DIPLOMACY, CANADIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND ACID RAIN
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CANADIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS
AND THE ISSUE OF ACID RAIN

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ABSTRACT

Diplomacy has been an important component in international relations since the earliest of civilizations. As societies evolved, so did diplomacy. In the context of the relationship between Canada and the United States the issue of acid rain resulted in some unusual diplomatic tactics being employed by Canada. This thesis seeks to review the degree of this unusual behaviour and determine whether it is an indication of a shift in the nature of diplomacy in the Canadian-American relationship, or an isolated incident, not likely to be repeated.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

John W. Holmes once wrote that "A wise country adjusts the tone of its voice to suit the end it wants to achieve."\(^1\) Holmes also noted that: "Diplomacy is by nature quiet and cannot very well be anything else."\(^2\) Furthermore, it was a necessity that "Much of diplomacy must remain confidential if the world is to be something better than a screaming bedlam."\(^3\) However, at times during the debate between Canada and the United States over the issue of acid rain, Canada spoke very loudly. Many of the tactics employed by Canada in its attempt to resolve the issue of acid rain appear to have been a departure from both the norms of traditional diplomatic behaviour, as well as the established protocols of the Canadian-American relationship. This then raises the query: how unusual was Canada's diplomatic approach to resolving the acid rain issue, and was this unusualness an indication of a shift in the nature of diplomacy in the Canadian-American relationship, or simply an anomaly, not likely to be repeated?

The art of diplomacy has long been a key component in international relations to facilitate conflict resolution. As an

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\(^2\)Ibid., 50.  
\(^3\)Ibid., 52.
instrument of international relations, diplomacy has been evident ever since the development of societies necessitated interaction. As civilizations evolved, so to did the craft of diplomacy. Depending upon the actors involved, and the situation at hand, diplomacy shifted and adapted while always maintaining focus on its main function of achieving peaceful resolutions to issues. Because diplomacy has become such an integral part of international relations, a shift in the nature of diplomacy between nations could have a profound effect on future conflict resolution.

From the perspective of traditional diplomacy, the nature of diplomatic relations between Canadian and the United States are often considered unusual, primarily due to a general amicability between the two nations. However, despite the anomalies, diplomatic relations between these two nations have tended to follow established diplomatic protocols. The one glaring exception to this norm was the issue of acid rain, and the extraordinary tactics that the Canadian government employed in its attempt to sway the American legislators.

In light of the evolutionary history of diplomacy, the question arises whether Canada's departure from the norms of diplomacy during the acid rain debate was an indication of a shift in diplomatic relations between Canada and the United States, or merely an isolated incident which would not influence the tenor of future relations with the United States. In order to address this question it is necessary not only to understand the issue of acid rain, but also to
One of the best ways to appreciate how diplomacy evolved is to follow the changing role of the agent of traditional diplomacy, the diplomat. Initially, the role of the diplomat was as a disseminator of information, letting people in the community know what was happening. Gradually, because of the growing interactions between communities, the diplomat was required to go to the neighbouring areas to explain the situation of his people, possibly developing allies, or preventing unnecessary hostility. With the emergence of a ruling class, the diplomat became the direct agent of the prince with a mandate of collecting information, negotiation, and forewarning about possible hostilities.

As the cost of war escalated, the value of peaceful alternatives to conflict resolution increased. For centuries, the challenge of avoiding hostilities through negotiation, has been the chief objective of diplomacy and diplomats. However, as democratic ideals started to increasingly influence diplomatic procedures, the nature of diplomacy began to undergo fundamental changes. While the mandate of maintaining peace remained constant, the manner in which this was achieved shifted from private negotiations between diplomats, to open discussions involving a myriad of actors.

The major difference between public diplomacy and its predecessor, quiet or traditional diplomacy, was that with public diplomacy, issue resolution occurred within the public arena, as
opposed to behind closed doors. For a variety of reasons, governments have been hesitant to enthusiastically embrace the use of public diplomacy techniques. While at times it has been an effective way to encourage legislatures to act, it does tend to endanger successful negotiation on sensitive or controversial issues. However, with the formalized procedures of traditional diplomacy having been proven time and time again to be ineffective, public diplomacy has increasingly been considered a viable option.

In the context of diplomatic relations between Canada and the United States, this shift from private to public diplomacy is also evident. Initially, diplomacy between these two nations was so quiet it appeared almost non-existent. However, as the number and complexity of the bilateral issues grew, so did the importance of the negotiation process between the two nations. In addition to a high level of familiarity and interaction at all levels between the two countries, the relationships and personalities of the political leaders served to influence the style of diplomacy between Canada and the United States. Because of a relatively high animosity between President Reagan and Prime Minister Trudeau, diplomatic relations between Canada and the United States tended to be tense during the early 1980s. It was anticipated that with the election of the more pro-American Brian Mulroney in 1983, relations would improve. To a great extent this was true, however, even Mulroney eventually became frustrated with the Americans over the acid rain issue.

Acid rain was an issue on the Canadian-American agenda
which clearly displayed the complexity of issue resolution between these two nation. In its attempts to resolve the problem of acid rain, Canada found itself in the difficult diplomatic situation that to decrease the level of acid precipitation falling in Canada would require a strengthening of American domestic environmental legislation. This interdependent element of the acid rain issue was particularly difficult issue to resolve in light of the Reagan's strong ideological aversion to increasing regulations. As a result, the Canadian government was tempted to go to some extraordinary diplomatic lengths in search of a resolution. Many of the tactics which were employed by Canada began to extend beyond the realm of traditional diplomatic relations with the norms of public diplomacy becoming increasingly prevalent.

While for Canada, public diplomacy was a new approach to its relations with the United States, it had long been the norm for other nations. American concern about the influence of foreign lobby interests on American policy makers resulted in a Senate report in 1986 by the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations entitled "Congress and Pressure Groups : Lobbying in a Modern Democracy". This report through a historical summary, clearly indicated that lobbying has been a factor in American politics almost since the first Congress was formed. Several witnesses also testified that there has been an upsurge of lobbying activities as Congress became more involved in foreign policy. It was noted by several witnesses that "As Congress has become more assertive in foreign policy, foreign
governments, foreign factions, and foreign businesses have all discovered the ease of access to Congress and have increased their activity, open and otherwise, on Capitol Hill." 4 In summary, the report found that:

Where once most Washington lobbying centered around economic interests, the last twenty years have witnessed the development of an array of groups representing social, environmental, philosophical and ideological interests.

While there is no single theory to account for this activity, a number of factors are clearly involved: growth of the Federal Government and the expansion of its influence—often as manager and provider; increased levels of relative affluence and education; advances in communications technology; and changes in Congress and the elections process. These factors create a fertile environment for pressure group politics.5

However, Canada was not one of these lobby groups. To the concern of some, even by the early 1980's Canada was not an active participant in lobbying Congress. This was to change quickly. In 1980, the Canadian embassy had only $200,000 available to it for

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5Ibid., 39.
lobbying purposes. By 1985, it was estimated that the Canadian government spent as much as $3.5 million on lobbying in Washington.

Even though Canada was not the only foreign interest actively lobbying Congress, it was the opinion of some that Canada overstepped the accepted political boundaries in its attempts to influence American domestic policy on the issue of acid rain. While some Americans became concerned about the attempt of a foreign government to so openly try and shape domestic policy, others were outraged at Canada's perceived insolence. There was also a faction which argued that the issue of acid rain was just an excuse to make the U.S. energy dependent on Canada. This opinion was in contrast to environmentalists, primarily in the American northeast, who started to regard Canada as a valuable ally in the fight against pollution. Whether the response to Canada's more aggressive approach was greeted negatively or positively, it did result in an increased awareness of the quiet country to the north, and the issue of acid rain.

In recent decades environmental concerns, such as acid rain have played an increasing role in both domestic and international politics. As the United Nations 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro indicated, concerns over pollution and its impact on the

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environment was no longer regarded as solely a domestic problem, often relegated to the fringe of the political arena. Because of their geographic proximity, Canada and the United States share many common environmental concerns. Some issues, such as pollution in the Great Lakes, were recognized early and effectively addressed through bilateral agreement. However, the problem of acid rain proved to be considerably more difficult to resolve.

At the core of the acid rain debate between Canada and the United States was that due to geography and air currents, the majority of acidic precipitation falling on Canada originated as airborne pollutants in the United States. As a result, Canada was in an awkward political position: in order to preserve its own environment, American domestic environmental regulations had to be strengthened.

The following is a survey of the tactics Canada used in its attempt to persuade the Americans to change their domestic environmental regulations and join in the fight against acid precipitation. When this information about the tactics used by Canada is compared to the norms of traditional diplomacy and the guidelines of the Canadian-American relationship, the degree of diplomatic unusualness becomes evident. Furthermore, this information will facilitate a discussion about the possible causes of such diplomatic behaviour and whether or not it is likely to be repeated. To achieve this review the Canadian anti-acid rain
campaign has been divided into three sections, each differentiated by an increased distancing from the protocols of traditional diplomacy.

The first section focuses on Allan Gotlieb, Canada's Ambassador to the United States from 1981 to 1989. Gotlieb arrived in Washington after spending a few years in Ottawa formulating what he terms 'new diplomacy'. At the root of this approach was the increased focus upon the Congress, with a more involved role for the Canadian Ambassador in Washington. While Gotlieb's lobbying approach was not unique for Washington, it was a departure from Canada's standard style of quiet negotiation.

The second section surveys how the Canadian policy-makers became more active in their attempt to directly influence American domestic policy. This section discusses the role of Canadian policy makers in such capacities as witnesses at Congressional hearings, as well as the increased tendency of Canadian policy-makers to publicly criticize the actions or inactions of American government and the American environmental policies. A further irregularity was that many of the Canadian policy-makers voiced their concerns directly to the American media or while giving a speech to an American dominated audience. Historically, Canada has occasionally criticized the Americans, but rarely with such a vengeance, or on American soil.

The final section keys in on the attempt by Canada to increase the awareness of the American public about the issue of acid rain. To this end, Canada launched what amounted to an overt marketing
campaign by a foreign government to encourage domestic pressure for a policy change. Examples of the tactics used during this unusual campaign included: the distribution of pamphlets and buttons to American tourists; Canadian embassy employees sporting 'anti acid rain' umbrellas on the streets of Washington; and having an anti-acid rain booth at a New York sporting show. Actions such as these represent the most extreme form of diplomacy used by Canada in its attempt to resolve the acid rain issue.

Although Canada's anti-acid rain campaign has been divided into these three sections, based on their distance from traditional diplomatic behaviour, it should be remembered that the activities of each section had an impact on the other sections. As a result, it is necessary to be aware of all three sections, in order to achieve a complete picture of the unusualness of the diplomatic approach that Canada used to resolve the issue of acid rain. Furthermore, it is also helpful to have an understanding of the complexity of the issue of acid rain, as well as the idiosyncrasies of the Canadian-American relationship.

Acid Rain

Acid rain results when sulphur oxides (mostly sulphur dioxides, \[ \text{SO}_2 \], and to a lesser extent nitrous oxide \[ \text{NO}_x \] ), are emitted into the atmosphere, mix with the humidity, and then return to earth in solution with rain, sleet or snow. While precipitation is naturally
mildly acidic, man-made emissions resulting primarily from fossil fuel combustion and metal smelting can increase the acidity, therefore upsetting the pre-existing environmental balance. This is especially noticeable in areas lacking adequate natural buffering agents, such as lakes with a low lime content.

The resolution of environmental concerns, such as acid rain, can often obstructed by a series of complex and interconnected issues. As was evident in the 1992 United Nations Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, there is a constant tension between development, and the protection of the environment. Furthermore, it is an ongoing challenge to convince governments and industry that the cost of the clean up of power plants and factories is less, or equal to, the value of future environmental well being. The battle between economics and the environment becomes particularly acute in difficult economic times when the cost of environmental clean up often results in increased expenses and job losses. In times of poor economic conditions, the value of a job is often perceived as being greater than the value of a few lakes or trees. The possible value of the environment is further decreased when the threatened environment is in another state, region, or worst of all, another country.

Environmental politics is also hindered by the slow and invisible nature of environmental deterioration. A lake that is affected by acidic precipitation looks very clear because all the algae, water insects and fish have died. As a result, to the uninformed observer a lake ravaged by acid rain looks crystal clean. An example
of this occurred in the early 1980's when the Ontario government invited some American journalists and politicians to visit the damaged lakes in the Muskoka region. These visitors which were expecting to see polluted waters and experience the stench of dead fish were instead treated to very peaceful, very clear -- but very dead -- lakes. Afterward, one of the guests commented that it would have been more effective if the government officials had artificially stocked the lake with dead fish. 8

Another major hurdle of perception is the slow nature of both the deterioration and the recovery of the environment. The damage caused by acid precipitation can only be perceived through long term study and comparison. The fish and trees do not die instantaneously, instead, over the years, the number which survive to maturity gradually decreases. Similarly, the recovery process is also very slow. If all acidic precipitation were to end tomorrow, it would still take several years for the environment to demonstrate any noticeable signs of improvement. This long term element of environmental issues such as acid rain makes it particularly frustrating for those trying to provide a justification to industries for the cost of clean up, or those politicians who wish to demonstrate the effectiveness of their environmental policies.

A final frustration for those battling acid rain is that because of the airborne nature of the pollutant, there is virtually no legal

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recourse available. Without being able to effectively establish a clear causal relationship between the damage to a lake in the Muskokas, and a specific smelter, there is not sufficient evidence for legal proceedings. 9

Acid Rain : An Issue in Canadian-American Relations

In the specific context of Canadian-American relations, Canada faced four imbalances when it tried to resolve the issue of acid rain with the United States. Geographically, because of prevailing air currents, a disproportionate amount of the acidic precipitation affecting Canada originated as air pollution in the United States, which was then blown northward. The result was that at least 50 percent of Canada's acid precipitation originated in the United States, whereas only about 15 percent of American acid precipitation came from Canadian sources. Consequently, even if Canada acted to unilaterally curb its own emissions significantly, the result would

only be a minimal environmental improvement. Furthermore, the problem arises that because the major source areas are not the major recipient areas, the former stand to pay a great deal for, and benefit little from, reductions in their own emissions.

A second imbalance was that because of the geological nature of Canada a much higher percentage of Canada's wilderness was sensitive to damage caused by acidic precipitation. Most notably, the lakes in areas such as Muskoka and Kawartha regions were low in lime content making them particularly vulnerable to acidification. In addition, there was an increased awareness of the deterioration of these areas because they tended to be popular resort areas for many Canadians living in the region.

Another problem was that acid precipitation was suspected of retarding the growth of commercially valuable forests. It was the argument of some that Canada tended to have more economic dependency on the forest industry than the United States, consequently, damage to forests could result in significant economic costs for Canada.

Finally, there was an imbalance of awareness with regard to the problem of acid rain. While a large percentage of Canadians were

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10 John E. Carroll, Acid Rain: An Issue in Canadian - American Relations (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1982), XIII
12 Carroll, XIII
13 Ibid.
familiar with the cause and effect of acid rain, this was not common knowledge in the United States.\textsuperscript{14}

Acid rain, as an issue, appeared suddenly on the Canadian-American agenda in the late 1970's. Unexpectedly, it soon became one of the most intractable of concerns, disturbing what was a notably harmonious relationship. Even though significant research into acid rain had been going on in Scandinavia since the 1960's, North Americans had taken little notice of it. The first mention of acid rain in the North American context was made by Canada's environment minister Romeo LeBlanc in a 1977 speech to the Air Pollution Control Association. In this speech, LeBlanc identified acid rain, as well as other air borne pollutants, as an "environmental timebomb." Noting that the source of pollution was from both Canada and the United States, he concluded that "Despite all co-operation that exists between Canada and the United States, I believe that we have both been negligent in this area. What we have allowed to happen, innocently enough, perhaps is a massive international exchange of air pollutants, and neither party to this exchange is free of guilt."\textsuperscript{15} Initially, neither the Canadian nor the American government responded to LeBlanc's concerns.

Ironically, it was an American complaint about the environmental impact of emissions from two Canadian power plants (Atikokan and Poplar River), which first initiated action on the little

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid.
known phenomenon of acid rain. In attempt to find a solution to the problems caused by Atikokan and Poplar River, in 1978 the U.S. Congress passed a law mandating that the U.S. Department of State begin formal negotiations with Canada. The purpose of these negotiations was to eventually develop an international air quality agreement similar in spirit to the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. The Boundary Waters Treaty, through the establishment of an International Joint Commission, was successful in developing effective mechanisms for communication and consultation between Canada and the United States on the issue of water quality problems. Unfortunately, unlike the Boundary Waters Treaty, little would come of the initial acid rain legislative action.

Also in 1978, the Canadian and American governments set up the Bilateral Research Consultation Group (BRCG). This group which was comprised of equal numbers of Canadian and American government scientists, was formed to help in the development of legislation and new research thrusts. However similar to the legislative action, while the initial motivation to resolve the problem of acid rain was quite strong, its progress was eventually stalled by international events. Of particular note was the oil crisis of 1980, which focused American attention upon its energy dependency.

16 Concerns over the pollution levels of a coal-fired energy plant in Poplar, Saskatchewan were raised by their American neighbours in Montana. The Atikokan was a similar dispute over a coal-fired electrical generating station being built in western Ontario, to provide energy to Ontario, but at the environmental cost of North Minnesota.

In response to the energy crisis, in February of 1980 the Carter administration decided to launch a $10 billion program to reduce American oil imports by converting 107 power plants to coal. Such a program would result in a dramatic increase in the emission levels, and consequently great environmental damage. Although this plan ultimately failed to pass Congress, its proposal alarmed Canadian environmentalists and politicians who were growing increasingly concerned about acid rain.

Spurred by the possibility of Carter's proposal passing Congress, the Canadian government worked with the BRCG to negotiate an environmental Memorandum of Intent between Canada and the United States. This Memorandum, which was eventually signed on 5 August 1980, was essentially an agreement between the governments to continue negotiation on the acid rain issue. At the centre of the agreement was an expressed "common determination to combat transboundary air pollution."\textsuperscript{18} To this end, five joint bilateral Technical Working Groups composed of government scientists and diplomats were organized. The task of these groups was to conduct an extensive study of the problem, and offer possible solutions. Furthermore, the Memorandum also mandated that formal negotiations for an air quality agreement begin not later than June 1981.\textsuperscript{19} While the reports were submitted on time, and the negotiation schedule maintained, Canadians were becoming

\textsuperscript{18} Memorandum of Intent, 1980.
\textsuperscript{19} Carroll, 41.
concerned that the Americans were following the letter of the law, rather than the spirit.

When the Canadian government signed the Memorandum in 1980, it did so under the impression that it was the first step toward a bilateral air pollution agreement. However, in light of the growing American policy trend toward relaxing environmental legislation, it became increasingly clear to Canadians that the newly elected Reagan administration did not view the Memorandum with the same degree of importance. As one senior American official noted "This all goes to hell if Ronald Reagan gets in." 20 Much to the disappointment of the Canadian government, by the end of 1981 the Memorandum of Intent was, for all political purposes, dead. For the next few years the acid rain negotiations remained locked in a stalemate.

While Canadian frustration was growing due to the lack of progress on the issue of acid rain, the Reagan administration contended that more research had to be done before a policy could be developed. This stagnant situation continued until the first summit meeting between Canada's new prime minister Brian Mulroney and Reagan. At this meeting on St. Patrick's Day in March 1985 meeting, dubbed the Shamrock Summit, Mulroney identified the issue of acid rain as the top priority on the bilateral agenda. In an attempt to show at least some progress on the issue, two special envoys, Canadian William Davis and American Drew Lewis were

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20 Munton and Castle, 371.
appointed to investigate the problem of acid rain and present a report at the 1986 summit.

As was planned, by the following March the special envoys' report was complete. The report concluded that acid rain clearly was a serious problem, and not a myth as some had proposed. Consequently, the primary recommendation was that there should be a major, long-term $5 billion investment by industry and government to research, develop and demonstrate clean coal technologies. 21 At the March 1986 summit, both Mulroney and Reagan endorsed the report, once again encouraging the possibility that a bilateral air pollution agreement would soon be reached.

However, this jubilation was to be short lived as the budget proposal which Reagan presented to Congress in January 1987, did not provide sufficient funding for the implementation of the envoys' proposals. This shortfall renewed Canadian cries that the United States was not living up to its commitments to combat acid rain. It was in this political atmosphere that Mulroney and Reagan held their third annual summit in April 1987. At this meeting the only progress made on the issue of acid rain was that Reagan, at the last moment, added to the script of his speech to the Canadian Parliament the accommodation that he "agreed to consider the Prime Minister's proposal for a bilateral accord on acid rain." 22

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22 Ibid., 183.
In September 1987, the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program (NAPAP) interim report was published. The NAPAP had been set up by an order of Congress in 1980 with the mandate to develop a ten year plan for research and monitoring of acid precipitation. The 1987 interim report was a clear example of how science had become politicized in the acid rain debate. Even though leading independent scientists had already concluded that acid rain was an urgent problem, the Reagan administration's NAPAP report asserted that there was little immediate danger from acid rain. Americans and Canadians both criticized the report as being inaccurate and unrealistic. Of particular concern was that the Executive Summary was reportedly penned by the director of NAPAP without consulting with the scientists involved, or examining their findings. It became the interpretation of many that the primary purpose of this report was to further strengthen the Reagan administration's position against environmental controls.

