GOVERNMENT POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA ON THE HOUSING OF BLACK PEOPLE AND ON SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS.
GOVERNMENT POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA ON THE HOUSING OF BLACK PEOPLE
AND ON SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS

BY

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ABSTRACT

Squatting is a common phenomenon, but its nature is different under various social-economic systems. This thesis emphasizes the need for careful consideration and identification of these different features and calls for a reorientation of the strategies adopted towards the alleviation of squatting. The study begins with a description of the geography of squatting in South Africa emphasizing the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal region which is the major industrial region. It then reviews the Government policies that were used to address the urban black housing backlog and the policy responses to squatter settlements in South Africa. This review involves a description of the historical development of the present social-economic structure of the South African community, which is seen as a basis for an explanation of the urban black-housing backlog and squatting. An examination of the legislation associated with black urbanisation in general is made. This legislation is used as a point of reference for the development of an explanation of the nature of squatting and its persistence. Based on this understanding of the social-economic structure of South Africa and urban black housing, an evaluation of the Government policies is made and certain possible solutions to South African squatting are recommended.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION.

South Africa shares with the other developing countries the problems of underdevelopment like poverty, high illiteracy rates, poor health and large squatter communities. Some authors view it as having characteristics of both developing and developed countries. The supporters of this view categorize the Homelands, land legally reserved for Blacks as developing, and regions that are inhabited by Whites as developed. The South African squatter settlements are however, not in line with this dichotomy in that they are not situated in the Homelands exclusively. They are instead more commonly found in the economically richer regions that are generally referred to as white South Africa. The peculiarity of the South African squatter settlements is that they are predominantly inhabited by the Blacks.

This chapter examines housing policy issues in order to provide an explanation for the development of this peculiar nature of squatting in South Africa. Lastly the aims of the thesis are identified and the methodology described.
1.1. THE HOUSING POLICY.

For the purpose of this study "policy" will refer to "a course of action or inaction chosen by public authorities to address a given problem or interrelated set of problems." (Pal, 1987, 4). In this case then, the given problem is housing and housing policies are a response thereto. This thesis will also accept Pal's premise that inaction is policy if it is intentional. Though it may sometimes be difficult to prove inaction as a deliberate response, those instances where the Government had decided to do nothing in response to the problem identified, will be included as government policy options. Another assumption that forms the basis of this study is that policies are intentional and have a specific goal that they are set to achieve.

An understanding of housing policy plays a significant role in the explanation of spatial urban residential patterns because generally, the type of housing in a certain area implies people of a certain income bracket. Housing is seen as one of the major sectors in a national economy. It is also a major source of employment (Bourne, 1981) and this invokes government interest and participation in housing issues.

In order to understand housing in a spatial context one needs to look at factors like residential mobility. Residential mobility is a process based on rational decision making by involved residents. These residents supposedly
examine factors like accessibility of space and costs of locality near the city centre (Short, 1978). Like any postulate based on the rational man the residential mobility argument assumes that people have access to all the information they need to make their choices. This then presupposes that spatial residential differentiation should reflect income level variations. In addition, the extent to which a Government intervenes in as far as a policy pertaining to housing finance and subsidy is significant.

Ideally in the developing world housing policies should take into cognisance the large scale poverty characterising their populations (Haarhoff, 1987). Hence these policies should of necessity differ significantly from those of the developed world. In the light of this it is critical that a Government should identify and incorporate the problems resulting from poverty when evolving a housing policy.

In general, policies in the developing world are a legacy from their colonial past (Simons et al., 1976). During this period, cities were the extension of the mother countries and thus had little to do with the local populations. Consequently, housing policies and the housing provided tended to concentrate on the needs of the colonial masters. There was also little home ownership because this was discouraged by the Government (Stretton, 1979).

Independence in the developing world was accompanied by the substitution of the expatriates by the local middle class (mostly civil servants)
and the majority of the local population's housing needs were not served (Stretton, 1979). The problem today is two-pronged. At one level, a changing of existing policies in order to address local housing needs is not adequate because there are manifestations which have developed over time that also need to be identified and addressed as well. At another level, the developing world housing policies are characterised by their strong western orientation with regard to housing standards. This situation comes from the fact that "in the past planning has been based on European and North American ideas of city structure and building standards" (Tipple, 1976, 169). These tend to be unrelated, to the physical or social-economic conditions in the regions. These standards and/or expectations, make housing inaccessible to most people. These people then become faced with a problem of unaffordable housing (Strelitz, 1989).

The realistic criteria used for determining standards of housing should be determined by factors like climatic conditions, health consideration, accessibility of building material, the resource base of the country and this calls for a combination of factors. Knowledge of climatic conditions and adaptation to them, natural and human resources, and favourable conditions which determine sound health are prerequisites for achievement of this goal. A sound housing policy should not only take account of economic resources and constraints but it should seek to exploit the resources of human ingenuity and
willingness to co-operate (Tipple, 1976). Because housing standards and expectations in the developing world are unrealistic there is an ever-increasing number of "squatter settlements".

1.2. SQUATTING

Squatting is most commonly characterised by illegality, which implies lack of tenurial security in squatter settlements. Squatting is some form of self-help housing in that squatters are usually owner-occupiers of these shelters. Housing in squatter settlements is of poor quality first, because of poverty of the majority of squatters and second, because squatters regard their housing as temporary shelter which will be improved incrementally as economic conditions become better. Last, as long as squatter settlements are under threat of demolition and removal it is uneconomic for squatters to build permanent structures.

Squatting is closely linked with rapid population growth and fast rates of urbanisation (Collier, 1976; Haarhoff, 1987) that characterise the developing world. Although squatting is not a new phenomenon in urban settlement studies, it is especially critical today because of continuous presence and the increasing numbers of the international squatter community.
Table 1 shows the population numbers of slums and squatter settlements in selected developing world cities between the 1960's and the 1970's. In the 1960's Jakarta had 750,000 squatters, a quarter of its total urban population (Clignet and Soja, 1975). This rose to close to two million in the 1970's (UN, 1976). Manila on the other hand, had its squatter population increasing from 320,000 in the 1960's (Clignet and Soja, 1975) to 1,540,000 in the 1970's (UN, 1976). These examples show a general trend of squatting in the developing world.

Squatter settlements are most commonly lumped together as typically "vast, unsanitary, unserviced shantytowns" (Rosenberg and Fitzgerald, 1983). In the same way, there is a tendency to assume that squatters are necessarily the same. According to Clignet and Soja (1975) there are likely to be important differences in the resources, motivations and backgrounds among squatters (Chapter two examines views by select authors). In the light of this and the above data, questions worth considering are; first, whether or not housing policies are sufficiently sensitised towards addressing squatting and, second, if not, whether new policies and strategies are a viable proposition or whether the aim should rather be to reorient the existing ones.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CITY POP. ('000's)</th>
<th>SQUATTER POP. ('000's)</th>
<th>% OF TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accra</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>61</td>
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<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>Monrovia</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>96</td>
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<td>Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calcutta</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>6248</td>
<td>2220</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>2475</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4400</td>
<td>1540</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4576</td>
<td>1190</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bogota</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>2294</td>
<td>1376</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico City</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>3287</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lima</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2877</td>
<td>1148</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caracas</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>2369</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>42</td>
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Source: Adapted from World Housing Survey - 1974 (UN 1976).
1.3. THE SOUTH AFRICAN SCENARIO

The trend followed by any housing policy and the resultant housing patterns are highly influenced by the government of the day. This is illustrated in the South African system of urban housing provision which reflects the Nationalist Party policy. This party has been in power since 1948. The South African urban-housing distribution pattern does not conform to theories of spatial analysis as they are postulated in geographic studies. There is a dichotomy comprising the Black and White residential subsystems in South African. The White subsystem conforms to the Western residential distribution model of the suburbanisation era in which the rich moved out of the city centre. The rich moved out because they could afford bigger yards and transport costs to the city centre. In the Black subsystem, the distance from the city centre is not a function of affluence. For the Blacks, this movement from the city centre was a political rather than an economic necessity. In the light of this the need for details pertaining to the legislation of the country becomes imperative. This situation consequently aggravates the complexity of housing issues.

The significance of South Africa in the light of what was earlier mentioned about the developing countries, is strengthened by its unique position vis-a-vis its independence. When South Africa received independence from Britain, political and economic powers were not relinquished to the indigenous
population but to the Whites who perpetrated policies which were not for the
benefit of the locals. Thus in South Africa the colonizer and the colonized share
boundaries (Wolpe, 1975). South Africa is the only country in the twentieth
century which has racial segregation codified in its statute books.

In the light of this, questions arising are; first, how much correlation is
there between South African squatting and that occurring in other parts of the
world, and, second, how unique, if at all, is South African squatting? These two
questions will be addressed though in a limited way only, (depending on
available evidence) in order to answer the questions that are central to this
thesis.

1.4. OBJECTIVES.

This thesis has four main objectives. First, it aims to describe the
geography of squatting in South Africa in the sense of identifying the spatial
distribution of squatting throughout the country. The occurrence of squatting in
both white parts of South Africa and the Homelands will be discussed. This is
the subject of Chapter Three.

Second, it seeks to offer an explanation for this geography and the
processes that lie behind squatting in South Africa. The experiences of other
countries in the developing world in these areas of housing policy, will be
reviewed in Chapter Two and hopefully, they will provide some useful insights into the processes of squatting. The approaches taken in the analysis of squatting and the resultant strategies which have been devised in the other countries will be illustrated in this chapter. It is anticipated that the explanations offered elsewhere will usually be specific to the country being studied and hence, will not apply readily to the South African scene. The South African explanation will be sought in terms of the history and political context in which different policies have been implemented. These issues are tackled in Chapter Four. This chapter is central to the thesis because it outlines a preliminary explanation of the South African squatter problem.

The third objective is to discuss and assess the policy responses which have been made to squatting in South Africa. This will be done through an evaluation of those policies that have been implemented aimed at resolving the problem of the housing backlog and squatting among the Blacks in the "White urban areas". Policy evaluation of this type requires an understanding of the policy goals and the strategies that were used to achieve these goals. Thus, it demands an examination of both the policies’ desired and unintended results, and their explanation (Pal, 1987). In addition, an evaluation must assess whether or not the policies did what they were supposed to do and, if not, why not. Thus, the cause and effect relationships between the policies and the
responses they invoked among the target population need to be examined. These topics will be taken up in Chapter Five.

The fourth and last objective is to fashion some preliminary recommendations concerning the need for changes in the social and economic structure of South Africa, changes that would dramatically improve the housing conditions and overall well-being of the majority of the black population. This is the subject of Chapter Six.

1.5. METHODOLOGY.

The methodology used was influenced by the constraints imposed by the current social and political situation. That is to say, a study aimed at providing an explanation of squatting in South Africa that would be based upon a more formal social-scientific methodology involving for example, a questionnaire survey of a selected sample of squatters and a subsequent analysis of the data obtained is simply impossible in South Africa today. This is so for the following two main reasons.

First, the structure of the squatter settlements is such that they are not readily accessible for research purposes. The shacks are generally not on record and, therefore, any form of choice of a sample population would have to be done through physical contact. But the making of such appointments is difficult
because of the absence of communication lines like a postal system. At another level, it would be difficult to gain access to people themselves. Due to continued police harassment these people tend to be suspicious of strangers and hence, the support of an organisation working with the community concerned, would have to be assured in order to gain the acceptance and confidence of the people in the community. This means that time would be needed to inform these people about the research, to obtain their cooperation and their participation in the interviews.

Second, the time was not right for interviews to be conducted especially by new interviewers. The political climate at the time of data collection (June to August 1990) was not very stable. Furthermore, the author was able to spend only three months back in South Africa in the summer of 1990 and this period was too short to allow for a properly designed set of interviews to be conducted. Also, it would have been ideal to interview members of the local authorities but this was hampered by the fact that most of them were not functioning at the time.

