer Xingan/Stanovoy Mountains to the sources of the Jingqili/Zeya River. In the Jingqili/Zeya and the Heilong/Amur basins lived the Manchu clans, the Daurian tribes, the Solons, the Orochon tribes, the Hezhe tribes and others, who were subjects of the Qing Dynasty and were paying tribute to the Manchu Emperor.[24] Although Poyarkov was first received as a guest at one of the native Daurian villages, his intention of extract furs and food supplies immediately led to bloody skirmishes with the local inhabitants. The natives were not only numerous, their communication links appeared also quite well established. F.A. Golder, who did considerable research on the Russian archives, concluded that "Payarkov had to fight his way down the Amur."[25] Yuri Semyonov wrote that, in the summer of 1644, "Every time they

(Poyarkov and his men) put into the bank they were met unfailingly by a hail of arrows."[26] Poyarkov camped at the mouth of the Heilong/Amur during the winter, and chose the sea route, wisely, to return to Yakutsk in the spring of 1645, with a loss of three-quarters of his men.[27]

The second Russian intrusion into the Heilong/Amur valley was carried out five years later. In March 1649, E. Khabarov, a bankrupt businessman, was appointed as the head of the second "expedition" into the region. He left Yakutsk that year with some seventy well-equipped men. In September 1650, E. Khabarov took a native fort called Yaksa at the Upper Heilong/Amur after a bloody battle which lasted from noon until evening. Khabarov renamed the fort as Albazin. Most of the villages they reached later were deserted as the natives had been scared away by the spreading news of Russian atrocities.[28]

In the summer of 1651, with reinforcement from Yakutsk, Khabarov descended the Heilong/Amur and camped for the winter at Wuzala, a Hozhe village which was about 300 kilometres down stream from the conjunction of the Heilong/Amur and the Wusuli/Ussuri. Here, however, on April 3, 1652, a Chinese force of about 1,500 attacked the Russian "explorers." Arrows and bows, nevertheless, seemed no match for muskets; the Chinese force, though

numerous, was defeated. "Khabarov lost 10 men in this engagement, while 676 Manchus were slain."[29] The battle, nonetheless, filled the Russians with great fear. Realizing the precarious situation, Khabarov deserted his camp and retreated to the Upper Heilong/Amur in early May the same year. We have historical statistics that during the period from 1643 to 1652, "Five hundred and thirty-two Russians in all had left Siberia for the Amur...and two hundred and thirty-three were lost in the combats with the natives and Manchu... The loss of the natives and Manchu, in killed, amounted, as far as can be ascertained, to about 1,600 men."[30]

In 1653, when Onuphrias Stepanov replaced E. Khabarov as the head of the Russian force on the Heilong/Amur, he recognized that the very survival of his men was at stake. After a series of bloody encounters with Manchu forces, O. Stepanov and his men were finally confronted on July 10, 1658 by a Chinese force of 1,400 at the Middle Heilong/Amur. This time it was the Chinese who were victorious. As a result of the battle, O. Stepanov himself was killed and the whole Russian force was wiped out. The Heilong/Amur was free of Russian "explorers."[31] There was no further Russian movement into the Heilong/Amur valley for another ten years.

In 1669, however, a group of outlaws, led by a Polish fugitive called Nikita Chernigovsky, escaped from Kirensk and occupied Yaksa/Albazin once again. In 1672, N. Chernigovsky managed to obtain a pardon from the Tsar in Moscow and his fort became, nominally, an enclave of the Russian Empire for the moment. Later, reinforcement from Russian Siberia resulted in a few small forts in the Heilong/Amur valley such as the Arguner Ostrog, built in 1681, the Tugursk winter camp in the Lower Heilong/Amur, built in 1682, and some other minor ones in the Jingqili/Zeya basin.

The reappearence of the Russians in the Heilong/Amur territory immediately caused urgent concerns in the Chinese capital. After subduing most of the rebels of the southern provinces the Qing government was able to turn its attention to its frontier troubles with the Russian Empire. A series of military actions took place in the ensuing years. At the close of 1683, the Qing forces had demolished all the Russian mini-forts in the Heilong/Amur valley.[32] In the summer of 1685, a Chinese force of 3,000 regained Yaksa/Albazin. The Russians who surrendered (some 600 in number) were allowed to retreat to Nipchu/Nerchinsk with all their belongings and weapons after they promised that they would never come back.

However, after the Chinese forces left the ruined fort, the Russians returned to Yaksa/Albazin and re-established themselves with a fairly large reinforcement from Nipchu/Nerchinsk. This was obviously intolerable to the Qing authorities. On July 18, 1686, the Qing troops from their base in Aihui(Aigun) besieged Yaksa/Albazin for the second time. The fighting was more fierce than on the previous occasion, since the Russians were more than 800 strong and much better equipped. The battle dragged on until the autumn of 1687 when the government of the Russian Empire agreed to the Qing Court's proposals of settling the frontier question by negotiation.

Consequently, in the summer of 1689, China and the Russian Empire held their first ever boundary negotiations outside the Russian fort Nipchu/Nerchinsk. During the first round of the negotiations, which was held on August 22, 1689, Russian Chief negotiator, F.A. Golovin, first proposed that the Heilong/Amur River should be the boundary line between the two Empires, all those lands north of the river belonging to the Russian Empire and all those south of the river or on the right bank of the river remaining as Chinese territory. "To this the Chinese objected, on account of the fine sables which the tribes to the north of that river paid as tribute,

and, in their turn, proposed to the Russians to surrender Albazin, Nerchinsk and Selenginsk."[34] The negotiations dragged on for days, and during the following sessions, both the Chinese and the Russians shifted their original positions. Finally, on September 7, 1689, an historic agreement was reached between China and tsarist Russia: the first Sino-Russian boundary line was officially established with the conclusion of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk (1689). This Treaty had two official texts written in Latin, and two semi-official texts, one in Manchu and the other in Russian.[35] During the formal signing ceremony of the Treaty, the official Latin texts were read and signed by the plenipotentiaries of the two sides and affixed with the seals of the respective governments. The text in Manchu was signed and sealed by the Chinese side while the text in Russian was signed and sealed by the Russian side.[36]

In short, the first Sino-Russian boundary line established by the Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk (1689) ran from the Erhkuna/Argun River eastward to the Rivulet Kerberchi, along the Kerberchi northward to the Outer Xingan/Stanovoy Mountains and along this mountain range eastward right to the Sea of Okhotsk (for text of the Treaty, see Appendix II). Since upon reaching the valley

of River Ud, the main range of the Outer Xingan/Stanovoy Mountains turns sharply to north, the Treaty stipulated that the Ud valley remained undecided. Thus, the Chinese boundary reached the Sea of Okhotsk along the south fringe of the Ud basin while the Russians obtained all the territory north of the Ud valley.[37] Even today, the section formed by the Erhkuna/Argun River still remains part of the Sino-Soviet boundary, though some revisions unfavourable to China have been made.

The conclusion of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk (1689) was significant in two respects: "first, it was the first international agreement ever made by a Chinese emperor with a European power on the basis of formal sovereign equality,"[38] and, secondly, a common boundary between China and the Russian Empire was formally established. As V. Conolly pointed out, "it suited both sides to come to agreement without having to resort to a prolonged armed struggle."[39]

As of 1680s, the Manchus, who became the ruling race of China in 1644, were still trying to further secure their control over southern China. A peaceful settlement over the frontier dispute in the northeast where their homeland was located, would naturally serve this end. The Russians, on the other hand, had over-expanded themselves in Asia. The Romanov Tsars had not

yet fully established their rule over their newly conquered territories, especially in Northeast Asia. Native unrest was common throughout Siberia. The Russian rulers could not fail to understand the significance of obtaining formal international recognition, which a treaty with China would provide, of their annexation of all of eastern Siberia. Russia's desire to develop trade with the "Middle Kingdom" also contributed to its eagerness to conclude the Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk. Furthermore, although the Russian side bargained at the border talks to establish the boundary along the Heilong/Amur River, this seems to be their bargaining position and not what Moscow was insisting on; the Heilong/Amur "was not seen in Moscow as the 'natural boundary'" between the two empires. The Russian Empire had never established its control over the north or left bank of the Heilong/Amur during its entire period of armed infiltration from 1643 to 1689. During this period, the Russians did not reach the vast area lying between the Wusuli/Ussuri River and the sea which is the present Soviet Maritime autonomous province. (Soviet publications of recent years have tried to suggest that they did. As a matter of fact, it was not until the latter half of the nineteenth century that Russian troops were able to

occupy the Heilong/Amur and the Wusuli/Ussuri territories, forcing the Chinese government to cede to tsarist Russia the region with the signing of the one-sided treaties of Aigun and Peking.)

The establishment of the first Sino-Russian boundary in the Far East in 1689 concluded the first stage of Russia's southward expansion in that region. The Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk continued in force for one hundred and seventy years until 1858 when tsarist Russia imposed on China the Sino-Russian Treaty of Aigun.

After 1689, being blockaded by the Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk in the Far East, the Russian Empire directed its thrust of expansion southwards toward the territories of the Mongolians in China's Outer Mongolia. By 1720, Russian troops had managed to encroach upon several minor areas in that region.[41] The government of the Qing Dynasty made repeated proposals to the Russian side aimed at negotiating a boundary between the two empires along the Mongolian frontier. Finally, in the summer of 1725, the Russian government agreed to start boundary talks.

Consequently, the Chinese and the Russians signed the Bur Treaty on August 31, 1727.[42] They exchanged two boundary protocols, one on October 23, 1727, at Abagatuy[43] and one on November 7, 1727, at the Bur River. Finally,



Map 1. First Sino-Russian boundaries established by Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk, 1689 and Treaty of Kiakhta, 1728. Source: Yu, Shengwu, et al., Sha E Qinhua Shi (History of Tsarist Russia's Aggression against China), Vol. 1, Beijing, Renmin Chubanshe, 1978, pp. 6-7.

on June 25, 1728, they concluded the Treaty of Kiakhta.[45] These treaties and protocols delineated the Sino-Russian boundary, running from the west end of the section defined by the Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk at the Erhkuna/Argun River, westward to the city of Kiakhta. From Kiakhta, the boundary ran for a short portion westerly, then turning sharply to northwest, proceeding along the north fringe of the area called Uriankhai or later known as Tannu Tuva, and ended on top of Shabin Dabag at the point where the well-known Chabindabaga border sign was erected (far north of the present tri-conjunction of the Sino-Mongolian-Soviet boundary at the Altai Mountains).[46] Thus Outer Mongolia, including Uriankhai was clearly recognized as part of China. The Qing government, however, made considerable concessions of territory south of Lake Baikal along with part of the Upper Irtysh and Sayan Mountains, obviously at the expense of the Mongolians in these regions.

This lengthy border line known historically as the middle section of the Sino-Russian boundary remained unchanged for more than a century. (The major part of this section defined by the treaties of 1727/1728 has now become the border between the People's Republic of Mongolia and the USSR.) Moreover, the Treaty of Kiakhta of 1728 also reaffirmed the formerly established Sino-

Russian boundary in the Far East which ran along the Outer Xingan/Stanovoy Mountains to the sea, and reiterated that the Ud valley remained undecided.[47]

The Second Stage of Russia's Southward Drive

The second stage of Russia's southward drive came in the middle of the nineteenth century, when the balance of power changed sharply. China was now severely weakened internally by the Taiping Rebellion, the greatest rebellion in Chinese history, and externally by the First Opium War (1840-1842) with Britain, and the Second Opium War (1858-1860) with Britain and France.[48] When the British force defeated the Chinese in the south and forced the latter to cede Hong Kong, the Russian Empire regained its appetite for territory in China's backyard and once more began to penetrate the Heilong/Amur valley, in violation of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk (1689).[49]

Shortly after the First Opium War, a series of steps were taken by the Russians to annex more Chinese territory. On August 13, 1850, Captain G.F. Nevelskoi, acting as an agent of the Russian-American Company, hoisted a Russian flag in a Chinese village called Miaojie (the present Soviet Nikolaevsk) at the estuary of the Heilong/Amur. On May 26, 1854, on the excuse of

helping China to protect its east coast, a large Russian force headed by N. Muravev, Governor-General of Eastern Siberia, intruded into China's inland river Heilong/Amur and occupied its estuary. By the end of 1856, Russian forces, on the ground of building up a communication line for the defence of the Pacific coast, were well entrenched along the entire course of the left bank or the north bank of the Heilong/Amur. As A. Krausse pointed out: the Russians'

> conduct in invading territory which was acknowledged by treaty to belong to a neighboring power with whom Russia was at peace at the time was an act against the law of civilised nations.[50]

During the course of the Second Opium War, when that British and French forces were attacking China's Dagu (i.e., Taku) and threatening Tianjin and Beijing, N. Muravev, relying on Russia's military supremacy, forced Yi, Shan, China's military governor of Heilongjiang Province to sign the Treaty of Aigun on May 28, 1858.[51] This Treaty created a new Chinese-Russian boundary in the Far East that ran from the Erhkuna/Argun to and along the Heilong/Amur to the Sea of Okhotsk. Thus, China unilaterally ceded all its territory north of the Heilong/Amur to Russia, losing an area of more than 600,000 square kilometres. Meanwhile, because [illegible] many Manchus and Chinese lived on the left or north bank of

the Heilong/Amur, the Treaty stipulated that an area consisting of sixty-four Chinese villages on the left bank of the Heilong/Amur, which scattered from the Jingqili/Zeya River southward to the village of Hormoldzin , was to remain in perpetuity under Chinese jurisdiction.[52]

Commenting on the Treaty of Aigun (1858), Karl Marx concluded, in September 1858, that the Second Opium War had helped the Russian Empire to obtain "the invaluable tract lying between the Gulf of Tartary and Lake Baikal, a region so much coveted by Russia that from Czar Alexei Michailowich down to Nicholas, she has always attempted to get it."[53] Soviet publications in the 1920s also pointed out that: the Treaty of Aigun (1858) "was the first decisive step that imperial Russia had taken in occupying China's territory."[54]

The Romanov Court, however, seemed not satisfied with this "achievement"; it anticipated acquiring still more territory from the decaying Qing Dynasty. In the following years, when the British and French forces were marching towards the Chinese capital, Beijing, Russian troops poured into the Wusuli/Ussuri territory. In 1860, when the British-French forces took Beijing and burned the imperial Summer Palace, the Russian Empire "joined in the grab by forcing another territorial

settlement on the Manchus -- the Treaty of Peking of 1860."[55] When China was signing the Treaty of Peking (1860), Russian military occupation of the Chinese Wusuli/Ussuri region was already an accomplished fact. According to the provisions of the Treaty of Peking (1860), the Chinese Empire had to cede to tsarist Russia some 400,000 square kilometres of its territory between the Wusuli/Ussuri River and the Sea of Japan.

In this manner, the Russian Empire pushed the newly defined Sino-Russian boundary from the Heilong/Amur line further south to the Wusuli/Ussuri line. The new border was so delineated as to follow the Wusuli/Ussuri, from the point where it joins the Heilong/Amur, south to and along its tributary the Sungacha, then across Lake Xingkai (Lake Khanka) southward to the Korean frontier, and on the Tumen River, twenty li or ten kilometres, above its mouth.[56] Article III of the Treaty of Peking (1860) stipulated that the new boundary should be surveyed by a mixed border commission in the following year. On June 28, 1861, the "Additional Article to the Treaty of Peking" was signed near Lake Xingkai. It reiterated the general delineation of the new border, and on a map attached to it, which was of the scale 1:1,000,000, a red line was drawn to this effect. Up to the present the Sino-Russian/Soviet



Map 2. Territories annexed by Russia in 1858 and 1860. Source: Yu, Shengwu, et al., Sha E Qinhua Shi (History of Tsarist Russia's Aggression against China), Vol. 2, Beijing, Renmin Chubanshe, 1978, pp. 166-167.

boundary in the Far East has remained, by and large, the same as that stipulated by the Treaties of Aigun (1858) and of Peking (1860).

The Formation of the Sino-Russian Boundary in Central Asia

Russian expansionism in the latter half of the nineteenth century was not confined to the Far East where tsarist Russia had despoiled China "of a country as large as France and Germany put together, and of a river as large as the Danube."[57] The Russians also moved aggressively into Central Asia.

According to Chinese sources, as early as 102 B.C., China's Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-220 A.D.) had expanded its jurisdiction to the area south of Lake Balkash and both east and west of the Yili (Ili) River, naming the region as Xiyu (west territory).[58] In 60 B.C., the central government of the Han Dynasty set up a local government called Xiyu Duhu Fu (a provincial level government) which was situated in the present Luntai County, Xinjiang Uigur Autonomous Region of the PRC. This government was recorded to have exercised administrative power over the entire Xiyu region.[59] Since then, the people in the region were governed either by the central government when the Empire was united, or by

the regional government when the Empire was divided among the feudal lords. China's Sui Dynasty (605-618), Tang Dynasty (618-907), Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) and Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) all established their control over the region; high level Han officials were sent to head the various governments in the territory and to collect taxes from the populace.[60]

After becoming the ruling race of the Chinese Empire, the Manchus, too, established their control over the Xiyu territory. The Qing government reorganized its northwest territory, which extended from Lake Balkhash in the north to the Pamirs in the south, into two administration regions which were known as Xinjiang Nanlu and Xinjiang Beilu, but jointly called Xinjiang.[61] At this time, Xinjiang was mainly inhabited by the Uigur tribes, the Mongol tribes, the Hasake (Kazakh) tribes, the Kirghiz tribes and other minority tribes of the Chinese Empire.[62] Not many of China's Han nationals had settled there since the area was not suitable for rice-growing and agriculture.

Once again, the establishment of the Manchus' control over China's northwest territory was followed by Russian southward expansion into Central Asia from the line of their earlier penetration in Siberia. By 1855, tsarist Russia had advanced in Central Asia to

"a line reaching from the central Caspian to Lake Aral to a point south of Alma-Ata, before turning sharply northward."[63] This was, obviously, still quite far from the effectively controlled boundary line of the Chinese Empire. In view of the nomadic nature of most of inhabitants of its northwest region, the Qing government guarded its northwest boundary with a combined system of "permanent pickets" or permanent frontier forts and "temporary and moveable pickets" which were stationed along the real boundary line.[64] The Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking (1860) had stipulated that, from Chabindabaga, the last border sign established by the Treaty of Kiakhta of 1728,

> The boundary line to the west, undetermined until now, should henceforth follow the direction of the mountains, the courses of the large rivers and the presently existing line of Chinese pickets.[65]

The Treaty had also designated that a mixed border commission was to be established by the two governments to survey and mark the boundary. In 1864, when the mixed commission commenced work, representatives of the two sides soon ran into a fierce quarrel as to whether the border line should run along China's temporary or moveable pickets or along the permanent pickets, since the Russian text of the Treaty (1860) mentioned

only the "present existing line of Chinese pickets." Because the Russians were militarily strong, and since Moslem unrest in Xinjiang was becoming serious, the Chinese position was so weak that they could do nothing but set up the line according to Russian demand, namely along the permanent Chinese pickets which were situated in a much interior line than their effectively controlled boundary.[66] In this connection, Frederick Engels pointed out that:

> such a Commission is in the hands of Russia. We have seen them at work on the Asiatic frontiers...where they kept slicing away piece after piece from that country.[67]

Consequently, when the Sino-Russian Protocol of Chuguchak (Tarbagatai) was signed in October, 1864, "The Chinese were thereby formally deprived of a belt of territory of some 350,000 square miles."[68]

In the ensuing years, Moslem unrest became more serious in Xinjiang. The Russian Empire, using the situation to its own advantage, encroached further upon China's frontier in the region. In 1871, Russian troops occupied the fertile Upper Yili valley on the Chinese side of the delimited boundary. This was done on the pretext of "maintaining law and order" for the Qing Court.[69] Moscow officially promised to return the occupied territory as soon as order was restored in Xinjiang.

When the Chinese regained their effective control over the rest of the province, the Russians, however, refused to leave the rich Yili valley. The Chinese, though they lodged repeated protests through diplomatic channels, were, nevertheless, not strong enough to force the evacuation of Russian troops.[70]

During the late 1870s, the two sides agreed to settle the question of the withdrawal of the Russian troops through negotiation. On February 14, 1881, after years of talks, the Sino-Russian Treaty of St. Petersburg was signed. Under the terms of this treaty, the Russian Empire was to evacuate almost the whole of the occupied territory. But, China was forced to cede a sizeable territory from Lake Zaisan eastward along the Cherny Irtysh and, also another piece of land west of Holkuts River. Moreover, the Qing government paid to the Russian Empire nine million rubles in silver for "occupation costs."[71]

In the Treaty of St. Petersburg, however, the Russian side imposed a very important term that allowed the boundary line east of Lake Zaisan and west of Kashgar, which was delimited by the Chuguchak (Tarbagatai) Protocol in 1864, to be redemarcated. Consequently, tsarist Russia forced China to sign the Sino-Russian Boundary Protocol of Yili in 1882, the Sino-Russian Boundary Protocol of

Kashgar of 1882, the Sino-Russian Boundary Protocol of Ketar in 1883, and the Sino-Russian Boundary Protocol of Kashgar of 1884.[72] In short, the Treaty of St. Petersburg of 1881, and the ensuing boundary protocols redelineated the most part of the Sino-Russian boundary in Central Asia, from Chabindabaga in the north right to the Uzbel Pass and to the Pamirs in the south; China lost another 70,000-odd square kilometres of territory during the process.[73]

As for the Pamirs, historically they had belonged to China. The Sino-Russian Boundary Protocol of Kashgar of 1884, however, stipulated that "Russia's boundary turns southwest while the Chinese boundary extends straight south" from the Uzbel Pass,[74] thus giving a considerable portion of the Pamirs to the Russian Empire, and creating an undecided triangular buffer zone. In 1892, however, with little excuse, Russian troops poured into the buffer zone, and, moreover, crossed the Chinese boundary line, occupying in China's Pamir region another piece of territory totalling about 20,000 square kilometres west of the Sarykol Range.[75] The decaying Qing Dynasty apparently could do no more than lodge repeated protests with the Russian Empire against this naked act of aggression. The Chinese demanded the withdrawal of the Russian troops, and demarcation of the

Pamirs according to the formally agreed provisions of the Sino-Russian Boundary Protocol of Kashgar of 1884. The Russian government, resorting to procrastination and evasion, rejected the Chinese proposal. The Russian government counter-proposed, in 1894, that the two sides should first of all keep temporarily to their positions pending a final settlement in order to avoid military skirmishes. To this, the Chinese agreed, but, at the same time, made it clear that China's consent to keep the status quo did not mean that China had given up its sovereignty over the Chinese territory which was under occupation by Russian troops. The question should be solved through negotiations. No settlement, however, has been reached to this date on the Pamir dispute while the Soviet Union still holds the Russian-occupied territory.[76]

In 1911, when the Qing Dynasty was collapsing, tsarist Russia turned its attention to the eastern section of the Sino-Russian boundary. The Russian Empire demanded that the sector immediately west of the Erhkuna/Argun River, which was delimited by the Treaty of Kiakhta of 1728 and reaffirmed by the Treaty of Peking of 1860, should be delineated again. After holding talks with the local Chinese governor in Qiqihar (Tsitsihar), the Russian side obtained a treaty on

Map 3: The formation of Sino-Russian boundaries in Central Asia. Source: Guo, Shengwu, et al., Sha E Qinlue Zongguo Xibei Bianjiang Shi (History of Tsarist Russia's Aggression against the Northwest Frontier of China), Beijing, Renmin Chubanshe, 1979, pp. 88-89.



December 20, 1911, known as the Treaty of Tsitsihar. By so doing, the Russians moved eight kilometres into Chinese side of the boundary, occupying a territory totalling about 600 square kilometres. The Treaty of Tsitsihar, however, has not been ratified by any of the Chinese national governments, so far, and has been considered nul and void by the Chinese side.[77]

After 1911, seeing the chaotic situation in China, tsarist Russia became more active in encroaching on Chinese territory in Outer Mongolia and in promoting the right of "autonomy" for Outer Mongolia.[78] Russian subversive activities in Outer Mongolia resulted in strong protests from the Chinese, and at one point, the two countries were quite close to war. The crisis, nevertheless, was brought under control when the two sides agreed to hold negotiations on the issue of Outer Mongolia. On November 5, 1913, they reached an agreement by which the Russian side acknowledged the continuing validity of the Treaty of Kiakhta of 1728 and China's sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, while extracting from China the recognition of the autonomy of Outer Mongolia. This settlement was reaffirmed in the tripartite Russian-Chinese-Mongolian Treaty of 1915, which was concluded at Kiakhta.[79]

Another important event of this period was

tsarist Russia's military occupation of China's Uriankhai in 1914, which was situated east of the Altai Mountains. This was a territory of about 170,000 square kilometres which now consitutes the major body of the Soviet Tannu Tuva Republic (See: Map 3, p. 45 of this thesis).

The Rise of the Sino-Soviet Boundary Dispute

Tsarist Rule itself collapsed in 1917. The victory of the Bolshevik October Revolution that year marked a turning point in Sino-Russian/Soviet relations. The official position of the Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR), under the leadership of V.I. Lenin, appeared to have provided a sound foundation for the resolution of all the pending issues regarding the delineation of the entire Sino-Soviet boundary.

On July 25, 1919, the Soviet Government issued its first declaration to the Chinese people and to the Governments of North and South China, announcing that the Soviets would "return to the Chinese people every thing that was taken from them by the Tsarist Government."[80] The declaration stated, in part, that

> The Soviet Government has renounced the conquests made by the Tsarist Government which deprived China of Manchuria and other areas.[81]

By issuing this specific declaration, the Soviet Government unilaterally committed itself to "give up many territorial gains made by tsarist Russia from China in Manchuria and other areas of Asia."[82]

This Soviet policy was further clarified and strengthened on September 27, 1920, when the Soviet Government issued its second declaration to the Chinese Government. In the second declaration, in addition to reaffirming the first declaration, the Soviets specified that "The Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republics declares as void all the treaties concluded by the former Government of Russia with China, renounces all the annexations of Chinese territory, all the concessions in China, and returns to China free of charge, and forever, all that was ravenously taken from her by the Tsar's Government and by the Russian bourgeoisie."[83] This was obviously a step forward from the first declaration in 1919, which only mentioned that some of the treaties be abolished. Moreover, the second declaration had in particular, mentioned the need to solve "Problems of ... frontiers."[84]

At the same time, we have to note what was happening in Outer Mongolia. In 1921, chased by the victorious Red Army, the White Russian Army, under Baron R. Nikolaus von Ungern-Sternberg, retreated into Outer

Mongolia, and built their last ditch of defence. In July of the same year, the Red Army poured into Outer Mongolia, expelled the White Russian forces, and helped to organize a Mongolian regime which was instantly recognized by the Soviet Government as the Mongolian People's Republic.[85] In early 1925, Soviet troops were withdrawn from the country.

The events in Outer Mongolia seem not to have changed the Soviet general policy towards China. In August, 1922, the Soviet special envoy to China, Adolf A. Joffe, reconfirmed Moscow's position as manifested in its two declarations to the Chinese governments. In his note to the Chinese Government, Adolf A. Joffe stated that "after all the treaties became invalid, there existed many questions unsettled," and, once again, proposed to hold bilateral negotiations aiming at concluding new treaties to replace the denounced former treaties between tsarist Russia and China.[86] In his statement of September 4, 1923, L.M. Karakhan, the Soviet envoy to China for the long-expected bilateral negotiations, reiterated that the Soviet position, as laid out in the declarations of 1919 and 1920, had not changed.[87]

As result, on May 31, 1924, the "Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions

Between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" was concluded. The Agreement was written in English as requested by the Chinese, and signed by L.M. Karakhan on behalf of the Soviet Government, and by V.K. Koo on behalf of the Chinese Government. Under the provisions of this Agreement, the two governments bilaterally committed themselves "to annul... all Conventions, Treaties, Agreements, Protocols, Contracts, etcetera, concluded between the Government of China and the Tsarist Government and to replace them with new treaties, agreements, etcetera, on the basis of equality, reciprocity and justice, as well as the spirit of the declarations of the Soviet Government of the years of 1919 and 1920."[88] Article II stipulated that a conference between the two sides should be held within one month after the signing of the Agreement to carry on further negotiations aimed at resolving the various questions.[89]

As the boundary question was one of the most outstanding issues during the 1924 negotiations, Article VII of the Agreement stipulated, in particular, that "The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to redemarcate their national boundaries...and pending such redemarcation, to maintain the present boundaries."[90] It has been revealed recently by the Chinese that a

special protocol was also concluded on this occasion. It stipulated that "before the conclusion of new treaties, all the former treaties will remain invalid."[91]

In 1926, the Chinese and the Soviet governments re-opened their negotiations in accordance with the provisions and spirit of the 1924 Agreement. However, because of the intensification of the civil war in China, the two governments did not reach any agreements or conclude any treaties on the boundary issues or on any other items defined by the 1924 Sino-Soviet Agreement.[92]

In the following decades, China suffered military aggression from outside and civil disorder inside. This eliminated any possibilities that may have existed of settling the questions connected with the re-delineation of the Sino-Soviet boundary.

The Chinese Communists emerged victorious over the Nationalists in mainland China in 1949. Upon its establishment, the Government of the People's Republic of China "declared to the world that all treaties and agreements old China had signed with any foreign countries would, according to their content, either be confirmed, abrogated, revised, or reconcluded."[93] In regard to its boundary policy, the PRC held that any question of that kind should be solved "on the basis of formal treaties"[94] and "according to general international practice."[95]

Such a policy, however, "by no means excluded the seeking by two friendly countries of a settlement fair and reasonable for both sides through peaceful negotiations between their governments."[96]

In the 1950s, though certain areas of the Sino-Soviet boundaries were obviously still undemarcated or in dispute, the PRC was preoccupied with much more urgent problems than the boundary question with the then-friendly Soviet Union.[97] However, the Chinese did not miss any opportunity to raise the boundary question with the Soviets. On February 14, 1950, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance was concluded in Moscow. One of the stipulations in the text stated that the PRC and the USSR undertook to develop their relations in accordance with the principle of "mutual respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity."[98] This principle, though not uncommon in international relations, warranted special attention. G. Ginsburgs pointed out in 1978 that even at the time these words were being written into the treaty, differences of opinion over territorial issues were reportedly being aired by the interested parties.[99] By having such a clause, the Chinese might have intended to remind the Soviets of their 1924 commitment to the redemarcation of the Sino-Soviet boundary. They might

also have hoped that this would serve as a barrier to any further encroachment on the Chinese territory. Although some Soviet scholars have recently interpreted this clause to mean that the PRC had thereby formally recognized what they called the "operative boundaries" between the two countries, it was apparent that the Chinese had no such intention or understanding.[100] The clause itself is too general to allow such a conclusion.

