

THE RISE OF THE ALBERTAN WESTERN SEPARATIST MOVEMENT IN 1980

A STUDY OF SOCIETAL CONDITIONS
RELATED TO THE RISE OF THE
ALBERTAN WESTERN SEPARATIST MOVEMENT
IN 1980

By
CHRISTINA MARY SZOLLOSZ, B.A.

A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Master of Arts

McMaster University
(August) 1983

MASTER OF ARTS (1983)
(Sociology)

McMASTER UNIVERSITY
Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: A Study of Societal Conditions Related to the
Rise of the Albertan Western Separatist Move-
ment in 1980

AUTHOR: Christina Mary Szollosy, B.A. (McMaster
University)
B.ED. (University of
Toronto)

SUPERVISOR: Dr. Ralph Matthews
Dr. Frank Jones
Dr. Michael Atkinson

NUMBER OF PAGES: x, 312

ABSTRACT

This study is an indepth examination of societal conditions related to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement during 1980. The paradigm chosen to analyze Albertan societal conditions was from Neil J. Smelser's Theory of Collective Behavior. To operationalize the given paradigm, Maurice Pinard's theory of one-party dominance, James C. Davies' theory of revolution, and the concept of 'issues' were employed. In comparison to Saskatchewan and Ontario, only Alberta's federal and provincial political party systems were characterized by the condition of one-party dominance. A sudden state of uncertainty, a revision of Davies' theory of revolution, likewise prevailed exclusively within Alberta. In addition, Alberta underwent greater social changes during the 1970's. These findings indicated further that Alberta's political, economic, and social conditions seemingly combined to produce a pre-conducive state for the re-emergence of the western separatist movement in that province.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisory committee, Ralph Matthews, Frank Jones, and Michael Atkinson, for their valuable assistance and contributions given during the preparation and completion of this thesis. I would also like to thank Lillian Giavedoni for her guidance regarding the use of computer facilities at McMaster University. Moreover, I would like to thank Debra Boychuk for her meticulous job in typing the thesis' final transcript. Most of all, special thanks are extended to the members of my family for their constant interest and encouragement in my daily work.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
	1
	6
ONE	7
	8
	13
	13
	24
	33
	60
	62
TWO	73
	75
	80
	91
	93
	99
	104
	109
	110
THREE	116

CHAPTER

PAGE

Movement During the Late 1960's	119
Phase II - Issues Prior to the Re-emergence of the Albertan Western Separatist Movement in the Early 1970's	131
Phase III - Issues Prior to the Rise of the Albertan Western Separatist Movement in 1980	146
Conclusion	163
Bibliography	165

FOUR

<u>An Analysis of Political, Economic, and Social Conditions Related to the Rise of the Albertan Western Separatist Movement</u>	186
Methodology	187
I - The Operationalization of Smelser's Determinant of Structural Conduciveness	191
II - The Operationalization of Smelser's Determinant of Structural Strain	203
III - An Analysis of Social Change	214
(i) An Analysis of the General Characteristics of Alberta's Population	217
(ii) Composition of the Labour Force	227
(iii) An Analysis of Average Income for Families and Unattached Individuals	231
(iv) A Discussion on the Section of Social Change	234
Conclusion	237
Bibliography	241

FIVE

<u>An Analysis of Societal Conditions Using the Quality of Life Study (May-August 1979)</u>	252
Methodology	253
I - An Examination of Smelser's Determinant of Structural Conduciveness	259
II - An Examination of Smelser's Determinant of Structural Strain	271
III - An Examination of Social Changes	281
Conclusion	284
Bibliography	287

Conclusion

A Statement Regarding This Study	290
--	-----

CHAPTER	PAGE
An Update on the Albertan Western Separatist Movement	299
Bibliography	305
<u>APPENDICES</u>	307
Appendix 1 Table A. Respondents' Sex by Province (1979) 18 Years of Age and Older	308
Appendix 2 Table B(1). Respondents' Age by Province (1979) - Both Sexes 18 Years of Age and Older	309
Table B(2). Respondents' Age by Province Controlling for Respondents' Sex - Male 18 Years of Age and Older	309
Table B(3). Respondents' Age by Province Controlling for Respondents' Sex - Female 18 Years of Age and Older	309
Appendix 3 Variables Chosen from the Quality of Life Study (1979)....	310

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

		PAGE
Chart	1-1	Development of the Western Separatist Movement in the 1960's
		11
Chart	1-2	Development of the Western Separatist Movement in the 1970's (British Columbia)
		15
Table	1:1	Election Results of the Esquimalt-Port Renfrew Riding
		24
Chart	1-3	Development of the Western Separatist Movement in the 1970's (Alberta)
		27
Chart	1-4	The Rise of the Western Separatist Movement in 1980
		35
Chart	2-1	Davies' Theory of Need Satisfaction and Revolution
		102
Table	3:1	Regional Attitudes Toward Official Bilingualism (1969)
		120
Table	3:2	Estimated Revenues from Oil and Natural Gas Production
		158
Table	3:3	Oil and Gas Incentives Under the National Energy Program
		162
Table	4:1	Distribution of Parties' Votes at the Federal Level, Ontario, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, 1968-1980
		197
Table	4:2	Distribution of Parties' Votes at the Provincial Level, Ontario, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, 1968-1980
		200
Table	4:3	Gross Domestic Product in Constant (1971) Dollars for Alberta and Saskatchewan (1)
		208
Table	4:4	Total Labour Force(1) and Annual Unemployment Rate(2)(3), 1970-1980
		210
Chart	4-1	Analysis of Conditions of Structural Strain, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Ontario, 1970-1980(1)
		211
Chart	4-2	Sudden State of Uncertainty
		214
Table	4:5	Annual Population Growth Rate (per 1,000); 1970-1980
		218
Table	4:6	Population by Urban, Rural-Non-Farm, and Rural Farm Distribution, 1971 and 1976
		220
Table	4:7	Population by Sex; 1970-1980(1)
		221
Table	4:8	Population by Age; 1970-1980
		223

	PAGE
Table 4:9 Ethnic Groups; 1961 and 1971(1)	224
Table 4:10 Percentage Distribution of the Population by Religious Denomina- tion; 1961 and 1971	225
Table 4:11 Marriage Rates (per 1,000 popula- tion)	226
Table 4:12 Divorce Rates (per 100,000 popula- tion and Percent Change in Rate); 1970-1980	226
Table 4:13 Labour Force(1) by Industry Cate- gories, Showing Percentage Dis- tributions; 1975 to 1980(2)	229
Table 4:14 Labour Force(1) by Occupation Cate- gories, Showing Percentage Dis- tributions; 1975 to 1980(2)	230
Table 4:15 'Real' Average Income(1) of Families (2) and Unattached Individuals(3), All Areas; 1971-1979	233
Table 5:1 Opinion - Quebec Separating from Canada	256
Table 5:2 Voting Intentions if a Federal Elec- tion Held Today(1) (2)	261
Table 5:3 Federal Political Party Preference in 1979(1) (2)	261
Table 5:4 Voting Intentions if a Provincial Election Held Today (1) (2)	263
Table 5:5 Provincial Political Party Preference in 1979(1) (2)	263
Table 5:6 Opinion - 'Quebec' Separating from Canada by Provincial Party Prefer- ence	265
Table 5:7 Opinion - 'Quebec' Separating from Canada by Satisfaction with Federal Government (1)	266
Table 5:8 Opinion - 'Quebec' Separating from Canada by Perceived Power-Provincial Government(1)	268
Table 5:9 Opinion - 'Quebec' Separating from Canada by Federal or Provincial Power	269
Table 5:10 Ladder - Life Expect 2 Years from Now(1)	273
Table 5:11 Able to Buy More Next Year than Last(1)	273
Table 5:12 Opinion - 'Quebec' Separating from Canada by Comparison of this Province with Others(1)	277

	PAGE
Table 5:13 Opinion - 'Quebec' Separating from Canada by Direction of Life Change(1)	278
Table 5:14 Opinion - 'Quebec' Separating from Canada by Hopeless Everything Will Turn Out Right(1)	279
Table 5:15 Opinion - 'Quebec' Separating from Canada by Effect on Life - Change Place of Residence(1)	283

INTRODUCTION

The Albertan western separatist movement in Canada gained national prominence during 1980. It was no longer considered a western joke or a movement of less significance in comparison to the separatist threat within Quebec. This study will examine the societal conditions that existed and that may have thereby contributed to its rise. It will examine whether any significant changes have occurred within Alberta's political, economic, and/or social sectors and if any of these changes were unique to Alberta in comparison to two other provinces. Thus, the main purpose of this study is to ascertain if the above-mentioned changes occurred and thereby established a conducive predisposition to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement during 1980. Moreover, the comparisons may help in indicating possible reasons for the movement's relative confinement to Alberta.

A major area of study within the discipline of sociology is social movements. This area of study specifically asks four basic questions:

- (1) What is the previous condition of society from which a movement emerges?,
 - (2) What sequence of events is required before a movement begins?,
 - (3) What determines the timing of its inception?,
 - and (4) What are the personal characteristics of people which make them receptive to a new movement?
- (Cameron, 1966: 173)

The present study examines the first, second, and third of these questions in relation to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement during 1980. This study thereby is a sociological examination of the context in which the Albertan western separatist movement arose.

At this point, additional factors should be noted for an overall view of the study's research design. First, the analysis of the chosen variables for the three provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Ontario will be limited to a ten-year period prior to 1980. Secondly, this study will predominately emphasize statistical data and quantitative analysis. A discussion of the research design and its selection will be given in greater detail later.

Chapter one is a history of the western separatist movement in Canada. Minimal information was known about the western separatist movement prior to 1980. In fact, few people realized that a western separatist movement had existed since the latter years of the 1960's. This chapter is designed to dispel that perception. Also, in this chapter, the location and extent of the outbreak of western separatist sentiment will be determined, and there will be an attempt to identify the supporters and/or sympathizers of the western separatist organizations. In addition, the seriousness of the western separatist threat will be examined. The findings from this chapter will strongly influence the remainder of the study.

Chapter two describes as well as operationalizes the theory to be used in the empirical examination of the various societal conditions. The theoretical approach chosen for this study is from the field of collective behaviour. Specifically, Neil J. Smelser's Theory of Collective Behavior has been selected as the underlying framework. The chapter's first half therefore contains an indepth examination of Smelser's model and the reasons for choosing and omitting portions of his theory.

The second half of the chapter describes how the selected portions of Smelser's theory will be operationalized. The determinant of structural conduciveness, for instance, will be operationalized through the use of Maurice Pinard's theory of one-party dominance while the determinant of structural strain will be operationalized through the use of James C. Davies' theory of revolution. Moreover, the determinant of precipitating factors will be operationalized through the use of 'issues'.

The third chapter is a discussion of 'issues' contributing to the rise of each phase of the Albertan western separatist movement. A discussion of different types of issues, recent in comparison to older ones, is provided. The criteria used in order to select the recent issues as precipitating factors is then established. The remainder of the chapter is divided into the following three sections; (1) a discussion of the issues prior to the development of

the Albertan western separatist movement during the late 1960's, (2) a discussion of the issues prior to the re-emergence of the Albertan western separatist movement in the early 1970's, and (3) a discussion of the issues prior to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement in 1980. This chapter's findings indicate that precipitating factors played a significant role with respect to the rise of each phase of the given movement.

Chapter four consists of an analysis of political, economic, and social conditions over a ten-year period in relation to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement. The empirical analysis, as indicated earlier, is twofold. First, there will be an examination of a number of variables in order to determine the possible existence of structural conduciveness, structural strain as well as the possible existence of any major changes within Alberta prior to the movement's rise. If the determinants existed and if major changes occurred, it will be concluded that their presence may have thereby contributed to the movement's re-emergence within Alberta. In addition, these findings will be compared to the corresponding statistics for Saskatchewan and Ontario. The comparisons are provided in order to determine if Alberta contains any noteworthy distinctions that may indicate possible explanations for the movement's relative confinement to that province.

Chapter five provides further analysis of the possible existence of structural conduciveness, structural strain, and social changes with respect to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement during 1980. A national cross-sectional survey entitled Social Change in Canada: Trends in Attitudes, Values, and Perceptions (May-August, 1979) (See Chapter 5 for details) is used as the chapter's source of data. This survey is useful since it is

designed to measure respondent's a) perceptions of their quality of life ... their expectations and aspirations in these areas, b) personal values, c) alienation, and d) policy priorities and attitudes.

(Atkinson, et. al., 1979)

A number of the survey's variables will therefore be useful indicators of the possible existence of the above-mentioned determinants and conditions. An analysis of these variables in relation to Albertans' opinions concerning separatism will then be conducted.

Throughout the examination of societal conditions, a direct, causal relationship is not implied between the given variables and the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement. Societal conditions are not deterministic of a movement's rise. Indeed, additional factors; e.g. the effect of a populace's beliefs and motivations during the given period, the internal structure and organization of the movement, the presence of social controls within the society as well as humanistic elements, determine if a movement will arise.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Atkinson, Tom; Blishen, Bernard; Ornstein, Michael; and
Stevenson, H. Michael
1979 Social Change in Canada: Trends in Attitudes,
Values, and Perceptions National Cross-Sectional
Survey Phase II May-August, 1979, Toronto, In-
stitute for Behavioural Research (York University).
- Cameron, William Bruce
1966 Modern Social Movements A Sociological Out-
line, New York, Random House.
- Davies, James C.
1962 "Toward A Theory of Revolution", American
Sociological Review, Vol. 27, pp. 5-19.
- Pinard, Maurice
1975 The Rise of a Third Party A Study in Crisis
Politics Enlarged Edition, Montreal, McGill-
Queen's University Press.
- Smelser, Neil J.
1962 Theory of Collective Behavior, New York, The
Free Press.

CHAPTER ONE: A HISTORY OF THE WESTERN
SEPARATIST MOVEMENT IN CANADA

Prior to the flurry of western separatist activity in 1980, minimal attention was given to the western separatist movement. In fact, few people, especially in Central Canada, were conscious that western separatist organizations existed prior to 1980. Rather, central Canadians were tenuously aware of western alienation and the familiar western grievances of protective tariffs and discriminatory freight rates. Thus, these organizations seemingly emerged for the first time after the 1980 federal general election.

As will be indicated, that perception of the western separatist movement is fallacious. The movement has a history extending to the latter years of the 1960's. The movement, therefore, cannot be considered as a recent phenomenon. Moreover, it will be indicated that the western separatist movement consisted of three phases. The first phase arose in the late 1960's, a second phase emerged in the early 1970's, and a third phase re-emerged in the early months of 1980.

In the examination of the various western separatist organizations in each phase of the movement, the following characteristics of the groups will be determined; the founder(s) of the organization, the organization's ideals

and/or goals, the location and turnout of the group's meetings, the characteristics of the people that attended the gatherings, the extent of the organization's membership, and the presence or absence of internal conflicts within the group. These characteristics of the various organizations are given in order to determine the physical location of the western separatist movement, the social backgrounds of the movement's supporters and/or sympathizers as well as the extent of western separatist support and thereby the seriousness of the existing western separatist threat.

Phase I - The Early Movement During the 1960's

Prior to the nineteen-sixties, western separatism in Canada had not been an issue for thirty years. A number of western separatist groups then re-emerged in the latter years of that decade. In July 1969, it had been noted, "the West was more and more thinking the unthinkable ... separatism" (Stewart, 1969: 34).

In British Columbia and Alberta, five 'major' western separatist groups arose in the late nineteen-sixties. They were; the Western Parliament Advocates, the British Columbia Separatist Association, the Western Canada Separatist Movement, the Voice of Western Canada, and the Dominion of Canada Party. Very little information is available with respect to the Western Parliament Advocates. It is only possible to note that the group did arise during that period

(White, 1977: 6).

The British Columbia Separatist Association was also formed in the late nineteen-sixties. The group's founder was Bob Reeds, a cabaret owner in Vancouver. This organization, according to Stewart, was primarily founded to promote Reeds' nightclub (1969: 39). Still, the 2,800-seat Queen Elizabeth Theatre was rented by Reeds in order to organize a debate on separatism with a Vancouver broadcaster. Approximately one-hundred people attended the meeting (Ibid.: 39). Aside from the advertisement of Reeds' cabaret and the occurrence of this debate, the group did not accomplish much more.

In Alberta, the Western Canada Separatist Movement was organized. The group claimed to have a "substantial secret membership". But according to Stewart, "they were so secret I couldn't find any of them in two days of hard looking in Edmonton" (Ibid.: 39). In addition, the Voice of Western Canada was another separatist group based in Alberta. Gerry Beck, an Edmonton accountant, founded the V.O.W. organization during October 1969. By October 1970, the group supposedly had over four-hundred members. Later, this group amalgamated with the Dominion of Canada Party.

The Dominion of Canada Party was founded by a "sprightly and aggressive 55-year-old grandmother" named Mrs. Frawley (Ibid.: 39). The Dominion of Canada Party was not separatist. Instead, Mrs. Frawley's followers preferred


to remain and fight for their interests within Confederation. Regarding membership, Stewart stated that Mrs. Frawley felt she could not reveal the group's strength, but "she did show me an impressive bundle of supporting letters and receipts for donations as well as a map indicating 24 DOC chapters across the west" (Ibid.: 39).

The Dominion of Canada Party, as noted previously, merged with the Voice of Western Canada. Gerry Beck became the group's executive secretary. From July 1969 to October 1970, the Dominion of Canada Party's branches rose to eighty-six. The branches were supposedly located from Victoria to Halifax (Kostek, 1970: 3). Regarding the character and growth of the group, Beck stated, "we have lawyers, teachers, doctors, clerks, just about every occupation represented, and we're getting more interest in the movement every day" (Ibid.: 4). In addition, the Dominion of Canada Party acquired a separatist tinge after the merger of the two groups (Ibid.: 3).

The western separatist movement was basically considered a fringe phenomenon and thereby was not seen as a serious threat to Confederation. None of the western separatist organizations was "presently too impressive in either intellectual terms or in numbers" (Barr, 1971a: 14). Besides, the western separatist movement that arose during the late nineteen-sixties had quickly "fizzled out" (White, 1977: 6).

Chart 1-1

DEVELOPMENT OF THE WESTERN SEPARATIST MOVEMENT IN THE 1960'S

Year	Groups Based In British Columbia:			Groups Based In Alberta:	
1969	<u>Western Parliament Advocates</u> - an unknown group - based in B. C.	<u>British Columbia Separatist Association</u> 1969 - founder Bob Reeds ↓ demise of the association shortly after the Queen Elizabeth Theatre meeting	<u>Dominion of Canada Party</u> 1969 - founder Mrs. Frawley	<u>Western Canada Separatist Movement</u> - an unknown group - based in Alberta	<u>Voice of Western Canada</u> 1969 - founder Gerry Beck
<div style="text-align: center;">  <p>MERGER</p> <p>Dominion of Canada Party-Voice of Western Canada</p> <p>↓</p> <p>maintains DOCP title</p> <p>↓</p> <p>Dominion of Canada Party 1969</p> <p>Executive Secretary - Gerry Beck</p> </div>					
1971	little mention of the above-mentioned groups - reportedly "fizzled out"				

Evidently, only a very small minority was willing to embrace a "radical change" (op. cit.: 20). Still, Stewart noted, "although ... none of them (the advocates of western separatism) has come to much, western separatism is no joke" (1972: 12). A number of prominent, western leaders recognized the possible threat of western separatism. In 1970, Premier Thatcher of Saskatchewan warned Ottawa that separatism could flourish in western Canada as well as in Quebec (Bird, 1970: 7). Although Senator John Nichol did not perceive western separatism as serious, he did recognize a possible threat to Canada's future, "I don't think there's anything in this separatist bit, but I can see a generation from now a lot of people out here looking at Confederation and wondering if it makes any sense" (Stewart, 1969: 37).

John Barr similarly saw the western separatist movement as a potential threat to Canada in the future. The movement, according to Barr, was in a "relatively early phase" (1971a: 13). Moreover, "the existing Western separatist organizations resembled their counterparts in Quebec in the late 50's" (Ibid.: 14). Thus, Barr warned, "the existing Western separatist organizations ... may well be replaced in time by quite different and more formidable movements" (Ibid.: 14).

Phase II - The Re-emergence of the Western Separatist Movement in the 1970's

Western separatism did re-emerge as prophesied by Barr. In the mid-nineteen-seventies, separatist groups were again organized and located primarily in British Columbia and Alberta. From 1974 to 1979, approximately six major separatist groups were formed; the Western Canada Party, the Committee for Western Independence, the Western National Party, the Independent Alberta Association, the Western National Association, and the Western Independence Party. Various newspaper, magazine, and journal articles as well as personal recollections by Douglas Christie, revealed conflicting information on some of the above-mentioned groups. Thus, there exists a degree of confusion regarding the proper names, founders, and times of formation of some of these organizations.

WESTERN SEPARATIST GROUPS BASED IN BRITISH COLUMBIA:

Prior to February 1975, the Western Canada Party was formed as the first "federal political party" to contemplate "anything in the way of western Canadian identity politically" (Christie, 1982: Tape #25). At that time, Ontario had 88 seats, Quebec had 74 seats, and the western provinces merely had 68 seats in the House of Commons (Normandin, 1975: 175). A majority government, as indicated, could be elected without the support of western Canadian

voters. Christie concluded, "this party got nowhere in the election of 1974 because it did not have any means of saying to the people of western Canada that they could do any more than effectively have what was then 68 seats" (1982: Tape #25). The Western Canada Party failed in 1973/74 since they could not offer a stronger voice for western Canadian interests in the federal government than the traditional parties.

The Western Canada Party apparently re-emerged or a new party under the same name arose in November 1976. Regarding the organization's origin, Neale Adams reported that the Western Canada Party was an offshoot of Douglas Christie's Committee for Western Independence (1977: 8). The Montreal Star also reported that the Western Canada Party split from the Committee for Western Independence in the fall of the previous year (1977: C12). As a result, it is uncertain if the Western Canada Party was a continuation of the fore-mentioned organization or an offshoot of Christie's group.

On January 29, 1977, Edward G. Fleming, president of Western Canada Party, led a campaign for separatism in British Columbia as well as any other western province that could be persuaded to join the movement (Odam, 1977: C2). By February 1977, Fleming announced that there would be a full slate of separatist candidates in the next British Columbian and Albertan provincial elections. These acti-

Chart 1-2

DEVELOPMENT OF THE WESTERN SEPARATIST
MOVEMENT IN THE 1970'S

Year	<u>Western Separatist Groups Based in British Columbia:</u>	
1974	<u>Western Canada Party</u> - founder (unknown) - collapse of party after the federal election in 1974	<u>Committee for Western Independence</u> - founded in 1974 - founder - Douglas Christie
1975	<div style="text-align: center;">↓</div>	
1976		
1976	Re-emergence of the Western Canada Party: (1) either a continuation of activities by the Western Canada Party founded in 1974 <u>or</u> (2) a splinter group from the Committee for Western Independence - president Edward G. Fleming	<div style="text-align: center;">↓</div>
1977	<div style="text-align: center;">↓</div> little mention of the Western Canada Party after the western, provincial elections	<div style="text-align: center;">↓</div>
1978		
1979		February 1979 - Fifth Annual Meeting - Christie ousted from his position as chairman Changes in the organization: (1) new chairman - Joan Dettwiller (2) name changed to <u>Western National Party</u>
1980		<div style="text-align: center;">↓</div> Christie resigns as chairman over dispute concerning extent of group's activities - Stan Bennett becomes new chairman <div style="text-align: center;">↓</div> the group's activities are restricted to B. C. only

vities were in accordance with the Western Canada Party's goal of "carving out a nation composed of British Columbia, Alberta, the Yukon and perhaps other provinces" (Globe and Mail, 1977: 11).

If the Western Canada Party won the provincial elections in British Columbia and Alberta, Fleming stated, "we'll abolish goddam Ottawa. Who needs it? ... This country is too cumbersome to handle as one" (Ibid.: 11). As indicated, the Western Canada Party, unlike the previous groups in the late nineteen-sixties, represented a serious shift and devotion to the cause of western separatism.

During the initial period of organization, Fleming stated that he had the private support of "a dozen Social Credit MLAs" in British Columbia (Odam, 1977: C2). On March 12, 1977, the Western Canada Party supposedly had 5,000 to 5,500 members (Globe and Mail, 1977: 11). By the end of 1977, Fleming reportedly aimed unrealistically for 100,000 members. Although western separatism was dismissed as an insignificant force at that time, there was concern over the sympathetic support that the Western Canada Party received from a portion of Social Credit MLA's in British Columbia (Wills, 1977: C3; Adams, 1977: 8). Thus, Neale Adams noted, "what was once the subject of cranks was becoming respectable" (1977: 8).

In 1974, Douglas Christie, a Victoria lawyer, founded the Committee for Western Independence by writing a

letter to the Victoria Colonist concerning the political, economic, and social effects of Confederation on the development of Canada (Christie, 1982: Tape #25). Christie's analysis within the letter supposedly demonstrated that Ontario and Quebec dictated the economic and political policies within the federal government. Christie argued that the western provinces had little or no input into the federal government's decision-making process due to Ontario's and Quebec's dominance despite the decisions' effects on the western provinces' interests. Christie thereby invited people to write to him in order to form an organization that would "first demand within Confederation, and I emphasize that its first objective was to demand within Confederation, our fair share of political power and then the alternative, if that was not to be possible then, that we might have the right to independence" (Ibid.: Tape #25). Thus, the Committee for Western Independence was initially started as a "pressure group" (McMartin, 1981: A10).

The goal of the Committee for Western Independence was expressed in the Western Canadian Petition of Right; the organization's original doctrine. The doctrine basically stated, "if we (western Canadians) are not to have our fair share of political freedom within Confederation, then, through the help of providence, (we are) to form a nation out of the area of western Canada" (Christie, 1982: Tape #25). Although the organization was originally a pressure group,

the Committee for Western Independence shifted its goal to a declaration of independence for the western provinces and Yukon Territories (Vancouver Sun, 1978: A11).

In 1974, one-hundred-and-fifty supporters attended the first Committee for Western Independence's meeting at the Oakridge Auditorium in Vancouver, British Columbia. The original blueprint in order to achieve economic and political sovereignty was designed at that meeting (Ibid.: A11). But from the first to the fourth annual meetings, little was done to achieve the goal of independence (Ibid.: A11). Thus at the fourth annual meeting in 1978, the members decided to conduct a campaign that pronounced the message of independence across the western provinces. They also advocated a membership drive in order to raise \$2.4 million within a year to "help finance the campaign's trip, publish brochures, and organize political campaigns" (Ibid.: A11). Prior to the campaign, the organization's membership consisted of approximately "1,500 people across Canada who have been members at one time or another" (Ibid.: A11). In addition, Christie declared, "let's face it, we're a joke financially" and "we're not very well organized" (Ibid.: A11).

Christie held meetings during his tour in Hope (B.C.), Princeton (B.C.), Penticton (B.C.), Vernon (B.C.), Banff (Alta.), Calgary (Alta.), Lethbridge (Alta.), Medicine Hat (Alta.), Moose Jaw (Sask.), Regina (Sask.), Brandon (Man.), Winnipeg (Man.), Yorkton (Sask.), Saskatoon (Sask.),

Prince Albert (Sask.), Edmonton (Alta.), Red Deer (Alta.), Prince George (B.C.), Williams Lake (B.C.), Kamloops (B.C.), and Vancouver (B.C.) (Christie, 1982: Tape #25). From Christie's tour, one can conclude that the organization's activities extended across British Columbia and the prairie provinces, and that the organization was also attempting to gain support from both rural and urban areas. Thus, the movement's support likely came from this base. By the end of the tour, the Committee for Western Independence had approximately 2,000 members (Calgary Herald, 1978: B2). Later, the organization claimed a membership of 3,500 before its annual meeting in February 1979 (Williamson, 1979: 9).

It is important to note that this organization was hindered by internal dissension. The dissension concerned Christie's so-called autocratic behaviour. For example, Douglas Christie was asked to give a presentation to the Task Force on Canadian Unity in 1978. During his presentation, Christie shouted, "Vive le Quebec Libre" (McMartin, 1981: A10). Christie's remark was an indication of his hope to see "the same happen in British Columbia" (Ibid.: A10). Shortly afterwards, Christie claimed that "three members of Parliament were members of the committee, though he refused to divulge their names" (Ibid.: A10). Members of his committee, in response, began to accuse Christie of "acting autocratically and making policy statements without

advising them" (Ibid.: A10).

At the fifth annual meeting in February 1979, the founder and chairman of the organization, Douglas Christie, was "ousted" from his position as leader (Williamson, 1979: 9). According to Williamson's report, critics of Mr. Christie said, "he was an autocratic leader who ignored his board of directors, neglected vital organizational duties and was plunging prematurely into political action on an all-out independence policy" (Ibid.: 9). The head office of the organization was to be moved from Christie's law office in Victoria to a new location in Vancouver. Joan Dettwiller became the new chairman (McMartin, 1981: A10). Concerning Christie's leadership, Dettwiller added, "Christie made himself very unavailable ... He's not a co-operative person. He wants everything his own way completely" (Ibid.: A10). Regarding Dettwiller's takeover of his position, Christie stated that "having been involved in advocating Western independence since 1975, I felt that it was time that I took a period of rest and I did not run for the leadership of the Committee for Western Independence in February 1979" (Christie, 1982: Tape #25).

Additionally, the Committee for Western Independence decided to soften its image. Critics within the organization felt that the group was losing support as a result of the independence stance exemplified in the organization's name (Williamson, 1979: 9). Hence, the organization's name was

changed from the Committee for Western Independence to the Western National Party or Association. In his final report to the committee, Christie insisted, "we have not yet achieved that which we intend to achieve, which is independence for British Columbia first, and the rest of western Canada after that" (Ibid.: 9).

No significant activities, according to Christie, occurred after his departure as leader until February 1980 (1982: Tape #25). Indeed, the organization was regarded as a "fledgling western separatist party" during the period of internal dissension and throughout the period of Dettwiller's leadership (Winnipeg Free Press, 1980a: 31).

The newly re-named organization will be referred to here as the Western National Party. Although the re-named organization is mainly referred to as the Western National Association, this distinction is made to differentiate this organization from a group in Alberta with the same name.

On February 24, 1980, Douglas Christie regained the leadership of the Western National Party (Ibid.: 31). A stronger separatist platform was then re-established by Christie. The aim of the Western National Party of British Columbia and Alberta was to run separatist candidates in the British Columbian and Albertan provincial elections (Ibid.: 31). After the federal general election of February 1980, the organization claimed 3,500 members. It was also noted that "memberships were coming in at the rate of fifty a day

in Victoria and Vancouver" (Montreal Gazette, 1980: 19).

But, the Western National Party was also burdened by internal dissension. A major dispute arose over policies. One of the major disputes concerned whether or not the organization should be confined to endeavours in British Columbia or the western provinces. Christie advocated that the organization extend its activities throughout the western provinces while the board members wanted to limit the organization's activities to British Columbia. As a result of the dispute, Christie resigned as leader.

Stan Bennett became the new leader of the organization. Concerning Christie, Bennett said, "we were trying to stay away from his ranting and ravings. We wanted a less strident profile ... I think Mr. Christie felt he himself was the movement. The image of the young Victoria lawyer who wanted to represent the voice of Western Canada was a matter of supreme importance to him" (McMartin, 1981: A10). Bennett added, "virtually, he was not consulting the executive. And he had trouble with the three previous executives to this one. He fought with all of them" (Ibid.: A10). In response to these accusations, Christie stated, "I'm impatient to get things done. I always tried to reach a consensus, but at times, if I felt it was my time involved, I would accept the invitation. I didn't ask permission from the directors to speak" (Ibid.: A10).

After his resignation Christie attempted to acquire

the membership lists and records of the Western National Party through the Supreme Court of British Columbia. Two intermmeetings were held in order to determine the possessor of the records. Mr. Christie won the right to possess the records in the first while Mr. Bennett won the right to possess the records in the second hearings (Christie, 1982: Tape #25). Mr. Christie concluded, "these two hearings were actually designed to split and divide the Western National Party" (Ibid.: Tape #25). Regarding Christie's action, Bennett stated, "I think he did it because he felt the committee voting against him was a personal attack. But it was just politics" (McMartin, 1981: A10).

The Western National Party continued to exist although Christie left and formed another western separatist organization called the 'Western Canada Concept'. The continuing organization claimed a membership of 1,000 individuals; mainly located in British Columbia (Spicer, 1980: A5). According to Bennett, the Western National Party would remain an organization restricted to activities within British Columbia and would thereby "leave the rest of Western Canada to determine its own future" (McMartin, 1981: A10).

An interesting appendage may be added before leaving the discussion of the various western separatist groups that Douglas Christie founded during this period. On May 10, 1979, a provincial general election was held in British Columbia. Douglas Hewson Christie ran as a candidate for

the provincial legislature in the Esquimalt-Port Renfrew riding. The election results were as follows:

Table 1:1 Election Results of the Esquimalt-Port Renfrew Riding

<u>NAME OF CANDIDATE & PARTY</u>	<u># OF VOTES</u>	<u>% OF VOTES</u>
Mitchell, Frank John (NDP).....	12,419	51.4%
Kahl, Lyle Benjamin James (SC)....	9,812	40.6%
Langlois, Bill (PC).....	1,462	6.0%
Christie, Douglas Hewson (IND)....	280	1.2%
Williams, Wayne Arthur (IND).....	131	0.5%
Stansall, Donald Cecil (IND).....	72	0.3%

(Normandin, 1979: 608)

As indicated, Douglas Christie was not elected to the provincial legislature. Unfortunately, The Canadian Parliamentary Guide did not state whether or not Christie ran as a Western National Party candidate. If Christie's platform was based on separatism, the election could serve as a good indicator of the extent of western separatist support in British Columbia at that time.

WESTERN SEPARATIST GROUPS BASED IN ALBERTA:

During 1974, a new separatist organization, the In-dependent Alberta Association, arose in Alberta. The founders of the organization were described as "a group of disgruntled influential, Calgary area residents" (Dykstra,

1980a: A1). In other words, the Independent Alberta Association was organized by prominent and influential men such as: Lloyd Gilmour, a publisher of an oil magazine; Milt Harradence, a lawyer and a former Alberta Conservative leader; Glen Morrison, a businessman; Bob McCulloch, a Calgary oil executive; and Robert Matheson, an Edmonton lawyer (Ibid.: A1; Skene, 1981b: 14). The organization was headed by John Rudolph, a Calgary 'oilman', and by Robert Matheson, the organization's vice-president (White, 1977: 6).

The goal of the Independent Alberta Association was to form a political party in order to run candidates on a separatist platform against Peter Lougheed's government (Dykstra, 1980a: A1). After the 1976 electoral victory of the Parti Québécois in Quebec, John Rudolph stated, "at this point the whole country is up for grabs ... the only reason we remain in Confederation is sentiment" (Vickers, 1976: 8). The next provincial election, according to Milt Harradence, would thereby be fought on separatism. But despite the victory of the Parti Québécois and its inspirational effect, the Independent Alberta Association did not form a political party (op. cit.: A1). Overall, the activities of the Independent Alberta Association were unsuccessful in relation to achieving the organization's goal of independence. At its peak, the organization claimed a membership of five-hundred individuals (Vickers, 1976: 8).

Although the organization did not accomplish its goal, it did commission two studies on the costs of Confederation to Alberta. The first study was conducted by Warren Blackman, an associate professor of economics at the University of Calgary. The study was entitled, 'The Costs of Confederation Parts 1 & 2'. The study, according to Robert Dykstra, was based on 1974 figures concerning "the federal equalization programs, the transfer of wealth from the richer to the poor provinces, plus the oil and gas export taxes that go to subsidize higher-priced imported oil for Quebec and the Maritimes" (1980b: A9). The estimated cost to stay in Confederation for Alberta was \$2.6 billion a year as a result of these federal programs. Hence, Blackman concluded that Alberta could easily survive as a viable, independent state (op. cit.: 8).

According to Christie, another study entitled 'The Status of a Province' was commissioned by this group. The study indicated that "at no time had any province subject to the Statute of Westminster or subsequent to the Statute of Westminster ratified Confederation" (Christie, 1982: Tape #25). As a result, each province maintained its 'sovereign jurisdiction' after the passage of the Statute of Westminster in 1931. For Matheson, the possession of sovereign jurisdiction by each province meant that "unilateral secession by a province was found to be a matter of right, not of revolution" (Skene, 1981b: 14). Thus,

Chart 1-3

DEVELOPMENT OF THE WESTERN SEPARATIST MOVEMENT IN THE 1970'S

Year	<u>Western Separatist Groups Based in Alberta:</u>	
1974	<u>Independent Alberta Association</u>	
	founders - Lloyd Gilmour - Milt Harradence (later founder of the <u>Western In-</u> <u>dependence Party</u> in 1977) - Glen Morrison - Bob McCulloch - Robert Matheson (later vice- president and co- founder of <u>Western</u> <u>Canada Federation</u> West-Fed) - John Rudolph President - John Rudolph	
1977	Doug Low - new president of IAA - headed transition of the IAA into the <u>Western</u> <u>National Association</u>	
	<u>Western National Association</u>	
	- formed on February 28 1977	
1978/ 1979	- amalgamation with the Committee for Western Independence	
1979	- new group known as the <u>Western National</u> <u>Party</u>	

each province had the right to secede from Confederation "by political choice" (op. cit.: Tape #25).

The above-mentioned, commissioned studies were the Independent Alberta Association's major accomplishments. Afterwards, Blackman noted that the Independent Alberta Association merely "ran out of steam ... and then it just died" (Dykstra, 1980a: A1). Doug Low, an Edmonton businessman, became the organization's last president before its demise. It was Mr. Low that headed a transition of the Independent Alberta Association into the Western National Association (Williamson, 1979: 9).

The new organization was officially formed on February 28, 1977. At that time, it was Canada's "newest federal political party" (Winnipeg Free Press, 1977: 7). The major aim of the party was self-determination. The association specifically wanted "a written constitution guaranteeing self-determination for western Canadians" (Ibid.: 7). Although the party advocated self-determination, Gerry Ronayne, the association's media director, stated, "we are not a separatist party ... there's a large degree of alienation in western Canada. Separatism for us would be a last resort" (Ibid.: 7).

Concerning political representation, the Western National Association advocated the establishment of a Senate similar to the one in the United States. Hence, the Senate would consist of an equal number of representatives from each

province while the House of Commons would maintain representation by population. Meanwhile, the British monarchy would remain as the government's figurehead (Ibid.: 7). In addition, the Western National Association wanted "the judiciary separate from political appointees" as well as "separate executive and legislative branches" (Ibid.: 7). If these changes concerning political representation within Confederation were considered as unacceptable, the Western National Association's platform then advocated the goal of self-determination through "effective representation in the decision-making processes of government with powers determined by a written constitution approved by 75 per cent of western Canadians" (Ibid.: 7).

Regarding membership, the association stated that they had supporters in the four western provinces. But, its two-hundred members were mainly located in Alberta; the organization's "first area of concern" (Ibid.: 7). In a tour of Saskatchewan and Manitoba in 1978, the association reportedly attracted small crowds. For example, only one-hundred people attended an association's meeting in Winnipeg (Calgary Herald, 1978: B2).

On August 4, 1978, the executive of the Western National Association and the Committee for Western Independence held a joint meeting in Red Deer, Alberta. At that meeting, the association decided to amalgamate with the Committee for Western Independence. The smaller association

apparently developed a stronger separatist stance. For example, Gerry Ronayne stated, "we hope to be the cutting edge of Western independence. We like to say independence instead of separatism" (Ibid.: B2). In addition, the unnamed association hoped to establish affiliate groups in Saskatchewan and Manitoba. Unlike the Western National Association's previous goal, the new organization planned to run candidates in the next provincial election. The Western National Association's goal of running candidates federally was dropped since "the West has sent some excellent men to Ottawa over the years and nothing has changed" (Ibid.: B2). The decision to run candidates only in provincial elections reflected the association's shift toward a stronger separatist stance.

The reader should note the distinction between the Western National Party and the Western National Association. First, the Western National Association, originally the Independent Alberta Association, joined forces with the Committee for Western Independence in 1978. After the Western National Association and the Committee for Western Independence amalgamated, the newly formed organization was known as the Western National Party or Association. The newly formed organization was known predominantly as the Western National Association. But in this study, the organization is referred to as the Western National Party in order to distinguish the new group from its past.

In 1977, another western separatist group, the Western Independence Party, emerged. Unfortunately, media coverage of this group was almost nonexistent. The few brief statements about the party indicated that it was located in Alberta and that the former leader of the Albertan Conservative Party, Milt Harradence had formed the organization (Globe and Mail, 1977: 11). The group apparently disappeared very quickly. In addition, the founder of the party presently "disclaims any interest or association with any form of politics" (Dykstra, 1980a: A1). Milt Harradence is currently an Alberta Court of Appeal judge.

The re-emergence of western separatism was seen as a possible threat to Confederation during the period from approximately 1974 to 1979, especially after the Parti Québécois victory in Quebec in 1976. It was stated, "until now, separatism in the West has been treated as a joke in Central Canada. The PQ victory in Quebec has given a lift to the Western separatists, however, and the joke has become less funny" (White, 1977: 6). Although the presence of the separatist movement was small, western political leaders again recognized the seriousness of its existence. Bill Hamilton, a former Conservative federal cabinet minister, stated, "while separatists are a very small minority, I have to say I have been struck by the fact that they include some very responsible and informed people" (Gwyn, 1977b: B1). In Regina, a provincial deputy minister

also stated, "I'm really scared. Feelings are so deep, and they're getting deeper. For the first time, even if only informally, people like lawyers and civil servants and businessmen are starting to calculate the costs and benefits of Confederation" (Ibid.: B1). According to Quebec Liberal leader Claude Ryan, western Canada's discontent with the federal system was "as real a threat to Canadian unity as Quebec separatism" (Gendron, 1979: A5).

Public opinion polls indicated a low level of support for western separatism during the given period. In 1977, Southam Inc. conducted a public opinion poll entitled 'the Searching Nation'. The results indicated that "only one in 10 on the Prairies would vote for breaking from Canada with or without economic ties. The B.C. figure was even less" (Oake, 1980: 57). In February 1977, a Calgary Herald poll showed less support for western separatism. The results were 93.7 per cent of Calgarians opposed while 2.7 per cent of Calgarians favoured Albertan separatism (McCune, 1980: A1). Moreover, memberships merely ranged from 14 to 5,000 individuals in relation to the various western separatist groups (Gwyn, 1977b: B1).

Prior to the federal general election on May 22, 1979, the advocacy of independence reportedly caused a loss of support for the organizations (Williamson, 1979: 9). Williamson noted, "talk of independence as a solution produced either yawns or hostility" (Ibid.: 9). Support or

sympathy for the western separatist organizations seemed to decline further after the federal general election on May 22, 1979. Since the Progressive Conservative party formed the government with an Albertan-born prime minister and since a number of influential cabinet posts were filled with MPs from the West "Albertans felt they finally had won a hand in running the country" (Dykstra, 1980a: A1). As a result, "advocates of independence, at least in Alberta, were content to admit that Joe Clark's victory was a death-knell to Western separatism" (1980b: A1).

Phase III - The Rise of the Western Separatist Movement in 1980

The descent of the western separatist movement did not last very long. On February, 1980, the Liberal Party defeated Joe Clark and the Conservatives without the support of western Canadian voters. In fact, only two Liberal MPs were elected from the West. As a result, Stanley Roberts, president of a western research organization - Canada West Foundation observed, "there was a sharp knee-jerk reaction immediately following the election. I trust there isn't and hope there isn't an increase in separatist sentiment" (Montreal Gazette, 1980: 19). But, a reporter noted, "the next step - from frustration to the desire to secede and go it alone - got off the ground when the federal Liberals returned to power" (Ma, 1980: A19). Indeed, western

separatist groups quickly re-emerged at that time.

The threat of western separatism continued to grow during 1980. After the federal general election, a question being asked was "is Western independence, as some Westerners are suggesting, an idea whose time has come" (Dykstra, 1980a: A1)? In March 1980, it was reported, "all across the west, people who spoke out on the idea of western separatism were amazed to find strong, widespread support" (Montreal Gazette, 1980: 19). By July 1980, observers felt that the latest resurgence of western separatism must be taken seriously (MacDonald, 1980: 7).

The re-emergence of western separatism reached its peak in November 1980. Jeff Sallot noted, "separatist feelings in Alberta had never been so high" (1980a: 3). Meetings and rallies were drawing "several hundred people" rather than a handful of individuals (Winnipeg Free Press, 1980d: 6). In addition, a separatist meeting or rally occurred almost every night within Alberta during the given period (Sallot, 1980c: 13). As a result, western separatism was no longer considered a fringe phenomenon.

After February 18, 1980, eight organizations arose that advocated or sympathized with the western separatist cause. They were; the Western Canada Federation, the Western Canada Concept, the Rupert's Land Independence League, the Western Party, the Committee for an Independent West, the Unionest Party, the United West Association and the National

Chart 1-4

THE RISE OF THE WESTERN SEPARATIST MOVEMENT IN 1980

Year	Western Separatist Groups in 1980				
1980	<u>Western Canada Federation</u> (West-Fed) - founded on May 23, 1980 - founded by Elmer Knutson and Robert Matheson President - Elmer Knutson Vice-President - Robert Matheson	<u>Committee for an Independent West</u> - founded in 1980 by Tom and Phil Matkin - founders disband organization and instruct their former members to join either West-Fed or WCC	<u>Unionest Party</u> - founded in 1980 - founder is Dick Collver - gained little support	<u>United West Association</u> President - Patrick A. Brown - not a separatist organization	<u>Western Canada Concept (WCC)</u> - founded in July 1980 - founded by Douglas Christie after his resignation from the Western National Party
			<u>Western Party</u> 1980-81 - founder Tom McArthur - absorbed the Rupert's Land Independence League - quickly failed	<u>Rupert's Land Independence League</u> - founded in November 1980 - founded by David Laird	
			(MERGER)		
1981	April 1981 - Elmer Knutson resigns as top executive of West-Fed - Jim Rayment is elected new West-Fed executive	<u>National Party</u> - founded in January 1981 - founded by Hu Harries			- existence continues despite loss of support and splintering of the group

Party.

This phase of western separatist support was located predominantly in Alberta (Crispo, 1981: 9). The Canada West Foundation, for example, polled 1,230 westerners concerning western separatism prior to the announcement of the Liberal Party's controversial budget of 1980. The results showed that Alberta had the highest percentage leaning toward independence (Grescoe, 1981: 10). Giles Gherson likewise noted, "the battery of squabbling separatist groups never achieved any significant degree of visible support in Manitoba, Saskatchewan or British Columbia" (1980b: 7).

Western Canada Federation became the largest organization advocating western separatism during this period. Elmer Knutson, an Edmonton businessman, unintentionally founded West-Fed by writing an angry letter to the editor of the Edmonton Journal in order to protest the Liberal Party's victory in the 1980 federal general election with only two seats from the West. In the letter, Knutson stated that "French power" was taking over the country. As a result, Knutson retorted, "Quebec must go, or we must kick them out ... They and us must divorce. The divorce must be done now or else western Canada must separate physically as we did politically last night" (Robertson, 1981: 102). This letter apparently instigated the emergence of the largest western separatist group during 1980.

Knutson did not intend to pursue the matter further, but felt that he had "a 'moral obligation' to lead a local campaign toward western separatism" when he was deluged with three-thousand calls and letters that offered him money, support, and encouragement (Montreal Gazette, 1980: 19; Robertson, 1981: 102). Knutson included twelve-thousand dollars of his personal funds in order to start the campaign. Also, the letter had attracted the attention of Robert Matheson; the former vice-president of the Independent Alberta Association. Together the two men formed West-Fed on May 23, 1980 with Elmer Knutson as president and Robert Matheson as vice-president (Skene, 1981b: 14).