Given these restrictions, the author had to rely on two sets of secondary data as the basis upon which an explanation of squatting was fashioned. The first set consisted of books and research - project reports that were available in the libraries of the universities of McMaster, South Africa and Witwatersrand, the Urban Foundations of South Africa, the Legal Resource Centre and the Development Bank of Southern Africa. The South African newspapers were also used. Even in respect to these sources of data there were limitations, for there is
very little published on squatting in South Africa and there is certainly no comprehensive literature on squatting at the national level in the country. The reason for this is that the reality of the existence of squatting was denied for a long time. This led to procrastination in addressing the problem as will be shown in the text. Most of the studies consulted were either reports about different projects in which particular organisations were involved or they were very localised accounts applying only to the provincial, local authority or even the level of a specific squatter settlement. Hence, it is difficult to assess the central Government's position and to make generalisations about its national policies that lay behind the passing of specific pieces of legislation.

The second set of data resulted from interviews with people working in the following organisations in South Africa: The Urban Foundation, the National Building Research Institute, the National Institute of Personnel Research, The Development Bank of Southern Africa (Government aided organisations); the Transvaal Provincial Administration (Government organisation), Plan Act, Black Sash and Network for the Homeless Pretoria University. The reason why open discussions were favoured with individuals from the above organisations was to seek out information on unpublished and unwritten reports which were not available in the libraries. This proved very useful.

While acknowledging the limitations of the methodology employed in this study, namely the reliance upon the interpretations of data derived from secondary
reports and interviews with agency personnel, it is contended that some useful generalisations can be made about the factors contributing to squatting in South Africa (Chapter Four). These allow in turn, for critical evaluations to be made of the South African government's policy responses to the problem of squatting and these evaluations are the subjects of Chapters Five and Six of the thesis.
CHAPTER 2.

LITERATURE REVIEW.

This section looks first into squatting in certain developing countries other than Africa. It then concentrates on the African examples with the aim of identifying the salient features shared by squatters and squatter settlements in the continent.

2.1. EXAMPLES FROM NON AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

Mangin (1967) presented a summary of views on squatting in Latin America, especially that which took place before the nineteen sixties. In this literature, squatters were typified as "outsiders" in that they were alleged to be rural people coming directly from farms. They were also regarded as being usually illiterate and thus unable to participate in city life. The squatters were seen as people who burdened the economy of cities and, ultimately, that of the nation because they were typically unemployed and unemployable.
Given this attitude, the squatters were treated negatively by the governments and hence, the most popular solution of the nineteen sixties was the demolition of squatter settlements and the forced relocation of the squatters. The governments and people incurred costs resulting from demolition and relocation respectively. Payne emphasized this point by stating that "squatter relocation programmes only squandered scarce resources on replacing existing dwellings and the poor simply moved to other parts of the cities" (Payne, 1984, 2).

Collier's (1976) description of squatters, based on his study conducted in Lima, Peru, was that they are low income families occupying unused and unauthorised land. In support of this, Stadel's (1975) Columbian study further connected the unauthorised occupation of land to the uncontrolled nature of squatting which was considered a form of high-density urban sprawl.

It was only from the nineteen sixties and onwards that there was a significant change in the attitudes towards squatting. The whole squatter movement was subsequently viewed more sympathetically. In the literature of the nineteen eighties, squatter settlements are seen as a contribution by the communities concerned towards the solution of their housing problems which the state seems to have difficulty in addressing. Published works on Latin American squatter settlements argued in support of their existence because they were seen as a solution rather than a problem (Turner, 1982, Mangin,
Thus, it was argued, governments in the developing countries should recognise the invaluable contribution that low-income house builders can make towards the solution of the housing problem (Guhr 1983). In addition, from his South-East Asian studies Poethig (1971) suggested that squatter settlements were to be regarded as a form of self-help housing in that they were initially built by owner occupiers themselves with whatever the rest of the society leaves them and with what they can obtain on their own initiative. This means that in spite of their poverty, lack of skills, and in some instances unemployment, squatters are able to provide their own housing. Supporters of Turner's argument see the virtue of squatting laying in the fact that it can raise the consciousness of low-income people. This is realised through their ability to recognise that they can do something to alleviate their situation. It also makes them aware of the realities and hurdles facing them when dealing with their housing needs. Squatting requires them to overcome their resource deficiencies and to reduce their dependence on the state (Gilbert and Ward, 1985).

Dietz described squatters as land invaders. This conclusion was drawn from his studies conducted in a Peruvian squatter settlement where an organised large number of people took over a piece of land illegally. He maintained that land invasion "at least partially releases pressure in society rather than intensifying it" (Dietz, 1977, 383). The assumption that squatting is less costly and thus a financial advantage to the squatter is further supported
by Guhr's (1983) argument that squatters are hoping to get free access to the land they occupy. Contrary to this, Dwyer (1975) surmised that squatter settlements are not necessarily rent free because in most cases these communities are charged some form of rent either by the government or by landlords.

While arguments by writers such as Turner, Dietz, Poethig and Guhr encouraged acceptance of the permanence of squatter settlements, problems have arisen when options were provided to squatters. Solutions that were successful in one country are often ineffective when transferred to another country. Guhr (1983) noted that the use of cooperatives, which have proved successful in the developed world have generally failed in the developing world.

Mabogunje et al. (1978), in their report on countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia, argued that the ineffectiveness or failure of adoptive strategies stems from the general tendency on the part of developing countries to ignore the social and economic positions of the majorities of their people when generating solutions to their problems. Hence, they suggest that all these problems call for a long overdue policy reorientation in these countries.

Most housing professionals in the developing nations do not know how to involve people in the housing projects (Rodell and Skinner, 1983). This was stressed by Turner (1976) who advocated proscriptive laws leading to more participation by low-income people rather than by a centrally administered
housing authority. Payne also made an interesting observation when he stated that "it is usually people who participate, and project agencies which decide" (Payne, 1984, 7).

There is another line of argument closely associated with Burgess (1977) who developed a case against Turner's generally accepted view that squatting should be supported because it is economically viable for the participants. Burgess saw squatter settlements as ideal grounds for further capitalist exploitation of labour. In so far as housing is necessary for the maintenance and expanded reproduction of social labour, the dominant mode of production, that is the capitalist mode of production, is satisfied to allow housing to be self-produced, particularly in view of the fact that the absence of rents will mean less pressure for wage increase. Gilbert (1982) also argued along these lines.

At another level, the vulnerability of squatters to capitalist exploitation is exacerbated by the fact that they still depend on building material that is produced by the capitalist building sector. Burgess (1978) argued that Turner misses a significant point in his analysis, and that is, even if the self-built housing costs are said to be almost half the government cost this does not mean that the squatter can ever escape capitalism. He is merely in another part of it, the "small is beautiful" capitalism of intermediate technology.

On the other hand, while self-help schemes are seen to offer cheap labour to industry, and a plentiful supply of servants to the developing world
elite, this argument presents a contradiction. Gilbert (1982) surmised that the very entry of the capitalist sector into the squatter settlements raises the costs of labour reproduction which leads to wage increase pressure. The other form of squatter exploitation was described by Dwyer (1975) who, in his studies in Asia, identified a form of squatting where some rich people actually avoided high costs charged by real estate firms through occupying squatter settlements. This is a form of exploitation where benefits due to squatters are usurped by the better-off group.

In spite of all the issues raised, Collier (1976) saw squatting still as a desirable alternative to inner-city slums. Dietz (1969) concluded that it should be seen as a permanent feature of the urban landscape for as long as the problem of low-income housing remains unaddressed.

2.2. AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

The aim of this section is to examine how squatting is, and has been, addressed over time in African countries. From this review, it is hoped, there will be issues raised that will be helpful in the search for understanding of South African squatting.

In her work on Kenya, Peil observed that squatting results from the lack of options faced by the squatter communities. This situation is mostly "a result
of bureaucratic decisions which ignore the needs and wants of ordinary people" (Peil, 1976, 165). In her writing, Peil quoted an example of a Kenyan squatter settlement, Mathare valley, where she found that most squatters were recorded as farmers who were discriminated against when preferential treatment was given to white farmers in regard to land distribution. In spite of this, the Kenyan Government also regarded squatting as impermanent. Based on these findings, then, Peil defined squatting as a response to official oppression.

In an alternative view, Clignet and Soja (1973) argued that squatting is caused by a lack of balance between supply and demand of low cost housing. This viewpoint was also supported by a Zambian study that observed that, "Rapid urbanisation has increased the demand for low cost housing at a faster rate than such housing has been supplied within the legal framework" (Simons et al., 1976, 41). These researches also found that the imbalance was further offset by high rentals charged. Alongside these findings can be set the argument raised by Tipple (1976) and Wilsenach (1989) in their work on Zambia and Botswana - Lesotho - Swaziland respectively, that squatters are poor people who cannot afford highly serviced areas.

The research on Zambia by Simons et al. (1976), further emphasized the positive nature of squatter settlements. The authors maintained that these settlements helped to alleviate the housing backlog because squatters were willing to provide their own housing. This is contrary to a "reputation of
fickleness and unemployment" which other writers on the African scene have attributed to the squatters (Tipple, 1976, 168). O'Connor (1983) too, argued that squatters are also not necessarily unemployed new arrivals from the rural areas. Most of them, he argued, have been in the cities for a number of years and some of them are holding stable jobs.

The tendency to regard squatters as a low-income group ignores squatters from other income brackets. In such cases, squatters who are not of a low-income level exploit the opportunities made for their low-income counterparts. This has been observed in "Swaziland (where) the middle income group began to utilize the self help site-and-service schemes provided for low income groups" (Wilsenach, 1989, 86).

Tipple (1976) who was mentioned above, further described a squatter as a person who settled illegally on land, which made him essentially a trespasser. Illegality was seen as generally discouraging capital investment in the squatter settlements. But studies that were conducted in a squatter settlement in Nairobi by Amis, suggested that squatting should not always be equated with self-provided housing. Observing the development of a private rental sector in Nairobi, Amis concluded that "illegality and the intervention of capital are not always incompatible and that it is perfectly feasible for the private sector to operate in such illegal areas, thus preempting the existence of subsistence
shelter" (Amis, 1984, 88). Under such circumstances then, squatting functions as a commercial activity.

The problem with such commercialisation of squatting, Amis argued, is that market forces tended to push the poor out of the squatter settlements. To counteract this, most squatters sacrificed health for housing and this, Amis continued, was identifiable and strengthened by their willingness to construct and continuously improve their housing with the little money they made.

Research on a Zambian squatter settlement, the George compound, by Andrew et al. (1972) encouraged a positive attitude towards squatting. Their focus was on the entrepreneurial opportunity that squatting accorded to the residents. With provision of their own housing, squatters participated in the actual production of their housing and besides this, they were involved in decision making in the whole building process.

The effectiveness of upgrading with tenurial security has also been shown in the studies of the BLS countries (Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland). Wilsenach's (1989) study of the old Naledi settlement in Botswana reported that fifty per cent of the community had permanent structures a year after the government had given them tenure rights.

On the other hand, other studies have suggested that the squatters are not always the only people benefitting from Government assistance. In her Zambian study where squatters were occupying private land, Rakodi (1988)
showed that the government upgrading programme which was undertaken actually benefitted the landlords in the long run. She identified exploitation when service improvement in such squatter settlements resulted in increased rentals and increased land values. This, coupled with the attraction of high-income families into such areas, ultimately led to the displacement of the squatters.

Tipple (1976), saw in his Zambian study, the source of negative attitudes towards squatting in the developing world lying in the western style and grandiose planning adopted by these governments. These same attitudes, Peil (1976) surmised, resulted in indigenous housing erected by the Africans being considered a danger to health, consequently, attempts were made to house all urban residents in controlled rental accommodation. Local resources and ingenuity were in this way neglected. Also, this meant that only those people who could afford rental accommodation would be housed.

Another issue raised in some studies is the question of how housing standards should be set in the developing world. The aim of the housing policy according to Simons et al. (1976), should be to devise a strategy for meeting qualitative housing needs of the urban poor be they squatters or not. Instead, the standards are seen to "often have little to do with basic structural soundness or hygiene" (Wilsenach, 1989, 89).
At this point, a pulling together of the misconceptions which have influenced policy in the developing world is appropriate. The studies made by Peil (1976) and Simons et al. (1976), have shown that in countries like Kenya and Zambia where housing was tied to wage employment, all housing belonging to the self-employed was declared squatting. On the other hand, Peil's study further showed that settlements whose legitimacy was based on customary land tenure were also declared squatter settlements simply because they did not fall within the cities' land-use zoning regulations.

