NORTH PACIFIC SECURITY REGIMES:
THE NPCSD AND OPEN SKIES.
NORTH PACIFIC SECURITY REGIMES:
THE NORTH PACIFIC COOPERATIVE
SECURITY DIALOGUE AND OPEN SKIES.

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This thesis examines the likelihood of institutionalized security arrangements, which have been successfully developed in Europe, emerging in the North Pacific. It seeks to explain whether a security regime, involving confidence and security building measures (CSBM) or arms control, can be established in the region. If such a regime is to be established, the obstacles that have to be overcome are analyzed. As a way of testing the transferability of CSBM from Europe to the North Pacific, two regional CSBM proposals, the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD) and Open Skies (OS), are evaluated. It is concluded that the NPCSD is more likely to succeed, as a regional security regime, than an attempt to transplant the Open Skies concept from Europe to the North Pacific.

Given the problems between the various North Pacific states and the different circumstances between the North Pacific and Europe, the NPCSD is more likely to be adopted because it attempts to build the requisite political cooperation necessary for larger CSBM, like Open Skies, to work. Open Skies needs greater inter-state collaboration than currently available in the region. This thesis concludes with a discussion of how greater economic integration of the North Pacific political-economy might encourage political cooperation over regional issues.
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Chapter One: Theoretical Foundations

This thesis analyzes the likelihood of institutionalized security arrangements, which have been successfully developed in Europe, emerging in the North Pacific. It examines the possibility of a security regime, involving confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) or arms control, being established in the region. If such a regime is to be established, what are the obstacles that have to be overcome? As a way of testing the transferability of CSBMs from Europe to the North Pacific, two regional CSBM proposals, the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD) and Open Skies (OS), are evaluated. It is concluded that the NPCSD is more likely to succeed, as a regional security regime, than an attempt to transplant the Open Skies concept from Europe to the North Pacific. The discussion in this thesis does not address the respective foreign policies of North Pacific countries on an individual basis. Rather, a regional perspective underlies the analysis.

Chapter One defines which states constitute the North Pacific region and outlines the theoretical concepts used in the thesis. It defines the concepts of security complexes, international regimes, arms control, and CSBMs. Chapter Two examines the obstacles in the way of establishing a regional arms control or CSBM regime. Chapter Three discusses the applicability and relevance of the Canadian proposals for a
NPCSD and Open Skies in the region. Chapter Four suggests how the area's changing political economy might enhance cooperation through economic interaction and concludes that, as a CSBM, the NPCSD is more viable than Open Skies.

The NPCSD is a Canadian CSBM proposal, first announced in 1990, for a multilateral forum of discussion amongst the North Pacific states. It consists of parallel fora composed of inter-governmental (IGO) and non-governmental (NGO) participants. The first track is made up of policy planning officials from member countries. The second track is formed by interested academics. The objective is the amelioration of the North Pacific nations' security concerns through widespread consultation. It is assumed that the negotiating parties believe regional security can be both interdependent and enhanced by greater amounts of information about each other's intentions and capabilities. The thesis examines the probability of a successful adoption of the NPCSD.

The Open Skies concept dates back to 1955 and was revived in 1989 by Canada for the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations. This CSBM proposal called for participating states to allow aerial surveillance overflights by others, using unarmed reconnaissance aircraft equipped with mutually agreed sensors. The data gathered is shared to help reduce fears about each other's capabilities and intentions. This thesis, then, evaluates the possibility of transferring, and adapting, the Open Skies
idea from Europe to the North Pacific. Although Open Skies is more of a technical verification exercise than an attempt at multilateral consensus building, both initiatives were originally designed to increase confidence and cooperation between interested countries.

The North Pacific Ocean, along with its contiguous nation-states, provides the geographic scope of discussion. Japan, North Korea, South Korea, the northeast portion of the People's Republic of China (PRC), and the Pacific coast of Russia now constitutes the Northeast Asian base of the North Pacific region. The west coasts of Canada and the US form the area's Northwest Pacific anchor. The North Pacific coastline of Russia, at 26,720 km, is the second-longest of the continental Pacific states. In contrast, the northeast Asian shoreline of the PRC is less than 18,000 km. The PRC is considered a potential maritime and North Pacific power due to its political-military modernization, economic reforms, and geographic-demographic size. The Far Eastern Military Theatre (TVD-teatr voyennykh deystvii) of the Russian Republic, formerly the Soviet Union, comprises a quarter of its total territory or approximately 6.2 million square kilometers. This area includes the Kamchatka, Magadan, Amur, and Khabarovsk districts along with the Sakhalin Maritime Territory and the Yakutia Autonomous
Republic. The former Soviet Union, of which Russia was a part, traditionally had both key military installations and foreign policy objectives in the North Pacific.

Japan, as an economic superpower and a major Western ally in the region, sits astride the vital sealanes of Northeast Asia. In particular, its military forces can block the straits which former Soviet maritime forces need to traverse to reach the North Pacific. The Korean Peninsula is the site of competing interests involving the major powers and their regional partners. Canada and the United States are included because of their political, military, and economic interests in the region as well as their geographic location in the North Pacific. The North Pacific is, therefore, an arena of conflict involving the regional states. It is an increasingly important theatre of military competition with the deployment of modern air, surface, and subsurface forces. US, Japanese, Russian, Chinese, North and South Korean, along with Canadian military forces operate in close proximity to each other, especially in the


2 For this thesis, the discussion of the defunct Soviet Union prior to the abortive coup of August 1991 uses the old name of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). References to events after August 1991 uses the new name of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Where references are made to the Far Eastern areas of the former Soviet Union, the name used will be the Russian Republic.
Northeast Asian waters.\textsuperscript{3} The need for a security regime, particularly in the aftermath of the Cold War, is predicated on the assumption that the North Pacific states want an intra-regional political rapprochement. A new political detente would, it is hoped, lead to arms control and CSBMs applied to regional military forces. In turn, it is possible for CSBMs to help promote regional cooperation and political dialogue.

Along with the idea of a security regime, the concept of a regional security complex is useful in defining the region. Neither of these two ideas are mutually exclusive for the analysis of the North Pacific. It is clearly possible for a security regime to be developed for the North Pacific regional security complex. Focusing on such a complex helps explain the choice of countries for the North Pacific security region. Much of the strategic studies literature examines security at either the national or systemic level. Conceived of as another level of analysis in the academic study of international relations, a regional security complex occupies a place between the nation-state and the global system of states.\textsuperscript{4} Shifting from a higher

\textsuperscript{3} Frank Langdon and Douglas Ross, eds., Superpower Maritime Strategy in the Pacific (London: Routledge, 1990), 11.

\textsuperscript{4} Barry Buzan, "Introduction," in Case Studies of Regional Conflicts and Conflict Resolution, ed. Leif Ohlsson (Padrigu: Peace and Development Research Institute at Gothenburg University, 1989), 2. See also Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear 2nd ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
level of generality about the power structure of the international system to a more specific examination of a particular geographic region allows for greater analytical detail.

Barry Buzan, in particular, has been struck by the lack of a level of analysis between the state and international system.

In between, ... we find only the hazy derived notions of regional balances of power, and subsystems. Yet it is precisely in this middle area that the concept of security finds one of its most useful applications. Because security encompasses both subjective and objective factors, it directs inquiry more towards the nature of relations among states than towards the more rigid attempts to compare attributes which are characteristic of power analysis.  

He goes on to point out that, "(s)ecurity is not only a relational phenomenon between countries but also a seamless web where their capabilities, perceptions, and objectives interact."  

Security is not a zero-sum game but rather an interdependent linkage between nation-states. A regional security complex, then, revolves around the security perceptions of countries in a given geographic area. These perceptions are an empirical phenomenon with distinctive historical and geopolitical roots. The argument is, then, that a group of states' fears and foreign policy perspectives are linked together such that their security is


5 Buzan, People, States, and Fear, 105.

6 Buzan, "Introduction" in Ohlsson, Case Studies, 3.
interrelated. The individual security of each state in the complex can not be addressed in isolation from the others.

The boundaries of such a complex are defined by the limits of their security interdependence. The limits of security interdependence are set where one state does not play a significant part in other states' security perceptions. The point at which one country does not play a significant role in the security policy calculus of another state, due to geographic distance or foreign policy indifference, constitutes the borders of a regional security complex. In the case of the North Pacific, the security concerns of the US, Russia, the PRC, both Koreas, Japan, and Canada are interlinked. Unlike the concept of a regional sub-system, a regional security complex helps define more clearly the historical patterns of alignment and enmity within a given area.

Within a security complex, there is usually a high level of perceived threat from a geographically proximate state or number of states. There may also be a high level of trust between allied countries inside a complex. The links binding a complex together are generally cultural, political, strategic, geographical, historical, and

7 Muthiah Alagappa, The Dynamics of International Security in Southeast Asia (Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Centre International Relations program Reprint Series #8 1991), 12. See also Buzan, People, States, and Fear, 106.

8 Buzan, "Introduction" in Ohlsson, Case Studies, 8.
economic. They perform a supportive or antagonistic function. The complexes tend to be durable but are not permanent, nor do they possess a rigid structure. In the North Pacific, the US, Japan, South Korea, and Canada form one cluster while the PRC, Russia, and North Korea form the other within the complex. Buzan makes the additional distinction between a lower level and a higher level security complex. The former consists of local states without a major military power projection capability whereas the latter includes countries with this ability, like the US and the CIS. Clearly, the North Pacific constitutes a higher level regional security complex.

Security complexes, like the one in the North Pacific region, illustrate the link between geographic diversity and an anarchic international system. Within the North Pacific, there are a number of bilateral security relationships interconnected at a regional level. These rivalries illustrate how respective national securities can become deeply intertwined and difficult to separate. They include, for example: North and South Korea (DPRK-ROK); Russia and the Peoples' Republic of China; Russia and Japan; Canada and the United States vis-a-vis Russia; the PRC and both Koreas; Russia in relation to the two Koreas; and Japan and the PRC. Political disputes at the domestic and intra-regional

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9 Ibid., 9.
10 Ibid., 11.
levels, thus, have the potential to spill over into the international sphere. The states which make up the North Pacific security complex were bound together, during the Cold War, by the conflicts between the nuclear superpowers and their regional allies. Local territorial disputes and extra-regional relations defined the national security priorities and perceived insecurities of the North Pacific states.

The primary focus of this thesis, therefore, is on the possible development of a security regime, like those found in Europe, within a North Pacific regional security complex. A security regime, of the CSBM variety like the NPCSD and Open Skies, could alleviate misperceptions within a regional complex. Regional security complexes are the product of an anarchic international structure and reflect more accurately the "operating environment of national security policymakers than do higher level abstractions about the distribution of power in the system."¹¹

More importantly, security complexes offer an approach to security which requires attention to both the macro-level of great power impact on the system, and the micro-level of local state relations. In forcing attention to both levels security complexes emphasise the mutuality of impact between them, with external influences tending to amplify local problems, and local problems shaping and constraining external entanglements and influences....As a tool of analysis, security complexes encompasses traditional power priorities by allowing for linked hierarchies of complexes. At the same time, they stress the importance of patterns of relations and sources of

¹¹ Buzan, _People, States, and Fear_, 111.
insecurity at all levels through which power relations are mediated.\textsuperscript{12}

The security dilemma faced by all countries increases both incentives for and obstacles to an arms control-CSBM regime. This is especially true in the North Pacific. Security regimes are difficult to construct and implement because of the fear of others circumventing their obligations and the detrimental consequences of unilateral action. They are most difficult to develop when they were most needed and appear more readily when their presence is less required. Obstacles to the emergence of regimes include the possibility of defection, as found in a Prisoners' Dilemma game, and the free-rider problem associated with collective action.\textsuperscript{13} In an anarchic international system without an overarching authority regulating inter-state relations, nation-states look towards their own resources for self-preservation.

Hence, the efforts of individual nation-states to improve their security are perceived by others as threatening, not as defensive measures. This action and reaction spiral constitutes a vicious circle at the core of a security dilemma. The primacy of security as a national

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 112.

objective, inter-state competition in a anarchical world, and uncertainty over the necessary or sufficient level of security accentuates the dilemmas states face. Security regimes help overcome this problem by providing incentives for actors within a regional complex to reach mutual goals. Cooperative solutions, like security regimes of the arms control or CSBM variety, are less common than individual state's attempts to improve their relative position in the region. They initially appear less attractive because decision-making elites are sanguine about mutual restraints limiting state actions.  

However, before one applies the concepts of arms control and CSBMs to the North Pacific, a clear definition of each is necessary. Arms Control is dealt with first. A number of common points in the large and diverse strategic studies literature on arms control are useful for a concise meaning. The arms control process starts from the assumption the world is composed of sovereign nation-states, some of whom are in adversarial relations with one another. Arms Control has three objectives. First, arms control agreements reduce the likelihood of interstate war and enhance mutual security. Second, if war occurs, the resultant damage is limited by prior restraints on armaments. Third, they reduce the cost of preparing for war. The first goal forms the main focus of arms control

14 Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy, 176.
itself. It is achieved by improving both crisis stability and arms race stability, enhancing the predictability of state actions, and furthering a sense of confidence between countries. The purpose, then, of arms control is to reduce those elements of armaments (and foreign policy) that make for instability. Stability and crisis management are the basic policy objectives of arms control.

Thus, arms control is part of a beneficial process whereby negotiations, leading to agreements enhancing mutual security, foster more peaceful international relations. Trust between nation-states, crucial in the arms control process, cannot be developed without a history of honored agreements. There has to be a perceived mutual security gain for all parties in any arms control measure. National decision-makers try to attain the objectives of greater stability, predictability, confidence or a combination of these. What is important is that the benefits outweigh the costs.

In a similar fashion, Hedley Bull defines arms control as "international restraint exercised upon armaments, whether in respect to levels of weapons, their character,

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16 Ibid., 11.

17 Ibid., 200.
deployment, or use."\textsuperscript{18} Arms control constitutes a particular perspective on international relations because it mediates the security dilemmas inherent in the structure of international society. Instead of the elimination of armaments as an objective, arms control stabilizes military relationships. Not only is it a vehicle for strategic change, but it also helps stabilize the international political system.

When an informal or formal arms control agreement is reached between the negotiating parties, the accord specifies concrete changes in the numbers and types of the participants' military forces, their deployments, and their national command, control, communication, and intelligence systems. However, arms control accords do not resolve the underlying political issues that cause regional or global tensions. They only alter the political status quo marginally and/or legitimize an existing confrontation. The domestic political process also plays a role in whether a proposed arms control measure receives legislative approval. Agreements believed to be asymmetrical, in terms of perceived costs and benefits, by the domestic legislative institutions of a nation-state may be politically unacceptable.