The Reagan administration was able to use the NAPAP report to once again justify its position that further research had to be conducted into the problem of acid rain before action could be taken. As a result, the debate between Canada and the United States remained stagnant until George Bush, the 'environmental president' succeeded Reagan after the 1988 election. By the fall of 1989, members of Congress were debating a new set of amendments to the

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24 Ibid., : 67.
Clean Air Act. These amendments, which had been put forward by the Bush administration, marked the first time that legislation had been developed which directly addressed the problem of acid rain. In November of 1990 the amendments passed.

Conclusion

As this recounting of the history of the acid rain debate between Canada and the United States demonstrates, resolution of the issue tended to proceed in fits and starts. Part of the reason for this slow progress was because the complexity of the acid rain issue defied a simple solution. Furthermore, the nature of the Canadian-American relationship was changing, thus requiring a re-assessment of Canada's negotiating approach with the United States.

The issue of acid rain provides some clear examples of Canada attempting a new diplomatic approach in its relations with the United States. As the following discussion will illustrate, these tactics ranged from relatively quiet strategy of increasing Canada's lobbying efforts in Washington, to the much louder tone of publicly criticizing the American government and distributing pamphlets and buttons to American tourists. As the following chapters will demonstrate, it is evident that Canada went to some extraordinary diplomatic lengths in an attempt to persuade the Americans to alter their environmental policy. These actions appear to have exceeded not only the norms of traditional diplomacy, but more surprisingly, the
accepted boundaries of public diplomacy. What remains for discussion is whether or not Canada's unusual diplomatic approach was an indication of a shift in diplomatic relations between Canada and the United States, or simply an isolated incident, not likely to be repeated.
Chapter 2
Diplomacy

In order to evaluate the unusualness of Canada's diplomatic approach to resolving the acid rain issue, it is necessary to have an understanding of the origins of traditional diplomacy. It is also insightful to realize how the norms of traditional diplomacy evolved, and the concerns of some about the perceived shift away from traditional diplomacy toward public diplomacy. When this knowledge is then applied to the Canadian-American relationship, and particularly the issue of acid rain, diplomatic similarities and anomalies become evident.

The practice of diplomacy is as old as civilization itself. Recent archaeological findings have uncovered evidence of diplomatic relations dating back as far as early Egyptian civilization. Diplomacy also has historical roots in the development of Greek civilization. By the fourth century B.C., relations between the Greek city states had developed beyond the capabilities of a herald, whose main attributes were a good memory and a very loud voice. Increasingly, there was a need for more capable negotiators, resulting in the practice of choosing ambassadors from the ranks of the finest orators. The primary task of these envoys was to plead their cause before popular assemblies of foreign leagues or cities. From this emerged the habit of regular diplomatic intercourse. By the fifth century, the system of
diplomatic relations had advanced to the point that diplomatic missions were accorded certain immunities, and the realization had set in that relations between states could no longer be managed solely by violent means.

These traditions were then passed down to the Romans whose main contribution to diplomacy was not in the area of negotiation but in the area of international law. It was not until the later stages of the Roman empire that the need for artful negotiation arose. The Byzantine Empire in particular was noted for a skillful negotiation technique. There were three main methods to their approach. First, was to weaken their opponents by formenting rivalry between them. The second method was to purchase the friendship of frontier tribes through gifts and flattery. The final method was to convert 'the heathen' to the Christian faith. In order to implement these methods, individuals who had powers of observation, experience and sound judgement were required. From this, the characteristics of the typical diplomat evolved.¹

The evolutionary process of modern diplomacy was gradual, starting in Europe in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. During this period, officials were designated by princes and other leaders to conduct special missions on their behalf at the courts of their peers. These officials were charged with essentially two duties, the first of which was to factually, accurately, and as quickly as possible convey

the views of the prince they were representing, and conversely, bring back a response. The second, and more important responsibility was to negotiate and conclude agreements on the prince's behalf.

The second stage of modern diplomacy occurred in the Italian city-states during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Starting with Mantua, Italian city-states began to send resident missions abroad, to courts both inside and outside the Italian system. The purpose of these resident missions was to continuously monitor the events in a rival state, and if necessary, maintain an ongoing dialogue between the states.

The third stage was when the Congress of Vienna codified diplomatic relations in 1815. This was in response to the recognized need to regularize diplomatic relations between the states. For the first time there was a general outline of proper diplomatic practice, and a distinction made between the diplomat and the politician. Furthermore, the traditional role of diplomacy and diplomats had been established within international relations.

The primary purpose of diplomacy has always been to try and maintain peace. As Morgenthau put it, "If the world state is unattainable in our world, yet indispensable for the survival of that world, it is necessary to create the conditions under which it will not be impossible from the onset to establish a world state. This method

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of establishing the preconditions for permanent peace we call accommodation. Its instrument is diplomacy.\textsuperscript{3} From this it can be concluded that if diplomatic action ends in war, then it has failed in its primary objective of promoting national interest through peaceful means.

On a broader scale, Morgenthau identified four tasks of diplomacy: first, to determine its objectives in light of the power actually and potentially available to pursue these objectives; second, to assess other nation's objectives and their actual and potential power available for the pursuit of these objectives; third, to determine how compatible these different objectives are to each other; and fourth, to employ the means best suited to achieve these objectives.\textsuperscript{4}

Diplomats were required to fulfill three functions for their government: symbolic, legal and political. Symbolic representation included attending official functions and hosting parties. The purpose of such activities was to perceive how their nation was regarded by other nations, as well as indicate how their nation regards others, especially the government of their posting. Furthermore, while entertaining, or being entertained, diplomats did not represent themselves, but rather their nation. Consequently, the lavishness of the parties, and the diplomat's demeanor was interpreted as a direct reflection of their government. As legal

\textsuperscript{4} Ibid.
representatives of their government, diplomats may be authorized to negotiate and sign contracts on their governments' behalf, as well as provide legal protection to their nation's citizens travelling abroad.

The most important function of the diplomat was as the political representative. It was in this capacity that the diplomat had a profound influence on the shaping of the nation's foreign policy. A key component of diplomacy which the diplomat had to fulfill was the assessment of the objectives of other nations, and the actual or potential power available to them to meet these objectives. To this end the diplomat had to be cognizant of all the nuances of the assigned country's political process. In addition, in order to evaluate the levels of actual and political power, it was occasionally necessary for a diplomatic mission to take on aspects of an intelligence gathering operation. This aspect of the diplomats' job has long been a factor in the evolution of diplomacy. In the Middle ages, it was automatically assumed that the prince's special envoy was a spy, and consequently was viewed with suspicion. Italian city-states also found that it was very valuable to have permanent diplomatic representatives providing forewarning about possible aggressive intentions of their host state. Even when permanent diplomatic missions became commonplace in the sixteenth century, diplomats were widely considered a nuisance and liability to the host country. However, the role of the diplomat as an intelligence gatherer has persisted throughout history. Consequently, it has traditionally been the

5 Ibid., 522-525.
diplomat who provided the raw information from which their government then shaped its foreign policy.

According to Sir Harold Nicholson, in order to fulfill these functions, the good diplomat must also have certain characteristics. The first characteristic all diplomats must have is that of truthfulness. Diplomats had to be careful not to leave any incorrect impressions upon the minds of those with whom they negotiate, as that would undermine attempts at successful negotiation. Perhaps more importantly, diplomats also had to be truthful in the relaying of information back to their own government. In conjunction with the characteristic of truthfulness was that of accuracy, in both interpretation and presentation. Inaccuracy served to devalue the information gathered by the diplomat. In addition, any imprecision during negotiation could result in the development of even greater problems between the nations. Nicholson also identified modesty as an important diplomatic characteristic. Immodest diplomats could be tempted to disregard the advice or opinions of those more informed than themselves, as well as make them vulnerable to being swayed by flattery. Finally, throughout all, diplomats had to remain calm, patient and even tempered, as any inappropriate behaviour would reflect poorly upon both themselves and their governments. 6

Since the end of World War I diplomacy has been undergoing tremendous changes as it gradually shifted toward a more open form of diplomacy. Some scholars identify the onset of these changes as

6 Nicholson, 57-65.
the beginning of the decline of diplomacy. One of the most significant factors that caused a change in traditional diplomacy was the development of modern communication and transportation technology. It soon became feasible for states to maintain continuous political relations directly with each other rather than through diplomats. Telephones facilitated direct and immediate communication between government officials, and improved transportation allowed officials to more easily arrange meetings with each other. As a result, the need for diplomats to represent their government in negotiations was greatly decreased.

The formation of the League of Nations and the United Nations was also another indication of a shift away from traditional diplomacy. Increasingly, problems which used to be resolved by a few diplomats were being dealt with in a more public, more parliamentary manner. Diplomatic negotiation had been replaced by public discussion between delegates from a variety of countries, and agreements were reached by voting. Such a process did not facilitate the nuances of traditional diplomacy or diplomats.\(^7\)

Perhaps the most significant change in diplomatic practice was signalled by President Woodrow Wilson in his speech of 8 January 1918 in which he declared that in the future there should be "Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy

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\(^7\) Morgenthau, 525-529.
shall proceed always frankly and in the public view."\(^8\) With this statement, the concept of open or public diplomacy was crystalized.

Whereas the traditional format for negotiations between states was behind closed doors, this trend toward public diplomacy increasingly allowed for more publicity about the negotiation process, often making successful negotiation difficult. The root of the problem lies in the difference between "open covenants" and "covenants openly arrived at". The key difference being publicity about the results of diplomatic negotiations, and publicity about the actual process of diplomatic negotiation. The principles of democracy dictate that there be public knowledge about agreements signed by the government. However, when one perceives democracy as also mandating that the public should have knowledge about the process prior to agreement, a number of challenges arise. Fundamental to the negotiating process is the assessment of each state's actual and potential power, as well as how much a state is willing to compromise to achieve a desired objective. In the assessment process, each state's strengths and weaknesses are revealed. In private negotiation, this exposure is kept behind closed doors, whereas with public diplomacy, this disclosure is much greater. Furthermore, if the negotiation process occurs in the public forum, states may be less willing to compromise for fear of looking weak or being criticized.

\(^8\) as quoted in Morgenthau, 527.
Technology, combined with a shift toward democracy, and more open diplomacy served to change both diplomacy, and the role of the diplomat. Discussions which previously had been conducted between diplomats, now occur at summit meetings between government leaders, and negotiations held behind closed doors are viewed suspiciously and are carefully scrutinized by the media.

Diplomacy and Canadian-American Relations

The evolutionary process of diplomatic relations between Canada and the United States has tended to parallel the global experience with a few modifications. Of particular note is the absence of military conflicts between Canada and the United States. The last time that the use of military force was an issue in Canadian-American relations was the War of 1812. This absence of the use of force as an instrument of policy has resulted in unusual elements in Canadian-American diplomatic relations. In particular, diplomatic initiatives between Canada and the United States have tended to focus on working co-operatively in multilateral efforts to help maintain peace in other parts of the world, rather than on bilateral military issues. Furthermore, the bilateral political agenda consists of a broad range of issues, with security often of a lower priority than economic and social concerns. There also exists between the two nations multiple channels of both formal and informal means of communication. The geographic and cultural closeness of Canada and
the United States facilitates dialogue and interaction at all levels of society, not just at the traditional diplomatic or governmental level.\textsuperscript{9}

The over-riding characteristic of Canadian-American relations has been a general amicability between the two nations. As a result, conflicts of interest and diplomatic irritations were viewed as 'problems to be solved' rather than 'major confrontations to be won at all cost'.\textsuperscript{10} Further complementing the 'joint gain' approach of negotiation between Canada and the United States is the element of a mutuality of interest. Historically, Canada has been successful in presenting the case that what was beneficial to Canada would also be a benefit to the United States. The counter argument was also available that if Canada was hindered, especially economically, then this could have a detrimental impact on the United States. This mutuality of interest approach was applicable to a variety of issues, but appears to have been most effective when applied to economic issues, where perhaps the highest amount of mutual dependence exists.\textsuperscript{11}

Canadian-American diplomatic relations have also been influenced by seemingly insignificant characteristics such as: a common language; constant communication between the societies at all levels; cultural similarities and familiarity; geographical closeness,


\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 390.
and ease of access to both countries. However these unique elements in the bilateral diplomatic relationship served to shape the evolution of a unique style of diplomacy. For the first half of the twentieth century, Canada and the United States tended to be in diplomatic congruence with each other. They were allies in both World Wars, and worked to form co-operative diplomatic organizations such as the United Nations and NATO. However, in the late 1950s and early 1960s a divergence of interests became noticeable. Canadian reaction to the Merchant-Heeney Report of 1965 was one of the first indications of a significant shift in the Canadian-American relationship.

In January 1964 President Johnson and Prime Minister Lester Pearson called for a joint study into the nature of the Canadian-American relationship so as to develop "acceptable principles which would make it easier to avoid divergences in economic and other policies of interest to each other."12 The result was the 1965 publication of a report by two senior diplomats, Canadian Arnold Heeney and American Livingston Merchant, entitled "Canada and the United States: Principles for Partnership". This report presented eight guiding principles about how the Canadian-American relationship should be managed. An indication of Canadians increasing distrust of their neighbours to the south was the strong reaction to paragraph 81 of the report which read: "It is the abiding

12 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Canada and the United States: Principles for Partnership (Ottawa: 1965), 1.
interest of both countries that, wherever possible, divergent views between the two governments should be expressed and if possible resolved in private, through diplomatic channels."13 This suggestion was in agreement with the report's earlier observation that "the practice of quiet diplomacy is not only neighbourly and convenient to the United States but that it is in fact more effective than the alternative of raising a row and being unpleasant in public."14 Canadians reacted strongly and critically to this suggestion of continuing the practice of quiet diplomacy, primarily because it came at time of increased Canadian criticism over the American presence in Vietnam.15 The Canadian public outcry over paragraph 81 was a clear indication that the traditional nature of relations between Canada and the United States was beginning to change.

The next indicator that the relationship was shifting was President Nixon's 1971 attempt to resolve the American balance of payment problems by enacting a variety of trade tariffs from which Canada was not granted exclusion, as had been the custom in the past. In response to this unusual action, Canada started to examine ways to reduce its vulnerability to the United States. The result was Mitchell Sharp's paper "Canada-U.S. Relations : Options for the Future". Citing concerns over Canada's dependence upon the United States, Sharp summarized that there were three options available for

13 Ibid., 49-50.
14 Ibid., 33.
the future direction of Canadian-American relations. The first was to maintain the status quo with a minimum of policy adjustments. The second was to deliberately move toward greater integration with the United States. The third and recommended option was "to pursue a comprehensive, long term strategy to develop and strengthen the Canadian economy and other aspects of our national life and in the process to reduce the present Canadian vulnerability." This recommendation, to be dubbed the "Third Option", was a by-product and further indication of growing Canadian distrust and concern over their vulnerability vis a vis the United States, combined with increasing Canadian nationalism. 16

As a result of this "Third Option" initiative, in 1974 the Canadian government set up the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA). This foreign investment review process was mandated to assess those wishing to invest in Canada, and their benefit to Canadian society. While FIRA did not significantly hinder American investment in Canada, it did prove to be a constant source of irritation for the American government 17. In a bid to strengthen free trade negotiations with the United States, the Mulroney government removed this nationalistic thorn in 1985.

However, the turbulence caused by Nixon's economic policies of 1971, and the American grumbling over FIRA was mild in


comparison to the American reaction when in 1980, Canada announced the National Energy Program (NEP). The NEP through its policies, federal-provincial agreements, legislation and regulations, affected everything from oil and gas pricing to taxation and exploration. The aims of this energy program were to develop domestic policy goals for the security of supply, encourage greater Canadian participation in the domestic petroleum industry, and shift the revenue sharing between the federal and provincial governments. It also had significant impact on the United States. At the centre of the NEP was a series of policies designed to give the Canadian oil and gas industry preferential treatment through subsidies and foreign investment restrictions. The newly elected, free-market oriented Reagan administration found the NEP particularly aggravating, resulting in a significant souring of relations between Canada and the United States.

Policies such as FIRA and NEP were indications of a shift in Canadian-American relations. Even though both governments were in almost continuous communication with each other, there had started to be less agreement concerning what to talk about. While in the past there had been one common agenda, increasingly this agenda was splitting. The two new agendas which were emerging may have contained similar issues, but often at different priority levels. Further compounding the situation was the greater

18 Ibid., 148.
involvement of domestic political preferences on the setting of external priorities, in ways which stiffened each country's bargaining position.\textsuperscript{20}

In 1982 Allan Gotlieb outlined the traditional rules for managing the Canadian-American relationship, and then explained how they had changed. According to Gotlieb, the rules of the past were directed toward maintaining informality, pragmatism and the avoidance of publicity. As a result, rule one was "no institutionalization of governmental mechanisms for managing the relationship." While in the past Joint Cabinet committees had been attempted, they were found to be largely ineffective. Consequently, it was advised to keep things simple, deal with each issue independently, and and keep discussion as informal as possible.

The second rule was that disputes between Canada and the United States should be handled by the principals involved, rather than allow for intermediation. The purpose of this rule was to keep the issues as depoliticized as possible, allowing for effective communication and resolution.

Perhaps the most important rule in the Canadian-American relationship was to avoid a linkage of issues. Gotlieb identified a "tacit understanding" between Canada and the United States that "you do not need to link issues with your friends, because linkage is implicitly an exercise in seeking advantage, and if issues are being

treated solely on their merits, then linkage is not necessary." He also acknowledged that if linkage became the rule of conduct than it would be to the great disadvantage of Canada.

The fourth rule was to have patience, and not to expect that issues could be solved by a "quick fix". The best way to deal with disputes was long term and low key. This gradual approach resulted in rule five, no public diplomacy, as had been established in the 1965 Merchant-Heeney report.21

Rules number six and seven specified that there would be: "no central bureaucratic control over the relationship;" and "no 'U.S. policy' in Canadian foreign policy, and no 'Canadian policy' in the State Department." These rules were often considered largely inconsequential because of the informality, and lack of linkage in the relationship.

Rule eight was that discussion or negotiation of issues at the political level should be limited in favour of keeping the discussion at the official or expert level. This was again to facilitate effective communication and resolution to an issue.

The agreement not to "rock the multilateral boat on bilateral issues", and "do not go against each other multilaterally on foreign policy issues" was the ninth rule. The tenth, and final rule was not to rely on summitry. Noting that between 1972 and 1981, no U.S.

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president had visited Canada, summits were to be used to "set the beacon jointly; rarely to resolve substantive issues."\textsuperscript{22}

By 1982, Gotlieb acknowledged that while many of these rules still applied, many had also changed quite markedly. The first rule of "no institutionalization" had remained largely unchanged, while the second rule of "no intermediation" had only sightly changed with an increased tendency to resolve issues through the International Court of Justice or GATT. Of rule number three, "no linkage", Gotlieb charged that now "Congress is trying to create linkage all the time." The "no quick fix" rule of number four had not changed, although public perception had. Because many issues were having an impact on domestic affairs, both countries were under increasing pressure to resolve them quickly. The fifth rule, "no public diplomacy", had also changed. "The public, at least in Canada, demands information and explanations on its government's efforts to pursue or defend national interests. Governments must be very clearly seen by the public to be engaged in bilateral discussions and negotiations." The growing complexity of the issues to be dealt with between Canada and the United States, and the subsequent need for greater coherence in the management of the relationship, resulted in the bending of rule six and seven. Increasingly, there was a need for the relationship between Canada and the United States to centrally coordinated. Rule number eight, which held that "negotiations at the political level should be limited", had been maintained. Similarly, the ninth rule

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., : 184.
against rocking the bilateral boat on multilateral issues, was also in effect. Finally, even in 1982 when Gotlieb presented this paper, it was evident that the final rule of "no summitry" was to soon dissolve.23

Gotlieb's summary serves to demonstrate not only the unusualness of the Canadian-American diplomatic relationship, in terms of traditional diplomacy, but also the future direction of the relationship. The majority of these changes were the result of increasing public pressure to make diplomacy more open. Canadians especially, were no longer willing to remain outside of the negotiation process. The first evidence of this was the response to the Merchant-Heeney report, and was again echoed by Gotlieb. One of the reasons for this public demand was the growing realization and discomfort about the high degree of interdependence and Canadian vulnerability in the Canadian-American relationship.

However, to allow diplomatic relations between Canada and the United States to be more open, and yet still successful, has been a difficult task. Similar to global diplomatic relations, a balance had to be found between the necessity of a private negotiation process, and the democratic right to know. This balance was further complicated in the Canadian-American relationship by the high level of interaction and interdependence between the two nations on a whole myriad of issues.

23Ibid., : 185-187.
The diplomatic techniques employed by Canada during the acid rain debate serve to provide clear examples of both the shift in Canadian-American relations as outlined by Gotlieb, as well as the more general evolution toward public diplomacy.

During the acid rain debate Canada's diplomatic tactics ranged from increasing the lobby efforts of the Canadian embassy in Washington to the highly unusual distribution of pamphlets and buttons to American tourists entering Canada. Some of these diplomatic techniques, such as Canada's Washington embassy becoming more involved in lobbying Congress, could be considered evidence of a shift in the nature of the Canadian-American relationship. As Gotlieb had identified, the established rule of "no public diplomacy" was starting to change due to increased public demand for information and explanation. Furthermore, it was evident that Congress was becoming an increasingly powerful actor in the formation of American foreign policy. Consequently, for successful negotiation foreign governments had to consider not only the position of the president, but also that of Congress. Despite the increased acceptability of a foreign government lobbying Congress, on more than one occasion some of Gotlieb's actions appeared to have extended beyond the normal diplomatic boundaries. It is in this context that while Gotlieb's actions were the closest of all the actors involved in the acid rain debate, they were still a departure from the norms of traditional diplomacy.
The perceived shift toward more public diplomacy could provide an explanation for the slightly more unusual technique of having Canadian policy-makers on public speaking tours throughout the United States. Increasingly, diplomatic discussions and negotiations were being conducted in view of the public. From this perspective, it was no longer completely unacceptable for one government to criticize the other. However, in the context of the Canadian-American relationship, this was not usually considered the norm.