These observations suggest that a redefinition of the criteria used to designate a settlement as squatter settlement is needed. The continuous enforcement of "solutions" which prove to be ineffective suggests a problem which might be related to the definitions and resultant understanding of squatting. This thesis suggests, therefore, that there is a need for the explanation of squatting to be reexamined and for the strategies so far attempted to be closely assessed in order to identify the reasons behind the ineffectiveness of these costly though presumably well-intended solutions.

These strategies were influenced by the earlier works of Turner and Mangin. Other scholars have argued that those works assumed that squatter settlements were occupied by the upwardly mobile who would definitely improve their housing in due course. This Turner-Mangin school "tended to ignore the overall structural context within which squatting occurred, a context
of extreme economic and political inequalities" (Simons et al., 1976, 72). Given this divergence of views, there is a need for an identification and analysis of the significant characteristics of different settlements within the squatter universe. In order to achieve this, "time should be spent on finding out what people really want within their economic constraints and (an attempt) be made to provide the basic necessities of life to all, especially the poor and the underprivileged in the most rational way available" (Tipple, 1976, 169).
CHAPTER 3.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF SOUTH AFRICAN SQUATTING.

3.1. THE STUDY AREA.

South Africa lies at the southern tip of the African continent. It is bordered inland by Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia and Mozambique. South Africa comprises four provinces viz Transvaal, Orange Free State, Natal and the Cape. It also includes the Homelands and the Independent States. For the purpose of this study, South Africa includes all these regions (Figure 1). Reference, however, will be made continually to the Homelands and the Independent States or to "Black" and "White South Africa" as the discussion requires.

The division of the whole country referred to above, stems from the 1913 Land Act and the 1936 Trust Land Act. According to the 1913 Land Act the country was divided in two. Seven percent was set aside for Blacks and the remainder for whites (Figure 2). Under the 1936 Trust Land Act, another six percent was added to the black land (Figure 3). This was the time when the
Homelands independent states

- Gazankulu
- Kwazulu
- Kangwane
- Lebowa
- Ndebele
- Qwaqwa

International Boundary
Provincial Boundary

NAMIBIA
CAPE PROVINCE
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Cape Town

BOTSWANA
TRANSVAAL
ORANGE FREE STATE
LESOTHO
NATAL
SWAZILAND
ZIMBABWE
MOZAMBIQUE
CAPE PROVINCE

Figure 1. The Provinces, Homelands and independent states of South Africa

Source: Johnson, (1988) p.17
1913

LAND SET ASIDE IN TERMS OF NATIVES LAND ACT

Figure 2. Land reserved for Blacks

Source: SAIRR, (1989)
Figure 3. Land reserved for Blacks

Source: SAIRR, (1989)
Homelands, some of which later became independent, were born. The four, often referred to as the TBVC countries, that became independent are Transkei (1976), Bophuthatswana (1977), Venda (1979) and Ciskei (1981).

Associated with this land division is a population distribution in which 74% of the total population is assigned only 13% of the land. Figure 4 shows the breakdown of population groups in South Africa while Figure 5 shows the land distribution between blacks and whites. Figure 6 shows the land distribution and population composition on a more detailed level for the four Provinces, as these were determined by the two Land Acts.

Most of the examples of the squatter settlements referred to in this study are located in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal region (the PWV), because this is the core industrial region of the country lying in the two Provinces of Transvaal and the Orange Free State. This is where squatting is at its highest due to the perceived higher opportunities for employment and better wages. The Transvaal, in which most of the industrial core is situated, has the highest black population: their numbers account for 32% of the total population in the Province.
Figure 4. The breakdown of population groups in South Africa

Source: SAIRR, (1989)
Figure 5. Land distribution between the Blacks and Whites in South Africa

Source: SAIRR, (1989)
Land reserved in 1913

Cape Province

Land added in 1936

Natal

Africans as a % of population

Transvaal

Orange Free State

Figure 6. Land for Blacks as a percentage of the 1936 population

3.2. SQUATTING IN SOUTH AFRICA.

Squatting in South Africa is one of the most pressing social-political issues because of its extent. The data show however, that it is not a new phenomenon; it is almost as old as black urbanisation, which started in the 1800’s. The number of squatter settlements is difficult to calculate because some squatters prefer their settlements to be unknown for fear of harassment and/or removal. The difficulty in collecting data on squatting is compounded by the fact that before the abolition of influx control in 1986, most squatters were officially regarded as illegal and therefore did not want their presence to be known and thus, they were not on record.

To date, it is estimated that there are seven million people living in informal circumstances nationally. "Informal" here refers to occupation of non-conventional housing, regardless of its legal status. Out of this total 4.7 million are said to be located in the major urban areas. The official estimate by the Government on the other hand, comes up with only 1,310,813 people in informal housing (SAIRR 1989). There is conflicting information pertaining to the numbers of Black people, first, those residing in the urban areas, and second, the squatters. The situation in regard to these discrepancies in the different provinces is described in the following sections.
NATAL PROVINCE.

The Central statistical services (1988), which is a government organisation, estimated the total Black urban population of the province in 1985 as 256,900. On the other hand, the government official sources estimated the Natal squatter population as 156,715 (SAIRR 1989), which means that the squatters constituted about fifty percent of the province's black population. But contrary to this estimate, a much more realistic report by Maasdorp (1975) is that there were about one million squatters in the Durban Metropolitan Area alone in the 1970's. If the government official population total is compared to Maasdorp's estimate of squatters, then squatters are far more than the black population residing in the province.

The general pattern of squatter settlements in Durban today (which is the major city of the province) is that they lie behind hills and ridges which makes them difficult to detect. Thus, it is stated that, "formal Durban is a little speck surrounded on three sides by a vastness of shackland" (Beckett 1989). Figure 7 shows the location of the main informal settlements that were recorded in 1977, some of which are squatter settlements. It can be seen that these lie generally on the outskirts of the main urbanised area.
THE DURBAN METROPOLITAN REGION 1977

Figure 7. Informal settlements of the Durban metropolitan region

Source: Morris, (1981) p.64
TRANSVAAL PROVINCE.

The province's total Black urban population was 3,098,958 in 1985 (Central statistical services 1988). Mavuso, a member of the executive committee which is part of the Local Government structure, estimated the number of black squatters in the province as 1.4 million. The other government official estimate was 850,000 squatters in the province, which is almost 50% less than Mavuso's estimate. The Urban Foundation, on the other hand, has on record 2.4 million squatters in the PWV (Pretoria-Witwatersrand Vaal) region alone. This high number might perhaps be attributed to the fact that the Foundation's report concentrated on the PWV region, which is the most densely populated part of the country.

Another report by the Foundation stated that there were 635,000 informal units in the PWV in 1989, out of which 97,000 were in Soweto alone. Soweto, which is situated in Johannesburg, is constituted by an agglomeration of about 30 townships. In the same year, Johannesburg North had 80, to 120,000 people living in informal housing. This informal housing included outside rooms, garages, and free standing shacks. Other squatter settlements in the province were demolished, for example Mandelaville near Potchefstroom in western Transvaal in 1990.
Although it is difficult for various sources to agree on the numbers of squatters, there are several known and recorded squatter settlements some of which are indicated in Table 2. These are around Johannesburg only. There are many others in the province. For example, around June/July 1990 a new settlement appeared around Soshanguve, a northern Pretoria township. The Johannesburg pattern of squatting is a filling in of gaps. Shacks are built in any open space in the region and because of this, it is difficult to produce an accurate map. Figure 8 shows informal settlements in the PWV, including squatter settlements.

**CAPE PROVINCE.**

According to the report of the Central statistical services (1988) the total Black urban population of the Cape Province was 974,429 in 1985. The government official estimate of the squatter population in the whole Province according to the 1987 census was only 300,000 (Fact sheet C 12 1989), which is about a third of the whole Black population. Other estimates show however, a larger number than the official government one. For example Hart's (1988) survey recorded a total of 90,000 in only two settlements, whereas the Cape Peninsular area has many black squatter settlements (Figure 10) despite the fact that it was declared a Coloured preferential area.
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**Source:** Adapted from Mashabela (1990).
Figure 8. Informal settlements of the PWV

Source: adapted from Hart, (1988)
Compared to Figure 9 which was compiled in 1981, Figure 10 shows a higher number of squatter settlements than expected. Cape Town squatter settlements are generally found along main roads and near the airport.

**ORANGE FREE STATE.**

Not much is written on squatting in this province. It is argued, however, that most of the province's urban squatting is covered in the PWV region (the Vaal part of the region lies in the Orange Free State).

The official government reports had on record only 1,142 squatters in the whole province. On the other, Hart (1988) has on record 200,000 squatters in one settlement alone. The Province's total black urban population was 567,852 in 1985 (Central statistical services 1988), this means that according to Hart's report a considerably large part of the province's Black urban population, is constituted by squatters.

The small number of urban squatters quoted in the government records, might be attributed to the fact that the province has a long history of rural squatting or share cropping where Africans used to stay in white farms in exchange for their labour and/or a certain percentage of their agricultural produce (Le Roux 1986). Another reason for the low incidence of squatting
The Western Cape Metropolitan Region

Figure 9. Informal settlements of the Western Cape Metropolitan region

Figure 10. Informal settlements of the Cape Peninsular

Source: Financial mail 26/10/1984
might be that the Province promoted house ownership long before the other provinces.

In addition to the people who are already squatting, there are many more who may ultimately become squatters. These include domestic workers who live in crowded conditions in the servants' quarters, people living in Grey areas (racially mixed Areas), people in the neighbouring farms, men in hostels (Adler, 1990), and people renting rooms inside the conventional houses in the black townships.
CHAPTER 4.

HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF SQUATTING IN SOUTH AFRICA: TOWARDS AN EXPLANATION.

4.1. BLACK URBAN HOUSING POLICY.

In order to understand the origin and character of squatting in South Africa, it is imperative to examine the different government policies which have influenced the urbanisation and housing of the black people. This section will try as far as possible to restrict itself to the urban areas of South Africa although reference will inevitably be made to the rural areas because of the nature of ties which exist between them and the urban areas. The government policy has until recently (the nineteen-eighties) regarded urban Blacks as rural people working in urban areas.

In essence, the urbanisation of Black South Africans started significantly during the nineteenth century with the development of the mining industry. The subsequent growth of this activity led to the need for cheap labour. This need was not readily satisfied, consequently the government coerced people out of
their self-employed farming into money-paying jobs through "the imposition of hut taxes and other monetary levies" (Harsch, 1980, 34). With an annual tax imposed on every hut, a need for cash was created in order to pay the tax. The occupants were in this way forced to earn this cash out of necessity. This taxation was also part of the Glen Grey Act which was passed in 1894. This Act, which prevented African commercial farming especially in the Glen Grey area of the Transkei, was expected to release more labour to the mining and manufacturing industries and to eliminate agricultural competition between black and white farmers. The subsequent introduction of the 1913 Land Act and the 1936 Trust Land Act made it progressively impossible for most black people to eke out a living from the land.

With the deterioration of living conditions in the Homelands the rural to urban migration increased. It later was accelerated by the drought and the depression of the nineteen-thirties. According to the Government, this necessitated the introduction of "influx control" measures and ever since this step was taken by the Government, all policies pertaining to urban Blacks have been based on control. Little did the Government realise that all these strategies were to contribute to a complex problem of a housing backlog and squatting that would be carried over to the twentieth century and probably even beyond.
There have been two major phases in the development of black urban housing policy, one prior to 1948 and another after that date. Each phase is now discussed in more detail.

4.2. PRE NATIONALIST PARTY RULE (BEFORE 1948).

The period before the Nationalist party rule is important because it serves to illuminate developments before the Apartheid era which have been instrumental in bringing about the present housing situation.

The poor conditions in black urban settlements in the early part of the twentieth century led invariably to the occurrence of diseases like tuberculosis and later the Influenza epidemic. The tuberculosis problem led to the appointment of the Commission of the same name in 1914, which examined conditions in the urban black townships. The Commission reported that living conditions were as a rule inadequate in those places. The irony of their finding lay in the fact that those places had been created as a supposed solution to the health threat which was posed by their predecessors, that is, slums and shanty towns.