The goal of West-Fed was to form a federation of the four western provinces and perhaps the Yukon and the Northwest Territories. Still, Knutson felt that West-Fed was not a separatist group for a combination of historical and legal reasons. According to Knutson, the British Parliament's passage of the Statute of Westminster of 1931 made each province of Canada a sovereign state with the right to self-determination. Robert Matheson explicitly stated, "we are a sovereign province and we have every right to do what we are proposing" (Cleroux, 1980b: 11). Thus, Confederation was a myth. Moreover, the British North America Act had never been ratified by the provinces (Ma, 1980: A19). As a result, Canadians never had a constitution. Hence, the ten provinces were "separate, sovereign

and independent" (Winnipeg Free Press, 1981c: 49). Knutson concluded, "How can we separate something that never was put together" (Ibid.: 49)?

West-Fed did not intend to form a political party since the process would take too long in order to fulfill the organization's goal (MacDonald, 1980: 7). Knutson also felt that "constitution-writing and nation-building comes before political parties and should include all people of whatever political party" (Godley, 1981: A1). Thus, West-Fed remained a "protest movement" and a "pressure group" (Ma, 1980: A19). West-Fed would achieve its goal by "collecting enough populist clout to pressure Lougheed into calling an assembly to draft a constitution for an independent west" (Robertson, 1981: 105). The same strategy was to be used in the other western provinces. Thus, the initial demand of West-Fed was that the four western provinces should hold an election to create a constituent assembly. Next, the assembly would draft a constitution for the new country (Williamson, 1981: 12). Later, the four western provinces' electorate would vote on the draft in a referendum (Cleroux, 1980b: 11).

If the draft was approved, "legislation approving the new constitution would then be introduced in the Legislature of each province whose electors had approved the constitution". Furthermore, "if the legislation passed, the Queen would be told about it, 'praying for her Majesty's

assent to such a constitution'" (Ibid.: 11). Afterwards, West-Fed would cease to exist since its purpose would be accomplished. Regarding additional policies, West-Fed favoured "unilingualism, capital punishment, abolition of the metric system, a return to 'traditional immigration sources and policies', and no special privileges for minority groups" (Blicq, 1981a: 9).

The founding meeting of West-Fed consisted of twenty-eight members. During August, approximately three-hundred to five-hundred people attended a debate between former British Columbia, cabinet minister Phil Gaglardi and Elmer Knutson at the Hyatt Regency Hotel's ballroom in Vancouver. Knutson then claimed that his organization had 5,000 members in the four western provinces, the Yukon, and the Northwest Territories (Spicer, 1980: A5). From the founding meeting to the debate, organized meetings usually occurred in rural Albertan towns. The rural meetings reportedly drew hundreds of individuals.

A sharp increase in membership did not occur until the federal government introduced its controversial budget on October 28, 1980. Shortly afterwards, West-Fed organized a rally at the Town and Country Centre in Airdrie, Alberta; a small farming community. The five-hundred seat community hall was reportedly filled (Cleroux, 1980b: 1). The audience mainly consisted of small businessmen, ranchers, farmers, and housewives (Zwarun, 1980: 27). Furthermore, the audience was

described as being elderly and Progressive Conservative (Skene, 1981b: 12). Bruce Roper, a former member of West-Fed, stated, "about half of the audience were convinced separatists, a quarter were federalists, and the rest came to find out what West-Fed was all about" (Cleroux, 1980b: 1). At the meeting, approximately one-hundred-and-seventy memberships were sold at a price of five dollars each (op. cit.: 12). Western separatism, after the rally, was proclaimed a 'grassroots movement' (Zwarun, 1980: 28).

Two days later, the characterization of West-Fed's supporters changed as a result of a meeting held by Carl Nickle. Nickle's decision to join West-Fed is significant because he was considered an influential, community leader. Indeed, Carl Nickle's personal background is impressive. Nickle was the former editor of the Daily Oil Bulletin; the so-called "bible in petroleum circles" (White, 1981: 4). Nickle also had eleven directorships on company boards, one of which was the Canada Trust Company (op. cit.: 28). Moreover, Nickle was a director of the Canadian Unity Foundation as well as a former Progressive Conservative MP for Calgary South from 1951 to 1957. Thus, the conversion of an influential and a former pro-federalist community leader gave the western separatist movement credibility. Nickle's decision to join West-Fed as a member supposedly "was a signal to the Albertan business establishment that talk of separatism was no longer subversive" (Sallot, 1980a: 3). As a

result, Nickle's membership helped to "put West-Fed on the map" (White, 1981: 4).

In November 1980, Carl Nickle held a luncheon meeting at the Calgary Inn in order to explain his reasons for joining West-Fed. Seven-hundred to one-thousand seats at ten dollars a plate were sold in less than forty-eight hours without advance advertising (op. cit.: 3; Byfield, 1981b: 93). An additional three-hundred individuals stood outside the hall to listen (Grescoe, 1981: 11). The audience consisted mainly of businessmen. As a result, western separatism was re-labelled a "blue-chip" movement (Ma, 1980: A19). West-Fed apparently developed a wide base of support from both farmers and Albertan businessmen. Moreover, Nickle's meeting was significant because it was the largest turnout for West-Fed (Winnipeg Free Press, 1980e: 10).

West-Fed gained additional momentum after Nickle's meeting. In December, Knutson went to Winnipeg, Manitoba in order to preach his message. Approximately four-hundred people went to hear Knutson despite the cold weather of only -22 Celsius (Vancouver Sun, 1980c: B10). But, Knutson reportedly drew a mixed response from the audience. The audience was described as "some interested, a few hostile, and others just curious" (Ibid.: B10).

According to Dennis Epps, president of the Manitoba branch of Western Canada Federation, West-Fed already had three-thousand members in Manitoba at that time with minimal,

active campaigning. Epps stated, "we've never tried to sell the idea - all the people we have come to us" (Ibid.: B10). The membership supposedly came from a variety of occupations and areas. Regarding activities, the Manitoba branch of West-Fed merely held one meeting during the summer prior to Knutson's visit. The branch also had published only one newsletter. Epps stated that he intended to organize additional meetings in rural Manitoba (Ibid.: B10).

Knutson extended his tour to other western provinces. In January 1981, Knutson held a second meeting at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Vancouver. Approximately 1,000 to 1,500 people attended the gathering (Williamson, 1981: 12; Godley, 1981: A1). Hence, Robert Williamson reported, "West-Fed bowled back into town vigorously soft-peddalling its separatist aims in its pitch to West Coasters, who have long disdained separatist outfits" (1981: 12). The rally apparently represented the largest expression of British Columbians' discontent with the federal Liberal government since the federal general election of February 18, 1980 (Ibid.: 12).

It was estimated that four-hundred West-Fed members from the Lower Mainland area attended the rally. Williamson noted, "a large proportion of the rest of the audience consisted of well-heeled suburbanites, including bankers, stockbrokers, builders and many small businessmen" (Ibid.: 12). Roughly two-hundred people decided to join West-Fed after the meeting.

Knutson continued to tour for the organization in the new year. After the meeting in Vancouver, Knutson organized a rally in Weyburn, Saskatchewan where approximately 800 to 1,400 people attended the gathering (Byfield, 1981b: 93). A four-day tour of Manitoba was also organized at the end of January 1981. Knutson held meetings in Minnedosa, Winkler, La Riviere, and Steinbach (Winnipeg Free Press, 1981c: 49). In Minnedosa, the meeting consisted of two-hundred people; mostly middle-aged farmers and their wives (Ibid.: 49). In Winkler, one-hundred people gathered to hear Knutson. Roughly twenty-eight people joined West-Fed (Blicq, 1981a: 9). At La Riviere, one-hundred people attended his meeting. West-Fed officials sold an additional, forty memberships (Blicq, 1981b: 12).

By the end of March 1981, West-Fed supposedly had thirty-thousand members. Half of the members reportedly were Albertans (White, 1981: 4). West-Fed, in addition, opened eight offices across the West in less than a year (Oake, 1981: A4). But as noted by various reporters, West-Fed's success was difficult to judge since Knutson would not allow anyone to examine the organization's membership lists.

During the Manitoba tour, Knutson announced that Western Canada Federation was planning a \$4-million advertising campaign (Winnipeg Free Press, 1981c: 49). The organization needed a donation of one-thousand dollars each from two-thousand farmers and/or businessmen to accomplish

its fund-raising goal (Blicq, 1981b: 12). But on February 25, 1981, Western Canada Federation was merely looking for people to donate one-thousand dollars to finance a \$800,000 campaign (Streich, 1981: 10). Knutson expected the campaign to "start in about a month and could generate about 400,000 new memberships" (Ibid.: 10). He had evidently reduced his expectations concerning the amount of donations required for the campaign. This reduction is important since it signals the decline of enthusiastic support for the western separatist movement in 1981.

An indication of West-Fed's declining rate of growth during the early months of 1981 was provided by the audiences' cool response to Knutson during his four-day tour of Manitoba. Knutson's retort to the audiences' response also indicated the diminishing enthusiasm and support for his organization's goal; "if Manitoba doesn't want to go along, it doesn't have to ... I'm confident Alberta is going and pretty sure B.C. is going too" (Blicq, 1981b: 12).

But, rallies attracted diminishing support after November 1980 even within Alberta, West-Fed's base of support. For example, a planned rally at Edmonton's Jubilee Auditorium in December 1980 had to be cancelled since the organizers anticipated 'bad weather' (Gherson, 1980b: 7). Yet, cold temperatures had not deterred the scheduling of meetings and rallies previously.

Western Canada Federation was also plagued by in-

ternal dissension. At a West-Fed directors' meeting after Carl Nickle's luncheon speech at the Calgary Inn, it was reported that "Calgary oilmen spoke scathingly of amateurish leadership and refused to allow funds they had raised to go toward supporting other West-Fed chapters" (Ibid.: 7).

Furthermore, executive members of the organization began to resign. In January 1981, Bruce Roper, a founding member and vice-president of West-Fed's Calgary chapter, left. In March 1981, the entire Calgary executive and two members of the Edmonton executive likewise departed from the organization. Moreover, West-Fed's Calgary office was closed and the proposed \$800,000 advertising campaign was cancelled (Zwarun, 1981: 20a). Internal dissension reached its peak during April 1981. At that time Elmer Knutson, the founder and president of West-Fed, resigned from his position since he was unable to resolve the organization's internal conflicts (Vancouver Sun, 1981: A7).

One may ask, 'what caused the internal dissension'? Although an incomplete answer, internal dissension stemmed from the leadership of Elmer Knutson. Doug Owrap, a history professor at the University of Alberta, observed, "the whole movement was right-wing anyway, but the people on the respectable right began to get a little embarrassed, especially by the blatant racism" (Oake, 1981: A4). For example, Knutson was criticized for making public references to "chinks, wops and French Jesuits" (Zwarun, 1981: 20a).

Former members additionally charged Knutson with leading the movement to right-wing ruin, especially his tirades against "bilingualism, the metric system, and the dangers of federally-imposed 'socialism'" (Vancouver Sun, 1981: A7). As a result, the organization began to lose members, sympathizers, and potential supporters (Oake, 1981: A4; Zwarun, 1981: 20a). Jim Rayment, a Calgary businessman, was elected to replace Knutson as the new West-Fed president.

Another major separatist organization, the Western Canada Concept, was established by Douglas Christie after his resignation from the Western National Party in July 1980. Western Canada Concept's goal was to form an independent nation from the four western provinces, the Yukon, and the Northwest Territories. Christie summarized the organization's aim as "one nation, one language (English), one Government ... independence for Western Canada" (Sallot, 1980a: 3). It was proposed that a constitutional monarchy would exist with the Queen as the Head of State. The government would consist of two Houses; the Lower and the Upper Chambers. The Lower Chamber would be based on representation by population while the Upper Chamber would be based on representation by region. Christie also stated that tariffs would be abolished. Moreover, the new nation would remain with NATO and Norad (McMartin, 1981: A10).

The new nation and its government, according to Christie, would be established through non-violent and

democratic means only (op. cit.: 3). To accomplish its aim, Western Canada Concept initially circulated a petition in order to force the provincial governments to hold a referendum on independence (Skene, 1981b: 14). A ten year moratorium on the vote was suggested by Christie to protect the referendum from newly arrived in-migrants from Ontario (Sallot, 1980a: 3). If the provincial governments ignored the petition and/or refused to hold a referendum, Western Canada Concept would become a political party and would thereby run candidates in the next provincial elections to obtain a vote on separatism (op. cit.: 14).

The organization's first major activity was a twenty-three city tour of the western provinces. Christie started the tour on July 1, 1980, but attendance at the meetings was low. Denise Harrington noted, "Christie drew two people in Brandon (Man.), eight in Winnipeg (Man.), twenty-five in Medicine Hat (Alta.), 275 in Lethbridge (Alta.), and fifty-five in Edmonton (Alta.)" (1981: 28). Despite the poor attendance, Western Canada Concept supposedly had 1,500 members by the end of the summer of 1980 (Spicer, 1980: A5).

On October 31, 1981, Christie organized another tour of the western provinces. This tour immediately followed the pronouncement of the Liberal government's controversial budget on October 28, 1980. As a result, attendance at the meetings had notably increased. A meeting in Lethbridge,

for example, attracted four-hundred people. In Calgary, two separate meetings were organized in order to accomodate the audience. The meeting hall in Red Deer was reportedly crowded. In Edmonton, approximately one-hundred people attended the first meeting while roughly two-hundred-and-fifty people went to the second gathering. Many of the attendants stated that they only heard about the second meeting by word of mouth; not by the advertisements placed in a local newspaper (Christie, 1982: Tape #25, Sallot, 1980a: 3).

From November 10 to November 20 Christie organized a rally to be held in Edmonton's 2,700 seat Jubilee Auditorium. On November 20, 1980, approximately 2,500 to 2,700 people attended. The rally was regarded as the largest separatist meeting in western Canada's history (Spectator, 1980c: 11). At the rally, it was reported that "many ... signed membership cards and a petition calling on the four Western provincial governments in order to hold independence referendums" (Ibid.: 11). Although membership figures were not provided, Western Canada Concept reportedly had 2,500 members by mid-November (Ma, 1980: A19).

But, attendance at Western Canada Concept's meetings decreased after the Edmonton rally. On December 8, 1980, Western Canada Concept organized another rally at the 2,700 seat Southern Alberta Jubilee Auditorium in Calgary. Unlike the capacity crowd in Edmonton, only 1,100 people

attended (Spectator, 1980e: 3). Also, there was a substantial decrease in attendance at a Vancouver meeting. It was reported that "only fifty people bothered to attend" (Grescoe, 1981: 10). In the early months of 1981, Christie merely attracted eighteen people to one Western Canada Concept meeting (Zwarun, 1981: 20a). Clearly, Western Canada Concept lost a substantial portion of its momentum after November 1980.

It is important to note that dissension also existed within Western Canada Concept. A splinter group formed during the week of organization for the Jubilee Auditorium rally in Edmonton. The group was led by David Laird, an Edmonton plumber. Approximately six local organizers joined him. The splinter group was named the Rupert's Land Independence League. Similar to Western Canada Concept, the Rupert's Land Independence League was "dedicated to Alberta's independence by running candidates in provincial elections and 'other peaceful means'" (Harrington, 1981: 32). But, the group split from Western Canada Concept because they did not want to join an organization based in Victoria, British Columbia. Another reason for the split was because Christie was supposedly withholding funds that were needed to form an Edmonton local (Ibid.: 32).

Additional dissension existed within the Calgary branch of Western Canada Concept. Tom McArthur, an owner of a Calgary gemstone mining business and a former Social

Credit candidate in the 1979 provincial election, claimed that Christie was "thwarting a Calgary local's attempt to organize" (Ibid.: 32). Also, McArthur felt that Christie was "naive to believe Westerners were ready to vote for independence in a referendum when they still feared it would not be feasible" (Ibid.: 32). As a result, McArthur formed the Western Party. The Western Party circulated a petition in order to obtain official registration in Alberta. In addition, the organization absorbed the Rupert's Land Independence League. But, Harrington noted that this party declined very quickly. The Western Party's first meeting only attracted fourteen people; including its own organizers (Ibid.: 32).

In response to rumours of a merger between Western Canada Concept and West-Fed, Knutson denied that the two organizations were attempting to join forces. Knutson also denied Christie's claim that the two leaders had met (Winnipeg Free Press, 1980e: 10). There were two basic reasons prohibiting the merger between Western Canada Concept and West-Fed. First, West-Fed had no immediate plans to become a political party. West-Fed's policy, as noted previously, was to work within the "mainstream political parties of their choice by organizing at the riding level to take control of constituency associations" (Cowan, 1981: 9). It was thereby hoped that political party affiliations would not hinder persons from joining West-Fed. Meanwhile,

Western Canada Concept was already a registered political party in British Columbia. The two organizations therefore had differences in their goals.

Second, West-Fed's aim was to create a federation of the four western provinces. Western Canada Concept advocated the creation of a single government after separation. Due to this major difference in policy, the two separatist groups showed few signs of joining forces (Cowan, 1981: 9).

Knutson did claim that West-Fed hoped to unite with other separatist organizations in the West. In fact, smaller separatist groups were disbanding and asking their members to join either West-Fed and/or Western Canada Concept (Ma, 1980: A19). For example, the Committee for an Independent West advised its members to "join West-Fed or the Christie group" (Ibid.: A19). The Committee for an Independent West was founded by Tom and Phil Matkin; both lawyers in Cardston, Alberta. The organization supposedly had two-hundred members before it disbanded.

Another separatist organization, the Unionest Party, was located in Saskatchewan. Its founder was Dick Collver, former head of Saskatchewan's Progressive Conservative Party. The Unionest Party's goal, unlike the previous separatist organizations, was to unite the Western provinces with the United States. Collver summarized the organization's goal accordingly, "we have the same culture, same

language, same religion. Our economy and politics are dominated by the Americans anyway. So why not join the United States? We are better off as Americans than as second-class citizens in Canada" (Ibid.: A19). The Unionest Party attempted to achieve party status in Alberta after the Liberal Party's budget in 1980, but its efforts were unsuccessful (White, 1981: 4). Still, it claimed one-thousand members; approximately seven-hundred members in Saskatchewan and three-hundred members in British Columbia (Spicer, 1980: A5).

Neither West-Fed nor Western Canada Concept perceived the Unionest Party as a serious alternative to Confederation. Douglas Christie noted, "nobody thought and I didn't then nor do I now think it will ever succeed as an idea. The idea of joining the United States appeals to nobody ... As it turned out, the people of Saskatchewan never did give any support to the Unionest Party" (1982: Tape #25). Christie seemed to be adamantly against the idea, "I argued in those days that it would be of no benefit to the people of western Canada to substitute a foreign bureaucracy five-thousand miles away in Washington for one four-thousand miles away in Ottawa" (Ibid.: Tape #25). As indicated, the Unionest Party received minimal support.

The United West Association, in comparison, was not a separatist organization. Patrick A. Brown was its founder and president. The United West Association consisted of

roughly one-hundred-and-fifty men "whose livelihood depended on the health of the oil and gas industry" (Skene, 1981b: 12). The association also published its own newspaper entitled United West News The Great Divide in order to inform westerners of their current plight within Confederation. Thus, the United West Association was similar to a 'pressure group'. But in a personal letter, Patrick Brown warned, "our organization is not advocating separatism at this time but we are well aware that 'once the work horse is fully loaded it only takes one more feather to break its back'".

Lastly, there existed the National Party. The National Party was founded in January 1981 by Hu Harries, an ex-Liberal MP for the Edmonton-Strathcona riding from 1968 to 1972. The National Party of Canada was a pro-federalist party. It was formed in order to provide a viable channel "for Western Canadians tired of being ignored by the existing federal parties" (Skene, 1981a: 26). According to Harries, his party would "provide an answer to those who felt the only alternative to frustration with central Canada was separation" (Ibid.: 26). The National Party's platform consisted of a reaffirmation of provincial ownership of natural resources, a guarantee of world prices for oil, sulphur, wheat and potash, and a reformed, 'regionalized' Senate (Ibid.: 26).

Harries' organizers had initially established offices

in Vancouver and Edmonton. The National Party aimed at attracting four-hundred delegates to a spring convention in 1981. Harries planned a leadership convention for the party in the fall of the same year. Afterwards, the National Party intended to "contest any and all by-elections in preparation for the ultimate test - a federal election" (Ibid.: 26). In the future, the National Party's organizers felt that the Atlantic provinces could be a source of potential support since the Atlantic provinces were engaged in a fight with Ottawa over off-shore oil rights. But, there was minimal support for the National Party and it appears to have consisted of "little more than an announcement" (Byfield, 1981b: 93).

Support for western separatism varied throughout the year after the federal general election on February 18, 1980 according to public opinion polls. In a survey conducted by Canada West Foundation, thirteen per cent of westerners supported western separatism shortly after the federal general election (Farquharson, 1980: C28). From March 8-10, the Opinion Center, a Calgary-based research company, conducted an opinion poll for the Calgary Herald and the Edmonton Journal. The poll indicated that ninety per cent of Albertans felt that the province should remain within Confederation. Five per cent felt that the province should separate while a further five per cent did not offer an opinion. In other words, thirty-two of the six-

hundred respondents expressed a desire for western separatism. In relation to the form of separation, "four of the thirty-two opted for an independent Alberta alone, twenty-five preferred a western federation and the remaining three expressed no opinion" (McCune, 1980: A1). The opinion poll's results were similar regardless of sex, age, education, occupation or place of residence (Ibid.: A1).

Canada West Foundation conducted another poll on western separatism amongst Albertans in the week ending October 25, 1980. The results indicated; eighty-five per cent wanted to remain a part of Canada, seven per cent felt the western provinces should form an independent country, four per cent favoured a union with the United States, two per cent favoured "something else - including Alberta as a independent nation", and the remainder had no opinion or did not respond (Stevens, 1980: 6). In other words, eight-five per cent favoured Confederation while thirteen per cent favoured separatism in Alberta (Ibid.: 6). Furthermore, the Canada West Foundation's poll indicated that ninety per cent favoured Confederation while nine per cent favoured separatism across the four western provinces. From this, the Canada West Foundation concluded, "there was good reason to believe there were approximately 400,000 western Canadians who favoured breaking up the country" (Ma, 1980: A19). This poll likewise indicated an increase in separatist support after the 1980 federal general elec-

tion. Moreover, the poll indicated that separatist sentiment in Alberta was stronger than elsewhere in the region.

The Calgary Herald and the Edmonton Journal conducted their own poll after October 28, 1980. The results indicated that twenty-three per cent supported an independent West. The figure was "even higher than the hard-core support for separatism in Quebec, which usually runs about twenty per cent" (Braid, 1980: A10). Mel Hurtig, an Edmonton book publisher, also commissioned a public opinion poll during the last two weeks of November 1980. The poll asked, 'Do you think Alberta should separate from the rest of Canada?' (Sallot, 1980e: 8). Eighty-six per cent answered 'no' while fourteen per cent answered 'yes'. The results thereby indicated "an increase in separatist sentiments in Alberta" (Ibid.: 8). David Elton, professor of political science at the University of Lethbridge, stated that Hurtig's poll would have shown greater separatist sentiment if the participants were asked if they favoured an independent federation of the four western provinces (Ibid.: 8).

But by January 1981, the vast increase in separatist sentiment subsided. A poll conducted by the C.B.C. indicated that separatist support returned to the pre-budget levels of the four western provinces. Apparently, seventy-five per cent favoured Confederation, fourteen per cent favoured separatism, and eleven per cent did not respond

(Winnipeg Free Press, 1981a: 1). Thus, support for western separatism varied from five to twenty-four per cent after February 18, 1980. The polls indicated further that western separatist support in Alberta was the strongest than elsewhere.

Interest in western separatism began to decline in the early months of 1981. Western separatist meetings and attendance had decreased (Gibbins, 1981b: 49). Polls indicated that western separatist support stabilized at twelve per cent by April 1981 (Oake, 1981: A4). In response, Mel Hurtig stated, "I see no significant support for separatism in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia ... In Alberta there does not appear to be any separatist threat in the foreseeable future" (Vancouver Sun, 1981: A7).

Other observers felt that the "separatist balloon" was "punctured" (Zwarun, 1981: 20a). By the end of April, 1981, Roger Gibbins, a political science professor at the University of Calgary, stated, "in the short term, the separatist movement in Western Canada is dead" (1981b: 49). Suzanne Zwarun similarly argued, "the time seemed ripe for western separatism, and yet the idea went as quickly as it had come. A 24-hour fever of the western psyche ... it has subsided into public indifference and organizational chaos" (op. cit.: 20a). The major problems with the separatist movement, according to observers, was its lack of a well-known credible leader and a clearly defined platform re-

presenting a common interest among the four western provinces (Gherson, 1980a: 9). The fighting within and between various separatist organizations had also contributed to the decline in the growth and support of the western separatist movement.

One may ask, 'Did the western separatist movement during 1980 merely represent another fad'? The response of politicians indicated the gravity of the movement's existence. For example, Joe Clark, leader of the federal Progressive Conservative Party, noted that western separatism was real and strong. Clark added, "to pretend that anger is not here is to guarantee that the anger will grow" (Globe and Mail, 1980b:9). Senator Ernest Manning, Alberta's Socred premier for twenty-five years, also noted, "I am deeply troubled by the large number of serious-minded people in western Canada who a year ago would have rejected the idea of separatism but who are now supporting organizations advocating that the West separate" (Grescoe, 1981: 10).

During the height of western separatist activity, Peter Lougheed, the premier of Alberta, recognized the seriousness of the movement by sending an observer to Carl Nickle's luncheon meeting (Sallot, 1980b: 4). Premier Allan Blakeney of Saskatchewan stated that he expected "a growth in western separatist groups and parties as 1981 goes on" (Winnipeg Free Press, 1980f: 4). Premier Sterling Lyon of Manitoba, in contrast, considered western separatism as a nonissue. But in December 1980, Lyon felt that it was

important to recognize the feelings of frustration by western Canadians (Vancouver Sun, 1980c: B10).

At the municipal level, Edmonton Mayor Cecil Purves stated, "for the first time in my life, I am disturbed by possible western separatism. It's real, it's deep, it's cutting and it's bitter" (Sallot, 1980a: 3). Purves added, "people who six months ago you never would have guessed were separatist are now joining, and in numbers" (Ibid.: 3). The western separatist movement thereby is difficult to dismiss as a 'fashionable fad' since western separatism attracted the serious attention of various politicians.

Western separatism is rightly perceived as a continuing threat regardless of its decline because "the grievances that the movement built on are all still there" (Zwarun, 1981: 20a). Thus, the western separatist movement is a reaction. It is a "symptom of anger and frustration rather than a genuine desire to separate" (White, 1981: 4). The western separatist movement arose as a result of underlying conditions. The movement will continue to pose a dangerous threat to Confederation if the underlying causes remain unresolved and if the majority of the Western population no longer perceive viable channels of expression as open. Majorie Nichols clearly expressed this view when she stated, "What the chances for success of any new party would be are really irrelevant to the political message here. Ordinarily sober and dedicated public people do not spontaneously start talk-

ing about new separatist parties, or new national parties, or new coalition parties unless there is something wrong" (Nichols, 1977: 4).

In other words, the western separatist movement did not arise because western Canadians were disloyal citizens. Rather, the western separatist movement may be perceived as an indication that certain background conditions exist which constitute western grievances. The western Canadian view is explicitly stated by Doug Low, the last president of the Independent Alberta Association, "most of the people in western Canada are loyal citizens of Canada. Most of us would like to see Canada continue to run. But we have to have some changes made" (Williamson, 1979: 9). Western Canadians, therefore, are no longer content to merely complain about their grievances (Zwarun, 1980: 28). Without the use of viable channels of expression and/or the existence of possible solutions to their grievances, western Canadians may be driven to separatism as the only available alternative. West-Fed's slogan, "independence if necessary, but not necessarily independence", clearly reveals the threat behind the western separatist movement (Williamson, 1981: 12).

Conclusion:

A western separatist movement has existed from the latter years of the 1960's to the present day. This chapter has demonstrated three other factors about this movement.

First, the western separatist movement was located mainly in Alberta, especially during its third phase. Second, the supporters and/or sympathizers of the movement came from a variety of social backgrounds. Third, the movement posed a threat to Canada's unity.

The western separatist movement continues to exist as a serious threat to Canada because the underlying causes of the movement still persist and remain unresolved. The purpose of this study is to examine the underlying societal conditions that may have contributed to the rise of the western separatist movement, particularly during 1980. This study will focus on Albertan societal conditions since the western separatist movement was and continues to be confined largely to Alberta.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adams, Neale
1977 "Facing B. C. Separatism Breakaway Movement is Coming Out of the Closet", Vancouver Sun, March 12, 1977, pg. 8.
- Barr, John J.
1971a "Beyond Bitterness: The New Radicalism", Owen Anderson and John Barr, eds., The Unfinished Revolt Some Views on Western Independence, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Limited, pp. 11-32.
- Barr, John and Anderson, Owen
1971b "The West is Ready to Revolt", Maclean's, Volume 84, June 1971, pp. 38-39, 60-61.
- Best, Dunnery
1981 "Alienation: It Won't Just Fade Away", Financial Post, February 14, 1981, pp. 25 and 26.
- Bird, John
1969 "Bertrand Unlike Johnson in Views on Separatism", Financial Post, April 12, 1969, pg. 7.
- Bird, John
1970 "West's Ire Catches Federal Ear Threats of Western Separatism Are No Longer Taken as a Great Joke", Financial Post, March 7, 1970, pg. 7.
- Blicq, Andy
1981a "Rosy Future Prophesied for Western Federation", Winnipeg Free Press, January 28, 1981, pg. 9.
- Blicq, Andy
1981b "West-Fed President Claims Alberta Ready to Go It Alone", Winnipeg Free Press, January 29, 1981, pg. 12.
- Braid, Don
1980 "Trudeau Mistaken If He Plays Down Western Separatists", Toronto Star, November 7, 1980, pg. A10.
- Byfield, Ted
1981a "Western Separatism Some Big Ifs", Odyssey, Volume 3, Number 1, January/February 1981, pp. 25-26.

- Byfield, Ted
1981b "West Writhing in Alienation Strength of Separatist Groups Tied to Engery Dispute with Ottawa", Winnipeg Free Press, February 7, 1981, pg. 93.
- Calgary Herald
1978 "Western Independence Groups Unite", Calgary Herald, August 4, 1978, pg. B2.
- Calgary Herald
1980 "Alberta Separation Ruled Out By Roche", Calgary Herald, March 13, 1980, pg. A3.
- Cleroux, Richard
1980a "Dreams of the Big Buck Luring Thousands to Alberta", Globe and Mail, November 15, 1980, pg. 11.
- Cleroux, Richard
1980b "An Old-fashioned Western Meeting - On Separating", Globe and Mail, November 24, 1980, pp. 1 and 11.
- Cowan, Peter
1981 "Federation of West Idea Loses Momentum", Spectator, August 10, 1981, pg. 9.
- Crispo, John
1981 "'We Have Stake in Keeping West in Fold'", Financial Post, January 17, 1981, pg. 9.
- Christie, Douglas
1982 "History of Western Separatism", Western Canada Concept Founder Douglas Christie Speaks, Victoria, British Columbia, Tape Number 25.
- Dykstra, Robert
1980a "Liberal Domination in Ottawa Renews Talk of Separatism", Weekend Herald, March 15, 1980, pg. A1.
- Dykstra, Robert
1980b "Taxation Without Representation Key to Discontent", Calgary Herald, March 17, 1980, pp. A1 and A9.
- Edinborough, Arnold
1969 "Notes towards a definition of the Mind of the West or: Why the West Hates the East and May Well Continue Doing So", Saturday Night, Volume 84, July 1969, pp. 23-25.

- Edmonds, J. K.
1963 "'Separatist' Fever Rises in Prairies",
Financial Post, December 28, 1963, pp. 1 & 2.
- Farquharson, Duart
1980 "The Quebec Question - 3 Separatists Press the
West's Case", Calgary Herald, March 15, 1980, pg. C28.
- Fennel, John
1970 "Would 'One Province' Help Growth? The Idea Is
Being Seriously Examined by Prairie Leaders", Finan-
cial Post, May 9, 1970, pg. P1.
- Financial Post
1970 "One Prairie Province Unlikely", Financial Post,
May 9, 1970, pg. 5.
- Friesen, John W.
1981 "The Campaign for Separatism in Alberta - 'An-
other Fad Is Over'", Calgary Herald, January 29,
1981, pg. A7.
- Gendron, Herbert
1979 "West Threatens Unity, Regan Says As Bad As
Separatists", Montreal Star, March 2, 1979, pg. A5.
- Gherson, Giles
1980a "Angry, Alienated - and Saying So", Financial
Post, November 22, 1980, pg. 9.
- Gherson, Giles
1980b "Fast Action Needed on West's Grievances",
Financial Post, December 20, 1980, pg. 7.
- Gibbins, Roger
1981a "Movement for Western Separatism has Run Out of
Steam", Winnipeg Free Press, April 24, 1981, pg. 4.
- Gibbins, Roger
1981b "It's Too Early to Bid Farewell to West
Separatism", Spectator, April 27, 1981, pg. 49.
- Globe and Mail
1975 "Aftermath of Alberta Tory Landslide Liberal Warns
of Separatism", Globe and Mail, March 28, 1975, pg. 8.
- Globe and Mail
1977 "Head of Western Canadian Separatist Group
Says It Plans Full Slate of Candidates in B.C.",
Globe and Mail, February 8, 1977, pg. 11.

Globe and Mail

1980a "Separatism Phony, But Grievances Aren't",
Globe and Mail, March 25, 1980, pg. 8.

Globe and Mail

1980b "Turmoil in the West Takes Heat Off Clark",
Globe and Mail, November 10, 1980, pg. 9.

Globe and Mail

1980c "West Being Ignored in Federal Decisions, New
Poll Suggests", Globe and Mail, November 25, 1980,
pg. 9.

Globe and Mail

1980d "For a Fair Hearing", Globe and Mail, November
27, 1980, pg. 6.

Globe and Mail

1981a "Separatist Fund-Raising is Probed", Globe and
Mail, February 23, 1981, pg. 3.

Globe and Mail

1981b "Few Separatists in Alberta: Poll", Globe
and Mail, March 16, 1981, pg. 12.

Godley, Elizabeth

1981 "1,500 Cheer West-Fed Leaders at Second Van-
couver Meeting", Vancouver Sun, January 9, 1981,
pg. A1.

Grescoe, Paul

1981 "Corralling Alberta's Separatists", Today Maga-
zine, February 7, 1981, pp. 10-12.

Gwyn, Richard

1977a "West's Alienation Growing Into Separatism",
Vancouver Sun, February 19, 1977, pp. 1 & 2.

Gwyn, Richard

1977b "'West Could Slide Out of Canada'", Toronto
Star, February 19, 1977, pg. B1.

Harrington, Denise

1981 "Who are the Separatists?", Larry Pratt and
Garth Stevenson, eds., Western Separatism The
Myths, Realities and Dangers, Edmonton, Hurtig
Publishers, pp. 23-44.

Hughes, Matt

1981 "How Many Battalions Do the Separatists Have?",
Vancouver Sun, January 24, 1981, pg. A5.

- Hull, David J.
1980 "A Country At Odds", Odyssey, Volume 2, Number 6, November/December 1980, pg. 2.
- Kostek, M. A.
1970 "A Western Canadian Separatist States His Case", Canada and the World, Volume 36, Number 2 (October 1970), pp. 3-4.
- Ma, Joe
1980 "Separatist Groups a Growing Force In the West - Long Held Grievances Cross Political Lines", Vancouver Sun, December 6, 1980, pg. A19.
- MacDonald Don
1980 "A New Separation Movement Surfaces in the West", Halifax Chronicle Herald, June 9, 1980, pg. 7.
- Malcolm, Andrew H.
1979 "Times Article Says Canada's Separatists are Found Not Only in Quebec", Calgary Herald, January 24, 1979, pg. A7.
- Mayers, Adam
1981 "Western Speakers Get Big Response", Spectator, February 26, 1981, pg. 9.
- McCune, Shane
1980 "Alberta Believes in Confederation", Weekend Herald, March 15, 1980, pg. A1.
- McKinsey, Lawren
1981 "Watching the Separatists", Larry Pratt and Garth Stevenson, eds., Western Separatism The Myths Realities and Dangers, Edmonton, Hurtig Publishers, pp. 209-227.
- McMartin, Pete
1981 "Beating Douglas Christie's Different Drum", Vancouver Sun, February 21, 1981, pg. A10.
- Montreal Gazette
1980 "Separatism in the West: How Far Does It Really Go?", Montreal Gazette, March 20, 1980, pg. 19.
- Montreal Star
1977 "Spurred by Levesque Victory B. C. Separatists Increase Clamor", Montreal Star, March 14, 1977, pg. C12.

- Nichols, Majorie
1977 "Talking (vaguely) About a New Party", Vancouver Sun, February 15, 1977, pg. 4.
- Normandin, Pierre G. (ed.)
1975 The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, Ottawa, Ontario.
- Normandin, Pierre G. (ed.)
1979 The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, Ottawa, Ontario.
- Oake, George
1980 "Western Separatism: A Spark or Raging Fire?", Spectator, December 19, 1980, pg. 57.
- Oake, George
1981 "Western Separatism 'In a Coma'", Vancouver Sun, April 18, 1981, pg. A4.
- Odam, Jes
1977 "British Columbia Separatism in the West", Montreal Star, January 29, 1977, pg. C2.
- Parker, Frank
1981 "What is Western Separatism", Socialist Voice, January 12, 1981, pg. 6.
- Pratt, Larry and Stevenson, Garth
1981 "Introduction", Larry Pratt and Garth Stevenson, eds., Western Separatism The Myths, Realities and Dangers, Edmonton, Hurtig Publishers, pp. 9-22.
- Robertson, Heather
1981 "Western Separatism: Genuine Angst or Lust for Power?" Chatelaine, Volume 54, Number 4, April 1981, pp. 51 and 102-110.
- Rodger, Ian
1973 "'Separatist' Talk Moves West", Report on Canada for Decision-Makers - Financial Post Supplementary, April 21, 1973, pg. 15.
- Roper, Bruce
1981 "Free the West", Speaker, Hamilton Hall, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, January 22, 1981.
- Sallot, Jeff
1980a "West's Anger on Budget Spawn Blue-Chip Separatists", Globe and Mail, November 8, 1980, pp. 1 & 3.

- Sallot, Jeff
1980b "Wild Cheers for Separatism The Losing of the West", Globe and Mail, November 15, 1980, pp. 1 & 4.
- Sallot, Jeff
1980c "Not Backing Separatists, Lougheed Says", Globe and Mail, November 22, 1980, pg. 13.
- Sallot, Jeff
1980d "Lougheed's Balancing Act on Separatism", Globe and Mail, November 25, 1980, pg. 8.
- Sallot, Jeff
1980e "13.8% Favor Split, Alberta Poll Shows", Globe and Mail, November 27, 1980, pg. 8.
- Skene, Wayne
1981a "A New Channel for 'The National'", Maclean's, Volume 94, Jan. - Mar. 1981, January 19, 1981, pg. 26.
- Skene, Wayne
1981b "Will the Prairies Go West? Examining the Threat of Western Separation", Quest, March 1981, pp. 11-17.
- Spectator
1980a "West Rapped Over 'Seige Mentality'", Spectator, June 17, 1980, pg. 5.
- Spectator
1980b "Blais Worried by Separation Push in West", Spectator, November 19, 1980, pg. 11.
- Spectator
1980c "Boos Drown Lone Federalist Speaker Crowd Cheers Separate West", Spectator, November 21, 1980, pg. 11.
- Spectator
1980d "PM and Lougheed Duel over West Separatism", Spectator, December 1, 1980, pg. 1.
- Spectator
1980e "Bomb Threat Shakes Western Separatist Rally", Spectator, December 9, 1980, pg. 3.
- Spectator
1980f "Albertans Offered a Yes - No Choice", Spectator, December 19, 1980, pg. 57.

Spectator

1980g "Separatist Support Eroding - West Expert",
Spectator, December 20, 1980, pg. 3.

Spectator

1980h "West-Fed Leaders Want Four Provinces",
Spectator, December 30, 1980, pg. 18.

Spectator

1981a "Western Split Opposed: Poll", Spectator,
January 2, 1981, pg. 1.

Spectator

1981b "Alta. Separatists Await Messiah, Says Pub-
lisher", Spectator, January 22, 1981, pg. 2.

Spectator

1981c "Western Separatist Cries 'Rape'", Spectator,
March 12, 1981, pg. 28.

Spicer, Keith

1980 "Western Separatists: Not Numerous, But Vocal",
Vancouver Sun, August 6, 1980, pg. A5.

Stevens, Geoffrey

1980 "The Anger is Genuine", Globe and Mail,
November 28, 1980, pg. 6.

Stewart, Walter

1969 "The Coming Showdown With the West", Maclean's,
Volume 82, July 1969, pp. 34-40.

Stewart, Walter

1972 "Western Separatism How Serious is this Move-
ment?", Canada and the World, Volume 37, April 1972,
pp. 12-13.

Still, Larry

1981 "Hurtig Conjures Vision of NDP in Power",
Vancouver Sun, February 9, 1981, pg. A11.

Streich, Laurie

1981 "Separatist Group Seeking People to Give \$1,000
Each", Winnipeg Free Press, February 26, 1981,
pg. 10.

Sunday Star

1980 "Separatist Threat Real: Alberta MP", Sunday
Star, October 26, 1980, pg. A1.

- Taylor, Paul
1981 "Ottawa Told Separatism May Be Too Late To Stop", Globe and Mail, January 24, 1981, pg. B2.
- Taylor, Rupert J.
1981 "Another Party Forming", Canada and the World, Volume 46, February 1981, pg. 17.
- Toronto Star
1977 "Gallop Poll 73 Per Cent See Separation as a Serious Threat", Toronto Star, March 23, 1977, pg. B5.
- Toulin, Alan
1980 "Alberta Expects Protest Party", Spectator, December 19, 1980, pg. 1.
- Vancouver Sun
1977 "'No Change' on Separatism", Vancouver Sun, May 18, 1977, pg. 27.
- Vancouver Sun
1978 "Western Separatists Plan Propaganda Trip", Vancouver Sun, February 13, 1978, pg. A11.
- Vancouver Sun
1980a "Western Separatist Chief Resigns", Vancouver Sun, July 2, 1980, pg. D18.
- Vancouver Sun
1980b "Separatism Called 'Cancer'", Vancouver Sun, August 1, 1980, pg. A8.
- Vancouver Sun
1980c "Western Separatists Haven't Worked Out the Economic Details", Vancouver Sun, December 18, 1980, pg. B10.
- Vancouver Sun
1981 "Western Separatism A 'Dead Issue'", Vancouver Sun, April 8, 1981, pg. A7.
- Vickers, Reg
1976 "West Separatists Get A Boost from PQ Win", Globe and Mail, November 20, 1976, pg. 8.
- Watkins, Ernest
1970 "Western View A Separatist State" It's Now Possible", Saturday Night, Volume 85, Number 9, September 1970, pp. 18-19.

- White, C. A.
1977 "Separatism: An Idea as Old as Canada",
Canada and the World, Volume 42, Number 6,
February 1977, pp. 4-6.
- White, C. A.
1981 "Western Alienation Anger in the Oil Patch",
Canada and the World, Volume 46, Number 7, March,
1981, pp. 3-4.
- Williamson, Robert
1979 "Disunity dooms Western Separatist Groups to
be 'tea-and-crumpets outfit', critic says", Globe
and Mail, February 20, 1979, pg. 9.
- Williamson, Robert
1980 "Separatism Seeks a Spark to Ignite It", Globe
and Mail, August 6, 1980, pg. 8.
- Williamson, Robert
1981 "'Utter Desperation' Lures 1,000 to Western
Separatist Rally", Globe and Mail, January 10,
1981, pg. 12.
- Wills, Terrance
1977 "Western Separatists Are Few in Number - But
Noisy", Toronto Star, February 21, 1977, pg. C3.
- Winnipeg Free Press
1977 "New Party Eyes Western Autonomy", Winnipeg
Free Press, March 12, 1977, pg. 7.
- Winnipeg Free Press
1980a "Ottawa Milks West: Separatist", Winnipeg
Free Press, March 24, 1980, pg. 31.
- Winnipeg Free Press
1980b "Separatism Appeal Falls on Few Ears", Winni-
peg Free Press, July 14, 1980, pg. 5.
- Winnipeg Free Press
1980c "Turnout Low for Separatist Only Eight
Attend Talk On Why West Should Go It Alone", Winni-
peg Free Press, July 15, 1980, pg. 3.
- Winnipeg Free Press
1980d "Western Separatism?" Winnipeg Free Press,
November 14, 1980, pg. 6.
- Winnipeg Free Press
1980e "Western Separatist Gains Converts in Alberta",
Winnipeg Free Press, November 15, 1980, pg. 10.

Winnipeg Free Press

1980f "Blakeney Expects Separatists to Flourish",
Winnipeg Free Press, December 30, 1980, pg. 4.

Winnipeg Free Press

1981a "Few in West Back Separatism Poll Conducted
for CBC Shows", Winnipeg Free Press, January 2,
1981, pp. 1 & 4.

Winnipeg Free Press

1981b "Western Split Tied to Oil", Winnipeg Free
Press, January 26, 1981, pg. 8.

Winnipeg Free Press

1981c "West-Fed Claims Support Growing", Winnipeg
Free Press, January 27, 1981, pg. 49.

World Affairs

1970 "Prairie Separatism", World Affairs, Volume 35,
Number 7 (March 1970), pg. 14.

Zwarun, Suzanne

1980 "Separatism West: Fact or Fad?", Maclean's,
Volume 93, 1980, December 1, 1980, pp. 27-32.

Zwarun, Suzanne

1981 "All Quiet in the West", Maclean's, Volume 94,
April-June 1981, May 11, 1981, pg. 20a.

CHAPTER TWO: A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY
OF THE SOCIETAL CONDITIONS RELATED
TO THE RISE OF THE ALBERTAN WESTERN
SEPARATIST MOVEMENT

Statement of the Problem

During the nineteen-seventies, the focus of national attention was on Quebec and the possibility of Quebec separatism. After the Front de Libération du Québec crisis in 1970, Quebec again captured Canadian concern with the provincial, electoral victory of a separatist leader and party, René Lévesque and the Parti Québécois, on November 16, 1976: From November 16, 1976 to May 20, 1980, the issue of Quebec separatism frequently covered the front pages of Canadian newspapers. But after the negative vote on the issue of separatism in the Quebec referendum on May 20, 1980, Canadian newspapers devoted more coverage to the issue of western separatism. Thus, western separatism appeared to suddenly emerge at that time.

This study will examine the societal conditions that existed and that may have contributed to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement in 1980. Specifically, there will be an examination of political, economic, and social conditions that may have led to the development of the Albertan western separatist movement. It must be stressed that societal conditions merely influence people's

actions indirectly; they do not dictate or determine them. Thus, this is an empirical, exploratory study of societal conditions that are indirectly related to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement. For an overall and thorough understanding of the re-emergence and growth of the movement, additional studies of the various groups' organizational structures and memberships must also be conducted.

Since this study is limited to an empirical, exploratory study of societal conditions, it is important to clarify what is not being examined. First, this study is not an examination of the groups and organizations that advocate western separatism in Alberta. Second, this study does not examine the reasons for the continued well-being, success or failure of the western separatist movement. Third, the study does not pretend to espouse a general theory for the appearance of social movements. Fourth, the study's purpose is not to test any particular theory's ability to explain the occurrence of the Albertan western separatist movement.

Consequently, one may ask, 'What is the significance of a study that limits itself to an examination of societal conditions in relation to the occurrence of an episode of collective behaviour?' Waterman notes that an examination of societal conditions is important since "larger societal trends ... are likely to be more or less direct sources of

motives, expectations, and resources that figure in the decisions of the collectivities in question" (1978: 69). Thus, an examination of Albertan societal conditions is significant because they have underlied and, as a result, they may have contributed to the rise of the given movement.