At the beginning of 1951, the Sino-Soviet Agreement on the Navigation and Construction of the Heilong/Amur, the Wusuli/Ussuri, the Erhkuna/Argun, the Sungacha and Lake Xingkai, was signed. The document contained a stipulation that the vessels of the two sides could navigate the main channels of the above-mentioned rivers regardless of the boundaries in these areas.[101] It appears that this stipulation indicated that disagreement existed at the time among the contracting Parties on the delineation of the boundaries in the region. Beijing might have hoped that such a statement would keep the redemarcation issue with the eventual implementation of the 1924 Sino-Soviet Agreement and the return thereby of some territories which belonged to China but in fact were under Soviet control.[102] The Soviets, on the other hand, might have felt that the wording was profitable in that it would allow them

to continue to hold the large Heixizi Island which was located on the Chinese side of the main channel at the conjunction of the Heilong/Amur and Wusuli/Ussuri.

In 1954, when Soviet leaders N. Khrushchev and N.A. Bulganin were visiting China, Beijing apparently raised the territorial issue again. The Chinese were quoted as complaining that "the Soviet Union, under the pretext of guaranteeing the independence of Mongolia, has actually placed that country under its domination."[103] In January, 1957, during his visit to Moscow, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) once again raised the boundary question with the Soviet leaders. The Chinese Premier "requested that the USSR make proper arrangement for the territorial issues covering Japan, China, the Middle East, and the Eastern European countries including Finland."[104] But the Kremlin apparently had no interest in the Chinese proposal. The Chinese Premier was quoted as saying that he "could not get a satisfactory answer from him (N. Khrushchev)," and that "the announcement of the issue was kept secret because the Sino-Soviet dispute was not public at the time."[105]

The Chinese approach in dealing with the border problem with the Soviets remained prudent. At a press conference in Katmandu, Nepal, on April 28, 1960, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, when confronted with a

question in this connection, stated that "There are insignificant discrepancies on the maps, easy to solve peacefully."[106] In short, the newly created People's Republic apparently considered it necessary to clarify its boundaries with all its neighbours, including the Soviet Union. The PRC had successfully concluded agreements on boundary delineation with Burma (1960), Mongolia (1962), Nepal (1961), and Afghanistan (1963).[107] Apart from India,the Soviet Union remained the only neighboring country with which the PRC failed to achieve satisfactory agreements.

The reason for this failure seems not to have been that the Chinese approach was unreasonable, but because the Soviets were reluctant to deal with the issue. As G. Ginsburgs pointed out, "in all cases the initiative for bringing up the problem...emanated from the Chinese; they are the ones who seemed to show an intense interest in talking about the issue, whereas the Soviets invariably shied away from the topic."[108] It has recently come to light that, "on August 22 and September 21, 1960, the Chinese Government took the initiative in proposing to the Soviet Government that negotiations be held "on the settlement of the pending issues regarding the Sino-Soviet boundary delineation."[109] This appears to be the earliest proposal that the PRC made through

diplomatic channels. The move was obviously prompted by the fact that some border troubles had already occurred around the Buz-Aigyr Pass area in the western sector of the Sino-Soviet frontier.[110]

On October 29, 1960, in its formal note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, the Soviet Government stated that "the Government of the USSR does not object to friendly consultation through diplomatic channels, if the PRC should so insist. But it does not consider debatable the question of the ownership by the USSR of the area north of the Buz-Aigyr pass."[111] Commenting on this Soviet position, G. Ginsburgs concluded that

> One thing seems clear from all this and that is that no matter what merit Moscow's "friendly and patient position" may have had in ending the affair, its attitutde did not achieve a "settlement," except in the sense that the Chinese eventually dropped their bid.[112]

In February 1964, nevertheless, the Chinese and the Soviets finally held their first round of boundary negotiations, after intolerable number of border incidents occurred. The talks, unfortunately, were broken off during the very first session after the two sides exchanged their respective maps on which they marked their positions concerning the definition of the border line.[113]

The failure of the 1964 negotiations ushered in

a period of continued tension on the border. While the PRC started to suffer from devastating civil disorder caused by the launching of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" in 1966, the USSR, on the other hand, apparently adopted a much harsher boundary policy. It was reported by China that, from October, 1964 to March, 1969, the Soviets had initiated 4,189 border incidents.[114] Moscow also charged the Chinese with a similar account. These numbers show that

> Though the Chinese Communists attributed the Sino-Soviet conflict and the border troubles to Khrushchev, they fared no better with his successors.[115]

Conclusion

Looking back at the historical frontier relations between the two countries, one cannot fail to see that the present Sino-Soviet boundary is the result of several stages of expansionism of the Russian Empire.

The Chinese and the Russians legally established their original boundaries in 1689 and 1727/1728 through equal and peaceful negotiations. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, tsarist Russia, relying on its military supremacy, was able to move the Sino-Russian boundary in the Far East from the original Outer Xingan/Stanovoy Mountains' line, which was delimited by

the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk, to the Heilong/Amur River in 1858, and, then, to the Wusuli/Ussuri line in 1860. By so doing, the Russian Empire deprived China of some 1,000,000 square kilometres of territory in the Far East without any compensation. Similar events also happened in the Central Asian region; the Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking (1860) and the Sino-Russian Protocol of Chuguchak (Tarbagatai) of 1864 sliced away more than 440,000 square kilometres of China's territory east and south of Lake Balkhash. Furthermore, the Sino-Russian Treaty of St. Petersburg (1881) and the ensuing protocols delineated another 70,000-odd square kilometres of China's territory east of Lake Zaisan and west of the Yili River as part of Russia.

It appears appropriate to conclude that among all the imperialist powers which, during this period of time, had imposed upon China one unequal treaty after another it was the Russian Empire that gained most: it seized, in the short span of a few decades, upwards of 1,500,000 square kilometres of territory which tsarist Russia had recognized as belonging to China, territory which was three times the size of France, or twelve times that of Czechoslovakia.

It is even more noteworthy that, in addition to the above accounts, tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union have occupied, at times, still some additional territory that should have belonged to China even according to the one-sided Sino-Russian treaties. Among the numerous such occupied territories is the presently "disputed area" in the Pamirs, which is about 20,000 square kilometres in size. It was against such a background that the Chinese and the Soviets entered into formal agreement, in 1924, to redemarcate their common boundaries, with an understanding that before this had been achieved the status quo along the border should be maintained.

Thus, when the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949, they too were confronted with various unsettled issues concerning their boundary with the Soviet Union. In the 1950s, the Chinese constantly expressed their intense desire to the Soviets to verify the Sino-Soviet border line. The Soviets, however, exercised an evasive strategy and refused to discuss the question with the Chinese. This lack of interest on the Soviet side seems to have forestalled any possible settlement of the problem during this period, even though the PRC and the USSR enjoyed close relations at the time. Had the Soviet leaders handled the question more prudently and more

far-sightedly, it was not impossible that they could have resolved their frontier dispute with China successfully. They nevertheless failed to do so.

It appears, therefore, that the roots of this frontier conflict rest on the expansionism of the Russian Empire. The origins of the Sino-Soviet boundary dispute may be traced to the irresponsible policies pursued by the USSR with a hegemonic style. The failure of the two sides to clarify the common border in the 1950s or, more precisely, the Soviet refusal to honour the provisions of the 1924 Sino-Soviet Agreement on redemarcating the boundary is the major cause of the still-current border dispute between China and the Soviet Union. In this connection, the escalation of frontier tension in the 1960s was inevitable, especially when their bilateral relations deteriorated. Frequent border strife finally culminated in the bloody clashes in the spring of 1969 on the tiny Chenpao (Damansky) Island in the Wusuli/Ussuri River,[116] bringing this deep-rooted frontier conflict once again into the arena of world politics. As a result, the Sino-Soviet boundary dispute entered a new stage in the 1970s.

CHAPTER ONE: NOTES

1. Whyte, Sir Frederick, China and Foreign Powers -- An Historical Review of their Relations, published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, second and revised edition, London, Oxford University Press, 1928, pp. 6-7.

2. Fitzgerald, C.P., "Tension on the Sino-Soviet Border," Foreign Affairs, July 1967, p. 683.

3. Hsu, Shuhsi, China and Her Political Entity, New York, Oxford University Press, 1926, pp. 1-5.

4. Yu, Shengwu, et al., Sha E Qinhua Shi 沙俄侵华史 (History of Tsarist Russia's Aggression against China), Vol.1, Beijing, Renmin Chubanshe, 1978, pp. 9-12.

5. Wei, Zhaojie, Guo Yu 国语 , Chapter Lu-yu-xia, cited in Yu, Shengwu, et al., Sha E Qinhua Shi, op. cit., pp. 8-9; Tan, Qixiang, "Xin tudi de kaifazhe haishi ruqin zhongguo de qiangdao?(Explorers of new lands or robbers intruding into China?)," in Shi, Yuxin, et al., Lishi Zhenxiang Burong Waiqu (Historical Truth Rebuts Distortion), Harbin, Heilongjiang Renmin Chubanshe, 1976, pp. 28-29.

6. In numerous studies, the Manchus and the Mongols have been ill-described as the "Tungus"; whereas the Manchus and the Mongols do not share the same ancestors. Western authorities in general seem to agree that the term the "Tungus" (See: E.G. Ravenstein, The Russians on the Amur, London, 1861, p. 4) is derived from the term the "Tung-hu." If so, we have a case of misnomer. The Donghu (Tung-hu) or Xianbi (Hsien-pi) or Qidan (Chitan), and the Shushen or Nuchen (Nuzhen) or Manchu, as each was known at different periods of history, were two different peoples, the former related to the desert nomads and the latter to the original tribes of northern Korea. The ancestors of the Manchus appeared in historical record at least seven centuries earlier than that of the Mongols, inhabited different parts of the lands in the Songhua

(Sungari) and Heilong/Amur valleys. The ancestors of the Qidan (Chitan) lived in the Cherim prairie and Jehol hills. They were two independent peoples until the Manchus were merged mainly into the Chinese and the Qidans mainly into the Mongols.

For more information on the ethnic origins of the Manchus, see: Hsu, Shuhsi, China and Her Political Entity, op. cit., pp. 1-9; Yu, Shengwu, et al., Sha E Qinhua Shi, op. cit., pp. 8-9; Chapter Four of this thesis.

7. Liu, Shang, et al., ed., Jiu Tang Shu 旧唐书 (Annals of the Tang Dynasty), Vol. 199; Vol. 9; Ouyang Xiu, et al., ed., Xin Tang Shu 新唐书 (Enlarged Annals of the Tang Dynasty), Vol. 219.

The compilation of the two monogrphs, Jiu Tang Shu and Xin Tang Shu, was a grand project carried out by Chinese historians. The first one, Jiu Tang Shu, was compiled under the chief editorship of Liu, Shang, assisted by numerous Chinese scholars from the year of 940 to 945. It has two hundred Chinese volumes. The second one, Xin Tang Shu, was compiled under the chief editorship of Ouyang, Xiu, China's prominent scholar and historian of the time, from the year of 1044 to the year of 1060. Enriched by the latest findings of the period, the new edition was finished in two hundred and twenty-five Chinese volumes. They are among the twenty-four classic works on the history of China which are regarded as highly important sources by Chinese scholars.

8. Ouyang, Xiu, et al., ed., Xin Tang Shu, op. cit., Vol. 219; On Black River Mohe.

9. Liu, Shang, et al., Jiu Tang Shu, op. cit., Vol. 199; On Mohe.

10. Ouyang, Xiu, et al., ed., Jiu Tang Shu, op. cit., Vol. 43; Seventh Article: On Geography.

11. Shi, Yuxin, et al., Bo Huangyan de Zhizaozhe (Rebut the Falsifiers' Fallacy), Beijing, Renmin Chubanshe, 1977, pp. 2-3.

12. Shen, Shixing, et al., ed., Ming Huidian 明会典 (Statutes of the Ming Dynasty), edition of Emperor Wan Li's reign (1573-1620), Vol. 108.

Ming Huidian was first compiled during Emperor Hong Zhi's reign (1488-1506) by the government-sponsored Shi Yuan (College of Historians) of the Ming Dynasty.

During Emperor Wan Li's reign (1573-1620), it was re-edited by Shen, Shixing, et al., and finished in two hundred and twenty-eight volumes in the fifteenth year of Wan Li's reign. The volumes, as structured, recorded governmental affairs, in fair detail, conducted by the Six Boards (Six Ministries) of the Ming Dynasty. This work is most essential to the study of Ming history.

13. Yao, Guangxiao, et al., ed., Ming Taizong Shilu 明太宗实录 (Records of the Third Emperor of the Ming Dynasty), Vol. 48, Yi Mao Tiao, March, 1407.

14. Chen, Xun, et al., ed., Huanyu Tongzhi 寰宇通志 (The Ming Comprehensive Digest on Local Governmental Affairs), Vol. 116, p. 7.
Huanyu Tongzhi was compiled under the sponsorship of the Ming government, completed in the seventh year of Emperor Jing Tai's reign (1456).

15. Yao, Guangxiao, et al., ed., Ming Taizong Shilu, op. cit., Vol. 62, Ding Mao Tiao, March, 1409.

16. Ibid., Vol. 55, Bing Shen Tiao, February, 1408.

17. The Nurkan Du Zhihui Shi Si (Nurkan Tuchih-huishi-szi), a provincial-level government established by the Ming government in the year of 1409, was recorded in numerous Chinese documents, Annals of the time. See: Yao, Guangxiao, et al., ed., Ming Taizong Shilu, op. cit., Vol. 62; Luo, Fuyi, Manzhou Jin Shi Zhi 满州金石志 (Records on Manchus' Land, eight volumes), Vol. 2, pp. 9-10, cited in Yu, Shengwu, et al., Sha E Qinhua Shi, op. cit., pp. 41-46.
This fact has also been recorded in some of the Russian publications. For example, Russian Professor V.P. Vasilyev wrote in his article, "On the Inscriptions of the Monument of the Cliff Near the Estuary of Amur (in Bulletin of the Academy of Sciences, No. 4, 1896, Moscow), that a

> temple Yun-chin-si (of eternal rest) was built, it appears, in the 11th year of the Ming Emperor Yun-lo (1413) in the country... Nurgan, inhabited by the race Tsi-me-li. The first attempts to penetrate this country, according to the monuments, were made already in the time of the first Ming Emperor Hun-wu (1368-1398), but without success; only in the spring of 1411 was a court official, Ishiha

(a name smacking of the Manchu or Solon pronunciation; elsewhere he is called The Eunuch Tai Tsian) sent there, with more than 1000 Government (purely Chinese?) soldiers in 55 large vessels. He introduced a local administration: Nurgan was transformed into the province Du-si...the natives being ordered to govern themselves. The annexation was effected, however, as the words of the monument show, not by force of arms, but by lavish gifts. Ishiha, besides feasting them well, distributed both to the inhabitants of Nurgan and the barbarians Ku (-i) who dwelt beyong the sea (i.e. on the island Sakhalin) clothes, corn...As it appears, the Chinese Government, being desirous of introducing civil life, built this temple as the foundation of enlightenment. (Quoted from Baddeley, J.G., ed., Russia, Mongolia, China, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 229. For more information, see: pp. 223-228 of the same volume and E.G. Ravenstein's work, The Russian on the Amur, op. cit., pp. 193-198.)

18. Zhong, E, Su Xiu de Huangyan he Lishi de Zhenxiang 苏修的谎言和历史的真相 (Soviet Fabrications and the Truth of History), Beijing, Renmin Chubanshe, 1977, pp. 32-34.

19. An, Tai Sung, Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., p. 26.

20. Tu, Hai, et al., ed., Qing Taizong Shilu 清太宗实录 (Records of the Emperor Taizong), Vol. 61, p. 3.

Qing Taizong Shilu, consisting of sixty-five volumes, is an indispensable work for the study of early Qing Dynasty history. It gives, in detail and a systematic way, information about major events happened during Emperor Taizong's (i.e., Huang Taiji or Huang-tai-chi) reign, from 1626 to 1643. According to this record, Huang Taiji, Nurhaci's successor, not only brought the entire two-river territories under his control, but also imposed taxation on the local inhabitants in the region starting from the year of 1616. See: Vol. 1, p. 20; Vol. 9, p. 11; Vol. 17, p. 5; Vol. 18, p. 20.

21. Hummel, A.W., ed., Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, 1644-1912, Vol. 1, Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1943, p. 2.

22. Conolly, Violet, Siberia Today and Tomorrow, London, Collins, 1975, p. 26.

23. Baddeley, J. F., Russia, Mongolia, China, op. cit., p. 195.

24. Sebes, S.J. Joseph, The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), Rome, Institum Historicum S.I., 1961, p. 58; Also see: Golder, F.A., Russian Expansion on the Pacific, New York, Paragon Book Reprint, Corp., 1971, pp. 36-37. For more information on the ethnic groups in the region, see Chapter Four of this thesis.

25. Golder, F.A., Russian Expansion on the Pacific, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

26. Semyonov, Yuri, Siberia -- Its Conquest and Development, translated from the German by J.R. Foster, London, Hollis & Carter, 1963, pp. 97-98.

27. Ibid., p. 94.

28. Akty Istoricheskie, vol. iv, doc. 31, 74, cited in Golder, F.A., Russian Expansion on the Pacific, op. cit., p. 43.

29. Dopolneniia k Aktam Istoricheskim, vol. iii, doc. 102, 367, cited in Golder, F.A., Russian Expansion on the Pacific, op. cit., p. 48; Yu, Shengwu, et al., Sha E Qinhua Shi, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 113.

30. Ravenstein, E.G., Russians on the Amur, op. cit., p. 25.

31. Yu, Shengwu, Sha E Qinhua Shi, op. cit., pp. 136-138; Ravenstein, E.G., Russians on the Amur, op. cit., pp. 40-48.

32. In his diary, the Russian special envoy to China, Spathary, states that, at the very initial stage of Russian penetration into the Upper Heilong/Amur, the government of the Russian Empire apparently knew very well that the territory was being governed by the Qing

Court, and that the natives were paying tax in furs to the Chinese Emperor. Spathary wrote in his letter to the Tsar on April 17th, 1676, that

> On the 15th came five Albazin Cossacks from Fort Albazin to see me, and...told me that they had got ready at Albazin two doshchaniks to go down the Amoor to the Zeya, to collect tribute. But I gave them injunctions here and wrote as well to the fort, to refrain from all offence against the Chinese tributaries -- to take no tribute, and embark on no campaign until, with God's help, this embassy had finished its work...(Spathary's Letter to the Tsar of April 17th, 1676, taken from the Nuun villages by Milovaniff, cited in Baddeley, J.F., Russia, Mongolia, China, op. cit., p. 310.)

33. Yu, Shengwu, et al., Sha E Qinhua Shi, op. cit., pp. 164-165.

34. Ravenstein, E.G., Russians on the Amur, op. cit., p. 60.

35. Sebes, S.J. Joseph, The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk, op. cit., pp. 150-151.

36. Ibid.

37. Liu, Hsuan-min, "Russo-Chinese Relations up to the Treaty of Nerchinsk," in The Chinese Social and Political Science Review, No. 23, 1940, pp. 426-429.

38. An, Tai Sung, Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., p. 30.

39. Conolly, Violet, Siberia Today and Tomorrow, op. cit., p. 31.

40. Semyonov, Yuri, Siberia -- Its Conquest and Development, op. cit., p. 121.

41. Yu, Shengwu, et al., Sha E Qinhua Shi, op. cit., pp. 228-232; 235; 253.

42. For the text of the Bur Treaty of August 31, 1727, see: Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between China and Foreign States, 2nd ed., Shanghai: Statistical Department of the Inspectorate General of Customs, 1917, pp. 14-17.

43. The Abagatuy Protocol of October 23, 1727, is also referred to as the Abagatuy Treaty. This document delimited the boundary east of Kiakhta by a description of sixty-three markers forming the frontier from Kiakhta to the headwaters of the Erhkuna/Argun River. For the text of the protocol see: Document 3, in An, Tai Sung, Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., pp. 171-176.

44. The protocol of November 7, 1727, signed at the Bur River delimited the boundary of the two countries from the section west of Kiakhta. See: An, Tai Sung, Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., pp. 178-182.

45. The Treaty of Kiakhta had encompassed all the provisions of the Abagatuy Protocol and the Bur Protocol of 1727 and was considered the most authoritative document for the delineation of the Sino-Russian boundary in the section concerned. The actual date of signing of the Treaty of Kiakhta, however, was often mistaken by scholars in the West to be in 1727. Recent Chinese sources revealed that the Treaty was drafted in 1727 but was officially signed only on June 25, 1728 after further exchanges between the two governments involved. For the text of the Treaty, see: An, Tai Sung, Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., pp. 178-182.

46. Ibid., p. 32.

47. Yu, Shengwu, et al., Sha E Qinhua Shi, op. cit., p. 266.

48. Tung, W.L., China and the Foreign Powers, New York, Oceana Publications, Inc., 1970, pp. 25-29.

49. An, Tai Sung, Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., p. 32.

50. Krausse, A., Russia in Asia, 2nd ed., London, Curzon Press, 1973, pp. 46-47.

51. For further references in English for the signing of the Treaty of Aigun of 1858, see: Banno, M., China and the West, 1858-1861, op. cit., pp. 128; 147-150; Krausse, A. Russia in Asia, op. cit., pp. 45-54.

52. In this regard, Article I of the Treaty of Aigun (1858) stated:

> The Manchu inhabitants settled on the left bank of the Amur, to the Zeya River up to the village of Hormoldzin to the south, will forever retain their former domiciles under the administration of the Manchu Government, and the Russian inhabitants will not be allowed to give them any offense nor cause them any vexation.(See: An, Tai Sung, Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., p. 184.)

53. Marx, Karl, "The British and Chinese Treaty," in Collected Works (by) Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Vol. 16, (prepared by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism), Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1980, p. 50.

54. Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsyklopeida, Vol. 1 (1926 edition), Moscow, 1926, p. 756.

55. An, Tai Sung, Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., p. 36.

56. Ibid., p. 186.

57. Engels, Frederick, "Russia's Successes in the Far East," in Collected Works (by) Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Vol. 16, op. cit., p. 83.

58. Guo, Shengwu, et al., Sha E Qinlue Zhongguo Xibei Bianjiang Shi 沙俄侵略中国西北边疆史 (History of Tsarist Russia's Aggression against the Northwest Frontier of China), Beijing, Renmin Chubanshe, 1979, pp. 10-11.

59. Zheng, Shi, "Sha E wuzhuang qinzhan woguo Pamier diqu de lishi zhenxiang (True historical picture about tsarist Russia's aggression against China's Pamirs)," in Lishi Yanjiu, No. 6, 1977, p. 114.

60. Ibid.

61. For more information about the political history of Xinjiang, see: Guo, Shengwu, et al., Sha E Qinlue Zhongguo Xibei Bianjiang Shi, op. cit., pp. 7-78.

62. Zheng, Shi, "Sha E wuzhuang qinzhan woguo Pamier diqu de lishi zhenxiang," op. cit., pp. 46; 57-

58; Guo, Shengwu, et al., Sha E Qinlue Zongguo Xibei Bianjiang Shi, op. cit., pp. 56-88.

63. An, Tai Sung, Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., p. 39.

64. Guo, Shengwu, et al., Sha E Qinlue Zhongguo Xibei Bianjiang Shi, op. cit., pp. 165-168.

65. See: Appendix III.

66. Ibid.

67. Engels, Frederick, "Russia's Successes in the Far East," in Collected Works, Vol. 16, op. cit., p. 85.

68. Watson. F., The Frontiers of China, London, Chatto & Windus, 1966, p. 37.

69. Guo, Shengwu, et al., Sha E Qinlue Zhongguo Xibei Bianjiang Shi, op. cit., pp. 220-222.

70. Ibid., pp. 218-219.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., pp. 270-272.

73. Ibid., p. 283.

74. Zheng, Shi, "Sha E wuzhuang qinzhan woguo Pamier diqu de lishi zhenxiang," op. cit., pp. 113-117.

75. Guo, Shengwu, et al., Sha E Qinzhan Zhongguo Xibei Bianjiang Shi, op. cit., pp. 321-337.

76. An, Tai Sung, Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., pp. 38-39.

77. Ibid., pp. 46-47.

78. Ibid.

79. Tang, Peter S.H., Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia 1911-1931, Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1959, pp. 299-310; Friters, Gerald, "The Prelude to Outer Mongolian Independence," Pacific Affairs, June 1937, p. 168. For the English text of the agreement, see: MacMurrary, John V.A., Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894-1919, London, Oxford University Press, 1921, Vol. II, pp. 1239-1244.

80. Degras, J., ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, London, Oxford University Press, Vol. 2, 1951, p. 159.

81. Ibid.

82. An, Tai Sung, Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., pp. 47-50.

83. Degras, J., ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 214-215.

84. Ibid., p. 215.

85. On November 5, 1921, the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia signed a Soviet-Mongolian treaty of friendship in Moscow. Thus, Outer Mongolia was officially recognized by the USSR as an independent state. No reference was made to the previous treaties in which the USSR recognized China's sovereignty over Outer Mongolia. At the same time, the northwestern territory Uriankhai was proclaimed to be "independent." Called the Republic of Tannu Tuva, it was under Soviet protection. In 1944, however, the "Tannu Tuva Republic" was quietly turned into a republic of the USSR. For the English text of the Soviet-Mongolian treaty of 1921, see: Shapiro, Leonard, ed., Soviet Treaty Series, Vol. I., 1917-1928, Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 1950, pp. 137-138; and Woodhead, H.G.W., ed., The China Year Book, E.P. Dutton & Co., 1923, p. 677.

86. Zhong E Wenti Laiwang Wenjian 中俄问题来往文件 (Documents on Question between China and Russia), No. 41 & 42 (compiled by the Russian Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China), cited in Lishi Yanjiu, No. 6, 1980, p. 73.

87. For the text of L.M. Karakhan's statement to the Press, see: China Year Book, Tianjin (Tientsin), 1924, p. 865. For further references concerning the Soviet position at the period, see: Fang, Ming, "Guanyu Su E duihua de liangci xuanyan he FeichuZhong E bu pingdeng tiaoyue de wenti (On the Two Soviet Russian Declarations to China and the Question of Annulment of Unequal Sino-Russian Treaties)," in Lishi Yanjiu, No. 6, 1980, pp. 63-76; Chen Bao (Morning Daily, published in Beijing), September 5, 1923.

88. "Public Documents," The Chinese Social and Political Science Review, viii: 3, 1924, p. 221.

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid., p. 222.

91. "Minute on Sino-Russian Conferences," in Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, cited in Lishi Yanjiu, No. 6, 1980, p. 74.

92. Li, Huichuan, "The Crux of the Sino-Soviet Boundary Question," Beijing Review, No. 30, 1981, p. 16.

93. Ibid.

94. Chiu, Hungdah, "Certain Legal Aspects of Communist China's Treaty Practice," American Society of International Law Proceedings, (177-26), p. 124.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.

97. Externally, the Korean War broke out in 1950, and internally, urgent questions such as the reconstruction of the country and land-reform were of paramount importance to the PRC.

98. For the Russian text of the treaty, see: Izvestiia, February, 15, 1950; and Ginsburgs, G. and Pinkele, C.F., The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, 1949-1964, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1978, p. 5.

99. Ginsburgs, G. and Pinkele, C.F., Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

100. Ibid., p. 6.

101. For the text of the treaty, see: Sbornik deistvuiushchikh dogovorov, soglashenii i konventsii, zakliuchennykh SSSR s inostrannymi gosudarstvami, Moscow, 1957, Vol. 14, pp. 106-107.

102. For more information on the disputed areas along the Sino-Soviet border, see Chapter Three of this thesis.

103. Sekai Shuho, Tokyo, August 11, 1964; Pravda, September 2, 1964, cited in CDSP, No. 34, 1964, pp. 67; Ginsburgs, G., Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., pp. 106-109.

104. Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo, August 1, 1964; Doolin, D.J., Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, Hoover Institution Studies: 7, Stanford University, 1965, pp. 45-46; Ginsburgs, G., Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., p. 9.

105. Ibid.

106. "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, May 24, 1969," Peking Review, No. 22, 1969, p. 8; Pravda, March 30, 1961; Ginsburgs, G., Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., p. 12.

107. "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, May 24, 1969," op. cit., pp. 3-9; Handbook on International Affairs, ed. by the Teaching and Research Program on International Relations, Beijing No. 2 Foreign Language Institute, Nanning, Yulin Chuban-she, 1981, pp. 88-98.

108. Ginsburgs, G., Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., p. 17.

109. "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, May 24, 1969," op. cit., p. 7.

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111. Kapitsa, M.S., Levee zdravogo smysla (Ovneshnei politike gruppy Mao), Moscow, 1968, pp. 67-68; Yurkov, S.G., Pekin: novaya politika?, Moscow, 1972, p. 59; Ginsburgs, G., Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., p. 13.

112. Ginsburgs, G., Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., p. 114.

113. See: "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, May 24, 1969," op. cit., p. 8; see also Chapter Three of this thesis.