In 1903 the first black township was built in Pimville near Johannesburg. This was in response to the recommendation of the 1903 -1905 Native Affairs
Commission. The Commission suggested that individual land holdings for the Blacks should be encouraged and, where possible labour townships should be established where black families could reside. This, the Commission argued, would promote labour stability which was then a problem. In spite of this recommendation, the mining Companies established compounds for single men in the mines (Sikakane 1977). Around the same period, freehold residential areas for Blacks, areas like Alexandra and Sophiatown, were recorded.

In 1918, during the influenza epidemic which claimed the lives of about 500,000 Blacks, a Commission was appointed. This Commission also looked into the conditions in slums and townships. A significant point to note here is that nothing effective was done to improve on these conditions. The general tendency of the Government was to come up with legislation, which though vaguely related to solving the housing problem, was basically aimed at encouraging separate development.

The slums had developed because black housing had not been provided for. The argument was that Blacks were only temporary inhabitants in urban areas. This was supported by the Transvaal Local Commission of 1922, paragraph 267, which stated, "The native should only be allowed to enter the urban areas which are essentially the white man's creation, when he is willing to enter and to minister to the needs of the white man and should depart there from when he ceases to minister".
This report influenced the housing policy in that the Government did not deem it appropriate to provide any formal housing for people it regarded as temporary sojourners. This led to the self-provision of some form of shelter by the Blacks in order to be near areas of employment. Thus, South African shanty towns were born. Generally, people lived in slum-like areas within cities. When these slums were cleared, the townships of today emerged. These consist of Government built thousands of small houses - small precisely because they were meant to house the occupants temporarily (Beavon, 1982). This was the time when Soweto, the acronym for South Western Townships, was created in Johannesburg (Figure 11).

**THE NATIVES (URBAN AREAS) ACT OF 1923.**

The central provision of this act was to put aside land for Black accommodation in segregated urban locations. This was necessitated by the mixed character of freehold townships like Sophiatown. White local authorities were employed to see to the provision of land specifically for the housing of employed Blacks. Whites were not allowed to own or occupy premises in these locations. Local authorities depended highly on the sale of sorghum beer to finance their housing schemes because there was no black tax base for this purpose. This was attributable to the low wage levels for the Blacks.
Figure 11. Layout of Soweto showing townships and hostels - 1980

Restrictions on the brewing of sorghum (native) beer were introduced and provision was made to give to the local authorities the monopolies of the manufacturing and selling of this beer.

The introduction of "influx control" measures in 1930 made it more difficult for Blacks to enter towns and settle with their families. Influx control was aimed at countering the phenomenal increase of black women in urban areas. Men who left their wives in the reserves were then regarded as single men. Making it difficult however, did not deter them, because people kept coming and they needed housing. The fact that these people were officially "non-existent" led to their not being attended to and this, of course, contributed to the creation of a housing crisis which remains incurable under the present conditions.

THE NATIVE URBAN AREAS CONSOLIDATION ACT 25 OF 1945.

According to the Act three forms of accommodation were allowed in urban areas. The first, "Hostels" were built basically for single men, not always because they were unmarried, but because their wives did not qualify to be in urban areas. The second form, "Locations", which were Government provided housing units, were built to house families which qualified in one way or another to be in urban areas. Lastly, there were the Native villages, of which only the
Lady Selborne, and the Fingo and Hottentot locations in Pretoria and Grahamstown respectively were built, where the more affluent and "stable" could erect their own dwellings. These native villages were subsequently resettled because they threatened the policy of non-merging of residential areas belonging to different racial groups. In this resettlement, the affluent were pushed together with other non-affluent groups into the standard conventional two - to four - roomed houses in the townships.

Thus, most people ended up living in townships, and these included even those who could provide their own housing. This trend resulted from "the decision not to grant property rights to Blacks" (Morris, 1981, 29), even to those who could afford them. Instead, long leases were to be granted to approved Blacks. Without tenurial security it was quite risky to build a house in an urban area and this led to massive lodging in the few owner-built houses. Out of 1, 700 owner-built houses, 1, 400 took in lodgers and the total number of such lodgers was 15, 000 (Morris, 1981).

OTHER LEGISLATION.

The 1933 Act proclaimed Johannesburg white except for Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare, which were located in the west of Johannesburg. At
this time about 43, 000 illegals moved to Sophiatown, rather than to the locations that were being built.

In the "locations" rent tended to be higher than what an average Black family could afford because white labour was used in the building of those units. Job reservation for whites made it impossible for black conventional housing to be built by Blacks. On the other hand, low wages for Blacks made it increasingly difficult for them to afford rentals in the urban areas. As Morris (1981, 36) reported, "the social and economic structure of the Union pegged Blacks to the unskilled occupations and maintained a wide gulf between skilled and unskilled wage levels". In 1937, the unemployed or unemployable urban black population (eg, pensioners), were labelled surplus labour and removed to the Homelands. The Government still stuck to its 1913 and 1936 Land Acts, in that no extra land (except in the few instances when the Government deemed it necessary) was acquired for Blacks.

The continual use of white labour for the production of housing for Blacks, in spite of the suggestions made against it since the nineteen-thirties, and the lack of funds that local authorities had to deal with, led to a decline and ultimately an end to building for Blacks in Johannesburg in 1943 and 1944. As a result, the people who were unhoused crowded into any available accommodation and this led to massive "pass raids" in 1943, which were an attempt to control and curb the lodging of Blacks in "white urban areas". A
pass raid refers to a police exercise where black people's identity documents are examined in order to determine the legality of their presence in the "white urban areas". During this pass raid, about 13,000 people were arrested in ten days. The majority of these were lodgers in white premises. This suggests that in an attempt to eke out a livelihood, people who were unwelcome in urban areas evolved ways and means of solving the housing problem on their own.

In 1944, James Sofasonke Mpanza started a squatter movement. This was the first recorded black squatter movement in South Africa. This movement called for occupation of land and incomplete houses by official subtenants. By that time, in recognition of the acute housing backlog, people were officially granted the right to take in subtenants in Orlando East. The aim of the movement was to force the Government to take the plight of these people seriously and to respond quickly. There were 20,000 people in the squatter camps that resulted from Mpanza's movement. In response, the Government provided them with temporary shelter. This move increased the problem facing the Government because the squatters' occupation of incomplete structures undermined the official waiting-list for housing. In 1946, the second and the third squatter movements started and land was occupied in Orlando, Pimville and Dube. In 1947, 60,000 people were reported to be in these camps. Durban alone had about 30,000 squatters in 1946. An influx of Blacks into urban areas during the Second World War worsened the post-war
housing conditions. Due to the war effort, the cities' industrial and commercial sectors expanded attracting to them rural people already affected by poverty and land pressures in the reserves. As the population increased, the cities' shortage of the required white manpower and building materials exacerbated the housing shortage.

These observations point to the evolution of a vicious circle in black housing which was strengthened by an attitude of deliberate negligence coupled with inappropriate responses made by the Government on an ad hoc basis. The 1948 report of the Native Laws Commission, also referred to as the Fagan Commission, pointed out that while Blacks were denied access to property from as early as 1923, local authorities could not provide sufficient alternative accommodation (Morris, 1981).

4.3. THE NATIONALIST PARTY RULE (FROM 1948 TO THE EIGHTIES).

From the beginning of its rule the Nationalist Party stressed the impermanence of Blacks in towns. This was done through intensification of segregation, stricter control of black urbanisation, and reduction of financial support of urban Blacks by both the state and local authorities. There was strict adherence to the 1923 Act, the exercise of Section Ten rights of the 1945
Black Urban Areas Consolidation Act (amended in 1954), the passing of the Group Areas Act of 1950, the 1951 Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, and Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act of 1952. Despite these steps, a large number of squatter communities were recorded.

In the nineteen-sixties many squatter settlements developed. The following were recorded in Natal in 1962: Two Sticks, Kwa Bhengu, New Look, Kwa Mnguni, Chateau and Good Hope estates. In 1965 there were places like Raincoat and Thusini with 5,900 and 3,350 people respectively. Pinetown had sixty to seventy thousand people, in Clermont seventy percent of whom were illegal. The number of squatters in Pinetown increased ten fold in three years while that of Durban - Pinetown industrial region increased seven times in six years.

The Transvaal has also had a large squatter community from as early as the nineteen-forties. This trend has continued as shown in the present squatter settlements mentioned in chapter Three. Winterveld near Pretoria had about 300,000 squatters in the late nineteen-seventies. The Cape also has a history of squatting. The squatter population increased there three times in ten years. Hart's (1988) survey reported about 100,000 squatters in the late nineteen-seventies in Mdantsane near East London, while Port Elizabeth had 70,000 in the early eighties. All these data show the extent and development of
squatting over the years in South Africa and these trends do not show any signs of abeyance.

THE GROUP AREAS ACT OF 1950.

Accommodation in a specific residential zone generally depends on a person's financial means. That is to say, people in the high-income bracket, for example, tend to reside in the upmarket neighbourhoods. The Group Areas Act has however "created an artificial situation in South Africa in regard to the availability of suitable accommodation for various race groups" (Ver Loren Van Themaat, ud, 11). Also, the Group Areas Act imposed control over occupation of urban residential areas. The Act provided for establishment of a Group Areas board whose role was to demarcate group areas in various towns for members of different racial groups. These provisions of the Act were applied retrospectively and thus, throughout the whole country, urban residential areas which had mixed races were affected.

The Group Areas Act resulted in the most massive movement of people ever seen in the country, because it strengthened the racial segregation of residential zones in urban areas. The Government planned and administered township building throughout the country to provide housing for squatters and people who were occupying the "wrong" areas. In the Transvaal, the increase
in the number of Johannesburg townships (Soweto) was attributable to this move among others. Soweto has about twenty-six such townships covering about eighty-five square kilometres (Sikakane 1977). This is one of the massive resettlement schemes. It started with Klipspruit, Pimville and Orlando townships which were built before the fifties. These latter townships were also built in response to the 1954 Black Resettlement Act whose intent was to remove Blacks from any area in the magisterial district of Johannesburg. This Act was passed primarily to effect demolition of Sophiatown, though other Western Native townships like New Clare and Martindale were also demolished then. In Pretoria, people from Bantule were resettled in Atteridgeville, Saulsville and Mamelodi. The residents of Lady Selborne, which was also located in Pretoria, were resettled in Garankuwa and Mabopane which are in a Homeland. The destruction of Bantule and Lady Selborne were necessitated by the expansion of the white residential area which, if not curbed, would have led to the merging of residential areas of different racial groups. Kwa-Mashu in Durban was built for people from Cato Manor which was also a mixed suburb.

New housing was only provided for the people who were displaced by the Group Areas Act. All the others were advised to apply for housing in the Homelands. In 1954 the Government refused to build extra houses in Langa, Cape Town because all its families were to be repatriated to the Homelands (Lodge 1983). Around the same period, Durban had an unusually high
shortage of housing because the Minister of Native Affairs refused to have government land used for black housing. Some people however, were resettled in new townships, most of which were built in Homelands.

This resettlement implied demolition of houses, compensation of house-owners in some cases, moving of these people to their new group areas and provision of housing for these people, and ultimately, services however minimal. These new locations are far from the city centre and this implied heavy transport subsidies. The poor who, incidentally, happen to be mostly black, were located the furthest away from their work places, in contrast to the normal suburbanisation process.

OTHER LEGISLATION.

Other laws were passed to both discourage urban settlement and to eradicate squatting. The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act was passed in 1951. This piece of legislation will be treated at length later in Chapter Five. It is sufficient to note at this point that it was specifically passed to address the squatting problem but it did not succeed. Squatting was progressively made difficult and penalties were tightened. As it turned out, the act "did not only hide illegals, it created them" (Beckett, 1989, 6). This means that some of the legal urban Blacks decided to squat because they were living in overcrowded
conditions as they were not provided with conventional housing, with squatting declared illegal, they became illegal by implication. This act was passed because the influx control measures which were in operation had failed by then.

Influx control measures were tightened through an emphasis on the migrant labour system which forced men to leave their families in the Homelands, while they were housed in compounds. To ensure this control, there was strict adherence to some of the section Ten provisions of the Black Urban Areas Consolidation Act of 1944 (amended in 1954) which prevented black people from living in urban areas, unless they first, were born there, second, had lived there lawfully and continuously for fifteen years, and thirdly, had served the same employer legally for ten years.