An Outline of a Theoretical Approach to the Present Study

Societal conditions in relation to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement will be examined basically from the stance of collective behaviour. This is a particularly appropriate choice for this study, since the area of collective behaviour's theory and research in social science explicitly emphasizes the importance of examining underlying societal conditions (Smelser, 1962: 5-12). The interrelationship between societal conditions and episodes of collective behaviour such as social movements is clearly stated by Toch who notes "Society not only gives rise to social movements, but also helps to determine their subsequent fate. The relationship of social movements to the world at large may promote, deflect, or retard their growth or decline" (1965: 203).

Among collective behaviour theories, perhaps the best known and also the most relevant to this research is that developed by Neil J. Smelser (1962). There are two main reasons for selecting Smelser's theory as the theoretical framework for this study. First, as Marx and Wood

note, Smelser's work provides the only comprehensive and detailed theory of collective behaviour for researchers,

... Into a loosely organized field which was dominated by social-psychological and even psychological theories, Smelser introduced a more sociological approach to collective behavior. Where there was previously little systematic analysis, Smelser introduced a highly systematic and broad, yet parsimonious, schema, in between middle-range theories and entire systems analysis. (1975: 416)

Second, Smelser's theory provides virtually the only comprehensive approach to collective behaviour which is formulated in such a way that it can be used as a tool for empirical analysis. Lewis describes Smelser's theory as "... currently the only viable theory of collective behavior available to sociologists" and notes that it "provides an opportunity for integrating a large body of data on a collective behavior episode with the only detailed theory available" (1972a: 87). As a consequence, certain portions of Smelser's theory are used here to help structure the empirical examination of the indirect causal relationship between societal conditions and the emergence of the Albertan western separatist movement.

Before proceeding, the meaning of the term 'collective behavior' will be clarified. An episode of collective behaviour, according to Smelser, refers to "an uninstitutionalized behavior ... a behavior formed or forged to meet undefined or unstructural situations" (1962: 8-9). Smelser specifically states that the character of any episode of

collective behaviour consists of an "uninstitutionalized mobilization to reconstitute a component of social action (values, norms, mobilization, and situational facilities) on the basis of a generalized belief (hysterical, wish-fulfillment, hostile, norm-oriented, and value-oriented)" (Ibid.: 382).

The central defining characteristic of an episode of collective behaviour, as indicated, is a "belief envisioning the reconstitution of some component of social action" (Ibid.: 11). Since there are five different types of generalized beliefs, Smelser identifies and defines five different types of collective behaviour: the panic, the craze, the hostile outburst, the norm-oriented, and the value-oriented movements (Ibid.: 2). The five types of collective behaviour can be reduced to two classes; the "collective outburst ... panics, crazes, and hostile outbursts, which frequently (but not always) are explosive" and the "collective movement ... collective efforts to modify norms and values, which frequently (but not always) develop over longer periods" (Ibid.: 3). In this research, the rise of an episode of collective behaviour from the second category is being examined since the movement has developed over a period of time and has intended to change certain segments of society in accordance with its goals and interests.

As the theoretical approach for this study is based on Smelser's work, it is appropriate to begin with an indepth examination of his theory of collective behaviour. First, Smelser's theory can be divided into two parts. In the second part, Smelser's theory focuses on the components of social action (values, norms, mobilization, and situational facilities) as well as the short-circuiting process. The main purpose of the components of social action is to develop "a language for describing and classifying action" (Smelser, 1962: 383). Moreover, Smelser states that "it is a 'flow chart' for tracing the course of action and not a direct source of explanatory hypotheses" (Ibid.: 383). Thus, the second part of the theory is mainly meant to describe and classify the types of 'structural strain' within society. As a result, it is seen as a basis for a typology of 'generalized beliefs' to be used when defining the various types of collective behaviour. Given this, the second part of Smelser's theory is irrelevant here since it lacks pertinence with respect to the present, empirical study of societal conditions.

The second part of Smelser's theory is inapplicable to the present study for additional reasons. Smelser himself recognizes that the components of social action are too "abstract and distant from the concrete details of collective behavior" (1962: 20). Marx and Wood also note that the "formulation of typologies (in the second part of the

theory) tend to be abstract and not well related to systematic analysis of empirical data" (1975: 368). Hence, the components of social action and the typologies will not be incorporated into this study since they are highly abstract and since they do not contribute a useful analytic approach to the examination of societal conditions in relation to the rise of a movement.

What then is the relevance of Smelser's theory of collective behaviour to this study? The study's purpose, as indicated, is an examination of the societal conditions which existed when a number of Albertans mobilized to form and/or join western separatist organizations during 1980. The first part of Smelser's theory is meant to answer a similar yet broader question, "What determines whether an episode of collective behavior of any sort will occur" (1962: 12)? As a result, portions of the first section of Smelser's theory are useful in that they provide a theoretical framework for this study.

In the first part of the theory, Smelser identifies the different types of conditions (determinants) that may lead to an episode of collective behaviour. The determinants, in addition, must combine in a value-added process in order for an episode of collective behaviour to occur. Unlike the theory's second part, the first part is meant as an analytic model in order to provide 'explanatory hypotheses' regarding the rise of an episode of collective behaviour

(Smelser, 1962: 12 & 383). The first part of the theory is thereby useful for the present study because the determinants through a value-added process attempt to explain the occurrence of an episode of collective behaviour.

The determinants of collective behaviour, for Smelser, are; structural conduciveness, structural strain, the growth and spread of generalized beliefs, precipitating factors, mobilization of participants for action, and social control (1962: 15-17). Moreover, Smelser states that these six determinants must concurrently exist within society. The examination here will therefore included a discussion on the value-added process in relation to these determinants.

An Indepth Examination of the Theoretical Approach for The Present Study

Smelser first introduces the determinant of structural conduciveness. For Smelser, this refers to the degree of permissiveness within a social structure that allows or encourages the development of collective behaviour (Smelser, 1962: 384). The meaning of the concept is further clarified by asking, "Do certain structural characteristics, more than others, permit or encourage episodes of collective behavior" (Ibid.: 15)? Structural conduciveness, in addition, is perceived as the "most general necessary condition" in order for an episode of collective behaviour to occur (Ibid.: 384). Thus, it will be determined if the condition of struc-

tural conduciveness existed and thereby, possibly contributed to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement in 1980.

The second general condition that encourages the rise of collective behaviour is the determinant of structural strain. Smelser first isolates the determinant accordingly,

... Writers on collective behavior assume almost universally that people enter episodes of (collective) behavior because something is wrong in their social environment ... They join reform and revolutionary movements because they suffer from the injustices of existing social arrangements. Such assumptions isolate an important set of determinants in the genesis of collective behavior. In this study we group such determinants under the heading of 'structural strain'. (1962: 47).

Smelser defines structural strain as "the impairment of the relations among parts of a system and the consequent malfunctioning of the system" (Ibid.: 384). In other words, structural strain refers to an objective structural condition. Smelser notes that "some form of strain must be present if an episode of collective behavior is to occur. The more severe the strain, moreover, the more likely is such an episode to appear" (Ibid.: 48).

Many recent analysts also perceive structural strain as an important underlying factor in relation to the emergence of an episode of collective behaviour. For instance, Marx and Wood note that collective behaviour is often associated with strain (1975: 375). Marx and Wood state further, "when a group's traditional or anticipated way of

life is disrupted, the likelihood of collective behavior is increased" (Ibid.: 376). The determinant of structural strain will therefore be included within this study since it is another 'general' determinant of societal conditions and since it is also seen as a 'necessary' determinant in order for an episode of collective behaviour to occur.

Smelser distinguishes two types of structural strain. Smelser explicitly states, "before we can classify any event or situation as a source of strain, we must assess this event or situation with reference to cultural standards and personal expectations ... Strain, then always expresses a relation between an event or situation and certain cultural and individual standards" (1962: 51). The determinant may therefore refer to the existence of either actual or "anticipated" "ambiguities, deprivations, conflicts and discrepancies" within a society (Ibid.: 15-16 & 51).

A researcher, as a result, may examine the existence of 'real' and/or of 'anticipated' structural strain(s). In this study, the first type of structural strain will mainly be examined with regard to Albertan societal conditions. The reasons for focusing on the first type of structural strain will be given later.

Smelser additionally notes that there is "no direct causal link between a particular kind of strain and a particular kind of collective behavior" (1962: 47). Smelser argues, "the connection, then between foci of structural

strain and collective behavior is indirect" (Ibid.: 66). The presence of actual structural strain, as indicated, may merely contribute to an episode of collective behaviour. This study, therefore, is primarily interested in the indirect relationship between the existence of actual structural strain and the emergence of the Albertan western separatist movement during 1980.

The third determinant of collective behaviour is the 'growth and spread of generalized beliefs'. This determinant will not be examined in the present study for three major reasons. First, Smelser's analysis examines the creation of generalized beliefs in the second part of his theory where he deals with the components of social action. The second part of the theory, as previously stated, is irrelevant to this study for various reasons. As a result, this determinant is not used here in relation to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement.

Second, Smelser's determinant of the growth and spread of generalized beliefs is not included in this study since it is presently being subjected to severe criticism. For example, Marx and Wood note that the determinant is castigated for "insufficiently dealing with heterogeneity of beliefs among, and within, the rank and file and the leaders" (1975: 407). Marx and Wood add further, "quantitative attitude studies of activists and of mass constituencies has called attention to the heterogeneity of beliefs and

motivations among those in the same social movement" (Ibid.: 382). Similarly, Stallings states that Smelser's assumption of "consensus among likeminded individuals as the basis for order and organization" is unwarranted and that "a more useful starting point is the assumption of heterogeneity, with unity among movement participants seen as problematic rather than as automatic" (1973: 476). Stallings adds, "the key problem then becomes the explanation of collective action out of the heterogeneity of individual definitions" (Ibid.: 476). In other words, it cannot be assumed that beliefs are shared across the groups and/or individuals as suggested by Smelser.

Third, the determinant of the growth and spread of generalized beliefs is excluded since the present study is based on secondary sources. One might argue that it is possible to tell from reports in newspapers etc. whether there are generalized beliefs developing in Alberta. In fact, Smelser used this approach to establish the existence of generalized beliefs. However, Marx and Wood contend that "when citing beliefs of specific movements, such as the Townsend or Technocracy movements, Smelser cites studies of movement ideologies, or statements from the movement's literature, rather than data on the beliefs of the rank and file" (1975: 407). Smelser is severely criticized for this approach since "the use of general statements of movement ideologies seems to imply that most, if not all, of the

participants share these generalized beliefs" (Ibid.: 407). Marx and Wood note that "there is a need to more carefully analyze the interrelations of beliefs" (Ibid.: 408).

Stallings similarly states, "there is a tendency to confuse movements ideology with individual belief structures" by relying on pamphlets, speeches, monographs, slogans, and articles (1973: 470). Stallings adds, "this is a form of the ecology fallacy in which a collective phenomenon (ideology) is used to predict the responses (beliefs) of individuals" (Ibid.: 470). As a result of these criticisms, the present study will not examine the possible existence of the growth and spread of generalized beliefs based on secondary sources.

Next, Smelser introduces the determinant of precipitating factors. The concurrence of the determinants of structural conduciveness, structural strain, and the growth and spread of generalized beliefs do not constitute sufficient conditions in order for an episode of collective behaviour to occur (1962: 16). For Smelser, "It is usually a specific event which sets the flight (an episode of collective behavior) in motion" (Ibid.: 16). Such specific events are considered as precipitating factors. Smelser elaborates,

these events may confirm or justify the fears or hatreds in a generalized belief; they may initiate or exaggerate a condition of strain; or they may redefine sharply the conditions of conduciveness. In any case, these precipitating factors give the

generalized beliefs concrete, immediate substance. In this way they provide a concrete setting toward which collective action can be directed. (1962: 17)

Thus, the determinant of precipitating factors refers to the occurrence of a specific event that may trigger an episode of collective behaviour by providing concrete substance to the generalized beliefs within a society. This determinant will therefore be incorporated into the present study since it advocates an examination of tangible events that may have triggered the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement.

The determinant of mobilization of participants supposedly brings the affected group into action (Smelser, 1962: 17). In his analysis of norm-oriented and value-oriented movements, Smelser stresses that four factors should be examined with respect to this determinant. They are: "the role of leaders in organizing the movement for action; the real and derived phases of mobilization; the effect of the success or failure of the movement's specific strategies and tactics" as well as "the effect of the movement's overall success or failure on its development" (Ibid.: 296-297 & 355).

The determinant of mobilization evidently examines the movement's internal structure and organization. This study, as previously noted, is not an examination of the Albertan western separatist movement per se. Rather, it is a study of the underlying, societal conditions that existed

and that may have contributed to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement. Therefore, the determinant of mobilization will not be included in this study.

The last determinant of collective behaviour identified by Smelser is social control. Unlike the other determinants, the operation of social control is a "counter-determinant" with respect to the development and continued existence of an episode of collective behaviour. To quote Smelser, "the study of social control is the study of those counter-determinants which prevent, interrupt, deflect, or inhibit the accumulation of the determinants just reviewed" (1962: 17).

For analytic purposes, Smelser distinguishes two types of social control. First, it is possible to analyze the type of social control that minimizes the determinants of structural conduciveness and structural strain. This type of social control prevents the occurrence of an episode of collective behaviour (Smelser, 1962: 17).

The second type of social control is implemented after the occurrence of an episode of collective behaviour. According to Smelser, the second type of social control "determines how fast, how far, and in what directions the episode will develop" (1962: 17). To assess the second type of social control's effectiveness, it is asked how the agencies of social control (e.g. the police, the press, the religious authorities, and the community leaders) act

in the presence of an episode of collective behaviour; "Do they adopt a rigid, uncompromising attitude? Do they vacillate? or Do they themselves take sides in the disturbance" (Ibid.: 17)? In other words, an examination of this determinant is crucial because "once an episode of collective behavior has appeared its duration and severity are determined by the response of the agencies of social control" (Ibid.: 384).

In this study, the first type of social control will not be included because it would be necessary to examine them and their effects in person. Since this study is being conducted outside of Alberta, it is not feasible to examine them adequately. Also, the second type of social control will not be included in the present study since it deals with social controls after the occurrence of an episode of collective behaviour. The purpose of this thesis is to examine underlying societal conditions that may have contributed to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement; not a response to it.

Lastly, Smelser introduces the concept of the value-added process. For Smelser, a single determinant is unable to produce an episode of collective behaviour. Smelser explicitly states, "together the necessary conditions constitute the sufficient condition for the episode" (1962: 382). Thus, a sufficient condition for the occurrence of an episode of collective behaviour is produced as a result

of the concurrent existence of all of the above-mentioned determinants. As suggested by the value-added process, it will be ascertained if the chosen determinants were present prior to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement during 1980. If they were present, Smelser's theory can help explain how societal conditions contributed to the rise of the given movement.

Another major point regarding the value-added process is that the determinants of collective behaviour do not need to occur within a specific order. Smelser explicitly states, "the logic of value-added ... does not posit a definite sequence for the empirical establishment of events and situations" (Ibid.: 20). Instead, the addition of the various determinants of collective behaviour is an analytic rather than a temporal process (Ibid.: 382). Hence, this process may also help in explaining the occurrence of the Albertan western separatist movement in relation to the chosen determinants.

All of Smelser's determinants, as indicated throughout the previous discussion, will not be employed here since some of them deal with the nature of an episode of collective behaviour and not the prevailing societal conditions which may have contributed to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement during 1980. Moreover, certain determinants are eliminated despite their usefulness since the thesis is shaped by the quality and the availability of

data on the western separatist movement as well as by the inability to obtain the co-operation of the various western separatist organizations to participate in a related scientific study. Nonetheless, the selected determinants of structural conduciveness, structural strain, and precipitating factors comprise an adequate, analytic approach for the purposes of this study.

Though the limitation of concepts may appear as a shortcoming, this approach is supported by Maurice Pinard who argues that all of the determinants in Smelser's theory are not of equal weight (1975: 246). In fact, Pinard notes, "structural conduciveness and structural strain are the two most important determinants of collective behaviour" (Ibid.: 21). The other determinants of collective behaviour, for Pinard, are primarily expected to follow the two, 'most important' determinants (Ibid.: 246). Pinard explicitly states,

once the conditions are ripe with strain and conduciveness, these will be in part responsible for the setting of precipitating events and even, to a certain extent, mobilization for action ... many other factors may also be involved in the activation of the other determinants, but we suggest that strain and conduciveness can be two important causes of these determinants. (Ibid.: 246-247)

Pinard continues, "we do not imply that the latter determinants are not necessary factors in protest movements, but simply that they are not wholly independent factors, and therefore, not as fundamental as strain and conduciveness" (Ibid.: 247). Thus, the independent determinants of

structural conduciveness and structural strain are both seen as the most important and fundamental conditions for the "appearance of a new movement" (Ibid.: 111).

A common critique of Smelser's theory is that "although the six conditions of collective behavior have stimulated much discussion and research, these conditions are not well operationalized" (Marx and Wood, 1975: 411). For example, Marx and Wood state that the determinant of structural conduciveness is "potentially useful but also ambiguous" (Ibid.: 409). Similarly, Firestone notes that there is a "problem in specification of the concept of strain" (1974: 119). The concepts from the first part of Smelser's theory are evidently inapplicable in their present state to a study of societal conditions since they are too abstract. Marx and Wood clearly indicate "in many cases the concepts must be further operationalized" (op. cit.: 371). Thus, the remainder of this chapter will attempt to operationalize the concepts of structural conduciveness, structural strain, and precipitating factors.

Operationalization of the Determinants of Collective Behaviour to be Used in this Study

In any study which attempts to employ a theory as a basis of social analysis, it is important to consider how best to operationalize the concepts which will be used. As for the present study of the societal conditions precipitat-

ing the rise of the western separatist movement in Alberta, this task is made easier by the fact that several of Smelser's concepts have already been operationalized and used as the basis of other studies. For example, Smelser's concept of the determinant of structural conduciveness underlies much of Maurice Pinard's analysis of the rise of a third party in the province of Quebec (1975). Similarly, in his theory of revolution, James C. Davies operationalizes many of the attributes which are related to the determinant of structural strain. Likewise, there have been several studies which have attempted to examine the impact of 'precipitating factors' on episodes of collective behaviour. Consequently, the rest of this chapter will concentrate on the ways in which these earlier studies have operationalized the key concepts which are to be used here and will begin to assess the implications of these works for this study's analysis.

In examining Pinard's operationalization of the determinant of structural conduciveness, we will examine his theory of one-party dominance, assess the ability of that theory to explain the rise of the Social Credit Party in Quebec, and examine how his theory can form the basis of the present analysis. Also, it will be determined if Pinard's method of operationalizing the determinant of structural conduciveness can be applied to this study.

The present study will likewise use James C. Davies' theory of revolution in order to operationalize the deter-

minant of structural strain. After a discussion of Davies' theory, a critique of his work will be given. Despite the critique, it will be argued that the theory of revolution still suggests a method of examining actual conditions as well as anticipated expectations within a society through the use of various economic and psychological variables.

The last section of this theoretical chapter will operationalize the determinant of precipitating factors. The concept of 'issues' will be introduced and defined in order to help explain the rise of a social movement. It will be argued that an examination of 'issues' within a society is important because 'issues' may act as precipitating factors. Therefore, an examination of possible 'issues' within Alberta will be necessary since the existence of issues may have acted as precipitating factors in relation to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement.

Operationalization of the Concept of Structural Conduciveness

There are two major reasons for selecting Maurice Pinard's method of operationalizing the concept of structural conduciveness. First, Pinard recognizes structural conduciveness as an important determinant in relation to an episode of collective behaviour since it "generally determines which courses of action are structurally possible" (1975: 246). The present study, as noted previously, also recognizes the importance of the determinant of structural

conduciveness with respect to an examination of Albertan societal conditions. Second, Pinard's method of operationalization is selected because he offers the only concrete, analytic method of operationalizing the determinant of structural conduciveness available in the literature. As a result, it will be beneficial to examine how Pinard has operationalized the concept and how Pinard's method of operationalization can be applied to this study.

The determinant of structural conduciveness, for Pinard, refers to a political variable; the conduciveness of the party system or the existence of one-party dominance. Structural conduciveness or one-party dominance in a two-party or multi-party system refers to "a situation in which the party in power cannot be seriously challenged by the opposition party' since 'the latter is too weak to replace the former'" (Ibid.: 22). Thus, structural conduciveness refers to the lack of an alternative, opposition party to the party that forms the government. With the electorate's unwillingness to support a weak opposition, a third party will likely emerge as an alternative channel for the expression of the electorate's discontent, especially under the condition of structural strain.

At this point, a correlation possibly exists between the emergence of a third party and the weakness of the opposition. Graham White describes the possible correlation accordingly, "when a third party does arise, its

strength will be negatively related (at the electoral-district level) to the previous strength of the opposition rather than of the dominant party" (1973: 402). If an opposition party is seen as an adequate, alternative source to the dominant party in power, the emergence of a third party is unlikely. As indicated, it is the strength of the opposition party, not the strength of the dominant party, that is important with respect to the determinant of structural conduciveness (op. cit.: 451).

The condition of one-party dominance is specifically determined by the following key proposition;

the indications are that whenever the opposition party (or the strongest of many opposition parties) fails to retain at least a third of the votes while in opposition, it tends to be replaced by 'third' parties. In other words, a third of the votes seems to be the empirical cutting point below which a situation of one-party dominance is created. Conversely whenever there exists a strong two-party system, third parties usually fail to make any serious inroads. (Pinard, 1975: 37)

It is this measure that will be used in order to ascertain if the determinant of structural conduciveness existed within Alberta as a societal condition in relation to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement during 1980.

Pinard's analysis of the 1962 federal election in Quebec provides a concrete example of how to apply his theory. Pinard determines whether the determinant of structural conduciveness, as operationalized by his approach, is an important condition with respect to the rise of

Quebec's Social Credit party. Pinard's findings indicated that there were no cases of Conservative one-party dominance in any Quebec electoral districts. Pinard further observed that the success of the Social Credit party was stifled in districts with stronger Conservative support (Ibid.: 25). Overall, the Conservatives in Quebec were not a viable alternative to the Liberals. Thus, Pinard concludes, "this finding supports our argument that ... the weakness of the Conservative party and the ensuing Liberal one-party dominance created a situation conducive to the rise of the Social Credit Party" (Ibid.: 25). As a result, the determinant of structural conduciveness, as operationalized by Pinard, is considered as an important condition with respect to the Social Credit party's rise. In the present study, a similar analysis of the societal condition of structural conduciveness in Alberta will be conducted. Thus, it will be ascertained if the determinant of structural conduciveness may have contributed to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement in 1980.

Pinard extends his analysis to determine if the theory of one-party dominance can explain the rise of other third parties at the provincial and federal levels in Canada. The results of his analyses were affirmative. Pinard concluded, "the hypothesis that one-party dominance is conducive to the rise of third parties seems to account for instances other than the 1962 upsurge of Social Credit

in Quebec ... in short, one-party dominance precedes and is a factor in the rise of new movements" (Ibid.: 36 & 69). In other words, the existence of strong opposition parties constitute serious deterrents while the existence of weak opposition parties constitute conditions of conduciveness with respect to the possible rise of third parties (Pinard, 1975: 38-39). Thus, structural conduciveness is seen as a necessary and fundamental determinant in relation to the rise of other third parties.

However, the issue here is whether or not Pinard's theory of one-party dominance contributes to an explanation of the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement during 1980. One may ask, 'Why must the dissatisfied turn to a third party as the new channel in order to express their concerns and interests?' In fact, the dissatisfied do not need to limit their channels of expression to third parties. Social or political movements are other methods of expressing the dissatisfied's concerns and interests. Social movements are generally seen as informal organizations that function as channels in order to express feelings of discontentment or frustration with a society. Toch elaborates, "when people feel themselves abandoned or frustrated by conventional society, they can sometimes bypass established institutions and create informal social organizations 'on the side'" (1965: 3). For Toch, the purpose of the informal social organizations is to provide

unavailable services in order to "protest indignities, to escape suffering, to release tension, to explain confusing events, or in some other way to create a more tolerable way of life than is afforded by existing formal organizations" (Ibid.: 3). Thus, people may turn to social movements in order to express their grievances if conventional channels of expression are or are perceived to be closed.

Pinard also realizes that "one-party dominance will tend to give rise to what we might call protest movements" (1975: 442). Although Pinard considers the theory of one-party dominance as a "more or less stable feature of the party structure which, given the appearance of strain during certain periods, will give rise to third parties", the theory of one-party dominance can be used in other studies in order to determine if it is a necessary condition for the rise of different channels of expression for dissatisfied concerns and interests; i.e. the rise of social and/or political movements. In other words, there is no guarantee that dissatisfied concerns or interests will be expressed merely through "conventional politics" to achieve change (Costain, 1981: 101). Thus, Pinard's method of operationalizing the determinant of structural conduciveness can be applied to this study.

Operationalization of the Concept of Structural Strain

At this point, a possible method of operationalizing Smelser's second determinant of structural strain will be examined. In this study, James C. Davies' theory of revolution is selected in order to operationalize the determinant since he provides an account of how the concurrent existence of actual and anticipated structural strains contribute to an explanation of the rise of a revolution or rebellion. In other words, Davies' theory is used here because it apparently incorporates Smelser's distinction of the two types of structural strain.

Before proceeding, it is important to note that Davies' theory of 'relative deprivation' mainly attempts to explain the rise of revolutions or rebellions. The present study might be criticized for operationalizing Smelser's determinant of structural strain by using Davies' theory on the grounds that it cannot be applied to examinations of different types of social and/or political movements.

This criticism is easily resolved by Davies who notes that his theory is applicable to other movements; not merely the revolutions and rebellions that he has examined; i.e. the Dorr's Rebellion of 1842, the Russian Revolution of 1917, and the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 (1962: 14). Wallis also observes that Davies' theory of revolution has already been used in many, various analyses of social move-

ments (1975: 360). As a result, it is logical that the given theory can be applied to this study as well.

Davies begins his theory by stating that it is difficult to determine the time of a revolution's or a rebellion's occurrence. Davies notes that various theorists attempt to explain the rise of revolutions in relation to periods of either social and economic progress or regress. Unlike the previous theorists, Davies incorporates both perspectives within his theory since "both ideas have explanatory and possible predictive value, if they are juxtaposed and put in the proper time sequence" (1962: 6). Thus, the key proposition of Davies' theory is that "revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal" (Ibid.: 6). As a result, a discernible pattern exists in relation to the rise of a revolution or rebellion with respect to 'objective' societal conditions.

But as previously noted, Davies does not limit his explanation of the rise of revolutions to an examination of objective, structural strains. In fact, Davies develops his theory further by noting that

the all-important effect on the minds of people in a particular society is to produce, during the former period, an expectation of continued ability to satisfy needs - which continue to rise - and, during the latter, a mental state of anxiety and frustration when manifest reality breaks away from anticipated reality. The actual state of socio-


economic development is less significant than the expectation that past progress, now blocked, can and must continue in the future. (1962: 6)

Political stability and instability are thereby dependent upon a state of mind. Davies concludes, "it is the dissatisfied state of mind rather than the tangible provision of 'adequate' or 'inadequate' supplies of food, equality or liberty which produces the revolution" (Ibid.: 6).

From this discussion, Davies' theory obviously includes Smelser's distinction between the two types of structural strain. In addition, Davies establishes the importance of determining whether or not subjective as well as objective structural strains exist within society.

Davies incorporates this distinction between the two types of structural strain into the following theory. For a revolution or rebellion to occur, a gap develops between the existence of expectations and gratifications. In other words, a gap widens between the actual and the expected conditions within a society. As a result, the people's situation becomes more intolerable as the gap widens between what the people want and what they can get. Davies clearly expresses his theory in the given chart:

Chart 2-1 Davies' Theory of Need Satisfaction
and Revolution



This theory is known as the 'J-curve' pattern.

At this point, the concept of 'gratifications' needs to be clarified. For Davies, 'gratifications' refer to the satisfaction of basic needs. They may range from "physical (food, clothing, shelter, health, and safety from bodily harm) to social (the affectional ties of family and friends) to the need for equal dignity and justice" (Ibid: 8). Hence, basic human needs have a very wide range. The necessary ingredient in order for a revolutionary state of mind to occur is a threat to the satisfaction of these needs. Davies explicitly states, "the necessary additional ingredient is a persistent, unrelenting threat to the satisfaction of these needs: not a threat which actually returns people to a state of sheer survival but which puts them in

the mental state where they believe they will not be able to satisfy one or more basic needs" (Ibid.: 8). Thus, physical deprivation may not be the prime factor for the occurrence of a revolution, rather, the prime factor is probably the fear of losing "ground gained with great effort" (Ibid.: 8).

Moreover, it must be stressed that there is a distinction between the two psychological variables of Smelser's generalized beliefs and of Davies' rising expectations. Generalized beliefs, for Smelser, are akin to magical beliefs since they envision the reconstitution of the components of social action in order to alleviate structural strain (1962: 8 & 11). The nature of Davies' expectations, in comparison, can be described as projections. These projections or expectations are based upon previous experiences with respect to the fulfillment of 'expected need satisfactions'. Since the 'actual need satisfaction' is no longer able to parallel the 'expected need satisfaction', a gap develops between actual and expected societal conditions. As a result, a revolution or rebellion may occur. Davies' expectations, as indicated, differ from Smelser's generalized beliefs in that they do not incorporate a vision or solution in order to alleviate structural strain. Thus, the two concepts are distinct although they are both psychological variables. Davies' concept of rising expectations is merely an elaboration of Smelsers' determinant of anticipated structural strain; not an elaboration of Smelser's concept of generalized beliefs.

Although Davies states that the prime factor to be examined is the prevailing mood or state of mind in a society, the present study will primarily examine the underlying state of economic conditions since the various western separatist organizations did not wish to participate in a survey of their memberships' subjective perceptions and expectations. As a result, this study is mainly concerned with an examination of 'actual' economic conditions that may have contributed to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement during 1980. The analysis will therefore be based on various indicators in order to determine if actual economic conditions within Alberta followed the J-curve pattern suggested by Davies. However, an analysis of anticipated structural strain will be included in Chapter 5 of this study through the use of attitude questions from the Social Change in Canada Study (1979).

Operationalization of the Concept of Precipitating Factors

In the field of collective behaviour, Johnston notes that social movements may be seen as "responses to problems which inhere in the social structure" (1980: 334). Likewise, Toch realizes that the expression of grievances and the formation of collective behaviour "must stem from specific discontents of specific people with specific situations in which they find themselves" (1965: 5). Aya also notes, "righteous indignation over concrete grievances, not

frustration, best describes the impetus to action" (1979: 70). Thus, an additional factor should be included with respect to an examination of societal conditions; the possible existence of present-day issues. This study will therefore attempt to identify and to examine possible issues in Alberta that may have thereby contributed to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement.

At this point, the concept of 'issues' will be defined since it is used to operationalize the determinant of precipitating factors. An issue is described as being a matter that is characterized by disagreement amongst people. Moreover, an issue is a matter that people have the right to disagree upon. Thus, disagreement, argument, and counterargument are allowed on the matter under discussion (Killian and Turner, 1957: 219-220). In addition, issues emerge through discussion and intercommunication among members and groups constituting the public (Ibid.: 248). Blumer extends the meaning of issues further, "the existence of an issue means that the group has to act, yet there are no understandings, definitions, or rules prescribing what that action should be. If there were, there would be no issue" (1953: 189). In conclusion, an issue consists of discussion in order to determine a new method of action with respect to an unresolved problem or situation. In other words, an issue arises in the absence of traditional or established understandings, definitions or

rules in relation to behaviour.

Hans Toch emphasizes that "the definition of motives in social movements must point to specific situations in which the person finds incentive to action" (1965: 202). But, one may ask, 'How does the existence of societal conditions, structural conduciveness and structural strain, indirectly lead to an episode of collective behaviour within society'? In other words, "How does the existence of structural conduciveness and/or structural strain convert certain people into mobilizing for collective action" (Aya, 1979: 52)? A direct causal relationship cannot be presumed to exist between frustration and revolt.

Rod Aya contributes a partial solution in relation to the connection between the existence of conducive, societal conditions and the occurrence of an episode of collective behaviour. Aya states, "collective violence is no mere eruption of rage. Its motive lies in, not vague social frustrations, but principled complaints over recognized bones of contention between groups" (1979: 70). Aya suggests that the emergence of issues from conditions of structural conduciveness and/or structural strain act as the linkage between the societal conditions and the occurrence of an episode of collective behaviour. Issues draw attention to, as well as express, societal conditions that raise discontent and grievances. This in turn enhances the possibility of the occurrence of an episode of collective behaviour.

Still, there is the need to know when a strain will contribute to the occurrence of an episode of collective behaviour. Marx and Wood note, "all societies have a certain amount of strain, but collective behaviour is not continually in existence" (1975: 411). Marx and Wood continue,

Smelser would argue that for a given strain to influence collective behavior, it must fit within the realm of a conducive social structure, and it must combine with the other determinants of collective behavior. Even when these arguments are granted, however, we are still left with the problem of specifying how much strain needs to exist before it helps generate collective behavior.

(Ibid.: 411)

In response to Marx's and Wood's question, Killian and Turner argue that the degree of strain needed in order to generate collective behaviour occurs when issues arise from the condition of structural strain and/or structural conduciveness. Killian and Turner explicitly state, "emerging movements partially reflect the definitions of issues that already prevail and partly supply their own modified definitions to the publics" (1957: 525). Killian and Turner apparently see emerging movements as incorporating the prevailing issues within a society. Therefore, an examination of the existence of possible issues within Alberta will be conducted since the prevailing issues may have contributed to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement.

A major source for the emergence of issues and

thereby a possible explanation for the mobilization of collective behaviour is the "policy arena" (Cameron, 1974: 145). By policy arena, Cameron refers to "the degree to which policies create or maintain perceptions of relative deprivation - which provides the spark for mobilization efforts" (Ibid.: 145). Hence, mobilization is the result of policy conflict and "in particular, of perceptions of relative deprivation vis-à-vis national policy" (Ibid.: 146). In other words, mobilization of collective behaviour is not directly determined or caused by societal conditions. There is the need for societal conditions to be translated into issues; specifically within the policy arena.

David Cameron continues, "mobilization efforts more often than not represent the resistance of groups which believe that public policy discriminates against them and that they are peripheral to its formation" (Ibid.: 169). Cameron concludes, "the critical independent variable which gives rise to mobilization efforts involves ... the context of public policy. In other words, it is in the structures, processes, and outputs of national policy that one must look for an explanation of why mobilization first occurs" (Ibid.: 169). Costain notes that "social movements typically arise in response to serious disaffection with the current course of public policy" (1981: 100). Thus, it will be determined if certain public policies by the federal government in particular may be regarded as issues

or as precipitating factors in relation to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it must be stressed that "collective behavior arises out of a complex of societal roots and not from a single condition" (Killian and Turner, 1957: 39). In other words, there exists a complexity of conditions that instigates the rise of an episode of collective behaviour as suggested by Smelser's value-added process. As a result, this study will operationalize three major determinants from the first part of Smelser's theory in its analysis of societal conditions within Alberta. The three major determinants to be used and operationalized are; structural conduciveness, structural strain, and precipitating factors.

As previously noted, the determinant of structural conduciveness is operationalized through the use of Maurice Pinard's theory of one-party dominance. The operationalization of the determinant of structural strain is based on James C. Davies' theory of revolution while the concept of issues is used in order to operationalize the determinant of precipitating factors. Overall, the present study's purpose is to examine the societal conditions that existed and that may have thereby contributed to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement, particularly during 1980.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ash, Roberta and Zald, Mayer N.
1966 "Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change", Social Forces, Volume 44, Number 3, March 1966, pp. 327-341.
- Aya, Rod
1979 "Theories of Revolution Reconsidered: Contrasting Models of Collective Violence", Theory and Society, Volume 8, 1979, pp. 39-99.
- Beach, Stephen W.
1977 "Social Movement Radicalization: the Case of the People's Democracy in Northern Ireland", The Sociological Quarterly, Volume 18, Summer 1977, pp. 305-318.
- Bennett, John W. and Krueger, Cynthia
1971 "Agrarian Pragmatism and Radical Politics", S. M. Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, Berkeley, Los Angeles, University of California Press, pp. 347-363.
- Blais, Andre
1973 "Third Parties in Canadian Provincial Politics", Canadian Journal of Political Science, Volume 6, 1973, pp. 422-438.
- Blumer, Herbert
1953 "Collective Behavior", Alfred M. Lee (ed.) Principles of Sociology, New York, Barnes & Noble, Inc., pp. 165-222.
- Cameron, David R.
1974 "Toward a Theory of Political Mobilization", Journal of Politics, Volume 36, 1974, pp. 138-171.
- Cameron, William Bruce
1966 Modern Social Movements, New York, Random House.
- Choice
1971 "Pinard, Maurice The Rise of A Third Party: A Study in Crisis Politics", Choice, Volume 8, November 1971, p. 1248.

- Cohen, Anthony P.
1972 "The Rise of a Third Party: A Study in Crisis Politics", Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, Volume 9, 1972, pp. 193-195.
- Cohn, Norman
1962 "Theory of Collective Behavior - Further Crowds", New Statesman, Volume 64, October 1962, pp. 576-577.
- Costain, Anne N.
1981 "Representing Women: The Transition from Social Movement to Interest Group", The Western Political Quarterly, March 1981, pp. 100-113.
- Cross, Michael S.
1971 "Pinard, Maurice The Rise of a Third Party", Library Journal, Volume 96, July 1971, p. 2338.
- Davies, James C.
1962 "Toward A Theory Of Revolution", American Sociological Review, Volume 27, 1962, pp. 5-19.
- Deutsch, Karl W.
1961 "Social Mobilization and Political Development", The American Political Science Review, Volume 55, 1961, pp. 493-514.
- Engelmann, Frederick C.
1973 "The Rise of a Third Party: A Study in Crisis Politics", American Journal of Sociology, Volume 78, 1973, pp. 1319-1320.
- Firestone, Joseph M.
1974 "Continuities in the Theory of Violence", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 18, 1974, pp. 117-142.
- Foladare, Irving S.
1972 "Pinard: The Rise of a Third Party", Contemporary Sociology, Volume 1, 1972, pp. 137-138.
- Fussner, F. Smith
1969 "Review Essays - Tudor Historical Thought", History and Theory, Volume 8, 1969, pp. 371-387.
- Halebsky, Sandor
1974 "New Perspectives on Political Radicalism", Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Volume 2, 1974, pp. 113-124.

- Hamilton, Richard and Pinard, Maurice
1976 "The Basis of Parti Quebecois Support in Recent Quebec Elections", Canadian Journal of Political Science, Volume 9, 1976, pp. 3-26.
- Hamilton, Richard and Pinard, Maurice
1977 "The Independence Issue and the Polarization of the Electorate: the 1973 Quebec Election", Canadian Journal of Political Science, Volume 10, 1977, pp. 215-259.
- Hamilton, Richard and Pinard, Maurice
1978 "The Parti Quebecois Comes to Power: An Analysis of the 1976 Quebec Election", Canadian Journal of Political Science, Volume 11, 1978, pp. 739-775.
- Hiller, Harry H.
1977 "Internal Problem Resolution and Third Party Emergence", Canadian Journal of Sociology, Volume 2, 1977, pp. 55-75.
- Homans, George Caspar
1963 "Theory of Collective Behavior - Book Reviews", American Political Science Review, Volume 57, 1963, pp. 957-958.
- Irvine, William P.
1972 "Recruitment to Nationalism: New Politics or Normal Politics?", Canadian Journal of Political Science, Volume 5, 1972, pp. 503-520.
- Jenkins, J. Craig and Perrow, Charles
1977 "Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements (1946-1972)", American Sociological Review, Volume 42, 1977, pp. 249-268.
- Johnston, Hank
1980 "The Marketed Social Movement", Pacific Sociological Review, Volume 23, 1980, pp. 333-354.
- Jung, Richard
1965 "Theory of Collective Behavior - Book Reviews", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Volume 19, 1965-1966, pp. 318-320.
- Killian, Lewis M. and Turner, Ralph H.
1957 Collective Behavior, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, Inc.

- Killian, Lewis M.
1963 "Theory of Collective Behavior - Book Reviews", American Journal of Sociology, Volume 69, November 1963, pp. 297-298.
- Lewis, Jerry M.
1972a "A Study of the Kent State Incident Using Smelser's Theory of Collective Behavior", Sociological Inquiry, Volume 42, 1972, pp. 87-96.
- Lewis, Jerry M.
1972b "Reply to Smelser", Sociological Inquiry, Volume 42, 1972, pp. 102-103.
- Lipset, S. M.
1971 Agrarian Socialism, Berkely, Los Angeles, University of California Press.
- Marx, Gary T. and Wood, James L.
1975 "Strands of Theory and Research in Collective Behavior", Annual Review of Sociology, Volume 1, 1975, pp. 363-428.
- Meier, August and Rudwick, Elliott
1972 "The Kent State Affair: Social Control of a Putative Value-Oriented Movement", Sociological Inquiry, Volume 42, 1972, pp. 81-86.
- Orum, Anthony M. and Wilson, Kenneth L.
1976 "Mobilizing People for Collective Political Action", Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Volume 4, 1976, pp. 187-202.
- Pinard, Maurice
1973 "Third Parties in Canada Revisited: A Rejoinder and Elaboration of the Theory of One-Party Dominance", Canadian Journal of Political Science, Volume 6, 1973, pp. 439-460.
- Pinard, Maurice
1975 The Rise of a Third Party A Study in Crisis Politics Enlarged Edition, Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Schwartz, Mildred A.
1973 "The Rise of a Third Party: A Study in Crisis Politics by Maurice Pinard", Political Science Quarterly, Volume 88, 1973, pp. 519-521.

- Skene, Geoff
1980 "Social Credit and the Christchurch Central By-Election", Political Science, Volume 32, Number 2, December 1980, pp. 128-141.
- Smelser, Neil J.
1962 Theory of Collective Behavior, New York, The Free Press.
- Smelser, Neil J.
1972 "Some Additional Thoughts on Collective Behavior", Sociological Inquiry, Volume 42, 1972, pp. 97-101.
- Stallings, Robert A.
1973 "Patterns of Belief in Social Movements: Clarifications from an Analysis of Environmental Groups", The Sociological Quarterly, Volume 14, August 1973, pp. 465-480.
- Stein, Michael B.
1967 "Federal Political Systems and Federal Societies", World Politics, Volume 20, 1967-1968, pp. 721-747.
- The Times Literary Supplement
1962 "Measurement and Myths", The Times Literary Supplement, November 2, 1962, p. 839.
- Tilly, Charles
1973 "Does Modernization Breed Revolution?", Comparative Politics, Volume 5, 1973, pp. 425-447.
- Toch, Hans
1965 The Social Psychology of Social Movements, New York, The Bobbs-Merill Company, Inc.
- Trofimenkoff, Susan Mann
1972 "Reviews - The Rise of a Third Party: A Study in Crisis Politics", Canadian Historical Review, Volume 53, 1972, pp. 81-82.
- Turner, Ralph H.
1963 "Theory of Collective Behavior - Book Reviews", American Sociological Review, Volume 28, 1963, pp. 826-827.
- Turner, Ralph H.
1964 "Collective Behavior and Conflict", The Sociological Quarterly, Volume 5, 1964, pp. 122-132.

Useem, Bert

1980 "Solidarity Model, Breakdown Model, and the Boston Anti-Busing Movement", American Sociological Review, Volume 45, 1980, pp. 357-369.

Wallis, Roy

1975 "Relative Deprivation and Social Movements: A Cautionary Note", British Journal of Sociology, Volume 26, 1975, pp. 360-363.

Waterman, Harvey

1978 "Political Mobilization and the Case of Chile", Studies in Comparative International Development, Volume 13, 1978, pp. 60-70.

White, Graham

1973 "One-Party Dominance and Third Parties: The Pinard Theory Reconsidered", Canadian Journal of Political Science, Volume 6, 1973, pp. 399-421.

Young, Walter D.

1976 The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF 1932-61, Toronto, University of Toronto Press.

CHAPTER THREE: AN EXAMINATION OF ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO
THE RISE OF THE ALBERTAN WESTERN SEPARATIST
MOVEMENT

Issues, as previously noted, are regarded as precipitating factors in relation to the rise of an episode of collective behaviour. At this point, it will be beneficial to give a recapitulation of why issues emerge and the importance of their emergence. Issues emerge in response to specific problems within a society. Basically, issues stem from problems of structural conduciveness and/or structural strain. They therefore draw attention to the problems related to societal conditions. By drawing attention to societal conditions, issues may act as catalysts in relation to the rise of an episode of collective behaviour. As a result, it is important to examine the existence of specific issues as possible precipitating factors related to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement.

A number of issues existed during the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement throughout its numerous phases. Many of the specific issues were a continuation of previously expressed grievances. Continual grievances within Alberta during the preceding, ten-year period included the existence of protective tariffs and duties, the maintenance of differential freight rates, the unavailability of an adequate number of railway cars for grain transportation,

the problem of extending foreign markets for western products, the difficulty of obtaining finance and credit from eastern-based, financial institutions, the struggle over tax-revenue sharing between the federal and the provincial governments, the difficulty in patriating the constitution, the lack of western political representation in the House of Commons, the minimal presence of western interests within the federal government's decision-making arena, and the lack of regional, economic diversification. Although a certain number of these historical issues have "lost much of their potency, in part because today's urban population knows less about such issues (e.g. tariffs, freight rates and transportation policy), and in part because these issues are of marginal relevance to the individual economic self-interest of most western Canadians today", they are still perceived as grievances by present-day Albertans (Gibbins, 1978: 40).

However, the continual existence of these historical issues does not account for the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement during its various phases. One may ask, 'Why have the historical issues not acted as catalysts of collective behaviour prior to the given phases of the Albertan western separatist movement'? Indeed, the question raises scepticism regarding the legitimacy of considering issues as precipitating factors.

In response, a distinction exists between the presence of older and of recent issues. The appearance of "new" issues apparently act as the catalysts in relation to the rise of an episode of collective behaviour (Gibbins, 1978: 40). Hamilton and Pinard indicate further that the 'decisive' issues would be "ones which strongly affect the populace in its interests or in its moral and political values" (1978: 773). The older issues, on the other hand, merely perform a supportive or a legitimizing task. As a result, there will only be an examination of the recent issues that existed and that possibly instigated the rise of each phase of the Albertan western separatist movement.

The selection of recent issues as precipitating factors for each phase will be based on two criteria. First, a specific event will be considered an issue if it concerns the general interest of the Albertan population. The population's general interests will be determined by the extent and the prominence of media coverage given to specific events. Second, specific events that may be considered as precipitating factors will be determined by the Albertan western separatist organizations' grievances. Newspaper articles will mainly be used to determine these organizations' grievances since the organizations were unwilling to participate in this study. After selecting the recent issues for each phase, there will be a discussion of why the selected, specific events may have acted as precipitat-

ing factors. Thus, the purposes of this chapter are to determine if precipitating factors existed immediately prior to the rise of each phase of the Albertan western separatist movement and to ascertain the possible reasons for a specific event in becoming a precipitating factor.

Phase I - Issues Prior to the Development of the Albertan Western Separatist Movement During the Late 1960's

In May 1969, former Progressive Conservative leader Robert Stanfield stated that western discontent in Canada had been reawakened as a result of the federal government's national policy (Spectator, 1969c: 14). The re-emergence of western discontent apparently arose from the federal government's introduction of the Official Languages Act to the House of Commons in October, 1968. The extent of western resentment that emerged in relation to this specific event will currently be determined.

