REPARATIONS TO AFRICA
REPARATIONS TO AFRICA:
EXAMINING THE AFRICAN VIEWPOINT

By

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores African opinion on Western reparations to Africa and investigates the prospects and challenges facing a social movement for African reparations. The findings are based on an analysis of 41 semi-structured interviews conducted with, for the most part, African human rights activists, academics, ambassadors to the USA and three members of the Group of Eminent Persons, mandated to advocate reparations to Africa. Respondents were asked about their personal feelings towards reparations and the "West," and about what shape reparations should take. Key themes from the interviews demonstrated a strong desire for "rehabilitative" reparations beyond merely words of apology or acknowledgement. From these results, concepts from existing reparations theory and frameworks are tested and expanded. An investigation of the advocacy literature demonstrates that advocates for reparations to Africa will face a number of challenges with respect to political opportunities, mobilization and framing for a successful social movement for reparations.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: AFRICA AND REPARATIONS

With a growing number of past precedents, the concept of "reparations" for historical injustices is growing in popularity within a political climate that is embracing the idea that past wrongs must be "repaired" in some way. As Olick and Coughlin (2003) put it, "the past is very much present on the public agenda, but it is more often a horrible, repulsive past than the heroic golden ages so often the part of public discourse in previous centuries" (p. 37). In his volume on negotiating historical injustice, Barkan (2000) similarly writes:

The demand that nations act morally and acknowledge their own gross historical injustices is a novel phenomenon...Beginning at the end of World War II, and quickening since the end of the Cold War, questions of morality and justice are receiving growing attention as political questions. As such, the need for restitution to past victims has become a major part of national politics and international diplomacy. (p. xvi)

Academics in the social sciences as well as the humanities have thus started to speculate that we have entered the "Age of Apology" (Brooks, 1999a, p. 3). In his work on politics and apology, Cunningham (1999) observes that there has been a "profusion of examples of what may be termed the 'politics of apology', with many individuals and agencies...saying 'sorry' or apologising for a variety of both recent and long-past actions" (p. 285). Torpey (2001) predicts that this trend is in its infancy, and shall continue forward: "As there is every reason to believe that demands for reparations will be with us for the foreseeable future, it may be worthwhile to reflect on where these demands have come from and what they may mean" (p. 334). As an increasingly salient subject, the idea of reparations has spawned an increasing amount of scholarship on both theoretical and applied questions.

This thesis is concerned with one very specific type of reparation: the claim for reparations to Africa. It is a subset of a larger ongoing research project called "What the West Owes Africa," headed by Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, Canada Research Chair in Global Studies and Political Science at Wilfrid Laurier University in Waterloo, Ontario (and Professor Emerita of Sociology, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario), which seeks to answer the foundational question of what, if anything, the West owes Africa. This claim is predicated on the view that reparations are owed for historical injustices perpetrated against Africa by the West, such as the Atlantic slave trade and colonialism,

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1 The term "reparations" defies any one static definition. Hayner (2001) provides a brief overview: "Reparations is a general term that encompasses a variety of types of redress, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of nonrepetition [italics in original]" (p. 171). I discuss definitions more fully later in this chapter.

2 For the purposes of both projects, we broadly define the "West" as Canada, Europe and the United States of America, as well as Western international organizations (like the World Bank), private companies, churches and non-governmental organizations that have or have had a relationship with Africa.
and more contemporary harms, such as the various manifestations of neo-colonialism. It arises from international debates about what is owed to victims of other past injustices, and while “the cry for reparation for continental Africans has been going on secretly among concerned members of the Diaspora for decades” (Osabu-Kle, 2000a, p. 331), it has become a somewhat more mainstream notion only in recent years. Both projects investigate how Africans think about the historical and contemporary harms perpetrated against Africa and, consequently, if and how they think about the idea of reparations for those harms.


More recently, the question of reparations arose at the September 2001 United Nations World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (herein known as UNWCAR) in Durban, South Africa, where

a long line of government ministers from developing countries...[argued] that the problems facing their nations, among them, widespread poverty and underdevelopment, stemmed in part from slavery and colonialism....The wrongs, they continued, could only be righted by clear acknowledgements of the past by the oppressing countries, and by creating schemes for compensation. (“Acknowledgement of past,” 2001)

The idea of reparations to Africa is borne out of previous instances of reparations for past injustices. While I will not go into depth into these other cases, there are a number of more well-known instances. The foremost of these cases is, of course, reparations to the Jews and other victims of the atrocities of the Nazis during World War II, which many argue have become the “standard and model” for reparation claims (Torpey, 2001, p. 338; see also Barkan, 2000; Bazyler, 2001; Torpey, 2003a). Other important examples include reparations to Korean comfort women for their treatment by Japan (“Japan’s official
responses,” 1999; Hicks, 1999), compensation to persons of Japanese descent in the USA (Daniels, 1991) and Canada (Gall, Cheng, & Miki, 2001) for their internment during World War II, and compensation for the treatment of Indigenous peoples in Canada (Gall et al., 2001). Other notable instances include the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, addressing the legacy of apartheid in South Africa (see Brooks, 1999b, part 8, “South Africa,” pp. 439-510), and the push for reparations to African-Americans for slavery (see, e.g., Brooks, 1999b, part 6, “Slavery,” pp. 305-390; Munford, 1996; Nuruddin, 2002; Robinson, 2000). This brief listing is not a complete inventory of previous cases of reparations; volumes by Barkan (2000), Brooks (1999b) and Torpey (2003b) include sustained analysis of these and other reparation cases. The call for reparations to Africa, however, emanates from such precedents.

Historical Injustices and Underdevelopment in Africa

Before continuing, I want to very briefly discuss the history of slavery and colonialism in Africa, and their relationship to African underdevelopment. Note that I provide here only a rudimentary and basic overview of these events in order to give some context to the impetus for reparation claims.

Slave Trade

Inikori (1997, p. 91) provides some statistics on the demographics of slavery in western Africa. The European slave trade took place between the 1440s and the 1860s, with the greatest number of exports occurring between 1650 and 1850; in total, it is approximated that anywhere from 13 to 15.4 million Africans were taken as slaves. In the period of 1700 through 1809, about two-thirds of the total export of slaves came from West Africa (Senegal through Cameroon), with the remainder coming almost exclusively from west-central Africa (Congo and Angola). Almost two-thirds of the exported Africans were male; both men and women taken as slaves were generally between the ages of 15 and 30.

In central Africa, Miller (1997) explains that the Portuguese first arrived in the 1480s, but did not engage in large scale slave trading until 1570 through 1670. During this period, it is estimated that five to ten thousand Africans were taken annually as slaves (p. 98). English, French and Dutch slave traders began trading as well in the 1670s. The central African slave trade was most intense during the 1670s, in the mid-eighteenth century, and from the 1790s forward. While there is some debate about the numbers of slaves taken, it is estimated that in 1700, approximately ten thousand slaves were taken

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3 During World War II, the Japanese Army forced women, primarily Korean, into organized prostitution schemes to satisfy the sexual desires of Japanese soldiers invading China (Barkan, 2000, p. 47; see also Parker & Chew, 1994/1999; Brooks, 1999, part 3, “Comfort Women,” pp. 82-151).

4 See also Barkan (2000, chap. 2) and Brooks (1999), part 4, “Japanese Americans” (pp. 152-228).

5 There is a separate movement for slavery reparations to African-Americans. My focus in this thesis is solely the continental African case.
annually; by the end of the eighteenth century, this number rose to over thirty thousand (p. 99).

Colonialism

Cooper (1997) notes that the terms "colonialism" and "imperialism" "did not always have negative connotations: European statesmen once proudly proclaimed themselves to be imperialists, bringing economic progress to the world and relief from backwardness and despotism in Africa" (p. 316). Akinola (1997) provides a more contemporary view:

Imperialism is essentially about the establishment of dominion or rule...usually, but not necessarily, by an alien power over peoples of another stock, for the purposes of expanding the commerce and other economic interests of the imperial power; for the promotion of its political and strategic interests; or sometimes solely for the sake of prestige. Imperialism is thus generally exploitative and aggressive. (p. 321)

Akinola explains that European imperialism in Africa occurred over two stages. In the first, there was a "scramble" for African territory, which the Europeans divided and conquered. In the second stage, imperialism institutionalized into colonialism, "by which the continent was organized and administered for maximum economic exploitation" (p. 321). Commencing with the Berlin Conference from November 1884 through February 1885, and the subsequent bilateral agreements between nations, Belgium, Britain, Germany, Italy and Portugal held colonies across Africa. "By the eve of World War I," Akinola notes, "the whole of the continent except Ethiopia and Liberia had been overrun" (p. 324). Thus began the colonial period, where colonial economies and colonial states imposed a new order on traditional African societies.6

Slavery, Colonialism and Underdevelopment

One school of thought that maintains that the historical events of slavery and colonialism "underdeveloped" the African continent. This viewpoint is articulated most prominently by Walter Rodney (1974; on the principle of "underdevelopment" more generally, see Frank, 1966/1970).

Rodney argues that Western involvement throughout Africa’s history helped to "underdevelop" the continent. In one such example, he writes:

Development means a capacity for self-sustaining growth. It means that an economy must register advances which in turn will promote further progress. The

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6 See Middleton (1997, pp. 328-351) for a collection of articles on the specific colonial policies and practices of Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
loss of industry and skill in Africa was extremely small, if we measure it from the viewpoint of modern scientific achievements or even by standards of England in the late eighteenth century. However, it must be borne in mind that to be held back at one stage means that it is impossible to go on to a further stage....What Africa experienced in the early centuries of trade was precisely a loss of development opportunity [italics in original], and this is of the greatest importance. (p. 105)

He thus calls European slavery and the slave trade a "direct block," as it "remov[ed] millions of youth and young adults who are the human agents from whom inventiveness springs" (p. 105). He laments that those who were left behind were more concerned with maintaining their freedom than trying to improve production where, at the same time, European contact made Africans in general more concerned with trade over production.

Rodney also holds African colonialism responsible for underdeveloping the continent. For example, from the point that Africa began to participate in a capitalist economy, Rodney traces underdevelopment to two factors: (1) the wealth created by African labour and African resources was appropriated by capitalist European countries and (2) Africans were restricted from making the most of their economic potential. Thus he argues:

The question as to who, and what, is responsible for African underdevelopment can be answered at two levels. Firstly, the answer is that the operation of the imperialist system bears major responsibility for African economic retardation by draining African wealth and by making it impossible to develop more rapidly the resources of the continent. Secondly, one has to deal with those who manipulate the system and those who are either agents or unwitting accomplices of the said system. The capitalists of Western Europe were the ones who actively extended their exploitation from inside Europe to cover the whole of Africa. (p. 27)

In a similar way, Sandbrook (1985) links the "colonial roots of the contemporary crisis," (p. 42), arguing that the colonial states left African countries in a precarious position for independence: "This is then how matters stood on the eve of independence. An alien state, a weakly articulated class structure, resurgent ethnic rivalries, high popular expectations – not an auspicious climate for postcolonial progress" (p. 62).

I reiterate again this is only an elementary overview of Africa's history with the West and the arguments of the underdevelopment thesis, with the hope of setting some context for the claims for reparations to Africa explored in the balance of this work.
The Purpose of this Thesis

In this section I outline the aims of the thesis and, in so doing, highlight the existing relevant literature. I provide here only a brief discussion of the literature as I explore more fully in the ensuing chapters. This project has four main objectives. The first is to explore how Africans—namely elite Africans, as I discuss in the Methodology section—think about, conceptualize and envisage reparations to Africa. This is an important objective as extant scholarly work on this issue has not, to date, attempted any social scientific collection and analysis of opinion on reparations from Africans.

Much of the literature on reparations to Africa has thus far come from Africans making the case for and advocating the issue itself. These works include those by Group of Eminent Person members Jacob Ajayi (2002), Ali Mazrui (1993; 1999; 2002a; 2002b) and Ambassador Dudley Thompson (1999; 2001),7 as well as the Abiola (1992) article. Others have published related work (see, e.g., Chinweizu, 1993; Gifford, 1993; Laremont, 1999, 2001; Mazrui, 2002c; Osabu-Kle, 2000a; Soni, n.d.). There are also a number of declarations originating from conferences regarding reparations to Africa (see, e.g., African and African Descendant Caucus, n.d.; African Regional Preparatory Conference, 2001; African World Reparations and Repatriation Truth Commission, 1999/2002; First Pan-African Conference on Reparations, 1993/2002). Overall, such works offer discussion about the context of harm to Africa, the responsibility for reparations, strategies for obtaining reparations and, in some cases, elaboration on the form(s) reparations to Africa should take. Other work offers more “neutral” analyses of the question, identifying the issues, debates, institutions and groups involved with reparations to Africa, without explicitly making a case for or against reparations (see, e.g., Barkan, 2000; du Plessis, 2003; Howard-Hassmann, 2004). Although the issues raised in both the theoretical and empirical literature are important to this analysis, these other works have not sought input from interested Africans, and thus our studies are unique in that they attempt just such an analysis.

Second, this analysis will act as an empirical assessment of current theoretical and conceptual thought on reparations. While there is little scholarly literature on African reparations proper, there is a burgeoning literature on the processes and configurations of reparations. There is theoretical work on topics such as the definitions of reparations themselves (an issue discussed in nearly every work on this topic), the sociology, philosophy and law of apology and acknowledgment (e.g., Cunningham, 1999; Govier & Verwoerd, n.d., 2002; Tavuchis, 1991; Thompson, 2000; Wagatsuma & Rosett, 1986), the function and importance of commemorative reparations (e.g., Barkan, 2000, 2002, 2003; Bassiouni, 2000; Hamber, 2000; Human Rights Watch, 2001; Jelin, 1998; Minow, 1998; Torpey, 2003a), the promises and pitfalls of financial compensation (another almost universally discussed issue) and frameworks of the reparations process (e.g.,

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7 Dudley Thompson is Jamaican, but was included in this analysis for reasons I discuss in the methodology chapter.
Brooks, 1999a, 2003; Torpey, 2001, 2003a). I discuss how the Africans we interviewed for this project think about these subjects, to test and, when applicable, expand concepts of reparations and frameworks of the reparations process.

Third, I offer some thoughts on how these Africans conceptualized reparations. I make the case that our respondents promote what I call a forward-thinking, collective and rehabilitative outlook towards the promises of reparations to Africa. This assertion is borne out throughout the thesis.

Finally, I give consideration to the “social movement” for reparations, or, more accurately, the lack thereof. I have been purposefully cautious in my earlier discussion about the “movement for reparations” because it is not a movement gaining much momentum at the moment, nor does it appeared poised to do so in the near future. In the social movement section, I discuss the prospects and challenges facing a social movement for African reparations.

This analysis is relevant to political sociology in numerous ways. The field of political sociology is concerned with the interactions of politics and society around international and local relations, the role of the state in society and the organization of political movements (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1994, p. 319). Each of these levels is evident in this analysis. First, my analysis shows how our respondents think about the politics of their countries, and Western countries, and how those politics affect the issue of reparations. Second, this project considers how international relations are affected by social processes such as apology and reconciliation. Finally, I address the challenges facing a potential social movement for African reparations, which, if organized, would be very much a political movement.

Chapter Overview

This thesis contains seven chapters, including this introductory one. Chapter two details the methodology, ethics and funding of this project, including the nature of the data collection process and qualitative analysis, and the ethical considerations. In chapter three, I discuss how respondents think about harm to Africa and responsibility for that harm. The ensuing two sections relate to the processes of reparations and how the respondents think about them: chapter four discusses “symbolic” approaches to reparations, such as apology and acknowledgement, and chapter five explores respondents’ opinion on compensatory measures. In each of these chapters, I show how our respondents’ views reflect or challenge prominent theoretical questions.

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8 I do not use the term “our respondents” in any sort of possessive sense. I use the term simply to clarify that Professor Howard-Hassmann and I interviewed the respondents as part of a joint project.
Chapter six discusses the prospects and challenges of a social movement for reparations. In the concluding chapter I analyze how the case for African reparations pushes the boundaries of existing reparation frameworks (namely those by Brooks, 1999a, 2003; Torpey, 2001, 2003a) and I provide a brief overview of the theoretical and empirical contributions this thesis makes. I also provide my tentative personal views on what the West owes Africa.

Readers will notice that I have not included a theoretical overview chapter. This is not an oversight, but rather a deliberate move given that there is no one viable encompassing theory that deals with all of the issues involved in the complex sphere of reparations. Instead, each component analytical section of the thesis draws upon theoretical speculation for the specific process of reparation that section discusses. Thus the analytical sections of the thesis (a) demonstrate how the respondents consider the topic; (b) describe the demands from the advocacy literature (where applicable); (c) consider the extant theory on the topic; and (d) analyze the responses with respect to the theoretical and advocacy literature. The social movement discussion draws upon social movements literature.

The Definition of “Reparations”

The term “reparations” does not, by any means, possess a static definition. Indeed, almost every work on reparations includes, whether explicitly or implicitly, a definition of what the term “reparation” or “reparations” should mean. Definitions are extremely varied and complex and even semantics are sometimes an issue; Osabu-Kle (2000a; 2000b), for example, distinguishes between the plural and singular forms of the term. It would be impossible and counterproductive to discuss all competing definitions of the term here.

Our guiding definition of “reparations” draws on United Nations (UN) documents, which provide definitions of “reparations” at the international level. A proposed International Criminal Court⁹ defines reparations as encompassing “restitution, compensation and rehabilitation” (Article 75, “Reparations to Victims,” in United Nations, 1998). Later documents from the UN expand on these types of reparations (e.g., Bassiouni, 2000; van Boven, 2001). Bassiouni (2000) notes that states guilty of international human rights violations should provide as reparation “restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition” (p. 10). Restitution includes acts to “restore the victim to the original situation before the violations of international human rights or humanitarian law occurred” (p. 10). Compensation covers “any economically assessable damage” (p. 10) resulting from the

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⁹ This court was established by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on July 17, 1998 (see International Criminal Court, n.d.; United Nations, 1998). It will be the “first ever permanent, treaty based, international criminal court established to promote the rule of law and ensure that the gravest international crimes do not go unpunished” (International Criminal Court, n.d.). While the statute entered into force on July 1, 2002, the court is not yet operational (see International Criminal Court, n.d.).
wrongs, including physical/mental harm, loss of earning potential, costs for social services, and the like. Under the concept of rehabilitation, wrongdoers should cover the provision of medical and psychological care, and legal and social services. Finally, guarantees of non-repetition include the cessation of current violations, as well as efforts to verify facts and truth, apologize and commemorate.

For the purposes of this project, “reparations” are defined as all those actions which might compensate for past mistreatment of Africa, and that might build a sense of equality between Africa and the Western world. There are three facets of this conception of reparations: acknowledgment, apology and compensation. Acknowledgment is a means to set facts straight on public record about historical and contemporary harm. Apology functions as a signifier that African suffering is taken seriously and may “act as a mechanism whereby a line can be drawn under history, thus allowing...parties to ‘move on’” (Cunningham, 1999, p. 289). Compensation might be helpful to aid African development and rebuild African cultural history. Respondents were asked about each of these processes and their importance to the reparations process, as I discuss more fully in the following methodology chapter.

Respondents and the Meaning of “Reparations”

Nearly three-quarters of our respondents interpreted reparations as some form of payback to Africa, a way of, as a finance manager with a Kenyan nongovernmental organization (NGO) said, “going back through history and trying to rectify the mistakes that were made against the people of Africa to their economic, social and cultural lives” (31). As an ambassador put it, through reparations, Africa should receive from offending parties “resources, financial or otherwise, as a way of atoning...for things that have happened to the continent in the past” (18). The notion of “paying back,” however, was not necessarily limited to financial compensation. Instead, some respondents defined reparations more broadly as some form of support for Africa. Reparations are a "recognition that...something needs to be done just to help the Africans...not necessarily pay this particular amount of money to whom,” said a Ghanaian graduate student studying in Canada (40). Payback was also seen to encompass the acknowledgement of wrongs perpetrated against Africa.

About a third of respondents further understood reparations as a measure to equalize the gap between the West and Africa. For instance, one Zimbabwean, a senior development officer with a Canadian organization, remarked,

First of all, [reparations] bring to my mind the gap that exists between the West and Africa....You can talk about issues of education, standards of living,...shelter, accommodations, health....There are big differences. You talk about skills....We talk about even the advances in technology. We don’t have those things in Africa...It’s preventing people from making progress in their own lives. (28)
A Togolese, the executive director of an NGO, characterized reparations as a means of "capacity building" for Africa, including improvement in educational opportunities (17). Respondents also often discussed reparations as a means of equalizing trade relationships between Africa and the West. While fewer respondents saw reparations explicitly as a development measure, we shall see in a later chapter that the notion of development through reparations is implicit in the type of reparations many respondents seek.

These views of reparations embraced notions of justice and morality and the sense that the West indeed carries some form of responsibility to Africa. A programme officer with a Kenyan human rights commission quite eloquently captured the essence of these views in his discussion on the meaning of reparations:

For me reparation is, I should not walk away, I should look at the inconvenience I cost you, the harm I cost you and be able to let's say, pay back...and pay back not even in monetary counts but even acknowledge to you that, 'Brother I subjected you to this situation, I'm sorry. I know I'm leaving you in this bad situation but I think I have an obligation to do all that there is in my situation to redress, to make sure that the injustices that I committed against you are redressed...' (32)

In these ways, a majority of respondents defined "reparations" as encompassing the more general ideas of justice (through payback) and development (through equalization). On the one hand, our respondents defined reparations as a means of effecting justice between an offended party and the offending party or parties, and on the other hand, this form of justice meant helping bring the parties into a more equitable existence through development projects and the like. As we will see in the following chapters, these conceptions of reparations are very much reflected in the ways that the respondents think about reparations and its related processes and consequences. These views are also consistent with other African calls for reparations, which also see reparations as a means to "pay back" Africa and equalize its relationships with the West (see, e.g., African World Reparations and Repatriation Truth Commission, 1999/2002; Chinweizu, 1993; First Pan-African Conference on Reparations, 1993/2002; Mazrui, 2002a; Mazrui, 1999; Mazrui, 2002c; Osabu-Kle, 2000a; Thompson, 1999).

In the next chapter, I discuss in more depth the methods, ethics and funding for this research.
CHAPTER 2: METHODS, ETHICS AND FUNDING

The Interview Sample

My findings are based on the analysis of 41 interviews conducted with persons of African citizenship, regardless of their “racial” origin, with two exceptions that I note later in this chapter. I conducted interviews for this project, as did Professor Howard-Hassmann and an assistant researcher, Kristina Maud Bergeron; the interviews were collected for the larger project. Interviews for the larger project were also conducted in French, but I have limited my analysis to the English interviews as I am not fluent enough in French to analyze those interviews.

The sample is deliberately purposive and focuses on members of the African elite and civil society.\(^\text{10}\) Professor Howard-Hassmann and I sought respondents through which we could “learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the research” (Patton, 1990, p. 169). We drew respondents from three main groups: human rights activists, academics, and diplomats.

We interviewed human rights activists to understand how civil society members think and feel about reparations, especially those involved in human rights advocacy. Seventeen (42\%) of the respondents were human rights activists. We also interviewed African academics,\(^\text{11}\) important because the extant discussions about reparations exist mostly among elites (Howard-Hassmann, 2004). Moreover, academics constitute one of the few influential professional groups in Africa, and they provide a scholarly viewpoint in addition to their personal views. We conducted 13 (32\%) interviews with academics. We also had the opportunity to interview the three remaining active members of the Group of Eminent Persons: Jacob Ajayi, Ali Mazrui, and Dudley Thompson. Finally, we chose diplomats in order to obtain official state positions on reparations, as well as to obtain some personal views from them. Our sample included eight interviews with African Ambassadors to the United States of America. Note, however, that while the majority of our respondents had heard of the idea of reparations to Africa, very few had given the idea much thought before being invited to the interview. Further, besides the members of the Group of Eminent Persons, only three respondents had worked specifically in the area of reparations to Africa: one professor had prepared a speech on the topic for a university seminar and two activists had written papers on the topic.

While we selected the sample groups purposively, our recruitment of respondents relied partially upon snowball sampling, the process of selecting respondents by availability and referral. Such an approach is often used to compile a sample of hard-to-reach respondents (Marshall, 1998, p. 605; Patton, 1990). We recruited respondents by

\(^{10}\) We define “elite” Africans as those with university degrees.

\(^{11}\) We use the term “academics” to apply to all those persons affiliated with universities, including professors, researchers and graduate students.
their interest in participating in the project and their availability to us. We therefore conducted most interviews with respondents present at specific venues which brought them (temporarily) to North America.