In addition, the Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act of 1952 was passed. This Act made it mandatory for all black men at first, and then later for all black women to carry reference books on their person. These documents reflected the status of the carriers with reference to the aforementioned Section Ten rights among others. In some instances, people were sent to Homelands regardless of their Section Ten rights. Women on their own were very rarely allowed to take over a house from a male tenant who had died or deserted them, and at the same time they were also not allowed to be on the housing list as an individual person.
POLICIES ADOPTED BY THE NATIONALIST PARTY.

The Financing of housing policy reaffirmed the temporary status of the Blacks. This was done for example, through the reduction of the number of black tenants who were permitted to pay sub-economic rentals. In 1954, only those tenants who earned fifteen pounds or below were to pay sub-economic rentals and all the others were to pay economic rentals which were higher. For rental purposes, the household income was taken to refer to "the householder's earnings together with one half of the income of each of his children residing with him and a full amount paid by any lodger, up to a maximum of four pounds per month per child or lodger" (Morris 1981). With this formula used to calculate income, most households qualified to pay economic rentals. It thus became progressively difficult for most families to afford rentals because they took in lodgers to complement their meager wages. The fact that most of their complementary income ended up being spent on rent means that most of these families could barely make ends meet.

On the other hand, those people who wanted to build their own houses, encountered difficulties in qualifying for loans from building societies because according to the Building Societies' Act of 1934, to qualify for a loan, one needed having a title to the land as collateral. As mentioned elsewhere in this Chapter, Blacks were legally prohibited from land ownership.
The housing policy also had characteristics that did not encourage Blacks to stay in urban areas. In 1950 the thirty-year leasehold was introduced in Black housing. This, in theory, served to help Blacks to qualify for building societies loans. But given the facts that to qualify for a housing loan a stipulated amount of income was needed and that most Blacks earned below this level, this new law did not change the state of affairs effectively.

Housing policy has been based on the assumption of a restricted flow of Blacks into the urban areas. To try to ensure this, the 1966 Housing Act No 4 empowered the Government exclusively to provide housing. The Act further provided for the establishment of the National Housing Commission, (Bantu Housing Board in the case of Africans) which was responsible for acquisition of land and property, for the maintenance of dwelling units, and for the formulation of the housing policy. As shown earlier, black housing has been deliberately neglected over the years because Blacks were only regarded as temporary residents in urban areas. Another way of ensuring that there would be a limited number of Blacks in the urban areas was illustrated in the Black Sash report when it stated that "government policy was to reduce the number of Africans residing in the prescribed areas and to ensure that as many as possible of the workers needed in the metropolitan areas were migrants" (Horrell, 1971, 146).

The Government also used the housing policy as a way of reducing the number of Blacks in urban areas, especially in the Western Cape. Building
schemes for family units in black townships were either reduced or dropped while hostels were being encouraged. In some regions like Johannesburg only schemes that had been approved earlier went ahead with building and thus, the growing population was not catered for at all. When people lost their housing in one way or the other they were not helped or encouraged to find new accommodation in urban areas and were pressed instead to accept repatriation.

The short term policy was to remove black freehold rights, to segregate races, control movement and to reduce the economic burden of Blacks on the Government and on the local authorities. Hence in 1968, leases were withdrawn and Blacks resumed their tenancy status. The local authority then bought the black-owned houses. The long term policy was aimed at ultimately sending all Blacks to their respective Homelands. However, in the nineteen-seventies a leasehold policy was reintroduced with provision for ninety-nine year leases. In 1972, a policy was introduced to the effect that all future family housing was to be provided in the Homelands in this way the number of ninety-nine year leases granted would progressively be reduced.

The 1986 white paper on urbanisation still supported orderly urbanisation. "Orderly" referred to furthering the control of black urbanisation. The paper sought to limit African settlement in the PWV region
(Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal) especially, which is the core industrial region of the country.

This section has sought to show the complex nature of the housing crisis in South Africa. The history and the development of the housing backlog has been built around a legal framework in which available options were manifestly inadequate and unpredictable. A major concern of this thesis is whether the right questions were asked before a claim was made that the Government was addressing the housing and squatting issues. To what extent, this study asks, was there an adequate understanding of who the squatters are in South Africa.

4.4. WHO ARE THE SQUATTERS IN SOUTH AFRICA?

Statistics show that squatting is growing by the day in South Africa. It has now become a vicious circle which is difficult to break. A better understanding of who the squatters are should be the essential starting point of any policy formulations aimed at dealing with squatter settlements. This is especially so where there is no consensus on precisely who the squatters are.

There are different viewpoints on the character and identity of squatters. The official Government view is that squatters are new arrivals from the country’s Homelands and Independent states. These new people are mostly unemployed and are, as a result, looking for free accommodation. There are
also among the squatters work-seekers, domestic workers and former hostel inmates. The legal status of the last two groups disqualifies them from enlisting for family housing units. These new arrivals are likely to be without housing in an urban scene where housing provision has been for a long time determined by employment. It becomes even clearer that they cannot be accommodated because the mechanisms for providing housing do not provide for free accommodation-seekers under any circumstances.

Another view defines squatters as permanent urban dwellers who have severed ties with the Homelands. They may be relocates from condemned residential enclaves in black townships, or evicted former residents of township backyard shelters (Hart and Hardie 1987). These people may have become tenants, subtenants and lodgers because the conventional housing demand far surpassed the supply. This description makes squatters part of the urban community who do not have any homes except for their shacks.

Other studies classify squatting as an economic phenomenon. This operates at two levels. On the one, people squat so as to be near employment opportunities whether real or imagined. Squatting may also be a result of the need for accommodation by mostly low-income people who do not have access to the regular financial system and hence access to housing loans (Hattingh, 1990).
From the legal point of view, a squatter is "any black person living on land governed by the Act (1936 Land Act) who is not an employee or labour tenant of the land-owner or the dependent of, or woman living with such an employee or labour tenant" (Budlender, 1987, 18). In other words, squatting implies "illegal tenure" (Zack, 1990). Squatters are, according to this frame of reference, most commonly Blacks living in informal structures on land not set aside for black residential purposes.

Given all these views how does one determine the nature of squatting for policy purposes? The most reasonable way would be the incorporation of all the definitions. In this way, one can readily identify gross generalisations which might account for the ineffectiveness of strategies adopted towards the solution of squatting.

ORIGIN OF SQUATTERS.

The conventional wisdom is that South African squatters are new arrivals from rural areas. It is generally alleged that the scrapping of the Influx Control in 1986 is primarily responsible for the present massive squatting. The rationale here is that squatting is temporary because as soon as these people get employment they will move to formal housing. Squatters are also generally viewed as lacking in skills and thus, for practical considerations, they should
return to where they were because the chances for them to be employed are very slim. Given all these arguments, the tendency for squatting to be regarded as temporary needs further consideration.

The analysis of the Tokoza study by Black Sash (1989), revealed that seventy-eight percent of the respondents were from the PWV region and other urban areas. In addition the study of Tshepo settlement by Crankshaw et al. (1988) suggested that only about two percent of the population came directly from the rural areas. Figure 12 shows the migration pattern of Tshepo residents. According to this study, almost half of the respondents came from the surrounding PWV farms and small holdings, about a third came from formal urban areas, while a sixth comes from the backyard shacks. The remainder come from other areas including hostels and compounds. The point made here is that most of these "immigrants" were not recent arrivals to the PWV region. The significant point here is that there was no sudden increase in rural (Homelands) to urban migration after the scrapping of the influx control in 1986 which is contrary to the conventional wisdom.

Thus, it is significant to reassess strategies and acknowledge the fact that most squatters are not from rural areas and do not have other options such as farming which policy makers are usually inclined to stress as being the case.
Figure 12. Migration patterns of Tshepo residents

KEY:

A - Tshepo
B - PWV Farm
C - PWV Urban
D - Hostel
E - Urban shack
F - Rest of Transvaal
G - Rest of South Africa
H - Homelands (including TBVC)
other Africa

Source: Crankshaw et al., (1988)
EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME PATTERNS.

The most commonly stated view is that squatting exists precisely because of a lack of income, a low income or downright poverty. The income used here was based on wages or salaries received from some economic activity be it formal or casual. Figure 13 shows the employment pattern of Tshepo shack residents (Crankshaw et al., 1988). The highest percentage is unemployed. Included in this forty-two percent, are pensioners, housewives and teenagers who do not attend school. Thirty-two percent are in formal (regular) jobs while about seventeen are doing piece jobs. The latter depend on odd jobs which are not a reliable means of livelihood because of their erratic nature.

Figure 14 shows occupation patterns in formal employment. The highest percentages, twenty-six and thirty-nine, are constituted by the unskilled and the semi-skilled respectively, while the professionals were constituted by three percent only. The occupation structure in casual employment is shown in Figure 15. Sixty-eight percent, which is the highest, comprised the unskilled labour, while only four percent is in white collar jobs. Finally, Figure 16 which shows the income distribution pattern has twenty-five percent receiving R301 and above while seventy-four percent receives R300 and below. These low
Figure 13. Employment of shack residents

Source: Crankshaw et al., (1988)
Figure 14. Occupations in formal employment

Source: Crankshaw et al., (1988)
Figure 15. Occupations in casual employment

Source: Crankshaw et al., (1988)
Figure 16. Average monthly shack income

Source: Crankshaw et al., (1988)
wage figures could not be complemented in any significant ways given that less than twenty percent claimed some rights to land or cattle in the Homelands.

Contrary to the accepted view, the Urban Foundation survey reported that "at least eighty percent of male squatters have formal jobs and at least twenty-four percent earn up to R1,000.00 per month" (Star 20/8/88). Table 3 shows the income structure of another squatter settlement, Vlakfontein, also situated in the PWV region. This table shows that about seventy four percent of the employed population received R300.00 and below, which is the same as the figure quoted for Tshepo.

Table 4 shows the 1982 income structure of the non-squatting population of Soweto. From this table about eighty percent received R300.00 and below. This table shows that in the nineteen-eighties a high percentage of the non squatter community was still receiving low wages. This compares favourably with the Zambian study conclusion which states that "the relevance of incomes consists not only in their lower levels among squatters than non squatters but in their generally low levels among the (Zambian) urban poor, particularly in relation to rents" (Simons et al 1976 pp. 65).

These comparisons clearly show that the tendency to lump squatters together into the low-income bracket needs reassessment. There are two considerations in this regard. First the income level in squatter settlements is varied as shown by the Urban Foundation and Vlakfontein surveys and second,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCOME CATEGORY</th>
<th>POPULATION %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 to R150.00</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R151.00 to R300.00</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R300.00 and above</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4: Income structure of Soweto - 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCOME CATEGORY</th>
<th>% OF SOWETO POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 to R150.00</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R151.00 to R250.00</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R251.00 to R300.00</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R351.00 to R450.00</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R451.00 to R650.00</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R651.00 and above</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

low income is not peculiar to squatter settlements as such, as the Mabin and Parnell study shows in Table 4. As a matter of fact, low-income characterises the majority of the South African Black community. Although there is no comparable data between the income levels of the squatter and non-squatter communities, the point made here is that the general pattern as shown in Tables 3 and 4 is comparable. Twenty percent earned above R300.00 in Soweto, while twenty six earned the same in the Vlakfontein squatter settlement (Black Sash, 1989). In addition, the Central Statistical Service reported that the monthly averages income for the Blacks and Whites were R365.00 and R1040.00 respectively in 1985. Squatters are only generally distinguishable from the larger Black urban population by the physical structure of their shelter and their classification as criminal by the Government. For example Table 5 shows a comparison of the occupational structure between the economically active Blacks and Whites in South Africa in 1985. Sixty percent of the White were in the professional category, while only about twenty-seven percent of the Blacks were in the same category. Only two percent of the Whites were unskilled whereas seventy-seven percent of the Blacks were unskilled (Central Statistical Services, 1988).