114. Handbook on International Affairs, op. cit., p. 98.

115. An. Tai Sung, Sino-Soviet Territorial Dis-pute, op. cit., p. 83.

116. For more information on the Chenpao Island incidents, see footnote 7 in the introduction to this thesis.

CHAPTER TWO

FRONTIER CONFRONTATION IN THE 1970s

Entering the 1970s, the most striking feature of the Sino-Soviet boundary dispute has been frontier confrontation. Having accelerated in the latter half of 1960s, this confrontation was in full swing in the past decade. Military buildup[1] and border incidents,[2] two expressions of this confrontation, have testified to the fact that the Sino-Soviet border is not only a sensitive weather-vane reflecting the boundary policies of the two countries, but also one of the most heavily guarded lines in the world.

Military strength, undeniably, plays an active role in quarrels of a territorial nature; it can be a factor of crucial importance in dictating the behaviour of the adversaries involved. The stronger party, in order to have its own will to prevail, would seldom fail to exploit any imbalance of strength. In a sense, the military might of a particular country could be the very corner-stone of its foreign policy, especially in regard to boundary disputes.

Throughout the 1970s, while Sino-Soviet border

negotiations remained stalemated a rapid buildup of military forces along the frontier regions of the two countries took place, bringing with it a substantial threat to the national security of the weaker party. Against this background, border incidents, which were still frequent and sometimes bloody, appear to have constituted another dimension for assessing the kinds of boundary policies the two powers pursued.

In this chapter, an attempt will be made, first, to gauge the degree of the military buildup along the Sino-Soviet frontier and the impact it had on the frontier considerations of the two sides. Secondly, an effort will be made to record andanalyze border incidents that have been documented by the two governments. It is hoped that such an examination and analysis might provide some answers for the following questions: How strong is the military presence along the Sino-Soviet border? How frequent and on what scale were the border incidents that occurred? Is there an organic link between military strength and the frontier incidents? What part did military capability play in the overall boundary dispute between the PRC and the USSR? Is there any pattern which emerges?

Military Buildup Along the Sino-Soviet Frontier

In the 1950s, the boundary between the PRC and the USSR appeared to be one of the quiet frontiers of the world, though Beijing and Moscow obviously failed to clarify their border line. "The traditional, i.e., long-term disposition of Soviet and Chinese forces along the border was roughly balanced in numbers of men."[3] In the eastern sector of the frontier, the Chinese had an edge, while in the western section the Soviets had an obvious advantage.

In the beginning of the 1960s, as we have seen, border incidents became a common phenomenon while the general relations betwen the PRC and the USSR deteriorated. Nevertheless, it was not until the Yili incident of April 1962 that both Beijing and Moscow apparently began to reinforce their garrisons in the border areas.[4] In the following years, further reinforcements of China's Xinjiang and the Soviet Far East were reported, but the military disposition on both sides remained defense-oriented. The Chinese kept about twenty-four divisions in the military districts adjoining the border, in addition to some units of border guards. The Soviets only maintained some twelve to fourteen regular divisions, apart from their border guards. Since "China traditionally presented no significant strategic threat, having

been either weak, friendly, or neutral,"[5] it was believed that only about two-thirds of these Soviets divisions were first-class, or in combat-readiness, while the remainder belonged to a lower category or were not fully manned.

The failure of the 1964 border talks between the PRC and the USSR, which apparently guaranteed a gloomy future for the boundary dispute, undoubtedly caused great concern in both countries. This seems to have been an important turning point in the development of a large-scale military buildup along the border. In the latter half of the 1960s, "both states began to bring their existing forces to a higher state of readiness, to equip them with better and more weaponry, and to augment their numbers,if only marginally. The Soviets seem to have been the more active party in this process."[6] As K. G. Lieberthal pointed out,

> since 1966...Moscow has made a series of major decisions to prolong, broaden, and make more permanent the size and nature of the Soviet military presence along its border with China.[7]

In 1966, reports appeared of the transfer of highly trained Soviet forces from East Europe to the Soviet Far East. These troops were provided with the latest equipment such as missiles, and surface-to-surface nuclear tipped rockets.

Another major aspect of the Soviet move, was the Kremlin's decision to station strong military units in Mongolia, whose border with China the Soviets had pledged to protect. From 1967 on, divisions of Soviet troops, supplemented by tank and missile units, began taking permanent bases along the Sino-Mongolian boundary, only a few hundred kilometres away from China's capital, Beijing.[8]

Nevertheless, it was not until after the incidents over the Chenpao (Damansky) Island in the spring of 1969 that both China and the Soviet Union significantly increased their military strength -- armored formations, rocket troops, missiles, nuclear weapons, and air power -- along their border as well as along the Sino-Mongolian border. By the end of 1969, the Kremlin was believed to have augmented its troops in the area east of Lake Baikal from fifteen divisions to twenty-one divisions, including some eight tank divisions.[9] By 1971, Soviet regular combat forces along the Sino-Soviet border had increased to about thirty divisions of which three were in the PRM.[10] In addition to long-range and intermediate-range strategic nuclear strike forces, the Soviet Union has now deployed hundreds of tactical nuclear missiles and rockets along the eastern sector of the Sino-Soviet boundary. One type of such weapon systems is the solid-fuel

mobile nuclear missile known as Scaleboard in the West. This system is mounted on a tank chassis, and has a range of about eight hundred kilometres, carrying a nuclear warhead of over one megaton, the equivalent of a million tons of TNT.[11]

On the Chinese side of the border, reinforcement also took place but not on a similar scale. The disastrous "Cultrual Revolution," launched in 1966, was followed by years of internal turmoil, making progress in production and technological innovation almost impossible. The People's Liberation Army (the PLA) was called on to share civil administration duties for the sake of keeping public order. In 1976, when the "Cultural Revolution" officially ended, the country's economy had been brought to the verge of total collapse. The bitter relationship with the Soviet Union had long since cut off China's only channel of armament importation. The Chinese had to rely mainly on weaponry acquired in the 1950s and on the few additional items they could produce themselves.

In spite of the lack of adequate equipment, the Chinese tried, however, to augment the numbers of troops in their frontier military districts, especially after March 1969. By the end of that year, the Chinese were believed to have deployed about twenty-eight regular

divisions in their Beijing and Shenyang Military Districts, scattered through the entire area from Beijing north to the eastern sector of the Sino-Soviet border. About four regular divisions were positioned in Xinjiang.[12] After the Soviet Union signed a twenty-year defense pact with the PRM in January 1966, and especially after Soviet crack troops moved into Mongolia, the Chinese increasingly felt the growing magnitude of the direct menace to their capital, Beijing. By 1970, the PRC had apparently increased its troops in Inner Mongolia to four regualr divisions, in addition to border guards.[13] In late 1970, another four divisions were reportedly added to the Beijing-Shenyang Military Districts, bringing the total of Chinese troops to about thirty-two division in these districts.[14] In short, by the beginning of 1970s, the Chinese were believed to have stationed some forty regular divisions in the military districts adjacent to the Soviet Union. On the other side of the border, the USSR was estimated to have deployed some thirty regular divisions.

Although the Soviets were outnumbered in terms of manpower, Moscow enjoyed an absolute supremacy over Beijing in terms of nuclear strike capability. Chinese sources indicate that "between 1965 and 1972...the Soviet Union deployed 150 new intercontinental missiles each year."[15] In addition to those in Siberia, many of the

Soviet ICBMs based in Europe could also be targeted against major centers in China. Furthermore, medium-range nuclear missiles had been placed by the Soviet side not only along the Sino-Soviet border, but the Sino-Mongolian boundary as well.[16] Immediately after the Chenpao incidents of 1969, the Kremlin more than once made it clear to Beijing that the USSR would definitely go to nuclear weapons in the event of a full-scale Sino-Soviet war.[17]

In contrast, China's limited nuclear devices appear to have been quite vulnerable. Though it was estimated in 1972 that the PRC had the capability to produce about 300 Hiroshima-sized (20 kilotons) nuclear bombs or warheads,[18] its striking capabilities were severely limited by its outdated delivery systems. Apart from some Soviet-built Il-28 Beagle light bombers, the PRC had no other bombers able to carry its nuclear warheads. Although China had reportedly deployed about twenty operational nuclear-tipped missiles of medium-range (up to 1,000 miles) in northwestern and north-eastern regions it seems clear that they in no way could counter-balance the Soviet might.[19]

In the early 1970s, therefore, the odds in this frontier confrontation appear to have greatly favoured the Soviet Union. The Chinese repeatedly suggested a

mutual reduction of both parties' military presence in the regions concerned. They explained that they had no intention of resolving the border dispute through the use or threat of force, nor had they the ability to do so. At the time, the Soviets might not have felt any threat from China militarily, but they may have seen in China's immense population a real potential threat, should the Chinese continue to hold to their position with regard to the boundary dispute. Therefore, the Kremlin appears to have felt that the best way to win the dispute was to maintain a strong military presence in the area to back their position at the negotiating table. As result, over the rest of the decade, the military buildup continued both quantitatively and qualitatively while border negotiations were firmly deadlocked. The sharp imbalance of military capabilities became an increasing serious problem to the Chinese.

According to British sources, by the end of 1979, the Kremlin had augmented the numbers of its modernized regular troops to forty-six divisions along the border, including six tank division.[20] Japan's White Paper on Defense of 1980 estimated that the USSR had placed one fourth of its ground forces along the Sino-Soviet frontier, of which about thirty-four divisions or 350,000 regulars were located in the area from Lake Baikal to Vladivostok.[21]

Chinese sources indicate that, in addition to Soviet regular divisions, the Soviet Union had also built up numerous missile units and air-force bases in the region. Therefore the total number of Soviet forces concerned could be well over one million men.[22]

In terms of armaments, the Soviet ground forces were outfitted with the latest equipment such as T-72 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles which increased attack capabilities and mobility. The Soviet air force was equipped with Backfire bombers, SU-17, SU-19, MIG-25, MIG-27 and other tactical fighters. Medium and long-range transport aircraft such as the IL-76 had immensely increased Soviet capabilities for long-range attacks, ground support and airlifting. The Soviet Pacific Fleet had also become a significant force. It included some seventy surface warships and seventy-five submarines among the latter D-Class nuclear-powered submarines, armed with SS-N-18 missiles. Moreover, the Soviet rocket forces had made visible progress in developing multiple independently-targeted ballistic missiles, such as the SS-17, SS-18, SS-19 and SS-20, and in improving the kill accuracy of different types of missiles which were capable of reaching any part of China.[24]

The Soviet Union had undoubtedly carried out a strategy of increasing its offensive capability in Asia, and its results appear startling. The Soviet military presence

Table 1. Sino-Soviet Strategic Balance, January 1980
(Source: Jacobson, C.G., Sino-Soviet Relations Since Mao, New York, Praeger, 1981, pp. 33-34.)

	Soviet Union	China
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)	1,398	First true ICBM tested in 1980; two limited-capability ICBMs deployed.
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs)	950	None
Intercontinental-Range Strategic Bombers	156	None
Total Warheads	6,000	Chinese missiles are "early generational" and carry only one warhead each.
Throw-Weight (lbs.)	11.8 million	Not known
Intermediate- and Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles	About 40 new SS20 (each with three independently targetable warheads) deployed against China	About 100 ("early generational")
Medium-Range Bombers	About 40 Backfire supersonic bombers (half assigned to naval aviation) plus about 100 bombers of earlier vintage	Somewhat over 100 (older TU16 and TU4 planes)
Ballistic Missile Defence	Soviet antiballistic missiles deployed around Moscow and available at central Asian test site effective against projected Chinese ICBM designs	No capability

is far in excess of the level needed for defense purposes.

Rapid expansion of military power naturally calls for a huge increase in military spending. Western sources indicate that, in the year of 1970, Soviet defense expenditure was about 49 billion U.S. dollars whereas in the year 1979, Soviet defense spending had jumped to about 100 billion U.S. dollars, double the 1970 figures.[25] According to Chinese sources, however, every Soviet annual defense expenditure since 1975 has passed the 100-billion-U.S.-dollar mark.[26]

In contrast, official Chinese defense expenditure for the fiscal year 1979 was only 20.32 billion Chinese Yuan, which equals about 12 billion U.S. dollars.[27] This was less than one fourth of the official Soviet defense expenditure figures, and less than thirteen per cent of the estimated Soviet defense expenditure of the same year. Due to the fact that China's economy did not embark on the road of recovery until 1978, it appears that, in the entire 1970s, there was little significant improvement in the modernization of the PLA. This was noted by former U.S. Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger when he visited Chinese military installations in late 1976. "After witnessing horse cavalry, antitank weapons that would bounce off contemporary Soviet armor,

and aerial target practice against low-flying ballons, Schlesinger expressed his belief that the Chinese were without an anti-aircraft or antitank capability."[28]

Nevertheless, China, in April 1970, launched its first (381-pound) earth satellite, and its second (486-pound) in March 1971, indicating that China would soon be capable of producing intercontinental ballistic missiles. As a matter of fact, however, the Chinese were not able to test their first IBM until 1980.[29] The backbone of the PRC's Air Force seems to be the Soviet-designed MIG-19. Its several dozen submarines were also outdated. Among them, in the past decade, only one was equipped with missile launching tubes but carried no missiles that could be delivered.[30]

Having made little progress in modernizing their armaments, the Chinese, it is believed, further augmented the numbers of the troops in their various military districts adjacent to the USSR. According to a British estimate, China deployed, in 1979, some fifty-two regular divisions in her Beijing and Shenyang Military Districts, and about thirteen mainforce divisions in Xinjiang and Lanzhou areas, in addition to border guards.[31] Apart from these, it was believed that there still exist some insignificant local forces.[32] At any rate, it is probable that the Chinese outnumber the Soviets in terms of manpower along the entire Sino-

Soviet border theatre.

It is significant that the Soviets had, in the 1970s, overcome to a large extent their traditional logistic difficulties in Siberia and the Far East. Siberia was being built up into an important strategic base. In 1970, Siberia produced only thirty-one million tons of oil. In 1974, however, crude oil production passed the 116 million ton mark. By 1980, Siberian oil made up fifty per cent of the total annual production of the Soviet Union.[33] With the construction of more refineries, the Soviet Army, Navy and Air forces in the Far East had ample energy supplies within easy reach. Industralization in Soviet Asian territory also had vastly increased Soviet war capabilities on their southeast frontier. It is estimated that the eastern part of the USSR has been producing thirty-two per cent of the total Soviet output of tanks, almost forty per cent of the planes, a quarter of the warships and a quantity of guided missiles.[34] When the second trans-Siberian railway line from Ust Kut to Komsomolsk is completed in the coming years, it, too, will greatly enhance the Soviet military posture in East Asia.

The Chinese, on the other hand, with no rail lines comparable to those of the Soviets indeed face great logistic problems, especially along the western

section of the border. Unlike the Soviets, whose military fortifications are found along the length of their railroads within easy reach of the border, the Chinese, retaining their faith in "defense in-depth" and guerilla warfare, have placed their troops on a more interior line which was far away from the border. The Chinese have failed to obtain modern surface and air mobility; they cannot concentrate large forces at a given spot as quickly as the Soviets. To a large extent, Chinese troops still depend on transportation by foot.[35] As a result, the Chinese have naturally pursued a defensive strategy in the past decade.

In summary, military confrontation was a striking reality between the PRC and the USSR in the 1970s. Severely handicapped by their economic and technological limitations, the Chinese have, in the past decade, achieved insignificant progress in modernizing their armed forces. In view of the unique character of modern warfare, in which high technology and heavy armaments predominate, the military dispositions on the Chinese side of the border, which were obviously defensive in nature, could generate no real threat to the Soviets. On the other side of the border, however, the Soviets had acquired an absolute military preponderance, with threatening offensive capabilities. As K.G. Lieberthal pointed out in

1978:

> It can be said with confidence that over the past eight years the USSR has developed a capacity -- either independently or in league with states it has cultivated -- to menace China from the east and south as well as from the north. While the major land threat remains concentrated in China's north, naval and missile assaults can now be launched from around the eastern and southern peripheries. Thus, Moscow has combined its diplomatic overtures to Peking with highly visible and clearly threatening actions to bring military force to bear in this relationship.[36]

Against this background, a close examination of the border incidents[37] which took place in the 1970s will lead to a clearer understanding of the respective boundary policies pursued by the two great adversaries.

Border Incidents in the 1970s

After the series of armed clashes in the spring of 1969, both the Chinese and the Soviets seem to have realized that such large scale frontier strife, if continued, could eventually bring the two countries to a general war which neither side could possibly afford. It seems, therefore, that their common desire of averting war led to the meeting between the late Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Soviet Premier A. Kosygin at an

airport near Beijing on September 11, 1969. Apart from having reached an understanding on the resumption of border talks, the two Premiers also agreed, as was recently disclosed, that "China and the Soviet Union should not go to war over the boundary question."[38] They also consented to the disengagement of troops of both countries in the "disputed areas."[39] As a result, during the following months, border incidents were almost eliminated.

Moscow, however, subsequently refused to recognize and implement the disengagement agreement, and the plan of withdrawing the troops of both parties from all the disputed areas did not work out. Therefore, further frontier strife appeared inevitable, especially in view of the lack of success of the border talks, and the increasing military buildup along the border.

According to various sources, in the past decade, minor incidents, which were recorded but not made public by the authorities concerned, could amount to as many as hundreds of cases annually.[40] In the eastern section of the boundary, the Soviets still claimed that the border line should run along the Chinese banks of the Heilong/Amur and Wusuli/Ussuri Rivers. They tried, as they did in the latter half of the 1960s, to restrain the Chinese farmers from carrying out production on the

islands which were situated on the Chinese side of the main channels.[41] Nevertheless, incidents were also frequent in the western sector of the boundary where more than fifteen pieces of disputed territory were located.[42] The unique character of these frontier clashes is that they tend to have inseparable links with the strength of each side's military position, as well as with their approach to the settlement of the boundary dispute as a whole. This assumption will become clear when we examine the three major incidents that have been made public by both sides, namely the helicopter incident of 1974, the Wusuli/Ussuri clash of 1978, and the Tersadi incident of 1979.

The Helicopter Incident of 1974-1975

The helicopter incident was sparked, on March 14, 1974, when a Soviet military helicopter carrying three servicemen on board crossed the Sino-Soviet frontier in the western sector of the Sino-Soviet border. It flew 70 kilometres deep into China's Xinjiang Uigur Autonomous Region, and made landings several times in Habahe County. The Chinese frontier guards and the militia forces eventually succeeded in capturing both the helicopter and its crew.[43]

The event was not made public until a week later,

when the Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) bluntly charged Beijing with acting contrary to international practice by holding the Soviet crew and the aircraft. Moscow asserted that the crew was on a "first aid" mission, sent to pick up a "seriously ill service man."[44] The helicopter "encountered difficult meteorological conditions, lost its bearings and, having used up its fuel supply, made a forced landing near the border in CPR* territory."[45] Moscow also declared that the crew "reported the actual situation by radio to their airport," and that the USSR had informed the PRC of the incident as early as March 15, 1974.[46]

Beijing, on the other hand, apparently did not trust the Soviet explanation, and reacted strongly. On March 23, the Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yu Zhan, summoned V.S. Tolstikov, the Soviet Ambassador in Beijing, and personally delivered a note of protest to the government of the USSR. According to the Chinese note, the seized helicopter was an MI-4 armed reconnaissance craft, and

> thorough investigations by the Chinese side established that the helicopter carried neither medical personnel on a "first aid" mission, nor any medicine or medical equipment; instead, it carried

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* The Soviet term "CPR" means the PRC.

> arms and ammunition and reconnaissance equipment.[47]

Beijing also revealed that

> Documents found on board and the activities of the three military personnel prove that they were instructed to carry out a "special mission." With the culprits and material evidence at hand, the case is conclusive. It is impossible for the Soviet authorities to shirk their criminal responsibility of sending this helicopter to intrude into China for espionage.[48]

Moscow, on the other hand, denied Beijing's accusation of espionage. In its note of March 28, 1974, it contended that "the Chinese side, deliberately distorting the facts, is seeking to use the forced landing of the Soviet border helicopter to aggravate an atmosphere of hostility toward the USSR in China and further to exacerbate Soviet-Chinese relations."[49] Because the crew remained in Chinese hands and continued to be held incommunicado, the Soviets escalated diplomatic pressure in the following months. In its declaration of May 2nd, 1974, the Soviet Government stated that

> ...judging by everthing, the CPR authorities are trying to exaggerate the incident of the unplanned landing of the Soviet border guard helicopter on Chinese territory and to use this to further complicate Soviet-Chinese relations...The Soviet Government insists on the immediate return of the

> three-man crew and the border guard helicopter...if the Chinese side intends to detain the helicopter and its crew even further and to make a mockery of the Soviet people, it thereby assumes full responsibility for the inevitable consequences of such a provocational action.[50]

No public response came from the Chinese in the months that followed. It seems that either a prolonged interrogation was being conducted, or Beijing intended to use the incident to underline further the aggressiveness of the Kremlin's frontier policy, or both.

The question of the helicopter incident remained inconclusive for nearly two years until its unexpected ending on December 27, 1975. Without public warning, Yu Zhan, Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, informed V.S. Tolstikov that the Chinese Government was returning to the Soviet Union both the crew and the craft. Yu's expalantion indicated that, after further investigation, the Chinese Public Security authorities "consider credible the Soviet crew members' statement about the unintentional flight into China."[51] The Chinese nevertheless reiterated that the craft was still an armed reconnaissance helicopter and had entered into China's side of the border "to an extent of over 70 kilometres, and had flown more than 400 kilometres over China's territory."[52]

Some international observers considered that the Chinese decision to end the incident in this manner could be interpreted as a tactical maneuver to ease the long-strained Sino-Soviet relations. It was obvious that the Chinese decision was made against the background of a coming succession period in the Chinese leadership, and on the eve of the Soviets' Twenty-fifth Party Congress. As K.G. Lieberthal observed, "it was not in China's interests for Moscow, frustrated by years of lack of progress in border negotiations...to opt for a harder line toward the PRC, one that carried increased risk of Soviet military involvement in China during the upcoming succession."[53] Here, the "military involvement" appears totally inconceivable, but Lieberthal might have been right that long-term consideration of the Sino-Soviet peaceful coexistence facilitated the release of the helicopter and its crew. The peaceful ending of the helicopter incident in 1975, however, did not succeed in refraining further frontier strife. The Wusuli/Ussuri incident of May 1978 was yet another manifestation of the tension on the Sino-Soviet border.

The Wusuli/Ussuri Incident of May 1978

The Wusuli/Ussuri incident of May 9, 1978, was fairly large in scale, involving eighteen Soviet armed

motor boats, another military helicopter and about thirty Soviet troops who had penetrated as far as four kilometres into China's side of the border in the lower part of the Wusuli/Ussuri River.

The incident became public on May 11, 1978, when the Chinese delivered a note of protest to the Soviet Government. In the note, it was disclosed that about thirty Soviet troops crossed the Wusuli/Ussuri on the morning of May 9, and landed on the Chinese bank of the river;

> They chased and tried to round up Chinese inhabitants, shooting continually and wounding a number of them.[55]

The Chinese pointed out that

> The above-mentioned atrocities of the Soviet troops constitute an organized military provocation against China occurring at a time when the Sino-Soviet boundary negotiations have just resumed...The Chinese Government hereby lodges a strong protest with the Soviet Government against this and demands that the Soviet side make an apology, punish the culprits who created this incident of bloodshed and guarantee that no similar incident will occur in future.[56]

The next day, the fact that an incident had occurred was confirmed by the Soviets. In their responding note, the Soviets, while admitting that their troops had crossed the boundary illegally, described

the incident somewhat differently. It was asserted that

> On the night of May 8, 1978, while searching for a dangerous armed criminal, a group of Soviet naval border guards, mistaking the Chinese bank for the Soviet Krestovsky Islands, landed on and went a short distance into Chinese territory. The Soviet servicemen took no actions with respect to Chinese residents but, realizing that they had inadvertently entered Chinese territory, left immediately.[57]

Regardless of the reliability of the Soviet statement, it was rather an unusual approach for the Kremlin to acknowledge that the incident was initiated by the Soviet side, and for it to express its regrets. Why did Moscow act this way on this occasion? The question as to whether or not the incident itself, and the Soviet admission was part of the Kremlin's design to put more pressure on the Chinese at the negotiating table has remained unanswered so far, but that was exactly what the Chinese suspected at the time. No matter what the Soviet intention was, the Kremlin's excuse of "inadvertent entry" was apparently unacceptable in Beijing.

Five days later, Yu Zhan summoned V.S. Tolstikov, the Soviet Ambassador, and stated that China "cannot agree to the Soviet distortion of the facts for self-justification."[58] In order to verify the event, Yu Zhan

delivered another note to the Soviet Government containing a quite detailed record of the incident. It was revealed that

> A Soviet helicopter intruded into China's airspace around 7 o'clock local time on the morning of May 9 and kept circling the area for reconnaissance till after 11 o'clock. At the same time, 18 Soviet military boats intruded into China's waters, and about 30 fully armed Soviet troops equipped with walkie-talkies landed on the Chinese bank and did not embark and leave until 10:30.[59]

Yu Zhan emphasized that

> the Soviet troops shot at more than 30 Chinese inhabitants, firing more than 100 rounds of ammunition, and wounded a number of them.[60]

Therefore, the incident was obviously

> a military provocation organized by the Soviet side, a bloody incident created by Soviet troops, and a demonstration of the Soviet policy of hostility to China and of threat or use of force against China.[61]

The Soviets, however, did not respond to Yu Zhan's May 17th statement, and the episode passed from the scene quietly. Whether or not the Wusuli/Ussuri incident was actually designed to exert more pressure on the Chinese only the Soviet side could tell. But, in view of their absolute military preponderance along the border, the Soviet intrusion seems to have left such an impression.

In the summer of 1979, this impression became much stronger, if not a conviction, when another bloody incident occurred in the western section of the Sino-Soviet boundary.

The Tersadi Incident of July 16, 1979

The border clash of July 16, 1979, took place in the Tersadi area, Tacheng County, Xinjiang Uigur Autonomous Region, involving shooting, wounding and killing. The two casualties were Chinese and both of them fell into the hands of the Soviets. Immediately after the incident, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Chinese Embassy in Moscow of the following:

> four armed Chinese servicemen violated the USSR's border and intruded into Soviet territory for a distance of one kilometre; as a result of a clash with a Soviet border detail, one of the Chinese violators...was killed, and second was wounded and is now undergoing treatment in the USSR.[62]

This official Soviet statement did not say who or which side opened fire first and this creates the impression that it was the Soviets that opened the fire and shot the Chinese.

It was not until seven days later that the Chinese, in their official note to the Soviet side, presented their description of the incident. The Chinese

stated that

> On July 16, 1979, twenty-odd fully armed Soviet frontier soldiers, lying in ambush at the Sino-Soviet border in the Tersadi area...fired at Li Baoqin, a cadre, and Burumbutug, a veterinary, of the Five Star Stock Farm of Tacheng County, who were there to inspect the pasture, a normal production activity. They killed Li Baoqin and wounded Burumbutug on the spot and then intruded into Chinese territory and carried Li Baoqin's body and the wounded Burumbutug into Soviet territory.[63]

The Chinese, while pointing out that the Soviets were "resorting to the mean trick of 'the villain making the charge first,'"[64] concluded that

> The Soviet side has deliberately created a border incident of provocation and bloodshed at a time when concrete arrangements are being discussed in negotiations on the relations between China and the Soviet Union.[65]

The background of the Tersadi incident appears indeed worthy of notice. It happened months after the Chinese rejected a Soviet proposal to conclude a general document on the principles guiding the relations of the two countries, and two months after the PRC publicly announced that it would not renew the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance of 1950 when it expired. Vice-ministerial talks were also being held at the time as a result of China's proposal to

discuss the problem of abnormal relations between the two countries.[66] Although the Kremlin was frustrated by these events, it is still not certain whether or not Moscow had indeed "deliberately created" the incident in order to warn the Chinese not to go too far. But the four Chinese involved were obviously caught unprepared. A clearer picture of the Tersadi incident, however, came to light in the spring of 1980 when Burumbutug, after returning to Tersadi, personally confirmed the Chinese version of what actually happened.[67]

All three incidents discussed above appear to have been initiated by the Soviet side while all the casualties were Chinese. What is more notable is that, during the diplomatic representations concerning these incidents, the Chinese complained that the Soviets quite frequently violated the Chinese border. By denouncing the Soviet helicopter intrusion in 1974, Beijing revealed that

> Over a long period, the Soviet authorities have frequently sent aircraft to intrude into China's border areas to disrupt the productive activities of Chinese inhabitants and engage in flagrant espionage. Despite the repeated protests of the Chinese side with the Soviet authorities, Soviet air intrusions have grown more frequent and unbridled. In the period from January 1973 to the present alone, there have been as many as 61 Soviet air intrusions into China's Sinkiang regions.[68]

This Chinese charge, nevertheless, was denied by the Soviets. In their statement of March 15, 1974, Moscow contended that

> In fact, there has been only one instance of an unintentional flight into C.P.R. airspace -- that was in February, 1973, by an AN-2 civil aviation plane that had lost its bearings while on a regular flight.[69]

The Soviet inadmission might have come as expected. What was important here, however, is that Moscow failed to make any counter-charges against the Chinese. Similar pattern came once again in the Tersadi case in 1979.

During the 1979 Tersadi incident exchanges, the Chinese protested that

> Since the beginning of this summer, Soviet soldiers have often intruded into Chinese territory to interfere with and disrupt the productive activities of Chinese herdsmen...The Soviet side also pulled down Chinese herdsmen's living and production facilities such as houses and sheep-pens in the said area.[70]

Beijing pointed out at the same time that the area involved in Tacheng Country "is not a disputed area, for the boundary alignment there is clear."[71] This time, the Soviets not only failed to lay any counter-charges, but in fact admitted the Chinese accusation in the following response:

> In 1978 and 1979, the Chinese side has

> regularly violated the conditions under which the Chinese population engages in economic activities in regions adjoining the Soviet border...As is known, these conditions stipulate that time limits for engaging in economic activity are to be agreed on beforehand, Chinese servicemen may not enter areas where this activity is underway, and no permanent structures or defense installations may be erected there. The Chinese side's attention has repeatedly been called to violations of these conditions, both through diplomatic channels and through the border authorities.[72]

An interesting aspect of the above statement is that the Soviets were not charging any Chinese border-crossings, but were accusing the Chinese of violating some sort of "conditions" which the latter were supposed to follow. In one sense, the Soviet wording in the document could mean that Moscow found it difficult to charge the Chinese bluntly with creating border incidents since the latter had not. This assumption would appear to be borne out by the pattern of all three major incidents analyzed above. In another sense, however, the local inhabitants of a disputed area could not be expected to act in every way that the authorities of the other side would consider proper. Thus, the Soviets' alleged "violation of conditions" could have happened, should such conditions exist. Since the Kremlin failed to specify what the "conditions" were or whether these "conditions" were still applicable, it is impossible, at this stage, to

assess whether the Chinese really violated any "condition" at all.