In April 1969, Chatelaine conducted a survey on attitudes towards the new legislation on official bilingualism. The western response, as indicated, was overwhelmingly negative,

Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba were, in general emphatically against concessions (official bilingualism) ... They said no (52 per cent) to official bilingual districts across Canada, no (59 per cent) to recognition of French as a language of debate in the Legislature; they were evenly divided (46 per cent yes, 45 per cent no) about bilingual rights in civil court cases, though more agreed than disagreed with bilingualism in all supreme courts (53 per cent) and criminal courts (49 per cent). (Gillen, 1969: 41)

Regarding individual bilingualism, "Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba again showed the least interest (35 per cent, 29 percent and 33 per cent)" (Ibid.: 41).

The Toronto Daily Star obtained similar findings in its survey. Respondents were asked, "As you may know, the federal government is planning a bill on language rights - by which in all areas where 10 per cent of the population is French-speaking, these citizens would have the right to deal with federal officials in their own language. Do you approve of this idea or not" (Toronto Daily Star, 1969r: 9)? As shown, a wide divergence of opinions existed across Canada on the federal government's proposed legislation,

Table 3:1 Regional Attitudes Toward Official Bilingualism (1969)

	Yes/Approve		No/Disapprove		No Opinion
National....	56%	...	37%	...	7%
Regions:					
Quebec.....	85%	...	8%	...	7%
Ontario.....	52%	...	39%	...	9%
West.....	30%	...	64%	...	6%

(Ibid.: 9)

This survey confirmed Chatelaine's findings regarding westerners strong disapproval of the bill.

The extent of western discontent in relation to the Official Languages Act was explicitly revealed by the bill's opponents in the House of Commons. Initially, the bill was

approved in principle after its first reading. But during the second reading, seventeen Progressive Conservative MPs opposed the bill. Six of the MPs were from Alberta, five were from Saskatchewan, five were from Manitoba and one was from Nova Scotia. The five Conservative critics that forced a recorded vote on the bill were mainly from Alberta.

The result of the recorded vote indicated; 41 Conservatives, 16 New Democrats, 10 Creditistes and 130 Liberals supported the bill while 17 Conservatives opposed it (Seale, 1969f: 1). The bill's dissenters were described as being a western split since they were overwhelmingly from the western provinces. In response to the split, Frank Moores, president of the Progressive Conservative Association of Canada, stated, "It's very unfortunate that some people felt they had to put regionalism ahead of nationalism. With the pressures on the Western members from their constituencies, I can understand their attitude" (Young, 1969b: 7). There are two crucial points to recognize here. First, opposition to the Official Languages Act was centered in the West. Second, the so-called 'rebel' MPs were under strong pressure from their constituencies to oppose the bill. Hence, the Official Languages Act was evidently seen as a recent and forceful issue to western Canadians.

The languages bill, moreover, may have acted as 'the' major precipitating factor in relation to the rise of the western separatist organizations in the late 1960's

since four of these groups were founded shortly after its announcement. Indeed, Stewart noted, "it was the Official Languages Act more than anything else that led to the founding of the British Columbia Separatist Association in Vancouver by cabaret owner Bob Reeds, the Western Canada Separatist Movement in Edmonton by taxi driver Reg Wheatcroft, and the Dominion of Canada Party in Calgary by Mrs. Flo Frawley, president of a printing firm and a former Conservative Party official" (1969: 39). Apparently, the Voice of Western Canada was also founded in response to the proposed bill. Gerry Beck, founder of the Voice of Western Canada, was asked, "Why are you promoting western Canadian separatism or a western Canadian state" (Kostek, 1970: 3)? In reply, Beck stated,

the answer is very simple ... I am not anti-French -- I love the French language -- but I do not feel that it should be forced upon us and our children in the manner that the federal Government is attempting to do it. Simply, I am against the forced 'Franconizing' of our country, and the elevating of French as an official language in our country. (Ibid.: 3)

From Beck's response, the Official Languages Act was 'the' major precipitating factor in the first phase of the Albertan western separatist movement.

In the following discussion, an outline of the original bill will be given in order to indicate the underlying sources of western discontent. On October 27, 1968, the Official Languages Act was introduced to the House of Commons for its first reading. The bill consisted of the

following points:

(1) the provision for federal bilingual districts in which 'services to the public' will be available in both the English and the French languages, wherever the official language minority represents at least 10 per cent of the population, (2) the appointment of a commissioner of official languages to ensure the status of each official language and to investigate alleged breaches of the act, (3) the ensurance that every federal department, court, administrative body or Crown corporation would provide communication with the public in both English and French at its Ottawa office, at its head office, and at any of its offices located in bilingual districts, (4) the provision that 'public instruments' issued by Parliament or the federal government, court or agency be published in both official languages, and (5) the provision that any person appearing in criminal proceedings before a judicial or quasi-judicial body established by federal law has the right to give evidence in the language of his choice. As for the federal 'courts of record' located in the national capital or a federal bilingual district, they also must be able to provide simultaneous translation at the request of any party to the action.

(Hill, 1968: 1; Globe and Mail, 1968: 1)

In summary, Prime Minister Trudeau stated that the purpose of the bill was to "provide federal government service in both the English and the French languages where required by the population" (World Affairs, 1969b: 12).

Westerners vehemently resented the Official Languages Act for various reasons. First, the Official Languages Act was strongly opposed because westerners felt that their interests were being neglected while the federal government was preoccupied with the problems of central Canada. Alberta Conservative Stan Schumacher noted that western Canadians perceived the Official Languages Act merely as "a central

Canadian solution to a central Canadian problem" (Lynch, 1969: 2). In addition, the federal government's failure to adequately explain the intent and content of the bill raised further western anger towards the federal government. As a result, resentment, suspicion, and hostility sharply increased within the western provinces.

Another major reason for the westerners' strong opposition was the bill's insensitivity to the "multilingual and multicultural" character of the western provinces (Gibbins, 1978: 41). Walter Dinsdale, member of Parliament, expressed the feelings of westerners accordingly, "Canada is a nation of minorities ... we talk about the English-speaking majority but in terms of population this majority is made up of many minorities most of which, in Western Canada, still retain their ethnic ways of life" (Seale, 1969e: 7). For example, other ethnicities, such as the Germans (14.2%), the Ukrainians (8.3%), and the Scandinavians (6.0%), outnumbered the French minority (5.8%) within Alberta (Statistics Canada, 1971a: 1-1). Albertans, as a result, resented the special rights and status given to the French language while the 'other' ethnicities (German, Scandinavian, and Ukrainian) received no such status. Albertans apparently felt the other ethnic groups within their province were being reduced to second-class citizens by this bill (Seale, 1969g: 2).

Perhaps the most damaging argument against the im-

plementation of the Official Languages Act was the extent of French anglicization outside of Quebec. Prior to the introduction of this bill, Richard J. Joy observed that French minorities were "fading away" in the western provinces (1967: 2). Two major forces contributed to the French-speaking population's decline in the West; the lack of French-Canadian in-migration and the process of assimilation.

Joy noted that there had been very little French in-migration to the western provinces in the previous twenty years. French-speaking westerners, as a result, could not rely upon reinforcements from external sources in order to maintain their presence (Joy, 1967: 45). Additionally, the process of assimilation was seriously weakening the French minority's chances of linguistic and cultural survival. Assimilation, according to Joy, occurred through two major processes. Joy states,

without the protective shell of the rural French parish, the city-dweller is constantly exposed to the English language. His children will, almost invariably, learn the language of their English-speaking playmates and a high proportion of the French-origin adolescents will find themselves marrying partners who are of the majority group, children of such couples may be able to understand both parents but would seldom choose French as their major language. (Ibid.: 34)

Due to social contact and to linguistically-mixed marriages, the chances of survival for the French language were drastically reduced. Joy states, "in the west, the social and

economic forces have already led to assimilation of three-quarters of those of French origin" and that the process of assimilation is "too strong to be offset by the mere provision of schools and television programs in the minority language" (Ibid.: 27). In fact, Joy predicted that the French language would "virtually disappear from the Western provinces" (Ibid.: 136).

Similarly, Roderic P. Beaujot and Charles Castonguay recognized the process of assimilation occurring amongst French-speaking westerners (Beaujot, 1979b: 23; Castonguay, 1979: 10). For Castonguay, the Official Languages Act was not realistic. The languages bill merely was "bent on expressing a symbolic Canadian unity" (Castonguay, 1979: 12). A more realistic language policy would have been territorial "with French as the indispensable language of communication in Quebec and Acadia, English in the rest of Canada, and a bilingual capital area surrounding Ottawa" (Ibid.: 13). Beaujot likewise noted that the vision of having a bilingual nation with bilingual districts across the country was merely a myth and did not deal with "tangible realities" (Beaujot, 1979b: 27). The overwhelming occurrence of assimilation and anglicization amongst French-speaking westerners supported western Canadians' complaints that the languages bill was not realistic in relation to the ethnic composition of the West or its needs and/or interests. Thus, it should not be surprising that westerners could not compre-

hend the "rationality" or the "political necessity" of the Official Languages Act in relation to the West (Elton & Gibbins, 1979: 89).

Another objection to the Official Languages Act concerned civil service requirements. Westerners feared that they would not be able to qualify for employment or for senior civil servant jobs since the vast majority of westerners did not speak French. As a result, it was feared that the bill would create "a completely bilingual civil service, drawn largely from Quebec" (Toronto Daily Star, 1968: 2). Since French Canadians would dominate the civil service, westerners felt that "administrative decisions, more than ever, would favour Quebec and Ontario" (Stewart, 1969: 39).

Moreover, the implementation of the Official Languages Act in the West was difficult to justify given its high cost. The bill's execution would supposedly amount to \$500 million a year (White, 1976b: 6). The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism thereby recommended that the federal government offer financial aid to the provinces. In response, Prime Minister Trudeau stated that the federal government would help the provincial governments with the costs of implementation, but did not specify the type of aid the federal government would offer. Concerning financial assistance, Seale reported, "Ottawa did not want to impose itself upon the provinces and suggested that nonfinancial

aid was possible" (1968: 4).

The lack of definite financial assistance from the federal government further aroused western anger. The costs of providing translators, teachers, and training programs would therefore be "wildly out of proportion to the number of times the bilingual civil service would be used" (Edinburgh, 1969: 12). As a result, "some provinces with small numbers of French-speaking residents, particularly in Western Canada, feared achievement of such a goal would have been too expensive" (Globe and Mail, 1969b: 1). According to Robert Simpson, M.P., the money spent on bilingual programs could have been used more wisely on urgent matters within the West (Spectator, 1969b: 1).

Lastly, a major debate developed over the bill's constitutionality. This constitutional debate centered on the interpretation of two sections of the British North America Act. First, Section 133 states,

Either the English or the French language may be used by any person in the debates of the Houses of the Parliament of Canada and of the Houses of the Legislature of Quebec, and both those languages shall be used in the respective records and journals of those Houses, and either of those languages may be used by any person or in any pleading or process in or issuing from any court of Canada established under this Act and in or from all or any of the courts of Quebec. The Acts of the Parliament of Canada and of the Legislature of Quebec shall be printed and published in both those languages. (British North America Act, 1867: 23)

Section 133 apparently safeguarded the use of English and French in the federal Parliament, in the Legislature of

Quebec, and in the Courts of Quebec and of Canada.

Section 133, as indicated, did not provide for the use of French in the other provinces. As a result, a debate arose regarding the purpose of this section. J. T. Thorson, former president of the Exchequer Court of Canada, argued that Section 133's role was to limit the official use of French in Canada. Thus, the Official Languages Act,

represented an attempt to give the French language the status of an official language in Canada in areas where it did not now have such a status and to compel its use in cases in which its use was not now required and that this was in conflict with the limitations relating to the status and use of the French language prescribed by Section 133 ... and repugnant to them. (Forsey, 1969: 7)

But according to Eugene Forsey, Section 133 did not attempt to limit the use of French or of English to the specific areas within Section 133 (Ibid.: 7). Rather, Section 133 merely attempted to safeguard the use of French and English in the aforementioned areas. The federal Parliament, therefore, "remained perfectly competent to add to the specified cases, within its own jurisdiction" (Ibid.: 7).

Section 91(1) also raised doubts about the constitutionality of the Official Languages Act. Supposedly, the section "expressly withheld the power to make any amendment as regards the use of the English or the French language" (Ibid.: 7). Hence, J. T. Thorson argued that "the power to legislate 'as regards the use of the English or French language' was excluded from the jurisdiction con-

ferred by the section" (Ibid.: 7). Western critics thereby stated that the Official Languages Act was unconstitutional since it exceeded the powers of Parliament (Seale, 1969f: 2). The federal government was consequently criticized by two members of Parliament, Jack McIntosh and Robert Coates, as well as by the Alberta Attorney-General, Edgar Gerhart, for attempting to "unilaterally amend the constitution as regards the rights of the English and the French languages" (Seale, 1969e: 7; Seale, 1969a: 9).

The federal government, in response, argued that the languages bill did not constitute a constitutional amendment because it did not change the language rights within the British North America Act (Seale, 1969d: 10). Therefore, it could still "legislate on the use of the two languages except as forbidden by Section 133" (Forsey, 1969: 7). Moreover, the Official Languages Act would merely be a statute. In other words, it would not be "entrenched in the Constitution" (Ibid.: 7). As a result, the federal Parliament "would not be taking 'unilateral action' to do anything but exercise what was in its own jurisdiction ... and for the exercise of which it required no 'approval' from any other authority whatsoever" (Ibid.: 7).

Perhaps the greatest fear regarding the Official Languages Act amongst the so-called rebels from the western provinces was expressed by Jack McIntosh, M.P.,

if we create a precedent of flouting our constitution by passage of the bill now before us, who or what can set a limit on the acts of any future Canadian Government with the majority and determination to ram legislation through Parliament" (Globe and Mail, 1969k: 2).

As a result of the precedent, McIntosh added, "no Canadian Government will ever again feel any necessity to feel bound by the provisions of the British North America Act which ... is our constitution" (Ibid.: 2). The so-called 'rebels' were evidently concerned about passing an unconstitutional measure and thereby destroying the various rights protected by the Constitution. Jack McIntosh implicitly expressed a familiar, western fear; the fear of western interests and/or rights being neglected or eroded by a domineering central Canadian force within the federal government.

As indicated, there were many possible reasons for the Official Languages Act becoming a precipitating factor in relation to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement during the late 1960's. The bill was described by westerners as "illegal, expensive, unnecessary, and a threat to Canadian unity" (Gray, 1969: 1). Therefore, it is very likely that the languages bill became a precipitating factor for a combination of the above-mentioned reasons.

Phase II - Issues Prior to the Re-emergence of the Albertan Western Separatist Movement in the Early 1970's

The major issue that concerned Albertans during the early 1970's was the federal government's policy toward the

oil industry'. At that time, the federal government 'moved' to control the pricing of oil and to redistribute the division of economic rent, economic return over and above all of the costs of operation including depreciation, operating expenses, overhead, transportation costs and an adequate return on risk capital (An Energy Policy for Canada, 1973a: viii), accruing to the oil industry, the provincial and the federal governments. The federal government, as a result, was brought into "direct confrontation with the oil industry and the producing provinces" (Kierans, 1975: 426). Thus, the federal government's oil policy became an important issue amongst Albertans and may have thereby incited certain Albertans to form or join western separatist organizations.

Albertan western separatist organizations specifically stated that the federal government's oil policy constituted the fundamental grievance that acted as a precipitating factor for their rise. The Independent Alberta Association, for example, was mainly organized by a group of "disgruntled" Calgary oil men in 1974 (Dykstra, 1980a: A14). This organization was reportedly formed in response to the recent, federal government's oil policy (Ibid.: A14). Thus, the federal government's oil policy acted as the catalyst for the emergence of the most important Albertan western separatist organization at that time.

A historical review of Canadian energy policy and of world oil price developments is necessary in order to understand the reasons for considering the federal government's oil policy in the early 1970's as a recent issue and thereby a possible precipitating factor. In the 1950's and 1960's, the Albertan oil industry's main problem was its inability to acquire sufficient markets for its product. Pratt and Richards noted that the "resolution of the Suez crisis and the reopening of the Suez Canal to tankers, a recession in the United States, and a new US oil import quota system" combined to restrict the export sales of Alberta's crude oil (1978: 10). The independent domestic producers thereby wanted to extend their market to Montreal, an area supplied by foreign oil imports. But, this proposal was "strongly opposed by the international oil companies, who wanted to retain the Montreal market for their unpro-rated offshore oil, and by the US State department, which feared the political repercussions in Venezuela of a loss of one of its key export markets" (Ibid.: 10). In response to these pressures, the federal government introduced the National Oil Policy in 1961.

The National Oil Policy consisted of the Ottawa Valley line that divided the Canadian petroleum market into two areas. East of the line Canadians would purchase cheaper, foreign oil from Venezuela and Saudi Arabia. West of the line Canadians had to purchase the higher priced, domestic

oil (an extra thirty-five cents a barrel) from the western provinces.

With this policy, the domestic producers' grievances were abated since they were guaranteed a Canadian market for their crude oil at 'higher-than-world-market' prices. External pressures were also alleviated since Canada reserved the area east of the Ottawa Valley for foreign imports. In return, the United States "agreed to exempt Canada from its import restrictions" (Ibid.: 10). The surplus production of western Canadian crude oil was to be "absorbed by the expansion of exports to the US midwest and west coast" (Ibid.: 10). Evidently, the aim of the federal government's oil policy was to "assist the provinces in the exploitation of 'their' energy resources via smoothing the obstacles involved in export market penetration" (McDougall, 1975: 47). Ottawa's energy policy from 1959 to 1973 could therefore be "reduced to two simple words: 'exploit' and 'export'" (Ibid.: 48).

World events led to a drastic change in the federal government's oil policy in the early 1970's. International oil prices began to increase slowly during 1970. Libya, an important oil exporter, had successfully raised its prices and taxes on oil by "threatening to curtail the production of a group of independent and major American oil companies" (Pratt and Richards, 1979: 218). From Libya's example, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

agreed to increase the prices and the taxes on their oil in the Tehran and Tripoli Agreements in 1971. But, the increases accruing to the oil producing countries were threatened by the high inflation rate in the West and by the devaluation of the American dollar (Ibid.: 218). As a result, OPEC arranged the Geneva Agreement to protect the oil producing countries' currency from devaluation by substantially increasing the price of their crude oil. During this period, the price of domestic crude oil also increased in accordance with the world market prices in a series of "upward adjustments" (Ibid.: 223).

After the Geneva Agreement, the world experienced another energy crisis from October 1973 to April 1974. First, the Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, owners of sixty per cent of the world's reserves, imposed an oil embargo on any countries considered friendly to Israel after the outbreak of the Middle East war in October 1973. Second, the Arab oil-producing countries planned a twenty-five per cent cut in their oil production. The price of a barrel of oil subsequently quadrupled from three to eleven dollars during the embargo. After six months, the twenty-five per cent cut in oil production and the price increase for a barrel of oil remained intact although the oil embargo was lifted in April 1974 (Paus-Jenssen, 1979: 49). But due to the federal government's intervention, the price of domestic crude oil, in comparison,

did not rise in accordance to the world market level.

It is important to recall that a major source of imported oil to Quebec and to the eastern provinces was from Venezuela. The price of imported crude increased since Venezuela raised the price of their oil to the world market level. Hence, the markets east of the Ottawa Valley line could not escape the increased price of foreign crude. The federal government decided to intervene in domestic oil pricing since it considered the increased cost of foreign oil as "unfair for the eastern provinces to bear" (White, 1975a: 6). Moreover, the world market price for domestic crude oil produced large increases in economic rent from 1970 to 1973. The federal government became concerned about the division of economic rent amongst the domestic oil industry, the provincial and the federal governments. As a result of these interests, the federal government decided to make "major changes" in its energy policy (Gainer and Powrie, 1975: 2). The revised energy policy may therefore be considered as a recent issue and a possible precipitating factor.

The federal government, as indicated, introduced new legislation on energy policy during 1973/74. There were three measures that particularly riled Albertans. First, the federal government announced a price freeze on domestic crude oil at "pre-embargo" levels of four dollars per barrel in September 1973 (Jump and Wilson, 1975: 31).

The price of oil was then increased to six dollars per barrel east of the Ottawa Valley line while the price of oil remained at four dollars per barrel west of the line in January 1974. By May 1974, a uniform price for crude oil was set at \$6.50 a barrel (Ibid.: 34). Hence, a single, lower price existed for crude oil across Canada while domestic crude oil for foreign markets would be exported at a 'slightly-lower-than-world-market' price. This measure formed the dual pricing system for domestic crude oil in Canada.

To maintain the single, lower price for crude across Canada, the federal government gave subsidies to the refineries in the amount of the difference between the domestic and the world oil prices. The funds for the subsidies would come from a new oil export tax of \$5.20 per barrel on domestic crude oil sold to foreign markets (Paus-Jenssen, 1979: 49). Estimates of the cost of the oil subsidy to the refineries in 1974 ranged from 800 million to 3,160 million dollars (Jump and Wilson, 1975: 35; Thirsk and Wright, 1977: 357). Despite this difference, the federal government still needed to collect a vast amount of money through the oil export tax in order to maintain Canada's uniform price of crude.

The third measure that riled Albertans was the federal government's proposal to disallow the deductibility of provincial royalties from the oil companies' corporate

income tax. This proposal was significant since "the federal Income Tax Act previously allowed the operators to deduct provincial royalties from taxable income for purposes of calculating corporate income taxes" and that "the provinces (thereby) enjoyed priority over the federal government in taxation of resource revenues" (Paus-Jenssen, 1979: 46).

The Alberta provincial government, for example, increased its royalty rates in order to acquire a larger share of the economic rents in response to the changes in the oil prices. In May 1974, the federal government also reacted by introducing the aforementioned proposal in order that they may obtain a greater share of the 'residual earnings'. As a result, Paus-Jenssen noted that "by the summer of 1974 revenue-sharing between the two levels of government had become a real problem with serious economic and political implications" (Ibid.: 46-47). A major dispute evidently arose in relation to the distribution of resource revenues between the Alberta provincial and federal governments.

Albertans were opposed to the federal government's new oil policy in the early 1970's for various reasons. First, Albertans considered the oil policy as an infringement upon their provincial rights. In 1930, ownership rights concerning natural resources were granted to Alberta (British North America Act, 1930: 54-55). The province therefore had the ability to "control access to and the

development of natural resources" (Paus-Jenssen, 1979: 46). But, there were three sections in the British North America Act that indirectly allowed the federal government to maintain a degree of control over this jurisdiction.

The first measure that caused conflicts between the two levels of government was the federal government's control of trade and commerce (British North America Act, 1867: 15). According to this measure, the federal government was responsible for interprovincial and international trade. As a result, the federal government was able to regulate exports and to impose taxes on products that left the province of origin (White, 1979b: 6). The federal government therefore felt justified in imposing an export tax on domestic crude oil.

Concerning revenue-sharing between the two levels of government. Paus-Jenssen noted that "the provincial claim on resource revenues was based on ownership of natural resources as well as on the authority to levy direct taxes within the province" (1979: 46). The federal government, in comparison, was given the additional power to levy direct or indirect taxes (British North America Act, 1867: 15). The federal government thereby claimed that it had the power to collect revenue from the resource industry.

Lastly, the federal government was able to rely upon an additional clause in the British North America Act in order to justify its new energy policy if necessary.

The British North America Act stated that the federal government could "make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Canada" (Ibid.: 15 & 22). Indeed, the federal government seemingly invoked this clause in order to justify its policy since it remarked that energy was "too vital to be left in provincial hands as a result of the oil shortages and the Arab crisis prices" (White, 1975d: 5). Hence, the federal government appeared to realize that their policy may have been impinging on provincial rights concerning jurisdiction over natural resources. The opposition by Albertans to the federal government's intrusion, therefore, should not be a surprise although the constitution did allow the federal government to act accordingly.

The opposition to the new energy policy was not merely centered on a constitutional debate but also on economic interests. To fully understand the strong, economic protest against the new energy policy by Albertans and by the Albertan provincial government, it is necessary to recognize the extent of the province's economic dependence on the oil and gas industry. Alberta, unlike the other provinces, contains most of Canada's supplies of oil and natural gas. White states, "86.5 per cent of all oil production, 84 per cent of all natural gas production and 42 per cent of all coal production" is located in Alberta (1979a: 4). Alberta thereby is highly dependent on this resource industry.

The heavy concentration of energy supplies, moreover,

instigated an economic 'boom' mainly in Alberta after the world energy crisis. In fact, future economic prospects in Alberta looked endless since exploration estimates indicated that Alberta's tar sands contained the "world's largest remaining oil reserve" (Ibid.: 4). Still, Albertans were aware that the economy's prosperity depended upon a non-replenishable resource.

Two factors threatened Alberta's prosperous economy. First, energy consumption rates continued to rise in North America. Kierans noted that Canada's consumption of energy "tripled in the last quarter century and in the process Canadians became dependent on oil and gas for roughly two-thirds of their needs" (1975: 427). Second, drilling activity in Alberta dramatically fell between 1968 and 1970. In fact, the smaller operators accounted for three-quarters of the provinces' new exploratory work (Pratt and Richards, 1978: 11). Pratt and Richards added, "new field wildcat wells drilled in Alberta fell from 421 in 1969 to 256 in 1971" (Ibid.: 11). Obviously, Alberta's reserves of conventional oil were declining without new commercial prospects. Without a diversified economy, the decline in the conventional oil reserves represented a serious threat to the prosperity of Alberta's economy.

The federal government's new energy policy was apparently seen as an additional threat to Albertans and to the Alberta provincial government since the dual pricing

system supposedly encouraged high consumption of oil in Canada (Thirsk and Wright, 1977: 358). With high consumption, the underlying source of Alberta's economic prosperity was being depleted at an increasing rate.

The federal government's new energy policy was also seen as a burden to the provincial government's attempt to acquire higher resource revenues. The share of the provincial government's resource revenues was already decreasing as a result of the decline in conventional oil reserves. The federal government's imposition of a low, uniform price for crude across Canada as well as the imposition of an export tax on crude to foreign markets further decreased the provincial government's share of resource revenues. For example, Gainer and Powrie estimated that if the federal government did not fix the price of oil then "given a wellhead price of \$11.70, the change in provincial royalties (Alberta's new royalty rates consisted of 22% on the first \$3.80 per barrel, and 65% on the remaining price per barrel for 'old' oil) would have transferred an additional \$2,434 million in royalty revenue" "calculated on the basis of 1973 volumes of oil flows" (1975: 2-4). The federal government's energy policy therefore "held royalty revenues much below their potential increases"; royalties that were needed in order to help diversify the Albertan economy (Ibid.: 3).

The Independent Alberta Association, as noted earlier, was formed by a group of disgruntled, Calgary oil men in response to the federal oil policy. An examination of the oil industry's opposition would therefore be beneficial as this provides an indication of why the new energy policy acted as a precipitating factor for the founders of the largest, Albertan western separatist organization at that time. Three major arguments by the oil and gas industry will currently be examined.

The first argument by the oil industry against the federal government's new energy policy was that the dual pricing system encouraged 'wasteful' consumption (Thirsk and Wright, 1977: 358). The lower price would supposedly lead to a greater demand for oil. The measure was therefore opposed because "the production required to satisfy this higher demand required resources that would have been used to produce something else" (Ibid.: 358). As a result, a misallocation of energy resources would occur within production. Moreover, the dual pricing system would likely benefit consumers at the expense of producers. Although the new energy policy could be beneficial for the federal government's popularity, the oil industry warned, "the loss to producers would either take the form of a reduction in profits or, if losses ensued, cutbacks in production and employment which would ultimately lead to a lower income for Canada as a whole" (Waverman, 1975: 79). Thus, the

new energy policy presumably acted as a precipitating factor amongst the oil producers since there was a potential transfer of wealth from the producers to the consumers within society.

The second major argument against the new energy policy concerned the exploration of oil reserves. All three measures, the dual pricing system, the oil export tax, and the disallowance of royalty deductions, likely dissuaded the oil industry from pursuing further exploration. For example, the oil industry argued that the lower price for oil discouraged exploration since the "anticipated unit costs in the development of new supplies of conventional crude oil could exceed the ceiling price" fixed by the federal government (Gainer and Powrie, 1975: 6). If this occurred, exploratory activity would not be a profitable venture. Indeed, Gainer and Powrie stated that the dual pricing system and the export tax were detrimental since they "forestalled all new developments whose cost was expected to exceed the price ceiling" (Ibid.: 7).

Moreover, the oil industry argued that the new energy policy might deter exploration since it "posed many uncertainties for explorers and investors" (Ritchie, 1975: 66). Exploration was already a high 'risk' activity without the additional hazard of "precedent setting actions ... which indicated to the oil companies that the federal government was prepared to tax away profits accruing when

combinations of fortuitous circumstances produced very high rates of return" (SydneySmith, 1975: 19). The oil industry, therefore, was apprehensive about exploratory activity since they feared further federal government intervention in relation to the expected rate of return after prosperous conditions. SydneySmith warned, "given the oil companies unchanged investment alternatives in some other countries, oil companies maximizing profits with acceptable risks rationally will reduce their investment in Canada" (Ibid.: 19). Although the federal government's policy may not have been the only cause, the decrease in exploration and the pullout of foreign investment was considered a serious 'blow' to the Albertan economy (White, 1975a: 7; Ritchie, 1975: 74).

Third, exploration was not the only activity that faced reductions. Since drilling activity is a function of price, the federal government's set price for Canadian crude made certain wells unprofitable to exploit (Waverman, 1975: 80). For instance, Gainer and Powrie noted that more expensive secondary recovery methods were needed to exploit shallow wells (1975: 6). With the lower rate of return, production from these wells became increasingly unprofitable. In response, the oil industry would likely decrease production from them. In addition, the federal government's new energy policy seemingly discouraged the exploitation of "higher-cost energy sources" (Thirsk and Wright, 1977: 357) that required the development of "new

mining and extractive techniques in sands and shales" (op. cit.: 6). As a result, production from the older and the newer yet unexploited reserves were threatened due to the strong dissuasive effect of the new energy policy.

As indicated, the new energy policy may have acted as a precipitating factor amongst Albertans directly or indirectly dependent upon the oil industry's well-being. However, there were many reasons why the given policy may have acted as a precipitating factor in relation to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement in the early 1970's. Western separatist support, as a result, likely came from a variety of sources; not merely the obvious base of people directly or indirectly involved in the oil and gas industry.

Phase III - Issues Prior to the Rise of the Albertan Western Separatist Movement in 1980

There were two specific events that acted as precipitating factors in relation to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement during 1980. They were the electoral defeat of the federal Progressive Conservative government and the introduction of the National Energy Program. Since these events are seen as precipitating factors, there will therefore be an examination of each specific event.

The Albertan western separatist movement was con-

sidered 'dead' after the federal Progressive Conservative party's electoral victory on May 22, 1979. But, the decline of the movement did not last very long since the movement re-emerged in the early months of the next year. The specific event that restored the movement's impetus was the federal Progressive Conservative party's defeat on February 18, 1980.

The defeat of the federal Progressive Conservative party can be considered a recent issue since the reaction to the Tories' defeat was negative and widespread. Robertson described westerners' reaction accordingly, "the west blew its top on election night, February 18, 1980, and the earth is still trembling ... Switchboards at television stations and newspapers lit up with a single furious cry: 'Our votes didn't count!' ... Frightened and angry, many westerners lost faith in the political system" (1981: 102).

A public opinion poll commissioned by the Calgary Herald and the Edmonton Journal further supports the contention that Albertans were furious after the federal election returns. In the poll, six hundred Albertans were asked, 'Do you feel the interests of Albertans are adequately represented in Ottawa?' (McCune, 1980: A1). Sixty-eight per cent answered 'no', twenty per cent answered 'yes' and twelve per cent answered 'don't know' or 'no opinion' (Ibid.: A1). An overwhelming majority of Albertans apparently

felt their interests were inadequately represented in the federal Liberal government. The results of the federal election, therefore, may have acted as a precipitating factor for the re-emergence of the Albertan western separatist movement.

As indicated earlier, Elmer Knutson, former president of Western Canada Federation, formed the largest western separatist organization in response to the federal election. Knutson explicitly stated, "we say Central Canada blew up the bridge between themselves and Western Canada on February 18, 1980" (Williamson, 1980: 8). Although Knutson's letter to the editor of the Edmonton Journal acted as a catalyst for the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement, the defeat of the federal Progressive Conservative party was the underlying precipitating factor. As Dykstra observed, "today, in the wake of the federal election, cries of separatism are once again coming from various Western closets" (1980a: A14).

But, westerners have protested about inadequate representation and lack of political decision-making power within the federal government for many years. One may ask, 'Why does the feeling of inadequate representation after the federal election on February 18, 1980 constitute a 'recent' issue and thereby a possible precipitating factor'? It must be stressed that the victory of the federal Progressive Conservative party on May 22, 1979 gave westerners the feeling of having finally "won a hand

in running the country" (Ibid.: A14). The early defeat of the federal Progressive Conservative party supposedly came as a "psychological jolt" (Sallot, 1985a: 1). Thus, the re-emergence of the past, political grievance is considered as a recent issue since westerners' expectations of maintaining their strong voice in the federal government were immediately dashed.

Three possible reasons exist as to why the electoral defeat of the federal Progressive Conservative party acted as a precipitating factor in relation to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement in 1980. First, the defeat emphasized that Ontario and Quebec have an overwhelming dominance within Parliament while the West is merely represented by one-quarter of the seats. Robertson stated, "it did not matter that the west had overwhelmingly rejected the Liberal party, its 77 seats were not enough to counter the influence of Ontario and Quebec" (1981: 102). Since eastern and central Canadians were able to elect a majority government, westerners began to question the relevance of their vote. In fact, Knutson, former president of Western Canada Federation, and Christie, former president of Western Canada Concept, both cited this as a major motive for their advocacy of separatism (Blicq, 1981: 9; Winnipeg Free Press, 1980a: 3). Christie explicitly stated, "western votes do not count" and therefore westerners "may as well not bother voting (federally)"

(Winnipeg Free Press, 1980a: 3).

Moreover, westerners deemed central Canadians' interests and problems would take precedence at the expense of the West. Gherson noted,

Alberta businessmen and the rising managerial class - like the scores of farmers who have been the backbone of this and previous Western protest movements - fundamentally were fighting ... against the continued centralization of Canadian decision-making 'for the advantage of Quebec and Ontario'. (1980: 9)

Albertans, therefore, feared that the Liberals would "gear their policies to Ontario and Quebec since the recent, federal government was elected by the predominant support of easterners" (Taylor, 1981: 17). Given the Liberal government's recent record (e.g. the Official Languages Act and the energy policy of 1973/1974), Albertans' fears were not unfounded.

Third, Albertans felt that they no longer had an effective voice in the decision-making arena of the federal government. The lack of Liberal MPs west of Manitoba meant that there would be very little western input in the federal government's decision-making bodies; the federal Cabinet and/or the Government caucus (Sallot, 1981a: 11). With the Progressive Conservatives in power and with western MPs assigned to prominent cabinet posts, Albertans at least felt that they had a say on how the federal government should spend the millions of tax dollars and equalization payments obtained from Alberta (Dykstra, 1980b: A9). But,

after the Liberal's regained power, Albertans thought that they would only have a minimal chance of re-acquiring any 'real' influence on the federal government.

These grievances indicate possible reasons as to why the defeat of the federal Progressive Conservative party acted as a precipitating factor concerning the re-birth of the Albertan western separatist movement in 1980. The major thrust of western politics had reportedly been to get a "degree of political power commensurate with their new economic strength" (Winnipeg Free Press, 1980b: 6; Elton and Gibbins, 1979: 88). The defeat of the federal Tories re-emphasized westerners' lack of decision-making power and/or influence upon the federal government despite the growing strength and importance of the Albertan economy in relation to the rest of Canada.

Although the defeat of the federal Progressive Conservative government acted as the precipitating factor for the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement in 1980, the National Energy Program was the event that bolstered the movement's existence. For instance, Sallot noted, "the new grievance - the thing that has many Albertans seething with hot anger ... is last month's federal budget with its national energy program" (1980: 1). Opposition leader Joe Clark observed that "frustration with the federal government's recent proposals had spawned sympathy for separatist movements in Western Canada"

(Spectator, 1980d: 11). Alberta Senator Ernest Manning further indicated, "'westerners' were 'now joining or supporting' separatist organizations 'not by hundreds, but by thousands'" (Lewis, 1980: 30). Due to the formidable, negative response, the National Energy Program can be considered as a recent issue within Alberta and thereby as a possible precipitating factor in relation to the re-emergence of the Albertan western separatist movement.

Lougheed's response to the National Energy Program clearly indicated that it was a major issue in Alberta. On October 30, 1980, Peter Lougheed, the Premier of Alberta, appeared on television to announce the provincial government's response to the federal budget. The response consisted of three measures; a production cutback of 15 per cent on conventional oil over a nine-month period, a delay in approval for new oil sands plants, and a court challenge on the legality of a federal tax on natural gas (Government of Alberta, 1980). These proposals essentially represented "an ultimatum to Pierre Trudeau: a new energy deal or an oil cutback" (Lewis, 1980: 29). Lougheed's response denoted the extent of Albertans' anger over the National Energy Program since the majority of Albertans continued to support the premier's stand despite the possibility of experiencing greater hardships as a result of the given measures (Spectator, 1980b: 1).

The National Energy Program apparently acted as

the major precipitating factor in relation to the flurry of Albertan western separatist activity at that time. Memberships in the most prominent western separatist organizations, Western Canada Federation and Western Canada Concept, did not rapidly increase until the introduction of the controversial, federal budget (Skene, 1981: 14). New western separatist organizations and/or sympathizers (i.e. the Western Party, the Rupert's Land Independence League, the United West Association, and the National Party) also arose after the announcement of the program. Public opinion polls indicated further that there was a sharp increase in western separatist support from thirteen per cent in February (1980) to twenty-three per cent immediately after October 28 (1980).

At this point, a summary of the National Energy Program's measures will be given in order to indicate the root of Albertans' anger. The three major objectives of the new energy program were;

(1) to establish the basis for Canadians to seize control of their own energy future through security of supply and ultimate independence from the world oil market, (2) to offer all Canadians the real opportunity to participate in the energy industry in general and the petroleum industry in particular and to share in the benefits of industry expansion, and (3) to establish a petroleum pricing and revenue-sharing regime that recognizes the requirement of fairness to all Canadians no matter where they live. (National Energy Program, 1980: 2)

To accomplish these goals, the federal government realized that it would have to "intervene massively" in the oil and

gas industry (Duncan, 1980: 5). In fact, the program listed seven measures to fulfill its three objectives. They were;

- (1) a new price system that blends the costs of different sources of oil (the cost of imported and the various streams of domestic oils) into one-weighted price to consumers. In addition, the blended price is 'never' to exceed eighty-five per cent of the international price or the average price in the United States if lower, (2) a Petroleum Compensation Charge to domestic oil, (3) a new natural gas and gas liquids tax to be levied on both domestic and export sales, (4) an eight per cent surplus tax on net oil and gas production revenue before allowable deductions are made, (5) the phasing out of depletion allowances and the substitution of direct incentives for oil and gas exploration and development in favour of Canadian companies and investors. Thus, the exploration companies' ability to acquire grants will be tied to their levels of Canadian ownership. In addition, further incentives will be given for the exploration of Canada (frontier) Lands, (6) a proposed natural gas bank at a worth of \$400 million, and (7) the establishment of a 'special levy' on all oil and gas consumption in Canada in order to finance an increase of public ownership in the energy sector by purchasing large, foreign-owned companies. (National Energy Program, 1980: 25, 30, 31, 37-40, 42, 47 & 51)

The National Energy Program, according to the federal government, was fair since its aim was to "safeguard the national interest through security, opportunity and fairness for all Canadians" (Ibid.: 12-13). Currently, it will be argued that at least four of these measures have dramatically raised Albertans' anger.

There are many possible reasons why the National Energy Program acted as a precipitating factor in relation to the sudden growth of western separatist activity after

October 28, 1980. In fact, many of the reasons are similar to the arguments mentioned earlier in relation to the federal government's energy policy of 1974/1975. Still, a critique of the overall program will be given in relation to Albertans' interests. Then, there will be an examination of why specific measures individually contributed to Albertans' anger and thereby acted as possible precipitating factors.

Similar to the energy policy of 1973/1974, the National Energy Program was considered unconstitutional since it was perceived as being an unprecedented attempt by the federal government to "invade and inhibit provincial ownership and control of the province's own resources" (O'Callaghan, 1981: 72). The Government of Alberta implicitly argued that the National Energy Program was unconstitutional since it "discriminated against the people of Alberta in a severe way by infringing upon provincial rights of resource ownership" (Government of Alberta, 1980). In a communique to the federal government, Alberta's Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Merv Leitch, British Columbia's Minister of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources Bob McClelland, and Saskatchewan's Provincial Secretary Elwood Cowley stated, "the National Energy Program served no other purpose than to divert revenue to Ottawa and attack the right to control resources that the provinces have under the British North America Act"

(Spectator, 1980h: 11). As indicated, the Alberta provincial government strongly opposed the federal government's "unilateral energy price-setting and federal taxation program" as unconstitutional (Sallot, 1981b: 1).

In addition, the provincial government of Alberta objected to the National Energy Program since its new pricing system left Canadian oil and gas prices below world levels. There were two major reasons for the provincial government's objections to this. First, the provincial government argued that it would be forced to sell their depleting reserves of oil for less than half of the world price (Government of Alberta, 1980). As a result, the provincial government would be unable to collect the full amount of potential revenue from its vanishing resource (Canada and the World, 1981: 10). A pamphlet issued by the Government of Alberta explicitly stated, "why does Alberta want to eventually raise prices to 75% of fair market value? ... It is only fair that Alberta get a reasonable return for resources which are depleting rapidly" (op. cit.).

Secondly, the maintenance of the artificially low prices for oil and natural gas were seen as leading to economic waste since it would likely "encourage excess consumption of non-renewable resources" (Helliwell and McRae, 1981: 16; Scarfe, 1981: 2). From the province's perspective, it would indeed be wiser to increase energy prices approximately to the world market level in an attempt

to conserve its depleting supplies of conventional oil. Thus, these concerns of the Alberta government and its citizens likely meant that the National Energy Program acted as a precipitating factor in relation to the sudden increase of Albertan western separatist activity.

As the prosperity of the Albertan economy is heavily dependent upon the well-being of the oil and gas industry, perceived negative effects on that industry by the National Energy Program may have constituted additional reasons why the program acted as a precipitating factor. Four of these perceived effects will therefore be discussed here.

The first major complaint raised by the oil and gas industry was that the National Energy Program might restrict its exploratory activity by reducing its share of oil and gas revenues. According to documents accompanying the National Energy Program, the program's implementation would reduce the share of revenues accruing to the oil and gas industry over the period 1979-1983 (See Table 3:2). But, as noted previously, exploration remains a high risk and expensive activity. With the reduction in its share, the oil industry may have no other choice than to reduce exploration.

A good indicator of exploratory activity is the well-being of the drilling business. The Canadian Association of Oilwell Drilling Contractors reported that 120 contracts were cancelled and 60 rigs were scheduled to leave

Table 3:2

Estimated Revenues from Oil and Natural Gas Production

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Federal					
Revenues	1.4(12%)	2.3(15%)	5.3(27%)	7.4(30%)	9.0(31%)
Incentive Payments	-	-	0.6(3%)	0.9(4%)	1.0(3%)
Total	1.4(12%)	2.2(14%)	4.7(24%)	6.5(26%)	8.0(27%)
Industry					
Cash Flow	4.6(39%)	6.1(39%)	5.9(30%)	7.3(29%)	8.2(28%)
Incentive Payments	-	-	0.6(3%)	0.9(4%)	1.0(3%)
Total	4.6(39%)	6.1(39%)	6.5(33%)	8.2(33%)	9.2(32%)
Provinces					
Alberta	4.8(41%)	6.3(40%)	6.8(35%)	8.4(34%)	9.7(33%)
Saskatchewan	0.4(3%)	0.5(3%)	0.8(4%)	0.9(4%)	1.0(3%)
British Columbia	0.5(4%)	0.6(4%)	0.8(4%)	1.0(4%)	1.2(4%)
Total	5.7(49%)	7.4(47%)	8.4(43%)	10.3(41%)	11.9(41%)
Total Revenue	11.7(100%)	15.7(100%)	19.6(100%)	25.0(100%)	29.1(100%)
		(\$ billions)			

(National Energy Program, 1980: 108)

the country after the introduction of the program. In addition, the industry estimated that it would face a forty per cent downturn in activity in 1980-81 (Best, 1980c: 1). Best reported, "the movement portends poorly for overall levels of exploration in the Western sedimentary basin in the coming years" (Ibid.: 1). Another analysis by the staff of Alberta's Energy Minister Mervin Leitch estimated that "the 1981 total Western Canada exploration and development budgets will decline to \$4.4 billion, or 71% of the pre-NEP figure" (Best, 1981b: 2). By 1984, investment could decline to "42% of the pre-NEP estimate for the year" (Ibid.: 2). The study concluded, "in terms of total dollars over the same period; 1980-1984, \$16.9 billion would be spent under the NEP regime versus the expected \$31.4 billion prior to the NEP" (Ibid.: 2). The estimated, accelerating decline in exploratory investment was not encouraging to Albertans with an economy that is heavily dependent on the oil and gas industry.

The National Energy Program, in addition, potentially affected the rate of production within the given industry. The Alberta Energy Board estimated that the failure to move prices toward the world market level and the imposition of a surplus tax could "result in a 20% to 30% decline in gross revenues to producers" (Best, 1981a: 9). As a result, there could likely be a reduction in the "size of the ultimately recoverable stocks of conventional oil and

natural gas" (Helliwell, 1980: 648). In other words, a reduction in the operation of marginal wells may occur since these wells would be perceived as being too expensive to operate and maintain under the National Energy Program. Presumably with the estimated reduction of gross revenues, the high cost of operation may "leave no profit margin" from the marginal wells (Best, 1981c: 1). Many of these wells, therefore, would likely be shut down.

In all, "the gap between the pre-NEP and post-NEP potential supply from all sources (excluding synthetic) would be in the order of 40,000-50,000 barrels per day" (Best, 1981a: 9). Best explicitly noted, "the National Energy Program slices roughly 50,000 barrels per day from Alberta's production at the end of the decade" (Ibid.: 9). Moreover, Alberta would supposedly be without an additional 375,000 barrels per day by 1990 since "the main participants in the oilsands projects do not feel that the NEP gives a high enough price for the oil produced" (Ibid.: 9). As a result of these estimated production cuts, Richard Thomson, chief executive officer of the Toronto Dominion Bank, stated that the National Energy Program "will lead to increased dependence on imported oil by 1985 and little economic growth from development of oil and natural gas" (Spectator, 1981c: 3).

Moreover, it was predicted that jobs in the petroleum industry would soon disappear due to the National Energy Program's perceived effect on the Albertan economy.

A survey of drilling contractors in Canada on December 1, 1980 indicated that "of the 570 rigs now available, at least 70 would leave the country before the end of June. Also, about 130 rigs have either had long-term or winter drilling contracts cancelled" (Spectator, 1980e: 3). This estimated loss represented "a third of the Western Canadian drilling force and will result in 12,000 lost jobs" (Humphries, 1980: 9). Additional estimates indicated that "a further 30,000 jobs would be affected by the drilling slowdown" (Ibid.: 9). Alberta Energy Minister Mervin Leitch responded, "this means the direct loss of 12,000 jobs in the industry and an indirect loss of 30,000 jobs within the Canadian economy" (Spectator, 1980h: 11). As a result, Scarfe stated, "the growth rate of economic activity Albertans have been led to expect will be substantially curtailed" (1981: 9). Although these circumstances may be due to other factors, the National Energy Program was still seen as the major instigator.

Supposedly, the new federal oil and gas incentives program would also have a negative effect upon Alberta's resource industry. This program is conveniently summarized by the federal government in Table 3:3.