Explanation for this state of affairs is offered by Ngcobo (1976) who examines the wage differences between Blacks and White in South Africa. He identifies the cause of these disparities as "the more favourable opportunities
Table 5: Comparison of Occupational Structure between the economically active Blacks and Whites in South Africa - 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATIONS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>WHITES</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>BLACKS</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional; semi</td>
<td>713,836</td>
<td>429,249</td>
<td>60.13</td>
<td>192,463</td>
<td>26.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional technical worker</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial executive and administrative worker</td>
<td>255,955</td>
<td>224,043</td>
<td>87.53</td>
<td>10,802</td>
<td>4.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and Sales worker</td>
<td>1,169,827</td>
<td>619,077</td>
<td>52.92</td>
<td>318,984</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Communication worker</td>
<td>421,519</td>
<td>64,064</td>
<td>15.19</td>
<td>296,721</td>
<td>70.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Worker</td>
<td>1,460,234</td>
<td>151,723</td>
<td>10.39</td>
<td>1,114,222</td>
<td>76.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer, Fisherman, Hunter, Farmworker</td>
<td>1,206,165</td>
<td>74,687</td>
<td>6.19</td>
<td>944,228</td>
<td>78.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradesman &amp; Apprentice</td>
<td>387,615</td>
<td>238,327</td>
<td>61.48</td>
<td>63,743</td>
<td>16.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and quarrying worker production foreman, supervisor, operator. Production and related worker</td>
<td>1,775,160</td>
<td>135,802</td>
<td>7.65</td>
<td>1,316,163</td>
<td>74.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled worker</td>
<td>450,045</td>
<td>5,060</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>344,519</td>
<td>76.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers not classifiable by occupation</td>
<td>852,007</td>
<td>30,746</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>703,073</td>
<td>82.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>8,692,363</td>
<td>1,972,774</td>
<td>5,304,918</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total population includes coloureds and Indians.
Source: Adapted from Central Statistical Services (1988).
that White workers have enjoyed with regard to general education, technical or vocational training as well as apprenticeship conditions" among others (Truu, 1976, 82). Given the above facts, the use of low-income among squatter communities for policy considerations is suspect.

EDUCATION.

The squatters' lack of access to jobs is most commonly said to be exacerbated by their low educational standards. The educational standard pattern is shown in Figure 17. Only two percent have obtained the highest level of education, while twenty-six percent, which is the highest, have received no formal education at all.

These data seem to support the commonly held view in that it shows low educational standards as characteristic of the Tshepo community. If the whole black population is examined however, then a significant point arises and that is, low educational standards are not confined to the squatter communities. Instead, the situation in squatter communities is representative of that existing among the general South African Black community and this is illustrated in Figure 18, which shows the education standards of Blacks and Whites. The data used starts with the people who do not have any formal education at all, then go right across the two grades up to Standard Ten. From this follows
Figure 17. Highest educational standards

Source: Crankshaw et al., (1988)
Figure 18. Comparison of education level between the Blacks and Whites in South Africa - 1985

Source: Central statistical services (South Africa 1988)
people with diplomas and Standard Six to PhD, then B degree to PhD only.

Eighty percent of the Blacks have attained standard two and below while less than ten percent of Whites are in this bracket. The highest qualified percentage are White with ninety-five percent in the PhD bracket while only two percent of PhDs are Black.

The conclusions to be drawn from the above discussion are that first, the majority of squatters are not rural migrants and, second, squatters are not different from the other Blacks. The characteristics that are generally associated with squatters like low educational standards, unemployment and low incomes are not peculiar to them but, are shared by all the Blacks instead. Thus, squatters are primarily Blacks from a variety of social and economic backgrounds who live in non-conventional housing that is not officially recognised by the Government.

The following section examines the South African urban black housing policy in the light of the issues raised above.
CHAPTER 5.

POLICY RESPONSES TO THE HOUSING BACKLOG AND SQUATTING.

Through the years the Government has come up with a number of responses to the black housing situation. The following sections describe some of the strategies that have been adopted.

5.1. PREVENTION OF ILLEGAL SQUATTING ACT.

This Act, which was passed in 1951 resulted initially in the setting up of resettlement camps for squatters who had been evicted from white farms. It has since had several amendments. The Act was aimed at eradicating squatting through demolition, but it was amended to provide for recognition and acceptance of some squatter settlements. This acceptance depended on their geographic location. That is to say, the "acceptable" squatter settlements had to be in the "right group area". This tolerance still showed implicitly the need by the Government to control black urbanisation. This is identifiable in the
subsequent amendments to the Act which even after the scrapping of the influx control in 1986, still showed a strong inclination towards control, as will be shown later.

According to the 1951 Act, the Government had the right to demolish squatter settlements and to remove the associated material from the land (Horrell 1971). The Act was predicated on the assumption that the dispossessed would return to their Homelands for shelter but, experience showed that this was not the case.

The main provisions of the Act were that squatters needed the owner’s permission to remain on land, that the government officials could demolish shacks and remove squatters without providing them with alternative accommodation, and that land owners could remove squatters if the local magistrate was satisfied that they posed a health hazard. In addition, there were stiff penalties for illegal collective occupation of land. This Act condoned, in fact it encouraged, demolition of squatter settlements. Later amendments to the Act have introduced strict measures whereby it became increasingly difficult to squat, though this did not in anyway prevent squatting.

The 1976 amendment to this Act drastically increased the penalties for illegal squatting. For example, the land owner was held liable for demolition and removal costs and had to prove that he had attempted to prevent
squatting on his property. Added to this measure there were increased penalties for the squatters themselves and also for the land owners.

In 1977 the Government allowed all existing squatter settlements to be recognised and to remain but all new ones established after the date were to be demolished. In the recognised settlements basic services were provided. The squatters in the new settlements marked for demolition, were "repatriated" to their specific Homeland. The latter was determined by the ethnic group to which they belonged in spite of the fact that they might never have lived in the said Homeland. The 1977 amendment denied squatters access to the courts to challenge any official action against them. The seven days notice that squatters previously had been entitled to receive prior to the demolition of their shacks was cancelled. Figure 19 gives an idea of how much resettlement there has been between the nineteen-sixties and the nineteen-eighties.

A 1989 amendment to the Act introduced some further negative measures although it did also involve some positive ones as well. The Minister of Co-operation and Development was empowered to take action against both squatters and land owners. Removal would take place for as long as the occupation of the designated area was considered not to be in the interest of the public besides being a health hazard. Squatter farming was also declared illegal and a fine of R2000 or a year in jail was introduced. The term "squatter farmer" refers to a person who ceases to use his agricultural land for farming
Figure 19. Estimated numbers removed and under threat of removal, by category 1960 - 1982

purposes but uses it instead for accommodating squatters who pay him rent, and who makes a living therefore, out of these squatters’ rents rather than from agricultural production.

This amendment further identified what were called Section 6 A Townships. These new sites were then provided with services. To date, in 1990, there have been only three such townships designated, all of them in the PWV area. First, there is Orange Farm which is for the resettlement of people from Weilers farm, Alexandra, Sandton, Soweto and all the other squatter settlements in the South of Johannesburg. Second there is Wildebeesfontein in Evaton North which is primarily for people from Mshenguville in Soweto, and finally, there is Rietfontein which is for squatter communities from Katlegong, Tokoza and Tamboekiesfontein (Gill, 1990). The squatter settlements, together with the Section 6 A Townships referred to above, are shown in Figure 20.

Since there was a general reluctance to move to these designated townships, incentives like free or subsidised transport for relocation were used. As is the case with all black urban residential areas there does not seem to be an economic rationale for the location of these Section 6 A townships. For example, transport costs for monthly return taxi fares between Dunusa, a squatter settlement located in the south east of Johannesburg and Germiston (their work place in the same area) for five and six working days were R52 and
Figure 20. Location of section 6A townships

Source: adapted from Mashabela, (1989)
R62.40. On the other hand, people commuting between Rietfontein, a Section 6 A township referred to above, and Germiston were paying monthly taxi fares of R102 and R122.40 for five and six working days respectively (Mashabela 1990). This means that a working person living in Dunusa, spent R40 less on monthly taxi fare than the one living in Rietfontein for five working days. A taxi in this case, refers to a privately owned mini - bus which is used as a passenger vehicle. This taxi service operates like public transport in that fixed routes are followed and flat rates charged.

Orange Farm, on the other hand, sold plots for R500 and charged R24.50 for monthly services, appreciably less than Mshenguville by R10.50. Furthermore, sites were rent free in Orange Farm but transport costs from there to Johannesburg, where the majority of people are working, were high. For example, daily transport costs were R4 and R6 return fares by bus and taxi respectively.

People who refused to relocate into the Section 6 A townships were charged exorbitant rents and their settlements were not provided with any services. For example, in Polar Park the shacks were charged R50.00 per month each as from June 1989. There did not seem to be a blanket policy for Local authorities. Each responded to the situation on a selective basis. In other words, the Act generally was used as a broad frame of reference which was a directive for action taken towards squatting.
5.2. SITE AND SERVICE AND SELF-HELP SCHEMES.

This section will first describe how squatter settlements were classified in South Africa in order for the Government to justify its demolition policies. Second, the specific pattern that was adopted for policy considerations will be described so as to show the rationale used by the Government for using self-help schemes the way it did. Site and service implies an extension of public services like water, roads, sewage and electricity to sites in preparation for the upgrading of a settlement. On the other hand, self-help has to do with self-managing of time, skills, personal savings and labour by the people occupying the houses produced (Hart and Hardie 1987). The significant issue here is the involvement of the owner/occupiers in not only physically producing the dwelling units but in managing and making decisions as well. Furthermore, the owner/occupiers use an incremental approach to housing, investing in improvements only when money is available. These two schemes occur concurrently most of the time.

In South Africa, a recognised self-help scheme which includes site and service is usually state-sanctioned. The purely self-help schemes, which are squatter settlements, such as have been encouraged in other countries, are usually declared undesirable until the state steps in. Although site and service schemes started as far back as 1946 in the Moroka emergency camp (Soweto),
where 11,000 sites of 20 by 20 ft with elementary services were provided, it was only adopted as Government policy in 1953. From this time onwards, sites of 40 by 70 ft were provided to people on waiting lists and basic services like sanitation, stand-water pipes at 500 yards intervals, access to roads, and refuse removal were supplied (Lewis, 1966).

According to the study made by Hart and Hardie in 1987, three forms of self-help schemes could be identified in South Africa. These were first, the illicit spontaneous settlements lying on the peripheries of urban areas of the white-designated parts of the country, second, spontaneous settlements in the Homelands, and third, state sanctioned site and service schemes in the segregated black townships of white cities and towns. Each of these forms is described below.

**ILICIT SETTLEMENTS.**

These are all the squatter settlements in the areas outside the Homelands and the Independent black states, that is, in "White South Africa". They are most commonly threatened by demolition because the Government found it difficult to regulate and control their location in relation to the land-use zoning regulations. Their large numbers and uncontrollable nature makes orderly
urbanisation impossible. Before the abandonment of influx control in 1986, the illicit settlements were demolished and their inhabitants resettled in the Homelands.

One way of discouraging this kind of settlement was for some local authorities to pass an Act providing for a levy charge directed at the landlords of back-yard shack dwellers. As mentioned elsewhere, the said amount was simply added by the landlords to the tenants' rent. Most squatters ended up moving to squatter camps which were less secure against harassment but less exploitative in terms of rent. The landlords then increased the rent of those who remained, to make up for the rent lost when the others moved, and this exacerbated the outflow to the squatter camps.

The illicit settlements can be in various areas and the sites can be described according to the land-use or group-area which they occupy. Squatter settlements can be around areas occupied by higher-income groups. They are obviously regarded as undesirable here because they tend to decrease the value of surrounding property. For example, there is Midrand, which is situated in a white suburb in the North of Johannesburg. Plastic City, on the other hand, is situated opposite Hospitalview which is a black group area in the east of Johannesburg. A settlement may be found in a wrong group area. This was the case for settlements like Snake Park, Eden Park and Lenasia in the White, Coloured and Indian group areas respectively. Squatting
may also occur in both a wrong group-area and a wrong land-use zone. For example, the Weilers Farm squatter settlement is on land designated as white farmland. Some settlements are in the right group-area but on land bought by developers. For example, in one squatter settlement in Daveyton the land occupied belonged to the developers. Still others are in a right group-area but wrong land use zone. For example, Mshenguville in Soweto, is on a golf course.

A significant point here is that demolition of these squatter settlements depends on the pressure exerted by the affected group. For example, the Daveyton squatter settlement mentioned above was removed in three weeks and no alternative land was provided to the squatters. Mshenguville, which was developed on the golf course in the mid nineteen-eighties was only being moved in 1990. Unlike the Daveyton squatter settlement, a resettlement place has been identified for the Mshenguville squatters. On the other hand, Tamboville, which is a squatter settlement in a white group-area in Benoni was allowed to stay by a decision of the town council in 1990.