\textsuperscript{18} Hedley Bull, \textit{The Control of the Arms Race}, (London: Weidenfeld, 1961), ix, quoted in Gerald Segal, \textit{Rethinking the Pacific}, 261.
Therefore, arms control entails cooperation between and among potential adversaries in order to avoid war, reduce the high cost of preparing for war, and the consequences of waging it. Arms control, as a process and in terms of informal or formal agreements, increases national and international security by complementing a nation-state's military strength. Unlike disarmament, arms control can involve reductions in weapon systems and deployments but do not necessarily require them. Arms control also includes measures that stabilize a given military-strategic balance.

One useful and illustrative example of arms control is the limitation on, and the counting rules applied to, Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) in the 1972 SALT and 1991 START treaties. MIRVs were restricted in size and number for individual missiles, although not actually reduced in terms of national stockpiles. Hence, the destabilizing consequences of the vertical proliferation of MIRVs was recognized much later by both nuclear superpowers. Therefore, arms control is premised upon wars evolving from the decisions of human beings. Arms reductions are considered worthwhile if they decrease instability and the chances of war being initiated. However, the assumptions underlying arms control overlap considerably with those of disarmament since the signings of

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the 1987 INF accord, the 1990 CFE treaty, and the START agreement. These arms control measures incorporated elements of quantitative disarmament.

Peace and stability are functions of, amongst other things, national intentions and capabilities. There has to be a common interest between states in the creation of a negotiated environment which decreases instabilities resulting from new technology, contemporary political disputes, and geo-political changes. Stability and crisis management are, thus, the key objectives of arms control. However, the arms control process and the agreements arising from it have unforeseen, asymmetrical consequences. As a technical solution to political problems, arms control is prone to obsolescence due to changing political, strategic, and technological conditions.

Confidence in any negotiated accord between states depends, in large part, upon the verification process whereby their intelligence gathering and interpretation capabilities are utilized to satisfy themselves that others abide by the terms of agreement. Verification is a function of monitoring, collecting, and evaluating data gathered on the activities of other parties. It promotes public confidence in the arms control process, detects circumvention of mutually agreed provisions, and ensures

20 Ibid., 8.
21 Ibid., 123.
compliance with any agreement. Thus, verification of arms control measures highlights the absence of trust between states. Compared with the alternative of an arms race, it is a more cost-effective route to improved mutual security.22

Both arms control and verification are attempts by one or more countries to preserve the existing power balance in military and political-strategic terms. Arms control is also a political process whereby governments exhibit their desire for peace, ameliorate confrontation, and reduce perceived military threats. Arms control enhances national and global security when states pursue cooperative efforts with potential adversaries.23 It implies the reduction of the quantity of armaments by interested states. This goal can also be reached by negotiating and implementing Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) between states.

Arms control and CSBMs, then, are two separate yet interlinked concepts in international relations. CSBMs occupy a larger place in contemporary arms control theory. Unlike arms control, CSBMs looks more at perceived intentions rather than actual capabilities. Whereas arms control focuses on restraining the number, character, deployment, and use of weapon systems, CSBMs improve the

22 Ibid., 125-126.
23 Ibid., 147-151.
knowledge of the parties about each others' military activities. They reduce the risks of war by accident or miscalculation, communication breakdown, and mitigate the prospect of a surprise attack. Crises are less likely and if they occur, their severity is limited. Those creating CSBMs seek to reduce the risks of fateful miscalculations on the part of governments.\textsuperscript{24} The nature of both the NPCSD and Open Skies place them both in the CSBM category.

Some examples of CSBMs include: data exchanges between parties to an agreement that increase the transparency of respective military operations; prior notification and guest observation of military exercises; limits on the number and size of military maneuvers by one or more states; national technical means (NTM) of verifying compliance with an arms control accord; and on-site inspection (OSI) of mutually specified, treaty-limited items and restricted geographic areas.

OSI takes five different forms, varying in terms of their intrusiveness. First, remote on-site inspection involves seismic sensors, electronic listening posts, and/or radars. Second, limited OSI includes challenge inspections of specified areas. Third, interval OSI consists of regular, scheduled visits. Fourth, residential on-site inspection has foreign personnel observing certain key

locales. Fifth, unlimited zonal OSI allows free-roaming checks in defined spaces. 25 Open Skies includes elements of the first, third, and fifth types.

But where does the concept of international regimes fit in? The security regime concept is important because it has the potential to alleviate the perceived national insecurities of North Pacific countries. Jervis thinks of a security regime as "those converging norms, principles, expectations, and rules that encouraged nation-states to be constrained in their security policy behaviour." This belief rests upon the assumption that other countries reciprocate. It also assumes the existence of expectations facilitating cooperation, especially expectations which accept that long-term interests take precedence over short-term ones. 26 Krasner argue that international regimes consist of the "implicit or explicit principles, norm, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for


making and implementing collective choice." Both definitions overlap but for the purposes of this thesis, the latter conception is used because of its more inclusive nature.

The formation and maintenance of a security regime, then, in any given area depends upon the interests of the regional states. The premise here is that the parties prefer a more regulated environment whereby the status quo is maintained or modified slightly and the actors believe others share the same norms and values. Such international regimes, encompassing the norms, rules, principles, and decision-making procedures shared by participating countries, also preserve and enhance the interests of those states. These complementary objectives become the basis for cooperation under certain conditions.

No security regime functions if one or more parties do not perceive its interests served by a given formal or informal agreement. Where the perceived costs and risks of confrontation outweigh the benefits, incentives for cooperating to preserve the status quo increase and the


interdependence of mutual security is recognized. In the North Pacific, a cooperative security structure requires the major powers and their regional allies to acknowledge the dangers of destabilizing the existing power balance. They must prefer an arms control and/or CSBM regime with the potential for modifications by uncoerced political changes to a world of unilateral gains and losses.  

Cooperation, in contrast to discord and harmony, requires active attempts to adjust policies to meet the demands of others. That is, not only does it depend on shared interests but it emerges from a pattern of (potential) discord. Without discord, there is no cooperation, only harmony. Cooperation, as mutual adjustment, is more than just common interests outweighing conflicting ones. The security concerns of North Pacific states, then, are mutually interdependent and require common recognition of the need to reduce regional tensions. A formal security regime, such as an arms control or CSBM accord, entails cooperative changes to a conflictual political relationship. An arms control or CSBM security regime thus contributes to cooperation by altering the context in which states make decisions. It is valuable to governments not because it enforces binding rules on others,


it does not, but a regime makes it possible for governments to enter into mutually beneficial agreements with one another. It empowers decision-making elites rather than shackling them.\textsuperscript{31}

The creation of an international security regime depends upon a combination of shared interests amongst the major powers and their regional allies, the contemporary balance of power, and the distribution of political practices and expectations. It continues in existence, if carefully designed initially, despite changing international and domestic conditions. Constructing an arms control or CSBM regime requires interstate cooperation to bring policies and actions into conformity with one another, according to formal agreements or implicit understandings, through the process of negotiation.

Cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behaviors to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination. To summarize more formally, intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating the realization of their own objectives, as the result of policy coordination.\textsuperscript{32}

The cooperation necessary for a security regime is intertwined with real or potential conflict and reflects partially successful efforts to overcome opposing policies. Where actors perceive their actions and objectives in

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 13.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 53.
conflict, actual or hypothetical, cooperation is possible. Without the spectre of a plausible clash, there is no need for cooperative measures. Once intergovernmental collaboration on a arms control or CSBM regime begins, its four component aspects (principles, norms, rules, and decision-making processes) reflect the objectives of participating countries. Also, the relative power of participating countries reveals how and who constructs and benefits from an international security regime.  

Thus, in the following analysis both the NPCSD and Open Skies are considered as possible formal CSBMs which could begin the process of building a North Pacific security regime. This is done in light of the obstacles impeding the inter-state cooperation necessary for their regional emergence and transferability from Europe. In the North Pacific region, political and economic changes within and between the various states in the late 1980s and early 1990s provided the opportunity for CSBMs and arms control agreements to develop. The end of the Cold War, the viability of reforms in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), potential instability in the PRC, Japan's role in the international system, the direction of inter-Korean relations, the settlement of territorial disputes, and the increased integration of the Northeast Asian political

33 See Susan Strange, "Cave! Hic Dragones," International Organization 36 (2) (Spring 1982): 480, for a discussion of relational and structural power.
economy are factors considered in this analysis. The NPCSD and Open Skies proposals are examples of how security dilemmas can be ameliorated. The question addressed in this study is how applicable these two CSBMs might be to the North Pacific region.

The differences between Europe and the North Pacific are not trivial. During the Cold War, Europe had a clear demarcation between the NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. The North Pacific, in contrast, is a more multipolar region with cross-cutting alliances. Instead of two opposing blocs, the North Pacific has three major military powers along with four other regional powers. The US, the former Soviet Union, and the PRC all had competing objectives in the area. In particular, the PRC balanced itself between the US and the old USSR while the DPRK oscillated between Beijing and Moscow. In addition to this, the confrontation in Europe was largely land-based whereas the North Pacific has a larger maritime component. Moreover, there is a long European history of arms control and CSBM efforts, like the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), while the North Pacific has no comparable diplomatic tradition. The North Pacific border disputes which play a significant role in impeding the emergence of a regional security regime, and which are discussed in later chapters of this thesis, have no counterpart in Europe because the
final status of post-1945 boundaries were settled by the 1975 Helsinki CSCE conference.

The following chapters, then, deal with a number of key issues. First, the obstacles that might prevent the emergence of a North Pacific security regime are assessed. Second, the viability of transferring CSBM proposals for regional security from Europe to the North Pacific, particularly the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue and Open Skies concepts, is reviewed. Third, how the regional security environment has changed since 1989 and the consequences for the possible emergence of a regional CSBM regime in the North Pacific is analyzed. The thesis concludes with a discussion of how the evolving regional political economy affects the regional applicability of the two Canadian CSBM proposals. The assumption here, at least implicitly, is that smaller states, like Canada, can have a leadership and innovation role to play.
Chapter Two: Roadblocks Ahead

This chapter analyzes the obstacles that have to overcome if arms control and confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) regimes are to be developed in the North Pacific. It examines the possibility of adapting CSBMs, that were successful in a European context, to the North Pacific. As a way of testing the transferability of CSBMs from one regional context to another, two possible forms of CSBMs are studied. They are the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD), an institution-building CSBM, and Open Skies, a technical verification CSBM. The analysis also focuses on a number of key political-strategic problems and how they have, to date, prevented the development of greater levels of inter-state cooperation. They give some indication of the difficulties in transferring particular forms of CSBMs from Europe to the North Pacific. These problems are, first, the territorial dispute over the Kuriles Islands (also known as the Northern Territories) between the Soviet Union/Russia and Japan; secondly, the disputed border along the land boundary between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the former Soviet Union/Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)\textsuperscript{34};

\textsuperscript{34} The historical analysis used in this chapter refers to the defunct Soviet Union as the Soviet Union/Russia for events prior to 1991. The term of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is used with reference to events after 1991. The rapid changes since the failed coup of
thirdly, the impasse on the Korean Peninsula between South Korea (ROK) and North Korea (DPRK); and fourthly, the unique geo-political and cultural context of the North Pacific.

The lack of any arms control and CSBM regimes in the area must be understood within the historical context of the Cold War in the North Pacific. The conditions prevailing in the North Pacific were different from those in Europe. The bilateral confrontations outlined above were also connected to the state of relations between the United States and the former Soviet Union. The security perceptions of the regional states have clearly been influenced by their crucial geographical locations and their roles as theatres of military confrontation. For example, during the Cold War it was argued that,

The Soviet Union constitute[d] the heartland power which produce[d] the major military threat linking the security orders in Europe and Asia. Nations inhabiting the Eurasian land-mass ha[d] no alternative to sharing the continent with the Soviet Union....The balance of power must be maintained as must a balance of incentives designed to induce cooperative behaviour and mutual restraint.\(^{35}\)

Moreover, the point was constantly made that,

The North Pacific Ocean and its adjoining waters constitute a region of great strategic significance for both the US and the [former] Soviet Union. It is also an area where the interests and objectives of the major littoral states- Canada, China, and Japan- converge. All five nations naturally protect their security and

August 1991 have made appropriate labelling of these states difficult.

vital interests in the region and deploy an array of military forces to achieve that goal. The Korean situation adds a significant element of uncertainty. The dramatic events in the international system since 1989 form the background for the changes, or lack thereof, in the area. The dawn of the post-cold war era provides a useful demarcation line for a comparison of the past, present, and future.

Japan and Russia

The first obstacle to the development of a North Pacific arms control and CSBM regime to be discussed is the territorial dispute over the island chain separating Japan from the Far Eastern area of Russia. The Kurile islands are also referred to by the Japanese as their Northern Territories (NT). They are located southwest of the Kamchatka peninsula and form an island barrier to the Sea of Okhotsk. Control of these islands confers a strategic, geographical advantage because they provide bases for air-naval forces capable of protecting the straits leading to and from the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk. These waterways are

the straits of Tsushima, Tatar, Soya, Kuriles, Shineseki and Tsugaru.37

The proximity of then Soviet and now Russian military bases, such as Vladivostok and Sovietskaya Gavan, to the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk make this sector of the North Pacific one of the most closely watched during the Cold War. The US, Russia, and Japan recognize the importance of these waterways in their geo-political and military strategies. The islands under dispute consist of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai. They cover a total area of 4,996 square kilometers and are situated near Cape Nossappu on the north coast of Hokkaido island.38 The history of this territorial controversy dates back to a mid-nineteenth century dispute between Czarist Russia and Imperial Japan. Its more recent manifestations go back to the end of the Second World War. Thus, "the territorial issue is the symbol and substance of the Japanese-Soviet relationship."39

Japan claims sovereignty over the Kuriles-NT based on a number of legal points. First, Japan argues that the 1855 Treaty of Shimoda and the 1875 Treaty of St. Petersburg confirmed Japanese rule over the islands. Second, the 1945

37 Blechman, Confidence-Building in the North Pacific: A Pragmatic Approach to Naval Arms Control, 206.


Yalta Accord between the Allied Powers, which ceded the Kuriles-NT to Russia, never included Japan as a party to that decision. Third, Japan believes Soviet/Russian claims are illegal because the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Accord stated that the Allies had no plans for territorial acquisitions from the Axis Powers. Fourth, Japan, under the terms of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, to which the Soviet Union was not a party, never relinquished its sovereignty over the Kuriles-NT. Fifth, Japan refers back to the 1956 Joint Declaration between it and the former Soviet Union to press for the return of Shikotan and Habomai.