Sixteen interviews with human rights activists and a single interview with an academic were conducted during the Canadian Human Rights Foundation summer human rights training program in Ste-Anne-de-Bellevue, Quebec, in June of 2002 and June of 2003. We interviewed six academics and the three members of the Group of Eminent Persons at the annual meeting of the African Studies Association in Washington, DC, in December of 2002. In June of 2003, we interviewed two academics at the annual meeting of the Canadian Association of African Studies in Halifax, Nova Scotia. Eight interviews with ambassadors and one interview with an activist were conducted in Washington, DC, between January and April of 2003. Four additional interviews were conducted with academics at their home universities between August and October of 2003. One interview was conducted with an academic through e-mail, but this interview unfortunately contained much less content than those interviews conducted in person. The analysis presented in this thesis is limited to interviews conducted as of October 31, 2003.\(^\text{12}\)

To locate African participants attending summer schools and conferences, we sent a letter of information describing the project to organizers, who passed it on to participants, asking them to reply if they were interested in being interviewed. As much as possible, interviews were arranged in advance with those persons who indicated an interest in participating. Unfortunately, several individuals who wanted to participate were unable to secure visas to visit Canada or the USA. In a few cases, respondents were recruited onsite. Before each interview, respondents signed a consent form indicating their preferences regarding anonymity, confidentiality and tape-recording. Although most agreed to be interviewed “on the record,” I do not use respondents’ names, except in the case of the members of the Group of Eminent Persons, whose views are already on the public record.

Of the 41 in this study, I conducted 14 interviews: eight with human rights activists and six with academics. I was also present during 12 interviews conducted by Howard-Hassmann.\(^\text{13}\) Howard-Hassmann conducted 25 interviews: eight with human rights activists, six with academics, eight with ambassadors and each of the interviews with the three members of the Group of Eminent Persons. Kristina Maud Bergeron, an assistant researcher, conducted one interview with an activist. We took extensive written notes on each interview and made oral comments on tape after the majority of the interviews. Each interview was professionally transcribed, with the exception of two...

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\(^\text{12}\) Data collection for the larger project continued until March 2004.

\(^\text{13}\) Since October 31, 2003, I conducted four additional interviews with human rights activists at a training programme in international human rights at the Raoul Wallenberg Institute in Lund, Sweden. I was also present at an additional five interviews Howard-Hassmann conducted at the Institute.
respondents who did not consent to tape recording and one interview where the tape was damaged. In these cases, I relied on our written and oral notes for analysis.

During oral presentations of preliminary versions of this research (Lombardo & Howard-Hassmann, 2003a, 2003b, in press), we have been asked why we did not include “ordinary” (that is, non-elite) Africans in our sample. Unfortunately, interviewing “ordinary” Africans was not a feasible option. First, physical, financial and organizational constraints prevented our travel to Africa to conduct interviews: the research travel would be too expensive, unsafe and time-consuming to be practicable. Conversely, it is highly unlikely that “ordinary” Africans would visit North America to be available for interviews. Second, to reiterate an earlier point, interest in reparations, as it currently stands, exists almost solely at the elite level; there does not appear to be much activity at the grassroots level. Insofar as reparations become a salient issue in international relations, it will be because African elites have raised it. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, many non-elite Africans may be too concerned with issues of daily survival to be available for, or even interested in, interviews on reparations.

Sample Demographics

Thirty (73%) of the respondents were male and 11 (27%) were female. Of the 26 respondents for whom age information was available, ages ranged from 26 through 60; the average age was 40.14 Eleven respondents held Bachelor’s-level degrees; five had Master’s-level degrees; 11 had doctoral degrees; and four held professional degrees. Education information was not available for the remaining 10 respondents. The respondents came from 16 African countries (number of respondents from each country in parentheses): Angola (1), Botswana (1), Ethiopia (2), Ghana (5), Kenya (7), Liberia (1), Malawi (1), Morocco (1), Nigeria (5), Republic of Congo (1), South Africa (5), Sudan (1), Tanzania (5), Togo (1), Zambia (1), and Zimbabwe (2). Dudley Thompson, of the Group of Eminent Persons, is from Jamaica, but, as a result of decades of Pan-African work, has contributed heavily to the idea of reparations to Africa and therefore is included in this analysis, notwithstanding his citizenship. The respondent from Botswana is actually a British citizen, but holds temporary residence in Botswana and has taught and researched in Africa for eight years.

The Interview Schedule

We conducted semi-structured interviews that followed a pre-designed questionnaire. Howard-Hassmann devised the original questionnaire and we tested it on our first slate of respondents in June of 2002. Based on results from those interviews, we revised and expanded some questions before settling on the final questionnaire which we have used for all interviews since June 2002. Appendix A includes a copy of the final questionnaire. We opted for an interview schedule that combined both an “interview

14 This calculation excludes one respondent who was 85 years of age.
guide approach” and a “standardized open-ended approach” thereby allowing us “more flexibility in probing and more decision-making flexibility in determining when it [was] appropriate to explore certain subjects in greater depth” (Patton, 1990, p. 287). Following the qualitative tradition, our interest was understanding how the respondents themselves thought about this issue, with as little influence from the researchers as possible (Patton, 1990).

The final interview schedule contained four distinct sections. The first section queried respondents about their participation—if any at all—in reparations-related work. Questions here included whether or not respondents had heard about the idea of reparations, and if so, from where, and whether it was something they talked or thought about in day to day life. We also asked respondents here about whether they were involved in any reparations-related work and if they were aware of any other instances of reparations in the past.

The second section formed the bulk of the interview. Here we asked respondents about what the term “reparations” meant to them. We asked the interviewees how they thought Africa had been affected—not “harmed”—by its relations with the West, probing for their perspectives on the slave trade, colonialism, neo-colonialism, globalization, international organizations (e.g., World Bank, International Monetary Fund) and their structural adjustment programs, and any other ways the respondents deemed relevant. We also asked if the respondent believed there were any beneficial aspects of Western relations with Africa, but we did not prompt on this question. We investigated the notions of apology and acknowledgement as reparation, asking respondents about what those processes meant to them, how they should be carried out, and how they could be made sincere. We then asked respondents about forms of compensation, including the necessity and direction of financial compensation and the return of stolen cultural artifacts. The final questions asked respondents about responsibility for reparations from other organizations than national governments, such as multinational corporations, international organizations, churches, non-governmental organizations and any other group respondents thought relevant. We also inquired about responsibility of non-Western nations like the Soviet Union, China, Cuba and the Arab World.

The penultimate section asked about respondents’ personal experiences and feelings about their own experiences with Western relations with Africa, as well as those

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15 Such international organizations are “preoccupied with more central questions of the management and allocation of rules and resources” (Held, 1995, p. 109). Through structural adjustment programs, these institutions are often involved in efforts to “stabilize” and “adjust” troubled economies. Leftwich (1993) explains that “stabilisation normally meant immediate devaluation and often drastic public expenditure cuts….followed by adjustment which sought to transform economic structures and institutions” through measures including deregulation, privatization, reducing public bureaucracies and reducing subsidies (p. 607).

16 In other words, we did ask respondents about any possible benefits that the respondent did not offer independently.
of their parents and friends. The final section collected basic demographic data and asked questions about respondents’ families, their volunteer affiliations and other aspects of their background, to give some context to the respondents.

We followed the interview schedule as closely as possible, given the nature of semi-structured qualitative interviews. Interviews typically ran about one to one and a half hours, but in some cases time constraints cut short interviews and we were unable to cover all areas of the interview schedule. Often we varied the order of questions to keep the interview moving smoothly when respondents independently raised topics we were interested in investigating. Also, we reconfigured some questions during the interview, depending on how knowledgeable a respondent was about the issue (e.g., a human rights activist new to the idea of reparations as opposed to a member of the Group of Eminent Persons).

Data Analysis

I analyzed the English interview data for themes in the respondents’ views on these aspects of reparations. I utilized the qualitative data analysis software package NVivo 2.0 to aid my analysis. I found the software useful for both data management and analytic procedures (Wolcott, 1994 as cited in Gibbs, 2002, p. 11). As Gibbs (2002) points out, while software like NVivo “can make qualitative analysis easier, more accurate, more reliable and more transparent,” it cannot “do the reading and thinking for you” (p. 11). I used the software to automate many of the qualitative analysis processes traditionally done manually. I followed an inductive analysis method (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Patton, 1990; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) to allow the data to “speak for itself” and capture the themes important to the respondents as they related them.

As this research is a unique, exploratory inquiry, the generalizability of these data is not a major concern and the sample should not be considered as representative. No other research, to our knowledge, has attempted to seek African opinion about reparations through a similar, or any other, methodology. Given the nature of the inquiry, I use “quantifying” terms in the following chapters to give a general sense of how common, or uncommon, a certain view was, and I use quotations from our respondents to illustrate these ideas. I realize such an approach might be considered somewhat out of place in qualitative research, but it is necessary here to illustrate which issues were salient to our respondents. As this thesis ultimately shows, our respondents demonstrated a fairly narrow range of opinion and somewhat of an emerging consensus of opinion on reparations to Africa.

To begin data analysis, I read through each of the transcripts I would analyze to familiarize myself with the data before attempting the actual analysis, an especially

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17 I was first introduced to this software in Professor Carl Cuneo’s graduate course on computer applications for qualitative data analysis, where I used it to analyze our first interviews for the project (Lombardo, 2002). I found Buston’s (1997) article very helpful in demonstrating how such software can be used in carrying out qualitative analysis.
important step since I was not present at every interview. From there, I imported all of the transcript data into the software to begin coding. In my first stage of coding, I progressed through each transcript again and began “sign-post” (Gibbs, 2002, p. 130) or “topic” (Morse & Richards, 2002, p. 117) coding to identify key areas for analysis (e.g., meaning of reparations) and early evident themes (e.g., factors of a “sincere” apology). After this stage of coding, I printed out node reports to reread the data collected at each node, and to continue finer coding by hand. After doing so, I returned to the software to perform “analytic” coding (Morse & Richards, 2002, p. 119) where I refined the nodes into their composite parts. For example, my original “meaning of reparations” code became further broken down into common themes of meaning. As I completed this “coding-on,” I placed my nodes into a more organized “node tree” which, after numerous reorganizations, came to reflect (more or less) the chapter outline. This process made common and important themes more evident, and provided the basis for the analysis presented in this thesis.

I followed a similar strategy in reviewing the empirical and theoretical literature. I made reading notes on each piece of literature in a word processor and imported these notes into the software. From there, I coded the notes to organize the literature into the areas discussed in this thesis (such as theory on apology, or advocates on forms of reparations). I also arranged these nodes into a node tree to follow the chapter outline. The software was invaluable here in facilitating a deeper analysis of the data in a simpler way than would have been possible with manual methods (such as photocopying, highlighting and cutting and pasting). Further, the software allowed each document to be assigned certain attributes, so that I could more easily identify and search them. For example, I assigned an attribute to each transcript referring to the respondent group (activist, academic, ambassador, Eminent Person) and I identified each reading note as theory, advocacy or neutral analysis. In this way, I could perform searches for text or nodes within only certain documents, without having to manually select those documents I wanted to search.

I also found NVivo’s facilities for constructing conceptual and analytic memos an invaluable aspect of the software. As I conducted the analysis, I created numerous memos on various topics to capture my thoughts as I read through the data and literature. Memo topics included my on-going thoughts as I proceeded through the analysis as well as more narrowly focused memos on themes on apology, compensation, responsibility, and the like. I used the time and date stamped entries into the memos to reflect on my thought paths, and I actually wrote some of the analysis itself in “bare bones” format in my memos and simply refined them for the final write-up. While it is possible to construct such memos without the aid of this software, the software permits memos to be kept well-organized, searched, coded and linked to other data (like reading notes and transcripts) to facilitate smoother analysis.

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18 Printouts indicating all data coded at a specific code label.
Ethics and Funding

The larger "What the West Owes Africa" research project received ethics approval from the McMaster University Ethics Review Board in 2002. In accordance with the Board's policies, as I indicated earlier, we sent all potential respondents, by mail, e-mail or both, a complete letter of information explaining the research and their rights and obligations should they agree to participate. These rights included not having to answer any questions one did not wish to, and the right to end the interview at any time. The interview itself posed no physical risks to the respondents, but, considering the potentially volatile nature of the research topic, the letter included this statement: "Should you believe that there are any political risks in granting me this interview, I will guarantee complete confidentiality. Or, you may prefer not to grant me the interview." Respondents received no compensation for the interview. Before interviews commenced, whether in person or through e-mail, respondents completed a consent form and indicated their preferred level of confidentiality and whether they agreed to be tape recorded. Appendix B includes a copy of a sample letter of information, and appendix C contains a copy of the consent form.

Again, as part of the larger research project, this thesis was indirectly funded through Rhoda Howard-Hassmann's Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) standard research grant (number 410-2002-1323, "What the West Owes Africa"), as well as her funds from a major collaborative research initiative grant on "Globalization and Autonomy," through McMaster University's Institute on Globalization and the Human Condition (number 412-2001-1000). I say that this thesis was indirectly funded by the research grant because the interviews were conducted for the larger project, thus any expenses incurred for conducting them are properly attributed to the larger project. Funds from the SSHRC grant have not been utilized for any portions of this thesis that were not directly related to the larger project.

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19 We did, however, reimburse travel expenses to one respondent who traveled from Toronto to McMaster University for the interview.
CHAPTER 3: THE BASIS OF CLAIMS AND RESPONSIBILITY

In this chapter, I illuminate why respondents felt that reparations are owed to Africa and discuss how they assigned responsibility for those reparations. This chapter is particularly important for two reasons: (a) one cannot analyze any reparations claims without an understanding of the wrongs the claims are being made against and (b) respondents did not always directly correlate harm with responsibility for reparations, as one might suspect they would. The first section of this chapter is descriptive; I outline respondents’ views on historical and contemporary harms against Africa. Following this, I speak to some central questions about responsibility for reparations for past injustices.

Dimensions of Harm: Why Reparations to Africa?

During the course of the interview, we asked each respondent why, if at all, they felt reparations might be owed to Africa. We asked about Western responsibility for harm caused through the Atlantic slave trade, colonialism, neo-colonialism, globalization, and the policies of international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. We included questions about the responsibility of non-state organizations like churches, multinational corporations, and non-governmental organizations.

Our respondents focused mainly on two types of harm: economic and socio-cultural/psychological, which I deal with in turn. In each category I discuss the perceptions of injustices through historical and contemporary periods, but note that I do not make any assertions as to the historical or empirical correctness of the responses. My focus is on how our respondents subjectively understood harms against Africa, whether or not their perceptions are factually correct.

Economic Injustices

Respondents discussed at great length the economic injustices perpetrated against Africa by the West, beginning with the slave trade and continuing into the present day.

Notwithstanding a common view of the mass enslavement of Africans as a gross human rights violation, a number of respondents discussed slavery with respect to its role in the underdevelopment of Africa. An assistant professor of law at a Canadian university, originally from Ghana, remarked on the loss of the “work force of whole generations” (16) and a Kenyan development worker lamented that “those people...who were taken [as slaves] were the strong people in the community” (14). To this end, a Ghanaian man said, “we [will] never know who was taken from our shores, who could have been the real geniuses...from our country” (18). This same respondent added that in a landscape “dominated by slavery,” Africa could not focus on economic development through its history. Overall, however, respondents discussed the harms of slavery more
in reference to its present day consequences than the harms inflicted during its actual operation.

Respondents characterized harms during the colonial period in a number of ways. They talked prominently about the intensively exploitative nature of colonialism, especially with respect to Africa’s natural resources. Respondents from Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe echoed similar concerns about the colonial appropriation of land in their respective countries. For example, a Zimbabwean development officer with a Canadian organization said, “the British...took over good land...[and] Zimbabweans were pushed to marginal land which...[was] not good for agriculture, not good for subsistence....They [the British] took over, I think, 90% of the most productive land” (28).

Approximately a quarter of respondents lamented the stripping of natural resources from Africa during colonial rule. One Malawian, a training officer with an NGO, remarked, “the African countries in the south who had minerals, like coal, cobalt, zinc, even gold....Their exploitation was, I would say, more intensified, to the extent that, within a few years, the resources were exhausted” (20). Similarly, a Tanzanian lawyer with a human rights commission called the West a “leech during colonialism” (22). Respondents were also concerned about the colonial dismantling of their traditional agricultural systems, which colonizers replaced with cash crop ventures, like tea and coffee plantations. Some respondents also mentioned the detrimental economic effects of the colonizers’ “divide and rule” approach. For a Ghanaian man, the splintering of Africa sapped its potential: “if you trace back the history of the United States...[it] is much stronger now because it is an amalgamation of different states....We’re [Africa] weaker now because of what happened to us through colonialism, just by dividing us up” (18). Like the harms of slavery, most respondents linked these historical harms with present day problems.

In the more contemporary period, respondents discussed economic harms arising from neocolonialism and globalization, as well as from international organizations and their structural adjustment programs. In many ways respondents linked present harms with the past injustices of slavery and colonialism, thereby framing these historical events as backdrops to present realities. In fact, a small number of respondents explicitly maintained that neocolonialism and globalization were more or less the same phenomenon: they perceived globalization as a manifestation of neo-colonialism. As one diplomat put it, “I think that with...globalization we can see...the very same logic of colonization” (7); a Tanzanian who teaches at a law centre likewise said, “really globalization is another way of colonialism. They’re coming in another fashion” (23). In this section, I discuss neo-colonialism and globalization together.

A major concern for some respondents was their countries’ “superficial independence”: while the countries are politically independent from colonial rule, their governments nonetheless find themselves still dependent upon and controlled by former...
colonial powers. Such control, of course, comprises the essence of “neo-colonialism” (see Tandon, 1994). A comment from a Kenyan with an education rights organization captures this trepidation:

Neo-colonialism is real. It is even more dangerous than colonialism itself....Today, with the coming of independence, with the globalization, we are seeing every powerful nation putting up an Embassy, putting up a High Commission Office, and each country wants to have an influence in the goings on in the country....Africa is not yet independent. But now we are being colonized by more than one power, unlike during the colonial days, when it was clear that it...was the British who were ruling Kenya. Today, we have the British High Commission in Kenya. We have the American Embassy in Kenya. We have the Danish Embassy in Kenya. And all of them want to have a direct say, an interest in the goings on. And the competition is still going on and real. So, so this to me is a form of colonialism. (26)

Eminent Person Dudley Thompson felt the same way, as he eloquently put it: “So you had emancipation...then they give independence, [but] we really were not fully independent....We got our anthem, we got our governors, we got our flag....they gave us a crown but they kept the jewels” (39).

Respondents tied this lack of true economic and political independence to a related and important concern with Africa’s lack of economic freedom. An ambassador commented that “I think that is neocolonialism, whereby the markets of...African countries continue to be dominated by the colonial powers, where they set commodity prices [and Africa has] little or no say” (1). A Tanzanian lecturer in developmental studies echoed similar concerns: “we don’t have any say in what we are producing and we don’t have any say in where and how to go about it. Our economy doesn’t have independence and...you can’t be truly independent if...there is not an independent economy” (13). Respondents also saw trade subsidies as problematic for African economies; a South African, involved with a law clinic, for example, noted her disappointment that in her country, imported cheese is cheaper to buy than locally produced cheese (6).

In a more general way, respondents tied economic problems to neocolonialism via complaints about globalization and Africa’s participation (or lack thereof) in the global economy. Some respondents saw globalization as a stilted, unfair and inequitable phenomenon, biased against African participation. A graduate student in Canada, originally from Ghana, put it thus: “My understanding of globalization is to have...equal partnership...but I realize that the relationship has been two-thirds in favour of the developed world and...the developed world continues to suppress the developing world” (35). To this end, a Togolese discussed the paradox of African involvement in the global economy: “Africa has been particularly marginalized in globalization....but at the same time African resources are crucial for the...global economy. So, as somebody put it, it is
as if we are sitting on gold and digging for food” (17). Representative of a more general view on globalization, a Kenyan NGO programme officer remarked: “you find that all benefit comes to the West and very little...goes to African countries” (32). In a similar way, a small minority of respondents saw globalization as coercion, as for one Tanzanian, an advocacy officer with an NGO, who referred to it as an “airborne disease” where globalized nations are running and pulling along those nations, like African ones, which are only walking (19).

One cannot discuss the role of globalization in African economies without considering key mechanisms of the globalization phenomenon: multinational corporations and international organizations. Multinational corporations are a cornerstone of the global economy (Held & McGrew, 1999; Waters, 1995), and a number of respondents had much to say about their presence in Africa. Often their complaints involved a perceived exploitation of Africa by multinationals, including their use of cheap labour and raw materials of the continent. Some respondents disdained the tendency of multinationals to desert African communities they were once based in: “they make their profit and...they just leave with no qualms about the damage that they have on the people,” said a Zambian former journalist, now working with an NGO, “you wake up in the morning, all the companies closed. Workers...may not even have been paid their monthly salary” (12). Along similar lines, others remarked on multinationals’ poor records for respect for the environment, or their employees. A South African graduate student said, “in terms of environmental degradation and deaths of people in...work related accidents and long-term health consequences...the list is long and shameful” (4). A Nigerian programme officer related a story about a Nigerian town where the inhabitants are “demanding compensation because their main occupation is fishing and [there is] no marine life due to environmental conditions [from a multinational corporation]” (34). British Petroleum, Chevron, Coca Cola, Firestone and Shell, among others, were named as offending companies.

International organizations, and their structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in particular, similarly received poor reviews from almost half of the respondents. As some respondents pointed out, SAPs do not always work as intended, and they linked severe negative economic consequences to them. A few respondents felt that SAPs “mismanage” the African economy (42), while others likewise maintained that they are self-benefiting and offer little real support for Africa (19). For some respondents, international organizations take a dictatorial role in African economies (23), and impose policies which “do not fit [Africa’s] situation currently,” (14) as a Zimbabwean activist described:

These policies...have been creating business for the West. The West has been benefiting because they say that market oriented economy....We [Africans] don’t have the capacities...to run a market oriented economy because we don’t own anything. The peoples who own something are the multinational corporations which are owned by the West. They come in, they take control of the market and
what happens? All the benefits go back to the West and this is the World Bank which is supposed to be developing it. (28)

A major issue for over half of respondents was the enormous amount of debt that African countries owe to international organizations. The World Bank (2003) places the debt of sub-Saharan African countries at $203 billion in 2001, with South Africa carrying another $24.1 billion debt. A Malawian NGO training officer described her views on these loans: “They are not grants. We can merely service the interests....the main amount of money which we borrowed...is...like a bondage....I don’t actually see my country getting out of it” (20). She, in fact, related a story that the IMF forced the government of Malawi to sell its maize reserves to pay back loans and interest. For one ambassador, the weight of these debts hindered his country’s participation in the global economy: “We cannot be a player in globalization if we carry the debt to represent 90% of our income” (27).

In general, our respondents’ main concerns were the exploitive nature of global economics towards Africa. A few were further disappointed that Africa has little representation in this economy, especially at the level of international organizations. As a Kenyan with an education rights organization aptly put it, “is it a World Bank? Which World Bank? Does Kenya have a say? Is the world constituted only by the West? Who influences policies that are made by the World Bank? It can only be a World Bank if Africans have representatives” (26). For these respondents, past injustices against Africa live on in the present, and constitute many of the economic problems that Africans face today.

Socio-Cultural and Psychological Harm

Our respondents were not solely concerned about economic injustices. Indeed, many discussed past and lingering socio-cultural and psychological problems relating to injustices against Africa.

Respondents, referring to historical Africa, were, expectedly, upset at the damage slavery did to African families and their communities, and African culture itself. They were also unhappy with the activities of the colonial powers. Respondents did not discuss the historical harms of slavery and colonialism as past harms per se, but rather discussed them in relation to contemporary problems. It is difficult to discuss respondents’ views on the harms of these historical injustices without making reference to contemporary issues.

20 These amounts from Table A.42, “Total external debt of developing countries, 1995-2001” in the statistical appendix of World Bank (2003, p. 221).
21 The International Monetary Fund denies such a charge. They argue that “the causes of food shortages in Malawi are complex, also including lapses in the government’s early warning systems, distortions in domestic markets, and mismanagement of food reserves” (International Monetary Fund, 2002).
A few respondents linked the history and present manifestations of racism to the slave trade. A native Ghanaian, now a law professor in Canada, said, "[slavery] perpetrat[ed] in the minds of the African people a sense of inferiority which has been carried out and become full blown racism" (16). As Eminent Person Ambassador Dudley Thompson saw it, through slavery, "people were wrenched from the heart of Africa and carried across the slave trade. In the same cradle of mercantile oppression you had twins...one of them was slavery and the other is racism" (39). These respondents pointed at slavery as the genesis of harm to African peoples’ dignity and psychological wellbeing, a view that Ajayi (2002) puts forth in his writing: "notions of cultural solidarity, continuity of traditions, and social responsibility were discouraged. In very many senses the communities were no longer communities, but collections of psychologically damaged individuals” (p. 1).22

About one third of respondents discussed colonialism and slavery with respect to their intense cultural damage, which still manifests itself today. The cultural damage included the loss of African traditions, language and religion, as a Kenyan involved with a peace organization observed: "We really lost our culture and our traditional values...the way the West came in...and they taught us so many strange things....So, still our culture is dying and also our traditions are dying” (15). A Nigerian programme officer with an NGO remarked that slavery prevented many Africans from being able to trace their heritage: “It’s very important because you know, you know your roots. There’s nothing like knowing that you are from somewhere and knowing your roots. You know that you belong somewhere and not just somewhere in a new place and you don’t have any heritage. I mean, you don’t have any roots” (34). In these ways, respondents discussed colonialism as what Bhargava (2004) calls “cultural injustice,” which “occurs when the basic cultural forms of a group are altered by the arbitrary or deliberate actions of the people of another group” (p. 4).