SPONTANEOUS SETTLEMENTS.

These do not pose a threat to the Government’s orderly urbanisation plan because they are located geographically in the Homelands. While their
labour is welcome the Government is not responsible for improving them because technically they fall under the jurisdiction of the Homelands. For example, there are Inanda and Edendale which had 500,000, and 250,000 people respectively in the early nineteen-eighties while Winterveld in the Transvaal had 300,000 people has existed since the late nineteen-seventies and has remained intact until this year 1990 when some of its inhabitants moved to squat in the area surrounding the neighbouring Soshanguve, a black township in white South Africa.

The illicit and the spontaneous settlements, it is believed, are closer to self-help housing schemes, as generally defined, in that owner occupiers are to a certain extent decision-makers as well. The choice of the building materials used is still constrained by threats of possible demolition.

STATE SANCTIONED SELF-HELP SETTLEMENTS.

In this self-help scheme there is clear government control. The housing policy here "separates legal self-help from illegal forms of the same process" (Hart and Hardie, 1987, 357). The legal self-help schemes are then provided with services. In contrast to conventional housing provision, participants are involved in housing production. In spite of this advantage, the state still makes
the major decisions. For example, in Khutsong which is a township in the West of Johannesburg, a self-help scheme was pioneered by the Urban Foundation in 1978. The site and service scheme was provided by the administration board, loan capital came from the private sector and the financial and technical guidance was provided by the Urban Foundation. This became successful largely because it was government controlled, for example participants were given 99 year leaseholds which helped them qualify for financial loans. Also participants in the scheme were regulated by the Government legislation and there was still emphasis on stipulated housing standards. Hence, the state sanctioned self-help schemes amount to self-production of conventional housing.

The study by Hart and Hardie (1987) argued that there was selective subsidization in that only people with a stable income of a certain level could qualify for a capital loan. In essence, therefore, it is argued that this self-help scheme served to filter out the very poor from the not so poor and the former were left unhoused and facing threats of eviction if they did not produce housing of the set standards. The approach to self-help here, was based on "organised intervention by a housing agency and the superimposition of a contractor based housing supply system" (Hart and Hardie, 1987). This
interferes with the incremental approach, which forms the very core of self help housing. Hence, self-help in South Africa is seen as representing another form of black urban control by the Government (Gill, 1990).

The other limitation of this scheme is its affordability. In some cases, the home-owners' compensation was inadequate to replace the demolished houses. That is to say, the amount paid by the Government as compensation for lost houses was insufficient for production of another house. Furthermore, people who depended on lodgers' rent cannot afford to erect new houses. Because of the fact that lodging was not allowed in these new areas, families who had previously complemented their income with lodgers' rents now could not afford to pay for costs incurred in the production of a house. In addition, imposition of conventional housing standards made such schemes inaccessible to these people, as well as to those who could not afford conventional housing (Hart and Hardie, 1987). Another argument presented by Morris (1981), is that such self-help schemes complemented the Government policy on urban Blacks that was the tightening of controls on rural to urban migration.

5.3. THE HOMELAND STRATEGY.

Another strategy that the Government resorted to was an attempt at using the Homelands for housing of Blacks. In the nineteen-sixties there was
concentration on Homeland development. These areas were used to legitimize the Government’s refusal to provide housing in “white urban areas”. All black housing construction in the latter areas was stopped. This, by definition, implied that as temporary sojourners in urban areas all Blacks were Homeland citizens. In the financial year beginning in 1976, a large amount of money was pumped into housing in the Homelands. The contribution included the following:

- The South African Development Trust - R33 million.
- The Homeland Governments - R60.7 million and
- The Private Sector - R6.8 million.

In contrast to this, in the urban areas only 210 houses were provided by private owners whereas about 420 houses were provided mainly by the Urban Foundation which is a government-aided organisation, in 1980 (Morris 1981). These differences on money spent on housing or the number of housing units produced between the two areas indicate that housing policy was aimed at providing housing in the Homelands rather than in the urban areas.

In its attempt to shift the Blacks and the related housing responsibility to the Homelands the Government abolished townships in some South African towns. By 1966, 22 black townships were proclaimed as Homeland areas in the Transvaal alone. Thus, the Government used geographical rather than physical resettlement in some instances. Townships like Garankuwa,
Mabopane, Thabane, and Mahwelereng in the Transvaal; Umlazi, Kwa Mashu, Ntuzuma, Madadeni, Osizweni and Esikhaweni in Natal, and Mdantsane in the Cape are examples of townships which were proclaimed Homeland areas.

This policy was coupled with an industrial decentralisation one. Industries were encouraged to move from core areas to the Homeland borders at first, then later into the Homelands. The types that were moved were light industries like textiles, chemicals, food and liquor. Concessions made to relocating industries, like the abolition of the minimum wages law, led to the gross underpayment of Homelands' dwellers. In spite of this, these industries were supposed to offer the Homelands' dwellers employment opportunities.

Another method of encouraging people to live in the Homelands was encouragement of commuting. In 1969 the Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development made a ruling that Blacks who worked in towns which were near Homelands were to commute and those whose jobs were far away should live in singles' hostels. The distance regarded as "near" was up to one-hundred and thirteen kilometres while six-hundred and forty kilometres was regarded as far enough away to disqualify one from commuting. In addition to this, there was resettlement of the unemployed into the Homelands. These included the aged, the sick and widows. Women were allowed to remain in township housing for as long as they were married. This was an attempt by the Government to avoid the responsibility and the expense of housing, maintaining
and providing welfare for these people. Homelands were used as a tool for controlling urbanisation. Labour bureau offices were introduced, and these provided people with annual contract work in urban areas. At the end of each year, workers were required to go back to the Homelands to renew their contracts. The labour bureau system also meant that black people could not obtain Section Ten rights any longer. Section Ten provisions made it lawful for Blacks to reside in the townships only if they were born there, had lived there lawfully and continuously for fifteen years or had served the same employer legally for ten years. Also, the labour bureau system did not ensure reallocation to the same employer. In this way, all possibility of serving one employer continuously for ten years was destroyed.

This strategy aimed overall at creating a labour pool for which there was no housing responsibility by the employers, the private sector and the Government in white South Africa. This strategy, however, was not feasible due to the following considerations. First, increasing population numbers in the Homelands, from both resettlement programmes and natural population increase, exacerbated the problem of overpopulation which the Homelands had faced from their inception. Second, some resettled communities were not provided with any farmland, and also, they were far from border industries and
any other forms of employment and therefore, had no means of livelihood. Contrary to the aims of the policy, these factors led to instead an increased migration towards white urban areas.

5.4. INVOLVEMENT OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR.

The private sector was involved in the housing of Blacks in the nineteen-seventies and nineteen-eighties. This was seen as a means of depoliticising housing (Morris, 1981) because the exclusive government housing provision was removed. Contrary to this, some scholars argue that it was resorted to as soon as capital demanded permanent Black workers, however few they might be (Sousson, 1984). Capital wanted to reduce the high costs which were incurred in continuous training programmes that resulted from the use of the migrant labour system. This disadvantage overrode the advantage of abundant and cheap labour that accompanied the migrant labour system. Regardless of why this scheme was introduced, it is argued that if the housing shortage and squatting were seen correctly as being caused by poverty then the involvement of a body that is interested in profit rather than welfare cannot, in anyway, address the problem. Under this scheme black development areas are dispersed by local authorities to developers who then sell plots and or houses to black buyers.
The private sector invariably is profit-oriented so it constructed middle to high-cost houses which could only be afforded by people in the high income bracket. This scheme therefore excluded about seventy percent of the urban black population (Hendler, 1990). According to a study in 1985, it was reported that eighty percent of the Blacks required assistance to buy "low cost housing", while about fifty-six percent was unable to make any contribution at all (Hart, 1988). Though the loan guarantee fund was set up to insure poor house buyers, it only included those people who earned R500 and more a month. Given that the report by the Central Statistical Services (1988) stated that on the average, Blacks earned R365 per month in 1985, the scheme was not effective. The loan guarantee fund only helped to make sure that these people qualified for loans and that the funding body would get its money back, but it did not in any way help in the payment of the loan. Another point worth considering is that the question of affordability was not really addressed. The above statistics show that most people could not afford housing with or without the use of the loan guarantee fund. Thus the use of the private sector to address the housing backlog and squatting defeats the purpose.

The strategy attempts unsuccessfully to address the demand for housing. It is inaccessible to the majority who need it. A pertinent question is whether indeed the strategy was intended to address the housing backlog per se or whether it was directed at stratifying the backlog through concentration
on middle-income demands to the exclusion of everybody else. But if so, the middle-income group also encountered problems with this scheme. The study of the Anglo-American scheme illustrates this point. This scheme required that "participant employees leaving the company liquidate their loan within six months of leaving the corporation, during which period full building society interest rates are charged" (Mabin and Parnell, 1983, 155). In case of default on mortgage repayments there was eviction. Therefore, people entering this scheme could not afford to lose their jobs for any reason and this affected their employment options. In most cases such schemes offered home-buyers little decision-making powers pertaining to plans of houses. The developers who had bought the land drew up the plans and the buyers could only choose from the given plans. Another problem was the assumption that old houses might be released through the filtering process. This assumption was predicated on the argument that first, there were many upwardly mobile black families, and second, these families would release their houses when they moved. In practice, however, some home-owners either sell or rent their old homes at exorbitant prices, while some of the buyers of the houses from this scheme are first home-buyers. In the light of these factors, this scheme is considered to be of little relevance to the low-income families who consequently find squatting to be the only a feasible option.
In conclusion, these different strategies need to be reevaluated and their implementation assessed. For example, in the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act the provision that criminalises squatting is contrary to the purported positive attitude towards squatting commonly prevalent in the developing countries today. The Homeland policy, on the other hand, reflects the willingness of the Government to condone and encourage employers not to take responsibility in contributing towards the social reproduction of the labour power serving them. Site and service schemes are basically costly to the participants and thus defeat the purpose of giving to squatters, who are defined as poor, some feasible options. The private sector is, as expected, interested in profit rather than welfare. In the light of this, it is imperative to look more carefully at whether these strategies were inappropriately used or whether they were never really directly intended as a solution to the housing backlog and squatting. This examination is undertaken in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 6

EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACHES TO SQUATTING.

It has been established so far that central to the explanation of the black housing backlog and squatting is an appreciation of the racial bias of Government policy. This does not imply however, that squatting is necessarily a product of the racial policy. Racial policy should not be seen as the cause of squatting but should be viewed rather as an aggravating factor.

The inclination by the Government towards maintaining the status quo is implicit in the strategies that were adopted towards eliminating squatting. When one looks at the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act and its amendments one is struck by the fact that not only is squatting described as undesirable under the Act but it is regarded as a criminal offence. The squatters are classed as people who refuse to recognise the political, racial and spatial differentiation which is the legal frame of reference for any settlement location. The rejection
of squatting by the Government is therefore, an expression of its determination

to act against infringement on the politically-defined, spatial distribution pattern.

The fact is, however, that squatters do not squat because they want to defy
the law. To them squatting is a survival strategy that cannot afford to
recognise any legal constraints. Existing Government strategies cannot
properly address the problems of squatting. The recently established Section 6
A Townships, which have to be located in the appropriate group area, are the
only positive aspect of the 1989 Act. Although the Government is to be
applauded on this step, there are still only three Section 6 A townships in
existence, all of them in the PWV region. It is thus too early to evaluate them.

The channelling of funds towards the improvement of housing in the
Homelands is seen as an attempt at a geographical relocation of the squatting
problem and the housing backlog. This strategy is unique to South Africa and
has no relevance for other countries. But at another level, it is seen as
expressing and representing a general trend that was followed in other
countries, that of demolishing squatter settlements.

The use of the private sector and employers in the provision of housing
also only addresses the problem partially. Only those persons who were
squatting because of a lack of adequate housing and not because of their
social-economic level were served. The strategy of involving the private sector
in housing provision can be viewed as an attempt at changing the black
township housing distribution in retrospect. As mentioned in Chapter Four, until
the late nineteen-seventies, the housing provided for the Blacks in the
townships was standard in that the economic differentiation was not used at all.
All people were provided with similar housing.