Table 3:3 Oil and Gas Incentives Under the National Energy Program*

Year	Provincial Lands				Canada Lands			
	Depletion†	Incentive Payments			Depletion†	Incentive Payments		
Canadian Ownership Rates‡		0-50%	50-75%	75%+		0-50%	50-75%	75%+
Exploration								
1981	33½	Nil	Nil	35	33½	25	35	80
1982	20	Nil	10	35	33½	25	45	80
1983	10	Nil	10	35	33½	25	45	80
1984	Nil	Nil	15	35	33½	25	50	80
Development								
1981	Nil	Nil	Nil	20	Nil	Nil	Nil	20
1982	Nil	Nil	10	20	Nil	Nil	10	20
1983	Nil	Nil	10	20	Nil	Nil	10	20
1984	Nil	Nil	10	20	Nil	Nil	10	20
Non-conventional and tertiary oil projects, and crude oil upgraders								
1981	33½	Nil	Nil	20	(not applicable)			
1982	33½	Nil	10	20	(not applicable)			
1983	33½	Nil	10	20	(not applicable)			
1984	33½	Nil	10	20	(not applicable)			

*As a percentage of allowable expenditures.

†Depletion will be earned on qualifying expenditures *net* of any incentive payments.

‡Canadian-owned firms must also be Canadian controlled to be eligible for the larger incentive payments. Individual Canadians are eligible for the same payments as firms with a Canadian Ownership Rate of at least 75%.

(National Energy Program, 1980: 40)

From the table, the incentives program evidently favours additional exploratory activity on Canada Lands rather than on Provincial Lands. For example, if a company is 75 per cent Canadian owned and if the company decides to pursue exploratory activity on Provincial Lands, the company would be qualified for a 35 per cent grant in relation to its exploratory costs. But, if a company is 75 per cent Canadian owned and if the company decided to pursue exploratory activity on Canada Lands, the company would then be qualified for an 80 per cent grant in relation to its explora-

tory costs. Thus, the differences between the exploration incentives on Provincial and on Canada Lands are vast even when the company's qualifications are held constant.

Albertans objected to this program since they "rightly saw the NEP, with its generous cash grants for exploration on federal lands as a bid to tilt the action away from the producing provinces and toward the North and the offshore lands controlled by Ottawa" (Howse, 1981c: 44).

As indicated, there were two basic issues that contributed to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement during 1980. They were; the defeat of the federal Progressive Conservative party and the introduction of the National Energy Program. Moreover, these two recent issues apparently acted as precipitating factors for a variety of given reasons.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that 'issues' did exist immediately prior to each phase of the Albertan western separatist movement. Every issue, as initially indicated, did not constitute a precipitating factor. The continuance of older issues do not explain the occurrence of an episode of collective behaviour.

For each phase of the movement, two criteria were used to isolate the issues that may have acted as precipitating factors. A recent event was considered an issue if

it aroused the interest or attention of the Albertan populace and if it was mentioned as a major grievance by the western separatist organizations. After determining the precipitating factor(s), a summary of the issue(s) was given in order to indicate the basis of Albertans' and western separatists' grievances. Then, an examination of Albertans' grievances regarding each issue was given in order to determine why the recent issue acted as a precipitating factor in relation to the corresponding phase of the Albertan western separatist movement.

As indicated, the Official Languages Act acted as the major precipitating factor for the movement's first phase. The dual pricing system, the new oil export tax, and the disallowance of provincial royalty deductions acted as the precipitating factors for the second phase, while the federal Progressive Conservative party's defeat and the introduction of the National Energy Program acted as the major precipitating factors for the third phase. These findings therefore indicate that Smelser's concept of precipitating factors contributes to an explanation of the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

An Energy Policy for Canada

1973a An Energy Policy for Canada Phase I Volume I-Analysis, Ottawa, Canada, Information Canada, 1973.

An Energy Policy for Canada

1973b An Energy Policy for Canada Phase I Volume II-Appendices, Ottawa, Canada, Information Canada, 1973.

Anderson, F. J.

1976 "Price Formation in the Canadian Crude Oil Sector", Canadian Public Policy, Volume 2, Number 1, Winter 1976, pp. 1-16.

Anderson, Ian

1980 "Big government vs. Big oil", Maclean's, Volume 93, Number 45, November 10, 1980, pp. 32-34.

Anderson, Owen

1971 "The Unfinished Revolt", Owen Anderson and John Barr, eds., The Unfinished Revolt Some Views on Western Independence, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart Limited, pp. 35-59.

Barr, John J.

1971 "Beyond Bitterness: The New Western Radicalism" Owen Anderson and John Barr, eds., The Unfinished Revolt Some Views on Western Independence, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart Limited, pp. 11-32.

Beaujot, Roderic P.

1979a "The Language Crisis: An Exchange of Views - Rejoinder", Canadian Public Policy, Volume 5, Autumn 1979, pg. 563.

Beaujot, Roderic P.

1979b "A Demographic View on Canadian Language Policy", Canadian Public Policy, Volume 5, Number 1, Winter 1979, pp. 16-29.

Best, Dunnery

1980a "Cut-rate Natural Gas Contracts Up For Grabs", Financial Post, October 25, 1980, pp. 1 & 2.

- Best, Dunnery
1980b "In Calgary; They Feel Bruised", Financial Post, November 1, 1980, pg. 5.
- Best, Dunnery
1980c "Oil Rigs Head Where the Action Is - in the U.S.", Financial Post, December 6, 1980, pp. 1 & 2.
- Best, Dunnery
1980d "NEP Hits Small Gas Firms", Financial Post, December 13, 1980, pp. 1 & 2.
- Best, Dunnery
1981a "Alberta Needs to Temper Its Oil Clout", Financial Post, January 31, 1981, pg. 9.
- Best, Dunnery
1981b "NEP Impact Only Starting to Hit Alberta", Financial Post, February 21, 1981, pp. 1 & 2.
- Best, Dunnery
1981c "Drillers Sag Under Tough Times", Financial Post, August 22, 1981, pp. 1 & 4.
- Blicq, Andy
1981 "Rosy Future Prophecies for Western Federation", Winnipeg Free Press, January 28, 1981, pg. 9.
- Booth, Godfrey
1980 "Petroleum Specialists Clash on Ottawa's 25% Energy Grab", Spectator, November 1, 1980, pg. 83.
- British North America Act, 1867
1867 "30 & 31 Vict. C. 3", The Statutes Revised Third Edition 30 & 31 VICT. to 34 & 35 VICT. 1867-1871 Volume VIII, London, Merritt and Hatcher Limited, 1950, pp. 1-31.
- British North America Act, 1930
1930 "20 & 21 Geo. 5. C. 26", The Statutes Revised Third Edition 20 & 21 GEO. V to 22 & 23 GEO. V A.D. 1929-1932 Volume XX, London, Billing and Sons, Limited, 1950, pp. 44-73.
- Cairns, Robert D.
1981 "The Constitution as Regulation: The Case of Natural Resources", Canadian Public Policy, Volume 7, Number 1, Winter 1981, pp. 66-74.

Canada and the World

1974 "Energy Shortage: What's It All About?",
Canada and the World, Volume 39, Number 2, January
 1974, pp. 4-5.

Canada and the World

1980 "National Unity Oui ou Non? East and West?",
Canada and the World, Volume 45, Number 9, May
 1980, pp. 6-7.

Canada and the World

1981 "Energy Pricing Agreement At Last", Canada and
 the World, Volume 47, Number 2, October 1981, pg.
 10.

Castonguay, Charles

1979 "Why Hide the Facts? The Federalist Approach
 to the Language Crisis in Canada", Canadian Public
 Policy, Volume 5, Number 1, Winter 1979, pp. 4-15.

Collison, Robert

1981 "The Hard Sell of Marc Lalonde", Today Maga-
 zine, March 28, 1981, pp. 8-11.

Dafoe, John

1969a "Priority Over Financial Problems Premiers'
 Language Bill Stand a Threat to Unity, PM Fears",
Globe and Mail, February 4, 1969, pp. 1 & 2.

Dafoe, John and Seale, Lewis

1969b "Few Gains Recorded But PM is 'Satisfied'",
Globe and Mail, February 13, 1969, pp. 1 & 2.

Dafoe, John and Seale, Lewis

1969c "Trudeau Sets Challenge, Angry Stanfield
 Answers", Globe and Mail, February 15, 1969,
 pp. 1 & 2.

Daniel, Terrence E. and Goldberg, Henry M.

1982 "Moving Towards World Pricing for Oil and Gas",
Canadian Public Policy, Volume 8, Number 1, Winter
 1982, pp. 3-13.

Duncan, Stephen

1980 "Ottawa: The Big New Presence in Oil and Gas",
Financial Post, November 1, 1980, pg. 5.

Dykstra, Robert

1980a "Liberal Domination in Ottawa Renews Talk of
 Separatism", Weekend Herald, March 15, 1980, pp.
 A1 & A14.

- Dykstra, Robert
1980b "Taxation Without Representation Key to Discontent", Calgary Herald, March 17, 1980, pp. A1 & A9.
- Edinburgh, Arnold
1969 "The Western Provinces, in their battle with Ottawa, have legitimate grievances. But their methods of attack are unworthy", Saturday Night, Volume 84, Number 4, April 1969, pp. 12 & 15.
- Elton, David and Gibbins, Roger
1979 "Western Alienation and Political Culture", Orest M. Kruhlak, Richard Schultz and John C. Terry, eds., The Canadian Political Process 3rd Edition, Toronto, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, pp. 82-97.
- Evans, Eric and Robinson, Allan
1980 "Long to Digest, Longer to Swallow", Financial Post, November 1, 1980, pg. 29.
- Financial Post
1980a "Oil Cash Flow Pain Worse Than Expected", Financial Post, November 15, 1980, pp. 1 & 2.
- Financial Post
1980b "Idle Drilling Rigs", Financial Post, December 13, 1980, pg. 4.
- Forsey, Eugene
1969 "Dr. Forsey and the Bill Are the Prairie Premiers Off Base?", Globe and Mail, February 8, 1969, pg. 7.
- Gainer, W. D. and Powrie, T. L.
1975 "Public Revenue from Canadian Crude Petroleum Production", Canadian Public Policy, Volume 1, Number 1, Winter 1975, pp. 1-12.
- Gherson, Giles
1980 "Angry, Alienated - and Saying So", Financial Post, November 22, 1980, pg. 9.
- Gibbins, Roger
1978 "Western Alienation: Historical Roots and Contemporary Characteristics", The Quarterly of Canadian Studies, Spring 1978, pp. 33-44.

- Gibson, Gordon F.
1981 "The Root of the West's Alienation: No Voice",
Globe and Mail, July 27, 1981, pg. 7.
- Gillen, Mollie
1969 "Report: How Far You'll Go For One Canada
Here's the Response From 2,500 Canadians (96%
English-speaking) in Reply to Chatelaine's Question-
naire", Chatelaine, Volume 42, April 1969, pp. 40-
41.
- Globe and Mail
1968 "Opposition Welcomes PM's Language Bill",
Globe and Mail, October 18, 1968, pg. 1.
- Globe and Mail
1969a "Urge Court Test 3 Prairie Premiers Assail
Language Bill", Globe and Mail, February 3, 1969,
pg. 1.
- Globe and Mail
1969b "Strom, PM Raise Hopes of Progress at Ottawa
Talks", Globe and Mail, February 10, 1969, pg. 1.
- Globe and Mail
1969c "Put the Stress on Constitution, Bennett
Urges", Globe and Mail, February 10, 1969, pp. 1 &
2.
- Globe and Mail
1969d "PM Assails Quebec on Bilingualism", Globe
and Mail, February 11, 1979, pg. 9.
- Globe and Mail
1969e "Tariffs, Taxes and Language Bill Prairie
Leaders Tell Conference What West Sees Wrong With
Canada", Globe and Mail, February 11, 1979, pg. 9.
- Globe and Mail
1969f "Critical Point Has Been Reached Language
Relations in Canada are Both Reassuring and Alarm-
ing, Trudeau Says", Globe and Mail, May 19, 1969,
pg. 9.
- Globe and Mail
1969g "Archer Backs ex-PM", Globe and Mail, May 28,
1969, pg. 2.
- Globe and Mail
1969h "Bill Excuse For Avoiding Real Problems,
Lang Says", Globe and Mail, May 30, 1969, pg. 9.

Globe and Mail

1969i "Conservative Rebels Frozen Out of Special Committee on Bill", Globe and Mail, May 30, 1969, pg. 9.

Globe and Mail

1969j "'Super-duper snooper to run language bill', Diefenbaker Says", Globe and Mail, May 30, 1969, pg. 9.

Globe and Mail

1969k "Language Bill is Approved by Commons", Globe and Mail, July 8, 1969, pp. 1 & 2.

Globe and Mail

1979 "Cost of Bilingualism Concern to Provinces", Globe and Mail, February 4, 1979, pg. 4.

Globe and Mail

1980a "Energy Plan is Flexible, Lalonde Says", Globe and Mail, November 5, 1980, pg. 8.

Globe and Mail

1980b "West Poll Shows Sharp Ambivalence On Energy Pricing", Globe and Mail, November 15, 1980, pg. 4.

Government of Alberta

1980 Energy Issues for the People of Alberta, December 1980.

Gray, James H.

1976 "Fighting Words Things You Shouldn't Say When You Visit the Prairies", Canadian Magazine, March 26, 1976, pp. 24-25.

Gray, John

1969 "MPs Approve Language Bill", Montreal Star, July 8, 1969, pp. 1 & 2.

Hamilton, Alvin

1969 "How the Liberals Lost the West", Toronto Daily Star, May 16, 1969, pg. 7.

Hamilton, Richard and Pinard, Maurice

1978 "The Parti Quebecois Comes to Power: An Analysis of the 1976 Quebec Election", Canadian Journal of Political Science, Volume 11, 1978, pp. 739-775.

- Hanson, Hugh R.
1975 "Economic Relations Federal-Provincial Bargaining Centers on a Struggle for Tax Dollars and Power", Canada and the World, Volume 41, Number 2, October 1975, pp. 14-15.
- Harrison, Fred
1980 "Energy Play Builds to Climax", Financial Post, November 1, 1980, pp. 1 & 4.
- Hazlitt, Tom
1969 "Language Bill Passes; Dief Leads Tory Revolt", Toronto Daily Star, May 28, 1969, pp 1 & 4.
- Heintzman, Ralph
1976 "Languages in Conflict", Journal of Canadian Studies, Volume 11, Number 3, August 1976, pp. 1-2 and 69.
- Helliwell, John F.
1980 "An Economic Evaluation of the National Energy Program", Report of the Proceedings of the Thirty-second Tax Conference, Canadian Tax Foundation, pp. 639-653.
- Helliwell, John F. and McRae, Robert N.
1981 "The National Energy Conflict", Canadian Public Policy, Volume 7, Number 1, Winter 1981, pp. 15-23.
- Hill, Bob
1969 "Dief Leads PC Revolt Over Languages Bill", Spectator, May 28, 1969, pg. 1.
- Hill, Robert
1968 "Sweeping Power for Languages Official", Hamilton Spectator, October 18, 1968, pg. 1.
- Howse, John
1981a "Lalonde Going West to Pour on Oil", Spectator, January 17, 1981, pg. 72.
- Howse, John
1981b "Oilmen Take Aim at Alberta Energy Policies", Spectator, February 24, 1981, pg. 3.
- Howse, John
1981c "The Bitter Pill Over Oil Costs", Spectator, June 23, 1981, pg. 44.

- Humphries, Donald
1980 "West Unified to Fight Ottawa on Energy",
Spectator, December 19, 1980, pg. 9.
- Jaremko, Gordon
1980 "Energy Ball Lobbed Back to Alberta", Specta-
tor, December 17, 1980, pg. 47.
- Jaremko, Gordon
1981 "Alberta Won't Back Down on Oil Embargo",
Spectator, February 25, 1981, pg. 1.
- Jones, Frank
1969 "Ottawa Proposes 'Regional' Senators Chosen by
Provinces", Toronto Daily Star, February 6, 1969,
pp. 1 & 8.
- Joy, Richard, J.
1967 Languages in Conflict The Canadian Experience,
Ottawa, Ontario, Published by Author.
- Jump, G. V. and Wilson, T. A.
1975 "Macro-Economic Effects of the Energy Crisis
1974-1975", Canadian Public Policy, Volume 1,
Number 1, Winter 1975, pp. 30-38.
- Kierans, Eric
1975 "Notes on the Energy Aspects of the 1974
Budget", Canadian Public Policy, Volume 1, Number 3,
Summer 1975, pp. 426-432.
- Kostek, M. A.
1970 "A Western Canadian Separatist States His
Case", Canada and the World, Volume 36, Number 2,
October 1970, pp. 3-4.
- Lewis, Robert
1980 "Alberta for Albertans", Maclean's, Volume 93,
Number 45, November 10, 1980, pp. 29-30.
- Lynch, Charles
1969 "Fears Quebecers May be Masters In All Houses",
Spectator, May 31, 1969, pg. 2.
- MacKay, Gillian
1980 "Double, Double Oil and Trouble", Maclean's,
Volume 93, Number 45, November 10, 1980, pg. 35.
- Matthews, Robert
1977 "The Commodity Squeeze", Canada and the World,
Volume 42, Number 5, January 1977, pp. 18-19.

- McCune, Shane
1980 "Alberta Believes in Confederation", The Weekend Herald, March 15, 1980, pg. A1.
- McDougall, Ian
1975 "Canada's Oil and Gas: An 'Eleventh Hour' Option that Must Not be Ignored", Canadian Public Policy, Volume 1, Number 1, Winter 1975, pp. 47-57.
- National Energy Program 1980
1980 The National Energy Program, Ottawa, Canada, Energy Mines and Resources Canada.
- Neville, William
1971 "After Victoria: The Choice for English Canada", The Canadian Forum, Volume 51, November 1971, pp. 16-20.
- Neville, William
1977 "Not Acting the Fool Western Reactions to the Quebec Election", The Canadian Forum, Volume 56, February 1977, pp. 19-20.
- Nielsen, A. R.
1980 "The Impact of the October 28 Budget: A Producer's Viewpoint ", Report of the Proceedings of the Thirty-Second Tax Conference, Canadian Tax Foundation, pp. 666-676.
- Norrie, Kenneth H.
1976 "Some Comments on Prairie Economic Alienation", Canadian Public Policy, Volume 2, Number 2, Spring 1976, pp. 211-224.
- O'Callaghan, J. Patrick
1981 "West Won't Accept Second-Class Status", Spectator, January 24, 1981, pg. 72.
- Official Languages Act
1968 "Chapter 0-2", Revised Statutes of Canada 1970 Volume V, Chapter J-1/0-6, Ottawa, Canada, Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970, pp. 5581-5600.
- Official Languages Act
1970 "R.S.C. 1970, Chapter 0-2", Canada Statute Citator R.S.C. 1970 Edition Volume 2 M-Z, Aurora, Ontario, Canada Law Book Limited, December 1980, pp. 143-1 to 143-2a.

- Paus-Jenssen, Arne
1979 "Resource Taxation and the Supreme Court of Canada: The Cigol Case", Canadian Public Policy, Volume 5, Number 1, Winter 1979, pp. 45-58.
- Pendergast, Father Russell
1971 "The National Policy and the West", Owen Anderson and John Barr, eds., The Unfinished Revolt Some Views on Western Independence, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart Limited, pp. 93-101.
- Pottier, Dan
1979 "Official Languages Act Language of Choice", Canada and the World, Volume 44, Number 9, May 1979, pp. 14-15.
- Pratt, Larry
1981 "Whose Oil Is It?", Larry Pratt and Garth Stevenson, eds., Western Separatism The Myths, Realities & Dangers, Edmonton, Hurtig Publishers, pp. 155-171.
- Pratt, Larry and Richards, John
1978 "Oil and Social Class in Alberta: The Bourgeoisie Take Power", The Canadian Forum, Volume 58, Number 685, October-November 1978, pp. 6-15.
- Pratt, Larry and Richards, John
1979 Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Limited.
- Regenstreif, Peter
1969a "Unity, Equality Canada's Main Problems, Ottawa Insists", Toronto Daily Star, February 7, 1969, pg. 8.
- Regenstreif, Peter
1969b "High Taxes are Canadians' Greatest Worry", Toronto Daily Star, May 26, 1969, pp. 1 & 4.
- Reid, Sarah, A. A.
1979 "Bilingualism in the West Flunking French", Canada and the World, Volume 44, Number 9, May 1979, pp. 20-21.
- Remnant, Robert R.
1979 "Federal Bilingualism Policy Springs From a Study of our Founding Peoples", Canada and the World, Volume 44, Number 9, May 1979, pp. 12-13.

- Remnant, Robert R.
1981 "Natural Resources Power Play", Canada and the World, Volume 47, Number 3, November 1981, pp. 18-19.
- Ritchie, Ronald S.
1975 "Public Policies Affecting Petroleum Development in Canada", Canadian Public Policy, Volume 1, Number 1, Winter 1975, pp. 66-75.
- Robertson, Heather
1981 "Western Separatism: Genuine Angst or Lust for Power?", Chatelaine, Volume 54, Number 4, April 1981, pp. 51 & 102-110.
- Rogers, Bryan Shaw
1982 "And Then They Pulled the Plug", Canada and the World, Volume 47, Number 7, March 1982, pp. 19-21.
- Rotstein, Abraham
1978 "Is there an English-Canadian Nationalism?", Journal of Canadian Studies, Volume 13, Number 2, 1978-79, pp. 109-118.
- Russell, Frances
1969 "Want Finance Put First Three Premiers Demand Ottawa Change Agenda", Globe and Mail, February 8, 1969, pg. 1.
- Sallot, Jeff
1980 "Wild Cheers for Separatism The Losing of the West", Globe and Mail, November 15, 1980, pg. 1.
- Sallot, Jeff
1981a "Loss of Political Clout Final Straw for Some in West", Globe and Mail, January 24, 1981, pp. 1 & 11.
- Sallot, Jeff
1981b "Prepare to Suffer and Bleed, Lougheed Warns Albertans", Globe and Mail, February 14, 1981, pp. 1 & 2.
- Sallot, Jeff
1981c "Grumbling Grows In Oil Ranks Over Lougheed's Firm Stance", Globe and Mail, February 28, 1981, pg. 13.
- Scarfe, Brian L.
1981 "The Federal Budget and Energy Program, October 28th, 1980: A Review", Canadian Public Policy, Volume 7, Number 1, Winter 1981, pp. 1-14.

Schreiner, John

1976 "Secession Gets Boost in West from PQ Win",
The Financial Post, November 27, 1979, pg. 5.

Seale, Lewis

1968 "December Talks with Premiers Called - PM
Warned Language Bill Can't Stand Alone", Globe and
Mail, October 18, 1968, pg. 4.

Seale, Lewis

1969a "Challenge to Language Bill Sidetracked to
Committee; Court Test Still Possible", Globe and
Mail, February 12, 1969, pg. 9.

Seale, Lewis

1969b "Tory Split Exposed as Commons Debates
Official Languages Bill", Globe and Mail, May 17,
1969, pg. 3.

Seale, Lewis

1969c "Move to Defuse Provincial Threats Language
Amendments Unveiled in House", Globe and Mail, May 21,
1969, pp. 1 & 2.

Seale, Lewis

1969d "PC Says Language Bill Beyond Parliament;
Ottawa Amendments Forbidden By BNA Act", Globe and
Mail, May 24, 1969, pg. 10.

Seale, Lewis

1969e "Will the Language Bill Create Cultural
Ghettos?", Globe and Mail, May 26, 1969, pg. 7.

Seale, Lewis

1969f "17 PCs Bolt Rank Bill on Language Over
First Hurdle", Globe and Mail, May 28, 1969,
pp. 1 & 2.

Seale, Lewis

1969g "17 Voted Against Leader Stanfield Puts
Down French Bill Rebels", Globe and Mail, May 29,
1969, pp. 1 & 2.

Skene, Wayne

1981 "Will the Prairies Go West? Examining the
Threat of Western Separation", Quest, March 1981,
pp. 11-17.

Skogstad, Grace

1980 "Agrarian Protest in Alberta", Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, Volume 17, 1980, pp. 55-77.

Smith, Allan

1978 "Quiet Revolution in the West", The Canadian Forum, Volume 58, June-July 1978, pp. 12-15.

Solomon, Hyman

1972 "'Together We're Stronger' is How the West Sees It", The Financial Post, September 16, 1972, pg. 2.

Spectator

1969a "Stanfield's Unwavering Unity Stand Wins Admiration of Friends, Foes", Spectator, May 26, 1969, pg. 9.

Spectator

1969b "PCs Remain Divided Dief Blasts Language Bill", Spectator, May 27, 1969, pg. 1.

Spectator

1969c "'Potshots' a Danger to Unity: PC Chief", Spectator, May 27, 1969, pg. 14.

Spectator

1969d "Dief Will Continue to Defy Party Line", Spectator, May 29, 1969, pg. 1.

Spectator

1969e "Stay In Line, Rebel PCs Told", Spectator, May 29, 1969, pg. 1.

Spectator

1969f "Official Status for French, English", Spectator, July 8, 1969, pg. 2.

Spectator

1980a "Consumer Study Calls For World Oil Price", Spectator, June 17, 1980, pg. 1.

Spectator

1980b "Lougheed Evasive on New Oil Talks", Spectator, November 1, 1980, pg. 1.

Spectator

1980c "Energy Battle Lines Shape Our Future", Spectator, November 1, 1980, pg. 82.

Spectator

1980d "Blais Worried by Separation Push in West", Spectator, November 19, 1980, pg. 11.

Spectator

1980e "Oil Firm Slashes Budget as Job Crunch Warned", Spectator, December 12, 1980, pg. 3.

Spectator

1980f "West Raps East in Energy Fight", Spectator, December 12, 1980, pg. 3.

Spectator

1980g "Alberta Name-Calling Hurts Talks - Lalonde", Spectator, December 16, 1980, pg. 3.

Spectator

1980h "Ottawa Welshed on Energy-West", Spectator, December 19, 1980, pg. 11.

Spectator

1980i "Alberta Firms Call Off Ontario Boycott Because They Want 'To Stay Canadian'", Spectator, December 24, 1980, pg. 27.

Spectator

1981a "Energy Goal 'Slipping Away'", Spectator, January 8, 1981, pg. 3.

Spectator

1981b "Energy Plan Kills Jobs, Projects-Joe", Spectator, January 21, 1981, pg. 5.

Spectator

1981c "Energy Plan Leading Us To Disaster - Bank Chief", Spectator, January 22, 1981, pg. 3.

Spectator

1981d "Alberta Oil Cut May Cost Us All \$3 Month More", Spectator, February 18, 1981, pg. 3.

Spectator

1981e "Bitter West Watches Oil Rigs Leave", Spectator, February 28, 1981, pg. 82.

Spectator

1981f "Oil Crunch Ottawa-Alberta Energy Feud Has Clobbered Us With 18-Cent Gas Hike", Spectator, March 4, 1981, pg. 2.

Spectator

1981g "Albertans Still Loyal to Canada", Spectator, March 16, 1981, pg. 1.

Spectator

1981h "It's Time For Alberta to Spread Wealth, Ottawa Hints", Spectator, April 24, 1981, pg. 3.

Spectator

1981i "Dead or Not, Western Separatism Still an Issue", Spectator, April 30, 1981, pg. 51.

Spectator

1981j "Alberta Cut Means the Oil Tax Will Rise", Spectator, June 1, 1981, pg. 1.

Spectator

1981k "Alberta Offers Better Oil Deal Report Claims", Spectator, June 19, 1981, pg. 1.

Statistics Canada

1971a "Table 1. Numerical and Percentage Distribution of the Population by Specified Ethnic Groups, for Canada and Provinces, 1971", Special Bulletin Population Specified Ethnic Groups Census Divisions and Subdivisions, Ottawa, Canada, 1972, pg. 1-1.

Statistics Canada

1971b "Table 1. Numerical and Percentage Distribution of the Population by Mother Tongue, for Canada and Provinces, 1961 and 1971", Special Bulletin 1971 Census of Canada Population Specified Mother Tongue for Census Divisions and Subdivisions, Ottawa, Canada, Statistics Canada, 1972, pg. 1-1.

Statistics Canada

1971c "Table 2. Population by Ethnic Group and Sex, for Canada and Provinces, 1971", 1971 Census of Canada Population Ethnic Groups, Ottawa, Canada, Statistics Canada, 1971, pp. 2-1 to 2-2.

Statistics Canada

1971d "Table 18. Population by Mother Tongue and Sex, for Canada and Provinces, 1971", 1971 Census of Canada Population Mother Tongue, Ottawa, Canada, Statistics Canada, 1971, pp. 18-1 to 18-2.

Statistics Canada

1971e "Table 26. Population by (A) Official Language, (B) Language Most Often Spoken At Home, and Sex, for Canada and Provinces, 1971", 1971 Census of Canada Population Official Language and Language Most Often Spoken at Home, Ottawa, Canada, Statistics Canada, 1971, pp. 26-1 to 26-2.

Statute of Westminster

1931 "22 & 23 Geo. 5. c. 4", The Statutes Revised 3rd Edition 20 & 21 Geo. V to 22 & 23 Geo. V 1929 - 1932 Volume XX, London, Billing and Sons, Limited, 1950, pp. 496-499.

Stevenson, Garth

1979 "The Language Crisis: An Exchange of Views", Canadian Public Policy, Volume 5, Autumn 1979, pp. 561-562.

Stewart, Walter

1969 "The Coming Showdown With the West", Maclean's, Volume 82, July 1969, pp. 34-40.

Stow, William

1977 "Refuting the Separatists Could the Western Provinces and Central Canada Really Get Along Without Each Other?", The Financial Post, Supplementary, June 25, 1977, pp. 31-32.

SydneySmith, Sam

1975 "The Taxation of Windfall Gains on Stocks of Natural Resources", Canadian Public Policy, Volume 1, Number 1, Winter 1975, pp. 13-29.

Taylor, Rupert J.

1980 "The Resources Boom", Canada and the World, Volume 46, Number 4, December 1980, pg. 17.

Taylor, Rupert J.

1981 "Another party forming", Canada and the World, Volume 46, February 1981, pg. 17.

Thirsk, Wayne R. and Wright, Robert R.

1977 "The Impact of the Crude Oil Subsidy on Economic Efficiency in Canada", Canadian Public Policy, Volume 3, Number 3, Summer 1977, pp. 355-364.

Thorssen, L. A.

1977 "Western Canada: Was Confederation A Bargain?", Canada and the World, Volume 43, Number 3, November 1977, pp. 18-19.

Toronto Daily Star

1968 "Trudeau Launches Canada on Bilingual Course", Toronto Daily Star, October 18, 1968, pg. 2.

Toronto Daily Star

1969a "He'll Meet Premiers First Trudeau Delays Law Guaranteeing French in Provincial Courts", Toronto Daily Star, February 3, 1969, pp. 1 & 9.

Toronto Daily Star

1969b "Roberts Backs West Opposition to Bilingualism", Toronto Daily Star, February 3, 1969, pp. 1 & 9.

- Toronto Daily Star
1969c "PM Fears Provinces' Stand on French Could Threaten Unity", Toronto Daily Star, February 4, 1969, pp. 1 & 4.
- Toronto Daily Star
1969d "Trudeau Says He'll Try to Change Constitution if Language Bill Invalid", Toronto Daily Star, February 5, 1969, pp. 1 & 4.
- Toronto Daily Star
1969e "Case Against Language Bill Isn't Good One, Robert Says", Toronto Daily Star, February 5, 1969, pg. 14.
- Toronto Daily Star
1969f "Alberta Says Bi-Bi Report 'Unacceptable'", Toronto Daily Star, February 6, 1969, pg. 1.
- Toronto Daily Star
1969g "Talks Open Monday Turner on Mission to Avert Conflict Over Constitution", Toronto Daily Star, February 6, 1969, pp. 1 & 8.
- Toronto Daily Star
1969h "Guarantees of Bi-Bi Proposals Chief Sore Point for Provinces", Toronto Daily Star, February 7, 1969, pg. 4.
- Toronto Daily Star
1969i "Prairies Want Tax-sharing to Head Agenda", Toronto Daily Star, February 8, 1969, pp. 1 & 4.
- Toronto Daily Star
1969j "Prairie Pressure Swings Premiers Into Money Talks", Toronto Daily Star, February 11, 1969, pg. 4.
- Toronto Daily Star
1969k "Turner to Lead Fight If Language Bill Goes to Supreme Court", Toronto Daily Star, February 12, 1969, pg. 10.
- Toronto Daily Star
1969l "Premiers Hand Language Rights Issue to their Attorneys-general", Toronto Daily Star, February 12, 1969, pg. 28.
- Toronto Daily Star
1969m "Language Bill to Make Toronto Federal Bilingual District", Toronto Daily Star, May 16, 1969, pp. 1 & 4.

- Toronto Daily Star
1969n "Strom Reported Backing Language Bill",
Toronto Daily Star, May 16, 1969, pg. 10.
- Toronto Daily Star
1969o "Thatch Hints Court Fight Over Language Bill",
Toronto Daily Star, May 17, 1969, pg. 83.
- Toronto Daily Star
1969p "Provinces to Say If Courts Bilingual Under
Altered Bill", Toronto Daily Star, May 21, 1969,
pp. 1 & 4.
- Toronto Daily Star
1969q "Be Careful With Law on Language; NDPer Says",
Toronto Daily Star, May 22, 1969, pg. 41.
- Toronto Daily Star
1969r "Canadians Split on Language Bill", Toronto
Daily Star, May 27, 1969, pg. 9.
- Toronto Star
1982 "There's Trouble in Paradise", Toronto Star,
May 2, 1982, pg. A10.
- Toulin, Alan
1980 "Self-Sufficiency Goal by 1990 in Danger,
Experts Warn", Spectator, November 1, 1980, pg. 82.
- Toulin, Alan
1981 "Left-Wing Influence in National Oil Policy",
Spectator, April 15, 1981, pg. 21.
- Waddell, Christopher
1980 "Major Companies 'Not Very Pleased'", Financial
Post, November 1, 1980, pg. 29.
- Waddell, Christopher
1981 "Attack Resumes on NEP", Financial Post,
January 17, 1981, pg. 4.
- Waverman, Leonard
1975 "The Two Price System in Energy: Subsidies
Forgotten", Canadian Public Policy, Volume 1,
Number 1, Winter 1975, pp. 78-88.
- White, Charles A.
1972 "Alberta's Oil Wealth: Bigger Share Wanted",
Canada and the World, Volume 38, Number 1, September
1972, pp. 4-5.

- White, Charles A.
1974a "Oil/Resources: Who Should Have Control?", Canada and the World, Volume 39, Number 8, April 8, 1974, pp. 9-10.
- White, Charles A.
1974b "The West: Grievances Old and New", Canada and the World, Volume 40, Number 3, November 1974, pp. 6-7.
- White, Charles A.
1975a "Energy: Oil and Gas War", Canada and the World, Volume 40, Number 5, January 1975, pp. 6-7.
- White, Charles A.
1975b "PetroDollars: Recycling Money", Canada and the World, Volume 40, Number 7, March 1975, pp. 3-4.
- White, Charles A.
1975c "Synchrude: Resource Sellout?", Canada and the World, Volume 40, Number 8, April 1975, pp. 6-7.
- White, Charles A.
1975d "Alberta: Opposition Crumbles", Canada and the World, Volume 40, Number 9, May 1975, pp. 4-5.
- White, Charles A.
1976a "Energy Update: Present Shock", Canada and the World, Volume 41, Number 5, January 1976, pp. 6-7.
- White, C. A.
1976b "Bilingualism: Two/Deux Solitudes", Canada and the World, Volume 42-42, September 1976, pp. 5-6.
- White, Charles A.
1977 "Balancing the Energy Budget", Canada and the World, Volume 43, Number 2, October 1977, pp. 6-7.
- White, Charles A.
1978 "Surplus Today - Shortage Tomorrow?", Canada and the World, Volume 44, Number 1, September 1978, pp. 16-17.
- White, Charles A.
1979a "Energy: The Crunch Gets Nearer", Canada and the World, Volume 45, Number 1, September 1979, pp. 3-6.

- White, Charles A.
1979b "Heritage Fund: Alberta's Nest Egg", Canada and the World, Volume 45, Number 3, November 1979, pp. 6-7.
- White, Charles A.
1980a "Federal Election The Budget That Never Was", Canada and the World, Volume 45, Number 5, January 1980, pg. 3.
- White, Charles A.
1980b "Elections Governments of Half the People", Canada and the World, Volume 45, Number 8, April 1980, pp. 4-5.
- White, Charles A.
1980c "Energy The Oil Budget", Canada and the World, Volume 46, Number 4, December 1980, pg. 8.
- White, Charles A.
1981 "Energy The Haves and Have-nots", Canada and the World, Volume 46, Number 5, January 1981, pp. 8-9.
- Wilkinson, Bruce W.
1980 "The 1980 Budget Energy Policy and All That", Report of the Proceedings of the Thirty-Second Tax Conference, Canadian Tax Foundation, pp. 653-666.
- Williamson, Robert
1980 "Separatism Seeks a Spark To Ignite It", Globe and Mail, August 6, 1980, pg. 8.
- Winnipeg Free Press
1980a "Turnout Low for Separatist Only Eight Attend the Talk on Why West Should Go It Alone", Winnipeg Free Press, July 15, 1980, pg. 3.
- Winnipeg Free Press
1980b "Western Separatism?", Winnipeg Free Press, November 14, 1980, pg. 6.
- World Affairs
1969a "The Official Languages Act", World Affairs, Volume 35, Number 1, September 1969, pp. 15-16.
- World Affairs
1969b "The Language Bill", World Affairs, Volume 35, Number 2, October 1969, pg. 12.
- Young, Scott
1969a "Why Stanfield Took His Official Language Message Into the Deep West", Globe and Mail, May 28, 1969, pg. 7.

Young, Scott

1969b "Among the Tories, Revolt is a Dirty Word",
Globe and Mail, May 31, 1969, pg. 7.

Zaritsky, John

1969 "House Passes Language Bill Tory Opponents
Give Up", Toronto Daily Star, July 8, 1969, pp. 1 &
4.

Zivitz, Marvin

1977 "Alberta's 45,000 Francophones Winning Fight
for Cultural Survival", The Financial Post, February 5,
1977, pg. 28.

CHAPTER FOUR: AN ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND
SOCIAL CONDITIONS RELATED TO THE RISE
OF THE ALBERTAN WESTERN SEPARATIST MOVE-
MENT

The purpose of the present chapter is to provide background evidence of possible changes in the political, economic, and social sectors of Alberta's society during the 1970's. It will then be determined if there are any underlying societal conditions that are unique to Alberta and if they may thereby help in explaining the movement's relative confinement to that province.

Earlier, three determinants of collective behaviour were chosen in order to analyze Albertan societal conditions. They were; structural conduciveness, structural strain, and precipitating factors. Smelser's determinant of precipitating factors, as indicated in the previous chapter, contributed to an explanation of the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement. In this chapter, it will be ascertained if the determinants of structural conduciveness and/or structural strain also contribute to an explanation of the movement's sudden re-emergence.

The data analysis in this chapter will be divided into three sections. In the first two of these sections, it will be determined if the conditions of structural conduciveness and structural strain possibly existed within

Alberta. An additional section dealing with the general social characteristics of Alberta's population will then be included. This section has been added since Hiller noted, "dissatisfaction ... may go far beyond merely political difficulties and economic strains" (1977: 59). Thus, we will attempt to determine if the sudden re-emergence of the Albertan western separatist movement in 1980 may also be a reaction to more general social changes within Alberta. Before proceeding, it is necessary to examine the methodology used throughout the data analysis.

Methodology

The main source of data for this chapter is Statistics Canada's published tabulations. However, there are difficulties with the use of Statistics Canada's figures since the statistics for the most recent years are only preliminary estimates. Any such difficulties will be indicated in the appropriate sections.

The analysis of societal conditions will be limited to the ten years prior to the movement's re-emergence in 1980. Societal changes prior to 1970 are not included since they have been credited with contributing to the victory of the provincial Progressive Conservative party in 1971. Palmer and Palmer state,

the 1971 Conservative victory ... caught many Albertans by surprise since they had come to think

of a Social Credit government as a natural, almost inevitable part of Alberta life ... But the Conservative slogan 'It's time for a change' was successful not only because Social Credit had been in power for so long, but because Alberta society had changed. Social Credit, which was basically a rural, small town, and lower middle-class movement, had little chance of surviving in a society which was not only increasingly urban and middle class but was also one in which urban values had penetrated rural areas. (1976: 123-124)

Palmer and Palmer conclude, "the Conservative victory was not based primarily on superior campaigning or on issues, but was more an indication of provincial trends of urbanization, secularization, increasing geographical mobility and affluence" (Ibid.: 124).

Similarly, Pratt and Richards perceive the provincial Progressive Conservative Party's victory in 1971 as a response to societal change in Alberta. They note,

Lougheed's victory and the abrupt termination of the Social Credit dynasty were an inevitable, though considerable delayed, response of the electoral system to rapid population growth, urbanization and secularization - trends underway during and after World War II, but greatly accelerated by the oil boom. (1978: 6)

Pratt and Richards likewise conclude,

Alberta's large and growing urban middle classes, nurtured by twenty-five years of oil and gas development, came to political power in the provincial election of August 30, 1971. That election, which saw Peter Lougheed's revived Progressive Conservatives win forty-nine seats to Social Credit's twenty-five and the NDP's one, was one of critical realignment - the political consolidation of major economic and social changes which occurred in Alberta in the generation of growth after Leduc. (Ibid.: 6)

Although western separatist organizations arose in Alberta prior to 1970, the major changes in Albertan society mainly contributed to the rise and the electoral victory of the provincial Progressive Conservative party in 1971. Thus, this chapter will examine societal conditions in the ten years after that election to determine if there are any noticeable changes within Alberta that may have contributed to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement during 1980.

All indicators will be chosen from Statistics Canada's publications except for the analysis of structural conduciveness with respect to political change. This will be based on federal and provincial election returns from 1968 to 1980. The indicators of the possible existence of 'actual' structural strain will consist of the Gross Domestic Product and the annual unemployment rate. The indicators to be used as the basis of an analysis of social change are; population growth, residence, sex, age, ethnicity, religion, marriage rate, divorce rate, labour force by industry, labour force by occupation as well as real average income for families and unattached individuals. A discussion of the rationale for these indicators will be given in each of the relevant sections.

The analysis of Albertan societal conditions will be paralleled by an examination of the same (political, economic, and social) indicators for Saskatchewan and Ontario.

Generally, one comparison should at least be included since "when an author fails to make a systematic comparison between his region and others, it is not possible to accept any claim that his region is peculiar ... the specific nature of regional differences cannot appear in the examination of one region alone" (Gibbins, 1980: 9). By examining societal conditions within Saskatchewan and Ontario, it will be possible to determine if certain societal conditions are unique to Alberta. These comparisons may thereby contribute to an explanation of the movement's rise and growth principally within Alberta.

There are specific reasons for selecting Saskatchewan and Ontario as comparisons with Alberta. Saskatchewan has been chosen since it is a nearby somewhat similar western prairie province. Yet the western separatist movement is largely confined to Alberta and has never gained a significant strength within Saskatchewan. It will therefore be interesting to compare the two provinces' societal conditions in order to determine possible reasons why the western separatist movement grew in Alberta while it stagnated in Saskatchewan. Ontario, on the other hand, has been chosen as an additional comparison since it is a distinctly different central Canadian province. It will be used to determine if there are any noticeable differences between the western (Alberta) and the eastern (Ontario) provinces that may contribute to an explanation of the movement's re-

lative confinement to Alberta.

I - The Operationalization of Smelser's Determinant of Structural Conduciveness

The chosen determinants from Smelser's theory, as indicated earlier, will be operationalized by adopting methods from other studies. In this section, Maurice Pinard's method of operationalizing the determinant of structural conduciveness will be used. Pinard's approach focuses on one-party dominance, "the presence of a single dominant party that leaves all groups opposing it without viable channels of political representation" (1975: 280). A weak opposition party, as a result, is abandoned for a new third party or, in this case, for another means of expressing dissatisfied concerns and interests; i.e. the rise of a social and/or a political movement. Thus, structural conduciveness will be operationalized as a political variable for this study.

Unlike Pinard's analysis of the 1962 federal general election in relation to the rise of Quebec's Social Credit party, this study will examine both the federal and provincial election returns from 1968 to 1980. An analysis of the electoral returns at both levels is included due to the western separatist organizations' underlying goal; the attempt to separate Alberta from Canada. In other words, it will be determined if the western separatist movement gained sub-

stantial support since Alberta's political party systems at the federal and provincial levels were characterized by the condition of one-party dominance. Consequently if the condition of one-party dominance characterized the province's party systems at both levels, a number of Albertans may have turned to western separatist organizations if they felt neither their federal representatives nor their provincial government dealt adequately with their grievances and/or interests.

At this point, one may ask, 'Why is the existence of a weak opposition party at the provincial level an indicator of structural conduciveness in relation to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement, a federally-related event'? Roger Gibbins provides an explanation accordingly, "there was a natural tendency (for Westerners) to turn to provincial governments for the assertion of regional demands" due to "the weakness of western Canadian representation in both the House of Commons and consecutive national governments" (1980: 201). Consequently, Gibbins adds, "provincial governments (in the West) have moved to the fore as regional spokesmen" while "the importance of the federal cabinet as an accommodative structure for regional interests has declined" (Ibid.: 201). Western provincial governments have apparently become the major representatives of western interests instead of federal agents. The recent federal-provincial conflicts may have

led to increasing concern or dissatisfaction with the Alberta provincial government's performance as the province's representative. If the condition of one-party dominance prevailed at the provincial level as well, Albertans may have turned to another means in order to express their interests and/or grievances. Thus, an examination of one-party dominance at the provincial level will be important to account for the re-emergence of the Albertan western separatist movement during 1980.

The analysis of the federal and provincial opposition parties' strength for each general election will be analyzed according to the overall percentage of votes received for each political party in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Ontario. This method of analysis is similar to Pinard's operationalization of the determinant except that it does not average the "proportion of votes which a party has received while in opposition" (1975: 291). Rather, the proportion of votes which an opposition party receives for each general election will be averaged. Thus, it will be determined if Alberta's, Saskatchewan's, and Ontario's party systems at the federal and provincial levels are characterized by the condition of one-party dominance from 1968 to 1980.

Pinard used the following rules in determining the strength of the opposition parties,

The previous state of the party system: (a) the main opposition had previously maintained, while in opposition, an average vote of less than 33 per cent, a clear situation of one-party dominance; (b) though a proportion superior to that was maintained, the opposition party suddenly weakened, a marginal situation ... as indicated by its failure to contest a large proportion of the seats ... or the main opposition party had relinquished its role by entering into a coalition with the government party or with a third party; (c) the main opposition party remained a strong party with more than 33 per cent of the votes, a situation with a strong two-party system, or two strong parties in a multi-party system. (Pinard, 1975: 38)

Since no opposition parties in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Ontario were 'suddenly weakened' as described in Pinard's measurement, opposition party strength was determined by the first and third measures. As a result, it will be concluded that a condition of one-party dominance existed if the main opposition party retained less than thirty-three per cent of the popular vote.

Before proceeding, it must be stressed that the 'peculiarities' of the Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Ontario party systems at the federal level will be examined. Although a strong, two-party system existed nationally, this analysis is concerned with the provincial representatives at the federal level and the strength of the possible alternatives within the given provinces. This approach is similar to Pinard in that he attempted to "analyze a federal election at the level of at least a province" and to "show in what ways the political situation at the federal level in Quebec was particularly conducive to the rise of a

third party" (Pinard, 1975: 14 & 21). Similarly, it will be determined whether the political situation at the federal level in Alberta was conducive to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement in 1980. As a result, the major, 'opposition' or 'alternative' party at the federal level within a province was determined by the distribution of the province's seats in the House of Commons. The party with the greater number of these seats represented the 'dominant' party within that province since it was the overwhelming representative of the given province's populace. The strength of the possible alternatives at the federal level was then determined by its percentage of the province's popular vote.