Likewise, two respondents talked about the present day effects of the colonial imposition of new borders in Africa. A Sudanese spoke about the British-imposed division between North and South Sudan: “they sowed the seeds of hatred between the two parts of the country and you wouldn’t imagine how many precious lives on both sides...how much money, how much property...how that war was caused by these struggles” (2). A South African involved with a law clinic (6) also reflected on the creation of ruling and submissive classes between the Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda, and their disastrous consequences (although Lemarchand, 1997 argues the Belgian colonial state only hardened existing pre-colonial class systems).

22 In his work on slavery reparations for African-Americans, Robinson (2000, chap. 4) dedicates a whole chapter to what he calls black “self-hatred” where he notes “the devastating, mutually reinforcing dual consequence [of slavery]: a pervasive global belief that blacks are inherently inferior and a crushing loss of confidence among blacks themselves” (p. 85). This view is consistent with Bhargava’s (2004) notion of “extreme negative” cultural injustices, where, drawing on Frantz Fanon, victims lose basic self-confidence and develop “grave moral defects, the principal deficiency being a permanent propensity to be servile” (p. 6).
There was concern about the social structural problems in countries affected by SAPs. Some respondents from Ghana and Kenya told stories about how SAPs instituted user fees for education and health care in their countries with injurious consequences. A Ghanaian man, now studying in Canada, said of imposed education user fees:

My basic concern was education…Africans, we are poor, so if education is not free it’s difficult for people. So in my country, for example, that’s created a line between the rich and the poor….Rich people have access to education and the poor ones [do] not… (40)

On health care user fees, a Kenyan programme officer with a human rights organization said,

To go to a public hospital you have to pay almost half…. [If you need] a bandage you have to buy that bandage. If you had to be injected you have to buy the needle, you have to buy the serum…. All these things just came in a flurry after the implementation of the [SAP]. It’s true that many people who must have lost their lives because they could not afford they could not afford medical care. And remember that these conditionalities are placed, they’re not responding… economically [to] people [who are] unable to pay the costs. (32)

In these ways, respondents concerned about SAPs largely viewed them as methods of, as a South African graduate student put it, “shifting away of public resources from the public and increasingly through the diversion of such resources from health care, [and] from education” (4).

In sum, respondents characterized harm against Africa in these ways, discussing at length both the economic and socio-cultural harms, in the past and present. Again, I must reiterate here that I make no claims about the veracity of the respondents’ remarks, but rather report them here to demonstrate how the respondents perceived harm against Africa. However, their remarks are reflected in the advocacy literature, such as articles 19 and 20 in the African Regional Preparatory Declaration (2001), which affirm the harmfulness of slavery and colonialism and maintain that those injustices “resulted in substantial and lasting economic, political and cultural damage to African peoples and are still present in the form of damage caused to the descendants of the victims, the perpetuation of the prejudice against Africans in the Continent and… in the Diaspora.” As well, articles 13 and 14 of the final declaration of the UNWCAR acknowledge that slavery and colonialism are the major sources and causes of racism and other forms of harm in the present day (Durban declaration, 2001, pp. 6-7).

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23 On the effects of SAPs in Ghana, see Appiah-Kubi (2001) and Waddington and Enyimayew (1989; 1990); on Kenya, Rono (2002). See also Geo-Jaja and Mangum (2001) and Osabu-Kle (2000b) on Africa more generally.
Not all Bad: Beneficial Aspects of Western Relations

While much of respondents’ discussions involved harm perpetrated against Africa by the West, we did ask them about positive benefits of those relations, whether past or present. In the economic realm, some respondents indicated that the West has been helpful—to some extent—in opening up African markets to global trade and introducing new industry and technology to the continent. Indeed, a small number of respondents had positive views of globalization and the necessity for structural adjustment programs. In the socio-cultural sphere, respondents mentioned health care, education, the introduction of Christianity (mainly from our Christian respondents) and human rights ideals as positive consequences of Western relations. One should not make a mistake here however: respondents saw the majority of Africa’s relations with the West as negative.

Reparations and Responsibility

Harm and Responsibility for Reparations

A graduate student from South Africa remarked, “I’m not sure responsibility equals reparations” (4). Indeed, our respondents did not necessarily think that every organization that had harmed Africa owed reparations. While some respondents sought reparations for harms from slavery through the contemporary period, others envisioned more limited claims. Indeed, there was a varied range of what I call the “scope of claims” for reparations.

Most respondents supported a call for reparations for slavery and colonialism, but this was not absolute. One ambassador, for example, did not want reparations for slavery because he feared “you are going to open old wounds. That would not help people to heal the scars of the past” (2). On the contrary, Ali Mazrui, of the Group of Eminent Persons, claimed that slavery should be the sole focus of reparations claims, for the purposes of making a viable claim: “Being enslaved is almost uniquely black in modern history. Once you broaden the agenda [for reparations] and it’s no longer uniquely black than you’re being rhetorical because people will say we can’t deal with two-thirds of the human race” (24). Mazrui’s Eminent Person counterpart Dudley Thompson shared this view. But the third Eminent Person, Jacob Ajayi, felt the opposite. “It’s only to myself...when you link the slave trade with colonialism that you begin to get the more correct focus,” he said,

colonialism in Africa is not the same as colonialism in India....the British went to India to trade...they had no business trying to destroy the trade that existed there before. But because of the racism that is involved in colonialism in Africa, there was no interest in developing trade that was there before. (3)
Indeed for a small minority of respondents, claims for reparations should be restricted to the historical period, and not for the harms of the contemporary period. First, some felt that post-independence, African countries should be held accountable for their own failings in the post-colonial period. A Nigerian, now an assistant professor of history at a Canadian university, spoke to this point: “There’s some arguments about neocolonialism and... I think that’s difficult because politically... no matter how ineffectual it was... Africa was politically independent” (11). Second, a few respondents worried that claims for reparations for the contemporary period would be, as an ambassador feared, “stretching the argument a bit far” (29).

On the other hand, some respondents desired reparations for the contemporary period. Of the three-quarters of respondents who talked about multinational corporation responsibility for reparations, for example, over one-third clearly stated multinationals owed reparations. Similarly, 60% of the nearly two-thirds of respondents who spoke about international organization responsibility agreed that such organizations also owe reparations. Our respondents therefore did not completely agree on the question of what reparations are owed to Africa for. This is by no means a minor point, and it is a problem reflected in the larger “movement” for African reparations, a point I return to in the social movements chapter.

**Historical Harms: Assigning Generational Responsibility**

A key issue in discussions on reparations for historical injustices involves the notion of inter-generational responsibility for those harms. When dealing with injustices of the past, one is inevitably drawn into the question of whether or not a present generation of people—"innocent payers," as Satz (2004, p. 12) terms them—can be held accountable for harms committed against another nation by previous governments, and should be responsible for paying reparations. This is, of course, an especially salient issue for claims for African reparations for slavery and colonialism, and is an issue oft mentioned in the reparations literature (see, e.g., Barkan, 2000; Block, 2002; Cunningham, 1999; du Plessis, 2003; Govier & Verwoerd, 2002, n.d.; Human Rights Watch, 2001; O’Neill, 1999; Satz, 2004; Tavuchis, 1991; Thompson, 2002, 2004; Torpey, 2001).

The advocacy literature addresses this question. The Abuja Proclamation, for examples, is “emphatically convinced that what matters is not the guilt but the responsibility [italics added] of those states and nations whose economic evolution once depended on slave labor and colonialism...” (First Pan-African Conference on Reparations, 1993/2002, p. 136). Likewise, article 29 of the African Regional Preparatory Draft Declaration maintains that states which pursued racist and/or discriminatory policies (e.g., slavery, colonialism) “should assume their full responsibilities and provide adequate reparation to...[the states they harmed] regardless of when or by whom they were committed [italics added]” (African Regional Preparatory
Conference, 2001). Robinson (2000) avows a similar argument for reparations to African-Americans for slavery:

When the black living suffer real and current consequences as a result of wrongs committed by a younger America, then contemporary America must be caused to shoulder responsibility for those wrongs until such wrongs have been adequately compensated and righted. *The life and responsibilities of a society or nation are not circumscribed by the life spans of its mortal constituents. Social rights, wrongs, obligations, and responsibilities flow eternal* [italics added]. (p. 230)

Despite its salience in the reparations literature, very few of our respondents explicitly discussed the issue of generational responsibility. Note however that we did not routinely ask about this issue, thus those respondents who discussed it brought it up independently in our discussions. Those who did discuss generational responsibility took different approaches to dealing with the issue. One such approach was a “moral” one, with hesitancy to heap responsibility on present generations. The argument was that even if the present generations are not directly guilty and/or responsible for past harms, they have a moral obligation to address them. An Ethiopian, the acting director of an NGO, voiced his views on this as such:

The wrong was done centuries back and those who did [it] are not now alive and we can not really, literally speaking we can not make responsible the generation, the new generation for the things done in the past. Now this is a question of moral ethics…it’s a question of justice, [a] sense of justice morally and those who did wrong are no longer alive and those who are of course [were] created by their ancestors and I think they have an obligation…to help one another if we’re going to create a peaceful world, a stable world....I think the west seems to me not responsible but I think has got a moral, it has a moral obligation to do that. (21)

On the other hand, Mazrui and Thompson of the Group of Eminent Persons contended that the responsibilities for harm are handed down, or “inherited,” through social citizenship. “You, who have the profits in the white world,” writes Dudley Thompson (1999), “have inherited the responsibility of what your forefathers did to us. *For it is the responsibility you have and not the guilt, by which we approach you* [italics added],” Mazrui (2002a), in his book on black reparations, adds similarly: “The struggle for Black reparations is not based on Western guilt but on Western responsibility. While guilt need not be inherited from generation to generation, rights and responsibilities are [italics in original]” (p. 88). Mazrui expanded upon this point during his interview:

Do you deny that you are entitled to the rights provided by a constitution which was written 200 years ago?....Do you in other words deny the assets side of being an American even if the assets side is much older than your presence here? If you don’t deny your asset side, why should you deny your liability side, because you’re not entitled to deny that. For as long as you are accepting the asset side,
you should accept the other side, the liabilities [i.e., responsibility for the harm caused to Africa]. (24; see also Mazrui, 1993)

These semi-divergent views of inter-generational responsibility operate at two different levels. At one level, there is the notion of state “responsibility” for reparations. Here, “responsibility” takes on two different meanings: it can mean, on one hand, responsibility in the sense that the present government is to blame for the injustices that have not been repaired or, on the other hand, it can be taken to mean that the present state has an obligation—despite not actually being guilty—to fix past wrongs. Both views would suggest that contemporary States are not to be seen as guilty of the crimes, but do indeed have an obligation of sorts to fix those injustices.

At the state level, there is a principle of what might be called state “transcendence” of responsibility. The mere passage of time and succession of governments cannot negate a nation’s responsibilities for past harms. As O’Neill (1999) puts it, “just as people do not disappear and reappear, the ‘national person’ is thought of as continuous” (p. 189). In other words, “it can be argued that the present-day government can apologise (in the sense of accepting responsibility) because it is the current embodiment of an institution which transcends the particular individuals [italics added] which constitute it at any particular time” (Cunningham, 1999, p. 290; see also Govier & Verwoerd, 2002; Govier & Verwoerd, n.d.; Thompson, 2002). Janna Thompson’s (2002) discussion of “obligations-dependent theory” is helpful here: “the right to reparation for an injustice depends on the existence of an agent or agents with the obligation to make reparation for the wrong….in the case of the actions of an organized group like a nation, the successors of those responsible [italics added]” (p. 39). Thus we can understand the “obligation” or “responsibility” of the present day nation state because that state must necessarily be seen as a collectivity with a collective past, and not just a group of individuals who inhabit the government structure at any one time, but are disconnected from its previous activities (see Govier & Verwoerd, 2002, n.d.). While actual guilt is not in question, the obligation is; present day states are therefore “symbolic co-offenders” (Tavuchis, 1991, p. 49) in the past injustices.

There is an appeal to another level here, one which touches on the relationship of social citizenship to the social actor. To put it another way, the question boils down to why the individuals of a present day society should be held responsible for those harms perpetrated by their countries in the past. These respondents turned to notions of social citizenship, or in other words, the obligations one takes on as a member of a certain society, to solve this problem. For example, echoing Mazrui’s sentiments, an academic at a South African university said:

because of certain things that have gone wrong, whether that is our fault or not...whereas you didn’t have anything to do with it on a concrete level...you can’t pinpoint guilt, but you still have responsibility because you come from a background of privilege and you had access to good schooling....so you have a
responsibility to use this background and this privilege to the good of society as a whole. (41)

MacIntyre (1984) provides an expansion of this idea, nestled in the notion of the “narrative view of the self”:

I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations....The story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity. I am born with a past; and to try to cut myself off from that past, in the individualist mode, is to deform my present relationships. The possession of an historical identity and the possession of a social identity coincide. (pp. 220-221)

In sum, Janna Thompson (2002) is again instructive here: “the responsibilities of citizens for repairing the injustices of their nation do not depend...on their participation in this wrongdoing, or even on their being descendants of those who did the wrong” (p. 43). The respondents who discussed the generational responsibility issue worked through it by demonstrating how both nations and national citizens can be seen as having at least an obligation—if not responsibility—for making amends for past injustices.

Understanding now why our respondents felt reparations were owed to Africa, the next chapter investigates their views towards the symbolic processes of reparations: apologies and acknowledgements of past (and present) misdeeds.

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24 I first read about MacIntyre’s idea and quotation in Cunningham (1999, p. 290). Peter French makes a similar point in his discussion of “collective responsibility”: “Public memory casts the past into our present...and well it should because it is our past or what we are jointly committed as a group to being our past. We, as a collective, are the continuation of the projects of our collective’s past” (French, cited in Tsosie, 2004, p. 27).
CHAPTER 4: SYMBOLIC REPARATIONS: APOLOGY AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Given their importance to the processes of reconciliation, apology and acknowledgement are central components of reparations. In the social world especially, apology is a means through which fractured social relationships can be repaired, hence Goffman's (1971) characterization of apologies as examples of “remedial work” (pp. 108-118). Tavuchis (1991) makes the point that apologies are inherently social acts, but these acts need not be restricted to the personal, one-on-one, private realm. On the contrary, collectivities can make apologies that take place on the public, international plane through apologies from the “One to Many,” the “Many to One” and the “Many to Many” (Tavuchis, 1991, p. 48). Cunningham (1999, pp. 285-287) provides numerous examples of such apologies, including apologies from commercial organizations, religious organizations, governments, and heads of state. In this chapter I analyze how respondents thought about international apologies and their role in the reparations process. In so doing, I also illustrate how and where these views support and extend current theories about apology and acknowledgement in the reparations process.

Apology and Acknowledgement: An Analytical Distinction

Strictly speaking, there is a qualitative difference between “apology” and “acknowledgement.” In the former, there is a sense of remorse, regret and/or sorrow that accompanies an admission of a wrong. This is reflected in working definitions of a “complete” or “thorough” apology. For example, Wagatsuma and Rosett (1986) maintain that in a “meaningful apology,” the apologizer must stipulate that (1) the hurtful act happened, was wrong and caused injury; (2) the apologizer was at fault and regrets participation in the injurious act; (3) the apologizer will compensate the injured party; (4) the act will not happen again; and (5) the apologizer intends to work for good relations in future (p. 469). Within this definition, we see that the process of acknowledgement proper is implied: when an apologizer accepts fault, there is an implicit acknowledgement of their participation in that fault. Thus apology implies acknowledgement (see also Govier & Verwoerd, 2002; Minow, 1998).

Although in the interview we asked about apology and acknowledgement as separate processes, a few respondents used the terms as a set and typified the distinctions above. For example, a Kenyan finance manager with an NGO said, “it would be very hard to pay back what we have lost over all those years. I think that they should acknowledge that, yes, this happened and probably apologize. Apologize that ‘we know we did, 1, 2, 3 and we can’t...’ [italics added]...they have to say that it cannot be paid back” (31). We see here that the acknowledgement is implied within the apology, and that the two ideally should occur together.

Indeed, this makes intuitive sense, yet the reverse does not hold. An acknowledgement alone does not imply an apology. One can, for example, stipulate that
he or she was responsible for a wrong, but stop short of showing regret for participation in that wrong. A hypothetical example to demonstrate this point, with respect to the issue at hand: the USA could acknowledge their role in the transatlantic slave trade, but could certainly stop short of apologizing for that role, and/or making any further amends.

Some respondents implied a sense that an apology without acknowledgement—or vice versa—would be somehow incomplete. Consider this excerpt from an interview with a Ghanaian graduate student studying in Canada:

Interviewer [I]: Do you differentiate between an apology and acknowledgement of the wrong?

Respondent [R]: Well, you acknowledge first and then you apologize. There’s a coalition between the two [italics added]. What are you apologizing for if you do not acknowledge it?

I: So if the West were to acknowledge without apologizing, would you accept that as reparations or not?

R: No. I mean you acknowledge that this is wrong, what next? The next one is to apologize. So apology follows, automatically follows, acknowledgement [italics added]. (35)

Similarly, this Tanzanian lawyer with a human rights organization said,

I think it should be separate because acknowledgment does not necessarily mean an apology. Someone may acknowledge that I have done wrong [but] you may not apologize. So, I think the first stage should be acknowledging. From acknowledging then there should be apology and then the last area is how to start to resolve that, how to reconcile the problem. (22)

Such statements give the impression that apologies and acknowledgements are intricately related processes, thus these processes must occur together for them to have meaning; as an activist from Kenya put it, “If you make a mistake or you wrong somebody, I think that it calls for recognition, it calls for admission. And I think that the faster you say sorry, and that to me is an apology, we are responsible for A, B, C, D” (26). Respondent 22, above, implies that there are additional steps after acknowledgement and apology, a very important theme that I discuss near the end of this chapter. With the relationship between these two processes established, I now discuss respondents’ views on the functions, features and obstacles/limits of apology and acknowledgement as processes of reparations.
The Functions of Apology and Acknowledgement

I do not discuss apologies and acknowledgements separately in this chapter, as many respondents maintained that apology and acknowledgement have similar functions. Respondents believed that these symbolic processes carried various pragmatic consequences.

*The Importance of the Public Record*

For a majority of the respondents, one of the most important functions of apology and acknowledgement was that through them, wrongs could be acknowledged and, more importantly, facts could be set straight on the public record. Many respondents expressed a desire for a public acknowledgement of the wrongs perpetrated against Africa, seeking a formal acknowledgement of who did what. Speaking with regard to colonialism, one Kenyan, a programme officer with a human rights organization, said: “they [responsible nations] should not look at colonialism as an accident, they should not look at it as a small grief that they caused...[those] they colonized, but they should acknowledge that...those were wrong policies because of the harm that they cost to people who fell victims” (32). A Ghanaian graduate student similarly added, “there’s a need for general acknowledgement that there was something that no one can really say...was a positive development” (40). There was thus a call for responsible nations and organizations to formally acknowledge the fact that their predecessors had a role in harming Africa.

When asked about how an acknowledgement and/or apology should take place, numerous respondents stressed making them public, “big news” (27). Respondents wanted statements from governmental leaders, such as the Prime Minister of England or the President of the United States of America, and governmental organizations, like the British Parliament or American Congress. They also felt it important that these statements occur on an international level, or at least on a level where all people of Africa would be privy to the fact that an apology or acknowledgement had been made.

A quintessential difference between interpersonal apologies and apologies to the “Many” is that the former are almost exclusively private, while the latter are typically a public affair, as Tavuchis (1991) tells us:

When the call [for apology] comes from a collectivity...there is a subtle but telling change in emphasis and execution. Here the offender is summoned into a world of records, social bookkeeping, and punctiliousness in which the speech act itself, *qua* performance, becomes paramount...Thus the energies of the One are invested in display, and the overriding interest of the Many is to put the apology ‘on record,’ that is, to extract a public, chronicled recantation that restores those aspects of the collectivity’s integrity and honor called into question by the offense. (p. 71)
Thus through the public apology and acknowledgement, responsible nations can accept their historical role in harms committed by their predecessors and make that acceptance known. Respondents placed value on a public process because they saw a number of positive consequences stemming from it, as follows.

Relieving Psychological Burdens

The reparations literature emphasizes the positive effect of apology and acknowledgement on the psychological wellbeing of persons harmed by historical injustices. Govier and Verwoerd (n.d.), for example, assert that

the power and importance of apology lie in its potential to offer to victims a moral recognition or acknowledgement of their human worth and dignity [italics added]....To the extent that the feelings of hurt, injury, and humiliation persist, there remains some point in offering apologies in an attempt to address and soothe them. (pp. 1, 7; see also Cunningham, 1999; Govier & Verwoerd, 2002; Hamber, 2000; Howard-Hassmann, 2003)

Indeed, as I demonstrated in chapter three, some respondents felt that psychological scars stemming from historical harms still linger in the African population. Tsosie (2004) writes that “we cannot heal the future if we cannot honestly acknowledge the truth of the past” (p. 31). A few of our respondents shared this view and felt that apology and acknowledgement would help heal these scars. A Togolese, for example, believed that apology and acknowledgement could be “psychologically speaking, a healing process for both the offender and the person offended” (17).

Some of these respondents thought that through public apology and acknowledgement Africans could gain a better understanding of their history and their role in it, to foster the healing process. The Sudanese concerned about the consequences of the colonial divisions, for instance, felt that acknowledgement would “ease the tension, especially for the new generations of southern Sudanese who have no idea of knowledge of colonial rule” and who tend to blame the North for everything that is wrong (2). A South African academic similarly noted that apology might help change the “basic results of the colonial project[:]...installing in the subject the sort of idea of them being inferior” (41). The effects of apology and acknowledgement need not be limited to only those in Africa, however: a Liberian professor of political science at an American university noted that “the perception that the West holds of Africa is...[one] that denigrates, that looks down upon, that is negative and I think this [apology/acknowledgement] could begin moving us in the direction of something positive” (8). Thus these respondents believed that the act of public apology and acknowledgement would play a role in altering the African psyche. If we assume that apologies and acknowledgement would bring beneficial psychological effects, then the publicity aspect has practical importance:
without widespread knowledge that the apology and/or acknowledgement occurred, such potential beneficial psychological effects would not be possible.

*Preventing Repetition*

Recall that guarantees of non-repetition of harms are a central feature in definitions of reparations (e.g., Bassiouni, 2000; van Boven, 2001). O’Neill (1999) makes the important point that as public, global expressions, international apologies necessarily constrain future assertions and behaviour. For a number of our respondents, public apology and acknowledgement brought hope that the past harms could never again be perpetrated. In this way, respondents situated the guarantee of non-repetition in public apology and acknowledgment. For a Congolese man, it was imperative to recognize these past harms as wrong, “because if it was not wrong that means it might happen again” (27). Similarly, a Togolese said:

Legally it is... very important [to] define stealing as a crime. Whoever steals something doesn’t do anything wrong but if you make a law prohibiting stealing then you can prosecute somebody for stealing. So apology is halfway in between. Once you say what they have done is wrong then doing it again is even more wrong. (17)

Thus for these particular respondents, the processes of amending the public record and acknowledging past harms would cultivate a situation where these past harms could not be repeated. We again see the importance of the public record here because without the publicity, the positive consequences of the statements could not be realized. This is especially true for non-elite Africans, who, as I have said before, are not overly, if at all, cognizant of the reparations issue. If the processes are not a matter of public record, then there can be no psychological effect nor any effect on future relations. For these processes to have any pragmatic effect, it must be widely known that they have indeed taken place.

*Processes as Starting Point*

Rigby (2001) asserts that through apology, “opinion leaders can open up the symbolic space where victims and survivors can begin to cast the past in a new light, relinquishing the quest to settle old scores, and begin to focus on the future” (p. 188). Indeed, about one third of respondents explicitly envisioned apology and acknowledgement as starting points, or as stepping stones, to a more complete reparation process. Again, such a view is implicit in a greater number of respondents’ views, as I discuss later in this chapter.

For a South African student, acknowledgement meant that an offending nation could no longer ignore its past misdeeds: “if you behave as though you don’t recognize...that your actions...had consequences in the past, then you can continue to disregard and behave as though there aren’t consequences or as if you don’t care about
those consequences” (4). One of her compatriots, an academic at a South African university, shared a similar view: “on a political level that [acknowledgement] might be seen by politicians...as a significant step forward...that Western governments are willing to also engage with Africa within the context of the historical context” (41). In this sense, apologies and acknowledgements signified the beginning of a process of atoning or amending past injustices.

But I cannot emphasize enough that our respondents saw these processes as simply the beginning of a larger process. Mazrui put it this way: “I would regard it [apology] as a start, really; I wouldn’t regard it as the climax of a process” (24). A Liberian professor referred to the processes as “significant point[s] of departure...where we need to start” (8) and a Zambian with a human rights organization said, “The premises of acknowledgement placed: we committed a wrong so how should we move together? How can you help me to better my life but not exploit me again?” (12). Such views are consistent with Barkan’s (2003) contention that “an apology does not mean the dispute is resolved, but is...a first step: part of the process of negotiation, but not the satisfactory end result” (p. 98). I discuss this centrally important theme again in the last section of this chapter.

In sum, our respondents’ comments demonstrate that the processes of apology and acknowledge, as symbolic acts, also carry practical significance. And this practical significance may have a more important role to play in international apologies, where the injustices are generally more serious than harms under the traditional purview of interpersonal apology.

Obstacles and Limitations of Apology and Acknowledgement

While the majority of respondents supported the notion of apologies and acknowledgement as reparations, a few respondents demonstrated some hesitancy about them for the reasons I discuss below.