Conclusion

Two major conclusions emerge from the preceding exposition and analysis.

First, military buildup in the Sino-Soviet border theatre gained momentum in the 1970s. The Chinese, handicapped by their economic and technological backwardness, achieved little substantial progress in modernizing the PLA. As M. Oksenberg commented, "the Chinese military capacity is limited and basically defensive in nature."[73] On the Soviet side, however, the military augmentation was rapid and substantial both qualitatively and quantitatively. The Soviet Union has clearly elevated its strategic position from that of a defensive posture in the 1960s to an offensive stance in the 1970s, tipping the balance of both offensive and deterrent capabilities heavily in favour of the USSR.

Second, the sharp imbalance thus created in terms of both nuclear and "non-strategic" forces seems to have predetermined the respective attitudes of the two sides towards their frontier conflict. It seems that, concerning frontier troubles, the PRC, the weaker party, opted for a more pacific approach. It restrained Chinese troops

from initiating border incidents and even from taking any retaliatory actions against the occasional Soviet incursions. The Soviet Union, however, relying on its military supremacy, has apparently adopted a "coercive policy." It has perpetrated border incidents in an attempt to bring more pressure on Beijing.[74]

Therefore, in the case of the Sino-Soviet frontier conflict, there is no doubt that military strength bears strong political implications and that its impact on the formulation of the boundary policies of the two parties is of great significance. The military imbalance along the border likely contributed to the perpetuation of frontier tension and the inconclusiveness of the border negotiations.

CHAPTER TWO: NOTES

1. In the 1970s, military buildup along the Sino-Soviet border was substantial both quantitatively and qualitatively. The speed with which this took place is astonishing. For more information, see: "Senate Hearings," Department of Defense Appropriations for F.Y., 1980 (F.Y. 1980 Posture Statement by H. Brown, Secretary of Defense, U.S.), p. 309; The Military Balance, 1969-1970, 1970-1979, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London; Jacobsen, C.G., Sino-Soviet Relations Since Mao, New York, Praeger, 1981, pp. 27-36.

2. Compared with the 1960s, border incidents along the Sino-Soviet frontier have been limited both in scale and in frequency in the past ten years. The two sides only traded formal protesting notes on three major occasions, i.e., the helicopter incident of 1974-75, the Wusuli/U-ssuri incident of 1978 and the Tersadi incident of 1979. For more information, see: Peking Review, No. 13, 1974, p. 5; No. 16, 1974, p. 3; No. 20, 1978, p. 3, No. 21, 1978, pp. 20-21; Beijing Review, No. 30, 1979, p. 3; No. 19, 1980, p. 5; Pravda, March 29, 1974, p. 4; Pravda, May 3, 1974, p. 4; Izvestia, May 14, 1978, p. 4; Pravda, July 27, 1979, p. 4.

3. Robinson, T.W., The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes, op. cit., p. 23.

4. An, Tai Sung, Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., pp. 77-78.

5. Robinson, T.W., Sino-Soviet Border Dispute, op. cit., p. 26.

6. Ibid., p. 27.

7. Lieberthal, K.G., Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s, Santa Monica, The Rand Corporation, 1978, p. 2.

8. A twenty-year Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was concluded between the People's Republic of Mongolia and the Soviet Union in January 1966. See: Pravda, January 18, 1966, cited in CDSP, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, 1966, pp. 7-8. For the buildup of Soviet military forces in the PRM, see: The New York Times, March 16, 1966, p. 8; Tsao, Chih-ching, "Peiping-Soviet Border Clashes," Issues and Studies, May 1969, p. 10.

9. The Military Balance, 1969-1970, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1969, p. 7.

10. The Military Balance, 1970-1971, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1970, p. 7.

11. The New York Times, July 22, 1970, p. 5.

12. The Military Balance, 1969-1970, op. cit., p. 39.

13. The Military Balance, 1970-1971, op. cit., p. 58.

14. Ibid.

15. "Soviet Military Strategy for World Domination," Beijing Review, No. 4, January 28, 1980, p. 15.

16. The Washington Post, August 15, 1970, p. 15; An, Tai Sung, Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., p. 135.

17. The New York Times, August 29, 1969; Hinton, H., "The United States and the Sino-Soviet Confrontation," Orbis, Vol. XIX, No. 1, Spring 1975, p. 44; Pravda, August 29, 1969, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXI, NO. 35, 1969, pp. 3-5.

18. Murphy, Charles, "Mainland China's Evolving Nuclear Deterrent," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 1972, p. 29.

19. The Military Balance, 1971-1972, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1971, p. 40; The New York Times, November 23, 1970, p. 4.

20. The Military Balance, 1979-1980, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1979, p. 10.

21. Japan's Defense, Japan's Ministry of Defense, 1980, Toyko.

22. Beijing Review, No. 4, 1980, p. 17; No. 12, 1981, p. 21.

23. Beijing Review, No. 4, 1980, p. 16.

24. Ibid.

25. The Military Balance, 1979-1980, op. cit., pp. 11-12; Beijing Review, No. 1, 1977, pp. 24-24.

26. Ibid.

27. The Military Balance, 1979-1980, op. cit., p. 61.

28. Johnson, Chalmers, "The New Thrust in China's Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 1, 1978, pp. 132-133.

29. Jacobsen, C.G., Sino-Soviet Relations Since Mao, New York Praeger, 1981, p. 33.

30. For more detailed references on China's navy, see: Ibid., p. 29.

31. The Military Balance, 1979-1980, op. cit., pp. 60-61.

32. Ibid.

33. "Build up the Siberian Base," Beijing Review, No. 19, 1981, p. 12.

34. Ibid., p. 13.

35. Robinson, T.W., Sino-Soviet Border Dispute, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

36. Lieberthal, K.G., Sino-Soviet Conflict, op. cit., p. 24.

37. See: footnote 2 above.

38. Li, Huichuan, "The Crux of the Sino-Soviet Boundary Question," Beijing Review, No. 31, 1981, p. 13.

39. Ibid.

40. "Reds' Border Threat to Peace," The Spectator, February 18, 1982, p. 54; footnote 2 above.

41. See; footnote 40 above.

42. For more information on the question of dispute areas along the Sino-Soviet border, see: "Disputed Areas" in the following chapter of this thesis.

43. Peking Review, No. 13, 1974, p. 5.

44. "USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Note to the Chinese Embassy in Moscow," Pravda, March 29, 1974, p. 4, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXVI, No. 12, 1974, p. 4.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. "PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Note to the Soviet Embassy to China," Peking Review, No. 13, 1974, p. 5.

48. Ibid.

49. Text in Pravda, March 29, 1974, p. 4, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXVI, No. 12, April 17, 1974, p. 4.

50. Pravda, May 3, 1974, p. 4, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXVI, No. 18, May 29, 1974, p. 15.

51. Peking Review, No. 52, 1975, p. 10.

52. Ibid.

53. Lieberthal, K.G., Sino-Soviet Conflict, op. cit., p. 129.

54. Peking Review, No. 13, 1974, p. 5; No. 16, 1974, p. 30.

55. Peking Review, No. 20, 1978, p. 3.

56. Ibid.

57. Izvestia, May 14, 1978, p. 4, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXX, No. 19, p. 8.

58. Peking Review, No. 21, 1978, p. 20.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid., p. 21.

61. Ibid.

62. "Note to the CPR Embassy," Pravda, July 27, 1979, p. 4, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXXI, No. 30, 1979, p. 4.

63. "Note to the Soviet Embassy in Beijing," Beijing Review, No. 30, 1979, p. 8.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. For the official announcement of the PRC on the decision not to extend the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1950, see: Beijing Review, No. 14, 1979, pp. 3-4.

67. Beijing Review, No. 19, 1980, p. 5.

68. Peking Review, No. 13, 1974, p. 5; No. 16, 1974, p. 30.

69. Pravda, March 16, 1974, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXVI, No. 12, 1974, p. 5.

70. "Note to the Soviet Embassy in Beijing," Beijing Review, No. 30, 1979, p. 8.

71. Ibid.

72. "Note to the CPR Embassy," Pravda, July 27, 1979, p. 4, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXXI, No. 30, 1979, p. 4.

73. Oksenberg, Michel, "China Policy for the 1980s," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 2, Winter 1980/1981, p. 308.

74. This view is also shared by U.S. scholar K.G. Lieberthal. See: Lieberthal, K.G., Sino-Soviet Conflict, op. cit., pp. 1-80.

CHAPTER THREE

SINO-SOVIET BORDER NEGOTIATIONS

Against a background of frontier confrontation, the most important development in the Sino-Soviet boundary dispute during the 1970s was the border negotiations. According to sources available, nine sessions were held from October, 1969, to June, 1978.[1] Little progress was made during this period and both the Chinese and the Soviets blamed the ineffectiveness of the sessions on the position of the other side. Some observers have concluded that, by mid-1978, when the last meeting recessed, the two sides had not even completed their preliminary talks for a mutually acceptable agenda.[2]

Owing to the fact that little information about these secret talks was revealed until recently, very few attempts have been made to examine the substance of these important discussions. Not even a single comprehensive assessment on the subject has been made. In view of the important role these talks played in regulating the overall relations between the two countries, the subject certainly deserves more attention. Indeed, without a careful evaluation of the border negotiations, neither a reliable assessment of the boundary dispute up to the

present, nor an exploration of its future development is possible.

This chapter attempts, first of all, to examine the historical and legal aspects that led to the commencement of these talks, and then to record and analyze the nature and contents of these negotiations as they took place in the past decade. Thus, after providing sufficient knowledge of the abortive border talks of 1964, our main discussion will center on the respective positions and the negotiating strategies of the two sides during the entire period in question. Efforts will also be made to identify the numerous disputed areas scattered along the more than 7,300 kilometre-long frontier. By way of summary, a general evaluation will be given at the end of the chapter.

The Abortive Talks of 1964

As discussed in Chapter One, China and the Soviet Union entered into agreement on May 31, 1924, to annul all the treaties and protocols which tsarist Russia had formerly concluded with China, and, among other things, to redemarcate their common boundary.[3] It appears that the Soviet Government of the time was prepared to return to China some of the territory that the Russian Empire had forcibly acquired in the latter half of the nineteenth

century. This original stand of the Soviets, which was enunciated soon after the victory of the October Revolution, was evidenced in many of the comtemporary Soviet documents and publications of the time.[4] Nevertheless, negotiations in 1926, aimed at implementing the 1924 Sino-Soviet Agreement, failed to achieve any result mainly because China was then preoccupied by civil disorder. Consequently, the exact nature of the redemarcation agreed upon in 1924 was left unresolved. According to the normal principles of international law, it would appear that, after the renunciation of all the Sino-Russian treaties in 1924, the boundary between China and the Soviet Union was indeed lacking an agreed-upon legal demarcation. As early as the 1950s, therefore, Beijing attempted, on several occasions, to discuss the boundary question with Moscow.[5] The Kremlin leaders, however, showed no interest at all in such talks with the Chinese.[6] Obviously, Moscow's considerations on the subject were no longer the same as in the early 1920s. In view of PRC's dependence on the Soviet Union, the Kremlin appeared to have calculated that they could turn the problem to their best advantage. Thus, a legally-agreed redemarcation of the boundary was apparently out of the question. This change of attitude on the part of the Soviet Union, and the evasive policy

it subsequently adopted, forestalled any settlement of the issues concerning the Sino-Soviet border.

Owing to the fact that there were numerous disputed areas along the entire frontier, the border problem, instead of diminishing in importance, became more serious by the end of the 1950s. In the early 1960s, the Kremlin said that there should be no territorial disputes between socialist countries that believe in Communism.[7] Although numerous border incidents already had taken place, Moscow, nevertheless, made no effort whatever to deal with the problem. As result, the frontier situation worsened drastically and contributed to the deterioration of the relations between the two countries. It was not until several major incidents occurred that the Kremlin finally accepted, in late 1963, a Chinese proposal to hold bilateral talks aimed at settling their boundary problem. On February 23, 1964, the official Soviet delegation, headed by P.I. Zyryanov, Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, arrived in Beijing, and the first round of boundary negotiations between the PRC and the USSR officially commenced. The Chinese delegation was headed by Zeng Yongqian, Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC.

It is interesting to note that the Soviets, even

while agreeing to hold border talks with the Chinese, still contended that there were no territorial issues existing between the two countries. Only nine days before the negotiations started, the prominent Soviet leader, M.A. Suslov, stated that the forthcoming talks were to "specify the frontier line between the Soviet Union and China at certain points. We do so in the belief that no territorial issues exist between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China."[8] The Chinese, however, held that there were a number of issues of a territorial nature that should be covered during the talks, especially the not-yet-implemented boundary redemarcation which was stipulated in Article VII of the 1924 Sino-Soviet Agreement. The fact that no joint announcement was made before the 1964 negotiations indicated that this difference of view was quite significant.

Some observers concluded that the two sides were confronted with insurmountable difficulties when they tried to work out a mutually acceptable text for such an announcement,[9] which suggested that if the two sides had had to define their positions prior to any negotiations no meeting ever would have been convened. In this respect, skipping over the preliminary technicalities might have facilitated the commencement of the 1964 conference. On the other hand, having failed

to establish the order of business, the Chinese and the Soviets, once they confronted each other across the negotiating table, might soon discover that they had no common frame of reference, therefore making the prospect of a compromise solution limited indeed.

Thanks to the stream of revelations triggered by the serious armed clashes in the spring of the 1969, a more complete picutre of the 1964 affair has since emerged. According to Beijing's official sources,

> in 1964, the Chinese Government held boundary negotiations with the Soviet Government, during which the Chinese side made it clear that the "Sino-Russian Treaty of Aigun, the Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking" and other treaties relating to the present Sino-Soviet boundary are all unequal treaties tsarist Russian imperialism imposed on China when power was not in the hands of the peoples of China and Russia. But, prompted by the desire to strengthen the revolutionary friendship between the Chinese and Soviet peoples, the Chinese side was willing to take these treaties as the basis for determining the entire alignment of the boundary line between the two countries and for settling all existing questions relating to the boundary; any side which occupies the territory of the other side in violation of the treaties must, in principle, return it wholly and unconditionally to the other side, but this does not preclude necessary readjustments at individual places on the boundary by both sides on the basis of the treaties and in accordance with the principles of consultation on an equal footing and of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation.[10]

This position of the Chinese side during the 1964 talks was indeed more conciliatory than that of any previous Chinese government. However, the Chinese proposal was apparently rejected by the Soviets. Beijing later disclosed that

> the Soviet side refused to accept the above-mentioned reasonable proposals of the Chinese side. It refused to recognize the treaties relating to the present Sino-Soviet boundary as unequal treaties and obstinately refused to take these treaties as the basis for settling the boundary question between the two countries in its vain attempt to force China to accept a new unequal treaty and thus to perpetuate in legal form its occupation of the Chinese territory which it seized by crossing the boundary line defined by the unequal treaties.[11]

A striking feature of Beijing's stand is that, for the first time since the Chinese and the Soviets agreed to redemarcate their boundaries in the 1924 Sino-Soviet Agreement, the Chinese voluntarily and formally proposed to the Soviets that the provisions of the nineteenth century Sino-Russian boundary treaties, which China considers unequal, be the basis of the redemarcation, hence for settling the various boundary issues. Equally striking is that the Chinese also raised, at the same time, the subject of Russian/Soviet territorial encroachments beyond the confines of the nineteenth

century one-sided treaties.[12]

During the 1964 negotiations, the Soviets appeared to have also brought with them to Beijing a proposal of their own which suggested taking the "status quo" as the basis for the talks and for conducting, afterward, some minor adjustment of certain areas of the frontier. Moscow recently has claimed that, in 1964, the Soviet Union took the initiative in submitting

> proposals whose adoption would have made it possible within the shortest period to carry out by mutual consent the specification of individual sectors of the Soviet-Chinese border line...the PRC delegation attempted to question the state border...artificially creating "territorial problems" that would complicate relations between our peoples and countries for many years to come.[13]

What were the actual Soviet proposals? A recent Soviet communique presented that

> During the consultations in Peking in 1964, the Soviet side expressed its readiness to meet half way the wishes of the Chinese side, which were concerned with the interests of the Chinese population along the banks of the rivers, and to reach agreement on the demarcation of the frontier line between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China along the Rivers Amur and Ussuri on the basis of mutual concessions, on condition that the Chinese side, in its turn, showed a readiness to recognize correspondingly the interests of the Soviet population along particular sections of the frontier.[14]

This statement shows that , in 1964, Moscow intended to withdraw its claim on some or most of the islands on the Chinese side of the main channels of the Heilong/Amur and Wusuli/Ussuri. In exchange, Moscow requested China to drop all its demands on the rest of the disputed areas especially in Central Asia. This Soviet proposal seems to have made an "offer" by withdrawing Soviet claims on the islands concerned. In reality, however, the Chinese must have perceived that the Kremlin had offered nothing in that they considered the river boundary ran along the main channels of the waterways and thus the Soviet-claimed islands naturally belonged to China. This appears to have been exactly what happened at the time. Beijing recently revealed that, during the 1964 talks, even a Soviet representative

> could not but agree that the central line of the main channel should be taken for determining the boundary line on the rivers and the ownership of islands.[15]

In short, what apparently torpedoed the 1964 talks was the question of what basis to use for settling the dispute. The Chinese manifested their readiness to take the existing treaties as the departure point. The Soviets, however, indicated their strong desire to re-

tain the status quo intact while withdrawing their claim on some of the islands. This was evidenced by the fact that Moscow refused to recognize that there existed numerous disputed areas along the Sino-Soviet border.

The failure of the 1964 negotiations guaranteed a period of continued tension in the frontier region. Minor incidents became a daily phenomenon and finally culminated in the armed clashes over Chenpao Island in the Wusuli/Ussuri River on March 1969.[17] It appears that until that time neither side had made successful efforts to resume border talks.

Border Negotiations, 1969-1978

After the second Chenpao skirmish of March 15, 1969, the Kremlin leaders apparently made a major adjustment in their overall strategy concerning the boundary question with China. The changed strategy sought to combine diplomatic and military pressure in an effort to "enlighten" the Chinese regarding the desirability of settling the boundary dispute "obediently." Some scholars have concluded that, in Moscow, "the decision was apparently made to force a resolution of this issue."[18]

As a result, the Kremlin produced a stream of diplomatic initiatives and the Soviets suddenly became

the "eager" party for resolving the boundary dispute. On March 29, 1969, Moscow called on Beijing to join in steps for "normalizing the frontier situation," and suggested that the two sides should resume the boundary talks broken off in 1964.[19] In its note of April 11, 1969, the Soviet Government demanded that talks begin in Moscow as early as within four days.[20] While the Chinese remained cautious and noncommittal, the Kremlin again proposed on June 13, 1969, that talks start no later than two or three months.[21] In these diplomatic statements, Moscow reiterated its 1964 position, which to the Chinese contained no offer at all. Meanwhile, in order to demonstrate its resolve to press a solution to the boundary dispute, Moscow brought up a high volume of military reinforcements (both troops and equipment) to the frontier region. It then began to use the superiority as a "stick" to drive the Chinese to submit immediately to its initiatives by precipitating incidents in various places along the border. As T.W. Robinson correctly pointed out, "a series of such incidents, in essence mounting to a campaign, occurred during the late spring and throughout the summer of 1969."[22] Another U.S. observer commented that "Exactly two months later (in August 1969) the Soviets launched a combined arms incursion into Sinkiang and orchestrated

a serious nuclear war scare against China."[23]

Such coordinated diplomatic moves and military actions did indeed create an unusually tense atmosphere in the frontier regions, and also gave the Kremlin some propaganda advantage over the Chinese. Why had Moscow suddenly become the active party in initiating boundary talks in 1969? Analyses of the Soviet policy of the early 1970s suggests that Soviet activity concerning the border question stemmed mainly from the conviction that, over the long run, the USSR could hardly afford to face an increasingly powerful and unfriendly China in Asia while coping at the same time with difficult problems in Europe and sustaining its global competition with the United States. Therefore, the Kremlin leaders might have decided it more opportune to speed up a "resolution" of the dispute by exerting strong military pressure before the Chinese became too powerful to handle.[24] Furthermore, Soviet experience in the numerous armed clashes in 1969 may also have led the Kremlin to see that the "Czechoslovakian formula" was definitely not applicable to China. The Chinese fought fearlessly and managed to maintain their effective control over Chenpao Island despite their inferior military equipment and the heavy casualties they suffered.

The military and diplomatic overtures of the

Soviets in the first half of 1969 made the Chinese more cautious. Feeling the effects of Moscow's new strategy, the Chinese might have considered that they were not in a good position to initiate boundary negotiations. In view of the immense Soviet military pressure they were facing, a Chinese call for resumption of border talks immediately after the Chenpao incidents could well have been interpreted as a Chinese "surrender," at least technically so. The Chinese, nevertheless, constantly insisted on the clarification of the boundary. They must have hoped that the Soviets could negotiate with them seriously, settling the problem peacefully. After all, China could expect to gain very little in the event of a military showdown with the Soviet Union. Talks, at any rate, would be helpful in removing some of the excuses used by Moscow for further military maneuvers and in preventing the frontier conflict from leading to full-scale hostilities.

On May 24, 1969, Beijing expressed its willingness to begin preparations for new general border negotiations.[25] It called in the statement that the Soviets should halt their artillery and machine gun fire in the various disputed areas. Meanwhile, however, Beijing was of the belief that Moscow, thus far, was unwilling to make any concrete offer, and this belief was proved to be true

when Moscow, in its June 13th statement, expressed strongly its unwillingness to accommodate Chinese demands while demanding border talks to be resumed as soon as possible. Thus, Beijing was convinced that, as of the summer of 1969, Moscow was more interested in influencing world public opinion than in promoting border talks.[26] Therefore, the Chinese still hesitated about where and when to resume negotiations with the Soviets.

On September 11, 1969, two days before the three-month Soviet deadline, Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin, after attending the funeral ceremonies for Ho Chi Minh, made an unannounced detour on his way home from Hanoi, and met with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai at the airport near Beijing. The two leaders held talks for three and an half hours, and "reached an understanding which laid the groundwork and provided a starting point for the resumption of negotiations."[27] As recently disclosed,

> During that meeting, Premier Zhou Enlai and Chairman Kosygin discussed mainly the boundary question...They unanimously agreed that: differences in principle between China and the Soviet Union should not be allowed to undermine their normal state relations; China and the Soviet Union should not go to war over the boundary questions; the negotiations should be carried on in the absence of any threats; to this end, the two sides should first of all reach an agreement on provisional measures for

> maintaining the status quo of the border, for averting armed conflicts, and for disengagement of troops of both sides in the disputed areas, and then proceed to settle the boundary question through negotiations. The two Premiers also discussed the major content of the provisional measures and reached an agreement.[28]

Following the two Premiers' airport summit, frontier incidents along the border, which had occurred almost daily during the previous months, virtually ceased for the moment. On October 7, 1969, less than a month after the airport summit, the Chinese announced that pending a date still to be decided, Sino-Soviet border negotiations would soon be resumed in Beijing at deputy foreign minister level.[29] This announcement was purposely accompanied the next day by the release of a Chinese Foreign Ministry document in which Beijing reiterated its firm position on the question of the boundary dispute.[30]

The timing of this diplomatic move by the Chinese seems noteworthy. Released in the aftermath of the Zhou-Kosygin summit, this lengthy document could be taken as a deliberate revelation that the PRC did not compromise its principles in the summit which resulted in agreeing to resume talks. Secondly, by making its stance public just on the eve of the border talks, Beijing

was clearly telling the world that border negotiations would go ahead and could make progress should Moscow be willing to accommodate China's principles.

Without any counter-maneuvers, the Kremlin sent, on October 20, 1969, a high-level delegation to the Chinese capital. Therefore, five years after the break-down of the 1964 border talks, the Chinese and the Soviets were back at the negotiating table, confronted with the same problems. The first session of these negotiations was held intermittently from October 20 to the end of December, 1969. The Chinese delegation was headed by Qiao Guanhua, First Vice-Foreign Minister of the PRC. The Soviet team was headed by Vasily Kuznetsov, First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR. In the summer of 1970, V. Kuznetsov was replaced by Leonid Ilyichev, also a Deputy Foreign Minister. The two sides apparently met two or three times a week in the Chinese Foreign Ministry building in Beijing.[31]

The talks, which were held behind closed doors, appear to have reached a deadlock during the very first session.[32] With each side holding to its own position, an impasse was apparently created on the formulation of an agenda. It seems that, due to their widely differing expectations, the two parties could not agree on the basic premises upon which the negotiations should proceed.

Recent disclosures from Beijing indicate that, during the course of the first meetings, the Chinese put forward a proposal consisting of a "five-point-resolution formula." This stated that, firstly,

> the Chinese Government advocates a clear distinction between right and wrong on historical issues and confirmation that treaties concerning the present Sino-Soviet boundary were unequal treaties imposed on China by tsarist Russian imperialism when the Chinese and Russian people were powerless.[33]

Secondly, Beijing maintained that

> both sides should, in the light of actual conditions and taking these treaties as the basis, bring about an all-round settlement of the Sino-Soviet boundary question through peaceful negotiations and determine the entire alignment of the boundary. China does not want to take back the Chinese territory seized by tsarist Russia in accordance with these treaties.[34]

Thirdly, the Chinese contended that:

> either side invading and occupying the territory of the other side in violation of these treaties must, in principle, return the territory unconditionally. But both sides can, considering the interests of the local inhabitants, make necessary adjustments in these areas along the border according to the principles of consultation on an equal footing, mutual understanding and accommodation.[35]

Fourthly, the Chinese Government held that

> a new and equal Sino-Soviet treaty should be signed to replace the old and unequal Sino-Russian treaties and that the boundary line be surveyed and demarcated.[36]

Finally, the Chinese have made it clear that

> the understanding reached by the Premiers of the two countries should be implemented, and that until an all-round settlement of the Sino-Soviet boundary question is reached through peaceful negotiations, the status quo of the border should be maintained, armed conflicts should be avoided, the armed forces of China and the Soviet Union should withdraw from or refrain from entering, thus become disengaged in all disputed areas along the border (i.e., areas where the boundary line was drawn in a different way on the maps exchanged between the two sides during the Sino-Soviet negotiations on the boundary question in 1964), and that an agreement on maintenance of the status quo of the border should be signed.[37]

The above disclosure shows that the core of the Chinese position was essentially the same as that of 1964. Insisting on a formal Soviet acknowledgement on the unequal nature of the existing treaties, the Chinese reaffirmed their 1964 position of taking the provisions of the one-sided treaties as the basis for the settlement of the dispute. They still demanded that either side should return to the other the territory occupied in

violation of these treaties, and that a new boundary treaty should be concluded to replace these treaties. Thus, what the Chinese demanded was actually nothing more than what they should have had according to the provisions of the treaties which set up the present boundary.

What was new in 1969 is the formula for carrying out the negotiations as defined in the last point; an agreement on maintenance of the status quo of the border should be first concluded which would disengage the respective armed forces from all the disputed areas. This formula, which appears to have been accepted by Soviet Premier A. Kosygin at the Beijing airport summit, manifested the Chinese cautiousness in dealing with the Kremlin leaders. Well-experienced as result of the 1964 talks, they might not have expected that Moscow would accommodate their demands easily, especially in view of the absolute Soviet superiority in both strategic and non-strategic forces. It turned out that in this the Chinese were entirely correct.

About the Soviet position as of the late 1969, several points seems noteworthy. First, the Soviets had an entirely different understanding of the matter. The Kremlin leaders flatly refused to acknowledge that the treaties defining the present boundary were unequal in nature. On the

contrary, they contended that these treaties had been signed in the nineteenth century "to promote good-neighbourly relations."[38] Secondly,

> The Soviet Government, however, has insisted on a settlement of the boundary question on the basis of a so-called "historically formed" and "actually defended" line unrelated to these treaties."[39]

In response to this, the Chinese complained that Moscow was attempting "to incorporate into the Soviet Union the Chinese territory which tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union have invaded and occupied, or intended to invade and occupy, in violation of the treaties,"[40] and in this manner to impose another unequal treaty on the PRC.

Thirdly, Moscow still stuck to its 1964 rhetoric that there was no territorial problem existing between China and the Soviet Union, denying that there were numerous disputed areas along the Sino-Soviet boundary.[41]

Fourthly, the Soviet side rejected the Chinese proposal on the disengagement of the armed forces from the disputed areas, and on the conclusion of an intermediate agreement. To this end, Moscow denied that an understanding had been reached during the September 11, 1969 summit between the Premiers of the two countries.[42]

Based on these arguments, the Soviets proposed that they would be willing to study, one by one, the

"disputed areas" identified by the Chinese delegation in certain sections of the frontier, and to decide their ownership provided that the Chinese, first of all, would take the Soviet-claimed delineation of the boundary as the departure point to resolve the dispute and, secondly, would discount that the nineteenth century treaties were unequal in nature.[43]

Thus, the core of the Soviet position was not to take the existing treaties as the basis for settling the the dispute, but to take a combination of the status quo and the Soviet-claimed "border line (i.e., in the Far East, the Chinese banks of the Heilong/Amur and Wusuli/Ussuri Rivers)" as the departure point for the border negotiations. Moscow apparently contended that the Sino-Russian/Soviet boundary was not only delimited by such international documents as the relevant treaties, but was also by "history itself." Obviously, Moscow was attempting to justify not only Russian annexation of Chinese territory through one-sided treaties, but also through the Russian/Soviet military encroachment, i.e., some additional territory which Russia/the Soviet Union occupied in violation of these very treaties. This position of the Kremlin could in no way be regarded by the Chinese as conciliatory since it appeared even less accommodating than Moscow's 1964 approach.