An analysis of the strength of Alberta's alternatives at the federal level reveals that a condition of one-party dominance prevailed in that province during the majority of the 1970's. In fact, Table 4:1 indicates that Alberta only had a viable alternative to the dominant party prior to the 1972 general election. The Liberal party may have gained temporary strength due to the sweeping force of 'Trudeaumania' at that time. Although the Liberals formed a viable alternative in Alberta in the general election of 1968, there was still a vast difference in the percentage of votes (14.7%) between the Liberal and the Progressive Conservative parties. The weakness of the Liberal party in Alberta was striking as it never exceeded 25 per cent

of Alberta's popular vote after the 1968 federal general election. Moreover, the Liberal party's strength in Alberta gradually weakened throughout the decade from 35.7 per cent in 1968 to 22.2 per cent in 1980. The federal party system in Alberta was evidently characterized by the condition of one-party dominance.

In comparison, Saskatchewan was characterized by a strong, two-party system. For instance, in 1968, the most viable, alternative party (the Progressive Conservatives) won a greater percentage of votes than the New Democrats, although the New Democrats (the province's dominant party at the federal level) won a greater number of House of Commons seats. In fact, a strong alternative party existed at the federal level throughout the period except for the federal general election of 1974. At that time, the federal Liberal party in Saskatchewan gained popular support. The party's percentage of votes rose from 25.3 per cent in 1972 to 30.8 per cent in 1974. But, the increase in the Liberal party's popular support was quickly lost and returned to its previous levels (approximately 20 to 25 per cent) in the 1979 federal general election. Apparently, a strong, two-party system at the federal level was re-established in Saskatchewan.

Ontario was also characterized by a strong, two-party system at the federal level. The only federal general election that did not produce a viable alternative party

Table 4:1 Distribution of Parties' Votes at the Federal Level, Ontario, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, 1968-1980

Year of Election		1968(1)	1972	1974	1979	1980
Province	Party	% votes	% votes	% votes	% votes	% votes
Ont.	Lib.	46.2	38.2	45.1	36.5	41.7
	P.C.	31.7	39.1	35.1	41.8	35.6
	N.D.P.	20.8	21.5	19.1	21.1	21.9
	S.C.	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.0
	Other	1.2	0.9	0.5	0.6	0.7
	Total(2)	99.9 (2,863,128)	100.0 (3,577,521)	100.0 (3,565,011)	100.0 (4,142,083)	99.9 (3,990,151)
Sask.	Lib.	27.1	25.3	30.8	21.8	24.2
	P.C.	37.0	36.9	36.5	41.2	38.9
	N.D.P.	35.7	35.9	31.5	35.8	36.3
	S.C.	0.0	1.8	1.1	0.5	0.0
	Other	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.7	0.5
	Total(2)	100.0 (414,430)	100.0 (432,564)	100.1 (413,868)	100.0 (489,387)	99.9 (455,709)
Alta.	Lib.	35.7	25.0	24.7	22.1	22.2
	P.C.	50.4	57.6	61.2	65.6	64.9
	N.D.P.	9.3	12.6	9.3	9.9	10.3
	S.C.	1.9	4.5	3.4	1.0	1.0
	Other	2.7	0.3	1.5	1.5	1.6
	Total(2)	100.0 (563,779)	100.0 (710,952)	100.1 (682,424)	100.1 (853,099)	100.0 (794,946)

(Normandin, 1969, 1974, 1975, 1979 & 1980)

- (1) 3 Ontario districts are missing in the summary of electoral returns for the federal General Election of June 25, 1968.
- (2) % votes may not add up to 100.0% due to rounding errors.

within the province occurred in 1968. Thus, Saskatchewan and Ontario were similar in their lack of one-party dominance. As such, they differed markedly from Alberta.

An analysis of the opposition parties' strength at the provincial level reveals similar findings to the federal analyses. A condition of one-party dominance characterized Alberta's provincial party system during the given period except for the 1971 general election. Perhaps a condition of one-party dominance did not exist at that time since the Progressive Conservatives was in the process of replacing the Social Credit party as the new, provincial government. For instance, Palmer and Palmer note that the Progressive Conservative victory "was aided by ... the switching of traditional NDP and Liberal support to the Conservatives" (1976: 123). The condition of one-party dominance, as a result, ceased to exist for a brief period due to the switch in the voter's support from the Liberals, the New Democrats, and the Social Credits to the Tories.

However, a condition of one-party dominance quickly re-emerged after the 1975 provincial general election. In fact, an opposition party was almost nonexistent at the provincial level. The main opposition party, the Social Credit, only acquired a popular vote of 18.2 per cent and 19.9 per cent in the 1975 and 1979 provincial general elections. In contrast, the dominant party, the Progressive Conservatives, maintained an unusually high proportion of

the popular vote at 62.7 per cent in 1975 and 57.4 per cent in 1979. Thus, a condition of one-party dominance seemingly prevailed during the periods prior to each phase of the Albertan western separatist movement.

Saskatchewan, in contrast, was characterized by a strong two-party system except in the 1975 provincial general election. In that year, a condition of one-party dominance briefly existed due to the sudden shift of electoral support from the Liberals (42.8% in 1971 to 31.7% in 1975) to the Progressive Conservatives (2.1% in 1971 to 27.6% in 1975). By 1978, a strong opposition party at the provincial level was again re-established in Saskatchewan after the switch in the electorate's support from the Liberals and the New Democrats to the Progressive Conservatives.

Ontario, in comparison, was characterized predominantly by a condition of one-party dominance at the provincial level during the given ten-year period. The only general election that did not demonstrate this occurred in 1975. In that year's election, the Liberals increased their popular support from 17.7 per cent to 34.2 per cent. But, the existence of a strong opposition party did not last very long since the province's party system was returned to a condition of one-party dominance in 1977. Ontario's provincial party system was thereby similar to Alberta rather than Saskatchewan.

Table 4:2

Distribution of Parties' Votes at the Provincial Level, Ontario,
Saskatchewan, and Alberta, 1967-1979

Year of Election		1967O/1967S/1967A	1971O/1971S/1971A	1975O/1975S/1975A	1977O/1978S/1979A
Province	Party	% votes	% votes	% votes	% votes
Ont.(1)	Lib.	31.4	27.7	34.2	31.5
	P.C.	42.3	44.5	36.1	39.7
	N.D.P.	25.9	27.1	28.9	28.0
	S.C.	0.1	0.0	0.1	---
	Other	0.3	0.6	0.7	0.8
	Total	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0
		(2,419,683)	(3,293,717)	(3,305,846)	(3,341,833)
Sask.(2)	Lib.	45.6	42.8	31.7	13.8
	P.C.	9.8	2.1	27.6	38.1
	N.D.P.	44.3	55.0	40.1	48.1
	S.C.	0.3	---	---	---
	Other	---	0.1	0.6	0.0
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
		(424,403)	(452,736)	(451,023)	(475,415)
Alta.(3)	Lib.	10.8	1.0	5.0	6.2
	P.C.	26.0	46.4	62.7	57.4
	N.D.P.	16.0	11.4	12.9	15.8
	S.C.	44.6	41.1	18.2	19.9
	Other	2.6	0.1	1.3	0.8
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.1	100.1
		(498,341)	(639,862)	(590,170)	(710,963)

% votes may not add up to 100.0% due to rounding errors.

(1) (Normandin, 1968, 1972, 1976, and 1978)

(2) (Normandin, 1969, 1973, 1976, and 1979)

(3) (Normandin, 1968, 1972, 1976, and 1979)

At this point, one may argue that Ontario was not characterized by the 'same condition of extreme one-party dominance as found in Alberta due to the province's distinctive three-party structure'. In other words, Ontario does not have a 'strong' opposition party that regularly acquires thirty-three per cent of the popular vote since there are two opposition parties of approximately equal strength; each with some 20-25 percent of the vote. This condition supposedly 'mitigates against the existence of one-party dominance in Ontario'. There are three major arguments in relation to this observation.

First, Ontario has not been characterized by a distinctive three-party structure at the provincial level throughout its history. Pinard noted, "from 1945 on, the Liberal party reoccupied its position of second major party (in terms of popular support)" although "it has remained nevertheless a weak opposition" (1975: 51). In fact, the C.C.F./N.D.P. merely resurged twice in 1948 and in 1967 "with 26 per cent of the votes each time" (Ibid.: 51). The N.D.P., as indicated, has only recently gained a modicum of strength. Thus, it cannot be argued that Ontario had a distinctive three-party system at the provincial level (Ibid.: 49-51).

Secondly, the percentage distribution of the parties' votes at the provincial level indicates that the two opposition parties are not of approximately equal strength. The

Liberal party clearly remains the second major party within the province although it is weak. Third, it has never been argued or suggested that the same condition of extreme one-party dominance in Alberta also prevailed within Ontario. But it was similar to Alberta in that no single opposition party obtained more than thirty-three per cent of the popular vote.

As indicated by the findings, Alberta's political party systems were unique in that a condition of one-party dominance existed at both the federal and provincial levels, especially prior to the latest phase of the Albertan western separatist movement. In comparison, a condition of one-party dominance characterized Ontario's party system at the provincial level only. Saskatchewan, in contrast, was generally characterized by a strong party system at both levels of government. As a result, a possible relationship may have existed between the condition of one-party dominance at both levels of government in Alberta and the sudden re-emergence of the Albertan western separatist movement during 1980.

In other words, a new alternative may have arisen in Alberta in order to express the populace's grievances and/or interests since the existing alternatives in the province's federal and provincial party systems were likely seen as weak and ineffective. Hence, the existence of structural conduciveness, the presence of one-party dominance at both the federal and provincial levels, may have contri-

buted to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement in 1980.

II - The Operationalization of Smelser's Determinant of Structural Strain

Smelser's determinant of structural strain will also be included in the present analysis of Albertan societal conditions. This determinant will be operationalized through the use of James C. Davies' theory of revolution. Davies' theory, as argued earlier, has been selected mainly because it incorporates many attributes of Smelser's determinant, specifically the distinction of real and anticipated structural strains.

Davies' theory, as mentioned previously, refers to the J-curve pattern. A society is characterized by economic and social development. But if a stage of growth is followed by a period of sharp reversal, a discernable J-curve evolves in relation to the rise of a revolution or rebellion. The populace's expectations continue to rise despite the reversal in economic and/or social development. A revolution or rebellion may occur as a result of the widening gap between the actual and expected conditions within a society. But for Davies, the most important ingredient in order for a 'revolutionary state of mind' to occur is a threat to the satisfaction of human needs that are physical and/or social.

The present analysis will only examine the underlying state of economic conditions since the various western separatist organizations did not wish to participate in this study. This section will therefore determine whether economic conditions in Alberta followed the J-curve pattern prior to the re-emergence of the Albertan western separatist movement in the 1970's. If a 'sharp' reversal in economic conditions did occur, the determinant of real structural strain, as operationalized by Davies, may provide a partial explanation of the Albertan western separatist movement's rise during the given decade.

There are two basic indicators that will be used in order to ascertain if the determinant of real structural strain existed within Alberta for the indicated period. First, there will be an analysis of the provinces' Gross Domestic Product from 1970 to 1980. Likewise, there will be an analysis of Saskatchewan's Gross Domestic Product for the same period in order to determine if the given condition is unique to Alberta. Unfortunately, Ontario cannot be used as a comparison since Ontario's Ministry of Treasury and Economics has only calculated the province's Gross Provincial Product (see Table 4:3).

Moreover, the annual unemployment rate will be examined as an indicator of the economy's condition prior to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement. As with the analysis of Gross Domestic Product, this indi-

cator will be examined for approximately a ten-year period before the movement's third phase. Similarly, Saskatchewan and Ontario will be included in the analysis as comparisons.

The Gross Domestic Product is considered "an aggregate statistic of general interest" which is used in order to "monitor the performance of the economy" (Alberta Economic Accounts, 1981: 6). As a result of this function, the Gross Domestic Product has been chosen as an extremely useful indicator of the possibility of structural strain.

But before proceeding, a definition of this indicator will be beneficial. The term that needs to be initially clarified is 'production'. According to the Alberta Economic Accounts, 'production' refers to "the creation of goods and services on which members of the community, or the community as a whole, set a dollar value. Any process that creates or adds value to already existing goods (and services) is production" (1981: 8). The Gross Domestic Product "indicates the value of total production within the geographical boundaries of the province" and thereby measures the province's "economic growth" (Ibid.: 8).

In addition, the Alberta Economic Accounts warns that this measure "should not be confused with the provincial equivalent of the Gross National Product, often called the Gross Provincial Product, which would be the value of total production attributable to the residents of Alberta, regardless of where that production takes place"

(Ibid.: 8). The Alberta Economic Accounts emphasize that "the GDP is a measure of economic activity and not a pure measure of economic well-being of the residents" (Ibid.: 8). It is further stated,

the GDP measures total income accruing to the factors of production ... due to economic activity within the province, however, it does not indicate whether these incomes are being collected by the residents of Alberta. The difference between GDP and GNP is thus investment income received and paid to non-residents. (Ibid.: 8)

As the GDP measures a provincial economy's development and growth, it will be a good indicator of Albertan economic conditions.

An analysis of Alberta's Gross Domestic Product for the given, ten-year period indicates that actual economic conditions did not resemble a J-curve pattern prior to the rise of the various phases of the Albertan western separatist movement during the 1970's. According to Table 4:3, Alberta's Gross Domestic Product (measured in 1971 constant dollars) increased each year by various percentages. In fact, the greatest rates of real growth occurred during the years immediately prior to the second and third phases of the Albertan western separatist movement, a 9.9 per cent increase in GDP during 1973 and a 9.8 per cent increase in GDP during 1979. Although Alberta's Gross Domestic Product increased at a slower, 'real' rate of 7.2 per cent in 1980, it cannot be argued that this slowdown represented a 'sharp' reversal in economic conditions. Rather, Alberta's

Gross Domestic Product (in real terms) grew by 91.8 per cent from \$7,373 million in 1970 to \$14,144 million in 1980. Hence, there was a significant and continual increase in real growth within the Albertan economy during the 1970's.

An analysis of Saskatchewan's 'real' Gross Domestic Product during the given, ten-year period reveals similar results to Alberta. For instance, the Saskatchewan Economic Review notes that "Saskatchewan has enjoyed increases in real (constant) Gross Domestic Product every year since 1973. By contrast, during the previous 20 years, the provincial economy suffered an absolute decrease in real output more frequently than one year in three" (1981: 15). Moreover, Saskatchewan's 'real' Gross Domestic Product increased by 61.8 per cent from \$3,129 million in 1970 to \$5,062 million in 1980. Although Saskatchewan's real growth rate for the decade did not increase as dramatically in comparison to Alberta, the Saskatchewan Economic Review still concluded, "the 1970's proved to be a decade of dramatic growth" for the province (Ibid.: 15).

An additional indicator of the provinces' economic well-being is their annual unemployment rate. This measure will therefore constitute a good indicator for the present analysis. Alberta's annual unemployment rate remained at approximately 5 per cent from 1970 to 1974. Hence, economic conditions within Alberta likely remained relatively pros-

Table 4:3

Gross Domestic Product in Constant (1971)
Dollars for Alberta and Saskatchewan (1)
(millions of dollars)

Year	Province			
	Alberta		Saskatchewan	
	G.D.P.	% Change in G.D.P.	G.D.P.	% Change in G.D.P.
1970	7,373	3.2	3,128	-8.1
1971	7,823	6.1	3,505	12.0
1972	8,375	7.1	3,431	-2.1
1973	9,202	9.9	3,708	8.1
1974	9,686	5.3	4,045	9.1
1975	10,406	7.4	4,370	8.0
1976	10,865	4.4	4,591	5.1
1977	11,410	5.0	4,659	1.5
1978	12,016	5.3	4,859	4.3
1979	13,191	9.8	4,967	2.2
1980	14,144	7.2	5,062	1.9

(Alberta Economic Accounts, 1982; Saskatchewan Economic Review, 1982)

- (1) Ontario's figures have not been included since the Ministry of Treasury and Economics has calculated the Gross Provincial Product (GPP) instead of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In addition, the province's GPP has been measured at the market value only (Ontario Statistics, 1982).

perous prior to the rise of the second phase of the Albertan western separatist movement. In 1974, the unemployment rate dropped to 3.5 per cent; an indication of the Albertan economy's continual economic well-being. Although the unemployment rate slowly rose to 4.7 per cent from 1974 to 1978, it cannot be inferred that economic conditions within Alberta dramatically deteriorated. In fact, another drop in the unemployment rate (3.9 per cent) occurred in 1979. Moreover, the unemployment rate declined to 3.7 per cent in 1980. This decline represented the "lowest" unemployment rate in Canada at that time (Alberta Statistical Review, 1981: xviii). Thus, economic conditions within Alberta were auspicious prior to the rise of the latest phase of the Albertan western separatist movement.

Saskatchewan's unemployment rate, in comparison, differed throughout the 1970's. For instance, Saskatchewan was characterized by an alternating unemployment rate from 1970 to 1973 between approximately 3.0 and 4.5 per cent. Afterwards, Saskatchewan's unemployment rate fell to 2.8 per cent in 1974. Indeed, economic conditions seemingly remained very prosperous until 1976 since the unemployment rate gradually increased to 4.9 per cent from 1976 to 1978. But, the province's economy appeared to improve since the unemployment rate fell to 4.2 per cent in 1979. Moreover, the unemployment rate remained constant in 1980 at 4.4 per cent. The changes in this rate throughout the given decade

Table 4:4 Total Labour Force(1) and Annual Unemployment Rate(2) (3), 1970-1980
 Unadjusted Series - Both Sexes - Average
 (thousands)

Province	Year										
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
ALBERTA											
Total Labour Force	667	682	711	746	781	822	871	909	960	1015	1072
Annual Unemployment Rate	5.1	5.7	5.6	5.3	3.5	4.1	4.0	4.5	4.7	3.9	3.7
SASKATCHEWAN											
Total Labour Force	347	346	351	355	360	376	394	410	421	433	443
Annual Unemployment Rate	4.2	3.5	4.4	3.5	2.8	2.9	3.9	4.5	4.9	4.2	4.4
ONTARIO											
Total Labour Force	3177	3290	3410	3532	3686	3818	3885	3994	4147	4289	4366
Annual Unemployment Rate	4.4	5.4	5.0	4.3	4.4	6.3	6.2	7.0	7.2	6.5	6.9

- (1) The Total Labour Force is composed of that portion of the civilian non-institutional population 15 years of age and over who, during the reference week, were employed or unemployed.
- (2) "The number of unemployed persons expressed as a per cent of the labour force - unemployment rate for a particular group is the number unemployed in that group expressed as a per cent of the labour force for that group."
- (3) "Unadjusted unemployment rate ... and annual averages are calculated from unrounded figures (i.e. estimates in units), but published figures are rounded to thousands. Therefore the sum of individual rounded items may not always equal the total."

(Statistics Canada, 1982d)

are so small that it would be unwarranted to assume that a sharp reversal occurred in relation to Saskatchewan's economic condition. These changes merely indicate that Saskatchewan's economy may have been more constant and not as prosperous as Alberta by the end of the decade.

An analysis of Ontario's unemployment rate shows a similar yet a more pronounced pattern to that of Saskatchewan. From 1968 to 1973, the unemployment rate fluctuated only slightly. From 1974 to 1978, Ontario's unemployment rate increased from 4.4 to 7.2 per cent. Like Saskatchewan, the unemployment rate decreased in 1979, but, it again rose to 6.9 per cent in 1980.

The analyses of the various indicators yielded similar results in relation to the possible existence of the determinant of structural strain prior to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement during 1980. The following chart summarizes the results of the above-mentioned analyses;

Chart 4-1 Analysis of Conditions of Structural Strain,
Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Ontario, 1970-1980(1)

Presence of J-Curve Pattern

Indicator	Phase of Movement	Province		
		Alta.	Sask.	Ont.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)	2nd (1973-74)	No	No	---
	3rd (1979-80)	No	No	---
Unemployment Rate	2nd (1973-74)	No	No	No
	3rd (1979-80)	No	No	Yes

- (1) An analysis of the given indicators in relation to the rise of the first phase of the western separatist movement (1969-1970) has not been included since the movement's first phase occurred between 1969-1970. As previously indicated, this chapter is limited to an analysis of societal conditions during the 1970's.

This chart illustrates that a J-curve pattern did not exist prior to the second and third phases of the Albertan western separatist movement. It also indicates that structural strain, as operationalized by Davies' theory, did not exist in Saskatchewan during the same period. Surprisingly, the findings suggest that a J-curve pattern existed in Ontario in the indicated period.

These findings lead to a number of possible conclusions. First, it may be argued that the determinant of real structural strain is not necessary in relation to the rise of an episode of collective behaviour. Second, it may be argued that Smelser's determinant is necessary but that Davies' theory of revolution is an inappropriate method of operationalizing the concept of structural strain. As a result, there is a need to replace Davies' method of operationalization with a new approach. One may also argue that Davies' theory is not inappropriate since it supposedly focuses on the populace's 'state of mind'; not actual societal conditions as were examined here. The 'revolutionary state of mind' is "derived from the widening of the gap between what they want and what they get" (1969: 690). Davies explicitly states,


the necessary additional ingredient is a persistent, unrelenting threat to the satisfaction of these needs (physical, social, equal dignity and justice): not a threat which actually returns people to a state of sheer survival but which puts them in the mental state where they believe they will not be able to satisfy one or more basic needs. (1962: 8)

Davies adds, "although physical deprivation in some degree may be threatened on the eve of all revolutions, it need not be the prime factor ... the crucial factor is the vague or specific fear that ground gained over a period of time will be quickly lost" (Ibid.: 8). What is needed then is a modification of Davies' theory.

The Albertan economy, as indicated, was characterized by a decade of growth; a period of time that likely raised Albertans' expectations with respect to Davies' theory. This disclosure suggests that the indicated 'threat' need not be based on a sharp reversal in economic and/or social development. Rather, recent issues, as indicated in the previous chapter, likely acted as the 'threats' to the Albertan populace's economic and/or social progress. For instance, the defeat of the federal Progressive Conservative party and the introduction of the National Energy Program were seen as threats to Albertans' continued social and economic well-being. Thus, it is these factors that likely incited the occurrence of a 'revolutionary state of mind' amongst Albertans and thereby may have contributed to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement during 1980.

As a result of these findings, Davies' theory has been modified accordingly,

Chart 4-2 Sudden State of Uncertainty (1)



- (1) 'X' refers to a specific event (precipitating factor) being or being perceived as a threat to economic and/or social development or to "gained ground".

It may not be necessary for a sudden reversal in economic and/or social conditions to occur. All that is necessary is a threat to the populace's well-being. The perceived threat, a precipitating factor(s), supposedly interferes or may interfere with the society's 'real', economic and/or social progress and, in consequence, the populace's ability of continuing to approximate or obtain its rising expectations. In response, a movement may arise due to the sudden state of uncertainty towards the continuance of economic and/or social development and the populace's ability to continually fulfill their expectations.

III - An Analysis of Social Change

The purpose of this section is to determine if noteworthy social changes occurred in Alberta during the

1970's and if the existence of these 'overall' changes may have thereby contributed to the Albertan western separatist movement's re-emergence in 1980. This is based on Hiller's contention that a possible relationship exists between social conditions and the rise of a third party. Hiller states, "third parties emerge and succeed when they are a means to resolve critical problems within the regional society" (1977: 55). For example, the emergence and success of Alberta Social Credit was mainly due "to the fact that it creatively responded as an indigenous movement with local roots to Alberta's own problems of rapid and heterogeneous population growth" (Ibid.: 70).

Likewise, the Albertan western separatist movement may have arisen as a means to resolve "internal pressures and conflicts" within Alberta (Ibid.: 59). For instance, the rapid population growth and urbanization that led to "Lougheed's victory and the abrupt termination of the Social Credit dynasty" may have persisted during the given decade. As a result of these continuing trends, the movement may have risen in 1980 as a response to social conditions (Pratt and Richards, 1978: 6). Thus, an examination of the possible existence of significant social changes in relation to Alberta's population will be conducted.

Various indicators will be analyzed in order to determine whether 'relevant' social changes continued within Alberta during the 1970's. Significant changes will first

be noted with respect to each chosen variable. This will be followed by a discussion of the combined impact of these changes. It is the combined impact of these changes which may have led to social instability and may have thus contributed to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement in 1980.

The analyses of the variables chosen for analysis here will be divided into three subsections. Initially, there will be an analysis of the general characteristics of Alberta's population. The indicators to be used are; population growth, residence, sex, age, ethnicity, religion, marriage and divorce rates. The second subsection will consist of an analysis of the Albertan labour force's characteristics. The indicators for this subsection are; the labour force by industrial and occupational categories. Lastly, the economic well-being of Alberta's population will be ascertained by an examination of real average income for families and unattached individuals.

The indicators to be used in the first subsection are basic, demographic variables. They have been selected to determine whether significant changes have occurred in the general characteristics of Alberta's population. The indicators of industrial and occupational categories in the second subsection have been selected to determine if the structure of Alberta's labour force has significantly changed. James W. Rinehart states that "work ... has always had a pro-

found impact on the lives of those who perform it" (1975: 1). Therefore, any dramatic change in labour force composition may have exerted a significant degree of internal pressure. Lastly, a subsection consisting of an analysis of real average income has been included since the variable is a measure of a populace's economic well-being.

Once again, data for Ontario and Saskatchewan will be included in the analyses in order to determine if the existence of significant social changes are unique to Alberta. The comparisons may thereby offer possible explanations for the confinement of the western separatist movement mainly to Alberta.

(i) AN ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ALBERTA'S POPULATION

Table 4:5 indicates that a rapid rate of population growth occurred in Alberta during the 1970's. For example, Alberta's annual population growth rate (per 1,000) was constantly the highest in comparison to Ontario, Saskatchewan and Canada for each of the given years. Moreover, Alberta's annual population growth rate (per 1,000) significantly accelerated after 1973-74. In fact, Pratt and Richards noted, "Alberta's annual population growth rate exceeded the national average consistently until 1965, levelled off until the early 1970's and then resurged under the impact of the energy crisis" (1978: 6).

Table 4:5 Annual Population Growth Rate (per 1,000);
1970-80

Year & Province		Total Increase (1)	
		Number (thousands)	Rate per 1,000(2)
1970-71	Ontario	152.1	20.1
	Saskatchewan	-14.8	-15.7
	Alberta	32.9	20.6
	Canada	271.3	12.7
1971-72	Ontario	106.8	13.9
	Saskatchewan	-12.2	-13.2
	Alberta	29.4	18.1
	Canada	233.2	10.3
1972-73	Ontario	98.9	12.7
	Saskatchewan	-9.5	-10.4
	Alberta	32.2	19.4
	Canada	241.3	11.1
1973-74	Ontario	145.3	18.4
	Saskatchewan	-4.8	-5.3
	Alberta	32.9	19.5
	Canada	321.2	14.6
1974-75	Ontario	118.1	14.7
	Saskatchewan	7.7	8.6
	Alberta	55.9	32.5
	Canada	333.1	14.9
1975-76	Ontario	92.3	11.3
	Saskatchewan	13.9	15.3
	Alberta	59.7	33.6
	Canada	295.5	13.0
1976-77	Ontario	90.4	10.9
	Saskatchewan	13.3	14.4
	Alberta	73.4	39.9
	Canada	294.2	12.8
1977-78	Ontario	89.2	10.7
	Saskatchewan	8.9	9.5
	Alberta	72.7	38.0
	Canada	247.1	10.6
1978-79	Ontario	60.1	7.1
	Saskatchewan	9.0	9.5
	Alberta	74.6	37.6
	Canada	234.8	10.0
1979-80	Ontario	69.6	8.2
	Saskatchewan	8.6	9.0
	Alberta	83.9	40.8
	Canada	288.9	12.2
1980-81	Ontario	50.9	5.9
	Saskatchewan	7.2	7.5
	Alberta	94.7	44.2
	Canada	284.1	11.8

(1) 'Total Increase' refers to Natural Increase (excess of births over deaths) and Total Net Migration (sum of the net interprovincial migration and the net international migration) combined.

(2) These rates are obtained by dividing the total increase by the total population.

(Statistics Canada, 1980e)

Ontario also had a high population growth rate from 1970-71 to 1973-74. But for the second half of the decade, Ontario's annual population growth rate increased at a decelerated pace. Saskatchewan, in contrast, experienced a real decline in population growth from 1970-71 to 1973-74. After 1973-74, Saskatchewan was characterized by a positive population growth rate, but this was not as pronounced or sustained as Alberta's (See Table 4:5). Hence, Alberta was unique in that its population grew at a consistently high annual rate during the 1970's.

Alberta's populace also appears to have migrated to urban from rural-farm areas, as indicated in Table 4:6. The population living in an urban area increased by 15.0 per cent from 1971 to 1976; an indication of a continual trend of "rapid urbanization" (Pratt and Richards, 1978: 6) during the 1970's. Ontario and Saskatchewan likewise experienced a decline in the percentage of their populations living on rural-farms and an increase in the percentage of their population living in urban areas. While this trend was not unique to Alberta, it was more pronounced there.

Table 4:7 shows no significant changes in relation to the percentage of males and females in Alberta from 1970 to 1980. Similarly, the percentages of males and females within Ontario and Saskatchewan were evenly divided throughout the given period.

Table 4:6 Population by Urban, Rural-Non-Farm, and Rural Farm Distribution,
1971 and 1976

Province & Year	Total	Urban 1,000 to 500,000 over	(Rural) Non-Farm	(Rural) Farm
Ont.				
1971	7,703,105 (100.0%)	81.8%	14.3%	3.9%
1976	8,264,464 (100.1%)	81.2%	15.5%	3.4%
Sask.				
1971	926,245 (99.9%)	52.7%	23.9%	23.3%
1976	921,325 (100.0%)	55.5%	23.6%	20.9%
Alta.				
1971	1,627,875 (100.0%)	73.6%	14.1%	12.3%
1976	1,838,035 (99.9%)	75.0%	14.6%	10.3%

Urban Population: Persons living in an area having a population concentration of 1,000 or more and a population density of at least 1,000 per square mile.

Rural Population: Persons living outside "Urban Areas" (Area having a population concentration of 1,000 or more and a population density of 1,000 or more per square mile).

Rural-Non-Farm Population: All persons living in rural areas in dwellings not situated on a census farm.

(Statistics Canada, 1978d)

Table 4:7 Population by Sex; 1970-1980(1)
(total-in thousands)

Year	Sex	Ontario	Saskatchewan	Alberta
		%	%	%
1970	Male	49.9	50.8	50.8
	Female	50.1	49.2	49.2
	Total	7,637.0	942.0	1,600.0
1971	Male	49.9	50.8	50.9
	Female	50.1	49.2	49.1
	Total	7,703,105	926,245	1,627,875
1972	Male	49.8	50.7	50.8
	Female	50.2	49.3	49.2
	Total	7,833.9	916.3	1,653.9
1973	Male	49.8	50.7	50.8
	Female	50.2	49.3	49.2
	Total	7,938.9	908.1	1,683.6
1974	Male	49.8	50.6	50.7
	Female	50.2	49.4	49.3
	Total	8,093.9	907.0	1,713.9
1975	Male	49.8	50.5	50.7
	Female	50.2	49.5	49.3
	Total	8,225.8	918.1	1,768.0
1976	Male	49.6	50.5	50.7
	Female	50.4	49.6	49.3
	Total	8,264.5	921.3	1,838.0
1977	Male	49.5	50.4	50.7
	Female	50.5	49.6	49.3
	Total	8,355.0	937.0	1,896.4
1978	Male	49.5	50.4	50.7
	Female	50.5	49.6	49.3
	Total	8,444.3	948.4	1,954.2
1979	Male	49.4	50.4	50.7
	Female	50.6	49.6	49.3
	Total	8,504.5	959.8	2,013.8
1980(2)	Male	49.4	50.4	50.7
	Female	50.6	49.6	49.3
	Total	8,574.4	970.1	2,081.4

(Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1971 and
Statistics Canada, 1973c, 1973e, 1974b,
1975c, 1976b, 1978e, 1980c, 1980d, 1982c)

- (1) Each figure has been rounded independently to the nearest hundred, hence, totals do not necessarily equal the sum of individual rounded figures in distributions.
- (2) Preliminary Estimates

However, Table 4:8 indicates that the age structure of Alberta's population underwent noteworthy changes during the 1970's. For instance, the majority of the population in 1970 (50.3 per cent) was twenty-four years of age or under. By 1980, this age group's percentage of the total population decreased by 9.3 per cent. During the same period, the '24-44' age-group's percentage of the total population significantly increased by 19.5 per cent. The other age-group categories, on the other hand, revealed small changes in their percentages.

This was not unique to Alberta. In 1970, the '0-24' age-group was the largest for the total populations of Saskatchewan and Ontario. By 1980, a shift in the population's age structure occurred within both provinces with a slight decline in the percentage between 0 and 24 as well as an increase in the percentage between 25 and 44. There were also noteworthy increases in the percentage over age sixty-five for both Saskatchewan and Ontario.

Table 4:9 indicates that the ethnic composition of Alberta's population did not change significantly. There was a slight decrease in the percentage of the 'French' ethnic group, while the other major ethnic groups within the province (British, German, and Ukranian) underwent slight increases in their percentages. Likewise, the ethnic group compositions of Ontario and Saskatchewan did not change dramatically.

Table 4:8

Population by Age; 1970-1980
(thousands)

Year	Age Group	Province		
		Ont.	Sask.	Alta.
1970	0-24	46.8%	49.5%	50.3%
	25-44	26.1%	20.8%	25.1%
	45-64	18.9%	19.8%	17.4%
	65+	8.7%	9.9%	7.3%
	Total	7,637.0 (100.5%)	942.0 (100.0%)	1,600.0 (100.1%)
1971	0-24	46.7%	48.0%	50.2%
	25-44	25.8%	21.5%	25.3%
	45-64	19.1%	20.2%	17.2%
	65+	8.4%	10.2%	7.3%
	Total	7,703,105 (100.0%)	926,245 (99.9%)	1,627,875 (100.0%)
1972	0-24	46.3%	47.9%	49.8%
	25-44	26.0%	21.2%	25.5%
	45-64	19.3%	20.4%	17.4%
	65+	8.4%	10.5%	7.4%
	Total	7,833.9 (100.0%)	916.3 (100.0%)	1,653.9 (100.1%)
1973	0-24	45.5%	47.5%	49.0%
	25-44	26.6%	21.1%	26.1%
	45-64	19.4%	20.6%	17.5%
	65+	8.5%	10.8%	7.5%
	Total	7,938.9 (100.0%)	908.1 (100.0%)	1,683.6 (100.1%)
1974	0-24	44.9%	47.3%	48.5%
	25-44	27.1%	21.0%	26.4%
	45-64	19.4%	20.6%	17.5%
	65+	8.6%	11.0%	7.5%
	Total	8,093.9 (100.0%)	907.0 (99.9%)	1,713.9 (100.0%)
1975	0-24	44.5%	47.2%	48.0%
	25-44	27.5%	21.3%	26.9%
	45-64	19.5%	20.4%	17.6%
	65+	8.6%	11.0%	7.6%
	Total	8,225.8 (100.1%)	918.1 (99.9%)	1,768.0 (100.1%)
1976	0-24	43.9%	46.3%	48.0%
	25-44	27.4%	22.4%	27.2%
	45-64	19.8%	20.2%	17.3%
	65+	8.9%	11.1%	7.5%
	Total	8,264.5 (100.0%)	921.3 (100.0%)	1,838.0 (100.0%)
1977	0-24	43.4%	45.9%	47.5%
	25-44	27.7%	23.0%	27.8%
	45-64	19.8%	19.9%	17.2%
	65+	9.1%	11.2%	7.5%
	Total	8,355.0 (100.0%)	937.0 (100.0%)	1,896.4 (100.0%)
1978	0-24	42.8%	45.4%	46.9%
	25-44	28.0%	23.6%	28.4%
	45-64	19.9%	19.7%	17.1%
	65+	9.3%	11.3%	7.6%
	Total	8,444.3 (100.0%)	948.4 (100.0%)	1,954.2 (100.0%)
1979	0-24	42.2%	44.8%	46.3%
	25-44	28.3%	24.3%	29.2%
	45-64	19.9%	19.4%	16.9%
	65+	9.6%	11.5%	7.6%
	Total	8,504.5 (100.0%)	959.8 (100.0%)	2,013.8 (100.0%)
1980*	0-24	41.5%	44.0%	45.6%
	25-44	28.7%	25.1%	30.0%
	45-64	20.0%	19.1%	16.7%
	65+	9.8%	11.7%	7.7%
	Total	8,574.4 (100.0%)	970.1 (99.9%)	2,081.4 (100.0%)

(Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1971 and
Statistics Canada, 1973c, 1973e, 1974b, 1975c,
1976b, 1978e, 1980c, 1980d, 1982c)

* Preliminary Estimates

Table 4:9 Ethnic Groups; 1961 and 1971(1)

Year and Ethnic Group	Ontario %	Saskatchewan %	Alberta %
1961			
British Isles(2)	59.5	40.4	45.2
French	10.4	6.5	6.3
German	6.4	17.1	13.8
Hungarian	1.0	1.7	1.1
Italian	4.4	0.3	1.1
Jewish	1.0	0.2	0.3
Native Indian	0.8	3.3	2.1
Netherlands	3.1	3.2	4.2
Polish	2.4	3.1	3.0
Russian	0.5	2.4	1.3
Scandinavian(3)	1.0	7.3	7.2
Ukranian	2.1	8.5	8.0
Asian(4)	0.6	0.5	0.9
Other & Unknown	6.9	5.4	5.4
Total	6,236,092(100.1)	925,181(99.9)	1,331,944(99.9)
1971			
British Isles(2)	59.4	42.1	46.8
French	9.6	6.1	5.8
German	6.2	19.4	14.2
Hungarian	0.9	1.5	1.0
Italian	6.0	0.3	1.5
Jewish	1.8	0.2	0.4
Native Indian	0.8	4.4	2.7
Netherlands	2.7	2.1	3.6
Polish	1.9	2.9	2.7
Russian	0.2	1.1	0.6
Scandinavian(3)	0.8	6.4	6.0
Ukranian	2.1	9.3	8.3
Asian(4)	1.3	0.8	1.4
Other & Unknown	7.5	3.7	5.2
Total	7,773,170(101.2)	928,340(100.3)	1,635,285(100.2)

(Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1962
and Statistics Canada, 1973d)

- (1) Distribution of population by ethnic groups is only given within the census years. As a result, there will only be a comparison of data for the census years of 1961 and of 1971.
- (2) British Isles includes English, Irish, Scottish, and Welsh.
- (3) Asian includes Chinese, East Indian, Japanese, Syrian-Lebanese, and Other.
- (4) Scandinavian includes Danish, Icelandic, Norwegian and Swedish.

Table 4:10

Percentage Distribution of the Population by
Religious Denomination; 1961 and 1971

Province and Year	Anglican	Baptist	Lutheran	Presbyterian	Roman Catholic	United Church	Other(2)
Ont.							
1961	17.9	4.0	3.9	7.9	30.0	26.3	9.9
1971	15.8	3.7	3.5	7.0	33.3	21.8	14.8
Sask.							
1961	10.2	1.7	10.3	2.7	26.3	32.0	16.7
1971	9.4	1.6	9.8	2.2	27.9	29.6	19.4
Alta.							
1961	11.8	3.2	9.2	4.2	22.4	31.5	17.8
1971	10.5	3.1	8.2	3.5	24.0	28.1	22.7

(Statistics Canada, 1973b)

- (1) Distribution of population by religious denomination is only given within census years. As a result, there will only be a comparison of data for the census years of 1961 and 1971.
- (2) Includes 'No Religion'.

Table 4:11 Marriage Rates (per 1,000 population)

Year	Province		
	Ontario	Saskatchewan	Alberta
1970	9.0	7.8	9.6
1971	9.0	8.4	9.6
1972	9.2	8.6	9.9
1973	9.1	8.6	9.7
1974	9.0	8.8	9.7
1975	8.8	8.8	9.9
1976	8.4	8.2	9.7
1977	8.1	7.7	9.5
1978	8.0	7.5	9.4
1979	8.0	7.6	9.4
1980	8.0	7.8	10.0

(Statistics Canada, 1979c, 1980h, 1981d, 1982f)

Table 4:12 Divorce Rates (per 100,000 population) and Percent Change In Rate; 1970-1980

Year	Province					
	Ontario		Saskatchewan		Alberta	
	Rate Per 100,000 Population	Percent Change In Rate	Rate Per 100,000 Population	Percent Change In Rate	Rate Per 100,000 Population	Percent Change In Rate
1970	164.9	2.8	92.6	0.5	236.4	7.0
1971	158.5	-3.9	88.1	-4.9	224.6	-5.0
1972	168.6	6.4	90.3	2.5	228.1	1.6
1973	173.6	3.0	97.7	8.2	263.4	15.5
1974	188.7	8.7	114.6	17.3	288.6	9.6
1975	212.6	12.7	123.2	7.5	309.7	7.3
1976	224.9	5.8	131.0	6.3	309.9	0.1
1977	236.2	5.0	157.3	20.1	308.1	-0.6
1978	243.2	3.0	150.7	-4.2	310.4	0.7
1979	256.3	5.4	159.3	5.7	324.5	4.5
1980	261.7	2.1	189.3	18.8	364.2	12.2

(Statistics Canada, 1979c, 1980h, 1981d, 1982f)

An analysis of the percentage distribution of Alberta's population by religious denomination also reveals minimal change. Most major religious denominations decreased slightly from 1961 to 1971. Only the 'Roman Catholic' and 'Other' religious denominations experienced increases in their percentages. Similar patterns were apparent within Ontario and Saskatchewan.

Table 4:11 indicates that no significant changes occurred in Alberta's marriage rates during the 1970's. An analysis of Saskatchewan and Ontario data also reveals a similar lack of noteworthy changes.

All three provinces, according to Table 4:12, demonstrated a significant increase in their divorce rates. Alberta experienced a 54.1 per cent increase in its divorce rate per 100,000 population from 1970 to 1980. Saskatchewan's rate increased by 104.4 per cent for the same period, while Ontario's divorce rate likewise increased dramatically by 58.7 per cent.

(ii) COMPOSITION OF THE LABOUR FORCE

Work consumes a major portion of a person's life. Rinehart notes that "what people do during these hours often penetrates to the very core of their personalities" and "an activity which consumes such a large portion of time cannot help but spill over into non-work spheres of life" (1975: 1). Due to the enormous influence of work upon

individuals, it is important to examine if major changes have occurred within the labour force. The two indicators chosen to do this are the percentage distributions of the labour force by industrial and occupational categories.

Significant changes occurred in Alberta's labour force from 1975 to 1980. In 1975, the three major industrial sectors in terms of the labour force's distribution were service (26.3 per cent), trade (18.5 per cent), and agriculture (13.6 per cent). But by 1980, the order had altered to service (28.2 per cent), trade (18.0 per cent), and construction (9.8 per cent). Agriculture declined to being the sixth largest category. Alberta's economic base was evidently shifting from agriculture to different industrial categories, such as other primary, construction, finance, service, and manufacturing industries. Although the data are not comparable for the years prior to 1975, significant changes also occurred during that period.

Saskatchewan's labour force by industrial category likewise underwent a significant change from 1975 to 1980. In that period, the service sector displaced agriculture as the labour force's largest division. In comparison, Ontario's distribution of the labour force by industrial category remained largely unchanged between 1975 to 1980 (See Table 4:13).

The occupational distribution of the labour force in Alberta also underwent major changes from 1975 to 1980.

Table 4:13 Labour Force(1) by Industry Categories, Showing
Percentage Distributions; 1975 to 1980(2)
(Total-In Thousands) (Both Sexes)

Province & Year	All Industries	Agriculture	Other Primary Industries	Manufactur- ing	Construc- tion
Ont.					
1975	3,818(100.0)	3.2%	1.4%	24.6%	6.6%
1976	3,885(100.2)	3.0%	1.6%	24.9%	6.6%
1977	3,994(100.1)	3.3%	1.5%	24.3%	6.5%
1978	4,147(100.1)	3.3%	1.4%	24.3%	6.3%
1979	4,289(100.1)	3.6%	1.1%	25.0%	6.0%
1980	4,366(100.1)	3.5%	1.5%	25.0%	5.9%
Sask.					
1975	376(99.6)	28.2%	2.4%	5.9%	5.6%
1976	394(99.8)	23.9%	2.0%	6.1%	6.6%
1977	410(99.5)	24.1%	2.2%	5.9%	6.8%
1978	421(99.8)	24.5%	2.4%	5.9%	6.4%
1979	433(99.3)	23.1%	2.5%	5.5%	6.7%
1980	443(99.5)	20.1%	3.2%	5.4%	7.0%
Alta.					
1975	822(100.2)	13.6%	3.5%	9.0%	8.3%
1976	871(99.7)	13.5%	3.9%	9.1%	9.4%
1977	909(99.7)	9.7%	4.6%	9.0%	9.9%
1978	960(99.6)	8.9%	5.5%	8.4%	10.4%
1979	1,015(99.8)	8.2%	5.8%	8.5%	11.1%
1980	1,072(99.6)	7.7%	6.1%	9.3%	9.8%

Province & Year	Transportation Communication & Other Utilities	Trade	Finance, Insurance and Real Estate	Service	Public Admini- stra- tion	Un- Classified (3)
Ont.						
1975	7.0%	17.1%	5.6%	26.7%	7.0%	0.8%
1976	7.3%	16.7%	5.8%	26.7%	7.1%	0.5%
1977	7.2%	16.6%	5.8%	27.5%	6.8%	0.6%
1978	7.3%	16.9%	5.8%	27.4%	6.7%	0.7%
1979	7.2%	16.9%	5.7%	27.7%	6.2%	0.7%
1980	7.3%	16.2%	6.0%	27.7%	6.4%	0.6%
Sask.						
1975	8.0%	16.0%	3.5%	23.4%	6.6%	----
1976	8.4%	17.0%	3.8%	24.4%	7.6%	----
1977	7.6%	16.6%	4.1%	25.4%	6.8%	----
1978	8.1%	16.9%	4.0%	24.9%	6.7%	----
1979	7.9%	16.6%	4.2%	25.6%	7.2%	----
1980	8.1%	17.8%	4.5%	25.7%	7.7%	----
Alta.						
1975	8.8%	18.5%	4.5%	26.3%	7.2%	0.5%
1976	8.3%	17.8%	4.5%	26.4%	6.8%	----
1977	8.5%	18.9%	5.3%	27.3%	6.5%	----
1978	8.9%	17.8%	5.1%	28.2%	6.4%	----
1979	9.1%	18.0%	5.2%	27.8%	6.1%	----
1980	8.8%	18.0%	5.3%	28.2%	6.4%	----

- (1) The labour force is composed of that portion of the civilian non-institutional population 15 years of age and over who, during the reference week, were employed or unemployed.
- (2) Comparable data not available prior to 1975 due to major revisions to Statistics Canada's Monthly Labour Force Survey (71-001 Monthly).
- (3) Comprises unemployed persons who have never worked before, and those persons who last worked more than 5 years ago.