Political Realities

Present political realities made some doubt the likelihood of an apology or an acknowledgement from the offending parties, be they nations or organizations. A Zimbabwean development officer with a Canadian organization, for example, said that while an apology would be a good thing, it “would probably be asking for too much....When you hit somebody, you need to apologize, it’s natural relations. But, because of the politics, maybe the African continent would be asking for too much, I

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25 In the sense that historical injustices typically involve some type of large-scale gross human rights violation. I do not mean to diminish here cases of interpersonal apologies surrounding major events, for example, a murder, but I do wish to differentiate them from apologies for minor, daily events, like accidentally breaking someone’s vase.
don’t know” (28). A South African who works in a law clinic associated likelihood of action with what she perceived as global systemic racism:

I believe deeply that white lives...are more important to Western governments than black lives. It’s a reflection I have working with refugees and it reflects a parallel for me that...in my work with refugees you find that during the Kosovo and Bosnian crises there were discussions in the media and from human rights...groups that governments in the West were spending about $80 per person in that particular crisis in comparison to the DRC [Democratic Republic of Congo] where the amount they were spending per person was something like $8. This reflection of the discrepancy of life and for me the fact that they weren’t willing to apologize for colonialism and they weren’t willing to acknowledge the role of the west in underdeveloping...Africa...[is a] reflection of basically black lives and black people are not important as important as white lives and white people. (6)

Likewise, a Liberian academic saw a “preoccupation with other things at the present time” (8) and a Tanzanian lecturer believed that responsible nations would not wish to “lose face” by making a public apology or acknowledgement (13).

Political realities play an important role in the prospects of apology and acknowledgement as a starting point for reparations. Certainly, opening up discussion on past injustices and what can be done about them is an effective starting point to achieving more complete reparations. The unanswered issue here, however, is simply this: What is the impetus for apology and/or acknowledgement from the outset? In other words, what are the necessary steps for getting to the point where apology and acknowledgement are a possibility? There needs to be, essentially, a “starting point for the starting point” and political realities are certainly relevant in this aspect. In this particular case they are detrimental.

Tavuchis (1991) argues that

an apology is emblematic of the offender’s socially liminal, ambiguous status that places him precariously between exclusion (actual or threatened) and rehabilitation....The crucial concern of an apology is...with the reclamation and revalidation of [the rights and obligations] enjoyed prior to the discreditable transgression. (p. 31)

This definition implies willingness or a desire of the offending party to apologize to gain back the social acceptance of the offended party, and it implies a scenario of power sharing where the offended appears to have more power than the offender.

Such a definition, however, does not accurately reflect the political reality in reparations to Africa. In this situation, it is clearly the offending parties—i.e., Western
countries and organizations—that possess the power and the offended party—i.e., Africa—which does not. It is therefore the offended party which seeks inclusion, not the other way around. Thus this is not a case of the West wanting to apologize so that it can once again be accepted by Africa; this is a case of the weaker, offended party asking the stronger parties for an apology. Indeed, it is the weaker party that is excluded. It is an ironic scenario if one takes as true the assertion that the West grew strong by exploiting Africa, consequently making it a weaker world power (e.g., Mazrui, 1999; Rodney, 1974). Such political realities make for quite an obstacle in the processes of “getting to the starting point.” More generally, this problem emphasizes the sometimes forgotten role of power differentials in the likelihood of an apology. An injustice may not always necessarily place the offender in a position where the offender needs to regain “acceptance.” It will be up to a social movement for reparations, of course, to create the conditions where a “starting point” becomes a feasible possibility.

Legal Implications

A few respondents identified another obstacle to getting to apology and acknowledgement: the potential for legal ramifications to the offending party making such statements. Govier and Verwoerd (2002) remark that public, international apologies “may carry implications of legal liability or a duty to compensate victims” (p. 77). Tavuchis (1991) notes that in the corporate world, any organization that publicly announced an apology for its role in an injustice “would certainly be subject to subsequent legal liabilities and penalties” (p. 43) and thus he continues,

because an apology necessarily acknowledges admission and fault...it is likely to be interpreted as acceptance of liability and grounds for compensation....The point here is that once we leave the interpersonal...domain ruled by conscience and an earnest desire for reconciliation, the legal economy imposes a logic that allocates the debits of material damages or punishment and the credits of formal satisfaction or forgiveness. Given these cultural and judicial facts of life, to apologize sincerely is a potentially stupid and costly gesture, especially when the offence is a serious one. (pp. 94-95)²⁶

Certainly some of the respondents shared this idea, including Ajayi, who said, “Americans are always very wary of acknowledging because there’s so much [to] leave them open to litigation and therefore they are not willing to acknowledge” (3). One South African, a senior lecturer in historical studies, believed “many of them [offending parties] would acknowledge if it weren’t for repercussions that follow that acknowledgement” (9). And a Nigerian academic, now a professor in Canada, observed “almost a consistent attempt to shy away from actually making a full apology....Maybe

²⁶ On the legal aspects of apology in the USA and Japan more generally, see Wagatsuma and Rosett (1986, pp. 478-488), especially the sections on “Apology as Admission” and “Apology and Liability” (pp. 483-488).
the political leaders are leery of legal implications but it’s becoming a trend, they talk about the evils of...the A-word” (11).

These arguments against the likelihood of apology link back to the problem of “getting to the starting point.” Indeed, a “spontaneous” apology or acknowledgement from an offending country or organization would leave the parties open to some sort of legal obligation and would therefore seem to be unlikely.\(^{27}\) A better approach might be to envision apology and acknowledgement as part of an organized, cooperative agreement or reparations settlement, where apologies become more plausible. For instance, if some sort of “world conference” on reparations were convened to orchestrate a settlement, and there was agreement by offending nations on how reparations would be shaped, then an apology or acknowledgement could be made, within the boundaries set out in the agreement, without the threat of further legal obligation. So while an isolated, spontaneous apology or acknowledgement by offending parties does seem unlikely, an apology or acknowledgement does not seem so unfeasible within a set reparations agreement, nor need it be a “stupid” venture as Tavuchis suggests. The responsibility thus falls, again, to the organization of a social movement to ensure this happens.

**The Need for Commitments Beyond Words**

Osabu-Kle (2000a) reproached former US President Bill Clinton for a (so-called) apology he made to Africa during a tour of Uganda because “without commitment to reparation, President Clinton’s apology...is totally unacceptable” (pp. 346-347).\(^{28}\) A similar theme pervaded a majority of the respondents’ discussions on apologies and acknowledgement: they desired practical action beyond simply the words of a statement. This was an idea that respondents typically raised independently. Connecting back to the emphasis respondents put on acknowledgement and apology as starting points, they placed great importance on the need for action to accompany any such statements. A Tanzanian lecturer summed up well this view: “The problem is to act. Action speaks louder than words....I am not interested in a verbal apology, I am interested in the economic apology” (13). Dudley Thompson (1999), in his writing, also promotes this view: “We say, yes, of course we forgive you, but we will not forget. *After confession comes atonement* [italics added].”

Notwithstanding the smaller number of respondents who explicitly saw the importance of apology and acknowledgement as a starting point, some respondents intimately connected the combination of apology, acknowledgement *and* commitments

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\(^{27}\) I am making a large assumption in this statement, but the facts remain that there has been no formal apology or acknowledgement by Western nations of their historical injustices in Africa and, to my knowledge, there are no immediate plans to do so.

\(^{28}\) During a 1998 tour of Africa, Clinton is said to have apologized for the slave trade as well as Western inaction during the Rwandan genocide (see Ryle, 1998 for commentary; see Clinton 1998a; 1998b for his actual addresses). Power (2001) asserts that the Rwandan “apology” was really a “carefully hedged acknowledgment.”
beyond those words with the perceived sincerity of the apology. For example, when asked about how apologizing nations might demonstrate genuine repentance in reparations, Ajayi responded, “If they’re willing to follow...it up by taking some action” (3). An ambassador said similarly, “I link the apology to...how they [former colonial powers] can come in and help with the general easement of the people....That should show that they are committed and that their apology was sincere” (1). A South African graduate student added, “if the symbolic dimension...means anything at all it has to go along with very substantive measurable changes in the lives of the greatest number of people....it’s dreadfully easy to draw on the language of sentiment to say ‘I’m sorry’, it can often be a cheap form of rhetoric” (4).

True reparations must encompass both acknowledgement and compensation; for at least one respondent, reparations could not be seen as genuine in the absence of either, as this Ghanaian, an assistant professor of law in Canada, put it:

Otherwise whatever money came out is not reparations. Reparations I think goes hand in hand with...making good, acknowledging that something was wrong and therefore making that good in whatever way; otherwise it’s no different than say giving donations or just aid to an ailing country, or whatever. There is a need to acknowledge what it is, what you are sorry for or what you think you should be trying to make good would be a necessary step of acknowledgement. (16)

On the other hand, a small minority of respondents were of the view that apology itself was sufficient as reparation. An ambassador advanced his country’s position:

If you feel that you have been wronged and someone says sorry, even if there’s...nothing that follows that somehow it does help to feel like the person doesn’t think, ‘Oh well, you know, we were just smarter than they were and we continue to be,’ that sort of thing and, ‘to hell with them, you can suffer I don’t care.’ You feel like the person realizes...we’re all human and what happened we shouldn’t ignore it was wrong and we wouldn’t want that [to] happen again. That’s the kind of thing you feel when someone apologizes. (29)

The role of actual compensation and/or “reparation” has an ambivalent place in the reparations literature. There is some sense in the literature that commitments beyond words are optional processes of reparations. Cunningham (1999), for example, concludes that

the case for apology is most convincing on the grounds that it has the potential to improve relations between groups if the apology...is sincere and is acceptable to the recipients....Reparations, in money or goods, may follow from this; but in practice reparation has occurred independently from apology. (p. 291)
Tavuchis (1991) likewise submits that “What is critical...is the very act of apology itself rather than the offering of material or symbolic restitution” (p. 22; see also Govier & Verwoerd, 2002; Torpey, 2003a). On the other hand, Minow (1998) notes that “unless accompanied by direct and immediate actions...that manifest responsibility for the violation, the official apology may seem superficial, insincere, or meaningless” (p. 116) and Barkan (2000) asks, “unless accompanied by material compensation or restitution, does not the apology merely whitewash the injustice?” (p. 323; see also Govier & Verwoerd, 2002; Govier & Verwoerd, n.d.; Torpey, 2003a; Wagatsuma & Rosett, 1986)

The majority of respondents clearly agreed with the latter view: for them, apologies must be accompanied by some form of compensation as support. Viable and acceptable reparations required measures to address the contemporary situations of deprivation in Africa. The action beyond the apologies and acknowledgements is not optional. Absent such measures, it seems that most respondents might see Western apology as a “politics of gesture” (Cunningham, 1999, p. 288), a method of “assuag[ing] white guilt without providing a concrete remedy” (Howard-Hassmann, 2003, p. 204). On a more practical level, a number of respondents felt that these commitments beyond words would make the reparations process more apparent to non-elite Africans. Through such views we find support of the respondents’ “rehabilitative” outlook towards reparations. This idea becomes clearer in the next section, where I demonstrate the links between the type of compensation respondents desire and the political, economic and socio-cultural realities in contemporary Africa.

As a concluding point, I want to address some debate in the reparations literature about institutions and their “abilities” to apologize. The question is twofold: (1) whether an institution or organization can rightly apologize for a past offence and (2) whether an institution or organization can make a “sincere” apology. The answer to the former question is covered quite well in the reparations literature, and it did not raise much concern among the respondents with the exception of the generational responsibility issue I discussed in an earlier chapter. For the latter problem, however, the respondents’ views present a compelling and theoretically interesting contribution to the question.

In the first instance, related to the generational responsibility issue, there is some question about whether a person with no connection to past harmful acts can offer an apology for those acts. A South African academic, for example, had the following concern:

In the United States...[there] is a huge historic divide at a point between those who were for and against slavery. Those who come out of antislavery traditions wouldn’t make much...it doesn’t have the same meaning to apologize. For people who I would say identify with the South and its historic traditions to say it’s much more meaningful and would be much more powerful than those who come from the New England tradition which was always antislavery and which adopted those arguments long ago....What does it mean for people like myself

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who were the children, grandchildren, immigrants to the United States long after the slavery period...and...people [who] grew up as Italian-Americans or whatever, what do they, I mean its not really part of their consciousness in that sort of way. So I don’t know, I don’t think it [apology] goes very far. (10)

The answer rests in suspending notions of personal responsibility and instead looking to institutional responsibility. One must keep in mind that states and organizations are “social inventions or creations....intangible bodies formally founded and sustained by human purposes, efforts, and discourse but with an independent existence, history, and identity as defined by custom or law” (Tavuchis, 1991, p. 99), and they cannot speak for themselves. These organizations, however, do have people who can speak on their behalf, and on behalf of their history as an organization. Thus the emphasis lies upon the spokesperson of the organization, who is apologizing not as an individual for his or her own wrongs, but rather as a spokesperson for the institution and its past misdeeds. Govier and Verwoerd (2002) explain this idea well:

An individual who speaks for an institution and apologizes may himself or herself have had little or nothing to do with the wrongful acts in question [italics added]....but what is most important, in the context of an institutional apology, is that person’s status as spokesperson for that institution....A collectivity can act, and be responsible for acts, without every individual in it being personally implicated....What is crucial is that the apology acknowledge wrongdoing and thereby also acknowledge the human dignity and legitimate feelings of those wronged. (pp. 76, 74)

From this perspective, then, there is no necessity for “hairsplitting” on who is responsible for issuing an apology, or who can “rightly” or appropriately do so: an organization or institution can issue an apology through a representative spokesperson without the spokesperson or every person of the nation or organization being personally responsible for the past harms.

There is a related dispute of whether or not institutions and organizations can express sorrow or regret in their apologies. Tavuchis (1991), for example, maintains that “corporations and similarly constituted collectivities are sociopathic: they are incapable, on the whole, of acknowledging regret and expressing remorse” (p. 43). He cites a number of examples of corporate and institutional apologies, and argues that “what is not immediately evident in these examples and in others...is anything that could unequivocally be construed as sorrow or remorse” (p. 108). He concludes, then, that “the principal function of the apology—all collective apology, for that matter—has little, if anything, to do with sorrow or sincerity but rather with putting things on a public record” (p. 117). Govier and Verwoerd (2002) also assert a somewhat similar view: “whether or not a collective institution can in any sense feel sorrow or regret [italics in original], it is clear that it can...acknowledge wrongdoing....They have the power to issue official
statements and documents, and to establish memorials and compensation programs” (p. 74).

Granted that the public record is important, as I have already shown, these arguments are restrictive because they neglect the subjective side of an apology. They place too much emphasis on “objective” displays of remorse and sorrow, but do not give much consideration to how the recipients of an apology define or perceive sorrow and remorse. Some of our respondents linked the sincerity, remorse and sorrow of an apology or acknowledgement with an institutions’ or organizations’ commitments to action beyond those statements. From this standpoint, an organization or institution can in fact demonstrate sorrow, remorse and sincerity in the apology by providing action beyond the words.

More generally speaking, we should not consider notions of sincerity, remorse and sorrow as embodied in the act of apology itself, but rather in the social actor’s reaction to that act of apology. In this way, institutional apologies can convey remorse and sorrow, to the extent that they are comprised of factors that the recipients of the apology come to define as representing remorse and sorrow. Therefore, in deciding whether or not an apology is sincere, we must move away from solely external judgments of sincerity, remorse and regret in apologies and instead consider how the recipient of the apology understands, defines and perceives them. W. I. Thomas’ classic sociological dictum, “If men [sic] define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas & Thomas, 1928/1970, p. 572), is instructive here: notions of sincerity, remorse and regret exist in the recipients’ subjective definition of the situation, and not so much in the act itself.

Brooks (1999a) intimates a similar view, when he maintains that “responses that seek atonement for the commission of an injustice” (p. 8) are an example of remorseful redress. In any case, the onus once again falls upon a social movement to orchestrate a reparations settlement which will permit them some latitude of perceived sincerity and remorse. Otherwise, reconciliation may not be a possibility in the absence of some concrete evidence of sincerity of the apology and acknowledgement.

In sum, I demonstrated in this chapter that, with a few differences, international apologies operate much like interpersonal apologies. On both levels, they function as attempts to fix ruptured relationships and effect reconciliation. In the case of reparations to Africa, however, there is a special burden placed on a social movement to start these processes of reconciliation, given the extreme political and power differences between the offended and offending parties.

In this chapter I showed that our respondents wanted some form of commitments beyond the words of any potential statements of apologies or acknowledgement that offending parties might offer. The obvious subsequent matter to consider is how those commitments should take shape, which I take up in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 5: BEYOND APOLOGIES AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: COMPENSATING AFRICA

In this chapter, I discuss how respondents wanted potential reparations shaped and how they worked through some central issues in this process. I also highlight what the extant advocacy literature says about compensation issues and, again, I demonstrate how and where respondents’ views support and expand current theoretical writing on reparations as compensation. To conclude this chapter, I elaborate on how the respondents demonstrated a “rehabilitative” outlook towards reparations.

Shaping the Commitments beyond Words

We asked respondents how Africa might be compensated through reparations, including a specific question about the direction of any potential financial compensation. Their responses called for reparations to two main areas: African economy, and African society and culture.

I want to preface this discussion with a brief conceptual note about the terms “financial” and “monetary” compensation. There is some sense in the literature that financial or monetary compensation in reparations necessarily means cash payments to individuals or lump sums of dollars. Ajayi (2002), for example, maintains that reparations should not be “monetary compensation” but rather “programmes of necessary reforms…to provide the infrastructure of transportation, communication, higher education, legitimacy and good governance” (p. 5). In a similar way, Brooks (1999a) subdivides reparations into “monetary” and “nonmonetary” responses (p. 9). Brooks offers no examples of monetary reparation, but indicates that nonmonetary measures include “amnesty, affirmative action,…the construction of new medical facilities or…new educational programs” (p. 9). I am not convinced that financial or monetary compensation has to equate to lump sum, cash payments, nor do I agree that actions like building hospitals or creating new educational programs are “nonmonetary” in all cases.

Instead, I envision monetary compensation as any sort of investment in reparations by offending parties. These types of reforms require a financial investment by the offending parties, but not necessarily a lump sum or individual payment. I therefore define the terms “financial” and “monetary” compensation more broadly. As the following discussion shows, this is congruent with respondents’ views on the issue.

Economic Reparations

The advocacy literature most commonly emphasizes reparations as efforts to help Africa’s economic development (see, e.g., Abiola, 1992; Ajayi, 2002; Chinweizu, 1993; First Pan-African Conference on Reparations, 1993/2002; Mazrui, 1999; Mazrui, 2002a; Mazrui, 2002c; Thompson, 1999). In chapter three, I outlined how respondents conceptualized the economic injustices perpetrated against Africa both historically and
presently. Not surprisingly, respondents talked about reparations to address these economic harms through practical changes in the present. Often they rooted this discussion in the need for changes to how Africa participates—or does not—in the global economy. Respondents shared much support for efforts to make trade policies with Africa more equitable as a method of reparations. A Kenyan with a human rights organization put it this way:

When we look at the...globalization of the economy by the West and the effect that it has had on poor people in Africa and Asia....We feel that there is a moral responsibility that should rest on the West to pursue more equitable, more humane and economic policies than those that tend to dominate the economies of the Third World, those that tend to have an imbalance...[in] their relationship in commerce and where in the final analysis you find that all the benefit comes to the West and very little...goes to African countries. And one [may] look at it from many perspectives, for example...that there is a rush for corporations to up their production in Africa not because they’re interested in the economy for this country but because there is a lot of position that Africa has in international affairs makes it easier to exploit cheap labour in Africa, it makes it possible to get raw materials cheaply in Africa. (32)

There was also support for changing trade tariffs and subsidies for Western farmers, which some felt were extremely damaging to national economies. Recall, for example, the South African academic I discussed in chapter three and her story that it is cheaper to buy imported cheese than locally produced cheese in South Africa. Emanating from comments about the “superficial independence” of their countries, some respondents promoted the idea of allowing Africa greater economic independence, including less foreign influence on price-setting and exports in African countries. Over one third of respondents also wanted help with African infrastructure to promote an improved economy, including money to build and repair roads and railways, and efforts to help communication within and from Africa (including the Internet). For example, a Kenyan development worker associated communication difficulties with unfair competition in the global economy:

We do not tread on an equal footing....If I give an example, something like communication, in Kenya to surf the Internet you pay a lot of money...therefore you limit the time that you surf the Internet but when I came to Canada it takes me a second to surf the internet, get all the information that I need....[It is] the same case with the telecommunications: the use of the telephone in Africa is very expensive...but here [Canada] it is very easy, very cheap. (14)

The advocacy literature also discusses at length the need for debt cancellation as a method of reparation. For example, article 7 of the Accra Declaration reads: “...there is no African ‘debt’; therefore the AWRRTC demands that the current so-called ‘international debt owed’ by Africa and all countries of African slave descendants, be
unconditionally cancelled” (African World Reparations and Repatriation Truth Commission, 1999/2002, p. 141). Over half of respondents also supported the cancellation of debts for loans from international lending agencies like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. A Kenyan with an education rights organization supported this call by placing the issue on the moral plane:

I [see] compensation in terms of the debt burden....After all the injustices, and after African people...fought for their independence, that the West still has the audacity to claim that Africa owes them so much in terms of debts, in terms of money that has been spent by lenders of funds, that have been invited between governments, in terms of funds that are given to the World Bank and to the IMF. It is inhuman...if that person owes you money, and you went to ask for your money back and you found the person went without food. It is inhuman and immoral to insist that you must be paid for your money. So I see the reparations in terms of debts cancellations. (26)

For some respondents, debt relief would help foster equality in global relations. A Zambian with a human rights organization, for example, said, “We are indebted to the very people that colonized us. If anything at all, let them keep their money but we say, whatever we owe we bring it to zero. Then...we start from level ground. The ground must be leveled” (12). For Eminent Person Dudley Thompson, debt relief also represented a method of “even[ing] the playing field” (39). Similarly, others felt that debt relief would encourage both economic and social development because funds could be directed to those areas, instead of to debt repayment; for example, one Tanzanian, a general director of an NGO, said about funds allocated to debt service: “this money could be used for other social activities” (30).

Stiglitz (2003) discusses the notion of “odious debts,” which are defined as “debts incurred by a regime without political legitimacy, from creditors who should have known better, with the monies often spent to oppress the very people who are then asked to repay the debts” (p. 39).29 A few respondents felt it was unfair that Africans should suffer for loans obtained by corrupt officials. A Ghanaian student put it this way: “the IMF had a very cozy...relationship with our former leader at a time that the man was deeply involved in human right abuse, nobody really raised any question mark or complained bitterly about it and...[they] gave him huge money because according to them it [the Ghanaian economy] was a success story” (40).

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29 As examples of “odious rulers and odious debts,” Stiglitz (2003) cites Cold War loans during Mobutu’s reign in Congo that went to his bank accounts and the Ethiopian “Red Terror” regime which used loaned money to buy arms “used to kill the very people whose friends and relatives must now repay the loans” (p. 42). Leftwich (1993) notes that western governments have regularly provided aid to authoritarian regimes including Argentina, Chile (under Augusto Pinochet), Iran and South Korea, as well as corrupt governments like Iraq, Zaire, Haiti and many sub-Saharan African countries (p. 606).
Some respondents wanted debt cancellation to have conditions attached, so as to prevent a recurrence of the above problem. A lecturer in Botswana, for example, said, “Sometimes you need to have strings attached, as it were, to make sure that the money isn’t just going to a Swiss bank account” (38). Similarly, an Ethiopian academic added, “Scratch out [outstanding debts] but at the same time you might...put conditionality...[on] what we’re going to spend the money with....If Ethiopia owed 20 billion dollars you might want them to invest it not in armaments, which they’ve been doing the last few years” (42).

Eminent Person Mazrui, however, did not advocate debt relief. As Mazrui put it, he is “less persuaded” by debt relief due to a “sneaking suspicion the debts will never be paid anyhow” (24). On the whole, however, there was support for debt relief as reparations, as well as the other forms of support to Africa. These sorts of calls for economic reparations reflect solutions for contemporary injustices to Africa which our respondents linked back to historical injustices, as I demonstrated in an earlier chapter.

A majority of respondents overwhelmingly talked about reparations to address what a Liberian academic called Africa’s “human needs” (8). The most common request was for efforts to aid education and health care services in Africa. For an Angolan, these areas were the “keys for development of society as a whole” (7). Some respondents saw poverty as a major problem and welcomed reparations for the deplorable African social situation, as for this Zimbabwean development officer:

I think the most pressing challenge in Africa is poverty. Our people need to be helped to get out of poverty. There is too much poverty. And how to do that I think is the question that everyone is debating at the moment. So, whether you do that through educating people or whether you provide them [with] good health or whether you give them water or you teach them how to do productive agriculture or how you provide them with infrastructure....But I think tackling the question of poverty is the most important challenge for me. (28)

Indeed, one Kenyan involved with a peace organization wanted reparations to invest money in these areas for what she called the “project of repairing” Africa (15). In these ways, respondents wanted reparations to address problems in African society.

**Social and Cultural Reparations**

I noted in chapter three that some respondents lamented cultural losses during slavery and colonialism. We asked respondents specifically about typical measures for achieving this goal, including constructing monuments and museums, and returning cultural artifacts to Africa.