In contrast, the former Soviet Union claimed the 1855 and 1875 treaties were invalidated by the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth ending the Russo-Japanese war. Second, the Soviets argued that both the Yalta and Potsdam agreements were considered legitimate. Third, the Soviet government felt Japan had to suffer the consequences of helping initiate the Second World War. Fourth, the Soviets pointed out the fact that Japan signed the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty which nullified any claims it had on the Kuriles-NT. In addition to the above points, there was little hope of territorial compromise during the Cold War until all US forces left Japan. Prior to the abortive coup in August 1991, the former Soviet Union proposed the return of Habomai and Shikotan, the demilitarization of the Kuriles-NT, a
joint economic zone of trade, and UN trusteeship over the islands. These proposals were rejected by Japan. The Japanese demand for the return of all the islands accentuated the then Soviet government's fear of creating a dangerous precedent in returning territory acquired after 1945. Since taking over the Kremlin, the Russian government has not produced a definitive position on the Kuriles-NT but it can reasonably be assumed that, for the moment at least, their view of the history of the dispute is similar to that of the former Soviet government.

In addition, there is the question of the Kurile-NT's military importance. The islands form a natural barrier or choke-point in and out of the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk. The latter has particular strategic value as a sanctuary for nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) based at Petropavlovsk. The former, during the Cold War, was a "watery fulcrum" around which the superpowers engaged as part of their global contest. It constituted a major prize in that competition. Naval forces in one sea could be

40 Ibid., 5.


interdicted by hostile forces based on or near the Kuriles-NT. Control of the straits referred to earlier would be greatly hindered or eased, depending on who possessed these islands. The most important of these waterways are the Tsugaru Kaikyo, between Hokkaido and Honshu islands, and the Tshushima Kaikyo or Korea Strait, between Japan and South Korea. Somewhat more difficult to traverse and, hence, rather less strategic are the Soya Kaikyo, between Hokkaido and Sakhalin islands, and Tatar strait, between the mainland and Sakhalin.43

The former Soviet, now CIS, Pacific fleet, therefore, has been largely landlocked within its bases along the Sea of Okhotsk except for Petrapovlovsk on the Kamchatka peninsula. However, that port suffers from ice-flows as well as vulnerable communication and supply routes. Given the importance of the Kuriles-NT as a barrier to the Okhotsk SSBN sanctuary, as a buffer to the Soviet Far East military district (TVD)44, and as a precedent for post-1945 territorial concessions, the unresolved dispute with Japan has not been a total surprise. Possession of these islands during the Cold War alleviated somewhat Soviet concerns regarding access to the North Pacific via the straits. As part of the Reagan era military buildup, the US Maritime

43 Ibid., 74.

Strategy, which emphasized an aggressive military posture in dealing with the Soviet navy, and the proposed 500 ship American navy increased Soviet fears of joint US-Japanese naval blockades in the event of hostilities. Even more than the US, Japan remained skeptical about dealing with the Soviet Union, both before Gorbachev came to power and prior to the 1991 abortive coup, because of the long history of armed conflict, ideological differences and border tensions.

Since the nineteenth century, then, the Kuriles-NT dispute has involved questions of sovereignty, the extent of territorial delimitation, commercial interests, and the influence of other great powers. In the twentieth century, security and trade are two other considerations complicating a settlement of this issue.45 The Soviet Union, and now Russia, considered the consequences of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements the legitimate result of Japan surrendering in 1945. The post-war status quo has been unquestioned as the possession of the Kuriles-NT strengthened Soviet military-strategic security. For their part, the Japanese felt a deep sense of grievance and betrayal because their concerns were sacrificed to great power rivalries.46

The history of the failure of bilateral negotiations between the old USSR and Japan has underlined the lack of


46 Ibid., 460-462.
diplomatic flexibility on both sides, the obstacle that domestic politics in both countries represent, and how the Cold War affected the regional political environment. Given the large military infrastructure built on the Kuriles-NT by the Soviets to protect the naval bases around the Sea of Okhotsk, the military-strategic value of the islands was obvious. The Kuriles-NT helped meet contingency plans against multiple potential threats by shielding ports, supply lines, and communication links from Japanese and American forces on Hokkaido and Honshu islands. Conversely for Japan and the US, the Soviet military threat was the main factor behind their Cold War military and political-security policies.

The stalemate in Soviet- and now Russian- Japanese relations highlights the lack of compromise over the Kuriles-NT and the lingering Cold War antagonism. A rapprochement has not appeared partly because of a lack of bilateral interest in improving political and economic relations. The relatively limited Soviet-Japanese trade, since 1945, was along barter-type lines, as if between a less-developed country and a more-developed one. Russian raw resources were traded for Japanese finished, high-end products. The need for Japanese credit, capital and consumer goods was strong while Japanese interest in

\[47\text{ Ibid., 464.}\]

\[48\text{ Ibid., 465-466.}\]
Siberian resources waxed and waned. Adverse geography, the technological problems inherent in deposit extraction, and the lack of industrial transportation infrastructure in Siberia made Japanese investors wary of greater commercial interaction. Perhaps in response to the lack of progress in bilateral relations, the former USSR improved ties with South Korea hoping to obtain financial credits, greater trade, and investment as a substitute for Japan in Soviet Far East development.

The 1986 and 1988 agreements over ancestral grave visitation rights, cultural exchanges, and fishing rights between Japan and the former Soviet Union were symbolic accords between the two nations. With the end of the Cold War, the Kuriles-NT does not have the same military significance as before. The return of the islands, for the Japanese, is the sine qua non of better Soviet-Japanese ties. Given its declining military value with regard to Soviet and now Russian protection of its SSBN sanctuaries, the eventual return of the Kuriles-NT is clearly more likely. In addition, any quid pro quo, with an exchange of Japanese financial aid for the return of these islands, is


complicated by the possibility of concessionary investment from South Korea, the European Community, and the United States. Assistance from these other countries reduces the need to rely on Japanese help.

The Kuriles-NT is a important and highly symbolic issue for Japan. In Japan, anything short of the full return of the islands might prove politically unacceptable. The old Soviet proposal to return Shikotan and Habomai, because of their eastern geographic position and relatively lower military value, is unsatisfactory for Japan. Demilitarization of part or all of the Kuriles-NT has to be part of a post-Cold War thaw.

Any compromise must include the possibility of bilateral or regional arms control and CSBMs as part of a settlement. Without a shift in the regional power balance that satisfies its security concerns, the former Soviet Union was unwilling to relinquish the islands as a strategic buffer. Russian perceptions of a US-Japanese threat must be reduced for a territorial compromise to succeed. The Russian-CIS Navy would have to alter its SSBN bastion policy towards the Arctic if it abandons the Sea of Okhotsk as a sanctuary by returning the Kuriles-NT.


Given the instability of the CIS in the post-coup period, policy changes on this issue await the results of political and socio-economic reforms. A relatively stable, reconstructed Russia/CIS could negotiate with Japan for a post-Cold War arrangement. An unstable Russia/CIS, dissolving into inter-ethnic conflict, is incapable of reaching a compromise. The process of political and socio-economic reforms in Russia/CIS is likely to be long and difficult, even with Western aid. The perception of a Russian threat, in decline since Gorbachev enunciated his Asia-Pacific initiatives from 1986 onwards, has declined further because of concerns over internal stability in the CIS. The completion of Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) disarmament, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) signings are harbingers of continued post-Cold War cooperation. But the key to any Russian-Japanese detente is still a resolution of the Kuriles-NT issue.

China and Russia

The second problem that obstructs the emergence and development of a North Pacific CSBM or arms control regime is the disputed land border between the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union/Russia. In a manner comparable to the Kuriles-NT issue, the two countries'
competing claims and historical antagonism also date back to the nineteenth century. Since then, the significance of the dispute to the two sides has ebbed and flowed. Most recently while Gorbachev was in power from 1985 to 1991, there was a progressive rapprochement between the two regional powers. An example of this detente may be seen in the May 1989 removal of 12 ground divisions, 11 air regiments, and 16 vessels from the Pacific fleet by 1991. The measures implemented by the PRC and the Soviets have been construed as, in effect, tacit CSBMs and therefore, a stepping stone towards resolving conflicting claims.

The border dispute concerns the exact location of the Soviet/Russian-PRC boundary along the Amur-Ussuri-Argun (A-U-A) rivers running through Siberia and Manchuria. Stretching from the Sea of Japan to West Mongolia, the common boundary is over 5000 km. More specifically, the islands along the Amur-Ussuri-Argun rivers, the delta between the Zeya and Bureya rivers, the Manzhouli area at the eastern junction of the Sino-Russo-Mongolian borders, and the Pamir Mountains along the Sinkiang-Tajikistan boundary are the areas under dispute between the PRC and the Commonwealth of Independent States. During the Cold War,

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the Sino-Soviet split exacerbated tensions over these territories. Only during Gorbachev's tenure did a new dialogue with the PRC succeed in resolving this problem.56

Preliminary meetings between the two countries began in Moscow in February of 1987. The Soviets argued their border with the PRC ran along the Chinese bank of the A-U-A rivers rather than their side. Thus, the islands astride the rivers were claimed as Soviet territory. In contrast, the PRC believed the boundary ran along the Soviet side of the rivers. The channel islands were considered to be Chinese land. In October 1988, the Sino-Soviet rapprochement produced an understanding whereby both sides agreed that Zhenbao (Damansky) island, site of border skirmishes in 1969, belonged on the Chinese side of the A-U-A rivers.

The strategic geographic location of Heixiazi has a large role in Sino-Soviet military security considerations. Whoever controls that island could attack across or defend the rivers along the border. The nearest city to Heixiazi, Kharbarovsk, is the headquarters for the Far East Military District, the site of major naval and air force installations, as well as an important equipment depot along the Baikur-Amal and Trans-Siberian railways. Military bases like Vladivostok, Kharbarovsk, and Nakhodha depend on these lines of communication and supply. They are, however, potentially vulnerable to Chinese bombardment, air strikes,

56 Ibid., 6.
and ground assaults. Conversely, the PRC feels that Heixiazi is crucial to the defense of its border regions, particularly in terms of the interdiction of air or ground attacks against industrial or military targets in Manchuria. 57

Despite the improvements in Sino-Soviet relations from 1987 onwards, the territorial dispute remains deadlocked over the status of Heixiazi. The PRC argues that the A-U-A rivers form its northern boundary with the island under its jurisdiction. Needless to say, the Soviets, and since December 1991 the Russians, believe the border is on the southern tributary of the A-U-A rivers, thus Heixiazi is within its control. Both the Chinese and the Soviets/Russians see the island as important in geostrategic, political, and military security terms. Despite the political stalemate, the border areas between both countries have witnessed an increase in bilateral trade. Barter exchanges and joint production ventures have been set up in nine trading locations along the A-U-A rivers as each side attempts to take advantage of its comparative economic strengths. 58

By 1986, the Soviet government had recognized that its relative isolation from both China and Japan, along with its consequent estrangement from East Asia's economic

57 Ibid., 7-8.
58 Ibid., 10-11.
development required a new approach. Indeed, as part of Gorbachev's New Thinking in Soviet foreign policy, there emerged a greater emphasis on peaceful regional conflict resolution, a decreased dependence on military force in dispute resolution, and a greater use of diplomatic overtures to other North Pacific states. Concessions on selected aspects of the Sino-Soviet border issue highlighted attempts to alter the political-strategic environment and regional perceptions of its policies in the North Pacific. The arms control and confidence-building proposals outlined in the July 1986 Vladivostok speech, the September 1988 address at Krasnoyarsk, the visit by Gorbachev to Beijing in May 1989, and the October 1991 reply to President Bush's arms reductions were all examples of Soviet efforts to improve bilateral relations with regional states.

In turn, the PRC recognized the necessity of a rapprochement with the former Soviet Union as part of its desire to remain a major actor in the North Pacific and to continue to participate in East Asian economic development. There was a mutual recognition by both countries that successful domestic reforms need a relatively secure external environment. The normalization of Sino-Soviet


relations, the detente with South Korea, and the dialogue with Japan were all examples of the New Thinking in Soviet foreign policy in the North Pacific. The Gorbachev proposals on Asia-Pacific security incorporated the realization that security, political and economic, depended on managing greater interdependence. In this sense, then, the prospects for a resolution to the remaining issue in the Soviet/Russia-PRC border dispute are fairly good.

North and South Korea

The third obstacle to the development of a North Pacific security regime is the stalemate between South Korea (Republic of Korea-ROK) and North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea-DPRK). The Cold War division began in 1945 and was solidified by the Korean War of 1950-1953. The Korean peninsula is one of the last major points of regional conflict because the concentration of opposing military forces remains unparalleled in the Asia-Pacific region. North and South Korea have over two million troops along a heavily fortified border.61 Both countries have been relatively unaffected, as yet, by the end of the Cold War between the nuclear superpowers and the beginning of the post-Cold War era. During the Cold War, the belief of a Soviet-Chinese-North Korean threat dominated political-

strategic thinking for the South Koreans and Americans. With the changes in Soviet/Russia-American, Sino-Soviet/Russia, ROK-PRC, ROK-US, and DPRK-PRC-Soviet relations, that perception is changing. Moreover, on the Korean peninsula as elsewhere, the North Pacific states have come to realize the importance of economic power and how it has altered conceptions of regional power and security. Military power is no longer sufficient as a barometer of relative capability.62

The Korean Peninsula remains a potential area of conflict and instability in the Asia-Pacific. The peninsular confrontation is the result of years of suspicion and hostility which, until recently, has been unrelieved by any serious joint efforts to negotiate improvements. Surrounding Korea are major powers with vital security interests in the region - the PRC, the former Soviet Union, and Japan. The United States is a key presence with its security commitments to Japan and South Korea.63 Divided Korea is not only the focal point of armed confrontation between two hostile regimes and states - the DPRK and the


ROK - but also as a strategic fulcrum where the four major world powers have an active interest. The intersection of these two contending forces and prevailing trends, the inter-Korean rivalry and the involvement of major powers, create a situation of real and potential regional conflict.\(^\text{64}\)

South Korea has been allied with the United States since the Korean war and American troops have been stationed within its borders. At the conclusion of the Korean War armistice in 1953, neither side recognized the other as a legitimate state. During the Cold War, both superpowers realized the geo-strategic importance of the Korean peninsula for their respective regional strategies. The intersection of these rivalries on the peninsula constituted a threat to security but recent changes offer an opportunity for diplomatic negotiations. However, the Korean situation contrasts with developments elsewhere. One major change in international affairs has been the collapse of the Cold War ideological confrontation, particularly in Europe. The Malta Summit of December 1989 symbolized the end of the Cold War between the superpowers. A post-Cold War mentality is only now, in 1992, slowly starting to penetrate the peninsula.

While the immediate relations between the two Koreas have remained relatively constant, the broader context for this relationship have altered considerably. These changes are beginning to have an impact on the two countries. The collapse of the Soviet bloc, the growth of the North Pacific political economy, the internal problems of the PRC, and the role of the US in the post-Cold War era may lead the two Korean states towards a revision of their respective foreign policies. During the past year, the roles of the major powers have changed forcing both North and South Korea to begin adjusting to a more multipolar international system.