(Statistics Canada, 1979f, 1980j, 1981g)

Table 4:14 Labour Force(1) by Occupation Categories, Showing
Percentage Distributions; 1975 to 1980(2)
(Total-In Thousands) (Both Sexes)

Province & Year	All Occupations	Managerial, Professional, Etc.	Clerical	Sales	Service	Primary Occupations
Ont.						
1975	3,818(100.1)	21.8%	18.2%	11.1%	12.1%	4.2%
1976	3,885(100.0)	22.1%	18.7%	10.9%	11.8%	4.2%
1977	3,994(100.2)	22.0%	18.3%	10.8%	12.5%	4.5%
1978	4,147(100.0)	21.9%	18.3%	10.2%	13.0%	4.4%
1979	4,289(100.1)	21.7%	17.9%	10.3%	13.0%	4.6%
1980	4,366(100.2)	21.9%	18.0%	10.1%	13.1%	4.8%
Sask.						
1975	376(99.8)	17.3%	12.8%	10.4%	10.4%	29.0%
1976	394(99.9)	18.3%	14.0%	9.4%	11.2%	24.9%
1977	410(99.5)	17.8%	13.2%	10.0%	11.7%	25.4%
1978	421(99.4)	17.8%	12.8%	9.3%	12.1%	25.7%
1979	433(99.3)	18.0%	13.2%	9.2%	12.7%	24.0%
1980	443(99.8)	19.4%	13.8%	9.5%	12.6%	21.7%
Alta.						
1975	822(99.9)	20.1%	15.7%	12.0%	11.6%	14.8%
1976	871(99.7)	21.0%	16.0%	10.7%	11.5%	14.9%
1977	909(99.8)	20.9%	16.9%	12.0%	12.0%	11.4%
1978	960(99.7)	22.9%	15.8%	10.5%	12.0%	11.1%
1979	1,015(99.7)	22.0%	16.4%	10.7%	12.2%	10.5%
1980	1,072(99.9)	22.0%	17.1%	10.5%	12.3%	10.2%

Province & Year	Processing	Construction	Transport- ation	Materials Handling & Other Crafts	Un- Classified (3)
Ont.					
1975	17.6%	6.7%	3.5%	4.1%	0.8%
1976	17.3%	6.6%	3.7%	4.2%	0.5%
1977	17.2%	6.4%	3.8%	4.1%	0.6%
1978	17.4%	6.2%	3.8%	4.1%	0.7%
1979	18.3%	6.0%	3.6%	4.0%	0.7%
1980	18.0%	5.9%	3.7%	4.1%	0.6%
Sask.					
1975	7.7%	6.4%	2.9%	2.9%	----
1976	7.9%	7.9%	3.3%	3.0%	----
1977	7.3%	7.8%	3.4%	2.9%	----
1978	7.6%	7.4%	3.6%	3.1%	----
1979	7.9%	7.6%	3.7%	3.0%	----
1980	7.9%	7.4%	4.3%	3.2%	----
Alta.					
1975	9.9%	8.3%	4.0%	3.0%	0.5%
1976	9.1%	9.0%	4.2%	3.3%	----
1977	9.8%	9.8%	4.0%	3.0%	----
1978	9.7%	9.8%	4.6%	3.3%	----
1979	9.7%	10.0%	4.7%	3.5%	----
1980	10.2%	8.9%	5.2%	3.5%	----

(1) The labour force is composed of that portion of the civilian non-institutional population 15 years of age and over who, during the reference week, were employed or unemployed.

(2) Comparable data not available prior to 1975 due to major revisions to Statistics Canada's Monthly Labour Force Survey (71-001 Monthly).

(3) Comprises unemployed persons who have never worked before, and those persons who last worked more than 5 years ago.

(Statistics Canada, 1979f, 1980j, 1981g)

The three major occupational categories of Alberta's labour force in 1975 were 'managers, professionals, etc.' (20.1 per cent), 'clerical workers' (15.7 per cent), and 'primary occupations' (14.8 per cent). By 1980, the three major occupational categories were 'managers, professionals, etc.' (22.0 per cent), 'clerical workers' (17.1 per cent), and 'service occupations' (12.3 per cent). The percentage of workers engaged in primary occupations dropped from third to fifth place while the proportion of the Albertan labour force engaged in services increased from fifth to third place.

Saskatchewan and Ontario did not experience such large changes in the occupational composition of their labour forces. For instance, 'managerial, professional, etc.', 'clerical', and 'processing' were the three major occupations in Ontario during 1975. By 1980, 'clerical' and 'processing' occupations were tied for second position while 'service' occupations moved from fourth to third position. Major changes in the labour force's occupational distribution were apparently limited to Alberta for the given period.

(iii) AN ANALYSIS OF AVERAGE INCOME FOR FAMILIES AND UNATTACHED INDIVIDUALS

This section will attempt to determine if a significant change has occurred in the economic well-being of

Alberta's families and unattached individuals. As indicated earlier, annual average income for families and unattached individuals has been selected for this purpose. In addition, 'real' average income has been estimated by controlling for inflation (See Table 4:15). It must be stressed that the data available are only for the capital cities of the three provinces. Therefore, these calculations must be seen only as possible illustrations of what may have occurred throughout the three provinces.

There have been noteworthy changes in real average income for families and unattached individuals living in Edmonton. In 1971, Edmonton's real average income for families and unattached individuals was below Toronto's. By 1979, a significant turnabout had occurred and Edmonton's real average income for families and unattached individuals had surpassed Toronto's. More importantly, Edmonton's real average income had increased by 28.1 per cent from 1971 to 1979. This increase indicates a positive, dramatic change in their economic well-being.

Regina's and Toronto's real average income for families and unattached individuals also increased. In fact, Regina's increased significantly by 46.3 per cent from 1971 to 1979. Toronto's real average income increased by only 12.8 per cent for the same period. If these city based data are illustrative of province wide trends, the people of Alberta and Saskatchewan experienced a significant in-

Table 4:15 'Real' Average Income(1) of Families(2)
and Unattached Individuals(3), All
Areas; 1971-1979
(1971=100)

Year	Cities as Provincial Representatives		
	Toronto (Ont.)	Regina (Sask.)	Edmonton (Alta.)
1971	9,853	6,594	8,759
1973	10,352	8,296	9,115
1975	10,831	9,697	10,283
1977	11,274	9,098	10,820
1979	11,111	9,647	11,219

(Statistics Canada, 1973h, 1975e, 1977f, 1979e, 1981f)

- (1) To calculate 'Real' Average Income - Take average income (AI) in year t (AI_t). Divide AI_t by Consumer Price Index for Regional City (CPI_t) and multiply by 100. (Consumer Price Index for Regional Cities Used - Toronto, Ontario; Regina, Saskatchewan; and Edmonton, Alberta).
- (2) Family refers to "a group of individuals sharing a common dwelling unit and related by blood, marriage or adoption. Thus, all relatives living together were considered to comprise one family whatever the degree of family relationship (economic family)" (Statistics Canada, 1973h: 10).
- (3) Unattached Individual refers to "a person living by himself or rooming in a household where he is not related to other household members. An unattached individual is treated as an economic family unit by himself" (Ibid.: 10).

crease in their economic well-being.

(iv) A DISCUSSION ON THE SECTION OF SOCIAL CHANGE

An examination of social change through the use of the above-mentioned indicators in the various subsections reveals that some social changes occurred in all three provinces during the 1970's. But, only Alberta experienced significant changes in all the following factors; population growth rate, urban/rural distribution, age structure, divorce rate, labour force by industrial categories, labour force by occupational categories, and real average income for families and unattached individuals.

Saskatchewan experienced similar changes in its population growth rate, urban/rural distribution, age structure, divorce rate, labour force by industrial categories, and real average income for families and unattached individuals. Ontario experienced the least amount of overall social change with noteworthy changes only in its population growth rate, urban/rural distribution, age structure, and divorce rate of the factors considered.

The combined effect of the given social changes within Alberta suggest that some notable degree of social instability likely preceded the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement in 1980. Pratt and Richards support this and have argued,

Lougheed's victory and the abrupt termination of the Social Credit dynasty were an inevitable, though considerable delayed, response of the electoral system to rapid population growth, urbanization and secularization - trends underway during and after World War II, but greatly accelerated by the oil boom. (1978: 6)

It is thereby possible that these continuing trends created or maintained a condition of social instability amongst the Albertan populace and may have thereby contributed to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement in 1980.

Significant changes in the economic conditions are also likely to incite a possible state of social instability. In discussing the import of such changes on Alberta's political life, Pratt and Richards note,

by the seventies, Alberta's population was substantially urbanized and its expanding labour force was oriented to the service sector and the managerial, professional and white collar occupations of the new middle class ... the new middle class was urban and secular in its outlook and impatient with Social Credit's blend of religious fundamentalism and the remnants of its agrarian populist past. (1978: 9)

They state further, "the meaning of Lougheed's victory was this. The political centre of gravity within Alberta had shifted in favour of metropolitan interests" (Ibid.: 6). As indicated in the preceding analysis, Alberta's labour force shifted away from its agricultural (rural) base. This continuing trend in combination with the other changes may have also contributed to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement.

Dramatic, positive changes also seemingly occurred in Albertans' economic well-being. An increase in a populace's economic well-being might usually be considered as a deterrent to the rise of a separatist movement. But, Alberta's situation was unique. Elton and Gibbins provide a possible reason why Albertans' increased prosperity may have contributed to the movement's rise. "Economic prosperity has only strengthened political discontent ... as western Canadians search fruitlessly for both a degree of political power commensurate with their new economic strength and a solution to seemingly intractable economic problems" (1979: 88). Hence, the combination of Albertans' recent wealth and their inability to "affect the policies or partisan composition of the national government" (Ibid.: 90) may have lead a number of Albertans to form or join a western separatist organization.

Saskatchewan's populace may have expressed interest towards the western separatist movement partially as a response to similar changes. Still, Saskatchewan's western separatist movement was not as strong as Alberta's possibly due to the less pronounced overall changes. Moreover, it may be that a separatist movement did not arise in Ontario since the province experienced few major social and economic changes.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to provide background evidence on possible changes in the political, economic, and social sectors of Alberta's society. Significant overall societal changes that were unique to Alberta might have served as factors leading to the rise of western separatism in that province.

To analyze the societal conditions, two determinants from Smelser's theory of collective behaviour were chosen; the determinants of structural conduciveness and structural strain. Smelser's determinant of structural conduciveness was operationalized using Pinard's theory of one-party dominance. The determinant of structural strain was operationalized using James C. Davies' theory of revolution. Lastly, a variety of indicators were selected to determine if noteworthy social changes occurred within Alberta prior to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement in 1980. To determine if the possible existence of structural conduciveness, structural strain, and significant social changes were unique to Alberta, comparable data for Ontario and Saskatchewan were included.

Reasons were suggested in the various sections for the rise of a separatist movement in Alberta and not in Saskatchewan or Ontario. Smelser's concept of the value-added process will be used to develop this argument further as he argues that it is the combined effect of these deter-

minants which leads to an episode of collective behaviour.

The various analyses indicated that only Alberta's political party systems at both the federal and provincial levels were characterized by the condition of one-party dominance during the 1970's. Second, Alberta was strongly characterized by an increasingly prosperous economy during the same period. As a result, it is likely that Albertans' expectations were also high. Precipitating factors, as indicated earlier, likewise occurred in 1980. Lastly, Alberta was characterized by a wider range of social changes than elsewhere, especially in relation to labour force distribution and economic well-being.

Therefore, it is possible that all of these factors combined to create a unique pre-conducive condition for the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement during 1980. The existence of one-party dominance in Alberta's federal and provincial party systems meant that viable and effective alternatives to the dominant parties at both levels within the province were lacking for Albertans in order to express their interests and/or grievances. With the threat to the populace's high expectations and to the continual prosperity of Alberta's economy, a number of Albertans were possibly led to form or join a western separatist organization. The occurrence of significant social changes likely added to the state of uncertainty concerning the immediate

future of Alberta.

It is also necessary to explain the separatist movement's general confinement to Alberta. First, Saskatchewan's federal and provincial party systems were not characterized by a condition of one-party dominance. As a result, the people of Saskatchewan had alternative outlets at both levels in order to express their grievances and/or interests. Hence, Saskatchewan lacked one of the most important societal conditions which might lead to the formation of a social and/or political movement. Some interest in separatism may have been aroused since Saskatchewan's economic prosperity and high expectations were likewise threatened by the National Energy Program, but to a lesser extent due to the lesser prominence of oil and natural gas industries in that province. In addition, the social and economic changes within Saskatchewan were less pronounced.

In comparison, Ontario lacked many of the necessary societal conditions. Only Ontario's provincial party system was characterized by the condition of one-party dominance. Hence, Ontario's populace still had a viable alternative at the federal level in order to express their concerns and interests. Ontario's economy, unlike Alberta and Saskatchewan, tended to fluctuate. In fact, Ontario's economic conditions somewhat resembled Davies' J-curve pattern. But due to the fluctuations, it is unlikely that this condition

would contribute to an episode of collective behaviour. Furthermore, Ontario's populace was not characterized by such significant social and economic changes as compared to Alberta and/or Saskatchewan, and likely did not contain such a level of social instability.

In conclusion, the findings indicated that Smelser's determinants of structural conduciveness and structural strain were useful in the analysis of societal conditions related to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement. Pinard's method for operationalizing the determinant of structural conduciveness contributed to this analysis. However, the findings suggested that Davies' method of operationalizing the determinant of structural strain needed to be revised.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alberta Economic Accounts
1981 Alberta Economic Accounts 1980, Edmonton,
Alberta, Alberta Bureau of Statistics, October 1981.
- Alberta Economic Accounts
1982 Alberta Economic Accounts 1981, Edmonton,
Alberta, Alberta Bureau of Statistics, November 1982.
- Alberta Statistical Review
1981 Alberta Statistical Review Annual 1980, Ed-
monton, Alberta, Alberta Bureau of Statistics,
October 1981.
- Alberta Statistical Review
1982 Alberta Statistical Review Annual 1981, Ed-
monton, Alberta, Alberta Bureau of Statistics,
November 1982.
- Blais, Andre
1973 "Third Parties in Canadian Provincial Politics",
Canadian Journal of Political Science, Volume 6,
1973, pp. 422-438.
- Bogue, Donald J.
1959 "Internal Migration", Otis Dudley Duncan and
Philip M. Hauser, eds., The Study of Population
An Inventory and Appraisal, Chicago, The University
of Chicago Press, pp. 486-509.
- Bolce, Louis H., Halligan, Mark, and Miller, Abraham, H.
1977 "The J-Curve Theory and the Black Urban Riots:
An Empirical Test of Progressive Relative Depriva-
tion Theory", American Political Science Review,
Volume 71 PT. 3-4, September 1977, pp. 964-982.
- Crosby, Faye
1979 "Relative Deprivation Revisited: A Response to
Miller, Bolce, and Halligan", American Political
Science Review, Volume 73 PT. 1-2, March 1979,
pp. 103-112.
- Davies, James C.
1962 "Toward A Theory Of Revolution", American Socio-
logical Review, Volume 27, 1962, pp. 5-19.

Davies, James C.

1969 "The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion", Hugh D. Graham and Ted. R. Gurr, eds., The History of Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, pp. 690-730.

Dominion Bureau of Statistics

1962 "1961 Census of Canada Population Ethnic Groups Bulletin 1.2-5 (92-545)", Canada Census 1961 V. 1 Pt. 2 DBS NOS. 92-541 to 92-551 Population: General Characteristics, Ottawa, Ontario, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, November 1962.

Dominion Bureau of Statistics

1971 Estimated Population by Sex and Age Group for Canada and Provinces, June 1, 1970 (91-202), Ottawa, Ontario, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, January 1971.

Elton, David and Gibbins, Roger

1979 "Western Alienation and Political Culture", Orest M. Kruhlak, Richard Schultz and John C. Terry, eds., The Canadian Political Process 3rd Edition, Toronto, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, pp. 82-97.

Feierabend, Ivo K., Feierabend, Rosalind L., and Nesvold, Betty A.

1969 "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns", Hugh D. Graham and Ted R. Gurr, eds., The History of Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, pp. 632-689.

Gibbins, Roger

1980 Prairie Politics and Society: Regionalism in Decline, Toronto, Butterworth & Company (Canada) Limited.

Gurr, Ted Robert

1969 "A Comparative Study of Civil Strife", Hugh D. Graham and Ted R. Gurr, eds., The History of Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, pp. 572-632.

Gustavus, Susan O. and Nam, Charles B.

1976 Population The Dynamics of Demographic Change, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company.

- Hamilton, Richard and Pinard, Maurice
1976 "The Basis of Parti Quebecois Support in Recent Quebec Elections", Canadian Journal of Political Science, Volume 9, 1976, pp. 3-26.
- Hiller, Harry H.
1977 "Internal Problem Resolution and Third Party Emergence", Canadian Journal of Sociology, Volume 2, 1977, pp. 55-75.
- Loether, Herman J. and McTavish, Donald G.
1976 Descriptive and Inferential Statistics: An Introduction, Boston, Allyn and Bacon, Inc.
- Normandin, Pierre G. (ed.)
1968 The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, Ottawa, Ontario.
- Normandin, Pierre G. (ed.)
1969 The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, Ottawa, Ontario.
- Normandin, Pierre G. (ed.)
1970 The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, Ottawa, Ontario.
- Normandin, Pierre G. (ed.)
1971 The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, Ottawa, Ontario.
- Normandin, Pierre G. (ed.)
1972 The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, Ottawa, Ontario.
- Normandin, Pierre G. (ed.)
1973 The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, Ottawa, Ontario.
- Normandin, Pierre G. (ed.)
1974 The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, Ottawa, Ontario.
- Normandin, Pierre G. (ed.)
1975 The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, Ottawa, Ontario.
- Normandin, Pierre G. (ed.)
1976 The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, Ottawa, Ontario.

- Normandin, Pierre G. (ed.)
1977 The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, Ottawa,
Ontario.
- Normandin, Pierre G. (ed.)
1978 The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, Ottawa,
Ontario.
- Normandin, Pierre G. (ed.)
1979 The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, Ottawa,
Ontario.
- Normandin, Pierre G. (ed.)
1980 The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, Ottawa,
Ontario.
- Ontario Statistics
1982 Ontario Statistics 1982, Toronto, Ontario,
Ministry of Treasury and Economics, 1982.
- Owram, Doug
1981 "Reluctant Hinterland", Larry Pratt and Garth
Stevenson, eds., Western Separatism The Myths,
Realities & Dangers, Edmonton, Alberta, Hurtig
Publishers, pp. 45-64.
- Palmer, Howard and Palmer, Tamara
1976 "The 1971 Election and the Fall of Social
Credit in Alberta", Prairie Forum, Volume 1, Number
2, November 1976, pp. 123-134.
- Pinard, Maurice
1975 The Rise of a Third Party A Study in Crisis
Politics Enlarged Edition, Montreal, McGill-
Queen's University Press.
- Pratt, Larry and Richards, John
1978 "Oil and Social Class in Alberta: The Bour-
geoisie Take Power", The Canadian Forum, Volume 58,
Number 685, October-November 1978, pp. 6-15.
- Rinehart, James W.
1975 The Tyranny of Work, Don Mills, Ontario,
Academic Press Canada.
- Saskatchewan Economic Review
1980 Saskatchewan Economic Review 1980, Regina,
Saskatchewan, Saskatchewan Bureau of Statistics,
November 1980.

Saskatchewan Economic Review

1981 Saskatchewan Economic Review 1981, Regina, Saskatchewan, Saskatchewan Bureau of Statistics, December 1981.

Saskatchewan Economic Review

1982 Saskatchewan Economic Review 1982, Regina, Saskatchewan, Saskatchewan Bureau of Statistics, November 1982.

Statistics Canada

1972 Advance Statistics of Education 1972-73 (81-220), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, August 1972.

Statistics Canada

1973a Advance Statistics of Education 1973-74 (81-220), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, August 1973.

Statistics Canada

1973b "Advance Bulletin 1971 Census of Canada Population by Religious Denomination (92-763)", Census of Canada 1971 Advances Series: Population 92-752 to 92-764, Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, September 1973.

Statistics Canada

1973c "Population Age Groups (92-715)", Census of Canada 1971 Vol. 1 - Pt. 2 Population 92-712 to 92-721, Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, April 1973.

Statistics Canada

1973d "1971 Census of Canada Population Ethnic Groups (92-723)", Census of Canada 1971 Vol. 1 Part: 3 Population 92-722 to 92-728, Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, October 1973.

Statistics Canada

1973e Estimated Population by Sex and Age Group, for Canada and Provinces, June 1, 1972 (91-202), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, March 1973.

Statistics Canada

1973f "Family Incomes (Census Families) 1971 (13-208)", Family Incomes 1971-79 13-208, Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, July 1973.

Statistics Canada

1973g Fall Enrolment in Universities and Colleges
1971-72 (81-204), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics
Canada, September 1973.

Statistics Canada

1973h Income Distributions by Size in Canada 1971
(13-207), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, May
1973.

Statistics Canada

1974a Advance Statistics of Education 1974-75 (81-
220), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, August
1974.

Statistics Canada

1974b Estimated Population by Sex and Age Group,
For Canada and Provinces, June 1, 1973 (91-202),
Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, March 1974.

Statistics Canada

1975a Advance Statistics of Education 1975-76 (81-
220), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, August
1975.

Statistics Canada

1975b "Family Incomes (Census Families) 1973 (13-
208)", Family Incomes 1971-79 13-208, Ottawa,
Ontario, Statistics Canada, August 1975.

Statistics Canada

1975c Population of Canada and the Provinces by Sex
and Groups, Estimated as of June 1, 1974 (91-202),
Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, April 1975.

Statistics Canada

1975d National Income and Expenditure Accounts
Volume 3 A Guide to the National Income and Expendi-
ture Accounts Definitions-Concepts-Sources-Methods
(13-549E Occasional), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics
Canada, Gross National Product Division, September
1975.

Statistics Canada

1975e Income Distribution by Size in Canada 1973
(13-207), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, July
1975.

Statistics Canada

1976a Advance Statistics of Education 1976-77 (81-
220), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, August
1976.

Statistics Canada

1976b Population of Canada and the Provinces by Sex and Age Groups, Estimated as of June 1, 1975 (91-202), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, May 1976.

Statistics Canada

1976c Fall Enrolment in Universities 1972-73 and 1973-74 (81-204), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, October 1976.

Statistics Canada

1977a Advance Statistics of Education 1977-78 (81-220), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, August 1977.

Statistics Canada

1977b "Family Incomes (Census Families) 1975 (13-208)", Family Incomes 1971-79 13-208, Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, July 1977.

Statistics Canada

1977c International and Interprovincial Migration in Canada 1961-1962 to 1975-1976 (91-208), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, July 1977.

Statistics Canada

1977d Fall Enrolment in Universities 1974-75 (81-204), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, February 1977.

Statistics Canada

1977e Fall Enrolment in Universities 1975-76 (81-204), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, August 1977.

Statistics Canada

1977f Income Distributions by Size in Canada 1975 (13-207), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, July 1977.

Statistics Canada

1978a Advance Statistics of Education 1978-79 (81-220), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, August 1978.

Statistics Canada

1978b "1976 Census of Canada Families. Families by Number of Children", Census of Canada 1976 Volume 4 Families 93-820 to 93-825, Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, June 1978.

Statistics Canada

1978c "1971 Census of Canada Occupations Historical For Canada and Provinces (94-716) Vol: III - Part: 2", Census of Canada 1971 Vol. 3 Part 2 Occupations 94-715 to 94-727, Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, June 1978.

Statistics Canada

1978d "1976 Census of Canada Population: Geographic Distributions Urban and Rural Distribution (92-807)", Census of Canada 1976 Volume 1 Population: Geographic Distributions, 1976, Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, February 1978.

Statistics Canada

1978e Estimates of Population by Sex and Age for Canada and the Provinces, June 1, 1977 (91-202), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, November 1978.

Statistics Canada

1978f International and Interprovincial Migration in Canada 1976 and 1977 (91-208), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, August 1978.

Statistics Canada

1978g Special Bulletin 1971 Census of Canada Economic Characteristics Industry Trends, 1951-1971 (94-793 (SE-2)), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, May 1978.

Statistics Canada

1978h Universities: Enrolment and Degrees 1976 (81-204), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, July 1978.

Statistics Canada

1979a Advance Statistics of Education 1979-80 (81-220), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, August 1979.

Statistics Canada

1979b Revised Annual Estimates of Population by Marital Status, Age and Sex for Canada and the Provinces 1971-1976 (91-519), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, July 1979.

Statistics Canada

1979c Vital Statistics Volume II Marriages and Divorces 1977 (84-205), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, November 1979.

Statistics Canada

1979d Universities: Enrolment and Degrees 1977 (81-204), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, March 1979.

Statistics Canada

1979e Income Distributions by Size in Canada 1977 (13-207), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, August 1979.

Statistics Canada

1979f Labour Force Annual Averages 1975-1978 (71-529 Occasional), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, February 1979.

Statistics Canada

1980a Advance Statistics of Education 1980-81 (81-220), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, August 1980.

Statistics Canada

1980b Estimates of Population by Marital Status, Age and Sex, Canada and Provinces June 1, 1977 and 1978 (91-203), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, April 1980.

Statistics Canada

1980c Estimates of Population by Sex and Age for Canada and the Provinces, June 1, 1978 (91-202), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, May 1980.

Statistics Canada

1980d Estimates of Population by Sex and Age for Canada and the Provinces, June 1, 1979 (91-202), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, September 1980.

Statistics Canada

1980e Estimates of Population for Canada and the Provinces, June 1, 1980 (91-201), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, November 1980.

Statistics Canada

1980f "Family Incomes (Census Families) 1977 (13-208)", Family Incomes 1971-79 13-208, Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, January 1980.

Statistics Canada

1980g International and Interprovincial Migration in Canada 1978-79 (91-208), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, May 1980.

Statistics Canada

1980h Vital Statistics Volume II Marriages and Divorces 1978 (84-205), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, April 1980.

Statistics Canada

1980i Universities: Enrolment and Degrees 1978 (81-204), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, February 1980.

Statistics Canada

1980j The Labour Force Feature: 1979 Annual Averages December 1979 (71-001 Monthly), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, January 1980.

Statistics Canada

1981a Advance Statistics of Education (81-220), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, August 1981.

Statistics Canada

1981b Estimates of Population by Marital Status, Age and Sex, Canada and Provinces 1978 Final 1979 Preliminary (91-203), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, November 1981.

Statistics Canada

1981c Family Incomes (Census Families) 1979 (13-208), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, August 1981.

Statistics Canada

1981d Vital Statistics Volume II Marriages and Divorces 1979 (84-205), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, June 1981.

Statistics Canada

1981e Universities: Enrolment and Degrees 1979 (81-204), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, July 1981.

Statistics Canada

1981f Income Distribution by Size in Canada 1979 (13-207), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, May 1981.

Statistics Canada

1981g The Labour Force Feature: 1980 Annual Averages December 1980 (71-001 Monthly), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, January 1981.

Statistics Canada

1982a Estimates of Families For Canada and the Provinces 1979 Final 1980 Preliminary (91-204), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, April 1982.

Statistics Canada

1982b Estimates of Population by Marital Status, Age and Sex, Canada and Provinces 1979 Final 1980 Preliminary (91-203), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, March 1982.

Statistics Canada

1982c Estimates of Population by Sex and Age for Canada and the Provinces, June 1, 1979 Final 1980 Preliminary (91-202), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, February 1982.

Statistics Canada

1982d Historical Labour Force Statistics - Actual Data, Seasonal Factors, Seasonally Adjusted Data (71-201), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, January 1982.

Statistics Canada

1982e International and Interprovincial Migration in Canada 1979-80 (91-208), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, January 1982.

Statistics Canada

1982f Vital Statistics Volume II Marriages and Divorces 1980 (84-205), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, March 1982.

Statistics Canada

1982g Consumer Prices and Price Indexes July-September 1982 (62-010 Quarterly), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, November 1982.

Statistics Canada

1982h Estimates of Population for Canada and the Provinces, June 1, 1982 (91-201), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, November 1982.

Thomas, Brinley

1959 "International Migration", Otis Dudley Duncan and Philip M. Hauser, eds., The Study of Population An Inventory and Appraisal, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, pp. 510-543.

CHAPTER FIVE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIETAL CONDITIONS USING
THE QUALITY OF LIFE STUDY (MAY-AUGUST 1979)*

This chapter provides an additional analysis of underlying political, economic, and social conditions that may be related to the sudden re-emergence of the Albertan western separatist movement in 1980. Data for Ontario and Saskatchewan will again be included to determine if any of the relationships examined are unique to Alberta. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is again twofold: (1) to determine if the possible existence of certain societal conditions in Alberta may have contributed to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement in 1980, and (2) to determine if certain societal conditions are unique to Alberta and thereby may partially explain the movement's relative confinement to that province.

There are two major distinctions between the previous and present chapters. The present chapter focuses only upon societal conditions prior to the latest and most

* The data used in this chapter are from the Social Change in Canada Project directed by Tom Atkinson, Bernard Blishen, Michael Ornstein, and H. Michael Stevenson of York University, Toronto, Canada. The data were made available by the Institute for Behavioural Research of York University. Neither the Principal Investigators nor the disseminating archive are responsible for the interpretations presented here.

serious phase of the Albertan western separatist movement. Second, the data for this chapter are obtained from a nationwide, attitude survey rather than from Statistics Canada. As a result, an examination of the relationships between societal conditions and attitudes is possible.

Smelser's concepts of structural conduciveness and structural strain will again be used. Likewise, Pinard's theory of one-party dominance will be employed to operationalize the determinant of structural conduciveness while Davies' theory of revolution will be used to operationalize the determinant of structural strain. An analysis of social changes will also be included.

The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. The first of these will discuss some methodological issues involved in this analysis. This will be followed with two sections dealing with the determinants of structural conduciveness and structural strain. The final section will examine whether social changes may be associated with outlooks concerning separatism.

Methodology

The data to be used here are from the Social Change in Canada Project (Atkinson, Blishen, Ornstein, and Stevenson; 1979). This project is commonly referred to as the Quality of Life Study (1979), and will be so identified here. This study was based on a nationwide probability

sample of 3,475 persons 18 years of age and older. The samples for Alberta, Ontario, and Saskatchewan were 181, 1,232 and 82 respondents respectfully.

There are two major problems in using data from the Quality of Life Study in this analysis. The first difficulty concerns the period in which the survey was administered in relation to the latest phase of the Albertan western separatist movement. The Quality of Life survey was conducted from April to July 1979, but the Albertan western separatist movement virtually disappeared after the federal general election on May 22, 1979. The latest phase of the Albertan western separatist movement did not arise until the defeat of the federal Progressive Conservative government and the introduction of the National Energy Program in 1980. The responses therefore may not reflect the attitudes of Canadians immediately prior to the Albertan western separatist movement's resurgence. Still, the Quality of Life Study provides the only data that are available on western attitudes within a year of the latest phase of the given movement.

The second problem concerns the dependent variable used here. The study did not ask the respondents any questions concerning western separatism. The only question that approximately measures the extent of separatist sentiment is stated accordingly,

QJ4 - What is your opinion about Quebec's separating from Canada and becoming independent? Are you ... (1) in favour of independence if an economic co-operation agreement can be worked out with the rest of Canada, (2) in favour of independence even if no agreement is possible, or (3) in favour of independence but against working out any economic co-operation agreement, or (4) are you opposed to independence?, (5) qualified support for independence, (6) qualified opposition to independence, (7) Depends, and (8) Don't know. (Atkinson, Blishen, Ornstein, and Stevenson; 1979)

One may object to the use of the above-mentioned question as the dependent variable for this chapter since it refers to Quebec separatism.

There are two major reasons which help to justify the use of this question as the dependent variable. First, the question on Quebec separatism may also indicate attitudes toward separatist sentiment in other provinces. A citizen is fundamentally limited to choosing the continuation of the Canadian Confederation or the separation of a province. Citizens that support the idea of Quebec separatism may also support the idea of western separatism if it is perceived as beneficial.

Second, the use of the question in this manner is given some validity in that the percentage of Albertans supporting the separatist option within the Qualify of Life Study (1979) is approximately equal to that found in a poll conducted by the Calgary Herald and the Edmonton Journal immediately after the announcement of the National Energy Program. The poll indicated that twenty-three per cent of

Albertans supported western separatism at that time (Sallot, 1980: 1 & 3). The percentage of Albertans supporting or favouring Quebec separatism in the Quality of Life Study was approximately twenty-two per cent (See Table 5: 1).

Table 5: 1 Opinion - Quebec Separating from Canada

<u>Support</u>		<u>Opposition</u>	
Favour 1	15	Opposed	111
Favour 2	6	Qualified Oppose	11
Favour 3	10		
Qualified Support	6	Total	122 (73%)
	<hr/>		
Sub-total	37 (22%)		
Depends	8		
	<hr/>		
Total	45 (27%)	Grand Total	167 (100%)

(Atkinson, Blishen, Ornstein, and Stevenson; 1979)

As a result of this similarity, the question may be considered as a possible measure of general separatist sentiment within Alberta during the movement's period of greatest popularity.

In analysing the responses to the question, the category 'Depends' will be recorded as an opinion favouring separatism since the response indicates that the respondents were at least willing to consider such an option. This combination of all Albertan respondents willing to support separatism at any level then totals 27 percent which still approximates the percentage obtained in the Calgary Herald and Edmonton Journal opinion poll during the height of separatist activity in Alberta. Thus, the dependent variable is recoded into two categories;

(1) a category that indicates separatist support by the responses, (i) Favour 1, (ii) Favour 2, (iii) Favour 3, (v) Qualified Support, and (vii) Depends and (2) a category that indicates opposition to separatism by the responses, (iv) Opposed and (vi) Qualified Opposition.

It is also necessary to determine if the study's samples are representative of the three provinces' populations. Comparisons can be made of Statistics Canada's information and the study's data with respect to sex and age. According to these external validity checks, the Quality of Life Study data are only somewhat representative of Alberta's, Saskatchewan's, and Ontario's populations. A comparison of the populations' distributions by sex indicates that a greater percentage of females were interviewed than males (Appendix 1). This bias will not present a serious problem since it is possible to weight the data in relation to sex (See Atkinson et. al., 1979: 5). A comparison of age distributions indicates that the samples are representative of their populations (Appendix 2). Moreover, the samples are representative of their provinces in terms of age with a control for sex (Appendix 2). Saskatchewan is the only province with a minimal bias; a slight over-representation of people from 18 to 64 years of age.

The majority of the selected variables were initially recoded into two categories due to Saskatchewan's small sample size. Otherwise, the crosstabulation, especially

for Saskatchewan, would not pass the chi square requirement test; an expected cell frequency more than five. This collapsing also permitted easier comprehension of the data.

The dependent variable, the populace's opinions regarding Quebec separatism, was originally crosstabulated with one-hundred and eight of the 641 variables from the given data set (Appendix 3). The independent variables were selected on the basis that they represented possible measures of structural conduciveness, structural strain, and social changes as well as to duplicate measures from the previous chapter's analysis. Crosstabulations were conducted in order to determine if significant relationships existed between Albertan views concerning separatism and these variables. Chi square was used to ascertain whether significant statistical relationships existed. However, as chi square merely indicated if the variables were associated, Cramer's V was used to measure the strength of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. For dichotomized tables, the phi statistic was used since it is calculated "for a two by two table" (See Bent et. al., 1975: 224).

Both Cramer's V and Phi do not reveal the manner in which the variables are associated. Although these statistics do not indicate causal relationships, they help in establishing if significant associations exist between the dependent and the independent variables. Hence, an examina-

tion of these measures will at least indicate the possible existence of a relationship between the chosen determinants and general separatist sentiment.

I - An Examination of Smelser's Determinant of Structural Conduciveness

Structural conduciveness will again be operationalized as a political variable. Voting intentions and political party preferences at the federal and provincial levels will be examined to ascertain if structural conduciveness possibly existed in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Ontario during 1979. The condition of one-party dominance will be determined by the following, key proposition, "a third of the votes (33 per cent) seems to be the empirical cutting point below which a situation of one-party dominance is created" (Pinard, 1975: 37).

The data in Table 5:2 reveal that Alberta's federal party system was characterized by the condition of one-party dominance prior to the re-emergence of the Albertan western separatist movement in 1980. Alberta's main alternative party at the federal level, the Liberals, would have obtained approximately 23.6 per cent of the popular vote if an election was held. In comparison, the condition of one-party dominance at the federal level did not prevail within Ontario and Saskatchewan in 1979.

Another indicator of the main alternative party's strength is the electorate's political perception of itself. If a voter considers himself/herself a Liberal, he/she may have a strong tendency to vote for the Liberal party. On this criteria as well, it appears that a condition of one-party dominance characterized Alberta's federal party system during 1979 since only 24.2 per cent of the Albertan respondents considered themselves Liberals, the main alternative party to the dominance of the Progressive Conservatives as the province's federal representatives. Once again there was no evidence of one-party dominance at the federal level in Saskatchewan, but it apparently prevailed at the federal level within Ontario.

Table 5:4 indicates that the condition of one-party dominance at the provincial level also existed in Alberta during 1979. For instance, Alberta's main opposition party, Social Credit, would have obtained roughly 13.9 per cent of the popular vote if an election was held. In contrast, Ontario and Saskatchewan apparently lacked a condition of one-party dominance at the provincial level in 1979 according to their distributions of voting intentions.

Table 5:5 reveals similar results in relation to the possible existence of one-party dominance at the provincial level for the three given provinces. For instance, only 11.9 per cent of the Albertan respondents thought of themselves as being Social Credit. In comparison, both

Table 5:2 Voting Intentions if a Federal Election Held
Today (1)(2)

Party	Province		
	Alberta	Ontario	Saskatchewan
Liberal	23.6%	39.5%	35.4%
P.C.	64.9%	38.4%	41.5%
N.D.P.	6.8%	19.8%	23.1%
Social Credit	3.4%	.1%	-----
Other	1.4%	2.2%	-----
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	100.1% (148)	100.0% (992)	100.0% (65)
Missing Cases(3)	33	240	17

(1) If a federal election were held today, which party's candidate do you think you would favour?

(2) Adjusted Frequency (Percentage)

(3) Undecided, Refused, No Answer

Table 5:3 Federal Political Party Preference in 1979 (1)(2)

Party	Province		
	Alberta	Ontario	Saskatchewan
Liberal	24.2%	41.6%	31.9%
P.C.	56.1%	28.2%	33.3%
N.D.P.	6.4%	16.4%	25.0%
Social Credit	5.7%	.2%	2.8%
Independent, None	7.0%	12.5%	5.6%
Other	.6%	1.1%	1.4%
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	100.0% (157)	100.0% (1,067)	100.0% (72)
Missing Cases(3)	24	165	10

(1) Thinking of federal politics, do you usually think of yourself as a Liberal, Conservative, N.D.P., Social Credit, or what?

(2) Adjusted Frequency (Percentage).

(3) Don't Know, No Answer

Ontario and Saskatchewan again appeared to lack the condition of one-party dominance at the provincial level since over thirty-three per cent of the provinces' respondents considered themselves as members of their main opposition parties. Overall, Alberta's political party systems were unique in that a condition of one-party dominance appeared to exist at both the federal and provincial levels during 1979.

At this point, it is interesting to determine if associations possibly existed between these indicators of one-party dominance at the federal and provincial levels and the Albertan populace's attitudes concerning separatism. Pinard states, "whether there is only one opposition party, which is too weak, or whether there are more than one, but all of them weak, a system of one-party dominance is likely to be conducive to new third parties" (1975: 37). A crosstabulation was performed to assess the relationship between Albertans' provincial party preferences and their opinions regarding separatism in that year.

This crosstabulation did not pass the chi square requirement test; no cell with an expected frequency less than five. The 'Eta' statistic was substituted since it is a measure of association that attempts to determine the strength of a relationship from 0.0 to 1.0. Table 5:6 indicates that a strong relationship existed between the Albertan populace's provincial political party preferences

Table 5:4 Voting Intentions if a Provincial Election Held Today (1)(2)

Party	Province		
	Alberta	Ontario	Saskatchewan
Liberal	11.4%	35.5%	23.5%
P.C.	63.9%	41.7%	39.7%
N.D.P.	9.5%	21.2%	35.3%
Social Credit	13.9%	.3%	1.5%
Other	1.3%	1.2%	-----
Total	100.0% (158)	99.9% (951)	100.0% (68)
Missing Cases(3)	23	281	14

(1) If a provincial election were held today, which party's candidate do you think you would favour?

(2) Adjusted Frequency (Percentage)

(3) Undecided, Refused, No Answer

Table 5:5 Provincial Political Party Preference in 1979 (1)(2)

Party	Province		
	Alberta	Ontario	Saskatchewan
Liberal	10.6%	33.7%	24.7%
P.C.	65.0%	37.3%	35.6%
N.D.P.	7.5%	17.9%	34.2%
Social Credit	11.9%	.4%	1.4%
P.Q.	-----	.2%	-----
Independent, None	5.0%	9.8%	4.1%
Other	-----	-----	-----
Total	100.0% (160)	100.0% (1,047)	100.0% (73)
Missing Cases(3)	21	185	9

(1) Thinking of provincial politics, do you usually think of yourself as a Liberal, Conservative, N.D.P., Social Credit, P.Q. (in Quebec Only) or what?

(2) Adjusted Frequency (Percentage)

(3) Don't Know, No Answer

and their opinions regarding separatism. However, this relationship likewise existed in both Saskatchewan and Ontario.

The relationship between a number of other political attitudes and separatist support was also examined. These indicated how a populace perceived its federal and provincial governments and it was expected that those with negative/dissatisfied attitudes were more likely to support separatism. Table 5:7 indicates that a relationship existed between the Albertan populace's satisfaction with the federal government's actions and programs and their opinions concerning separatism. A greater percentage of people that were neutral or dissatisfied with the federal government's performance supported separatism (28.8 per cent) than those who were satisfied with the federal government (14.9 per cent). Moreover, a greater percentage of satisfied people opposed separatism (85.1 per cent) while only 71.2 per cent of neutral or dissatisfied people rejected the separatist option. This relationship did not exist for Saskatchewan, but did exist for Ontario.

A relationship also existed between Albertans' attitudes toward the perceived power of their provincial government and their opinions regarding separatism (See Table 5:8). The respondents who felt their provincial government had 'too little power' were more likely to support separatism (60.3 per cent) while those that felt their provincial

Table 5:6 Opinion - 'Quebec' Separating from Canada by Provincial Party Preference

Alberta

Alberta	Provincial Party Preference				
	Liberal	P.C.	N.D.P.	Other	
Quebec Separating from Canada	Support	30.8%	24.9%	42.8%	8.0% (45)
	Oppose	69.2%	75.1%	57.2%	92.0% (145)
	Total	100.0% (28)	100.0% (112)	100.0% (12)	100.0% (37) (189)

Raw Chi Square = 8.49305 with 3 Degrees of Freedom

Significance = .04 Cramer's V = .21

Missing Observations = 36 Eta = .21 with QJ4 Dependent

Saskatchewan

Saskatchewan	Provincial Party Preference					
	Liberal	P.C.	N.D.P.	Other		
Quebec	Support	5.1%	23.7%	35.8%	0%	(19)
Separating						
from						
Canada	Oppose	94.9%	76.3%	64.2%	100.0%	(62)
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
		(17)	(28)	(31)	(5)	(81)

Raw Chi Square = 7.52629 with 3 Degrees of Freedom

Significance = .06 Cramer's V = .31

Missing Observations = 10 Eta = .31 with QJ4 Dependent

Ontario

Ontario		Provincial Party Preference				
		Liberal	P.C.	N.D.P.	Other	
Quebec Separating from Canada	Support	16.0%	19.5%	31.2%	28.1%	(188)
	Oppose	84.0%	80.5%	68.8%	71.9%	(699)
	Total	100.0% (301)	100.0% (344)	100.0% (146)	100.0% (95)	(887)

Raw Chi Square = 16.96975 with 3 Degrees of Freedom

Significance = .00 Cramer's V = .14

Missing Observations = 183

Table 5:7 Opinion - 'Quebec' Separating from Canada by Satisfaction with Federal Government (1)

Alberta

Satisfaction with Federal Government		
	Neutral/Dissatisfied	Satisfied
Quebec Separating from Canada	Support 28.8%	14.9% (50)
	Oppose 71.2%	85.1% (159)
Total		100.0% (139) 100.0% (70) (209)

Corrected Chi Square = 4.23617 with 1 Degree of Freedom
 Significance = .04 Phi = .15
 Missing Observations = 16

Saskatchewan

Satisfaction with Federal Government		
	Neutral/Dissatisfied	Satisfied
Quebec Separating from Canada	Support 16.4%	29.2% (19)
	Oppose 83.6%	70.8% (70)
Total		100.0% (57) 100.0% (32) (89)

Corrected Chi Square = 1.30798 with 1 Degree of Freedom
 Significance = .25 Phi = .15
 Missing Observations = 2

Ontario

Satisfaction with Federal Government		
	Neutral/Dissatisfied	Satisfied
Quebec Separating from Canada	Support 23.9%	15.9% (206)
	Oppose 76.1%	84.1% (777)
Total		100.0% (619) 100.0% (364) (983)

Corrected Chi Square = 8.38786 with 1 Degree of Freedom
 Significance = .00 Phi = .09
 Missing Observations = 87

(1) How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the federal government in Ottawa?

government had 'too much power' were least likely to support such an option (16.3 per cent). Conversely, respondents who felt their provincial government had 'too much power' were more likely to oppose separatism (83.7 per cent) while those that felt their provincial government had 'too little power' were least likely to oppose it (39.7 per cent).

This relationship was weak for Saskatchewan. However, a very different pattern existed in Ontario than either Alberta or Saskatchewan. The portions of the populace with an extreme attitude regarding the perceived power of the provincial government were more likely to support a separatist option. Thus, distinct differences existed among the three provinces.

Table 5:9 indicates that a strong relationship existed between Albertans' attitudes concerning the division of powers of the federal and provincial governments and their opinions with respect to separatism. Albertans who believed that the provincial government should receive more power were more likely to support separatism (27.6 per cent). Albertans who believed that the division of power between the federal and provincial governments should stay the same supported separatism to a similar extent (27.0 per cent). But, Albertans that felt the federal government should acquire more power gave no support to separatism (0 per cent). The data for the two comparison provinces reveal that this relationship was unique to Alberta.

Table 5:8 Opinion - 'Quebec' Separating from Canada by
Perceived Power-Provincial Government (1)

Alberta

Provincial Government's Perceived Power

	Too Much	Right On	Too Little	
Support	16.3%	23.4%	60.3%	(50)
Oppose	83.7%	76.6%	39.7%	(144)
Total	100.0% (59)	100.0% (111)	100.0% (25)	(195)

Raw Chi Square = 18.40502 with 2 Degrees of Freedom
Significance = .00 Cramer's V = .31
Missing Observations = 31

Saskatchewan

Provincial Government's Perceived Power

	Too Much	Right On	Too Little	
Support	22.6%	17.7%	29.8%	(19)
Oppose	77.4%	82.3%	70.2%	(68)
Total	100.0% (25)	100.0% (45)	100.0% (16)	(87)

Raw Chi Square = 1.08336 with 2 Degrees of Freedom
Significance = .58 Cramer's V = .11
Missing Observations = 4 Eta = .11 with QJ4 Dependent

Ontario

Provincial Government's Perceived Power

	Too Much	Right On	Too Little	
Support	26.1%	17.5%	29.2%	(197)
Oppose	73.9%	82.5%	70.8%	(744)
Total	100.0% (263)	100.0% (592)	100.0% (85)	(941)

Raw Chi Square = 11.83479 with 2 Degrees of Freedom
Significance = .00 Cramer's V = .11
Missing Observations = 129

(1) How much power does the government of this province have?

Table 5:9 Opinion - 'Quebec' Separating From Canada by
Federal or Provincial Power

Alberta

		Future Division of Federal/Provincial Power		
		Provincial More	Federal More	Stay Same
Quebec Separating from Canada	Support	27.6%	0%	27.0% (45)
	Oppose	72.4%	100.0%	73.0% (144)
	Total	100.0% (81)	100.0% (24)	100.0% (84) (189)

Raw Chi Square = 8.63483 with 2 Degrees of Freedom
Significance = .01 Cramer's V = .21
Missing Observations = 36

Saskatchewan

		Future Division of Federal/Provincial Power		
		Provincial More	Federal More	Stay Same
Quebec Separating from Canada	Support	27.3%	21.7%	18.5% (19)
	Oppose	72.7%	78.3%	81.5% (65)
	Total	100.0% (32)	100.0% (9)	100.0% (44) (84)

Raw Chi Square = .82118 with 2 Degrees of Freedom
Significance = .66 Cramer's V = .10
Missing Observations = 7 Eta = .10 with QJ4 Dependent

Ontario

		Future Division of Federal/Provincial Power		
		Provincial More	Federal More	Stay Same
Quebec Separating from Canada	Support	26.9%	18.3%	21.1% (193)
	Oppose	73.1%	81.7%	78.9% (685)
	Total	100.0% (277)	100.0% (196)	100.0% (455) (878)

Raw Chi Square = 4.96651 with 2 Degrees of Freedom
Significance = .08 Cramer's V = .08
Missing Observations = 192

- (1) In the future should ... (a) the provincial governments have more power ... (b) the federal government have more power, or ... (c) should things stay as they are?