Just over half of respondents had positive views on the benefits of rebuilding and restoring African cultural history through museums and monuments. However, while there was support for these cultural reparations, I should preface this section by noting

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that many respondents imposed priorities on them. A number of them took the view that reparations should serve basic priorities first, like economic and social deprivation. A Kenyan activist put it this way:

What benefit is a monument if people go without food? If people in the thousands are dying of AIDS-related infections, what monument are you making? Are you making monuments for [a] starving population, people going without clothing, people who walk naked? (26)

Eminent Person Dudley Thompson also shared the view that museums and monuments should be a low priority: “I do not place much value upon cold monuments; I’d rather see a live student” (39). Some respondents, then, saw cultural reparations as “luxuries,” to be considered only after “the first priority…to save the life of people” (21). Indeed, just under two-thirds of respondents had negative views towards such types of reparations, a total which encompasses some of those with positive views towards them, and even some who lamented the cultural losses of colonialism. This again reflects the primacy respondents placed on reparations as a method of addressing various forms of contemporary suffering. Nonetheless, our respondents did envision positive aspects of cultural reparations, whether or not they believed they were a high priority.

Monuments and museums can “embody memories” (Jelin, 1998, p. 26). They are “an integral part of the process of building identities, both at the individual and the collective levels” (Jelin, 1998, p. 24; see also Barkan, 2000; Barkan, 2002; Human Rights Watch, 2001; Torpey, 2003a). In addition to transmitting memory through generations, monuments and museums can serve as a form of public censure for past misdeeds; share direct and indirect experiences; and function as historical documents for the future (Jelin, 1998).

Indeed, just over one third of respondents felt that museums and monuments act as a reminder of the past, as a Zimbabwean put it: “[museums and monuments are] very important to people’s history…and remembering that this happened. And it helps avoid the same thing happening again” (29). These symbolic forms of reparations were important because through them, Africans could have a better sense of their history and their future, as this Tanzanian, a lawyer, put it:

I think it is important that any people, any group of people should know where it comes from because from knowing about it you can, you reflect yourself and other people and you may define yourself when you are put together with other people and of course you can determine your future by knowing where you’re coming from. (22)

Respondents also felt that museums and monuments would be helpful for educating present and future African generations, as a Liberian academic, resident in the USA, pointed out:
What they [museums and monuments] do is they educate and they remind each time we commemorate. We have this Holocaust Museum, for example, it serves a significantly important, to me. It reminds the world and the Jewish people and everybody else about what has happened and therefore the need to ensure that that which has happened will never happen again....That is basically to educate the world about what was there, what has happened and who these people really are rather than the portrayal of them which is what I think the problem is the portrayal of them in the state of relative decay....So I think it’s extremely important for this educational project to be on the ticket.30 (8)

In a similar way, a Moroccan felt that museums and monuments would help Africans “interiorize” their own history and culture (25). Thus for these respondents, museums and monuments would play a positive role in helping rebuild African cultural history and traditions, both in Africa and abroad.

Some writers in the advocacy literature emphasize the necessity of returning cultural property stolen from Africa. Gifford (1993), for example, writes that the “reparation process must include the restoration of identifiable treasures to the country which most closely represents the people from whom they were robbed.” The Africa Reparations Movement has been involved in efforts to return the Benin Bronzes, looted in 1897 from the Oba of Benin, which now rest in the Museum of Mankind in London, England (Soni, n.d.). This group maintains that “in the true sense of justice and self-determination [sic], the Benin artifacts belong to the culture from where they were deprived from—they symbolise a historical and social significance which the aesthetic and monetary value they hold in exile would never compensate” (Soni, n.d.).31 Likewise, the Association for the Return of the Maqdala Ethiopian Treasures (AFROMET) advocates the return of “priceless treasures looted during the British invasion of the country [Ethiopia] in 1867-8” (AFROMET, n.d.-c; on the history of the treasures and the looting, see Pankhurst, n.d.; Pankhurst, 1985). Their most recent statistics indicate that nine items have been returned while 468 are still missing.32

There are some other recent instances of the return of cultural property taken from Africa. In May of 2002, France returned the remains of Saartje Baartman (derogatorily known as “Hottentot Venus”) to South Africa. Baartman was a southern Africa woman taken from her country in the early 1800s to be part of a circus “freak” show in France.33

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30 Three respondents lamented the fact that while there is a Holocaust museum in Washington, DC, there is no comparable museum to commemorate slavery, in which the USA played a greater role than in the Holocaust. As Robinson (2000) put it, “one can scour the commemorative architecture of the nation’s capital and find little evidence that America’s racial holocaust ever occurred” (p. 33). In November 2003, the US Senate passed a bill to construct a national museum of Africa-American culture in Washington, although it is not expected to open before 2013 (for more on this museum, see Corwell, 2003).

31 See Africa Reparations Movement (n.d.) for their index of other “hijacked African treasures.”

32 Returned items include tabots (consecrated altar slabs), manuscripts and royal regalia. For a complete list of returned items, see AFROMET (n.d.-b); for a list of missing items, see AFROMET (n.d.-a). I do not know how recent these statistics are.
Her remains were on display in a French museum until the 1970s (see Allie, 2002; BBC News, 2002). In May of 2003, a German museum returned to Zimbabwe a soapstone sculpture of a bird pilfered from the Great Zimbabwe ruins (see BBC News, 2003b). In 2004, Italy was in the process of returning an obelisk taken from Ethiopia by Benito Mussolini in 1937 (see BBC News, 2003a; Freeman, 2003).

A large number of respondents supported the idea of returning cultural artifacts taken from Africa throughout history. For many respondents, the return of these artifacts was important because they are integral to African cultural history. As an Ethiopian academic put it, cultural artifacts should be returned “because it’s part of one’s own history and ethnicity, identity and all those kinds of issues” (42). A Zambian similarly said, “Give Caesar what belongs to Caesar. Those artifacts...should be returned to where they rightfully belong so that they are put in museums for future generations” (12). Two ambassadors also (independently) requested that documents relating to their countries’ history be returned from former colonial powers to preserve and maintain national cultural wealth and history (25, 33). Interestingly, even some respondents who held negative views towards museums and monuments felt strongly about the return of cultural artifacts, perhaps because of a perception that seeking the return of such items would not divert many funds from more pressing concerns.

Two respondents who supported the idea of the return of cultural artifacts did not frame the issue as “reparations” per se. Instead, they located the argument in a moral, legal field with the idea that if the artifacts were stolen from Africa, they should be returned because they were illegally obtained in the first place. “If the logic is they’re stolen,” said a Ghanaian graduate student, “you return something that is stolen so to my opinion I don’t find that reparation” (40). Some other respondents saw the economic potential, through tourism, of the return of artifacts to their home countries. A number of respondents expressed concern about the ability of African countries to properly preserve the artifacts, although, for at least one ambassador, this was a false excuse for not returning them (33). In his opinion, if preservation was such a great concern, the West could provide the proper technology to the African country in question. 33

A small minority of respondents, however, were of the opinion that leaving artifacts in foreign countries, such as in the British Museum, might actually be more advantageous to educate the West about African culture and history. A lecturer from Botswana said, “They [missing artifacts] have served a purpose in the West by educating people that wouldn’t go to Africa to see the glories of the African culture as it were....They’ve benefited Africa in ways in which if it stayed in the back bedroom of the chief’s hut maybe it wouldn’t ever be seen” (38). A Nigerian historian, now an assistant professor in Canada, shared a similar outlook: “I’ve had people who said, ‘Well I’ve seen Benin art work at the British Museum and I said I will visit Benin, I want to know where

33 For a discussion on preservation, conservation and cultural property restitution, see Barkan (2002, pp. 26-28).
those works came from.” And I think that’s a good thing” (11). Indeed, museums have claimed a similar defence in justifying their collections of pilfered objects (Barkan, 2002).

Barkan (2003) notes that “cultural property embodies the group national identity. Specific cultural objects in every society bear the mark of that society’s unique identity… the group’s identity is said to be invested in them” (p. 100; see also Barkan, 2002). Our respondents placed importance on reparations as a method of addressing social and cultural problems facing the contemporary African society. Like the economic reparations they desire, these demands for reparations emanate from present problems stemming from past injustices.

Directing Reparations: The Importance of the Collective Good

Some previous instances of reparations included individual reparation payments. Contrary to the popular understanding that reparations mean financial payments to individuals (Valls, 2004), many respondents indicated that reparations—financial or otherwise—should be directed at the “collective good.”

As I illustrated in the above discussion, most respondents wanted reparations directed towards social services, strengthening economies, debt cancellation, and, in some cases, to constructing commemorative buildings. Inherent in each of these desired forms of reparation is an emphasis on help for the collective—the community, the state, the continent—not the individual (although individuals would ultimately benefit from many of the collective reparations). A South African activist spoke explicitly about the importance of collective spending in this respect: “I see [it] as very, very important over and above individual reparations to people. I think if the money was supposed to be spent on individual reparations there would be too little and it would... really have no momentous impact” (6).

Few of the respondents, then, expressed a desire for individual payments for identifiable victims of slavery and colonialism, or their descendants. I suggest that, for this group of respondents at least, this lack of desire for individual reparations is a result of the large-scale suffering that Africa presently experiences. As Mazrui (2002a) notes, “the damage of enslavement and colonization does not lie in the past. The damage is here; the damage is now. Africa contains some of the most destitute societies of world [italics in original]” (p. 90). Mazrui’s statement is supported by the United Nations’

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34 These include German reparations to Jewish victims of the Nazis (United States Department of Justice Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 1996/1999); American (Daniels, 1991) and Canadian (Gall, Cheng, & Miki, 2001) reparations to persons of Japanese descent interned during World War II; and promised payments to victims of apartheid through the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Mkhize, 1997/1999).

35 It may indeed be the case that the desire for collective over individual reparations is a consequence of interviewing only “elite” Africans. “Ordinary” Africans might have very different views, but this issue is beyond our data.
indexes on human development (United Nations Development Programme, 2003), where African countries consistently rank low (and sometimes lowest) on measures of life expectancy, education and gross domestic product (pp. 237-240). Reparations to the collective permit changes at a macro-level which would not be possible at the individual level. For example, new hospitals cannot be built through individual payments, nor can trade relations be refashioned. This orientation may also result from the perceived futility of individual payments where deprivation and suffering is systemic. We can therefore understand reparations for the collective as the most logical and efficient method of managing such large-scale deprivation.

Seeking collective reparations overcomes a number of other problems often associated with individual reparation payments. Nuruddin (2002), for example, talks about the potential problems of giving condition-free reparations payments to people with what he calls “present time orientations”: he fears that the payments would be squandered without any real effect on deprivation, and he cites multi-million dollar lottery winners who send themselves to ruin as examples of this phenomenon (pp. 104-105; see also Conley, 2002). Collective payments also avoid difficulties individuals might experience trying to obtain their personal reparation payments. Kim (1999), for instance, notes that “scores of survivors who endured Nazi persecution have not received any share of reparations payments for their suffering, while many more have only received a mere pittance” (p. 77; see also Bazyler, 2001; Laremont, 2001). There still is, however, always the possibility of “state-squandering,” to which Chinweizu (1993) alludes, and the possibility that those responsible will not have the capacity to pay reparation amounts (Osabu-Kle, 2000a).

There is, nonetheless, some suggestion in the theoretical literature that collective reparations are not as important as individual reparations. For example, Hamber (2000; 2004; Hamber & Wilson, 2002), in his work on the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, argues that social development projects have “limited psychological impact on individuals who suffered the brunt of the direct brutality of apartheid violence. At an individual level, it will not work to substitute social reconstruction for individual reparations” (Hamber, 2000, p. 224). He continues that collective reparations should take a second place to individual reparations as the “physical and psychological impact of violence has to be addressed directly and individually if we are ever to deal with the traumas of the past and prevent cycles of revenge from emerging” (p. 224).

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36 The lowest ranked country is Sierra Leone. It has a life expectancy of 34.5 years, an adult literacy rate of 36% and a GDP per capita of US$470. Sub-Saharan Africa as an aggregate has a life expectancy of 46.5 years, an adult literacy rate of 62.4% and a GDP per capita of US$1831. By comparison, Norway, the top ranked country, has a life expectancy of 78.7 years, an adult literacy rate of approximately 99% and a GDP per capita of US$29 620 (United Nations Development Programme, 2003, pp. 240, 237). The data report 2001 levels.
It is obvious by now that our respondents would not agree with this view. This fact highlights the importance of the context of the reparations settlement. While both reparations for apartheid and slavery, colonialism, etc., deal with gross human rights injustices, they are very different contexts on a number of different planes, including timing, the possibility of identifying victims and perpetrators, and direct victimization. Apartheid is a more recent injustice than slavery and colonialism, it occurred for a more easily defined period of time, its victims are more easily identifiable and, indeed, many of its victims are still alive. On the contrary, in the case of African reparations (especially with regard to slavery), these boundaries cannot be so easily drawn. In this case, reparations are not necessarily directed towards the victims per se, but rather towards the descendants of the victims, thus rendering individual payments less important. Unlike the South African victims of apartheid, present generation Africans have not experienced the direct "brutality" of slavery. But as the effects of past injustices persist on the macro-level—the economic, social and cultural spheres—collective reparations are perhaps more necessary than individual payments to address them. The important point here is to recognize that the context of harm and reparations must be taken into account when discussing the importance of collective versus individual payments.

There is also some debate in the advocacy literature about setting a monetary "amount" owed to Africa for reparations. Some writers attempt to calculate an amount they feel is owed. The Accra Declaration argues that offending parties owe the equivalent of US$777 trillion principal with interest per annum at current market rate (African World Reparations and Repatriation Truth Commission, 1999/2002, pp. 140-141). Osabu-Kle (2000a) states that the "present value of reparation for human loss to Africa alone is $75,000 billion U.S. dollars or $75 trillion U.S. dollars," and, when all told, the minimum compensation due is $100 trillion US dollars (pp. 344-345).37

On the other hand, some writers feel that assigning a monetary amount on the injustices is an impossible task. Lord Gifford (1993) put it this way:

To put monetary figures on any of the elements of the claim raises questions to which I have no answers: how do you assess the value of the loss to an African people of a young person, kidnapped and transported over 200 years ago? What figure can be placed on the psychological damage inflicted by a system which is still deeply racist? (see also Loury, 2004; Satz, 2004)

Our respondents did not make any independent attempts at calculating a dollar figure owed to the continent (nor did we ask them to do so). Some, however, expressed the impossibility of doing so, agreeing that, as a Kenyan with a human rights organization

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37 To arrive at this amount, Osabu-Kle (2000a) estimated the lost African population due to the slave trade and multiplied that number by the US$75 000/person the Warsaw Convention allows for loss of life in a commercial airplane disaster. The Warsaw Convention amount is appropriate, says Osabu-Kle, because "the processes of slavery crashed the aircraft of life in which Mother Africa and her children were riding. Some Africans survived, others perished" (p. 344).
said, “It would be very hard to pay back what we have lost over all those years....We can’t get our people back. We can’t get probably the land back. We can’t go back to our traditional culture” (31). Those few respondents who did discuss individual reparations—never to the exclusion of collective reparations, however—did think that quantifying certain damages and identifying victims was possible. The key point, however, is that on the whole, our respondents made claims for reparations for the collective.

There is a related issue in the theoretical literature about whether financial compensation can be considered anything other than symbolic in itself. Hamber (2000) questions, again regarding the South African case, “whether the material reparations granted will dramatically change the life of the recipients. In essence, material reparations are merely another form of symbolic reparation” (p. 222). Similarly, Minow (1998) makes the point that “money remains incommensurable with what was lost. Even as an ideal, and certainly in practice, reparations fall short of repairing victims or social relationships after violence” (p. 103).

Again, the problem in these views lies in the equation of “material restitution” with individual reparation payments, or lump sum payments. When taking a broader definition of material restitution—as I do and as our respondents did, by using it to refer to development investments as part of reparations—this type of reparation moves away from the symbolic realm and towards the pragmatic one. Certainly, developmental reparations, like individual payments, cannot undo what was done nor fully compensate the harms, but they are more than simply symbolic: they offer a means through which macro-changes can be made with the goal of improving the economic, social and cultural realities of the offended parties.

Administering the Reparations: Who Should be in Charge?

An important issue in discussing financial reparations is, of course, who should be entrusted with the responsibility of administering reparation funds. A number of respondents spoke very critically of government corruption and were wary about trusting governments with any reparation dollars. A Nigerian, a professor at a Canadian university, put it this way: “That is the problem. I don’t trust any of the authorities to handle the money well. They have shown over and over that they are not to be trusted” (36). While a few respondents felt comfortable with governments administering the funds, others were concerned that the money would be abused and wasted on things like weapons, unnecessary commissions and “white elephant” infrastructure projects.

In response to these concerns, a “participatory” approach (19) to reparations, which would include input from Africans, was emphasized. “Part of the reparation,” said one Kenyan activist, “should be to help Africa’s people develop the mechanism to put in place a government of the people, a government that would be representative and would speak for the people and rule on behalf of the people” (26). Some talked about the
need to create an independent body for administering reparations, a body which would include input from a cross-section of the African population.

This call for an independent reparations body with African influence reflects a similar call in the advocacy literature. Article 4 of the Accra Declaration, for example, calls for compensation to be paid to a “Foundation, which will be administered by designated individuals” (African World Reparations and Repatriation Truth Commission, 1999/2002, p. 140; see also Abiola, 1992; African and African Descendant Caucus, n.d.; Ajayi, 2002; First Pan-African Conference on Reparations, 1993/2002; Gifford, 1993; Mazrui, 2002a; Thompson, 1999). In the African-American case, suggestions have been made for “legitimate” representative groups to supervise the administration of reparation funds (Pugh, 1999, p. 373; Baraka, cited in Nuruddin, 2002, p. 107).

Barkan (2000) notes that “government corruption has become a major argument against foreign aid, which often does not reach its intended beneficiaries” (p. 305). Our respondents attempted to circumvent this issue by calling for increased civil society involvement in the reparations administration process. At the same time, this call also reflects a larger desire for greater African influence in major decision-making bodies, as well as more democratic participation and accountability within Africa.

Reparations as Rehabilitation

When considering the various themes on African reparations as a whole, one central theme clearly emerges: the desire for reparations to empower Africans. While respondents sometimes disagreed about the importance of certain reparations over others, on the whole, it is clear that they desire reparations which would have some pragmatic effects. They are not seeking reparations solely on the symbolic level; they do not want reparations to merely acknowledge past mistakes and apologize for them. Nor do they desire reparation which would only build, for instance, a museum to commemorate the wrongs of slavery and colonialism. They do not want individual payments to address suffering on the micro-level. Instead, they call for reparations directed at the collective, to create a better Africa, economically, politically, socially and culturally. In short, they want reparations to develop and rehabilitate Africa. For these respondents, reparations are not symbolic tokens; they are a vehicle to empowerment, development and self-sufficiency.

I suggest, therefore, that our respondents characterize a “rehabilitative” outlook towards the issue of reparations, an outlook most likely related to the continuing suffering and deprivation in Africa. Because the economic and socio-cultural deprivation is so great in Africa, they want reparations to specifically alter these conditions. Our respondents conceptualized reparations as a method of boosting African independence and self-sufficiency; in short, to have Western help in developing the very continent the West itself helped to underdevelop. Note as well here that the type of reparations the
respondents desire are almost wholly of a "perpetual" and sustainable nature. Changing trade policies, building new infrastructure, relieving debts, and aiding social services are all measures whose effects take place over time. They are very different, therefore, from one-time, lump sum payments. Furthermore, these sorts of "perpetual" reparations are important as they move reparations away from the idea that once reparation has been paid, the injustices can be forgotten (Nuruddin, 2002; Tsosie, 2004; Valls, 2004).

In this regard, most of our respondents, like those cited in the literature, see the compensation component of reparations as the most important. Throughout the interviews, few promoted the view that reparations should stop at apology or acknowledgment. Reparations, therefore, are not understood only as measures for obtaining moral equality between Africa and the West. The implicit statement is that those responsible for harming Africa both in the past and in the present must fix their mistakes in real, pragmatic ways. To construct acceptable "repair" for the historical and contemporary deprivation in Africa, our respondents assumed a rehabilitative, collective approach, emphasizing the importance of civil society involvement. In a later chapter I consider some existing conceptual frameworks around reparations and how they do not adequately cover this idea of a "rehabilitative" reparations outlook. Next, however, I consider the challenges and prospects for a social movement for reparations to Africa.
CHAPTER 6: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES FOR THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR REPARATIONS TO AFRICA

There is an emerging consensus among our respondents that the Western world owes some form of reparations to Africa. Only two respondents, a South African academic (10) and an ambassador (33), were of the opinion that reparations per se were not necessary. For both, discussions of reparations meant that Africans were not taking responsibility for themselves, but rather were relying too much on help from the West, which, in their opinion, was most unlikely to be forthcoming. Like many other respondents, however, they were nonetheless concerned with measures to help African independence through empowerment, so that Africans might, as the ambassador intimated, stop “begging” and begin to help themselves. This larger consensus, however, is one in broad principle only. In this chapter I consider the prospects and challenges for a “social movement” for reparations to Africa through an analysis of the advocacy literature and social movement theory.

Components of Social Movements and the African Reparations Case

As I alluded to in earlier chapters, a “movement” for African reparations, as such, does not presently exist. We should differentiate here between a “social movement,” which is “defined by broad goals and/or interests,” and “social movement organizations,” (SMOs) which are “defined by particular organizational structures” (Jenkins, 1983, p. 540). Social movements are typically comprised of numerous SMOs.

As we see in this chapter, the “social movement” for African reparations is best represented at present as disparate groups promoting rather incongruent ideas, but which share an overarching goal of reparations to Africa. I am, however, hesitant to label these individuals and groups “social movement organizations” within a larger “social movement” for African reparations. To the extent that a SMO is a “complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement” (Zald & McCarthy, 1980, p. 2), it may be erroneous to refer to these various groups as SMOs, as they appear to be isolated individuals and organizations, with minimal organization, communication or alliances between them. Moreover, perhaps even calling these organizations part of a “social movement” is my imposition of an unsuitable label, as there seems to be little conscious activity around a larger movement. I am unclear as to whether those advocates and organizations view themselves as part of a larger movement.

Perhaps then it is better to refer to these advocates and advocacy groups as what McCarthy (1987) calls unmobilized sentiment pools. These are groups of people who are “like-minded but unlinked” (p. 59) and the goal is to organize these groups into “organizational vehicles explicitly designed for social movement activities (SMOs)” (p. 59). In this way, we can consider the advocates and advocacy groups as sharing a similar overarching goal—that is, reparations to Africa—but who are otherwise structurally
unlinked. This conception accounts for the seemingly “unconscious” social movement activity around African reparations and the absence of an organized structure.

I call this an “unorganized approach,” which I believe will have detrimental effects on movement success. In pursuing reparations from this approach, one might find numerous groups claiming reparations through different tactics (e.g., political, moral, or legal approaches) from different targets with different reparative demands. The result would be targets inundated with varied and perhaps competing demands for reparations from a number of different angles. Let us consider a hypothetical example: Four separate groups want reparations from the American government. Groups 1 and 3 want reparations for slavery; group 2 for slavery and colonialism, and group 4 for slavery, colonialism and neo-colonial harms. Groups 1 and 2 take a legal approach; they sue the American government, in one case, for US$100 trillion (following Osabu-Kle, 2000a, p. 345) and in the other, for US$777 trillion (following African World Reparations and Repatriation Truth Commission, 1999/2002, p. 140). Groups 3 and 4 take a political approach. The former demands unconditional debt relief; the latter, investments in African infrastructure, education and health care systems.

How would (or could?) the American government respond to these competing demands? If the lawsuits were successful, would that negate political claims? The government could argue that they adequately disposed of the reparations issue, stunting any further claims. If the political claims were successful, what would be the fate of the legal ones? If the lawsuits failed, perhaps success through political channels would be even less likely. This unorganized approach presents numerous problems, not least the problem of many unconnected groups “racing to the finish” for reparations from a single target. Losing the “race” might leave certain groups unsatisfied with the results, with little or no recourse. This movement differs from others because there do not exist numerous “local” targets that numerous movement organizations could lobby for change, as might be the case in other movements, like local environmental justice (Rosen, 1994) or homeless mobilization (Cress & Snow, 2000) campaigns. Instead, there are a limited number of targets (i.e., there is only one American government, only one British government, only one World Bank, and so on) that, I submit, would most likely not be receptive to so many competing demands.

While I realize that no social movement is a unified, monolithic entity (Zald & McCarthy, 1980), I take the position that to construct a stronger foundation from which to pursue actual reparations, those advocating African reparations must present a unified front, approaching the issue from an established standpoint and be resolute about its demands. I am in agreement here with the African and African Descendant Caucus (n.d.), who propose a “permanent organizational structure” for African reparations:

As this wave of African awareness and resistance arises, it is imperative to create an organizational structure to galvanize its energies, promote its vision and allow for the greatest possible international unity and mobilization while recognizing
that this thrust for justice must be driven by dynamic, growing, grassroots movements. The need for an organized voice to represent us at the United Nations and in other international fora to promote our positive agenda is predicated on the recognition that those who owe reparations to African peoples will fight all efforts to justly compensate our people. Instead they will continue to play upon existing prejudices and biased self-interested perceptions and seek to thrive upon any apparent weakness and actively foster weaknesses such as disorganization, ignorance, mis-communications, absence, poor representation, disunity and voicelessness. This new permanent organization will defeat these efforts by drawing upon the bold heritage of our ancestors and our African awareness to strengthen our position and advance our cause.