In the case of the United States, a reduction in its military role has had a catalytic effect on further ROK-DPRK cooperation. In turn, rising South Korean nationalism, concerns over the ROK-US trade imbalances, the success of South Korea's Nordpolitik, and a more ambiguous perception of external threats to the ROK, have combined to place the role of the US in the peninsula in a state of flux.\(^6\) Despite the detente between the major powers, the security problem still revolves around the high level of military tension along the ROK-DPRK boundary. With the end of the Cold War, the inter-Korean nature of this dispute has taken on greater salience. Bilateral relations between the two Koreas and other North Pacific states have been strengthened.

\(^{65}\) Ibid., 554. See also Susan Chira, "North and South Korea are still far apart," *New York Times*, 6 October 1991, A4.
in an attempt to localize this particular regional conflict. For example, the Soviet Union and South Korea formally established diplomatic relations with each other on 30 September 1990.66

The military forces of the DPRK, with the assistance of the PRC and the former Soviet Union, are perceived as the main threat to the ROK, while American and South Korean troops are viewed as the major antagonists of the DPRK. With the end to the Korean War and the implementation of the Cold War containment doctrine, American military personnel were stationed in the South to deter another attack from North Korea. Similarly, Soviet and Chinese military aid to the DPRK was intended to help prevent aggression from South Korea. North Korea, backed by both the Soviet Union and the PRC, allowed its allies access to naval ports and aerial overflights in return for transfers of sophisticated weapon systems. During the Cold War, the minimal diplomatic contact between North and South occurred in an atmosphere of mutual distrust. Resolution of the Korean problem, even the beginning of a dialogue, required the tacit or explicit cooperation of all states in the North Pacific region.

66 Byung-joon Ahn, "Strategic Trends in East Asia," Pacific Review 4 (2) (Summer 1991): 112. The author refers to "localizing disputes" by having the respective parties settle the outstanding issues amongst themselves without overt external interference.
With the changing relations among the major North Pacific powers finally having an impact on their Korean allies, renewed discussions between the ROK and DPRK began in the late 1980s. This led to both countries joining the United Nations in October 1991, their non-aggression pact of 13 December 1991, their 31 December 1991 agreement to make Korea nuclear weapons-free, along with the meetings of both Northern and Southern leaders on 22 October 1991 and 19-20 February 1992.

The Nordpolitik of South Korea has already brought results in the form of increased bilateral contacts with other states. The essence of Nordpolitik is greater international cooperation with the former Soviet Union, now Russia, and the PRC as a means of reducing tension, promoting greater mutual trust, and eventual reunification through intensified dialogue with North Korea. Also, President Roh Tae Woo met with both Chinese and Soviet leaders in order to improve relations. For example, President Roh met President Gorbachev in December 1990 at San Francisco and in April 1991 at Cheju. In terms of Soviet-Japanese trade, South Korea imported raw materials and semi-finished goods from the PRC and the old USSR in return for finished products. In response, North Korea

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intensified its diplomatic contacts with the PRC and the former Soviet Union.

In the post-Cold War era, the focus on the Korean peninsula concerns possible arms control and CSBMs covering both sides. The regional political, economic, and military balances are changing such that CSBMs, like the NPCSD and Open Skies, are less implausible than before. The end of the Cold War, the internal collapse of the former Soviet Union, the economic travails of the US, and the direction of reforms in the PRC, are all factors to be considered in assessing if, or when, regional security regimes might be suitable for the North Pacific. The conceptions of national security, held by both North and South Korea, must change for the military confrontation to wind down. Definitions of security in the late twentieth century incorporate a realization of its economic, societal, and ecological dimensions, not just its military aspects. Until a minimal level of mutual understanding between the ROK and the DPRK develops, arms control as a means or strategy for conflict resolution is problematic. Real progress in arms control or CSBM negotiations occurs when the underlying issues are amenable to resolution.68 There was no progress, until 1991, on the proposals announced by both sides because North

and South perceived them to be inconsistent with their respective national interests.

In the period of post-Cold War detente and after the mutual arms cuts agreed to between President Bush and President Gorbachev, the need for CSBMs in the Korean peninsula has increased. CSBMs, such as notices of large-scale exercises, exchanging observers and military data, and limits on the size of manoeuvres, could help establish a higher level of openness, predictability, and transparency in the Korean military balance. They are initial steps along the political-military path towards arms control. CSBMs applied to the Korean peninsula, like the NPCSD and Open Skies, have two objectives. First, they reduce the risk of war by limiting the perception of threat from opponents. Second, they limit the risks posed by the possibility of accidental or inadvertent misperception by either side. The objective is to stabilize the relationship at a minimum level of antagonism.\(^6^9\) Both the NPCSD and Open Skies are intended to increase mutual trust; foster a psychological change in the perceptions of political leaders; and, thus, change the foreign policies of states. The NPCSD will accomplish these goals through multilateral dialogue concerning regional issues in both IGO and NGO

fora. Open Skies will allow participating states to evaluate the intentions and capabilities of their neighbors through multilateral overflights of designated territory.

For both North and South Korea, their high degree of mutual enmity and hostility overshadows diplomatic overtures towards each other and the regional powers. While the other North Pacific powers support the tentative rapprochement between North and South, the growth of bilateral understanding will take some time. A reduction in political and military tension is necessary for the development of an expanded dialogue with reunification as the ultimate objective.\(^70\) The influence of the former Soviet Union, the PRC, and the US will play an important role in persuading their respective Korean allies to pursue substantive negotiations. This kind of regional power diplomacy forms part of a broader political strategy ensuring the major powers' status as reliable dialogue partners.\(^71\) The NPCSD can reinforce this discussion in a more institutionalized forum, thus enhancing predictability and reducing misperceptions.

There is a growing recognition that changes in North Pacific can be dealt with better through a institutionalized


security dialogue like the NPCSD. The issue of the eventual status of the ROK-DPRK border is, thus, intertwined with the stability of North Korea after Kim Il-Sung's death and the purpose behind the nuclear facility at Yongbyon. It is unclear whether domestic economic conditions in the North and/or concerns over the patriarchal succession will spur the DPRK towards reducing military tensions. The ROK's Nordpolitik hopes to draw the North out of its relative isolation through increased social, economic, political, and cultural contacts. Both the former Soviet Union, now Russia, and the PRC have similar interests in a stable, peaceful peninsula which invite greater flows of Korean financial credit and technology.

North Korea is a political and economic burden to its regional supporters as the latter improve their relations with South Korea. Both the PRC and Russia may exert pressure on the DPRK to curb actions or policies deemed detrimental to improved North Pacific relations. All the regional powers in the North Pacific concur that premeditated aggression involving the North and South is unlikely in the post-Cold War era. CSBMs, on their own or in tandem with arms control, can lower the military and political tensions on the Korean peninsula. On a bilateral ROK-DPRK basis or as part of a broader regional framework, negotiated CSBMs and arms control measures are plausible
because of the converging interest in peninsular stability of all regional states.

However, there are fears that future instability within the DPRK and ROK might trigger hostilities. In order to avoid this, the major allies of both Korean states have mediated discussions designed to improve inter-Korean relations and security.72 Both sides fear the escalatory potential of any military confrontation. Evidence of this realization is seen in American efforts to limit the nuclear weapons and chemical-biological weapons capabilities of the DPRK. Naval exercises by both North and South Korean navies have also been cut.73 In light of the tentative diplomatic normalization between the two Koreas and improved major power relations, the circumstances for arms control and/or CSBMs become slightly more favorable.

The CIS and the PRC cannot continue supporting North Korea economically and militarily. The growing economic strength of South Korea and the dismal performance of the North helps push both countries towards greater dialogue, not just with other North Pacific states, but also with each other.74 The governments of both Koreas appear to accept the need for arms control/CSBM talks. The key here is the

73 Ibid., 166.
74 Ibid., 171-174.
emergence and maintenance of the requisite political will from all parties for discussions to succeed.

Arms control and CSBMs, as inherently political processes, are part of a state's security policy. States are judged by their effects on national and international security. Weapons are mere instruments of that policy. CSBMs do not address the question of weapons reductions, limitations, or assess capabilities but focus on reassurance about military intentions instead. They reduce the dangers of accidental or inadvertent war through enhanced predictability. Thus, the clash of competing political objectives is the root of the conflict. Such negotiations work only if there is sufficient willingness to compromise.

Both CSBMs and arms control assume that all parties involved do not wish to use military force. In the case of the two Koreas and their supporters, this minimum level of confidence seems to be emerging. However, if there continues to be a military imbalance, real or perceived, and a strong degree of mistrust between both states continues, then CSBMs and arms control will be difficult to accept.

Unilateral gestures, such as the standing invitation since


77 Asada, "Confidence-Building Measures," 491.
1982 to North Korea to send observers to joint US-ROK exercises (Team Spirit) have been tried in an attempt to break the impasse and start the negotiation process. In 1992, the US and South Korea suspended the annual Team Spirit manoeuvres as part of the attempt to increase the dialogue between North and South Korea.

Although such measures are easily implemented by one country, it may not be reciprocated. More complex CSBMs that require verification depend on how cooperative the parties perceive each other to be. The linkage between the security perceptions of the North Pacific states and the interdependence of their security dilemmas make a multilateral regime, like the NPCSD, more useful than a series of bilateral agreements.

The de facto mutual recognition of both Koreas upon their entry into the United Nations (UN) and their increased diplomatic activity with other regional countries are the first steps in a long process in which CSBMs might be implemented. The security dilemmas of North and South Korea revolve around the large military forces along the DMZ exacerbating fears of mutual attack. South Korea perceives the Korean People's Army (DPRK) as capable of launching a massive, combined operations assault. The South

78 Ibid., 498.

believes the military balance is unlikely to change rapidly. Political cooperation, as the ROK government argues, takes precedence over the negotiation and implementation of CSBMs.\(^80\) Like the CFE talks in Europe, the military balance between the two Koreas is perceived as asymmetrical\(^81\) and the source of their security dilemmas. Any steps toward a inter-Korean compromise must recognize the linkage between military cooperation and political rapprochement.

Young Koo Cha argues that,

Military alliances reflect superpower outreach and forward defense. Designed to deter attack upon an exposed party, they identify a mutual adversary and legitimize superpower military assistance. They also allow for forward basing.\(^82\)

The above quotation illustrates the rationale behind the assistance provided to North and South Korea by the PRC, the former Soviet Union, and the US. The incompatible foreign policy objectives of both Koreas have been revised in light of the New Detente. Reunification has been a long-term goal for the ROK and DPRK but neither side has been willing to fundamentally change their political system. Yet the


continued contacts between their governments is an improvement from the old Cold War confrontation. Differences remain in many areas, such as the ultimate purpose of arms control-CSBM measures. North Korea sees them as initial steps towards eventual reunification while South Korea views them as instruments for achieving cross-recognition of their separation. 83 Korean security, and North Pacific security generally, ultimately depends not just on bilateral talks but also multilateral efforts by the other regional states. 84 A CSBM like the NPCSD would be valuable in maintaining contacts between all parties.

As a Northeast Asian conflict zone, the Korean peninsula affects the other North Pacific countries. In contrast to the other outstanding issues preventing the emergence and development of a regional arms control-CSBM regime, the two Koreas form the nexus where the interests of these states converge and clash. 85 The rapprochements involving both North and South with other nations notwithstanding, the ROK and the DPRK still rely to a great

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extent upon their regional allies. The outcome of the political, military, and economic competition between the two Korean states is determined partly by the role their allies chose to play and partly by the policies of their respective leaderships. The North appears less adept, in comparison with the South, at translating its resources and capabilities into workable political capital. 86

The necessary political will, in order to transcend the territorial and military stalemate, seems to be lacking on the part of both Koreas. The end of the Cold War only highlights this incongruity. The major impediments to inter-Korean negotiations are the lack of mutual trust and the sub-regional political atmosphere which hinders CSBMs from taking place on the Korean peninsula. 87 This lack of trust springs from hostile post-1945 relations. Both sides are reluctant to recognize existing divisions, much less each other as legitimate nation-states. 88 A compromise requires greater inter-Korean dialogue, CSBMs to reduce military tension, restrictions on arms transfers, relative

86 Ibid., 110-111.


88 Ibid., 78.
domestic stability, and continued detente between the North Pacific great powers.  

**Differences between the North Pacific and Europe**

A final issue which needs to be addressed is the question of whether or not it is possible for proposals from Europe to work in the North Pacific. The discussion here examines the difficulties of transferring ideas from one context to another. In the post-Cold War detente, all the states within the North Pacific have a vested interest in managing peaceful, interdependent change. However, their competing objectives have, in the past, prevented a multilateral consensus developing on the question of a security regime. For example, the United States wants to maintain a favorable balance of power in the North Pacific and Northeast Asia. Unlike Europe, the Pacific Basin region in general, and the North Pacific in particular, does not possess political, strategic, and geographic factors suitable for the emergence and development of a arms control-CSBM security regime. It is not integrated into a security community like Europe.

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Regional stability, for the West, has been defined in terms of a continued alliance with a non-hostile, economically strong Japan with no hegemonic ambitions. By contrast, the former Soviet Union, in the pre-coup period under Gorbachev, did not want any further increases in American influence. Gorbachev began, in 1986, the process of improving diplomatic and economic relations with other countries in the region. With the transformation of the former Soviet Union into the CIS, it is easy to lose sight of the regional characteristics that made the North Pacific an area of major power confrontation inimical to a security regime.