An element of Canada's acid rain campaign which cannot be easily explained by either a change in the Canadian-American relationship or general shift toward public diplomacy is the third section of this study. On several occasions Canada appears to have disregarded diplomatic norms and directly encouraged the individual American citizen to pressure the American government to alter their domestic environmental policy. This was done in a variety of ways such as: distributing pamphlets and buttons; radio commercials; and setting up displays at sporting shows.

Many of the diplomatic tactics employed during the acid rain debate can be at least partially explained by a shift in the Canadian-American relationship in combination with the growing acceptability of public diplomacy. However, this explanation falls short of encompassing the entire acid rain campaign. Furthermore, it would not account for how extraordinary much of this campaign was in terms of traditional diplomacy. The unusualness of Canada's anti-
acid rain campaign becomes increasingly evident as this study reviews the different sections of the campaign. If the diplomatic approach used by Canada during the acid rain dispute is an indication of the diplomatic style of future relations between Canada and the United States, then it would signal a dramatic shift in the diplomatic nature of the relationship.
Chapter 3
Ambassador Allan Gotlieb and his "New Diplomacy"

In comparison to the other aspects of Canada's acid rain campaign, it was the actions of Canada's ambassador to the United States, Allan Gotlieb, which most closely resembles previously established diplomatic norms. As ambassador from late 1981 to 1989, Gotlieb was one of the most dominant actors in the acid rain debate. In addition to his role as ambassador, he was also responsible for a significant shift in Canada's approach toward their relations with the United States. This chapter is an explanation of Gotlieb's strategy of 'new diplomacy'; the examination of its application to the acid rain issue; and the subsequent responses this approach received.

By the time Gotlieb became ambassador major changes had occurred in the Canadian-American relationship. The potential for disputes between Canada and the United States had been amplified by an increase in both the number and the complexity of the issues that needed to be resolved by both nations. However, perhaps the most significant change was the increased diffusion of power in Washington. Since the end of the Vietnam conflict, Congress had become increasingly involved in foreign policy formation. This Congressional intervention resulted in an executive branch with diminished policy influence, and it became necessary for foreign
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governments to consider not only the policy position of the president, but Congress as well.

Associated with this increased role of Congress was a growth in the number of lobby groups active on Capitol Hill. Both domestic and foreign interest groups realized that to achieve favourable American policy decisions, it was now necessary to actively lobby the members of Congress, as well as maintain relations with the executive branch. ¹

In light of these changes in Washington, Gotlieb began advocating a shift in Canada's strategy in its relations with the United States. Gotlieb first began to explore alternatives to Canada's diplomatic approach while working with the Department of External Affairs in the 1970's. For Gotlieb, and others, it became evident that, because of the fragmented nature of the American political structure, the strategy of public diplomacy could increase Canada's effectiveness in Washington. In 1975, Allan MacEachen, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, commented that: "As an increasing number of Canadian policies are now having an impact on

the United States, a new challenge is facing the Canadian
government-one of public diplomacy - to explain to the American
people 'what Canada is, where it is going and why.' It was Gotlieb
who would soon be faced with these challenges, resulting in the
development of what he referred to as the 'new diplomacy'.

Gotlieb had outlined his ideas even before he became
ambassador. In 1981, he presented his proposed strategy in an
article he co-authored with Jeremy Kinsman, the chairman of the
Policy Planning Secretariat of the Department of External Affairs.
In this article Gotlieb and Kinsman contended that the increasing
complexity of Canadian-American relations, combined with the
growing influence of Congress in American policy making, made it
necessary for Canada to develop a new diplomatic strategy vis-a-vis
the United States. A key element to this new strategy was that
Canada should replace its existing short term, ad-hoc diplomatic
approach, with the establishment of long term goals. Furthermore,
Gotlieb and Kinsman also proposed a re-examination of the technique
of linkage. While agreeing that outright linkage was still a poor
approach, a modified form of linkage to help Canada use its strengths
in other areas to compensate for its weaknesses was suggested. The
Canadian-American relationship was beneficial to Americans in
many ways, as a trading partner, a source of investment, tourism and
so forth. Because of these benefits, Gotlieb and Kinsman proposed

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2 As quoted in Andrew F. Cooper, "Playing by New Rules : Allan Gotlieb,
Public Diplomacy, and the Management of Canada - U.S. Relations," The
Fletcher Forum ( Fall 1989), : 97.
that those American legislators, who were particularly conscious of Canada's benefits, be kept well informed of Canada's interests in other areas where the politician may have a positive influence.³

Perhaps the most significant suggestion of Gotlieb and Kinsman's 1981 article was the call for "the projection of Canadian policy interests to the U.S. Congress and on public opinion". ⁴ While acknowledging that it would be unwise to ignore the Administration, clearly Congress had become a force that the Canadian Government should attempt to increase their influence upon. On a more local level, Gotlieb and Kinsman called for the greater participation of the Canadian consulates and consulates-general in making the Americans aware of the Canadian perspective. Underpinning this entire strategy was the argument that it was necessary for the Canadian government to increase its lobbying efforts in Washington so that the American policy makers become cognizant of the possible impact a policy might have upon Canada. On occasion the American government has enacted a policy which, because of Canada's dependence on the United States, had an unintentional negative impact on Canada. Gotlieb and Kinsmen contended that if the Americans had a better understanding of the Canadian situation, then such legislative sideswipes could be avoided.⁵

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³Allan Gotlieb and Jeremy Kinsman, "Reviving the Third Option," *International Perspectives* (January/February 1981), : 3.
⁴Ibid.,:5.
⁵Ibid., : .2-5.
One of the challenges which Canada faced in their relations with the United States was that historically, Canada had not received a great deal of attention. There were a few key reasons for Canada's relative invisibility. Ironically, one of the main reasons for this is because Canada and the United States have had such a long and cordial relationship. The United States tended to give more weight to its relations with those countries in which security was an issue of possible dispute. However, relations between Canada and the United States, were noted for their lack of defense orientation. Associated with this was that Americans had often placed a higher significance on global involvements, many times to the detriment of more local relationships. Furthermore, cultural, political and economic similarities between Canada and the United States enabled the politicians to assume that they either knew everything about Canada, and therefore did not need more information, or that any possible policy differences must be minor. Such assumptions, could have easily led directly to legislative sideswipes.

In addition to the reasons Gotlieb cited, there were other strong justifications for Canada to increase its lobby efforts in Washington. A key element was the high level of economic interdependence between Canada and the United States. In terms of volume and value of trade, this bilateral relationship was unmatched world wide. Another factor was the awareness that other nations, most notably

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7 Gotlieb and Kinsman, : 5.
Japan and Israel, had much larger lobbying budgets than did Canada. This disparity put Canada at a disadvantage when trying to attract the attention of Congress.\(^8\) Finally, the Canadian-American relationship was an unequal one, with Canada being more economically vulnerable than the United States. In the past, this inequality had been compensated by the safeguard of traditionally cordial relations between Canada and the United States. However, as tensions increased between the two countries, the good-naturedness of the relationship could not be depended upon.\(^9\) As a result, Canada had to consider other methods, such as lobbying to maintain a balance within the relationship.

As a foreign lobby, Canada also had a few distinct advantages over its counterparts. Because Canada and the United States were so similar, many of the issues which concerned the Canadian government were also of concern to American domestic interests. As a result, it was usually not difficult for a Canadian lobby to find a domestic U.S. interest with which to ally. An example of such an approach was Canada's attempt at increasing the awareness of the American hunting and fishing enthusiasts and tourists, especially in those states which were also suffering the effects of acid rain. In addition, established environmental groups, such as the Sierra Club, often received Canadian guest speakers discussing the problem of

\(^8\) Charles F. Doran and Joel J. Sokolsky, *Canada and Congress: Lobbying in Washington* (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1985), 19-20.

\(^9\) Doran, "Intervulnerability and Interdependence," : 129.
The key to such an alliance was that once established, it became difficult for Congress to ignore Canadian concerns without also angering domestic interests.

Canada also had the advantage of a long history of government to government communication. There was an established network of formal and informal contacts which could then be used to effectively and efficiently present the Canadian perspective to the key individuals. This factor was further strengthened by the existence of extensive corporate relationships, which could be appealed to for domestic support.

Finally, an often underestimated advantage was the generally positive attitude that American legislators had toward Canada. While at times the relationship may have been strained, the maintenance of this friendship had always been compatible with American national interests. Clear evidence of this advantage is what Gotlieb identified as the 'Canadian factor'. It was suggested to Gotlieb that Canada was able to receive special treatment from American policy makers, because of the historically amiable relations between the two nations. On more than one occasion, Sen. George Mitchell (D:Maine), Sen. John Chaffee (R:Rhode Island) and Sen. Bill Bradley (D:New Jersey), all influential Senators, and all important acid rain allies, had commented to Gotlieb that it was "the Canadian factor -

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10 This approach will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
12 Doran and Sokolsky, 113.
the importance of addressing acid rain as an element of good relations with Canada. That, during the dark hours, kept the issue alive in the Administration and helped move it in the right direction."\(^{13}\)

However, Canada also faced some unique disadvantages as a foreign lobby in the United States. As was mentioned previously, because security was not an issue of contention between Canada and the United States, Canada did not often receive high priority from the American policy-makers. Furthermore, the similarities which allowed the Americans to better relate to a Canadian issue also resulted in a legislator not realizing the possible uniqueness or gravity of the Canadian situation. Associated with this, because of the sheer volume of Congressional matters which could affect Canada's interests, it was virtually impossible to effectively lobby on any but the most crucial.\(^{14}\) It is an irony of the Canadian-American relationship that many of the unique advantages that Canada had as a lobby group could also be presented as disadvantages.

When he was appointed as Canada's Ambassador to the United States in 1981, Gotlieb had the opportunity to put his theories into practice. As ambassador from 1981 to 1989, Gotlieb also became instrumental in Canada's efforts to resolve the issue of acid rain. Few of Canada's previous ambassadors to the United States were able to impress the social columnists of the Washington as successfully

\(^{13}\)Allan Gotlieb, "I'll be with you in a moment Mr. Ambassador" (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 73.
\(^{14}\)Doran and Sokolsky, 115-120.
Gotlieb did. This was valuable because in Washington social get-togethers are often an extension of work, and as such a good opportunity to lobby one's cause. Within a few months of arriving in Washington, Allan Gotlieb had the distinction of being cited in the Washington insiders guide *Who Runs Washington?* Of Gotlieb, it sycophantically declared: "If you were to draw up a list of the brightest men in Washington, you'd quickly put down Allan Gotlieb and then wonder who else to put on the list." An important element of Allan Gotlieb's dynamism was clearly attributable to his wife Sondra Gotlieb. The splashiest parts of Canada's presence in Washington were the parties hosted by the Gotliebs. The Gotliebs were proud of the fact that they were able to turn the Canadian embassy into what *Vanity Fair* magazine identified as "...the only social hotspot on Embassy row". When not preparing for an embassy party, Sondra Gotlieb was writing about Washington's powerful people in a satirical column for the *Washington Post*. Allan Gotlieb brought to Washington not only a new diplomatic strategy, but also a unique diplomatic style.

Shortly after his arrival, Gotlieb also realized that it was no longer sufficient for diplomats to communicate their concerns exclusively through the State Department. Instead, the Canadian embassy, like every other special interest group in Washington, was required to haunt the halls of Congress, make the contacts, and


\[\text{ibid., 261.}\]
uncover the necessary information to stall or alter a possibly damaging piece of legislation. Furthermore, similar to interest groups, Gotlieb's lobbying efforts became focused on specific issues, often seeking short term gains, rather than longer-term considerations. While Gotlieb acknowledges that initially he was surprised to discover that such a large component of his job in Washington would be as a lobbyist for Canadian concerns, he quickly became a master of this new diplomacy.

A key component of public diplomacy, and Gotlieb's task in Washington, was public relations. The purpose of this political marketing was to explain "Canadian political, economic and cultural realities and [to defend] Canadian economic policies and practices to influential U.S. circles." To achieve this goal, Gotlieb extended his contacts beyond the normal diplomatic channels, with a particular emphasis on gaining access to influential members of Congress and key domestic interest groups. Geographically, the focus was also expanded. Where in the past, diplomats had focused on Washington alone, Gotlieb expanded Canada's diplomatic efforts into the rest of the nation. In an attempt to cultivate regional public opinion, and to "get the message out, and get it out attractively" the Canadian embassy was also involved in the production and distribution of

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17 Cooper, : 103.
18 Gotlieb, "I'll be with you in a moment Mr. Ambassador", 12.
19 As quoted in: Cooper, : 98.
packaged satellite feeds to local stations. 20 Throughout Gotlieb's role as ambassador, he actively marketed Canada to Americans.

While Gotlieb has claimed success in many of the disputes between Canada and the United States, the issue of acid rain presented him with some unique problems. The largest hurdle to be overcome was that the Canadian government's position on acid rain was directly opposed to the position of the United States administration. Clearly, the Reagan administration was ideologically against increased environmental regulation, which was exactly what Gotlieb was lobbying for. This problem was further aggravated because the American government also insisted that more research on acid rain was required before an environmental policy could be implemented. As a result of the divergent opinions of the two governments, any pressure by the Canadian government to encourage a change in American domestic policy, was quickly greeted with cries of domestic intervention. 21 Gotlieb was determined to overcome these problems, and he did so in an energetic, and at times, inflammatory manner.

As a result of the American sensitivity over possible domestic intervention, it became very important that the efforts of the Canadian Embassy were not perceived as an attempt to undermine the position of the U.S. government. In order to avoid criticisms of intervention, the Canadian Embassy concentrated their efforts on

20 Ibid., : 103.
21 Gotlieb, "I'll be with you in a moment Mr. Ambassador", 66-68.
informing the legislators, and clarifying any misunderstandings. This was achieved in a variety of ways. First, the embassy was very receptive to anyone seeking information about the issue; as well, Gotlieb himself continuously tried to make contact with those important legislators who did not contact the embassy on their own. Gotlieb also regularly called upon those members of Congress who were directly involved in the acid rain legislative process. From these efforts Gotlieb was able to foster 'the Canadian factor', that is, the importance placed on addressing the acid rain issue as an element of good relations between Canada and the U.S. 22

However, despite his continued efforts, Gotlieb began to conclude that to resolve the problem of acid rain would require much more than an extensive lobbying effort. Because of the intense Congressional divisions over the issue, there would never be sufficient support for any meaningful piece of legislation. Gotlieb contended that for a successful resolution of the issue, the executive branch of the American government must become involved. It was for this reason that Gotlieb encouraged Mulroney to keep the acid rain issue at the top of summit agendas. 23

Even though Gotlieb persisted in his lobbying activities, his efforts, especially on the issue of acid rain, were not always greeted warmly. An integral part of Gotlieb's acid rain campaign was the writing of letters to those members of Congress who were directly

22 Ibid., 73.
23 Ibid., 74.
involved in the acid rain debate. On more than one occasion, this correspondence was interpreted by the Americans as a foreign government attempting to interfere in domestic affairs. For example, when Rep. Thomas Luken (D:Ohio) agreed to Gotlieb's request that a letter to Luken on the issue of acid rain be read into the Congressional Record, Luken dismissed it as an "unsolicited letter" that was "just the latest in the Canadian Government's proselytizing campaign [against acid rain] in the United States." 24

This letter was written in response to Luken's 20 April 1983 statement in the House of Representatives in which he called for a balanced approach to protecting the environment and protecting jobs. Luken also used the opportunity to raise his concerns about Canada's lobbying efforts on the acid rain issue. "Canada is spending a lot of money not for pollution controls in its own country, but for lobbyists and advocates to scurry about Washington and the United States propagandizing for laws which will place the burden on the U.S. utility payers, and put U.S. businesses at a disadvantage in competition with Canadian businesses". Luken identified five specific concerns he had about the Canada's environmental program. First, while the United States had reduced emission levels by 15 to 20 percent in the last ten years, Luken charged that the only reason why Inco, Canada's primary source of pollutants, had reduced its emissions was because of reduced production resulting from the

economic situation. Second, even though the American consumer had spent $160 million in the past ten years for air pollution controls, according to Luken, Canada would only decrease emissions if the United States does so first. Third, Canada had no scrubbers, whereas the United States had 97. Fourth, unlike the United States, Canada had "no effective standards for utility plants", and lax auto emission standards. Finally, Luken raised the conspiracy theory, noting that Canadian utility companies had been actively trying to export into the United States, and that if American utilities were to reduce their production substantially for environmental reasons, this would provide a market opening for Canada.25

Gotlieb's letter in response, sought to counter what he termed misconceptions in Luken's views, offering "clarifications" and information. He concluded his letter to Luken by asking his letter be inserted in the Congressional Record "in the interest of fairness". He also reminded Luken that "I have always been ready to discuss these matters and remain willing to do so. However much our perspectives may differ, I have felt that we should at least proceed on the basis of accurate information."26

Coinciding with the entry of Gotlieb's letter into the Congressional Record, Luken included his own letter which he had sent to the Secretary of State George Shultz. In this letter Luken raised his concerns about Gotlieb's conduct as Ambassador. "I and

26 Luken, "Acid Rain, " : E3389
others have questioned the propriety and efficiency of this aggressive lobbying campaign [against acid rain] here in the United States by our guests. Mr. Gotlieb's brazen request that I make his remarks part of the Congressional proceedings puts the matter in bold relief." 27 Luken's distress about the inappropriateness of Gotlieb's correspondence did not go unheeded. Gotlieb's comments came to the attention of the President's National Security Advisor, Judge William Clark. Shortly thereafter, Gotlieb received "a handwritten, not very complimentary" letter from Clark. Gotlieb responded to this, and all subsequent criticism by affirming his position of not standing idly by in the face of inaccurate information being circulated about Canada.28

Gotlieb's communications with Luken also prompted the Chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Rep. John Dingell (D:Michigan), to actively begin seeking information on Canada's acid rain program. Of particular interest to Dingell were the inaccuracies which Gotlieb cited in his letter to Luken. In an attempt to clarify the information, in July of 1983, Dingell sent a letter to then Ontario's Minister of the Environment Keith Norton. While the stated premise of Dingell's letter was to gather accurate information about acid rain, it quickly became evident that Dingell viewed Gotlieb's criticisms with considerable suspicion. Central to Dingell's concerns was that while both the Ontario and Canadian government

27 Ibid.
28 Gotlieb, "I'll be with you in a moment Mr. Ambassador", 68.
claimed to have reduced emissions. To Dingell it appeared that these reductions were

... no more stringent than what Inco and Hydro had already undertaken voluntarily. In fact, unless my information is inaccurate, when stronger measures have been tried, the firms have successfully resisted. In short, unlike current legislative proposals in this country, the Canadian-Ontario actions are not technology - forcing or regulatory forcing actions. They seem to be consensus - type actions confirmed by regulatory order.  

A second concern expressed in Dingell's letter to Norton was that the Canadian government was unwilling to appreciate the severity of the economic conditions in the midwestern states. In particular the possibility of job losses due to the costs of emission reduction legislation was an issue. This economic concern was heightened by the continued inability of the scientists to prove that decreased emissions would guarantee an improved environment. The final issue raised was Dingell's uneasiness with the impression that Canada would not reduce their emissions prior to the United States taking action toward emission reductions. Even though he concluded his letter by stating that "the purpose of this letter is to obtain accurate information about your country's SO2 emissions and control

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standards", it was evident that the primary purpose of the letter was to try and further substantiate Luken's initial claims.30

Before Ontario's minister of the environment could respond to these queries, Gotlieb sent a letter to Dingell. Gotlieb's letter of 19 August 1983 served to inform Dingell that Keith Norton had been replaced by Andrew Brandt in a cabinet shuffle, as well as to further clarify his earlier letter to Luken. In this letter to Dingell, Gotlieb noted that "...there has been frustration in Canada because Canadians accept the scientific evidence that there is a direct link between sulphur emissions in one part of the continent and acid rain in the others."31 In reference to Dingell's letter to Norton, Gotlieb defended the actions of Inco and Ontario Hydro, pointing out that while these industries were contributing to acid rain, it was a small amount in comparison to the pollutants which crossed the border from the United States. In an attempt to allay Dingell's concerns about Canadian insensitivity over the economic plight of the midwest, Gotlieb noted that there was a similar economic situation in Canada. However, he contended that even in light of the economic situation, solutions could be found. With regard to the issue of unilateral action by Canada, Gotlieb only offered the following cryptic statement: "We are very conscious of the need to take strong action in Canada....Canada must also take into account the fact that further unilateral action will not be effective without comparably effective

30 Ibid.
action in the United States."32 The letter was concluded with the assertion that in the absence of the desired bilateral agreement, Canada would go ahead with a unilateral 25 per cent reduction of 1980 allowable limits by 1990.