I do not necessarily maintain that Western nations would take such a “malicious” approach to reparations as the Caucus suggests. However, I do agree with them on their larger point that disorganization will impede success. Indeed, previous successful reparations movements involved coordinated, representative bodies: for Jewish reparations, the “Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany,” an organized body of representatives from 23 Jewish organizations (United States Department of Justice Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 1996/1999); for Japanese-Americans, the Japanese American Citizens League (Tateishi, 1991); for Korean comfort women, the Voluntary Service Corps Study Association and the Comfort Women Problem Resolution Council (Hicks, 1999). To this end, Laremont (1999; 2001) stresses that solidarity was one of the main features that helped the Japanese-American redress movement succeed, and he encourages that same solidarity within the African and African Diaspora movements.

Thus I focus this chapter on the disjuncture between what presently exists and what should exist (theoretically, at least) for a movement of reparations to Africa to succeed. At the very least, the unmobilized sentiment pools should be organized into a more cohesive and representative group. I analyze the present realities and potential future development of the African reparations movement through McAdam, McCarthy and Zald’s (1996) three “broad sets of factors” of social movement emergence and development: (1) political opportunities; (2) mobilizing structures; and (3) framing processes. I base my analysis on the activities of the Group of Eminent Persons, the advocacy literature and other groups advocating for reparations to Africa.

As “framing processes” are important to the first two factors as well, I preface my analysis with a brief introduction to this concept. Traditional social movement theory, like resource mobilization theory, has been criticized for its neglect of the social-psychological and social constructionist aspects of social movements (Benford & Snow, 2000; Klandermans, 1992; Nash, 2000; Snow & Benford, 1988, 1992; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986). Snow et al. (1986), for example, note that there had been little progress in linking social-psychological and structural factors in social movements; accordingly, they see “movement organizations and actors as actively engaged in the
production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers” (Snow & Benford, 1992, p. 136). Likewise, Klandermans (1992) points out the sociological truism that social problems are not objective in themselves and that the existence of a social problem does not necessitate a social movement. He thus complains that resource mobilization theory has neglected the “mediating processes through which people attribute meaning to events and interpret situations. Scholars of social movements have become increasingly aware that individuals behave according to a perceived reality [italics in original]” (Klandermans, 1992, p. 77). Thus “framing processes,” the final factor in McAdam et al.’s (1996) framework, represent attempts to bring these social-psychological and social constructionist aspects into traditional social movement theory.

Snow et al. (1986) first developed the idea of “framing” in social movements, borrowing from Goffman’s (1974/1986) work on “frame analysis.” “Primary frameworks,” according to Goffman, allow “its user to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms” (p. 21). The concept of a frame “refers to an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action within one’s present or past environment” (Snow & Benford, 1992, p. 137). In social movement theory, the emphasis is on “collective action frames” which, in addition to their framing role, also “function simultaneously as modes of attribution and articulation” (Snow & Benford, 1992, p. 137). As we see in the ensuing discussion, framing processes are an important factor for social movements at both the macro and micro levels. Equally important, especially in this particular case, are “frame disputes” which can erupt between and within social movement organizations (Benford, 1993; Benford & Snow, 2000).38

Political Opportunities

McAdam et al. (1996) point out that “social movements and revolutions are shaped by the broader set of political constraints and opportunities unique to the national context in which they are embedded” (p. 3). In other words, political realities play a role in determining the emergence and success or failure of social movements. In the case of reparations to Africa, the political context of opportunities and constraints is an international one, not a national one, as the targets of the reparative claim are national governments, and international organizations and institutions.

In the introductory notes to this thesis, I highlighted various arguments that we have entered what Brooks (1999a) calls the “Age of Apology” (p. 3). Such a notion, I submit, represents a “master frame” that previous successful movements have played a role in developing. “Master frames,” according to Snow and Benford (1992),

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38 I realize that I already argued that the various advocates for African reparations should not be considered SMOs. The idea of “frame disputes” is still applicable, however, because each advocate/advocacy group possesses its own specific “frame” which may become an area of dispute if/when these individuals/groups become more organized and cohesive.
perform the same functions as movement-specific collective action frames, but they do so on a larger scale....They are also modes of punctuation, attribution, and articulation, but their punctuations, attributions, articulations may color and constrain those of any number of movement organizations [italics added]....Master frames are generic; specific collective action frames are derivative. (p. 138)

The “master frame” of the “Age of Apology” embodies the view that historical injustices of the past require some form of atonement, in the present, from the offending parties. Hence the movement for reparations to Africa is (or, will be) occurring through this master frame of “reconciliation.”

Previous instances of successful reparation movements have helped develop this master frame. Meyer and Whittier (1994) posit the idea of “social movement spillover” (p. 277), exploring the nature of “movement-movement influence” (p. 278). In attempting to achieve movement-specific goals, social movements also “influence indirect targets... includ[ing] the practices, perspectives, and outcomes of other collective actors, as well as the lives of participants” (p. 278). To the extent that previous movements alter policy and policymaking processes, they “alter the structure of political opportunity new challengers face” (p. 281). As the “model” of reparations claims (Barkan, 2000; Bazyler, 2001; Torpey, 2001, 2003a), we can consider reparations to the Jews as the “genesis” of this master frame. Subsequent movements then drew upon this model (albeit perhaps indirectly) and, in so doing, they reinforced and expanded the idea of redress and reconciliation for past harms. The result is a political climate at least somewhat more receptive to the idea of reparations and reconciliation for historical injustices.

Certainly, proponents of African reparations draw upon this master frame in making their claims. One common theme in the advocacy literature is the question of why Jews have been compensated for their historical suffering while Africans have not. Often advocates engage in “competitive suffering,”39 arguing that Africans have suffered longer than the other groups that have received compensation, including the Jews. Mazrui (2002a), for example, writes:

How do twelve years of Jewish hell, seven years of injustice toward Japanese-Americans, decades of Korean colonization, four years of female exploitation and seven months of Kuwaiti indignity compare to several centuries of Black enslavement? Compensation and reparations seem rational to observers in one case after another, until the principle is applied to Black suffering. Suddenly what is rational becomes absurd; what is compelling for Jews or Koreans becomes

39 I borrow this term from Rhoda Howard-Hassmann, who originally used it with regard to genocide claims.
comic or ‘uneconomic’ for Blacks....Restitution to Jews, comfort women, Japanese internees, Kuwaitis – even though the suffering was for a shorter time [italics added]– is considered right, moral, and plausible, while restitution for the centuries of damage to the African Diaspora is considered a ridiculous pipe-dream.  

(pp. 87-88)

Other advocates put forth similar ideas (e.g., Abiola, 1992; Chinweizu, 1993; Gifford, 1993; Munford, 1996; Robinson, 2000; Thompson, 1999). In outlooks such as these, advocates clearly situate their claims within this master frame of “reconciliation” and indeed use the frame itself to justify their own claims. As Abiola (1992) put it, “clearly, we are treading a path which is already well trodden” (p. 910). This master frame, then, provides a political context through which the advocates for reparations to Africa can base their more specific collective action frames in order to mobilize political and moral support for their claims.

Mobilizing Structures and Mobilization

“Groups seek to organize” through mobilizing structures, “those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action [italics in original]” (McAdam et al., 1996, p. 3). Organization is a key factor here:

...most political movements and revolutions are set in motion by social changes that render the established political order more vulnerable or receptive to challenge. But these “political opportunities” are but a necessary prerequisite to action. In the absence of sufficient organization – whether formal or informal – such opportunities are not likely to be seized....No matter how momentous a change appears in retrospect, it only becomes an “opportunity” when defined as such by a group [italics in original] of actors sufficiently well organized to act on [the] shared definition of the situation. (McAdam et al., 1996, p. 8)

Earlier I said that there are presently a number of “unmobilized” groups and individuals involved in advocating reparations to Africa. I want to expand here on my earlier contention that these groups do not appear to have the necessary level of organization

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40 I discussed already all these previous instances of reparations, except the Kuwaiti case. Here, Mazrui is referring to war reparations from Iraq to Kuwait from its invasion in 1990 through the end of the Gulf War.

41 See Howard-Hassmann (2004) for more discussion on this idea. She writes that such statements reveal an understandable lack of knowledge of the situation of Jews in Europe. If one were to bring together their entire history of expulsions, mass murders and discrimination, one could argue that the Jews, like Africans, suffered for centuries, if not millennia, not for only six or twelve years....More important is the sense that white Jews take up an inordinate amount of the Western world’s attention and sympathy, while black African suffering is ignored. (p. 88)
required for mobilizing participants but instead appear to be largely isolated proponents without much momentum.

To begin, the original 12-member Group of Eminent Persons mandated to advocate African reparations enjoys little widespread success. The group itself has dwindled to the three members we interviewed (Jacob Ajayi, Ali Mazrui and Dudley Thompson) and, according to Mazrui, these members have little communication or collaboration outside of their sessions on reparations at the annual meeting of the African Studies Association (USA). While their 1993 conference in Abuja, Nigeria and the subsequent 1999 conference in Accra, Ghana released declarations on African reparations (First Pan-African Conference on Reparations, 1993/2002; African World Reparations and Repatriation Truth Commission, 1999/2002, respectively), they do not seem to have inspired any real follow-up action or mobilization. 42

At the more recent UNWCAR, numerous African countries and organizations made statements calling for reparations to Africa, such as the following, from Jakaya Kikwete, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Republic of Tanzania:

Slavery and colonialism are the historic roots and prime causes of the problems of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance in the context of the African continent and the African people across the world. Slavery and colonialism are also responsible in a big way, for poverty, underdevelopment, marginalization and economic disparity in Africa and among people of African descent in the diaspora. After several hundred years of slavery and colonialism, the legacy of those obnoxious systems are so deeply rooted that the consequences live on and will continue to be felt for many years to come.

Tanzania supports the proposal that States which benefited from slavery, the slave trade and colonialism should acknowledge responsibility for their past injustices, express explicit remorse and apologies as well as assume full responsibility and provide reparations and compensation to the victims. The Tanzanian delegation is fully aware of the concerns of some States and their rejection of the Dakar position. We are utterly surprised by that response, for we believe acknowledgement of responsibility and apology are important first steps in the healing process and would repair the enormous damage caused by those crimes against humanity. They form essential elements for reconciliation and for building societies based on justice, equality and solidarity.

Payment of reparation and compensation are logically the best way of demonstrating that justice has been done to those who have been wronged. After all, it is common practice everywhere – why not apply it to Africa? The Germans

42 I found one news report which discussed a "Second Historic African World Reparations and Repatriation Conference," held in Accra, Ghana, in July of 2000 ("Accra hosts," 2000); however, I could not locate any information on the effects of this conference.
paid reparation to Europe for crimes against humanity during the First World War. The Jews are being compensated for crimes committed against them during the Holocaust. There are many such examples. We do not understand why there is total hostility to the idea of reparation and compensation to Africa. What is it that is so blasphemous about it? Is it because Africa does not deserve it? Or is it the difficulty of determining the compensation? Africans deserve this – it is a matter of principle. What form that reparation and compensation will take is a matter that can be discussed. ("Acknowledgement of past," 2001)

Thirteen African representatives made similar statements, but they indicated no concerted effort or demands between them, except, again, generally shared principles that the West owes reparations. In fact, some reports suggest that the call for reparations for slavery and colonialism was a particularly divisive issue at the conference (see, e.g., BBC News, 2001a, 2001b; Kirby, 2001). Further, the impact of these statements, and the Conference itself, was overshadowed by numerous factors: the Israel-Palestine dispute, the United States’ withdrawal from the conference (see Phillips, 2001 on both), and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC. In the end, the final declaration of the conference contained sections about reparations in particular, but nothing specific to the African case:

165. Urges States to reinforce protection against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance by ensuring that all persons have access to effective and adequate remedies and enjoy the right to seek from competent national tribunals and other national institutions just and adequate reparation and satisfaction for any damage as a result of such discrimination. It further underlines the importance of access to the law and to the courts for complainants of racism and racial discrimination and draws attention to the need for judicial and other remedies to be made widely known, easily accessible, expeditious and not unduly complicated;

166. Urges States to adopt the necessary measures, as provided by national law, to ensure the right of victims to seek just and adequate reparation and satisfaction to redress acts of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, and to design effective measures to prevent the repetition of such acts. (Durban declaration, p. 52, see also sections 100, 104 & 160)

While this declaration may contribute further to the “master frame” of reconciliation, it is still unknown if it will have any effect on mobilization for the movement for reparations to Africa. Previous reparation movements involved more successful sorts of mobilization through similar conferences. For example, the Jewish “Claims Conference” was a starting point to actual reparations (United States Department of Justice Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 1996/1999), as was the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians for Japanese-Americans (Daniels, 1991), and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission for South African victims of apartheid (Mkhize,
The African “equivalents” of these conferences have not enjoyed equivalent success.

There are also the individuals who contribute to what I call the “advocacy literature,” but again there appears to be no cooperation, links or alliances between them. In addition to these writers, there are some other groups involved in advocacy work, to greater or lesser extents. The Africa Reparations Movement (UK) previously maintained a website about their goals and objectives (see Africa Reparations Movement, n.d.-a), but their website is no longer maintained since the death of their chair and major benefactor, Dr. Bernie Grant, MP.43 Additionally, there is a Kenyan chapter of the Africa Reparations Movement, launched in January 2002, but information about it (or from it) is difficult to locate.44 There is a “Jamaican Reparations Movement,” which maintains a small website,45 but its goals are “specific to the enslavement of Africans in Jamaica and their descendants.” The “Reparations Central” website46 is intended to be a clearing house for reparations information and for “linking reparationists.” Its focus, however, is largely the movement for reparations to African-Americans. Their website includes links to websites for 20 other organizations in reparations movements, but outside of its listing of the defunct Africa Reparations Movement (UK) website, all organizations pertain to the African-American movement for slavery reparations.

While these groups are involved in advocacy work for a common cause, there does not appear to be any sort of organization, or indeed even communication, between them. Hence my view that these groups may be better considered unmobilized sentiment pools rather than SMOs. The lack of organization or communication hampers efforts to construct a united advocacy front, which subsequently presents a mobilization problem:

while movements often develop within established institutions or informal associational networks, it is rare that they remain embedded in these nonmovement settings [italics in original]. For the movement to survive, insurgents must be able to create a more enduring organizational structure to sustain collective action [italics added]. (McAdam et al., 1996, p. 13)

Indeed, discussions about mobilization for this “movement” may perhaps be premature, because the various groups do not seem organized enough among themselves to begin mobilizing “external” participants on a grand scale.

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43 www.arm.arc.co.uk. The group’s objectives included reparations for slavery and colonialism, return of African artifacts, apology and acknowledgement from Western governments, an accurate portrayal of African history, and education for African youth on African culture and history. I do not know if the group is still operating.

44 According to Mazrui (2002), its chairperson is Dennis Akumu, a veteran trade unionist; other members include Professor Katama Mkangi, a previous Kenyan presidential candidate, and Mwandawiro Mghanga, a student leader. The group is concerned primarily with apology for slavery and colonialism.

45 www.geocities.com/i_makeda/

46 www.reparationscentral.com
It is difficult, therefore, for the movement to achieve “consensus mobilization”—the “process through which a social movement tries to obtain support for its viewpoints” (Klandermans, 1984, p. 586)—because the actors do not share consensus on their own viewpoints. This then precipitates a problem with “action mobilization”—the “process by which an organization in a social movement calls up people to participate”—because “action mobilization cannot do without consensus mobilization” (Klandermans, 1984, p. 586). In other words, until these disparate movement groups themselves can organize around a united front, they will not be able to mobilize participants on a collaborative and cohesive scale. Otherwise, the disparate groups may achieve only isolated mobilization, and may therefore experience difficulty in “getting to the starting point,” as I discussed in chapter four. As I show in the next section, the biggest challenge the social movement for reparations faces, or will face, is overcoming “frame disputes” on crucial aspects of their reparative claim.

Framing Processes

“Framing” can apply to master frames as well as to more case-specific frames. Snow and Benford (1988) identify three “core framing tasks” upon which the success of participant mobilization rests:

1. a diagnosis of some event or aspect of social life as problematic and in need of alteration; 2. a proposed solution to the diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to be done; and 3. a call to arms or rationale for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action. (p. 199)

They explain that the first two tasks relate to consensus mobilization, while the final task relates to action mobilization. Through this framework, I show that those currently advocating African reparations each possess their own framing perspectives on these core tasks, which have the potential to become divisive “frame disputes” if/when these groups are brought together to construct a cohesive and representative advocacy body for reparations to Africa.

The first task in the framework involves Snow and Benford’s (1988) concept of “diagnostic framing,” the “identification of a problem and the attribution of blame or causality” (p. 200). Ideally, consensus is required on these two areas, but Snow and Benford maintain that it is usually easier to achieve consensus on the problem itself rather than on who is to blame.

Clearly, the advocates for African reparations are agreed that there is a problem: the West has harmed Africa and it needs to atone for those harms. “Enslavement of Africans and their colonization,” as Mazrui (2002a) maintains, “put the West in debt towards Africa and the Black world” (p. 89). But as Snow and Benford predict, the advocates in this case share less consensus on who, in the present day, is to blame for these harms. The blame conundrum rests on three related and equally problematic areas:
(1) the "scope of claims," or for exactly which events reparations are owed (i.e., slavery? colonialism? neo-colonialism? all three? only historical events?) and, by extension, the exact institutions responsible for paying reparations; (2) the matter of generational responsibility (i.e., are present generations responsible for paying reparations?); and (3) the demonstration of a causal chain of harm. I discussed the second problem in chapter three, but I want to discuss the first and final problems in more depth here.

On the first issue, some advocates maintain that reparations should be claimed only for slavery and its legacies (e.g., Laremont, 1999; Osabu-Kle, 2000a; Thompson, 1999). On the other hand, some argue that reparations are owed for both slavery and colonialism and their legacies (e.g., Abiola, 1992; African and African Descendant Caucus, n.d.; African Regional Preparatory Conference, 2001; African World Reparations and Repatriation Truth Commission, 1999/2002; Ajayi, 2002; Chinweizu, 1993; First Pan-African Conference on Reparations, 1993/2002; Gifford, 1993; Mazrui, 1993; Mazrui, 1999; Mazrui, 2002a; Mazrui, 2002c). Still others maintain that reparations are owed for slavery, colonialism, and neo-colonialism (e.g., Ajayi, 2002; Chinweizu, 1993; First Pan-African Conference on Reparations, 1993/2002; Gifford, 1993). Moreover, while they share a view that the Western nations and organizations that participated in and/or benefited from these practices should pay reparations, they do not identify specific targets. Thus we see that the advocates possess different views on what exact events reparations are owed for, and we do not know whether they share common ground on which nations and/or organizations should be targeted for paying reparations.

On the third problem, while there is little doubt that most Africans suffer harm, for the purposes of a reparative claim, this harm needs to be causally connected to the past injustices. Keck and Sikkink (1998) discuss this through their notion of the "causal chain" (p. 27). They argue that the more successful social movements can demonstrate a causal chain that is "sufficiently short and clear to make the case convincing" (p. 27). For example,

Activists have been able to convince people that the World Bank bears responsibility for the human and environmental impact of projects it directly funds, but have had a harder time convincingly making the International Monetary Fund (IMF) responsible for hunger or food riots in the developing world. In the latter case the causal chain is longer, more complex, and much less visible, since neither the IMF nor governments reveal the exact content of negotiations. (p. 28)

A similar problem befalls the case of reparations to Africa. Howard-Hassmann (2004), for instance, observes that "there is a very long causal chain between slavery, colonialism

47 I indicated earlier that during his interview, Mazrui said that reparations should only be claimed for slavery. In his writings on the topic, however, he sometimes maintains that reparations are owed for both slavery and colonialism.
and the current situation of Africans” (p. 92). Keck and Sikkink’s example further points out a problem with demonstrating a causal chain for even neo-colonial “injustices,” which one might assume would be easier to demonstrate, given their recent or ongoing nature. Demonstrating a viable causal chain thus is an important diagnostic framing problem, as it clearly relates to attributing blame for harms.

Thus the emerging movement will face disputes at the “diagnostic” level. The advocates need to construct a cohesive frame which demonstrates collaboration on these important, foundational questions. They require a common front on exactly what historical and/or contemporary events they are seeking reparation for, exactly who or what institutions/organizations are responsible for paying reparations, and they need to construct a convincing causal chain to link these first two issues. This is a particularly important point as “reaching an agreement on attributions can be important to concerted action because these definitions of the situation often designate targets of collective action” (Benford, 1993, p. 689).

The second task requires “prognostic framing,” to “suggest solutions to the problem but also to identify strategies, tactics, and targets. What is to be done is thereby specified” (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 201). Here again the various advocates have distinct views.

One area of controversy is how best to pursue a reparative claim. “Neutral” analyses of African reparations suggest a political or moral approach as the most viable option. du Plessis (2003), a legal scholar, for example, argues that “the legal path, at least insofar as international law is concerned, does not present itself as an attractive option to reparationists and is likely to continue to attract significant opposition from states” (p. 637). He concludes that the only plausible approach is “a political one built on moral argument” (p. 658). Howard-Hassmann (2004), a social scientist, agrees, writing that the movement must rely on “international political and moral debate” (p. 91), in the absence of a strong case in international law.

Countering these opinions, however, some advocates contend that a legal approach is a viable one to take. Gifford (1993), for example, argues that advocates must situate the claim for reparations within a “framework of law and justice” because “an appeal to the conscience of the White world...would be misconceived....Its political an[d] economic power centres have evidenced a ruthless lack of conscience when it comes to Black and African peoples.” Likewise, Abiola (1992), promoting a moral, historical and legal argument, writes that

For every illegality a debt is owed. It is international law which compels Nigeria to pay her debts to western banks and financial institutions; it is international law
which must now demand that the western nations pay us what they have owed us for nearly six centuries. (p. 910)48

Other advocates, though, such as the African Regional Preparatory Committee (2001) and Laremont (1999; 2001) present arguments for and against moral, legal and political frameworks. We see here, then, that advocates have different views on the very basic and foundational question of how best to pursue a successful claim for African reparations.

Another pivotal framing problem is defining exactly what form of reparations to claim. While advocates agree that the West owes Africa, they lack consensus or cohesion on what exactly it is the West should owe as reparations. Advocates have wide-ranging reparation demands, including apology, debt reduction/elimination, infrastructure improvement, land return, and the erection of monuments. Some demand lump-sum monetary payments, while others maintain that such measures are not the answer. Most are agreed that reparations should aid Africa’s participation and equality in global political and economic systems; however, they disagree on how to achieve this goal.

As a further case in point, African countries themselves had different views of reparations at the UNWCAR; some saw reparations as increased aid, while others wanted new payments explicitly as compensation for past injustices (see BBC News, 2001b). In fact, Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo maintained that an apology was all that was necessary and further reparations were not needed (BBC News, 2001a) and Senegalese president Abdoulaye Wade called the idea of reparations for slavery absurd (Ba, 2001). Quite on the contrary, however, the Togolese president Gnassingbe Eyadema stated that reparations were definitely required to right the past injustices of slavery and colonialism (BBC News, 2001a).

To repeat my earlier point, a framing dispute here is particularly problematic, as Western nations and organizations, if they agreed to pay reparations, would most likely not be receptive to contradicting, competing and unorganized demands. Until the groups can organize and resolve these “prognostic” disputes, consensus mobilization (Klandermans, 1984; Snow & Benford, 1988) will remain a difficulty.

The final core framing task is the “elaboration of a call to arms or rationale for action that goes beyond the diagnosis and prognosis [italics in original]” (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 202). This framing task relates to action mobilization (Klandermans, 1984) and it “provides the motivational impetus for participation” (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 199). Snow and Benford (1988) explain that

Since agreement about the causes and solutions to a particular problem does not automatically produce corrective action, it follows that consensus mobilization

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48 This is not, however, an accurate reading of international law with respect to reparations; see du Plessis (2003).
does not necessarily yield to mobilization. Participation is thus contingent upon
the development of motivational frames that function as prods to action....[Action
mobilization] is consequently confronted with the task of convincing particular
participants of both the need for and utility of becoming active in the cause. (p.
202)

Advocates often draw upon visions of a better African society, or indeed “Black World,”
in order to motivate participants to the cause. Chinweizu (1993) offers a good example
of such sentiment:

Let me note that, for us, no global order would be truly new without apologies for
ancient wrongs, without an end to continuing wrongs, without reparations,
without restitutions, without the creation of systems and mechanisms that would
ensure that the holocaust we have been through never happens again. Our crusade
for reparations would be completed only when we achieve a global order without
negrophobia, without alien hegemony over any part of the Black World, and
without the possibility of holocaust. From our perspective, a global order which
failed to meet such conditions would not really be new or adequate: It would be
an order serving us the same old bitter wine in some new bottle.