Since 1945, the North Pacific security environment has shifted from a largely bipolar systemic competition between the two nuclear superpowers to a more multipolar arrangement. At the regional level, there were a number of bilateral alliances between the US, the Soviet Union, and the PRC with their respective allies. In contrast to Cold War-Europe, geographical and political factors contributed to a perceived strategic imbalance between various


92 Ibid., 551.
countries. Whereas NATO and the Warsaw Pact once confronted each other, the North Pacific had no common threat perception nor a strong, multilateral alliance structure. In the North Pacific, the competition was more multipolar than bipolar.93 On the European continent, a number of states coalesced into opposing alliances of relatively equal military power. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process also entrenched the post-1945 European borders as final.94

The defense policies of European states accepted formal arms control, such as the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, as part of their defence culture. In the North Pacific, there has been little conception of how beneficial mutually-agreed arms limitations can be. In the perceptions of North Pacific states, the hierarchical, international system and the international laws that formal arms control or CSBMs were based upon reflected the power or hegemony of the Eurocentric great powers.95 The high degree of verification utilized in previous US-Soviet and European treaties were considered inappropriate for the North Pacific because countries within the area lack sophisticated verification capabilities. Informal measures were the

95 Segal, ed. Arms Control in Asia, 6.
preferred instruments. Unlike Europe, there was also no specific regional forum for arms control-CSBM negotiations nor did the North Pacific have a comprehensive regional security framework. In addition to the geographic factors and diffusion of power within the region, asymmetric military force postures and deployments were detrimental to the emergence and development of a security regime. The PRC and the Soviet Union both possessed large ground forces whereas the United States had a preponderance in air and naval units.96

These differences between Europe and the North Pacific illustrate the difficulty in applying arms control and CSBMs which work in one geo-political context to another. Hideo Sato argues the diversity of the North Pacific region, in terms of country size, development level, economic objectives, culture, and political tradition, make it impractical to constitute formal policy-making bodies along European lines.97 Trevor Findlay supports this position because, compared with Europe, the North Pacific is politically and geographically fragmented. Europe is a

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relatively well-defined regional entity but, so far, the North Pacific is not.98

The North Pacific certainly does not have the cohesion of a Europe which is culturally and historically more homogeneous and contains a number of states of broadly similar size, capabilities, and similar aspirations. European states are more organized and able to act collectively on political and economic issues but North Pacific countries are not. Indeed, it is the only large regional grouping that lacks a regional institution. There is no shared threat compelling enough to bring the area together in a regional security framework and no common thread of broad mutual interest to overcome the inherent diversity of security perceptions, cultures, religions, and ethnic compositions.99 In contrast, Europe has a common culture of diplomacy developed over centuries with arms control as a lingua franca of security policies despite previous ideological divisions, a history of conflict, and a diverse political-economy. The North Pacific region's diffuse, multipolar power structure inhibits a common thrust

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towards alleviating its security dilemmas. The focus is centred on economic security and development instead.¹⁰⁰

Neither arms limitations nor CSBMs can substitute for a resolution of the outstanding issues underlying the military and political confrontation. Until these disputes between the regional states are closer to being settled, the likelihood of a arms control or CSBM regime is relatively low. The Kuriles-NT question, the Sino-Russian and inter-Korean border questions all may be negotiated further. No one wants a Sino-CIS confrontation and all countries in the region have a stake in the stability of the Korean peninsula. The DPRK is isolated while the ROK develops its diplomatic and economic potential to ensure its participation in any security arrangement.¹⁰¹ There is no consensus yet on a regional, North Pacific perspective on security, just a multitude of contending national viewpoints. At most, informal or tacit solutions to the security dilemmas of each country are possible but any kind of formal, negotiated solution has yet to emerge.

In addition, the US has seen past proposals for regional arms control and CSBMs made by the former Soviet Union as irrelevant or potentially damaging to its security


interests. With the end of the Cold War, the balance of power in the North Pacific is perceived as favorable to the US. There is no pressure from its local allies to proceed with CSBM or arms control negotiations. The US sees arms control and CSBMs, especially their naval variants, as detrimental to regional stability, deterrence credibility, and its bilateral ties with North Pacific nations.102 Geographic factors, such as the strategic importance of North Pacific sea lanes, and different force structures highlight how any arms control or CSBM regime involves asymmetric compromises. Ground force concentrations are relevant only for the inter-Korean and Sino-Soviet cases. Air and naval forces are more salient for the Kuriles-NT question because of the large bodies of water involved.103

In the case of the PRC, formal arms control and CSBM agreements appear as yet to be unacceptable. It fears the potential implications of such a regional process. Other states pressure it to accede to various limits or reductions while involvement in negotiations implies the PRC is part of the security dilemma problem, and thus forces it to play a role in regional security possibly detrimental to its


103 Ibid., 158. See also Andy Mack, "Superpower Arms Control in the Pacific," 2.
perceived interests. The PRC opposes formal, multilateral or bilateral accords because of the adverse precedents they set for its military postures. The informal, tacit CSBMs negotiated between the PRC and the former Soviet Union along its land boundary are the former's preferred choice.

Unlike in Europe where the US and its allies took initiatives in the arms control-CSBM field as an instrument for achieving parity or redressing perceived imbalances, the US has not done the same in the North Pacific. Although there is no strict hierarchy of threat perceptions, the North Pacific region has additional factors inhibiting the genesis of a security regime. These include an absence of a sense of common security and perceptions of inadequate military capability in a highly threatening environment. The presence of nuclear weapons in various countries presents the possibility of accidental or inadvertent war, local conflicts have potential implications for the area, and the major powers are a strong influence upon their


105 Ibid., 189.

regional allies.\textsuperscript{107} Political and military confrontations are symptomatic of the underlying political or economic conflicts, not the reverse.\textsuperscript{108} A security regime, informal or formal, is thus hardest to reach when it is most needed and easiest when it is not.\textsuperscript{109}

Keeping in mind the differences between Europe and the North Pacific helps explain why the North Pacific is not a simple geopolitical region unified or divided by a single overarching military problem. Rather, the disputes exist in a complex pattern of regionally contained bilateral conflicts which are legacies of the Cold War. This is an area where the interests of four great powers intersect, yet there is no tradition of broadly based alliances nor a habit of consultation among regional actors.\textsuperscript{110} The lack of well-developed, intra-regional security diplomacy, the absence of a negotiating framework, and a legacy of bilateral alliances inhibits multilateral arms control agreements.


\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 158.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 114.

There are, then, lingering suspicions between a number of these North Pacific countries which impede security regime development. The territorial disputes between the PRC and the CIS, the CIS and Japan, the asymmetric force structures between the US and Russia, the importance of maritime geography in the regional power balance, the presence of bilateral security ties within a multipolar region, the differences between the European and North Pacific security contexts, and the lack of clear-cut political borders are all factors that explain the absence, to date, of a North Pacific arms control regime. Although these disputes make regional arms control accords unlikely, CSBMs are possible because of the growing recognition of the need to address these unresolved problems. The less ambitious nature of CSBMs may make them more acceptable to the North Pacific countries.

111 Ibid., 188.
Chapter Three: Testing Two Ideas

Given the improbability of any arms control agreements being negotiated during the 1990s, this chapter evaluates the possibility of introducing two types of Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), which have been adopted in Europe, into the North Pacific. These CSBMs are, first, the institutionalization of regional security discussions in the form of a North Pacific Security Dialogue (NPCSD) and, secondly, a technical verification approach to confidence building through Open Skies in the North Pacific. Both proposals are judged on the following criteria: first, whether either idea is relevant for the North Pacific and second, whether one or both schemes can be implemented.

The obstacles examined in the previous chapter are important in the discussion of the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD) and Open Skies. After a critique of each concept's relative merits and drawbacks, two conclusions are reached. First, the likelihood of regional acceptance is higher for the NPCSD than Open Skies. Second, the nature of the NPCSD, as a multilateral forum of formal and informal discussion about regional issues of concern, makes it less susceptible to the obstacles analyzed in previous chapters. Open Skies is too ambitious a CSBM-verification proposal for successful adaptation from Europe.
and requires the resolution of the contentious issues mentioned earlier.

The NPCSD, then, is classified as an information and communication CSBM. As a multilateral forum, it encourages participant states to discuss their respective concerns over regional security issues. Information and communication flows are the means used to reduce misperceptions and tension. In contrast, Open Skies falls more under the category of a constraint against surprise attack CSBM. Aerial surveillance, by unarmed aircraft, of a treaty-defined geographic area is more of an inspection and deployment constraint measure.\textsuperscript{112} The former proposal calls for informal consultations between interested countries, and their citizens, with the potential for institution-building. The latter is more of a technical exercise in verifying non-hostile intentions and treaty compliance.

The concept of confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) is the subject of definitional debate within the strategic studies literature. The lack of a widespread consensus in the academic community revolves around the following questions: what constitutes CSBMs? What are they intended to achieve? And whose confidence is supposed to be built by them? For this thesis, the

discussion of both NPCSD and Open Skies as types of CSBMs uses the criteria outlined by James MacIntosh. He argues that CSBMs are both processes and sets of procedures. "At the most general level, confidence building attempts to make clear to concerned states, through the use of a variety of measures, the true nature of potentially threatening military activities." 113

Confidence-building is viewed as a process which reduces the misperceptions and suspicions of a country through the availability of accurate information about the intentions and actions of others.

The use of the confidence-building approach, in short, assumes that no participating state is seen to be planning to resort to force. This appears to be a fundamental precondition for participation in a confidence-building regime- a regional arrangement for cooperatively moderating international behaviour embodying confidence-building measures as central elements. 114

CSBMs are predicated, then, on the assumption that the major risk of armed conflict between nation-states, or alliances, arises from uncontrolled escalation pushing adversaries into an unintended confrontation and not from unprovoked aggression.

Confidence-building as a procedure, MacIntosh argues, entails the following features: first, state actions are undertaken with the expectation that other participating

113 Ibid., 2.
114 Ibid.
states do not have hostile intentions. Second, confidence-building occurs on a unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral basis. Third, it reduces or eliminates misperceptions of potentially threatening activities and capabilities. Fourth, verifiable information about, and advanced notice, of potentially threatening activities is provided. And fifth, confidence building presents the opportunity for the explanation of these activities.115

As a confidence-building process, MacIntosh argues that,

certainty-building is a psychological process involving the transformation of senior decision-maker beliefs about the nature of the threat posed by other, formerly antagonistic states, primarily entailing a shift from a basic assumption of hostile intentions to an assumption of non-hostile intentions.116

Limited types of CSBMs increase a state's confidence in its ability to detect another's aggressive intentions. Extensive CSBMs, where two or more sides improve their confidence, are useful when no one has aggressive aims but there is still considerable bilateral or regional tension.

During the summer of 1990, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark called for, in a number of speeches, the establishment of a North Pacific Cooperative

115 Ibid., 7-8.
116 Ibid., 9.
Security Dialogue (NPCSD). 117 In his addresses, he outlined the necessity for multilateral discussions concerning threats to the security of the North Pacific region. Clark argued that political, military, and economic security were interrelated and should be considered to be aspects of an indivisible whole. 118 The main idea behind the NPCSD centres upon Canada, as a North Pacific state with extensive ties to the Asia-Pacific region, creating a multilateral forum for the discussion of various security issues. These talks, one on a non-governmental (NGO) track and the other on an intergovernmental (IGO) track, are intended to foster common or mutual interests in peace and security amongst Canada, the US, and the Northeast Asian states. 119

The first track focuses on academics developing expertise and suggestions for discussion while the second track concentrates on government officials, particularly policy planners. The official side of the Canadian

117 See speeches by Joe Clark, Canada and Asia-Pacific in the 1990s to the Victoria Chamber of Commerce in Victoria on 17 July 1990; the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan in Tokyo on 24 July 1990; the Indonesia-Canada Business Council and the Canada Business Association in Jakarta on 26 July 1990; and the NPCSD colloquium on 6 April 1991 in Victoria, BC.

118 Clark, Canada and the Asia Pacific in the 1990s speech presented to the Victoria Chamber of Commerce on 17 July 1990 in Victoria, BC., 5.

119 Clark, Canada and the Asia Pacific in the 1990s speech presented to the Indonesia-Canada Business Council and the Canada Business Association on 26 July 1990 in Jakarta, 8.
initiative is a process designed to examine the merits of building a regional dialogue. The NGO talks are designed to explore issues and prospects for consultation in the North Pacific and encourage an exchange of views by regional experts.120

At the heart of the Canadian proposal is the concept of cooperative security. It is based on the twin ideas that threats to security, in addition to the traditional military ones, are increasingly diverse and multi-dimensional, ... The second idea is that the management of these issues is best handled through multilateral channels involving a process of discussion, negotiation, cooperation and compromise.121

The point of the two track approach of the NPCSD is that the NGO forum is intended to pave the way for the IGO group.

In the Canadian definition of security for the NPCSD, security is not just the absence of war but the presence of a stable peace. Applying the cooperative security concept to the North Pacific is not intended as an alternative to collective and mutual defence arrangements preserving national sovereignty. The aim is to address all issues of concern and focus on agreed areas where multilateral progress is possible. Developing relationships, through a multilateral dialogue, across a range of issues and at


different levels of interaction promotes confidence, knowledge, and transparency. "Cooperative security takes as its point of departure the fact that security is both complex and indivisible. That is, no one state is secure either at the expense of, or in isolation from, others."122

In contrast to the transformations on the European political landscape, the North Pacific had not received as much political or academic attention. Clark argued that the North Pacific region faces potential threats, not solely in military or political terms, but also in the economic and ecological spheres. Domestic political and military instability also result from economic stagnation and environmental degradation. Military cooperation for collective or mutual defense is still important for preserving national sovereignty but Clark emphasized how the NPCSD develops working relations across various security issues.123 He also stressed how the NPCSD would not interfere in bilateral issues, like the Kuriles-NT between Japan and now Russia, because it is not solely a intergovernmental process but rather a more informal, consultative mechanism.124 Bilateral or multilateral

122 Henderson, Canada and Asia Pacific Security, 3.
123 Joe Clark, Canada and the Asia Pacific in the 1990s speech presented to the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue colloquium on 6 April 1991 in Victoria, BC., 3-4.
124 Ibid., 5.
collective security arrangements are compatible with a regional cooperative security framework.

The direct linkage between security and prosperity, then, forms one of the underlying assumptions behind the NPCSD. With the absence of one, the other can be under strain. Political stability and security may be threatened by economic and ecological collapse. The other premise is the need for, and utility of, a multilateral forum for discussion. When the Canadian government proposed this concept, Clark called for a recognition of the need for greater regional cooperation to help resolve bilateral disputes. There is a clear recognition of the inadequacy of unilateral means to promote national security against a variety of potential threats. The NPCSD facilitates interstate cooperation by identifying and addressing disputed issues. Its non-institutional nature places a premium on adaptability and flexibility. In addition, its multilateral forum supplements the bilateral talks underway in the North Pacific, such as those between the two Koreas.

The NPCSD, like other types of CSBMs, attempts to alter perceptions of threat, reduce tensions, ameliorate the distrust that led to armed conflict, and produce a conducive environment in which arms control measures can be

125 Ibid., 6.
126 Ibid., 8.
successful.\textsuperscript{127} Common endeavors like the NPCSD "... provide a framework and forum for defusing discords, engender mutual trust, and promote regional accords. Regional cooperation... provides an opportunity for developing an array of... Confidence-Building Measures."\textsuperscript{128} Unlike other CSBMs, the NPCSD forum tries to address the obstacles hindering regional stability. Drawing together the North Pacific powers would facilitate, Canada hopes, greater understanding of each country's interests and intentions. Confidence building, as an inherently psychological process, means that more or improved data about other states can lead to better assessments of their policies.\textsuperscript{129}

Canada, in the NPCSD proposal, stresses the need for multilateral dialogue. The responses by the other North Pacific states to the Canadian proposals meant that discussions among officials have been very limited.


\textsuperscript{128} van Schaik, "Openness, Transparency and Confidence-Building." 96. There was no explicit intention in Canada's NPCSD proposal to attempt to transplant Eurocentric concepts, like an Asian version of the CSCE, to the North Pacific region.