The above examination tells us that, at the negotiating table in 1969, neither the Soviets nor the Chinese were prepared to make any significant concessions; their fundamental premises remained the same as those they presented in 1964. The Chinese approach, nevertheless, indicated that it was the two Premiers' "gentleman's agreement" of September 11, 1969, that finally led the Chinese to the decision to resume border talks with the Soviets. Hence, the Chinese modified their 1964 proposal by the addition of the last (the fifth) point in their 1969 formula. In the following sessions, the Chinese apparently upheld the formula firmly and persisted in demanding of the implementation of the two Premiers' "gentleman's agreement."

The Soviet approach in late 1969, however, appears to have been no more, in fact even less, conciliatory than in 1964, especially in view of the fact that the Kremlin dismissed the "gentleman's agreement" which had been reached only forty days before the re-opening of the negotiations. This seems to fit well into the pattern of Moscow's overall strategy of conducting "coercive diplomacy" with a strong military backing. The Kremlin, by insisting that the Chinese banks of the Heilong/Amur and Wusuli/Ussuri be taken as a departure point for the talks apparently retreated a step back from the 1964 Soviet

position since the Kremlin was more flexible on that occasion. In short, Soviet negotiating tactics during the first session of the border talks appear to have clearly reflected Moscow's strategy of, first, bringing the Chinese to the negotiating table, and then, trying to pressure them into accepting a Soviet "resolution." The Soviet attempt obviously failed, for the Chinese refused to give in. Consequently, the irreconcilable positions of the two sides firmly deadlocked the negotiations during the very first session, leaving the prospect of a successful conclusion of the border talks in limbo.

Unlike the 1964 case, this time the Chinese and the Soviets did not break off the talks for good. Despite the stalemate, they returned to the negotiating table in January 1970, bringing the discussion into its second session.

Starting from the second session, Moscow seems to have adopted a new approach, which dominated all the rest of the sessions in the decade. In order to retionalize its intransigence in not accommodating Chinese demands, Moscow now argued that the cause of the border dispute was not the various unsettled issues themselves but rather the political differences between the two countries, and that the border issues should be resolved only when

overall relations between the two countries greatly improved.[44] Therefore, Moscow apparently intended to skip over the subject of the boundary dispute and to obtain an "overall" improvement of bilateral relations. Thus, the Kremlin attempted to turn border negotiations into talks that would cover other aspects regarding the general relations between the two countries. The contours of this strategy were sketched out right at the second session when the Soviets proposed discussion of a whole range of Sino-Soviet differences, and the conclusion of a "non-aggression agreement."[45]

The Chinese, however, appear to have considered that, with the frontier problem unsettled, the Soviet proposal to sign a "non-aggression agreement" was only an empty paper promise. Even if concluded, it could not possibly provide China with security against possible "Soviet aggression." Beijing would have felt much safer should the Kremlin have agreed to carry out the border talks according to the "gentleman's agreement" of September 11, 1969. The Chinese argued that their proposed "intermediate agreement" regulating the negotiations would be much more practical, and a specific provision on mutual non-aggression could be added to that effect.[46] The whole enterprise, nonetheless, foundered over Soviet non-admission of the existence of disputed areas.

After this episode, Moscow was reported to have

> tabled a significant new package that sought to solve the territorial question by handing over certain islands in dispute along the Ussuri (including Chenpao Island) and expressing a willingness to negotiate Chinese claims in the Pamir region (thus implying that these claims had at least a shred of legitimacy) in exchange for the PRC's dropping all further territorial demands and withdrawing their insistence on Soviet recognition of the "unequal" nature of the previous treaties defining the border.[47]

This modified Soviet position, which was called a "new package" by some international observers, was apparently not new to the Chinese, because it was precisely what the Kremlin presented during the 1964 talks. The Chinese naturally perceived that the Soviet willingness to negotiate the Pamir question did not mean that Moscow was prepared to return the territory to China. Thus, the second session ended on April 22, 1970, having failed to break the stalemate.

After a long recess of eight months, the third session of the border talks was held from mid-January to the summer of 1971 with a short break from late March to early April for Soviet chief-negotiator Ilyichev to attend the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It is believed that, during

this session, the Soviets expressed their willingness to accept partially the Chinese position that the boundary in the Heilong/Amur and Wusuli/Ussuri should run along the central line of the main channels. The Kremlin, nevertheless, still maintained that the USSR, for "security reasons," could not relinquish the large Heixiazi Island at the conjunction of the above-mentioned rivers. This apparently was the best "offer" the Soviet side rendered. Moscow indicated that, if the Chinese would accept the conditions, it would agree to conclude a new treaty to replace the previous ones defining the boundary. The Chinese, on the other hand, might have seen in the Soviet proposal nothing different substantially from Moscow's proposal of 1970, and that the Kremlin's willingness to have a new treaty signed (on Soviet conditions) was merely a tactical maneuver.[48] Beijing argued that the Heixiazi Island which is situated on the Chinese side of the main channels should be returned to China unconditionally and that other disputed areas should also be settled.

Regardless of the inconclusiveness of the 1971 meetings, the Chinese and the Soviets resumed their talks in the spring of 1972 for the fourth session. The discussions dragged on from March 20 to the middle of July, 1972, but failed, once again, to overcome the impasse.

Both sides remained firmly attached to their 1969/1970 positions.

During the fifth session, which was held from March 6 to the end of June, 1973, nothing particular seems to have come out except that Moscow tried to obtain Beijing's consent to sign a "non-aggression treaty."[49] To the Chinese, the offer of the "non-aggression treaty" was not appealing at all, since it appeared to be exactly the same, save the title, as the previously proposed "non-aggression agreement."

The sixth session, June 25 to August 18, 1974, and the seventh session, February 15 to May 5, 1975, were overshadowed by the helicopter incident that took place in Xinjiang,[51] making progress at the talks impossible.

In September, 1976, however, when Chinese Party Chairman Mao Zedong passed away, the Kremlin suddenly stopped their anti-China propaganda. The following month witnessed a dramatic change in the Soviet approach to the handling of relations with China. Moscow began strongly to advocate that "there was no reason why relations should not be improved between the two countries."[51] Moscow also attempted to restore Party-to-Party contacts by sending a congratulatory message to the CCP's new leader Hua Guofeng.[52] Against this background, the eighth session of the border negotiations resumed on November 27, 1976, after an unusually long eighteen-month intermission.

Beijing, however, seemed not to have changed its position with regard to the boundary dispute per se. On February 28, 1977, the Soviet negotiating team left the Chinese capital with empty hands, and Moscow embarked again on its propaganda campaign against the PRC. Chinese Vice-Premier Li Xiannian (Li Hsien-nien) subsequently presented a vivid description of the event:

> When our great leader and teacher Chairman Mao passed away, social-imperialism employed both soft and tough tactics against us. On the one hand, by deliberate gestures, it feigned willingness to improve relations with us; on the other hand, it slandered that our foreign policy had been "greatly discredited"... Exasperated at being rebuffed and disillusioned, it has now thrown away its mask and revealed its true colours by hurling vicious slanders and curses at China...But whatever tactics social-imperialism uses will prove futile. Who does it think will be cowed by such tactics?[53]

In April of 1978, the ninth and the last session of negotiations was held. It seems that neither the Chinese nor the Soviets were prepared to modify their previous position. Nothing notable happened and the session ended quietly in June, 1978.[54]

According to sources available, the two delegations have not met again, and the Sino-Soviet border negotiations have been, up to the present, tacitly suspended. In 1979, Beijing announced that it would not

renew the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, and proposed, at the same time, to hold high-level talks on bilateral relations between the two countries. Since then several rounds of negotiations have been carried out, and the frontier problem appears to have been discussed as well, but nothing substantial thus far has been produced.

Disputed Areas along the Sino-Soviet Frontier

During the 1970s border negotiations, one of the key points of disagreement was whether or not there actually existed "disputed areas" along the Sino-Soviet frontier. The Soviets, while continuing to hold the talks with the Chinese, more than once declared that there were no "disputed areas " along the border and that the border was well guarded by the two sides. The Chinese, however, maintained that there were, in fact, numerous such areas which were claimed by both sides, and that troops of both countries should be removed from those territories. Therefore, in examining the overall Sino-Soviet frontier conflict, the question of "disputed areas" requires special attention.

It was only after the middle of the 1970s that the extent of these "disputed areas" was revealed to be about 35,000 square kilometres, a territory which is

larger than Belgium and Luxembourg put together.[56]

These dispute areas are scattered along the different sections of the frontier between the PRC and the USSR. The most obvious were located in the eastern sector of the Sino-Soviet boundary, along the Heilong/Amur and Wusuli/Ussuri Rivers. Here, the Chinese hold that, according to the provisions of the treaties concerned and according to international practice, the border line should be the central line of the main channels. The Soviets, nevertheless, argue that, according to a "red line" on a map attached to the "Additional Article to the Treaty of Peking," the border line should go along the Chinese banks of the rivers. Consequently, Moscow, on the boundary map it presented to the PRC, delineated as "Soviet territory" about 600 of the some 700 islands which are situated on the Chinese side of the main channels of the rivers, and occupied some of them. The largest one is the Heixiazi Island, about 350 square kilometres in area, which is located on the Chinese side of the main channels at the conjuction of the Heilong/Amur and Wusuli/Ussuri Rivers. The most well-known of these disputed islands is Chenpao (Damansky) where armed clashes occurred in the spring of 1969. Chinese frontier guards have maintained control over this tiny island of 0.74 square kilometres with a watch-tower on it.

In addition to these islands, there appear to be more areas in dispute in the eastern section of the border, including a short portion of the frontier in the region north of the Chinese city Manzhouli. In 1959, the Soviets are believed to have pushed into the Chinese side of the boundary for a distance of more than 500 metres and to have erected barbed-wire fences more than 4,000 metres long. Another trouble area is apparently located east of the Chinese city of Suifenhe, involving a belt about fifteen kilometres long. The Soviet border guards were reported to have forcibly carried out their patrols along a route deep inside the Chinese boundary, and to have constructed military fortresses in places which the Chinese considered to be their territory. After repeated representations of the Chinese authorities, the Soviet side apparently demolished some of the constructions but not all them.*

It appears, therefore, that the PRC and the USSR have troubles along most of their boundary in the Far East. But these areas in dispute, though numerous, account for only a little more than 1,000 square kilometres of territory, about 3.5 per cent of the total territory under dispute. The rest, amounting to about

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* The writer learned this personally during his years of living in the region.

33,000 square kilometres lies in the western section of the boundary. Here, the largest identifiable area, consisting of some 28,000 square kilometres of territory, is in the Pamirs, the most southwestern tip of the boundary where, on Chinese maps, the border line is marked as pending demarcation. The remaining several thousand square kilometres encompass more than fifteen minor sectors along the rest of the western frontier between the PRC and the USSR.[57]

These disputed areas, which had been clearly identified during the 1964 talks, are exactly what the PRC and the USSR have called the "discrepancies" which appeared on the boundary maps they exchanged in 1964. Since then, the Chinese began to define the disputed areas as

> those areas where the two sides disagree in their delineations of the boundary line on the maps exchanged during the 1964 Sino-Soviet boundary negotiations.[58]

This Chinese definition apparently was accepted by the Soviet side during the September 11, 1969 summit between Premiers Zhou Enlai and A. Kosygin. Chinese sources have revealed on several occasions that, during the summit, the two Premiers had reached an agreement that the discrepancies on the maps exchanged in 1964 be treated as "disputed areas."[59] The Soviet Premier was

also quoted as saying that

> the disputed areas mean areas that you say are yours and we say are ours.[60]

The Soviet recognition of the existence of "disputed areas" was thought to have been one of the stimuli that led to the resumption of the border talks in October 1969. This assumption was proved true when, in 1971 and 1973, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai personally confirmed, during his meetings with U.S. journalists, that such an agreement had, indeed, been reached in 1969.[61]

In the past decade, however, the Soviets have refused to accept the definition of "disputed areas." The Kremlin has contended that all these so-called disputed areas were "Soviet territory," and that the boundary line on the Chinese map had been arbitrarily delineated deep in the territory under Soviet control. To this end, L.I. Brezhnev stated that:

> Actually, Peking advances as a preliminary condition no more or less than a demand for the withdrawal of Soviet border guards from a number of areas of our territory to which the Chinese leaders have now decided to lay claim and so have begun to call "disputed areas."... Comrades, it is perfectly clear that such a position is absolutely unacceptable, and we reject it...As far as the Soviet Union is concerned,...We lay no claims to anyone else's territory, and for us there are no "disputed areas."[62]

The Chinese naturally reminded the Kremlin that the very term "disputed areas" was in fact recognized by Soviet Premier A. Kosygin during his talks with Chinese Premier Zhou. They asked whether the Soviets wanted to see the minutes of the summit. Beijing also contended that the boundary line on the Chinese map presented in 1964 was delimited strictly according to the stipulations of the Sino-Russian treaties which set up the present boundary. "It is the boundary line on the Soviet map that, along many sections, goes deep into Chinese territory in violation of the stipulations of these treaties."[63]

Concerning the river boundary in the eastern section of the border, as mentioned earlier, the dispute is over the numerous islands. Moscow advocated drawing the border line more or less along the Chinese banks of the Heilong/Amur and Wusuli/Ussuri. The Kremlin's argument is apparently based on its own "reading" of the "red line" on the map attached to the "Additional Article to the Treaty of Peking" which was signed in 1861. This document itself was supplementary in nature, designed to implement the provisions of the one-sided Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking of 1860. The attached map on which the "red line" was drawn is 1:1,000,000 in scale. The "red line" was designed to outline the

general delineation of the boundary as specified in the Treaty of Peking (1860). The map itself appears to have dealt more with the land portion from Lake Xingkai to the Tumen River rather than the portion along the Heilong/Amur and Wusuli/Ussuri. While the letter of the documents stipulated that the boundary run along the rivers themselves, the Kremlin's reading of the "red line" was that the border line should run "along the Chinese banks of the rivers."[64]

The Chinese, however, found that the Soviet argument unacceptable in that, according to specific stipulations of the treaties, tsarist Russia was granted only the territory of China that was situated on the left or north bank of the Heilong/Amur whereas the land on the right or south bank of the River remained with China. As for the Wusuli/Ussuri River section, the provisions of the treaties defined that the Russian Empire only obtained the territory on the right or south bank of the River, whereas the Chinese Empire continued to hold the land on the left or north bank of the Wusuli/Ussuri, leaving the river-proper unmentioned. Therefore, it is crystal clear that the river-proper was then treated as the boundary, and according to the general practice of international law, in such navigable rivers, the border line should be drawn along the middle

line of the main channels (i.e., the THALWEG solution).[65]

After a careful study of the 1860 Treaty of Peking and the 1861 "Additional Article," one cannot fail to see that the documents indeed referred only to the lands on the north bank and the south bank or left and right bank, leaving the river proper as the de facto boundary line. There exists not a single stipulation in these documents that indicates that the border line should run along either of the banks of the rivers. What is even more important is that, according to Article III of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking (1860), should any contradictory interpretations arise concerning the two documents, then the specific contradictory interpretation in the supplementary document of 1861 should be overruled by the official provisions concerned in the 1860 Treaty.[66]

Judging from the letter and the spirit of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking (1860), it is crystal clear that the "red line" in question could hardly be regarded as anything more than an indication of the general alignment of the boundary in the region. In view of the limited scale of the map, which is 1:1 million, it does not seem possible to distinguish whether the "red line" runs along the river proper or along either of the banks. The essence of the quarrel appears, therefore, to be

only a matter of different reading of the "red line" on the attached map, whereas the specific provisions of the official documents are not at all disputable. In this connection, Professor An Tai Sung has concluded that "

> Certainly the historical evidence makes this Soviet claim untenable for the course of the boundary in the Amur, Ussuri...has never been precisely delimited.[67]

Neither the Chinese nor the Soviets have so far been willing to present the public with the map that was attached to the "Additional Article to the Treaty of Peking" of 1861. The argument remains one of the major obstacles of the border talks, and evidently a valuable "asset" of the Kremlin; Moscow has constantly expressed in the past decade that it would withdraw its claim on most of these islands in exchange for China dropping its claim on the rest of the "disputed areas."

In the Pamirs, where the largest section of the disputed areas lies, the odds are obviously aginst the Kremlin. The imperial government of China and the government of tsarist Russia had never delimited their boundary in the region until 1884 when they agreed, in the Sino-Russian Boundary Protocol of Kashgar (1884), to a general delineation. The document stipulated that, from the Uzbel Pass, "Russia's boundary turns southwest

while the Chinese boundary extends straight south,"[68] and the triangular terrain between the two lines was left as a buffer zone to offset Russia's military pressure. In 1892, however, Russian troops, under the pretext of protecting their "scientific expeditions," occupied not only the buffer zone but also more than 20,000 square kilometres of territory that were recognized as China's in 1884.

In 1894, in an effort to avert large scale armed conflict, the two sides exchanged notes, agreeing to keep temporarily the positions of their troops pending a final settlement of the problem. A brief review of these notes shows that the Chinese, while agreeing to maintain the status quo, made clear their position that any effort on their part to solve the dispute through peaceful means should not be taken as acceptance of the Russian occupation, nor should it be considered as providing any legal right for the Russians to perpetuate their unlawful occupation.[69] Nevertheless, no settlement whatever has been achieved up to the present, and the Soviet Union today continues to hold the territory occupied by tsarist Russia in 1892.

In the past decade, the Kremlin has contended that the notes exchanged in 1894 "redelimited" the boundary in the Pamirs, and replaced the 1884 Kashgar

Protocol. The Chinese, on the other hand, have argued that none of their notes or the Russian notes contained any stipulation to this effect. On the contrary, these notes only specified to keep the status quo temporarily pending a final settlement.[70]

Commenting on the question of the "disputed areas," some observers have concluded that the fact that both tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union occupied some additional territory of China's in violation of the one-sided treaties, seems to be the cardinal reason for Moscow's rejection to the concept of the existence of disputed areas along the Sino-Soviet frontier. In this respect, K.G. Lieberthal has pointed out that

> In several places, most importantly in the Pamir region of Sinkiang, the "actual situation" evidently placed territory in the possession of the Soviet Union that the treaties had left in China's hand.[71]

Conclusion

The preceding examination strongly indicates that, in the 1970s, what has kept the border negotiations from making any progress was the fundamental disagreement between the two sides concerning the principal basis upon which the settlement of the dispute was possible.

Most observers share the view that the Chinese attitude toward the border talks has been consistent.[72] While the Chinese do identify huge tracts of Soviet territory that were unfairly taken from China by tsarist Russia through the unequal treaties of nineteenth century, they make no claim to any of this territory. The Chinese do, nevertheless, require a formal Soviet recognition of the unequal nature of these treaties, reasoning that this was the very fact which the Soviet Government had recognized in the decades before the 1960s.

China's principal condition in the talks is to accept these treaties, however unfair, as the basis for settling the border dispute. The Soviet Union should return, in principle and unconditionally, the Chinese territory which tsarist Russia and the USSR occupied in violation of these nineteenth century treaties. The Chinese maintain that only by honouring the agreement reached at the September 11, 1969 summit can the border talks proceed smoothly and a promising prospect for their conclusion be secured.

The Soviet position, on the other hand, had undergone a remarkable shift. The Kremlin took a much tougher stance when the border negotiations first started in 1969, attempting to coerce the Chinese into

submission.[73] In face of Beijing's unwillingness to yield, the Kremlin has retreated, since 1970, to a position which is identical with their stand during the abortive border talks of 1964. The Soviet Union still bluntly refuses to take as the fundamental premise of the negotiations the treaties defining the present boundary, insisting on the status quo as the basis for the boundary talks. Therefore, Moscow has been prepared only to withdraw its claim to some of the river islands which it has not yet occupied, should the PRC agree to carry out the discussions according to the Kremlin's formula.

Realizing that the Chinese have good reasons to uphold their position, the Soviets have carried out a strategy of, first, obtaining a better environment, i.e., improving relations with the PRC, and then bargaining for the best possible deal for the USSR. Therefore, Moscow has utilized the border talks as a major vehicle for projecting wide-ranging tactical proposals aimed at promoting Soviet image in the world and in the PRC in particular. Thus,

> The Soviet Union has submitted specific proposals concerning the objective and subject matter of possible talks: in 1969 and 1970, on the drafting of a special interstate act...in 1971, on the signing of a treaty of the nonuse of force; in 1973, on the conclusion of a nonaggression treaty...[74]

Needless to say, these are more in the nature of superficial diplomatic maneuvers which can contribute little of substance to resolving the "disputed areas" practically. As K.G. Lieberthal concluded in 1978,

> To be sure, Moscow had not yielded on the core Chinese demands. The USSR adamantly refused to pull back its forces from "disputed" areas along the border; it made clear that it would not accept the position that the Sino-Soviet treaties that had defined the border during the 19th century had been "unequal'; and it persisted in its demand that the border negotiations take both the treaties and the actual situation, rather than the treaties alone, as the basis for a final settlement.[75]

In sum, it seems that, as long as Beijing and Moscow remain firm in their respective positions, the prospect for a final settlement or even a break-through of the stalemate situation is inconceivable. Nevertheless, their nine-year negotiating behavior has indicated that, once the PRC and the USSR agree on how and on what fundamental premises they should negotiate, a successful conclusion of the Sino-Soviet border talks could, then, well be expected.

CHAPTER THREE: NOTES

1. On the Sino-Soviet border negotiations, though official statements have been rather limited, some important disclosures may be found in Pravda, Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka, Renmin Ribao(People's Daily), Guangming Ribao, Beijing Review, Lishi Yanjiu, International Affairs, and other publications of the USSR and the PRC. Major international papers such as the Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, The New York Times, London Observer, have also made their efforts in keeping track of the talks and have presented some sporadic brief reports on various aspects of them.

For our analytical purpose, the negotiations have been divided into ten sessions according to the table compiled by K.G. Lieberthal. The actual number of sessions, however, may not be exactly the same. It is impossible to make a final judgement since none of the international observers has, so far, been able to get access to the minutes of the talks. In this particular case, nevertheless, the time frame for the sessions appears less important, in that the substance of the discussions seem not to have changed much during the various sessions. For the actual table on the sessions of the talks, see: Lieberthal, K.G., Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s, Santa Monica, The Rand Corporation, 1978, p. 189.

2. Lieberthal, K.G., Sino-Soviet Conflict, op. cit., p. 52.

3. See: Chapter One of this thesis.

4. The pre-1961 Soviet position on the various historical issues can be found in many of the Soviet documents and publications of the time. The most important ones are the Soviet declarations to China in 1919 and 1920, and the Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1924. See: Degras, J., ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, London, Oxford University Press, 1951, pp. 158-161; 212-215; "Agreement of General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions Between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (signed on May 31,

1924, in Beijing in English)," in Whiting, A.S., Soviet Policies in China, New York, Columbia University Press, 1957.

5. See; Chapter One of this thesis.

6. Ginsburgs, G., Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., pp. 5-12.

7. "Statement of the USSR Government," Pravda, June 14, 1969, p. 1, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXI, No. 24, July 9, 1969, pp. 10-15; An, Tai Sung, Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., pp. 80-81.

8. World Communist Unity, p. 59; Klimenko, B.M., Gosudarstvennye granitsy-problema mira, Moscow, 1964, pp. 101-102, cited in Ginsburgs, G., Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., pp. 96-97.

9. Borisov, O.B. and Koloskov, B.T., Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya 1945-1970, kratkii ocherk, Moscow, 1971, p. 304, cited in Ginsburgs, G., Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., p. 96.

10. "Chenpao Island Has Always Been China's Territory -- Statement of the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs," Peking Review, No. 11, March 14, 1969, pp. 14-15.

11. Ibid.

12. See: Chapter One of this thesis.

13. "Statement of the Government of the USSR," Pravda, March 30, 1969, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXI, No. 13, April 16, 1969, pp. 3-5.

14. "Statement of the Government of the USSR," Pravda, June 14, 1969, p. 1, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXI, No. 24, July 9, 1969, pp. 9-15.

15. "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China," Peking Review, No. 22, May 30, 1969, p. 4.

16. Ginsburgs, G., Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., p. 100.

17. See: Chapter One of this thesis.

18. Robinson, T.W., The Border Negotiations and the Future of the Sino-Soviet-American Relations, Santa Monica, The Rand Corporation, 1971, p. 5.

19. "Statement of the Government of the USSR," Pravda, March 30, 1969, p. 1, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXI, No. 13, 1969, pp. 3-5.

20. Pravda, April 12, 1969, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXI, No. 15, April 30, 1969, p. 18.

21. "Statement of the Government of the USSR," Pravda, June 14, 1969, p. 1, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXI, No. 24, July 9, 1969, pp. 9-15.

22. Robinson, T.W., Border Negotiations, op. cit., p. 4.

23. Lieberthal, K.G., Sino-Soviet Conflict, op. cit., p. 51.

24. Such views are also held by some observers in the United States. See: Robinson, T.W., Border Negotiations, op. cit., p. 5.

25. "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China," Peking Review, No. 22, May 30, 1969, pp. 3-9.

26. Up to October 20, 1969, at which date the border talks resumed, there had been no indication of any kind that Moscow was prepared to re-consider its 1964 position or to accommodate any of the core Chinese demands. For more information on the Soviet position, see: Pravda, March 30, 1969, p. 1, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXI, No. 13, 1969, pp. 3-5; Pravda, June 14, 1969, p. 1, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXI, No. 24, pp. 9-15.

27. Li, Huichuan, "Crux of Sino-Soviet Boundary Question," Beijing Review, No. 31, 1981, p. 13.

28. Ibid.

29. "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China (October 8, 1969)," Peking Review, No. 41, 1969, pp. 8-15.

30. An, Tai Sung, Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., p. 112; Pravda, July 11, 1970, p. 1,

cited in CDSP, Vol. XXII, No. 28, 1970, p. 15; The New York Times, December 21, 1970, p. 11; Xinhua News Agency dispatch, December 24, 1970.

32. See for example: The New York Times, June 11, 1970, pp. 1; 8; Snow, Edgar, "Talks with Chou En-lai: The Open Door," The New Republic, March 29, 1971, p. 23.

33. Li, Huichuan, "Crux of Sino-Soviet Boundary Question," Beijing Review, No. 31, 1981, p. 16; "Document of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (October 8, 1969)," Peking Review, No. 41, 1969, pp. 8-15.

Reviewing these two documents, one can see that the position of the PRC on the border problem was consistent both before and after the resumption of the border talks.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. "L.I. Brezhnev's Speech in Ulan Bator," Pravda, November 27, 1974, p. 1, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXVI, No. 48, 1974, p. 6; Prokhorov, A., K voprosu o Sovetsko-Kitaiskoi granitse, Moscow, 1975, pp. 242-243.

42. Li, Huichuan, "Crux of Sino-Soviet Boundary Question," op. cit., p. 16.

43. Ibid.; Prokhorov, A., K voprosu o Sovetsko-Kitaiskoi granitse, op. cit., pp. 242-244.

44. Lieberthal, K.G., Sino-Soviet Conflict, op. cit., p. 15.

45. Pravda, June 5, 1979, p. 4, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXXI, No. 23, 1979, p. 6.

46. Zycie Warzawy, June 23-24, 1974, cited in Lieberthal, K.G., Sino-Soviet Conflict, op. cit., p. 11.

47. Lieberthal, K.G., Sino-Soviet Conflict, op. cit., p. 10.

48. Hinton, Harold, "The United States and the Sino-Soviet Confrontation," Orbis, Vol. XIX, No. 1, Spring 1975, p. 33; Washington Star News, November 2, 1971; Taylor, Jay, China and Southeast Asia, New York, Praeger, 1976, p. 167; Jiang, Yan, "Heixiazi Island: China's Sacred Territory," Dili Zhishi (Geographic Journal)," No. 1, 1975, pp. 5-7.

49. See: footnote 45 above.

50. See: Chapter Two of this thesis.

51. Pravda, October 1, 1976, p. 1, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXVIII, No. 39, October 27, 1976, pp. 1-3; 24.

52. Beijing rejected the communication on the ground that the Party-to-Party relations had long ago been suspended. See: Hsin Wan Pao (Hong Kong), November 2, 1976.

53. Peking Review, No. 24, 1977, p. 5.

54. During the last session of the border negotiations, it is believed that the Soviets proposed a draft of a joint document on principles governing relations between the two countries. Seeing it contained nothing substantial, the Chinese apparently rejected it.

55. Pravda, December 6, 1979, p. 5, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXXI, No. 49, 1979, p. 6; Beijing Review, No. 44, 1979, pp. 24-25; Beijing Review, No. 4, 1980, p. 8; Gelman, M., The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking Against China, Santa Monica, The Rand Corporation (R-2943-AF), 1982, p. 106.

56. Prokhorov, A., K voprosu o Sovetsko-Kitaiskoi granitse, op. cit., pp. 242-245.

57. These conclusions are drawn out of the writer's own research work and assessment of the subject.

58. Li, Huichuan, "Crux of Sino-Soviet Boundary Question," op. cit., p. 13.

59. Li, Huichuan, "Crux of Sino-Soviet Boundary Question," Beijing Review, No. 31, 1981, p. 13.

60. Ibid.

61. See: The New York Times, October 29, 1973, p. 1; p. 8; Snow, Edgar, "Talks with Chou En-lai," in The New Republic, March 27, 1971, p. 23.

62. "L.I. Brezhnev's Speech in Ulan Bator," Pravda, November 27, 1974, p. 1, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXVI, No. 48, 1974, p. 5.