This strategy seems to sift through the economically better off from all the
others instead. Thus this strategy can be defined as a filtering process that is
gradually substituting the black housing backlog for the black low-income
housing crisis. Only the families who can either afford such houses, or are
holding ranks in their jobs which meet the requirements for people qualifying for
housing subsidies move into the private sector homes. The smaller houses that
they leave are in theory released to the disadvantaged but, in practice, they are
either sold or rented to the same disadvantaged people at exorbitant prices.
Thus in the long run the Government will have to develop strategies that will
specifically address the problem of the black low-income squatters exclusively.
Also, there will be the unemployed squatters who need housing.

The site and service, and self-help schemes deserve to be evaluated at
length because they are not specific to South Africa and the lessons learned
from other countries are relevant and can be used.

The United Nations report (1975) views the site and service schemes as
means and ways of improving the environmental conditions of the low-income
population in urban areas by increasing their access to land and providing
them with infrastructure and tenurial security. The provision of infrastructure should take into consideration the population that they are being provided for, thus, their operation and maintenance costs should be affordable. In addition, appropriate technologies, the use of indigenous building materials and methods and the formulation of specific standards are necessary. The World Bank report (1975), which is based on the projects in ten developing countries also emphasized the significance of siting such projects near the major jobs and, where possible an effort should be made to provide job opportunities within the project area.

The UN (1975) report also makes a clear distinction between aided self-help schemes which are accompanied by technical assistance and financial support and, spontaneous self-help schemes which are carried out on the initiative of the people themselves without the institutionalised technical assistance or financial aid.

The South African schemes tend to selectively follow some UN examples while ignoring those that although they might be sound tend to undermine the Government policy of Apartheid. For example, in South Africa, a distinction was made between types of self-help schemes but, the spontaneous schemes were outlawed in the "White urban areas" and accepted in the Homelands. Also the aided self-help schemes which were referred to as state-sanctioned self-help schemes were reduced to self-provision of conventional housing. In these
schemes the Government selection of the participants was based on the black urbanisation policy and also the Government stipulated housing standards which were to be stringently adhered to. These standards denied the home-owners choice in such matters as building materials and methods and this is contrary to the UN consideration mentioned above.

The location of site and service schemes in South Africa operates in the same way as that of black townships with regards to the distance from employment centres. The World Bank (1975) report had location as a major consideration because the participants are regarded as a low-income group. In South Africa on the other hand, the income status of the squatters does not seem to be significant, they have to be located in the appropriate geographic locale in spite of its distance from the community's employment. The provision of employment within the project areas was adhered to in schemes like Khutsong in the Transvaal. But, in this scheme the participants were not fully taking part in basic decision-making and management processes.

Access to land is another issue that was not sufficiently addressed in the South African scenario. Urban black land was not significantly increased. Also access to land generally meant state intervention through legalisation of occupation and provision of services. This step in itself is acceptable but its implementation had other connotations. The major consideration in the legalisation of access to land was the geographic location with regard to the
general land-use zoning and the group areas residential plan. State intervention was also directed more towards sanctioning and screening people in the settlement with the aim of controlling and keeping in check those people who should not be in the urban areas.

Other issues which are of relevance in the South African squatting were raised in Chapter Two. Other countries, especially the Latin American countries started viewing squatting sympathetically from the nineteen-sixties onwards. South Africa on the other hand, passed an amendment to its squatting Act in 1989 which still has sections that do not show sympathy to squatting.

The Kenyan example cited by Peil (1976), identified the lack of options that squatters faced, while Wilsenach's (1989) Swaziland study, stated that not all squatters were low-income people. In the strategies applied in South Africa squatters are still "repatriated" to the Homelands where they do not have any options except to return to urban areas. Whether this is seen by policies as unrealistic or not that is not the issue with squatters because they perceive urban areas as having better employment options for them. Squatters in South Africa are still basically addressed as a similar group hence, they are treated in the same way in spite of the fact that available data contradicts this view.

Coupled with this, the Turner-Mangin assumption that squatters are the upwardly mobile people who will improve their housing is still adhered to in most site and service schemes in South Africa. This assumption was
discredited by other scholars as mentioned in Chapter Two. In South Africa it was reported that studies conducted in 1985 stated that eighty percent of the Blacks required assistance to buy low-income housing while fifty-six percent thereof were unable to make any contribution to their own housing at all. Given these facts, the assumption that squatters will be able to improve their housing at some point is not necessarily true of all squatters.

This section suggests that squatting has not been effectively addressed in South Africa because, firstly the policies used do not sufficiently show understanding of South African squatting, and secondly most significant lessons from outside were ignored if and when they were seen as undermining the South African Political structure.

6.2. RECOMMENDATIONS.

The major issue in South Africa is the social economic structure that was developed, maintained and strengthened over time. As shown throughout this thesis, in order for one to understand the rationale behind planning in general and housing provision in particular in South Africa, one has to appreciate the strong legal machinery that was developed which tended to perpetrate the social economic inequalities.
For major changes in the housing scenario to be realised basic changes in the political structures of the country are advocated. All apartheid laws should be abolished and these include the Lands and Group Areas Acts, laws that govern the education and employment structures and lastly all races should participate in Government through voting.

This proposition does not however, imply that the termination of apartheid will eradicate the chronic housing problem and squatting. What this proposition is suggesting is that the South African political structures exacerbate the economic problems that South Africa shares with other developing countries. Another major point of departure for the following recommendations is that the solution to squatting does not lie simply in the provision of more housing.

There is a tendency to view squatting as a direct result of the black housing backlog in South Africa. This is because the black housing crisis originated with black urbanisation (Morris 1981). In spite of this the solution to squatting does not lie in provision of housing only, in fact "lasting solutions (will then) may lie outside the housing crisis itself" (Duncan 1976). This proposition is motivated by the fact that today squatting is a manifestation of a wider economic problem which is politically motivated or aggravated, as mentioned elsewhere in this chapter.
This section does not in any way intend to come up with recommendations along the lines of new technologies, approaches and solutions. This study agrees with Angel and Benjamin (1978) when they state that nothing new, however revolutionary, can be effective in the solution to squatting. Attention should be drawn to redirection of existing strategies.

The following are some of the most significant factors that can be used as starting points.

**LAND DISTRIBUTION.**

Government intervention will be necessary in the land redistribution process. The grossly uneven distribution of land makes it impossible for Blacks to live normally. This land redistribution should take into cognisance the distribution pattern of resources. The Homelands are not only overpopulated but they are generally the country’s lagging regions. They lie in areas that do not have natural resources like minerals, fertile lands and sufficient rainfall. It is thus no coincidence that the Blacks are consequently generally poor besides all the factors already cited as contributing to their poverty.
EDUCATION AND PROVISION OF EDUCATIONAL SERVICES.

The black formal education system makes it impossible for most people to break out of poverty. It is poorly subsidized by the Government and given that most parents are poor there is a high drop out rate which makes access to better paying jobs impossible. The position of squatter communities is worsened by the fact that they generally do not have their own schools. They rely on those provided for the townships. Also, like everybody else they pay for school fees, school uniforms and they incur transport costs for their children. Coupled with this (at least until the nineteen-eighties) is the fact that the type of education provided makes certain jobs inaccessible to Blacks.

The black professional pattern is indicative of the effects of lack of access to certain professions by Blacks as a result of the Black Education structure.

INCOME LEVELS.

Income here refers to wages or salaries earned from a job, it thus becomes a function of skill or profession. Lack of access to certain skills and professions together with the Job Reservation Act and black wages in general explain in some way why Blacks are generally a low income race. More access
to skills and jobs and closing wage gaps between races will significantly reduce the racially determined income inequality. Employment opportunities for Blacks are further thwarted by the highly mechanised trend that manufacturers and agribusinesses follow.

**LOW COST HOUSING.**

Where the Government has to provide housing it is imperative that it be low-income housing and not low-cost housing. The 1985 studies recorded that the average monthly income of Blacks is R352. A low cost house is worth R40,000. If the 1985 monthly income average for Blacks is used to calculate how long it will take an average family to pay for the house, and it is assumed that each family spends twenty-five percent of its salary on housing, then thirty-seven years is the expected period. This means that most families might find it difficult to pay for their housing. As parents grow older they tend to have more financial commitments like education for their children, so this may make it difficult for most of them to pay up their housing debt.

The first move towards attainment of low-income housing would be to address the standards set in relation to building materials and methods recommended, their costs and accessibility. Within this it is also significant to redefine low income. This definition could include for example how much is
spent on education and health of children and dependents, how much is spent on transport costs as determined by distance from work and other facilities like schools, health care centres and how much is spent on day to day necessities. These should be some of the factors that are taken into consideration when classification of families into various income groups is made for the purposes of squatter settlements improvement.

POVERTY.

Because of the general problem of low income and absence of income in some instances, most black families live in abject poverty. In South Africa poverty is basically a racially determined phenomenon. This does not in any way suggest that there are no rich or poor people across the racial spectrum. It does suggest that the nature of the Government policy is such that poverty is identifiable with certain race groups. Given this one has to appreciate the fact that squatters are black and thus poor by definition.

This poverty has been and is still exacerbated by the removal strategies adopted by the Government. Figure 18 shows the removal patterns and threats. When these people move they incur costs of building new structures, losses through damage of moved furniture and other property.
This section cannot claim to have exhausted all possibilities because of the intricate nature of the political and economic relationships existing in South Africa. It is intended to indicate some of the issues that need to be incorporated into the analysis and understanding of squatting in South Africa.
CHAPTER 7.

CONCLUSION.

This thesis has shown that even though squatter settlements throughout the developing world may share symptoms, the underlying processes behind squatting are different in various countries. The South African situation, it is contended, is best explained in terms of the policy of apartheid which is unique in the sense that the policy is entrenched in a legal framework that serves to keep it intact. The geography of South African squatting was described in order to show the comparison between the Government's policy rationale, which is basically a social - political one, and the squatters' motivation which is economic. In describing this geography of squatting, a synthesis was attempted of earlier works on the subject and the statement in this thesis is an up - to - date account of the spatial distribution of squatting in South Africa.

The history, origins, and trends of squatting in South Africa were also examined closely in order to seek an explanation for the phenomenon. Squatting was found to be primarily manifested in the social, economic and political structures of the country though its origin was closely linked with the
nature of black urbanisation and housing policies. The Government policies that were adopted in order to address the urban black housing backlog and squatting in South Africa were examined, assessed and an explanation for the results has been provided. This overall assessment of housing policy towards the black population is a contribution to a literature that is not yet a very sizable one.

The abolition of apartheid in South Africa is seen as a starting point towards the reduction of squatting, but as mentioned in Chapter Six, apartheid is not the cause of squatting, but it is an aggravating factor. Even with the abolition of apartheid, there will need to be policies aimed at dealing with the deeper ramifications of the social political structure that is today prevalent in South Africa. These ramifications have to do principally with the social and economic plight of the black population. Although squatting is predominantly a low-income phenomenon in the developing world, in South Africa as has been shown in this thesis, this is not necessarily the case. Like all the other Blacks in South Africa, those persons in squatter communities come from the various social-economic backgrounds, and this should be borne in mind when addressing their plight. Although squatting is presented in this thesis as an acceptable form of a self-help housing, within the context of existing conditions, it is discouraged in its present form in South Africa. Presently, squatting implies poor quality housing and lack of infrastructure, but unless
greatly improved economic conditions are created by the Government for the Blacks in South Africa such squatting will continue to increase.

The problem of squatting is a very critical issue in the developing world today. While there have been many attempts to address it, they have usually been unsuccessful. The major issue for further research is why squatting persists and whether indeed it is possible to eliminate it. The author believes that as long as the world fails to produce a social - economic system that does not thrive or depend on the poverty of a part of its population, then successful strategies can only make squatting a little more bearable for the squatters. Policy based on this kind of a social - economic system will serve as a major constraint to even the most non - conventional planner.

In South Africa, within the present political structures the different organisations and individuals that are contributing to life improvement in squatter settlements should be applauded and encouraged to continue and lobby for more assistance from various quarters. Another way of trying to alleviate living conditions in the squatter settlements would be to listen to the squatters and to incorporate their ideas into strategies and policies. A careful consideration of who is listened to is significant because the most vocal and outspoken squatter might not necessarily be the most representative.
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