\textsuperscript{129} James MacIntosh, The Arms Control Potential of Confidence Building Measures, 24.
Instead, progress has proceeded more on the academic or NGO track. During 1991 and early 1992, a series of NPCSD policy workshops took place in Victoria, Toronto, and Honolulu. Others in Tokyo, Beijing, and Ottawa are scheduled for later in 1992. The expertise and suggestions developed from these conferences, combined with the discussions between the participant states' policy planners, provide national decision-makers with more accurate information about the participant states' respective security concerns.\(^{130}\)

CSBMs which reduce threat perceptions and possible misunderstandings are, in principle, conditionally supported by the North Pacific states. However, their enthusiasm is qualified by certain concerns. For example, the US is wary of regional arms control and CSBM proposals, particularly in the naval sphere, because it perceives them as potentially asymmetrical in their effects.\(^{131}\) The US, in the aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, continues to perceive any multilateral forum, much less a security regime, as inimical to its interests. It prefers to maintain its bilateral ties

\(^{130}\) The first NGO conference, attended by various North American academics, was held in April 1991. The December 1991 meeting in Honolulu examined non-conventional security threats in the North Pacific. The April 1992 gathering in Beijing will look at the history, culture, and prospects for multilateralism in the North Pacific. During the summer of 1992, the Tokyo conference will discuss national responses to changing regional security perceptions while the fall 1992 Ottawa workshop will review the prospects for arms control in the North Pacific.

to the North Pacific where it still considers itself to be a dominant actor. The US prefers to use existing diplomatic channels, where it is predominant, rather than have the status quo, which it sees as beneficial, threatened.

With the end of the Cold War, the NPCSD presents an opportunity to push forward a multilateral, regional initiative. It provides a security forum which can complement the economic focus of other fora, like the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Greater North Pacific cooperation could help resolve the outstanding disputes hindering other arms control and CSBM proposals. The cooperative security the NPCSD fosters is based on multilateral discussion and collaboration against a variety of perceived threats. This kind of "soft regionalism" is built upon functional commonalities, widespread cooperation, and a implicit commitment to free market, economic growth. As Paul Evans and David Dewitt, the directors of the NPCSD's academic track, put it,


134 Ibid., 13.
Peace through regional building blocs or "islands of peace" is perhaps a necessity in an era of increasing multipolarity. Regional conflicts are no longer seen in terms of ideological competition but as threats to world order.\footnote{Ibid.}

Given the differences between the European and North Pacific regions, a multilateral, discussion forum such as the NPCSD is one of the few acceptable CSBM proposals. Not only are there unresolved regional disputes, there is little consensus on a common threat. There is no history in the area of a widespread informal or formal security regime. The few successful CSBMs were implemented on a bilateral basis.\footnote{Ibid., 14.} Pan-regional proposals, like the Australian Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia, were considered unworkable because of complex, overlapping security conflicts. Applying Eurocentric concepts without qualification to the North Pacific runs the risk of making them irrelevant.

Another possible approach to building a cooperative North Pacific security regime concerns the applicability of the Open Skies concept to this region. Open Skies could be an important first step towards a North Pacific arms control-CSBM regime. It was first proposed by US President Dwight Eisenhower in 1955 at the Geneva Conference of the four major powers (Great Britain, France, the former Soviet Union, and the United States). It called for the mutual
inspection, by aerial surveillance, of the territories of the then Soviet Union and the United States. Open Skies is intended to allow either side to gain greater understanding of the other's intentions and capabilities. This initial proposal was rejected and remained dormant until its revival in 1989. On 12 May 1989, President George Bush relaunched Open Skies as a CSBM proposal for the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations.

Open Skies allowed Canada and the United States to shoulder some of their post-Cold War diplomatic and security obligations. Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty verification occurred in Europe but not in North America. The NATO and US emphasis on high levels of visibility or openness regarding the verifiability of any arms control agreement helps explain the interest level shown by its proponents. Canada took a leading role in advancing the Open Skies initiative by hosting an international conference.

on the subject and participated in reciprocal trial overflights with Hungary in January 1990 and January 1992. The successful experiments proved Open Skies worked without obstructing air safety or air traffic control.

In the context of international relations theory and strategic studies, Open Skies is one way to build confidence between adversaries. Open Skies was originally intended to apply to the NATO-Warsaw Pact military confrontation in Europe. Canada believed an Open Skies Treaty improved relations within and between states of the two alliances by allowing members to achieve an independent capability for monitoring events of particular military interest. Sophisticated surveillance satellites have made aerial reconnaissance redundant to a certain degree. But only the US and the former Soviet Union possess the instruments capable of observing Europe. An Open Skies treaty enables the smaller states to see and judge for themselves. Peter Jones described Open Skies as "... one of the more ambitious confidence building measures ever proposed. In essence, an Open Skies regime would enable states to conduct regular overflights of each others' territory for the purpose of ensuring confidence, especially with regard to perceived
unusual and potentially threatening military activities."\textsuperscript{138}

He also notes that,

Open Skies is a ambitious confidence building measure because it calls for a state to accept and encourage the controlled abrogation one of its most basic sovereign rights-the right to deny another state access to its own territory and airspace.\textsuperscript{139}

Open Skies is both a CSBM and a verification measure. The proposal, in its European context, calls for a treaty allowing individual states of either alliance to overfly the other participants' airspace on short notice using unarmed, fixed-wing reconnaissance aircraft. These flights enhance perceptions of security by permitting large and small countries to satisfy themselves of each others' peaceful intentions. Open Skies, then, complements both information exchange and national technical means (NTM) of data collection.\textsuperscript{140} However, such a regime requires a consensus or common understanding regarding its purposes and objectives. If there is little or no convergence of state interests, an Open Skies security regime is clearly more difficult to create.\textsuperscript{141}

\textsuperscript{138} Peter Jones, \textit{Open Skies in Other Regional Contexts: Lessons of the Current Negotiations} Paper prepared for the Verification Research Unit of the Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1990), 1.

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., 11.

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., viii.

\textsuperscript{141} Jones, \textit{Open Skies in Other Regional Contexts}, 2-10.
In a similar manner, applying a Open Skies regime to the North Pacific needs the US, China, and Russia, along with their regional allies, to open their airspace to scheduled, unarmed, aerial surveillance flights which increase openness and transparency, thereby enhancing confidence and mutual security. Such a regime contributes to cooperation not just by implementing rules that states follow, but also by altering the context within which countries make decisions. It can be valuable to governments not just because it enforces binding rules on others but rather because it makes mutually beneficial agreements among states possible. However, the applicability of Open Skies to the North Pacific is doubtful because of the impediments to negotiations discussed earlier. The creation and implementation of Open Skies requires at least the partial resolution of Northeast Asian territorial disputes, reduced border tensions, and a decision on the status of regional military deployments.

Open Skies, if employed in the North Pacific as a CSBM, could try to achieve objectives similar to those achieved by its application in Europe under the CFE treaty. All states, large or small, use fixed-wing, unarmed reconnaissance aircraft and carry mutually agreed sensor equipment. These planes help verify the peaceful intentions of each state's military postures in the treaty-designated overflight zones.

Greater transparency concerning force deployments, troop or equipment withdrawals, and military manoeuvre size, can improve perceptions of regional equilibrium and crisis stability. Open Skies stresses "cooperative monitoring" where each party actively participates in demonstrating its compliance with the treaty, unlike the unilateral monitoring associated with National Technical Means (NTM) in other agreements.\textsuperscript{143} One example of NTM is satellite surveillance using optical and electronic sensors.

An Open Skies regime requires a combination of political consensus amongst regional powers, a stable power distribution in the area, shared interests or expectations, and a background of prior attempts at cooperation.\textsuperscript{144} These conditions are not currently prevalent in the North Pacific. All regional states want political, economic, and military stability but differ over the means to achieve these objectives. During the Cold War, there was little progress in inter-state cooperation in the area. With Gorbachev's New Thinking in foreign policy, there was a noticeable rapprochement amongst the PRC, the Soviet Union, the US, Japan, and the two Koreas. Greater cooperation became evident in reduced border tensions, improved bilateral trade

\textsuperscript{143} Ivan Oelrich, \textit{Conventional Arms Control: Their Limits and Their Verification} CSIA Occasional Paper #8 (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America for the Centre for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, 1990), 8.

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 14.
links, and heightened diplomatic activity in the North Pacific region. But the improvements have not yet reached a stage where a CSBM like Open Skies appears feasible.

Open Skies depends on the North Pacific states pursuing an interest in mutual cooperation as a rational, utility-maximizing instrument. As Keohane argues, "international regimes depend on the existence of patterns of common or complementary interests that are perceived or capable of being perceived by political actors. This makes common action to produce joint gains rational." In international relations theory, especially the realist perspective, governments are assumed to be rationally pursuing their interests, however they define them. Regimes are seen as implicitly benevolent and voluntary devices for managing conflict or tension. In the North Pacific, the

145 Ibid., 53-54. Keohane, in After Hegemony, argues cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination. Intergovernmental cooperation, he posits, takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating the realization of their own objectives, as the result of policy coordination. Cooperation does not imply the absence of conflict but it may be seen as the reaction to real or potential disagreements.

146 Ibid., 78.

attenuation of Cold War hostility in the region proceeds on a bilateral, informal basis. Confidence-building measures, such as the mutual troop withdrawals along the Sino-Soviet, now Russian, border, are informal in the sense of unwritten, tacit, or implicit agreements between countries. They are not negotiated as formal, binding treaties under international law. Formal multilateral regimes, like Open Skies, are yet not seen as beneficial or necessary by the regional powers. The post-Cold War rapprochements between the US, the Soviet Union/CIS, the PRC, Canada, Japan, and the two Koreas reflect an appreciation of the need for regional stability. However, tension reduction among these countries can best take place in an informal manner, not in a formal sense where a regime is imposed or formally negotiated.

Agreeing upon and implementing Open Skies in the North Pacific requires countries in the region to restrain, more than before, their foreign policies and military activities. Also, these states are expected to reciprocate any gestures of cooperation and openness to surveillance. Certainly, unilateral initiatives detrimental to a security regime must be constrained. Open Skies, in a solely multilateral or

(Spring 1982) for a excellent introduction to the concept of regimes. Both Robert Keohane in After Hegemony and Oran Young in "Regime Dynamics: the rise and fall of international regimes," International Organization 36 (2) (Spring 1982) offer a modified structuralist perspective on regimes.
bilateral-multilateral context,\textsuperscript{148} has to overcome the regional powers' fear of others breaking an agreement and their lack of interest in opening up their territories for aerial scrutiny.

These difficulties, at a theoretical level, are partly explained by reference to the free-rider or defection problem regarding collective goods. Regional security and stability are public or collective goods because they are widely available without stringent restriction on who benefits. There is little or no real exclusion involved with these goods. During the Cold War, North Pacific states utilized unilateral means to improve their security. Inter-state cooperation, in the form of arms control and CSBM regimes, was minimal because no country gave up its prerogative to expand military defenses. All the regional powers engaged in arms buildups, individually or in concert with their allies. However, this increased the security dilemmas they attempted to alleviate. These potential conflict spirals involved reactions by each state to the prior actions of others. The Cold War situation faced by

\textsuperscript{148} Multilateral refers to the actions of three or more states through ad hoc arrangements or institutions. In the North Pacific, this applies to an Open Skies regime involving all or most of the US, USSR, PRC, Japan, Canada, the ROK, and the DPRK in a common surveillance area. Bilateral-Multilateral refers to separate, bilateral Open Skies accords between regional states without the possibility of overlapping observation areas. See also Robert Keohane, "Multilateralism: an agenda for research," \textit{International Journal} XLV (4) (Autumn 1990), 731-764.
the North Pacific countries, then, resembled the problem of a prisoners dilemma (PD). ¹⁴⁹

In the game of prisoners' dilemma, two individuals are interrogated and given the choice of defection or non-defection. If one defects and the other does not, the former is rewarded while the latter is punished. There are incentives, therefore, for both to defect and avoid punishment. However, if both do not defect and cooperate instead, neither is punished. In the North Pacific, there was a comparable situation where none of the countries cooperated, during the Cold War, to ameliorate their security dilemmas. The regional powers unilaterally, and in concert with their allies defected, in game theoretic terms, and did not cooperate in implementing a regional security regime. The punishment, or negative consequences, came in the form of a regional arms buildup, as part of a global arms race between the superpowers and their allies, which exacerbated the initial security dilemmas faced by the North Pacific states and, hence, regional tensions and instability.

During the Cold War, there was little or no collaboration because the outstanding territorial disputes

and military competition hindered the North Pacific governments' recognition of mutual benefits from creating and implementing a security regime. With as many as six different states involved in any potential regime, one or more actors could have abstained from negotiations but still enjoyed the benefits of regional stability without making any contribution. Security and stability are collective goods that are hard to restrict in terms of availability. This attribute of non-divisibility presents the possibility for defection or free-riding by states who desire the benefits, but not the costs, of cooperation.150

In an anarchic international system with no overarching political authority, states are the political entities possessing the capability to employ large-scale military force against other members of the system. They are the parts of the international structure in which political power and authority are vested. Their interests clash with sufficient frequency and intensity that the threat of force is a unavoidable and constant feature of their existence.151 During the Cold War, the North Pacific states faced conflicting interests, especially over territory and the perceived need for strategic stability, which were stronger than any desire to achieve a negotiated compromise in the

150 Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy, 18-19.

region. Only with the end of the Cold War has there been a move, however limited, towards a rapprochement among these countries of the region.

Regional arms control treaties in the North Pacific are unlikely because of the impediments mentioned in chapter two. However, CSBMs negotiated first on a more informal, ad hoc basis are possible. None of the regional powers are likely to initiate negotiations for any sort of major security regime until the problems outlined earlier are resolved. Of the two CSBMs analyzed above, Open Skies is less likely to emerge at the moment than the NPCSD. Although aerial surveillance enhances security and confidence building through greater transparency in terms of the military deployments of all states, North Pacific countries are reluctant to consider reciprocal inspections as part of greater bilateral or multilateral cooperation.

The security perceptions of the North Pacific countries, during the Cold War, and their calculus of how to reach foreign policy objectives most efficiently precluded consideration of any arms control or CSBM regime. They never seriously considered how CSBMs could ameliorate their security dilemmas. Instead, they pursued armament buildup

152 For this thesis, treaties such as START, SALT I, SALT II, and INF are considered to be of an international nature and thus, not strictly regional.

that perpetuated their perceptions of insecurity and hindered resolution of those issues blocking greater cooperation. Their sense of strategic rationality never "incorporated the realization that the pursuit of egoistic interests requires a consideration of one's interactions with other states' choices. No state can choose the best strategy ... independent of choices made by others."154

Prior to the detente of the late 1980s, the increased Soviet and Chinese troop strength along the Sino-Soviet border, the numerical and qualitative improvements in the Soviet Pacific fleet, and the transfer of sophisticated armaments to North Korea, led to a corresponding strengthening of American, Japanese, and South Korean military forces. This arms race dynamic consisted of action and reaction by the North Pacific states, exacerbated regional tensions, and precluded consideration of their mutual interests in a security regime. A legacy of this spiralling suspicion involved Cold War habits that were difficult to break as these preconceptions linger on.