Dingell responded to Gotlieb's letter on 8 September. In this letter he restated his skepticism about the credibility of the scientific evidence, as well as his concern that Canadian control programs did not often translate into policy, especially in economically difficult times. Furthermore, Dingell took exception to what he perceived as Gotlieb's suggestion that the United States had remained inactive in reducing emission levels. Once again, he called into question the details of Canada's own pollution control legislation, requesting of Gotlieb specifics of Canada's environmental program. 33 These details were provided in Gotlieb's 5 October letter to Dingell. 34

Despite Gotlieb's efforts, Dingell was still not convinced that the Canadian government was releasing the true amount of emissions from Inco. However, as was demonstrated by his 1 November letter to Gotlieb, what was of increasing concern to Dingell was the problem of economic costs, and scientific uncertainties. In this letter, Dingell cited a statement by William Ruckelshaus (Administrator of the EPA), in which the Ruckelshaus identified the cause of policy delay by the United States as the result of four issue areas: "scientific

32 Ibid.
uncertainty, the question of the best strategy to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions, the issue of who pays for the reductions, and the way in which the reductions are to be administered." Dingell concluded that: "I know you believe that enough is known to begin to design and implement a control program, but not everyone is as confident in the research or the meaning of the relevant data produced by the U.S. and Canadian scientists as you are." 36

The same day that Dingell sent this letter to Gotlieb, the newly appointed Ontario minister of the environment, Andrew Brandt, sent a response to Dingell's earlier request for information. To complete the correspondence to all interested parties, Brandt also sent a copy of this letter to the Secretary of State George Shultz; U.S. Ambassador to Canada, Paul Robinson, Jr.; minister of the environment Charles Caccia; Rep. Thomas Luken; William Ruckelshaus; and Allan Gotlieb.

1984 began with Gotlieb sending to Dingell a letter which included a copy of the Canada-U.S. Memorandum of Intent of Transboundary Air Pollution. This was in attempt to encourage Dingell to support a recent Canadian study on the needed level of reduction to protect some lakes and streams. Dingell responded to Gotlieb by stating that while this information was welcome, it was "...not as convincing as you hoped. There are still may uncertainties

about the reliability of the available scientific information. Thus, doubts about the wisdom of embarking too soon on an acid rain control program continue."37 This letter of 16 February 1984 then proceeded to explain in some detail the flaws that Dingell saw in Canada's scientific argument. The letter concluded by making reference to efforts by Gotlieb to resolve the problem of asbestos. Noting that Gotlieb's goal of bilateral discussions had resulted in formal discussions coming to fruition. Dingell curtly concluded that "This result demonstrates quite clearly that normal diplomatic channels or communications between governments often achieve better results that the use of the media to sensitize a nation's people in order to pressure that nations to negotiate."38

It appears that this comment effectively concluded the series of letters between Dingell and Gotlieb. However, Gotlieb continued to use letters to members of Congress as effective tool of communication. For example, Gotlieb sent a letter to Sen. George Mitchell (D:Maine) in March of 1987, expressing his pleasure at the progress of the Senate Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution, of which Mitchell was Chairman. Gotlieb also took the opportunity to remind Mitchell of certain criticisms that Canada had about the American's attempts to limit emissions, and encourage a speedy

38 Ibid., 424.
resolution to the acid rain dispute. Gotlieb also forwarded this letter to Sen. Quentin Burdick(D:North Dakota), Sen. Robert Stafford(R:Vermont), and Sen. John Chaffee(R:Rhode Island), all of whom had been strong supporters of increased environmental regulations, and allies of Canada. This letter also appeared as evidence in the Senate hearing on acid rain control, as well as read into the Congressional Record by Chaffee. Unlike the previous series of communication, this letter was greeted positively. However, it can be argued that this was more a result of the audience, rather than the content.

In addition to Gotlieb's letter writing campaigns, he was also a common presence in the halls of Congress. Members of Congress and congressional staff noted that rarely had an ambassador had such a pronounced presence on Capitol Hill, continuously meeting with old contacts and trying to make new ones. Furthermore, Gotlieb had the reputation of understanding the local politics of the Washington. "He knows that Senator X has a particular problem and therefore is able to approach him with bilateral concerns." These characteristics were crucial to a successful lobbying effort.

Gotlieb's reputation extended beyond the confines of the halls of Congress. Upon arrival in Washington, the Gotliebs quickly acquired notability for hosting some of the best parties in town.

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However, the glitter of the parties only concealed the purposefulness. "Parties in Washington are an extension of work, and people will go to an embassy party if they think they might see someone they have missed during the day." 41 As Sondra Gotlieb once wrote, "People come to parties to gather information, make a contact, and try to influence those who make the decisions". Gotlieb himself, would often use the opportunity to discuss Canada's concerns on a particular issue, and make arrangements for subsequent meetings. At some point before or after dinner, he would schedule later visits with some of his guests to discuss issues of particular interest to Canada.42

Still, despite all of Gotlieb's diligence and extensive lobbying efforts on the acid rain issue, he was not able to overcome the political impediments of a divided Congress and an administration which was diametrically opposed to Canada's position. As Gotlieb acknowledged in his book, the acid rain issue demonstrated that there were limits to the impact of lobbying Congress. It was Mulroney's continuous presentation of acid rain as the 'litmus test' for the Canadian-American relationship, which Gotlieb credits as being the solution to what often appeared to be an insoluble political dilemma. 43

With the change of government in Canada in September 1984, Gotlieb's position in Washington also changed. As was exemplified

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41 Ibid., B1
42 Ibid., B 4.
43 Gotlieb, "I'll be with you in a moment Mr. Ambassador.", 101.
by the Shamrock Summit of 1985, relations between Mulroney and Reagan were much more amiable than when Trudeau was the prime minister. The shift in government also resulted in a change of bureaucracies. Key members of Mulroney's team, such as Simon Reisman and Derek Burney, became challengers to Gotlieb's position as sole advisor on Canadian-American relations. These changes, coupled with some bad publicity about Gotlieb, most notably the 'Deaver incident', and an indiscretion by Sondra Gotlieb, weakened Gotlieb's diplomatic stature. As Gotlieb found out, his 'new diplomacy' was a double edged sword. While the media was necessary for getting Canada's message out, it also publicized the problems.

Prior to 1986, a surprisingly minor amount of attention was paid to the increasing aggressiveness of Canada's lobbying efforts in Washington. However, in 1986 an event occurred which resulted in a critical spotlight being directed toward Canada's lobbying efforts in the United States. Of particular interest was Canada's management of the acid rain issue. In early spring 1986 the story broke that the Canadian government's newest lobbyist, Michael Deaver, was possibly guilty of ethics violations. Throughout April and May, the investigation into the 'Deaver incident' slowly evolved, with the American media paying close attention to it, and the Canadian government working equally as hard to ignore it.

The controversy revolved around Deaver's involvement in a series of meetings with Canadian officials on the acid rain issue while
he was still employed as Deputy Chief of Staff at the White House. Shortly after leaving the White House, Deaver signed a contract with Canada for $105,000, to lobby for Canada on the issue of acid rain. In addition, allegations surfaced that while still employed by the White House, Deaver had approached Canadian officials about securing Canada as a client for the Washington lobby firm he planned to establish upon his departure from the White House.

Concerns over Deaver's actions were of sufficient weight to result in a full investigation by the General Accounting Office into possible ethics violations. The genesis of the controversy was apparently a White House meeting on 11 December 1984, in which both Gotlieb and Deaver were in attendance. This meeting was probably the first time that Deaver and Gotlieb discussed the issue of acid rain. On 3 January 1985, it was announced by Reagan that Deaver would be resigning from the the White House. Deaver was expected to leave his position sometime between March and May of 1985. On 28 February, Deaver and Fred Doucet, a senior advisor to Mulroney, met to discuss plans for the upcoming Shamrock Summit to be held on 17 March. Prior to the summit, Doucet and Deaver were to meet again on several occasions, primarily to discuss summit details. At one point during these meetings, Doucet made what was claimed to be a "light-hearted conversational remark" to Deaver, saying how much Canada "could use a good man" like Deaver. During the investigation, and after media pressure, the Canadian
government eventually acknowledged that such a comment had occurred, but would not initially identify the official.44

However, queries about this comment were of minor concern in comparison to the questions about Deaver's influence in the shaping of the special envoys project on acid rain. At the March 1985 summit, Reagan and Mulroney announced the appointment of two envoys to study the issue of acid rain. Appointed were American Drew Lewis, and Canadian William Davis. These two envoys were to investigate both sides of the acid rain debate, and present their findings within a year. As the Deaver incident unravelled, it became evident that Deaver was actively involved in the formation of the special envoys project. On 2 March, and again on 6 March, Deaver met with U.S. administration officials who were debating the merits of the proposed special envoy project. At this point, there were still some concerns about the project and whether or not it should be announced at the summit. These concerns were also a subject of much discussion at the daily morning White House senior staff meetings which Deaver regularly attended. On 12 March, Deaver and Gotlieb met privately to discuss a variety of issues, perhaps including acid rain and the details of the special envoy proposal. On 17 March, Reagan and Mulroney announced the appointment of William Davis and Drew Lewis as special envoys to study the issue of acid rain.

Deaver officially left the White House on 10 May. Both Deaver and Canadian officials claimed that the first meeting to discuss the possibility of Canada becoming a client with Michael K. Deaver and Associates, occurred on 16 May. At this meeting, Deaver and Canada agreed to a $105,000 per year contract to begin in mid-September. On 25 October, Deaver, Gotlieb, and special envoys Davis and Lewis met at the River Club in New York to discuss the discrepancies over timing and content of the envoys' report. On 8 January 1986, three months early, the report was released. However, the recommendations of the report were tainted by concerns over Deaver's involvement as well as rumours that the Canadians wanted a much more critical report, but had compromised to satisfy the Americans.

The investigation into Deaver's activities concluded that the evidence suggested that Deaver may have violated several federal conflict of interest laws by his participation in the meetings and then lobbying for Canada. The General Accounting Office referred its findings to the Justice Department for further investigation, and possible prosecution. On 16 December 1987, Deaver was found guilty on three counts of lying under oath, and acquitted on two others. One of the acquittals was on the charge that he had lied to Congress about his role in the 1985 appointment of Drew Lewis and William Davis. He was fined $100,000, with no time served in prison.

Even though Deaver had been acquitted on the charge most injurious to Canada's efforts, for Gotlieb, much of the damage had
already been done. The investigation into Deaver's activities had resulted in critical attention being paid to Canada's lobbying efforts, resulting in a considerable amount of negative press. As well, shortly after the Deaver incident, Sondra Gotlieb was chastised for publicly slapping her social secretary in the face for forgetting to invite a guest to one of their many parties. This indiscretion, which was quickly labelled "the slap flap" by the media, resulted in even more negative publicity about the Gotliebs, and raised questions about their suitability as Canada's representatives in Washington. Neither the Deaver incident, nor the "slap flap" were significant events by themselves. However, the negative impact that they had on Gotlieb's new diplomacy was significant. As one lobbyist phrased it, "The Michael Deaver thing had poisoned the well".45 American sensitivity to foreign lobbyists was further aggravated, and the Canadian embassy was no longer the accepted host of grand parties.

When Gotlieb arrived in Washington in December 1981, he had a theory about how Canada's relations with the United States should be handled. For the next eight years, he had the opportunity to put this theory of new diplomacy into practice. To do this, he became a regular fixture in the halls of Congress, wrote letters, and made the Canadian Embassy one of the social centres of Washington. As a result of this more public approach to diplomacy, Gotlieb increased American's awareness of Canada, as well as exposing Canada to

potential criticisms of its own environmental policies. While Gotlieb's approach was a clear departure from the protocols of traditional diplomacy, and as such involved some risk, other sectors of Canada's campaign strayed even further in the attempt to resolve the issue of acid rain.
Chapter 4

Policy-makers and "Indiscreet Diplomacy"

While Gotlieb's approach to diplomacy was clearly a step away from the protocols of traditional diplomacy, the actions of some Canadian policy-makers indicated an even greater distancing from the established formalities of state-to-state relations. In an attempt to achieve a successful resolution to the acid rain issue, some of the Canadian policy-makers initiated a political marketing technique which could best be identified as "indiscreet diplomacy". An important variance between this approach, and the efforts of Gotlieb, was the intended audience. With indiscreet diplomacy the audience was as much the American public as it was the American politician. In contrast, Gotlieb's lobbying efforts were focused more on effective communication with the American legislator rather than the electorate. The following is an explanation of the technique of indiscreet diplomacy, and how Canadian policy-makers attempted to use it to influence the acid rain policy of the United States.

Throughout the acid rain debate a considerable amount of the dialogue between Canada and the United States occurred in public forums. Both governments used the media, and public speaking opportunities to express their concerns about the opposing government's position. By the mid 1980s, it seemed to have become commonplace for Canadian officials to publicly criticize American
domestic policy. The use of public forums like the news media, had the advantage that the criticism was heard not only by those government officials directly involved with the acid rain dispute, but also by the general public. Consequently, when a Canadian policy-maker used the media to express concern or frustration at the inaction of the American politicians, not only did the American legislators receive the message that the Canadians were not pleased, but also thousands of Americans were informed that, at least from the Canadian perspective, the American government was not cooperating in trying to solve the problem of acid rain. In light of the Canadian strategy of trying to increase American awareness about acid rain, the use of public or indiscreet methods of communication had the potential of being quite effective.

From the Canadian perspective, one of the greatest advantages of indiscreet diplomacy was that it allowed Canada to further enlighten the American public about acid rain, as well as maintain political pressure. It was the Canadian opinion that increased knowledge about acid rain would only strengthen their position with the American policy-makers. An awareness factor about acid rain could benefit Canada's cause in two ways: one, it informed the individual citizen who might then take environmental issues into account at election time; and two, it helped to motivate and provide support for already established environmental groups. Because the Canadian officials represented neither a domestic constituency, nor a potential source of campaign support, it was quickly realized that
assistance from the domestic American interests was crucial. If the American environmental groups were to also start lobbying for regulation changes, then Canada's chances of success grew exponentially. Finally, it should not be overlooked that at times, this approach was also beneficial because it tended to quell Canadian concerns about political inaction on improving the environment. This was especially valuable to Canadian politicians who found it necessary to present at least the impression that progress was being made in their negotiations with the United States.

However, as with Gotlieb's new diplomacy, this technique also had political hazards. One of the most formidable was the American resentment at having a foreign government publicly criticize its domestic policy. This outrage was further heightened when the criticism was communicated via the domestic media. A direct result of the American displeasure of the Canadian approach was an intensified examination of the Canada's own pollution policies. The Americans discovered what they considered to be significant shortcomings in Canada's own environmental control legislation. Concerns about the legitimacy of Canada's domestic pollution control served to effectively undermine the validity of Canadian criticisms about American environmental controls. Canada's continued pressure on the United States to strengthen its acid rain policy resulted in highly critical retorts. Typical of these was a statement by Rep. Ron Marlenee (R:Montana) in 1987:
If they [Canada] think their smoke does not stink, they have got another thought coming. Before we shoot ourselves in the foot again, before we begin another round of "Aren't we terrible", self-incrimination, we had better look at the Canadian plants built upwind and upstream some 20 miles, and as close as 3 miles with a heck of a lot less pollution control than our own. ¹

While negative comments of this tenor appeared occasionally throughout acid rain debate, their vehemence tended to grow in times of increased Canadian criticism.

Another by-product of this critical examination of Canada's environmental policy was the emergence of an energy conspiracy theory. Throughout the acid rain debate, it was periodically proposed by some American officials that the real reason why Canada was so concerned about acid rain was because Canada wanted to increase its energy sales to the United States. Because the pollution generating coal smelters were a major source of energy for American industry, it was argued that tougher environmental regulations would most likely result in an increased demand for hydro power, of which, conveniently, Canada was the best supplier. Therefore, Canada's concerns about acid rain was presented as nothing more than a ploy to make the United States dependent on Canada for its energy sources. While to many this conspiracy theory did not appear credible, its continued re-appearance signifies that it should not be entirely discounted.

Even though indiscreet diplomacy had some negatives, from the Canadian perspective, the opportunity to gain American domestic support far outweighed the possible drawbacks of making the debate a public issue. During the acid rain debate, there occurred two identifiable waves of indiscreet diplomacy. The first wave, which started in 1980, quietened down by 1983; the second wave was between 1986 and 1987. In both instances it was the Canadian policy-makers which initiated the use of public avenues. Public speeches and statements to the media were commonly used in an attempt to further the dialogue with the American legislators. There was also an incremental nature to the message Canada was trying to send. At first, it was: "acid rain is a problem, let's try and find a solution"; this then soured into "the United States is not cooperating"; followed by "we have enough scientific information to justify action". As well, throughout the debate, Canada continuously placed great importance on making the average American aware of the acid rain problem.

The first wave was sparked by Canadian concern over Carter's plans to reduce the American dependency on oil by increasing domestic sources of energy, and a perceived disregard of the 1980 Memorandum of Intent. To the Canadians it was becoming increasingly evident that the Americans did not view the Memorandum with the same degree of importance. At the core of the Memorandum was an agreement to a "common determination to
combat transboundary air pollution"\textsuperscript{2}. Subsequently, Canada considered it an important step forward toward resolving the problem of acid rain, and was very sensitive to any possible deviations. With the administrative change-over from the Carter to the Reagan administration, there was a brief reprieve from Canadian pressure on the issue of acid rain. However, with the March 1981 meeting between Trudeau and Reagan, Canada's environment minister, John Roberts, had an opportunity to remind the Americans of the commitments made in the Memorandum. In an interview with \textit{The Globe and Mail} just prior to the March meeting, Roberts commented that the Memorandum was to be a focus of discussion between the two leaders, and that "Ottawa will be pressing for performance". Later in the same interview, Roberts tempered his statement with the assurance that he was not going to "condemn them without giving them a chance."\textsuperscript{3} During their meeting, Reagan apparently assured Trudeau that the United States would not export pollution. However, it is highly questionable whether Reagan, or even Trudeau, were fully aware of the magnitude of the acid rain problem, or the difficulties associated with trying to find a solution.\textsuperscript{4}

After the niceties of the March meeting subsided, Canadian anger and frustration toward the American government grew noticeably. Canada was becoming increasingly concerned about the

\textsuperscript{2}Memorandum of Intent, 1980.
seeming disregard of the Americans for the Memorandum, charging that the United States was not fulfilling its obligations to assist in the fight against acid rain. It was this dispute which launched Canada's first wave of indiscreet diplomacy.

In July 1981, Trudeau travelled to Washington to discuss several issues with Reagan, one of which was acid rain. Following a meeting at the White House, Trudeau publicly reminded Reagan of his promise not to export American pollution, and assured the president that acid rain was still very much an issue between Canada and the United States. John Roberts, in an associated article of the same day, was more direct. He charged that "the United States government had failed to live up to an agreement," and that acid rain continued to fall on Canada. In the same article, Roberts stated that "there has not been a vigorous effort by the United States to bring down pollution that causes acid pollution". He concluded his comments with the warning that if the provisions of the 1980 Memorandum were not met, then "the public reaction in Canada would be sharp, bitter and deep."  