In summary, a number of findings tend to support the view that separatist sentiment is related to political structural conduciveness. The possible relationship between provincial party preferences and opinions regarding separatism may partially explain the Albertan western separatist movement's sudden re-emergence during 1980 and its relative confinement to that province.

A number of political attitudes were also unique to Alberta. Those with opinions of neutrality or dissatisfaction with the federal government's performance, perception of the provincial government's power as being too little, or that the provincial government should acquire more power, were most likely to support a separatist option. Evidently, the possible relationships between Albertans' opinions regarding satisfaction with the federal government's performance, the perceived power of the provincial government, and the division of powers of the two levels of government may have thereby been contributing factors in relation to the rise of the latest phase of the Albertan western separatist movement. Overall, the absence of most of these relationships in Saskatchewan may help in explaining the movement's lack of development and growth in that province.

II - An Examination of Smelser's Determinant of Structural Strain

In this section, Smelser's determinant of structural strain will be used to analyse societal conditions related to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement in 1980. As indicated in previous chapters, Smelser draws a distinction between real and anticipated structural strains. Both types of strain are said to contribute to an episode of collective behaviour. Davies' theory of revolution, as discussed in chapter two, has been selected for this study since it operationalizes the two types of structural strain in relation to a revolution or rebellion.

Chapter four already presented an analysis of the possible existence of real structural strain by examining economic conditions within the three given provinces during the 1970's. That analysis was intended to determine if a J-curve pattern existed prior to the re-emergence of the Albertan western separatist movement in 1980. The current analysis will determine if anticipated structural strain existed by examining the respondents' answers to questions on their expectations and aspirations. Although a J-curve pattern did not exist with regard to actual conditions, it is important to determine if the Albertan populace held rising expectations since the revised theory of rebellion perceived 'rising expectations' as a necessary ingredient in explaining the development of a 'revolutionary state of

mind'.

It will first be determined if the Albertan populace maintained rising expectations. If so, the analysis will then be continued to determine if indicators of these expectations are possibly related to Albertans' opinions regarding separatism. Moreover, comparisons will again be included to ascertain if any or all of the above-mentioned relationships are unique to Alberta.

Table 5:10 provides data on Albertans' expectations about their lives in the following two years. An overwhelming majority (98.3 per cent) expected their lives to improve. Approximately one per cent (1.1 per cent) felt that their lives would remain the same while only a small minority of Albertans (0.6 per cent) felt that their lives would become worse. The findings for Ontario and Saskatchewan were very similar since an immense majority within each province thought that their lives would become better.

Table 5:11 specifically concerns the respondents' perceptions of their ability to purchase merchandise in the future. This variable is a good indicator of expectations of personal economic well-being. Alberta apparently contained the highest percentage of people (28.9 per cent) expecting to purchase more goods in the upcoming year. In addition, 37.8 per cent of the Albertan populace expected to buy the same amount of commodities while only 13.3 per cent of the populace expected to purchase fewer goods. The

Table 5:10 Ladder - Life Expectation 2 Years from Now (1)

Opinion	Alberta	Ontario	Saskatchewan
Worst Imagine (0 to 4)	0.6%	2.7%	1.2%
The Same (5)	1.1%	3.0%	3.7%
Best Imagine (6 to 10)	<u>98.3%</u>	<u>94.3%</u>	<u>95.1%</u>
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Cases	(180)	(1,199)	(82)
Missing Cases	(1)	(33)	(0)

(1) What number would you give the life you expect to have in two years?

Table 5:11 Able to Buy More Next Year Than Last (1)

Opinion	Alberta	Ontario	Saskatchewan
More	28.9%	19.8%	12.3%
Less	13.3%	16.5%	11.1%
Same	<u>57.8%</u>	<u>63.8%</u>	<u>76.5%</u>
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Cases	(180)	(1,215)	(81)
Missing Cases	(1)	(17)	(1)

(1) Do you think that you and your family will be able to buy more of the things you want during the next year than last year, or about the same as last year?
More/Less/Same

majority of Ontario's and Saskatchewan's populaces likewise expected to buy at least the same amount of merchandise in the following year.

These findings indicate that expectations were high or rising in the three provinces, especially in Alberta. Hence, the second major component of the revised theory, the condition of rising expectations, existed prior to the Albertan western separatist movement's sudden re-emergence during 1980.

In conjunction with the previous findings on real structural strain, a greater percentage of those with rising expectations in Alberta are expected to support separatism since it is their abilities to continually attain these expectations that are supposedly jeopardized. Crosstabulations between the two, above-mentioned indicators and Albertans' opinions regarding separatism indicated that their relationships were insignificant ($\text{Eta} = .06$; Significance = 1.00). Despite this, additional indicators regarding high or rising expectations revealed dissimilar results.

Before proceeding, Feilerabend, Feilerabend, and Nesvold noted, "levels of social expectation depend very much on past performance of the social system. Men who experience a constant history of either frustration or satisfaction will develop expectations consistent with their experience" (1969: 640). The following indicators were

selected in that they indicated whether the populace's expectations were high or rising in the past, present, and immediate future. For instance, the comparison of the respondent's province to others indicated his/her present expectations in relation to the place that he/she lived. The indicator concerning the direction of life change potentially indicated the respondent's expectations for the future in that future expectations depend on "past performance". Lastly, the respondent's opinion regarding 'No matter how hopeless things seem, in the long run everything will work out right' indicated the respondent's expectations concerning the future. Together all three indicators determined whether the majority of the given populaces' expectations were high or rising in the past, present and future in accordance with the revized theory of rebellion. The aforementioned relationship between these variables and the respondents' attitudes toward separatism was expected to occur.

Table 5:12 shows that a possible relationship existed between the Albertan populace's perception of their province and their attitudes regarding separatism. Approximately 27.2 per cent of Albertans who felt their province was better than 'any' or 'most' other provinces were likely to support separatism. Only 8.3 per cent of Albertans that felt Alberta was 'the same' or 'not as good' as other provinces were likely to entertain separatist views.

In comparison, a relationship did not exist between the Saskatchewan populace's perception of their province and their opinions concerning separatism. This relationship, on the other hand, existed within Ontario. But, distinct differences did exist between Alberta and Ontario since Albertan citizens who held a high perception of their province were more likely to support separatism while the people of Ontario with a high perception of their province were less likely to favour such an option.

Table 5:13 indicates that a relationship existed between the Albertan populace's perception of their lives in the past two years and their views regarding separatism. Albertans that felt their lives 'became better' (32.3 per cent) were more likely to support separatism while Albertans that felt their lives 'stayed the same' or 'became worse' (12.3 per cent) were least likely to favour it. Saskatchewan and Ontario did not display this relationship.

Table 5:14 indicates that an association existed between the Albertan populace's views regarding the statement, "no matter how hopeless things seem in the long run everything will work out right" and their opinions concerning separatism. Albertans that believed 'everything would turn out right despite how hopeless things seem' (27.0 per cent) were more likely to support separatism than Albertans that neither agreed nor disagreed (6.0 per cent) with this statement. In comparison, the above-mentioned relationship

Table 5:12 Opinion - 'Quebec' Separating from Canada by Comparison of this Province with Others (1)

Alberta		Respondents' Province as a Place to Live	
		Better	Same or Less
Quebec Separating from Canada	Support	27.2%	8.3%
	Oppose	72.8%	91.7%
	Total	100.0% (175)	100.0% (34)

(50)

(159)

(210)

Corrected Chi Square = 4.62105 with 1 Degree of Freedom
 Significance = .03 Phi = .16
 Missing Observations = 16

Saskatchewan		Respondents' Province as a Place to Live	
		Better	Same or Less
Quebec Separating from Canada	Support	25.3%	16.0%
	Oppose	74.7%	84.0%
	Total	100.0% (43)	100.0% (40)

(17)

(66)

(84)

Corrected Chi Square = .61220 with 1 Degree of Freedom
 Significance = .43 Phi = .11
 Missing Observations = 7

Ontario		Respondents' Province as a Place to Live	
		Better	Same or Less
Quebec Separating from Canada	Support	18.6%	26.5%
	Oppose	81.4%	73.5%
	Total	100.0% (639)	100.0% (260)

(188)

(711)

(899)

Corrected Chi Square = 6.45532 with 1 Degree of Freedom
 Significance = .01 Phi = .09
 Missing Observations = 171

- (1) How do you think (name of province) compares with the other provinces as a place to live? Would you say that it was ... (1) better than any or most other provinces, (2) about the same or not as good as most other provinces.

Table 5:13 Opinion - 'Quebec' Separating from Canada by
Direction of Life Change (1)

Alberta

Alberta		Direction of Life Change		
		Better	Same/Worse	
Quebec Separating from Canada	Support	32.3%	12.3%	(50)
	Oppose	67.7%	87.7%	(162)
	Total	100.0% (122)	100.0% (91)	(213)

Corrected Chi Square = 10.42312 with 1 Degree of Freedom
Significance = .00 Phi = .23
Missing Observations = 13

Saskatchewan

Saskatchewan	Direction of Life Change		
	Better	Same/Worse	
Quebec	Support	25.8%	15.5%
Separating			(19)
from			
Canada	Oppose	74.2%	84.5%
			(70)
	Total	100.0%	100.0%
		(47)	(42)
			(89)

Corrected Chi Square = .85997 with 1 Degree of Freedom
Significance = .35 Phi = .13
Missing Observations = 2

Ontario

Ontario	Direction of Life Change		
	Better	Same/Worse	
Quebec Separating from Canada	Support	19.9%	21.4% (206)
	Oppose	80.1%	78.6% (794)
	Total	100.0% (514)	100.0% (487)

Corrected Chi Square = .25123 with 1 Degree of Freedom
Significance = .62 Phi = .02
Missing Observations = 69

- (1) During the past two years, would you say that your life
has ... (1) become better, (2) become worse, or (3) stayed
the same?

Table 5:14 Opinion - 'Quebec' Separating from Canada by
Hopeless Everything will Turn Out Right (1)

Alberta

Future Prospects Will Improve

	Agree	Neutral	
Quebec Separating from Canada	Support 27.0%	6.0%	(47)
	Oppose 73.0%	94.0%	(149)
Total	100.0% (167)	100.0% (29)	(196)

Corrected Chi Square = 4.86708 with 1 Degree of Freedom
Significance = .03 Phi = .17
Missing Observations = 30

Saskatchewan

Future Prospects Will Improve

	Agree	Neutral	
Quebec Separating from Canada	Support 18.1%	37.1%	(19)
	Oppose 81.9%	62.9%	(68)
Total	100.0% (72)	100.0% (15)	(87)

Corrected Chi Square = 1.63011 with 1 Degree of Freedom
Significance = .20 Phi = .17
Missing Observations = 4 Eta = .17 with QJ4 Dependent

Ontario

Future Prospects Will Improve

	Agree	Neutral	
Quebec Separating from Canada	Support 20.4%	25.2%	(193)
	Oppose 79.6%	74.8%	(733)
Total	100.0% (839)	100.0% (87)	(926)

Corrected Chi Square = .86942 with 1 Degree of Freedom
Significance = .35 Phi = .04
Missing Observations = 144

- (1) Do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
No matter how hopeless things seem, in the long run
everything will work out right.

was weak in both Saskatchewan and Ontario.

As suggested, the three chosen indicators of Albertans' expectations were related to their opinions regarding separatism. It was hypothesized that Albertans with high or rising expectations were more likely to support separatism, and these findings supported that hypothesis. Those with high expectations or with optimistic views apparently constituted the portion of the populace most likely to develop a 'revolutionary state of mind'. Moreover, the lack of similar relationships in Saskatchewan and Ontario may help in explaining the western separatist movement's relative confinement to Alberta.

At this point, it is possible to amalgamate the findings from the fourth and fifth chapters in relation to the determinant of structural strain. Chapter four's analysis indicated that conditions within Alberta were prosperous for a lengthy period of time before the third phase of the Albertan western separatist movement. In this chapter, it was determined that an overwhelming majority of Albertans held high or rising expectations for the future. Moreover, it was determined that the chosen indicators of expectations were related to Albertans' views concerning separatism and that those with high expectations or with optimistic outlooks were more likely to support a separatist option. Hence, the two components of the revised theory appear to have existed within Alberta.

Chapter three indicated that certain events likely threatened or hindered Albertans' abilities to continually attain their rising expectations. Due to the combination of all these factors at the same period, a 'sudden state of uncertainty' likely arose amongst the Albertan populace. Consequently, there is some confirmation for the hypothesis that a condition of structural strain, as operationalized by the revised theory of rebellion, contributed to the Albertan western separatist movement's sudden re-emergence during 1980.

III - An Examination of Social Changes

The present study would not be complete if an examination of social changes was excluded. This section attempts to parallel the previous chapter's analysis. Significant social changes, as argued earlier, may have contributed to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement in 1980 since they are seen as indicators of social instability. Killian and Turner indicate the possible relationship accordingly, "social change ... may give rise to widespread frustration in a society ... at times, the norms and structure of a society are such that the repression and frustration of a large portion of the population are chronic" (1957: 31). They conclude, "frustration and deprivation do not always lead quickly and surely to revolt ... For collective behavior of any

sort to develop, there must also be a belief in better conditions which can be brought about through collective action" (Ibid.: 31).

While significant social changes do not solely determine whether or not a movement will arise, such changes may have played a significant role in the Albertan western separatist movement's third re-emergence by instigating a high degree of frustration or unrest amongst the general populace. The following analysis will determine if certain social changes are related to the Albertan populace's opinions regarding separatism. If such relationships are unique to Alberta, they may thereby indicate another reason for the movement's relative confinement to that province.

Karl W. Deutsch notes that "changes of residence" is considered as one of the "more specific processes of change" in relation to social mobilization which he terms "an overall process of change" (1961: 493). It is, therefore, a good indicator of social change in the three chosen provinces. Table 5:15 indicates a relationship between Albertans' feelings regarding their change of residence during the last five years, 1974 to 1979, and their attitudes concerning separatism ($Eta = .22$). The same relationship likewise characterized Saskatchewan but not Ontario. Although social changes of this kind may not directly contribute to the occurrence of an episode of collective behaviour, they may be an important underlying

Table 5:15 Opinion - 'Quebec' Separating from Canada by Effect on Life - Change Place of Residence (1)

Alberta

Change Place of Residence - Effect		Better	Worse	Same	
Quebec Separating from Canada	Support	27.7%	35.4%	0%	(24)
	Oppose	72.3%	64.6%	100.0%	(80)
	Total	100.0% (74)	100.0% (11)	100.0% (20)	(105)

Raw Chi Square = 7.75825 with 2 Degrees of Freedom

Significance = .02 Cramer's V = .27

Missing Observations = 121 Eta = .27 with QJ4 Dependent

Saskatchewan

Change Place of Residence - Effect		Better	Worse	Same	
Quebec Separating from Canada	Support	26.5%		51.6%	(7)
	Oppose	73.5%		48.4%	(14)
	Total	100.0% (16)		100.0% (5)	(21)

Corrected Chi Square = .20068 with 1 Degree of Freedom

Significance = .65 Phi = .22

Missing Observations = 70 Eta = .22 with QJ4 Dependent

Ontario

Change Place of Residence - Effect		Better	Worse	Same	
Quebec Separating from Canada	Support	18.1%	22.7%	18.5%	(66)
	Oppose	81.9%	77.3%	81.5%	(293)
	Total	100.0% (276)	100.0% (22)	100.0% (62)	(360)

Raw Chi Square = .27365 with 2 Degrees of Freedom

Significance = .87 Cramer's V = .03

Missing Observations = 710 Eta = .03 QJ4 Dependent

- (1) An event which happened in the last five years - that is since the spring of 1974 - Did you change your place of residence?

factor. Moreover, the fact that this relationship was unique to the two western provinces may offer an additional explanation of the separatist movement's confinement to the West.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to determine if any underlying, societal conditions may have contributed to the re-emergence of the Albertan western separatist movement during 1980. By using the data from the Quality of Life (1979) Study, the analysis of societal conditions was again based on Smelser's determinants of structural conduciveness and structural strain. A third section on social changes was included in order to thoroughly examine societal conditions. Since the data for this chapter came from the Quality of Life (1979) Study, it was possible to examine in greater depth the relationship between societal conditions and opinions regarding separatism.

The various analyses supported the proposition that a pre-conducive state of societal conditions existed prior to the third phase of the Albertan western separatist movement. Alberta was apparently characterized by a condition of one-party dominance at both the federal and provincial levels of government. The probable relationship between Albertans' provincial party preferences and their opinions regarding separatism may have contributed to the

movement's re-emergence since only Alberta lacked viable alternatives of expression in its federal and provincial political party systems. The possible relationships between Albertans' opinions regarding satisfaction with the federal government's performance, the perceived power of the provincial government, and the division of powers of the two levels of government also tended to support this proposition.

Secondly, it was determined that the general populace of Alberta held high or rising expectations; the second major component of the revised theory of rebellion. Albertans with high expectations or with optimistic views evidently were more likely to favour separatism. They comprised the portion of the populace whose ability to attain their high or rising expectations was most likely threatened and may therefore be most likely to develop a 'revolutionary state of mind'.

The combination of findings from chapters' four and five concerning the determinant of structural strain also appeared to substantiate the revised theory of rebellion. The presence of a sudden state of uncertainty together with the condition of one-party dominance likely compounded the degree of frustration amongst Alberta's populace. Such frustrations presumably increased since Albertans seemingly lacked viable and effective, political alternatives for the expression of their interests and/or

grievances.

This state of compounded frustration may have led a number of Albertans to form and/or join a western separatist organization after the occurrence of precipitating factors. The existence of these determinants as well as the perceived effects of significant social changes during the same period may have thereby created a pre-conducive state for the re-emergence of the Albertan western separatist movement in 1980.

Alberta was the only province of the three considered that was characterized by all of the following societal conditions; one-party dominance in both its federal and provincial party systems, high and/or rising expectations, and a significant effect on the respondents' lives of at least one major process of social change. Moreover, the majority of relationships between the chosen indicators of societal conditions and opinions regarding separatism were either unique to or stronger among the Albertan populace. This combination of unique and distinctive societal conditions may also contribute to an explanation of the western separatist movement's relative confinement to Alberta.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Atkinson, Tom; Blishen, Bernard; Ornstein, Michael; and Stevenson, H. Michael
1979 Social Change in Canada: Trends in Attitudes, Values, and Perceptions National Cross-Sectional Survey Phase II May-August, 1979, Toronto, Institute for Behavioural Research (York University), May-August 1979.
- Bent, Dale H.; Hull, C. Hadlai; Jenkins, Jean G.; Nie, Norman H.; and Steinbrenner, Karin
1975 SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences Second Edition, Toronto, McGraw-Hill Book Company.
- Blalock Jr., Hubert M.
1979 Social Statistics Revised Second Edition, Toronto, McGraw-Hill Book Company.
- Davies, James C.
1962 "Toward a Theory of Revolution", American Sociological Review, Volume 27, 1962, pp. 5-19.
- Deutsch, Karl W.
1961 "Social Mobilization and Political Development", The American Political Science Review, Volume 55, 1961, pp. 493-514.
- Feierabend, Ivo K.; Feierabend, Rosalind; and Nesvold, Betty A.
1969 "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns", Hugh D. Graham and Ted R. Gurr, eds., The History of Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, pp. 632-689.
- Gibbins, Roger
1980 Prairie Politics and Society: Regionalism in Decline, Toronto, Butterworth & Company (Canada) Limited.
- Hamilton, Richard and Pinard, Maurice
1976 "The Basis of Parti Quebecois Support in Recent Quebec Elections", Canadian Journal of Political Science, Volume 9, 1976, pp. 3-26.

- Hamilton, Richard and Pinard, Maurice
1977 "The Independence Issue and the Polarization of the Electorate: The 1973 Quebec Election", Canadian Journal of Political Science, Volume 10, 1977, pp. 215-259.
- Hull, C. Hadlai; Klecka, William R.; and Nie, Norman H.
1975 SPSS Primer Statistical Package for the Social Sciences Primer, Toronto, McGraw-Hill Book Company.
- Killian, Lewis M. and Turner, Ralph H.
1957 Collective Behaviour, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc.
- Loether, Herman J. and McTavish, Donald G.
1976 Descriptive and Inferential Statistics: An Introduction, Boston, Allyn and Bacon, Inc.
- Marx, Gary T. and Wood, James L.
1975 "Strands of Theory and Research in Collective Behavior", Annual Review of Sociology, Volume 1, 1975, pp. 363-428.
- McRoberts, Hugh A.; Pineo, Peter C.; and Porter, John
1977 "The 1971 Census and the Socioeconomic Classification of Occupations", Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, Volume 14, 1977, pp. 91-102.
- Pinard, Maurice
1975 The Rise of a Third Party A Study in Crisis Politics Enlarged Edition, Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Pineo, Peter C.
1977 "The Social Standing of Ethnic and Racial Groupings", Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, Volume 14, 1977, pp. 146-157.
- Sallot, Jeff
1980 "West's Anger on Budget Spawns Blue-Chip Separatists", Globe and Mail, November 8, 1980, pp. 1 & 3.
- Smelser, Neil J.
1962 Theory of Collective Behavior, New York, The Free Press.
- Statistics Canada
1979 "Income Distributions by Size in Canada 1977 (13-207)", Income Distributions by Size in Canada 1971-77 (13-207), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, August 1971.

Statistics Canada

1982 Estimates of Population by Sex and Age for
Canada and the Provinces, June 1, 1979 Final
1980 Preliminary (91-202), Ottawa, Ontario,
Statistics Canada, February 1982.

CONCLUSION

A Statement Regarding This Study

The general aim of this study was to examine the societal conditions that existed prior to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement in 1980. The goal was to determine if existing societal conditions possibly created a pre-conducive state for the given movement's third re-emergence. To accomplish this, Alberta's political, economic, and social sectors were examined. In addition, the same three sectors were examined for Ontario and Saskatchewan. This study thereby attempted to answer two major questions; (1) is there any evidence that societal conditions were related to the rise of a separatist movement in Alberta, and (2) can societal conditions help explain why the movement was strongest in and generally confined to Alberta?

In order to organize the data as well as provide possible explanations for the occurrence of the movement, Neil J. Smelser's Theory of Collective Behavior was selected as the underlying framework for this study. All six determinants outlined by Smelser were not relevant here since the study mainly examined societal conditions. The study therefore focused on the determinants of structural conduciveness, structural strain, and precipitating factors. In addition,

Smelser's concept of a value-added process was used in the explanation of the rise of Albertan separatism and its relative confinement to that province.

Before proceeding, the chosen determinants from Smelser's theory needed to be operationalized further. Maurice Pinard's theory of one-party dominance was used to operationalize the determinant of structural conduciveness while James C. Davies' theory of revolution was used to operationalize the determinant of structural strain. The determinant of precipitating factors was operationalized by examining 'recent issues'.

The various chapters revealed that the following societal conditions likely existed prior to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement in 1980. First, chapters four and five indicated that Alberta's federal and provincial party systems were characterized by the condition of one-party dominance. In addition, chapter five's analysis suggested that a number of significant political attitudes were unique to Alberta. The possible relationships between Albertans' opinions regarding satisfaction with the federal government's performance, the perceived power of the provincial government, and the division of powers between the two levels of government seemed to support the hypothesis that those without viable channels of expression within both of their province's political party systems were more likely to support separatism.

The analyses in chapters four and five also led to a revised theory of rebellion with respect to the determinant of structural strain. Unlike Davies' theory, chapter four indicated that Alberta's economy was characterized by a period of growth throughout the 1970's. Chapter five revealed that the vast majority of Albertans entertained high or rising expectations. However, as was explained in chapter three, the defeat of the Progressive Conservative party and the introduction of the National Energy Program instigated a sudden state of uncertainty. Thus, it was argued that the occurrence of a widening gap between a populace's expectations and their actual fulfilment was not necessary. Rather, specific events being or being perceived as threats to economic and/or social development or to previously 'gained ground' served as the precipitating factors and were likely the instigators of a 'revolutionary state of mind'. These events may have evidently created a state in which the populace felt a high degree of frustration and anxiety concerning the continual attainment of their high or rising expectations in the immediate future. In conjunction with the other determinants, a social and/or political movement may have arisen in response to the sudden state of uncertainty.

This revised theory of rebellion appears to be substantiated by the findings from the last three chapters. Albertans with high or optimistic views were more likely to

favour separatism. Moreover, this condition was likely amplified since Albertans lacked viable channels of expression for their grievances and/or interests within their federal and provincial party systems. As a result, the lack of these alternatives may have led a number of Albertans to form or join a western separatist organization.

The occurrence of significant social changes, especially in relation to the distribution of the labour force and the populace's economic well-being, may have contributed further to Alberta's sudden state of uncertainty by creating a state of social instability. According to chapter five, the perceived effects of significant social changes were underlying factors associated with Albertans' opinions regarding separatism. Overall, the possible existence of these societal conditions likely combined to produce a pre-conducive state prior to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement during 1980.

In comparison, both Saskatchewan and Ontario lacked a number of societal conditions that characterized Alberta during the given period. Saskatchewan's federal and provincial party systems, for instance, were not characterized by the condition of one-party dominance; an indication of the possible existence of political structural conduciveness. Similarly, economic conditions within Saskatchewan did not resemble a J-curve pattern. While the majority of Saskatchewan's populace also appeared to hold high or rising ex-

pectations, the economy of Saskatchewan was characterized by constant rather than rapid growth. Moreover, Saskatchewan was characterized by similar yet less pronounced social changes.

While Saskatchewan's populace expressed some interest in the western separatist movement, they evidently had viable channels of expression for their grievances and/or interests within the province. Thus, a separatist option would not be seen as a likely alternative to the province's federal or provincial politics.

In addition, a 'sudden state of uncertainty' concerning Saskatchewan's prosperity may not have developed since the province did not undergo a rapid rate of real economic growth during the indicated period. The province likewise did not experience a high degree of social instability since it was characterized by a moderate extent of social change. Together, these similarities and distinctions may help in explaining the movement's lack of development and growth within Saskatchewan.

Ontario's societal conditions, on the other hand, differed markedly from Alberta. Ontario was not characterized by the condition of one-party dominance within both of its political party systems and hence, one of Ontario's party systems provided a viable alternative to its populace. Ontario's economy did not experience a rapid rate of real growth throughout the given period. As a result, it is un-

likely that a sudden state of uncertainty developed in Ontario. In addition, the relationships between the indicators of high or rising expectations and the populace's opinions regarding separatism revealed major differences between Ontario and Alberta. Social changes in Ontario also did not appear to be as great as in Alberta and Saskatchewan. Hence, a state of social instability did not likely occur within the province. Evidently, Ontario's societal conditions were not conducive to the occurrence of a separatist movement.

As indicated, there were three societal conditions that were necessary in order for an episode of collective behaviour to occur. They were structural conduciveness, structural strain, and precipitating factors. Each of these determinants, as operationalized, apparently played a significant role regarding the creation of a pre-conducive state for the occurrence of the given moment.

At this point, it must be stressed that these findings are not universally applicable to all episodes of collective behaviour. One may therefore ask, 'How much can one learn from this'? Although the findings from this study are not applicable to all situations, they do help in understanding the given, particular movement; a movement that threatened Canada's existence as a single country. Second, it is important to pinpoint the societal conditions within an area that may be causing undue anxiety within a populace.

Through identification, programs and policies may be devised to directly or indirectly alleviate the source of society's excessive stress. Third, this study may be useful in that it provides a basis for understanding the rise of other particular movements under similar circumstances.

This study, as indicated, was not an examination of the western separatist movement per se. Rather, it focused upon the societal conditions that contributed to the rise of the given movement. As this research focused on three of the determinants of collective behaviour identified by Smelser, there is a need for future research on the remaining determinants; the growth and spread of generalized beliefs, mobilization, and social control, if we are to fully understand the factors contributing to the Albertan western separatist movement's third re-emergence. In other words, the other determinants would need to be examined since they are also necessary ingredients for a movement to occur. Without an examination of these determinants, a more complete understanding of the nature and causes of western separatism is lacking.

During this study, two of the chosen methods of operationalization needed to be refined. For instance, difficulty existed in applying Pinard's method of operationalizing the determinant of structural conduciveness at the federal level within Alberta. Pinard suggests that third parties arise since the opposition parties "cannot be

considered as viable alternatives to the party in power" (1975: 37). But unlike Quebec, the dominant party in Alberta's federal party system was not the 'party in power'. Therefore, Pinard's theory was modified in that the dominant party was determined by the 'standing of parties' in relation to the province's House of Commons seats. The possible alternatives would then be the opponents of the province's major federal representatives. Hence, a third party at the federal level is likely to emerge if the populace becomes dissatisfied with (1) the federal government, (2) the province 's major federal representatives, and (3) if the existing parties within the province are not seen as viable alternatives to the major federal representatives.

The method of determining the alternative parties' strength remained the same. In other words, thirty-three per cent of the popular vote was considered the "empirical cutting point below which a situation of one-party dominance is created" (Ibid.: 37). Although this measure appears to be arbitrary, it is still used here since "it measures the strength of a party" and "its possibility of providing a viable alternative" (Ibid.: 291-292). Moreover, Pinard suggests, "it would be difficult to find indications that opposition parties with an average of less than 33 per cent of the votes - my indicator of one-party dominance - were actually strong parties" (Ibid.: 292). Perhaps, a less arbitrary measure of one-party dominance will later

be developed for such an analysis.

Davies' theory of revolution was another method of operationalization that needed to be revised. Currently, additional indicators are needed to measure the respondents' reactions after the occurrence of a precipitating factor during a prolonged period of social and/or economic development as well as high and/or rising expectations. Meanwhile, this study was only able to examine the two conditions within the revised theory separately in relation to the rise of the Albertan western separatist movement during 1980.

Overall, this study would have been enhanced if more quantitative material relating to western separatism was available. The western separatist organizations, as indicated, refused to participate in a related, scientific survey. Moreover, other surveys on western separatism were unavailable. Perhaps better generalizations could have been drawn if more appropriate material was available. The information could also have been used to re-examine hypotheses presented here. In addition, the populace's perceptions on various subjects; eg. political intentions, political parties' strength, and economic and/or social expectations, could have been determined in order to examine how "the social world from the perspective of the subjects" may have led a number of them to form or join a western separatist organization (Scimecca, 1981: 45).

Moreover, this study's approach does not adequately examine social interaction. Human beings do not merely react to situations; they act within and upon the world as well. A major difficulty with the chosen approach is that it heavily emphasizes the system in its analysis rather than individuals. The actions of individuals, as a result, appear to be predetermined if certain circumstances prevail within a society. This approach is therefore limited in "assessing the reality of the social world" (Ibid.: 26). There is evidently a need to "see social reality from the perspective of the thinking individual ... human beings as having the freedom to interpret and alter external conditions which play upon them" (Ibid.: 26).

An Update on the Albertan Western Separatist Movement

Numerous events have occurred since the early months of 1981. The purpose of this section is to provide an update on the third phase of the Albertan western separatist movement. In fact, the movement's activities will be documented until its demise. A discussion of the Albertan western separatist threat will then follow.

The Albertan western separatist movement has undergone three major events since the period covered in this study. The first major event occurred after the resignation of Elmer Knutson as president of Western Canada Federation in April 1981. Previously, Knutson stated that West-

Fed would not merge with Western Canada Concept due to significant policy differences (see Chapter One). But on December 17, 1981, the two major separatist groups merged. Gordon Kesler, then spokesman for the Western Canada Concept Alberta Party, stated, "West-Fed national leader Elmer Knutson and Western Canada Concept leader Douglas Christie had both failed to be ready to grow so they have been left behind" (Globe and Mail, 1981: 11).

The second major event was the election of Gordon Kesler in the Olds-Didsbury riding on February 17, 1982. Initially, Kesler, an oil scout, had "no organization and no established electoral support when he won the separatist party's nomination in January" (Winnipeg Free Press, 1982: 1). In the by-election, Kesler obtained 42 per cent of the vote with a 1,300 vote margin. The Social Credit candidate, Lloyd Quantz, received 28 per cent while the Conservative candidate, Stephen Stiles, obtained 25 per cent of the vote. Liberal George Leussink, New Democrat Myrna Jarboe, and Independent Adilsha Shivji were reportedly far behind (Ibid.: 1). Kesler's victory was considered "a stunning show of force" (DeGroot, 1982: A1).

Kesler's victory was regarded as an "anti-Ottawa and Anti-Lougheed protest vote" (Cowan, 1982b: 5). Kesler himself stated that his victory was an outcry against Prime Minister Trudeau and Premier Peter Lougheed (Winnipeg Free Press, 1982: 1). Apparently, a number of Albertans

were disillusioned with Premier Lougheed since they supposedly felt he "sold out to Trudeau on both energy and constitutional issues" (Redekop, 1982: 41). Kesler explicitly stated that the by-election result was "a message to all governments that people are tired of not having a voice in their lives" (Nelson, 1982: 2). As a result of the by-election, the separatists could no longer be ignored by the government and the opposition parties (Braid, 1982: A3). Indeed, they were considered as a 'real threat' within Alberta.

The Western Canada Concept party held two major conventions prior to the provincial general election on November 2, 1982. The first convention dealt with the party's policies while the second convention determined the party's leader. The first convention openly revealed the split within the party between the hardliners and the moderates. Kesler and his supporters favoured "good government ahead of the separation pitch ... while endorsing independence as the WCC's 'fundamental priority' to be approved by a Quebec-style referendum" (Smith, 1982a: A4). Moreover, they "also approved a motion giving Canada 'one last chance' at wholesale political reform to allow the West a voice in Ottawa" (Ibid.: A4). The hardliners, on the other hand, wanted "separation front and centre as the WCC's main plank" (Cowan, 1982b: 5). The moderates apparently prevailed.

At the leadership convention in August 1982, Gordon

Kesler was narrowly re-elected as leader of Western Canada Concept. He reportedly "edged former party policy chairman Howard Thompson, a hardliner, by just 38 votes in a second-ballot victory" (Spectator, 1982: 3). Afterwards, Mr. Kesler vowed to "end the internal feuding which has tarnished the party's public image" (Ibid.: 3). But, Dan Smith noted, "the party's credibility had been crippled by the summer of bitter public brawling among members and the high-profile defections over Kesler's leadership and watered-down separatism" (Smith, 1982b: A13).

The third major event in relation to the Albertan western separatist movement was the provincial general election on November 2, 1982. In that election, the Progressive Conservative party won an overwhelming landslide. They captured 75 of the possible 79 seats; an additional two seats in the legislature. Moreover, the Progressive Conservative party obtained a popular vote of 63.0 per cent. The Tories thereby "topped their 1975 record of 62.7 per cent" (Zacharias, 1982: A1).

Zacharias noted that "the NDP and Independents were left to scrabble for the position of official opposition with two seats each" while "the Western Canada Concept ... and the once-mighty Social Credit were wiped off the political map" (Ibid.: A1). The New Democratic Party modestly increased its share of the popular vote from 15.7 per cent to 18 per cent. The Western Canada Concept party

obtained approximately 11 per cent of the popular vote while the Socreds received roughly one per cent. Lastly, the Liberals and the Alberta Reform Movement acquired merely seven per cent of the vote. Analysts remarked that the separatist Western Canada Concept party and its leader were effectively "wiped out" (Toronto Star, 1982b: A1).

The Western Canada Concept party's defeat in the Alberta provincial general election on November 2, 1982 may be regarded as the decline of the Albertan western separatist movement's third phase. But in comparison to the results of Quebec's first separatist party in the Quebec provincial general election on June 5, 1966, Western Canada Concept's outcome was impressive. For instance, the Rassemblement Indépendance Nationale (RIN) party was only able to enter seventy-three out of a possible one-hundred and eight candidates in that election (Normandin, 1967). Moreover, the RIN party obtained only six per cent of the popular vote. None of their candidates were elected to the Quebec legislature at that time.

The Western Canada Concept party, on the other hand, was able to run seventy-eight out of possible seventy-nine candidates in the aforementioned Alberta provincial general election. The party merely lacked a complete slate of candidates since "one of its brighter lights missed the nomination deadline in a fertile southern riding" (Smith, 1982b: 13). Although Western Canada Concept similarly

failed to win any seats in the Alberta legislature, the party did obtain a greater percentage of votes (11 per cent) than the RIN party in its first provincial general election.

As a result of these findings, the possible threat of western separatism should not be dismissed. There is still a need for the federal and provincial governments to be sensitive and responsive to the Albertan populace's needs, especially during a period characterized by the societal conditions discussed in detail earlier in this study. In other words, the two levels of government should attempt to eliminate the conditions that created undue anxiety and frustration within Alberta's society. This is likely to occur with solutions that integrate and benefit both western and eastern interests. If these societal conditions persist without adequate redress in relation to their effects upon the populace, the Albertan western separatist movement may again re-emerge.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Braid, Don
1982 "Cowboy Power Wins for Angry Albertans",
Edmonton Journal, February 18, 1982, pp. A1 & A3.
- Cowan, Peter
1982a "Separatists Adopt PQ Independence Strategy",
The Spectator, July 16, 1982, pg. 11.
- Cowan, Peter
1982b "WCC Will Pick Full-time Chief", The Spectator,
July 17, 1982, pg. 5.
- Cowan, Peter
1982c "Alberta Rejects Separatists in PC Sweep",
The Spectator, November 3, 1982, pg. A1.
- Cowan, Peter
1982d "PCs Scare Out Voters and Sweep Boards",
The Spectator, November 3, 1982, pg. B1.
- Davies, James C.
1962 "Toward A Theory of Revolution", American
Sociological Review, Volume 27, 1962, pp. 5-19.
- DeGroot, Paul
1982 "Stunning Separatist Victory", Edmonton
Journal, February 18, 1982, pg. A1.
- Globe and Mail
1981 "Separatist Factions Agree to Merge", The
Globe and Mail, December 19, 1981, pg. 11.
- Nelson, Barry
1982 "Lougheed Under Fire Over Separatist Victory",
The Globe and Mail, February 19, 1982, pp. 1 & 2.
- Normandin, Pierre G. (ed.)
1967 The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, Ottawa,
Ontario.
- Pinard, Maurice
1975 The Rise of a Third Party A Study in Crisis
Politics Enlarged Edition, Montreal, McGill-Queen's
University Press.

- Redekop, John H.
1982 "Western Separatist Majority? Rising From the Ashes of Alberta's Socreds", The Spectator, July 17, 1982, pg. 41.
- Scimecca, Joseph A.
1981 Society and Freedom An Introduction to Humanist Sociology, New York, St. Martin's Press.
- Smelser, Neil J.
1962 Theory of Collective Behavior, New York, The Free Press.
- Smith, Dan
1982a "Political Cowboy a Hit with Western Separatists", The Toronto Star, July 19, 1982, pp. A1 & A4.
- Smith, Dan
1982b "Alberta Election: Separatists Bank on Boldness to Save Day", The Toronto Star, November 2, 1982, pg. A13.
- Spectator
1982 "Kesler Again Heads WCC", The Spectator, August 23, 1982, pg. 3.
- Toronto Star
1982a "Energy Dispute Will Trigger Independence Vote: Kesler", The Toronto Star, August 23, 1982, pg. A14.
- Toronto Star
1982b "Lougheed Gets Massive Victory 75 of 79 Seats", The Toronto Star, November 3, 1982, pp. A1 & A27.
- Winnipeg Free Press
1982 "Separatist Wins Alberta By-election", Winnipeg Free Press, February 18, 1982, pg. 1.
- Zacharias, Yvonne
1982 "Smashing Win Voters Say: Lougheed for Alberta", The Calgary Herald, November 3, 1982, pg. A1.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1

Table A

Respondents' Sex by Province (1979)
18 Years of Age and Older

Sex	Ontario		Saskatchewan		Alberta	
	Q of L	StatsCan	Q of L	StatsCan	Q of L	Statscan
Male	38.5%	48.7%	35.4%	50.1%	35.4%	50.4%
Female	61.5%	51.3%	64.6%	49.9%	64.6%	49.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	(1,232)	(6,054.9)	(82)	(658.8)	(181)	(1,379.9)

Sources:

Atkinson, Tom; Blishen, Bernard; Ornstein, Michael; and Stevenson, H. Michael
1979 Social Change in Canada: Trends in Attitudes, Values and Perceptions National Cross-sectional Survey Phase II May-August, 1979, Toronto, Institute for Behavioural Research (York University), May-August, 1979.

Statistics Canada

1982 Estimates of Population by Sex and Age for Canada and the Provinces, June 1, 1979 Final 1980 Preliminary (91-202), Ottawa, Ontario, Statistics Canada, February 1982.

Appendix 2

Table B(1)

Respondents' Age by Province (1979) - Both Sexes
18 Years of Age and Older

Age	Ontario		Saskatchewan		Alberta	
	Q of L	StatsCan	Q of L	StatsCan	Q of L	StatsCan
18 to 64	88.5%	86.6%	87.8%	83.2%	89.5%	88.9%
65 to Highest	11.5%	13.4%	12.2%	16.8%	10.5%	11.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	(1,232)	(6,054.9)	(82)	(658.8)	(181)	(1,379.9)

Table B(2) Respondents' Age by Province Controlling for Respondents' Sex - Male
18 Years of Age and Older

MALE Age	Ontario		Saskatchewan		Alberta	
	Q of L	StatsCan	Q of L	StatsCan	Q of L	StatsCan
18 to 64	88.2%	88.4%	93.1%	84.2%	89.1%	89.8%
65 to Highest	11.8%	11.6%	6.9%	15.8%	10.9%	10.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	(474)	(2,947.9)	(29)	(329.9)	(64)	(695.9)

Table B(3) Respondents' Age by Province Controlling for Respondents' Sex - Female
18 Years of Age and Older

FEMALE Age	Ontario		Saskatchewan		Alberta	
	Q of L	StatsCan	Q of L	StatsCan	Q of L	StatsCan
18 to 64	88.7%	84.8%	84.9%	82.2%	89.7%	87.9%
65 to Highest	11.3%	15.2%	15.1%	17.8%	10.3%	12.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	(758)	(3,107.1)	(53)	(328.9)	(117)	(684.1)

Sources: See Appendix 1

Appendix 3

The 108 variables from the Quality of Life Study (1979) selected for the crosstabulations.

NEWED	Size of the Community
XRAGE	Respondent's Age
XRSEX	Respondent's Sex
QA1H	How Describe the Safety from Crime
QA2	Number of Years in Neighbourhood
QA7	Neighbourhood Satisfaction
QB1	Number of Years in this City
QB5	City Satisfaction
QC1	Country of Birth
QC3	Province of Birth
QC4	Ethnic or Cultural Group - Male Ancestor
QC8	Religion
QC9	Church Attendance
QC10	Years in Province
QC11	Comparison of this Province with Others
QC12	Life in Canada
QC14	Satisfaction with Life in Canada Today
QC15A	Satisfaction with Federal Government
QC15B	Satisfaction with Provincial Government
QD6A	Parliament Soon Lose Touch with People
QD6B	Government Doesn't Care About People (Me)
QD6C	Politics, Government Complicated (Understand)
QD6D	Have No Say What Government Does
QD7A	Perceived Power - Provincial Government
QD7C	Perceived Power - Large Corporations
QD7D	Perceived Power - Federal Government
QE3	Happiness
QE4	Direction of Life Change
QE8	Low Spirits or Depressed
QE9	Own Life Right Now
QE10AA	Last 5 Years - Marriage
QE10BA	Last 5 Years - Separated or Divorced
QE10CA	Last 5 Years - Have a Child
QE10KA	Last 5 Years - Get a New Job
QE10LA	Last 5 Years - Get a Job Promotion
QE10NA	Last 5 Years - Change Place of Residence
QE10NC	Effect on Life - Change Place of Residence
QE10OA	Last 5 Years - Large Increase - Income
QE10PA	Last 5 Years - Large Decrease - Income
QE13	General Life Satisfaction
QE14	Ladder - Present Life
QE15	Ladder - Life Expect 2 Years from Now
QE16	Ladder - Best Life Ever Hope to Have
QE17	Ladder - Life Best Ever Been
QE18	Ladder - Life Deserve to Have Right Now

APPENDIX 3 CONT'D

QG1 Highest Level of Education
 QH1 Now Working Full-time or Part-time
 QH5 Main Occupation - StatsCanada Code
 QH51 Choose Same Job Again
 QJ1 Ottawa Treatment of Province
 QJ2 Ottawa Attention of Quebec
 QJ3 Federal or Provincial Power
 QJ5 Concessions to Quebec
 QJ6 Favour Force to Stop Separation
 QK9 Result of Foreign Investment
 QK10 Enough U.S. Capital in Canada
 QK11A Government Take Over Foreign-Owned Companies
 QK11B Foreign Companies Sell Shares to Canadians
 QK11C New Foreign Company Shares Owned by Canadians
 QK13A Shortage of Energy, Other Resources
 QK13B Government Intervention - Energy, Resources
 QK14A Government Control Big Business
 QK14B Government Ownership of Industry
 QL2 Personal Income - 1978
 QL14 Satisfaction - Present Income
 QL15 Any Major Things Could Not Afford
 QL17 Able to Buy More Next Year than Last
 QL20 Satisfaction - Standard of Living
 QL21 Satisfaction - Present Financial Situation
 QM1 Own or Rent House, Apartment
 QM6 Number Years Lived This House, Apartment
 QM15 Satisfaction with House, Apartment
 QM16 How Likely Live Here in 2 Years
 QO1A Hopeless Everything Will Turn Out Right
 QO1B Good Things Come from Worst Situations
 QO1C Society, Civilization Falling to Pieces
 QO1D Things Look Good, Something Bad Happen
 QO1E Every Cloud has a Silver Lining
 QO3 Do Plans Work Out
 QO4 Sure Life Would Work Out
 QO5 Run Life as You Want
 QQ1 Marital Status
 QR1 Number of Children
 QR19A Scale - Community
 QR19B Scale - Neighbourhood
 QR19D Scale - Life in Canada Today
 QR19E Scale - Present Job
 QR19I Scale - Financial Situation
 QR19J Scale - Standard of Living
 QR19M Scale - Marriage
 QR19O Scale - Life as a Whole
 QSlA Political Involvement - Volunteer Worker
 QSlB Political Involvement - Community Problems

APPENDIX 3 CONT'D

QS1C	Political Involvement - Spoken, Written Representative
QS1D	Political Involvement - Signed Petition
QS1E	Political Involvement - Protest Meeting
QS2A	Justification of Strikes
QS2B	Justification of Boycotts
QS2C	Justification of Rallies, Picketing, etc.
QS2D	Justification of Sit-Ins
QS2E	Justification of Violent Protests
QS3	Interested in Politics, Political Events
QS4A	Belong to Social Class
QS4B	Which Social Class Belong To
QS6	Federal Political Party Preference
QS8	Federal Election Held Today - Party Favour
QS9	Provincial Political Party Preference
QS11	Provincial Election Held Today - Party Favour
QJ4	OPINION - QUEBEC SEPARATING FROM CANADA

Source:

Atkinson, Tom; Blishen, Bernard; Ornstein, Michael; and
Stevenson, H. Michael

1979 Social Change in Canada: Trends in Attitudes,
Values, and Perceptions National Cross-Sectional
Survey Phase II May-August, 1979, Toronto, Instit-
ute for Behavioural Research (York University),
May-August 1979.