63. Li, Huichuan, "Crux of Sino-Soviet Boundary Question," op. cit., p. 14.

64. Kruchinin, A., and Olgin, V., Territorial Claims of Mao Tse-tung: History and Modern Times, Moscow, n.d., p. 72; Ginsburgs, G., "The Dynamics of the Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute: the Case of the River Islands," in Cohen, J.A., ed., The Dynamics of China's Foreign Relations, Cambridge, Harvard East Asian Monographs, No. 39, 1970, p. 3.

65. "Document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (October 8, 1969)," Peking Review, No. 41, 1969, pp. 8-15; "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China," Peking Review, No. 22, 1969, pp. 3-9.

66. An, Tai Sung, Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., p. 187.

67. Ibid.

68. "The Disputed Area of the Pamirs," Beijing Review, No. 37, 1981, pp. 21-23.

69. "Document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (October 8, 1969)," Peking Review, No. 41, 1969, pp. 8-15; Guo, Shengwu, Sha E Qinlue Zhongguo Xibei Bianjiang Shi, op. cit., pp. 343-346.

70. "The Disputed Area in the Pamirs," Beijing Review, No. 37, 1981, pp. 21-23.

71. Lieberthal, K.G., Sino-Soviet Conflict, op. cit., p. 19.

72. Ibid., p. 54

73. Gelman, Harry, The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking Against China, op. cit., pp. vii-viii.

74. Pravda, and Izvestia, June 5, 1979, p. 4, cited in CDSP, Vol, XXXI, No. 23, 1979, p. 6.

75. Lieberthal, K.G., Sino-Soviet Conflict, op. cit., p. 19.

76. Li, Huichuan, "Crux of Sino-Soviet Boundary Question," op. cit., pp. 13-15.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE "ACADEMIC WAR"

During the last decade, while tension continued to haunt the Sino-Soviet frontier, and while border talks went on without much prospect for success, a new aspect of this enduring boundary dispute came to the fore: a significant "academic war." Both the PRC and the USSR made great efforts to explore the background to the formation of their boundaries in order to substantiate their respective positions through historical evidence. Hence, the 1970s were characterized by the burgeoning of official publications of both countries. Since the present frontier conflict owes itself fundamentally to history, the "paper war" can well be defined as a "war" on historical issues.

A comparison of the various Sino-Russian boundary lines stipulated by the various treaties reveals that "immense areas of Chinese territory were lost to Czarist Russia during the latter part of the Ching dynasty."[2] But, in the past and in the present, it has remained both a delicate and formidable issue as to how to interpret the changing sovereignty over these territories.

The Cause of the "Academic War"

It is exactly the differing interpretations of the nature of the Sino-Russian boundary treaties that have given rise to this far-ranging "academic debate" which in turn has escalated the overall dispute to a higher and more complex ideological level.

After the Chenpao Island incidents in the spring of 1969,[3] fierce governmental exchanges occurred between the PRC and the USSR, with one statement after another being released. On March 12, 1969, Beijing declared that the Island in dispute "has always been China's territory."[4] "Before 1860, the Wusuli River...was still an inland river of China. It was only after the Opium War in the 19th century when the capitalist powers, one after another imposed unequal treaties on China, that the Wusuli River was stipulated as forming part of the boundary between China and Russia in the Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking of 1860."[5]

Moscow appeared at the time to have little interest in discussing the history of the frontier, especially the period before the Opium War. Without any mention of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk (1689),[6] the Soviets claimed that the Sino-Russian Treaty of Aigun (1858), the Sino-Russian Treaty of Tientsin (1858), and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking

(1860) were not only valid but also equal in nature. The Kremlin asserted that "The question of some sort of unequal treaties...is a fabrication from beginning to end."[7]

On May 24, 1969, Beijing reaffirmed that, "The Treaties Relating to the Present Sino-Soviet Boundary Are All Unequal Treaties Imposed on China by Tsarist Russian Imperialism."[8] The Chinese reasoned that the entire region, which is generally known as Soviet Far East, had originally been the territory of China, and that this fact had been recognized by the Russian Empire in 1689 by the official conclusion of the Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk. It was not until tsarist Russia imposed on China the Sino-Russian Treaties of Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860) that China was forcibly deprived of the territory in question. The main reason the Chinese made this argument so strongly is that the Soviets themselves acknowledged these facts during the period from 1917 to 1961, but tried thereafter to avoid any such admission. By the summer of 1969, however, the Chinese presentation of the historical aspect of the dispute left the Kremlin no way in which to continue avoiding the subject.

On June 7, 1969, Communist Party Chairman, L.I. Brezhnev, charged that the Chinese statement of May 24,

1969, was "filled with falsifications of history...It reiterated groundless claims of a territorial nature against the Soviet Union, and we resolutely reject these claims."[9] Six days later, the USSR released another statement, declaring that it was China that, in the seventeenth century, "organized a series of military campaigns against the Russian settlers in Albazin Province on the Amur."[10] The boundary treaties of the nineteenth century were not unequal since the treaties were "concluded 'by common consent for the sake of the great, eternal and mutual friendship of our two states'..."[11]

The Chinese, naturally, found it impossible to accept the Soviet interpretation of the frontier's history. On October 8, 1969, Beijing issued another lengthy statement, accusing the Soviets of falsification of history. It pointed out that, by denying historical facts and the verdict laid down by K. Marx, F. Engels and V.I. Lenin in regard to Russian annexation of China's territory, the Soviet leaders had treacherously betrayed Marxism-Leninism. In order to bring the point home, Beijing asked the question: "Historically was it China which committed aggression against Russia, or was it Russia which committed aggression against China?"[12]

This time, however, Moscow failed to present any answering statement. It appears that this failure to

respond not only lies in the fact that border negotiations were about to be resumed, but also in the fact that Moscow found the Chinese argument difficult to rebut. Regardless of what the motivation was, one thing seemed clear, and that was that Moscow was not about to acknowledge a "defeat." The Kremlin would find it necessary only to change the "battlefield."

Handicapped by the weight of historical evidence,[13] Moscow apparently decided to adopt a long-term strategy of substantiating its position by producing a large quantity of new supportive academic publications. The Kremlin seemed determined to challenge the fact that the Heilong/Amur and Wusuli/Ussuri territories had been governed by the Chinese Empire until the middle of the nineteenth century. This time, however, it was the Soviet "scholars" who stood in the forefront of the battle.[14]

Consequently, the early 1970s witnessed a major undertaking by Moscow to revise its earlier publications which were in contradiction to its present position. For instance, Ye. M. Zhukov, who is the Director of the Institute of World History of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Chairman of the National Committee of Soviet Historians, stated in the 1956 edition of the book, History of International Relations in the Far East, that the Sino-Russian

Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk (1689) was concluded through negotiations based on equality. In 1973, when the third edition of the book appeared, however, the same editor and author presented a totally different conclusion: the Treaty was an "unequal one" which tsarist Russia signed under immense military pressure.[15] The Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsyklopedia, published in the same year, also replaced the statements made in previous editions concerning the boundary treaties with entirely different conclusions.[16] These are only two of the numerous works from the early 1970s which presented substantially new interpretations of the early history of Sino-Russian frontier relations.[17]

In 1973, the Soviet Government published a special decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation changing into Russian some of the Han and Manchu names of a number of towns and cities in the Soviet Far East.[18] This move further demonstrated the Kremlin's strong intent to eliminate any traces of prior Chinese possession of the territory. In the later 1970s, Moscow began publishing articles and books almost entirely based on the publications of the previous years with the intent of justifying the present position of the Soviet Government on the dispute.

The Chinese, who appeared to be the "victor" of the debate in 1969, were, at first, caught unprepared by

the Soviet challenge. It was not until the middle of the 1970s that scholarly works began to appear in notable numers, among which were two valuable reference books, Soviet Fabrication and the Truth of History (1977) and A Brief History of Tsarist Russia's Aggression and Expansion (1975).[19]

The publication in 1978 of a series of volumes, Sha E Qinhua Shi (History of Tsarist Russia's Aggression against China), indicated that the Chinese had become more alert to Moscow's efforts in redrawing the "picture" of Sino-Russian frontier relations. The series was based not only on Chinese archives, but also on Russian, Soviet and non-partisan materials. It had such a great impact on the dispute that a special "scientific" conference was held in Moscow the following year with the express purpose of discussing the issues in order to wage a "struggle against Maoist falsifications in the field of history."[20] This conference was cosponsored by the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee. It appears quite clear, therefore, that the "academic war" is not merely a disagreement among "scholars" of the two countries, but rather a "war" between the two respective governments.

The Question of the Historical Possession of the Two-River Territories

According to the Soviets, history and historical ethnography play "a definite role in settling territorial disputes."[21] "To establish the right of possession" depends largely on the "original discovery or length of possession" of a territory.[22] This explains why one of the key components of the Sino-Soviet boundary dispute is the proper relationship between historical possession and ethnographic factors in regard to the Heilong/Amur and Wusuli/Ussuri territories.

In the early 1970s, Soviet scholars put forward two essential notions in an attempt to justify Russian seizure of China's two-river territories in the mid-nineteenth century. First, Moscow asserted that it was the Russians who first opened the area:

> the expedition headed by V. Poyarkov began exploring the Amur River basin... from 1643 to 1646...The estuary of the Amur was explored by an expedition headed by S. Kosoy in 1647 and 1648... which was followed from 1649 to 1653 by the well-known explorer, E. Khabarov, whereupon the Amur area was officially joined with Russia.[23]

Secondly, Moscow contended that:

> The lands which Russia annexed were a wild taiga territory with small nomad tribes...of Daurs, Duchers, Evenks, Nivkhs and Natkhs, with no state organisation.[24]

The regions "were not inhabited by the Manchus, to say nothing of the Chinese."[25] The Russian Empire had occupied "the virtually uninhabited lands of the Amur and the Maritime areas then not belonging to any country."[26]

As discussed in Chapter One, in the seventeenth century, the Russians infiltrated China's Heilong/Amur valley but failed to establish their rule over the territory owing to the effective resistance waged by the Manchu authorities and their native subjects. Moreover, the Russian "explorers" only reached some spots in the Heilong/Amur valley, but did not "explore" the Wusuli/Ussuri territory located futher to the south. Therefore, the Soviet claim that, by the 1680s, the Heilong/Amur territory and the Wusuli/Ussuri territory (i.e., the Maritime areas) were "joined with Russia" appears totally incomprehensible and very difficult to accept.[27]

In Beijing, the Soviet claims aroused a furious reaction. The Chinese charged the Soviet scholars with falsification of history. A major counter-offensive came in early 1974 with the publication of a series of articles in the Journal Lishi Yanjiu (Historical Studies).[28]

Basing their studies on the archives of various Chinese Dynasties, Chinese scholars concluded that more than nine centuries before the Russian "explorers" reached the Heilong/Amur valley, the region had been already

explored by the Chinese and the territory had become a part of the Chinese Empire. Since the Tang Dynasty (618-907), various Chinese governments had set up local governing institutions, and collected taxes from the local people. Moreover, years before V. Poyarkov's exploratory "trip" to the Heilong/Amur valley, China's Qing Dynasty, with the Manchus as the ruling race, had re-established its control over the entire region. The Chinese, therefore, pointed out that the Soviet contention that the Heilong/Amur valley belonged to no country as of the 1640s was a pure fabrication.[29]

The Chinese, while presenting reliable historical evidence, seemed, nevertheless, not to have given enough emphasis to the difficulties which they experienced in governing the region which was essentially rural before the Qing Dynasty. The feudal Chinese Empire, which was multi-national in nature, covered such a vast territory that the country found itself quite often in the throes of civil wars, the rise and fall of dynasties and even the coexistence of rival regimes. Therefore, it would be very surprising indeed if one governing system of a particular dynasty survived without change. The historical archives that the Chinese scholars relied upon are nevertheless not in question, as it is well-known that "From the Tang period... a

highly organized College of Historians (Shih Yuan) took charge of the compilation, not only of history of former dynasties but also of the materials from which the history of their own times would be written."[30]

Concerning the ethnography of the Heilong/Amur valley in the mid-seventeenth century, the Chinese, too, presented an entirely different picutre from that offered by the Soviets. While the Soviet scholars claimed that the Heilong/Amur valley was not inhabitated by Manchus or the Han people, the Chinese claimed that the region was mainly inhabited by the Manchus, and even by a limited number of the Han people. The ethnography of China's Northeast appears to have remained a mystery to the outside world until this argument between the Chinese and the Soviets. It is worthwhile to take a look at the history in more detail.

The tribes inhabiting the two-river territories in China's Northeast are mentioned for the first time in the world record in the Annals of China, 1100 B.C. They were then known as the Shushens, and paid tribute to the Chinese Kings and Emperors in arrows, bows, fur-clothing, and sables from that time forth.[31] During the Tang period, the Shushens were recorded as Mohes.[32] In 907, when the Tang Dynasty collapsed, the Mohe tribes were subdued by the Qidan (Khidan) tribes; the Qidan

tribes who lived around the Xilamulen River basin west of the Liao River, established a rival dynasty of their own called, first, Qidan and, later, Liao. During the Liao period, the Mohes were known as Nuzhens (Niuchzen).[33]

In 1115, the Nuzhen tribes overthrew Qidan rule, and established another rival dynasty called Jin (i.e., Chin, 1115-1234)[34] In the thirteenth century, however, the Nuzhen tribes and other ethnic groups of China's Northeast were all conquered by the Mongolians. During the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368), with the Mongolians as the ruling race of the Chinese Empire, the population in the two-river territories was decimated, mainly because of the harsh government policies, such as the excessive use of man-power for military purpose in the region. It was not until the overthrow of the Yuan Dynasty and the establishment of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) that the population in the region began to increase gradually.

During the Ming Dynasty, the Nuzhens began to grow powerful. They were now divided into three main regional groups. Those who lived in the area from the Yalu River in the south and the present Fushun city in the west, to the Upper Songhua River in the northeast were known as "Jianzhou Nuzhens;" those who inhabited the region north and east of the present city Kaiyuan to the middle Songhua River, were the "Haixi Nuzhens;" and those

in the Lower Songhua, the Heilong and the Wusuli Rivers were the "Yeren (wild) Nuzhens."[35]

As discussed in Chapter One, in 1616, Nurharci, a chieftain of the Jianzhou Nuzhens rebelled against the Ming Court and established a shadow dynasty of his own called the Hou Jin.[36] As a result of the close links between the Northeast and Central China, quite a number of officials in his government were actually not Nuzhens but Han nationals.[37] In 1635, when Huang Taizong, successor to Nurharci, forbade the use of the name Nuzhens in reference to his people and decreed that the name Manchu should be used instead,[38] it was believed that the change was a result of the advice of his Han Councillors as an attempt to obscure the fact that his people were referred to in the Chinese palace archives as Nuzhens. In 1636, Huang Taizong changed the name of his dynasty to Qing.[39]

In the mid-seventeenth century, when the Russians intruded into the Heilong/Amur valley, the inhabitants there were predominantly Manchus. Hence, the entire region was subsequently called Manchuria. According to the Qing Dynasty's archives, the Manchu clans were scattered all around the Heilong/Amur and Wusuli/Ussuri territories: the Fulecha clan in the Lower Wusuli/Ussuri valley; the Yanzha clan in the Wusuli/Ussuri and Yalan River basins;

the Wuzhala clan in the Lower Heilong/Amur River basin; the Jingqili clan, Boholi clan, Guobeili clan, Geerdasu clan and the Esuli clan in the Jingqili/Zeya River basin north of the Heilong/Amur River, and the Ezhuo clan in Yaksa/Albazin. The Annals of the Qing Dynasty of the period recorded that, among the 625 Manchu clans, one hundred and thirty-nine, which constituted more than one fifth of the total number, were living in the Heilong/Amur River territory.[40]

In addition to the Manchu clans, the region was inhabited by other ethnic groups who were subject to the Qing Court. The Solon, Daurian, and Dochero tribes inhabited the vast area from the Upper Heilong/Amur valley to the Outer Xingan/Stanovoy Mountains.[41] The Hozhe and Feiyako tribes, also known as the Dog-breeding tribes, inhabited the Lower Heilong/Amur basin.[42] The Orochon tribes, also known as the Reindeer tribes, were scattered mainly north of the Heilong/Amur with a small number of them living on the Kuye/Sakhalin Island. (The Qidan tribes, whose home-land was the Xilamulun River basin located in an area far south and west, had by now merged mainly with the Mongolian tribes or the Han nationals.)[43] Until 1640s, there appears to have been only a negligible number of Han nationals in the Heilong/Amur valley, although southern Manchuria, particularly the lands along the Liao and Hun

Rivers, had been ethnically Han since the third century B.C., with over one million Han peasants living in the vast region.[44]

The population in the two-river territories decreased in the 1640s. This was mainly due to two reasons. Firstly, after the Qing Government established its jurisdiction over the two-river territories during the period from 1616 to 1640, the region was regarded as a main source of military recruits, and most of the males were drafted into the army. The Manchu armies that moved into Central China in 1644 consisted of a large numbers of conscripts from the Heilong/Amur valley. Secondly, during the first wave of Russian invasion into the Amur basin, the Manchu government in China, having been tied down by domestic problems and in no position to send sufficient armies and military supplies into the area, tried to halt the Russian advance by creating a supply problem for the invaders through a "scorched-earth" policy.[45] The tribes were ordered to destroy their grain and to leave their homelands. Russian atrocities were also a major factor in the decrease of the population. As. E.G. Ravenstein points out,

> When the Russians first arrived on the Amur, the natives cultivated fields and kept cattle. Ten years afterwards these fields had become deserts; and a country, which formerly exported grain, could not even support its own reduced population.[46]

According to recent Soviet sources, in the seventeenth century, the native population in the Heilong/Amur territory was over 40,000.[47] This figure, however, appears, in all probability, to be lower than the actual figure, since many nomadic families would be hard to locate. Judging from the various records available, it seems that the actual population in the 1630s in the region could well have been double the Soviet estimate, or even more.

Both Chinese archives, various Western sources, and even quite a number of Russian/Soviet publications, show that the claim made by tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union that E. Khabarov was "successful in establishing Russian power on the Amur" was "an inflated claim, because both Poyarkov and Khabarov were strongly resisted by the local natives and their expedition resulted in a Manchu force being sent to the Heilong/Amur to drive out Khabarov and the Russians."[48]

In view of the excellent historical arguments presented by Chinese scholars, the Soviets in the later 1970s dramatically changed their approach to the problem and began to accuse the Chinese of placing undue emphasis on "individual facts."[49] Without dropping their "falsification charge" against the Chinese, the Soviet scholars now concluded that, before the coming of the Russians to

the Heilong/Amur valley, China did govern the region, although "on paper, more than physically."[50] At the same time, they withdrew their previous claim that "the Amur area was officially joined with Russia" by 1653; they carefully replaced this notion with another, which asserted that it was only

> By the beginning of the 1680s the cis-Amur territories... became part of the Russian State and were known as Albazinsk Province.[51]

These contradictory "explanations" offered by Soviet scholars invariably led a large number of observers to question the quality of the Soviet publications, and the consistency of Moscow's positions. In any case, this shows that Moscow's claim to "Russians having opened the area" is not only unconvincing but also misleading.

The question of the historical possesion over the two-river territories is, in essence, not disputable. The Chinese archives, the only reliable source for the study of the pre-1644 history of the region, have clearly shown that more than nine centuries before the Russians learned about the existence of the Heilong/Amur territory, China had proclaimed its sovereignty over the region, and exercised its administrative power over the native tribes. The sporadic Russian intrusions into the

Heilong/Amur valley from 1644 to 1689 did not enable tsarist Russia to establish its sovereignty in the territory, though, at various times, a few short-lived military outposts were constructed. This was clearly underlined by the conclusion of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk in 1689 by which the Russian Empire officially recognized China's sovereignty over the entire two-river territory.

The Dispute on the First Sino-Russian Boundary Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk, 1689

Another dramatic battle in this "academic debate" has centred on the interpretation of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk (1689). The main questions were whether the Treaty had drawn a boundary line for the two empires and whether the Treaty was equal in nature.

As discussed in Chapter One, the Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk was the first boundary treaty concluded between the government of China and that of the tsarist Russia. It was signed on September 27, 1689, and it officially set up the boundary line in the Far East between the two countries for the first time.(The text of the Treaty is given in Appendix II). Before the boundary quarrel between the PRC and the USSR became overt in 1963, the Treaty was not in dispute. Both the Chinese

Government and the Soviet Government held that it was equal in nature and concluded through negotiations based on equality.

The Diplomatic Dictionary, edited by A.A. Gromyko, Vice-Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, stated in 1961 that: the Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk was the result of "official, equal negotiations,"[52] and that "the Treaty had strengthened and expanded the neighborly relations between the two peoples."[53]

P.T. Yakovlyova, a Soviet scholar, pointed out in 1958 that "the Treaty of Nerchinsk between Russia and China was concluded on the principle of equality,"[54] and that "there was no article in the Treaty that had hindered the sovereignty of either Russia or China."[55] The Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsyklopedia (1954 edition) observed that "the Treaty of Nerchinsk was a great victory for Russian diplomacy."[56] The official Soviet publication Russian-Chinese Relations in the Seventeenth Century reiterated this view in 1960, stating that "From the point of view of international law, the Treaty of Nerchinsk of 1689 between Russia and China, was the first treaty concluded on the basis of equality and mutual benefit."[57]

This is probably the very reason that the Soviets

did not bother to mention the Treaty in their lengthy statements of 1969, even though some of the other treaties were raised by them and discussed.[58] The Soviets must have realized that their previous interpretation of the Treaty did not allow them any advantage over the Chinese, especially in the debate over such questions as "historical possession" and "unequal treaties."

As a result, the new edition of the Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsyklopedia (1973 edition) changed the previous appraisal of the Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk, and contended that

> In 1689, however, the Ching government constrained the Russian government by direct military threat to sign the Treaty of Nerchinsk of 1689. Russia conceded to the Ching Empire its possessions on the right bank of the Argun River and on part of the left and right banks of the Amur.[59]

This new stand by Moscow carried three major implications. First, the Soviets denied the equal character of the Treaty. Secondly, they suggested that it was China which annexed "Russian lands." And finally, the PRC was still "occupying" some "Russian lands" on the right bank of the Erhkuna/Argun River.

The next move made by the Kremlin was to undermine the legal validity and the historical significance of the Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk. Moscow first argued,

in 1972, that "the formulations of the border articles of the Treaty of Nerchinsk are not identical in the Russian, Manchu and Latin texts,"[60] and that "the reading of the texts was made more difficult by the fact that no maps were annexed to the Treaty..."[61] The Kremlin, nevertheless, still held that "under the terms of the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk Russia and China had demarcated the lands from the Argun River to the Ud River."[62]

By the end of the decade, with the intensification of the academic debate, the Soviet writers, however, had developed still another interpretation of the Treaty, asserting that

> The differing texts of the Nerchinsk make it an extremely flawed legal document. The delimitation of the border in this treaty was absolutely unsatisfactory in view of discrepacies in the text and the vague geographic points of reference it specified. The boundary line was virtually nonexistent.[63]

The most important points embedded in this notion seem to be the contention that the Treaty was "unsatisfactory," and that "The boundary line was virtually nonexistent." In contrast to previous Soviet interpretations, this one constitutes a substantial development in shaping an entirely new appraisal of the Treaty and further demonstrates the Kremlin's determination not to lose any of the "battles" to the PRC.

This new interpretation by Moscow naturally created an uproar in Beijing.[64] The persistence of the Soviets in continually revising their attitude toward the Treaty was frustrating to the Chinese. An authoritative article appeared in Beijing Review reiterating that

> the Treaty of Nipchu, the first ever concluded between China and Russia, was signed in 1689 following negotiations held on the basis of equality when the two feudal empires were by and large equally powerful.[65]

Beijing also pointed out that the equal nature and the significance of the Treaty had been officially supported by Moscow itself until the early 1960s, and that the Kremlin's new appraisal of the Treaty inevitably complicated the overall Sino-Soviet boundary dispute.[66]

Moreover, the Chinese reasoned that the provisions of the Treaty were undeniably fair. According to the terms of the Treaty, "China recovered part of its territory occupied by tsarist Russia."[67] The Russian Empire, as result of China's concessions, obtained the area east of Lake Baikal and near Nerchinsk as its territory. In addition, Russia obtained important trading privileges and was able to realize its aim of expanding trade with China.[68] The conclusion of the Treaty was obviously not attributable to anything but mutual needs and desires.

The Chinese also argued that there existed no military pressure which forced the Russian Empire to sign the Treaty. In 1689, Th. A. Golovin, the Russian plenipotentiary for the boundary negotiations, brought with him a military force of "around two thousand" while Russian troops nearby also may have numbered another "two thousand."[69] The Chinese representatives who arrived in Nipchu/Nerchinsk by land were accompanied by 1,400 soldiers while a local force of about 1,500 accompanied the representatives who arrived by water.[70] The Russian troops were outfitted with the latest European armaments. In contrast the Chinese were still relying on the primitive weaponry such as bows and swords.[71]

> Therefore, neither in the number of the military personnel nor in the military equipment, did there exist any so-called Chinese military pressure on the Russians.[72]

As for the question of the alleged "discrepancies" in the various texts of the 1689 Treaty, it was pointed out that only the Latin text was official, to which both sides had fixed their seals. According to international law, only this text was the official and authoritive version, whereas the Manchu and Russian copies, which were signed and sealed by only one side (see Chapter One), could be regarded as nothing more than semi-official documents. According to the Latin text there was no lack of

clarity in regard to the provisions that delimited the boundary line between the two empires.[73]

The Chinese view appears to have been commonly shared by most prominent scholars in the world. For instance, in 1961, Joseph Sebes, who devoted several years in the study of the 1689 Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk, concluded that although the sequence or paragraphing of the various copies of the Treaty differed to a certain extent,

> From the point of view of textual criticism...Our concern, however, is primarily with regard to contents; and there the differences are neither formal nor substantial.[74]

The textual consistency of the Latin text and the Manchu and Russian texts is also shown in the diary of T. Pereira, one of the eyewitnesses to the signing, who stated that "The treaty had to be written three times because one word was translated incorrectly."[75] The well-known English historian, G.W. Prothero, also pointed out, in 1920, that in regard to the argument on the ambiguity of the provisions the

> contention does not seem to be valid, for the first article of the treaty defines the boundary to the eastern ocean as clearly as could be done in the circumstances, only leaving the exact line immediately abutting on the Pacific coast for delimitation with reference to the river Ud.

> Moreover, boundary stones were duly placed and the river boundaries were annually inspected.[76]

Needless to say, the signing of the Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk (1689) owes more to the historical conditions and the common desire of the two empires (China and Russia) to establish stable frontier relations than to any influence or undue "pressure" by either side. By signing this Treaty, China further consolidated its control over the Northeast, while the Russian Empire not only benefited by China's recognition of its possession of the Nipchu/Nerchinsk areas, but gained China's recognition of the vast stretches of its newly annexed Eastern Siberia as well. To a certain extent, it was the signing of the 1689 Treaty with China that enabled tsarist Russia to successfully colonize the inhospitable lands of northeast Asia.

In view of the advantages gained by the Russian Empire through the conclusion of the Treaty and in view of the positive appraisal of the Treaty by the Kremlin prior to 1961, Moscow's argument about the "unfairness" of the document failed to convince not only the Chinese but also other observers. The fundamental cause of this change of attitude on the part of the Soviet Union was Moscow's need to justify the annexation by tsarist Russia in the middle of the nineteenth century of the two-river

territories. These were the territories which were recognized formally by the Russian Empire in the Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk as belonging to China.

A rather interesting aspect of this argument is that the newly-formulated Soviet position of the 1970s has revived the rhetoric of the tsarist government when it was preparing its military occupation over the two-river territories in the nineteenth century. An alarming result of this shift of position on the Soviet side is that in this battle over the legitimacy of the Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk, the Soviets declared for the first time ever that the PRC was still holding "Russian territory" on the right bank of the Erhkuna/Argun River.[77] Whether or not the USSR will follow the footsteps of the tsarist Russia, by putting its claim into action, only the future can tell. In any case, the quarrel over the Treaty has reflected the intensity and the complexity of the overall Sino-Soviet boundary dispute.

The Question of the Unequal Treaties

The most intriguing question in the "academic war" is the issue of the unequal treaties. There are two major aspects to this dispute: the Chinese attempt to evoke an official admission from the USSR of the unequal nature of the Sino-Russian treaties relating to the present

Sino-Soviet boundary; and Moscow's efforts to do away with the concept of unequal treaties, especially in regard to the treaties that deprived China of the Hei-long/Amur and Wusuli/Ussuri territories. The first aspect is an obvious and continuing source of concern to the Kremlin, because the Soviets assume that Beijing's intention cannot be simply to achieve a moral victory in the boundary dispute, but represents an attempt to lay the groundwork for a possible recovery of the territories sometime in the future. It is the latter aspect, however,that poses the most complicated issue in the quarrel.

Ever since the early 1960s, when the border dispute emerged as a public issue, the question of unequal treaties was placed in the limelight. Even at that time, though, the term "unequal treaty" was not new to either side. During the years between 1842 to 1901, China had been forced to sign a number of land-ceding and concession-leasing treaties with Britain, France, tsarist Russia and other countries. The Sino-Russian treaties in question were concluded during this period of time, and were regarded as unequal treaties by all Chinese governments and until very recently by the Soviet Government as well.