However, by the end of 1981, the Memorandum of Intent, was in essence dead. It had become clear to Canadian officials that the Reagan administration had little concern for a weak document signed by the previous administration. Reagan's perceived disregard for

Canada's environmental concerns, increasingly frustrated and annoyed the Canadian policy-makers. In March 1981, Roberts commented to the media that in his opinion, the United States had done little to strengthen their environmental regulations, adding that Ottawa will be "pressing for performance" from the United States.\(^7\)

By the fall of 1981, Canadian frustration had grown exponentially. In October, there was a conference in Ottawa between Canadians and Swedes to compare their acid rain problems, and the variance of approaches to finding a solution. At this conference Roger Simmons, the parliamentary secretary to John Roberts, commented that the "United States became selfish and ignored the damage they are doing to Canada we made the tactical error of telling them what they were doing to us. We found out they were not particularly interested in what they were doing to us."\(^8\) Canada was beginning to realize that simply criticizing the Administration was not very effective. It became apparent that Canada must begin to educate the American public about the problem of acid rain before a solution could be found. As a result of this realization, a shift in Canada's strategy and application of indiscreet diplomacy occurred. Instead of using the public forum to criticize, Canada was now going to use it to inform. Roberts explained his educational technique as

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\(^7\) Lawrence Martin, "U.S. ignoring pollution agreement, Ottawa says", Globe and Mail, 4 March 1981.

follows: "Short of taking my shoe off and banging it on the desk, I will try to be as dramatic as possible... We want to make as much impact as we can."⁹

Canada's first opportunity to make such an impact occurred just prior to the Canada-Sweden conference. In the beginning of October, the appearance of two Canadian environmental officials, scheduled to appear before a congressional subcommittee hearing on acid rain, was abruptly cancelled. This cancellation, and the justifications for it, raised some questions in both Canada and the United States. On 1 October 1981, representatives from Canadian and Ontario governments were scheduled to provide a "technical briefing" before the House Energy and Commerce subcommittee on health and the environment which was considering amendments to the Clean Air Act. However, the Canadian Embassy cancelled the appearances, explaining that the subcommittee was dealing with policy, not technical matters. However, other Canadian officials attributed the cancellation to pressure from the Reagan administration. The media reported rumours of veiled threats by the Reagan administration to link the issue of energy with acid rain if the experts were to appear. Roberts, upon learning of the decision made by the embassy to cancel the appearances, quickly reversed it.¹⁰

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Despite the controversy surrounding the October 1981 hearings, a Canadian presence at similar hearings was not unusual. Since the first acid rain hearing in 1980, Canadians have appeared as technical witnesses to explain the scientific elements of the acid rain issue on numerous occasions. For Canada, the primary goal of such appearances was to inform the American policy-makers about the problem of acid rain, and to acquaint them with the possible solutions. 11

Another method that the Canadian government implemented to inform the Americans was giving public speeches. Roberts was one of the first Canadian policy-makers to publicly address an American group on the topic of Canada's problem with acid rain. In a speech given on 23 June 1980 to the predominantly American audience of the Air Pollution Control Association, Roberts cited acid rain as "one of the most serious environmental issues facing our two nations today." This was followed by the warning to his audience that he was "going to take off the gloves and say some very blunt things" about the issue. Because of Canada's concern about "the seeming lack of awareness of the average American about acid rain" he foreshadowed that Canada might soon resort to handing out leaflets to tourists entering Canada from the United States. Sardonically he suggested that the theme of these pamphlets might be "come see our fish and forests before they fade into memory". He

bluntly questioned why industries such as tourism, fishing, logging, as well as those individuals suffering from respiratory ailments should be burdened with the cost of keeping the electricity rates of mid-western states low. In a gentler tone, Roberts rejected the classification of Canada's approach as "environmental aggression", explaining that this term erroneously suggested a deliberate attempt by Canada to damage the United States. "There is no malice in the acid rain from the United States, nor I assure you in the much smaller amount of acid rain we send back." His speech concluded with a request to the audience, as professionals in the field of air pollution, to urge their elected officials to follow Canada's lead in controlling acid rain.12

A series of addresses by Canadian officials in 1981 and 1982 continued in the same blunt pattern. Most active in this speaking campaign were John Roberts, and Mark MacGuigan, the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Through these speeches, Canada's increasing frustration with the United States inaction was evident. In June of 1982, John Roberts again had the opportunity to address the Air Pollution Control Association. Because of the lack of progress since the first speech, this second one was even more vehement. Expressing Canada's disappointment with the negotiation process thus far, he identified the American "foot dragging and interference in the development of scientific information" as having "reached

12John Roberts, "The Urgency of Controlling Acid Rain," a speech before the Air Pollution Control Association, Montreal, 23 June 1980, Statements and Speeches, No. 80/8.
frustrating proportions". He interpreted the American rejection of Canada's proposal to reduce SO2 emissions by 50 percent by 1990, as a clear indication that the two sides are a long way away from any meaningful action. For Canada, "this was a bitter pill to swallow". Roberts concluded his scathing comments on the failed negotiations by simply stating "This is not what we expected when we signed the Memorandum of Intent."13

In this speech, Roberts also touched on an issue which was to become of increasing concern between Canada and the United States. Questions about the validity of Canada's scientific information, especially as it pertained to the causes and effects of acid rain, were a constant challenge to Canada's position. From the Canadian perspective, sufficient research had already been done to justify the implementation of the expensive programs needed to cut emissions. However, the Americans were not convinced. They insisted that more research was still required before they would be willing to adopt a costly pollution control program. In his June 1982 speech, Roberts summed up the debate between research and action in the following manner: "To procrastinate on the basis of a so-called lack of knowledge would be like hesitating to drain a malarial swamp, because we didn't know precisely which mosquitos were carrying the disease."14

14 Ibid.
The unwillingness of the Americans to implement control policy before there was conclusive scientific data was also an issue that Mark MacGuigan addressed in a 1981 speech to the Conference on Acid Rain held at the State University of New York in Buffalo. In this speech, MacGuigan extended an invitation to the doubters about acid rain to "come to our country and see for themselves. They will find signs of the depredations of several million tons of sulphur dioxide and oxides of nitrogen - at least half of which is of U.S. origin." Ironically, he concluded the speech by expressing his pleasure at having received the President's assurance that the negotiation of an agreement to solve the acid rain problem would proceed as was outlined in the Memorandum of Intent.

In the subsequent statements by Canadian policy-makers, this issue of scientific proof became an important concern, quickly developing into a major stumbling block in the negotiation process. From the Canadian perspective, it appeared that the United States was simply using the demand for more research as a stalling tactic to avoid having to increase environmental regulations. However, the Americans were adamant that it would be irresponsible of them to implement costly control programs without definitive proof of the effectiveness. As a result of these divergent views, Canada found it necessary to slightly alter the strategy of indiscreet diplomacy.

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15Mark MacGuigan, "Acid rain one of the most serious problems in Canada-US relations," an address to the Conference on Acid Rain, State University of New York, Buffalo, New York, 2 May 1981, Statements and Speeches, No. 81/10.
Previously, the focus had been to inform the American public so as to better facilitate the finding of a mutual solution; however, the scientific debate, coupled with the ineffectiveness of the Memorandum, forced Canada to return to a more critical stance. Increasingly, Canadian officials publicly accused the American government of ignoring the acid rain issue and impeding progress on policy implementation. Coinciding with these criticisms was an increased emphasis on enlightening the American public about the problem of acid rain.

Because the question of scientific evidence had such an impact on the subsequent development of the acid rain issue between the United States and Canada, it requires some examination. Early on in the acid rain debate, scientists were asked by the policy-makers in both countries to provide unequivocal proof of two claims: one, that there was a causal effect between acid rain and environmental damage; and two, that reducing certain emissions would have a positive impact on the environment. Unfortunately, the science of acid rain has a multitude of possible variables. Different ecosystems react uniquely to acidic precipitation, making it virtually impossible to predict the potential impact of reduced emissions. Furthermore, unequivocal scientific proof required a consensus in the scientific community, with such a large number of variables, this was a standard of proof that the scientists could not provide. While the reality of these scientific grey areas was a serious hindrance to

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16 Alm, : 61.
policy implementation, of greater issue was the question of the necessity of unequivocal scientific proof before action should be taken. The debate between these two perspectives was not fought in the hallways and meeting rooms of bureaucrats and politicians. Instead, the Canadian government took it to the public.

On the one side were the Canadian officials who, since 1981, had claimed that there was sufficient scientific data to take action. In testimony before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agricultural Research and Environment, Canadian Embassy representative, John Rejhon bluntly stated that "In our view, there is no doubt that the scientific understanding of the acid rain phenomenon, at this time, both justifies and necessitates the beginning of ameliorative action." This was a message that was echoed by subsequent Canadian officials.

While the 1980 Memorandum Of Intent did not succeed in creating a bilateral agreement, it did cause the formation of joint scientific work groups to conduct a study of acid rain. On 21 February 1983, the groups findings were finally completed, more than a year behind schedule. From the perspective of the Canadian government, the scientific evidence presented in the reports led "inexorably to the conclusion that action must be taken now. The findings and conclusions in the reports strongly support the position

taken by Canada at this time last year."\textsuperscript{18} Despite the Canadian enthusiasm, the Americans continued to claim to be unsatisfied that enough research had been done to justify the cost of pollution control actions. The fact that Canada was forced to unilaterally release the results of this joint research project provided early insight into how the Americans were receiving the report.

From these early scientific debates there developed a visible pattern. At the same time that the Canadians were claiming scientific evidence, the Americans continuously countered with their own interpretation. In 1982, Anne Gorsuch, the administrator of the EPA stated that: "Current parameters of the uncertainty as to the cause and effect, we believe, do not provide a premise for further regulatory action at this time. To conclude at this point that SO\textsubscript{2} equals acid rain is not a conclusion that can be established in the scientific community."\textsuperscript{19} This view was mirrored by her successor, William Ruckelshaus: "There is no consensus in the country about acid rain....We [have not arrived] at the point were the country is sufficiently convinced that we have a real problem here that we have to address..."\textsuperscript{20} Finally, Lee Thomas, the EPA administrator in 1986, followed suit with: "We do not believe that the current state of knowledge can sustain any judgement with respect to the level of


\textsuperscript{20}U. S., Congress, House, Subcommittee on Science and Technology, March 14, 1984, as quoted in Alm, : 77.
emission reductions needed to prevent or eliminate damage from acid rain."\textsuperscript{21}

As the acid rain debate evolved, it became increasingly obvious that scientific research had become politicized; this created even greater problems for the policy-makers. Each side of the debate was very skilled at interpreting the latest scientific report to their own advantage. While the Canadians were presenting report after report which supposedly justified their cause, the Reagan administration was either ignoring the reports, or finding the one clause which could cast doubt on the absoluteness of the findings. Examples of this are plentiful, with one of the most illustrative being the controversy surrounding the NAPAP (National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program) report of 1987. Despite the declaration of several independent scientists that acid rain as a serious environmental issue, this Reagan administration sponsored report asserted that there was no immediate danger from acid rain, and in essence, not very much to worry about.\textsuperscript{22} Of particular note were the criticisms by both Canadian and American policy-makers and scientists, levelled at the executive summary. It was charged that the director of NAPAP himself had independently penned the summary in the form of a political document with no supporting data. This led to claims by the scientists that the report was misleading and

\textsuperscript{21} U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, \textit{Clean coal technology development and strategies for acid rain control}. 99th cong. 2nd. sess. 9-10 June 1986, 135.

\textsuperscript{22} Alm, : 66.
inaccurate, designed to be a direct attempt at strengthening Reagan's position in the scientific debate.²³

It was a common interpretation that Reagan liberally used the justification of the need for more research as a continuous hindrance to taking action on acid rain. It appeared that regardless of the voluminous scientific data identifying acid rain as a problem that had to be addressed, it was still deemed inconclusive by the Reagan administration. Before Reagan was willing to begin the implementation of environmental controls, the administration demanded that the scientific data be absolutely conclusive. Unfortunately, much to the frustration of the Canadians, such a standard of scientific knowledge was impossible to achieve.

Of all the problems confronting the governments of Canada in their fight against acid rain, the scientific debate proved to be one of the most intractable. Aside from the impossibilities of providing conclusive scientific evidence, Canada was also also hindered because the debate tended to quickly become mired in scientific detail. Such detail, while crucial to Canada's cause, did not lend itself well to the strategy of indiscreet diplomacy. Canada was forced to present the information to the general public in a simplified form, thus diminishing the strength of the scientific evidence.

A clear indication of the intractable nature of this issue in the acid rain debate is that it spanned eight years, as well as a change of government in Ottawa, and two changes in Washington. The

²³Ibid., : 66-67.
impending elections in both Canada and the United States initially
provided a brief reprieve from the growing Canadian frustration.
With Mulroney's election, the increasing tensions evident in the early
1980's between Canada and the United States, over the acid rain
issue, were lost in the shuffle of a new government in Ottawa. The
1984 election not only brought new people to Ottawa, but also a new
perspective on Canadian-American relations. Whereas under
Trudeau the relationship had noticeably soured, Mulroney arrived
with a much more conciliatory manner toward the United States.24

Initially, in his approach to the acid rain issue, Mulroney did
not use the tactic of indiscreet diplomacy. However, as his own
frustration at American inaction grew, his government began to
openly criticize American domestic policy. Mulroney also placed the
issue of acid rain at the top of the bilateral agenda. Consequently,
the first summit meeting between Reagan and Mulroney, in March
1985, resulted in a joint study group being formed on the issue of
acid rain. Drew Lewis was the American representative, and William
Davis was appointed by Canada. Their mandate was to examine the
issue of acid rain and present a report by the next years summit
meeting. By January 1986, this team had completed their report and
presented it to their respective governments. A key component to
the envoys' report was the recommendation that Canada and the
United States begin a five year, five billion dollar program to test

24Lawrence Martin, Pledge of Allegiance : The Americanization of
Canada in the Mulroney Years (Toronto : McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1993), 81.
new technology, the cost was to be shared equally by both
government and industry. At the March 1986 summit, the report
was accepted by both governments, however the Americans did not
appear to be as enthusiastic about the report as the Canadians.

While Mulroney was heralding the American approval of the
report as a win for Canada, others were criticizing it as a hollow
victory. There were two major concerns raised about the report and
the American acceptance of it. The first problem was that the report
did not call for actual reductions with any specific details. As a
result of this vagueness, assuring compliance to the report's
recommendations could be difficult. The second, and perhaps more
significant concern, was the manner in which the American
government approved the report. Reagan accepted the report while
saying that "serious scientific and economic problems remain to be
solved". Those who questioned Reagan's commitment to the report's
recommendations were further alarmed when Reagan's press
secretary commented that the White House still believed that further
research was needed on the causes of acid rain, and as a result,
would not seek stricter controls on air pollution.25

Mulroney's congenial relationship with Reagan was soon
soured by increasing pressure on his government to get definitive
action from the United States on the acid rain issue. Prior to 1987,
there were significantly few incidents of indiscreet diplomacy

25 David Israelson, "Mulroney wins hollow victory on acid rain,"
between the Mulroney and Reagan governments over the environmental issue. However, a furor arose in Canada when Reagan presented his budget proposal to Congress in early January 1987. In his budget proposal, Reagan sought only $287 million for environmental programs. This was a figure far below what environmentalist argued was necessary to fulfill the American commitment to the envoys' report.

On 15 January 1987, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark sent a letter to Secretary of State George Shultz. While this letter was sent in confidentiality, its contents were published by the Globe and Mail on 20 January. In his letter, Clark expressed Ottawa's disappointment that the U.S. government was not treating the acid rain issue with sufficient seriousness. He cited that the "continued quibbling" by U.S. officials who have ample scientific evidence of the gravity of the acid rain problem, combined with a "lack of specific action" in the U.S. to clean up its pollution sources, "calls into question the sincerity of the Administration" to fulfill Reagan's commitment to the envoys' report. Clark identified the dispute over scientific evidence as "red herrings" that should have been laid to rest with the acceptance of the report. Clark concluded the letter by commenting that Ottawa's reaction to Reagan's budget proposals on acid rain was "one of great disappointment".26

26 Jeff Sallot, "Clark letter chastises Shultz over 'quibbling' on acid rain, " Globe and Mail, 20 January 1987, A5."
The day after Clark's letter was published, Vice-President Bush had a brief meeting with Mulroney in Ottawa. While Bush left the meeting without making any promises, he commented to reporters that Mulroney gave him "an earful", and that he would convey Mulroney's concerns to Reagan immediately. Meanwhile, Mulroney appeared skeptical, and commented to the media that he thought the Reagan Administration should do "a lot more". Other Canadian officials who did not want to be identified described the acid rain issue as the "litmus test for the Canada-U.S. relationship as a whole", and that "This was a meeting about commitment and it provided us with the opportunity to spell out in the clearest terms possible the ways the United States has fallen short."27

This surge of indiscreet diplomacy did not end with the Bush's return to Washington. The day after Bush left, a federal report was released by Ottawa which strongly attacked Reagan's inaction on acid rain. The report concluded that the program that the U.S. proposed in compliance with the envoys' report "will not provide any measurable reduction" in the SO2 and NOx crossing the border into Canada. Alex Manson, the author of the report, commented to reporters that he "wouldn't go so far as to say its [the U.S. pollution plan] a bust. I don't think we're wasting our breath. But the U.S. has failed to meet its commitment [under the report] ".28 Later Manson

tempered his comments with the acknowledgement that Canada's own acid rain plan was not yet in place.

With another summit planned for 5 and 6 April 1987, the public comments by Canadian policy-makers began to appear on an almost regular basis. In the middle of February, Environment Minister Tom McMillan stated that Canada wanted the United States to cut the amount of acid rain entering Canada by fifty percent by 1994. "Our position couldn't be clearer. The Americans send over into Canadian territory about four million metric tonnes of acid-rain emissions each year these emissions would have to be slashed by at least fifty percent ..." by 1994 to prevent irreversible damage to the Canadian environment.29 This statement by McMillan marked the first time that Canada had publicly specified by how much Canada wanted the United States to lessen its emission levels.

Aware of the criticisms from Canada, and trying to avoid a major conflict at the April summit, on 18 March, Reagan re-affirmed his pledge to fund the $2.5 billion, five year program to reduce acid rain. However, Reagan still refused to seek stiffer emission regulations. Instead, the funds were to go to research programs intended to advance and commercialize new technologies for burning coal more cleanly. Again, Mulroney declared this commitment as a significant step forward. The critics on both sides of the border were quick to chastise Mulroney. Rep. Henry Waxman (D:California)

commented " I am surprised that the second time around the Prime Minister would not see through the president's hocus-pocus. This is a betrayal of our common environment." Michael Perley, of the Canadian Coalition on Acid Rain simply stated: "To look at this as a meaningful solution to the acid rain problem is naive at best." In reality, all that Reagan was doing was re-issuing a promise he had made a year earlier and had not fulfilled.

A short three days later, Mulroney had altered his interpretation of the situation slightly. Speaking at a conference on wildlife and natural resources in Quebec City, Mulroney presented one of his strongest speeches yet. He informed the predominantly American audience that "The government of Canada is firmly determined to end the blight of acid rain, and expects the same genuine resolve from the United States of America. Anything less would be unworthy of the common responsibility we share for the health of our continents environment." Mulroney was then able to balance these comments by adding that his "good-neighbour policy" with the U.S. "is yielding welcome results on this issue". While this speech was more critical than was common for Mulroney, others, most notably Ontario's minister of the environment, James Bradley, and Quebec environment minister, Clifford Lincoln, wanted it to be even stronger. It was hoped that a tough speech could set the tone

for the upcoming summit, as it was, the speech appeared to fall short of that mark.32

Clearly, the Americans were starting to respond to the Canadian criticisms. Unfortunately, most of the response was negative. One of the most colourful responses was the re-emergence of the "conspiracy theory" by Donald Hodel, Secretary of the Interior. This theory, which was first developed in the early 1980's, contended that the only reason why Canada was so anxious for Americans to cut their emission levels was so that utilities in Ontario and Quebec could increase their electricity exports to the United States. McMillan dismissed Hodel as being "way off base [and] terribly misinformed...I don't think we should be unduly concerned when one of them says something that's colossally stupid".33 McMillan's provincial counterpart in Ontario, James Bradley, had a similar perspective, commenting that "Mr. Hodel is simply one of several one-watt light bulbs in an Administration that appears to be lacking in environmental enlightenment."34

A second American criticism which was less easy to discount was that Canada did not have as stringent environmental regulations as they were expecting the United States to adopt. This criticism was presented clearly in a tersely worded warning from one of the most

32Donald Israelson, "Ontario Wanted PM to be 'tougher'," Toronto Star, 24 March 1987, A4.
powerful members of Congress, John Dingell (D: Michigan). In his letter to U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, he suggested that the president should be advised to tell Mulroney to think twice before again criticizing American efforts to fight acid rain. Central to Dingell’s concerns were the apparent inequalities in Canada’s approach to pollution control. After strongly questioning whether Canada’s criticism of American environmental policy, and subsequent praise for the Canadian program was well founded, he advised that the Canadians be informed by the president in forthcoming meetings that "the U.S. system is different, less flexible and not accompanied by federal funding." Furthermore, that when environmental regulations are "imposed regionally with the actual and perceived economic consequences at a time of huge U.S. dollar and trade deficits, strong resistance in the U.S. should not be surprising, particularly when it is accompanied by significant disagreement over the applicable science." Dingell concluded the letter by scolding Canada’s response to Reagan’s promise of $2.5 billion. In his opinion, such a "commitment should not be taken lightly by Canada or others." It was in this atmosphere that Reagan and Mulroney prepared for their third summit meeting on 5 and 6 April 1987. Despite of all the comments made prior to the summit, and Mulroney’s continuous public insistence that acid rain was at the top of the summit agenda, 

Reagan's decision to mention acid rain in his summit speech was very much an afterthought. Earlier, after a private morning discussion with Mulroney, Reagan discussed with his chief of staff Howard Baker, the possibility of changing his speech to include the issues of acid rain and Arctic sovereignty. After forty-five minutes of revisions and negotiations between the U.S. treasury, justice, state and defence departments, and the EPA, four additional lines were added to his speech. As a result of this addition, Reagan acknowledged before a special joint session of the House of Commons and Senate, that he and Mulroney had agreed to consider "a bilateral accord on acid rain, [building] on the tradition of agreements to control pollution of our shared international waters". The transparency of this statement was evident to many.37

Criticism of Reagan's pledge was swift and furious. Ontario's environment minister, Jim Bradley viewed the summit as an environmental failure "Acid rain seemed to be only an afterthought. This is an insult to the administration in Ottawa. When you unwrap the package [delivered by Reagan in Ottawa], what you're left with is a candy coated nothing".38

In the days following the summit, while Mulroney continued to try and present the summit as a success, others, most notably Bradley, increased their criticisms. On 11 April, Bradley spoke to the

Federation of Ontario Cottagers Association (a group representing approximately 40,000 Ontario cottage owners, of whom about one quarter were American). To this group he warned that Reagan's latest acid rain pledge was just another delaying tactic. "I have no faith that the current U.S. administration will make any real attempt to cut back acid rain emissions acid rain played a neglected Cinderella to the favoured ugly sisters of global struggle and free trade".39

The America media was also starting to listen to the Canadian concerns. On 9 April, Rep. Bruce Vento (D:Minnesota), had included in the Congressional Record a series of articles which had been appearing in his local paper (the St. Paul Pioneer Press-Dispatch) entitled "Acid Rain Over Canada". Written before the summit occurred, journalist Tom Majeski summarized how Mulroney could come out of the summit a winner in two scenarios: one, he could get a "signed-in-blood" commitment from Reagan; or two, he could "walk out in a snit". Majeski added that "The former is preferred, but the latter would be applauded nevertheless because Canadians are tired of being stonewalled on the acid rain issue. They are tired of being ignored by the United States, tired of being considered a second-class neighbor, tired of being viewed as a vast nation of lakes, forests and a handful of residents living alone in the woods. " The article concludes with the acknowledgement that Canadians " are

now waiting anxiously to see if [Reagan] will come [to Canada] prepared to meet his obligations as a responsible neighbor". A few days later, The New York Times reported a similar sentiment. In an article entitled "A Rage That Rises When the Trout Go Belly Up", the frustration of Canadians in their attempts to get the Reagan administration to address the acid rain issue was clearly outlined. This same article presented a particularly strong quotation from NDP MP Bill Blaikie: "There is a widespread perception that Americans really don't give a damn if we have any forests, any fish of any lakes. The sense of an incredible selfishness on the part of the U.S. government is going to have a fundamental effect on the way that Canadians think about the United States."