Perceived threats, such as North Korea's clandestine nuclear weapons development program, induced short-term responses, like increased force deployments, from each regional power. The possibility of creating a Open Skies regime, much less a NPCSD, requires a more long-term

outlook from actors in the area. There has been little consensus on the need for a North Pacific Open Skies regime or how to achieve it. However, in seeking to resolve existing problems the North Pacific states see the value in developing a CSBM, like the NPCSD, as a means of building a security regime. Certainly, unless the regional actors perceive cooperation to be in their interests, they will continue with either the status quo or with minimal changes.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, a new awareness of the mutual nature of North Pacific security interests has emerged. Great powers and their allies, like the US and South Korea, realize their regional security depends on the perceptions and (re)actions of their rivals as much as their own actions. Unilateral measures, such as improved naval and air capabilities, are costly, in political and economic terms, and produce unintended reactions from other states. Both the NPCSD and Open Skies reduce perceptions of potential instability by alleviating the fears concerning the military capabilities and foreign policies of other countries. Assuming pre-meditated aggression is not always a viable alternative for a given nation-state, both types of CSBMs reassure neighboring states of non-hostile intentions by communicating perceptions of peaceful intent and defensive force deployments.
Unlike Europe where the CFE participants accepted the principles behind Open Skies, the North Pacific states have not seriously considered formal arms control agreements and have given relatively little attention to technical CSBMs. Given the differences between the two regions and the bilateral problems within the North Pacific, the Open Skies proposal is unlikely to succeed. The concept of neighboring countries requesting aerial observation rights over one another, as provided for in a bilateral or multilateral treaty, and sharing reconnaissance aircraft or flight data is anathema to almost all North Pacific members. The idea of openness, as a precondition for increased confidence and stability, is not widely accepted in this area.155 The political will necessary to start Open Skies is absent amongst the regional powers, especially in light of the unresolved obstacles.

The NPCSD concept, with its essentially gradualist approach and a different confidence-building function, has a greater chance for implementation. The multilateral nature of the NPCSD forum makes it a sort of informal, institution building. The idea of discussion group conferences, on both NGO and IGO tracks, allows participants to learn more about each other, rather than through more intrusive mechanisms. Multilateral discussion is seen in the region as conforming

to the East Asian method of dealing with issues between countries. Thus, the NPCSD is more applicable and relevant than Open Skies. The informal nature of the NPCSD makes it more acceptable than Open Skies. Open Skies, by comparison, is more of a technical exercise in confidence enhancement. It is not readily applicable to the area because the outstanding issues between the regional powers prevents the higher level of cooperation necessary for it to work. Also, Open Skies is suited more to the European region because of its clearly divided Cold War boundaries and longer history of inter-state cooperation.

In the North Pacific, borders continue to be contentious issues. None of the regional states are willing to open up their airspace for others to conduct aerial surveillance on a bilateral or multilateral basis. They are locked into their security dilemmas where unilateral means of improving national defense predominate and cooperation to enhance mutual security is minimal. The NPCSD has a greater probability of success because of its role as a multilateral forum discussing a variety of security concerns. Its twin tracks of IGO and NGO meetings can facilitate broader understanding and cooperation through informal consultations amongst the participating countries. Since it is not as ambitious as Open Skies, in terms of its technical focus, the NPCSD brings together the regional
powers and spurs diplomatic progress in settling issues of concern.
Chapter Four: What Lies Ahead?

Having looked at the past and present obstacles to transferring institutional and technical CSBMs from Europe to the North Pacific, this chapter provides some tentative conclusions regarding the likely emergence of a North Pacific CSBM regime. Particular attention will be paid to how changes in the North Pacific political economy help modify regional actors' security perceptions. Economic integration can act as a catalyst for political change which, in turn, can help the convergence of security interests amongst the seven North Pacific states. That is, closer economic and political cooperation has the potential to improve the likelihood of the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD) succeeding.

Between 1991 and the early twenty-first century, the likelihood of an arms control regime being established in the North Pacific region is very low. Although the seven North Pacific states agree on the desirability of arms control for reducing arms race and crisis instabilities, unresolved territorial and political disputes hinder such negotiations.156 Without a diplomatic resolution of the

156 States arm themselves for reasons that they consider both necessary and legitimate. Consequently, arms control and confidence building negotiations generally have better chances of success when the political relationships between countries involved have made sufficient progress towards the diffusion of tensions, and a perception of mutual confidence in the peaceful intentions of other states
problems associated with the obstacles outlined in previous chapters, the United States, Canada, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and the CIS/Russia will find it difficult to improve regional security.

The seven countries in this area are more likely to agree on CSBMs. The NPCSD proposal of 1990, within an evolving regional security complex\(^{157}\) in the North Pacific, might help the emergence of a security regime. The threat perceptions of the states in the North Pacific security complex are interrelated and changes in the actions and policies of one country alters the perspectives of its neighbors. The NPCSD is designed to further the detente within the North Pacific that began in the late 1980s. The high level of perceived threat from geographically proximate actors has diminished somewhat. The security links between

the North Pacific countries, such as the US with Japan, South Korea, and Canada, have undergone changes with the end of the Cold War and the evolution of the regional political economy.

The security regime concept used in this thesis presupposes a common interest in, or consensus, concerning stability. In the North Pacific region, such a convergence of interests has not yet emerged. There is also limited understanding amongst the North Pacific actors concerning the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures that comprise an international regime. In each of the disputes discussed in earlier chapters, the countries involved have clashed over beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. They have defined their standards of behaviour in terms of different rights and obligations. There is little consensus regarding prescriptions or proscriptions for action. For example, the Northern Territories (NT)-Kuriles and the Korean peninsula stalemates have both sides perceiving each other as the cause of the problem and their respective positions as correct. In contrast, the situation did improve somewhat for Sino-Soviet and US-Soviet relations after Gorbachev came to power with a rapprochement over the Sino-Soviet, now Russian, land border and the end of the Cold War.

Yet the question of sovereignty over the NT-Kuriles is unsettled. The April 1991 visit by Gorbachev to Japan did
not produce a hoped-for compromise agreement. Recognition of the importance of economic factors in world politics, the domestic collapse of the former Soviet Union, and Moscow's desire for Japanese economic assistance were insufficient to make Japan interested in improved bilateral relations. Although both sides discussed the issue, any possible quid pro quo that involved a swap of some or all the islands for Japanese financial assistance was undermined by the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the election of Boris Yeltsin as president of a nationalistic, Russian Republic.  

The end of the Cold War has removed much of the military, strategic value from the possession of the NT-Kuriles for the CIS. Concessions to Japan could have opened up a Pandora's Box of internal and external territorial claims. The turmoil within the former Soviet Union may make it less difficult to negotiate the return of the NT-Kuriles for Japanese aid.

On the Korean peninsula, the thaw in inter-Korean relations has been overshadowed by Japanese, American, South Korean, and Canadian concerns about North Korea's clandestine nuclear weapons facility at Yongbyon, north of Pyongyang. The DPRK refuses to allow International


Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections until certain conditions are met by the US and ROK. The IAEA agreement signed by North Korea in 1992 permits continued stockpiling of weapons-grade plutonium so long as the material remains open to inspection. The North Korean effort to achieve a nuclear weapons capability is perceived as militarily destabilizing and as a desperate measure to ensure the legitimacy of the Kim Il Sung-Kim Jong Il succession. In turn, South Korea has pressed for IAEA inspections of Yongbyon and American guarantees for its security. North Korea also came under pressure from the former Soviet Union, the PRC, and Japan to allow external examination of its facilities.¹⁶⁰

The development and proliferation of nuclear weapons in this sub-region simultaneously increases the need for the NPCSD and jeopardizes its viability. In addition, it calls into question the unilateral cuts in tactical and strategic nuclear weapons stockpiles by both the US and the former

The increasing economic ties between the Northeast Asian states are put in jeopardy by rising fears of a North Korean nuclear capability. The security dilemmas faced by the North Pacific states are exacerbated if this issue is not dealt with adequately. Any security regime, be it arms control, NPCSD, or Open Skies, has little chance of success if the regional military balance is upset in this manner.

The US defence budget cuts of the early 1990s signalled the demise of the US Navy's Maritime Strategy as the size of the fleet has been reduced. The CIS Pacific Fleet has also been reduced in size and operational scope since 1986. The fear felt by the other North Pacific countries during the Cold War of an aggressive, potentially


destabilizing American naval deployment scheme has been ameliorated by these cuts. The potential for a crisis inherent in the Maritime Strategy's offensive sea control and horizontal escalation postures were an impediment towards any kind of conventional, naval arms control agreement or CSBMs. The collapse of Soviet power removed the rationale underlying the military buildup of the Reagan era.

Canada recognizes its interest in the stability of regions and countries with which it has significant economic linkages. In this context, the Northeast Asian states of the North Pacific are very relevant. As Brian Job has noted, "The rise in the global economy of the trading and financial presence of Asian states has had a dramatic impact on Canada. Within the last decade, the balance of Canadian non-US related international trade has shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific."\(^{164}\) He has also pointed out that,

Canada's present interests and involvement in the North Pacific need to be viewed from its perspective as a middle power state with concerns over (a) the increasing importance to Canada of economic links to the region, (b) maintenance of peaceful and stable social and political environments in which economic growth proceeds, and (c) a longstanding Canadian internationalist role in facilitating

conflict resolution. 165

Sustaining the core nature of the post-1945 Asia-Pacific security order is no longer feasible. A framework of bilateral arrangements, largely patron-client relationships, is no longer viable. Changes in "the nature of the security problems found in the North Pacific region, in combination with changes in the attitudes of relevant actors as to how they themselves and others approach the resolution of these problems, are sufficient to create a climate in which steps towards establishing a new regional security order can be taken ...." 166

Canada has sought to be a more active player, through the NPCSD, in a region where it has substantial economic stakes and, therefore, strong interests in maintaining political cooperation and regional stability. "In effect, Canada's objective might be described as the nurturing of a security community, i.e. a collection of states that recognizes their mutual security interests and seeks to advance them through regularized consultation, confidence-building actions, and cooperation." 167 Job argues that a functioning North Pacific security community has four goals. They are the peaceful settlement of disputes, the promotion

165 Ibid., 10.
166 Ibid., 1-2.
167 Ibid., 11.
of prosperity through reduced domestic and international tensions, the decreased stockpiling and proliferation of conventional and nuclear weapons, and the promotion, through effective regulation, of more secure marine environments.168

Canada, as an actor with growing interests in the North Pacific,169 can use its reputation as an intermediary, with no capability to threaten the military interests of others, to foster stable integration through bilateral discussions or the NPCSD. Canada can help bridge the differences amongst the North Pacific states regarding the political and economic consequences of the area's transformation. The diplomatic emphasis stresses improved information flows, consensus building, and informal negotiations while placing less attention on formal, intergovernmental institutions. Canada can facilitate the emergence of a stable North Pacific political-economy only if there is support from, or at least tacit acceptance by, larger states like Japan, the US, and the PRC.

The reduced tension and conflict between the nuclear superpowers, as the Cold War ends, also influences the detente between the regional states. Competing territorial

168 Ibid.

169 By 1989, for example, 12 per cent of total Canadian exports went to the North Pacific region. For British Columbia, 43 per cent of total provincial exports went to this area. Dobell and Brownsey, "Japan and North America as partners in the Pacific Community," in Brownsey and Matthew, eds., Japan' Relations with North America, 62.
claims over disputed boundaries are pursued less vigorously as historical animosities are muted by a greater understanding of the interdependence of national security and the benefits of economic integration. The NPCSD encourages discussions of perceived security problems, avoids a recourse to unilateral action that exacerbates security dilemmas, and paves the way for cooperative endeavors. The benefits of cooperative meetings between the North Pacific actors, on both IGO and NGO tracks of the NPCSD, outweigh the perceived costs and risks of confrontation. These shared interests arise from the realization that continued discord and hostility are incompatible with regional stability.

Canadian policy-makers, in both IGO and NGO tracks, emphasize the establishment of working relationships and the creation of a dialogue evolving from bilateral to multilateral cooperative arrangements. The core of the Canadian proposal revolves around the idea that a new regional security order can develop in an environment of mutual knowledge and understanding about the problems and perceptions of the participants involved. Examining the current absence of such a prerequisite environment is a necessary first step. The Canadian idea promotes the inclusive rather than exclusive participation of actors. It
provides an environment where formerly isolated actors can gradually assume more active roles.\textsuperscript{170}

The NPCSD, by encouraging talks among the North Pacific seven on foreign policy problems increases the chances of a greater understanding developing about each other's security perceptions. Formal or informal agreements can arise from these cooperative discussions about mutual security interests. In the long term, other CSBM proposals, such as Open Skies, might be viable if a basic level of trust, confidence, and shared objectives is reached. Open Skies could eventually be most useful in improving bilateral or multilateral confidence in any regional arms control regime in the North Pacific.

\textbf{The Regional Political-Economy}

The chances of success for the NPCSD is being strengthened by the economic integration of the North Pacific countries. According to Benjamin Ward, trade is arguably the most basic form of international cooperation. It often precedes formal ties between countries and its growth usually leads to an expansion of cooperative arrangements. Trade is growing more rapidly in East Asia and across the North Pacific than elsewhere.\textsuperscript{171} Greater

\textsuperscript{170} Job, \textit{Canadian Interests and Perspectives}, 12.

trade links can lead towards economic integration and cooperation between the North Pacific states. Closer ties in the economic sphere are a potential catalyst for improved regional political relations and can facilitate the acceptance of the NPCSD as a multilateral, confidence-building forum. "Commerce offers the most rational approach to fostering greater regional cohesion." 172

The concept of a North Pacific political-economy assumes there is an interest in trade and some degree of economic complementarity between the countries of the region. Such a North Pacific political-economy consists of the Northeast Asian states (the former Soviet Union, the PRC, the two Koreas, and Japan), along with Canada and the US. The increased trade and financial links between these countries, since the mid-1980s, has facilitated a convergence of political and economic interests in regional stability. With the thaw in relations between the North Pacific actors, their economies have been drawn into greater interactions with each other. 173 Canada and the US have a bilateral Free Trade agreement while Japan is a major source of investment capital for the North Pacific. The PRC, the former Soviet Union, and even North Korea seek Western

Institute for East Asian Studies, 1986), 32.


assistance, principally from South Korea, Japan, and the US.