From here today, I foresee a day when we too shall get back our expropriated
lands; I foresee a day when we too shall get compensation or our losses and our
pains; I foresee a day when negrophobia and the conditions which foster it shall
have vanished from the earth. But between now and that day, much work waits to
be done. The most serious part of that work is the work of self rehabilitation. And
so I say: “Black Soul, Heal Thyself, and all shall be restored to you”.

In sum, advocates for African reparations share similar ideological underpinnings, but
they are unconnected entities and therefore cannot share consensus on the diagnostic,
prognostic and, subsequently, the motivational framing levels. This reality renders
consensus and action participant mobilization impossible, or at best, less effective. For
greater chances of success, then, the various groups should engage in what Snow et al.
(1986) call “frame alignment” processes, a “necessary condition for movement
participation” (p. 464). They note that

grievances or discontent are subject to differential interpretation, and...variations
in their interpretation across individuals, social movement organizations, and time
can affect whether and how they are acted upon....What is at issue is not merely
the presence or absence of grievances, but the manner in which grievances are
interpreted and the generation and diffusion of those interpretations. (pp. 465,
466)

Certainly the African reparations case presents a stunning example of just this problem.
As I showed above, the advocacy groups share different interpretations of the problems
and their solutions in the reparations process. “Frame alignment” processes refer to the “linkage of individual and SMO [social movement organization] interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary” (p. 464). These processes include frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension and frame transformation, and each can play an important role in the social movement for African reparations. My interest here is the role of “frame alignment” processes at two levels: (1) organizing the presently unmobilized sentiment pools into a cohesive, representative advocacy body and (2) utilizing that body to mobilize new participants. This latter task is especially important, as advocates should attempt to gain support for their cause within the various Western countries from which reparations may be claimed (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).

Frame bridging refers to “the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem” (p. 467). This can occur at either the organizational or individual level. Here it is an important idea because I demonstrated that while the advocacy groups and individuals share an ideological groundwork, they are structurally unconnected at present. From these disconnected frames, the various groups cannot fashion consensus or active mobilization for their claims. However, frame bridging between the various groups could form the basis for a more “ideologically isomorphic SMO” (Snow et al., 1986, p. 468). This would be the first step in linking the various advocates and advocacy groups and transforming them into a more formally organized representative advocacy group for African reparations. This body could then continue frame bridging to recruit new participants to the movement.

Through “frame amplification,” there is a “clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem or set of events” (p. 469). There are two relevant aspects here: value amplification and belief amplification. The former refers to the “identification, idealization, and elevation of one or more values presumed basic” to prospective adherents (p. 469). Thus to bring potential participants aboard, the groups must clarify and invigorate the basic values related to its cause. In this particular case, they might organize around and promote values such as human rights, equality, social justice, economic justice, and reconciliation. While proponents seemingly already share these values, an organized body could promote them further to recruit new participants.

Belief amplification involves those “ideational elements that cognitively support or impede action in pursuit of desired values” (pp. 469-470). There are two relevant areas here: (1) beliefs about the targets of the social movement (i.e., attributions of blame or causality) and (2) beliefs about the potential success of the collective action. In this case, advocates need to promote and amplify beliefs that not only has the West harmed Africa, but also that it has an obligation to make amends for those harms and offer reparations. Further, “optimism about the outcome of a collective challenge...enhance[s] the probability of participation; pessimism will diminish it” (p. 470). Thus to mobilize
new participants, the African reparations movement also needs a frame which portrays the claim for reparations as one which is likely to succeed.

Proponents should be wary, however, of the “range and interrelatedness” of their core beliefs. Snow and Benford (1988) note that

If the framing effort is linked to only one core belief or value that is of limited range, then the movement is vulnerable to being discounted if that value or belief is called into question or if its hierarchical salience diminishes within the entire belief system. (p. 206)

Thus the movement for African reparations must be resolute in keeping strong the belief that the West does owe Africa for certain past and/or present harms. The movement would otherwise find itself in dire trouble if supporters called into question the foundational belief that the West is responsible for paying reparations to Africa.

There can also be a problem of “centrality” in value and belief amplification, if the values and beliefs are of low importance among potential participants. “The greater the correspondence between values promoted by a movement and those held by potential constituents,” explain Snow and Benford (1988), “the greater the success of the mobilization effort” (p. 205). This may be an especially salient problem for mobilizing grassroots participation in the movement for reparations, given our observation that the movement is largely an intellectual one. As I mentioned in the methodology section, many “ordinary” or non-elite Africans may be too concerned with issues of daily survival to place much emphasis on the values and beliefs promoted by the proponents of African reparations. Perhaps this may be a problem in mobilizing intellectuals and politicians as well, as they might be dealing with more pressing issues facing Africa. This question, however, is beyond the scope of this research.

Framing processes and mobilization may encounter another problem at the phenomenological level of “frame resonance” (Snow & Benford, 1988; Benford, 1993; Benford & Snow, 2000), where one asks “Does the framing strike a responsive chord with those individuals for whom it is intended?” (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 207). The issue here is whether the framings possess “experiential commensurability”:

Does it [the framing] suggest answers and solutions to troublesome events and situations which harmonize with the ways in which these conditions have been or are currently experienced? Or is the framing too abstract and distant from the everyday experiences of potential participants? (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 208).

Again, the case may be that non-elite Africans are too removed from the issue to effect this sort of commensurability and, likewise, this may even be a problem for mobilizing elite Africans.
Through “frame extension” a movement attempts “to enlarge its adherent pool by portraying its objectives or activities as attending to or being congruent with the values or interests of potential adherents” (p. 472). In other words, the movement attempts to portray its causes as congruent with other causes such that persons not aligned with the specific cause would come to find it appealing: “Movement leaders frequently elaborate goals and activities so as to encompass auxiliary interests not obviously associated with the movement in hopes of enlarging its adherent base” (p. 472). Thus the African reparations movement may frame reparations as part and parcel with, for example, achieving greater political equity for Africa, fostering a higher level of African influence in the global political context, and combating racism and inequality. Emphasizing these aspects of the movement, in addition to its goal of obtaining reparations, might mobilize persons to the cause who might not otherwise have been interested, especially important for gaining support in Western countries.

Finally, frame transformation is required because “the programs, causes, and values that some SMOs promote...may not resonate with, and on occasion may even appear antithetical to, conventional lifestyles or rituals and extant interpretive frames” (p. 473). In these cases, a “reframing” is required, through a process Goffman (1974/1986) termed “keying”: “the set of conventions by which a given activity, one already meaningful in terms of some primary framework, is transformed into something patterned on this activity but seen by the participants to be something quite else” (pp. 43-44).

The first goal of frame transformation is to reframe that which is presently seen as a “misfortune” to that which can be considered an “injustice.” There needs to be a “revision in the manner in which a substantial group of people look at some misfortune, seeing it no longer as a misfortune warranting charitable consideration but as an injustice which is intolerable in society” (Turner, 1969, p. 391). Thus the construction of an “injustice frame”—“an interpretation of what is happening that supports the conclusion that an authority system is violating the shared moral principles of the participants” (Gamson, Fireman, & Rytina, 1982, p. 123)—is required. The second and related goal of frame transformation is to shift attribution or blame from internal to external targets.

Proponents for African reparations obviously already promote such a frame. Their shared basic premise is that the West is largely responsible for injustices against Africa in the past, the legacies of which present generations of Africans still suffer. Thus

49 Notwithstanding, of course, my earlier comments about the potential constraints to participant mobilization.
50 Turner (1969) illustrates the difference between a “misfortune” and “injustice”:

The sense of misfortune and the sense of injustice can be distinguished by the difference between petition and demand [italics in original]. The victims of misfortune petition whoever has the power to help them for some kind of aid. The victims of injustice demand that their petitions be granted. The poor man appealing for alms is displaying his misfortune. The Poor People's March on Washington to demand correction of their situation expressed a sense of injustice. (p. 391)
the proponents promote a frame where blame and causality is externalized, embodied in those Western nations and organizations that harmed Africa. In this way, they transform a "domain-specific interpretive frame"—that is, the present state of African countries—such that it is "reframed as problematic and in need of repair" (Snow et al., 1986, p. 474). They do so within the "global interpretive frame" (Snow et al., 1986, p. 475), or master frame (Snow & Benford, 1992), of reconciliation, which I already discussed. The challenge in this respect is diffusing this frame and mobilizing adherence to it, not only within Africa, but also within the Western world.

In sum, the proponents for African reparations are engaged in framing processes, but the frames they construct are not particularly well aligned, nor are the proponents particularly well organized to begin to align them. If/when the proponents become more organized, there is a great potential for frame disputes and problems with participant mobilization. Again, this spells trouble for a mass movement for reparations, as McAdam et al. (1996) point out:

framing processes are held to be both more likely and of far greater consequence under conditions of strong rather than weak organization [italics added]....Even in the unlikely event that system-critical framings were to emerge in the context of little or no organization, the absence of any real mobilizing structure would almost surely prevent their spread to the minimum number of people required to afford a basis for collective action [italics added]. More to the point, however, is the suspicion that lacking organization these framings would never emerge in the first place [italics added]. (p. 9)

Without organization and frame alignment within that organization, it will be difficult for the reparations movement to achieve the mobilization—both among the proponents themselves and potential participants—to help the reparative claim succeed. However, McAdam et al. (1996) also posit that

we can expect the initial framing processes to be less consciously strategic than later efforts. In fact, at the outset, participants may not even be fully aware that they are engaged in an interpretive process of any real significance....In the absence of such a strong strategic self-consciousness, the initial framing process also has a more emergent, inchoate quality to it than do later framing efforts. (p. 16)

Thus the movement for African reparations is not without any hope of success, but to reiterate my earlier point, it is imperative for success that the various advocates and groups organize into a representative body advocating a united front with solitary demands, as opposed to approaching reparations as numerous groups with competing demands, which may make the offending parties less likely to agree to a reparations settlement. More to the point, factionalism within a movement can have adverse effects on its success (Frey, Dietz, & Kalof, 1992; Gamson, 1990; McAdam, 1982), as can a lack
of a solitary and collective identity among social movement actors (Stotik, Shriver, & Cable, 1994), the absence of an organizational structure (McAdam, 1982; Swain, 2000), the absence of effective mobilizing structures (Kaminstein, 1995; Ono, 2002), and frame conflicts (Shriver, Chasteen, & Adams, 2002), each of which apply to the present efforts of the African reparations “movement.”

Mounting a Successful Redress Movement

In the final part of this chapter, I use Brooks’ (1999a) “theory of redress” (pp. 6-7) to help point out some of the problems this movement may face if and/or when it gains more organized ground. Brooks’ theory has four necessary conditions for the “successful redress of human injustices” (p. 6). The first condition is that “demands or claims for redress must be placed in the hands of legislators rather than judges” as, he argues, the former are in a position to have more influence than the latter (p. 6). Thus Brooks argues that a political approach is the best to assume for a successful redress claim. As we have seen, however, the proponents for African reparations do not agree on what sort of approach—political, moral, or legal—to take for pressing their claims. Given arguments about the heavy burden of proof in legal challenges and the difficulties in constructing a convincing causal chain of harm, a political approach would seem to be the best to assume.

The second related and necessary condition is political pressure: “the success of any redress movement has depended largely on the degree of pressure (public and private) brought to bear upon the legislators—that is, politics—than with matters of logic, justice, or culture” (p. 6). Here, the problem in the African reparations case is obvious: if there is no agreement on how to pursue the claim, whether it be through moral, legal or indeed political means, it is difficult to create the momentum for effective political pressure. Further, the movement will require a responsive international political arena for its claims. As we have seen, conferences thus far have not been successful in generating an effective level of political pressure. Finding and encouraging such a responsive political community again, especially given the contentious and ill-defined goals of this movement in particular, constitutes a difficult yet crucial task for the movement.

Brooks’ third element of successful redress is the presence of “strong internal support... The victims themselves must exhibit unquestioned support for the claims being pressed” (p. 6). I already demonstrated that the extant advocates and groups show a lack of strong internal support, except in broad principle. Further, in an elaboration on his original theory, Brooks (2003) notes that “internal cohesion may...be difficult to achieve when members of the group cannot agree on the form of reparations (or, more generally, the form of redress)” (p. 106). We have already seen that this question has the potential for generating great “frame disputes” among the various movement actors.

There is a related problem with regard to the role of “sincerity” in the reparations process. Minow (1998) makes the important observation that “apologies are actual
actions officials can take to promote reconciliation and healing in the contexts of political and interpersonal violence. *They may also be the most inexpensive and least difficult actions available to them* [italics added]” (p. 114). I demonstrated earlier that our respondents tied the sincerity of apology and acknowledgement to action beyond those statements. Those demands beyond the symbolic statements will undoubtedly be more costly for the offending parties, and this may render those reparations harder to obtain (see also du Plessis, 2003).

The advocates and groups, then, in the process of “frame alignment,” will need to balance their demands (and thus what level of reparations they would find “sincere”) with considerations of what they are realistically likely to receive. I make this assertion based on my earlier discussions of those advocates seeking trillions of dollars in reparation sums (i.e., African World Reparations and Repatriation Truth Commission, 1999/2002; Osabu-Kle, 2000a), requests which offending parties are unlikely to honour (or, indeed, even be in a position to realistically honour them). Indeed, it was reported that during the UNWCAR, most European Union countries favoured issuing an apology for the slave trade, but they later became “united against what they call[ed] unreasonable African demands” [italics added]” (BBC News, 2001b).

Brooks’ final condition is that, beyond political considerations, “claims still must be meritorious” (p. 7). Brooks modifies Matsuda’s (1987) work to offer five prerequisites for a meritorious redress claim:

1. a human injustice must have been committed; 
2. it must be well-documented; 
3. the victims must be identifiable as a distinct group; 
4. the current members of the group must continue to suffer harm; and 
5. such harm must be causally connected to a past injustice. (p. 7)

If we limit the claims for reparations to historical harms, like slavery and colonialism, the first condition is not difficult to satisfy. Slavery and colonialism were human injustices and, indeed, to satisfy the second condition, they are well-documented. If, however, we open up the scope of claims to more recent harms, like those of neo-colonialism, these two premises become murky because they raise the question of whether contemporary policies, such as structural adjustment programs, can be considered “injustices.” It is difficult to consider such policies in the same league of “injustice” as slavery and colonialism.

Further, while it is easy (or, perhaps, easier) to make the case for slavery and colonialism as historical injustices, it is much harder to identify who or what organizations are presently responsible for these past injustices. As I demonstrated

51 For example, section 13 of the final declaration of the UN World Conference on Racism *(Durban declaration, 2001)* acknowledges that “slavery and the slave trade…were appalling tragedies in the history of humanity” and that both slavery and colonialism (section 14) are sources and causes of racial intolerance in the present *(Durban declaration, 2001, pp. 6-7).*
earlier, our respondents found this a thorny issue. There is no reason to suspect this would be any different in the social movement for African reparations. Again, this movement will be best off with a cohesive, common front on what events reparations are owed for and a common front on who is responsible for paying them.

These criteria for a meritorious claim, then, present somewhat of a quandary for this particular movement. A focus on historical injustice satisfies the first two criteria, but makes satisfying the remaining criteria difficult. On the other hand, a focus on more contemporary “injustices” can satisfy conditions three through four, but it is harder to make the case for the first two conditions and indeed the final condition. Once again, the very different unique circumstances of African reparations make these criteria difficult to fit to its specific case. I offer a plausible solution to this problem in my characterization of reparations as both “backward” and “forward” looking, an idea I explore in the next chapter.

In 1991, a reporter for the magazine *West Africa*, covering the conference where the Group of Eminent Persons was sworn in, noted that “the lack of response from the media and other organisations perhaps begs the question of how seriously the reparation issue is being taken” (Makanjuola, 1991, p. 143). Thirteen years later, the situation has not changed very much. There are, therefore, numerous challenges for the African reparations movement to manage in hopes of achieving a successful reparative claim. At present, it is failing on a number of points. But still, we must keep in mind that the movement actors do not appear to be conscious of their engagement in a social movement. If and when it becomes more organized and cohesive, the “movement” may fare better on these criteria of success.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

In this chapter I make some concluding notes on this research. First, I demonstrate how the case of reparations to Africa challenges and extends two dominant frameworks of reparations. Second, I review the empirical and theoretical contribution this research makes to the literature on reparations. Finally, I offer my own tentative assessment on the question of whether reparations are owed to Africa.

A Review and Critique of Other Reparations Frameworks

Brooks (1999a; 2003) and Torpey (2001; 2003a) both offer conceptual frameworks for categorizing reparation claims. I discuss them here to illustrate how the case for African reparations challenges and expands some of the ideas in these frameworks.

To begin, Brooks conceptualizes redress as either “reparations” or “settlements,” where the former includes remorse and the latter does not (p. 8). Readers will recall that Brooks also subdivides these types into “monetary” and “nonmonetary” responses (p. 9). I have already discussed this problem in chapter five, where I argued that the division between monetary and nonmonetary responses is not quite so clear cut.

Brooks further maintains that the monetary and nonmonetary measures can be directed towards individuals or collectivities. When directed to individuals, they are “compensatory,” to “return the victim to the status quo ante [italics added]” (p. 9). When directed to collectivities, they are “rehabilitative,” to “nurture...cultural transformation, or...to improve the conditions under which the victims live” (p. 9).

Here Brooks touches upon a somewhat common issue in the reparations literature: this idea of “compensatory” reparations that aim to return the victims to a “status quo ante.” Janna Thompson (2004) writes that this traditional understanding of reparations requires that the perpetrators of injustice return what they have stolen from their victims and/or compensate them for harm done, with the objective of returning them, as far as possible, to the situation that they were in before the injustice was done. (p. 1; see also Thompson, 2002)

Reflecting this view, Human Rights Watch (2001) states that reparations mean “not only compensation but also acknowledgment of past abuses, an end to ongoing abuses, and, as much as possible, restoration of the state of affairs that would have prevailed had there been no abuses” (p. 1). These conceptions of reparations stem from Nozick’s (1974) notion of “rectification,” which, as Valls (2004) explains, is a principle that “requires...we use reasonable assumptions and rules of thumb to estimate what the distribution would have been in the absence of the violations, and make transfers to achieve that distribution” (p. 7). This idea is also evident in the United Nations...
definitions of reparations, as I illustrated in the introductory chapter (see, e.g., Bassiouni, 2000; van Boven, 2001).

This is a troublesome approach to take in the case of reparations to Africa because one must face the problem of determining an ante-slavery and/or ante-colonialism status quo. Barkan (2003) offers a parallel to this problem in his discussion on reparations to Lakota Native Americans: “It is one thing for the government to compensate them for the violence and for broken obligations; it is quite another to try to imagine what would have been the case had the violence not taken place and to compensate them for lost opportunities” (p. 97; see also Barkan, 2000; Satz, 2004; Thompson, 2004). The conception of reparations as “restoration” is more applicable to cases of injustices which are more narrowly defined, such as the Jewish Holocaust, where a “status quo” can be more easily determined or “calculated.” The focus in reparations to Africa, however, should not (and perhaps cannot) be so much on returning Africa to its “pre-injustice” existence, but rather “bringing” Africa into a more equitable contemporary existence. Janna Thompson (2004) recognizes this problem in her own work on reparations for Australian Aborigines; she maintains “traditional ideas about reparation are difficult to apply to cases where it is not clear who (if anyone) now counts as a perpetrator or a victim or what reparation requires when a return to an ante-injustice state of affairs is...[not] possible” (p. 1). This is precisely the conundrum for African reparations, and this problem clearly illustrates the limits of this “restoration” approach.

To continue, Torpey (2001), in his original framework, conceptualizes two types of claims. In the first place are those that “seek to compensate persons whose physical victimization took place in the past and who now suffer principally psychological scars” (p. 337). These calls emphasize commemorative reparation and are “largely symbolic” (p. 337). They are typically “backward looking” and require the construction of a “consciousness of victimhood” for both “survivors” and the public (p. 337). These sorts of reparations are not typically meant to address economic deprivation. The second type of demands are “rooted in claims that a past system of domination...was unjust and is the cause of continuing economic disadvantage” (p. 337). These sorts of claims are typically “more forward looking” and see reparations as means of “transforming the current conditions of deprivation” suffered (p. 337). These reparations are more likely to be part of broader movements for social change.

In an earlier paper on preliminary results from our first slate of interviews (Lombardo, 2002), I argued that Torpey makes too staunch a split between his types of reparations. His framework leaves no room for reparation calls which appeal for both types of reparations (that is, both socio-cultural and economic reparations). Torpey’s second type seems concerned only with transforming economic deprivation. But as we

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52 Again, here I mean narrowly defined in terms of the duration of the injustice, the identification of victims and perpetrators, and the definition of the actual harm caused.

53 Torpey (2001) offers “colonialism, apartheid, slavery, [and] segregation” as examples of such systems of domination (p. 310).
have seen, our respondents wanted measures to address both economic and socio-cultural deprivation (even though they put more emphasis on economic reparations), and they demonstrated both psychological scars and situations of economic, social and political deprivation. Torpey’s distinctions cannot account for this combination. His original framework thus offers no room for reparation calls which seek both economic and socio-cultural rehabilitation, which characterizes what our respondents generally desired.

Torpey himself must have recognized this shortcoming. In a later work on this framework (2003a), he maintains that his previous ideal types should be considered "endpoints on a continuum" of symbolic or economic reparations, instead of "being mutually exclusive" (p. 11). This is the exact recommendation I made in my earlier paper, where I put forth the idea that reparations should be considered on a continuum between commemorative and transformative (which I now refer to as "rehabilitative") goals. Commemorative reparations would only commemorate past injustices, as their name suggests, whereas rehabilitative measures would involve reparations to rehabilitate the victims.

For example, commemorative reparations might include symbolic lump sum payments to individuals or the erection of a war monument. Rehabilitative reparations, on the other hand, would encompass efforts to rebuild infrastructure and social services, to make trade policies more equitable, or build museums to acknowledge historical injustices. The key difference between the two types is their larger purpose: whether or not they are to have any large-scale, pragmatic effect on the daily lives of the victims. I suggest that in cases where there are high levels of deprivation, such as the African case, rehabilitative reparations are the most likely and attractive option. It would be counterintuitive, as our respondents pointed out, to solely commemorate harms of the past without any practical changes to address the legacies of those harms. The case for African reparations thus falls nearer the rehabilitative end of the continuum.

My other concern with Torpey’s original framework was that it did not adequately account for the idea of cultural rehabilitation through reparations. While Brooks (1999a) asserts that rehabilitative reparations could “nurture...cultural transformation” (p. 9), Torpey restricted the means of cultural rehabilitation—that is, museums, monuments, return of artifacts, and the like—to symbolic reparations that do not appear to play a rehabilitative function. Our respondents showed that this need not necessarily be the case and indeed some supported such cultural reparations to help rehabilitate African history and cultural identity. To his credit, his new framework has made steps towards recognizing “the role of reparations in repairing the damages said to have been inflicted on a culture” (Torpey, 2003a, p. 11).

Furthermore, Torpey’s second type of claim seems concerned only with injustices in the past which have effects on the present. This approach is applicable to the legacies of slavery and colonialism in Africa, but some of our respondents experienced perceived injustices perpetuated in contemporary times, such as the debt crisis, damaging structural
adjustment programs, and exploitation by multinational corporations. It would therefore be erroneous to claim that African economic and social problems are exclusively rooted in past domination; to do so would obscure the totality of problems they experience in the present day.

Torpey also brings up another common issue in the reparations literature, that of “backward” and “forward” looking reparation claims. There is some deliberation in the literature about whether reparations should atone for the past injustices themselves (“backward” looking), or for the legacies of those injustices (“forward” looking). In other words, there is debate about whether reparations should directly address the actual past harms (e.g., through individual payments to persons identified as direct victims of past harms) or their connection to present injustices (e.g., the sort of rehabilitative reparations our respondents seek). Support falls generally for “forward” looking orientations (e.g., du Plessis, 2003; Satz, 2004). Du Plessis (2003), for example, states

the call for compensation ought to shift away from attempts to compensate for racial injustices against victims of the past...and focus instead on correcting contemporary effects of past wrongs as they continue to present themselves in the here and now. (pp. 651-652)

Human Rights Watch (2001) maintains a similar view, writing that reparation claims should not focus “on the past abuse itself but on its contemporary effects....[and] focus on people who can reasonably claim that today they personally suffer the effects of past...violations through continuing economic and social deprivation” (p. 1).

When the issue of “forward” looking reparations arises, it is often accompanied by the question how such forward looking reparations—such as altered trade policies, etc.—can be considered “reparations” instead of just “routine” policy changes. The answer, in my view, lies in the presence of apology and acknowledgement in the reparations process. If such changes were to be implemented with accompanying apology and acknowledgement, then they could be considered reparations. In the absence of the symbolic statements, the changes could not be considered reparations as such. As Boxill (1972) puts it, “part of what is involved in rectifying an injustice is an acknowledgment on the part of the transgressor that what he is doing is required of him because of his prior error [italics added]” (p. 118). Brooks (1999a; 2003) makes a similar point in his distinctions between “reparations” and “settlements,” where he argues that “usually, a reparation is easily distinguishable from a settlement by the presence or absence of an accompanying statement of apology” (1999a, p. 9).