While, historically, these little flare-ups of indiscreet diplomacy subsided shortly after the summit, such was not the case in 1987. In early June, Jim Bradley gave a speech to the American Bar Association. Described as one of the strongest attacks by a high-ranking Canadian official in several years, Bradley connected acid rain with chemical warfare: "Canada has put in place a plan to cease firing, but we want the truce to be mutual". He explained that he came to New York as a friend of America and a foe of acid rain. Canadians are as pro-American as anyone you'll find, but friends are allowed to criticize one another. "With that justification, he then

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40 Bruce Vento, "Who'll Stop the Rain?", Congressional Record, 9 April 1987, E1372.
started a scathing criticism of the American approach to acid rain. He presented five major criticisms: first, he charged that the United States was "out of step with the world" and was "hiding behind endless research"; second, key U.S. politicians lacked "the political will" to enforce existing environmental legislation; third, Reagan's five year technology program was insignificant and would be ineffectual; fourth, there were economic benefits of pollution control which the United States was ignoring; and fifth, the biggest single spender among Congressional lobbyists was the coal industry. Ironically, Bradley delivered this speech while sharing a panel with Ashley Brown, a top utility official from Ohio, one of the biggest producers of emissions. Afterwards, Brown's only comment was that "technology cannot be forced".42

The summer of 1987 saw the re-emergence of the scientific debate as a major issue in Canadian-American relations. As mentioned previously, the dilemma faced by the policy-makers was that science was not able to provide the absolute proof that some politicians were demanding before taking action. The 1987 release of the NAPAP report resulted in not only the re-engagement of this dilemma, but it also crystalized the two sides of the acid rain issue.

The Canadian media especially, was flooded with statements by Canadian officials dismissing the validity of the report and asserting that Canada had a strong record on environmental affairs.

Environment minister, Tom McMillan, was the first and most vocal of the report's critics. In a speech to the Fourth World Wilderness Congress in Denver Colorado, McMillan labelled the report as 'voodoo science'. He summarized the report as being "awkwardly out of step with prevailing scientific judgement"...as well as "incomplete and misleading". He further identified the acid rain issue as the litmus test of Canadian-American relations. In a statement to the press, McMillan said that "What is missing is the political will by some Americans to do what is necessary to reduce, on a targeted and scheduled basis, a dangerous pollutant that is wreaking havoc not only in [the United States], but in Canada as well." Just as this fury over the NAPAP report was starting to subside, a study conducted by the EPA was released. This report was also highly critical of the Canada's claims to having improved the emission standards. It concluded that Canada was exaggerating its acid rain clean up program, and that many components of the program were still not in place. McMillan again responded immediately to this report in a speech he was giving in Washington. He contended that the report was also flawed, and that Canada was well on its way toward an acid rain program. At the same time, there was some concern raised by other Canadians, most notably, Jim Bradley, that McMillan was taking a chance by bragging to

Americans about Canada's achievements. "Sometimes sticking your jaw out too far is not wise if you're going to have someone's fist placed squarely on it." It is interesting to note, that this potentially damaging report did not receive very much media attention, whether that was by design or luck is unclear, however, it was very fortunate for Canada.

The next flare-up of indiscreet diplomacy was predictably in advance of the final summit between Reagan and Mulroney. On 28 March 1988, Mulroney delivered a speech in New York to the Americas Society (a non-partisan organization with more than 1000 members who work in the United States to try and improve understanding of the economic, political and cultural values of the Americas). In his speech, Mulroney clearly identified scientific study as simply an American delay tactic "We are told in the face of overwhelming scientific evidence to the contrary, that the issue of acid rain needs more study. All of this is to avoid action. America must do its part. Friendship has inescapable costs." Prior to this speech, Mulroney defended his acid rain position in an interview in which he reportedly snapped at Robert MacNeil (of the MacNeil/Lehrer Hour) "I'm not some wild-eyed kook who needs some functionary to tell me what is happening".

While many had hoped that Mulroney would maintain this tough stance for his meeting with Reagan, Mulroney's tone was significantly muted when he was granted the unusual opportunity to address Congress prior to his meeting with Reagan. In this speech, Mulroney noted that although some progress had been made, Canadians would really like some more. "I recognize that congressional funding for a clean coal technology program will help to develop new methods for reducing emission in the long term. I welcome that. I think it is a helpful and a progressive step. But more is needed."\textsuperscript{47} Afterward, the only result of the meeting with Reagan was the assurance from Reagan that he would "reflect on" the acid rain problem.\textsuperscript{48}

As could well be expected, the critics were quick to comment on Mulroney's handling of the acid rain issue, and his ineffective 'pal diplomacy' technique. However, most of the criticisms were muted by the reality that in a short while there would be a new administration in Washington. America's 'environmental president' George Bush was elected that November. By the following year, a significant amendment to the Clean Air Act, parts of which specifically addressed the issue of acid rain, was in Congress.


\textsuperscript{48} Martin Cohn, "Mulroney pleads with Congress to curb acid rain," \textit{Toronto Star}, 28 April 1988, A10.
This examination of Canada's attempt to forward the acid rain issue by implementing indiscreet diplomacy exposes both the cyclical characteristic of the approach, as well as the incremental nature of the message being communicated. At the beginning of each wave of indiscreet diplomacy, the criticisms tended to be mild, and cast in a positive light. However, as Canada's frustration grew, so did the scorn, on both sides of the debate. Further adding to the cyclical element was that both of the waves were eventually diffused, not necessarily because progress had been made, but as a result of a change in government. Coinciding with these waves was a shift in the messages being sent. Initially, Canada had hoped that the United States would work with them to achieve a solution to this problem. With Canada's realization that the United States was not willing to co-operate, the messages turned negative. It began with the claim that the Americans were not fulfilling their commitments under the 1980 Memorandum of Intent, and concluded with a long and bitter dispute over conclusive scientific evidence. Underlying all of these messages was a Canadian focus on educating Americans about acid rain.

When reviewing indiscreet diplomacy and its impact on the acid rain debate, it is necessary to consider the approach within the context of everything else that was happening at the same time. As was outlined in the previous chapter, Allan Gotlieb was actively lobbying Congress on the acid rain issue at the same time that the Canadian government officials were making public speeches or
addressing the media. Furthermore, as will be explained in the next chapter, Canada was also mounting a strong anti-acid rain campaign focused at the average American. This approach included such unorthodox events as the distribution of pamphlets and buttons to American tourists, or the renting of a booth at regional sporting shows. All of these strategies were operating at the same time, but at different political levels, and each one step further away from both the established protocols of traditional diplomacy as well as the guidelines of the Canadian-American relationship.
Chapter 5
Acid Rain and the American Public

Furthest away from the protocols of traditional diplomacy was a Canadian campaign which attempted to directly educate and influence the American public about the acid rain issue. From the Canadian perspective, one of the major hurdles to be overcome in the acid rain debate was the lack of knowledge of the average American about the causes and effects of acid rain. In attempt to increase awareness, between 1980 and 1989 Canada engineered a variety of publicity seeking activities. This campaign was unique from the other Canadian techniques because in this approach the intended audience was clearly that of the average American, rather than the American legislators. In Canada's attempts to communicate directly with the American public, it departed completely not only from the norms of traditional diplomacy, but also from the established protocols of the Canadian-American relationship. It is in this final section that the distance between the norms of traditional diplomacy, and Canada's actions during the acid rain debate, is most evident.

Despite LeBlanc's 1977 warning about acid rain, neither Canada nor the United States paid much public attention to the issue prior to 1980. If the issue of acid rain was discussed, it was done so quietly, and behind closed doors. Much to the increasing frustration of Canadian policy-makers, this approach had little impact on trying to
find a solution to the problem of acid rain. This frustration, when combined with the recommendation of a Parliamentary Subcommittee, resulted in Canada initiating a public campaign to try and enlighten the American public about Canada's concerns about acid rain. Between 1980 and 1989, Canadian policy-makers became actively involved in the distribution of anti-acid rain pamphlets, posters and buttons to Americans. In addition, radio spots were purchased, and for a good photo opportunity, anti-acid rain touques and umbrellas could be found. While the response in the United States to these actions varied from humour to irritation, it was clearly an attempt to rectify what was perceived by Canadian policy-makers as gross ignorance and dangerous inaction on the part of the United States with regard to the issue of acid rain.

In 1980 Canadian policy-makers began a campaign aimed at increasing American awareness about the problem of acid rain. In June of 1980, during a speech to the Air Pollution Control Association, environment minister John Roberts, announced that the Canadian government was contemplating the distribution of leaflets to every tourist who entered Canada at the United States border. Roberts argued that the primary goal of these pamphlets was to increase the awareness of the Americans about the impact that pollution originating in the United States was having upon the Canadian environment.¹

By the end of 1980, the Canadian government had spent $85,000 on the distribution of one million pamphlets to American tourists travelling into Canada. Canadian customs officers at border crossings in Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick distributed these "snappy red pamphlets" to every American tourist entering Canada at these border points. The pamphlets, which were hexagon in shape, had a red cover with the words "STOP ACID RAIN" in white.² There were three key messages that the pamphlet tried to communicate. One, American tourists were informed that "...at least half of the acid rain falling in Canada has its origin in the United States". Secondly, Americans were encouraged to take action: "...if you enjoy Canada's forests, lakes and parks, if you care, help us protect them from acid rain. Write your elected representative expressing your concern".³ Finally, there was the reassurance that "The acid rain problem can be solved if Canada and the United States act together".⁴ These pamphlets heralded Canada's first overt attempt at trying to communicate concerns about American domestic policy directly to the citizens of the United States. The pamphlet distribution also coincided with the first wave of Canadian officials publicly criticizing the American government's inaction on the acid rain issue, discussed in the previous chapter.

³ Ibid.
⁴ "U.S. tourists are target of blitz against acid rain", Montreal Gazette, 6 October 1980, 10.
The first official articulation of Canada's new strategy toward the Americans and the acid rain issue appeared in a 1981 report by the parliamentary Sub-committee on Acid Rain entitled "Still Waters: The Chilling Reality of Acid Rain". This Sub-committee was appointed by the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Forestry, and consisted of nine Members of Parliament representing all three major federal political parties. The Sub-committee was initially struck on 10 July 1980 to examine the costs and effectiveness of finding solutions to the acid rain problem. However, shortly thereafter, by the request of the members of the Sub-committee, their field of study was broadened to include all aspects of acid rain. The Sub-committee received evidence at public hearings held in Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, and Calgary. To achieve a more global perspective on the issue, the Sub-committee also travelled to Washington, London, and Stockholm. Furthermore, the Sub-committee took advantage of invitations from a variety of corporations to visit their facilities, and to discuss with them the particular perspective and concerns of corporations about the acid rain issue. All of this information was then presented in the Sub-committee's final report, "Still Waters", which was distributed on 15 October 1981.

After discussing the causes and impacts of acid rain on the environment and human health, the "Still Waters" report presented thirty eight recommendations on what Canada should do about the
problem of acid rain. Of particular note was recommendation thirty-four:

The Sub-committee recommends that a major public awareness and information program is necessary to generate public concern in the United States about the acid rain problem and the threat it poses to the Canadian and American environments. The present program [pamphlet distribution and speeches] should be continued and expanded and consideration should be given to inviting influential American media representatives to Canada so they can be apprised of the transboundary effects of U.S.-sourced air pollution.5

During its research, the Sub-committee found that many Americans were unaware of the existence of acidic precipitation, and the possible environmental damage it caused. It was even suggested by some witnesses and committee members that many citizens of the United States believed that acid rain was a phenomenon which was somehow confined to the regions of Europe and Canada. The members of the Sub-committee contended that if the American public and politicians became aware of the realities of the problem of acid rain, then they would be just as anxious as Canadians to work toward a solution.6

A few months prior to the official release of the "Still Waters" report an anti-American demonstration on Parliament Hill provided

6Ibid., 103-106.
evidence of the growing Canadian discontent over the issue of acid rain. When Reagan visited Trudeau in Ottawa in March 1981 he was rudely welcomed to Canada by a group of about two thousand protesters, approximately a third of whom were there to express their anger about the failure of the United States to act on the acid rain issue. Whereas the pamphlet campaign, and Canadian policymakers public grumbling about acid rain, failed to receive much media attention in the United States, this problem of lack of exposure was to briefly come to an end. These protesters were so loud that during the playing of the Star-Spangled Banner, all that could be heard were chants of "Stop Acid Rain" and "Get Out of El Salvador". Furthermore, obstructing Reagan's view of an American flag flying in his honour, was a bed-sheet sized sign with huge bright red letters which read "Stop Acid Rain". When the band finished playing, the hecklers, some sporting umbrellas and wearing gas masks, continued to chant "Acid rain, go home", interrupting the speeches of both Trudeau and Reagan.7 Trudeau's initial response was to chastise the crowd for its bad manners, commenting that "when I go down to the United States, I'm not met with these kind of signs. You know the Americans have some beefs against us too. But they receive them politely. Now how about a cheer for President Reagan."8 Later, the House of Commons gave a unanimous consent to a motion deploring the action, and environment minister John Roberts, who had

8 Ibid., 2.
promised to address the demonstrators on their concerns about acid rain, found a pressing engagement elsewhere. Stephen Clarkson comments that if Trudeau had known the intensity of the acid rain battle that they were soon going to have to fight, then he might have been tempted to applaud and encourage the crowd rather than dismiss them.⁹

The recommendations presented in the "Still Waters" report were formulated under the assumption that an effective agreement between Canada and the United States on the joint control of acid rain was soon to be achieved. This perspective was based on the recently signed Memorandum of Intent which implied that Canada and the United States would begin working together to solve the acid rain problem. However, in the years following the "Still Waters" report, it became increasingly apparent to the Sub-committee members that their assumptions were incorrect, and that little or no progress was being made toward significant emission reductions. As a result, by early 1983 the former members of the Sub-committee agreed to unanimously request the formation of a new Sub-committee to examine what progress had been made on acid rain since the 1981 report.¹⁰ Once again, the Sub-committee members conducted a series of hearings across Canada, toured plant sites, and visited parts of the United States. The result was the Sub-

¹⁰ Canada, House of Commons, Parliamentary Sub-committee on Acid Rain, Time Lost: A Demand for Action on Acid Rain (Ottawa : 1984) 3.
committee's 1984 report "Time Lost: A Demand for Action on Acid Rain".

As well as presenting sixteen new recommendations, the "Time Lost" report also examined the response to the thirty-eight recommendations of the "Still Waters" report. With regard to recommendation thirty-four, the report applauded the increased government funding of public awareness programs from a budget of $450,000 in 1981 to about $925,000 by 1983. However, this did not offset the report's principal criticism of both the Canadian and American governments. The report identified the Canadian government's "inaction and/or obstinacy with respect to domestic controls" as "quite frankly, an embarrassment". In their report, the members of the Sub-committee also chastised their American colleagues for a "lack of political will to tackle the problem" of acid rain. The report continued with: "indeed, it has been argued by some that the essential problem with the Reagan Administration, and with certain members of Congress, is an overabundance of political will to resist any rational argument in favour of transboundary atmospheric pollution controls." It was evident that the "Time Lost" report was a product of the Sub-committee's dissatisfaction with the progress of both the Canadian and American governments to find a solution to the acid rain problem. In light of the lethargic

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11 Ibid., 54.
12 Ibid., 7.
nature of both governments, the report issued an urgent demand that effective action be promptly taken to reduce emissions.

As the "Still Waters" reports noted, the Canadian policy-makers had been making some progress in their acid rain campaign. Most notable was the decision by both the government of Canada, and Ontario to formalize their affiliation with the environmental lobby group Canadian Coalition Against Acid Rain (CCAR). It was reported that environment minister John Fraser, after meeting privately with a group of environmentalists in 1979, first suggested the idea of Canada sending an environmental lobby group to Washington. In the spring 1981, Canada officially joined forces with the CCAR, a lobby group comprising of forty-two individual groups representing tourist, trade, religious and native organizations, as well as a multitude of others already suffering from the effects of acid rain. The organization received funding from both the federal government and the government of Ontario (one third each) with private donations providing the final third of the Coalitions' operating budget. It was also decided that the word "Canadian" should be used in the organization's name to act as a constant reminder to Americans that the organization exists as a response by Canadians to the inaction of the American government on the issue of acid rain.

14John E. Carroll, _Acid Rain : An Issue in Canadian - American Relations_ (Toronto : C.D. Howe Institute, 1982) 43.
In May of 1981 Adele Hurley went to Washington to head the CCAR's operation. One of the first things discovered upon arriving in Washington was "that interest in Canada stops at the border." Although initially Hurley's progress was slow, with few of her calls being returned, she did come to the notice of some former senior Carter officials who were continuing the environmental fight from outside the system. These contacts helped her in becoming properly registered, and allowing her access to a network of scientific experts. Eventually, Hurley was also invited to join the weekly meeting of the Clean Air Committee. This committee, which consisted of Washington's environmental lobby groups, was formed to facilitate the transfer of information and to plan joint strategies. Slowly, Hurley started to receive calls from congressional aides, and a few reporters in search of information about acid rain. By early 1982, Hurley's expertise was also being called upon by American officials for advice about who should be requested to appear as witnesses before committee hearings. By her own admission, Hurley's ultimate victory was in early 1983, when she was invited to appear on the "Today Show". However, she sent an American sports fisherman in her stead, providing the explanation "I wasn't going to waste a spot like that on a Canadian". By the time Hurley returned

16 Gwyn, 257.
17 Ibid., 250.
to Canada, in mid 1983 there were some indications that American awareness of the acid rain issue was beginning to grow. 18

During Hurley's stay in Washington, the CCAR launched several projects. The first one began in early 1982 when the CCAR started a $100,000 campaign consisting of radio commercials and posters. About 10,000 posters described as a "visually powerful plea for help", with the slogan "Who Will Stop The Rain" were distributed to U.S. based environmental groups by February of 1982. 19 Coinciding with the poster campaign, 1,000 copies of a radio commercial intended for voluntary air-play, were sent to a variety of U.S. stations. These radio spots were produced with the help of $200,000 worth of donated talent, and featured Canadian rock singer David Clayton Thomas. They emphasized to the listener that Canada and the U.S. have much in common, including acid rain. The spot ended with Thomas urging Americans to join Canadians in the fight against acid rain. The 1960's song "Who'll Stop the Rain?" was a constant theme throughout the commercial. 20 Similar to Canada's pamphlet distribution, the focus of this campaign was the American public, not necessarily the American politician. The CCAR's strategy was that if they could impress upon the Americans how strongly Canadians felt

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18 Ibid., 258.
19 Ross Howard, "Powerful coal interests in the U.S. have launched an aggressive campaign saying that Canada in covering up the acid rain blame. Canada, meanwhile, is starting a low key drive aimed at truth" Toronto Star, 30 December 1981
20 Ibid.
about acid rain, then the Americans would then be willing to put pressure upon their politicians to resolve the problem.\footnote{Hamlin Grange, "Acid rain fighters launch major radio campaign", \textit{Toronto Star}, 12 February 1982, A8.}

This strategy resulted an almost immediate response from a group of powerful American lobbyists commonly referred to as the 'coal coalition'. The 'coal coalition' was an influential, and rich lobby group representing the major U.S. power companies. Prompted by the assertions of the CCAR, the coal coalition launched a variety of attacks on the Canadian claims in the form of newspaper and radio advertisements. At the centre of the coal coalition's advertisement was the assertion that Canadian claims about acid rain were based on "circumstantial evidence", and that the cost of pollution clean up would paralyze sectors of the U.S. economy.\footnote{Howard, \textit{Toronto Star}, 30 December 1981.}

These criticisms by the coal coalition initiated a response from both the CCAR, and the Canadian government. While Canada's environment minister John Roberts promised to embark on a "correction of the insidious propaganda", the CCAR noted that "For a subject that was declared a non-issue and a hoax only eight months ago, the acid rain-source industries are spending an awful lot of money now."\footnote{Ibid.} The response by coal coalition clearly indicated was that the CCAR's strategy was having some impact, and that Canada's concerns about acid rain were beginning to be heard by the American public.
The next major anti-acid rain campaign began in the summer of 1986 when the CCAR initiated a second radio campaign aimed at American visitors to Canada. The CCAR distributed five one minute spots to over 100 radio stations in Ontario. It was predicted that these broadcasts would reach the target audience of more than 1 million tourists, and fishing enthusiasts expected to visit Ontario during the summer. These messages were considerably tougher than those of 1982. "For years the Americans have been pussyfooting around," a woman, angry about acid rain declares in one public service advertisement. This was followed by an announcer urging "Get mad about acid rain. This land is worth fighting for. If you're Canadian, talk to an American. If you're American, when you go home push for Bill 4567. " In addition to this, there was also a radio commercial which noted that Canada's maple trees were dying because of acid rain, while another featured two fishermen bemoaning the poor fishing in a high-acidity lake. Other scenes depicted in these one minute radio spots included a child explaining acid rain to his grandfather, and teenagers engaged in a serious Friday night conversation about the environment.

As in the previous campaign, the CCAR was able to produce these professional sounding spots because of the volunteered assistance of more than a dozen communication experts concerned

24 Nick Joe Rahall II, "Heavy-Handed Canadian Tactics on Acid Rain Not Helpful", Congressional Record, 14 August 1986, : E2894.
25 Ibid.
about acid rain.\textsuperscript{27} However, unlike the previous campaign, these radio spots did not spark a counter campaign from the coal coalition. Part of the reason for this could be because the spots were aired only on Canadian radio stations, and not on American stations, as had been the case in 1982. Furthermore, the coal lobbyists might have been preoccupied with diffusing the ongoing aggressive lobbying by Canadian officials in the halls of Congress.