The official Soviet acknowledgement of the unequal nature of these treaties was exemplified by the 1919 Soviet

declaration to China and by the second declaration of 1920.[78] The Soviet Government, at the time, unilaterally declared "as void all the treaties concluded by the former Government of Russia with China, renounces all the annexations of Chinese territory...and returns to China free of charge, and for ever, all that was ravenously taken from her by the Tsar's Government..." [79]

As result of this Soviet position, the USSR and China reached, on May 31, 1924, the "Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions Between China and the Soviet Union," and the two countries formally agreed to "annul...all Conventions, Treaties, Agreements, Protocols, Contracts, ect., concluded between the Government of China and the Tsarist Government and to replace them with new treaties, agreements, etc., on the basis of equality." [80]

This Soviet attitude toward these treaties was recorded in many of the Soviet publications of the time. In 1926, the Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsyklopedia pointed out that the Sino-Russian Treaty of Aigun(1858) was "the first firm step taken by Russian imperialism to occupy Chinese territory." [81] The Diplomatic Dictionary edited by A. Ya. Vyshinsky, the former Soviet Foreign Minister, explicitly stated, in 1950, that the 1860 Sino-British, Sino-French and Sino-Russian

Treaties of Peking were "a series of unequal treaties Britain, France and Russia imposed on China through the 1859-60 British-French war against China."[82] The Diplomatic Dictionary published in 1961 under the editorship of the present Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs and First Vice-Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, A.A. Gromyko, also admitted that the Treaty of Peking was an unequal one.[83]

On account of their own statements, the Kremlin leaders found in 1963 that it was difficult to reject Beijing's argument that these Sino-Russian boundary treaties were unequal in nature.[84] Moscow, however, realized the political implications the topic would have on the boundary dispute. The Soviets, therefore, made their stance clear, declaring that:

> References by Chinese propaganda and Chinese diplomacy to the allegedly unequal character of the old treaties... would be politically inadmissible even in the event they were historically accurate.[85]

In essence, Moscow hinted rather baldly that, if the PRC continued to mention the unequal nature of these treaties, the USSR would then reconsider its interpretation of these treaties, irrespective of what may have happened in the past. The Chinese might have got the message, but were clearly not in the mood to accept this kind of Soviet political pressure. Meanwhile, this clear

change of attitude on the question by Moscow further convinced Beijing of the Kremlin's departure from the Marxist-Leninist principles it had observed in earlier years.

What is worth noting here is that this Soviet statement appears to mark the turning point in the Kremlin's position concerning the nature of these Sino-Russian treaties. As the boundary dispute intensified and as military clashes occurred in early 1969, the very term "unequal treaty" was no longer acceptable to the policy-makers in Moscow. According to them, it became not only "politically inadmissible," but also historically "inaccurate," and, even, "a fabrication from beginning to end," to regard these treaties as unequal in nature.[86] They contended that the statements in the preambles of the treaties testified to their "equal and fair nature." In response to this, Beijing, on October 8, 1969, stated that

> The Soviet Government...quoted hypocritical empty words from the treaties, trying hard to prove that they were equal treaties. This only further reveals that the Soviet Government has lost its reason in its effort to justify the old tsarist crimes of aggression against China.[87]

The PRC's position in late 1969 was clear that Moscow should recognize, as it did before 1961, that the treaties

imposed on China by tsarist Russia in the nineteenth century were unequal in nature.[88]

But the Soviets were not willing to do so. In early 1970s, they argued that all the unequal and secret treaties that tsarist Russia had concluded with foreign states, including China, were annulled by decrees issued by V.I. Lenin immediately after the Great October Socialist Revolution.[89] Moreover, they contended that neither the declarations of 1919 and 1920 nor the Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1924 "contained indications...to the effect that the treaties fixing the course of the present Soviet-Chinese border belong to the category of unequal or secret treaties."[90]

In addition to the official Soviet position as expressed in Soviet publications prior to 1961, the Chinese contended that the documents of the early 1920s did indicate that the Sino-Russian boundary treaties belonged to the category of unequal treaties and were to be replaced. They further pointed out that both the 1920 declaration and the 1924 Sino-Soviet Agreement, when stipulating the annulment of the nineteenth century treaties and the replacement of them with new ones on the basis of equality, had unambiguously used the term "ALL." Thus, the Sino-Russian treaties which established the Sino-Soviet boundary were clearly included. In this respect,

Article VII of the 1924 Sino-Soviet Agreement, had, in particular, stipulated that the two parties "redemarcate their national boundaries"[91] at a particular conference to be held, and "pending such redemarcation, to maintain the present boundaries."[92]

In 1972, a world atlas was published by the PRC in which the Chinese position on the question of unequal treaties was reiterated in the following way:

> From the fifties of the nineteenth century, within the short period of fifty years, (tsarist Russia) forced China, at times, to sign a series of unequal treaties, and annexed more than 1,500,000 square kilometres of China's territory.[93]

Moscow for its purpose reacted strongly. A special article appeared in Izvestia and alleged that Beijing's

> arguments are nothing less than outright claim on Soviet territory and an attempt to call into question the existing border between the U.S.S.R. and C.P.R...It is a well-known fact that there are no "unequal treaties"that defined the present border between the U.S.S.R. and the C.P.R.[94]

Meanwhile, Moscow developed another theory in explaining the nature of these nineteenth century treaties. It argued that

> The demarcation in the mid-19th century of the Amur and the Maritime areas should be considered in the context of the circumstances in which the Treaty of Nerchinsk was signed, for this is the only way to recreate the true picture of how the Russo-Chinese border was established in the area,

> and to refute the version, accepted in Chinese and Western historical writings about Russia's alleged "seizure" of Chinese territory. The truth is that under the 1689 Treaty, the Ching Empire seized a sizable piece of territory in the Amur area, but was forced to return a large part of what it had seized under the Treaties of 1858 and 1860.[95]

This pronouncement by Moscow, that China in the nineteenth century, had been forced "to return" some "Russian territory," further antagonized the Chinese. Beijing accused Moscow of not only fabricating history but also of being more aggressive and greedy than the tsarist government in claiming as "Russian" Chinese territory.[96]

Indeed, the Soviet statement, apart from admitting that China was unwilling to sign the Treaties of 1858 and 1860, can hardly be considered logically applicable to the study or resolution of boundary conflict. In terms of historical analysis, there is, first of all, a fundamental difference between the Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk (1689) and the Treaties of Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860). As was shown in Chapter One, no formal boundary line between the two empires was delimited until the signing of the Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk. Russian infiltration into the Heilong/Amur valley during the period from 1644 to 1689 was never accepted by the Qing Empire: it considered such action as aggression. By concluding

the Treaty of 1689, however, the Russian Empire officially recognized China's legitimate possession of, and sovereignty over, the entire Heilong/Amur and Wusuli/Ussuri territory. For nearly two centuries tsarist Russia formally recognized and respected China's sovereignty over the two-river territories in question. Then, tsarist Russia, by applying military forces, imposed on China the Treaties of Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860), and, hence, deprived the Qing Empire of the two-river territories. Therefore, the Treaties of 1858 and 1860 were the result of Russia's military aggression into the territory which Russia acknowledged as belonging to China.

Moreover, as of 1858 and 1860, the region's ethnography also differed greatly from that of 1689. When the Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk was concluded the inhabitants of the territories were predominantly Manchus and other native tribes. There were only a negligible number of Hans. By the time the Treaties of Aigun and Peking were signed, however, the Han population had reached an unprecedented level and the population in the region as a whole was much larger than 1689. In this respect, Iosef Gurvich, who based his research entirely on Russian archives, wrote that as of the middle of the nineteenth century the

> Basic inhabitants, the Chinese, lived all over the territory. They were occupied with agriculture, hunting, fishing and

> other forms of trade...The most densely populated Chinese villages were on both sides of the Amur-river and rivers, falling into Amur, which were the main means of communication in this region. Chinese ships maintained service on the Amur-river from the mouth of the river to the Russian border on the Argun-river.[97]

In view of the large Chinese population in the region, the Russian Empire could do nothing but agree in the Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking (1860) that:

> If there should exist lands colonized by Chinese subjects (in the above-mentioned areas) the Russian Government promises to allow these inhabitants to remain there and also to permit them to engage, as in the past, in hunting and fishing.[98]

In light of the above analysis,,it appears clear that, objectively speaking, the Treaties of 1858 and 1860 cannot properly be compared with the Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk of 1689. The nature of and the historical conditions of these two sets of treaties differ fundamentally. As commonly understood, there exist two main approaches to examine whether a treaty is equal or not. One is to analyze the provisions of the treaty; the other is to look into the circumstances under which the treaty was signed.

Various sources show that Russian military activity played an essential role in the signing of the

Treaties of Aigun and Peking. Some years before the conclusion of the Treaty of Aigun, Russian troops occupied the left bank of the Heilong/Amur. Before the conclusion of the Treaty of Peking of 1860, Russian troops occupied the Wusuli/Ussuri territory, and demolished Chinese military posts.[99] In this connection, E.G. Ravenstein presented a rough assessment of the Russian forces in the two-river territories before the signing of the Treaty of Peking (1860). According to his description:

> The Russians have established military posts along the whole course of the Amur, on the Usuri and at various harbours of the Channel of Tartary, down to Victoria Bay. The force in the territory in 1859 were as follows:
> 5 Battalions of regular Infantry...,
> 2 Regiments of Cossack Cavalry...,
> 2 Battalions of Cossack Infantry of the Amur...,
> 2 Battalions of Cossack Infantry of the Usuri...,
> 1 Battery of Field Artillery...,
> The 27th Equipage of the Navy...Since then, however, fresh forces have arrived...The report of the Minister of War speaks of 18,000 men sent during 1858-1860...[100]

As discussed in Chapter One, the Russian Empire carried out its military occupation of the Heilong/Amur territory in the early 1850s. Chinese archives show that the Qing government, from the period May 1855 to August 1857, delivered at least five official notes to the Russian government, protesting the latter's military occupation of her territory north of the Heilong/Amur River.

For example, on September 3, 1857 and again on November 9, 1857, the Qing government formally sent protesting notes to the Russian authorities, requesting the latter to withdraw their troops from China's territory.[101] Regardless of the strong reaction of the Qing Court, tsarist Russia continued to build up its military forces in the region, and finally forced I-shan, Chinese military Governor of the Heilongjiang Province, to sign the Treaty of Aigun in May 1858.

In regard to the Treaty of Aigun, A.W. Hummel tells us that the Russian Governor-General of Eastern Siberia, Muraviev

> proposed to make the Amur River the boundary between the two empires but I-shan maintained that the boundary set up by the Treaty of Nerchinsk should continue to be effective. After five days of fruitless meetings Muraviev, on the evening of the fifth day, tried a demonstration of force by setting off cannon on the left bank of the river. I-shan, frightened into submission, signed the treaty of Aigun the following day.[102]

The Chinese, apparently, "had no other course open to them, seeing that they did not have one serviceable cannon in the Amur region, the emperor's throne was tottering under the blows of the Taiping revolt and Canton was occupied by the British and French."[103] Russia's "persuasion of having on the Amur sufficient force to advance to Peking"[104]

seems to have been the deciding factor under the circumstances. Two years later, the Treaty of Peking was signed against a background of Russian military occupation of the Wusuli/Ussuri territory and British and French occupation of the Chinese capital, Beijing.[105] These historical facts explain why the Chinese insisted that these treaties were unequal in nature, a fact that the Soviet Government, until very recently, had also acknowledged.

Although Moscow attempted to deny the fact that these treaties were unequal in nature, some Soviet scholars' definitions of what constitutes an unequal treaty appear fully applicable to the treaties discussed above. Grigoryeva and Kostikov pointed out in 1975 that:

> From the standpoint of the generally accepted provisions of international law, in the broad sense any international act contradictory to the principles of sovereign equality, mutual advantage and voluntary will of the parties is understood as an unequal treaty.[106]

It is therefore surprising that they reach an opposite conclusion in regard to these Sino-Russian treaties.

As is known,

> International treaties are concluded generally on a reciprocal basis for the execution of certain rights and obligations between contracting parties...the principle of equality is normally the guiding rule of their provisions. Contrary to standard practice, many of China's treaties with foreign powers were unequal in nature, unilaterally beneficial to the latter at the expense of the former.[107]

A simple perusal of the provisions of the Sino-Russian Treaties of Aigun and Peking will lead inevitably to the conclusion that neither of these treaties was mutually advantageous. These treaties unilaterally granted the Russian Empire large tracts of China's territory, which tsarist Russia had, in the Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk, officially recognized as belonging to China.

Numerous documents and publications have presented the view that the nineteenth century Sino-Russian treaties were not concluded on the basis of mutual benefit or sovereign equality, but against the will of the Chinese side. The refusal of ratify the Treaty of Aigun by the Qing government and the difficulties surrounding the Treaty of Peking both indicate that the Chinese never considered these to be fair agreements.[108]

Indeed, the quarrel between the Chinese and the Soviet governments over the unequal treaties was not caused by the inherent nature of the question, but rather by the change of attitude on the part of the Soviet Union. There have, so far, been no signs that Moscow will shift back to its pre-1961 position, nor that the Chinese will change their view. It seems, therefore, that the quarrel over the unequal nature of the nineteenth century Sino-Russian treaties will continue to remain a formidable issue in the foreseeable future.

Conclusion

The "academic war" is an inevitable side-product of the boundary dispute between the PRC and the USSR. Soviet reinterpretation of Sino-Russian frontier history in an attempt to substantiate Moscow's present position, and Chinese efforts to check this new stand posed by the Soviet Union, are the two major motivating forces behind the scene.

The Soviet position on the various historical issues has changed considerably since 1917. V.I. Lenin held that the "policy of the tsarist government in China is a criminal policy"[109] and that "the European governments (the Russian Government among the very first) had already started to partition China"[110] in the nineteenth century. The Soviet Government of 1917-1924 not only condemned tsarist Russia's annexation of China's territory, but also was inclined to replace the old unequal treaties with new ones on the basis of equality. The Soviet Government from 1925 to 1961 still maintained that it was Russia that historically carried out aggression against China, and that the related boundary treaties were unequal in nature. Even N.S. Khrushchev did not deny these facts. He merely told the Chinese leaders that "In many cases, references to history are of no help,"[111] and that the question of unequal treaties, even though historically accurate,

was politically inadmissable.

It was during the L.I. Brezhnev period that the Soviets thoroughly reinterpreted the history of Sino-Russian boundary relations, complicating the very complex dispute even further. The boundary policy pursued by L.I. Brezhnev appears to the Chinese to be even more aggressive than that of the tsarist government, especially in its rejection of the equality of the Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk (1689), and of the unequal nature of the Treaties of Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860).

The Chinese, on the other hand, have been consistent in evaluating these historical events. They were apparently extremely alarmed by Soviet claim that the PRC was still holding some sort of "Russian territory" on the right bank of the Erhkuna/Argun, even though the claim seemed to be a possible tactical maneuver by the Soviet side for obtaining a better bargaining position at the negotiating table.

In sum, the "academic war" has constituted a significant dimension of the Sino-Soviet boundary dispute in the 1970s. It has provided an indispensable source of information for examining the intensity of the conflict and for shedding a great deal of light on the mystery surrounding Sino-Soviet border negotiations. It seems still difficult at this stage to fully assess the reper-

cussions of this fierce academic debate. The prospects for the quarrel, however, are clear. Moscow, in the coming years, will further its strategy of consolidating its position with timely "new" results of "academic studies." The Chinese, on their part, will, in every probability, be very unlikely to stop challenging the various "new Soviet theories" concerning the Sino-Russian frontier relations. The question of how to interpret tsarist Russia's acquisition, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, of large tracts of Chinese territory will continue to animate both scholars and political statesmen well into the future, as it did in the past and does at present.

CHAPTER FOUR: NOTES

1. A large number of publications were produced during the 1970s by the PRC and the USSR. For more information, see: Appendix I of this thesis.

2. Tung, William L., China and the Foreign Powers, New York, Oceana Publications Inc., 1970, p. 352.

3. See: footnote 7 in the Introduction of this thesis.

4. "Chenpao Island Has Always Been China's Territory," Peking Review, No. 11, 1969, p. 14.

5. "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China (May 24, 1969)," Peking Review, No. 22, May 30, 1969, p. 3.

6. "Statement of the U.S.S.R. Government (March 29, 1969)," Pravda, March 30, 1969, pp. 1-2, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXI, No. 13, pp. 3-5.

7. Ibid., p. 3.

8. "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China (May 24, 1969),", op. cit., p. 4.

9. "L.I. Brezhnev's Speech at the International Conference of Communist and Workers Parties," Pravda, June 8, 1969, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXI, No. 23, 1969, p. 9.

10. "Statement of the U.S.S.R. Government," Pravda, June 14, 1969, pp. 1-2, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXI, No. 24, 1969, pp. 10.

11. Ibid.

12. "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China (October 8, 1969)," Peking Review, No. 41, 1969, pp. 8-12.

13. Until 1969, official publications of the USSR still held that the Sino-Russian boundary treaties of the nineteenth century were unequal in nature. See: Vyshinsky, A.Ya., ed., Diplomatic Dictionary, Vol. 2 (1950 edition),Moscow, 1950, p. 344; Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsylopeida, Vol. 1 (1926 edition), Moscow, 1926, p. 756; footnote 4 of Chapter Three of this thesis.

14. In this "academic war," the Soviet side is well-organized, with high level officials, academics, and diplomatic personnel involved. For example, S.L. Tikhvinskiy, is the Director of the Department of Diplomatic History, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and also a Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR; M.S. Kapitsa , Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR is also a Professor at Moscow University; Ye.M. Zhukov, Director of the Institute of World History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, is the Chairman of the National Committee of Soviet Historians; and A.L. Narochnitskiy is Director of the Institute of Soviet History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

The Chinese side was not that well organized and authors quite often are not identified by titles.

15. Zhukov, Ye.M., ed., History of Far East International Relations, third edition, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1973. Also see: Section III in Chapter I.

16. Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsyklopedia, Vol. 12 (1973 edition),Moscow, 1973, p. 5.

17. See: Appendix I.

18. "Two Tactics with One Purpose," Peking Review, No. 11, March 16, 1973, pp. 9-10.

19. See: Appendix I.

20. "Against Maoist Falsifications," Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka, No. 2, 1979, pp. 200-204, cited in JPRS, No. 74497, 1979, pp. 269-270.

21. Grigor'yeva, Ye.A., and Kostikov, Ye.D., "Speculation of the Maoists with the Concept of 'Unequal Treaty'," Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka, No. 1, 1975, pp. 48-58, cited in JPRS, No. 64688, 1975, p. 55.

22. Ibid.

23. Beskrovny, L., et al., "On the History of the Formation of the Russo-Chinese Border," International Affairs, No. 7, 1972, p. 11.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., p. 12.

26. Ibid.

27. Quite a number of publications have dealt with the subject exclusively. One of the authoritative Chinese monographs is the Sha E Qinhua Shi (Yu, Shengwu, et al., Beijing, 1978) which has presented ample evidence collected in the Chinese archives. For further references, see: footnote 3 in the Introduction to this thesis and Appendix I.

28. Regarding the various historical issues, three authoritative articles were published in early 1974 by the Chinese explaining their views. They are: Shi, Yuxin, "Bo huangyan de zhizaozhe (Rebut the Falsifiers' Fallacies)," Lishi Yanjiu, No. 1, 1974; Tan, Qixiang, et al., "Xin tudi de kaifazhe haishi ruqin Zhongguo de qiangdao (Explorers of New Lands or Robbers intruding into China?)," Lishi Yanjiu, No. 1, 1974; Zhong, Minyan, "Lishi de jianzheng (Historical Evidence)," Lishi Yanjiu, No. 1, 1974.

29. Shi, Yuxin, et al., Bo Huangyan de Zhizaozhe (Rebut the Falsifiers' Fallacies), Beijing, Renmin Chubanshe, 1977, pp. 2-45; Yu, Shengwu, et al., Sha E Qinhua Shi, op. cit., pp. 7-70.

30. Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 11, Chicago-London, 1971, pp. 539-540.

31. Yu, Shengwu, et al., Sha E Qinhua Shi, op. cit., pp. 7-37; Ravenstein, E.G., Russian on the Amur, op. cit., pp. 3-8.

32. Ibid.; Ouyang, Xiu, et al., ed., Xin Tang Shu, op. cit., Vol. 219: On Black River Mohe; Liu, Shang, et al., ed., Jiu Tang Shu, op. cit., Vol. 199: On Mohe.

33. Yu, Shengwu, Sha E Qinhua Shi, op. cit., pp. 18-32; Ravenstein, E.G., Russians on the Amur, op. cit., pp. 4-7.

34. Ibid.

35. Shi, Yuxin, et al., Lishi Zhenxiang Bu Rong Waiqu (Historical Truth Rebuts Distortion), Harbin, Renmin Chubanshe, 1976, pp. 100-102.

36. Hummel, A.W., ed., Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, 1644-1912, Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 594-596; Yu, Shengwu, et al., Sha E Qinhua Shi, op. cit., pp. 55-58.

37. Ibid.

38. Hummel, A.W., ed., Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, 1644-1912, Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 1-2; Yu, Shengwu, et al., Sha E Qinhua Shi, op. cit., p. 64.

39. Ibid.

40. Yu, Shengwu, et al., Sha E Qinhua Shi, op. cit., pp. 56-62; Manzhou Shilu (Record of Manchu Affairs, eight volumes), Vol. 3; Vol. 4; Tu, Hai, et al., ed., Qing Taizong Shilu, op. cit., Vol. 1 to vol. 9.

41. Shi, Yuxin, et al., Lishi Zhenxiang Bu Rong Waiqu, op. cit., pp. 104-105.

42. Ibid.

43. Hsu, Shuhsi, China and Her Political Entity, op. cit., pp. 6-9; footnote 6 of Chapter One.

44. Jackson, W.A.D., The Russo-Chinese Borderlands, op. cit., p. 31.

45. Sebes, J., The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk, op. cit., p. 26.

46. Ravenstein, E.G., Russians on the Amur, op. cit., p. 25.

47. Yasenev, V.S., and Kruchinin, A.G., "The Truth About the Border Between Russia and China," Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka, No. 2, 1980, pp. 155-169, cited in JPRS, No. 76807, 1980, p. 81.

48. Conolly, Violet, Siberia Today and Tomorrow, op. cit., p. 26.

49. Ol'gin, V.S., "Expansionism in the Border Policy of Peking," Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka, No. 1, 1975, pp. 36-47, cited in JPRS, No. 64688, p. 47.

50. Yasenev, V.S., and Kruchinin, A.G., "The Truth About the Border Between Russia and China," op. cit., p. 82.

51. Ibid., p. 81.

52. Gromyko, A.A., ed., Diplomatic Dictionary, Moscow, 1961, pp. 403-404.

53. Ibid.

54. Yakovleva, P.T., The First Russo-Chinese Treaty of 1689, Moscow, 1958, p. 211.

55. Ibid., pp. 211-212.

56. Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsyklopedia (second edition), Vol. 29, Moscow, 1954, p. 488.

57. Shebenkov, V.G., Russo-Chinese Relations in Seventeenth Century, Moscow, 1960, p. 208.

58. "Statement of the USSR Government," Pravda, March 30, 1969, p. 1, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXI, No. 13, 1969, pp. 3-5.

59. Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsyklopedia (1973 edition), Vol. 12, Moscow, 1973, p. 5.

60. Beskrovny, L., et al, "On the History of the Formation of the Russo-Chinese Border," op. cit., pp. 13-14.

61. Ibid., p. 14.

62. Ibid.

63. Yasenev, V.S., and Kruchinin, A.G., "The Truth About the Border Between Russia and China," op. cit., pp. 84-85.

64. After the emergence of the various new theories or interpretations developed in the early 1970s by Soviet scholars, a number of relevant articles appeared in Chinese publications, followed by a series of monographs in the

latter half of the decade. For further references, see: footnotes 28; 29 above.

65. Li, Huichuan, "Crux of Sino-Soviet Boundary Question," Beijing Review, No. 30, July 1981, p. 13.

66. Zhong, E, Su Xiu de Huangyan he Lishi de Zhenxiang, op. cit., p. 1-3.

67. Yu, Shengwu, et al., Sha E Qinhua Shi, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 199.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid., p. 205.

70. Ibid., p. 207.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Shi, Yuxin, et al., Bo Huangyan de Zhizaoshe, op. cit., p. 9.

74. Sebes, J., The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk, op. cit., p. 161.

The Sino-Russian Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk (1689) was concluded with four copies, two official ones in Latin and the other two were semi-official, one in Manchu and one in Russian.

According to J. Sebes' research, the original Latin text, which was kept by the Russian side, has been found in the Russian archives and published in Sbornik dogovorov Rossii s Kitaiem in the seventeenth century. The semi-official copy in Russian which was presented to the Chinese side has not been found so far. In the present Soviet archive, there exists only an informal "reporting version" of the semi-official copy in Russian. However, Russian scholars and/or government and the present Soviet government and scholars, disregarding the official text in Latin, all based their arguments entirely on the above-mentioned "reporting version" of the semi-official copy in Russian. According to P.T. Yakovlyova, this "reporting version," without any acknowledgement of or signature of the Chinese side, could be found in the files of the reports of the Russian delegation that negotiated the Treaty. The fact that this "reporting version" was unilaterally written by the Russian delegation seems to have explained why there has existed a discrepancy of some sig-

nificance between this "reporting version" and the official Latin text. The fact that the date appearing on this "reporting version" is not the same as that in the official text in Latin or the semi-official copy in Russian strongly suggests that this "reporting version" is nothing more than a report from the Russian delegation to its own government. See: Yakovlyova, P.T., The First Russo-Chinese Treaty of 1689, op. cit. (This information can be located in footnote 3 in Appendix I of the book.)

In the 1970s, however, the Soviet side even claimed that this "reporting version" as having the same legitimacy as the official text in Latin. Moreover, Moscow argued that, in consideration of the "discrepancies" between this "reporting version" and the official Latin text, the Sino-Russian Treaty of 1689 should be less legitimate or even discounted entirely.

75. Sebes, J., The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk, op. cit., pp. 276; 277.

76. Prothero, G.W., Eastern Siberia, London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1920, pp. 23-24, cited in Prothero, G.W., ed., Handbooks Prepared under the Direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, No. 45 to 56, London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1920, No. 55, pp. 23-24.

77. Beskrovny, L., et al., "On the History of the Formation of the Russo-Chinese Border," op. cit., p. 13; footnote 59 of above.

78. Degras, J., ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 158-161; 212-215.

79. "Terms of Soviet-Chinese Agreement Proposed by Narkomindel to the Chinese Government (known as the second Soviet declaration to China)," cited in Degras, J., ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 214.

80. "Agreement of General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions Between the Republic of China and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (signed on May 31, 1924 in English)," cited in Whiting. A.S., Soviet Policies in China, New York, Columbia University Press, 1957, p. 277.

81. Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsyklopedia, (1926 edition) Vol. 1, Moscow, 1926, p. 277.

82. Vyshinsky, A. Ya., ed., Diplomatic Dictionary, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1950, p. 344.

83. Gromyko, A.A., ed., Diplomatic Dictionary, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1961, pp. 498-499.

84. The issue of the unequal treaties was brought to light in 1963 during a quarrel between Beijing and Moscow over the Cuban missile crisis. For more information, see: Doolin, D.J., Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, Hoover Institution Studies: 7, Stanford University, 1965, p. 19.

85. Khvostov, V.M. "Kitaiskii 'schet po reestru' i pravda istorii," Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn', 1964, No. 10, p. 23, cited in Ginsburgs, G., Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., pp. 46-47.

86. "Statement of the USSR Government," Pravda, March 30, 1969, p. 1, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXI, No. 13, 1969, p. 3.

87. "Document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China," Peking Review, No. 41, 1969, p. 12.

88. Ibid.

89. Nikolayev, F., "How Peking Falsifies History," International Affairs, No. 5, 1973, p. 29.

90. Apalin, G., "Maoist Style Geography, " Izvestia, August 8, 1972, p. 3, cited in CDSP, Vol. XXIV, No. 32, 1972, p. 3.

91. "Agreement of General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions Between the Republic of China and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (signed on May 31, 1924 in English)," op. cit., p. 277.

Article VII of the Agreement stipulated that the two sides agreed "to redemarcate their national boundaries" at a conference to be held within one month after the signing of the Agreement. The proposed conference was untimely delayed and when it was held in 1926, no agreement of any kind came about.

In the 1970s, the term "demarcation" which appeared in the 1924 Agreement has apparently become one of the key points in the boundary dispute. The Chinese side holds that the term refers to the process of delimitation of the boundary according to the letter

and the spirit of the Agreement. The Soviets, however, contend that the term "demarcation" should only refer to the actual technical process of maintenance of the border markers or signs.

According to authoritative international reference works, there was no distinction formerly between the word "demarcation" and the word "delimitation"; they were used interchangeably. Only in 1935, eleven years after the Sino-Soviet Agreement was concluded, Colonel Sir Henry McMahon gave a vague distinction to the two terms, stating that "delimitation" was "to comprise the determination of a boundary line by treaty or otherwise, and its definition in written, verbal terms," while "demarcation" should mean the actual laying down of a boundary line on the ground, and its definition by boundary pillars or other similar physical means." According to either of the 1935 definitions, the term "redemarcation" used in the Sino-Soviet case in 1924 should refer to a re-delineation of their boundary.

Moreover, there exists no stipulation in the 1924 Agreement to the effect that the term "redemarcation" should refer to the "maintenance of border signs." Even at the present time, some of the Soviet publications still use "demarcation" and "delimitation" interchangeably. For example, in 1972, an authoritative Soviet article written by high-level diplomats and academics, stated:

> the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk Russia and China had demarcated the lands from the Argun River to the Ud River...(cited in Beskrovny, L., et al., "On the History of the Formation of the Russo-Chinese Border," op. cit., p. 14.)

For additional reference on the terminology of the words, see: McMahon, H., "International Boundaries," Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, Vol. 84, 1935, p. 4; Cukwurah, A.O., The Settlement of Boundary Disputes in International Law, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1967, p. 27.

92. "Agreement of General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions Between the Republic of China and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (signed on May 31, 1924 in English)," op. cit., pp. 277-278.

93. Shijie Ditu Che (World Atlas), Xian, Shanxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1972, p. 38.

94. Apalin, G., "Maoist Style Geography," op. cit., p. 11.

95. Beskrovny, L., et al. "On the History of the Formation of the Russo-Chinese Border," op. cit., p. 16; Prokhorov, A., On the Question of Soviet-Chinese Border, Moscow, 1975, p. 119.