I suggest that we can conceptualize the complete reparations process as both backward and forward looking: symbolic acts of apology and acknowledgment can be

\[See especially Boxill (1972, pp. 117-118) on the ideas of forward and backward reparation schemes.\]
made for and to address the past (and, if applicable, present) injustices, while the compensatory aspects (broadly defined) can acts as reparations for present situations. Such an approach thus overcomes the problems of deciding whether reparations should directly address the actual past harms as opposed to their present consequences. A South African lecturer brought up just this problem with respect to reparations for apartheid (9). He related a story about a South African youth group concerned that the government was wasting money on the past (through reparations in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission), which they felt would be better spent on job creation, education, and other mandates for youth. The respondent said this story had stayed on his mind because he wondered, "How do you [mediate] between those quite legitimate needs of both groups?" Conceptualizing reparations as both backward and forward looking, I submit, presents a plausible solution to this problem.

Indeed, this sort of forward looking approach seems to make the most sense for African reparations, given the intricacies of the context of those reparation claims. It would be difficult to assume a backward looking approach because there are no "direct" victims of slavery to compensate, and compensating victims of colonialism would involve large-scale reparations. Further, if one accepts that reparations are required for the neo-colonial period, one cannot assume a backward looking orientation for injustices that are ongoing. More pragmatically speaking, forward looking reparations could help alleviate the social and economic problems that Africa presently faces. Taking a forward-looking approach addresses these problems, and it also offers a reasonable alternative to the traditional conception of reparation as restoration.

It is quite clear that our respondents share these views, and they have demonstrated a forward looking orientation towards reparations. They seek reparations which will have a rehabilitative effect on Africa, for both present and future generations. Further, they made no requests for reparations to address past harms explicitly. Their emphasis on collective and continuing forms of reparations indicates a movement away from reparations to atone only for the past injustices, and this may again be a reflection of the present economic and social realities in Africa.

The case for African reparations thus challenges some of the existing theory on reparations, a point which I made not only in this chapter but also in the preceding ones. Here I have shown that a "status quo," restoration approach to reparations cannot fit the African reparations case, thus we must recognize that a "status quo" return through reparations is sometimes an impossibility. I once again demonstrated that the context of reparations claims play a role in shaping those claims themselves; when injustices are long in the past and direct victims are difficult to identify, reparations must take shape as forward-looking orientations. Present situations of deprivation also play a role in this orientation. This approach makes further intuitive sense when a "status quo" return is not possible. I also made the point that forward looking reparations are inevitably rehabilitative ones, and the African reparations case demonstrates that reparations cannot easily be divided into "symbolic" or "economic." Instead, reparations can be

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rehabilitative in both ways, by both addressing economic problems, and addressing social, cultural and indeed psychological problems through symbolic reparations.

Empirical and Theoretical Contributions

Previous studies have not sought the input of Africans on the notion of reparations to Africa. My study is important because it illustrates how at least one group of Africans thinks about reparations to Africa. In addition to this empirical contribution, this work challenges and extends certain areas of reparations theory and frameworks.

Major Empirical Points

In this work, I made the following points about how our respondents thought about reparations:

Definition of reparations. On the whole, our respondents defined reparations as processes of justice (through payback measures) and development (through equalization measures). We see the early signs of a rehabilitative outlook here, as their definitions of reparations assume both a philosophical and a pragmatic approach. Their emphasis, however, is on the pragmatic aspects of reparations.

Why are reparations owed? Our respondents wanted reparations for both economic and socio-cultural harm throughout Africa’s history. In both cases, they related present deprivation in Africa to the past harms of slavery and colonialism, and, to some extent, perceived injustices from the neo-colonial period. They did not, however, share a clear consensus on how far back, or how far forward, reparations claims should stretch.

Respondents who spoke about the generational responsibility problem assumed either a “moral” or an “inherited responsibility” approach. In the former approach, present generations should not be held guilty for the historical injustices, but they nonetheless have a moral obligation to right a past misdeed. The latter approach takes the view that as a citizen of a nation with past misdeeds, if you accept the benefits of that citizenship, you must also accept its liabilities, regardless of when you became a citizen of that nation. In either case, the majority of our respondents believed that the West has harmed and owes some form of reparations to Africa.

Apology and acknowledgement. Our respondents shared a general sense that apology and acknowledgement are an important part of reparations. Our respondents further demonstrated that apology and acknowledgement are more than just symbolic acts—they also have pragmatic consequences: (1) acknowledging facts on the public record; (2) relieving psychological burdens; (3) preventing repetition; and (4) functioning as a starting point to the balance of the reparations process.

This final point is very important, because our respondents felt that reparations must necessarily go beyond symbolic statements of apology and acknowledgement.
Many linked the sincerity of apology and acknowledgement to commitments beyond those words. Beyond this limit of apologies and acknowledgements, some of our respondents believed that the likelihood of the statements might be hindered by contemporary global political realities (i.e., the power differentials between the West and Africa) and/or the possible legal ramifications branching from such statements.

**Compensating Africa.** Our respondents wanted reparations chiefly to address the present legacies of past harms to Africa. They felt economic and social reparations were most important, especially measures to improve African development and economy, strengthen Africa’s relationship with and participation in the global economy, and alleviate social problems, like poverty, and poor health care and education systems. While many respondents felt that cultural reparations were important, some believed that they were “luxuries” and should take second priority to the “basics.”

Moreover, our respondents sought reparations largely for the collective good. They made no calls for individual payments, and in so doing, they overcame many of the problems associated with individual reparation payment approaches. Further, they demonstrated a desire for participation in the reparations process as a buffer against government corruption, and also as a means to embrace all levels of African society in the process. Again, we clearly see the idea of reparations as rehabilitation through such views.

**Social movement for African reparations.** Despite the existence of numerous advocacy groups, at present, a “social movement” for African reparations as such does not exist. The various advocates and advocacy groups are best considered unmobilized sentiment pools (McCarthy, 1987) which require organization into a more cohesive and representative body to advocate reparations. This can be achieved through frame alignment processes, but not without encountering “frame disputes” (Benford, 1993) on pivotal topics. Once organized, the group(s) can continue frame alignment processes to recruit new participants to their cause. As it presently stands, however, the advocates and groups are not in a position to successfully claim reparations for Africa.

**Major Theoretical Contributions**

One of the main points I reiterated throughout this study is that the case of African reparations is very different from previous instances of reparations. This is true with respect to the timing and duration of the injustice(s) in question and the possibilities to identify perpetrators and victims of the harms, especially “direct” victims. Because of these key differences, the notion of African reparations challenges and extends reparations theory and frameworks in various ways.

**Apology and acknowledgement.** The “symbolic” acts of apology and acknowledgement should not be considered as solely symbolic; they can have practical effects, as our respondents pointed out. Further, this particular case demonstrates that we must account for power differentials between the offended and offender when discussing
the likelihood of an apology or acknowledgement. Traditional “apology theory” takes it that an injustice places an offending party in a liminal state requiring acceptance back into a social milieu. While this may be true in many (perhaps most?) cases, it is not absolute, especially in this case. Instead, Africa is a clear case of a weaker power seeking apology and inclusion from the West, the stronger power, representing an inversion of the traditional process.

Moreover, legal ramifications need not always be an impediment to apology or acknowledgement. The threat of legal ramifications would seem to only be a concern in cases where an offending party made an apology or acknowledgement as an isolated, spontaneous act. If, however, the offending party made the statements as part of a reparations settlement, where the boundaries of obligation had already been set, then an apology or acknowledgement would not carry the threat of further legal challenges. The real challenge lies in arriving at the point where a reparations settlement is a real possibility.

Most importantly, we have seen that, for this case at least, commitments beyond words (or material reparations) are not optional components in the reparations process. To the extent that action beyond words is connected to the sincerity of the apology or acknowledgement, material reparations cannot be divorced from the “symbolic” acts. Along similar lines, I made the argument that institutional apologies need not be devoid of notions of sorrow, remorse or sincerity. Instead, we should see these notions as embodied in the recipient’s reaction to the apology and acknowledgement, instead of considering them to be inherent in the act of apology or acknowledgement itself.

Compensation (material reparations). I argued that we should not use a restrictive definition of “monetary” or “financial” compensation that refers solely to individual or lump sum cash payments. Instead, we should use the term to refer to any type of investment in reparations, whether that does indeed translate to individual payments, or to funds to build and maintain new roads, schools or hospitals. Using the term in its more restrictive sense becomes a bit misleading and obscures a more encompassing meaning of compensation.

Reparations frameworks and approaches. Traditional “status quo” or “restorative” approaches to reparations do not adequately fit this particular case. An ante-injustice status quo is too difficult, if not impossible, to determine for the historical injustices perpetrated against Africa. I suggest that such an approach may be better suited to more “narrowly defined” injustices, where harms occurred for a finite period of time, direct victims can be identified and compensated, it is clear who the perpetrators were, and an ante-injustice state can be determined or calculated. In the case of Africa, reparations should be a considered a means to delivering the continent from its previous status quo state as a weaker, deprived global power to a more empowered state.

I also made the point that reparations can ameliorate not only economic and social deprivation, but also cultural deprivation. Cultural reparations should not always be
considered solely “symbolic” reparations, as these reparations can play a role in rehabilitating an injured collective psyche or cultural identity. To this end, I supported the idea that rehabilitative reparations are more likely to occur in situations where present situations of deprivation are high. Where present situations of economic and social deprivation are related to past injustices, it would be morally short-sighted to simply commemorate the past wrongs while not addressing the legacies of those wrongs.

Finally, I argued that we should conceptualize reparations as both backward and forward looking. In a case like reparations to Africa, there is no need to equivocate about whether reparations should address past harms or their present injustices. Indeed, reparations can do both, where statements of apology and acknowledgement address past harms, and the material reparations address their present legacies.

A Tentative Assessment: Are Reparations Owed to Africa?

One topic I have not yet addressed in this analysis is my personal view on whether or not reparations are owed to Africa. I want to explore my tentative answer to this question in this final section. I do so, however, with a strong disclaimer: I am by no means a specialist in African history, economy, politics or society, nor am I a political scientist or lawyer. I make my statements here based only on my reading and research for this project.

Reparations are owed to Africa. Certain wrongs, specifically the Atlantic slave trade and colonialism, were undeniably human injustices perpetrated against Africa and require atonement. I therefore take a moral approach to this question, which I believe is the most sensible to assume. A legal approach seems to me to rely too much upon a burden of legal “proof” requiring evidence that would be difficult to uncover in this case. An emphasis on obligations, steeped in morality, is an approach which does not require such stringent levels of proof. I do not believe that present generations in offending nations are guilty or responsible for the harms of the past, but at the same time I do not believe that the passage of time and generations negates obligation. Present generations, including state and society, have responsibility for past harms insofar as they have an obligation to amend these past wrongs on behalf of their nation’s history.

Reparations are most certainly owed for the historical (and human) injustices of slavery and colonialism. I am persuaded by the argument that political independence means that African countries are liable for their present day problems. I cannot, however, ignore the view that the past injustices play a role in shaping Africa’s present realities. Thus I emphasize again my “combined” backward and forward looking approach to reparations. Offending parties can make apologies and acknowledgements for the past historical injustices, while initiating reparations in the present to atone for these past events but, in so doing, they can correct many of the injustices our respondents perceived.

55 For example, questions like quantifying numbers of victims and harm.
Our respondents were largely concerned with changing trade policies, tariffs, and subsidies, encouraging more equitable relationships with international organizations and the global economy, and debt relief. Making positive changes in these areas as reparations will effectively atone for both the past and “present” injustices. Such an approach therefore offers the proverbial best of both worlds for the recipients of the reparations.

Western nations involved in the Atlantic slave trade and colonial rule should be called upon to provide reparations to Africa. I am not so convinced that multinational corporations and international organizations share the same level of responsibility as nations because they did not have the same intentions, but they are not completely without blame. Putting the suggested changes our respondents sought into action, however, will necessarily require the combined efforts of nations, multinational corporations, international organizations and the like. Thus the neo-colonial “offenders” will still be indirectly involved in providing reparations.

In keeping with my emphasis on the backward/forward looking approach, I believe that apology and acknowledgement for the historical harms (and perhaps even acknowledgement of their present legacies) is necessary. Without these statements, as I maintained before, any changes implemented should not be considered “reparations,” because offending nations need to acknowledge their roles and detrimental effects for the historical record and the potential psychological benefits.

The material reparations need to assume a rehabilitative function. They should not be lump sum, individual payments, which may have little effect on actual rehabilitation. Instead, they should be carefully chosen investments into problematic areas of African economy and society, such as infrastructure, technology, education and health care, as well as the requested changes in Africa’s relationship to the global economy and its economic independence. Economic and trade changes may set the foundation for future prosperity in Africa. I believe that debt relief is also a necessity, but I do not know the economic plausibility of such an event. While I can see the importance of cultural reparations, I agree with the majority of our respondents that they should take second place to more pressing needs; a “culture” is difficult to maintain in a society plagued by various levels of deprivation. Further, these forms of reparations will carry some guarantee that future generations will benefit from them, and the reparations will not be perceived as for the exclusive benefit of the present generation.

In short, I believe that reparations need to go beyond the symbolic level. The most important consequence of reparations, I should think, would be to help empower Africa and its population, to allow it to become more of a powerful participant in the

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56 Again, this is a tentative view on my part. At present, however, it seems to me that multinational corporations and international organizations are not operating in Africa to deliberately disrupt its advancement in the way that slavery and colonialism did.
global economy and decision-making structure. Once again, however, I cannot speak for the political viability of such a vast alteration in global political realities.
REFERENCES


Thompson, J. (2004, February). *Coming to terms with the past in Australia*. Paper presented at Reparations: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Some Philosophical Issues, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON.


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APPENDIX A

Interview Schedule

This interview is to find out about your opinions on reparations to Africa.

N.B. Res = respondent raised this answer on own; Int = interviewer prompted respondent about this category

A) Participation in the Movement for Reparations

1) Have you heard of the idea that the Western world owes reparations to Africa?

1) Had you heard about the idea of reparations before this interview?

   a) If so, how did you hear about it?

       i) colleagues? Res ___ Int ___

       ii) family? Res ___ Int ___

       iii) mass media? Res ___ Int ___

           - newspapers or journals?

           - the Net?

   b) If so, with whom have you discussed this idea?

       i) colleagues? Res ___ Int ___

       ii) family? Res ___ Int ___

       iii) friends? Res ___ Int ___

2) If you had heard about this idea, did you give it much thought before this interview?

3) Have you taken part yourself in the movement for reparations?

   - if so, how?

4) Do you know anything about the Durban Conference against Racism, held in September 2001?

   - were you interested in this conference?

   - did you expect any results from it?

   - do you know what the results were?

5) Were you involved in any way in the Durban Conference or in preparations for it?

   - participated?
6) Have you been involved in any other actions regarding reparations?
   - by your government? Res __ Int __
   - in non-governmental organizations? Res __ Int __
   - by writing? Res __ Int __
   - by participating in or giving workshops or training? Res __ Int __
   - in any other way?

7) If you have not been involved, would you like to be involved in the reparations movement?
   If so, what kind of involvement would you prefer?

8) N.B: INTERVIEWER SHOULD NOT PROMPT THIS QUESTION:

   Are you aware of reparations anywhere else in the world?
   - already given to other people?
     - to whom? __________________
     - by whom? __________________
   - claimed but not yet given?
     - to whom? _________________
     - by whom? __________________

B) The Term “Reparations”

1) What does the term reparations mean to you?

2) How do you think that Africa has been affected in the past by its relations with the West?
   via the slave trade? Res __ Int __
   via colonialism? Res __ Int __
   via “neo-colonialism”? Res __ Int __
   via globalization? Res ___ Int ___
   via Structural Adjustment Programs? Res ___ Int ___
   any other way?
3) NB: INTERVIEWER SHOULD NOT PROMPT THIS QUESTION:
Have there been any beneficial aspects of Western relations with Africa?

Code for

education ____
health/hospitals ____
Christianity ____
other ____

4) What about your own country: how has it been affected
- by relations with its former colonial power? (U.K., France, Portugal)
- by relations with the West in general?

5) If you believe that the West or any Western country has harmed Africa, do you think the West or the particular Western country should acknowledge the harm it has done?
- to Africa?
- to your own country?

6) I would like to investigate the idea of acknowledgement some more.

a) How should the West/a Western country acknowledge the harm it has done Africa?
   - e.g. an official proclamation? __________
   - a statement by the Head of State, or President or Prime Minister? ______
   - any other way? ______________

b) How would you know that the government or individual acknowledging the harm really believed what was said?

7) Do you think the West, or the particular Western country, owes an apology?
- to Africa?
- to your own country?

8) I would like to investigate the idea of apology some more.

a) How does a powerful African apologize to a less powerful African (e.g. chief to commoner, lineage head to young person)

b) How would an African person show forgiveness, once an apology had been offered?

c) How could the West/a western country show its apology was sincere?
d) Could you forgive the West, or the former colonial power of your country, if an apology was offered?

   e) do you think most people in your country could forgive?

9) The term “reparations” can mean acknowledgement or apology, but it can also refer to financial compensation. If the West, or the former colonial powers, were to pay Africa compensation, on what do you think the money should be spent?

   a) education? Res _____ Int _____
      - education about Western-African relations? Res _____ Int _____
      - general education? Res _____ Int _____
   b) health and hospitals? Res _____ Int _____
   c) development projects/infrastructure Res _____ Int _____
   d) monuments? Res _____ Int _____
   e) museums? Res _____ Int _____
   d) other?

10) If the Western world, or any former colonial power, were to pay compensation, to whom should the money be given?

   - governments? Res _____ Int _____
   - non-governmental organizations? Res _____ Int _____
   - others? Res _____ Int _____

11) Some people in other parts of the world have been discussing the idea that art, artifacts, or other materials taken away from a country that has been colonized or conquered in war should be returned to it.

   Is this an idea you had heard of before I just mentioned it? Yes ____ No ____

   What do you think of this idea?

12) Do any other Western groups besides Western or colonial governments owe reparations to Africa?

   a) multinational corporations? Res _____ Int _____
      If you think such corporations do owe reparations, can you name any particular corporations?
   b) foreign/non ethnic-African businessmen in Africa? (E.g. Greeks, Lebanese, Asians) Res _____ Int _____
   c) international organizations (e.g. International Monetary Fund, World Bank) Res _____ Int _____
d) churches or missionaries? Res ___ Int ___
e) non-governmental organizations? Res ___ Int ___
f) any other groups?

13) How, if at all, do you think that the following non-Western countries or regions have affected Africa in general, or your country in particular?

- the Soviet Union
- China
- Cuba
- the Arab world

If you think any of these countries or regions has harmed Africa or your own country

a) should they acknowledge the harm they have done?
b) should they apologize for the harm they have done?
c) would you be willing to accept such an apology and forgive them?
d) should they pay financial compensation?

14) Had you thought about any of the questions I just asked you before this interview?

C) Personal Experiences and Feelings

I now have some personal questions for you. I hope you will feel able to speak freely, even though I myself am white and Western.

1) How do you personally feel about the Western world and its relations to Africa?

- anger? Res ___ Int ___
- bitter? Res ___ Int ___
- hurt? Res ___ Int ___

2) Do you think other people in your country feel

- anger? Res ___ Int ___
- bitter? Res ___ Int ___
- hurt? Res ___ Int ___

3) Do you think that you personally have been affected by the West’s relations with Africa?

If so, how?
4) Do you think that members of your family have been affected by the West’s involvement in Africa?
If so, how?

5) Has your village or hometown been affected by the West?
If so, how?

6) Do you have any special feelings about, or opinions of, white people?

7) Do you have any special feelings about, or opinions of, people from your former colonial power?

8) Had you thought about this set of questions before this interview?

D) Please Answer the Following Questions About Yourself

1) Full Name:

2) Contact Information:
Mailing Address:
Telephone:
Fax:
E-mail:

3) Citizenship:

4) Birthplace:

5) Please name the village or town you were born in.
Village:
Town:

What is the chief economic basis of your home village or town?

6) Sex: Male Female

7) Age:

8) Marital Status:

9) Number of Children: Male ____ Female ____

10) Parents’ occupations/levels of education:
a) Mother’s occupation (before retirement, if relevant):

b) Mother’s level of education:

c) Father’s occupation (before retirement, if relevant):

d) Father’s level of education:

11) Your Educational Background:

a) What is your highest level of education? Please pick one:

No formal education:
Primary school:
High school:
Post-secondary:

b) What type(s) of school(s) have you attended (please pick as many as are relevant)

Public:
Mission:
Koranic:
Private:

c) Please answer this question if you have post-secondary education.

BA or equivalent completed? Yes No

Subject:

University:

Year of degree:

MA/MSc or equivalent completed? Yes No

Subject:

University:

Year of degree:

Ph.D. completed? Yes No

Subject:

University:

Year of degree:
Professional degree? Yes  No

Subject:

University:

Year of degree:

12) Your present occupation:

How many years in occupation?

Name of employer?

Previous occupations and dates? (If too many to list, please give a brief account of other occupations you may have had)

13) Languages spoken (African and other; please list up to four)

14) Ethnic Group (i.e. within Africa, e.g. Ewe in Ghana, Kikuyu in Kenya):

If multiple ethnicities, please list all you think are relevant:

15) Religion:

Denomination (if relevant; e.g. if Protestant, are you Anglican, Baptist, Presbyterian, or another group: please specify):

16) In what capacity are you/will you be at this meeting (where we are interviewing you)?

17) Please list up to four voluntary or non-governmental groups in which you are presently a member, with the approximate date that you joined.

1) Name:

Member since:

2) Name:

Member since:

3) Name:

Member since:

4) Name:

Member since:
18) Please list up to four more voluntary or non-governmental groups in which you have been a member in the past, with the approximate dates you were a member.

1) Name:
Dates:

2) Name:
Dates:

3) Name:
Dates:

4) Name:
Dates:

19) Please list the names of countries you have traveled to outside your own (if too many, please name up to four in each region)

In Africa?

In Europe?

Elsewhere?
APPENDIX B

Letter of Information

March 2004

Dear Madam/Sir,

This letter is to request your assistance in a research project.

I am Canada Research Chair in Global Studies and Political Science at Wilfrid Laurier University, in Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. My contact information is printed above. My research is financed by Grant number 410-2002-1323 from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

My project is on the question of “What the West Owes Africa”: that is, on what, if anything, the Western world owes Africa as reparation for the periods of the slave trade, colonialism, and post-colonial relations. As part of this project I am approaching informed Africans to ask if they are willing to be interviewed on their thoughts on this question, and as well, on whether they, personally, have taken part in any way in the movement for reparations to Africa.

I am requesting an interview with you for about an hour and a half during your time at the Raoul Wallenberg Institute Advanced International Programme on Human Rights. Either I or my research assistant, Anthony Lombardo (BA Hons.), will conduct the interview. This interview can be “on the record” (i.e., your name would be known) or “off the record” (confidential) as you prefer; or, if you prefer, part of the interview can be on the record and part confidential. With your consent, I will tape record the interview for future transcription: if you prefer, I will not tape the interview, but merely take notes instead.

Should you permit this interview, you will be free to end it at any time you wish. Also, after the interview is complete, you may instruct me at any time you wish to cease using your responses in my research.

There will be no payment for this interview. There are also no physical risks to you. Should you believe that there are any political risks in granting me this interview, I will guarantee complete confidentiality. Or, you may prefer not to grant me the interview.
I will be able to provide you with references to the publications that emerge from the interviews I have conducted, at your request. No one will see the transcripts of the interview except me and my co-authors (if any), my research assistants (when necessary), and of course, the individuals who transcribes the interview.

For further information, you may contact me via any of the means indicated in my return address, as above. Or, you may wish to contact the Chair of the Wilfrid Laurier University Research Ethics Board for Social Sciences:

Dr. Bill Marr,
Chair, Research Ethics Board,
Department of Economics,
Wilfrid Laurier University,
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3C5
tel (519) 884-1710 extension 2468
bmarr@wlu.ca

Yours sincerely,

Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann
APPENDIX C

Consent Form

Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, What the West Owes Africa
Consent Form

I, ____________________________ (Printed name) consent to be interviewed by Professor Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann or her research assistant ____________________________ for her research project on "What the West Owes Africa".

I understand that although I have consented to the interview, I am free to end it at any time I wish. Further, I understand that once the interview has been completed, I may instruct Professor Howard-Hassmann at any time I wish to cease using my responses in her research. I understand that no one will see the transcript of this interview except Dr. Howard-Hassmann and her co-authors (if any), her research assistants (when necessary), and the individual who transcribes the interview (in the event that I grant permission to have it tape-recorded). I agree that the individuals named in the previous sentence may read this interview.

I understand that there will be no payment for this interview. I also understand that the interview itself poses no physical risks to me. Further, I understand that aside from granting me complete confidentiality, should I request it, Professor Howard-Hassmann cannot protect me from any political risks that granting her this interview may entail.

Confidentiality: Please initial one of the two options below:

_____ I have agreed to be interviewed "on the record" (That is, I grant Professor Howard-Hassmann permission to reveal my name in written and oral material that uses information from my interview).

_____ I have agreed to be interviewed on condition of complete confidentiality (That is, Professor Howard-Hassmann may not reveal my name in any written or oral material that uses information from my interview).

Tape-Recording: Please initial one of the three options below.

_____ Professor Howard-Hassmann has my permission to tape record my interview.

_____ Professor Howard-Hassmann does not have my permission to tape record my interview.

_____ I will indicate throughout the interview the parts that Professor Howard-Hassmann may or may not tape-record.

Signature ____________________________ Date ____________________________