The 1986 campaign demonstrated that a continuing strategy of the acid rain campaign was to encourage those Americans who were already appreciative of Canada's environment, to put pressure on their elected officials. This educational strategy had been a constant focus not only with the campaigns of the CCAR, but by the governments of Canada as well.

It should not be overlooked that in addition to the actions of the CCAR, Canada also persisted in their own campaign efforts throughout the acid rain debate. Canadian policy-makers fought the acid rain issue at two levels. As was discussed in the previous chapter, there was the one level of an active speaking campaign, and public criticisms of the American government. At a second level the Canadians focused their attentions on the average American, and attempted to generate domestic support for the acid rain cause. As a result, while the CCAR was Canada's official acid rain lobby organization, it often worked in tandem with Canadian officials on a variety of initiatives.

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
Evidence of how the CCAR and the Canadian policy-makers worked together can be found in the series of campaigns coordinated by Canadian officials. While the previously discussed pamphlet distribution of 1980 preceded the enlistment of the CCAR, such was not the case in subsequent drives. By the fall of 1981, the Canadian government once again started to actively follow-up on recommendation thirty four of the "Still Waters" report, trying to increase awareness of the acid rain issue in the United States. A major difference between this campaign, and that of the summer of 1980 was that in 1981 the battleground was not limited to Canadian soil, but instead crossed over to reach the Americans at home. Furthermore, the 1981 campaign was much broader in scope than its predecessor. In addition to several speaking tours by Canadian officials, a campaign which cost an estimated $1 million, resulted in the production and distribution of "Stop Acid Rain" buttons, films, slide shows, and booklets. The buttons which were approximately three centimeters in diameter continued the red hexagon theme of the 1980 pamphlet. Similarly, in the centre of the red hexagon was the slogan "STOP ACID RAIN". These buttons were distributed liberally to American tourists at a variety of forums. The booklets about acid rain were available to anyone who requested them, as well as being displayed at the multitude of Canadian government offices throughout the United States. Finally visual aids such as slides and films were available on request for public
presentations either by a Canadian official, or interested environmental groups. 28

While the primary focus of the ongoing distribution of information was that of education, on occasion there were some events planned with the clear intention of getting the attention of the media. An example of such a tactic was in November of 1982 when Canadian diplomats and employees of the Canadian embassy in Washington started displaying anti-acid rain umbrellas. These beige umbrellas with a big raindrop on them, carried the message "Acid Rain Umbrella. Keep My pH Low" in blue letters. The umbrellas served to remind Washingtonians that for Canadians, acid rain was still very high on the political agenda. This oddity also resulted in a small column in the back pages of the New York Times, summarizing the positive responses of those walking by. 29

A similar attention-getting tactic was used in October 1983 at a conference between Canadian and American environment officials. Conveniently scattered throughout the Halifax hotel in which the Americans were staying were a multitude of anti-acid rain signs and brochures. In addition, at a news conference EPA administrator William Ruckelshaus displayed a gift from the Canadian officials, a red and white touque, which read "Stop Acid Rain".30 The touque,

like the umbrellas of a year earlier, provided photo opportunities for the assembled media; however it did not result in extensive media attention.

In contrast, one of the most successful Canadian approaches was to invite American journalists up to Canada so that they could view for themselves the damage caused by acid rain. Such tours were conducted on two occasions, once in 1982, and then again in 1987. In 1982, the Canadian and Ontario governments invited a small group of American journalists on a two day trip to the Muskoka region. Standing by the shores of acid damaged lakes, such as Plastic Lake near Bracebridge Ontario, the journalists listened as Canadian politicians and scientists explained to them that the reason why this lake, like so many in the region, was so calm and clear was because it was dead, and the cause of death was acid rain. While this experience did result in a short term increase in the number of acid rain articles in American newspapers, the attention was not sustained, and the issue of acid rain was soon forgotten by the media.

A tour which resulted in greater media attention was the one conducted in 1987. The tour lasted four days, included stops in Sudbury, Bracebridge, Quebec City (to talk to maple syrup producers), and then finally Ottawa. Unlike the 1982 visit, this time the key speakers were not the politicians and scientists, but instead local people whose livelihood was being threatened by the damage

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caused by acid rain. As a result, the articles which then appeared in a wide variety of American newspapers consisted of stories about real people, with whom Americans could better identify.32

Another action by the Canadian policy-makers which received positive attention was their appearance at American sporting shows. In February of 1987, Ontario's environment minister Jim Bradley organized an acid rain information booth at New York's annual Outdoor Sportsman's Show. The government of Ontario spent $30,000 to set up and operate the booth for the three day show. It was estimated that in the first two hours, as many as 20,000 people visited the booth leaving with posters reading "Gone Fishing. Fish Going!", and a better understanding of the acid rain problem.33 While Bradley in his business suit might have looked slightly out of place in amongst the baseball caps and work boots, he was well received. As one American visitor to the booth commented, "It is a scary situation. You don't need to have a gun or rod in you hands to feel the effects of this. More people should be made aware of it." 34 Bradley's goal of trying to increase public awareness about acid rain was clearly met through this rather unorthodox approach.

Another approach that the Canadian government was only peripherally involved with, was the controversy surrounding three

32 Bruce F. Vento, "Who'll Stop the Rain ?", Congressional Record, 9 April 1987, : E1369.
33 David Israelson, "Crowd at U.S. outdoors show loves our display on acid rain", Sunday Star, 1 February 1987 A8.
34 Martin Mittelstaedt, " U.S. sportsmen asked to join campaign against acid rain", Globe and Mail, 10 February 1987 A10.
films produced by the National Film Board. In 1983 the United States Justice Department labelled three National Film Board films as political propaganda. Two of these films "Acid from Heaven", and "Acid Rain : Requiem or Recovery", dealt with the issue of acid rain, and were intended to be used as educational tools. As the pamphlet for "Acid from Heaven" explains, the film was:

...Accurate, up-to-date and scientifically vetted, the film shows all the basic information and answers fundamental questions about acid rain. It will help your agency or group acquire a working knowledge of the basic aspects of the acid rain phenomenon...re-enacting a typical case of one uninformed man whose income was cut off as a direct result of acid rain.35

The second film, "Acid Rain : Requiem or Recovery", maintained this educational intent, while focusing more on "the interdependence of plant and animal life and the role each caring citizen must play in protecting our environment."36 Both of these films were distributed on a free loan basis by the National Film Board of Canada, with additional information being available through Environment Canada. While the propaganda label did hinder the distribution of the films, it served to generate discussion and publicity about acid rain, and the Canadian perspective. Even though much of the media attention to

35 National Film Board of Canada, "Acid From Heaven", pamphlet published by National Film Board of Canada, (Montreal:1982).
36 Ibid.
these films was of a negative nature, and tended to increase skepticism about Canada's claims of acid rain damage, in the end, it did facilitate to increase American awareness about acid rain.

Unlike the lobbying efforts of Allan Gotlieb, or the speaking campaigns by the Canadian officials with Canada's campaign to increase awareness it is possible to determine to some extent which tactics were successful in getting Canada's anti-acid rain message across. Throughout the acid rain debate, the efforts of the CCAR, and government officials focused on a constant struggle to be noticed by the American public. As a result, a good indication of the success of the campaign would be the level of media response it received. It follows that if the American media were to write or talk about acid rain, then Canada's message was being communicated to the American public. It should also be noted that even when the media response was critical of Canada's efforts, at least now there was an awareness of the acid rain issue.

Using this measurement of media coverage, the actions of the CCAR must be viewed as being effective. While the CCAR was mildly successful in attracting the media's attention to its campaign activities, considerable attention was generated by the responses to the CCAR's tactics. Of particular notice were the actions of the 'coal coalition'. In response to the 1981 CCAR campaign, the coal coalition launched a counter-attack through advertisements in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and other media. Both the CCAR and environment minister John Roberts acknowledged that this reaction
demonstrated that the power industry had been forced to take the issue of acid rain more seriously than it did before the CCAR started its campaign.\textsuperscript{37}

Furthermore, response to the CCAR's tactics were not limited to the coal coalition. In 1986, angered by the CCAR's radio advertisements, Rep. Joe Rahall II (D:West Virginia) spoke out in Congress. While asserting that he had always valued Canada's friendship, he acknowledged that he had become "increasingly upset with certain tactics they have employed to pressure the U.S. Congress to enact acid rain control legislation". In particular, he accused the CCAR of using "heavy-handed" tactics, and criticized the Canadian effort for trying to emotionalize the debate, rather than approaching it from a scientific perspective. He concluded his statement with the warning that "the Canadians would be well advised to clean their own house before pointing the finger at their neighbors".\textsuperscript{38}

The level of media attention generated by the CCAR was high in comparison to other elements of the campaign. But one of the realities of Canada's campaign to increase the awareness of the American public was the surprisingly little media attention it received on both sides of the border. An exhaustive search of the newspapers and governmental publications from both Canada and the United States, revealed that while attention was being paid to the

\textsuperscript{37} Howard, Toronto Star 30 December 1981.
\textsuperscript{38} Rahall II, : E2894.
environment, and occasionally the specific issue of acid rain, rarely was there mention of the apparently aggressive campaign being waged by the Canadian government. An example of this was the pamphlet distribution of 1980. These pamphlets were not mentioned in the New York Times nor the Washington Post. In June of 1980, the Globe and Mail had one article, and in late August, the Wall Street Journal also had a small article. Furthermore, both of these articles appeared well back in the first section of the newspaper, and only the Wall Street Journal discussed the pamphlet itself in any detail. A similar fate also befall the campaign of 1981. Despite the large sums of money spent by Canadian policy-makers, it did not result in a great deal of media attention. It should also be mentioned that the tactics of the acid rain umbrellas and touques, if mentioned at all in the media, was usually in the form of a light humorous article.

Further evidence of the ineffectiveness of these campaigns was the American media's lack of awareness of the acid rain issue at the time of Reagan's 1981 meeting with Trudeau. Flooded with questions about the acid rain from their viewers, newsrooms of the American networks had to scramble to try to educate themselves about the problem. As well, Stephen Clarkson suggests that even Trudeau was poorly informed about acid rain, and that is why he dismissed the demonstrators as merely being impolite. 39

39 Clarkson, 183.
The 1982 acid rain productions by the National Film Board gained slightly more media attention. While this attention was primarily because of the propaganda controversy, rather than the issue of acid rain, it at least served to increase curiosity about the message.

It appears that one of the most successful tactics of these early years, at least in terms of getting space in newspapers, was to invite American journalists to see the problem for themselves. While the 1982 trip resulted in a few articles scattered throughout a variety of newspapers, the more extensive 1987 was considerably more successful. This tour resulted not only in a series of articles in The New York Times, but Rep. Bruce Vento (D: Minnesota) was so impressed by the acid rain series running in his local paper that he had the entire series included in the Congressional Record.40

Despite the apparent mixed success of Canada's attempt to increase the Americans' awareness of the acid rain issue, the Canadians persisted in the distribution of buttons, pamphlets, and audio visual materials. It was asserted by both the CCAR and Canadian policy-makers that if the Americans understood the severity of the problem, then a solution could be quickly found. As a result, throughout the entire acid rain debate, Canada's continuous focus was to better inform Americans about acid rain. To this end, a major success can be identified in that the media's coverage of the issue became more sophisticated. In the early 1980's, when the

40 Vento, : E1369-E1372.
problem was relatively unknown, almost every newspaper article had to first explain what the problem was before it could be discussed. However, in later articles such background information was not required before new material could be presented. Similarly, the early Canadian government publications were relatively simplistic, as the debate progressed, less detail about the cause and effect of acid precipitation was required.

Of all of the tactics used by Canada during the acid rain dispute, this final section examined the element of the campaign which was most distant from the norms of traditional diplomacy and the guidelines of the Canadian-American relationship. As has been discussed, in attempt to get the message across not only did the Canadian policy-makers intentionally circumvent the American legislators, but the information that was then presented to the American public was on occasion perilously close to propaganda. Even some the more mild examples of literature distributed by Canada were laced with questionable claims such as "Acid rain in North American must be halted before its insidious effects damage more of our continental environment." (Appendix A). However, when one considers the time and money spent by Canadians in attempt to increase American awareness about acid rain, and then contrasts this with the actual number of media reports of the campaign, a rather bleak picture appears. Still, it must be remembered that this more aggressive and unconventional approach
was in concert with a variety of other initiatives by the governments of Canada.

At the diplomatic level, Allan Gotlieb was a constant presence on Capitol Hill, while Canadian government officials, of all levels, were publicly voicing their concerns and criticisms of the American administration. As a result, these three separate, but unified, approaches served to reinforce each other, culminating in an acid rain campaign which was active throughout all levels of the American political process.

In isolation, Gotlieb's lobbying efforts or Canadian officials publicly criticizing American domestic policy may not be considered extreme violations of diplomatic protocol. However, when these actions occur in concert with the tactics examined in this last section, a very unusual approach to diplomacy emerges. Because all of the sections of Canada's anti-acid rain campaign were operating together with the other sections, the extreme diplomatic unusualness of this final section of the campaign indicates that Canada's entire campaign is an example of unusual diplomatic behaviour.
Chapter 6
Conclusion

Diplomacy dates back to the earliest civilizations, evolving as the societies evolved. Gradually, as relations between nations grew more complex so did the role of diplomacy. Similarly, as technology altered communication and brought forth new issues, diplomacy also had to adapt. The result of these changes was the development of a more public form of diplomacy, no longer could states rely on the privacy of closed door negotiation. However, as was reviewed in this thesis, the issue of acid rain produced a new element of diplomacy in the Canadian-American relationship.

This thesis has examined the nature of diplomacy in the Canadian-American relationship as revealed in Canada's approach to resolving the issue of acid rain. Because such a large percentage of the acid precipitation which falls in Canada originated in the United States, for Canada to minimize the environmental damage caused by acid rain required that the United States change their domestic environmental policy. This objective resulted in some novel diplomatic tactics.

The overriding diplomatic tenor of Canada's acid rain campaign had been that of public diplomacy. Gradually, as technology improved, the democratic demands of the public increased, and the issues facing the Canadian-American relationship grew more
complex, there was a shift away from the norms of traditional diplomacy toward public diplomacy. However, many of the actions taken by Canada in attempt to resolve the issue of acid rain extended far beyond the protocols of even public diplomacy.

Closest to the norms of public diplomacy was Canada's ambassador, Allan Gotlieb. Following on his proposal of 'new diplomacy' Gotlieb quickly became a presence as a Canadian lobbying force in the halls of Congress once he took his post in Washington. Gotlieb also occasionally stretched the boundaries of acceptable diplomatic behaviour by requesting, for example, that his letters be entered into the Congressional Record.

Other Canadian policy-makers not only stretched the boundaries of acceptable diplomatic behaviour, but often exceeded them. This group of Canadian politicians and scientists were perhaps not as skilled as Gotlieb in masking their frustration at the American response. During the two waves of indiscreet diplomacy in 1981 and 1987, this group publicly criticized the actions or inactions of the American legislators via both Canadian and American media. In addition, some Canadian officials launched speaking tours in the United States accusing the American government of failing in their environmental responsibilities.

These public criticisms of the American domestic policy by Canadian officials marked a significant departure from the previously established diplomatic norms of the relationship, resulting in a backlash from some American legislators. As a result of
Canada's increased criticism of the American environmental policy, some Americans began to take a closer look at Canada's own performance, and found it lacking. The shortcomings of Canada's own environmental policy tended to undermine the integrity of Canada's assertion that the United States must have increased environmental standards.

The level furthest away from the norms of traditional diplomacy was Canada's attempt to directly communicate their acid rain concerns with the American public. The logic throughout the acid rain campaign was that if the Americans were aware of the devastation caused by acid rain, then they would be more than willing to work with Canada to solve the problem. As a result, Canada began to actively try to increase Americans' understanding about acid rain, and then encourage them to pressure their politicians to do something about it.

This strategy of increasing awareness involved tactics such as: handing out pamphlets and buttons to Americans entering Canada; distributing posters throughout the United States; airing radio commercials in both the United States and Canada; inviting American journalists up to Canada to see the damage caused by acid rain; setting up an anti-acid rain booth at Sporting Shows; and displaying anti-acid rain umbrellas on the streets of Washington. Even though these tactics did not receive as much media attention as one might expect, when one combines this level with the preceding two, and views the campaign in its entirety, then its significance increases.
While Canada's anti-acid rain campaign has been presented here in order of increasing distance from the norms of traditional diplomacy, it could have just as easily been presented in terms of increased volume. By nature, traditional diplomacy is quiet. However, the style of diplomacy Canada employed in its attempt to be heard by the Americans was occasionally very loud, the loudest of all being the third, and most unorthodox section of the campaign. And yet, there is little indication that this final section was the most effective. To the contrary, as the volume of Canada's campaign increased, so did the scrutiny of the weak Canadian environmental legislation, and American determination that more research must be done before potentially expensive policies are enacted. While the situation was not necessarily "screaming bedlam", it does not appear to be an exceptionally effective form of diplomacy either.

However, it should not be overlooked that in November of 1990, the United States Congress passed amendments to the Clean Air Act which for the first time specifically addressed the issue of acid rain. While it would be difficult to assert that it was the Canadian campaign which forced such legislation, it could be considered one of many factors. Other factors include the American public's increased concern about environmental issues, as is indicated by George Bush using environmental issues as part of his campaign platform. Furthermore, ideologically, Bush was not as strongly opposed to increased environmental legislation, as was his predecessor Ronald Reagan. In Congress there was also a shift which
favoured the passage of the Clean Air Act. In late 1988 Sen. Robert Byrd (D:Ohio) resigned from his position as Senate majority leader. Byrd had been the majority leader since 1976, and throughout that time had been strongly opposed to increased environmental regulations. In contrast, his replacement, Sen. George Mitchell (D:Maine), had been an influential ally, and supporter of Canada's efforts. More than likely, it was all of these factors combined which resulted in the acid rain legislation, rather than solely the Canadian campaign.

The question then arises: why was this unusual diplomatic approach used? Was it because of the nature of the issue of acid rain, or the result of a shift in the Canadian-American relationship?

A review of recent disputes between Canada and the United States suggests the conclusion that the extraordinary tactics used by Canada during the acid rain debate have not been repeated. As a result, there is little indication of a beginning of a trend, or a shift in the diplomatic relations between the two nations. During the past few years, issues such as the Free Trade Agreement, the North American Free Trade Agreement, the softwood lumber dispute, and the Auto Pact have provided a multitude of opportunities for Canada to use the unorthodox diplomatic tactics used during the acid rain debate. And yet, the chosen approach of dispute resolution was that of private negotiation behind closed doors. During these negotiations, there were no overt attempts to sway the American public to support the Canadian perspective, and the media was used to inform
the public of the progress, not to force action or to blatantly criticize. This was in contrast to the negotiation techniques common during the acid rain debate.

Perhaps then there was something unique about the issue of acid rain itself which resulted in the unusual approach. Some suggest that a source of much of the tension between Canada and the United States, especially in the early 1980's, was poor communication. Neither government was sufficiently sensitive to the other government's problems or political priorities, as a result, there were misunderstandings which made issues difficult to resolve.¹ This explanation could be applicable to the issue of acid rain, especially when one considers that a major thrust of the acid rain campaign was to increase the Americans awareness about acid rain, and its effect upon the environment. Throughout the campaign, the argument was presented that if the Americans understood the damage caused by acid rain in both Canada and the United States, then the Americans would be just as anxious as the Canadians to resolve the problem. However, as the debate evolved both sides became very clear about their perception of the issue, with the two governments firmly establishing themselves on opposite sides of the debate. The problem was not an American lack of awareness or understanding of Canada's concerns about acid rain, but instead disagreeing with the Canadian conclusion that action must be taken

immediately. As a result, while poor communication may have been a source of tension on other issues, such was not the case with acid rain, and therefore is not a sufficient explanation for Canada's unusual diplomatic behaviour.

Another possible explanation for the unique approach to the issue of acid rain was the influence of Allan Gotlieb. Gotlieb's role in the acid rain dispute should not be underestimated, especially when one considers that he was the ambassador throughout most of the debate. Furthermore, Gotlieb arrived in Washington with a new philosophy about how Canadian-American relations should be approached. Shortly after his arrival, the role of the Canadian embassy in Washington started to change, and Canada began to be more active in lobbying Congress. However, acid rain was just one of the issues that Gotlieb had to contend with, and one which he claims little personal success. Furthermore, Gotlieb was only one level of the Canadian campaign against acid rain. If the unprecedented Canadian approach to the acid rain issue was a by-product of Gotlieb's ambassadorship, then this does not account for the variety of other actors involved in the the acid rain campaign in a multitude of areas.

Another possibility was that the acid rain campaign was an outgrowth of an anti-American sentiment in Ottawa. The hostile relations between Trudeau and the Americans was well known in

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2 Allan Gotlieb, 'I'll be with you in a minute, Mr. Ambassador' (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 74.
both nations. In addition, Canadian nationalism was a growing force resulting in many new problems between Canada and the United States. Clearly in the past few decades there has been an increased Canadian sensitivity about their vulnerability vis a vis the United States.\textsuperscript{3} Mulroney, one of Canada's more pro-American prime ministers, has had to occasionally defend his cordial relations with the United States, with some interpreting his 'hard-line' on acid rain as simply a ploy to appease those Canadians concerned about his friendliness with the Americans. However, if anti-Americanism was the motivator for the adoption of the unusual form of diplomacy evidenced during the acid rain debate, then election of the pro-American Mulroney government should have altered the diplomatic methodology. And yet, even though Canadian-American relations did improve with the election of Mulroney, the issue of acid rain still remained far from being resolved. It should also be noted that while the style of Trudeau and Mulroney was vastly different with regard to the United States, Canada's acid rain campaign remained

essentially consistent throughout the debate.\textsuperscript{4} As a result, to identify the anti-American sentiment, or the personalities of the leaders, as the shaping influence of the Canada's acid rain campaign would not be wholly accurate.