96. Shi, Yuxin, et al. Bo Huangyan de Zhizhaozhe, op. cit., pp. 15; 23.

97. Gurvich, I. How Chinese Lands Were Occupied by Russia, New York, Russian Problems, 1977, p. 4.

98. For text of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking (1860), see: Appendix IV of this thesis; An, Tai Sung, Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., p. 186.

99. Yu, Shengwu, Sha E Qinhua Shi, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 71-218.

100. Ravenstein, E.G., Russian on the Amur, op. cit., pp. 155-156.

101. Jia, Zhen et al., ed., Chouban Yiwu Shimo (A complete account of the Management of Foreign Affairs), op. cit., Xian Feng period, 1851-1861, Eighty Chinese Volumes.

This reveals that on May 6, 1855 the government of the Qing Dynasty protested against Russia's forcible navigation of the Heilong/Amur, pointing out that the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk should be respected. See: Vol. 10, p. 33;

On November 11, 1855, the Emperor Xian Feng repeated in his decree this position of the Qing Court. See: Vol. 12, p. 2;

On January 3, 1856, the Chinese Government delivered another note to the Russian authorities, protesting Russia's military occupation of the left bank of the Heilong/Amur River. See; Vol. 12, pp. 18-21;

On July 31, 1857, the Chinese side sent officials to meet Muraviev, protesting Russia's unlawful occupation of China's territory. See: Vol. 16, pp. 16; 19; 22;

On September 3, 1857, and on November 9, 1857, the Qing Government delivered notes to the Russian Government, protesting Russia's military occupation and requesting Russia's total withdrawal of its forces from China's territories. See: Vol. 16, pp. 27-28; Vol. 17, p. 20.

102. Hummel, A.W., ed, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 392.

103. Semyonov, Yuri, Siberia -- Its Conquest and Development, op. cit., pp. 274-275.

104. Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 9, Chicago-London, 1971, p. 71.

105. Banno, Masataka, China and the West, 1858-1861, op. cit., pp. 118-156.

106. Grigor'yeva, Ye. A., and Kostikov, Ye. D., "Speculation by the Maoists with the Concept of the 'Unequal Treaty'," Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka, No. 1, 1975, pp. 48-58, cited in JPRS, No. 64688, 1975, p. 55.

107. Tung, William L., China and the Foreign Powers: The Impact of and Reaction to Unequal Treaties, op. cit., p. 8.

108. Banno, M., China and the West, op. cit., pp. 148-151.

109. Lenin, V.I., "The War in China," in Collected Works of Lenin (fourth edition), Vol. 4, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House (in English), 1960, p. 377.

110. Ibid., 374.

111. Doolin, D.J., Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, op. cit., p. 34.

CONCLUSION

The preceding discussion provides a foundation for assessing the respective policies pursued and positions taken by the PRC and the USSR in the past decade, and for exploring possible directions of development of this boundary dispute in the near future. In view of the evidence presented here, several points warrant special attention.

Negotiation vis-a-vis Confrontation

Few boundary disputes have had such enduring and complex characteristics as that between the PRC and the USSR. From its earliest beginnings, the conflict has involved a mixture of national interests and ideological inclination. The heart of the problem, however, lies in the fact that there exists a 35,000 square kilometre discrepancy on the boundary maps the Chinese and the Soviets exchanged in 1964. Chinese insistence on the return of the territory occupied by Russia/Soviet Union beyond the confines of the treaties concerned and Moscow's refusal to relinquish such terrtory is the major impediment to the border negotiations.

What has deadlocked the talks to this date is the intractable disagreement between the two parties over the basic premises upon which the dispute should be settled. The Chinese maintain that the treaties themselves should be taken as the basis for the negotiations. They contend that, in making this proposal, they have offered an unprecedented concession to the Soviets since these treaties were unequal ones, arbitrarily imposed on China by the Russian Empire. According to the Chinese formula, the Soviet Union would be obliged to give back to China some 30,000 square kilometres of territory which it now holds in contradiction to the provisions of the treaties.

The Soviet Union, however, insists on taking as the departure point for the talks not only the treaties but also the status quo. In doing so, the USSR undoubtedly hopes that it would be able to hold on to almost all the "disputed areas," and perhaps even obtain an official acceptance of such a "resolution" from the Chinese. Moscow contends that the boundary was not established by the treaties alone but also by history itself, on the grounds that Russian/Soviet occupation of certain "disputed areas" itself has gained over the years a "legitimacy" which China should recognize. These contending positions, which were initially formulated during the 1964 talks, have been maintained throughout the 1970s.

It appears that the discussions at the negotiating table, while failing to produce any positive results, have led, in fact, to the out-break of the fierce "academic war." The scholarly debate, which may have further complicated the overall quarrel, has constituted an important dimension of the conflict. The large volume of publications thus produced has provided indispensable data for the examination of the intensity of the dispute. In this respect, the opinions appearing in pre-1961 Soviet publications as compared to those Soviet works of the 1970s warrant particular attention.[1] Since the pre-1961 Soviet publications were more in accord with the Chinese position on various historical issues, Soviet scholars, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, engaged in revising the earlier publications and in rewriting the subjects. Consequently, most Soviet works of the past decade have tended to ignore the various historical archives and have based their arguments largely on their own publications of the late 1960s and the early 1970s.

It is worth noting that the change of attitude by Soviet scholars as expressed in their works has coincided with the change of position on the part of the Soviet Government. In contrast, Chinese scholars, as well as the Chinese Government, have been extremely critical to this shift of attitude in the USSR, while upholding firmly

their own stance. In this connection, the "paper war" might have provided an extra avenue for debate outside of direct government-to-government exchange. But the scholarly confrontation thus created may also have a far-reaching negative impact on the development of relations between the two countries in the years to come.

Military Strength and Frontier Policy

In the past, military strength was always a decisive factor affecting Sino-Russian frontier relations, with the balance tilted against the Chinese. Today, the imbalance in this respect has become even more striking, bringing with it significant political implications. In assessing the frontier policies of the PRC and the USSR, therefore, this key aspect cannot be overlooked, especially when the military buildup along the Sino-Soviet border has reached an extremely high level.

As the 1960s ended, it was clear that the Soviets were taking a variety of initiatives to contain the Chinese challenge as expressed at the border talks. The most threatening of the Soviet responses was the steady increase of their military forces in the frontier regions concerned. To the fifteen Soviet divisions stationed in 1967, the Soviets added another thirty or more regular divisions in the 1970s, maintaining a combined force of

more than one million men, with probably one-third of Soviet SS-20s targetted on China.[2]

The presence of such a formidable force and the stern military warnings to the Chinese, as demonstrated by Soviet initiation of border incidents, are the visible expression of the coercive policy pursued by the Soviets.

> Military threats are, by their very nature, double-edged -- producing either greater accommodation on the part of an adversary or a more determined effort by him to strengthen himself so as to be relatively immune to the threat in the future -- and in China since 1970 the latter response has predominated.[3]

The Chinese, retaining their faith in defense in depth, have not changed their position. The PRC still maintains that the treaties establishing the present boundary were unequal in nature and that the Soviet Union should return to China the territory she is now holding in violation of these very treaties. Thus, the history of the 1970s has not been kind to those in Moscow who may have argued that the high costs of establishing a major military presence on the Chinese border would pay off in terms of greater ability to wring concessions out of the Chinese Government.

Some uncertainty about the future course of this frontier confrontation, nonetheless, may flow from the "contradiction" between China's determination to oppose the hegemonic expansionist policy of the Soviet Union,

and China's inability to alter significantly a position of relative military weakness -- or even, indeed, to maintain its present level of military spending. A rough calculation by some observers is that China's military budget in 1980 was about one-sixth the size of the military budget of the Soviet Union.[4] On account of the PRC's limited technological capability at this stage, the question when China will be in a position to achieve military parity with the USSR is indeed difficult to answer. At any rate, the two-decade estimate presented recently by Professor D. Perkins seems, in all likelihood, not a real possibility.[5]

China's deterrence of land invasion, nevertheless, rests not merely on her armed forces but on her vast territory and immense population as well. Militarily, it might be easy for Soviet armies to strike into China, but it would be extremely difficult for them to consolidate their position or to pull out. In this respect, the PRC, though being not strong militarily, has created a grave dilemma for the Kremlin in that it is an impossible task for the million-strong Soviet army to "Czechoslovakize" China. The crucial question remains, then, what kind of frontier relationship the USSR will have with the PRC if the boundary problem can not be settled. "Already approximately 25 percent of Soviet military commitment was to

the defense of Chinese border; what would be the cost of competing with a growing Chinese power, particularly one having close diplomatic ties with major capitalist states?"[6]

Against these factors, one element seems to possess very strong momentum and resistance to change. This is the dynamism already inherent in the boundary policies of the two sides, and this is likely to endure along with the continued growth of military capabilities in the 1980s. There is likely to be an indefinite continuation of what the Chinese term the Soviet "offensive posture" along their frontier, and the imbalance of military strength will continue to exert great impact on the fundamental positions of the two sides.

The Nature of the Conflict and its Future Prospect

The major discovery of this work is the identification of two sets of polemics involved in the Sino-Soviet boundary dispute. One is the quarrel over some 35,000 square kilometres of disputed territory; the other is the debate over the formation of the various boundaries between the two powers. The first set of issues appears to be the crux of the present conflict, involving the question of real national gain or loss. The second set, however, seems to bear more significance in the realm of morality and justice, its political implications being

primarily the rationalization of historical events. These two sets of issues are organically interconnected, and each adversary tends to use the arguments drawn from the second set to consolidate its position on the first set.

The fact that almost all the disputed territory is under Soviet occupation means that, in strictly territorial terms, any settlement of the dispute would require a willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to relinquish, in whatever way, certain territory over which it now has de facto control.

In view of the conflicting positions laid out by the two sides, the prospect of a final resolution of the dispute indeed appears dim. One should note, however, that the paramount determinant for resolving the first set of issues may not be the amount of territory in dispute but rather the respective policies of the two governments. In this respect, given the probability of a possible change of stand on either side -- though major change seems most unlikely in the near future -- the possibility of a diplomatic "break-through" cannot be totally ruled out.

The second set of issues -- the debate on the history of the Sino-Russian/Soviet boundary -- appears to possess a more enduring nature. It is inconceivable that the Soviet scholars will, in the foreseeable future,

retreat to their pre-1961 stand, or that the Chinese scholars will let the Soviet political historians obliterate the history of Sino-Russian/Soviet boundary relations without check. Therefore, even if the above-assumed diplomatic "break-through" eventually resolves the first set of polemics, the second set would not be settled simultaneously. Only history can answer the question of when the Chinese and the Soviets will put an end to the "academic war."

The Boundary Dispute and Overall Sino-Soviet Relations

The abnormality of relations between China and the Soviet Union has been one of the main facets of world politics in the past decade. The boundary dispute which, in the main, produced and contributed to the intensification of this abnormality, has not received sufficient attention. Individual commentators continue to disagree about the relative importance of the frontier conflict as it relates to different stages of the Sino-Soviet relationship. Some observers hold the view that it was the "political debate" between the PRC and the USSR in the early 1960s that caused the border dispute; that the PRC could have glossed over the border problem in dealing with a "friend" but could not do so in dealing with a prime antagonist. It appears, nevertheless, that such an

argument puts too much stress on the outward symptoms while neglecting the essence of the conflict, namely its historical foundations.

It is the writer's contention that any realistic discussion of the cause of this frontier conflict must rest upon a thorough understanding of the creation of the boundaries between the two countries. One simply cannot obtain a sound comprehension of the quarrel without raising such questions as how the Russian Empire, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, managed to annex more than 1.5 million square kilometres of Chinese territory and to establish the present border through imposing upon the Chinese a series of treaties of unilateral benefit. What is more important is that tsarist Russia and the USSR occupied, beyond the confines established by the treaties, some additional 30,000 square kilometres of China's territory.

Concerning the border, the various historically unresolved issues such as boundary redemarcation and the annulment and replacement of the unequal treaties were still pending settlement in 1949 when the PRC was founded. In the 1950s, Chinese efforts to resolve the problem through high-level discussions came to naught since the Kremlin leaders had apparently considered it of crucial importance of uphold the principle of the

immutability of Soviet frontiers. Even the friendly relationship the two nations enjoyed during the 1950s failed to help resolve their difference on the delineation of their common boundary. The border problem, therefore, was not only a symptom but, in reality, a major cause of the Sino-Soviet rift which became public in early 1963. The repercussions of the rift naturally intensified the frontier conflict. The out-break of the boundary dispute was, in the main, predetermined by the existence of the various unresolved historical issues for which Beijing and Moscow have, so far, failed to find solutions.

In this respect, the Soviet claim that the "border dispute itself was more a reflection than a cause of Sino-Soviet animosity"[6] appears to have been made out of tactical need and political necessity, instead of a faithful evaluation of the problem itself. No observers know better than the Soviet leaders the extent to which the boundary problem contributed to the deterioration of relations between the two countries.

The Chinese have clearly sensed the great geopolitical pressure exerted by the strong Soviet military presence along their frontier. They have apparently viewed this as a "gun at the head" strategy used by the Soviet leaders to back up Moscow's bargaining position in the Sino-Soviet border negotiations, and to add credibility

to the Soviet refusal to entertain Chinese demands.[7] As a result, the border negotiations have emerged over the last decade as a forum for regulating Sino-Soviet relations in general rather than for settling the mutually recognized issues. The Soviets have been constantly interested in signing documents on bilateral relations as a whole[8] rather than in concluding any agreement regarding the border talks and the frontier situation in general. Moscow appears to be the active party in relegating the border negotiations to such an obscure position, and it apparently has good reasons of self-interest for doing so.

After U.S. President Nixon's visit to China in 1972 -- an event that observers consider established a triangular relationship between China , the Soviet Union and the United States -- what appears to have alarmed the Kremlin was the further development of relations between China and the United States. No doubt, the Kremlin would have preferred a bipolar system with China on its side, a situation which could possibly isolate and contain the United States. It seems clear that the USSR cannot compete effectively with the United States on a global scale without, first of all, diminishing its problem with China. The Kremlin may have calculated that, despite their intransigence in refusing to accommodate Chinese demands, their demon-

strated willingness to take decisive military action, as recently displayed in Afghanistan, and their verbal desire to have closer ties with China, will ultimately have a compound effect on Beijing, eventually inducing a much more conciliatory Chinese attitude toward Moscow. To this end, Moscow has frequently indicated its "desire" to obtain a "friendlier" relationship with the PRC. But, the realization of this "desire" has apparently been severely undercut by the actions of the Soviet Union, such as its obdurate position on the border talks and the continuing increase of its military presence along the Chinese border.

Thus, it seems rather debatable to what degree the Soviet Union can obtain closer ties with China without settling the frontier conflict. Leaving the consideration of future development aside for the moment, it appears clear that in the past decade, as the focus of the Sino-Soviet "political debate" has shifted from internal to external policies, the boundary dispute has acquired a new status vis-a-vis the two nations' bilateral relations. The failure of theboundary talks to achieve any agreement, the rapid military buildup along the border, and the intensification of the "academic war," have combined into a dynamic force nourishing and sustaining the abnormality of relations between the PRC and the USSR.

At present, however, the various issues involved in the dispute are of too little consequence to warrant a major armed conflict between the two countries. Both the Chinese and the Soviets must know that in the event of a general war neither side would have anything to gain politically or militarily. Historically, frontier conflict has, on several occasions, led the two powers to the point of war, but, each time, they have managed to avert what could have been full-scale hostility. It appears therefore that the prospect of war between China and the Soviet Union in the near future must be discounted. Nevertheless, the possibility of continued frontier confrontation and further border incidents cannot be excluded from the range of possible future developments. Though common sense dictates action to prevent the boundary dispute escalating into a major war, this source of uncertainty in Sino-Soviet frontier relations, and even in the bilateral relations of the two countries as a whole, still remains active and will continue to exist in the foreseeable future.

CONCLUSION:NOTES

1. See: "The Cause of the 'Academic War'" in Chapter Four of this thesis.

2. Griffith, William E., "International Politics and the Sino-Soviet Dispute," in Ellison, Herbert J., ed., The Sino-Soviet Conflict, Seattle and London, University of Washington Press, 1982, p. 133.

3. Lieberthal, K.G., Sino-Soviet Conflict, op. cit., p. 166.

4. Perkins, Dwight, "The Economic Background and Implications for China," in Ellison Herbert J., ed., The Sino-Soviet Conflict, op. cit., p. 109.

5. Ibid., pp. 108; 110.

6. Ellison, Herbert J., ed., The Sino-Soviet Conflict, op. cit., p. xx.

7. Gelman, Harry, "The Sino-Soviet Dispute in the 1970s," in Ellison, Herbert J., ed., The Sino-Soviet Conflict, op. cit., p. 360.

APPENDIX I

Soviet and Chinese Publications in the 1970s

The following list is a collection of articles and books produced in the USSR and the PRC which are directly related to the border dispute. It shows that, in the past decade, the volume of these publications has been uneven. Soviet scholars, starting from 1969, have consistently produced a great quantity of books and articles on the subject though the production ceased for a while after the passing away of the Chinese Communist Party's Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976. Chinese publications are limited in number and most of them have been produced since 1974.

A. Soviet Publications

Books

Tikhvinskiy, S.L., ed., Russko-Kitayskiye otnosheniya v XVIIv (Russo-Chinese Relations in the 17th Century, Paper and Documents), Vol. 1, 1608-1689, Moscow, 1969.

Aleksandrov, V.A., Rossiya na Dal'nevostochnykh rubezhakh, 2-ya polovina XVIIv (Russia and its Far Eastern Boundaries in the Second Half of the 17th Century), Moscow, 1969.

Tikhvinskiy, S.L., ed., Russko-Kitayskiye otnosheniya v XVIIv (Russo-Chinese Relations in the 17th Century, Paper and Documents), Vol. 2, 1681-1691, Moscow, 1972.

Astaf'yev, G.V., et al., Noveyshaya istoriya Kitaya (The Modern History of China), Moscow, 1972.

Zhukov, Ye.M., ed., Istoriya mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy na Dal'nem Bostoke (History of International Relations in the Far East, from the latter half of the 16th century to 1917), Moscow, 1973.

Sladkovskiy, M.I., Istoriya torgovo-ekonomickeskikh otnosheniy narodov Rossii s Kitayem do 1917 g (The History of the Russian People's Trade and Economic Relations with China, Prior to 1917), Moscow, 1974.

Sidikhmenov, V.Ya., Kitay: Stranitsy Proshlogo (China: Pages from the Past), Moscow, Izdatek'stvo Nauka, 1974.

Tikhvinskiy. S.L., Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya i vneshnyaya politika SSSR, Istoriya i sovremennost (The International Relations and Foreign Policy of the USSR, Past and Present), Moscow, 1977.

Territorial'nyye Prityazaniya Pekina: Sovremennost i Istoriya (Peking's Territorial Pretension: Past and Present), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy Literatury, 1979.

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APPENDIX II

The Sino-Russian Treaty of Nipchu/Nerchinsk, September 7, 1689

(Partial Text*)

The river named Kerbechi, which is next to the river Shorna, called, in Tartarian Urwon, and falls into the Saghalian, shall serve for bounds to both Empires;

And that long chain of Mountains which is below the source of the said river Kerbechi, and extends as far as the eastern sea, shall serve also as bounds of both Empires;

Insomuch that all the rivers and brooks, great or small, which rise on the southern side of those mountains, and fall into the Saghalian, which all the lands and countries from the top of the said mountains southward shall belong to the Empire of China; and all the lands, countries, rivers and brooks which are on the other mountains extending northward, shall remain to the Empire of Russia;

With this restriction nevertheless, that all the countries lying between the said mountains and the river Ud shall continue undecided, till the Ambassadors of both powers on their return home shall have gotten proper informations and instructions to treat of this Article; after which the affair shall be decided either by ambassadors or letters.

Moreover, the river Ergone which falls also into the Saghalian ula, shall serve for bounds to the two Empires; so that all the lands and countries lying to the south thereof shall appertain to the Emperor of China, and whatever lies to the north of it shall remain to the Empire of Russia.

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* Source: Liu, Hsuan-min, "Russo-Chinese Relations up to the Treaty of Nerchinsk," The Chinese Social and Political Science Review, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, 1940, pp. 426-429 (Saghalian refers to Heilong/Amur and Ergone to Erhkuna/Argun).

APPENDIX III

The Sino-Russian Treaty of Aigun Signed on May 28, 1858

(Partial Text*)

The left bank of the Amur River, beginning at the Argun River, to the mouth of the Amur, will belong to the Russian Empire, and its right bank, down to the Ussuri River, will belong to the Chinese Empire; the territories and locations situated between the Ussuri River and the sea will, as they are presently, be commonly owned by the Chinese Empire and the Russian Empire until the boundary between the two States is settled. Navigation on the Amur, the Soungari, and the Ussuri is permitted only to vessels of the Chinese Empire and those of the Russian Empire; Navigation on these rivers will be forbidden to vessels of all other States. The Manchu inhabitants settled on the left bank of the Amur, to the Zeya River up to the village of Hormoldzin to the south, will forever retain their former domiciles under the administration of the Manchu Government, and the Russian inhabitants will not be allowed to give them any offense nor cause them any vexation.

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* Source: An, Tai Sung, The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 1973, pp. 183-184.

APPENDIX IV

The Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking, November 14, 1860

(Partial Text*)

Article I

In order to corroborate and elucidate Artcle I of the Treaty signed in the city Aigun, May 16, 1858, and in execution of Article IX of the Treaty signed on the first of June of the same year in the city Tientsin, it is stipulated that:

Henceforth the eastern frontier between the two empires shall commence from the juncture of the rivers Shilka and Argun, will follow the course of the River Amur to the junction of the River Ussuri with the latter. The land on the left bank (to the north) of the River Amur belongs to the empire of Russia, and the territory on the right bank (to the south) to the junction of the River Ussuri to the empire of China. Further on, the frontier line between the two empires ascends the rivers Ussuri and Sungacha to where the latter issues from Lake Kinka; it then crosses the lake, and takes the direction of the River Belen-ho or Tur; from the mouth of the River Huptu (a tributary of the Suifan), and from that point the mountains situated between the River Hun-Chun and the sea, as far as the River Tumen-Kiang. Along this line the territory on the east side belongs to the empire of Russia, and that on the west to the empire of China. The frontier line rests on the River Tumen at twenty Li above its mouth into the sea.

Further, in execution on the same Article IX of the Treaty of Tientsin a map was prepared on which, for more clarity, the boundary line is traced in a red line and indicated by letters of the Russian alphabet. This map is signed by the Plenipotentiaries of the two Empires and sealed with their stamps.

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* Source: An, Tai Sung, The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, op. cit., pp. 185-188.

If there should exist lands colonized by Chinese subjects (in the above-mentioned areas) the Russian Government promises to allow these inhabitants to remain there and also to permit them to engage, as in the past, in hunting and fishing...

Article II

The boundary line to the west, undetermined until now, should henceforth follow the direction of the mountains, the courses of the larger rivers and the presently existing line of Chinese pickets. Beginning at the last lighthouse, called Chabindabaga (in Mongolia) which was established in 1728 after the signing of the Treaty of Kiakhta, the boundary line will run southwest toward the Lake Dsai-sang, and then extends to the mountains called Tengri-chan or Alatau of the Kirghises or Thian-chan-nana-lou (southern branches of the Mountains Celestes), which are situated to the south of the Lake Issik Kul, and from this point down to the possessions of Kokand along the above mountains.

Article III

Henceforth all questions regarding the frontiers which could subsequently arise will be settled according to the stipulations of Articles I and II of the present Treaty. For the settlement of the eastern boundary from the Lake Hinkai to the Tumen River and the western boundary from the lighthouse Chabindabaga (in Mongolia) down to the possessions of the Kokand, the Russian and Chinese Governments will appoint Commissars. For the inspection of the eastern frontier, the Commissars should meet at the junction of the Ussuri River ....

As determined in Articles I and II, four maps and detailed descriptions (two in the Russian language and two in the Chinese or Manchu language) will be prepared by the Commissars. These maps and descriptions will be signed and sealed by the Commissars, after which two copies, one in Russian and one in Chinese or Manchu, will be returned to the Russian Government and two similar copies will be returned to the Chinese Government to be kept by them.

For the return of the maps and descriptions of the frontier line, a corroborated protocol will be set up by the signature and the affixing of the seals of the Commissars; this will be considered as an Additional Article to the present Treaty.

APPENDIX V

Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, and V.I. Lenin on Sino-Russian Frontier Relations

Comments by K. Marx, F. Engels and V.I. Lenin on Sino-Russian frontier relations have acquired more significance and importance amidst the Sino-Soviet boundary dispute, since the Chinese contend that the unequal nature of the nineteenth century Sino-Russian treaties and the fact that tsarist Russia annexed large tracts of China's territory has been long ago recognized by the founders of Marxism-Leninism, and they are not Chinese "fabrications." Collected here are some of the comments from K. Marx, F. Engels and V.I. Lenin that the Chinese have been frequently quoting in consolidating their position.

A. Comments by Karl Marx

...first opium-war, procured Russia a treaty yielding her the navigation of the Amoor and free trade on the land frontier, while by...second opium-war... helped her (Russia) to the invaluable tract lying between the Gulf of Tartary and Lake Baikal, a region so much coveted by Russia that from Czar Alexei Michaelowitch down to Nicholas, she has always attempted to get it... (Written by K. Marx on September 28, 1858, first published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 5455, October 15, 1858; reprinted in the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune, No. 1398, October 19, 1858, cited in Marx, K., "The British and Chinese Treaty," in Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: Collected Works - prepared jointly by Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., London, International Publishers Co. Inc., New York, and Progress Publishers, Moscow, in collaboration with the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Moscow-, Vol. 16, New York, International Publishers, 1980, p. 50.)

Now, this is one of Lord Palmerston's old tricks. When Russia wanted to conclude a treaty of commerce with

China, he drove the latter by the opium war into the arms of her northern neighbor. When Russia requested the cession of the Amoor, he brought it about by the second Chinese war, and now that Russia wants to consolidate her influence at Pekin, he extemporises the third Chinese war...it has always been his invariable and constant rule to ostensibly oppose Russia's designs by picking a quarrel, not with Russia, but with the Asiatic State, to estrange the latter from England by piratical hostilities, and by this round-about way drive it to the concessions it had been unwilling to yield to Russia. (Written on September 16, 1859, first published in the New-York Daily Tribune, Nos. 5750, 5754, October 1, 1859; reprinted in the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune, Nos. 1496 and 1498, September 27 and October 4, 1859, and the New-York Weekly Tribune, No. 942, October 1, 1859, cited in Marx, K., "The New Chinese War," in Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: Collected Works - prepared jointly by Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., London, International Publishers Co. Inc., New York, and Progress Publishers, Moscow, in collaboration with the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Moscow -, Vol. 16, New York, International Publishers, 1980, p. 514.)

B. Comments by Frederick Engels

Here was another of those tottering Asiatic Empires, which are, one by one, falling a prey to the enterprise of the European race;...an empire so rotten that nowhere scarcely was it capable either of controlling its own people or opposing resistance to foreign aggression. While the British squabbled with inferior Chinese officials at Canton, and discussed among themselves the important point whether Commissioner Yeh really did, or did not, act according to the will of the Emperor, the Russians took possession of the country north of the Amoor, and of the greater part of the coast of Mantchooria south of that point; there they fortified themselves, surveyed a line of railway, and laid out the plans of towns and harbors. When at last England resolved to carry the war to Pekin, and when France joined her in the hope of picking up something to her advantage, Russia, though at the very moment despoiling China of a country as large as France and Germany put together, and of a river as large as the Danube...and when we come to compare the different treaties, we must confess that the fact of the war having been carried on for the benefit, not of England or France, but

of Russia, becomes evident to all. (Written by F. Engels about October 25, 1858, first published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 5484, November 18, 1858, reprinted in the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune, No. 1409, November 26, 1858, cited in Engels, F., "Russia's Successes in the Far East," in Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: Collected Works - prepared jointly by Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., London, International Publishers Co. Inc., New York, and Progress Publishers, Moscow, in collaboration with the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Moscow - Vol. 16, New York, International Publishers, 1980, p. 83.)

As to Russia...Beside sharing in all the ostensible advantages, whatever they be, secured to England and France, Russia has secured the whole of the country on the Amoor, which she had so quietly taken possession of. Not satisfied with this, she has obtained the establishment of a Russo-Chinese Commission to fix the boundaries. Now, we all know what such a Commission is in the hands of Russia. We have seen them at work on the Asiatic frontiers of Turkey, where they kept slicing away piece after piece from that country, for more than twenty years, until they were interrupted during the later war, and the work has now been done over again. (Ibid., p. 85.)

And that a Russian Ambassador, with the chance of having, a few years hence, an army strong enough for any purpose at Kiakhta, a month's march from Pekin, and a line of road prepared for its march all the way -- that such a Russian Ambassador will be all powerful at Pekin, who can doubt?...In a short time, the valleys of the Central Asiatic rivers and of the Amoor will be peopled by Russian colonists. The strategic positions thus gained are as important for Asia as those in Poland are for Europe. (Ibid., p. 86.)

C. Comments by V.I. Lenin

And now the European capitalists have placed their rapacious paws upon China, and almost the first to do so was the Russian Government, which now so loudly proclaims its "disinterestedness."

...

One after another the European governments began

feverishly to loot, or as they put it, to "rent," Chinese territory, giving good grounds for the talk of the partition of China. If we are to call things by their right names, we must say that the European governments (the Russian Government among the very first) have already started to partition China. However, they have not begun this partitioning openly, but stealthily, like thieves. They began to rob China as ghouls rob corpses, and when the seeming corpse attempted to resist, they flung themselves upon it like savage beasts, burning down whole villages, shooting, bayonetting, and drowning in the Amur River unarmed inhabitants, their wives, and their children. (Written by V.I. Lenin in 1901, cited in Lenin, V.I., "The War in China," in V.I. Lenin: Collected Works, fourth edition, Vol. 4, 1898-April 1901, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, in English, 1960, p. 374.)

But the Chinese people have at no time and in no way oppressed the Russian people. (Ibid., p. 377.)

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