The industrialized, capitalist states of the North Pacific (the US, Japan, Canada, and South Korea) all have strong trade and financial ties with each other. Interestingly however, the PRC, North Korea, and the former Soviet Union are also gradually improving their links with these countries. Notwithstanding its temporary diplomatic isolation after the Tiananmen Square massacre, the PRC has proceeded with its domestic program of market reforms, albeit at a slower pace. In the North Pacific, the PRC has increased trade relations with both Koreas, the US, Canada, Japan, and the Soviet/Russian Far East provinces. There are also proposals currently being floated for special economic zones (SEZs) around ports in the Russian Far East, the Yellow Sea, and the Sea of Japan.

The end of the Cold War highlights a major geopolitical change as the political and economic power of the Eurasian

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174 By 1990, there were daily scheduled commercial flights between Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Harbin, Dairen, Pyongyang, Seoul, and Niigata. Trade volumes between the PRC and the Russian Far East, South Korea and the former Soviet Union, along with the PRC-South Korea have increased 1.4, 2.5, and three times respectively since 1988. Since April 1990, there have been multilateral trade fairs hosted by the PRC to facilitate improved economic ties between Northeast Asian countries. "Market around the Sea of Japan.", Mainichi Daily News, 19 September 1990.

rimland, particularly in the North Pacific, increases while that of the heartland, the former Soviet Union, decreases. In each of the North Pacific states, governments realize, some more so than others, that allies and "[f]ormer adversaries have become political and security partners. National economies are part of an increasingly integrated global economic system." National and regional security are increasingly interlinked in the global economy.

The shift towards market reforms in the PRC, the CIS, and even North Korea have been paralleled by the increasing intra-regional trade and financial links within Northeast Asia, along with the expanding ties to Canada and the US. Not only has Japanese and South Korean capital flowed into North America as direct and indirect foreign investments, but the PRC, the Russian Far East, and North Korea are targeted for possible Japanese economic assistance. Trade and investment has grown because Northeast Asia and North America, indeed, the North Pacific as a whole, is becoming a regional production network with Japan and the US as the


177 Richard Solomon, Challenge: To Build a Sustainable US-Japan Relationship, 1. Speech by the US Assistant Secretary of State at the Foreign Correspondents Club in Tokyo, 10 April 1990.
dual, geographic anchors. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the stagnation of the Northeast Asian command economies, and the trend within Western states towards domestic deregulation and market liberalization have combined to increase the economic interdependence of these countries.

However, the integration of the North Pacific political-economy may be hindered by the global recession of the early 1990s and the structural weaknesses within the US and Japanese economies. Both countries are the economic pillars of the region. Slower economic growth could impede regional economic integration and the political cooperation that might result. Without further political rapprochements, the possibility of the successful adaptation of the NPCSD, much less Open Skies, is remote. The depressed economic conditions in the US have exacerbated bilateral tensions with Japan, specifically over the perceived inequality of their trade (im)balance. The

178 Robert Scalapino, "The US and Asia: Future Prospects," 21. He argues that natural economic territories (NETs), based on economic complementarity and comparative advantage, may be found in the coastal areas of neighboring North Pacific countries. Relevant examples include: Shantung province (PRC) and Cholla province (ROK); Vladivostok, Nakhoda (Russia), and Niigata (Japan); the Kuriles-NT, Sakhalin (Russia), and Hokkaido (Japan).

January 1992 trip to Asia by President Bush only heightened the underlying political acrimony. In Japan, the Heisei economic boom cycle has slowed into a "growth recession" where annual GDP growth is 3 per cent or less. There has also been growing concern directed at the declining rate of capital and consumer spending in Japan, decreasing corporate profits, slow growth in the money supply, and the need for the Bank of Japan to reduce interest rates. In addition, there is international concern about the availability of capital for future investment in Japan and overseas.

Japan, then, plays a key role linking North America and Northeast Asia in terms of trade and military alliances. Ironically, the investment capital flows necessary for continued regional integration come largely from Japan but are simultaneously feared and accepted by the other North


181 Robert Thomson, "Appearance and Reality," The Financial Times, 4 November 1991, A12. In addition, the tight labor market in Japan raised fears of higher inflation. The US also pressed Japan, through the SII talks, into spending 1000 billion yen on public infrastructure as a means to reduce its massive trade surplus. However, the simultaneous domestic pressure for a interest rate cut undermined this attempt to reduce the US trade deficit by devaluing the yen and, thus, made Japanese exports cheaper and imports more expensive.

Pacific countries. There is a perception or fear of potential Japanese economic hegemony yet these financial movements are welcomed for their beneficial effect on economic development. In the case of South Korea, the other major source of capital in Northeast Asia, there is no equivalent worry about their intentions. \(^\text{183}\) South Korea is now courted by both the PRC and Russia as an attractive, complementary economic partner but it cannot substitute for Japan because the latter has greater financial resources and global influence. Each of these surplus capital countries has further integrated the North Pacific political economy by increasing its intra-regional investments in manufacturing and export industries.

Growing protectionist sentiments in the US threaten to undermine the linkages built up within the regional political-economy, especially if trade blocs emerge from a failure of the Uruguay Round. \(^\text{184}\) If trade disputes between North Pacific states are left unsettled, they could weaken the economic integration supporting the necessary political cooperation required for the NPCSD to succeed. The reforming economies of the PRC, North Korea, and Russia

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\(^\text{183}\) Taiwan is another major source of investment capital in East Asia but is not included in the geographic definition of the North Pacific region used in this thesis. Taiwan belongs more to the Southeast Asia region.

depend on continued assistance from, and open markets in, Canada, the US, South Korea, and Japan. The ties built up may be weakened by increased economic nationalism in the latter states and greater political, economic, or social turmoil in the former countries. In addition, the political and economic consequences of a bitter trade dispute between Japan and the US would also affect other countries in the North Pacific. As William Gleysteen argues,

The speed with which [Northeast Asia] has emerged as a major factor on the world scene is not matched by the strength of its defenses against adversity or the solidity of its political institutions. No other region of the world is as dependent on the continuity of the world trading system.185

The integration of the North Pacific political economy as a distinct region has brought about the economic growth and political stability necessary for the market-oriented reforms of the East Asian command economies to succeed. Increasing ties between the North Pacific states have not led to the development of trade barriers against non-North Pacific goods and services. Greater regional, economic interdependence embedded within a liberalized, multilateral trading order, like a strengthened GATT, is not seen as

overtly protectionist. Improved bilateral relations within the region helps limit regional conflicts and their spillover effects on other issues.

However, economic integration can also lead to increased political fragmentation and a heightened sense of nationalism within North Pacific states because of perceived disadvantages for some socio-economic interests as the balance of power among groups in a country changes. Domestic discontent directed at the consequences of economic interdependence in the North Pacific is an obstacle that governments may face if the NPCSD is to work. This leads, in turn, to appeals for ethnic and cultural solidarity against supposed external influences. Class and social differences are accentuated as a result of political and economic changes in these countries. A rising living

186 "The relative importance of trade in goods is counterbalanced by significant increases in services, international investment flows, immigration, transfers of technology, and the transmission of knowledge. In short, greater economic interpenetration is the most striking feature of current international relationships." Rod Dobell and Lorne Brownsey, "Japan and North America as partners in the Pacific Community," in Brownsey and Matthew, eds., Japan's Relations with North America, 58. See also John Gerard Ruggie, Unraveling Trade: Global Institutional Trade, Global Institutional Change, and the Pacific Economy, Paper presented for the Fulbright Symposium on Managing International Economic Relations in the Pacific in the 1990s at the Australian National University in Canberra on 16-17 December 1991.

standard for some but not others engenders societal demands for political inclusion in domestic policy formulation.

Political disintegration and economic stagnation within the CIS, then, forms one context for changes in the security and foreign economic policies of the other North Pacific states. Paradoxically, there is a simultaneous process of economic integration, political rapprochement, and domestic turmoil within the region. In areas of the Russian Far East, like Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, coastal trade with Japan, the PRC, and both Koreas increase as joint ventures and barter swaps are set up. By 1 January 1992, four free trade zones operated along the DPRK-Russian border, the Sino-Russian boundary, Khabarovsk, and Vladivostok. The Far Eastern provinces of the Russian Republic place their hopes for economic growth in targeting export-oriented sectors for foreign investments. However, the low level of trade with other North Pacific states prior


189 See Gerald Segal, The Soviet Union and the Pacific (London: Unwin Hyman for the Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1990), 7-11.

to the 1990s has obscured the potential for this area of Russia becoming a primary source of raw materials.\textsuperscript{191} Japan and, to a lesser extent, South Korea are seen as the growth centres, capital goods suppliers, and investment fund sources for the shift from planned to market economies.\textsuperscript{192}

Without cooperative security measures which facilitate regional discussion or awareness, like the NPCSD, conflicts which arise out of internal political collapse, greater trade frictions, and the emergence of countries intent on revising the regional status quo could lead to greater regional tensions. With the continuation of the North Pacific economic integration and political rapprochements, a soft regionalism of informal cooperation can develop on a more multilateral and less bilateral basis.\textsuperscript{193} The convergence of interests around the NPCSD is the start of a demand for, and the supply of, some form of regional security regime. While Japan and the US continue their

\textsuperscript{191} Segal, \textit{The Soviet Union and the Pacific}, 135-140.


roles as the pillars of the North Pacific, Canada can be a catalyst in strengthening a network of economic, political, and security ties through the NPCSD.

Canada's role as a political entrepreneur, exercising medium power leadership, can help promote a gradual process of regional consultation and institutionalization in the North Pacific, just as it did in Europe. Instead of coercion, Canada relies on diplomatic and intellectual persuasion. The NPCSD, unlike Open Skies, does not spell out specific rules of behaviour. Rather, it provides for conventions, a shared recognition of the utility of cooperation. The NPCSD gives Canada a regional voice and avoids diplomatic exclusion in a key region. Canada is not left vulnerable to external forces over which it has no influence.

Notwithstanding the disparate cultural traditions within the region and the limited history of a collective approach to common problem-solving, the NPCSD has the potential to develop a sense of coherent, regional identity and ameliorate the security concerns of its members. Greater regional cooperation through the NPCSD illustrates how "[g]overnments have an important interest in creating

194 Steven Chan called the predominance of Japan and the US in the East Asian region a "regional bigemony", the presence of two hegemons. See Chan, *East Asian Dynamism*, 103.

195 Higgott, Cooper, and Bonnor, *Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation*, 841.
norms and rules that enable [them] to have stable expectations and institutionalized procedures in acting together for joint gains." For Canada, the NPCSD must foster "the active political and diplomatic encouragement of an ongoing regional dialogue on comprehensive security-in all its military, economic, and environmental manifestations. The Clark initiative . . . could figure prominently in the generation of a multilateral security dialogue that would have real potential for identifying those areas of common interest and concern where cooperation may be practical."197

Conclusions:

This thesis has examined the prospects of transferring to the North Pacific, from Europe, two forms of confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs). The two regime proposals are the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD) and Open Skies. Utilizing the concepts of security regime and regional security complex, the analysis has evaluated whether the necessary political conditions are

196 Steven Chan, East Asian Dynamism, 102. According to Robert Keohane, "Regimes are much more important in providing established negotiating frameworks (reducing transaction costs) and in helping to coordinate actor expectations (improving the quality and quantity of information available to states)." Robert Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," in International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 111.

sufficiently present in the North Pacific for either concept to work and how further regional economic integration can make circumstances more propitious.

After reviewing the situation in the North Pacific since the mid-1980s, the likelihood of a successful NPCSD is enhanced by the end of the Cold War and the emergent strength of a regional political-economy. The NPCSD is a less ambitious proposal that builds upon a minimal level of regional consensus. In contrast, Open Skies is more problematic because of its more intrusive nature and requires a higher level of regional political cooperation than presently exists. Also, it is less likely to be adopted in the North Pacific because of unresolved regional issues.

The NPCSD is a multilateral forum for the discussion of regional security issues, involving the North Pacific states, based on simultaneous NGO and IGO tracks. Participating countries include Canada, the US, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Japan, South Korea (ROK), North Korea (DPRK), and the new Commonwealth of Independent States, particularly Russia. Open Skies is more of a technical exercise in verification and confidence-building based on overflights of specified territories. Participating states use fixed-wing, unarmed surveillance aircraft equipped with treaty-specified sensors.
Both the NPCSD and Open Skies have been evaluated in terms of their applicability from one region to another and the obstacles rooted in past conflicts that may hinder their implementation. The impediments hindering the emergence of the NPCSD, much less Open Skies, are: first, the contested land border between the PRC and the former Soviet Union, now the CIS; secondly, the stalemate over the Kuriles-Northern Territories (NT) between Japan and the old USSR, now involving Russia; thirdly, the lingering Cold War between both North and South Korea; and fourthly, the differences between Europe and the North Pacific in their regional contexts. During the Cold War, these problems blocked any attempt to build a regional arms control or CSBM regime.

However, the post-Cold War era has changed somewhat the circumstances surrounding these issues. The first problem has been ameliorated by the Sino-Soviet detente since the late 1980s. An accommodation over much of the disputed land border has been reached although questions still remain over selected mountains and islands. There has also been a slight rapprochement between Japan and the former Soviet Union recently. The end of the Cold War and the domestic turmoil in the CIS has produced Soviet and Russian acknowledgements of Japanese grievances and the need for Japanese economic aid. Inter-Korean relations have improved modestly since the end of the Cold War in 1989. During 1991 and February 1992, there were ministerial meetings between
the ROK and the DPRK which led to a bilateral non-aggression accord and further promises of cooperation. Nonetheless, there is growing concern over the destabilizing implications of North Korea's nuclear weapons program, particularly in terms of regional proliferation and the genesis of a nuclear arms race between both Koreas.

The differences between the North Pacific and Europe are slightly less pronounced than they were during the Cold War. Post-1989 Europe no longer has a single East-West divide between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. But the legacy of inter-state negotiations over regional security issues still continues in the next stage of CFE and European Open Skies discussions. In contrast, the North Pacific has not witnessed the same level of cooperation because of the unresolved disputes discussed earlier. The cross-cutting Cold War cleavages between the US, the PRC, the former Soviet Union, and their regional allies hindered the emergence of any consensus or understanding concerning the security dilemmas of each state. Unlike the land-based focus of Europe, the large bodies of water in the North Pacific gives it more of a maritime context. In addition, the US has considered naval CSBMs and arms control to be anathema to its regional interests unlike the reductions of ground forces in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty.
Given the obstacles between the various North Pacific countries and the different circumstances between Europe and the North Pacific, the NPCSD appears more likely to succeed because it attempts to build the requisite political cooperation necessary for more ambitious schemes, like Open Skies, to work. Open Skies requires a greater level of inter-state and regional collaboration than presently available in the North Pacific. But one possible way to improve the viability of both the NPCSD and Open Skies may be through the integration of the North Pacific political-economy. Enhanced trade, production, and financial linkages between the seven countries in the area could encourage political cooperation over a variety of regional issues, including security in its economic, military, and ecological variants. Thus, the NPCSD could be an appropriate forum to discuss such concerns between participating states.
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