One area which has remained unexplored is the possibility that the uniqueness of Canada's response to the issue of acid rain was a result of the issue itself. As has been explained, the issue of acid rain placed Canada in the difficult political situation that in order to lower the amount of acidic precipitation affecting the Canadian environment, there had to be a change in the American domestic environmental policy. Furthermore, the people who would be burdened with the cost of saving Canada's environment would be Americans, especially those living in the economically distressed Ohio Valley. Apart from the obvious problem of justifying such a cost, there was the added problem of inconclusive scientific data. It still was beyond scientific capabilities to provide specific information about the actual damage caused by acid rain, or to pinpoint its source. Finally, if the cost could be justified, the immediate political rewards would be minimal, as the rate of recovery would be very slow and would often take decades to be noticeable. While the challenges of resolving the issue of acid rain were large, it would be difficult to use this as justification for Canada's unusual diplomatic

\textsuperscript{4}For a recent discussion about the tenor of the relationship between Mulroney and the United States see Lawrence Martin, \textit{Pledge of Allegiance: The Americanization of Canada in the Mulroney Years} (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd, 1993).
behaviour. This justification is especially challenging in light of the fact that Canada and the United States have been able to resolve complex issues both before and after the problem of acid rain, without resorting to the unorthodox techniques.

It appears that what made the Canadian response to the acid rain issue unique was not just the issue, nor was it solely the result of the actors involved, or the element of anti-Americanism and Canadian nationalism, but rather a combination of all of these factors. The issue of acid rain appeared on the Canadian-American agenda at a time when there was increased ideological antagonism between Canada and the United States; the call for a new, more aggressive approach to Canada's managing of relations with the United States; the emergence of dynamic individuals, such as Allan Gotlieb, who were capable of implementing such an aggressive diplomatic strategy; and when the American economy was beginning to slow down. The uniqueness of Canada's acid rain campaign is attributable to all of these elements impacting upon each other, rather than a conscious shift in diplomatic relations between Canada and the United States.

Also added to this mix should be the growing interest and political importance of environmental concerns during the 1980's. Bush adopted environmental issues as part of his political platform during the 1988 election. This signifies that the American public were starting to see value in the protection of the environment. While the Canadian campaign might have assisted such a perspective,
it did not cause it. Similarly, when Bush presented his amendments for the Clean Air Act, he did so because of the domestic situation, not solely because Canada had been campaigning for it for the previous ten years.

It could even be argued that initially, Canada attempted to follow the norms of traditional diplomacy. However, this approach of behind the scenes polite negotiation only resulted in the hollow Memorandum of Intent. The frustration at the ineffectiveness of the traditional approach served to increase the demand for a re-evaluation of how Canada negotiates with the United States. Out of this emerged: Gotlieb's suggestion for 'new diplomacy'; support for his actions as a lobbyist; funding for lobby activities; and the encouragement of Canadian policy-makers to voice their concerns to the American media.

The campaign that Canada launched against acid rain was a unique experience in Canadian-American relations; as was the issue, the actors involved, the political milieu in which it evolved. As such, it should be viewed as an anomaly rather than a trend in diplomatic relations between Canada and the United States. Regardless of the complexity or the emotive nature of the issue facing the bilateral relationship, Canada has not returned to the extraordinary techniques it employed during the acid rain debate.

This examination of the diplomatic techniques employed during the acid rain debate provides the opportunity to view what happens when Canada stretches the boundaries of acceptable behaviour in
the confines of both Canadian-American relations, and public diplomacy. The response from the Americans to this unusual diplomatic behaviour was at best distracted annoyance. While at first blush actions such as handing out pamphlets at the border and harshly criticizing another government in public appears diplomatically outlandish and completely unacceptable, it produced barely a ripple of response from the Americans. Occasionally a member of Congress would rail against the Canadian's aggressive lobbying, but the comments were rarely noted beyond the Congressional Record. Similarly, the attention from the American media to Canada's actions was often in the form of human interest columns in the Sunday paper, not front page exposes.

It is perhaps this non-response which is the most illustrative of the future of the unusual style of diplomacy Canada used during the acid rain debate. If the Americans had responded more directly and strongly to Canada's outlandish diplomatic behaviour, then the chances of Canada trying such an approach again would be probably be higher. However, such was not the case. As a result, the previous diplomatic approach of a general amicability between two nations with common interests, and only the occasional dispute remains the prevalent trend.
APPENDIX A

These two pamphlets are examples of the tone of the literature that Canada was distributing throughout their anti-acid rain campaign. The first one, "Acid Rain", was published in the early 1980s and probably distributed through government offices and at acid rain presentations. The second one, "Acid Rain Milestones". was published in 1984, and had a similar distribution process to the first one.
Acid Rain

It's invisible. You can't smell it, or even taste it. It feels like ordinary rain or snow. But it's there and it's one of the most serious environmental problems facing parts of Canada today.

Acid rain is acidic precipitation, better known as acid rain. This airborne acid is threatening fish and plant life in thousands of lakes, injuring plant leaves and perhaps stunting the growth of trees. It may slowly damage metal on cars and eat away at stone statues, older limestone buildings and metal rooftops.

Acid rain can also eat away at leaves, leach nutrients from the soil and interfere with photosynthesis. In Scandinavia, scientists suggest that an increase in acid rain may have reduced timber growth.

The effects of acid rain are slow but sure, and once an area is affected, there's no quick and easy way to bring it back to normal. The problem must be tackled before it's too late.

What is acid rain?

Even in an environment completely free of all pollution, rain and snow would still be slightly acidic. This is because carbon dioxide, which is a natural by-product of earth, reacts with moisture in the atmosphere to form a mild carbonic acid in rain and snow. This type of rain or snow is considered to be "clean".

But acid rain is not natural. It contains more acid than normally found in nature. Clean or normal rain has a pH of 5.6. Rain with a pH of less than 5.6 is considered to be acidic. It is now common. in parts of Canada, for rain to be 10 times more acidic than "clean" or normal rain. In some areas it is even found to be up to 40 times more acidic than normal.
Acidic or alkaline
When trying to show how much acid is in any liquid, scientists use what they call a pH scale. This scale goes from 1 to 14. If the pH is 7, then that liquid is considered neutral, that is, neither an acid nor a base. As pH decreases from 7 down to 1, the acidity of the liquid increases. For example, vinegar has a pH of 2.2 and distilled water has a pH of 7. As the pH increases from 7 up to 14 a liquid becomes more alkaline or basic. For example, baking soda in water has a pH of around 8.

Because the pH scale is logarithmic (i.e., it is not linear), a change in one pH unit, (for example, a decrease in pH from 6 to 5) means a tenfold increase in acidity. A change in two pH units, such as a decrease in pH from 6 to 4 means the solution is a hundred times more acidic.

Long Range Transport of Airborne Pollutants (LRTAP)
The larger problem is Long-Range Transport of Airborne Pollutants (LRTAP) and acid rain is only part of that problem. Scientists now know that pollutants are carried by the winds over long distances, hundreds and even thousands of kilometers. These pollutants do not disappear. Instead, while moving through the atmosphere, they are chemically changed and these new products then react further with water vapor in the atmosphere. The result is acidic water vapor. This transformation process, these chemical changes, are not yet fully understood — but the harmful results are becoming more and more apparent.

Over a period of time, pH levels change in lakes which receive these acids through rain or melted snow. That, in certain cases, impairs the egg-producing ability of fish. As well, organic matter in lakes decomposes more slowly. Scavenging microorganisms also suffer. The number of plankton falls off and a vital link in the food chain is depleted.

What are the pollutants?
They include: oxides of sulfur and nitrogen; particles of heavy metal (from burning coal in thermal power plants, smelters, etc.); persistent organic chemicals (chemicals which get into the environment and accumulate); and also re-active organics that contribute to formation of photochemical oxidants (produced from nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbons in presence of sunlight).

Although they all contribute to the problems of LRTAP, sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides are the two main culprits responsible for the acid rain problem facing Canadians:

- Sulfur dioxide is generally a by-product of industrial processes. Ore smelting in Canada and coal-fired power generation in the United States are the main sources in each country.
- About half the nitrogen oxides emissions are a by-product of exhausts from cars, trucks and other forms of transportation, and the rest come from coal-fired power generation and other industrial processes.

Near the source the concentrations of these pollutants at ground level, as well as when these pollutants drift, are usually within air quality standards established by federal and provincial governments. Both industry and government have been working for years to try to reduce these pollutants at the source.

But these substances go through chemical changes while being carried by the winds through the atmosphere. They can be deposited as particles from the air (dry deposition) or be washed out from the air through rain or snow (wet deposition). In either case, delicate or sensitive ecosystems can be changed as they accumulate on the ground and in the water over the years. The problem is aggravated when the pollutants are carried by weather systems in the higher reaches of the atmosphere. These systems move over other industrialized areas and pick up even more pollutants. They can accumulate on the ground or in lakes and streams through either dry or wet deposition. If acid rain falls over a lake every year for 20 years, and if that lake has no way of neutralizing the extra acid, the lake will change. This accumulated deposition is known as loading.

In North America, a total of 30.7 million tonnes a year of sulfur dioxide go into the atmosphere. About 25.7 million tonnes come from U.S. sources and some 5 million tonnes are from Canada.

A total of 24 million tonnes of nitrogen oxides go into the air every year as well. The U.S. accounts for about 22 million tonnes a year, while in Canada emissions total about 2 million tonnes.

Three things are necessary for these airborne pollutants to create the problems we now face:
- The first is the pollution source, usually in areas where there are a lot of industries.
- The second is weather conditions which carry these pollutants over long distances allowing for the changes to take place.
- The third is areas which are sensitive to the buildup of this acid rain or snow.
Unfortunately, wide areas, some of them beautiful recreation spots, are this sensitive.

There are now many lakes in parts of eastern Canada and the United States which no longer have any fish because this high acidity has stopped new fish from hatching. Many more lakes are showing unmistakable signs of this happening. Many thousands more are in danger.

The tourist, agriculture and forest industries could also suffer with increased environmental damage.

**Buffering**

In some cases, nature can cope with this change in acidity.

One rainfall will not turn a lake acidic. It is the accumulation of this rainfall and melting snow combined with the limited ability of the lake to neutralize the acid, which harms certain types of lakes. Lakes in limestone areas are able to neutralize the acid but others are not able to fight off the effects. Lakes with a pH of below 5.5 and of low buffering capacity, are considered to be in serious danger. Even in lakes which are considered to be well buffered, acidic precipitation can still have dramatic and damaging results. The acids can accumulate in the snow, and heavy snow can be followed by sudden, warm spring weather which melts it quickly. As the melt-off runs into lakes and streams, the acid levels are so high that the lake cannot neutralize the acid fast enough. In some cases, not only is fish reproduction harmed, but small fish are killed by this sudden acid shock.

But large areas of eastern Canada have lakes which do not have the ability to neutralize increasing amounts of acid rain. Lakes in these areas may eventually end up as crystal clear, but without fish or other aquatic life.

When a lake is unable to cope with the increased acid levels, there is a sharp decline—in some cases to the point of extinction—of fish.

Certain microorganisms and stages in the aquatic life cycle are intolerant of acids and they are usually the first to be harmed. Newly-hatched fish are especially sensitive and the years of acid rain falling in certain lakes may result in the death of eggs and young fish.

Reproduction processes may also be harmed as female fish develop eggs which cannot be fertilized. In lakes where the eggs are still fertilized, newly hatched fish may die as acid levels accumulate or as spring runoff with high acid levels rushes into the waters.

Older fish do survive at first, but as younger fish die off, the older ones lose their main source of food and eventually die off as well.

The first species to show signs of being harmed are bass, walleye, salmon and aurora trout, followed by pike and lake trout. The most acid-tolerant fish such as lake herring, rock bass, perch and carp, last longer but in extreme cases die off as well.

The damage caused by acid rain and snow, however, is not confined to lakes and rivers. Soils can also suffer damage. Although soils which have a high limestone content can neutralize the acid, soils on granite bedrock, with a low buffering capacity, may be damaged. Early evidence indicates that acid rain does affect sensitive soils, subtly impairing the cycle essential for soil fertilization, and taking out vital nutrients needed by trees and other plants.

The eastern part of Canada could be seriously affected by acidic precipitation because the soils and aquatic systems in south-western New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, as well as throughout Newfoundland, have little natural buffering capacity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alkaline</th>
<th>Acidic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Alkaline Diagram" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Acidic Diagram" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The pH scale (0-14) measures free hydrogen ions in liquid</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### pH Scale

- **Alkaline**: pH 14.0 - 7.0
- **Acidic**: pH 0.0 - 4.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>pH Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lime</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammonia</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk of magnesia</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea water</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blood</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean rain below 6 pH</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acid rain</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomatoes</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apples</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinegar</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The pH scale (0-14) measures free hydrogen ions in liquid.
Widespread damage
The changes produced by acid rain are obviously far-reaching. But the problems are not confined to any one province or country — acid rain does not respect political boundaries.

Because we share the problem with our neighbors, we must work together to share the solution. A Canada/United States research group has already been formed and federal and provincial governments are working to coordinate research.

Research
In order to understand the whole problem, scientists must list all the sources of sulfur dioxide and other pollutants in both Canada and U.S. They must study how the pollutants are carried and how they are changed so that they can eventually predict how much acid rain will fall and where, under various weather conditions.

It is a study which includes all aspects of the environment — meteorology, geology, forestry, atmospheric and water chemistry and fish and animal life.

For further information contact:

Enquiry Centre
Information Directorate
Department of the Environment
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0H3

STOP ACID RAIN

Produced in cooperation with the provinces.
Acid rain in North America must be halted before its insidious effects damage more of our continental environment.

Canada and the United States, allies and mutual friends, sometimes differ in their acid rain strategies, even though they both perceive the need for ultimate victory.

This fact sheet lists, in chronological order, the many advances made together in the last half decade.

1. July 1978 — Recognizing the international dimension of the acid rain problem and the need for cooperation in the development of a mutually agreed scientific data base, from which Canada and the United States could develop solutions, a Bilateral Research Consultation Group (BRCG) on the long range transport of airborne pollutants (LRTAP) was established. This resulted from Canadian initiative. The mandate of the group was: to facilitate information exchanges; to coordinate research activities between the two countries; and, to develop an agreed scientific data base.

2. November 1978 — Canada received diplomatic note from U.S. requesting informal discussion on Congress resolution calling for cooperative agreement with Canada on transboundary air pollution.

3. December 1978 — first round of discussions on U.S. initiative in Washington. Canada stressed importance of LRTAP. Both countries agreed to develop papers outlining agreed principles relating to transboundary air pollution and to request BRCG to indicate the extent, in percentage terms, of transboundary pollution caused by Canada and the U.S.

4. July 1979 — Canada and U.S. issued joint statement on transboundary air quality, announcing the intention of both governments to develop a cooperative agreement on air quality.
5. October 15, 1979 - release of Canada-U.S. Bilateral Research Consultation Group's first report. It indicated large areas of North America are sensitive to damage from acidic precipitation, and delineated the extent of current scientific knowledge on the causes and effects of this phenomenon. Decreased productivity and diversity of fish species have been observed in lakes and rivers in Ontario and in the Atlantic provinces. Spawning failure of Atlantic salmon has been linked to acid rain. Various pieces of evidence also suggest agriculture and forest productivity are endangered.

6. October 24, 1979 - Third Bilateral meeting on transboundary air quality held in Washington. The Canadian delegation comprised federal officials and representatives from Ontario, Quebec and Nova Scotia. Discussions were of a technical nature.

— The Canadian Environment Minister, the U.S. Environment Administrator and Environment Ministers from Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick met to review acidic precipitation in North America. The status of research in the two countries, governmental overviews, future requirements and interim measures for the containment of acid rain were reviewed.

8. February 15, 1980 — Canadian concerns over the U.S. coal conversion plans expressed to senior U.S. administration officials in a diplomatic note requesting information and consultation on American proposals prior to decisions being taken.

9. February 29, 1980 — Canadian officials met with U.S. counterparts to discuss Canadian concerns over the coal conversion of power generating stations in the U.S. Canadian officials strongly urged the U.S. to incorporate sophisticated pollution control technology into their program to reduce emissions of acid-causing pollutants.

10. March 4, 1980 — Following the February 29 meeting, the Canadian embassy sent a second diplomatic note to the Department of State, to elaborate on a number of concerns which Canadian officials took with them from the bilateral consultation.

11. August 5, 1980 — Canada and the United States signed a Memorandum of Intent on transboundary air pollution. The Memorandum states the intention of both nations to vigorously enforce existing air pollution legislation and to work toward development of a bilateral agreement on air quality.

12. December 16, 1980 — The Canadian Parliament unanimously passed Bill C-51 amending the Canadian Clean Air Act. The amendment provided the Minister of the Environment with authority to regulate air pollutants affecting another country. (The Act previously limited such authority to the existence of an “international obligation”).

13. January 15, 1981 — The first reports in a four-phase reporting process, designed to provide necessary information for development and negotiation of an air quality agreement between Canada and the United States, were submitted by the Working Groups to the Coordinating Committee.


15. February 13, 1981 — The Control Strategies Development and Implementation Work Group (3A) report was released. In accordance with its coordinating function, Work Group report 3A summarized the interim reports of Work Groups 1, 2 and 3B.

The remaining reports were released in late March.


18. November 6, 1981 — The first report of the bilateral work group formed to examine legal and institutional aspects of a Canada-U.S. agreement on transboundary pollution was submitted to the negotiating group.

19. February 15, 1982 — John Roberts, Canadian Environment Minister, announced important commitments which Canada is prepared to undertake to reduce acid causing emissions. "Canada is prepared to cut sulfur dioxide emissions in eastern Canada, including Manitoba, by 50 percent by 1990, contingent on parallel action by the United States." This proposal was based on a recent agreement reached with the eastern provinces that acid deposition should be reduced to 20 kilograms per hectare per year, or about 50 percent of current levels, to protect moderately sensitive ecosystems.

20. February 25, 1982 — Negotiating session on Bilateral Agreement on Transboundary Air Pollution. Based on the agreement reached with the provinces on February 15, Canada proposed to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions east of the Saskatchewan-Manitoba border by 50 percent, contingent on parallel action in the eastern U.S.

21. April 16, 1982 — Canadian and U.S. scientists met in Washington to discuss increased cooperation and further joint research projects on acid rain.

22. June 15, 1982 — Canada-U.S. negotiation session on transboundary pollution. U.S. negotiators rejected Canada's proposal (proposed at February 15 meeting) to reduce acid-causing emissions in eastern Canada and United States by 50 percent. Following the meeting Canadian Environment Minister John Roberts expressed his great regret that the U.S. was reluctant to take action. The "implication of this stick-in-the-mud stance of the Americans is that we have to ask ourselves whether it makes any sense" to continue negotiations.

23. October 24-25, 1982 — Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs MacEachen and U.S. Secretary of State Shultz agreed to exchange papers on Canadian Abatement options and U.S. scientific issues.

24. January/February, 1983 — Canadian and U.S. papers were exchanged as decided at October 25 meeting of Messrs. MacEachen and Shultz.


26. April 11, 1983 — Second meeting between Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs and U.S. Secretary of State. The Canadian response to U.S. paper was tabled. Having exchanged papers, the two Secretaries felt they could not move without further outside information and called for a fall meeting with chairmen of the Canadian and U.S. Peer Review panels.

27. April 21, 1983 — U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed a resolution calling upon the Administration to respond constructively to the Canadian emission reduction proposal.


29. June 28, 1983 — The U.S. Peer Review Panel issued its interim report, calling for reductions in acid emissions and rejecting the argument that more research is needed before control action.

30. June 30, 1983 — U.S. National Academy of Science Study was released, confirming link between sulfur dioxide emissions and acid deposition.
31. July 27, 1983 — Canadian Peer Review Report was released by the Royal Society, concluding that scientific evidence is sufficient to warrant prompt introduction of abatement measures.

32. August 1, 1983 — U.S. National Governors established a task force to review acid rain issue and develop a policy on reductions in acid deposition.


34. September 29, 1983 — Canadian Federal and provincial environment ministers agreed to an abatement strategy which, in conjunction with emission controls in the U.S., would limit wet sulphate to 20 kg/hectare/year.

35. October 16, 1983 — 3rd meeting between Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs and U.S. Secretary of State. Canadian Environment Minister, Charles Caccia, and William Ruckleshaus, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, attended the meeting. They exchanged views on acid rain control actions. Mr. Caccia expressed Canada's disappointment and impatience over lack of U.S. policy to control acid rain.

36. January 25, 1984 — U.S. President's State of the Union Address defined U.S. policy on acid rain. No action will be taken to reduce emissions. Instead, the Administration will intensify its research into the causes and effects of acid rain.

37. March 6, 1984 — Meeting of Canadian federal and provincial Environment ministers. Ministers agreed to a 50% reduction of emissions causing acid rain, by 1994. This decision includes the February 1982 commitment of 25% reduction of emissions.

In the future we expect that more advances will be made together. There is optimism that we shall achieve substantial progress as we work side by side in this common cause. We do not plan to report on a requiem in our next progress report, because we are working toward a recovery.

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or
Janet Davies (819-997-1831)
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